THE UNIVERSITY OF
SYDNEY

Copyright and use of this thesis
This thesis must be used in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968.

Reproduction of material protected by copyright may be an infringement of copyright and copyright owners may be entitled to take legal action against persons who infringe their copyright.

Section 51 (2) of the Copyright Act permits an authorized officer of a university library or archives to provide a copy (by communication or otherwise) of an unpublished thesis kept in the library or archives, to a person who satisfies the authorized officer that he or she requires the reproduction for the purposes of research or study.

The Copyright Act grants the creator of a work a number of moral rights, specifically the right of attribution, the right against false attribution and the right of integrity.

You may infringe the author's moral rights if you:

- fail to acknowledge the author of this thesis if you quote sections from the work

- attribute this thesis to another author

-subject this thesis to derogatory treatment which may prejudice the author's reputation

For further information contact the University's Copyright Service.
sydney.edu.au/copyright

Thesis - B. Jinks

Title: Policy, Planning and Administration in Papua New Guinea 1942-52, with special reference to the role of Colonel J.K. Murray

The thesis asks whether there was in fact a change in colonial policy after World War 2: if so, where did it come from and who was responsible for putting it into effect. The roles of Ward, his Department, the Directorate of Research and Angau are discussed. The balance of forces changed at the end of the war, and it was left largely to Col. Murray to carry on with the Directorate's intentions. He had very little support. His problems included: the state of the country, Ward's lack of interest, the inefficiency of the Canberra Department, the weakness of the Provisional Administration's staff and opposition from whites generally. All of these factors are examined. Murray and his people attempted to plan, but were ignored in Australia. As a consequence, Murray and the Provisional Administration were blamed for apparent lack of progress when the government changed in 1949. Spender tried to favour whites, but made little headway, while clashing with Murray. Once Hasluck became Minister, it was a matter of time until Murray was dismissed. But in his 7 years as Administrator, Murray had persisted with a pattern that could not be reversed: had his ideas been followed further, there would have been some plan for P.N.G. and not just the ad hoc decisions of the next 20 years.

POLICY, PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA, 1942 - 1952, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE ROLE OF COLONEL J.K. MURRAY

Being a thesis submitted by Brian Edwin Jinks for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Department of Government, University of Sydney, October 1975.

.... an administration, like a machine, does not create. It carries on. It applies a given penalty to a given breach of the rules, a given method to a given aim. An administration is not conceived for the purpose of solving fresh problems... For this to happen, a man would have to intervene with authority to rip the whole thing up. But an administration is conceived as a safeguard against disturbances resulting from human initiative. The gear-wheels of the watch stand guard against the intervention of man. The watchmaker has no place among them.

Antoine de Saint-Exupery,
Flight to Arras

ABSTRACT

This study of policy and administration in Papua New Guinea during and after World War 2 provides additional information about events and personalities which have previously been discussed only in outline. Existing summaries have suggested that the Provisional Administration and the Administrator during the period, Colonel J.K. Murray, were largely unsuccessful in executing changes in policy in Papua New Guinea. The present study seeks to present a clearer picture, developing it in three different stages. The first part of the discussion is a basically chronological account of conditions up to the latter part of the 1940's; the second sets out essential details of the major post-war programmes, which led to attempts at long-term planning; and the third, again mainly chronological, traces the final rejection of planning in favour of ad hoc welfare provisions.

Thus Chapter One comprises a brief resume of pre-war colonialism in the islands, noting the irreconcilable tension between white economic development and village welfare, the consequent European domination of the colonies and the differences - real and imagined - between the Mandated Territory and Papua. Chapter Two discusses the changes in the balance of power that

followed the outbreak of war, and particularly the temporary dominance of the Directorate of Research over planning for the post-war period. Chapter Three shows that the Directorate's dominance ensured the rejection of the so-called "Murray tradition" and the appointment of an Administrator sympathetic to the Directorate's own approach. Chapter Four points out, however, that conditions in Papua New Guinea, which were far more difficult than has previously been suggested, made the immediate implementation of reforms virtually impossible; this was particularly so when white interests began to re-assert themselves. Chapter Five indicates that programmes of reform were in any case lacking; the Minister had relied heavily on the Directorate for policy advice, and the Australian bureaucracy was unable to fill the vacuum after the Directorate was disbanded. Chapter Six notes that the Territory Administration, comprising several rival factions, possessed few officials able to compensate for the weakness in Canberra; and that their task was made much harder by the government's failure to provide effective administrative structures or security for public servants. Chapters Seven and Eight trace the emergence of the Administration's own plans for social and economic development, against the background of pressures and problems that developed in these fields during the post-war years; they conclude that useful draft plans were produced, to be ignored in Canberra. Chapter Nine demonstrates that the impasse

in the planning and execution of post-war policy was created in Australia by an ineffectual Minister, an obstructionist Secretary and an apathetic Department; last-minute attempts to produce effective plans came too late to dispel the impression that both the Labor government and the Territory Administration had failed in their attempts at post-war development. Chapter Ten outlines the Liberal-Country Party government's search for greater efficiency through renewed encouragement of white interests, another campaign that could be only partly successful owing to changes in conditions and attitudes during the preceding decade. Nevertheless, the new government saw its problems in mainly political terms, linking them and the difficulties of the post-war years with inefficiency in the Territory, rather than in Australia. This attitude led to the dismissal of Colonel Murray and the assertion of further influence from Canberra, events which are reviewed in the final Chapter. The Conclusion argues, in its first section, that Colonel Murray's strengths as Administrator far outweighed some minor weaknesses, and in particular that his dedication to reform provided the only effective link between the Labor Party's broad aims and the officials responsible for executing them. The second section of the Conclusion uses the terminology of systems and organization theory to generalise about the bureaucratic processes involved in programmes of

innovation; it suggests that the systems approach helps to indicate relationships between the various agencies involved in innovation, but that it provides no useful insight into the forces promoting innovation.

CONTENTS

Abstract 3

Acknowledgements

Abbreviations used in the footnotes

Biographical guide

INTRODUCTION

The present problem 23
An organizational model 25
The colonial situation 29

CHAPTER ONE - PRE-WAR PATERNALISM

End of the Murray era 33
Early administrations 35
Australia and New Guinea 39
Sir Hubert Murray and Papua 42
Papua and the Mandated Territory 47
Attitudes of the field staff 58
Papua New Guinea's Europeans 64
Tropical fantasies 69

CHAPTER TWO - THE WAR AND WHITE INTERESTS

The impact of war 72
Countervailing interests 74
Angau staffing and the New Guinea ascendancy 77
Department of External Territories 81
Mr. J.R. Halligan 83
Mr. E.J. Ward 84
Ward, Evatt and Labor policy 86
The New Guinea settlers 90
Pacific Territories Association 96
Angau: leadership and structure 100
Angau's accomplishments 105
Angau labour policy 107
Angau's influence on events 112
Angau conference, 1944 114
Directorate of Research and A.A. Conlon 118
The Directorate's work 124
Conlon's influence 129
The Directorate's proposals 131
Directorate versus Department 135
Conlon's eclipse 139

CHAPTER THREE - THE ADMINISTRATORS MURRAY

Keith Murray	142
University, war service and a career	145
Murray and the Directorate	147
School of Civil Affairs	150
Administrator wanted	155
Leonard Murray	156
Suspension of Papuan Administration, 1942	158
Rejection of Leonard Murray	160
The Barry Commission	163
Colonel J.K. Murray, Administrator	172

CHAPTER FOUR - POST-WAR NEW GUINEA: CHAOS AND CONFLICT

Confusion in Port Moresby	176
Needs of civil government	182
Murray assumes control	184
Declaration of intent	187
Quest for staff	188
Difficult conditions	189
Return of the settlers	195
Unsatisfactory shipping	198
Cancellation of labour contracts	202
The cancellation controversy	208
War Damage Compensation	210
Barry Committee on compensation	212
Differences on compensation	214
Problems of paying compensation	217
Settler opposition	219
Compensation and "collaboration"	220
Rebuilding Hanuabada	223
War surplus: its use and disposal	227
War surplus for settlers	230
Commonwealth Disposals Commission investigates itself	235
Murray settles in	237
Tensions with the military	242
Problem at Manus	246
Murray's impressive start	247

CHAPTER FIVE - IN SEARCH OF A POLICY

Cabinet sub-committee, 1944	251
Anzac Pact	253
Scope of the sub-committee	255
Sub-committee recommendations	256
Inter-departmental committee recommendations	258
Problems of unified administration	261
The Ward statement of 1945	264
Origins of the labour controversy	268
Conference on labour, 1944	273

(continued)

Chapter Five (continued)

Vaguesness of the Ward statement	276
Pressures on policy	277
Instruments of planning	279
Pacific Territories Research Council	281
Demise of the Research Council	284
Direct action by Murray	289
Murray's Macrossan lectures	293
Australian School of Pacific Administration	300
Influence of Trusteeship	303
South Pacific Commission	305
Planning frustrated	308

CHAPTER SIX - THE NEW GUINEA BUREAUCRACY

A demoralised service	309
Doubts and divisions	312
Papua versus New Guinea	316
Continuing uncertainties	319
Murray and his service	322
Murray's many roles	326
Need for investigation	331
Growth of committees	333
Administrative structure and co-ordination	339
Murray's advisers	342
The Buttsworth report	351
Administration counter-proposals	365
Reaction to Buttsworth proposals	369
Influence of junior staff	375
Staff training and A.S.O.P.A.	381
Conlon's final appearance	383
Decline of A.S.O.P.A.	385

CHAPTER SEVEN - SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES

Planning by committee	391
Post-war finance	393
Departmental expenditure	399
District Services	402
Re-establishing contact: tensions and changes	406
Local government	411
Village courts	419
Field staff attitudes	421
Public health	422
Dr. J.T. Gunther	426
Migrant doctors	428
Education: a broad base	430
The Wedgewood proposals	436
Groves' problems	438
Reconstruction Training Scheme	443

(continued)

Chapter Seven (continued)

Missions: the 1946 conference 445
Mission-Administration relations 448
Missions and education 450
Missions and health services 453
The planning committees 456
Social Development Planning Committee 456
Welfare Planning Committee 460

CHAPTER EIGHT - ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: PLANNING AND PARALYSIS

Need for action: Professor Isles 466
White interests and government controls 471
Palliatives for workers 475
Labour department seeks control 477
Mr. J.L. Taylor 479
Labour problems 484
Highlands Labour Scheme 487
Pre-war policy: development by compulsion 490
Agriculture: the Cottrell-Dormer plan 492
Different approaches to co-operatives 497
Self-help movements 500
District Services control of co-operatives 503
Murray's demand for guaranteed markets 507
Murray's idealism 510
Economic Development Committee 511
Development finance and administration 514
Need for Australian support 518

CHAPTER NINE - MURRAY'S AUSTRALIAN BURDENS

Ward and the settlers 521
Ward wades ashore 525
Murray and Ward 527
The Garden affair 532
Mr. Chambers and the Papua and New Guinea Act 535
The Halligan handicap 537
Murray and the white community 541
Murray's situation, 1949 545
Controversy on Bougainville 548
Colonel Allen and Rabaul 553
Administrator's office made a political issue 558
Australian planning: an exercise in futility 560
Mr. Chifley intervenes 564
The 1949 committees 566
Apparent progress: further delays 571
Executive Council fiasco 574

CHAPTER TEN - NEW GOVERNMENT, OLD INTERESTS

Change of Minister	579
Settlers rejoice	581
Mr. Menzies' emphasis	582
Mr. Spender's beliefs	584
The Spender visit, 1950	586
Spender's promises to settlers	594
Spender, Murray and the U.N. Mission	598
U.N. Mission poses problems	605
First attempts to remove Murray	609
Spender sums up	612
Reaction to the new conservatism	619
Disillusioned settlers	621
Australian aid	623
Yet more committees, 1950	626
Murray presses his economic plan	628
Support from External Territories	633
Rejection of the plan	634
Secretariat of Planning and Development	637
Limitations of the Secretariat	639
Spender's achievement: slowing post-war trends	642
White representation	645
Strengthening the companies' hold	647

CHAPTER ELEVEN - HASLUCK AND THE REMOVAL OF MURRAY

Mr. P.M.C. Hasluck	652
Cautious beginning	655
Hasluck meets the people	658
Controlling the public service	660
Halligan's departure	664
Assistant Administrator	665
Mr. D.M. Cleland	666
Murray under attack	669
Mount Lamington eruption	672
Murray and Cleland	675
Future of Rabaul	679
Hollandia visit	681
Murray is dismissed	683
Emotional farewells	686
Murray's attack	690
Hasluck exerts authority: pattern of the future	693

CONCLUSION - PART I - POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND COLONEL MURRAY

Prevailing opinions	696
Policy: aims and origins	699
Policy and the Provisional Administration	703

(continued)

Conclusion - Part I (continued)

The role of J.K. Murray	704
Administration of policy: formal organization	709
Informal networks	710
Recruitment and training	712
And end to planning	713

CONCLUSION - PART II - INNOVATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Closed and open systems	715
Metropolitan controls and quantitative assessment	718
Wartime defence of systems	719
Post-war responsiveness	721
Policy goals and elaboration of structure	723
Problems of adaptation	725
Innovation and reaction	728

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

At each stage of the preparation of this thesis I have been greatly helped by Professor Henry Mayer. Professors J.D.B. Miller and R.S. Parker helped with comments on various aspects of the manuscript. Professor R.N. Spann gave valuable encouragement. Thanks are due to the Chief Archivist, Australian Archives, and his staff and to Messrs. Kevin Green and Moika Helai at the Papua New Guinea National Archives Office. I am much in debt to Sir John Kerr and Sir John Gunther for their patience during lengthy interviews. Many officers and former officers of the Papua New Guinea Public Service and the Department of External Territories provided information on a great variety of matters; they are too numerous to list here, and their particular assistance is acknowledged in footnotes.

My greatest debt is to Colonel Murray himself. Not only did he and Mrs. Murray submit to many hours of questioning, but Colonel Murray subsequently provided invaluable written notes and several key documents for my use. Above all, he showed me a completely new aspect of colonial administration: one in keeping with his own outstanding character.

ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations have been used in footnotes:

C.P.D.	Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates
C.R.S.	Commonwealth Records Series
D.E.T.	Department of External Territories
N.G.A.R.	Territory of New Guinea Annual Report
P.A.R.	Territory of Papua Annual Report
P.I.M.	Pacific Islands Monthly
P.N.G.A.R.	Territory of Papua-New Guinea (or Papua and New Guinea) Annual Report
P.N.G.N.A.	Papua New Guinea National Archives
S.P.P.	South Pacific Post

Note:

Papua New Guinea has undergone so many changes of name that it is impossible to use wholly accurate terminology without undue repetition. The exact area being discussed in a particular passage should be clear from the text, but the following table may be helpful for the period covered by this thesis:

German New Guinea
1884-1914

became

Australian New Guinea
(military control)
1914-1921

became

Mandated Territory of
New Guinea
1921-1942

British New Guinea
1884-1906

became

Territory of Papua
1906-1942

became

Australian New Guinea
(military control)
1942-1945/6

became

Territory of Papua-New Guinea
1945-1949

became

Territory of Papua and New Guinea
in 1949

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL GUIDE

The thesis discusses the roles of a relatively large number of individuals. The following details of the major figures involved may therefore be useful to readers:

Allen, Colonel Herbert Thomas

Planter and entrepreneur, Rabaul, 1946-51; briefly Commander, Pacific Islands Regiment, 1945; sought influence in the New Guinea Islands branch of the R.S.S.&A.I.L.A., making highly critical statements about the Papua New Guinea Provisional Administration while at the League's national conference in 1947.

Barry, Mr. Justice John Vincent

Appeared for External Territories Minister Ward at the 1943 "Brisbane Line" Royal Commission; appointed by Ward as Commissioner to inquire into the 1942 suspension of civil administration in Papua, which effectively destroyed the career of Leonard Murray; member of the Committee into War Damage Compensation, 1945.

Buttsworth, Cecil Jones

Chief Clerk, Department of the Chief Secretary, New South Wales, 1945-48; conducted the 1946-47 investigation into the staffing of the Provisional Administration, antagonising Colonel Murray and a number of his staff in the process; Buttsworth's report reflected the Australian bureaucrat's point of view and generally failed to appreciate the type and scale of change occurring in post-war Papua New Guinea.

Chambers, Cyril

Acting Minister for External Territories 1948-49 (while Minister for the Army) during E.J. Ward's

voluntary suspension from his portfolio at the time of the "New Guinea Timbers" Royal Commission; visited Papua New Guinea, which Ward had failed to do in peacetime, and later secured the passage of the long-delayed Papua and New Guinea Act through Parliament.

Cleland, Brigadier (later Sir) Donald Mackinnon

Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General, Angau, and Chairman, Production Control Board, 1943-45; Federal Director, Liberal Party of Australia, 1945-51; Assistant Administrator, 1951-1952; Administrator, 1952-67; appointed by Hasluck to succeed Colonel Murray as soon as the latter could be removed from office.

Conlon, Alfred Austin

Director of Research and Civil Affairs, 1943-45; Principal, Australian School of Pacific Administration, 1948-49; instigator of many wartime and post-war initiatives for Papua New Guinea; all evidence suggests that he possessed the elements of charisma; partly because of this, and partly owing to his sometimes unscrupulous methods, he made a number of enemies; thus his influence faded once his most powerful allies, Prime Minister Curtin and General Blamey, could no longer assist him.

Cottrell-Dormer, William

Director of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries, 1946-51, having been Director of Agriculture in Tonga, 1939-44; committed to rural development, but an ineffectual administrator who gained little support for his schemes; resigned from the directorship in 1951 and until his retirement in 1961 worked in field extension.

Fenbury (formerly Fienberg), David Maxwell

Assistant District Officer and Senior Native Authorities Officer, 1947-54; mainly responsible for founding local government in Papua New Guinea; far-sighted but often outspoken and tactless, Fenbury showed imagination but also made enemies in his strong support for local government and village courts; one of the relatively junior officers encouraged by Colonel Murray.

Fry, Dr. Thomas Penberthy

A very highly qualified lawyer, Fry was associated with several policy documents while a member of the Directorate of Research, notably on the future status of the Mandated Territory, and some of these documents are among the few surviving records of the Directorate; later Officer-in-Charge, Legal Research Branch, Department of External Territories and Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Queensland, Fry was responsible for consolidating and annotating the very complex laws that survived into, and were introduced during, the post-war period.

Groves, William Charles

Director of Education, 1946-58; a teacher and anthropologist, Groves worked and researched in the Territory of New Guinea and other islands of the Pacific in the 1930's; he took a very broad view of education which, while correct in principle, was inimical to the setting of goals for his department; a gifted humanitarian, Groves was an ineffective administrator.

Gunther, Dr. (later Sir) John Thomson

Director, Department of Public Health, 1946-57; Assistant Administrator, 1957-66; Vice-Chancellor, University of Papua New Guinea, 1966-72; strong-willed administrator who gained a prominent position for his department in post-war years; a supporter of Labor policy and friend and admirer of Colonel Murray.

Halligan, James Reginald

Secretary, Department of External Territories, 1944-51; Commonwealth public servant from 1911; assumed control of miniscule department when it was in eclipse owing to events of the war; unable to build up his organization in post-war years or to adjust personally to the changing demands of the period; disliked by Colonel Murray, who considered Halligan to be deliberately obstructionist; Halligan was eased out of the Secretaryship by Hasluck.

Hogbin, Dr. Herbert Ian Priestly

An eminent anthropologist and member of the Directorate of Research, 1944-46, Hogbin studied Angau labour policy, which he severely criticised, in 1944; instructor, School of Civil Affairs, 1945-6, under Colonel Murray; regular visitor to Papua New Guinea during the post-war period, accompanying Murray on official tours; member of the Barry Committee on War Damage Compensation, 1945.

Isles, Professor Keith Sydney

Professor of Economocs, University of Adelaide, 1939-46; attached to Directorate of Research, 1944-45; proposed outline of post-war policy involving limits on European activity and financial guarantees from Australia; later Vice-Chancellor, University of Tasmania.

Jones, John Herbert

Jones spent most of the period 1946-53 as Director or acting Director of the Department of District Services and Native Affairs; a former member of the Mandated Territory service (from 1921), Jones was a member of the influential "New Guinea" group (with Lonergan and Phillips) which was out of sympathy with Colonel Murray's plans; a fairly efficient pragmatist, Jones retained his position against mediocre competition; he attained a senior position with Angau and was little involved in post-war planning; his lack of ability in that direction was clear during his period as Secretary of the abortive Secretariat of Planning and Development (1950-51); later Special Representative to the United Nations Trusteeship Council.

Kerr, Sir John Robert

Member and Assistant Director, Directorate of Research, 1944-46; Principal, Australian School of Pacific Administration, 1946-48; Organizing Secretary, South Pacific Commission, 1948; later Chief Justice of New South Wales and Governor-General of Australia; Kerr was less one of the inner "intellectual" circle of the Directorate than an organizer and negotiator; he had only limited contact with Colonel Murray.

Lonergan, Stephen Ainsworth

Assistant Government Secretary, 1945-49; acting Government Secretary, 1949-51; Government Secretary, 1951-55; officer of the Mandated Territory service from 1923; in Canberra with J.R. Halligan 1944-45, when in conflict with the Directorate of Research staff; member of the influential "New Guinea" group (with Jones and Phillips) out of sympathy with many of Colonel Murray's proposals; Murray distrusted and disliked Lonergan.

McAuley, Professor James Phillip

Member of the Directorate of Research; Tutor, School of Civil Affairs, 1945; Lecturer in Government, Australian School of Pacific Administration, 1946-60; initially a supporter of Labor policies and an admirer of Conlon, McAuley was one of several (including Kerr, Stanner and Wootten) who later became critical of their war-time associates, sometimes changing political allegiances; in McAuley's case this has reached the point where no reference to his war-time activities appears in his entry in Who's Who.

MacGregor, Sir William

Lieutenant-Governor of British New Guinea, 1888-1898; an energetic man who created most of the policies and institutions claimed for Papua by Sir Hubert Murray; MacGregor's colonial strategy survived until the mid-1940's.

Mair, Professor Lucy Philip

Lecturer in Anthropology, London School of Economics, 1932-46; Lecturer, School of Civil Affairs, 1945-46; Mair was one of the left-liberal intellectuals who introduced contemporary English thinking on colonial government to the staff of the School and Directorate, who projected it into the post-war New Guinea situation; later, in Australia in New Guinea (1948), Mair defended Ward and Murray, accusing the Canberra bureaucracy of obstructing efforts at reform; later, Professor of Applied Anthropology, London School of Economics.

Melrose, Robert

Acting Government Secretary, 1946-49; formerly Director of District Services in the Mandated Territory; after escaping from the Japanese invasion, worked in the Department of External Territories without becoming

wholly associated with Halligan, Lonergan and Vertigan (the "Ghan brothers") so despised by the Directorate group; led the civilian advance party to Port Moresby, mid-1945; sympathetic to post- war policies and admired by Murray, Melrose had problems in mastering a most difficult situation; he retired to Australia in 1949 owing to continued ill health.

Millar, Claude John

Registrar of Co-operatives, 1947-54; Millar and Fenbury visited Africa and the United Kingdom in tours organized by the Directorate of Research in 1945-46, Millar concentrating on co-operatives and Fenbury on local government; member of the 1947-48 planning committees whose reports were ignored in Australia; later Director of Aboriginal Resources, South Australia.

Morris, Major-General Basil Moorhouse

Commandant, 8th Military District, 1941-42; General Officer Commanding Angau 1942-46; assumed military control from Leonard Murray in 1942 and later presented Murray in a poor light to the subsequent Barry Commission; an earnest but unenlightened officer who was ably assisted by D.H. Cleland; post-war critic of E.J. Ward and New Guinea policy generally.

Murray, Hubert Leonard

Nephew of Sir Hubert Murray, Leonard worked under his uncle for many years; Administrator of Papua, 1940-42; out of favour with the Labor government; Leonard Murray's career was destroyed by the findings of the Barry Commission into the 1942 suspension of civil administration in Papua

Murray, Sir John Hubert Plunkett

Chief Justice and Lieutenant-Governor of Papua, 1908-40; strong-willed paternalist who built a reputation as an enlightened colonialist but who was nevertheless far behind the times during the later years of his long term in Papua.

Phillips, Mr. Chief Justice Sir Frederick Beaumont

Chief Justice of Papua New Guinea 1946-56; former

Chief Justice and Deputy Administrator, Territory of New Guinea; member of the influential "New Guinea" group which played little part in war-time planning and which consequently had limited understanding of Colonel Murray's aims; acted as Administrator during Murray's frequent tours of the Territory until Cleland's appointment in 1951; strong opponent of Fenbury's proposals for village courts.

Robson, Robert William

Founded Pacific Islands Monthly, 1930, editing the journal until 1956; supported "small" planters and white entrepreneurs against alleged injustices of both large companies and colonial administrations throughout the Pacific; bitter opponent of all "socialist" governments and of the Australian Labor Party and E.J. Ward in particular; owing to the lack of other news media in Papua New Guinea during the post-war years, Robson and his Monthly were both influential and an accurate reflection of white settler opinion.

Spender, Sir Percy Claude

Minister for External Affairs and for External Territories, 1949-51; Spender attempted to reverse several trends in post-war policy, but with very limited success; clashed with Colonel Murray and attempted to remove him from office in 1950.

Stanner, Professor William Edward Hanley

Assistant Director of Research, 1944; an anthropologist, Stanner fell out with Conlon and later published scathing comments on the Directorate, the Labor New Guinea policy, the Australian School of Pacific Administration and associated matters; his opinions have influenced subsequent accounts of the period.

Strong, Most Reverend Sir Philip Nigel Warrington

Anglican Bishop of New Guinea, 1936-62; friend and consistent defender of Colonel Murray; supporter of post-war policies and proposals during mission conferences; strongly objected to Murray's removal from office; later Archbishop of Brisbane and Primate of Australia.

Taylor, James Lindsay

Acting Director of Native Labour, 1945-46; District Officer, Goroka, 1946-49; a Territory of New Guinea officer, Taylor gained fame for his exploration of the Highlands in the 1930's and some notoriety for his then radical views while a member of Angau; member of the Barry Committee on War Damage Compensation, 1945.

Ward, Edward John

Ward was the turbulent, erratic left-wing Labor Minister for External Territories from 1943 to 1949; sympathetic towards post-war New Guinea policy, Ward did virtually nothing to promote it; did not visit the Territory after 1944; pre-occupied by scandals and the "New Guinea Timbers" Royal Commission for the last two years of his term as Minister.

Wedgewood, Hon. Camilla Hildegarde

An anthropologist by training, Wedgewood was recruited by A.A. Conlon to the Directorate of Research from her post as Principal of Women's College, University of Sydney; after conducting a war-time study of Papua New Guinea education which became the model for W.C. Groves' post-war scheme, she lectured at the Australian School of Pacific Administration until her death in 1955.

INTRODUCTION

The present problem - An organizational model - The colonial situation

The present problem

Papua New Guinea, at independence, is seeking to introduce major changes of policy and administration throughout the country. These involve a movement from the benevolent but closely supervised colonialism of the decades following World War 2, to an autochthonous, self-reliant pattern of development which emphasises mass participation and rural improvement.[1] In attempting to effect this transformation the national government faces two major problems: a recent history of almost a century of white paternalism; and an administrative structure which for most of

1. The first stage of the scheme is set out in Papua New Guinea, Department of the Chief (now Prime) Minister, National Improvement Plan, Port Moresby, Government Printer, 1973.

this period has concentrated on control and direction of the village population, rather than on the encouragement of innovation.

The following study, which concerns a decade of colonial administration that has been neglected in discussions of Papua New Guinea, indicates that the present government has two kinds of precedents to guide its attempts to introduce change. Firstly, the history of the period following World War 2 reflects most of the social, economic, political and bureaucratic forces which persist in the modern nation: it adds some light to the present scene. Secondly, attempts during that period to create innovative bureaucratic structures may provide a model for current initiatives, provided that a sufficiently generalised basis can be established for comparing the two situations: for the late 1940's saw a fundamental change in administrative strategy, from repressive exploitation of the village people to heavily subsidised development of the country's social and economic infrastructure. In particular, the burden placed on the innovative administrators of the post-war period by resistance to change among entrenched interests was comparatively as great as any obstacle now being encountered by Papua New Guinea's national government. If they are

to succeed, today's reformers will have to learn, by example, to overcome the obstacles that confronted their colonial predecessors.

An organizational model

In an attempt to arrive at generalisations that might be applied to another situation across a gap of some thirty years, the study of the post-war period in Papua New Guinea concludes with an examination of several features of systems theory. The systems approach is said to promise some advantages for a comparative study. Morton Kaplan, for example, has claimed that, "....rather than merely attempting to describe institutional behaviour, taking into account all the variables of a particular case, the systems approach attempts greater generality by its use of models that are first-order approximations of reality."[2] In the fields of management, education and, to a lesser extent, public administration, systems theory has been applied in studying the various kinds of organizations involved,[3] while in the area of politics

2. Morton A. Kaplan, Macropolitics, Chicago, Aldine Publishing Co., 1969, p. 74.
3. Studies in these fields include: John A. Beckett, Management Dynamics: The New Synthesis, New York, McGraw Hill, 1971; C. Kenneth Tanner, Designs for Educational Planning, Lexington, Mass., Heath, 1971; Guy Black, The Application of Systems Analysis to Government Operations, New York, Praeger, 1968; Saul M. Katz, "Exploring a sSystems Approach to Development Administration" in Fred W. Riggs (ed.),

it has concentrated particularly on post-independence phenomena in the "developing" nations.[4] Systems theory has also encountered many criticisms. Initially, these mainly concerned the details of systems analysis, particularly as they were formulated by David Easton.[5] More recently, as

Frontiers of Development Administration, Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1971, p. 109. Some attention has also been directed towards systems of international relations, as in Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, New York, Wiley, 1957. "Systems thinking" spreads much more widely; for an indication of its various applications, and criticism of the uses to which it has been put, see Ida R. Hoos, Systems Analysis in Public Policy, Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1972.

4. The development of the theory in this application can best be traced through the work of one of its major proponents; see Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1960; Almond and G.B. Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, Boston, Little, Brown, 1966; Almond, Political Theory and Political Science, New York, McGraw Hill, 1967; Almond, "Political Development: Analytical and Normative Perspectives", Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 1 No. 4, January 1969, p. 447; and Almond, Political Development, Boston, Little, Brown, 1970.

5. Easton's main contributions are A Systems Analysis of Political Life, New York, Wiley, 1965 and A Framework for Political Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1965. Critiques include: Peter Nettl, "The Concept of System in Political Science", Political Studies, Vol. 14 No. 3, September 1966, p. 305; M.B. Nicholson and P.A. Reynolds, "General Systems, the International System and Eastonian Analysis", Political Studies, Vol. 15 No. 1, March 1967, p. 12; Oran R. Young, Systems of Political Science, Englewood Cliffs,

one aspect of the post-behavioural revolution, the very notion of applying an all-embracing theory to social and political activity has come under bitter attack for being anti-historical, ethnocentric and inherently conservative in its ideology.[6]

The more sweeping attacks are justified when levelled against the extravagant claims of the "general systems" theorists, who propound a mechanistic approach aimed at large-scale social

(continued) N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1968; Michael Evans, "Notes on David Easton's Model of the Political System", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol. 8 No. 2, July 1970, p. 117. Perhaps the fullest general discussions of Easton and Almond are: "Eugene F. Miller, "David Easton's Political Theory", and Stanley Rothman, "Functionalism and its Critics: An Analysis of the Writings of Gabriel Almond", both in George Carey (ed.), The Political Science Reviewer, Vol. 1, Fall 1971, pp. 184-235 and 236-76, respectively.

6. See, for example, Martin Kesselman, "Order or Movement? The Literature of Political Development as Ideology", World Politics, Vol. 26 No. 1, October 1973, p. 139; Susanne J. Bodenheimer, The Ideology of Developmentalism: The American Paradigm-Surrogate for Latin American Studies, Sage Comparative Politics Series, Vol. 2, No. 01-015, Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage, 1971; Marvin Surkin and Alan Wolfe (eds.), An End to Political Science: The Caucus Papers, New York, Basic Books, 1970; and Terry Nardin, Violence and the State: A Critique of Empirical Political Theory, Sage Comparative Politics Series, Vol. 2, No. 01-020, Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage, 1973.

engineering,[7] but the study of a particular situation need not involve the kinds of commitments alleged by systems theory's most severe critics.[8] In matters of detail, the present failings of the systems approach are fairly obvious: as Roy Macridis has observed, there has been considerable attention to the building of "grand theory" at the one extreme, and to social trivia at the other, but little study of political events in between.[9] Yet this could be an argument in favour of applying systems concepts in a particular situation, rather than for discounting them as no longer useful. Moreover, the approach has scarcely ever been used in the study of a colonial situation,[10] and few attempts have been made to link the insights from the various fields in which systems theory has been

7. This group is represented by the members of the Society for General Systems Research and their yearbook General Systems; a brief statement of their position is contained in Ludwig von Bertalanffy, "General Systems Theory - A Critical Review", General Systems, Vol. 7, Ann Arbor, Mich., University of Michigan Press, 1962, p. 1.
8. For a more balanced approach, see Lee Sigelman, Modernization and the Political System: A Critique and Preliminary Empirical Analysis, Sage Comparative Politics Series, Vol. 2, No. 01-016, Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage, 1971.
9. Roy C. Macridis, "Comparative Politics and the Study of Government", Comparative Politics, Vol. 1 No. 1, October 1968, p. 79, particularly pp. 80-9.
10. A preliminary application of the model is attempted in Brian Jinks, Colonial Political System? (University of Sydney, Department of Government colloquium paper), Sydney, mimeo, 1970.

employed.[11] It seems premature to dismiss the theory because of its jargon or the possible implications of its more extreme forms. Instead, it is examined in the conclusion with the more limited aim of seeking further insights into the topic under discussion: the post-war period in Papua New Guinea is analysed in a mainly chronological narrative, then a systems framework is examined for generalisations which may be applied to the present situation in the country. There is no intention of "proving" or "disproving" systems theory, but merely of applying it as an analytical tool.

The colonial situation

Systems theory should be appropriate to studying the development phase of colonial administration - that is, when the colony is being advanced deliberately and as a matter of policy towards self-government - because political and bureaucratic roles and considerations are closely interwoven; the study of this phase presents an opportunity for testing the relevance and relationships of different

11. There is growing interest in drawing together various parts of the theory, as in Ralph Braibanti (ed.), Political and Administrative Development, Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1969, and Colin Campbell, "Current Models of Political Systems: An Intellective-Purposive View", Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 4 No. 1, April 1971, p. 21.

strands of systems analysis. However, since dynamic analysis is required for the study of a development situation, it is possible to examine the different approaches to system equilibrium and adaptation, which are key concepts in the analysis of ongoing process.[12] The discussion leads from the consideration of systemic process to an analysis of policy content; more particularly, it concerns the reaction of bureaucratic structures to specific policies.[13] It is necessary, in this context, to consider the adaptive capabilities of different structures in relation to changing policy content and to delineate the decision-making procedures which result.[14] Analysis of process, content and capability directs attention back to the systems approach itself: specifically, to the uses of systems theory in generalising about the

12. See, for example, Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations, New York, Wiley, 1966, particularly pp. 23-6.
13. The study of content as distinct from process has received relatively little attention: see Austin Ranney (ed.), Political Science and Public Policy, Chicago, Markham Publishing Co., 1968, pp. 3-10, and Martin Albrow, Bureaucracy, New York, Praeger, 1970, pp. 95-6. For further comment see Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development and Politics", Comparative Politics, Vol. 3 No. 3, April 1971, p. 283, particularly pp. 309-11.
14. Of particular relevance are the summaries of theory and analysis in such works as Peter Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (rev. ed.), Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1963, Part 3, and Louis C. Gawthrop, Bureaucratic Behaviour in the Executive Branch, New York, Collier-MacMillan The Free Press, 1969, Ch. 7.

administration of change.[15]

The colonial situation chosen for the examination of change is that in the Territory of Papua-New Guinea from the return to civil administration in October 1945 until the departure of the first post-war Administrator, Colonel J.K. Murray, in June 1952. During those years post-war rehabilitation was essentially completed and the development phase begun. Australia acquired her colonial possessions some decades after the European expansion into the tropics reached its peak. She lagged behind most other powers in timing the development of her major colonies of New Guinea and Papua, where independence has only now been achieved. It is almost a generation since that stage was reached throughout Asia and more than a decade since the greatest part of Africa was granted independence. The time differential meant that Australia's colonial policy was often criticised as involving unnecessary delays. On the other hand, once the Pacific war forced a drastic revision of policies throughout the region, Australia still had sufficient time to begin the planned development of Papua New Guinea, provided that changes could be financed and executed with reasonable efficiency. That is, there

15. Organization and change are discussed in Victor A. Thompson, Bureaucracy and Innovation, University, Ala., University of Alabama Press, 1969, in which (pp. 55-7) he is scathing about certain aspects of the systems approach. However, each body of theory can be used to supplement the others for both analysis and generalisation.

was a conjunction of three factors in Australia's colonial relationship that was denied the majority of European powers: there emerged a consciousness that change was needed; a resolve (although not always a strong one) that change should be introduced; and a reasonable length of time to put it into effect.

Relative neglect of New Guinea and Papua by the Australian governments of the inter-war period denied the Territories' administrators the opportunity to introduce major, planned innovations in policy. The intrusion of an alien system inevitably produced a number of changes in the traditional pattern of life, but the changes were incidental by-products of colonial control and were not intended innovations in the direction of eventual independence and self-sufficiency for the people of the colonies. When such innovations were announced as the ultimate objectives of post-war policy, they were bound to require major changes in administrative practice; and, as such, were likely to provoke strong reactions from those who had found security in the old colonial relationships. The following study examines those innovations and reactions.

CHAPTER ONE

PRE-WAR PATERNALISM

End of the Murray era - Early administrations - Australia and New Guinea - Sir Hubert Murray and Papua - Papua and the Mandated Territory - Attitudes of the field staff - Papua New Guinea's Europeans - Tropical fantasies

End of the Murray era

Australia's pre-war policy in Papua New Guinea collapsed when the Japanese bombed Rabaul in December 1941. Within a few weeks invading forces occupied the outlying islands and most of the north coast; the Japanese then turned their attention to Papua and its headquarters town, Port Moresby. George Johnston described the scene there:[1]

> Strewn all over the main street are pieces of twisted corrugated iron, splintered plaster and smashed timber - souvenirs of the two night

1. G.H. Johnston, New Guinea Diary, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1943, p. 18.

> raids. A few houses and shops have been blown to pieces and scores of others damaged by blast...Papua's capital is now abandoned and in the houses and hotels where there were the sounds of tinkling ice and swing music only a few weeks ago there is no sound but the buzzing of the insects...The troops are not waiting for the town to be wiped out. Looting has been going on for days, in some cases on a grand scale.

It was clearly beyond the capacity of the civil government to deal with such a situation. Military rule was declared by Major-General Basil Morris, General Officer Commanding Eight Military District, on 12 February 1942. There were subsequent accusations that officers in the Papua public service had, in effect, deserted their posts in the face of the enemy; the charges were substantially discounted by a commission of inquiry which reported in 1945,[2] but the pre-war Administrator of Papua, Leonard Murray, nephew of the eminent Lieutenant-Governor Sir Hubert Murray, was not re-appointed when hostilities ended. The "Murray era", which had begun in Papua in 1908, was over. None of the Administrators in the Mandated Territory had enjoyed Sir Hubert's status, so that at war's end there was a serious gap in New Guinea's leadership. If the Labor government were to introduce far-reaching changes in policy for the Territory, as

2. Commonwealth of Australia, Department of External Territories, Report of a Commission of Inquiry into the suspension of the Civil Administration of the Territory of Papua in February 1942, typescript, Canberra, 1945. The inquiry is discussed in Chapter Three.

was their announced intention, then they would have to find a new agent to supervise its execution. And in view of Australia's relative neglect of its colonies during earlier years, policy changes were clearly needed.

Early administrations

Australia had exercised full control over eastern New Guinea only since 1914, following the capitulation of the Germans at Rabaul; earlier, she had assumed control of Papua from Great Britain not long after Federation. Few of the historical details in the development of the separate Territories of New Guinea and Papua between the wars are directly relevant to the discussion which follows, although several broad trends are significant.[3] These include the legacies

3. The following discussion is a generalized account which assumes a broad knowledge of Papua New Guinea colonial history; only points of particular significance to the post-war situation are noted in any detail. There is no comprehensive general history of eastern New Guinea. S.W. Reed, The Making of Modern New Guinea, Philadelphia, American Philosophical Society, 1943, deals with that Territory to 1941; J.D. Legge, Australian Colonial Policy, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1956, is a study of British New Guinea and Papua to the early 1950's; the first edition of L.P. Mair's Australia in New Guinea (London, Christophers, 1948) outlines key policies, notably social services and labour, to the time of publication and was the first book to attempt an assessment of the situation discussed in this study, although the second edition (Melbourne, M.U.P., 1970) is

of the earlier colonial regimes, the relationship of the two Territories with each other, their standing with the Australian government and people, and incidental or historical events which affected their relative affluence.

The Germans and Englishmen who first administered eastern New Guinea experienced a number of common problems; this was to be expected, in view of the ethnological and geographic similarities in that part of Melanesia. The islands were far from the respective centres of metropolitan government, so that a sense of isolation was immediately apparent. Neither power appeared anxious to acquire another colonial possession: the British government repudiated an attempt by

(continued) sketchy on the period. Other books which deal with certain periods up to the early 1950's in some detail are C.D. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, Melbourne, M.U.P., 1958; W.E.H. Stanner, The South Seas in Transition, Sydney, Australasian Publishing Co., 1953; and L.A. Mander, Some Dependent Peoples of the South Pacific, New York, MacMillan, 1954. Biographies of some major figures are referred to later in this Chapter. The only recent general history is P. Biskup, B. Jinks and H. Nelson, A Short History of New Guinea, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1970, but it is intended mainly for New Guinea secondary schools. Selected readings may be found in B. Jinks, P. Biskup and H. Nelson (eds.), Readings in New Guinea History, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1973. The lack of detailed research in a number of areas is an important factor in accounting for the persistence of certain myths about New Guinea, particularly for the periods of German administration and the 1940's.

Queensland to annex Papua in 1883,[4] while Bismarck was initially prepared to establish only a chartered company,[5] although this move prompted the British to declare a Protectorate in the south-east.[6] There followed several years of frustration and confusion in each case. It was not until Sir William MacGregor arrived in British New Guinea in 1888 and the Imperial government assumed sovereignty over German New Guinea in 1899 that patterns of administration began to emerge. Nevertheless, MacGregor and the German Governors were severely limited by the general policy that, if the colonies could not turn a profit, as was hoped, then they should cost the home countries as little as possible.[7] The British overcame the problem by requesting an annual subscription from each of the three eastern Australian colonies; this attitude

4. Port Moresby's European community was similarly opposed to Queensland control; see R. Lovett, James Chalmers: His Autobiography and Letters, London, Religious Tract Society, 1903, pp. 237-8.
5. The proclamation granted extensive powers and placed few limits upon company operations: P. van der Veur (ed.), Documents and Correspondence on New Guinea's Boundaries, Canberra, A.N.U. Press, 1966, pp. 14-16.
6. The proclamation's declared intention of protecting Papuan interests nevertheless contrasts with the Kaiser's pronouncement; see C. Lyne, New Guinea: An account of the establishment of the British Protectorate over the southern shores of New Guinea, London, Sampson Low, 1885, pp. 8-9.
7. This was, of course, a general policy until World War 2; see D.K. Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires, Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1966. Financial assistance subsequently granted to the Territory of Papua is outlined later in this Chapter.

served to divide control over policy, under which MacGregor was required to explore and control the country while at the same time attracting European settlers. Owing to the fact that relatively little money and few staff were available, a basic conflict between the demands of "native administration" and "development" appeared from the earliest years.[8] MacGregor succeeded in setting up a field service to execute policies which persisted for seventy years or more, including the Native Regulations, the Village Constable system and the Armed Constabulary; but economic development posed an intractable problem. As long as Papuan land and labour enjoyed a measure of protection, European entrepreneurs believed they could not secure a return on their investments proportionate to the risks involved. Economic progress was therefore painfully slow.

In German New Guinea controls were less strict, in a geographical environment relatively more favourable to plantation enterprise, so that a much stronger base was established there by 1914;[9] land and labour laws were generally tailored to the needs of the companies.[10] There is little evidence to support the contention that German settlers were notably harsher in their exploitation

8. Details of the conflict during the years before World War 2 are set out in Legge, op. cit., Chs. 6, 10, 11 and 12.
9. S.S. Mackenzie, The Australians at Rabaul, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1934, describes (pp. 112-13) the companies dominant role in German New Guinea.
10. Rowley, op. cit., pp. 106-8.

of labour than were their counterparts in Papua, although such allegations were used as partial justification for the expropriation of German plantations after the 1914-18 war.[11] In general, the Germans showed a more imaginative approach to social policy than did the administrators of Papua. Nevertheless, the myths, once established, had a significant effect on New Guinea field administration between the wars and helped to sustain the tension between Papua and the Mandated Territory.[12] German legacies were such that the Australians who ultimately came to control them under the Mandate gained experience on a scale that was unknown in Papua.

Australia and New Guinea

The fact that the major policies for eastern New Guinea were set by others meant that Australia had very limited early experience in colonial planning and innovation. Moreover, once the possessions had been acquired, Australians lost interest in them; planning was scarcely considered necessary. It was

11. The labour system would be viewed with horror today, but it was in keeping with colonial practice of the period; this is borne out by the description of the German system afforded by an Australian, G. Thomas of the Rabaul Times, in an article in Pacific Islands Monthly, Vol. 9 No. 7, February 1939, p. 34.
12. As observed by Marnie Bassett, Letters from New Guinea, Melbourne, Hawthorn Press, 1969, pp. 11-12, 39.

nevertheless essential that general Australian interests be maintained. In this respect, three factors combined to give an unusual cast to the Australian relationship with the colonies.[13] Firstly, New Guinea and Australia are closer geographically than any other colony and its metropolitan power; the nearest piece of Papuan sand is only a few hundred yeards from the northern border of Queensland. This meant that, even in the era before the development of modern communications, the Australian authorities were physically able to exercise closer control of New Guinea affairs than was possible in the great majority of colonial situations. Secondly, New Guinea was the colony of an ex-colony which retained a self-conscious and sometimes aggressive attitude towards criticism, both from overseas and from within the Territories. Thirdly, New Guinea was the only major possession administered by Australia. Whereas the Colonial Office in London devoted varying amounts of attention to scores of territories and a letter to a Governor might elicit a response within six months,[14] the Australian officials, though few in number, were able to concentrate almost entirely on the details of

13. This argument has not been developed in other studies. I first made these points in J.D.B. Miller and Brian Jinks, Australian Government and Politics, 4th ed., London, Duckworth, 1970, p. 200.
14. A whimsical example is provided by Sir Arthur Grimble in A Pattern of Islands (London, Allen, 1954), where at the appointment interview an official is portrayed as searching the maps for the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Protectorate.

administering eastern New Guinea. These conditions made possible the bureaucratization of the relationship between Australia and her major colonies, particularly in respect of the bureaucratic principles of hierarchical control and concern for the routine of precedent.

It may be argued that two additional factors - the lack of concern for New Guinea affairs within Australia and the small amount of money allocated to the country - made close attention unnecessary. This does not necessarily follow, however. Since Papua and the Mandated Territory were of political significance only on the rare occasions when crises occurred or when Australia's status as a colonial power was in question, the permanent officials in Melbourne (and later in Canberra) received little attention from the Ministers who were at various times in charge of External Territories. Nor did the fact that few resources were allocated to the colonies before World War 2 necessarily reduce the degree of control from Australia; there was even more need to ensure that nothing was wasted. The existence of a generally bureaucratized relationship is substantiated by the historical evidence. In the Territory of New Guinea, the initial military administration acted only as a caretaker and was required to concentrate on the routine tasks of

promoting law and order and plantation production. The principles of military discipline ensured that directives were applied as far as control extended into the field.[15] There was an understandable tendency for Army officers to apply what they considered to be German precedent rather than to innovate. An analogous situation existed in the Mandated Territory under civil administration: the inter-war Administrators were ex-Army officers with no immediate experience of peacetime work in a colony, while the permanent officials in Australia had been supervising the administration of Papua for a numbers of years, so that there was no question as to who was boss.

Sir Hubert Murray and Papua

The situation in Papua was more complex. It has been suggested that Sir Hubert Murray enjoyed so much prestige and authority as Lieutenant-Governor of the Territory, and was acknowledged as such an expert on colonial administration, that he was allowed virtually a free rein by the Australian government in

15. Rowley, op. cit., pp. 100-1. He also makes the point (pp. 18, 25) that there were instances of troops acting in contravention of the spirit of the military occupation; the implication is not that the army was acting on its own initiative but that in some cases control was ineffective in the absence of detailed instructions from superiors.

his control of the colony.[16] It is true that by the end of his 32-year tenure Murray had become something of a legend, his opponents of former years had mostly departed the field, and any move to change his methods or appoint a successor while he was still alive might have proved embarrassing politically. But in earlier years his position had been far less secure and there had been several challenges to his authority. His biographer, F.J. West, presents the picture of a man dogged by insecurity and the knowledge that he had his last chance, in Papua, to build a successful career.[17] From the first he made a number of enemies among the Port Moresby community and relations were constantly strained between Murray and Atlee Hunt, who was responsible for Papuan affairs for much of the period before World War 2. In addition, W.M. Hughes, Prime Minister during crucial years for Papua, disliked Murray: West quotes him as saying:[18]

> He was quite impossible. Believe me, a very opinionated man. He was stubborn. He wanted to tell me, not let me tell him. Oh, I assure you, quite impossible. Well, life's far too short, brother, and I had better things to do than bother with a man who was usurping the role of God Almighty, so I left him to be God Almighty among his blackfellows if that was the way he wanted it.

16. Murray was a good publicist in his own cause; his effectiveness can be gauged from Lewis Lett's embarrassingly eulogistic biography, Sir Hubert Murray of Papua, London, Collins, 1949.
17. F.J. West, Hubert Murray: The Australian Pro-Consul, London, O.U.P., 1968.
18. Ibid., pp. 202-3.

As far as Hughes and his successors were concerned, Papua could remain a backwater.

Like all regimes, the colonial administrations of New Guinea and Papua could have achieved greater autonomy had they been able to establish a degree of financial self-sufficiency. But New Guinea was barely able to support itself and Papua was dependent at all times upon its annual grant from Australia.[19] There

19. The Territory of New Guinea received no financial grant from Australia. Papua received grants ranging from £30,000 to £50,000 annually, depending upon economic conditions; these usually comprised between 20 and 25 per cent of total annual expenditure. The comparative scales of finance and administration between the two Territories are difficult to assess, particularly in relation to their impact on the villagers. The Mandated Territory had a good deal more money available to it, as the following table shows:

Year	Papua	New Guinea
	(£ Australian)	
1930/31	135,325	293,377
1931/32	128,682	282,404
1932/33	118,762	321,567
1933/34	121,199	348,817
1934/35	152,901	367,470
1935/36	166,116	425,793
1936/37	170,920	460,118
1937/38	183,102	508,612
1938/39	166,331	502,579
1939/40	177,932	500,614

However, the village population in the Mandated Territory was estimated to be two and a half times that of Papua, so that on the basis of funds per head of population, Papua was perhaps no worse off, in terms of things that might have been attempted in the villages. Two additional points of particular significance for this study are, firstly, that the administrative staff of the Mandated Territory became accustomed to dealing with more money, more people and, consequently, larger

was a certain inevitability in the situation, for the Territories were dogged by economic misfortune. Following the stagnation brought about by the 1914-18 war, production had just begun to increase again when the recession of the early 1920's affected world prices. The price of copra was almost halved and the value of exports of this crop from both Territories dropped by some 40 per cent, even though the total quantity produced increased by one-fifth.[20] The financial problems that arose from declining internal revenue were aggravated by the application, in July 1921, of the Commonwealth's Navigation Act to all exports from the Territories; since Papua and New Guinea markets were mainly in London, the necessity to re-route produce via the expensive Australian coastal trade was a heavy imposition,[21] illustrating Australia's narrow view of its responsibilities as a

(continued) projects. Secondly, the table shows that the funds available in the Mandated Territory increased by 74 per cent during the 1930's entirely from internal sources, while Papua was able to increase its finances by only 47.5 per cent in the same period, even after the Australian grant is taken into account. The New Guinea public servants developed the opinion that they were not only capable of administration on a larger scale than were their counterparts in Papua, but also that they could do this from their own resources. (Sources: Papua Annual Report, 1930/31-1939/40; New Guinea Annual Report, 1930/31-1939/40).

20. Reed, op. cit., pp. 193-4; Legge, op. cit., p. 149. Even after the drop in prices, the Mandated Territory, with copra exports of £474,110 in 1922, had more than five times the income from this source than Papua, where copra exports in 1922 returned only £87,377 (Legge, loc. cit.).

21. Mair, op. cit., (1970), pp. 116-7.

colonial power. The Act was not applied after 1923, but scarcely had production again recovered than the Depression crippled both Territories' plantations; in 1934 copra brought £4.11.0 per ton, less than the cost of shipping it to London.

The economic crises had two important consequences for policy-makers in later years. They embittered the European planters, many of whom had to sell out to the major companies, thereby increasing yet further the commercial sector's importance among economic interest groups. The slumps also convinced both the companies and those independent planters who survived that they were an embattled, beleaguered community that would have to protect its future interests by every means if it were to survive. The effects on the villagers were slighter, in economic terms, since indigenous production accounted for only a small part of total exports and the people could simply revert to subsistence agriculture; but they were of the utmost psychological significance. The attempts, mainly by the Papuan administration, to establish the nucleus of a village cash economy came to nothing. Most villagers became disillusioned with white promises and were convinced that their enterprises were bound to fail.[22] This, in turn, created a demonstration

22. A case study is set out in R.G. Crocombe, Communal Cash Cropping Among the Orokaiva, New Guinea Research Bulletin No. 4, Canberra, A.N.U., 1964.

effect for white settlers, who came to view the people as shiftless and lacking perseverance. The failures meant, moreover, that villagers continued to rely for introduced goods on wage labour for Europeans, who were thus able to maintain their economic domination of the country.

Papua and the Mandated Territory

The Territory of New Guinea was saved from the worst effects of the Depression by the discovery of substantial deposits of alluvial gold in the Wau-Bulolo area of the Morobe District in the early 1930's.[23] By 1935 gold exports were £1.9 million, 81 per cent of the Mandated Territory's total. In contrast, total Papuan exports of gold, copra and rubber in the same year were but one-ninth of this amount.[24] The disparity in income led to jealousy and wistful hopes for an oil discovery in Papua, and a disparaging attitude among the New Guinea public servants towards their poorer colleagues to the south.[25] Tensions were maintained by the continued separation of the Territories from each other. In a number of details the laws of one differed from those of the other; New Guinea had District Courts and Courts of Native Affairs, while

23. The most authoritative account is A.M. Healy, Bulolo, New Guinea Research Bulletin No. 15, Canberra, A.N.U., 1967.
24. Mair, op. cit. (1948), p. 233.
25. Mair, op. cit., (1970), pp. 15-16.

Papua used Courts of Petty Sessions and Courts for Native Matters. New Guinea was divided into Districts, each administered by a District Officer, while Papua's Divisions were presided over by Resident Magistrates. Although these should have been minor matters, the differences between the staff of the field services for the two Territories extended well beyond the titles which the members of each group assumed. As in the British Colonial Service, none too subtle distinctions appeared in the occupational philosophy of the services and the status which each accorded the other.[25]

The basic difference between the British Colonial Service and the field services of the Territories of New Guinea and Papua was that the educational level required by the latter was much lower; a good honours degree was not merely considered unnecessary, but a probable hindrance to the Australian officer who, like his counterpart in the home public services, was expected to develop his important skills through experience. This experience was expected to begin rather earlier in Papua than in the Mandated Territory. Sir Hubert Murray attempted to recruit the sons of

25. The basic distinctions are outlined, from the outsider's viewpoint, in Heussler, Yesterday's Rulers, op. cit. and by Sir Ralph Furse, the originator of the British recruitment system, in his autobiography, Aucuparius, op. cit.

Territory families to his field service: the Champions, the Healeys, the Bramells were thought to be particularly suitable for appointment, initially as clerks and after probation as Patrol Officers, simply because they had been born in Papua and had spent much of their early lives there.[26] Other officers were recruited from the ranks of unsuccessful settlers, restless employees of the trading companies and sometimes directly from Australia, and through tours of inspection, reports and regular circular instructions Murray sought to exercise a similar style of paternalistic control over them.[27] Such methods of supervision need not have deadened initiative among the majority of officers, since Murray was a man of intellect and imagination; but in addition the Papuan officers commanded relatively few resources and so were limited in their sphere of operation. Officers of the Papua service could not be given additional training because the money was not available; they were not even paid travelling expenses while on leave and there was no pension scheme until 1918.[28] Those who stayed on were either uncertain of their prospects elsewhere or, in a number of cases, were men dedicated to colonial administration and to

26. The most detailed study of one of these officer's lives is J.P. Sinclair's The Outside Man, Melbourne, Lansdowne, 1969, the biography of the young explorer of Papua, Jack Hides.
27. West, op. cit., pp. 167-73.
28. Ibid., pp. 194-5.

the "Murray tradition".[29]

The Territory of New Guinea service began with a different tradition - or possibly no tradition at all. It was staffed in three main stages, the first being in the years immediately after World War 1, when a number of ex-soldiers remained on from the military administration and others were recruited upon their return from overseas. At the outbreak of the Pacific War the majority of senior positions were held by men from this group, many of whom lost their lives during the Japanese occupation.[30] A second group arrived in the late 1920's, after the Territory had recovered from the effects of the post-war recession; included in their number were such men as H.L.R. Niall and J.K. McCarthy, who were to reach top levels during the 1950's.[31] The third stage of recruitment took place after the Depression; the members of this group retired at about the time of self-government.

The New Guinea service had no particular reason

29. The tradition, together with the personal Murray legend, was publicised by Lewis Lett in Knights Errant of Papua (Edinburgh, Blackwood, 1935) and The Papuan Achievement (2nd. ed., Melbourne, M.U.P., 1944).
30. Unlike Papuan officers, members of the New Guinea field service published almost nothing between the wars. Some indication of their outlook and service conditions is provided in G.W.L. Townsend, District Officer, Sydney, Pacific Publications, 1968 and Malcolm Wright, The Gentle Savage, Melbourne, Lansdowne, 1966.
31. See J.K. McCarthy, Patrol Into Yesterday, Melbourne, Cheshire, 1963.

to doubt its abilities. It was sustained through the inter-war crises by three main factors: it had taken over a comparatively sound economic and administrative infrastructure, its minimum finances were assured by the gold discoveries and its major sense of achievement came from the exploration of the rich, populous Highlands valleys during the 1930's. Its comparative scale of operation is illustrated by the fact that at the outbreak of the Pacific war it numbered three times as many officers as the Papua service.[32] Although conditions of service were comparably poor, salaries in the mandated Territory were marginally higher than those in Papua,[33] while on the older-established stations officers had the advantage of the very superior surroundings that had been created by the Germans. In addition, a cadetship scheme involving a year's university study was instituted in 1925, although it lapsed during the Depression and had scarcely been revived when the Pacific war broke out.[34] The fact remains that even the New Guinea public service was small by post-war standards; the combined numbers of both Territories' services at the time of the Japanese invasion - 612 officers - more than doubled by 1950.[35] Moreover, as Mair has pointed out,[36]

32. CRS A518, item B800/1/7, 20 October 1945.
33. Mair, op. cit. (1948), gives salaries on engagement as £300 and £285 respectively (p. 42).
34. Ibid., p. 34.
35. Brian Jinks, New Guinea Government: An Introduction, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1970, p. 150.
36. Mair, op. cit. (1948), p. 33.

> Despite their greater numbers the administrative officers here too were unable to devote nearly enough time to native matters. Owing to the greater importance of the commercial community, many of them had to give their entire time to dealing with questions affecting Europeans.

As in other colonies, the size of the settler community affected the willingness and ability of the field staff to carry out certain policies.

A debate continued for many years about the alleged differences in policies and attitudes between New Guinea and Papua. This was pointless in most contexts, since both administrations conducted massive invasions of the traditional system and neither possessed the means to achieve any but modest goals. Nevertheless, both services had higher ambitions and each developed its own ethos about these. It has been noted that the early administration of New Guinea was thought to condone harsh treatment of villagers, while Sir Hubert Murray enjoyed a reputation for enlightened administration. However, the contrast between the two Territories was by no means as sharp as Lett and even Mair have suggested. In the Mandated Territory, for example, there was some "spillover" of revenue produced by the larger scale of European enterprise to village development and welfare. The Department of Agriculture, for example, employed some research staff and although Reed, in particular, makes

scathing comments about the Territory's provision for village education,[37] there were a few government schools, whereas Papua relied wholly on the missions, aided by some subsidies, for education.[38] Similarly, public health expenditure in New Guinea ranged from four to ten times the amount provided by the Papuan administration, although a larger part of this was spent on services for Europeans in the Mandated Territory.[39] There were also some attempts to formulate long-range policies; the Queensland Director of Education was commissioned in 1929 to prepare a plan for the extension of government schooling.[40] On the other hand, the provisions for development and services in the Mandated Territory remained inadequate in relation to its needs, and the Australian government usually ignored advice tendered by the League of Nations.[41] Moreover, one of the most commonly remarked features of life in the Territory of New Guinea was the unabashed, unqualified acceptance of the notion

37. Reed, op. cit., pp. 187-90.
38. Legge, op. cit., p. 187; Mair, op. cit. (1948), p. 169.
39. Mair, op. cit. (1948), pp. 175-9.
40. N.G.A.R. 1929/30, pp. 127-9.
41. The most detailed study of this question between Australia and the League is W.J. Hudson, "Australia's Experience as a Mandatory Power", Australian Outlook, Vol. 19 No. 1, April 1965, while the matter is placed in a wider context in Hudson's Australia and the Colonial Question at the United Nations, Sydney, S.U.P., 1970, Ch. 1.

of European racial supremacy.[42] The assumption assiduously promoted by the Rabaul Times was that the white man's security depended upon the maintenance of his "prestige" and that this could be accomplished only by physical, social, economic and psychological segregation.[43] Public servants and settlers alike were socialized into this environment, which was an important influence in determining the attitudes of Europeans towards the post-war administration when it threatened to weaken the old barriers between the races.

Papua under Murray enjoyed a different reputation. The Mandated Territory's Europeans alleged that Papua achieved little because of its over-protective policies towards villagers. In reply, Papuan residents could do little but attempt to make a virtue out of necessity, so that the attitude of each group towards the other became increasingly coloured by myth over the years.[44] The situation influenced Sir Hubert Murray in the presentation of his policies: in his official reports he was by turns defensive and aggressive in the face of the repeated frustrations which his Territory

42. See, for example, R. Fink and I. Grosart, Race Relations in Papua and New Guinea, Australian School of Pacific Administration, Staff Seminar No. 3, Sydney, 1963, particularly pp. 3-4; and Hank Nelson, "Our Boys Up North: The Behaviour of Australians in New Guinea", Meanjin Quarterly, Vol. 32 No. 4, December 1973, p. 433.
43. Reed, op. cit., pp. 243-52.
44. Mair, op. cit. (1948), p. 17. The groups rarely met except on the ships taking them on leave, when there were comments about the "coon bashers" and "kanaka lovers", respectively.

experienced, while his public statements and books tended to develop into expressions of hopes that had grown gradually dimmer.[45] Murray wrote so much about Papua and its people that it is difficult to find an uncontradicted philosophy on the essential question of colonial development: almost everything in Murray's published work that might be considered liberal and progressive can be qualified by reference to his more paternalistic pronouncements. This was only to be expected of a gifted, complex personality unable to show full potential through concrete actions: Sir Hubert Murray's is the story of what might have been.

When all this has been said, however, there is still a discernible difference between administrative norms in Papua and the Mandated Territory. Murray's directions to his field staff on extending control by peaceful means were much more explicit and direct than were any issued in New Guinea,[46] and it was this model that was generally applied in the post-war years. Murray was also prepared to ensure much closer co-operation with the missions in his area than any of the New Guinea Administrators was able, or indeed

45. It is unfortunate that West's biography of Murray provides much less detail about the late 1920's and 1930's, which were the most difficult years in Papua's history, than about the earlier period. However, some indication of the contradictions in Murray's writings is provided in Jinks, Biskup and Nelson (eds.), op. cit., pp. 118-139.
46. J.H.P. Murray, The Scientific Aspect of the Pacification of Papua, Port Moresby, Government Printer, 1932.

willing to do.[47] It should be pointed out that the relationship had been established by Sir William MacGregor and that assistance from and for missions was an utter necessity in Papua;[48] nevertheless, the fact that missionaries were, almost without exception, willing to endorse the "Murray tradition" says much for both its moral and paternalistic qualities. In Papua the most publicised, and perhaps most real concern was for village rather than European welfare; in New Guinea it was fairly clear that the reverse situation applied, at least in the major centres.

Another thread running through Murray's policy statements was his wish to develop enterprises at the village level. Here again, initial provisions had been made by Sir William MacGregor in his Native Regulations Ordinance; these were expanded by Murray through the Native Taxation Ordinance and Native Plantations Ordinance.[49] At the same time, Murray was conscious that there was a lack of resources for agricultural extension, while every attempt to develop the villages tended to reduce the immediately available supply of plantation labour.[50]

47. See, for example, R.R. McNicoll, "Sir Walter McNicoll as Administrator of the Mandated Territory", Journal of the Papua and New Guinea Society, Vol. 2 No. 2, 1969, pp. 8-10. Part of the problem was that the missionaries, being Germans, were suspect to many Australian returned soldiers, among whom were all of the Territory's Administrators.
48. Legge, op. cit., pp. 176-8, 180.
49. Details are provided in West, op. cit., pp. 185-6.
50. See, for example, J.H.P. Murray, Papua or British New Guinea, London, Fisher Unwin, 1912, pp. 340-5.

In addition, there was the general failure of indigenous ventures to show an adequate profit, owing to the inter-war economic crises.[51] Murray appreciated all of these problems, commented on them at length and created the impression that he was not sure whether village enterprise was really designed to assist the people or to force them to find money for their taxes.[52] In the event, "native development" became another catalogue of inevitable frustrations, but a sincere attempt had at least been made to introduce such a policy.

In summary, it can be said that the Territory of New Guinea possessed the minimum of finance necessary to improve village welfare, together with the staff to introduce a few basic innovations, but that the will to move in this direction was far from strong.[53] The Papuan service had the will to promote indigenous development, but it did not possess the means even to maintain itself without Australia's assistance. The result was that in 1941 the great majority of villages in New Guinea were indistinguishable, in terms of the white impact upon them, from those in Papua: visited by patrols perhaps once a year, lacking most services,

51. See above, pp. 45-7.
52. An implied contradiction appears as early as the statement on taxation in the Papua Annual Report 1918-19, pp. 5, 65-8.
53. McCarthy, op. cit., pp. 79-82, related that when he attempted to set up a village marketing scheme he was quickly transferred to another areas as a consequence of pressure from local planters.

isolated from neighbours, relying on European traders and plantation labour for cash to pay taxes. Objectively, there may also have been greater similarities between the field services than has been suggested. But the officers themselves considered that substantial differences existed, and this was to be an important factor once the administrations were amalgamated.

Attitudes of the field staff

Another important influence on administration, once additional staff and finance were provided in the 1940's, was the attitude towards village life which had evolved among the field staff during the preceding years. For several reasons, many officers came to assume that Papua New Guineans would not take advantage of new opportunities, even if these were provided. With very few exceptions, traditional socio-political groups were small, the clan of a few humdred members being the basic unit. For purposes of hunting, warfare and trade there was a greater degree of co-operation between clans, but still on a much smaller scale than could be found in much of Africa and almost the whole of Asia.[54] Traditional technology was limited;

54. As in the history field, Papua New Guinea lacks a survey of its society; the closest approach is C.D. Rowley's impressionistic The New Guinea Villager, Melbourne, Cheshire, 1965.

metal was not used, the wheel was unknown and there were no draught animals.[55] The very difficult terrain of the country combined with the fragmented socio-political structure and the basic technology to create a cycle of suspicion that a century of European contact has done little to overcome.[56] Until administrative control was established in each area, clan warfare, "payback" killing and sorcery set limits upon the life of every villager. Under these circumstances, Europeans tended to view New Guinea Society as being particularly savage, on the grounds that the members of the community at large could not maintain law and order among themselves. It might have been a more accurate analogy had each language group been considered the counterpart of the Western state, determined to preserve its sovereignty in the face of threats from its neighbours; but this functional comparison scarcely occurred to whites who were aware only of the structures and norms of their native political systems. They saw New Guinea society as lacking dignity and having little claim to survival. Had they been confronted by the power and trappings of Emirs or Sultans, by courtiers and age regiments, their reactions would have been different; some colonial administrators came to view most highly those peoples whom they had

55. I have suggested some of the political consequences of this situation in New Guinea Government, op. cit., Chs. 2-5.
56. P. Hastings, New Guinea: Problems and Prospects (2nd. ed.) Melbourne, Cheshire, 1973, Chs. 5, 7.

pacified at greatest cost. But Melanesian society capitulated to Western dominance with little overt resistance.

Even had they viewed traditional New Guinea society as intrinsically valuable, white administrators would have been forced to intervene directly because of its weak authority patterns. The clans lacked hereditary chiefs who, by right of birth, exercised executive and judicial power over a group of subjects.[57] The lack of an elitist principle meant that "indirect rule" on the Afro-Asian colonial pattern, whereby the traditional chief acted as the agent of the white regime, proved impossible. Instead of powerful leaders capable of exacting obedience even to unfamiliar laws, provided their own status was protected, New Guinea's administrators found headmen whose limited authority rested on group consensus. It mattered little whether these headmen approved of the new order being introduced to their villages: if their people chose to reject it, then the headmen could not enforce it. In order to achieve results, the field staff resorted to appointing minor officials in every village. These men relayed instructions to their people and were given the power to arrest non-compliers, but as far as the Territories' administrations were concerned, they possessed little

57. K.E. Read, "The Political System of the Ngarawapum", Oceania, Vol. 20 No. 3, March 1950.

authority apart from their official appointments. By comparison with the general Afro-Asian pattern of colonial administration, the system in Papua New Guinea could only be classed as "direct rule", although Murray believed that special factors modified the Papuan practice. He observed:[58]

> So in Papua we have found it necessary to follow the method of Direct Rule in building up a form of administration of our own, both executive and judicial; but in the substance of our administration we adhere as closely as we can to native custom and native tradition generally. We cannot fulfil the letter of Indirect Rule, but we are true to the spirit.

Even if the spirit of indirect rule were observed - and it is debatable whether it had as its primary aim the protection of traditional custom - circumstances in both New Guinea and Papua forced upon the administrators a fragmented system of control that was not expanded until the introduction of local government in the 1950's. Before that time, officers generally were experienced only in giving orders directly to small groups. Area administration and the notion of development through extension techniques were virtually unknown.[59] Even where the spirit of indirect rule was observed, officers tended to adopt

58. J.H.P. Murray, Indirect Rule in Papua, Port Moresby, Government Printer, 1929, p. 11.
59. The officers responsible for introducing local government in the post-war years went to great lengths in emphasising that a completely new approach to field work was involved; see Territory of Papua and New Guinea, Department of District Services and Native Affairs, Local Government Circular No. 1, Port Moresby, typescript, 1952.

a protective attitude; they lacked both the time and the training to assume a developmental or innovative role. This was the situation that led Lord Hailey to observe that Murray's policy amounted to "no more than a well-regulated and benevolent type of police rule".[60] Villagers were not given the opportunity to show their abilities, and Europeans formed condescending, paternalistic attitudes towards them, at best. Murray wrote:[61]

> The truth, of course, is that the native is a man, and not a child; he has a man's passions and a man's power to hate and love, but he is a very ignorant man, and he is a man whose customs and ways of thought are strange to use, even in the rare instances in which we try to understand them.

There were few doubts and less self-examination in the Territory of New Guinea. Forty years after Murray wrote, a District Officer of the pre-war period saw little reason to be repentant: after blaming the villagers for a lack of enterprise, he went on:[62]

> We could have done more in education, but not much more in view of the cultural indigestion of the natives...Our Administration was admittedly paternal. But I believe it was the most humane way of governing the country at the time. If we had forced that native into a civilized commercial way of life then, he would have died off in thousands. The other alternative was to have imported Eastern coolie labour, in which case the result would have been worse still.

60. In his introduction to Mair, op. cit. (1948), p. xvi.
61. J.H.P. Murray, Papua of Today, London, King, 1925, p. 230.
62. E. Feldt, "New Guinea's Between-Wars Administration is Too Frequently Misunderstood", P.I.M., Vol. 37 No. 5, May 1967, pp. 58-9.

The alternative of emphasising village welfare at the expense of "civilized" European commerce was not even considered. As one of the settler's wives observed about her days in New Guinea:[63]

> According to today's book, we were long in sin. According to ours, long in virtue. The extraordinary thing is that less than a generation separates the two attitudes.

This generation gap was to create enormous tension around the post-war administration and its policies.

A variety of factors thus combined to limit initiatives at all levels in Australia's pre-war administration of Papua New Guinea. The Australian government and people saw no reason to provide additional finance and staff for the Territories. Moreover, Australia's peculiar situation as a colonial power and the nature of traditional New Guinea society transformed a highly bureaucratized relationship between metropolitan power and colonial administration into a fairly rigid paternalism at the lowest levels of the hierarchy of control. The restrictions which this system imposed at the village level were undoubtedly resented by the people, but it has only been in very recent years that they have been able overtly to express their resentment; the cultist outbreaks of earlier years were partial manifestations of these sentiments, but they were usually

63. Judy Tudor, Many a Green Isle, Sydney, Pacific Publications, 1966, p. 67.

viewed as irrational aberrations. On the other hand, European resentment was a constant source of friction with both the Territories' administrations and the Australian government; relations were at all times strained and occasionally became openly hostile.

Papua New Guinea's Europeans

Several sources of tension among Europeans in Papua New Guinea have already been noted: labour supply, shipping, trade difficulties, village development and services, race relations and the feeling of insecurity found in all communities isolated as a small minority in an alien environment. But even in those areas where there was substantial agreement between Territory field staff and officials in Australia, such as the need for "development" and the extension of law and order, attitudes were dissimilar because of the different cultural backgrounds against which the two groups functioned. For the men in Papua New Guinea, their work constituted their environment; most of them became so thoroughly socialized that they looked to their colleagues for security even when on leave in Australia.[64] In

64. Until it was demolished, Usher's Hotel in Sydney was Australian headquarters for the Territory service; it had a New Guinea bar and a New Guinea book, where officers who had become lonely while on leave could look up the leave addresses of colleagues who were often in the same plight.

addition to feeling isolated while in the islands, a number thus became alienated from Australian society. This feeling tended to manifest itself in constant criticism and occasional bitterness directed at the Australian officials who exercised final control over the Territories' affairs without having to undergo the relative hardships of New Guinea life.[65] They were not required to show the same "dedication"; their future rested among the anonymous papers in their comfortable offices, rather than in the romantic visions of pacifying mountain tribes that supported the remote existence of the colonial field officers. Above all, they could find relief from their work, and this made them the objects of both scorn and envy among those in Papua New Guinea who considered themselves hardier souls.

There was no policy designed to promote a sense of identification among the officers administering Australia's colonies. Planned interchange of staff between the Territories and the administering Department in Australia was scarcely considered, owing partly to the strict recruitment procedures governing the Commonwealth Public Service.[66] Territory public servants were thus denied the opportunity of

65. Evident in the correspondence colums of the islands press and Pacific Islands Monthly and underlined by many of Sir Hubert Murray's comments in F.J. West (ed.), Selected Letters of Hubert Murray, Melbourne, O.U.P., 1970.
66. The situation did not change; post-war attempts to arrange secondments are outlined in Chapter Six.

gaining wider experience and of demonstrating their ability to those who ultimately controlled their work. There is some analogy with the villager, unable to convince the visitor to his area of the capabilities of his own system of government; the Papua New Guinea public servants found themselves the junior partners in administering the country with which they were by far the most familiar.

Australian control

It was indicative of the unusual relationship between Australia and her Territories that the islands were visited quite frequently by official parties. The Burns Philp steamers made round trips to Port Moresby, Rabaul and a varying number of other island ports, the journeys lasting from one to two months, depending on the number of towns visited and the size of the ship. This could be a pleasant cruise, particularly during the Australian winter, when parties of up to forty parliamentarians and their families arrived in the Territories; at other times individual politicians were the subjects of scathing comment from Murray and disinterested visitors alike.[67] On such occasions those unfamiliar with tropical climate, customs and

67. West (ed.), op. cit., pp. 58, 119; Bassett, op. cit., pp. 85-6, 90-1.

dress rarely appeared at their best, so that many Territory Europeans became more than ever convinced that they were being governed by people out of touch with the realities of New Guinea life.

White cynicism was increased by the confusion over the control of islands affairs. At the time of Federation the Prime Minister's Department was made responsible for Papua; in 1908 control was transferred to the Department of External Affairs, later passing to the Department of Home Affairs, then to Home and Territories.[68] The Mandated Territory at first came under the Prime Minister's Department, thus for a time splitting the control of colonial matters. Home and Territories was then made responsible for both colonies from July 1923 until the Department was abolished in January 1929. Control of colonial affairs then passed to the Territories Branch of the Prime Minister's Department. This was a small section whose activities were considered of less significance than those of the other branches, so that in effect the status of colonial affairs was reduced in the decade preceding World War 2.

In their discussions of pre-war Australian attitudes

68. D.E.T., Notes on the History and Functions of the Department, Canberra, typescript, n.d., p. 1. Additional details in this passage are drawn from West, op. cit., p. 201 and Legge, op. cit., pp. 134-5.

towards Papua New Guinea, such authors as Legge and West concentrate on individual politicians, notably Hughes, Mahon, Marr and Scullin, rather than on their parties, simply because little in the way of party policy can be found.[69] Labor may have had marginally greater interest than non-Labor, but it can be argued that this arose mainly from Labor's concern for immigration policy. Were there much credit to be taken for pre-war development, neither of the major party groupings could legitimately claim it. The lack of political concern meant that the influence of permanent officials in Australia could be very great. The pattern was set by Atlee Hunt, who remained Secretary of the various departments administering Papua from 1901 to 1921.[70] Hunt set the tone of early Australian policy in Papua with a report in 1905 which recommended that the colony be viewed as a commercial asset for European settlement; Murray, who was never on good terms with Hunt, spent much of his 32 years in Papua attempting, with little success, to correct the false impressions and high expectations created by Hunt's attitude. In later years officials less gifted than Hunt sought to exert the same control, which was all the more galling

69. Legge, op. cit., p. 148 comments, "....Australia had no clearly formulated colonial policy, and...it was only when situations demanding action presented themselves that she realized she had a colony at all."
70. This and the following passage is drawn from Legge, op. cit., pp. 118-9, 129-30 and West, op. cit., pp. 48-52, 67-9, 104-9, 118-23.

because of their lower status. Europeans in the Territories grew accustomed to being the objects of curiosity rather than interest among the remote politicians and officials who nevertheless possessed the power to veto any proposals from the islands.

Tropical fantasies

People with imagination and the ability to plan for the future of eastern New Guinea, such as Sir Hubert Murray, were affected by the situation in which they found themselves, but it should not be supposed that the rest of the European community found islands life wholly depressing or frustrating. Even when copra prices and salaries were low, liquor and servants were plentiful and cheap; Europeans performed no manual labour and in the areas of settlement there were clubs, tennis courts and horses to ride.[71] It was not difficult to convince oneself that life was better than anything that could be found in Australia at a comparable socio-economic level. There was fever, certainly, and the food often was poor; children had to be sent away to school and marriages were rarely free from strain. But each of these things came to be accepted as part of tropical life and could be rationalised into a kind of mystique

71. Bassett, op. cit.; L. Overell, A Woman's Impressions of German New Guinea, London, Bodley Head, 1923, particularly pp. 27-9.

not shared by outsiders. Only visitors found the existence grotesque, and for each one who did there was another who was convinced of its romance. Under these circumstances, many figures became larger than life, and some of their accomplishments were indeed remarkable. Karius and Champion crossed the island from south to north in 1928, Hides and O'Malley explored the area between the Strickland and Purari Rivers in 1935 and Champion, accompanied on separate patrols by Adamson and Timperley, penetrated the Southern Highlands.[72] Although the exploits of the Leahy brothers and James Taylor in New Guinea received little contemporary publicity, their discoveries were of great significance for future development; Taylor led the historic patrol from Bena Bena to Mount Hagen in 1933 and explored between Mount Hagen and the Sepik River headwaters in 1938-39.[73] It was therefore not difficult for Europeans to believe that they had made New Guinea a vastly different place from what it had been a few decades earlier, and from their point of view they were correct.

72. I.F. Champion, Across New Guinea from the Fly to the Sepik, London, Constable, 1932; J.G. Hides, Through Wildest Papua, London, Blackie, 1935; Hides, Papuan Wonderland, London, Blackie, 1936; Hides, Savages in Serge, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1938.
73. N.G.A.R. 1933-34, pp. 115-20; 1938-39, pp. 147-51. See also Gavin Souter, New Guinea: The Last Unknown, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1963, Ch. 13 and Colin Simpson, Plumes and Arrows, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1962, pp. 127-58.

The villagers of Papua New Guinea were not asked their opinions and because of the lack of development in their country they were unable to express them of their own accord. Yet by some measures their situation had improved considerably. Many were better off, in material terms, than they had been. In a number of areas they no longer lived in constant fear of sudden attack. The rate of infant mortality had slowly begun to decline and a few children were receiving more than just elementary schooling. Offsetting these gains were the beginnings of the breakdown of the traditional social fabric and the total economic and political domination of the settled areas by whites. In comparison with what had gone before, there had been some accomplishments; by the measure of what had still to be done, these were scarcely a beginning.

CHAPTER TWO

THE WAR AND WHITE INTERESTS

The impact of war - Countervailing interests - Angau staffing and the New Guinea ascendancy - Department of External Territories - Mr. J.R. Halligan - Mr. E.J. Ward - Ward, Evatt and Labor policy - The New Guinea settlers - Pacific Territories Association - Angau: leadership and structure - Angau's accomplishments Angau labour policy - Angau's influence on events - Angau conference, 1944 - Directorate of Research and A.A. Conlon - The Directorate's work - Conlon's influence - The Directorate's proposals - Directorate versus Department - Conlon's eclipse

The impact of war

The Japanese invasion severely affected each of the three major instruments of Papua New Guinea administration: the Territory of New Guinea public service, the Papua service and the Department of External Territories in Australia. The severity of the war's impact varied according to the distance

of each agency from the main centres of battle. In the Territory of New Guinea most of the administrative plant and equipment were demolished, almost all records were destroyed and a substantial number of personnel were killed.[1] The Northern, Central and Eastern Divisions of Papua suffered direct attacks and considerable destruction and the rest of that Territory suffered such indirect effects of war as labour and food shortages, insecurity and tensions within the community.[2] The Department of External Territories, recently elevated in status from its position as a branch of the Prime Minister's Department, continued as the nominal administrative agency of the Australian government in Papua New Guinea affairs, but it played only a minor role during the years of the Pacific war.[3]

1. At the end of the war more than 600 civilians were known to have been killed or were missing; see Commonwealth of Australia, Statement made by the Hon. P.C. Spender, Minister for External Territories, in the House of Representatives, 1 June 1950, Canberra, Government Printer, 1950. The great majority had lived in the Mandated Territory, where the pre-war population had included some 4,600 whites (N.G.A.R. 1939/40, p. 131). More than 300 Chinese and Australians, mainly from the New Guinea islands and including many officials, died in June 1942 when the prison ship Montevideo Maru, en route from Rabaul to Japan, was sunk, probably by an American submarine. For a reconstruction of the event from contemporary records, see A.J. Sweeting, "Montevideo Maru - Myth or Merchantman?", Australian Territories, Vol. 1 No. 2, February 1961, p. 36. A list of all civilian casualties, including those lost on the Montevideo Maru and whose who fates were unknown, was published as a special supplement to P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 6, January 1946.
2. The areas in question are now the Northern, Central and part of the Milne Bay Districts, respectively.
3. The situations of the islands public services and the Canberra Department are discussed in more detail later in this Chapter.

The remnants of the peacetime colonial administrative system were either absorbed by the new instruments of military rule or existed in a state of minimal animation for the duration of hostilities. Military power was supreme from early 1942 until late 1945, but as the war neared its end civil administrative interests, assisted in some cases by commercial and planters' representatives, sought to apply such influence as might help to shape the post-war colonial system in the image they desired.

Countervailing interests

The emerging Provisional Administration of 1945 is best seen as the product of several countervailing interests which survived, or were set up during the war. The extent and duration of their power varied widely, but it can be said that those which were most severely handicapped by the peculiar conditions of war and military control were best able to exert their claims for consideration as more familiar conditions returned to the islands. Conversely, those interests which owed their existence to war were soon eclipsed, although not without a struggle, once peace came. The interests included:

the Territory of Papua public service;

the Territory of New Guinea public service;

the Department of External Territories;

the Minister for External Territories;

the Labor government of the period;

the commercial and planting communities from the islands;

the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit;

the Allied Land Forces Headquarters Directorate of Research and Civil Affairs.

The evolving relationships of these interests with each other help to indicate the balance of forces at war's end. The relationships were complex and frequently marked by tension; in order to show their significance for post-war events it is first necessary to outline the circumstances of each as the war progressed.

The devastation and slaughter by the opposing armies, of each other and in the villages of Papua New Guinea, form the permeant background to the political and bureaucratic manoeuverings of the period, but they can be noted only as they affected the interests which are central to this discussion.

The first major contest for influence arose between the officers of the New Guinea and Papua public services. With the establishment of military rule in February 1942, all the able-bodied public servants of military

age who had not already joined the armed services were conscripted into the Army's Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit. Even then the separation of the two Territories continued for a time; initially, two Units were established and it was not until 10 April 1942 that they were amalgamated.[4] The staffs of the separate public services brought with them the differences in perception and approach that had emerged during the pre-war years in their two Territories, and which have been discussed in the previous Chapter.[5] These have been commented upon in recent years by some of those who worked in Angau,[6] but it is difficult to find a contemporary assessment of differences by the staff members themselves. For example, at the 1944 conference of Angau staff papers were presented by officers from the separate Territories on their respective methods of administration, but most of their information was comparatively trivial: the nature of the village officials systems, pension plans for the constabulary and rates of taxation.[7] One explanation for the situation might

4. Peter Ryan, "The Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit", The History of Melanesia (2nd Waigani Seminar), Canberra, A.N.U. Press, 1969, p. 532.
5. See Chapter One, pp. 47-58. It was noted that Papuan officers considered themselves the more enlightened and New Guinea officers the more efficient administrators.
6. Interviews with Mr. G.C. O'Donnell, 15 June 1969 and Mr. D.M. Fenbury, 8 August 1972. See also Ryan, ibid.
7. Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit, Conference of Officers of Headquarters and Officers of Districts Staff, Port Moresby, 7-12 February 1944, Port Moresby, 1944, Vol. 1, papers 3 and 4. The papers were by Majors Penglase (New Guinea) and Austen (Papua). The conference is discussed in greater detail later in this Chapter.

have been that the tensions felt by each group were so acute that they could not be allowed to come to the surface, but it is more likely that the staffs were rarely hostile in a direct way; rather, they were chronically antipathetic towards each other owing to their patterns of socialization into different roles and environments. This was to have an important effect during and after the war.

Angau staffing and the New Guinea ascendancy

Officers of the Mandated Territory service, considered as a group, tended to gain the ascendancy over their counterparts from Papua during the war years, notably in military renown, decorations for bravery and administrative reputations. This situation arose for a variety of reasons, most of them circumstantial. The New Guinea service was still considerably larger than the Papuan, notwithstanding its losses in the islands. By late 1944 New Guinea staff outnumbered Papuan by more than two to one in the key Department of District Services and Native Affairs, as shown in the following table:[8]

Members of the suspended Administrations	T.N.G.	Papua	Total
Field staff	35	17	52
Other than field staff	20	6	26
	55	23	78

8. The information is drawn from Australian New Guinea

The formal appointments held by the officers of the two services did not suggest dominance by either group: of the fifteen District Officers attending the 1944 Angau conference, eight were from the Mandated Territory and seven from Papua; the Director of District Services was a New Guinea officer, the Director of Native Labour from Papua.[9] This did not necessarily indicate that Papuan staff had received significant appointments out of proportion to their total numbers. The Papuan District Officers were mostly confined to the difficult routine of war-time support administration, supervising patrolling by new Army recruits through the unoccupied areas, controlling the recruitment of labour for the armed services and the plantations, and assisting the Production Control Board in the harvesting and transport of tropical produce. That at least some of them were dissatisfied with their roles was indicated by the commanding officer, Major-General Morris, in his opening address to the 1944 Angau conference:[10]

(continued) Administrative Unit, Report on the Activities of Angau in respect of Native Relief and Rehabilitation in the Territory of Papua and the Mandated Territory of New Guinea, Port Moresby, typescript, 1944, p. 7.

9. Angau, Conference, Vol. 1, title page. The trend towards following the precedents of the Mandated Territory is illustrated by the fact that the titles of these major segments of Angau were taken from New Guinea, as was the term "District Officer". The Papuan Department of Native Affairs had been primarily concerned with labour matters and had been absorbed by the Department of the Government Secretary shortly before the war.
10. Ibid., paper 1 (pages were not numbered). Brief biographies of the major figures of the period under discussion are provided in the introductory pages of this study.

> Some may think they are being put into backwaters - Districts where there are no operations. It is not given for everyone to live out their lives in the limelight. In every walk of life there are some whose only reward is the satisfaction of a job well done. To some of the older men of the former Territories' Service I want to explain (and I hope it will help), that it is not possible in a military organization to put them in appointments that their seniority in the Civil Administration might warrant.

Confined as they were to the unpopular service functions of Angau,[11] the Papuan officers were often unhappy and seemed relatively ineffectual.

The New Guinea staff at the outbreak of war suffered greater disasters than did the Papuan group, but they at least had little doubt about the response required of them, having been thrown immediately into a situation of total hostilities.[12] Many acquitted themselves with exceptional resourcefulness and courage, immediately after the invasion and later, while working behind Japanese lines as members of the Coastwatchers organization or carrying out the operational functions of Angau.[13] By far the greater part of the Japanese-

11. The structure of Angau is discussed later in this Chapter.
12. There were some exceptions, owing mainly to the lack of officially accepted contingency plans. On the fate of Lieutenant-Colonel Walstab's "Blue Book" plan, see J.K. McCarthy, op. cit., Chapters 20-21.
13. In addition to coastwatching, these involved forward reconnaisance for the armed services. A coastwatcher's story is Malcolm Wright's If I Die, Melbourne, Lansdowne, 1965. Peter Ryan's Fear Drive My Feet, Melbourne, M.U.P., 1960, gives a vivid and detailed account of the author's operations in occupied areas of the Morobe District when he was an Angau officer.

held areas lay within the former Mandated Territory, so that almost all coastwatching and intelligence parties were led by men who were familiar with those regions. They were subsequently awarded a number of decorations and were the subjects of a good deal of merited praise and publicity.[14] Meanwhile, the Papuan officers suffered the ignominy of having their administration suspended by the military in 1942, in the manner discussed in the next Chapter.

The operational role assumed by many of the Mandated Territory officers also provided a particular perspective on the problems of labour recruitment and employment and of village welfare. The Angau report on the relief and rehabilitation of the people makes it clear that priority in newly-liberated areas had necessarily to be given to the needs of the forces, adding:[15]

> District Services Personnel are known to the natives as the representatives of the Government in the pre-war days (i.e. the "Kiap" or No. 1). Because of their influence in pre-war days they have a decided effect on the natives even where the area has been under Jap domination. Experience with Task Forces to date has shown this.

14. They included R.I. Skinner, M.C.; A.A. Roberts, M.C.; C.D. Bates, M.C.; H.L. Williams, M.C.; R.R. Cole, M.C.; D.M. Fenbury, M.C.; M. Wright, D.S.C.; J.K. McCarthy, M.B.E. Commander Eric Feldt, the war-time chief of coastwatching operations and a former Mandated Territory public servant, published The Coastwatchers (Melbourne, O.U.P.) in 1946, at a time when it was likely to have a considerable impact on the reputations of those officers who returned to New Guinea after the war, particularly in the eyes of new recruits to the field service.
15. Angau, Report, op. cit., p. 12.

The New Guinea officers who were members of the operational teams were, on average, a good deal younger than the senior Papuan District Officers such as A.C. Hall, Leo Austen and W.H.H. Thompson. Austen's paper on "Native Welfare" at the 1944 Angau conference seems unimaginative in comparison with the address given by the younger New Guinea officer James Taylor on the same subject.[16] Taylor was the exception rather than the rule among the New Guinea group, but the impression remained that those men were better suited to responsibility than their Papuan colleagues. Dr. Gunther has summed up the impression created by the Mandated Territory officers in saying that "there were a lot of good Tories in the New Guinea field service; they seemed more efficient, more dependable".[17]

Department of External Territories

The Department of External Territories had hardly been established as a separate entity, following many years as a minor branch of the Prime Minister's Department, before its formal activities were virtually paralyzed by the war. The External Territories portfolio was created as part of the Menzies government in June 1941, but the Department continued to rely on its parent organization for many facilities throughout the war.[18]

16. Angau, Conference, op. cit., Vol. 2, papers 9 and 10.
17. In an interview of 4 December 1968.
18. Barry, op. cit., pp. 44-5, 51.

The Department of External Territories had no separate permanent head until 11 May 1944, when Mr. J.R. Halligan was appointed Secretary.[19] At the outbreak of the Pacific war the Department boasted a staff establishment of twelve and there were still only 95 officers on strength by 1947.[20] The 1950 Minister, Mr. P.C. Spender, did not overstate the case when he said that the External Territories organization had long been the "Cinderella of Commonwealth Departments".[21] Under wartime conditions the Department had few functions to perform. Papua New Guinea was under the control of Angau and the Japanese, Nauru was occupied, and Norfolk Island was a minute territory. The Papua New Guinea Production Control Board was formally responsible to the Minister for External Territories, but its chairman, Brigadier D.M. Cleland, was also Quartermaster-General of Angau and its effective chief of staff, in which capacity he was first answerable to its commander, Major-General Morris.[22] Even then, the Department would have been the repository in Australia of knowledge about Papua New Guinea, had that role not already been usurped by the Army's Directorate of Research and Civil Affairs.[23] Under the

19. Commonwealth of Australia, Spender Statement, op. cit., p. 20; CRS G37/1, Halligan papers, staff lists.
20. D.E.T. memorandum, 19 July 1972.
21. Commonwealth of Australia, Spender Statement, loc cit.
22. Angau, Report, op. cit., Diagram 3.
23. The role and activities of the Directorate are discussed later in this Chapter.

circumstances, and in view of the very small staff of the Department, such influence as it possessed was likely to flow very largely from the status and background of its permanent head and Minister. In neither case was the Department particularly well served.

Mr. J.R. Halligan

Halligan was a Commonwealth public servant of long experience, having been appointed to the Department of External Affairs in 1911.[24] In 1916 he transferred to the Department of Home and Territories and subsequently, through his contacts in that Department, was seconded to the Mandated Territory as an accountant at Rabaul. In 1929 he returned to the Prime Minister's Department and in 1933 transferred to the Territories Branch as an unattached Third Division clerk. In 1935 he was appointed Senior Clerk and in 1937 Deputy Administrator of Norfolk Island. Following his return to Australia he was appointed Assistant Secretary of the new Department of External Territories in 1941, and its permanent head in 1944. Halligan was clearly a member of the traditional pre-war school of Commonwealth public servants, in that he had joined the service in his teens and had worked his way up primarily on the basis of seniority. His appointment as Secretary thrust him into an extremely

24. The following passage is based on CRS G37/1, Halligan papers, staff lists.

difficult position: he had a miniscule staff to advise him and was increasingly forced to deal personally with the powerful authorities in the Army and Angau, and with the intellectuals of the Directorate. This created an administrative style in his Department that was eventually to create numerous delays and difficulties in the post-war period.

It is difficult to establish an objective picture of Halligan's personality. A number of people who had close dealings with him at senior level during and after the war seem to have some understanding of his difficult position and limited background, but are scathing nonetheless.[25] A former member of the Department who worked with Halligan considers that he was personally pleasant towards his staff, but the unmistakable impression is that the Secretary was both out of his depth and behind the times.

Mr. E.J. Ward

The Minister for External Territories, Mr. E.J. Ward, was in an equally difficult position in dealing with his portfolio during the war years. Following his clashes with Prime Minister Curtin, particularly over

25. The comments and their sources would add little to the discussion in this context. Interviewees who made them are listed elsewhere in this study. Halligan's relations with J.K. Murray are discussed in Chapter Nine.

the "Brisbane Line" controversy and the Royal Commission which ensued, he had been in effect demoted from the relatively important post of Minister for Labour to that of Minister for Shipping and Transport, which was not insignificant in strategic terms but which had far less impact within the Labor movement.[26] The External Territories portfolio constituted a minor appendage to what was already, to the Minister, a post of reduced status. There is no evidence to suggest that Ward took an interest in New Guinea affairs for their own sake; his biographer makes almost no reference to Ward's role as Minister for External Territories, even though he held the position for more than six years.[27] It is hard to disagree with Sir John Kerr's assessment that Ward's role in colonial affairs was anathema to him.[28] Ward set great store by his reputation of being a radical socialist and in this respect his second portfolio was a political embarrassment. His only possible reaction was to take what he saw as a radical line on New Guinea questions, to some extent on matters affecting the country's people and particularly in his dealings with its settler community.[29]

26. P.M.C. Hasluck, The Government and the People 1942-1945, Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1970, pp. 711-7. See also Elwyn Spratt, Eddie Ward: Firebrand of East Sydney, Adelaide, Rigby, 1965.
27. Spratt, ibid., while a poor biography, shows that faction fights and ideological questions ranked first in Ward's political priorities, with his External Territories portfolio very much in the ruck.
28. Interview with Sir John Kerr, 30 June 1969. This passage draws heavily upon Kerr's information and impressions.
29. Ward's New Guinea dealings are set out in general chronological order in later Chapters.

But Ward was not in fact radical in such opinions as he possessed about New Guinea and there is nothing in his few speeches on the country to suggest that he knew much about it. What he did have to say would have been considered quite unexceptionable in England at that period and most of his statements would have seemed distinctly conservative in some British Labour circles. Ward's career had never required him to establish a policy position on colonial matters and his ideological stance made it difficult for him to do so after he was appointed to the External Territories portfolio. The major contributions to policy, and certainly all the details of planning, would have to come from other sources.

Ward, Evatt and Labor policy

Few such policies or plans were likely to flow from the Australian Labor Party in government. There was no precedent of involvement in colonial affairs upon which the part could draw and until 1944 its leaders were heavily committed to the prosecution of the war. There was more time for post-war planning as events swung in the Allies' favour, but this was devoted largely to domestic matters. As Hasluck has observed, "....the approach of the party and of some of its leading personalities to post-war problems was that here was the opportunity to do what they had long contemplated as desirable but had never had the chance of doing before.

The ball was in their hands at last."[30] There were many matters for attention: health, housing, a national works programme, migration, employment.[31] Ward's Ministerial concern was primarily for the standardization of railway gauges, although his party political interests ranged much wider.[32] Since Papua New Guinea had never been seriously considered as a domestic issue in Australia, it did not figure in metropolitan post-war plans; there certainly was no occasion to amalgamate railways there.

Insofar as they attracted attention from the government, the islands were mainly a matter for foreign policy and defence. They were certainly viewed in this way by the Minister for External Affairs, Dr. H.V. Evatt. Evatt's interest in New Guinea stemmed largely from his commitment to the United Nations concept and in this respect the principles of the U.N. Charter and the broad objectives of Labor party policy neatly coincided. In one of several highly generalized statements on New Guinea's future made by Ministers in the mid-1940's Evatt said, "We recognize that the future of the native races is a subject of legitimate international interest, and are ready to collaborate to ensure the welfare of colonial people and their steady advancement economically,

30. Hasluck, op. cit., p. 444.
31. Ibid., pp. 508-23.
32. Ibid., p. 519. Spratt, op. cit., Chs. 9-11.

socially and politically."[33] The statement could equally well have been made, although with less justification, by many pre-war Ministers. And the Labor government showed that it had not yet broken away from the old colonial attitudes when Evatt successfully pleaded Australia's case for a "special interest" in New Guinea before the U.N. One of Evatt's biographers has suggested that he was "embarrassed" by this necessity,[34] as well he might, but he was merely encountering the difficulty confronting all Western statesmen who have tried to disentangle colonial from strategic interests: on another occasion, for example, Evatt included New Guinea in the "zone of security" which he envisaged for the Pacific area.[35] Nevertheless, Evatt was the only Labor Minister to make a clearly personal contribution to Australia's New Guinea policy.

Even allowing for the government's preoccupation with domestic matters and the complexities of international affairs, a Minister other than Ward, less egocentric and with different ideological interests and involvements, may have produced from Cabinet a specific dynamic for New Guinea affairs: that is, an endorsement

33. H.V. Evatt, Foreign Policy of Australia, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1945, p. 145. See also Evatt's statement on Trusteeship, reprinted from his House of Representatives statement of 13 March 1946 in his Australia in World Affairs, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1946, pp. 163-7.
34. Kylie Tennant, Evatt: Politics and Justice, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1970, p. 197.
35. Evatt, Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 145.

of detailed programmes and not, as proved to be the case, mere pious hopes. But Ward was a problem for his leaders and, eventually, for New Guinea. His talents were political rather than administrative and his actions within and outside Cabinet tended to direct attention away from his portfolios rather than towards them; Ward himself often became the issue, rather than the matters for which he was formally responsible. Crisp has named him as the chief irritant to Prime Minister Curtin, as a man who "imperfectly accepted the bonds of collective responsibility".[36] Ward was never entirely at ease with Evatt, the Minister from whom he could have learned most about the need for a New Guinea strategy. He had his disagreements with Evatt, no more than with other senior members of the government, but relationships were further strained by the fact that he lost the deputy leadership of the party to Evatt in 1943 and again, by a two-to-one margin, in 1946.[37] Having alienated his Prime Minister and set his deputy leader at a distance, Ward was in a weak position to persuade Cabinet to exercise its vision on New Guinea's behalf. In this context, it might be argued, a genuinely reformist party leadership was obliged to create its own design for the transformation of New Guinea society. Yet the basic materials for such a design were simply not available from orthodox sources, since the Ministry, the party and the bureaucracy lacked

36. L.F. Crisp, Ben Chifley, Melbourne, Longmans, 1960, p. 143.
37. Tennant, op. cit., pp. 206, 270; A. Dalziel, Evatt the Enigma, Melbourne, Lansdowne, 1967, p. 29.

the necessary information and experience or were preoccupied with other concerns. The basic data and planning for post-war Papua New Guinea had to be found elsewhere.

The New Guinea settlers

Three major interests could possibly have provided advice to the government about New Guinea: settlers, Angau and the Directorate of Research. Of these, the settlers were most truly based in the Territories and had the greatest material stake there, but assessing their strength presents some problems. Detailed statistics of the European population in the pre-war Territories were not published, but from indirect sources, such as the numbers of officers in the public services and the numbers of plantations in production, it is possible to arrive at broad estimates.[38] These can be presented most clearly in the form of tables. The first shows the three main groups of Europeans - officials, missionaries and settlers - in round figures at 30 June 1940:

	Total population	Officials		Missionaries		Settlers	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Papua	1,800	325	18	250	13	1225	69
Mandated Territory	4,400	800	18	825	18	2875	64

38. Figures for the Mandated Territory are drawn from N.G.A.R. 1939/40 and those for Papua from P.A.R.

The settler group can be sub-divided approximately as follows:

	Planters etc.	Mining and exploration	Commerce	Miscellaneous
Papua	500	150	475	100
Mandated Territory	1,000	700	925	250

It may be objected that employees of commercial and

(continued) 1938/39 and 1939/40 and from R.W. Robson (ed.), Pacific Islands Yearbook 1944, Sydney, Pacific Publications, 1944. Papua annual reports are particularly sketchy in their statistics and it is my opinion that the tables over-estimate the settler group and under-estimate missionaries for that Territory; some allowance has been made for the fact that in 1940 and 1941 increasing numbers of Australian troops were stationed in Port Moresby. Briefly, the figures were established as follows: 1) officials - numbers of officers employed, multiplied by less than two (since many children went to school in Australia); 2) missionaries - figures for Catholics, plus figures for Protestants multiplied by about 1.5 (quite a few lay workers and spinsters were employed); 3) planters - numbers of plantations multiplied by less than two (larger plantations had two or more white staff, but on average there would be fewer married men than in the case of officials, with fewer children living permanently with their parents); 4) miners - the approximate number is given in N.G.A.R. 1939/40, p. 121; 5) commerce and miscellaneous - the remainder, plus guesswork and personal knowledge; this group includes independent small traders, recruiters, crocodile shooters and schooner masters. The figures obviously cannot be accurate, but they are supported by sufficient evidence to show the relative sizes of the segments of the white community and, consequently, the pressure which could later be applied to the Provisional Administration. There were also 2,061 Chinese in the Mandated Territory at 30 June 1940 (compared with a handful in Papua, where Australian immigration laws applied), but they had almost no standing with the white community and had not at that time challenged the economic domination of the Europeans. The small Malay community was not listed, but numbered several hundred people.

mining firms can hardly be termed "settlers", since they were not long-term residents of the Territories. However, the object is to show the approximate strength of interests in the islands, and in that sense the employees identified much more with their companies than with the official or mission groups.

The settlers, representative of the colonial capitalist interests which most antagonized Mr. Ward, enjoyed little sympathy in the Australian Cabinet, despite their having been severely affected by the war: captured by the Japanese, conscripted into the Army or hastily evacuated from the country at the outbreak of hostilities. None had reason to be impressed by government planning or by the efforts of the military. In Papua, the suspension of civil administration had been accompanied by confusion on the outstations and followed by summary treatment of civilians at the hands of the Army.[39] The situation in the Mandated Territory had been disastrous. Its main centre, Rabaul, should have been evacuated but was not, owing to serious errors of judgement both there and in Canberra.[40] Residents of the outlying islands had stood little chance of survival, while many of those who escaped from the mainland had been forced to flee on foot into the Highlands or across the ranges into southern

39. Barry, op. cit., pp. 9, 26-47. See also Chapter Three.
40. The most succinct account is A.J. Sweeting, "Civilian Wartime Experience in Papua and New Guinea", Appendix 2 to Hasluck, op. cit., pp. 669-81.

Papua. Some refugees from the Morobe District were rescued dramatically from Wau by civil and military aircraft as the Japanese closed in, while a number of survivors of the Rabaul debacle were evacuated from the south coast of New Britain by seaplanes and coastal vessels.[41] But the survivors brought with them accounts of death from starvation and disease, "betrayals" by villagers and executions carried out by the Japanese.[42] In all, the white community had no difficulty in finding martyrs and allocating blame. Its members straggled into Australia in 1942 bitter and disillusioned people.[43]

Many of the settler evacuees went to their families

41. Details are set out in Dudley McCarthy, South West Pacific Area: First Year, Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1959, pp. 47-64 and in Hasluck, op. cit., pp. 680-90.
42. For a graphic account see D. Selby, Hell and High Fever, Sydney, Currawong, 1956.
43. Missionaries in the islands usually suffered the same fate as the soldiers and settlers: see D. Tompkins and B. Hughes, The Road from Gona, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1969, Chs. 4-6. The survivors were able to serve with their parent organizations in Australia and in the forces as priests and chaplains during the war years. Unlike the settlers, the missionaries possessed a wider role which allowed them to continue their basic work, notwithstanding the occupation of New Guinea. They could also be reasonably assured that their pre-war efforts in the islands were viewed with some favour by the authorities and that their return would be considered sympathetically once conditions were suitable. The settlers, and particularly the planters, enjoyed none of these advantages. The Chinese and Malay communities were denied Australian citizenship and thus were not evacuated. They eked out a miserable existence in prison camps or labour compounds throughout the war, providing assistance to the Allies on occasions; see Gavin Long, The Final Campaigns, Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1963, pp. 137-9, 557 and P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 8, March 1946, p. 57.

throughout Australia, but the lives of others had centred on the islands for so long that they tended to congregate, like exiles, in northern Queensland, Brisbane and, more significantly, in Sydney, where they found a staunch ally in R.W. Robson, founder and editor of the Pacific Islands Monthly and defender of settler interests.[44] In May 1942 the Sydney group formed the Pacific Territories Association, which Wolfers has termed the "roof organization" for the various interests represented among the settler evacuees.[45] The leading

44. Throughout this study a great deal of information and opinion has been drawn from the pages of the Pacific Islands Monthly, mainly because it was the only civilian-controlled publication with an interest in Papua New Guinea affairs which was available from 1942, when the Papuan Courier was suspended by the Army, until mid-1950, when the South Pacific Post began publication in Port Moresby as a twice-weekly and, for a time, weekly newspaper. The magazine, like its editor, was bitterly anti-Labor and usually opposed also to the wartime and post-war administrations of the islands, but it reflected rather than led settler opinion in this respect. In an interview of 3 July 1969 Mr. Robson was outspoken in his continuing support for the settlers, whom he considered to be, in the strictest sense, the "small men", rather than the owners and representatives of the major companies; at one point he grew incensed at a suggestion that he would have been forced to support the companies because of his reliance on their advertising and gave details of personal clashes with them over many years. Robson gave a sensitive appreciation of the settlers' wartime plight, noting that although they could find employment in Australia, their economic future was very uncertain until late 1944 and their situation was psychologically demoralizing; these matters are discussed further in Chapters Four and Five.

45. E.P. Wolfers, "The Unsettled Settlers: New Guinea in Australia 1942-1946", Journal of the Papua and New Guinea Society, Vol. 1 No. 2, 1967, p. 9.

figures in the Association were Mr. E.A. James, a Port Moresby accountant and former proprietor of the Papuan Courier, and Mr. C.A.M. Adelskold, an employee of the British New Guinea Development Company.[46] They directed the Association towards its two main aims: return of settlers to Papua New Guinea as soon as possible and preservation of conditions there as they had been at the outbreak of war. Neither goal was achieved. It was not until May 1943 that the first male civilians were allowed to return, and then only to work their holdings on behalf of the Production Control Board.[47] By May 1944 there were still only 65 planters in the Territories, almost all of them in Papua, while many hundreds more languished in Australia.[48]

By this time the Association had become seriously concerned at the government's treatment of them: relations with the Minister were very strained; Robson, having conducted a vitriolic campaign against Labor since 1942, had been declared subversive by Ward and refused entry to the islands;[49] and the military showed no signs of slackening its hold on the Territories' administration and the settlers' plantations. The settlers, like all exiles, thus fell prey to rumours and their own imaginations. They began to fear that Papua

46. Ibid., p. 10. Robson interview, 3 July 1969.
47. CRS A518, item A800/1/7, 31 May 1944.
48. Ibid. See also the table on page 90 of this Chapter.
49. Wolfers, op. cit., p. 12.

New Guinea was to be commandeered by an unlikely combination of Labor and the Army and used as an "experiment in socialisation".[50]

Pacific Territories Association

The response to this situation by the Pacific Territories Association was to seek as much publicity as possible for its cause in an effort to create public sympathy in Australia. At the same time, it attacked and sought to discredit Angau. Robson wrote of "fine pioneer people" becoming "victims of a military bureaucracy",[51] while one of his journalists and former New Guinea resident Judy Tudor argued in favour of more "colonists" for the Territories.[52] Robson accused Angau of "increasing its grip on Papua" without constitutional authority and James wrote letters to the press urging a quick return to civil control.[53] Throughout the latter

50. The term appeared in an article in Smith's Weekly, 29 July 1944 and seems to have been adopted by Robson and the Association thereafter.
51. P.I.M., Vol. 13 No. 5, December 1942, p. 33. From this time the Monthly gave prominence to Pacific Territories Association affairs, reporting its branch meetings, social gatherings and campaigns; see, for example, Vol. 13 No. 11, June 1943, pp. 8-9, 32-3, 36; Vol. 14 No. 5, December 1943, pp. 11-12; Vol. 15 No. 3, October 1944, pp. 11-12; Vol. 15 No. 4, November 1944, p. 7; Vol. 15 No. 7, February 1945, pp. 4-5; Vol. 15 No. 9, April 1945, pp. 17-19.
52. Letter to the Sydney Morning Herald, 18 November 1944.
53. P.I.M., Vol. 14 No. 11, June 1944, p. 9 and Vol. 15 No. 1, August 1944, p. 10; Sydney Morning Herald, 27 October and 23 December 1944.

half of 1944 Adelskold expressed the Association's various concerns to the Minister: the future of military rule, the establishment of the Army's School of Civil Affairs, the role of the Association in advising about future policy.[54] From the complaints in Adelskold's letters it seems that Ward replied infrequently and that when he did the Association received little satisfaction: in September 1944 the Minister bluntly told the settlers they paid too much attention to the "anti-Labor daily press".[55]

The settler group eventually achieved minor representation on advisory bodies, such as the Production Control Board, and at discussions, including the Native Labour Conference of December 1944.[56] However, the conference merely indicated the settlers' reduced status

54. CRS A518, item A800/1/7, 14 and 16 September, 27 October and 7 November 1944. One of the Association's major problems was in choosing and holding to a suitable target.
55. CRS A518, item A800/1/7, 27 September 1944. Other organizations fared no better. In reply to a letter from the Papuan Association, based in Brisbane, Ward stated that he would not answer in detail, owing to the discourteous tone of the Association's letter; he advised the Association to "secure the services of a secretary who knew how to present a case". (P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 7, February 1945, p. 6). Settlers' letters were often expressed in emotional terms, but this made it even more advisable for Ward to have them answered by his Department; by entering into partisan slanging matches he achieved little, other than to make the position of his officials even more difficult in later years.
56. CRS A 518, item C213/3/2, 1 December 1944.

in the wartime scheme of things. They were greatly outnumbered by officials, missionaries and academics such as Professor A.P. Elkin and Dr. H.I. Hogbin.[57] In such company their representatives' claim that "any violent change other than reversion to pre-war conditions would be inimical to [the natives'] present interests and future development" was hardly like to win them friends. During this period settler influence on government policy reached its lowest point.

In 1944 New Guinea could not rely on established interests for its plans and programmes. Its surviving pre-war administrators had heavy operational responsibilities. In Canberra the Department of External Territories was moribund, it Minister renowned more as a disruptive element than a positive force in Cabinet, and the government preoccupied with domestic concerns. The country's white entrepreneurs were determined to limit change rather than support it. General principles had been announced, but detailed plans could at that point come only from the organizations that had been set up to meet the peculiar exigencies of war. Yet both Angau and the Directorate of Research and Civil Affairs were, by their very nature, ephemeral bodies whose long-run effectiveness in New Guinea affairs was necessarily limited.

57. This and the following passage are drawn from ibid. The conference is discussed further in Chapter Four.

Angau

"The function of Angau is twofold," the Unit's reports stated:[58]

> (a) Operational - to takes its place in the order of battle and operate against the enemy in accordance with any orders of the senior formation, or of the particular Commander of the area in which Angau personnel may be located, including US commanders where US forces are operating in any part of the Territories;
>
> (b) Administrative - to administer and carry out within the Territories such of the functions and duties of the former civil administration of the Territories which by reason of the emergency caused by the present state of war or for any cause are now suspended, and such other functions which may become necessary for the peace, order and good government of the Territories and its (sic) peoples.

The operational role of Angau is not of primary concern in this discussion, but it must be noted that the Unit's record in this sphere was an impressive one. During the advances along the New Guinea mainland Angau officers accompanied the forces and began relief and rehabilitation operations as soon as the Japanese were clear of an area.[59] Angau detachments also accompanied the task forces which established bridgeheads at Nassau Bay, Nadzab, Hopoi, Finschhafen, Saidor, Arawe, Cape Gloucester, Manus and Aitape.[60] The Unit at times operated behind enemy lines, obtaining information by "infiltration into native villages", contacting leaders and questioning the people.

58. Angau, Report, op. cit., p. 1. The Unit's monthly reports often carried a similar preamble.
59. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
60. The remainder of this passage is a precis of ibid., p. 12.

It also provided guides and locally-recruited labour for task forces and arranged "administration and hospitalisation" of labourers, villagers evacuated to make way for defence installations and refugees from Japanese-held areas. W.E.H. Stanner has accurately summed up the Angau operational role in stating that "these tasks were carried out excellently...and many officers in forward positions acted with great valour".[61]

Angau: leadership and structure

The Angau administrative function was both more complex and, in a sense, less immediately rewarding for the Unit's members. In its early months Angau was a "small and somewhat irregular" adjunct to New Guinea Force.[62] During this period it was staffed almost entirely by former public servants and settlers and was divided into two parts, District Services and Production Services.[63] Its commander, Major-General Basil Morris, D.S.O., was originally appointed General Officer Commanding 8th Military District (subsequently known as New Guinea Force) in May 1941.[64] He held this post, as well as being responsible for Angau in its early days, until 31 July 1942, when Lieutenant-General S.F. Rowell assumed

61. Stanner, op. cit., p. 76.
62. Ibid.
63. Angau, Report, op. cit., p. 1.
64. Long, op. cit., p. 594.

operational command in the face of growing danger as the Japanese launched the second phase of their Pacific campaign. Morris was then appointed General Officer Commanding Angau and remained in the post until the Unit was formally disbanded in June 1946. He was a competent soldier who, although lacking experience in colonial administration, took a close interest in the work of his subordinates, to the point of reading every patrol report submitted during his term as G.O.C.[65] Morris probably enjoyed a good deal of autonomy in his control of Angau, since New Guinea Force had many other things to concern it and the Unit was doing a good job, from the Army's point of view. In addition, the command problems encountered by New Guinea Force left Morris as

65. Angau, Conference, op. cit., G.O.C.'s address. The copies of Angau patrol reports in the Papua New Guinea National Archives bear Morris' initials, the date of reading and occasional, sometimes pointless comments in coloured pencil. While this could indicate great interest, it also suggests that Morris was not fully occupied; he went so far as to initial the appendices to a number of reports and even to check the additions in tables of village census figures (see, for example Patrol Report No. 1 of 1944 from Finschhafen Sub-District, Morobe District). He seems to have been particularly keen on comments indicating "native loyalty", placing ticks in the margins alongside them. In all, he was probably a pompous and rather limited man. Osmar White describes him as "a tall, imposing man with a brown moustache and sharp, small eyes. When abroad he wore an expensive sun helmet and carried a horse tail fly whisk, elegantly mounted" (Green Armour, Melbourne, Wren, 1972, p. 48). Peter Ryan ("Angau", op. cit.) comments that Morris much enjoyed reviewing troops. Whatever its strengths, Morris' personality was not of the kind to commend itself to the intellectuals in the Directorate of Research; their relations are discussed later in this Chapter.

very much the top man in his own field: the Force had six different G.O.C.'s on eight occasions between 1 August 1942 and 30 November 1945.[66] Morris was also fortunate in having the services of an effective Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster General in Brigadier D.M. Cleland, M.B.E., from 1943.[67]

With the stabilization of its command and functions, Angau entered upon a phase of expansion in staff and duties that extended to the final stages of the New Guinea campaign. Angau proposed, and had approved, four different War Establishments, each larger and more complex than its predecessor, until by mid-1945 it had more than 2,000 men on strength.[68] Angau was formally responsible to New Guinea Force headquarters, but in addition it maintained a liaison link with the Department of External Territories, mainly in matters affecting the Production Control Board;[69] several Angau officers, including MajorsLonergan, Vertigan and Humphries, were attached to the Department during the latter stages of the war. However, Angau had no formal responsibilities to the Minister for External Territories, nor to the Directorate of Research, which was to have great influence

66. Long, op. cit., p. 594.
67. For an assessment of Cleland's administrative role see Ryan, "Angau", op. cit., p. 533. Cleland's background is discussed in Chapter Eleven.
68. Angau, Report, op. cit., p. 2.
69. The formal structure of Angau War Establishment IV/153/4 is set out in Diagrams 3 and 4 of its Report, ibid.

on Ward and on the Army's own Commander-in-Chief.

Two features of Angau's internal structure are of interest, in that they set useful precedents that were not followed for many years. The Royal Papuan Constabulary and the New Guinea Police Force remained apart from the Unit, their commanding officer being responsible directly to the G.O.C.[70] A significant departure from pre-war practice was the establishment in 1944 of regional headquarters (Southern, Northern and Islands) in an effort to decentralize administration and delegate authority. Angau's major organizational problem arose from its attempt to perform the functions both of the pre-war administrations and the settler communities, as well as exercising broad control over mission activities. It was inevitable that there would be clashes of interests.

The staffing pattern of Angau tended to reinforce the conflicts arising within its formal structure. It drew its personnel from Papuan officers, New Guinea public servants, the settler groups and new recruits from within the Army's own ranks. The tensions these men brought with them - Papua versus Mandated Territory, official versus entrepreneur, newcomer versus "before",[71] civilian

70. The forces were later amalgamated as the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary, under a single Commissioner, but they did not again enjoy autonomy from the main service for over twenty years.
71. From the pidgin "bipo" and meaning, in this context, "old hand".

versus soldier - were rarely far below the surface.[72] Moreover, the roles of the main branches of Angau were in some cases incompatible with the tasks which they had to perform. District Services, headed by former New Guinea and Papuan field staff and supplemented by new recruits, was charged with maintaining village life while also being called on to recruit a maximum of labour for the armed services and the remaining plantations.[73] District Services came under further pressure from other branches of Angau. Production Services (later the Production Control Board), comprising mainly plantation managers and white overseers, was responsible for the copra and rubber industries; its interest in obtaining as many labourers as possible for an unlimited period was obvious. The Native Labour Branch - drawn to some extent from the miscellany of white residents but mainly from the Army - allocated labourers, supervised them when they were employed away from the plantations, and arranged rations, issues and such accommodation as was available. The branch had no immediate interest in the village welfare responsibilities of District Services. In all, Angau had an unenviable task, having to operate in a crisis situation after inheriting the tensions and problems of the pre-war administrations. It tackled them in a businesslike manner which was inevitably concerned with only the most immediate issues.

72. Ryan, Angau, op. cit., pp. 532-3.
73. Details in this and the following passage are drawn from Angau, Report, op. cit., p. 8.

Angau's accomplishments

Angau brought undeniable benefits to New Guinea administration. It performed perhaps its most valuable function merely by being created as a unified service: once the two Territories had been amalgamated there was little chance of their again being separated, so that the opportunity for co-ordinated planning arose at last. The Unit also showed a little of what could be done with additional staff. Compared with the peak pre-war staff in both New Guinea and Papua of some 660,[74] Angau attained the following strength:[75]

Date	Officers	Other Ranks	Total
31 December 1942	107	345	452
31 December 1943	169	1056	1225
30 September 1944	288	1361	1649
July 1945 (peak strength)	366	1660	2026

At its peak strength Angau possessed more than three times the staff of the pre-war administrations combined, and although many of them were involved in duties that would not have concerned a peacetime government, the remainder were concentrated in a smaller geographical area. More than half the staff were in the Native Labour branch, so that Angau had a large support organization; of its staff

74. N.G.A.R. 1938/39 and 1939/40; P.A.R. 1938/39 and 1939/40; Pacific Islands Yearbook 1944, op. cit., p. 291. The figures in published accounts vary according to whether exempt and temporary staff have been included in the totals. Numbers in both services declined as men joined the forces (see Chapter One, p. 51).
75. Angau, Report, op. cit., p. 2. Stanner, op. cit., p. 77.

of 1,649 at 30 September 1944, 595 were posted to central and regional headquarters alone.[76] It had more men in the field carrying out District Services functions than the pre-war administrations,[77] but even then only 173 of the 1,054 men stationed outside headquarters in 1944 were members of the District Services branch.[78] Thus the Angau contribution to village administration, although larger than the pre-war effort, was not as great as the total numbers of staff in the Unit might at first suggest. In the medical field, however, the Angau effort surpassed anything that had been possible before the war, even allowing for the fact that many of the services for labourers and evacuees would not have been necessary in peacetime. Although in 1944 Angau had only ten medical officers, compared with sixteen in the pre-war administrations, it also employed 113 European medical assistants, compared with 49, and operated 53 hospitals, in comparison with 20.[79] It is more difficult to compare performance, since statistics for Angau were compiled on a different basis from those for civil medical services,[80] but the sheer volume of Angau effort speaks for itself. In the year to September 1944 the Medical Services branch of the Unit treated 84,617 labourers and villagers in

76. Stanner, op. cit., p. 80; Angau, Report, loc. cit.
77. Angau, Report, op. cit., p. 44.
78. Ibid., pp. 2,8. This compares with a combined pre-war total of 141 field staff (ibid., p. 8).
79. Ibid., pp. 22-3.
80. The civil administrations' annual reports showed the number of patients, rather than the total number of treatments given.

its hospitals and inspected 124,362 people during 523 patrols, administering treatment in 68,332 cases.[81] The cost of medical equipment, drugs, rations and comforts in this period was more than £240,000, or 35 per cent more than the whole budget for Papua in 1939/40.[82]

There were other ways in which Angau turned attention slightly more towards a practical concern for the welfare of the people. It set up the first non-mission school and artisan training programme in Papua and provided seeds, tools, building materials and trade goods to the villagers.[83] Angau also released two of its officers, D.M. Fenbury and C.J. Millar, for study tours of Africa and England, where they acquired interests which later placed them in leading roles in the local government and co-operatives movements in post-war years.[84] And in an effort to define its role more clearly the Unit held a conference of senior staff in early 1944. The papers and discussions at the conference were less than inspiring, but they were at least an attempt to look to the future, and thus a departure from the attitudes of the pre-war administrations.[85]

Angau labour policy

In other respects the Angau record was less

81. Ibid.
82. Ibid., p. 24. See also Chapter One, p. 44.
83. Ibid., p. 15.
84. Interview with Mr. D.M. Fenbury, 8 August 1972. The

impressive. It was inevitable that the Unit's responsibilities for the labour force would cause dissatisfaction among the workers who were recruited, but the problem extended further than this. In 1945 Angau's control of labour was reported on in scathing terms by Dr. Ian Hogbin following his tour of New Guinea "on instructions from the Directorate of Research" between March and June 1944.[86] He asserted that "some of the Labour overseers are unfit to exercise authority...and, to judge from their conversation, a few of the old hands regard brutality as part of the regular routine. W.O. ..... , since removed, boasted in my hearing at Bena Bena, for example, of the number of hidings he had administered".[87] A major problem was what Stanner termed

(continued) tours were in fact arranged by the Directorate of Research and took place after the war's end, but the officers were still on Angau strength. See also Papua New Guinea Post-Courier, 26 March 1973.

85. Angau, Conference, op. cit., paper 1. The conference is discussed later in this Chapter.

86. The information in this passage is drawn from H.I. Hogbin, Report of an Investigation of Native Labour in New Guinea, typescript, probably written in Melbourne in 1944, one of the few Directorate of Research documents now available. Others are discussed later in this Chapter.

87. Ibid., p. 6 (name included in original). Hogbin's attitude may have coloured his findings; Stanner (op. cit., p. 80) quoted the report, without acknowledgement, and claimed that one sentence contained a "twisted observation" that made the objectivity of the report doubtful. However, by 1953, when he wrote, Stanner was strongly critical of the Directorate, of which he had once been a senior member, and his own objectivity was questionable. Nevertheless, the report illustrates the tension and lack of understanding between Angau and the Directorate. In one passage Hogbin wrote, "An incident which occurred on the visit of the Minister for

"a constant waste of labour".[88] Hogbin reported cases of apparent corruption in which labour officials had provided personal servants for soldiers in return for liquor; on the use of labour to build churches, officers' clubs and a swimming pool, to make flower beds and even to spend weeks in the obviously useless pastime of decorating the gardens around Army buildings with coral borders. Stanner later referred to these reports as "ex post facto criticism of the early military period [which], in all circumstances, was little more than a counsel of perfection",[89] but by 1944 the "early" period had passed, so that Hogbin's report carries more weight than Stanner's criticism of it. Mr. J.V. Barry, K.C. gave the most succinct view of the situation, stating, "....when the supposed needs of the Army conflicted with the welfare of the natives, Army requirements...triumphed".[90] By

(continued) External Territories, the Honourable E.J. Ward, to the Song River compound, Finschhafen, is worth recording. During the presentation of a carved walking-stick, the donor, catching sight of a crack at the lower end, remarked casually, 'I must have bashed that coon this morning harder than I intended.'" (Hogbin, loc. cit.). This was a variation of an old joke, albeit one in poor taste, and in an interview on 21 December 1973 I suggested to Dr. Hogbin that the remark was not intended seriously; he maintained, however, that it had been made directly to the Minister. I still find this hard to believe. In any case, Hogbin's report did little to improve relations between Angau and the Directorate.

88. Stanner, op. cit., p. 81.
89. Ibid.
90. Barry, op. cit., p. 57.

September 1944, when the vital need for labour had decreased considerably, only 10,758 men had been repatriated out of a total of 45,203 initially recruited;[91] Stanner lists eleven villages with a total population of 2,769 in which only 38 ablebodied men remained in May 1944.[92]

On one point there can be no doubt: Angau as an organization was detested by all labourers and villagers who came into contact with it. Earlier studies have noted that the war severely affected village life in a number of ways: death from bombs, bullets and diseases; dislocation caused by the absence of men, by having to flee from battles and by being evacuated to foreign areas; destruction and deterioration of houses, possessions and gardens; and major food shortages.[93] Stanner has also referred to the "invisible" as well as the "visible" effects of war: changes in attitudes and expectations, increases in cultist activity, new impressions of different races and groups of people.[94] The studies made immediately after the war were necessarily impressionistic

91. Angau, Report, op. cit., p. 42.
92. Stanner, op. cit., p. 81. The table appears to have been taken from the Hogbin report, but there are some differences in spelling.
93. The situation is discussed in Commonwealth of Australia, Department of External Territories, Report of a Committee Appointed by the Minister for External Territories on Compensation to the Natives of Papua and New Guinea for War Injuries and War Damage, Canberra, mimeo, 1945.
94. Stanner, op. cit., pp. 86-90.

and there was little interest in the matter once conditions became stable. In recent years, however, students from the University of Papua New Guinea and the Administrative College have conducted "oral history" projects that indicate not only that the war's effects were more complex and far-reaching than has generally been supposed but that most of the blame for poor conditions in the areas not occupied by the Japanese has been placed by the people on Angau.[95] While making allowance for the fact that the wartime conditions were not of Angau's making and that some branches of the organization had to meet more difficult demands than others, it is nevertheless clear that many of the Unit's decisions and methods were unfeeling and in some cases appear deliberately provocative. Its

95. N.K. Robinson, Kukipi in the War, Port Moresby, mimeo, 1971 and N. Blackburn (ed.), War in My Village, Port Moresby, mimeo, 1969. The latter accounts contain some particularly vivid passages, drawn from many parts of the country, that are too consistently critical of Angau to reflect only individual attitudes. For example: "The men were strictly looked after under the military rule. Anyone who disobeyed or refused to go was flogged. Those who ran away to their villages were found, flogged by the officials...and sent back...under guard...During this time of the war the families back in the villages were suffering from hunger and many other things." (E. Lei, "The Effects of the Last War (1942-45) on my Village - Lese, Gulf District", in Blackburn, Ibid., Set 1, p. 7). Also: "For those who went as soldiers it was a story of adventure and courage. But those who went under ANGAU there was nothing to tell the villagers but complaints...These would proudly show the scars they received by flogging and tell tales which seems (sic) highly incredible to us." (W. Abore, "War as it Affected my Village", in ibid., set 2, pp. 8-9; the area in question was near New Britain, literally on the other side of the country from Lei's village).

staff made strenuous efforts to block contact between labourers and troops, and particularly with American negroes; permitted the wearing only of ramis (lengths of cloth held around the waist and extending usually to the knees) rather than shorts; confiscated all gifts from the troops; often demanded military levels of discipline from the untrained conscript labourers; and meted out canings for disobedience.[96] There were undoubtedly exceptions to this pattern of behaviour, but the villagers gained the impression of a repressive administration that exhibited the worst characteristics of the authoritarian colonial regime and the petty brutality of plantation employers. It is important that the people's opinions be borne in mind in any debate over the duration of military rule and the timing of the transfer to civil administration.[97]

Angau's influence on events

Angau, established in a situation of major crisis and with many operational responsibilities and conglomerate personnel, could not have been expected to develop major innovations of policy. Indeed, the functions allotted to the Unit contained no reference to policy formation.[98] Major-General Morris seemed to have no notion of a

96. Robinson, op. cit., pp. 9-15.
97. The question is discussed in Chapter Four.
98. See p. 99 of this Chapter.

specific policy role when he opened a conference of District Officers in February 1944. He spoke generally about the need to build up a "going concern", but told his men, "....it is not possible to commit any future Civil Administration that may at a later date be brought into the Territories."[99] This was a particularly narrow view of the proper relationship between the military and civilians and meant that any influence on policy by Angau depended largely upon the effectiveness of the informal links its staff possessed with authorities in Australia. These, in turn, were related to the status of the Unit's leaders in the metropolitan power structure, military and civil. In these matters Angau was not well placed. Morris, the G.O.C., was a regular soldier with no discernible political background in a command that was relatively small, of low priority and physically remote from the Commander-in-Chief and Cabinet. Moreover, he shared with the Minister a personal antipathy that was made public only after the war's end.[100] Nor were he and his men on good terms with the staff of the influential Directorate of Research.[101] Brigadier Cleland, a solicitor from Western Australia, had been State Chairman of the National Party from 1936 to 1938, and so his

99. Angau, Conference, op. cit., paper 1.
100. In an address to the Institute of Accountants in Melbourne Morris later maintained that Ward was known to Papuans as "kanaka belong Sydney" (Sydney Daily Mirror, 24 November 1948); see also P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 6, January 1947, p. 36.
101. Their opinions of each other are outlined later in this Chapter.

background set him even further apart than Morris from Ward and his advisers, although his efficiency was acknowledged at all levels. Following the establishment of the School of Civil Affairs as an offshoot of the Directorate in 1944, some Angau officers attending courses there formed links with Directorate personnel, but these were well below the command level and involved more an injection of Directorate ideas into Angau than the reverse.[102]

Angau conference, 1944

The main record of Angau thoughts and initiatives resides in the proceedings of its conference of District Officers held in Port Moresby from 7 to 12 February 1944. Angau's limited role in planning is indicated by the fact that this was the only occasion upon which its officers discussed future prospects, even though the Unit had administrative responsibility for Papua New Guinea for another twenty months. The conference brought together fifteen District Officers, a number of headquarters personnel, the chief of staff, Brigadier Cleland, and Lieutenant-Colonel W.E.H. Stanner, the only member of the Directorate of Research to attend. Fourteen papers on twelve topics were considered, the subjects of "native welfare" and "native labour" each being discussed by two

102. The Directorate's relations with D.M. Fenbury, G.C. O'Donnell, C.J. Millar and James Taylor are discussed in their contexts in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight.

officers.[103] Two papers were concerned with background details of pre-war administration, three were devoted to technical matters (preventive medicine, dental services and rice cultivation) and one was delivered by Lieutenant-Colonel Stanner.

Of the remaining papers, those on land tenure, agriculture, labour policy, village plantations and welfare centred on questions of particular importance for future development. They were delivered by officers with some years of pre-war experience in their respective Territories. Each had had two years in which to reflect on the changes wrought by the war and was free to speak out: the conference was closed to outsiders, the record of its proceedings was classified "confidential" and the Angau commander left after his opening address so that open debate could continue.[104] Under the circumstances, at least a few far-reaching proposals might have been expected from the participants. All but one of these papers, however, show a narrow approach. In particular, there is a preoccupation with the problem of labour supply; the participants still seem wedded to the concept of development through a European-controlled plantation economy. The paper on land tenure, for example, concentrates as much on the provision of labour to work "available" land as on the question of tenure itself. The tenure problem is

103. The material in this and the following passages is set out in Angau, Conference, op. cit., Vols. I-III.
104. Ibid., Cover, title page and paper 1.

discussed almost entirely as a matter of introducing individual land ownership, rather than of using usufructory rights as a basis for communal enterprise on a Melanesian pattern. The paper on agriculture deals largely with pre-war facts and opinions and a section on "native agricultural schools" reaches the grudging conclusion:[105]

> Native Agricultural Education is likely to prove costly, and people would like value for money expended. It would be preferable to start out on a limited scale, and by experience work out the system and syllabus most likely to be of value in producing results with New Guinea natives.

The writer, a Mandated Territory officer, approves of compulsion in promoting change, stating:

> There is often expressed the idea that a native should not be compelled to work against his own wishes, even where such procedure is necessary for his own good. To illustrate what is best in practice, the following example is given:- The Dutch in 1850, caused the Javanese to cultivate food crops, against their will, by administrative force, and before many years had passed it was realised that there would be little need for other than preliminary enforcement as the natives recognized the value of what was being done for them. At this stage, the population of Java was 3 million, and by 1934 it had risen to more than 40 million population, all due to good Government.

On the other hand, a paper by a Papuan officer, while making gloomy reading, recognizes the difficulties of forcing "development" on villagers and shows an appreciation of the people's feelings and attitudes.

Of the papers on the major issues of labour and

105. This and the following quotation are drawn from ibid., paper 17.

welfare, the two on labour show the same preoccupation with numbers of labourers available for plantations and similar enterprises and a lack of foresight in most other respects. Both writers oppose the abolition of indenture as a system of employment because, they say, it was misunderstood. One of the papers on welfare is sympathetic but unimaginative, reflecting Papuan paternalism. The other, by James Taylor, is deliberately provocative and parts of it are almost certainly facetious. Taylor devotes one page to his introduction - "so much for the past" - then goes on to criticize most features of contemporary islands life: plantation economics, indenture of labourers, health services, orthodox views of cult activities, missions, education policies and attempts to try villagers for "treason".[106] Concerning the war he states, "Our prestige has not suffered. This is because it is non-existent. The so-called prestige of the white man is merely a respect based upon his superior arms and wealth...We are demanding a loyalty to which we are not entitled, and taking all things into consideration, one that we have not the right to expect".[107] Since Taylor's paper stands in such sharp contrast to the others at the conference, it suggests that few innovative policy suggestions could be expected from Angau as a whole. This left only one major source of initiatives - the Directorate of Research.

106. Ibid., paper 10.
107. Ibid.

Directorate of Research and A.A. Conlon

The Directorate of Research was, during the war years, virtually the only source of policy advice to the Australian government on the future of Papua New Guinea. It warrants a complete study in itself, notwithstanding the lack of written records of its activities.[108] All

108. The great bulk of records from the wartime and immediate post-war periods have suffered sorry fates or have been mislaid. In a letter of 4 June 1969 the Chief Archivist, Australian Archives Office, stated:

> Over a number of years the Commonwealth Archives has conducted extensive enquiries as to the fate of administrative records of Papua-New Guinea in the period 1942-46, without reaching satisfactory conclusions...The Department of the Army's "Archives" Section in Melbourne has been unable to locate any significant records produced by the Directorate of Research relating to New Guinea. It appears certain from contemporary accounts that all major policy matters were referred by the military administration in New Guinea (A.N.G.A.U.) to the Directorate and considerable records should have accumulated. However, the ultimate fate of these has not been determined...The fate of the majority of the records of ANGAU remains a matter of supposition. It would appear that, as the war came to an end and ANGAU headquarters moved northwards in New Guinea, it became re-absorbed into the structure of the Army's HQ 8 MD, and its operational records were absorbed...and their individual identity was lost...It appears most probable [that the civil administrative records of Angau] were handed over to the incoming Provisional Administration...It may be that the majority were destroyed in two fires - in the Government Secretary's Office in 1949, and in the Law Department in 1957.

The Department of the Government Secretary was the main executive agency of government, and so the fire of 12 February 1949 (the anniversary of the suspension of civil administration) destroyed almost all policy papers, together with much routine information concerning the Administrator and his office. However, Colonel Murray kept a number of files at Government House, where he often worked and held conferences. These, together with his

accounts of the Directorate are unanimous on one (and perhaps only one) point: that it owed its existence ultimately to the efforts of one man: Dr. Alfred A. Conlon. It is difficult to separate fact from legend in any study of Conlon, and he seems to have imparted the same quality to his Directorate. Thus any examination of the organization must necessarily flow from a discussion of the man. Conlon was born in Sydney in 1908 and graduated in Arts from Sydney University in 1932, taking

(continued) personal papers, are held in Papua New Guinea's National Archives. The files hold copies of some policy material, although this is far from complete. The 1957 fire in the Crown Law Office destroyed mainly legal papers, although a certain amount of policy material was also lost. Ironically, a number of policy papers held at the Australian School of Pacific Administration, from the period between 1945 and 1949 when there was still close contact between Port Moresby and senior staff at the School, were also destroyed by fire in 1969. The main puzzle surrounds the whereabouts of the records of the Directorate of Research. The letter quoted above implies that they could have been destroyed or permanently lost. For some years there have been rumours that a considerable number of papers, once in the possession of Conlon, are now held by other people. The assumption seems to be that Conlon took most of the Directorate's files with him when the unit disbanded. It has been further suggested that Conlon did this because people opposed to the Directorate would otherwise have destroyed its records. However, Conlon's son, Mr. Telford Conlon, has stated that he knows of no collection of papers held by his father, other than personal records (letter of 22 August 1969). These, he says, were bought by Mr. Peter Ryan "on behalf of a private trust", but Ryan has advised that he has "no recent information" concerning them (letter of 20 May 1969). Several people who were associated with Conlon in the Directorate, including Dr. H.I. Hogbin, Mr. V.H. Parkinson and Colonel Murray, doubt whether many policy documents ever existed, since Conlon (to quote Parkinson) "was a talker, not a writer". Moreover, the Directorate was located in three very temporary sites - in Melbourne, Canberra and Sydney - in just two years and this would have made files even harder to preserve. If located, they should be the basis of a separate study.

an honours degree in philosophy under Professor John Anderson.[109] He began studying medicine in the same year, but then from 1933 to 1936, when he married, he read law. He subsequently returned to medicine, reaching third year in 1938, but did not complete this degree until after the war. He was elected a Fellow of the Senate, representing undergraduates, in 1939 and was appointed University Manpower Officer in 1940. His duty as Manpower Officer was, in his view, to ensure that the education and skills acquired by students entering the armed forces were put to good use.[110]

Conlon made his first recorded contact with the policy agencies of the government in late 1940, when he became a member of a committee investigating the establishment of an Army Education Scheme.[111] The

109. The material in this passage is taken from the memorial volume published by the Benevolent Society of New South Wales, Alfred Conlon 1908-1961, Sydney, 1963, a series of recorded comments edited by John Thompson (Australian Broadcasting Commission) and broadcast on 8 October 1963.
110. Like most of Conlon's activities, the nature of his work as Manpower Officer varies according to the source of information; it has been suggested that he spent most of this period extending his network of influential contacts and finding better military jobs for his associates. The difficulties of establishing a clear picture are compounded by the fact that some of Conlon's wartime colleagues assumed different stances in political and ideological matters, during later years, from those of the Directorate of which they had once been members. One or two of them later became embroiled in the controversy surrounding Professor Sydney Orr, opposing the attitude taken by Conlon in the matter. See "The Master Puppeteer", Nation, Vol. 1 No. 1, 26 September 1958, p. 12.
111. Long, op. cit., p. 84.

committee was set up by Major-General Victor Stantke, at that time Adjutant-General, with responsibilites, among other things, for Army manpower. Conlon's duties at the university brought him into contact with Stantke and led to his appointment to the committee on education.[112] By late 1941 Conlon's interests centred on two issues: the morale of the Australian people and the need for expert advice and research within the Army. The morale question assumed greater, if passing, significance with the bombing of Darwin and the scares that followed and in early 1942 Conlon emerged suddenly as Chairman of the Prime Minister's Committee on National Morale, whose members included Professors K. Stout, R.D. Wright and J. Stone, R.M. Crawford and Sir Ian Clunies-Ross.[113] The functions and deliberations of the committee seem to have gone unrecorded and it produced no final conclusions or results, but it is probable that it arose out of Conlon's interest in the likely effects of a Japanese invasion of Australia.[114] The committee's discussions had two main

112. Interview with Sir John Kerr, 30 June 1969.
113. "The Master Puppeteer", op. cit., p. 13.
114. Professor Geoffrey Sawer has suggested that the committee actually produced draft national security regulations on morale (Canberra Times, 26 January 1972), but Professor Stone says its meetings "were just briefings for the P.M." (National Times, 3-8 April 1972). Hasluck (op. cit., pp. 127-30, 401-3) goes to some pains to make out a case that part of the morale problem was of the government's own making. Any further discussion would require a detailed examination of Australian politics and personalities and would detract from the main theme of this study. The need for a detailed examination of these structures and personalities is increasingly apparent, however.

consequences: it became clear that much basic data necessary for the planning of disaster administration was simply non-existent; and Conlon came to enjoy more than ever the "men-only think sessions, accompanied by much beer and pipe-smoke", to use Sawer's description.[115]

Conlon's interest in research coincided with the National Morale Committee's need for information and in 1942 he approached Major-General Stantke with a proposal that a research organization be established within the Army.[116] A research group, with Conlon in charge and attached to the Adjutant-General's branch, was formed in April 1942 and subsequently transferred to the Directorate of Military Intelligence.[117] In the meantime, however, the command structure of the Army had changed radically. The Military Board had been suspended and on 26 March 1942 General Blamey had taken up his appointment as Commander-in-Chief.[118] Major-General Stantke was replaced as Adjutant-General by Major-General C.E.M. Lloyd, who

115. There remains a distinct impression, from the retrospective comments made on Conlon and the Directorate, that the majority of those who were once involved, and are now in eminent and influential positions, would like to dissociate themselves from the brash idealism that might otherwise be thought to have marked their earlier years. Many of Conlon's contemporaries maintain that they were not close to him in the Directorate. One letter seeking information for this study was answered in a brief note signed by an eminent professor's secretary.
116. Benevolent Society, op. cit., p. 8.
117. Long, op. cit., p. 397.
118. Dudley McCarthy, op. cit., p. 25.

was less enthusiastic about the research project.[119] As the invasion scare passed, Conlon came to devote more attention to research, however, and was able to counter the changes in the Adjutant-General's branch by using the contacts he had established with the Prime Minister in the morale committee and through Brigadier Eugene Gorman, a Melbourne K.C. who was a friend of Blamey.[120] After a period of uncertainty Conlon's group was established as the Directorate of Research on 6 October 1943.[121] Conlon was then promoted Lieutenant-Colonel, with his office at Victoria Barracks, Melbourne. The apocryphal story maintains that his relationship with Blamey was cemented in the following exchange:[122]

> Blamey (making first inspection tour of Victoria Barracks as new C-in-C): What are you doing in this unit, Colonel?
>
> Conlon (removing feet from desk): Research, sir.
>
> Long pause.
>
> Conlon: Well, Tom, we just buggerise around.
>
> Blamey: Ah, Alf, you buggerise around. Well, well.
>
> Blamey trusted Conlon implicitly from that day on as the only honest man he had met in the Army since his return from the Middle East.

The activities and outputs of the Directorate of Research (leaving aside the School of Civil Affairs for the moment) are as difficult to establish as its genesis. However, there is again one point of consensus: Conlon enjoyed direct access to, and exerted remarkable influence

119. Kerr interview, 30 June 1969.
120. Kerr interview.
121. Department of the Army memorandum of 12 May 1969.
122. The story is an amalgam of the anecdote contained in "The Master Puppeteer", op. cit., p. 13 and accounts by two other men closely associated with Conlon, both of whom used more colourful language.

on both the Prime Minister and General Blamey. Precisely how this came about is not clear; Blamey's biographer, even in his second and more detailed account of the general's life, has nothing definite to say on the point.[123] However, Curtin and Blamey were under great pressure and Conlon presumably gave some relief from the limited orthodoxy of established civilian and military bureaucracies. Blamey, in particular, enjoyed little popularity,[124] and had nothing in common with External Territories Minister Ward, with whom he was supposed to deal on matters affecting New Guinea's people.[125] Conlon thus offered an avenue of contact and negotiation, as well as providing ideas for post-war reforms. So long as this network remained, Conlon occupied a key position as its power-broker and prophet.[126]

The Directorate's work

There was little in the Directorate's terms of reference to indicate the work that was expected of it. There seems to be no record of its original charter; Gavin Long quotes the February and August 1944 issues of

123. John Hetherington, Blamey: Controversial Soldier, Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1973, pp. 317-22. In his earlier Blamey (Melbourne, Cheshire, 1954), Hetherington mentioned Conlon only once, in connection with the proposed John Curtin School of Medical Research.
124. See, for example, Hasluck, op. cit., pp. 572-6 and Long, op. cit., Ch. 3.
125. Kerr interview, 30 June 1969
126. Conlon was not alone. Dr. H.C. Coombs, in particular, occupied a powerful position in the wartime networks, but operating more comfortably within formal organizations than Conlon and stabilising his influence accordingly.

The Australian Army War Effort, a propaganda journal, when noting:[127]

> By February 1944 the functions of the Directorate of Research had been re-defined thus:
> (1) To keep the Commander-in-Chief and certain other officers informed on current events affecting their work;
> (2) To undertake specific enquiries requested by Principal Staff Officers;
> (3) To assist other Government Departments in work concerning the Army.
> On 20th October 1943 the Directorate was given specific duties concerned with the National Security (Emergency Control) Regulations. It is required to maintain full records at L.H.Q. of all exercise of powers and all activities by the Army under the Regulations; to effect liaison and collaborate with Federal and State authorities on matters arising out of activities by the Army under the Regulations and to carry out such other duties in connection with the Regulations as the C-in-C may direct... A considerable proportion of the work of the Directorate has been concerned with administration and development in New Guinea.

Although providing no executive authority, this charter allowed the Directorate, in maintaining "full records", virtually to conduct surveillance over a wide range of areas, including the administration of New Guinea under the Regulations. The Directorate thereupon involved itself in several domestic matters, including the proposals for a school of medical research and a national university and in overseas planning for post-war government in Borneo and Japan.[128] In the operational sphere the Directorate's efforts were far from successful. Concerning its dealing with the British Borneo Civil Affairs Unit, Long

127. Long, op. cit., pp. 397-8.
128. Kerr interview, 30 June 1969.

points out that the Directorate "contained few officers with real military experience, yet it was organizing and controlling military units, a task requiring expert staff work. At the same time the directorate (sic) was causing confusion and distress among the British Borneo officers who had arrived to perform a task for which they had long been preparing."[129]

In conducting its studies in Papua New Guinea the Directorate antagonized the great majority of Angau staff, who viewed it as, at best, a carping critic and at worst a spy organization with all power and no responsibility. Professor Charles Rowley, who worked in Army Education in New Guinea for some time, recalls that he had "lengthy experience of how the whole Conlon setup was regarded by the army brass. Among officers, none of whom knew him, Alf was probably the most unpopular man in the army".[130] During his wartime travels in New Guinea Colonel Murray gained the impression that "Major-General Morris...really hated Conlon and exhausted his worst expletives on him".[131] Sawer summarises the outsider's impression of Conlon in saying, "I never heard him promulgate a constructive idea which was also workable," but adds, "...one great gift he indeed possessed; it was the capacity for anticipating a problem, and getting other people to do some work on

129. Long, op. cit., pp. 402-3.
130. Benevolent Society, op. cit., p. 22.
131. Murray letter of 26 May 1969.

solving it."[132]

The "other people" who worked with Conlon at that time included several who were, or would become, among the most eminent in their professions in Australia. One group, members of the Directorate who in most cases went on to teach at the School of Civil Affairs, included Colonel J.K. Murray, Professor Julius Stone, Professor K.S. Isles, Professor W.E.H. Stanner, Sir John Kerr, Sir James Plimsoll, Dr. H.I. Hogbin, Dr. T.P. Fry, the Honourable Camilla Wedgewood and Professor James McAuley.[133] Others recruited primarily for the School were Professor John Andrews, Professor Ralph Piddington, Dr. D'Arcy Croll, Professor Lucy Mair, Mr. P.A. Ryan, Mr. Justice J.H. Wootten, Professor J.D. Legge, Senator Sam Cohen and Miss Ida Leeson, while part-time lecturers included Professor R.D. Wright, Professor Sir Edward Ford and Professor Sir Stanton Hicks.[134] Of the people who at various times came within the Conlon orbit without being permanent members of the Directorate or the School, the most notable were Sir Mark Oliphant, Professor

132. Canberra Times, op. cit.
133. In most cases the names indicate the positions which the staff later attained, rather than contemporary status. An exception is Murray, who had already attained the positions of both Professor and full Colonel before joining the Directorate (see Chapter Three). Details of the Directorate's personnel are drawn from interviews with Sir John Kerr and Colonel Murray; letter from Colonel Murray of 26 May 1969; Benevolent Society, op. cit.; and J.K. Murray, The Allied Land Forces (LHQ) School of Civil Affairs 1945-46, Brisbane, typescript, 1971, pp. 2-3.
134. The work of the School of Civil Affairs is discussed in the next Chapter.

Zelman Cowan and Professor A.P. Elkin.

Such a grouping of talent, with almost no operational responsibilities and therefore ample time for discussion and thought, was unprecedented in Australia, providing great intellectual stimulus for those who belonged to it.[135] But most recollections are of a great deal of talk and not very much in the way of concrete results. Colonel Murray recalls that "the Directorate functioned in a collection of rooms in old buildings in Vic. Barracks, isolated and suited to the personal arrangements. The director and one or two others had entree to the C-in-C. A good deal of discussion and forming of attitudes was done in Melbourne homes in the evenings to early mornings...'brains trust' thrashing out of situations as they arose or looked like surfacing: dialogue style".[136] To people of a certain temperament this method of operation proved irritating or even infuriating, particularly with Australia at war; the reactions of Professor Sawer and Major-General Morris have already been noted. Conlon eventually exasperated those among his subordinates who favoured a more formal approach to planning, notably Stanner, who had been one of the first appointees to the Directorate.[137] Conlon

135. Not all wished to "belong" (see below), and it has already been noted that a number had second thoughts.
136. Colonel Murray has prepared a series of notes on his recollections. The pages of the manuscript (written in a carbon duplicate book) are numbered from 16. This and later references refer to the numbers stamped on the manuscript pages. This quotation is from page 39.
137. Kerr interview, 30 June 1969.

is reputed to have been ruthless at times in achieving his goals,[138] but on the other hand some of his wartime associates profess amusement at the faintly Gilbertain atmosphere within his entourage; James McAuley has been quoted as saying he performed the function of "court poet".[139] To others Conlon held the ingredients of charisma. The journalist Sydney Deamer has called him "the absolute visionary...He was a bloke who could see the consequences of things before any of us could see them",[140] and Professor Stone has said that Conlon was a "theoretician of the social process" who was interested more in theory than in practice. "But of course his genius was precisely that he combined the two."[141] The impression is that Conlon made his most favourable impact on those who were least involved in solving immediate, practical problems.

Conlon's influence

Conlon's association with power has been the subject of some debate. Peter Coleman, summing up his impression of the controversy, writes:[142]

> ...one real theme of Conlon's life was Power - studying other people's use of it, needing it himself to put his ideas into practice, getting it, using it, misusing it, losing it, struggling to get it again.

138. Interview with Colonel Murray, 12 December 1966.
139. By Peter Coleman in the Bulletin, 28 September 1963, p. 23.
140. Benevolent Society, op. cit., p. 7.
141. Ibid., p. 26.
142. Coleman, op. cit., p. 23. It is interesting the political right should display such a fascination for Conlon; the passage quoted is almost certainly by Coleman out of McAuley.

> But this has to be read mainly between the lines since so many of the writers feel they have to apologize for Conlon's interest in Power. He used his power, they repeat, never for personal ends, always for the national good, in the service of the community, for reform etc. etc. Intellectuals themselves, they seem unable to reconcile Conlon's being an intellectual with his wanting the power he had as...Director of Research...to get things done.

This assessment is not entirely consistent with Coleman's later claim that Conlon's various projects were of little effect,[143] since it does not distinguish between operational and intellectual power, as exercised by Conlon. Conlon's efforts at institution-building alienated many people, but none has seriously argued against his intellectual force. In relation to New Guinea, Conlon and the staff of the Directorate and School created an atmosphere, an aura of conviction, that major changes would have to be made, and made urgently. Thus the policy later outlined for Papua New Guinea by the Minister owed much to the Directorate.[144] Colonel Murray has observed, "My assessment would be, in relation to PNG, that Conlon and his Directorate, directly and indirectly (bringing knowledgeable personnel into contact with the Minister of External Territories) inspired and formulated in basic ways the 'Ward Policy'".[145] Ward's acceptance of this policy ensured that the Directorate's views also received the tacit approval of Prime Ministers Curtin and Chifley. Two essential steps had still to

143. Ibid., p. 24.
144. The policy and its genesis are discussed later in this Chapter and in Chapter Five.
145. Murray notes, op. cit., pp. 36-7.

be taken, however: the broad statements of principle needed to be filled out and supported by detailed plans; and dynamic administrative structures had to be set up if the programmes were to be executed. Unfortunately, Conlon was unable to convert his intellectual drive into either operational charters or stable institutions, as is shown by his abortive efforts in these directions after the war.[146]

The Directorate's proposals

Any assessment of the Directorate's impact on post-war policy and programmes must take full account of the fact that the unit had no formal administrative role. Perhaps the effort of prompting a change in general policy was itself an accomplishment; Lucy Mair, for example, viewed it as such in 1948.[147] If this opinion is accepted, then the fact that no detailed plans can be traced immediately to the Directorate may be of little relevance. In such circumstances, not the Directorate but the operational agencies of government may be at fault. Moreover, among the few papers that can at present be linked to the Directorate there are indications that a firm basis for detailed planning was being prepared.[148] Several of the Directorate staff

146. Conlon's post-war role in New Guinea affairs is discussed in Chapters Five and Six.
147. Mair, op. cit., (1948), pp. 203-4.
148. Carbon copies of some reports and position papers have been located among loose documents at the Australian School of Pacific Administration. Most

visited Papua New Guinea during 1944 and 1945. Conlon accompanied General Blamey during the Commander-in-Chief's tour of the islands in 1944, but there is no available record of any report he might have prepared.[149] However, there are surviving documents concerning tours made by Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable Camilla Wedgewood and by Drs. Hogbin and Fry, while Colonel Murray has provided an account of his study of the agricultural potential of the Territories.[150]

Hogbin's report, while concerned largely with the "grave" situation he found in villages owing to the excessive recruitment of labour, gave some indication of the measures that would have to be taken immediately the war ended. He recommended that labourers be repatriated urgently; that tools, seeds and livestock be distributed; and that measures be taken to stabilize village and economic life.[151] Hogbin's conclusions were neither detailed nor far-reaching, but a clear link between the Directorate's activities and Labor's

(continued) bear the notation "prepared in the Directorate of Research" in what appears to be the handwriting of Dr. T.P. Fry. None of the position papers bears a date, author's name or file number.

149. Benevolent Society, op. cit., p. 21.

150. Hogbin's report has been discussed earlier (pp. 108-9) and Fry's is outlined later in this Chapter. Wedgewood's report on education, which was the basis of the post-war system, is discussed in Chapter Seven. The main features of Murray's tour are set out in the following Chapter.

151. Hogbin, op. cit., pp. 8-10. The tone of the paper is in marked contrast to the section on labour in the Angau report on relief and rehabilitation, op. cit. and in the District Officers' addresses at the Angau conference; Angau's concerns were scarcely related to those of the Directorate.

post-war policies was apparent, since several of the labour report's recommendations were later incorporated in the War Damage Compensation Scheme, proposed by a three-man committee of which Hogbin was a member.[152] Fry's report was a more substantial document, prepared for the January 1945 conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in Melbourne.[153] Much of the paper was devoted to background information, but this was presented in a more analytical way than anything in the proceedings of the 1944 Angau conference. More significantly, the section of the report dealing with "Australian colonial policy for the forthcoming era of reconstruction and development" clearly presaged Mr. Ward's policy statement to the House of Representatives on 4 July 1945.[154] Fry referred to "control of economic development, in order to protect... the native communities", "increasing participation by the natives in the administration of justice and other duties of government", and repeatedly emphasised the need for greatly increased spending: "considerable annual sums from...mainland revenue" in addition to £20 million for rehabilitation and reconstruction.[155] He quoted statements made by Ward during his 1944 New Guinea visit and in his disputes with the Pacific Territories Association, in effect summing up the Ward-Conlon collaboration to the end of 1944 and setting the scene for the more open

152. The findings of the committee are set out in Chapter Four. The other members were Mr. J.V. Barry, K.C. and Major James Taylor.
153. T.P. Fry, Relief and Rehabilitation in Australia's Territories in New Guinea, Melbourne, mimeo, 1945.
154. Ibid., pp. 7-9. See also Chapter Five of this study.
155. Ibid., pp. 9, 20.

approach to New Guinea policy that followed the establishment of the School of Civil Affairs and the Minister's statement to Parliament.[156]

Other surviving Directorate documents include several position papers prepared for the first meeting of the Cabinet Sub-Committee on Papua New Guinea in February 1944. These papers show foresight and an awareness of comparative developments elsewhere in the world, drawing heavily on contemporary thinking on colonies from the United Kingdom and on the philosophy which supported the British Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940. One argues the case for the establishment of the School of Civil Affairs, another compares the scope of civil administration in overseas theatres with the likely needs of New Guinea, and a third comprises briefing notes for Mr. Ward for the first meeting of the Cabinet sub-committee.[157] The details of the policy proposals are discussed in context in later Chapters, but it is worth noting that the papers correctly predict the major problems of the post-war administration. The paper

156. Ibid., pp. 8-9. There is considerable similarity between Fry's conclusions and those of James Taylor at the Angau conference, although the latter are stated more colourfully. This supports the suggestion of John Thompson (Benevolent Fund, op. cit., p. 32) that Conlon and Taylor were in close contact. Thompson refers to the "relief and comfort" Conlon afforded Taylor, presumably from the latter's Angau associates.

157. The fact that the notes for the Minister for External Territories were prepared by an Army unit formally responsible to the Commander-in-Chief indicates the disarray into which the orthodox structures of government had fallen in this area.

dealing with the question of continuity between military and civil administration sees the need for "disregarding or modifying those features of the prewar position which were based mainly on historical accident or inertia" and warns that, while the alternative of "turning back... the clock" is impossible, "...the danger will remain that the civil administration will tend to adopt it partially, out of a hankering for the past".[158] The briefing notes support the introduction of programmes by means of legislation and urge the passage of a Welfare and Development Bill for the Territories. "The scale of the Bill should be determined, not by rough estimates, but on calculations derived from the items of policy approved by this Committee."[159] It was the lack of such programmes that subsequently hampered post-war administration most severely.

Directorate versus Department

The task of preparing plans and programmes should normally have fallen to the Department of External Territories, but because of its miniscule staff and the peculiar relationship between its Minister and the Directorate the Department was in an invidious position.

158. The quotation is from pages 3 and 9 of the paper.
159. The quotation is from page 9 of the notes, in a passage referring to Item XIV of the agenda for the meeting of the Cabinet Sub-Committee. The need for legislation had been suggested by the Director-General of Post-War Reconstruction, Dr. H.C. Coombs. (Ibid.). Later attempts to institute this approach are discussed in Chapters Five and Eight.

A formal relationship between the Department and the Directorate was set out in Cabinet Agendum 597 of 18 February 1944 in the following terms:[160]

> ....there should be the closest possible collaboration and direct communication between the Department of External Territories and the Army. (Through the Director of Research).
>
> ...the Department of External Territories should be the Secretariat for the Cabinet Sub-Committee /~on Papua New Guinea_7.
>
> ...the Minister for External Territories should be the responsible Minister in all matters relating to Civil Administration in Papua and New Guinea whether for immediate or post-war application.

However, the Directorate emerged as Ward's chief advisory group and became heavily involved in planning for civil administration; the original arrangement was obviously ineffective, and so a year later a more detailed proposal was approved by the Cabinet Sub-Committee. This was initially proposed by the Department of External Territories, but after bouts of bargaining it became so complex that it could only have made matters worse. It provided:[161]

> Department of External Territories to communicate direct with the Administrative Unit (ANGAU) in routine matters and with the Director of Research in matters of importance and policy matters. Copies of routine memoranda to be sent to Director of Research.
>
> Director of Research to send to External Territories copies of communications sent to ANGAU through the Lieutenant General Administration and New Guinea Force whether such matters originate with the Director of Research or with the Department of External Territories.

160. CRS A518, item G815/1/1, 18 February 1944.
161. Ibid., February 1945 (full date not shown).

> ANGAU to send to External Territories copies of communications sent to L.H.Q. on all matters except those of a purely military character.
>
> Any matter of policy on which Angau desires a decision to be submitted to the Department of External Territories through the Director of Research for consideration of the Cabinet Sub-Committee.
>
> Reports /"representations" deleted/ by Angau as to conditions in the Territories on the point of view of civil affairs therein to be made available to External Territories at least monthly for the information of the Cabinet Standing Sub-Committee.
>
> Secretary, Department of External Territories, and the Director of Research to confer at least once a fortnight, alternatively at Canberra and Melbourne as convenient to them. The report to be submitted to the Minister for External Territories after each conference.

Although this charter did not exceed the Directorate's original terms of reference as an information-gathering agency, it emphasised its central role; the Directorate, it should be noted, was not required to distribute its own policy proposals for information. Moreover, two paragraphs of the original draft were deleted. These provided:[162]

> Any submission relating to civil administration in the Territories to be made through the Department of External Territories to the Minister for External Territories and not to the Minister for the Army.
>
> Copy of the permanent Agendum to be supplied to Director of Research and through him to Angau with request that submissions to be made to the Department of External Territories upon any item thereon. A request also to be made for suggestions for any additions to the Permanent Agendum.

The deletion of these paragraphs represented a defeat for the Department, whose role was reduced to that of

162. Ibid.

a cipher. Relations between the Directorate and the Department reached a sorry state, with the Secretary unable to limit access to his Minister by the highly unorthodox group of interlopers nor to control the subjects upon which submissions could in any case be made.[163] It suggests an extraordinary lack of sensibility and, one would think, responsibility on the part of the Minister that he should allow interference of this scale with the obligations of the civil bureaucracy. The problems of co-ordination and the farcical nature of the relationship between Department and Directorate are apparent from the travel arrangements proposed, like those for heads of rival fiefdoms.

Relations were every bit as bad as they appeared from the Sub-Committee Agendum. By 1945, Colonel Murray recalls, "Conlon and some of his staff" had taken to calling the Secretary for External Territories and two senior New Guinea officers from Angau "the Ghan brothers and other less kindly substantives" because of their "stonewalling policies in Angau and External Territories".[164] What should have been an alliance of experience with talent had become a scattered, disparate assortment of

163. CRS A518, item G815/1/1, entitled "Post-War Reconstruction - Liaison with Army Research Directorate" contains only three folios. Had the Secretary's bid succeeded, he would have been swamped with paper, as eventually happened after the war.
164. Murray notes, op. cit., p. 38. The men in question were Halligan, Lonergan and Vertigan. The "Ghan" was the train which made its funereal way from Adelaide to Alice Springs.

competing factions. The enormous disruption caused in Papua New Guinea by the war could possibly be overcome by a positive development programme, but this could be introduced only if there were a smooth transition to civil rule and general agreement on progressive policies. Unfortunately, the situation grew even less promising, owing to a radical change in the balance of forces as the war drew to a close.

Conlon's eclipse

With Curtin's death in July 1945 a vital link in Conlon's network of influence was broken; his ties with Chifley, the new Prime Minister, were by no means strong.[165] Moreover, General Blamey had by this time recommended that the orthodox system of Army control through a Military Board be restored and he stepped down as Commander-in-Chief on 1 December 1945.[166] Once he lost the delegated power that had flowed to him from Blamey, Conlon was at a great disadvantage. He had no permanent organization to support him, no source of formal authority, and he was surrounded by "oppositionists" (to use Kerr's term) who had been alienated by the Directorate's methods, or lack of them, during its years of power. Kerr has said, "In terms of the great centres of national power Alf's writ ceased to run with the

165. Kerr interview, 30 June 1969.
166. Long, op. cit., pp. 578-9.

termination of the war."[167] On 8 January 1946 Conlon was succeeded as Director of Research by Colonel F.B. Lambden.[168] Angau, too, had a limited future, although many of its personnel were ready to join the civil administration, some resuming and many more beginning their careers. The staff of the Department of External Territories, although small in numbers, assumed responsibility for exercising the full powers of the Australian government over Papua New Guinea immediately the National Security Regulations were repealed. The Directorate had no such personnel or authority to carry its influence into the post-war years. Its staff, mainly academics, wished to resume their work in the universities; only the small group who joined the Australian School of Pacific Administration retained contact with the Territory, and then without a formal policy role.[170] The task of sustaining the innovative drive of the Directorate of Research and Civil Affairs fell to the only man from its staff who subsequently worked in the Territory: the Administrator of Papua New Guinea from 1945 until 1952, Colonel Jack Keith Murray.

167. Benevolent Society, op. cit., p. 31.
168. CRS A518, item H800/1/7, 8 January 1946.
169. The fate of the Australian School of Pacific Administration is discussed in Chapters Five and Six.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ADMINISTRATORS MURRAY

Keith Murray - University, war service and a career - Murray and the Directorate - School of Civil Affairs - Administrator wanted - Leonard Murray - Suspension of Papuan Administration, 1942 - Rejection of Leonard Murray - The Barry Commission - Anomalous findings - Colonel J.K. Murray, Administrator

Keith Murray

Keith Murray is a slightly-built, wiry man of less than medium height. He has a fairly narrow face with even features, grey hair that has not receded in old age, and a clipped moustache. He speaks in a considered manner with an "educated Australian" accent, quietly but with an air of constant interest and enquiry, extremely courteous in an unfashionable way and always aware of those around him. He enjoys conversation, while expecting attention from his listeners, and has a sense of occasion, so that he tends

to become the central figure. Murray gives the impression of a contained, alert personality, accustomed to authority and recognition of his status. His wife, Evelyn, is a well-proportioned woman, taller and heavier than Murray, strong in character and ready to support her husband, who is several years her senior, with clearly stated opinions. Keith and Evelyn Murray have obviously supported and relied on each other in a variety of situations over many years. They have no children. They live in a small, shaded house in the university suburb of Saint Lucia, Brisbane.

Murray's childhood was not unhappy, but it was unsettled and by no means secure, financially. He was born at Brighton, Melbourne on 8 February 1889 to John and Elinor Mary Murray (nee Grant). A sister was born the following year but died in 1894.[1] Murray's grandfather, William Murray, was a tea merchant of some substance who had migrated from Invernesshire. John Murray, Keith's father, was educated at Scotch College, Melbourne, and was cared for by a guardian after both parents died while he was still young. John Murray was left in comfortable circumstances from his father's estate, but had little left of his inheritance when he married Elinor Grant in 1887. The couple separated in 1891, the two children remaining with their mother. John

1. The biographical details are taken from Colonel Murray's notes, op. cit., pp. 16-23; interview with Murray, 12 December 1966; and Brian Jinks, J.K. Murray: A Brief, Port Moresby, mimeo, 1968, a history seminar paper, University of Papua New Guinea, with corrections, comments and additions by Murray.

Murray died in July 1916. Elinor Murray moved to New South Wales after the separation and her son only once saw his father to remember him: in about 1898, when he and his mother paid a visit to Melbourne to enquire if there was any residue from William Murray's estate. Elinor Murray possessed no skills, but she was a strong-willed woman and able to support herself and her son as best she could by taking generally domestic work; at one time she worked as a stewardess on one of the North Coast Steam Navigation Company's vessels plying between Sydney and Newcastle. In such ways she managed to keep her son at school and maintain a home for them both. Elinor Murray died in Sydney in December 1950, aged 83. Colonel Murray has said that he finds it "impossible to pay an adequate tribute to her".[2] She was a Roman Catholic, educated in convent schools, but possessed a broad outlook on religious matters which she passed on to her son; this, coupled with his wide education, went a good way towards shaping his outlook.

Murray moved about the Sydney area with his mother for several years, during which he attended no fewer than seven State primary schools and five denominational primary schools (one Protestant, four Roman Catholic). He completed his secondary schooling at St. Joseph's College, Hunter's Hill, between 1904 and 1907, his main academic achievements being that he topped the State in

2. Murray notes, p. 18.

Intermediate Chemistry and was third in that subject at the Leaving Certificate examination. Murray says that he was treated generously at St. Joseph's, although he found the atmosphere occasionally restrictive; he recalls that copies of The Descent of Man and The Origin of Species were confiscated before he completed them. These restrictions on his curiosity gave him an insight into the problems of inquiry and gave rise to his life-long impatience with doctrine. He remembers particularly the orthodoxy of St. Joseph's and the contradictions between the British history he had learned at primary school and the "St. Patrick's Day and Ireland" approach at the College. His mother regularly bought newspapers and these formed a link between the world at large and the College to which Murray did not wholly belong. At the end of 1907 the College applied for a university bursary on Murray's behalf and he was awarded a half-grant of £25 per year. He took chemistry, in which he already excelled, and he was advised to take Latin, French and mathematics as well. After a year marked by a good deal of self-discovery despite (or perhaps because of) the fact that he lived at home, Murray gained a High Distinction in chemistry and failed his other subjects. He then obtained a cadetship in the State public service, being posted to the Chemist's Branch at Cowra Experimental Station in 1909.

University, war service and a career

Murray began the agriculture course at Sydney University in 1911 as a member of the second group to enter the faculty. He gained Upper Second Class Honours in 1914 - being very close to a First - as well as taking three extra Arts subjects in each of the last two years of the Agriculture degree and graduating in Arts in 1915. It was typical of Murray that he repaid £25 to the bursaries fund for his earlier failure in Arts I. During his last two years at the University Murray lived at St. John's College on a scholarship. The rector, Monsignor O'Brien, "was kind and freely available, sympathetic in philosophical discussions generally and in relation to theism, atheism and agnosticism, which rather absorbed me".[3] Murray was a member of the University of Sydney Regiment and a first-class rifle shot, gaining an Imperial Universities Badge and the University Rifle Club gold medallion. He was awarded a University Diploma in Military Science in 1913 and, upon completing his degree and a few more months at Cowra, he went into the Army, being promoted Captain in 1916.

From July 1916 to January 1917 Murray served in the Sea Transport Service as adjutant on troop transports between Australia and England, but was then released and went to Hawkesbury Agricultural College, where he taught

3. Murray notes, p. 24.

for a few months. This did not satisfy him, and so he joined the Australian Army Veterinary Corps as a Private and again went overseas. After the Armistice, Murray was granted leave under the A.I.F. Educational Scheme to undertake the National Diploma in Dairying course at Kilmarnock, Ayrshire, where he topped the course in gaining his Diploma at the end of 1919. He returned home by way of an extensive tour of universities and diarying schools in Canada and the United States, arriving in Sydney in March 1920 to take up an appointment as Lecturer in Dairy Bacteriology and Technology at Hawkesbury. In December 1923 Murray was appointed Principal of Gatton Agricultural College, Lawes, Queensland, after interviews with J.D. Story and E.G. Theodore; and, in 1927, foundation Professor of Agriculture in the University of Queensland. He held both posts concurrently until his appointment as Administrator of Papua New Guinea in 1945.

Citizen soldier

In 1935 Murray joined the 25th Battalion, Darling Downs Regiment, from the Reserve of Officers, with the rank of Captain.[4] He achieved the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and command of the Battalion in 1939. In that year Murray volunteered for the 2nd A.I.F. and was a candidate for appointment as Brigade Machine Gun Officer in 18 Brigade. By this time, however, he was over

4. This section is based on Murray's notes, pp. 30-34.

50 and the recommendation for his appointment was not approved on the grounds of age. Instead, Murray was appointed G.S.O. II (Training) at Northern Command headquarters. While taking a staff officers' course at Seymour, Victoria in 1940, Murray was seriously injured in a Bren carrier accident and spent three months in hospital and convalescing. Upon his return to duty he was promoted Colonel and appointed Commandant of the Queensland Line of Communications Training Depot at Redbank, Queensland. In 1942 Murray was transferred from the Australian Military Forces to the A.I.F. and posted as second in command of the North Eastern Training Centre, an enlarged command created after the return of the 2nd A.I.F. from the Middle East campaign. Late in 1943 he transferred to Allied Land Forces Headquarters, Melbourne, initially to undertake a potentiality survey of the Northern Territory and to investigate such matters as the Army farms in the area. His reports were by no means favourable.

Murray and the Directorate

In Melbourne Murray met Conlon and some of his staff and joined the Directorate of Research towards the middle of 1944. Murray differed from almost all other members of the Directorate in several ways. Although he shared the breadth of education and interest of the other staff, his main training and profession lay in the area of the

sciences rather than the humanities. He was older than the great majority of his colleagues and possessed very much wider experience in both military and educational administration. Murray was a somewhat paradoxical figure: a liberal, tolerant humanitarian by upbringing and intellectual conviction, he was also a man whose attitudes had been shaped by the mores of the early years of the century and by the exercise of authority over a long period. The potential conflicts in these traits of Murray's character had not developed before the war and were unremarkable in a Directorate peopled by unorthodox personalities. However, in circumstances of tension within more ordered institutions they could lead to apparent contradictions in Murray's conduct.

While in the Directorate Murray was engaged more in survey work than in long-range legal and administrative planning, travelling throughout New Guinea, Papua and the British Solomon Islands. He does not claim to have been particularly close to other members of the Directorate, nor to have made a particular impression upon them prior to his appointment to the School of Civil Affairs. Murray worked initially with two veterinarians, A.F.S. Ohman and William Grainger, on agricultural and animal husbandry policy for the Northern Territory and Papua New Guinea. In late 1944 he was attached to Angau for visits to agricultural centres and training establishments in Papua, moving on to tour New Guinea with the assistance mainly of U.S. forces.

Murray's wartime observations in Papua New Guinea are too detailed and in many cases too technical to be dealt with in this study.[5] The main features were his visits to the Morobe, Manus, New Britain and Bougainville Districts, to the Highlands area and to Guadalcanal. Murray was at Finschhafen at the time of Mr. Ward's 1944 visit to New Guinea and subsequently discussed islands affairs with General Blamey in Port Moresby.[6] He particularly investigated the production of quinine at the experimental station at Aiyura (Eastern Highlands District) and his assessment of Manus as having "third-class" agricultural potential was a factor influencing his later advice to the Minister on the island's future.[7] Murray gained an accurate impression of the war's impact on the Territories and of the attitudes of the troops and Angau personnel. He was not unimpressed by Angau efforts, forming the opinion that the Unit played a part in changing old outlooks on the administration of New Guinea. Murray was developing a deep interest in the Territories and it is significant that his attitudes were shaped while he was a disinterested observer and researcher, beginning his investigations with only the most basic knowledge of the area. He has observed, "I

5. Details are in Murray's notes, pp. 35, 40-51.
6. The impression created by Ward during this visit, which is discussed later, was of considerable importance in determining public attitudes towards him and his associates (including Murray) in later years.
7. The Manus question is discussed in the next Chapter.

knew no more of...P.N.G. [in 1943] than the general run of Australians and that would be little indeed. Everything in most minds was subordinated to the needs of the S.W.P.A. situation (availability of labour and P.I.R. recruitment)."[8] But Murray was ready to learn more about the islands when he took charge of the School of Civil Affairs in 1945.

School of Civil Affairs

The first proposals for the School of Civil Affairs were made at least twelve months before its establishment in January 1945.[9] A strong case for it was made out in one of the Directorate of Research papers referred to in the previous Chapter. The paper argues:

> ....expansion of ANGAU raises the problem of training the selected recruits...They will lack the background knowledge necessary to deal with problems of native administration, which have become more difficult as a result of the war...This training is also needed by those members of the present staff who were taken into the unit without any previous training in colonial administration...The establishment of an Army school to provide this training is an immediate necessity...The course will be intensive, as it will need to be sufficiently short to permit all students to attend the school within a reasonable time.

Murray recalls that the School's function "was to train suitable candidates (volunteers from the services) for military government in P.N.G., Borneo, Morotai etc. as

8. Murray notes, p. 49. The abbreviations refer to the South-West Pacific Area and the Pacific Islands Regiment.
9. Like the Directorate of Research, the School of Civil Affairs left no records that are currently accessible.

areas south of the equator were occupied by allied forces".[10] The candidates were selected by interview panels which at various times included such people as Professor D.S. McElwain, Murray and Mr. Cyril Chambers, M.H.R. Staff were drawn mainly from the Directorate and provided a staff-student ratio of one to eight. Subjects studied included Law, Anthropology, Government and Geography in courses of three months duration. Murray supervised the first two courses, which were conducted within the Royal Military College, Duntroon. He requested that his appointment as Chief Instructor should be in an acting capacity only, since he wished to write up the findings of his New Guinea tour and conduct follow-up studies. Murray's most pleasing recollection of the School is that he was able to attend classes on New Guinea affairs conducted by experts in their fields, but it is likely that the staff were more difficult to administer even than most academics, and there were several clashes between lecturers and officers with New Guinea field experience.[11] Murray gave lectures on agricultural potential and development, but was otherwise engaged with administrative detail and with planning a permanent status for the institution.

10. The information in this and the following passage is drawn from Murray's notes, pp. 56-8.
11. Interviews with Mr. W.E.T. Tomasetti, 20 November 1968; Mr. G.C. O'Donnell, 15 June 1969; Mr. J.K. McCarthy, 8 November 1968. Among the staff of the School only Mr. Peter Ryan, who was tutoring students, had worked as a field officer in Papua New Guinea. No field staff ever held permanent academic posts at either the School of Civil Affairs or the Australian School of Pacific Administration.

It was the intention of Conlon and his advisers that the School should continue, as a civil institution after the war, to fill the serious gaps in the training of field staff for Papua New Guinea.[12] The aim was to seek affiliation with an established university, giving the peacetime institution a measure of autonomy by statute. The three-month introductory courses would be followed, once the students had gained some field experience, by two-year courses of full tertiary standard providing credits towards a degree. Conlon obtained some finance to begin work on a permanent site and Colonel Murray began negotiations with the Minister for Internal Affairs, Mr. J.S. Collings, for possible locations near the Canberra University College. However, Murray recalls, "the D.Q.M.G....was unsympathetic and unhelpful. The Army may well have had more urgent projects, but it was unfortunate for the School. Further pressure was of no avail".[13] This was a sign that the Conlon drive would falter for lack of a permanent institutional base. Few of the established New Guinea interests had reason to support the Army School. Pre-war administrative officers favoured training in the image of their old services. They saw their postings to courses as something of a reflection on their competence as field officers, and were unimpressed by the theoretical approach to subjects, particularly anthropology.[14] The Department of External

12. Murray notes, p. 58.
13. Ibid., pp. 58-9.
14. Interviews as in footnote 11.

Territories favoured training under its own control, as its later dealings with the Australian School of Pacific Administration showed. To the settler community the School represented the twin evils of continued military control of New Guinea and entrenchment of the policy favoured by Ward and Conlon. The settler attitude soon found expression through Robson and the Pacific Islands Monthly.

In an unattributed article in the June 1945 article of the Monthly, Murray first came to public attention in connection with New Guinea affairs. The circumstances and tone of the article, as well as its treatment of Murray, set the pattern for press comment on his role in New Guinea for the next seven years: he was associated with the problem, but not singled out for blame. "Depressing End of the First Class" is the sub-heading of the article, which maintains that the plan for the School was "faulty in conception", without stating what that conception should have been. It continues:[15]

> The plan seems to have been the product of the combined genius of Mr. Ward, Minister for External Territories, and Colonel Conlon, who is called a "Director of Army Research", but who has been described disrespectfully to us in other language. He seems to have much to do with the School, but has no apparent standing in connection with Territories administration...Present information suggests that there was too much anthropology in

15. P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 11, June 1945, p. 17. The article refers to "statements made to this journal" and gives details which would have been known only to individuals closely associated with the School. It was probably provided by a pre-war officer attending the first short course in early 1945.

> the School, and too much Conlon everywhere...The students describe the School itself as a farce... The students expected that the School would give them a well-rounded-out picture of tropical administration. Instead, it was devoted to a very large extent to instruction on native affairs and native welfare. European and economic affairs were comparatively neglected. "It was definitely an Eddie Ward show, so far as atmosphere and politics were concerned," said one student... Little improvement can be expected until the School is freed from Labour Party politics, Canberra bureaucracy, Army headquarters and anthropology rampant.

However, the article specifically absolves from blame for this situation "the man in charge (Colonel Murray, an expert agriculturalist) or the Second in Command (Colonel Piddington, an anthropologist)". There were probably two reasons for Murray's escape on this occasion: his manner was too obviously military to invite attack and the opposition wished to concentrate their spleen upon the men whom they then saw as the main threats to their positions. The article also bears out the impression gained by some officers who attended the early courses at the School that Murray was a reserved figure, not obviously associated with the Conlon group.[16] Murray has stated, however, that he continued to be closely involved with planning, being drawn further into New Guinea affairs owing to a growing interest in the survey of agricultural potential he had begun; at one time he considered applying for the position of post-war Director of Agriculture.[17] But as

16. Interviews as in footnote 11.
17. Murray notes, p. 59; Murray interview, 14 December 1966.

far as Murray was aware there was some time before firm decisions would be required.

Administrator wanted

In mid-1945 the Directorate of Research was planning on the basis that hostilities would end in about twelve months time, or possibly as late as the end of 1946.[18] The assumptions were that the Japanese would be slowly "mopped-up" from the islands bypassed in MacArthur's advance; that the campaign against the Japanese islands would be long and costly; and that, in the intervening period, stability would have to be restored by military administrations in the areas previously occupied by the Japanese. Once this had been achieved there would be a phased transfer of control back to civilian authorities. This was the meaning of the "smooth transition" to civil government propounded in the position paper referred to in the previous Chapter. An important assumption in the paper was that the military administrations, having progressive views inculcated by the School of Civil Affairs, would be able to institute sufficient reforms to make it impossible for the restored civil administrations to revert to pre-war policies. In Papua New Guinea progress was to begin with the appointment of a suitable Administrator in 1945, giving him time to settle in and

18. Murray notes, p. 52; Murray interview, 12 December 1966; Kerr interview, 30 June 1969. The restoration of civil administration is discussed in the next Chapter.

arrange an orderly assumption of responsibility. The positions of Administrator and directors of Public Health, Education, Agriculture and Public Works were advertised in the Commonwealth Gazette in July 1945 and later in Army Routine Orders and the press, including, ironically, the Pacific Islands Monthly.[19] By the time applications closed, atomic bombs had been dropped in Japan and the war was over.

In August 1945 Murray was visiting the main Army camps in eastern Australia, interviewing candidates for short courses at the School of Civil Affairs.[20] While at Liverpool, near Sydney, he felt ill and was admitted to Concord hospital with malaria and appendicitis. While there he read the Routine Order advertising the position of Administrator, applications for which closed on 31 August 1945. Murray submitted a brief, rather poorly typed application just before the closing date.[21] On 16 September he was advised that he had been appointed Administrator of the Territory of Papua-New Guinea under the provisions of the Papua-New Guinea Provisional Administration Act 1945.

Leonard Murray

Two obvious questions arise concerning Murray's

19. Commonwealth of Australia, Government Gazette No. 144, 26 July 1945; Army Routine Orders, 10 August 1945; P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 1, August 1945, p. 10.
20. Murray notes, p. 54.
21. The source of this information cannot at present be disclosed.

appointment. Why was a man with New Guinea experience not appointed? And, if not an experienced man, why, particularly, Colonel Murray? It was not for want of pressure in favour of an experienced Administrator, nor owing to a dearth of candidates with other careers of some distinction. Of the two candidates with pre-war standing, Brigadier-General Sir Walter McNicoll, Administrator of the Mandated Territory from 1934 until the Japanese occupation, was 68 years of age in 1945 and too old to be considered.[22] In any case, his departure from New Guinea had occurred in unfortunate circumstances, and there was no indication that any section of the Territory's community favoured his return.[23]

By contrast, the last Administrator of Papua, Hubert Leonard Murray, was in a strong position until the early months of 1945, at which time he was 58 years old, healthy and alert.[24] His background as a colonial official was virtually impeccable, beginning with his appointment as private secretary to his uncle, Sir Hubert Murray, Lieutenant-Governor of Papua, in 1909. Leonard Murray, as he was generally known, subsequently served as official secretary to the Lieutenant-Governor from 1916 until Sir Hubert Murray's death in 1940. Leonard was not merely

22. Hasluck, op. cit., p. 669. An unofficial report in late 1944 stated that McNicoll had retired (P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 3, October 1944, p. 7).
23. The fall of Rabaul is discussed later in this Chapter.
24. Details in this passage are drawn from Pacific Islands Yearbook and Who's Who, 10th edition, Sydney, Pacific Publications, 1968, p. 694.

a manager of social affairs and ceremonies, if only because there was little of either during Sir Hubert's long tenure. In the manner of the impoverished Papuan service, he served also as master of the Lieutenant-Governor's official yacht, the Laurabada, accompanying his uncle on his many tours of Papua and gaining a knowledge of the country second only to Sir Hubert's. During this period he was appointed a member of the Executive Council and made a Commander of the Order of the British Empire. The office of Lieutenant-Governor lapsed at Sir Hubert's death and Leonard succeeded his uncle as Papua's chief executive when he was appointed Administrator, for a five-year term, on 16 December 1940. By that time even the settler community had become reconciled to the benevolent paternalism of the "Murray tradition", which seemed destined to continue for many years, at no great cost to the taxpayers and with marginal benefit to the people of Papua.

Suspension of Papuan Administration, 1942

At the time Leonard Murray was appointed Administrator, life in Port Moresby had already been disturbed to some extent by the presence of Australian soldiers, the first of whom had arrived early in 1939.[25] By the time the war with Japan broke out there were some 1,250 troops in Port Moresby under the command of Brigadier (later

25. Barry, Civil Administration, op. cit., p. 3.

Major-General) Basil Morris, who had arrived in Papua in May 1941.[26] Relations between the civil administration and the military authorities were marked by no more than minor tensions, such as the question of the Army's use of the Port Moresby sports ground, until additional troops arrived aboard the liner Aquitania in January 1942.[27] The soldiers were alleged to be poorly trained and badly equipped. Their presence in Port Moresby created some problems of discipline and hygiene, so that in mid-January Murray complained to Canberra that he was not being kept informed by the military authorities. On 23 January there was a false air raid alarm, causing most of the Papuans in the town to flee. An actual raid then took place in the early hours of 3 February, damaging a number of buildings, including major commercial centres such as the Burns Philp store. Many buildings were looted by troops during the next forty-eight hours and Port Moresby became virtually ungovernable, particularly since the civil administration had been disrupted by a call-up of all able-bodied Europeans on 27 January.

By this time Morris was anxious to assume control, and Murray was ready to agree, but for two factors: Morris' peremptory treatment of civilians in general and the Administrator in particular; and the Australian government's conflicting advice on whether the military

26. Ibid.; Dudley McCarthy, op. cit., p. 42.
27. The information in this and the following passage is drawn from Barry, Civil Administration, op. cit., pp. 3-26.

should take charge.[28] Murray eventually authorised an order that outstations in Papua be evacuated, but made no specific reference to the future welfare of the village people. In the event, the instruction was received at only some centres and none of the officers at those places acted upon it.[29] Relations between the civil and military authorities had meanwhile degenerated to the point of chaos. Finally, on 12 February 1942 the National Security (Emergency Control) Regulations were gazetted, vesting authority in the "Senior Officer of the military forces" and directing all other persons to comply with his orders.[30] After one last delay caused by further breakdowns in communication between the Administrator and Canberra, Murray and his senior officials left Port Moresby by flying boat on 15 February. Leonard Murray never again visited Papua in an official capacity.

Rejection of Leonard Murray

During the war years the Administrator of Papua spent most of his time apart from the centre of events. Late in 1942 Committees of Review were set up to advise the government on claims for war damage compensation lodged by European former residents of the Territories, and Murray was made a member of the Papuan group; this was

28. The events of the period are too complex to be detailed here, but Barry, ibid., pp. 8-9, 13-16 discloses an extremely confused situation that was caused to some extent by the Canberra authorities.
29. Ibid., pp. 17-18.
30. Ibid., p. 22.

his last formal duty. The Committees met approximately twice a month during 1943 and rather less frequently in 1944, being disbanded the following year.[31] There is no evidence of direct links between the settlers and Murray during this period, and none of the press statements on Papuan affairs was attributed to him.[32] The Pacific Islands Monthly went to some pains to dissociate Leonard Murray from anti-government comments, stating, "....the hon. Leonard Murray has courteously but firmly declined to supply any information to the newspapers".[33] Murray was equally removed from any association with the other interests dealing in Papuan affairs. He had no dealings with the Directorate of Research; his standing with Major-General Morris of Angau was low following the events of early 1942; he was unknown to the Minister for External Territories; and the Secretary of that department, Murray's only formal link with Papua, had almost no influence on events while the war lasted. However, Murray was a potentially important figure in the anti-Labor campaign being fought by the settlers. From their point of view it was far preferable to have the Murray paternalism extended to the whole of the post-war Territories than to face the avowedly anti-settler policies of the Minister and the Directorate. Thus from

31. P.I.M., Vol. 13 No. 9, April 1943, p. 37.
32. Occasional articles, such as "Govern or Get Out!" (P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 1, August 1944, p. 22) were attributed to a "former member of the Papuan public service" who was an "authoritative voice", but the material lacks polish and it is unlikely that Murray was associated with it.
33. P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 3, October 1944, p. 7.

the early months of 1944, with the whole of Papua firmly in allied hands, there were demands for the return of civilians and the restoration of civil administration to that Territory, with Leonard Murray resuming his post as Administrator.

On 30 March 1944 Mr. A.W. Fadden asked a series of six questions in the House of Representatives on the future government of Papua New Guinea, mentioning Leonard Murray's name in three of them. The direction of Fadden's criticism, and of the settlers' concern, was indicated in the following exchange, to which the Pacific Islands Monthly added its own supplementary answer:[34]

Fadden:

> Can the Minister say why Mr. Leonard Murray and certain members of his staff have been largely ignored by him in favour of unfledged Sydney University personnel, University professors and former members of the British colonial staff largely inexperienced in New Guinea conditions?

Ward:

> Future policy in regard to the Territories has been entrusted to a Committee of Cabinet which will obtain the best advice available. All the data in the possession of the Department of External Territories and the officers of that Department will be available to the Committee. The Committee will also have at its disposal the valuable experience gained by the military authorities during the past two years...

Pacific Islands Monthly:

> Replies which might truthfully have been made by the Minister:
> ...Mr. Leonard Murray, members of his staff and all experienced residents of the Territories have been ignored by the Minister in dealing with plans for the Territories, because it is feared that these persons' views would almost certainly be unanimously at variance with those of the...clerks and politicians

34. P.I.M., Vol. 14 No. 10, May 1944, p. 5.

> of Canberra. In the Territories there is a splendid opportunity to experiment with and popularise many new ideas of politicians, without fear of political results....

The Minister's reply suggests that Leonard Murray was, in fact, being excluded from planning, since he was neither an officer of the Department of External Territories nor one of the military authorities. Nevertheless, he was still head of the "Papuan Administration, temporarily suspended", as Murray himself termed it,[35] with a legitimate claim to a part in both war-time planning and post-war administration, according to the situation prevailing in 1944. Late in that year, however, it became apparent that Leonard Murray's position was under serious threat.

The Barry Commission

In its issue of October 1944 the Pacific Islands Monthly reported that "a leading Melbourne K.C." had been asked by the Minister for External Territories to inquire into the suspension of civil administration in Papua. The magazine continued prophetically:[36]

> Well-informed people are quite sure that the object of the inquiry is to blacken Mr. Leonard Murray, and the reputation of the Murray regime. It is indicated that neither the Port Moresby Brass Hats, nor Mr. Ward, are well-disposed towards Mr. Murray. Mr. Murray is a Menzies Government appointee, and

35. Ibid.
36. P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 3, October 1944, p. 7. The Latin can be translated, "One word is enough for the wise!"

> is a member of a very famous family - two good reasons why he should now be hated in Canberra. He also is one of the remaining man (sic) between the Brass Hats and the fat jobs which will be available in Australia's Pacific Territories, sooner or later, for out-of-work generals. Verbum sapienti sat est!

On 17 November 1944, Ward appointed Mr. John Vincent Barry, K.C. as Commissioner under the National Security (Inquiries) Regulations to investigate:[37]

> 1. All the circumstances relating to the suspension of the Civil Administration of the Territory of Papua in February, 1942.
> 2. Without restricting the generality of 1, the following particular matters:-
> (a) Whether the Administrator and/or any members of the Legislative Council and/or any members of the Executive Council of Papua failed in their public duty to safeguard the Territory;
> (b) Whether any action taken or omitted to be taken by the Military Commandant of the 8th Military District prior to noon on 14th February, 1942, contributed to any failure on the part of the Civil Administration of the Territory;
> (c) Whether there was adequate co-operation between the Civil Administration and the military authorities in the Territory and if not who was responsible for the absence of such co-operation; and
> (d) All other matters deemed relevant to the above.

The Commissioner heard evidence on eighteen days between 12 December 1944 and 16 February 1945, sitting in Melbourne, Sydney, Townsville and Port Moresby, and submitting his report on 29 March 1945, the findings being made public in June.[38] In the meantime, the Papuan Association of Brisbane had been formed in January 1945 with the major objective of the "immediate restoration

37. Barry, Civil Administration, op. cit., p. iii.
38. Ibid., pp. 1, 60; P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 11, June 1945, p. 3.

of Murray Administration in Papua",[39] while the Anglican Bishop of New Guinea, Rt. Rev. P.N.W. Strong, urged in March that the "Murray regime" be re-established.[40] Their efforts were of no avail, since the Commissioner's report damned Leonard Murray in circuitous but unmistakeable terms. The Pacific Islands Monthly summary of the findings was, apart from an occasional adjective, clear and accurate:[41]

> The only man whom the Commissioner criticises harshly - in fact, the only man whom he criticises at all - is the Administrator, Mr. Murray. He wraps his conclusions in courteous and even sugary language; but, in effect, he says that (a) Mr. Murray was thin-skinned, hypersensitive and legalistic in his attitude towards the Commandant; (b) Mr. Murray, to a degree that was deplorable in the circumstances, insisted upon frequent consultation with the Australian Government, at Canberra; (c) Mr. Murray in his attitude towards the Army on his doorstep, was withdrawn and unco-operative; (d) Mr. Murray, in his communications with Canberra and Army, in the critical fortnight under review, showed no particular concern for the welfare of the natives, which should have been his particular care.

The Commissioner's language, by constrast, seemed to be an exercise in obfuscation. When summing up the Administrator's reaction to the circumstances, to "state the matter compendiously," Barry wrote:[42]

> I consider the Administrator was, if I may use the phrase, the prisoner of circumstances, and those circumstances were of a kind so over whelming and so foreign to anything which his experience and training had made him familiar and the powers he had been accustomed to exercise enabled him to deal that it would be exacting an unresonably high standard to ascribe the necessity to make the military authorities supreme to any censurable failure on his part.

39. P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 7, February 1945, p. 13.
40. Sydney Morning Herald, 17 March 1945.
41. P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 11, June 1945, p. 3.
42. Barry, Civil Administration, op. cit., p. 56.

In other words, Leonard Murray had behaved only in the manner of a normal man during the crisis. Why this should have been reason to remove the Administrator from his job requires investigation.

The circumstances surrounding the setting up of the Barry commission of inquiry were unusual and its proceedings and findings were to some extent partial, in the double sense that they tended to favour the military and that, by a legal device, they dealt with only some of the events between December 1941 and February 1942. A further question concerned the reasons for inquiring into events in Papua and not into the fall of Rabaul, which led to considerable loss of civilian life. The anomaly did not escape R.W. Robson who, on 12 January 1945, asked the Minister to add to Barry's terms of reference the circumstances surrounding the stranding of hundreds of civilians in Rabaul just before the Japanese invasion.[43] On that occasion the M.V. Herstein, a cargo vessel of some 5,000 tons, was in Rabaul for several days before the Japanese sank her during their major air raid of 20 January 1942.[44] The Administrator, Sir Walter McNicoll, was in Lae, where he had been taken ill, but the Government Secretary, Mr. H.H. Page, asked the Australian government for permission to use the ship to evacuate civilians. In

43. P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 6, January 1945, p. 6.
44. Hasluck, op. cit., p. 674. The remainder of the passage is drawn from this source.

the event, the Herstein was sunk, Rabaul was bombed and no reply was received, but even had it arrived it would have given Page little comfort, since it merely suggested that unnecessary personnel should be evacuated where possible and that administrative staff should remain so long as they had work to do. Subsequently, hundreds of civilians died as a consequence of the Japanese invasion. However, it was not until the announcement of the Barry inquiry that concerted pressure arose for an investigation into the Rabaul disaster. Not surprisingly, R.W. Robson and the Pacific Islands Monthly played a leading role, to be joined by Messrs. A. Cameron and H.L. Anthony, who led the campaign in the House of Representatives.[45] On 28 June 1946 a debate in the House on the fall of Rabaul, Ambon and Timor produced the following statement from the Prime Minister, Mr. Chifley:[46]

> I see no purpose in raking over the dead ashes of the past. That opinion is held by men occupying higher positions in the world than I hold...I shall not order a survey of what has happened in the past, or be a party to the making of charges against people who, although they made mistakes believed at the time that they acted for the best.

Unfortunately, the policy was announced many months too late to be of any help to Leonard Murray.

The choice of Mr. J.V. (later Mr. Justice Sir John)

45. C.P.D., Vol. 187, pp. 1948-9, 1966-8, 27 June 1946.
46. Ibid., p. 1977, 28 June 1946. A military court of inquiry into the Rabaul, Timor and Ambon episodes was convened on 13 May 1942, but its findings were not, of course, binding on any civil authorities involved (Hasluck, op. cit., p. 674).

Barry to conduct the civil administration inquiry was less than politic, in view of the questions which had already been asked about relations between Leonard Murray and the Minister for External Territories and the fact that Barry had represented Mr. Ward during the Royal Commission into the "Brisbane Line" controversy. Moreover, the Commissioner's terms of reference were unusual in two important respects: they ordered an investigation into actions taken in accordance with an executive direction, and aimed that investigation not primarily at the military authorities who may have hastened or hindered the carrying out of that direction, but at the officers who obeyed it. Since no loss of life occurred as a result of the acts or omissions of Murray and his staff and the only damage arose from Japanese action and looting by Australian troops, Mr. Robson and members of the Australian Opposition were justified in questioning the government's attitude to both Leonard Murray and the debacle at Rabaul. The actions of the Australian authorities in these matters were extraordinary in their inconsistency.

Proceedings during the commission of inquiry were equally remarkable. Firstly, the hearings were held in camera (the Commissioner termed it "in private") since "the evidence would involve matters relating to national Security", although the effect on the war effort of events which had occurred almost three years earlier can

only be guessed at.[47] Secondly, although the Commissioner was assisted by counsel and another officer "was given leave to appear on behalf of any Army witnesses who were required to give evidence", the interests of the Papuan staff were merely "watched" by a former legal officer of the Territory service who was also a witness during the proceedings.[48] Thirdly, the inquiry concentrated on the particular matters in the terms of reference (item 2) rather than on "all the circumstances" specified in item 1. Thus it made no criticism of the Australian authorities, who had persisted with a system of dual control, through both the Ministers for the Army and External Territories, which had produced a series of conflicting and contradictory orders to the Administrator and the Commandant. It is worth noting that there was strikingly similar confusion in communications just prior to the fall of Rabaul.[49]

The thrust of the inquiry was directed at the conduct of the civil authorities and only incidentally at the Army. Of the 202 paragraphs of the report, 40 deal with introductory and technical matters and conclusions, 143 concern the structure and conduct of the civil administration and events on outstations, and only 19 refer directly to the military. There are, moreover, two sections in the passages dealing with the

47. Barry, Civil Administration, op. cit., p. iii.
48. Ibid.
49. Hasluck, op. cit., pp. 673-4.

Army that go to extreme lengths in suggesting mitigating circumstances for the unruly conduct of the troops. Paragraph 18, dealing with the arrival of soldiers on the Aquitania on 3 January 1942 states, "The troops were of the average age of 18½ years and had received no proper training."[50] It was obviously impossible for them to be so young on average, unless their officers and N.C.O.'s were teenagers and other ranks barely out of school,[51] and a later check of battalion records showed that the average age among some 3,000 troops was 23 to 25 years, with an average of 8.3 months training.[52] In paragraph 67, one of only two dealing with looting by the troops, some 400 words of the transcript of evidence is quoted, with the apparent intention of showing that the looting offences were excusable under the circumstances.[53] The subsequent paragraph of the report is worth quoting in full to illustrate the lenient attitude adopted towards the responsibilities of a military commander:[54]

> I am satisfied that the looting did not assume large proportions until after the second bombing raid but thereafter it is undoubted that the theft and

50. Barry, Civil Administration, op. cit., p. 4.
51. The assertion is repeated in Dudley McCarthy, op. cit., p. 44.
52. Hasluck, op. cit., p. 696.
53. The only other direct quoting of evidence occurs in a passage which shows Leonard Murray to have been excessively formal in his dealings with both the Commandant and the Commissioner (pp. 52-3 of the report).
54. Barry, Civil Administration, op. cit., pp. 25-6.

> destruction of civil property was general and extensive. I do not consider that it is part of the duties imposed upon me to examine the question of looting generally, but it is proper, however, that I should make some observations upon it. It must be borne in mind that there was a general belief in Port Moresby, which all the knowledge then available suggested to be well-founded, that the enemy would attack and invade Port Moresby. If such an attack and invasion had been undertaken by the enemy at that stage it could have had only one outcome. The resources at the disposal of the Commandant were quite inadequate to enable any attack in strength to be repelled, and the general feeling was, therefore, that civilian property would either be destroyed by air attack or bombardment or fall into the hands of the enemy. Under such circumstances it is not surprising that respect for private property, particularly where there was any appearance of abandonment, diminished to such an extent as no longer to act as a restraining influence. The civil administration was powerless to prevent the looting, and even if it had been functioning in full vigour, it could not have done so. Because of the lack of discipline of the troops under his command and the worthlessness of his insufficient Provost personnel, it was quite impossible for the Commandant, confronted as he was with an extraordinarily difficult and complicated situation, to take any effective steps to prevent the looting. I feel that to consider the Commandant blameworthy in respect of any of the looting that occurred between the first bombings and the departure of the members of the civil administration on the 15th February (and it is with this period only that I am concerned) would be to take a completely unrealistic view of the matter.

The passage discloses several anomalies. The first is that the looting was one of "all the circumstances" set down for investigation in the first of the terms of reference. It obviously played a major part, together with the call-up of civil personnel, in creating almost impossible conditions for the Administrator, and should therefore have been acknowledged as a key factor in his defence. Secondly, the offence of looting occurs precisely in the conditions which are described in the

passage: the circumstances create the offence; they do not excuse it. Thirdly, discipline must ultimately be the responsibility of a commander; there may be extenuating circumstances, but if in this case they were sufficient to exonerate the Commandant, then they should have gone even further towards pardoning the Administrator. The circumstances outlined in this paragraph of the report were precisely those which led the Administrator to order the abandonment of the outstations; an action for which he, by contrast, was criticised.[55] Thus the only conclusion is that a double standard was applied to the conduct of the military commander, on the one hand, and to that of the civilian official, on the other. A second inquiry into the same circumstances may well have concluded that the Administrator did his best, albeit in an unimaginative way, under conditions rendered intolerable by the precipitate conscripting of his staff, by the looting of much of his capital by supposedly friendly soldiers, and by the inability of the Army commander to control his troops. It is not difficult to agree with Robson's contention that the inquiry was meant to "blacken" Leonard Murray. This was its effect: thereafter any application by Leonard Murray for the position of post-war Administrator was bound to be rejected.

Colonel J.K. Murray, Administrator

There were 53 applicants for the position of

55. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

Administrator. They included five Major-Generals, an Air Vice-Marshal, two Brigadiers, two Group-Captains, two judges, several academics and a number of officers of the pre-war Administrations of the Mandated Territory and Papua.[56] The applicants were reduced to a short list of eighteen names, excluding Colonel Murray's: he was placed well down the list on the grounds that he lacked experience. At that point the leading contender was a senior military officer who had played a leading part in several of the Army's major campaigns: a former regular soldier and solicitor. Close contenders were the judges, an academic and Leonard Murray. From the accounts of those who were close to events in Canberra during September 1945 it seems that the recommendations by the Department of External Territories came to the attention of Conlon, who immediately protested to the Minister that they were unsuitable.[57] The matter came before Cabinet on 11 September 1945. Colonel Murray's appointment was confirmed.

Murray has observed, "I have read that Conlon 'forced' my appointment on E.J. Ward. I doubt anyone's ability to force something on Ward, who...came up through a hard school....".[58] In any event, the fact that Conlon exerted pressure on his behalf is no

56. The source of the information contained in this and the following passage cannot at present be disclosed.
57. Interviews with Sir John Kerr, 30 June 1969 and Mr. J.K. McCarthy, 8 November 1968. McCarthy said that Conlon "blew his top and stormed off to Ward". Kerr termed the Murray appointment Conlon's "last fling" as Director of Research.
58. Murray letter of 26 May 1969.

reflection on Murray's suitability for appointment. The short list was drawn up in the Department of External Territories, where appreciation of what was required in the post-war situation differed from that of the Minister and his advisers in the Directorate. In seeking change, Ward was wholly consistent in favouring Conlon's recommendation of Murray as Administrator.

Murray was still recovering in Concord Repatriation Hospital when, on 16 September, he was advised of his appointment. He was eager to begin work and suggested to the Secretary for External Territories that he should aim to take over by 15 October. Murray's discharge from the Army was completed on 10 October and he was sworn in by Mr. Ward in the Minister's Sydney office on the following day.[59] The appointment was for twelve months in the first instance but, in accordance with the provisions of the Papua-New Guinea Provisional Administration Act, Murray held office "during the pleasure of the Governor-General". A salary of £2,500 plus £500 expenses was requested by the Department of External Territories, but approval was given for £2,000 plus £500. Leonard Murray's salary, by comparison, had been £1,500 plus £150 allowance for his also serving as navigator of the official yacht Laurabada. There was no income tax in

59. Murray notes, op. cit., p. 55. The rest of the information in this passage is drawn from a source which cannot at present be disclosed.

Papua New Guinea during Murray's term as Administrator. The Administrator was entitled to six weeks annual leave and the Residency in Port Moresby was wholly furnished and maintained by the Administration. No provision was made for long-service leave or superannuation.

Murray arrived in Papua in the third week of October and soon advised the Minister that the takeover of the area south of the Markham River should take place on 30 October. On 31 October 1945 Murray began a term of almost seven years as Administrator of Papua New Guinea.

CHAPTER FOUR

POST-WAR NEW GUINEA: CHAOS AND CONFLICT

Confusion in Port Moresby - Needs of civil government - Murray assumes control - Declaration of intent - Quest for staff - Difficult conditions - Return of the settlers Unsatisfactory shipping - Cancellation of labour contracts - The cancellation controversy - War damage compensation - Barry Committee on compensation - Differences on compensation - Problems of paying compensation - Settler opposition - Compensation and "collaboration" - Rebuilding Hanuabada - War surplus: its use and disposal - War surplus for settlers - Commonwealth Disposals Commission investigates itself - Murray settles in - Tensions with the military - Problem at Manus - Murray's impressive start

Confusion in Port Moresby

Colonel Murray arrived in Port Moresby to take up duty as Administrator on 23 October 1945, two and a half months after the first group of civilian

officials had begun preparations for the re-establishment of civil administration.[1] However, civilian organization was such that there was no one at the airstrip to meet him when he arrived.[2] One of the passengers on Murray's flight was Bishop Scharmach, of the Catholic Mission, and the new Administrator spent his first few official hours in Port Moresby having tea at the Bomana seminary, several miles from the town. "No one turned up from the Liaison Group," Murray recalls, "...D.E.T. had failed to let /them/ know. Later someone saw my name on a passenger manifest and the name rang a bell of sorts... When being driven in to Port Moresby we met a party from the Liaison Group and I completed the journey with it."[3] This episode of minor confusion was a mild introduction to the problems Murray had to deal with during the next several years with a weakened and inexperienced staff.

The half-dozen officials of the Liaison Group had been despatched by the Department of External Territories in some haste immediately the war ended. It was led by officers from the Department of the Army and included Mr. Robert Melrose, who had been Director of District Services and Native Affairs in the Mandated Territory at the outbreak of war.[4] The partywas responsible for making preliminary arrangements for the restoration

1. P.A.R., 1945/46, pp. 2, 9.
2. Murray notes, op. cit., pp. 54-5.
3. Ibid.
4. P.A.R., 1945/46, p. 2.

of civil control, "to determine in principle the method of transfer...and the supplies and equipment which the Civil Administration would require from stocks held by the Army, and to devise means by which services essential to both civil and military needs would be carried on so that transfer would be effected as smoothly as possible".[5] So the laboured style of the official summary put it, but the public servant's attitude was stated more succinctly in a memorandum which said the problem was to decide "who was liable for what".[6] The Army personnel soon returned to Australia,[7] and during the next two months Melrose carried a considerable burden of responsibility.

Melrose had worked in the Department of External Territories for most of the Pacific war. He had been in Salamaua when the Japanese occupied Rabaul,[8] but since he suffered from a heart condition he was unfit for service with Angau.[9] He had not been closely associated with the Directorate of Research, but Murray had come into contact with him and been favourably impressed. "I was very glad to have Melrose," Murray has written. "He was devoted to the Government new deal; slow to act, perhaps, for the conditions, but careful, hard working and pleasant."[10] In the weeks before civil

5. Ibid., p. 3.
6. CRS A518, item E852/6/11, 20 August 1945.
7. Ibid.; P.A.R., 1945/46, pp. 2-3.
8. Dudley McCarthy, op. cit., p. 55.
9. Hasluck, op. cit., pp. 690-1.
10. Murray notes, p. 55.

administration was restored, Melrose showed a clear grasp of the priorities involved and his reports to Canberra give a sharp picture of the work that had to be done.

While Angau controlled Papua New Guinea many of the facilities normally required by a civilian community went unattended; were converted to military use; or were damaged by enemy action or allied troops (and in some cases by both). The list of requirements compiled by Melrose was therefore a formidable one and indicated the range of problems facing the civil authorities. It included needs for shipping and air transport; the currency and confidential codes to be used in the country; the shortage of stoves and typewriters; the handling of village evacuees; and arrangements for taking over numerous Army installations, including slipways, docks operating equipment, medical stores, the old government printing office, hospitals, the Sogeri school, the rice and coffee mills, the telephone system, the power house, the water supply, the gaol, the constabulary and its training depot, and even the flora and fauna reserve at Hombrum Bluff, some twenty miles from Port Moresby.[11] However, there was almost no civilian staff to take control from the Army; even had there been, they would have lacked office accommodation, housing, motor vehicles and even personal

11. CRS A518, item E852/6/11, 20 August 1945.

clothing and food, since commercial activity had been suspended in Papua for three and a half years.[12] The first post-war annual report provided a graphic summary of the position:[13]

> Where to start was indeed a problem. The Army had everything, the civil authority nothing...A survey of the town was not encouraging. Buildings belonging to the Papuan Administration bore the traces of occupation by troops and of war; some had been damaged by bombs, others had fallen into disrepair and most of them needed a good deal of renovation and repair to fit them for civil use. There were not sufficient to accommodate all Departments and their staffs...The area and buildings, which comprised the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit headquarters at Konedobu about two miles from Port Moresby were accordingly taken over and as staff became available Departments moved in. It will be seen, therefore that administrative establishments and services are dispersed over a wide area...It is not without point in regard to the future to mention here that all buildings erected by Army were designed for Army needs and are therefore of a temporary nature with but a life of two or three years.

The annual report for 1945/46 was the last writeen in the informal style of Sir Hubert Murray's pre-war narratives,[14] but even then it does not give a complete picture of the depressing situation which confronted those who returned to Papua New Guinea shortly after the war. Particularly depressing was the damage caused by the troops, as a Pacific Islands Monthly correspondent

12. Ibid.
13. P.A.R., 1945/46, pp. 5, 8, 9.
14. From 1946/47 the annual reports for both Papua and the Trust Territory were tailored, in Canberra, to the format required by the United Nations Trusteeship Council; this involved a series of formal headings and voluminous statistics and virtually precluded any narrative.

pointed out:[15]

> I will never be able to work out why the troops (who, after all, were human beings), who occupied the houses here, could so wantonly, and unnecessarily and callously do such damage to the places. Some are worse than others, admittedly - some even being so bad that it is a question if they are worth doing up...What is known as the "Top" Hotel was just ready for occupation when the balloon went up; it was occupied by troops (whose, I do not know), but practically everything that could be pulled out, in light and water fittings, basins and fixtures of all descriptions, were just torn out - not any trouble being taken to avoid tearing a bit out of the walls in doing so. It was fully, and very well furnished. Today, it is a skeleton....

The civil authorities had cause for complaint against the armed forces, but could not do without them. It was necessary to call on Angau, the Production Control Board and various small units of the other services to run the coastal vessels, provide air transport, maintain telecommunications and postal services, supervise labourers and run the electricity generators and the water purification and refrigeration plants.[16] Civilians were in no position to provide for their own needs:[17]

> Apart from a store conducted by the Australian New Guinea Production Control Board, which catered in

15. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 1, August 1946, p. 64. At the time Robson and his staff were denied entry to Papua New Guinea (see Chapter Two, p. 95) and the journal relied on reports and letters from "special correspondents", some of whom, judging from the information they supplied, were public servants. This report refers to the Papua Hotel, owned by Burns Philp. The comment about the identity of the troops who lived there is disingenuous, for it was well known that the building had served initially

> a limited way for plantation and trade store requirements, a hostel which it had established in Port Moresby for the accommodation of civilians proceeding to and from plantations, and the Commonwealth Bank, which had been opened primarily to provide Savings Bank facilities for natives there was nothing in the nature of hotels, accommodation houses, shops and the many things required in civil life.

The smooth transition from military to civil control that had been planned in the Directorate of Research was clearly impossible, owing to the sudden end of the war and the speed of the military withdrawal from Papua. Nor could the civil authorities ignore settler interests, as the Directorate had tended to do.

Needs of civil government

The problems which confronted the civil administration call for some explanation: after all, military control had prevailed throughout the war and it might well be supposed that the civil authorities could resume operations very simply, with greatly expanded facilities available to them. Some of the factors which made this impossible have already been noted: the dispersal of Port Moresby's military installations, their temporary nature, and the destruction of many civilian assets. There were other difficulties. The great allied bases at Milne

(cont.) as General Macarthur's field headquarters, although the General himself had lived at Government House, near Konedobu. By 1945, however, Government House, too, was uninhabitable and Murray lived in a house nearby until makeshift repairs were completed.

16. P.A.R., 1945/46, pp. 5-6.
17. Ibid., p. 5.

Bay, Dobodura, Finschhafen and Manus were scattered away from the main lines of civil communication and from the largest centres of population.[18] To take advantage of the vast dumps of stores and equipment abandoned at the bases the civil administration required much labour and sea transport, but possessed neither. In any case, the accumulations of ammunition, heavy trucks, drums of bitumen, oil and aviation fuel, signal wire and rotting bags of cement were of limited use to a civil government. Moreover, the bases had in most cases been run down months before the Provisional Administration was set up, so that moveable items which could be of value at the main centres and outstations, such as jeeps, typewriters, furnishings and refrigerators, had suffered from the climate, pilfering and cannibalizing long before the civil authorities were ready to assume control. By that time, the Commonwealth War Disposals Commission had sold off much of the material, using peculiar procedures that are discussed later in this Chapter. Nor were there the tradesmen, equipment and spare parts to maintain the more useful assets. Port Moresby's network of wartime roads had almost washed away after two wet seasons and vehicles were simply abandoned by the side of the track when they broke down. For a time Papua New Guinea was an early model of the

18. Some materials from these bases were used by the villagers in the immediate vicinity, but little of the remainder could be transported in the small coasters available to the Provisional Administration (see below). Some smaller bases, such as Vivigani and Kiriwina, were even more isolated.

disposable society, except that there were no replacements for the items consumed. Before long, a country that had been transformed into a military warehouse had been thoroughly ransacked.

Murray assumes control

The difficulties encountered by the civil authorities were increased by the rapid transfer of military headquarters from Port Moresby to Lae prior to August 1945; Major-General Morris and his Angau staff followed on 27 September 1945.[19] The transfer resulted from the Australian government's wish to resume civil administration in the area south of the Markham River as soon as possible.[20] The Angau move was particularly unfortunate, since the Administrator, who had to rely on the Royal Australian Air Force for travel by aeroplane, could spare little time from the many crises in Port Moresby to conduct full liaison with the military and Angau commanders. It was also apparent that the tensions and rivalries that had characterised relations during the war between the Army in New Guinea and the various interests in Australia was being carried into the post-war situation; one of the officers who observed events throughout the period has maintained that the military "gave back New Guinea grudgingly and piecemeal",[21] and

19. P.A.R., 1945/46, p. 3.
20. The policy for resumption of civil administration and related matters is discussed in the next Chapter.
21. Interview with Mr. G.C. O'Donnell, 15 June 1969.

it is possible that one of the motives for the rapid withdrawal to Lae was Army pique. In the circumstances, Murray was in an uncomfortable position when the time came to assume control of the area south of the Markham River.

Murray flew to Lae on 27 October 1945 to arrange the transfer of control with Lieutenant-General Robertson, the General Officer Commanding New Guinea Force.[22] The agenda for the meeting included the takeover of the Highlands from the Army; the timetable for transferring other areas to civil control; demobilisation of the Pacific Islands Regiment; the supply of shipping; the transfer of personnel from the Army to the Provisional Administration; procedures for clearing imports through customs; personal particulars of Angau staff applying for post-war positions; and, finally, the return of the official yacht Laurabada and the Royal Papuan Constabulary Band to the Provisional Administration.[23] During the discussions it was agreed that, in accordance with Murray's recommendation to the Minister, he would assume control of the southern part of Papua New Guinea on 30 October. On the evening of 29 October a dinner to mark the occasion was arranged at the Lae Officers' Mess, but Murray declined to

22. Murray notes, p. 55. Murray had no direct dealings with Major-General Morris and Angau until after New Guinea Force was disbanded; subsequent negotiations are discussed later in this Chapter.
23. This passage is drawn from P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item 1-4-2, 27 October 1945.

attend, feeling that he should be in civilian territory at the time of assuming control.[24] Such a gesture may have seemed quixotic, but it was an early indication of Murray's concern for protocol. Thus a small party set off in a launch for Salamaua, some thirty miles south of the Markham River mouth, where before the war a town had been built to supply the Bulolo gold fields. Most of Salamaua had been destroyed during the war and the presence of Murray and his small staff, most of them still in military uniform, in the ruins of the small town, typified the uncomfortable and precarious position of the Provisional Administration. While the generals and their staff enjoyed dinner at the Lae mess and no doubt joked about the attitude of the new Administrator, the party at Salamaua ate their rations while Murray drew up the following proclamation in sweeping layman's terms:[25]

Declaration of Provisional Administration

In order to meet the requirements of any Act, Law, Ordinance, Regulation or any other requirement whatsoever of the Commonwealth of Australia or the Territory of Papua-New Guinea, I, Jack Keith Murray, hereby assume the duties of Administrator of the said Territory and, should it be required of the Administrator, declare that the Provisional Government of the Territory of Papua-New Guinea commenced to function this day.

J.K. Murray
Administrator

Before: W.J. Lambden, D.O.

Witnesses: H. Ian Hogbin, Lt.Col., L.H.Q. School of Civil Affairs
Lt. B. Wickham, Angau
Lt. H. West, Angau

24. Interview with Colonel Murray, 12 December 1966.
25. P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, item GH1-3-1, 30 October

The ceremony was an unnecessary formality, since the restoration of civil administration had been proclaimed by the Australian government on 25 October 1945,[26] but to Murray it was of symbolic importance in marking the beginning of the post-war era.

Declaration of intent

One of the new Administrator's first concerns was to draw the village people's attention to the fact that the troubled period of the war was at an end and that new policies were to begin. On 6 November 1945 Murray delivered the first of several "information" broadcasts (as opposed to the formal addresses that marked such occasions as the Queen's birthday) by the Administrator and his staff. Murray's concern for, and attention to such details is illustrated by the fact that he wrote the whole of his early talks, reading them from a series of large filing cards.[27] Significantly, the opening theme was a Papuan song, rather than some European anthem. The Administrator then told the people that, although the war was won, many soldiers and villagers were dead and the survivors should remember them. He promised that more money would be given to the country, particularly to improve education, which would be the "main contribution" of the government to the people.

(cont.) 1945 (the document was apparently drawn up after midnight; it is in Murray's handwriting).

26. Commonwealth Government Gazette No. 207, 25 October 1945.

27. P.N.G.N.A. Box 169, item GH1-9-6, 6 November 1945.

This broadcast was followed by another on 4 December 1945 in which Murray thanked the people for the "grand co-operation" they had already given him and the staff of the Provisional Administration and concluded with a quotation from John Stuart Mill: "With small men nothing great can be accomplished."[28] The broadcasts showed Murray's willingness to deal on even terms with whites and villagers alike, a quality that earned him a good deal of ridicule from both the settler community and certain members of his own Administration, who cited it as an example of Murray's inexperience in observing the rituals of colonialism.

Quest for staff

Having indicated his intentions to both the military and the people of Papua New Guinea, Murray was faced with the need to staff his Administration. Some steps had already been taken, beginning as early as 13 August, when a memorandum was circulated to several departments of the Commonwealth Public Service and to the various branches of Angau, requesting details of all personnel who had been members of the New Guinea or Papua public services at the outbreak of war.[29] There was little response from civilian departments, but by 30 August a list of 13 men serving in the Navy and 179 in the Army

28. P.N.G.N.A. Box 169, item GH 1-9-6, 4 December 1945.
29. CRS A518, item B852/6/11, 13 August 1945.

(including Angau) had been compiled.[30] A list of another 24 personnel serving with the Army was provided on 9 September, including 13 who had already served at the level of District Officer or who could be appointed at that level; the first of these were to be released from Angau by October 1945.[31] There were also staff recruited by Angau during the war who wished to join the Provisional Administration and others who were completing the second orientation course at the School of Civil Affairs. However, by January 1946 the number of experienced personnel available to the civil authorities was considered to be "negligible" and Murray was writing of problems he was encountering with Angau over the release of staff.[32] Further action by the Commonwealth Department of Post-War Reconstruction was urged in an effort to hasten demobilization; it was pointed out that the position would become critical as the Army withdrew progressively from large areas of the Territory of New Guinea.[33] Only one transfer was completed with little difficulty: the Royal Papuan Constabulary, which included several European officers, came under civil control on 6 November 1945.[34]

Difficult conditions

Although Murray had been told that pre-war officers

30. Ibid., 30 August 1945.
31. Ibid., 9 September 1945.
32. Ibid., 21 January 1946.
33. Ibid.
34. P.N.G.N.A. Box 185, item 28/3, 6 November 1945.

were anxious to leave the Army and return to civilian employment in Papua New Guinea,[35] the conditions then on offer to them were far from attractive. The main problem then, and for the next four years, was the uncertainty surrounding their appointments, conditions of service and future prospects. As long as the civil administration possessed only provisional status, it was not possible to make substantive appointments nor to determine a host of technical questions, such as seniority dates, superannuation rights, leave credits and the like.[36] This insecurity created only minor tensions during the first few months of the Provisional Administration, when it was believed that problems of organization and establishment would receive top priority and be settled in the near future, but it assumed great importance as the years passed.

Initially, the physical conditions facing the service were of greatest concern. The situation had been set out uncompromisingly by Melrose soon after his arrival in Port Moresby, where facilities were no better than those at an Army camp:[37]

> Officers will be provided with essential items of furniture (stretcher, chair, table) and electric light and power (240 volt) will be available. A central lounge will be available and, as far as

35. Murray notes, p. 79.
36. The problems and controversies involving the public service are discussed in Chapter Six.
37. CRS A518, item E852/6/11, 25 August 1945. The remainder of the passage, including quotations, is drawn from this document.

> possible, officers will be accommodated not more than two to each room...Meals will be provided and to conform to TNG Public Service practice, cost per day for accommodation and board will not exceed 5/3d (TNG Public Service Reg No 47). Assistance will be given to officers in securing the services of one native for personal and laundry duties. Wages and maintenance of natives to be the responsibility of the officer. Servants will be provided for dining room and general duties.
> Cyclos (deck tennis) courts will be provided... and the nearby football and cricket ground will be available. It is hoped to secure the use of a tennis court but tennis balls and racquets are not likely to be available. The centre will be thoroughly treated with DDT prior to use and at intervals during use.

Conditions for female staff were similar, "with added provision for sleeping quarters, bathing and sanitary conveniences to be within an enclosed area of the residence". No special consideration could be given to married officers and their families and provision could be made to bring from Australia only "items of lounge furniture, occasional tables, wireless sets etc., sufficient to meet needs on a bachelor basis". Plans were being made for the construction of temporary quarters for officers and their families, but here again there was a major element of uncertainty "pending decision in regard to [the site of the Territory's] future capital, town planning etc." Free issues would be made of atebrin, for the prevention of malaria, and quinine, for its treatment. However, "purchase of liquor and tobacco will be extremely difficult until Stores and Hotels are re-established. Action should be taken...for officers to purchase and bring to the Territory with them one

month's supply of tobacco based on Army ration scale"; a month's supply of liquor presumably presented too great a transport problem to be considered.

Paradoxically, staff who were posted to the more distant parts of the Territory usually faced fewer difficulties than those arriving in the towns, and particularly in Port Moresby. The procedures for handing over outstations were more nearly on a "walk-in-walk out" basis and this term was used in a circular issued by Angau in January 1946, instructing that the handover of goods and services should be completed by 28 February in those areas under civil control.[38] In such cases District Officers were to decide what was required, taking into account post-war needs, and although it was not clear how they would determine these requirements, this was a formality in some instances, where officers had to do little more than remove their Army badges of rank and remain on the job.[39]

The level of destruction on outstations varied considerably. The Western, Gulf, Delta and South-Eastern Divisions of Papua had experienced almost none of the direct effects of the war and routine maintenance had been possible, using Angau stores and equipment.[40] The

38. P.N.G.N.A. Box 185, item GH55/5, Angau Instruction 114 of 30 January 1946.
39. Arrangements were made for the demobilization of Angau staff while they remained in Papua New Guinea.
40. Murray notes, p. 78.

Highlands area suffered minor attacks from Japanese aircraft, with little effect, and since the area had been explored only in the 1930's the great majority of buildings were still of a temporary nature, constructed from undressed timber, thatch and plaited reeds ("kunai" and "pit pit"). The Central Division of Papua suffered, particularly near Port Moresby, from Japanese attacks and also from large-scale construction by allied forces. In the rest of the country - the Northern and Eastern Divisions of Papua and the Sepik, Madang, Morobe, Manus, New Ireland, New Britain and Bougainville Districts of New Guinea - there had been severe damage and many established stations, such as Aitape, Saidor, Salamaua, Jacquinot Bay and Sohano (to name but a few) had been virtually razed. Nevertheless, rebuilding in a fairly basic form was not particularly difficult. Although the villagers were exhausted, there were sufficient available near the established stations to begin reconstruction under the supervision of policemen and overseers, while "gavman" enjoyed a priority call on building materials from the forests and grasslands.[41] Additionally, Angau was able to hand over items such as furniture and refrigerators which could be shared on a community basis, and small lighting plants that greatly improved evenings which would otherwise have been spent under kerosene

41. This information is based on informal talks, over a period of years from 1955, with such officers and former officers as W.W. Crellin, M.J. Healey, A.T. Timperley, H.H. Jackman and D. Clifton-Bassett.

lanterns.[42] This is not to say that conditions were luxurious, even by pre-war standards, since imported fresh foods were unobtainable and shipping was disorganized and spasmodic, while in many areas the villagers had not been able to re-plant the gardens nor obtain the seeds for "European" vegetables which had provided some variety for the expatriate diet before the war.

Nevertheless, conditions in the towns were in some ways worse, since the private and official roles of public servants were more clearly defined than on outstations and it was therefore more difficult to obtain personal comforts under the guise of official need. It was difficult to find labour in the main centres, particularly Port Moresby and Samarai where the population was relatively sparse. Port Moresby also presented special difficulties for constructing temporary buildings, since the savannah country immediately surrounding it provides few suitable materials. But perhaps the greatest limit upon rebuilding the main centres was the conviction - which might be termed the "European town mentality" - that the dwellings and possessions of the white community should be demonstrably different from (and preferably superior to) those of the local population. Whites would not be keeping up to the expected standards, nor setting

42. Ironically, electricity was not again available on most small outstations for some twenty years after the Angau plants expired from longevity and overloading.

an "example", if they were seen living in houses built of "native" materials.[43] On the outstations, where such dwellings were the rule rather than the exception, wives and families were permitted to join their husbands "directly transport and supply is assured. If an officer is of the opinion that station conditions are suitable his application will be approved unless some extraordinary circumstance demands otherwise."[44] As a consequence, married field staff devoted some time to rendering houses fit for family life. Conditions were still extremely difficult, but as a rule outstation life could be more stable than that in the towns. The relatively early return of white women and children to isolated government posts helped to restore appearances of colonial normalcy and contributed in some measure to the surprisingly orderly resumption of administrative control in most areas.[45]

Return of the settlers

Civilian public servants found it extremely difficult to work effectively without the accustomed support of the private community, and particularly of the commercial sector, but the return of settlers was a mixed blessing, since it created new problems for the Provisional Administration. By October 1945 a limited number of

43. On European racial attitudes, see Chapter One, pp. 53-5, 58-63.
44. CRS A518, item E852/6/11, 25 August 1945.
45. This passage is based on talks with some of the wives who returned at that time, notably Mrs. L.J. Doolan and Mrs. J.K. McCarthy.

missionaries, planters, maintenance workers employed by oil and mining companies, and plantation managers working for the Production Control Board had been allowed to return to Papua, but they presented numerous problems and had to be accommodated and provisioned by the Control Board, drawing on Army supplies and services.[46] It was partly because of these difficulties that Angau and the Directorate had opposed the return of any large number of civilians to Papua during the last two years of the war.[47] However, the Department of External Territories did not envisage that the Provisional Administration would continue the self-contained operation which had characterised the war years; one of Melrose's first tasks was to draw up procedures and conditions for the return of certain civilians to the area south of the Markham River.[48] The fact that the External Territories advance party in Port Moresby paid such early attention to the needs of settlers indicates that the changing pattern of influence at the war's end, outlined in Chapter Two, began to affect policy as early as August 1945.

The factors limiting the return of the many hundreds of settlers in Australia included a general lack of transport, shortages of food, stores and materials of all kinds, lack of accommodation and a severely limited

46. CRS A518, item E852/6/11, 22 August 1945.
47. The evolution of this policy is discussed in Chapter Five.
48. It is interesting that Melrose dealt with the question of settlers three days before he outlined reception arrangements for public servants (CRS A518, item E852/6/11, 22 and 25 August 1945).

supply of labour. Upon their return they had no priority in the allocation of most materials and they relied even more heavily than the Provisional Administration on a regular supply of labour to carry on their plantation and commercial activities.[49] The intended policy was, nevertheless, that "evacuated residents who have property in the area be permitted entry and residence in order to preserve and rehabilitatie such property", with "firms and individuals previously operating in the area... invited to re-open stores for the supply of European needs (excepting trade goods for sale to natives), hotels and boarding houses".[50] However, it was clear that "restrictions must continue for at least six months on the classes of civilians who may take up residence in the area".[51] The restrictions were relatively severe. Civilians had to be assured of employment in "essential" undertakings, or be former residents, who had been principals of business firms, resuming their activities and able to supply their own accommodation and "the bulk of their maintenance supplies from Australia". Wives and children of these persons would be admitted if they could be wholly provided for.[52] Not surprisingly, few members of the settler community could meet these

49. CRS A518, item E852/6/11, 22 August 1945. The controversy surrounding the labour question is discussed later in this Chapter.
50. It was thought that sufficient trade goods would be available from Production Control Board stores, but this policy is still revealing in its order of racial priorities.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.

requirements in the initial period of civil control and it was not until April 1946 that the first large group, some 160 in number, arrived in Port Moresby aboard the Ormiston.[53] From this time, the official and private communities complemented each other in re-establishing European interests in the Territory, although the difficulties and tensions that remained were to flare up spasmodically and add to Murray's problems during the ensuing years.

Unsatisfactory shipping

One of the main factors which undermined public service morale during this period and led to growing unrest among the settler community was the chaotic state of shipping services, both with Australia and within Papua New Guinea. Before the war the Australia-New Guinea shipping service had been conducted by Burns Philp, who had faced very little competition and been one of the main targets of Mr. Ward's attacks against "monopoly" interests in the islands.[54] Burns Philp also owned a number of inter-island and coastal trading vessels, as did such smaller firms as W.R. Carpenter and Colyer Watson. There were, in addition, numerous small craft owned by planters, traders and recruiters: probably some three hundred in both Territories.[55] During the

53. P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 9, April 1946, p. 12.
54. Stanner, op. cit., pp. 101, 103, 117.
55. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 12, July 1947, p. 17.

war the four largest Burns Philp vessels were requisitioned by the Commonwealth Directorate of Supply and Shipping. One was sunk, one severely damaged and another remained in government service until 1948, so that at war's end only one passenger ship and some smaller freighters were on the regular Australia- New Guinea run, aided by vessels occasionally re-directed from overseas services.[56] These ships had inadequate capacity to supply New Guinea and further problems arose from the waterside strikes of the post-war period, delays in repairs owing to dockyard strikes and shortage of materials, and slow turnaround in New Guinea ports because of labour shortages.[57]

But perhaps the greatest difficulties arose from policy and management in Australia. The government controlled the movement of ships but lacked the staff to operate them, so that for practical purposes they were sailed by their original owners, who were thereby assured of a return on the marginal New Guinea routes and showed little desire to improve their efficiency.[58] There were further organizational problems in arranging supply from Australia. The Department of External Territories had set up a Sydney office in 1943 as a purchasing agency, initially to supply the Papua New Guinea Production

56. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 10, May 1947, p. 10; Stanner, op. cit., p. 117; P.A.R. 1945/46, p. 18.
57. Settlers blamed stevedoring problems, along with much else, on the policy of "spoiling the natives" (P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 3, October 1946, pp. 16, 45).
58. Stanner, loc. cit.

Control Board,[59] but the complex accounting procedures between Australia and New Guinea delayed payment of accounts and "it was said that suppliers often discriminated against Government".[60] This was one of the initial problems creating dissatisfaction in Port Moresby at the operations of the Department of External Territories.

Within Papua New Guinea the inter-island shipping services were equally unsatisfactory. Here, too, the Australian government brought shipping under official control, except for vessels of 25 tons or less.[61] The authorities in Australia presumably believed that the nucleus of a government fleet was available in Papuan waters from among the vessels requisitioned during the war; initial reports listed three substantial coasters, and over 100 launches, cutters, ketches and luggers.[62] However, few of these were suitable for official use and most were unfit for service: "....vessels which were plying on the coast during the war period had been required to give the utmost service without adequate repair or overhaul. These vessels were found to be unserviceable when Civil Administration was resumed."[63]

59. D.E.T., Notes on history etc., op. cit., p. 1.
60. Stanner, loc. cit.
61. Even the smallest vessels could be used only for the owners' passengers (mainly labourers) and freight (P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 2, September 1946, p. 9). Access to the main file on this subject - CRS A518, item G904/1 - was denied.
62. CRS A518, item E852/6/11, 17 August 1945. The count even included the 25 luggers of the Thursday Island pearling fleet.
63. P.A.R., 1945/46, p. 29.

It was recommended that almost all the small ships be sold by the War Disposals Commission or returned to their owners.[64] However, the military had so depreciated the assets it had commandeered that, when handed back, they were of only marginal value, and the Territory lacked the slipways, stores and skilled tradesmen to maintain even small vessels.[65] Nevertheless, the Australian government persevered with "socialised shipping", as the Pacific Islands Monthly termed it,[66] and in May 1946, after six months in which Angau provided all coastal facilities, the Papua-New Guinea Coastal and Inter-Island Shipping Board was set up, under the guidance of the Commonwealth Directorate of Shipping.[67]

Urgent measures were required of the Board, for the situation had become desperate. In March 1946 Murray complained to Canberra of an acute shortage of ships and of Angau's attitude, stating, "....military personnel... have lost interest now that the war is over".[68] This was followed in June by a request that the Navy repair the Dregerhafen slipway, and by a cable stating that the position was "extremely bad": Kikori and Misima stations were unable to carry out urgent field work owing to a

64. CRS A518, item E852/6/11, 17 August 1945.
65. P.A.R., 1946/47, p. 38. One of the main problems involved repairing "short life" wartime engines, spare parts for which could be obtained only in America (P.A.R., 1945/46, p. 44).
66. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 2, September 1946, pp. 2, 9 and No. 3, October 1946, p. 45.
67. P.A.R., 1945/45, p. 29.
68. P.N.G.N.A., Box 185 item GH35/2, 14 March 1946.

lack of sea transport, while the Army had still not released the necessary vessels from its pool at Rabaul, where the boats' equipment was being stolen by the people in the area.[69] The Shipping Board provided little relief, however, owing to long delays in recruiting staff. It was not until October 1946 that the Board advertised for personnel, and even then it was able to offer them only twelve months tenure in the first instance.[70] The Board's staffing situation reflected the uncertainties prevailing in the public service proper. This was one of several cycles of frustration that affected the work of the Provisional Administration: public servants who felt insecure about their conditions of service became more dissatisfied because of poor communications and supply, but their living conditions could be improved only slightly because the same insecurities made it difficult to man the ships. By neither allowing private shipowners to operate freely nor establishing an efficient government service, Ward created the worst possible situation for the Territory at a critical time; shipping services remained very poor until the early 1950's.[71]

Cancellation of labour contracts

An even greater controversy, encountered by Murray

69. P.N.G.N.A., Box 185, item GH38/4, 20 June 1946; item GH35/2, 10 July 1946.
70. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 3, October 1946, p. 69.
71. The Australia-New Guinea service was resumed by private owners in 1948. The coastal service remained in government hands until the Liberal-Country Party coalition came to power.

from the moment of his arrival in Port Moresby, stemmed from another of Ward's policy decisions. On 15 October 1945 the Minister had a proclamation issued in Port Moresby, and broadcast in the Pidgin and Motu lingua franca over radio station 9AA, directing that all labour contracts should cease from that date, although all labourers who wished to re-engage for employment were free to do so.[72] This was Ward's personal decision and one that was contrary to the advice he had received from Port Moresby and from the Directorate of Research. The initial direction from Melrose was that, while the policy should be to "avoid, as far as possible, the carry over to Civil Government the employment of labour impressed by the Army", there should be a "slow rundown" of contract labour to ensure stability in the country.[73] This recommendation was endorsed in a full report submitted by the External Territories liaison group on 20 August 1945.[74] However, on 18 September the Secretary for External Territories advised Melrose that all contracts would have to be cancelled.[75] Melrose replied that the order had created an "atmosphere of gloom" in Port Moresby and that it was considered by the Europeans there to be an "injustice to employers".[76] During the same period the Directorate of Research queried the decision and was advised by telegram, "Minister considers

72. P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 4, November 1945, pp. 7-8.
73. CRS A518, item E852/6/11, 14 August 1945.
74. Ibid., 20 August 1945.
75. P.N.G.N.A., Box 185 item GH21/1, 18 September 1945.
76. Ibid., 3 October 1945.

that with full co-operation all concerned it should be possible to minimise dislocation that is inevitable when transfer from compulsory to voluntary labour is effected no matter when that is done stop No matter what the inconvenience may be Minister unable to countenance a continuation of employment of forced labour under civil administration even for a limited period stop."[77] As in several later instances, Ward's action was correct in principle, but was not followed by support for the officials who had to put his policy into effect.

The suspension of labour contracts completely disrupted work throughout the area which came under civil control on 30 October and proved a major handicap to the new Provisional Administration. However, the attitude of the workers themselves provided complete support for the Minister's rejection of compulsory employment. Only a very small proportion continued at their jobs - probably fewer than five per cent, on the estimates that are available[78] - and most of these were overseers, semi-skilled tradesmen and personal servants.[79] Work at government centres, and on the plantations that had been brought back into production, came to a halt. At that

77. Ibid., 8 October 1945.
78. The sketchy annual reports for this period give no figures for re-engagements, but state that almost the entire labour force had been returned home by the end of 1945. (P.A.R., 1945/46, p. 11). An employer reported that 12 of 339 labourers stayed on at Mariboi Estate (Central District), while others reported a retention rate of only 2½ per cent. (P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 4, November 1945, pp. 7-8).
79. For further details see Stanner, op. cit., pp. 134-5 and P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 4, November 1945, p. 7.

point the shortage of coastal shipping compounded the labour problem, while the cancellation of contracts increased shipping difficulties, since most of the boats' crews also wished to cease work. Between 15 October and 31 December 1945, more than 21,000 labourers returned to their villages, over half of them requiring sea transport, sometimes for hundreds of miles.[80] Many more waited some time for boats, then after jamming the ports decided to walk home, creating unrest and occasionally meeting hostility from traditional enemies on the way.[81] Many were dissatisfied with the terms of their repatriation. They received only a few pounds in accumulated wages; there were very few trade goods to be bought for relatives at home; all equipment with which they had been issued was taken back; and any gifts or spoils they had acquired from the troops were confiscated during searches as they boarded the boats.[82] Upon their arrival in the villages the men were drawn into the work of rehabilitation,[83] but it was not long before many of them decided to re-engage; the Labour department reported that at the end of 1945 there were a "considerable number of labourers available for recruitment" in Papua.[84] Few could be transported to places of employment, however, since all available coasters were occupied in repatriating

80. Stanner, op. cit., p. 79. A table of labourers employed by Angau provides figures from which the rate of repatriation may be calculated for each month.
81. Robinson, op. cit., pp. 14-15.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid., p. 17.
84. P.N.G.N.A., Box 185 item GH21/6, 2 May 1946.

paid-off labourers.[85] The position in the Territory of New Guinea was more serious, owing to widespread damage and dislocation, but it was expected that conditions even there would be satisfactory by the second half of 1946; in the meantime, the Labour department suggested that planters might consider working their holdings on a share basis, calling on the people living nearby for assistance.[86] This recommendation was ignored by the settlers, who had no intention of entering into partnership with villagers.

The settler reaction to the cancellation of contracts was one of predictable rage. However, by the end of 1945 the Pacific Islands Monthly had vented so much of its spleen against Ward that the labour issue apparently found Robson without words adequate to the latest enormity: the situation was merely described as one of "chaos".[87] To the settlers, convinced that Papua New Guinea had survived in the past mainly through their efforts and would continue to rely on them for generations to come, the Minister's proclamation was but one incredible episode in a series of decisions by which Ward intended to destroy private interests in the country.

85. Ibid., 12 and 23 November 1945, et al.; the file contains a good deal of correspondence which discloses a major problem and a serious lack of resources to deal with it.
86. Ibid., 2 May 1946.
87. The impression of an editor bereft of words is heightened by the appearance of the word "chaos" three times in four consecutive sub-headings in the November 1945 issue of the magazine (P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 4, November 1945, pp. 7-8.)

Robson proclaimed:[88]

> Mr. Ward - in his famous role of "Eddie, Protector of the Underdog" - has espoused the cause of Fuzzy-wuzzy. He has decided to make New Guinea a Happy Home for High-Minded Natives, and protect them for evermore against that Ruthless Exploiter, the white man...Fuzzy-wuzzy gets all possible attention - and publicity, of course - but the claims of the unfortunate Europeans are determinedly and systematically ignored...Large numbers of men, of the finest individualist and pioneer types, are kept kicking their heels in Australia, while Mr. Ward plays happily with his Socialistic toy in New Guinea. In pre-war days, the Territories...asked Australia for little in the way of public funds... Now, under the rule of this Trades Hall genius from King's Cross, the Territories are absorbing hundreds of thousands of pounds of money torn from Australian taxpayers in the guise of war taxation, and giving us in return nothing except this delightful picture of Eddie Ward, being cooed over by happy anthropologists....

There was no doubt in the minds of correspondents to the Monthly that the first task should be to restore production, and even a writer as sympathetic to Labor as Lucy Mair stated subsequently that the affair of the labour contracts had been handled ineptly.[89] Stanner, the "apostate" former Assistant Director of Research, sought motives for the cancellation:[90]

> Evidently four factors induced this surprising and costly decision on the resumption of civil administration. The indentures of the military period, it was said, were no longer legally binding, though this was a matter of fairly simple remedy. It was desired to end the thoroughly unsatisfactory conditions of the later military phase. It was desired to offer the natives an opportunity to go home, if they wished, or to re-employ for a further period. Cancellation must have seemed compatible with the other administrative intentions. A full allowance for each factor still fails to make the decision seem reasonable.

88. Ibid., p. 3.
89. Mair, op. cit. (1948), p. 210.
90. Stanner, op. cit., p. 134.

Stanner made the further point that many of the contracts had been entered into only a few months before they were cancelled and stated, "It was a mistake to have treated the labour force as if it had all been at work continuously since 1942".[91] In his view, the most important factor was that the "embitterment of the civilian and planting community against Government policy became fixed at this point".[92]

The cancellation controversy

Murray approved of Ward's decision and has since noted, "The cancellation of contracts made resumption of village life possible, and rehabilitation and maintenance of commerce and plantations difficult. What was good /for the/ Australian was good for the Papuan and New Guinean: return to his home country if he so wished it, and both did. The consequences had to be put up with and, in the long view, the action was just, humane, wise and paid dividends in subsequent amicable labour-employer and -government relations."[93]

The wartime labour contracts had been authorised by the National Security Regulations and so would in any case have been voided by the gazettal of the Papua-New

91. Ibid., p. 135. Nevertheless, the "contracts" were compulsory, and this was in itself a contradiction in terms; under the circumstances, it was of little consequence how long they had been in force.
92. Ibid.
93. Murray notes, pp. 78-9.

Guinea Provisional Administration Act on 25 October. They could have been extended by the legal device of including a legitimating Section in the Act, but as far as Ward was concerned this would still have amounted to forced labour;[94] he had no intention of continuing a system, of military origin, which even Stanner was to term "extremely unsatisfactory".[95] The blame for the situation was placed on the Army, rather than on Ward, by one of the planters severely affected by the cancellation of contracts:[96]

> ....the Army's voracious demand for labour resulted in conscription of such numbers for so long that the natives have "had it". After, say, mid-1943, this conscription should have been cut in half. Had that been done the boys then released would now be available as volunteer workers under the new civil contracts. And a lot less than half the enormous number still under compulsory indenture at the 15th of this month would be more than sufficient to man all Papua's normal activities - planting, shipping, Government and all the rest. Few will agree with my idea as to where the blame for this disaster rests, but that is my opinion for what it is worth... Look for it in the bone-headedness of Army brass-hats.

The most important factor, and one that has in the past been ignored, was the attitude of the workers towards their contracts. This was clear from the very large proportion who elected to return home. Both Stanner

94. See pp. 203-4 of this Chapter.
95. W.E.H. Stanner, Reconstruction in the South Pacific Islands: A Preliminary Report, Part I, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1947, p. 93. This was a mimeo booklet including much of the material later published in The South Seas in Transition (op. cit.); the words used in the latter were "thoroughly unsatisfactory" (p. 134).
96. P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 4, November 1945, p. 8.

and Mair later suggested that more opportunity should have been given to employers to explain the situation to their workers,[97] but in view of the situation that had prevailed under the military, efforts to re-engage labourers could well have been interpreted as extra coercion.[98] The problem of implied or direct coercion ruled out the main alternative to mass cancellation - a phased run-down of labour - suggested by Melrose in August 1945.[99] There was no guarantee that the workers would have been given a genuine option, nor that those whose names were missing from repatriation ballots would have stayed on the job. The mass cancellation aided the rapid restoration of village life and may have greatly reduced the tensions which could otherwise have hampered the work of the Provisional Administration. The sudden cancellation of labour contracts brought, in a rush, problems that might in other circumstances have been spread over many years, creating new difficulties as a consequence. In any event, this was the first decision made concerning Papua New Guinea that could be proved to meet the wishes of the people.

War damage compensation

Another policy decision that created short-term

97. Stanner, Transition, op. cit., p. 134. Mair, op. cit., (1948), p. 210.
98. Ironically, difficulties in communicating in the lingua franca were given by settlers as an explanation for the small proportion of workers who re-engaged (P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 4, November 1945, p. 7).
99. See p. 203 of this Chapter.

problems, but which helped to reduce any tensions existing in the villages, was the payment of compensation for war damage. In this matter, too, settlers objected to the policy and its implications, although by the end of the war their own compensation was assured. The settlers' campaign for compensation was launched within a few months of the fall of Rabaul, but it encountered a number of problems before payment was finally made.[100] Compensation for European-owned assets was to be paid from the War Damage Insurance fund, set up within Australia to pay for destruction caused by the enemy at Darwin, in Papua New Guinea and during the few other isolated instances of direct enemy action against Australia.[101] The compensation scheme involved several technical and legal problems which were the subject of recommendations to the government by an inter-departmental committee of Australian officials.[102] In summary, the committee concluded that compensation should be paid only for damage resulting from direct action by the enemy or from deliberate destruction by Australian forces intended to stop the assets in question falling into enemy hands. The committee maintained that property requisitioned by the forces, or "irregular impressment", to use the committee's euphemism, was not the Commonwealth's responsibility. The recommendations were approved by

100. The public campaign was launched by the Pacific Islands Monthly as early as March 1942 (P.I.M., Vol. 12 No. 8, March 1942, p. 9.). It was one of the main concerns of the Pacific Territories Association (P.I.M., Vol. 13 No. 1, August 1942, p. 7)
101. P.I.M., Vol. 13 No. 8, March 1943, p. 7.
102. Details in this and the following passage are drawn from Hasluck, op. cit., p. 142.

War Cabinet on 6 April 1942. This meant that most of the European property in Papua could not be restored under the War Damage Insurance scheme and that assets in the Territory of New Guinea which had been abandoned could attract compensation only after investigation, in which it would be difficult to establish that damage had been caused by Japanese action rather than through looting or by deterioration owing to lack of maintenance. Further details of the controversy are not of direct relevance to this discussion, but it was only after a High Court decision and a prolonged campaign by the Pacific Territories Association that the Australian government finally agreed, in November 1944, to extend the compensation provisions to include "consequential" damage caused by depreciation and military occupation.[103] After this struggle, the settlers were even further convinced that the government was discriminating against them when the terms of the compensation scheme for war damage in the villages was announced

Barry Committee on compensation

Action on village war damage came much later than the scheme to compensate Europeans. It was not until 26 October 1944 that the Minister for External Territories set up the Native War Damage Compensation Committee, whose function was to "recommend a just and

103. P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 4, November 1944, p. 7.

practicable plan for compensating natives in Papua and New Guinea for loss of or damage to land and property and death or injury arising from military operations or arising out of causes attributable to the existence of a state of war in the Territories. If found necessary or desirable the Committee in recommending measures for native compensation /~should_7 bear in mind particularly the connection between compensation and rehabilitation in native societies."[104] The members of the Committee represented the major interests then controlling Papua New Guinea. The Chairman was the ubiquitous Mr. J.V. Barry, K.C., assisted by Dr. H.I. Hogbin, the anthropologist, who was at that time a member of the Directorate of Research, and James L. Taylor, the explorer of the New Guinea Highlands, then a Major in Angau, who had taken a radical position on a number of issues at the Unit's conference in February 1944.[105] The Committee listed the names of 62 European witnesses - whom it interviewed - and made passing reference to "a large number of natives" - who remained anonymous.[106] The Chairman spent less than eight days in Papua New Guinea during this inquiry, so that most of the work fell to Hogbin, who visited one of the centres of his pre-war field work at Busama, between Lae and Salamaua; and to Taylor, who joined Hogbin on a tour of fourteen centres, and the British Solomon

104. Barry, Compensation, op. cit., p. 1.
105. See Chapter Two, p. 117.
106. Written replies were received from another sixteen Europeans (ibid., pp. 54-5).

Islands Protectorate, during February 1945.[107] Barry visited only Lae and Port Moresby. Thus the major part of the investigation and the bulk of the report stemmed from a member of the Directorate and the Angau officer most closely linked to it.[108] The report was submitted to the Minister in August 1945, more than nine months after it had been commissioned.[109] It made twenty-one recommendations on compensation and the restoration of village life. Some were concerned with matters of detail, such as the setting up of "government piggeries" and nurseries and the establishment of a trust fund for reafforestation; some were far-reaching, notably in relation to "village councils and village treasuries"; and the majority were expensive, involving cash compensation for death, injury, incapacity, deterioration in the quality of land (from airstrip construction and similar works), damage to property and destruction of possessions, food and livestock.[110]

Differences on compensation

The compensation scheme was instituted in the general terms proposed by the Barry committee, but there was little or no action on several key recommendations. The adoption in principle of the report marked the first

107. Hogbin's visit to Busama was one of several which formed the basis of his book Transformation Scene: The Changing Culture of a New Guinea Village, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951.
108. See Chapter Two, p. 134, footnote 156.
109. Barry, Compensation, op. cit., p. 52.
110. Ibid., pp. 1-3.

action by the Australian government to implement a major segment of its reformist policy for New Guinea, while the problems encountered in the execution of the detailed recommendations illustrated the lack of resilience in the Territory bureaucracy. The most obvious feature of the scheme was its cost: the initial estimate was £2,210,000, an unbelievable figure in comparison with the £42,500 that the Commonwealth had granted as recently as 1940.[111] The report, together with the estimated cost, were submitted on 5 December 1945 to Cabinet, which set up an inter-departmental committee to make final recommendations.[112] It was also to examine a proposal from the Department of External Territories that the "total funds required to meet the cost of the proposals...be obtained from the surplus funds of the Commonwealth War Damage insurance scheme".[113] The question of finance was a delicate one. If the amount paid to Papua New Guinea villagers was anywhere near the total estimated, it would mark a clean break with the pre-war "pay as you go" policy and have a substantial influence on the Territory economy. Moreover, distribution of such sums would render the people less dependent on manual labour as a source of cash income and

111. P.N.G.N.A. Box 805 item CA6/150, 3 October 1945. The pre-war grant had gone to Papua. The Mandated Territory received no grant. The compensation estimate was drawn up by Mr. W.R. Humphries, a Resident Magistrate of the Papuan service, later the Director of Native Labour. His calculations were astonishingly accurate: final payments totalled a little more than £2 million.
112. CRS A518, item 320/3/1, 5 December 1945. The committee comprised Messrs. J. Brack (External Territories), R.A. Battersby (War Damage Commission) and L.F. Crisp (Post-War Reconstruction).
113. P.N.G.N.A. Box 805 item CA6/150, 5 December 1945.

therefore less reliant on Europeans; this would constitute an important shift in the balance of power in the colony.

The inter-departmental committee decided that village compensation should be financed directly from Commonwealth revenue, by inclusion in the annual grant to Papua New Guinea, rather than from Australians' contributions to the War Damage Insurance scheme,[114] no doubt owing to the political implications of spending funds levied for use in Australia on Territory villagers. The committee also recommended that the sums for compensation suggested in the Barry report - up to £60 in the case of the death of a mature man with dependants - should be increased by 50 per cent. The recommendation was supported by Mr. Ward and by Mr. Dedman, the Minister for Post-War Reconstruction, but was questioned by Mr. Chifley, Prime Minister and Treasurer.[115] Upon receiving Chifley's query, Ward directed that compensation should be paid at the rates originally recommended "to avoid more delay"; it was then June 1946 and more than five months had passed since increases had been supported by Ward and Dedman.[116] There the matter rested. It was perhaps thought difficult to prove that a "native" life was worth £90 rather than £60.

114. The material in this and the following passage is drawn from CRS A518, item A320/3/1, 7 February 1946.
115. Ibid., 7 February, 7 March and 7 June 1946.
116. Ibid., 18 July 1946.

Problems of paying compensation

The delayed decision on the village compensation scheme caused concern, since an early announcement to the people was desirable, as part of the effort to restore confidence in the Administration. Following requests from Murray, a copy of the report by the Barry committee was received in Port Moresby in February 1946, when some preparations for payment were begun. Further delays were inevitable, however, for as Murray has pointed out, "personnel of District Services were on the stretch in so many ways",[117] rebuilding outstations, dealing with returning labourers and village evacuees, assisting the settlers and re-establishing contact with the people. The main problem was the time taken up by compensation work: not merely in visiting villages to assess and pay claims, but in the large amount of paper work that was involved. Other problems were encountered in dealing with the large amounts of cash being distributed. The Barry report had recommended that "provision should be made for the immediate deposit of all sums into Savings Bank accounts",[118] but this was not done and the omission was later criticised by Stanner and Hogbin.[119] However, the work entailed in issuing many thousands of passbooks, recording initial deposits and

117. Murray notes, p. 77.
118. Barry, Compensation, op. cit., p. 2.
119. Stanner, Transition, op. cit., pp. 119-20; Hogbin, Transformation Scene, op. cit., pp. 22-3.

arranging subsequent withdrawals, would have placed such a burden on the field staff as to prejudice the compensation scheme itself; in any case, it is doubtful whether all the materials involved could have been transported, safeguarded and checked adequately under the rudimentary transport and banking organizations then existing in Papua New Guinea.

The Barry committee also recommended that stores controlled by the Administration, "stocked with approved goods of standard quality", should be established throughout the Territory as soon as possible and that prices in all trade stores should be controlled.[120] The Administration was unable to introduce these measures, for the same reasons that precluded the introduction of compulsory banking: the necessary resources were simply not available. Supplies of any kind, far less the paternalistic category of "approved" goods, were almost unobtainable for at least a year after the war; the Production Control Board was then providing the maximum service possible under the limitations of staff, shipping and supply. The Provisional Administration was in no position to construct, staff and stock additional trade stores. Efforts to control prices were equally unsuccessful, largely because there were higher priorities for the available staff. Murray recalls, "An endeavour to fix prices by regulation met with mixed success and

120. Barry, Compensation, loc. cit.

was resisted by big firms and those selling to native people throughout the Territory...The Administration found...coping with the voracity of the big firms, greatly profiting from policies they condemned, tough and patchy."[121]

Settler opposition

The reaction among settler and commercial interests to the village compensation scheme was predictably selfish. Having finally gained all the conditions they had sought for their own compensation, the settlers gave lavish praise to the War Damage Commission, which had assessed and paid their claims. The Pacific Islands Monthly maintained that the Commission "provided the only leavening in an otherwise dark and demoralising situation.../C/laims...were met fairly and even generously by the Commission."[122] Similar generosity towards the villagers was considered reprehensible, however. A Rabaul correspondent complained of the shortage of labour in the town and attributed it to the compensation payments:[123]

> ....the Government has commenced to pay out thousands of pounds in war damage compensation to the natives - and they will not work while the money lasts. Indications are that it will not last long - it is being spent in the usual native style on bread, tinned meat, biscuits, tobacco, European clothing

121. Murray notes, p. 77.
122. P.I.M., Vol. 19 No. 10, May 1949, p. 31.
123. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 7, February 1947, p. 24.

> (boots, shoes, sox, etc. which are worn for the novelty and then discarded)...Decked out like Christmas trees, they ride around in hired ex-military trucks...It needed no great knowledge of New Guinea native psychology to prevent the needless waste. The native has, and always has had, only one method of dealing with a sudden influx of unearned wealth - to get rid of it as soon as possible.

Under the sub-heading "Europeans Fight to Restore Fortunes While Officialdom Pampers the Natives", another correspondent complained, "If poor old White Brother could only get a tithe of the love and attention and money lavished upon Black Brother by Australian officialdom... what a different story it would be!"[124] No doubt. But in their efforts to level every possible criticism at village compensation the settlers contradicted themselves, maintaining also that villagers were "hiding away" their money:[125] "already scores of thousands of pounds are 'socked away' by natives - and the money is still rolling in".[126] The money, whether spent or saved, posed the first general threat to white dominance and its distribution was therefore resisted.

Compensation and "collaboration"

A particular point of controversy concerned compensation payments to villagers who had allegedly helped the Japanese. The Barry committee had anticipated such criticism in recommending that compensation "must

124. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 12, July 1947, p. 60.
125. P.I.M., Vol. 19 No. 4, November 1948, p. 8.
126. P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 8, December 1947, p. 62.

embrace and apply to all natives except those who have assisted the enemy actively, voluntarily and with a realization that it was wrong to do so".[127] In reaching this conclusion the committee gave its "full assent and concurrence" to the views of Mr. Chief Justice J.B. Phillips of the Territory of New Guinea, who summed up the confusing situation in which the people found themselves during the occupation:[128]

> In the middle eighties of the last century they were subjected...to government by Europeans - the Germans. They found, after some disastrous clashes, that the newcomers were too strong to be resisted. After approximately thirty years of German rule the Germans were...supplanted by Australians who bore arms...After nearly thirty years...the Australians... were ousted by the Japanese. [The people] completely lacked the knowledge and experience which might have enabled them to judge just when a de facto government should be recognized as one de jure.

This view received Murray's full support and instructions were issued to field staff enlarging on the Barry committee's recommendations: to be denied compensation a villager must have known his actions in assisting the Japanese were wrong at the time, and not just subsequently.[129] The instructions suggested that such a situation could have arisen only in areas under prolonged occupation;[130] but in these places there would clearly be extenuating circumstances. Murray thus intended the compensation scheme to be administered in the most liberal manner

127. Barry, Compensation, op. cit., p. 24.
128. Ibid., p. 26.
129. P.N.G.N.A., Box 805, item CA6/150, 30 October 1946. The instructions comprised Department of District Services and Native Affairs Circular 27 of 1946/47.
130. Ibid.

possible: in particular and as "a matter of general policy all Field Staff are instructed that police investigation of alleged misdeeds by natives during the war with a view to prosecution as indictable offences will be discontinued".[131] The object was to avoid directing people "back to the past"; instead, patrol officers were advised to direct their own "thoughts and action to constructive native welfare and development and inculcating a similar outlook in the native population". Proceedings should be taken only in cases of "exceptional heinousness or depravity" where, if action were not taken by the Administration, there was a danger that the community might take the law into its own hands. The Barry committee had recommended that compensation be denied only upon the decision of the Director of District Services and Native Affairs,[132] but the Administrator's instructions went further by directing District Officers to pay claims unless they were "convinced" there had been a case of collaboration, in which instance they were to report their doubts to the Director.[133] In administrative terms this meant that payment was almost never withheld, even temporarily, owing to the additional work and delay involved in submitting a case to Port Moresby.

This situation met with disapproval from a number of Europeans, particularly in the Territory of New Guinea,

131. Ibid. This and the following two sentences are based on the Circular.
132. Barry, Compensation, op. cit., p. 26.
133. P.N.G.N.A., Box 805 item CA6/150, 30 October 1946.

where the majority had lost friends at the hands of the Japanese and found it difficult to adjust their opinions, following the propaganda and patriotism of the war years, to new realities. However, there were no recorded instances of Papua New Guineans taking action against each other for supporting the Japanese during the war and the situation was certainly not as portrayed by one European who maintained, "What is...hurtful among natives is the fact that their own tribesmen, who joined up with a Japanese Police Force and caused the deaths of hundreds of natives and Europeans, are treated the same as those who were loyal to us. No effort is being made to punish those who were traitors, not only to us, but to their own people."[134] Exaggerated statements of this kind ignored the complex relationships between different language groups and the fact that all interlopers had traditionally been regarded as enemies. They mainly demonstrated the gulf between settler opinion and the attitude of the Administrator.

Rebuilding Hanuabada

The most publicised controversy over village compensation surrounded the rebuilding of Hanuabada village, a settlement of several clans of the Motu people which, before the war, comprised a large number of houses, built in traditional styles and material, out

134. P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 5, December 1947, p. 62.

over the waters of Port Moresby Harbour near Government House.[135] Owing to the village's proximity to Port Moresby, many of the Papuan Administration's workers had been drawn from Hanuabada and its people had achieved prominence, such as was attainable by villagers, out of proportion to their numbers. To the critics of Sir Hubert Murray's policies, Hanuabadans epitomised the "arrogant natives" who had been "spoiled" by paternalism; to Europeans from the Mandated Territory they were typical of "big-headed Papuans". When the Japanese bombed Port Moresby the people of Hanuabada were evacuated to Manu Manu, a malarious area along the Papuan coast. During this time their village was destroyed by a combination of neglect, enemy action and vandalism.[136] As soon as they were able, the people of Hanuabada sought to return to their lands, rebuilding with whatever scraps of material were available: the result was described as "the worst kind of tropical slum".[137] During their exile, and in the conditions to which they returned, the villagers contracted a variety of serious diseases, while the incidence of malaria increased and a health check immediately after the war revealed that 18 per cent of the population were suffering from a severe and particularly infectious form of tuberculosis.[138] While other villages in Japanese-occupied areas no doubt

135. In Hiri (formerly "police") Motu, the lingua franca of Papua: hanua, village; bada, big. A detailed history is C.S. Belshaw, The Great Village, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957.
136. For the various accounts see P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 8, March 1946, p. 21.
137. Ibid.
138. Interview with Dr. J.T. Gunther, 4 December 1968.

suffered as much or more, Hanuabada's location close to Port Moresby made its plight embarrassingly obvious to visitors. In his suggestions for implementing the Barry report, W.R. Humphries noted, "The houses have to be rebuilt; why not build well and put up houses that will not be out of place near the capital of the country? Why not use sawn timber?"[139] The proposal met with approval in Canberra, presumably because it would produce a material illustration of the government's determination to promote village welfare, and in June 1946 Mr. Ward announced that £118,000 would be spent on rebuilding Hanuabada, using "permanent", or European-style materials.[140]

The Minister's announcement was met by predictable scorn and criticism from the European community. The Pacific Islands Monthly sought to lead the campaign but was in an awkward position, since it had first drawn public attention to the situation at Hanuabada.[141] This was no particular handicap, however, for it quoted with approval the statement of the Australian Country Party leader, Mr. Fadden, that Aborigines should receive attention before the people of Papua New Guinea, but that none of them would appreciate it: "....a somewhat similar ateempt was made some years ago in Queensland,

139. P.N.G.N.A., Box 805, item CA6/150, 27 September 1945. It is interesting that Humphries, a Papuan officer, referred to Port Moresby as the capital when so many of the post-war arrangements for the combined Territory were still undecided.
140. P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 11, June 1946, p. 12.
141. P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 8, March 1946, p. 21.

and the natives immediately left the model houses and built their own gunyahs outside".[142] Further complaints were that the work would have to be done "at the expense of Australian taxpayers" and that there were too few building materials, in any case, for Europeans returning to "blasted plantations and 'kunai' houses".

The decision to rebuild Hanuabada in a style resembling European construction epitomised, for officials as well as settlers, the Labor government's challenge to white supremacy, and so the public service's response to the decision was significant in determining the European community's attitude towards the post-war service. Moreover, the majority of public servants were themselves poorly housed. The file dealing with the reconstruction of Hanuabada contains little that could be construed as direct opposition from officials, but it discloses a marked lack of enthusiasm in supervising arrangements.[143] Meetings with the villagers produced conflicting reports as to whether they supported the rebuilding programme,[144] and Murray experienced difficulty in having a field officer assigned to the work, so that for a time his Official Secretary supervised operations.[145] The village was eventually

142. The material in this and the following passage is drawn from P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 11, June 1946, p. 12.
143. P.N.G.N.A., Box 163 item GH1-3-4, folios from September 1946 to December 1950.
144. P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 12, July 1946, p. 9.
145. P.N.G.N.A., Box 163 item GH1-3-4, 24 July 1950.

rebuilt, the end result being something of an architectural disaster that would now be dismissed as an example of excessive paternalism. Yet in the 1940's it possessed considerable symbolic importance. It also indicated Murray's willingness to persist with policies he knew to be lacking support even from his own staff.

War surplus: its use and disposal

Problems of obtaining building materials for the Administration, for settlers and for such special projects as the reconstruction of Hanuabada could have been reduced if the disposal of surplus war materials had been better managed. Some of the stores abandoned by the Allied forces were of little value for civilian purposes, others deteriorated very quickly, and a considerable proportion posed a substantial and continuing threat to public safety,[146] but there were large quantities of other materials, and many buildings of a more or less temporary nature, which had obvious potential for post-war use. The main bulk materials were Marsden matting (used initially for runways and bridge decking and later adapted to a wide range of uses), A.R.C. mesh (intended as reinforcing for the light concrete constructions of wartime standard but

146. Enormous quantities of ammunition were dumped in shallow holes and many areas were unsafe for ten years or more after the war.

useful for walls, windows, security screens and fences), transmission poles and signal and fencing wire, as well as the more usual items such as corrugated iron, nails and tarpaper.[147] Flimsy buildings in a variety of styles - barracks, administrative blocks, hospital wards, storehouses and hangars - were scattered in a dozen major locations throughout the country. Those at Port Moresby and Lae could be used by the Provisional Administration, even though some were inconveniently located.[148] Most of those at Manus, Milne Bay and Finschhafen were surplus to local requirements, while those at such places as Nadzab and Dobodura were of no conceivable use in situ.

The civil authorities possessed neither the personnel to dismantle the surplus buildings nor the shipping to transport them and the unused materials to suitable locations. Nor could they exercise control over the disposal of the materials, which were either Commonwealth property or American property assigned to the Commonwealth by the United States military command. Nevertheless, the Provisional Administration was obliged to accept responsibility for safeguarding the property immediately it assumed control for particular areas from the military. The Australian government had decided in May 1945 that "....it is a matter of paramount importance that surplus stores should be cleared while a demand for them exists

147. The information in this and the following passage is drawn from CRS A518, item F809/1/1, folios from April to July 1950.
148. P.A.R., 1945/46, p. 9.

in the civil economy rather than that they should be released later and cause a glut."[149] The reasoning was simplistic but the instruction unmistakeable, particularly in the case of Papua New Guinea, where there were added fears that delay would cause deterioration of stores. Murray recalls the attitude: "Rapid sale, rather than hard bargaining was necessary to get material into use before 'decay' set in."[150]

By ordering such high priority for the disposal of war surplus materials the government created further problems for its Administration in New Guinea. The formal arrangements were that the Army first handed over surplus items to the Commonwealth Disposals Commission.[151] The Provisional Administration had no direct claim on stores and equipment; rather, it was the Army's responsibility to "declare" items likely to be needed after the war. The War Disposals Commission then "allotted" these materials to the civil authorities. This procedure was necessary until the Provisional Administration was established, but it led to predictable problems, since the military were not the best judges of what would be required in peacetime. Thus the Administration was eventually forced to bid against private buyers for certain stores: it purchased the Engineers dump at Lae,

149. Hasluck, op. cit., p. 521.
150. Murray notes, p. 76.
151. The material in this and the following passage is drawn from P.A.R., 1945/46, p. 7.

together with such items as 200 tons of corrugated iron and 20 tons of nails, for £60,000.[152] Tenders of this size caused consternation in both Port Moresby and Canberra. The Lae bid alone was 40 per cent greater than the total grant to the Territory in 1940 and the officials responsible for authorising such payments had not yet adjusted to the new levels of expenditure; Murray was forced to appeal to the Minister to have his approval of the Lae tender sustained.[153] This episode marked one of the earliest clashes between the Administrator and the Department of External Territories over the two basic issues which created tension between Port Moresby and Canberra for the next twenty-five years: the pace of adjustment to new realities in Papua New Guinea, and the allocation of authority between the Administration and the Department.

War surplus for settlers

Most settlers were at a serious disadvantage in acquiring war surplus. Early in 1946 the great majority were still in Australia because they were unable to meet the conditions set down for their return to Papua New Guinea.[154] They were unable to bid for materials to repair their properties, but until some repairs were carried out and their residences made habitable, many were

152. CRS A518, item F809/1/1, 5 May 1950; P.N.G.N.A., Box 185 item GH55/2, 15 February 1946.
153. Interview with Colonel Murray, 12 December 1966.
154. See pp. 197-8 of this Chapter.

denied entry to the country. In the meantime, parties of buyers from Australia were being conducted on tours of Papua New Guinea by staff of the Commonwealth Disposals Commission, using a Catalina aircraft supplied by the Air Force, and taking up valuable shipping space when exporting their purchases.[155] The "Southern buyers", as the settlers called them, were able to bid for large amounts of material following their comprehensive tour of the wartime dumps and there were complaints that the "small buyers" were being kept away from the market deliberately, so that the Commission could clear the dumps in the shortest possible time.[156] The matter developed into one of the several post-war conflicts that characterised relations between government and settlers. In the case of the Army vehicle park at Lae, for example, it was alleged that 900 vehicles were sold to an Australian tenderer for only 38 shillings each. Moreover, on removal of the vehicles, the number was found to be less than 900, whereupon the officer in charge of disposals had commandeered town vehicles in running order to make up the deficit.[157]

In April 1946 it was agreed that European residents in the Territory would receive priority in their tenders

155. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 4, November 1946, p. 12. A photograph of the Catalina accompanies the article.
156. P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 9, April 1946, p. 9. It was not generally realized by the settlers stranded in Australia that much of the material had been dumped almost two years before the Commission began full-scale operations.
157. Ibid. Civilians in Lae could easily have been responsible for the deficit.

for surplus materials, although it was not until November that the arrangement was confirmed publicly by the Minister for Supply and Shipping, Senator Ashley.[158] The Minister maintained that there had always been a policy of giving priority to the Territory; the government had also made special arrangements for the Production Control Board to purchase materials on behalf of settlers still in Australia. In any case, Territory residents enjoyed an advantage over Australian buyers, who had to pay freight in transporting their purchases to southern markets. These assurances did not satisfy the settlers, and the Pacific Islands Monthly claimed that the Minister had been misled on the Commission's practices. The disposals sales continued, as did the complaints, and by the time the Commission ceased operating in Papua New Guinea on 30 June 1947 its critics had accumulated a good deal of evidence tending to indicate considerable inefficiency: confusion over the timing of sales, so that settlers missed their opportunity; multiple sales of the same goods to different buyers; incomplete records of materials sold; and loosely-worded sales agreements that allowed purchasers unlimited time to clear scrap from areas over which they had gained salvage rights.[159] The disposals issue provided the white community in the Territory with yet another trauma to add to its collective persecution complex.

158. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 5, December 1946, p. 57.
159. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 5, December 1946, p. 27 and No. 6, January 1947, p. 71; Vol. 18, No. 9, April 1948, pp. 33-4.

In fact, there were gains as well as losses for settlers from their dealings in war surplus materials. For those who were in the Territory immediately after the war speculation could bring big gains, if only because control was extremely lax. In a court case arising from the theft of disposals goods the Chief Justice later stated that, in the period from late 1945 to 1947, "people really thought they had licence to confiscate any property".[160] It was also alleged that European landowners who had returned to New Guinea concealed dumps on their properties from Disposals Commission inspectors, and in some cases moved materials from village-owned land to their plantations, subsequently buying salvage rights over their land for very small amounts and making huge profits from the sale of the stolen goods.[161] Similar profits could be accumulated by legitimate speculation. Sam Marshall, one of the first post-war settlers in the Kainantu area, recalled, "I bought the telephone line from Lae to Gusap. Copper was worth a lot of money in those days. I paid £350 for it, and I made about £20,000, after I sold it as scrap to America. I also bought about 50 trucks for £25. I gave a few away, picked the eyes out of the others and left the rest there." [162]

Profits decreased and risks mounted with each succeeding transaction involving the same dump or salvage right. The Milne Bay area was a typical example. In

160. CRS A518, item F809/1/1, 24 October 1950.
161. Ibid.
162. Papua New Guinea Post-Courier, 26 May 1972.

addition to the usual vehicle parks and dumps of assorted stores and building materials, the Milne Bay base was the site of a large American field hospital, two airstrips and the American naval base at Gamadodo.[163] The Army's method of dealing with much of this equipment was described by the Disposals Commission as "something approaching a scorched earth policy; M.T. had been wrecked, water-craft sunk, machinery sprayed with acids or cut with oxy-acetylene torch and then bull-dozed into the ground".[164] Even after this treatment, however, there was still much to be salvaged from the millions of dollars worth of material that had been on the site. Various items were sold (sometimes more than once) and in December 1946 bids were taken for salvage rights over the whole area.[165] These were bought by the firm of John Stubbs (Papua) Ltd. on behalf of the Australian syndicate of Hornibrook, McKenzie and Clark for a total of £11,500. In a letter detailing the Administration's dissatisfaction with disposals practices, Colonel Murray noted:

> The subsequent history of this transaction is that John Stubbs and Son (Papua) Ltd., after dealing in the area for some time, sold out to Vacuum Oil Ltd. for an amount believed to be about £85,000. This company removed oil installations and other equipment and then sold out to a company known as Milne Bay Merchants Ltd. for a sum believed to be in the vicinity of £68,000. Milne Bay Merchants Ltd. then sold a large amount of equipment from the area and in the process issued for the guidance of buyers a 35 page catalogue of material available for sale. Milne

163. P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 10, May 1946, p. 66.
164. CRS A518, item F809/1/1, 24 October 1950.
165. This passage, including the quotation, is drawn from ibid.

> Bay Merchants Ltd. then sold certain rights in the area to another firm who traded as Milne Bay Merchants, for a sum believed to be £16,500. This last firm is still in the Milne Bay area and have (sic) recently offered pipeline in the area, approximately 4,200 tons, to the Department of Works and Housing for £3,000. A check of the Treasury records shows that amounts paid by the Treasury, Port Moresby, to the Milne Bay Merchants Ltd. and Milne Bay Merchants are £25,155... practically all for goods the title to which was acquired in the original auction sale.

Thus during the latter stages of the disposals transactions some of the settlers - often associated with new arrivals in such ventures as "Milne Bay Merchants" - made extraordinary profits from a minimum of effort. The blame for this situation was levelled not at the profiteers, but at the officials who allegedly allowed them to operate as they did.

Commonwealth Disposals Commission investigates itself

The settler complaints culminated in charges that large quantities of equipment - variously estimated at between £200,000 and £500,000 in value - had been stolen or misappropriated.[166] Rumours of this kind circulated from early 1948, but the Labor government ignored them. It was not until April 1950, shortly after the Liberal-Country Party coalition came to power, that an inquiry into the New Guinea operations of the Commonwealth Disposals Commission was ordered, possibly with a view to embarrassing the previous government.[167] An investigation

166. P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 8, March 1948, p. 10.
167. CRS A518, item F809/1/1, 12 April 1950.

began in May 1950, but it was conducted by a sub-committee comprising members of the Commission.[168] Not surprisingly, the sub-committee refuted the charges made against its parent body, relying heavily on extenuating circumstances that applied equally to all activities during the post-war years: shortages of staff and labour, poor communications, lack of shipping, widespread destruction and general dislocation of services caused by the Army's rapid withdrawal. The full Commission therefore had no hesitation in endorsing the conclusions of its own sub-committee that:[169]

(a) There was no evidence of dishonesty or suspicion of the integrity of the Commission's officers.

(b) There was no reason to doubt that the Commission's officers had, at all times, acted in good faith and in the best of their judgement.

It was suggested that the disposals auctions at Milne Bay could have been conducted in a more satisfactory manner, but that owing to "extreme pressure" and poor conditions this had been impossible.

In November 1950 the Commission's findings were referred to the then Minister for External Territories, Mr. Spender, with a suggestion that they be "discussed". They were later minuted to the new Minister for Territories, Mr. Hasluck, as one of the matters outstanding at the time of his assuming the portfolio.[170] No further

168. Ibid., 5 May and 24 October 1950.
169. Ibid., 24 October 1950.
170. Ibid., 17 and 24 July and 14 November 1950 and 13 June 1951.

action was taken on the matter. Thus the Commonwealth Disposals Commission was able to defend itself by means of an inquiry whose objectivity must have been in question. The difficulties which the Commission's operations created for the Provisional Administration, and their impact on relations with the settler community, went unremarked.

Murray settles in

During his first few months as Administrator, Murray encountered a series of major problems, most of them inter-related, which led to cycles of frustration: lack of preparation for civil rule; military petulance; a debilitated country; severe shortages of personnel and equipment; and several decisions by the Australian government, notably those concerning labour contracts, shipping, war damage compensation and war surplus disposals, which placed severe limitations on the work of the Provisional Administration. Every step Murray took to implement the Labor government's policies increased the opposition among the influential white community to the Administration generally and to Murray in particular. Perseverance with the policy required both courage and conviction. The pragmatic course would have been to counsel delay, using the arguments later advanced by Stanner:[171]

171. Stanner, Transition, op. cit., p. 86.

> It was an error to have ended the military "period" so soon. The civil authority remained for several years under-equipped to maintain, let alone rival, a large part of the work of an organization which had taken nearly four years to build. The nature of the tasks was badly under-rated. No other inference from the preparations which were made seems to be allowable. The loss of most of the senior officers of the Mandated Territory was a particularly heavy handicap.

This assessment can now be shown to be completely wrong, in view of the villagers' alienation from Angau.[172] In Murray, the people had an Administrator far more sympathetic towards their situation than any Army officer.

Murray's activities until the final takeover from the military in June 1946 show that he had no intention of delaying the resumption of civil administration. During those months he travelled almost continuously, mainly in the Territory of New Guinea, familiarising himself with conditions, interviewing staff who were, or soon would be, working with him, and negotiating the transfer of control. During his journeys Murray made entries in a journal, the only time in his adult life that he kept anything like a diary.[173] The entries reveal the scope of Murray's energies and responsibilities, as well as an incisiveness in assessing people and the ability to make firm decisions. Some of the notes read:[174]

172. See Chapter Two, pp. 110-12.
173. Interview with Colonel Murray, 31 May 1968. The journal is "scrappy", according to Murray's note (of 4 December 1966) on the flyleaf, "but relates to a difficult time in a theatre of war then being taken over by Civil Government". Murray added some margin notes and the extracts used here have had the more cryptic abbreviations filled out.
174. Murray journal, pp. 67-8.

> Lae Conference 14-15 January with First Australian Army...General Robertson in hospital; saw him before conference. Brigadier General Staff represented G.O.C. in C. Offered chair, but I asked him to accept, which he did. He spoke about Army view. Wish First Army out of mainland New Guinea by 28 February. Possibility of Civil Administration taking over? I spoke next, said policy take over as soon as possible. Personnel most difficult problem. Supplies, buildings, probably O.K., shipping doubtful. Went on with an appreciation along the lines: object, factors, causes, and plan left to Army and Civil Administration representatives to put into effect when factors fully known. Finished with, "The impossible is that which has not yet been done."... Melrose and self went to Salamaua at 5 p.m. in... boat and slept at S. - within P.-N.G. territory... 15 January...Robertson wanted matter of takeover clinched for 28/2 and Angau to Rabaul area; clean-up to be left to Lae Base...Think he must have given an undertaking to Prime Minister when latter at Lae. Gesture of offering me chair again. General R. took it but gave me chance of suggesting that he should! General worked conference around to view that we wanted to take over by the 28th Feb. and it would be impertinence (partly in fun of course) for them to tell us how to do it! I countered that... we were anxious to take over if both parties could so work as to make it possible.

As well as manoeuvering with General Robertson, Murray also used the opportunity of the Lae conference to observe his own staff in action and to learn something of the attitudes in the public service. On 28 January he noted:[175]

> Looking back: An interesting sidelight on the dominance of T.N.G. in the thoughts of T.N.G. officers was the reaction of Melrose when first discussing the matter of a takeover by the 28th Feb. M., who had opposed the taking over of the Highlands in February because the time was not ripe for additional responsibilities, made no comment on the difficulties but said, "You will be able to shift your Headquarters." Now I had no desire to shift them - there is no existent town on the other side.

175. Murray journal, p. 71. On the other hand Humphries, the Papuan officer, had referred to Port Moresby as the "national capital" (see p. 225 of this Chapter).

The Territory of New Guinea also had support within the military, although Murray observed that this had definite limits:[176]

> Sturdee was very pro Lae as capital; Robertson didn't seem to care at all. I think his main interest is becoming Adjutant General....

Later in January 1946 Murray held conferences with representatives of the Commonwealth Disposals Commission, about which he made some brisk observations and decisions:[177]

> The C.D.C. have a staggering job and want to clean up Aitape, Wewak, Torokina and Jacquinot Bay in six weeks...Think our people are a bit staggered... G - - - - requires break in Australia and is not really aware of the picture...worried about the largeness of his own share in the total governmental job...Told McMullen to replace old District Services vessels which have had it by new vessels, standardise on types and spares. Told all to take over 2 years supplies whenever they will not deteriorate unduly in this climate.

The Disposals Commission wished the Administration to take most of the stores and "declare" those it could not use at a later date, but Murray was adamant: "....we could not possibly accept except under conditions of caring for, but no responsibility".[178]

In February 1946 Murray made an extensive tour of the centres to be taken over from the military:[179]

176. Ibid., p. 72.
177. Ibid., p. 73.
178. Ibid., p. 78.
179. Ibid., pp. 80-1.

> Went to Lae-Madang-Wewak-Aitape-Hollandia-Madang (Hagen, Kar Kar, Bagabag)-Lae...Woodman /District Officer, Madang/ seems to have things in hand and is full of confidence; and will obviously get things done W's way. Saw Maxwell there and reminded him Admin. would have priority on Production Control Board stores for disposal. Told him this in Woodman's presence...Niall at Wewak was assured also. He and Woodman know their districts and have...little anxiety. Niall has plans and will I think implement them...Stores and material a headache.
>
> Aitape...native hospital site O.K. but the latrine on the sand not so good and no immediate effort to make it satisfactory. Major O - - -, D.O. Angau didn't seem disturbed or issue any orders. Store for drugs has roof like a sieve, though no great worry about this either. Hope things improve when M - - - takes over...Police looked well and moved well.
>
> Dutch doing things in big way at Hollandia. They bought base, strips, roads. Liberty ships unloading cargoes and 3 Land Ships (Transport) came in while there...
>
> McMullen seems a little jaded but resolute and doing things. T.N.G. District Services jealousies - maybe the senior fellows won't help him too much unless interests coincide.

Progress in Port Moresby was less satisfactory, particularly since Murray was sometimes forced to spend valuable time on problems which should have been solved by his subordinates. The town's building programme, for example, was being delayed by an inability to decide on sites for houses:[180]

> 9/3/46. Housing dragging. A couple of months at least since a committee or Board was appointed in this matter...contract finalised months ago and only four sites available...no progress in the way of declaring sites to the contractor up to yesterday. At 2.30 went with /several officials/ in Jeeps and took until 5.30 p.m. inspecting sites and modes of ingress. Finalised 16 sites of which 12 can be stated to the contractor to be ready for the commencement of his work.

180. Murray journal, p. 43 (some entries are not in chronological order).

The limitations of his staff increased the burden on Murray and detracted from such larger projects as the clarification of policy with the Australian government,[181] and the resumption of civil administration throughout the Territory.

Tensions with the military

The final takeover from the military was complicated by the fact that General Robertson departed for Australia shortly after the January conference at Lae, leaving Major-General Morris once more in command of the Army in New Guinea.[182] Morris immediately moved his headquarters to Rabaul, where he could again conduct a self-contained operation. Murray was not impressed with the Army's attitude during this period: "Had luncheon... with General Morris: all medals, photogravures of His Majesty and pictures of their presentation."[183] Murray formed the impression that the Army was no longer making a determined effort to remove the wartime dangers from the areas still under its control.[184] He raised the question of the large quantities of rifles and ammunition which, through abandonment or deliberate distribution, were spread through the villages. "The G.O.C. said it was the aftermath of the war, and would have to be faced as best possible." Murray lacked the authority to extract further effort from the military in overcoming

181. Murray's work in Australia is discussed in Chapter Five.
182. Long, op. cit., p. 594.
183. Murray journal, p. 78.
184. This passage, including quotations, is drawn from P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item 1-4-2, 28 April 1946.

the problems that remained and it seemed for a time that he might be taking a risk in resuming civil administration according to the timetable agreed upon, particularly when rumours of impending uprisings began to spread.

Fears and false alarms

In March 1946 the District Officer at Lae, Mr. K.C. McMullen, received a report from an Australian who had recently been discharged from the Pacific Islands Regiment at Rabaul that disturbances had occurred in the town between Papua New Guinean soldiers and the civil police.[185] The report went on:

> The trouble appears to be that the natives of the /New Guinea Infantry Battalion/ have the idea that they and they alone were responsible for the defeat of the Japanese. They believe that this gives them the right to be a law unto themselves and they resent the Government simply for the fact that it represents Law and Order. Another favourite theme is that the Government hid in Australia whilst the war was on and ANGAU only came in after the N.G.I.B. cleared the Japanese.
>
> Natives of the N.G.I.B. have stated that on return to their villages they will train other natives as soldiers and be a law unto themselves...
>
> I am of the opinion that these natives will cause considerable trouble and in their present organized state present a serious menace, particularly when AMF troops evacuate New Guinea.

While the basic facts in the report were correct, the conclusions drawn from them might normally have been dismissed as a combination of old-style settler racism, officers' mess gossip and tales spread by New Guineans

185. The McMullen memorandum and its attachments, dated 4 April 1946 but unreferenced, was kept in his journal by Murray. The passage is drawn from these documents.

about members of rival language groups. However, the views in the report were generally supported by McMullen, who argued, "The War has had a marked effect on the natives of New Guinea, but the real reaction is not yet apparent." He saw the reaction flowing from the occupation of the country by "a coloured race" and the consequent loss of face by whites; from the establishment of the Pacific Islands Regiment, which had "aroused the latent desire to kill for killing's sake"; and from the fact that "ANGAU was forced to continually break faith with the natives". This had led to:

> The present stage, when Law and Order seems to have been discarded - where troops, civilians, asiatics and natives struggle together in the looting of dumps and camps as troops vacate them; when natives (discontented and with cause), threatened violence when they did not get satisfaction.

Making a special plea for his own service, McMullen criticised:

> Four years of Military Administration, during which the authority of the District Services staff has been undermined by a Native Labour Organization and the Royal Papuan Constabulary. A military Administration in which each service or department endeavoured to be a separate and water-tight Unit, with non-co-operation and no common policy: ANGAU, approximately 2000 strong, with only a small number of experienced men.

In summarising the position, as he saw it, McMullen stated, "The natives have lived in a reign of force and violence for four years; many are trained killers and jungle fighters...The country is full of abandoned firearms and ammunition. No one knows the quantity in

the hands of the natives."

In retrospect, it is obvious that McMullen's fears were exaggerated; indeed, his letter to Murray suggests that he was disgruntled and unable to accept changing circumstances; this may account for his resignation from the Administration, to join the W.R. Carpenter group, at the end of the year.[186] Nevertheless, Murray had to regard the report as important, particularly since he had until then considered its author "not a jumpy individual".[187] He noted that it could affect the takeover from the military, but reacted calmly in referring it to his senior field staff. After consultations with them he directed that the takeover should proceed as planned. In the event, no serious disturbances occurred, so that the risks that existed at the time were later overlooked. Yet the episode illustrates the strains and uncertainties under which Murray had to operate: had there been unrest, the evidence of the Administrator's misjudgement would have been overwhelming.

It is important to note that the rapid progress towards rehabilitation at this time occurred when Murray was still exercising a great deal of personal authority as Administrator, relying on the broadest policy guidelines from Australia and accepting enormous

186. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 6, January 1947, p. 8.
187. This passage is drawn from Murray's journal, pp. 133-5.

responsibilities in the process.

Problem at Manus

An issue which involved more complex political factors was the takeover of the American base at Manus Island from the United States Navy. The base had been built as one of the "spring-boards" for General Macarthur's advance on Japan and was estimated to have cost $156 million.[188] It was by far the biggest base south of the equator during 1944/45 and was strategically located for any post-war operations in South-East Asia. The Australian government was faced with a difficult decision about the future of the base, which the Americans wished to retain, but which was located in an area shortly to come under United Nations Trusteeship. In the event, the United States did not hand over the base until August 1948, and during the immediate post-war months Murray had no information about its possible fate. In April 1946 he paid his first peacetime visit to Manus in company with Major-General Morris (following their Rabaul conference on the transfer of military control).[189] On 22 April Murray was forced to cable Canberra for advice, since the U.S. Navy Captain in charge of the base was reluctant to enter into any negotiations for a handover.

188. An Australian's impressions of the establishment of the base are in P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 3, October 1946, pp. 22-4.

189. CRS A518, item A800/1/7, 22 April 1946. During several tours Murray had the use of an Australian Navy corvette. The level of negotiations at the time were unprecedented for an Administrator or Lieutenant-Governor.

The matter was referred to Dr. Evatt, the Minister for External Affairs, who was in London at the time, but the reply, while flattering to Murray, provided no practical guidance; the Minister suggested that negotiations should proceed, in the knowledge that Murray possessed the "utmost tact and courtesy".[190] The Administrator eventually secured an agreement from the base commander that the Americans working there would in future be subject to the laws of Papua New Guinea, but had then to return to Port Moresby, to wait more than two years for the government's final decision on the matter.

Murray's impressive start

During his first months as Administrator Murray worked under great pressure and at all levels - from international negotiation to deciding sites for public servants' houses - with a range of responsibilities and problems far greater than those imposed on any previous civil governor. He demonstrated, in addition to his obvious awareness of change and his sensitivity to situations, an ability to get things done. This was more impressive because his own position was far from secure. His initial appointment had been for one year only, and the opponents of the post-war policy regularly referred to the limits imposed on the Provisional Administration and to the rumour that the two Territories might be legally

190. Ibid., 24 April and 3 and 6 May 1946.

obliged to revert to "separate and more or less independent administrations".[191] In addition, Murray's application for secondment from his positions in Queensland, although supported by the Prime Minister, had been refused by the State government, so that his resignation as Professor of Agriculture and Principal of Gatton College became effective at the end of 1945.[192]

Meanwhile, Murray was making an impression in Papua New Guinea affairs. At the time of his appointment the Pacific Islands Monthly had avoided attacking him directly, but had pointed out, "Colonel Murray...will be under the handicap that he is a Ward appointee. Nothing good is expected of the Minister who produced the Provisional Government plan, the Production Control Board and the new Native Labour Regulations."[193] During the following months Murray's energy and personal conduct began to impress observers. In March 1946 a journalist noted:[194]

> The Administrator of Papua-New Guinea (Colonel J.K. Murray) has sketched in outline to me a possible future of hydro-electric power; of copra, coffee, cocoa and rubber plantations processing their products with that power; of native agriculture being improved through scientific research, and a million natives, rising in literacy, health and technical skill.
>
> It is a level-headed concept - a 50 years plan. Meanwhile, the man who voices it lives in an ancient

191. P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 2, September 1945, p. 5; No. 7, February 1946, p. 41; No. 12, July 1946, p. 10. This matter is discussed in the next Chapter.
192. Murray interview, 14 December 1966.
193. P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 2, September 1945, p. 5.
194. P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 8, March 1946, p. 26. The article fails to make the major point that electric power was to be used to mechanise plantations; this was in turn to free villagers from indentured labour and allow them to develop their own areas (see Chapter Eight).

> Government House where Papuan painters and carpenters are frugally patching. He lives simply. The one sadly battered car that was saved for him from the lavish transport of Moresby's military days is now unusable. The Administrator must go by Jeep when he tours his "capital".

Even one of the settler "special correspondents" to the Pacific Islands Monthly gave grudging commendation:[195]

> Rehabilitation of European settlement and industry... is now proceeding at a steadily accelerating pace. The position has improved considerably, compared with December last...As a result of four months practical experience of Territories conditions, Colonel Murray has been able to make many administrative rearrangements, the benefit of which should be felt in the next few months.

At the time of his appointment Murray was paid a tribute that was both prophetic and ironic, in view of his later dealings with the non-Labor government, by the leader of the Country Party, Mr. Fadden:[196]

> I...commend the Government upon its appointment of Colonel J.K. Murray as Administrator of the Territory of Papua-New Guinea. I am confident that Colonel Murray brings to this important post the special qualifications which it requires. For many years he has been principal of the Gatton Agricultural College in my electorate...Colonel Murray - or Professor Murray as he is better known in Queensland - ...is a man of deep convictions, and a fearless administrator. He is well fitted to discharge the trust which the Government has now reposed in him, and I am confident that he will carry out the duties of his new office without fear, or favour.

Murray soon showed that his convictions could indeed be uncompromising. For example, R.W. Robson wrote to Murray at the time of his appointment, commending him to a

195. P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 9, April 1946, p. 10.
196. C.P.D., Vol. 185, pp. 5854-5, 25 September 1945.

"task of extraordinary difficulty" and offering congratulations, to receive a rebuke in reply. "You will of course understand," Murray observed, "that my receipt of this courtesy must be tempered by the intemperate, unjust article with regard to the School of Civil Affairs and my friend, Colonel A.A. Conlon, for whose invaluable work and qualities I have a most high regard."[197] The attack would eventually be directed against Murray himself, as he sought to implement the Labor government's post-war policy. The question was whether the principles for which Murray was admired could withstand the pressures of transforming broad policy into firm administrative action.

197. P.N.G.N.A., Box 185 item GH27/2, 13 September 1945.

CHAPTER FIVE

IN SEARCH OF A POLICY

Cabinet sub-committee, 1944 - Anzac Pact - Scope of the sub-committee - Sub-committee recommendations - Inter-departmental committee and Provisional Administration - Problems of unified administration - The Ward statement of 1945 - Origins of the labour controversy - Conference on labour, 1944 - Vagueness of the Ward statement - Pressures on policy - Instruments of planning - Pacific Territories Research Council - Demise of the Research Council - Direct action by Murray - Murray's Macrossan lecture - Australian School of Pacific Administration - Influence of Trusteeship - South Pacific Commission - Planning frustrated

Cabinet sub-committee, 1944

Colonel Murray was responsible for executing a policy which was set out in only the very broadest terms. Formal planning began for the post-war development of Papua New Guinea with the establishment of a standing sub-committee of Cabinet in February 1944.[1]

1. CRS A518, item A800/1/7, 31 May 1944. The

The sub-committee comprised the Ministers for the Army (Mr. F.M. Forde), External Affairs (Dr. H.V. Evatt, who was also Attorney-General and required to advise on matters of constitutional and international law), Post-War Reconstruction (Mr. J.B. Chifley, who was also Treasurer), Health and Social Services (Senator J.M. Fraser, who had served as Minister for External Territories from 1941 to 1943) and External Territories (Mr. E.J. Ward, who was also Minister for Transport). In addition, the Commander-in-Chief, General Blamey, and the Director of Research, Colonel Conlon, were appointed permanent members of the sub-committee, with Mr. J.R. Halligan, Secretary for External Territories, as its executive officer. The Cabinet sub-committee established, in turn, an inter-departmental committee representing all of the departments for which the sub-committee's Ministers were responsible, with Halligan as its chairman.[2] It had taken the Australian government more than two years, from the outbreak of the Pacific war, to set up this elaborate structure and its membership reflected the balance of forces influencing Papua New Guinea affairs at the time: the Department of External Territories and the Directorate of Research enjoyed direct representation, the pre-war public services and the settlers were ignored and Angau appeared rather

(cont.) sub-committee is referred to in the published accounts (Stanner, Transition, op. cit., pp. 93, 104, 107; Mair, op. cit. (1948), p. 203), but without members from outside the Cabinet; in fact, this was not an orthodox Cabinet sub-committee.

2. CRS A518, item B927/7, February 1944 (full date not shown).

remotely through the Commander-in-Chief. Owing to the government's preoccupation with Australian domestic affairs, the main planning activity stemmed from its advisory groups.

Anzac pact

There was little to guide the planners, beyond the knowledge that, as James McAuley expressed it, "before the war it was accepted by all parties that the Territories should be self-supporting".[3] Nor was there any recent indication of political interest in New Guinea; apart from matters concerning military operations in the general South-West Pacific theatre, New Guinea was not once mentioned in Parliament during the whole of 1943. However, the Territories figured in Dr. Evatt's design for Australia's international role in the post-war world, finding particular expression in the Australia-New Zealand Agreement, or "Anzac Pact", signed in January 1944.[4] There were three features of the agreement that held significance for Papua New Guinea. Articles 5, 13 and 15 expressed a determination to co-ordinate the defence of the area between Australian and New Zealand interests, while omitting reference to Great Britain and

3. J.P. McAuley, "Trusteeship in Practice: New Guinea, Nauru, Western Samoa", in A.H. McDonald (ed.), Trusteeship in the Pacific, Sydney, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1949, p. 36.
4. The accounts of the agreement set out in Stanner, Transition, op. cit., pp. 96-7 and Legge, op. cit., pp. 191-2 suggested that it would have greater significance than it finally possessed.

the United States.[5] Article 30 proposed the establishment of a South Seas Regional Commission; this eventually emerged as the technically-oriented, politically ineffectual South Pacific Commission, whose formation is discussed later in this Chapter. For planning purposes, the operative clause was Article 31, which set out the broad guidelines for the Commission without providing specifications for detailed action:

> 31. The two Government agree that it shall be the function of such South Seas Regional Commission as may be established to secure a common policy on social, economic and political development directed towards the advancement and well-being of the native peoples themselves, and that in particular the Commission should
>
> (a) recommend arrangements for the participation of natives in administration in increasing measure with a view to promoting the ultimate attainment of self-government in the form most suited to the circumstances of the native peoples concerned;
>
> (b) recommend arrangements for material development, including production, finance, communications and marketing;
>
> (c) recommend arrangements for co-ordination of health and medical services and education;
>
> (d) recommend arrangements for maintenance and improvement of standards of native welfare in regard to labour conditions and participation of natives in administration and social services;
>
> (e) recommend arrangements for collaboration in economic, social, medical and anthropological research....

In this Article the agreement went considerably beyond

5. The regional arrangement was foreshadowed by Dr. Evatt in a statement to the House of Representatives in October 1943 (C.P.D. Vol. 176, pp. 572-5, 14 October 1943). Both the statement and the agreement itself seemed to leave the U.K. and U.S. out of account and were later attacked for this reason (for the "islands" point of view, see P.I.M., Vol. 14 No. 4, November 1943, pp. 11, 35; No. 7, February, 1944, pp. 3-4 and No. 8, March 1944, pp. 1-2). The significant feature for this study is that the later involvement of these other powers limited the functions of the Commission.

the terms of the "C" Class Mandate under which the Territory of New Guinea had been administered, anticipating the conditions of trusteeship by making specific reference to political development, self-government and participation in administration.[6] Additionally, it committed Australia to applying the same conditions to the Territory of Papua and thereby removed the main formal objection to unified peacetime administration of the two Territories.[7]

Scope of the sub-committee

The Australia-New Zealand Agreement seemed to provide the Cabinet sub-committee with clear, if generalised, principles upon which detailed programmes of action could be based, but constraints upon long-term planning remained. One was the proposal for regional co-operation itself: although the Commission was to have "advisory" powers only, there was a possibility that its mere existence would impose restrictions on independent action by either of the parties. Of greater importance were the limitations inherent in the sub-committee's own terms of reference. Both Mair and Stanner later implied that these gave the sub-committee a wide role: Mair stated that it was intended "to deal with the future administration of the territories" and Stanner that its function was "to

6. The Mandate merely provided, in Article 3, "The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory subject to the present mandate."
7. The main factors in the debate about unified administration are set out later in this Chapter.

consider future administrative policy".[8] They no doubt based their assessments on Mr, Curtin's statement that the sub-committee would "deal with all future civil administration",[9] but this phrasing was intended to make explicit the contrast between military and civil rule. The specific terms of reference set out in departmental records disclose the true position: the sub-committee was primarily intended "to deal with civil affairs and plan rehabilitation and reconstruction" in Papua New Guinea.[10] This indicated definite limits on the responsibilities of the sub-committee and the time during which it would exercise them. In any event, the group interpreted its functions in the narrower sense and limited its recommendations to the resumption of civil administration and associated short-term problems.

Sub-committee recommendations

The Cabinet sub-committee made its recommendations in two stages.[11] In February 1944 Cabinet approved its

8. Mair, op. cit. (1948), p. 203; Stanner, Transition, op. cit., p. 104. It is necessary, in discussing this and some later developments, to consider the studies published at about this time, since most subsequent accounts draw their assessments in turn from these sources, which were limited by their proximity to the events which they discussed and their authors' involvement in those events.
9. P.I.M., Vol. 14 No. 8, March 1944, p. 3.
10. CRS A518, item A800/1/7, 31 May 1944.
11. Stanner (Transition, op. cit., p. 93) stated that the sub-committee was established in February 1944, when it was announced by Curtin. However, it had already met on an ad hoc basis, making the recommendations Curtin outlined on 22 February, including the proposal that it be set up permanently.

proposals that it should continue as a standing sub-committee; that there be close collaboration between the Department of External Territories and the Directorate of Research; that the Minister for External Territories be responsible for all matters concerning civil administration in, and attend War Cabinet discussions concerning New Guinea; and that his Department provide executive services to the sub-committee.[12] In addition to these procedural matters, Cabinet also decided that the School of Civil Affairs be established; that limited numbers of civilians be allowed to return to Papua; and that "substantial financial provision...be made available by the Commonwealth Government" for the Territories.[13] The last of these decisions marked the clear break with pre-war practice, but there was no firm indication of the next steps to be taken. The sub-committee had discussed the question of resuming civil administration but, on being advised that General Macarthur opposed an early resumption, decided that the matter be deferred for another six months.[14] The question of transfer was next discussed in September 1944, when General Blamey agreed to a handover being conducted in stages, but this meant that there had already been a considerable delay in implementing earlier proposals.

The responsibility for settling the details of

12. CRS A518, item A800/1/7, 31 May 1944. Note that much of the executive work was in fact carried out by the Directorate (Chapter Two, pp. 131-5, particularly p. 134, footnote 157).
13. P.I.M., Vol. 14 No. 8, March 1944, p. 3.
14. CRS A518, item A800/1/7, 4 February 1944.

post-war administration was then delegated to the inter-departmental committee, which accepted as its framework certain "determinants of development policy" which bore a close resemblance to the recommendations contained in the position papers prepared for the Cabinet sub-committee by the Directorate of Research.[15] The "determinants" included the requirements of the future defence of Australia and New Guinea; Australia's international obligations; the political consideration that, if Australia should be slow to develop the country, "someone else will"; and concern for the economy of the country.[16] The inter-departmental committee was reminded that the government would have to be prepared to "spend large sums of money on the Territories without the prospect of any comparable economic return".

Inter-departmental committee and Provisional Administration

The second stage of planning for the resumption of civil administration began on 23 February 1945, just a year after initial preparations had begun, when the inter-departmental group made several recommendations to the Cabinet sub-committee. These were that the separate administrations for New Guinea and Papua should not be reconstituted; that they should be replaced by a combined administration for the immediate future; that

15. See Chapter Two, pp. 134-5.
16. This and the following passage are drawn from CRS A518, item B927/7, undated February 1944.

the combined service be staffed, for the present, by temporary appointees; that no Legislative Council be appointed during the interim period; that the separate laws of New Guinea and Papua continue in operation, unless superseded by new legislation; and that an Australian Territories Research Council be set up to continue post-war planning.[17] In a statement to the House of Representatives on 9 March 1945 Mr. Ward announced the government's decision to establish a combined Provisional Administration in terms almost identical with those of the inter-departmental committee's recommendations, omitting reference only to the Research Council.[18] Thus neither the Cabinet sub-committee nor Cabinet itself added anything of substance to the immediate post-war arrangements proposed by the officials.[19]

The Minister's announcement of the Provisional Administration in March 1945 gave few details of the planning that had taken place and gave no reasons for the decisions reached by the government. Referring to the proposal for a combined administration, Mr. Ward merely stated:[20]

> Although the Government does not propose at this stage to consider the question of a combined Public Service for the two Territories, it considers that

17. CRS A518, item A800/1/7, 23 February 1945.
18. C.P.D., Vol. 181, pp. 529-30, 9 March 1945.
19. Successors to the Cabinet sub-committee and the inter-departmental group were set up in later years; their efforts are discussed in Chapters 9 and 10.
20. C.P.D., Vol. 181, p. 529, 9 March 1945.

> it would not be desirable immediately to re-establish the two entirely separate services. It has, therefore, been decided to continue the suspension of the officers of the two services and make temporary arrangements for the performance of functions of civil administration in the Territory of Papua and the portion of the Territory of New Guinea south of the Markham River....

Besides casting doubts on the employment security of pre-war public servants, the statement led to speculation about the motives for establishing a combined civil administration on a temporary basis only. For the previous two year settler interests had condemned the delay in restoring civil control and had attributed it to Angau's desire to continue its rule.[21] However, Angau had too little influence in Cabinet for its future to cause notable concern; although Generals Blamey and Macarthur both wished to prolong military rule for a time, there is no evidence of a serious proposal that it should continue for a period of years. A second argument, put forward by the Pacific Islands Monthly, was that the Minister intended to confine power to Canberra and deny European private interests to the Territory in order to plan a "socialist utopia" for "brown brother".[22] The magazine maintained that the "Brass Hats", including the senior officers of both Angau and the Directorate, wished to retain control by indirect methods after being denied the continuation of full military rule. It was also difficult to sustain this argument, since it ignored the fact that the two

21. P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 3, October 1944, pp. 6-8.
22. P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 12, July 1945, pp. 6, 41-5.

groups were openly antagonistic towards each other.[23]

Problems of unified administration

The obvious explanation for the adoption of interim measures in the immediate post-war period was that Australia could not make final arrangements until the status of the Mandated Territory and the role of the United Nations were settled. Yet there had already been significant pressure for permanent unification. Some time before the Minister's statement of March 1945 papers were prepared within the Directorate of Research suggesting strongly that there was no operative legal barrier to combined administration.[24] One of the papers supported the view that "in Mandate C at any rate international law not only permits but, indeed, commends combined administration in just such cases as New Guinea. Certain limitations on unification are clearly admitted in this view, but they are only limitations, not prohibitions."[25] The limitations arose from the terms of the Mandate which provided that "unification must not go to the point of calling the Mandatory's

23. See Chapter Two, pp. 135-9.
24. The papers are unsigned, undated and carry no file numbers: merely the handwritten notation, "Directorate of Research". One is headed, "Note on legality under international law of proposals for combined administration of Papua and the Mandated Territory" and the other, "Note on the report of the Eggleston Committee on combined administration of Papua and New Guinea of 1939 in its relation to Australian strategic security". They were almost certainly prepared by Dr. T.P. Fry.
25. Directorate of Research, "Note on legality etc.", op. cit., p. 1.

control over the territory 'sovereignty'"; that any arrangement was subject to Australia's obligation eventually to "emancipate" the Territory; and that "unification must leave it possible to account separately for the income and expenditure of the Mandated area".[26] A second paper analysed the findings of the 1939 Eggleston Committee, which had investigated administrative union but recommended against it: not, according to the paper, on legal grounds, but for reasons of a "trivial nature" with "their roots in private economic interests";[27] that is, objections to union during the pre-war period had come not from international or legal sources but from internal pressure groups.

Attempts to create a unified administrative structure after the war were more likely to meet with international objections, mainly on the grounds that Australia might attempt in this way to assert full sovereignty over the Territory of New Guinea. However, any claims of this kind could be rejected by reference to the terms of the Australia-New Zealand Agreement and to Dr. Evatt's policy speeches on Pacific affairs. Yet the circumstances were sufficiently complex to require a clear directive from Cabinet if the planning of a

26. Ibid., pp. 1-4.
27. Directorate of Research, "Note on Eggleston etc.", op. cit., p. 2. The committee comprised Mr. F.W. Eggleston, Mr. H.O. Townsend, Treasurer, Territory of New Guinea and Mr. Leonard Murray, representing

permanent administration were to be completed quickly. Nothing so definite appeared in the "determinants of development policy" presented to the inter-departmental committee which, under Halligan's chairmanship, was thus left without firm guidance on the matter.

During the discussions on unified administration, tensions between the Department of External Territories and the Directorate reached their height, with Halligan and his staff being accused by Conlon of obstructing change.[28] The Department was well aware that the Eggleston Committee had found no support for amalgamation among the European community of the Territories; and that the settler evacuees were even then campaigning, through the Pacific Territories Association and the Pacific Islands Monthly, for a return to the status quo ante.[29] Halligan faced the prospect of having dealings with the settlers for years to come, so that any obstruction was probably less deliberate than circumstantial, particularly since Halligan lacked the

(cont.) Papua (Report of Committee Appointed to Survey the Possibility of Establishing a Combined Administration of Papua and New Guinea, Commonwealth Parliamentary Paper No. 230, Vol. 3, 1937-40). Different accounts have been given of the findings. Stanner (Transition, op. cit., pp. 40-1) states that "legal difficulties" were "crucial", while Legge (op. cit., p. 189) maintains they were not a source of opposition. In fact, Leonard Murray, in a minority report, expressed legal doubts, while the majority did not. Stanner's peculiar interpretation was apparently intended to support his argument that separate administrations might be desirable; this was part of his contradiction of most post-war policies.

28. See Chapter Two, p. 138.
29. P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 2, September 1945, p. 5; No. 7, February 1946, p. 41; No. 12, July 1946, p. 10.

freedom of action of the Directorate staff and had received little attention from his Minister. By this time Ward was receiving advice of widely different scope from two rival sources: the Directorate, working on long-term issues; and the inter-departmental committee, concentrating on immediate arrangements that seemed far more practical. When the nature of the post-war administration came to be decided, the decisive role fell to the formal bureaucratic structure, which adopted the cautious approach of taking into account all the considerations of supposed international law and of public service and settler interests: matters that had been largely dismissed or ignored by the Directorate. This inevitably created further delays in the establishment of a combined permanent administration.[30]

The Ward statement of 1945

Mr. Ward announced the Provisional Administration proposal on 9 March 1945, stating that military rule would end "as soon as it is practicable to re-organize the civil administrative service",[31] but it was almost four months before he introduced the enabling legislation to Parliament. The delay could hardly have been excused by difficulties of drafting, since the Bill incorporated only the most basic machinery provisions

30. The permanent administrative structure did not become operative until 1 July 1949 (see Chapter Nine).
31. C.P.D., Vol. 181, p. 529, 9 March 1945.

to give effect to the recommendations of the inter-departmental committee; it suspended much of the Papua Act and the New Guinea Act, while allowing the laws of the separate Territories to continue in force, and provided for the appointment of a temporary public service (Section 15), a Supreme Court (Section 16) and an Administrator (Section 9).[32] Mr. Ward's second-reading speech on the Bill lasted for less than twenty minutes. In setting out the machinery provisions of the legislation he repeated his statement of 9 March, while giving no further explanation for the government's reaching the decisions it had. Yet the speech has received a remarkable amount of attention, presumably because it was the only one of substance the Minister ever made on New Guinea policy. One section, in particular, has been quoted or paraphrased in each of the published accounts of the period.[33] It reads:[34]

> This Government is not satisfied that sufficient interest had been taken in the Territories prior to the Japanese invasion, or that adequate funds had been provided for their development and the advancement of the native inhabitants. Apart from the debt of gratitude that the people of Australia owe to the natives of the Territory, the government regards it as its bounden duty to further to the utmost the advancement of the natives, and considers that that can be achieved only by providing facilities for better health, better education and for a greater participation by the natives in the wealth of their country and eventually in its government.

32. The Papua-New Guinea Provisional Administration Act contains only 17 Sections.
33. Stanner, Transition, op. cit., p. 100; Mair, op. cit. (1948), pp. 207-8; Legge, op. cit., p. 192.
34. C.P.D., Vol. 183, p. 4052, 4 July 1945.

This was a direct expression of the views of the Directorate, just as the machinery provisions of the Bill had been provided by the inter-departmental committee. The Minister's speech contained nothing that had not already been stated in the Australia-New Zealand Agreement or by Dr. Evatt during the United Nations Conference and following his return from San Francisco.[35] Ward, although a sincere supporter of the principles he expressed, was not the first to apply them to New Guinea and it is doubtful whether he appreciated, then or later, the amount of effort required to transform principles into action. His main concern in New Guinea appears to have been labour conditions, about which he held the strongest of views, but although his interest in this matter was entirely laudable, it tended to obscure affairs of equal importance. Thus he devoted more than one-third of his second-reading speech to the labour question, directing much of the ensuing parliamentary debate in

35. It is not proposed to discuss Australia's foreign policy except insofar as it gave clear direction to policies and programmes in Papua New Guinea. In this respect, Dr. Evatt's role at San Francisco was significant for his support for a strong system of trusteeship supervision, on the one hand, while on the other he argued forcefully in favour of sweeping powers for Australia over the Territory of New Guinea; in this latter respect he differed little from Hughes at Versailles. His attitude, and Australia's continuing obsession with the defence of the islands, is particularly clear in his speech on the second reading of the Charter of the United Nations Bill (C.P.D., Vol. 184, pp. 5016-39, 30 August 1945), during which he answered numerous questions on the provisions of the United Nations Charter, including matters relating to trusteeship.

the same direction.[36] The controversy over the labour policy eventually commanded so much public attention that it created a false impression of the major concerns of the Provisional Administration, though perhaps not of the Minister, and so to indicate the significance of the issue it is necessary to discuss its origin.

36. C.P.D., Vol. 183, pp. 4050-5, 4 July 1945. The speech was some 3,000 words in length. About 1,000 words concerned machinery provisions, so that the labour question received a full half of the attention devoted to substantive matters: clearly disproportionate, under the circumstances. The ensuing debate, including committee stages, occupied more than ten hours of the parliament's time; some 7½ hours in the House of Representatives and two hours forty-five minutes in the Senate (C.P.D., Vol. 183, pp. 4200-18, 4282-4325 [House of Representatives]; 4593-8, 4671-86 [Senate]). The debate concentrated mainly on defence, settlers' rights and representation, and the pre-war "record" of Australian administration, in addition to the labour question, which, as in Mr. Ward's speech, occupied about one-third of the debating time. Two speeches made during the debate are of particular relevance to later developments in Papua New Guinea: those of Mr. Haylen, who used such terms as "new order" (p. 4206) and "new deal" (p. 4210), thereby adding heat to the contemporary argument and providing material for much debate in later years; and Mr. Spender, the future Minister, who confessed his "abysmal ignorance" of New Guinea affairs (p. 4210). Of the remainder, only five Members of the House spoke during the debate-in-chief on the Bill and eight on an amendment moved by Mr. White (Liberal) that the Bill be referred to a Select Committee for advice on the "best methods" of restoring civil administration (p. 4282), a motion which was defeated by 36 votes to 14 on the division (p. 4306). Twenty Members spoke during the committee stages of the Bill, the main contributors being Mr. Archie Cameron (six speeches) and Mr. White (five speeches). No amendments were passed. Seven Senators spoke during the debate-in-chief. There was no debate during the committee stages of the Bill in the Senate. The Bill received assent on 3 August 1945. A summary of the debate is provided in G. Gray, "The Passing of the Papua-New Guinea Provisional Administration Bill" in H.N. Nelson, N. Lutton and S. Robertson (eds.), 06: Select Topics in the History of Papua and New Guinea, Port Moresby, University of Papua New Guinea, 1970(?), p. 37.

Origins of the labour controversy

The easily exploitable wealth was removed from Papua New Guinea almost before government control could be established. The pearlshell from the shallower reefs, the beche de mer, the sandalwood and the alluvial gold were mostly taken by the turn of the century and the "kanaka trade" in labourers was forbidden.[37] After a short period of freehold sale, the alienation of land was controlled, so that labour became the most important exploitable resource for European entrepreneurs in the islands. Yet the country was not heavily populated, and so the supply of labour dwindled: villagers near towns found other sources of income and the administrations in the two Territories increased their efforts to control recruitment and to improve labourers' conditions. As labour became scarcer and relatively more expensive, employers became obsessed by the issue.[38] As they chafed under the restrictions of their war-time exile in Australia, the settlers grew even more apprehensive as pressure mounted in favour of transforming the system of employment in Papua New Guinea.

The public debate on post-war employment began with statements by representatives of the Papua New Guinea

37. A succinct account of these early activities is Gavin Souter, New Guinea: The Last Unknown, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1963, Chs. 1-2.
38. The best account of pre-war labour conditions, policies and European attitudes towards them is in Mair, op. cit. (1948), Chs. 6-7.

missions on the future of the country. In November 1943 Bishop Strong of the Anglican Mission urged caution, after the war, "against the men who planned to make money in New Guinea because of the cheap native labour".[39] At the end of that month an Anglican conference adopted a "Christian Charter for Melanesian Peoples" drawn up with the assistance of Professor A.P. Elkin. This document expressed sentiments similar to those of Bishop Strong, as did a paper by the Rev. Dr. J.W. Burton, secretary of the Methodist Overseas Mission, entitled "The Atlantic Charter and the Melanesian People".[40] The gulf between this attitude and that of the employer was apparent in the statement by the chairman of New Guinea Goldfields Ltd. at the company's annual general meeting in January 1944:[41]

> In pre-war days the boys /~workers~/ were virtually wards of the Administration, and were well cared for from an industrial, health and recreational standpoint. They received ample food and clothing allowances, and sufficient wages to provide extras and some luxuries. It is common knowledge that the boys employed in industry so developed physically and mentally that one would hardly recognize them as the same race of natives...That the former policy was satisfactory was evidenced by the growing development of the agricultural and mining resources of the island just prior to the war...The problem of restoring the highly satisfactory pre-war conditions to the native boys should be entrusted to persons thoroughly trained and experienced in such matters.

Almost immediately, the debate came to centre on the long-standing controversy over the "indenture" system of

39. This and the following passage are drawn from P.I.M., Vol. 14 No. 5, December 1943, pp. 10, 34-5.
40. Burton expressed similar views in a letter to the Pacific Islands Monthly in November 1943 (Vol. 14 No. 4, p. 16).
41. P.I.M., Vol. 14 No. 7, February 1944, p. 12.

employment, under which labourers could be engaged on contract for terms of several years.[42] The pernicious feature of the system was that workers who broke their contracts could be gaoled for months at a time. The proposal to "abolish" indenture, put forward many years previously and supported by Ward and his advisers, mainly involved the substitution of civil remedies for the long-standing penal sanctions. Supporters of indenture argued that civil remedies, such as damages for breach of contract, would be of little consequence if applied against a person with no realisable assets, so that workers would "desert" whenever they wished. This was a tacit admission that employment conditions were such that labourers stayed at work mainly through fear of gaol, although it was more usual to blame the situation on the "unreliability of the native". However, even relatively disinterested observers maintained that indenture had the advantage of placing certain obligations upon employers in their treatment of workers; settlers were sometimes prosecuted for breaches of the employment regulations. Yet similar controls could have been exercised under a system which did not involve penal sanctions against workers. In fact, indenture was symptomatic of the colonial economic system and of the assumptions underlying it: development could occur only through European "enterprise", which had to be attracted by easy access to Papua New Guinea's

42. A summary of the system and of the debate surrounding it appears in Legge, op. cit., pp. 155-67, from which a good deal of the following passage has been drawn.

most readily exploitable resource, labour. Abolition of indenture threatened the very presence of Europeans in the country.

Nevertheless, the missions continued their campaign and on 2 February 1944 a deputation, supported by the views of the anthropologists Elkin and Hogbin, presented the case for the abolition of indenture to the Minister for External Affairs, Dr. Evatt.[43] The deputation's submission was passed to the Department of External Territories, where the Secretary, Mr. Halligan, revealed the gulf between the bureaucracy's views and those of the mission-academic group. In replying, Halligan supported the indenture system on the grounds that it developed "character" and the "habit of industry"; improved the labourers' knowledge of agriculture; provided instruction in sanitation and personal hygiene; exposed workers to discipline and law and order; illustrated the practical application of the "principles of contract"; and established the habits of a "regular life" as against an irregular one.[44] While Halligan's comments revealed a

43. CRS A518, item C213/3/2, 2 February 1944. The deputation waited on Evatt rather than on Ward because the latter had been Minister only since October 1943, while Evatt's views were already well known from his statements on the Atlantic Charter; he was also acquainted with members of the group. Hogbin had joined the debate during a talk at Sydney University in October 1943, provoking a savage attack from Robson (P.I.M., Vol. 14 No. 3, October 1943, p. 15).
44. CRS A518, item C213/3/2, 2 March 1944. It is tempting to recount many of the extraordinary arguments put forward in support of indenture: one statement in particular shows the futility of pre-war paternalism. Mrs. Mollie Lett, wife of Sir Hubert Murray's

remarkable ignorance of life both in the villages and on plantations, they were not reactionary, but the conventional wisdom of the time. They are of significance mainly because they were expressed at exactly the time when the anthropologists who opposed indenture were beginning their association with the Directorate of Research.

The government's attitude to indenture was still not clear. In April 1944 a statement was drafted in the Department of Information for release by Australian representatives abroad suggesting, "It should be borne in mind that the majority of New Guinea natives are nearer to the primitive type than most other races inhabiting the earth. They are centuries behind semi-civilized natives...."[45] It is probable that the statement was not released, but the fact that it should even have been prepared - presumably with the advice of the Department of External Territories - indicated that

(cont.) eulogistic biographer, contributed the following: "The abolition of...indentured labour was a measure Sir Hubert Murray feared would be introduced before the natives were ready for it... With the abolition of penal sanctions, settlers will have to be prepared to allow natives to break contracts with impunity; for, as a defendant in a civil action, a native is worthless...Sir Hubert wrote on the subject only a short time before he died. 'Personally,' he stated, 'I should be glad to see indentured labour replaced by free labour, but I do not think that this will come about until the native has developed a sense of responsibility that will hold him to his contract without penal sanctions; and it appears to me that when we can do without penal sanctions, we can do without indentured labour altogether.'" (P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 1, August 1944, p. 19).

45. CRS A518, item C213/3/2, 19 April 1944.

the bureaucracy would have to revolutionize its thinking if major reforms were to be introduced in New Guinea. Meanwhile, the Directorate of Research had joined the campaign against indenture and on 3 August 1944 its staff leaked information to the press that the system would be abolished after the war.[46] This brought a quick reaction from the Pacific Territories Association, whose executive presented a petition, accompanied by twelve pages of signatures, to Mr. Ward on 26 August, requesting that indenture be retained.[47] However, the Cabinet sub-committee on New Guinea decided on 8 September that indenture could no longer be supported and shortly thereafter the Minister informed the House of Representatives that the system would probably be abolished.[48] The decision was publicly confirmed by the Minister for Supply and Shipping, Mr. Beasley, at the September conference of the International Labour Organization in Philadelphia.[49]

Conference on labour, 1944

Owing to the strong support for the indenture system, it was decided to call a conference of the interested

46. Ibid., 3 August 1944.
47. Ibid., 26 August 1944.
48. C.P.D., Vol. 175, p. 1268, 22 September 1944.
49. CRS A518, item C213/3/2, undated September 1944 (press release). Beasley had earlier joined Ward in condemning indentured labour and the two had been labelled by the Pacific Islands Monthly "typical products of the now degenerate democratic system" (P.I.M., Vol. 14 No. 10, May 1944, p. 3).

parties in Sydney on 1 December 1944.[50] This was the only occasion during the war when the government entered into direct consultation with the European interests associated with Papua New Guinea. It was unfortunate this was not done more often, for there was an obvious need for increased communication on both sides. The labour conference, for example, represented a wide range of views: from the Department, the Directorate, the Territories' public services, the missions and the Pacific Territories Association.[51] It was intended, according to Mr. Ward's opening address, to plan the steps involved in putting the government's decision into effect.[52] However, many of the delegates who attended were more concerned to have the decision reversed than to help in implementing it; most of the others advised the government to proceed with extreme caution in introducing changes; and the meeting broke up after lengthy but inconclusive discussion.[53] It was not re-convened. This left the field to the mission-academic group favouring abolition,

50. CRS A518, item C213/3/2, 4 December 1944.
51. Among the representatives were Messrs. Halligan, Leonard Murray and Melrose; Professor Elkin and Dr. Hogbin; Mr. E.W.P. Chinnery, anthropologist, former Director of District Services, Territory of New Guinea and at that time Commonwealth Adviser on Native Matters; Lt.-Col. E. Taylor, former Assistant Director of District Services, T.N.G.; Lt.-Col. J. Mullaly and Mr. J. Bretag, former Members of the Legislative Council of New Guinea; and Messrs. G. Aumuller and T. Nevitt, former M.L.C.'s from Papua. The Methodist, Lutheran, Catholic, Seventh Day Adventist and London Missionary Society missions were also represented (ibid.).
52. Ibid., 1 December 1944. For a summary of the conference, see Stanner, Reconstruction, op. cit., pp. 62-3.
53. Ibid. and P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 5, December 1944, p. 8.

whose proposals were endorsed by the Minister in his speech on the Provisional Administration Bill.[54]

Mr. Ward announced that, immediately civil administration was re-established, a new Native Labour Ordinance for the combined Territory would be enacted. It was the government's policy that indenture should be abolished "within a period of five years or at an earlier date".[55] In preparation, it was proposed to "eliminate" professional recruiters; tighten controls over levels of employment and consequent over-recruitment in certain villages; increase wages, pending an inquiry into the matter; introduce a greatly improved scale of rations; reduce working hours to 44 a week (from 55 in New Guinea and 50 in Papua); increase the minimum employment age from 14 to 16; ban the employment of women under indenture; limit the period of employment to 12 months, followed by a compulsory three-month break (compared with a maximum of seven years in New Guinea and four in Papua); provide for repatriation at the employer's expense; establish a Court of Labour and Arbitration, in lieu of the courts of criminal jurisdiction, to deal with a limited range of penal provisions against workers, with reduced penalties; give limited encouragement to non-indentured labour, who would have the same conditions as contract workers; provide for workers' compensation; and establish a separate

54. For the substance of the proposals, see ibid. and P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 6, January 1945, p. 12.
55. C.P.D., Vol. 183, p. 4052, 4 July 1945.

Department of Native Labour.[56] In this area, at least, the Minister's speech provided the Provisional Administration with a fairly detailed programme of action.

Vagueness of the Ward statement

Had proposals in similar detail been made in the many other areas requiring attention - health, education, village agriculture, local government, technical instruction, political education, communications, status of women, administrative structure, mission relations, financial policy - then the task of the new civil administration would have been immeasurably easier. Yet even the labour measures, which in most cases were little more than amendments to long-standing practices, stand in marked contrast to the Minister's vague statements on other policies. On development: "In future, the basis for the economy of the territory will be native and European industry with the limit of non-native expansion determined by the welfare of the natives generally."[57] On public service staffing: "To carry out the plans of the Government, an efficient and energetic administration will be required, and, although many of the experienced officers...will be available, other officers will be required to fill vacancies that have been caused by war casualties and retirements from the services."[58] These statements were far from

56. Ibid., pp. 4052-3.
57. Ibid., p. 4054.
58. Ibid.

the "comprehensive programme...for the rehabilitation and development of the Territories" promised by the Minister earlier in his speech, and he had to conclude by saying, "Naturally, many of the plans of the Government affecting native education, health, &c., are in the formative stage. From time to time statements will be made to the Parliament of decisions taken in respect of various matters."[59] But the statements were not delivered, because comprehensive decisions were never reached.

Pressures on policy

Colonel Murray was aware of the impact of Ward's statement. He observed, "The Minister made his policy clear in parliament and it certainly received a great deal of publicity; the humanitarian aspects made their greatest popular appeal in Australia; and the economic [aspects created] 'commercial' animosity."[60] But New Guinea still lacked an administrative programme and Murray had little to refer to apart from his observations at the School of Civil Affairs: "I had attended most of the lectures in the School...by people like Hogbin, Mair, Piddington, Wedgewood, Andrews and thus knew the attitude to development and administrative policy and procedures discussed by them with the classes." These were lectures delivered mainly to the men who were "to be the junior

59. Ibid., pp. 4052, 4055.
60. This and the following quotations are drawn from Murray's notes, p. 61.

officers at the commencement of administration in '45": the highest and lowest echelons of the public service thus had something in common. However, attitudes at the intervening levels had been conditioned by experience in New Guinea rather than by formal lectures; the staff of the school represented only a narrow spectrum of contemporary opinion. Since Murray had little opportunity of broadening his network of informants before taking up his post, he had a limited appreciation of the acceptability of the Ward proposals among his senior staff.

Prior to his swearing-in on 11 October 1945, Murray had met Ward only once, at Finschhafen during the war. There was little time for formal discussion during the twelve days between his appointment and departure for New Guinea.[61] It was this haste that led to criticism of the sudden transition to civil administration;[62] after all, it had taken the government seven months, from the announcement of the Provisional Administration, to appoint its Administrator, so that another few weeks delay could hardly have mattered. By that time, however, Murray's future was being dictated by pressures that had grown out of earlier delays: the unexpected ending of the war; the need for Australia to keep to its promises made in the Anzac Pact and at San Francisco; the desire to end military rule; and the determination to deny the appointment to a pre-war officer, particularly Leonard Murray. The

61. Murray letter of 26 May 1969.
62. See, for example, Stanner, Transition, op. cit., p. 86.

new Administrator was obliged to take up duty with a minimum of formal support and preparation.

Instruments of planning

In the absence of pre-determined, detailed programmes for colonial development, the Australian government had several possibilities open to it. The first major alternative was to establish a public service body to draw up, albeit belatedly, the necessary plans. The orthodox structure for this purpose was the Department of External Territories, but during the 1940's its few staff were confined to rehabilitating their own status and New Guinea - probably in that order - and its permanent head had shown little sympathy for the changes proposed by the Minister.[63] A second alternative was to delegate the authority for planning to the Administrator: but the Territory public service was no better equipped for this role than the Canberra Department, and its tasks in reconstruction were even more urgent. Moreover, any such move would have run counter to the established hierarchy of Canberra-Port Moresby relationships and therefore been strongly opposed by the Department.[64] A third alternative was suggested, some years after the event, by Professor Stanner:[65]

63. See, for example, p. 271 of this Chapter.
64. See Chapter One, pp. 39-44. Post-war relations between Canberra and Port Moresby are discussed in Chapters Nine and Ten.
65. Stanner, Transition, op. cit., p. 118.

> It is possible that a separate authority for physical reconstruction after 1945, and a special development authority at a later stage, might have freed the Provisional Administration for concentration on administrative re-consolidation, including social service, welfare and development schemes requiring, by their proposed nature and scale, very detailed study and deft introduction.

This proposal had some merit, but it did not overcome the problems confronting New Guinea. Post-war conditions made it impossible to staff a separate authority, except by weakening the Provisional Administration, and a third structure would have created additional tensions and problems of co-ordination between Canberra and Port Moresby. Moreover, conflicts between planning and execution were acute in post-war New Guinea: reconstruction problems were so pervasive that a planning authority would probably have become enmeshed in them, to the detriment of its major functions. If, on the other hand, the authority had tried to observe a strict planning role, there would have been accusations that the planning process was divorced from reality.[66] A fourth alternative was to establish a service organization, staffed from new sources and based in Australia, capable of providing detailed guidance, as requested, for those groups exercising administrative authority in Canberra and Port Moresby. It was a body of this kind that had been proposed, under the title of

66. Ironically, Stanner discerned similar problems in the much more modest planning activities of the Provisional Administration in early 1947 (Reconstruction, op. cit., p. 104). It is possible to combine planning and executive structures, but Stanner's proposal seemed to envisage separate roles for each.

Australian Territories Research Council, by the inter-departmental committee in February 1945, following a recommendation by the Directorate of Research.[67]

Pacific Territories Research Council

The Australian Pacific Territories Research Council, as it was eventually called, was seen by Conlon as the peacetime successor to the Directorate of Research.[68] As such, it was to continue the initiatives begun by the Directorate; and also, presumably, to ensure that Conlon retained some influence upon New Guinea affairs. The functions proposed for the Council, and even at one stage approved by Cabinet, were exceptionally wide: "to promote research and learning in any matter that may affect the development, welfare or advancement of the External Territories of the Commonwealth of Australia".[69] To this end, but subject to Ministerial approval, the Council was empowered to "initiate, finance, organize, supervise, assist, co-ordinate, and in any other way promote research and learning; control its staff; allocate funds available to the Council; [and] assist the Minister

67. CRS A518, item R815/1/1, 19 June 1945. The proposal was originally made to the Cabinet sub-committee on 15 September 1944 and then referred to the inter-departmental committee for consideration.
68. The proposal was set out in Agendum No. 104 of 15 September 1944, noted in ibid.
69. Ibid., 6 July 1945. Papers on the establishment and early meetings of the Council do not appear in departmental files, presumably because the matter originated in the Directorate. This information is drawn from reports on meetings by Halligan and his staff.

in the establishment, advancement and supervision of educational institutions, especially an Australian School of Colonial Administration".[70] The Council first met in mid-1945, while the Directorate was still functioning, with Conlon as Chairman and a membership drawn largely from the Directorate's staff, comprising:[71]

Professor R.C. Mills, Professor of Economics, University of Sydney, representing the Commonwealth Office of Education
Professor K.S. Isles, Professor of Economics, University of Adelaide
Professor E.S. Hills, Professor of Geology, University of Melbourne
Professor J.K. Murray, Professor of Agriculture, University of Queensland
Lt.-Col. Hon. C.M. Wedgewood, Directorate of Research
Professor Harvey Sutton, Director, School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine, University of Sydney, representing the Department of Health
Professor R.D. Wright, Professor of Physiology, University of Melbourne
Mr. W.D. Forsyth, Officer-in-Charge, Pacific Section, Department of External Affairs
Mr. W.C. Thomas, Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury
Dr. H.C. Coombes, Director-General, Department of Post-War Reconstruction
Mr. J.R. Halligan, Secretary, Department of External Territories

In retrospect, it is extraordinary that approval could have been given for a body whose functions and powers so obviously duplicated those of other organizations, notably the Office of Education and Department of External Territories, and the majority of whose members represented the Directorate and its allies. By its very nature the Council was bound to create opposition within the formal

70. Ibid.
71. Ibid., undated July 1945.

bureaucracy, which proceeded to thwart its operations.

The Secretary for External Territories neglected to attend the Council's early meetings, but his departmental delegate gave a succinct view of its nature and possible relations with the Department:[72]

> This Council appears to have its genesis in its English equivalent (designed to give effect to the Colonial Development and Welfare Act) and is based primarily on English practice but with a difference...it goes further than the British idea. Whereas the British Research Committee is advisory in character...and executive only in respect of co-ordinating the general pattern of research into colonial problems, the Australian Pacific Territories Research Council is both advisory and executive in character. It assumes...control of finance and staff matters more properly the province of the Department.

There appeared to be dangers in this situation:[73]

> If the powers contained in the constitution are exercised [the Council] may do anything it wishes in regard to research subject only to the limitation of funds made available to it. As the Council is responsible directly to the Minister the only association it has with the Department is by means of the Secretary of the Department being a member of the Council. By these means the way is open for the Council to exert considerable pressure on the Minister in the making of policy. Should it develop along that line there will be two organizations with [the] same purpose, but with bilateral approach to the Minister. This may become very embarrassing to the Department and to the Minister....

There were already a number of bodies to advise the government:

72. Ibid., 19 June 1945.
73. The material in the remainder of this paragraph, including quotations, is drawn from ibid., 6 July 1945.

> The Australian Pacific Territories Research Council is just another and I believe the establishment of it to be an error. It would have been better to have tied the question of research...to the Department of External Territories...Executive functions except in technical matters should remain with the Department.

While the proposal for the Council was in need of refinement, it promised to fill a serious gap in the government's sources of advice on New Guinea policy. By contrast, the Department's counter-proposal was unimaginative and largely redundant. As a substitute for the Council it recommended a "planning committee", comprising the Secretary for External Territories as chairman; the officer-in-charge of the Department's Planning and Research Branch - which had not yet been established; representatives of the Departments of the Treasury and Post-War Reconstruction; "an ex-Administrator or a retired senior officer of the Territory Service...and for the time being the Administrator of the Provisional Administration". It was not made clear why this additional body was required when the inter-departmental committee set up in 1944 was still nominally in existence. The Department and the Directorate each seemed intent on out-manoeuvering the other by setting up a new structure in its own image.

Demise of the Research Council

The Department of External Territories could not control the structure and operations of the Research Council so long as the Directorate remained in being and

while Conlon exercised influence over the Minister. During the latter half of 1945 all of the Council's business was controlled by the Directorate and its meetings were held in the military college at Duntroon, site of the School of Civil Affairs.[74] By early 1946, however, Conlon had resigned to resume his medical studies and the Directorate was soon to be disbanded.[75] Conlon then stepped down from chairman to deputy chairman of the Council, being replaced by Professor Mills.[76] The venue for the meetings was changed, usually alternating between Melbourne and Sydney for the convenience of members; it was perhaps appropriate, in view of the esoteric nature of some of the discussion, that in March 1946 the Council met in the Theosophical Society Building in Melbourne.[77] At this meeting the new balance of post-war forces became apparent and the animosity between Halligan and Conlon assumed a new character, with the Secretary now in the position of strength. The significance of the encounter was apparent from the fact that Mr. Ward took the chair. He immediately dealt a blow to Conlon's aspirations when he "stressed the advisory nature of the Council's functions and explained that the Prime Minister desired that it remain an advisory body attached to the Department of External Territories, to which its staff would belong. He suggested that the Council might consider including the word 'Advisory' in its title."

74. Ibid.
75. See Chapter Two, pp. 139-40.
76. CRS A518, item R815/1/1, 15 February 1946.
77. Ibid., 28 March 1946. The remainder of this passage, including quotations, is drawn from the minutes of the meeting.

It says something for Conlon's influence over the Minister that Ward found it necessary to invoke the Prime Minister's authority in announcing the terms of the Council's establishment. Nevertheless, Conlon still argued that the Council should have its own staff, preferably officers seconded from the Papua-New Guinea public service. Professor Wright suggested a compromise, in which "for administrative purposes the staff might be under the Department of External Territories, but for practical purposes should operate under the direction of the Council." Halligan then intervened, with the full authority of the formal executive of government, stating that the staff of the Council would be officers of his Department and that the Council secretariat would be located there. This decided the fate of both the Research Council and research generally: responsibility was effectively returned to the Department, which was incapable of discharging it; it was not until 1947 that a Research Section under a Senior Research Officer began operating, while a Division of Research and Development, under an Assistant Secretary, was set up only in September 1949.[78]

For another year Conlon continued a sporadic, futile campaign for his original concept of a Research Council. The main questions concerned the control of staff and funds: in May 1946 the Minister had announced that £30,000 would be made available to the Council for "inaugural

78. D.E.T., History and Functions, op. cit., p. 2. The subsequent planning operations of the Department are discussed in later Chapters.

work", so that it seemed as if the body would have resources worth capturing.[79] However, the matter was resolved unequivocally in favour of the Department of External Territories when the Minister approved the establishment of a committee, dominated by public service representatives, to consider the relationship between the Research Council and the Australian School of Pacific Administration, successor to the School of Civil Affairs.[80] In April 1947 the Research Council met, for the last time, to consider a recommendation that it transfer its functions to the School's new governing body, which would have a majority of public servants among its members. Conlon saw this as an effort to obstruct rather than encourage his proposal for research and spoke in bitter terms:[81]

> ....as far as most people around this table are concerned, we are interested in encouraging research, wherever it may occur. Our real problem is that most of us have known for a long time what ought to be done. There is no danger of us committing any mistake because there is no danger of us getting anything done, under the present circumstances... We want this new governing body of the school to be a body that can do something, that might initiate and carry out projects...When we transfer these functions to the governing body of the school...it should be given the power to do something.

It was not. The Research Council was disbanded and the Council of the School, which replaced it, was empowered

79. The material in this and the following passage is drawn from CRS A518, item R815/1/1, folios from May 1946 to April 1947. The money was not allocated.
80. The School's activities are discussed in the next Chapter.
81. CRS A518, item R815/1/1, 19 April 1947.

only to "conduct research activities in the subjects appropriate to the courses of the School and for the needs of the Territory as approved by the Minister".[82] In effect, this precluded the staff of the School from conducting applied research on contemporary New Guinea problems, since the Secretary had already reserved this function for the proposed Research Section of his Department. In the following years some members of the School staff published articles on Territory affairs, but their activities were otherwise confined to conducting training courses.

With the demise of the Research Council, and with the Department of External Territories unable to provide planning support for the Provisional Administration, a situation was reached that should have prompted Cabinet to further action. However, no initiatives came from the Minister, who could no longer draw on the Directorate of Research for advice; and his Department, having finally regained the control it had lost during the war years, was determined that formally correct administrative procedures should once more be observed. These could not encompass long-range planning, owing to the Department's shortcomings, and so the burden of policy formation and planning fell upon the very limited resources then available in Papua New Guinea. During the remaining years

82. Australian School of Pacific Administration, Monthly Notes, Vol. 1 No. 9, May 1947, p. 7.

of Labor government Murray and the Provisional Administration sought to discharge this de facto responsibility, but without the delegation of Ministerial or Departmental authority necessary to ensure acceptance and execution of such programmes as were formulated.

Direct action by Murray

Murray received no directives on the powers of the Administrator in matters of planning and policy, and so his role in these areas evolved through a series of ad hoc decisions and conferences during the first eighteen months of his tenure. He found himself in a curious position, severely limited in many spheres by the need to seek Canberra approval on issues for which precedents existed, but with considerable freedom in matters that were new in the experience of the Department of External Territories. Murray created a limited field of independent action, making use of his informal network of personal contacts in direct initiatives. Murray acted independently for two reasons: he wished to achieve quick results; and he believed that the position of Administrator was of considerable status, providing access to the higher executive levels in Australia. His role in deciding the details of policy at this time are illustrated by Murray's visits to Australia, during which he provided such initiatives as existed.

In March 1946, following his familiarisation tours

of the Territory, Murray visited Australia for a series of meetings with the Minister. He observed, "Took up a list of about 40 matters with him. Substituted 2nd page as numbers grew. Minister fairly shrewd, able in assessment of desirability of action from varied viewpoints: political, Department of External Territories and Administration. Halligan present at all meetings but took two opportunities of discussing points [alone with the Minister]."[83] Murray was deeply concerned at the immediate problems of re-establishing civil administration, but his proposals extended considerably beyond these matters: to the supply of currency in the Territory; the attitude of Australian trade unions to the importing of finished timber products; the future policy concerning grants to missions; and the need for unequivocal assurances that the combined administration would continue.[84] Even in matters where powers should have been delegated to the Administrator, such as the question of missions' subsidies, details were referred by the Minister to the Department for advice or subsequent approval; Ward was reluctant to give the Administrator direct authority to implement even those schemes of which Ward himself approved.

In matters for which few precedents existed, or in which the Department had no apparent interests to preserve,

83. Murray journal, p. 137.
84. The material in this and the following passage is drawn from Murray journal, pp. 19, 20, 139.

Murray negotiated arrangements directly with senior officials, in a number of cases with neither Ward nor Halligan present. He approached the Department of Post-War Reconstruction for skilled tradesmen to assist in the rebuilding of Rabaul and Kokopo; the Department of Air concerning improvements to internal air services in Papua New Guinea; the Victorian Department of Education requesting the release of Mr. W.C. Groves for appointment as Director of Education in the Territory; and the Chairman of the Australian Broadcasting Commission, Mr. Boyer, to arrange peacetime broadcasting.[85]

Murray's most important talks during this period were undoubtedly those he had with the Prime Minister and Treasurer, Mr. Chifley. Murray had met Chifley occasionally during the war and the contact came to have particular significance when the Administrator visited Parliament House during his trips to Canberra. Murray recalls, "On several occasions he sat alongside /~me_7... when I was listening to a debate and he on his way out of the House; he was an informed cicerone on Australian policy re P.N.G."[86] In mid-1947 Murray visited Canberra to seek additional finance after "the Treasury indicated to me that the grants and other Commonwealth expenditure were not to continue to increase in the way we of the

85. Murray journal, pp. 5, 19, 25, 138.
86. Murray letter, 3 October 1967.

Administration thought essential".[87] After interviews with senior Treasury officials, Murray asked to see the Prime Minister, and an appointment was arranged for the late afternoon. Just as Murray began to put his case he was interrupted by the arrival of the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Menzies, who wanted the Prime Minister present on the floor of the House. Murray recalls, "When Mr. Chifley left with Mr. Menzies, he paused at the door and said that I should come back during the evening when we would not be disturbed. [When our talks resumed] he was courteous, helpful in comment, but critical in relation to the submissions I made - a sort of third degree by an open-minded executive. I was given all the time I desired, perhaps an hour. When I left he accompanied me to the door and said that he didn't think that lack of finance would be my greatest worry. The appropriation for Papua-New Guinea continued to increase." The Labor government's New Guinea policy thus withstood its first test, partly owing to Murray's intervention against the Commonwealth Treasury. During the remaining years of Labor rule the implied guarantee that Murray received from the Prime Minister was of far greater significance than any assistance provided by Ward; Murray later stated, "The meetings I had with Mr. Chifley led me to believe that he was the most likeable political personage and personality I have met."

87. The information in this and the following passage, including quotations, is drawn from notes accompanying Murray's letter of 3 October 1967.

Murray's Macrossan lectures

In the field of broad policy Murray's role during the immediate post-war years was far greater than his formal authority as Administrator would have suggested. This situation arose partly from Ministerial default, but also because Murray was anxious to support and explain the post-war policy. His main opportunity came when he was invited by his old university to deliver the John Murtagh Macrossan Memorial Lectures in Brisbane on 22 and 24 April 1947. Murray had been appointed Macrossan lecturer in 1945, before he assumed the position of Administrator, and in requesting that he continue with the lectures he suggested to Mr. Ward that the topic be the work and policy of the Provisional Administration.[88] The Minister expressed "much pleasure" in granting permission.[89] The Administrator was following the practice of Sir Hubert Murray, who had delivered numerous papers in Australia and overseas during his many years as Lieutenant-Governor, creating for himself something of an international reputation as a colonial administrator and adding to the status of his position. It is significant, in the light of later changes in the relationship between the Administrator and the Canberra authorities, that Murray's Macrossan lectures were the last non-official public addresses delivered by a serving Administrator. In the published version of his talks, Murray virtually usurped

88. CRS A518, item I800/1/7, 23 September 1946.
89. Ibid., 16 October 1946.

the function of the Minister in stating policy on New Guinea.

The Macrossan lecture is notable for the frankness of its statements and its accuracy in assessing influences on Australian policy. While paying tribute to the work of Sir William MacGregor and Sir Hubert Murray, the Administrator criticised the narrow base of policy, as that was understood in Australia:[90]

> Strategic interests have throughout been paramount, although somewhat narrowly conceived...Security may well be wrapped up, to an extent quite unappreciated by the Australian public, in an adequately conceived and vigorously implemented policy of native welfare... Public concern was allayed too easily by the bare legal occupancy of the two Territories....

The narrowness of Australian interest, together with the failure to provide financial assistance, produced inevitable consequences:[91]

> ....the tendency was to place the tiny European community's economic activities in the centre of the picture because of their importance to internal revenues...An increase in revenue depended on expansion of European enterprise, but such an expansion...might merely place the native at a greater economic, social and political disadvantage in his own country.

Murray pointed out that the Chifley government had provided the means for solving the dilemma of past years by granting finance for a "dynamic policy".[92] He acknowledged that

90. J.K. Murray, The Provisional Administration of the Territory of Papua-New Guinea: Its Policy and Problems, Brisbane, University of Queensland, 1949, pp. 11-12.
91. Ibid., p. 16.
92. Ibid.

much of the policy was based on British concepts as expressed in the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of 1940 and 1945; and that it had been applied to New Guinea by the staff of the Directorate.[93] This was only part of the process, however: there was a need for a "positive programme" based on extensive research.[94]

On several occasions during his lectures Murray indicated that much more extensive information would have to be gathered on almost every aspect of Papua New Guinea life and resources, in order to provide programmes based on realistic assessments of need and potential; there can be no doubt that he was already disturbed by the lack of continuity from the wartime schemes that had been proposed by the Directorate; and by the fate of the Pacific Territories Research Council.[95] Murray again referred to British precedents where, he said, policies "are guided and supported by research programmes embracing the physical, biological and social sciences. The British Government is not making phrases: it has got down to the task of providing the executive machinery for carrying out its intentions."[96] The clear implication was that the Australian authorities had not. The Administrator further expressed concern that such machinery might not be developed for New Guinea, owing to

93. Ibid., pp. 16, 1-2.
94. Ibid., p. 16.
95. Ibid., pp. 16, 22, 64.
96. Ibid., p. 64. This passage made it clear that Murray was particularly interested in policy-oriented, "applied" research.

the relationship that was developing between Canberra and Port Moresby:[97]

> The exercise of legislative powers by the Commonwealth Government at the present time naturally increases the centralisation of initiative and responsibility in the Department of External Territories in Canberra. A similar increase in Departmental power is indicated by the conferring upon the Minister, instead of as before upon the Government as a whole, of the power to issue instructions to the Administrator. The future distribution of powers between Port Moresby and Canberra must take into account conflicting factors. On the one hand... the tendency which existed even before the war to concentrate control in Canberra impaired the initiative of the Papuan Administration and left it unable to act decisively...On the other hand, the enormously increased dependence of the Territory financially upon the Commonwealth is bound to strengthen the centralising tendency.

Murray left no doubt as to his opinion of this trend, saying, "The greater the financial dependence upon the metropolitan country becomes, the more earnestly must we strive to strengthen the forces of responsibility and initiative within the Territory."[98]

The Administrator went on to outline the difficulties that had been encountered by the Provisional Administration, notably in rehabilitating devastated areas and in obtaining sufficient personnel, materials and shipping. He then sought to indicate the particular action that was proposed in such areas as health services, education, agricultural extension, forestry and petroleum exploration. At that point the gaps in Australian policy became apparent. Murray's statements on several issues were much more

97. Ibid., p. 58.
98. Ibid., p. 59.

detailed than anything announced by the government, but still lacked the definition that detailed planning should have provided. A complete section of Murray's address, dealing with the key areas of health, education, labour and race relations, was headed "Some Problems of Social Policy" and comprised little more than a catalogue of the Administration's difficulties;[99] only in the matter of labour policy was the Administrator able to give details of action already taken, and these related to measures that had been approved before the end of the war.[100] In a section entitled "The Economic Problem" Murray was able to provide some specifications for agricultural policy, but these came mainly from his own expertise and war-time survey of New Guinea.[101] In other areas he made informed guesses as to future development: the growth of forestry, the wide extension of village cash-cropping, the establishment of the co-operative movement and the eventual role of local government councils.[102] It was clear that the only plans available were those that had survived the Directorate or been suggested by Murray's own experience.

Murray's greatest contribution to post-war policy was made during his analysis of race relations in the

99. Murray did not mention that he had already set up planning committees in Port Moresby in an attempt to overcome these problems; their recommendations are discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight.
100. Ibid., pp. 27-39.
101. Ibid., pp. 48-53.
102. Ibid., pp. 43, 53-4, 59-61.

Territory, during which he rejected the hypocrisy of paternalism. He first criticised[103]

> ....a disposition to believe that the natives have no importance except as workers in European industry, and that they ask nothing better than to be allowed to remain under conditions of employment which have not substantially changed since the time of MacGregor...I wish, therefore, to make two things very clear: first, that the Administration treats the native as an end in himself, not as a means for the use of others, in other words, as a person, not a tool; second, that there can be no progress in the Territory if labour relations are frozen at a primitive level.

He saw this situation stemming partly from the existing balance of power in Papua New Guinea, which had to be changed by the example of his own staff:[104]

> The Europeans are a small dominant minority with a monopoly of political and economic power and social prestige...Cultural differences and differences in economic patterns tend to close off the members of one group from easy access to other groups. On the European side, this sense of difference becomes frozen into the ugly and irrational prejudices of racialism...Although the Europeans as a whole act as an exclusive caste, there is not complete solidarity of prejudice...It is above all the duty of administrative officers to combat by their example the perpetuation of...damaging illusions....

The Administrator served notice that he would not allow white domination to continue through political institutions:[105]

> It is worth raising the question whether the Legislative Council, as it existed in both Territories before the war, is an appropriate device for the discharging of our trust at this stage. We have few, if any, natives capable of handling the business

103. Ibid., p. 35.
104. Ibid., pp. 38-9.
105. Ibid., p. 59.

> of such a Council without a further period of tutelage; yet to confine the unofficial membership to Europeans carries the implication, which must be avoided, that New Guinea is a white-settler country.

Murray summed up:[106]

> We cannot continue to use the word native as if it meant something less than the word man. The interested and ignoble doctrines of racialism which have penetrated deeply into the life of New Guinea and constitute an irrational obstacle to future progress, can only be expelled by showing that a liberal and humane...policy works when it is backed by knowledge and skill. There is a danger that unless that knowledge and skill is concentrated upon the task, there may be a failure which will discredit liberal policies...New Guinea is pitifully dependent upon the willingness of Australia to provide the means of avoiding such a disaster.

The Macrossan lectures received little publicity in Papua New Guinea,[107] mainly because there was no newspaper in publication there at the time. The Pacific Islands Monthly printed a brief resume of the talks, concluding with an "editorial note" by Robson: "What is wrong with the policy of encouraging the Europeans to develop the Territories' wealth during the period (at least 25 years) in which anthropologists, educationalists and well-meaning theorists generally are trying to make a peasant farmer out of 'Fuzzy-Wuzzy'?"[108] To ensure that his

106. Ibid., p. 55.
107. When discussing the draft of this section, Mr. H.H. Jackman (a co-operatives officer in the 1940's and later Assistant Director of Business Development), observed that it was just as well there had been little publicity, otherwise "the Europeans would have hung Murray for calling them racists".
108. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 10, May 1947, pp. 59-60. The relative mildness of Robson's reaction to Murray is again worth noting.

attitude to policy was made clear to the staff of the Provisional Administration, Murray therefore circulated a pamphlet entitled Memorandum on the Policy of the Administration, a twelve-page summary of his Macrossan lectures.[109] The document emphasised that the people's interests were paramount in any policy of the Administration and stressed the need for research in establishing priorities and determining programmes;[110] in effect, Murray served notice that change would continue, notwithstanding the difficulties being encountered:[111]

> It has been suggested that [rehabilitation] could be more readily accomplished if all new features of policy were postponed...The Administration has not accepted this view. It does not believe it either possible or desirable to make such a separation between rehabilitation and future development... What is done now determines in large measure the future pattern...Post-war basic rehabilitation of the native economy by the native people necessarily, rightly and naturally has taken precedence over the rehabilitation of European interests.

It was at about this time that Murray, owing to his espousal of villagers' interests and his alleged bias against Europeans, became generally known among whites as "Kanaka Jack".[112]

Australian School of Pacific Administration

Murray's growing concern for research and planning

109. Port Moresby, mimeo, 1947. The specially-printed cover bears the notation, "Government House, Port Moresby, 8 September 1947".
110. Ibid., pp. 1,3, 6-10.
111. Ibid., p. 3.
112. In fact, Murray has always used, and been known by, his second Christian name, Keith.

was reflected in his letters to Canberra. He corresponded with Halligan on the matter for several months, without result, then in exasperation addressed a terse note to the Minister in April 1947, stating bluntly, "Your policy, and really anything better than a mid-Victorian colonial administration, is impossible without an adequate research and training institution of the kind envisaged in the /Directorate/."[113] The Australian School of Pacific Administration was producing little of consequence, since Murray lacked the authority to direct the activities of its staff; any advice he received from them was confined to personal correspondence.[114] The School's relationship with New Guinea was unclear for several years, while the Department of External Territories maintained that a clear role would emerge from the legislation to set up a permanent administrative structure for the Territory.[115] Further delays resulted, and Murray's frustration in attempting to secure action can be illustrated by tracing the fate of the School as a research support for the Administration.

The Papua and New Guinea Act of 1949 finally gave statutory recognition to the School, its Council and its Principal, but generally restricted its activities to what the annual report summarised as "special courses for

113. P.N.G.N.A. Box 171, item GH7-5, 2 April 1947.
114. The School's training role and Murray's relations with its staff are discussed in the next Chapter.
115. P.N.G.N.A. Box 171, item GH7-5, folios from September 1947 to February 1949.

the education of officers and prospective officers of the Territory".[116] As part of the discussion of the draft Bill, an inter-departmental committee was set up in June 1949 to "examine the activities of the Australian School of Pacific Administration and to submit recommendations for its organization and the draft regulations to be made under the Papua New Guinea Act 1949".[117] The committee comprised the Assistant Secretary (Administration), Department of External Territories; the Director of Research, Commonwealth Public Service Board; and representatives of the Commonwealth Office of Education, Commonwealth Public Service Inspector (Sydney), Commonwealth Treasury, the School and the Papua New Guinea Administration.[118] Halligan asked the Administrator for his views on the functions of the School, for presentation to the committee, and received a stinging reminder of all the proposals made in earlier years that had emphasised the importance of the School to Papua New Guinea. Murray pointed out that the functions of the Pacific Territories Research Council, which had been "formed for the purpose of getting a move on", had been transferred to the School Council and that nothing further had happened. "Provision really must be made for research both in relation to teaching, and...to meet the pressing development needs of the Territory," he concluded.

116. N.G.A.R., 1948/49, p. 12.
117. P.N.G.N.A. Box 192, item CA1/4/1/14, 14 June 1949.
118. The information in this and the following passage is drawn from ibid., 16 July 1949.

In its report, submitted in August 1949, the inter-departmental committee noted the Administrator's comments and observed, "It was felt that no special reference to teaching research is necessary, as this is inherent in teaching itself. In regard to the Administrator's reference to 'the research requirements of the Territory', the Committee considered that whilst this may be a very important question, it is outside the scope of the terms of reference and is not germane to the organization of the School."[119] Thus one of the main reasons for the founding of the School was rejected, in a manoeuvre which ensured that the Department of External Territories' ineffectual "research" section would become the only official source of information for the Papua New Guinea Administration.[120]

Influence of Trusteeship

Two other factors reinforced Australian policy during this period, without providing detailed guidance for the Provisional Administration. The first was the Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of New Guinea, the terms of which were presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister on 7 August 1946.[121] In his statement to the House, Mr. Chifley made little reference to the obligations placed on Australia by the terms of the draft Agreement, although

119. Ibid., 22 August 1949.
120. Interview with Dr. J.T. Gunther, 4 December 1968.
121. C.P.D., Vol. 188, pp. 3853-5, 7 August 1946.

he observed, "....we shall recognize and gladly accept the general duty...to promote the welfare and advancement of the inhabitants of New Guinea."[122] He dwelt mainly on the rights that Australia would enjoy as the administering authority, particularly in providing for the defence of the area and in exercising "full powers of legislation, administration and jurisdiction over the Territory".[123] He felt that nothing but "absolute control" could be accepted by any Australian government.

The Trusteeship Agreement, and the government's statement on it, added nothing to the factors, including the U.N. Charter and the Australia-New Zealand Agreement, which had already been taken into account as guiding principles for the administration of Papua New Guinea. Its most immediate effect was to create further delays. Mr. Chifley noted in his speech that the U.N. General Assembly would not begin its first session until September 1946, so that legislation to give effect to the Agreement would have to be submitted to a later session of Parliament.[124] This, in turn, delayed the creation of a permanent administrative structure for the Territory, since the government would not proceed until it was assured of the necessary trusteeship terms. These were approved by the General Assembly on 14 December 1946, and had then to go before the Trusteeship Council, which met

122. Ibid., p. 3854.
123. Ibid., p. 3853.
124. Ibid., p. 3854.

for the first time on 26 March 1947.[125] It then took the Australian government more than fifteen months - until 8 July 1948 - to submit the Agreement to the Trusteeship Council, which approved it on 2 August 1948.[126] Similarly, it was not until 18 June 1948 that the Papua and New Guinea Bill was presented to Parliament. The delay resulted more from the low priority accorded Papua New Guinea by the government than from Australian concern for its international obligations. W.J. Hudson has pointed out that criticism of administrative union, which was the only source of major friction, became heavier after the Agreement was approved than before; and at no time did Australia's U.N. representatives pay attention to it.[127] So far as the enforcement of trusteeship conditions was concerned, Australia rejected any United Nations role in the formation and implementation of policy, thereby denying the Territory Administration help of this kind from the international body.[128] Australia was determined to preserve New Guinea as its exclusive sphere of influence and adhered to that policy for another twenty-five years.[129]

South Pacific Commission

The second factor reinforcing Australian policy in

125. Monthly Notes, Vol. 1 No. 5, January 1947, p. 14 and No. 8, April 1947, p. 11.
126. P.I.M., Vol. 19 No. 1, August 1948, p. 8.
127. Hudson, Colonial Question, op. cit., pp. 82-8.
128. Ibid., p. 112.
129. It was not until the late 1960's that U.N.D.P. funds were accepted for use in the Territory.

New Guinea was the establishment of the South Pacific Commission, the body which was originally proposed by the Australia-New Zealand Agreement of 1944 under the title of the South Seas Regional Commission. This organization was given a prominent place in the 1944 Agreement as an example of the determination of the two governments to observe the principles of trusteeship. Some of the war-time enthusiasm faded as other parties became involved, however. The political advisory function was dropped: in a statement on 26 September 1946, Dr. Evatt "emphasised that the proposed Commission would not deal with questions of defence or security and would not interfere in political matters".[130] The British government was later reported to be "lukewarm" on the subject of the Commission and there was opposition to it among Fiji's Europeans.[131] At the first meeting of the Commission, which began in Sydney on 11 May 1948, further problems arose over the selection of its Secretary-General and the site of its headquarters.[132] The Australian delegates argued that, in view of their country's major role in proposing the Commission, its first Secretary-General should be an Australian.[133] The only reason why this should be of more than incidental interest is that the first Australian nominee was none other than Alfred Conlon.[134] At this

130. Monthly Notes, Vol. 1 No. 2, October 1946, p. 13. For further details, see T.R. Smith, South Pacific Commission, Wellington, Milburn, 1972, Chs. 2-5.
131. CRS A518, item 100/1/1, 17 May 1948; Monthly Notes, Vol. 1 No. 12, August 1947, p. 17.
132. South Pacific, Vol. 2 No. 8, May 1948, p. 158.
133. CRS A518, item 100/1/1, 17 May 1948.
134. Ibid., 14 May 1948.

session Australia's Senior Commissioner was Mr. Halligan, with Rev. Dr. J.W. Burton as Commissioner; and Mr. E.W.P. Chinnery and Colonel Murray as alternates.[135] Halligan was outnumbered by the other Australian representatives in the nomination of Conlon, which was approved by both Ward and Evatt.[136] This represented one of the last attempts by those formerly associated with the Directorate to revive the influence of their colleagues and find a role for Conlon within the formal structure of post-war planning.[137] It did not succeed: in September 1948, Mr. W.D. Forsyth, an Australian representative at the United Nations, was appointed Secretary-General, with Mr. H.E. Maude as his deputy.[138]

The functions of the South Pacific Commission were confined almost entirely to areas of technical advice, mainly because the member countries were jealous of the powers they exercised over their colonies. Australia made relatively little use of the organization's expertise, and then only in narrow fields, owing partly to the nature of the Commission's research: its first 28 projects were devoted to such matters as epidemiology, infant food, tropical grasses and building types.[139] Such investigations

135. Ibid., 11 May 1948.
136. Ibid., 14 May 1948.
137. A last attempt is discussed in the next Chapter. This meeting of the Commission was held at the School of Pacific Administration, where such former Directorate personnel as Kerr, Hogbin and Macauley were available for lobbying on Conlon's behalf.
138. CRS A518, item 100/1/1, 9 September 1948.
139. South Pacific, Vol. 3 No. 10, August 1949, pp. 208-9.

were far removed from the policy-oriented research and planning needs of New Guinea; and even had the Commission been able to provide such assistance it is most unlikely that the Canberra authorities would have allowed Murray free access to it, in view of their demonstrated policy of concentrating power in the Department of External Territories.

Planning frustrated

In the immediate post-war years, then, the Administrator and some of his former colleagues from the Directorate attempted to maintain the open, wartime approach to planning, only to be frustrated by a formal bureaucratic structure that had regained its influence with the return of stable peacetime conditions. Murray's demands for continued research had been met by the ploy of setting up a unit in the Canberra Department that was to prove wholly ineffectual for several more years. The only remaining avenue for Murray was the establishment of planning groups under his own control to provide the initiatives and data essential for the introduction of a dynamic policy. It has already been observed, however, that the personnel resources in New Guinea were severely limited. The extent of these limitations will be apparent from an examination of the staffing and structure of the Provisional Administration.

CHAPTER SIX

THE NEW GUINEA BUREAUCRACY

A demoralised service - Doubts and divisions Papua versus New Guinea - Continuing uncertainties - Murray and his service - Murray's many roles - Need for investigation Growth of committees - Administrative structure and co-ordination - Murray's advisers - The Buttsworth report - Administration counter-proposals - Reaction to Buttsworth proposals - Influence of junior staff - Staff training and A.S.O.P.A. - Conlon's final appearance - Decline of A.S.O.P.A.

A demoralised service

The public service over which Colonel Murray assumed control in October 1945 had been weakened and demoralised by a number of forces mostly beyond its control: the losses from the Japanese invasion; the suspension of the Papuan administration; the rivalry among officers of the Mandated Territory and Papuan

services; tensions between Angau and the Directorate; and, most of all, insecurities resulting from the rapidly changing policies and shifts in the balance of power during the war years. During the post-war period, continuing rivalries, together with prolonged uncertainty about the form and conditions of the combined public service, created even great difficulties for Murray and the Provisional Administration. The magnitude of these problems can best be illustrated by tracing the early developments which specifically affected administrative personnel.

Most public servants from the Territories suffered losses during the war, and only a few gained advantages useful for their later careers. All were displaced from their accustomed positions, and for almost four years their conditions of service and long-term career prospects remained frozen at the point they had reached in 1941. This had a damaging effect on the morale of men used to according great significance to questions of employment security and status. For, example, those officers who survived the Japanese invasion and were subsequently absorbed into Angau had little opportunity to negotiate conditions of service or future prospects while they remained within a system of military administration and discipline. The burden of this concern therefore fell to the officers who were classified as unfit or too old for military service

and who spent the war years in Australia. These men were for the most part given temporary wartime appointments in the Commonwealth Public Service, with the largest single group concentrated in Sydney. Their conditions of service, set by regulation in April 1942, were generally similar to those relating to the Commonwealth service and gave rise to anomalies when applied to officers of a colonial administration who would normally have been eligible for retirement after twenty years of continuous service.[1] Thus a number of men who wished to retire during the war years, particularly as their future employment became less certain because of changes proposed for the post-war period, could not do so because they forfeited half their pension if they then accepted employment with a government instrumentality; they were dissatisfied because this condition did not apply to officers who had left the service before 1942.[2] In addition, those who had been transferred temporarily to the Commonwealth service were, by a curious calculation, allowed to contribute at only two-thirds of their normal rates towards superannuation funds, on the grounds that

1. The provisions, under the National Security Regulations, were contained in Regulation 200 of 1942, gazetted on 27 April 1942. The discussion in this Chapter seeks to avoid technical details of such public service personnel matters as establishment, promotion, staff postings, superannuation and salary fixation, but assumes a broad acquaintance of the principles involved in each. It should not be inferred from the relative lack of detail that these matters were insignificant to the officers affected by them: the importance of security of tenure and promotion prospects to these public servants cannot be overemphasised.
2. P.I.M., Vol. 13 No. 6, January 1943, p. 5.

they would otherwise have expected early retirement.[3] These were exactly the kinds of apparent injustices which could add to the insecurities of the Territories' bureaucrats.

Doubts and divisions

The situation of Papua New Guinea's public servants was far from serious in fact, but was made to appear so by their isolation and their suspicions about the intentions of the Labor government. They therefore decided to press their case by reviving pre-war industrial organizations. Thus the Papuan Public Service Association reconstituted itself in Sydney in late 1943 and the Territory of New Guinea Association held its first Australian meeting, also in Sydney, on 9 February 1944.[4] The public servants were disturbed at the announced changes in Australian policy towards New Guinea, much like their private-sector compatriots in the Pacific Territories Association,[5] but they were neither as vocal nor as aggressive as the settlers, partly owing to their special obligations under public service legislation and partly because most of their leaders were serving in New Guinea or had been killed. They merely selected deputations to wait on the Minister for

3. P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 9, April 1945, p. 47. This anomaly was later corrected (ibid.).
4. P.I.M., Vol. 14 No. 8, March 1944, p. 7 and No. 9, April 1944, p. 12.
5. See Chapter Two, pp. 94-8.

External Territories, the New Guinea association resolving to clarify the "rights, privileges and future of the members of the Service, irrespective of whether that future lies only in New Guinea or in any combined service that may be set up".[6] The Papuan association further decided to "continue to work in close harmony" with the New Guinea group, but it is significant that it reported on the deputation in exclusively Papuan terms, as if a combined administration were not even under consideration.[7] It was clear that the public servants were not about to give up their cherished autonomy if anything could be gained by separate action.

Their concern increased with the rumours and tensions which surrounded Angau personnel. It was feared that staff who had served with Angau would enjoy advantages over those who had left the Territories during the war; a soldier who had taken war leave from the Papuan service in order to enlist wrote to the Pacific Islands Monthly, in officially correct terms, seeking information: "Are the rights of officers who...volunteered for military service...being preserved and considered in the planning of Papua's future? With many years' service behind me, and the future welfare of my young family at stake, any information would be greatly appreciated."[8] The enquiry

6. P.I.M., Vol. 14 No. 9, April 1944, p. 12.
7. P.I.M., Vol. 14 No. 12, July 1944, p. 15.
8. P.I.M., Vol. 14 No. 11, June 1944, p. 19.

provided R.W. Robson with an opportunity to further his anti-Angau campaign:[9]

> When ANGAU was first established, some two years ago, the comment of Territorians was: "These lads will dig in, with everything they've got, and will try to get a lien on the fat jobs of the Civil Administration when it returns." Colour is given to that belief, now, by the facts that (a) nearly all senior administrative officials of both Territories have been consistently ignored by the Army set-up...and pushed into the background; (b) certain senior officials who have reluctantly been admitted to the ranks of ANGAU appear to have lost all the seniority rights which they had gained by long and good civil service in the Territories... Present indications are that ANGAU will hold office for a long time yet; and then, that the present ANGAU organization will be transformed and modified to become the new Administration of the combined Territories.

The "facts" alleged by Robson were incorrect, but with encouragement from reports of this kind public servants were ready to believe the worst about the people with whom they would eventually have to work.

Tensions within the ranks of public servants were becoming increasingly complex. By 1945 the basic division between the public services of Papua and the Mandated Territory had been multiplied by four new factors, each arising from the different conditions under which various officers had worked during the war years. Those men who had joined, and stayed in, the armed forces (other than Angau) wished to protect their post-war careers. Their concerns differed, to

9. Ibid.

a degree, from those of officers who had initially joined the services and had later been recalled to Angau. There were also the groups, from both the Territory of New Guinea and Papua, who had served with Angau from 1942, and the others who had spent the war years in Australia. These amounted, in effect, to eight identifiable factions whose future careers could be affected by the way in which their wartime activities were viewed by the Australian authorities. If the men who had transferred to Angau in 1942 were considered to have gained superior experience to those who had gone to Australia, the latter might claim to have been disadvantaged through circumstances, such as age and health, beyond their control. The Angau group, on the other hand, could maintain that their war service, involving vital field work in New Guinea, was far more relevant to career prospects than, say, a period spent as a clerk in Sydney.[10] To these eight groups could be added two others: men with New Guinea experience in the various fields of private enterprise who had joined Angau and later wished to continue with the Provisional Administration; and young soldiers who had joined Angau from the Army, usually in response to advertisements placed by the School of Civil Affairs during the last years of the war. It was on this fragmented base that Murray was required to build a unified administrative organization.

10. There were genuine animosities. Referring to a contemporary, a decorated ex-Angau man said, "Oh, he frigged around in Canberra or somewhere during the war."

Papua versus New Guinea

The early signs were far from encouraging for, following the relaxation of wartime controls and the removal of censorship, traditional tensions between the Papuan and Mandated Territory services came to the surface. They were freely reported by the Australian press, together with complaints about poor conditions, to substantiate charges of inefficiency against the Labor government. In December 1945 the Sydney Sun quoted a letter from a former Papuan officer which, it claimed, had been leaked to the press by a Canberra public servant. The letter complained that there was a lack of co-operation between the military and the returning civil administration and that public servants were consequently being relegated to living quarters which were known locally as "Belsen".[11] The report continued, "Former Papuan officials are being ignored and men of the Mandated Territory of New Guinea are in control of a country whose natives they do not understand."[12] In the following month an article in

11. Sydney Sun, 9 December 1945.
12. Ibid. This recurring theme of Papua New Guinea administration is treated chronologically throughout this study. In the pre-war years (see Chapter One, pp. 47-58) Papuan officers believed they followed a more enlightened policy, although they lacked the resources to put much of it into effect, while Mandated Territory staff considered themselves more pragmatic and efficient. During the war the Territory of New Guinea officers gained prominence (see Chapter Two, pp. 77-81) from active service in occupied areas, while Papuan staff were relegated to the more mundane and unpopular tasks of labour recruitment.

the Sydney Telegraph maintained that the administration was "finding difficulty in reconciling the sharply differing creeds of former officers of the separate territories of Papua and New Guinea, now sharing jobs in the combined service".[13] The reports caused concern in Canberra and, in response to an enquiry from Mr. Ward, Murray suggested: "While there is some difference in the approach of Territory of New Guinea and Papuan officials to the native problem there is no essential difference between the best men in both services."[14]

The Administrator later sought an opinion from Professor A.P. Elkin on this question following the anthropologist's 1946 visit to Papua New Guinea. Elkin believed that New Guinea officers, whom he saw as the dominant group, were starting to admit that Papua had some good qualities: "Of course, the Papuan administration was slow and it did not do this and it did not do that, but it had no gold royalty...."[15] However, deep antipathies persisted within the public service for years. In late 1951 Mr. J.H. Jones, Director of District Services and a former New Guinea officer, made his sympathies clear when asked for an opinion on the merits of officers with pre-war experience. He believed there was considerable significance in the fact that field officers of the Mandated Territory "had to pass

13. Sydney Telegraph, 18 January 1946.
14. P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, item 1-3-16, 22 January 1946.
15. P.N.G.N.A. Box 167, item GH1-9-2E, 31 July 1946.

examinations before being eligible for advancement to senior Patrol Officers, and to Assistant District Officer...and that it usually took 10 years in the Territory of New Guinea Service before an officer could be appointed as Assistant District Officer. Another point /~was_7 that a junior Assistant District Officer in the pre-war Papua Service was actually equal only to a senior Patrol Officer in the Territory of New Guinea Service."[16] Besides being disloyal to a number of his staff, the Director was displaying his ignorance, since the rank of Assistant District Officer had not existed in Papua.

Murray's personal attitude towards the Papua versus New Guinea dichotomy was somewhat different from the official opinion he expressed to the Minister. He later stated that the New Guinea officers were "a mixed lot" and characterised a former Mandated Territory public servant who subsequently rose to a very senior position in the post-war administration as "too much Territory of New Guinea, not enough Papua".[17] He believed that certain officers who had served in the Mandated Territory retained "too much of the old German attitude". This did not mean that Murray was biased against all New Guinea staff, for he praised such men as Melrose,

16. P.N.G.N.A. Box 887, item GH47-13, 5 November 1951 and undated letter of the same period addressed to the Public Service Commissioner under reference J/5.
17. This material in this and the following passage, including quotations, is drawn from an interview with Colonel Murray, 12 December 1966.

Taylor, McCarthy, Niall and McMullen. Yet he had a high regard for these officers not only for their efficiency but also for their "progressive" attitude; it was this combination of qualities that the Administrator wanted in his staff. However, Murray was not always in a position to gauge the performance of public servants. In the few months after the resumption of civil administration he was in relatively close contact with the handful of senior officers who were then exercising power in what was essentially an emergency situation. As the public service grew more stable, with increasing numbers of men being demobilised from the armed forces, the Administrator's relations with most of his officers became more distant and more formal. The personal relationships formed by Murray with staff who returned immediately upon the resumption of civil administration were denied those who resumed duty even a few months later. Since the Administrator knew almost none of the men in the latter group, his view of the total public service was necessarily restricted and this contributed to the administrative problems he faced in the following years.

Continuing uncertainties

The difficulties which Murray encountered in establishing working relationships with his staff were accentuated by the haphazard release of personnel from

the services. Demobilisation began in August 1945, but the location and availability of officers were the main considerations in deciding the order of release, rather than factors of greater significance for the orderly resumption of civil administration, such as rank and experience.[18] Reviewing the situation some years later, J.H. Jones pointed out that, because staff resources were so limited in 1945, officers had been posted to the best advantage, as they became available.[19] Many of those who were first released continued in their initial postings even after more experienced men returned from war duty. As a consequence, relatively junior field staff were sometimes given charge of large districts, while in other instances senior men could be allocated only limited responsibility. There were also problems concerning the Territories to which officers could be posted; it was thought inadvisable, for example, to appoint a Territory of New Guinea man to the post of District Officer in Papua. Several anomalies were adjusted between 1946 and 1948, but others remained until a full review was carried out following the creation of a permanent public service under the Papua and New Guinea Act of 1949. In addition to the jealousies created by apparent injustices in appointments, there was the more important factor that postings could be made in acting capacities only, pending the creation of a

18. CRS A518, item B852/6/11, 13 and 30 August and 8 September 1945.
19. The information in this and the following passage is drawn from P.N.G.N.A. Box 186, item 1/2, 8 March 1949.

permanent establishment for the public service; officers in such positions were wary of taking decisive action lest any mistakes might jeopardise their substantive rank when final gradings ultimately were decided.

The insecurity of staff arising from the delay in establishing a permanent combined service was increased by other circumstances relating to the provisional basis of the total administrative structure. There were persistent rumours that the Provisional Administration could run for only six months from the end of the war; that it would certainly end after twelve months, since that was the limit of the Administrator's appointment; or that, alternatively, the staff were being held on temporary appointments deliberately so that men from Angau and the School of Civil Affairs could be placed over them, when ready.[20] Further uncertainy was created by administrative oversights in Canberra. There were delays in extending Murray's authority to the areas of the Territory of New Guinea handed over by the military, and no action was taken to empower the Administrator to make even temporary appointments to the public service; in a cable to the Minister Murray stated that he was being "seriously embarrassed" by such omissions, which were creating "anxiety among personnel".[21] When acting status was

20. Reports on "public service unrest" were minuted to the Administrator from December 1945; P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, item 1-3-16, all folios; also CRS A518, item B800/1/7, 23 November 1945, 15 November 1946.
21. P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, item 1-3-16, 16 November 1945.

finally accorded a number of officers there were rumours that permanent appointments had in fact been made, without prior advertisement, contrary to public service practice.[22] Many of the rumours which circulated may later have seemed ridiculous, but they indicated a major problem of morale, stemming from insecurity and poor communications and gaining further strength from the continuing uncertainites of the period.

Murray and his service

The dissatisfaction within the public service which had been reported in the Australian press was soon brought to the attention of the government, although the Public Service Associations of the Territory of New Guinea and Papua continued to act separately in industrial matters.[23] They complained that senior positions were being filled from outside the public service: "Public servants resent apparent influence of former members Directorate Army Research detriment other public servants stop." There were objections that junior officers were supervising the takeover from the military in the New Guinea mainland area; and that nothing had been done to grant salary increases or to establish arbitration machinery, both of which were considered essential in

22. Ibid., 6 February 1946.
23. The material in this and the following passage, including the quotation, is drawn from P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, item 1-3-16, 6 February 1946.

view of the high living costs being encountered in the Territory. Murray urged the Minister to give urgent attention to all outstanding administrative and personnel matters and sought advice from the most experienced men who had so far resumed duty in Port Moresby.[24] The most revealing reply came from Mr. E.B. (later Mr. Justice) Bignold, a former Papuan officer of the Crown Law Department, who wrote, "I regret to say that in regard to appointments to the Service I believe that you are being ill advised by some advisers whose views are not, I think, generally shared." Apart from the fact that most appointments were being made as a result of circumstance rather than design, it was ironic that Bignold's criticims were directed as they were: for the responsibility for personnel lay with the acting Government Secretary, Robert Melrose, who was supported by Murray precisely because he possessed what the Administrator considered to be the "Papuan outlook".

Such differences of perception between Murray and his staff arose largely because the Administrator was a stranger to the Territory and suffered from the further disadvantage, in the eyes of many of his subordinates, that he had worked in the Directorate of Research; and for Papuan officers particularly, that he had usurped the position of Leonard Murray. There were further

24. The information in this and the following passage, including the quotation, is drawn from ibid., 8 February 1946.

difficulties. Murray's incisive manner could overwhelm people not accustomed to disciplined thought; a public servant who had been baffled by Murray's trenchant questioning described him, many years later, as "starchy".[25] A man of Murray's intellect, committed to implementing change as rapidly as possible, was a different personality from the majority of his senior staff, particularly those whose outlook remained narrow and who were accustomed to the more leisurely pace of the pre-war period. Murray associated more easily with the professional men in the public service, many of them post-war appointees, whose background more closely resembled his own. Such an attitude was strengthened by the fact that Mrs. Murray, also an expert in tropical agriculture, was one of the few well-educated white women in Papua New Guinea at that time.

The Murrays' Government House was a different establishment from that presided over by the ex-Army officers who administered the Mandated Territory before the war. Its relationship to the rest of the community was similar to that which existed under MacGregor and Murray, both men of some intellectual force.[26] To offset any aloofness, Murray's manner was exceptionally courteous, almost old-worldly in its attention to people of all kinds.

25. Interview with a former senior officer of the Department of the Public Service Commissioner, 17 July 1968.
26. See F.J. West, Sir Hubert Murray, op. cit. and R.B. Joyce, Sir William MacGregor, op. cit.

Murray has said that he believed in extending the same courtesies to everyone and saw no point in changing his manner to fit allegedly different social circumstances; for example, when he was meeting villagers.[27] Ian Hogbin, who accompanied Murray on some of his officials tours, says that he was never at all "stiff" with Papua New Guineans, treating everyone with the same "common politeness";[28] the point is, of course, that Europeans were not expected to behave in such a manner towards "natives". However, Murray's behaviour might have seemed inconsistent. For example, he sometimes dressed in a tropical uniform similar to that worn in the British Colonial Service.[29] Yet Murray was being neither pompous nor vain in dressing in this way; he later observed that, if the people were willing to dress ceremonially when he was present, as was the invariable custom at the time, then he felt obliged to extend the same courtesy to them.[30] Nevertheless, these were apparent contradictions in the behaviour of a man who, while supporting a wholly progressive policy, was also willing to adopt the trappings of an old colonialism on certain occasions. In fact, most of Murray's social attitudes stemmed from an earlier generation, while his intellectual

27. Murray interview, 14 December 1966.
28. Interview with Dr. Hogbin, 21 December 1973.
29. This was the colonial uniform "second class", worn by such senior officials as Colonial Secretaries. Unlike his successor, Brigadier Cleland, Murray did not wear military uniform in the Territory, since he wished to make it clear that his was a civil post.
30. Murray interview, 14 December 1966.

convictions were far in advance of those held by most of the community. It was only to be expected that his behaviour sometimes seemed paradoxical to those who worked with him.

Murray's many roles

Murray formed few close friendships in Papua New Guinea, but he is remembered with great affection by those who knew him well; most of the associations he formed at that time have lasted for many years.[31] He was a fairly distant figure to the great majority of his staff, however, and he seems to have been viewed generally with respect rather than liking. Some of his personal mannerisms were far removed from usual New Guinea practice: for example, his habit of addressing everyone but his closest friends by surname only - "Thank you, Jones" - in a country where Christian names were the universal rule. He did not smoke, drank little, and took as much pleasure in visiting villages, particularly to inspect gardens and agricultural projects, as he did in European company of the kind generally available in the Territory.[32]

There was little empathy between the Administrator and Papua New Guinea's Europeans, but Murray worked hard

31. Gunther interview, 4 December 1968.
32. This passage is based on conversations with people associated with Murray and on semi-personal correspondence in P.N.G.N.A. Boxes 163 and 168.

for all of them. He travelled a great deal, rather in the pre-war manner of Sir Hubert Murray, and certainly more than any of his successors. He spent an average of one day in four, or one-third of his working time, on tour.[33] In the financial year 1949/50, for example, he made twelve separate visits to centres in the Territory of New Guinea, from the Highlands to Manus Island, in a total of 56 days, and spent half that time again touring Papua.[34] Hogbin recalls that during a cruise in the Milne Bay District aboard H.M.A.S. Condamine, Murray visited "all the missions, all the plantations and all the villages" where the ship called.[35] After these visits a stream of brief memoranda flowed from Government House to the office of the Government Secretary, requiring information or action on a peculiar variety of matters: replacement of a saw at Samarai, the rate of pay for a mixed-race tradesman, repairs to a freezing unit, correspondence studies for outstation children, enquiries of the Colonial Sugar Refining Company on the best method of storing sugar in the tropics.[36] When he was in Port Moresby Murray kept up a similar barrage of minutes, on the average of twenty to thirty each month, about many kinds of official matters that came to his attention in the files or from visitors; as well as on everyday community affairs, such as water supply or car parking,

33. P.N.G.N.A. Box 164, item 1-6-1, undated July 1950.
34. Ibid.
35. Hogbin interview, 21 December 1973.
36. P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item L621, folios from September 1947 to January 1948.

which he noticed in the town.[37] These must have caused a good deal of work, and presumably some exasperation, among the Government Secretary's staff; it is probable that some of them were never dealt with, although reminders were occasionally sent from Government House.[38]

Murray provided the main outlet for the complaints and concerns of both the public service and the white community generally, since at the time there were no formal bodies representing European interests, such as the Legislative Council or the Town and District Advisory Councils established in the 1950's.[39] The office of Administrator thus became the focus, within the Territory, of much of the post-war discontent. This was something Murray appeared willing to accept. Within a few months of his appointment, for example, the Port Moresby public servants called a meeting to air their grievances and discuss action that might be taken to remedy them. The main issue was the low standard of housing in the town. Murray, who was better acquainted than anyone with the even worse situation on the wrecked New Guinea outstations, was sceptical about some of the Port Moresby claims; as he observed later, "The top level of staff, better housed than most, were much less

37. P.N.G.N.A. Box 185, item 58/2, all folios.
38. The degree of follow-up is not clear, owing to the destruction of the Government Secretary's files, but Government House records contain a number of reminders.
39. Jinks, op. cit., pp. 110-12, 152-3. Murray was, of course, more concerned at the problems of the villagers, but whites could exert more pressure. Village representation is discussed in Chapter Seven.

affected...."[40] In any event, Murray attended the meeting, to the consternation of those present.[41] There were objections that the Administrator was not a public servant, but Murray pointed out that the invitation had been addressed to "officers". "On this term," he recalls, "I succeeded in persuading the chairman that I had a right to attend."[42] The meeting agreed to protest to the Australian government at the delay in providing "reasonable accommodation" for public servants; Murray would no doubt have enjoyed adding his name to the complaint, had that been possible. The positive feature of the meeting was that, after some discussion in which Murray took part, senior officers of the Department of Public Works agreed to build emergency houses, with walls of tar paper over a sawn timber frame, each to be completed in about a week.[43] Murray believed that the houses "notably relieved the accommodation problem and improved the morale of the Civil Service".[44] However, there were many other issues causing dissatisfaction and certain of those who attended the staff meeting supplied highly critical reports of it to the press. On 15 September 1946 the Sydney Sun carried an account of the meeting, saying that it had been called to take "strike action" and that Murray's presence had been an "attempt to intimidate" those who attended. The report brought

40. Murray notes, p. 74.
41. P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, item 1-3-16, 24 August 1946.
42. Murray notes, p. 76.
43. P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, loc. cit.
44. Murray notes, p. 76.

an enquiry from the Minister, who was coolly advised by Murray that he had attended the gathering because "all members of the Administration" had been invited; it had, wrote Murray, been an "orderly meeting".[45]

Even the Pacific Islands Monthly agreed with Murray's assessment of the meeting, reporting that the press account was "exaggerated".[46] With grudging respect the magazine noted:[47]

> /The chairman/ suggested that, as the Administrator was a busy man, the meeting be adjourned while he addressed those present; later he (the Administrator) could leave and the business of the meeting could proceed. The Administrator, however, was not so lightly disposed of; he said that as a member of the Provisional Administration he insisted upon being permitted to remain, and the chairman, probably out of his depth, consented...Opinion is divided in the Territory on the appearance of the Administrator at a meeting called for the purpose of discussing and dissecting him and his administration. But whether it was or was not etiquette his presence certainly cut the ground from under the feet of the rank and file, although he in turn was forced to listen to some frank criticism.

In fact, Murray attended the meeting out of a desire to assist rather than embarrass his staff, as the decision on emergency housing showed. This was simply an example of his personally confronting issues in an effort to achieve quick results. Particularly during his early period in office he acted on the assumption that the main authority to settle administrative details rested

45. P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, item 1-3-16, 20 September 1946.
46. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 2, September 1946, p. 8.
47. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 3, October 1946, p. 8.

with him and as if matters affecting policy primarily required consultation between him and the Minister, with the Canberra Department playing a supporting role; or, in his own words, Murray "did not want to have to refer every last thing to Canberra for approval".[48] This became one of his major concerns as the Canberra authorities proved themselves notoriously slow to act, thereby adding to such problems as the dissatisfaction within the public service. For example, salaries and entitlements for public servants came under Ministerial determination, and so could be improved only by decision in Australia. In mid-1946 Halligan had visited Port Moresby, promising a complete review of the public service in the near future; but nothing had been heard by the time of the August protest meeting, despite enquiries and prompting by Murray, who remained in a frustrating position at the centre of the dispute.[49]

Need for investigation

It was not until 8 November 1946, almost six months after the undertaking by Halligan, that an investigation into the public service was begun.[50] It was to inquire into both the conditions and organization of the service, although by that time the Provisional Administration

48. Murray interview, 14 December 1966.
49. P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, item 1-3-16, 20 September 1946; P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 2, September 1946, p. 8.
50. D.E.T., Report on the Public Service of the Provisional Administration of Papua New Guinea by Mr. C.J. Buttsworth, Canberra, typescript, 1947, p. 1.

had been in operation for more than a year and many ad hoc decisions had created precedents that could not easily be changed. Moreover, certain senior officials had manoeuvered themselves and their departments into influential positions which they wished to retain. To appreciate the limitations of the 1946/47 inquiry it is necessary to examine the events preceding it and the personalities and organizations involved.

Since there had been no planning for a post-war administrative structure for the Territory, hurried arrangements on the basis of pre-war practice had to be made when the early end to the war caught the authorities by surprise.[51] As the annual reports put it, "At its inauguration on 30th October, 1945, the Public Service of the Provisional Administration of Papua-New Guinea was tentatively classified on the basis of classifications in the pre-war Public Service of the separate Administration for Papua and New Guinea."[52] This was misleading, as the peculiar choice of words in the singular to describe what had actually been two organizations indicated. In fact, the Provisional Administration followed the Mandated Territory pattern in both terminology and organization, with the addition of two departments to make a total of ten in 1945/46.[53] Conditions of service also followed

51. See Chapter Three, pp. 155-6.
52. N.G.A.R., 1946/47, p. 13.
53. P.A.R., 1945/46, p. 10. Adoption of the Mandated Territory structure produced important administrative effects, which are discussed later in this Chapter.

pre-war patterns for some time; married officers were paid an allowance only if their annual salary was less than £400; child allowance was payable only to officers with salaries of less than £600; and staff had to pay for most of their leave passages.[54] These terms compared most unfavourably with later practice and even with the pre-war situation, since without salary increases, staff were forced to cope with the inflation of the war period on wage scales that had been set six years previously; the only concessions were that the minimum amount paid to single officers was raised from £300 to £354 and to married staff by £70 to £400 by interim Ministerial decision.[55] When these facts are considered in conjunction with the uncertainty surrounding officers' careers, the poor housing and the lack of shipping and supplies, it is not hard to understand the unrest in the public service. Under the circumstances, the delay of over a year in instituting the first review of the service showed a lack of responsibility on the part of the Minister and his Department.

Growth of committees

The government also failed to set up a formal policy and executive structure for the Territory, even on an interim basis. The Papua-New Guinea Provisional Administration Act 1945 suspended the Executive and

54. Mair, op. cit. (1948), p. 42.
55. Ibid.

Legislative Councils of the pre-war Territories and vested legislative power formally in the Governor-General; in practice, many of the early Ordinances were proposed in Port Moresby,[56] then passed to the Department of External Territories for consideration by the Minister, following which there were usually long delays before gazettal was approved.[57] The Administrator was empowered to make regulations under Ordinances that had come into effect, but lacked any formal consultative machinery to advise him on future requirements for legislation and executive action. For several months there was little opportunity to think beyond the moment; but as conditions became more stable, and particularly as the planning activities of the Pacific Territories Research Council and the Council of the School of Pacific Administration were stifled by the Department of External Territories, the need for a policy group in Papua New Guinea became urgent.[58] In 1946 Murray therefore approved the setting up of an Advisory Committee "to report on matters referred to it by the Administrator".[59] It was intended that the committee should meet weekly under the chairmanship of the acting Government Secretary. Its members included the acting Treasurer and the acting Directors of Public

56. The information in this and the following passage is drawn from Murray interview, 14 December 1966.
57. This situation continued for more than five years, until Hasluck became Minister.
58. See Chapter Five, pp. 281-9, 300-3.
59. P.N.G.N.A. Box 192, item CA1/4/1, undated (early 1949; the original papers were probably destroyed: this file contains a review of the situation).

Health, District Services and Native Affairs, Native Labour, Education and Agriculture.[60]

The matters initially referred to the Advisory Committee mainly concerned the reconstruction phase of the Provisional Administration's work, following the completion of the rehabilitation phase by the latter half of 1946. These included such things as improvements to urban services, conditions on outstations, and problems of shipping, air services and supply: that is, matters which concerned several, or all, departments.[61] However, the Advisory Committee had also to concern itself with questions which, like labour supply, leasing of land and the expansion of schooling, seemed to fall within the ambit of a single department.[62] This was because almost every question held implications for other areas of policy. The problem of housing, for example, soon led to such considerations as the availability of urban land, which opened up questions of town planning. With almost everything in Papua New Guinea in a state of flux and without a plan from which to work, it was impossible to fix the parameters of administrative action.

As the Advisory Committee sought to resolve the issues confronting it, its discussions became both more

60. P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item 1-4-2, 23 October 1946. The committee also had power to co-opt. The state of the public service is indicated by the fact that none of these senior officials held a permanent appointment.
61. P.N.G.N.A. Box 169, item GH1-9-6, folios November 1946 to March 1949.
62. P.N.G.N.A. Box 164, item GH1-4-3, folios November 1946 to July 1949.

detailed and less conclusive, until members began to complain about the length of meetings.[63] These gradually became less frequent: from weekly in 1947 to monthly by early 1949.[64] The committee was often forced to refer matters back to the Administrator, usually requesting clarification of policy from the Australian government. On other occasions it recommended further study of certain questions by specialised groups, with the result that by 1949 a total of 25 committees and advisory groups had been established.[65] Of these, the Advisory Committee, Water Board, Land Boards, Public Service Appointments Board and Inter-Departmental Committee on Native Development and Welfare had relatively defined areas of concern.[66] The functions of several others overlapped to a degree and suggested a need for rationalisation: the Stores Purchases and Supply Board, Tenders and Disposals Board, Patrol Equipment Committee and Petroleum Advisory Committee were concerned with stores; the Housing Committee, Building Board, Building Priorities Committee and Town Planning Advisory Committee considered urban affairs; and the Economic Planning Committee, Rural Production Advisory Council, Fisheries Committee and Transport Investigation Committee advised on development matters. Other committees were concerned with finance (the Estimates Revision and Finance Committees)

63. Buttsworth, op. cit., Appendix "A", p. 1.
64. P.N.G.N.A. Box 192, item CA1/4/1, undated.
65. Ibid.
66. The material in this and the following passage is drawn from P.N.G.N.A. Box 169, item GH1-9-6 and Box 192, item CA1/4/1.

and reconstruction (the Regional Re-establishment and Re-employment and Regional Reconstruction Training Committees).

A final group of advisory bodies grew out of the Committee on Native Development and Welfare, which was established in October 1946 with the aim of providing advice more relevant to village requirements, and with longer-term goals, than was the case with the Advisory Committee.[67] The Development and Welfare body comprised most of the members of the Advisory Committee: the acting Directors of District Services and Native Affairs (chairman), Native Labour, Agriculture, Education and Public Health. It discussed any matter relating to Papua New Guineans and covered an enormous range in the process: air freight allowance for employees on isolated outstations, artisans' wages, prices in trade stores and individual cases involving "destitute persons".[68] The Development and Welfare group, too, became enmeshed in details and recommended the establishment of subsidiary committees to conduct further enquiries; these emerged as the Committees for Social Development, Native Welfare, Broadcasting and Amenities, and Recreation

67. The material in this and the following passage is based on P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item 12-7-2 and Box 187, item PD8/5.
68. The members themselves found difficulty remembering committee names and functions; the acting Director of District Services at one time referred to a "Destitute Persons Committee", which may have been an unrecorded offshoot of the Development and Welfare group (Buttsworth, op. cit., Appendix "A", p. 1.)

Facilities for Women. These groups were intended to achieve results when earlier attempts had failed, although they were rarely successful. There were several reasons for this impasse, most of them stemming from the Australian government's failure to establish clear policy objectives. Firstly, none of the policy-oriented committees possessed statutory authority and there was little in the way of formal power that could be delegated to them by the Administrator, who was in turn obliged to refer many matters to Canberra for decision, against his wishes. Secondly, committee members were heavily committed to departmental work, for which there were serious shortages of staff. Thirdly, there was almost no support staff for the committees themselves, apart from a few officers undertaking basic secretarial duties in addition to their normal work.

A situation thus arose in which the same basic group of senior staff threshed around with similar sets of interrelated problems, approaching them from a slightly different viewpoint in each committee. Some progress was made with immediate problems: finance allocation, housing needs, service conditions for Administration employees (i.e., Papua New Guineans). However, the fact that such matters had to be dealt with by senior committees indicated that much more power needed to be delegated to, and then within, the Provisional Administration. Efforts at long-term planning, in turn,

were obscured by essential, but recurring, requirements for co-ordination; it was tempting to deal with the more routine affairs first, by which time there was little opportunity to discuss the less tractable problems. Hence the establishment, by the major groups such as the Native Development and Welfare and Advisory Committees, of yet more offshoots responsible for planning: notably the Social Development Planning Committee and the Economic Development Committee. Both of the latter groups produced lengthy reports which were intended to form the basis for future policy; they are discussed, according to their particular concern, in the next two Chapters.

Administrative structure and co-ordination

Problems of co-ordination and planning were increased by the structure of the Provisional Administration, particularly in relation to the roles of its major administrative organizations, the Departments of District Services and Native Affairs, and Government Secretary. District Services was staffed largely by field officers responsible for a wide range of general administrative and service functions in the main centres and outstations of the Territory.[69] The department contained by far the

69. Field staff possessed both police and magisterial powers and acted as bankers, postmasters, construction overseers and in any other capacity which seemed indicated by the circumstances. There has been no detailed study of the administrative aspects of Australian control, although two former District Commissioners, Messrs. I.F.G. Downs and J.P. Sinclair,

largest number of officers with pre-war experience; and, owing to the nature of colonial administration, with its need to spread a limited number of staff over a large area, it enjoyed a virtual monopoly of formal legal and administrative authority and of sources of information. In pre-war Papua the field staff had been members of the Department of the Government Secretary, which provided the executive group to the Lieutenant-Governor and effected the delegation of his authority, in the limited degree he considered appropriate, to Resident Magistrates. It was a simple and direct method of control, reasonably suited to the conditions at that time. It was never put to the test as a system of co-ordination and development, since the Papuan Administration possessed few professional officers and the majority of those whom it could employ were based in Port Moresby. In the Mandated Territory, on the other hand, the Department of the Government Secretary was a small organization responsible for co-ordinating affairs on behalf of the Administrator, with the field staff serving in a separate Department of District Services under their own Director. The Government Secretary remained the senior public servant in the Territory, but the de facto power of the Director of

(cont.) are presently compiling separate versions. Such works as Mair, Legge, Stanner (Transition), West (Sir Hubert Murray) and Joyce, op. cit., concentrate on the history of expressed policy and pay some attention to actual performance in some key areas, such as labour and welfare. However, it is possible, by examining these accounts, to discern an outline of administrative practice; for example, see Mair (1948), Chs. 2-7, Legge, Chs. 9-12 and Stanner, Ch. 2. The most useful material is in Reed, op. cit., pp. 164-71. See also P.A.R., 1938/39, pp. 10-13 and N.G.A.R., 1939/40, pp. 9-13, for broad outlines of public service structure.

District Services was considerable because his staff occupied such vital positionsin the country. It was the latter system, in which the field staff were separated from the Administrator's executive group, that was adopted for the combined administration in 1945.

Within the Provisional Administration the Department of the Government Secretary was formally responsible for the "co-ordination of the activities of all Departments".[70] The Government Secretary had also to provide a channel of communication between the Administrator and the Department of External Territories, arrange the compilation of statistics and preparation of reports, and supervise the Police Branch, Library Service, Crown Law Office, Registrar General's Branch and Supreme Court Registry. To carry out these duties he had an effective staff of only twelve, all but two of whom (the Assistant Government Secretary and an Administrative Assistant) were in clerical and typing categories. Thus a great deal of the actual work of co-ordination necessarily fell to the senior officers of the other departments, meeting in committee. In the absence of detailed oversight from the Government Secretary's office, the "co-ordination" effected through committee more closely resembled a bargaining process between officials with the strongest personalities and representing the most influential departments.

70. The material in this and the following passage is drawn from N.G.A.R., 1946/47, p. 14 and P.A.R., 1945/46, p. 10.

Murray's advisers

The importance of personalities within the Provisional Administration was emphasised by the restricted role of the Administrator's own staff. The only personnel assigned specifically to Government House were an Official Secretary (paid at the rate of Chief Clerk) and a typist.[71] This was very different from the "staff" concept Murray had encountered in the army and far removed from the notion of an academic community which had influenced relationships at Murray's university and within the Directorate of Research. By comparison with the earlier phases of his career, Murray as Administrator was isolated, not only from people of similar background, but from almost all contact, through formal channels, with officers who could provide him with a conspectus of the Papua New Guinea situation. This placed a heavy responsibility, in addition to all his other duties, on the Government Secretary, who as senior department head should ideally have been both the Administrator's executive officer and chief adviser; in the absence of Executive and Legislative Councils, there was no other formal source of information for the Administrator to draw on. In Robert Melrose, his acting Government Secretary, Murray found a man whom he considered "thoroughly on-side", rather slow to make decisions, "but not because of the possible consequences to Melrose".[72] However, Melrose was unwell

71. N.G.A.R., 1947/48, p. vii.
72. Murray interview, 12 December 1966. See also Chapter Four, pp. 177-9.

and a heart condition which had persisted from the pre-war period forced him to leave the Territory in 1949.[73] Because of his health and personality, Melrose was not the commanding figure required for the almost impossible tasks confronting the Government Secretary. Even had he been, Murray would still have used informal channels to gain the information and intellectual stimulation that his office and personality demanded.

The other top officials, with whom Murray associated in varying degrees, were a mixed group indeed. Nine of the heads of the eleven departments functioning in 1946/47 can be broadly categorised in three groups. The first group, which worked to some effect but without attracting particular attention, included the acting Director of Forests, J.B. McAdam, the acting Chief Collector of Customs, T.P.M. Byrne, and the acting Treasurer, W.N.M. Chester. Two other senior officials, in charge of Public Works and Lands, Surveys and Mines, were unable to cope with the urgent demands made upon them and were later replaced. A third group was in general sympathy with post-war policy and could be considered to have a "progressive" outlook on development. It included Melrose; W.R. Humphries, the acting Director of Native Labour;[74] the acting Director of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries,

73. P.N.G.N.A. Box 168, item GH1-9-2M, 19 July 1949.
74. The first acting Director of Native Labour was J.L. Taylor, who returned to the Highlands at his own request in 1946; his work in the position is discussed in Chapter Eight.

W.E. Cottrell-Dormer; and the acting Director of Education, W.C. Groves. Of these, Humphries was a former Papuan Resident Magistrate with more than thirty years service whose views on Papua New Guinea were sensitive, if rather paternalistic. He was one of the Papuan field officer-authors, having written Through Wildest Papua in 1923.[75] His position proved to be both difficult and frustrating and he lacked the personal force to carry his views through the various committees.[76] Cottrell-Dormer, at Agriculture, was a friend of Murray and the similarity of their professional backgrounds gave them interests in common. Cottrell-Dormer was particularly interested in agricultural extension and its social effects but he, like Humphries, proved largely unsuccessful in a senior administrative post; he eventually accepted demotion in order to continue his work in the field.[77] Groves had wide experience in New Guinea and in the field of education generally. After service in World War I he had been Supervisor of Native Education in the Mandated Territory until 1925, had carried out anthropological research there in the 1930's, besides being Director of Education in Nauru and adviser to the British Solomon Islands, and had served in Papua New Guinea with the Army Education Service during the Pacific war.[78] With his

75. London, Fisher Unwin.
76. Gunther interview, 4 December 1968. Humphries' later work is discussed in Chapter Eight.
77. Cottrell-Dormer's later work is discussed in Chapter Eight.
78. The material in this passage is drawn from P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 10, May 1946, p. 9.

detailed knowledge of social issues in the Territory, Groves was potentially the most commanding figure in the Provisional Administration. However, like several of his colleagues of that period, he had not been tested in the administration of a rapidly-developing situation, such as the one he encountered in post-war Papua New Guinea.

The performance of the "progressive" group of senior officers was of great importance for the success of the Provisional Administration, for it was largely in their areas of responsibility - labour, agriculture, education and the co-ordination of development - that judgements of the post-war achievement would be made. However, until the specialist departments could be expanded by recruiting professional and technical staff, much of the responsibility for executing development programmes would fall to the field staff. Moreover, only limited participation could be expected from the villagers until there was a general improvement in their health, which had received only limited attention before the war, and had then been seriously affected by the privations resulting from the military occupation. A great deal thus depended on the Departments of District Services and Native Affairs, and Public Health, and on their Directors. At the establishment of the Provisional Administration both of these departments were headed by senior pre-war officers from the Mandated Territory, District Services by Edward Taylor and Public Health by Dr. B.A. Sinclair; both resigned in 1946. Taylor's replacement during most of

the Provisional Administration period was J.H. Jones, another Territory of New Guinea officer. Jones had reached the rank of District Officer in 1934, serving in several areas, but came to prominence only after joining Angau, in which he received rapid promotion to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.[79] In April 1945 he was appointed Angau commander of its Northern Region, and Director of District Services and Native Affairs for the area still under Angau control (parts of the New Guinea islands) in November 1945. He returned to the civil administration in September 1946, when he was appointed acting Director of District Services and Native Affairs for the combined Territory. "Bert" Jones was a tall, powerfully-built man with pronounced features and a strong personality. His competence was obvious from his rapid rise in Angau, but this very background had isolated him from the major policy changes proposed during the war; he represented the conventional in the field service, just as J.L. Taylor represented its more progressive aspect. Jones' experience and proficiency, in the District Services field at least, set him apart from the other department heads of the immediate post-war years.

Another commanding figure in the senior ranks of the Provisional Administration was Dr. John Thomson Gunther, a specialist in tropical medicine who had worked in the British Solomon Islands before the war and had

79. P.N.G.N.A. Box 186, item 1/2, undated August 1949.

later served as a malariologist with the Royal Australian Air Force, attaining the rank of Wing Commander in charge of a unit conducting research into the aetiology of scrub typhus; in the latter capacity he had for a time been stationed near Port Moresby and become interested in the situation in Papua New Guinea.[80] Gunther's abilities can be appreciated from a resume of his career: after a decade spent as Director of Public Health, he was Assistant Administrator for several years and finally served as the first Vice-Chancellor of the University of Papua New Guinea from 1966 to 1972. During most of this period he was the most outstanding single figure in New Guinea development. Ironically, Gunther was Murray's second choice for the Public Health position and the relationship between the two men, which later became extremely close, began coolly.[81] It was inevitable, however, that their substantial professional backgrounds and the similarity of their social values would bring Murray and Gunther together. Gunther possessed a most forceful personality, which he could use to dramatise his own demands, and in all his work he accomplished something rare in Papua New Guinea: setting clear objectives and working, with sometimes ruthless dedication,

80. Gunther interview, 4 December 1968.
81. Following Sinclair's resignation, Murray sought advice on a suitable appointee from doctors he had known in the Directorate. Approaches were then made to senior medical men through the Department of External Territories, without result. Murray was then advised that his remaining candidate was unsuitable for appointment to a senior administrative post (Murray journal, p. 19). Gunther was recommended through the Minister and, like Murray before him, found no one

towards them. At a time when many of the plans for Papua New Guinea were unformed, this ability in the Director was to prove of enormous benefit to the public health effort, although it sometimes meant that other projects went short of scarce materials when their proponents were unable to withstand Gunther's demands. Gunther could be blunt to the point of rudeness and never hesitated to voice his opinions, which were both liberal, for the time, and pragmatic; he believed that achieving results was the best way of supporting a principle.[82] He, like Jones, occupied a special place among the senior officials.

The only other official group of major significance comprised the senior legal figures. Of these, Mr. F.B. (later Sir Beaumont) Phillips, formerly Chief Justice of the Mandated Territory, served in the same capacity in the combined administration. Phillips had very long experience in the islands for, after service in World War I, he worked as a Land Commissioner in the British Solomon Islands until 1925, when he was appointed a Stipendiary Magistrate for the Territory of New Guinea, moving to the Supreme Court in 1928 and gaining the

(cont.) to meet him upon his arrival in Port Moresby. He was given an appointment to see the Administrator in two days time, but "forced the issue" and had dinner with him that night (Gunther interview). Two strong personalities thus had an early opportunity of sizing each other up.

82. This passage is based, in part, on personal experience of working with Dr. Gunther.

position of Chief Justice in 1938; in 1940 he rejoined the Royal Australian Air Force and saw service in the United Kingdom.[83] Phillips, like Jones, had thus been isolated from the planning for post-war New Guinea, but was in a most influential position, since he acted as Administrator during Murray's frequent absences from Port Moresby.[84] Phillips observed all of the ceremonies of his office and, when Murray was away, those of the Administrator's position as well, "sitting in the chair", as Gunther has termed it.[85] In some other respects the Chief Justice seems to have been given to pomposity, considering the circumstances of the Territory: he was strongly opposed to traditional Melanesian ways of settling disputes and was prolix in his judgements, reports and memoranda.[86] However, he added weight to the dominant Territory of New Guinea group forming within the Provisional Administration. The other senior legal men were Mr. Justice R.T. Gore, formerly a colleague of Sir Hubert Murray in the Supreme Court of Papua, a big, bluff raconteur who was not involved in policy matters; and Mr. E.B. Bignold, Crown Law Officer, a former Papuan official who had been disturbed at conditions in the post-war public service, but who was soon to be appointed to the Supreme Court.[87]

83. P.I.M., Vol. 14 No. 3, October 1943, p. 6.
84. P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item 1-4, 1 July 1947, et. al. This, too, followed Mandated Territory precedent; in Papua the Government Secretary had usually acted.
85. Gunther interview, 4 December 1968.
86. P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item 1-4 and Box 887, item GH42/1.
87. See p. 323 of this Chapter.

When the 1946/47 inquiry into the public service began, Murray's active advisers were divided into two groups. One element, including Groves and Cottrell-Dormer, was close to the Administrator in terms of background and convictions, but lacked the experience required to deal with the machinery of the bureaucracy. The other, whose major figures were Jones and Phillips, had little in common with Murray or with the post-war approach to Papua New Guinea development. Their influence stemmed from their knowledge of the pre-war administrative practices that were being adopted in many important spheres of the Provisional Administration. The latter group was further strengthened by the return in 1946 of Mr. S.A. Lonergan to the combined service. Lonergan had served in the secretariat at Rabaul before the war and had worked with both Angau and the Department of External Territories between 1942 and 1946.[88] Upon his return to New Guinea he was appointed acting Assistant Government Secretary, displaying the direct approach that was to some extent lacking in his superior, Robert Melrose; this gave Lonergan influence beyond that which would normally have attached to his position. The relationship between Murray and Lonergan was an uneasy one and this was doubly unfortunate because Lonergan was eventually appointed the first substantive Government Secretary after Melrose left the Territory. Murray has said that he and Lonergan "got on", but they had little in common

88. Lonergan had been one of the "Ghan brothers" reviled by the Directorate staff (see Chapter Two, p. 138) and this no doubt affected Murray's attitude towards him.

and this lack of rapport eventually damaged Murray's attempts to pursue the policies he favoured.[89]

In the first year of its existence the Provisional Administration thus evolved as a clumsy instrument, unsuited either for planning or for executing the changes proposed for Papua New Guinea. A good deal of administrative authority rested with individual departments, and the Department of District Services and Native Affairs in particular, while the function of co-ordinating their efforts was assigned to a skeleton organization in the Government Secretary's office. As a consequence, a plethora of committees grew up, compounding rather than reducing the problems of planning and co-ordination. The weaknesses in organizational structure were accentuated by the uneven quality of senior personnel and by the tensions which existed among them. It was against this background that the 1946 inquiry into the public service began.

The Buttsworth inquiry

The public service inquiry, begun in November 1946, was conducted by Mr. C.J. Buttsworth, a retired senior officer of the New South Wales public service, and Mr. A.G.M. Burns, Assistant Secretary (Administration) in the Department of External Territories. Neither of

89. Murray interview, 14 December 1966. This matter is discussed further in Chapter Nine.

these men had worked in Papua New Guinea, but the Department of External Territories made no formal provision for assistance or advice to their inquiry by members of the Territory public service. The investigation had been instituted in response to the protest meetings in Port Moresby earlier in the year and it seemed as if the Provisional Administration's staffing problems were at last receiving urgent attention in Canberra; Buttsworth and Burns arrived in the Territory on 11 November, only three days after receiving their commissions, allowing the Port Moresby authorities no time in which to prepare a detailed case. It thus appeared that the inquiry was intended to effect rapid adjustments in the specific areas of salaries and conditions of service, but it was in fact charged with much broader terms of reference:[90]

> To inquire into the conditions of the Public Service and submit recommendations as to -
>
> (a) the organization of the Service and the functions of the various branches;
>
> (b) the positions necessary, and duties and salary ranges of such positions.
>
> In making these recommendations...to consider two things in particular -
>
> (1) the actual present requirements of the Territory; and
>
> (2) the funds to be made available by the Commonwealth towards carrying out the functions of government in the Territory.
>
> Finally...to report on any organizational aspects [apparent from the] inquiries.

Clearly, this was far from being an orthodox exercise in

90. Buttsworth, op. cit., Introduction, p. 1.

reorganization and reclassification. Such an investigation, although sometimes complex in detail, begins from a known position: the basic objectives of the organization under review, which in the case of a public service are the policies of the government. From that point, it provides, in consultation with those involved, a structure capable of achieving the set objectives. Finally, the investigation determines the categories of staff required for the structure agreed upon, setting their salaries in relation to similar position in the public service as a whole.

Such an exercise for the Provisional Administration posed major problems, however. With the possible exception of labour policy, post-war plans were so vague as to give no clear guidance for the establishment of organizations and classifications. Moreover, the Australian government controlled no other colonial service of significance with which staffing in Papua New Guinea could be compared. This meant that the public service inquiry had two main alternatives open to it: either to propose short-term ameliorative measures, pending a full statement of plans and programmes by the government; or to assume certain parameters of policy within which a total organization could be established for the long run. In this respect the inquiry's terms of reference were of limited use, owing to their ambiguity. A good deal depended, firstly, on the construction placed on the words "actual present

requirements in sub-paragraph (1); if these were interpreted as involving all recent policy considerations, then the inquiry was faced with an enormous task beyond the capacity of just two men. In addition, the reference to finance in sub-paragraph (2) might possibly have suggested that a certain level of funding had been approved by the government, and that the public service was to be established with this in mind. This was not the case, however; Commonwealth Treasury was anxious to contain spending in the Territory, but Colonel Murray's intercession with the Prime Minister later in 1947 secured further increases.[91]

In effect, the Buttsworth inquiry was being asked to deal with a set of variables far beyond the scope of a normal public service investigation, including structure, classification, objectives and finance. In order to reduce the task to manageable proportions, Buttsworth therefore assumed that funds should remain approximately at the level of the 1946/47 financial year and further determined that "actual present requirements" should be interpreted within this framework. Such a narrow view necessarily imposed severe limitations on the Provisional Administration's future activities. This approach had serious implications for Australian government policy and it is possible that the Department of External Territories endorsed, or even encouraged it, out of a

91. See Chapter Five, pp. 291-2.

desire to curb the far-reaching ambitions of Murray and his staff.

The Provisional Administration had proceeded on a set of assumptions completely different from those implied by the Buttsworth inquiry's terms of reference. The major departments had drawn up development plans for presentation to the Administrator and the Advisory Committee, and these involved, for such agencies as Health, Education and Agriculture, massive expansions of their activities to meet the goals suggested by the Minister's policy statements.[92] It was therefore inevitable that the investigating team would clash with the Territory's senior officials.

Before leaving Australia, Buttsworth and Burns had little time to discuss their responsibilities with the authorities in Canberra, and there is no indication that they were specifically briefed on the likely impact of the government's proposed policy on the requirements of the Territory public service; the tenor of their findings suggests, on the contrary, that such factors were never considered. They made some effort to acquaint themselves with Papua New Guinea conditions, remaining for two months in the Territory. However, apart from a one-week tour of major centres in seven districts, they spent their time in Port Moresby,[93] thereby receiving a restricted

92. These proposals are discussed later in this Chapter and in Chapters Seven and Eight.
93. Buttsworth, op. cit., Introduction, p. 1 and Section 2, pp. 1, 3, 5, 7.

view of a most complex situation. Indeed, Buttsworth appears to have enjoyed his temporary status, addressing his correspondence from "Re-classification Office, Government House, Port Moresby".[94] He and Burns later visited the headquarters offices of the departments and there investigated the proposals for reorganization and reclassification that had already been prepared. During the inquiry Buttsworth devoted himself to what Murray later described as a "general critique" of the public service, while Burns dealt with the details of reclassification.[95] Buttsworth emerged as very much the dominant figure of the team, and he alone signed the final report.[96]

Conflict over the inquiry

After first reviewing written submissions from departments, Buttsworth sought an interview with the Administrator.[97] It is clear from Buttsworth's report that he had already encountered hostility from some officials and that he had also been drawn into the internal bickerings of the Port Moresby bureaucracy. He expressed concern that individual departments had drawn up their own proposals for expansion with only "certain broad functions" as a guide; and that their plans had not

94. Ibid., Section 2, p. 11b.
95. P.N.G.N.A. Box 168, item 1-9-3C, 18 February 1949.
96. Buttsworth, op. cit., Conclusion.
97. Murray does not recall the interview (letter of 26 May 1969); Buttsworth's account seems intended to place the Administrator in a poor light.

been reviewed "by the Administration", by which he presumably meant a co-ordinating group representing a broad view.[98] In fact, this stage had not been reached by the time of Buttsworth's arrival, and it is very likely that this criticism had been suggested to him by pre-war officers envious of the schemes of the new developmental departments. He revealed his entanglement in the internal rivalries of the public service when he professed to be particularly disturbed at the far-reaching proposals of the departments of Agriculture and Health, noting that "several heads of departments, while probably being competent in the specialised functions of their departments, did not possess a wide knowledge of the conditions and pecularities of the country and its population".[99] He therefore recommended that their plans should be "closely examined by senior officers possessing such knowledge" and suggested that Jones and Melrose, in particular, should be given this duty.[100] This was clearly a case of the old guard, having gained Buttsworth's support, attempting to obstruct the plans of the newcomers. This was exactly the situation Murray wished to avoid and he maintained ingenuously that such men as Melrose and Jones could not be released for special projects of that kind.[101] However, far more serious in Murray's view was the fact that Buttsworth had not observed the

98. Buttsworth, op. cit., Appendix "A", p. 1.
99. Ibid. It does not seem to have occurred to Buttsworth that he was even less qualified to comment on such matters.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.

proprieties, making personal criticisms of some of the Administration's senior staff. "He had," he told Buttsworth, "complete confidence in the Heads of the various Departments and it would be a reflection on his own intelligence if any unpracticable propositions of the 'wild cat' kind were to be promoted by any of them. The plans should be regarded only in their broadest sense and would be varied as time went on in the light of experience."[102] There was now even less chance of the inquiry proceeding smoothly, since in identifying himself with the conservative group within the public service, Buttsworth had alienated the Administrator.

After reviewing the written departmental submissions and interviewing Murray, the inquiry team visited departments, where they further antagonized senior staff by questioning the functions they intended to carry out and making severe criticisms of their performance to that time. Several of the criticisms were vague and unsupported by relevant evidence: at one point the report seemed to question the need to provide health services and schooling as a general entitlement of the people of the Territory; it made disparaging references to a scheme to improve subsistence fishing; suggested that there was no need for specialist medical services; and castigated all organizations involved in the control

102. Ibid., p. 2.

of funds and stores.[103] While there were obvious deficiencies of administration, the report gave a distorted impression of the actual situation, omitting any reference to problems of staffing and supply and making no direct acknowledgement of the rehabilitation priorities arising from the war. For the departments, however, the most irritating feature of the team's inquiry was the willingness of its members to report particular instances of what they considered to be inefficiency to the Administrator, including such things as the arrangements and costs for stevedoring at Madang, the security of war surplus stores at Lae, and the costing of sawmilling operations at Yalu.[104] In this respect Buttsworth, at least, seems to have taken it upon himself to conduct a grand inspection of the Provisional Administration and this had an adverse effect on his relations with most of its officers. He also showed a tendency to compare practices and organizations in Papua New Guinea with those in New South Wales, albeit inconsistently: on occasions he criticised such things as financial control and co-ordination because they did not resemble Australian methods; and at others claimed that departmental structures and the plans for agricultural staffing, for example, followed Australian precedents too closely.[105] In general, the conduct of the inquiry and the tone of the report were provocative, owing to Buttsworth's ignorance of, and

103. Ibid., Section 1, p. 2; "Agriculture", p. 2; "Health", p. 7; Section 1, pp. 3-7.
104. Ibid., Section 2, Appendix "B", pp. 2-3; "Forests", p. 1
105. Ibid., Section 1, p. 2, 4-6; "Agriculture", p. 2.

insensitivity to, the complex issues that were involved.

Buttsworth report

The Buttsworth report met a hostile reception at all levels of the Territory public service, and so marked a further stage in the deterioration of relations between Canberra and Port Moresby. It made one or two sound recommendations concerning changes in administrative structure, but these were eventually lost to sight in the storm of criticism levelled at its proposals for minimal salary increases and inadequate levels of departmental staffing. Buttsworth adopted, although without sufficient examination, a useful scheme put forward by the Department of District Services and Native Affairs for strengthening the executive and co-ordinating machinery of the Administration by the creation of a central Secretariat. This was to be headed by a Chief Secretary, as senior officer of the public service, and would include Secretaries for District Services and Native Affairs, Administration and Finance.[106] There was nothing novel in the proposal, which was modelled on the purely structural aspects of the great majority of British colonial services. It promised to increase control and efficiency by bringing the key field personnel directly under the Administrator and his chief executive, thereby giving them a major role in

106. Ibid., Section 1, p. 3; Section 3, Appendix "A", pp. 1-2. The origin of the proposal is discussed later in this Chapter.

the planning and co-ordination of development. At the same time, the arrangement would be successful only if officers received comprehensive training in the principles and techniques of colonial development.[107]

Unfortunately, the Buttsworth report did not acknowledge its debt to British precedent in recommeding the Secretariat organization and made no reference to the very considerable difference in personnel and environment between the British and Australian colonial services. The British concept of the Secretariat was based on two major features which had not even been considered for the Australian system: the Administrative Class, with all that it implied in terms of education, training and socialisation; and regular, planned interchange of personnel between the Secretariat and the field.[108] While there was nothing sacrosanct about the Administrative Class concept, it at least provided its members with much of the background necessary for effective co-ordination at Secretariat level. The Buttsworth report, however, made no reference to the heavy training programme that would be required to fit the Papua New Guinea field staff for the more sophisticated role that would be required of them if the Secretariat system were adopted. Nor was there any explicit reference to the tensions between "specialists"

107. The actual training provisions through the School of Pacific Administration are outlined later in this Chapter.
108. A succinct statement of the Secretariat system appears in Charles Jeffries, The Colonial Empire and its Civil Service, Cambridge, C.U.P., 1938, Ch. 10.

and "generalists" that would need to be overcome under the revised arrangement; the question of providing additional experience for co-ordinating officers was dealt with in a manner that typified the pre-war outlook of the bureaucracy in both Australia and Papua New Guinea: senior officials should have "thorough knowledge of the Territory" and of the "policy aims of the Government" as well as "practical knowledge and experience of public finance".[109] These were precisely the qualities to be found in an officer who had worked his way up the clerical grades of an Australian public service; and, not surprisingly, in a senior member of the Papua New Guinea field staff. Whether they were the qualities needed by the staff of a co-ordinating Secretariat based on British structures was a question not pursued in the report.

As it stood, the Buttsworth report placed the field staff in a potentially powerful position without providing them with the background needed to carry out their proposed functions effectively. Such qualities could be acquired only in the long term; in the meantime, the concentration of field staff of pre-war vintage in such a powerful body as the Secretariat could threaten the aspirations of the expanding departments of Agriculture, Education and Health. Such a possibility was made more

109. Buttsworth, Section 1, p. 2. The qualifications were listed for members of the Planning and Revising Council (see next page), who were in fact the Chief Secretary and his senior colleagues.

likely by Buttsworth's recommendation that a Planning and Revising Council be set up to carry out close examinations of departmental proposals.[110] The Council was presumably to perform some of the functions of an Executive Council, pending the establishment of that body by legislation, although the report did not say this. Buttsworth proposed that the Council comprise the Chief Secretary and his three Secretaries. Since the co-ordinating role had already been assigned to the Secretariat, the Council appeared to be redundant; its most significant effect would have been to strengthen even more the formal authority of the pre-war officers who were bound to dominate the Secretariat.

Buttsworth's recommendations for re-organization attracted little criticism from the specialist departments, mainly because other aspects of the report drew their immediate attention: its condemnation of existing practices, its reduction of the staff establishments proposed by departments and, most particularly, the low salary levels it recommended for many positions. The salary question was of first concern: basic rates had not been changed since the pre-war period; it was almost eighteen months since the Provisional Administration had been set up; and the protest meeting by public servants in late 1946 had disclosed a serious state of unrest.[111] The means of

110. Ibid., Section 1, pp. 2-3.
111. See pp. 328-31 of this Chapter.

setting salary scales, and the counter-arguments to the Buttsworth recommendations, are too detailed to be examined in this study,[112] but the principle followed in the report's calculations should be noted, since it set the trend of the future relationship between conditions of service in the Commonwealth and Territory bureaucracies. Salaries were based on the rate paid at equivalent levels of the Commonwealth public service - with minor adjustments to allow for such things as Australian child endowment payments - plus two added factors, one a "tropical loading" and the other a relatively small allowance for higher living costs in the Territory.[113] In the absence of official data on post-war living costs, the inquiry refused to make substantial additions to Australian figures, even though a quick tour of Port Moresby shops would have shown that fresh food, in particular, was enormously more expensive than in Australia. The final recommendation was for a minimum salary of £372, compared with a minimum actual salary of £356 in the Commonwealth public service at that time - and the £300 minimum that had been set in the Territory of New Guinea as long ago as 1922! No minimum salary for married officers was set and the payment of marriage allowance was discontinued.[114] So far as the investigating team was concerned, conditions for the Territory's public servants were simply an extension of those in Australia, with minor technical adjustments to take account of location.

112. An accurate and relatively objective summary is set out in P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 1, August 1947, pp. 33-5.
113. The main problem arose because calculations were

Administration counter-proposals

The Buttsworth report was received in Port Moresby in April 1947, but Colonel Murray refused to release its contents to the public service because he considered them to be unacceptable; instead, he advised the Minister, "I called together my advisers, including all heads of Departments, and directed that, making such use of the Buttsworth report as they could, they produce for me in the light of their long and specialised knowledge of native administration, and the conditions of the Territory, an organization and classification of the Public Service which would, in their view, produce the maximum of efficiency."[115] Murray had no authority to determine the organization of his Administration nor the service conditions of his staff, but his action in presenting a counter-proposal was by no means quixotic: he was seeking Ministerial intervention against the bureaucracy in Canberra.

The counter-proposals to the Buttsworth recommendations were prepared in less than a month and sent to the Minister on 24 May 1947.[116] They occupied some 200 pages of typescript and ranged from a long and very detailed

(cont.) based on Commonwealth base salary levels, rather than on actual levels including cost of living adjustments.

114. See pp. 332-3 of this Chapter.

115. Un-referenced memoranda accompanying the Buttsworth counter-proposals (see next page), 27 April and 24 May 1947.

116. Territory of Papua-New Guinea, Government House, Reports on the Buttsworth Report, Vols. 1 and 2, Port Moresby, mimeo, 1947.

submission from the rapidly-expanding Department of Public Health to a brief statement on relatively minor matters from the Department of Police; Murray sent them on with his personal endorsement, including a special cover bearing the inscription "Government House". The material was prepared rather quickly and showed a lack of co-ordination, thereby giving some force to one of Buttsworth's main criticisms of the Provisional Administration. It also revealed something of the differences in approach between certain senior officers: Gunther seized the opportunity to present an exhaustive case on behalf of the health service, while Groves felt unable to submit Education Department proposals "owing to the pressure of other duties...connected with the Mission conference".[117] Each department was required by Murray to prepare a statement of its functions, accompanied in most cases by objections and adjustments to the Buttsworth proposals; from these, there could be no doubting the departmental reaction to the report. It was "not acceptable" to the Departments of the Government Secretary, Public Health and Public Works; contained "misstatements and misconceptions" and proposed "unsatisfactory and inadequate organization" in the opinion of the acting Director of Agriculture; and, according to the acting Director of District Services, revealed that the inquiry team were "out of their depth when dealing with the organization and special

117. Ibid., Vol. 1, "Education", pp. 1-2.

requirements of a Colonial Service".[118] The acting Treasurer pointed out, "Mr. Buttsworth has overlooked the fact that more than half of the Territory was devastated by war; whole towns have been wiped out and all records have been lost. All this is totally different to anything experienced in Australia."[119] The criticisms of the report also revealed something of the tensions within the Territory public service. Complaining that the inquiry team spent only two hours in his department before preparing their recommendations, the acting Chief Collector of Customs noted, "I now learn for the first time of factors which governed the report on this department. The Acting Director of District Services and the Acting Government Secretary made statements to the Classifying Officer on the needs of this department which were apparently accepted as authoritative, [and on that basis] the Classifying Officer considers that my views on the needs of the department have been expressed without an adequate regard for economic organization."[120]

The counter-proposals from the Administration demanded an overall increase in the salary scales recommended by the Buttsworth report. These were moderate, proposing a minimum actual salary of £426, pending an investigation of living costs in the Territory.[121] The proposals involved

118. Ibid., Vol. 1, "Government Secretary", p. 1; Vol. 2, "Public Health", p. 2; "Public Works", p. 1; "Agriculture", p. 1; Vol. 1, "District Services", p. 6.
119. Ibid., "Treasury", p. 1.
120. Ibid., Vol. 2, "Customs", p. 2.
121. The moderate nature of the proposals is apparent

an increase of twenty per cent over the minimum scale proposed by Buttsworth, grading down to a 7.5 per cent increase at the top level (the Government Secretary).[122] In giving first priority to salary increases, the counter-proposals recognized the major problem confronting the public service at that time. They also gave high priority to increases in staff establishment, objecting in almost every case that the Buttsworth proposals represented severe reductions in the departments' original plans and left them unable to cope with the rapidly increasing demands upon them; as Gunther noted, "The approach of /the investigators/ was, in their interview, towards what was needed at present. This was explained to them and given to the best of our ability, and expansion was discussed. However, no real figures appeared to be required by Messrs. Buttsworth and Burns for the greater expanded Service....".[123] The acting Director of Agriculture pointed out, "It will have to be realised that this Territory will go ahead and that native pressure is being brought to bear on the Administration for real action so that a growing need for staff will be felt for some time."[124] This reaction from Cottrell-Dormer was

(cont.) from the fact that at the time the minimum actual salary for Commonwealth public servants working in the Territory was £476 (P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 1, August 1947, p. 34.)

122. In forwarding the proposals to the Minister (letter of 24 May 1947) Murray urged that senior officers' salaries be further increased; his department heads had set their salaries in relation to his own, and he could see no reason why this relationship should be maintained.

123. Report on Buttsworth, op. cit., Vol. 2, "Health", Appendix 3, p. 1.

124. Ibid., Vol. 2, "Agriculture", p. 4.

particularly mild, in view of the fact that his department's proposals had been termed "laughable" in the Buttsworth report.[125] Even the Department of District Services and Native Affairs, which had received relatively generous treatment, urged that additional establishment positions be provided.[126]

Reaction to Buttsworth proposals

In their anxiety to press for increases in salaries and staff establishments, most departments paid little attention to Buttsworth's proposals for reorganizing the public service; these were dealt with explicitly only by the Director of District Services and the Government Secretary. There were no objections in principle to the proposed Secretariat; the main paper from J.H. Jones confined itself to arguing for higher salaries for field staff on the grounds that their responsibilites would be increased upon the formal recognition of their co-ordinating role.[127] However, Jones attached to his submission a paper by C.J. Millar, one of the field staff who had travelled overseas immediately after the war.[128] Millar drew on his observations of Nigerian administration in pointing out that the Secretariat

125. Buttsworth, op. cit., Section 1, p. 1; "Agriculture", p. 3.
126. Report on Buttsworth, op. cit., Vol. 1, "District Services", p. 2; Appendix "B".
127. Ibid., pp. 3-6.
128. See Chapter Two, p. 107. The following passage is drawn from Ibid., Appendix "A", pp. 1-3.

system involved regular, and preferably compulsory, transfer of staff between the Secretariat and the field. However, in referring to "Administrative Officers" in the British Colonial Services, Millar made no reference to the particular educational and sociological background of the Administrative Class, although he did emphasise the need for training officials of the New Guinea service. In forwarding Millar's paper, Jones drew no conclusions from the points it made. He, like his colleagues, seemed to view reorganization as entirely a matter of structural adjustment and made no reference to the special recruitment and training provisions needed to make the system effective. Lonergan, the acting Government Secretary, objected only to the proposals to include financial control within the Secretariat and to the establishment of a separate Planning and Revising Council.[129] He gave no reasons for preferring a separate Treasury, but in reference to the Council pointed out that "planning and co-ordination is a normal function of the Secretariat....".[130]

The Provisional Administration thus provided the Canberra authorities with major problems in reconciling New Guinea demands for salaries and establishments with those recommended by the inquiry team, but with no serious objections to the reorganization proposals. Ironically, it was the salary and establishment provisions of the

129. Ibid., Vol. 1, "Government Secretary", p. 2.
130. Ibid.

Buttsworth report that were finally adopted, while the Secretariat reorganization was never put into effect. The reaction aginst the salary recommendations was so strong that it continued to draw attention away from the reorganization question. Since the two emerged as distinct questions, it is best to examine separately the later developments in each.

The Buttsworth report was eventually released to the Public Service Association in July 1947. There followed further protests to the Australian government until, in May 1948, some additional salary increases were approved, notably a "temporary" provision that married officers would receive a minimum of £500 per year.[131] However, the concessions were considered unacceptable, and on 10 June 1948 Papua New Guinea saw its first stop-work meeting by public servants in Port Moresby, with "more than 250 officers" attending.[132] Murray then called another meeting of department heads and advised the acting Minister, Mr. Chambers, that he was more than ever disturbed at conditions and morale in the public service, urging action particularly on salaries, superannuation and the creation of a public service Conciliation Commission.[133] Yet another "investigation" by an officer of the Department of External Territories was announced, and again in July the Minister approved a three-man

131. P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 11, June 1948, p. 11.
132. P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, item GH1-3-16, 11 June 1948.
133. Ibid., 17 May and 26 June 1948.

committee of officials (two of them Commonwealth public servants) to examine costs of living in the Territory.[134] This failed to mollify the Public Service Association, which called further meetings to protest at delay and confusion in announcing the findings of the various inquiries, until at the end of the year the Minister announced a second full-scale investigation into the Papua New Guinea service, to be conducted on this occasion by Mr. R.F. Archer, Commonwealth Public Service Inspector for New South Wales.[135] Two years had thus passed since the Buttsworth inquiry began, while relations between Canberra and Port Moresby deteriorated even further. No Public Service Ordinance had been promulgated and all senior appointments continued on an acting basis only. It would have been difficult, even by intentional sabotage, to have produced a situation more destructive of an organization's effectiveness.

In contrast to the dispute over salary scales, there was a remarkable level of agreement between the Canberra and Port Moresby authorities on Buttsworth's reorganization proposals. In May 1947, commenting on the report, Murray supported the establishment of a Secretariat, to include District Services as well as general co-ordinating functions, but opposed the incorporation of financial

134. P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 12, July 1948, p. 28; Vol. 19 No. 1, August 1948, p. 10.
135. This inquiry also encountered several delays; it is discussed, in the context of the permanent Administration, later in this study.

control, and responsibility for labour inspection, within a single organization; he favoured the retention of separate Departments of the Treasury and Native Labour.[136] While Murray's proposals were being drafted, the Department of External Territories was reaching similar conclusions, and Ministerial decisions on the Buttsworth recommendations reached Port Moresby in early June.[137] These gave formal approval for a Secretariat and agreed with Murray's view that a separate Treasury was required. The main difference was that the Department of External Territories saw no need for a separate Labour department, endorsing Buttsworth's proposal for an Inspectorate only.[138] To ensure that this edict was observed, Halligan's memorandum on the subject claimed that the Minister had given "specific directions" that there was to be no "basic change" from the approved departmental structure. However, in view of Ward's commitment to reforming the Territory's employment system, it is unlikely that he would have approved, in specific terms, reducing the control of labour from departmental to "inspectorate" status.[139] In any event, Murray objected to the

136. Memorandum of 24 May 1947 (see p. 365, footnote 115).
137. This and the following passage is drawn from CRS A518, item AJ852/6/11, 4 June 1947.
138. Control of labour had been a District Services function in the Mandated Territory, and this recommendation by Buttsworth was almost certainly in response to pressure from J.H. Jones and his staff. The matter is discussed further in Chapter Eight.
139. CRS A518, item AJ852/6/11 contains little useful information on discussions between the Minister and the Secretary on this point.

incorporation of labour control in the Secretariat,[140] and the separate department was eventually allowed to remain.

The initial Ministerial approval for reorganization required Murray to report on progress made in establishing the Secretariat, but there is no further reference to action on the matter in the surviving files.[141] In 1952, following Murray's departure, Jones reported, "....I have been pressing for the replacement of the Departments of the Government Secretary and District Services and Native Affairs, by a Secretariat...for some years", but the new Administrator's Official Secretary noted in a position paper on the subject that the proposal had been "shelved": "Generally speaking the heads of Departments did not favour any alteration to the existing organization."[142] In this instance, the specialist departments prevailed against the influence of the field staff group, maintaining a considerable degree of freedom from centralised control. They may thus have succeeded in protecting their development programmes from further obstruction, but in the process blocked effective co-ordination of the Administration's work. This set the pattern of fragmented, compartmentalised

140. P.N.G.N.A. Box 210, item CA1/9/11, 10 September 1947.
141. CRS A518, item AJ852/6/11, 4 June 1947. Relevant papers may have been destroyed in the 1949 fire in the Government Secretary's Department, although the following passage suggests that the matter was obstructed, and eventually lost sight of, in Port Moresby's numerous committees.
142. P.N.G.N.A. Box 245, item GH2-3-3, 29 September 1952.

bureaucracy that has plagued Papua New Guinea to the present day.[143]

The Buttsworth inquiry may have met with greater success had it made provision for the review and implementation of its recommendations by a personnel authority within Papua New Guinea. It made no reference to such a need, however, and the Department of External Territories retained control of all staffing matters of consequence: establishment, salaries and general conditions of service. Yet the Department was unable to deal with these questions effectively, owing to its own staff shortages and its remoteness from the Papua New Guinea situation. As unrest in the Territory public service increased, the Canberra authorities had even less chance of dealing with the complex problems which they had themselves largely created. It was not until a semi-autonomous Public Service Commissioner was appointed to the Territory in September 1949 that a semblance of order was introduced into the situation.[144] By that time, the public service had been demoralised by almost four years of unrelieved bungling.

Influence of junior staff

Murray appreciated, more than Buttsworth or the

143. The initial entrenchment of this system under Hasluck is outlined in Chapter Eleven.
144. Certain problems persisted, nevertheless; they are discussed in Chapter Eleven.

majority of his own staff, the value of training and encouraging junior officers. He was also accustomed to recognizing younger men of ability in academic institutions and saw nothing amiss in accepting, and even seeking, policy suggestions from junior staff of the public service whose ideas showed promise. Among these were G.C. O'Donnell, who had the unusual characteristic, for New Guinea at least, of being a member of the Australian Labor Party; C.J. Millar and D.M. Fenbury, who had visited Africa and the United Kingdom while members of Angau and become interested in the co-operative movement and local government councils, respectively; and J.R. Black, one of James Taylor's companions during his 1930's explorations of the Highlands who shared many of Taylor's ideas.[145] O'Donnell and Fenbury prepared papers on the implications of the War Damage Compensation Scheme, O'Donnell concentrating on the shorter-term problems of rehabilitations and the supply of goods and materials, and Fenbury extending his inquiry to considerations of community development and area authorities.[146] Fenbury's proposals, and those on co-operatives by Millar, are discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight. For the present, the main interest in these proposals is that their acceptance by the Administrator marked a radical departure from accepted norms in a bureaucracy as hierarchical as

145. It is worth noting Gunther's view that Taylor was considered a "red ragger" by his colleagues. Gunther classfied J.H. Jones as "the opposite of Jim Taylor" (interview, 4 December 1968).
146. Gustaf O'Donnell, "Native Compensation", Monthly Notes, Vol. 1 No. 3, November 1946, p. 1 and No. 5,

the Territory's. Moreover, through publication in South Pacific, the Journal of the Australian School of Pacific Administration, they began a public discussion of the views of young officers that was unprecedented in Papua New Guinea.[147]

The most interesting short-term phenomenon was the appointment of J.R. Black, a junior Assistant District Officer of the former Mandated Territory service, as acting Assistant Director of District Services and Native Affairs in mid-1946, a position he held for just over a year before his resignation from the service. In that time he presented his views directly to the Administrator on the policy and organization of the Provisional Administration.[148] His proposals have two main points of interest: in July 1946 he suggested the strengthening of the Secretariat and the co-ordinating role of the field staff, several months before these steps were recommended to the Buttsworth inquiry. And the fact that this proposal did not stem from a desire to limit change is shown by the uncompromising language he used to describe Australian colonialsim of the pre-war vintage. "The New Guinea and Papuan Services," he

(cont.) January, 1947, p. 3; D.M. Fenbury, The Barry Report Compensation Scheme, Port Moresby, typescript, 1947.

147. As noted in Chapter One (pp. 50, 70), relatively junior field officers of the Papuan service wrote books about their experiences, but these had no effect on policy, which remained the concern of Sir Hubert Murray's even more numerous publications.

148. J.R. Black, The Implementation of Policy in Papua-New Guinea, Port Moresby, typescript, 1946.

maintained, "...will have to shed the garments of prejudice and irrational practice associated with the era of exploitation in colonial administration with all its concomitants of colour bar, racial discrimination, racial inferiority and other notions that we have lately accepted as essentially fascist in character."[149] Not surprisingly, Black's appointment brought complaints from other public servants accustomed to the principle of appointment on the basis of seniority:[150]

> Mr. J.R. Black was an obscure officer in the TNG services; but suddenly he was attributed with great tropical experience and administrative ability, and was appointed Assistant Director of District Services. As Public Servants, we cannot understand why, and we naturally resent it.

Black's views, and his presentation of them to the Administrator, went against all precedent, and it was indicative of the returning strength of orthodox forces within the service that before long both he and his mentor, James Taylor, left the Administration.

Murray still had high hopes of his junior staff. From the time of his appointment to the School of Civil Affairs, he had placed special emphasis on training, as a means to increase awareness of changes in colonial administration and the demands of development. He believed that this role could be filled by the School

149. Ibid., Appendix A, p. 3.
150. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 12, July 1947, p. 72. The tortuous syntax of the last sentence, and the unconscious humour it contained, went unremarked by Pacific Islands Monthly editors.

of Pacific Administration, even though the research and planning function of the institution had been obstructed by Halligan and the Department of External Territories.[151] New appointees to the service were to be acquainted with modern approaches to colonial affairs during introductory courses at the School, while officers with pre-war experience would attend "refresher" courses.[152] This combination of training would, it was hoped, create a shared attitude towards development throughout the public service. Unfortunately, the first few years of the School's history as a training institution were scarcely happier than its efforts at research and planning.

The School retained many of its staff following its transfer from the control of the Army to the Department of External Territories early in 1946, and Murray kept up a correspondence with several of them.[153] He also visited the School whenever he was in Sydney and on several occasions gave lectures to the students, emphasising among other things the importance of the School in the schemes for New Guinea development.[154] His intention was that everyone appointed to the public service should attend the School: clerical and other staff posted to main centres taking an orientation course of a few days; and all field staff, including patrol officers, agriculture personnel, school teachers and

151. See Chapter Five, pp. 300-3.
152. Murray notes, pp. 58-60; Murray interview, 12 December 1966.
153. P.N.G.N.A., Boxes 168-70, particularly items GH1-9-3C, H, K, M.
154. Monthly Notes, Vol. 1 No. 1, September 1946,

medical assistants, receiving several weeks of instruction.[155] Mission workers were also invited to attend, and a number were included in the early courses. At the same time, the School staff were preparing a two-year Diploma course which, it was intended, would be taken by officers of all departments with field responsibilities, qualifying them for appointment to senior administrative positions. Provided that the Diploma was completed by a substantial number of officers within a reasonable length of time, it would provide the sophistication and unity of approach to administration that was essential for the co-ordination of development in the Territory. There was never a serious suggestion that the Papua New Guinea field service should be staffed by graduates, but the effect of the School Diploma would have been to provide something of the educational background and experience shared by the senior officers of the British Colonial Service. It was initially intended that the School would teach at university standard and for this reason a largely academic staff, as opposed to a vocational training group, was recruited. Conlon had proposed that the School should establish a formal association with a university and that its courses should provide recognized tertiary qualifications, including such things as credit towards degree courses.[156] All of

(cont.) p. 2; No. 3, November 1946, p. 8. South Pacific, Vol. 2 No. 6, March 1948, p. 121.

155. This and the following passage is based on Murray notes, loc. cit. and interview of 12 December 1966.

156. The University of Queensland eventually granted credit for three Arts subjects to officers who completed the two-year Diploma course.

this presupposed a certain degree of autonomy for the School, preferably through statutory recognition

Staff training and A.S.O.P.A.

The Australian School of Pacific Administration was regarded with some suspicion by the Department of External Territories, owing to the fact that it had its roots in the Directorate of Research. With the establishment of the School Council,[157] the Principal was made clearly responsible to the Secretary of the Department and from that time there was no possibility of the School's achieving autonomy, despite regular promptings from Conlon. This, in turn, was taken to preclude any formal association with a university, for the School was legally a mere section of a Commonwealth public service department.[158] The School was permanently established by the Papua and New Guinea Act 1949, but its Council was given advisory functions only. The sole practical effect of the Act was to allow School staff to become permanent officers of the public service, but since this also tended to restrict their academic work, a number retained relative freedom as temporary employees, while others resigned.

The School also experienced difficulty in its relations

157. See Chapter Five, pp. 301-2.
158. It would have been possible to overcome this technical barrier, as in the case of the School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine, University of Sydney; it was allowed to remain because the Department wished to retain control of the School.

with both the Department of External Territories and some senior officers of the Provisional Administration. J.R. Kerr, who had served as Assistant Director of Research, assumed control of the School upon Colonel Murray's departure for New Guinea. Kerr visited Port Moresby in September 1946 to outline his plans for training and to hear the views of the departmental heads in the Territory service.[159] Murray believed that Kerr was well received and that he produced some "converts" among the senior officers, notably Melrose and Bignold.[160] However, Kerr gained the impression that the "old hands" were generally opposed to the School and still favoured the pre-war method of learning by experience.[161] Similar attitudes prevailed in the Canberra Department, where the lack of enthusiasm posed particular problems. At the time plans were being prepared for the establishment of a prestigious School of Pacific Studies within the proposed Australian National University. The School of Pacific Administration, lacking powerful support in academic and government circles, was handicapped by relatively low admission standards and its status as a public service instrumentality Kerr was further exasperated by his dealings with Halligan, which were influenced by the old antagonisms of the war years. In 1947 he submitted his resignation to the Minister in what he has termed a "two-page attack on

159. P.N.G.N.A. Box 171, item GH7-5, 5 September 1946.
160. Ibid.
161. Kerr interview, 30 June 1969. The information in the remainder of the passage, including quotations, is drawn from this interview.

Halligan". "Ward nearly died," Kerr recalls. Kerr withdrew his resignation at the request of the Minister, but declined to remain as Principal for longer than necessary and eventually set his departure date at 20 August 1948.[162]

Conlon's final appearance

Murray was not particularly close to Kerr, but was impressed by his work at the School and concerned that he might be succeeded by a nominee of Halligan who would not support New Guinea interests.[163] After some debate among former members of the Directorate, it was decided that the most suitable candidate was Alfred Conlon; in August 1948, Murray wrote virtually offering him the position, although it was not within the Administrator's power to make the appointment.[164] Conlon, who was then attempting to complete his medical studies, was somewhat reluctant, but cabled Murray, "Willing accept if required."[165] Conlon's appointment as acting Principal of the School on 20 September 1948 marked his last period of formal association with New Guinea affairs and the final attempt by the Directorate group to re-assert its influence in a key area of Territory development. The Council of the School would agree to Conlon's engagement in an acting capacity only, and for a period

162. P.N.G.N.A. Box 171, item GH7-2, 13 August 1948.
163. Murray interview, 12 December 1966.
164. P.N.G.N.A. Box 171, loc. cit.
165. Ibid., 19 August 1948.

of twelve months in the first instance.[166]

Conlon's appointment was unwise, under the circumstances. The stimulus of the wartime emergencies had long faded and Conlon's haphazard methods of administration were unsuited to the needs of a teaching institution, particularly an insecure one under the control of a sceptical public service department. Moreover, Conlon's subordinate position under his old adversaries in the Department of External Territories merely created further resentment and distrust. Other tensions soon appeared, this time between Conlon and the School staff, who were less willing than they had been in the days of the Directorate to tolerate his occasionally abrupt manner and his blunt language.[167] After a time Conlon withdrew from most contacts with his staff, until they virtually went on strike over a complex dispute that had its origins in the use of the School's library funds and books. Kerr was then called in to negotiate between the staff and the School Council, with Conlon eventually agreeing to leave.[168] This episode marked the break-up of the Directorate group. Conlon returned to his medical studies and had little further involvement with New Guinea. Murray's links with the School became weaker, while Kerr returned to the Bar. Most of the former School of Civil

166. Ibid., 20 September 1948.
167. The following passage is based on an interview with Mr. V.H. Parkinson, 16 September 1970.
168. Kerr interview, 30 June 1969.

Affairs staff left the School of Pacific Administration during the following two years, only McAuley and Parkinson staying for any time. Eventually C.D. Rowley, who had worked in the Army Education Service in New Guinea and later in the Commonwealth Office of Education, was appointed Principal and the School began a period of steady, if unspectacular, training for European public servants from the Territory. However, the early hopes of creating a major research and educational institution for the whole of the Pacific were ended, with the School remaining firmly under the control of the Department of External Territories.

Decline of A.S.O.P.A.

As the fortunes of A.S.O.P.A. declined, so did the hopes of Murray and the School staff that it would be capable of changing public service attitudes towards colonialism. The change from a centre of lively inquiry into New Guinea affairs towards an institution for public service training can be traced in the journal of the School. In its early years the journal featured articles by the School's staff, papers by officers of the Provisional Administration, reprints of material on comparative colonial administration, and other items thought to be of interest in the Territory. For some ten years the journal was distributed widely throughout Papua New Guinea, performing a valuable service when the country's communications were extremely poor. It was during this period that the

articles by such field officers as D.M. Fenbury and G.C. O'Donnell, mentioned earlier in this Chapter, were brought to the attention of the public service in general. Participation of this kind soon decreased, however, partly because officers became more involved in routine work in the Territory and partly owing to the weakening of links between the Provisional Administration and the School: formal bureaucratic procedures supplanted the more open system of the immediate post-war period. Thus of 37 articles contributed to the first volume of the School's journal, fourteen were by serving officers of the Provisional Administration; but the third volume carried only two articles by Territory personnel, of a total of ten, while reprints increased from seven in Volume 1 to twenty in Volume 3.[169]

The School was able to carry out much of its training programme during the post-war years, despite the problems it encountered, but it was unable to reach the standards originally proposed and encompassed only a few of the occupational groups in the Administration. In 1948, W.C. Groves, the acting Director of Education, proposed that the School should train school teachers for Papua New Guinea and received strong support from Kerr, who agreed that the maximum number of officers should receive the "highest standard tertiary education ".[170] As in many other instances, however, there were long delays and it

169. Monthly Notes, Vol. 1; South Pacific, Vol. 3: Indexes.
170. P.N.G.N.A. Box 171, item GH7-5, 28 January and 17 February 1948.

was another ten years before the first teacher education programme began.[171] In the meantime, the School came under attack for its relatively low entry standards, and for the part played by its staff in defending Labor policy. W.E.H. Stanner summed up these points in a general criticism of his former colleagues in 1947:[172]

> The staff of the School have taken part in a number of public controversies, and have explained and defended the course of policy in the Territories, and expounded the Commonwealth's responsibilities and intentions. The degree of authority to be attached to such statements is not clear. An assiduous campaign has also been carried out on behalf of the School to have it incorporated with the National University at Canberra, although the status of its studies at present is well below undergraduate level, and its permanent staff, while being graduates, for the most part lack research or teaching experience in institutions of recognized standing, and have no personal experience as colonial administrators.

Territory public servants had similar doubts, particularly concerning the political sympathies of the School staff and their lack of "practical knowledge".[173] Nevertheless, planning for the two-year Diploma course continued, although there were problems in providing sufficient students for it.[174] The major developmental departments, notably Health, Agriculture and Education, were staffed by officers who obtained qualifications at a higher educational level than that achieved by District Services field staff and they saw little need for additional

171. Several hundred teachers for primary and secondary schools were trained between 1958 and 1971.
172. Stanner, Reconstruction, op. cit., pp. 70-1.
173. This conclusion is based on personal association with field staff between 1955 and 1966.
174. P.N.G.N.A. Box 186, item PD1/7-1, 1 August 1949.

training.[175] There was also a serious staff shortage in the Territory and all departments were loath to release officers for two years; even District Services, which had most to gain from the course and eventually provided all of its students, was unable to send officers in 1951, owing to the tensions between Holland and Indonesia over Dutch New Guinea.[176] In the event, the Diploma course became the preserve of District Services staff, gradually evolving into an entirely academic study conducted by staff with little or no experience of New Guinea.[177]

The problems and obstructions encountered by the School of Pacific Administration nullified many of the benefits it might have provided the Territory Administration. There was no chance of its effecting a general change in attitude among public servants, as Murray had first hoped. Indeed, by 1949 he was arguing for the very survival of the institution in its original form, urging that it be kept open to all residents of Papua New Guinea and that every appointee to the public service should take at least one of its courses; he even went so far as to suggest that much of the School's budget should be deducted from the allocation to the Provisional Administration, if its costs could not be met by the Department of External Territories.[178] By that time, however, the School had

175. The entry level for District Services staff was the Victorian Leaving Certificate (i.e., sub-matriculation), although ex-servicemen were admitted with the Intermediate Certificate.
176. P.N.G.N.A. Box 171, item GH7-2, undated 1951.
177. This course became a one-year "certificate" in 1956 and ceased altogether in 1966.
178. P.N.G.N.A. Box 186, item PD1/7-1, 16 July 1949.

become increasingly remote from everyday New Guinea affairs and had adapted itself to a minor quasi-academic role, aided in its survival by its location in Sydney: it offered an attractive break from the Territory for field staff selected to attend its "long courses".

The fading of the original hopes for the School of Pacific Administration owed something to Halligan and his Department, but Ward gave no help. Kerr has said that he found great difficulty in gaining decisions from the Minister, so that the Department was free to interpret policy as it saw fit.[179] The staff of the School had the same impression; when the Papua and New Guinea Act was being drafted, Murray offered support for the School's campaign for statutory recognition, to which McAuley replied, "The only point on which you might make representations for us at present is on the major difficulty of getting the Minister to act at all."[180] Even the Department protested that it had been unsuccessful in urging Ministerial action and this brought another of Murray's exhortatory letters to Ward, pointing out that it was "essential to finalise details" of the School's leadership and status.[181] It was by no means the atmosphere for introducing changes in policy and attitudes.

By the time the Papua and New Guinea Act established

179. Kerr interview, 30 June 1969.
180. P.N.G.N.A. Box 171, item GH7-5, 18 October 1949. The emphasis appears in the original.
181. Ibid., 22 October 1949.

a permanent Administration for the Territory in mid-1949, much of the flexibility that had marked the public service of 1946/47 had been replaced by orthodox procedures emanating from the Department in Canberra and the pre-war staff in Port Moresby, or by a general malaise caused by the years of tension and insecurity during which staff remained unsure of their appointments and conditions of service. The concerns of the Territory's public servants had inevitably come to centre upon their own problems. Murray was aware of this narrowing of vision and suggested that there should be an interchange of staff between Canberra and Port Moresby, and between Papua New Guinea officers and those of other colonial services, summing up his major problem in introducing change: "The present system has been alluded to...as 'in-breeding'."[182] It was apparent that he could not hope for major innovations outside his own service; and even within it, mainly from junior officers like Fenbury and Millar and from such senior post-war appointees as Gunther and Groves. These men were the dominant members of the planning committees, set up between 1946 and 1948, which produced recommendations for development programmes for the Territory. These programmes, together with the problems of putting them into effect, require further examination.

182. P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, item GH1/3/2, undated mid-1950.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES

Planning by committee - Post-war finance - Departmental expenditure - District Services Re-establishing contact: tensions and changes Local government - Village courts - Field staff attitudes - Public health - Dr. J.T. Gunther - Migrant doctors - Education: a broad base - The Wedgewood proposals - Groves' problems - Reconstruction Training Scheme - Missions: the 1946 conference - Mission-Administration relations - Missions and education - Missions and health services The planning committees - Social Development Planning Committee - Welfare Planning Committee

Planning by committee

Several major programmes for development were introduced to Papua New Guinea during Colonel Murray's term as Administrator. They are considered in two groupings. Firstly, there are those programmes which aimed to provide benefits for the people of Papua New

Guinea and affected European interests only indirectly. They include the extension of Administration control in relatively isolated areas, improvements in the fields of health and education, and the establishment of a form of local government. Secondly, there are programmes having a much greater influence on white settlers, notably plans for agricultural extension, for economic development in general and for the control of the labour force.[1]

The clearest expression of the Provisional Administration's approach to the development programmes is contained in the reports of the Committees for Social Development Planning, Native Welfare Planning, and Economic Development, whose establishment as advisory bodies to the Administrator was noted in the previous Chapter.[2] It has also been pointed out that these committees were set up only after Murray had exhausted other planning sources in Australia.[3] Thus the advisory bodies did not report until the latter half of 1948, by which time their findings were influenced to a considerable degree by the events, delays and problems of the preceding years. Several of the major influences have been discussed: policy statements, and the difficulties of giving them concrete form; disruption caused by the war; tensions within the Territory and between Port Moresby and Canberra; and the consequent

1. The former grouping is considered in this Chapter and the latter in Chapter Eight.
2. See Chapter Six, pp. 334-9.
3. See Chapter Five, pp. 281-9.

difficulty of establishing a permanent administrative structure. Additional influences arose from the attempts by various departments to establish their own development programmes. These post-war efforts must be outlined, in order to place the recommendations of the Committees in perspective.

Two aspects of the work done by the departments of the Provisional Administration between 1945 and 1949 must be considered. Firstly, essential details of departmental operations indicate the precedents which had either to be followed or changed by the committees that were seeking to establish co-ordinated programmes.[4] Secondly, development proposals during the immediate post-war years disclosed differences of approach between key departments; in seeking to reconcile differing views, the planning committees attempted to overcome one of the Provisional Administration's greatest problems.[5]

Post-war finance

Three major factors determined the scale of

4. Accounts of the Provisional Administration's intentions in the fields of social welfare and economic development have been published in the narrative accounts of the period. These include Mair, op. cit. (1948), Ch. 10; Stanner, Transition, op. cit., Part I, Chs. 8-10; Legge, op. cit., Chs. 14-15; Mander, op. cit., Ch. 4. Details already known are not repeated at length in this study.
5. The reports by the Provisional Administration's Committees were submitted to the Commonwealth Inter-Departmental Committee on New Guinea (see Chapter Five, pp. 257-9). The later operations of this latter Committee are discussed in Chapters Nine and Ten.

departmental operations and the plans for co-ordinated development: finance, personnel and the availability of supplies. The Provisional Administration was provided with much more money than its predecessors, but remained restricted in its operations by shortages of staff and materials. The following table compares funding during the immediate pre-war years with the Provisional Administration period:

£ millions

Separate Territories

Year	Papua		New Guinea		
	Internal Revenue	Grant	Internal Revenue	Grant	Total
1937-8	.140	.042	.506	Nil	.690*
1938-9	.123	.042	.461	Nil	.627*
1939-40**	.135	.042	.497	Nil	.675*

Territory of Papua-New Guinea

Year	Internal Revenue	Grant	Total
1946-7	.464	2.018	2.482
1947-8	.914	2.269	3.183
1948-9	1.233	3.197	4.430

* Discrepancies in additions are owing to rounding of figures and carry-over of surpluses from preceding financial years.

** Complete figures for the 1940-41 financial year were not published, owing to the outbreak of the Pacific war.

Sources: Papua Annual Report, 1937-8 to 1939-40; 1946-7 to 1948-9.
New Guinea Annual Report, 1937-8 to 1939-40; 1947-8 and 1948-9 (no separate Report for this Territory was published in 1946-7 and figures in the Papua report for that year give combined totals for the Territories).

Two main features are apparent from the table. It was an indication of the debilitation of the Territory, and the problems facing its administration, that internal revenue in 1946-7 was so far below the pre-war level. And the post-war increase in administrative activity clearly stemmed from the large increases in direct Commonwealth grants: during the first full year of the Provisional Administration these represented an increase of 4,500 per cent over the immediate pre-war figures, rising to a 7,000 per cent increase in 1948-9. Adjustments must be made to take account of wartime inflation,[6] but on available figures this still gives a budget of £1.91 million, at 1940 values, for 1946-7 - a three-fold increase on total pre-war annual expenditure.[7] The budget for 1948-9 - £2.62 million at 1940 values[8] -

6. Adjustments should normally take account of population trends, as well, but there is no clear information on them for this period. It is extremely doubtful whether population increased in those areas having regular contact with the Administration, owing to the rigours of war, while in some regions, such as Bougainville, population declined dramatically (see Chapter Nine). Thus no adjustment has been made for this factor.
7. Again, no statistics on inflation in the Territory are available for this period. However, most goods were imported from Australia, where wartime inflation was officially calculated at 23 per cent (Commonwealth Yearbook, 1955, p. 252). The figure given here allows for Territory inflation of 30 per cent. Statistics are based on the retail price index for the period in question. Since public service salaries, which made up much of the budget, increased at a much slower rate than the price index, a relatively higher proportion remained for spending in other areas, such as village welfare services and war damage compensation.
8. Inflation in Australia in the post-war has been officially calculated at 16 per cent (ibid.). An overall allowance of 50 per cent for the preceding decade has been made for the Territory.

represents a 400 per cent increase in total expenditure, compared with 1939-40. Financial increases of this size presented opportunities for considerable expansion to those departments able to take advantage of them, as well as creating problems of adjustment for officials accustomed to the smaller scale of pre-war operations.

The allocation of finance among the main developmental departments gives an initial indication of the direction of the Provisional Administration's efforts. The following tables set out expenditure for the departments dealing primarily with the village people - District Services and Native Affairs, Public Health, Education, and Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries:

£ Australian

Department of District Services and Native Affairs

Year	Salaries and Contingencies	Miscellaneous Services	Total
1946-7	368,540	-	368,540
1947-8			
Papua	179,679	-	
T.N.G.	357,111	-	
	536,790		536,790
1948-9			
Papua	190,352	1,039	191,391
T.N.G.	447,884	896	448,780
	638,236	1,935	640,171

Total 1946 to 1949 - 1,545,501

Sources: P.A.R. 1946-7 to 1948-9; N.G.A.R. 1946-7 to 1948-9.

Department of Public Health

Year	Salaries and Contingencies	Miscellaneous Services	Total
1946-7	173,191	-	173,191
1947-8			
Papua	31,340	70,976	102,316
T.N.G.	60,067	163,680	223,747
	91,407	234,656	326,063
1948-9			
Papua	45,055	115,022	160,077
T.N.G.	86,396	359,262	445,658
	131,451	474,284	605,735

Total 1946 to 1949 - 1,104,989

- - - - - -

Department of Education

Year	Salaries and Contingencies	Miscellaneous Services	Total
1946-7	36,695	-	36,695
1947-8			
Papua	50,752	-	50,752
T.N.G.	52,256	-	52,256
	103,008		103,008
1948-9			
Papua	65,287	-	65,287
T.N.G.	81,950	-	81,950
	147,237		147,237

Total 1946 to 1949 - 286,940

Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries

Year	Salaries and Contingencies	Miscellaneous Services	Total
1946-7	15,037	31,761	46,798
1947-8			
Papua	12,799	30,987	43,786
T.N.G.	19,434	28,347	47,781
	32,233	59,334	91,567
1948-9			
Papua	23,547	57,277	80,824
T.N.G.	32,444	77,648	110,092
	55,991	134,925	190,916

Total 1946 to 1949 - 329,281

Expenditure under "salaries and contingencies" was generally devoted to the internal functioning of the departments, while "miscellaneous services" were usually those provided for the community: for example, medical, hospital and hygiene services from the Health department.[9] Spending by these four departments accounted for an average of 40 per cent of the Provisional Administration's total budgets,[10] and 48 per cent of recurring departmental expenditure in the period 1946 to 1949.[11] Although there are no statistics on the proportion of departmental effort directed exclusively towards the village people, it was the intention of senior officials that villagers should receive the greatest post-war

9. See, for example, N.G.A.R., 1948/49, p. 117.
10. Excluding exceptional payments for disposals materials and village war damage compensation; the latter amounts, totalling £947,096 to 30 June 1949, went directly to the people.
11. That is, excluding charges for capital construction and maintenance.

benefits, as indicated by the programmes outlined later in this Chapter. Certainly, the Territory's Europeans believed that an excessive amount was being spent in the villages,[12] and some measure of their discontent can be gauged from the fact that, compared with the large share of the budgets allocated to the developmental departments, only 3.2 per cent of expenditure between 1946 and 1949 was devoted to town reconstruction and the building of European accommodation.[13] Europeans comprised a very small part of the total population, of course, but they had been accustomed to receiving a large share of available services. Thus it was the relative change in allocations that was most significant, and in this respect there was no doubt that the Provisional Administration was carrying out its stated intention of directing a substantial part of its resources towards benefiting the people of the country, rather than the white community.

Departmental expenditure

The statistics of departmental expenditure suggest

12. See Chapter Four, pp. 219-20 and 223-7; settler opinion is examined further in Chapter Nine. A final comparison might also be noted. Between 1946 and 1949 the four developmental departments spent £3,266,631, by far the greatest proportion in the rural areas. This compared with total budgets for all departments, in both Territories, between 1937 and 1940, of £1,993,000.
13. The total amount was £143,972 - half the amount spent on education, and one-eighth of the health total.

trends in the direction and effectiveness of development that are investigated in later sections of this Chapter. The tables on pages 396-8 show that, of the four major departments, District Services required the largest single allocation of funds to re-establish contact throughout the country and to perform a variety of agency functions on its outstations. By 1949, however, it had almost been overtaken in expenditure by the Health department, whose expansion was on a dramatic scale. In the field of agriculture there was a similar expansion, beginning from a smaller base. Education, by contrast, failed to sustain its growth rate, as shown in the following table of percentage increases in departmental budgets:

Year	District Services	Health	Education	Agriculture
1946-7 to 1947-8	45	90	180	95
1947-8 to 1948-9	20	90	43	108

A further measure of departmental performance for Health, Education and Agriculture can be calculated by comparing the amount of finance provided for services with that required for salaries and contingencies.[14] This ratio

14. See page 398 for these categories. This is only an approximate measure, since a department's contribution to development cannot be judged only by tangible services it provided at a certain time; District Services, for example, relied on the personal administrative contributions of individual field staff in fostering change. Nevertheless, the ratios for the other departments reveal such wide variations that they suggest a basic difference in the effectiveness of their efforts in dealing with post-war problems.

indicates, in broad terms, the degree to which the community at large gained a direct return from each unit of internal departmental expenditure.[15] In 1949 the ratios for the three departments were:

Health - more than 3 to 1
Education - .25 to 1
Agriculture - more than 2 to 1

Thus of the three indicators listed - total expenditure, percentage annual increase and ratio of services provided to internal spending - the Health department showed the most consistent expansion; Agriculture achieved notable gains; and Education lagged behind. A fourth indicator, applicable only to Education and Health, reveals a similar picture. Of the 1949 Education budget, some 29 per cent was not spent by the department directly, but went in grants to missions for schooling.[16] The Health department, by comparison, set aside only 7 per cent of its funds for mission aid;[17] but this was a proportion of a much larger budget, so that the gross amount exceeded that for aid to mission education.[18]

15. In the finance segment of reports, Education listed spending under "salaries and contingencies" only, but provisions for services can be calculated from other tables (P.A.R., 1948/49, p. 91; N.G.A.R., 1948/49, p. 161). The amounts were - services: £22,968; salaries etc.: £83,844.
16. The actual amount was £43,205 out of the Department's total budget of £150,017 (ibid.; the discrepancy between this and the main finance table noted on p. 397 was not explained).
17. The actual amounts were - aid: £43,728; Department budget: £605,735.
18. The grant-in-aid for health in 1948/49 was £43,728, and that for education was £43,205 (ibid.).

Moreover, during 1948/49 the missions received a little more than eleven shillings for each pound of their own money spent on schooling, compared with £1-6-0 for every £1 they allocated to health services.[19] Here again, the Health department seemed relatively more effective than the Department of Education. Performance cannot be measured solely in terms of expenditure, but the big differences in the scale of operations by the departments require explanation. They can be partly attributed to some obvious factors, such as the medical facilities the Health department gained from Angau, but by 1949 the Provisional Administration had been functioning for almost four years and the continuing disparities between different kinds of development were a cause for concern. In order to examine them more fully, it is first necessary to trace events from the end of the war.

District Services

During the immediate post-war years the largest single provisions of finance and staff, and the most urgent tasks of reconstruction, were allotted to the Department of District Services and Native Affairs. In each full year of the Provisional Administration, the Department spent more money, much of it in war damage compensation payments to villagers, than had been budgeted in the whole of the Mandated Territory and Papua in any

19. Ibid. In 1949 the missions spent £34,470 on health services and £76,092 on education.

one year before the war.[20] By 1949 the Department employed 308 officers, twice the permanent staff of the Papua public service in 1940;[21] with an approved establishment of 421 in 1949, District Services would have employed more staff had it been able to recruit them.[22] Its employment rate was relatively good, since it had been able to recruit 73 per cent of its establishment at that time, compared with a rate of 65 per cent for the public service as a whole.[23] Nevertheless, the Department faced great staffing difficulties, owing to the loss of many New Guinea officers during the war and the retirement of several senior Papuan officers between 1944 and 1946.[24] In 1949 District Services employed 211 field staff, only 40 per cent of whom possessed substantial experience; they were listed as:[25]

Officers with pre-war experience	54
Officers with 4 to 6 years experience (including service with Angau)	30
Officers with 3 to 4 years experience	58
Officers with 2 to 3 years experience	27
Officers with 1 to 2 years experience	23
Officers with 6 months to 1 year experience	19
Total	211

20. The amounts were - 1946-7: £1,028,081; 1947-8: £825,821; 1948-9: £1,008,657 (P.A.R., 1946/47 - 1948/49; N.G.A.R., 1946/47 - 1948/49). Compare these sums with those in the table on p. 394.
21. P.A.R., 1948/49, p. 46.
22. Ibid., p. 42.
23. Ibid., pp. 10, 46.
24. P.N.G.N.A. Box 186, item PD1/4, 25 October 1949.
25. Ibid.

Officers served a two-year Cadetship, during which, according to the regulations, they were not permitted to lead patrols.[26] Moreover, during the first four years of their service, they were intended to enter Restricted Areas only with patrols led by senior officers. Since approximately one-fifth of the Territory was then classified as Restricted, including almost the whole of the heavily-populated Highlands areas, the formal limitations on the deployment of staff were often ignored.[27] Moreover, at a given time about 40 of the 84 senior field staff would be involved with office work at the various district headquarters and at Konedobu, or assigned to special duties, or on leave, so that the burden of contact and patrolling during the rehabilitation and reconstruction phases of post-war administration inevitably fell upon the young, inexperienced and sometimes immature junior staff.[28] Officers who in the pre-war years would not have been permitted to patrol "solo" were occasionally placed in charge of outstations for months at a time.

26. Regulations governing field work were consolidated in Departmental Standing Instructions, Vol. 1: General Field Administration (Port Moresby, Government Printer, 1962), which incorporated instructions issued since 1945. The Restricted Areas concept was introduced in the post-war period to control the movements of non-field staff and private citizens, notably missionaries, recruiters and traders. In "uncontrolled" areas a patrol might be liable to attack by the local population, while in areas "under influence" villagers were arrested for crimes. An area was "under control" when a police constable could effect an arrest without danger from attack; it was then "de-restricted".
27. Talks with Messrs. L.J. Doolan, B.B. Corrigan and W.W. Crelling between 1955 and 1960.
28. Some recruits were ex-servicemen and perhaps more mature than the 18-year-olds recruited in the 1950's and '60's.

Under stable conditions the emergence of a new, young group of field staff to relative prominence may have produced salutary results by injecting new approaches and attitudes into a vital sector of the public service. It was with this intention that the School of Civil Affairs had been established; and Murray has always been of the opinion that field staff recruitment by Angau and the Provisional Administration produced this general effect.[29] In the absence of a contemporary study of the post-war field service, it is difficult to reach definite conclusions about it nature, although the officers themselves have few illusions about their role at that time.[30] In a period of makeshift solutions to urgent problems, junior officers had few opportunities to form opinions about long-term policies; the reaction of many to the difficulties, delays and poor conditions of the period was to develop a deep and lasting cynicism. They rarely came into contact with a cross-section of their contemporaries, so that the senior officers under whom they worked in their first years of service had great influence on their attitudes. The senior men, too, were often cynical, if not reactionary, in their attitudes, helping to perpetuate ill-founded beliefs: about the behaviour of villagers, who were referred to by the majority of

29. Murray interview, 14 December 1966.
30. The following passage is based on talks with numerous officers between 1955 and 1965, including Messrs. R.M. Geelan, H.H. Jackman, J.C. Baker, G. Smith and B.M. O'Neill, in addition to those listed in footnote 27; and on personal experience, in a similar situation, a decade later than the period discussed here.

field staff as "kanakas";[31] about missionaries, with whom almost every field officer was in a state of perpetual conflict; about the respective merits of the Territories of New Guinea and Papua; about the trustworthiness or otherwise of their populations; and about the methods, real and fancied, adopted by their pre-war field staffs. Such conditioning overwhelmed the fleeting impressions created by an introductory course at the School of Pacific Administration; and by the time officers returned to the School for the two-year Diploma course, attitudes had usually become too fixed to yield to academic entreaties for reform. Any changes in the approach to field administration in New Guinea could occur only slowly and as a result of evolving circumstances, rather than as a consequence of new personnel being introduced into the service.

Re-establishing contact: tensions and changes

Concerning one administrative method there was no doubt: in contacting the people, field staff were to follow the practice of "peaceful penetration", which had been publicised to such effect by Sir Hubert Murray that his exact instructions were re-issued in 1947.[32] It was

31. The word "native" was rarely used by field staff, and such terms as "coon" and "nig" mainly by settlers. "Boong" was not used after the war. In later years "oli" ("they"), another pidgin word, tended to replace "kanakas" among field staff and was itself supplanted by "locals" in the late 1960's.
32. Department of District Services and Native Affairs, Circular Instruction No. 8 of 1947, 1 December 1947.

expecting a good deal of inexperienced staff to use this method, not only in newly-contacted areas, but also in districts where the reaction to the Japanese occupation was unknown; and in the extensive regions, such as the hinterland of the New Guinea islands and the interior of the Sepik, Madang and Morobe Districts, which had not been visited by patrols for several years. It was remarkable, in retrospect, that contact was re-established with relative ease. Concerned mainly with restoring the status quo in the districts, field staff in Papua reported from the outset that conditions were rapidly returning to normal. "In many areas little rehabilitation has been or is necessary...and those men who were away now wish to settle down in their villages, build new houses and restore the gardens."[33] In parts of New Guinea the war's effects were much more serious:[34]

> The war had caused serious loss to native life and property and it has been established that in some areas the native population has been reduced very considerably. The loss over the whole Territory is not yet known but reports indicate that there have been alarming decreases in certain areas with large populations.

Nevertheless, village society proved remarkably resilient, so that by 1948 the authorities in the Morobe District were able to report that "reconstruction of villages devastated by the war and the general rehabilitation of the people is now practically complete".[35] There was

33. P.A.R., 1945/46, p. 13.
34. N.G.A.R., 1946/47, p. 10. Clearly, the war devastated village society. This fact has so far been ignored by writers who have celebrated Australian and allied "victories".
35. N.G.A.R., 1947/48, p. 13.

also dramatic progress in Bougainville, which "as a whole probably suffered more from the Japanese occupation and consequent operations than any part of the Territory. Rehabilitation has been so rapid that conditions now are almost back to normal."[36] The state of normalcy could be construed very narrowly, however, and reports submitted to the United Nations from Canberra sometimes presented outdated and callous views of the people's situation. Referring to the depopulation of certain areas, one passage noted that this would cause difficulties with the supply of labour, which had posed problems "even under favourable conditions".[37] This concern for old norms, in reports prepared by the Australian government for international scrutiny, provided direct contrast to the pious sentiments about social, economic and political benefits for the New Guinea people expressed in the same documents. Given this example, it was hardly surprising that many field officers developed or retained an air of cynicism.

Meanwhile, tensions between the field staff and the people were rarely far below the surface. For some months there was concern that discharged soldiers and former policemen would disrupt village life and "would be inclined to take charge and foment strife".[38] It was later reported, almost with surprise, "Nothing like this has happened. On the contrary their return has done good.

36. Ibid., p. 14. See Chapter Nine for further details of the Bougainville situation.
37. N.G.A.R., 1946/47, p. 10.
38. P.A.R., 1945/46, p. 15.

They have set an example in many villages with their hygienic methods (sic) and general cleanliness."[39] At that time a little "strife" would have been a good thing, in helping the Provisional Administration to achieve a general, popular advancement in village conditions; but even in the 1945/46 report, the last prepared wholly in Port Moresby, there was an obvious conservatism. This arose not only from the narrow outlook of many of the staff, but also from a genuine nervousness about the reception that the people would accord Europeans. Throughout New Britain, for example, thousands of rifles and other infantry weapons were collected from the villagers, and as late as December 1948 tribal fighting in the Morobe District ended with six of the combatants killed by shots from Japanese rifles.[40] During the same month a former Assistant District Officer was killed by villagers of inland New Britain when he attempted to recruit them for plantation work.[41] These were no more than isolated incidents, but they limited the application of progressive policies. The 1947 annual report noted, "Shortage of trained staff, changes of personnel due to exigencies of war service, investigation and payment of War Damage claims and pre-war wages as well as the problems of rehabilitation have precluded any material advances in native administration."[42]

39. Ibid.
40. P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item 1-4-2, 12 April 1946; N.G.A.R., 1948/49, p. 15.
41. N.G.A.R., 1948/49, loc. cit.
42. P.A.R., 1946/47, p. 14.

Officers on patrol were aware, however, that distinct changes in the people's attitudes and aspirations had occurred as a direct result of the war:[43]

> Possibly the greatest result of the war has been the vociferous and widespread demand for education generally, and, in particular, the reading and writing of English.

A new attitude towards their economic role seemed to be emerging among the people:[44]

> Generally speaking, natives do not show the same desire to work for Europeans as evinced before the war...Another outcome of the war, although it was manifest in a minor degree in the more sophisticated areas before 1942, is the desire of the natives to possess articles previously regarded as "European goods". All District Officers have been instructed to assist natives to purchase vehicles and vessels from stocks held by the Commonwealth Disposals Commission in the Territory. It is interesting to note that some of the native-owned vehicles were hired to the Administration from time to time... assisting the Government at times when heavy demands were made on Administration transport.

Patronising though the reports might have been, they recognized the new interest in economic activity and pointed to the need for support in the establishment of both co-operative societies and individual enterprises;[45] the extent and effectiveness of that support are discussed in the next Chapter. In addition, there was official recognition that much greater opportunities had to be provided for general participation in government, even if at a relatively low level in the first instance. These sentiments were borrowed mainly from the Directorate

43. P.A.R., 1945/46, p. 13.
44. Ibid.
45. P.A.R., 1947/48, pp. 43, 46-8.

of Research, and particularly from such people as Hogbin and Mair, but they had a certain precedent in some pre-war administrative methods.

Local government

Most aspects of the establishment of local government councils in Papua New Guinea have been discussed at length by Dr. A.M. Healy in his thesis, Native Administration and Local Government in Papua 1880-1960.[46] There is little point in repeating its details in this discussion, which is confined to the salient features of the local government programme.

Before World War 2, Village Councillors were elected in a number of Papuan villages, while in the Gazelle peninsula of New Britain an association of villages formed a council in 1937.[47] All of these bodies were referred to as "unofficial" councils, since they lacked statutory recognition and powers, and their effectiveness depended to a large extent upon the attitudes of field staff towards their merits as advisory bodies.[48] During the war certain Angau officers sought to develop a more orderly system of consultation and the first post-war report for Papua recorded:[49]

46. Ph. D. thesis, Australian National University, Canberra, 1962. The title is misleading, since the study deals also with developments in the Territory of New Guinea.
47. Mair, op. cit., pp. 50-2, 56-7.
48. Stanner, Transition, op. cit., p. 25; Legge, op. cit., pp. 137-9.
49. P.A.R., 1945/46, p. 14.

> It was expected that the Councillors, freely elected by the people, would assist the village officials, especially in the difficult period of rehabilitation and readjustment. Arrangements were made for bi-yearly meetings of village officials and Councillors belonging to the same tribal group at which matters affecting natives in the area were discussed.

Between 1945 and 1948 regular reference was made to "village councils", which in some cases were identified with the traditional meetings of clan elders;[50] and to "experimental village councils", which in the Madang District were operating satisfactorily "in a purely advisory capacity", and in New Ireland in such a way that "the natives are expressing appreciation of their value".[51] The field staff recognized that post-war policy was in favour of developing councils; the major problems were to find a suitable model and to define the relationship between councils and the field staff, who were accustomed to "direct" administration on a village-by-village basis.[52]

Healy's study of local government points out that an important influence on the establishment of formal or "official" councils was the work of Dr. Ian Hogbin, who

50. P.A.R., 1946/47, pp. 16-17, 19.
51. N.G.A.R., 1947/48, pp. 13-14.
52. The debate on "direct" and "indirect" methods of administration descended directly from Lugard's principles, variously interpreted, in his The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (Edinburgh, Blackwood, 1922). The largely irrelevant concern for these principles in Papua has been noted in Mair, op. cit. (1948), pp. 44-5. In general, the method of "direct" administration was considered necessary in Papua, in the absence of traditional authorities to whom minor powers could be delegated by the Administration.

had worked in the British Solomon Islands in the 1930's and been impressed by the loosely-structured councils being established there.[53] Hogbin proposed the adoption of a similar system in Papua New Guinea, publishing his recommendations in 1946.[54] It was still necessary to engage the interest of Territory field staff, and in this respect a vital part was played by D.M. Fenbury.[55]

In 1946 Fenbury, still a Captain in Angau, was selected to gain further experience through travel overseas. Upon his return to Australia, after visits to East Africa and the United Kingdom, he was posted to the School of Pacific Administration while awaiting demobilisation. At about this time articles by G.C. O'Donnell on the war damage compensation scheme, published in the School Monthly Notes,[56] attracted the attention of the Administrator. Murray wrote to the acting Director of District Services that O'Donnell seemed to have "rather definite ideas on the matter. I should be very pleased if you would discuss the matter with him by letter at an early date and let me have some

53. Healy, op. cit., pp. 266-70.
54. H.I. Hogbin, "Local Government for New Guinea", Oceania, Vol. 17 No. 1, September 1946, p. 38.
55. Healy has not provided all the details of Fenbury's developing interest in local government, and so these are set out in the following pages. This episode also illustrates some of the points made in earlier Chapters about Murray's relations with his staff and the attitudes of certain senior officers towards changes in policy. See also Chapter Six, pp. 375-8.
56. Vol. 1 No. 3, November 1946, p. 1; No. 5, January 1947, p. 3.

recommendations concerning it."[57] In the meantime, O'Donnell had returned to the Territory and the correspondence found its way to Fenbury, who seized the opportunity to propound the views on field administration and local government which he had developed during his overseas tour.[58]

Fenbury's main contention was that the compensation scheme could not fulfil the Barry Committee's intentions of restoring village life and improving general welfare because it was based on a European concept of individual cash payments.[59] These placed an unwarranted burden on field staff, who had many other tasks requiring urgent attention; were open to abuse through false claims; and were being wasted, owing to high prices for the few goods available. "The logical inference," stated Fenbury, "is that the methods of payment must be reconsidered." It was of vital importance to build up the communal element in village life, which he considered to be "fast disappearing". Fenbury considered that the only suitable remedy would be the establishment of co-operative enterprises, "native treasuries" and "native authorities".[60] He made a number of specific recommendations concerning the method and direction of payment for war damage and sent his report direct to Government House. Murray then

57. P.N.G.N.A. Box 805, item 6/150, undated mid-1947.
58. His report, ibid., is dated 3 December 1947.
59. The following passage, including quotations, is drawn from ibid.
60. Fenbury was still using African terms at the time.

referred the proposals to his advisory committee on Native Development and Welfare, supporting them in principle and requesting action on a key recommendation of the Fenbury report: where no compensation payments had yet been made, the Administrator proposed, attempts should be made to have them credited to "tribal treasuries" operating through the Commonwealth Savings Bank, with the District Officer as trustee.[61] He recommended that selected field staff be specifically allocated to war damage compensation work and the developments to be associated with it, arguing that such specialisation of effort could eventually reduce the total effort required from District Services.

Murray's attitude towards village councils was already well known, for he had instituted conferences of councillors from the villages near Port Moresby in 1946.[62] As a representative or advisory body the gathering had only symbolic importance, since the full group totalled only 107 councillors from 22 villages, of whom about two-thirds attended each meeting. Since the gathering occasionally took place on the Government House lawn, and was sometimes followed by afternoon tea, it was viewed with scorn or horror by most Europeans.[63]

61. P.N.G.N.A. Box 805, item 6/150, 30 January 1948.
62. The following passage is based on P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item GH1-4-4, which contains minutes of the meetings.
63. A major shock came when on one occasion Murray told the Director of Public Works to stand when addressing the gathering of councillors (P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 9, April 1946, p. 11).

This may help to account for the unfavourable reaction to the proposals made by Fenbury and the Administrator when they were considered by the Committee on Native Development and Welfare. In reporting to Murray, the committee's chairman, J.H. Jones, stated that the express intentions of the Barry Committee were being carried out "as far as present circumstances and facilities make possible" and that there could be no major changes in the compensation scheme, since it had been adopted by the Australian government.[64] He further believed that the people had become familiar with the scheme and that changes might have "undesirable repercussions" among them. While agreeing that certain of the details of Fenbury's proposals were practicable, Jones argued that their broader implications, involving local authorities, were not "officially directly linked with War Damage payments" and therefore not "directly related" to them.

The Fenbury proposals were half-formed and too sweeping for the immediate circumstances, but it is significant that they were dismissed in such an offhanded manner by Jones. In this respect, and in invoking "adopted" procedures, he behaved in a similar manner to the Canberra authorities when they stifled the development of research functions in Australia.[65] In

64. The following passage, including quotations, is further based on P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item GH1-4-4, 2 April 1948.
65. See Chapter Five, pp. 284-9.

each instance, proposals for change were rejected for shallow, formalistic reasons in a manner that would serve as a model for bureaucratic obstructionism. Even more important for the future of local government, and for the fate of other new schemes proposed during this period, was the prominence of Jones in the deliberations of the major committees, in addition to his very considerable influence as administrative head of the field service. Gunther, who served on many of the Provisional Administration's committees, has contended that Jones worked actively against many of the recommended programmes, abetted by Lonergan at the Government Secretary's office.[66] Using his apparent expertise in New Guinea affairs, Jones, in Gunther's words, "got to" the Administrator before committee reports were presented. Evidence later in this study shows that Murray did not change his basic views on development, but that he faced major problems in having new programmes put into effect.

That this situation placed severe limitations on the development of local government is made clear in Healy's study.[67] Fenbury was posted to Rabaul as Senior Native Authorities Officer in 1948, building on the foundation of the pre-war "unofficial" councils of the

66. Gunther's views (from an interview of 4 December 1968) are self-interested to a degree, but supported by written evidence noted here and later in this study and by the observations of W. Grainger and H.I. Hogbin (interviews, 12 and 21 December 1973).
67. The following passage is based on Healy, op. cit., pp. 309-49 and 351-60.

Gazelle Peninsula. However, he faced strong and sometimes bitter opposition from certain of his colleagues, both at Konedobu and in the field, and it was not until 1955 that the policy of extending local government wherever possible was accepted by senior field staff, and then only after considerable prompting from higher authorities. In the meantime, the first councils to be established were not always set up on the merits of the situation; only two of the first four were near Rabaul; another, at Hanuabada (which bordered Konedobu), was largely a show-piece; and the fourth, at Baluan near Manus Island, was intended to counter the influence of a "cult" led by Paliau Maloat.[68] Fenbury fought a continuing battle

68. For an outline of the development of local government see Jinks, op. cit., pp. 112-7. Much of the contemporary material is contained in P.N.G.N.A. Boxes 316 and 317 in the old CA series (Civil Affairs, i.e., Government Secretary) of files in the sequences 35/5 and 35/6, which in some cases contain additional information to that investigated by Healy in District Services records. The material on the reaction to, and treatment of, leaders such as Paliau is particularly interesting, although much too detailed to be dealt with in this study; I am presently using it in a separate investigation of self-help movements in Papua New Guinea. One facet of the Paliau situation, however, brings out clearly the basic difference in approach between Murray and the field staff. Paliau was eventually imprisoned, and upon his release the acting Director of District Services, I.F. Champion, recommended that he be deported to another area for a year (Box 317, item CA35/6/38, 12 September 1950). Murray, who had been uneasy for some time at Paliau's treatment, directed on the contrary that he should be conducted on a tour of selected parts of the Territory to increase his awareness of developments and "to give him a clear understanding of the useful part he can play in the gradual evolution of the indigenous people of the Territory" (ibid., 19 September 1950). This was anathema to the field staff, and the records indicate that they did not observe the spirit of Murray's instructions.

with his superiors in District Services headquarters and eventually left the field in disgust in 1956. To some extent Fenbury's problems - and, consequently, those of local government - were of his own making, for he was fluent, blunt, self-confident and sometimes vitriolic. Healy has underestimated this factor, but it was far from being the most important in accounting for the opposition to local government. The basic difficulty arose from the reluctance of the field staff to share power with the village people.

Village courts

Similar opposition was directed towards another programme, in which Fenbury again played a key role - the institution of a village courts system.[69] The intention was to increase village participation, as in the case of local government, by establishing a method of settling disputes using traditional practices as a foundation. Under the system of acephalous control and kinship found in most parts of Papua New Guinea, decisions had been reached traditionally after open debate among adult members of the clan, with leaders who had acquired authority through personal skills and qualities seeking to exert their influence.[70] Certain matters concerning such things as ritual observances were often settled in

69. The following passage is based on Healy, op. cit., pp. 279-86.
70. For a brief account of traditional decision-making, see Jinks, op. cit., pp. 8-16.

secret by gatherings of leaders and elders. There was a clear link between activities of this kind and the deliberations of representative bodies such as local government councils, and Fenbury considered that village courts should be set up simultaneously, in order to complement them. One of his main arguments was that many disputes were, and would continue to be, settled among the people themselves and not by reference to courts patterned on Western law. It was better that this situation be recognized and brought within the framework of government than continue in a clandestine and, in the strict sense, illegal way. The position was officially admitted in 1949, when the New Guinea annual report stated:[71]

> There are no judicial tribunals exclusively composed of indigenous inhabitants recognized as a part of the judiciary system of the Territory. Village Courts do exist, however, but they are not mentioned in the laws of the Territory. They are given no statutory authority but only the authority of local Native law and custom.

The report noted that the Papua and New Guinea Bill included provision for the establishment of formal village courts as well as local government authorities.[72] This situation had come about following approval of the court scheme, and also of a re-drafted local government proposal, by the Committee on Native Development and Welfare. On that occasion Jones had succumbed to the pressure of his colleagues, but the village court scheme

71. N.G.A.R., 1948/49, p. 24.
72. Ibid.

was then criticised by the Chief Justice, Mr. Beaumont Phillips. He and Fenbury were utterly lacking in sympathy for each other's reasoning and a bitter struggle on the issue continued until 1956, when the scheme was finally vetoed by Hasluck.[73] As a consequence, Papua New Guinea established what Fenbury considered to be only a partial local government system, owing to the narrow Western views of legal and political processes held by the senior authorities of the period. It was not until the formation of the first National Coalition government in 1972 that formal approval for a village courts system was finally granted.

Field staff attitudes

The Fenbury proposals for an integrated system of councils and village courts threatened the foundations upon which the work of the field officers rested: an effective monopoly of administrative, police and magisterial authority in their areas. Along with this power went a heavy responsibility for the maintenance of "control" in the villages, as well as for the introduction of appropriate development programmes. But owing to the restricted nature of pre-war experience and the limitations placed upon the School of Pacific Administration, field staff lacked the training in community development

73. Healy, op. cit., p. 291.

and extension methods which would allow them to operate on the basis of popular participation rather than direction - and, frequently, coercion. They were also imbued with the notion that villagers were generally incapable of responsible spontaneous action. Moreover, in the immediate post-war years they were faced with enormous tasks, so that there was little sympathy for time-consuming administrative methods based on voluntary participation and delegation of responsibility, such as the extension of local government. Thus for reasons which can be understood, if not supported, the great majority of field staff resisted immediate changes in their functions on the pragmatic grounds that they could achieve greater results in the immediate future - the period most affecting their career prospects - by following accepted methods of "direct" administration. This attitude among the field staff, expressed with the authority of experience through Jones, their Director, became a most important factor governing the deliberations and conclusions of the special advisory committees responsible for recommending programmes of development to the Administrator.

Public health

In comparison with the Department of District Services and Native Affairs, the health authorities possessed a major advantage. Unlike the multi-functional

responsibilities of the field staff, the duties of the medical service were relatively specialised, being directed towards fairly clear objectives determined by the expertise and ethics of their senior professional staff. The main aims were to prevent disease wherever possible and to treat it where it could not be prevented, with special campaigns against major problems: malaria, tuberculosis, leprosy and yaws, in particular.[74] Acceptance of these objectives led directly to the creation of a large but relatively uncomplicated department structure, with Divisions of Medical Services, Medical Education and Hygiene, together with specialists in malariology, leprology, venereology and tuberculosis.[75] Gunther's initial plans, submitted to the Buttsworth inquiry, called for a staff establishment of 511, but by 1949 only 288 of these positions had been created; they comprised some 16 per cent of the public service.[76] The Department was able to achieve one of the best employment rates in the public service by filling 211 of these jobs, accounting for 76 per cent of establishment, at 30 June 1949.[77] Of these staff, 93 were European Medical Assistants with some training, and 40 were qualified nurses: a total no greater than that employed by Angau, for a considerably smaller area, four years previously.[78]

74. N.G.A.R., 1946/47, p. 26.
75. Report on Buttsworth, op. cit., Vol. 2, "Health", Table 1.
76. N.G.A.R., 1948/49, pp. 101-2.
77. Ibid., p. 17.
78. Ibid.; Stanner, Transition, op. cit., p. 160. There were many Papua New Guinean staff, but they were not classified as public servants and had relatively little training.

The recruitment of physicians and surgeons was the greatest problem.[79] Only eleven were employed in 1947 and eighteen in 1949,[80] although this, at least, represented an improvement on wartime services.[81]

The Health department faced equal difficulties in acquiring sufficient buildings and supplies. By late 1946 only the Port Moresby hospital was in a fit state to be re-occupied and at all other centres every building was of temporary construction, while many of the drugs and other medical supplies purchased from the Disposals Commission had deteriorated or proved unsuitable for civilian use.[82] Gunther thus proposed a massive building programme, costing many millions of pounds, to provide the most basic essentials of an effective health service.[83] Minimum requirements by 1952 required the construction of three base hospitals with a total of 1,005 beds, sixteen sub-base hospitals with 3,600 beds and over one hundred outstation or "native" hospitals.[84] Proposals on this scale - the

79. N.G.A.R., 1946/47, p. 25.
80. N.G.A.R., 1948/49, p. 146; P.A.R., 1948/49, p. 79.
81. This is not the impression given in Stanner (Transition, op. cit., p. 160), the only published account containing a range of statistics on Angau health services. He suggests that Angau employed 50 doctors at its peak strength, which would have given a remarkable ratio of professional to support staff, since only 113 medical assistants were then in the service (see Chapter Two, p. 106 for details). However, Angau's Report (op. cit., p. 44) states that ten doctors were serving with the Unit in mid-1944. Stanner may have confused Angau medical officers with those serving the whole military establishment in the Territory.
82. P.A.R., 1945/46, pp. 27-8.
83. Report on Buttsworth, op. cit., Vol. 2, "Health", Introduction.
84. Ibid., p. 3.

total for base and sub-base hospital construction alone was £4 million at 1946 prices - proved incredible to Buttsworth, who made only basic provisions for the department, on the grounds that future patterns of finance were unclear.[85] The public health service was eventually granted staff and finance greatly exceeding the pre-war scale, but it could not operate at the level envisaged by its Director until the mid-1950's.

In addition to clear objectives, the medical service also had certain foundations upon which to build its post-war programme. Of the relatively few services provided before the war, health had received most attention and it has been noted that Angau increased medical treatments, often for its large labour force but also in a number of the villages under its control.[86] In addition, the "miracle" drugs that had come into full use during the war were available to treat the people of New Guinea. The sulfa drugs, penicillin and the early antibiotics, and the anti-malarials succeeding atebrine, notably Paludrine and the chloroquin group, wrought a revolution in health care, particularly for people in the tropics; diseases which had been virtually incurable among people living under village conditions, notably yaws, dysentry and the venereal infections, had become relatively easy to treat, and all within a space of six years. It was as well that the revolution occurred, for

85. See Chapter Six, pp. 354-60.
86. See Chapter Two, pp. 106-7.

war conditions had caused a serious decline in the health of the people. There were two main causes for this: poor nutrition, housing and hygiene among evacuees and those villagers deprived of adult male labour; and the spread of infection resulting from the influx of troops and the increased mobility of certain sections of the village community. During the war dysentry and malaria were introduced to the Highlands and such imported diseases as measles, chicken pox and mumps, all potentially lethal to a people with no resistance to them, became endemic over large areas of the country.[87]

Dr. J.T. Gunther

Much of the credit for dealing with the massive health problem must go to Dr. Gunther, who exhibited a singleness of purpose that was largely lacking in other sectors of the Provisional Administration. Gunther took direct action at any level and in any location where this was possible, using his European Medical Assistants much in the way that District Services relied upon its field staff, to re-build on the outstations and to contact the people through a programme of regular patrolling.[88] This led to inevitable clashes with the field staff over spheres of jurisdiction and the allocation of scarce resources; and marked the beginning

87. P.A.R., 1946/47, pp. 28-30.
88. This and the following passage are based on an interview with Dr. Gunther, 4 December 1968.

of Gunther's antipathy for the relatively untrained but apparently omnipotent Patrol Officer. Nevertheless, the Director's methods produced results. From what Stanner has termed the "calamity" resulting from the withdrawal of Angau medical staff, the Department of Public Health by 194 had extended the wartime level of services throughout the Territory, operating 54 hospitals and 100 clinics and village aid posts, with 265 wards and 9,047 beds; and treating 134,989 non-European patients, or some 15 per cent of the enumerated population.[89]

In pursuing the medical programme, Gunther and his staff either set or extended important precedents in the recruitment and training of staff. The Territory of New Guinea retained the pre-war system of appointing medical tul tuls in the villages, but with little or no training they were "not expected to provide attention for other than the most minor ailments".[90] In addition, a number of medical orderlies had gained on-the-job experience in the hospitals of both Territories, but little formal training had been available.[91] Operating from this base, the health service began a vastly increased training programme in 1946 and within three years had set up five Medical and Hygiene Training Schools with a total enrolment of 426 students.[92] In addition, Papua New

89. P.A.R., 1948/49, p. 79; N.G.A.R., 1948/49, p. 147.
90. N.G.A.R., 1946/47, p. 26.
91. Mair, op. cit. (1948), pp. 176-7.
92. N.G.A.R., 1948/49, p. 69.

Guinean students had begun practitioners' courses at the Medical School in Suva, Fiji; and planning was in progress for setting up the Papuan Medical College.[93] By 1949 the Health department employed 961 non-European staff with technical qualifications suited to the positions they occupied.[94] The shortage of doctors continued, however. In seeking a solution to this problem Gunther freed his department from Australian practices by appointing "D.P. doctors", as they were called.

Migrant doctors

Under the Australian immigration programme all non-British arrivals, regardless of qualifications or experience, were required to undertake two years of assigned work. Professional people wishing to practice were then required to qualify according to Australian standards, and particularly to show proficiency in English commensurate with the profession they wished to re-enter. When it became clear to Gunther that there was no possibility of recruiting sufficient doctors from Australia, he proposed that carefully-selected European practitioners be allowed to begin work immediately in the Territory; that is, that the period of assigned work and the English proficiency test at Australian standards be waived for those considered suitable.[95] The first

93. Ibid.
94. P.A.R., 1948/49, p. 79; N.G.A.R., 1948/49, p. 147.
95. Department of the Public Service Commissioner, file A5/3/2/1, 22 December 1948.

approach was made in 1948 to the Commonwealth Department of Immigration, which initially refused permission.[96] A request was then made directly to the Minister for Immigration, A.A. Calwell, who gave his approval early in 1949; Gunther took a direct part in these negotiations and he achieved the results he desired.[97] Within the next few months he further demonstrated his effectiveness in handling such issues. By April 1949 he was in regular contact with the head of the Australian medical service at the Military Mission in Cologne, seeking information on refugee doctors, and in the same month interviewed applicants from among migrants already in Australia.[98] As a consequence, twelve doctors began work in the Territory early in 1950, after completing a special introductory course at the School of Pacific Administration.[99] By 1952 the Administration employed 48 physicians and surgeons, an increase of 250 per cent in three years.[100] Clearly, this was the kind of innovative scheme required for New Guinea, although it was not without opposition in both Australia and the Territory.[101] As Murray later observed, "Dr, Gunther arranged accession of great

96. Ibid., 30 March 1949. Murray has referred to the Australian desire "to protect...the vested interests of the locally qualified practitioners" (Murray notes, p. 83).
97. Murray notes, p. 84; Gunther interview, 4 December 1968.
98. Department of the Public Service Commissioner, file A5/3/2/1, 26 and 30 April 1949.
99. P.I.M., Vol. 20 No. 5, December 1949, p. 8; No. 8, March 1950, p. 21.
100. P.A.R., 1951/52, p. 129; N.G.A.R., 1951/52, p. 84.
101. For scathing white criticism in New Guinea, see P.I.M., Vol. 20 No. 5, December 1949, p. 8. The appointments were also depicted as a blow to the Medical Association in Australia - see C.P.D., Vol. 205, p. 2184 for Calwell's views on the matter.

strength by the acceptance, for the territory's requirements, of many European immigrants to Australia with full medical qualifications who were refused registration for purposes of practising in Australia. The services of these doctors were of incalculable value in the many districts of the territory in which they served."[102] The health programme was well on the way to achieving its objectives.

Education: a broad base

The introduction of an effective education programme posed greater problems. The most serious of these was the lack of a base from which to work. In pre-war Papua, for example, all schooling had been conducted by the missions, which received a few thousand pounds each year in grants from the Territory's administration.[103] The Mandated Territory possessed six Administration schools for New Guineans, but no subsidies were paid to the German-dominated missions, whose relations with the authorities were usually tense. Owing to the lack of finance and trained staff in both Territories, instruction was at a low level, with only the Administration schools in New Guinea and the better mission schools providing even a minimum level of competence in English, the only language ever considered by the Administrations to be

102. Murray notes, p. 83.
103. The following passage is based on Mair, op. cit. (1948), pp. 161-73 and Stanner, Transition, op. cit., pp. 30-1 and 40-2.

a suitable medium of official communication. The effect was to deny Papua New Guineans access to any but the lowliest positions in government, business or the church.[104] At the outbreak of World War 2 the education system, if it could be so termed, virtually collapsed, with only a small number of missionaries able to continue rudimentary teaching in the areas least affected by the war. However, Angau required semi-skilled workers to maintain its large establishment, and in 1944 set up a training school at Sogeri, in the ranges above Port Moresby. The school produced a number of partially-trained tradesmen, who were to prove invaluable in the reconstruction phase of the post-war years. It also established the precedent of direct official involvement in the education of Papuans and on this account drew complaints from the missions.[105] However, the government's limited capacity in this field was apparent from the fact that the first Sogeri headmaster was a missionary.

The education planners had only the broadest of government aims to guide them. For example, Mr. Ward's second reading speech on the Papua-New Guinea Provisional Administration Bill in mid-1945 had merely stated:[106]

104. There were exceptions, such as Father Vangeke of the Catholic mission and Rev. Ambo of the Anglican mission, as well as some Papuan medical trainess, but they were so few in number as to prove the rule. For examples of white reaction to such training, see Jinks, Biskup, Nelson (eds.), op. cit., pp. 132-6.
105. For details of the mission attitude towards government schooling, see P.I.M., Vol. 15 No. 1, August 1944, pp. 10-11.
106. C.P.D., Vol. 183, p. 4054, 4 July 1945.

> It will be the aim to improve the health of the natives generally and by education to improve their conditions and the standard of living. In the past much of the education of the natives has been in the hands of the missionaries. Our plans provide for a vigorous programme of education in its broadest sense controlled and directed by the Administration. This does not mean that the Missions will be excluded from that field. They have performed valuable services in the past and can continue to do so within the framework of the educational programme that is being developed.

The annual report for 1946 was scarcely more specific when it quoted with approval the recommendations of international experts:[107]

> The broad principles upon which native education will be developed are those enunciated by the British Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, namely, that -
>
> > Education should be adapted to the mentality, aptitudes, occupations and traditions of the various peoples, conserving as far as possible all sound and healthy elements in the fabric of their social life, adapting them where necessary to changed circumstances and progressive ideas, as an agent of natural growth and evolution.

The sentiments were very much those of the new Director of Education for the Territory, Mr. W.C. Groves.[108] Groves had in 1936 produced the definitive paper on education in the Mandated Territory, arguing against the use of government schools as producers of European-oriented skills in people who were expected to move away from their own culture.[109] He headed one part of his

107. P.A.R., 1945/46, p. 21. Later annual reports, all reviewed in Canberra, carried no such comparative references.
108. For details of Groves' career, see Chapter Six, pp. 344-5.
109. W.C. Groves, Native Education and Culture Contact in New Guinea, Melbourne, M.U.P., 1936.

study "The Concept of Nativization in Education" and expressed certain of his views in emotive terms:[110]

> ....the need is urgent to arrest the racial rot; to prevent further tragic disintegration and malaise; to repair the damage of the past. Efforts must be made to restore a just racial pride...and to provide a new form of social security which will preserve /the/ native spirit. It is worth preserving: it is the people's own.

Groves proposed the introduction of as many traditional skills as possible into school curricula, and co-operation with agricultural authorities in efforts to improve and expand gardening techniques; he took a total view of education, as something inextricably woven into culture and life. It was a principle with which no informed person could reasonably argue. Unfortunately, the practical situation in which Groves found himself in 1946 saw people - in the village and the European community alike - more interested in short-term results than general principles. The education programme encountered difficulties from the outset.

The Groves strategy, like most proposals for the development of autochthonous structures, could not be easily expressed in clear objectives that were acceptable to the major colonial interests. While a senior public servant or businessman might agree that education should suit the cultural needs of the people,[111] he was in

110. Ibid., p. 61.
111. Only a small minority of Europeans agreed with this approach; see, for example, P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 4, November 1947, pp. 68-9; No. 10, May 1948, pp. 28-30; Vol. 19 No. 1, August 1948, pp. 5-6, 8.

fact more interested in employing Papua New Guineans literate in English and acquainted with Western bureaucracy or commerce. The culturally valid education system Groves recommended was unlikely to create enthusiasm among either Europeans seeking employees or villagers who saw white education as the key to the acquisition of material wealth. The Groves proposals included the introduction of traditional art, handicrafts, dancing and even modified forms of ritual observance, as aids in teaching from the "known to the unknown"; this might have been pedagogically sound, but it was not what the community as a whole wanted.

There were, in addition, greater problems in setting objectives for the education programme than for the health plan. The Education department had to provide different schooling for the white, Asian and village communities in the Territory, as well as make special provisions for the missions, whose pre-war dominance of education had been more obvious than in the provision of health services.[112] The complexity of these factors was apparent from the five-year education plan presented by Groves to a conference of missionaries and senior officials held at Port Moresby in October 1946.[113] The

112. The health and education authorities' dealings with the missions are outlined later in this Chapter.
113. The material in the following passage, including quotations, is based on records of the conference, P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item 1-4-2, 12 October 1946. An outline can also be found in Stanner, Transition, op. cit., pp. 152-8.

missions were promised, and later received, greatly increased aid, with none-too-stringent checks on their performance. In return, Groves proposed, the "philosophic basis of Trusteeship" should govern education, rather than the specifically Christian doctrine of the pre-war years. He then stated that the Administration would in any case be extremely flexible in its interpretation of the conditions applying to mission education. The Education department's goals for its own schools were not entirely clear. Groves announced that four different kinds of institutions would be recognized or established: village schools, teaching in the venacular and conducted mainly (in the event, entirely) by missions; village higher-grade schools giving instruction in elementary English at general primary level; area schools, conducting upper-level primary classes in English, using European teachers and providing the key to subsequent educational attainment; and secondary schools offering general and technical education in separate streams.[114] Yet even some of these proposals were tentative: Groves emphasised that the education programme would develop slowly, since there was "practically no existing foundation of establishment or organization in which to base a properly conceived plan". Under the circumstances, the Education department's

114. An additional level of schooling was subsequently introduced by dividing the highest category into central and higher-training schools. Later again, an orthodox pattern of primary and secondary schools emerged. The missions eventually conducted an education system that, above village school level, was virtually parallel to the Administration's.

accomplishment in presenting a programme at such an early date may have appeared impressive, but it fact it drew heavily upon a source that was barely acknowledged.

The Wedgewood proposals

In August 1944 Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable Camilla Wedgewood completed a preliminary study of the post-war education needs of Papua New Guinea, following a tour of parts of the islands as a member of the Directorate of Research.[115] She proposed, among other things, that a conference of all missionaries be called "at an early date" to discuss and comment upon her long-range, thirty-year plan for educational development in the Territory, with particular emphasis on its first segment, which would constitute a five-year plan covering the immediate future.[116] The main objective of Wedgewood's long-range plan was the establishment of a five-level school system at village, area, intermediate and technical school standard, with training colleges constituting the final stage.[117] The main difference between her proposals and the programme later submitted by the Department of Education was the clear distinction that Wedgewood made between those institutions - notably

115. C.H. Wedgewood, Some Problems of Native Education in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea and Papua, Canberra (?), typescript, 1944. This is one of the few remaining, accessible records of the Directorate of Research (see Chapter Two, pp. 118-9, 131-5).
116. Ibid., p. 20.
117. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

intermediate schools - intended to prepare students for higher education; and others, designated "area schools", designed for pupils possessing "neither the ability nor the inclination to proceed to the education given in the Intermediate Schools".[118] Her basic approach to education differed little from that propounded by Groves in 1936, but it was expressed in dispassionate terms that gave a clearer indication of the objectives to be set for each kind of school. Thus the aim of technical schools "should be not primarily to train skilled employees for the white man, but to prepare natives who will be capable of using what they learn, either as private individuals or as Government servants, to educate their fellow-villagers and to raise the standard of life in the villages".[119] She was unimpressed by the pre-war efforts of the missions and suggested as a long-range goal "the establishment of Government village schools in sufficient numbers to enable every native child to attend school without being dependent upon any mission school".[120] Missions should be free to conduct schools at their own expense, but subsidies should be phased out within the period of the first five-year plan and the schools taken over by the Administration in cases where they could not continue to function without aid; Wedgewood even appended an extract from the Education (Scotland) Act 1918 as a legislative example of the manner in which this could be accomplished.[121]

118. Ibid., p. 2.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid., Introduction.
121. Ibid., pp. 5-9, 17, 21-2.

Miss Wedgewood's study went on to consider matters of education policy for Europeans and for mixed-blood and Chinese children; teacher education; finance for both official and mission schools; and the recruitment of suitably qualified teachers for service in New Guinea. She observed that recruits from Australia would require additional training in order to appreciate the needs of education in the colonies. There was an ironic corollary to this argument:[122]

> ....it is essential that the Director of Education should be a man of wide experience in this field... I would suggest therefore that the Commonwealth Government should ask the British Colonial Office... to recommend one of its experienced officers... able to come out to New Guinea for a period of 5 years...This, perhaps, is the most urgent thing that needs to be done, for until such a man is appointed... it will not be advisable to do anything more than to make temporary arrangements for...carrying on the existing village schools.

The reason for her concern at the Director's appointment was made clear in her most prophetic statement: "The fate of Native education in New Guinea for the next fifty years depends upon the planning done during the next five."

Groves' problems

Soon after his appointment as Director, Groves admitted to a group of officers at the School of Pacific

122. Ibid., p. 16.

Administration that "immediate pressures would call for the extension of the system of schools at present in the Territory. This system...would be definitely limited to pressing demands and could not be allowed to sidestep the basic principle of adaptation to the natives' needs, even if so desired by the natives themselves."[123] The Department of Education faced a dilemma. It could pursue an orthodox schooling programme that was likely to produce early results and thereby gain popular acceptance; but which would, in the process, create undesirable precedents. Alternatively, it could set long-term goals based on sound principles; but these were unpopular with both the European and village communities, who were concerned primarily with the immediate benefits they might gain from the education system. Wavering between these two aims, the education programme achieved neither; it produced only modest results during the period of the Provisional Administration, without demonstrating the capacity to achieve the long-term goals proposed by Groves. The department's main difficulties arose from the lack of administrative expertise among its senior professional staff. For example, the department failed to make detailed recommendations for its staff establishment to either the Buttsworth investigation or in the counter-proposals sent to Canberra, owing to the Director's involvement with the mission conference of

123. Monthly Notes, Vol. 1 No. 1, September 1946, p. 10.

October 1946;[124] clearly, the education authorities had not established their priorities correctly.

As a consequence, the initial Buttsworth proposals provided an Education department establishment of only 106 positions, or less than seven percent of the total public service; and the department was able to fill only 32 of these by 30 June 1947.[125] Following further submissions, the department's establishment was increased to 171 by 1949, or almost ten per cent of the service, with 96 position filled; this still represented an unsatisfactory employment rate of 56 per cent, compared with the public service average of 65 per cent.[126] The department faced many difficulties in recruiting teachers, partly because Groves did not wish to follow the Mandated Territory practice of employing teachers on secondment from Australia. Rather, he sought staff with special training to meet New Guinea conditions. A cadetship scheme was therefore instituted in conjunction with the School of Pacific Administration and Sydney Teacher's College,[127] but there was a delay of several years before it began to operate effectively. The training programme had beneficial effects in the long term, but it involved a time lag, even after training commenced, that made it impossible for the Education department to effect a rapid increase in schooling through such measures. Thus by

124. See Chapter Six, p. 366.
125. N.G.A.R., 1946/47, p. 14.
126. N.G.A.R., 1948/49, p. 17.
127. Ibid., p. 85.

1949 there were 39 schools teaching 3,232 Papua New Guinean pupils: an unimpressive total when it is noted that there were 13 schools for European, Asian and mised-blood children, with 660 students.[128] Moreover, the latter schools absorbed a disproportionate amount of the department's most skilled personnel, employing 24 European teachers, compared with the six Europeans teaching in village schools.[129] This problem was caused partly by factors, such as the tradition of segregated education, beyond the department's control; but it should have suggested to the education authorities that special efforts - perhaps an in-service training programme for teachers recruited from Australia - would have to be made to redress the balance.

A degree of imbalance was evident in other areas of the education programme. Of the five schools functioning in Papua in mid-1949, four were within a few miles of Port Moresby, while in the Territory of New Guinea 21 schools, of a total of 34, were in the New Britain District, with five in New Ireland and two in Manus.[130] This left only six schools to cater for the villages of the entire New Guinea mainland: five in the Sepik District and one at Madang. Eight of the sixteen districts of the Territory of Papua-New Guinea were without

128. P.A.R., 1948/49, p. 89; N.G.A.R., 1948/49, p. 157.
129. Ibid. There were, in addition, 97 Papua New Guineans teaching their own people.
130. The statistics in this and the following passage are drawn from P.A.R., ibid. and N.G.A.R., ibid., pp. 157-8.

government schools, almost four years after the re-establishment of civil administration; and in one case - at Chimbu in the heavily-populated Highlands region - a pre-war school had not been re-opened by 1949. Part of this difficulty arose from the allocation of staff. Of the 96 officers employed by the department in 1949, only 30 were teaching; by comparison, 175 of the 211 Europeans in the Department of Public Health were working in hospitals.[131]

Even when allowance is made for the difficulties which faced the Department of Education in 1946, it must be concluded that its performance during the next few years was disappointing. This had important effects on the internal functioning and public image of the Provisional Administration as a whole. The education programme, more than any other, propounded a distinct alternative to the notion of European cultural dominance that had provided the foundation for all pre-war efforts and attitudes. Had the department been able to establish more schools in the short term, while still publicising its long-term strategy, it could have played a major role in modifying the views of the senior pre-war officers, such as Jones and Lonergan, who tended to dominate the

131. P.A.R., ibid. and pp. 10, 79; N.G.A.R., ibid., and p. 147. These represented some 31 and 83 per cent of staff, respectively. Even when allowance is made for the fact that some personnel in hospitals performed purely administrative functions, the difference is still very great. The disparity for Papua New Guinean staff was even larger (ibid.).

major advisory groups to the Administrator. Instead, the impression grew that Groves and his associates valued the lengthy planning and discussion sessions of the various committees for their own sake. "Groves loved debating," says Gunther, who sat on numerous committees with him. "He had two committees running - Welfare and Social Development. They each met once a week and the meetings would go on for hours. The trouble was that Groves was not 'getting on with it'."[132]

Reconstruction Training Scheme

It was perhaps fortunate that there was a second programme operating during the post-war period, conducted in conjunction with the Department of Education and the missions. This was the Commonwealth Reconstruction Training Scheme, an extension of the work carried out in Australia by the Commonwealth Department of Post-War Reconstruction and funded separately through the Australian budget. A Deputy Director was appointed by the Commonwealth department for service in the Papua New Guinea region and a committee of senior representatives, including Colonel Murray, was set up.[133] Unlike the Provisional Administration's advisory committees, the reconstruction training group had its own executive officer

132. Interview with Dr. Gunther, 4 December 1968.
133. The records of the committee are at P.N.G.N.A. Box 187, item PD8/7, July 1946 onwards. A summary of the Scheme is set out in Stanner, Transition, op. cit., pp. 158-60.

and substantial finance, with relatively little supervision from the authorities in Australia. This allowed the Deputy Director to give a wide interpretation to the terms of reconstruction training, and so the Scheme was opened to virtually any Papua New Guinean under the age of 25 who had been affected by the war. The main emphasis was on technical training and trade skills, although provision was also made for a category of "scholastic" training, which was intended primarily for those wishing to take up teaching as a career. By 1949 nine training centres with almost 600 students had been established by the Administration; and 32 centres with 1,722 students by the missions.[134] Almost 1,000 students were in "scholastic" classes and the remaining 1,300 were undertaking trade training in such areas as carpentry, vehicle maintenance, plumbing and printing.

As in all other fields, reconstruction training faced problems of staffing and accommodation, but the major difficulty was in creating interest among Papua New Guineans, who often found the wages paid by general employers more attractive than the living allowances paid to trainees: by the end of 1949, 489 trainees had completed courses, but during the preceding three years 1,227 had cancelled their traineeships.[135] Moreover, although there was provision for assistance to tradesmen

134. This and the following passage are based on P.A.R., 1948/49, p. 91 and N.G.A.R., 1948/49, p. 160.
135. P.N.G.N.A. Box 187, item PD8/7, 16 November 1949.

in setting up their own enterprises, few were established on a permanent basis: as the Administration, missions and commercial interests increased their own capacities, and the disposals materials acquired by villagers deteriorated, semi-skilled tradesmen found it increasingly difficult to function independently. The white domination of the Territory economy and work force thus re-asserted itself.[136] Nevertheless, the Reconstruction Training Scheme made an important contribution to rebuilding New Guinea, by adding substantially to the semi-skilled labour available from the pre-war period and by training teachers for the education expansion that began in the mid-1950's.[137]

Missions: the 1946 conference

The development of health, education and training programmes after World War 2 was aided in varying degrees by the Christian missions operating in Papua New Guinea. In Papua relations between missions and administration had been generally good and all except the Roman Catholic orders had agreed to observe spheres of influence throughout the Territory. No such agreement had existed for the Mandated Territory, where relations

136. By the mid-1950's there were virtually no Papua New Guineans conducting enterprises on their own account, owing largely to the fact that the resurgent Western-oriented approach to development made it almost impossible for people with only traditional assets, such as usufructory land, to raise capital.
137. For statistics on school expansion, see Jinks, op. cit., p. 107.

with the administration had often been strained. However, certain events during the war years, notably Angau's move into the field of education and the Australian government's failure to re-appoint Mr. Leonard Murray as Administrator, met with disapproval from the formerly co-operative Papuan missions.[138] It was therefore essential for the Provisional Administration to restore mission confidence without delay. The process began with the labour conference of 1944, which was followed by a brief meeting in Sydney in June 1946 and a major conference in Port Moresby in the following October.[139] The latter gathering was attended by 35 representatives of all nine major missions, and its significance to the Administration was evident from the attendance of the Administrator and all heads of major departments.[140] Major policy statements were delivered by Gunther, Groves and Cottrell-Dormer, and these were so comprehensive that they later provided the foundation for the published accounts of the Provisional Administration's work.[141] In addition, there were statements on programmes affecting rehabilitation training, legal services, forestry, and field administration, as well as discussions of such specialised matters as

138. See p. 431 of this Chapter and Chapter Three, p. 165.
139. P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item 1-4-2, 10 to 14 October 1946.
140. Gunther and Groves had attended the Sydney meeting in June, but had been unable to deliver detailed statements, since they had only recently taken up their appointments.
141. Stanner, Transition, op. cit., pp. 152-8, 160-3; Legge, op. cit., pp. 210-13; Mander, op. cit., pp. 275-88.

broadcasting and the education of European children.[142] The conference occupied five days and created unprecedented good will with the missionaries. In his concluding address Murray acknowledged the past accomplishments of the missions, proposed greater co-operation with the Administration, and was rewarded with a most sweeping resolution by the delegates:[143]

> This Conference, representing all missions operating in the Territory of Papua-New Guinea, desires to express its sincere appreciation of the policy for education, health, agriculture and rehabilitation outlined to it by His Honour Colonel J.K. Murray, Administrator, and the directors of the various departments of the Provisional Administration.

This marked a major success by the official group, for in allaying the suspicions of the Papuan missionaries and for the first time winning unqualified support from those in the Territory of New Guinea, the Administration overcame immediate tensions with the people who generally enjoyed the closest contact with the villages.

The success of the mission conference can be gauged from the reaction in the settler community, who saw the strength of the new alliance between officials and missionaries as a challenge to their own influence:[144]

> It is...a good thing that the practical hard-bitten men of the Missions should be given the opportunity to bring the Administration's corps of eager

142. For a summary of proceedings, see P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 4, November 1946, pp. 72-3.
143. P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item 1-4-2, 14 October 1946.
144. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 4, November 1946, pp. 73-4.

> unblooded young idealists down to hard earth, and to earthy facts. It may be paradoxical, but it seems to the "PIM" that the missionaries' main job will be to persuade the officials that the Fuzzy-wuzzies are not angels. The most disheartening feature...is the consistency with which these worthy gentlemen ignore the claims of the unfortunate European settlers...The natives, who ask little more than to be left alone, are being yearned over by three hundred officials and swamped under millions of Australian taxpayers' money.

Mission-Administration relations

Relations between the missions and the Provisional Administration were marked by some continuing tensions, however. The very number of mission groups operating in the Territory created difficulties. By 1949 there were six Catholic orders represented in Papua New Guinea, four Lutheran organizations, three Seventh Day Adventist groups, three Methodist missions and two Anglican bodies.[145] In addition, three breakaway sects were operating in New Guinea and four in Papua. Most of these groups had worked among the people of a particular area for a half-century or more, with very little official assistance, and saw little justification in the Provisional Administration's claim to equal or superior partnership after so many years. In other instances old rivalries continued, particularly between certain denominations in

145. The information in this and the following passage is drawn from P.A.R., 1948/49, p. 91 and N.G.A.R., 1948/49, p. 161. Separate branches of a particular denomination usually had parent bodies in different countries. One or two were off-shoots of groups that had experienced internal differences after their establishment in the islands.

the Territory of New Guinea, and were extended to the Highlands region when expansion began there in earnest from 1947. In some cases the contest for adherents became quite bitter, placing the provision of social and welfare services in a disturbing light: the mission station which appeared to give the most to the people was likely to win the largest number of converts, thus maintaining the enthusiasm and material support of the parent body in its home country. This led to exaggerations, so that from the statistics supplied by the missions it appeared as if they were making astounding contributions to the Territory's development. Indeed, at first glance it seemed that in 1949 the disparity between mission and Administration efforts was enormous:

Number of schools

	Administration	Mission
Papua	9	687
New Guinea	44	1,746
Total	53	2,433

Number of pupils

	Administration	Mission
Papua	484	39,318
New Guinea	2,869	64,516
Total	3,353	103,834

Number of hospitals and clinics

	Administration	Mission
Papua	61	91
New Guinea	93	174
Total	154	265

Number of patients

	Administration		Mission	
	Out-patients	In-patients	Out-patients	In-patients
Papua	15,405	16,064	174,036	4,687
New Guinea	58,610	51,741	436,996	13,325
Total	74,015	67,805	611,032	18,012

Source: P.A.R., 1948/49, pp. 79, 81, 89-91; N.G.A.R., 1948/49, pp. 146-7, 149, 157, 159.

Missions and education

In fact, the mission contribution was not all that it appeared. The statistics for mission education gave no indication of the quality of teaching. Only a few mission schools were conducted by fully-trained teachers, the great majority being adjuncts of outstations manned by Papua New Guinean catechists and evangelists who had themselves completed no more than a rudimentary primary education.[146] Enrolment of pupils was often erratic;

146. Little official comment on mission education was recorded before 1952, when the department formally assumed inspectorial functions; this reflected the department's reluctance to disturb its equable relationship with the missions.

many were older than was desirable in junior primary classes and others attended lessons for just one or two days a week, spending years at the same level before returning to village life. It was not until 1952 that the powers of inspection that had been exercised by the pre-war administrations were formally restored to the Department of Education by the Education Ordinance of that year, by which time haphazard developments had taken place in a number of areas.[147] This is not to belittle the mission accomplishment. Each of the major denominations conducted some schools equal to anything achieved by the Administration, and all faced enormous problems in obtaining teaching materials and maintaining contact with their more distant outstations. Moreover, there were two aspects of mission education that held important implications for the development of the Territory. The first was pointed out by Wedgewood, who otherwise took an uncharitable view of mission schooling: mission employees linked education with other aspects of life; were aware of the importance of religious observance in traditional life; and brought a sense of commitment to their task that was not necessarily possessed in the same degree by Administration teachers.[148] A second advantage, only vaguely apparent at the time, was that mission schooling gave the majority of its pupils only

147. There were delays in both the Department of Education and in Canberra in promulgating the legislation; for its major provisions, see Legge, op. cit., pp. 212-3.
148. Wedgewood, op. cit., pp. 5-7.

a fleeting impression of Western society, and this may have been preferable to a more intense official programme likely to create aspirations that could not then be met, owing to the continuing white domination of New Guinea.

In any event, there was little point in the Administration's questioning the quality of mission schooling, since the Education department was unable to assume any of the missions' responsibilities. In reviewing the department's work up to 1950, Groves had to emphasise the mission role, saying that "the part they were playing...and must necessarily play in the future must be very great. He went on to say that because the Administration lacked resources the Missions had carried out the larger part of the technical training under the C.R.T.S., and Mr. Groves considered that it would not be possible to provide anything like an adequate educational programme for the native people, especially in vernacular village schools, except with the participation of the Missions."[149] The Education department's prospects were no brighter at the end of 1951, when the new Minister for Territories was advised that he might have to consider "an expanding role...for the missions in the field of education", owing to the department's problems in carrying out its own teaching programme.[150]

149. CRS A518, item BQ800/1/1(A), 30 March 1950.
150. CRS A452, item 56/1197, 9 November 1951.

Missions and health services

Dr. Gunther took a direct - sometimes aggressive - approach to the question of mission involvement in health services. He enjoyed the advantage, in comparison with the Department of Education, of working from an established base, even though the health authorities were unable to cover the whole of the field themselves. Gunther sought the co-operation of the missions, but based his request for support on "certain tenets" that could leave the missions in little doubt as to his aims; at the mission conference of October 1946 Gunther stated his proposals:[151]

> (1) That medical care and attention for natives is only of secondary interest to Missions compared with their teaching of the Gospel and their interest in education.
>
> That missions will accept as a fact that the Public Health Department is finally responsible for the medical care of all people in these Territories, and that as the establishment of more hospitals can be undertaken by this Department any subsidy to the Mission in that area would cease.
>
> (2) That there exist, if not in theory in actual fact, certain well marked lines which divide the Territories into individual Mission "Spheres of Influence".
>
> (3) That Missionaries, as individuals, are the more suited to conduct certain ancillary medical establishments, such as Infant and Maternal Welfare Centres, Leprosaria and the Institutions for the care of Tuberculosis.

151. The material in this and the following passage is based on P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item 1-4-2, 9 October 1946. Gunther's reference to "spheres of influence" was meant to indicate that in virtually all areas where two or more missions operated, one was dominant; the department dealt mainly with the major group in each area.

Assuming mission agreement to his proposals, Gunther then stated that free drugs, on a specified list subject to annual review, would be supplied to all missions, as well as financial aid to those which employed qualified staff "stationed in places mutually agreed upon by the Director of Public Health and the Mission concerned". Such assistance would not be provided in areas where the Administration established its own hospitals; but in other instances it would give the department "the right to inspect all hospitals and clinics and to make any recommendations it thinks fit". In the case of specialised institutions, such as leprosaria, the department would build, equip and maintain the hospitals while the missions provided the staff, who would be paid from a grant allocated by the Administration. "These Institutions would be conducted as directed by the Department of Public Health."

One of the notable features of Gunther's proposals, compared with the education plan, was that they rested entirely on administrative decision, there being no legislative provision for the general oversight of medical services at the time. In general, the department was able to exercise satisfactory supervision, and used the sanction of withdrawing subsidies in only a few instances.[152] There was only limited success in

152. This and the following passage, including quotations, are drawn from CRS A452, item 56/1197, 13 December 1951.

delegating responsibility to the missions for some specialised functions, notably tuberculosis treatment; but on the other hand it proved unnecessary to withdraw subsidies from missions operating close to Administration health centres, owing to the expanding supply of drugs available to the department. Nevertheless, there were inevitable tensions, owing to the programme of rapid expansion pursued by the department, and Gunther had no hesitation in criticising the missions when he thought it necessary. Recommending caution in interpreting mission reports, he observed:

> The attitude of most [missions] has been, "Give us the tools and the money and we will use them as we think they should be used, but we are too busy to make reports so don't ask for them." Every mission...wittingly or unwittingly exaggerates the amount of work it does for the benefit of those who provide it with its finances to carry on...To boost their figures almost all of them show each individual treatment to the one patient as a separate unit of disease...Two treatments a day for a tropical ulcer would be shown as 60 tropical ulcers in the month against the one patient...Thus sometimes fantastic figures...of patients treated appear in their monthly returns. No means of persuasion known to us can alter this Mission practice.

Having placed the mission contribution in perspective, Gunther conceded that it was "essential that we give the Missions every physical aid to continue with the work they are doing and encourage them to do more". Yet there could be no doubt that the Health department controlled the provision of medical services generally; in the education field, by contrast, it sometimes appeared that the missions still dictated the course of events.

The planning committees

Against this background of accomplishments and problems during the immediate post-war years, the committees on Social Development Planning and Native Welfare Planning, both under Groves' chairmanship, began their regular meetings from late 1947.[153] The objectives of the two committees were unclear, and the material eventually submitted by them would have been better co-ordinated had it been included in the one document.[154] Nevertheless, both committees adopted the sensible approach of examining programmes already in progress; then investigating areas that were not being dealt with effectively under existing departmental structures; and finally recommending measures to produce a comprehensive, co-ordinated effort in the field of social welfare.

Social Development Planning Committee

The Social Development Planning Committee comprised mainly officers of the Department of Education: Groves

153. The genesis of these committees is outlined in Chapter Six, pp. 337-8.
154. Territory of Papua-New Guinea, Government House, Report of the Native Welfare Planning Committee of the Provisional Administration and Report of the Social Development Planning Committee etc., both Port Moresby, mimeo, 1948. The reports are referred to as Welfare and Social Development, respectively. The Committee on Native Welfare Planning commented on "the absence of any specific terms of reference" when submitting its report (Welfare, op. cit., p. 1).

as chairman; Miss Barbara McLachlan, a teacher; Mr. Charles Julius, an anthropologist, then research officer in the department; and Mr. C.J. Millar, Assistant District Officer, Department of District Services.[155] The committee presented a brief report consisting mainly of accounts of its later meetings, at which it had endorsed the five-year plan of the Department of Education. This plan was, in effect, the statement of broad aims presented by Groves to the mission conference of October 1946; it lacked comprehensive target figures for school construction and pupil enrolments, but it at least set out the argument for "broadly-based education", as favoured by Groves and his senior staff. However, the committee made the error of omitting even an outline of the plan from its final report, merely stating, "The Committee agreed to adopt the Five-Year Plan of the Department of Education as the first and major part of its recommendations."[156] Since the education plan had been seen by few people, the report of the Social Development Planning Committee was of little value as it stood. It was mainly of interest because, operating from its unstated assumptions about the nature of educational development, it went on to make complementary

155. Millar was one of the Angau officers who had visited Africa and the United Kingdom. He had already written a paper on the structure of the public service (see Chapter Six, pp. 369-70), and was working on the establishment of co-operative societies at the time of his membership of the Social Development committee.

156. Social Development, op. cit., p. 2.

recommendations on village welfare and mass education.

The committee saw a need, in addition to formal schooling, for the widest possible approach to community development. It observed:[157]

> The question of maintaining satisfactory group relationships and adapting their conditions to changing circumstances is one which involves the application of mass education techniques to deal, as broadly and deeply as possible, with the social, political, cultural and economic and physical welfare aspects of community life...Such co-ordinated activity can best be obtained through the selection of representative teams to carry out definite schemes in specific areas.

The total programme could be viewed as an "achievement in the general field of citizenship", with a more specific aim in the first instance:[158]

> That aim could, perhaps, be economic, and the target set might, in this Territory, be carefully selected and clearly defined in the agricultural sphere. To use an anthropological distinction, the ostensible function of the plan could be economic development, its latent function development in the field of citizenship: the two would, in fact, be mutually complementary.

Such a scheme would require close co-operation among the major departments concerned - Agriculture, Education, Public Health and District Services - and the committee recommended that pilot projects be established in the

157. Ibid., p. 12. The account provided in this and the following passage is more coherent than the report itself, which presented its major recommendations in an initial summary, gave further details in the minutes of its meetings and referred to appendices containing additional information; it bore all the signs of hasty and haphazard preparation.
158. Ibid., p. 13.

Northern and Western Districts of Papua to test methods of co-ordination.[159] To ensure co-operation in the long term, co-ordinating bodies would be required at both the central and village levels. Thus a Social Welfare Section was recommended for the Department of District Services; and Local Welfare Committees for the villages, with representatives of "village councils, Mission bodies, Native church congregations, Native school councils, European commercial interests and Native economic interests, such as co-operative organizations".[160] The Welfare Section and the village committees were expected to take a particular interest in the advancement of women and girls within the community and to pay special attention to those people who were adopting an urbanized pattern of life as the towns in the Territory underwent their sudden post-war expansion.[161]

For the rest, the social development report made several sweeping recommendations that illustrated the concerns and foresight of the committee, without providing detailed proposals for further action. The Department of Public Works, for example, should be "required" to provide suitable accommodation for all Administration employees; a committee should be established to examine

159. Ibid., pp. 1, 5. The concerns of the report bear a striking resemblance to those at present occupying the attention of the national government of Papua New Guinea.
160. Ibid., p. 11.
161. Ibid., pp. 11-12.

juvenile delinquency; a separate prisons organization should be set up; the U.N. Educational, Social and Cultural Organization should be asked to assist and co-ordinate programmes in the Territory; and special attention should be paid to workers' compensation and industrial welfare generally.[162] The members of the committee showed an awareness of recent thought on social development in the tropics, but the format and language of their report were so obscure as to be largely incomprehensible to the pragmatic officials whose more orthodox views carried so much weight in Port Moresby and Canberra.

Welfare Planning Committee

The Native Welfare Planning Committee presented a longer report which devoted 50 of its 79 pages to a consideration of factors affecting community health. By contrast with the passing reference to education planning in the document on social development, the welfare report set out the Health department's five-year programme in full, giving details of hospital construction and location, staffing, preventive medicine campaigns and co-operation

162. Ibid., pp. 1, 12-17. Some indication of the later delays in instituting these programmes is provided by the fact that the separate prisons organization and the labour measures were not put into effect until the latter 1950's; U.N. aid was not accepted by the Australian government until the 1960's and the question of housing for Papua New Guinean public servants has never been dealt with adequately, despite heavy expenditure beginning in the mid-1960's.

with missions; this was the fourth occasion upon which Gunther had presented an exposition of his plans, but the committee made no apology for the repetition, it being "purposely done to underline what we think is important".[163] The committee took as its general aim the improvement of "the physical and mental wellbeing of the native peoples" and, as the particular goal of its report, a programme to that end for the period to 1953/54.[164] As a first step the report proposed "....an acceptance of the native as a fellow human being...who is readily capable of being brought to our own [level] if the correct teaching medium is chosen".[165] The committee made it clear that there was no such acceptance by emphasising the need for intensive training to promote racial understanding at all levels of the public service.[166] From that training would flow a new approach to village administration, emphasising participation in development and not mere control of the population.

In order to promote increased participation by villagers in community life, the welfare report proposed "closer association...through organized sports, Boy Scout and Guide movements, First Aid classes, the early

163. Welfare, op. cit., p. 1. Gunther's proposals had already been put to Buttsworth, to Canberra in the reply to Buttsworth, and to the mission conference. The contrast between Gunther's persistence and Groves' lack of drive is again apparent.
164. Ibid., p. 4.
165. Ibid., p. 9.
166. Ibid., pp. 14-17.

creation of the Fourth Division of the Public Service, the introduction as soon as possible of the native people to the professions, controlled debating and dramatic and choral societies, the sponsoring of local arts and crafts and the introduction of our own cultures. Most of this is being undertaken by the Department of Education, but should be brought forward rapidly."[167] The committee further urged that a special training programme be established for "accepted native leaders" at village level; that local government councils and courts be set up as soon as possible; that co-operative societies be given "every impetus within reason"; that Village Women's Committees be formed to promote the emancipation of women; that the establishment of trade unions be investigated; and that a limited system of taxation be re-introduced.[168]

The welfare committee saw increased participation by the people not merely as a means to improve village life, but as a step towards the eventual mobilization of the population towards national goals. In its most prescient recommendation, the committee observed:[169]

> If it is the intention to bring at our earliest opportunity a measure of self-government, it is necessary these people become a homogeneous people

167. Ibid., pp. 9-10. The public service Fourth Division was intended to train Papua New Guineans for higher levels of the bureaucracy. It was eventually set up in 1957 (see Jinks, op. cit., pp. 143-4.)
168. Ibid., pp. 9-12, 15-16, 18-19.
169. The following passage is drawn from ibid., pp. 19-21

> rather than a series of tribes, clans and family groups loosely knit together under a common administrative procedure...As a protestation of our early intention and faith, this Administration should begin to drive home the necessity that the people regard themselves as Nationals of Papua and New Guinea. As a first step to this the Administration should introduce a National Name for the native people.

The committee recommended that the name "Papuan" be adopted and that other questions, such as the use of a national dress, be investigated. In creating a sense of national identity, much would depend on the slow processes of general education, but the committee believed that a more direct campaign should be instituted, using "ancillary instructional media, the wireless and the motion picture, to drive this propaganda to the fullest".

The committee pointed out that the public service's employment conditions and structure would have to be improved if the welfare programme were to be carried out. "We would suggest the hastening of the envisaged reclassification of the Public Service, the early establishment of Arbitration, but, above all, there must be the earliest declaration of a permanent Administration Organization...which will provide...superannuation, the promise of promotion and the legal safeguards of a Public Service Ordinance."[170] A building and town planning programme was also required to improve the conditions of all Administration officers and employees. It was

170. The following passage, including quotations, is drawn from ibid., pp. 1-3.

also essential that an Executive Council be established, since the committee system which had evolved since 1945 was "not acting purely as originally prescribed. We would suggest that the...Executive Council will bring wider thought to many problems." The committee then referred obliquely to the dominance of conservative pre-war officers at the senior advisory levels of the public service: "We feel that in interpreting our functions we can refer to a position within the Administration which may delay the successful implementation of any Policy, should it continue. We are very conscious that the best of intentions are easily frustrated today and we would warn that nothing should be attempted unless it can be developed...according to plan...."

The welfare committee, even more than the committee on social development, showed an awareness of long-range needs, while demonstrating its appreciation of the key administrative steps required to meet these needs. The two reports would have been more coherent had they been combined and presented in a more systematic format. Nevertheless, they represented a sincere attempt by the more progressive senior officers in the public service to draft a co-ordinated social welfare programme for the Provisional Administration; and it must be remembered that they were prepared by staff with many other pressing responsibilities. These two reports,

together with the plan which was prepared by the Economic Development Committee and is discussed in the next Chapter, were sent to Canberra between September 1948 and January 1949 for consideration by the Commonwealth Inter-Departmental Committee on New Guinea. They required, and deserved, detailed consideration by the Australian government, which at that time had failed to support its sweeping policy statements by administrative programmes.

CHAPTER EIGHT

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: PLANNING AND PARALYSIS

Need for action: Professor Isles - White interests and government controls - Palliatives for workers - Labour department seeks control Mr. J.L. Taylor - Labour problems - Highlands Labour Scheme - Pre-war policy: development by compulsion - Agriculture: the Cottrell-Dormer plan - Different approaches to co-operatives - Self-help movements - District Services control of co-operatives - Murray's demand for guaranteed markets - Murray's idealism - Economic Development Committee - Development finance and administration Need for Australian support

Need for action: Professor Isles

As in the field of social welfare, the programme of economic development set out by the Provisional Administration followed the broad policy announced by the Australian government in 1945.[1] The policy was

1. Details of the policy, such as it was, are set out In Chapter Five, pp. 265, 276.

by no means explicit, and its implications were complex and far-reaching for the planners who sought to produce effective action towards economic change among the people of the Territory. In his speech on the Papua-New Guinea Provisional Administration Bill Mr. Ward said, "....the basis for the economic development of the territory will be native and European industry with the limit of non-native expansion determined by the welfare of the natives generally."[2] It was far from clear what this statement meant in practical terms. On the one hand the words, if broadly construed, differed little from the sentiments of Sir Hubert Murray, who had often expressed the determination to maintain a balance between village and European interests. On the other hand, despite the protestations and policies of the pre-war years, the people of the country had remained merely a source of labour for white enterprises, which were confined almost entirely to planting and mining, with a commercial sector to support them. The question was whether the Australian government proposed to alter this pattern substantially; and if so, how it proposed to bring about this change.

It has been noted in Chapter Five that the clearest manifestation of the government's intentions appeared in the field of labour policy.[3] However, among the

2. C.P.D., Vol. 183, p. 4054, 4 July 1945.
3. See Chapter Five, pp. 275-6.

motives which shaped Ward's attitude to the question, concern for the welfare of the workers and for the political influence of employers ranked much higher than any awareness of the economic effects of revised labour conditions. This was consistent with the Minister's background and political convictions and also with the pattern of advice he received from the Directorate of Research, whose staff were concerned primarily with constitutional, strategic and social issues; only one of its members, Professor K.S. Isles, was an economist. Nevertheless, the decision by the Minister and the Directorate to concentrate on the welfare of the people in itself constituted an economic policy of sorts, since it necessarily limited the amount of labour available for plantation employment. From this point of view, labour was the key economic factor, as Isles pointed out to the first group of officers to attend the School of Civil Affairs in February 1945:[4]

> ....you can't properly decide what policy to adopt in expanding production for export by European planters and traders, unless you balance this aim against other aims. And the reason why you can't is the limited supply of native labour. The supply was probably up to the limit already before the war, and could not be increased unless you're going to break down the native way of life...Now, people who know New Guinea may tell you this is all moonshine; that, instead of 60,000 natives...you could safely draw off 100,000 /but/ that would not affect the form of my argument. For...unless very strict limits are placed on the recruitment of native labour, private business interests will find it profitable to invest capital in plantations, mining, trading and so on,

4. Monthly Notes, Vol. 1 No. 1, September 1946, p. 5. Emphasis as in the original.

> in such a stream that the native village economy will be stripped of the labour necessary to keep it going and developing...In other words, the scarce economic factor in New Guinea is, without any doubt, native labour...considerations of short-term economic benefit will push considerations of native welfare...right into the background - and will even undermine long-term economic benefit.

Isles therefore recommended the establishment of an Administration labour recruiting agency to replace the white entrepreneurs of earlier years; the control of private capital entering the country; the control of monopolies; imposition of tariffs that would benefit the village population rather than white businessmen; and implementation of a Territories Development and Welfare Act.[5] The Act, which Directorate staff saw as being modelled on British precedent, would, according to Isles, give "generous financial provision for schemes for developing the native methods of agriculture, food supplies, health, education, etc. That involves research, experimental plantations, experimental livestock farms, provision of a good medical and hospital service, and so on: not only research into improved methods and new products, but also into market conditions. And there will have to be close co-ordination of research organizations with the administration and its officers."[6]

Urging that the government quickly announce its policy, Isles in effect predicted the pattern of post-war

5. Ibid., p. 6.
6. Ibid.

events in New Guinea when he observed, "The Government cannot put off making a decision. In fact it decides by failing to decide. Day-to-day administrative decisions must be taken, whether the government decides on its basic policy or not. Private interests will make preparations to return, and the die will be cast. Basic policy will then have been decided by default."[7] When Ward presented the Provisional Administration Bill he endorsed the general principles propounded by Isles and the other members of the Directorate, but neglected to support them with legislative programmes for development and welfare on the British pattern. The failure to provide specific direction led to considerable speculation about the government's intentions and motives; and allowed those who were opposed to changes in policy to take advantage of the prevailing uncertainty and promote their sectional interests.

The main problem was that, if the Territory's export industries were to be limited in their operations by strict controls on labour and on the activities of entrepreneurs generally, then the country seemed fated to become an eternal welfare state.[8] There was a related

7. Ibid., p. 5.
8. By the 1940's gold production had declined steeply, leaving copra once more the vastly dominant source of export earnings; see, for example, P.A.R., 1948/49, p. 58 and N.G.A.R., 1948/49, p. 124. For examples of settler reaction to post-war financial policy, see P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 3, October 1947, p. 19 ("Orgy of Government Spending....") and Vol. 20 No. 1, August 1949, p. 35.

problem at the village level: if the labour supply were severely limited, those men who would otherwise have left to work would have to be found something to do at home.[9] However, village cash-cropping had an unfortunate history in those areas where it had been attempted before World War 2: the system of usufructory land rights placed major restrictions on the planting and harvesting of permanent tree crops by individuals, whose enthusiasm was further dampened by fluctuating world prices for tropical produce.[10] Even if, by some stroke of fortune, village participation could be assured, it would be many years before production could remotely approach exports from the European-owned plantations. The expansion of village holdings would require vast programmes of agricultural education and extension, and the Provisional Administration possessed very few staff in these fields.

White interests and government controls

In the meantime, resumption of activity by white planters could hardly be resisted, owing to the world shortage of tropical produce and the Provisional Administration's inability to staff even its own ranks,

9. The standard argument that villagers, if left to themselves, would "get into mischief" was a white rationalisation for exploitation, but it held some truth; with warfare banned by officials and much ritual forbidden by missionaries, village life could become very dull.
10. For accounts of pre-war attempts at village planting, see Mair, op. cit. (1948), pp. 86-91; Legge, op. cit., pp. 171-7 and Crocombe, op. cit.

far less an official production service as well. In these circumstances, and notwithstanding any limits placed on the level of labour recruitment, Europeans would inevitably re-assert their dominance over the Territory economy. Once this occurred, it would be all the more difficult to shake their control: every attempt to set up a village production project would threaten the plantations' labour supply and would therefore be resisted; and the stronger the white plantation sector, the stronger the resistance. Thus the government's policies on marketing, labour and agricultural extension were closely linked, even when, as in the case of village projects, they seemed to have little direct bearing on white interests. Events in each of these fields had an important bearing on the attempts to drawn up development plans in the 1947/48 period, so that, as in the matter of social welfare, they must be considered as background to the report of the Provisional Administration's Economic Development Committee.[11]

In the fields of marketing and employment, in particular, the government at first showed every intention of retaining the complete control that had been asserted by Angau during the war years, but soon found that it

11. As in the social welfare field, there are published accounts of the major post-war developments in the economic sphere; these will be summarised, referred to in footnotes and expanded only where important details have been omitted or require re-evaluation. The emphasis is again on the genesis of the programmes rather than on the programmes themselves.

could not sustain such an effort. For several years the Territory's coastal trade was conducted by the Commonwealth Directorate of Shipping,[12] while the Production Control Board, which had been run by Angau, came under the full control of the Minister for External Territories in 1946, when an officer of his Department was appointed its chairman.[13] However, the Board gradually withdrew from commercial activities as private traders returned to the Territory, while continuing to organize the purchase of all copra within Papua New Guinea and its sale in Australia. Its activities were maintained, according to official reports, "owing to the vital importance of the copra industry to the Territory and the need to firmly establish the industry"; there was not even a mention of special assistance to village producers, far less any suggestion that European plantations should be controlled. The Board concentrated its purchasing depots at the main ports of the Territory, paying cash on delivery and meeting all handling and transport costs. This was not as advantageous to producers as it may have seemed, since ruling prices were higher on world markets than those paid by the Board.[14] Planters protested when the Board established a Copra Stabilization Fund, under which a further deduction was made from the producer's return and

12. Department of the Government Secretary, Circular Memorandum No. 24 of 1947, 13 November 1947. See Chapter Four, pp. 199-202 for an account of the government's ineffectual efforts to control shipping.
13. This and the following passage are based on N.G.A.R., 1948/49, p. 31.
14. P.I.M., Vol. 7 No. 4, November 1946, p. 9.

accumulated in a Board-controlled fund as a safeguard against future price fluctuations.[15] As the Fund increased and copra prices showed no sign of falling, the planters, who were not represented on the Board, grew increasingly restive, demanding that they be allowed the full return on their produce and be permitted to seek the best available price on the world market.[16]

The government's control of the copra trade was of greater benefit to Australia during the shortages of the immediate post-war years than it was to the villagers of New Guinea; by 1946 the plantations in the Territory had recovered sufficiently to supply the full Australian copra requirement of 25,000 tons annually. In achieving this situation, the government lost any slight chance it may have had of loosening the European hold on the Territory economy. The Production Control Board's only assistance to villagers was to permit direct sale of smallholders' produce to its marketing points, but these were so few in number that the great majority of villagers continued to sell at reduced prices to planters and traders. In the meantime, plantation production continued to increase, until by mid-1948 it reached some 40,000 tons annually, considerably in excess of Australian requirements and about two-thirds of the estimated total capacity of existing plantings.[17] From a certain point

15. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 7, February 1947, p. 6.
16. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 11, June 1947, pp. 15, 21; Vol. 18 No. 3, October 1947, pp. 3-4.
17. P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 12, July 1948, p. 10.

of view, this was a major accomplishment in the face of post-war difficulties. On the other hand, this return to normalcy also marked a resurgence of white economic power. Indeed, the extra production began to embarrass the government to the point where Mr. Ward was forced to announce in July 1948 that the Production Control Board would be disbanded and producers permitted to market their copra independently under a series of export licences, a system similar in principle to that which had existed before the war.[18] In the event, there were administrative delays and the Board continued to function until it was replaced in March 1952 by a Copra Marketing Board, which performed similar functions but included two producer representatives among its five members.[19] As the minimal level of government control was reduced further, white domination of export production went unchallenged.

Palliatives for workers

In the employment field the Australian government similarly failed to exercise rigid controls of the kind needed to reverse the precedents of the pre-war years. A radical change of emphasis, of the kind envisaged by Isles, would have meant encouraging villagers to stay at home, producing on their own account, rather than continuing as low-cost labourers for white entrepreneurs. This was made impossible when the Australian government acquiesced in

18. Ibid.
19. P.I.M., Vol. 22 No. 9, April 1952, p. 91.

the revival of the plantation industry under private ownership, in order to meet short-term needs for coconut products. Thus Ward's speech on the Provisional Administration Bill, made some four months after Isles outlined his proposals, contained no reference to the control of private capital and monopolies, nor to preferential tariffs faouring village interests;[20] all that remained were several provisions relating to employment - improved conditions and hours of work and somewhat higher wages, for example - that were no more than palliatives to relieve the worst excesses of the pre-war period. Indeed, the proposal to abolish the system of indenture within five years simply gave employers ample time in which to campaign against the reforms.[21]

On the question of labour reform, the Provisional Administration was once more placed in an ambivalent position. The Minister at times gave every indication that he would take drastic action against white employers, regardless of the short-term effects on the Territory economy: he had cancelled labour contracts, against all advice;[22] and continued, in strongly-worded statements, to criticise the "exploiters" of the New Guinea people.[23]

20. See Chapter Five, pp. 275-7 and pp. 468-70 of this Chapter.
21. Further aspects of this matter are discussed in Chapters Nine and Ten.
22. See Chapter Four, pp. 202-6.
23. A typical example of Ward's approach was his statement of early 1946 that he was determined to break the "stranglehold" of commercial interests over New Guinea (Sydney Daily Mirror, 5 February 1946). His attitude is discussed further in Chapter Nine.

However, he failed to produce legislation, or even administrative action in his own Department, that in any way corresponded with his tough public stance; even the limited measures announced in the Provisional Administration Bill were severely compromised during the next four years by indecisiveness and delay in Canberra. The combination of threats and inaction produced the worst possible combination of circumstances for the Administration: it was opposed at every step by employers made fearful of the future, but was unable to act firmly in carrying out the policy announced by the Minister. As the settlers grew increasingly aware of the administrative difficulties being encountered in Port Moresby, their opposition to reform became stronger and more effective

Labour department seeks control

The initial problems facing the labour authorities in Papua New Guinea arose from a combination of local circumstances and the setting of contradictory policy aims by the Australian government. On 26 June 1945 Cabinet approved the immediate establishment of a Department of Native Labour, but gave it no specific functions, merely stating that its establishment would "ensure the best administration of the system".[24] This was immediately rendered doubtful by other aspects of the labour policy.

24. Cabinet Agendum of 26 June 1945, attached to T.P.-N.G., Department of Native Labour, DS1-1-1 of 5 February 1946.

On the one hand, there was some attempt to discourage the indenture system by ending the pre-war practice of licensing professional recruiters and confining powers of engagement to employers and their salaried agents: "recruiting fees, bonuses, commissions or considerations other than salary are not to be allowed".[25] On the other hand, the Administration was intended to become a pace-setter for industrial reform by engaging its own workers on a "casual" or free basis, rather than under indenture. To this end, the Department of Native Labour was to act as an employment exchange. This experiment, which ran directly counter to pre-war practice, may have proved reasonably effective in stable circumstances: that is, if the Administration's demand for labour had been relatively small, as in pre-war years, and it had been able to separate the employment function from inspectorial duties. Employment conditions during the Provisional Administration period were far from normal, however. Cabinet decided that priority in the allocation of labour should be given to defence works, Administration works and services, commerce and shipping, agriculture, mining and new industries.[26] Following the withdrawal of Angau to the Gazelle Peninsula within the first few months of civil rule, the burden of reconstruction fell upon the Provisional Administration, which by 1948 was employing some 10,000 workers, five times as many as had been

25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.

required by government before the war.[27] This not only diverted the attention of the department's staff from labour inspections, but compromised the Provisional Administration as the controlling authority, for it had suddenly become the largest single employer in the country. The department had scarcely greater success than private employers in obtaining the clothing, rations, equipment and quarters prescribed by regulation, so that it consistently contravened the provisions that it was supposed to enforce.[28]

Mr. J.L. Taylor

The Labour department faced major problems in acquiring staff. In view of the importance apparently attached to the department by the Minister, it was considered essential that an outstanding officer be appointed as its Director: a man who would be in complete sympathy with the government's aims in the employment field. The first choice was James L. Taylor, the explorer of the Highlands who had expressed radical views at the 1944 Angau conference.[29] Taylor took up duty during the last week of October 1945, before the Provisional Administration had been formally proclaimed. Within a few days he and a very able assistant, J.B. McKenna,

27. Stanner, Transition, op. cit., pp. 137-9.
28. T.P.-N.G., Department of Native Labour, Annual Report 1946/47, Port Moresby, typescript, 1947, pp. 7-8.
29. See Chapter Two, p. 117.

produced a series of circulars and proposals that demonstrated their efficiency and awareness of issues. Taylor's approach closely resembled that which was later adopted by Gunther in the medical field: to take direct action and solve problems as they arose. By early 1946 Taylor had arrived at his proposed functions for the department and in seeking Murray's approval for them observed, "The difficulty in organizing a Department before it is known what the ambit of its operations is to be... will be appreciated...The following proposals...indicate the lines upon which the Department is being organized and for which approval has been assumed."[30] He wished to see the department relieved of its responsibilities for Administration employment and provided with a greatly increased staff to carry out inspections of villages to ensure that limits on recruitment were rigorously enforced. Taylor's other proposals involved the conduct of extensive research into labour conditions, a reduction in the amount of menial labour by greater use of machinery, and conduct of training schemes for private employees. However, by the time he submitted his recommendations to Murray, Taylor had already become disillusioned by the lack of support from Canberra and the consequent reassertion of pre-war norms. In a cynical observation to the Administrator a few weeks after being appointed, Taylor stated:[31]

30. This and the following passage are based on T.P.-N.G., Department of Native Labour, DS1-1-1, 5 February 1946.
31. T.P.-N.G., Department of Native Labour, DNL29/25, 21 November 1945.

> What has been done in the past can be done again, more or less in the same manner, but I am under the impression that we are charged with the duty of creating a new department to put into effect the Commonwealth Government's policy. I am well aware that this course will involve considerable expenditure, a fact that was brought to the notice of Cabinet...Staff of the Department...should not be long left in doubt as to the future of the Department, in which theirs has become involved.

Taylor already doubted whether major reforms could really have been intended and noted that, without adequate finance and staff, the new department was merely a gesture. Under the circumstances, he wrote:[32]

> Were I asked to recommend the most economical... method of...regulating Native Labour I should, without hesitation, recommend that it be left entirely to the Department of District Services and Native Affairs...an extremely satisfactory solution for a Territory without adequate revenues....

Taylor's sarcasm was prompted by the fact that he still had only one trained officer on his staff. Dissatisfied with the situation, he requested release in order to return to the Highlands.[33] In April 1946 Taylor was posted as District Officer to Goroka and the Labour department was left to make a fresh start from the frustrations of the first few months of its existence.

Taylor was replaced as acting Director of Labour by Mr. W.R. Humphries, a former Resident Magistrate who, having joined the Papuan service in 1912, was by several

32. Ibid.
33. Murray journal, p. 137. Taylor also encountered some difficulty with the Port Moresby white community, but this was not the major reason for his wanting to leave the Labour department.

years the most senior continuously-serving officer in the Territory.[34] At the time of his appointment Humphries was already 55 years of age and, although a humanitarian and paternalist of the "Murray tradition", he lacked the flexibility and drive that had been brought to the position by J.L. Taylor. From the innovative organization that had initially been proposed for the administration of labour matters, the department under Humphries came to concentrate on the essential procedures that were required to check the more obvious abuses occurring on the plantations. This was not entirely Humphries' fault, since the department continued to face problems arising from the lack of adequate legislation and staff; nevertheless, he may have achieved more results by adopting the direct approach favoured by such people as Taylor and Gunther.

At the declaration of civil administration, draft legislation had already been prepared to give effect to the labour policy announced by Ward, and it was expected that the department would need to operate for only a few weeks under its peculiar amalgam of pre-war Ordinances from both Territories and some post-war regulations.[35] However, as Mair later noted:[36]

34. The fact that Humphries had not already received a senior appointment was a source of dissatisfaction among some former Papuan staff; related correspondence is in P.N.G.N.A. Box 185, item 21/3, folios March-May 1946.
35. T.P.-N.G., Department of Native Labour, Circular Instruction No. 1, 28 October 1945.
36. Mair, op. cit. (1948), p. 218.

> Many months were to pass...before the Department of External Territories could find time, in the pressure of work which overwhelmed it, to make these alterations, and Mr. Ward did not apparently consider that there was any necessity to give this matter priority. It finally received the Governor-General's assent a few days after the general election of September, 1946, at which the Labour Government was returned; there were not lacking those who attributed to the Department the hope that, had the election gone the other way, it would be allowed to lapse.

Having gained the statutory authority it needed, after a wait of almost twelve months, the department then found difficulty in obtaining the inspectorial staff essential for putting the legislative provisions into effect. This problem arose largely from the uncertainty concerning the department's role. At the time of the Buttsworth investigation at the end of 1946 it was still not clear whether the labour authorities would be required, for example, to provide a "labour exchange", proposed by Taylor as a means of reducing workers' reliance on indenture as an avenue of employment.[37] Buttsworth disapproved of this function, on the grounds that the employment and inspection of labour should not be the responsibility of a single agency.[38] However, Buttsworth misconstrued the proposal, which involved an advisory rather than a direct employment service by the Administration. Consequently, he made no reference to the possible alternative of establishing an independent employment exchange as a step towards improving employment opportunities, nor to Taylor's

37. Taylor's other proposals are outlined on p. 480 of this Chapter.
38. This and the following passage are based on Buttsworth, op. cit., "Labour", p. 1.

proposals that the department undertake extensive research into labour matters and carry out continuing field surveys to check on recruitment levels in the villages. These recommendations were virtually ignored by Humphries, and so functions that were vital to the institution of labour reforms were allowed to lapse without further inquiry.[39] In the meantime, the Labour department had to carry out other duties, including supervision of workers, of which no one approved and for which staff were therefore not provided.

Labour problems

The Labour department was required to supervise the recruitment and employment of labour for official purposes, notably for stevedoring, during the whole of the Provisional Administration period.[40] In engaging extra staff for this purpose, the department had to employ more officers than were allowed it by Buttsworth in 1947: the original establishment provided it with only 28 positions, or 1.7 per cent of the total service, while at 30 June 1947 it employed 45 officers, or 4.6 per cent of the public servants engaged at that date.[41] It was the only

39. Report on Buttsworth, op. cit., Vol. 1, "Labour", pp. 1-2. Humphries proposed only that a statistical section be established and that inspections be confined to places of employment, rather than extended to villages generally.
40. Private employers maintained that they were unable to recruit labour for stevedoring, while they no doubt enjoyed the low handling charges levied by the Administration (Mair, op. cit. (1948), p. 214).
41. N.G.A.R., 1946/47, p. 14.

department in this position. Most departments experienced serious staff shortages, but were able to make acting appointments within their ranks. This opportunity was denied the Labour department, which could not recruit inspectors while it remained overstaffed with white overseers and supervisors. Moreover, the lack of government interest in the organization, and the limitations of its staff, became obvious when it was one of only two departments that failed to gain increased establishment by 1949, following the strong protests against the Buttsworth report.[42]

Faced with these problems, Humphries reported in a querulous tone in 1947. Commenting on the stevedoring duties of his department, he observed, "There were many complaints regarding the manner in which the work was done; but this was not surprising in view of the lack of handling facilities, and the fact that experienced staff were not available...Inspectors of native labour are not stevedores and they have a multitude of other duties to perform."[43] The record of inspections had therefore not been particularly good:[44]

> There are approximately 120 main places of employment. Of these, 55 were inspected during the year, 26 being visited twice by Inspectors of Native Labour, and 29

42. N.G.A.R., 1948/49, p. 17. The Police department was the only other organization unable to secure an increase in staff establishment.
43. Labour Report 1946/47, op. cit., p. 14.
44. Ibid., p. 8. The "scores of places" of minor employment should be added to the figures quoted in the report to achieve an accurate picture of the inspection task and the department's performance.

> on one occasion only. Shortage of staff has greatly curtailed the plans made for a three-monthly inspection of all the major places of employment, and of the scores of places where small numbers of natives are employed.

Referring to the difficulty in maintaining the supply of labour, Humphries suggested that many men were reluctant to engage for work on plantations because they much preferred to stay close to home, and would do so if able to operate their own holdings profitably.[45] However, Humphries was reluctant to take a firm stand in encouraging village enterprises:[46]

> For every ten men who leave home today to work on distant plantations there would be thirty available if the same class of work were near at hand...But the expansion of native enterprises on a large scale in the vicinity of villages would change the economy of the country. Labour would not be available for European-owned plantations and these, except for a few favourably situated, would cease to exist.

Thus, as Stanner later observed, the post-war labour situation marked the "restoration of an old problem".[47] In considering why controls on labour had been ineffectual he wrote, "Presumably, the problem simply ran away, for it could not be done without some form of parallel investment control and this would have forced some difficult issues for Government capital expenditure." In fact, it is unlikely that the government even comprehended the

45. Ibid., pp. 1-2. It is worth noting that the problem of labour supply was the first matter dealt with by Humphries.
46. Ibid., p. 2. Compare this ineffectual attitude with Sir Hubert Murray's pronouncement on indenture, noted in Chapter Five, p. 271, footnote 44.
47. This and the following passage are drawn from Stanner, Transition, op. cit., pp. 140-1.

problem; and there was little chance of dealing imaginatively with particular employment questions after J.L. Taylor left the Labour department. By 1949 Ward's proposed labour reforms had achieved almost nothing.

Highlands Labour Scheme

Had the labour supply been confined to pre-war sources, it would have proved wholly inadequate for the expanded needs that arose from 1945. These included greatly increased Administration requirements, claims for rebuilding plantations, and demands for trade trainees, school pupils and domestic servants for the rapidly growing white population.[48] It became possible to service both the official and private sectors only because the Highlands region was opened to recruiting in 1950.[49] The main problem in recruiting from the Highlands was disease: wartime experience had shown that the people from the mountains were dangerously susceptible to coastal diseases, notably malaria, tuberculosis and dysentry; and their hurried repatriation to their homes once the sickness pattern emerged had caused those diseases to become endemic in the Highlands area itself.[50] However, by 1949 the Health department had gained sufficient experience with new drugs

48. Labour Report 1946/47, op. cit., p. 2. Humphries comment on employment priorities was, "The number of Europeans resident in the country has increased threefold, and Europeans must have native servants."
49. This decision was taken before Labor's 1949 defeat, and so is discussed here rather than in chronological sequence.
50. See Chapter Seven, pp. 425-6.

to be confident that the diseases could now be controlled. Moreover, it was desirable, in Gunther's opinion, "to give certain Highland people an opportunity to work on the coast and enter an economy pattern available to others".[51] There was no immediate prospect of economic development in the Highlands, so that as far as Gunther was concerned the matter resolved itself into a question almost entirely of health control. In conferences with the Directors of Native Labour and District Services he took the lead in setting most stringent conditions for what became the Highlands Labour Scheme. These required that recruits be vaccinated; that they be employed "only at a centre where a medical practitioner or medical assistant acceptable to the Director of Public Health" was stationed; that prescribed doses of Paludrine anti-malarial be administered to the employee; that penicillin be kept for immediate treatment of any respiratory infections; that all diseases affecting Highlands workers be immediately reported; that all labourers be returned to approved health centres upon repatriation; and that failure to comply with the prescribed conditions would lead to "immediate cancellation of the contract".[52] This was a model for what might once have been done for workers from coastal villages.

51. This and the following passage, including quotations, are drawn from CRS A518, item 57/2748, 15 December 1949.
52. In addition, all recruitment was by the Labour department and was on contract - it was several years before Highlanders were able to move freely to the coast to engage in casual employment.

The Highlands Labour Scheme was administered strictly and the many thousands of workers who left their mountain villages for the coastal plantations were the virtual saviours of the white economy, although they have never been acknowledged as such and their lack of sophistication has given rise to much sarcasm among employers.[53] Yet the fact that the Scheme was instituted at all, and that large numbers of villagers were processed throught it - 6,100 workers left the Highlands in the first year of operation alone[54] - marked the final abandonment of plans for a revolutionary change in the economic structure and control of the country.[55] Instead, any programmes for economic development at the village level had to be drafted with competition from the European sector in mind. In this sphere the planners encountered the problems that had bedevilled pre-war Papua: how to encourage general participation and maintain enthusiasm when returns from village enterprise were so small and slow in coming. Of necessity, the burden of these programmes fell upon those officers who favoured extension techniques for community

53. See, for example, P.I.M., Vol. 21 No. 12, July 1951, p. 91 and Vol. 22 No. 3, October 1951, p. 76. The attitude of employers was apparent from the suggestion of a correspondent that, "It will be interesting to see if the Minj boys put up any records when they get to grips with that hitherto unknown quality (sic), steady work." (Ibid.).
54. P.I.M., Vol. 21 No. 12, July 1951, p. 91.
55. The establishment of white plantations in the Highlands later allowed villagers to work locally and prompted the establishment of the village plots that are now so important to the Highlands economy; but the whites soon established economic dominance in the area: the village role was merely somewhat larger, in comparison with that in the coastal areas.

development: that is, the encouragement of local initiative through education and incentive, in contrast with the development-by-direction approach of the pre-war period.[56] The techniques could be applied in all fields; the programmes for social welfare and local government development, noted in the previous Chapter, were clearly based on them. It was in the area of economic change that they met their first serious test.

Pre-war policy: development by compulsion

Pre-war development of village agriculture had been restricted by shortage of staff and a lack of understanding of traditional society, in addition to the demands for plantation labour. As a consequence, the people of both Territories were required by law to plant and maintain a stipulated number of cash-crop trees, usually coconuts. In the Mandated Territory there was no assistance with production or marketing; the main intention was apparently that the people should sell produce to planters and traders in order to meet their head-tax payments.[57] Sir William MacGregor introduced a similar provision in Papua and this was developed by Sir Hubert Murray, in what at first seemed an imaginative measure, into the Native Plantations Ordinance. The intention of the "native

56. The "community development" concept has always been vague and this has been one of its major problems. For an early statement resembling the Groves-Cottrell-Dormer approach, see T.R. Batten, Communities and their Development, London, O.U.P., 1957.
57. See Mair, op. cit. (1948), pp. 100-4.

plantations" was to encourage communal enterprise on a larger scale than that generally found in traditional society, as well as to provide the people with assets and income under their exclusive control.[58] Unfortunately, motives became confused when the plantations scheme became linked with obligations to pay head tax; as Mair later observed, "....in some respects the plantation takes on the appearance of a remedy to which the harrassed officer turns in desperation when he finds it impossible to collect the taxes due".[59] Thus the scheme came to involve European-imposed obligations, rather than the encouragement of enterprise for its own sake. It finally collapsed when, during the Depression, the price of most produce fell below the cost of freighting it from the Territory. As a consequence, the people became wholly disillusioned and many officials became even more convinced that "native ignorance" could be countered only by stricter compulsion.[60] Apart from these attitudes, little remained from the pre-war efforts but a few overgrown coconut groves, plus the remnants of the Sangara (Northern District) coffee scheme and the Mekeo (Central District) rice project, both of which were revived in the 1940's, despite earlier failures. It was a discouraging background against which to argue that development could occur through village initiative.

58. There is a useful review of the policy in Legge, op. cit., pp. 171-7.
59. Mair, op. cit. (1948), p. 88.
60. For the attitude of a former Mandated Territory agricultural officer, see Chapter Two, p. 116.

Agriculture: the Cottrell-Dormer plan

Despite the failures of the pre-war years, the Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries emphasised village welfare and development in its programmes for the Provisional Administration.[61] In the manner of Gunther at the Department of Public Health, Cottrell-Dormer, the acting Director of Agriculture, took advantage of several opportunities to publicise his department's plans,[62] and in his recommendations on the Buttsworth report he provided the most succinct statement of his aims:[63]

> The objectives of the Department...may briefly be stated as follows:
>
> 1. In co-operation with the Department of Public Health, the improvement of native nutrition.
>
> 2. The improvement of the living standard of the native people by the development of:-
>
> a. Permanent systems of mixed farming for small holders;
> b. Native internal trade and industry;
> c. Native export industries and generally of mutual trade with the Commonwealth and other countries.
>
> 3. The provision of technical services for the assistance of non-native enterprises within the Territory.

These questions had been investigated to some extent by the Department of Agriculture of the Mandated Territory,

61. Colonel Murray recalls that the department's name was intended to call Canberra's attention to its broad functions, although it "didn't help much" (Notes, p. 64).
62. The proposals were less detailed than the Health department's, but they included such continuing publicity as regular readio broadcasts and a journal of agriculture.
63. Report on Buttsworth, op. cit., Vol. 2, "Agriculture", p. 1.

but much of its attention had been devoted to the diversification of cash crops, particularly on plantations; it was therefore significant that such work was given low priority by Cottrell-Dormer. In his address to the mission conference of October 1946, the Director spoke of his vision of a stable, secure nation of farmers:[64]

> The principal basic unit of the community will be the rural family...producing food and other crops for its own and local consumption and export...The rural family will largely be dependent on the produce of the small-holding for its food. Hence not only must the farming system include efficient and non-wasteful methods, but it must also include the most suitable kinds and varieties of food crops and provision for storage against lean times. Furthermore, since the rural family will also be dependent largely on the small-holding for its income it will produce crops for sale.../I/t will...not achieve full security unless it grows a diversity of crops, in each case using the most suitable kinds and varieties. Finally, particularly in the case of export crops, the produce of the small-holder will need to be treated or processed and stored by the small-holder himself or by the Marketing Board or Co-operative Society which will handle his produce.

Cottrell-Dormer went on to outline an equally glowing future for new crops, notably tea, suggesting that nuclear estates could be used to teach villagers techniques of production which could then be applied to their own holdings.[65] Following the establishment of suitable processing and marketing facilities, the proceeds from co-operative enterprises could then be used to re-purchase the nuclear estates from white entrepreneurs. Cottrell-Dormer was willing to concede that certain other activities

64. P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item 1-4-2, 15 October 1946.
65. This and the following passage, including quotations, are drawn from ibid. Something similar eventually occurred with Highlands coffee plantations, but in an unsystematic way.

would be necessary in a "self-governing and self-supporting community", which would have to "engage to some extent in secondary industry (including small village industries such as soap and sugar for local consumption) and will therefore include a proportion of teachers, clerks, artisans, technicians, traders and wage-earners of various kinds". Clearly, this would be a far different society from the one inherited from pre-war colonialism; and, indeed, from that which developed under the rampant white capitalism of the two following decades.

Cottrell-Dormer's visionary schemes, like those of Groves at Education, had little chance of success without the full backing of the Australian government against the white power structure of the Territory. And even their partial acceptance was in jeopardy unless he could produce an administrative organization capable of dealing with at least some of the problems involved. There were technical questions concerning the suitability of crops and techniques for the New Guinea environment - for example, it was twenty years before tea was produced commercially in the country. Moreover, the concept of "small-holdings" ran counter to the communal system of land use and suggested a massive programme of tenure conversion if it were to be put into effect. There was a further difficulty in establishing holdings large enough to secure the diversification of planting the Director considered essential, while maintaining an economic unit for each crop. But the major problem was a social one: how were

people already subjected to strong Western influences to be persuaded to stay at home?[66]

Answers to such questions were not apparent from the agriculture scheme which, like the education programme, was expressed in broad terms and encompassed numerous general goals. Nor did the structure proposed for the Agriculture department give a clear indication of priorities for development. The department in 1946 possessed five divisions: agricultural extension, animal industry, fisheries, production and marketing, and experimental stations. These were intended to put new programmes into effect, notably in extension and fisheries, and also to continue long-standing activities, such as experimental work.[67] However, the most experienced, pre-war staff were still interested in testing new crops, and so devoted much of their attention to the experimental farms, leaving the broader functions of extension and marketing to the Director.[68] This seems to have accorded with Cottrell-Dormer's own wishes, but in engaging in field work he had to limit the attention he could pay to administrative issues. The combination of circumstances produced a department that was over-diverse for the amount of central

66. The task might have been less difficult had there not been an enormous growth of European interests under the "develop by white example" policies of later years (see Jinks, Biskup, Nelson (eds.), op. cit., pp. 354-64, 394-401), but it would still have been formidable.
67. For further details of the divisions' functions, see Stanner, Transition, op. cit., pp. 148-50.
68. Experimental work was emphasised in Cottrell-Dormer's radio talk on agriculture plans of 5 November 1946, reproduced in Monthly Notes, Vol. 1 No. 4, December 1946, p. 5.

direction that was available to it.[69] The problem of diversified effort was accentuated by the difficulty of recruiting the professional staff necessary to co-ordinate the department's numerous activities. Following the very poor reception accorded Cottrell-Dormer's establishment proposals by the Buttsworth investigation,[70] the department secured only 82 positions out of a public service of 1,583, or five per cent of the total.[71] Of these, it had filled 35 at 30 June 1947, giving it only 3.5 per cent of staff engaged by that time. By mid-1949 the department's establishment had grown to nine per cent of the Administration's total, but it still engaged just 7.6 per cent of the staff on duty, giving it an employment rate of 56 per cent, considerably lower than the District Services and Public Health departments' and no better than that of the Department of Education, which had begun from a smaller base.[72] Its main accomplishment at that stage was engaging in field work, which provided a relatively high ratio of departmental expenditure away from headquarters.[73]

69. This is not to say that the department's structure and plans were over-ambitious, as maintained by Buttsworth (see Chapter Six, pp. 368-9); they were no more elaborate than those for the Health department, but had less clear objectives and were not supported by Gunther's drive.
70. See Chapter Six, pp. 359, 368-9.
71. The statistics in this and the following passage are drawn from N.G.A.R., 1946/47, p. 14 and 1948/49, p. 17.
72. For comparative staffing and establishment figures, see Chapter Seven, pp. 403, 424-5, 440.
73. It was noted in Chapter Seven (p. 401) that in this respect the Department of Agriculture performed considerably better than the Education department; however, money spent on experimental work was of little immediate benefit to villagers.

Different approaches to co-operatives

Cottrell-Dormer suffered from the further disadvantage, in establishing his department's role, of being a newcomer to Papua New Guinea and therefore not a member of the network of pre-war officials who exerted considerable influence in the Provisional Administration's advisory bodies.[74] Nor was he able to win acceptance among the pragmatists by achieving quick results in developing village agriculture. These problems were particularly important in determining the fate of one of Cottrell-Dormer's key proposals: the development of village enterprises through co-operative activity. In his speech to the 1946 Mission conference the Director suggested that one of the functions of his department's Division of Production and Marketing would be the "organizing and supervision of native co-operative societies".[75] This was an obvious development from the Division of Agricultural Extension's activities in encouraging the system of mixed small-holdings which Cottrell-Dormer saw as the basis for the country's future economy. Prior to this, however, there had been support for the co-operative principle in other quarters; it had been discussed in classes at the School of Civil Affairs, had been studied by C.J. Millar during his overseas tour,

74. For details of the personalities involved, see Chapter Six, pp. 342-51. Nor was Gunther a member of the network, but he forced it to pay attention to his demands.
75. P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item 1-4-2, 15 October 1946.

and was one of the aspects of village participation endorsed by Groves in his proposals for a broadly-based educational system.[76] The establishment of a network of co-operative societies within the Territory thus provided a challenge to the Provisional Administration's ability to co-ordinate its activities among several related agencies.

From the outset, there were different approaches to the co-operatives question, and rivalry between departments to capture the "co-operative" function for themselves. Cottrell-Dormer and Groves saw the answer to greater village participation in the use of correct techniques by staff in their dealings with the people; broadly, this required less emphasis on direction and control.[77] How this should be accomplished was less than clear. Outlining their work on extension projects at Madang, Wewak and in the Ramu Valley, officials of the education and agriculture departments later suggested that there was no particular solution to the problem of securing village participation; and in a passage as indefinite as the methods proposed, they noted:[78]

76. See Chapter Two, p. 107, ibid., and Chapter Seven, pp. 457-9.
77. T.P.&N.G., Department of Education, "Community Development through Rural Progress Societies", South Pacific, Vol. 5 No. 7, September 1951, p. 123.
78. This and the following passage, including the quotation, are drawn from ibid., pp. 125-6. Although the review was written long after the control of the co-operative movement was decided, the article itself was an attempt by the Education and Agriculture departments to justify their approach to the development question.

> The projects...illustrate the diversity of approaches which are being explored by the Extension Division of the Department of Agriculture, and are considered by that Division to indicate the pattern which community development may take through agricultural improvements. Neither communal enterprise nor individual peasant farming is paramount. Rather is the one considered as a joint effort to make techniques commonly known, with the possibility that improved individual peasant production may follow. In any case, apart from individual preferences and economic possibilities, there is no preference shown by the Department for either form - the aim is toward increase of economic potential and improved standards of living.

The article concluded that there had been some success in encouraging new projects by use of non-directive techniques. However, all this was much too vague for field officers who were being asked, by both their superiors and the village people, for quicker, measurable results.

Owing to their numbers and the wide scope of their activities, the field staff, rather than the specialist officers of the Agriculture and Education departments, had first dealings with spontaneous economic movements in the villages. Following the first round of post-war patrols to the villages, it was reported:[79]

> The native peoples of the Territory are becoming increasingly aware of an organized economy. In several Divisions there is a general desire to band together in order to obtain more trade goods at reasonable prices, and through the same agency, to market whatever surplus food stuff, etc. they might possess. District Co-operative Societies are in the process of formation in connection with which all possible advice is being given by Administration officials.

79. P.A.R., 1946/47, p. 14.

There were several reasons for village awareness: the people's observation of wartime activity and materials; the shortage of goods in European-owned trade stores and the high prices charged for them; direct encouragement from field staff who had developed an interest in village enterprises while at the School of Civil Affairs; and the accumulation for the first time of a limited amount of capital from war damage compensation payments. General European attitudes towards the village movements were unfavourable, being influenced by two main factors. The first was the fear that the people were exhibiting anti-white attitudes; for example, it was reported with concern from the Milne Bay area that the people wished to "discontinue dealing with European stores other than for the purchase of bulk supplies".[80] The other factor, linked to the first by European residents, was the appearance of some apparently cultist practices in association with village self-help projects.

Self-help movements

Representative of the self-help movements of the post-war years were the Christian Co-operatives of the Northern District and the movement led by Tomu ("Tommy") Kabu in the Purari Delta of the Gulf District. The Christian Co-operatives were encouraged during the 1930's by an Anglican missionary working in the Gona area, but

80. Ibid., p. 19.

at that time they resembled church-sponsored communes rather than commercial enterprises.[81] After the war, both Papuan and European missionaries sponsored the collection of money to establish trading ventures and classes were conducted in the principles of co-operation and "simple book-keeping". However, the villagers lacked the experience and guidance to move from the stage of popular effort to that of formal organization; there followed confusion over accounting for the money that had been collected and the people's enthusiasm waned, but not before magico-religious features began to appear in the garbled accounts of the co-operatives' aims.[82] The "Tommy Kabu movement" began in 1945, immediately after Kabu's discharge from naval service.[83] He sought to introduce European goods and techniques to the Purari villages, drawing on his wartime observations in Australia and on suggestions and promises made to him by Australian servicemen. As in other popular movements of this kind, notably the cult which centred on the former sergeant-major Yali in the Madang District, the efforts of the leader and his lieutenants to explain things thay had seen in other places became associated with traditional beliefs and the teachings of the missions, so that rationally-based explanations were overlaid by notions

81. This and the following passage are drawn from South Pacific, Vol. 4 No. 11, November 1950, p. 210.
82. The situation is outlined in F.M. Keesing, The Papuan Orokaiva and Mount Lamington: Culture Shock and its Aftermath, Port Moresby, typescript, 1951 (?).
83. The major account of this movement is R.F. Maher, New Men of Papua, Madison, Wis., University of Wisconsin Press, 1961. This and the following passage are drawn from pp. 55-76 of this study.

of supernatural influences.[84] Although Kabu was treated with some understanding by field officers on the spot, the Purari Delta movement was considered by the Department of District Services to be a "cult" and therefore in need of correction. This view differed from that taken by senior officers of the Education and Agriculture departments, who continued to encourage Kabu in his efforts at community development in later years.[85]

The restrictive attitude taken by many - but by no means all - field staff towards the popular movements of this period was a result of their having been obliged to assume direct control of village situations when major disputes arose; the administrative structure and traditions of the Territory provided them with no approved alternative.[86] Thus spontaneous activity was often viewed with apprehension, if only because it seemed to reflect on the officer's ability to maintain control in his area. From this point of view, enterprises of the kind being encouraged by the education and agriculture authorities were so loosely structured as to be dangerous

84. For an account of Yali's movement, and an examination of its magico-religious associations, see Peter Lawrence, Road Belong Cargo, Melbourne, M.U.P., 1964, particularly Chs. 3-6.
85. T.P.&N.G., Department of Education, "Community Development in the Purari Delta", South Pacific, Vol. 5 No. 10, December 1951, p. 208.
86. For an outline of the field staff's administrative approach and traditions, see Chapter One, pp. 58-64 and Chapter Seven, pp. 404-22. The field officer was placed at a relatively low level in a multi-stage, strict hierarchy (see Jinks, op. cit., p. 75) which virtually demanded the adoption of authoritarian attitudes.

to the processes of orderly administration. Once the apparently cultist activities appeared in these movements, it seemed highly desirable that the villagers' efforts be channelled through stable institutions that could be comprehended by the field officers and, where necessary, controlled by them. For this reason the formal co-operative movement, based on Western practices, commended itself to the Department of District Services much more than did the amorphous groupings being encouraged by the Education and Agriculture departments.

District Services control of co-operatives

When the extension of village enterprises through some form of co-operative activity was proposed by Cottrell-Dormer to the Committee on Native Development and Welfare in 1946 it was at first opposed by the Director of District Services, and by several of his senior officers. This was mainly because they wished to ensure that the field staff remained the dominant power at village level, although Gunther, who attended the discussions, maintains that the proposal was resisted "simply because it was new; Ivan Champion was horrified".[87] Nevertheless, the progressives had an initial victory when the Committee recommended that the co-operative movement should be

87. Gunther interview, 4 December 1968. Champion later recalled that he had initially told J.H. Jones that the villagers were "not sufficiently advanced" for co-operatives; by 1950 he had still not changed his views, recommending that the Native Plantations Ordinance concept be restored (P.N.G.N.A., Box 320, item CA35/8/1, 5 May 1950). The Government Secretary

encouraged, and that it should be fostered by the Agriculture department's Division of Production and Marketing, as envisaged by Cottrell-Dormer. This recommendation was eventually rejected by the Department of External Territories, and in 1947 a Co-operatives Section was set up in the Department of District Services and Native Affairs.

Subsequent developments showed that the District Services approach to co-operatives differed greatly from that of Cottrell-Dormer and Groves. Two experts on the co-operative movement were brought to the Territory from New South Wales as advisers, and C.J. Millar, who was appointed the first Registrar of Co-operatives, spent some time in Australia studying societies and their activities there.[88] On the basis of his observations and the advisers' reports, Millar then drew up a Co-operative Societies Ordinance, using the New South Wales legislation as a model because it was the only one readily available.[89] This was an unfortunate move, since all of the complex principles of co-operation were incorporated in the Territory ordinance and proved over-elaborate for the conditions which then existed in the country. As Murray

(cont.) replied drily, "I do not feel that in the present form your recommendation is one that will receive the approval of His Honour the Administrator." (Ibid., 11 May 1950).

88. P.A.R., 1949/50, p. 35.

89. Interview with Mr. H.H. Jackman, 17 September 1973. Mr. Jackman later became Registrar of Co-operatives and in various capacities was associated with the movement for 25 years.

later observed, the ordinance was "a poor thing" that did little to aid the development of the movement.[90] Even then, the ordinance was not promulgated until 1950, owing largely to the accustomed delays in Canberra, and it had soon to be supplemented by the simpler Native Economic Development Ordinance of 1951, under which the smaller and less sophisticated economic groups could be registered.[91] During the 1950's the co-operative movement met with some success, despite a lack of enthusiasm and occasional overt opposition from senior field staff.[92] However, for a variety of reasons, including the increasing attractions of individual entrepreneurship, co-operatives declined from the mid-1960's and their future is now in some doubt.[93]

The drafting of the Native Economic Development Ordinance showed that, as in several other areas, the junior staff of the Department of District Services were willing to adopt a less formalistic approach to development than were their superiors. Nevertheless, there was general agreement within the department that

90. P.N.G.N.A. Box 168, item 1-9-2M, undated mid-1949; Murray's opinion was expressed in a letter to Professor Mair, following publication of her Australia in New Guinea.
91. For a more detailed discussion of the ordinance, see Legge, op. cit., pp. 216-9 and Mander, op. cit., pp. 273-4.
92. Interview with Mr. E. Graham, 9 May 1972. Jackman, who preceded Graham as Registrar, recalls that he urged his Director to pay more attention to extension through such institutions as co-operatives in order to secure the future of the department. The Director replied that "he would not have his men become a bunch of green-grocers" (Jackman interview, 17 September 1973).
93. For statistics on the development of the co-operative movement, see Jinks, op. cit., p. 109.

the field staff's approach was superior to the indeterminate methods favoured by the education and agriculture authorities. Cottrell-Dormer did not agree, and his department continued to support village movements of two kinds: broadly-based activities similar to those begun before the war, notably the Mekeo rice scheme and the Sangara coffee project; and ventures on a smaller scale which were termed Rural Progress Societies. In an address to the District Officers' conference in September 1949, Cottrell-Dormer stated:[94]

> While the registered Co-operative Society is the ideal form of organization for native communal enterprises, it has been my view that many of our native people need to be guided through a simple form of organization before they are able fully to understand co-operative principles, particularly in regard to their control of finance.

The Director of Agriculture continued with a thinly-disguised attack on the attitudes of District Officers and their field staff:[95]

> I have often heard it said that the native has "no sense of responsibility". From my observations I suggest that it would be truer to say that he has little interest in any project unless he feels that he has a real stake in it.../T/he native must be led to participate because <u>he</u> thinks it is a sound scheme....

For another year Cottrell-Dormer encouraged the development of village schemes, but the tensions and lack of

94. P.N.G.N.A. Box 320, item 35/8/1, 17 September 1949. The paper, entitled "Native Rural Progress Society: An Experiment in Social and Economic Development", was later published in <u>South Pacific</u>, Vol. 4 No. 4, March 1950, p. 53.
95. <u>Ibid</u>. (<u>South Pacific</u>, p. 55).

co-ordination between the Departments of Agriculture and District Services became more obvious and the Director found increasing difficulty in administering his organization while also taking an active interest in field work. In December 1950 he accepted reduction "by consent" to the rank of Agricultural Officer Grade 3, being succeeded as Director by Mr. R.E.P. Dwyer, a former Mandated Territory officer.[96] His plans for a nation of independent farmers were overlooked for many years; meanwhile, the co-operative movement remained firmly under the control of field officers.[97]

Murray's demand for guaranteed markets

During the immediate post-war years three main factors maintained European control of the Papua New Guinea economy: the restoration of the plantation system, the limited nature of labour reforms and the structuring of village enterprises upon Western models. By the time the Provisional Administration's Economic Development Committee met in late 1947, any radical departure from established precedent was unlikely. Even limited change was proving difficult, owing to differences in strategy among the major developmental agencies. To some degree

96. P.N.G.N.A. Box 887, item GH47-13, 7 December 1950.
97. The co-operative movement came under the control of the Department of Trade and Industry in 1961 and in 1969 was made the responsibility of the Department of Business Development. However, all white Registrars of Co-operatives were former field officers.

these differences had arisen because no definite economic objectives had been set by the Australian government; and no further statements by the Minister were in the offing. The Economic Development Committee thus had little more to draw on than the opinions that had been expressed by the already overtaxed senior staff in Port Moresby. In this respect the thinking of the Administrator was of considerable influence.

During his survey tour of Papua New Guinea during 1944, Murray became convinced that the islands could provide all of Australia's needs for tropical produce.[98] At the time, the concern of Murray and the other members of the Directorate of Research for secure sources of raw materials was conditioned by the recent events of the war. However, their interest went much further than a narrow regard for Australia's future, since they considered the economic development of the Territory to be a valuable end in itself.[99] Murray, in particular, saw the policy of the post-war years as springing much more from idealism than national self-interest, observing in his Macrossan lecture of 1947 that "such an aim springs inevitably from the heart of our democracy".[100] This is an important consideration in assessing Murray's major economic proposals, which involved Australia's guaranteeing Papua New Guinea an assured market for all tropical produce that

98. Murray notes, pp. 40-7.
99. See, for example, Isles, op. cit.
100. Murray, Provisional Administration, op. cit., p. 18.

the Territory could provide, from both existing plantings and new crops, up to the maximum of Australia's requirements.[101] Murray's proposal was not intended to bind the Papua New Guinea economy to Australia's; rather, it was a short-term measure aimed at providing a hedge against possible problems in village production during the initial stages of diversification. It was clear from pre-war experience that villagers, like producers anywhere, required a reasonable return if their interest in economic projects was to be maintained. Incentives would be even more important for the successful introduction of new crops, such as vanilla, pepper, spices, tea and fibres; and for the expansion of plantings that had proved successful on European-owned holdings, notably coffee, cocoa and rubber.[102] Since it was doubtful whether small-holders could compete on world markets in the immediate future, Murray was in effect proposing that Australia go beyond the simple allocation of cash grants to the Territory by subsidising its village projects with special import conditions and tariffs.[103]

Murray's approach to economic development was perhaps over-optimistic, in view of the fact that Australia possessed extensive tropical regions of its

101. Murray interview, 14 December 1966.
102. For Murray's assessment of particular agricultural prospects, see his Provisional Administration, op. cit., pp. 48-52.
103. The proposal was also related to Isles' recommendation that Papua New Guinea should itself be permitted to adopt a tariff structure favourable to village rather than European producers (see p. 469 of this Chapter).

own, but he was well aware of the implications of his proposals. He made no reference to such crops as sugar and bananas, which had been established largely from New Guinea stock throughout northern Australia, and viewed such products as meat and rice as import-replacement commodities which would never be exported to Australia. The proposals were not unreasonable, although Murray's apparent assumption that the government was capable of entering upon such wide-ranging commitments make them seem idealistic.

Murray's idealism

In his attitude towards the economic development of Papua New Guinea, Murray was an optimist. Like Cottrell-Dormer, Murray sometimes made statements of the kind which Stanner has criticised for being "on a high ethical level, declamatory in tone, and in extremely general language".[104] At the mission conference of October 1946, for example, Murray advised the delegates:[105]

> We know...potentialities...to be high. Given the opportunity /Papua New Guineans/ would develop as other peoples, including our own, but incomparably faster, owing to the possibilities afforded education by modern developments in teaching aids, such as visual education and broadcasting.

Referring to this speech in one of his many slighting

104. Stanner, Reconstruction, op. cit., p. 68.
105. P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item 1-4-2, 14 October 1946; the speech is quoted by Stanner, at somewhat greater length, loc. cit.

observations on the Provisional Administration, Stanner later wrote, "It may not be unfair...to point out the strong resemblance between the Administrator's... statement...and the Trotskyist 'law of combined development', according to which extremely backward countries are supposed to be able to advance under certain conditions so rapidly that they can skip centuries of economic development."[106] However, as James McAuley pointed out, the suggestion that the Administrator was "tainted with Trotskyism" was part of Stanner's general attack on the influence of the Directorate and those associated with it.[107] McAuley denied the "naive rationalist assumptions" attributed to the Provisional Administration by Stanner, although in cautious tones which suggested that McAuley himself doubted the practicality of some of the more ambitious schemes proposed for New Guinea. The exchange illustrated something of both the scepticism and defensiveness that were aroused by the Administrator's attitude. Even though his views were shown to be substantially correct by later events, it may be said that Murray's approach placed too much reliance on the good-will of others.

Economic Development Committee

That Murray's views influenced certain of his senior

106. Stanner, Reconstruction, op. cit., p. 69.
107. This and the following passage are drawn from an unreferenced paper by James McAuley, entitled "Comments on Part I of 'Reconstruction in the South Pacific Islands'" and dated 27 April 1948.

staff is apparent from the report of the Economic Development Committee, which was submitted in September 1948.[108] The committee comprised J.B. McAdam, acting Secretary of the Department of Forests, as chairman; R.E.P. Dwyer, who later succeeded Cottrell-Dormer as Director of Agriculture; E.P. Holmes, Secretary of the Department of Lands; and C.J. Millar, of the Department of District Services. None of the members had been associated with the Directorate of Research and only Millar had previously played any part in discussing major changes in policy at the central level of the Administration. It thus says a good deal for Murray's influence on his staff that the Economic Development Committee's report endorsed many of the proposals that had emanated from the Directorate's personnel, including Murray himself.

The report of the Economic Development Committee was a more substantial document than the submissions of the committees on either Welfare or Social Development;[109] it comprised almost 200 pages and was accompanied by a second volume containing appendices and graphs.[110] The committee intended initially to prepare a five-year plan, similar to that for the social development of the Territory, but soon concluded that this was impracticable for two major reasons: the lack of data on key aspects

108. T.P.-N.G., Government House, Report of the Economic Development Committee of the Provisional Administration, 2 volumes, Port Moresby, mimeo, 1948.
109. See Chapter Seven, pp. 457, 460.
110. Economic Development, op. cit., Vol. 2. There were statistics on business firms, existing and potential crops and various features of export production.

of Papua New Guinea's resources and the difficulties and uncertainties which continued to dominate the post-war years.[111] With these factors in mind, the committee followed the example of the groups which had examined welfare and social development by attacking the arrangements that had been made for staffing and equipping the Provisional Administration. Its criticisms were similar to those noted in earlier Chapters,[112] concentrating on unsatisfactory recruitment levels, low salaries, poor conditions of general employment and accommodation, and deficient shipping and supply services.[113] The growing frustration with delays in Canberra was reflected in the committee's proposals to give greater authority to the Territory Administration. The report first pointed out that effective planning required the allocation of sufficient staff, and the provision of finance on a long-term basis; the Territory public service would then be able to draw up its own programmes. Provisional Administration staff would be posted to Canberra to interview all applicants for the expanded service, in order to provide "accurate information of conditions of employment, and life in the Territory, and [ensure that] there would be fewer disappointments on arrival in the Territories".[114] With a more stable service, the Administration would carry out its own resources surveys

111. Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 15.
112. See Chapter Six, pp. 319-33 and Chapter Seven, pp. 463-4.
113. Economic Development, op. cit., pp. 16-21.
114. Ibid., p. 17.

in order to provide the basis for sound planning.[115] Owing to the protracted nature of the work, "scientific personnel seconded from Australian Institutions for short periods...are not the media required for this work... /Our/ officers will have a lifetime of useful work ahead of them and their experience in the Territory, as they pass from active field work to Administrative positions, will be invaluable to the Service".[116] In effect, the report challenged the very bases of Canberra control over the Territory: finance, staffing and research.

Development finance and administration

In the body of its report, the committee discussed a variety of technical matters associated with labour supply and with agriculture, forestry, fisheries and mineral production, concluding, as had Murray, that there was potential for greatly increased production within the country, but that special considerations were required if success were to be assured.[117] These included the measures that had been stressed by the Directorate and the Administrator: legislation based on the British Colonial Development and Welfare Acts; and the guarantee of markets in Australia, particularly during the establishment phase of new ventures.[118] To carry out even its basic programmes in the Territory, the committee pointed out, "Australia

115. Ibid., pp. 46-56.
116. Ibid., pp. 47-8.
117. Ibid., pp. 86-187, 194.
118. Ibid., pp. 36-45.

obviously is committed to an Annual Expenditure of £4,000,000. To stabilise the position, to provide for continuity of development and assure uniform development in the two Territories as well as offering an earnest to the World of her intentions with regard to the Trust Territory, it is most desirable that Australia should bring down a 'Welfare and Development Act for Papua and New Guinea' to guarantee these finances for at least ten years."[119] Moreover, it was "necessary for Australia to appreciate the unstable position of undeveloped Papua and New Guinea attempting to break into...markets in crops such as rubber, cocoa, coffee and tea...and to realize that she must take special steps to stabilise the market for these Territory products...."[120] Decisions of this kind were essential in order that clear objectives could be set for the country's development, not only in the economic sphere but also to ensure effective participation by the people of the country:[121]

> It has been laid down that the local people shall be prepared for ultimate self government, but this is too general a statement for this Administration to work to...the Australian Government must prescribe the steps towards that end. It would seem that the present Administration should be a model for the ultimate Administration and that the simplest way to that completely native Administration would be by gradual displacement from the bottom up as the native peoples become experienced and capable of carrying the functions and responsibilities of higher positions of Administration. The Committee does not see how the native people can avoid following the same steps in the fields of Commerce and Industry.

119. Ibid., p. 199.
120. Ibid., p. 197.
121. Ibid., p. 195.

While emphasising the role of the people in developing their own country, the report noted that European-owned enterprises would be required to maintain production and export levels for "two or three decades".[122] Moreover, "good" settlers could provide more regular assistance to the people of many areas than Administration officers, who would be able to visit villages only occasionally; no further settlement should be considered, however, until a full resources survey had been completed.[123]

To ensure that development plans, once drawn up, were effectively implemented, the report recommended that the existing advisory committees on welfare, economic and social development and finance should be replaced by a Central Development Board.[124] The chairman of the Board would be an officer working not in "any one department but...in close liaison with all. He should, in fact, be the economic adviser to the Administration and be directly responsible to the Administrator."[125] It would be impossible to conduct planning entirely at the central level, however, particularly in the absence of much essential data, so that a good deal of responsibility would rest on the field staff to ensure that programmes were sensible and were being carried out or amended, as necessary. District Development Committees should therefore be established,

122. Ibid., p. 198.
123. Ibid., pp. 199, 194-5.
124. Ibid., p. 68.
125. Ibid., pp. 67-8. The close resemblance between the committee's proposals and the structures eventually established is discussed later; the point to be noted here is that it was twenty years before the necessary organizations were set up.

comprising the District Officer as chairman and the senior officers of the departments represented in the district, together with representatives of "Missions, planting, commercial and native interests" co-opted by the District Officer.[126]

> The Committee regards the establishment of these District Development Committees as the basis on which overall Territorial Planning should be built. The appointment of District Development Committees would result in the most beneficial co-ordination of departmental development activity at the District level.

In addition, co-ordination of programmes would be required when they affected more than one district, but at a level which would allow greater responsiveness to local conditions than would generally be possible in Konedobu. The Committee therefore recommended the establishment of three to five "Provinces", each headed by a Provincial Commissioner who would be chairman of the Provincial Development Committee.[127] On the basis of programmes drawn up at the provincial level, departmental headquarters would submit plans to the chairman of the Central Development Board, who would be responsible for "reshaping and reforming" them prior to their consideration by the full Board. The plan for the whole Territory would then be "broken down into s series of Provincial, District and Village projects". The organization proposals, like those for developmental legislation, borrowed from British

126. This passage and the following quotation are drawn from ibid., p. 69.
127. This and the following passage are drawn from ibid., pp. 69-71.

thinking, modified via the Directorate of Research, but the fact that they were not wholly original did not detract from their value: their use of other colonial experience stood in marked contrast to Australian policy of the 1950's, while their stress on an adequate balance between economic and administrative development compared more than favourably with the 1960's approach.[128]

Need for Australian support

The reports by the three committees on New Guinea development were clearly not disinterested in their presentation. Their exhortatory tone, primarily when dealing with the problems of the public service, could have little appeal to officers of the Department of External Territories who, with their own tenure guaranteed, were remote from New Guinea problems and no doubt believed that their efforts to reclassify the Territory public service had not been appreciated. A more general criticism may be levelled at the very sweeping nature of the decisions being urged on the Australian government, with little supporting data on the use to which money grants would be put; and with no apparent appreciation of the domestic and international political implications of such things as preferential tariffs for Territory products. The reports

128. For later policy statements on the strategy of the Liberal-Country Party government, see Jinks, Biskup, Nelson (eds.), op. cit., pp. 374-5, 384-7, 397-9. The beginnings of this strategy are discussed in Chapters Ten and Eleven.

were unsophisticated documents, but this was to some extent related to the lack of data upon which programmes could be based; the committees recognized this fact and made their recommendations accordingly. More importantly, the committees were not reporting on the merits of a policy framework proposed by the government, in an orthodox bureaucratic manner. Rather, they were acting like pressure groups, seeking to hold Cabinet to its promises. This role was forced upon the committees by the circumstances of the time: of the other interested parties, white settlers had shown themselves hostile to the principles enunciated by the Minister; the Department of External Territories remained uncommitted to them; and the people of the Territory were unable to press their own case. For a colonial bureaucracy, the Provisional Administration found itself in a most peculiar situation.

It has been shown, however, that the staff of the Territory public service were far from united in support of post-war policy and programmes. In many fields the senior staff lacked the convictions or the drive to give effect to plans that had begun as no more than vague promises. Nevertheless, by the end of 1948 some changes had been instituted, more in the area of social than economic development. Once begun, these programmes dominated the administrative effort of the Territory public service for more than a decade, with particular attention paid to the health and education programmes; to local

government and the co-operative movement; and to agricultural extension. During that time the field staff slowly moved towards non-directive techniques in dealing with the people. The changes were created from an amalgam of pious pre-war hopes and sweeping wartime stratagems derived from British precedents, gaining acceptance through the steady, if sometimes naive, promptings of Murray and a handful of his supporters. All of this was achieved with minimal initiative from the Australian government. Yet once the reconstruction phase had been passed in Papua New Guinea, it became essential that the government take more positive steps, either by producing detailed plans of its own or by delegating a large measure of planning authority to the Territory Administration. Unless that were done the new programmes were bound to lose momentum: they had survived on the enthusiasm of the few and were handicapped by the absence of defined goals and the continuing opposition of major interests. By the end of the decade it was apparent that, even under a sympathetic Minister, the post-war approach could produce no more than a series of unco-ordinated, incremental decisions of a relatively minor nature. Unsympathetic control might even lead to a rejection of some of the Provisional Administration's gains. The key issues of Murray's remaining years in office thus mainly concerned relations between New Guinea and Australia.

CHAPTER NINE

MURRAY'S AUSTRALIAN BURDENS

Ward and the settlers - Ward wades ahore - Murray and Ward - The Garden affair - Mr. Chambers and the Papua and New Guinea Act - The Halligan handicap - Murray and the white community - Murray's situation, 1949 - Controversy on Bougainville - Colonel Allen and Rabaul - Administrator's office made a political issue - Australian planning: an exercise in futility - Mr. Chifley intervenes The 1949 committees - Apparent progress: further delays - Executive Council fiasco

Ward and the settlers

In examining the relationship between Australia and Papua New Guinea during the post-war years it is first necessary to summarise the various aspects of the Australian government's influence on the Provisional Administration. In the preceding five chapters the emphasis has been on the situation within the Territory, with occasional references to the role of the Minister

for External Territories and his Department. Discussion of the Australian approach to New Guinea must now centre on Mr. Ward and his staff and on their effectiveness in gaining acceptance for the government's policy. The Minister's role in this area was also of importance to the Administrator, who was in particular need of public support. Attention must also be paid to Murray's dealings with the community at large, particularly in relation to the major controversies which arose within the Territory. These factors, in combination with the efforts of the Provisional Administration, are the background against which the fate of the post-war reformist policy was decided.

It has been suggested in previous Chapters that Ward's attitude to New Guinea affairs was of little benefit to the Territory Administration: he found colonialism distasteful; experienced difficulty in dealing coolly with those who, in his view, gained from it; and showed little inclination to provide Ministerial direction in promoting its aims, even when they seemed benevolent in their effects.[1] The Minister's role during the 1940's created even greater problems for the Territory than have so far been indicated. These arose from a combination of Ward's public image and the personal difficulties he encountered during the post-war period.

1. See Chapter Two, pp. 84-90 and Chapter Five, p. 264 passim.

When Mr. Ward was first appointed Minister for External Territories in September 1943, the reaction among the exiled settler community was, ironically, relatively favourable. Their relations with the previous Minister, Senator J.M. Fraser, had not been happy. The Pacific Islands Monthly maintained that "Territorians", as it termed the various European groups, had been "sickened and disheartened" by a "long line of Ministers who were little more than rubber stamps. Mr. Ward may be irresponsible and class-conscious to a degree, but he is no rubber stamp."[2] It believed that the new Minister would make decisions "idependently of bureaucratic promptings", provided that he did not come to be dominated by people with "cockeyed notions" about New Guinea. He would either be the man the Territories had been waiting for, or the "quaintest misfit" in the history of the islands. The settlers' first impressions were good. A formal delegation from the Pacific Territories Association saw Ward in December 1943 and reported that they had enjoyed their "most satisfactory meeting yet" with a Minister; they were particularly pleased with the "keen interest and appreciation of evacuees' difficulties" shown by him.[3] The Pacific Islands Monthly editorialised that the Minister was a "'Yes' or 'No' man" who had given fresh hope to the settlers.[4]

The honeymoon between Ward and the settlers was

2. This and the following passage, including quotations, are drawn from P.I.M., Vol. 14 No. 3, October 1943, p. 8.
3. P.I.M., Vol. 14 No. 5, December 1943, p. 11.
4. Ibid.

short-lived. By April 1944 there were complaints that the Minister, although in office for six months, had provided none of the decisions the Europeans had hoped for and had otherwise done very little to loosen Angau's tight control over Papua New Guinea.[5] A great deal was thought to depend upon Ward's first visit to the Territory, which was to take place from 17 to 29 April 1944; changes were expected once the Minister saw conditions for himself. Ward was accompanied by the Secretary of his Department, J.R. Halligan, but of considerably more influence were two advisers from the Directorate of Research: Colonel A.A. Conlon and Lieutenant-Colonel R.D. Wright.[6] The party visited Port Moresby, Lae, Finschhafen and nearby areas, talking mainly with Army commanders and Angau officials, but also on occasions addressing gatherings of village leaders. The official reports of these discussions indicate that the Europeans concentrated on their own problems, notably the lack of shipping to supply their plantations and transport their produce; while the villagers were promised more schools, hospitals and general welfare services by the Minister. There would have been nothing untoward about the tour, apart from tension between the Directorate officers and some Angau staff,[7] had it not been for an incident which, although minor in itself, had an enormous impact on everyone associated with New Guinea: it was taken up by the Australian press and for the rest of Ward's

5. P.I.M., Vol. 14 No. 9, April 1944, p. 4.
6. The material in this and the following passage is drawn from CRS A518, item B800/1/7, 17-29 April 1944.
7. See, for example, Chapter Two, p. 126.

term as Minister was used to characterise his attitude towards the Territory and its people.

Ward wades ashore

On 18 April 1944 Mr. Ward was taken on an Army workboat to Papa village, a coastal settlement a few miles west of Port Moresby.[8] This village, like most in the area, was fringed by shallow water, so that dinghies grounded some distance away from the beach. It had long been the practice for white visitors to be carried ashore when situations of this kind were encountered. The merits of this custom were debatable, even though great significance was attached to white dignity. To wade ashore in boots was uncomfortable, while to remove them was even more so, owing to the sharp coral fringing many beaches. However, to be carried ashore was itself undignified, since the European usually perched precariously on the linked hands of two villagers, with an arm around the neck of each. When the Ministerial party arrived at Papa, the Angau commander, Major-General Morris, was first ashore, following the accepted colonial practice of being carried there. Mr. Ward, however, elected to wade to the beach, minus shoes and socks and with his trousers partly rolled up. He was there photographed by the correspondent accompanying the party and the photograph soon appeared

8. The material in this and the following passage is based on CRS A518, item B800/1/7, 18 April 1944 and on my own experiences of getting to shore by both of the methods discussed.

in most Australian newspapers, being republished at regular intervals to illustrate stories about Mr. Ward.[9] It shows the Minister wearing a lounge suit, but no tie, and a solar topee. The rolled trousers are wet and disclose what might have been termed "well-shaped calves". With his suit coat thrown back and his hands on his hips, Ward seems to be exchanging comments with an Army officer and appears to be relaxed and enjoying himself. It was reported at the time that the Minister refused to be carried ashore because he believed that such an action would have demeaned the villagers called upon to do it; but I believe he was a sensible man who, having just witnessed the Major-General's progress to the shore, considered it more dignified to walk than be carried. In any event, when questioned about the incident following his return to Australia, Ward told reporters he had waded ashore to show the people that Australians were not "weaklings" and because he disagreed with such a colonialist practice. "The chap who thinks it necessary," he said, "probably thinks we ought to use the stock-whip to display our superiority. But I am no Simon Legree."[10] The New Guinea whites were unimpressed. The Pacific Islands Monthly stated that the villagers were "primitive folk" who set great store by "a master's behaviour and appearance". They would be upset by a Minister "performing in this fashion on the beach", like "a sand-boy pursuing worms"

9. The settlers saw the picture in P.I.M., Vol. 14 No. 10, May 1944, p. 7.
10. Sydney Mirror, 6 May 1944.

and would consider him to be "something nothing", or a nonentity.[11] To hammer home the point, Europeans concocted expressions, obviously spurious because of the language, by which the villagers were alleged to have referred to the Minister: they included "kanaka belong Sydney" (or, sometimes, Australia) and "masta pissim pants".[12] Whatever the merits of Ward's action, he had presented his opponents with the powerful weapon of ridicule.

Murray and Ward

From the time of his New Guinea tour, the Minister's relations with the white community rapidly deteriorated in the manner outlined in Chapter Two.[13] There were occasional press comments indicating some sympathy with Ward's point of view, notably after his speech on the Provisional Administration Bill in July 1945, but by 1946 these had virtually disappeared.[14] So, it seemed, had Ward. With the departure of Conlon, there was no one to stimulate the Minister's interest in New Guinea affairs, so that after the first flurry of activity in re-establishing the civil administration there was a gradual decline from the war-time vigour of policy-making.

11. P.I.M., loc. cit.
12. The word "kanaka", without adjectives, is not used by New Guineans in a pejorative sense, although often employed in that manner by Europeans. The second expression would have been constructed quite differently, and "pants" is not a pidgin word.
13. See Chapter Two, pp. 95-7.
14. Even the praise was faint; after the July 1945 speech the Hobart Mercury merely suggested that Ward "deserved credit" for his "keen interest" in New Guinea. (Mercury, 5 July 1945).

This was partly because Ward chose to endorse a distant relationship with his Administrator, despite the urgency of the tasks to be carried out in Papua New Guinea. On 12 November 1945 the Minister directed that all formal communication from Port Moresby should be through the Secretary for External Territories.[15] This was a reversion to the early years of Sir Hubert Murray's tenure, when he had addressed his official correspondence to Atlee Hunt; in later years Sir Hubert had written directly to the Minister and, in some cases, to the Prime Minister.[16] It is not hard to see the source of this direction. Halligan had no wish to be overborne by an Administrator who exercised the power that Sir Hubert had enjoyed in his later years; and certainly not by one who had very recently been one of Halligan's rivals at the Directorate of Research. He had therefore persuaded Ward to adopt strictly formal administrative procedures.

The legal position was debatable, however. Section 9 of the Papua-New Guinea Provisional Administration Act stated that the Administrator was "charged with the duty of administering the government of the Territory on behalf of the Commonwealth", and Section 10 that he was appointed at the pleasure of the Governor-General. On the other hand, Section 11 provided that the Administrator

15. In a confidential letter which I have not seen. However, its tenor is apparent from Murray's reply, which is noted in footnote 17, below.
16. This is apparent from a comparison of the correspondence references for the early chapters of West, Hubert Murray, op. cit., with those for later chapters.

should perform his duties "according to such instructions as are from time to time given to him by the Minister". There could be differences of interpretation on the status conferred on the Administrator by Sections 9 and 10, taken together, in comparison with Section 11. Replying to the Minister's direction concerning channels of communication, Murray argued:[17]

> In view of the provisions of Section 9 of the Papua-New Guinea Provisional Administration Act 1945 which makes the Administrator responsible to the Commonwealth Government - I consider, with respect, that the Administrator may communicate direct with the Minister and that it is intended or inferred that he is not to be confined to communicating with the Minister through the civil service.

Murray therefore proposed a compromise. While not refusing to comply with Ward's direction, Murray observed:[18]

> It is clear that, in general, correspondence will, as you direct, be addressed to you through the Secretary of the Department. I propose, however, that, in exceptional cases, you permit correspondence be addressed direct to you.

This was the practice which Murray then followed, regularly urging action from the Minister on such matters as the public service, the School of Pacific Administration, judges' appointments and the formation of the Executive Council.[19]

This episode showed something of Ward's attitude

17. Confidential letter from Murray to Ward, 27 December 1945, in my possession. Emphasis in the original.
18. Ibid.
19. See Chapter Six, pp. 331, 389-90 and later in this Chapter.

towards his responsibilities to Papua New Guinea. He was ready to have all information on Territory problems filtered through an organization which had been opposed to his most trusted wartime advisers in the Directorate of Research. Ward must have been aware of the effects of this arrangement on his proposed New Guinea reforms: those measures which had emanated from the Directorate of Research - and which he had endorsed in his speech on the Provisional Administration Bill - were bound to meet obstruction in the Department of External Territories. Even more revealing of Ward's tactics in this impasse was his suggestion that Murray could write directly to him, provided that the letters were "confined to the expression of personal views in a non-official capacity".[20] Such an arrangement, between men who were not personal friends, could only have been destructive of the morale in his own Department, while reducing the Administrator to the role of supplicant and tale-teller.[21] Murray replied that he considered such a practice "inadvisable". "I do not care very much for unofficial correspondence," he continued, "though I realise that there are cases in which it performs a useful function...In those cases in which the matters raised are such that they should not go through routine official channels, confidential but official documents would, I think, meet requirements."[22] Through

20. This is the phrase used by Murray in his reply; it was probably identical with the Minister's own words of 12 November 1945.
21. Similar tactics had been employed by Atlee Hunt in Sir Hubert's early days; see West, Hubert Murray, op. cit., p. 53 et seq.
22. Letter of 27 December 1945.

this rebuke, Murray may have lost an opportunity for exerting some influence on Ward, although it is doubtful whether the offer of private correspondence was anything more than a sop intended to persuade Murray to accept the formal Ministerial direction. In any event, this early exchange of letters showed that neither man understood the other's personality.

Relations between Murray and Ward were not improved by later contact: the Minister usually kept Halligan by him during conferences with the Administrator, and Murray soon formed the impression that Ward deferred too much to his Department; that Halligan "slowed him down".[23] Like his predecessors, Murray was experiencing the disadvantages of being far removed from the centre of power in Canberra. This problem could not be overcome by the trips to Australia which Murray made three or four times a year, and so it became imperative that the Minister should tour the Territory to gain first-hand knowledge of the situation there. However, it was not until early 1948 that the Minister announced his intention of visiting the islands, despite earlier rumours that he would make the trip.[24] At that time controversy arose

23. Murray interview, 12 December 1966. This is the strongest criticism of Ward made by Murray in letters, notes or interviews for this study. Contemporary correspondence noted elsewhere (including later in this Chapter) indicates Murray's impatience with Ward, however. Apparently at a loss to explain Ward's lack of action, Murray at one time conjectured that the Minister may have tolerated Halligan's ineffectual efforts because they were both Catholics; it is more likely that neither had a grasp of the New Guinea situation.
24. P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 4, November 1947, p. 3. Later rumours were reviewed in P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 11, June 1948, p. 8.

over the "New Guinea timbers case", which is discussed below, and the tour was postponed. In the event, Ward did not return to New Guinea, so that in more than six years as Minister he visited the Territory only once, and not at all in the years of the Provisional Administration.

The Garden affair

Ward's role as Minister was further affected by his involvement in what became generally known as the "Jock Garden case". In January 1948, John Smith Garden, a longtime associate of the Minister, was charged on three counts of fraud.[25] It was alleged, among other things, that Garden had in November 1945 signed Mr. Ward's name to a letter which falsely stated that a lease over timber stands in the Bulolo Valley of the Territory of New Guinea had been granted to a syndicate of speculators. The syndicate then accepted £50,000 from the Brisbane firm of Hancock and Gore for their non-existent interest, Garden sharing in the proceeds. Garden was eventually convicted and sentenced to three years gaol; an appeal against the conviction was dismissed.[26] In his evidence Garden maintained that the Minister had been involved in the conspiracy and this led to a great deal of speculation

25. The material in this and the following passage is drawn from a file of press clippings in the library of the International Training Institute (formerly A.S.O.P.A.). See also P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 6, January 1948 to No. 11, June 1948, for a detailed account of the case.
26. P.I.M., Vol. 19 No. 8, March 1949, p. 7.

about the relationship between the two men. They had been close political associates; Garden had been Secretary of the New South Wales Labor Council for some twenty years and had, with Ward and two others, been a Lang Labor member of the House of Representatives from 1934 to 1937. In 1942 Garden had been appointed an officer of the Department of Labour and National Service, of which Ward was the Minister at the time, and had stayed on there when Ward moved to Transport and External Territories in 1943. However, Garden had retained his office near Ward's Ministerial suite in the Commonwealth premises in Sydney, even after the Labour department had moved to another building; this had given Garden access to the Ministerial notepaper upon which the forgery had been uttered. Garden had even gone so far as to use a Department of External Territories typist to re-type a letter of complaint from one of the parties being defrauded, so that when it reached Ward it would contain no reference to the activities of Garden and his associates.

When these facts were presented to the court there were many people willing to believe that the Minister had at least been aware of what had been happening for more than two years, if not a party to the fraud, as alleged by Garden and an accomplice. Ward gave evidence that he was unaware of Garden's activities and, under cross-examination, was attacked by the counsel for the defence as an "unmitigated liar, quite unworthy of the slightest

credence in any court whatever", upon whose evidence "nobody would dream of hanging a dog".[27] Further hearings were held on different charges, so that the various trials of Garden and his associates spanned more than twelve months. Towards the end of this period the government bowed to Opposition demands for a Royal Commission into the allegations against the Minister and this enquiry began on 1 February 1949, publishing its findings on 24 June of that year. The Royal Commission exonerated Ward from any complicity in the dealings of Garden and his accomplices, but by the time this finding was made public the Minister had been associated with the various allegations for eighteen months. The attack on Ward by Garden's defence counsel was also publicised and led to an exchange in the House of Representatives between the Prime Minister and Opposition members, so that political issues were added to the legal difficulties already facing the Minister.

The effect of this imbroglio on Papua New Guinea was disastrous. From having a Minister who was at least committed to the post-war policy in principle, if reluctant to put it into practice, the Territory came to be burdened with a man who could take no interest in its affairs and whose association with the country had become an embarrassment. During the course of the Garden trials there had been demands from the Opposition, and suggestions

27. P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 8, March 1948, p. 7.

in the Australian press, that Ward resign. Such an action could only have benefited Papua New Guinea, which still awaited the legislation to create its permanent Administration.[28] However, for a variety of reasons concerning the alliances within the Labor party as well as the reputation of the government, Ward remained; at the establishment of the Royal Commission he merely "asked" to be relieved of his Ministerial responsibilities for the duration of the hearing. Mr. Cyril Chambers, Minister for the Army, was appointed acting Minister for External Territories in his stead. Chambers performed these duties for some seven months, and the degree of Ward's neglect of New Guinea affairs can be gauged from the acting Minister's efforts in securing some action, notwithstanding the limitations placed upon him by his temporary appointment.

Mr. Chambers and the Papua and New Guinea Act

Ironically, Chambers' first decision as acting Minister was that he would visit Papua New Guinea; indeed, the cablegram advising the Administrator of the temporary appointment also outlined arrangements for the acting Minister's tour.[29] Accompanied by Halligan, Chambers spent ten days in the Territory during January 1949, providing such groups as the Public Service and Planters'

28. The passage of the legislation, and other matters relating to policy, are discussed later in this Chapter.
29. CRS A518, item AA800/1/7, 31 December 1948.

Associations with their first opportunity for many years to air their grievances directly to a Minister. There was nothing unusual about the visit; its most constructive aspect was that Chambers assured the Administrator and his senior staff that greater attention would be paid to oustanding matters.[30] Chambers then took to Australia a list of the issues requiring attention and decision, setting a precedent for later Ministerial visits, and illustrating the earlier lack of action by Canberra.

During Chambers' term as acting Minister he also secured passage of the Papua and New Guinea Act. The legislation, which had been delayed pending Parliament's approval of the Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of New Guinea, was eventually tabled in the House in June 1948, but further delays occurred while the terms of the amalgamation of New Guinea and Papua were referred to the United Nations.[31] Owing to various objections from within the U.N., the legislation was withdrawn for redrafting and was re-submitted to Parliament only in February 1949. The eventual passage of the Act was peculiar, in that the Speaker of the House ruled that any debate touching upon Ward's administration of the Territories portfolio would be sub judice, since the Royal Commission into Garden's allegations was then conducting its hearings.[32] The

30. This and the following passage are based on ibid., 11 to 21 January 1949.
31. See Chapter Five, pp. 304-5.
32. The debate is in C.P.D., Vol. 201, pp. 250-7, 735-77, 842-920, 968-88 (H. of R.), 1098-1143, 1241-4 (Senate); 15 February, 1, 2 and 3 March (H. of R.), 9 and 10 March (Senate) 1949.

debate on the Papua and New Guinea Bill was therefore largely irrelevant to the situation in the Territory, concentrating mainly upon the question of defence, virtually the only issue with which Ward had not been closely involved. The legislation was passed in March 1949, but did not become operative until the following July, just as Ward resumed his duties as Minister. In more than four years of peace-time control the Labor government was able to provide New Guinea with a permanent form of administration for only the last few months of its tenure.

The Halligan handicap

Not all of the blame for Australian neglect of the Territory's post-war problems can be placed on Cabinet and the Minister. Notwithstanding the lack of direction by Mr. Ward, the Department of External Territories showed a lack of understanding of the New Guinea situation and an indifference to urgent issues that eventually amounted to serious negligence. The weakness of the Department and the rigid attitude of its Secretary have been noted in previous Chapters, as have some of the delays which arose from the Department's inability to cope with the work load placed upon it.[33] These problems occurred largely because the Department could not shake itself free from the pre-war limitations which its senior officers had come to accept as the norm. As Murray has expressed

33. See Chapter Two, pp. 81-4; Chapter Five, pp. 283-8; and Chapter Six, pp. 331-3, 375.

it, "A major difficulty throughout the 1945-50 period was that the prewar...administration of the Department of External Territories (and its predecessors) had been in relation to grants of a few tens of thousands of pounds (to Papua only)...and did not adjust...with any degree of facility to thinking in millions."[34] The Administrator saw the Canberra authorities as being "overwhelmed" by the scale of the Provisional Administration's demands, often because Halligan remained "timid" in requesting and allocating finance, apparently in the belief that the supply of money would suddenly be cut off by a change of policy or of government.[35] Murray has said that his plans "suffered critically as a consequence", particularly in the fields of education and agriculture.[36]

Compared with the initiatives of the Directorate and the commendable improvisation being practised in New Guinea, the lack of vigour in the Canberra Department proved more than usually frustrating to Murray, whose attention came to centre on Halligan as one of the main causes of delay. In his published observations on New Guinea, and in his notes, letters and general conversation, Murray has been over-scrupulous in his remarks about individuals. His comments on Halligan thus carry more than usual weight because of their tone. Murray considered the Secretary "a suave no-man, precedent-bound

34. Murray notes, pp. 63-4.
35. Ibid., p. 38.
36. Ibid., p. 64.

and scared of decisions, with inferiority feelings from his dealings with Sir Hubert Murray...He was the most difficult man I have ever had to deal with."[37] Halligan's impressions of the Administrator have not been recorded, but even their non-official correspondence was most formal, with Halligan often addressing letters "Dear Colonel" and Murray, in his usual fashion, writing, "My Dear Halligan".[38]

Halligan was in an invidious position, handicapped from 1946 by a Minister who showed less and less interest in the portfolio.[39] It was partly for this reason that the Secretary had difficulty in securing adequate staff increases from the Public Service Board. His Department was thus overwhelmed by the great increase in correspondence and general activity that followed the resumption of civil administration. Moreover, he had been belittled and criticised by Conlon and his staff, who had little appreciation of the controls under which the Department and its Secretary were required to operate.[40] He was understandably suspicious of those, including Murray, who

37. Murray interview, 12 December 1966.
38. P.N.G.N.A. Box 168, item 1-9-3H, January 1946 - June 1950.
39. The problems of the Department have not been studied from its files. The following is based on interviews with people who worked in the Department or were associated with it during this period, notably Mr. W. Grainger (13 December 1973); Mr. J. Legge (18 October 1972) and Mr. V.H. Parkinson (16 September 1970).
40. This problem continued into the post-war years. When Conlon was Principal of A.S.O.P.A. he bought books with money donated by Sir Edward Hallstrom without observing Treasury regulations. Halligan refused to approve the expenditure and was accused of "obstructionism" by Conlon (Parkinson interview, 28 August 1973).

had been associated with an organization that was so obviously antagonistic towards him. Nor can Halligan have been reassured by Conlon's efforts to usurp the functions of the Department through the Pacific Territories Research Council.

When full allowance is made for these circumstances, however, Halligan must still be considered seriously at fault. He failed to delegate responsibility to his subordinates, laboriously writing minutes in long-hand as he had in more leisurely times, and he consequently surrounded himself with files. He, as much as anyone, was responsible for the bottleneck that developed in the Department. As its Secretary, it was his responsibility to alleviate the organization's problems; he had ample time to do this between 1946 and 1951, when he was finally removed from the position. However, his only response was to attempt reorganizations of his Department,[41] an orthodox step which was completely inadequate under the changed circumstances of the post-war period. His determination to retain responsibility which it was beyond his capacity to discharge was one of the major causes of the Provisional Administration's problems. An officer of his standing should have re-ordered priorities and, where necessary, delegated to Port Moresby responsibilities which could not adequately be discharged in Canberra. His lack of perception in the changing situation, coupled

41. Halligan's assessment is noted later in this Chapter ("The 1949 committees"), and see also Chapter Five, pp. 284, 286.

with what Murray has termed his "atavistic" attitude to policy,[42] meant that he was a serious hindrance to the post-war effort in Papua New Guinea. It is possible to have some understanding of Halligan's difficulties, but difficult to sympathise with his ineptitude.

Murray and the white community

Handicapped in his dealings with the white community by a Minister who had become an object of both ridicule and suspicion, and by a Department in Canberra unable to hasten the decisions urgently needed by the Territory, Murray found it increasingly difficult to obtain general support for the post-war policy. Nor did he possess the relaxed social manner that might have permitted him to publicise the policy discreetly in the milieux favoured by the Territory's Europeans: the Papua Club, the R.S.L., the Planters' Association, the Chamber of Commerce. The Murrays therefore behaved as if their social outlook were perfectly acceptable to the European community. The first test came soon after Murray's appointment. In March 1946 the Administrator asked to lunch at Government House two men from the Mekeo area of Papua who had recently arrived in Port Moresby after spending some time as conscripted labourers for the Japanese in Rabaul. Included in the invitation were six senior officials, of whom four attended. The settlers were horrified and their reaction

42. Murray notes, p. 38.

to the event gives some indication of the gulf that still existed between white attitudes and the post-war policy. A correspondent to the Pacific Islands Monthly asked indignantly why European prisoners of war could not have been invited and suggested that the Papuans, "like many other Mekeos, ran away from the carrier lines on the Kokoda Trail...Old residents do not like Mekeos... generally they are born thieves, and untrustworthy."[43] The correspondent pointed out, "Rightly or wrongly, we cannot live in this country as the equal of the native at this stage of his development. We can only be here as his superior - or not at all." Such attitudes could be countered only with the constant, close support of the Australian government - something which Murray never received.

The white reaction to the "Government House luncheon" episode - led, according to Mrs. Murray, by the managers of the main commercial houses in Port Moresby, such as Burns Philp - was to boycott functions held by the Murrays. Government House invitations were then issued only to those Europeans, mostly officials, who were willing to be present with Papuans.[44] The boycott lasted for several months until, Mrs. Murray has said, "We were given to understand that invitations would be welcomed." This incident, more than any other, led to Colonel Murray's

43. The material in this and the following passage, including quotations, is drawn from P.I.M., Vol. 16 No. 9, April 1946, p. 11.
44. This and the following passage are based on an interview with Mrs. Murray, 14 December 1966.

being dubbed "Kanaka Jack", but he gave no sign that it interfered with his relations with the settlers. Over the years the Administrator conducted a steady, polite correspondence with a variety of planters and businessmen, usually in response to complaints about general conditions or against particular field officers.[45] Most of the letters came from people Murray had met on his numerous tours of the Territory, and although it was often a month or more before Murray answered, his replies were always extremely cordial, with the Administrator's usual concern for correctness, often containing personal compliments about the state of a mission or plantation or the generosity of hospitality.

Murray's concern for the outlying areas of the Territory was maintained after his intensive tours during the rehabilitation phase of the civil administration,[46] and it was through these that he made his main impact on the people. Towards the end of 1950, for example, when Murray was 61, he made one of his regular visits to the Western District of Papua, one of the most difficult and sparsely-populated parts of the Territory.[47] Flying to Daru from Port Moresby, he then went by aeroplane and launch to the navigation limit of the Mai Kussa River,

45. This correspondence is contained in P.N.G.N.A. Box 166, items 1/7/15, 16 and 19 and in Boxes 168-72, item 1-9-3A to Z.
46. See Chapter Four, pp. 238-42 and Chapter Six, pp. 327-8.
47. This and the following passage are drawn from P.N.G.N.A Box 200, item CA1/6/41, 2-8 October 1950.

and with a party headed by the acting Director of District Services walked to Rouku patrol post, a new station in the area. After spending a day at Rouku, he then completed the two-day walk back to Daru before going on to a similar tour of the Southern Highlands District.[48] This was quite in the tradition of Sir Hubert Murray; and there were other features which had impressed white observers after the early shock of Murray's attitude towards the village people. After observances in September 1947 to commemorate the Australian wartime landing at Scarlet Beach, near Finschhafen, one of the Europeans present observed, "We did not know before that the Administrator was a 'Digger' in the old 18th Battalion 1st AIF. His dignity and bearing at the Finschhafen show coupled with those two rows of war ribbons gave him added prestige...."[49] Murray's role as the agent of a new regime for New Guinea created schisms within the orthodoxy of European thought, while sometimes placing him in some personally embarrassing positions. In mid-1948, at the height of the public service unrest over delays in granting salary increases, he was snubbed by Europeans attending a cricket match in Port Moresby between the town's European club and a team from Hanuabada village.[50] A report in the Pacific Islands Monthly maintained that the incident arose from public servants' dissatisfaction

48. No walking tours were conducted by later Administrators, whose ventures away from aircraft and ships were of a purely token nature.
49. P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 3, October 1947, p. 73.
50. This and the following passage are drawn from P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 12, July 1948, p. 23.

with Canberra's neglect of their conditions of service, rather than from disapproval at the Administrator's attitude towards Papuans. However, his meeting with the Papuan cricketers was accompanied by "surly" greetings from Europeans. The episode led to a reaction among some whites: the president of the cricket club resigned in protest. The Pacific Islands Monthly correspondent observed:

> The cricket ground incident...does not stand to the credit of the European community. Colonel Murray, as Administrator, carrying out the policy laid down for him by the Socialists in Canberra, is in a difficult and most unenviable situation. Even although (sic) we do not like his native policy, we must agree that he has done nothing to forfeit the respect of Territorians; and the attitude of Europeans towards him should be dictated by that knowledge, and the fact that he is a cultured and courteous gentleman.

This was an indication that Murray's commitment to change was causing a few Europeans to re-examine their own attitudes: the Administrator was creating a conflict between the belief in white superiority and European respect for authority.

Murray's situation, 1949

Murray's gains had been only slight, however, as Osmar White pointed out in a cynical but perceptive study of the Administrator in September 1949, when Murray had been in office for almost four years.[51] Painting him as

51. This and the following passage, including the quotations, are drawn from P.I.M., Vol. 20 No. 2, September 1949, pp. 45-7.

a rather forlorn and lonely figure, White wrote:[52]

> His Honour the Administrator...is the instrument of External Territories Minister Eddie Ward and Secretary Joe Halligan, who is reported once to have said to a Territorian in an unguarded moment, "Governments come and Governments go, but I go on for ever!" Murray is a man whom few love, most respect and almost all pity. When far enough gone in the charity of rum, the rough, tough goldminers of the Watut and Edie Creek say of him, "Why the poor blankard only gets 2,500 a year! A man'd be a mug to do the work for that much a month!"

White commented that Murray, being "an idealist, a scholar, a gentleman", was "one of the poorest politicians and most faithful civil servants a shrewd Permanent Secretary ever dreamed to see hired". He had, however, received little support:

> If Murray were backed by a Government that had any real understanding of the task it has given him, he might succeed - or, at least, pave the way for future success. But he has not received any intelligent direction in high policy, nor the sympathy, support, or clear delegation of authority that would do much to offset the handicaps under which he now labours.

Murray's approach differed widely from that of the pre-war period:

> The present Administrator is no admirer of the methods of the late Sir Hubert Murray...who thought even missionary school-masters who educated their scholars to the third standard were a pack of interfering, disruptive busy-bodies. Such an interpretation of the moral responsibilities of metropolitan government offends J.K. Murray, to whose humanitarian mind even a laissez-faire imperialism is abhorrent.

52. The apocryphal nature of at least some of White's story is apparent from his use of the wrong name in referring to Halligan, who was known by his second Christian name as "Reg.".

White was sceptical of the Administrator's belief that the people of New Guinea could transform themselves within a few generations, but he showed little sympathy for the prejudiced whites, approving the Administrator's attitude towards them: "These he coldly ignores as self-seekers...."

On the other hand, White was misled by Murray's refusal to enter into recriminations against his superiors, seeing this as the attitude of "a man of rigid principles and rigid mind". White obviously had little knowledge of the frictions that had already arisen between Port Moresby and Canberra, or of the continuing frustrations that had, for example, led Murray to upbraid the Minister for his continuing failure to appoint more judges to the Territory's Supreme Court:[53]

> Much more confidence with regard to important matters in New Guinea Administration would be brought about if you were to arrange for the expiditing of the appointment of the additional judges whose services are urgently required. You will recollect representations by letter and radio to you with regard to this matter.

It was not, as White suggested, "For him established channels are sacred, the discipline of the bureaucracy inviolate." Rather, the situation had been reached where Murray was receiving almost no effective support, except from a handful of his senior officers. But he was not one to discuss such things with journalists.

53. P.N.G.N.A. Box 887, item GH47-3, 22 December 1948.

Controversy on Bougainville

The Administrator's problems were increased by a mounting cycle of criticism in both New Guinea and Australia. On several occasions, lack of action by the Australian government gave rise to complaints and crises that the Provisional Administration was called upon to remedy, but with inadequate resources. When dramatic improvements did not occur, the same critics shifted their attention to Ward and the government, who in defending themselves paid even less attention to the immediate problems of the Territory. The major controversies, which centred on conditions on Bougainville and at Rabaul, developed into attacks on the government by some of the most conservative elements in the Territory and the Australian parliament. They also illustrate the effectiveness of the Provisional Administration's response, under extremely difficult conditions, and indicate the problem of developing effective village programmes when so much attention had to be paid to countering the pressure of European interests.

The Bougainville issue stemmed from a concern for the welfare of the people, but developed into a political controversy within which village conditions almost came to be ignored. It came to public attention in late 1946, when Monsignor Hannan of the Catholic Mission at Torokina wrote in the journal Catholic Missions that there had

been no changes on the island since the end of the war; the people there had suffered severely from the Japanese occupation, more than in most other districts, and Monsignor Hannan felt deeply about this.[54] The matter was taken up in Canberra and Port Moresby and it was pointed out that special relief had been provided from Australia, with officers of the Provisional Administration buying seeds and animals in northern Queensland and distributing them in Bougainville from a ship specially allocated for the purpose.[55] The main problems were to re-establish taro gardens to provide the people with their staple pre-war food and to increase medical treatment to the level provided by Angau; staff in the district were already more numerous than in January 1942, but it was difficult to do more, owing to similar demands from many other parts of the Territory. The Monsignor was far from happy with these efforts, however, and during a visit to Australia in early 1947 he warmed to his theme, stating, "More people have died in Bougainville in the last eighteen months - under Australia rule - than during the war."[56] He claimed that 8,000 people in all had died since the beginning of the war and that 4,000 of these had died since August 1945; in all, one quarter of the population had perished. The Monsignor then approached the Minister for Immigration, Mr. A.A. Calwell, with a

54. The material in this and the following passage is drawn from CRS A518, item CI840/1/3, October-December 1946.
55. Ibid., 27 December 1946.
56. Melbourne Herald, 1 April 1947.

request that food supplies be given to the Catholic Mission for distribution to the people; the proposal was refused.[57]

Monsignor Hannan was subsequently reported to have denied his claim about the death-toll in Bougainville, but in what Gunther has called a "fit of pique" at Calwell's refusal of special aid to the mission, then demanded that food be flown to the island.[58] There followed questions in the House of Representatives,[59] and Murray was finally presented with the problem of extricating the government from a full-blown political controversy. In June 1947 he went to Bougainville, having, ironically, postponed his trip slightly for the second missions conference.[60] With the Bougainville situation a matter of special importance to the government, the Administrator was provided with the frigate H.M.A.S. Condamine, upon which he took a large party that included four department heads. In ten days the main part of this group, including Murray, walked for more than ninety miles through the villages of south-west Bougainville. It was a notable expedition for an Administrator with so many other urgent tasks, and one in which Murray showed the combination of punctilio and vulnerability that puzzled many of his subordinates while creating genuine regard among those who had some understanding of his character. Dr. Gunther,

57. Gunther interview, 4 December 1968.
58. Sydney Sun, 3 April 1947; Melbourne Herald, 10 April 1947.
59. C.P.D., Vol. 191, p. 1300, 16 April 1947.
60. The material in this and the following passage is drawn from P.N.G.N.A. Box 163, item GH2-7-2, 15 July 1947.

who was a member of the party, recalls that Murray made a point of changing into fresh clothes before entering a new village and of going through all of the patrol ceremonial, which included greetings with village officials and saluting the flag.[61] On one occasion he slipped over during this ritual, causing sarcastic comment among some of the accompanying group; and on another occasion fell while walking between villages, but kept on despite a painfully swollen ankle. In Gunther's words, "Murray was all brass, and you couldn't do other than respect the man."[62]

The inspection party reported that, while conditions in the south-western part of Bougainville had probably been worse than in any other part of the Territory, the situation had clearly improved.[63] There had been 25,000 Japanese in the area and once their supplies had been cut off they had engaged in wholesale looting of villages and gardens, including cutting down tens of thousands of coconut palms to obtain the "cabbage" portion at the base of the fronds. As a consequence, by August 1945 the death rate had grown to massive proportions, owing to starvation and disease. The situation had been stabilised

61. Gunther interview, 4 December 1968.
62. Murray was "brave", says Gunther, who recalls another incident at Manus, after the naval base was sold to the Nationalist Chinese and left in charge of a U.S. Navy lieutenant, who had allowed Chinese troops to guard the gates to the base. Upon Murray's arrival, the guard challenged him with bayonet at the "high port". "Murray didn't flinch," Gunther says. "He went back, dressed in his uniform and then blew hell out of all and sundry. The Navy transferred the Lieutenant very smartly."
63. This and the following passage is drawn from CRS A518, item CI840/1/3, 3 and 8 July 1947.

within twelve months, so that by the time of Monsignor Hannan's complaints rehabilitation had begun. Murray noted:[64]

> I went to Bougainville, as did at least some of the party, with considerable misgivings as to the state of affairs we should find. While there is general and great regret at the ghastly occurrences /of the war/...I feel that the future can be regarded with considerable confidence...Having seen over 5,400 people...I am glad to be able to report that I did not see a single case in which the individuals appeared to be other than well fed. There were certainly no cases which could possibly be described as approaching starvation.

The party reported, however, that there were still great problems, mainly arising from the shortages of shipping and medical personnel. This brought no response from the government, other than a note on file to "follow up the matter with the Directorate of Shipping". The issue had been defused by Murray's visit to Bougainville, and particularly by his establishing close relations with the Catholic Bishop and Monsignor Hannan, with whom he had spent several days both before and after his patrol through the villages. There were no further comments from the mission, although a statement by Monsignor Hannan in March 1948 suggested that his views on New Guinea were a little peculiar and that he had a penchant for making spectacular remarks to the press. He suggested that the Army should again be called in to "show the flag" to the people of Bougainville, who might be ready for a "slight" measure of autonomy, "perhaps in fifty years".[65] In the

64. Ibid., 8 July 1947.
65. Melbourne Herald, 13 March 1948.

meantime, Australia would be well advised to secure the islands by having the Chinese populate them! On this occasion his comments drew no reaction from press or parliament. Bougainville slipped to the background of Australian consciousness until the discovery of copper there twenty years later.

Colonel Allen and Rabaul

The other major public controversy of the post-war years, which began over conditions in Rabaul, was restricted to white interests and showed the selfishness and malice of the European community in their attitudes towards the Provisional Administration. The central Territory figure in this episode was Colonel H.T. Allen, who provided further ammunition for an attack that had already been launched on the government by Mr. T.W. White, a Liberal M.H.R. from Victoria. In April 1947 White moved that a select committee of the House inquire into conditions in New Guinea, with particular emphasis on economic matters, the "unbalanced native policy" and unrest in the Territory public service.[66] Drawing to some degree upon reports in the Pacific Islands Monthly, White aimed a sumber of his criticisms specifically at the Provisional Administration, rather than at the government in general. He adopted the settler argument that pre-war conditions should be re-established in the islands through aid to white

66. The material in this and the following passage, including quotations, is drawn from C.P.D., Vol. 191, pp. 1814-26, 16 April 1947.

plantations and enterprises, complaining of shortages of labour, shipping and materials of all kinds. Some of White's comments were sound, including his account of conditions within the public service; but in the manner of partisan debate, Mr. Ward answered mainly with bland assurances and some jibes of his own at "exploiters" and "vested interests", assuring the House at one point, "If there is any unrest in the public service then it exists only in the minds of certain disappointed people." With this lack of balance on either side the actual conditions in Papua New Guinea once more became of secondary importance, particularly after Colonel Allen became involved.

Allen, who had been mining at Wau before the war, moved to a plantation near Rabaul in 1946; in May of the following year he adopted the stance of settlers' spokesman, making a series of complaints in an article published by the Pacific Islands Monthly under the title, "What Is Wrong With New Guinea Administration: Colonel 'Blue' Allen Deals With Muddled Situation - With The Gloves Off".[67] Then during a visit to Australia a few months later, Allen claimed that he had been appointed the New Guinea delegate to the annual conference of the Australian R.S.L. in October 1947, saying that he intended to press for a higher price for copra and the restoration of the Legislative Council, with provision for European representation.[68] It appears that the New Guinea branch

67. P.I.M., Vol. 17 No. 11, June 1947, pp. 13-14.
68. P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 3, October 1947, p. 25.

of the R.S.L. may have acquiesced in Allen's arrangements after he made them, but he was not their formal delegate; since a large number of returned soldiers in the Territory were public servants, they did not wish to have their work criticised by a man who so clearly represented plantation interests.[69] However, Allen addressed the Australian conference and later claimed to have secured endorsement of a number of resolutions, mainly dealing with New Guinea land and related matters.[70] His greatest impact came with statements to the press, claiming that whites in New Guinea were living in tents while villagers were being provided with specially-built houses.[71] There were, he said, vast areas of "idle" land in New Guinea; if Australia wished to hold the islands it should settle them as soon as possible.[72] Approving his attack on the government, the Bulletin was wary of giving full credence to Allen's claims:[73]

> The colonel painted pictures of natives housed in model dwellings at the cost of the Commonwealth taxpayers, and of one village (it was destroyed accidentally) rebuilt at a cost of £150,000, while white women lived in tents and shacks in a mass of mildew, and returned soldiers, prepared to pioneer the worst climate within the Australian ambit, were denied the rights of Commonwealth settlement, war-service homes and repatriation.

Allen achieved his effect when, in early November, he was

69. This assessment was given by Mr. I. McDonals, a public servant and member of the Port Moresby branch of the League (CRS A518, item U800/1/7, 3 November 1947.
70. P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 4, November 1947, pp. 18-19.
71. Melbourne Sun, 26 September 1947.
72. Melbourne Argus, 30 October 1947.
73. Bulletin, 5 November 1947.

interviewed by both the Prime Minister and Mr. Ward and advised that an "investigation" would be carried out into his claims.[74]

Allen had made his first official complaints to the Department of Post-War Reconstruction, supplying one of its officers with a set of photographs which purported to show the poor conditions under which the Europeans of Rabaul were living. They included photographs of tents said to be occupied by whites; and houses, allegedly built by the Administration, allocated to New Guineans.[75] Allen further alleged that European entrepreneurs had been refused supplies of timber from the only sawmill in Rabaul, owned by the Administration. However, by the time of the Prime Minister's intervention, investigations had begun which led to the discrediting of Allen's main claims. As early as 3 November 1947 the Deputy Director of Post-War Reconstruction at Port Moresby visited Rabaul on instructions from his head office, reporting that the Administration had allocated timber to settlers, but that some had failed to collect their quotas; that the "native" houses in the photographs had been built by their owners from timber salvaged from the tunnels constructed by the Japanese under the hills of Rabaul; and that the tents

74. According to the report supplied by Allen to the Pacific Islands Monthly, he saw the Prime Minister in company with a "resentful" Mr. Ward, but the official records suggest that Allen was asked by Mr. Chifley to explain his allegations (P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 4, November 1947, p. 18; CRS A518, item U800/1/7, 3 November 1947).
75. CRS A518, item U800/1/7, 3 November 1947.

allegedly occupied by Europeans were work shelters on property owned or leased by Allen himself.[76] The report continued:

> Although much is written and reported in Southern Papers regarding Government Control stifling individual effort, there is not much evidence to show it. While undoubtedly there is some truth in such reports, much is grossly exaggerated...and, as is well known in this country, small grouches rapidly assume enormous proportions...A further impression I have gained is that at present the endeavour is not really pointed to "rehabilitation" of properties, but to the immediate effort of making as much money as possible in the quickest time, whether it be from plantations, or from Surplus Army Equipment....

The Deputy Director concluded that the publicity Allen had received was "not welcomed" by the people in Rabaul, but that they nevertheless objected to a number of post-war restrictions imposed by the Australian government, particularly on shipping, the marketing of produce and such "minor matters" as the use of dynamite in fishing.[77] Ex-servicemen in private enterprise appeared to be "quite unanimous in their criticisms of the policy laid down by the Commonwealth Government, in respect of the Territories, and consequently a feeling of antipathy is being built up against the Administration. All complain of frustration on the part of the Administration (whose duty it is to carry out the Government's policy)...." The report disclosed a situation that was beginning to appear in most parts of the Territory: a tendency to blame the

76. The material in this and the following passage, including quotations, is drawn from ibid.
77. The "blown" fish were usually fed to plantation workers.

Australian government rather than the Administration for continuing problems.[78]

Administrator's office made a political issue

The government showed little further interest in the Rabaul issue after Allen had been more or less discredited. Nor did Murray attempt to capitalise on the political situation by pressing for special consideration for Rabaul; it was far from being his highest priority. However, Allen's attacks provided further material for the Opposition to continue the campaign launched by Mr. White in April 1947. In November Mr. Anthony, a Country Party member from New South Wales, returned to the New Guinea theme because, according to the Pacific Islands Monthly, Allen had found on his return to Rabaul "that public affairs had deteriorated further in his absence" and the "promises" made to him by the Prime Minister were not being kept.[79] Mr. Anthony's urgency motion condemned:[80]

> The complete breakdown in the proper administration and provision of services in the Territories of Papua and New Guinea, and particularly the failure to provide reasonable accommodation for many white men and women, the breakdown in continuity of fresh food supplies and essentials, and the unsympathetic attitude of the responsible Minister towards Australians attempting to re-establish themselves in these Territories.

78. The impression was confirmed in a report by Melrose, who also paid a special visit to Rabaul; ibid., 28 November 1947.
79. P.I.M., Vol. 18 No. 5, December 1947, p. 10.
80. The material in this and the following passage, including quotations, is drawn from C.P.D., Vol. 195, pp. 2928-38, 28 November 1947.

Anthony was supported in the ensuing debate by White, and although their exchanges with Ward were little more than a repetition of their respective bigotries, they showed that the Opposition was building up sources of information in the Territory that were an embarrassment to the Minister. In his reply Ward relied heavily on the report compiled for the Department of Post-War Reconstruction and it began to appear that he and his Department were out of touch with events in key areas of Papua New Guinea. The need for a Ministerial visit was increasingly obvious. When Parliament resumed after the Christmas recess, White revived his motion calling for a select committee into condition in the Territory. After yet another airing of the same grievances and counter-accusations, the motion was defeated on 4 March 1948.[81] Thus in five months of argument, political forces in Australia failed to advance conditions in Papua New Guinea in any measurable way. The issue slipped from public attention for a few months before being revived at the end of 1948 by Ward's involvement in the "Garden case", which damaged morale in the Territory even further.

By the time the Labor government was defeated at the election of December 1949, its New Guinea policy, the Minister and the Provisional Administration had, separately or in varying combinations, been the subjects of more than four years of almost continuous dispute.

81. C.P.D., Vol. 196, pp. 385-92, 4 March 1948.

The issue was a minor one in Australian politics, but it marked an important change from the pre-war period, when the major parties had been interested in little more than Papua New Guinea's importance for Australia's defence.[82] The partisanship of the post-war controversy had unfortunate effects on the later administration of the Territory. Firstly, the settler viewpoint gained much greater attention than it had in earlier years, at the expense of village interests. Secondly, the Provisional Administration in general, and Murray in particular, were associated with the Labor cause; even though Murray had never been a member of the Labor Party, it was almost inevitable that he would be viewed with suspicion by a non-Labor government. Thirdly, the office of Administrator itself developed certain political associations; after Labor's defeat, the Provisional Administration came to be referred to as the "Ward-Murray regime".[83] The Liberal-Country Party victory in 1949 thus opened the way to an essentially political reaction in Papua New Guinea: one which Murray had done nothing to invite, but which Ward's conduct had made almost certain.

Australian planning: an exercise in futility

By 1949 New Guinea's problems and shortcomings, which could have been excused during the immediate post-war

82. See Chapter One, pp. 39-40, 67-8.
83. See, for example, P.I.M., Vol. 21 No. 4, November 1950, pp. 10-11.

period, were almost indefensible. In particular, there was a lack of direction in policy. That this was entirely caused by the Australian authorities will be apparent from a review of planning for Papua New Guinea under the Labor government. The Commonwealth Inter-Departmental Committee on the Territory, whose recommendations on the resumption of civil administration were noted in Chapter Five,[84] was revived in April 1947 after some two years of complete inactivity.[85] It comprised representatives of the Departments of External Territories (Mr. Halligan, chairman), Treasury, Post-War Reconstruction, Commerce and Agriculture, and Works and Housing. Its first meeting consisted of "preliminary discussions" and its next three were devoted to an examination of a proposed timber project in the Bulolo Valley, so that it was not until early August that the committee was able to consider the major questions of New Guinea development. At this fifth meeting the committee reached the unremarkable conclusion that "a physical survey, including a topographical investigation of communications, water and power resources, should be made to determine the production potential of the Territories". Its second recommendation was astonishing: "that the British Colonial Office be approached with a view to obtaining the services of suitable personnel to

84. See Chapter Five, pp. 257-9.
85. The records of the Inter-Departmental Committee and the Cabinet Sub-Committee to which it was supposed to report, are in CRS A518, items C and D927/1; notes on the 1947 meetings are contained in Halligan papers, Box 2, item 1. The information in the following passage has been drawn from a summary of the various committees set out in item C927/1, 22 September 1949.

assist in carrying out the survey and to perform such other duties as may be required".

While the notion of drawing on comparative experience was one which had been urged on the government for several years by the Directorate and Murray, the committee showed an extraordinary lack of perception in supposing that the Colonial Office would be able to spare more than one or two observers. Moreover, it was typical of the Commonwealth bureaucracy's arrogance in dealing with Papua New Guinea affairs that Murray was not consulted on the use of British personnel, nor on the possibility of the Provisional Administration's being provided with additional staff and finance to begin the survey itself. Predictably, the British authorities declined the Australian invitation, but the committee continued to look to the United Kingdom for assistance, while taking no further action of its own. In early 1948 an official of the British Overseas Food Corporation suggested during a visit to Canberra that the British and Australian governments might set up a joint survey team, "composed of approximately twenty scientific personnel and crop specialists". This second scheme was rejected by the British government in September 1948. In the meantime, the Inter-Departmental Committee had followed the example of its predecessor by suspending its operations, having given no consideration whatsoever to any of the multitude of other problems that faced the Territory.

After sixteen months of sporadic discussions, the second Commonwealth Inter-Departmental Committee had thus produced nothing to assist the Territory. This marked the third failure by the Canberra authorities to provide planning support for the Provisional Administration,[86] and was one of the factors that led to the preparation of the reports, discussed in the two previous Chapters, by the Territory committees on social development, welfare and economic development. The reports bore a note on the cover that they were intended specifically for the Inter-Departmental Committee, but there is no evidence that they were ever brought to the attention of the government. This was partly because the Inter-Departmental Committee had lapsed, in its turn, by the time the Administration's reports reached Australia; the last official record of its meeting as a formal group is for 1 October 1947. During the next eighteen months some of the items that the committee had placed on its standing agenda were dealt with in the Papua and New Guinea Bill, but these were mainly machinery provisions; a review of the situation in 1949 reported that the "major part of the work" had still to be done.[87] It was a lamentable performance by the Canberra authorities: one that had passed the point of mere inefficiency and had developed into gross negligence.

86. The others were the Australian Pacific Territories Research Council and the Council of the Australian School of Pacific Administration, discussed in Chapter Five.
87. CRS A518, item C927/1, 22 September 1949. The agenda was no more than a list of major issues requiring attention and gave no indication of proposed action.

Mr. Chifley intervenes

The lack of progress in New Guinea planning had become so obvious by mid-1949 that the Prime Minister saw fit to remind Ward of the situation, observing that the 1947 Inter-Departmental Committee could "be regarded as having ceased to function for some time past".[88] Thus in August 1949, shortly after the Minister's resumption of his portfolio following the Royal Commission into his involvement with Garden, Mr. Chifley urged that Ward reconstitute the planning committee. The proposal was that there should be a third inter-departmental group reporting to a Ministerial Standing Committee. This was the second time the Prime Minister had recommended such an arrangement, which in turn paralleled the pattern of organization of 1944. When announcing the formation of the 1947 machinery, the Prime Minister had stated that a Cabinet Committee would be responsible for drawing up a ten-year plan for the development of the Territory,[89] but there had been no action at the Ministerial level, partly because Cabinet had received no detailed proposals from its departmental advisers. The 1949 Ministerial Standing Committee differed from its stillborn 1947 counterpart in that the Minister for External Affairs replaced the Minister for Post-War Reconstruction. There was a similar change at the departmental level, and an important addition: the Administrator was included in

88. CRS A518, item 103/1/8, 1 August 1949.
89. Sydney Daily Telegraph, 16 April 1947.

the inter-departmental group. This was the first time the Territory had been given direct representation within the Commonwealth executive; other bodies which included Papua New Guinea delegates, such as the Pacific Territories Research Council, had possessed advisory functions only.

Planning for New Guinea during the few remaining months of the Labor government's tenure was no more encouraging than it had been during the preceding four years. In a minute on the reconstitution of the inter-departmental committee, the Department of External Territories could offer only extremely broad recommendations that showed no advance on the thinking of the war years. Apparently ignoring the Prime Minister's earlier desire for a ten-year plan, the Department suggested that a five-year programme be prepared:[90]

> For the purpose of developing such a plan it will be necessary -
>
> (a) To inaugurate and complete further research work as will be necessary in connection with the social, educational and political aspects of the plan.
>
> (b) To organize and carry through an economic survey of the Territory on a regional basis.
>
> (c) For the purpose of such survey to obtain clarification of any policy matters likely to affect the scope and purpose of the survey.

These were merely platitudes which considered nothing more than the preliminaries of planning, and other sections of the departmental minute suggested that their vagueness reflected not only the Department's inability to produce

90. CRS A518, item C927/1, 22 September 1949.

definite proposals, but also a general uneasiness about the trend of the government's policy. As Murray suspected, this disquiet centred on the cost of post-war administration in comparison with the level of return from the Territory's own finances:[91]

> ....the Commonwealth has already devoted considerable resources to the social and educational advancement of the peoples of the Territory. The emphasis which has been placed on these aspects of development has, however, entailed a substantial cost to the Commonwealth and it is considered that, in any plan for future development, more emphasis will require to be placed on the aspects of economic development than has been practicable up to now...Basic economic policy aims at encouraging both native and non-native industry, with the limit of non-native expansion determined by the welfare of the natives generally. The implementation of this policy involves a much greater measure of governmental responsibility in the planning of economic development than would be involved in the normal forms of unrestricted commercial development.

Since the social and educational development programmes had scarcely begun in 1949, the department's reference to the "considerable resources" devoted to them shows its continued preoccupation with pre-war scales of administration. The suggestion that unrestricted commerce constituted "normal forms" of development also reveals something of the thought behind the tortuous syntax of the minute.

The 1949 committees

There was little chance that yet another group under the chairmanship of the Secretary for External Territories

91. Ibid.

could provide fresh impetus for New Guinea planning. Any opportunity that may have existed was soon lost in the confusion that accompanied the formation of the 1949 inter-departmental committee. In September 1949, a month after the Prime Minister's proposal, the Administrator had still not been informed of it: in an enquiry that apparently referred to the defunct 1947 committee, Murray asked again whether any decisions had been reached on the recommendations of his committees on social and economic development, whose reports had by that time been in Canberra for a year.[92] His enquiry elicited no response, but in the meantime the Department had prepared background papers on the proposal for the new planning structure and had arranged a meeting of the inter-departmental committee for 26 September 1949.[93] Dr. Gunther was in Australia at the time, and he attended the meeting after approval had been hastily obtained from the Administrator.[94]

The only meeting of the 1949 inter-departmental committee revealed the lack of progress in Australian planning for the Territory during the four preceding years, as well as the narrow view of New Guinea affairs taken by some Commonwealth departments. In opening the meeting, Halligan suggested a characteristically labyrinthine procedure:[95]

92. CRS A518, item 103/1/8, 2 September 1949.
93. CRS A518, item C927/1, 26 September 1949.
94. P.N.G.N.A. Box 166, item GH1-8-3, 23 November 1949 (reviewing the situation, this memorandum also informed Murray officially of the committee's formation).
95. CRS A518, item C927/1, 26 September 1949.

> The approval of Cabinet would be necessary for the reconstitution of the two Committees on the lines suggested by the Prime Minister and a draft submission for this purpose...prepared. In accordance with the Prime Minister's suggestion, the reconstituted Ministerial Standing Committee would need to consider a programme of work for the Inter-Departmental Committee to undertake, and it was desirable that the Departments concerned should examine the matter in preliminary discussion with a view to the preparation of appropriate draft recommendations for consideration by the Ministerial Standing Committee.

In other words, Halligan could only suggest that the committee start the whole tortuous operation again. He could produce nothing from previous discussions to which the 1949 committee could refer and made no mention of the Provisional Administration's reports on development, presumably because they contained material highly critical of his Department's efforts. The most familiar feature of the proceddings was the lack of any suggestion of urgency by the Secretary: he was either indifferent to the needs of New Guinea, or incapable of dealing with the situation; possibly both.

The proceedings of the meeting of the 1949 inter-departmental committee were far from encouraging. An Assistant Secretary representing the Department of the Treasury observed that:[96]

> ....greater emphasis should be placed on making the Territory self-supporting...so long as there existed two policies for the Territory, one basically economic in approach and the other stressing the paramount interest of native welfare and development, there would be a diversity of approach which must lead to confusion....

96. The material in this and the following passages is drawn from ibid.

The notes of the meeting recorded further statements by the Treasury official:

> He appreciated the obligations which had been undertaken by the Commonwealth in relation to the welfare and advancement of the native people, but he thought that there should be a proper relationship between welfare and finances. He did not wish it to be thought that he was taking the pure Treasury approach to the Committee's task, but the expenditure indicated in relation to the health programme rather suggested that it had not got beyond the stage of "health for health's sake".

This was the attitude that had determined pre-war policy for the islands and, as Dr. Burton, the Secretary for External Affairs, suggested:

> ....it would not be desirable for the Committee to divide into two sections, namely, those who want the Territory to cost nothing and to be self-supporting, and those who want native welfare to be the primary objective of Government policy... the Committee alone could not possible do the work listed, and...much of that work could be carried out only by those persons on the spot.

Burton's final point was of major importance, but Halligan failed to acknowledge it, even when he was forced to admit that "the Department of External Territories had not been adequately staffed and this had thrown many difficulties in the way of the previous Committee". He said, however, that some reorganization of the Department had been approved and anticipated that "with the additional staff...the Department would be in a better position to meet its responsibilities". Finally, the Director-General of Agriculture, one Mr. Bulcock, gave

the quintessential bureaucratic assessment of earlier proceedings by saying that "the work done by the previous Committee could not be regarded as futile. The Committee had demonstrated the limitations of its Organization."

Few comments by Dr. Gunther are recorded in the notes of the meeting. However, he pointed out that such matters as health and welfare programmes were themselves the foundation of sound economic development, and secured an admission from the Treasury representative that he "had not realised until this meeting the various factors concerned in such policy, as, for example, the way in which the labour supply determined the working tempo of the Territory. He found that by reducing such a policy to recognizable economic terms he could more reasily understand the problems facing the Committee." Gunther cannot have been impressed by such proceedings. "He mentioned that there was a growing feeling of frustration amongst the Territory officials, and even amongst the native people, and he said that they were awaiting a definite expression of policy under which their efforts could be organized...."

The meeting of the 1949 committee produced nothing more than a ten-point agenda that set out the same tasks as had been perceived as early as 1944, but it came at a time when the inertia of the preceding years could no longer be ignored. Since it virtually coincided with the

change of government, it also provided a pattern that could be followed by the incoming Minister. This was little consolation to the Port Moresby authorities, for the conditions which had developed in the administration of the Territory could by this time only be described as desperate.

Apparent progress: further delays

Despite the impasse in planning, it seemed by mid-1949 that some of the technical uncertainties that had weakened the Papua New Guinea Administration were about to be resolved. Legislation establishing a permanent public service was finally promulgated and the Papua and New Guinea Act was passed by the Australian parliament.[97] These measures formalised the administrative amalgamation of the two Territories and established a combined public service, as well as making provision for the usual institutions of colonial government.[98] In addition, the position of Administrator was given substantive authority, and on 1 July 1949 Murray's appointment was extended for five years in the first instance; by that time he had held office for three years and eight months, and in the normal course of events his new term would have expired on 30 June 1954. As was the case with such statutory appointments, however, the Papua and New Guinea

97. The Public Service Ordinance 1949, No. 5 of 1949, came into effect on 22 June 1949.
98. The name of the Territory was also changed, from Papua-New Guinea to Papua and New Guinea.

Act provided that he held office "during the pleasure of the Governor-General".[99] The terms of Murray's appointment remained unchanged, as did his salary.[100]

The situation was not all that it appeared, however. The Public Service Ordinance 1949 had been in operation for only six months before the government announced that it was still only a temporary measure and would be re-drafted before being promulgated in its final form.[101] As a consequence, no Regulations were introduced under the 1949 Ordinance, and so a wide range of public service entitlements remained undefined. The Superannuation Ordinance 1949 was also found to be unsuitable for the Territory's needs, and it was to be more than two years before satisfactory provisions were introduced.[102] The morale of the public service fell even lower because of this continued confusion. Officers who believed that their "temporary" appointments of several years past would at last be confirmed were faced with further uncertainty, so that tensions within the service remained high.

The most serious delays occurred in the establishment of an effective decision-making structure for the Territory. It was noted in Chapter Six that, in the absence of an Executive Council, major problems occurred

99. P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, item 1-3-1, 29 June 1949 sets out the terms of Murray's renewed appointment.
100. For the terms of Murray's original appointment, see Chapter Three, pp. 174-5.
101. P.I.M., Vol. 20 No. 6, January 1950, p. 17.
102. Massive amendments were introduced by the Superannuation (Papua and New Guinea) Ordinances 1951 on 9 August and 13 November 1951.

in developing a co-ordinated executive and planning group; and that a series of committees had emerged in its stead.[103] The committees, despite their limitations, had guided the rehabilitation of the Territory and had produced the reports on economic and social development. When these reports had elicited no response from Canberra, the Administrator directed that a new structure be set up in an effort to improve planning and co-ordination. This was to be known as the "Administrator's Conference", being attended by all department heads and, occasionally, by a small number of their senior advisers.[104] The group first met in December 1948 and then at weekly intervals for a time, although its meetings grew less frequent after the first few months.[105] This body, too, was severely limited in its actions because it possessed no greater powers than its predecessors, so that even relatively trifling matters had still to receive the formal approval of the Administrator. However, with the passage of the Papua and New Guinea Act it was expected that the formal executive machinery so urgently required in the Territory would be created very rapidly. Anticipating early action, Murray in June 1949 requested that the Executive Council be set up immediately the enabling legislation came into effect.[106] He favoured a Council of fifteen members, including the heads of the major departments, with four District Officers to keep the executive informed of

103. See Chapter Six, pp. 333-9.
104. P.N.G.N.A. Bos 163, item 1-4, 9 December 1948.
105. Ibid., 9 May 1949.
106. P.N.G.N.A. Box 190, item CA1/2/3, 24 June 1949.

developments in the rural areas. When no reply was received from Canberra by September 1949, Murray pointed out that the permanent Administration had been in operation for three months and that there seemed no reason for further delay.[107]

Executive Council fiasco

The next steps in the establishment of the Executive Council illustrate once more the cycle of frustration created by the inability of the Canberra authorities to meet the needs of the Territory Administration, as well as their unwillingness to allow Murray and his staff to act on their own initiative. Replying to Murray's requests, Halligan stated, "Until firm decisions are taken in regard to the Department Organization for the Public Service of the Territory and on the matter of permanent appointment thereto it seems that it will be impracticable to secure the formation of a Council of a permanent nature."[108] The Secretary suggested that a "temporary" Executive Council comprising a "minimum number of members" should be set up in the interim. However, since Halligan did not reply until late November, almost five months after Murray's original recommendation, it was not until 19 December 1949 that the "temporary" Executive Council met for the first time.[109] Thus the Papua New Guinea

107. The material in this and the following passage is drawn from P.N.G.N.A. Box 166, item GH1-8-3, undated September 1949.
108. P.N.G.N.A. Box 190, item CA1/2/3, 20 November 1949.
109. P.N.G.N.A. Box 169, item GH1-11-1, 19 December 1949.

authorities were trapped in a Kafkaesque situation: the Department of External Territories denied them an Executive Council because there was no permanent public service; and there was no permanent public service because the Department of External Territories had failed to make adequate arrangements for it.

The temporary Executive Council was established on 1 December 1949 for a period of six months, with extensions of the members' appointments to be made "if required". In May 1950 and again in the following September, Port Moresby was obliged to advise the Department of External Territories that the term of the Executive Council would expire within one or two days and to ask the Canberra authorities their intentions.[110] Additional renewals were required until 1952, following the establishment of the permanent public service and the Legislative Council. Meanwhile, the membership of the Executive Council continued as a point of contention between Canberra and the Administration. The Minister approved a Council of only nine members, six fewer than requested by Murray, on the grounds that wider representation could be provided with the establishment of the Legislative Council. Yet the Papua and New Guinea Act provided that the Legislative Council would not be formed until a year after the proclamation of the permanent Administration, so that a case clearly existed for a larger membership for the interim Executive Council. Nor was any provision made

110. Ibid., 30 May and 30 September 1950.

for membership by officers stationed outside Port Moresby; all were heads or acting heads of departments, including:[111]

Mr. S.A. Lonergan, acting Government Secretary
Mr. J.H. Jones, acting Secretary for Planning and Development (see Chapter Ten)
Dr. J.T. Gunther, Director of Public Health
Mr. W.C. Groves, Director of Education
Mr. W.N.M. Chester, acting Treasurer
Mr. W.R. Humphries, acting Director of Labour
Mr. W. Cottrell-Dormer, Director of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries
Mr. E.P. Holmes, Secretary for Lands, Surveys and Mines
Mr. J.B. McAdam, acting Director of Forests

Six of the nine members were senior pre-war officers; four - Lonergan, Jones, Holmes and McAdam - from the Mandated Territory and two - Chester and Humphries - from Papua.

Only Jones, Lonergan, McAdam and Gunther were firm administrators, so that the Executive Council, like the Advisory Committee and the Committee on Native Development and Welfare, could be dominated by pre-war Mandated Territory personnel. Murray was dissatisfied with the membership approved by the Minister, and particularly with the fact that it excluded the Crown Law Officer; he advised Halligan that in his opinion the Executive Council, whether temporary or not, could not function without legal advice.[112] The acting Crown Law Officer, Mr. W.W. Watkins, had recently been appointed following Bignold's elevation to the Supreme Court. Bignold was a senior Papuan officer, and the fact that Watkins was both very junior in the

111. CRS A518, item H927/1, undated January 1950.
112. P.N.G.N.A. Box 169, item GH1-11-1, 17 January 1950.

service and a relatively young man may have counted against him. However, Halligan gave no reasons when he again refused to make the appointment.[113] Murray replied tersely, demanding to know why it was thought the executive could function without its senior legal officer; he was, he wrote, "at a loss" to understand the Secretary's reasoning.[114] Murray later raised the matter during visits to Canberra, and in October 1950 Watkins was finally approved as a member of the temporary Executive Council.[115] It was extraordinary that the Administrator could secure a favourable decision on such a matter, in which his attitude was obviously sensible, only after nine months of time-consuming argument. It is difficult to find an explanation for the Department of External Territories' stubborness on the issue, other than an apparent determination to have its own way in limiting the size of the Council, regardless of the circumstances.

Murray had cause to be apprehensive about the trend of future policy when the government changed in December 1949, but after experiencing more than four years of bureaucratic ignorance, neglect and obstruction he could have been forgiven for hoping that the level of

113. Ibid., 14 February 1950.
114. Ibid., 18 February 1950.
115. Watkins retained his membership of the Executive Council for only a year, being dropped on the formal approval of Hasluck in October 1951, shortly before the Legislative Council was established. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the Department of External Territories finally had its way.

administrative efficiency in Canberra might at least improve. Unfortunately, the improvement took some time to appear, and when it did a situation had been reached where much of the blame for past omissions was placed, not in Canberra where it belonged, but on the Administrator himself.

CHAPTER TEN

NEW GOVERNMENT, OLD INTERESTS

Change of Minister - Settlers rejoice - Mr. Menzies' emphasis - Mr. Spender's beliefs - The Spender visit, 1950 - Spender's promises to settlers - Spender, Murray and the U.N. Mission - U.N. Mission poses problems - First attempts to remove Murray - Spender sums up - Reaction to the new conservatism - Disillusined settlers - Australian aid - Yet more committees, 1950 - Murray presses his economic plan - Support from External Territories Rejection of the plan - Secretariat of Planning and Development - Limitations of the Secretariat Spender's achievement: slowing post-war trends - White representation - Strengthening the companies' hold

Change of Minister

The new Liberal-Country Party Cabinet was sworn in on 19 December 1949, with Mr. P.C. (later Sir Percy) Spender being appointed to the portfolios of External Affairs and External Territories. Spender, a King's Counsel who had served in World War 1, was elected member

for Warringah, Sydney, in 1937 and had been Treasurer and Minister for the Army in the non-Labor ministries of 1940 and 1941. He ranked sixth in the new Cabinet, compared with the eighth position held by Ward in the second Chifley ministry, and was one of the most prominent figures in the Liberal Party.[1] However, his first portfolio at External Affairs was both more important and more onerous than had been Ward's as Minister for Transport; the possible effects of this situation were summed up by the Pacific Islands Monthly:[2]

> Mr. Menzies' decision to place those two portfolios in the hands of one man is a new idea, but a sound one...The main objection to the new arrangement is that External Affairs is an important portfolio, and the Minister may be so preoccupied with it that he will not have much time for External Territories - which, under present circumstances, demands a lot of time.

To reduce this problem, the Prime Minister had announced his intention of appointing Parliamentary Under-Secretaries to assist Ministers who had heavy responsibilities "The most persistent forecast," the Pacific Islands Monthly noted, "is that the /External Territories/ job will go to Mr. Paul Hasluck, a newly elected West Australian, who was formerly a journalist and a prominent official in the Department of External Affairs. He should make an admirable junior Minister for the Territories." However, Hasluck was engaged with his

1. C.A. Hughes and B.D. Graham, Australian Government and Politics 1890-1964, Canberra, A.N.U. Press, 1968, pp. 22-31. Ward ranked considerably lower in the Curtin and first Chifley ministries.
2. The material and quotations in this and the following passage are drawn from P.I.M., Vol. 20 No. 6, January 1950, p. 10.

volumes of the official Australian war history, and the appointment went to Mr. John Howse, a relatively junior Liberal Party member from Victoria. The white community of Papua New Guinea awaited with interest the first impact of the new Minister and his assistant on Territory affairs.

Settlers rejoice

Predictably, the defeat of the Australian Labor government was greeted enthusiastically by settler interests, who were further encouraged by non-Labour victories in New Zealand and the United Kingdom during the same period. "Goodbye to Socialism - and all that!" rejoiced the Pacific Islands Monthly,[3] which also noted more soberly:[4]

> It would be foolish to suggest that the end of Socialism means that all those plans for native welfare and advancement are to be abandoned. There has been no indication of any such change in policy. On the contrary, it may be taken as certain that the new Government will carry on with all the enterprises designed to assist the native to higher standards of life. But it is equally certain that those plans generally will be revised, so that they may be tied more closely to realities, where necessary.

The magazine supposed that revised policies, which it persisted in calling "reforms", would occur as soon as the new Minister had an opportunity to assess conditions in New Guinea. There were problems requiring urgent attention, notably shipping, copra marketing, and the

3. P.I.M., Vol. 20 No. 5, December 1949, p. 5.
4. Ibid., p. 6.

morale of the Territory's public service, but the Pacific Islands Monthly was ready to admit that Spender was justified in making "no fundamental change in administration until he has examined conditions on the spot".[5] After all, the magazine pointed out:

> Mr. Ward's policies, plus his reluctance to give any worthwhile discretionary power to his Administrator, certainly placed some strangleholds on the Territories. But, in the new Minister's view, they must be removed with care and discretion, lest new evils be created.

The possible "evil" of allowing the Administrator too great a voice in New Guinea affairs could in any case be offset by a change in the government's attitude towards the settler community:

> It is anticipated that Mr. Spender, to a much greater extent than has been known hitherto, will consult with experienced, non-official people in the Territories in regard to Territories problems.

There was thus a feeling of anticipation among the "non-official people" when the Minister announced that he would tour the islands in April 1950, just six years after the last visit by a substantive Minister for External Territories.

Mr. Menzies' emphasis

The Territory's officials, and Colonel Murray in particular, had little cause for optimism about their

5. The material in this and the following passage, including quotations, is drawn from P.I.M., Vol. 20 No. 6, January 1950, p. 10.

relations with the new government. Already, in the joint Opposition policy speech delivered in November 1949, Menzies had said, "Australia's record in recent years in New Guinea and Papua is not a very satisfactory one."[6] After making a predictable jibe at "Socialist Ministers at Canberra", he had then gone on, in an implied criticism of the Administration, to propose "a skilled Australian Territories Service offering opportunities and producing a level of competent and civilised administration like those of the British Colonial Service". This was needed to carry out a "basic attack on the problems of production and expansion". The establishment of a combined colonial was never seriously considered, but Menzies' remarks were an early indication that the Territory officials would share the blame for New Guinea's difficulties during the post-war years. The reference to "production and expansion" was particularly revealing; Menzies said that his government would change the emphasis of development. He maintained that under Labor the "real things" had not been done. "We shall make it our business to restore and develop production in the Territories; to improve shipping facilities...and encourage industrial enterprise... in mining, plantations and trade generally." This was a clear warning that greater sympathy would be shown to white interests. As for the Territory's people, Menzies' only comment was that there "should be adequate health

6. The material in this and the following passage, including quotations, is drawn from CRS A518, item AL800/1/7, 10 November 1949. The typed extract from the speech was filed by the Department the day after it was given.

and other services for native populations". With guarded statements of this sort in mind, Murray believed that the programmes that had been instituted as part of the Labor reforms for New Guinea, while not in danger of being abandoned by the new government, could nevertheless be so modified in favour of settler interests that the progress of the post-war years would be jeopardised.[7] The Administrator was in no sense antagonistic towards the Menzies government, but was aware that he had been identified with Labor and was therefore uncertain of his reception by the new Minister.

Mr. Spender's beliefs

Murray was not left long in doubt. Towards the end of February 1950 he was summoned to Canberra, where he found the Department of External Territories staff engaged in a flurry of activity and the atmosphere "cordial but formal, if not cool".[8] Mr. Spender had come to office convinced, quite correctly, that the "first essential was the mapping out of a practical plan for the advancement of /the/ people".[9] He was aware that the various committees established by the Labor government had "got nowhere" and believed that, "in whatever was being done, there was a

7. This and the following passage are based on Murray interview, 12 December 1966.
8. Murray interview, 12 December 1966.
9. P.C. Spender, Politics and a Man, Sydney, Collins, 1972, p. 274. In a conversation on 27 November 1973 Sir Percy stated that most of what he wished to say about his dealings with New Guinea was contained in the relevant section (Chapter 29) of this book.

lack of understanding and absence of co-ordination between Canberra and the administration in New Guinea".[10] He sought to correct this situation by demanding firm proposals from his Department and by engaging in a series of well-publicised meetings with groups and individuals with interests in the Territory.[11] He had determined upon an early visit there: "The journey was, in my judgement, a 'must'. How could one intelligently apply oneself to its problems unless the Territory and its people, so to speak, were seen on the ground?"[12] While the tour was the precursor to the Minister's new plan for Papua New Guinea, he had nevertheless formed certain opinions about the efforts of the preceding few years and the future needs of the country:[13]

> Minister Ward never saw much merit in private enterprise. The idea that private capital should be permitted to develop the territory would have been anathema to him - would lead to what was then called "the capitalist exploitation of the native people". On the other hand, the local administration - and I hope I do no injustice in saying this - seemed to me inclined to view the territory and its people as a large native museum of which they were the devoted custodians. It is not surprising that liaison between Canberra and Port Moresby was not the best.

Having accepted this simplistic view, Spender formed the opinion that private investment was essential: "otherwise you couldn't have development of anything very much".[14]

10. Ibid., pp. 274-5.
11. P.I.M., Vol. 20 No. 8, March 1950, p. 5.
12. Spender, op. cit., p. 271.
13. Ibid., p. 275.
14. Conversation with Sir Percy Spender, 27 November 1973.

It was this approach that he hoped to encourage in the coming years; and there can be no doubt that he saw this as an identifiable policy: in retrospect, he wrote that during his eighteen months as Minister he was able to "lay down a new policy for Papua and New Guinea; to stay, or change the direction of, much of the policy previously pursued; and to see a new one...started on the road".[15] In fact, the "new" policy was as old as colonialism itself.

With his preconceptions, most of them reflecting the opinions of settler interests, the Minister was in no position to establish an open relationship with the Administrator. Spender recalls that he and Murray "didn't see eye-to-eye on a number of things".[16] Yet it is unlikely that there was any immediate intention of removing Murray from office; his appointment had more than four years to run and any move against him might have created an unnecessary political issue during the first months of the new government. Murray's position was cast in a new light, however, when a major disagreement arose during the Minister's visit to the Territory during the following April.

The Spender visit, 1950

The background to the 1950 Ministerial visit was not

15. Spender, op. cit., p. 271.
16. Spender conversation, 27 November 1973.

a particularly favourable one for Murray and his Administration. Murray had presented to Spender in Canberra a seventeen-page summary of existing conditions and outstanding issues in Papua New Guinea, but it contained none of the recommendations for substantial changes in policy which the Minister clearly desired. Rather, it dealt with a multitude of apparently minor, if related, matters which could only be appreciated in full by someone already possessing a fairly detailed knowledge of the Territory and its recent history. It noted, for example, that the morale of the public service had improved somewhat, but that new allowances scarcely offset the increased cost of living; that among the outstanding legislative matters, a land commission was urgently required; that the very rate of inflow of money to New Guinea was creating its own problems of shortages and inflation.[17] In one or two cases the summary argued against the conventional wisdom of the period: that, for instance, cult leaders such as Yali and Paliau could be viewed as "constructive workers" who were an "asset rather than a liability".[18] As for long-range plans, Murray returned to the theme that, in order to safeguard the future of Papua New Guinea, Australia should buy as much tropical produce as possible from that quarter.

Representations against the Administration were made

17. The material in this and the following passage is drawn from P.N.G.N.A. Box 166, item GH1-8-3, 21 February 1950.
18. See Chapter Seven, p. 418, footnote 68.

by other interests. A Sydney solicitor who had read of Spender's proposed tour of the Territory wrote:[19]

> As you will remember, I practiced (sic) there for six years pre-war and saw a few ministers come and go. None of 'em did anything except Eddie Ward and he gummed up the entire works. I will offer no advice but to suggest that you listen to the commercial and planting communities alone and not accompanied by Government Officials. And remember, Missionaries, Anthropologists and Officials are not disinterested witnesses. They are all after bigger pay and/or more power. Papua-New Guinea...should be practical and producing [areas], not anthropological museums. Before E. Ward, New Guinea cost nothing and Papua £40,000 a year. Now they cost we (sic) taxpayers upwards of 4 million pounds annually - Whaffor?

Opinions of this kind strengthened what was apparently the prevailing feeling in Canberra that the Territory Administration might adopt an unco-operative attitude during the Ministerial visit; it is otherwise hard to account for the peculiar message that was sent to Murray a few days before the Minister's arrival, stating, "The Minister feels that it is most important that the correct dignity and position of the Crown...should be maintained in the eyes of the peoples of the Territory."[20] Shortly afterwards, in an obvious reference to settler interests, the Administrator was further advised, "....the Minister does not want you or any other member of the Administration

19. CRS A518, item BQ800/1/1, 22 February 1950. The use of the term "anthropological museum" here and Spender's reference to a "native museum" give some indication of influences on Spender's thinking.
20. P.N.G.N.A. Box 164, loose papers, 17 March 1950. The Department of External Territories' advice to the Minister was presumably contained in two items, "Canberra Survey 1950 New Guinea" and "Progress Report to Minister for Territories on Papua and New Guinea 1950", access to both of which was refused.

to shield him from the many people who would like to approach him".[21] In reply, Murray pointed out that free access to visitors had been a "consistent" policy of his Administration; he believed that it would be a mistake to shield the Minister from any section of the Papua New Guinea community.[22]

In the meantime, agitation against the New Guinea authorities continued. This included messages from the Territory itself, such as a cable from the Planters' Association of New Guinea complaining about "difficult problems confronting planters due former government's negative policy".[23] To this the Minister replied that he was "only too glad to receive representations of your Association and do what I can to assist".[24] In most situations an interchange of this kind could be considered as no more than the formal acknowledgement of mutual interests, but under the conditions then existing in New Guinea it could be construed as a good deal more. Obviously, the tone of the Minister's reply differed widely from that which had been employed by Ward. And in view of the bitterness which had been engendered during the post-war years, any promise of assistance was likely to raise high expectations among the settlers. During this period there was criticism of the Administration from within the government parties, particularly from Senator R. Kendall, who had been what

21. Ibid., 24 March 1950.
22. Ibid., 28 March 1950.
23. CRS A518, item BQ800/1/1, 24 December 1949.
24. Ibid., 5 January 1950.

was termed a "schooner master" in New Britain before the war and who had visited Rabaul in January 1950, almost immediately after his election.[25] In his maiden speech the Senator attacked previous policy and present conditions in the Territory.[26] He was more restrained than had been Mr. White in the House of Representatives during earlier years,[27] but he voiced a number of the usual settler complaints: the amount of war damage compensation paid to villagers; the lack of timber; poor shipping services; the cost of living; the failure to establish a Legislative Council with a strong settler presence. The situation, Kendall believed, was bad for the people themselves:[28]

> They could see three or four years hard work ahead of them, but they were looking forward to going back (sic) to what they called then and still call the "good fellow time before"; in other words, the times before the war, when they were happy, and which they enjoyed...The general reaction of natives in the territory during the past three years has been: "Why should we work? This is a fine Government; we just sit back and get pennies from Heaven. This is our ideal state. We do not have to work." The work is not being done, and the territory is getting into a worse and worse state.

In the face of such sweeping misrepresentation, and with Ward no longer taking the first thrust of criticism, Murray had reason to be anxious about the Minister's attitude during his visit.

Mr. and Mrs. Spender, accompanied by the Minister's

25. P.I.M., Vol. 20 No. 7, February 1950, p. 16.
26. C.P.D., Vol. 206, pp. 175-80, 1 March 1950.
27. See Chapter Nine, pp. 553-4, 558-9.
28. C.P.D., Vol. 206, pp. 176-7, 1 March 1950.

Private Secretary and Mr. Halligan, arrived in Port Moresby aboard a special Qantas flight on 29 March 1950 for a tour which was to last for some two weeks.[29] The Minister was much impressed, although clearly not enlightened, by the ceremonies which accompanied his progress:[30]

> We travelled by plane, day after day, to all the main areas, as far north as Manus Island and east as far as New Britain and New Ireland...We visited many places never before visited by an Australian Minister. It was a thrilling and fascinating journey. It was a new world to us...I was not the centre of attraction by any means. My wife unconsciously stole the limelight. If these New Guineans were new to her and me, she was something out of the world to them. As we moved around, all eyes were on her petite, attractive form...The paramounts - head chiefs - delicately touched her dress as we moved before them. She and her dress were a wonder to them...To mark the occasion some hindquarters of meat were distributed to the tribes. This was, for them, a great treat...The tribes, in celebration, put on a feast for themselves and a "sing sing" which went on until late in the night...Their impressive Gregorian-like chant, as it rose and fell, beat through the darkness. I recall my wife saying that she hoped that the meat was not too rich for them and did not create any warlike impulses within them.

For a new Minister responsible for the development of New Guinea, a tour of this exotica was the worst kind of introduction to the country. It gave the impression of a "primitive" land and, as such visits may still do, suggested that its people were unready for dramatic advance. Consequently, it added weight to the claims by Europeans that already too much had been done for the villagers.

From the first day of his visit the Minister showed

29. The party spent a further week visiting other parts of the Pacific.
30. Spender, op. cit., pp. 271-2.

that he was in broad agreement with the settler point of view, and his statements were given wide publicity through daily press releases. Upon his arrival in Port Moresby Spender said that many of the problems involved in the development of the Territory could be met "only by private enterprise".[31] It would be the policy of the government to encourage such enterprise and the "investment of risk capital". Proper safeguards would fully protect the welfare of the people; there was no foundation to the "silly idea" held in Australia "by a few ill-informed people" that men engaged in private enterprise in the islands wished to exploit the villagers. This statement was reproduced in detail, and warmly welcomed, by the Pacific Islands Monthly, which termed the Minister "a man of vision and lively imagination".[32] From that point onwards, Spender was beseiged by Europeans encouraged by the tone of his early remarks, and it became increasingly clear that a great deal was expected of him.

Spender displayed a good deal of energy during his tour. While most of his public comment concentrated upon the need for "development" and on the demands of the settler community, he also spent a good deal of time with officials, beginning with a meeting of Directors in Port Moresby. This, like the report provided by Murray in Canberra, can have given the Minister little encouragement, for the

31. The material in this and the following passage is drawn from CRS A518, item BQ800/1/1, 2 April 1950.
32. P.I.M., Vol. 20 No. 9, April 1950, p. 5.

Territory officials failed to acknowledge his announced "new" approach, outlining their departmental programmes and problems as if no changes had been proposed. Moreover, the departmental statements were in some cases broad and imprecise. Groves, for example, was asked by the Minister for an outline of the Education department's situation:[33]

> Mr. Groves stated that it was difficult to indicate particular problems of present urgency, since the problems of his Department arose from day to day as part of the routine of the development of the work of the Department...One basic fact Mr. Groves wished to bring to notice was that the Department in this Territory, interpreting education as wider in its functions than those of a Department of Education in a European community, was a many-sided organization....

The Administration paid the penalty for Canberra's neglect of its planning when Groves was asked whether he had "made recommendations as to the general nature of the educational scheme he had in mind". The Director replied that "a very detailed report on the five-year plan of his Department had been made",[34] but was then forced to admit "there had never been any explicit approval by External Territories of this policy and because the policy had the approval of the Administrator, the Department of Education had assumed that it was acceptable and had made this policy widely known amongst its officers for their guidance". Thus instead of laying the blame where it belonged, on the officials in Canberra, Groves gave the impression that his

33. This and the following passage is drawn from CRS A518, item BQ800/1/1, 30 March 1950.
34. This was included in the social development report, discussed in Chapter Seven. The report, and the plan for education, were ignored by the Department of External Territories (see Chapter Nine, p. 568).

staff had been acting without formal approval, implicating Murray in the process.

The Administrator sought to make up for delays in Canberra by seeking action from the Minister on numerous matters that had been awaiting decision for as long as four years. He raised 35 separate issues in all, ranging from the role of the School of Pacific Administration, to the need for Ministerial approval of 24 outstanding Ordinances, to the design of the Territory's own postage stamps.[35] Murray also returned to several of his earlier suggestions that had been neglected, such as the scheme for hydro-electric power stations, the interchange of staff between Canberra and Port Moresby and the need to train officers overseas. For a newcomer to the situation the impression must have been that the Territory service had not, in fact, been working to any set programme; yet available plans could not proceed because so many basic issues remained unresolved. Murray may not have made this clear to the Minister, although it would have been difficult to do so, owing to Spender's prior convictions about the nature of the Administration.

Spender's promises to settlers

When the Minister, leaving Port Moresby, began his visit to the Territory of New Guinea, he must quickly have

35. CRS A518, item BQ800/1/1, 30 March 1950.

formed the opinion that all of the Territory's Europeans, officials and settlers alike, had become fixated with their own trivial concerns. At each centre he was confronted with deputations of irritable whites complaining about such things as wages, labour recruitment, health benefits, district officials and land.[36] Mr. J.H. Jones, who accompanied the Ministerial party during this stage of the tour, made daily reports to the Administrator, stating that many of the complaints were made with the intention of "undermining" the Administration, but that many people were simply "letting off steam at their first sight of a full Minister post-war".[37] Nevertheless, on most of these occasions the Minister received something that had been absent from his reception by Port Moresby's officials: wholehearted approval of his announced changes in policy. In response, Spender made a valiant effort to deal in a positive manner with even the most contentious issues. He promised to make "every effort" to secure additional land leases in the towns;[38] to ensure the "more efficient screening of Communist elements" entering the Territory; to promote the settlement of the "rich areas of the Central Highlands and the vast reaches of the Markham Valley"; and to approve the construction of a European high school at Wau. His most significant statement came on the issue of labour contracts, which had been limited to one year by the Labor government. The tone of his announcement

36. P.N.G.N.A. Box 204, item CA1/8/1/21, 5 - 12 April 1950.
37. Ibid., 15 April 1950.
38. These had been delayed by Canberra's failure to approve town plans.

indicated the extent to which he had accepted the spurious racist arguments of employers about the alleged problems and benefits of plantation work:[39]

> An important change in the term of native labour employment was foreshadowed by Minister for External Territories Spender at a public meeting in Wau... He said that although he was unable to announce a policy on native labour at present, from close observation of the native labour situation since his arrival in the Territory it was obvious that the present limit of one year gave employers only a few months of effective service. Further, the existing limit did not contribute to native welfare. He was aware of the time needed to transport natives from villages to places of employment, the period of medical treatment and the few weeks nutritional diet needed to build up physical condition while engaged on simple tasks such as grass-cutting. Only then could real training as effective workers begin. It was obvious the natives showed a marked advance physically and in their progress out of primitive standards of village life a few months after being employed. In short, they benefited considerably in health and reached a higher level as human beings through employment away from their villages. Further, his observations convinced him that the majority of Europeans were just as interested in the welfare of the natives as any government.

Nevertheless, the constant pressure for concessions began to make the Minister wary. In Madang on the following day he told a delegation from the local Planters and Traders Association that he "would not permit the return to the pre-war system of private recruiters...World opinion was against traffic for profit in obtaining labour and world opinion could not be ignored."[40] At Manus Island on 9 April he told planters who complained at the shortage of labour that they would have to do more to

39. CRS A518, item BQ800/1/1, 6 April 1950. The following is the text of the cabled press release, with articles, conjunctions and prepositions added.
40. This and the following passage are drawn from ibid., 7, 9 and 11 April 1950.

mechanise their industry. Apparently tiring of the constant demands for government intervention, Spender said that planters should form a Territory-wide association and that stabilisation of the industry would have to be financed by the planters themselves; although the government might be called upon in adverse years to finance a deficit, this would have to be repaid over a period after returns increased.

Three main features are apparent from the Minister's political style and publicity campaign during the visit. Firstly, he often ignored the Administrator and his staff in releasing details of his intentions and decisions to the public in the first instance. Secondly, the substance of some of his statements led him further than was wise in committing the government to certain courses of action. Thirdly, he continued to build up white expectations that had been created by his initial statement in Port Moresby. Relations with the settler community could be fragile, and no more; whites had been at loggerheads with many Ministers before Mr. Ward, and scepticism rather than charitableness was their customary attitude. For example, when Spender failed to visit Sohano, Bougainville, on the grounds that he was "exhausted", and sent Halligan and Jones in his stead, there came a bitter complaint from the planters' representatives.

Spender, Murray and the U.N. Mission

While the white community received Spender with few reservations, his tour strengthened the antipathy that was already apparent between him and the Administrator.[41] The relationship was soured completely by a disagreement between the two men over the forthcoming visit of the first United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory. The dispute arose partly from differing attitudes towards the U.N. itself. Murray subscribed to what might be termed the Evatt view of Australia's international obligations.[42] Spender, on the other hand, was of the opinion that United Nations pressure had already produced unfortunate consequences in South-East Asia, particularly in the matter of Indonesia. He was disturbed at what he later termed the "cynical disregard...of the interests and human rights of the indigenous peoples of Dutch New Guinea" and feared that Papua New Guinea might eventually receive the same treatment.[43] Partly for this reason, and partly because the new government had been able to make few preparations to receive the U.N. delegation, there were suggestions that the visit be postponed. Certain doubts had been expressed even before the Australian election; in November 1949 a debate had taken place on whether the Mission should plan its own itinerary or have one presented to it

41. Spender apparently believed from the outset that Murray, like the Labor government, was "opposed to private enterprise" (conversation of 28 November 1973).
42. Murray notes, p. 37.
43. Spender, op. cit., p. 286.

by the Australian authorities. When asked his opinion, Murray advised Canberra that the U.N. should be consulted about the itinerary since, if it were not, the exercise would be "somewhat unrealistic and quite inexplicably cynical".[44] The Department of External Territories then advised the new Minister, cynically, "Probably there would be more adverse consequences by endeavouring to defer the Mission than by facilitating it".[45] The qualms returned when the membership of the Mission was announced. There was no objection to the chairman, Sir Alan Burns, formerly an eminent member of the British Colonial Service, but it was thought that the selection of representatives from China and the Philippines, in addition to a fourth from France, would pose problems.[46] Once again, the Australian delegation to the United Nations was advised that delay would be "undesirable",[47] but it was apparent that the government was not looking forward to the Mission's visit.

The matter came to a head in Rabaul on 12 April 1950. After the Minister's tour of certain areas in the Territory of New Guinea, he had been rejoined briefly by the Administrator, who wished to discuss Spender's impressions during his visit. The official party had been entertained by the Planters' Association at Kokopo during the evening and had returned to the District Commissioner's

44. CRS A518, item 103/1/8, 22 November 1949.
45. Ibid., 29 December 1949.
46. Ibid., 17 January 1950.
47. Ibid., 24 January 1950.

residence at Rabaul to continue their talks. Murray, who for some weeks had been seeking details from Canberra of the U.N. Mission's visit,[48] raised the question with the Minister.[49] During the course of the discussion Spender said that the members of the Mission should not be permitted to address the people nor to receive petitions from them during the visit. Colonel Murray demurred, suggesting that a Visiting Mission was entitled to do such things under the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement. The Minister insisted that the conditions he considered appropriate should be observed, until something of an argument developed, with the Administrator finally agreeing that he was obliged to observe the Minister's direction. Murray insisted, however, that Spender "put it in writing". The Minister then wrote out the following:[50]

48. For example, ibid., 14 January 1950.
49. The material in this and the following passage is drawn from separate interviews with Colonel Murray (12 December 1966), Dr. Gunther (4 December 1968) and Mr. J.K. McCarthy (8 November 1968), the latter two also being present during the dispute. Gunther and McCarthy both laid particular emphasis on this incident and clearly considered it to be of great significance in illustrating Murray's concern for issues of principle, the Minister's attitude to his own and Australia's authority, and Murray's standing with Spender.
50. The original of the document, in the Minister's own hand, is in P.N.G.N.A. Box 887, item GH47/5. It bears the notation, in Colonel Murray's hand, "Seen or heard only by Dr. Gunther, Mr. McCarthy, Miss Kemp and self. J.K.M. 13/4/50." (By that time it was after midnight, hence the difference in dates). Miss Kemp was the Administrator's secretary at the time.

Rabaul.
12th April 1950.

In relation to the impending visit of the United Nations Trusteeship Council Mission to the Territory of New Guinea.

I direct

1. The functions and activities of the Mission shall not exceed such functions as are derived from the terms of its authority.

In particular I direct

2. Notwithstanding the general nature of paragraph 1. hereof,

(a) There is no warrant or authority conferred upon the Mission or any member thereof to address publicly any assemblage or group of people. This direction shall not ap ly to any purely social gathering so approved by the Administrator.

(b) Accordingly, except as referred to in paragraph 2(a) hereof, no member of the Mission either alone or purporting to speak on behalf of such Mission shall be permitted to address any such assemblage or groups of people.

3. There is no warrant or authority under the Trusteeship Agreement, to which Australia is a member, for the Mission or any member thereof to receive any petition or similar request from the community in New Guinea or any section or member thereof, except in consultation with the Government of Australia.

4. Accordingly no person, either alone or acting on behalf of others, shall present any such petition or request, nor shall the Mission or any member thereof be permitted to receive the same, except in consultation with the Government of Australia.

Percy C. Spender

Minister for State for External Territories

The Minister left for the British Solomon Islands on the following day and the Administrator returned to Port Moresby. Murray, who was disturbed by the events of the previous night, considered resigning his post. He knew, however, that he had "burnt his bridges", having no remaining ties with the Queensland Department of Education or the University of Queensland.[51] He believed that he was right in his attitude towards the Visiting Mission and found the situation in which he had been placed a distasteful one. Nevertheless, he felt obliged to carry out the Minister's direction while holding the post of Administrator. Spender's orders proved virtually unenforceable, however, since the terms of reference of the Visiting Mission were explicit, particularly on the matter of petitions:[52]

> /The Mission is instructed/...
> 3(c) To accept or receive petitions and, without prejudice to its acting in accordance with rules 84 and 89 of the rules of procedure, to investigate on the spot, after consultation with the local representative of the Administering Authority concerned, such petitions dealing with the condition of the indigenous inhabitants as were in its opinion, sufficiently important to warrant special investigation.

The Visiting Mission, which comprised, in addition to Sir Alan Burns, M. Jacques Tallec of France, Mr. T.K. Chang of China and Mr. Victorio D. Carpio of the Philippines, together with a secretariat of six, arrived in Rabaul from Nauru on 10 May 1950. It was unfortunate for Murray that

51. Murray interview, 12 December 1966.
52. United Nations Trusteeship Council, Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in the Pacific on New Guinea, Document T/791, 15 August 1950, p. 5.

the party did not first visit Canberra, for it fell to him to make known to Burns the Minister's wishes concerning meetings and petitions.

In the meantime, Spender had second thoughts about the correctness of his interpretation of the Visiting Mission's functions. In a coded cable to the Administrator on 4 May he stated that he had examined the question further and, while he doubted whether the relevant rule under which petitions could be accepted was "in conformity with Article 87 of the Charter", this was a matter which could not be discussed with the Mission.[53] The cable continued:[54]

> I think that you can easily achieve the objectives I have in mind and set out in my directive of twelfth April by resting the case on the backward nature of the Territory and its inhabitants and the fact that the mission cannot expect any true appreciation by the natives of its place in the trusteeship system or their purposes and functions. In fact, I imagine there will be considerable bewilderment, particularly as the Mission follows closely on my own visit, when certain representations were made to me on a number of matters. I think you can persuade the Visiting Mission not to make our task even more difficult by confusing the minds of the natives. On this co-operative basis I think you can without seeming to restrict their activities or in any way prejudice a co-operative approach to our administration achieve the objectives contained in my directive.[55]

53. This and the following passage are drawn from CRS A518, item 103/1/8, 4 May 1950. The question of the offending rule (Rule 89) might "have to be taken up at the appropriate place".
54. Orthodox punctuation has been provided in the text.
55. The Minister was much concerned that the people should be fully aware of Australia's authority. At Wau he had asked why the U.N. flag was flying alongside the Australian ensign and directed that this should not happen again, lest it create "confusion" in the minds of the people (CRS A518, item BQ800/1/1, 5 April 1950).

Murray did his best to carry out the instructions which, the Minister now acknowledged, lacked adequate foundation. After an interview with Burns, he cabled Spender that the Chairman was of the opinion "that we cannot prevent reception of petitions offered to any member of the Mission nor prevent public speeches by members of the Mission".[56] However, Sir Alan had told Murray that he was ready to qualify "any important biased criticism". The Administrator pointed out that favourable comments had already been made by and to the Mission and suggested that there was little cause for concern about petitions. "I am satisfied that Burns is fully co-operative but he is restricted by specific terms of Trusteeship Council Directive to the Mission and of which of course all members are acutely aware." Murray was returning to Port Moresby, leaving Mr. Ivan Champion with the powers of Deputy Administrator for purposes of liaison with the Mission. Before leaving, however, he sent a three-page letter to the Minister, providing accurate assessments of the attitudes of each of the Mission's members towards the tour ("I found the Chairman to be constructively conservative....") and concluding, "I am not aware of the Australian Government's intentions and policy regarding the Trusteeship Council, but I do suggest that, unless the risk of a grave, even downright break with the Trusteeship Council is acceptable, the prohibition of public meetings and non-acceptance of

56. The material in this and the following passage is drawn from CRS A518, item 103/1/8, 11 May 1950.

petitions without consultation be not persisted with."[57] It is impossible to disagree with Murray's assessment and conclusions, but events were already beyond his control.

U.N. Mission poses problems

Early on the morning of 11 May the members of the Mission met to discuss their itinerary. The controversy came into the open when Murray was formally asked why no provision had been made for public meetings.[58] Murray cabled the Minister to this effect, unfortunately saying in the text that the Mission "insisted" on meetings, although he later noted that the Chairman had "asked" him to call a meeting in Rabaul on the following Saturday. This the Administrator agreed to do, again urging Spender that "refusal to accede would present a most awkward position of possible international repercussions". The reply from Canberra, which appears in the files on Department of External Affairs paper, was apparently not drafted by the Minister, but was nevertheless devastating in its lack of realism. "It is most regrettable that position has been allowed to develop as you describe....," it read.[59] Disregarding the fact that the existing impasse had been created by the Minister, it continued, "The objective of the administering authority is the welfare of the native peoples and we do not concede any right of the Mission to override our judgement on the wisest course for it to

57. Ibid., 13 May 1950.
58. Ibid., 11 May 1950.
59. Ibid., 13 May 1950 (from Canberra).

follow." New Guinea could not be compared to any other Trust Territory; there could be doubts among the people "concerning the authority of the administration" if meetings and petitions were allowed; and so "the Mission procedures should be adapted accordingly". In the case of public meetings, there was no obligation to assist the Mission in any talks it might have with the people. However, the cable continued, "We willingly agree that each case should be treated on its merits and you have full authority to co-operate with the Mission and to decide accordingly." Nevertheless, "....it is most essential for the administering authority to receive any petition or be present when they (sic) are being received". The cable stated that the Minister intended to discuss "these and related matters" with the Mission when it reached Australia. In the meantime, the government's attitude should be put "tactfully but firmly" to the Mission.

On this basis, and on the grounds that the Rabaul meeting had produced nothing untoward,[60] Murray gave tacit approval for meetings at all centres in the Trust Territory, so ending one part of the controversy. Unfortunately, the question of petitions had still not been resolved. When it arose, as it was bound to do, Champion was in charge of the Mission's arrangements and saw

60. Ibid., 15 May 1950. New Guineans complained about prohibitions on drinking, low wages and prices in Chinese trade stores; and asked that their children be sent to Australia for schooling. They expressed general satisfaction with conditions, praising the education programme and "the British Empire".

himself as still being bound by the various instructions which had been issued during the preceding month by and on behalf of the Minister. Thus when the Visiting Mission was approached on 15 May with a petition from the Chinese community in Rabaul, Champion stated that he had to be present when it was delivered.[61] When asked why this should be, he showed the text of the most recent instruction from Canberra to Burns. This was more than the Mission's Chairman was able to accept; he made what Champion termed a "polite protest" and said that, if petitions were not to be presented, he would be obliged to cable Lake Success for further instructions. At this, Murray took it upon himself to approve the unrestricted presentation of petitions; two more were received by the Mission. In the meantime, Canberra had been advised of Champion's action and this had further aggravated the Minister. In a cable of 23 May he indicated that he had not read, or refused to understand, the communications he had received on the matter from the Territory:[62]

> I fail to understand radio message from Champion "discussed text with the leader who said if petition not permitted he would cable Lake Success to that effect".
>
> I have never directed that "petitions" would not be permitted but have insisted that administering authority must receive any petition or be present when they are being received...
>
> I have also suggested on this and other matters that a tactful personal approach to the Chairman should resolve any difficulties...This should be your method rather than a formal demarche to the Mission through its leader...Powers and functions of Commission should

61. Ibid., 16 May 1950.
62. Ibid., 23 May 1950.

> not be discussed with Commission itself but may be taken up later with appropriate body, i.e., Trusteeship Council.[63]

Murray revealed his exasperation in replying:[64]

> ....Personal and, I hope, tactful approach to Chairman made by me...Action had been taken to obviate demarche ...Mission's awareness of their instructions under rules of procedure of the Trusteeship Council and relevant section of the United Nations Charter makes full insistence on your directive 12 April...most difficult if grounds for demarche to be avoided with certainty.

To some extent the final episode in the dispute was caused by the cryptic language used in the cables between Port Moresby and Canberra, with the Minister quibbling over words in an effort to allocate blame elsewhere.

The entirely unnecessary confrontation with the U.N. Mission was caused partly by the Minister's stubbornness, but the role of his External Affairs advisers, as revealed in the cable of 13 May, should not be under-estimated. It was typical of relations between Australia and Papua New Guinea that obviously sound advice from the Territory service should have been ignored consistently by authorities in Canberra who refused to recognize the realities of the situation. In the event, the contretemps had no effect on the Visiting Mission's final report, which made no reference to the dispute over meetings and petitions and commented in mild, almost placatory tones on the matters

63. The use of the word "Commission" is an error in the original.
64. Ibid., 27 May 1950.

which had been raised during its direct communications with the residents of the Territory.[65]

First attempts to remove Murray

On the issue of the Visiting Mission Murray had, for reasons mostly beyond his control, set in train the events that would eventually lead to his removal from office. He had openly disagreed with his Minister. Worse, he had been proved correct on a question of international law and in matters of diplomacy in a dispute with men who were supposed to be experts in such matters.[66] Finally, he had pointed out that the Minister was himself at fault in providing grounds for the Visiting Mission controversy. He may also have given Spender the impression that, during the early days of the Mission's visit, he had deliberately disregarded the Minister's instructions or had dealt with the Mission in such a way as to make the instructions unenforceable. The records of the period do not support such a conclusion and an attitude of that kind was wholly against Murray's character, but the Minister obviously did not see the matter in that light. He had decided that the Administrator would be best employed elsewhere and on 22 June 1950, while the Visiting Mission was still in Australia, he offered Murray alternative appointments as

65. See U.N. Report 1950, op. cit., pp. 64-72.
66. Murray had some support in Canberra; a position paper prepared in the Department of External Territories noted that petitions were allowed in other Territories (CRS A518, item 103/1/8, 22 May 1950).

Principal of the Australian School of Pacific Administration and Commissioner to the South Pacific Commission, the two appointments to be held concurrently.[67] The letter containing the offer was drafted by Halligan and was extremely polite in tone, noting, "It has occurred to me that of all the possible appointees for the two appointments that I mentioned that your qualifications and experience fit you to render a service not only to Papua and New Guinea but to Australia in her general Pacific interests."[68] Murray's term as Administrator had several years to run, but it was intended that the combined salary for the proposed appointments would be slightly more than he was presently receiving, but with no entertainment allowance (at that time £500 per year).

The ensuing negotiations between Murray and various individuals in Australia occupied several months and need only be summarised. On 1 August, while Murray was visiting Australia, he visited Spender at his Sydney home, and was again offered the alternative appointments.[69] During the Australian visit he also saw Halligan and discussed the situation with Howse, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary.[70] While not rejecting the offer, Murray suggested that he should receive a higher salary as Principal (mainly to offset Australian taxation), that the Principal should be

67. CRS A452, item 61/5207, 22 June 1950. The draft was dated 15 June.
68. Ibid. The irony of Halligan's drafting this letter will be apparent in the following Chapter.
69. Murray interview, 12 December 1966.
70. Murray interview, 14 December 1966.

allowed entertainment "by voucher", and be provided with a house near the School.[71] Some two weeks later Murray again discussed the matter with Howse, who was on a winter Parliamentary tour of the islands, and on this occasion further suggested that he should serve until the following October, by which time he would have completed a five-year term, and should receive some honour in recognition of his service. Murray then travelled to Canberra with Howse in mid-August and saw Mr. Fadden, who was acting Prime Minister at the time, about his position. He was advised that this was entirely a matter for the Minister to decide. In a further talk with Howse, Murray recalls being asked, in effect, "What do you want in order to take the jobs as Principal and S.P.C. Commissioner?" He replied that, if he "had to go", he wanted an appointment as Commander of the Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, or something similar, but not a knighthood. Howse advised the Minister, who was then in London, of the Administrator's requests, noting in placatory tones that Murray seemed genuinely keen to remain in New Guinea, particularly if the title of Lieutenant-Governor were restored, together with its mode of address, "Your Excellency".[72] Spender rejected this proposition, as well as Murray's other suggestions, in very blunt terms. Some two months later Mr. C.D. Rowley was appointed Principal of the School of Pacific Administration. Murray remained in New Guinea.

71. The material in this and the following passage is drawn from Murray interview, 12 and 14 December 1966.
72. CRS A518, item B800/1/7, 29 August 1950.

By the latter months of 1950 Spender had made his main impact on New Guinea. He had delivered the long policy speech which is discussed later in this Chapter, but had also become heavily involved with the Colombo Plan and in negotiations concerning the Anzus Treaty.[73] Moreover, he was suffering from an ulcer which, he maintains, was soon to lead to his retirement from politics; and at the end of the year he became, according to come reports, involved in moves within the Liberal Party to replace Menzies as Prime Minister.[74] The Murray question slipped into the background, but was not forgotten, for in December the Minister again asked for recommendations on an alternative position that would be suitable for the Administrator. No further action was taken at that time, however, and Spender relinquished his portfolio on 27 April 1951, shortly before the election resulting from the double dissolution of Parliament. Murray thus retained his position, but developments during the preceding seventeen months, in addition to his confrontation with the Minister, had made it clear that he was wholly out of favour with the government

Spender sums up

In reviewing Spender's term as Minister for External Territories, it is hard to disagree with his own assessment: "I left my Ministries feeling that I could not have done

73. See P.C. Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy: the ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan, Sydney, S.U.P., 1969.
74. Spender, Politics and a Man, op. cit., pp. 300-4.

more than I did in the time."[75] Certainly, he had shown more drive than had Ward in the whole of his last four years as Minister. The high point of his term came with his statement on New Guinea policy to the House of Representatives on 1 June 1950, a few weeks after his tour of inspection. It followed a similar statement on foreign policy delivered some three months previously, helping to stamp the Minister, if nothing else, as one of the most able publicists in the government. He set considerable store by his New Guinea speech, as he later made clear:[76]

> If, in a strict sense, this statement might be said not to be a plan, it was certainly planning. It set forth a programme to be achieved. It marked out the road to be taken, and gave the necessary directives to those who were to travel the road. Nothing comparable, I venture to say, had previously been done on New Guinea.

The significance of the Minister's 1950 speech has not been assessed, mainly because it came to be overshadowed in later years by the more numerous statements of his successor; indeed, this may have been in Sir Percy's mind when he later came to review his political career, and could account for the attention he devoted to it in his reminiscences.[77] Nevertheless, it is hard to escape the conclusion that his "policy" was no more than a review of the problems and progress of the post-war years, coupled with a statement of his intentions which, while being no less pious than

75. Ibid., p. 304.
76. Ibid., p. 275.
77. In ibid., more than half of a chapter of eight and a half pages is devoted to the statment and to laudatory reviews of it.

those expressed by Ward in 1945, were far narrower in their compass.[78]

The Minister devoted about one quarter of his speech, which totalled some 11,000 words, to an orthodox review of Australia's relations with Papua New Guinea, the difficulties of development and the usual predictions about new products and mineral resources.[79] Even at that stage, however, there was an equivocal tone to the speech that was likely to please neither the government's friends nor its enemies, and which once again failed to provide the clear guidelines required for detailed planning. Thus Spender first announced that in order to achieve the government's aim of "the fullest development of the Territory resources" it would be necessary, as "prime objectives", to promote:[80]

> (1) The welfare and advancement of the natives peoples and their increasing participation in the natural wealth of the Territories.
>
> (2) The development of the resources of the Territory to the point ultimately where the area will be economically self supporting....

Apart from the fact that the second of the objectives, as stated, was tautological, this part of the speech suggested that welfare provisions would continue to enjoy first priority. However, the Minister went on to deal at considerable length with economic questions:[81]

78. The speech is in C.P.D., Vol. 208, pp. 3635-53, 1 June 1950. It was reissued as a pamphlet - an important precedent for later Ministers - and widely circulated, being included as a special supplement, for example, in South Pacific (Vol. 4 No. 7, June 1950).
79. Ibid., pp. 3635-41.
80. Ibid., pp. 3636-7.
81. Ibid., p. 3637.

> While it will be the task of the Government, through its programmes for their social advancement, to enable these people to take a constantly increasing share in the government of their country, it is to private enterprise under proper safeguards that the Government must to a major extent look for assistance in securing the economic advancement of these Territories. To this end every encouragement will be afforded to private enterprise in bringing its available skill and capital to bear on the development of the Territories' natural resources and, in so doing, to impart to these backward peoples the means of participating to an ever increasing extent in developing the wealth of their country.

In reviewing the pattern of New Guinea trade he continued, "It is the view of the Government that...development should generally be complementary to existing Australian industry."[82] He then re-stated, in one of several repetitions in his speech, the government's development strategy:[83]

> Generally, the policy of the Government in relation to the Territories will be to encourage private enterprise to foster production with a view to the resources of the Territory being developed to the utmost, and to advance the welfare of the native peoples.[84]

Contrary to the priorities set out in the earlier part of the statement, this implied that private capital, rather than village welfare, would receive the prior attention of the government.

Such an impression was borne out by the fact that the Minister proceeded to announce six separate changes in policy favourable to European interests. Inter-island

82. Ibid., p. 3638.
83. Ibid.
84. Spender may have believed that the occasional use of the plural, "Territories", indicated the difference in status between Papua and the Trust Territory. This was a practice sometimes adopted by the Pacific Islands Monthly.

shipping and stevedoring would revert to private control.[85] Private agencies would be permitted to mill timber. The maximum term of employment under contract would be extended from one year to two. Customs tariffs would be adjusted in an effort to relieve pressure on the cost of living. The Production Control Board would be abolished and the marketing of copra placed in private hands. The settlement of ex-servicemen in the Territory, with government assistance, would be investigated. In addition, special bank finance would probably be made available for prospective settlers; tighter control would be exercised over the payment of war damage compensation to villagers; and approval would be given for the re-establishment of the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles. All of these concessions flowed from settler demands.

In contrast to his lengthy discussion of economic matters, the Minister devoted only some 1,200 words, or about one-ninth of his speech, to matters which were in any way connected with village welfare and social advancement. However, he made the first public acknowledgement that a five-year education plan had been prepared, and announced the formation of a committee to investigate the programme of hospital building proposed by Dr. Gunther in 1946.[86] His comments on these aspects of development were guarded: for example, the education plan was "being examined in the light of the needs of the

85. This and the following passage are drawn from ibid., pp. 3639-44.
86. Ibid., pp. 3647-8.

Territory and the availability of staff, cost of equipment, buildings and other essential factors".[87] The problems of cost and financing were major concerns of the Minister, who estimated that in the post-war years some £11 million had already been granted to Papua and New Guinea by the Commonwealth, compared with the Territory's internal revenue of less than £4 million. At least another £12 million would be required for construction programmes. "Expenditure of that magnitude is clearly beyond normal budgetary provision and the question of obtaining at least a substantial portion of the necessary funds by way of loan must accordingly be explored," the Minister added. In addition, "the share of the cost of the Administration of the Territory borne by the residents should be fully examined".[88]

The Minister seemed to be advocating at least a partial return to the "pay as you go" policies of the pre-war period, but this was bound to be very difficult, owing to other commitments which the government was obliged to meet. The public service, for example, had recently been enlarged to some 1,600 positions and it would be necessary to expand the building programme to provide improved accommodation for them, since the poor conditions still existing in the Territory made recruitment difficult. It was intended that the uncontrolled areas of the country

87. Ibid., p. 3646.
88. Ibid., p. 3652.

would be "fully...administered within the next five years";[89] this would require further heavy expenditure on staffing and the construction of outstations, roads and airfields throughout those areas. The operations of the Commonwealth Department of Works and Housing in Papua New Guinea would be greatly expanded, particularly with a view to rebuilding wharves and providing the usual amenities in the towns. It was inevitable that a programme on this scale would require much larger cash grants; in suggesting otherwise, the Minister made it even more difficult for the Administration to secure Treasury guarantees for the long-term financing of development plans, a problem which is discussed later in this Chapter.

For the rest, the Minister announced a delay in the establishment of the Legislative Council, owing to some doubts about the membership provided for it under the Papua and New Guinea Act 1949, and the formation of District Advisory Councils comprising private citizens nominated by the Administrator.[90] Both decisions involved concessions to white opinion. There were also some words of encouragement for the officials in both Canberra and New Guinea. The Department of External Territories would be strengthened; it had been the "Cinderella of Commonwealth Departments" and only by the "energy and enthusiasm of a

89. The material in this and the following passage is drawn from C.P.D., Vol. 208, pp. 3645. 3648-9, 1 June 1950 (i.e., ibid.).
90. This and the following passage are drawn from ibid., pp. 3650-1.

small number of officers" had it coped with its tasks. As for the Territory Administration, Spender made the identical promise extended by every Minister before and after him: there would be increased delegation of responsibility from Canberra. Only by this step would "the best efficiency" be developed. He announced an increase in the financial delegations of the Administration's senior officials; but this did little more than account for inflation, so that the most significant announcement about delegation was that two Deputy Administrators would be appointed to serve in "distant parts of the Territory" to ensure effective administration. The Minister wished to "pay a tribute" to District Officers and announced that, in a step to help restore their "prestige and standing", they would in future be known as District Commissioners. There was no praise for senior headquarters officials and Murray's name was not mentioned.

Reaction to the new conservatism

The Minister's statement was received most enthusiastically by the Australian press. The Sydney Morning Herald stated:[91]

> For the first time an Australian Government has shown full recognition both of its obligations and its opportunities in New Guinea...Development of these potentially rich dependencies has long been hamstrung by the fatal combination of an ill-informed and badly advised Minister, a weak department, and a local Administration reluctant to take responsibility.

91. Sydney Morning Herald, 3 June 1950. Spender quoted this passage with obvious relish in his reminiscences (Politics and a Man, op. cit., p. 278).

The Pacific Islands Monthly adopted a similar approach in an editorial which began, "For the first time...New Guinea has been given a clear-cut policy on which to base its administration."[92] The only difficulty would be in executing certain measures. There was "a great deal of house-cleaning to be done",[93] and while most people could prepare a plan, "the real test comes when other people try to give effect to it".[94] While the second part of this assessment was partly correct, it is impossible to agree with the opening statements. Most of the decisions announced by the Minister involved administrative adjustments, not new policies. His statement on village welfare merely endorsed measures that were already being put into effect, while his remarks about the role of private enterprise were reactionary rather than innovative. He was essentially advocating more of everything that already existed, with some adjustment of priorities in favour of white interests.

From the discussion of settler demands and attitudes in earlier Chapters,[95] it is possible to make some assessment of the ideal situation that the settler community wished to see develop from the Minister's statement: a reversion to the pre-war situation of administrative poverty and laissez-faire production. The least informed of the Territory's whites may even have

92. P.I.M., Vol. 20 No. 11, June 1950, p. 92.
93. Sydney Morning Herald, loc. cit.
94. P.I.M., loc. cit.
95. See, for example, Chapter Two, p. 98, Chapter Four, passim.

expected the return of this situation following Spender's statements during his New Guinea tour, but it obviously could not develop from the proposals he outlined to the House of Representatives. Moreover, the Minister faced the same problem that had confronted Ward: there was still no research and planning organization to provide the ideas, plans, programmes and details needed to put even reactionary proposals into effect. Owing to inevitable delays in public service recruitment it would be some time before an effective executive organization could be developed. Above all, Spender was bound to encounter the difficulties of inducing change in a bureaucracy that had grown accustomed to proceeding in a particular direction. This might be termed bureaucratic inertia, not of a static kind, but in the sense that an organization, once in motion, tends to continue on a given line, until acted on by an external force. In the case of the bureaucracy controlling Papua New Guinea, a change of direction had gradually been effected by post-war circumstances and by pressures from such people as Ward and Murray. A further change, even if it were a return to the original course, required additional pressure which the Minister, in his remaining months in office, was unable to impart.

Disillusioned settlers

Spender found that the New Guinea settlers, their hopes high following his tour of the Territory, were quickly

demoralised when sudden and dramatic improvements in their conditions failed to appear. Thus as early as October 1950, four months after Spender's statement to Parliament had been acclaimed by the white community, complaints appeared in the Pacific Islands Monthly:[96]

> The slowness of the Australian Governmental authority in implementing its policy of developing Papua-New Guinea through the encouragement of private enterprise is causing a lot of irritation both in and out of the Territories...Months ago, the new Australian Minister for Territories (Mr. Spender) announced the new policy - co-operation with private enterprise in creating a strong Australian outpost in New Guinea... It can be said at once, in so many words, that there has been so much maddening delay in giving effect to what might be called the Spender Policy that a reaction has set in...New Guinea Europeans are enterprising, bursting with energy...For all that, they cannot understand why there is so much frustration and delay in the implementation of the Spender Policy....

This editorial was headed, "Is the Spender Policy Being Sabotaged?", and made pointed reference to "Ward-ism, as applied to Papua-New Guinea by J.K. Murray", the "Ward-Murray native labour laws" and the "Ward-Murray regime". New Guinea residents themselves were more demanding. The Wau branch of the R.S.S. and A.I.L.A. sent a cable to the Prime Minister in mid-November expressing their dissatisfaction:[97]

> We, the returned soldiers of Wau, New Guinea, are alarmed and apprehensive at the continued delay and evasion shown by your Government on the policy as publicly outlined to us by Mr. Spender during his visit to New Guinea.

96. This and the following passage are drawn from P.I.M., Vol. 21 No. 3, October 1950, pp. 5-6.
97. P.N.G.N.A. Box 166, item GH1-7-7, 14 November 1950.

In the same month R.W. Robson, owner and editor of the Pacific Islands Monthly, paid his first visit to Papua New Guinea for ten years, having been kept out of the Territory by wartime conditions and a direct prohibition by Mr. Ward. Far from praising conditions since the defeat of Labor, he wrote a series of pen-sketches filled with the innuendo and destructive criticism that epitomised his magazine. He noted, for example, that delegation of powers and the establishment of District Advisory Councils had been promised by Spender, then complained:[98]

> Seven months have gone by, and at this writing not one of these things has come to pass. I am told that fantastic delays occur, while more and more matters are referred South, to the inevitable Mr. Reg Halligan, for decision. Everyone blames everyone else - it is like fighting a feather bed.

Clearly, the honeymoon with the new government had ended.

Australian aid

It was ironic that circumstances which had earlier made it difficult for Murray to secure change now helped to preserve the reforms that had taken place since 1945. Under Ward a virtual social revolution had been announced, but it had proved impossible to effect the transformation of economic conditions and control required to make the social policy wholly effective. Now Spender wished to relax economic controls, but was unable to modify the social

98. P.I.M., Vol. 21 No. 4, November 1950, p. 103.

programmes to the point where white entrepreneurs could have gained the freedom of access to local resources, particularly labour, that they demanded. The new government faced the same problem as its predecessors: the economic situation in Papua New Guinea was hopelessly inadequate to support an active programme of social development. If the government wished to pursue such a programme, it had no alternative but to subsidise the Territory in at least the proportions approved by the post-war Labor government. In the long run, the subsidy could possibly be reduced once revenue from new economic activity increased. However, this goal had been pursued by various administrations for more than sixty years, without measurable success, and it offered little hope for the Liberal-Country Party government.

The level of Australia's financial aid to Papua New Guinea was a matter of concern to the new government. Shortly after Spender's major statement on New Guinea, a letter from the Treasurer, Mr. Fadden, politely expressed "interest" in Spender's view that Australia would have to support New Guinea.[99] Treasury was concerned about the large commitments being suggested, and Halligan had already encountered some searching enquiries from the Secretary for the Treasury (Mr. G.P.N. Watt) concerning the heavy expenditure being proposed once the reconstruction phase

99. CRS A518, item C927/1, 22 June 1950.

in the Territory had ended.[100] The problem of finance increased in July 1950, following a general directive from the Prime Minister that the government's policy was to "check unhealthyexpansion in the public service"; to avoid additional expenditure; and, if possible, to make reductions.[101] For the first time, the Department of External Territories was obliged to request, rather than question, the allocation of funds. It did so in terms almost identical with those which had been employed by the Labor government and the Territory Administration:[102]

> I think it is necessary to view this expenditure in the light of the war-time background against which this Department was created, the post-war commitments entered into by the Government in regard to the Trust Territory of New Guinea and the Government's post-war policy for the rehabilitation and economic development of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea...If the Government's policy of the development of the Territory...is to be at all effective and capable of providing sufficient revenue for self-support within a reasonable time, it is my considered and firm opinion also that quite considerable funds will have to be provided for a wide range of capital works and for maintenance... over a suitable period of years.

The Australian budget for 1950/51 provided for an increase in the grant to Papua New Guinea from some £4.2 million to approximately £4.35 million, or little more than four per cent.[103] This compared most unfavourably with the three preceding years, when budgets drafted by the Labor government increased the grant to the Territory by,

100. Ibid., 31 May 1950.
101. Ibid., 7 July 1950.
102. Ibid., 26 July 1950. The letter was drafted by Mr. J.C. Archer, Assistant Secretary dealing with financial and economic matters.
103. For the statistics upon which these and the following calculations are based, see Jinks, op. cit., p. 105.

successively, 12, 22 and 33 per cent. The time was being reached when a levelling-off of the rate of increase was to be expected, but the first Liberal-Country Party budget represented virtually no increase in the provision of net goods and services, owing to the inflation of the Korean War period. The obvious questions were: did this represent a permanent plateau of Australian finance for the Territory, or would increases continue in later years? And on what basis would the money be made available? A static, annual Australian grant would render development planning impossible.

Yet more committees, 1950

Planning for Papua New Guinea was taken into account in the structure of the new Cabinet, which provided for seven "major" and ten "specialist" Standing Committees.[104] Within the latter group was the Standing Committee on the Development of the External Territories. It comprised Spender as chairman; the Treasurer, Mr. A.W. Fadden; the Minister for Commerce and Agriculture, Mr. J. McEwen; and the Minister for Works and Housing and for National Development, Mr. R.G. Casey. While its membership was smaller, the Standing Committee clearly followed the pattern adopted, with few results, by the Labor government; and the cycle was complete when, following an enquiry from Halligan, a parallel Inter-Departmental Committee was also

104. The material in this and the following passage is drawn from CRS A518, item C927/1, 31 January 1950.

established.[105] It comprised representatives of the departments whose Ministers made up the Standing Committee (including the Department of National Development), plus the Administrator. As with the various groups set up by the Labor government, there was again considerable delay in securing recommendations on New Guinea development: the Standing Committee awaited a report from the Inter-Departmental Committee, which in turn required direction from the Minister following his tour of the Territory. However, by May 1950 a Report on Present Conditions in Papua and New Guinea was available and, in addition to providing certain material for the Minister's statement, it was available as a basis for discussion by the Inter-Departmental Committee.[106] There were yet more delays, however, and it was not until 24 August 1950 that the group of officials was convened for the first time, eight months after the election of the new government.[107]

The Report, as presented to the Inter-Departmental Committee, contained nothing in the way of basic information that could not have been gained from the annual reports for the Trust Territory and Papua, and its recommendations mainly drew together a number of proposals that had been

105. Ibid., 23 February 1950.
106. The report is contained in CRS A518, item H927/1 and is minuted 11 May 1950. It may be different from the two other 1950 reports contained in the Halligan papers and to which access was refused (see p. 588), but it is hard to imagine the Department preparing three different reports; this one is innocuous enough, at least.
107. CRS A518, item D927/1, 24 August 1950.

submitted from Port Moresby as long as four years previously: the need for a land registration commission, for price control, and for clarification of employment conditions. It also pointed out, yet again, that there was no clear policy for the development of the Territory.[108]

Murray presses his economic plan

The committee's attention was thus directed to the major question governing the Territory's development: its economic and trade relationship with Australia.[109] The Department of External Territories position on the matter was set out in a paper which recommended:[110]

> (a) That the economies of the External Territories should, as far as practicable, be developed in such a way as to be complementary to the Australian economy and that the development of any industries which might be competitive with Australian industries should not be encouraged beyond the limit of local Territory requirements;
>
> (b) That, in the development of the Territories' economy, Australia should afford Territory industries such measure of assistance and protection as international commitments will allow; and
>
> (c) That conversely, the Territories should as far as practicable ensure for Australia the Territory market for import requirements.

The paper made no reference to the original reasons for

108. Ibid. It is worth noting that the Minister's statement to Parliament was not mentioned during the course of the committee's discussions.
109. Ibid. Mr. J.G. Crawford, of the Department of Commerce and Agriculture, opened this part of the discussion. He had been a member of the 1949 committee.
110. The following is a brief summary, by the Department, of material originally set out in CRS A518, item AL800/1/7, 10 March 1950.

Australian protection, as put forward by the Directorate and Colonel Murray: that only through such guarantees could the country's resources, notably labour, be diverted from plantations and towards production on village small-holdings.[111] The economic strategy proposed by External Territories seemed, in contrast, to aim at the protection of the white plantation industry, while limiting the diversification of the colonial economy. Murray was not happy with the proposals, although the minutes of the meeting do not present his views clearly, possibly because the secretary could not follow them:[112]

> Colonel Murray stated that in the long term the Territory could provide Australia with every tropical product at present imported. For strategic reasons we should aim at such a type of self-sufficiency. This aim should not be publicised. As most of the products concerned were tree crops (which took a long time to come to maturity) an assured market over a long term would have to be given. He advocated that (a) the Commonwealth Government should indicate that for 15 years Australia will take all the Territory can produce at cost of efficiency production up to Australia's requirements; and (b) a body like the Tariff Board should assess cost of production and stabilisation schemes should be introduced on the basis of costs of efficient production.

Murray believed that the committee should recommend such a scheme to the government.

The major problem associated with any such scheme of

111. See Chapter Eight, pp. 508-9.
112. CRS A518, item C927/1, 24 August 1950. The "strategic" arguments were a relatively minor factor in Murray's thinking, but they were useful in his attempt to win the support of the committee.

economic expansion arose with the ensuing discussion of possible financial arrangements. The Territory Administration had provided a table of projected expenditure for the twenty years to 1970,[113] upon which the Treasury representative on the committee commented:[114]

> It was true one could not talk about development unless the general limits of expenditure were known. It would not be possible, however, for the Treasurer to bind himself to budget for firm sums such as those nominated, over the next 20 years. Treasury did not reject the principle provided there was no implication that the Treasurer was obliged to accept firm commitments.

Having been advised that Treasury approved of planning, but would not necessarily provide the means to carry it out, Murray once more suggested that statutory provision should be made for the funding of projects, as under the British Colonial Development and Welfare Act. Other members of the committee then pointed out, correctly, that the estimates of future finance were not "concrete"; "the concept was good, but Treasury had continually asked for a definite development programme". Halligan ventured that some indication of the availability of funds was necessary before a programme could be drawn up. Murray pointed out that, while expenditure in such areas as health, education and district services could be estimated with reasonable accuracy, this was virtually impossible in the

113. The amounts suggested are of significance only because they were very much smaller than those eventually provided; the 1950 projections even envisaged a levelling-off of Australian grants within a decade.
114. The material in this and the following passage, including quotations, is drawn from ibid.

economic sphere. Support services, particularly roads, would cost enormous amounts, while the amount of private investment could not be predicted. He maintained that, as in the case of the United Kingdom, the Australian government would have to "take some things on trust". Referring to the failure of the previous committees to produce firm proposals, Murray stated that it was essential for the new body to ensure that a definite programme was begun in 1951, "without fail". The committee therefore suggested that the "Development Fund approach" be put to Cabinet, in addition to the possibilities of providing finance on the more orthodox annual basis.

Following this meeting, Murray apparently engaged in some minor lobbying in support of the development fund concept, for on the following Sunday there were press reports that the government was about to initiate a £100 million plan in New Guinea during the next ten years.[115] This was a matter that the Administrator had already proposed, mainly through a loan programme to finance long-term capital works; but although such methods of funding were orthodox within the Australian budgetary system, the government apparently lacked sufficient confidence in New Guinea's future to sanction them for the Territory: in July the Treasurer had observed:[116]

115. Sydney Sunday Sun, 27 August 1950.
116. CRS A518, item C927/1, 12 July 1950.

> I have noted the Administrator's suggestion about separating expenditure from revenue and expenditure from loan funds and also his proposal for a Papua and New Guinea Development Fund of £100m. for expenditure spread over the next ten years. I shall consider the points he has made but at this stage I would say that we may not find it convenient or desirable to deal with grants to the Administration in the way he has suggested.

Consequently, there was no official comment on the press report of the development fund, and for some months the debate was confined to Canberra, through an interchange between Halligan and Watt, at the Treasury. Commenting on various programmes which had been proposed to extend for three, ten or even twenty years, Watt stated that he was opposed to the concept of long-term financing for the colonies and could see no value in it.[117] He maintained that the situation in New Guinea was different from the case of the United Kingdom's development fund, since in the British case the extra funds provided from London were "marginal" to the British colonies' regular sources of revenue. Papua New Guinea, on the other hand, relied wholly on the government for its development. In later correspondence there were few signs of compromise. Watt had proposed the establishment of a separate "works committee" to concentrate on capital construction and services,[118] but Halligan maintained that the Inter-Departmental Committee was adequate for the purpose; he also denied that New Guinea development was being left entirely in the

117. This and the following passage are drawn from CRS A518, item J927/1, 9 October 1950.
118. Ibid.

hands of the government.[119] The Treasury attitude could not be shaken, however, and the question of long-term finance gradually slipped into the background.

Support from External Territories

Curiously, during the brief period of negotiations with Treasury, the Department of External Territories approach to development came close to that advocated by Murray and the progressive Territory officials. This was particularly obvious in the background papers prepared for the second meeting of the Inter-Departmental Committee. The Department's first draft of the economic strategy for New Guinea could have been written by Murray himself. It pointed out that the primary means of increasing the work force in the Territory was through health and education programmes; and, further, that available labour could be used effectively while maintaining the existing rural structure:[120]

> Preservation of the family unit implies preservation of the social framework pending gradual transition. The social framework is essentially based on land and therefore tends to be inflexible. Consequently policy will require to aim more at bringing industry to labour rather than labour to industry. It must also aim at increasing efficiency of the force through education and training and the introduction of mechanical aids, wherever economic. If basic policy relating to the labour force is determined on the foregoing lines, the general internal policy will take shape accordingly. Where practicable, industry will be encouraged to develop in areas with large populations... In this way much disruption of family life will be avoided and the growth of native population encouraged.

119. Ibid., 10 and 22 November 1950.
120. CRS A518, item D927/1, 8 February 1951.

> The long term aim of such a policy is a native operated economy aided by invested capital with managerial and technical skills, rather than a European economy aided by a native labour force...Acceptance of this aim would affect the rate of development from the beginning and would imply that the process of development will be a long one....

The tenor of this paper followed closely a submission from Port Moresby, which sought to supply more of the data demanded at the first meeting of the Inter-Departmental Committee. The Territory approach envisaged "a considerable stepping up of the present rate of development, and the overcoming of the problem of the availability of labour by mechanisation and other methods, such as the incorporation within the developmental schemes of aspects such as peasant production, co-operative production, share farming etc., whereby the 'hidden' labour force can be utilized".[121] In both instances the primary emphasis was on the life of the people and their role in the economy, rather than on economic development for its own sake. Unfortunately, new influences in the Department of External Territories rejected this view even before the Canberra authorities had time to discuss it.

Rejection of the plan

Once the discussions between Halligan and Watt on the development fund concept had proved fruitless, the Department of External Territories could envisage only a

121. P.N.G.N.A. Box 186, item PD1/3-1, 17 January 1951.

continuation of informal discussions with the Treasury: in that way it might be possible to obtain "general agreement on a broad policy plan which could be placed before the Cabinet's Standing Committee...Otherwise the work of the [Inter-Departmental] Committee threatens to remain pretty much at a standstill."[122] Because of these difficulties, the second meeting of the Inter-Departmental Committee was further delayed. The various position papers on economic strategy that had been prepared in early 1951 were thus not reviewed until the following August, by which time Mr. Hasluck had become Minister for Territories and some new staff had been recruited to the Department. One of these officers minuted the draft proposing, as he termed it, a "native operated economy":[123]

> This paper was originally drafted before I actually took up duty here. I tried to follow the ideas therein expressed. In the light of subsequent experience I find that paras. 3-10 [the passage quoted on pp. 633-4] lay stress on the wrong points. European enterprise is essential for development. Much later the natives will take up the running. Development in centres of high population seems quite impracticable until "white" industries are there to buy the product of the native grower...Whole villages may find it advantageous to move to an area where they can produce for a factory...The stress on the preservation of the family unit need not imply inflexible adherence to existing tribal lands - families may move to the proximity of employment as in our society.

This passage was remarkable: for its ignorance of Papua New Guinea and its customs, for its callousness in suggesting the creation of a class of landless labourers,

122. CRS A518, item J927/1, 7 February 1951.
123. CRS A518, item D927/1, 6 August 1951.

and for its arrogance in rejecting other viewpoints. Moreover, the fact that the officer was new to the Department did not limit his influence on events:[124]

> I doubt whether /the paper/ will be needed for any inter-Departmental Committee, for our own lines of policy have grown fairly clear from a number of separate development policy questions determined for specific cases.

It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the techniques of administration employed by Hasluck's Department during the following twelve years, but it is clear that the method of incremental decision-making from Canberra that dominated the period had its genesis in this early attitude towards planning.[125] Neither the Standing Committee of Cabinet nor the Inter-Departmental Committee played much further part in policy-making, which came to be dominated by Hasluck personally. Thus the planning structure proposed for New Guinea development by the non-Labor government, the fourth such organization announced since 1944, not only failed to produce a detailed programme for the Territory, but could not even agree on the broad strategy to be followed. The "Spender policy", too, had faltered on the inherent contradiction involved in attempting to promote rapid economic development in a colony while at the same time protecting the welfare of the people.

124. Ibid. The officer eventually became First Assistant Secretary in charge of planning.
125. For some comment on the lack of planning during this period, see U.N. Report 1962 (the "Foot Report"), pp. 44-58.

Secretariat of Planning and Development

While these attempts were being made to revive New Guinea planning in Australia, the Territory Administration embarked on a similar scheme. In mid-1949, when Mr. Chifley directed that the Labor Cabinet sub-committee on New Guinea be re-established - and with preparations finally in hand for staffing a Division of Planning and Research within the Department of External Territories - Canberra approval was also given for the setting up of a Secretariat of Planning and Development in Port Moresby.[126] In the sudden flurry of activity before the 1949 election, there was little time to arrive at a clear statement of objectives for the Secretariat, or even to recruit staff for it. On 15 August 1949 the acting Government Secretary, Mr. Lonergan, following discussions with the Administrator, offered the position of acting Secretary for Planning and Development to Mr. J.H. Jones, who had been acting Director of the Department of District Services and Native Affairs for some three years.[127] Jones advised that he was ready to begin duty in the new position on 17 August, and on that day a circular was sent to all departments advising them of the existence of the Secretariat.[128] In his new position, Jones was formally responsible to the Government Secretary, but retained his office in the District Services building. His staff comprised an officer

126. See Chapter Nine, p. 564 and Chapter Five, p. 288.
127. P.N.G.N.A. Box 186, item PD1/1-1, 16 August 1949.
128. Ibid., 17 August 1949.

seconded from the field service, a clerk, and a secretary, but it was an indication of the status accorded the new organization that Jones' subordinates could be accommodated only in the shell of an ex-Army hut.[129] The Secretariat had all the failings of hasty organization, by Halligan and Lonergan, in an attempt to retain their control of planning; but since it lacked the immediate support of the group of progressive officers supporting Murray its future was immediately in doubt. The Pacific Islands Monthly, commenting on the new Secretariat, was by no means impressed:[130]

> A new, important-sounding post - that of Secretary of Planning and Development - has been created in the Administration...One thing the Administration is not short of is plans, so Mr. Jones should be kept very busy.

Jones' initial problem was to discover what he was intended to do. The circular announcing his appointment could merely state, "The Acting Secretary (Planning and Development) will at the outset be occupied on the work preparatory to planning and directly this work is completed notification will be made of the functions of the office."[131] After compiling a neat filing index, Jones spent most of the next twelve months attending discussions, in Canberra and Port Moresby, concerning the intentions of the new government; and in preparing parts of the background papers that have been referred to earlier in

129. Ibid., 31 August 1949.
130. P.I.M., Vol. 20 No. 2, September 1949, p. 11.
131. P.N.G.N.A. Box 186, item 1/1-1, 17 August 1949.

this Chapter.[132] He attended the meeting of the Inter-Departmental Committee in Canberra with the Administrator in August 1950, returning to the Territory with the Treasury admonition that more detailed proposals were required before long-term funding of New Guinea programmes could be considered. Jones then requested each department to prepare a seven-year plan, but since none of them was any better equipped than the Secretariat to engage in such activity, the resulting documents for the most part contained little more than guesses at future financial requirements, with a minimum of supporting evidence.[133] The estimates of expenditure for the ensuing three years proved reasonably accurate, but acting on advice that the Commonwealth would provide a proportionately smaller share of Territory funds by the end of the planning period, most departments predicted a gradual reduction in their total requirements: the figure estimated for 1956/57 - £8.5 million - was little more than half the amount eventually spent in that year.[134]

Limitations of the Secretariat

For planning purposes, the material produced by and

132. The 139 files, most of them very slim, are contained in P.N.G.N.A. Boxes 186 to 189. The background papers are in Box 186, item 1/3-1. Ironically, the records of the abortive Secretariat are the only ones from this sector of the Administration to have survived the various fires and departmental reorganizations intact.
133. P.N.G.N.A. Box 186, item 1/6, 19 September 1949. The plans are contained in Box 186, item 1/3-1.
134. For statistics of actual expenditure, see Jinks, op. cit., pp. 105-6.

for the Secretariat was of little use; certainly, it was far from being the "concrete" evidence demanded by the Commonwealth Treasury. It was unlikely that anything better could have been prepared, since Jones concentrated on orthodox administrative requirements, emphasising particularly the contribution that individual departments might make to economic development. In contrast, the Secretariat's papers on social and political advancement were slight documents indeed, containing the kinds of generalisations that could be found in one of the annual reports to the United Nations. Even in the economic sphere, the proposals were little more than revivals of schemes that dated back as far as Sir Hubert Murray and even the German administration, such as the production of kenaf and manila hemp.[135] This situation was not entirely of Jones' making, but it is unlikely that the outlook would have been so narrow had, say, Dr. Gunther been responsible for general planning. Moreover, Jones operated in virtual isolation from Canberra, having at one stage to ask the Department of External Territories if it could provide information on its proposed Division of Planning and Research.[136] The Canberra records disclose an equally limited scope: in the relevant series for this period there appear, for example, fifty files on economic development and sixty on particular commodities to be investigated; but most folders are as thin as those produced

135. These papers are contained in P.N.G.N.A. Box 186, items in series PD2.
136. P.N.G.N.A. Box 186, item 1/1-1, undated February 1951.

by the Port Moresby Secretariat. By comparison, there are only three files on political development, two each on health and education and one, comprising three folios of Jones' notes, on social advancement.[137] This was hardly the material for a development plan.

By the early months of 1951 Mr. Spender's initial impact on New Guinea affairs had clearly begun to fade; shortly after Hasluck's appointment as Minister the Secretariat of Planning and Development was abolished, Jones returning to the Department of District Services. The short life of the Secretariat illustrates the cycle of frustration that continued to dominate all attempts at producing defined programmes for Papua New Guinea. Basic policy could not be approved owing to a lack of supporting data, while the necessary data was of little use because it lacked the framework of a clear policy. As a consequence, decisions were taken by Spender, and later by Hasluck, on unrelated grounds, except in such relatively narrow fields as health services or agricultural extension. In the absence of clear objectives, the implementation of many decisions tended to be conservative. The events of the following decade require much more research, but it is likely that the main aspects of the Hasluck policy of "uniform development",[138] such as the

137. These papers are contained in CRS A518, items in the sequence 927 (e.g., Social Advancement Policy, 927/12).
138. For the Minister's major statements on this policy, see Jinks, Biskup, Nelson (eds.), op. cit., pp. 356-61

emphasis on primary schooling and the lack of attention to political development, were not a conscious design, but rather the outcome of a tentative approach that grew inevitably from processes of ad hoc decision-making.

Spender's achievement: slowing post-war trends

The impasse in planning produced ironic consequences. With the Liberal-Country Party government reluctantly committed to steadily increasing grants to the Territory, those departments which had already prepared specialised programmes were able to continue with them. The Departments of Public Health and Education, whose heavy spending on social measures had been a particular cause of concern to the new government, continued to expand.[139] On the other hand, departments concerned with economic affairs, such as Lands and Agriculture, were able to produce neither a sudden influx of white settlers nor a dramatic increase in village production. The 1950's proved to be the decade of social measures, to be followed by a reaction that was partly responsible for making the 1960's the decade of economic development; uniform development proved to be a myth, owing initially to a lack of co-ordinated planning.[140]

139. See ibid., pp. 362-4.
140. This is merely a hypothesis. I wish to make the period of "uniform development" the subject of a study following the present one; at this point it is worth suggesting the lines of enquiry indicated by the present discussion.

Of the ad hoc decisions taken by Spender as a result of his New Guinea tour, few did more than slow certain trends that had resulted from post-war conditions. One of the most significant for independent Papua New Guinea was the re-establishment of the Pacific Islands Regiment on a peacetime basis, a step which had been opposed by Dr. Evatt.[141] Of much greater immediate importance were the amendments to the conditions and control of the employment of villagers. The Minister's main concession to employers was the extension of the maximum period of contract work from one year to two, while a less publicised move that was at first considered a victory for settler interests was the abolition of the separate Department of Native Labour, whose establishment had been one of the few defined features of Ward's policy.[142] However, these measures were far from being a major revision of labour policy. The government honoured the promise of its predecessor to abolish the pre-war form of indenture within five years, providing for employment by contract "agreement" under a 1950 Ordinance which substituted civil remedies for all of the criminal provisions that had previously applied to workers who broke their contracts.[143] This

141. There was little advance publicity on the reconstitution of the Regiment and its all-white, part-time counterpart, the Papua and New Guinea Volunteer Rifles. The new government acted swiftly; an Army advance party was in Port Moresby by February 1950 (P.I.M., Vol. 21 No. 8, March 1951, p. 21).
142. See Chapter Five, pp. 275-6.
143. Abolition before the announced date was attempted by Labor, but administrative arrangements could not be completed before the government's defeat (CRS A518, item I840/1/4, 9 and 16 November and 1 December 1949).

was considered a blow to employers who had previously been able to mete out punishment to recalcitrant workers; even the Territory's Crown Law Officer, when asked his opinion of the measure, stated:[144]

> My personal opinion in the matter was and is that an agreement without a means of enforcement is not satisfactory, and that the academic remedy available to an employer against a native who breaks a contract is not a practicable means of enforcement.

By the time this opinion was expressed Murray was no longer in office and there were few remaining supporters of the liberalised employment conditions of the post-war years, but decisions that had been made during the earlier period could not be reversed, and could be modified only with some difficulty. Thus although the Department of Native Labour was abolished, it had been apparent for some time that it was less than wholly effective; owing to difficulties in recruiting suitable labour officers, many of the Department's duties had to be performed, under delegated powers, by members of the field staff. Moreover, it had been considered for some years that it was undesirable to have a single organization responsible for both the administration of employment and for the inspection of working conditions.[145] It was therefore no concession to employers, in practice, when the functions of the former Department were divided between the Departments of District Services (administration of employment) and the

144. P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, item GH1-2-7, 2 June 1952.
145. See Chapter Eight, pp. 478-80.

Government Secretary (inspection and control) early in 1951.[146] The control of employment became, if anything, a little more effective once the staff exercising it were made responsible to their direct superiors, rather than carrying out these duties as agency functions on behalf of a separate, relatively minor department.[147]

White representation

Similarly, the formation of representative bodies among European residents at town and district level proved to have less significance than the settler interests had hoped. In announcing this decision, Spender had gained credit for a policy that had reached its final form before the 1949 election. It envisaged District and Town Advisory Councils, the latter confined to major centres such as Port Moresby and Madang, with the District Commissioner as chairman and nominated representatives.[148] Action had been taken on the proposal several months before Spender's New Guinea visit, and the first body was set up in the Central District in February 1950. However, it was clear from their titles that these bodies had no executive functions; for the next twenty years they merely

146. N.G.A.R., 1950/51, p. 51.
147. The agency functions were detailed and repetitive, and always resented by field staff, who sometimes needed direction to carry them out correctly. Most performed labour inspections efficiently. A separate Department of Labour was re-establsihed in 1958.
148. The material in this and the following passage is drawn from P.N.G.N.A. Box 193, item CA1/4/1, 4 and 6 May 1950.

offered an avenue for the expression of settler opinion and minor status to those individuals nominated to them.[149] No research has been conducted into their functioning, and it is unlikely that it ever will be, but it might be suggested that the Advisory Councils, if anything, slightly weakened the influence of white pressure groups by diversifying the efforts of their members.

Mr. Spender's implication that the Legislative Council membership provided under the Papua and New Guinea Act might be altered in the settlers' favour also came to nothing. Under the terms of the Papua and New Guinea Act, the Council could have been established on 1 July 1950. Earlier in that year the drafting of an Ordinance was begun, together with investigations into the backgrounds of those Papua New Guineans considered most suitable for appointment to the three places reserved for non-Europeans.[150] However, following the Minister's expression of dissatisfaction with the proposed Council, preparations were suspended, and it was not until August 1951 that organization of the poll for the Council's three European elected members was begun.[151] In the interim, the Territory Administration seems not to have been involved in the question of the Council's composition. On the available evidence it seems probable that this was one of

149. For an outline of the Councils' functions, see Jinks, op. cit., pp. 110-12.
150. P.N.G.N.A. Box 190, item CA1/2/1, 27 December 1949 and 14 January and 31 March 1950.
151. P.N.G.N.A. Box 191, item CA1/2/6, 20 August 1951.

the matters which slipped into the background during the period when Spender's attention was drawn away from New Guinea affairs.[152] In any event, the Legislative Council, when it met for the first time in November 1951, was constituted in the manner prescribed in 1949 by the Papua and New Guinea Act, having an official majority of 17 in a Council of 29, with three white missionaries, three Papua New Guineans, and only six Europeans who could be considered as representing settler interests.[153] The settler group was a source of constant criticism of policy and administration during the nine years of the Council's existence, but it was to have only marginal influence on Hasluck and his advisers.[154]

Strengthening the companies' hold

Following Spender's 1950 statements, the most important changes anticipated by settlers were in the economic field. Here again, earlier policy and events should have indicated that a major change of approach was impossible. Large areas of apparently unused land had attracted the Minister's attention, but they could not be alienated without serious disruption to the village subsistence economy; if Mr. Spender had been acquainted with the colonial history of

152. The Department of Territories file on this matter (CRS A518, iten 0800/1/7) was not cleared for access.
153. For further details, see C.A. Hughes, "The Legislative Councils of Papua-New Guinea", Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 12 No. 2, Spring 1959, p. 209.
154. See, for example, B. Jinks, "The New Guinea Tax Issue", Journal of the Papua and New Guinea Society, Vol. 1 No. 2, 1967, p. 16.

Papua New Guinea, he may have ignored the settlers' demands on this matter.[155] In the absence of large tracts of alienable land, the soldier-settler scheme which the Minister favoured was scarcely practicable. A plan to provide credit and land for ex-servicemen was eventually instituted in 1958, but it was mainly used to aid earlier settlers who were experiencing financial difficulties.[156] Moreover, most of the land grants, notably in the Northern District of Papua, were made from areas that had been alienated by the Administration for other, abortive schemes that dated back to the pre-war period. There was no influx of white immigrants as a consequence of Spender's proposal. Rather, the plantation economy continued to be dominated by the company-owned, manager-operated units, as individual owners were forced to sell out. As Howlett has observed, it appeared that the pattern which followed the first world war was being repeated after the second.[157] The trend ran counter to Ward's 1944 policy, but since the Labor government had shown no signs of overcoming the problem,[158] events under its successor did not involve any particular change in favour of the settlers.

155. The main source then available would have been Mair's Australia in New Guinea (op. cit., pp. 72-9, 92-7), but the author would not have been highly regarded by a non-Labor Minister. The proposal was criticised by James McAuley in the journal of the School of Pacific Administration in early 1952, possibly affecting official views on the matter (J.P. McAuley, "White Settlement in Papua and New Guinea", South Pacific, Vol. 5 No. 12, March-April 1952, p. 250).
156. For further details, see D.R. Howlett, The European Land Settlement Scheme at Popondetta, New Guinea Research Bulletin No. 6, Canberra, A.N.U., 1965, pp. 3-9.
157. Ibid., p. 3.
158. See Chapter Eight, passim.

Two other schemes announced during Spender's term of office produced no particular gains for private interests in New Guinea, other than the incidental advantages that tended to flow from increased spending. The first, a continuation of oil exploration that had been carried out spasmodically between the wars, continued into the 1960's without locating a field of economic proportions. The second, which led to the production of plywood from the pine stands in the Bulolo Valley, was announced by Spender in December 1950, but had already been approved in principle by the Labor government's 1947 committees.[159] The scheme involved a joint venture between the Bulolo Gold Dredging Company, whose mining operations in the area had almost ended, and the Commonwealth government, through a company to be known as Commonwealth New Guinea Timbers Limited. It was ironic that the project, one of the most economically successful in the Territory's history, should have introduced a minor element of socialism into the country. It was to be the last for many years,[160] for in 1950 investigations were begun into the encouragement of private enterprise. The Minister approved the granting of special concessions to new private ventures, subject to extremely vague conditions: that a proposed project was one to be encouraged; that the company presenting a proposal was sound; and that it required concessions in

159. South Pacific, Vol. 4 No. 13, January-February 1951, p. 233. See also ibid., Vol. 5 No. 12, March-April 1952, p. 274. The committees' discussions are noted in Chapter Nine, p. 561.
160. The Hoskins Oil Palm Scheme of the 1960's had some similar features.

order to be profitable.[161] It was this further trend towards company ventures, with a consequent growth in the numbers of transient white employees, rather an increase in white settlement, that followed the Spender statements of 1950. Further investigation may show that the most far-reaching consequence of the Minister's proposals was his view that development in Papua New Guinea "should generally be complementary to Australian industry".[162] It has been noted that, to the Territory Administration, this involved guaranteed markets.[163] It is probable, however, that in practice the Spender pronouncement led to the obstruction of projects in Papua New Guinea, such as the production of meat, soap and rice for home consumption, that would be in competition with imports from Australia. Even then, it is likely that this attitude resulted less from a deliberate policy decision than from a series of ad hoc rulings made during succeeding years.

The first eighteen months of Liberal-Country Party government did not produce the reversals of post-war policy in Papua New Guinea that Murray had feared and settler interests had hoped for. It was clear that all future governments would have to persist with the dual policy of economic development and social advancement, and that this could be accomplished only by continuing to

161. CRS A518, item 927/2, 19 July 1950.
162. C.P.D., Vol. 208, p. 3638, 1 June 1950.
163. See Chapter Eight, pp. 508-9 and p. 629 of this Chapter.

grant substantial sums of money to the Territory Administration. Attempts at long-range planning had proved unsuccessful yet again, and it began to appear as if the only alternative would be to place substantial power over day-to-day decisions in the hands of an individual, if the delays of the preceding five years were to be avoided. In such a case, the individual would not be Murray, whose differences with Spender had made him thoroughly unpopular. Following the appointment of Mr. Hasluck as Minister for Territories in May 1951, it became apparent that the question of the Administrator's role could not long be left in doubt.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

HASLUCK AND THE REMOVAL OF MURRAY

Mr. P.M.C. Hasluck - Cautious beginning - Hasluck meets the people - Controlling the public service - Halligan's departure - Assistant Administrator - Mr. D.M. Cleland Murray under attack - Mount Lamington eruption - Murray and Cleland - Future of Rabaul - Hollandia visit - Murray is dismissed - Emotional farewells - Murray's attack - Hasluck exerts authority: pattern of the future

Mr. P.M.C. Hasluck

Murray served as Administrator for only ten months of Hasluck's twelve and a half year tenure as Minister for Territories.[1] The policy with which Hasluck was later identified did not achieve its full expression

1. Hasluck was appointed Minister for Territories on 11 May 1951. Colonel Murray went on leave to Australia in March 1952 and did not resume full duty as Administrator.

until 1956 and so will not be discussed in this study.[2] During his first months in the portfolio, the new Minister acquainted himself with conditions in Papua New Guinea and created the conditions necessary for the full exercise of his authority. The events of this period thus give some indication of Hasluck's approach and, like those which occurred during Spender's term as Minister, suggest avenues for future inquiry.

Hasluck's background was of significance in influencing his role as Minister, particularly since it was considerably broader than that of any of his predecessors. At 46 years of age at the time of his appointment, he was sixteen years younger than Murray.[3] Born in Western Australia, he had worked as a journalist there from 1922, meanwhile specialising in the history of policy towards Aboriginals. He was awarded a Master's degree before being appointed Lecturer in Australian History in Perth in 1940. In the following year he joined the Department of External Affairs and was appointed officer in charge of the post-war section of the Department in 1942. He worked under Dr. Evatt on matters concerning Australia's relations with the United Nations and in 1946 was appointed Counsellor-in-Charge to the Australian Mission

2. See, particularly, P.M.C. Hasluck, Australian Policy in Papua and New Guinea, George Judah Cohen Memorial Lecture, Canberra, typescript, 1956; and Australia's Task in Papua and New Guinea, Roy Milne Memorial Lecture, Canberra, typescript, 1956.
3. The material in this and the following passage is drawn from South Pacific, Vol. 5 No. 3, May 1951, p. 38.

to the U.N. After differences with Evatt, Hasluck resigned from External Affairs in 1947 and was appointed Reader in History at the University of Western Australia in the following year. He was elected Liberal Party member for Curtin, Western Australia, in 1949 and entered the 1951 Cabinet as its most junior member. He was the first Minister to be given responsibility for both Papua New Guinea and the Northern Territory; and the first, since the islands had assumed any peacetime significance for Australia, to hold only one portfolio. As the author of three books on Aboriginal policy, and as one of the architects of Australia's policy towards the United Nations, Hasluck was equipped for his ministerial duties as few others in Australian political history. Moreover, with his experience of research and administration, he was trained to take a close interest in the details of departmental affairs.[4] In some respects his interests and outlook resembled those of Murray, and at first sight there was a possibility that the two men could work closely together. On the other hand, both were strong-willed and conscious of their status. The new Minister was also aware that the changes in New Guinea policy proposed by Spender had failed to produce conspicuous results; it was to be expected that he would seek to remove the causes of any previous failures.

4. The information in this and the following passage is based on talks and interviews with various people who were associated with Hasluck during his term as Minister for Territories. These are tentative conclusions until a detailed study is completed.

Cautious beginning

The most significant early actions by the new Minister were in the field of administration rather than policy. He made a tour of Papua New Guinea; superintended the arrangements which finally brought some order to the Territory's public service and legislature; and effected staffing changes in both Canberra and Port Moresby. In dealing with issues remaining from previous years, Hasluck made only modest claims:[5]

> In coming to this job, I do not claim to have any precise or detailed knowledge of all the territories nor do I pretend that I know how to tackle all its (sic) problems. I can claim to have devoted a good deal of time and thought to the subject during past years and to have a lively appreciation of its importance to Australia at the present.

The Minister saw the significance of Papua New Guinea extending far beyond the questions of defence and the development of resources:[6]

> ....we recognize that we have a great national responsibility for the social welfare and advancement of dependent peoples. Quite frankly and without apology, I approach this job in a rather idealistic way...We have a moral compulsion to do it.

Hasluck's emphasis was much more in keeping with the approach of Ward than of Spender. There could no longer be any doubt that the dual policy of development and

5. South Pacific, Vol. 5 No. 4, June 1951, p. 67. Mr. Hasluck gave a semi-formal talk to students at the School of Pacific Administration on 1 June 1951; the following are extracts from it. For purposes of publication it was entitled "The Administration of Australia's Territories", but it was not intended to be a major statement.
6. Ibid., p. 68.

welfare, involving large grants from Australia, would continue, particularly if this junior Minister wished to establish his reputation in a field where he had every claim to expertise.

Hasluck's measured, almost cautious approach during the early months of his tenure became apparent when, on 25 July 1951, just two and a half months after assuming the portfolio, he began a two-week tour of Papua New Guinea. This visit, unlike his predecessor's, was accompanied by a minimum of publicity and involved no policy statements. By that time the disappointment among the settler community that followed Spender's tour had deepened and Hasluck was subjected to the same barrage of complaints and demands that had been directed against his predecessor. These included grievances from the Rabaul Chinese community, representations from planters favouring relaxed controls on labour, and criticisms of copra marketing.[7] In each case the Minister reacted coolly, giving brief directions to his own staff or to the Territory Administration.[8] There were no promises of change or even of early action. The settler reaction indicated puzzlement, although expectations still remained:[9]

7. Papers on these and other matters are in CRS A518, item BK800/1/7, June-October 1951.
8. For example, a margin note to a submission from the Rabaul branch of the Returned Servicemen's League requesting restoration of penal sanctions to labour legislation reads, "The Minister refused to consider this."
9. P.I.M., Vol. 22 No. 1, August 1951, p. 11.

> ....here is a man who will not deliver any ill-considered judgements, or facile promises. When this Minister's decision is given it will be wise and fair...Mr. Hasluck said that consideration would be given to all...requests. But, in cases, even if granted, there would be great delay in introducing new measures, as this would involve new legislation...One wonders who organizes tours of this nature. The time is obviously too short for the Minister to do anything except listen to the carefully-prepared statements of public bodies - and take quite a lot of ear-bashing on the side from those with axes to grind.

The settler assessment of Hasluck's personality was ironic, in view of the bitter relations that later developed between him and the Territory's Europeans:[10]

> The first thing we noticed about our new Minister is his youth, the lines of laughter round his eyes, and that air of frank friendliness which belongs to most West Australians.

For his part, Hasluck contented himself with some general comments and an enigmatic statement that he hoped to see "much closer contact between Port Moresby and Canberra"; the Pacific Islands Monthly interpreted this as yet another promise of greater delegation of responsibility to Territory officials.[11] However, it was equally possible that the Minister intended to supervise affairs in Papua New Guinea more closely, and this became the more likely interpretation when he began a series of visits to the Territory at intervals of four to five months,[12] thereby establishing a pattern that was followed by all Ministers to the time of self-government.

10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., p. 63.
12. Hasluck's visits after July 1951, and before Murray left, were in November 1951 and April 1952.

Hasluck meets the people

The most notable departure from precedent during Hasluck's first visit to Papua New Guinea was the presentation to him of an address by the Presidents of the Rabaul and Reimber Native Village Councils. Far from being the usual pledge of loyalty, the address was a clear statement of the people's own opinions and grievances, referring to the need for increased wages, more land in the Rabaul area for village use and higher prices for copra.[13] The address gave ample notice of the need for reform when the people analysed their own role in colonial society:

> There are some white men in New Guinea, and some Chinese who do not want the native people to become educated, and to engage in business. They want the people to stay workboys...We are not cross with these people, because they make money, and we do not know why they should be cross with us because we wanting to make some money too. If we do not want to work for them for £1 a month, they say we are big-heads, and should be in gaol.

The people's assessment of Murray's role was as accurate as any that could be made, perhaps even suggesting to Hasluck that any move against the Administrator should proceed with caution:

> If we say we do not like some things that does not mean we do not like the Government of Australia or the Government of New Guinea. We know that the Administrator, Colonel Murray, is our friend.

13. The material in this and the following passage is drawn from CRS A518, item BK800/1/7, 31 July 1951.

In reply, the Minister promised action on such matters as the payment of war damage compensation with rather more enthusiasm than he had shown towards the settlers' demands.[14] He pointed out, however, that some matters were complex, resorting to a tale that was perhaps intended to show his ability to communicate with unsophisticated people:[15]

> If one man is up in a mango tree, and another is standing on the ground, and they are both looking at the same mango on the tree, the man up above might say, "That mango is good and ready to eat." But the other man, looking at it from underneath, might say, "That mango is not ripe yet." That is because they are both seeing different sides of the same fruit. Some of our problems in New Guinea are like that mango...I have first to make sure that I have seen all sides of the question.

Similar representations from settler interests failed to impress the new Minister as they had Mr. Spender. A few days before Hasluck arrived in Rabaul, the Executive Council of the Planters Association of New Guinea resolved, at a meeting specially called for the purpose, to protest to the Minister about the composition of the Legislative Council.[16] The meeting disagreed with "the opinion of the Administrator that there are natives who could adequately represent diverse native interests"; was "aghast" that only three elected European members would

14. Ibid.
15. This was a false analogy. Villagers' tastes differ from Europeans', and many mangoes are picked and eaten green. The Minister might have benefited had he learned the true parallel and applied it in later years in the peoples' demands for self-government. See also Fowler on the "demerit" of analogy.
16. The material in this and the following passage is drawn from ibid., 27 July 1951.

be included in the legislature; and maintained that its protests were the "first indication of a growing resentment amongst Europeans" at the attitude of the Administration towards private enterprise in the Territory. The Secretary for Territories, who accompanied the Minister, noted that the planters' submissions should be considered when the membership of the Council was being reviewed, but by the end of his tour Hasluck had directed that preparations for the Legislative Council should proceed on the basis of the Papua and New Guinea Act 1949.[17] No reply to the Planters' Association appears on the file. The new Minister seemed intent on resisting pressure, regardless of its origin.

Controlling the public service

In dealing with the remaining problems of the Territory public service, Hasluck had the doubtful advantage of almost two years of preparatory work, begun in the last months of the Labor government, which had done little to appease officials, particularly at the senior levels of the Administration. After the many delays following the presentation of the Buttsworth report in 1947,[18] a second classification had been completed in 1949.[19] This had produced slight salary increases and some minor adjustments to conditions of service, but a Public Service Ordinance introduced in 1950 had left many matters unresolved,

17. P.N.G.N.A. Box 191, item CA1/2/6, 20 August 1951.
18. See Chapter Six, pp. 360-75.
19. Ibid., p. 372.

including permanent appointments for the majority of department heads and certain other senior officers.[20] However, this second report had recommended the appointment of a Public Service Commissioner for Papua New Guinea, an Australian precedent that had not previously been followed in the islands.[21]

Mr. E.A.F. Head took up duty as Public Service Commissioner in September 1949, having most recently been Assistant Commonwealth Public Service Inspector in Adelaide.[22] He had joined the Commonwealth service in 1913 and had worked with the Public Service Board since 1924; at the time of his arrival in Papua New Guinea he had no experience of the Territory or its Administration. From the outset, the Public Service Commissioner followed Commonwealth practices wherever possible, supervising the drafting of legislation for the Territory service similar in detail to the Commonwealth Act and following the precedent established by the 1949 Archer report in adopting Australian standards for job classification.[23] Thus when the Commonwealth service was reclassified on a work-value basis in 1950, Head recommended that this

20. See Chapter Nine, p. 572.
21. Staffing matters had been the responsibility of the Department of the Government Secretary both before and after the war.
22. The material in this and the following passage is drawn from P.I.M., Vol. 20 No. 1, August 1949, p. 75. It later became common practice for relatively junior Commonwealth officers to be appointed to Territory positions for which they lacked the necessary experience and flexibility.
23. Head allegedly told his staff that he had no intention of learning new procedures. (Interview with Mr. F.N.W. Rolfe, 10 October 1972).

procedure be followed in Papua New Guinea; salary increases would be granted as a consequence, and on this basis all senior positions should be re-advertised in Australia.[24] This step, Head believed, might "attract applicants with qualifications considerably superior to those of the officers now occupying these positions". Since the Commissioner was a statutory appointee responsible to the Minister, Murray was unable to direct him in such matters, so that for several months negotiations took place through the Secretary for Territories concerning the status of the department heads of the Administration. There were several for whom Murray had little regard, but he was obliged to defend them all, pointing out that the qualifications of most were such that they were unlikely to be bettered by new applicants; "moreover, the making of changes in the relevant Departments is likely to impede rather than to assist organization and administration".[25] Nevertheless, it was not until April 1951 that the first six department heads were confirmed in their positions. This left key positions in the Departments of the Government Secretary, District Services, Law and Agriculture to be filled on a permanent basis. These were among the first matters attended to by Hasluck during his first visit to Port Moresby, all appointments being decided in favour of the Territory public servants who had acted in the positions for some time.

24. P.N.G.N.A. Box 887, item GH47-13, 7 November 1950.
25. Ibid.

In certain respects the public service decisions were unfavourable to Murray, who had been opposed to the appointment of some former Mandated Territory officers, and particularly Lonergan, to top positions.[26] However, Lonergan had been acting Government Secretary for more than two years and it was inevitable that he would be confirmed in the position. In addition, J.H. Jones finally became the permanent Director of District Services, following the abolition of the abortive Secretariat for Planning and Development. This meant that the two most important executive agencies of the Administration were under the firm control of former Territory of New Guinea staff; the network which had threatened to encircle the Administrator for several years past was now fixed in place. In addition, the Public Service Commissioner asserted his right of access to the Minister, through the Secretary for Territories, in the most obvious ways; his letters to Canberra, for example, were copied to Government House, but had the words, "Information Only" written ostentatiously across them.[27] Finally, Head addressed correspondence directly to the Administrator, instructing that stricter controls should be exercised over the granting of leave and the provision of travel and accommodation for public servants on tours of duty.[28] No reply from Murray appears on the file, but the Commissioner's letter bears the terse inscription in the Administrator's

26. Murray interview, 12 December 1966; Murray letter, 26 May 1969.
27. The correspondence is in P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, item GH1-3-4, March 1951.
28. Ibid., 24 and 27 March 1951.

hand: "Have spoken to PSC re his staff duties."[29] Head had greatly exceeded his authority, but such clashes may have strengthened the opinion, created in Canberra while Spender was Minister, that Murray resented interference from the Minister's representatives.[30]

Halligan's departure

In Canberra the Minister made a major staff change, aimed at improving his Department's efficiency. In June 1951 Halligan was transferred to the sinecure of senior Australian Commissioner to the South Pacific Commission and "special adviser" to the Minister on "matters arising from Australian membership of and responsibility to the United Nations Trusteeship Council".[31] There was a double irony in this appointment: it was one that had been suggested for Murray in 1950; and Halligan was removed from office just when, according to one of the officers associated with him, "he was starting to believe that things in the world were happening just as the 'long-haired intellectuals' had been telling him they

29. Ibid., 27 March 1951.
30. This episode merely marked the beginning of the tensions between Administrators and Public Service Commissioners (from 1969, Chairmen of the Public Service Board) that arose from their divided control of the Administration. While similar problems have arisen in the Australian public services, they were constantly exacerbated in the case of Papua New Guinea by the fact that the parties could seek the intervention of an intermediate authority: the Secretary for External Territories, who acted on behalf of the Minister. The three parties then sought to play one off against the other. This was a complex matter that acquired greater significance in later years; it merits detailed investigation.
31. South Pacific, Vol. 5 No. 5, July 1951, p. 78.

had."[32] But while Halligan may have made a more effective Secretary for Hasluck than for his predecessors, the new Minister was taking no chances. In Halligan's stead, he secured the appointment of Mr. C.R. Lambert, who had most recently been Director of Northern Territory Affairs in the Department of the Interior.[33] Lambert, an accountant by profession, had spent the greater part of his senior career working in the areas of rural development and reconstruction, but possessed no experience in New Guinea affairs.

Assistant Administrator

Hasluck's next step was the appointment of an Assistant Administrator, although with different functions from those proposed in Spender's 1950 policy speech.[34] It was originally intended that one or two "Deputy" Administrators should be stationed away from Port Moresby - one obvious location being Rabaul - in order to hasten decision-making and to improve co-ordination among the Districts of the Territory. Thus when applications were called in October 1950 the advertisement stated that two Deputy Administrators were required; that applications from both within and outside the Papua New Guinea public service would be considered; and that the appointees

32. Interview with Mr. W. Grainger, 13 December 1973.
33. South Pacific, loc. cit.
34. See Chapter Ten, p. 619. Spender acted on proposals that dated back to 1947, but which had previously received little attention in Canberra; the position is reviewed in a memorandum from Jones to Halligan in P.N.G.N.A. Box 186, item PD1/2, 30 May 1950.

would be required to serve "in any part of the Territory".[35] The duties were broad: "The Deputy Administrators will be required to assist the Administrator in all phases of administration." In December 1950 the Department of External Territories announced that more than 100 applications had been received and that several candidates were being interviewed.[36] This was the period, however, when Spender was engaged with other matters, and no decision was announced. Additionally, the Minister was still seeking an alternative position for Murray; the Pacific Islands Monthly, quoting "influential circles" in Canberra, reported that the appointments would be delayed "pending some clarification of the Administrator's powers and authority".[37]

Mr. D.M. Cleland

There was a further delay while Hasluck reviewed the original purpose of the Deputy Administrator positions, but even so he acted relatively quickly; on 9 August 1951, less than four months after assuming the portfolio, he announced that an "Assistant Administrator" would soon take up duty in the Territory.[38] The appointee was Mr. D.M. Cleland, who had served as chief of staff in Angau during the war.[39] There were some notable departures from

35. P.I.M., Vol. 21 No. 3, October 1950, p. 113.
36. P.I.M., Vol. 21 No. 6, January 1951, p. 7.
37. Ibid.
38. South Pacific, Vol. 5 No. 7, September 1951, p. 122.
39. See Chapter Two, p. 102.

the original concept: one position was filled, rather than two, and the Assistant Administrator was to be based permanently in Port Moresby. It was not unreasonable to provide some relief for the Administrator, who was by that time clearly overburdened, but the failure to appoint a second deputy in a major centre other than Port Moresby indicated that the proposals for decentralisation of the Administration and the delegation of power had been rejected by Hasluck. On the other hand, the appointment meant that, as soon as Cleland settled in, there would be a successor to Murray ready on the spot.

The political affiliations of the new Assistant Administrator were unmistakable. He had for the preceding five years been Federal Director of the Liberal Party of Australia, after losing the by-election for Mr. Curtin's former seat of Fremantle to Mr. K. Beazley in 1945.[40] The appointment of a person with such a background to the position of Assistant Administrator, which carried with it the responsibilities of formal head of the Territory public service, may under certain circumstances have appeared a wholly political manoeuvre likely to harm the neutrality of the Administration. However, Cleland had obvious claims to the position. He had an impressive war record, having served in the Middle East and Greece,

40. The material concerning Sir Donald Cleland is drawn from South Pacific, Vol. 5 No. 7, September 1951, p. 122 and P.I.M., Vol. 22 No. 2, September 1951, p. 8

where he was awarded the M.B.E., before being promoted to the rank of Brigadier in 1942 and assuming the posts of Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General, Angau, and Chairman of the Production Control Board in New Guinea. For his services to the Territory he was made a Commander of the Order of the British Empire. He had enjoyed a reputation for efficiency while in Port Moresby and his organizing ability had gained him some credit for the Liberal Party's electoral successes in 1949 and 1951. From a certain viewpoint Cleland was what the Pacific Islands Monthly termed "the outstanding candidate".[41] Nevertheless, he brought with him no particular commitment to New Guinea development and, although a solicitor by profession, he possessed no obvious intellectual qualities that would assist him in anticipating the Territory's changing needs. These factors, coupled with his executive background, indicated that Cleland's contribution to Papua New Guinea administration was likely to be in the formal, organizational field. At the time there was a clear need for managerial skills at the upper levels of the Administration, particularly in some of the major developmental departments,[42] but they could be fully employed only if there were direction from some superior authority concerning the strategy and programmes to be followed. Murray had been denied this role, and so it became inevitable that instructions would have to be

41. P.I.M., loc. cit.
42. See Chapters Seven and Eight for particular problems in the Departments of Education and Agriculture, respectively.

issued from Canberra.

Murray under attack

The Cleland appointment placed Murray in an even more uncomfortable situation. The Assistant Administrator's political sympathies were well known and it was widely - and in this case correctly - rumoured that he had been one of the applicants in 1945 for the position of Administrator.[43] Within the public service the belief was that Cleland would be promoted to the office of Administrator as soon as the opportunity arose.[44] Settler interests further saw his appointment, simultaneously with those of Lonergan and Jones, as a counter to some of the changes which had occurred since the war. The Pacific Islands Monthly quoted "a private note from an old resident of New Britain":[45]

> I take it that Mr. Cleland may be able to act as a brake on too much administrative idealism and that he and Jones (fast friends during later Angau days) will work together. But the thing is, is it too late to bring about the required reforms and tighten up? The rot among natives has gone far - very far - and that goes for /District/ Services, as they are so much affected by the slackness, sloth, general distaste for work and lack of real interest in native welfare that a come-back will be hard to stage.

Moreover, during the preceding few months the magazine had begun a campaign against Murray personally, a notable

43. See Chapter Three, pp. 172-3.
44. Interview with Mr. W. Grainger, 13 December 1973.
45. P.I.M., Vol. 22 No. 2, September 1951, p. 10.

change from earlier years, when Robson's attacks had been aimed more broadly, at the "Socialist" or "Wardist" "regime". The criticism was at first fairly moderate; in November 1950, Robson complained at the delay in carrying out Spender's promises of decentralisation, noting that matters had still to be referred to "the inevitable Mr. Reg. Halligan" for decision, then continuing:[46]

> I would place the blame mostly upon the present Administrator - a most worthy professor, who has had no experience whatever in this kind of turbid and turgid organization, who is too much of a gentleman to do the obvious, necessary things, and who is the South Pacific's outstanding example of a round peg in a hole that has become painfully square (sic).

By January 1951 the attack had become more pointed. Robson reported that a delegation from the Territory public service, while petitioning the Minister in Canberra, had been told by Spender that many matters being referred to him should have been dealt with in Port Moresby.[47] Robson termed the decision-making process "vicious", maintaining that it made the Minister appear ridiculous. He continued:

> It is quite well known that both Mr. Spender and his Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Mr. Howse, are looking on, in apparent helplessness, while Mr. Spender's much-lauded Territories Policy of last May (sic) is rendered more or less nugatory by the fumbling, inexperienced hands of the Ward-appointed Administrator, Colonel J.K. Murray.

According to Robson, Murray was allowed to remain in office

46. P.I.M., Vol. 21 No. 4, November 1950, p. 103.
47. The material in this and the following passage, including quotations, is drawn from P.I.M., Vol. 21 No. 6, January 1951, p. 6.

only because his term had been extended to mid-1954 by the Labor government. "Further, Colonel Murray is a courteous and completely sincere gentleman, who is manifestly doing his best, and Mr. Spender presumably shrinks from harsh measures. But Colonel Murray is so clearly a misfit in the Administratorship that it is most unfair that the Territories, and the Minister's own record, should be made to suffer by that final act of unadulterated Ward-ism." Significantly, the article concluded by suggesting that Murray's appointment should be terminated, like that of Mr. C.W. Frost, the former Labor Minister for Repatriation, who had been relieved of his post as High Commissioner to Ceylon by the Menzies government.

With the appointment of Cleland, the Pacific Islands Monthly shifted its emphasis, so that by April 1952 one of Robson's editorials was headed, "The Hasluck-Cleland Driving Force in Papua-New Guinea".[48] It maintained that the new Minister was "promoting the establishment of new industries" in the Territory and was being "ably supported by Assistant Administrator D.M. Cleland". Murray was not mentioned. Nevertheless, the government still lacked an obvious case, other than one based wholly on political grounds, for removing the Administrator. By 1952 Murray had considerable experience in his position; his competence was not seriously questioned other than in the settlers' press, which had never produced

48. P.I.M., Vol. 22 No. 9, April 1952, p. 11.

evidence of Murray's personal inefficiency; and his formal qualifications were, if anything, more than ever relevant to Papua New Guinea development. Moreover, an awkward situation had been created following the explosion and eruption of Mount Lamington, in the Northern District of Papua, in January 1951.

Mount Lamington eruption

The Mount Lamington eruption was a major disaster, resulting in the deaths of more than 3,000 people.[49] The volcano, which lies well to the south of the volcanic ring which runs through the New Guinea islands, was thought to be extinct. Some two days before the major eruption, it had rumbled ominously and given off clouds of smoke, but Mr. Chief Justice Phillips, who was acting Administrator during Murray's absence on one of his tours of the Territory, had decided that there was no immediate danger. On 18 January the volcano erupted from its cone, causing

49. A summary of events is in P.I.M., Vol. 21 No. 7, February 1951, pp. 11, 17-20, 102-3 and assessments of effects on villagers in F.M. Keesing, The Papuan Orokaiva versus Mount Lamington, op. cit. and C.S. Belshaw, Resettlement in the Mount Lamington Area, both Port Moresby, typescript, 1951. One or two aspects of white reaction are worth noting. The Pacific Islands Monthly sub-headed its report, "Over 30 Europeans and 4,000 Natives Killed" (loc. cit.). Subsequently, there was opposition among Europeans in Lae to the relief fund for the Higaturu area, partly because of the "Administrator's insistence that there should be no appeal for the assistance of Europeans only", while a letter from "Old Planter", of Lae, suggested that the villagers were being "mollycoddled" (P.I.M., Vol. 21 No. 8, March 1951, pp. 85, 102). Murray was later given a set of A.B.C. recordings of his radio talks and interviews about the disaster; he offered to give them to me because he "could never bear to play them" (interview of 14 December 1966).

many villagers to flee from the area. Then on Sunday morning 21 January the side of the mountain was blown out in a massive explosion which, coupled with "glowing clouds" of white-hot gas, killed all living things in an eight-mile radius. Many officials, including Murray, arrived in the area and made what was generally acknowledged as an outstanding effort in assisting the people. Murray was deeply shocked by the disaster, which he has termed "the one thing I could never forget",[50] going with very little sleep for several days and working constantly alongside his junior staff.[51]

There were soon demands for an inquiry into the lack of action in evacuating the area once the first warning signs had appeared. Criticism was levelled at Phillips, who had full formal responsibility at the time, and in February the Minister was forced to issue a statement defending the Chief Justice.[52] Under the circumstances, any move against Murray during the early months of Hasluck's term as Minister could very easily have been interpreted as victimisation. Nevertheless, the government was very grudging in its acknowledgement of the Administration's rescue work, and none of the officers who went into the area after the major explosion was included among the fourteen individuals who later received awards for their

50. Murray interview, 14 December 1966.
51. Discussion with Mr. W.W. Crellin, 11 November 1969.
52. S.P.P., 2 February 1951.

efforts.[53] Even the Pacific Islands Monthly suggested that there should have been some recognition of the contribution of Murray, "who was one of the first in the devastated area and who stayed there doing as much as anyone".[54]

Another interesting, though minor, sidelight on relations between Minister and Administrator was Murray's association with the Governor-General, Sir William McKell. In March 1950, following a tour of Papua New Guinea by McKell, the Murrays had been guests at Yarralumla during one of the Administrator's visits to Australia.[55] Further visits followed, and the Administrator and his wife were the Governor-General's guests, this time in an official capacity, during the Australian Jubilee celebrations in mid-1951.[56] This happened to be the occasion of Murray's first discussions with Hasluck, and it may have disconcerted the new Minister to have a subordinate arrive for a meeting from the Governor-General's residence. However, there were no further attempts to entice the Administrator away from Port Moresby with alternative appointments. Rather, he was made to feel increasingly uncomfortable, with Cleland playing an important role in the operation.

53. The only Territory public servant to receive an award had been in the area at the time of the explosion. Two Papuans employed by the Administration received awards. Three went to Qantas pilots who flew surveys of the Mount Lamington crater. (P.I.M., Vol. 22 No. 10, May 1952, p. 37).
54. Ibid., p. 38.
55. Sydney Daily Telegraph, 17 March 1950.
56. P.I.M., Vol. 21 No. 12, July 1951, p. 7.

Murray and Cleland

During his last few months in Papua New Guinea, Murray's relations with his Assistant Administrator were, as always, entirely correct, but an underlying tension was apparent from the outset. Immediately upon his arrival in Port Moresby, for example, Cleland suggested disingenuously that he should not use his Army rank of Brigadier.[57] Murray replied that, since the Administrator's commission had originally been published with Murray's rank shown, then the same procedure would be in order for the Assistant Administrator.[58] Cleland's status was given further emphasis by administrative adjustments ordered by the Minister. Cleland became head of the new Department of the Administrator, in which capacity he superseded the Government Secretary as head of the public service. The Assistant Administrator's position carried with it a higher salary, a larger entertainment allowance and better housing conditions than those enjoyed by other heads of departments, so that in these respects Cleland was on a par with the Supreme Court judges, and in the administrative sphere was clearly a powerful figure.[59] All department heads were made responsible to the Assistant Administrator in the first instance; and he, rather than the Chief Justice, assumed the responsibilities of acting

57. P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, item GH1-3-3, 20 August 1951.
58. Ibid., 25 August 1951.
59. Ibid., 13 July 1951.

Administrator during Murray's absences from Port Moresby. In other circumstances, Cleland should have been the Administrator's main executive officer, but in addition to the uncertainties that Murray now felt about his own position, a situation developed around Cleland that tended to isolate Murray from his own service.

The Minister's directions on the role of the Assistant Administrator were far from explicit. Cleland was to assist the Administrator; to be responsible to him for the "co-ordination and promotion of development policies"; and to advise him "generally".[60] According to Hasluck, the Territory's District Commissioners needed a senior official to whom they could refer matters concerning the agency functions they performed on behalf of other departments. However, he concluded, "This appointment does not alter in any way the character of the office of Administrator." This could not be true since, apart from the personal and political factors involved, the Assistant Administrator's position as permanent head of the Department of the Administrator had two undesirable effects on the structure of the Administration. Firstly, it placed the Government Secretary under the control of the Assistant Administrator, leaving the Administrator with no executive staff of any kind and attenuating the decision-making chain even further. Secondly, it added the

60. This and the following passage are drawn from ibid., 9 August 1951.

Department of the Administrator to the other two key administrative agencies - the Departments of the Government Secretary and District Services - and thereby increased, rather than reduced, problems of administrative co-ordination.[61] This was a contrived arrangement to ensure that Cleland was available to replace Murray, a fact which became obvious when the Assistant Administrator's position was left vacant for two years after Murray's departure.[62] Murray made little comment on the situation; in a letter welcoming Cleland and setting out the "character of the service", he merely remarked drily that in many other colonies the co-ordination of programmes was the responsibility of a Secretariat.[63] The administrative situation had by then become so complex that when Cleland embarked on his first visit outside Port Moresby he found it necessary to advise the District Commissioner at Daru that he did not wish to "usurp" the functions of the Government Secretary and that for all practical purposes the District Commissioner should continue to work through the Department of the Government Secretary when dealing with agency functions performed for other departments.[64]

61. The relationship between these agencies is noted in Chapter Six, pp. 360-3.
62. The Department of the Administrator continued in being, but it was not until July 1954 that Mr. Rupert Wilson was seconded from his position of a Treasury Assistant Secretary in Canberra to the Assistant Administratorship. He remained for only two years and his successor, also on secondment, stayed for only a few days! The role of Assistant Administrator finally achieved some purpose with the appointment of Dr. John Gunther in 1956.
63. P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, item GH1-3-3, 25 August 1951.
64. Ibid., 19 September 1951.

Murray was particularly concerned at Cleland's attitude towards his responsibilities as a Territory public servant. Two episodes which remained in Murray's mind were Cleland's inspection of the Department of Education's headquarters in the absence of its Director, Mr. Groves, and a report to Canberra by Cleland on certain senior officers, who were not given the opportunity by the Assistant Administrator to comment on his assessment of their work.[65] Dr. Gunther recalls that, during the Administrator's absences from Port Moresby, Cleland followed the precedent established by Chief Justice Phillips of moving into Murray's office.[66] On one of these occasions Cleland apparently forgot to remove copies of confidential personal letters to the Minister from the drawer of the Administrator's desk; when Murray found them he was furious and, according to Gunther, "carpeted Cleland for going behind his back". Following this episode, Murray directed Cleland to hold formal discussions with him in order to establish the status of the Assistant Administrator's position.[67] Murray again pointed out that the administrative structure created in 1951 was probably "unique" in colonial government, involving as it did an Administrator, an Assistant Administrator, a Government Secretary and an Official Secretary to the Administrator; and added that the problems of control and communication would have to

65. Murray interview, 14 December 1966.
66. This and the following passage are drawn from an interview with Dr. Gunther, 4 December 1968.
67. This and the following passage are drawn from P.N.G.N.A. Box 887, item GH47-13, 25 January 1952.

be solved by personal discussion if further confusion were to be avoided. Murray re-stated the functions of the Assistant Administrator, as prescribed by the Minister, and concluded an otherwise mild letter with the direct order, "Unless by direction of the Minister or the Administrator, there should not be correspondence to the Minister or to the Secretary of the Department other than in the Administrator's name and office.[68]

Future of Rabaul

By early 1952 relations between the Administrator and his senior executive had deteriorated sharply and Murray's own position was in jeopardy. He nevertheless continued to adopt an independent stance, although he was aware that the Minister needed no ecouragement to remove him. Two issues were of particular significance: the siting of Rabaul township and the question of an exchange visit with the Governor of Netherlands New Guinea. As in several of his other disagreements with the authorities in Australia, Murray's position was affected by his attitude towards questions of protocol and the status of the Administrator's office.

The question of Rabaul's future had remained unsettled since 1946, when the Labor government had first decided that the township should be moved, owing to the danger from

68. The emphasis appears in the original.

the volcanoes surrounding it.[69] After several years of correspondence, studies and plans had produced no decision from Canberra, Murray, in an effort to secure action from the Liberal-Country Party government, requested Cleland to visit the area and prepare a report on the situation there.[70] However, the Assistant Administrator's study merely clouded the issue further by recommending that much of the township should be moved, but that the harbour facilities should remain on their old site. In the meantime, the Australian budget of 1951/52 had reduced the Territory works programme for the year,[71] so that it became impossible to finance the move; the fact that the great majority of Rabaul's white community opposed the transfer also influenced the final decision.[72] The government then determined, against the advice of the Territory Executive Council, that Rabaul should continue as the main centre in New Britain, whereupon Murray, incensed at what he has

69. The early records of the debate over Rabaul are in P.N.G.N.A. Box 185, item GH26/3, January-March 1946. The initial decision was endorsed in 1948, when financial provision was included in the 1948/49 works programme (CRS A518, item A241/3/1, 9 April and 21 August 1948). There was disagreement as to the most suitable site, however, and further reports were prepared, still without producing results. There is a voluminous correspondence on the matter in P.N.G.N.A. Box 164, items 44/4/4/4 and 44/4/4/9.
70. Cleland's report is in P.N.G.N.A. Box 164, item 44/4/4/4, 4 February 1952.
71. CRS A518, item A241/3/1, 13 November 1951.
72. Murray notes, p. 66. See also P.I.N., Vol. 20 No. 10, May 1950, pp. 56-8 and Vol. 21 No. 10, May 1951, p. 11, when the magazine noted, following the eruption of Mount Lamington, "If there are any residents still unconvinced on this matter they should take a walk through Higaturu and the adjoining villages." In fact, the Rabaul cones are unlikely to explode, but they could erupt at short notice, with severe consequences for the town and its residents.

termed "one of the worst rejections of the Territory Administration's recommendations in my time", appealed directly to the Prime Minister.[73] The Administrator did not have the formal authority to make such representations, so that this episode, together with his earlier interview with Mr. Fadden concerning the future of his appointment, suggested once more that Murray was reluctant to accept his status as invariably subordinate to that of the Minister for Territories.[74]

Hollandia visit

The issue of Murray's proposed visit to Netherlands New Guinea was of minor importance compared with the fate of Rabaul, but it brought a sharp, direct rebuke from Hasluck. Murray, who had been constantly thwarted in his desire to arrange staff exchanges with other colonies, wished at least to establish some contact with the Dutch authorities to the West. The first official approach was made by the newly-appointed Dutch Governor, Mr. S. van Waardenburg, in early 1950,[75] but the Australian government

73. Murray notes, pp. 67-8. The Executive Council recommendation was unanimous. Murray was annoyed less by the rejection itself, since he had become accustomed to such actions by the government, than by its possible consequences: "I hope, indeed, that it is not paid for by ultimate disaster" (Murray notes, p. 68).
74. See Chapter Nine, pp. 527-9 for details of Murray's representations to Ward on the rights conferred on the Administrator by the Papua-New Guinea Provisional Administration Act (whose provisions remained unchanged in 1949). See also Chapter Ten, p. 611 concerning Murray's interview with Fadden.
75. P.N.G.N.A. Box 887, item GH47/1, 15 February 1950.

was reluctant to agree to direct contacts being established between Port Moresby and Hollandia, owing to the tensions surrounding Indonesian claims to the Dutch possession.[76] In May 1951, however, a "survey party" of officials from Papua New Guinea flew to Hollandia and it was eventually agreed that van Waardenburg should visit Port Moresby, which he did from 7 to 10 November 1951.[77] Murray wished to return the visit as soon as possible and sought permission from Canberra on two separate occasions to make the journey to Hollandia in the New Year. He was fobbed off on each occasion: a greater interval should pass between visits; the Assistant Administrator had to tour outlying districts of the Australian Territory.[78] Murray then wrote directly to van Waardenburg, suggesting February 1952 as a suitable time.[79] When the Minister learned of this proposal he cabled Murray, "Your precipitate communication with Hollandia in disregard of my suggestions for delay have created awkward situation." The Administrator was to have no further communication with "representatives of other governments" without Hasluck's specific approval. The Minister and the Department of External Affairs both considered an early return visit to be "undesirable".[80] At no time during this exchange was Murray given any reason for the government's attitude; and being unwilling to accept such offhanded treatment, he contested the Minister's

76. Ibid., 9 November 1950.
77. Ibid., 26 May and 6 and 22 November 1951.
78. P.N.G.N.A. Box 164, item 1/6/1/15, 11 November and 20 December 1951.
79. Ibid., 11 December 1951.
80. The foregoing passage is drawn from ibid., 8 January 1952.

conclusions, as he had with Spender over the issue of the U.N. Visiting Mission.[81] He replied, "It may be that such visits should be regarded as conventional. To regard them as being otherwise, even in the rather tense present situation, would appear to convert a conventional procedure into one having a political import."[82] No reply to this rather sophisticated reasoning appears on the file, but if Murray had the last word on the issue, it was to be his final gesture.

Murray is dismissed

Murray had arranged to go on leave in March 1952, intending to be away for several months. In six years and five months of service, he had taken only four months leave, compared with the usual entitlement of nine months, and had not been on holiday outside the Territory for almost four years.[83] By the time of his departure on 3 March 1952 he was, he says, "very tired; they were the hardest years I had ever spent".[84] Dr. Ian Hogbin recalls seeing the Murrays a few days before they left; unlike the previous occasions when he had been a guest at Government House, Hogbin thought Murray depressed, for although he had no thought of being removed from office, he had been subjected to great pressure from Canberra and

81. See Chapter Ten, pp. 607-9.
82. P.N.G.N.A. Box 164, item 1/6/1/15, 9 January 1952.
83. The information is contained in an unreferenced letter dated 5 June 1952 from Cleland to Lambert.
84. Murray interview, 14 December 1966.

even suggested to Hogbin that he was being "put on the skids".[85] During the next few weeks, however, he and Mrs. Murray visited Tasmania and, upon his return to Queensland to spend the remainder of his leave, Murray felt refreshed and fully prepared to resume duty in June.[86]

In Murray's absence from Port Moresby, final preparations for his dismissal had been completed. On 30 April 1952 Cabinet approved the Minister's recommendation that Murray's appointment be terminated and on the following day legal advice was received that dismissal was in order, under the terms of the Papua and New Guinea Act.[87] Murray was advised by letter on 2 May, despite the fact that the formal recommendation to the Governor-General was not made until 5 May, nor approved by him until 8 May. In the meantime, Murray had written a non-committal note acknowledging his dismissal, which was to take effect on 30 June 1952. He was to receive an ex gratia payment of £5,000 in lieu of salary for the remaining two years of his original term of appointment.[88] It soon became clear that he could expect little else from the government.

On 8 May the Minister instructed Lambert to draft a statement of about 150 words announcing Murray's departure and reviewing his term as Administrator.[89] Hasluck's

85. Hogbin interview, 21 December 1973.
86. Murray interview, 14 December 1966.
87. This and the following passage are drawn from CRS A518, item D800/1/7, 1 May 1952.
88. The Administrator's salary had been increased to £2,500 from 1 July 1950 (P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, item 1-3-1, 1 July 1950).
89. CRS A518, item D800/1/7, 8 May 1952.

minute suggested, "We need not say he was responsible for all of [the main changes and achievements] but we can at least give him what credit is due from the fact that they happened while he was Administrator." Thus began what one former officer of the Department of External Territories has described as the "re-writing of history" that occurred during Hasluck's term as Minister.[90] The press statement, released on 10 May, simply noted that Murray would "relinquish" his position, then concentrated on the immediate post-war period: "Colonel Murray's term had been largely one of restoration and re-establishment following war devastation."[91] The "notable features" of Murray's term were, according to the statement, the amalgamation of the Territories and their public service and the inauguration of the Legislative Council, all of which had clearly been inevitable. No mention was made of the welfare policy, of agricultural extension, local government, co-operatives or attempts at economic planning; far less of Murray's humanitarianism and his struggle against racist attitudes: merely that "the re-establishment work done during his period of office had laid the foundations and helped to shape the course of policy". During the following weeks it became even clearer that conditions would be made difficult for Murray until he was safely out of the way. He was made to pay for official cars he had used to inspect agricultural research stations in Tasmania while on leave there; and, more seriously, was denied payment in lieu of long-service leave for his

90. Interview with Mr. W. Grainger, 13 December 1973.
91. CRS A452, item 61/5207, 10 May 1952.

term as Administrator.[92] The Public Service Ordinance of 1951 made provision for long-service leave at the rate of three months after each six years of service, but this had not been the case in 1945, so that Murray's original letter of appointment, which remained unchanged when his five-year term began in 1949, made no mention of it. However, as Murray pointed out in a letter to Lambert, "the granting of long leave to Lieutenant Governors and Administrators was an established practice [before the war] based on the not unreasonable supposition that those public officers required long leave in much the same way as the members of the Civil Services which they controlled."[93] The Minister determined, however, that in view of the "generosity" which had been shown Murray, no long-service leave would be granted. It is difficult to interpret this decision as other than an act of spite.

Emotional farewells

It now remained for Murray to determine the manner of his going. There would be a minimum of embarrassment for the government, and presumably for Murray himself, if he simply remained in Australia and had his personal effects packed by staff in Port Moresby, for despatch to Brisbane. On the other hand, it was foreign to Murray's

92. This and the following passage are based on papers in my possession.
93. This and the following passage are based on letters of 10 and 30 June 1952, respectively. Long leave was granted retrospectively to all other staff who joined the service between 1945 and 1951.

character to behave as if he were in any way ashamed of what had occurred. On 8 June 1952 he therefore returned to Port Moresby to complete his term. Then, in order to make his attitude towards the situation abundantly clear, he requested Canberra's permission to make a farewell tour of some two weeks throughout the Territory.[94] The Department of Territories suggested some amendments to his itinerary, but was in no position to reject Murray's proposal, since the Minister still wished to preserve the fiction that Murray was leaving of his own accord. In the meantime a "J.K. Murray Fund" had been launched by a circular letter, on Government House notepaper and bearing Cleland's signature, inviting public subscriptions.[95] While these collections were being made, the Murrays proceeded on a round of public receptions in the main centres of the Territory, with police guards of honour, meetings with village elders, and official dinners and other, larger social gatherings.[96] The Territory's Europeans, and particularly its public servants, now felt closer to Murray, the victim of Canberra omnipotence, than they ever had to Murray the Administrator; and perhaps a little guilty as well. They, together with people from nearby villages, flocked to functions held in the various towns. There was a crowd at Sogeri, in the hills above Port Moresby, to witness Murray's final parade as Commandant of the Royal Papua and New Guinea

94. P.N.G.N.A. Box 167, item 1-8-17, 10 June 1952.
95. P.N.G.N.A. Box 167, item 1-8-18, 16 May 1952.
96. For reports of these events, see S.P.P., 13 June and 4 July 1952.

Constabulary,[97] while the presentation from the public appeal, which had yielded £631-9-9, was made in full colonial splendour at the Konedobu Club, bastion of the "old-timers" of the public service. As the Murrays prepared to leave for Australia by ship, it appeared as if New Guinea's whites and Colonel Murray had finally come to terms with each other.

While Murray had been turning an ignominious departure into a round of tributes, his dismissal was the subject of several protests to the government. The first of these was made by Mr. Ward in the House of Representatives, when he accused the Minister of victimising Murray because he was a Labor appointee.[98] Ward gave an accurate summary of events of the preceding two years, maintaining that Spender had attempted to make Murray's position untenable and that the Administrator had disagreed with the efforts of the Liberal-Country Party government to change the emphasis of New Guinea development in favour of white interests. However, Ward destroyed his case by implying that Labor would, in turn, dismiss a non-Labor appointee. The only reason given by Hasluck, in reply, for the termination of Murray's appointment was that at 63 he was considered "rather advanced" in age for further tropical service.

97. P.N.G.N.A. Box 162, item 1-2-17, 3 July 1952.
98. This and the following passage are drawn from C.P.D., Vol. 217, pp. 442, 453, 15 May 1952.

It was left to the Territory's missionaries to show that the defence of Murray was more than a political gambit. In June the Kwato mission protested to the Governor-General at the dismissal; the National Missionary Council passed a resolution calling for his reinstatement; and the Anglican Bishop of New Guinea appealed to the Prime Minister, stating that the removal of Murray was a "disservice to New Guinea".[99] Bishop Strong was particularly scathing about Hasluck's reference to Murray's age:[100]

> Those of us who have witnessed his great physical and mental energy and one like myself who saw his courage and physical endurance last year in the days following the eruption of Mount Lamington are amazed and unimpressed by this suggestion. We are asked to believe that this man whom we have seen to be indefatigable in his work and travels is incapable on account of age of continuing his term of office until 1954.

The Bishop feared that Murray's dismissal would make the Administrator's office "more than ever the pawn of rival political parties", and that it would result in reduced emphasis on village welfare. Unfortunately, in this as in other issues of earlier years, Murray's supporters tended to harm rather than help him, merely by being associated in his defence; this, at least, was the way in which the controversy was viewed by the Minister. Stung by the missionaries' criticisms, Hasluck replied that the Administration's efficiency would be "improved" by the removal of Murray.[101] He also emphasised that there

99. P.I.M., Vol. 22 No. 11, June 1952, p. 121.
100. S.P.P., 13 June 1952.
101. S.P.P., 20 June 1952. The statement was released on 11 June.

would be no change in the policy of promoting the welfare of the villagers. Then some three weeks later, on 3 July, he made a second statement, apparently in answer to reporters' questions about Murray's effect on the efficiency of the Administration.[102] Hasluck maintained that he was being "forced to say in public what I would rather have left unsaid": namely, that Murray's capacity was "not adequate" for the job of Administrator. He had, Hasluck said, decided to dismiss Murray only after "twelve months careful observation".

Murray's attack

Until this time Murray had made no public comment, even though he had been shocked by the abruptness of the dismissal and the fact that the Minister had not even had the courtesy to convey his decision to Murray personally.[103] Even the Pacific Islands Monthly, in its June issue, was forced to admit that Murray had "refused to allow himself to be used by the muck-raking politicians. He conducted himself in trying circumstances with dignity and restraint... Even his Territories critics will remember him with respect

102. This and the following passage are drawn from S.P.P., 4 July 1952.
103. These were not Murray's exact words (interview of 14 December 1966), but this was the impression he conveyed; certainly, an action of this kind would have been completely foreign to his own concepts of the courtesy, honesty and courage required of a man in a position of authority. Mr. V.H. Parkinson (talk of 3 January 1974) recalls that Lambert was considerably disturbed at the manner in which Murray was dismissed.

and esteem."[104] Hasluck's statement he considered to be provocative, however, particularly in view of Murray's own reticence on the issue of his dismissal.[105] It was also to be expected that he was moved by the reception he and Mrs. Murray had received during the farewell tour, but even then he may not have replied to Hasluck's most recent allegations had it not been for the circumstances of his departure from Port Moresby. This, by all accounts, was an emotional occasion. The Murrays were to leave aboard the M.V. Bulolo on 9 July. Shortly before the ship sailed, hundreds of people had gathered at the wharf, the Murrays had been garlanded with leis of frangipani by representatives from Hanuabada village, the Royal Papua and New Guinea Constabulary Band was there, and, according to the South Pacific Post, a thousand people sang "Auld Lang Syne" to the accompaniment of the band.[106] Shortly before the ship sailed, Murray was asked by the editor of the Post if he had a final statement to make. Murray then gave way to his pent-up feelings and answered the editor's questions in an uncharacteristic manner. Murray later said that he had not expected all of his comments to be reported, but this would have been a naive hope,

104. P.I.M., Vol. 22 No. 11, June 1952, p. 121. At the time, Robson was pleased that Murray had not given more ammunition to Ward; the "muck-raking politicians" were not intended to include Hasluck. Robson's attitude was that Murray was immune to direct attack so long as he failed to defend himself. Following Murray's statement upon his departure from Port Moresby (see below), Robson made a bitter attack on him (P.I.M., Vol. 23 No. 1, August 1952, pp. 43-5, 47-9, 83).
105. Again, these were not Murray's words, but his feelings were clear (interview of 14 December 1966).
106. S.P.P., 11 July 1952.

under the circumstances. In any event, the South Pacific Post's next issue carried the lead story that Murray had termed Hasluck's latest comments on the dismissal affair "absurd and a gross impertinence".[107] He said that he had been under pressure to leave the Territory ever since the Menzies government had come to power, predicting that the policy on village welfare would be changed after his departure and that Canberra control of New Guinea affairs would increase. He regretted leaving the Territory, but professed relief at being able to "escape the methods and manners of the Minister and some of his senior departmental officers." Murray said that Hasluck, before criticising the Territory Administration, should first put his own house in order, and gave several examples of what he termed "unpardonable delays in Canberra". Murray was also critical of Canberra's disallowing Ordinances that had been passed by the Territory Legislative Council and approved by the Administrator, suggesting that such vetos had sometimes been influenced by "Australian pressure groups". He suggested that Australia would have problems in New Guinea if social and political development were allowed to lag behind economic change; and urged the government to grant the Administration "a much greater measure of decentralised power". As the South Pacific Post observed with unconscious irony, it was one of the most impressive farewells since the war.

107. This and the following passage are drawn from ibid.

Hasluck exerts authority: pattern of the future

Murray's statement, including his claim that he had been subjected to a "war of nerves" by Canberra, appeared in Australian newspapers the day after it was made, causing the Minister a good deal of concern. Hasluck did not reply at once, presumably because he was waiting to see whether Murray made any more specific allegations. It was typical of Murray, however, that having departed momentarily from his detached stance, he felt unable to enter into controversy for its own sake. This provided Hasluck with the perfect opportunity to answer Murray's case, which he did in signed newspaper articles in early August.[108] The articles are of interest less for their review of events - Murray is not even mentioned by name in them - than for the fact that they provide an exact, unabashed, patronising account of the way in which Papua New Guinea was to be subordinated to Canberra's wishes for the next twenty years. In the first of his articles the Minister concentrated on the constitutional situation of the Territory and its Administrator:[109]

> Governments encourage Administrators to "do the honours" properly, but sometimes this leads to unexpected consequences. It needs a very level head and practical outlook to avoid confusion in the duties of the post. The greater part of the allegations of "remote control" from Canberra do not concern any interference with the exercise of the powers delegated to an Administrator but a confused view of what the office of Administrator

108. Sydney Morning Herald, 4 and 5 August 1952; South Pacific Post, 11 and 18 August 1952.
109. Sydney Morning Herald, 4 August 1952.

> really is. For example, some critics complained of the dis-allowances of Ordinances by "Canberra", as though the Administrator ought to have the final word. Yet...the responsibility rests squarely on the Governor-General (which means in practice the Federal Executive Council acting on a recommendation from the Minister for Territories)...In fact... everything that the Administration does in Papua and New Guinea is done on behalf of the Australian Government in pursuance of a policy laid down by the Government...and with funds provided in a large part by the Australian taxpayer...The policy of the Government is to encourage the Territorial Administration to do more and more on the spot but for the time being the delegations are necessarily limited to administrative action. The immediate need is for administrative efficiency rather than constitutional dream castles.

These statements entirely misrepresented the situation. Murray had not contested the formal allocation of power, but the manner in which it had been exercised: ignorantly, insensitively and tardily. To Murray the Administrator had the duty to represent the interests of the villagers of Papua New Guinea, in a constructive, not a paternalistic manner. In the sense that Hasluck saw the Administrator as nothing more than the agent of the Minister and his Department, he had no alternative but to dismiss Murray. In doing so, he ensured that the Papua New Guinea Administration would be limited in flexibility and initiative. This mattered only to the villagers, until the confrontations of the 1960's - over the Hahalis movement of Buka, the Mataungan Association of the Gazelle Peninsula, the land rights of the Bougainville people and the movement to self-government - showed Australia's efforts at colonial government to be rigid and ineffectual.[110]

110. For accounts of these issues see Peter Hastings, New Guinea: Problems and Prospects, Melbourne, Cheshire,

All of these events belong in a further study. But I suspect that study will show that, had Murray's approach been adopted by Ministers, Administrators and senior officials, then and in later years, Papua New Guinea's progress to independence would have been smoother and more rapid.

CONCLUSION

PART I - POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND COLONEL MURRAY

Prevailing opinions - Policy: aims and origins Policy and the Provisional Administration - The role of J.K. Murray - Administration of policy: formal organization - Informal networks - Recruitment and training - An end to planning

Prevailing opinions

Any assessment of Australian post-war policy and administration in Papua New Guinea, and particularl of Colonel Murray's role during the period, must take into account the views that have come to be generally accepted since that time. Apart from wholly partisan statements, the two more or less contemporary accounts - Mair's Australia in New Guinea, published in 1948, and Stanner's The South Seas in Transition, published in 1953[1] - express divergent opinions. Mair was confident that an essentially new policy had

1. Op. cit.

been introduced and fairly optimistic that it would succeed. Stanner was able to review the blunders of the post-war years in criticising the Labor government's "well-meant but tactless humanitarianism".[2] The next book on the Territory - Legge's Australian Colonial Policy, published in 1956 - was primarily an account of Papuan administration before World War 2. Its summary of post-war events was inconclusive: the record was "by no means a negligible one"; but the "post-war period did not...present a complete and dramatic departure from the general goals of the past".[3]

Legge's was the last discussion of the post-war period for many years. Studies published in the 1960's, particularly by such journalists as Hastings and Ryan,[4] concentrated on contemporary events. Although often critical of Liberal-Country Party policy, they tended to treat it in isolation; there was an assumption in these writings that the important features of Papua New Guinea development dated from 1949, or even from the beginning of the Hasluck era in 1951. Thus it was only a matter of time before a summary of the country's history would include a passage maintaining, "At the end of 1949...

2. Stanner, Transition, op. cit., p. 103.
3. Legge, op. cit., p. 225.
4. Hastings, New Guinea: Problems and Prospects, op. cit. and Ryan, The Hot Land, op. cit.

a new Australian government...was voted into office, and a change in the official policy towards Papua and New Guinea soon became evident...Under the new policy the old notion that Papua and New Guinea should be self-supporting was abandoned...."[5]

Predictably, Colonel Murray has received even less attention than the post-war period as a whole. In the accounts by Stanner and Mander,[6] his name is not even mentioned in the text. Mair was clearly impressed by Murray, although certain passages in her book were inaccurate and on other occasions she was given to over-statement. She maintained, incorrectly, that Murray was "offered" the post of Administrator, and was exaggerating when she claimed that he faced "active opposition" from "most of the senior members of the Public Service".[7] Mair stated, more accurately, that Murray's "indomitable spirit and uncompromising integrity" were major influences on post-war reform, but such sentiments were of the kind that provoke rejoinders. This became easier after Murray was dismissed, so that by 1956 Legge maintained that Murray's "very sincerity was a source as much of weakness as of strength, for it made it difficult for him to handle the political pressures of the situation in which he found himself".[8] This situation "required on the part of the

5. R. Langdon, "A Short History" in P. Hastings (ed.), Papua New Guinea: Prospero's Other Island, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1971, pp. 54-5.
6. Stanner, Transition, op. cit. Mander, op. cit.
7. Mair, (1948), pp. 209-10.
8. Legge, op. cit., p. 199.

Administrator, a tactical finesse which was foreign to Murray's single-minded outlook": Murray's apparent failure was largely of his own making.

The only recent attempt to set the post-war period in perspective, by E.P. Wolfers, maintains that the trend of events was determined by pre-war and wartime policies that could not achieve full expression owing to lack of finance or the exigencies of the situation:[9]

> A number of [Labor's "new deal's"] most important provisions, however, were but a continuation of A.N.G.A.U.'s ad hoc decisions during the war (the amalgamation of the two administrations, and the provision of government money for development), long-overdue reforms left over from the pre-war period, or measures designed to restore the territories to at least their pre-war level of affluence and amenities...On the other hand, a number of the reforms that were promised or implemented, bore all the marks of being no more than extensions of traditional Labor foci of domestic political interest into Australia's dependencies...In the developmental categories for government action (health, education, political and economic development)...the Labor government could do little. Throughout its period of office reconstruction and repair absorbed most of the available funds and personnel, and development had to be left to the Australian Liberal-Country Party government.

These conclusions provide an interesting standpoint for examing the information presented in this study of post-war Papua New Guinea.

Policy: aims and origins

Post-war policy for Papua New Guinea can be examined

9. E.P. Wolfers, "Trusteeship Without Trust" in F.S. Stephens (ed.), Racism, The Australian Experience: Vol. 3, Colonialism, Sydney, Australia and New Zealand Book Co., 1972, pp. 112-3.

on two different levels: firstly, whether the intention differed notably from that of the pre-war period; and secondly, whether policy evolved from basically different sources. On the first level, it can be said that the aims expressed by Ward, however vaguely, differed from those of even the "enlightened" administration of Sir Hubert Murray. At no time before World War 2 had policy involved or envisaged a shift of economic and political power from white interests to the villagers. Pre-war controls on white enterprise had been opposed because they tended to make conditions less advantageous for Europeans; but they posed no threat to the whites' dominant position. By contrast, a change in the power balance underlay every aspect of the announced post-war policy, from the proposals for government schools to the general statement that white expansion would be limited by the needs of village welfare. Certainly, the policy embodied the "long-overdue reforms" mentioned by Wolfers: and a good deal more besides. It was, contrary to Legge's claim, a "departure" from past goals, if by that term is meant a movement considerably beyond those goals: in proposing a shift of power within the colony, post-war policy set a basic objective which was qualitatively different from that of the pre-war regime. Moreover, orthodox sources played a minimal role in shaping policy for post-war New Guinea. The Department of External Territories was almost totally eclipsed in this field by the Directorate of Research, while party influences flowed not so much from

traditional domestic sympathies as from the new internationalist concerns of Dr. Evatt.

The details of the present study show, for example, that Evatt's support for the principles of the United Nations Charter was strongly reflected in the proposal for a South Seas Regional Commission; and in turn was projected into Australia's adoption of trusteeship as the active guide to its colonial policy. This move away from the aggressive, protectionist attitude towards the pre-war Mandate was hastened by the academics in the Directorate of Research, who adopted as their model the British Colonial Development and Welfare Act. Thus the two major features of post-war policy - eventual self-determination and village development through large financial grants - had their origins quite apart from domestic politics and the Australian bureaucracy.

These broad proposals were developed in several ways by Directorate personnel. Their recommendations included those by T.P. Fry for the permanent amalgamation of the Mandated Territory and Papua; the scheme which led to the establishment of the School of Civil Affairs; the reforms to the labour system proposed by Hogbin; the short- and long-term education plans outlined by Camilla Wedgewood; the assessment of agricultural development that followed Murray's potentiality survey of the islands; and Isles' advice that a new economic strategy would be needed if reforms were to be wholly effective. The Directorate's

attitude on all major questions dominated wartime planning, from the inter-departmental committee of 1944 to the Minister's statements on the restoration of civil administration and the details of the Provisional Administration Bill of mid-1945.

The major question surrounding post-war policy concerns not its origins, but the Minister's failure to spell out its details fully and publicly after the war's end. The reasons for this failure have been examined in the central section of this study, from Chapter Five to Chapter Nine. They include the Minister's very narrow interests; his Department's antagonism to the Directorate's personnel and concepts; the determination of Halligan and his staff to re-occupy their formal advisory role; their inability to carry out this role adequately; their determination, nonetheless, to block alternative sources of advice; the work pressures, conflicts, political agitation and general debility of the Territory that made it difficult for either the Department of External Territories or the Provisional Administration to give more than passing attention to policy questions; and the disruptions caused by the Minister's involvement in the Garden case and the subsequent Royal Commission. The remarkable feature of the post-war situation was not that the reformist policy lacked definition, but that it survived at all.

Policy and the Provisional Administration

It might be argued that, in the absence of further details in the years following Ward's 1945 speech, policy could not be said to exist in a practical sense. Yet a policy expressed in very broad terms is still a policy, particularly if it is followed by action consistent with its intentions. And the action which determined that the main features of the policy would persist was taken by the Prime Minister, who continued to increase the Commonwealth grants to the Territory. Nevertheless, the fact that the Territory continued to receive this level of finance owed a good deal to Colonel Murray's personal intercession with Chifley in 1947: this marked the beginning of the Provisional Administration's efforts to keep the post-war policy alive.

The Territory Administration's forays into the field of policy are one of the singular features of the post-war situation. By 1947 the colonial bureaucracy had been effectively subordinated to Canberra: through the Minister's distant relationship with his Administrator; Halligan's success in closing off Port Moresby's sources of independent policy advice; and the relegation of the Territory public service to secondary status by the Buttsworth report. Yet the Provisional Administration showed, in such key developmental areas as education, health, agricultural extension, co-operatives activity and local government, a practical commitment to the post-war policy that far exceeded that of the Department of

External Territories, or even of the government itself.

Nevertheless, there were major divisions within the Provisional Administration on the implementation of reforms. Most of the key administrative staff - notably in the Departments of the Government Secretary and District Services - had been remote from, or in opposition to, the stimulus of the Directorate, while the relatively junior officers who prpounded a changed approach (Taylor, Black, Fenbury, Millar) lacked the authority to put their plans into effect. Of the handful of public servants who favoured reforms, only Gunther was able to force the issue against the network of pre-war officers. This meant that the translation of Labor's broad aims into effective programmes, and even the survival of the post-war policy, depended heavily upon the efforts of the Administrator.

The role of J.K. Murray

No particular initiatives of the post-war period can be traced wholly to Colonel Murray, but his was the most crucial role: he transmitted the policy which he had helped shape to the officials and the people of Papua New Guinea. He had almost no effective support, but by encouraging such progressive officials as he could find he ensured that constructive steps were taken in several key areas. This is not to say that he was always successful. He had neither the knowledge of the network of pre-war officials to manipulate it with regular

success, nor the support from his superiors to force it to his wishes. In any case, these methods were foreign to Murray: rather he relied, sometimes unwisely, on the willingness of others to be persuaded into changing their views. It is also likely that Murray expected people to be more impressed by the intellectual force of the arguments supporting reform, and by the status of the Administrator's office, than they actually were. But this did not make him, as Legge suggests, "single-minded", in the sense of being inflexible. During his term as Administrator Murray learned a great deal about Papua New Guinea, as his Macrossan lectures showed. It was simply that this knowledge did not change his opinion that radical alterations should be made to the pattern of colonial life in the islands.

The main interest in Legge's criticism of Murray is his suggestion that the Administrator would have achieved more had he shown greater "tactical finesse" in handling "political pressures". During the first four years of Murray's term the political pressures came largely from settler interests and their supporters in Australia. It was Ward, not Murray, who lacked "finesse" in dealing with them; who, indeed, went out of his way to be antagonistic, leaving Murray to bear the consequences. Murray's personal relations with the settlers were always cordial, as is shown by his correspondence with them and the relative lack of criticism of the Administrator in the settler press. Murray could have gained acceptance at this level only by

agreeing to settler demands for the restoration of reactionary policies. From 1949 the strongest political pressures came from the new government, but once again Murray could have done little to improve his standing without rejecting a large part of the post-war policy; political finesse on Murray's part could only have involved compromises likely to hinder rather than advance post-war reforms.

It can still be asked whether certain aspects of Murray's character were a drawback at the time. He was a singular personality in post-war Papua New Guinea, combining scientific knowledge, liberal attitudes and administrative experience; but these very qualities set him apart from the Territory's Europeans: courteous, kindly and attentive towards them, Murray was not of them. He also had a keen sense of his own position, and this was shared by his wife. Ian Hogbin recalls being told "with approval" by Mrs. Murray that women wore gloves to Government House; this was part of the respect demanded by the Administrator's office.[10] To a degree this attitude was carried into Murray's dealings with Australian Ministers and officials: in his desire for the title of Lieutenant-Governor; his determination to express his own views on contentious issues; and his suggestion of honours for himself and Mrs. Murray when Spender first attempted to remove him from office. On balance, however, these foibles were more

10. Hogbin interview, 21 December 1973.

a reflection of Murray's desire for the recognition of Papua New Guinea than a wish for personal aggrandisement.

The final questions concern Murray's decision to take the Administrator's job in the first place, and his refusal to bow out in 1950, when the opportunity presented itself. When the position was advertised in 1945 Conlon said, only half in jest, that the first Administrator would "either be broken or commit suicide".[11] Had the appointment been decided after Conlon's fall from power it would obviously not have gone to Murray, but once it was offered to him he was irrevocably committed; if Murray had backed out at that stage he would have been deserting his colleagues, just as most of them were to abandon the cause of post-war reform. Murray also hoped that he could gain an extension of his war-time secondment from the university; when secondment was refused, he was wholly committed to Papua New Guinea. Murray was caught up in the rush of events in mid-1945: from a certain viewpoint, he was fortunate in not having to return to a relatively quiet existence after the stimulation of the war years. However, he did not suspect that the vigour of the Directorate would be succeeded so quickly by the apathy and ignorance of Halligan and his Department.

When asked why he had not left Papua New Guinea when offered alternative appointments by Spender, Colonel Murray replied simply that he could see no reason to do so: "I

11. Hogbin interview, 21 December 1973.

thought I was doing a good job."[12] While not refusing the offers made to him, Murray set conditions for acceptance that would have amounted to an implicit endorsement of the post-war effort in the Territory. Once these were refused, it was merely a matter of time before Murray was removed from office; the white community sensed this, and by 1951 the feeling in Port Moresby was that he "hadn't a friend in the town".[13] However, Murray made no attempt to ingratiate himself with the government. This attitude may have suggested - as it did to Legge - stubbornness and a lack of perception. But Murray was fully aware of what he later termed the "war of nerves" against him; in an old-fashioned and sometimes unworldly manner he was governed by principles, and it was his misfortune, and Papua New Guinea's, that these were shared by so few others.

In all, Murray as Administrator was more interested in, and more at ease with the villagers of Papua New Guinea than the white community. The truest measure of his effectiveness could have been gained from the people, but their views were ignored. Yet they were not unaware of the events and conflicts that surrounded them. Murray's meetings with councillors at Government House and his support for the rebuilding of Hanuabada were well known to the people in the vicinity of Port Moresby, but

12. Murray interview, 14 December 1966.
13. Hogbin interview, 21 December 1973.

the fact that this knowledge spread throughout the Territory, at least among the more sophisticated villagers, was evident from the address presented to Hasluck in 1951 by the people from the Gazelle Peninsula, which coupled the people's desire for a new role with the statement, "We know Colonel Murray is our friend." This suggests that villagers were aware that changes were taking place - more than were many Europeans - and that Murray was identified with them. Many factors had contributed to these changes, but they were epitomised and focused by Murray. He created an atmosphere in which reform remained the central issue. Awareness of the changed post-war situation was kept sharp so long as Murray remained Administrator. And by the time he was removed from office major precedents had been established. Regardless of the influence of other factors, the Administrator put the issue beyond doubt: after Murray, there could be no turning back.

Administration of policy: formal organization

The major factor which limited the implementation of post-war reform was not the policy itself - vague though it was - nor the strength of settler opposition to it, but the general weakness of the administrative machinery in both Canberra and Port Moresby. In Canberra this stemmed from the government's neglecting to restructure and expand the Department of External Territories in terms of the revised policy objectives for the post-war years. To be

reasonably effective, such changes would also have required the replacement of Halligan: a need that was quickly perceived, and met, by Hasluck in 1951. A restructuring of the Territory administration was also clearly indicated, but the Buttsworth inquiry of late 1946 was carried out under narrow terms of reference that bore little relation to the massive tasks that had been assigned to the Provisional Administration by Ward's 1945 proposals. Once again, some of the blame for the limited scope of the Buttsworth investigation lay with the Minister and the government, but an effective Secretary for External Territories would have perceived the need for major reform and advised the Minister accordingly. Ironically, the only useful proposal by Buttsworth - for the establishment of a Secretariat - was borrowed from the Territory's junior officials, who had been influenced by overseas experience and the thinking of the Directorate. For the rest, the scope of the Buttsworth inquiry, and the conditions it assigned to the Territory's public servants, were destructive of initiative and morale.

Informal networks

The informal networks that operated among the key officials of the post-war period effected little change in the Canberra-Port Moresby relationship, while tending to divide the Provisional Administration itself. When the Directorate of Research was disbanded its network collapsed and Colonel Murray was left without a base of support.

Supplementary structures like the Research Council would have assisted him, but they were short-lived. Further attempts to expand contacts through staff interchanges between Port Moresby and Canberra, and to weaken established ties by having officers travel overseas, foundered owing to Department of External Territories opposition and lack of interest on the part of the Minister. Murray then attempted to establish a reformist network of his own, but it could not easily find expression through the formal structures provided for the Territory administration. This problem helped to speed the departure of Taylor, Black and Millar and frustrated such officials as Groves, Cottrell-Dormer and Fenbury. By contrast, the limited formal structure created by the Buttsworth recommendations fitted admirably into the closed network operating among the pre-war officials in Canberra and Port Moresby.

The succeeding reviews of the public service produced a formal structure which, by 1949, was related a little more closely to the needs of Labor policy. When the Liberal-Country Party government came to power, however, it decided that the progressive group within the Provisional Administration, and the administrative structure which had gradually been built up, were inappropriate to its purpose. In particular, Spender's attitude towards Murray suggested that he saw the progressives as a major force, but he left the organizational structure and subordinate staffing of the Territory administration

largely undisturbed.[14] Spender and his advisers failed to appreciate the manner in which formal structures could continue to pursue goals already set for them, despite the weakening of the complementary network of senior personnel.

Recruitment and training

In the absence of any plan to meet the personnel requirements implied in Labor's policy, staffing in both Canberra and Port Moresby was far from satisfactory. The Department of External Territories laboured, through the Commonwealth Public Service Board, to expand its establishment, but with very limited success. Recruitment to the Provisional Administration gave the impression of greater flexibility, but the resulting changes were less than might have been expected. Outside recruitment occurred at two levels: in categories which had been lightly staffed in pre-war years (Education, Health, Agriculture); and for those groups - particularly the field officers - where wartime losses had been heavy. The latter recruits were young men who were rapidly assimilated into the conservative District Services network. Thus the injection of new personalities was largely confined to the areas of social development and welfare; hence the limited scope of the Provisional Administration's

14. The disbanding of the Department of Native Labour at the end of 1950 was mainly a symbolic gesture against Ward's policy; it has been shown in Chapter Eight that the control of employment was scarcely affected by the move.

progressive network, and of subsequent attempts to promote political and economic development at the village level.

The general limiting of the scope of the post-war administration was epitomised by the restrictions placed on staff training. In giving great emphasis to training programmes, the Directorate, and then Murray himself, had viewed the transformation of officers' attitudes towards colonialism as the key factor in implementing change in the rural areas. The programme was intended to operate in two major streams: institutionally, through the School of Pacific Administration, and by exchanges among other colonies and between Port Moresby and Canberra. However, the School's functions and clientele remained limited, owing to the possessive attitude of Halligan and his Department, while all requests for staff exchange and secondment were ignored or refused.

Planning frustrated

In summary, formal structures in both Canberra and Port Moresby were so inadequate that the dominant informal networks of pre-war years were able to maintain control of them. Appointees tended to be drawn into the conservative network, while their conditions of service created dissatisfaction with the post-war regime, whose goals could not be made clear owing to the limited training provided for new entrants. These weaknesses added to the cycle of

frustration which developed around the planning and implementation of post-war policy. Formal planning structures were simply absent until 1949, when a research section was established within the Canberra Department and a Secretariat set up in Port Moresby. However, both these groups were staffed from the orthodox personnel networks, so that they had little empathy with the progressive group that had attempted to promote change within the Provisional Administration. Thus when the progressive groups instituted planning exercises of their own, their reports were ignored by the orthodox networks of pre-war officials, through lack of communication and comprehension. Moreover, efforts to secure appropriate administrative structures, personnel recruitment and staff training for the Territory proved so onerous that planning was forced into a lower priority. And when the long-range schemes of Murray and his advisers were finally rejected by the Menzies government, issues were merely dealt with as they arose: the pattern of ad hoc administration that dominated Papua New Guinea for a further twenty years followed inevitably upon the events of the early 1950's.

PART II - INNOVATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Closed and open systems - Metropolitan controls and quantitative assessment - Wartime defence of systems - Post-war responsiveness - Policy goals and elaboration of structure - Problems of adaptation - Innovation and reaction

Closed and open systems

In seeking to draw more general conclusions from this study, it is useful to consider the colonial administrations in the pre-war, separate Territories of New Guinea and Papua as closed organizational systems. They were not, of course, closed in the sense of physical systems which have neither inputs nor output capabilities; rather, to adopt systems terminology, they lacked negentropic qualities in that they failed to elaborate structure.[15] It should be noted that the usual qualities of a closed system are considered to be entropic: that is, they tend typically to lose organization, to "run down", then to "hold that minimum level within relatively narrow limits of

15. Walter F. Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1967, p. 51.

disturbance".[16] The New Guinean and Papuan pre-war systems were, to use Buckley's phrasing, sufficiently exposed to the intrusion of environmental events to force them to move to a new level of equilibrium.[17] They achieved a steady state: a condition of homeostasis over time.[18] Equilibrium was the operational imperative in that the systems were concerned with their own maintenance in their existing forms and made only those adjustments to changing inputs as were necessary to maintain those forms. Neither system exhibited any tendency to aim for new, more comples structural forms such as were required for advance towards self-government.[19]

Each system was affected intermittently by two kinds of inputs: those from the metropolitan government and those from settler groups and their Australian supporters. These inputs aimed at the same goal as the systems themselves: the maintenance of the systems in their equilibrium condition. The colonial administrations were closed to inputs from those sectors of the community - the indigenous Papuan and New Guinean populations - who might have wished them to elaborate structure in the manner of open systems.[20]

16. Ibid., p. 40.
17. Ibid., p. 50.
18. Katz and Kahn, op. cit., p. 24.
19. See Chapter One for the details of this argument.
20. See, for example, Brian Jinks, New Guinea Government: An Introduction, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1971, pp. 74-6.

Apart from the question of the systems' denying access to certain inputs, there is also the consideration of the systems' responsiveness to those inputs that were permitted access. Here it must be noted that the New Guinean and Papuan administrative systems were dependent sub-systems of the Australian political system with very limited degrees of autonomy.[21] Thus some inputs, notably those from certain Australian politicians, public officials and businessmen, were considered to possess a mugh higher degree of legitimacy than those from some other sources: the League of Nations, the very few academics with an interest in the country, and most mission bodies. Although the actual structure of the administrative systems did not deny access to these latter categories, as it did to Papua New Guinean communities, the systems were so unresponsive to inputs of doubtful legitimacy as effectively to close themselves to these sources. For purposes of analysis and in view of the dependent nature of the colonial administrative systems, the former kind of inputs is termed "authoritative" and the latter "non-authoritative". So long as the authoritative inputs aimed at the maintenance of the existing systems they demanded no elaboration of structure: hence the systems failed to produce negentropic qualities and can be considered as closed, notwithstanding the fact that they remained receptive to a limited range of inputs.

21. The terminology follows that of Almond and Powell, op. cit.

Metropolitan controls and quantitative assessment

It may seem that the colonial system was in an advantageous position in initiating change, if it wished, since it was usually so physically remote from the metropolitan system that its actions could not be kept under close control. But this very remoteness ensured that metropolitan officials sought to exert strong influence in those areas of policy and administration where this was possible. As Jeffries has observed, "....if the Governor wanted to spend a hundred pounds, that was something the chaps at home could get their teeth into".[22] That is, there was an unusual emphasis on evaluation in quantitative rather than qualitative terms.[23] The dependence of the colonial system on metropolitan norms and inputs was reinforced through the socialisation of staff and the assessment of their performance; it was always clear that the relevant standards were those set by, and accepted in the metropolitan country, regardless of the special conditions in the colonial system.[24] In such a situation, structure

22. Sir Charles Jeffries, The Transfer of Power, London, Pall Mall, 1960, p. 35.
23. The terminology is applied as in Victor Thompson, Modern Organization, New York, Knopf, 1961; see p. 161, in particular.
24. The setting of standards peculiar to the metropolitan society is discussed in detail, in the British case, in Sir Ralph Furse, Aucuparius, London, Oxford University Press, 1962; and, with some wonderment, in Robert Heussler, Yesterday's Rulers: The Making of the British Colonial Service, New York, Syracuse University Press, 1963.

and socialisation limited the ability of the colonial system to change in response to anything but authoritative inputs.

The New Guinean and Papuan systems were, before World War 2, similarly dependent upon metropolitan influences. Although the Territories were physically closer to input sources than was the case in most other colonies, there was heavy emphasis on quantiative assessment of performance. In both colonial systems there were severe shortages of resources and an almost complete absence of formal training for public servants. Even more than in the British case, personnel relied heavily upon metropolitan initiatives. However, there were remarkable few metropolitan demand inputs promoting change, since colonialism was not recognized as a policy issue by any of the potential sources of authoritative inputs. Thus the pre-war administrative systems in the Territories of New Guinea and Papua ran down to certain levels (particularly low in the case of Papua), were unable or unwilling to elaborate structure beyond those levels, and were satisfied with the maintenance of structure at the run-down points.

Wartime defence of systems

It might be supposed that the Pacific war opened the colonial systems to enormous volumes of inputs from international, Australian and internal sources. Certainly,

there were great changes in the conditions of life in the islands; old patterns of behaviour disappeared, crises arose and were eventually dealt with, some splendid improvisation occurred and many people - villagers and Australians - believed that a new era had begun. But this was not the case. During the war systems goals remained the same as they had been. Maintenance (or, more accurately, defence) of the existing systems was the major aim of the war effort in New Guinea and Papua; for Australia, defence of the dependent sub-systems in the Territories was essential for the survival of the major system itself. Under the stress of the period, there were no authoritative demands for immediate changes. However, in the interests of the major system's future survival there was an increase in non-authoritative demands for increased responsive capability in the dependent sub-systems. Yet even at this level there were tensions between demands for greater responsiveness to indigenous inputs and those favouring expatriate Australian interests. Measures introduced by Angau were intended primarily to promote the military goal of system maintenance: the mobilisation of labour for defence construction; the training of villagers for military service and support; the provision of health services to increase the labour supply. Angau was a terminating system, so that any departure from pre-war norms during its period of control were incidental to its limited

maintenance responsibilities.[25] In short, nothing that occurred during the war was sufficient to create an open system in Papua New Guinea.

Post-war responsiveness

It was at the restoration of civil administration in 1945, and not at the time of the Japanese invasion in 1941, that the colonial administrative system became open and responsive to new ranges of inputs: international, Australian and domestic; authoritative and non-authoritative. This was not a spontaneous movement; rather, it was a responsiveness forced from the system by major changes in its extra-societal environment and, to a certain extent, in the intra-societal environment as a result of the war. Above all, responsiveness was demanded by authoritative inputs from the Labor government and Minister of the time. The authoritative inputs were presented in the broadest possible terms and there was an easy assumption that the changes required in the colonial administrative system could be wrought by those on the spot. It was not generally recognized that the structures and personnel of the colonial system had changed so little that its responsive capability was still severely limited. The Department

25. See, for example, the speech by the commander of Angau, Major-General Morris, to the 1944 conference of his staff (Chapter Two, p. 113).

of External Territories, which provided the link between the major system and the colonial sub-system had, like the colonial civil administrations, been in a state of virtual suspension during the war. Meanwhile, the highly responsive group of advisers in the Directorate of Research had worked closely with the Minister, the Prime Minister and the Commander-in-Chief of the Australian forces. The Directorate, of itself, possessed no authoritative status but was frequently able to channel its demands through authoritative structures. At the same time, it was never called upon to accept responsibility nor to demonstrate its executive capacity (in systems terminology, its conversion capability). It impressed the Minister by its willingness to countenance, and in many cases to suggest major changes; it showed an innovative desire in that it proposed system adaptation at a greater rate than was being demanded at that time by authoritative inputs. But the Directorate did not have the duty of inducing responsiveness in the colonial system: that task fell to Colonel Murray, who provided the link between the innovative drive of the Directorate and the minimally-responsive structures of the colonial system. Murray was, to use Marshall Dimock's term, the "policy official" charged with instituting change.[26] He became the central figure in subsequent attempts to resolve inter- and intra-structural

26. Marshall E. Dimock, "Bureaucracy Self-Examined" in R.K. Merton, A.P. Gray, B. Hockey and H.C. Selvin (eds.), Reader in Bureaucracy, Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1952, p. 404.

tensions.

Policy goals and elaboration of structure

In view of Colonel Murray's policy role, it is important to make a general distinction between administrative process and policy content. The concept of process is inherent in the systemic approach, where it has been noted that an open system displays negative entropy in elaborating structure and achieves a state of dynamic homeostasis. But this definition of process provides no dimensions for a particular situation. There is little indication of the extent to which structures are or should be elaborated, nor of which structures are most likely to promote the state of dynamic homeostasis. Elaboration of structure is essential to the continuance of the dynamic state of the system: such a system is "not at rest", since it will "tend towards differentiation and elaboration".[27] But beyond a certain level the process of elaboration could prove dysfunctional; proliferating structures could clog the system. It can be argued that the systemic approach itself provides the necessary corrective through negative feedback,[28] but there is still no indication of the source of feedback, nor of the kind of feedback that would flow from over-elaboration of structure. This

27. Katz and Kahn, op. cit., p. 26.
28. Ibid.

problem is similar to the one encountered in the Easton analysis, which has been characterised as static and tautological.[29] The dynamic system, however, poses a question which is quite different in detail from the Easton problem: that is, dynamic homeostasis threatens to create over-elaboration (where there is inadequate feedback) or quantitative checks only on elaboration, since there is nothing in the systemic process itself to provide a check on the quality and relevance of structures. It is necessary to establish clearer criteria for system performance: for structural quality and for the kinds of outputs (notably those involving elaboration of structure) which trigger negative feedback and the consequent correction of any trends towards over-elaboration or elaboration in irrelevant or inappropriate directions. In other words, there must be general guidelines on what is relevant and appropriate in the performance of the particular system.

In the case of the political system - which in this context will be termed the "primary" (i.e., Australian) system - the problem of determining system goals has already been noted. For the purpose of the following analysis it is of minor significance, however, since the Papua New Guinea colonial administrative system did not

29. These criticisms relate mainly to the fact that the Easton analysis gives system maintenance as the goal of the system: for example, Evans, op. cit. maintains that this must inevitably produce a static situation, regardless of the feedback loops of the system.

enjoy primary status: it was a dependent sub-system of the primary Australian system.[30] In such a case the relevance of structural elaboration is determined by authoritative inputs from the primary system. These comprise the policy content to be dealt with through the systemic process of the dependent sub-system - the Papua New Guinea administration. Here, then, policy content anchors the system. In the case of the open system elaborating structure, policy content provides the test of structural relevance, triggers the necessary feedback in instances of over-elaboration or inappropriate elaboration and thereby provides goal-orientation for the system dynamic. But goal-orientation does not mean automatic goal-achievement by the system. A given set of inputs will not necessarily produce the exact outputs desired, owing to limits upon the conversion capabilities of the system (or sub-system). The major limitations involve structural efficiency and personal adjustment. Policy content of itself provides no guarantee of the quality or appropriateness of outputs (which may include elaborated structure).

Problems of adaptation

In summarising to this point: a high correlation between policy inputs and system outputs will be achieved

30. This does not limit the usefulness of such analysis to a small number of special cases, since there are many sub-systems, wholly dependent or otherwise, which could be considered.

only through organizational behaviour which is appropriate to the particular process of conversion. The aspects of systemic process and policy content have been taken into account; it is now necessary to link the third, related element of organizational behaviour with the other two factors.

It has been noted that, before 1945, the colonial administrative systems of New Guinea and Papua were effectively closed. In the organizational structure of such a system "a kind of rigidity grows out of role enactment, and...bureaucrats, over a period of time, become insensitive to the needs of change".[31] As Blau has noted, "The widely held belief that members of bureaucratic organizations necessarily resist change rests on the assumption that bureaucratic structures are characterised by a perfect state of equilibrium, which makes any alteration a disturbance."[32] Blau points out that this rarely is the case; but bureaucracy is, as Schaffer suggests, "adaptive rather than innovative" and the bureaucratic style emphasises "incremental rather than other sorts of change".[33] In terms of management theory, bureaucratic systems would generally achieve a homeostatic state with few problems, but in

31. Victor A. Thompson, Modern Organization, New York, Knopf, 1961, p. 166.
32. Blau, op. cit., p. 248. For a further discussion of varying approaches to the nature and qualities of bureaucracy, see Albrow, op. cit.
33. Bernard Schaffer, "The Deadlock in Development Administration" in Colin Leys (ed.), Politics and Change in Developing Countries: Studies in the Theory and Practice of Development, London, Cambridge University Press, 1969, pp. 191-2.

the great majority of cases the state would not be particularly dynamic. Moreover, the structures of public administration operate under much stronger policy constraints than do many other organizations; coupled with changes in technology and society, policy generally demands a sufficient degree of dynamism from administrative agencies to maintain the system in a receptive, responsive, adaptive and open state. But the authoritative inputs of policy content manifestly failed to demand and produce this state in the pre-war administrative systems of New Guinea and Papua.

When authoritative demands for change - in a number of areas, massive change - were made upon the formerly closed systems (now combined in a single unit) from 1945, the result was organizational dislocation in Papua New Guinea.[34] The situation must also be considered against the background of wartime disruption, but this factor added to, rather than caused, the bureaucracy's problems. Officials wished to re-establish order and, since organizational goals had remained unchanged during the military occupation of the islands, this meant arriving at a new state of equilibrium. The state could not be identical with that of the pre-war period, but it would be equilibrium, nonetheless. It was in such a situation that the officials had previously

34. The combining of the two systems under Angau in 1942 did not affect the state of the amalgamated system, which remained closed until 1945 (see above).

functioned and in it they found security. The new Labor government policy threatened this security and provoked strong reactions. As Blau has observed, "....officials who find their security in strict adherence to familiar routine...strongly resist change in the organization and are incapacitated by new problems that confront them".[35] Victor Thompson similarly maintains that "resistance to change may...be exaggerated by insecure officials".[36] All of the characteristics of insecurity, insensitivity, incapacity and resistance can be seen in key areas of the post-war Papua New Guinea bureaucracy once it was subjected to demands for change.

Innovation and reaction

It must be noted, however, that resistance to certain demands had been functional in the pre-war closed systems in that it contributed to equilibrium and system maintenance. In a newly-open system resistance to change can be defined as dysfunctional so long as it opposes structural elaboration in the direction indicated by policy inputs. In this sense, the resistance of the Papua New Guinea bureaucracy during the post-war period was dysfunctional. Since policy inputs from the Labor government were generalised in the extreme, elaboration of their content was left, by default, to

35. Peter Blau, Bureaucracy in Modern Society, New York, Random House, 1956, p. 89.
36. Thompson, Modern Organization, op. cit., p. 163.

the policy official - Murray - and such structures as he was able to establish. The evidence suggests that, within the limits of Murray's formal powers and the personnel available to him, the structural elaboration he proposed was appropriate to the broad policy aims of the Labor government. In that case, the resistance he encountered within the bureaucracy was generally dysfunctional.

Further evidence suggests that in some instances resistance to appropriate structural elaboration was "exaggerated", within Thompson's meaning of the term; resistance of this order is considered by Thompson to be "bureaupathic".[37] That is, the officials' response may be a reflection of their personal needs; and since the best opportunity to satisfy those needs falls to those in authority, their particular response may be transmitted throughout the organization under their control, thereby creating bureaupathic structures.[38] In post-war Papua New Guinea it might be suggested that such structures emerged in the Departments of the Government Secretary and District Services, while in the Department of Public Health elaboration proceeded in the direction indicated by policy content. This indicates that responsiveness varies sectionally according to the

37. Thompson uses generalised terms only; he does not provide a specific test of the relevance of structural elaboration and resistance. This problem is discussed below.
38. Thompson, Modern Organization, op. cit., p. 153.

kinds of structures that go to make up the total system; certain structures possess a more appropriate "fit" with policy content than do others. It could be argued, however, that the only major differences between the Papua New Guinea departments were the personalities of the officials controlling them. In that case, the concept of "structure", to be useful in this analysis, would have to include personnel factors as well as those relating to formal organization; this could make the concept highly variable and very hard to define over a range of situations. Nevertheless, the systems approach would maintain that, depending on the proportions of responsive and resistive structures within it, a total system may achieve a state of adaptive or dynamic homeostasis; in certain circumstances, presumably, resistance to change could develop to the point where the system reverted to a closed state.

On balance, the Papua New Guinea post-war administration ultimately achieved a state of dynamic homeostasis, at least at the peak of the period under consideration. This occurred despite the unspecific nature of authoritative policy inputs and the strong resistance of some structures. The explanation, in terms of organization theory, is that certain structures developed innovative drive in their own right. Thompson defines innovation as the "generation, acceptance and implementation of new ideas, processes, products

or services".[39] Innovation goes considerably beyond the adaptive processes of homeostatic organization. It is more than a strong commitment to "moderation, compromise, negotiation and accommodation"; innovation is "radical" in departing from existing behaviour patterns.[40] An innovative structure moves ahead of the process of stimulus (by input of policy content) and response (by conversion to output): it becomes anticipatory, in that it perceives forces of change before actual demands are made.[41] This can occur when the responsive structures of the system become attuned to a wider range of inputs than those of a purely authoritative kind. The planning committees set up from 1947 in Port Moresby could be placed in this category.

The organizational consequences of innovation must also be noted. Among resistive structures the very existence of innovative areas within the total system tends to create greater insecurity. It has been noted that the pre-war colonial systems rested on standards of quantitative assessment; this, in turn, helped to produce performance in quantitative terms and resulted in a cycle of what Thompson has called "quantitative compliance".[42] The steady equilibrium state of the closed system rested on controlled behaviour, and so the

39. Victor Thompson, "Bureaucracy and Innovation", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 10 No. 1, June 1965, p. 2.
40. Gawthrop, op. cit., p. 183.
41. Ibid., pp. 178-9.
42. Thompson, Modern Organization, op. cit., p. 158.

appearance of innovative structures produced antipathetic reactions. "In an organizational context dominated by the need to control, innovation is dangerous because, by definition, it is not controlled behaviour."[43] As a consequence, a number of innovations were resisted more strongly than ever, with the mounting resistance placing an increasing burden on the policy official, Colonel Murray. His persistence in encouraging and, in some cases, initiating innovation was of major significance in breaking the cycle of quantitative compliance and establishing a dynamic administrative system. For after the innovative trend was seen to persist for some time resistive structures, in turn, began to adapt. That is, persistence in unco-operative behaviour began to produce its own sense of insecurity. However, the move from resistance to adaptation had not proceeded far before there was an attempt to change policy, following the election of the Liberal-Country Party government in Australia.

The events which followed the change of government make it possible to test the relevance of the main strands of this analysis in reverse, as it were. Policy content changed and, with it, the systemic processes appropriate to the new situation. As a consequence, changes in organizational and individual behaviour were required if this were to remain functional in relation

43. Ibid., p. 163.

to system goals. Yet the Ministerial direction that access to the 1950 United Nations Visiting Mission be restricted was contested by Murray, while other proposals by Spender for revisions of land and labour policy produced little or no action. It might then be argued that the behaviour of Murray and the Administration was dysfunctional in relation to the revised goals of the system: the new government required elaboration of structure in certain directions, but that was not forthcoming. Indeed, Murray's resistance to change could even be viewed as bureaupathic, in terms of the analysis already presented, so that his subsequent removal from office was entirely justified.

Such an interpretation would appear nonsensical. The Spender policies which Murray opposed, or at least to give his full support, could not be considered "innovative" in any usual sense. In that case, the analysis of the system can proceed only upon some judgement of the value of a policy, or of an individual's attitude towards it. Thus Professor Robert Parker maintains that the sudden injection of new ideas and outstanding personalities into the Papua New Guinea situation from 1944 "tends to make nonsense of the systems approach and all its works".[44] This would certainly be true if one were to claim - as did some of the early proponents of the systems approach - that it provided a total framework

44. In a note to the author on an earlier draft of this analysis, undated June 1972.

of analysis. However, it should still be possible to proceed from some common-sense appraisal of what is innovative and then use the systems approach to analyse the manner in which organizations respond to, or react against, such innovations.

With these more modest goals, there should be something to learn about the present situation in independent Papua New Guinea from the generalisations that can be drawn from J.K. Murray's attempts at innovation. Thus the need for a clear, explicit policy is obvious, as are the problems that can arise from insecurity brought about by rapid change, from quantitative compliance and from over-elaboration of structure. The question remains, however, whether there is anything to be gained from proceeding in these terms. Parker has argued that such an exercise amounts to "a perfectly orthodox exposition... dressed up in a peculiarly inappropriate metaphorical vocabulary".[45] And in many ways it would be much simpler to say that bureaucrats grow used to "going by the book", and that organizations tend to spawn other organizations if some check is not kept upon them, rather than to use such terms as "quantitative compliance" and "over-elaboration of structure" to describe much the same thing.

Under these circumstances it must be asked whether

45. Ibid.

any further claims can be made for systems theory; and there are probably two. Firstly, its metaphorical language should have the advantage of applying a common terminology to a range of situations. Secondly, the systems approach combines the various segments of organizational analysis into a whole. Unfortunately, the terminology may be more of a drawback than an advantage. To take just two examples: the key concept of "inputs" can embrace everything from a demand by a minor pressure group to a world-wide cataclysm; and the term "structure" could include things as far removed from each other as major bureaucratic departments and casual friendships among a group of employees. Up to a point, there might still be some advantage in applying such broad concepts, provided that they draw attention away from unnecessary detail towards fundamental relationships between the various parts of the administrative system.

This leads to the second major claim that remains to be made on behalf of systems analysis: its insistence that the organization must be viewed as a whole. It may be argued that this approach merely endorses a truism; but in that case the systems approach at least provides a framework within which to apply that truism. The critics of systems theory may themselves have benefited from its insights before dismissing it in favour of orthodox analysis which might otherwise have produced quite disjointed results. I believe, for example, that

my study of the Provisional Administration was aided by my attempt to apply the systems framework to it: the relationships between government policy, administrative action,, tensions among bureaucrats and pressure from the white community possibly became clearer because I then saw some need to establish that relationships in fact existed. In the modern context, the independent government of Papua New Guinea could benefit from the knowledge that it is most likely to achieve effective change if it can:

(a) match explicit policy with
(b) appropriate formal structures that can
(c) limit their growth to essential needs and
(d) promote productive networks among officials.

No doubt there are other ways of arriving at this conclusion. But systems analysis would serve some purpose if it provided decision-makers with a framework against which to check their progress towards these goals.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. MANUSCRIPTS

Australian Archives Office

Commonwealth Record Series (CRS), Correspondence files, Multi-number System Classes relating to External Territories:
- all index books in series A1242
- selected files in series A518 pertaining to the period 1944 to 1956

Note: Several files were not available for access, including:

S213/3/2 - Criticisms by A.L.P. Central Executive
K904/1 - Competition - Government Vessels and Shipping Lines
A926/1/6 - Re-establishment of Telecommunications
C926/1/6 - Re-establishment of Radio Communications
A927/6 - Education - Policy
A927/11 - Health Policy
Q800/1/7 - Criticisms of Education
A808/1/6 - Aviation - General
V818/1/6 - Wau High School

Papua New Guinea National Archives

Correspondence files, 1945-54, various accession lists and numbering systems:
- all index sheets, all Departments
- all files in boxes 152 to 210
- all files in boxes 306 to 322
- all files in boxes 800 to 818
- all files in boxes 876 to 896

Patrol Reports, Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit, 1944-45

Patrol Reports, Department of District Services and Native Affairs, 1946-51

Department of External Territories, Report by Mr. C.J. Buttsworth on the Public Service of the Provisional Administration of Papua-New Guinea, Canberra, 1947

Australian School of Pacific Administration Library, Sydney (now International Training Institute)

Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit, Conference of Officers of Headquarters and Officers of

Districts Staff, Port Moresby, 7-12 February 1944, Port Moresby, 1944, 2 volumes

--, Report on the Activities of Angau in respect of Native Relief and Rehabilitation in the Territory of Papua and the Mandated Territory of New Guinea, Port Moresby, 1944

Australian New Guinea Production Control Board, Annual Report, Port Moresby, 1944 and 1945

Australian School of Pacific Administration, File of press clippings relating to "Jock Garden" case and "New Guinea Timbers" Royal Commission, undated 1947-48

--, Miscellaneous papers, unreferenced and undated, relating to proposals by the Directorate of Research for the post-war civil government of Papua New Guinea, and associated matters

Belshaw, C.S., Resettlement in the Mount Lamington Area, Port Moresby, 9 May 1951

Department of External Territories, Commission of Inquiry into the Suspension of the Civil Administration of the Territory of Papua in February 1942, Canberra, 29 March 1945

--, Report of a Committee Appointed by the Minister for External Territories on Compensation to the Natives of Papua and New Guinea for War Injuries and War Damage, Canberra, July 1945

--, Notes on the History and Functions of the Department, Canberra, 1949

--, The Territory of New Guinea, Canberra, 24 January 1947

--, The Territory of Papua, Canberra, 18 October 1946

--, Report on a Visit to Papua and New Guinea October-November 1950 by J. Legg, Animal Health Section, Yeerongpilly, Queensland, Canberra, March 1951

Department of Territories, Classification Index of Photographs Held in the Department of Territories, Canberra, October 1951

Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries, Fisheries Survey in New Guinea by M.V. "Fairwind", 1948 to 1950 by I.S.R. Munro and A.M. Rapson, Port Moresby, 1951(?)

Department of District Services and Native Affairs, Report on the Implementation of Policy in Papua-New Guinea by J.R. Black, Port Moresby, 1946

--, Barry Report Compensation Scheme: A Report to His Honour the Administrator by D.M. Fienberg, Port Moresby, 1947

--, Proceedings of a Conference of District Officers Held at Port Moresby, 18-28 February 1948, Port Moresby, 1948

--, Minutes of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Native Development and Welfare, Port Moresby, 1947

--, Circular Instructions, 1946-54

--, Circular Memoranda, 1946-54

Department of the Government Secretary, Circular Instructions, 1946-54

--, Circular Memoranda, 1946-54

Department of Native Labour, Annual Report 1946-47, Port Moresby, 1947

Fienberg, D.M., From Administration to Politics: Emerging Problems in New Guinea, Sydney, 1947(?)

Fry, T.P., Relief and Rehabilitation in Australia's Territories in New Guinea, Melbourne, 1944

Government House, Port Moresby, Functions and Responsibilities of District Commissioners, Port Moresby, 1951

--, Minutes of the Vocational Training Advisory Committee, Port Moresby, 1949

--, Reports on the Buttsworth Report on the Public Service of the Provisional Administration of Papua-New Guinea, Port Moresby, 24 May 1947, 2 volumes

Hogbin, H.I., Report of an Investigation of Native Labour in New Guinea, Melbourne, 1944

Keesing, F.M., The Papuan Orokaiva and Mount Lamington: Culture Shock and its Aftermath, Port Moresby, 1951(?)

Lucas, J.R. (Chief Inspector, Commonwealth Bank of Australia), Report on Visit to Territory of Papua-New Guinea, Sydney, 18 June 1949

Rees, C. and Rees, L., Patrol Officers of New Guinea: A Feature, Sydney, November 1951

Wedgewood, C.H., Some Problems of Native Education in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea and Papua, Canberra(?), 1944

Wren, E.D., Duties of Administrative Officers, Sydney, 10 June 1951

Material provided by Colonel J.K. Murray

Journal-diary with intermittent entries from November 1945 to May 1946

Handwritten notes of recollections, compiled 1967-68

Tape recording for broadcast by Australian Broadcasting Commission on Dr. A.A. Conlon

Miscellaneous journals, articles, speeches, drafts and documents relating to Papua New Guinea, covering period 1945 to 1971

B. PUBLISHED OFFICIAL MATERIAL

Commonwealth of Australia

Department of External Territories, Annual Report to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Canberra, 1947-49

Department of Territories, Report of the Committee on the Combined Administration of the Territories of Papua and New Guinea, Canberra, August 1939

--, Speech by His Honour the Administrator of the Commonwealth on the Inauguration of the Legislative Council for the Territory of Papua and New Guinea, Canberra, Government Printer, 1951

--, The Progress of the Australian Territories 1950-56, Canberra, Government Printer, 1957

Papua-New Guinea Provisional Administration Act 1945

Papua and New Guinea Act 1949

Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 176, 1943 to Vol. 217, 1952

Year Book, No. 34, 1938-39 to No. 43, 1954-55

Territory of New Guinea

Annual Report, 1921/22 to 1939/40; 1946/47 to 1953/54

Territory of Papua

Annual Report, 1918/19 to 1940/41; 1945/46 to 1953/54

Territory of Papua-New Guinea

Government Gazette, 1945-49

Government House, Report of the Economic Development Committee of the Provisional Administration, Port Moresby, 1948, 2 volumes

--, Report of the Native Welfare Planning Committee of the Provisional Administration, Port Moresby, 1948

--, Report of the Social Development Planning Committee of the Provisional Administration, Port Moresby, 1948

Laws of the Territory of Papua-New Guinea 1945-49

Territory of Papua and New Guinea

Department of Native Affairs, Departmental Standing Instructions: General Field Administration, Port Moresby, 1963

Government Gazette, 1949-52

Laws of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea 1949-54

Legislative Council Debates, Vol. 1 (mimeo.) and 2, First Council

United Nations Organization

Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in the Pacific on New Guinea, New York, 1950

Report of the 1962 United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of New Guinea, New York, 1962

C. NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

Monthly Notes, 1945-47

Pacific Islands Monthly, 1932-53

South Pacific, 1947-56

South Pacific Post, 1951-52

D. BOOKS, ARTICLES, THESES etc.

Albrow, M., Bureaucracy, New York, Praeger, 1970

Anonymous, "The Master Puppeteer", Nation, Vol. 1 No. 1, 26 September 1958

Australian Broadcasting Commission, "What Should We Do About New Guinea?", The Nation's Forum of the Air, Vol. 2 No. 9, May 1946

Australian School of Pacific Administration, "Administrator's Visit", Monthly Notes, Vol. 1 No. 3, November 1946, p. 8

Barrett, D., "The Legislative Council of Papua and New Guinea", South Pacific, Vol. 6 No. 3, June 1952, p. 337

Bassett, M., Letters from New Guinea 1921, Melbourne, Hawthorn Press, 1969

Belshaw, C.S., Economic Development in South-East Papua, typescript, Canberra(?), 1950

--, The Great Village, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957

--, "Social Consequences of the Mount Lamington Eruption", Oceania, Vol. 21 No. 4, June 1951, p. 241

Benevolent Society of New South Wales, Alfred Conlon 1908-1961, Sydney, 1963

Biskup, P., Jinks, B. and Nelson, H., A Short History of New Guinea (2nd. ed.), Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1970

Blackburn, N. (ed.), War in My Village, Port Moresby, 1969

Blau, P.M., Bureaucracy in Modern Society, New York, Random House, 1956

--, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1963

-- and W.R. Scott, Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach, London, Routledge, 1963

Buckley, W., Sociology and Modern Systems Theory, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prenctice-Hall, 1967

Capell, A., "The Future of Education in Papua", Oceania, Vol. 15 No. 4, June 1945, p. 277

Cottrell-Dormer, "Native Rural Progress Societies", South Pacific, Vol. 4 No. 4, March 1950, p. 53

Cranswick, G.H. and Shevill, I.W., A New Deal for Papua, Melbourne, Cheshire, 1949

Crisp, L.F., Ben Chifley, Melbourne, Longmans, 1960

Crocombe, R.G., Communal Cash Cropping Among the Orokaiva, New Guinea Research Unit Bulletin No. 4, Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1964

Dalziel, A., Evatt the Enigma, Melbourne, Lansdowne, 1967

Dimock, M.E., "Bureaucracy Self-Examined" in R.K. Merton, A.P. Gray, B. Hockey and H.C. Selvin (eds.), Reader in Bureaucracy, Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1952

Dwyer, L., "Economic Development in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea", South Pacific, Vol. 4 No. 7, June 1950, p. 113

Encyclopaedia of Papua New Guinea, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1972

Evatt, H.V., Foreign Policy of Australia, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1945

--, Australia in World Affairs, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1946

Feldt, E., The Coastwatchers, Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1946

Fieldhouse, D.K., The Colonial Empires, Wiedenfield and Nicholson, 1966

Fienberg, D.M., "Native Taxation: A Comparison between East Africa and New Guinea", Monthly Notes, Vol. 1 No. 12, August 1947, p. 1

--, "It Could Happen in New Guinea?", Monthly Notes, Vol. 1 No. 10, June 1947, p. 5

Fink, R.A. and Grosart, I., Race Relations in Papua and New Guinea, Sydney, Australian School of Pacific Administration, 1963

Firth, R., Davidson, J.W. and Spate, O.H.K., Notes on New Guinea, October-November 1951, Canberra, Australian National University, 1951

Forsyth, W.D., "Stability in the Pacific: Australia's Position", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 16 No. 1, March 1943, p. 7

Fry, T.P., "Papua and Mandated New Guinea Today", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 19 No. 2, June 1946, p. 146

Furse, Sir Ralph, Aucuparius, London, Oxford University Press, 1962

Fysh, W.H., Impressions in New Guinea, Sydney, 1949

Gawthrop, L.C., Bureaucratic Behaviour in the Executive Branch, New York, Free Press, 1969

Gray, G., "The Passing of the Papua-New Guinea Provisional Administration Bill" in H.N. Nelson, N. Lutton and S. Robertson (eds.), 06: Select Topics in the History of Papua and New Guinea, Port Moresby, University of Papua New Guinea, 1970(?)

Greenwood, G., "Australian Attitudes towards Pacific Problems", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 23 No. 2, June 1950, p. 153

Groves, W.C., Native Education and Culture Contact in New Guinea, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1936

Guiart, J., "Forerunners of Melanesian Nationalism", Oceania, Vol. 22 No. 2, December 1951, p. 81

Halsey, T.H., "Cacao, Coffee and Tea in Papua-New Guinea", Part I, South Pacific, Vol. 2 No. 10, July 1948, p. 208; Part II, South Pacific, Vol. 2 No. 11, August 1948, p. 233

Hasluck, P.M.C., Australian Policy in Papua and New Guinea, George Judah Cohen Memorial Lecture, Canberra, 1956

--, Australia's Task in Papua and New Guinea, Roy Milne Memorial Lecture, Canberra, 1956

--, The Government and the People 1942-45, Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1970

Hastings, P., New Guinea: Problems and Prospects, (2nd. ed.), Melbourne, Cheshire, 1973

Healy, A.M., "Native Local Government in New Guinea: Its Functions and Problems", Journal of African Administration, Vol. 13 No. 3, July 1961, p. 165

--, Native Administration and Local Government in Papua 1880-1960, Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, Canberra, 1962

--, Bulolo, New Guinea Research Unit Bulletin No. 15, Canberra, Australian National University, 1967

Hetherington, J., Blamey, Melbourne, Cheshire, 1954

--, Blamey: Controversial Soldier, Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1973

Heussler, R. Yesterday's Rulers: The Making of the British Colonial Service, New York, Syracuse University Press, 1963

Hogbin, H.I., "Local Government for New Guinea", Oceania, Vol. 17 No. 1, September 1946, p. 38

--, "Government Chiefs in New Guinea" in Essays Presented to A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1949

--, Transformation Scene: The Changing Culture of a New Guinea Village, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951

-- and Wedgewood, C., "Native Welfare in the Southwest Pacific Islands", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 17 No. 2, June 1944, p. 133

Howlett, D., The European Land Settlement Scheme at Popondetta, New Guinea Research Unit Bulletin No. 6, Canberra, Australian National University, 1965

Hudson, W.J., "Australia's Experience as a Mandatory Power", Australian Outlook, Vol. 19 No. 1, April 1965

--, Australia and the Colonial Question at the United Nations, Sydney, Sydney University Press, 1970

Hughes, C.A., "The Legislative Councils of Papua-New Guinea", Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 12 No. 2, Spring 1959, p. 209

-- and Graham, B.D., Australian Government and Politics 1890-1964, Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1968

Isles, K., "Economic Policy in New Guinea", Monthly Notes, Vol. 1 No. 1, September 1946, p. 4.

Jeffries, C., The Colonial Empire and its Civil Service, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1938

--, The Transfer of Power, London, Pall Mall, 1960

Jennings, I., The Approach to Self-Government, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1956

Jinks, B., Some Aspects of Representation in Colonial Government: The Third Legislative Council of Papua and New Guinea, B.A. thesis, University of Queensland, 1965

--, "The New Guinea Tax Issue", Journal of the Papua and New Guinea Society, Vol. 1 No. 2, 1967, p. 16

--, J.K. Murray: A Brief, Port Moresby, University of Papua New Guinea, 1968

--, "Return of J.K. Murray", Nation, No. 246, 22 June 1968, p. 10.

--, New Guinea Government: An Introduction, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1971

--, "Colonel Murray, Administrator", Australian External Territories, Vol. 11 No. 2, April 1971, p. 31

--, Biskup, P. and Nelson, H.N. (eds.), Readings in New Guinea History, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1973

Johnston, G.H., New Guinea Diary, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1943

Joyce, R.B., Sir William McGregor, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1971

Katz, D. and Kahn, R.L., The Social Psychology of Organizations, New York, Wiley, 1966

Lawrence, P., Road Belong Cargo, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1964

Legge, J.D., Australian Colonial Policy, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1956

Lett, L., Knights Errant of Papua, Edinburgh, Blackwood, 1935

--, The Papuan Achievement (2nd. ed.), Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1944

--, Sir Hubert Murray of Papua, London, Collins, 1949

Long, G., The Final Campaigns, Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1963

Lyden, F.J., "Innovation in Bureaucracy?", Public Administration Review, Vol. 29 No. 1, January/February 1969, p. 84

McAuley, J.P., "On the Eve of Trusteeship", Monthly Notes, Vol. 1 No. 2, October 1946, p. 1

--, "Trusteeship in Practice: New Guinea, Nauru, Western Samoa", in A.H. McDonald (ed.), Trusteeship in the Pacific, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1949

--, "Defence and Development in Australian New Guinea", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 23 No. 4, December 1950, p. 371

--, "White Settlement in Papua and New Guinea", South Pacific, Vol. 5 No. 12, March-April 1952, p. 250

-- and Hogbin, H.I., "Development in New Guinea", Far Eastern Survey, 25 February 1948, p. 51

McCarthy, D., South-West Pacific Area First Year: Kokoda to Wau, Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1959

McCarthy, J.K., Patrol Into Yesterday, Melbourne, Cheshire, 1963

Mackenzie, S.S., The Australians at Rabaul, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1934

McNicoll, R.R., "Sir Walter McNicoll as Administrator of the Mandated Territory", Journal of the Papua and New Guinea Society, Vol. 2 No. 2, 1969, p. 5

Maher, R.F., New Men of Papua, Madison, Wis., University of Wisconsin Press, 1961

Mair, L.P., "Native Political Institutions and Alien Rule", South Pacific, Vol. 3 No. 2, October 1948, p. 1

--, Australia in New Guinea, London, Christophers, 1948; second edition, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1970

Mander, L.A., Some Dependent Peoples of the South Pacific, New York, MacMillan, 1954

Miller, J.D.B. and Jinks, B., Australian Government and Politics (4th. ed.), London, Duckworth, 1970

Murray, J.H.P., Papua or British New Guinea, London, Fisher Unwin, 1912

--, Papua of Today, London, King, 1925

--, Indirect Rule in Papua, Port Moresby, Government Printer, 1929

--, The Scientific Aspect of the Pacification of Papua, Port Moresby, Government Printer, 1932

Murray, J.K., "Problems and Policy", Monthly Notes, Vol. 1 No. 1, September 1946, p. 2

--, The Provisional Administration of the Territory of Papua-New Guinea: Its Policy and Its Problems, Brisbane, University of Queensland Press, 1949

--, The Allied Land Forces (LHQ) School of Civil Affairs 1945-46, Brisbane, 1971

Nelson, H.N., New Guinea: Black Unity or Black Chaos?, Melbourne, Penguin Books, 1971

--, "Our Boys Up North: The Behaviour of Australians in New Guinea", Meanjin Quarterly, Vol. 32 No. 4, December 1973, p. 433

Nwanwene, O., "British Colonial Policy and Localisation: The Nigerian Experience 1930-60", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol. 6 No. 3, November 1968, p. 202

O'Donnell, G., "Native Compensation", Monthly Notes, Vol. 1 No. 3, November 1946, p. 1 and Vol. 1 No. 5, January 1947, p. 3

Pacific Islands Yearbook and Who's Who (originally Pacific Islands Yearbook), Sydney, Pacific Publications, 1st. ed., 1932 to 10th. ed., 1968

Read, K.E., "Effects of the Pacific War in the Markham Valley, New Guinea", Oceania, Vol. 18 No. 2, December 1947, p. 95

--, "Notes on Some Problems of Political Confederation", South Pacific, Vol. 3 No. 12, October 1949, p. 229 and Vol. 4 No. 1, November 1949, p. 5

--, "The Political System of the Ngarawapum", Oceania, Vol. 20 No. 3, March 1950, p. 185

Reed, S.W., The Making of Modern New Guinea, Philadelphia, American Philosophical Society, 1943

Reilly, J., "Technical Training in Relation to Native Education", South Pacific, Vol. 4 No. 8, July 1950, p. 136

Robinson, N.K., Kukipi in the War, Port Moresby, University of Papua New Guinea, 1971

Rosner, M.M., "Administrative Controls and Innovation", Behavioural Science, Vol. 13 No. 1, January 1968, p. 36

Rourke, F.E., Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy, Boston, Little, Brown, 1969

Rowley, C.D., The Australians in German New Guinea, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1958

--, The New Guinea Villager, Melbourne, Cheshire, 1965

Ryan, J., The Hot Land, Melbourne, MacMillan, 1969

Ryan, P., Fear Drive My Feet, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1960

--, "The Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit" in K. Inglis (ed.), The History of Melanesia, second Waigani Seminar, Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1969, p. 531

Schaffer, B.B., "The deadlock in development administration" in C. Leys (ed.), Politics and Change in Developing Countries: Studies in the Theory and Practice of Development, London, Cambridge University Press, 1969

Selby, D., Hell and High Fever, Sydney, Currawong, 1956

Simpson, C., Plumes and Arrows, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1962

Sinclair, J.P., The Outside Man, Melbourne, Lansdowne, 1969

Smith, E., "Native Labour and the Native Labour Ordinance 1946", South Pacific, Vol. 2 No. 1, September 1947, p. 1

Smith, T.R., South Pacific Commission, Wellington, Milburn, 1972

Souter, G., New Guinea: The Last Unknown, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1963

Spender, P.C., Exercises in Diplomacy: the ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan, Sydney, Sydney University Press, 1969

--, Politics and a Man, Sydney, Collins, 1972

Spratt, E., Eddie Ward: Firebrand of East Sydney, Adelaide, Rigby, 1965

Stanner, W.E.H., Reconstruction in the South Pacific Islands: A Preliminary Report, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1947

--, The South Seas in Transition, Sydney, Australasian Publishing Co., 1953

Sweeting A.J., "Montevideo Maru - Myth or Merchantman?", Australian Territories, Vol. 1 No. 2, February 1961, p. 36

Tennant, K., Evatt: Politics and Justice, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1970

Thompson, V.A., Modern Organization, New York, Knopf, 1961

--, "Bureaucracy and Innovation", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 10 No. 1, June 1965, p. 1

--, Bureaucracy and Innovation, University, Ala., University of Alabama Press, 1969

Timperley, A.T., "Native Labour: Comparisons between New Guinea and East Africa", Monthly Notes, Vol. 1 No. 8, April 1947, p. 4

Tomasetti, W.E., New Guinea and the United Nations: Trusteeship Issues from 1946-66, New Guinea Research Unit Bulletin No. 36, Canberra, Australian National University, 1970

Tompkins, D. and Hughes, B., The Road from Gona, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1969

Townsend, G.W.L., District Officer, Sydney, Pacific Publications, 1968

Tudor, J., Many a Green Isle, Sydney, Pacific Publications, 1966

Ward, E.J., "Brown Man's Future", South Pacific, Vol. 3 No. 4, November 1948, p. 67

Wedgewood, C.H., "Native Education", Monthly Notes, Vol. 1 No. 2, October 1946, p. 4

--, "Native Compensation", Monthly Notes, Vol. 1 No. 7, March 1947, p. 1

West, F.J., Hubert Murray: The Australian Pro-Consul, Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1968

-- (ed.), Selected Letters of Hubert Murray, Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1970

White, O., Parliament of a Thousand Tribes: A Study of New Guinea, London, Heinemann, 1965

--, Green Armour, Melbourne, Wren, 1972

Wolfers, E.P., "The Unsettled Settlers: New Guinea in Australia 1942-1946", Journal of the Papua and New Guinea Society, Vol. 1 No. 2, 1967, p. 7

--, "Trusteeship Without Trust" in F.S. Stephens (ed.), Racism, the Australian Experience: Vol. 3, Colonialism, Sydney, Australia and New Zealand Book Co., 1972

Wright, M., If I Die, Melbourne, Lansdowne, 1965

--, The Gentle Savage, Melbourne, Lansdowne, 1966