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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
2015
THESIS

STONE AUTHORITY VIOLENCE
Relating Body, Materials, Remembering

by
Andrew Hazewinkel
This volume is presented as a record of the work undertaken for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Sydney College of the Arts, University of Sydney.
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The ideas expressed and explored in this text accompany an extensive body of original artworks. When considered together the exhibition and the text represent an attempt to listen to and feel the double pulse that exists in the complex interweaving of life into death and death into life.

At the completion of my doctoral project, this ancient, rhythmic, gargantuan dilemma will, of course, remain unresolved. I set out with that understanding. My aim here however is to draw together a very specific, perhaps unanticipated, and some would say idiosyncratic set of ideas, to create a plastic, adaptable framework that is useful in creative processes of identifying, reflecting on and participating in, the double pulse of life and death, both from within and without, both enacted and embodied.

Whilst my project draws extensively from a diverse range of established scholarly traditions conventionally considered the realm of the humanities, I situate my use of them within the dynamic field of contemporary art practice. I am, after all, first and foremost a maker of things. The scholarly traditions hold ideas that I put to work in order to make things, or to put things in materially apprehensible relationships in space and time, in artistic contexts.

Throughout this undertaking I have resisted the impulse to prioritise one over the other, neither the original artworks that I have made nor the theories that I have
examined hold authority over the other. I have done my best to keep the playing field level; concert rather than priority has been my guiding principle.

My method is characterised by the mirroring apparent between the range and the diversity of the scholarly fields and histories that I draw upon in the written component of this undertaking, and the range and diversity of materials and processes that I have engaged with in my practical, studio-based thought experiments.

It is the mirroring between the diversity and range of my chosen theoretical sources and the diversity and range of the materials and processes that I have worked with which enables these two ways of thinking to come together in a kind of kinetic, double-helix form. In short, my methodology is contingent on a sense of productive between-ness within each of the two realms that give overall shape to this research. Between the realms, new ideas get generated. I do not claim to extend particular scholarly-textual fields, rather I deploy these scholarly domains in order to generate new modes of understanding with regard to the material artworks that I put on display.

By considering the theories explored on the following pages within a framework of art making, and more broadly, when engaging with both ancient and contemporary artworks, a generative loosening occurs within them, this loosening enables a broadening of the thresholds of their interpretation thus opening the way for their application beyond the limits of the specific fields from which they have emerged.
Broadly speaking, the issues central to this research have engaged artists, writers and thinkers throughout history and continue to in contemporary realm; whilst I have looked closely at a number of contemporary artists working with the nexus of our inner and outer worlds, it is because of the specificity of my quest, which focuses on the relationships between materials and remembering that I have taken the decision to refrain from analysis and critique of other contemporary artists’ works. By doing so I aim to bring another, less anticipated, set of sources to the ongoing discourse.

Perhaps it is the sheer immensity of the core issue addressed by this doctoral undertaking that renders individual fields of inquiry incapable of offering resolution, and therefore perhaps it is only through the confluence of ideas arising from diverse fields that a new way forward - encompassing new ways of understanding the interplay between materials and memory - may become apparent.
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We cannot know his legendary head
with eyes like ripening fruit. And yet his torso
is still suffused with brilliance from inside,
like a lamp, in which his gaze, now turned to low,
gleams in all its power. Otherwise
the curved breast could not dazzle you so, nor could
a smile run through the placid hips and thighs
to that dark centre where procreation flared.

Otherwise this stone would seem defaced
Beneath the translucent cascade of the shoulders
and would not glisten like a wild beast’s fur:
Would not, from all the borders of itself,
burst like a star: for here there is no place
that does not see you. You must change your life.

Rainer Maria Rilke

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ABSTRACT

In this doctoral thesis I experiment with images of damaged ancient figurative sculpture, physical space and a specific set of materials in order to generate a fresh understanding of how one’s personal experiences mingle with the residues, presences and traces of others peoples’ pasts, presents and perhaps, futures.

Two questions drive this thesis. How are materials and material culture caught up with remembering? And, how are the broken stone and bronze bodies of Antiquity entangled with our contemporary social dimension?

First investigating early photography’s association with violence and then considering the material properties and qualities of ancient figurative sculpture I investigate the relationships between materials and remembering.

This research then goes on to coin and explore the the concept of preremembering which through the development of this thesis I have come to define as a distributed system of memory-related cognition that extends beyond the individual and is enacted through a process of active externalism that embraces both the properties and qualities of materials in processes of mutual participation.

Then taking this highly personal and psychic sensation to a social level, I examine preremembering as the materially triggered understanding of events, circumstances or conditions that one may have not directly experienced, but which one’s culture already knows and stores up for all its future participants.
Finally, considering this notion of *premembering* within the context of Michel Serres’ conception of collective acceptance, complicity and intentionality (in relation to violence), I consider the contemporary socio-cultural legacies of damaged ancient figurative sculpture and question how, through the conflation of the properties, qualities and sensed histories of materials, *premembering* might be considered a future-shaping force that can be made manifest in original artworks.
INTRODUCTION

This thesis accompanies a body of original photographic and sculptural works produced as part of this doctoral research. Through writing this thesis I aim to generate fresh understanding of the relationships between materials and remembering, and to shed new light on the contemporary social relevance of damaged ancient sculpture.

Through a series of studio-based experiments involving nineteenth century, dry plate photographic negatives, contemporary digital and analogue photographic images of damaged Archaic, Greek and Roman figurative sculpture, and a specific set of materials, I aim to generate fresh understanding of how one’s personal experiences are caught up with the residues, traces and presences of others peoples’ pasts, presents and perhaps futures.

METHOD

Throughout this thesis I engage an inter-disciplinary methodology that is characterised by four distinct steps that draw together and synthesise, in new and productive ways, the perhaps unexpected combination of the diverse fields of Contemporary Art, Cognitive Archaeology, Social Anthropology and Memory Studies.
STEP 1. DISTINGUISH
First I reveal the subtle distinctions that can be productively made between specific aspects of an otherwise singularly perceived term or concept. In relation to materials the distinction between their physical properties and socially constructed qualities is important; in relation to memory the subtle distinction between memory and remembering is critical.

STEP 2. EXPLICATE
Then I identify and analyse in detail the productive aspects of the new space between the separated yet related concepts or terms; namely how the individually experienced properties and the socially constructed qualities of materials conflate in material semiosis, and how memory can be understood as closely associated with the past while remembering is active in the immediate present.

STEP 3. REORIENTATE
Next I reorientate the productive, dynamic space between the newly distinguished concepts or terms, as a means of generating new ways of thinking about the relationships between them, thus revealing new meaning between them.

STEP 4. SYNTHESISE
Finally I deploy the relevant new meaning toward the overall quest of this thesis, which is to create fresh understanding of the relationships between materials and remembering, and to shed new light on how the broken bodies of Antiquity are caught up with the contemporary realm.
In this thesis I examine the roles that the properties and qualities of materials play in human remembering. I propose that because remembering is an activity contingent on the commingling of temporal frameworks, finding new ways to think about remembering requires opening up avenues through which to consider not only how the pasts of others conflate with our own, but also how this conflation shapes individual and collective pasts, presents and perhaps futures.

As I develop and explore these considerations, I contextualise the material implications of one’s experiences with the residues, traces and presences of other people’s pasts, presents and perhaps futures in relation to violence; specifically the ongoing cycle of mythic violence which I explore with the aid of the writings of Walter Benjamin.

I want to make clear that although violence is a current which courses through this research, it is not the focus of this research, rather it functions as a kind of prism through which I examine the relationships between materials and remembering.
Extrapolating on Benjamin’s conception of *mythic violence* which concerns “the natural-historical cycles of the rise and fall of empires and states – of the establishment, augmentation and decay of institutions”,¹ I use the term mythic violence to specifically mean the interdependent, visible and invisible forms of violence that manifest in individual and collective actions and systems, through which one unconsciously comes to care more about property than life.

To make the generic, often misunderstood, broad term ‘violence’ more critically approachable, I employ Slavoj Žižek’s tripartite subdivision of the term into the three related subcategories - *subjective violence, systemic violence* and *symbolic violence*. I then deploy these precise terms to investigate the relationships between materials and remembering.

I begin at the beginning of modern photography and examine the emergent medium’s associations with subjective violence, systemic violence and symbolic violence, which as I see it, are the modes of violence that comprise the broader concept of mythic violence. Through this research I seek to expose the deeply embedded, and at times almost imperceptible relationships between these specific modes of violence and remembering.

One aspect of my research focuses on the peculiar form of remembering (identified relatively recently in the field of Memory Studies) known as postmemory. I use the concept of postmemory in productive contrapposto to the fundamental premise of this thesis, which is that materials and material culture play a significant role in the cognitive process of remembering and in intergenerational memory transfer. Throughout this thesis my focus remains on the role that materials play in the highly personal, memorial processes that bind the living to the dead, and through which, I propose, the broken bodies of Antiquity exert their ongoing contemporary legacies and relevance.

Absent memory, inherited memory, belated memory, prosthetic memory, mémoire trouée, mémoire des cendres, vicarious witnessing, received history, postmemory.  

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The terms above have been coined by various scholars working in the relatively new field of inquiry that we know as Memory Studies. Each entry in this list attempts to define a sense of “living connection”, a deeply felt and identifying relationship between those who had a direct physical experience of the unimaginable atrocities of the Holocaust, and those we call the ‘second generation’ or the ‘generation after’.

I want to make clear that this doctoral thesis is not located in the important field of Holocaust Studies, nor does it focus principally on trauma, however some of the recent work done in field of Memory Studies, specifically that concerning “the ethics and aesthetics of remembrance in the aftermath of catastrophe”, can be applied to the central inquiry in this thesis.

Social anthropologist Tim Ingold begins his discussion article “Materials Against Materiality” with the following list of materials. It is taken from the Table of Contents of a small book titled Artefacts written in 1964 by Henry Hodges. The book examines all manner of materials used by prehistoric people in making things.

Pottery, glazes, glass and enamels, copper and alloys, iron and steel, gold, silver, lead and mercury, stone, wood,

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3 Ibid. 1
4 Ibid. 2
fibres and threads, textiles and baskets, hides and leather, antler, bone, horn and ivory, dyes, pigments and paints, adhesives. 7

This list might also be read like a didactic panel on the wall of a contemporary art museum, outlining a range of materials used by a contemporary person in making an artwork. Although this list is short it spans a vast temporal distance, or as the contemporary French philosopher Michel Serres might say, it ‘commingles’ time. 

8 The medium of photography does much the same as this list, it commingles time while providing an indexical document of what was present and what happened. I expand on the idea of commingled time throughout the body of this thesis.

STRUCTURE & THEMATICS

This thesis is structured into 3 distinct parts, each part comprises two chapters, each chapter is followed by a detailed summary of that chapter, each chapter specific Summary In Conclusion provides an overview of the key concepts that have been examined therein, and explains how these concepts lead into the concerns of the following chapter. Throughout the text I draw attention, where pertinent, to my own creative practice, in order to show how the theoretical and practice-based investigations have informed and transformed each other throughout the full extent of my doctoral research.

7 Ibid.
Part One concerns early photography, specifically its developing relationships with violence and its associations with memory in the period defined by the medium’s emergence in the 1830’s up to 1910’s. In Chapter One I use the portrait genre to examine how early photography became caught up with the new forms of social regulation and systemic violence that were coterminous with the medium’s rapid development. In Chapter Two I turn from early photography’s relationship with the problem of violence to early photography’s relationship with the issue of memory. I then examine how photography came to be caught up with death and acts of remembrance. Next I introduce and examine Henri Bergson’s conception of the passage from pure memory to memory image, as a means to distinguish between memory and remembering. This is achieved by highlighting the function of habit in each of these closely related yet distinguishable concepts.

In Part Two I shift my research from photographic aspects of memory onto the material aspects of remembering. In Chapter Three I closely examine Michael Polanyi’s conception of tacit knowing and Marianne Hirsch’s conception of postmemory in relation to the habitual aspects of Bergson’s conception of the passage from pure memory to memory image. Then with the aid of Serres’ characteristic literary device, the variegated list, I introduce the concept of productive between-ness which should be understood as critical, not only to the range of theories concerning memory, materials and the body that I examine throughout this thesis, but also as reflective of the productive exchange between the theoretical and studio-based research that give shape to this doctoral submission. In Chapter Four, with the help of Cognitive Archaeologists Colin
Renfrew and Lambros Malafousis, and Social Anthropologist Tim Ingold, I locate my research into the relationships between materials and remembering in the social dimension. I distinguish the properties from the qualities of materials, thereby establishing the properties of a material as associated with the physical characteristics of a material, and the qualities of a material as the socio-culturally generated attributes of a material. This important distinction begins to foreground my questioning of whether acts of remembering are contingent on retrospectivity, and sets up my detailed analysis of Malafouris’ Material Engagement Theory, which I then explore in the following chapter.

Part Three focuses on Material Engagement Theory, and Serres’ writings on the historical associations between statuary and death. Through these two recent conceptual developments I bring the contemporary social dimension of ancient figurative sculpture to life. In Chapter Five I undertake a detailed analysis of the three working hypotheses of Material Engagement Theory - the Hypothesis of the Extended Mind, the Hypothesis of Enactive Signification and the Hypothesis of Material Agency - drawing out the “constitutive intertwining of cognition and material culture”. 9 I go on to introduce the important concept of material semiosis 10 which describes the integration of the material and conceptual domains in meaning making. My detailed and lengthy analysis of the three working hypotheses of Material Engagement Theory foregrounds the issues of collectivity, complicity and intentionality which are explored in relation to the problem of violence through Serres’ writings on the historical associations between statues.

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10 Ibid. 18
and violent death. In the sixth and final chapter of this thesis I turn my theoretical focus onto Serres’ premise that statues are not static objects, rather that they can be understood as the basis for knowledge of society, subject object relations, the world and more broadly our engagement with it. In this chapter with Serres as our navigator and the concepts of collective acceptance, complicity and intentionality as our coordinates, we time travel from 6th century B.C. Carthage to 1986 Cape Canaveral and beyond. Though this analytical process I expose a remarkably unchanged collective response to violence that is made manifest in, through, around and indeed with statues.

JM018: Dry plate negative. 17.8 x 12.9 cm. Marshall Collection. Photo-Archive, the British School at Rome.

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CHAPTER 1
EARLY PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIOLENCE

The photograph is violent: not because it shows violent things, but because on occasion it fills the sight by force, and because in it nothing can be refused or transformed.

Roland Barthes

To possess the world in the form of images is, precisely, to re-experience the unreality and remoteness of the real.

Susan Sontag

As I have pursued my studio-based and photo-archive research activities it has become clear to me that the history of photography is caught up with violence.

In this chapter I examine and extend some established understandings of the relationships between photography and violence by focusing specifically on one conception of violence, *mythic violence*.

In this thesis, I base my definition of mythic violence on the writings of Walter Benjamin. For Benjamin, mythic violence is related to the operations of the state; it concerns “the natural-historical cycles of the rise and fall of empires and states - of the establishment, augmentation and decay of institutions”. 3

In this chapter I explore the relationship between photography and mythic violence by focussing on two specific periods in the medium’s development.

1. The turbulent months during which the new medium emerged (and began to exert social ramifications).

2. The slightly later period during which photography became directly involved in the new social management and policing systems that were designed to establish and enforce an authoritative conception of social order.

This chapter is structured as a violence-focused analysis of four photographically concerned texts. My analysis of these texts enables me to identify and examine

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For contextual framing of Benjamin’s conception of *mythic violence* in relation to and distinct from his conception of *divine violence*, see Benjamin W. "Critique of Violence." In *Reflections. Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings*, edited by Peter Demetz, 277- 300. (New York: Schocken Books, 1986); in which he states “Mythic violence is bloody power over mere life for its own sake, divine violence is pure power over all life for the sake of the living”. 297
some specific examples of the ways in which early photography became caught up with a range of different forms of violence that I propose fuel the ongoing cycles of mythic violence.

Before I begin my analysis of these key texts I point out that for Benjamin mythic violence is defined by repetition compulsion, which can be understood as an internally unstable iterative process that is created by the fundamental tensions between law and life, principle and contingency, precedent and novelty. To explain now in my own words, throughout this thesis I use the term mythic violence to mean specifically the interdependent, visible and invisible forms of violence that manifest in individual and collective actions and systems, through which one unconsciously comes to care more about property than life.

It is necessary here to distinguish between some of the various forms of violence and to precisely define them. This specificity gives examinable form to the otherwise slippery, unwieldy, generic term ‘violence’. Throughout this chapter, in addition to the term mythic violence, I also use the terms subjective violence, symbolic violence and systemic violence. I use these classifications to describe the specific, related forms of violence that contribute to my conception of mythic violence.

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4 Ibid. 67
5 My definition of mythic violence has parallels with Michel Serres’ First Foundation, which is explained in his book Statues: The Second Book of Foundations, Bloomsbury 2015. Serres’ idea is founded on the issues of collective acceptance, complicity and intentionality, all of which are caught up in my definition of mythic violence. For my detailed examination of Serres’ First Foundation see Chapter 6.
In this thesis I base my understanding of these terms on the following definitions proposed by Slavoj Žižek, in his 2008 book, *Violence: Six Sideways Reflections*.6

*Subjective violence* is the obvious, highly visible form of violence usually performed by a clearly identifiable agent. Common manifestations of subjective violence are “acts of crime and terror, civil unrest, international conflict”.7

To aid deeper understanding of the complexity of this highly visible form of violence, and our responses to it, Žižek identifies two other forms of violence. He proposes that these two other forms of violence form the “background which generates such outbursts”8 of subjective violence. The two other forms of violence are *symbolic violence* and *systemic violence*.

*Symbolic violence* “is embodied in language and its forms”.9 *Systemic violence* is manifest in “the often catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning of our economic and political systems”.10

Throughout this chapter I elaborate on these definitions as I apply them to the specific examples that I use to highlight the relationships between early photography and mythic violence.

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7 Ibid. 1
8 Ibid. 1
9 Ibid. 1
10 Ibid. 2
Four texts directly inform this chapter, three of the four are well-known, one is less well-known. I examine the well-known texts in direct relation to the less well-known text by undertaking a process of comparative analysis, which is designed to provide fresh understanding of how the development of photography is caught up with various forms of social violence.


Explicating the central concerns of this chapter, I also draw from other texts that, while important in the overall development of my research, fulfil a subsidiary role in this chapter. The additional texts are Eric Santner’s 2006 book, On Creaturely Life: Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald; the 2012 collection of essays, Picturing Atrocity: Photography in Crisis; and Geoffrey Batchen’s 1997 book Burning With Desire: The Conception of Photography.

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15 Santner, On Creaturely Life. Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald.
In this chapter I examine precisely how early photography became caught up with subjective, symbolic and systemic violence, in the following chapter I explore how the issue of memory is entangled with the same forms of violence. Then in subsequent chapters I go on to examine the relationships between materials and human remembering.

*****

THE AUTHORITY OF WORDS / THE AUTHORITY OF IMAGES

Photography is superficially understood to have been invented when the physicist François Arago announced in Paris to the French Academy of Sciences on January 7th 1839, that his fellow Frenchman, Louis-Jacques-Mandé Daguerre had discovered a process to fix the image created in a camera obscura.

Almost immediately a challenge to the authority of the French claim was issued in London. On January 25th 1939 at London’s Royal Institution, seventeen days after the Arago’s first announcement, William Henry Fox Talbot, made his claim to the title of ‘true inventor of photography’. That evening as the regular Friday lecture at the Royal Institution ended, all those in attendance were invited into the library for a special display of the visual outcomes of Talbot’s proto-photographic experiments.
Central to Talbot’s claim as the ‘true inventor of photography’ was the public display of a small collection of his photogenic drawings and contact prints; tangible, visual proof of the successful outcomes of a series of photographically determined, scientific experiments.

We are able to identify a fundamental difference between the two claims to the authority of invention. The inherent tension between these two events resides beyond the obvious Anglo / Franco division (although it is likely to have been influenced by the political and economic implications). As I see it, the tension resides in the philosophical domain, in the very nature of how these announcements were made. Close examination of the series of announcements that Arago made demonstrate that initially he relied solely on language, both written and spoken. Talbot however combined his photographic images with language from the outset. This subtle, philosophically inflected tension foregrounds an important issue that concerns how the new medium emerged into the social and political context of the day.

In the four announcements made by Arago between 7th January and 19th August 1839 in support of Daguerre’s claim to the title of true inventor of photography, language was prioritised over images.

Although Arago and his rival Jean-Baptiste Biot, the eminent French physicist working in the field of optics, had privately examined Daguerre’s early images, Arago elected not to reveal them in his process of championing the Daguerre claim.
through the scientific and then the state institutions of France. Although images were at the very centre of this dispute it appears that Arago did not yet comprehend the power inherent in the fixed photographic image.

Arago’s second announcement was made on the 15th of June 1839 and it escalated Daguerre’s claim to authority from the scientific community’s Academy of Sciences to the parliamentary institution the Chamber of Deputies; again it did not include the presentation of images.

One hundred and seventy two days after Talbot’s public display of his photographically generated images, on July 16th 1839, Arago made his third announcement. It was at this announcement, again at the Academy of Sciences, that Arago first presented Daguerre’s photographic images. The third announcement was significant for two other reasons, firstly Daguerre was effectively distanced from his earlier partner in proto-photographic experimentation Nicéphore Niépce, who was effectively written out of provenance; and secondly any potential foreign claim to the title of true inventor of photography was undermined and discredited.

Arago proclaimed:

    Had it been possible to disavow the importance of the Daguerreotype, and the place which it cannot fail to hold in the esteem of all men, all hesitation on our part would have ceased
when we should have beheld the pressing avidity of foreign nations
in endeavouring to profit by an erroneous date, a fact held in doubt,
pretexts of the most frivolous nature, to substantiate a claim to
priority, to try to add the brilliant ornament which will always be
formed by photographic processes, to the crown of discoveries
which every one of these nations is wont to wear.\textsuperscript{18}

At the very inception of photography a subtle yet important issue emerged that has
stayed with photography for a very long time. From its emergence and during the
very early days of the new medium’s development a conflict between the perceived
authority of words and the perceived authority of images developed. This conflict
exerted a powerful effect on the development and proliferation of the new medium
and shaped the functions that it came to fulfil within the rapidly modernising social
context into which it was emerging.

One of the images included in Talbot’s early photographic display was a small
photogenic negative, titled \textit{Latticed Window (with camera obscura)}. This now
famous image pictorially represents a gridded geometric formation, set on a
slightly diagonal axis centred in a field higher than it is wide. The image is an
interior view of a window frame in the hall of Laycock Abbey, Talbot’s family
home.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid. 224

This quotation originates in Francois Arago’s report to the Chamber of Deputies reproduced in
Daguerre, \textit{Account}, 30-31. Arago’s original statement to the Académie des Sciences is reproduced
in Helmut and Alison Gernsheim, L.J.M. Daguerre: The History of the Diorama and the
Daguerreotype (New York: Dover Publications, 1968.) Batchen explains that Arago’s official
statement was pre-empted by newspaper reports such as H. Gaucheraud’s January 6, 1839 report
in \textit{Gazette de France} which is reproduced in Aaron Scharf, \textit{Pioneers of Photography: An album of
pictures and words} (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1975) 37
Although small, “not much larger than a postage stamp”, this photographic artefact presents vast historical, social and philosophical implications when we consider what is written on its mount-card. Although it was first presented to the public in January 1839, written on the mount-card is August 1835, a date four years prior to the commencement of Arago’s Daguerre announcements.

Today, Talbot’s *Lattice Window (with camera obscura)* is widely considered the earliest known photographic negative, and Talbot’s January 25th 1839 public display of photographically generated images is now widely accepted as the very first photographic exhibition.20

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This quotation and the following refer to a recorded conversation between Schaaf, L. and Batchen, G about the early work of Henry William Fox Talbot. The conversation was held in 2011 at Monash University in Melbourne as part of the Art, Design and Architecture Art Forum series. This reference is drawn from Schaaf’s introduction to *Latticed Window (with the camera obscura)* William Henry Fox Talbot, 1835. Regarded by many photographic historians as our ‘touchstone’, it is the earliest documented paper photograph and the earliest photographic negative.

20 Ibid. Schaaf
Although today Talbot is considered the inventor of modern photography, the importance of his role in the conception, invention and development of photography remained buried, for a very long time, beneath another version of recorded photographic history.

In the early days of photography the new medium came to be publically perceived as both a threat and a promise. The photographic image’s natural realism contributed to this perception. As it emerged the medium became understood as a means for generating an irrefutable visual record of the circumstances of a moment in time, proof that something had happened at a specific time in a specific place.
As Allan Sekula suggests in his essay “The Body and the Archive”, it was the amount and diversity of photographic practices that proliferated in the medium’s early days that contributed to the medium’s dual perception of threat and promise:

The sheer range and volume of photographic practice offers ample evidence of the paradoxical status of photography within bourgeois culture. The simultaneous threat and promise of the new medium was recognised at a very early date, even before the daguerreotype process had proliferated.

The context of threat leads to considerations of violence. To consider the relationships between early photography and specific forms of violence, it is necessary to examine both the social response to the new medium and the social functions that it came to fulfil within the rapidly modernising social context it was emerging into.

In his well-known essay Sekula examines the British social context of the 1830’s and 1840’s to explore the threat / promise duality that is today acknowledged as a defining characteristic of early photography. He makes the important point that early photography was not pitted against a “static traditional culture”, rather that

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21 Sekula, “The Body and the Archive.”
22 Ibid. 5
23 Ibid. 4
its perceived threat was founded in the fact that it had the technological potential to “outpace” already expanding cultural institutions:

photography promises an enhanced mastery of nature, but
photography also threatens conflagration and anarchy, an incendiary levelling of existing cultural order.25

Here Sekula is referring to the nature of the early relationship between photography and high culture, specifically London’s National Gallery which, having been founded in 1824, moved into its neo-classical buildings on Trafalgar Square in 1839. Sekula is suggesting here that from its very inception, photography had a relationship of unease with the bastions of high culture.

In August 1839, Arago made his fourth announcement regarding Daguerre’s claim to the title of true inventor of photography. This announcement took the form of a media frenzied, first public viewing of Daguerre’s images, thus making public the visual secrets of Daguerre’s process. In the same month a popular song circulated the streets of London,26 its verses highlight some of the social responses to the emergent medium.

The song begins with the verse:

O Mister Daguerre! Sure you’re not aware

24 Ibid. 4
25 Ibid. 4
26 Ibid. 4
Of half the impressions you’re making,
By the sun’s potent rays you’ll set the Thames in a blaze,
While the National Gallery’s breaking.27

The third verse of this popular song makes a direct reference to the 1839 New Metropolitan Police Act of British parliament.28 Although the Act itself does not make reference to the new medium, the third verse of the song suggests a widespread public perception that the new medium had arrived with potential for authoritative intrusion into daily life.

The new Police Act will take down each fact
That occurs in its wide jurisdiction
And each beggar and thief in the boldest relief
Will be giving a colour to fiction.29

Rapidly the new medium came to fulfil new functions with social, legal, medical, scientific and economic implications. The photographic apparatus was dramatically changing an already transforming world.

The authoritative power implied by the new photographic realism was quickly realised through its new role as an irrefutable form of forensic evidence. Soon after, its potential for application to policing activities was realised, and thus

29 Sekula, "The Body and the Archive." 4
brought early photography into close association with the violence implicit to law enforcement and criminal transgressions.

Although photographic documentation of prisoners was not at all common until the 1860’s, the potential for a new juridical photographic realism was widely recognised in the 1840s, in the general context of these systematic efforts to regulate the growing urban presence of ‘dangerous classes,’ of a chronically unemployed sub-proletariat.30

Tracing this development, Sekula highlights the text that accompanies two plates in Talbot’s book *The Pencil of Nature*,31 which is richly illustrated with Talbot’s photogenic drawings combined with his textual meditations on each image. Combining images and text, *the Pencil of Nature* reveals many things about the emergent medium including the details of Talbot’s Calotype process, and it came to function as a “compendium of wide-ranging and prescient meditations on the promise of photography”32.

First drawing our attention to a plate titled *The Open Door* (which represents both pictorially and allegorically, a broom leaning beside an open door), Sekula points

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30 Ibid. 5
31 The Pencil of Nature was published in six volumes between 1844 -1846, it is considered the first photographically illustrated book.
32 Sekula, "The Body and the Archive." 5
out that Talbot is claiming the “authority of the Dutch school of art for taking as subjects of representation scenes of daily and familiar occurrence”.

The 17th century Dutch Masters paintings that Talbot’s photographic image directly references were precisely the kind of cultural artefact that was being celebrated and collected by the recently established new national galleries and other high art institutions. In creating this image Talbot invests it with the culturally authoritative lineage of an established image making tradition. This is clearly evidenced by the following image comparison.

The second example Sekula highlights is Plate 111, *Articles of China*. This image reveals the emergence of a very different order of naturalism. The image *Articles of China* represents a collection of 30 objects made of china that are arranged

33 Ibid. 5-6
equidistantly across four shelves. In Talbot’s notes accompanying this image he reveals an acknowledgement of the forensic capacity inherent in his new process.

William Henry Fox Talbot
Articles of China (prior to June) 1844
Salted print from calotype negative 14 x 18.2 cm

(S)hould a thief afterwards purloin the treasure - if the mute testimony of the picture were to be produced against him in court - it would certainly be evidence of a novel kind. 34

This example demonstrates that photography’s new found forensic function had been realised and it was quickly developed and put to work in the process of identifying and indicting criminals.

34 Ibid. 6
Here I draw directly from Sekula, the quotation is sourced from William Henry Fox Talbot, The Pencil of Nature, 1844, facsimile edition, New York, Da Capo, 1968, pl.6, n, p.
In his essay “Evidence, Truth and Order: A Means of Surveillance”, John Tagg examines the social frameworks existing in London at the time of photography’s emergence. He analyses the implications of the new medium’s application to policing activities through the genre of portraiture. This well-known essay occupies an important position in my research as its central theme addresses the symbolic and systemic violence inherent in the development and implementation of early policing photography, and the contemporary legacies of this that can be identified in the social structures that we to live with today.

It is widely accepted that the proliferating industrialisation that occurred in the second half of the nineteenth century necessitated the presence of a diverse workforce in increasingly dense urban centres. These new, dense and diverse conurbations generated a need that had not previously existed, a need for “practices of social obedience within the dangerously large urban concentrations which advanced industrialisation necessitated”. Tagg explains that the increasing need for social regulation was met by,

more and more extensive interventions in the daily life of the working class within and without the workplace, through a complex of medical, educational, sanitary and engineering departments which subsumed older institutions and began to take over the work of private and philanthropic agencies.

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35 Tagg, "Evidence, Truth and Order. A Means of Surveillance."
36 Ibid. 245
37 Ibid. 245
The issue of force was also present in the newly emergent local state. Local police forces were conceived in response and enacted by the 1829 Metropolitan Police Act. Tagg examines the significance of this in relation to the living conditions of the emergent social circumstances and he describes the implications of this upon the very production of capital that necessitated its existence. A vicious circle was forming.

(Local police forces and the administrative arms of the Poor Law were of central importance to the emerging local state, but even these could not operate by coercion alone. They depended on a more general organisation of consent, on disciplinary techniques and a moral supervision, which at a highly localised and domestic level, secured the complex social relations of domination and subordination on which the production of capital depended. 38

This socially turbulent process and the way that photography was quickly developed and deployed within “disciplinary techniques” and modes of “moral supervision” can be considered in the context of Franz Rosenzweig’s conception of martial temporality, and in relation to Eric Santner’s conception of sovereign temporalisation.

38 Ibid. 245
39 Ibid. 245
40 Ibid. 245
Rosenzweig’s martial temporality is a form of temporality organised around the rise and fall of sovereign power, therefore it has close associations with Benjamin’s conception of mythic violence. For Rosenzweig sovereignty is “a political-theological ‘solution’ to the problem of positing meaningful units within and against the forward rush of time”. This means that for Rosenzweig sovereignty is “ultimately a mode of temporalisation”. Elaborating on Rosenzweig’s concept of martial temporality, Santner defines sovereign temporalisation as “a form of ban, which can mean, among other things: sovereign authority; the prohibition or punishment decreed by sovereign authority; spell; banishment; abandonment”.

In Michel Foucault’s language the presence of sovereign temporalisation can be considered as “a diffuse and pervasive micropolitics of power operating in the smallest gestures of everyday life”. This brings us back to Benjamin’s mythic violence, specifically the aspect of it that concerns repetition compulsion, which as already explained, is “an internally unstable iterative process created by the fundamental tensions between law and life, principle and contingency, precedent and novelty”.

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41 Santner, On Creaturely Life. Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald. 66
This quotation and the following three are drawn from Chapter Two of Santner’s On Creaturely Life: Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald; in which he elaborates on Rosenzweig’s idea of martial temporality first presented by Rosenzweig in his book The Star of Redemption. Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1990), 368; The Star of Redemption, Trans.William W. Hallo (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985), 332. Santner’s On Creaturely Life is a detailed study of the work of Franz Rosenzweig in relation to psychoanalytic theory.
42 Ibid. 66
43 Ibid. 66
44 Ibid. 68
45 Tagg, "Evidence, Truth and Order. A Means of Surveillance." 245
46 Santner, On Creaturely Life. Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald. 67
In its new role within the policing apparatus, the emergent medium generated a new genre of photographic portraiture, one that was without precedent. This new form of portraiture developed in parallel with the booming business in honorific (most often familial) photographic portraiture.

In much the same way that Talbot’s 1844 photographic image *The Open Door* claimed descendancy from an established pre-photographic image making lineage; the increasingly popular honorific genre of photographic portraiture claimed descendancy from the European, aristocratic painted portraits of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The photographic documentation of suspected and indicted criminals was a coterminous development. It is important to acknowledge that the new genre of photographic portraiture did not evolve from the honorific tradition, rather it developed from and with a desired repressive function. Its potential for misuse represents its clear and direct associations with both symbolic and systemic violence, and demonstrates how early photography became deeply entangled in a double system of representation, a system “capable of functioning both honorifically and repressively.”

As the honorific photographic portraits of loved ones became more and more accessible to an expanding field of social classes, the social and cultural status that was previously only available to the privileged few who could afford to commission a painted portrait, spread to other groups in society and began to play

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47 Sekula, “The Body and the Archive.” 6
48 Ibid. 6
an important role in reshaping a long established hierarchical social order. Sekula puts it this way:

Photography subverted the privileges inherent in portraiture, but without any more extensive levelling of social relationships these privileges could be reconstructed on a new basis. That is photography could be assigned a proper role within a new hierarchy of taste. Honorific conventions were thus able to proliferate downward.\(^{49}\)

Coterminous with this levelling of social relationships, photography’s relationship with law enforcement continued to develop, generating multiple forms of photographic activity each motivated by different social desires. These developments can be understood as attempts to reinforce or prop up the crumbling structures of social distinction that the new medium was actively eroding.

During the 1880’s photography and statistics merged. Two examples of this are the Bertillon System and the Galton Composite,\(^{50}\) both of which were systems designed to identify and regulate the perceived criminal type. Detailed analysis of the Bertillon System and the Galton Composite are outside the scope of this thesis but it is important to acknowledge them in the context of this chapter. The following paragraphs are intended only as brief explanations of each of these photographic applications and they are provided here as examples of how as

\(^{49}\) Ibid. 6
\(^{50}\) Ibid. 18-19, 62
photography developed it became caught up with the subjective, symbolic and systemic violence implicit to law enforcement and criminal transgressions.

In 1879 the Parisian police official Alphonse Bertillon devised and deployed a system for identifying criminals based on aggregates of visual, textual and numeric data. It combined photographic portraits with anthropometric descriptions and standardised written notations creating “macroscopic aggregates” or characterisations that were based on “microscopic individual records”. Bertillon’s cataloguing system was devised to identify and regulate the criminal other within the rapidly modernising, bourgeois nineteenth century society. It was the first modern system of criminal identification and as Sekula points out, traces of it continue to survive today:

(I)t survives in the operations of the national security state, in the condition of intensive and extensive surveillance that characterises both everyday life and the geopolitical sphere.

The English polymath Francois Galton invented a portrait typology aimed at presenting a purely visual photographic representation of the criminal type. Galton was also the founder of eugenics and his motivation for developing the now famously suspect composite portraits was based in his interest in lineage, heredity and racial betterment; all of which shaped his quest for a biological determinism of the criminal type. While the Galton Composite was an attempt to visually articulate

51 Ibid. 18
52 Ibid. 18
53 Ibid. 62
the generic evidence that supported the theoretical structure of eugenics, it also represents a deeper and more insidious violent desire; the desire to intervene in and control human society by means of controlled and regulated reproduction to be enforced under the guise of the betterment of humankind. Galton was greatly interested in this deep systemically violent ideology, and along with his development of the repressive and forensically functioning collective composite portraits of the perceived criminal type, he actively pursued and promoted a public policy that would prevent those deemed ‘unfit’ from reproducing while encouraging those deemed socially ‘fit’, to propagate.  

While this systemically violent ideology may seem like a framework of thought that could only exist in the past, we need only to consider the current rise of the political far right and neo-fascism in western Europe and the rise of islamophobia on our own shores to be reminded otherwise. Sekula makes it very clear when he states:

“Galton” lives in the renewed authority of biological determinism, founded in the increased hegemony of the political Right in Western democracies…Galton’s spirit also survives in the neo-eugenicist implications of some of the new biotechnologies.  

Coterminous with early photography’s increasing involvement with systems of social regulation, it was developing new relationships with the medical industry.

54 Ibid. 19
55 Ibid. 62
Photography rapidly came to fulfil a function previously served by anatomical and medical illustration, the documentation of physical anomalies. In this way early photography became involved in establishing and delimiting the terrain of the other, defining both a “generalised look”\textsuperscript{56} and “contingent instance of deviance and social pathology”. \textsuperscript{57}

The portraiture of suspected and convicted criminals was not the only photographic application to affect policing activities. The case of the 1871 Paris Commune highlights another instance where early photography’s two faces of threat and promise can be identified.

On the 16\textsuperscript{th} of May 1871 Bruno Braquehais captured a series of powerful social documentary images. His albumen prints, made from collodion negatives, represent the demolition of the Vendôme Column during the brief period of the Paris Commune. The Paris Commune was a popular social response to France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. Then, as today, the Vendôme Column commemorates the military conquests of the Emperor Napoleon.

In 1871 the Communards declared the Vendôme Column,

\begin{quote}
\hspace{2em}a monument to barbarism, a symbol of brute force and false glory,
\hspace{2em}an affirmation of militarism, a denial of international law, a
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid. 7

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid. 7

I am drawing directly from Sekula’s description of the rapidly expanding applications of photography and the parallel development of honorific and repressive forms of early photographic portraiture.
permanent insult directed at the conquered by their conquerors, a perpetual attack upon one of the three great principles of the French Republic.\textsuperscript{58}

For the Communards the column was a powerful concrete symbol of systemic violence and they called for its demolition. Being a Communard sympathiser Braquehais set out to document a socially and politically important historic event. I identify the Communard’s toppling of the Vendôme Column as a clear example of what Žižek would describe as a subjectively violent outburst generated by and against a background of systemic violence.

I also identify a double desire deeply embedded in Braquehais’ motivation, a desire motivated by his understanding of the power inherent in the photographic image. Braquehais wanted to not only record the unfolding events of the turbulent times, but also to generate reproducible, distributable ‘souvenirs’ of the event. By doing so he extended both the reach of the news, and I propose, in some sense the ‘life’ and ‘affect’, of the event. I find support for this premise in the writings of Roxana Marocci who in, \textit{The Original Copy: Photography and Sculpture 1839 to Today}, \textsuperscript{59} states “it is quite likely that Braquehais intended to sell his pictures to the victorious Communards as souvenirs”.\textsuperscript{60}

\begin{flushleft}
\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.127
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The Paris Commune was short lived and what came to transpire had not been anticipated by the Communards. In a catastrophic inversion of the Communard’s desire, the systemic violence that had been the target of their subjective violence, triumphed; and very soon after their creation Braquehais’ photographs became caught up in the unexpected, externally enforced reversal of his desires. The intended function of these early social realist images was suddenly altered and this was played out in how they were eventually deployed.

The intended status of Braquehais’ images as cultural artefacts documenting the toppling of a powerful symbol of systemic violence did not manifest as he had intended, rather they became active agents in the very apparatus of systemic violence that they originally sought to challenge. A few short weeks after the fall of the Communards “prosecutors would use his pictures for different political ends: to
identify and indict former Communards”. In what I consider an example the cyclical nature of Benjamin’s conception of mythic violence, the Vendôme Column was re-erected.

The inherent duality that is evidenced by the development of early photography’s repressive and honorific portraiture genres can be considered as reflective of the threat / promise duality that played out in the case of Braquehais’ Paris Commune photographs. What I am endeavouring to demonstrate through these examples of early photography’s associations with violence, is a pattern of correspondence between certain terms that, when paired and considered in the early photographic context, shed light on a pattern of dualities that characterise the emergence and development of early photography.

Threat / Promise
Repressive / Honorific

Based on the pattern identified through my analysis of these well-known texts, I propose that these dualities are not the only dualities that can be identified in the emergence and development of the new medium. A direct line can be extended from the threat / promise duality, identified by Sekula, through the dual functioning

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61 Ibid. 127
62 In 1844, prior to the toppling of the Vendôme Column, Talbot photographed the construction of Nelson’s Column in Trafalgar Square. Commenting on Talbot’s *Nelson’s Column under Construction, Trafalgar Square 1844* L, Schaaf points out that what Talbot is actually photographing is “the social implications of the 1840’s, the building of public space, and that he (Talbot) is worried about what is going to come in terms of social unrest.” See Batchen, ”Monash University Art, Design and Architecture, Art Forum Lecture.” Schaaf
of repressive and honorific portrait genres, to the pairing of the terms *memorial* and *violence*, both of which can be now understood as being caught up with early photography.

**Threat / Promise**

**Repressive / Honorific**

**Violence / Memorial**

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**RESETTING SUBJECT VIEWER RELATIONS**

As I have already explained, the honorific photographic studio portraits made from 1839 onward, with painted scenic backdrops, plush velvet curtains, miniaturised classical columns, potted palms and other simple props, have their pictorial and ideological inception in the tradition of painted portraiture. This is one of the ways through which the new photographic medium established a close relationship with the concerns of the memorial.

At this stage in the development of my argument it is important to spend some time examining these honorific portraits as a means to better understand the complex social implications that extend beyond the obvious differences that exist between them and the repressive photographic portrait genre.
In his frequently cited 1931 essay “A Short History of Photography”, Benjamin examines two early honorific photographic portraits. One of the motivations for his analysis is to explain his concept of the image aura, and how an image aura can be created, destroyed, fragmented or lost. On the basis of his analysis of these two portraits he proposes the importance of a network of gazes (between the subject and the viewer) in establishing aura like qualities in a photographic portrait.

In the following analysis I re-examine Benjamin’s reading of the two portraits in relation to another portrait. Although the third portrait is also familial in nature, it represents a very different portrait genre, one that is inflected with violence, the atrocity image.

The portraits examined by Benjamin and used in the following analysis are The photographer Karl Dauthendey with his betrothed Miss Friedrich after their first attendance at church. St Petersburg 1857, (hereafter referred to as the Dauthendey portrait) and the unknown photographer’s 1888 Portrait of Franz Kafka as a boy, (hereafter referred to as the Kafka portrait). The third image used in my analysis of subject viewer relations is the 1904 portrait Nsala with the remains of his daughter (hereafter referred to as the Nsala portrait).

In this comparative analysis I again draw together well-known subject material with less well-known subject material as a way of generating fresh understanding of the relationships between the repressive and honorific photographic portrait

63 Benjamin, “A Short History of Photography".
genres; and to shed light on how this has led me to make associations between the terms memorial and violence.

I begin the following analysis by drawing on Benjamin’s analysis of the Dauthendey and Kafka portraits through which he highlights the fragility of an image aura, and how easily it might be destroyed either by intention or unknowingly as an act of violence that registers either subjectively or symbolically. I then go on to analyse the Nsala portrait in the specific context of Benjamin’s notion of a generative network of gazes between subject and viewer, and his ideas regarding the confluence of temporalities, both of which he states are preconditions for the generation of an image aura. I then go on to discuss a very different set of subject viewer relations that are evidenced in the Nsala portrait. Lastly I question what implications these newly identified subject viewer relations have in the potential for generating an empathic relationship with an image aura that is generated by the confluence of modes of violence. What I will endeavour to explain through my analysis of the Nsala portrait, is that it is possible to generate an image aura (in the Benjaminian sense) not only through the confluence of temporalities, but by demonstrating their relationship with the confluence of the subjective and systemic modes of violence.

In the Benjaminian sense an image aura can only emerge at the confluence of two temporalities, the temporality that is present in the making of an image and the temporality of being with an image. He also famously suggests that for an image to have an aura, what is critical in the moment of making is the correspondence
between the subject and the process, or in his words “object and technique”.64

Benjamin described the aura of an image as “a strange web of time and space”.65

He then goes on to say that what is critical in the temporality of being with an image, is the ‘resting’ with the image of something until “the moment or hour begins to be part of its appearance”.66 He elaborates:

(O)n a summer noon, resting, to follow the line of a mountain range on the horizon or a twig which throws its shadow on the observer until the moment or hour begins to be a part of its appearance - that is to breathe the aura of those mountains, that twig.67

I identify that as Benjamin’s concept of the image aura is contingent on the confluence of temporalities, it has parallels with Rosenzweig’s concept of martial temporality which is also contingent on the confluence of temporalities. As I have previously elaborated, Santner’s conception of sovereign temporality builds upon Rosenzweig’s conception of martial temporality. Therefore Santner’s conception is foregrounded by the common requirement of a confluence of temporalities, which is a precondition for both Benjamin’s image aura, and Rosenzweig’s martial temporality. As both Rosenzweig’s and Santer’s conceptions have a social dimension it is possible to consider Benjamin’s concept from a social perspective.

64 Ibid. 207
65 Ibid. 209
66 Ibid. 209

67 Ibid. 209
Identifying the commonality between Benjamin’s concept of the *image aura* and Rosenzweig’s notion of *martial temporality*, I acknowledge and employ Santner’s concept of *sovereign temporalisation* as a useful tool in examining the relationships between early photography, memory and violence. This is made possible because as explained, sovereign temporalisation is caught up with mythic violence, and for Santner, under the conditions of modern capitalism, mythic violence has somehow “penetrated the fabric of everyday life and has become a part of the ‘life cycle’ of capitalist production”.\(^68\)

To put this in simpler terms I return to the central concern of this chapter and point out that the emergence of photography was coterminous with the establishment of the institutions of modern capitalism, which according to Santner, occurred in the period during which systemic and symbolic violence began to penetrate the everyday lives of everyday people.

Embossed on the mount-card of the *Dauthendey* portrait is the explanatory title *The photographer Karl Dauthendey with his betrothed Miss Friedrich after their first attendance at church. St. Petersburg in 1857*. In his analysis of this image Benjamin explains that Dauthendey’s wife committed suicide in the bedroom of their Moscow house where she slashed her arteries shortly after the birth of their sixth child. Analysing the formal visual aspects of the image he writes “She is seen beside him, he holds her, her glance, however, goes past him, directed into an

\(^{68}\) Santner, *On Creaturely Life. Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald*. 76
unhealthy distance”, 69 outside the frame. Benjamin’s analysis alludes to the idea that the camera has captured something unconscious in the subject, a sense of something that may come to bear.

To put it another way, Benjamin is suggesting that the new medium had the capacity to capture the essence of something that is not yet consciously understood, something that has not yet been directly experienced. In this way he highlights a link between early photography and the yet to be realised drives of the unconscious which were central to the emergent of the practise of psychoanalysis. He puts it this way.

If one concentrated long enough on this picture one would recognise how sharply the opposites touch here. This most exact technique can give the presentation a magical value that a painted picture can never again posses for us. All artistic preparations of the photographer and all the design in the positioning of his model to the contrary, the viewer feels an irresistible compulsion to seek the tiny spark of accident, the here and now. 70

69 Benjamin, “A Short History of Photography”. 202
70 Ibid. 202
Unknown photographer
The photographer Karl Dauthendey with his betrothed
Miss Freidrich after their first attendance at church St. Petersburg 1857.

detail
Benjamin asks the viewer of the Dauthenday portrait to identify and engage their own sense of sadness or discomfort in seeing the expression on young Miss Freidrich’s face, he asks us to search for, or to sense, the clues of the future violent act of suicide that the image holds.

It is a different nature that speaks to the camera than speaks to the eye: So differently that in place of a space consciously woven together by man on the spot there enters a space held together unconsciously.\(^{71}\)

Kaja Silverman has identified a misidentification in Benjamin’s analysis of the Dauthenday portrait.\(^{72}\) According to Silverman, what Benjamin missed is that the young woman in the image is Dauthendey’s second wife, therefore she is not the woman who killed herself in their Moscow bedroom. Silverman argues that Benjamin’s misidentification is “a motivated one that points to the limits of the subject’s agency in photography”.\(^{73}\) For Benjamin the new medium was characterised by the ‘spark of contingency’ made sensible through the network of gazes that are exchanged between subject and viewer. As Silverman explains, although this means that reading the Dauthendey portrait as ‘a portent of unhappiness’ is not entirely implausible, she argues that,

\(^{71}\) Ibid. 202
\(^{73}\) Ibid.
this mode of double-seeing - the viewer who looks at the photograph and the subject who looks back - is what makes photography a potentially revolutionary force in human relations and interactions.” 74

Benjamin uses the *Kafka* portrait to highlight and distinguish between what we might call the performative aspects of the making of the image. In other words, between the physical experience of the subject as their portrait was being made and the implied social currency of the setting in which the image is made. He describes the early photographic studios in which the subjects stood motionless for the long periods required by early cameras as being “ambivalently between execution and representation, torture chamber and throne room”. 75 In this description Benjamin’s chosen language can be seen as reflective of the threat /promise and repressive / honorific dualities that Sekula identifies. The long exposure times required by early cameras to capture enough light to make a faithful image required subjects to remain motionless for long, sometimes painfully long, periods of time. Domestic supports “balustrades, little oval tables and columns”, 76 served to assist the subject in their journey into stillness, while the drapery, plush curtaining and exotic palms that were often incorporated into the image settings reflect the mise en scene of the genre’s painterly forebearers.

Using the *Kafka* portrait as an example of the ‘weight’ of this, Benjamin states:

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74 Ibid.
75 Benjamin, "A Short History of Photography". 206
76 Ibid. 206
There in a narrow, almost humiliating child’s suit, overburdened with braid, stands the boy, about six years old, in a sort of winter garden landscape. Palm fronds stand frozen in the background. And as if it were important to make these upholstered tropics even more sticky and sultry, the model holds a huge hat with broad brim like those Spaniards wear in his left hand. He would surely vanish into this arrangement were not the boundlessly sad eyes trying so hard to master this predetermined landscape. This picture in its immeasurable sadness forms a pendant to the early photographs in which people did not yet look out into a world as isolated and godforsaken as the boy here. There was an aura around them, a medium that gives their glance the depth and certainty which permeates it. 77

Through these two early photographic portraits, Benjamin presents the idea that the aura of an image resides in the conflation of temporalities and the specific qualities and nature of the gaze between the subject and the viewer. In these examples Benjamin highlights a particular kind of gaze, the gaze of sadness. In these examples the gaze is not returned to the viewer directly, rather the subject’s gaze travels across and out of the frame thus penetrating the physical space of the viewer. Here the viewer’s interaction with the image is not premised on the meeting of the subject’s gaze, rather through what happens when the subject’s gaze pierces the physical domain of the viewer. I propose that through this specific form

77 Ibid. 206-207
of image interaction the viewer becomes somehow physically associated with, or implicated in, the sadness expressed in the subject’s gaze; my argument is that it is the subtle relationship between the entry of the subject’s gaze into the physical space occupied by the viewer that generates a special connection between the subject and the viewer, and that in this special connection resides the potential for a physically felt empathic response to the image. One predicated on wit(h)ness rather than on the idea of bearing witness.

To put it another way, what I am suggesting here is that it is the non-directness of the gaze, the non-meeting of the gaze, the looking askance rather than directly at, that is most powerful in generating a bodily sensible empathic response to images. This idea has parallels with Žižek’s description of how to approach thinking about violence. In the introduction of his book *Violence: Six Sideways Reflections* he states:

> There are reasons for looking at the problem of violence awry. My underlying premise is that there is something inherently mystifying in a direct confrontation with it: the overpowering horror of violent acts and empathy with victims inexorably function as a lure which prevents us from thinking. A dispassionate conceptual development of the typology of violence must by definition ignore its traumatic impact.  

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78 The concept of wit(h)ness has close association with Michael Polanyi’s conception of *indwelling* both of which are examined in detail in Chapter 3.

79 Žižek, *Violence : Six Sideway Reflections*. 4
Returning to the juridical realism employed in the repressive typology of early photographic portraiture, I identify that as early as 1904 photography came to serve another evidential function. The photograph’s role as evidence which had originally been conceived and developed in relation to the identification and regulation of the criminal other, was then applied to the identification of a very different perpetrator of violence; the sovereign authority. In the following example photography had turned the tables.

The *Nsala* portrait was made in 1904 by Alice Seeley Harris, a British missionary working in the Belgian King Leopold’s Congo Free State. It occupies a conceptual and stylistic position outside both the repressive and honorific portrait genres; rather it is located within another photographic genre, the atrocity image.

The atrocity genre is often mistakenly assumed to have started with the images captured at the liberation of Nazi concentration camps at the end of World War II but the history of the atrocity genre extends further back toward the early days of photography.

The *Nsala* portrait is a family portrait, it is also one of the earliest examples of the atrocity genre, and it was involved in one of the first public deployments of such images in a campaign of publishing and magic lantern shows designed to inform far distant audiences about the often invisible, painful human experience of systemic violence perpetrated by a sovereign authority. In fact these images are

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80 *Picturing Atrocity: Photography in Crisis*. 39
considered by many as representative of the birth of the Human Rights movement,\textsuperscript{81} a public movement bound up with the issue of empathy, which according to Sharon Sliwinski, is inextricably bound to an aesthetic experience.\textsuperscript{82}

The conception of rights did not emerge from the abstract articulation of an inalienable human dignity, but rather from a particular visual encounter with atrocity.\textsuperscript{83}

These images were widely presented to the public in both Europe and North America in the early 1900’s, marking a significant shift in the representation and understanding of colonial violence, specifically in the Congo.\textsuperscript{84}

I suggest that these images and their extensive proliferation also illuminated the capacity for the impact of the intrusion of systemic violence into the daily lives of people, while simultaneously raising difficult questions for early twentieth century European and North American audiences, concerning complicity and notions of race, inequality and perceptions of savagery and the other.

Throughout my following analysis of the \textit{Nsala} portrait I draw from Christina Twomey’s essay “Severed Hands: Authenticating Atrocity in the Congo 1904 -

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{81} Sliwinski, “The Kodak on the Congo. The Childhood of Human Rights, in Autograph. Republic of the Congo”. 1
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid. 4
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid. 4
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid. 1
\end{flushleft}
1913”, and Sharon Sliwinski’s essay “The Kodak on the Congo: The Childhood of Human Rights”. 

In this portrait we see Nsala of Wala seated on the floor gazing at the severed hand and foot of his five year old daughter Boali who was murdered along with her brother and mother by the militia associated with the Anglo-Belgian Indian Rubber Company (ABIR). These body fragments, wrapped in banana leaves and carried by Nsala into the mission where Harris worked, were all that remained of Nsala’s

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85 Picturing Atrocity: Photography in Crisis. 39-50
daughter after a cannibal feast that followed the brutal murder of his son, wife and
daughter.\textsuperscript{87}

The following lengthy quote is taken from Sliwinski’s evocative description of the
image and it sets in place an important aspect of my argument concerning the
relationship between photography and violence by highlighting the moment in the
medium’s development at which it was realised that images representing the effects
of subjective violence also articulate systemic violence:

Harris’s image is remarkably calm given the story of its making.
Nsala is seated centrally, sitting in profile on what looks like a
thatched veranda, gazing at two small objects lying in front of him.
A potted cactus is positioned at his back. Two other men look on
from a distance, one stands with his arms crossed protectively
against his chest. It is a formally posed, almost peaceful image.
Painful scrutiny is required to make out the items in front of Nsala.
The object closest to him appears to be his daughter’s foot, lying on
its side, severed end tipped towards the camera: the object furthest
is Boali’s little hand, resting palm side down. These tiny body parts
explode the peaceful composition of the image and illustrate an
uncanny inversion of the typical representation of injury; rather than
a picture of a child with missing limbs, here Nsala poses with the
remains of his missing child.\textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid. 10
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid. 5-6
Sliwninski goes on to make an important point in relation to the presence of absence at work in this image:

(M)issing is not entirely the right word - Boali is more than simply absent from the scene - but then there are no words which could appropriately signify the palpable affect of her non-existent presence. 89

Looking closely at the composition of this photograph I identify an easily missed bodily association in the representation of the two subjects, the present subject and the absent subject. This subtle yet powerful resonance is created by the camera angle and the pose that Nsala is sitting in. Looking again at the image we notice that his left leg descends below the veranda that he is sitting on, effectively, in this view, amputating his left foot, while before him lay the remaining amputated foot and hand of his dead daughter. In a symbolic way the present living subject and the absent dead subject are connected.

Considering the powerful and violent nature of the Nsala portrait in relation to Silverman’s commentary on Benjamin’s misreading of the Dauthendey portrait, I identify a very different kind of aura at work in this image, one that I propose is generated by the evidential confluence of subjective and systemic violence. Although as Silverman explains, the photograph is organised by a mode of “double

89 Ibid. 6

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seeing” whereby the viewer looks at the photograph and the subject looks back, thereby photography becomes “a potentially revolutionary force in human relations”; 90 I argue that it is not the only mode of seeing that makes photography a potentially revolutionary force in human relations, especially violent relations. As I have already proposed, it is not the direct return of the gaze that is most powerful in photographic images that are associated with the problem of violence. The Nsala portrait’s power resides in a very different gaze structure than either the Dauthendey or Kafka portraits. In this portrait the subject gazes at the remains of his daughter, he is gazing at the body parts that were once his daughter, he is also gazing into the space from which his once familiar gaze was returned. While he is gazing at the fragmentary remains of his daughter, her gaze is unable to be returned, rather it can only be remembered, he is gazing into a temporal rupture.

In our looking at this photograph, we participate in that rupture as we enact the impossibility that is central to the power of this image. As viewers, our gaze enacts the profound impossibility of Nsala’s gaze being returned by Boali’s. I suggest that herein resides the profound, visceral, empathic power of this portrait. In the network of visible and invisible gazes at work in this image, the viewer becomes an active participant by enacting a process that highlights a violently inflected impossibility. The viewer enacts one aspect of what has been lost. The viewer gazes at Nsala gazing into the rupture of loss and remembering. The profound loss that is the subject of this portrait is articulated entirely within the image and enacted by the viewer from outside the frame. Here the viewer’s gaze pierces the

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90 Silverman, "Report from the Clark Symposium: Photography as Model".
image in a reversal of the way the gazes at work in *Dauthenday* and *Kafka* portraits pierce the physical realm of the viewer.

CHAPTER 1: A SUMMARY IN CONCLUSION

At the beginning of this chapter I proposed that the history of early photography is caught up with the issue of mythic violence. In order to explicate my argument it became necessary to distinguish between, and ascribe some precise definitions to the various forms of violence that come under the somewhat generic, and perhaps much misunderstood yet familiar term *violence*. There can be little meaningful consideration when terms are clouded.

Throughout this chapter I have used the term *mythic violence* which, as suggested in the writings of Benjamin, is related with the operations of the state, and concerns the ongoing cyclical histories associated with the rise and fall of states and empires; of their conception, founding, development and decay. In my interpretation and use of his (Benjamin’s) term mythic violence throughout this doctoral research, I mean specifically the interdependent visible and invisible forms of violence that manifest in individual and collective actions and systems, through which one unconsciously comes to care more about property than life.

To examine the way that early photography became entangled in this form of violence it was necessary to make some further distinctions regarding the generic
term violence. I turned to Žižek and employed his classification and terminology of subjective, symbolic, and systemic violence. Reiterating the meaning and importance of those terms, I again explain that subjective violence is the obvious and highly visible form of violence - crime, terror, civil unrest, international conflict - and that acts of subjective violence often erupt from a background of the less visible systemic and symbolic violence. Symbolic violence is embodied in our use of language and its forms, while systemic violence is related with the systems that we live with and by. These inherently violent systems are sometimes visible and sometimes invisible, and like most other systems often only become visible when they cease to function smoothly.

With these precise distinctions I examined the socially turbulent months of the European summer of 1839 during which photography emerged. My detailed analysis of the volley of claim and counter claims that were fired back and forth between London and Paris (and indeed the very nature of how these reports were made) exposed the emergent medium’s association with symbolic and systemic violence, and revealed a subtle philosophically inflected tension that has stayed with photography right up to today. I am referring here to the tension inherent between the perceived authority of images and the perceived authority of words. As I have already demonstrated, this internal conflict, which I argue is endemic to photography, shaped the functions that the new medium came to fulfil within the rapidly modernising social context that it was emerging into.
As I progressed my research into the relationships between early photography and mythic violence I exposed and investigated a series of dualities that characterised the new medium. The first of these is the threat / promise duality that was originally proposed by Sekula in his essay “The Body and the Archive”.\textsuperscript{91} With Sekula’s help I examined the social response to the emergent medium within the British social context of the late 1830’s and early 1840’s, and I demonstrated how the emergent medium borrowed from a long lineage of established image making traditions that exerted a particular form of socio-cultural authority. I proposed that through this alliance with, and propagation of the cultural implications of well established and unfair social hierarchies, it can be seen to evidence both symbolic and systemic violence.

Talbot’s notation accompanying Plate 111 in *The Pencil of Nature*, the 1844 salted print from a Calotype negative, titled *Articles of China*, can be considered as the first documentation of the forensic potential inherent in photography. “Should a thief afterwards purloin the treasure - if the mute testimony of the picture were to be produced against him in court- it would certainly be evidence of a novel kind.”\textsuperscript{92}

Drawing from Tagg’s well-known essay “Evidence, Truth and Order: A Means of Surveillance”,\textsuperscript{93} I then examined another of the important dualities that characterise early photography, the repressive / honorific duality. Examining the coterminous development of the repressive and honorific photographic portrait genres as a

\textsuperscript{91} Sekula, “The Body and the Archive.”
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid. 6
\textsuperscript{93} Tagg, “Evidence, Truth and Order. A Means of Surveillance.”
means for explicating the social developments that were occurring in all sectors of bourgeois nineteenth century society, I examined how early photography became caught up with the social perspectives relating to the existence of a perceived criminal type, and how this became manifest in the development of systems of policing and law enforcement designed to regulate this type of person. While this information is not new information, in the context of this chapter it enabled me to productively extend the line of established dualities inherent in early photography from threat / promise, to repressive / honorific, and then onto violence / memorial. This is an important link to establish in the development of my theoretical and studio-based research which ultimately concerns the relationship between materials and remembering. It is important because it foregrounds the issues of complicity, collective acceptance and subject viewer relations, which I address in detail in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. It may seem paradoxical that my quest for fresh understandings of the relationships between materials and remembering begins with an examination of the emergence of an image making technology - photography - it is important to acknowledge that it is my way in; and it is pertinent to appreciate that photographic activity has played a vital role in the studio-based research, the photo-archive based research and fieldwork that I have undertaken as part of this doctoral project.

The term ‘fieldwork’ may at first seem oddly displaced in this context however its archaeological resonance is entirely appropriate given the subject matter of my research.
Making reference to Rosenzweig’s concept of martial temporality, and Santner’s concept of sovereign temporalisation, I highlighted what I consider to be a series of parallels between the repetition compulsion, which is central to Benjamin’s conception of mythic violence, and the social circumstances apparent in the immediate period of photography’s emergence. What I am referring to here are tensions between law and life, principle and contingency, precedent and novelty.94 My analysis of the social considerations and the relations between the repressive and honorific photographic portrait genres supports this claim. I turned to Braquehais’ early social realist images of the Paris Commune to example one of the ways that the threat / promise duality inherent in early photography was played out, and introduced another important socially concerned photographic genre into my argument.

Approximately halfway through this chapter I turned to the issue of subject viewer relations and used three examples to explicate what I call a resetting of the subject viewer relations. This resetting (or reorientating) of subject viewer relations is contingent on a kind of active and enactive participation of the viewer. I propose that this active participation is enacted through the way that the viewer’s gaze bodily enacts a represented impossibility. I explained this through my analysis of the Nsala portrait. My starting point for arriving at this important development in my research was the close examination of two well-known examples of the honorific portrait tradition. The Dauthenday and Kafka portraits discussed by

94 Santner, On Creaturely Life. Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald. 67
I am referring again to Santner’s explanation of repetition compulsion, which is central to Benjamin’s conception of mythic violence.
Benjamin in his essay, “A Short History of Photography”.\(^9\) Considering these two well-known familial portraits in relation to less known familial portrait I effectively expanded the field of consideration of Benjamin’s conception of the *image aura*, the *studium* and the *punctum*. I thereby reconsider how a viewer is implicated in the subject matter of a photograph and thus open up a fresh way to consider the well-established premise that a network of gazes is central to the establishment of an image aura. Drawing Rosenzweig’s martial temporality and Santner’s sovereign temporalisation into association with Benjamin’s image aura, I highlighted a social dimension to Benjamin’s well-known concept. This newly identified social dimension is important in the next chapter of this thesis in which I examine the bodily implications of the relationship between memory and violence, which is my next step toward fresh understanding of the relationships between materials and remembering, specifically those materials that have borne witness to acts of violence.

The following image was generated through my photographic fieldwork, it is part of a suite of photographic artworks titled *Spectral Materialism*, it examples how all forms of my practical, creative research have interacted with the theoretical investigations of this doctoral project.

\(^9\) Benjamin, “A Short History of Photography”.
This image represents the badly damaged head of a 2nd century B.C. statue of a woman. It is a marble copy of a 4th or 5th century B.C. statue that most likely represents Aphrodite, but we can’t be sure. What interests me most about the object represented in this image (and indeed the image itself) is the way people appear to respond to it. The figure appears to be crying, this is uncharacteristic of classical statuary. Most people who physically approach this disembodied head appear to do so with a sense of empathy or what I call wit(h)ness; most people look into her eyes for a long time before moving away. It is important to note that most people remain with this disembodied head longer than the many other disembodied heads that populate the same gallery; this is the only one that appears to be crying. I propose that most people sense that they have looked into the crying eyes of a woman, a woman that has been crying for a very long time. However, those that take the time to read the didactic panel accompanying this transfixing ancient object soon discover that this painted marble sculpture originally had bronze
eyelashes and that the stain running down her cheek is most likely the result of the oxidation (over time) of her bronze lashes. This makes another important point in the progression of this thesis, which is evidenced by the fact that whilst I ‘know’ the physical material reasoning behind what appears to be such a dramatic expression of emotion, for me she is somehow still crying, and not. I am unable to shake this impression. It is as though this ancient object has cast a kind of spell, a spell that emerges from the confluence of temporalities and ways of knowing, both bodily (physical) and internal (psychical).

In the following chapters I will explore the relationships between materials and remembering through the diverse fields of Memory Studies, Contemporary Archaeological and Anthropological Theory by applying the productive betweenness that I identify between them to the body parts of Archaic, Greek and Roman figurative sculpture, which serve as the subject matter of many of the original artworks that I have made as part of this doctoral inquiry.
CHAPTER 2
MEMORY AND REMEMBERING

The whole dynamic of our relation to the past is shaped by the subtle interplay between the inaccessible and the non-existent.

Pierre Nora ¹

How are we to explain that memories return in the form of images and that the imagination mobilized in this way comes to take on forms that escape the function of the unreal.

Paul Ricœur ²

Through my studio-based research, photo-archive based research and photographic fieldwork, as well as my investigations of historical and theoretical writings, it has become clear to me that early photography’s relationship with memory is caught up with the issue of violence.

In this chapter I shift focus from the relationship between early photography and violence onto the relationship between early photography and memory. These entangled relationships are examined to create a historically defined framework that enables me to investigate the subtle yet important distinction between the broad issue of memory and acts of remembering.

In this chapter I investigate the memory-related aspects of early photography by building on the ideas examined in the previous chapter that concern early photography’s association with subjective, symbolic and systemic violence.

Drawing the issue of memory and the problem of violence together through the medium of photography is important in the development of my argument because it helps me to clarify the subtle but important distinction between memory and remembering, which I do with the aid of Henri Bergson’s writings on matter and memory. This resets my compass and establishes the direction for the following chapters of this thesis which ultimately concerns the relationships between the materiality of objects and acts of remembering.

Scholars who examine the complex relationships between photography and memory have already generated an enormous amount of research. I wish to make clear that my intention in this chapter is not to directly extend the existing corpus of their research, rather I acknowledge its range and complexity as a foreground to the further development of the central concerns of this doctoral research. Therefore, in this chapter I engage with one specific hypothesis from the field of
Memory Studies and use it as a conceptual mechanism through which I shift my research focus from the photographic image onto the materiality of photographic artefacts and other related objects.

The hypothesis that I am referring to is Bergson’s precise distinction between memory and remembering which is made through his conception of the passage from pure memory to memory image. In this chapter I examine his hypothesis in specific relation to materials, the body, and habit. This leads me to consider the residual marks of violent histories that can be found in material objects, specifically the stone and bronze of damaged ancient figurative sculpture. In subsequent chapters I go on to propose how these objects function in processes of memory-related cognition, and how they maintain relevance in the contemporary social domain.

By shifting focus from the problem of violence to the issue of memory, and from the defining aspects of early photographic imagery and practices onto themes more closely concerned with material culture, I do not relocate my research. Rather, by doing so, this research reveals the complex entanglement between memory and violence whilst remaining firmly grounded in the terrain of the past made present. This important research development opens the way for me to directly address the central concern of this thesis, which is to examine the function of materials in the commingling of one’s personal experiences with the residues, traces and presences of other people’s pasts, presents and perhaps futures.
I begin by referring to Susan Sontag’s writing on the relationships between early photographic images, death, loss and mourning. I explore this well-known perspective through an analysis of two unseen images described in Roland Barthes’ final book *Camera Lucida, Reflections on Photography*. Then I draw the ideas of Sontag and Barthes together to help explain the subtle yet important distinctions between memory and remembering averred by Bergson. With the aid of Bergson’s conception of the passage from pure memory to memory image, I make the important distinction between memory and remembering crystal clear. A helpful starting point in understanding this complex issue is the knowledge that for Bergson the successive layering of habitual memory is associated with the past, and the non-habitual memory of action, or as I see it, the act of remembering, is more closely associated with the present.

Distinguishing between memory and remembering has direct resonance with my studio-based research. It has enabled me to understand more thoroughly the correspondence between the two main creative disciplines that describe my studio-based research - photography and sculpture. And it helps me to see and analyse the associations between ancient objects and contemporary life.

With the distinction between memory and remembering established, and having examined the physical, bodily implications of remembering, I conclude this chapter by introducing the concept of *postmemory* as defined by Marianne Hirsch, and the concept of indwelling as defined by Michael Polanyi, then in the following chapter I deploy these concepts to examine how the material trace, or as

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I call it *spectral materialism*, is active in processes of memory and knowledge transfer.

The way in which the driving quest of this thesis is linked by the two creative disciplines that describe my studio-based research is articulated by the simple diagram below.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 1.** How my conceptual concerns emerge between my creative practices.

The specific research activities that come under the category of Photography include:

- Photo-archive based research.
- Analogue and digital photographic field work.
- Studio-based photography.
- Video.
- Digital image processing and printing.
- Darkroom practices.

The specific research activities that come under the category of Sculpture include:

- Mould making.
- Casting.
- Constructing.
- Screen-printing.
- Practical material research.

Some of the materials employed in this doctoral research include porcelain, silicone, glass, leather, steel, plaster of Paris, agate and carbon.

The texts directly informing this chapter are the 1988 English translation of Henri Bergson’s 1908 book *Matière et Mèmoire* published in 1988 as *Matter and Memory*;  
Batchen’s 2004 book *Forget Me Not: Photography and Remembrance*;  
and Susan Sontag’s 2003 book *Regarding the Pain of Others.*

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5 Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*.

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EARLY PHOTOGRAPHY / DEATH

EARLY PHOTOGRAPHY / MEMORY

It is widely understood that from its very inception, photography established a close relationship with the issue of loss, mourning and death, all of which are inextricably bound up with memory.

In the previous chapter I examined the coterminous development of the repressive / forensic and honorific portrait typologies that emerged with early photography. In this chapter I examine how each of these photographic genres played distinct roles in establishing the emergent medium’s association with death. Briefly explained, the honorific portrait typology was associated with death through the issue of loss and the desire for ancestral remembrance. The repressive / forensic portrait typology was caught up with death through its entanglement with the violence associated with transgressions of and enactment of law.

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10 Farr, *Memory.*
As already explained, the emergence of the honorific photographic portrait typology “subverted the privileges inherent in portraiture”\textsuperscript{13} by enabling a broader range of nineteenth century social classes to commission images of their loved ones, to keep close long after their loved ones had died. This levelling of long established social hierarchies was coterminous with the emergence of the repressive / forensic portrait typology which forged a different relationship with death. As this new genre developed it rapidly became an instrument of emergent policing practices and the legal apparatus that pursued the regulation of the socially perceived criminal type which often resulted in their execution, or at the very least the cessation of the mode of living that the malefactor had pursued before incarceration.

In her well-known book \textit{Regarding the Pain of Others} Sontag writes about early photography’s association with the memory and the mourning associated with loss:

\begin{quote}
Ever since cameras were invented in 1839, photography has kept close company with death. Because an image produced with a camera is, literally, a trace of something brought before the lens, photographs were superior to any painting as a memento of the vanished past and the dear departed.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{14} Sontag, \textit{Regarding the Pain of Others}. 24
Developing this theme in his deeply personal book *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*, written shortly after the death of his mother, Barthes presents his evolving ideas regarding the relationships between photography, memory and loss. In the edition of *Camera Lucida* that I refer to throughout this thesis, Barthes includes a total of twenty-four images that support the development of his ideas. However, the most significant image in the evolution of Barthes’ ideas concerning the relationship between photography, memory and loss, the *Winter Garden Photograph*, is not included; it has never been published.

Of this historically important image Barthes declares:

I cannot reproduce the Winter Garden Photograph. It exists only for me. For you, it would be nothing but an indifferent picture, one of the thousand manifestations of the ‘ordinary’; it cannot in any way constitute the visible object of a science; it cannot establish an objectivity, in the positive sense of the term; at most it would interest your studium: period, clothes, photogeny; but in it, for you, no wound.

This pivotal image in the history of photographic research has never been published and thus it remains unseen by those of us working in this field, however it exists in our minds eye, our mental image of it is shaped only by Barthes’

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16 Regarding the significance of images selected by Barthes for inclusion in *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography* specifically the use of Daniel Boudinet’s 1979 image Polaroid on the cover of the original French edition. See Batchen, *Photography Degree Zero: Reflections on Roland Barthes’ Camera Lucida*. 15-17
17 Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*. 73
evocative description and response. Through his analysis of this now famous unseen image of his mother as a child, and his highly personal, at times painful response to it, Barthes arrives at the conclusion that photography and memory do not come together at all well. He expands this hypothesis by proposing that a photograph actually blocks memory.

Not only is the Photograph never, in essence, a memory (whose grammatical expression would be the perfect tense, whereas the tense of the Photograph is the aorist), but it actually blocks memory, quickly becomes a counter-memory.¹⁸

Startlingly, it is approximately two thirds of the way through his frequently analysed text that he arrives at his key concept, that a photograph actually blocks memory. To gain a better understanding of Barthes thoughts on the relationship between photography and memory I closely examine the beginning of this his final and best-known book.

Barthes begins Camera Lucida, Reflections on Photography by describing the inner or psychic experience that he had upon seeing a certain photograph, and how that photograph struck him in such a way that he was not thereafter able to escape it. Again, this important image in the study of the history of photography is not seen by the reader, rather, Barthes demands our imagining.¹⁹

¹⁸ Ibid. 91
¹⁹ Barthes’ uses the literary strategy of calling us to imagine an image rather than expose it in the instance of the two defining images of his argument that a photograph actually blocks memory. With this in mind it is interesting to consider that Barthes’ dedicated Camera Lucida as an homage to Jean-Paul Sartre’s L’Imaginaire; and that for Bergson memory and the imaginary are inextricably linked. There are also parallels with Žižek’s notion of the benefits of looking askance
I happened on a photograph of Napoleon’s youngest brother
Jerome, taken in 1852. And I realised then, with an amazement I
have not been able to lessen since: ‘I am looking at eyes that
looked at the Emperor.’ Sometimes I would mention this
amazement, but since no one seemed to share it, not even
understand it…I forgot about it.20

Here Barthes is describing a kind of psychic impression generated by his act of
looking at an image of the eyes of a subject that once looked at another more
distant subject, the Emperor Napoleon. We can say that Barthes psychic sensation
occurred in place of the direct physical experience of looking at the Emperor
Napoleon, which the passage of time denied him.

Parallels with inherent differences can be drawn between Barthes’ powerful
experience of looking at the Jerome portrait and, as analysed in the previous
chapter, our experience of looking at the Nsala portrait. In Barthes’ experience his
gaze is met by another’s gaze, his eyes meet another’s eyes that once looked at a
subject that Barthes longs to see. In our experience of the Nsala portrait our gaze
is not met, we gaze at the man who gazes into the space from which his gaze was
once returned; he remains in search for the absent eyes of his murdered daughter.

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20 Barthes, Camera Lucida. Reflections on Photography. 3
Although Barthes himself was not able to look at the Emperor, seeing Jerome’s eyes and being struck with the idea that he was looking at eyes that had looked at the Emperor, Barthes perceived that he became somehow physically closer, perhaps even somehow connected with, or implicated in, an experience that was that was for him physically impossible. Barthes’ deeply felt psychic connection, or sense of wit(h)ness, is what ties together Barthes’ experience of the *Jerome* portrait and our experience of the *Nsala* portrait.

Barthes’ psychic impression shaped his thinking about photography’s capacity to “touch him across time and space”. In this instance, the image of Jerome acts as a kind of psychic bridge, linking what Jerome had seen and Barthes’ could not. Barthes goes on to describe this special connectivity in physical terms, “a sort of umbilical cord links the body of the photographed thing to my gaze”. As Geoffrey Batchen has pointed out, it was Barthes’ perception of a physical link between a photograph and the thing that it represents, that led Barthes toward what he called an “ontological desire”, that, for Barthes, was essential to the apprehension of photography.

I was overcome by an “ontological” desire: I wanted to learn at all costs what Photography was “in itself,” by what essential feature it was to be distinguished from the community of images.

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I suggest that Barthes’ unshakeable psychic impression occurred at the confluence of familiarity and impossibility. Familiarity with the act of seeing, and the knowledge of the impossibility of seeing what Jerome had seen. In this example, the familiarity has bodily associations, specifically with the physical act of looking, and the impossibility, created by the passage of time, is experienced in the mind. In this example the conflation of the familiar and the impossible occurs within and without the photograph’s frame; it is experienced between the subject and the viewer. In the *Nsala* portrait however, the conflation of familiarity and impossibility is *enacted* by the viewer’s gaze. In this example familiarity is embodied in the viewer as their gaze enacts the impossibility of the present subject’s gaze being met by the absent subject’s gaze. In this instance, enacted impossibility is caught up with the residues of subjective and systemic violence.

In both of these examples we are reminded of Benjamin’s concept of the image aura and the role played by a network of gazes in generating it. In both examples one of the gazes present in the affective network remains unseen. There is however a subtle yet important distinction between these two examples, one is sensed and the other is enacted. Barthes senses an impossibility that is his own, while the viewer of the *Nsala* portrait enacts the impossibility that is being experienced by the subject, or in other words, the viewer embodies and enacts what the subject desires.

In relation to the *Jerome* portrait Barthes is both psychically and physically conscious of the presence of a specific kind of gaze, a hidden, removed, or
inaccessible gaze; one that is psychically sensed and understood, yet remains unseen. For Barthes the sense of the invisible is of paramount importance, for him the *unseen* is most forceful, as he explains when he states that, “what is hidden is for us Westerners more ‘true’ than what is visible.” 25 Elaborating on the idea of the inherent power of the unseen Barthes makes it most clear when he states:

Is not the most erotic portion of a body *where the garment gapes*?

In perversion (which is the realm of textual pleasure) there are no ‘erogenous zones’ (a foolish expression, besides); it is intermittence, as psychoanalysis has so rightly stated, which is erotic: the intermittence of skin flashing between two articles of clothing (trousers and sweater), between two edges (the open-necked shirt, the glove and the sleeve); it is this flash itself which seduces, or rather: the staging of an appearance-as-disappearance.

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My analysis of the opening lines of *Camera Lucida* suggests that Barthes’ reflections on photography, and its association with the act of remembering, point to a psychic entanglement between a viewer and a photograph, one that triggers a psychic capacity caught up with the sensed but not necessarily directly experienced, or overtly displayed. If this is the starting point from which Barthes arrives at the notion that a photograph is not a memory and that photographs

25 Ibid. 100
actually block memory, perhaps we can say that remembering is best served by the absence of a photographic image.

Batchen suggests that Barthes’ concluding claim that photographs block memory is based on the “presumed capacity of the photograph to replace the immediate, physically embracing experience of involuntary memory (the sort of emotional responses often stirred by smells and sounds) with frozen illustrations set in the past”. He goes on to assert that Barthes implies that photography “replaces the unpredictable thrill of memory with the dull certainties of history”. Considering this in relation to the important distinction made by Bergson between memory and remembering, I rephrase Batchen’s statement about Barthes’ concluding claim, to serve greater clarity of the distinction between memory and remembering.

Barthes’ concluding claim that photographs block memory is based on the presumed capacity of the photograph to replace the immediate, physically embracing, unpredictable dynamic act of remembering with presumed static certainties of memory.

What I am endeavouring to draw out here is Barthes’ implied distinction between memory and the feelings, or actions, associated with remembering. I will expand on this subtle yet important distinction with the aid of Bergson’s conception of the passage from pure memory (which I identify as more closely associated with the

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27 Batchen, Forget Me Not. Photography and Remembrance. 15
28 Ibid. 15
See Batchen’s lengthy endnote as to the origins of this idea, including a long extract from Gustave Flaubert’s Madame Bovary in which, as Batchen describes, ‘Flaubert canvases the idea’.
past), to memory image (which I identify as more closely associated with the present).

The idea of the subtle distinction between the experience of seeing a photographic image and its capacity to generate feeling can also be found in Sontag’s writings on a different photographic genre, the atrocity image.

In her discussion about the impact of the proliferation of images depicting the outcomes of subjective violence - war, crime, acts of terror - and all kinds of images that represent the suffering of others - Sontag suggests that it is the very exposure to the proliferation of pictorial violence that lessens our capacity to feel, not our capacity to remember.

(I)n a world saturated, no hyper-saturated with images, those that should matter have a diminishing effect: we become callous. In the end, such images just make us less able to feel, to have our conscience pricked.29

For Barthes however, the relationship between photography and violence is not an issue of representation, for him the relationship between photography and violence is different from those that I examined in the previous chapter. For Barthes photography’s relationship with violence is a kind of unconscious, ontological, systemic violence, in other words, it is the way that photography blocks memory that makes photography itself violent.

29 Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others. 105
The photograph is violent: not because it shows violent things, but because on each occasion it fills the sight by force, and because in it nothing can be refused or transformed.\textsuperscript{30}

For Barthes it is the role played by a photograph in blocking memory, or more succinctly, in blocking imagination, that is itself violent, and I suggest that it is perpetrated through an active and affective form of symbolic violence.

It is important to contextualise Barthes’ conception of how memory and violence are related. He first presents the complex association at the end of a lengthy meditation on a photograph that remains unseen by the reader, an image that he demands us to imagine.

This can been seen as mirroring the conditions through which Barthes had his initial psychic impression that was triggered by a realisation of his connection with a subject that he could never see; or in simpler terms, the conflation of the familiar and the impossible. Through his description of the image of his recently deceased, elderly mother as a child, he sets up or restages for the reader, the very set of conditions from which his earlier psychic impression emerged.

Barthes draws us into a collision of the familiar and the impossible. We all have mothers and we are all in some way physically connected with them, this is met by the impossibility created by Barthes, of us ever seeing the image of his mother.

\textsuperscript{30} Barthes, \textit{Camera Lucida. Reflections on Photography}. 91
Some scholars have questioned the very existence of the image. It is his refusal to block our imagination by showing us an image of his mother as a child, through his refusal to show us the very image that his entire meditation rests upon, that Barthes refuses violence. He thus maintains his mother in creation in the minds of all readers.

Barthes’ thoughts come to us through his deep sadness. He uses his own immovable grief to describe and distinguish the relationships between the immovable, static nature of the still photographic image, and the concept of dynamic futurity that is inherent in the moving photographic image. For Barthes it is the motionlessness of the still photographic image that denies it a future and imbues it with melancholy:

Here again is the Winter Garden Photograph. I am alone with it, in front of it. The circle is closed, there is no escape. I suffer, motionless. Cruel, sterile deficiency: I cannot transform my grief, I cannot let my gaze drift; no culture will help me utter this suffering which I experience entirely on the level of the image’s finitude…the Photograph - my Photograph - is without culture: when it is painful, nothing in it can transform grief into mourning.

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31 Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory. Writing and Visual Culture after the Holocaust. 47 Hirsch points out the Margaret Olin’s identification of a ‘glaring mistake’ made by Barthes in his use of an image by James Van der Zee in his explanation of his concept of the punctum, and calls into question the very existence of the famous Winter Garden photograph. 32 Barthes, Camera Lucida. Reflections on Photography. 90
Memory and remembering are caught up with the past, which by its very nature exists only because of the experienced present and an anticipated future. Culturally speaking, death is caught up with the past through our experience of the death of others, and it is caught up with our sense of the future, through our knowledge of our own inescapable death. Death and memory are inextricably connected.

As already explained, early photography emerged into a society in flux, and as the world modernised, the social attitudes toward longstanding cultural constructs such as ideas concerning the issue of faith and myth were being transformed. These were not the only types of cultural perceptions that were changing. I have already explained that the emergent medium played a role in eroding and reshaping certain existing class based, socio-cultural frameworks. The emergent medium also played a role in changing social perceptions regarding the concept of death, or more precisely, the way in which death was present in everyday life.

The emergent medium opened a door that enabled death to take up residence in the private spaces in which people were living their lives, it did so through the presence of the material qualities of a photograph. Notably, this occurred at the same time as modern funerary methods and efficiencies took dead bodies away from homes and family contexts evermore quickly. The more that people had access to photographs of deceased loved ones, the less time did people spend with the actual bodies of the dead. The fixed image of the now dead, slowly replaced the physical presence of the recently dead body in mourning practices. This has
had a profound effect on western funerary practices and on contemporary approaches of dealing with the dead bodies.

Early photography brought a touchable past into the present in a new way. In other words the thingness of the photograph gave the act of remembering an identifiable and lasting, present, static physicality. Memory did not come from photographs, rather remembering was brought to them, and their material presence functioned as facilitator.

DISTINGUISHING MEMORY FROM REMEMBERING

Although conventionally considered interchangeable, the words memory and remembering do not mean the same thing. In Sontag’s writings about the vast reservoir of images depicting the incomprehensible suffering of others, she makes the important statement:

The images say: This is what human beings are capable of doing - may volunteer to do, enthusiastically, self righteously. Don’t forget. 33

Sontag then makes the point that this is not the same as asking people to remember, and she goes on to assert that a critical distinction between memory and remembering is that remembering involves an ethical dimension.

33 Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others. 115
Remembering is an ethical act, has ethical value in and of itself. Memory is, achingly, the only relation we can have with the dead. So the belief that remembering is an ethical act is deep in our natures as humans, who know we are going to die, and who mourn those who in the normal course of things die before us.\(^{34}\)

Extrapolating on this distinction provides me with an avenue to pursue greater understanding of the entangled relations between photographic images, material culture, remembering, and the ethical dimension.

The following image, *Spectral Materialism # 2. 2013*, evidences the way that my theoretical investigations, my photographic fieldwork and my studio-based research have informed each other in my investigation of this important idea.

Andrew Hazewinkel
*Spectral Materialism # 2 (Julia Acquilia Severa) 2013*
Pigment print on archival cotton rag. 44 x 66 cm.

Source object: Bronze portrait statue of the empress Julia Acquilia Severa A.D. 221-222

\(^{34}\) Ibid. 115
Here we see the head of a badly damaged bronze statue representing a woman, the statue stands at approximately 1:1 human scale. Unlike the example that I used in the previous chapter, *Spectral Materialism #1*, here we know the identity of the individual represented. She was (and still is) Julia Acquilia Severa, the second and fourth wife of the emperor Elegabalus (A.D. 218-222).

My interest in this object and my motivations for photographing it, are caught up with the issue of mythic violence, specifically the practice of *damnatio memoriae*. Briefly explained damnatio memoriae was the Roman State (and sometimes private) practice of defacing the representations of powerful public figures who had fallen from favour. It involved posthumous condemnation, including the destruction of images and erasure of names (usually of emperors, generals and their families) from public buildings and monuments. As with the earlier example of *Spectral Materialism #1*, the didactic panel that accompanies this compelling object provides us with facts that run contra to our ‘sensed’ response to the object (and image). The archaeological record indicates that at least three other women in the Severan dynasty, to which Julia Acquilia Severa belonged, were subjected to the practice of damnatio memoriae, however the last three lines of this object’s didactic panel state:

There is no evidence that Julia Acquilia Severa suffered *damnatio memoriae*. The poor condition of the statue is the result of the collapse of the building in which it was erected, caused by a fire, as it is clear from the excavation record.
I cannot get away from a sense of *intent* in the damage wrought upon this figure, it is visceral and brutal, and the lines quoted above have for me a sense of a legal proceeding. My experiences with the material object, and in making the image, are deeply connected with the issue of how our contemporary lives are caught up with subjective violence, symbolic violence and systemic violence.

If we consider our relationship with photography as essentially one concerned with static memory, then perhaps when we consider the dynamic act of remembering, and its ethical implications, we should turn our attention to materials and material culture.

Distinguishing between, and shifting focus from, memory to the act of remembering leads directly to the central concerns of this thesis which questions the role played by materials and material culture in the commingling of our experiences with the residues, traces and presences of other people’s pasts, presents and futures.

By considering the very stuff of material culture as inextricably entangled with remembering and therefore, by Sontag’s assertion, ethics, we come closer to establishing an association between materials, remembering and the social dimension.

Further evidence of the critical distinction between memory and remembering can be found in Bergson’s conception of the passage from pure memory to
memory image which he explains in great detail in his book *Matter and Memory*.

35 I deploy Bergson’s concept as a way of explaining another subtle yet important distinction that can be made between memory and remembering. Bergson introduces the concept of *habit* as a means of separating memory from remembering, thereby positioning remembering as action, and associated with the lived experience of the body, which he once referred to as “an ever advancing boundary between the future and the past”.36 For Bergson memories are ‘not conserved in the brain as in a container’, rather he conceives of them as acts which can be facilitated or inhibited by our habits.37

By using Bergson’s hypothesis as an example I am able to further distinguish memory and remembering, or as Bergson would call them the *habitual memory of representation* and the *non-habitual memory of action*.

In his book *How Societies Remember*, Paul Connerton states, “Habit is a knowledge and a remembering in the hands and in the body, and in the cultivation of habit it is our body which understands”.38

What I am endeavouring to draw out here is the idea that material culture and remembering are inextricably linked, an idea that points toward the concept of materially based social remembering. This concept has been identified and explored in the field of contemporary archaeological theory, specifically the field

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35 Bergson, *Matter and Memory*.
36 Ibid. 78
38 I am indebted to Protevi for the premise of this passage.

I begin my examination of Bergson’s concept of the passage from pure memory to memory image with a question posed by Paul Ricoeur in Chapter 1 “Memory and Imagination” in his 2004 book, Memory, History, Forgetting, 42 under the section headed “Memories and Images”.

How are we able to explain that memories return in the form of images and that the imagination mobilized in this way comes to take on forms that escape the function of the unreal? 43

In his attempt to untangle this “double imbroglio” 44 Ricoeur adopts the Bergsonian concept of the passage from pure memory to memory image as a

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42 Ricouer, Memory, History, Forgetting.
43 Ibid. 50
working hypothesis. Although he works with Bergson’s concept, he indicates concerns with distinguishing between,

the psychological description of memory and the metaphysical (in the strong and noble sense of the word) thesis concerning the role assigned to the body and to the brain and, consequently asserting the immateriality of memory.45

A useful way of considering Bergson’s radical separation is through the metaphor of the ancient alliance between eikon and tupos.46 As Ricœur points out, considering Bergson’s distinction from a metaphysical perspective would be to separate the eikon from the tupos, however from a phenomenological perspective the eikon and tupos belong to separate related orders.

(T)he eikon contains within itself the other of the original affection, while the tupos involves the external causality of an impetus (kinesis), which is itself at the origin of pressing the seal into the wax.47

As I make clear throughout this chapter, distinguishing between the roles played by the body and the mind in acts of remembering, foregrounds another important

45 Ricouer, *Memory, History, Forgetting*. 50
46 The ancient Greek conception of eikon and tupos describes the relationship between an object and a physical impression, or characteristic, of that object. An easy way to think about this complex relationship in sculptural terms is the relationship between a mould and the object that is made by pressing into it. Eikon - an image or effigy. Tupos - originally- the mark of a blow, which came to mean a stamp struck by a die, then a figure, a copy, an image, and now a ‘type’ prefiguring something or somebody.
aspect of this doctoral investigation which is designed to examine the function of the material traces of subjective and systemic violence; and also to question what roles these residual objects play in the commingling of our experiences with the residues traces and presences of others people’s pasts, presents and futures.

In Chapter 2 “Of the Recognition of Images”, in his book *Matter and Memory*, Bergson defines two types of memory and seeks to make a systematic link between them. To achieve this he must first distinguish between them, he must first separate pure memory and the memory image.

I begin my investigation of Bergson’s complex analysis of these two related yet separable forms of memory with very some simple terms from which I will then unfold a more complex understanding.

One of the forms of memory that Bergson identifies, *pure memory*, is, as I see it, related with the making or layering down of memory. For Bergson, this occurs through a series of “motor mechanisms”\(^\text{48}\), or in my terms, impulse exchanges, between an object, image or action and the brain.

The second form of memory, *the memory image*, is the act of recalling the aggregated effects of the ‘motor mechanisms’, and it is somehow independent of the subject of a given memory.

\(^{48}\) Bergson, *Matter and Memory*. 78
This perhaps over simplified description provides a useful starting point in distinguishing between what Bergson termed *pure memory* and the *memory image*.

As I have progressed through my studio-based, photo-archive based, photographic fieldwork and theoretical research, it has become clear to me that I am more interested in Bergson’s concept of the *memory image*, which I identify as most closely associated with remembering, and therefore the present, than in his concept of *pure memory*, which is most closely associated with the past.

My interests in the concept of the memory image and its association with physical enactment and embodiment, have a direct relationship with my studio-based research which, in this doctoral undertaking, draws together archival photographic glass plate negatives with photographic images of broken ancient figurative sculpture and a range of related specific materialities in creating a series of objects and images that enact the same dynamic concertinaing effect that a photographic image has on the temporal dimension.

To make this distinction between pure memory and the memory image clear, therefore enabling me to focus specifically on the concept of the memory image, I highlight Bergson’s example of a process that is used in learning a lesson in order to know it “by heart”.

\[\text{Ibid. 79}\]
I read it a first time, accentuating every line; then I repeat it a certain number of times. At each repetition there is progress; the words are more and more linked together and at last make a continuous whole. When that moment comes, it is said that I know my lesson by heart, that it is imprinted on my memory.\textsuperscript{50}

Stepping back from these actions that characterise one of the two forms of memory in question, Bergson considers how the lesson was learnt. He outlines the successive phases of the process and states:

Each successive reading then recurs to me with its own individuality; I can see it again with the circumstances which attended it then and still form its setting. It is distinguished from those which preceded or followed it by the place which it occupied in time; in short, each reading stands out in my mind as a definite event in my history. Again it will be said that these images are recollections, that they are imprinted on my memory.\textsuperscript{51}

In the form of memory involved in the learning of a lesson by heart, identified by Bergson as pure memory, he identifies the characteristic of a habit.

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid. 79
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid. 79

For further engagement with the ‘mechanical’ aspects of Bergson’s conception of ‘habit’ see Carlisle, \textit{On Habit}. 91-94
Like every habitual bodily exercise, it is stored up in a mechanism which is set in motion as a whole by an initial impulse, in a closed system of automatic movements which succeed each other in the same order and, together, take the same length of time.\textsuperscript{52}

However, recalling each individual successive pure memory has for Bergson none of the characteristics of habit. \textsuperscript{53} Simply put, each successive layer, or each pure memory, is habitual and is associated with representation, while the memory image is non-habitual and is associated with action.

Herein lies the complex issue of distinguishing between these two forms of memory. Through this example we are able to identify them as the recollection of the individually layered readings, or pure memory; and the recollection of the lesson learnt (or knowledge gained), the memory image which is the facilitator of action. Bergson explains the pure memory of the successive readings as representations thus.

Its image was necessarily imprinted at once on the memory, since the other readings form, by their very definition, other recollections. It is like an event in my life; its essence is to bear a date, and consequently to be unable to occur again. All the later readings can add to it will only alter its original nature; though my effort to recall this image becomes more and more easy as I repeat

\textsuperscript{52} Bergson, \textit{Matter and Memory}. 80
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid. 80
it, the image, regarded itself, was necessarily at the outset what it always will be.\textsuperscript{54}

You might say that the memory image of the lesson, the non-habitual memory of action, is an aggregated image of all the individual successively layered, repeated pure memory. The memory image then is a kind of aggregate of pure memory, perhaps it is better described as an accumulation, encrustation or coagulation of the individual layers, in which each is informed by the partial definition remaining from the layer that precedes it.

Bergson goes on to state:

(I)t is no less certain that each of them, considered as a new reading and not as a lesson better known, is entirely sufficient to itself, subsists exactly as it occurred, and constitutes with all its concomitant perceptions an original moment of my history.\textsuperscript{55}

Bergson continues to push this line of argument suggesting that the memory of a given reading is a representation to which one can assign any duration; “and only a representation; it is embraced in an intuition of the mind which I may lengthen or shorten at will”.\textsuperscript{56} Here Bergson is using duration to distinguish between the two orders of memory.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid. 80
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid. 80
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid. 81
The memory of the lesson, if repeated only mentally, “requires a definite time, the
time necessary to develop one by one, were it only in imagination, all the
articulatory movements that are necessary: It is no longer a representation; it is an
action”. 57

For Bergson, the lesson learnt bears no trace of the past, rather it is part of one’s
present, and functions in precisely the same way as the habit of walking or of
writing, in that it is “lived and acted”58 rather than represented. The memory
image is enacted in the present.

SIX LONG MOMENTS

To help explain this complex conceptual distinction between memory and
remembering, I draw an example from my photo-archive based research,
specifically six of nine glass plate negatives that represent different views of the
same object. The following six images provide a visual way of understanding
Bergson’s important premise and raises further questions about the differences
and associations between representation and action.

The following images are souced from the collection of photographic artefacts
that were present at the inception of this doctoral inquiry. Each of the following
images is a digital reproduction of one of the late 19th century, dry plate glass
negatives comprising the Marshall Collection that is currently held in the photo-

57 Ibid. 81
58 Ibid. 81
archive at the British School at Rome, where my photo-archive based research that informs this project has been undertaken.

I need to point out that my ‘first’ experience with the six images below was a tactile ‘hands on’ experience, and that somehow my ongoing experience with them continues to be directly related with their thingness, with the very materiality of the glass plates and shimmering silver salts held on them.

Each of the images represents a late 19th century, photographic glass plate negative measuring 39.5 x 29.7 x .3 cm, considerably larger than this sheet of paper. Each image represents a different view of a badly damaged 1st or 2nd century A.D. marble statue of a young Hercules seated on a rock.
Like Barthes’ inability to get away from the psychic impression that he had upon seeing the *Jerome* portrait for the first time, I am unable to get away from the very objectness of these six images. I am unable to separate my experience of the material properties and qualities of the fragile glass plates that hold these images from these digital reproductions of them. It is important to appreciate that I have never seen the physical object that these images represent.

If we look closely at these images we find a clue to the materiality of the glass that originally supported them, it is easily missed. Looking closely at the bottom left corner of JM758 we can identify a small, clean break. Studying the nature of that break we notice that it has characteristics unlike that of a tear which we might expect to find in sheet of old photographic paper. It is the physical properties of the break that provides a clue to the original materiality and the history of these photographic artefacts. It leads us toward a contemporarily, less anticipated, materiality of a photographic image - glass.
The break in the materiality of this small glass artefact exposes another unexpected resonance between image and its subject, one that emerges from the philosophical and mythological realms. It is revealed in the way that the break in the fragile glass negative mirrors the breaks in the body of the sculpted figure that the image represents. It is the mirroring of the damage caused by the passage of time (to both the sculpted figure and the glass plate) that enables us to sense an unexpected fragility in the representation of a figure that is mythologically famed for strength. What I am suggesting here is that there is a correspondence between the materiality of the subject and the object, between what has happened over time to the materiality of the represented sculpture and what has happened over time to the materiality that supports the image of it. This can be understood as a form of material semiosis, which is a concept that I will discuss at length in Chapter 5.

Although I am very familiar with the glass plate representations of this ancient object, and I have made artworks based on it, I have not been physically present with the broken sculpted figure. In one sense I am not familiar with the sculpture itself, rather only with the various representations of it, yet I am already intimately involved with it. This brings us back to the idea of the conflation of the familiar and the impossible, to Barthes use of the Winter Garden Photograph, and how he uses it as a means of presenting the idea that photographs block memory. By considering this I am able to connect his use of the imagined image and its association with memory as a powerful aid in understanding Bergson’s conception of the passage of pure memory to the memory image.
Collectively these six images document not only a sculpted object, they also record a specific duration and an action. They do so in a different manner than Eadweard Muybridge’s famous images of running men and horses, here the camera (and the background) have moved around the subject and different views have been captured along the way. The static nature of these views slows down the sensed duration of physically circling the statue. If one circled the sculpted object with a fixed gaze one would retain what Bergson calls a memory image of the object. Our memory image would be an aggregate of each successive moment of our action. Then, days or years later, when we recall the experience of circling the statue, we would remember the entirety of the material presence of the broken young Hercules and not the individual moments or static views of the experience.

Looking again at the six photographic negatives reproduced here, we apprehend that each individually asserts a clear, potent association with the other five, yet each also exerts itself as an individual object; as Bergson would say as a pure memory, a “definite moment in my history”.

This example not only makes clear the distinction between pure memory and memory image, it can also be considered a practical example of what Michel Serres calls the commingling of time. What I mean by this is that the images that are printed here on this sheet of paper actively participate in an affective network of material correspondence in which each of the active elements occupies a different set of spatio-temporal coordinates. These six images are derived from a set of nine late nineteenth century glass plate negatives that are stored in boxes.

\[59\] Ibid. 79
JM A1 + A2, they are effectively suspended in the temporal limbo of photo-archive at the British School at Rome. The broken marble statue of the young Hercules that they represent is currently standing in temporal mash-up of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, Gallery 162 to be precise, and on this white sheet of paper they are now also in your hands.

CHAPTER 2: A SUMMARY IN CONCLUSION

I began this chapter by building on the foundation that I established in the previous chapter concerning the relationships between early photography and subjective, systemic and symbolic violence.

Turning my attention from early photography’s relationship with violence toward early photography’s relationship with memory enabled me to begin my examination of the entangled relationships between memory and violence as it has been mediated through photography.

In the first half of this chapter I examined the ways in which early photography came to have close associations with the issue of death and by association, memory, a sense of loss and the melancholic tone that is so often associated with the medium.

In the second half of this chapter I turned to Bergson, with whose help I demonstrated an important distinction between memory, which is closely associated with the past, and the act of remembering which is more closely associated with the present.
I set out by acknowledging the extensive corpus of work concerning the relationships between photography and memory that has already been generated within the scholarly fields of Memory Studies and Photographic History. Again I want to make clear that the intention in this chapter is not to create fresh understanding of that specific relationship, rather I have used it as a stepping-stone toward the driving quest of this thesis, which is to create fresh understandings of the relationships between materials and remembering.

The starting point for my analysis of the relationship between early photography, death, loss, mourning and memory, was provided by Sontag when she stated:

> Ever since cameras were invented in 1839, photography has kept close company with death. Because an image produced with a camera is, literally, a trace of something brought before the lens, photographs were superior to any painting as a memento of the vanished past and the dear departed. 60

From this important statement I turned to Barthes’ well-known and deeply personal book *Camera Lucida: Reflections On Photography*, and through a process of detailed analysis I considered how Barthes arrived at the important conception that a photograph blocks memory. I considered this in relation to the distinction, made by Bergson between memory and remembering, and proposed that if photography is caught up with memory in such a way that it inhibits the

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60 Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others*. 24
dynamic and present act of remembering, perhaps materials and material culture are better suited to, or enjoy a closer relationship with, the cognitive act of remembering.

Then, pointing out the importance of the unseen in Barthes framing of memory, I looked specifically at the unseen image described in the opening lines of his book, the *Jerome* portrait; and the unseen image of his recently departed elderly mother as a child, the *Winter Garden Photograph*, upon which his entire meditation rests. I did this as a means to re-examine ways that a viewer of a photograph is psychically and physically entangled with its subject. Analysing the parallels that I identified between Barthes’ description of his psychic experience with the *Jerome* portrait and the way he uses the unseen image of his recently deceased mother as a child, I proposed that in both instances he draws the reader (not viewer) into the confluence of the familiar and the impossible. I reflected on the evocative power inherent in the confluence of the familiar and the impossible by returning again to consider how a viewer is physically connected with, or implicated in, the *Nsala* portrait. The examples of how the conflation of the familiar and the impossible work in the *Jerome* and *Nsala* portraits brought us back to Benjamin’s concept of the image aura, and specifically to how a network of gazes is critical to its establishment. Using these two examples I identified a subtle yet important distinction between how the viewer’s gaze functions. In Barthes’ example the active impossibility is sensed psychically while in the *Nsala* portrait, the active impossibility is embodied and enacted by the viewer’s gaze. Here again we might consider Barthes’ famous dictum that a photograph actually
blocks memory, and therefore, as I have already proposed that remembering is best served by the absence of the photographic image.

The following diagram represents the subtle yet important distinctions that have set in motion the turning of the concerns of this thesis from the relationship between early photography and violence, onto the relationships between early photography and memory, and now toward the relationships between materials and remembering.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 2:** Distinguishing characteristics of memory and remembering.

In the second half of this chapter I examined Bergson’s conception of the passage from pure memory to memory image which lead to important developments in my thinking about the nature of the relationships between materials and remembering. This distinction maintains an important position throughout this doctoral research, largely because of the way that it enables me to see memory as less dynamic than remembering, and therefore more closely related with the past; whilst remembering can be understood as a series of active feelings caught up with the immediate present. In short, memory functions symbolically, and remembering
functions through participation. If we accept this premise and consider it in relation to my earlier proposition that acts of remembering are better served by materials than photographs, then we see a clear path to the central concerns of this thesis which question the roles played by materials and material culture in the commingling of our experiences with the residues, traces and presences of other people’s pasts, presents and futures.

I examined the role played by habit in Bergson’s conception of the passage from pure memory to memory image, and thereby came to understand remembering as action and deeply associated with the lived experience of the body. Understanding remembering in this way led me to consider how we share our individual material mass with the rest of the material world, which is a complex idea that I will explore in great detail in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. This form of relatedness, or between-ness, can be understood through the ancient alliance between the eikon and the tupos, whereby, in a phenomenological sense, although the tupos and the eikon belong to different orders, they are connected in a special way; the eikon is somehow present in the tupos and the tupos in the eikon. Although, as I have demonstrated, Bergson successfully and productively distinguished memory from remembering, he did not separate them, they are still connected, connected in much the same way that the eikon and the tupos are connected.

To demonstrate this complex association in a visual way I used the example of six images drawn from my photo-archive based research and explained the role that these photographic artefacts have played in the inception of this doctoral research.
The six digitally reproduced images of late nineteenth century dry plate negatives also evidenced how the indexical marks left on a specific materiality expose the physical qualities of that material, and how this kind of information can be drawn into a contributory (or participatory) relationship with the imagery associated with it, thus informing our experiences with it. In this way my example revealed a kind of mytho-material entanglement which has close association with the concept of material semiosis. The six images also led us into another more philosophically inflected consideration relating to how objects, the processual artefacts produced in generating images of them, and the representational images of them, are caught up together with the layered experiences of pure memory, and how these experiences aggregate as memory image. This has strong associations with Serres’ conception of commingled, crumpled time which plays an important role in the development of the next chapter in which I examine Marianne Hirsch’s conception of *postmemory*, and the notions of *indwelling* and *wit(h)ness* through a detailed analysis Michael Polanyi’s conception of *tacit knowing*. 
PART 2
CHAPTER 3
INDWELLING AND WIT(H)NESS

If there be memory, that is, the survival of past images, these images must constantly mingle with our perception of the present and may even take its place.

Henri Bergson ¹

It is not by looking at things but by dwelling in them, that we come to understand their joint meaning.

Michael Polanyi ²

Because our body is involved in the perception of objects, it participates thereby in our knowing of all other things outside.

Michael Polanyi ³

³ Ibid. 29
In this chapter I investigate Michael Polanyi’s conception of the tacit dimension, specifically his concept of *tacit knowing*, and Marianne Hirsch’s conception of *postmemory*. Each of these complex structures is examined in relation to the other, and then both are reflected onto the habit concerning aspects of Henri Bergson’s conception of the passage from pure memory to memory image.

Also in this chapter I bring focus to specific interest in the relationships between the materiality of objects and remembering in relation to the body of the observer/rememberer.

Furthermore, by elucidating the similarities and differences between tacit knowing and postmemory, both of which I identify as structures of memory and knowledge transfer, I foreground a critical framework for the concept of *premembering*, which I define as a materially triggered understanding of the events, circumstances or conditions that one may have not directly experienced, but which one’s culture already knows and stores up for all its future participants.

The concept of premembering will be developed further and examined closely in the subsequent chapters as I explore how this form of embodied memory is informed by the sensed properties, qualities and histories of materials.

The texts directly informing this chapter are Marianne Hirsch’s 2012 book *The Generation of Postmemory, Writing and Visual Culture After the Holocaust*; 4

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POSTMEMORY, PREMEMBERING

On page two of her book *The Generation of Postmemory, Writing and Visual Culture After the Holocaust*, Marianne Hirsch asks the following important question, “How are we implicated in the aftermath of crimes we did not ourselves witness?”

Reconsidering Hirsch’s question in light of the research I have undertaken in this doctoral project, I propose an adjustment to it so that it better suits the central themes of my research. By replacing the word ‘implicated’ with the words ‘caught up with’, and the word ‘aftermath’ with the words ‘residue’ and ‘trace’, I rephrase Hirsch’s original question in a way that progresses my quest for fresh understanding of the relationships between the materiality of objects and remembering.

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5 Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension*.  
Throughout this chapter I ask the following question. How are our lives caught up with the material residues and traces of systemic and subjective violence that we ourselves did not witness? I do this by examining the concepts of *tacit knowledge* and *postmemory*.

My argument throughout this thesis is that the condition of being caught up with the traces and residues of violence that we have not directly experienced, occurs through our engagement and practical involvement with the materials and material culture that surround us; the very same material and material culture that has born witness to the outbursts of subjective violence and the episodes of systemic violence that comprise the ongoing narrative cycles of mythic violence.

**AN EXERCISE**

Before moving into a detailed analysis of Polanyi’s *tacit knowing* and Hirsch’s *postmemory*, I begin this chapter by undertaking a semiotic exercise designed to enable a corporeal sensing of what I call the illuminating between-ness at work in tacit knowing and postmemory. The exercise has been conceived as a means of revealing the perceptual residues, associations and expressive relations between the individual subjects and entries in a series of lists below. In this exercise the words comprising the following lists function in the same way as the *proximal term* in Polayni’s conception of tacit knowing, meaning that each word occupies the position of something ‘known’ from which we attend to something hitherto ‘known yet untellable’.
The methodology of this experiment borrows from Michel Serres’ characteristic literary device, the “variegated list”, which in this instance I combined with the foundational premise of Polanyi’s tacit knowing, which is that we attend from something known toward something else known, yet untellable.

The following exercise uses three lists as primary data sources, and generates a fourth list. Each of lists 1, 2 and 3 are drawn from the theoretical writings that have informed this chapter and represent one of the areas of conceptual concern that come together and shape this thesis - materials, memory and the body. Please read each list out loud.

List 1.

Pottery, glazes, glass, enamels, copper, alloys, iron, steel, gold, silver, lead, mercury, stone, wood, fibres, threads, textiles, baskets, hides, leather, antler, bone, horn, ivory, dyes, pigments, paints, adhesives.  

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9 Serres, The Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies. 5
In his introduction to The Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies, Steve Connor explains Serres’ motivation for invoking “that most characteristic Serresian device, the variegated list,” he states that “the listing impulse is stimulated whenever Serres evokes a complex or irregular surface,” and that in creating variegated lists Serres “allows the series of words for variety themselves to variegate, so that the soul, or centre of gravity of the sequence is to be found not in one particular location, but rather in the ramifying array or spraying out of the approximating terms themselves.”

10 Henry Hodges, Artifacts: An Introduction to Early Materials and Technology (London: John Baker 1964). See Table of Contents
This is an index of materials used by ancient people in making things; its source is the Table of Contents of a small book published in 1964 titled *Artifacts: An Introduction to Early Materials and Technology*, written by Henry Hodges.  

Although short, this list spans vast temporal distances, it commingles time, or as Serres would say, “it crumples and folds time in multiple diversities”. Returning briefly to the preceding two chapters I reflect again on the medium of photography and suggest that photography does much the same thing as this list; it commingles time while simultaneously providing an indexical document of what was present and what happened.

List 2.

Absent memory, inherited memory, belated memory, prosthetic memory, mémoire trouée, mémoire des cendres, vicarious witnessing, received history, postmemory.  

These terms, coined by various scholars working in the relatively new field of Memory Studies, attempt to define a “sense of living connection”, a deeply felt

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11 Ibid.  
13 Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory. Writing and Visual Culture after the Holocaust.* See page 3 for detailed attributions of the terms used in List 2 to the various scholars whose work is concerned specifically with memory transmission between generations of traumatic parental pasts.  
14 Ibid 1.  
This expression is first used by Hirsch in her introductory quote from Eva Hoffman’s, *After Such Knowledge: Memory, History, and the Legacy of the Holocaust.* New York: Public Affairs, 2004. In the development of her argument Hirsch refers to it repeatedly.
and identifying relationship between those who have had a direct corporeal experience of the unimaginable atrocities of the Holocaust, and those we have come to know as the second generation or the generation after.

The next list in this exercise is drawn from Chapter 1, “Veils”, of Serres’ book *The Five Senses, A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies*. Under the subheading of Tattoos, Serres composes a variegated list in an attempt to describe the relationship between the surfaces of our bodies, and as he puts it, our soul.

List 3.

Observe on the surface of the skin, the changing, shimmering, fleeting soul, the blazing, striated, tinted, streaked, striped, many-coloured, mottled, cloudy, star studded, bedizened, variegated, torrential, swirling soul.\(^{15}\)

This list continues a few lines further along in Serres’ discussion about the relationship between our skin, and our soul.

Historiated skin carries and displays a particular history. It is visible: wear and tear, scars from wounds, calluses, wrinkles and furrows of former hopes, blotches, pimples, eczema, psoriasis,

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\(^{15}\) Serres, *The Five Senses. A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies*. Preceding the Introduction written by Steven Connor to *The Five Senses, A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies* is a series of notes titled ‘Sense and Sensibility: Translating the Bodily Experience’ in which the translators Margaret Sankey and Peter Cowley describe in great detail Serres’ love of and capacity for expressive language and style of writing; describing it as a *hybrid* whose ‘connectivity and cohesion is as much literary as philosophical’.. ‘frequently lyrical and rhapsodic.’
birth-marks. Memory is inscribed there, why look elsewhere for it? And it is invisible the fluctuating traces of caresses, memories of silk, wool, velvet, furs, tiny grains of rock, rough bark, scratchy surfaces, ice crystals, flames, the timidity of touch, the audacity of aggressive contact.  

I apply Serres’ variegation methodology in this exercise as a means of invoking his motivation for generating such lists, which is explained by Steven Connor in his introduction to The Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies. Therefore, in the same way that Serres attempts to relocate the “centre of gravity of the sequence not in one particular location in it, but rather in the ramifying array or spraying out of the approximating terms themselves”, in this exercise I am endeavouring to achieve the same outcome, but in specific relation to the central themes of this thesis: the entangled relationships between the materiality of objects, remembering, and the body.

I want to make clear that my interest in Serres’ contribution to this exercise is less in the poetics of his language than in what I identify as the productive betweenness at work in his variegated lists. This leads me to consider whether or not this expressive strategy, which is in some ways akin to collage, might be extended to the realm of images, objects, their materiality, and histories. As I reflect on the relationships between the studio-based research, photo-archive based research, photographic fieldwork and theoretical investigations that come together to form

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16 Ibid. 24
17 Ibid. 5
18 Ibid.

For a detailed explanation of Serres’ conception of the workings of ‘between-ness’ see pages 77-78
this doctoral project, I am able to identify that a kind of material manifestation of Serres’ variegated list is at work in my art making.

It is important to again acknowledge that each of the three lists above is drawn from one of the complex conceptual domains that give form to this thesis. The first list is concerned with the materiality of objects and the ancient past; the second is associated closely with violence and is related to intergenerational memory transfer; and the third concerns the body, specifically the complex relationship between the surface of our bodies and, in Serres’ words, our soul.

From these lists I create a new list, a mash-up, which I again ask you to read aloud thus enabling your habitual recollections of the sounds, feelings and thoughts of your very recent past to commingle with the sounds, feelings and thoughts of your immediate present.

List 4.

Observe on the surface of the skin, inherited memory, hides and leather, dyes, traces of caresses, absent memory, antler and bone, horn and ivory, received history, mottled, cloudy, star studded, tiny grains of rock, pottery, glazes, memories of silk, furs, velvet, wool, rough bark, mémoire trouée, ice crystals, the timidity of touch, flames, mémoire des cendres, baskets, threads, fibres, the changing, shimmering, fleeting soul, torrential, alloys, copper, silver, enamels, postmemory, mercury, lead, stone, the audacity of aggressive contact, vicarious witnessing, glass, iron, steel, blazing, streaked, pigments, variegated, belated
memory, gold, lead, striated, scratchy surfaces, wood, many-coloured, tinted, striped, textiles, adhesives, bedizened, swirling soul, paints, prosthetic memory.

BETWEEN-NESS AND TACIT KNOWING

The dimension of between-ness that is central to the functioning of Serres’ variegated list is also central to Michael Polanyi’s conception of tacit knowledge. Regarding human knowledge, Polanyi states, “we know more than we can tell” 19 This is foundational to his ideas concerning tacit knowledge. He demonstrates this with the example of how we are able to recognize a face that we know, among hundreds if not thousands of faces, although we may not be able to identify why or how we know that face. “We know a person’s face, and can recognise it among a thousand, indeed millions. Yet we usually cannot tell how we recognize a face we know. So most of this knowledge cannot be put into words.” 20

Polyani introduces another example to clarify his point, he refers to the photographic genre of the forensic facial composite, which, as already discussed, was originally developed and deployed by various agencies and institutions concerned with social regulation. The facial composite is a tool to prompt the ‘telling’ of the tacit knowledge that a witness may hold regarding the identity of a perpetrator of criminal activity but that they have not the means to tell. 21

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19 Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension. 4
20 Ibid. 4
21 See Chapter 1 for my reference to the Bertillon System and the Galton Composite regarding early photography’s developing association with modes of systemic violence. The Bertillon System and the Galton composite can be identified as progenitors of contemporary Facial Composite methodologies employed by policing agencies around the world.
Here Polanyi is referring to the original PhotoFit, IdentiKit, and Portrait Pad systems that have now been replaced with the digital generation of these policing memory aides, such as SketchCop, FACETTE, and E FIT. Suggesting that the practice of their use has not changed much, he explains that a witness of a criminal activity is asked to recall, as best as possible, the suspected perpetrator of a crime, by selecting from vast archives of images containing a great number of variant isolated facial ‘features’. The witness chooses the eyes that they can remember, the nose that they can remember, the forehead that comes to mind, and so on. These disembodied (or dismembered) features are then combined (or remembered) to form a reasonable likeness of a person’s face, the face that before undertaking this process, the witness ‘knew’ but could not fully envisage and therefore could not tell. In this example the individual features are recalled, however it does not change the fact that prior to undertaking this activity, the witness knew more than they could tell.

To test if, and how, this concept of a special bond between what is known and tellable and known yet untellable can be extended from images and objects to systems and processes, I undertook a series of studio-based experiments designed to link geological processes and long established sculptural practices as a means to highlight the connective resonance between them. The experiment also represents my continuing investigation into physical manifestations of what I have been referring to as ‘productive between-ness’. In this example the productive between-ness exists in temporally commingled processes and the resultant physical outcomes of the experimentation. Because the immediate stage of my
theoretical research has concerned varying genres of portraiture, I designed my experiment around the portrait; specifically the sculptural portrait (or bust) which has resonance with both the 19th century and Antiquity, which are periods of history that are central to this doctoral inquiry. The following images detail the outcomes of that series of experiments which included, silicone mould making, casting in plaster of Paris, steel fabrication and working with stone.

Andrew Hazewinkel
Two Figures (after Caillois) 2013.
Plaster of Paris, agate, steel.
Each figure 170 x 30 x 30 cm. detail
Evidence of the productive conceptual and spatial between-ness explored in the above example can also be identified in the following image that was generated through my photographic fieldwork.

Andrew Hazewinkel
Poseidon and Discobolus 2015
Fibre-based silver gelatin print. 41 x 41 cm

In this image it is also possible to identify the beginnings of another concept that I address in Chapter 6. I refer to it as the *temporal paradox of unmaking*. Looking closely at the surface of the bronze figure represented on the left of the image we can see that not only the surface of the bronze but the very material mass that comprises the figure has been transformed, not only by the passage of time but through exposure to a specific set of circumstances and conditions.

It is pertinent here to acknowledge that I have employed photographic and sculptural experimentation to test ideas emerging from my theoretical research and to note that by working in both creative disciplines, the outcomes of one set of experiments has informed and indeed transformed the outcomes of the other set of experiments.

Identifying links between Polanyi’s conception of *tacit knowing* and Bergson’s *memory image*, I argue that Polanyi’s example of the forensic facial composite can be read as another practical example of Bergson’s method for distinguishing between habitual pure memory and non-habitual memory image. One way to test this link between the two concepts is to consider the role of habit in Polanyi’s conception of tacit knowledge.

In the previous chapter I discussed how habit, in the context of the Bergsonian memory image, has a specific association with the physical body. Bergson used the habitual actions of walking and writing\(^22\) as examples and proposed that the

\(^{22}\) Bergson, *Matter and Memory*. 81
habitual characteristics of pure memory become embodied in non-habitual memory image.

To identify a relationship between habit (in the physical sense) and tacit knowledge, I turn again to the productive between-ness found in Serres’ variegated lists, and in Bergson’s passage from pure memory to memory image. I argue that this between-ness is reflected in the very structure of tacit knowing which involves two kinds (or terms) of knowing; and that it is between these two terms of knowing, the *proximal* and the *distal*, that we attend toward embodiment or ‘indwelling’.

Polanyi uses the term subception to describe the processes by which we apprehend the relation between two events, both of which we know but only one of which we can tell. He repeatedly returns to the language of the body by using terminology from physiognomy to exemplify and explain his ideas. As I have already explained, he uses the features of the face and the performance of muscular actions to describe varying aspects of tacit knowing, in fact he chooses

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23 Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension*. 7
In the field of contemporary psychology the term *subception* describes the ‘level of perceptual activity’ that occurs in instances where the speed of exposure to stimuli is too rapid for conscious discrimination yet where the subject is still capable of making discrimination. http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/rev/58/2/113/ accessed 22/09/2014
In his lengthy footnote Polanyi refers to Lazarus, R. S.; and McCleary, R.A., published in both *Journal of Personality* (Vol.18 1949), p.131 and *Psychological Review* (Vol.58 1951) p.113. Poylani traces the development of this idea (and the counter argument) back to 1917 and the work of Otto Potzl. See Potzl,O. *Preconscious Stimulation in Dreams, Associations, and Images*, in Psychological Issues Vol 2. No 3. International Universities Press, New York, 1960. Potzl first presented his ideas in 1917 to the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society; Freud was well aware of them and spoke of their “wealth of implications that went far beyond the sphere of dream interpretation.” This comment can be traced to Charles Fischer’s introduction to *Preconscious Stimulation in Dreams, Associations, and Images in Psychological Issues Vol 2. No.3* New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1960. Polanyi goes on to make clear that he is relying on *subception* only as confirmation of tacit knowing in an elementary form. On page 95 he states *subception* is “the mechanism underlying the formation of Gestalt from which I first derived my conception of tacit knowing in Personal Knowledge.”
the language of anatomy to title the two kinds of knowing that are implicit to tacit knowing. He calls the first term *proximal* and the second *distal*. Outlining the relationship between the somatic and semantic aspects of tacit knowing he states: “All meaning tends to be displaced away from ourselves, and that is in fact my justification for using the terms ‘proximal’ and ‘distal’ to describe the first and second terms of tacit knowing.” He then uses these two anatomically inflected terms to describe what he calls the ‘Phenomenal Structure’ of tacit knowing, explaining that “we are aware of the proximal term of an act of tacit knowing in the appearance of its distal term; we are aware of that from which we are attending to another thing, in the appearance of that thing.”

To describe the functional structure of tacit knowing he uses the example of our reliance on our awareness of the combining of muscular acts for attending to the performance of a skill, he states that we attend “from these elementary movements to achieve their joint purpose, and hence we are able to specify the elementary acts”.

In much the same way that Bergson made the subtle, yet important distinction between pure memory and memory image, Polyani seeks to distinguish the meaning of a thing, “from that which has this meaning”. He introduces the example of the use of a physical probe to help distinguish between the meaning of a thing and that, which holds meaning.

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24 Ibid. 10
25 Ibid. 13
26 Ibid. 11
27 Ibid. 10
28 Ibid. 12
We may take the example of the use of a probe to explore a cavern, or the way a blind man feels his way by tapping with a stick, and we can also observe here the process by which the separation gradually takes place.\textsuperscript{29}

He goes on to state that when a person first uses either a probe or a stick for feeling the way, their awareness is of its impact against their hand, fingers and palm; but that as they learn to use the probe or stick the awareness of its impact on their hand is transformed into a sense of its point touching the objects being explored. They quite literally feel through the stick or probe. We might call it a sensory extender. Of this Polanyi states: “This is how an interpretive effort transposes meaningless feelings into meaningful ones and places them at some distance from the original feeling.”\textsuperscript{30}

This analysis of Polanyi’s conception of tacit knowledge reveals a reliance on precise associations with and through the body, thereby linking it with the habitual aspects of Bergson’s conception of the passage from habitual pure memory to non-habitual memory image:

Because our body is involved in the perception of objects, it participates thereby in our knowing of all other things outside. Moreover, we keep expanding our body into the world, by assimilating to it sets of particulars which we integrate into reasonable entities. Thus do we form, intellectually and practically,

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid. 12
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid. 13
an interpreted universe populated by entities, the particulars of which we have interiorized for the sake of comprehending their meaning in the shape of coherent entities.\textsuperscript{31}

In Bergson, I find support for Polanyi’s idea, and importantly Bergson provides a way for us to consider it in terms of memory. Polanyi states emphatically that the continual expansion of our bodies into the world occurs through the process by which we assimilate our bodies with “reasonable entities”\textsuperscript{32} formed of sets of particulars to which we inscribe entity. In the context of this thesis I interpret Polanyi’s ‘reasonable entities’ as objects, and his use of ‘sets of particulars’ as the materials, specifically the qualities and properties of the materials of which those objects are made; through all of which we inscribe them with entity.

Early in his investigation of tacit knowledge Polanyi introduces the terms ‘indwelling’ and ‘empathy’, and by briefly tracing the history of their development he makes an important distinction between them. This distinction is significant in the development of the idea of wit(h)ness which is important in the progression of this thesis. He states,“indwelling as derived from the structure of tacit knowing, is a far more precisely defined act than is empathy”.\textsuperscript{33}

It is important to understand how, in Polanyi’s conception, we come to ‘dwell’ in something. This can be explained through the special relationship between the proximal and the distal terms of tacit knowing. Polanyi proposes that when we are awake we rely on “our awareness of contacts of our body with things outside for

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid. 29  
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid. 29  
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid. 17
attending to these things”. To put it another way, when we are awake our body functions as the proximal term of tacit knowing, and that it is from our bodies that we attend to the distal term. He explains a process of ‘incorporation’ of the distal term into the proximal term. Again he uses the example of a blind person’s use a cane, and how they come to understand the sensations at the tip of the cane rather than those at the point of its connection with the body. Polanyi makes clear that this is how we come to indwell with something when he states,

we can say that when we make a thing function as the proximal term of tacit knowing, we incorporate it in our body - or extend our body to include it - so that we come to dwell in it.³⁵

Bergson speaks similarly of the body in relation to duration and history when he refers to the body as “an ever advancing boundary between the future and the past”.³⁶

Polanyi goes on to suggest that his example only hints at the full range of this generalisation. His conception of indwelling is indebted to two late nineteenth century German thinkers, Dilthey and Lipps who postulated that “indwelling, or empathy, was the only ‘proper means’ of knowing man and the humanities”.³⁷ For Dilthey, a person’s mind could only be understood by ‘reliving its workings’, while Lipps regarded aesthetic appreciation as a means of “entering a work of art

³⁴ Ibid. 16
³⁵ Ibid. 16
³⁶ Bergson, Matter and Memory. 78
³⁷ Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension. 16
and thus dwelling in the mind of its creator”.\textsuperscript{38} For Polanyi, Dilthey and Lipps were describing “a striking form of tacit knowing as applied to the understanding of man and of works of art and that they were right in saying that this could only be achieved by indwelling”.\textsuperscript{39}

However, he does not agree with their position that this separated the humanities and natural sciences, rather he uses their analysis to distinguish between indwelling and empathy.

\begin{quote}
Indwelling, as derived from the structure of tacit knowing, is a far more precisely defined act than is empathy, and it underlies all observations, including all those described previously as indwelling.\textsuperscript{40}
\end{quote}

I suggest that there are parallels between Polanyi’s conception indwelling and Benjamin’s concept of the image aura which I explored in Chapter 1. While describing an image aura as a “a strange web of time and space”, \textsuperscript{41} Benjamin spoke of the importance of ‘resting’ with an image until “the moment or hour begins to be part of its appearance”.\textsuperscript{42} It follows that Benjamin’s ‘resting’ with an image is a form of what Polanyi calls indwelling, which is closely associated with what I call wit(h)ness. As Benjamin’s concept of the image aura is contingent on the confluence of temporalities, it mirrors the concept of indwelling and the

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid. 17
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid. 17
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid. 17
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid. 209
practice of indwelling’s capacity to enable one to understand the joint meaning of things.

A good example with which to explain this important idea can be found in the experience of being with ancient statuary, specifically, the broken bodies of Antiquity which play a central role in this doctoral research.

I propose that inherent in the material mass of damaged figurative sculpture is meaning that is associated with the deep past in which the object was made, and that in the between-ness of the bodily form of the sculpture and the bodily form of the viewer, there resides complex meaning in the viewer’s immediate present.

This is made clear by the following image drawn from my photographic fieldwork, which represents a badly damaged fragment of a marble statue of a group of figures representing a battle scene.

Fieldwork documentation.
National Archaeological Museum Athens.
Indwelling and wit(h)ness are contingent not only on the confluence of
temporalities, but also on the confluence of states of knowing. As Polanyi
explains, “it is not by looking at things but by dwelling in them, that we come to
understand their joint meaning”.

Another visual example of this complex idea can be found in the productive
between-ness at work between the following two photographs that I created while
investigating this idea.

Andrew Hazewinkel
Kouros (1) 2015
Fibre-based silver gelatin print. 41 x 41 cm

Source object: 6th century B.C Pentelic marble kouros.

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43 Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension. 18
Acknowledging these subtle distinctions between indwelling, wit(h)ness and empathy is another important development in the progression of this thesis as it enables me to apply the concepts of indwelling and wit(h)ness directly to the materiality of objects, objects that have associations with other people’s pasts. This is a more focused and critical activity than a more generalised understanding of empathy for other people’s experiences and memories. Simply expressed, indwelling and wit(h)ness are connected with the body, and therefore, through its association with physical objects, the rest of the material world, while empathy is associated with non-physical feelings, with affections or with psychological processes rather than with physical sensations.
In the following chapters I further my exploration of the concept of wit(h)ness in specific relation to the materiality of objects. Through that investigation I come to distinguish it from Polanyi’s conception of indwelling; however, first I explore Hirsch’s concept of *postmemory* in greater detail by examining the roles played by photographs and objects within its structure.

**POSTMEMORY**

I begin my analysis of Hirsch’s conception of postmemory by noting the specificity with which she subtitles her book *The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture after the Holocaust*.\(^44\) I acknowledge that she makes no reference to material culture, however, for me, material culture and visual culture are inextricably intertwined. This raises questions as to why objects (or more pertinently, why meaningful analysis of the materiality of objects) do not populate the pages of her text in any significant way. Through my analysis of her explanation of the workings of postmemory I identify that, Hirsch, perhaps unconsciously, privileges photography over other forms of postmemorial practice. Hirsch provides the most succinct articulation of the complexities of postmemory when she states:

‘Postmemory’ describes the relationship that the ‘generation after’ bears to the personal, collective, and cultural trauma of those who

\(^{44}\) Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture after the Holocaust*. 

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came before - to the experiences they ‘remember’ only by means of the stories, images and behaviours among which they grew up. 45

Elaborating on this she makes the important point that postmemory is a structure, “not a movement, method or idea…rather a structure of both intergenerational and trans-generational return of traumatic knowledge and embodied experience”. 46

The structure of postmemory is not mediated by acts of recall, rather, in the Hirschian idiom, it is mediated by “imaginative investment, projection, and creation”. 47 Therefore postmemory is characterised by the production of images, objects, performances and literary narratives by the generation that follows a community of individuals who have experienced unimaginable trauma.

Postmemory is a structure of remembrance that is constructed by the generations that have been profoundly affected by exposure to the residues, traces and presences of the extreme violence that was experienced directly by the generation before them. The generation that come after, that create the superstructure of postmemory, have not themselves directly experienced the same acts (or habits) of extreme violence. It is because of this generational remove that postmemory “reflects the uneasy oscillation between continuity and rupture”. 48

Hirsch is herself a member of the generation who came after, she is the daughter of survivors of the horrific atrocities committed during the Holocaust; she arrived

45 Ibid. 5
46 Ibid. 6
47 Ibid. 5
48 Ibid. 6
at her term ‘postmemory’ through “autobiographical readings” 49 of the visual artworks and writings created by her own generation.

Hirsch was motivated to coin the term by the need to find a language that described the “quality”50 of her relationship to her parents’ experiences of unimaginable trauma which were expressed to her through her parents “daily stories of danger and survival during the Second World War in Romanian Cernaut”, 51 and also to shed light on the ways that her parents accounts “dominated”52 her post war childhood in Bucharest.

While Hirsch dedicates an entire book to exploring her concept of postmemory, the following quote taken from the introduction to her book, provides a sufficiently nuanced understanding of the concept to enable its application to an examination of the function of the specific materiilaties of objects in the memorial structure that she defines below:

Postmemory’s connection to the past is thus actually mediated not by recall but by imaginative investment, projection, and creation. To grow up with overwhelming inherited memories, to be dominated by narratives that preceded one’s birth or one’s consciousness, is to risk having one’s own life stories displaced even evacuated, by our ancestors. It is to be shaped, however indirectly, by traumatic fragments of events that still defy narrative

49 Ibid. 4
50 Ibid. 4
51 Ibid. 4
52 Ibid. 4
reconstruction and exceed comprehension. These events happened in the past, but their effects continue into the present. This is, I believe, the structure of postmemory and the process of its generation.\textsuperscript{53}

I have already explained that this thesis is not located in the important field of Holocaust Studies, however I do acknowledge the field’s contribution to the development of my thinking. I note also that Memory Studies emerged as a field of inquiry in the late twentieth century amid, and from, anxieties surrounding the potential for another significant loss of cultural knowledge caused by the approaching natural ending of Holocaust survivors lives.\textsuperscript{54}

As explained in the Introduction of this thesis, Benjamin’s conception of mythic violence describes, “the natural historical cycles of the rise and fall of empires and states – of the establishment, augmentation and decay of institutions”,\textsuperscript{55} and his conception is the basis for my interpretation of the term mythic violence. However, I use the term mythic violence to specifically mean the interdependent, visible and invisible forms of violence that manifest in the individual and collective actions and systems, through which one unconsciously comes to care more about property than life. The centrality of mythic violence in this thesis, and in the atrocities of the Holocaust is why a detailed analysis of Hirsch’s concept of postmemory is critical to the development of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid. 5
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid. 18
Hirsch uses the Holocaust as an example, and a historically defined frame of reference for postmemory; however, she acknowledges that in the middle of the second decade of the twenty-first century, the Holocaust no longer serves as a “conceptual limit case” for considering the relationships between “historical trauma, memory, and forgetting.” Hirsch brings into the frame of postmemory a long list of atrocities perpetrated by humans on other humans; American Slavery, The Vietnam War, Argentina’s Dirty War, Latin American dictatorships, South African apartheid, communist terror in China, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Block, The Armenian genocide, The Cambodian genocide, The Rwandan genocide, The Japanese internment camps in the United States of America, Indian Partition and the Stolen Generations of Aboriginal Australia. As the register of atrocities continues to crowd, the cycles of mythic violence prove ongoing. Therefore, as I see it, postmemory, as defined by Hirsch, is not alone in its deep entanglement with the cycles of mythic violence; however, in each given example the relationship is more complex than one of causality.

Most of the postmemorial work examined by Hirsch is located within the context of the image and the word production. This is exemplified in the proliferation of the photo-mediated practices, varying literary genres, and the archives that combine them all, that appear in Hirsch’s book. In my reading of her seminal book, Hirsch privileges the photograph above other media. In fact there is not an example used in her book that does not involve a photograph. For instance, at the

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57 Ibid. 18
58 Ibid. 19

Hirsch explains that it is this *connective resonance* that she was hoping for as she developed the concept of postmemory. *Connective Histories*, the final chapter in her book is dedicated to connective and intersecting analyses which she has come to see ‘as absolutely necessary if we are to move forward in the field’.
beginning of Chapter 8, Objects of Return, she quotes a lengthy passage from Lily Brett’s 1999 fictional novel *Too Many Men*; in which Edek, one of the story’s protagonists, excavates “a small object”⁵⁹ from under the foundations of his pre-war family home. It is a small, flat, rusty tin; a container that is later opened to reveal a small photograph, a photograph of his daughter’s mother holding the small child that they gave away while living in the German displaced persons DP camp Feldafing.⁶⁰ The point that I am making here is that Hirsch is using an example of postmemory that involves a photograph *and* the specific materiality of the object it was buried in, however, in her analysis of this example, she relies solely on the photograph to progress the postmemorial narrative and thus excludes the potential for the materiality of the object to progress the postmemorial narrative, or to provide meaning. In this example materiality is ignored, neglected, and this proves to be the case in almost all of her examples.

Although this thesis began with an investigation of how early photography was complicit in the development of early modern forms of systemic and subjective violence, the driving quest of this thesis is to provide fresh understanding of the relationships between materials and remembering. My reading of Hirsch has led me to question whether the structure of postmemory can provide a useful framework for examining how the residual traces and sensible presences of materials that have born witness to outbursts of subjective and systemic violence commingle with and shape our experiences of the present?

⁵⁹ Ibid. 203
⁶⁰ Ibid. 204
I have come to understand that what is critically at issue here is one’s direct exposure to the objects, their material surfaces and places where violence was enacted and experienced by others. It may seem pertinent here to refer to indexical signs, however, whilst I acknowledge their contribution to the perception of an object, the concept of *material semiosis*, which concerns the conceptual integration of the physical and cultural domains of a material, through the conflation of the properties and qualities of that material, is more pertinent to my argument in this thesis. I investigate the concept of material semiosis in my detailed explanation of the differences between the properties and qualities of materials in Chapter 5.

If we accept, as my analysis of Hirch’s work suggests, that the photograph is the medium par excellence of postmemory, then perhaps objects and their specific materialities are better suited to an analysis of my concept of ‘premembering’.

What I am trying to draw out here is that it is by our exposure to the objects, and their specific materialities, that have association with the habitual experiences of others (not only violent experiences) that enables us to premember. The important distinction between the physically associated *properties* of materials and the culturally constructed *qualities* of materials is helpful in understanding this complex entanglement. I propose that it is through the conflation of the properties and qualities of materials that we become able to understand that which is still to become more detailed and nuanced but which is ‘sensed’ ahead of full cerebral comprehension. By this I am proposing that one is capable of sensing a personal meaningfulness (some may call it a hunch) in what Polanyi refers to as the distal
term of tacit knowing, that which we know but can not yet tell; as well as the
importance of indwelling, or entering into wit(h)ness with objects.

In “Connective Histories”, the final chapter of her book, Hirsch draws together
three works: two “return” stories from different sources; a 1969 novella from a
Palestinian writer Ghassan Kanafani titled Return to Haifa which concerns the
Nakba, Lilly Brett’s 1999 fictional novel Too Many Men which deals with the
Holocaust; and a series of artworks titled The Eurydice Series by Israeli artist
Bracha Lichtenberg-Ettinger, also a daughter of Holocaust survivors. Hirsch
draws these works together to discuss the importance and function of images,
objects and places in the processes of postmemory; however, I propose that her
analysis is limited to the symbolic meaning of her examples.

Having already suggested that Hirsch privileges the photographic as the primary
driver of postmemorial narrative practice, I now point out that while she
illuminates the symbolic function of the few objects that she does refer to, this is
done without any significant attempt to describe the material properties or
qualities of these objects; or the role that their material presence may have in
generating a sense of living connection with those that had direct physical
experience of unimaginable violence.

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61 Ibid. 205
Hirsh points out that ‘return narratives’ are an increasingly prevalent genre in the Holocaust
literary genre, in which the child of a Holocaust survivor is accompanied by one of their parents on
a journey to their parent’s former homes.
62 Nakba, an Arabic word for catastrophe, is frequently used in reference to the displacement of
over 700,000 Palestinians who became refugees upon the creation of the state of Israel in 1948.
In her analysis of the Kanafani story about Said S. and Safiya’s return to the house in Haifa that they had been forced to leave in 1948 as a result of the Nakba (which was created by the establishment of the state of Israel), Hirsch pays her closest attention to the materiality and spatial qualities of the contested sites of original dispossession and return. In describing Said S.’ journey back to his pre exile home, she draws together the concepts of habit and memory by stating Said S. “reanimates deep habits and sense memories”.

When Said S. slows his car ‘before reaching the turn which he knew to be hidden at the foot of the hill’ when he looked at all the little things which he knew would frighten him or make him lose his balance: the bell, the copper door knocker, the pencil scribblings on the wall, the electricity box, the four steps broken in the middle, the fine curved railing which your hand slipped along.

Through her analysis of these three works Hirsch acknowledges “images and objects mediate acts of return”, however she pays scant attention to the properties and qualities of the material presences embedded in those objects. Although she states, “these three works enable us to look in particular, at the role that objects (photographs, domestic interiors, household objects, items of clothing) play in return stories, marking their sites of implausibility and incommensurability”, I suggest that her analysis prioritises the photographic image and remains steadfastly

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63 Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory. Writing and Visual Culture after the Holocaust. 208
64 Ibid. 208
65 Ibid. 205
66 Ibid. 206
focused on the symbolic function of the objects that she refers to. Hirsch goes on to say that “such testimonial objects, lost and again found, structure plots of return: they can embody memory and thus trigger affect shared across generations”, 67 again she prioritises the symbolic function of objects and excludes the potential for meaning (specifically meaning that relates to suffering and loss) to be resident in the properties and qualities of the materials of which the objects and spaces are made.

Hirsch suggests that in the same manner that Said S. and Safiya’s need “to return to their former home and to reencounter the objects that trigger body memories and with them the emotions of inconsolable loss they had so long repressed”, 68 Edek and Ruth in Brett’s novel return to their familial pre war home in Lodz. Here again, although reference is made to the materiality of the objects that connect Ruth with her grandmother, and Edek with his father and lost son, they lack meaningful material consideration or description. I acknowledge that these stories were not written by Hirsch, however she has chosen them to explicate the nuances of her concept.

If we accept that in *The Generation of Postmemory, Writing and Visual Culture After the Holocaust*, Hirsch privileges photography’s role in the intergenerational and trans-generational transfer of memory created by the direct experience of violence, then we must consider what implications does Barthes’ conception that a photograph actually blocks memory, have on this prioritising of the photographic image over other historically associated material culture?

67 Ibid. 206
68 Ibid. 210
As I explained in the previous chapter, what makes photography violent for Barthes is the way that it blocks dynamic imagination, and replaces it with static perceptions of history, which I identify as a kind of unconscious ontological form of systemic violence. I consider that the tone and spirit of Hirsch’s analysis resonates with anti-violent sentiment, therefore I find her prioritising of the photographic counter-intuitive to the important motivation and content of her work.

I propose, as is evidenced in my studio-based research, that it is in the conflation and between-ness of the photographic with the properties and qualities of historically associated materials, that the past, and acts of remembering, commingle with our bodily experienced present. 69

While Hirsch’s analysis of the function of photographic images within the structure of postmemory is comprehensive, (not withstanding the omission of any reference to Barthes’ concept that a photograph actually blocks memory), I argue that her analysis addresses only the symbolic function of objects without addressing the cognitive impact that the viewer senses and understands through the properties and qualities of the object’s materiality: the resonant traces, the palpable, haptic communicative residues, the surfaces, substances and the expressive presences of these injured objects; which I argue are all active agents in the commingling of one’s experiences with the experiences of those that lived before us.

69 See Chapter 5 for images and a detailed description of the series titled Head Replacement Therapy (plundered) #1-6, 2012
In the following quote, drawn from Brett’s novel, Hirsch further privileges a specific genre of photography when she suggests that it is the photograph of a lost child that most succinctly articulates the impossibility of return:

More than objects of intimacy - Ruth’s grandmother’s teas service, or her grandfather’s overcoat and the photographs that are in one of it’s pockets - The photo of the lost child figures the expulsion from home and the impossibility of return.\(^{70}\)

In her analysis of her three key examples in *Objects of Return*, Hirsch goes on to focus on the bodily implications of the return to the original site of the trauma; she identifies in Kanafani’s text an uncontrolled, and I suggest uncontrollable, automatic bodily ‘re-enactment and reincarnation’ of the events that took place on the day, twenty years earlier, in 1948 when Said S. and Safiya fled their home leaving their child behind.

Said S. and Safiya respond viscerally, with trembling, tears, sweat, and overpowering physical feelings of torment. As the couple approaches their former house, the streets they cross, the smells of the landscape, the topography of the city all trigger bodily responses that are not exactly memories, but reenactments and reincarnations of the events of the day in 1948 when they left their home.\(^{71}\)

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\(^{70}\) Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture after the Holocaust*. 210

\(^{71}\) Ibid. 207
Here Hirsch is referring to the spatial and olfactory conditions of the site of trauma, but again she offers little consideration of the implications of the properties and qualities of materials present at, and constitutive of the site. Having already examined the function of objects and materials within Polanyi’s structure of tacit knowing, and how one might come to indwell with them, it follows that Hirsch’s quote reveals that Said S. and Safiya are experiencing bodily reactions to the form of tacit knowing about the past, the form of tacit knowledge that is known yet untellable.

This brings me back to Bergson’s conception of the passage from habitual pure memory to non-habitual memory image. Focusing on the role of habit in Bergson’s conception, I identify that it is the ‘forgetting’ of that which is habitual in our experiences that transforms pure memory into the multi-dimensional aggregate of individual related experiences that is memory image.

As cited in Chapter 2, Paul Connerton argues, in *How Societies Remember*, 72 that “Habit is a knowledge and a remembering in the hands and in the body, and in the cultivation of habit it is our body which understands.”73

Considering this in relation to the structure of Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowledge, we can say that it is in attending from the proximal term toward the distal term of tacit knowing (through the process of subception) that we

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72 Connerton, *How Societies Remember*.
73 Ibid. 95

The Chapter 2 citation was made in direct relation to Bergson’s conception of the role of habit in the passage from pure memory to memory image. Here it is used in direct relation to Polanyi’s conception of ‘tacit knowledge’.
incorporate the distal into the proximal; thereby indwelling or entering into a state of wit(h)ness with an object, and that doing so requires not that we remember but that we forget.

If as Polanyi states “indwelling, as derived from the structure of tacit knowing, is a more precisely defined act than is empathy”, then perhaps acts of empathy are best served by degrees of embodied forgetting.

For Hirsch, in the moment when Said S. and Safiya approach the house they fled and left a child in, 20 years earlier, the past overpowers the present. She states that “at that moment we are with Said S. in 1948 as he desperately attempts to get back to his wife through the bullets and the confusion on the city streets”. I describe this situation differently. I propose that what Said S. and Safiya are experiencing at that moment is a return to the habitual, triggered by the conflation of the material properties and qualities of the habitual, and their spatial and olfactory aspects, in what can be described as a reversal of Bergson’s passage from pure memory to memory image. In other words Said S. and Safiya, through exposure to extreme trauma, passage from memory image to pure memory.

Hirsch again acknowledges the importance of objects and spaces in processes of postmemory when she suggests that, “in returning to the spaces and objects of the past, displaced people can remember the embodied practices and incorporated

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74 Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension. 17
75 Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory. Writing and Visual Culture after the Holocaust. 207
knowledge they associate with home”. Yet again, she does not meaningfully consider the function of the materiality of such objects.

Central to Hirsch’s conception of postmemory is that it is not concerned with identity; rather it is connected with and serves transmission of memory and knowledge. She states, “I have argued that postmemory is not an identity position but a generational structure of transmission deeply embedded in such forms of mediation”.

In her book section titled “Returning Bodies”, she draws our attention to another important distinction that can be made when considering the role of objects and places regarding memory; she refers to the distinction made between ‘I memory’ and ‘me memory’ made by Aleida Assmann in her 2006 book The Long Shadow of the Past (Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit: Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik). Hirsch explains that it is Assmann’s ‘me memory’ that speaks to the body and that ‘I memory’ speaks to language and reason:

Invoking the German reflexive formulation of ‘ich erinnere mich’…she (Assmann) distinguishes what she calls the verbal declarative, active ‘ich- Gedächtnis’ (I - memory) from the more passive ‘mich - Gedächtnis’ (me - memory), which appeals to the body and the senses rather than to language or reason. Assmann’s

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76 Ibid. 207-208
77 Ibid. 35
‘mich - Gedächtnis” is the site of involuntary memory that is often mediated by the encounter with objects and places from the past.\(^{78}\)

If we accept, as my analysis of her book suggests, that Hirsch’s conception of postmemory does not embrace the idea that the specific properties, qualities and histories of materials are active participants in the generation of meaning and memory by means of speaking directly to the body, then postmemory can be considered as aligned with Assmann’s conception of ‘I memory’ and it is therefore concerned with language and reason rather than the haptic realm. This runs counter to the central argument of my thesis which is that the properties and qualities of materials are foundational to the cognitive processes that we call remembering.

CHAPTER 3: A SUMMARY IN CONCLUSION

At the beginning of this chapter I set out to examine Polanyi’s conception of tacit knowing and Hirsch’s conception of postmemory in relation to the habitual aspects of Bergson’s conception of the passage from pure memory to memory image.

By reflecting the differences and parallels identified in this chapter between the two conceptual structures of tacit knowing and postmemory, with specific reference to the roles that materials play in acts of remembering, I revealed the

\(^{78}\) Ibid. 211
reasoning for my focus shift from early photography’s relationship with violence to the relationships between materials and remembering.

The question of how our lives are caught up with the material residues and traces of systemic violence and acts of subjective violence that we ourselves did not witness, permeates this chapter.

Turning to Serres’ characteristic literary device of the variegated list, I designed a semiotic exercise which revealed the sense of a productive between-ness that exists between the conceptual concerns that give shape to the theoretical and studio-based research of this doctoral inquiry - memory, materials and the body. Through this exercise I drew to the fore issues related with the temporal aspects of memory, and began to lay the foundations for the concept of premembering which, at this point in my ongoing quest for its precise definition, I define as a materially triggered understanding of the events, circumstances or conditions that one may have not directly experienced, but which one’s culture already knows and stores up for all its future participants.

Applying the idea of productive between-ness to my analysis of Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowledge, I revealed how the body can be understood as being entangled in the productive between-ness existing between the proximal and distal terms of knowing. This is evidenced by Polanyi’s language and through the examples he uses to support it. I used this premise of productive between-ness to identify and examine parallels between tacit knowing and the habitual concerns of Bergson’s concept of the passage from pure memory to memory image. This important
development brought memory and remembering clearly back into focus. Building on Polanyi’s distinguishing between indwelling and empathy, through which he proposes that indwelling is a “more precisely defined act than is empathy”, I introduced the term wit(h)ness, which is important in this thesis as it conceptually conflates the more passive act of bearing witness, with the participatory physical aspects of being with something or someone. Highlighting strong associations between Benjamin’s image aura, Polanyi’s indwelling and the concept of wit(h)ness, which suggests paradoxically the productive condition of coterminous passive and active states, I used the example of a contemporary viewer being with an ancient broken figurative statue as a means to demonstrate the idea of the joint meaning of things, which as Polanyi suggests is enabled through the state of indwelling, or in my own terms, wit(h)ness.

My analysis of Polanyi’s tacit knowing has made clear a very important aspect of the development of this thesis, for it has drawn together the two main concerns that define this thesis, material culture and remembering.

I began my analysis of Hirsch’s concept of postmemory by proposing that Hirsch has a tendency to prioritise the photographic image and literary examples over materials and material culture in evidencing her concept. I went on to present examples of her tendency to privilege the photographic image and the textual over the properties and qualities of materials as the primary drivers of postmemorial narratives. Through my detailed analysis of her book *The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture After the Holocaust*, I arrived at the

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79 Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension*. 17
conclusion that postmemory is concerned more with language and reason than the haptic realm and that, unlike Polanyi’s conception of tacit knowing, postmemory does not serve well an investigation into the relationships between materials and remembering.

Throughout this chapter I have continued my strategy of making subtle and important distinctions between related terms, and then, through the process of explicating these differences, I have set up a field of potential in which to reorientate the relationships between them. As in the preceding chapters, I have synthesized their more precise meanings in order to generate fresh understanding of the productive between-ness exposed between them, and sought ways to progress the central argument of this thesis, which is that the condition of being caught up with the traces and residues of violence that we have not directly experienced, occurs through our engagement and practical involvement with the materials and material culture that surround us; the very same materials and material culture that has born witness to the outbursts of subjective violence and the episodes of systemic violence that comprise the ongoing narrative cycles of mythic violence.

In the next chapter I turn to the field of Cognitive Archaeology as a means of further examining the complex interactions between material culture and the human cognitive process of remembering.
CHAPTER 4
MATERIALS AND BODIES COMMINGLE

Things are active not because they are imbued with agency but because of the ways in which they are caught up in these currents of the lifeworld.

Tim Ingold ¹

Prehistory, in addition to designating a vast span of time, also has a second, deeply philosophical sense: It is the discipline by which we study ourselves and investigate the way we have come to be as we are.

Colin Renfrew ²

In this chapter I focus on contemporary archaeological theory, specifically the new field of research known as Cognitive Archaeology. I also draw on new theories emerging from the field of Social Anthropology, specifically those that

concern the relationships between materials, cognitive processes and the
development of human societies. I turn to these perhaps unanticipated fields of
scholarly research to reflect some of their concerns back onto the photographic
artefacts that launched my early thoughts that have since developed into this
doctoral inquiry. I am referring again to the small collection of late nineteenth and
early twentieth century dry plate photographic negatives that cradle images of
Archaic, Greek and Roman sculpture that I discovered in the temporal limbo of
the photo-archive at the British School at Rome. These small plates of glass were
not only present at my first thoughts about the relationship between materials and
remembering, they launched the driving quest of this doctoral research that seeks
to generate fresh understanding of the nature of the relationships between
materials and remembering.

From the field of Cognitive Archaeology I focus on Colin Renfrew’s research in
which he precisely identifies and examines the concept of the Sapient Paradox.³
Then I consider this area of Renfrew’s research in relation to the closely
associated research of Lambros Malafouris, which concerns the delimiting of
commonly held perceptions regarding the boundaries of the human mind, and the
implications of this on understanding the role of the body in human cognition. It is
through this complex and ground-breaking research that Malafouris began to
develop the foundations for Material Engagement Theory,⁴ which I will examine
in detail in the following chapter.

³ “Towards a Cognitive Archaeology: Material Engagement and the Early Development of
⁴ Lambros Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material
Malafouris’ Material Engagement Theory is indebted to the work Renfrew with whom he
maintained a close professional relationship sustained by a shared conceptual framework regarding
Complementing Renfrew’s and Malafouris’ research I consider the research of social anthropologist Tim Ingold regarding the social implications of the materiality of objects, through which he proposes a reconfiguration of the understanding between human being and the material world.


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the study of Prehistory and the importance of its relevance to contemporary human being and society.

9 “Materials against Materiality.”
THE SAPIENT PARADOX

The Sapient Paradox is a concept developed by archaeologist Colin Renfrew that concerns the evident temporal lag between the emergence of *Homo sapiens* and the spike of materially related new behaviours that led to the development of human societies as we have come to know them.

Renfrew examines this temporal lagging of new behaviours, which is considered uncharacteristic of the emergence of a new biological species, and identifies two largely overlooked episodes in the development of human being and society. Both episodes centre on the relationships between human being and materials.

Renfrew makes the point that while it is often asserted otherwise, or perhaps simply overlooked, there appears to be a thirty thousand year gap between the emergence of our species and any significant decisive material happenings in human existence.

It is often asserted, rather than demonstrated, that with the emergence of our own species, *Homo sapiens*, perhaps 150,000 years ago in Africa and certainly 40,000 years ago in Europe, there emerged not only physically modern humans, but also the formulation of fully developed language as we know it, a more sophisticated material culture, and fully human self consciousness.

It should be stressed, however, that after this momentous
conjuncture (if such it was), looking at the question broadly and at a distance, there were few decisive happenings in human existence for another 30,000 years. 11

We may consider words, as does Renfrew, “the most flexible symbols by which reality can be conceived, represented and communicated”, 12 and that the development of language, in hunter-gatherer communities, as a form of “external symbolic storage” 13 occurred 40,000 years ago; however, as Renfrew suggests, language itself did not make that much difference in new decisive happenings within our species. 14

This premise is central to Renfrew’s conception of the Sapient Paradox and it leads toward the two largely overlooked episodes that occurred in the development of human society, which Renfrew proposes as a means for rethinking the importance and nature of the relationships between materials and the social development of humans.

The first episode is the development of sedentary societies which “allowed a much more varied relationship with the material world to develop”. 15 The second episode is characterised by the “emergence of certain materials as embodying

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12 Ibid. 126
13 Ibid. 127
14 Ibid. 126
15 For further engagement with the concept of the Sapient paradox see Prehistory. The Making of the Human Mind. 79-101
16 "Towards a Cognitive Archaeology: Material Engagement and the Early Development of Society.” 127
wealth and prestige”,\textsuperscript{16} which led to “fundamental changes in the nature of culture and society”.\textsuperscript{17}

The cultural constructs that began to be ascribed to specific materials are what I refer to throughout this thesis as the \textit{qualities} of materials, as distinct from the physical \textit{properties} of materials. The \textit{qualities} of materials are socially constructed and collectively experienced.

Considering these two episodes in the light of Malafouris’ Material Engagement Theory, a clear and important distinction emerges between them that helps to clarify the next important aspect of my argument in this thesis.

Episode One concerns the \textit{properties} of materials.

Episode Two concerns the \textit{qualities} of materials.

It is important at this stage to reiterate the distinction between the properties and qualities of materials. A simple way to think about these two aspects of material culture is to understand the \textit{properties} as the physical nature of a specific material, e.g. hard, soft, cold, flexible, granular, viscous and so on. The \textit{qualities} of a specific material are the socio-cultural constructs that come to be understood as the values, or meanings, ascribed to a material. Diamonds, terracotta, gold, hessian, fur and silk are all useful examples.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid. 127
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid. 127
In his 1968 book *The Nature and Art of Workmanship*, design theorist, woodworker and educator David Pye expresses it this way:

> The properties of materials are object and measureable. They are out there. The qualities on the other hand are subjective: they are in here: in our heads. They are ideas of ours. They are part of that private view of the world which artists each have within them. We each have our own view of what stoniness is.\(^{18}\)

The two closely related episodes upon which the Sapient Paradox is founded are also foundational to much of the thinking that has given shape to Material Engagement Theory, and they offer a critical framework for my argument throughout this thesis which is that it is through the commingling of our individual, habitual experience of the *properties* of materials with the collectively experienced, socio-cultural *qualities* that we imbue them with, that we create our highly individual memory space.

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As a way of demonstrating how our habitual experiences with the physical properties of materials commingle with our non-habitual experiences of the collectively generated socio-cultural qualities of materials, I use the following set of materials to example the ways in which we interact with both their properties and qualities.

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This short list represents a range of substances that we are all more or less familiar with. Reading each of these words invokes a network of individual recollections that are associated with the physical properties of objects that we have seen, touched, held, and used. It is in this way that most of us have direct personal relationships with each of these materialities. Copper coins for example, and the ice in a gin and tonic. In the Bergsonian sense, we have *habitual pure memory* with each of these specific materials.

However, the materials on this short list represent another set of cognitive reference points that relate specifically with their socio-cultural qualities. This second set of reference points is less related to an individual’s habitual pure memory experiences with a specific material, rather they point toward a historical framing of its social considerations and thus toward its qualities.

Ice, Stone, Bronze, Copper and Iron are terms that not only describe the very stuff of objects that we are physically familiar with, they also classify periods in the development of human society. Each materially resonant term articulates a period of significant human societal development facilitated through, and with, an increasingly complex relationship with a specific material.

The Ice Age 19

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The Stone Age

The Bronze Age

The Copper Age

The Iron Age

What I am attempting to draw out here is the idea that human engagement with specific materials at specific periods in history is foundational to the complex relationships between human cognition and materials, and that sometimes these associations appear to emerge from and occupy a subconscious dimension.

While each of these materially resonant terms refers to a specific period in what is conventionally referred to as Prehistory, we can continue this list through a series of non-materially referent terms, The Dark Ages, and the Middle Ages, right up to our own post-industrial age, the Digital Age.

The fossils of several types of human, leading up to modern humans, have been identified from this period which is characterised by extensive and frequent glacial episodes.

Ibid., S.V. "stone age"

In this period we identify the first use of tools (stone, bone, wood or horn) by humankind’s ancestor (Australopithecus). Agriculture was invented in this period in which we identify the development of the first towns.

Ibid., S.V. "bronze age"

In this period (late 4th - early 3rd millennium B.C.) weapons and tools were made of bronze, it is often associated with early European civilizations and the inception of urban life in China. It did not occur in Africa or Australia.

Ibid., S.V. "copper age"

In this period, (4th and 3rd millennia B.C.) some weapons and tools were made of copper. It is also sometimes called the Eneolithic or Chalcolithic period.

Ibid., S.V. "iron age"

As early as c.1400 B.C. the Hittites in Anatolia were working with iron however the term refers to a period conventionally understood as occurring between 800 BC and the emergence of the Roman period, however in the territories of the Roman Empire it continued until 4- 6th century A.D. During this period, weapons and tools came to be made of iron.

Ibid., S.V "dark ages"

The period between the end of the Bronze Age and the beginning of the Archaic period in Greece and other Aegean countries. It is sometimes applied to the period of the Middle Ages to signify the intellectual darkness of the early Middle Ages between the fall of Rome and the appearance of vernacular written documents.

Ibid., S.V. "middle ages"

Although sometimes the Dark Ages and the Middle Ages are grouped together it is conventionally understood in the European context as the period from c.1100 until 1453. This period is
In doing so we are able to identify a paradigmatic shift in the language we use to characterise and classify periods of history. Identifying this shift away from materially referent terminology opens up a way for me to consider the contemporary social implications of the term the Digital Age and what this means in terms of the relationships between materials and remembering.

At some point in time we moved away from direct material references toward other references that invoke other natural phenomena such as light; the Dark Ages and the subsequent Enlightenment are good examples. As we progress through this expanding list we arrive at the term Industrial Age which represents another fundamental shift in these unfolding linguistic signs. This term invokes a \textit{processual} referent. Considering the Digital Age in light of this progression we might identify an end to what started as a material chronology of the development of human society; and we might consider that our Digital Age is somehow separated from the rest of the material world, yet that would be to fall into misconception.

The term Digital Age may at first seem to continue a trend away from material association, however by mining even a superficial understanding of the functionality of most of the artefacts that characterise our Digital Age we arrive at the material known as Silicon. Silicon is a non-metallic element with semiconducting properties, in pure form it has a dark grey crystalline structure, it

\begin{flushleft}
\underline{characterised by the emergence of separate kingdoms, the expansion of trade and urban life, and the growth in power of monarchies and the Church.}\n\end{flushleft}
also exists naturally as an amorphous powder; considering its abundance it ranks next to oxygen.  

Pushing a little further down this digital road, we soon arrive at Silicon Valley, a place that has no specific geological relationship to the substance Silicon, rather it has become known as Silicon Valley for economically inflected, socio-cultural reasons. It is home to some of the world’s largest technology companies that are responsible for the proliferation of the digital chip and the digital devices that so many of us have come to rely on. It is widely understood that the digital, and I propose by its association, silicon, characterises our Age.

It is quite right to say that when we first consider the term the Digital Age, its material association with silicon, and therefore somehow the rest of the material world is disguised, hidden, or perhaps simply buried; however, a direct material association exists right at our fingertips as they glide, through time, across the screens of our now ubiquitous personal devices.

There is another bodily association deeply embedded in the term commonly used to define our Age. Etymologically speaking, the term Digital refers directly to our bodies, specifically to our fingers, it’s origins can be traced back to the late 15th century when it developed from the Latin *digitalis*, meaning a finger’s breadth from *digitus*, meaning finger. 

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26 Ibid., S.V. "silicon"
27 Ibid., S.V. "digital"
It is therefore reasonable to say that the contemporary social dimension, that we have come to know as the Digital Age, has at its very core a direct, physically material relationship with the rest of the material world, and that buried in the term Digital Age are associations with the properties and qualities of the substance silicon.

The Digital Age is often cited as a cause of an increasing sense of social isolation amongst digital natives and a looming sense of disconnection from the material world in digital immigrants. If we consider this social phenomenon in relation to Renfrew’s earlier quote that “words are the most flexible symbols by which reality can be conceived, represented and communicated”,”28 and if we referred to our Age as the Silicon Age rather than the Digital Age, then perhaps we would identify greater resonance between our Age and the Ages that have come and gone before us, and thereby have a clearer sense of how our lives are materially associated with the past lives of others.

The Ice Age
The Stone Age
The Bronze Age
The Copper Age
The Iron Age
*
*
*

28 Renfrew, "Towards a Cognitive Archaeology: Material Engagement and the Early Development of Society." 126
The Silicon Age

There is an issue of critical reflection to be considered here. Each of the terms listed above is a modern term, they were not used by the people that lived through the Ages that we have come to know by their material referent. These terms have been developed through processes of scholarship aimed at understanding how past peoples lived and therefore, by extension, where we have come from, and by inference, how we might live in the future.

Considering these examples of the Ice, Stone, Bronze, Copper, and Iron, it appears that the complex interaction between the physical and cultural aspects of materials (their properties and qualities) as well as their function in the development of human society comes to be understood only through retrospection. Here I could be accused of stating the obvious given that the periods of history listed above have already occurred and therefore retrospection is implicit in thinking about them. However there is more at issue here, namely the long-standing premise that remembering requires a past experience. This idea has been largely accepted as an a priori truth, however I am no longer so sure. If this long-standing unchallenged perspective has to date been based solely on the human interaction with the properties of materials, then what happens to it when we conflate the collectively constructed non-physical, cultural qualities of a material? I propose that it is possible to ‘know’ the qualities of a material before having a physical experience with their properties. This complex and important idea will be examined in closer detail in the following chapter.
Returning again to the Ice, Stone, Bronze, Copper and Iron Ages provides a powerful way to explain what I am trying to draw out here. By introducing the newly coined Silicon Age into the list above, I alter the diverse field of its associations by conflating its temporal frameworks and commingling the past with the present.

This enables us to chronesthetically consider the experiences of our own Age from a prospective perspective, and thus to question what role our understanding of, and connection with, materials plays in prospective cognitive activities. I propose that the materially related language that we use in our attempts to define our own Age plays a critical role in how we understand our experiences of living through it. I am proposing that the cultural qualities of materials not only play a role in shaping the social dimension of our Age, but that they also have a direct relationship with our individual processes of remembering and that sometimes these associations emerge from, and occupy, a subconscious dimension.

If this is so, then the combined properties and qualities of materials are not only useful in examining the past, they may also be useful in considering the future.

This discussion about how materials are implicated in both retrospective and prospective cognitive activities is a complex terrain; it is helpful here to separate

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The term chronesthesia coined by E. Tulving refers to the form of consciousness that allows individuals to think about the subjective time in which they live and that makes it possible for them to ‘mentally travel’ in such time. It directly expresses the human capacity of being aware in the present of our pasts and possible futures.
some of the material implications in retrospective and prospective cognitive activities whilst maintaining memory as the focus of the inquiry.

In order to examine more thoroughly the issue of how materials are implicated in both retrospective and prospective cognitive activities, I undertook a series of sculptural studio-based experiments designed to examine notions of the copy, individuation within the collective, and thereby notions of the past and potential futurity. The specific materiality through which I examine this idea is plaster of Paris, which is historically inflected and has cultural resonances with both the past, specifically the nineteenth century, and through the implications of reproduction, the future.

The following images represent the outcomes of the experiment titled *12 figures (after Niccolò) Studies in Collective Anxiety*. 2014

Andrew Hazewinkel
Twelve figures (after Niccolò) Studies in Collective Anxiety. 2014 (installation detail)
Plaster, steel.
Each figure, 170 x 30 x 30 cm. Overall dimensions variable.
Installation view *Speculative Everything*, Firstdraft Sydney 2014
The object source of my starting point is a numbered and dated 1885 plaster bust of a male head commissioned for the Bathurst School of Arts by the Sydney Board of Technical Education. It was made by Mr A. Murray, as is reported in the Sydney Morning Herald 16th May 1885.  

The object source of Mr Murray’s starting point cannot be ascertained, however what is certain is that Murray’s undertakings were designed to create a faithful reproduction of the c.1430 terracotta bust of Niccolò da Uzzano attributed to Donatello, which is held in the collection of the Bargello Museum in Florence.

Donatello’s object has been physically reproduced thousands of times, copies of it stand in Cast Galleries and traditional drawing schools world over. It is still used as a tool with which to teach the rendering of anatomical accuracy and character in portraiture. Acknowledging its long and noble history, I employed a strategy of the fractured multiple and undertook a series of casting experiments to draw out the sense of potential individuation in collective and like groups, thereby pointing toward a prospective sense while maintaining an acknowledged retrospectivity exercised though the properties and qualities of the materials used.

In the resultant cast objects, the site of rupture, or ‘damage’ exposes clues to the specific materiality of these objects and therefore information which leads to the sensed knowledge that resides in the conflation of the properties and qualities of
materials. Precisely the same occurs at the break sites in broken ancient figurative sculpture.

What I am trying to demonstrate in this example is how when the properties and qualities of materials conflate with the shared physical mutuality between subject and viewer they create an individual’s memory space. I have identified this phenomenon at work in the experience that a contemporary viewer has in the company of a broken body of Antiquity, and I will expand on that issue in Chapter 6.

Andrew Hazewinkel
Twelve figures (after Niccolò) Studies in Collective Anxiety. 2014 (installation detail)
Plaster, steel.
Each figure, 170 x 30 x 30 cm. Overall dimensions variable.
Installation view Speculative Everything, Firstdraft Sydney 2014

As a result of the proliferation of the plaster copies of Donatello’s terracotta ‘original’, it is reasonable to consider that many more individuals have had habitual pure memory experiences with the plaster ‘versions’ than the terracotta
‘original’, and thereby many more individuals have non-habitual memory image experiences with the plaster versions.

Andrew Hazewinkel
Twelve figures (after Niccolò) Studies in Collective Anxiety. 2014 (installation detail)
Plaster, steel.
Each figure, 170 x 30 x 30 cm. Overall dimensions variable.
Installation view Speculative Everything, Firstdraft Sydney 2014

The point that I am making is, considering Bergson’s conception of the passage from habitual pure memory to non-habitual memory image, the plaster versions have become more closely associated with the present and thereby potential futures, while maintaining a profound material based association with the past. This example evidences how the conflation of the properties and qualities of materials can function as a kind of memory-bridge between the past and the future.

This chapter is primarily concerned with the relationships between materials and retrospectively focused cognitive activity, such as remembering; in fact that is the quest that we are on; however, as I have demonstrated above, opportunities exist
in this doctoral undertaking to consider the relationship between materials and prospective cognitive activity.

This leads me toward my concept of *premembering*, which I again discuss briefly in this chapter before presenting a more detailed analysis of the idea in relation to Material Engagement Theory in the next chapter.

If there is a direct relationship between our understanding of past experiences and the properties and qualities of materials, then how might that relationship be effectively examined, to serve the driving quest of this thesis? My example of the Silicon Age may be considered by some as a very long bow to draw, however it begins to shed light on an important shift in the thinking about the very nature of the relationships between human cognition and materials that is emerging from the fields of Social Anthropology and Cognitive Archaeology.

This significant shift in thinking requires two momentous developments. One is concerned with the way we think about human cognition, and the other concerns the way we think about material culture.

The following two quotes function as an axis around which the rest of this chapter revolves.

> Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin?  

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We can think of material culture as a means of propagating or extending persons beyond their specific time-space frame. 33

The first quote is a simple and profoundly important question posed by Malafouris in his book chapter “The Cognitive Basis of Material Engagement: Where Brain, Body and Culture Conflate”.34 It is the bedrock of his attempt to delimit the commonly held perceptions regarding the boundaries of the mind. Malafouris poses this question as a means of redressing some of the long held beliefs about human cognition and it opens up a way forward for rethinking the complex connections between materials and cognition.

The second quote is a statement made by Andy Jones in his book chapter, “Matter and Memory: Colour, Remembrance and the Neolithic / Bronze Age Transition”;35 it points toward a more nuanced understanding of the complex relationship between individuals and material culture. It suggests that the relationships between individuals and material culture transcend physical engagement and are not defined exclusively by direct individual engagement. Here Jones is implying a socio-cultural relationship between the materiality of things and human cognition.

35 Jones, "Matter and Memory. Colour, Remembrance and the Neolithic / Bronze Age Transition.”
The following diagram represents the distinctions between the properties and qualities of materials, and how they are caught up in retrospective and prospective forms of human cognition. It aims to make clear some of the specific relationships between materials and human cognition that I seek to draw out through this doctoral research. It is these relationships which lead me to question whether a complex relationship with materiality is a necessary precondition for remembering, and perhaps the capacity for premembering?

Figure 3:
Properties-Qualities. Pure memory-Memory image. Remembering-Premembering
Reflecting on the material concerns of my studio-based research activities, in the previous chapter, I identified a kind of material manifestation of Serres’ semiotic strategy of the variegated list at work in my art making. I have previously described this particular form of material manifestation as a cycling of materials through my art making, wherein associations between the physical materials that I engage in making objects, commingle with our highly individual, complex, embodied, non-habitual memory image of those same materials.

In his discussion article, “Materials Against Materiality”, social anthropologist Tim Ingold “seeks to reverse the emphasis…. on the materiality of objects as against the properties of materials”. He makes the point that:

Things are not active because they are imbued with agency but because of the ways in which they are caught up in these currents of the lifeworld.

It follows that things are caught up in the currents of the lifeworld through an inseparability of the properties and qualities of materials in relation to our experience of the world. It is our conflation of the properties of materials as experienced through the surface of our bodies, and the qualities of materials as experienced in the mind, that creates our highly individual memory space.

36 Ingold, "Materials against Materiality."
37 Ibid. 1
38 Ibid. 1
This conception of the way things are caught up in the currents of the lifeworld is supported by Malafouris’s attempts to delimit the mind when he asks the question “where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin?”

Moreover, Ingold effectively corroborates this approach when he states, “The properties of materials, then, are not fixed attributes of matter but are processual and relational.” The reason for focusing my research on the broken bodies of Antiquity finds resonance with Ingold’s statement that “to describe these properties means telling their stories.”

With the support of Ingold’s research I acknowledge that although the properties and qualities of materials are distinct realms, they are not separable, rather they are co-actively relational; reciprocity occurs between them in much the same way that reciprocity occurs between the development of individual minds and human society.

As he points out, Ingold’s argument is premised on anthropologist James Gibson’s division of the inhabited environment into three categories: mediums, substances, and surfaces. The three categories can be explained thus.

Mediums afford movement and perception. For human beings the medium is normally air, that while offering little resistance allows us to move about, do things, make things and touch things.

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39 Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. 2
40 Ingold, "Materials against Materiality." 1
41 Ibid. 1
42 Ibid. 4
Substances are resistant to movement and perception. They are the solid stuff that furnishes the physical foundation for life and we, generally speaking, cannot see through or move through them.\footnote{Ibid. 5} Perhaps glass can be considered an exception.

Surfaces are the interface between medium and substance, they are where radiant energy is reflected or absorbed. Surfaces are, “what our bodies come up against in touch”.\footnote{Ibid. 5}

It is from the base of this tripartite view of the composition of inhabited environment that Ingold has evolved his conception of the complicity of materials with the emergence of, and the forms of things.

The forms of things are not imposed from without upon an inert substrate of matter, but are continually generated and dissolved within the fluxes of materials across the interface between substances and the medium that surrounds them.\footnote{Ibid. 1}

When Ingold states that “things are in life rather than that life is in things”,\footnote{Ibid. 12} he points out that this idea is diametrically opposed to how conventional anthropology understands animism, insofar as that animism is commonly understood as an ethnographically related belief wherein the elements of the material world possess souls or spirits. The premise that ‘things are in life’ is
significant to my investigation into the relationships between materials and remembering. I argue that our profound embodied relationship with materials is shaped by the conflation of our habitually experienced personal histories with the properties of materials, and our individual, non-habitual memory image, which emerges from our exposure to the qualities of the same material.

Accepting this argument is to acknowledge that our profound, embodied relationships with materials are both individually and socio-culturally formed. This conflation of our individual experiences with specific materials and the currents of the socially constructed conceptions of the same specific materials opens up an avenue for thinking about the nature of direct physical experience, and the role that it plays in memory making and remembering.

Accepting this argument raises questions that relate to the temporal constructs associated with remembering, as well as the roles played by direct experience in processes of remembering.

This argument is therefore critical to my concept of premembering, which in the abstract of this thesis, I described as a materially triggered understanding of events, circumstances or conditions that one may not have directly experienced, but which one’s culture already knows and stores up for all of its future participants. I return to and expand on the concept of premembering again and again throughout this thesis, and I explore it methodologically through studio-based research, which is the other half of my doctoral research, and which is on display in the exhibition component of this doctorate. The sculptural artwork
What I am trying to explain here is that remembering a physical experience tends to occur after a direct physical experience with the properties of materials. This dependency, however, need not apply to the qualities of materials. In fact, sometimes we sense and experience the qualities of materials before we have a direct bodily experience with their associated properties. If we accept this hypothesis then we must ask the question, how do the perceived qualities of materials shape our experience of their properties? And is there a sense of priority between our experience of the properties and the qualities of materials at work here?

I propose that in the conflation of the properties and the qualities of specific materials there is a commingling of time. This brings me back to Serres and his conception of commingled time, and to Benjamin’s idea of the image aura, which he identified as contingent on the confluence of times. I propose that it is the very conflation of the properties and qualities of materials that enables a material to function as a kind of memory-bridge that links to materials and remembering.

The socially and culturally generated qualities that we impress upon materials, inform our direct physical experience of the properties of materials, and this enables us to premember the nature of an experience. I am suggesting here that when we conflate our haptic relationships with the properties of materials, and the socially constructed qualities of materials, we set up the conditions that enable the
process of premembering to occur, which can be described as a socially informed
phonemetic phenomenon.

As I have already explained, the initial thinking that lead me into this doctoral
research had its inception in my hands-on experience examining a small collection
of late nineteenth and early twentieth century photographic dry plate glass
negatives representing ancient sculpture. Considering the relationship between the
materiality of the small photographic artefacts, I return briefly here to my earlier
points about silicon and its role in the contemporary domain as a way to highlight
the material impetus of my first thoughts that have since developed into this
doctoral research, and to draw attention to how glass, the most ubiquitous of
contemporary materials, as I see it, commingles time. Silicon is a significant
component of glass which, although familiar, is a curious substance, it is an
amorphous solid with an ancient history. Glass can be traced back roughly 5,500
years to Mesopotamian origins, and it is also a thoroughly contemporary
substance, it curtain-walls our cities, our fingers glide across it opening internet
browser windows in pursuit of knowledge, entertainment and a sense of
connection with others as we flick through photographs on our phones, tablets and
other proliferating devices that have come to characterise the Silicon Age. Some
of us shave in front of its silvered form, or apply our lipstick with its aid; glass
and therefore silicon, play a role as most of us decide each day if we are ready to
publicly face the world. Glass also has a long and complex relationship with the
science of optics and it continues to play an important role in the realm of
photographic image making.
The dry plate photographic negatives that I have researched in both the theoretical and photo-archive based research components of this doctorate, form part of the Marshall Collection, which is held in the photo-archive at the British School at Rome. These photographic artefacts were created for the commercial enterprise associated with the international antiquities market, they cradle images of Archaic, Greek and Roman figurative sculpture, many of which are of great cultural significance to their cultures of origin. Today we might consider these small planar photographic artefacts as industrial artefacts, artefacts that speak clearly about the socio-economic and cultural practices of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; they also maintain a direct connection to the deep past. It is in this way that this entire doctoral project is indebted to the commingling of time that I first identified, not so much on these small panes of old glass, but somehow in them; in the very stuff of their objectness which, for me, is somehow coterminous with the materiality of the ancient objects that they represent.

In each of these small two or three millimetre thick transparent panes of varying dimensions, the making of Antiquity commingles with the material and social processes of the early industrial and modern periods; my engagement with them has made them ‘active’ in the contemporary realm by altering their temporal suspension of the past century during which they ‘hovered’, largely forgotten, in the buried limbo of a photo-archive.

These shimmering glass plates and the fugitive images captured upon them, ignited in me a quest motivated by questions about how materials are involved in the commingling of time, and how the physical, tangible properties of materials,
in concert with their cultural qualities are involved in the deeply human act of remembering. It is with, and through, these gelatin dry plate photographic negatives that I first began to see a way to draw together the two main areas of my art making practice -sculpture and photography- in a focused inquiry into the relationships between materials and remembering.

This quest raises further questions, it asks how the individually and collectively perceived social legacies of the symbolic, subjective and systemic forms of violence (that contribute to the ongoing narrative of mythic violence) are associated with the materials that are entangled with our lives, and therefore, by extension, how our lives are caught up in the ongoing cycles of mythic violence.

When I started my deep engagement with the 795 gelatin dry plate negatives that comprise the ‘glass’ component of the Marshall Collection, the Collection was uncatalogued, it was and remains little known. At that time, however, it was understood by a small group of people to hold significant relevance, in a traditional art historical context, toward furthering the understanding of the relationships between archaeological practices of the late nineteenth century and the means by which some of today’s most significant museums set about amassing their collections of Archaic, Greek and Roman antiquities.

My research on the Marshall Collection began in a very different place to that from which the small group of traditional art historians, archaeologists and curators currently working with the Collection began. My research has always remained clearly focused on the glass plate negatives, while the small band of art
Historians, curators and archaeologists currently engaged by the British Academy to write about the Collection have, to date, ignored this important aspect of the Collection; rather they remain, more conventionally, focused on the photographic prints that comprise the larger component of the collection.

As I completed my detailed survey of the entire collection of glass plate negatives, I looked for new ways to consider this archaeologically associated material within a contemporary social context. In short, I sought new ways to consider the negatives themselves, and the ancient material that they represent, from the perspective of its contemporary social relevance.

I began to sense profound relationships between all of the currents of inquiry that have shaped this doctoral research. The past made present through the commingling of time, remembering, materialities, how our bodies are caught up in remembering and in the modes of violence that are at times articulated in sanctioned systemic practices. As I made links between the objects captured in aging, shimmering silver salts and glass, and objects that I found on the websites of some of the worlds most prestigious museums, it became increasingly apparent that in some instances these glass plates and the commercial enterprise that generated them are caught up in practices that today would be considered culturally inappropriate, or as I suggest, systemically violent.47

This line of inquiry makes some museum curators nervous, it raises issues about the provenance of certain objects and the associated legal implications, which of

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course are economic concerns. This nervousness is not limited to learned scholars and curators, it also extends to some of the institutions that employ them.

Although my research began with a focus on the associations between the materiality of the glass plates and the materiality of the objects that they represent and how this might be considered a commingling of time, I began to identify an avenue for considering how the material qualities of these objects has changed over the last 100 years, and how now they might be considered as being inextricably caught up in a very specific form of systemic violence that I suggest has significant cultural legacies that remain today. It is in this way that they commingle with our time.

Through the process of thinking deeply about the properties and qualities of the materiality of these glass plates in light of the ideas associated with Cognitive Archaeology, I was able to look past, or through, the images held on the plates and I began to question the contemporary social meaning of the amassed plates as a Collection; and how the Collection itself might have a sense of contemporary relevance, how it might tell us something about the present as well as the past that it purported to preserve.

Unlike some of the prints in the Marshall Collection, each of the 795 gelatin dry plate negatives were commissioned by John Marshall and his partner Edward Perry Warren. The commissions were motivated by the desire and need for
seemingly objective visual documentation for use in the proliferating commercial trade of antiquities, in what has come to be known as ‘the great collecting age’.48

Photographic negatives tend to occupy a curious position of disinterest for many traditional art historians, photographic negatives are processual artefacts rather than ‘works’ in their own right.

The tendency toward disinterest in photographic negatives (as processual artefacts) by traditional art historians is however not consistent with other processual artefacts produced through other art making disciplines. Sketches, studies and models for sculptures are also processual artefacts, however traditional art historians, museums and other collecting institutions and individual collectors express great interest in these forms of processual artefact. Why then this tendency by traditional institutions and art historians to neglect a scholarly examination of photographic negatives, especially those that exert a profound material presence?

All photographs can be considered as mnemo-technic artefacts in that they function primarily as aids to memory. I suggest that the Collection of glass plate negatives that launched this doctoral inquiry can itself be considered artefact, an ideo-mnemo-technic artefact, and that over time, the function of the individual plates has been met, and perhaps surpassed, by the communicative potential of the

48 Marshall, and his professional and life partner Warren, were largely responsible for establishing the holdings of Greek and Roman art at the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, which at the beginning of the 20th C. was considered the premier Greek and Roman Collection in the U.S.A. Marshall was sole European agent to the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York from 1905 to 1928 and played a significant role in establishing their Greek and Roman Collection.
Collection as a whole. When viewed from this perspective, the Collection can be understood as having a primary function related to new understanding of the social and commercial systems in which they actively participated.

What I am suggesting here is that it is through the qualities of the Collection in conflation with the properties of the individual glass plates comprising the Collection that the ancient objects in question remain caught up in the contemporary realm.

This significant shift in my thinking about photography and memory signposts the way toward the contemporary social implications of this Collection and others like it; and it finds support in the field of Cognitive Archaeology. I have always sensed something darker beyond the seductive shimmering images that hover in and on these plates. This trace of darkness that I identify in these plates can be found in my own artworks, especially those that I have developed and created over the course of this doctoral undertaking. If we consider the late nineteenth century gelatin dry plate negatives that comprise a significant component of the Marshall Collection as *ideo-mnemo-technic artefacts*, we can begin to consider them in relation to Benjamin’s conception of mythic violence; or as Žižek would say, within the context of systemic violence.

Perhaps today’s traditional scholarly, art historical environment differs little from certain cultural practices that proliferated in the period during which the Marshall Collection was generated. As with the processes of amassing the Collection itself, it appears that economic forces were influential in defining the very nature of the
Collection. It seems little has changed in this regard; today economic forces are again defining the nature of the research being commissioned on the Collection. These economic forces, in this instance the British Academy and their supporters, are at work shaping a particular recording of history, a particular history that they are caught up with. In opaque situations such as this there is the opportunity for much to be overlooked or left out, certain questions are off the table, the social aspects of a Collection such as this one might easily be somehow erased from sanctioned art history.

I suggest that it is the potential for these processes of traditional scholarly exclusivity to remain in place, perhaps by an unwillingness to redefine the limits of research, that leads toward a commonly perceived position of contemporary indifference toward so much ancient material. And perhaps this is why so often the ancient material represented on these small glass plates is commonly considered the domain of the privileged.

In the following chapter I explore archaeology’s less conventional and newest defined field of research, Cognitive Archaeology, and expand on Malafouris’ Material Engagement Theory as a means to bring to this argument the productive associations between materials and social memory.
CHAPTER 4: A SUMMARY IN CONCLUSION

In this chapter I turned from the fields of photographic history and memory studies toward Cognitive Archaeology and Social Anthropology, thus locating my examination on the relationships between materials and remembering in the social dimension.

At the beginning of this chapter I introduced three influential contributors to the development of my ideas. Renfrew and Malafouris from the field of Cognitive Archaeology, and from the field of Social Anthropology, Ingold.

I began my analysis of the complex ways that materials are caught up with memory in the social dimension by examining Renfrew’s Sapient Paradox, which concerns with the temporal lag between the emergence of our species, *Homo sapiens*, and the spike of materially related new behaviours that led to the development of human society as we have come to know it. As explained, the Sapient Paradox is characterised by two much overlooked episodes in the development of human society. The first concerns the emergence and development of sedentary societies, and it relates specifically with the properties of materials. The emergence of sedentary societies meant that as groups of individuals remained for longer periods of time in a specific location they developed richer, more complex relationships with the material properties autochthonous to that location. The second episode concerns the development and ascribing of socio-cultural meanings to specific materials, therefore it is concerned specifically with the qualities of materials. This important distinction
between the properties and qualities of materials is the most recent in a series of
distinctions that characterise this thesis. It is a critical development in the
progression of my argument because it has enabled me to reconsider and reframe
the commonly held assumptions related to the retrospective temporal aspects of
memory in and through specific relation to materials.

To example the differences and relatedness of the properties and qualities of
materials I turned to Ice, Stone, Bronze, Copper and Iron, pointing out that we all
have habitual pure memory experiences with the properties of these materials as
well, as well as non-habitual memory image experiences with the qualities of
these materials. I made the point that the use history of a particular material is not
solely responsible for the definition of the socio-culturally defined qualities of that
material, and that the cultural qualities of materials not only play roles in shaping
the collective social dimension but also our highly individual cognitive processes
of remembering. Then, by adding our own Silicon Age to the materially defined
chronology of human societal development, I expanded the temporal implications
of the materially referent linguistic strategy, and by doing so I was able to directly
question the issue of retrospectivity as a precondition of memory.

The next important issue discussed in this chapter emerged from the field of
Social Anthropology. By untwisting the cord of this issue we are better able to
understand two of its closely related questions. How do we think about human
cognition? And how do we think about material culture? This issue importantly
asks how we think, not what we think. Addressing the first of these questions, I
turned to Malafouris’ work on delimiting and expanding the boundaries of the
mind beyond its physical limits; and I pointed out how his argument builds on Gibson’s tripartite subdivision of the inhabited world into mediums, substances and surfaces. This led me to Ingold’s important quote that “things are in life rather than that life is in things”, and I explained how this idea runs counter to traditional anthropological perspectives of animism. On the basis of my analysis of all of this, I argued that our profound embodied relationships with materials are shaped by the conflation of our habitually experienced personal histories with the properties of materials, and our non-habitual memory image which is generated by our exposure to the socially enacted qualities of materials. This brought me back again to Benjamin’s conception of the image aura, and I drew parallels between it and how, through the conflation of the properties and qualities of materials, we commingle time.

I returned to the materiality that was present at the very inception of this doctoral research, glass. I briefly outlined the historical emergence and development of glass and drew out its contemporary social associations. This led me directly toward the issue of how, through materials, our lives are caught up with the cycles of mythic violence. Through my analysis and conflation of the properties and qualities of the Marshall Collection as a whole, rather than as individual plates, I made clear that although individual photographs are understood as mnemo-techic artefacts, an amassed collection of photographic artefacts (both prints and negatives), can be considered as a singular ideo-mnemo-techic artefact. I went on to suggest that over time a Collection, perceived as an ideo-mnemo-techic artefact, can come to speak more loudly than the individual elements that

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49 Ingold, "Materials against Materiality." 12
comprise it, and that it is in this way that a Collection concerned mostly with ancient material remains caught up with the contemporary realm, and continues to exert its contemporary relevance.

I exposed how certain cultural disciplines and practices have a tendency to ignore photographic processual artefacts, although they embrace other discipline specific processual artefacts. This brought me back again to the issue of mythic violence and to question how the traces of the economic forces at work in generating a Collection can be reflected in contemporary, traditional approaches to examining it.

Throughout this chapter I have examined the individual and collective implications of the exposure to, and involvement with, the properties and qualities of materials, in specific relation to memory. This complex terrain foregrounds Malafouris’ Material Engagement Theory which I will explore in detail in the next chapter.
PART 3
The mind is to be understood as embodied, indeed as extended beyond the body, and beyond the individual, and as interacting with the things of the material world.

Colin Renfrew

There is no sense in which the notion of a human can be disentangled from the nonhumans into whose fate it has woven more and more intimately over the ages.

Bruno Latour

If there is such a thing as human agency, then there is material agency; there is no way human agency and material agency can be disentangled.

Lambros Malafouris

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This is drawn from C. Renfrew’s summary of Malafouris’ critique of cognitivism in the Foreword to L. Malafouris, *How Things Shape the Mind: A Theory of Material Engagement*.


In this chapter I address the very crux of this thesis, and ask precisely how materials are caught up with remembering.

In order to generate fresh understanding of the relationships between materials and remembering I examine the most recent theory to emerge from the field of Cognitive Archaeology, Material Engagement Theory. This theory occupies an important position in my research because it has provided me with a wholly new theoretical framework for thinking about materials, and it is tied in with both the established and new modes of material thinking that are evidenced in my studio-based research, my photo-archive based research and my photographic fieldwork.

I begin this chapter by tracing the slow development of Cognitive Archaeology from the broader and more traditional field of archaeological practice. In doing so I identify and reflect on the parallels between its emergence and the development of the central argument of my thesis, which is that the materiality of things play a significant role in acts of remembering. I then go on to analyse the three working hypotheses of Material Engagement Theory in specific relation to remembering. This analysis opens up new avenues for me to consider the relationships between materials and remembering, and importantly it provides me with ways to understand more thoroughly how the photographic and sculptural components of my studio-based research interact with the other and drive this quest forward.

In Chapter 3 I raised the idea of ‘productive between-ness’ and noted its presence in my art making. As I analyse the three working hypotheses of Material
Engagement Theory, I examine the productive between-ness that exists between them as a means to understand more clearly how my photographic and sculptural practices transform one another and can be considered as a hybridised practice that involves analogue and digital photographic methodologies, object-based sculptural methodologies and photo-archive based research activities. As is made clear throughout this chapter, my photo-archive based research is the nexus through which my photographic and sculptural practices merge. The following unfolding analysis of Material Engagement Theory’s three working hypotheses also sheds light on how the discoveries that I have made through my theoretical research has transformed my studio-based research.

The three working hypotheses of Material Engagement Theory are,

1. *The hypothesis of the extended mind*, “which explores the constitutive intertwining of cognition with material culture”.

2. *The hypothesis of enactive signification*, “which explores the nature, of the material sign not as a representational mechanism rather as a semiotic conflation and co-habitation through matter that enacts and brings forth the world.”

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4 Ibid. 50
5 Ibid. 51
3. The hypothesis of material agency, “which explores agency not as a human property, but as the emergent product of situated activity asking not “what is an agent” but “when is an agent”.”


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6 Ibid. 51
Cognitive Archaeology is a relatively new field of research located within the much broader field of archaeological undertaking. It is considered theoretical rather than practical in the sense that it is not concerned with digging potsherds from the earth, or rediscovering lost citadels; rather, cognitive archaeologists dig in the mind, exploring the prehistory of the mind, and how this has come to shape contemporary society.

While cognitive archaeology shares many of the motivating desires of more traditional forms of practical archaeology, it approaches the quest to further the understanding of contemporary human society by advancing the knowledge of how past human societies lived, in very different and, some would say, radical ways.

THE EMERGENCE OF COGNITIVE ARCHAEOLOGY

The nascent stages of the conceptual framework that gave rise to Cognitive Archaeology were developed largely by Colin Renfrew. Its conceptual inception however can be identified as early as 1962, when, in the paper that is today regarded by many as the inaugural paper of New Archaeology, Lewis Binford identified “ideo-technic artefacts”.

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12 Renfrew, "Towards a Cognitive Archaeology: Material Engagement and the Early Development of Society." 124
Ideo-technic artefacts have “their primary functional context in the ideological component of social systems”.\textsuperscript{14} Binford’s identification of ideo-technic artefacts was a critical development in archaeological thinking about the relationships between objects, their use histories, and human societies; I consider it the first stone laid on the very long road toward Lambros Malafouris’ Material Engagement Theory.

As I explained in the previous chapter, the concept of ideo-technic artefacts provided me with a new way to approach my thinking, and my artistic practice, especially in relation to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century glass plate photographic negatives that have played a significant role in the inception and development of this doctoral research.

My introduction to the concept of ideo-technic artefacts enabled me to consider not only the mnemo-technic function of the individual glass plate negatives that comprise the Marshall Collection, but also to consider the Collection itself as an ideo-mnemo-technic artefact. A ‘collective’ artefact that can be studied from the perspective of the ideological systems that were prevalent in the society in which the Collection was generated.

The tensions between the ideo-technic and mnemo-technic functions of artefacts are at the very founding of Cognitive Archaeology; they also come together in my research and provide me with a new way to consider the contemporary social

\textsuperscript{14} Renfrew, "Towards a Cognitive Archaeology: Material Engagement and the Early Development of Society." 124

Here Renfrew is quoting directly from page 221 of Lewis. R. Binford’s 1962 article \textit{Archaeology as Anthropology}, published in American Antiquity. Vol 28 No 2. (Oct 1962) published by Society for American Archaeology 217-225
legacies of ancient objects, which is a theme I will explore further in the following chapter.

While Binford identified and distinguished between how objects, and therefore materials, function in our understanding of human society, my research conflates these important functions and examines how artefacts might be considered in both frameworks.

Conflating the two terms, I now refer to this aspect of my research as an examination of the *ideo-mnemo-technic* function of artefacts, a function that emerges from the constitutive intertwining of the properties and qualities of materials in relation to remembering and prevailing social ideologies. Simply expressed, the memo-technic functions of an artefact are more closely associated with the properties of materials, and the ideo-technic functions of an artefact are more closely associated with the qualities of materials.

The constitutive intertwining that characterises the way that the properties and qualities of materials are understood in the frame of Material Engagement Theory, is reflective of how the theoretical research activities that have shaped this doctoral inquiry, have informed my ongoing, practical photo-archive based research, and in turn how this has informed the original artworks that I have created as a part of this doctoral research.

Evidence of this can be found in the ways I have creatively employed the photographic artefacts comprising the Marshall Collection, and in the title of one
of the bodies of work that I have created as part of my studio based research, *Head Replacement Therapy (Plundered) #1-6* 2012. My choice of the word ‘plundered’ refers simultaneously to the darker side of the nineteenth century archaeological practices that proliferated at the time of the Collection’s creation, and to the way that I have creatively engaged with the Collection.

My hands on photo-archive based research, and specifically the materiality of the small plates of glass that are held in Marshall Collection, have played an important role in a series of networked systems of thought that can be considered from ideological and sociological perspectives. This orientates my research toward questions regarding the ongoing contemporary social legacies of the social systems in which these photographic artefacts, and indeed many museum collections of important historical, cultural objects were generated.

*Head Replacement Therapy (Plundered) #1 - 6. 2012*

This body of work, comprising 6 planar, glowing, wall-based objects, represents my early studio-based experiments that were designed to find new ways of bringing together all three areas of my practical creative research. In this body of work my photo-archive based research, my photographic research and my sculptural research practices merge in an attempt to blend a *hylomorphic ontology* of “imposing form on matter”,15 with a *hylonoetic ontology* of “thinking through and with matter”.16 I began this experiment by selecting a series of glass plate

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The terms *hylomorphic ontology* and *hylonoetic ontology*, as well as their applied meanings, are drawn directly from Malfouris.

16 Ibid. 236
negatives from the Marshall Collection that represent Archaic, Greek and Roman figures, all of which have lost their heads. It is impossible to know how these stone bodies lost their heads, however it is pertinent to note that in the illicit trade of antiquities, that has existed from the nineteenth century right up to today, it is often easier to sell a fragment than a whole figure. My motivation for undertaking this experiment was to replace the figure’s missing heads while simultaneously using specific materials to commingle time. The absent, ‘original’, carved stone heads are replaced with an uncarved stone head. Agate is sometimes called an ‘image bearing’ stone, and my selection of sliced agates was motivated by the face like features that I identified as occurring ‘naturally’ within the stone. By combining the uncarved stone with the carved stone I effectively conflate geological and human temporal indices.

The outcomes of these creative experiments evidence what I previously referred to as a ‘material cycling’ at work in my art making practices. The image on the
left is a digitised reproduction of one of the selected glass plate negatives, the image on the right documents one of the glowing, glass, wall based sculptures that comprise the series *Head Replacement Therapy (Plundered) #1-6*. I draw attention to the material relationship between the source material and the experiment’s outcomes; and identify the range of processes involved in the ‘material cycling’ that takes the original image on a journey from hand-based methodologies, through the digital realm, then back to hand-based methodologies.

First the glass plate negative is selected and digitised at very high resolution. The digital files are then used to make subtle adjustments, such as cropping the image. Then these files are used to create image specific dot screens in which the shape and scale of the dots are specifically designed to maximise the individual image quality. Next the images are screen printed onto the back of a sandblasted sheet of 6mm lead free glass. When the image is stable on the glass, a lux specific
electro-luminescent light panel is applied to the back of the glass, then when an electric current is applied the printed panel lights up.
Through my theoretical research and, specifically, my introduction to the ideas that are central to Material Engagement Theory, I have come to understand what I previously referred to as a material cycling at work in my art making as a form of material semiosis,\(^\text{17}\) wherein the conceptual integration between material and cultural domains produce meaning.

\(^{17}\) The term *material semiosis* describes the conceptual integration of physical materiality and cultural domains of a material in the production of meaning. The concept of material semiosis will be examined in detail in the following analysis of the hypothesis of enactive signification.
The development of Cognitive Archaeology as a defined field of research has been relatively slow; it was initially met with scholarly scepticism. Fifty-one years after Binford’s paper, Renfrew, in 2013, proposed this definition of Cognitive Archaeology.

Cognitive archaeology is no longer seen as the attempt simply to reconstruct some early and elusive symbolic concepts, seen as situated at almost unattainable rungs up some notional ladder of inference. It is understood, rather, to be a program of exploration and investigation by which we can seek to understand the basic foundations of human society and culture.  

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18 Renfrew, "Towards a Cognitive Archaeology: Material Engagement and the Early Development of Society." 124
19 Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. xi
It is helpful for those of us that are not archaeologists to consider the archaeological antecedents of Cognitive Archaeology, and to consider the reasons for its surprisingly slow development. Renfrew proposed a conceptual ‘relative neglect’ as the reason for its apparent slow emergence. I identify parallels with his reasoning and the development of the driving quest of this thesis, which pursues fresh understanding of the entangled relationships between materials and remembering. I propose that there has been a ‘relative neglect’ in considering the roles played by materials in processes of remembering. The following is a brief outline of the emergence of Cognitive Archaeology, which I offer here as a means of highlighting the parallels that I have identified between its slow emergence and the reasoning behind the focus of my research topic.

In the 1960’s New Archaeology emerged from more traditional, long-established approaches to archaeological practice. In the 1970’s and 80’s New Archaeology, which later became known as Processual Archaeology, tended to focus on the production of tools, subsistence economies, and sometimes on socio-political systems; but rarely did it examine the cognitive dimensions of societies.\(^\text{20}\) Processual Archaeology led to what Ian Hodder defined in 1982 as Post-Processual Archaeology.

Renfrew suggests that it is the “relative neglect by early Processual Archaeology of the symbolic or cognitive dimension”\(^\text{21}\) that led to slow evolution of Post-Processual Archaeology toward Interpretive Archaeology, and in the mid 1990’s

\(^{20}\) Renfrew, "Towards a Cognitive Archaeology: Material Engagement and the Early Development of Society." 125

This explanation of the development of New and Processual Archaeology is drawn directly from Renfrew.

\(^{21}\) Ibid. 124
onto Cognitive Processual Archaeology; which eventually paved the way for the arrival of Cognitive Archaeology in the mid 2000’s.

Simply explained, Renfrew suggests that it was the relative neglect of any scholarly consideration of the cognitive dimension of societies and objects that resulted in the slow emergence of Cognitive Archaeology.

While, as Malafouris points out, there has been a relatively recent spike in studies concerning the relationship between material culture and human cognition in the fields of archaeology, anthropology, philosophy and cognitive science,\textsuperscript{22} It appears that within the context of the relatively new field of Memory Studies, there has been a relative neglect of scholarly work undertaken with the specific concern of investigating the relationships between materials and remembering.

In the Chapter 3, I argued that in her book \textit{The Generation of Postmemory, Writing and Visual Culture after the Holocaust},\textsuperscript{23} Marianne Hirsch displays a tendency toward the photographic image and written forms of remembrance. One might argue that in much of Hirsch’s work to date there has been a relative neglect of the function of objects and the materials of which they are made in relation to remembering.

In the introduction to his book \textit{How Things Shape The Mind: A Theory of Material Engagement}, Malafouris sets out his reasons for developing a theory of material engagement. I suggest that his reasoning runs contra to Hirsch’s

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{22} Malafouris, \textit{How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement}. 10
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tendency, in fact it sets up a framework for examining a diametrically opposed position. I argue that it does this by highlighting the importance and primacy of objects and their materiality in processes of cognition. Malafouris explains:

Material Engagement Theory represents the effort of many years to build an interdisciplinary analytical framework able to recast the boundaries of the mind and redress the balance of the cognitive equation by bringing materiality – that is, the world of things, artifacts, objects, materials, and material signs – firmly into the cognitive fold. 24

He then goes on to explain how and why the development of Material Engagement Theory addresses the “unhelpful” 25 cognitive dualism that Renfrew suggested “has been dominant in Western thought since Descartes”. 26

As I have moved back and forth between the studio-based research activities and the theoretical research activities that form this doctoral project, it has become increasingly clear to me that objects, and the very stuff of which they are made, are caught up in the cognitive processes of remembering. I propose that it is through the habitual experience of the properties of materials, in concert with the non-habitual experience of the qualities of materials that we come to create our highly individual memory space.

24 Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. 2
25 Ibid. x
26 Ibid. ix
This is where my research differs from Hirsch’s work on the associations between photography and memory. In the instances where Hirsch does refer to photography, she demonstrates a tendency to focus on the *qualities* of her chosen photographic artefacts, while making little reference to the conceptual implications of their material *properties*.

This thesis is intended to redress what can be perceived as a historical imbalance in the understanding of the function of objects and the materials of which they are made in relation to the cognitive process of remembering. It aims to do so by bringing materials to the fore in examining the cognitive process of remembering and knowledge transfer. Material Engagement Theory affords me a critical framework with which to further this investigation.

**MATERIAL ENGAGEMENT THEORY**

In his book chapter “The Cognitive Basis of Material Engagement: Where Brain, Body and Culture Conflated” in the 2004 McDonald Institute Monograph, *Rethinking Materiality: The Engagement of the Mind With the Material World*, Malafouris suggests that for the advancement of cognition oriented archaeological research, two main avenues exist. The first concerns a rethinking of materiality, the second, and a correlated one, concerns a rethinking of cognition. This is where Malafouris’ research and the central argument of my research come close together.

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Malafouris and I share the pursuit of rethinking materiality and how it relates with human being. We also share a desire for rethinking cognitive processes. Even so, whilst I draw heavily from Malafouris, it is important to note that my focus differs from his. My focus is less on embracing the ambitiously broad field of all human cognition; rather, I remain specifically focussed on memory, acts of remembrance and knowledge transfer.

It is worth noting that Malafouris frequently uses memory related examples as a means to clarify this complex conceptual structure, which is based on the three working hypotheses mentioned earlier.

Nine years of conceptual gestation exists between Malafouris’ essay “The Cognitive Basis of Material Engagement: Where Brain, Body and Culture Conflate”, ²⁸ and his book *How Things Shape The Mind: A Theory of Material Engagement.* ²⁹ In his early essay he begins setting out the foundations for Material Engagement Theory, which are the basis for his hypothesis of the *extended mind.* He makes the two following key statements in his early essay: “Material culture is cosubstantial with the mind”, ³⁰ and “material engagement is the synergistic process by which, out of brains, bodies and things, mind emerges”. ³¹

²⁸ Ibid.
²⁹ Ibid.
³⁰ Ibid. 58
³¹ Ibid. 58
In attempting the gargantuan task of redefining the boundaries of the mind, Malafouris explores the hypothesis of the extended mind to conceive of cognition as a socially embedded, embodied process that is distributed beyond the individual.

The following diagram is based of Figure 5.2, *Mind Beyond Cognitivism* in Malafouris’ book chapter “The Cognitive Basis of Material Engagement: Where Brain, Body and Culture Conflate”, it represents Malafouris’ conception of an expanded field of cognition.

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32 Ibid.

**Figure 4: Mind Beyond Cognitivism.**

He suggests that if we accept these relational domains of human cognition then we “are able to collapse the conventional mind / brain tautology and mind / body dichotomy”.  

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**THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE EXTENDED MIND**

Analysing the *Hypothesis Of The Extended Mind* in relation to memory I ask the question, if the mind extends beyond the body, what does this mean in terms of memory and remembering? Or to put it in another way, if the *hypothesis of the extended mind* is an attempt to alter commonly held perceptions of the boundaries of the mind, how might it be used to alter commonly held perceptions of how memory is formed, reformed, and transferred? and to consider its potentially active role in shaping the future.

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33 Ibid. 58-59
A useful way into this complex questioning is to return to Polanyi’s example, discussed in Chapter 3, of a blind person using a stick, to feel their way in the world, or to bodily ‘know’ their way in the world. Through my analysis of Polayni’s example, I drew attention to a direct conceptual association between it and Bergson’s conception of memory, specifically, the role of habit in memory development. Now I draw out a direct relationship between the example of how a blind person uses a stick and the development of the hypothesis of the extended mind, thereby highlighting and deploying the productive between-ness between the research of Polanyi, Bergson and Malafouris.

On page four of his introduction to *How Things Shape the Mind: A Theory of Material Engagement*, Malafouris uses the same example as Polanyi as a means for setting up the questions associated with the task of delimiting cognition. In the epilogue he returns to the example and highlights the importance played by “the classical phenomenological thought experiment of the blind man with a stick” in paving the way for the main thesis of his book.

The example of the blind person and the stick, presents us with a powerful metaphor of the “ontological unity” between the human and the non-human. It enables us to think about minds and things as “continuous”. In this way, the

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36 Ibid. 243
37 Ibid. 244
38 Ibid. 244
example of the blind person and the stick, which has been used by several thinkers questioning where the mind stops and the rest of the world begins,\textsuperscript{39} “encapsulates the spirit of Material Engagement Theory”.\textsuperscript{40}

Malafouris points out that throughout history, whatever form the ‘stick’ has taken, its main function has been that of an ontological pathway rather than a boundary. “Through the ‘stick,’ the person feels, discovers, and makes sense of the environment but also enacts the way forward.”\textsuperscript{41} In this example the stick does more than replace vision with touch, it becomes a kind of transformative interface that we might call a “brain-artefact interface”.\textsuperscript{42}

Remembering is a cognitive activity. While this may seem obvious, I want to point out that remembering and memory itself are active cognition; this is why and where Malafouris’ delimitation of mind, and more generally cognition, relate with the central quest of this thesis which concerns the relationships between materials and remembering.

At this point in my analysis of the hypothesis of the extended mind it is important to take a step back, and to frame this hypothesis within the broader context of Material Engagement Theory, thereby considering how it relates to the


\textsuperscript{40} Malafouris, \textit{How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement}. 244

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid. 244

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid. 244

In this paragraph not only the terms in parenthesis are drawn from Malafouris, the conceptual premise of the paragraph is also indebted to him.
relationships between materials and remembering. The following quote is a summary of the overarching thesis of Material Engagement Theory.

The functional anatomy of the human mind (which includes the whole organism, that is brain/CNS and body) is a dynamic biocultural construct subject to continuous ontogenetic and phylogenetic transformation by behaviourally important and socially embedded experiences. These experiences are mediated and sometimes constituted by the use of material objects and artifacts (e.g., the blind man’s stick) which for that reason should be seen as continuous, integral, and active parts of human cognitive architecture. 43

Returning to the now conceptually situated hypothesis of the extended mind, I examine how it relates with memory. If we accept Malafouris’ delimited conception of human cognition, and apply it to the long held idea that human memory resides in the mind, and that the mind is inside the head, and therefore, that the head functions as a kind of storehouse of experiences, we are able to conceive of material culture and the very stuff of objects as enactive agents in a dynamic reciprocal process of remembrance, whereby in remembering the traces, residues, and presences of an other’s experiences, co-create our experiences.

With my studio-based research I resolved to test whether Material Engagement Theory and memory are inextricably linked, and how it might offer a way into a

43 Ibid. 244
more nuanced understanding of remembering. In his early essay, written nine years before the distillation of Material Engagement Theory, Malafouris states:

I simply want to underline the need on the one hand for a more subtle classification of mnemonic operations enacted in the context of material engagement, and on the other for a shift in the basic analytic unit for the study of human memory beyond the boundaries of the individual.⁴⁴

This quote is important in the development of my thesis as it points toward the conception of social memory, which for the purposes of this research I associate with the qualities of materials. The idea of social memory will be taken up in detail in the following chapter; but, for now it is important to continue my memory related analysis of the hypothesis of the extended mind a little longer.

“What is outside the head may not necessarily be outside the mind.” ⁴⁵ This statement may at first seem obvious especially when we are thinking about memory. Considering photography, which since its inception has been considered the aid mémoire par excellence, is a simple way to demonstrate this point. No-one will dispute that printed photographs exist as touchable objects that are outside of the head, however, most people would agree that the ‘image’ offered by a photograph, the ‘memory image’ as Bergson would say, remains in the mind. Many people would call the recalled internal image the memory itself. I suggest that in this instance remembering occurs in the transactional interface between the

⁴⁴ “The Cognitive Basis of Material Engagement. Where Brain, Body and Culture Confl ate.” ⁵⁷
⁴⁵ How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. 3
photographic object, which is outside the body, and the photographic image in the mind.

In this example, the photographic object can be understood as functioning in the same way as the blind person’s stick, and it provides us with a memory specific example of the hypothesis of the extended mind.

As the blind person’s stick represents a coalition between the human and the non-human that generates a kind of “ontological unity”, printed photographs, and indeed other forms of photographic artefacts, can be seen in the same way; as a conflation between brain, body, and thing, through which, according to the hypothesis of the extended mind, cognition emerges.

The example of the printed photograph is a useful way to frame the question, why is there a prevailing tendency to prioritise the mental over the material?

This question leads us into an internalist, externalist dualism, which the hypothesis of the extended mind seeks to address. In forming this hypothesis, Malafouris argues that the common tendency to prioritise mentality over materiality is a “historical convention”, rather than an “a priori metaphysical truth”.

It is epistemological contingency, rather than metaphysical necessity, that makes us see, in various objects, marks, gestures,
and lines of human prehistory, merely as external products of human thought rather than integral parts of it.\textsuperscript{49}

Material Engagement Theory does not seek to prioritise either the “internal” or the “external” factors in cognitive development, rather it is based on the principle of active participation characterised as a mutual process of exchange between the internal and external.

The theoretical power of Material Engagement Theory lies precisely in providing a new means for studying the complex nature of the interactions between the internal and external resources of human cognition as well as the role of cultural practices in the orchestration of human cognitive processes.\textsuperscript{50}

This quote brings us firmly back to memory, and succinctly expresses how I am able to draw upon the theoretical power of Material Engagement Theory to advance my argument that materials and remembering are caught up together.

So what are the “internal” resources and what are the “external” resources of memory, and where does materiality fit in with this specific form of human cognition? The example I used earlier of photographic artefacts and how they function in generating memory is again helpful here.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid. 3
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid. 38
At first glance the material aspects of the printed photograph may seem external to us, this is most commonly perceived when we consider only the properties of their materiality; however, when we consider the socially imbued qualities of their materiality a more complex entanglement is revealed.

Returning to Figure 3 (page173) I now further explain, with the aid of another related diagram, the differences between the properties and qualities of materials. Figure 3 is reproduced again here, and the two diagrams should be read together, they visualise how the relationships between material culture and human cognition function in relation to memory. They also highlight the mirroring that I have identified between Malafouris’ distinction of the properties and qualities of materials, and Bergson’s distinction between pure memory and memory image.
Figure 3: (repeated)

Properties-Qualities. Pure memory-Memory image. Remembering-Premembering
The final important discussion in my memory-related analysis of the hypothesis of the extended mind concerns the transactional exchanges between the internalism and externalism that are essential to this working hypothesis. A comparison of the basic principles of internalism and externalism is a good place to start. Internalism
is premised on the idea that the content of a mental state is “determined by features of the individual biological subject without recourse to ‘external’ or ‘non biological’ conditions”. Externalism acknowledges that elements of the world external to the biological subject play a part in generating the content of a biological subject’s mental state. Which means that an externalist study of human cognitive skills cannot be undertaken independently of the material, social or technological environment.

Rather than prioritising either of these two approaches in thinking about the development of human cognitive processes, Material Engagement Theory proposes that human cognition is best studied through a conflation of these seemingly oppositional perspectives. This can be thought of as a deeper intra-active temporal basis for human intelligence.

Suffice it to say that for MET human intelligence is not situated simply in a basic interactive sense but in a deeper intra-active and temporally structured sense. This means that interaction elicited by our surroundings (human and nonhuman) not only influences our cognitive abilities and affective responses from the very beginning but also shapes the form and the constitutive mechanisms of interaction.

51 Ibid. 74
52 Ibid. 39
I again ask the question, what does this mean in terms of memory? And what are the implications of this on considering the relationships between materials and remembering?

As I have already explained, it is commonly perceived that memory resides inside the head. This internalist view of memory is one most likely to lead to a relative neglect of considering the roles played by materials (both their properties and qualities), in the formation of memory and processes of remembering. The concept of the embodied mind in concert with the concept of the extended mind, however, takes us a long way in the other direction.

An externalist view of memory requires us to consider the material culture of the world outside of our bodies as reciprocal active agents in cognitive processes such as memory formation and remembering.

Returning to the Hirschian conception of postmemory, I question where it fits in. Postmemory, as defined by Hirsch, is a significant departure from an internalist view of memory; her central argument that we are able to experience other people’s memories has at its core the belief that it is possible to experience memory of something you have not directly (or physically) experienced. However, as I have already pointed out, Hirsch has tendency to prioritise the visual and literary expressions of a material experience, which I consider as representative of the qualities of that material experience, goes only part of the way.
It is important to acknowledge that the photographic and literary artefacts that Hirsch uses as exemplars of postmemory were created with the intentionality of not forgetting, the intentionality of recording which can be understood as related to the qualities of her photographic examples. The properties of material culture however, are also bound up with and bear witness to the experiences that are being recorded. The properties of the materials that bore such witness, I suggest, have the powerful capacity for engendering a sense of wit(h)ness, which a more comprehensive externalist perspective of memory wants to embrace. I propose that no study of the development of cognitive processes, such as remembering, can be meaningfully undertaken without acknowledging the contribution made by the properties of materials.

This is reflective of the concept of indwelling, expressed by Polanyi when he states, “indwelling, as derived from the structure of tacit knowing, is a far more precisely defined act than is empathy”. Simply put, ‘mainstream externalism’, the idea of external symbolic storage, implies that the content of a cognitive process involves external resources; ‘active externalism’, however, goes a step further, and it implies that the content and process of a cognitive activity such as memory are external. I therefore propose that Hirsch’s position, characterised by the prioritising of the qualities of materials, can be considered as a partially active externalist perspective.

In summarising the hypothesis of the extended mind, Malafouris points out that a simplistic reading of the differences between internalism and externalism leads us

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53 Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension*. 17
toward ‘significant pitfalls’. He makes clear that Material Engagement Theory subscribes to a “locationally neutral account of cognition, but not a substrate-neutral account of cognition”.

In other words, the material culture that is active in an extended conception of the mind is not neutral in human cognitive function. He argues that what an extended mind is made of, the very stuff of that extended mind, matters as much as how it functions.

Thinking is not something that happens ‘inside’ brains, bodies and things; rather it emerges from contextualized processes that take place ‘between’ brains, bodies and things.

This statement is important to consider in relation to the studio-based experiments that I have undertaken in generating the main component of this doctoral research project. I have argued consistently that a between-ness is at work in my art making practices, between the materials that I employ and the ideas explored in each of the experiments. Through these experiments I have come to understand the power of material semiosis in facilitating attempts to apprehend how our own direct, personal experiences commingle with the experiences of those that lived and died long before us.

With this premise in mind it is pertinent to consider my studio-based testing of the idea of active externalism that is manifest in the artwork Material Collision (staring together at the stars) Parts, 1,2,3. 2013. This artwork deploys the

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55 Ibid. 76
56 Ibid. 76
57 Ibid. 77-78
productive between-ness and the psychological interplay between memory, materials and the body in an investigation of active externalism.

Comprising three large format screen prints on carborundum sandpaper, each measuring 139 x 105 cm. with overall dimensions of 146 x 351 cm., this work evidences the practical manifestation of a form of material semiosis.\(^{58}\)

The following three images are digitised representations of the nineteenth century glass plate negatives that form the basis of this investigative artwork.

It is important to understand the direct material relationship between the support material of these photographic artefacts, glass, and the support material of the screen-printed images that comprise this artwork, carborundum sandpaper.

\(^{58}\) The concept of material semiosis will be examined in detail in the following analysis of the hypothesis of enactive signification.
Carborundum is a compound made of silicon and carbon, it is closely related with silica, which is an important component in glass. The processes involved in this experimentation involve not only an approach founded in the idea of material semiosis, which is central to the idea of active externalism, they also involve a range of methods that commingle time. What I am trying to explain here is that in the creation of this artwork I have moved back and forth between analogue and digital photographic processes, and I have moved back and forth between hand-based and digital methodologies, which led to the process of screen-printing these images, that represent ancient and perhaps forgotten objects, onto large sheets of carborundum sandpaper.

This series of ‘reverse portraits’ raises the issue of subject / viewer relations that was discussed at length in Chapter 1, and builds on the idea of wit(h)ness that was discussed in Chapter 3. The idea of active externalism is embodied in our experience of this artwork, this occurs through the conflation of our knowledge that we are looking at, and somehow with, a series of ancient figures, and the bodily ‘known’ mutuality that we share with their form. To use Benjamin’s
expression, by ‘resting’ with these images we somehow become active agents that are caught up in a mutli-layered commingling of time, whereby the ongoing continuum of collective human immortality is mirrored in the material semiosis at work in this artwork.

Andrew Hazewinkel
Material Collision (staring together at the stars). Parts1, 2,3, 2013
3 screen-prints on carborundum sandpaper (from digitised 19th century glass plate photographic negatives).
146 x 351 cm

Installation view Melbourne Now. 2014
National Gallery of Victoria.
The studio-based experiments that resolved into the work *Material Collision (staring together at the stars)* Parts 1,2,3 evidence how I have progressed this doctoral research through a back and forth investigation between theoretical and studio-based methodologies, designed to specifically investigate the entangled associations between materials and remembering.

The oscillation between the theoretical and studio-based investigation slowly led me to another important issue inherent to this doctoral inquiry, the question of whether retrospectivity is a precondition of memory, which is the founding question that led me to the concept of *premembering*.

I propose that premembering is a cognitive process closely associated with memory, I am not suggesting that it replaces the long established temporal framing of memory, rather that its prospective function has the potential to conflate with the retrospective function of memory.

In my earliest attempts to define premembering, I defined it as a profoundly physical (embodied), radically empathic (emotive), corporeal understanding (extended mind) of events, circumstances or conditions that one may not have directly experienced, but which one’s culture knows and stores up for all of its future participants. It is important to note that as I define it now, premembering is a distributed system of cognition that extends beyond the individual and is enacted through a process of active externalism that embraces both the properties and qualities of materials in processes of mutual participation.
To further understand the concept of premembering, important questions concerning agency need to be considered, both material agency and the agency of individuals and groups. I will address these questions later in this chapter in my detailed analysis of the third working hypothesis of Material Engagement Theory, the hypothesis of material agency.

I conclude my analysis of the first hypothesis of Material Engagement Theory, the hypothesis of the extended mind, with the following important quote from Malafouris.

If we are to understand the idiosyncratic abilities of objects, past or present, to make us forget and remember, to guide our everyday action, to channel and signify social experience, and to sustain our embodied routines, we should resist or bypass our modern representational or computational preoccupations and allow a truly meaningful sense of how the material world constitutes our existence as human beings to emerge.  

THE HYPOTHESIS OF ENACTIVE SIGNIFICATION.

The hypothesis of enactive signification is the second working hypothesis of Material Engagement Theory; it is concerned with the semiotic dimension of materials, and more specifically, material semiosis.

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59 Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. 87
As Malafouris explains, *the hypothesis of enactive signification* “explores the nature of the material sign not as a representational mechanism but as a semiotic conflation and co-habitation through matter that enacts and brings forth the world”. ⁶⁰

As this hypothesis is concerned with the semiotic dimension of Material Engagement Theory, my analysis of it in relation to memory is briefer than my analysis of the previous hypothesis, however important distinctions and other relevant points are made.

A useful way to understand the concept of enactive signification, and therefore deepen our understanding of the relationships between memory and material culture, is to approach it as Malafouris does, by questioning *how* a sign means, rather than *what* a sign means.

Enactive signification works in a way contra to the “dominant representational-computational view of mind”, ⁶¹ and it is foundational to Material Engagement Theory’s premise of the constitutive intertwining of cognition and material culture. Central to the hypothesis of enactive signification is the understanding that the semiotic dimension of language and the semiotic dimension of material culture differ significantly.

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⁶⁰ Ibid. 51
⁶¹ Ibid. 89
From a semiotic perspective language and material culture differ substantially in respect of the cognitive mechanisms that support their cognitive function. 62

A simple way to explain this difference is that a material sign does not function though embodying a “communicative or representational logic” 63 rather it embodies an enactive one.

For material semiosis, meaning is not the product of representation but the product of a process of ‘conceptual integration’ between material and conceptual domains. 64

To further explain the idea of material semiosis, I borrow an example from Gregory Bateson’s 1973 book *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*. 65 The following example resonates with the idea of material semiosis through its material focus, and how that focus interacts with our own individual pure memory experiences of the two materials that are used in the example. I suggest, with the help of Bergson, that this is most clearly understood in an embodied way.

The following example demonstrates what I have been proposing throughout this thesis, that it is in (and through) the conflation of the properties and socially generated qualities of materials that our individual memory space is created, and

62 Ibid. 90
63 Ibid. 90
64 Ibid. 90
enables our individual memory space to have a constitutive role in the pool of knowledge that one’s culture knows and stores up for all of its future participants:

The lions in Trafalgar Square could have been eagles or bulldogs and still carried the same (or similar) message about empire and the cultural premises on nineteenth-century England. And yet how different might their message have been had they been made of wood! 66

I mentioned earlier that enactive signification works contra to the dominant, computational view of the mind. To explicate precisely how a sign is enactive it is useful to consider it in relation to the Saussurian approach to semiotics. Here is not the place for a treatise of Saussurian semiotics, rather, I will consider only two aspects of the Saussurian approach.

The first of these is that the Saussurian position originates in what Malafouris refers to as a “nominalist” 67 basis rather than a “realist ontological basis”, 68 which means that the sign has a “disembodied and disengaged” 69 relationship with the signified concept. In this aspect of the Saussurian approach, the linguistic sign exists in the human mind “completely disassociated from and unaffected by external reality”. 70

66 Ibid. 130
Malafouris uses this quote in his discussion of enactive signification.
67 Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. 92
68 Ibid. 92
69 Ibid. 92
70 Ibid. 92
The second point of difference between enactive signification and the Saussurian approach lies in the ‘arbitrariness’ of the internal bonds that link the signifier and the signified which characterise the Saussurian approach. This arbitrariness restricts the potential for meaning to arise from the materials and processes that are involved in the making of the sign.

In order to demonstrate that my position is contra to the Saussurian idea of arbitrariness in relation to the roles played by materials in the making of meaning and remembering, I provide this quote of from his 1966 book, *Course in General Linguistics*.

> The means by which the sign is produced is completely unimportant, for it does not affect the system. Whether I make the letters in white or black, raised or engraved, with pen or chisel - all of this is of no importance with respect to the signification.71

As the Malafourian concept of material semiosis and the *hypothesis of enactive signification* are premised on the absence of the Saussurian concept of arbitrariness, my position regarding the meaning in materials draws closer to Material Engagement Theory.

Artists have known for a long time that a chosen materiality might conflate with the conceptual terrain of an artwork to produce its meaning, but how are the roles played by properties of materials and the roles played by the qualities of materials

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71 Ibid. 92
See also Saussure, F.D. 1966. *Course in General Linguistics*. McGraw-Hill. 66
caught up with remembering? How does their participation in meaning making differ, and how do these differences shape memory?

A helpful way to approach this double sided question is to reconsider an example that Malafouris uses; by examining the differences between a hand signed letter and a digitally signed letter he addresses the important issue of the processes involved in the production of a sign. He then goes on to make a comparison between the kinds of paper most letterheads are printed on and a Post-it note thus illustrating the roles played by the properties of materials in the making of a sign.72

Considering a hand signed letter from the perspective of material semiosis, we can identify a relationship between the person who signed the letter and the signature as a signified /signifier relationship. As Malafouris points out, if we were to accept Saussure’s notion that how a sign is made is irrelevant to its meaning, therefore whether the signature is handwritten, photocopied or digitally created makes no difference. He suggests that both “ethnographies of the workplace environment”73 and common sense suggest otherwise, and that while an “artificially produced signature”74 maintains the same explicit meaning, the implicit meaning is changed.75 In his words, “the artificially produced signature, not being cosubstantial with the signified person, has lost the element of sympathy. It has been transformed into a kind of commodity that no longer bears

72 Ibid. 92-94
73 Ibid. 92
74 Ibid. 92
75 Ibid. 92
Not only the terms used in this paragraph but also its conceptual premise is indebted to Malafouris.
any personal imprint”76 In a pragmatic sense, the meaning of the signature remains the same but the “power of this signature to represent the person”77 has been altered.

Considering the differences between the closely related yet significantly different kinds of paper that many letterheads are printed on and Post-it notes, enables us to examine the differences between their properties and their deeply embedded cultural qualities, both of which contribute to the meaning of the messages inscribed upon them.

Most official letterhead paper has a slightly heavier weight than Post-it note paper; it is often slightly textured and is sometimes creamy in colour or at least a warmer white than other more common forms of A4 paper. This evokes the qualities of handmade papers that were produced at a time when paper had a far less common social presence than it does today. Long ago fewer people handled paper, there was a time when it was not a commonplace material. I argue that at that time, largely because of the systems that it participated in, paper was imbued with a sense of authority. Charters, treatises, documents of law, sacred documents, deeds of ownership, and the like, were the domain of paper. These documents often had other associated materialities, such as wax in the form of seals that provided security, they were often rolled rather folded and fastened with ribbon.

What I am suggesting here is, that embedded in the paper of many of today’s printed letterheads is a historically associated set of qualities, which are not embedded in Post-it notes. The Post-it note however, with its ingenious sticky

76 Ibid. 93
77 Ibid. 93
back section, is pragmatically more aligned with today’s proliferated, far less authoritative use of paper, and to the way written language is used in the contemporary realm. As Malafouris has pointed out, “The distinctive properties of the material world bring about meaning in ways that language cannot, and vice versa.”78

What then does the hypothesis of enactive signification mean in terms of memory and remembering? The hypothesis, as I understand it, is most useful in examining the relationships between materials and memory through its clear distinguishing between the nature and role of material signs and linguistic signs.

The hypothesis also exposes what Malafouris calls “the fallacy of the linguistic sign”, 79 which, he suggests, resides in the common practice of either implicitly or explicitly collapsing a material sign into the more broadly understood category of the linguistic sign. In short, the fallacy of the linguistic sign works against the idea of the enactive sign and, therefore clouds, or perhaps even better, buries the idea of materials having an active role in meaning and memory making.

I believe that the conflation of “semiotic ontologies” 80 that, in the Malafourian sense, constitute the fallacy of linguistic signification, has led to the dominance of the understanding of the linguistic sign, which in turn has led to the relative neglect of the specific functions of the material sign.

78 Ibid. 95
79 Ibid. 90
80 Ibid. 91

The language that I have used in attempting to describe the concept and memorial implications of fallacy of the linguistic sign is drawn directly from the second section of Chapter 5 in Malafouris’ book, titled The fallacy of the linguistic sign.
Material culture is not analogous with language, however when the fallacy of linguistic sign is invoked that is precisely what happens, an analogy between material culture and language is made. This is well demonstrated by Malafouris in the following quote.

Put very simply…you assume that a real ceramic vase and the word ‘vase’ possess the same semiotic properties and affordances. In other words, you presuppose that both the material entity and ‘vase’ as a word mean, or signify, in the same manner. 81

I propose that the historical collapsing of the semiotic dimension of materials (including material semiosis and therefore all of its potential for knowledge production) into the more commonly understood realm of linguistic signification, has led us away from understanding the profound implications of our daily interactions with the rest of the material world.

This is precisely where the hypothesis of enactive signification contributes directly to my investigation of the relationships between materials and remembering; it does so by exposing the way by which, over generations, our consciously identified relationships with the material world have faded.

In order to examine this premise more thoroughly I undertook another series of studio-based experiments and made another series of screen prints. These

81 Ibid. 91
experiments were designed to test whether the physically experienced materiality of an object that supports a photographic representation of a like material, in association with the bodily ‘known’ mutuality of shared human form, could function as a kind of perceptual bridge across to long forgotten relationships with materials.

In these experiments I drew again from a nineteenth century archival photographic source representing a broken figure. In these experiments I engaged a different materiality from my previous experiments with glass and sandpaper, in these experiments I worked with leather.

This shift in materiality was motivated by three specific reasons.

1. Unlike all previous experiments, the archival source for this experiment was not a glass plate negative, rather it was two small photographic prints representing different views of the same object.

2. The test focused on one material aspect of the content of the source image rather than its material support.

3. Leather (or skin) is common to all participants in this experiment - subject, object and viewer.

The following images document the original photographic source used in this experiment and varying stages of the resultant artwork’s production.
The material outcome of these studio-based experiments is titled *Suspicious Marble* 2012-2014, it comprises six double sided, screen-printed leather hides each measuring approximately 270 x 100 cm.

In these striking source images of a female nude, we can identify the mythological attributions of Hercules; the female figure leans against ‘his’ olive wood club and wears ‘his’ lion skin cape. It first appears as though we are looking at a female Hercules; however, further research reveals that we are looking at a representation of another ancient mythological character, one that has been almost completely

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82. The title *Suspicious Marble* refers to the label on the Solander box of the Marshall Collection that I discovered this source material in. Titled Suspicious Marbles, this box contains images of objects considered by 19th and early 20th century curators, scholars, and commercial agents to be copies of ancient objects likely to have been generated by the proliferating ‘fakes’ industry that blossomed during what is now described by some as the ‘great collecting age.’
erased from the Western Classical tradition. Omphale \textsuperscript{83} was and still is her name. While her story is a compelling one, my experiments were not designed to address specifically the important socio-political and gender aspects embedded in her story, rather they centre on the materiality of the skin cape that is draped about her shoulders.

Identifying the commonality of skin between subject, object and viewer enabled me to test the \textit{hypothesis of enactive signification} which, as Malafouris puts it "explores the nature, of the material sign not as a representational mechanism

\textsuperscript{83} According to Classical Western mythology, Omphale, the queen of Lydia, had an intimate relationship with Hercules. There are conflicting stories about how these lovers came together, one suggests that Omphale purchased Hercules as a slave for a period that was decreed by the Delphic Oracle as atonement for his killing of Iphitus. Other versions suggest that Omphale seduced Hercules. The differing stories concur that Omphale entered into a gender based role swap with her famous partner, wherein she wore his lion skin cape and took his olive wood club and spent her days out hunting, whilst he stayed at home and spun wool. See Easterling, P. “Looking for Omphale” in \textit{The World of Ion of Chios}, Jennings,V. and Katsaros, A. (ed) Koninklijke Brill NV Leiden 2007. Suhr, E. “Herakles and Omphale” in the American Journal of Archaeology, Vol 57, No.4. October 1953.
rather as a semiotic conflation and co-habitation through matter that enacts and brings forth the world”.\textsuperscript{84} I designed my experiment to specifically test the hypothesis of enactive signification in relation to remembering by activating a sensed bodily understanding of meaning through active participation with the material signifier.

Working on both the soft suede and tanned leather sides of the hides with front and back views of the draped figure at 1:1 human scale I maximised the full range of material potentials inherent in both the subject and the object whilst activating the productive between-ness of both the properties and qualities of the chosen material.

\textsuperscript{84} Malafouris, \textit{How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement}. 51
This series of experiments evidence that it is *how*, rather than *when*, the hypothesis of enactive signification co-operates and participates with the hypothesis of the extended mind (which explains and exposes the functioning of our embodied knowledge of and interaction with the rest of the material world), and points toward the relevance of Material Engagement Theory in this study of the relationship between materials and remembering.

Andrew Hazewinkel
Installation view All In Time. 2014.

Before I begin my analysis of the third working hypothesis of Material Engagement Theory I need to explain precisely why I have focused specifically on damaged ancient figurative sculpture as the main subject matter of my studio-
based research. As I have progressed through and developed my research via simultaneously deepening and expanding processes, I have come to understand that at the outset of my research I thought that my chosen subject matter would afford me the means to explore the practical intersections between the two main areas of creative activity that define my art making practice, photography and object-based sculpture. I have come to understand that there was something else deeply embedded and present at the inception of this doctoral research project, something that Polanyi might describe as ‘known yet untellable’.

By undertaking a series of practical experiments and simultaneously uncovering and analysing a series of precise theoretical distinctions in relation to memory (Bergson), material culture (Renfrew) and modes of human cognition (Malafouris), I have come to understand that my focus on the broken bodies of Antiquity is motivated by sensing their enactive signification, and a questioning of their ongoing relevance and function within the contemporary social domain. In other words it is how these damaged stone bodies of Antiquity resonate with our soft bodies through being caught up in memory processes that these ancient objects continue to participate with us in the ongoing continuum of collective human immortality, which as I see it, is the basis of their contemporary relevance.

It is important to appreciate that my specific interest is in the damaged, broken, or ‘injured’ figures rather than the prized, pristine few which appear to be untouched by the passage of time. The few pristine pieces that do exist, that remain unaffected by time, seem to me a kind of fiction and have less to ‘say’ about
experience and cultural continuity than those that bear, as we do, the marks of the passage of time.

The objects that I examine are body parts, or part bodies, that resonate with or ‘speak’ directly to our own bodies, whilst at the same time functioning as material signs. In the semiotic context of Material Engagement Theory they are enactive material signs; and I suggest that they provide us with a means for considering not only the deep past, but also the present.

I call the sites on these stone bodies where damage has occurred, and is evident, break-sites. The break-sites are important in my thinking about these ancient objects for two reasons. The first concerns their capacity to serve as facilitators in what I see as a commingling of time, via the properties of the materials that they are made of; the second concerns a kind of processual paradox related to their (un)making, or becoming. I call this the temporal paradox of uncarving, which as I see it, these ancient objects embody.
At the break-sites we are exposed to a paradoxical exchange of properties between nature and history creating a tear in the comportment of what is easily understood. The ‘natural’ state of the materiality of the stone is exposed at the break-site, it invokes a sense of geological time; the parts of the figure that remain intact and identifiable as having human form, invoke a sense of human time. In this way I have come to understand these figures as active in commingling time which occurs through the conflation of the properties and the qualities of the material of which they are made. What I mean by this is that the properties of the material are revealed at the break-sites, and they invoke the geological temporal index, which conflates with the human temporal index invoked by the qualities of the material and the parts of the figure that remain undamaged, and therefore identifiable as having human form.

Andrew Hazewinkel
Kouroso (2) 2015
Fibre-based silver gelatin print. 41 x 41 cm

Source object: 6th century B.C Pentelic marble kouros.
These identifiably human body parts bring forth in us a profound understanding of the body parts that are missing. Our embodied knowledge, our non-habitual memory image, experienced and manifest through our own bodies, establishes, in a social way, what I argue is a profound bodily relationship between the present and the deep past. I suggest that it is looking at these objects from this perspective that imbues them with a contemporary social relevance and therefore makes them more accessible to a broader audience.

The figures represent for me a strange conflation of carving and uncarving, doing and (perhaps unintentional) undoing, making and remaking, and it is in this way that the break-sites invoke the temporal paradox of uncarving.

Andrew Hazewinkel
Marsyas 2015
Fibre-based silver gelatin print. 41 x 41 cm

The term ‘uncarving’ presents us with a perceptual conundrum, sometimes the process of carving a stone is spoken of as ‘working’ a stone, but how does one ‘unwork’ a material? What does it mean to uncarve or unwork a material? I identify a usefulness in the conundrum of uncarving in the way it leads us toward the temporal implications that are enactively signified in these objects. What I am trying to draw out here is that the broken bodies of Antiquity, through their capacity to commingle time, instantiate a relationship between their materiality and our memory.

A way for me to further explain this is to return to the Bergsonian working hypothesis of the passage from habitual pure memory to non-habitual memory image. I have already made direct associations between habitual pure memory and the properties of materials, and non-habitual memory image with the qualities of materials. Expanding on these alignments, I observe that it is through the properties and qualities of the materials that constitute the broken bodies of Antiquity, that our habitual pure memory and non-habitual memory image conflate, thus forming our highly individual memory space, which we inhabit with, and through, these objects.

Returning now to my memory-specific analysis I crystallise the hypothesis of enactive signification with the following statements made by Malafouris.

If materiality can be seen to affect the meaning of a message, even in the case where the message is clearly articulated through the use
of written language, one can easily imagine the impact of materiality on the vast majority of cases where the message is not explicitly inscribed on matter but rather embodied and objectified through matter.\textsuperscript{85}

These physical relations between the body and cultural artifacts should not be taken as mere ‘indications’ of ‘internal’ and invisible mental processes; they should, rather, be taken as an important form of thinking. These embodied engagements, not isolated in the brain, create mechanisms, for ‘Aha!’ insight, and for abstraction.\textsuperscript{86}

THE HYPOTHESIS OF MATERIAL AGENCY

The hypothesis of material agency is the third and final working hypothesis of Material Engagement Theory. It investigates agency “not as a human property but as the emergent product of situated activity asking not “What is an agent? but When is an agent?”\textsuperscript{87}

The two main themes inherent to the hypothesis of material agency are,

1. The differences between traditional concepts of anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism, and the cognitive implications of the differences between anthropomorphic and anthropocentric world-views.

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid. 94  
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid. 105  
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid. 51
2. Fetishism.

Malafouris begins his discussion of the third and last major dimension of Material Engagement Theory by saying: “If there is such a thing as human agency, then there is material agency; there is no way that human agency and material agency can be disentangled.”

To begin questioning the conventionally accepted framing of agency as a primarily human phenomenon, it is useful, as Malafouris has pointed out, to re-examine the meaning of anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism, to help clarify the distinction between them, and to acknowledge their frequent misuse. Anthropomorphism is the attribution of human form or character to a god, animal or object. Anthropocentrism is the practice of centring in man, regarding man as the central fact of the universe, to which all surroundings facts have reference.

How is this relevant to the central quest of this thesis, the pursuit of a fresh understanding of the relationships between materials and remembering? By following the ideas that are critical to Material Engagement Theory (that it is how we approach thinking about our rich and varied engagements with the materials and material culture) the relevance becomes clearer. The following example will demonstrate what I am trying to explain, and illustrate what I believe is a common misconstrual.

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88 Ibid. 119
90 Ibid., S.V. “anthropocentric”
There is a long history in Western culture of the personification of nonhuman elements. Rivers are a good example, as is evidenced by Gian Lorenzo Bernini’s 1651 *Fontana dei Quattro Fiumi* (Fountain of the Four Rivers) in Piazza Navonna at Rome. It represents the Ganges, Nile, Danube and Rio de la Plata; each of the river gods is represented in human form. Rivers are not the only nonhuman elements to have a long history of representation in human form. Mountains, oceans, planets, stars, even winds and spirits populate the history of Western art in human form. These are generally considered to be examples of anthropomorphism, but like Malafouris, I suggest that they are anthropomorphic manifestations that represent an anthropocentric view of the world, a world-view that has been the dominant for a very long time.

It can be concluded that this dominant anthropocentric view of the world has over time obscured the nature of our direct relationships with the properties and qualities of materials, and thereby, our understanding of the roles they play in remembering. Malafouris puts it this way: “To engage in anthropocentrism is to perceive humans at the centre of reality; to engage in anthropomorphism is to perceive reality in human terms.”91 My interpretation of this statement is that when reality is perceived from an anthropocentric perspective it is most likely that the concept of agency is perceived as a human property, which excludes the possibility of materials having agency. To view the world in human terms, however, to view the world from an anthropomorphic perspective, is to embrace the concept on nonhuman agency, which leads to the concept of material agency.

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91 *How Things Shape the Mind: A Theory of Material Engagement*. 131
Rethinking our relationships with the rest of the material world, and how we train ourselves to think about our relationships with the rest of the material world, is a critical aspect of Material Engagement Theory and my own research practice.

Anthropocentrism is a bad intellectual habit, characteristic of Western modernity that we need to overcome. Anthropomorphism is a biological necessity of the human condition that we need to embrace, or else we run a constant risk of removing the human subject from the centre of the social universe only to place this subject in a god-like position on top and outside of it. 92

It is important to understand that this is not an anti-humanist quest. Rather as Malafouris puts it, it is a “meta-humanist”93 quest.

The concept of material agency is too broad a field to be neatly articulated through the above discussion about anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism, though it goes a-long way toward explicating it. The other main theme used by Malafouris in explaining the concept of material agency is Fetishism; however,

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92 Ibid. 131
For another engagement with the issue of how long standing, and often unchallenged, ways of thinking directly affect the biological and ecological realms, see Félix Guattari, The Three Ecologies, trans. Ian Pindar and Paul Sutton(London: Continuum, 2000). Another example of what Malafouris calls “a bad intellectual habit” can be found in Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind. He states “There is an ecology of bad ideas, just as there is an ecology of weeds” he goes on to suggest that for to long humanity has adopted the maxim - survival of the fittest - and proposes that if humanity is to survive the current threat to historical human immortality, we must reconfigure the idea of “survival of the fittest” to “survival of the organism plus environment”. 484
93 Malafouris, How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. 132 Malafouris explains that “aim is not to devalue the importance of the role of human subjectivity in the drama of life for the sake of some neo-materialism or neo-determinism, but to understand the nature of this subjectivity from a new symmetric point of view.”
not fetishism as conventionally perceived through the traditional anthropological framework, through Freudian discourses or through Marxist theory.

Malafouris distinguishes his use of the term fetish from the three intellectual traditions mentioned above by relating it to processes and methodologies, rather than to objects. “Instead it relates to the underlying cognitive processes responsible for the generation of the objects or phenomena labelled as fetishes.”

In other words, in the Malfourian sense, the term fetish relates to a process, it is processual and can therefore be applied to methodologies, systems and ideologies. For instance, my example of G. L. Bernini’s *Fountain of the Four Rivers* can be described as an anthropomorphic manifestation that represents an anthropocentric system of thought or ideology. Viewed from this perspective, Rome’s most famous fountain can be understood as representative of a fetishist perspective. In its simplest possible expression, anthropocentrism, when viewed from the perspective of Material Engagement Theory, is itself a fetish. By accepting that fetishism relates to “the underlying cognitive processes responsible for the generation of the objects or phenomena”, it is also possible to argue that many forms of systemic violence caught up in the grand cyclical narrative of mythic violence are themselves fetishist.

I conclude my analysis of the hypothesis of material agency by drawing, again, directly from Malafouris.

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94 Ibid. 133
95 Ibid. 133
Material agency is not a figment of a particular cultural imagination that I seek to understand, but a real, philosophically and ontologically defensible aspect of reality. Thus, my conception of material agency is not grounded in the gray zone of Frazerian ‘contagious’ and ‘sympathetic’ magic where supernatural powers dwell and acquire material form and substance, but in the relational ontology of material engagement. 96

CHAPTER 5: A SUMMARY IN CONCLUSION

In this chapter I focused on Material Engagement Theory, the most recent conceptual development to emerge from the field of Cognitive Archaeology; my frame of reference remained steadfastly on the relationship between materials and remembering. This chapter summary is longer than previous chapter summaries due to the criticality of Material Engagement Theory to the driving quest of this thesis, which aims to provide fresh understanding of the relationship between materials and remembering.

Firstly I examined Material Engagement Theory’s emergence from more traditional modes of archaeological research, and I highlighted Renfrew’s premise that it was the ‘relative neglect’ in scholarly studies into the relationships between the cognitive dimension of societies and objects that resulted in the new field’s slow emergence. From this I drew out distinct parallels between Renfrew’s exampled ‘relative neglect’ and the reasoning behind my focus in undertaking this

96 Ibid. 146
doctoral research project. This brought me back to Hirsch’s tendency to privilege the photographic and literary forms of expression that are associated with memory transfer over the potential expressivity of objects and their materiality. I made it clear that, for me, the Hirschian perspective is diametrically opposed to the aims of Material Engagement Theory, and this thesis.

Arriving at this conclusion set up the necessity for me to analyse the three working hypotheses of Material Engagement Theory in direct relation to the issue of memory. It is important that we remind ourselves what the three central hypotheses of Material Engagement Theory actually are.

1. *The hypothesis of the extended mind* - ‘explores the constitutive intertwining of cognition with material culture.’ 97

2. *The hypothesis of enactive signification* - ‘explores the nature of the material sign not as a representational mechanism rather as a semiotic conflation and co-habitation through matter that enacts and brings forth the world.’ 98

3. *The hypothesis of material agency* - ‘explores agency not as a human property, but as the emergent product of situated activity asking not “What is an agent” but “When is an agent”’. 99

97 Ibid. 50
98 Ibid. 51
99 Ibid. 51
Before summarising my analysis of each of the three central hypotheses of Material Engagement Theory, I need to again point out that Material Engagement Theory is characterised by two main concerns - a rethinking of materiality, and a rethinking of human cognition – these concerns are also the main concerns of this doctoral inquiry, as is specifically expressed through my studio-based experiments and the theoretical research undertaken throughout this doctoral research project. As I have already explained the hypothesis of the extended mind is a means through which we are able to conceive of cognition, and therefore remembering, as a socially embedded, embodied process that is distributed beyond the individual. As Malafouris suggests, if we accept these relational domains of human cognition, then we are “able to collapse the conventional mind / brain tautology and mind / body dichotomy”.  

I began my analysis of the hypothesis of the extended mind by asking the following question. If the hypothesis of the extended mind is an attempt to delimit the commonly held perceptions of the boundaries of the mind, how might it be used to delimit the commonly held perceptions of how memory is formed, reformed, and transferred between individuals? This brought me back to Polanyi’s example of a blind person using a stick as a means to ‘feel’ their way into and through the world. This powerful metaphor of “ontological unity” between the human and the nonhuman has direct associations with the hypothesis of the extended mind; in fact Malafouris also uses it to explicate this hypothesis, which enables us to think of the mind as “continuous” with the rest of the material

101 How Things Shape the Mind : A Theory of Material Engagement. 244
102 Ibid. 244
world. So how does the *hypotheses of the extended mind* directly relate with memory? By accepting Malafouris’ delimited conception of cognition and then using it to question the long held idea that memory resides in the mind, which is inside the head, which functions as a kind of storehouse for memory, we can begin to conceive of the materials of which things are made as ‘enactive agents’ in the dynamic, reciprocal processes of remembrance, in which the traces, residues and presences of another’s experiences commingle with our own. I pointed out that nine years prior to the formalisation of Material Engagement Theory, Malafouris identified a need for more subtle classifications of the memory related aspects of material culture, and for a shift in the established individually based approach to analysis of human memory; the subsequent study of these two important related issues has led toward an understanding of memory that extends beyond the individual. The conception of memory that extends beyond the individual is important in my research as it directs it toward a conception of social memory, which I now associate with the qualities of materials. I returned to photography as a means of exploring the implications that the *hypothesis of the extended mind* has on issue of memory. Turning to the photographic object, I highlighted its touchable properties and distinguished them from the image that the object ‘holds’. I used this example to demonstrate that in the same manner that a blind person’s stick represents a coalition between the human and the nonhuman; the printed photograph (or other photographic objects for that matter) also conflate the brain, body and thing; through which, according to the *hypothesis of the extended mind*, cognition (and therefore memory) emerges.
I propose that it is in the conflation of, and transactional interface between the photographic object, which is outside of the body, and its directly associated image, which resides inside the mind (that is the extended mind) that memory is produced and remembering occurs.

This conception of memory raised the question of why there has, historically speaking, been a general tendency to prioritise the mental over the material, the psychic over the haptic. This question led me to consider another important aspect of the hypothesis of the extended mind, one concerning the internalist / externalist dualism. Of this dualism Malafouris proposed that ‘historical convention’ rather than a ‘a priori metaphysical truth’ is its basis. Responding to this I highlighted that Material Engagement Theory does not seek to prioritise either the internal or the external factors in cognitive processes; rather, that it is based on the principle of ‘constitutive intertwining’ of cognition and material culture, which occurs through the process of ‘active participation’ that should be understood as a mutual process of exchange between the internal and external. In other words, Material Engagement Theory is a ‘locationally neutral’ but not ‘substrate neutral’ account of cognition, and therefore memory.

This issue of the internalist / externalist dualism required further consideration in relation to how the hypothesis of the extended mind can be deployed and thus contribute to fresh understanding of the relationships between materials and remembering. I examined the very nature of the transactional exchanges between internalist and externalist perspectives by again returning to Hirsch.

103 Ibid. 76
While I recognise Hirsch’s conception of postmemory as a significant departure from a purely internalist view of memory, I argue that her exampled ideas are based only on the socially constructed qualities of materials and, therefore, she goes only part of the way. Her examples are bound up with the intentionality of not forgetting, which is different from remembering. I suggest that the properties of materials also have a significant role to play in the generation of memory and that they have the capacity to generate a sense of wit(h)ness, which a more comprehensive externalist view, than that taken by Hirsch, needs to embrace. The concept of active externalism is contingent on the conflation of the properties and qualities of materials, and it takes us a lot closer to the fresh understanding of the relationships between materials and remembering that this thesis pursues.

I concluded my analysis of the hypothesis of the extended mind by coming back to my concept of premembering. I consider premembering to be a distributed system of cognition that extends beyond the individual and is enacted through a process of active externalism that embraces both the properties and qualities of materials in processes of mutual participation. In some ways this entire thesis can be understood as an attempt to gain greater clarity of the complex concept of premembering which challenges some of the longest standing and commonly held views of ‘what’ and ‘how’ memory is. As I have progressed through this thesis I have found ways to explicate different aspects of my conception of prememebreng, those expressed in this chapter relate specifically the social dimension of premembering, those examined in the previous chapter relate specifically with how it challenges and reorientates longstanding assumptions regarding memory’s temporal framing.
I then began my inquiry into the semiotic dimension of materials, specifically the issue of material semiosis, by analysing the second working hypothesis of Material Engagement Theory, the \textit{hypothesis of enactive signification}. Critical to the \textit{hypothesis of enactive signification} is that it explores the very nature of the material sign, and positions it as a ‘semiotic conflation’ and ‘co-habitation’ through matter that “both enacts and brings forth the world”.\footnote{Ibid. 51} This understanding of the material sign is oppositional to the conception of the material sign as a representational mechanism, and reinforces the idea that the semiotic dimension of language and the semiotic dimension of material culture are significantly different. As my frame of reference throughout this chapter, and indeed the entire thesis, is concerned primarily with remembering, my analysis of the \textit{hypothesis of enactive signification} is briefer than my analysis of the \textit{hypothesis of the extended mind}, which bears more distinct and direct relations with the issue of memory.

The \textit{hypothesis of enactive signification} asks a very simple but perhaps unexpected question, it asks ‘how’ is a sign rather than ‘what’ is a sign? With Malafouris’ help I explained the way that enactive signification works contra to the representational view of the mind, and that it is foundational to the constitutive intertwining of cognition and material culture which is the basis of the concept of the extended mind. I explained that the main difference between the semiotic dimension of language and the semiotic dimension of material...
culture is that the material sign does not function through the embodiment of a communicative or representational logic, rather, through the process of material semiosis. This is reflected in my approach to art making, I have previously referred to a kind of material cycling at work in my studio-based experiments, my intended meaning in using that expression was to describe the cycles or loops of association between the conceptual concerns, material concerns and, at times, mythological concerns of my chosen subject matter. My expression of ‘material cycling’ is mirrored and more succinctly expressed by the term material semiosis.

Considering how enactive signification actually works, I reflected it onto the Saussurian approach to semiotics, and again with the help of Malafouris I pointed out that Saussure’s approach has a nominalist base rather than a realist ontological base, and that this ultimately disembodies or disengages the relationship between a sign and what it signifies. The second main point of distinction between enactive signification and Saussure’s approach to semiotics is in the latter’s premise that arbitrariness characterises the internal bond that links the signifier with the signified. This policy of arbitrariness excludes the potential for meaning to arise from the materiality and the processes that are involved in the making of a sign. To help explain this I drew from and expanded upon Malafouris’ example of a hand signed letter and a digitally authorised letter. By looking at the specific materilaities of an embossed letterhead paper and a Post-it note, I demonstrated how the cultural and historically distant implications of a particular material can remain deeply embedded in their contemporary descendants and, indeed, how these socio-cultural qualities of a particular material can be deployed to attain desired associations.
Coming back to memory, I propose that the hypothesis of enactive signification contributes most to the generation of fresh understanding of the relationships between materials and remembering by clearly distinguishing the material sign from the linguistic sign, and by illuminating what Malafouris refers to as the “fallacy of the linguistic sign”. To really understand the fallacy of the linguistic sign requires acknowledging the common practice of either implicitly or explicitly collapsing the material sign into the category of the linguistic sign. I propose that because the fallacy of the linguistic sign works against the concept of enactive signification it has played a powerful role in burying the idea that materials have an active role to play in meaning and memory making. The collapsing of the semiotic dimension of materials, including material semiosis, and as a result its potential for memory and knowledge production, into the realm of linguistic signification, has led us further and further away from understanding the profound implications of our daily interactions with the rest of the material world.

Before moving onto my analysis of the third working hypothesis of Material Engagement Theory, the hypothesis of material agency, I turned again to my studio-based research as a means to explicate the reasons for my focus on damaged ancient figurative sculpture as a subject field through which to examine the contemporary relationships between materials and remembering.

I pointed out that at the commencement of this doctoral research I considered that my chosen subject matter would provide me with an avenue of investigation

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105 Ibid. 90
through which I would arrive at a clearer understanding of the practical intersections between the two main areas that characterise my art making, object-based sculpture and photography. As I have progressed though my research it has become clear that something “known yet untellable”\(^{106}\) was present at this project’s inception. Through a series of precise distinctions in relation to memory, material culture, and human cognition I have come to understand that the enactive signification of the broken bodies of Antiquity enables me to examine the contemporary and ongoing social relevance of ancient objects. I pointed out that my interest lies in the injured or damaged figures only, and that the very few pristine unbroken sculptures appear to me as a kind of fiction. I asserted the importance of the break-sites of these stone and bronze bodies in the commingling of time, and the processual paradox that resides in their making and unmaking. I explained how at the break-site we are exposed to the geological index of time, through the exposure to the ‘raw’ material that is exposed, and the human temporal index that is invoked by the remaining, evident human form. It is through the conflation of these temporal indices and the profound embodied relationship that we have with what remains of the broken bodies of Antiquity that their contemporary social relevance emerges. The perceptual paradox that is set in motion by their break-sites concerns a strange conflation of carving and uncarving. How does one uncarve something? This perceptual conundrum is productive when it leads us toward the temporal implications that are enactively signified in these broken bodies. Simply put, through their inherent capacity to commingle time, the broken bodies of Antiquity instantiate a relationship between their materiality and our memory.

\(^{106}\) Here I am making a direct reference to Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowing.
I began my memory-focused analysis of the hypothesis of material agency by making very clear that it investigates the premise that agency is not an exclusively human property, rather it is the emergent product of a situated activity. Moreover the key question is not ‘what’ is an agent but ‘when’ is an agent? My analysis focused on two main areas of consideration; the first is the differences between traditional conceptions of anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism and their associated cognitive implications, the second, the concept of fetishism.

Anthropomorphism, as we know, is the attribution of human characteristics to nonhuman elements, and anthropocentrism is the practice of placing humankind at the centre, or in the most elevated position, in a world-view. So exactly how can the hypothesis of material agency serve fresh understanding of the relationships between materials and remembering? As a way of explaining this, I used the example of the proliferation in Western art of anthropomorphism from an anthropocentric position. I propose that this has contributed to the obscuration of our direct relationships with the properties and qualities of materials. Malafouris states that “to engage in anthropocentrism is to perceive reality in human terms”\(^{107}\), building on this comment I suggest that the dominant anthropocentric perspective in Western thought has led to the conception of agency as a human property that excludes the possibility of materials having agency. By applying this notion to thinking about the ways we train ourselves to think about the cognitive relationships between ourselves and the rest of the material world, Material Engagement Theory becomes critical. I explained that the issue of material

agency does not fit wholly into the discussion about anthropomorphic and anthropocentric world-views, and that the issue of fetishism provides us with another useful context through which we can come to understand it. To do so requires an understanding of fetishism that is outside of the framework of traditional anthropology, Freudian discourses and Marxist Theory; Malafouris positions it thus by relating fetishism with processes and methodologies, rather than with objects. I extend Malafouris’ perspective by relating fetishism with systems and ideologies; then by applying my conception of fetishism to my earlier example of anthropomorphic manifestations that are representative of an anthropocentric world-view, I propose that world-view, and the systems and ideologies that characterise it, as fetishistic. This brings us back to the systems of social regulation and law enforcement that developed conterminously with the emergence of the photographic medium, and enables me to position them as fetishistically inflected.

Through this detailed summary of the memory-related analysis of the hypothesis of the extended mind, the hypothesis of enactive signification and the hypothesis of material agency, I have foregrounded the next important issue to be considered in this thesis; the issue of collectivity, specifically in relation to acceptance, complicity, and intentionality which, in the following chapter, I take up and examine within the framework of our relationships with death and remembering.
CHAPTER 6
STATUES AND FORGETTING

We walk over the black box of fundamental death, trample on our dissolved ancestors in such a way that history and memory lie in the depths of dark excavation sites. The Earth is the ark for the dead at the same time as the set of objects.

Michel Serres \(^1\)

The greatest tearing of our time comes from the formidable noise that language makes in order to claim that it produces the century even though we live, taciturn, dyslexic, drowned amongst objects, in the midst of statues that have come back, in a hard flood repeating the most ancient of idolatrous times, a strange state that the dying languages inveigh against so as not to understand it.

Michel Serres \(^2\)

In this chapter I examine the relationships between materials and remembering by turning to the field of contemporary philosophy. I focus specifically on the recent

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\(^2\) Ibid. 25
work of Michel Serres addressing statuary, through which he proposes a conception of statues as more than static entities, rather as the “basis of knowledge, society, the subject and object, the world and experience”.\textsuperscript{3} Through a series of mediations on examples that bridge prehistory and the contemporary realm, Serres proposes the centrality of death and the statufied dead body as central to the human condition and he exposes how sacrificial art was foundational to and still persists in society.

Although the ancient sculpture that I have examined and worked with throughout this doctoral research was not chosen for its funereal association, rather for its era of origin and importantly its damaged state, much of the ancient material that I have focused on does have a funereal origin. Therefore my research implicitly has strong conceptual associations with Serres’ philosophical meditations on ancient statuary and death, and the legacies of this relationship in our contemporary social dimension.

In this chapter I draw on Serres and Aleida Assmann’s research on the role of the arts in the production of the cultural memory of Western civilization. This extends my investigation into the contemporary social relevance of ancient figurative sculpture, and advances my pursuit of fresh understanding of the ways in which the broken bodies of Antiquity remain relevant to the everyday experiences of contemporary citizens.

\textsuperscript{3} Ibid. jacket

As I progress through this chapter, which consists primarily of a detailed memory-focused analysis of the two foundations proposed by Serres at the beginning of *Statues: The Second Book of Foundations*, I make reference to the Assmann’s text; however, I want to make it clear that this chapter is mostly concerned with the application of Serres’ philosophical approach to the consideration of the relationships between ancient statuary and remembering. While important, Assmann’s work is subsidiary in this instance. Although Assmann identifies a close relationship between the concept of cultural memory and the arts, she examines it through the media of writing, images, bodily practices, places and monuments. As the driving quest of my research is fresh understanding of the relationships between materials and remembering, through an examination of the broken figurative statuary of Antiquity, the area of Assmann’s work that I draw most from is the section of her book concerning the body.

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¹ Ibid.
TWO FOUNDATIONS

At the beginning of *Statues: The Second Book of Foundations*, Serres proposes two founding thoughts that lay the basis for considering the contemporary cultural legacies of ancient sculpture.

Foundation 1 concerns collectivity, and puts the subject in relation with death.

Foundation 2, consequent of, but not necessarily following Foundation 1, puts death in relation with the object. ⁶

Both of these foundations can be understood as having conceptual connections with early photography, which is where this doctoral research project began, these conceptual connections are based in early photography’s relationship with death and memory.

Before I commence my memory-focused analysis of Serres’ two foundations, I bring to the fore the etymological origins for the word *matter* and, by association, the words *material, materials and materiality* as used throughout this thesis. Although understood by some, the etymological relationship between the word *matter* and the word *mother* remain largely buried in conventional use of the English language. Excavating the origins and the changing meaning of the term *matter*, we uncover its origin in the Latin word *mater* meaning *origin, source*, and *mother*. The next development in the long line of meanings that deliver us today’s

⁶ Serres, *Statues*. 22-23
contemporary understanding of the term is the Latin word *materia*, which *described the hard inner wood of a tree* and more generally *the substance of which something is made.* 7 The word *matter* is, therefore, closely associated with both *mother* and the notion of *origin*, which are both concepts inextricably caught up with remembering and loss.

This association brings us back to photography and Barthes, specifically his well-known, yet largely unseen photograph of his mother as a child, the *Winter Garden Photograph*. In Chapter 2 I examined this image and its importance in the development of Barthes’ hypothesis that a photograph actually blocks memory.

Not only is photography never in essence, a memory…it actually blocks memory, quickly becomes a counter-memory.8

I return to Barthes famous hypothesis to reminds us that it is not the photographic image that serves best our memory, rather, as I proposed in Chapter 2, it is our embodied relationships with materials that better serves remembering. In reference to the philosophical legacies inherent in the etymological associations between the terms *matter* and *mother*, Serres makes the point that “Materialism, never scientific, remains a philosophy at the breast.”9

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9 Serres, *Statues*. 51
For another engagement with the issue of the maternal, specifically, the womb, see Luce Irigaray, "The Bodily Encounter with the Mother," in *The Irigaray Reader*, ed. Margaret Whitford(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991).
Serres’ First Foundation is explained via three examples. The first example is the 1986 explosion of the Challenger Space Shuttle. Serres deploys it to highlight the role played by the media in shaping our collective remembered experience of the event. The second example is the 6th century B.C. howling, enemy incinerating, bronze bull statue that was commissioned by Phalaris of Agrigentum. Serres’ third example is, historically speaking, only slightly younger than the second, namely the 6th century B.C. jewelled, bronze, mechanised, child devouring sculpture of the god Baal erected in Carthage. Through these examples Serres establishes a timeless association between sculpture and death, and in each case examines the deeply embedded collective response to these specific associations. This leads me to conclude that these associations have not changed greatly in the last 2500 years. According to Serres, the collective or social response at the root of the ongoing associations between sculpture and death has to do with the concepts of collective acceptance, complicity and intentionality.

The Space Shuttle Challenger example highlights the effect of repeated television broadcasts of the event’s iconic imagery on the memories of millions of viewers around the world. It reveals a kind of media misguidance, or obscuration, of the intentionality at work. This multiple bearing witness to the event, in real time, over and over again has a profound effect on our remembering. When we experience an event in this way we experience it not as a singular, isolated event within our personal, historical, human time; rather, through our repeated exposure

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10 Serres, Statues. 2-3
to the imagery of the event across days, weeks, months, years, it continues to explode into the different circumstances of our daily lives. You can watch it right now on YouTube.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fSTrmJtHLFU

It is in the habitual way that the media representation of lift-off and the seventy four seconds of hopeful futurity and faith in progress that precedes the momentous explosion, that the event enters (in the Bergsonian sense) our non-habitual memory image. In this example, the repeated television and now Internet broadcasting of the event, fulfils the function of the habitual in Bergson’s conception of the passage from pure memory to memory image. Through the event’s proliferation, we cease to bear witness to the event; rather, we develop and experience a sense of wit(h)ness with the event.

In Chapter 3 I examined Polanyi’s conception of the tacit dimension in relation to the Bergsonian hypothesis of the passage from pure memory to memory image. Through my analysis of Polanyi’s conception of the tacit dimension I proposed that the concept of indwelling is closely related with the human body, and therefore, the rest of the stuff of the material world. According to Polanyi, we come to indwell with something in this way, “we can say that when we make a thing function as the proximal term of tacit knowing, we incorporate it in our body - or extend our body to include it - so that we come to dwell in it”.  

Although *indwelling* and *wit(h)ness* are closely associated terms, a subtle yet important distinction can be made between them. Simply explained, *indwelling* is more closely related with the body, things, and therefore the tangible and tactile *properties* of materials; *wit(h)ness*, as I see it, is more closely related with the social dimension, and therefore the collectively constructed and experienced *qualities* of materials or an event.

indwelling - properties
wit(h)ness - qualities

I argued in the previous chapter that it is through the conflation of our experiences with the *properties* and the *qualities* of materials that our individual memory space is formed. Therefore, indwelling and wit(h)ness are potential responses to (or experiences with) the properties and qualities of materials. I propose that in the same manner as the active participation between the *properties* and *qualities* of materials (which occurs in their conflation), forms our individual memory space, the active participation between *wit(h)ness* and *indwelling*, has much the same generative effect. In short, indwelling, in conflation with wit(h)ness, gives shape to how we *enact* our highly individual memory spaces, and perhaps what we choose to do with it.

The First Foundation concerns a timeless collective acceptance of violence that is enacted upon others, in the name of a common good. Throughout his book Serres
posits rockets and missiles as sculptures. He uses these chosen examples as a way to expose the role that intentionality plays in the collective acceptance of violence enacted upon others in the name of the common good. This leads him to liken the missiles and warheads that are currently pointed at each of us in a criss-crossing network between tolerant and civilized societies, as statues. “We attend to our daily affairs, threatened, some would say protected, by the power of these statues, ready for blast off.”13

By conceiving the proliferated, ready to fire missiles that surround us (and the Challenger Space Shuttle) as statues, a direct link can be drawn to the embedded cultural implications of ancient figurative sculpture, thus making clear their ongoing association with loss, death and remembering. This is especially so in the case of the Challenger Space Shuttle, and for all of us that maintain a sense of wit(h)ness with those seventy four seconds of January 28th 1986:

There is a history of science or of these technologies, certainly, and even several, but more profoundly there is an anthropology of them. The humanities teach this anthropology, without knowing it: when they speak of statues, they shed light on those of our museums or cemeteries, but also and above all on torpedos and missiles.14

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13 Serres, Statues. 6
In addition to the premise of collective acceptance in relation to death, loss and mourning, Serres uses his examples to highlight the material likeness between rockets, missiles and his exampled ancient sacrificial sculpture.

14 Ibid. 6
This brings us back to Žižek’s concept of systemic violence, discussed in Chapter 3, and specifically to the role that it plays in the interconnected triumvirate of subjective, symbolic and systemic violence, and in the ongoing cycles of mythic violence as defined by Benjamin. For me the broken bodies of Antiquity are manifestations of a violently inflicted material semiosis, and they somehow bear silent wit(h)ness to the systemic violence enacted by super powers on others, under the guise of protecting the ‘innocents’ in their charge; and in forming the collective acceptance, maintained by those innocents, of the violent acts that are designed to ‘protect’ them.

By what unfathomable mystery do we tolerate so many deaths for the sake of progress of the happiness of the greatest number? 15

Another important memory-related aspect of the First Foundation relates, specifically, to the idea collective forgetting. The concept of immortality is conventionally perceived in relation to the individual, and it is usually considered within the realm of the spiritual; however, as Serres points out there is also an historical, collective conception of immortality. The historical, collective conception of immortality can be understood as the ongoing continuum from generation to generation, of human time “over the centuries of centuries without rupture or break”. 16

My fieldwork led me to discover that this was well understood and respected in Antiquity as evidenced by the epigram of a fourth century B.C. grave stele that

15 Ibid. 13
16 Ibid. 7
represents Andron, an elderly Athenian, bidding farewell to one of his sons.

“Andron is buried here, who looked on one of his own sons, dead, and, dead (himself), welcomed the other.”

Serres posits that over time, and particularly through certain events of the 20th century, such as the 6th of August 1945 bombing of Hiroshima, we have

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The translation from ancient Greek is drawn from the didactic panel accompanying the object.
forgotten this form of immortality. He suggests that it is not just the passage of time that is responsible for this very particular collective forgetting; rather, it is the result of a proliferation of ‘effective technologies’ in rupture with society and culture:

For having forgotten this immortality, we put it in danger of being interrupted. This forgetting has resulted in the opposition of effective technologies and those of society and culture. The former construct the world, the latter construct time. On their own the latter without the former tend to abandon real things: isolated, the former without the latter push up or close duration.  

The following diagram outlines the ‘functioning rupture’ of the relatively new dualism between effective technologies and society and culture as proposed by Serres. 

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18 Serres, Statues. 8

For further engagement with the issue of the contemporary social implications of the 1945 bombing of Hiroshima, specifically in relation to death and collectivity, see Mary Zournazi, "The Art of Living: A Conversation with Michel Serres," in Hope. New Philosophies for Change(Annandale: Pluto Press, 2002). 193-194, 208

19 Serres, Statues. 8

20 For Serres’ description of the functioning rupture between effective technologies and society and culture, see ibid. 8
The concomitant implementation and effects of this relationship of rupture, the ‘power’ inherent in this schismatic relationship is, according to Serres, drawn forth by a quadriga of administration, media, science and technology.

Administration holds the performative power of language, the media possess its seduction, science keeps its truth-value, and technology the monopoly on effectiveness.  

This brings us back to the issue of systemic and symbolic violence, which is, at times, deeply embedded in contemporary presentations of history, and of past cultures that persist in the realm of commingled time.

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21 Ibid. 9
The Second Foundation puts death in relation with the object. Serres precedes this direct and straight-forward statement with the following temporal conundrum: “The second foundation, about which we don’t know whether it precedes or follows the first, ensues from it or deepens it.” This statement is important in terms of understanding the significance placed by Serres on the commingling of time.

Jules Verne’s 1865 novel *De la terre à la lune* is the device with which the Second Foundation is introduced. In this story the *Columbiad*, a humanly inhabited military shell, a space gun pointed at the moon, is launched by a gigantic underground canon. On board are three humans and two dogs, a male and a female. One of the dogs dies from the shock of the blast-off, which quickly raises the issue of how to dispose of the now dead body. The issue of how a community (in this instance, an intimate, future focused community), chooses to deal with the physical remains of death is central to this story. This example sets us thinking about burial, cremation and other disposal methodologies, about the earth, the humus, and the social connections with (or, indeed, disconnections with) the remnant bodies of the no longer living.

The Second Foundation sets up three direct questions that concern the stabilising relationships between subject, object and death.

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22 Ibid. 22
1. Are the relations of the subject to the object stabilised by death?

2. Are the relations of the subject to death stabilised by the object?

3. Are the relations of death and the object stabilised by the subject?

These three questions are helpful when considering the specific relationships between the broken bodies of Antiquity and remembering, in the context of death, loss and mourning. Applying these questions to the broken bodies of ancient figurative sculpture, I position the subject as viewer, the broken stone body of Antiquity as object, while death remains death. I now re-ask Serres’ questions.

1. Are the relations between a viewer and a broken body of Antiquity stabilised by death? Or to put it another way, is it the fundamental knowledge of our own inescapable death, and therefore our participation in the collective immortality of human being, that stabilises our relations with these broken bodies of Antiquity?

2. Are the relations between a viewer and the knowledge of their own inescapable deaths stabilised by the broken bodies of Antiquity?

3. Are the relations between death and the broken bodies of Antiquity stabilised by the presence of a viewer?
By reframing Serres’ questions in relation to the broken bodies of Antiquity, I highlight the parallels between the memorial function of early photography and the memorial function of much ancient sculpture. What I mean by this is both technologies can be characterised as having a relationship with remembering that is directly caught up with death, loss and mourning.

In reposing Serres questions I positioned the viewer as subject as a means of directly questioning the nature of the viewer’s relationships with ancient figurative sculpture, death, loss and remembering. This is a helpful way to consider the complex idea of the material semosis of these carved stones and, thus, our shared material relationship with the earth and the humus with which we share bodily and etymological origins.

Returning to Serres’ original questions, I again repose them. This time however, given the physical mutuality that exists between our bodies and the broken bodies of Antiquity, we are going to swap roles with the broken bodies of the deep past. In the following three questions the subject / object roles are inverted, the viewer now assumes the position of object, the broken bodies of Antiquity assume the position of subject, and again death remains death.

1. Are the relations between a broken body of Antiquity and a viewer stabilised by death?

2. Are the relations between the broken bodies of Antiquity and death stabilised by a viewer’s knowledge of their own inescapable death?
3. Are the relations between death and a viewer stabilised by the presence of a broken body of Antiquity?

The complex consideration of these questions is manifest in another example from my photographic fieldwork, evidenced by the epigram on a 6th century B.C. kouros that was found in Anavysos near Athens.

“Stop and mourn at the grave of dead Kroisos, whom the raging Ares destroyed when he fought among the defenders.”

Fieldwork documentation.
Kouroso. Parian marble. 530 B.C.
3851. Archaeological Museum of Piraeus at Athens.

The translation of the ancient Greek is drawn from the didactic panel accompanying the object.
Throughout this doctoral research I have asked these questions again and again as a means of drawing out what Hirsch describes as a ‘sense of living connection’ between the living and the experiences of those that came before us; specifically, with the violence experienced by those that came before us. I do not wish to diminish in any way the violent experiences that Hirsch is referring to when she makes this statement, rather in drawing this parallel I wish to expand on her thesis and to address her tendency to prioritise the role played by the visual and literary in second generation manifestations of such violence. I do so in the hope of providing fresh understanding of the relationships between materials and remembering and, therefore, knowledge transfer.

What I am questioning here is whether, when viewed from the perspective of the extended mind, the broken bodies of Antiquity give shape to our memories though a profoundly physical sensing of the past experiences of others. Supported by the arguments of Serres, Hirsch and others, I propose that in the realm of commingled time, these silent and immobile damaged figures join us in our collective human being, and participate in, rather than represent, our collective immortality.

In the Foreword of this thesis I referred to the concept of premembering as the understanding of events, circumstances or conditions that one may not have directly experienced, but that one’s culture already knows and stores up for all of its future participants.

As I have progressed through the development of this thesis, I have repeatedly returned to the concept of premembering and reshaped its definition in specific
relationship to materials. What has remained constant throughout the evolving definitions is the premise, “that one’s culture knows and stores up for all of its future participants.” In the previous chapter I described premembering as a distributed system of memory-related cognition that extends beyond the individual and is enacted through a process of active externalism that involves both the properties and qualities of materials in processes of mutual participation.

If we consider the properties and qualities of the broken bodies of Antiquity as active participants in a distributed system of memory enacted by and through the extended mind, rather than as inert displaced artefacts of another time; we are forced to acknowledge them as contributing participants in the active externalism that shapes the social memory that our cultures know and store up for us; and through which we negotiate the life-world.

SOFT BODIES, HARD BODIES

Memory Studies, as we know, is a relatively recent field of scholarly activity. We also know that for a long time the atrocities of the Holocaust functioned as a limit case for considering the relationships between trauma (individual and collective) and memory (individual and collective). As I have already stated, this thesis should not be read as a deliberate contribution to the important field of Holocaust Studies, and I reiterate the point that the Nazi Holocaust is no longer understood as a limit case for examining the relationship between violence and remembering. The Stolen Generations of Indigenous Australians, the Armenian Genocide, the Rwandan Genocide and the atrocities of the Killing Fields of Cambodia are just some of the many other examples. This expanding list is evidence of real and
widespread distribution (across time and space) of what Benjamin has called Mythic Violence.

As I have already explained, violence is used throughout this doctoral research as a prism, through which I focus on the driving concerns of this thesis, which is to generate fresh understanding of the relationships between materials and remembering. For this reason I am less concerned with the subject matter through which Assmann examines her ideas. (see quote below) Rather I am more interested in the ideas themselves. While this may seem like a dangerous separation between subject matter and content, in the following analysis of Assmann’s work I consider the stories and experiences of the Holocaust as examples through which I endeavour to go beyond their subject matter in order to consider the very principles that Assmann explicates; and then to consider these memory-focused principles in specific relation to materials.

The field of memory studies is alive with new perspectives and theories. As Assmann puts it:

We are currently facing, restructuring, and discussing new forms of memory that open up an access to the past that is distinct from and complementary to that which is provided by historical scholarship. Living memory thus gives way to a cultural memory that is underpinned by media - by material carriers such as memorials, monuments, museums, and archives.24

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24 Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Western Civilization: Functions, Media, Archives.* 6
My aim has been to participate in this bristling field, and to offer fresh understanding of the relationships between materials and remembering by drawing together emergent thinking from the diverse fields of Cognitive Archaeology, Social Anthropology, Philosophy, and Memory Studies. To this end it is important to bear in mind Assmann’s assertion that there is “no self-organisation and self regulation of cultural memory”. Rather, as she points out, cultural memory is reliant on the conflation of “personal decisions and selections” with institutions and media. Thus the concept of cultural memory challenges some longstanding beliefs that memory is an individual phenomenon that can at best be socialised through the sharing of individual memories.

Applying the hypothesis of the extended mind to the concept of Cultural Memory reveals that the collectivity at work in generating Cultural Memory extends beyond the physical limits of an individual, to include all of the material culture of the life-world.

Fresh perspectives, such as this, now characterise and energise the field of memory studies.

The transposition of individual living to artificial cultural memory and thus from short-term to long-term memory is a highly complex process fraught with problems: it brings together temporal extension with the threat of distortion, reduction, and manipulation.

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25 Ibid. 6
26 Ibid. 6
that can only be averted through continuous public criticism, reflection, and discussion.\textsuperscript{27}

As Malafouris identified in his pursuit of a theory of material engagement, the complexity of the task is too great for any singular field of study operating in isolation to provide a meaningful understanding. Assmann suggests the same in relation to the phenomenon of memory: “The subject not only transcends the borders of individual disciplines, in the sense that there is no one profession that can provide an all-embracing concept of it.”\textsuperscript{28}

Assmann, like Serres but from her own particular standpoint, discusses the relationships between the body and memory in Antiquity. She links the ancient stories of Simonides,\textsuperscript{29} made into the foundational legend of ‘new art of mnemotechnics’ by Cicero,\textsuperscript{30} with the tale on Melamphus\textsuperscript{31} to highlight different forms of memory. Through this comparison she emphasizes that the “material structure”\textsuperscript{32} of “memory carriers”\textsuperscript{33} plays an “especially important role”\textsuperscript{34}. She then points out that both of the memory metaphors introduced by Aristotle and Plato connect the durability of an impression with its reliability and that, historically speaking, stone, although more expensive than wax or clay, was the most durable material even though acts of violence or exposure to weather would

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid. 6
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid. 6
\textsuperscript{30} Assmann, \textit{Cultural Memory and Western Civilization: Functions, Media, Archives}. 230
\textsuperscript{31} Assmann points out that these two ancient stories, both of which combine the collapse of a house with an unusual feat of memory, have previously not been linked.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid. 231
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid. 231
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid. 231
remove the signs engraved upon them, and that these actions would remain visible in acts of reuse, motivated by economic necessity, or acts of damnatio memoriae founded in the social and legal response to falls from power or grace.

The following example from my photographic fieldwork evidences a productive between-ness between the properties related durability of a material and the flexibility of the intended meaning of artefact created from it. What I am trying to explain here is that the durability of a material does not ensure the durability of the intended meaning of the artefact crafted from, and with, it. The following example demonstrates how an artefact’s use history can be modified for material and memorial purposes. It also demonstrates a curious commingling of socially motivated practical use histories.

The sarcophagus represented below, was used twice. Originally a married couple were represented reclining on its lid that has the design of a mattress.

However, somewhere between A.D. 230-240, in a period of economic difficulty, the original male figure was cut away and replaced by a group of papyrus scrolls (visible on the right of the image). Then the head of the female figure was removed and replaced with the head of the man seen above. In this example we can identify that the original specific intentionality of the sarcophagus has been altered. This is a complex, multi-layered example in that it demonstrates a personal complicity in the violent act of cutting away individuals and body parts from a funereal mnemonic technic artefact to achieve the same intentionality as was already implicit to the object; this raises the issue of ‘conscience’.

Nietzsche, it is noted by Assmann, can be acknowledged as responsible for turning the metaphor of memory from the traditional body soul opposition, in which the soul was a prisoner of the body, to the conception of soul fulfilling the function of the body’s jailer.35 This paradigm shift in thinking about memory meant that “now it was the sensitive and vulnerable body that became the writing surface, instead of the heart and soul”.36 In *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche questions how it is possible that individuals are able to develop what he calls a ‘memory of will’, which both passively retains a ‘once engraved impression’ and actively links with its content. In Nietzschean, terms the memory of will is ‘conscience’.

Conscience can be considered in relation to Serres’ First Foundation which concerns, in my interpretation, the collective acceptance of a set of conditions that are usually associated with the violence experienced by others, in defence of the

35 Ibid. 234
36 Ibid. 234
self. Serres’ First Foundation is, for me, caught up with the idea of ethics and how it plays a role in both the generation and recall of memory. Considering Nietzsche’s conception of ‘conscience’ in relation to memory and will, Assmann writes:

He calls this memory of will ‘conscience,’ and sees in it the basis in which cultures anchor their sense of morality and responsibility. It does not record autobiographical experiences; it is, rather, a cultural script that is written directly and indelibly into the body. With this reversal, Nietzsche releases memory theory from its history of internalization and individualization, and links it for the first time to institutions of power and to techniques of violence. 37

I have already linked Nietzsche’s conception of ‘memory of will’ with Serres’ First Foundation, which concerns collectivity and puts the subject in relation with death. This link is important in the progression of my thesis as it draws violence and memory closer together within a social context.

In the Chapter 1, I highlighted the relationship between systemic violence and early photography as a means of demonstrating the presence of a residue of violence inherent in photography. Much of the creative work undertaken as part of this doctoral research has involved photographic practices, including photographically capturing the broken bodies of Antiquity. Following the thought that material semiosis is a conflation of the properties and qualities of materials, I

37 Ibid. 234
have come to understand that something similar is at work in my art making, in that the violence inherent in photography conflates with, what I argue is, the physically evidenced and historical violence inherent in the broken bodies of Antiquity.

Here two forms of violence conflate. What I am trying to explain is the way that the violence inherent in photography, (the way that it blocks imagination) conflates with the residues of mythic violence inherent in the broken bodies of Antiquity.

I am referring not only to the intentional breaks, sometimes made by commercial agents who find it easier to trade illicitly in fragments rather than whole figures, but also the embedded signification of violent myths and mythic violence that is resident in the very stuff of the broken bodies of Antiquity.

In the previous chapter I referred to a material cycling inherent in my work, and likened it to what we now understand as material semiosis, here, I am extending the idea of material semiosis by applying its characteristic intermingling of the physical and cultural domains, of materials, to processual and philosophical domains.

Wounds and scars have often referred to as the ‘body writings’ of memory. Assmann points out that photography has also been used as a metaphor to “describe the phenomenon of bodily inscription”.\(^{38}\) It is the immediacy of the

\(^{38}\) Ibid. 236
imprint in the form of the photographic trace that she is referring to. The idea that I have raised a number of times regarding an inherent residual violence in photography, is also taken up by Assmann when she states:

The metaphor of the photograph emphasizes not only the directness of the impression, but also the damage inflicted on sensitive material. Thus there is a correspondence between photography and trauma: the inscription of a section of the real on the silver bromide of the photographic plate may be compared to the inscription of a traumatic experience on the matrix of the unconscious.\(^{39}\)

I do not see this as an abstract representation of violence. Rather, I consider it a _processual enaction_ of violence. Drawing our attention to a paradox in the metaphor of the photography, Assmann, in alignment with Barthes’ premise that a photography actually blocks memory, suggests that photography emphasises the exact opposite of a direct impression, namely an ‘indirection’. In other words, _mediality_ (a term that refers to the directness of an impression) brings to the fore a range of potential activities involved in making an impression. For example, a photograph can ‘show’ an absence that can be appreciated bodily through a sense of remote yet understood tactility, invisible, having occurred elsewhere in time and not in the frame, but effective and affecting nonetheless.

\(^{39}\) Ibid. 236
This provides us with another way to consider Malafouris’ important
distinguishing between the properties and qualities of materials. As I have already
explained, properties are the physically tangible characteristics of a material and
the qualities of a material are the socially constructed, sometimes temporally
distant, formations of perceived realities that are associated with particular
materials.

Memories are fleeting, highly plastic, unreliable, ephemeral phenomena. Serres’
three questions, that I reposed earlier, directly address the stabilisation of relations
between subject, object and death.

It is possible to interpret them as attempts to stabilise a conception of memory that
is related with loss and mourning. Assmann points out that the issue of
stabilisation is at the core of “why people of different cultures and living at
different times have constantly had recourse to technical stabilizers ranging from
material objects and pictorial mnemotechnics to the medium of writing”. 40

Those that approach the phenomena of memory from a constructivist position are
opposed to the traditional conception of memory as one of inscription and storage:

They replace the static storage model with a dynamically
constructive one of continuous reorganization, according to
which memory of the past is adaptive and malleable, so that
it can fit in with an ever-changing present. 41

40 Ibid. 238
41 Ibid. 238
This approach has close associations with Malafouris’ Material Engagement Theory, specifically in terms of how material engagement occurs. Assmann states it most clearly when she says, “the argument that memories depend exclusively on the present and ‘not on the past’ strikes me as a gross exaggeration”.42

Returning to the issue of plasticity and the desire for stability, three categories of memory stabilisers can be identified: material objects, pictorial mnemo-technics and writing. Assmann positions language ‘first and foremost’, when she says, “whatever we have captured in language is far easier to remember than something that has never been articulated”.43 I am not as certain about this as Assmann. As I have progressed through this doctoral research, and in reflecting on Renfrew’s Sapient Paradox, more and more I sense a primacy in our relationships with materials over language, and I propose that remembering is better served by our relationships with materials.

In relation to the primary role played by language in stabilising memory, Assmann states, “what we remember then is not the events themselves but our verbal accounts of them. Linguistic signs function like names through which we recall objects”.44

Considering this statement in light of Material Engagement Theory and, specifically, the hypothesis of enactive signification, I argue that Assmann’s

42 Ibid. 239
43 Ibid. 239
44 Ibid. 239
position, as I have argued of Hirsch’s within the context of her conception of postmemory, can be seen as a partially active externalist perspective.

Assmann draws support from Maurice Halbwachs’ notion that “members of a group cannot perceive an object without giving it a name and thus subjecting it to the group’s conventions and ways of thinking”. 45 However, by aligning my position more closely with Malafouris’ Material Engagement Theory, I suggest that this conception of memory is based in a thought matrix that does not recognise the important role of the conflation between the experience of an object’s materiality and the socially constructed realm that accompanies it. In short, Assmann’s position is closer to a traditional perspective of the cognitive processes and phenomena that we call memory.

Although displaying a tendency, like Hirsch, to prioritise language as the most powerful stabiliser of memory, Assmann acknowledges and examines what she calls “other psychic stabilizers”. 46 These can be grouped under three category headings – trauma, affect, and symbol. The body is caught up with affect and trauma, while the symbol “entails the translation of physical experience into ‘meaning’”. 47

45 Ibid. 239
46 Ibid. 239
47 Ibid. 239

Figure 7 is based on Assmann’s conception of the tripartite categorisation of memory stabilisers. See ibid. 252
Each of the three categories of psychic memory stabilisers proposed by Assmann can be productively examined in relation to one’s experiences with the broken bodies of Antiquity. I propose that trauma, affect, and symbol are all active during an individual’s experience of being with the broken bodies of Antiquity. In the following paragraphs I explain how.

Jean-Francois Lyotard exposed the paradoxical nature of trauma by considering representations of trauma in a collective historical context. Focusing on the experiences of the atrocities of the Holocaust, Lyotard arrives at a paradoxical conception of trauma wherein, as Assmann puts it, “the trauma created by the most extreme act of disempowerment itself becomes the most suitable stabilizer

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48 Ibid. 249
for remembrance”. For Lyotard, trauma is a form of “placeless and restless present that prevents closure”.

I identify conceptual associations between Lyotard’s conception of trauma and certain ideas of Serres. The first of these is the Serresian concept of commingled time. Assmann’s description of Lyotard’s conception provides a clue. By using the words ‘placeless’, ‘restless’, and ‘present’, she sketches an image of Lyotard’s conception of trauma that refers to the spatial, the emotional and the temporal. These three domains are also central to Serres’ conception of commingled time, which is caught up with the spatial, the emotional and the temporal. I propose that we also are caught up with, or hover in, a suspended state between the domains of the spatial, the emotional and the temporal when we are present with a broken body of Antiquity.

Regarding the issue of collectivity, I identify a parallel between Serres’ First Foundation and Lyotard’s conception of trauma. Serres’ First Foundation, as we know, concerns collectivity and puts the subject in relation to death, thereby it moves toward the realm of ethics through the issue of the collective acceptance of violence perpetrated on others in the name of a common good.

In the context of Lyotard’s conception of trauma and, more precisely, in dealing with that trauma in relation to memory, the relationship between the individual and collective response is very different; as Assmann explains, “although the individual is entitled to a therapeutic processing of his or her traumatic

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49 Ibid. 251
50 Ibid. 251
experiences, such alleviation is excluded on the collective level”.  

This is where I see Serres’ collective acceptance and Lyotard’s ideas of trauma coming closest together.

AFFECT

To consider the role of affect in experiencing a damaged figure from the deep past, it is helpful to consider it in conjunction with the concept of agency. Here agency and affect are drawn into a kind of double imbroglio. I return to the third hypothesis of Material Engagement Theory, the hypothesis of material agency as a means to explain the associations between agency and affect. The hypothesis of material agency investigates agency “not as a human property but as the emergent product of situated activity asking not ‘What is an agent?’ but ‘When is an agent?”  

What I am suggesting here is that the situated activity, referred to above, is the affect. I am endeavouring to explain that in the context of the experiencing the broken bodies of Antiquity, the affect is the conflation of what Polanyi calls indwelling, which is closely related with the body and therefore with the properties of materials; and what I call wit(h)ness, which is closely related with the psychological realm and the qualities of materials.

SYMBOL

The last category of memory stabilisers proposed by Assmann that I must address in relation to the chosen subject matter of this doctoral research is the symbol.

51 Ibid. 251
Again I return to Material Engagement Theory, specifically the *hypothesis of enactive signification*, which “explores the nature of the material sign not as a representational mechanism rather as a semiotic conflation and co-habitation through matter that enacts and brings forth the world”.\textsuperscript{53}

How might we consider an enactive material sign as a memory stabilising sign? Better put, can an enactive material sign function as a memory stabilising sign? I have already explained that the concept of the *enactive material sign* is contra to the dominant representational and computational view of the world, and what makes it enactive is its activity, its presence and its participation in the process of meaning making.

It is important here to disassociate the concept of stability from fixity or stasis, which a representational perspective might harbour. In trying to understand the complexity of the seemingly straightforward question that I have just posed, it is important to consider both the plasticity of memory and to understand the idea of stability within a dynamic, fluid context.

To apply the idea of enactive signification to the category of memory stabilising signs, requires us to suspend the notion of a sign as a static, passive, representational symbol, and to consider it as dynamic and participatory in the plastic cognitive processes that we call remembering. This enables us to consider remembering as dynamically enacted through the extended mind in conflation.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid. 51
with, rather than a reflection on, the rest of the material world, including both material and linguistic signs.

Returning to the collective implications of Serres First Foundation, I touch briefly on Nietzsche’s concept of ‘conscience’, which as Assmann explains, refers to as “a memory of will”. Assmann highlights Nietzsche’s argument that culture has constructed morality and conscience in response to the ‘unjust’ forgetting that characterises the ‘man of action’ (he that is in control of what he remembers). To explain this she quotes directly from Nietzsche, “conscience needs the support of memory, but memory shows itself too weak for the purpose”. Thus the collective acceptance which is central to Serres’ First Foundation (as explained in relation to statuary and violence) can be seen as having associations with Nietzsche’s well known, following, passage:

“I did that,” says my memory
“I can’t have done that” says my pride, and remains unshakable
In the end, memory gives in.

CHAPTER 6: A SUMMARY IN CONCLUSION

I began the final chapter of this thesis by directing my attention to statuary, specifically the broken stone and bronze bodies of Antiquity that are the subject matter of the artworks that I have created as part of this doctoral research. In this chapter I considered the philosophical implications of the damage wrought over

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54 Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization: Functions, Media, Archives. 254
55 Ibid. 254
56 Ibid. 254
time on these silent objects by undertaking a detailed analysis of Serres’ Two Foundations as developed and explained in his book *Statues: The Second Book Of Foundations*; and Assmann’s notion of Cultural Memory as developed and explained in her book *Cultural Memory and Western Civilization: Functions, Media Archives*.

In the previous chapter I examined the material aspects of damaged ancient figurative sculpture, in this chapter, I brought memory to the fore by examining the specific relationships between ancient statuary and remembering.

As I approached the end of my quest for greater understanding of the relationships between materials and remembering, I have maintained my investigation into the contemporary social relevance of ancient figurative sculpture, and I have continued to pursue fresh understanding of the ways in which the broken bodies of Antiquity continue to resonate with a sense of ongoing human meaningfulness.

I began this chapter by restating Serres’ overarching conception of statues which positions them not as static entities, rather as the basis for knowledge of society, subject object relations, the world and, more broadly, our experience of it. With Serres’ as navigator we have time travelled from sixth century B.C. Carthage and Agrigentum to 1986 Cape Canaveral and beyond, thus revealing a remarkably unchanged collective response to violence that is made manifest in, through, around, and indeed with statues.

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57 Serres, *Statues*.
58 Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Western Civilization: Functions, Media, Archives*. 
By excavating the etymological roots of the word *material*, I unearthed deeply embedded associations between it, our mothers, and the notion of origin. I proposed that through these deeply embedded, and at times invisible cultural associations, that the word material itself is mnemo-technically inflected and has a resonance with loss, mourning and remembering.

This line of thought brought me back to photography, specifically, to Barthes’ *Winter Garden Photograph*, the described, yet unseen, image of his recently deceased elderly mother as a child. Through this unseen image Barthes attempts to explain the resonant grief and unchanging pain experienced at and beyond the death of his mother. Revisiting my Chapter 2 analysis of the implications of this unseen image brought me back to Barthes’ conception that a photograph actually blocks memory, and my proposal that it is our embedded relationship with materials and material culture that better serves remembering. Returning to the *Winter Garden Photograph* enabled me to demonstrate the philosophical legacies and etymological associations between the everyday terms - *matter* and *mother*.

Then turning to Serres’ First Foundation which concerns collectivity and puts the subject in relation with death, I highlighted a social dimension of death and with Serres help I explained that ancient figurative sculpture is caught up with that very issue through the enactment of the concepts of *collective acceptance, complicity* and *intentionality*.

I addressed the issue of intentionality by using the example of the repeated, and ongoing, television and Internet broadcasting of the 1986 Challenger disaster, and
how these multiple broadcasts enter our non-habitual memory image, and the broader collective Cultural Memory. I explained that it is in the habitual way that the media representation of the lift-off and the seventy four seconds of hopeful futurity that precedes the spectacular explosion, that the event directly enters our non-habitual memory image. Simply put, the repeated broadcasting of the event assumes the role of the habitual aspect in Bergson’s conception of the passage from pure memory to memory image.

Through this example I also demonstrated that the mediatising of the disaster represents a profound social attraction to events and objects that embody the spectacular pain and loss of others, and an ongoing morphology of the original intentionality. The issues of acceptance and complicity are also caught up with this. I returned to Chapter 3 and revisited Polanyi’s concept of indwelling and the concept of wit(h)ness; I made it clear that indwelling is more closely related with the body, things, and the tangible and tactile properties of materials, and that wit(h)ness should be considered as more closely related with the social dimension and the collectively constructed qualities of materials (or an event). I suggest that through the mediatised proliferation of the spectacular Challenger explosion we cease to bear witness to the event, rather that we develop and experience a sense of wit(h)ness with the event.

Addressing the two closely related issues of complicity and acceptance, I returned to my argument in Chapter 5 that it is through the conflation of our experiences with the properties and qualities of materials that our highly individual memory space is formed. Extrapolating on that premise I proposed that the concepts of
indwelling and wit(h)ness are two potential responses to the conflated properties and qualities of materials. I went on to explain that the generative affect of the active participation between the properties and qualities of materials is mirrored by the active participation between indwelling and wit(h)ness, and that it is the conflation of indwelling and wit(h)ness that gives shape to how we enact, or act from, our individual memory space.

Serres’ First Foundation concerns the timeless collective acceptance of violence that is enacted upon others in the name of a common good. To help us understand the role that intentionality plays in the collective acceptance of the violence enacted upon others, he likens missiles and warheads to statues. Building on Serres’ idea, I suggested that by conceiving of them as statues, the proliferated, ready to fire missiles surrounding us, and the Challenger Space Shuttle, we can draw a direct link to the embedded cultural implications of ancient figurative sculpture, making clear their ongoing association with loss, death an memory.

This idea, supported by Serres’ likening of warheads to statues, brings us back to the issue of systemic violence and how it is entangled with subjective and symbolic violence. It also brings us back to the issues surrounding the ways in which systemic violence is caught up with mythic violence which were discussed in Chapter 3.

I declared that the body parts and the part bodies of Antiquity manifest a violence-inflected material semiosis, and that they bear silent wit(h)ness to the systemic
violence enacted upon others by empires, states and institutions under the guise of protecting the accepting, and therefore complicit, innocents in their charge.

Next I turned to the issues of collective forgetting and immortality. I pointed out that the concept of immortality has a social dimension and that it is useful in considering the issue of ‘collective forgetting’. Conventionally the concept of immortality is considered in relation to the individual, however as Serres points out, there is also an historical, collective conception of immortality which can be understood as the ongoing continuum of human generation to generation, over centuries of centuries, without break or rupture. He points out that over time and through certain events of the 20th century, like the 1945 bombing of Hiroshima, that we have forgotten this form of immortality that we are all individually bound up with, and that ‘effective technologies’ have played a role in this very particular collective forgetting.

Considering and accepting the duality between effective technologies, and society and culture, is to acknowledge, and accept, that effective technologies construct the world, and society and culture construct time. It is also to accept that effective technologies, without society and culture, tend to close duration, and that society and culture, without effective technologies, tends to abandon real things.

As Serres’ points out, the power that is inherent in this relatively new dualism is propelled forward by the workings of administration, media, science and technology; this brings us back again to the issues of systemic and symbolic
violence which, I have already stated, is deeply embedded in representations of history and is caught up with temporally commingled contemporary culture.

Having addressed the issue of collective acceptance, complicity and intentionality I turned to Serres’ Second Foundation, which puts death in relation with the object. Using another space-travel related example, Jules Verne’s 1865 novel De la terre à la luna, Serres brings to our attention the issue of how communities deal with the object remains of death. This set me thinking about burial and cremation, excavation and exhumation, about the humus, and it launched questions relating to our social connections and disconnections with dead bodies.

The following three questions are asked by Serres in the Second Foundation.

1. Are the relations of the subject to the object stabilised by death?

2. Are the relations of the subject to death stabilised by the object?

3. Are the relations of death and the object stabilised by the subject?

Framing these questions with specific reference to the broken bodies of Antiquity, and by ascribing the subject status to a viewer, and object status to the broken bodies of Antiquity, while allowing death to remain death, I asked the following questions.
1. Are the relations between a viewer and a broken body of Antiquity stabilised by death? Or to put it another way, is it the fundamental knowledge of our own inescapable death, and therefore, participation in collective immortality of human being that stabilises our relations with these ancient objects?

2. Are the relations between a viewer and the knowledge of their own inescapable deaths stabilised by the broken bodies of Antiquity.

3. Are the relations between death and the broken bodies of Antiquity stabilised by the presence of a viewer?

By ascribing the viewer (ourselves) with subject status, these questions address specifically the issue of how the relationships between ancient figurative sculpture, death and memory are caught up with our own experiences.

Then I introduced the issue of material semiosis and the mutuality between our physical bodies and the broken bodies of Antiquity, which enabled me to repose the questions again, this time inverting the previous subject/object status. The reposed questions brought us closer to a fresh perspective on the nature of the relationships between materials and remembering.

1. Are the relations between a broken body of Antiquity and a viewer stabilised by death?
2. Are the relations between the broken bodies of Antiquity and death stabilised by a viewer’s knowledge of their own inescapable death?

3. Are the relations between death and a viewer stabilised by the presence of a broken body of Antiquity?

Through the process of asking and re-asking these questions, I proposed that in the realm of commingled time, these silent and immobile damaged figures join us in our collective human being by actively participating in our collective immortality.

This brought me back to my concept of premembering, and I explained that each time that I have reshaped and fine-tuned its definition it is its social context that has remained constant. I return to the definition that I proposed in the Chapter 5; premembering is a distributed system of memory-related cognition that extends beyond the individual and is enacted through a process of active externalism that embraces both the properties and qualities of materials in processes of mutual participation.

Considering the properties and qualities of the broken bodies of Antiquity as active participants in a distributed system of memory enacted by and through the extended mind, rather than as inert displaced artefacts of another time, we are forced to acknowledge them as contributing participants in the active externalism
that shapes the social memory that our cultures store up for us; and through which we negotiate the life-world.

Returning to the field of Memory Studies, I acknowledged that the atrocities of the Holocaust no longer provide a limit case in examining the relationships between individual and collective trauma, and individual and collective memory. By listing some of the many, and ongoing, examples of acts of systemic, symbolic and subjective violence, I evidenced the real and widespread distribution (across time and space) of what Benjamin called ‘mythic violence’.

I explained that while violence in its many forms is an issue that courses through this thesis, I have used it as a lens through which I provide fresh perspectives and understandings of the relationships between materials and remembering. Reconsidering the habitual aspects of the Bergson’s conception of memory, as explicated in his book *Matter and Memory*, exposits the logic and reason behind my focus on Assmann’s book chapter “The Body” in her book *Cultural Memory and Western Civilization: Functions, Media, Archives*.

A Fundamental premise of Cultural Memory is that it provides no opportunity for self-organisation or self-regulation; rather it is contingent on an individual’s decisions and selections conflating with those of institutions and media. I explained that the concept of Cultural Memory generates a degree of nervous discomfort in some more traditional schools of thought in which memory is perceived as an individual phenomenon. However by considering memory within

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60 Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Western Civilization: Functions, Media, Archives*. 
the context of the hypothesis of the extended mind I highlighted the issue of collectivity at work in the cognitive process of remembering.

Assmann, like Serres (and myself), begins her discussion about the relationships between the body and memory in Antiquity. She draws from two ancient stories to highlight different forms of memory. Through her comparison between the stories of Simonides and Melamphus, she emphasises the material structure of memory carriers, and the authority associated with the durability of specific materials. Although more expensive than clay or wax, stone ‘speaks’ louder, longer.

I briefly addressed Nietzsche and his role in turning around the oppositional memory metaphor of the body/soul duality, and how this resulted in the perception that the body was the place where memory is inscribed. In Nietzschean terms the memory of will is ‘conscience’, which has obvious associations with the issues of complicity, collective acceptance and intentionality. These obvious, yet perhaps unanticipated, associations are important in the development of my argument because they draw the problem of violence and the issue of memory together and into the social context.

The three questions that I reposed earlier were designed to stabilise the relationships between subject, object and death; they can also be seen as attempts to stabilise a conception of memory that relates with loss and mourning. Assmann takes up the importance of the issue of stabilisation and suggests that it is at the
very core of why “people of different cultures and living at different times have constantly had recourse to technical stabilisers ranging from material objects and pictorial mnemotechnics to the medium of writing”.  

Considering the issue of stability, Assmann positions the effectivity of language first and foremost, for her, “whatever we have captured in language is far easier to remember than something that has never been articulated”.  

As I explained, my position on this is not as fixed as Assmann’s and I pointed out that as I have progressed through my research and by reflecting of Renfrew’s Sapient Paradox, I have come, more and more, to sense a primacy in our relationships with materials, and that therefore remembering is better served by our relationships with materials.

Although Assmann, like Hirsch, has a tendency to prioritise language as the most powerful stabiliser of memory, she acknowledges three other ‘psychic stabilisers’: Trauma, Affect, and Symbol. The body is caught up with trauma and affect, and the symbol involves the translation of experience into meaning.

As I approach the end of this doctoral research I considered Assmann’s three psychic memory stabilisers in direct relation to the broken bodies of Antiquity.

Considering the representation of trauma within a collective historical context enabled Jean-Francois Lyotard to reveal trauma’s paradoxical nature. As I have already explained, for Lyotard trauma is a form of “placeless and restless present that prevents closure”.  

Relying on the atrocities of the Holocaust, Lyotard arrived at the paradox that Assmann described as, “the trauma created by the most

61 Ibid. 238
62 Ibid. 239
63 Ibid. 251
extreme act of disempowerment itself becomes the most suitable stabilizer for remembrance. Using the terms ‘placeless’, ‘restless’ and ‘present’ in describing Lyotard’s conception of trauma points toward a conception of trauma, and therefore of psychic memory stabiliser, that is spatial, emotional and temporal. I suggested that these three domains are central to Serres’ conception of commingled time, and I proposed that a viewer is caught up in, or suspended between, the same domains when in present with a broken body of Antiquity. Which means that being in the presence of a broken body of Antiquity can be considered an action of memory stabilisation.

Considering the role of affect in experiencing a damaged figure from the deep past, it is helpful to consider it in conjunction with the concept of agency. Returning again to the hypothesis of material agency, which investigates agency as the emergent product of a situated activity, rather than as a human property, by asking not ‘what’ is an agent? but ‘when’ is an agent? I proposed that the situated activity referred to here is the affect. To make this clearer I drew again from my earlier discussion about what Polanyi calls indwelling, and my understanding of the concept of wit(h)ness. What I am proposing here is that in the context of experiencing the broken bodies of antiquity, the affect, or psychic memory stabiliser, is the conflation of indwelling and wit(h)ness.

The last of Assmann’s psychic memory stabilisers to be considered in the context of damaged ancient figurative sculpture is the ‘symbol’. This returned me to the hypothesis of enactive signification which “explores the nature of the material

64 Ibid. 251
sign not as a representational mechanism rather as a semiotic conflation and co-habitation through matter that enacts and brings forth the world”. To apply the idea of enactive signification to the memory stabilising sign - the symbol - requires us to suspend the notion of the sign as a static, passive representational symbol. Doing so enables us to consider memory as dynamically enacted through the extended mind in conflation with, rather than through a reflection on, the rest of the material world, including both material and linguistic signs. When Assmann prioritises language as the most effective mode of external memory storage, she demonstrates a more traditional view of memory, one that excludes the potential for materials to play a meaningful role in the making and transfer of memory. I come back to Nietzsche, Serres and the broken bodies of antiquity to conclude this summary by proposing that it is through the associations between Nietzsche’s concept of conscience and Serres’ notion of collective acceptance, as developed and explained in relation to statuary and violence, that links the broken bodies of Antiquity with the cycles of mythic violence that we continue to be caught up with.

Whoever has the gift of the senses speaks ancient languages, 
sings dead myths in forgotten cadences and dialects.

Michel Serres ¹

Even outside consciousness, the past co-exists along with the present.

Henri Bergson ²

As I approach the end of this doctoral research project, I am beginning to identify the green shoots of new research potential emerging from my ongoing quest for fresh understanding of the relationships between materials and remembering.

To conclude this doctoral submission I come back to, and address with new knowledge, the two questions that I have asked of myself, the broken bodies of

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Antiquity, and the many theories that I have examined throughout this doctoral research.

How are materials caught up with remembering? And how are the broken stone and bronze bodies of Antiquity entangled with our contemporary social dimension?

Throughout this thesis I have progressed my argument, step by step, on a set of important distinctions that for a long time have remained obscured, unquestioned, or buried beneath long-established historical conventions and traditional conceptions entrenched in the diverse fields that I have drawn together. The productive between-ness that I have excavated between these diverse fields and in my studio-based research, photo-archive based research and photographic fieldwork has led me into a domain of new knowledge and understanding.

In these final paragraphs I come back to the distilled issue of the importance of materials and material culture in acts of remembering, and the associated issue of its ongoing contemporary human meaningfulness.

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The flash of photography’s arrival blinded the social order that it emerged into to the highly personal and collective expressive dominion of materiality.
With the emergence of photography the philosophically inflected tension between the authority of words and the authority of images gathered apace. This tension did not originate in the new medium, rather photography escalated the existing conflict from an intimate domestic scale to a global scale through the diverse applications inherent to its early development and it’s subsequent proliferation.

The sense of touch - and its partner, materiality - that were present at, and critical to the first-ever photographic exhibition, has over time become numb in relation to memory. It is in this way that photography, acting with and through a kind of ontological systemic and symbolic violence, has come to play a significant role in the silencing of materials. I am reminded again of Barthes dictum: “The photograph is violent: not because it shows violent things, but because on each occasion it fills the sight by force and nothing can be refused or transformed.”

With the sense of touch and the expressive memorial capacities of materiality silenced, the battle for memory-related authority became one between words and images, language and sight.

Returning to Žižek’s premise that episodes of subjective violence erupt from a background shaped by systemic and symbolic violence, I question where and why did this conflict for authority between words and images come from? From what background did it erupt? Turning to Antiquity I find traces of its Western cultural origin in the ancient story of the fight between Hermes and Argus which, allegorically speaking, is a conflict between language and sight.

Hera, the wife of Zeus, whose authority is based on power rather than morality, is the mother of his legitimate children and she suffers jealousy. Zeus has many other loves, Antiope, Callisto, Danae, Io, Leda, Semele and Maia. Hermes is the accepted illegitimate son of Zeus and Maia, for millennia he has represented language, words and communication. Zeus, protecting Io from the jealous wrath of his wife Hera, transforms Io into a radiant white heifer. Hera, wise to this, sends Argus, the one hundred eyed giant, to maintain watchful surveillance over Io, and Zeus, in retaliation, sends Hermes to kill Argus.

Serres has suggested that there is “unease with this Hermetic victory”, and he describes this myth as representing “the beginning of the ascendancy of the word, of communication over things”. To help us understand this ancient story in a more contemporary way I replace each characters name with their symbolic characteristics and then retell the story in a de-anthropomorphised way.

Hera - legitimacy and jealousy.

Zeus - authority based on power rather than morality, a projection of law and justice.

Io - disguise, camouflage and submissive acceptance.

Maia – is etymologically associated with motherhood and midwifery.

Hermes - words, language and communication.

Argus - uninterrupted vision and, more generally, sight.

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4 Serres, *The Five Senses. A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies*. 10

5 Ibid. 10
The story can be retold this way.

Jealousy is married with authority based on power rather than morality. Authoritarian power loves disguise and camouflage that is predicated on submissive acceptance. Jealousy deploys uninterrupted watchfulness in the hope of acquiring irrefutable evidence of the crimes committed against it; authoritarian power responds by sending in words and language to kill vision, thus destroying the potential for evidence of jealousy’s suspicions.

This timeless story doesn’t end there. Weeping Io leaves the violent scene that she is caught up in and little attention has been payed to her since, rather the focus remains on the gory implications of the murder itself. Considering this in relation to the contemporary social realm it follows that a collective disinterest prevails in the revelation of disguise, or the expression of the background to acts of subjective violence. Rather, a fervent and frenzied interest remains in the spectacular act of violence. Maintaining this perspective facilitates detachment from the sense of complicity in the systemic and symbolic issues that form the background from which subjective violence erupts. This progresses toward an uneasy collective acceptance of the violence enacted on others in the name of the common good, and thus minimises our inherent capacity for wit(h)ness. We are reminded here of Sontag’s words, “in a world of saturated, no hyper-saturated with images, those that should matter have a diminishing effect: we become callous. In the end, such images just make us less able to feel, to have our conscience pricked.”

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There are further contemporary implications to be unearthed in this ancient story. Hera makes one more important, violently inflected, memorial gesture; she removes from dead Argus his multi eyed skin, “the panoptic skin of the watcher, a shredded, billowing rag of shut eyelids”, and drapes it upon the body of her favourite bird, the flightless peacock that today resonates with the issues of decoration and ornament rather than the meaningful. The other senses are also caught up in this story. As Serres has pointed out, Hermes continues to metaphorically play his flute lyrically while the decorative fowl squawks unharmoniously. In this way the assassin’s violent triumph is symbolically over sound as well as sight. Also, Hermes metaphorically continues to fly through our skies while the flightless bird remains on the ground. Again the assassin’s triumph is ongoing, it retains *dead sight* in perpetual defeat. Serres puts it this way: “Sight gazes without seeing at a world from which information has already fled.”

How does this ancient story serve the driving quest of this thesis, which aims to provide fresh understanding of the relationships between materials and remembering? The story prioritises words over images; the sense of touch is not easily identified within it, yet it is there, at the very heart of Hera’s jealousy. The issues of origin, motherhood (and, therefore, when considered etymologically) matter, are entangled in the background of this famous story. The legitimacy of the sense of touch, and therefore matter, is at issue in this story.

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7 Serres, *The Five Senses. A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies*. 51
8 Ibid. 51
9 Ibid. 51
Coming back to the differences between the properties and qualities of materials, I highlight how the sense of touch is caught up with memory making and remembering, and propose that it is in the way that the sense of touch conflates with the internal dimension of materials. The properties of materials are individually experienced in episodes of habitual pure memory, therefore they are associated most closely with the external dimension. The qualities of materials are socially constructed and collectively experienced in episodic non-habitual memory image experiences, therefore they are most closely associated with the internal dimension.

Conventional thinking tends to prioritise the external dimension of materials over the internal dimension of materials. As I approach the end of this doctoral research I propose that the internal dimension of materials have been neglected and that this has contributed toward the common perception that materials are less caught up in remembering than photographs and story telling.

Photographic images and words have been acting with and through symbolic and systemic violence for a long time now, though, through the recent conceptual developments in the fields of Cognitive Archaeology and Social Anthropology, materials and material culture are coming to be understood as having a significant role in memory making and remembering.

By thinking about our collective and individual pasts, presents and futures in a way that is not based on exclusivity, priority, or through oppositional dualisms, but rather through a perspective that mingles the dualisms, and combines them
with processes of active participation enabled by the extended mind, we are able
to acknowledge a new set of complex relations between materials and acts of
remembering.

Considering the contemporary social legacies of the broken bodies of Antiquity
brings me to another two important issues, the issue of collective forgetting, and
the issue of collective immortality.

Conventional conceptions of the issue of immortality frame it in relation to the
individual and connect it with the spiritual realm. For this issue to serve the
driving quest of this thesis, I focus on it in relation to the historical rather than the
spiritual realm, and consider it in relation to the idea of collective acceptance that
leads toward the collective forgetting of our complicity in acts of systemic and
symbolic violence.

I am referring here to the idea of a collective human immortality, one that we all
participate in by playing our roles in the continuum from generation to generation
in human time, “over the centuries of centuries without rupture or break”.10
Broadly speaking, modernity, and more specifically, certain catastrophic events of
the twentieth century have brought us face to face with the possibility of
interrupting that continuum. The bombing of Hiroshima is used by Serres as an
example,11 to which I add the real and felt possibility of nuclear disaster and the
potential that we face of environmental collapse.12

Trilogy (Bloomsbury, 2015). 7
11 Ibid. 8
12 Ibid. 7-8
Through the arc of this doctoral research I have argued that the collective acceptance (enacted as a means of absolving individual responsibility) of the catastrophic mythic violence that came to pass in the twentieth and early twenty-first century (as proliferated initially through the deployment of photography) has slowly eroded the concept and our physically sensorial and psychic understanding of collective human immortality and its associated responsibilities.

Throughout this thesis I have questioned how the broken bodies of Antiquity are caught up with our contemporary social dimension? As I conclude this doctoral research project I propose that it is through embracing cognitive processes conjoined with material semiosis and the physical mutuality between the hard bodies of stone and bronze, and our own soft bodies, that we are able to understand these ancient broken figures as standing in silent address to the forgotten concept of collective immortality; and that by doing so they speak loudly to our contemporary society. It is in this way that the broken bodies of Antiquity remain the keepers, for the life-world, of such important knowledge.

In this paragraph, specifically in relation to the issue of collective human immortality, I am indebted to Serres.
Through this quest, I have come to understand that a productive between-ness exists in the tensions between the perceived authority of words and the perceived authority of images. We might give it the name Poetry. Rainer Maria Rilke’s ‘thing poems’, specifically The Archaic Torso of Apollo, intertwine the internal and external dimensions of things and endow this conflation with a gaze, the gaze of the object, which Santner suggests, “is in turn reinvested with a kind of sublime, dazzling ‘thingness’.”

The last line of the poem raises the issue of contemporary moral imperatives, “for here there is no place that does not see you. You must change your life.” As Santner has said, it is “as if the poem is making a claim -indeed a moral judgement- about the nature of a life lived in ignorance of the object (or kind of object) evoked in the poem”. This brings me back to Barthes’ inability to share the Winter Garden Photograph.

I cannot reproduce the Winter Garden Photograph. It exists only for me. For you, it would be nothing but an indifferent picture, one of the thousand manifestations of the ‘ordinary’; it cannot in any way constitute the visible object of a science; it cannot establish an objectivity, in the positive sense of the term; at most it would

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3 Ibid, 200
interest your studium: period, clothes, photogeny; but in it, for you, no wound.”  

Santner proposes, in Barthes’ language, that for Rilke, “the object’s status as remainder allows him to experience its surface as a pure surplus over any possible studium, as the locus of a kind of wandering punctum”.  

Drawing together the last line of Rilke’s poem, *The Archaic Torso of Apollo*, “for here there is no place that does not see you. You must change your life.”  

and Barthes’ last words about the *Winter Garden Photograph*, “but in it, for you, no wound”, I illuminate a sense of wit(n)ness between them. Santner states that the poem “exerts a moral pressure” and that it injects into the life of the reader “a disquietude about the shape and direction of the life lived before the aesthetic encounter”, at the same time Barthes’ last line evinces his refusal of violence.  

For me, the fourteen lines of *The Archaic Torso of Apollo* resonate with an illuminating between-ness, between words and images, not in the manner of ekphrasis, rather as space in which an ancient object hovers. It invokes, through association between a broken body of Antiquity and contemporary social and ethical imperatives, that time commingles, that bodies commingle, that our histories commingle, as do our desires, fears and futures.

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5 Santner, *On Creaturely Life. Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald*. 201  
6 Rilke, *The Selected Poetry of Rainer Maria Rilke*. 60, 61  
7 Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*. 73  
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9 Ibid. 200
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4.44 min single channel projection
Video stills from Warrior A Warrior B 2014
4.44 min single channel projection
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Six double sided screen-printed leather hides
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12 figures (after Niccolo) Studies in collective anxiety 2015
Plaster, steel
Individual figures 170 x 30 x 30 cm

A site for re-recording history 2014
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700 x 137 x 130

Fifty Monuments (the necessity of remembering, the necessity of forgetting) 2012-15
Co-hand pressed porcelain, steel plate, charred 19th c. side-table.
72.5 x 104 x 59.5 cm
Lower level installation detail

12 Figures (after Niccolo) Studies in collective anxiety 2014
Fifty monuments (the necessity of remembering, the necessity of forgetting) 2012-15
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Fifty Monuments (the necessity of remembering, the necessity of forgetting) 2012-15
Co-hand pressed porcelain, steel plate, charred 19th c. side-table
72.5 x 104 x 59.5 cm
Lower level installation detail

Lower level installation overview
Head Replacement Therapy (plundered) #6,3,4 2012
Screen printed image (from digitised 19th C photographic glass negative)
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each 79 x 48.5 cm. 3 of 5.

Two Figures (after Caillois) 2 2014
Plaster, agate, steel
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41 x 41 cm
Centaur 2015
Fibre based gelatin silver print
41 x 41 cm
Lapith 2015
Fibre based gelatin silver print
41 x 41 cm
Aphrodite’s hand 2015
Fibre based gelatin silver print
41 x 41 cm
Kouros / 2015
Fibre based gelatin silver print
41 x 41 cm
Kourosh 2 2015
Fibre based gelatin silver print
41 x 41 cm
Kroisos 2015
Fibre based gelatin silver print
41 x 41 cm
Poseidon and Discobolus 2015
Fibre based gelatin silver print
41 x 41 cm
Ephebe 2015
Fibre based gelatin silver print
41 x 41 cm
Antinous 2015
Fibre based gelatin silver print
41 x 41 cm
Torso 2015
Fibre based gelatin silver print
41 x 41 cm
Zeus 2015
Fibre based gelatin silver print
41 x 41 cm