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Introduction.

Part One - a discussion of the nature and origins of mystical symbolism, and its literary implications, developed by considering aspects of William Blake, Thomas Transeue, D.H. Lawrence, and some others.

SYMBOLISM

Part Two - an essay in poetica. The theory and technique of poetry in the nineteenth century, from Novalis to Mallarme - its more significant developments in modern English poetry noted in the work of Eliot, and in the surrealist tendency.

Part Three - symbolism as an aesthetic problem in experience, in language, and in poetry - general theory of the nature of poetry.

James McAuley B.A.
**Introduction.**

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**Part Three** - symbolism as a fundamental process in experience, in language, and in poetry - general theory of the nature of poetry.
This essay was originally intended to be a survey of symbolism in poetry, viewed simply as a technical device. But it soon became apparent that no such bounds can be set to the subject without doing violence to the real nature of symbolism. It is not merely a technical device, it is the fundamental process of poetry, and any account of its working completes itself naturally into a theory of poetry.

A symbol is something that stands for something else. Language is essentially symbolic, because words stand for the things they are said to mean. But symbolic reference is not confined to the sphere of language. In our daily life we are constantly reacting to the symbolic meaning of the things. Flags, badges, uniforms, crosses, all the insignia of our social and institutional life are symbols, and we recognise them as such.

But symbolic reference does not cease to operate even when we don't recognise its presence. The more closely we analyse the workings of the mind, the more we realise that we are constantly making symbolic references so automatic and immediate that we do not notice their character. Even the simplest acts of cognition make use of complex symbolic reference. I hear a certain sound, and I say: "That is a motor-car going along the street." That single sense-datum serves as a symbol for the whole situation of which it forms part. Perception is a constant process of interpreting the fragmentary data of our senses; we treat our sensations
as signs from which we infer the presence of the whole thing we perceive. We do not see merely shapes, colours, distances - we see houses, people, trees, i.e., we refer the signs given in sensation to complex objects not completely given in sensation.

Poetry makes use of all these activities of symbolism and groups them into what we must call, for lack of a better description, aesthetic structures. Accordingly, any enquiry into the nature and extent of symbolism in poetry will end as an enquiry into the nature of poetry itself. The later portions of this essay are an attempt to co-ordinate the discoveries made in previous sections into a general theory.

The plan adopted was to consider in some detail the various types of symbolism which poetry uses, taking the most significant and most highly developed examples of each type as the working material. Thus, a great deal of poetry is concerned with the attempt to express symbolically the supernatural, superconscious world. The realities of this world cannot be expressed directly - the infinite must reveal itself in finite terms, and hence through symbols. Now, it is in mystical poetry that we find the most thorough-going attempt to deal with super-conscious realities, and so the analysis was directed towards mystical poetry as a convenient instance of a wide-spread activity.

Again, a great deal of poetry is concerned with emotional symbols - indeed it might be said that poetry either expresses the infinite or it expresses human emotions. (The course of the enquiry leads us to the view that this distinction
is unreal, and that mystical poetry is also a mode of emotional life. The most complicated and self-conscious form of emotional symbolism is to be found in the work of the French Symbolists, so I have taken them as another special field for study.

Finally, the symbolist aesthetics of the nineteenth century, (the main development of which I have taken from Novalis through Baudelaire to Mallarme), raises the question of the place of words in poetry. Accordingly, the linguistic element was isolated and analysed, in an endeavour to ascertain the function of words in the aesthetic structure. This verbal analysis threw fresh light on the particular questions that had been considered previously, and opened the way to a broad survey of the whole field.

One or two general observations on the method employed must be made. In order to keep the discussion—which could ramify itself into vast proportions—within useful limits it has been necessary to make a condensed statement of many points which deserve a much fuller treatment. Sometimes a dogmatic attitude had to be assumed so as not to be lost in a morass of conflicting opinions. The dogmatism, however, lies in the method, not in any desire to claim certainties which do not exist. For example, in order to give a coherent account of mysticism, I have adopted what seems to be on the whole the most tenable hypothesis: that the superconscious world is a symbolic figment and nothing more. Mystical symbolism I consider
to be a by-product of the interaction between subconscious and conscious levels of experience. However, it may be that the superconscious entities have an independent existence. In that case, some changes of detail would have to be made in the account, but the essential fact of the symbolic reference to the subconscious level would not necessarily be impugned. I have tried to bear in mind the words of Cromwell to the Irish bishops: "I beseech you, gentlemen, in the bowels of Christ, to think it possible that you might be mistaken." For the rest one must endeavour to introduce a modest order into one's convictions.
PART ONE: MYSTICAL SYMBOLISM.

L'Inconscient, c'est l'Éden - Levant que tout sangne;
Si la Terre ne veut sècher, qu'elle s'y baigne!

- Lafargue: Complainte du Sage de Paris -
Mysticism

When people talk about mysticism they tend to adopt one of two prevailing attitudes: either it is considered to be a sacrosanct mystery, not to be explored by the profane; or it is dismissed as the nonsense of the diseased mind. There are those with such an infinite capacity for spiritual thrills that they accept the whole thing unreservedly—they may not really "believe in" mysticism, but they think it very beautiful. Wordsworth's view of the universe is often considered to be sublime and inspiring by critics who would dismiss the flat theory of pantheism as an error. They fail to show in what way an error could be sublime, inspiring, and above criticism. Other people, impatient of realities that are not realistic, destroy the basis of mysticism a priori, and do not trouble to search amongst the ruins for anything that may be valuable. The existence of a spiritual world is denied on logical grounds, mystical doctrine is reduced to fantasy, and the fantasy is dismissed as morbid and hence valueless.

Both attitudes are equally indefensible, and arise out of an unwillingness or inability to enquire into the facts. On the one hand, sentimental reverence is out of place in dealing with a subject where much is obscure, much is doubtful, and much is downright unhealthy. Wordsworth, for instance, played the hypocrite towards his own experience, and spent a good deal of his life in an attempt to fake it so that it
would harmonise with the Church of England. There seems to be no reason why we should follow his example. Catholic mysticism, and those parts of Catholic dogma which show mystical influence, have developed a noteworthy tradition. Yet the fountain-head of Catholic mysticism is in the writings of the "pseudo-Dionysus", which are now admitted to be a flagrant and unscrupulous fraud, no matter what suggestive value they may have. When we must move amongst such facts, it is well to keep our eyes open. Recent investigation has made this doubly necessary, for psychologists to-day have seen a suspicious similarity between the symbolic language of mysticism and the pathological fantasies of lunatics. Unless we are prepared to examine the subject critically, how can we differentiate between mysticism and insanity?

That this differentiation can be made is the argument to be advanced against the second class of people, who find nothing in mystical experience except pathological disorder. The case against them cannot here be set out at length, but there are certain pertinent observations which must be made.

The classic case on which the orthodox Freudian theory is based is that of Flournoy's Mme. Vé. The patient developed strong mystical tendencies during her illness, and her fantasies (which bore a close resemblance to ordinary mystical experience) were shown to have a pathological content, to be the projections of a morbid personality. The conclusion was drawn that mysticism in general is a symptom of a morbid condition and marks the deterioration of the
mind to a lower level of adjustment to reality. The same mystic is a case which has not regressed far enough to catch the alienist's eye; but the logical conclusion of the "via mystica" is a complete breakdown of the personality, a complete failure to cope with the demands of life.

All that we can say of this, is that it is simply not true. The mysticism of schizophrenics may be a symptom of regression, and its character is revealed by a progressive dislocation of the psyche. The mysticism of sane persons does not, as a matter of fact, exhibit this regressive character, but frequently leads to a wider integration of the personality and an increased power of dealing with reality. Of many examples that could be adduced as evidence I shall quote one. A.E., in his autobiographical "The Springs of Song", gives an account of how, until the age of 27, he was afflicted with morbid shyness and stammering of the usual neurotic type. These symptoms disappeared as he began to progress along the "via mystica" and he became a forceful public speaker, and one of the most valued public figures in Ireland.

It may seem that the rejection of the reverential as well as the Freudian attitude has left no ground on which to base a discussion. Nevertheless some attempt must be made to estimate the validity of mysticism, and to provide a reasonable basis for criticism. It is impossible to conduct a fruitful discussion in an agnostic void, although the attempt is often made. The attitude I have taken up (not so much dogmatically as under
the necessity of taking up some attitude) involves a hypothesis that seems to me to be at least tenable. While refusing to be impressed by the mystics claim that his beliefs have an objective validity, I remain unsatisfied by the crude attempt to reduce those beliefs to a purely pathological setting. The difficulty is this: if we reject the notion that mystical beliefs (in the One, the All-Soul, God immanent, God transcendent, etc.,) correspond to an objective reality, then we cannot escape the conclusion the these beliefs are fantasies, or "wishful thinking". Having admitted that mystical belief is a projection into the outside world of subjective wishes and conflicts, we are hard put to it to show how those fantasies could have any value except as indications of mental disorder. How can fantasies be the means of developing a progressive and not a regressive personality? For a long time this problem seemed to me unanswerable. That mysticism could be a character of sane minds was the deliverance of the facts as I saw them. But it was equally clear that mysticism took its origin, not in any higher spiritual world, but in the nether-world, the Freudian hell. The hypothesis by which these facts could be harmonised came at last from the psycho-analytic school itself. In his illuminating study, "Mysticism and its Problems", Dr. Silberer has evolved a theory which accounts for the value to be found in mystical tradition, without distorting the subjective origins. The following discussion will lean heavily on Silberer's assistance, and apply his conclusions to other fields than that with which he was concerned.

Briefly, the validity of mysticism depends on what use is
made of the symbolic projections thrown up by the unconscious. If the mind uses these symbols to escape from reality, the result is schizophrenia; if it uses them to come to terms with reality the result is mysticism. The detailed working out of this conception will appear in the course of the discussion, but it may be well to pause and answer one pertinent enquiry.

It might be asked: "If you find that you can dispense with higher realities in interpreting the mystics, why do you not dispense also with the lower realities, the Freudian underworld? Surely you do not attach any greater validity to the one myth than the other?"

There is a certain force in this objection. To some extent it must be admitted that the psycho-analysts have provided us with another myth to replace the older ones that were beginning to wear thin. It is true that we have not "discovered" the unconscious as an observable thing. It is a word, a rough symbol, thrown tentatively at the facts in order to get a working explanation. This "discovery", which has in our day set our old men seeing visions and our young men dreaming dreams, may in time pass into the limbo of symbols and myths that are no longer current. But for the present it is the best description we can give and is proving useful as an instrument of research, and so we must stick to it. The saints gained a certain proficiency in casting out devils: we find that a slightly larger number of cases yield to treatment if we cast out complexes instead. So we dismiss the devils and pin our faith to the complexes, and the Ancherontic darkness in which
they move, believing that we are at least closer to the facts than before.

(2)

Working on the above assumptions, it will be necessary to show, in the case of mystical poetry, not only that it derives from deep-lying mental processes, but that it is ultimately concerned with an adjustment to reality, not an escape from it. It is probable that in many cases regressive and progressive tendencies will be found mingled. A poem may indicate that the poet is still in the grip of a neurotic impulse, even while it shows that a movement towards reality has been undertaken.

One of the common examples of subjective symbolism quoted is Blake's "I saw a chapel all of gold", which, to the meanest intelligence, is obviously using sexual symbolism of the type which Freud analysed in dreams. The poem is interesting because Blake certainly knew that his symbols had a sexual content as well as a wider significance. His meaning is not discoverable unless we realise that the primary meaning of his symbols is sexual. To that primary meaning Blake added a secondary meaning, and used the sexual situation as a symbolic instance of something wider, involving the whole structure of life. In other words, Blake is consciously doing the very thing we suppose all mystics to do, consciously or unconsciously. They develop symbols which have an inner, subjective significance, and re-interpret those symbols in a wider objective context. This wider, secondary meaning includes the primary meaning whether
they know it or not), and by the working out the secondary implications of the fantasy they are also working out the primary problem from which it sprang.

"I saw a chapel all of gold
That none did dare to enter in,
And many weeping stood without,
Weeping, mourning, worshipping.

I saw a serpent rise between
The white pillars of the door,
And he forc'd & forc'd & forc'd
Down the golden hinges fore,

And along the pavement sweet,
Set with pearls & rubies bright,
All his slimy length he drew,
Till upon the altar white

Vomiting his poison out
On the bread & on the wine:
So I turned into a sty
"And laid me down among the swine."

The imagery here should be compared with "The Garden of Love", a much clearer statement of the forbidden chapel theme. In the last resort, the poem presents a symbolic picture of the instinctive life corrupted and thrown into discord by the attempt to impose upon it repressive and abstract moral standards which it
can neither accept nor evade. It is an analysis of the possibilities of neurosis involved in repression, and bears a startling resemblance, as theory, to the selfsame Freudian analysis by which it is condemned! The secondary interpretation of the fantasy points to the same adjustment to reality as the analysts recommend, and yet in its primary significance the poem is a symptom of mental disorder.

Blake's poem was noteworthy because he shows himself conscious of the fact that, beneath the secondary, mystical interpretation, lies a primary sexual meaning, and he was aware of the multiple significance that lay in his symbols. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the full implications of his symbolism on the primary level were apparent to him. We can use the poem to show that awareness of this primary, unconscious significance is not essential: even if he had ignored the subjective connotation completely, the value of his secondary meaning would not be impaired.

It is probable that an analyst would find in the poem much more than the more or less overt sexual meaning. The course of the fantasy suggests that the object of desire, symbolised by the chapel, is a mother-image, protected by the incest-barrier.

"And many weeping stood without,
Weeping, mourning, worshipping."

That the "many" spoken of vaguely here concerns mainly the poet himself is apparent from the poem as it stands, for it is on him that the effect is produced in the end. This symbolising of the self by a vague plurality of persons is not uncommon. The real
object being unattainable, the desire is directed towards other objects, but not successfully, because they are merely inferior substitutes for the ideal, the mother.

(I am not prepared to affirm that this is a true and sufficient analysis, nor is it necessary for the argument. It is the kind of thing which analysis suggests, and I think it is in the right direction. Even so, the terms "incest" and "mother" need a good deal of clarification before they can be taken as exact descriptions of the subjective processes involved. The drama is revealed as a competition between the son and father: the father triumphs over the son and delivers him over to moral condemnation.)

It is nearly certain that Blake did not see his sexual fantasy in these terms, so that while he was aware of some of the primary content he was not aware of all or it. Nevertheless, his failure to realise the whole multiple significance of his work did not prevent him from working out an acceptable sublimation of the conflict. When we develop the full Freudian significance of the fantasy, it becomes apparent that Blake has arrived at the same position by a short-cut. The serpent of the poem represents the father, not simply as an actual person competing with the son for the mother's love, but also as a complex subjective image to which all sorts of emotional attitudes adhere. The father is himself an image, representing the power and authority, not only of the parent, but of the powers that be in the social environment. The manner in which moral authority thwarts the instinctive life (and at the same time benefits itself)
is the subject of the poem, in its widest meaning, not only for Freud, but for Blake also. Blake comes nearer to the notion of the father-image when he, in other poems, uses Nobodaddy, Jehovah, and Urizen the God of this World, as symbols of moral authority acting in a repressed fashion instead of a co-operative fashion.

In connection with Blake's most developed symbolism, it is worth pointing out here that Freudian theory has developed in much the same way. The theory of the super-Ego implies that the moralism of the father is no longer thought of as mainly external to the psyche, but is taken up into the personality as something which operates from within as well as from without. The super-Ego implies more than this - and so, for that matter does the father-image - but this is part of its significance. The general solution that Freud gives of neurotic conditions is that the demands of the Ego and the Id must be strengthened against the overweening and the repressive super-Ego, while the latter must be induced to take up a more co-operative attitude towards the rest of the psyche. In the same way, Blake's early symbols refer us more to moralism operating on the unwilling mind from the outside, whereas in the delineation of Urizen he stresses rather the fact that the repression can come from within, for Urizen is one of the powers of the soul. Blake's myth of soul makes a fourfold division, but he looks for the reclaiming of Urizen as a working-partner with the other three Zoas. This fourfold division in Blake as against the threefold division that Freud makes is very suggestive. Los is noticeably absent from the Freudian Weltanschauung.
This superficial survey of the common ground between the 18th Century mystic and the 20th Century psychologist should suffice to put the dogmatic analyst on his guard. Some of the further implications of Blake’s work will be taken up later.

(3)

In the discussion of Blake’s poem, the terms “primary” and “secondary” were applied to the two levels of symbolic reference. Silberer introduces an echo of that teutonic romanticism which appears so strangely throughout psychoanalytic theory by speaking of the “titanic” and the “anagogic” levels. The term “titanic” as applied to the unconscious powers is tempting because it is reminiscent of a remarkable passage in Blake, a direct foreshadowing of psychological theory:

"The giants who formed this world into its sensual existence and now seem to live in it in chains, are in truth the causes of its life & the sources of all activity; but the chains are the cunning of weak and tame minds ---

"Thus one portion of being is the Prolific; the other, the Devouring: to the devourer it seems as if the producer was in his chains; but it is not so, he only takes portions of existence and fancies that the whole.

"But the Prolific would cease to be Prolific unless the Devourer as a sea received the excess of his delights." ("Heaven and Hell").

The Devourer is the rational, conscious self, which thinks
it has instinct under control because it is not aware of the unconscious life which instinct is carrying on; it "only takes portions of existence and fancies that the whole." In the economics of the psyche, the rational, conscious self is the consumer, the unconscious the producer. Both have their function, and they must not seek to interchange these functions, nor ignore one another's importance.

Although it is tempting to adopt Silberer's terminology because of this truly remarkable parallel, I have not done so. There is in the words "titanic" and "anagogic" a suggestion that we are dealing with two distinct metaphysical planes of reality, a suggestion which I wish to avoid at all costs. One of the results of the analysis we have undertaken is to remove the concept of a metaphysically "higher" level of reality. The mystic is only valuable in so far as he relates his fantasies to the ordinary known level of reality. The only sense in which the primary meaning of a symbol can be "lower" and the secondary meaning "higher" is the ethical sense. The sublimation achieved on the secondary plane may have a higher ethical value which is lacking in the primary, unsublimated content.

Silberer reaches his conclusions from a study of the alchemical tradition. As far as English literature is concerned, the hermetic art is a minor influence - Vaughan, I think is the only considerable poet who shows the clear influence of Alchemical writers on the mystical side. But the general theory of multiple interpretation, of functional symbolism and of introversion which he develops in an eclectic fashion from Freud and Jung, contains
a great deal that illuminates mystical writing in general. His analysis of the "titanic" and the "anagogic" aspects of the mystical impulse is too detailed to be described in full, and I shall borrow from him mainly his discussion of the father and mother images.

Repeatedly, the analysis of mystical fantasy reveals the situation which we suppose to be implicit in Blake’s poem. The mother is the supreme object of the child’s attention; the father represents that which stands between the son and the attainment of its object. Be it remembered that even on its primary level, the father and the mother are complex images involving more than any actual parents. On the secondary level, the symbolic use of the father to represent the whole paternal aspect of the world— that which stands between the soul and its Ideal—may proceed without any clear knowledge of the primary meaning. When, on the secondary level, the wish is formulated to do away with, or to at least overcome, the thing which obstructs the soul in its pursuit of the Ideal, it comes about naturally that the primary unconscious meaning is concerned with the killing or conquering of the father. The "old Adam" must be done away with, so that the new, regenerated Adam can appear. Primarily this is a fantasy whereby the son kills the father, assumes his power and position, and thus wins the mother’s exclusive attention. But on the secondary level, the "old Adam" ceases to be an opponent outside of the self, but an enemy from within. The putting-off of the old Adam becomes a rigorous self-sacrifice, even though it is based originally on unbridled selfishness.

We have seen how Blake found the old Adam, the father, to be
an abstract reasoning power, authoritative in its claims, repressive in its moralism, and tenacious in its grip on the instincts. Urizen must be overcome and regenerated before the soul can awaken from the "sleep of Ulro".

It cannot be expected that all mystics will take the same view of moral codes as Blake did. More often, the old Adam is not attacked as unjust moral law, but is thought of as symbolizing the very lusts which the moral law attempts to govern. This diversity of significance, even on the primary level, demonstrates the complex and ambiguous nature of symbols.

That which stands between the son and the attainment of the Ideal (the Mother) may be thought of as this a mass of passions and dispositions inherited from the father. If no criticism of the right of moral authority to curb the instincts is made, then the aspect of the father-image which appears most obstructive is the original sin, the old Adam in its Pauline context. The desire, on the primary level, to prevent the father from enjoying the mother, is sublimated by taking up the father-image into the self, and then preventing the natural fleshly lusts from having free rein.

Not until the natural lusts are regenerated and subordinated to the quest of the ideal, can they be countenanced freely.

It is more often that we find the father-image developed from this side than from the obverse, authoritative side in mystical thinking. Only the more daring spirits like Blake could cope with the old Adam in both its aspects. So far, we have shown Blake as concerned only with the authoritative side, in full revolt from a morality which seeks to impose a pattern on the instin-
-cts from above, instead of co-operating with them, and respecting their peculiar characteristics. But if we return to the Chapel poem, it will now be apparent he was aware of the unregenerate, lustful behaviour which constitutes the sin of Adam. The poet in that poem turns away with disgust from the defilement of sexual enjoyment which the Serpent effects. It is typical of Blake's mental strength that he was able to combine together these two seemingly contradictory aspects of the father symbol, and show that they derive from one another. Lesser mystics have taken the simpler course of condemning the natural life-energy of the flesh "in toto", and accordingly they attain a much lower degree of integration of the self. Blake will not flee from the fierce energy of the flesh, finding it sinfull only when it is distorted by abstract moralism. The special sins which arise from the dominance of the father are revealed in "The Human Abstract":-

"Pity would be no more
If we did not make somebody poor;
And Mercy no more could be
If all were as happy as we.

And mutual fear brings peace,
Till the selfish loves increase:
Then Cruelty knits a snare
And spreads his baits with care.

He sits down with holy fears
And waters the ground with tears:
Then Humility takes root
Underneath his root.

Soon spreads the dismal shade
Of Mystery over his head,
And the Caterpillar and Fly
Feed on the Mystery.

And it bears the fruit of Deceit,
Ruddy and sweet to eat,
And the Raven his nest has made
In its thickest shade.

The Gods of the earth and sea
Sought thro' Nature to find this Tree,
But their search was all in vain:
There grows one in the Human Brain!

Add to these sins - selfishness, cruelty, hypocrisy, mystery-mongering, deceit - Those other sins that relate to the sexual life, and we have a clear picture of the unregenerate Adam. The sexual sins centre round the great theme of jealousy:

"Why art thou silent & invisible
Father of Jealousy?"

Why darkness & obscurity
In all thy words & laws,
That none dare eat the fruit but from
The wily serpent’s jaws?
Or is it because Secresy gains females’ loud applause?"
The last line seems, from the manuscript, to have been an afterthought, but it is pregnant with meaning. The general sexual symbolism of the serpent and the fruit is pinned down to a particular case - the corruption of the female attitude to sexuality through false modesty, deceit and jealousy.

When Blake wishes to do away with the old Adam, it is this definite emotional complex that he is talking about. He wishes to purge the soul of abstract moralism, and of the hypocrisies and hardness of heart which come in its train. Only so can the son attain the mother, the seeker the ideal.

For the adult, it appears that two ways of life are possible. Either he clings to the infantile, retrograde aspect of his impulses; or else he leads those impulses into a closer adjustment to life by re-interpreting his fantasies, by identifying (in this case) the rather he would remove with the old Adam in his unregenerate self. In this way, a spiritual warfare is liberated which results in rebirth into a new and improved manhood.

(4)

The theme we have chosen is only one of many that condition the "via mystica", but it is probably the most basic and essential character of mysticism. On the primary level we have the vaguely realised but perfectly definite interaction between the son, the mother and the father. The same problems that lie under the sur-
race or the family relation appear in a sublimated and more
objectified form in the mystical fantasy. This process is cer-
tainly not limited to mystical experience, but is a feature of
human experience generally: but in the mystics the problem is
worked out more intensively. From the Christian viewpoint, it is
most simply by Richard Rolle:

"Inasu that died on the rood for love of me,
And bought me with thy precious blood, thou have mercy
of me,

What me lets of any thing to love thee,
Be it me lier, be it me loth, do it away from me."

It is interesting to see what a complete reversal has
taken place on the secondary level. The father-image which the
son would destroy has been subsumed under the self: the agent of
destruction, on the other hand, ceases to be the self and is
projected outwards into the figure of Christ. Christ, for the
Christian, is not only the type-hero whom everyone wishes to
imitate, he is considered as still working upon the soul, still
an active agent destroying the old Adam. This projection of the
inner psyche into the symbol of the spiritual hero is a common
method of objectifying the conflict. Donne has a similar passage
of great vigour:

"Batter my heart, three person'd God; for, you
As yet but knocke, breathe, shine, and seeke to mend;
That I may rise, and stand, o'erthrow mee', and bend
Your force, to breake, blowe, burn and make me new."

The same movement of thought is apparent in non-Christian
writings. The mythology that D.H.Lawrence created for himself shows
a formal similarity with the Christian mystic way, whatever differences or content there may be. The ideal is represented as a feminine image with the function of the mother:

"You beauty, O you beauty
You glistening garmentless beauty!
Great lady, great glorious lady--

Now lady of the Moon, now open the gate of your silvery house
and let me come past the silver bells of your flowers and the cockle-shells into your house, garmentless lady of the last great glair:
who will give me back my lost limbs
and my lost white fearless breast
and set me again on moon-remembering feet
a healed, whole man, O Moon!

The regeneration that comes about through the attainment of the mother has rarely been expressed in such full beauty. Here the emphasis is on the final re-creation. Elsewhere Lawrence develops a myth for the antecedent destruction of the corrupted self (the father-image). At a certain point of experience the inherited self falls into ruin. Although it is dead as a function or life, it has not, however, ceased to exist - it must make the journey to complete oblivion before re-birth is possible. This is a theme of a whole series of Lawrence's later poems. In "Beware the Unhappy Dead", the ruined selves are shown as unwilling to depart:
"Beware the unhappy dead thrust out of life unready, unprepared, unwilling, unable to continue on the longest journey. Oh, now as November draws near the grey, grey reaches of earth's shadow, the long mean marginal stretches of our existence are crowded with lost souls, the uneasy dead that cannot embark on the slinking sea beyond."

This death corresponds in many ways to the state of Experience that Blake speaks of. The discordant souls that have lost their power to live look back longingly to the state of Innocence but are unwilling to undertake the difficult path of regeneration. They prefer regression to sublimation:

"Seeking their old haunts with cold ghastly rage
Old haunts, old habitats, old hearths,
old places of sweet life from which they are thrust out and can but haunt in disembodied rage."

The dead must embark upon that sea which is a symbol of primal motherhood, of the maternal unconscious womb-existence:

"Build then the ship of death, for you must take the longest journey, to oblivion.

And die the death, the long and painful death that lies between the old self and the new——

O build your ship of death, your little ark and furnish it with food, with little cakes, and wine for the dark flight down oblivion."
This "great adventure of death, where Thomas Cook cannot guide us" is not undertaken for its own sake, but in hope of the resurrection to follow.

"The flood subsides, and the body, like a worn sea-shell emerges strange and lovely ---"

The mystical poetry of Lawrence's mature vision is, I think, unquestionably his great achievement in literature. The besetting weaknesses, the errors of taste and judgment, that mar his prose and much of his verse, disappear almost completely in these extraordinary poems, with their

"----snatches of lovely oblivion, and snatches of renewal

Ood, wintry flowers upon the withered stem."

(5)

That the basic forms of the mystic quest, and the basic powers of the soul which underlie it, do not change, no matter what vast differences of symbolism or content appear, becomes increasingly obvious the more we attend to the inner core of the meaning. A difference in symbolism does not necessarily mean a difference in content, and even a difference in content does not imply a difference in the formal method employed. Throughout there are the same three stages - the death of the old self, the gestation, and finally the rebirth of the new: and always this secon-
ary level is found to originate in and be conditioned by the primary. Despite all the differences between D.H.Lawrence and a mystic like Thomas Traherne, the same basic pre-occupation are discernable. Traherne affords a fairly clear example of the dual aspect of mystical fantasy, and his work is relatively free from the complexity, the uncertainties and obscurities, that make many mystics so hard to understand. The first half-dozen or so of Treharne's "Poems of Felicity" form a connected series, and present us with the essential characteristics of his thought. Traherne pictures the soul thrown into discord by contact with experience, and troubled by recollections of the state of innocence. He looks back wistfully to an idealized childhood, when

"I within did flow
With Seas of Life like Wine;
I nothing in the World did know
But 'twas Divine---
The State of Innocence.
And Bliss, not Trades & Poverties,
Did fill my Sense."

The conviction grows upon him that a return to that ideal state is not impossible, but necessary for the soul's happiness:

"Return: Thy Treasures
Abide thee still, & in their places stand
Inviting yet, & waiting thy Command."

So the mystical journey begins, and it has the same three stages that we have noted, even if the detailed experience has
elements peculiar to Traherne:-

(1) The Flight. The old, corrupt self must be put off before the end can be gained. This involves a retreat from the world and a turning in upon the soul - the process which the psychologists call introversion.

"Spew out thy Filth, thy Flesh abjure; Let not Contingents thee defile; For Transients only are impure, And empty things thy Soul beguile."

The object of the flight (both neurotically and mystically) is to become a child again by re-birth:

"----- & therefore fly (A lowly State may hide A man from Danger) to the Womb, That I may yet New-born becom."

(2) The Contemplation. The soul, having weaned itself from the accumulated mass of passions and habits which constitute the old Adam, now adjusts itself to the new, introverted stage of its experience. Introversion is the test of the mystic's quality, for it can as easily lead towards regression as towards progression. Jung has expressed the opinion that the danger of introversion lies in indolence. For the introvert, many pleasing fantasies and sensations come. These can as easily be taken in a retrograde spirit of self-indulgence, as in a forward-looking spirit. Traherne is clear on n
his attitude to this too:

"Flight is but the Preparative: the Sight
is deep & infinit—""

The Vision takes for its theme the pleasures of the Eden-state,
and anticipates further experiences not yet gained:

"To see the Fountain is a Blessed thing;
It is to see the King
Of Glory face to face: But yet the End,
The deep & wondrous End, is more;
In that the Fount we also comprehend,
The Spring we there Adore—"

From One, to One, in One, to see All things.
Perceiv the King of Kings
My God & Portion: to see his Treasures
Made all mine own, my Self the the End
Of his great Labors! 'Tis the Life of Pleasures!"

(3) The final stage is the fulfilment of these anticipations.
In "The Rapture", the wanderer has attained the ultimate union and
emerges new-born:

"Sweet Infancy!
O Hevenly Fire! O Sacred Light!
How fair & bright!
How Great am I
Whom the whol World doth magnify."

The new self attains to a power and glory and a happiness beyond
anything the old self could imagine.
Traherne's particular emphasis on Childhood is noteworthy even though it is a common theme in Vaughan, Blake, Wordsworth and others. For Christian mysticism the "locus classicus" is, of course, to be found in the gospels. "Whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child shall in no wise enter therein" (Luke 18. 17) "Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God." (John 3. 3-5).

Thus the secondary interpretation of Traherne's symbolism is not hard to find. He either explains himself, or uses such recognised symbols as Eaen, Adam, Infancy, the womb, and so on. The psychoanalytic interpretation in its general features will be apparent from what has already been said. Only one or two observations need be made.

(1) Traherne introduces a characteristic symbol, the Infant-Eye, which raises an analytic point that has not been dealt with so far. The emphasis on the pleasures of the innocent eye, in its primary connotation, is to be referred to the satisfaction of infantile sexual curiosity.

(2) The mother-image appears in the womb symbolism, but not elsewhere. The exigencies of Christian theology make it difficult for any further objectification of the so-called incest-wish.

(3) In the same way, the theological framework puts a limit to the theme of usurping the power and privileges of the father. The father, in the aspect which refers to the old Adam, is successfully combated; but the father in his function as supreme authority must remain. God is still God. The only way in which the usurpation fantasy could be fulfilled would be for the soul to become God - a
heresy not unknown, but alien to the Church of England. The egoistic ambitions of the unconscious have to insinuate their wishes in a more guarded fashion:

"O how Divine

Am I!"

It may seem to many that analysis has gone out of its way to scrawl obscene suggestions over the beauty of Traherne's poetry. I do not accept such a criticism. It may well be that the Freudian interpretation I have worked out above, on analogy with Silberer's more competent work, does not succeed in representing undistorted the relation between Traherne's symbols and the subjective problems that fashioned them. It is not necessary to be dogmatic about this or that point of analysis, so long as the fact is recognised in principle, that mystical symbolism is conditioned by the "titanic" forces of the mind. But those who think of analysis as something like "the motive-hunting of the motiveless (and indecent) malignity" are usually those who refuse to face the possibility that the "titanic" forces of the mind may appear unpleasant and crude when brought into relation with our conscious ethical standards. Such people take up one of two attitudes, equally indefensible. Either they refuse to consider for a moment the evidence that man's conduct is not wholly conditioned by the unconsciousness; or, (while admitting the hypothesis - is that there is more of the mind than appears on the surface), they will not believe that the unconscious activities could be so monstrous as the analysts make out.

It is not difficult to dismiss the first type. They do not want explanation, but prefer to remain in comfortable ignorance. The
second type appears to make a slight concession to the evidence by allowing the existence of the unconscious — but only if its nice! Yet if there is one thing more certain than another it is that, no matter what changes may come about in our attitude to the unconscious, no matter what wonderful and pleasant things we may later unearth from it, a great deal of its activities will always be found socially unacceptable. Such people do not think it osten-
sive if you point out that, as often as not, the activities of the unconscious are abominable. Why should they dislike the idea that the unconscious also exhibits undesirable characteristics? One of the functions of the unconscious is to give shelter to those wishes and intentions which even the easy-going conscious mind treats as pariahs.

The truth is that this attitude of horror and disapproval is utterly irrelevant to a serious discussion. If we desire explanation at all, then we must also accept the means of explanation, the only available means of explaining the symbolism is to use the finding or analysis. Freudianism apart, it remains a fact that it is not in the least easy to differentiate the out-
pourings of lunacy from the symbolic writings of some of the most significant figures in European culture. It is only by seeing what the lunatic, the lover and the poet have in common that we can proceed to differentiate them.

As I have shown, that differentiation can be reasonably based on the view that symbols are ambivalent. One aspect of the symbol looks towards sanity and the other towards insaincy. If
it seizes upon the sublimated, progressive aspect, there is no deterioration and the personality is enlarged. The full beauty and significance of Traherne cannot be appreciated unless we know the nature of the subjective forces which the poet called into play and succeeded in harmonising with reality.

The two aspects of Traherne's symbolism which we have noted above may be summarised thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Primary Impulse</strong></th>
<th><strong>Secondary Impulse</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Removal of the Father.</td>
<td>(1) Death of the old Self.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(2) Desire for the Mother.</td>
<td>(2) Return to Childhood, Introversion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Enjoyment of the Mother.</td>
<td>(3) Spiritual regeneration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Sexual curiosity.</td>
<td>(4) Spiritual Sight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Replacing the Father.</td>
<td>(5) Exaltation of the Soul.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The form of this table, and some of the terminology is borrowed from Silberer. (p263). I quote with approval his own comment:

"We need not scent anything extraordinary behind these intro-determinations, as the scheme here is only roughly sketched; they take place in each and every one of us, otherwise we should be mere beasts. Only they do not in every one of us rise to the intensity of the mystical life" (Ibid).

Traherne, at the end of his book, asked himself the ques-
"Did I grow, or did I stay? Did I prosper or decay? When I so From things to thoughts did go?"

We are, in some ways, in a better position to answer than he was. If we glance down the left-hand column of the table above, the neurotic possibilities of Traherne's experience become evident. More fully than he could, we can see the dangers of decay to which he did not succumb. The right-hand column thus indicates the progress he did make. It does not concern our analysis that Traherne was of the opinion that he had entered the kingdom of God: nor need we believe that Traherne's Childhood ever was the ideal state of innocence that he conceived it to be. What does concern us is that he developed his capacity to live fully and enjoy life deeply without indulging in the anti-social attitudes which mark the neurotic. Of that increased vital power and harmony, Traherne can bear abundant testimony.

"----- my Life is a Circle of Delights;
A hidden Sphere of obvious Benefits:
An Earnest that the Actions of the Just
Shall still revive, & flourish in the Dust."

But where Traherne finds assurance of progress, the orthodox Freudian finds proof of regression, and is satisfied with only the primary interpretation of the "hidden sphere of obvious Benefits."

We stand - somewhat uneasily, perhaps, for moderation is difficult - between Traherne and Freud. We do not, with the former, find
any sanction in reality for his conviction that he has entered the Kingdom of God: nor do we, with the latter, see as a purely regressive process something which has resulted in a higher adjustment to, and enjoyment of, ordinary reality. What Traherne has done is to take the primary level of regressive desires as itself a mere symbol of the secondary level. He has solved the problem of the regressive wish by projecting it into a way of life which makes for sublimation instead. He moves between two forces - between the Id and the Super-Ego, if we may borrow the terms - and proceeds by an intuitive adjustment or the demands of the one to the demands of the other.

Unless we take this view, we are faced with one of two insoluble problems. If the unconscious impulse be disregarded, the question then arises: Why is this imagery of gestation and birth so compelling a symbol for Traherne? How does he come to choose that particular symbol rather than another? No analysis of the overt content of the poetry furnishes a clue. On the other hand, if the whole mystical interpretation be disregarded as a mere rationalization of what is simply an interuterine fantasy and nothing more, then the equally difficult question can be asked: How is it that we can detect no progressive neurotic maladjustment to reality? Or the regressive impulse is indulged so consistently in these fantasies, would we not expect to find a gradual breakdown of the mentality of the poet? But there is little to suggest this in Traherne's writings. The bifold interpretation suggested in this essay is born out of the conflict between these two opposing problems that present themselves to the pious mystic and
the pious Freudian. The mystic cannot explain away the fact that his symbolism has a close relation to the clinical fantasies collected by analysts. The analyst cannot explain away the fact that a schizophrenic who shows mystical tendencies is a very different matter from the mystic whose personality is well adjusted to daily life, and who is perfectly capable of meeting the stresses and strains of reality — perhaps even more so than other people.

(6)

This brief comparative survey enables us to return with greater confidence to the work of the greatest and most difficult of English mystics, and to investigate further the symbolic process as he used it. Much will probably remain in obscurity for some time to come, and it is admittedly a hazardous undertaking to discuss Blake at all in the present condition of our understanding.

For instance, it is, in my opinion, impossible to pronounce with certainty on the precise nature of Blake's metaphysical belief. This much can be positively stated. If Blake was a Christian, he was the nearest thing to an atheist that ever bore that title. Time after time we find that what appears to be in Blake a positive statement about the nature of the Universe disappears into a subjective presentation of the human soul. That most of the mythological machinery or the prophetic books is to be so interpreted is clear from his own statement:

"The ancient Poets animated all sensible objects with Gods
or Geniuses, calling them by the names and adorning them with the properties of woods, rivers, mountains, lakes, cities, nations, and whatever their enlarged & numerous senses could perceive.

And particularly they studied the genius of each city and country, placing it under its mental deity;

Till a system was formed, which some took advantage of & enslav'd the vulgar by attempting to realize or abstract the mental deities from their objects; thus began Priesthood,

Choosing forms of worship from poetic tales.

And at length they pronounced that the Gods had order'd such things.

Thus men forgot that All deities reside in the human breast."

This deliberate subjectivism operates not only in the story of the deities, but I think it is true of the cosmological material as well. It seems that Blake rejected the Gnostic myths as objective cosmologies and treated them as what they really are - projections of subjective status or mind. Just how far this goes is shown by his further statement, "God only acts and is, in existing beings or Men? And if this is true of God, it must be true of Jesus as well. Jesus is the name for the Divine Imagination. Blake seems to leave no room for an objective Heaven with its Trinity and attendant powers. All deities reside in the human breast. The Apocalyptic conclusion to "Jerusalem" is not an orthodox Christian apocalypse. One line is sufficient to demonstrate this:

"So Spake the Vision of Albion, & in him so spake in my hearing
Whether Blake accorded any cosmic validity at all to the Gnostic myth or the Fall from the Pleroma is difficult to say. In the subjective domain, he certainly used that myth as a pure symbol, and its usefulness as a symbol is independent of the question of its ultimate validity. Instead of trying to decide just what is objective in Blake's cosmology, I prefer to point out that the Gnostic framework is easily separable from the essential core of his teaching, and the latter's validity is independent of cosmological theory. We shall not do any great violence to Blake if we consider "Jerusalem" as wholly a myth of the soul, in its endeavours to adjust itself to the realities of which it is conscious.

Having rescued Blake from the normal religious categories, however, we must be sure that we do not put him back into "single vision and Newton's sleep." The realities of which Blake was conscious are vastly different from the space-time world of Newton. He never doubted for a moment that the four-fold vision in which he delighted was a genuine perception of a reality infinitely greater than the world of the five senses. Whether he was right in this is too difficult a question to answer. If we should say that he was wrong, then we should have to look for an explanation of such abnormal visionary experiences in terms of Newtonian reality. So far, no such explanation of vision has been forth coming, and it is wise to leave the question in
abeyance.

What concerns us more is to discover what Blake (and visionaries like him) meant when they spoke of vision that goes beyond the five senses. Blake endeavours to help us, but he is a wayward guide. As often as not he is having a quiet joke at the expense of the non-visionary. It is like Antony pulling Lepidus's leg -

"LEP. What manner of thing is your crocodile?
ANT. It is shaped, sir, like itself--
LEP. What colour is it of?
ANT. Of its own colour too.
LEP. 'Tis a strange serpent."

I suspect that Blake's imagination or visionary power was not unlike the crocodile.

"What", it will be questioned, "When the Sun rises, do you not see a round dish of fire somewhat like a Guinea?"

No, no, I see an Innumerable company of the Heavenly host crying, "Holy, Holy, Holy is the Lord God Almighty." I don't doubt for a moment that Blake may on occasion have seen such angels and heard such music, but very obviously what Blake meant by vision was something much more incommunicable than any such pleasant raree-show. The power to replace the sun by a sideshow of angels is certainly not the power of Eternal Life that Blake so passionately claimed as an essential principle in human conduct.

In the "Last Judgement" he makes several attempts to explain what he means by the visionary power. The passage
quoted above continues with a comparatively informative statement: "I question not my Corporeal or Vegetative Eye any more than I would question a Window concerning a Sight. I look thro' it & not with it." This is consonant with his earlier statement in "Europe:"

"Five windows light the cavern'd Man: thro' one he breathes the air,
Thro' one hears the music of the Spheres, thro' one the eternal vine
Flourishes that he may receive(sic) the grapes, thro' one can look
And see small portions of the eternal world that ever groweth,
Thro' one himself can pass out what time he please; but he will not,
For stolen joys are sweet & bread eaten in secret pleasant."

For Blake, the experience of the ordinary senses was merely a part of a much wider experiences. If we bind ourselves down to the reality observable by our ordinary senses, we cut ourselves off from Eternity, and live in an artificially closed world - the material, or vegetable universe as he called it. "For man has closed himself up, till he sees all things thro' the narrow chinks of his cavern." (H & H). If the receptivity of these senses is enlarged so that it can see "the infinite in all things", the vegetable universe is destroyed, in the sense that it is no longer separate from the infinite. Vision seemed to him to be not a
matter of neglecting the senses, lent of developing them beyond their present condition ----"The whole creations will be consumed and appear infinite and holy, whereas it now appears finite & corrupt.

"This will come to pass by an improvement of sensual enjoyment.

"But first the notion that a man has a body distinct from his soul is to be expunged: this I shall do, by printing in the internal method, by corrosives, which in Hell are salubry and medicinal, melting apparent surfaces away, and displaying the infinite which was hid.

"If the doors of perception were cleansed, every thing would appear to man as it is, infinite." (HLH).

Probably, Blake was confusing two different types of experience when he spoke of vision in general. On the one hand, there is this affirmation of the power of the senses to see the infinite in all things; and on the other hand, there are the numerous apparitions that came to him - fairies, ghosts, angels etc. The first is the mystic power that we find in Shelley, Wordsworth and so on, and we may call it by Blake's own name, Imagination. It is much the same as the esemplastic power that Coleridge also called imagination.

The same vision, we shall keep for the second type of Blake's experience, where a definite, hallucinatory apparition is involved. Concerning this, the wisest criticism has been made by Bernard Shaw in his discussion of the visions of Joan of Arc.
As in the case of mystical experience proper, it is foolish to judge hallucination as pathological a priori. The only criterion is in the final result—whether the hallucination is directed towards an adjustment to reality. With this second type, vision, we have little concern as students of literary symbolism, however. In Blake has a vision of Isaiah, then he needs no symbolic technique to describe him in terms of the five senses.

But with the kind of thing we have called imagination, we are very much concerned. Language was fashioned to record experience in terms of the five senses of this vegetable world. It is not designed to give a direct presentation of such realities as may exist beyond. If the infinite should impinge on ordinary experience, the problem arises: How can the infinite be expressed in finite terms? This is the classic problem of mysticism. The difficulty does not disappear even if, as Blake did, we speak of imagination as simply an enlargement of the existing senses: it is still true that language does not lend itself readily to be a vehicle for such enlarged apprehensions.

So far, Blake has been our best guide in the difficult paths we follow. But now he becomes something very like the worst. His imagination was so shot through with vision that he seldom gives us any clear notion of the precise nature of his experience. Hence Sauret denies that Blake is a mystic at all. Wholly a visionary, Sauret, betrayed by academic distinctions. If we would understand imagination in its specialised meaning, we must go elsewhere.
It is in European thought that we find the clearest analysis of the conditions under which the imagination fashions its symbols. Be it remembered that we are concerned above all with an experience that involves no hallucination. The hallucinated visionary claims to have perceived something with his finite senses - the inkspot on Luther's wall is the testimony of this. The mystical imagination does not make any such claims. If the mystic "hears" a celestial sound, or "smells" a celestial odour, it is not an actual sound or odour he is thinking of but something analogous, i.e., something of which actual sounds and odours are a symbol. "Understand me", says St. Teresa, "the soul does not feel any real heat or scent, but something which I use as metaphor to explain."

This point must be constantly borne in mind. Crashaw has made many verses on St. Teresa:

"O how oft shalt thou complain
Of a sweet insubtle Pain;
Of intolerable Joyes;
Of a Death, in which who dyes
Loves his death, and dyes again;
And would for ever so be slain.
And lives, & dyes; and knowes not why
To live, But that he thus may never leave to Dy."

It cannot be stressed too often, that the simple-seeming language of pain which is used here, is to be taken as symbolic of something which is not pain, but is expressible only
in terms of such an analogy.

Similarly, Richard Rolle uses the language of music to symbolise something infinite, which is merely like finite music.

"But love him at thy might,
While thou art living here,
And look up to that sight
that name be thee so dear;
Say till him day and night,
"When may I nigh thee near?
Raise me up to thy light
thy melody to hear."

Rolle is noticeable because of the unusual emphasis he places on music as a symbol. Mystical experience came to him in terms of the three things: "calor", "canor", "dulcor" - heat, song, and sweetness. The heat of love and its sweetness are the common-place themes of religious poetry generally, but Rolle is almost unique in his employment of musical symbolism. His editor, Francis M. Comper, has found a certain similarity to Rolle in A Meditation of St. Augustine, but scarcely elsewhere. The passage in St. Augustine is worth quoting, because of its insistence on the symbolic nature of sensuous language.

"It was going up to the tabernacle (i.e. to the church) the psalmist arrived at the house of God; ... by following the leadings of a certain delight, an inward mysterious and hidden
pleasure, as if from the house of God there sounded sweetly some instrument; and he whilst walking in the tabernacle, hearing a certain inward sound, led on by its sweetness and following the guidance of the sound ——— made his way on, even to the house of God."

Augustine is particularly careful, by use of the word "inward", to dissociate the music from any literal and finite connotation.

The mystics of the neo-Reformation, St. Theresa, St. John of the Cross, etc., elaborated a definite classification which has been used by more recent writers. They posited a number of definite senses of the soul, each bearing an analogy with a physical sense, but concerned with other sense objects. Thus there is a sense of spiritual sight, of spiritual hearing, of spiritual smell and so on. The confused and intuitive symbolism of earlier mystics is taken up into a definite psychology, nay physiology, of the soul. The language of symbolism is the "language of the spiritual senses", and they dream of an extension of speech whereby symbolism can be dropped, and a naked direct terminology evolved.

So far, that dream has not been fulfilled. "The Song of Songs", in its mystical interpretation, remains the supreme expression of spiritual experience in terms of the finite senses. The result is, that for the mystic, the subject is always outside of the poem. If the mystic says: "Stay me with flagons, comfort
me with apples: "for I am sick of love," he includes in his meaning a positive and a negative aspect:-

(a) He denies that the literal meaning is intended. He does not want earthly apples and flagons.

(b) But he does want something analogous in the spiritual world which is outside of the poem. He wants "food for the soul."

The peculiar status of mystical poetry may be compared with what we find in another art. Another great 17th-century Catholic strove to conquer the problem in his paintings. Few men could give such a literal representation of the real things as El Greco, when he wished. The lower half of the "Burial of Count Orgaz" is superbly realistic. But the upper half, the spiritual region which waits to receive the dead man's soul, is executed with the characteristic distortions for which El Greco is noted. What are we to make of these glaring, melodramatic visions, with their elongated saints, their bulgy, bulging faces and weird unearthly lightning? It used to be said that El Greco suffered from astigmatism, and knew no better. But his realistic studies count. Surely he is presenting in his own medium the same general conception of the mystics, that spiritual vision is like the physical but essentially different? He is endeavouring to express be outward and symbolic forms certain inward states of ecstasy which cannot otherwise be expressed.

The evaluation of the language of the spiritual senses on the basis of the general view of mysticism I have expressed not
above is not an easy matter. We must start by recognising that, whatever suspect meanings and overtones the mystic finds in his experience, the experience itself is an actual phenomenon and cannot be dismissed. It may not be true that the soul is in communication with its deity, but it is true that the soul has an experience which is not an hallucination of the senses, but something different - an experience like pain, or sweetness, or fire, or light. An explanation of spiritual sensations in terms of a nervous organism may be - and I think it is - necessary. The fire of love which St. Teresa felt was, I believe, based upon a definite nervous structure. But it was not the kind of hallucination which interprets some internal nervous change as sense-knowledge of an external object. It is part of the essential datum that the experience is not a sense experience, not a vision of an actual light, nor the smelling of an actual odour: and this deliverance of the mystic's experience must be respected.

Now this very difficulty which confronts the psychologist points to a solution for us. We are not concerned with how spiritual sensation can be referred to a psycho-physical organism: it is sufficient for us to conclude that it can be so referred. But this analysis suggests that a useful distinction can be made between the various parts of the mystic's experience which he considers to be a simple whole. We may say that St. Teresa's experience of heat is separable into two parts

(a) an actual sensation of spiritual heat which cannot, "qua sensation", be denied.
(b) her automatic interpretation of that feeling in terms of religious dogma. It came to her as part of her experience that the fire of love derived from the celestial bridegroom. We may be pardoned for supposing that this was a rationalization, a secondary development of her primary experience, not carrying the same sanction or immediacy that the primary does.

I am following in this a line of criticism suggested by Aldous Huxley in his illuminating essay on Pascal. The fact that the Catholic experiences something which confirms his catholicism, the Buddhist something which confirms his Buddhism, the atheist (atheist mystics are not unknown: Richard Jefferies was an atheist) something which confirms his atheism, can only be explained by this secondary process of rationalization. Huxley, in discussing that curious record of ecstasy which Pascal left behind him, has chosen a particularly good example — in fact, the presence of the basic experience side by side with its rationalization is so obvious here, that it is almost taking advantage of Pascal to point it out. I shall cite only a little of the document:

"Depuis environ huit heures et demy du soir jusqu'environ minuit et demy."

FEU

"Dieu d'Abraham, Dieu d'Isaac, Dieu de Jacob
Non des philosophes et des scuans"
Certitude, certitude, sentiment, Joye, Paix."

Observe the stratification. First comes the single dramatic word, the pure symbol of an intense mystical emotion - "Feu". This is followed by a dogmatic incantation and we do not return to the primary feeling until he breaks out: "Certitude, certitude ---".

Usually it is not so easy to disentangle the basic sentiment from its dogmatic scaffolding. In search for an example as simple in its way as Pascal, I arrived at that curious and rather magnificent book of Richard Jefferies called "The Story of My Heart". Jefferies is more sceptical than the average sceptic: he rejects God, he perceives no evidence for plan or purpose in nature; but he rejects evolution also as a "modern superstition", and with it the whole logic of science. "There is no inherent necessity for a first cause, or that the world and the universe was created, or that it was shaped of existing matter, or that it evolved itself and its inhabitants, or that the cosmos has existed in varying forms for ever. There may be other alternatives altogether. The only idea I can give is the idea that there is another idea."

This is probably the simplest affirmation of belief that could be made. We would not, therefore, expect to find an overgreat sophistication in the dogmatic framework of his mysticism, and indeed it expressed with a superb simplicity: "I was not more than eighteen when an inner and esoteric meaning began to come to me from all the visible universe, and indefinable aspirations filled me ----. There was
a deeper meaning everywhere. The sun burned with it, the broad front of morning beamed with it; a deep feeling entered me while gazing at the sky in the azure noon, and in the star-lit evening." Here we have to race only such comparatively accepted symbols as "meaning". The word "meaning", may not, in this context, yield any clear concept on analysis, but nearly everybody has known brief moments, at dawn, at dusk, or midnight, when by some trick of the light or some aerlection of neural habits, the visible world is present to the brain more vividly, more immediately, and as it were charged with an unusual "intention". We can imagine Jefferies as experiencing this, not in a brief flicker, but for long periods at many times in his life, and hence assigning to it an importance that it has not for us. No doubt also, the consumption that ate into the last years of his life contributed to the intensity of his awareness.

It seemed worth while to dwell a little on the writings of this too little known nature-mystic. I doubt if the basic emotion of mysticism has ever achieved such simplicity of expression. Now and then it seems as if he is beginning to develop an unwarranted machinery or dogma to support his feelings, and to some extent he does, as a matter of necessity. But it is well to bear in mind his own "caveat" upon the terms he uses. "One of the greatest difficulties I have encountered is the lack of words to express ideas. By the word soul, or psyche, I mean that inner consciousness which aspires. By prayer I do not mean a request
for anything preferred to a deity; I mean intense soul-emotion, intense aspiration. The word immortal is very inconvenient, and yet there is no other to convey the idea of soul-life. Even these definitions are deficient, and I must leave my book as a whole to give its own meaning to its words." This confession is one of the most important passages in mystical literature and cannot be studied too deeply. He who would read well must pierce beyond the diverse symbolisms and assess the inner content of well-nigh incommunicable experience. To stand at the periphery, paralysed by the attempt to arrange the symbols into a system of belief, distraught by the esoteric machinery of cults and sects, is to miss the essential human core or feeling that is basic.

"To make light of philosophy," said Pascal, "is to be a true philosopher." The true mystic is one who makes light of mysticism in its external symbolic form. The great mystics, even the great intellectualists like Plotinus and St. Augustine, never lose sight of the necessity of putting first things first. It is the mark of inferior minds of the suburban theosophist, the cabbalistic bank clerk to be seduced by the glamour and mystery of symbolic trappings until the human immediacy of the thing is lost. It is the mark of inferior minds for a very definite reason. The neurotic often displays a fondness for reading about the esoteric symbolisms of various cults -- Freemasonry, Rosicrucianism, Theosophy etc. -- not because he is concerned with the arduous spiritual life which the adepts have found in these symbols, but because they lend themselves easily to his own private fantasies.
There is always a choice between the "titanic" and the "anagoge" aspect: the neurotic submits to the force of the titanic and lets the anagoge pass.

(7)

The primary concern of the mystic as a poet is, therefore, to use words to present sensations which they are not very well adapted to present. But this is a difficulty that is by no means confined to mysticism. If it were it would be of little account in this essay. Just as the mystic is struggling intensively to make the same kind of adjustment to reality as ordinary people do with less perservance and thoroughness, so does he face the same language problems as the other people do. The "language of the spiritual senses" is not some peculiar esoteric mumbo-jumbo that is irrelevant to normal life, for normal life is also concerned with the so-called spiritual senses. Everybody is aware of a large number of physical and mental sensations that cannot be directly expressed in language, and everybody makes use of symbolic language in order to make a clearer statement of what they feel. Colloquial speech abounds in phrases that use ordinary sense-impressions as symbols of some interior feeling that they have about things.

A loud check-suit.
A screaming red tie.
Heavy music.
A bright melody.

These words do not characterise their objects, but give a personal
comment on them - i.e., they refer to an interior impression which is produced by sense-data, but is not itself a sense-datum. This is even more obvious when we consider phrases like:

Am I blue?
I saw red.
A cold heart,
A bright thought.

If we had to explain what we meant, we should have to say that we were using sense impressions as the nearest analogy to the feelings we had. In some cases, language has more or less direct words corresponding to these interior sensations. Thus, instead of the four phrases above, we could have said:

Am I sad?
I was very angry.
An unkind person.
An intelligent thought.

But the difference is striking. Instead of a vivid phrase that suggests the quality of the experience very closely, our language has declined into vague expressions that indicate what we mean without really presenting it. If we wish to bring out the unique and vivid nature of an impression, we are almost forced to introduce the symbolic language of the spiritual senses.

The enquiry into mysticism has revealed something of the way in which the mind uses the images of external reality in order to interpret its own passions and conflicts, and it has led us to the problem of language as a symbolic instrument. The
two questions are closely related, and it is impossible to solve the linguistic problem without having settled the wider problems involved in the making of poetry. In the next section, the same enquiry will be directed to the literary symbolism that became a cult in the nineteenth century. The mystical aspect of Romanticism will be ignored as far as possible in order to concentrate on the more purely aesthetic questions that present themselves.
PART TWO: THE SYMBOLISTS.

And thus do we of wisdom and of reach,
With windlasses and with assays of bias,
By indirections find directions out.  

_Hamlet_ II. 1. 64-66
"Speech", said Novalis, "is Delphi." (Fragmente p186)

The most significant aspect of the nineteenth century poetry is the especial, and at times extraordinary, attention that was paid to words. At the very beginning of the century, in the full tide of the Goethean summer, Novalis was enunciating ideas, not wholly new or peculiar to himself, which were to be a constant point of reference for the succeeding generations. It does not matter much in what way precisely these ideas were spread. Europe was apparently waiting for them and received them as

"Hieroglyphes dont s'exalte le millier
A propager de l'aile un risson familier!"

The minute questions of sources and influences are irrelevant here: what is needed is an account of where and how those ideas were stated and put into practice in their most significant form.

Novalis’ "magical idealism" goes further in its elevation of the aesthetic than even Fichte and Schleiermacher. The epistemological teaching of Fichte, that the phenomenal world was a mental construction, an appearance thoroughly conditioned by the activity of the mind in knowing, joined forces with the ethical teaching of Hemsterhuis. In the view of Hemsterhuis, the mental organ that was supreme above others was the "moral sense", and this organ, in its activity, was capable of infinite productiveness, infinite perfectibility, until man was raised to the level of the divine. Out of these notions Novalis evolved the conception of poetry as capable of producing reality.
ad. lib. Walzel quotes him as saying: "Poetry is the authentic, absolute reality. This is the kernel of my philosophy. The more poetical, the truer."

In the "Fragments" (p. 207) he has some illuminating notes:

"Hemsternuis' theory of the moral sense. His surmises about the perfectibility and the infinitely possible use of this sense. Philosophical ethic – poetical ethic ----

"Religious doctrine is scientific poetry. Poetry is to reeling what philosophy is in relation to thought --

"The poetical philosopher is 'en état de Créateur absolu'-----"

It is tempting to multiply examples, and even more tempting to point out how many men were saying similar things round about 1800, from Coleridge with his esemplastic power to Hugo with his demand for complete creative freedom for the imagination. Novalis was one of those who tried to give a philosophical basis for what was a dominant impulse of the era-

"Das Urspiel jeder Natur beginnt,
Auf kräftige Worte jedes sinnt,
Und so das grosse Weltgemüt
Überall sich regt una unendlich blüht/ blüht."

("Astralis")

Words had been enowced with a new power, for as the instruments of poetic imagination they could call up new realities from the void. The poet armed with his "Logos" was indeed "en état de créateur absolu ----" and the "Logos" itself was the outward
clothing, the appointed symbol of the world of imaginative realities which it brought into being.

It seemed particularly appropriate to speak of Novalis rather than of any other. A century later, in Sydney, a poet with a striking similarity to the author of "Hymnen an die Nacht" was writing:

"What do I know? myself alone,
a gulf of uncreated life night,
wherein no star may e'er be shown
save I create it in my might.

What have I done? Oh foolish word,
and foolish deed your question craves!
think ye the sleeping depths are stirr'd
tho' tempest hound the madden'd waves?

What do I seek? I seek the word
that shall become the deed of might
wherenby the sullen gulfs are stirr'd
and stars begotten on their night."

Those lines of Brennan are more than a personal confession, they are the expression of the aesthetic dreams of a century of European poets.

So much for the theory in the nebular ecstatic condition in which Novalis left it. Later developments and introdeterminations of the idea of the logos as creative magic will be taken up in due course.
the philosophical somnabulism typified by Novalis, and the
results are instructive both for what was actually
achieved and for what deficiencies were revealed for later
times to rectify.

From Novalis himself the most highly
developed fruit was the "Hymen an die Nacht". By means
of the imagery of day and night he attempts to give a
philosophical presentation of existence. The ordinary
view of night is that it comes about through the absence
of day, but Novalis has it that night is primary, all-
embracing, and that day cannot be viewed rightly except as
a secondary incident produced out of night, the great mother
of all things. So he addresses light -

"Sie trägt dich mütterlich
Und irh verdankst du
All deine Herrlichkeit."

This is the "true night", which is something more than a
leap of the sun, something greater than a part of the
24-hour cycle. Cosmologically, it is the basis of the
universe, presupposed by all light and form and life.

This cosmological meaning of night is itself
a symbol of further meanings. Just as light typifies the
conscious, practical, reasoning mind, so does night stand
for the unconscious and barely conscious emotional powers,
and it is towards the realm of night that religious ecstasy,
the poet's vision, and most of all the passion of love.
forever tend. Love is the daughter of night —

"Aber getreu der Nacht
Bleibt mein geneimes Herz
Und ihrer Tochter
Der schaffenden Liebe."

- because love is supremely concerned with the half-realised obscurities of the soul, with dream, and ecstasy.

Finally night has the significance of death. It is too far from our purpose to show how Novalis faces the implications of this. Briefly, death loses its power when night is regarded not as the absence of light, but as the creative mother of the universe: when we die, we die into primal life, we go back to the source.

Brennan, too, exhibited the same urge "toward the source", and his work is close to the spirit of Novalis. Probably there is a direct influence at work, but at any rate they are both instances of a common trend of thought. Brennan concentrated all the associations of night into a single image:

"This is Lilith, by her Hebrew name
Lady of night."

All that is terrible and horrible in man's thought of night disappears when the final illumination comes:

"All mystery, and all love, beyond our ken,
She woos us, mournful till we find her fair:
and gods and stars and songs and souls of men
are the sparse jewels in her scatter'd hair."
It might be interesting to develop the analysis in a psychological fashion, and to find what the origins of the mother-symbol are in Novalis (and Brennan). But a more strictly literary aspect concerns us at the moment. Novalis has claimed magic powers for the Word. What sort of poetry has the theory given us?

The poetry of the Romantic period has long since ceased to be completely satisfying to critical taste. "Childe Harold", "Ernani", "die Räuber" and other significant productions can no longer give us the unquestioned thrill that they once gave to eager minds hailing them as declarations of a new aesthetic freedom and power. We are sober again after the Romantic intoxication, and our praise is given more sparingly. The spectacle of an autonomous imagination operating in defiance of reason and common-sense experience is apt to arouse in us very mixed feelings. Thus, in respect to "Hymnen an die Nacht", one is inclined to wish that Novalis had not allowed his inspiration to outstrip his analytical and critical faculty. There are too many passages where the words swirl around their object, multiplying like rabbits, without any comparable increase in expressive power. Admittedly, it was not an easy task, to render in words the peculiarity of a mystical intuition, but the task is only rendered more difficult when diction is allowed to float vaguely around the subject. A similar criticism applies to the form of the verse. The existence of both a prose manuscript and a versified form seems to indicate an uncertainty in Novalis' mind in respect of form.
The result is that the poem does not succeed in being satisfactory rhythmic prose nor convincing free verse. At times the rhythm takes wing very beautifully, but sooner or later it flags and falls. Were it not that the diction, even at its most prolix, retains a certain sinewy fibre and toughness, the poem might at many points have collapsed altogether.

The likeness between Brennan and Novalis comes out strongly here. Although Brennan was aware of a whole century of sophistication that Novalis did not know, and was sufficiently impressed by Mallarmé to pay him homage, nethertheless in his own verse, it is as if that century had never been; he takes us back to the earlier and more untutored Romanticism. Was this because he had to write in a "milieu" that was still, artistically speaking, very "colonial"? It may be that the refined maturity of the late Romantics was too difficult of attainment for one who had to start at virtual zero. Brennan sins time and again against the light of Mallarmé - his failure is an inability to create a living form, to purify his diction of the fogged contusions it so readily developed.

The idea of the poet as absolute creator, to whom words are instruments of power, which was stirring in the mind of Novalis and some of his German contemporaries was also operative in France, and was destined to bring forth a more significant harvest. For the time being, however, the sceptre lay in the hands of Victor Hugo. He established the right of the
the poet to exercise his imagination in complete freedom, to create at will - and proved his point by writing poetry as great as anything since the Renascence. However a great deal of his verse - one might almost say his typical verse - has not proved very acceptable to posterity. Trousset speaks impatiently of "les majuscules d'Hugo, ses dialogues avec Dieu, tant de tintamarre", thereby summarising those things that we feel as defects in the master. Too often the rhetorical brilliance, the coruscating virtuosity, and the brassy bravado, are indulged in for their own sake. In his rôle as seer, Hugo impresses us more by a purely verbal grandeur than by the greatness of his thought. We move amongst vast sculpturesque forms; the somnus is filled with fanfares and thunders; sonorous platitudes and wordy gnostic oracles fail from the lips of the prophet -- and after awhile we quietly take our leave, hoping that our absence will not be noted. Giese has an unsparing comment (244) "His philosophical verses are like French matches; they refuse to burst into an illuminating flame, but their vague phosphoresence assails us with a tantalizing suggestion of unrealized light - and they usually come in packages of fifty."

"Que croire? Oh j'ai souven, d'un oeil peut-être expert,
Fouille ce noir problème où la se perdu --
J'ai plongé dans le gouffre et l'ai trouvé profond!"

A remarkable discovery.
But apart from the monumental silliness of much of
Hugo's thought, there is another relevant criticism which is
often made. It is said that Hugo showed us only the plastic,
external aspect of his visions, and did not reveal the inner
core of passionate human emotions. There is an absence of the
interior, psychological subtly of the heart. "Un grand poète
sculptural", said Baudelaire (Rnoes 157) of him, "qui a
l'oeil ferme à la spiritualité."

Finally, Hugo's breaking up of the classical
models of verse opened the door to a laxity of form which
tended to be excessive in the hands of his contemporaries. The
relaxed, nerveless verse of Musset with its sliding,
sentimental tone was bound to produce a reaction. One has
only to compare Musset's:

"Et pourtant j'aurais pu marcher alors vers elle,
Entourer de mes bras ce sein vide et glace,
Et j'aurais pu crier: 'Qu'as tu fait, infidele,
Qu'as tu fait au passe?'

with Verlaine's:

"Qu'as tu fait, o ta que vola.
Pleulant sans cesse,
Dis, qu'as tu fait, toi que vola,
De ta jeunesse?"

to see the difference between an effusion and a carefully
organised economy of form.
Romanticism, by its faith in the imagination, i.e., by its belief in the creative image magic of verbal symbols, had produced some fine work but more often it was content with rhetoric, sentimentalism, imprecision, and a libertine attitude to form. It was only a matter of time that these characteristic weaknesses were felt to be intolerable. In particular, it was felt that if words had within them such potency, then they should be cultivated more intensely. "Le Culte de Verbe" was about to begin.

(2)

"The verbal element in magic is extremely important - so much so that Malinowski regards it as the fundamental constituent and the believed source of magical power. There are said to be a few magic rites when no spell is recited, but it is a question if the magician does not here at least express his formula in thought. In many communities such as the Maori, the Trodians, or the Dobuan, the form of words is thought to be fixed and invariable, so much so that a mistake in the recital may spoil the effects of the magic. In others, however, particularly in Africa, the form of the words is variable, and consists rather in a conversational address to the medicine to perform its work, the magician modifying his phrases at his discretion. Where the form of the words is fixed - the spell proper - ther certain conventions usually obtain. The words are often alliterative and
onomatopoeic, suggestive by their sound of the end desired, again they convey analogies to what is wanted — and again some of the words are cryptic in form and archaic, so that they have no meaning apart from their particular magical context. As Malinowski insists, they are not meant to convey information, but to be a mode of action and an expression of human will. The formula is, then, a translation of the urge of human desire into words, and the rite and spell are the spur of the hand and voice to the forces of Nature.*

The early Romantics were in the position of those African magicians who thought it enough to use any appropriate words. But with the coming of Baudelaire verbal magic becomes a formula, a spell. How closely 19th century aesthetics clings to primitive superstition we shall see. They sought "the word that shall become the deed of might", very much as the primitive magician did.

The immediate precursor of Baudelaire was Nerval, that strange, unhappy, bewildering figure. Deeply read in the occultism that had subdued Hugo's inferior brain, he brought to his reveries a keen intellect dominated by a paranoid disturbance of the soul that drove him to ruin. The verse he left was not great in bulk — it never came in packages of fifty — but it is exquisitely wrought and its sybilline utterance half hides and half reveals the profundities that gave it birth. True to his mystical apprehension, he presents a world that recalls Vaughan's lines on the text:
"Utenim res Creatae exerto Capite observantes expectant revelationem ———"

And do they so? have they a sense
Of ought but Influence?"
Nerval's answer was in the affirmative:
"Chaque fleur est une âme à la Nature éclosée;
Un mystère d’amour dans le métal repose;
Tout est sensible!"

His pantheism is explicit and informs the whole of his thought. His importance for symbolism, however, lies not simply in his doctrine that "all is feeling", but in the revival of a correlated idea:
"À la matière même un verbe est attaché."

Nature is "Logos", a spirit achieving form and matter; and language is "Logos" too, for the same occult meaning that informs nature, informs the words we use of it, and it is for the poet to discern this inner life through the outer covering of the word.

"Souvent dans l'être obscur naît une Vie cachée;
Et comme un œil naissant couvert par ses paupières,
Un pur esprit s'accroît sous l'écorce des pierres!"

Nerval was strongly intellectualist in his approach, but did not empty his poems of their deep emotional existence significance. One line in "Vers dorés" seems to me to contain within it the whole pathological torment that underlies the
poetry of his century:

"Crains dans le mur aveugle, un regard qui t'épie."

But it was left to a much stronger spirit to conquer the domain of feeling that Nerval proclaimed, and to which he succumbed. Baudelaire was one of those rare spirits who possess in equal proportion the power of searching deeply into the obscurities of the soul and the power of imposing on the emotional flux a perfect form. Not only were words essential for his magic, but those words must be an inevitable formula. "There is in the word, in the very, something sacre, which formulas make a plaything of them in a game of chance. To wield the pen skilfully is to conjure up a revealing enchantment." It is this "revealing enchantment" that Baudelaire worked for with passionate industry, with vigilant intellect and a cultivated intuition. His subject is given in the sonnet "Correspondances", which was to prove a source for later symbolism:

"La Nature est un temple où de vivants piliers
Laissant parfois sortir de confuses paroles;
L'homme y passe à travers des forêts de symboles
Qui l'observent avec des regards familiers.

Comme de long échos qui de loin se confondaient
Dans une ténébreuse et prolixe unité,
Vaste comme la nuit et comme la clarté,
Les parfums, les couleurs et les sons se répandent.

Il est des parfums frais comme des chairs d'enfants,
Doux comme les hautbois, verts comme les prairies,
- Et d'autre, corrompus, riches et triomphants,

Ayant l'expansion des choses infinies,
Comme l'amour, le musc, le benjoin et l'encens,
Qui chantent les transports de l'esprit et des sens."

Marcel Raymond has given a useful summary of the implications of this poem. The correspondances are of three kinds:

(1) sensations have an equivalence amongst themselves - this is synaesthésia, of which Edith Sitwell is a crude exponent in English. The cultivation of the links between one sense and another is very marked in later symbolist poetry.

(2) sensations, "ayant l'expansion des choses infinis", evoke corresponding emotions and ideas in the spirit. They become, in fact, the symbols of those psychic disturbances.

(3) lastly, sensible appearances correspond to a supra-sensible reality (the affirmation of the first quatrain). This is mystical symbolism proper.

It is to be noted that Baudelaire does not clearly separate out these three kinds of symbolism:
because of the "tenebreuse et profonde unité" of the world, one kind of correspondence merges into another. Thus, since the psyche is also spiritual in essence, the supra-sensible and the mental share the same language and tend to confuse themselves. The peculiar function of poetry is to use words which will evoke these symbolic correlations. Nature for the poet is a means of deciphering his own soul and the supra-sensible world.

In this way, Baudelaire believed that poetry idealises reality, that is, raises it above the ordinary level by making it a function of the spirit. Only in this ideal realm is beauty to be found. Baudelaire thus fulfills Schiller's requirements: "The content of the poetic plaint can never be an external, but always an inner, ideal object; even if it bewails a loss in reality, it must first transform it into an ideal loss. The poetic treatment specifically consists in the reduction of the infinite to the infinite." ("Über naive und sentimentalisher Dichtung").

Naturally, no clear description is ever given of what is meant by the infinite. The Romantic is in much the same position as St. Augustine with regard to time: "If not asked, I know; if asked, I know not." Even if we waive the scepticism which is reasonable on such subjects, we can still point out that, whatever his theory, in practice Baudelaire fails to produce the infinite and gives us only a
picture of the world coloured and permeated by his emotions. "L'infini que vous portez en vous" - the profundity of the instinctive and emotional life - is all we can recognise in the poetry. It would be easy to reduce the aesthetic theory in his essay on "L'Art Romantique" to a heap of inconsistent and meaningless assertions, but the task would be a thankless one. Baudelaire's theory is only of importance because, however confusedly, it brought into prominence the fact that the psyche does seize upon external images as symbols of its own conflicts and emotions. That there is a transformation of objective reality is proved by the evidence yet forthcoming. But Romanticism had to run its course and peter out into a discouraged cynicism before the questionable nature of its assumptions could be made plain.

If we set aside the infinite and ideal world, and look upon Baudelaire as a poet of this world, the change in attitude is not very great. He may not be doing some of the things he thinks he is, but he is doing the most important thing - constructing what he himself has called "paysages d'âme". Symbolism in his hands becomes a highly self-conscious process and begins that reflexive movement of thought whereby it lays bare its own foundations, which was to be carried further by
Mallarmé in the next generation and Valéry in our own times.

"L'un t'éclaire avec son ardeur,
L'autre en toi met son deuil, Nature!
Ce qui dit à l'un: Sépulture!
Dit à l'autre: Vie et splendeur!

Hermès inconnu qui m'assistes
Et qui toujours m'intimides,
Tu me rends l'égal de Midas,
Le plus triste des alchimistes,

Par toi change l'or en fer
Et le paradis en enfer;
Dans le suaire des nuages

Je découvre un cadavre cher,
Et sur les célestes rivages
Je bâtis de grands sarcophages."

The reference to Hermes Trismegistus is not fortuitous, for the hermetic idea was working quietly in the brains of many of the poets who formed the 19th century tradition. The importance of this poem lies in its recognition of the fact that the "correspondance" between the soul and its images is due to the fashion in which the soul infuses its mood into nature. Sorrow is the philosopher's
stone that tinctures its environment with its own properties. The poem which follows this, "Horrer Sympathique", seems to reverse this conclusion:

"De ce ciel bizarre et livide,
Tourmenté comme ton destin,
Quels pensers dans ton âme vide
Descend ?"

But the reversal is more specious than real. From the fact alone that it follows "Alchimie de la Douleur", we may assume that the poet was thinking of the action of the soul upon its images, but was describing a different aspect of that experience. Here there is no consciousness that the soul is responsible for the alchemy, for the spirit seems quite empty, and feels that its thoughts are transmitted from without instead of from within. The spirit has projected its contents so completely outwards that they seem to come to it from the sky, and not from itself. In this case Baudelaire makes it plain that he knows what is the real state of affairs, but it is easy to imagine that this movement of projection could be prolonged and intensified until it becomes an hallucination. Instead of the subjectification of nature, we then have the objectification of the soul. It becomes charged with an intense, emotional significance, but the link between that significance and the soul that calls it forth is no longer observed. Consequently, it is no great step to imagine that the image derives its significance from some higher
from some higher, supernatural power.

This point is of such paramount importance that it seems worth while to pause on it for a moment, and to widen the circle of the discussion a little. A useful comparison can be made between the work of Coleridge and the work of Wordsworth in this respect. Coleridge shared a good deal of the pantheistic attitude which was "in the air", at the beginning of the century. We find many affirmations of this belief that nature is permeated and animated by a spiritual power. The human soul might be analogous to, or even a minute part of, this embracing spirit but it was certainly not identical with it. Wordsworth held the same conception - which derives philosophically from the Plotonic notion of the World-Soul - and maintained his belief fairly consistently. But Coleridge, at the moment when his life fell to ruins and his creative powers failed him, ceased to find the spirit of nature as a power transcending his own soul. In a last cry before his poetic gift went out forever he recognised that it is the soul alone which gives animation to external objects:

"O Lady! we receive but what we give,
And in our life alone does Nature live --
And from the soul itself must there be sent
A sweet and potent voice, of its own birth,
Of all sweet sounds the life and element."

The only genuine revelation vouchsafed to him was that it is
the human soul, and not a transcendent power, that animates nature, and gives to it the light that never was on land and sea. This clairvoyance into the real nature of romantic feeling was never part of Wordsworth's experience. He could continue to affirm that the spirit that dwelt in nature was not his own spirit but a transcendent reality, because he kept the power of projecting his inner feelings completely into the object.

A most illuminating example from more recent times is found in the work of Rainer Maria Rilke. His approach to life was more empirical, less sophisticated by philosophical tradition than Coleridge's, but he is concerned with the same problems. The terms in which he expresses his attitude have to be very carefully observed, for they do not always carry the accepted meanings. Thus, when he speaks of God, it is by no means certain that he is concerned with the transcendental deity of common belief. More often God is a name he gives to certain powers and states of feeling which he finds immanent in his own nature. (Indeed, after his conversations with Freud in 1912, he simplified his notions to the extent of saying: "God is sex." ) Rilke is thus concerned, less with the dogmatic framework implied in his terminology, than with the empirical character of the actual experiences he describes. His work is illuminating because it presents us with the raw material of romantic
sensation, and he remains surprisingly indifferent to the elaborate generalisations which most poets seek to draw. One poem in particular is worthy of study as an exposition of the link between the objective world and the subjective feelings.

"Es winkt zu Fühlung fast aus allen Dingen, aus jeder Wendaung went es her: Geschenk!
Ein Tag, an dem wir fremd vorübergingen, entschliesst im künftigen sich zum Geschenk.

Wer rechnet unseren Ertrag? Wer trennt uns von den alten, den vergangnen Jahren?
Was haben wir seit Anbeginn erfahren; als dass sich eins im anderen arkennt?

Als dass an uns Gleichgültiges erwärmt?
0 haus, o Wiesennang, o Abendlicht,
auf einmal bringst au's beinahe zum Gesicht und stehest an uns, umarmend und umarmt.

Durch alle Wesen reicht der eine Raum:
Ich sorge mich, und in mir steht das Haus.
Ich hütte mich, und in mir ist die Hut.
Geliebter, der ich wurde: an mir ruht
der schönen Schöpfung Billa und weint sich aus."

Baudelaire has the same power of presenting
the subjective "meaning" of nature, but he is not so content
as Rilke was to disregard abstract philosophical theories.
The title of one section of his work - "Spleen et Idéal" -
indicates his preoccupation with transcendentalist notions.
Although he never succeeds in showing us anything more than
the operation of his own soul on the objective images that he
presents, he still represents himself now and then as the
poet of the Absolute, and it is in this rôle that Gautier presents
him to us in his preface:

"Baudelaire, bien qu'on l'ait souvent accusé de
matérialisme, reproche que la senti
e ne manque pas de jeter au
talent, est, au contraire, doué à un degré éminemment du don de
spiritualité, comme aurait Swedenborg. Il possède aussi le don
de correspondance, pour employer le même idiome mystique, c'est-
daire qu'il sait découvrir par une intuition secrète des
rapports invisibles à d'autres et rapprocher ainsi, par des
analogies inattendues que seul le voyant peut saisir, les
objets les plus éloignés et les plus opposés en apparence. Tout
vrai poète est doué de cette qualité plus ou moins développée,
qui est l'essence même de son art."

The reply one can make to this is, that these inner connections between things always follow the lines of the poet's own emotion, and it is unnecessary to postulate a mysterious ideal system as an explanation of such correspondences. Things undoubtedly do develop symbolic meanings for us, but the reference is always to the poet's subjectivity, not to the absolute.

(3)

With Mallarme, the cult of the symbol reaches its most specialised and rarified form. Baudelaire can be read and appreciated by anyone who understands poetry at all: but Mallarme wrote only for those who could follow him to the furthest confines of the Romantic quest.

The distinction implied in previous poets between a word used poetically and a word in ordinary speech is now brought out into the open. Mallarme distinguishes between "la parole immédiate", and "la parole essentiale". The "immediate" word is a medium of exchange, and is used to report events and to transmit ideas. The "essential" word is not just a means of communication in the ordinary way, but, as its name suggests, it evokes the "essence" of things. Such a word acts not so much through its form/meaning, as through its form, its sound value, and the associations that surround it. "Se rapprochant de l'organisme dépositaire de la vie, le
mot presente dan ses voyelles et ses aiphthongues, comme une chair." ("Les Mots Anglais") Just as the flesh envelops the spirit, and serves as a clue to its workings, so the outward form and texture of a word envelops its inner, esoteric meaning. And that essential meaning refers us not to the real world, but to an ideal world on dream and reverie:

"Avec comme pour language

rien qu'un battement aux cieux

le futur vers se degage

du logis tres precieux ---"

The distinction that Mallarmé draws is difficult to grasp, not because it is unreal, but because he states it in terms which are alien to present-day trends of thought. The "cadre" in which he presented his ideas was the idealistic philosophy of Hegel, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer - who, whatever their divergences, all play with concepts which have little meaning for a generation that is bitterly impatient of romantic philosophies. The parallel distinction, between logical and a-logical functions of speech, which is made today will be discussed later (Part 3, pp. 2-11). But first an attempt must be made to understand Mallarmé in the terms of his own aesthetic.

Having distinguished between immediate and essential language - between mere "reportage" and the language of evocation - Mallarmé proclaimed that it was the
poet’s duty to use words only in the latter way. "Donner un sens plus pur aux mots de la tribu"—the pure poet is concerned with only with language in its purified form, and does not seek to report events or to communicate knowledge, but only to evoke, to idealise, to transform reality into something else. The nature of this something else is apparent only after a careful study of the evolution of his verse.

The evolution has been studied from many points of view, and one does not hope to present any fresh or original observations. Attention may well be confined to the verbal element in Mallarmé’s theory and practice. Weary of reality, of that "too, too solid earth" that crushed Hamlet, the young Romanticist decided to banish reality from his pages, and to rely on the magic of words to conjure up that "something else" which is the eternal quest of Romanticism. For years he pursued his impossible and perverse task, suffering the sterile agonies of refusal. If, as Valéry suggests, the quality of a poet is measured by the number of his refusals, then Mallarmé is the supreme poet,

"du pacte dur

De creuser par veillée une fosse nouvelle
Dans le terrain avaré et froid de ma cervelle,
Fossoyeur sans pitié pour la stérilité."

This first period of his struggle against reality culminates in "Héroïlade", where in the person of the virgin, narcissistic
princess, he has fashioned a symbol not only of a soul that has made itself impenetrable to the real, but also of the stiff-agony of the soul threatened always by the invasion of the natural life, typified by the nurse. And already the "something else" that he desires makes its appearance in the subtle verses. The mental conflict is revealed by a series of images, each carrying within it some potent symbolic power that is not to be found in objective reality. In the mirrors, the candles, the gold and jewelled ornaments, the lavish perfumes, lurks a secret trouble of the soul:

"Allume encore, enfantillage
Dis-tu, ces flambeaux où la cire au feu léger
Pleure parmi l’or vain quelque pleur étranger ----"

It is not simply that the gold, the precious stones, the frozen mirror are symbols of the hard inviolability with which the narcissist wishes to surround his inner dreams, as they appear in the poem, the emotion they represent seems to live in them, and "Hévéalaue" finds her own life already answering her out of the gleaming depths:

"Oui, c'est pour moi, pour moi, que je fleuris, désirée!
Vous le savez, jardins d'améthyste, enfouis
Sans fin dans de savants abîmes éblouis,
Ors ignorés, gardant votre antique lumière
Sous le sombre sommeil d'une terre première,
Vous pierres où mes yeux comme de pur bijoux
Empruntent leur clarté mélodieuse, et vous
Métaux qui donnez à ma jeune chevelure
Une splendeur fatale et sa massive allure!

The Parnassian ideal has been fulfilled in these lines, but they have already passed over into something more than "le Parnasse" ever dreamed of. Parnassianism was a literary pose, a rigid gesture against life without the inner creative power to blossom into a new aesthetic. With Mallarmé we enter into a new Euen, of which "le Parnasse" is the angel with the flaming sword, protecting it from the real. What then is this new domain? The answer is more precisely given in the next great poem that Mallarmé attempted: "L'Après-Midi d'un Faune".

Now the anguish and rigidity of the early work has vanished, and in the soft pure music of the verse we feel the contented power of the poet who has found the region that he seeks. The real dissolves, flowing into

"Une sonore, vaine et monotone ligne."

And in its place the smiling image of dream appears. The faun has abandoned the attempt to pursue his desires into reality, and lets his spirit sink inwards in a delighted contemplation of fantasy:

"Ainsi, quand des raisins j'ai sucé le clafte,
Pour bannir un regret par ma feinte ecarte,
Rieur, j'éleve au ciel d'ete la grappe vive
Et, souriant dans ses peaux lumineuses, avide
D'ivresse, jusqu'au soir je regarde au travers."
The faun is an image of the poet, who intoxicates himself, not with the real grape, but with the empty grape skins blown up the breath of fancy.

Mallarmé is the apotheosis of romanticism. Novalis dreamed, and thought he could make his dreams true by putting a verbal spell upon them. Always there was this ëæendeavour to confuse dream and reality, and to foist the former on the latter. But romanticism was growing old and bitterly sceptical. The facile ardours of Hugo were succeeded by the thin mockery of Heine, the acrid despair of Baudelaire. It seemed that, whatever the magic power of words might be, reality had its own power of suddenly bursting in on naïve aspiration, of reclaiming its own and expelling from its midst the bastard progeny of dream. The later age began to take Hamlet as its prototype, with his consuming doubts of the real and the ideal alike, his sophisticated indecisions and merciless wit, his slow prostration before the death-wish that flowered in his own being. Mallarmé has many reminiscences of Hamlet in ëIgiturï and Laforgue is obsessed by him.

The only way out — short of returning to objective reality — was the way which Mallarmé took. He dismissed the endeavour to force his dreams into the real world, and recognised that an irreconcilable conflict lay between the two. To be a pure poet was, above all things, to recognise the boundaries that divide reality from dream — and
to admit into one's poetry only the images of fantasy:

"Ainsi le choeur des romances
A ta levre vole-t-il
Exclus-en si tu commences
Le reel parce que vil"

Only if one thus defines one's world can the potency of magic
avail, and the dream of an esoteric, hermetic art be realised.

From this point onward, Mallarmé vanishes
into the autonomous reverie of the pure poet. Since his
constructions follow the lines of dream, let us see if the
modern theory of "Traumdeutung" will not help us to
understand his procedure. The dream-work as analysed by
psychology has certain salient characteristics which may be
summarised as follows.

(a) Dream-symbols have a structure of their own,
and their relations follow the logic of the wish, and not the
logic of the real. The assumption that lies behind formal
logic is that the laws of thought correspond to the laws of
things. The corresponding assumption we make in interpreting
dream is that the laws of wish correspond to the laws of
dream.

(b) Dreams concern themselves little with
abstract statements, but seek always a concrete visual
representation of ideas. To take a simple example, an
abstract idea such as "moral superiority" would be translated /
into a spatial image of height. From this point of view, dreams reverse the process of language. Abstract terms were historically developed on the basis of concrete images whose original significance is ignored. (The word "abstraction" derives from the concrete idea of "taking away"). In dreams, abstract terms are broken down again to the primal, concrete imagery that underlies them.

(c) The dreamer projects his inner stress of feeling into the image. What is happening inside him, now seems to be coming from outside. For instance, insurgent sexual desire that threatens to disrupt his inner composure is symbolised by a snake that attacks from the outside.

(a) Dream-symbols are often "polyvalent", referring to more than one set of circumstances. They may fulfill a conscious wish, and also an unconscious one; or they may even fulfill different levels of unconscious desire. The complexity of their symbolic reference is accompanied by a similar complexity of the emotions they call up. This polyvalence reinforces the general tendency towards economy which is found in dreams. Not only does one symbol summarise a vast emotional experience, but it might also contain within it the secret of other experiences, equally vast, as well.

If we apply these considerations to Mallarme's work, many things become easier to understand. The logic that binds together his symbols is not always the logic of reality.
His poem develops along connections which surprise the uninitiated reader. Sometimes he essays a pure arabesque, merely for the delight of building up a new and unguessed pattern. More often, this visual arabesque, is dominated by the emotional connections, and the line of its development is the line of the fantasy it embodies. Thus in "Le Tombeau d'Edgar Poe", the poet lifts his eyes suddenly from the block of granite to the birds overhead: and he thinks, at last this monument will protect the poet from some of the future detraction:

"Que ce granit du moins montre à jamais sa borne
Aux noir vols du Blasphème épars dans le futur."

The link between the two symbols follows an interior fancy. This is an obvious example of a practice that has driven commentators to despair.

But the chief reason, at once for the obscurity, and for the charm of Mallarmé is to found in the second characteristic that we have noted of dreams. The poet avoids abstract statement in favour of a vivid symbolic image. In his "Hommage" to Richard Wagner, there is a supreme example of the economy and suggestive power that resides in the symbol but not in the vague ordinary statement. He describes how Wagner's music seems to accomplish all the aesthetic ambitions which he has cherished, but which he has not fulfilled:

"Trompettes tout haut d'or pâmé sur les vélins,
Le dieu Richard Wagner irradiant un sacré
All the magic of Wagner's music is expressed in a few concrete words, rich in the sense-confusions that Baudelaire would have loved; and all the anguish or thwarted poetic ambition is conveyed by the brief sobs. This constant translation of the non-concrete into the concrete may involve a number of difficulties when carried out so swiftly and uncompromisingly, but it is justified by the compulsive beauty that results.

A further consequence of this technique is the disturbance of the grammatical order of the words in order to bring out the peculiar relations of the theme. It is said that Mallarmé's method of composition was to place on his page certain key-words in the position that he felt they should occupy, and to fill in the rest of the poem in relation to them. In order to enforce the link between two symbols he would juxtapose them in his verse and disturb the grammatical sequence for this purpose. It is "a visual inspiration translating itself into an auditory aesthetic", as Camille Soula has pointed out. Images juxtaposed in sight must be together in speech. A simple example of this occurs in the sonnet "Victorieusement fui".

"Quoi! de tout cet éclat pas même le lambeau
Sattarue, il est minuit, à l'ombre qui nous fête--"

The image of midnight is interposed in lieu defiance of a natural syntax, so that it will link itself more closely to
the idea of "shadow". This procedure is reminiscent of Latin verse, where the play of accidence makes it easy to group words in any desired order; but in a relative analytic language like French, it is by no means easy and requires great ingenuity in the poet and increased effort from the unfortunate reader.

In addition, it may be mentioned that the auditive aesthetic which governs poetry, tends to develop back into a visual aesthetic on the printed page. Mallarmé was one of the first of modern poets to realise the possibilities of expression that result from the mere spatial appearance of print. In English, the experiments of George Herbert have made us familiar with the idea of shaping a poem to suggest wings, crosses, and so on. Mallarmé experimented with the idée possibilities that lay in the removal of punctuation, the spacing of lines and of words in those lines: an idea that has been caricatured with flamboyant perversity by E.E. Cummings.

The third characteristic of dreams, the continual projection of the subjective life into the symbol, has already been discussed in connection with "Héroïade", and in the work of Baudelaire. Mallarmé is distinctive for the amazing economy of his means. All the resources of music and association are utilised to breathe into a single phrase an infinitely subtle content that awakens echoes far
into the background of consciousness. For instance, this simple image:

"Tristement dort une mandore
Au creux naît musicien."

every word is essential, and any addition would only destroy its inexplicable magic.

Finally we may note the "poyvalence" of the Mallarmean reverie. Almost always there is a bi-fold interpretation referring us partly to the aesthetic discoveries he has made, partly to the more general psychic meaning. The "Après-Midi d'un Faune" symbolizes, not only the narcissistic delight of the introvert, but also the manner in which poetry effects the transposition of the real into the ideal. It is typical of Mallarme's attitude that he did not seek to delimit the zone of the symbolic reference but was content to leave it as variable and complex as possible. He depended not so much on the reactions of the conscious interpreting mind, as on the obscure response of the unconscious regions from which his symbols originally flowed. This is the sense in which the famous dictum is to be understood:

"Le sens trop précis rature
Ta vague littérature."

A poem was to be imprecise in the sense that it could evoke a multiple response. But in order to ensure this variable
profundity of suggestion an immensely careful search for the right word - the word with evocative power - was needed. Verbal precision was essential in order to gain this imprecision of suggestion.

Mallarmé's achievement was to liberate fantasy from the impossible effort to foist itself upon the public as reality, and to preserve its true structure and meaning. The attempt to pass fantasy off as fact - to give a precise sense to one's vague literature! - only resulted in destroying the integral structure of reverie. Both the logical order of reality and the emotional order of dream became confused and corrupted in the process, and the aesthetic unity of design was lost. This the valid objection to most romantic poetry: it is not content to develop its theme in its native structure but introduces a false design borrowed from reality. To such an aesthetic impurity, Mallarmé opposed his own idea of pure poetry.

Pure poetry is certainly not what Mallarmé and thought it was, but nevertheless he was approaching an aesthetic solution to problems which had baffled most of his predecessors. The touching faith of Novalls in his magical idealism had long been replaced by a more sceptical approach to imaginative writing. But the belief that words carried within them a creative power, if only one used them properly, was not dead. The difficulty was to know what was the proper use! Mallarmé thought that by avoiding "reportage", and
using the non-logical function of words, he could transmute experience into something which exhibited pure ideality. He swept aside many kinds of writing, and concentrated on this one special kind, affirming that it was only in the ideal realm that the poet could be "en état de créateur absolu."

Now, it is quite clear, as soon as we read his poems, that he has not excluded reality at all. He has simply done with extraordinary subtlety what many, if not most, poets do - taken fantasy as his subject. Fantasy may not be true, but it is just as much a real thing as anything else, and occurs in the ordinary realm of experience. Mallarmé's poetry, like Baudelaire's, fails to present us with any ideal realm of existence - all we can find is the operation of fantasy in the real world. The importance of Mallarmé is that he kept his fantasy unsullied by attempts to identify it with objective reality, and so gave an indirect revelation of one of the fundamental laws of creative writing - that each subject must develop along the lines of its own unique structure, and not to be forced into an alien mould. If objective reality is the subject, then the artist must attend to the form and structure of objective reality and not distort it by "romanticising" it. If subjective reality (fantasy) is the subject, then the artist can achieve a pure design only if he does not confuse the
the lines of fantasy with the logical pattern of the external world. The external images which he uses must be correlated along a subjective principle, and any attempt to put them back into the order of nature produces discord and confusion. Unlike Shelley or Hugo, Mallarme never attempted to make the subjective order of his images counterfeit the objective order of nature.

In this way, it might almost be said that under Mallarme's hands, romanticism became realism. By attempting to follow out the romantic ideal consistently, he liberated subjective experience from the impositions of logic and revealed its genuine structure.

(4)

The common feature in the symbolist technique of Baudelaire and Mallarme is their perception of the emotional content that an image can have. When a poet mentions a rose, he is not as a rule concerned with it as something which merely occurs in the external world: the rose exists for him as a symbol of his emotional state, and its meaning for the poem can only be known when we realize the subjective context in which the rose has been placed. The rose has not entered into an ideal world above space and time, but it has been endowed with a subjective, emotional significance.
It must be stressed that there is nothing peculiar or abnormal about this. The tendency to subjectivise one's environment is a basic mental function, and is often carried to excess by the very people who deny that they are doing it. The Freudian account of psychic symbolism was not necessary to prove that everyone makes these emotional links between himself and his world. For the lover, a woman's glove is not merely an article of clothing; it is charged with intense emotion. He would like to be as close to his mistress as the glove is to her hand: and so the glove becomes a symbol of his desires. For the successful man, an automobile, or a house, or a well-dressed wife, do not exist for their own sake, but as symbols of his social power and privilege. Moreover, this emotional tone that surrounds objects easily alters our perception of them. The lover will be inclined to think the glove much more beautiful than it is; the business man will fail to observe that his car, his house, and his wife are undistinguished and standardized products of commerce.

Logical thinking and perception are comparatively late products of biological development, and we have a very imperfect hold in them. Strip off a thin skin of critical activity and they are gone. Most of our reactions to the world are bathed in a diffused medium of emotion, and the attempt to view things objectively is the last sophistication. Levy-Bruhl, in his analysis of the
mentality of primitive man, has coined the phrase "participation mystique" to describe this emotionalized awareness. Primitive man, he thinks, is at a pre-logical stage of thought, and his animistic, anthropomorphic beliefs are merely examples of his general inability to react to his environment objectively. Probably he is wrong in denying to primitive man any logical ability, but he has given an interesting description of a mental process that does co-exist with logical thinking not only in the savage but also in sophisticated cultures. "Participation mystique" is an excellent phrase from our point of view because it reminds us that the mystic is concerned with an emotionalized, subjectivist approach to external images. When the mystic becomes one with nature, he does so by linking his emotions to appropriate symbolic objects — by "participation mystique", in fact. Romanticism is another mode of emotional experience with close similarities to the "via mystica". The ordinary man is a mixture of all tendencies — a little mystical, a little romantic, a little logical, — but not very intensely given to any activity at all.

As far as ordinary poetry is concerned, I am inclined to think that this pre-logical type of thinking and perception always furnishes the subject-matter. Insofar as logical awareness is concerned at all, it is taken up and dominated by the more ancient and
pervasive mode of experience. Symbolist poetry has not done anything specifically new: it has merely become more self-conscious in its technique, more highly specialised in its chosen means of expression. Observing that the images of poetry do carry with them an emotional significance, the symbolist decides that he will present his emotional experience as much as possible in images alone, with as little direct statement as possible. Poetry rarely attempts to avoid images altogether, but usually there is some measure of explicit statement surrounding the image. The symbolist however, moves as much as possible from image to image without direct statement, making the emotion implicit rather than explicit. Contrast a lyric such as:

"O western wind, when wilt thou blow
That the small rain down can rain.
Christ, that my love were in my arms
And I in my bed again!"

with a typical quatraine of Mallarmé:

"Le vierge, le vivace et le bel aujourd’hui
V’t-il nous déchirer avec un coup d’aile ivre
Ce lac nur oublié que haute sous le givre
Le transparent glacier des vols qui n’ont pas fui!"

The first poem brings up a swift image of spring by means of "the small rain" - an image just as economical and evocative as anything of Mallarmé’s - but explicitly
associates certain emotions with it. The second poem
implies just as definite an emotional content, but moves
from symbol to symbol with very little explicit information.
The only two words which link the picture with the poet at
all are "nous" and "oublié". Both poems are perfect
achievements of their kind, and there is no reason to
disparage one method of expression in favour of the other.
Since even Mallarmé gives us some verbal direction, the
difference is only one of degree - it is open to the poet
to choose how much of his emotion he will make explicit and how
much he will leave implicit, and his choice is a matter of
indifference so long as he succeeds in writing a good poem.
In either case, he will be using his images as symbols, for
one does not have to practise "le symbolisme" in order to
create symbolic poetry. Wherever we find emotion at all, we
find it connecting itself to the external world by symbolic reference.

(5)

After Mallarmé, symbolist poetry in the
special sense of the term did not by any means cease, but
later writers have not added very much to the theoretical
position. In France, Mallarmé was succeeded by Valéry. In
Germany, Stefan George took up the distinction between the
ordinary language of communication and the special function
of words in poetry. George and his disciples added little
to the aesthetic principles except a dash of philosophical melodrama - as when Gundolf informs us that "language is the last refuge of the god in man"!

Only two recent developments in symbolist theory and practice appear to be of special interest, and both may be studied in modern English poetry, which affords us quite characteristic examples.

The first of these developments is surrealism, a continental movement that is gaining adherents in England. Surrealism might be termed mysticism decapitated, for while it recognises the link between symbols and the unconscious, instead of looking for an analogic interpretation. In its pure form, surrealism sets out to write under unconscious dictation, and presents us with words that have no conscious significance. David Gascoyne's "In Defence of Humanism" is a fair specimen:

"The face of the precipice is black with lovers;
The sun above them is a bag of nails; the spring's
First rivers hide among their hair.
Goliath plunges his hand into the poisoned well
And bows his head and feels my feet walk through his brain.
The children chasing butterflies turn round and see
him there,
With his hand in the well and my body growing from his head,
And are afraid. They drop their nets and walk
into the wall like smoke.

This poem is, not inappropriately, inscribed to M. Salvador Dali. The rest of it is similar to the piece quoted in that it seems to be more of a description of a surrealist painting than an independent poem. As a series of notes for a picture it might have some value, but as a poem it has serious defects. The meaning of the symbols, their emotional correlation, is almost completely shut from view. Whatever deep reactions the words may evoke in the poet's private soul, the reader who is not acquainted with the Gascouyne unconscious is left rather baffled. Since the symbols give us no immediate "kick", we might try to psycho-analyse the poem in order to catch its significance at one remove. But, unfortunately, the materials for analysis are not at hand—we do not even know whether the Gascouyne unconscious is Freudian, Jung-ist, or Adlerian! The symbols confront us with blank faces, and there is nothing to be done about it. They neither stir us emotionally nor offer a chance of elucidation; and there is nothing more boring than other people's unelucidated symbols.

Mr. Gascouyne's verse reminds one of Baudelaire's comment on Victor Hugo. In both men we find a certain plastic gift but feel the lack of any emotional depth behind the images. For the surrealist, this is
more serious, because his work stands or falls by its subjective inwardness. I am by no means convinced that the poem under discussion is a genuine product of the unconscious in any case. It reads more like a perverse juggling with images in consciousness: the surrealist may be foolsing himself all time.

Nevertheless, it seems that surrealism is opening up a valuable source of poetic material. There is no reason why the poet, becoming increasingly conscious of the interior workings of his mind, should not take as his theme the subliminal passions which he succeeds in dragging into the twilight of consciousness. Some modern poems have succeeded in this endeavour, using the symbols fashioned by the unconscious but linking them with the emotional processes they accompany. Charles Midge's "Solar Creation" is a magnificent example of the use of birth-symbolism in a context that makes the inner significance clear.

"The sun, of whose terrain we creatures are,
Is the director of all human love,
Unit of time, and circle round the earth,

And we are the commotion born of love
And slanted rays of that illustrious star
Peregrine of the crowded fields of birth,

The crowded lane, the m
The crowded lane, the market and the tower.
Like sight in pictures, real at remove,
Such is our motion on dimensional earth.

Down by the river, where the ragged are,
Continuous the cries and noise of birth,
While to the muddy edge dark fishes move,

And over all, like death, or sloping hill,
Is nature, which is larger and more still."

It is only by using symbols in a consciously realised context
that they can be effective at all: then they reach back into
the dark hinterland with a profound emotional effect which is
not achieved by a purely surrealist concatenation of blank
pictures.

The other development of the symbolist
theory is more directly connected with Mallarmé, and descends
through Jules Laforgue to T.S.Eliot. Laforgue did not
invent" the situation as a symbol, but it was he who showed
the possibilities in taking an aspect of a social or
psychological situation as a symbol for a subjective emotion.
Mallarmé had confined himself almost entirely to definite,
visual images — flowers, sunsets, fans, angels and so on — and
it was left to Laforgue to apply something of his technique
to these social and moral situations. A charming example is
in his "Complaierte sur certains ennuis", where he relates his ennu to a drawing-room comedy:

"On voudrait saigner le Silence,
Secouer l'exil des causeries;
Et non! Ces dames sont aigries
Par des questions de présence.

Elles bougent là, l'air capa ble.
Et, sous le ciel, plus d'un s'explique,
Par quels gâchis suresthétiques
Ces êtres-là sont adorables.

Justement, une nous appelle,
Pour l'aider à chercher sa bague,
Perdue (où dans ce terrain vague?)
Un souvenir D'AMOUR, dit-elle!

Ces êtres-là sont adorables!"

The situation is not presented for its own sake, but finds its significance in the interior feelings of the poet it reveals.

The early poems of T. S. Eliot were composed under the influence of Laforgue, and show a close similarity in many respects. Eliot was aware of the literary value of situations, gestures, and so on, from the
work of Henry James. What he did was to take the Henry James situation and make poetry of it according to the formula of Laforgue. Sometimes his work, even in metre, echoes that of the French poet:

"Let us take in the air, in a tobacco trance,
Admire the monuments,
Discuss the late events,
Correct our watches by the public clocks.
Then sit for half an hour and drink our clocks."

The subjective content of this passage is entirely implicit in the situation, fulfilling the requirements which he set out later in an essay on Hamlet:

"The only way of expressing emotion is by finding an "objective correlative"; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked."

Mallarmé had concentrated on "a set of objects" as the correlative for his inner feelings; Eliot and Laforgue were both more concerned with the "situation". From this point of view, an interesting comparison might be made between Mallarmé's later poems and "The Waste Land". Both poets are concerned to make emotions as implicit in their symbols as possible. Eliot moves from one situation
to another with bewildering rapidity, and omits the overt
connections which he should have indicated, trusting almost
entirely to the inner, subjective linkage to weld the
fragments into a continuous whole. Mallarmé, on the other
hand, never attempted along poem of this type: even his
longer works are fashioned from a single set of symbols. This
suggests a useful criticism of Eliot's method. We may note
that, although any one of the situations, taken singly, is
an admirable "objective correlative", yet the whole poem fails
to achieve a real unity. Had Eliot followed Mallarmé's example,
and confined himself to a series of smaller, self-sufficient
poems, he would have avoided the incoherence of structure that
mars his work. His failure, in this respect, is a failure to
perceive the limitations of the technique he adopted; he did
not realise that the endeavour to make emotion wholly implicit
in the symbol could only succeed within certain bounds. A
long poem must compromise with perfection in order to
maintain cohesion.

The influence of French symbolist theory
and practice has been widespread in English poetry during recent
years. But while it might be interesting to trace the lines
of connection, the effort would contribute little to the
present discussion. Yeats, for instance, shows a certain
likeness to the French poets in his early work, but the
likeness is fairly superficial, and in the mature work his
indebtedness is slight: it is not so as an exponent of symbolist aesthetics but as a quasi-mystical poet that he would find a place in this essay.

One general comment, however, on the English reception of the higher wisdom of the French is worth making. When symbolist aesthetics has appeared in English writings, it has usually been scorned of its transcendental metaphysics. Eliot's dictum on the "objective correlative" may not be entirely free from latent obscurities, but it does at least avoid the confused statements about ideal creative magic, the transcendental Absolute, and so on, which did so much to bury the valid observations of aestheticians under a mass of verbiage. In the next section, an attempt will be made to gather up the various considerations that have emerged in the preceding chapter pages into a theory of poetry; and, as far as possible, metaphysical mysteries will not be invoked in order to guarantee loose statements and baseless assertions.
PART THREE: LANGUAGE AND POETRY.

And a thing is always fit to receive the operation of Soul when it is brought to the Condition of a mirror, apt to catch the Image.

Plotinus: Ennead 3. 11
Some of the ways in which the mind works in image-making have become apparent from an analysis of those special fields of literature where symbolism is adopted as a conscious method. Mystical poetry is a highly developed form of a process that goes on in many non-mystical poems - the mind uses its images to pass over from deep subjective forces to the sublimated pursuits of ordinary living. Symbols, from this point of view, have the function of money in the economics of the psyche. They are both a method of valuation and a medium of exchange. The analysis of mysticism also showed that symbolic language supplies defects in ordinary speech - the "language of the spiritual senses" uses the data of sense-perception to describe interior feelings by analogy.

The criticism of Romantic Aesthetics brought out further aspects of the correlation between mind and its objects. The pretensions of the symbolists contained at least this amount of truth, that the mind does use the external world as a series of symbols for its internal passions. In this way objective images are like hieroglyphs from which we may decipher our own emotions.

Finally, the increasing importance assigned to the verbal element in poetry by the symbolists pointed to a purely linguistic problem which has not yet been faced. It is this crucial point that must be examined now.

The symbolizing-process that is constantly going on in the mind conducts itself largely by means of words. But it is neces-
sary to remember that these words themselves are only symbols. Thus we say: the Union Jack stands for Great Britain. But we are apt to forget that the words "Union Jack" are also symbols, that is, they stand for the particular piece of bunting that we have in mind. By a convention of speech, a certain set of vocables is recognised as having a definite meaning.

"And out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air; and brought them to Adam to see what he would call them: and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof" (Gen.2:19.)

The account in Genesis may be oversimplified, but it brings out the important fact that the names are a human convention and their significance changes according to human intentions. This may seem too obvious to be worth mentioning, but we are constantly in danger of taking up a superstitious attitude towards words, and forget that meanings are not fixed and certain but share the variability and mutability of mankind.

The first logical analysis of words to be made in English was made by Hobbes, one of the most acute minds that ever applied themselves to this study. Hobbes defines words as "signs" which indicate the things they stand for. When I say "the sun", I direct attention to a particular objective fact. In this way it may be said that my words stand for that heavenly body, and their function may be called "indication". So long as they indicate correctly, they have served their purpose. This theory of signs is the basis of logic, for what a proposition does is to direct attention to a particular subject and indicate that it co-exists with a certain predicate, e.g., "The sun is rising." Such a
proposition has **significance** because it makes signs in the direction of the object it stands for.

"Indication", then, is a fundamental part of the function of words. Hobbes, limited by temperament and by the temper of his age, saw no reason to look for other functions that words could have. But clearly he has not given us a complete account of words. He himself ran up against a difficulty when he tried to define cursing. The simple logical use of words does not apply here very well at all, for the logical meaning of the words is comparatively unimportant. Nowadays, "bloody" is rarely used in its literal sense. But because its logical meaning is pushed into the background, that does not imply that the word has no significance. However, it does imply that its significance is not of the ordinary logical kind. Similarly, expressions like "You pig!" are not intended to convey the information that the person addressed is a member of that animal species. And even if we hedge by saying that the phrase must be regarded as a condensed form, and that the real meaning is "You are like a pig", it is still apparent that something more than logical information is intended by those words.

If we confined ourselves to logic, the most important part of the meaning would escape us. That is why Hobbes shelved the difficulty by saying that cursing was "the actions of a tongue accustomed".

This may be no solution, but it is an acute observation, and may point out a possible solution. Consider another type of "actions of a tongue accustomed" - nonsense syllables. While it is true that "hey-nonny-no" has no logical significance, (does not point out a definite object) it does not seem to be devoid of all
significance. It is expressive of a state of carefree exhilaration which does not stop to define its objects or motives. Instead of indicating an object, it expresses the mood of the speaker, and must be understood purely as an expression of mood. This kind of significance works through the sound-values and the rhythm of the word—what Mallarmé would call its "sensuous envelope"—without requiring the aid of logic.

In nonsense-words we seem to have isolated a further element of meaning in its pure state. Such words have no inner core of "indication". Instead of pointing outwards from the speaker towards an object they point straight back to the speaker and refer us to his emotional attitude. Whereas in logic we have pure indication, here we have what can be called pure "expression", an a-logical function. It is the "cry or cadence" or mood" which Joyce sees at the back of every work of art.

But words do not ordinarily serve for pure indication or pure expressiveness: usually there is a mixture of the two, and though one may predominate, the other is not entirely absent. In the case of cursing, the words often retain a certain amount of logical reference, but it is swamped by the overmastering demands of emotional expression. The final result is that the curse has a meaning which escapes logical categories. That this use of words can justly be termed a-logical is seen by comparing

"The sun is rising"

with

"He's a son-of-a-bitch."

The first statement is a genuine proposition, i.e., it gives us definite information, and the only question that arises is whether it is true or not. The second statement is not a genuine
proposition, for the information it seems to give is irrelevant to its intention. It raises no real issue, but simply refers us back to the emotional attitude of the speaker. Even if we affirmed or denied the truth of the statement, we would by no means have exhausted its full significance. This is more obvious still in the case of exclamations like "damn", and "blast", which do not ape logical form and so avoid confusion. While the logical meaning of "damn" is present and cannot be ignored, it is nevertheless subservient to the expressive function of the word.

Verbal signs, therefore, can have at least two functions. Logically, they point outwards to the objects spoken of. A-logical-ly they point backwards to the attitude of the speaker. But even this does not account for all the effects that words can have. To pursue the analogy between a word and a fruit, indication is the kernel of the fruit, and expression is the surrounding flesh. But the fruit also gives off an odour which creates a little halo of perfume around it. This circumambient atmosphere of words is the associations they evoke. Thus if I speak of "the bright moon", my words complete themselves into a triple meaning. Firstly, they indicate their object; secondly, they suggest the feeling of admiration I have for the object; and thirdly, they evoke a wide range of associations that the object has for me. In such a simple phrase, the associations evoked in different minds might be extremely various. While I might think of the poetic and erotic associations that the moon has acquired, someone else might think of the part it plays in occultist theories, while someone else might set it in an astronomical context. This third element of
meaning could seem to be too variable to be taken into account. But I.A. Richards has pointed out that whereas a simple phrase might evoke many associations, the more the verbal statement is elaborated, the more confined the associations become. The associations that play around the following lines are comparatively fixed:

"To live a barren sister all your life,
Chanting faint hymns to the cold fruitless moon."

Surrounding the actual meaning of the words are the associations with Diana the goddess of chastity, and the full significance of the passage is not reached until this halo of associations is included.

It may be said that words fulfil three functions - they indicate, express, and associate. The relation between these functions is worth noting. (1) Whereas pure indication is often possible, and pure expressiveness more rarely, there is no such thing as pure association. It only appears in the presence of the other two, and might be considered as an affect of the interaction between expression and indication. The words "cold, fruitless moon" would evoke no associations unless they signified some particular object, and it is doubtful whether even then the associations would appear unless spurred by the emotional attitude that the words also present. (2) Indication is independent in its function to this extent, that it does not need the aid of expressiveness in order to reach its object. The word "moon" has a meaning quite apart from the emotional attitude of the speaker. (3) Expressiveness is rarely independent of the other
functions. Usually it works through them to its particular purposes. We have seen how, in the case of curses, the a-logical aspect can so dominate a word that its logical meaning can almost disappear. This is an extreme case of a widely operating principle.

Verbal symbolism is thus by no means a simple mechanism, but opens up a complex world of its own. Mallarmé, whose analysis of words was very similar to that outlined above, was right in claiming that a failure to realise the intricate structure of words was likely to be fatal. A poet does not need to have a complete theory of the subject, but in practice he must instinctively recognise the interplay of indication, expression, and association, and utilize these functions to his own advantage. There is a good deal of point to the story that Lytton Strachey tells of Mallarmé. Degas complained that, though he wished to write verses as a relaxation from painting, and though he had some excellent ideas, still the verses would not come. Mallarmé replied: "Poetry is not written with ideas, it is written with words."

Granting this as a general maxim, how, on the theory of meaning put forward, can we explain the mechanism of poetry? The explanation will have to be content with mere generalisations, for no analysis would ever yield the full secret of any one line of verse. Every phrase of poetry is a unique mystery that cannot be fully analysed: But we can at least show that certain general principles are at work.

Most poems have a logical meaning (whether true or false),
that is, the words indicate a certain situation. But the logical
meaning tends to be dominated more and more by the expressive
function of the words.

"When to the sessions of sweet silent thought
I summon up rememberance of things past,
I sigh the lack of many a thing I sought,
And with old woes new wail my dear time's waste."

Here the words indicate a particular situation, and the poet tells
us what he does in that situation. If that were all, the subject
of the poem could be set down in propositional form and nothing
be missed. But in and through the logical structure and the
sound-pattern of the syllables breathes an inescapable emotional
quality that cannot be formulated. We follow the logical signif-
icance in order to perceive the expressive meaning that permeates
it. Sometimes the a-logical factor is so strong that it seems to
consume the ordinary meaning almost completely, as in the Clown's
apologue to "Twelfth Night":

"When that I was and a little tiny boy,
With a hey, ho, the wind and the rain,
A foolish thing was but a toy,
For the rain it raineth every day."

The objective information given is of the thinnest kind, but the
words present an emotional attitude with extraordinary immediacy.

When we speak of the subject of a poem - what the words
present - it is necessary to consider the subject as the final
product of all the elements of meaning. A poem presents more
than what the words indicate, for the verbal symbols carry a
strong expressive content and surround themselves with relevant associations.

This view must be carefully differentiated from the commonly-held theory of "expressionism". For the expressionist, the subject of the poem is not the words at all. He goes behind the words and speaks of emotion of the writer as the real subject. The poem fades into the flux of emotion that gave rise to it. But the writer's emotions - and the same applies to the reader's emotions - are not works of art and have no aesthetic relevance. The theory of language put forward here guarantees that the subject is presented in the words, and we do not have to go behind them to find any further subject. The poem presents an emotion seizing on various images in order to give itself "a local habitation and a name". The subject is not simply the particular images seized on, nor is it merely the emotion acting in a void, but the whole complex situation. The writer's emotions may correspond to those presented in the poem, or may be different; the reader's emotions on reading the poem may be similar to those presented there, or they may be quite at variance with it: the only thing that is of aesthetic importance is the subject as actually presented, which is not just an emotion, but a picture of an emotion in contact with its images, weaving the external world around itself as a symbolic vestment.

From this standpoint, objections can be raised to the naively realist position put forward in Professor Anderson's
monograph. If we limit the function of words to indication, then it is comparatively easy to raise the question of "coherence". The subject can be viewed as a series of propositions, and the question of the truth or falsity of those propositions appears at once. Coherence is thus a relation between true propositions, and to say that a poem is coherent is simply to say that what the words indicate actually exists. But if we say that indication does not deliver the whole subject, then the simple logical issue tends to disappear. The presented subject of Joyce's "Goldenhair", which Anderson quotes, is not simply a lady with golden hair being asked to lean out of a window. It is a passionate "cri du coeur" that surrounds itself with these images in order to achieve form. Neither the emotion, nor the images voiced from the emotion, are the subject. What is presented is the integral situation of the emotion in contact with its images, and since emotion has a habit of distorting the structure of reality, of disturbing the logical connections between its images, to question the logic of the images is to raise the issue of coherence prematurely.

In rejecting indication as mere "reportage", the nineteenth century poets adumbrated a valid distinction, even if they did not achieve it. Mallarmé was correct in saying that the words of poetry were not merely a means of conveying information or communicating ideas. But in his attempt to show what else words could do, he was seduced by the idealist heresy. It is true that poetry is not concerned with making propositions which can be affirmed or denied in the ordinary way. But that does not mean
that poetry enters an ideal world above space and time, where questions of truth and falsity cannot occur. The words still refer us to situations that take place in this world, and to one kind of situation in particular, where human passions and emotions strive to express themselves by the images of the objective world. A curse, (or a blessing), is an embryonic stage of poetry. We do not think of contradicting the literal meaning of a curse, all we ask is that it should give an adequate presentation of a state of mind. The question of truth or falsity comes up in this form: is the experience registered in these words genuine? Is this a true picture of the way such a person's anger would attach itself to external symbols? Most curses are crude and unindividuated, failing to present their subject properly, just as most of the poems that are written are crude and unaesthetic, mere bundles of words that mean next to nothing.

This question is bound up with another, that of sentimentalism, pornography and other forms of bad art.

"The rhetorician would deceive his neighbour,

The sentimentalist himself, while art

Is but a vision of reality."

The releasing of a poem from the bonds of indication means that it is released from the common purposes of speech. It is complete in itself and content with its own nature. An aesthetic image is not static: it seeks to convince no-one, nor does it attempt to arouse desire, to excite action, or to alleviate discomfort. Its dynamic relations are all within itself: to the world it is an equilibrium of forces, that requires nothing further in order to
complete its development. The sentimentalist cannot create an aesthetic image. He desires to convince himself that he feels certain emotions which he does not feel, and that he does not feel other emotions which, in fact, he does feel. The desire to present human emotion as it really acts and is, disappears in his endeavour to convey false information about his feelings - and the result is that he sinks into "reportage", aping the technique of poetry without its substance. Similarly, the pornographer disguises his purpose in the trappings of art. He cannot induce a stasis of desire because his whole aim is to stimulate desire. Only those works are aesthetic that are complete in themselves and do not need any action or reaction in the reader in order to fulfil their function ---- they are "a stasis called forth, prolonged and at last dissolved by what I call the rhythm of beauty" (Joyce).

(3)

These modes of writing - the sentimental, the pornographic, the propagandist - fail to produce an aesthetic image, because they use language in order to convey information of some kind, or to excite action of some kind, and make the expressive function of words subservce this primary aim. The material is ordered and disposed for some ulterior end and not for the sake of the purely aesthetic values that appear in the finite, self-sufficient work of art. Behind every aesthetic production lies a particular attitude of mind that made it possible - the
aesthetic attitude. It seems to be characterised by an indifference to ulterior, practical aims and seeks only to organise expressive language into a structural unity. A consideration of its peculiar function helps to illuminate some of the further qualities of the works of art themselves.

In order to define the aesthetic attitude, it is necessary to go beyond linguistic symbols and analyse the facts of cognition that called them forth. Just as the functions that go to make up language are divisible into three, the functions of cognition are also three, although the divisions do not correspond.

The theory of knowledge indicates the presence of three aspects of cognitive experience — sensation, thought, and intuition. It is with the last that we are especially concerned, but what is meant by the intuition can only be arrived at by considering the limitations of the other two processes. Roughly speaking, by sensation we become aware of some of the qualities of the thing, we recognise it as a particular object with a certain form, colour, mass, and so on. By thought we conceptualise the thing, we recognise it as a particular instance of a general class to which it belongs. Sensation yields particularity, thought recognises universality. For example we sense a vertical ramified structure coloured brown and green. Thought identifies that structure as a tree, and thus observes its universal aspect. The act of naming indicates that conceptual thinking is going on, for names refer us to general classes of things.

So much is fairly straightforward. We sense X as a "thing", and think it as a "thing of a certain sort". The
combined apprehension of particularity and universality is called perception. But the analysis is not really as simple as that. The union of sense and thought into perception does not give the whole of what is meant by cognition.

Consider again the perception of a tree. It was said that sensation acquaints us with the green colour of the foliage, and it was because of this and other sensations that we could recognise the object as a member of the class "tree". But if we attend to this sensation of green, it appears that even at this elementary stage of awareness conceptual thought is still operating. The fact of naming the colour shows that we see it as a "colour of a certain sort", that is, we recognise the concept of greenness as exemplified in that particular sense-datum. No matter how much we try to simplify sensation, we find that it co-exists with a certain measure of conception. "Pure sensation" is a thin abstraction that never occurs in experience. Awareness of $X$ and the conceptual interpretation of $X$ are indissolubly linked, and we tend to sense only what we can conceptualise. The union of sense and thought which we have called perception seems, therefore, to encounter distinct limitations and cannot pass out of the range of conceptual thinking.

But conceptual thinking cannot provide for a complete realisation of the object, even when combined with sensation. We could go on perceiving this and that quality of the tree indefinitely, but we would never reach the totality we mean by "this tree", for it exhibits an infinite variety of qualities. Taking the tree as subject, we could multiply the predicates we
apply to it without ever exhausting the object, and without arriving at that apprehension of the tree as a single unmistakable fact which we call cognition. In order to complete our cognitive experience of the tree we must press beyond the boundaries of perception and seize upon the unique whole that is presented. This movement of the mind to complete perception by a total awareness not given in perception is the process of intuition.

In the hands of Bergson, intuition is elevated to a peculiar status. He shows the limitations of perception, its fundamental incapacity to grasp the whole of the experience — but then he goes on to dismiss perception altogether and posits a "pure intuition" independent of sense and thought. However, this is not warranted by the facts. Just as we cannot isolate pure sensation, or pure thought, so we cannot isolate pure intuition without making it a hollow abstraction. Experience always exhibits these three elements working together.

But while intuition cannot be isolated from knowing, that is not to say that the three elements must maintain a constant proportion to one another. It is always possible to accentuate in experience either the conceptual element, the sensuous element, or the intuitive element. Intuition can be forced into prominence without losing its connection with sense-data or concepts. If the peculiar quality of intuition as an element of experience must be described, I can only do so by speaking of a "pure awareness of the existence of a unique, unnamed object." Such a descriptive formula will perhaps be completely jejune to
those who have not undertaken the discipline necessary before intuition can be realised consciously in experience. To others it will be seen as it is, a hopeless throwing of a handful of words in the direction of an indescribable thing. Like many functions we fulfil automatically and incessantly, the intuitive movement of thought is carried on irrespective of our awareness of it.

IT is useless to suppose that a state of pure intuition can be arrived at: but it is by no means impossible for the mind to orientate itself towards a greater receptivity. Too often we rail to realise just how little we apprehend of the reality that surrounds and permeates the psyche. But a little attention to our habitual acts of cognition should be convincing.

I am seated at table. My neighbour asks me to pass the butter. My eye swiftly identifies the butter by its most obvious features and my hand does the rest. What is the cognitive content of this experience? A fleeting recognition of a yellow amorphous substance in a flat dish - just these roughly observed features brought into prominence against a background of vague apprehension of the butter as a total thing. The reason for this fragmentary kind of recognition is simple. My attention is located on the butter only because I have a simple, practical purpose with regard to it.

In order to fulfil that purpose I select the butter by its most noticeable features and ignore all the qualities that are irrelevant to my purpose.

One way in which I can enlarge my experience of the
butter is to make it the object of a more difficult task. Since I am at a table which is not rationed by war or poverty, I assume without question that the substance is butter and not margarine or copha-substitute. But if the butter were given to me and I had to decide which of these three it really was, then it would be necessary to observe a much greater number of its characters with greater accuracy — and the increase in the scope of my sensuous-conceptual approach would probably result in a greater area of intuitive apprehension. But still, my examination of the butter would be limited to those characters which were relevant to my specialised purpose. The butter as a unique, infinitely complex thing would still present itself to me only vaguely. An even more difficult purpose would probably force cognition to take in still more of the manifold aspects of the butter, and the field of intuition would be still further occupied by these new characters. But there would be no increase in the ratio between it and the other elements of cognition. The conceptual aspect of knowledge would be paramount as long as a specialized practical purpose stimulated it.

Suppose, therefore, that I have no intention of passing the butter, that I am not trying to prove that it is not margarine, that I do not want to eat it, to buy it, to sell it, or even to possess it. As far as my practical activity is concerned the butter might just as well not exist. If, under these circumstances, I contemplate the butter, a significant change takes place in my experience. Since I am barren of any desire to do
anything about the butter except look at it, my conceptual and sensuous activity has no particular direction. Being indifferent to the practical value of any of its characters, it considers any aspect as important as any other and expands its scope to embrace the whole field. But, as we saw, no multiplication of concepts and percepts will bring us to a sense of that piece of butter as a unique, complex thing. Intuition, no longer pressed back by the demands of practical purposes, asserts itself, and gives to experience a quality that is unmistakable once it is realised in its intensity. The mind becomes absorbed into an intimate contact with reality and unites itself with its object. The thing is no longer butter - something you want in order to spread on a piece of bread - it is a dazzlingly unique object with its own peculiar shape, size, texture, consistency and so on. Its mere "Dasein" - the pure fact of its existence - fills the mind.

But this is not all. As the intuitive aspect of the object strengthens itself (giving a new immediacy and vividness to perception), the whole of the psyche vibrates in response. There follows a keen excitement, a diffused emotionality divorced from its usual causes and called forth purely by the object qua object. It is the exhilaration of really seeing the piece of butter - nay, more than seeing, of uniting the mind with its object at the full stretch of all the cognitive powers. One might almost say that one has given sight, hearing, smell, touch and taste to the butter itself, for it is as though it is not us knowing the object, but the object knowing itself. While we are concerned with practical purposes, we interpose our desires between the mind and the object,
blocking as it were, our own view. But in this contemplative state, the self disappears as a barrier - there is an "ecstasy", in the strict sense of the word.

After I had elaborated these ideas, I was pleased to find something of a confirmation of them in the writings of Roger Fry. He makes a distinction between four kinds of vision:

(1) Practical vision that limits itself to utility features. "In practical vision we have no more concern after we have read the label on the object; vision ceases the moment it has served its biological function."

(2) Curiosity vision. "Even the grown man keeps something of his unbiological, disinterested vision with regard to a few things which have some marked peculiarity that catches his eye."

(3) Aesthetic vision. "Those who indulge in this vision are entirely absorbed in apprehending the relations of form and colour to one another, as they cohere within the object --- no element of curiosity, no reference to actual life comes in." This vision requires for its exercise either works of art, or natural objects that exhibit a similar kind of beauty.

(4) Artistic vision. The creative artist goes further, for he does not require works of art, and even the ugliest and least aesthetic appearances can be subjected to the creative vision of the artist.

My description of intuitive awareness corresponds to this last kind of vision. It may be, as Fry supposes, that the
disinterested power of passionately apprehending the appearances of life for their own sake is the exclusive property of the artist, I should be disappointed to think that the gift was so specialised: but it may be that these appearances (including the most vulgar and trivial) can only be apprehended aesthetically by the ordinary man when the artist has taken them up and presented them in a rhythmic ordered sequence, separating them from the biological context or everyday life.

However, it is true that this peculiar function of cognition does lie at the back of creative art. Fry is concerned with the visual arts, but the same thing is true of poetry, which is not exclusively visual. When we consider the material that poetry works with, it is seen that intuition must extend itself beyond the domain of sense-perception. It has been pointed out that the subject of a poem is not simply the objective situation which the logical meaning of the words presents, but it is also the subjective attitude to the situation which is conveyed by the a-logical function of words. It is always the mind in contact with its images that we find, and not merely those images themselves. Moreover, as often as not, the logical meaning of the words deals with human emotions and passions quite directly, for example:

"Sweet love renew thy force; be it not said
Thy edge should blunter be than appetite ---"

The emotional subject is conveyed not only by the a-logical over-
-tones but also by direct statement. Even though it is true that no direct statement about emotions would, on its own, constitute poetry, it is often the case that expressive power of the words is strengthened by some degree of logical statement about the emotions involved. Accordingly the poet’s “vision” is very much concerned with human material which cannot be apprehended by the senses alone. The same detached, intuitive awareness must be directed towards the obscure passions of the soul. The poet has a particularly difficult path to follow. It is comparatively easy to contemplate detachedly external objects whose link with us is after all fairly slight. The piece of butter may be biologically relevant to my appetite, but I cannot attach the same desperate importance-for-life to it as I attach to my appetite itself, and to those other appetites that make up my mental life. If some-one said, that piece of butter is not there at all, I should probably argue with him, but I would not feel it mattered much. But if some-one denied that I had an appetite, I should be much more concerned. The overwhelming intimacy of the link between the self and its various passions makes it particularly difficult to regard them in anything else but a practical way. But that is precisely what the poet must be able to do. The disinterested contemplation of objects must be directed towards the interior life. The poet, in his moments of creative vision, must cease to identify himself with his loves and hates, and regard them purely as objects of contemplation. The satisfaction or non-satisfaction of those passions, may be of the utmost importance to his ordinary life, but
for the purposes of poetry they are irrelevant. An unsatisfied passion is just as good as a satisfied passion from this special point of view, for it is only the unique quality of his experience that absorbs him, not its biological context.

It follows that, while a poem is concerned with desires, it is not a satisfaction of those desires. The attempt to satisfy desire by creating a fantasy substitute in words is not art. If fantasy appears in poetry it must be there for its own sake - as an object of aesthetic contemplation - not for the sake of some ulterior purpose. Any man can indulge in fantasy, and many men can write out their fantasies in words - but it is not until the interest is shifted from the satisfaction-value of the fantasy and concentrated in a pure, detached contemplation of the fantasy itself, irrespective of its practical purpose, that the fantasy can become the subject of a work of art.

(4)

It will be noticed that aesthetic contemplation, the endeavour to apprehend objects in a direct and sustained intuition, is closely connected with the attitude of mind which the great religious contemplatives have always enjoined. In both attitudes there is the demand that the mind must free itself of the bondage of the ordinary passions and purposes of life in order to contemplate existence in a new way. Aldous Huxley, in his valuable study of contemplation in "Ends and Means" defines the requirement as "non-attachment". As a suggestive description this
is a useful word, but it is by no means easy to give a satisfactory psychological account of the processes involved. Briefly, there seem to be two main divisions of thought on the subject. The ascetics take non-attachment to imply the non-satisfaction of as many of the ordinary desires as is consistent with continued existence. This is the complete withdrawal from passionate life which is preached by Buddha in the famous Fire-Sermon. The natural man, he taught, is on fire with the various mental and physical lusts, and cannot reach a state of pure contemplation until these fires are put out. In the West, the same intense asceticism is preached by St. Augustine (as Eliot noted so cryptically and pungently in "The Waste Land").

But complete asceticism would mean extinction. Amongst the various lusts of the flesh are some that must be satisfied - the desire for food and drink; for micturition and what Hobbes calls "exoneration"; for shade in the desert and for clothing in the snow. If these are not to be inhibited, what grounds are there for inhibiting, for example, the social desires - companionship, sexual pleasures, procreation of children and so on? The non-ascetic contemplatives see no reason to make this arbitrary distinction between desires which may, and desires which may not be admitted. Their argument is an extension of the principle that the ascetics apply to those fundamental desires which they satisfy. The ascetic agrees that hunger must be filled, but points out that there are two ways of reacting to hunger - in the vulgar phrase, either you eat to live or you live to eat. The choice lies between satisfying hunger when it is
there, and merely becoming a hunger-driven automation. Very reasonably, the non-ascetic asks why the same attitude cannot be taken up in respect of other passions, and suggests that the ascetic is taking the cowardly way out. Admittedly it is difficult to satisfy sexual hunger and yet keep oneself detached, but that is no reason for not trying. The non-ascetic contemplative recognises sexual and other demands, but refuses (the phrase is Huxley’s) to identify himself with these demands. The opposite of non-attachment is attachment, the inability of the mind to be anything else that the servant of one or two dominant imperious cravings. Shakespeare’s tragic heroes are studies in attachment. The tragic “hamartia” takes the form of a diseased craving that overmasters the mind. The character ceases to be able to see life except as a means to this one end, and destroys himself in the attempt to force nature and society and his own soul to submit to this one demand. The contemplative (whether ascetic or non-ascetic) refuses to submit himself entirely to any single passion or group of passions, but maintains an ultimate detachment from them.

Poets have sometimes been ascetics, but mostly they have accepted gladly and fully the sensuous passionate life of a man. However their attitude shares with the religious contemplative the same non-attachment. As we have seen, the poet’s business is to gain an intuitive apprehension of experience. Were he completely dominated by his cravings, he would write poems merely to satisfy those particular desires. Cognitively, he is at the mercy of his perceptual functions that seek out only those aspects of things
which have relevance to his practical purposes - his intuitive awareness is feeble and perfunctory. Aesthetically, the weakness of his poetry lies in an improper use of language, wherein the merely logical and informative function of words masquerades as something else. The only way in which an aesthetic subject is achieved is by utilising the expressive power of words to show a mind in contact with its images. The writer who desires only to create a verbal satisfaction for his cravings is not interested in an aesthetic subject, he is simply trying to convert unreality into reality - making false logical propositions and pretending they are true. Poetry lends itself to such improper uses very readily, for its set rhythms can be used to hypnotise the critical faculty, and so smuggle into the words any shoddy rubbish that would not bear critical inspection. If fantasy is to be introduced into poetry it must be viewed "sub specie artis" and not remain on the level of mere "reportage". The only information that a poem gives is that such and such an emotional activity reacts to the world in such a way. One of these ways might be the making of fantasy-substitutes for reality, but that fantasy must not be divorced from its appropriate emotional setting and put forward as information about reality. In practice, it is very difficult to demonstrate the difference between improper poetry and a genuine aesthetic image: the difference is rather felt than perceived, because it lies in the recognition of a unity between the expressive, a-logical tone of the words and the logical meanings that they convey. Where this unity exists, an aesthetic whole has been created; but where the relation between expression and logic is factitious, then the poem is not an aesthetic whole. Criticism
must remain tentative and impressionistic, for it takes time and
the conjunction of many skilled minds to disentangle the counter-
feit from the true. All we can say is, when criticism has done
its work, it has separated out those works which use language poet-
ically from the mass of improper verbiage which constitutes the
verse-production of every age. It is not necessary (though it
might be useful) for a critic to have an intellectual realisation
of the nature of a poetic language, but it is necessary that his
impressions should be directed (whether consciously or not) by the
eaesthetic approach. The basis of that approach is not only the
psychological process of non-attached contemplation, but the
symbolic function of words that requires the contemplative vision
for its proper use. Words in poetry, it cannot be too often stress-
ed, are not only logical symbols, but are also symbols of the
mental attitude that fashioned the words. Words are not poetically
significant until both these symbolic functions are combined into
an aesthetic whole. From this basic doctrine flow all the wider
implications that are now being discussed.

Mystical contemplation, therefore, has a certain likeness
to the poet's vision. But there are differences between the two.
The poet, at least in the hours of creative effort, disassociates
himself from the passionate cravings of his life and views them
objectively, striving to achieve the same intuitive awareness of
them as the painter does of his objects. The mystic also contra-
dicts his biological processes, but not merely to gain a non-
biological approach to experience. He is usually concerned with
inhibiting normal life in order to enter into some higher mystical
experience that he craves. He places his acts and thoughts in
the setting of a kind of super-biology, the nature of which has be
been sketched in the earlier discussion of mystical symbolism.
The "via contemplativa" of the mystic starts with the same effort to
detach the mind from its experience, but it proceeds to attach the
mind to another and higher kind of experience. Only if the mystic
is a poet does the endeavour to bring his super-biological
experience into the field of aesthetic vision.

Since we have argued that this higher experience does
not differ in quality, but only in intensity, from the experience
of ordinary man, it will be useful to review what we have discover-
ed of the nature of that experience and see what happens when it
is placed in an aesthetic context.

(a) The basic movement of mystical thought is from
unconscious motives to their sublimation in the real world. This
"transformation of the libido", as Jung calls it, is affected
through symbols which are ambivalent - on one side they refer us to
reality. The mystic differs from the normal man in a much more
intensive use of symbolic fantasy, and in a greater measure of
belief in the objective existence of his fantasy. The adjustment
to life he achieves is something of a by-product: while he is
endeavouring to adjust himself to the demands of his fantasy, he
is also adjusting himself to some of the demands of real life. If
this symbolic process is to become the material of poetry, the
same attitude must be maintained to it as to other activities of
the mind. It ceases to be relevant to poetry whether the
fantasy succeeds in satisfying the demands of either the conscious
or the unconscious life: all that the poet does is to present that
fantasy as an object of intuitive apprehension, and with it the
emotional reactions that surround it.

(b) Mysticism is much occupied with interior sensations which do not come from the external sense-organs. Again, it has been shown that there is nothing unusual about these "spiritual sensations", for everyone experiences something of the kind, though not always to the same degree. The lover who feels an inner feeling of sweetness, or light, or warmth, is not concerned with sense-data, but only uses the language of sense in order to symbolize his inward feelings. Thus we have a series of symbolic correspondences between sense-impressions and the interior sensations which resemble them. Symbolic statement is necessary because language is not constituted as a means of communicating these experiences directly. But to this account of the language of the spiritual senses, something further might now be added. Just because these sensations are so difficult to describe, they tend to enter the province of expressive language, which endeavours to create the subtle emotional tone in which experience is bathed. No direct statement could ever do justice to the complexity and profundity of emotion and feeling - it is a field that yields its secrets mainly to the indirect, a-logical processes of language. It is there that we would naturally look for a record of these
obscure pervasive features of experience.

(c) Finally, mysticism often results in an extraordinarily intense vision of natural objects. They press upon his consciousness with a vivid immediacy that suggests that they are imbued with an inner life and power. Sometimes the mystic finds an esoteric "meaning" in the objects and views them as symbols of the cosmic spirit. He interprets his vision in terms of the occult doctrines that inform the rest of his thought, and adds to it a framework of dogmatic meaning that is not actually given in the experience itself. Such moments occur sometimes in the life of the ordinary people. Their senses seem immeasurably sharpened and everything they see comes as a unique illumination. But normal people do not fit such moments into a dogmatic framework, nor do they cultivate their sensibility so that these illuminations may be more abiding, and inevitably the experience fades and is forgotten, and recurs at ever-lessening intervals as practical life increases its demands.

Yet poetry is full of such moments, whether they are mystically interpreted or not. Quite ordinary and everyday appearances, under the hands of the poet, come to the reader with a dazzling freshness and a new delight. Is this not the very state of intuitive awareness that we have already tried to describe?

(6)

The argument as it developed so far may be summarised as follows.

At all stages of experience, symbolic reference is
the fundamental law of the mental life. Even a simple act of
cognition uses the sense-datum as the symbol of a perceived whole
of which it is part. As we rise in the scale of complexity, we
reach elaborate sets of intellectual symbols (in philosophical
systems and so on) and equally elaborate sets of emotional symbols
(as in a Blake myth, or a Baudelairean "landscape of the soul").

Language is a special case of symbolism. Words
can make significant reference in three ways: by indication, by
association, by expression. Although meaning is often defined
solely in terms of indication, it is often that a full account of
meaning must include some kind of controlled association, and also
the a-logical reference back to the mental attitude of the speaker.

Poetry does not arise unless the expressive function
of the words begins to dominate the logical and associate functions.
But expressive language is only a necessary, it is not a sufficient,
condition of the appearance of poetry. A string of curses may be
expressive, but it is not a poem. What we call a poem is a
structure with some peculiarly aesthetic character that marks it
off from the other kinds of expressive language.

In order to isolate this aesthetic character, an analysis was
undertaken of the aesthetic attitude; and it was found that it
consisted of a non-bound attitude to the objects contemplated.
It was found also that this contemplative attitude, by abandoning
the purposive perception that practical affairs require of
cognition, liberated the intuitive side of the cognitive process
bringing objects before the mind with something of the virgin
freshness and uniqueness they must have had for Adam when he stood in the Garden and named all things to himself.

The suggestion that the course of the argument forces on one is that the peculiar quality of poetry lies in its ability to present things as they appear in moments of intuitive awareness. A poem is composed of verbal symbols, and of the various symbolic processes of experience which these verbal symbols "mean". The poet must manipulate words so that his subject will come as a unique intuition of reality:

"Le Maître, par un oeil profond, a, sur ses pas,
Apaisé de l'âme l'inquiète merveille
Dont le frisson final, dans sa voix seule, éveille
Pour la Rose et le Lys le mystère d'un nom."

But how can words be used so as to reduce "the restless eden splendour" to that "final shiver"?

The answer seems to be already available from the facts that have been brought to light. Pure awareness springs from a cessation of the practical, biological reaction to things. The basic pattern of life is expressed in the psychological formula: stimulus → organism → response. So long as the stimulus issues into the ordinary motor response, attention will be located in only those aspects of the object which are relevant to the motor response. The object, as object, and not as a means to an end, remains unknown. Only when the normal response is checked in some way does the previous energy flow back from the normal action and consider the object for its own sake. Imagine the primitive man wooing his mate by a series of mating-calls. Ordinarily, the
mating-calls would pass smoothly into the attainment of their aim. But if the woman refuses to be charmed, a blockage occurs. The lover then turns his attention more closely to his calls in an endeavour to improve them. So far, his purpose is still a practical one, and any change that occurs in his vocalising will be directed towards a biological end. But imagine him attending to his voice, and suddenly taking an interest in the sounds he makes for their own sake! The sounds are no longer just a practical instrument, but are attended to purely as sounds. Their rhythms and pitch-relations please him in themselves, and he starts to experiment, trying to introduce an even more pleasing order into them. In that moment art is born. The more he experiments, the further does he move away from the biological purpose of the sounds, and finally he brings them into an order which no longer suggests its erotic origin. He has made a song, it will divert their attention also from the biological purposes of the voice, and by its peculiar structure will concentrate their attention purely on itself as a work of art.

In a like fashion, the structure of poetry is removed from its connections with ordinary practical speech. The mere fact of its stylised order, its recurring rhymes and rhythms, will tend to check the incipient motor-responses of the reader and fix his attention on the subject in a disinterested fashion. But also, in every line, the unusual way in which quite ordinary words are used will reinforce the effect. I open the Oxford Book of English Verse at random and come across this:
"O my Luve's like a red, red rose
That's newly sprung in June."

In a non-poetic context, to say "my love" would set up a specific train of practical adjustments in the mind. But the poem, instead of continuing to stimulate those practical adjustments quickly shuts them off with - a symbol. She is like a red rose. Moreover that red rose has the glamour of newly blossomed summer flowers. The practical point of view has been hopelessly lost in the elaboration of the symbol, and instead of being merely an object of sexual interest, we become aware of the unique quality of the woman as she exists in herself. Moreover the excitement and stir of the rhythm of the words is no longer an erotic stimulus, but exists only to present to us the emotional reaction of the lover.

I turn the pages again, and find a song of Blake's:

"The moon like a flower
In heaven's high bower,
With silent delight
Sits and smiles on the night."

Ordinarily, if the moon were mentioned, we would attend to it just long enough to recognise the object referred to. "In actual life the normal person really only reads the labels as it were on the objects around him and troubles no further. Almost all the things that are useful in any way put on more or less this cap of invisibility." But the simile - and a simile is
only a symbol whose correlative is stated in the same sentence as itself - will not allow us to be content with casual recognition. The moon, as an object of beauty on which the poet's emotion fixes itself, is suddenly stripped of its normal context and presented in a moment of vivid intuitive awareness. We apprehend not only the beauty of the moon but also - in the sensuous spell of the words and the associations called up - the emotional tone that permeates the poet's vision of the moon. Metaphor, simile, allegory - in short all the symbolic imagery or speech - is a means of bringing out the intuitive aspect of things, or laying them bare as objects of absorbed and disinterested contemplation. We are held in a kind of trance, aware only of the subject as it develops within the poetic structure - and that subject, fully understood, is the relation of the visible world to the emotional life of the poet, an emotional life that penetrates often beneath consciousness into the depths beyond.

What answer, then, shall we give Zenocrate? A poem is a kind of emotional algebra, a set of symbolic functions that evolve along the lines of their own peculiar logic. The terms of the equations are unknowns that cannot be evaluated until the implications between the various equations are developed. Sometimes these variables have more than one solution; they may have an irrational value as well as a rational one. And perhaps it is the surdic element in experience that gives to our algebra its peculiar vitality and power.
The range of critical writing that bears on one or other of the aspects considered in this essay is almost co-extensive with the whole of literary criticism. Often, the most fruitful ideas appear in books that do not deal with either of the special topics — mysticism and romanticism — and sometimes in books not directly connected with literary studies. I have therefore confined the list to a relatively small, if diverse, number of books from which proved valuable in some way, rather than compile what would be simply a record of my reading in literary criticism and other subjects in general. Many books, particularly those bearing on Part II, have been found almost valueless. Others, for example Rhodes' book on Baudelaire which is mentioned, give a mass of useful references, quotations etc., but are beneath contempt as serious studies. A few — notably the writings of Denis Saurat, A.R. Chicholm, and — have been invaluable.
PART I

Blake and Modern Thought
Blake and Milton
Literature and Occult Tradition
An Introduction to the Study of Blake

Introduction to "Verse and Prophecies of Blake" (Everyman Edit)

William Blake
Vision and Vesture
Ideas of Good and Evil (Studies in Blake)
William Blake


The Intellectual Background of the 18th Century (a study)

A Survey of Mystical Symbolism
Symbolism and Belief
Problems of Mysticism and its Symbolism
The Enneas of Plutarch
Psychology of the Unconscious

Denis Saurat
Denis Saurat
Denis Saurat
Max Plowman
Max Plowman
Arthur Symons
Gardiner
W. B. Yeats
P. Berger
Middleton Murry
Yeats and Ellis
Basil Willey
M. A. Elmer
A. S. Bevan
N. Silberer
Franz S. Mackenna
Carl Jung
Introductory Lectures  : S. Freud.
Interpretation of Dreams  : S. Freud.
Three Contributions to Sexual Theory  : S. Freud.
Psycho-analysis and Poetry (Southern b. i.) a reply to Passmore's article  : A. D. Hope.
Song and its Fountain  : A. E.
For Part II

Deutsche Romantik (2 vols)
Modern German Literature
Romanticism and the Romantic School in Germany
Fragments (in collected works)
Decline and Fall of the Romantic Ideal
The Romantic Agony
Axel's Castle
Victor Hugo
Chopin Brennan
Towards Nérodia
Rimbaud
Tradition and Barbarian
Baudelaire
Variété II (on Baudelaire)
Baudelaire and the Symbolists
De Baudelaire à Surréalisme
Cult of Beauty in Baudelaire (2 vols)
Selected Essays (Blake, Baudelaire)
Preface to "Les Fleurs du Mal"
(Calmann-Lévy ed. with critical appendix)

Walzel
Ellesser
Wernae
Novalis
F. A. Lucas
Mario Praz
Edmund Wilson
Geise
H. M. Green
A. R. Chisholm
A. R. Chisholm
P. W.Jones
Arthur Symons
Paul Valéry
Peter Quennell
Marcel Raymond
S. E. Rhodes
T. S. Eliot
M. Gantier
Mallarmé
Poesia of Mallarmé (with much critical material)
La Poesia e la Pensée de St. Mallarmé
Vers et Prose (Divagations etc.)
L'Art Romantique
Oeuvres Choisis
La Poesie Pure
Prayer and Poetry
Belphegor
The Achievement of T.S. Eliot
Human Types (vide Disscussion of magic words)
Primitivo Religión (for criticism of Levy-Brahl)
for Part III

Leviathan
The Meaning of Meaning
Principles of Lit. Criticism
The Literary Mind
Vision and Design
Words and Poetry
Emotion
An Introduction to the Psychology of Perception
Symbolism and Truth
Ends and Means

Hobbes
Ogden and Richards
G. K. Chesterton
Max Eastman
Roger Fry
George Rylands
E. MacCurdy
Sir H. Parsons
Ralph Eaton
Aldous Huxley