COPYRIGHT AND USE OF THIS THESIS

This thesis must be used in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968.

Reproduction of material protected by copyright may be an infringement of copyright and copyright owners may be entitled to take legal action against persons who infringe their copyright.

Section 51 (2) of the Copyright Act permits an authorized officer of a university library or archives to provide a copy (by communication or otherwise) of an unpublished thesis kept in the library or archives, to a person who satisfies the authorized officer that he or she requires the reproduction for the purposes of research or study.

The Copyright Act grants the creator of a work a number of moral rights, specifically the right of attribution, the right against false attribution and the right of integrity.

You may infringe the author’s moral rights if you:

- fail to acknowledge the author of this thesis if you quote sections from the work
- attribute this thesis to another author
- subject this thesis to derogatory treatment which may prejudice the author’s reputation

For further information contact the University’s Director of Copyright Services

sydney.edu.au/copyright
NATIONAL REVOLUTION IN NORTH SUMATRA

Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli

1942 - 1950.

by

Michael van Langenberg

VOLUME 2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER 5: WHICH WAY? WHOSE REVOLUTION?</th>
<th>488</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 6: NEGARA SOEMATERA TIMOER</td>
<td>588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 7: CIVIL WAR</td>
<td>666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 8: GUERRILLAS AND FEDERALISTS</td>
<td>740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 9: MERDEKA ACHIEVED</td>
<td>821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 10: ASSESSING THE REVOLUTION</td>
<td>918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDICES</td>
<td>951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 5

WHICH WAY?

WHOSE REVOLUTION?
If the Social Revolution had been the climax to the early, anarchic stage of the National Revolution in Sumatera Timur, the next fifteen months was to see intense and fierce competition, both within the Republic and between the Republic and its opponents, for the control and direction of that revolution, affecting not only Sumatera Timur but Tapanuli as well. As the violence of the Social Revolution in Sumatera Timur abated, exhausted, by early April 1946, thousands of individuals from hundreds of groups throughout North Sumatra began to assess their respective futures. These futures were being assessed and planned in terms of many interests and identities, competing and overlapping, represented by politicians, military commanders, civil servants, 
lasykar rakyat, pemuda, kerajaan, pergerakan, moderates, conservatives, Moslems, Christians, Javanese, Malays, Karos, Simalungun Bataks, Tobas, Acehnese, South Tapanuli Bataks, Chinese, Dutch, Marxists, peasants, wage labourers and traders. Eventually, Dutch military force effected the opening of yet another new chapter.

On April 9 a British plane brought to Medan a central Republican government delegation headed by two prominent Sumatrans, the Minister for Defence, Amir Sjarifuddin, and the Minister for Information, Mohamad Natsir. The central Republican government and the British military command, both seriously concerned at the chaotic effects of the Social Revolution, had jointly
decided that the provincial government in Sumatra had to be re-organized and made more effective. Sjarifuddin and Natsir were charged with carrying out this task. They were welcomed at Medan airport by a large contingent of Republican government leaders, headed by Hasan and Dr. Amir, and by senior British officers. (1)

The choice of these two to supervise a re-organization of the Republic in Sumatra following the Social Revolution was quite deliberate. Sjarifuddin, born in Medan of South Tapalnuli Batak parents, a Christian, a leading sponsor of the pemuda congress in Yogyakarta in November 1945 and a founding-father of Pesindo, (2) enjoyed considerable popular support within lasykar rakyat circles throughout Sumatra, especially Pesindo, Napindo and Barisan Merah. Natsir, Minangkabau-born and a member of the national leadership council of Masyumi, had considerable influence amongst Masyumi and Hisbullah leaders.

(1) The other members of the delegation were: Rasjidi (KNIP), Mr. Hermani (Ministry of the Interior), Lt. Col. van der Post (Chief Liaison Officer between the Allied military command and the Republic), Ang Yan Goan (Director of the newspaper Sin Po), Dr. Kwa Tjoan Sioe (Director, Yang Seng-le Hospital, Jakarta) and officials from the ministries for Transport, Public Health, Justice, Economic Affairs, Social Affairs, Public Works, Land, Food Supplies and Defence. Ang and Dr. Kwa were in the delegation specifically as representatives of the Chinese community. Document 538; 2. Documents 369; 6 and 369A; 1.

(2) See Anderson (1972); 253-60.
The day after their arrival in Medan, following a procession through the city where they were greeted by large crowds of enthusiastic Republican supporters, the central government delegates attended a special meeting of the Sumatera Timur KNI. Sjarifuddin informed the KNI that the struggle for independence had to be pursued with moderation and that this applied particularly to the youth, the pemuda.

as a Marxist ... I want an egalitarian society with fair distribution. But every theoretician of revolution must accept that that aspiration must be attained in stages. ... Mao Tse Tung once said, 'Our struggle now must be directed to the first phase, with the second phase delayed for the time being.' (3)

A few hours later, at a meeting with the British commander, he undertook to support the establishment of a joint Republic-British-NICA "Working Committee" through which negotiations between the three sides could take place. At the same time, Sjarifuddin announced that an all-Sumatra People's Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat)-DPR, would be convened in Bukittinggi within the next few days in order to decide upon a properly coordinated system of government for the province. (4)

Three days later, on April 12, Governor Hasan decreed the establishment of a 100-member DPR for Sumatra, announcing the names of the members. (5) Twenty representatives were appointed from

(3) Soeloeh Merdeka 10 April 1946. Cited in Reid (1974); 75.
(5) "Maklumat Gubernur Propinsi Sumatera" No. 8/1946.
Sumatera Timur and eleven from Tapanuli. The session was scheduled to convene in Bukittinggi on the 17th. By now Hasan had disbanded the TRI military government for Sumatera Timur and had appointed the pacificator, Luat Siregar, as the new civilian Resident.

Within hours of the decree being issued, Hasan and Amir Sjarifuddin left by car for Bukittinggi. Natsir left at the same time by plane for Padang. The next day Abdul Xarim M.S. and Luat Siregar departed for Bukittinggi. So, too, did 18 of the 20 Sumatera Timur representatives to the DPR. Dr. Amir, however, remained in Medan as Acting Governor.

Since his arrival in Medan, Sjarifuddin had made no attempt to disguise his dissatisfaction with the state of Republican

---

(6) They were:
Tapanuli - Patuan Raja Natigor Lumbantobing, S.M. Simandjuntak, Mr. Rufinus Lumbantobing, Raja Djundungan Lubis, Sutan Mangaradja Muda, Sutan Naga, Baginda Kalidjundjung, Raja Barita Sinambela, G. Silitonga, Abdul Hakim and Washington Hutagalung.


government in Sumatra as he found it. At his meeting with the British commander he had agreed that the Republic lacked authoritative leadership. The TRI, he admitted, was too inexperienced to effectively maintain order. Civilian and military administrators, therefore, would have to be sent from Java to act as advisors to the Republican authorities in Sumatra. (8)

According to the British liaison officer with the Sjarifuddin-Natsir delegation, Lt. Col. van der Post: (9)

After two days in Medan Dr. (sic) Amir Sjarifoedin asked me if we could extend the time of the tour. I asked him why and he told me that from his point of view conditions as he had found them in Medan were far from satisfactory. He said that it was obvious to him that there was no real leadership among the Indonesians in Sumatra, that the civilian administration was breaking down and that he wanted the opportunity of going into the interior and seeing for himself what the real facts were. ... My own impression at this stage was that everybody in Medan was singularly out of touch with affairs in the outside world. On the Indonesian side there was certainly nobody who could act with real decision or authority.

Attentions of the top echelons of the Republican, British and NICA administrations in Medan were concentrated now upon Bukittinggi: (10) firstly because of the all-Sumatra DPR session;

(8) Document 233, No. 26; 3.
(9) Document 530; 1.
(10) A British report at the time comments that "Political events and decisions involving the future of Indonesian policy in Sumatra are hastening to a climax. The meetings at Fort de Kock (Bukittinggi) will force the Indonesian leaders to come out into the open. The pursuance of an implementation of
but, also, because Sjarifuddin and Hasan had managed to get the various Volksfront residency leadership councils to convene an all-Sumatra conference, immediately following the DPR session.

The DPR session opened as scheduled on the 17th, with 65 of the 100 members present. Governor Hasan was elected Chairman; with the Partai Sosialis leader, Dr. Gindo Siregar, as Vice-Chairman. A permanent Working Committee (Badan Pekerdja) was also chosen, consisting of Gindo Siregar and Dr. R. Soenario (both from Sumatera Timur), Mr. Rufinus Lumbantobing (Tapanuli), Soetikno (Aceh), Tjik Wan (South Sumatra) and Mohamad Nasrun (West Sumatra). (11)

Over the next two days the DPR passed legislation setting out a formal structure of government for Sumatra. Basically it was decided that:

The province of Sumatra will be an autonomous body, subordinate to the central government in Java. The same relationship will obtain between the residencies and Medan, which will remain the capital of the province. The autonomy provides that the different areas have the greatest possible freedom in the conduct of their own affairs within the framework of the republic. The autonomy

Sjahrir's moderate policy will depend entirely on the degree of success with which Sjarifoedin by his personal influence can sway the opinion of the delegates at Fort de Kock." Document 233, No. 26; 3.

(11) Document 233, No. 28; 4.
of the sub-divisions within the residencies will be regulated by the residents with the respective sub-divisions. It was decided in principle to grant autonomy to all capitals of residencies, which will be designated in agreement with the executive committee of the council of Sumatra.

The following denominations were decided upon:
Province of Sumatra under a governor.
Residencies under a resident.
Kabupaten ... under a boepati.
Kewedanaan ... under a wedana.
Ketjamatan ... under a tjamat.

With regard to negaries, margas etc., further rulings will be drafted. For the present, existing regulations will be maintained. (12)

In addition, legislation was passed establishing civil service departments responsible for Finance, Health, Religion, Information, Social Welfare, Public Works, Communications, Police and Defence; each department having local branches in each residency. Further legislation set up special Councils (Dewan) for Economic Development, Education and Plantations.

Perhaps more important was a decision by the DPR to pay at least formal recognition to the realities of residency autonomy and the difficulties of inter-residency communication. The residencies were granted the legal status of "autonomous region" (daerah otonom) with civilian government in the hands of the Resident, an Executive Council (Badan Pekerdja), a Peoples' Representative Council (DPR) and a bureaucracy; responsible in the first instance to the provincial and then to

(12) ibid.; 4-5. Also, see Document 369; 10.
national government. In addition the DPR recognized the need for some sort of inter-residency coordinating authority below that of the provincial administration. It was decided that the province would be divided into three sub-provincial "administrative regions" - North Sumatra (the residencies of Aceh, Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli), Central Sumatra (residencies of West Sumatra, Riau and Jambi) and South Sumatra (residencies of Palembang, Bengkulu, Lampung and Bangka/Biliton). Each sub-province would constitute a daerah administratif, having no autonomous powers or government institutions, and be headed by a Deputy Governor (Gubernur Muda) who would be responsible for coordination of the various residency administrations. (13)

On the 19th the DPR session closed. Sjarifuddin, Natsir, Rasjidi, the British liaison officer Lt. Col. van der Post and the two representatives of the Chinese community left for Jakarta via Medan. Mr. Hermani and the other central government officials who had accompanied Sjarifuddin and Natsir remained behind to assist in the implementation of the DPR decisions. Governor Hasan also remained in Bukittinggi.

Next day the Volksfront conference convened. A provisional leadership council, the Putjuk Pimpinan Persatuan Perdjuangan Sumatera (all-Sumatra Supreme Command for a United Armed Struggle) - P4S, was elected with the chairman of the Sumatera Timur Pesindo, Sarwono Sastrosutardjo, as Chairman. The emphasis at the conference was upon the over-riding need for unity in the struggle for national independence. Sarwono, in his address as Chairman, stressed that the creation of unity should be the central aim of all Volksfront policies. At the same time, however, he acknowledged regionalist sentiments by pointing out that the Sumatra Volksfront would have to be different in character from its counterpart on Java, the Persatuan Perdjuangan. (14) The conference closed with the issue of a four-point resolution to the effect that:

(i) The administrative HQ will be established in the capital of Sumatra.
(ii) A War Council and a construction council must be formed. Next to these there will be formed a council of investigation and a council of adjudication.
(iii) The Popular Front will be a support for the re-inforcement of the government of the Republic and loyal to the Government of Sjahrir on the basis of the unity of the whole of Indonesia.
(iv) The social revolution to be carried out on the principle of one government, one people and one army. (15)

Insofar as being able to get the pergerakan movement in

(14) Document 369; 11.
Sumatra to reach a compromise with the moderate leaderships of the civilian government and the TRI and accept the policies of *diplomasi*, however, the visit by Sjarifuddin and Natsir proved an abject failure. In the main this was because they sought to effect a re-organization of the Republic in Sumatra by concentrating their discussions upon the uppermost elite levels of civil and military administration, rather than by attempting to communicate with those sectors of society whose grievances and militancy had given rise to the conditions which brought them to Sumatra in the first place, namely the pemuda and lasykar rakyat. As Reid(16) has noted,

Sjarhir and Amir (Sjarifuddin) had insufficient trusted cadres of their own to restructure the government; they distrusted the forces engaged in pulling down the old order. Their insistence on presenting an appearance of ordered democracy to the outside world drove them in specific cases to side with the old pamong praja against the social revolution.

... in the case of the 'social revolution' of East Sumatra, the government's opposition was unqualified. The disturbances there caught Sjarhir and Amir completely by surprise, and gave powerful ammunition to Van Mook (17) in his attempt to demonstrate the Republic's lack of control over Sumatra.

Implementation of the decisions taken and the ideals expressed at the two Bukittinggi conferences was far from being a simple matter. By May, provincial government departments for

(16) (1974); 74.
(17) Lieutenant Governor-General, Netherlands East Indies.
Plantations (Perkebunan), Information (Penerangan) and Economic Development (Perkembangan Ekonomi) had been set up. By early July, two advisory and planning councils had been installed, responsible for plantation management and economic development. By August, further government departments had been formed, this time for Health, Education, Religious Affairs, Defence and Government Loans.

In the meantime, decisions taken at earlier discussions between Amir Sjarifuddin, Hasan and the TRI commander for Sumatra, Gen. Suhardjo, had resulted in a "rationalization" of the army command structure. The all-Sumatra TRI command headquarters was moved from Medan to Prapat. The Sumatera Timur Divisi VI command, headed by Ahmad Tahir, was transferred to Siantar. Unit commands throughout Sumatra were re-organized into a normal division-regiment-battalion-company structure. Also, the divisional commands, each responsible for a residency, were given new names. The Divisi VI in Sumatera Timur was

(18) These were the Dewan Perkebunan Sumatera (Sumatra Plantations Council) and the Dewan Kemakmuran (Economic Development Council). The former was headed by a senior civil servant, Ir. Indratjaja, with the Partai Sosialis leader, Dr. Gindo Siregar, as Deputy Chairman. The Dewan Kemakmuran was given the task of planning and supervising a wide range of government economic activities, including running the oil refineries at Pangkalan Brandan and Pangkalan Susu, controlling taxation and currency circulation, and stimulating trade.
renamed *Divisi Gadjah II* and the *Divisi IV* in Tapanuli was renamed *Divisi Banteng II*. All the field units in Sumatera Timur were reorganized into three regimental commands. In Tapanuli, a new divisional headquarters was established at Aek Pinang (Batang Toru) and field units were re-organized into three regimental commands. (19)

From a problem-solving perspective, these were all superficial changes. Yet they were important in that they reflected the concern with which many Republican leaders, both in Java and Sumatra, viewed the discordinate condition afflicting the National Revolution in the latter province. Again at the DPR session in Bukittinggi, Amir Sjarifuddin seems to have conveyed

(19) *Dirgahayu Dwiwindu Lambang Bukit Barisan*. Aneka Minggu 31 July 1970. Nip Xarim et. al. (n.d.), vol. 1; 168-70. In Tapanuli: Regiment I (the former *Pesindo* unit led by Maradan Panggabean) was based at Sibolga, Regiment II at Padang Sidempuan and Regiment III at Tarutung. In Sumatera Timur: Regiment I was based at Brastagi, Regiment II at Kisaran and a special Regiment based at divisional headquarters in Siantar. In addition there were two special Battalions: Battalion B, commanded by Nip Xarim, based at Two Rivers and a special Battalion responsible for the protection of railways and oil refineries, based at Pangkalban Brandan. Regiment I consisted of five active Battalions, based at Tanjung Pura, Kutacane, Kabanjahe, Binjai and Perbaungan respectively. Regiment II consisted of four Battalions, based at Siantar, Tanjung Balai, Tebingtinggi and Wingfoot. Despite the formal designation of the main active units as "Battalion"s, the actual size of the different units still varied greatly.
to British observers the impression that he was deeply worried
about the condition of the Republic in Sumatra.

To British officers present at Fort de Kock, Sjarifoedin gave the impression that what he had seen had
convinced him that the people of Sumatra today had little
conception of reality; they were in fact "living in a
dream". One explanation of this was that Sumatra had
been left rather out of the picture of developments in
Java and Holland and had been forced to rely on the
idealistic and somewhat unpractical guidance of its local
leaders. There is no doubt that Sjarifoedin holds the
firm conviction that the general standard of Sumatran
leaders is very low indeed. Their lack of political
education and administrative ability was the subject of
his main criticism. Sjarifoedin repeatedly stressed
the need for men of moral courage and integrity, capable
of influencing the masses along moderate and practical
lines. In an attempt to improve this state of affairs,
Sjarifoedin has left behind a number of his more expe-
rienced and tried adherents, whose task will be to instruct
and advise Sumatran leaders and administrators. The TRI
has not been overlooked and two senior officers from Java
are remaining in Sumatra to help in the work of stren-
thening the organisation here. (20)

In the same context, Col. van der Post noted: (21)

From what Amir Sjarifoedin told me I gathered that
Sumatra was a great disappointment to him and that they
(the Republican government leaders present at the DPR
session) were afraid that the rule of the interior of
Sumatra was rapidly sliding into undesirable hands.

Within days of the DPR and Volksfront meetings in Bukittinggi,
the ideological conflicts separating moderates from pergerakan
and the policies of perjuangan from those of diplomasi had
again surfaced in both Tapanuli and Sumatera Timur.

(20) Document 233, No. 27; 2.
(21) Document 530; 2.
In Sumatera Timur these conditions produced some especially dramatic developments in the immediate aftermath of the Social Revolution. A few days after Hasan's departure for the DPR session in Bukittinggi, Amir found himself directly confronted by a group of pergerakan leaders based in Siantar, led by the former Sumatera Timur Resident Junus Nasution, the Bupati of Simalungun Urbanus Pardede and the BHL leader Jakub Siregar. Reacting strongly against the moderate, diplomasi line being emphasised by Amir Sjarifuddin and the central government delegation, they viewed Sjarifuddin's call for moderation with considerable distaste, if not the fear that the Social Revolution was about to be betrayed by a new alliance of moderate forces. Amir, under strong pressure, decided to take the extreme course of abandoning the Republic. On April 23 he left his home in Medan for a nearby RAPWI camp where he announced his defection from the Republic and placed himself under British protection. Explaining his decision, Amir declared that control of the Republican government had now fallen into the hands of a council of "extremists" based in Siantar.(22)

(22) Document 233, No. 28; 2. Amir's conflict with the Siantar group seems to have provided the final motivation for his defection. But, this had also been merely the final additive to more deep-rooted motives. Firstly, the intervention of the Java-based central government in Sumatra following the Social Revolution seems to have jarred severely Amir's strong commitment to Sumatran autonomy. Secondly, ever since the events of March he appears to have been
Consequential to Amir's defection was a further rapid polarization of moderate versus pergerakan tensions, particularly between the TRI and lasykar rakyat. Shortly after Amir's departure the TRI commander, Ahmad Tahir, decided to move against the pergerakan group in Siantar. On his orders Urbanus Pardede was arrested and charged with having corruptly expropriated government supplies. At the same time the former Resident Junus Nasution, who had fled to Binjei, was arrested there by the TRI and placed in custody, also charged with corruption. Some minor shooting incidents occurred between lasykar and TRI units in Simalungun. Tensions between the two sides in the Simalungun region were now more acute than they had ever been. (23)

becoming more and more fearful of the safety of his Dutch wife and children.
In June 1946 Amir left Indonesia for Holland, from where he strongly criticised the Republic. In particular he attacked the Republic as anti-Democratic and dominated by Javanese. During August and September 1946, in a series of articles in De Opdracht, he emphasised his dislike of these two aspects of the Republic and stressed his continued commitment to an autonomous Nieuw Sumatra (New Sumatra), free of Javanese domination. See also Oostkust van Sumatra Instituut Kroniek 1941-1946; 78-81.
In February 1948 Amir accepted an invitation from the Dutch-sponsored Negara Indonesia Timur (State of East Indonesia) to become a senior official with the Department of Health. In April 1948, in an interview with the journalist Rosihan Anwar, Amir declared that he wished to forget the whole question of why he had decided to abandon the Republic because he had been "confused" at the time. See Waspada 15 April 1948.
Also on Amir's defection, see Said (1973); 180.

(23) The British command in Medan, commenting on the transfer
In Tapanuli, equally dramatic expressions of internal dissension were being manifest. The ethnic and ideological tensions there, which had been building up in the wake of the Social Revolution in Sumatera Timur, finally exploded into serious internecine conflict.

On April 23 Pesindo youth in Tarutung, Sibolga and Balige, acting on the orders of the Pesindo chairman for Tapanuli, Raja Saul Lumbantobing, arrested a total of 44 senior civil servants, politicians and military officers on charges of being "NICA agents". All were interned in Balige pending trial. Raja Saul and other Pesindo leaders announced that a "Social Revolution" was now under way in Tapanuli.

---

of the Sumatera Timur TRI headquarters to Siantar, noted, with considerable accuracy, that "The underlying reason for this move may well be to attempt to restore by Tahir's direct control the balance of power for the moderates in Siantar.... " Document 233, No. 28; 1.


(24) The arrested included: seven members of the Tapanuli KNI (including Sutan Naga and Mr. Rufinus Lumbantobing), the Police chiefs for Tapanuli and North Tapanuli (Mohamad Nurdin and K. Sitompul), the Chief Justice and TRI Judge Advocate for Tapanuli (Sutan Mangaradja Muda), the Bupati of Tarutung (Farel Pasaribu), the former chairman of the Tapanuli Shū Sangikai and now special advisor to Resident Lumbantobing, Mangaradja Parlinggunan, the Demang of Balige (Mangaradja Herman Hutabarat), the Demang of Sidikalang (Junus Siahaan) and the former demangs of Porsea and Silindung (Lucius Lumbantobing and Iskandar Tampubolon respectively).

Six days later internecine conflict spread to Dairi. About 120 Acehnese pemudas from Rundeng (in the southern corner of Aceh about 30 kilometers from the Tapanuli border) and several truckloads of Karonese lasykar leaders from Brastagi, Kabanjahe and Tiga Lingga in Dairi jointly launched an armed attack on Sidikalang. The attack had been coordinated and initiated by Karo, Acehnese and Pakpak lasykar leaders in Dairi. After a short, fierce fight the attackers overpowered the small TRI garrison at Sidikalang. (26) Within hours the Acehnese and Karo lasykar leaders were in control of the town. Assisted by local pemudas they arrested a total of 21 government officials and civic leaders, most of whom were Toba Bataks. (27) Several other local government officials who were not arrested were told that they had been dismissed from their posts. Weapons and supplies were seized from the TRI post, the houses of those arrested were ransacked, as were a number of shops in the town. The better-off local farmers and merchants were

the Resident's office, ten other other senior civil servants, six Police officers, three TRI officers and three members of the Tapanuli Volksfront.

(26) TRI casualties were one killed and nine wounded.

(27) They included the negeri chiefs of Sitolunempu, Silimpat and Tiga Lingga, two elders of the HKBP and three Toba Batak traders. Several other government officials were dismissed from their jobs.
forced to pay "taxes" of rice and meat. New officials were appointed to replace those removed, in what the new controllers here, too, began to describe as a "Social Revolution". (28)

On May 1, two days after the occupation of Sidikalang, about half the occupying pemudas moved on to the north-western part of Samosir. Assisted by a number of local pemudas associated with Pesindo, they overpowered the TRI unit and arrested a number of negeri and village chiefs and civil servants. As in Sidikalang, weapons and supplies were seized from the TRI, houses and shops ransacked and "taxes" levied. In one region, Simanindo, four village chiefs were executed. (29)

The incidents in Dairi and Samosir were the culmination of the overlapping ethnic and ideological tensions, produced by Toba migration and HKBP evangelism that had been building up in both regions (as well as in south-eastern Aceh) for some time, particularly since late 1945, being prodded into open conflict by the Social Revolution in Sumatera Timur. (30)


(30) The "tributaries of the social revolution began to flow from Sumatera Timur" into Tapanuli. B. Siregar (1950); 28. Shortly the events on Samosir a series of violent clashes broke out in Kotacane region, North-West of Tanah Karo, in Aceh, between Toba and Acehnese pemuda. Document 541; 9-10.
the same time, in Tanah Karo a number of *lasykar rakyat* units (mainly from *Napindo* and *Pesindo*) decided to export the Social Revolution to Tapanuli in order to remove what they considered to be colonialists and feudalists still holding office in the Republican administration there. An indigenous movement with the same aims had concurrently been developing on Samosir. All these factors - ethnocentricism, religion and political ideology - came into play together, mutually reinforcing the spread of violence.

Both the civilian government and the TRI command in Tarutung left no doubt that they considered the events of the past ten days as constituting open rebellion. Army and Police units in Tarutung and Siborongborong were mobilized and despatched to clean up the rebels in Samosir and Dairi. At the same time the families of those in detention in Balige pressed for government reprisals to be taken against the *Pesindo* leadership.

On May 4 a TRI and Police Mobile Brigade force attacked the rebel base on Samosir at Pangururan. After a short, fierce battle, in which three of the defending *lasykars* were killed and 47 wounded, government forces occupied the town. A total of 121 rebel *lasykars* were arrested and taken to Tarutung for internment. The village chiefs detained in the earlier rebel
attack were released, although several of the deposed rajas, negeri chiefs and civil servants were despatched to Tarutung along with the arrested lasykars. (31) On the 13th, the senior Pesindo leaders in Tarutung and Siborongborong, including Raja Saul Lumbantobing and his chief advisor Parhusa Panggabean (a former negeri chief of Sitompul Panggabean), were arrested by the TRI. Next day a Pesindo force attacked the TRI headquarters in Tarutung. However, they were easily beaten off and about twenty lasykars captured. (32)

Actions in pursuit of "Social Revolution" had by now also occurred in South Tapanuli. Early in May, pemuda groups, chiefly from Pesindo, forced the resignation of several more kuria and village chiefs in the region south of Padang Sidempuan. They initiated the election of local KNIs and of new kuria and village chiefs. To a great extent these particular actions reflected not only class antagonisms towards the older hereditary chiefs with colonial backgrounds but also South Tapanuli resentments against the northern, Toba-dominated residency government. In a number of cases (for example, in Pintupadangdjahe, Sabadjambu and Pagarantonga) advice of the new appointments, and requests for their confirmation, were

sent not to the residency administration in Tarutung but direct to Governor Hasan's office in Medan. (33) Moreover, neither the civilian authorities nor the TRI in South Tapanuli chose to take any action against the initiators of these changes. In fact some weeks earlier, in April, the KNI and Volksfront in Padang Sidempuan had announced that it no longer regarded the South Tapanuli-based TRI Regiment II as being subordinate to the TRI command in Tarutung. (34) With the residency government having its hands full coping with dissension in the north, Padang Sidempuan, by the end of May 1946, became the centre for an increasingly autonomous administration in South Tapanuli.

Internecine conflict continued in Dairi. More Pesindo and Napindo units from Tanah Karo had moved across the border and occupied Tiga Lingga, arresting about 200 Toba Batak officials and seizing weapons and supplies. Most of the Toba community in the region fled towards Sidikalang and from there, south, into the Toba region itself. By now Karonese and Pakpak pemudas in Dairi were engaged in a large scale assault against the Toba communities there.

On May 20 TRI units counter-attacked, launching a major

(34) Document 539; 13.
assault against Sidikalang and occupying the town after a brief, violent skirmish. About 50 of the rebel pemudas, together with the new officials appointed since April 29, were arrested. The TRI force then attacked Tiga Lingga and captured the town after some heavy fighting. Several of the Karonese *lasykars* there were captured, although the majority retreated across the border into Tanah Karo. At the same time TRI forces occupied the *Pesindo* base at Merek inside Tanah Karo, on the crossroads between Sidikalang, Kabanjahe and Siantar, stopping all traffic between Dairi and Medan. The arrested rebel *lasykars* were taken to Tarutung for internment. (35)

The fighting in Dairi during May had constituted "a bloody inter-ethnic conflict..." (36) Altogether some 300 persons had been killed and about 700 wounded. (37) Inter-ethnic tensions between Toba and non-Toba communities in Dairi were at a peak. So too were those between Tobas and Acehnese and Tobas and Karonese throughout North Sumatra.

From Siantar, Governor Hasan and the all-Sumatra TRI


(36) Castles (1974); 76.

command intervened. A special government commission was constituted under the leadership of a former demang of Tarutung, Cornelis Sihombing, and despatched to Sidikalang to negotiate a truce between the conflicting groups. On June 14, after about a week of discussions with Toba, Pakpak and Karo community leaders in Sidikalang, the commission was able to negotiate an agreement on a formal peace settlement. An adat ceremony was arranged at which a buffalo was ritually slaughtered and leaders of the three communities ate a meal together to symbolise an end to the conflict. In response the TRI released all those arrested since the crushing of the revolt. (38) On June 29, the Tapanuli DPR (39) set up a

(38) ibid.

(39) The Tapanuli DPR had been installed on June 5, in place of the previous KNI. It consisted of 55 members composed of 39 regional representatives, 14 representatives of political parties and one representative each for women and Chinese. The breakdown of the regional representatives was: Batakland (Toba and Dairi regions) - 19, Padang Sidempuan (South Tapanuli) - 11, Nias - 6 and Sibolga - 3. The political party representatives consisted of two each from the PNI, Pesindo, Partai Sosialis, GRI, PKI, Masyumi and Parki. Supervision of the day to day work of the DPR was placed in the hands of a Badan Pekerja (Working Committee) headed by the Resident. Each member of the Badan Pekerja was made responsible for particular areas of public administration. Aside from Resident Lumbantobing, as Chairman, other members of the Badan Pekerja were: Sia Marinus (S.M.) Simanjuntak (Batakland) - responsible for Justice and Defence and Vice-Chairman of the Badan Pekerja, Raja Patuan Natigor Lumbantobing (Batakland) - Local Government, Abdul Hakim (Padang Sidempuan) - Finance and Social Welfare, Gerhard Silitonga (Batakland) - Education and Religion, Maraganti Siregar (Sibolga) - Information, and Albert Lumbantobing (Batakland) - Transport and Public Works. Document 311; 16 & bijlage II. Document 313; 16.
special commission to determine whether those persons arrested by the TRI during May should be brought to trial or released. The commission, headed by Dr. Wasito, was installed on July 7. (40)

By the end of the month the commission had authorised the release of all but seven of the detainees. Among the seven still detained, however, was the Pesindo leader Raja Saul Lumbantobing.

(One) outcome of these events of March-June 1946 was a further strengthening of the TRI, which absorbed or disbanded the lasykars who had supported Saul Lumbantobing. The TRI retained this ascendancy until the first Dutch military action a year later resulted in the withdrawal into Tapanuli of many of the Republican units from East Sumatra. (41)

The military strength of the North Tapanuli lasykars, Pesindo in particular, was now shattered. By the end of July, the TRI had forced the disbandment of the Tapanuli Volksfront throughout North Tapanuli. (42) As a result the moderate, anti-pergerakan

(40) Dr. Wasito was director of the plantation hospital at Sumuran. He was a leading figure in the Partai Sosialis in Tapanuli.

Members of the special investigating committee were:
Dr. Wasito, Fachruditin Nasution (Pesindo, Padang Sidempuan),
Dr. Hulman Lumbantobing (Partai Sosialis, North Tapanuli),

(41) Castles (1974); 76. By the end of June 1946 the three largest lasykar units in Sibolga, for instance, had disbanded and merged with the TRI. Document 311; 15.

(42) Document 314; 14.
forces took control of the residency government.

Another immediate outcome of the internecine conflicts of May and June was an increased dominance of the residency governmental apparatus by Christian Toba Bataks. They dominated the TRI regiments in North Tapanuli and the civilian administration in Tarutung and Sibolga. This situation soon brought about an exacerbation of North-South tensions within the DPR and the TRI. The intensity of conflict within the DPR over this issue at one stage forced Resident Lumbantobing to offer his resignation. The South Tapanuli representatives immediately tried to get Abdul Hakim appointed as Resident in his place. However, by early August, the northern members had rallied behind Lumbantobing, re-electing him as Resident. South Tapanuli resentment had particularly developed against northern Christian control of the Department of Religious Affairs, headed by Gerhard Silitonga, as a result of which the DPR agreed on July 7 to the establishment of a special Council for (Islamic) Religious Affairs (Dewan Agama).

(43) Note, for example, the predominance of Toba Bataks on the Badan Pekerja of the new Tapanuli DPR. See note 39 above. The central apparatus of the bureaucracy for the residency was no less dominated by Toba Bataks.

(44) Document 315; 12.

(45) Document 312; 21.
Concurrently the North-South divisions within the TRI grew wider, with the South Tapanuli regimental command virtually no longer acknowledging the authority of the Tarutung-based divisional command. From Bukittinggi, the Sumatra TRI commander, Suhardjo, intervened, despatching the Tapanuli divisional commander Colonel Mochamad Din (who since his appointment in January had spent virtually all his time in Bukittinggi) to Tapanuli. Din, a Moslem Gayo, had little empathy with the Christian Toba military commanders of the North, especially in the aftermath of the internecine conflicts in Gayo, Alas and Dairi. He promptly transferred the divisional command headquarters from Tarutung to Sibolga and set about sponsoring an expansion in the military strength of the South Tapanuli regiment as a means of dismantling Christian Toba dominance.

Yet another effect of the recent upheavals in Tapanuli was an increase in the size of that small sector of Tapanuli society opposed to the idea of Tapanuli forming part of a unitary Republic of Indonesia governed from Java. Several hereditary chiefs and former colonial civil servants, from both North and South, who had either been directly affected by or had witnessed the events of May and June, became convinced that independence within the Republic would inevitably mean a victory for political extremists, bringing with it the destruc-

tion of traditional Batak society. Already several of these people had moved to Medan, seeking the protection of the British and Dutch presence. There they made contact with fellow Tapanuli Bataks who wanted a much more gradual progress towards independence (under Dutch tutelage), one which would guarantee adequate political and cultural autonomy for Tapanuli. (47)

Turning to Sumatera Timur, one finds the contrary dynamics of diplomasi and perjuangan in full play. Despite the arrests of Junus Nasution and Urbanus Pardede, pergerakan politicians were still in positions of much more prominence (vis a vis the moderates) within the residency administration than before the Social Revolution. For example, the new 86 member Sumatera Timur DPR at a plenary session between May 20 to 22 elected a seven-member Badan Pekerja consisting entirely of pergerakan politicians. (48) Paralleling this was an increase

(47) By mid-1947 a group of Tapanuli Bataks, mostly former colonial civil servants, living in a RAPWI camp in Sumatera Timur, had formed an organization called Oesaha Pembangoenan Batak (Endeavour for Batak Development). It was headed by a former colonial government customs official named Parlaungan, son of a kuria chief in South Tapanuli. The organization sent telegrams protesting against the inclusion of Tapanuli in the Republic, to the Dutch Queen and the Lt. Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies. Document 312; 19.

(48) Members of the Badan Pekerja were: Luat Siregar (PKI) - Chairman, Saleh Umar (PNI) - Vice-Chairman, Agus Salim (Partai Buruh), Haji Abdul Rahman Sjihab (Masyumi), M. Yunan Nasution (Masyumi), Abdul Malik Munir (Pesindo) and Hadely Hasibuan (Partai Sosialis). Document 541; 4. Document 233, No. 32; 2.
in the manpower strength and militancy of the *lasykar rakyat*; a result of the stimulus to *pemuda* activism provided by the Social Revolution, the withdrawal of Japanese forces and the increasingly noticeable Dutch presence.\(^{(49)}\) By early May, the Republican government's information office in Siantar was referring to the existence of three different Republican "authorities" in Sumatera Timur: the government and the TRI, the *Volksfront* and "wild and obscure groups",\(^{(50)}\) the last-named referring to the still large number of independent *lasykar rakyat*.

Despite the government's calls for unity, both the "wild

---

\(^{(49)}\) "Two contributory causes of the build-up in the Medan area have been the increased evacuation of the Japanese from North Sumatra, and the belief that all remaining Japanese will shortly be leaving the country. It is appreciated that as the Japanese evacuation progresses, the number of armed Indonesians in and around Medan will increase. The average Indonesian is now firmly convinced that the British object is to re-instate the Dutch in Sumatra: he has heard of the relief of British troops by Dutch in Soerabaya and Semarang, and of the arrival of Dutch troops in Batavia. In Medan, he knows that Dutch troops are being trained under British auspices and has seen offices taken over by the British on the Dutch behalf." Document 233, No. 33 (1 June 1946); 3.

The number of Japanese troops in North Sumatra between March and July was as follows: 26 March - 17,806, 8 April - 11, 403, 2 June - 7,792, 15 July - 6,762, 19 July - 4,170. See Document 233, Nos. 24; 8, 25; 3, 33; 5, 39; 4 and 40; 4.

\(^{(50)}\) Document 540: 3. Document 233, No. 30; 2. A report by the Republican military police in Sumatera Timur in July 1946 complained about "arbitrary" behaviour on the part of groups associated with the *Volksfront*, and accused the *Volksfront* leadership of regarding itself as a "government". Document 323; 4.
and obscure groups" and those *lasykar rakyat* units more formally linked to the *Volksfront* stepped up their attacks on British forces. *(51)* From the beginning of April clashes between *lasykar rakyat* and British forces in the Medan area increased. This in turn brought new recruits into *lasykar* units in the kampungs on the perimeter of the Medan Area. British forces stepped up their arrests of Indonesians for "unlawful possession of arms", "looting", and offences against "law and order" and "security", *(52)* while at the same time increasing the armed strength of the Chinese Defence Corps (*Poh An Tuï*). These measures served to intensify the level of Republican-British conflict as well as that of *pemuda* attacks on the Chinese community. By June armed conflict between the *lasykar rakyat* and British forces was approaching full-scale war. The frequency and violence of British raids on *lasykar* bases grew, including the use of mortar and artillery bombardments. Thousands of civilians fled from the Medan Area kampungs towards Binjei, Tanjung Morawa, Pancur Batu and Tebingtinggi.

*(51)* At a conference of the Sumatera Timur *Volksfront* held in Siantar from May 14-15, Amir Sjarifuddin's special representative in Sumatra, Mr. Hermani, appealed for *Volksfront* support for central government policies. Eventually the conference adopted a resolution expressing support for the Sjahrir government, provided it stood for nothing less than 100% independence for Indonesia. Document 387; 13.

*(52)* At the end of April 1946 a total of 154 Indonesians were in British custody in the Medan Area charged with these offences. Document 233, No. 28; 10.
With British troops being accompanied on their raids by small Dutch (KNIL) units, yet another stimulus to conflict was introduced. (53)

While *perjuangan* was tearing life in the Medan kampungs apart, Hasan and the TRI command continued their negotiations with the British. (54) On May 13 Hasan, in discussions with the British commander, undertook to continue to cooperate with the British as much as possible. (55) A month later Hasan, Mohamad Jusuf and Col. Tahir stood as special guests of the British commander at a military parade in Medan to mark the British King's birthday. (56)

Once again the moderates of the civilian government and the TRI command in Sumatera Timur moved to try and control both

(53) Document 233, No. 29; 1, No. 30; 1, No. 31; 1-2, No. 32; 1, No. 33; 1-2, No. 34; 1 and No. 35; 1. Document 540; 1. Document 541; 2. Radjab (1949); 17. Nip Xarim et. al. (n.d.), vol. 1; 165 & 230.

(54) Hasan, following Dr. Amir's defection, had returned to Medan, but departed the next day for a tour of Aceh. He returned to Sumatera Timur on May 9. But this time he chose to stay in Siantar rather than Medan. Document 233, No. 30; 2 and No. 34; 3.

(55) The British command described the discussions with Hasan as "cordial". Document 233, No. 31; 1-2.

(56) Document 233, No. 35; 1. Among the special guests at the ceremony was the Sultan of Deli who was making his first official public appearance since his installation as Sultan.
the pergerakan movement in general and the layykar rakyat in particular, this time prodded by directives from the central Republican government. On May 25 instructions had arrived from the Ministry of Defence in Jakarta to the effect that all "armed units belonging to non-governmental bodies be integrated fully into the official army." (57) In Tapanuli this was already under way. In Sumatera Timur, however, the government and TRI were in no position to put the instructions into effect. On June 28 a presidential decree effecting a state of emergency throughout the Republic was issued from Jakarta, pursuant to which it was ordered that Regional Defence Councils (Dewan Pertahanan Daerah) - DPD - should be established to coordinate the activities of the civilian government, the TRI, layykar rakyat and political parties. (58) By mid-July, following a meeting of the first all-Sumatra TRI conference (in Bukittinggi), DPDs were formed in both Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli. They were headed by the respective residents and TRI divisional commanders, with other members sitting as representatives of either the residency executive councils or "peoples' organizations" (organisasi2 rakyat). (59)

(57) Nip Xarim et. al. (n.d.), vol. 1; 363. For a detailed account of developments in Java leading up to this decision, see Anderson (1972); 332 passim.


(59) Apart from the two Residents and TRI commanders, the members of the DPDs for Tapanuli and Sumatera Timur were:
In Tapanuli establishment of the DPD merely formalised an already operative government-TRI control over the layyak rakyat and the pergerakan movement. On July 24, when leaders from the PNI, PKI, Masyumi, GRI and Partai Sosialis met in Sibolga to set up a new united front in place of the disbanded Volksfront, they announced that the central task of the new front, to be known as the Concentrasi Nasional (National Concentration) would be to coordinate the "Peoples' Forces" under the leadership and command of the TRI. (60)

In Sumatera Timur the setting up of the DPD was accompanied by

Sumatera Timur - Saleh Umar (PNI) and Haji Abdul Rahman Sjihab (Masyumi); representing the Badan Pekerja DPR. Abdul Xarim M.S. (PKI), Bachtiar Junus (Masyumi/Hisbullah) and Hutasoit (Partai Sosialis); representing the organisasi rakyat.

Tapanuli - Sia Marinus Simandjuntak (Partai Sosialis) and Raja Patuan Natigor Lumbantobing (Partai Sosialis) representing the Badan Pekerja DPR. Jahja Siregar (Masyumi), Sutan Katimbun (PNI) and Dr. Sinaga (Parki) representing the organisasi rakyat. Sutan Katimbun was an elder brother of Amir Sjarifuddin. Dr. Sinaga was chairman of the Medical Association for Tapanuli.


(60) Document 314; 16. Leadership of the Concentrasi Nasional was: M.H. Samosir (GRI) - Chairman, Jahja Siregar (Masyumi) - Deputy Chairman, M. Siahaan (Partai Sosialis) - First Secretary, Maraganti Sitompul (PKI) - Second Secretary. The Parki did not participate in the Concentrasi Nasional.
another re-organization of the TRI command. Most importantly Ahmad Tahir was replaced as divisional commander by the commander of the Siantar garrison, Col. Hopman Sitompul. (61) Also, initial steps were taken to more closely integrate the administrative functions of the all-Sumatra TRI command and Governor Hasan's civilian government. (62) On July 13, the central government appointed Dr. Gani in Palembang as chief representative of the defence department in Sumatra, with direct control over all DPDs. (63)

The reorganization marked a recognition of the continuing relative weakness of the TRI and the moderate political forces vis a vis the Zasykar rakyat and the pergerakan movement. The replacement of Tahir by Hopman Sitompul, for example, had to a

---

(61) Tahir was made chief of the Military Police for Sumatra. Sitompul, a Toba Batak from Siantar, had been commander of the Giyu-gun unit in Siantar in the last months of the Japanese occupation. Late in 1945 he became TKR commander for Siantar. The reorganized division, re-named Divisi Gadjah II, consisted of three regimental commands (based at Brastagi, Wingfoot and Tebingtinggi), incorporating ten battalions (based at Tanjung Pura, Kutacane, Kabanjahe, Binjei, Perbaungan, Tanjung Balai, Wingfoot, Kotapinang, Siantar and Rampah) plus two special battalions at Two Rivers and Pangkalan Brandan respectively and six small naval units (at Tanjung Balai, Teluk Nibung, Tanjung Tiram, Tanjung Beringin, Pangkalan Susu and Labuhan Bilik). Nip Xarim et. al. (n.d.), vol. 1; 173-5.

(62) For example, the chief of the finance department of the Sumatra TRI command, Lt. Col. Raden Kadiman, was made special assistant for economic affairs to Governor Hasan.

(63) Raliby (1953); 405.
great extent been forced by *lasykar rakyat* and *pergerakan* pressure. The latter had bitterly resented Tahir's attempts to protect the *kerajaan* during the Social Revolution and his part in arresting Urbanus Pardede in April. Many *pergerakan* leaders saw this as a deliberate attempt to stifle the Social Revolution, to use the TRI as a counter-revolutionary force in support of the status quo. Sitompul, on the other hand, was on friendly terms with many *lasykar* commanders and *pergerakan* politicians in the Simalungun/Asahan region. Since his days as a *Giyū-gun* officer he had maintained a distinctly *pergerakan* stance, (64) being far less prepared to accept the dictates of *diplomasi* in mid-1946, than most of the TRI officer corps were. The change of command, therefore, was something of a victory for the *pergerakan* movement.

A similar compromise with the *pergerakan* movement was forced upon Governor Hasan during July, when he attempted to replace Luat Siregar as Sumatera Timur Resident. On July 24 Hasan announced that Luat would become a special advisor to the Governor and be replaced as Resident by the former Mayor of Padang and former Deputy Chairman of BOMPA, Abu Bakar Djaar, who stood well outside the activist core of the *pergerakan* movement. Luat, however, refused to resign immediately, declaring that he still had work to complete as Resident. Eventually

(64) Just before the Japanese surrender he had led an abortive revolt in an attempt to seize weapons.
Hasan was forced to agree to his remaining as Resident for the time being while also taking up the post of advisor to the Governor. (65)

While the power struggles between moderates and pergerakan and between the TRI command and the lasykar rakyat developed further, the physical difficulties occasioned by increasing British/Dutch military pressure on the Republic in Sumatera Timur was forcing an awareness upon both sides of the need for some better coordination in the military field. By the middle of 1946 TRI and lasykar commanders, as well as moderate and pergerakan politicians, were only too aware of the deteriorating military position of the Republic vis-à-vis the British and Dutch. The uncoordinated nature of Republican military activity, particularly in the Medan Area, throughout 1946, had resulted in heavy casualties and loss of weapons. Growing awareness of the need to remedy such a potentially disastrous situation finally moved the leadership echelons of the government, the TRI, the lasykar rakyat and the political parties in Sumatera Timur to cooperation in seeking a remedy.

On August 8 TRI, lasykar rakyat and party leaders met in Tebingtinggi to discuss the problem. By the following day they

(65) Document 233, No. 41; 2 and No. 42; 2.
had agreed to establish a new coordinating command for all lasykar rakyat units in the Medan Area. It was agreed that the new command, to be known as the Komando Resimen Lasykar Rakyat Medan Area (Lasykar Rakat Regimental Command, Medan Area) - RLRMA - would be responsible to the Divisi Gadjah II command in Siantar. The TRI's special Battalion B was made part of the RLRMA with the Battalion B commander Nip Xarim as RLRMA commander. (66) Units making up the new regiment were divided into five "Battalions", incorporating units from Napindo, Pesindo, Barisan Merah, Hisbullah and Pemuda Parkindo (Divisi Panah). (67)

The term "Battalion", however, was a command rather than a unit designation. It represented a nominal alliance of separate lasykar units under a coordinating command rather than an amalgamation into a single unit. Each of the lasykar units making up the RLRMA battalions retained its independent


(67) The battalions were based at Tembung (Napindo), Sunggal (Napindo and Pesindo), Hamparan Perak (Barisan Merah, Napindo and Hisbullah), Tanjung Morawa (Napindo, Pesindo, Divisi Panah and Barisan Merah) and Two Rivers (Battalion B). The battalion commanders were Jakub Lubis (Napindo), Abdul Hamid (Napindo), Aladin Barani Pohan (Barisan Merah), Jahja Ibrahim Atjeh (Napindo) and Nip Xarim respectively. Aneka Minggu 31 July 1970.

The total strength of the RLRMA was about 7,000, although only about half that number were equipped with firearms. Nip Xarim et. al. (n.d.), vol. 1; 382.
Within three weeks, a further attempt at defence coordination was taken when an all-Sumatra Defence Coordination Body, the Badan Koordinasi Pertahanan Sumatera, was formed in Siantar on instructions from Dr. Gani. Headed by Governor Hasan (as chairman), Gani (deputy chairman) and the Sumatra TRI commander Gen. Suhardjo, the task of the Badan Koordinasi was to integrate all of the armed units into the TRI and ensure their subordination to government control. (68) Just two days earlier, a provincial government announcement had made a strong appeal for unity amongst supporters of the Republic. It had urged:

Unity between the people and the government, government and political parties, unity between government and military, and furthermore between political party and political party. There can be no exceptions, all citizens must desire unity, because united we stand and divided we fall. Unity of thought, unity of strength, unity of struggle must be nurtured .... (69)

In the five months since the Social Revolution petered out in Sumatera Timur, dissenion and factionalism within the Republic in North Sumatra had increased. This had been drama-

(68) Raliby (1953); 383-4. The other two members of the Badan Koordinasi were Dr. Gindo Siregar (then Deputy Chairman of the Sumatra DPR) and Col. Hasan Kasim (deputy to Gani in the latter's capacity as representative of the Minister for Defence in Sumatra).

(69) Indonesia Merdeka 25 August 1946.
tically evidenced in Tapanuli. In Sumatera Timur, the division between pergerakan and moderates had hardened since March. But perhaps the most important development since the Social Revolution was a further consolidation in the autonomy of local military administrations, headed both by TRI and lasykar commanders, across Sumatera Timur. TRI unit commanders, while acknowledging their subordination to the divisional command, had, nevertheless, built up and jealously guarded their own local autonomous fiefdoms. Similar fiefdoms had been built up by many of the lasykar rakyat commanders. These local military governments functioned through arrangements reached between the military commanders and local political and community leaders; the former utilising his monopoly of force to control the local economy. In other words, local government in most of Sumatera Timur was, by the end of August 1946, in the hands of petty warlords. Neither the re-organization of the TRI structure nor the formation of the RLRMA nor the establishment of the Badan Koordinasi made any difference to this situation. In the case of the RLRMA none of the constituent units surrendered their territorial autonomy. Moreover, several lasykar units within the Medan Area had refused to join the RLRMA, unwilling to even risk compromising this autonomy. (70)

Among the lasykar rakyat that stayed out of the RLRMA was the largest and best armed of those on the Medan Area boundaries, the Naga Terbang led by Timur Pane. Pane, a Moslem Ankola from Sipirok, had built up his force out a pemuda street gang in Medan. During the Social Revolution he had acquired a considerable reputation for ferocity and ruthlessness. By mid-1946 Pane controlled an extensive local fiefdom centered upon Perbaungan and based upon a large, well-armed unit controlling several plantations (mostly rubber) and a profitable trading network with Malaya from the port of Pantai Labu near Lubuk Pakam. During July he had expanded the size of his force still further by recruiting numbers of pemudas who had fled from Tapanuli to Sumatera Timur in order to avoid arrest by the TRI.

It was control of the plantations in Sumatera Timur which provided the armed units with the mainstay to their political autonomy. Via Chinese traders, local military commanders were exporting large quantities of plantation products, especially rubber, sisal, and palm oil, to Malaya and Singapore, where they were either sold or bartered directly for weapons and military supplies. From the time of the Social Revolution, when armed units seized large amounts of plantation produce, the quantities of such goods flowing out from the ports of Sumatera Timur and the quantities of goods and other supplies coming in from Malaya and Singapore increased enormously. The
main trading ports from which this trade was conducted were: Langsa in Aceh; Tanjung Pura, Pangkalan Susu, Tanjung Balai and Labuhan Bilik in Sumatera Timur; and across the Malacca Straits from Penang and Singapore. By August 1946 TRI and lazykar units were acquiring quantities of rifles, machine guns, revolvers, grenades, ammunition, motor vehicles, uniforms, helmets, boots and other military equipment from Malaya/Singapore. (71) A powerful group of military entrepreneurs was emerging in Sumatera Timur. Military commanders took over the organizing of production and supply of plantation produce, linking up with the Chinese trading network between Sumatera Timur and Malaya/Singapore.

The barter-trade network, and the growth of military

(71) Document 314; 2. Document 388; 1. Document 109; 3 & 10. On one occasion in June 1946 a Chinese firm in Tanjung Balai organized the barter of plantation produce in exchange for 20 boat loads (between 20 and 30 tons each) of military equipment; consisting of machine guns, rifles, pistols, ammunition, motorcycles and helmets. By this time dozens of motorboats, chartered by pro-Republican organizations in Malaya and Singapore from Chinese traders there, were travelling regularly between Singapore, Penang and Malacca to ports in Sumatera Timur. The boats varied in size from 20 to 200 tons. One occasion a chartered motorboat from Penang to Tanjung Pura carried a cargo of 50 sten guns, 200 rifles, 60 revolvers and 35 boxes of ammunition - all of British manufacture. As for goods travelling the other way across the Malacca Straits, the Singapore Free Press reported on 26 June 1946 that the greatest quantity of imports into Singapore during May had come from Sumatra being more than double in value than imports from the United Kingdom in that month. Document 386; 1-3. Document 388; 2. Document 217.
entrepreneurs reached into Tapanuli as well. In South Tapanuli military commanders organized the transport of rice and smallholder rubber to Labuhan Bilik or Rantau Prapat where it was sold or bartered for weapons and supplies coming in on the trade route from Malaya/Singapore to Sumatera Timur. TRI and lasykar units occupying plantations in Asahan and Labuhan Batu needed rice and were willing to siphon off some of their weaponry and supplies to South Tapanuli in exchange for that commodity. With the encouragement of the Tapanuli divisional commander, Mohamad Din, unit commanders from the TRI regiment in South Tapanuli were, by August 1946, operating a regular and profitable trading network. In consequence, the manpower and equipment of the TRI in South Tapanuli grew rapidly. (72) Also, in the North, chiefly out of Sibolga, a trade was developing with Singapore (based mainly on the export of rubber), controlled by the TRI and operating via local Chinese merchants. (73)

Integral to the operations of all these trading networks

(72) Document 319; 19-20. In August 1946 Dutch military intelligence in Medan reported that the strength of the South Tapanuli regiment had grown to about 3,000 and that the battalion in Kotanopan, about 500 strong, was now completely equipped with British uniforms. Document 314; 14-15. One consequence of this trade was that between August and October 1946 the price of rice in South Tapanuli rose from Rp. 14 to Rp. 32 per kilogram. Document 317; 9.

(73) Document 317; 11.
were the Chinese business communities in Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli. A few, mostly the small number of Chinese who supported the communist revolution in China itself, acted out of committed support for the Republic. Most, however, acted out of that ingrained mixture of self-preservation and the profit motive which had long been a dominant part of the culture of the Chinese minority in the Netherlands East Indies. (74) While Indonesians supporting the Republic vented their hatreds and frustrations against the Chinese because of the latter's control of economic resources and because of their apparent cooperation with the Dutch, those in leadership positions in the Republic, whether moderates or pergerakan, needed the Chinese merchant community in order to survive economically. Since these Chinese financed and administered an economic infrastructure which they themselves had constructed, only they could operate it since it spread beyond the territorial and political spheres of either the former Netherlands Indies or the Republic of Indonesia.

On the other side of the Malacca Straits, in Malaya and

(74) On 4 December 1946 the Chinese newspaper in Jakarta, Sheng Huo Pao commented that "The trade between Sumatra and Malaya has created not a few newly prosperous Chinese merchants who began their enterprises during the Japanese Occupation. Unlike the pre-war Chinese capitalists who are night and day expecting the return of the Dutch government, these newly prosperous merchants are hoping for complete independence of the Indonesians." From a translation in Document 410, No. 44/1946.
Singapore, this trade was organized by Chinese traders and a number of expatriate Indonesians, most of whom were Sumatrans. The former did the buying and selling and provided the necessary shipping. The latter acted as agents for the Republican government and the military entrepreneurs in Sumatra. Two main groups of expatriate Indonesians were involved, both associated with the General Labour Union - GLU - of Malaya. The first, the Perkoempoelan Kaoem Boeroeh Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Workers) - Perkabin - was headed by the deputy chairman of the GLU, S.M. Zainan, a Minangkabau. The other, the Persatooan Kaoem Boeroeh Indonesia (Indonesian Labour Union) - PKBI - was headed by two Tapanuli Bataks, Sorta Lumbantobing and Abdul Salim Harahap. Both organizations were based in Singapore. (75)

(75) Three other important Indonesian nationalist organizations based in Malaya/Singapore which were involved in these trading activities were: the Kepandoean Rakjat Indonesia Singapore (Vanguard of the People of Indonesia in Singapore) - KRIS, the Perkoempoelan Persahabatan Indonesia (Indonesia Friendship Association) - PPI, and the Pembantoe Indonesia Merdeka (Supporters of Independent Indonesia) - PIM. KRIS was affiliated with the PKBI. The PPI, also based in Singapore, was headed by a member of the GLU leadership council, Hasmy Tahir. The PIM, based in Kuala Lumpur, was led by a Minangkabau, Nurding Rais. In addition there were the Malay nationalist organizations with a long history of close ties with the Indonesian nationalist movement in Sumatra. In Kuala Lumpur there was the Partai Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (Malay National Party of Malaya) - PKMM, led by a close associate of Xarim M.S., Dr. Burhanuddin. In Penang there was the group of Malay nationalists led by Mohamad Samin Thaib. See Documents 382, 385 and 399.
As competition between armed units developed for control over territory and resources, especially in the plantation regions of Sumatera Timur, the incidence of violence between units increased. With growing frequency violent inter-unit clashes took place. In July, for example, a serious clash occurred between TRI and Pesindo units near Binjei. The issue was the control of local plantations and trade. Eventually the Pesindo unit was forced to abandon its plantation base and several of its leaders were arrested by the TRI and sent to divisional headquarters in Siantar for internment. The TRI unit seized a stockpile of 300 tons of rubber on the plantation and promptly sold it to local Chinese merchants.\(^7^6\)

By now the Dutch were returning in force to Sumatra and a new scenario to the National Revolution was being written. At the beginning of October 1946 a battalion of Royal Netherlands Army troops from Holland landed in Medan. They were followed a few days later by a KNIL battalion from West Java. The British had decided upon a speedy departure from Indonesia\(^7^7\) and defence installations in the Medan Area were quickly handed over to the Dutch command. Dutch forces took over the main task of raiding Republican bases in and around the Medan Area. TRI

\(^{76}\) Document 3; 2.

\(^{77}\) See George Kahin (1952); 196.
and laskar rakyat units in the region reacted immediately to the Dutch takeover and began to intensify their attacks on both Dutch and British patrols. By the end of October fighting had become quite heavy throughout the Medan Area. (78)

The central Republican government now intervened. On October 14 a Joint (Republic-British) Truce Committee in Jakarta had agreed to a ceasefire. On the 30th Governor Hasan, in Siantar, received instructions from the Republic's Defence Minister, Amir Sjarifuddin, and his Sumatran deputy, Dr. Gani, ordering him to reopen immediately ceasefire negotiations with the British command. (79) The very next day Hasan went to Medan where, on November 1, tripartite talks between the Republic, the British and the Dutch produced agreement that a ceasefire should come into effect from 6 pm the following day. (80) The three sides agreed that a Joint Truce Committee (JTC) would be immediately constituted to supervise the ceasefire. (81) Hasan

---


(79) Both Sjarifuddin and Gani had been members of the Republican delegation to the Joint Truce Commission in Jakarta on October 14. Aneka Minggu 4 August 1970.

(80) Document 233, No. 55; 3.

(81) Day to day activities of the JTC were to be carried out by two sub-committees: a Joint Civil Affairs Committee, to supervise the control and operations of public utilities
then appointed a five-man delegation, headed by Mr. Mohamad Jusuf, to represent the Republic on the JTC, (82) following which he returned to Siantar.

On November 3 Dr. Gani, accompanied by Col. T.B. Simatupang from the TRI High Command, arrived in Medan from Jakarta to lead the Republican delegation at the initial JTC meetings. At the first three sessions the Republican case was put by Gani, Simatupang and Mohamad Jusuf. Gani, on his arrival in Medan, had made it clear that he intended to commit the Republic in Sumatra to a negotiated peace with the British and Dutch. (83) At the JTC talks he and Simatupang undertook to guarantee Republican observance of the ceasefire and agreed to a British demand for a total withdrawal of Republican troops from the Medan Area. They also undertook that all lasykar

in the Medan Area, and a Joint Truce Committee, to establish and police the ceasefire boundaries. Document 233, No. 55; 3. Oostkust van Sumatra Instituut Kroniek 1941-1946; 57. Nip Xarim et. al. (n.d.), vol. 1; 244-5.

(82) The other four members were: Mr. Rufinus Lumbantobing (now Deputy Governor of Sumatra, in place of Dr. Amir), Munar Sastro Hamidjojo (Deputy Resident of Sumatera Timur), Lt. Col. R. Sutjipto (Chief of Staff, Divisi Gadjah II) and the RLRMA commander Nip Xarim. Sutjipto and Xarim were specifically included as representatives of the TRI and the lasykar rakyat respectively. Document 319; 3. Nip Xarim et. al. (n.d.), vol.1; 245-6.

(83) One of Gani's first public announcements on arrival in Medan was to order all Republican forces to comply with the ceasefire agreement. Document 233, No. 55; 4.
rakyat units on the ceasefire boundary would be replaced by regular TRI units. (84) Next day another battalion of Royal Netherlands Army troops from Holland landed at Belawan, taking Dutch military strength in the Medan Area up to a full brigade. (85)

The ceasefire agreement had two immediate effects. Firstly, the pergerakan movement particularly resented this latest exercise in diplomasi. If their frustrations had increased with Governor Hasan's willingness to compromise with the British, they were even more unhappy with this recent concession to the returning Dutch. (86) Secondly, the sense of common purpose in resisting the returning Dutch which had prevailed amongst most of the armed units now quickly dissipated. Serious disagreements arose between the lasykar rakyat and the TRI over observance of the ceasefire.

*Pergerakan* resentment against the ceasefire agreement with the Dutch expressed itself in continued lasykar attacks on British and Dutch forces. (87) The TRI command, responding to


(85) Designated the "Z. Brigade".

(86) "At that time many pemuda were angry and sorrowful because they were ordered to surrender territory (to the Dutch) which up to then they had defended to the death." Radjab (1949);62.

(87) On November 7 Major General Hedley wrote to Hasan demanding
British demands, convened a meeting of RLRMA unit commanders to discuss a TRI proposal that the RLRMA should be "rationalised" to the extent that it be reduced in size by about half. The lasykar commanders understandably were quite unwilling to countenance such a proposal and it was quickly abandoned. (88)

 Barely had the ceasefire agreement been reached in Medan than a major confrontation developed between TRI units and one of the strongest lasykar rakyat in the residency. This centered around moves by Timur Pane's Naga Terbang, which had refused to join the RLRMA, to expand its control of territory and trade. Early in November, Naga Terbang units, operating in the Tebing-tinggi and Kuala Namu regions, led by Pane himself and two of his chief lieutenants - Mateus Sihombing and Sakti Lubis, came into conflict with local units from the TRI and Pesindo in the course of competition to control plantations in the region. Pane, Sihombing and Lubis were also trying to establish control over some of the trade in rice and weapons with South Tapanuli. Several armed clashes occurred between the two sides, in which a number of TRI and Police officers were captured and interned by the Naga Terbang. By the end of the month the Naga Terbang had established itself as perhaps the strongest Republican armed

 that Republican attacks on British forces cease immediately, in compliance with the ceasefire agreement. Document 106.

(88) Nip Xarim et. al. (n.d.), vol. 1; 382-3.
unit in the residency.

The TRI Divisi Gadjah II command and the civilian government were for the time being, however, too absorbed in peace negotiations with the British and Dutch, and with trying to get Republican armed units on the Medan Area perimeter to observe the ceasefire, to be overly concerned about Pane and the Naga Terbang. (89) The "Linggadjati Agreement" between the Republican and Netherlands governments had just been signed in Java (90) and four days later, on November 19, the British command in Medan formally handed over control of the Medan Area to the Dutch. Royal Netherlands Army and KNIL troops took over all the British military positions. At the same time the British delegation withdrew from the Technical Commission, leaving the Commission to function as a forum for direct Republican-Dutch negotiations.

Reactions in Sumatera Timur to the Linggadjati Agreement were entirely predictable in view of the political stances taken.

(89) On November 13 the JTC was renamed a Technical Commission for determining the final demarcation of the new Dutch-controlled Medan Area. Almost immediately the commission was forced to set up a Joint Investigation Board to look into and try to settle numerous breaches of the ceasefire agreement by both Republican and Dutch forces.

(90) On the terms of the Linggadjati Agreement, and the internal disputes it produced within the Republic, see George Kahin (1952); 196-209 and Hanifah (1973); 206-12.
to date by all major social groups. Among the politically alert, the moderates saw Dutch recognition of the Republic under the Agreement as a significant victory and hence a vindication of the tactics of diplomasi. The pergerakan, on the contrary, condemned the Agreement for permitting a continued Dutch presence within Indonesia (via the proposed Netherlands-Indonesia Union). Opponents of the Republic, especially the kerajaan and Malay communities, were still uncertain about just what sort of future a peace settlement which formally recognized the Republic was likely to construct for them. (91) They continued to look to a restoration of pre-War Dutch authority and the "peace and order" they remembered.

The British departure from Sumatera Timur saw the last vestiges of formal adherence to the ceasefire agreement of November 1 abandoned. Both TRI and lazykar rakyat units greeted the Dutch takeover with attacks on Dutch patrols and bases within the Medan Area, while the Dutch for their part welcomed the acquisition of artillery and aircraft from the British by intensifying raids on Republican military bases.

During the final week of November the intensity and frequency of clashes increased, culminating in a full-scale

(91) A Dutch interpretation of these reactions is given in Document 320; 5-6.
Dutch offensive, which included the use of fighter aircraft to strafe Republican positions around the Medan Area perimeter. Renewed fighting erupted on all sectors of that perimeter. (92) Within hours Governor Hasan despatched delegates to Medan for discussions with the Dutch authorities. The two sides met on December 2 and agreed to resume talks aimed at restoring the ceasefire. The fighting, however, continued. On the 5th the central Republican government intervened again. The Defence Minister, Amir Sjarifuddin, and the TRI Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Urip Sumodihardjo, arrived in Medan accompanied by a number of senior Dutch officials. Next day a special session of the Technical Commission was convened and agreement was reached on the basic terms for yet another ceasefire, in accordance with the provisions of the Linggadjati Agreement. (93) The Republican side agreed to Dutch forces occupying all territory within a line running two kilometers back on either side of the road and rail line linking Medan and Belawan and extending back the same distance from the boundaries of those two towns. Republican civilian government representatives and a small police unit would be permitted free access in and out


(93) The Republican delegation to the session consisted of: Amir Sjarifudin, Lt. General Urip Sumodihardjo, Dr. Gani, Mr. Mohamad Jusuf, Col. Hopman Sitompul, Lt. Col. R. Sutjipto and seven other TRI officers.
of this Dutch controlled area. (94)

On December 27 the new ceasefire agreement was signed in Siantar. (95) Yet there was little hope for its observance. Following the agreement for ceasefire, on December 5, Sjarifuddin had gone to Siantar where, in conferences with provincial government, TRI, political party and lasykar rakyat leaders, he explained the reasons for the agreement. He stressed that Dutch occupation of the Medan Area was only a temporary measure aimed at creating peaceful conditions which would facilitate the eventual establishment of a Republican government over the whole of Indonesia. (96) But the response was less than favourable. On the 20th the leadership of the Sumatera Timur Volksfront met in Siantar and issued a demand for a continuation of the armed struggle. Throughout Amir Sjarifuddin's visit and subsequent peace talks during December, lasykar units on the Medan Area had kept up their attacks on Dutch forces. Even the new commander of the Divisi Gadjah II, Col. Hopman Sitompul, also refused to accept the ceasefire at first, only reluctantly


(95) Document 304A. Also, Document 322; 3-4. A detailed account of the Republican-Dutch negotiations in Medan during December 1946 is given in Nip Xarim et. al. (n.d.), vol. 1; 278-304.

(96) Nip Xarim et. al. (n.d.), vol. 1; 283.
agreeing to do so a little later. (97) None of the lasykar units made any attempt to comply. The day before the signing of the ceasefire agreement, the Napindo leadership council for North Sumatra had met in Kuala Namu (one of the main operational bases for Timur Pane's Naga Terbang) and decided to withdraw all Napindo units from the RLRMA. (98) The two most prominent Napindo leaders, Jakub Siregar and Saleh Umar, were now openly in conflict with Governor Hasan; Hasan even despatching a protest to the central government against what he alleged to be the lawless behaviour of the Napindo leadership and urging that the Ministry of Defence no longer recognize Napindo as part of the Republic's armed forces. (99)

Simultaneously a major inter-party conflict had developed within the Sumatera Timur DPR. The DPR had convened in a special session to elect representatives to the national house of representatives, the KNIP. (100) A split between Islamic and non-Islamic representatives emerged early in the session, in effect producing an alliance of the PNI, Pesindo, PKI, Partai

(97) Document 322; 3-4.
(98) Basrie (1958a); 37.
(100) This was in compliance with Law No. 12 of July 1946 which increased the size of the KNIP, adding more representatives from the regions outside Java. See George Kahin (1952); 193.
Sosialis and Parki against the Masyumi. As a result, not a single Islamic representative was among the ten elected to the KNIP. (101)

One interesting aspect to the election, aside from the Islamic versus non-Islamic split itself (and yet directly a part of it), was the alliance of the Christian party (Parki) representatives with those of the secularist parties, including the Marxist-oriented ones. This was a direct result of the worsening sectarian relations between Christians and Moslems in Tapanuli. The Acehnese attacks on Christian Batak communities in Gayo/Alas, Dairi and Samosir, and the increasing tensions between North and South within Tapanuli itself, had revived amongst the predominantly Toba Batak leadership of Parki in Sumatera Timur the age-old fears of Islamic domination. (102) Hence by the end of 1946 they were willing to sup with the devils of Marxism and secularism in order to seek support against political Islam, for the time being seen as the most dangerous devil of all.

(101) Those elected were: Agus Salim (PSBI), Melanthon Siregar (Parki), Luat Siregar (PKI), Jusuf Abdullah (Pesindo), Petrus Samosir (Geraktani), Abdul Xarim M.S. (PKI), Jahja Jakub (PNI), Abdullah Jusuf (PNI), one member from the Partai Sosialis and one other from Parki. Document 323; 5.

(102) The Christian versus Islamic conflicts in Tapanuli had taken on much more immediacy within Christian circles in Sumatera Timur as a result of the continuing influx of Christian Toba youth from Tapanuli into Sumatera Timur.
Reaction from Islamic political leaders to their exclusion from the KNIP was immediate. All Masyumi members of the Sumatera Timur DPR withdrew from that body and the party leadership despatched protests to the central Republican government. The question as to the size of Masyumi representation on the KNIP was by now gathering momentum as a major issue of dispute at the national level of Republican politics. By mid-January 1947 Governor Hasan had received instructions from President Sukarno that at least one Masyumi representative had to be included on the Sumatera Timur delegation to the KNIP. Sukarno also informed Resident Lumbantobing in Tapanuli that an equitable balance between Christian and Islamic representatives had to be ensured on the Tapanuli delegation. (103)

However, with the dispute at the central government level still far from resolved, (104) both Hasan and Lumbantobing chose to take no further action. In Hasan's case he was also absorbed with a far more immediate problem - the breakdown of the cease-fire agreement and growing lazykar rakyat intransigence.

Early in January 1947, as another Dutch military offensive forced Republican units to retreat even further back from the

(103) Document 324; 5 & 16. Prior to this, on January 6, the Tapanuli DPR had elected three representatives from political parties to the KNIP. They were: Dr. Hadrianus Sinaga (Parli), Abdul Hakim (Masyumi) and Dr. Wasito (Partai Sosialis). Document 323; 13.

(104) See George Kahin (1952); 200-3.
Medan Area boundary, the collapse of the RLRMA brought hurried attempts by the Sumatra TRI command to try and re-establish some kind of coordinated defence structure. Hasan tried to reach a new peace agreement with the Dutch. (105)

Between January 7 and 9 a conference of the all-Sumatra TRI command at Bireuen in Aceh discussed the problems of coordinating military defence against the Dutch. The Medan Area defence structure it was decided would have to be re-organized. As a result, the RLRMA was officially disbanded and in its place a new Komando Medan Area (Medan Area Command) - KMA - was set up. Although meant to include lasykar rakyat units from Pesindo, Hisbullah, Barisan Merah and Pemuda Parkindo/Divisi Panah, the KMA was in effect a new TRI sub-command. Headed by the Divisi Gadjah II chief of staff, Lt. Col. Sutjipto, it consisted entirely of TRI officers. (106) To supplement the KMA a special Biro Perdjuangan (Struggle Bureau) was formed within the Sumatra Defence Department to supervise lasykar rakyat activities. Like the KMA it, too, was placed under the


(106) Sutjipto was assisted by an Operations Staff consisting of Lt. Col. Richardo Siahaan, Major Tengku Nurdin, Major Jakub Lubis and Captain Zein Hamid. Nip Xarim et. al. (n.d.), vol. 1; 314-5.
command of a TRI officer, Major Djamin Gintings (a Karonese
former Giyu-gun officer).

These fresh attempts at assertion of TRI authority yet
again brought negative reactions from the lasykar rakyat.

A number (of lasykar rakyat units) among them Barisan
Merah North Medan, Pesindo KM-20, Lasjkar Rakjat South
Medan and Hisbullah-Sabillilah etc. still fulfilled
their defence roles in the Medan Area, but in the majority
of cases they acted independently of the organizational
authority lying in the hands of the single KMA command.
Besides this, the great majority of Napindo units
which previously constituted the nucleus of Republican
defence in East Medan and Southeast Medan openly withdrew
from the KMA. (Instead) they continued to establish their
own bases within the plantations as they had been doing
since the end of 1946. (107)

In several instances lasykar commanders proceeded to directly
confront the government and TRI command in the process of
expanding their local fiefdoms. The most notable case of
this was the rapid expansion of political and economic control
being exercised by Timur Pane's Naga Terbang force now spread-
ing across Serdang, Simalungun and Asahan.

Early in January 1947 TRI and Police units joined a
Pesindo force to attack the Naga Terbang base at Kuala Namu.
The base was occupied by the attacking force and both Timur
Pane and Sakti Lubis were arrested. The conflict now threatened

(107) ibid.; 316. Napindo had already withdrawn from the earlier
RLRMA.
to blow up into a major confrontation between government and non-government armed forces. Other Naga Terbang units prepared to counter-attack the TRI. The Napindo leadership threatened to support the Naga Terbang. Eventually, following a conference on January 20 between the Divisi Gadjah II command and that of Napindo (headed by Saleh Umar and Jakub Siregar), in Lubuk Pakam, the former, convinced they were unlikely to prevail in any large scale confrontation with the lasykar rakyat, withdrew the TRI units from Naga Terbang territory. Pane and Lubis were released. (108) It was a significant victory for lasykar independence. Within a month the Naga Terbang had further increased its armed strength and expanded its economic and political power. Pane had become the premier warlord in Sumatera Timur.

Confrontation had developed at the same time between lasykar rakyat units from Sumatera Timur and the Tapanuli TRI as a result of the lasykar incursions into Samosir. On January 10 a BHL force from Prapat raided Negeri Gultam on the eastern side of Samosir. They proceeded to levy "war contributions" from the local population, arresting those who refused to contribute. Later that month a TRI force from Balige attacked

and occupied the BHL headquarters near Prapat, releasing the Samosir detainees and taking about 30 BHL members back to Balige for internment. (109) Accompanying the internecine conflicts, diplomasi with the Dutch continued. On January 9 Hasan despatched a government delegation, headed by his deputy, Mr. Rufinus Lumbantobing, to Medan for further peace talks. (110) Described by both sides as an "informal discussion", (111) the talks continued until the 16th, when they were adjourned. A joint communique was issued, declaring that both sides had agreed to adhere to the principles of the Linggadjati Agreement in implementing a ceasefire. (112) The Republican delegation then returned to Siantar where discussions involving Hasan and the Sumatra TRI command resulted in a decision to accept Dutch occupation of the Medan Area, subject to the placement of Republican civil and military representatives


(110) Other members of the delegation were: Abu Bakar Djaar (who had finally replaced Luat Siregar as Sumatera Timur Resident following the latter's appointment to the KNIP), Mr. Mohamad Jusuf, Abdul Malik Munir (the Pesindo leader, now Deputy Mayor of Medan), M. Hutasoit (Third Chairman of the Sumatra Volksfront and now an advisor to Governor Hasan), Raden Suleiman (Chief of Police for Sumatra), Mangatas Nasution (Secretary, Sumatra DPR), Dr. Sunario (now an advisor to Hasan) and three other senior civil servants - Ir. Indratjaja, F. Sibarani and J. Sihombing. The TRI was represented at the talks by an "advisor", Lt. Col. Kartawirana.


in Medan itself. On the 23rd the peace talks resumed in Medan where a ceasefire (the third since November 2) on these terms was agreed upon, to come into effect from the 27th. By January 29th a Consulate for the Republic had been opened in Medan, headed by Resident Abu Bakar Djaar, and incorporating a TRI liaison office.\(^{113}\)

Non-compliance with this latest ceasefire on the part of the *zasykar rakyat* continued from the very moment the agreement was concluded. Hasan and Gen. Suhardjo decided, therefore, to proceed with yet another re-organization of the defence structure. It was a case of chasing the evasive butterfly with another new net. On February 5, a meeting of the all-Sumatra TRI command decided to implement an earlier central government direction that the existing divisional commands in Sumatra be amalgamated into just three commands - one each for South, Central and North Sumatra, to be called *Divisi VIII, IX* and *X* respectively.\(^{114}\) TRI units in West Sumatra and Tapanuli would

\(^{113}\) Since replacing Luat Siregar as Resident, Abu Bakar Djaar had been based in Tebingtinggi, going to Medan on Thursday and Friday of each week. The TRI liaison office was headed by the veteran nationalist politician Dr. Pirngadie, now with the honorary rank of Lieutenant Colonel. His deputy was one of the few prominent *kerajaan* remaining in the Republican administration, Tengku Bahriun, who held the honorary rank of Major. *Waspadaa 13, 17, 20, 23, 25 & 29 January 1947. Oostkust van Sumatra Instituut Kroniek 1941-1946; 42. Document 323; 2-3. Document 324; 2-3.*

\(^{114}\) Nip Xarim et. al. (n.d.), vol. 1; 364-8. Document 326; 2.
form *Divisi IX*, those in Sumatera Timur and Aceh would constitute *Divisi X*.

No sooner had the new changes been announced than dissen-
sion emerged within the TRI itself. To command the new *Divisi X* General Suhardjo had appointed the commander of the former *Divisi Gadjah I*, the Acehnese Col. Husin Jusuf, with the former *Divisi Gadjah II* commander, Hopman Sitompul, as his deputy. Dissatisfaction with this arrangement amongst the staff officers of the *Divisi Gadjah II* was immediate. They considered that they had borne the brunt of the fight against the British and Dutch and disliked now having to accept orders from an outsider. Mixed with this was the inevitable element of ethnocentrism. Most of the *Divisi Gadjah II* officers were either Tapanuli Bataks or Javanese. Hopman Sitompul himself and most of his closest advisors were Christian Toba Bataks. They disliked the idea of now having to play subordinate roles to an Acehnese commander and the group of Acehnese officers who would gather around him.

For a time it looked as though ethnic hatreds and local power interests would shatter the official military arm of the Republic in Sumatera Timur. However, Suhardjo managed to

Document 406; 2. A number of the details given in the two latter sources, concerning the new divisional command structure, are inaccurate.
negotiate an ad hoc compromise which averted a potentially disastrous situation. It was agreed that Sitompul and the ex-Divisi Gadjah II staff officers would retain full authority over TRI units in Sumatera Timur and especially over operations in the Medan Area, while Husin Jusuf as Divisi X commander would have merely a coordinating function, under the overall direction of the all-Sumatra command.

Dissension within the TRI in Tapanuli, however, was not so easily averted. The long simmering North-South division reasserted itself even before a commander had been appointed for the new Divisi IX. The staff officers of the Toba Batak Regiment I (based in Sibolga), including the regimental commander, Lt. Col. Pandaptan Sitompul, informed Suhardjo that they were no longer prepared to accept the former Divisi Banteng II commander Mohamad Din as divisional commander. Unless Din was removed, they threatened, they would resign. Support for their stand came immediately from the other Toba regiment, Regiment III in Tarutung, commanded by Lt. Col. Jansen Siahaan. The issue was the resentment by the northern officers at what they considered to be special patronage that Din as a Moslem was extending to the South Tapanuli-based Regiment II, commanded by the Acehnese, Major Zakaria. They regarded Din's sponsorship of the growth in the military and economic strength of the South Tapanuli regiment and his personal friendship with
its commander as evidence of a conspiracy by Moslem interests directed against the Christian Toba Bataks. These suspicions had been compounded by President Sukarno's instructions to Resident Lumbantobing that there should be adequate Islamic representation on the Tapanuli delegation to the KNIP. Christian political groups in North Tapanuli, particularly the HKBP and Parki, alleged that this amounted to interference deliberately aimed at a reduction of Christian representation in the national parliament. (115)

The Tapanuli dispute was eventually resolved only after Suhardjo had managed to convene a 'peace' conference of the three Tapanuli regimental commanders and Divisi Banteng II staff officers at TRI headquarters in Prapat, where the Tapanuli officers agreed to accept a Minangkabau, Colonel Ismail Lengah, as Divisi IX commander in place of Din. (116) While the compromise prevented a serious immediate deterioration in communal relations, it did not remove the conditions of mutual suspicion, which continued to seriously afflict communal politics in Tapanuli.

In Sumatera Timur differences between the TRI command and

(115) Document 325; 11-12. Also, Radjab (1949); 64 quotes remarks made by Mr. Abdul Abas about the re-emergence of North versus South conflict in Tapanuli in mid-1947.

the main lasykar rakyat had widened further by early February. At a meeting of the Biro Perdjuangan in Tebingtinggi on February 7, several lasykar commanders condemned the January 24 ceasefire agreement as being nothing more than TRI and government capitulation to blatant Dutch trickery. They made clear their adamant refusal to comply with the agreement. (117) Two days later, at a conference to discuss the defence situation in Sumatera Timur, held in Siantar, there emerged a fundamental difference on the question of military strategy, setting lasykar rakyat clearly apart from the TRI. The latter cautioned against any frontal or large-scale attack against the Dutch positions, urging instead that priority should be given to the consolidation of Republican military strength. The former, however, bitterly criticised the TRI command for keeping TRI units away from the front line while trying to exert control over those armed units who were bearing the brunt of the armed struggle against the British and Dutch, namely the lasykar rakyat. The lasykar commanders urged instead that a united, all-out military offensive should be launched immediately to push the Dutch forces into the sea. The conference closed with these differences unresolved. (118)

Both Hasan and Suhardjo now made further efforts at

(117) Nip Xarim et. al. (n.d.), vol. 1; 334.
(118) ibid.; 317-9.
mending these rifts and at getting the armed units in Sumatera Timur to observe the ceasefire. On February 12, Suhardjo issued a decree ordering all armed groups to effect a total ceasefire by the 15th, in compliance with the ceasefire agreement of January 24. Two days later he appealed over the radio for observance of the ceasefire and urged Republican armed units to maintain unity and discipline. (119) At the same time Hasan issued a statement criticizing individuals and groups who he declared were continuing to pursue personal and group interests above those of the nation. He made it clear that he included sections of the civil service and the armed forces in this category. During the next few weeks this statement was circulated in roneoed form by the Department of Information in Siantar. (120)

Quite simply, the government and TRI command were in no position to impose any compliance or unity upon the laskyar forces. Not only were the latter in many regions still significantly stronger in military terms than the TRI, but the

(119) The text of both Suhardjo's decree of February 12 and his radio speech of the 14th are given in *Indonesia Merdeka* 24 February 1947. For reports of continuing clashes between Republican and Dutch forces during this period, see *Waspada* 20 January, 13 & 16 February 1947.

(120) See *Waspada* 15 February 1947. The essence of Hasan's criticisms also appeared in editorials in official journals published by a number of local Republican administrations. See, for example, the report in *Kebangoenan* (Kabanjahe) No. 6, Th. 1, February 1947.
control they exercised over local economic activity gave them far more say in the day to day running of local government than the official civil servants. (121) Furthermore many prominent pergerakan leaders with close personal links to particular lasykar rakyat still held important positions within the civil administration, with the result that there was no singleness of purpose within the government as to policy concerning government-lasykar rakyat relations. Finally those within the government/TRI ranks who would have favoured either the exploitation of inter-lasykar competition or the use of armed force by the TRI to pacify recaltricant lasykars were well aware that such a display of disunity might be too tempting for the Dutch to avoid exploiting and could mean military disaster for the Republic. After all those most critical of lasykar independence were in the main those most committed to diplomasi, most fearful of the dangers likely to emanate from hasty or precipitate action.

Nevertheless the warnings of likely disaster with which the advocates of diplomasi rationalised their argument were rapidly turning into a self-fulfilling prophecy. As differences of opinion between the government and TRI command on the one side and the lasykar rakyat on the other increased, so did raids

(121) For example, the Napindo Halilintar in Tanah Karo, the Pesindo in parts of Langkat and, notably, the Naga Terbang in parts of Serdang, Simalungun and Asahan.
by lazykar units on Dutch positions in the Medan Area. This brought more frequent and heavier reprisal raids by Dutch forces into Republican territory. Finally the TRI was left with no alternative but to try and achieve some respite from the Dutch attacks by taking the offensive itself. Several TRI commanders, particularly Hopman Sitompul, became convinced that the Dutch had to be made aware that the Republic was capable and resolved to fight if necessary. As a result the KMA on February 15, just one day after Suhardjo had made his radio appeal for Republican unity, decided to launch a full-scale offensive against the Dutch forward positions. Unfortunately poor coordination within the KMA and Dutch superiority in firepower brought about the predicted disaster. The attack failed. KMA units were forced to retreat even further back from the earlier ceasefire boundaries, weakened by heavy casualties and losses in equipment. (122)

The scale of the disaster - the heaviest in terms of casualties suffered by the Republic in North Sumatra since the Japanese attack on Tebingtinggi - brought an immediate response from the central government. The Sjahrir cabinet despatched a delegation, headed by Dr. Isa, to Medan with instructions that peace talks had to be resumed with the Dutch forthwith and a

new ceasefire effected. On February 25 the Isa delegation reached Medan. Travelling back and forth between Medan and Siantar during the next few days, Isa managed to arrange for the Technical Commission to be re-convened for peace talks. In the meantime sporadic fighting continued around the Medan Area perimeter. (123)

The Technical Commission re-convened in Medan on March 6. Two days later the two sides issued a joint communique announcing that a fresh ceasefire had been agreed upon, in accordance with which Dutch and Republican forces were to withdraw behind new demarcation lines. (124) The Republic had been forced to accept Dutch conditions for a ceasefire. From Siantar, the Divisi X Deputy Commander, Hopman Sitompul, announced that:

Even though the (ceasefire) order is harsh ... and our forces (must) retreat, we must remain faithful and loyal to our Government. (125)

The immediate effect of the military defeat suffered by the KMA within the Republic in Sumatera Timur bears a striking similarity to that following the Tebingtinggi Affair fifteen months earlier. The attentions of most political groups were

(123) See Waspada 26 February & 2 March 1947.
(124) See Waspada 7-10 March 1947.
(125) Waspada 8 March 1947.
for the moment diverted away from the external enemy and
towards reconstruction and reorganization within. Most
importantly the military defeat made it clear to both TRI
and *lasykar rakyat* just how serious their weakness in weapons
and military supplies was. Their attentions now turned to
remedying this.

From March 1947 on the barter trade in plantation products
and military supplies between Sumatera Timur and Malaya/Singa-
pore grew rapidly. Within three months a highly intricate
trading network was operating; involving Republican government
agencies, TRI, *lasykar rakyat*, Malay nationalist groups and
Chinese traders. Emissaries from various Republican groups
(civilian government, TRI and *lasykar rakyat*) moved between
Sumatera Timur and Malaya/Singapore arranging for the sale of
rubber, palm oil, sisal, tobacco and other plantation products
and for the purchase of military supplies. Republican agents
began paying high rates in Singapore and Penang for the hire
of fast motor vessels which could effectively evade the Dutch
naval blockades outside the Sumatera Timur ports. (126)

(126) Remarkably accurate detailed information about the opera-
tions of the barter trade with Sumatra during 1947 is given
in the reports of the Dutch Resident for Riau (who was based
in Singapore) and the Netherlands Consul General in Singa-
pore. Much of this information was acquired directly from
the (British) Police Special Branch in Singapore.
Between June and September 1947 emissaries from Nip
Xarim's Battalion B, from Major Widji Alvisah's TRI battalion
By April Republican government-sponsored trading agencies in Singapore and Penang were helping to organize much of the barter trade across the Malacca Straits. In Singapore a Nusantar "Agency" had been set up by two expatriate Republican supporters, the secretary of the Persatoean Kaoem Boeroeh Indonesia in Langkat, from the Pesindo leadership council for Sumatra, from lasykar units in Tanah Karo and from the TRI Regiment III command in Siantar (the last-named being the main competitor to the Naga Terbang for control of the plantations in Simalungun and Asahan) are reported in Singapore on arms buying missions. Document 240, Nos. 428, 439, 457, 459 & 502/1947. Document 107, No. 546.

Early in April 1947 Governor Hasan had sent two delegates, M. Zainuddin and Jusuf Ganta Ali, to Singapore and Malaya specifically to "pave the way in order that our Government will be able to have relations with foreign authorities with respect to the purchase of commodities needed by our Government." Document 185.

By mid-1947 the volume of trade, particularly via Tanjung Balai and Labuhan Bilik had increased enormously. A major stimulus to this was the acquisition by TRI and lasykar units in Asahan and Labuhan Batu of large stocks of rubber and palm oil from the plantations, and the growing barter trade of rice for weapons between South Tapanuli and South Sumatera Timur. See Document 109; 2 and translation from Sumatra Bin Poh 19 May 1947 in Document 410, No. 60/1947.

In addition to the Chinese merchants, a number of foreign European entrepreneurs were also deeply involved in the barter trade. An important role in the trade in and out of Labuhan Bilik was played by an Australian named Hanson, who was a partner in a Singapore-based company, Hanson, Wah Giap & Coy. In Singapore, the company negotiated its trading arrangements with Sumatera Timur via the PKBI headed by Sorta Lumbantobing. Document 240, Nos. 518 & 522/1947.

There also were some rather more obscure foreign-owned trading enterprises involved. For example, a letter from one "L.A. Watson" in Jakarta to an "Arthur Paul" of the "Overseas Corporation, New York", dated 4 May 1947, refers to the Deli branch of the "Overseas Corporation" doing "considerable business" with Republican groups in Sumatera Timur. Document 651.
PKBI - Abdul Salim Harahap and another South Tapanuli Batak, Tahir Karim Lubis, which arranged the supply of military equipment (and information) to the government and TRI in both Java and Sumatra. In Penang a flourishing import-export business had been established by the former TRI chief of supply Mahruzar. Via the Mahroezar Trading Company, which operated in close concert with Chinese traders in Penang and Sumatra Timur, military supplies flowed into TRI units in Langsa and Langkat. One important consequence of the build-up in barter trade since March 1947 was that large quantities of straits dollars began flowing into the hands of Republican groups and Chinese traders in Sumatera Timur. By the middle

(127) Before and during the Japanese occupation, Harahap had spent several years in Malaya, Thailand, Burma, India and Ceylon. He had returned to Malaya from India in 1945 as a soldier with the British Indian army. Soon afterwards he resigned from the army, becoming Secretary of the PKBI soon after that.

Lubis, born in South Tapanuli, had spent the Japanese occupation in Java. He arrived in Singapore in November 1946 with instructions from the Sjahrir government and funds to set up a branch of the Bank Indonesia there. Together with the group of Indonesians associated with the PKBI, he set up the Nusantara Agency. In April 1947 Lubis had gone to Siantar where Governor Hasan authorised him to establish a liaison office for the Sumatran provincial government in Singapore. Following this he and Harahap played a major role in arranging for the sale of plantation produce from Sumatra and for the purchase of military equipment in exchange.

On July 7 both Lubis and Harahap were arrested by the British authorities in Singapore on charges of espionage. They were jailed for 18 and 16 months respectively. Document 284. Also, Document 240, Nos. 384, 392 and 396/1947.

of the year this had become not only the most stable currency, but the de facto official currency, in the residency.

The emergence of large-scale barter trade during 1947 established the foundations from which the new military entrepreneurs soon emerged as a distinct power grouping. Active participation in commercial and trading ventures quickly became an accepted privilege of the military elite. A structure of vested interests emerged linking military commanders (TRI and lasykar rakyat) and Chinese merchants in a pattern of mutually profitable commercial relations. Individual military commanders began to establish personal commercial relationships with individual Chinese merchants. The former provided the goods in the first instance (rubber, palm oil, rice and other primary products) and protection, the latter provided the markets. With the withdrawal of Japanese forces Republican military commanders were now completely dependent upon the Chinese-controlled markets in Malaya/Singapore for the supply of weapons, equipment and funds with which to maintain their units. In the case of the Chinese merchant community in North Sumatra this meant not only profits but also access to protection from the periodic assaults by armed pemuda.

Another consequence of the internalization of political attentions following the KMA military defeat in February was a
re-intensification of internal dissension within the Republic, especially in Sumatera Timur. Fears, uncertainties and mutual suspicions grew as different interest groups sought to consolidate their power bases against perceived threats from other groups.

Early in March 1947 three things - inter-group competition for the resources emanating from the barter trade, tensions between lasykar rakyat and government and inter-ethnic tensions - combined to produce the so-called "Logam Affair". On March 10 a Toba Batak lasykar unit in Siantar, the Tjap Rantai, commanded by Logam Marpaung, surrounded Governor Hasan's house and issued an ultimatum for the arrest of a number of civilian government and TRI leaders on charges of corruption. Hasan complied. Those arrested included the former Sumatera Timur TRI commander Ahmad Tahir, Hasan's personal secretary Mas Tahir, the Sumatran chief of police Raden Suleiman, the former deputy commander of the Divisi Gadjah II Lt. Col. Sutjipto and the head of the department of Economic Affairs for Sumatra Ir. Indratjaja. (129)

(129) Waspada 11 March 1947. Document 327; 3. The main charges laid against those arrested were that they had illegally appropriated valuables (mostly money and jewels) seized from the kerajaan during the Social Revolution and were now doing the same with proceeds from the barter trade with Malaya and Singapore.
Following the arrests Hasan announced that a special commission of inquiry would be formed to investigate the charges brought by Logam. Three days later he ordered the detainees released from jail and placed under house arrest. The commission of inquiry, headed by Mr. Abdul Abas, included senior civil servants, officers from the Sumatra TRI command and two powerful lasykar rakyat commanders - Iskandar M.H. Napitupulu (Pesindo) and Saragih Ras (BHL).

The commission convened immediately but by the 20th was still unable to reach a decision. Abas then submitted an interim report to Hasan stating that there was insufficient evidence to proceed with Logam's charges. The commission was by now split between moderates and pergerakan, between those who supported the diplomasi of government policies against lasykar perjuangan, between people like Abas and others (like Napitupulu and Saragih Ras) who represented anti-government pergerakan interests which Logam's actions had sought to promote.

On April 3 Hasan ordered the commission to reach a final

(130) Abas, the former Lampung Resident and Sumatran representative to the PPKI in 1945, was now a special advisor to Governor Hasan in Siantar.


decision by the 12th. However, on the 15th Abas informed him that the commission was unable to reach any consensus and was therefore dissolving itself. Hasan then ordered the release of the detainees. He attempted to have Logam arrested but backed down following threats from several lasykar commanders, including Iskandar Napitupulu, Timur Pane and Mateus Sihombing, to intervene with force if this was done. (133)

The motives behind the Logam Affair were three mutually reinforcing factors. First were the long standing antagonisms held by lasykar groups in Simalungun towards the government, emanating from the clashes with TRI forces in April 1946 when Ahmad Tahir had effected the arrest of Urbanus Pardede. Second was a genuine conviction by Logam and others that action had to be taken, in the best interests of the Indonesian National Revolution, against what they considered to be increasingly corrupt government leaders. Third were inter-ethnic hatreds, in this case fears by Toba Batak groups in Simalungun and Asahan that they were under threat from Javanese and Acehnese interests, supported by the provincial government and the Sumatra TRI command.

Several recent developments in Sumatera Timur had served

(133) Document 329; 5-6.
to heighten Toba ethno-centrism there: the appointment of the Acehnese Husin Jusuf as Divisi X commander; the appointment of another Acehnese, Mr. Mohamad Amin, to the long vacant post of Deputy Governor for the sub-Province of North Sumatra; the almost immediate arrival in Siantar of an Acehnese joint TRI/ Zasykar force to "protect" the new Sumatran capital; and an announcement by Hasan that some 300 senior civil servants from Java would arrive soon in Siantar to "strengthen" the civil administration in Sumatra. Several of those arrested by Logam - notably Ahmad Tahir, Raden Suleiman, Mas Tahir and Lt. Col. Sutjipto - had long been regarded by Toba groups in Sumatera Timur as being especially antipathetic towards Toba interests. Toba pemudas in Simalungun who during the Social Revolution had been in the forefront of the anti-kerajaan actions there had at that time come to see Ahmad Tahir and Suleiman (in their capacities as TRI and police commanders respectively) as both anti-Toba and also deliberately protective of Malay and kerajaan interests. It is not without significance.

(134) Waspada 2 April 1947. Amin was born in Aceh, where his father, Raja Aminuddin Nasution from Mandailing, was the headmaster of a Native (Malay language) school. He received a Dutch education, eventually graduating as a lawyer. From 1934 until the Japanese occupation he practised law in Kutaraja. During the occupation he worked firstly for the Department of Education in Kutaraja and then became Chairman of the District Court in Sigli. In late 1945 he became a member of the Aceh KNI. He had long been a close associate of Governor Hasan, both socially and politically.

(135) Document 328; 3-4.
that two of the three lasykar rakyat chieftains who supported Logam against Hasan - Iskandar Napitupulu and Mateus Sihombing - were Toba Bataks, while the third, Timur Pane, commanded a lasykar force within which Toba pemudas by now constituted the largest single ethnic group, if not the majority. Furthermore, the Toba TRI commander for Sumatera Timur, Hopman Sitompul, had made no move to intervene against Logam following his arrest of Tahir and the others.

In general the available evidence suggests that the Toba political elite in Simalungun, including Sitompul, supported Logam's action. Radjab, (136) for example, recalling his visit to Siantar in June 1947, three months after the Logam Affair, notes that:

In conversations with individual educated Bataks (137) they sometimes would unintentionally come out with statements which indicated their dislike for other ethnic groups. And in government offices they prefer to have other Bataks in official positions. ... The Bataks have a dislike for Acehnese and Minangkabaus, or rather, because of sentiments inherited from their ancestors, this antipathy lies deep within them. Even though amongst the educated (Bataks) there exists today the desire for unity among all regions, this desire is not yet strong enough to overcome provincialism in the short term.

Aside from those who want to wipe out provincialism, there are others who do not want to change their traditional prejudices. This is possibly because of their

(136) (1949); 18-19.

(137) Radjab uses the term "Batak" to refer specifically to Toba Bataks.
great love for their own region and their own community, and possibly because they are suspicious of people from other regions.

Such sentiments, which have enormous influence in Sumatera Timur, were still prevalent at the time of our visit (to Siantar). And at this time are compounded by group loyalties to political parties and armed units.

Widely prevalent throughout Sumatera Timur was also much that appeared as official corruption. Many Republican leaders, civil and military, were benefitting financially out of trade and local taxation. Again Radjab (138) reported:

When I saw people walking on the main street (of Siantar) I thought, 'they are prosperous, not lacking food, clothing etc.'; but after I had observed the peasants in the kampungs, and the workers in the factories and on the plantations, my opinion changed. Here I saw conditions like those in Java, torn clothes, worn out and dirty, and some who were half-naked, and visibly undernourished.

These people worked in factories and plantations which were run by political parties and armed units. The poverty of these workers was not because of declines in productivity, but because most of the profits go into the pockets of cunning and greedy leaders, or are deposited on the Peninsular (Malaya/Singapore). Thus the distressed workers complain that Dutch and Japanese capitalism has been substituted by indigenous capitalism. Not only the workers, but also the lasjkars who captured and defended the factories and plantations, are inadequately clothed, some even without shoes. In one factory, which is run by a political party, the workers have not received any clothing for a year. It is not that there is no money with which to buy them clothes, which are abundant in the markets of Siantar, but rather that their leaders do not wish to do so. In this way the leaders accumulate wealth, by drinking the blood of the workers, and it is used to buy buildings, cars, beautiful jewellery for their wives - who also profit out of this revolution - and to take pleasant shopping excursions along the main street, a

(138) ibid.; 20.
pleasure which they had never experienced during the earlier Dutch and Japanese times.

There are thousands of these new rich in Sumatera Timur. Such people get thrown up during every upheaval. The ordinary people refer to them as O.K.B. (Orang Kaya Baru) (the New Rich), or as the new feudalists who have replaced the old feudal class which were wiped out a year ago.

Finally, underlying the Logam Affair was a complex set of factors involving vengeance, ethno-centrism and ideological differences. Logam himself had been deputy commander of the lasykar unit led by the former Bupati of Simalungun, Urbanus Pardede (a fellow Toba Batak) who had been arrested and removed from office in April 1946 on Tahir's orders. His action in now effecting the arrest of Tahir was clearly one of reprisal. Moreover, following Pardede's arrest, Tahir had had him replaced as Bupati by Madja Purba, an ideologically conservative member of a prominent Simalungun kerajaan family. Vengeance was thus mixed in with ethnic hatreds and the broader issues of the pergerakan-moderate conflict.

Logam's action was used by the leading lasykar chieftains in Simalungun - Pane, Napitupulu, Sihombing, Saragih Ras - as a means of reinforcing their power and authority vis a vis that of the government and TRI. Shortly after Logam had acted, Pane reached alliances with Napitupulu and Sihombing whereby they merged their lasykar units with the Naga Terbang. Pane then affirmed his warlord ambitions by re-naming his expanded lasykar
force as a Tentera Marsosê (Commando Army) giving himself the rank of "Major General". (139) The whole Logam Affair attested to the continued inability of the government in Sumatera Timur to control lasykar activities. Mohamad Radjab (140) describes some typical lasykar activities, experienced during a journey from Pancur Batu to Pangkalalan Brandan in Langkat at the end of June 1947.

From Pantjurbatu to Pangkalalan Brandan we were stopped fourteen times and our travel documents checked, and if we left two packets of cigarettes at the guard-post we were allowed to proceed on our journey. If we had not given them cigarettes - according to our driver - things would have been made difficult for us, we would have been ordered to open all our suitcases, they would have arbitrarily rummaged inside or tipped out the contents of the suitcases, because in this region they wielded the power. If they had shot us the police would not have dared to arrest them. But as a contribution to the youth on the front line we were willing to give them cigarettes. It was just their manner of asking for it that did not make us feel happy.

Those who stopped and checked us were from various lasjkar units in the Medan region. Even though we had already been checked by both the Army and Military Police, the lasjkars considered it their duty to check us again. Thus at various times we were stopped and checked by Napindo, Harimau Liar, Pesindo, Mudjahidin and Banteng (Barisan) Merah, the distances between one roadblock and another often being only 1 kilometer. It seemed as if those guarding the post ahead refused to recognize those who had checked us the time before. It appears that these checks were not aimed at investigating people's credentials, but rather at relieving travellers of money and cigarettes.

(139) Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 127. Nip Xarim et. al. (n.d.), vol. 1; 390. Radjab (1949); 19.

(140) Radjab (1949); 28.
On April 19 yet another central government delegation, the fourth since the Social Revolution, arrived in Medan. This latest one was headed by the Minister for Home Affairs, Sultan Hamengkubuwono of Yogyakarta. Accompanying him was a team of officials from the ministry, led by Sumitro Kolopaking. Referring to the purpose for the visit, Sumitro declared on his arrival: "In particular I wish to have clarified several problems related to the civil administration, military and police in Sumatra." Because of "the shortages of experts in Sumatra, such as in the technical, economic, communications and other fields", he went on, the 300 civil servants promised from Java would be sent to fill gaps in the civil administrations of North and South Sumatra. (141) Until their return to Java on April 30, the Sultan and Sumitro travelled through Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli urging upon civilian government and military leaders the need for political unity and administrative coordination. Two days before their departure a central government regulation relating to provincial and local government in Sumatra was issued. (142)

(141) See Waspada 23 April 1947. As events developed during the next few weeks, however, none of the promised civil servants were actually sent.

(142) "Peraturan Pemerintah" No. 8/1947. Within Sumatra there would be "three levels of autonomous regions, not including those regions possessing areas of autonomy in accordance with customary law." The province of Sumatra itself would be an "autonomous region" (daerah otonoom). The provincial government would be headed by a Governor together with a "People's Representative Council" (Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat). Communications between the central government and the
When the second plenary session of the all-Sumatra DPR opened in Bukittinggi, on May 12, it was the general condition of provincial government in Sumatra which dominated the discussions. The central government viewed the session as important enough to despatch four ministers - Mr. Mohamad Roem (Internal Affairs), Mr. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (Finance), Mr. Maria Ulfah Santoso (Social Welfare) and Ir. Putuhena (Public Works) - to attend the opening debates. (143)

During the session several of the representatives from Sumatera Timur were particularly critical of the government. The Masyumi leader Haji Abdul Rahman Sjihab declared that the chaotic state of the various representative councils in Sumatera Timur was responsible for preventing effective cooperation between the residency and various kabupaten administrations. He then went on to attack patronage, group interest and political provincial government would take place via a Sumatran government executive council (Pimpinan Pemerintahan Sumatera). "Autonomy" (otonoom) would apply to both the carrying out of civilian government and the financing of the military and defence structure. Responsibility for defence would, therefore, lie with the Governor and subordinate regional heads. There would be three levels of autonomous region below the province, namely, residencies, kabupatens and those cities so designated. The three sub-provinces of North, Central and South Sumatra would not be autonomous regions but rather administrative territories (wilayah administratif), with each Deputy Governor being directly responsible to the provincial Governor.

20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka, vol. 2; 189-92.

(143) Propinsi Sumatera Tengah; 393.
factionalism within the civil service. (144) Gulmat Siregar from the PKI accused the Sumatran government of being unable to mobilise effectively popular support. The reason for this, he went on, was simply because

... officials, the civil service and police are still functioning as they did during the Dutch colonial era while the people wanted a more revolutionary and dynamic approach .... (145)

One issue which became a major topic of discussion at the DPR session was the occupation of the plantation lands; the "land problem" (soal tanah) as it was now being referred to. (146)

By May 1947 several organizations linked to the major political parties were busy mobilizing support amongst this growing squatter-farmer community. The most active amongst them were the Serikat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia (Estate Labourers' (144) Waspada 20 May 1947.

(145) ibid. On May 10 and 19, just before and during the DPR session, the newspaper Waspada carried editorials criticising several aspects of civilian government in Sumatra: a lack of real regional government autonomy, a lack of contact between Governor Hasan and the President, subordination of the Governor to several central government ministries, impotence of the provincial government executive council, and widespread corruption. All these factors, the editorials declared, have combined to produce a highly inefficient system of regional government at all levels in Sumatra.

(146) See Waspada 20 May 1947. The occupation of plantation lands was now proceeding with complete disregard for the special tanah jaluran usage rights of the orang asli communities, the rakyat penunggu, on the tobacco plantations.
Union) - Sarbupri, led by the young Partai Sosialis activist Hadely Hasibuan, and the Barisan Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Farmers' Front) - BTI, led by S.M. Tarigan. Both Sarbupri and the BTI were allied with the Sumatran branch of the PKI's trade union federation, the Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia - SOBSI, led by Xarim M.S. (147)

By the end of April 1947 Sarbupri, BTI and several smaller, locally-based, organizations (148) had successfully pressured the Sumatera Timur administration for official recognition of squatter rights to plantation land. (149) On May 1 Resident Abu Bakar Djaar issued a decree recognizing the right of those farming plantation land to continue doing so and promising an additional 4,000 hectares of plantation land for distribution to landless peasants. (150) During the next month


(148) For example, the Persatuan Kaum Tani, the Sarikat Kaum Tani Indonesia, the Barisan Pemuda Tani Indonesia.

(149) On March 18 the Sumatran government had transferred control of the plantations in Sumatera Timur to the residency administration. Waspada 21 March 1947.

(150) "Peraturan tentang tanah konsesi kosong di Keresidenan S. Timur", No. 1138/VI/16. See Waspada 3 January 1951. Said (n.d.); 6. Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 552. Squatter farmers were given rights of usage (hak2 pin-djaman) of one hectare of irrigated land, or two hectares of unirrigated, for the growing of annual crops. Usage was guaranteed for up to a five year period.
there was a further surge in the land occupation. (151) As the farmers' organizations moved in to organize the squatters, more local areas moved out of the orbit of governmental authority.

By the time the DPR session had closed on May 22, it had passed legislation proposing some far-reaching changes to the structure of provincial government in Sumatra. Most importantly it decided that Sumatra should no longer remain a single province but that the three existing sub-provinces should each become separate provinces. (152) Implementation of this decision, however, required complementary legislation by the central government and, for the moment, there was no movement in this direction. Nevertheless, the DPR session had given vent to grievances which expressed the administrative discoordination, factionalism and corruption now seriously afflicting the Republic in North Sumatra. (153)

(151) From early June 1947 the Sumatera Timur administration had begun to distribute the promised 4,000 hectares of plantation land. See Waspada 17 November 1950. In June, Mohamad Radjab, travelling from Binjei to Tanjung Pura, comments that he observed plantation land on both sides of the main road (a distance of 41 kilometers) either already under dry cultivation or being cleared for that purpose. Radjab (1949); 31.

(152) "Peratoeran Tata-tertib Dewan Perwakilan Soematera serta Badan Pekerdja Dewan Perwakilan Soematera, dan Kepoetoesan2 sidang pleno DPS II jang dilangsung di Bukittinggi dari 12 - 22/5/47."

(153) On May 29 the four central government ministers who had
By now the deteriorating relations with the Dutch had begun to inject a sense of urgency into the minds of Republican political and military leaders, especially those in Sumatera Timur. Discussions between the Sumatran government and the Dutch military command in Medan had made no progress towards agreement on implementation of the ceasefire in the Medan Area. (154) In Java, on May 27, the Netherlands Commission General in Indonesia had submitted an ultimatum to the Republic demanding recognition of de jure Netherlands sovereignty over all territories of the former Netherlands East Indies until 1 January 1949. (155) It was becoming increasingly clear to Republican leaders in Sumatera, and especially those in Sumatera Timur, who were closest to the action, that serious armed conflict with the Dutch was an imminent possibility.

attended the Sumatra DPR session in Bukittinggii arrived in Siantar where they joined Hasan and senior civil servants from the provincial administration in discussions aimed at introducing some administrative reforms into the Sumatran government. The meeting eventually decided that more realistic provincial and local government autonomy, as well as better administrative coordination at the sub-provincial levels, would have to be achieved. Mr. Abdul Abas was appointed as senior representative of the Ministry of the Interior in Sumatra with the specific task of "supervising an effective process of government at the residency level throughout Sumatra and the implementation of autonomy within the province of Sumatra."

Waspada 29 June 1947.

(154) On the resumption of Republican-Dutch talks in Medan and the main issues dividing the two sides, see Document 136.

(155) See George Kahin (1952); 206-7. Also Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 135.
By the end of June, a Presidential decree of June 3—ordering the integration of all armed forces within the Republic (TRI and lasykar rakyat) into a single Indonesian National Army (Tentera Nasional Indonesia) - TNI (156)—brought TRI and lasykar commanders in Sumatera Timur together to discuss the question of amalgamation. On June 26 Divisi X staff officers and lasykar rakyat commanders met in Siantar. They agreed in principle on the need for amalgamation. However, the form it should take and the manner of its implementation remained an issue of fundamental disagreement. The lasykar commanders insisted upon guarantees of unit autonomy within any new TNI command. (157) TRI officers, on the other hand, demanded that amalgamation must mean a centralized, coordinated command structure. The meeting closed without any final agreement being reached. Nevertheless, the increasing likelihood of conflict with the Dutch stimulated both sides to continue informal bargaining on the question. (158)

Eventually on July 13 General Suhardjo ordered all TRI and lasykar rakyat forces in Sumatra to amalgamate immediately. (159)

(156) George Kahin (1952); 162 n. 22.
(157) Nip Xarim et. al. (n.d.), vol. 1; 374-5.
(158) ibid.
(159) ibid. The amalgamation was to be effected jointly by TRI divisional and battalion commanders and the lasykar rakyat commanders.
In Tapanuli amalgamation was already a reality; the *lasykar rakyat* now long irrelevant as an independent armed force. In Sumatera Timur, the divisional command in Siantar had in the time between the conference of June 26 and Suhardjo's decree of July 13, managed to reach a tentative working arrangement with some of the most powerful *lasykar rakyat*. Timur Pane's *Tentera Marsose* was accepted as part of the new TNI. The *Napindo* and BHL units in Tanah Karo and Langkat were incorporated as TNI *Brigade A*, under the command of Selamat Ginting. Those in Deli/Serdang became TNI *Brigade B*, under Bedjo.

A number of *lasykar* units, however, made no effort to comply with Suhardjo's order. This applied especially to units from *Pesindo* and *Barisan Merah*. Even those units which did accept designation as part of the TNI surrendered little, if any at all, of the political and economic autonomy they had enjoyed up to now. In the case of the *Tentera Marsose*, amalgamation into the TNI meant no change at all in this regard. In general, the various *lasykar rakyat* continued to operate as independently as ever, both in competition with each other and with the old TRI. (160)

On July 20 the Republic's vice-President, Mohamad Hatta, arrived in Siantar from Bukittinggi. Referring to the military

defence of the Republic in Sumatera Timur, he declared that factional disputes within the defence councils was making unification of TRI and laskar rakyat impossible. (161) That same day, the Netherlands Prime Minister ordered Dutch forces on Java and Sumatra to begin a "police action" against the Republic. (162)

On the morning of July 21 Dutch infantry supported by tanks, artillery and aircraft attacked Republican positions on the Medan Area perimeter. Within twenty-four hours Dutch forces had captured Stabat, Binjei and Tanjung Hilir. In the occupation of Binjei they were assisted by units of Chinese security corps, the Poh An Tui. (163) The next day Dutch forces entered Sungei Bingei and Deli Tua. On the 28th they captured Tanjung Morawa, Lubuk Pakam and Perbaungan.

Vice-President Hatta, Governor Hasan and provincial govern-

(161) Hatta had arrived in Bukittinggi from Java on June 26, accompanied by twenty central government officials, for the specific purpose of investigating the general state of government and defence in Sumatra. Propinsi Sumatera Tengah; 153.

(162) For the background to the Dutch "police action", see George Kahin (1952); 206-213. Also, Wolf (1948); 124 passim. Woodman (1955); 231 passim. Hanifah (1973); 244-9.

ment officials left Siantar for Bukittinggi. The Sumatera Timur administration, led by Resident Abu Bakar Djaar, moved from Tebingtinggi to Tiga Binanga in the Karo highlands. The deputy Governor, Mr. Amin, returned to his home in Kutaraja. With the retreat of Republican armed forces the Divisi X command split up; command headquarters being transferred to Bireuen in Aceh while an operational sub-command for Sumatera Timur was set up in Prapat.

Less than a day after Hatta and Hasan had left Siantar both that city and Tebingtinggi were occupied by Dutch forces, again assisted by the Poh An Tui. (164) By August 4, Seribudolok, Brastagi, Kabanjahe, Tanjung Pura, Indrapura and Tanjung Balai were also in Dutch hands. Republican controlled territory had been pushed back to a line running north of Tanjung Pura, west of Kabanjahe and south of the Asahan river. The Dutch military offensive then halted in response to a cease-fire order issued by the United Nations Security Council. (165) Hundreds of TRI and lasykar rakyat troops had been captured. (166)

(164) Document 512; 3.


(166) See Waspada 10 December 1947 and 16 February 1948.
Dutch forces released hundreds of persons who had been held in detention since the Social Revolution. These included the sultans of Langkat, Serdang and Asahan, the rajas of Siantar and Tanah Jawa, dozens of members of the Malay, Karo and Simalungun aristocracies, and many former colonial civil servants. (167)

On July 30, with the Dutch military action still in progress, Hatta (in Bukittinggi) announced that he was taking over direct supervision of the Republican government for Sumatra. Appealing for complete unity within the nation, Hatta left no doubt where he considered blame for the military defeat should lie. When the national government had decreed that Indonesia would be a multi-party state, he declared, this had been done in the name of democracy not to permit the present conditions of rampant factionalism to develop. (168)

Out of the immediate violence occasioned by the Dutch military action the chief victims were the kampung dwellers on the outskirts of the towns, peasant farmers and plantation workers.

(167) When the Dutch military offensive began, hundreds of internees from the Social Revolution were still held in camps in Sumatera Timur. Despite recommendations in May by a special government commission (set up by Governor Hasan to investigate the charges against the internees) that most of them should be released, no action had been taken. On July 27, with the Dutch offensive under way, Hasan issued a decree ordering the release of these people. Waspada 4 August 1947.

(168) Propinsi Sumatera Tengah; 157-9.
workers. Much of the violence they experienced resulted from the indiscriminate use of scorched earth tactics by retreating Republican armed units rather than direct violence from Dutch troops. Republican units would often seize goods from nearby kampung and village communities before retreating. Sometimes they would set fire to houses and farm lands. The result was that thousands of kampung dwellers, peasants and plantation workers uprooted themselves and accompanied the retreating armed units; sometimes willingly, sometimes out of purely reflexive response at seeing their houses and farms disappear.

Less indiscriminately selected victims were the Chinese (urban and rural) and the Malay peasant communities. Both communities were physically identifiable, especially the former, and having long been identified by nationalist groups as pro-Dutch, took quite a battering at the hands of retreating Republican forces. (169) Also, a number of those still in internment


On July 26, the newspaper Sumatra Bin Poh commented that: "In spite of our sympathy with the Indonesian government for independence, the Indonesians have directed their brutal
since the Social Revolution fell victim to acts of violence from Republican forces. The most notorious of such incidents involved the killing of about 100 Social Revolution internees in a camp called "Kampung Merdeka" near Brastagi, by a local Karonese BHL unit. Those killed were chiefly the families of Karo rajas, former colonial civil servants and former KNIL soldiers. In the main they were Karonese, Javanese, Chinese and Ambonese. (170)

The violence experienced by these people at the hands of scorched earth policy especially against us Overseas Chinese. We feel greatly indignant. Now we wish to give the Indonesians the following warning: the adoption of the brutal scorched earth policy is not only disadvantageous, but also injurious to them; and if they do not become conscious of their guilt and convert themselves; the Overseas Chinese will be dissatisfied, the Indonesians will lose the sympathy of other countries, and the independence of the Indonesians will be affected." From Document 410, No. 66.

In the case of the Malay communities; following the initial Dutch occupation of the Medan Area, numbers of Malay hereditary village chiefs sought Dutch protection against attacks by Republican armed units. They alleged that Malay farmers had been forced off their lands by lasykar units and that many farmers had been killed and wounded in attacks by both lasykar and TRI forces. Document 549.

(170) At the time of the Kampung Merdeka killings, BHL pemudas in the Brastagi region attacked and killed a number of Dutch-speaking Toba Batak living in the region. The victims included the wife and daughter of the former Pasoekan V leader, Dr. F.J. Nainggolan, whose son Boyke was in charge of a TRI unit in Simalungun. Report from New China Times of 17 September 1947, in Document 410, No. 72/1947. Also, Document 653.
Republican forces now served to commit them to oppose the Republic. They turned to the movement for an autonomous East Sumatran state, a movement which was entering its final stage by the end of July 1947.

Since April 1946 leaders of the Sumatera Timur kerajaan who had survived the Social Revolution had beset the Dutch authorities in Medan, Batavia and Holland with accounts of the sufferings of the orang asli people at the hands of Republican "extremists", of the "terror" being perpetrated by these extremists throughout Sumatera Timur, and with continual affirmations of loyalty to the Dutch crown. They demanded that the Netherlands government intervene in Sumatera Timur to restore "law and order" and the "customary rights" of the Malay and orang asli peoples. (171) By early 1947 the Dutch authorities were responding favourably to these requests. (172)

Most of the Sumatera Timur kerajaan and the overwhelming

(171) The Netherlands East Indies' Advisor on Political Affairs in Sumatra (Rapolsum), van de Velde, reported on 1 December 1947 that: "The movement for a Special Region of East Sumatra was the product of a group of intellectuals among the Malay coastal peoples, who to this end were joined by the group of Simalungun Bataks and to a lesser extent by the Karo Bataks. These three groups of East Coast inhabitants had in common the fact that they felt threatened by the energetic and vigorous Tobas who regarded themselves as having a pre-ordained right to live and work throughout the whole of the territory of the East Coast." Document 470.

majority of the Malay, Chinese and Eurasian communities in Sumatera Timur deliberately placed their future in the hands of the Dutch. By April 1947 that future was taking shape in the form of plans being jointly constructed by both Dutch and kerajaan to restore pre-war economic "prosperity" and political "stability" in Sumatera Timur. This looked to the establishment of a Malay/kerajaan-dominated East Sumatran state, protected by Dutch arms and living off a re-constructed plantation economy. (173)

Increasingly these plans were excluding the sultans and rajas from a restoration of their pre-war political positions. The former rulers were already being regarded by the Dutch and by the Westernized sector of the kerajaan as anachronisms, burdens to a modern future. They were now impediments to the appearances of 'Democracy' which these planners were keen to maintain in any future East Sumatran state. (174) Nevertheless, the traditional rulers were not dispensable. The Malay sultans,

(173) See Documents 466, 142 and 331; 1. Shortly after the end of the Dutch military offensive of July/August 1947, the Recomba in Medan reported that the speed of the Dutch offensive and its lack of destructiveness in comparison with the scorched earth tactics of the Republican forces was the result of a long period of "underground work" carried out by the Dutch in Sumatera Timur before July 1947. This underground work, he added, had eventually manifested itself openly in the movement for a Special Region of East Sumatra. Document 512; 2.

(174) See Documents 466, 467, 468, 267 and 186.
in particular, continued to symbolise fundamental values underlying the proposed East Sumatran state, namely, a self-conscious Malay ethnic identity. Early in 1947 the Sultan of Deli (then in Holland) expressed those values succinctly.

I shall certainly return to Deli, when that will be I am not certain. The position of the Sultan of Deli is No. 2 of my aspirations, No. 1 is and remains "ALAM MELAJOE" (the Malay World), a Malay territory re-organized and democratized, but based on Malay Adat, free from the Republic of Indonesia. Following my discussions in Holland I have reason to hold fast to this ideal. I shall do my best, God protect the Malays. I shall now work in this direction, I am not optimistic, I only do my duty as a Malay Nationalist, the ultimate result lies in God's hands. (175)

On July 31, ten days after the Dutch military offensive had begun, a mass meeting to demand the establishment of an autonomous East Sumatran state took place in Medan. It was chaired by a Simalungun Batak lawyer, Mr. Djomat Purba (brother of the Republican Bupati for Simalungun). Among the official guests present were the Dutch Brigade commander, Col. Scholten, the Dutch Resident for Sumatera Timur, Mr. J. Gerritsen, and the Netherlands Indies' Government Commissioner of Administrative Affairs for North Sumatra (Regeeringscommissaris voor Bestuurzaangelegenheden) - Recomba, Dr. van de Velde.

Speakers at the meeting attacked the leaders of the Republic.

(175) Letter from the Sultan of Deli to his Secretary in Singapore, appended to Document 116.
for having sanctioned murder and pillage during and after the Social Revolution and called for the establishment of an autonomous East Sumatran Special Region (Daerah Istimewa Soematera Timoer). Djomat Purba read out a petition on behalf of the orang asli peoples calling on the Lieutenant Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies to recognize Sumatera Timur as an autonomous state within an independent federal Indonesia, in accordance with the terms of the Linggadjati Agreement. He then announced that a Comite Daerah Istimewa Soematera Timoer (Committee for an East Sumatra Special Region) - Comite DIST, headed by Tengku Dr. Mansoer, had been formed for this purpose. (176)

The Recomba, Dr. van de Velde, then addressed the meeting. He praised the people of Sumatera Timur for taking the initiative towards determining their future and promised that the demands for an autonomous East Sumatran state would be forwarded immediately to the Lieutenant Governor-General. He implied that recognition of the Comite DIST by the Netherlands government was imminent. (177)

(176) Members of the Comite DIST were: Tengku Dr. Mansoer (Malay), Tengku Hafas (Malay), Tengku Mr. Dzulkarnain (Malay), Datuk Hafiz Haberham (Malay), Djomat Purba (Simalungun), Raja Sembiring Meliala (Karo), Tengku M. Bahar (Malay), Mr. Djaidin Purba (Simalungun), Raja Silimakuta (Simalungun), Madja Purba (Simalungun), Anak Raja Panei (Simalungun), Raja Kaliamsjah Sinaga (Simalungun) and Orang Kaya Ramli (Malay). Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 216.

During the next few days similar mass meetings were held in Binjei, Lubukpakam and Siantar. (178) The meetings marked the beginning of the final stage in plans for setting up the East Sumatran State. When the Dutch military action ended on August 8 this final stage was already under way. (179)

Among those who had played active roles in the formation of the Comite DIST and in negotiations with the Dutch on the East Sumatra state question were a number of prominent Tapanuli Bataks living in Sumatera Timur, including the former Pasekkan V chairman, Dr. F.J. Nainggolan. (180) So, too, had the Chinese Consul in Medan and several Chinese community leaders. Also, links had been established between the Comite DIST and several former civil servants and local chiefs in Tapanuli disaffected with what they considered to be growing


(179) Two days after the Comite DIST rally in Medan, van de Velde wrote to the Lt. Governor General in Jakarta noting that while the East Sumatran state movement was still mostly limited to the kerajaan and the Malay ethnic community, Djomat Purba was already mobilizing support for it in the kampungs of Siantar. He added, however, that with the emergence of the movement, coupled with the release from internment of the sultans of Langkat and Asahan and the impending return of the Sultan of Deli to Medan, the "problem" of the restoration of the traditional kingdoms will "immediately come to the fore". Document 502.

(180) Most of them, however, were reluctant at this stage to play public roles for fear of reprisals against their families in Tapanuli. See Documents 470 and 512; 4.
'extremist' influence in the Republican government. The anti-Republican movement in Sumatera Timur, finding its main rationale in the events of the Social Revolution of March 1946, had now acquired allies in Tapanuli whose rationales for disaffection with the Republic turned chiefly upon their experiences of events there between April and June 1946.
CHAPTER 6

NEGARA SOEMATERA TIMOER
Four months after the Dutch military occupation of Sumatera Timur, the Rapolsum, van de Velde, (1) reported that:

When on August 4 (1947), the order was given to cease hostilities, Sumatra's Eastcoast was placed under (military) occupation up to the furthermost extremities of the region which the available troops were able to control.

Thanks to the efforts of the movement for the Daerah Istimewa Sumatra Timoer, cooperation had been gained from all strata of the population prior to the pacification of the region, quicker than had initially been expected.

This movement was established under the leadership of Dr. Mansoer by intellectuals from the coastal Malay community, with the cooperation from representatives from the hill and mountain country of Sumatra's Eastcoast, namely from the Simaloengoen Bataks around Siantar, as well as, to a lesser extent, from the Karo Bataks of the Karo highlands around Kabanjahe.

After some hesitation leaders from those Toba Bataks long resident in Sumatra's Eastcoast joined the movement too, with the attendant idea of strengthening the (political) influence of the Toba Bataks and of forming a Greater Batak state in the future.

With the success of Dutch arms few among the opponents of the Republic in Sumatera Timur would have disagreed about the most important and immediate tasks facing them.

... after Sumatera Timur in July 1947, as a result of the Netherlands Army's police action, had been cleansed of irresponsible groups, this entire region had to be reconstructed from scratch. (2)

Cleansing and re-construction were the operative concepts. A polity cleansed of Republican elements with its institutions

(1) Document 481; 1.
(2) Bukti; 10.
and values firmly rooted again in the traditions of the past. Just what form and content such a cleansed and reconstructed polity would take soon brought serious division and conflict to non-Republican politics in Sumatera Timur. The view that prevailed was for a polity firmly under the control of the Malay and orang asli elites, guaranteeing the hegemony of orang asli traditional rights and privileges, maintaining a profitable economic relationship with European capital via the plantation economy, and defending its territorial integrity through a close alliance with Dutch arms.

Immediately the ceasefire had come into effect on 4 August 1947 Dutch officials in Medan, in conjunction with Comite DIST leaders, began setting up a non-Republican bureaucracy. Netherlands East Indies officials, all Dutchmen, were appointed as Assistant Residents in Lubuk Pakam, Tebingtinggi, Tanjung Balai, Kabanjahe, Binjei and Siantar. Their task was to supervise the establishment and operations of new regional administrations. Prominent local supporters of the Comite DIST were made mayors of the three largest cities - Medan, Siantar and Tebingtinggi. Two senior

(3) Document 513A; 1.
(4) The new mayors were: Medan - Mr. Djaidin Purba (also a member of the Comite DIST), Siantar - Florencius Lumbantobing, Tebingtinggi - Tengku Hasjim. Waspada 8 September 1947.
Netherlands Indies civil servants, G.J. Forch and G. van Gelder, became permanent advisors to the Comite DIST. In 1946 they had been senior officials with the Netherlands military intelligence service in Medan.

On August 25, members of the Comite DIST, other prominent supporters of the East Sumatra state movement and senior Dutch officials (led by the Recomba, Dr. van de Velde) met at the home of the Comite DIST chairman, Dr. Mansoer, in Medan to discuss basic conditions under which the East Sumatran state would be established. The Dutch officials insisted that the state would have to be "democratic" in structure, to the extent that all vestiges of "feudalism" (in the sense of residual powers continuing to lie in the hands of the traditional rulers) would have to be removed and that the state would have to reflect as broad as possible popular support.

Most of the Comite DIST, including Dr. Mansoer, accepted

(5) On August 11 the Lt. Governor General, van Mook, noted that the future of the traditional royal families in Sumatera Timur would have to await further developments, as it was still unclear they would be able to play any active part in a modernized political structure in the residency. He suggested that, in view of this, priority should be given to educating younger members of the royal families so that they would be able to gather popular support as leaders beyond the narrow confines of their respective traditional kingdoms. At the same time, van Mook informed the brother of the Sultan of Langkat that restoration of the Sumatera Timur sultanates would only be effected under "modernized" conditions. Document 269.
Dutch proposals for disbanding the traditional kingdoms, despite the *kerajaan* connections of most of them. Since the Social Revolution they had few illusions about the strength of anti-*kerajaan* feeling amongst large sections of the Simalungun and Karo populations. On September 13 van de Velde reported to Lt. Governor-General van Mook, that:

The Simalungun Bataks, Tobas and Karo Bataks, who will struggle by word and deed for a more or less democratic polity, will certainly withdraw (from the East Sumatran state movement) if they get the impression that they have been fitted before the cart of the coastal Malay sultans, for whom they hold not a grain of sympathy, particularly not for the Sultan of Deli. (6)

But "democracy" or broadening the popular base of the proposed state had its limits. The *Comite DIST* leaders were uninterested in "democracy" to the extent that this would have to involve a watering down of the principles of orang asli, and particularly Malay, dominance; principles which lay at the very root of the *Comite DIST*’s existence.

An immediate result of the August 25 meeting was an expansion in the size of the *Comite DIST*, aimed at broadening its ethnic composition and reducing its *kerajaan* content. The *Comite* was increased from 13 to 22 members, by the addition of

(6) Document 504. Three days later, in another letter to van Mook, van de Velde remarked that any attempt to incorporate the traditional Malay kingdoms within an East Sumatran state would only serve to create "problems" in Simalungun and Tanah Karo. Document 506.
representatives for the Toba, Chinese, Menadonese, Ambonese and Timorese communities. At the same time three of the Simalungun Batak members of the initial Comite - Raja Sili-makuta, Anak Raja Panei and Madja Purba - withdrew. (7)

However, the new members also included four additional Malay representatives, bringing the ethnic composition of the expanded Comite to 10 Malay, 3 Simalungun, 3 Toba, 2 Chinese, 1 Karo, 1 Menadonese, 1 Ambonese and 1 Timorese.

Despite the broadening of ethnic representation, therefore, the new Comite was clearly Malay-dominated, even more so than its predecessor in which Malay and Simalungun Batak representation had been equal with six members each. Also, the new Comite contained no representative of the largest single ethnic group in Sumatera Timur, the Javanese. Moreover, the three Toba representatives were all from that small group of Westernized Toba intellectuals like Dr. Nainggolan, who had been victims of pemuda radicalism during and since the Social Revolution and who had consequently become deeply alienated from the Republic. These people in no way reflected popular

(7) The twelve new members of the expanded Comite DIST were: Florencius Lumbantobing (Toba), Dr. F.J. Nainggolan (Toba), H.F. Sitompul (Toba), Tan Boen Djin (Chinese), Tan Wee Beng (Chinese), M. Lalisang (Menadonese), C.B.M. Manusiswa (Ambonese), A.H.F. Rotty (Timorese), Abdul Wahab (Malay), Sajoeti (Malay), Mohamad Noeh (Malay) and Datuk Kamil (Malay). Document 524; 4.
Toba support for the proposed East Sumatran state. On the contrary, at the mass level, ethnic conflict between the orang asli and Toba Batak communities in Sumatera Timur was now at a high level. (8) Likewise the absence of Javanese representation on the Comite DIST accurately reflected the almost complete lack of popular support amongst the Javanese ethnic community for the DIST movement.

Amongst the Chinese in Sumatera Timur, however, support for DIST had if anything increased during August. This was a direct result of the continued attacks on Chinese by the remnants of Republican armed groups still operating in the residency. (9) Most Chinese in Sumatera Timur were now eager to see the setting up of the East Sumatran state, under Dutch military protection, with its promise of a return to the economic prosperity of pre-War days. In mid-August the Union of Chinese Associations of East Sumatra and the Chinese Consul in Medan both released public messages sent to the Kuo Min-tang government in China requesting that steps be taken to protect the Chinese of Sumatera Timur. (10) On the 21st Dr. Mansoer announced at a

(8) Document 470.


(10) Reports from New China Times and Sumatra Bin Poh 16 August
press conference in Medan that:

The terrorist acts of the Republican troops against the Chinese form part of the Republican Government's organized plan to destroy the Chinese economic position totally. (11)

Comite DIST leaders were now supporting demands by Chinese community leaders that the Chinese security force, the Poh An Tui, be strengthened. (12) By early September 1947, following direct intervention by the Chinese Consul in Medan, the Netherlands Indies government and the Commander-in-Chief of the Dutch forces granted permission for the force to be expanded to 3,000. (13) However, by mid-September actual Poh An Tui strength had reached only about 1,000, made up of 15 operational units. (14)


(12) On September 4 several thousand Chinese had marched through Medan in protest against atrocities committed against the Chinese community by armed Republican groups. The leaders of the demonstration handed a petition to the Dutch Resident, Gerritsen, demanding that Dutch forces remain in Sumatera Timur until law and order had been restored. Report from New China Times 5 September 1947 in Document 410, No. 70/1947. Also, Document 513; 4.

(13) Reports from Thien Sung Yit Po 29 August 1947 and Seng Hwa Pao 10 September 1947 in Document 410, Nos. 68 & 70/1947.

(14) Locations and sizes of the units were: Medan (138), Labuan (102), Titipapan (51), Pancur Batu (34), Batang Kwis (51), Tanjung Morawa (34), Lubuk Pakam (34), Perbaungan (34), Tebingtinggi (68), Rampah (34), Siantar (138), Binjei (138), Tanjung Pura (34), Kabanjahe (34) and Brastagi (34). Document 621.
So far as the restoration of the pre-war economy of the East Coast was concerned, it was the rehabilitation of the plantation economy which soon occupied most of the attentions of the Dutch administrations (in both Medan and Jakarta), the Comite DIST and, of course, the plantation companies themselves. For the first two, this was the economic base upon the prosperity of which the future political survival of the East Sumatran state would depend. As for the plantation companies, they wanted to return their investments to profitability as quickly as possible.

By the second half of September, as discussions between the Comite DIST and the Dutch authorities proceeded, restoration of the plantation export economy in Sumatera Timur became integral to questions about the overall political future of the region. Most of the foreign estate companies - Dutch, Belgian, British and U.S. - had either re-opened offices or had representatives in Medan. Both AVROS and the DPV were once again functioning and busy with plans for re-opening of the plantations. (15)

As to the general conditions of the plantations, a Dutch observer, in November, commented:

Round about Medan one finds the tobacco estates where

everything is being done to make it possible to begin sowing again next January. To make this feasible the tobacco fields will have to be prepared. Most of them are a mere wilderness. Drying sheds must be built for none are left.

Having passed the tobacco fields we come to huge acres of rubber tree and palm oil groves, and these present a similar picture. ... The world is shouting for oil and the palm oil cultivation has suffered great damage. Many of the groves are nothing but a wilderness; ...

And what holds good for the palm oil groves also applies to the rubber plantings. Here also there are many and various problems to be solved. ... Magnificent factories were burnt down. ...

We may ask if peace and order have now entirely been restored? Not by any means. There are small groups of freebooters that pass across some of these outlying estates and that send over shots in the darkness of the night ....

A large number of planters and technical employees have already arrived, although obviously a great many workers are (still) needed. (16)

Despite this, rehabilitation of the plantations was proceeding with some speed by the latter months of 1947. (17)

By November regular discussions between the Dutch authorities, the Comite DIST, AVROS and the DPV had begun on the question of plantation rehabilitation, in particular on the question of how the squatting ladang farmers were to be removed. (18) By December a total of 147 estates had been returned to their former owners. They consisted of 73 rubber estates, 14 palm


(17) By mid-September the Recomba in Medan had already expressed himself satisfied with the progress towards rehabilitation of the plantations. Document 513; 1.

(18) See Document 550. Also, Document 646A.
oil, 13 tea, 35 tobacco, 5 fibre and 7 coconut. Of these 45 rubber estates, 7 palm oil and 5 coconut were in partial production. (19)

If rehabilitation of the plantation economy was a central issue within the DIST movement by September 1947, so too was the future of the Malay traditional kingdoms and the position of the ruling families in any East Sumatran state. The earlier acceptance by the Comite DIST of Dutch insistence upon a de-feudalised state produced a major split in the ranks of the East Sumatran state movement, resulting in the emergence of two rival political parties.

The first of the two parties was formed in Medan on September 8 by a group of Malay aristocrats, mainly related to the royal families of Deli, Langkat and Serdang, most of whom had been interned during the Social Revolution. (20) Called the Partai Nasional Soematera Timoer (National Party of East Sumatra) - PNST, its origins and the aims of its founders was made abundantly clear in several documents issued by the party leadership at the end of September. One, a "History of

(19) Between October and December 1947 the total number of plantations returned to their former owners rose from 80 to 147. Document 514; 11 and Document 516; 12.

(20) Document 513A; 2. Also, Document 283; 1.
the National Party of East Sumatra"\(^{(21)}\) explained that:

In March 1946 leaders of the Republic of Indonesia together with their followers organized a movement which they called the Social Revolution. In this so-called Social Revolution movement they seized governmental power, killed, kidnapped, robbed, raped and carried out other illegal actions against thousands of people from all ethnic groups, a large proportion of whom were the Native Inhabitants of East Sumatra (Boemipoetera Soematera Timoer)\(^{(22)}\) from all stratas (men, women and children). Almost all the intellectuals among the Native Inhabitants of East Sumatra were interned, even though judicial investigations by the Republic produced no evidence of wrongdoing on their part.

In consequence of this we got the impression that this movement had been organized for the purpose of seizing our motherland Sumatera Timur by destroying the power of our people, killing those who held power (those who governed) - those who had become leaders in accordance with the customary law - interning the intellectuals, impoverishing our people, dividing other ethnic groups from our own and making false allegations of feudalism.

In our internment camps we came to realise that the Republic of Indonesia was unwilling to guard the peace, something acknowledged by the official newspaper of the Republic of Indonesia itself.

Because of this, in our places of internment, we decided that, whenever we had the opportunity, we would quickly establish an association (serikat) which would have as its aims:

a. to unite the natives of East Sumatra within a single party so that, although not a large (ethnic) group, they will not vanish within the society at large;

b. to create consciousness of our customs and traditions and the special privileges consummate with the times;

c. to press for positions of responsibility for its members;

d. to withdraw Sumatera Timur from the Republic.

The Statement of Principles\(^{(23)}\) of the PNST announced that:

\[\text{(21) "Riawajat Partai Nasional Soematera Timoer Didirikan", appened to Document 432.}\]

\[\text{(22) The term is used here to refer specifically to the ethnic Malay community.}\]

\[\text{(23) "Beginsel-Programma Dari Partai Nasional Soematera Timoer." Appended to Document 432.}\]
The National Party of East Sumatra which constitutes the kernel of the original native peoples has come to the conclusion that, because of various weaknesses, foreign assistance is greatly needed for the creation of this state. Among such foreign peoples, our particular choice falls upon the Dutch people, because in culture and education this region has been influenced by Dutch culture for about the last 100 years. ....

The National Party of East Sumatra wishes that Sumatera Timur be made an autonomous territory. Sumatera Timur is not able to be a nation because of lack of territory, lack of population, shortage of intellectuals, lack of economic strength.

The efforts of the National Party of East Sumatera are directed towards other regions of Sumatra achieving autonomy and these regions later uniting to become a SUMATRAN NATION, which will be free of Java.

According to history, custom and tradition Sumatra and Java are different, foreign to each other, so much so that the two islands must be separate, that is each become a state in itself.

Later these states could be combined into a federation in accordance with "Linggaadjati", to be called: THE INDONESIAN UNION (NEGARA INDONESIA SERIKAT (N.I.S.)) An Indonesian Union which will be linked with the Netherlands.

The party also issued a demand that a specific number of seats in the legislative council of the future East Sumatran state be allocated to its members, as representatives of one of the native ethnic groups of Sumatera Timur. (24)

The PNST had come into being directly as a result of fears, justifiably held under the circumstances, amongst the Malay royal families that the Dutch and the Comite DIST had already decided upon their political extinction. The sponsors

(24) "Permohonan Tempat didalam Dewan Persiapan oentoek merantjang Daerah Soematera Timoer." Appended to Document 432.
and leaders of the party were determined to restore and preserve the pre-War rights and privileges of the Malay sultanates and their ruling families, if necessary in direct political opposition to the *Comite DIST.* (25)

Yet this fundamental aim of the PNST was the cause of a major split within the party leadership from its inception. Majority opinion within the leadership, the chief articulators of which were Tengku Moechtar Aziz (a younger brother of the Sultan of Langkat) and two members of the Serdang royal family, Tengku Nikmatullah and Tengku Jafizham, was for a restoration of the pre-War condition. However, a minority group, led by the party chairman, Tengku Bacharoedin, opposed this on the grounds that protection of the traditional kingdoms should not mean a restoration of "feudalism". (26)

Only a matter of days after the establishment of the PNST, the second of the political parties was formed. It was sponsored and led by members of the *Comite DIST.* Called the *Partai Daerah*

(25) Document 268. On September 10, two days following the formation of the PNST, the Sultan of Deli requested, on behalf of the traditional rulers in Sumatera Timur, that the Netherlands Indies government clarify just what the future position of the rulers would be and whether the government was prepared to abide by the terms of the pre-War "long contracts" (*lange contracten*) with the Malay rulers in Sumatera Timur. Cited in Document 475.

(26) Document 519; 3.
Istimewa Soematera Timoer (Party of the Special Region of East Sumatra) - *Pardist*, it was officially inaugurated at a ceremony in Medan on September 27, attended by the *Recomba* and other senior Dutch officials. (27) The party's first public announcement (28) declared that:

"PARDIST" has been formed out of the secret associations "S.S." (Siap Sedia) and "P.S.T." (Persatoean Soematera Timoer) which have been active since the Japanese Army occupied Indonesia. The aims of those secret associations was to struggle against and hinder the greedy aims of the Japanese against our country. ....

At the time of the Japanese surrender and the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia, the aims and purposes of which we have already experienced together, when the majority of us experienced the acts of tyranny, these secret associations, which had at first been disbanded, were re-activated in order to free our compatriots and those of the Sumatera Timur people who since that time had been held in internment by the Republic of Indonesia, even though the Republic of Indonesia itself had been unable to prove them guilty of any offence.

Since then these secret associations have worked well within Republican territory and also within the Dutch controlled region, that is within and outside the demarcation line.

These secret associations have played their part in speeding up the long desired release of these Republican prisoners, in cooperation with the Netherlands Army. ...

"PARDIST" is a party of the PEOPLE. All inhabitants irrespective of descent, religion or ethnicity, may become ...
members of the party.

"PARDIST" firmly and resolutely opposes the re-establishment of the government of the Republic of Indonesia in Sumatera Timur.

"PARDIST" supports the KOMITE Daerah Istimewa Soematera Timoer which has now been formed from leaders from the above two secret associations.

"PARDIST" is willing to become the kernel of the KOMITE Daerah Istimewa Soematera Timoer.

As the political child of the Comite DIST, Pardist was formed to articulate and mobilize popular support for the ideals of an East Sumatran state in the form agreed upon between the Comite and the Dutch authorities. It stood directly opposed to the aims of specifically Malay and kerajaan hegemony as represented by the PNST.

Although its leading members were all aristocrats, the movement (Pardist) showed little enthusiasm for restoring the rajas whom the 'social revolution' had overthrown. ... the revolution had run too deep to allow the clock to be turned back. (29)

In stressing the differences between the two parties one should not overlook the fundamental values they represented in common. Both parties reflected a strong Malay/orang asli ethnocentrism. Pardist may have sought to deny any ethnocentric values, but the interests it represented were quite specifically those of the orang asli peoples. It may not have been as raucously Malay-centered as the PNST, yet the party leadership was clearly Malay dominated. Also, bitter reminiscences of the

(29) Reid (1974); 116.
Social Revolution loomed largely in the public statements of Pardist leaders, as they did in those from the PNST. (30)

On 30 September 1947 the Netherlands Indies' Lieutenant Governor-General, van Mook, arrived in Medan for discussions with the Comite DIST. When the formal talks began, on October 2, Dutch officials stressed their determination to ensure that the future East Sumatran state appeared as democratic as possible. van Mook, questioning why the Comite DIST did not include any representatives of the Javanese community, said:

You gentlemen state that your committee represents a majority of the Sumatera Timur population. We must take care to ensure that people cannot claim this to be just play-acting. (31)

Dr. Mansoer, in reply, admitted that he had so far been unable to induce any prominent Javanese to join the Comite. (32) Other Comite DIST members, however, declared that the Comite

(30) See Document 418. At the ceremony, in Medan, to officially inaugurate Pardist, the party's First Chairman, Datuk Hafiz Haberham, declared in his speech: "After the fall of the Japanese Government (in Sumatra) a new government came into existence. This new government is the Indonesian Republican Government, which is not at all a democratic one, but a duplicate of the Japanese fascist government, which gave us disappointment instead of enthusiasm. It is under this regime that some irresponsible leaders started an irrational movement to massacre us." Translation from New China Times 29 September 1947 in Document 410, No. 71/1947.

(31) Cited in Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 217.

(32) ibid.; 218.
was nevertheless still widely representative of the various ethnic groups in Sumatera Timur. Djaidin Purba announced he was convinced that once peace was fully restored throughout Sumatera Timur (referring to the continued operation of small groups of armed Republican supporters) all ethnic groups in the Simalungun region would support the aims of the Comite. (33) Dr. Nainggolan, referring to Tapanuli support for the Comite, declared that he and the other two Tapanuli Batak representatives had been "elected by 200,000 Batak people." (34)

Dutch concern with the need to minimise any kerajaan orientation of the Comite DIST and the future East Sumatran state featured prominently in the discussions. Mansoer acknowledged at the September 30 meeting that the Comite included many members of the traditional ruling families but added that:

If we compare this region with West Kalimantan, the difference is clearly apparent. In Kalimantan there are representatives of the people and representatives of the traditional rulers. Here the situation is different. Here there has been a Social Revolution. Here the Sultans do not possess de facto powers. The Comite is not anti the traditional rulers, but it is intended to make perfectly clear the basic democratic nature of this region. ... We do not oppose the traditional rulers. But today we believe it to be both unnecessary and dangerous for us to include representatives of the Sultans on the Comite. (35)

(33) ibid.; 219.
(34) ibid.
The talks between van Mook and the Comite DIST eventually concluded on October 3. Agreement was reached on the basic structure for an autonomous East Sumatran state within a federal state of Indonesia. (36) It was an agreement which firmly excluded the traditional rulers from positions of any political consequence in the proposed state by virtue of hereditary rights alone. (37)

Two days later a delegation from the Comite DIST - consisting of Mansoer, Tengku Dzulkarnain, Datuk Hafiz Haberham, Djomat Purba, Lalising and Dr. F.J. Nainggolan - left Medan for Jakarta. On their arrival Mansoer announced that the delegation had been invited by the Netherlands Indies government to discuss the establishment of an East Sumatran state, adding that he wanted the same political "status" for Sumatera Timur as that enjoyed by the State of East Indonesia (Negara Indonesia Timoer). (38)

(36) Document 514; 1. On the development of Dutch plans for a federal Indonesian state after the Japanese surrender, see Schiller (1955); 18-25.

(37) The day after the Medan talks had ended, van Mook informed the Netherlands Indies cabinet that restoration of the Sumatera Timur traditional kingdoms should be avoided, for two reasons: firstly, because it would lead to serious inter-ethnic conflict, especially between the Malays and "Bataks" (Tobas) and secondly, because the moderate Malay intellectuals were strongly opposed to the conservatism of the sultans and rajas. Document 268.

(38) Waspada 15 October 1947. Also, Oostkust van Sumatra Instituut
On October 8, in Jakarta, van Mook issued a five-point decree extending provisional recognition to the Comite DIST. (39)

Points 1, 2 and 5 of the decree provided that: the Comite DIST would become a Provisional (representative) Council (Dewan Sementara) for Sumatera Timur, following the addition of representatives from those groups not yet satisfactorily represented in the existing Comite; the special function of the new Council would be to work with the Government Commissioner for the Administration of North Sumatra, the Reombad, in drafting constitutional legislation for the future East Sumatran state; (40) and that, pending the establishment of the East Sumatran state, the functions of the Council would

Kroniek 1947; 37. On the structure of the Negara Indonesia Timoer, see Schiller (1955); 148-55. But, ironically, when a constitution was eventually promulgated for the state of East Sumatra in 1948 it "displayed a form of government in direct contrast to that of Indonesia Timur." ibid.; 156.


(40) The office of Reombad had been instituted in West Java, Central Java, East Java, North Sumatra and South Sumatra at the conclusion of the Dutch military action of July. On July 19, the Rapoleum, van de Velde, also took over as Reombad for North Sumatra. The Reombad was "the highest civil authority directly responsible to the Lieutenant Governor-General. He was pledged to work in cooperation with military forces situated in his sphere of influence. He was charged with the reorganization of the civil administration in his territory and was thus in control of all administrative officers and police within the area." The
be carried out under Netherlands Indies Government supervision. Points 3 and 4 of the decree concerned the traditional kingdoms. The position of the traditional kingdoms would be decided later, following consultations with elected representatives of the populations of the territories concerned and, pending this decision, control of the traditional kingdoms would be jointly in the hands of the Provisional Council and the Recomba.

Van Mook's decree brought immediate reaction from sultanate quarters. Within a few days the Sultan of Langkat had written to van Mook: (41)

Custom and tradition can only be made strong again in this region if the traditional kingdoms in Sumatera Timur are themselves made strong once again, because they are the pillars of the adat here as they are in West Sumatra, where the pillar of the adat is the maternal descent line. All the rulers in Sumatera Timur definitely agree that the system of government should be regulated to accord with desires for an era of peace.

In my opinion the governmental structure most suitable for Sumatera Timur is: for all the (traditional) self-governing kingdoms in Sumatera Timur to be joined into a federation. Such federation can determine the regulation of government in Sumatera Timur in accordance with the wishes of Recombas were "the top officials in the military government .... They took over both the control of local affairs and the reins of power in their respective areas for the central government. The Recomba North Sumatra filled the gap occasioned by the murder or flight of the rulers of the self-governing lands of the Oostkust van Sumatra and their retinues." Schiller (1955); 74 & 201.

(41) Document 572.
the time. To this end there should be a democratically constructed legislative council. All laws must be debated in that council before they can be put into effect.

Decisions of the council would have to be approved by the abovementioned federation of rulers and they would be implemented in each kingdom in the name of the ruler of that particular kingdom.

Therefore I am of the opinion that the decisions of such a peoples' Council must firstly be filtered through a council of traditional rulers because I know that the people of this country are insufficiently educated to fully consider the consequences of a law or the effects of its implementation.

Your Excellency certainly knows at what level of development the Indonesian population of Sumatera Timur in general and the native peoples of Sumatera Timur in particular are.

If decisions reached by the Council or by popular meetings are put into effect right away, the consequences for us will be the same as that experienced recently in the period of the Republic of Indonesia. (42)

It was a vain plea for a cause already lost. Given the

______________________________

(42) Earlier in his letter, the Sultan had made no secret of his disdain for the Republic and the social changes which he considered its leaders to have implemented. "All my valuable possessions", he declared, "have been stolen, all my officials have been imprisoned, many of them have been killed, so too have the members of my family. The Government has been seized by criminals who are recognized by the Republic of Indonesia. Thus the person who became the Bupati of Langkat was a former maker of kopiah headresses without any training in government, so too there were Wedanas of whom one was a former primary school teacher and one a former plantations clerk. Tjamats were appointed from amongst former tailors, sellers of vegetables, etc. so that it is not surprising the Langkat nation has fallen into disorder." Ever since the Japanese arrival, the Sultan went on, the youth have been encouraged to disobey, even destroy, the customary laws, religion and traditional values of the sultanate. In order to revive and rebuild these institutions, he pleaded, a restoration of the powers and authority of the traditional rulers was imperative. Document 572.
glare of international attention currently focussed upon their actions in Indonesia, following the United Nations sponsored ceasefire, the Dutch were disinclined to commit their limited resources to the support of patently colonialist institutions such as the pre-War traditional kingdoms in Sumatera Timur.

In Medan, the Comite DIST and the Recomba were busy setting up the Dewan Sementara. By October 30 they had agreed on the final composition of a 28-member council. In accordance with decisions reached at the Medan and Jakarta talks earlier in the month, and in compliance with van Mook’s decree of October 8, the Comite DIST was re-constituted into the Dewan Sementara; with the addition of ten new members, including representatives for the Javanese, Dutch, Eurasian and Indian communities. Mansoer, Tengku Dzulkarnain, Raja Kaliamsjah Sinaga and Lalisang were appointed as a de facto Executive Council and, as such, were omitted from the Dewan. (43)

(43) All members of the Dewan Sementara were appointed as representatives of particular ethnic groups. Members of the Comite DIST now in the Dewan were: Tengku Hafas (Malay), Orang Kaya Ramli (Malay), Datuk Kamil (Malay), Datuk Hafiz Haberham (Malay), Abdul Wahab (Malay), Sajoeti (Malay), Mohamad Noeh (Malay), Tengku M. Bahar (Malay), Florencius Lumbantobing (Toba), Dr. F. J. Nainggolan (Toba), H. F. Sitompul (Toba), Djaidin Purba (Simalungun), Djomat Purba (Simalungun), Raja Meliala Sembiring (Karo), C. B. W. Manusiwa (East Indonesia), A. H. F. Rotty (East Indonesia), Tan Boen Djin (Chinese) and Tan Wee Beng (Chinese). The additional members appointed to the Dewan were: Tengku Bahriun (Malay), Orang Kaya Djafar (Malay), Abdul Rahman (Malay), C. J. J. Hoogenboom (Dutch), D. P. van Meerten (Dutch), P. W. Janssen
While ethnic representation in the Dewan had been broadened from that in the Comite DIST, the change was one of pious superficiality. The appointment of three Dutch representatives to just one Javanese was hardly a serious attempt at "democratic" representation. Orang asli and Malay domination was, in other words, carefully maintained.

Less than two weeks after the formation of the Dewan Sementara, the draft constitution for a Negara Soematera Timoer (State of East Sumatra) - NST - had been prepared under the direction of Dr. Mansoer and the Dewan's Judicial-Technical Commission. Also, recruitment and training of an indigenous defence force, the Barisan Pengawal Soematera Timoer (later more popularly known as the Blauwijpers, because of their blue uniforms), was begun under the supervision of Dutch officers. On November 1 a command headquarters was opened in Siantar under Djomat Purba (who was given the rank of Colonel).

On November 15 the Dewan convened specifically to approve

(Dutch), Neroes Ginting Soeka (Karo), R.M. Soedardjadi (Javanese), F. Enkorama (Eurasian) and Partap Singh (Indian). Bukti; 22.

(44) Documents 578 and 511.

(45) Bukti; 44-5. Oostkust van Sumatra Instituut Kroniek 1947; 87-8. A senior Dutch army officer, Lt. Col. F. Supheert, was in charge of training for the Barisan Pengawal.
the constitution and to elect a Wali Negara (Head of State) for the N.S.T.. During two days of discussion the Dewan accepted the draft constitution, unanimously elected Mansoer as Wali Negara and chose Tengku Bahriun (a younger brother of Tengku Dzulkarnain) and the Dutch representative C.J.J. Hoogenboom as First and Second Deputy Chairman, respectively, of the Dewan. (46)

Two days after the Dewan had adjourned Mansoer submitted the draft constitution to the Recomba for approval by the Netherlands Indies government. (47) On the 25th Mansoer, Tengku Dzulkarnain and Tengku Bahriun left for Jakarta for discussions on the final form of the constitution. They were accompanied by the Government Advisor for Political Affairs for Sumatra (Regeringsadviseur voor Politieke Zaken op Sumatra) - Rapolsum, Dr. van de Velde, and the new Recomba for North Sumatra, Mr. J. Gerritsen (the former Resident for Sumatra's East Coast). Both van de Velde and Gerritsen were to be part of the Dutch side in the discussions with the three Sumatera Timur leaders.


(47) Document 579.
The constitutional talks in Jakarta, chaired by the Deputy Lt. Governor-General, Raden Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo, proceeded over five sessions between November 27 and December 5. For the first four sessions there was little disagreement between the two parties, the discussion being mainly about the position of the N.S.T. within a future federal state of Indonesia. At the final session, on December 5, however, fundamental differences between the Dutch and Comite DIST visions of the East Sumatran state came into the open. The central issue was the determination of Comite DIST leaders to ensure that control of the new Sumatera Timur polity was in the hands of the Malay-cum-orang asli ruling elite.

Prior to the talks both van de Velde and Gerritsen in Medan had been highly critical of Comite DIST attitudes on this question. Gerritsen in particular had attacked Comite DIST leaders for demanding ethnic exclusiveness because of their fear of "foreign" domination by the non-orang asli groups, particularly the Toba Bataks. He signalled out two of the delegates to the Jakarta talks, Tengku Dzulkarnain and Tengku Bahriun, as holding particularly strong anti-Toba prejudices.

(49) Document 508. Also, Document 469.
At the final session of the talks the session chairman, Raden Abdulkadir, asked the Comite DIST delegates if they were prepared to guarantee that the non-Malay groups in Sumatera Timur would be given proper representation in the Dewan Semen-tara. Mansoer replied in the affirmative, but specifically distinguished between those who were recent immigrants to the region and those who had been there sufficiently long to become absorbed into the orang asli cultures. Using the Toba Bataks as an example, he differentiated between those who had lived in Sumatera Timur for more than forty years, and consequently were culturally integrated, and those who had migrated since and who refused to accept the customs and traditions of the regions in which they settled. The latter, he implied, warranted no consideration for franchise or political equality. (50)

But this disagreement was not permitted to interfere with the planned process for setting up the NST. With formal peace negotiations between the Republic and the Netherlands due to commence at the beginning of December, (51) the Dutch were unwilling to risk their plans for the East Sumatran state being frustrated by exercising pressure on the Comite DIST for changes which the latter would undoubtedly have felt inclined to resist

(51) Hanifah (1973); 261-2.
with some determination.

On December 5 the Dewan Sementara reconvened in Medan to hear a report from the Recomba on the progress of the constitutional talks in Jakarta. Gerritsen assured members of the Dewan that rapid progress was being made towards setting up the NST and the federal Indonesian state. The session closed with the approval of a resolution declaring full confidence in both the Netherlands government and the Comite DIST delegates in Jakarta to achieve independence and regional autonomy for Sumatera Timur within a federal polity. The resolution urged both parties to finalize negotiations quickly and urged the Netherlands government to issue establishing legislation for the NST as speedily as possible. (52)

These developments, however, brought no especial sense of victory to those in the main centre of non-Republican political opposition to the Dutch-Comite DIST plans, namely the PNST. While the Dewan was still in session the PNST leadership despatched a protest to the Lt. Governor-General in Jakarta against an earlier refusal by the Recomba and Comite DIST to allocate the party special seats in the council. (53) Van Mook and Mansoer,

(52) For a report of the December 5 session of the Dewan Sementara, see Waspada 9 December 1947.

(53) Document 440. Establishment of the Dewan Sementara
however, had already settled the final stage of the program for bringing the NST into being. The PNST protest was disregarded.

On December 19, eleven days after the "Renville" peace talks between the Dutch and Republic had opened in Batavia, the Netherlands Prime Minister, Dr. Beel, arrived in Medan—accompanied by the Minister for Redevelopment, L. Neher. They were greeted at the airport, in a lavish display of pomp and ceremony, by a welcoming committee headed by Mansoer and van de Velde. That night Beel made a short speech over Medan Radio in which he praised the people of Sumatera Timur for

stimulated a controversy between the PNST on one side and the Comite DIST and Dutch administration on the other.

Between the time of van Mook's decree of October 8 and the actual formation of the Dewan Sementara, the PNST leadership council had reiterated its demand for special representation of the party on the Dewan. In reply, the Comite leaders had offered to provide one seat for the party and asked that the names of three candidates be submitted. The PNST rejected this and demanded a minimum of three seats. Several days later the Recomba intervened and informed the PNST that an existing member of the Dewan Sementara, Abdul Rahman (a relative of the Sultan of Langkat) would act as the de facto representative of the PNST. This too was rejected. Eventually on November 27 the Dewan itself rejected the appointment of any members to represent political parties, stating that PNST interests were already represented by several existing members, referring to those members of the Dewan from sultanate families. Documents 433, 434, 435, 102, 436, 437, 509, 438 and 652.

(54) For accounts of the Renville talks, see George Kahin (1952); 224-9. Woodman (1955); 240. Ray (1967); 134-41. Tengku Dzulkarnain, one of the founder-members of the Comite DIST, was a member of the Netherlands delegation to the talks.
... an initiative ... to start the great work to be done in cooperation with the Netherlands. ... A future in which the justified wishes of the Indonesian peoples will be fulfilled, and in which these peoples will jointly on a federative basis occupy a position on an equivalent footing with the Netherlands, Surinam and Curacao in the voluntarily accepted relation(ship) of the Union, in which the House of Orange as the bearer of the Crown of the Union and, standing, true to the tradition, above all the groups, will be able to fulfill its highest vocation. (55)

Next day the Dewan Sementara convened for a special session in honour of the visitors. Addressing the members, Beel announced that the constitutional discussions in Holland and Jakarta were virtually complete and that proclamation of the NST was now imminent. (56) During the next few days both he and Neher gave similar assurances to gatherings of politicians in Siantar, Tebingtinggi and Perbaungan.

On December 25, less than a week after Beel and Neher arrived in Medan, the Lt. Governor-General, van Mook, issued a decree "Concerning the Recognition of the State of East Sumatra." (57) The decree established that the Daerah Istimewa Soematera Timoer was now constituted as a State, namely the

(57) Gouvernementsbesluit No. 3, 8 October 1947. (Staatsblad No. 176/1947). ("Betreffende de erkenning van de Negara Soematera Timoer.")
Six days later, the Dewan Semen-tara met and passed a "Law Concerning the State Organization of the Negara Soematera Timoer" which approved and ratified the constitutional decree, subject to further changes which might be proposed by the Netherlands government. (59)

The haste with which the constitutional provisions were drawn up is obvious from first reading. The structure of the state and its governing institutions are set out in the broadest of terms. Offices and functions are defined in only the most cursory fashion. It was, in other words, a constitution born of pressure and haste to meet short term needs. So far as the orang asli interests, which underlay the indigenous side of the movement for the East Sumatran state, was concerned, the constitution remained silent, apart from a brief reference to the fact that the Wali Negara had to have:

... special ties with Sumatera Timur by reasons of history, descent and custom ....

Structurally the NST constitution laid out the very simplest pattern of government institutions. Legislative and

(58) The full text of the decree is given in Lampiran2 Bagian jang kedoea Kearable Ketertiban Hoekoem Baroe di Indonesia; 148-50. The decree incorporated all five points of van Mook's earlier resolution of October 8.

executive powers were to reside in three institutions: a Dewan Perwakilan (Representative Council) of fifty members (thirty eight popularly elected and twelve appointed by the Head of State); a Badan Amanah (Advisory-cum-Executive Council); and the Head of State, the Wali Negara, elected by the Dewan Perwakilan for a term of five years. The Wali Negara would simultaneously be commander in chief of the armed forces. In addition to the Badan Amanah, the Wali Negara would be assisted by a five-member Kabinet (Cabinet). The civil administrative functions of the state would be supervised by seven Departments: Justice, Government, Finance, Welfare, Education and Culture, Transport and Defence. (60)

In three vital, and as yet not fully resolved, areas the NST constitution remained silent. Firstly, no attempt was made to define the territorial boundaries of the state. This was because of continued Republican control over northern Langkat, southern Asahan and Labuhan Batu. The drawing of final cease-fire lines between Dutch and Republican controlled territory in Sumatera Timur was still a matter of dispute at the Renville negotiations in Jakarta. Secondly, the constitution ignored the question of the former self-governing territories within the region, particularly the status of the traditional kingdoms

(60) Sumarsono (1949); 396.
and their rulers. Thirdly, the precise degree of autonomy which would be vested in the NST vis-a-vis the projected federal State of Indonesia was also ignored. In effect, the NST came into legal existence undefined territorially, its sovereignty still obscure and with merely a skeletal structure of internal government.

On 29 January 1948, the NST was officially proclaimed at a ceremony held in the Dewan Sementara in Medan. Watched by hundreds of official guests, the Wali Negara and members of the Dewan took their oaths of office. The NST flag, of yellow, white and green, was officially unfurled for the first time.

Twelve days before this the Renville peace talks had concluded with an agreement between the Republic and the Netherlands which gave the NST official, but temporary, territorial boundaries. The agreement determined that the temporary ceasefire line separating Dutch from Republican territory in Sumatera Timur would be the "van Mook Line" of August 1947. The NST border now was

The territory between the Batang Serangan and the Sungei Asahan (rivers) inclusive of both rivers. (61)

(61) For the ceasefire lines as delineated in the Lieutenant Governor-General's proclamation of August 29, see Three Months of Truce on Java and Sumatra; 21. Also, Oostkust van Sumatra Instituut Kroniek 1947; 33. On the terms of the Renville Agreement, see George Kahin (1952); 224-9. Wolf (1948); 148-9 & 184-9. Ray (1967); 136-40.
Thus northern Langkat, southern Asahan and Labuhan Batu were beyond the sovereignty of the NST. But they remained contested territories, for the Renville Agreement had provided that:

Within a period of not less than six months or more than one year from the signing of this agreement a plebiscite will be held to determine whether the populations of the various territories of Java, Madura and Sumatra wish their territory to form part of the Republic of Indonesia or another state within the United States of Indonesia... (62)

The NST government, therefore, regarded the territories as legitimately a part of the NST, temporarily under Republican occupation.

With the signing of the Renville Agreement the NST and Netherlands East Indies governments turned their attentions towards setting up an operative governmental structure for the NST. On the same day that the Wali Negara and members of the Dewan Sementara were sworn in, the Dewan elected the seven-member Badan Amanah. (63) Mansoer appointed Tengku Bahriun, the Sultan of Asahan, Tengku Hafas (the former Republican Resident for Sumatera Timur) and the two Netherlands Indies government advisors to the Comite DIST, Forch and van Gelder, as members


(63) Elected to the Badan Amanah were: Tengku Bahar (Malay), Datuk Kamil (Malay), Raja Kaliamsjah Sinaga (Simalungun), Raja Meliala Sembiring (Karo), Tan Boen Djin (Chinese), D.P. van Meerten (Dutch) and A.H. Rotty (East Indonesia). Negara Soematera Timoer Sepintas Laloe; 27. Document 517; 1.
of his five-person Cabinet. Bahriun, Hafas and the Sultan of Asahan were made temporary heads of the departments of Welfare, Government and Defence respectively. (64)

The objections of the PNST group and the anti-sultanate policies of the Comite DIST notwithstanding, leadership of the NST was firmly in the hands of members of the orang asli aristocracy, aside from the important supervisory role exercised by Dutch officials. Commenting on the composition of the Executive and Civil Service leadership, the Rapolsum, van de Velde, (65) remarked:

The Wali Negara himself and all the Indonesian dignitaries, with the exception of two, are from the sultanate families and the two exceptions are non-Sumatrans, viz. East Indonesians. Moreover, two of the department heads, Tengku Bahriun and Tengku Sulung are brothers of Tengku Dzulkarnain, so it is no wonder that the Republican press talks about a "feudal clique". (66)

Appointed to head the four other civil service departments were: Tan Tjeng Bie (Justice), Lalisang (Finance), J.F. Keulemans (Education and Culture) and Tengku Sulung Hibatullah (Transport).

(65) Document 473.

(66) Van de Velde is not strictly correct in his use of the term "sultanate families" since two members of the Badan Amanah - Raja Kaliamsjah and Raja Meliala - were members of Simalungun and Karo, rather than Malay, royal families. Nevertheless, the general thrust of his point remains accurate. Of the seventeen NST leaders referred to, nine were from orang asli royal families - seven Malay, one Simalungun and one Karo. The six non-Indonesians among the other eight consisted of four Dutchmen and two Chinese.
In mid-February 1948 the Netherlands Indies government commenced the transference of autonomous government powers to the NST. On the 16th a decree of the Lt. Governor-General confirmed the legal existence of NST government institutions. (67)

The office of Recomba was disbanded and replaced by a Commissioner of the Crown (Commissaris van de Kroon).

The tasks of the Commissioner and his staff were dual in character: (1) aid and service to the state itself, and (2) representation of the interests of the central government (in Indonesia) and the Netherlands in seeing that the state fulfilled its obligations to the people governed. Accordingly, it is proper to designate the Commissioner a 'Crown' official and to consider him a delegate of the supreme administration. (68)

Pending the appointment of a Commissioner, the former Recomba, Gerritsen, took over the functions of the new office. (69)

On March 9, general responsibility for internal civilian government was formally transferred from the Netherlands Indies to the NST government. (70) No specific powers, however, were


(68) Schiller (1955); 36.

(69) Oostkust van Sumatra Instituut Kroniek 1948-1949; 31-2.

(70) "Gouvernementsbesluit" No.6, 9 March 1948. (Staatsblad No. 64/1948). At the same time as internal security powers were transferred to the NST government, the Netherlands Indies authorities ordered the disbanding of the Poh An Tui in Sumatera Timur. Reports from New China Times 21 February
transferred, since the federal state, of which the NST was to be a constituent entity, had yet to be formed. So far as the functioning of the NST was concerned, its government would for the time being remain directly responsible to the Commissioner for the Crown.

One important new development was that all areas of autonomy and administration formerly exercised by the traditional rulers were now to be transferred to the NST government. This meant that, pending formation of the federal government, even those powers formerly lying outside the legal competence of the Netherlands Indies government now came directly within the authority of the Commissioner for the Crown.

Amidst an atmosphere of solemn pomp, the Dewan Sementara convened for its first official session as the Dewan Perwakilan (House of Representatives) NST on March 15. Present were the Commissioner of the Crown, the Wali Negara, the foreign Consuls in Medan, senior Netherlands Indies officials and representatives of the estate companies and planters associations. The session convened under the chairmanship of Raja Kaliamsjah Sinaga. Mansoer, as Wali Negara, declared the session open with a lengthy speech. Reminding his listeners of the success of the

Dutch military action of July 1947 which had resulted in the formation of the Comité DIST, he went on:

I am afraid, gentlemen, that many amongst the people are unable to fully understand the real meaning of the rapid course of events that have taken place. The people, who for some years now have borne great suffering, are unable to think in terms of political and economic development; above all they desire peace, order and security; they wish for subsistence, clothing and medicines. Together we will make the utmost effort to give this to them, but in this context still many other things become cravings for them and for us.

For us, gentlemen, who are aware of the great meaning for this Nation of the events just outlined, it is fitting that we express gratitude to all those who have helped us and made those events possible. A word of thanks to the Royal (Netherlands) Army and the Army of the Netherlands Indies, to the Navy, also to those from the Barisan Pengawal, from the Police and the Chinese Security Corps, who together have helped in different ways to achieve the restoration of law and order in this region. (71)

Mansoer closed his speech with a call for a strengthening of ties with the Netherlands.

Whether this region develops to become a State which is strong and self-sufficient, one which is able to navigate the hurricane winds of modern politics and economics, will depend to a great extent upon your constructive efforts. In that regard we do not intend that as a consequence of our self-sufficiency the Indonesian Union should become weak. On the contrary, we see it as necessary that there be a strong Union, sovereign and independent, united with the Netherlands under the House of Orange. (72)

The speech pointed glaringly to the elitist, aristocratic values of the NST leadership: the patronising distinction

(71) Pedato Wali Negara ... 15-3-48; 3. The text of this speech is also given in Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 223-9.

(72) Pedata Wali Negara ... 15-3-48; 8.
between "us" the rulers and "them" the ruled. It was a speech which placed the NST clearly into its historical setting; starkly garbed in the aims, traditions and class perceptions of its leaders. The Social Revolution, particularly, had not escaped reference, as it now rarely did in statements made by NST leaders on ceremonial occasions. (73)

The Dewan Perwakilan session closed with a decision to increase the size of the House by seven, to 35 members so as to provide for a more equitable balance of ethnic representation. This was done: firstly, in direct response to pressures from the Dutch authorities for greater democratization of the political system, especially for increased participation of the large Javanese community, and, secondly, demands from Karo and Simalungun community leaders for greater representation of the non-Malay orang asli communities. The Dewan decided, therefore, to increase the number of Karo representatives from two to five, of Simalungun representatives from two to four and of the Javanese from one to four. Malay representation was reduced from eleven to nine. Also, an additional seat was provided for other ethnic groups not already represented

(73) On March 4, for example, virtually the entire NST government elite had been present at a ceremony in Medan to commemorate those killed during the Social Revolution, at which Mansoer declared that the NST was deeply indebted to those who had become victims of the events of March 1946. Document 519; 4.
in the Dewan. (74)

On March 23, shortly after the session had adjourned, the acting Commissioner for the Crown (Gerritsen) formally handed over responsibility for the supervision of all civil administration within the territory to Mansoer (as Wali Negara) and Tengku Hafas (as head of the NST Department of Government). (75) At the same time the Barisan Pengawal was installed as the official defence force for the NST; still, however, operating under Dutch instructors and supported by Dutch forces. But the Poh An Tui was now disbanded, the last unit being demobilized on March 31. (76)

In April the vacant post of Deputy Wali Negara was finally filled when the Dewan Perwakilan elected Raja Kaliamsjah Sinaga to the office. (77) The position had for some time been an issue of dispute between Simalungun and Toba Batak leaders

(74) Document 16; 1.
(76) Document 519; 6. At the ceremonial parade in Medan to mark the disbanding of the Poh An Tui, the Dutch military commander for North Sumatra praised the force for assistance given to the Dutch army. The demobilized troops were presented with a certificate of honour. Reports from Sumatra Bin Poh 20 March 1948 in Document 410, No.89/1948.
(77) Warta Rasmí Negara Soematera Timoer No. 11/1948.
associated with the NST. Toba leaders, particularly those belonging to the Siradjabatak movement in Simalungun, had been pushing the candidature of Dr. Nainggolan for Deputy Wali Negara. The eventual election of Raja Kaliamsjah, coming upon the increase of Simalungun, Karo and Javanese representation in the Dewan, but not that of the Toba Bataks, placed some strains on relations between Tobas and the orang asli groups within the NST hierarchy. Nainggolan himself left Medan for Jakarta shortly afterwards, where he became involved in the setting up of a national political party in support of Dutch plans for a federal Indonesia.

During the previous month, increasing Toba ethnocentrism had produced a movement for the protection and advancement of Tapanuli Batak rights within Sumatera Timur. Initially centered upon the large Toba community in Simalungun, it had developed out of a growing feeling amongst Toba community leaders that Toba (and Tapanuli Batak) interests were not being adequately protected by the NST government and that both Pardist and the PNST were actively working against those interests.

(78) Document 520; 1.
(79) At the end of May the Rapolsum, Los, reported that the appointment of Kaliamsjah as Deputy Wali Negara had noticeably increased the level of Toba versus Malay ethnic hostilities within the NST. Document 495; 11.
(80) Document 520; 1.
(81) At the end of February, the Rapolsum, van de Velde, had
Eventually on March 21 forty-eight Toba community leaders gathered in Medan to discuss the problem. They decided that a political party to counter Pardist and PNST had to be formed specifically for the protection of Tapanuli Batak interests. The party, it was decided, would be called the Persatoean Tapanoelî (Tapanuli Association) - Perta. A 17-member leadership council, headed by a Toba Batak Police Commissioner, Eduard Nasution, was elected.\(^{(82)}\)

Essentially Perta policies were directed towards two aims. Firstly, to counteract the continued protection of

\[\text{complained to the Lt. Governor-General that the anti-Toba prejudices of many NST leaders were serving to alienate a large minority of the population. He criticised NST leaders with "feudal" backgrounds for being unable to construct a sufficiently "democratic" polity. Document 473.}\]

Early in April the Crown Commissioner, Gerritsen, reported that the "problem" of achieving adequate Toba participation in the NST political system had still not been solved. Document 519; 2. Shortly after this, van de Velde reported that Toba community leaders were accusing those of the orang asli communities of refusing to contemplate an equitable alliance between the NST and Tapanuli out of a fear that the Tapanuli Bataks, because of greater energy and intellectual strength, will eventually seize the leadership of the NST. "It is nevertheless known", van de Velde added, "that the Negara (Soematera Timoer) was brought into existence by the actions of the Malay intellectuals and that representation and participation of the Javanese and Batak communities in the legislative council and the government leaves much to be desired." Document 474.

\(^{(82)}\) Eduard Nasution gelar Sutan Endar Bongsu was originally from Sibolga. The Deputy Chairman of Perta was a former MULO schoolteacher, Gerhard Silitonga. The party Secretary was a former HTB clerk, F. Hutagalung. \textit{Waspada} 24 March 1948. Document 519; 2.
orang asli privilege within the NST to the detriment of Tapanuli Batak interests. Secondly, to work for the establishment of a Batak State in Tapanuli, along the lines of the NST, within the federal Indonesia as proposed under the Renville Agreement. The Perta chairman, Eduard Nasution, was one of twelve prominent Tapanuli Bataks living in Siantar who on 27 August 1947 had submitted a petition to the Recomba requesting Dutch intervention in Tapanuli to protect Tapanuli community leaders who they alleged were being terrorised by lasykar rakyat units that had retreated from Sumatera Timur. (83)

But it was not only non-Republican opposition to the NST government that was taking organized form. On February 8, barely a week after the NST had been officially proclaimed, a number of prominent Republican supporters, mostly former civil servants, had met in Medan under the chairmanship of the former head of the Republic's Department of Economic Affairs for Sumatra, Ir. Indratjaja. Also present were three leaders of the pro-Republican Indonesian Traders' Association of Medan, the Perserikatan Saudagar Indonesia Medan - Persim, Dr. Abdul Manap, Elias Sutan Pangeran and Mr. Kasiman. (84) Indratjaja,


(84) Manap was Chairman of Persim. Pangeran, a former director of the Bank Dagang Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Trading Bank) in Medan, was Chairman of the Ikatan Saudagar
on opening the meeting, declared that:

> It is not that we oppose political autonomy in the de facto territory of the Republic (Sumatera Timur), provided it is of such a form as is really approved by the people, but we will struggle for a single sovereign Federal Indonesian State. (85)

Realization of these aims, he continued, could be best achieved through implementation of the terms of the Renville Agreement. The meeting closed with a decision being taken to form a Front Nasional (National Front) to unite Republican supporters within the NST.

Four days later a leadership council for the Front Nasional (FN) was formed in Medan. Indratjaja was elected Chairman, with one of the founders of the Paskokan V, and member of the leadership council for the Partai Sosialis in Sumatera Timur, Dr. Djabangoen, as Deputy Chairman. (86) They headed a leadership council that represented the moderate, diplomatically-oriented wing of the Republican elite, prepared and willing to

Indonesia (Indonesian Traders' Union), which had recently merged with Persim. In July 1947 he had been arrested by the Dutch during the military action, but was released soon afterwards along with most of the other Republican detainees. Kasiman was Chairman of a subsidiary organization of Persim, the Persatoean Dagang Indonesia Medan (Indonesian Traders' Association of Medan). Indratjaja was now acting as an advisor to Persim.

cooperate with the NST government.

For the moment both Dutch and NST authorities were content to let the Front Nasional operate openly and legally under this moderate leadership. Indratjaja, supported by the former Republican Mayor of Medan, Mr. Mohamad Jusuf, had assured the authorities that the aims of the FN were peaceful. (87) The latter accepted the assurance, preferring to keep the FN on a moderate course rather than risk diverting it towards more radical opposition to the NST by making it illegal.

Concurrently with the emergence of the Front Nasional, the question of the future of the traditional kingdoms had produced a wider rift in the ranks of committed NST supporters. By March 1948 the factional dispute within the PNST leadership between the anti-feudal minority and the pro-sultanate majority and reached a stage where both factions were openly organizing support against each other. The anti-feudal group turned to establishing alliances with the de facto NST government party, the Partai Negara Soematera Timoer (East Sumatra State Party) - Parnest (formerly the Pardist) and the newly formed Front Nasional. (88) The pro-sultanate group, as adamantly determined

(87) Document 473.

(88) By April 1948 this group, including Tengku Bacharoedin himself, had had talks with Front Nasional leaders at
as ever to prevent the destruction of the traditional kingdoms and of kerajaan hereditary rights, turned to expanding political support within the kingdoms themselves.

Organized political support for the preservation of the kingdoms had already emerged in the Deli sultanate, in the form of two closely associated organizations - the Partai Anak Deli (Party of the Native People of Deli) - Padi and the Deli Sepakat (Deli Union). Both were led by senior members of the Deli kerajaan, the Sultan himself becoming Patron of the Deli Sepakat. Among the political aims of Padi was the formation of a federation of Sumatera Timur sultanates along the lines of that in Malaya. The Deli Sepakat presented itself as the protector of the cultural values underlying the political aims of Padi. (89)

On May 10 the PNST Chairman, Bacharoedin, resigned. This left the leadership firmly in the hands of the kerajaan militants, Tengku Nikmatullah of Serdang replacing Bacharoedin as Chairman. On May 19 the PNST and Deli Sepakat established a formal alliance, agreeing that local branches of PNST would not be formed in those areas where there were already branches of which Bacharoedin had proposed an alliance between the two organizations, in support of an independent federal Indonesia. The offer was neither finally accepted nor rejected. Document 520; 4.

Deli Sepakat. The Secretary of the PNST, Datuk Anwaruddin (the Datuk of Bedagai in Serdang), became chairman of Deli Sepakat, thereby not only linking the two organizations but also widening the territorial base of the latter beyond simply the Deli sultanate.\(^{(90)}\) Bacharoedin now aligned himself with Parnest and also established regular communications with the Front Nasional.\(^{(91)}\)

Relations between pro- and anti-sultanate forces within the NST elite were further exacerbated during the second half of 1948 when the Interim Federal Government of Indonesia\(^{(92)}\) effected the final transfer of specific autonomous governmental powers to the NST.\(^{(93)}\) These included the residual autonomous powers formerly enjoyed by the traditional rulers. On July 19 the Dewan NST legislated for the transfer of all autonomous political authority and administrative functions of the kingdoms to the NST government.\(^{(94)}\) Three months later, on October 21,

\(^{(90)}\) Document 521; 2-3. Document 283; 1. On September 5, a Deli Sepakat conference was attended by delegates from 5 district and 15 sub-district branches. Document 18; 1.

\(^{(91)}\) Document 522; 2 & 9.

\(^{(92)}\) The Interim Federal Government had been enacted into law on March 9. See Schiller (1955); 45.

\(^{(93)}\) Staatsblad Nos. 125-131, 157-159, 175, 184, 221 and 320/1948.

\(^{(94)}\) Oendang2 Dewan NST, "Penjerahan Kekoeasaan Keradjaan dan Alat2 Goebernoerment." See Warta Rasmi Negara Soematera Timoer No. 17/1948. Also Schiller (1955); 325. Sunarko
the NST government abolished the former Cultuurgebied Oostkust van Sumatra, transferring all its officials, powers, duties and property to the NST. (95)

This in effect sounded the death-knell of the traditional kingdoms as viable political entities. However, it did not mean a demise in the political influence of the rulers themselves, particularly the Malay sultans. They remained an integral part of the NST elite. The sultans continued to be the dominant symbols of Malay cultural identity to the mass of the Malay population. (96) In this context, they were far from being politically irrelevant.

Not surprisingly the rulers were less than pleased at the actions of the NST government in revoking their autonomous

(1954); 15-19.
In the Medan area, for example, the regions of Kota Maksum, Gelugur, Sungai Mati and Sungai Agul within the sultanate of Deli, previously administered by officials appointed directly by and responsible to the Sultan, were completely absorbed into the NST local government administration for the District of Medan. All the former sultanate officials were made NST civil servants. Madjalah Kota Medan, no. 36, th. IV, July 1957; 5.
A little over a month earlier, an ordinance by the Wali Negara had made the populations of the traditional kingdoms liable to the payment of property taxes to the NST government. Warta Rasmí Negara Soematera Timoer No. 13/1948.

(95) Schiller (1955); 276.

(96) At the beginning of December the chief of Dutch military intelligence in Medan reported that the Sultan of Deli
powers. The Sultan of Deli reiterated his demands that the traditional kingdoms be organized into a federation along the Malaya model. Together with the other rulers he pressed the Dutch for continued recognition of the rights guaranteed them under the old political contracts. (97) Such proposals were, however, directly contrary to Dutch interests, wherein the prime concern was to present the NST to the world with as little as possible a "feudal" image.

This 'feudal question', nevertheless, remained a major source of dissension within the ranks of the non-Republican forces in Sumatera Timur. Not only was there the conflict between the anti-feudal and pro-sultanate groups, but the age-old conflicts between the sultans themselves persisted. A particular case in point concerns the sultans of Deli and Asahan.

The Sultan of Deli regarded himself as the premier ruler in Sumatera Timur, the only sultan who had not been deposed during the Social Revolution. He had for a short while entertained ambitions of becoming Wali Negara. These self-perceptions probably enjoyed greater mass popularity in "East Sumatra" than even the Wali Negara, Mansoor. Document 228. While this exaggerated the territorial scope of the Sultan's influence, it was undoubtedly the case amongst the Deli Malay population.

(97) Waspada 19 June and 19 July 1948.
and ambitions had been dented by the rise to political importance of the Sultan of Asahan and members of the Asahan ruling family. The Sultan of Asahan had become a member of the NST Cabinet, acting head of the Department of Defence and was a member of the leadership council of Parnest. The Wali Negara, Mansoer, was himself a member of the Asahan royal family. Other family members had been appointed to high administrative positions in the NST government. By the end of 1948 relations between the Deli and Asahan royal families were noticeably poor. (98)

The growing internal dissension within the ranks of non-Republican forces in the NST by mid-1948 moved the Netherlands Indies authorities in Jakarta, the Interim Federal Government, to try to improve political unity in the new state. For the Dutch, further dissension within the NST would only endanger plans for the creation of a federal Indonesia, and the Netherlands-Indonesia union. The Jakarta authorities turned to the Persatuan Rakjat Indonesia Serikat (Union of the People of Federal Indonesia) - PRIS, formed recently in Jakarta and headed by the former Pasoekan V chairman, Dr. F.J. Nainggolan, as an instrument through which the political organizations in Sumatera Timur might be brought into a single federation linked

(98) Document 228.
by mutual support for the federal Indonesian state. (99)

In July, Nainggolan returned to Medan. He began discussions with political party and ethnic community leaders on the possibility of forming a Sumatera Timur branch of PRIS, which would function as a united front of all legal political organizations within the NST. Nainggolan was only too aware of the difficulties posed by the immense heterogeneity of Sumatera Timur politics. The negotiations, therefore, were held in private. Eventually he managed to form a preliminary leadership council for PRIS in Sumatera Timur, consisting of Datuk Hafiz Haberham (Parnest), Tengku Nikmatullah (PNST), Eduard Nasution (Perta), R.M. Soedardjadi (Javanese, Dewan NST) and Manusiwa (Ambonese, Dewan NST). (100)

It was, however, more an alliance of intentions rather than fact, reflecting merely acknowledgements of support in principle which Nainggolan had been able to get in the course of his discussions. No sooner had rival political and ethnic leaders given their support to the ideal than the fundamental differences and rivalries between them acted to confirm conflicts in purpose. By the end of August, Nainggolan's efforts and Dutch hopes had

(99) Document 283.
come to nought. (101) The PRIS leadership simply disintegrated. The efforts to bring the rival groups in Sumatera Timur together had if anything only served to make them even more aware of the basic differences between themselves and more fearful and mistrustful of one another than before.

Heading the list of causes for this condition was the age-old problem of ethnic hostilities, now being given a further boost by the overt ethno-centrism which dominated NST politics. The token gesture of reducing the Malay and increasing Javanese representation in the new, enlarged Dewan NST made no difference to the reality of Malay and orang asli dominance of the government. The largest single ethnic group in Sumatera Timur, the Javanese, remained excluded from participation in government decision-making. This was not only because the size of the Javanese population posed an obvious threat to orang asli interests but also because of the attitudes that NST leaders held towards the Javanese community in general. They viewed the mass of the Javanese population as coolies, indentured labourers, who up to now had been pawns in the hands of Republican leaders in Java and of "communists" and "extremists" in Sumatra. Regarding the Javanese as uneducated, politically

(101) Document 17; 2. Soon afterwards, Nainggolan returned to his medical practice in Siantar, turning his political activities towards sponsoring the idea of an autonomous Tapanuli state, a Negara Tapanuli. Document 20; 5.
naive and, hence, easily controlled by whoever controlled the political system as a whole, they saw little need for anything more than token gestures.

The exclusion of the Javanese community, however, had little direct relevance to the dynamics of internal conflicts within the NST elite itself. But it was a different matter in the case of Toba-orang asli relations, given the direct participation of several Toba community leaders in the NST government. (102) Communal hostilities between the Tobas on the one side and the Malays, Karos and Simalungun Bataks on the other had been a major contributory factor in the failure of Nainggolan's efforts to set up PRIS in Sumatera Timur. The latter, ever fearful of further influx of the aggressive Tobas from Tapanuli into Sumatera Timur, became highly suspicious of the long term implications of PRIS, since it was being promoted by a prominent Toba leader like Nainggolan. They feared that PRIS might provide a means by which Toba politicians would eventually wrest control of the NST from orang asli hands. Conversely, the Toba leaders were suspicious of too close a

(102) While referring here to Toba - orang asli relations within the NST hierarchy, it should not be forgotten that the great majority of Toba Bataks in Sumatera Timur were still committed supporters of the Republic. Perta leaders, for example, were having considerable difficulty in mobilizing support within the mass of the Toba community because of the party's open cooperation with the NST and Dutch authorities. Document 521; 3.
cooperation with *orang asli* interests within PRIS for fear that this could facilitate even more *orang asli* control of the political system. \(^{(103)}\) Moreover, the election of Raja Kaliamsjah Sinaga, instead of Nainggolan, as Deputy Wali Negara and the ethnic composition of the enlarged, and theoretically reformed, Dewan NST, had not served to make Toba leaders convinced that the *orang asli* political elite was any more prepared to contemplate greater power sharing at the end of 1948 than they had been at the beginning of the year. \(^{(104)}\)

The communal hostilities between *orang asli* and other ethnic groups contributed significantly towards maintaining primordial antagonism against the NST among the non-*orang asli*, and hence support for the Republic. So too did the overtly *kerajaan* colour of the NST government. The long established anti-*kerajaan* movements within the Karo and

\(^{(103)}\) One other example of the difficulties of Toba-*orang asli* cooperation concerns *Perta*. In August 1948 a number of Simalungun and Karo community leaders had requested *Perta* leaders to change the name of the party to *Persatuan Batak* (Batak Association) so as to facilitate the incorporation of both Tapanuli and Sumatera Timur Batak within a single organization. The *Perta* Chairman, Eduard Nasution, rejected this on the grounds that use of the term "Batak" would alienate the South Tapanuli ethnic groups, as happened in 1938. For *Perta* leaders the idea of the Negara Tapanuli was now coming to dominate their political ambitions. Document 17; 2.

\(^{(104)}\) In mid-December 1948 the Rapolsum reported that the political leaders of the NST were deliberately applying a policy of *orang asli* domination of the government, and the exclusion of all other ethnic groups. Document 475.
Simalungun communities remained important mobilizers of mass support for the Republic within these communities. Furthermore, Dutch insistence upon the NST maintaining at least some of the trappings of a pluralist democracy ensured the continued existence of a legal pro-Republican opposition with which primordial antagonisms could be organized. This centered upon the Front Nasional, but also spread widely through "non-political" organizations such as the Mohamadiyah and its affiliated organizations, the Batak Christian churches (particularly the HKBP), the Taman Siswa, peasants associations like Gaperta, and a wide range of communal social organizations such as ethnic, marga and adat associations as well as clubs and other societies. (105) At the same time there was an active Republican press led by two of the largest circulation daily newspapers in Medan; Mimbar Umum edited by Arif Lubis and Waspada edited by a founding member of the Front Nasional, Mohamad Said. Both newspapers took a strong anti-NST, pro-Republic line, particularly Waspada. (106)


(106) Dutch estimates placed the average daily circulations of Mimbar Umum and Waspada in Medan at 2,000 and 1,800 respectively. Document 521; 9-12. There were several other pro-Republic journals being published in the NST. For example: the weekly Wakte; an illustrated monthly produced by the Al Jamiatul Washliyah, called Fedoman; the weekly Setaraf;
By March 1948 this legal Republican movement was active and articulate throughout the NST; holding public meetings, circulating propaganda and recruiting members into the various organizations. (107) But it was a cautious movement, moderate in its public demeanour. Dutch and NST authorities kept the movement under careful surveillance, periodically banning public meetings, closing newspapers for several days at a time, seizing Republican propaganda and holding various Republican leaders in detention for short periods of time.

Following the Dutch military occupation of Sumatera Timur in July 1947 all "political" Republican organizations - PNI, Masyumi, PKI, Pesindo, Parkindo and others - had been banned. Most of the top leaders had retreated with the Republican government to Aceh, Tapanuli or West Sumatra. Others remained in areas of widespread Republican support such as Tanah Karo, northern Langkat and south Asahan, to organize underground activities. A few remained within NST territory and transferred their activities to the legal "non-political" organizations. Via

[insert text from original document]

these latter, links were maintained between the legal pro-
Republic movement in the NST, the underground Republic in Suma-
tera Timur and the Republic in Aceh, Tapanuli and West Sumatra.(108)

Extremely important so far as the survival of the Republic
within the NST was concerned was the illegal underground.
Consisting in the main of hundreds of small groups of pemuda,
it operated throughout NST territory, from both urban and
rural bases. Chiefly the remnants of laskar and TNI units
which had either been disbanded or had retreated into Aceh or
Tapanuli following the Dutch military offensive of July 1947,
they operated in rural areas and on the fringes of the planta-
tions as sabotage and ambush units. In those regions of Tanah
Karo, Langkat and Asahan bordering on Republican controlled
territory these units tended to be larger, better equipped and
better organized (often operating under the direction of TNI
or laskar commanders on the Republican sides of the ceasefire
lines) than those in the heartland of the NST.

While it is impossible to assess accurately just how many
pemuda were actually in these underground units, it appears

(108) The NST and Dutch authorities were in no position to restrict
the movement of Republican sympathisers across the NST
boundaries with Republican controlled territories, especially
since they were interested in maintaining as much as possible
of the trade with the rice producing regions of South Tapa-
nuli and the vegetable producing regions of Tanah Karo.
unlikely that there would have been many more than a thousand full-time guerillas throughout NST territory. Probably several thousand, however, joined guerilla units operating near their home towns or villages for one or two actions, and then returned to their homes and normal occupations.

Operations of these underground groups consisted mainly of raiding plantation factories, ambushing Dutch military patrols, attacking NST police posts and local government offices and raiding food storehouses. Chinese businesses were also a popular target. The scale of operations were biggest in the regions with the largest concentration of units - those bordering Republican-controlled territory. This was especially so in Tanah Karo where the underground units enjoyed both the protection of a largely pro-Republican population and the advantages of supply from nearby Karonese TNI units based in the Gayo-Asas-Dairi regions. (109)

While in no way seriously threatening the stability of the NST, the activities of the Republican underground did serve to keep the NST and Dutch authorities mildly off-balance

(109) For reports of operations by underground Republican units in Tanah Karo, Deli, Serdang, Simalungun, Asahan and the Medan Area during 1948, see Documents 518; 2. 521; 5-6 & 24. 522; 3 & 20. 16; 7-9 & 25-6. 17; 5-7 & 21-5. 18; 7 & 21-2. 19; 3-4. 21; 5-6. Also, see Gintings (1969); 10 passim. Documents 484, 622, 649 and 8.
and helped maintain a grass-roots base of militant support for the Republic within NST territory. The sabotage units caused minor, nuisance damage to the NST economic infrastructure. They forced the continued retention of strong Dutch military forces in the NST, thus seriously compromising the appearance of NST autonomy. Rural communities not only became aware of the continued dependence of the NST government upon Dutch arms but also of the fact that the Republic continued to exist as a viable alternative authority, able to challenge the *de jure* one. In some rural areas, notably Tanah Karo and Langkat, the underground groups were the effective local governing authorities.

It was the *Front Nasional*, however, which became the main politically organized expression of the Republic's continued viability within the NST. Throughout 1948 it maintained a somewhat tortuous course, zealously striving to preserve a legal existence through cooperation with the NST government. From its inception *Front Nasional* leaders went to considerable pains to stress the regional independence, the specifically Sumatera Timur identity, of the organization and their acceptance of the NST. For example, at a meeting on February 28 to inaugurate the Siantar branch, the FN Secretary, M.A. Dasuki, declared that the *Front Nasional* had been formed because of the inability of the central Republican government in Java to assist supporters of the Republic in Sumatera Timur since the Dutch military action of July 1947. The *Front Nasional* had, therefore,
been formed to protect their freedom and interests. (110) At the same meeting the FN Chairman, Indratjaja, announced that while the Front Nasional supported Sukarno, Hatta and the Republic of Indonesia government it did not intend to work to change the NST, which must now be accepted as a fait accompli. Even more, he went on, the Front Nasional, was prepared to accept seats in the Dewan NST: "not in order to raise the prestige of the Negara Sumatera Timur government..." but to represent the aims of Republican supporters, namely, the attainment of "one Indonesian nation which is free and sovereign." (111)

Within two months of its establishment branches of the Front Nasional had been formed in most of the larger towns of Deli, Serdang and Simalungun. In Medan itself, six sub-branches were formed. (112) During this period Indratjaja relinquished

(110) On March 3 a notice in the newspaper Waspada announced on behalf of the "Front Nasional, Sumatera Timur" that the FN had been "formed out of the wishes and on the urging of a section of the people of Sumatera Timur..." The "activities (of the FN) will encompass only the (Dutch) occupied region in Sumatera Timur..." and the FN "does not have any connection with any other Front Nasional organization or any other body outside this territory."

(111) Waspada 6 March 1948. Also, Document 519; 4. At a meeting on March 21 to inaugurate the Labuhan Deli branch of the FN one of the kerajaan members of the FN leadership council, Tengku Johani, announced that "if we should ask for seats in the Representative Council of the Negara Soematera Timoer, we will not be refused." Waspada 24 March 1948.

(112) On the growth in Front Nasional branches in this period, see Waspada 22, 25, 27, 29 February, 6, 7, 10, 13, 24, 31 March & 2 & 14 April 1948.
the chairmanship, going to Bukittinggi on March 23 to join the
staff of vice-President Hatta. He was replaced as Chairman by
Dr. Djabangoen, who continued the conciliatory line, stressing
Front Nasional support for the "Renville" concept of an inde­
pendent federal Indonesia. (113)

On July 4 the first Front Nasional general conference was
held, in Medan. A total of 46 delegates attended. In deference
to instructions from the NST government no Republican flags
were flown and no portraits of Republican leaders displayed.
Also, two NST government observers were in attendance. Never­
theless, the conference opened with the singing of Indonesia
Raya. By the time it closed Dr. Djabangoen had been confirmed
as Chairman and a conference resolution issued expressing complete
loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia. All speakers avoided
any references to the question of political relations between
the FN and the NST. The overall tone of the conference was
one of low-key diplomasi. (114)

By September, however, a quite noticeable change had
occurred in the orientation of the Front Nasional. The policy

(114) Reports of the conference are given in Waspada 9 July
1948 and Document 16; 4. The 46 delegates at the conference
represented branches in Medan, Perbaungan, Tebingtinggi,
Siantar, Kisaran, Lubuk Pakam, Pancur Batu and Tanjung Balai.
of moderation and cooperation with the NST was beginning to break down. This was the direct result of a rapid growth in the number of branches and membership of the organization. Branches had been set up throughout NST territory with sub-branches reaching right down to village level. (115) Younger and more militant supporters of the Republic were joining these local branches. They included young Moslem radicals who had previously been associated with the Masyumi and Hisbullah, as well as pemudas formerly associated with the PNI, Napindo, PKI, Barisan Merah and Pesindo. (116) At the local level Front Nasional branches began to openly articulate strong opposition to the NST. (117) On August 17, branches throughout Sumatera Timur, including Medan, held mass rallies to celebrate the third anniversary of the declaration of Indonesian independence. In contrast with the Medan conference six weeks earlier, Republican flags were flown and photographs of Sukarno and Hatta were on prominent display. Front Nasional

(115) At the beginning of June the Rapolsum referred to the activities of the Front Nasional as "reaching into the smallest kampungs". Document 496; 9. At the same time the Recomba reported that the FN had a larger territorial sphere of operations than either Parnest or the PNST and "probably" enjoyed greater popular support than either of the two pro-NST parties. A month later the NST government reported that the FN had a registered membership of 8,203. Documents 522; 2 and 16; 4.


(117) Document 18; 21-5.
leaders, including Dr. Djabangoen and Sugondo Kartaoprodjo (at the Medan rally), made speeches supporting the Republican government, urging commitment to nothing less than "100% independence" for Indonesia. (118)

A strong pergerakan movement had now developed within the Front Nasional, exerting pressure on the top leadership of the organization for it to adopt a harder anti-NST line. Faced with countervailing pressures from the NST government on the one hand and from this more radical sector within the organization on the other the FN leadership not surprisingly began to split. One group, headed by the Chairman, Dr. Djabangoen, and Elias Sutan Pangeran, stood firmly for a continuation of the moderate policies, of support for a federal Indonesia and cooperation with the NST. This group had established harmonious relations with both the NST government and the Parnest leadership. Djabangoen had even offered the former PNST chairman, Tengku Bacharoedin, a position on the Front Nasional leadership council in exchange for the latter's support. (119) Another group, headed by the Secretary, M.A. Dasuki, and the Chairman of the Siantar branch, J.H. Souhouka, more and more began to articulate openly pergerakan demands. (120) By the end of 1948,

(119) Bacharoedin rejected the offer. Document 16; 3.
the Front Nasional was clearly divided between conflicting moderate and pergerakan attitudes.

An important stimulus to the pergerakan movement within the Front Nasional came from the Republican farmers' organizations. Local branches of the BTI, Sarbupri and Geraktani continued to function in a de facto fashion after July 1947. Many of their leaders joined the Front Nasional. In addition, a Federation of Farmers' Associations, the Gabungan Persatuan Tani - Gaperta, had been formed under the chairmanship of a Medan lawyer, Musa Pattipeluhu, who was closely associated with leadership circles of the Front Nasional and the PNI.

By the beginning of 1948 thousands of hectares of tobacco plantation land were under vegetable and rice cultivation by squatter farmers, the vast majority of whom were Javanese plantation labourers. (121) With the NST and Dutch authorities

(121) As one Dutch report at the end of 1947 described it: "In places where we had hoped to plant again soon the valuable Deli product (tobacco) we find vegetable gardens and pig sties spring up. Also certain village chiefs do not hesitate to rent out the "ladang" plots assigned them at the time by the Japanese authorities. Where are now the original inhabitants of our agricultural estates, after their various forced and voluntary evacuations? The people that fled from the Medan area are now compressed in the coastal region where practically all available soil is under "ladang" cultivation. In the higher hill regions and the estates there one encounters many thousands of hectares of abandoned paddy fields." van der Weij (1947); 189-90. The writer was particularly referring to Malay rakyat penunggu farmers
bent on restoring the plantations to commercial production as quickly as possible, and the former committed to the restoration of Malay *tanah jaluran* usage rights, this large squatter community was a natural Republican constituency. (122) Attempts by the NST government to restore the *tanah jaluran* privileges of Malay farmers acted as a powerful stimulus in placing the loyalties of the non-Malay squatter population behind the Republic. By May the incidence of violent clashes having been pushed off tobacco concession lands by squatters from the Karo, Deli and Langkat highlands.

(122) In November 1947 Dr. Mansoer and Tengku Bahriun had given an undertaking to the DPV, on behalf of the Comite DIST, that the Comite would fully support the removal of squatter farmers and the restoration of the tobacco plantations. Document 520; 5. At the Dewan NST session on 15 March 1948 Mansoer announced: "We are well aware that agricultural activity, which most benefits the State and the people, must be cared for as much as possible, since, at the present time, it is the export of agricultural products which provides us with the finance necessary for development. We will protect the rights of those who have worked here for a long time, but we must also pay special attention to the rights of our own people. The policy of replacing (plantation) concession rights with long-term leases, which had begun before the war, will be continued, although perhaps in a different form. In the carrying out of this efforts will be made to look for equitable settlements, which do not destroy economic viability. ... Sumatera Timur hopes to assist in meeting world needs by the export of the many items produced by the plantations." Pedato Walî Negara...15-3-48; 5. Also cited in Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 226. Mansoer was affirming a fundamental element of NST government policy, and of Malay communal interests: namely, that the occupation of the plantation lands by non-Malays had to be stopped so that the plantations could be restored to full-scale commercial production and Malay land rights protected.
between non-Malay squatters and Malay peasant farmers had begun to increase. (123) Ethnic hostilities, therefore, provided a powerful rallying call for squatters to resist the NST government and the plantation companies. Javanese, Toba, Karo and Simalungun communities among the squatter population responded readily to calls to resist 'Malay feudalism'.

Via the farmers' organizations, peasant interests - presented as the struggle of the common Indonesian against feudalism, imperialism and colonialism - quickly came to reinforce and assist the growth of the pergerakan movement within the Front Nasional.

Of the farmers' organizations it was Gaperta which emerged as the largest and best organized during 1948. Gaperta branches began organizing the squatters to resist and frustrate implementation of NST government policy for rehabilitation of the plantations. Squatters were encouraged to respond to government attempts to evict them by returning and re-cultivating the land as quickly as possible after eviction. (124)

(123) See Waspada 18 April 1948.

(124) On February 15 and 15 a Gaperta leadership conference was held in Medan to discuss the "fate of the farmers" and the "problem of dry (ladang) cultivation on concession (plantation) lands". It was attended by twenty delegates from six branches (claiming to represent a total of 41,000 members). At its conclusion the conference submitted two
NST government reaction to the activities of the Republican farmers' organizations was to take a hard-line. An editorial in the NST government newspaper Mestika on March 1 accused the farmers' organizations of

... inciting the people to hatred of the government and inciting the squatter farmers to continue cultivating (plantation) land ....

NST authorities became increasingly concerned at the threats posed to their interests by this "land problem". (125) At a session of the Dewan NST on May 10 much of the discussion centered upon the land problem. Senior government leaders, including the former Republican Resident and now Director of the NST Cabinet, Tengku Hafas, virulently attacked the squatters and their pro-Republic leaders, demanding strong action for their eviction. (126)

On May 30 a division that had been developing for some time within Gaperta between the Pattipeluhu leadership and a small group of moderates, anxious to reach a compromise settlement with the NST and the plantation companies, reached a climax. resolutions to the Dewan NST and the Crown Commissioner in Medan. These demanded that: first, the NST government recognize the legal rights of squatter farmers to continue in occupation of land already under their cultivation and second, all concession leases granted to foreign plantation companies be revoked. Waspada 17 February 1948.

(125) Documents 520; 5-7 and 521; 4-5, 10 & 15.

(126) Oostkust van Sumatra Instituut Kroniek 1948-1949; 54-5.
In Medan, the moderate faction announced that Pattipeluhu had been expelled from Gaperta. The NST government immediately granted official recognition to the new leadership. The same day, Pattipeluhu announced that 6,000 Gaperta members had now reorganized themselves into the Serikat Kaum Tani (Association of Farmers) - Sekata. (127)

This was followed on June 23 by an NST government ordinance imposing severe penalties in the form of arrest, fines and imprisonment upon any person found in occupation of land belonging to the Netherlands Indies, the NST or plantation leaseholders. (128) It was a signal for tough action against the squatters. Immediately plantation guards and police began arresting squatters and plantation managers began sending in bulldozers to dig up squatter farms. (129)

The hard-line eviction policy, reflecting a rather typical aristocratic and urban tendency to under-estimate peasant awareness of their own political and economic interests, resulted in a rapid growth of squatter support for Sekata and with it

(127) Waspada 1 June 1948. Also on the Gaperta - Sekata split, see Documents 522; 4 and 16; 5.

(128) Ketetapan Wali Negara Soematera Timoer No. 16, 23 June 1948 ("Ordinansi memakai tanah dengan tiada hak.") in Warta Rasmi Negara Soematera Timoer No. 14/1948. Also, see Schiller (1955); 224 and Haliman (1957); 76.

the swift demise of the NST-sponsored Gaperta. Pattipeluhu announced that Sekata would provide seed, building materials and any other assistance necessary to enable farmers threatened with eviction to continue cultivating. (130)

By the end of 1948 the eviction policy had patently failed. Squatters would be evicted, held under arrest for a few days, fined and then released. Almost immediately, with the assistance of the local branch of one or other of the farmers' organizations, they would return, frequently to the same plot of land, and resume cultivation. (131) This pattern of behaviour soon became ritualistic.

The more the government and the plantation companies attempted to evict squatters the stronger and more widespread peasant support for the Republic became. In December, therefore, NST officials began discussions with Sekata leaders in an attempt to reach some compromise solution. (132) But it was far too late. The latter were too confident of the popular support they commanded to be inclined towards any deals with the government or the plantation companies. Consequently the

(130) Waspada 30 June 1948.
(131) Document 221; 11-13
discussions came to nought. Attacks on the "colonialist" and "feudalistic" land policies of the NST were now a proven effective rallying call for support for the Republic within Sumatera Timur.

The land problem had not only served to strengthen challenges to the NST government in its role as defender of orang asli rights and privileges, and thereby assisted the mobilization of popular support for the Republic, but it was also posing a threat to the very base of the NST economy, the plantations. Since the conclusion of the Dutch military action in 1947 a great deal of effort on the part of the Dutch, the Comite DIST and the plantations companies had gone into the restoration of the pre-War plantation economy. (133)

By the end of 1947 most of the plantations had been brought within Dutch-controlled territory. (134) Two months later, a total of 208 had been returned to their pre-War owners and, of these, 163 were in part production. (135) The high incidence of

(133) Document 29; 1.

(134) For plantation numbers and acreage, see Prillwitz (1948); 34. Details of particular plantations restored to their former management during 1947 are given in The Economic Review of Indonesia vol. 1, no. 9, 1947; 138-9.

(135) The 208 plantations were made up of 113 rubber, 41 tobacco, 15 tea, 14 oil palm, 7 coconut and 5 fibre. The 163 in
squatter cultivation, however, not only limited the acreage
that could be returned to commercial cultivation but was also
causing a severe labour shortage. Thousands of former plan-
tation workers who had become squatter farmers were disin-
clined to return to full-time wage labour employment. Between
March 1942 and January 1948 the number of full-time plantation
workers in Sumatera Timur had dropped from 208,800 to 72,400. (136)
The situation improved considerably between January and Octo-
ber when, as the number of plantations restored to part
production increased from 128 to nearly 200, the work force
rose by nearly 150% to 160,877. (137) The plantation companies,
however, were far from satisfied, to the extent that the AVROS
Chairman announced in October that a "serious" labour shortage
still existed on the Sumatera Timur plantations. (138)

It was a situation which soon saw the NST government and
the two plantation associations, AVROS and DPV, somewhat at
odds regarding a solution. Both AVROS and DPV had for some

part production consisted of 86 rubber, 35 tobacco, 15
tea, 15 oil palm, 7 coconut and 5 fibre. Document 518;
5. Also, see The Economic Review of Indonesia vol. 2,
no. 4, 1948; 54 and Maas (1948); 1-4.

(137) Documents 521; 7, 18; 14 and 20; 16. A detailed break-
down of the plantations work-force as at the end of May
1948, according to plantation company and type of planta-
tion, is given in Document 16; bijlage II; 1-3.
(138) Waspada 29 October 1948.
time been pressing for a resumption of the old contract-coolie system, to enable fresh labour to be brought over from Java. NST leaders, ever fearful of the large non-orang asli population already in Sumatera Timur, viewed such proposals as further threatening their ethnic communal interests. At best they were willing to countenance the import of short-term contract workers, provided the plantation companies undertook full responsibility for the return of the workers to Java once the contract periods had ended. The plantation companies for their part regarded such a solution as directly contrary to their express need for cheap labour. There the matter rested unresolved.

Finally, an assessment of the condition of the NST polity at the end of 1948. Economically, the state was in a sound position so far as its export earnings was concerned. Despite labour shortages and squatter occupation, which in the main affected the tobacco plantations, production of other plantation crops, especially rubber and palm oil, rose steadily from October 1947 on. While production of fibres and palm-kernels tended to fall during the latter half of 1948, that of rubber increased nearly four-fold between January and November 1948. In the same period palm oil production increased more than

(139) Document 484; 3.
Politically, the NST at the end of 1948 remained a Dutch vassal, ultimately subordinate to the Netherlands and the Interim Federal Government in Jakarta. In mid-December the General Representative of the Secretary for Economic Affairs of the Interim Federal Government, Mr. C.H.V. de Villeneuve, following a visit to Medan, had no doubts as to where credit for the rehabilitation of the plantations should lie nor of the real nature of NST political autonomy.

One must, however, well realise, that all this is exclusively the work of Europeans. Deli remains Deli: an outpost of Amsterdam. It is at the same time: Holland at its best and Holland at its narrowest. One does not, or hardly ever, think of the Eastcoast in terms of Indonesia as a whole. (141)

The limits of NST autonomy were under the direct control of the Netherlands Crown Commissioner in Medan. (142) Advice flowed daily from the Commissioner's office to that of the Wali Negara. A senior Dutch civil servant, Dr. Th.H.M. Loze, was secretary and advisor to the Wali Negara. The two former Dutch intelligence officials, Forch and van Gelder, who had

---

(140) See Appendix 1 for monthly production figures of rubber, palm oil, palm kernel and fibres between October 1947 and November 1948.

(141) Document 29; 1.

(142) Schiller (1955); 220 passim.
been the chief advisors to the *Comité DIST* in the months leading up to the formation of the NST were now members of the NST Cabinet. The NST Police and the *Barisan Pengawal* operated under the direction of Dutch military officers. Dutch remained the official second language in the conduct of government business; all legislation and most government publications being issued in both Bahasa Indonesia and Dutch. The NST bureaucracy was dominated by expatriate Dutch civil servants. (143) De Villeneuve (144) chose to describe the situation as follows:

The Wali Negara, Dr. Mansoer, is undoubtedly a man of quality, who combines intelligence with bonhomie. He is to an important degree Holland-orientated, such that one hears him use the term "we Hollanders" in casual conversation. From amongst his closest Indonesian colleagues probably only Radja Kaliamshar (sic) (Deputy Wali Negara), Bahrioen (now overworked) and Lalisang (an East Indonesian) are of noticeable value. Economic Affairs is piloted by Seyffardt and his staff; (145) Internal Affairs by Lurink; V. and W. (Public Works) by Barkey; Social Affairs (Education and Public Health) by Keulemans; the administration is to a great extent directed by Schilperoort; (146) in the Wali Negara's Cabinet van Gelder

(143) An example of the predominance of Dutch officials in the upper strata of the NST bureaucracy can be seen from the names of senior government officials listed under NST government departments in the Medan city telephone directory of 1949. Of the 152 names of senior officials listed in the directory, 108 are Dutch names, 41 Indonesian and 3 Chinese. *Telefoongids Medan 1949; 78-92.*

(144) Document 29; 2.

(145) Here he adds a footnote stating: "Seyffardt certainly has several capable Indonesians on his staff. This applies particularly to the top ranks."

(146) Head of the General Government Secretariat (*Algemeene Secretariat*) of the NST.
and Forch exercise great influence. (147)

Two events during 1948 served to symbolise the closeness of Dutch involvement in the NST. First was an "Orange Festival" (Oranjefeesten) held throughout the NST from August 28 to September 6, to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the reign of Queen Wilhelmina and the accession of Juliana to the Dutch throne. In Medan and elsewhere the celebrations were held in grand style, far outstripping those held to mark the establishment of the NST itself. The ceremonies, in which NST leaders were active and prominent participants, were all planned and directed by Dutch officials. (148) Second was the departure soon afterwards of the Wali Negara to Holland where he was invested as a Grand Officer in the Order of Oranje Nassau. (149) Equally symbolic was the fact that those major institutions of colonial rule in Sumatera Timur, the Medan Club, the Medan Golf Club and the Deli Yacht Club had all been re-opened and were back in operation as key informal institutions through which the old colonial establishment was once more exercising

(147) See also Document 564 for a later reference to the political importance of Forch and van Gelder in the NST.

(148) See Oostkust van Sumatra Instituut Kroniek 1948-1949; 281-5.

(149) ibid.; 36. A sharp reminder of the 'Dutchness' of the NST comes from a report by the Rapoleum in October 1948 where he refers to Dutch troops in Tanah Karo "teaching" the Karonese how to keep their kampungs "clean" and to observe the "basic rules of hygiene". Document 484; 2.
political power. While the NST enjoyed the committed support of the great mass of the ethnic Malay population, the overwhelming majority of the Javanese, Karo, Tapanuli Batak and Acehnese communities were supporters of the Republic, and together they constituted a large majority of the total population. (150) In the urban kampungs, on the plantations and in the villages there were hundreds of thousands of men and women who saw the NST as simply a restoration of the pre-War colonial condition.

The Japanese occupation and the Social Revolution had already destroyed the legitimacy of that pre-War system so far as most of the non-Malay population was concerned. Between 1942 and 1947 both the colonial power and the indigenous traditional elite had been shown to be weak and ineffectual. In the eyes of the great mass of the non-Malay population of Sumatera Timur this meant that accessibility to the material benefits of class and communal privilege enjoyed by the kerajaan and the Malay community was greatly increased. Now it was the Republic which best offered access to these resources. Thus while there was a clear ethnic dimension to anti-NST and pro-

(150) In October the Rapolsum reported that political support for the NST outside the Medan area was very low, despite the propaganda efforts of the NST government, efforts which were being financially supported by the plantation companies. Document 484; 2.
Republic sentiments in Sumatera Timur it was also part and parcel of a larger set of perceived interests.

Anti-Malay, anti-kerajaan and anti-Dutch feelings were generally indivisible in the minds of those who chose to commit their loyalties to the Republic. So far as these persons were concerned a Malay-dominated kerajaan, allied with the former colonial rulers, were visibly frustrating their materialistic aspirations. It was the material rewards (land, jobs, prosperity etc.) promised by national independence, not representation of their ethnic group in some distant NST government council, with which they were chiefly concerned. The Republic, promising to re-distribute the foreign and sectionally controlled resources, alone appeared to offer a realization of these aspirations. Javanese plantation labourers, Tapanuli and Acehnese migrants, Karo and Simalungun Bataks disaffected with their traditional rulers, all had materialistic expectations of independence which stood in contradiction to the aims of those who led and supported the NST.\(^{(151)}\) In December 1948 de Villeneuve\(^{(152)}\) had reported that within the NST

\(^{(151)}\) De Villeneuve, in December 1948, cites a current saying common amongst many of the "native" population in the NST: "The Japanese treated us like cattle, the Chinese use us as packhorses; now we have the Negara, which promises us everything, but we shall all be dead before we shall ever see anything of it." Document 29; 3.

\(^{(152)}\) ibid.; 2.
Indonesian political authority rests upon and stems from one group: the Malays. They scrupulously exclude the "foreign" Indonesian elements (Bataks, Javanese) from this milieu; the Chinese are allowed to participate. So it is too with the (in fact appointed) Negara Council. Not unjustly then has Sumatera Timur acquired the alternative name of Mansoerije (Mansoer-land). (153)

(153) Earlier, in October, the Rapolsum reported that an NST government committee established to plan for future general elections was unable to arrive at any useful consensus because of disputes within the committee over the question of ethnic representation in the proposed elected house of representatives. ibid. On the popular reference at the time to the NST as Negara Mansoerije (Mansoer Land), see Vrooland (1950); 193.
CHAPTER 7

CIVIL WAR
Immediately the Dutch military offensive into Sumatera Timur began on 21 July 1947. Vice-President Hatta, Governor Hasan and General Suhardjo moved the Sumatran provincial capital and the TNI command from Siantar to Bukittinggi. Hatta took over the task of constructing a fresh governmental structure for the remaining Republican territories in Sumatra. On July 27 he appointed a member of the KNIP Working Committee in Yogyakarta, Supeno, as Komisaris Negara untuk Sumatra (State Commissioner for Sumatra) with responsibility for overseeing the reconstruction of a government and defence structure for the Republic in Sumatra. Supeno was made directly responsible to Hatta. (1)

On August 2, with the Dutch military occupation of Sumatera Timur virtually complete, Supeno arrived in Bukittinggi. Three days later General Suhardjo ordered the TNI in Sumatra to cease fire.

The sub-province units within Sumatra were now abandoned. Instead Aceh, Langkat and Tanah Karo were combined into a Daerah Militer (Military Region) with the Acehnese PUSA chairman Daud

(1) Waspada 4 August 1947. Propinsi Sumatera Tengah; 159. Also, see Hamka (1966); 373. Supeno in 1946 had been head of the Balai Pemuda (Youth Council) in the Ministry of Social Affairs. Anderson describes him as "a powerful influence within the PS (Partai Sosialis) and Pesindo". (1972); 294.
Beureueh as Gubernur Militer (Military Governor). (2) In Republican-controlled southern Sumatera Timur - South Asahan and Labuhan Batu - the Sumatera Timur Resident, Abu Bakar Djaar, set up a headquarters at Rantau Prapat. The kabupaten administration for Asahan, under Bupati Abdullah Eteng, was transferred from Tanjung Balai to Bandar Pulau. That for Labuhan Batu, under Bupati Gose Gautama, remained in Rantau Prapat. Real control of these Republican territories, however, quickly fell into the hands of the retreating military units, especially Major Bedjo's Brigade B and Timur Pane's Tentera Marsose (soon afterwards renamed the Stormtroop Legion - Legioen Penggempur). (3) In Tapanuli, Resident Lumbantobing and his senior officials transferred their headquarters from Sibolga to Aek Sitahuis, less vulnerable to Dutch attack. At the same time the Tapanuli Regional Defence Council (DPD) decided to decentralize the residency administration by increasing the number of kabupaten divisions from four to nine. (4)

Beureueh was given the rank of Major General. The Republican kabupaten administration for Langkat had moved to Langsa in southern Aceh, that for Tanah Karo had moved to Tiga Binanga in the western highlands near the Dairi border.

(3) Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 147-8.

(4) ibid.; 145. Perdjuangan Rakjat; 110. The nine kabupaten were Sibolga, Padang Sidempuan, Padang Lawas, Kotanopan/Natal, Silindung, Humbang, Dairi, Toba and Nias. The Republican administration on Nias, headed by Bupati P.R.
On September 23 South Asahan, Labuhan Batu and Tapanuli were together made the Daerah Militer Tapanuli/Sumatera Timur Selatan (Military Region for Tapanuli and South Sumatera Timur) by decree of Hatta. Dr. Gindo Siregar (the former co-founder of the Pasoekan V and currently Deputy Chairman of the all-Sumatra DPR) was appointed Military Governor. Mr. Abdul Abas was made Deputy Governor. (5)

Siregar and Abas were placed in charge of the residency administrations for Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli and all military forces within the two residencies, excepting those in Langkat and Tanah Karo. Their immediate task was to construct

Telaumbanua (who was also Chairman of the Nias branch of Parkindo) had become virtually independent of the residency administration. Telaumbanua had built up what amounted to an independent fiefdom on the island. He had appointed a number of close relatives to senior positions in the kabupaten administration. His nephew commanded the largest military unit on the island, a laskar force about 500 strong. The main opposition to the Telaumbanua administration came from the Moslem minority, amongst whom the Nias TNI commander, Major Hasanudin Waruwu, gathered most of his support. Document 108; 1-2.

(5) Hatta appointed a seven-member executive council to assist the Military Governor. Members of the council were: Dr. M. Nasution, Mr. Abas, Raja Barita Sinambela, Abdul Wahab Siregar (former editor of the paper Mimbar Umum in Medan), Dr. Cashmir Harahap (representative for Sumatera Timur on the all-Sumatra DPR and member of the Sumatra leadership council for Sarbupri), Melanthon Siregar (Chairman of Parkindo for Sumatera Timur) and Jahja Jakub (former editor of the paper Soeloeh Merdeka, member of the Sumatra leadership council for the PNI and head of the Department of Information for the Province of Sumatra). Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 145.
a coordinated defence structure for the Military Region. For this they were made responsible to both the Komisaris Negara and the Sumatra TNI command.

Reconstruction was no simple matter. Civilian government and defence structures had been badly dislocated by the Republican retreat from Sumatera Timur. Thousands of refugees from the Dutch occupied areas had moved into Asahan, Labuhan Batu, South Tapanuli, Langkat, Tanah Karo and Dairi. (6) The simultaneous retreat of military units had been an ad hoc process, devoid of any central control or direction.

All the Republican armed units from Sumatera Timur, with the exception of a few which had broken up and disbanded in the face of the Dutch offensive, had retreated beyond the "van Mook Line" into Republican territory by the end of August 1947. They retreated west from Langkat and Tanah Karo into south-eastern Aceh, south from Tanah Karo into Dairi, south from Simalungun and Asahan into Labuhan Batu, and east into Tapanuli.

(6) It is almost impossible to even estimate how many persons fled from Dutch occupied regions of Sumatera Timur into Republican-held territory. Dutch sources put the number of refugees from Sumatera Timur to Tapanuli at approximately 50,000. Document 492; 11. The official Republican history of the Revolution in North Sumatra estimates the number of refugees into both Tapanuli and West Sumatra at approximately 200,000 and into Aceh at about 150,000. Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 693.
In northern Langkat and western Karo, the TNI units were incorporated into the Aceh territorial command. An exception was Selamat Gintings' Napindo Halilintar force which moved into the Alas/Dairi region thereby coming within the orbit of the Tapanuli command. In Sumatera Timur Selatan the TNI units were reorganized into a new Brigade XII under the command of Lt. Col. Ricardo Siahaan (a Toba Batak, former Giyū-gun officer) with headquarters in Rantau Prapat. (7)

Bedjo's Brigade B, which moved into the Labuhan Batu-Padang Lawas-Padang Sidempuan region and Timur Pane's Legioen Peng-gempur, which set up bases slightly to the north, retained separate operational commands. Several BHL units in the Langkat-Tanah Karo-Deli region, led by Pajung Bangun, and in the Serdang-Simalungun region, led by Saragiras, were combined into a new Brigade A. The new brigade, operating under the joint command of Bangun and Saragiras, set up its base of operations in western Tanah Karo where it nominally came within the Aceh territorial command. (8) Later, in 1948, the Brigade A moved down through Dairi into South Tapanuli where it set up a new base in the Sipirok region.

(7) ibid.; 147. Aneka Minggu 15 September 1970.

(8) Bangun (1950); 5. Gintings (1969); 19. Document 83; 4. Document 80; 3-4. The Napindo/BHL leader, Jakub Siregar, became chief political advisor to the Brigade A.
Of the units that retreated south into Sumatera Timur Selatan and Tapanuli, Brigade XII consisted of two main units - a battalion based in South Asahan (mainly Javanese in composition) led by Captain Sukardi and another based in the Labuhan Bilik region (of mixed ethnic composition) led by Captain Abu Samah and two small former Pesindo units – one near Labuhan Bilik led by Captain Mudiruddin and the other in Kuala Leidong led by Captain Sidik. Both Mudiruddin's and Sidik's forces were recruited from local pemudas. The Brigade B (about half of whom were Javanese with the rest being South Tapanuli, Karo and Simalungun Bataks) was divided into a small unit under Captain Rame Bodo in Labuhan Batu and the main force under Bedjo himself in the Padang Lawas/Padang Sidempuan area. The Legioen Penggempur too had divided, a small force under Radjin Simamora operating in the Balige region with the main force under Pane and Liberty Malao based in South Asahan and Labuhan Batu.

These armed units retreating into Sumatera Timur Selatan and Tapanuli quickly became the dominant influence upon internal politics in these regions. Searching for new bases, for access to military and economic resources and free of any restraints from the civilian government or the TNI High Command, they brought violence and chaos with them. Arbitrarily seizing goods and property, killing local officials and refugees (on
the grounds of their being NICA collaborators) units of the BHL, of the Legioen Penggempur and of the Brigade B all acquired considerable notoriety.

Bitterly divided East Sumatra provided some of the saddest examples of brutality. Passions aroused during the 'social revolution' of March 1946 were now unrestrained by government or TNI authority. Many of the aristocrats arrested in 1946 were killed as they left their place of detention, whether or not they were seeking to contact the Dutch. Thousands of refugees fleeing the Dutch army were killed as they entered Tapanuli or the Karo plateau. Part of the reason was the regalia, jewellery, and gold of the ill-fated rajahs of East Sumatra, which had intensified mutual suspicions among pasukans (armed units) as soon as it had fallen into their hands. When refugees were found carrying property of this sort they were immediately accused of enriching themselves instead of staying to fight the Dutch. The property changed hands, but its bitter legacy continued. The killings of 1947 had the double effect of driving many Republicans to seek reluctant refuge in Dutch-occupied East Sumatra, and of further bedevilling the politics of Tapanuli, where the strongest East Sumatran pasukans had retreated. By far the most troubled area of Republican Sumatra, Tapanuli in 1948 provided a sad contrast with the reconstruction the Dutch were able to show in the comparatively opulent plantation area of East Sumatra. (9)

Vitally important, indeed integral to the whole question of reconstruction, was the rebuilding of the economic infrastructure of the Republic. Here the several military forces in North Sumatra came to play both constructive and destructive roles. In the months immediately following the retreat these military commanders further expanded the barter trade with Malaya/Singapore. In the process they brought about growing

(9) Reid (1974); 115-6.
violence and disorder for no other reason than competing determinations to control it.

Centered upon Labuhan Bilik and Langsa in Sumatera Timur and upon Sibolga in Tapanuli, the complex pattern of barter trade - involving military officers, civilian government officials, Chinese merchants on both sides of the Malacca Straits, Malay nationalists and Republican agents in Malaya/Singapore - grew steadily bigger. The flow of plantation products (mainly rubber, palm oil, copra), rice, gold and opium from North Sumatra to Singapore and Penang, and the flow back of weapons, other military supplies and consumer goods increased. Despite periodic Dutch protestations the British authorities were unwilling to interfere with the free-port economic activity of Singapore and Penang, since the trade was contributing significantly towards re-building the post-War economy in Malaya and Singapore. (10)

Many of the Chinese merchants made fortunes out of the trade. A number of the Republican military commanders and government officials in both North Sumatra and Malaya/Singapore

(10) It is quite likely too that the British authorities were none too unhappy at seeing as much as possible in the way of 'illegal' arms traffic flowing to Sumatra rather than into the hands of the rebel forces of the Malayan Communist Party.
were also not above personal profiteering. Some, in particular a few who moved into full-time commercial activity in Penang and Singapore, made a great deal of money. (11)

The barter trade from Labuhan Bilik expanded enormously. With Tanjung Balai in Dutch hands Labuhan Bilik became the only large port through which the armed units now in Sumatera Timur Selatan could obtain adequate supplies. Commanders from the three large military forces in the South Asahan/Labuhan Batu region - Brigade XII, Brigade B and Legioen Penggempur - stepped up production from the big rubber and oil palm estates within the territories they controlled. They gathered in increasing quantities of small-holder rubber from nearby villages, by purchase and as 'taxation'. These goods they shipped out from Labuhan Bilik to Singapore, and Penang, to be

(11) While it would be easy to categorise the activities of these people as "corrupt" - and from the standpoint of the highest ideals of the Indonesian nationalist struggle many were corrupt - it must be remembered that the raison d'être of the barter trade was personal profit. Many British military officers and civil servants in Malaya and Singapore profited no less from the trade than their Republican counterparts. It must remain a moot point as to whether or not the Republic would have acquired the resources from the barter trade that it did without the activities of its own 'corrupt' agents. This is a socio­logical 'if', not a moral assessment.

On the growth in the barter trade during the latter part of 1947, the Chinese newspaper Seng Hwa Pao on 1 January 1948 commented that commerce has been thriving in the Republican controlled regions of Sumatera Timur, compared to that in the NST controlled regions. Translation in Document 410, No. 81/1948.
sold or bartered for weapons and other needed supplies.

In Labuhan Bilik itself, agents for Bedjo, Timur Pane, Sukardi, Abu Samah(12) and the other two Brigade XII unit commanders, Mudirudin and Sidik, were in permanent residence. Also, agents of the Sumatran provincial government and the TNI High Command in Bukittinggi made frequent visits to Labuhan Bilik to organize barter trade deals. All of them travelled to and from Singapore and Penang, arranging barter trade via Republican representatives there. Prominent among the latter were the chief representatives for the Republic's Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence in Singapore (Oetoyo and Ali Djajeng Prawiro respectively), Sorta Lumbantobing of the PKBI and the former TRI chief of supply, Mahroezar.

Among the biggest purchasers of goods from Sumatera Timur and suppliers of weapons etc. in return were "Hanson, Wah Giap and Company" in Singapore and the "Mahroezar Trading Company" in Penang. Sorta Lumbantobing, Ali Djajeng Prawiro, Hanson and representatives of Oetoyo and Mahroezar made frequent journeys back and forth to Labuhan Bilik; collecting rubber and palm oil, delivering weapons, ammunition, fuel and other supplies and arranging further trade deals. By the end of 1947 the Wedana

(12) Abu Samah was a brother of the Republican Wedana of Panai, Usman Effendi, in Labuhan Bilik.
in Labuhan Bilik, Usman Effendi, had become a key figure in barter trade arrangements with Oetoyo, Ali Djajeng Prawiro and Hanson. (13) Mahroezar and Oetoyo also played a major part in arranging barter trade arrangements on behalf of the Republican military commanders in northern Langkat and southern Aceh, operating out of Langsa. (14)

(13) Considerable details of the barter trade during the latter part of 1947 are given in Documents 240 and 107. A personal account of the trade between Labuhan Bilik and Singapore at this time is given in Document 109. The informant is described as about 35 years old, with a Dutch-language tertiary education in Bandung and holding a senior position with the Republican administration in South Asahan (until early 1948). For a summary of part of this report, see Appendix 2. It is possible that the report was compiled from information provided by the Wedana of Panai, Usman Effendi, who abandoned the Republic in October 1948.

(14) At the end of December the Netherlands Consulate in Singapore reported that Mahroezar in Penang had "smuggled" machine guns and carbines from Penang to Pangkalalan Susu in November 1947 in exchange for rubber and copra to the value of 70,000 Straits dollars. A month earlier the consulate referred to Mahroezar as the "great smuggler" who lives in "luxury" in Penang. His employees were said to include two TRI officers, Captain Bustaman and Lt. Suratman, and one Lie Tek Kong, formerly the owner of a Black Cat Coy. in Tanjung Balai. Document 107, Nos. 622 and 655/1947.

Barter trade was also increasing out of Sibolga in Tapanuli. Mohamad Radjab, travelling between Sibolga and Padang Sidempuan in July 1947, noticed that "The livelihood of the farmers cultivating on the perimeter of the road between Sibolga and Padang Sidempuan was clearly beginning to improve. Various types of agricultural produce were laid out in their fields drying in the sun, most of this being rubber and copra which later would be sold in Sibolga and the proceeds used to buy imported goods brought over by barges from Singapore." (1949); 79. Document 493; 8 reports that during November and December 1947 a total of 5,516 tons of rubber was exported from Sibolga and that for January 1948 exports totalled 3,525 tons. Also, see Document 239.
Since July 1947 the barter trade had grown entirely as a result of the involvement of the Republican military commanders in it. It was inevitable, therefore, that the growth of the trade would stimulate conflict between military units. By October competition for control of this trade had divided off Timur Pane's Legioen Penggempur from the official TNI units in South Asahan, Labuhan Batu and South Tapanuli - Brigades B and XII. (15) The focal point for this competition was the rubber and palm oil plantations of Sumatera Timur Selatan and the port of Labuhan Bilik. Competition was further intensified by the support being given to the TNI forces by the High Command in Bukittinggi, anxious to prevent too much in the way of resources falling into the hands of the irregular forces of Pane.

The authorities in Bukittinggi as well as the TNI commanders in the field had good reason to fear Pane's intentions. He had already successfully defied the TNI command. During the retreat from the Dutch army in July Pane had acquired a widespread reputation for having little compunction about the use of violence against opponents. He was well known to be fiercely ambitious. Radjab, (16) for example, describes a meeting with

(15) The predominantly Javanese forces of Brigade B and the Brigade XII unit led by Sukardi had been operating in alliance since the retreat of July/August.

(16) (1949); 69-70.
Pane at the latter's bungalow in Prapat (on the edge of Lake Toba) on July 15, less than a week before the Dutch military action began. (17)

Physically he was small and short, the lower part of his face was of a blueish hue, his eyes were wary and fierce. He was a famous and feared figure in Sumatera Timur; feared greatly because of his radical behaviour and because he had those of his opponents whom he captured perfunctorily decapitated. It was rumoured that he personally had killed many people on the battlefield.

He admitted that he had in the past been a seller of vegetables in the markets of Medan, had been a thief and pickpocket and had become a member of the Partai Pendidikan Nasional. He had no wish to hide his lowly origins, as was customary with so many others, and he emphasised that he had attained his present position through bravery and determination.

And, Pane continued, not one of the popular leaders and senior government officials in Sumatera Timur was of much worth. Some were Dutch collaborators, some were bourgeois, some were womanizers, some money-crazy and so forth. They were, of course, clever and fluent so that unsuspecting audiences believed everything they said. All these corrupt people will eventually be swept away in a cleansing of Sumatera Timur.

Eventually in mid-October 1947 both the civilian government and TNI command in Bukittinggi had decided to risk a confrontation with Pane. The aim was to either force absorption of the Legioen Penggempur into the TNI or its complete disbandment. Pane, however, struck first. (18) On November 1 the Legioen Penggempur occupied Rantau Prapat and arrested the

(17) Prior to the Dutch military offensive, Prapat had been the headquarters of the Legioen Penggempur.

Bupati. Within a few days Pane's forces were in control of virtually all Labuhan Batu, the TNI units having retreated towards Tapanuli. With Labuhan Bilik cut off from the interior, the Wedana, Usman Effendi, departed for Singapore. The rubber and palm oil stockpiles and the plantations in the region were in Legioen Penggempur hands. (19)

The Legioen Penggempur attack resulted in an urgent meeting between General Suhardjo, Bedjo and the regiment commanders from the Tapanuli-based Brigade XI at Narumonda (south of Porsea). They despatched units from Brigade B and Brigade XI to join the retreating Brigade XII. The strengthened TNI force counter-attacked the Legioen Penggempur bases. (20) By mid-November fighting had spread through most of Labuhan Batu and southeastern Tapanuli, extending from Rantau Prapat almost to Sipirok. (21) From Bukittinggi, Hatta ordered that military


(20) Kadiran (1971); 31.

operations against the *Legioen Penggempur* were to be continued until "law and order" had been restored. (22)

By early December the joint TNI forces were proving too strong. The *Brigade B-Brigade XI-Brigade XII* force had captured all the *Legioen Penggempur* strongholds. Hundreds of *Legioen Penggempur* members had been arrested, including the commander in the Balige region, Radjin Simamora. The surviving force retreated towards North Tapanuli. (23)

Both the Military Governor, Dr. Gindo Siregar, and Resident Lumbantobing urged Hatta to bring the fighting to an end by reaching a peace agreement with Pane and the defeated *Legioen Penggempur* commanders. Siregar, Lumbantobing and the North Tapanuli civilian and military elite had become concerned about the extensive control now being acquired by Bedjo and the *Brigade B* over Sumatera Timur Selatan and South Tapanuli, in the wake of Pane's defeat. (24) They feared that one ambitious and

(22) Cable from Secretary, Vice-President, Bukittinggi to Military Governor, Padang Sidempuan, 29 November 1947 cited in Document 481; 2.


(24) Document 492; 13. A cable from the Commandant, 1st Section (TNI), Tarutung to Sumartono of the *Komisaris Negara Sumatra* office in Bukittinggi, 4 December 1947 declared that the general opinion in Tapanuli was that Bedjo's troops were being used by Suhardjo to "demoralize" Tapanuli and asked that the *Komisaris Negara*, Supeno, come to Tapanuli to settle the problem. Cited in Document 481; 3.
independently-minded warlord had been replaced by another, this time with the support of the authorities in Bukittinggi. Added to this were growing fears amongst the Toba Batak in North Tapanuli that the strengthened position of the Brigade B would result in Javanese control of the residency. On the other hand in South Tapanuli there were many who began to see the Brigade B as a potential instrument for ending Toba control of the residency administration. (25)

In Tapanuli and Bukittinggi political and military leaders rushed to patch up the internecine conflicts, fearful of a Dutch incursion into Tapanuli itself. Already Dutch forces in northern Sumatera Timur had resumed their offensive into Tanah Karo, capturing Tiga Binanga. The Republican kabupaten administration there was forced to shift its headquarters to Mardinding in the western corner of Karo. The Napindo Halilintar and Brigade A units in Karo had to retreat south into Aceh/Dairi. (26) In the face of external threat it

(25) Several local South Tapanuli chieftains who had fled to the NST, there signed a document in October 1948 which refers to the forces of "Pak Bedjo" coming to the "assistance of the people and Government against the Legioen Penggempur; as a result of which Bedjo became 'very popular'". Document 567. Also, see Document 84; 2.

was imperative that the conflict be ended.

Eventually, following the intercession of the former Peeindo Chairman for Tapanuli, Raja Saul Lumbantobing (who enjoyed personal friendships with Pane and several other Legioen Penggempur commanders) peace talks began near Tarutung on 6 January 1948. Governor Hasan and General Suhardjo arrived from Bukittinggi. Also present were the Military Governor, Gindo Siregar, Resident Lumbantobing and the senior commanders from brigades B, XI and XII - in addition to Pane and other Legioen Penggempur commanders.

Pane agreed to surrender command of the Legioen Penggempur to his senior deputy Liberty Malao (a Christian Toba who, like Pane, had originally led a lasykar unit in Medan) and to the integration of the Legioen into the TNI. It would now be the TNI Brigade Banteng Negara. Pane, Malao and Bedjo agreed that eventually the Banteng Negara would be incorporated into the Brigade B. The conference also decided that each of the four brigades would confine their normal operations to particular territories: Banteng Negara to the Toba region, Brigade XI to Sibolga, Brigade B to South Tapanuli and Brigade XII to Sumatera Timur Selatan. (27) Pane for his part retired

to engage in commercial activities. (28)

For the time being a delicate North-South balance was maintained between Toba military units (Brigade Banteng Negara and Brigade XI) on one side and non-Toba units (Brigade B and Brigade XII) on the other. Within two months, however, this balance had been upset by the movement of two more large non-Tapanuli units into the residency: Selamat Gintings' Napindo Halilintar (which set up its headquarters at Tiga Lingga and its base of operations in Dairi) and the Brigade A (under the joint command of Saragiras and Pajung Bangun) which, retreating from the Dutch offensive in Tanah Karo, moved first into Dairi and then, in March, into the Sipirok region of South Tapanuli. (29)

Meanwhile plans were being laid in Yogyakarta which were to affect profoundly the course of events in Tapanuli. On January 17, the "Renville" ceasefire agreement was signed by the Republican and Netherlands governments. (30) Six days later

(28) Document 500; 4. Pane moved to Sibolga where he became an agent in the export trade in copra and mica. Politically he maintained close ties with the Pesindo leadership in Sibolga and Tarutung, periodically writing pamphlets and leaflets urging the need for a Social Revolution in Tapanuli.


(30) George Kahin (1952); 229. Ray (1967); 136-40.
Amir Sjarifuddin resigned as Prime Minister. In his place, as both Prime Minister and Defence Minister, President Sukarno appointed vice-President Hatta to head a "presidential cabinet". (31) Hatta returned to Yogyakarta from Bukittinggi highly critical of the state of provincial government in Sumatra. (32)

On taking over control of the central government, Hatta inaugurated a basic re-organization of both military and civilian affairs aimed at achieving greater coherence of the republican forces in the more limited areas they now controlled. He attempted to carry out policies of rationalization and reconstruction of the civilian administrative organization. (33)

Legislation was presented to the KNIP providing for the division of Sumatra into three provinces - North, Central and South. With the support of the TNI chief of staff, Colonel A.H. Nasution, the Hatta government decided that a "rationalization" (rasio-nalisasi) of the Republican armed forces had to be effected; in order to create smaller, more militarily effective, mobile offensive units supported by locally based territorial reserves. (34)

In Tapanuli/Sumatera Timur Selatan this would mean drastic alterations to the prevalent warlord structure in which large

(31) George Kahin (1952); 231-2.
(32) Audrey Kahin (1974); 105-6.
(33) ibid.; 104.
(34) Nasution (1968), vol. 2; 158. George Kahin (1952); 263.
armed forces operated as *de facto* regional governments via their control of trade and local taxation.

For the moderate government leaders in Tapanuli - Gindo Siregar, Ferdinand Lumbantobing, Abas and others - *rasionali-sasi* was greatly appealing. It promised to curtail, if not immediately end, the operations of the warlords. It held out hope for the establishment of an orderly and rational government that the moderate leaders looked to. As the several warlord fiefdoms had consolidated themselves during the latter half of 1947, both Siregar and Lumbantobing had become increasingly concerned at the deterioration of governmental authority - at the arbitrary requisitioning of supplies, levying of taxes and intimidation of local populations being carried out by military units. (35)

The requisitioning by military commanders of increasing

(35) Document 492; 11-12. The Toba Batak writer Sitor Situmorang, describing this situation in Tapanuli in March 1948, says that two conditions immediately strike the visitor to Tapanuli: that the residency is "filled" with "undisciplined" military units and that economic conditions are "unbearable". The Republic in Tapanuli, therefore, faces two major problems: to create a disciplined military and to regulate the economy in the face of food shortages, lack of equipment for the armed units, spiralling inflation and widespread corruption. Many armed units were engaging in what amounted to banditry. These conditions, Situmorang concluded, are creating popular antagonism against both the TNI and the Republic itself. Waspada 7 April 1948.
quantities of primary produce to meet the needs of their own units and to feed the barter trade network had resulted in shortages for the civilian population and rising prices. Expansion of the barter trade had introduced large quantities of non-Republican currency, especially Straits dollars and Netherlands Indies currency, into the economy. Control of this trade by military commanders meant that the civilian government had to finance its activities by printing more and more Republican currency. The value of the two main Republican currencies, ORIPS and ORITA, swiftly decreased. Between August 1947 and December 1948 the value of ORITA currency printed each month increased from Rp. 100,000 to Rp. 109,000,000. In Sumatera Timur Selatan the two local currencies, Oeang Republik Indonesian Kabupaten Asahan - ORIKA and Oeang Republic Indonesia Laboehan Batoe - ORLAB, had become almost worthless by early 1948.

(36) *Perdjuangan Rakjat;* 62.

(37) On April 15 Governor Hasan set up a Supervisory Committee (Badan Pengawas) and a Working Committee (Badan Pekerja) to regulate the printing and circulation of ORIPS. "Ketetapan Gubernur Sumatera" No. 47/1948, cited in *Saltan Dafter Ketetapan Gubernur Propinsi Sumatera.* At the beginning of May Sitor Situmorang reported that the exchange rate of the ORIPS rupiah to the Straits dollar varied between 4.7 to 1 and 15.0 to 1 in different regions of Tapanuli. *Waspada* 5 May 1948. According to a Dutch report, by July the ORIPS - Straits dollar exchange rate in Labuhan Batu had dropped to 25.0 to 1. Document 86; 2. In the case of ORIKA, by March it was being issued in denominations of 2,500 rupiahs. Two months later single notes to the value of Rupiah 250,000 were being printed.
As a result of mounting inflation and monetary chaos, the surviving civil administrations in Tapanuli and Sumatera Timur Selatan soon broke down. As the real value of salaries paid to government officials decreased more and more officials either ceased to work at all or turned to additional part-time private enterprise. Civil servants began to strike in protest against the declining wages and began demanding increases in subsistence allowances of rice and other consumer items. But the demands of the military units together with the increasing quantities of rice being channelled into the barter trade between South Tapanuli and Singapore, made civil service demands impossible to meet. (38)

Neither Resident Lumbantobing nor Gindo Siregar had the resources necessary to assert effective governmental authority over the major armed units. Gindo's personal influence within the military was negligible. His background of involvement in the Pasoekan Lima and support for diplomasi with the Dutch meant that the more pergerakan-oriented of the military commanders

By the latter stage a kilogram of rice cost up to Rupiah 1 million ORIKA. See Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 149-50. Earlier, the newspaper Sumatra Bin Poh on 13 February reported that in parts of South Asahan one kilogram of coconut oil cost Rupiah 30,000 ORIKA, a kilogram of salted fish Rupiah 80,000 and a single cigarette Rupiah 3,000. Translation in Document 410, No. 86/1948.

- the one-time lasykar commanders like Bedjo, Malao, Saragiras and Bangun - regarded him with great suspicion. They, along with most of the pergerakan civilian politicians in Tapanuli, considered Gindo as barely one step away from being a Dutch collaborator. (39) Gindo himself was aware that his long-term political survival depended upon one thing: the successful implementation of the rasionalisasi program whereby the size and independence of the powerful military units could be reduced. Lumbantobing's stature as the premier Indonesian nationalist amongst the Toba Bataks gave him a great deal of influence within the ethnic Toba military units, Brigade XI and Brigade Banteng Negara. He had little, if any, however, amongst the non-Toba units from Sumatera Timur such brigades A and B.

Meanwhile, Bedjo's consolidation of control in South Tapanuli, including the establishment of alliances with South Tapanuli political and military leaders, had yet again brought North-South primordial conflicts into the open. In the North, Lumbantobing, with the support of Gindo Siregar, began channelling additional funds in ORITA currency to the Brigade XI and the Banteng Negara. Bedjo reacted to this by convincing

(39) The involvement of some of Gindo's former colleagues, such as Dr. F.J. Nainggolan, with the NST government and with the Negara Tapanuli movement being sponsored by Perta, helped to confirm these suspicions.
General Suhardjo in Bukittinggi that the Republic in Tapanuli was under threat from a Toba separatist movement in the North. Suhardjo then began to counter Siregar's and Lumbantobing's support for the Toba units by himself channeling funds (in ORIPS) to Bedjo's headquarters. At the same time Bedjo stepped up his efforts to consolidate control of the barter trade network between South Tapanuli and Labuhan Bilik, independently of the Lumbantobing-Siregar administration.

A vicious circle of distrust and suspicion developed. Toba leaders in the North perceived an anti-Toba conspiracy developing in the South, led by Javanese such as Bedjo and Suhardjo. Non-Toba leaders in the South, as well as in Bukittinggi, perceived the emergence of Toba separatism in the North, led by Lumbantobing, Gindo Siregar and the Toba military commanders. (40)

Further factionalism and confusion was added to the situation by the emergence early in 1948 of an anti-Republican movement centered amongst the more conservative former colonial civil servants and local chieftains, in both North and South Tapanuli. Antagonistic towards what they saw as growing extremist control of the Republic via the powerful ex-lasykar commanders from Sumatera Timur such as Bedjo, Pane, Malao, Saragiras, (40) Document 492; 14. Document 493; 7. Document 528; 3.
Pajung Bangun and Selamat Ginting—they began to establish contact with the *Negara Tapanuli* movement now finding organized form within the NST. Stimulated by the development of the NST-based movement and by implied promises of Dutch assistance, anti-Republic sentiments by March 1948 linked supporters in North Tapanuli, South Tapanuli and the NST. These people were now convinced that the moderate Republican leadership in Tapanuli, which earlier had managed to defeat *pergerakan* attempts at a social revolution in the residency, was in danger of succumbing to the stronger *pergerakan* forces that had moved into Tapanuli from Sumatera Timur since August 1947. Many felt a great deal of sympathy for the difficulties being experienced by people like Gindo Siregar in the Republican leadership in their difficulties in dealing with the more radical military commanders like Bedjo, Pane and others.

In mid-April the central government intervened, this time with a much more far-reaching program for change than ever.

(41) The *Rapolsum*, van de Velde, reported that during a visit to Tapanuli with the United Nations ceasefire supervisory commission at the end of March 1948 he met and talked with many former colonial civil servants and negeri and *kuria* chiefs who declared their support for the *Negara Tapanuli* concept and who urged that Dutch forces intervene in Tapanuli to restore "order". Document 474. Also, see Document 492; 14 and Document 493; 8.

before attempted. This was the Hatta-program for reorganizing the civilian government and rationalising the military forces in Sumatra. The KNIP approved legislation making each of the three former sub-provinces of North, Central and South Sumatra separate provinces. Each new provincial government was to be delegated specific autonomous powers and was made responsible to the central government via a *Komisariat Pemerintah Pusat* (National Government Commission) for Sumatra - *Kompempus*, based in Bukittinggi, out of an amalgamation of the offices of the Governor and the *Komisariat Negara* for Sumatra. The former Governor, Hasan, was made chairman of the *Kompempus* and was made responsible for establishing the three new provincial governments.

The Sumatra DPR was disbanded and its members were re-allocated to constitute the legislative councils of each of the

(43) "Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia" Nos. 10 & 42/1948.

(44) The other members of the *Kompempus* were Mr. Lukman Hakim, Mr. Abdul Gafar Pringgodigdo and Mr. Sutan Mohamad Rasjid. All three, like Hasan, were Dutch-educated lawyers. Hakim (Javanese) was a member of the PNI and had been seconded from the Ministry of Finance. *Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 183-4. 20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka*, vol. 2; 205-7. The Liang Gie (1967); 98-101. Pringgodigdo (Javanese) had previously been State Secretary to the national government. Rasjid (Minangkabau) had been associated with Hakim before the War in the nationalist youth organization *Indonesia Moeda*. He was a member of the *Masyumi* but also had established close ties with the PKI, having been a speaker at the PKI Sumatra conference at Bukittinggi in December 1946.
the three new provinces. Thus, representatives for Aceh, Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli in the former Sumatra DPR now constituted the DPR for the Province of North Sumatra. By the end of May, Hasan had appointed governors for the three provinces. In the case of North Sumatra the former Deputy-Governor of the old sub-province, Mr. S.M. Amin, was made Governor. But aside from this nothing else changed in the short term. Governor Amin remained in Kutaraja, isolated and to all intents and purposes irrelevant to developments in Tapanuli and Sumatera Timur Selatan. Public administration continued to be effected by the several residency and local bureaucracies, civil and military.

Throughout 1948 the province of North Sumatra in effect remained an aspiration of certain national leaders in Yogyakarta and Bukittinggi, far removed from the realities of the political game being played on the ground. That game was concerned with the protection of specific local group interests. The premier interests were both economic and primordial. The key groups were military ones. By May 1948, the ongoing dynamics of Republican politics in Tapanuli/Sumatera Timur Selatan was centered in the military arena.

In mid-April, Hatta and Colonel Nasution arrived in Bukit-

(45) Waspada 5 June 1948.
tinggi to lead a Rapat Pertahanan Sumatera (Sumatra Defence Conference) at which implementation of the rasionalisasi program was the main item on the agenda. The Rapat Pertahanan convened on the 17th. Hatta and Nasution presented a plan for the division of Sumatra into four Territorial Commands (Komando Territorium) - Aceh, Tapanuli/Sumatera Timur Selatan, Central Sumatra and South Sumatra. Under the plan all military units would be reduced in size and separated from permanent territorial bases, thereby being transformed into mobile units. The former laskar rakyat units would be broken up and completely integrated with the TNI. Further, a number of high-ranking TNI officers would be transferred from Java to each of the Sumatran territorial commands. Finally Nasution announced that a staff officer from the West Javanese Siliwangi Division, Lt. Colonel Alex Kawilarang, would be commander of the new Territorial Command for Tapanuli/Sumatera Timur Selatan (Komando Territorium Tapanuli/Sumatera Timur Selatan). (46)

(46) Waspada 6 May 1948. Also, Nasution (1968), vol. 2; 157-9. At the time of his appointment Kawilarang was only 29 years old. He had been born in Jakarta to a relatively well-off Menadonese family with extensive commercial interests. Following a Dutch secondary education in Bandung he entered the KNIL military academy of Breda, graduating just before the Japanese occupation. During the occupation he was in South Sumatra, his last job before the Japanese surrender being manager of a rubber factory in Tanjung Karang. After the declaration of independence he returned to Java where he joined the TRI, quickly reaching staff rank in the West Java Siliwangi Division. Kawilarang and Nasution had been classmates at Breda and later as staff officers in the Siliwangi. The two held common commitments to the concept
The Rapat Pertahanan accepted the Hatta/Nasution rasio-nalisasi plan, but only after much debate and in the face of strong opposition to it. General Suhardjo remained vehemently against the plan. The field commanders, he argued, would not accept reductions in the strength of their forces and the dismantling of their territorial authority. In principle he argued for the retention of the large 'peoples' territorial forces as they now existed in Sumatra, rather than the mobile units being proposed by Hatta and Nasution. (47)

From one point of view Suhardjo was being a realist. Military commanders like Bedjo, Malao, Saragiras etc. made no secret of their determination to resist any attempts to reduce their units in size and to dismantle their territorial fiefdoms. They still retained a strong element of the pergerakan radicalism of the early laskar rakyat. Hatta and Nasution represented the Dutch-educated and Dutch-trained sector of the nationalist elite whom they deeply mistrusted. Bedjo and Saragiras in particular, still saw themselves as social revolutionaries. The great majority of the military commanders in Tapanuli/Sumatera Timur Selatan deeply resented attempts by people they regarded as outsiders to interfere with what had of a flexible, professional army. See Anderson (1972); 234-5 & 425.

(47) Nasution (1968); vol. 2; 159.
become their National Revolution. Suhardjo had already experienced the difficulties of trying to bring the military units in Sumatera Timur under central control. He had now reconciled himself to the futility of such an ideal, and had settled himself into a program of manipulation and compromise between and with the more powerful military commanders.

Both Gindo Siregar and Abas came out in full support for rasionalisasi. The two of them were now in open conflict with Suhardjo on the question.

This opposition from Suhardjo meant that Gindo's position as Military Governor was heavily dependent upon support from Hatta and Nasution. He decided, therefore, to proceed with rasionalisasi as quickly as possible, hoping to implement the program before opposition to it had time to properly organize.

Gindo set the first stages of the program into motion in appropriately moderate fashion insofar as it was directed at the TNI units of brigades XI and XII, rather than at the main object of rasionalisasi in Tapanuli - the ex-lasykar forces of brigades A, B and Banteng Negara. With perfect bureaucratic logic the program was designed to move from the smaller problem to the larger. In accordance with such logic, Brigade XI was dealt with first. About a quarter of the troops, including a
number of junior officers, were demobilized and placed on (unarmed) reserve. The remainder were re-organized into three battalions - one each for North, Central and South Tapanuli - and assigned to bases in Tarutung, Sibolga and Padang Sidempuan respectively. (48)

No sooner had the Brigade XI been rationalized than the scale of the opposition to the program became manifest. Most of the demobilized troops promptly joined up with the Brigade Banteng Negara, helping to stiffen the opposition to rationalization from that unit. Several of the demobilized junior officers began intriguing for Gindo's removal. Soon, in addition to the opposition from Bedjo, Saragiras and Suhardjo, Gindo found himself under attack from an organized opposition within North Tapanuli, linking the Brigade Banteng Negara with civilian pergerakan elements, especially the Pesindo groups associated with Raja Saul Lumbantobing and Timur Pane.

Toba Batak chauvinism played an important part in bringing opposition in North Tapanuli together, ironically so in the light of Gindo's earlier attempts to build a political base on those very same chauvinist sentiments. His rationalization of the Brigade XI was now being interpreted in North Tapanuli as having served to shift the balance of military strength in the

residency in favour of the non-Toba and non-Tapanuli military forces in the South. (49)

As the opposition to rationalization amongst the northern Toba units increased, Resident Lumbantobing and his colleagues in the civil administration began to step back, avoiding any active part in the disputes. Although continuing to support rasionalisasi in principle, they now chose to remain on the sidelines watching developments. Gindo and Abas continued to maintain their headquarters in Padang Sidempuan, under the protection of the Brigade XI battalion in the city. However, they were totally ignored by both Bedjo and Saragirias, who communicated directly with Suhardjo's office in Bukittinggi. (50)

By the end of May 1948 a Brigade A and Brigade B alliance had been formed, with the support of Suhardjo, to resist rasionalisasi. (51)

The Brigade B began to strengthen its territorial control over South Tapanuli and South Sumatera Timur. Brigade B troops

---

(49) Document 494; 8 and Document 495; 7-8. Timur Pane's opposition to Gindo led Dutch officials in the NST to associate Pane with the Negara Tapanuli movement. Document 484; 5 and Document 84; 4. As Castles (1974); 77, points out these Dutch assertions have little basis in the available evidence.


(51) Document 495; 8.
moved into Labuhan Batu where they attacked and disarmed Abu Samah's Brigade XII unit near Labuhan Bilik. Abu Samah was arrested and charged with corruption. Part of his unit was then incorporated into the Brigade B. At the same time the other Brigade XII unit in South Asahan, led by Sukardi, also allied itself with Bedjo. (52) Bedjo had thus not only expanded the territory under his control but had also effectively preempted the planned rationalization of Brigade XII.

Meanwhile, Bedjo, Saragiras and Pajung Bangun had decided to proceed with their own 'social revolution'. Civil servants, district heads, negeri and adat chiefs in the Sipirok-Padang Sidempuan-Padang Lawas region were arrested on charges of being pro-Dutch. Several were charged with being "NICA agents" (kaki tangan NICA). A few fled to the NST. Supported by local pemuda activists, the purges soon spread south into Mandailing. (53)

The purges constituted an open challenge to Gindo Siregar's authority as Military Governor. They were also a challenge to the authority of Resident Lumbantobing. Neither could do anything about it. Neither Suhardjo nor Hasan (as Kompempus

(52) Document 496; 7. According to this report rumours were already circulating in Tapanuli that brigades A and B were planning a similar operation to disarm the Brigade XII.

chairman) took any action. (54) From a Toba vantage point in North Tapanuli this provided additional evidence of a conspiracy by non-Tapanuli groups to interfere in Tapanuli affairs, with the connivance and support of political groups in the South. Finally, the purges provided a further spur to the Negara Tapanuli movement. Many of those who were deposed and escaped arrest fled to the NST, where they added influential voices to the calls for Dutch intervention in Tapanuli and the establishment of a Negara Tapanuli. Two of those who fled to the NST and soon came to play leading roles in the Negara Tapanuli movement were the kuria chief for Aek Nangali in Mandailing, Sutan Mulia Radja, and the former wedana for Tarutung (prior to the Japanese occupation), Raja Iskandar Tampubolon. (55)

During June, July and August 1948 the issues and complex pattern of factionalism persisted. A brief visit to Tapanuli by President Sukarno in early June did bring a temporary diversion of attentions away from the factional disputes. But it was a visit which concentrated upon mass rallies in the larger towns and, aside from speeches from Sukarno urging determination and unity in the struggle for national independence, scant

(55) Document 567. Both Mulia Radja and Iskandar Tampubolon had fled to the NST early in May 1948. Iskandar (a Moslem Toba) had been one of those arrested in the attempted social revolution led by Saul Lumbantobing in 1946.
attention was paid to the specific problems afflicting the Republic within Tapanuli. (56) Certainly no serious discussions aimed at settling the factional disputes were held.

It was the dispute over rasionalisasi which continued to dominate. By August, brigades A and B together had established what was in effect an autonomous regional military government in South Tapanuli and South Sumatera Timur. (57) Gindo Siregar was now ill and supervision of the preparations for the second stage of rasionalisasi, that affecting brigades A, B and Banteng Negara, were taken over by Mr. Abas. The commander-elect of the new, rationalized Komando Territorium Tapanuli/Sumatera Timur Selatan, Kawilarang, was due to arrive in Sumatra soon. (58)

Swiftly now the common opposition to rasionalisasi cut across and obscured the inter-ethnic conflicts which had underlain the earlier conflicts between the Brigade Banteng Negara and brigades A and B. Bedjo, Saragiras, Pajung Bangun and Malao met in Sipirok and agreed that common action had to be

(56) Rallies were held in Kotanopan, Penjabungan, Padang Sidempuan, Sibolga, Tarutung, Balige and Siborongborong. Waspada 18 June 1948.

(57) Document 496; 8 refers to rumours circulating in Tapanuli that Bedjo and the Brigade B leaders were preparing to launch a coup d'etat against the residency government.

taken to prevent the emasculation of their forces. The immediate result was what became known as the *Peristiwa 10 September* (September 10th Affair). (59)

Late on the night of September 9 a small force of military police from *Brigade A* in Sibolga, only recently posted there, arrested a number of senior TNI and Police officers. They included the commander of the *Brigade XI*, the Regiment I commander, Major Maraden Panggabean, and the chief of police for *kabupaten* Sibolga, Elam Aritonang. A few hours later, in the early hours of the morning of the 10th, Padang Sidempuan was the scene of a related but much larger action. A *Brigade A* force of about 300, personally commanded by Pajung Bangun, attacked the headquarters of the *Brigade XI* battalion in the town. Following a brief skirmish, in which the *Brigade XI* battalion commander, Captain Koima Hasibuan, was killed, about 100 members of the battalion were captured. The remainder of Hasibuan's unit retreated to North Tapanuli. Troops from brigades A and B then arrested Gindo Siregar, Mr. Abas, and the commander of the former *Brigade XII*, Lt. Col. Ricardo Siahaan. In the meantime further arrests had been made in Sibolga. They included the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Tapanuli DPR, Mr. Silitonga, the Chairman of *Sobesi* (59) See *Waspada* 18 October 1948 and 20 *Tahun Indonesia Merdeka*, vol. 2; 564.
Tapanuli, Dr. Luhut Lumbantobing, and the chief of the Brigade XI military police, Garang Harahap. (60)

The next day Resident Lumbantobing intervened in the affair. Lumbantobing and the Executive Council of the Tapanuli DPR met in Sibolga and issued a resolution announcing that the existing situation made the carrying out of responsible government impossible. They despatched a message to the Kompeten in Bukittinggi protesting against the actions of Bedjo and Bangun. (61)

New developments now occurred daily. On the 12th a mass demonstration marched through the streets of Padang Sidempuan in support of the arrests; and accused Siregar, Abas and the rest of those arrested as Dutch collaborators. In Sibolga, the Brigade A, on Pajung Bangun’s orders, released from jail 26 members of the BHL who in December 1947 had been convicted of the murder of eight refugees from Sumatera Timur. Seven of the 26 were under sentence of death. At the same time the


Military Prosecutor, Maruhum Hutabarat, who had been head of the military court which had convicted the 26, was arrested and taken to Padang Sidempuan. (62)

Next day, September 13, the Brigade Banteng Negara entered the fray. Banteng Negara units attacked and disarmed the Brigade XI units in Tarutung, Balige and Siborongborong. Unlike the Brigade A-Brigade XI clash in Padang Sidempuan three days earlier, there was no resistance. Some of the disarmed Brigade XI troops simply returned to their villages. The rest joined up with the Banteng Negara. (63) Also in contrast with the operations carried out by brigades A and B in Sibolga and Padang Sidempuan, no civilian government officials were arrested. For one thing the chief implementers of rasionalisasi were already under arrest and for another the Banteng Negara leaders saw themselves as defenders of the Tapanuli administration against the threats from Bedjo, Suhardjo and their allies. While Bedjo and Pajung Bangun had acted to defeat not only rasionalisasi but also what they considered to be Batak separatism being sponsored by Gindo, Resident Lumbantobing and the Banteng Negara, Malao and his colleagues had joined the anti-rasionalisasi

(63) Document 482; 1. Document 83; 3. The latter report states that only two persons were killed in the operations in Tarutung, Balige and Siborongborong, both members of the attacking force.
actions in order to prevent the dissipation of Toba military strength, not to undermine Toba control of the Tapanuli residency administration.

On the 14th Bedjo informed Bukittinggi that he had effected a reorganization of the Komando Territorium Tapanuli/Sumatera Timur Selatan. He advised Suhardjo that he had taken over as territorial commander, that Saragiras had become commander of the Tapanuli sub-territory and that Pajung Bangun was now commander of all Military Police forces. (64) The same day Resident Lumbantobing ordered a special plenary session of the Tapanuli DPR to convene on the 30th, specifically to discuss the events of recent days. He despatched a message to Bukittinggi inviting both Hasan and Suhardjo to attend the session. On the 16th Lumbantobing sent a message to vice-President Hatta in Yogyakarta requesting that he too come to Tapanuli to supervise restoration of order. (65)

On the 17th a revolt by anti-government military units, the


(65) Document 83; 3-4. The central Republican government at this stage seems to have been still relatively ignorant of just what had taken place in Tapanuli since September 9. The Republic's Minister of Information, Mr. Mohamad Natsir, is reported in Merdeka of September 20 as stating that the government knew that some disturbances had occurred in Tapanuli but had no detailed information.
Musso-led PKI and FDR led by Amir Sjarifudin exploded at Madiun in East Java. (66) News of the rebellion had reached Tapanuli by the 20th. Next day the Sumatra FDR in Bukittinggi issued a statement calling upon all Republican organizations to maintain peace and unity. (67) On the 25th, it issued a further statement announcing complete support for Sukarno and Hatta-government in Java. (68) By the 27th other statements declaring loyalty to Sukarno and Hatta had been issued by the Sumatra leadership councils for the PKI, Pesindo, Partai Buruh, PNI and Partai Sosialis. (69) Shortly afterwards, Hasan, as Kompempus, instructed Resident Lumbantobing that, in view of the opposition to the Madiun rebellion by the FDR parties in Sumatra, no action should be taken against the FDR or its constituent organizations in Tapanuli in reprisal for Madiun. (70)

In the meantime a three-member delegation representing the

(66) See Reid (1974); 136-47. Also, George Kahin (1952); 268-303.

(67) Waspada 24 September 1948. The Sumatra FDR had been formed in Bukittinggi as an alliance of the PKI, Partai Sosialis, Pesindo and Partai Buruh, under the chairmanship of Xarim M.S. The Sumatran organization, however, remained quite separate from that on Java. Following Musso's return to Indonesia in early August, the Sumatra FDR consistently refused to participate in the plans for a revolutionary seizure of power being drawn up by Musso and Amir Sjarifudin in Java. By the time of the Madiun rebellion, the Sumatra FDR had broken completely with the Musso-Amir group.

(68) Waspada 29 September 1948.

(69) Waspada 23 & 29 September, 2 October 1948.

Kompempus and the TNI Sumatra Command - consisting of the West Sumatra Resident, Muljohardjo, the Sumatera Timur Resident, Abu Bakar Djaar, and the head of the Bureau for Lasykar Coordination within the TNI command, Lt. Col. Sjarif Usman - had arrived in Sibolga to investigate the September 10 Affair and attend the Tapanuli DPR session on the 30th.

The events in Tapanuli between September 9 and 13 had taken place quite independently of the Madiun rebellion. While the September 10 Affair had been prompted by opposition to policies initiated by the Hatta-government in Java, it had absolutely no causal connection with the plans for rebellion then being drawn up in Java by Musso, Sjarifudin and others.

Nevertheless, there was a strong ideological aspect to the opposition to rasionalisasi in Tapanuli, which had its equivalent in the Madiun rebellion. Those who promoted and implemented the September 10 Affair - Pane, Malao, Bedjo, Pajung Bangun and Saragiras - had all been in the forefront of the Social Revolution in Sumatera Timur. They were all committed to a vague sort of proletarianism. As much as they saw rasionalisasi as a threat to their particular political and economic interests, they perceived it also as a policy aimed at destroying the popular forces of the National Revolution. The chief implementers of rasionalisasi in Tapanuli, Gindo Siregar and Abas, they regarded as part of that pre-War, pro-
Dutch elite who had stood in the way of the Social Revolution.

Closely associated with these military commanders were individuals from that small group of neo-Marxist politicians from the PKI, PNI and Pesindo who also had been deeply involved in the Social Revolution of 1946. In North Tapanuli, the former Sumatera Timur Resident, Junus Nasution (who had been released from detention shortly before the Dutch military action) and the PKI Zasykar commander and former bupati of Simalungun, Urbanus Pardede, had become influential advisors to Timur Pane. Along with Pane, they exerted much influence within the hierarchy of the Brigade Banteng Negara. In South Tapanuli, Jakub Siregar, Saleh Umar and Natar Zainuddin were all important advisors to Bedjo, Pajung Bangun and Saragiras.

But to see this ideological aspect of the anti-rasionalismasi movement which linked social revolutionary-oriented politicians and Zasykar commanders as constituting evidence of some kind of direct link between the September 10 Affair and the Madiun revolt, is to construct a conspiracy theory that ignores both the realities of poor communications between Tapanuli and Java and the extent to which local issues and local interests dominated the internal politics of the Republic in Tapanuli at the time. (71) Even as the Madiun rebellion was under way

(71) Dutch military intelligence at the time did construct just
those local issues of factional conflict continued to be the dominant reality in Tapanuli. (72)

With the threat of rationalization removed, following the arrests of Gindo Siregar and Abas, the factional conflict returned to fundamentals: the conflicts of ethnic, religious and regional loyalties. On September 25 a congress of the Tarutung branch of the Indonesian Women's Association (*Per-satuan Wanita Indonesia*) - PWI - addressed a resolution to the central Republican government asking that Bedjo be made to surrender all those arrested since September 10 to proper judicial authorities. The resolution went on to request that the government create a properly disciplined army, which would cease interfering in civilian affairs. On the same day Resident Lumbantobing had a meeting with the commanders of the two surviving military forces in North Tapanuli - Malao and Colonel Simandjuntak of the ALRI unit in Sibolga. At the same time Suhardjo in Bukittinggi announced his acceptance of Bedjo's and Saragiras' "reorganization" of the Komando Territorium such a conspiracy theory, arguing that the September 10 Affair was a planned prelude to the Madiun revolt and that together the two events constituted part of a larger Communist-led revolution. Document 80; 13-21. The theory, however, remains unevidenced and unconvincing. (72) The Madiun rebellion did serve to intensify ideological polarization within the Republic in North Sumatra in the longer term. See note 134 below.
Tapanuli/Sumatera Timur Selatan, thus giving implied recognition to Bedjo as acting commander of military forces in the region. (73)

A deep gulf now separated conflicting Toba and non-Toba interests. In North Tapanuli Toba Batak fears of political control of the residency falling into the hands of outsiders increased still further. Bedjo's takeover of the territorial command and Suhardjo's support for this action brought a rapid spread of Toba chauvinism, especially anti-Javanses sentiments, through North Tapanuli. Toba politicians, including Resident Lumbantobing, openly threw their support behind the Brigade Banteng Negara to protect Toba interests. In reaction Suhardjo, Bedjo and Saragiras became further convinced they had to protect the National Revolution against Toba provincialism. (74)

On September 28 units of the Brigade Banteng Negara in Balige and Porsea, under the overall command of Matteus Sihombing, (75) attacked and disarmed units of brigades A and B in those towns. Simultaneously a military police unit from Brigade

(75) Sihombing, like Pane, had acquired a considerable reputation for ferocity and ruthlessness as a laisykar commander in Sumatera Timur.
A in Tarutung was also disarmed by the Banteng Negara. (76) The following day Pajung Bangun informed Resident Lumbantobing from Sipirok that he would if necessary avenge the Brigade A soldiers killed in the attacks by destroying Tapanuli in a sea of flames. (77)

With the threat of full-scale war looming larger daily, the Tapanuli DPR convened in Sibolga on September 30. Resident Lumbantobing read out the threat from Pajung Bangun. A number of North Tapanuli representatives made speeches attacking the civilian and military authorities in Bukittinggi for permitting the civil government in Tapanuli to be usurped by warlords. Eventually the session concluded with approval of a resolution requesting the central government to bring the TNI in Tapanuli under civilian government control. (78) The next day Resident Lumbantobing installed a special commission headed by Suhardjo’s special representative in Tapanuli, Col. Sjarif Usman, and including both himself and Resident Abu Bakar Djaar, to plan a reorganization of the TNI in Tapanuli. (79)

(77) Document 500; 11.
It was too late, however. On October 3 Sipirok was attacked and occupied by a large Banteng Negara force under Malao and Sihombing. The same day Tarutung, Siborongborong, Balige and Porsea were attacked and occupied by Bedjo's forces. (80) The Banteng Negara was cut off in the Sipirok region. Bedjo transferred his headquarters (as TNI commander for Tapanuli) to Sibolga. From Bukittinggi, General Suhardjo ordered Lumbantobing and Bedjo to arrange a ceasefire, adding that representatives of the central government would arrive shortly in Tapanuli. (81) Meanwhile, the Banteng Negara withdrew from Sipirok and began regrouping in the region around Tarutung in preparation for a counter-attack.

During the next two months Tapanuli was rent by a civil war, as the Banteng Negara and the brigades A and B fought


According to Dutch sources, the day before the Tapanuli DPR session Bedjo had met Malao and Sihombing in Balige where he agreed to support a Banteng Negara attack on the Brigade A base at Sipirok. It was, however, a tactical ploy by Bedjo in that he took advantage of the movement of the Banteng Negara units to Sipirok to occupy the North Tapanuli towns. Document 500; 10 and Document 84; 4.

I have been unable to satisfactorily confirm or deny the accuracy of this report. Nevertheless, the simultaneous timing of the Banteng Negara and Brigade B attacks does tend to suggest that Bedjo had been especially well informed about the Banteng Negara plans.

each other in a savage struggle.

Bitter fighting followed around Tarutung, Sibolga and Sipirok; what one writer calls 'a torrent of blood and a feast of death'. In a sense the pattern of the 1946 clash was repeated; what began as a social or ideological conflict developed into an inter-ethnic one. The Toba-Bataks rallied to Malau. (82)

On October 10 *Banteng Negara* forces attacked and recaptured Tarutung, Balige and Porsea, forcing the *Brigade B* to retreat into South Tapanuli. In Dairi, Selamat Gintings' *Napindo Halilintar* now entered the conflict. *Halilintar* units moved into Sidikalang and disarmed a small *Brigade B* unit which had been posted there shortly after Bedjo's assumption of the territorial command. Gintings then despatched a *Halilintar* unit to Siborongborong to support the *Banteng Negara*. (83) On the 15th a

(82) Castles (1974); 78. In January 1949 the head of the District Court in Tarutung, Mr. Bernhard Siregar (a brother of Dr. Gindo Siregar) told the head of the Dutch military administration in Tapanuli that most Toba politicians and civil servants had a great deal of admiration for Malao because he had "saved" them from Bedjo. Document 606, 15 January 1949.

(83) Document 91; 1. Document 90; 2. Document 630; 1. Document 631; 2. Gintings' decision to support the *Banteng Negara* had come after a brief flirtation with the Bedjo forces. Following Bedjo's takeover of the Tapanuli command, Gintings had sent representatives (led by his deputy, Ulung Sitepu) to Padang Sidempuan for discussions about the possibility of an alliance with brigades A and B. Eventually he decided against it. The main reason seems to have been a long-standing dispute with Saragiras and Pajung Bangun. In July 1947 Gintings had refused to join the then newly-formed *Brigade A* because of opposition to what he considered to be terroristic activities by the BHL units led by Saragiras and Bangun. This enmity had grown during the latter part of 1947.

Over the next few days violent fighting took place in the Tarutung-Sibolga-Sipirok triangle. Brigades A and B briefly reoccupied Tarutung but were driven out again. The Banteng Negara launched heavy attacks against its opponents in the Sipirok region. This brought Brigade B units from Sumatera Timur Selatan (led by Abdul Manaf Lubis and Sukardi) into South Tapanuli as reinforcements. But by the 19th heavy casualties on both sides had forced a halt to the fighting. The tactical situation had returned to taws with the two sides once again facing each other across a line broadly dividing North from South Tapanuli.

From Tarutung the Banteng Negara command sent messages to the Ministry of Defence in Java accusing brigades A and B of deliberately fomenting chaos in Tapanuli, with the support of Suhardjo. The wedana of Tarutung, Tagor Lumbantobing, when both the Halilintar and Brigade A were operating in Tanah Karo. Document 628; 2 and Document 630; 2.


(85) The impression gained from informants is that perhaps two to three hundred persons were killed and wounded in the fighting during the first two weeks of October, including civilian non-combatants.
informed Bukittinggi that a Gerakan Rakjat (Popular Movement) in North Tapanuli had already joined the battle against Bedjo, Saragiras and Pajung Bangun. (86) From Padang Sidempuan the joint Brigade A and B field command sent despatches to the Defence Ministry attacking the Banteng Negara as undisciplined troublemakers and accusing Resident Lumbantobing of deliberately supporting them for his own reasons. (87) Bedjo, meanwhile, had sent Gindo Siregar, Mr. Abas and a number of others arrested during the September 10 Affair to Bukittinggi under military escort. There, Suhardjo had them placed under house arrest pending examination of the charges against them. (88)

On October 26 Suhardjo, Hasan and a party of about thirty senior government officials and TNI officers arrived Padang Sidempuan. (89) Lumbantobing remained in Sibolga, making

(86) Tagor Lumbantobing, a former schoolteacher, was Chairman of the Silindung branch of the PNI and editor of the party's weekly newspaper Soeara Rakjat. The Gerakan Rakjat was centered upon local branches of the PNI and Parkindo and pemuda and women's groups in the Tarutung region. It soon took over the task of organizing the provision of supplies (food etc.) to the regrouping Banteng Negara units. Document 500; 13. Document 89; 4. Document 90; 2-4.

(87) Document 500; 13.


(89) Waspada 30 October 1948. Hatta had already intervened from Yogyakarta, instructing Suhardjo and Hasan to take immediate steps to restore order in Tapanuli and informing them that he would soon lead a central government delegation to Sumatra. Suhardjo passed on the instructions to Resident Lumbantobing
his position in the conflict perfectly clear by sending an open letter to Bedjo accusing him of failing to obey earlier ceasefire orders from both himself and Suhardjo and ordering him to cease all military operations immediately and not to re-enter Sibolga. The letter, printed in broadsheet form with a leader in heavy type reading "BEDJO AND ASSOCIATES. Continuing to turn Tapanuli into a Sea of Fire and Blood" (BEDJO C.S. Tetap Bertindak mendjadikan Tapanuli Lautan Api dan Darah), was publicly distributed in Sibolga and Tarutung. (90)

Bedjo's response was to launch another attack on Sibolga. Resident Lumbantobing and the Banteng Negara were forced to retreat to Tarutung and the Brigade B once again occupied the town. (91) Next day Suhardjo and Hasan accompanied Bedjo to Sibolga. From there the former went on to Tarutung to discuss a ceasefire with Lumbantobing.

Returning to Sibolga on the 30th Suhardjo announced another reorganization of the Tapanuli/South Sumatera Timur

and to Bedjo. Letter from Lumbantobing to Bedjo cited in Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 174-5. Also, Document 92; 2 and Document 632; 1.

(90) Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 174-5. A photograph of the broadsheet reproduction of Lumbantobing's letter to Bedjo appears on page 177 of this book.

(91) Ibid.; 176. Kadiran (1971); 36.
territorial command. Announcing that he was taking over as territorial commander himself, he appointed two prominent civilian politicians - the former Deputy Resident for Tapanuli, Abdul Hakim and Raja Barita Sinambela - as Deputy Commanders. Hakim and Sinambela were given the honorary rank of Lieutenant Colonel. In addition a nine-member staff command council was appointed, consisting of seven officers from the TNI Sumatra High Command together with Bedjo and the commander of the former Brigade XI battalion in Sibolga, Captain Oloan Sarumpaet. Finally Suhardjo ordered the Brigade B to withdraw at least 15 kilometers from Sibolga and the Banteng Negara to remain at least 40 kilometers from that city.

There were two main reasons behind the command changes. First, they aimed at excluding the Banteng Negara from the territorial command; hence the appointment of Oloan Sarumpaet to the staff command council rather than Malao. Second, Suhardjo was trying to assuage both North and South Tapanuli ethnic sensitivities by appointing Hakim and Sinambela as

---

(92) At the time of the command changes Hakim was a senior advisor to Resident Lumbantobing and Sinambela was a member of the executive council to the Military Governor for Tapanuli/Sumatera Timur Selatan. The latter's position had, of course, been defunct since the arrest of Gindo Siregar and Abas in September.

deputy commanders. Hakim, a leading figure in the Masyumi, commanded considerable support in South Tapanuli, having long been regarded by most political groups there as the alternative Resident. Sinambela was still the most prominent adat leader in North Tapanuli.

Whatever Suhardjo's intentions, the reorganization of the territorial command did nothing towards ending the state of civil war. On the contrary, the ethnic-regional divisions between North and South Tapanuli hardened still further. In the North, the major political parties - Parkindo, PNI, Pesindo, PSI and several minor ones (including Masyumi) issued a joint statement attacking Bedjo for having deliberately promoted civil strife between Javanese and Tapanuli Bataks. In the South both the PNI and Masyumi came out openly in support of Bedjo. (94) Resident Lumbantobing, two of whose sons had been arrested by the Brigade B in Sibolga, informed Suhardjo that he would not return to Sibolga for negotiations until Bedjo's forces had left the city. (95) Meanwhile, the TNI Command in Bukittinggi had further exacerbated the situation by issuing a statement praising Bedjo for having worked to "restore order and peace" in Tapanuli. (96) Lumbantobing protested directly to

(94) See Waspada 2 November 1948. Also, Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 176.
(96) Waspada 6 November 1948.
Yogyakarta about Suhardjo's actions and again requested central government intervention against brigades A and B. (97)

By the beginning of November both competing military forces, Banteng Negara and brigades A and B, were engaged in an energetic recruitment of additional manpower. In North Tapanuli the Brigade Banteng Negara, for long considerably weaker in manpower than the combined strength of brigades A and B, (98) found hundreds of eager new recruits among Toba pemudas anxious to help defend their ethnic homeland against the invading outsiders. Toba provincialism, so long the main rationale used by Bedjo and Suhardjo to justify the operations of brigades A and B, was now a real force helping to swell the ranks of the Banteng Negara. At the same time though, support for brigades A and B from the various political organizations in South Tapanuli brought new recruits into the ranks of those units.

Barely a week after Suhardjo had announced his reorganization of the territorial command, fighting broke out again. The Brigade B withdrew from Sibolga, in compliance with Suhardjo's


(98) Dutch sources estimated that as at the end of September 1948 the strength of the Toba units (Banteng Negara and Brigade XI) was approximately 2,300 and that of the brigades A and B was approximately 3,600. Document 89; 2-3.
instruction, but, instead of retreating south, it moved north attacking Bangeng Negara positions on the road between Sibolga and Tarutung. At the same time the Banteng Negara attacked Brigade A positions just north of Sipirok. On November 7, one day after Suhardjo and Hasan had returned to Bukittinggi, Malao's forces once more occupied Sibolga. Brigades A and B again retreated back to South Tapanuli. During the next fortnight fierce fighting took place in the Batang Toru region between Sibolga and Padang Sidempuan, again with heavy casualties on both sides.

The civil war had now reached crisis proportions. Suhardjo, in the face of what was virtually total opposition from the Toba communities in the North, had lost control of the situation. He was now a stimulus to further conflict rather than a focus for reconciliation. As a result Hatta and Nasution intervened once again. Suhardjo was promoted to become Inspector-General of the TNI in Yogyakarta and replaced by Col. Raden Hidajat, like Kawilarang, a Siliwangi staff officer and close colleague of Nasution. At the same time Kawilarang left Java to take

(102) Hidajat, a Sundanese, also was a graduate of the Breda
up his appointment as Tapanuli/Sumatera Timur Selatan commander.

Kawilarang arrived in Sibolga on November 11. There over the next few days negotiations took place involving Resident Lumbantobing (who had returned to Sibolga following the withdrawal of Brigade B), Suhardjo (who returned there on the 15th), Governor Amin, Abdul Hakim and Raja Barita Sinambela. (103) On the 19th Hatta and Hidajat reached Bukittinggi. As if to mark the occasion the Brigade B attacked and re-occupied Sibolga. On the 22nd Hatta and his party reached Padang Sidempuan. (104) Accompanied by Bedjo, Hatta went immediately to Sibolga, after ordering a ceasefire in Tapanuli. (105) There he convened a peace conference between Resident Lumbantobing, Bedjo, Kawilarang and the leader of the Tarutung-based Gerakan Rakjat, Tagor Lumbantobing. (106)

academy, receiving his commission as a lieutenant in the KNIL just before the Japanese occupation. He too was a strong supporter of the Nasution plan for a mobile, professional army.


(105) The text of Hatta's ceasefire order, in Dutch translation, is given in Document 79; Vertaling I.

The rival parties agreed to a ceasefire\(^{(107)}\) and yet another reorganization of the territorial command. Hatta announced that Tapanuli and Sumatera Timur Selatan would constitute the Komando Sub-Territorium VII (VIIth sub-Territory Command) under Kawilarang with Major Ibrahim Adjie as his deputy.\(^{(108)}\) The crux of the ceasefire agreement was the allocation of specific regions (Sektor) to each of the major military forces. Brigades A and B were given responsibility for the defence of South Tapanuli and Sumatera Timur Selatan. The Toba and Sibolga regions of North Tapanuli were placed under the Banteng Negara and the ex-Brigade XI. Dairi was designated as Napindo Halilintar territory.\(^{(109)}\)

Bedjo withdrew his forces from Sibolga and the Banteng Negara troops withdrew from the Sipirok region. Kawilarang then set up the sub-territorium headquarters in Sibolga.

---

attend the conference, remaining in Tarutung instead.

\(^{(107)}\) \textit{Waspada} 24 November 1948.

\(^{(108)}\) Document 79; Vertaling II.

Hatta, who had returned to Java immediately after the ceasefire agreement, announced from Yogyakarta that the conflicts in Tapanuli had now been settled. They had had nothing to do with the Madiun rebellion, he stressed. (110)

From Bukittinggi, Hidajat announced that a "rationalization" of both government and military had taken place in Tapanuli/Sumatera Timur Selatan, that "undesirable incidents" had now been checked and that the "fighting forces, police, political parties and the people will act to wipe out destructive elements." (111)

But the "rationalization" that had been effected bore no relationship to the earlier plans of Hatta and Nasution. On the contrary, settlement of the civil war had been achieved by official recognition of the endemic condition of warlordism rather than through the exercise of government control over military commanders. The ceasefire had been arrived at by an official recognition of disunity, via the allocation of separate territorial spheres of influence: those of the three premier warlords - Selamat Gintings, Malao and Bedjo.

Three effects of the recent conflicts predominate. Firstly, civilian government at the regional and local levels had been

(110) Waspada 27 November 1948.
(111) Waspada 29 November 1948.
subordinated to the powerful military units. Secondly, the
pre-War indigenous elite, the Dutch-trained civil servants
and the hereditary chiefs, had been reduced to a subordinate
position in the course of what had become an important class
conflict. To this extent

Leadership had passed to men of humble origin like
Bedjo and Malau who had won their spurs in the pol-
tical cockpit of East Sumatra. (112)

Thirdly, there was the continuation of ethnic conflict, esp-
esially that of Toba against non-Toba.

On three occasions in three separate districts, when
interscine fighting reached a peak, it can be seen
that the lines were drawn, crudely speaking, Toba
versus non-Toba. In 1946 the largely Toba Tapanuli
TRI clashed with the Karo and Aceh forces around
Sidikalang in the north. In 1947 the largely Toba
lasykar force of Timur Pane seized and then lost the
region of Asahan-Labuhan Batu to the east with its
mainly Malay and Javanese population. Finally in
1948 the almost wholly Toba forces of Liberty Malau
clashed with the mainly non-Toba Brigades B and A,
mainly along the southern borders of the Toba-Batak
homeland. (113)

(112) Castles (1974); 79. The head of the Dutch military ad-
ministration in Tapanuli in 1949, F.P. Heckman, reported
in January that in the Sipirok-Padang Sidempuan region
the hereditary kuria chiefs had already lost all autho-
ritv, were "deeply demoralized" and "feared for their

(113) Castles (1974); 79-80. Castles also refers to the impor-
tance of the lasykar rakyat versus TNI aspect of the civil
war. This was undoubtedly an important factor motivating
the original decision by the Sumatra TNI command in late
1947 to initiate the conflict between Bedjo and Timur Pane.
However, by mid-1948 it had virtually disappeared as a
determinant in the civil war. Especially indicative of
this were the alliances established between Suhardjo and
Bedjo and between the Brigade Banteng Negara and the TNI
The events of 1948 in Tapanuli, particularly the class conflict aspect, had also spurred a sudden growth during October and November of the *Negara Tapanuli* movement; both its organized base in the NST and its 'underground' extension within Tapanuli itself. The former colonial civil servants and local chieftains who had fled the internecine conflicts between April and November 1948 to seek refuge in the NST added their voices to the demands for Dutch military intervention in Tapanuli. Others who remained in Tapanuli were convinced now that the Republic promised only destruction of the traditional social order which only Dutch intervention could prevent.

By October those refugees from the internecine conflict in Tapanuli who had been victims of the purges carried out by brigades A and B in the South had begun to add their weight to the *Negara Tapanuli* movement in the NST. Several local South Tapanuli chieftains and their families who had fled to the NST during 1948 joined members from the royal families of Kotapinang, Kualuh and Bilah (to whom they were related) in urging Dutch military occupation of Tapanuli.

*Brigade XI.* By the end of 1948 both Bedjo and Malao clearly viewed themselves as fully-fledged members of the TNI. It was about a year later before the contrary self-perceptions of TNI and *lasykar* identity re-surfaced into open conflict in Tapanuli when Bedjo moved to clean up the ex-BHL units led by his former ally Saragiras.
On 15 October 1948 several of this group presented the Crown Commissioner in Medan with a long indictment of political developments in Tapanuli under the Republic. They demanded that Tapanuli be removed from Republican control and made an autonomous state within the federal Indonesian state.

Chief petitioners were: the kuria chief of Aek Nangali, Sutan Mulia Radja; the eldest son of the lu hak chief for Hadjaran, Amir Siregar; the eldest son of the lu hak chief for Portibi, Parmohonan Harahap; a cousin of the Sultan of Kotapinang, Tengku Hermaja; a cousin of the Sultan of Kualuh, Tengku Ishak; and a son of the Sultan of Bilah, Tengku Amirsjah.

The petition marked an increase in pressure from community leaders inside Tapanuli for Dutch intervention against the Republic there. The petition, moreover, is revealing in the class-determined views of the recent events in Tapanuli taken by the petitioners. Recent developments in Tapanuli, they asserted, had placed "civil servants", the "upper classes" and all "right-thinking" elements among the population in great danger because control of the residency had fallen into the hands of "criminal" and "Communist"-oriented groups. For

(114) Document 567. Sutan Mulia Radja had fled to the NST on 12 May 1948. Amir Siregar and Parmohonan Harahap had done the same on September 5. Tengku Hermaja had been imprisoned during the Social Revolution and was not released until the Dutch military action in July 1947. Tengku Ishak had fled to Malaya during the Social Revolution, returning to Sumatera Timur at the end of May 1947.
this reason, they pleaded, Dutch intervention, for the purpose of setting up a (Tapanuli) state, was a matter of great urgency and would be applauded by the Tapanuli people. Should the Dutch be unable to carry out such military operations themselves, the report went on, they should train an "army" of anti-Republican Tapanuli Bataks which could invade Tapanuli and restore order there. This request, the report concluded,

is not an act of treason against Indonesian nationalism but a sensible request for Dutch assistance against political bandits and adventurers, to benefit the Indonesian people themselves. (115)

On October 20 Raja Iskandar Tampubolon submitted another petition to the Crown Commissioner in Medan, this time on behalf of Perta, also requesting Dutch military intervention in Tapanuli in order to establish the Negara Tapanuli. (116)

Earlier in the month, the Rapolsum, M.A. Los, had suggested that the Dutch authorities extend full support to the Negara Tapanuli movement because the people behind the movement, such as the Batak adat chiefs, including Raja Barita Sinambela, were

(115) ibid.

(116) Both petitions calling for Dutch intervention were supported by the Sultan of Asahan. In reply the Crown Commissioner told Raja Iskandar that there were major international obstacles to Dutch military intervention in Tapanuli, namely opposition to Dutch policies in Indonesia within the United Nations Organization. Document 130.
eager to restore the *adat*, law and order. (117) The time is now right, Los concluded, for Dutch intervention in Tapanuli.

About the same time Dutch military intelligence were advising that events in Tapanuli had greatly diminished the authority of the Republic there and that, consequently, "circumstances for forming such a *Negara* (Tapanuli) have never been so good." (118)

On November 1 Mulia Radja and the small group of Toba intellectuals in Sumatera Timur opposed to the Republic and associated with *Perta* set up a *Panitia Sementara Tapanoeli* (Provisional Committee for a Tapanuli State) in Medan. (119)

(117) Document 484; 5-6. While Sinambela was still a member of Gindo Siregar's advisory staff, prior to the latter's arrest, Dutch military intelligence in Medan and Jakarta had begun referring to him as a probable *Walinegara* of a future *Negara Tapanuli*. See Documents 352 and 383; 1. There is no evidence to suggest that at this stage Sinambela was directly involved in the *Negara Tapanuli* movement. Nevertheless he was deeply conscious of his pre-eminent position as an *adat* leader in Tapanuli and held fundamental ideals in common with many of those leading that movement. There were good reasons, therefore, for the Dutch and the *Negara Tapanuli* movement leaders to regard Sinambela as a vital figure around whom the movement could mobilize popular support in Tapanuli. Almost by definition Sinambela was a key symbol, a focal point, in the political aims of those prominent Tapanuli Bataks now alienated from the Republic.

(118) Document 90; 5.

(119) Document 131. Other members of the *Panitia Sementara* were: Eduard Nasution (Chairman of *Perta*), Florencius Lumbantobing (Mayor of Siantar), L. Lumbantobing (a schools inspector), Gerhard Silitonga (Vice-Chairman of *Perta*), Raja Iskandar Tampubolon (the former *wedana* of Silindung), M.S. Siagian, I. Pulungan
Three weeks later the Panitia presented the Crown Commissioner in Medan with a "Statement of First Instance" (Pendahoeleean) recognizing Dutch sovereignty over all of Indonesia and requesting Dutch intervention in Tapanuli. The Statement concluded with requests for the creation of a Daerah Istimewa Tapanoeli (Special Region of Tapanuli) and for the reinstatement of all dismissed former colonial civil servants to their pre-war positions. (120)

The introductory paragraphs to the Statement, which announced the establishment and aims of the Provisional Committee (PST) declared that:

Considering the situation, which as time goes on becomes increasingly worse, caused by different kinds of irresponsible actions in our beloved motherland of Tapanuli: banditry, murder, never ending clashes between lasjkers and between lasjkers and the TNI, robbery by those who desire to seize popular leadership, threats against the intelligentsia and legitimate members of the government - we the undersigned, as citizens of Tapanuli living in the Negara Soematera Timoor, have come to the conclusion from the above that this suddenly prevalent evil condition cannot be permitted to spread further.

Without qualification we hereby declare that we too desire national independence, but that which is evident now in Tapanuli has no connection with such honourable ideals; on the contrary, it points to a revolution 'which consumes its own', one carried out by a power-

and F. Hutagalung (Secretary of Perta). Nasution and Florencius Lumbantobing had been signatories to the petition to the Recomba in August 1947 requesting Dutch intervention in Tapanuli.

(120) Document 414.
hungry, fascist-oriented group for whom terrorising the people is normal behaviour. (121)

This and the third of four "Aims" (Toedjoean) of the PST say much about the leaders' motives behind the Negara Tapanuli movement. That third aim called for:

The restoration of all civil servants who were in employment as at January 1942. (122)

The Statement was, in other words, a call for the restoration of the pre-War status quo in Tapanuli.

In contrast to the earlier enthusiasm of the Rapolsum for the Negara Tapanuli movement, the Crown Commissioner for the NST, Mr. Brouwer, advised against immediate recognition of the PST because there was no indication of what degree of popular support its leaders could command in Tapanuli, and also because the composition of the Committee (eight Toba and one Mandailing) pointed to the still unresolved conflict between North and South Tapanuli. Nevertheless, Brouwer added, the anti-Bedjo Gerakan Rakjat in Tarutung, led by Tagor Lumbantobing, was a useful medium through which a Negara Tapanuli headed by Raja Barita Sinambela (as Walinegara) might be constructed. (123)

(121) ibid.

(122) ibid.

(123) Document 131. In the wake of the civil war in Tapanuli, the Dutch authorities in Sumatra were now eager to promote an anti-Republic movement there, along the lines of the Comite DIST. Document 484A.
Notwithstanding Dutch hopes for the emergence of a viable alternative political leadership in Tapanuli to that of the Republic, this had not eventuated. The civil war may have seriously weakened Republican leadership in Tapanuli but it had not to any significant degree undermined popular support for the Republic itself there. Despite the violence of the internecine conflicts the overwhelming majority of the population in Tapanuli still regarded the Republic as preferable to a restoration of Dutch hegemony, no matter how temporary. The social and political changes that had resulted from the conflicts of 1948, especially the removal of many hereditary chiefs, had after all opened up a degree of social mobility that had never existed before, certainly not under pre-War Dutch colonial rule. (124)

There are two important aspects of the 1948 period which bear vitally upon the course of the Revolution as a whole and upon its immediate aftermath. First, was the enormous expansion in the barter trade system during 1948: stimulated by the growing needs of the Republican military forces, the increased competition between military units and the further consolidation

(124) In mid-January 1949 the head of the Dutch military administration in Tapanuli commented that the influence of the Republican period in Tapanuli should not be under-estimated, to the extent that it provided opportunities for people to break free from adat bonds and become more socially and economically mobile, particularly in South Tapanuli. Document 607; 4.
of military government. Second, was a revival of Acehnese versus Tapanuli regional hostilities brought about by the incorporation of the two residencies into the new province of North Sumatra.

By mid-1948 huge quantities of goods were being shifted along the barter trade networks in and out of Langsa, Labuhan Bilik, Sibolga, Penang and Singapore. Hundreds of boats - small diesel freighters, motorised junks, speedboats and even sailing vessels - were now working the trade, making a mockery of Dutch attempts to impose a naval blockade on the Malacca Straits. (125) From Labuhan Bilik, brigades A and B operated a barter trade economy that now linked Singapore with Bukittinggi via Padang Sidempuan. Hundreds of tons of goods - rice from South Tapanuli, rubber and palm oil from South Sumatera Timur - flowed out from Labuhan Bilik. (126) From Sibolga, the brigades Banteng Negara and XI built up exports of rubber and copra. From Langsa, Nip Xarim's unit in particular expanded its trading operations considerably. So too did the Napindo Halilintar in Dairi, which, by late 1948, was exporting agricultural products from Dairi and western Tanah Karo to Penang via Langsa.

(125) Document 528; 6 and Document 531; 2-3.
A noticeable feature of this barter trade growth was the number of Republican military commanders and civil servants who moved into full-time trading activities, several setting themselves up in business in Penang or Singapore. (127) There were now big profits to be made. Even though the bulk of the profits out of the trade continued to flow to the Chinese traders in Sumatra, Malaya and Singapore, many of the new Indonesian traders became rich men during 1948. Those who led the several *de facto* regional military governments, controlling virtually all the territory of Tapanuli and Sumatera

(127) The reports of the Netherlands Consulate General in Singapore (Document 107) provide some interesting sketches. Report No. 100 (21 April 1948) refers to Usman Effendi, the former *wedana* of Panai, having organized the export of 6,000 tons of rubber from Labuhan Bilik. Report No. 130 (8 June 1948) refers to a former *lasykar* commander in Labuhan Batu named Aminullah arriving in Singapore in January 1948 with a boat load of 100 tons of rubber which he sold, then established himself in business and began exporting dismantled trucks to Labuhan Bilik. See also Document 110. Report No. 133 (18 June 1948) refers to a former *Pesindo* commander in Sumatera Timur, Abubakar Lumbantobing (a nephew of the NST Mayor of Siantar), running a "Sumatra Star Trading Coy." in Singapore which was doing business with the *Brigade B*. Reports Nos. 154 & 156 (13 & 25 August 1948) refer to the former Director of the *Bank Dagang Nasional Indonesia* in Medan, Elias Sutan Pangeran (now on the leadership council of the *Front Nasional*), having opened a branch of the *Bank Dagang* in Penang, with a capital of 350,000 Straits dollars, in partnership with the "Mahruzar Trading Company." In January 1949 the *Bank Dagang Nasional* in Penang is reported to have set up an "Indonesia Trading Company" (INCO) there for the specific purpose of supplying Republican units in Aceh. Document 107, No. 20/1949. At the beginning of December 1948 a total of 20 "active Indonesian trading enterprises" were reported in Kota Penang.  Document 107, No. 200/1948.
Timur outside the NST, had built their fiefdoms upon this rapidly expanding trade. The barter trade was now supplying their units with big quantities of arms and equipment. (128)

The other important development within the Republic during 1948 took place parallel with and subsequent to the military conflicts. This concerned the effect upon inter-ethnic relations of the incorporation of Aceh, Tapanuli and Sumatera Timur into the Province of North Sumatra. Basically this brought a revival of Acehnese versus Toba hostilities. Immediately following the installation of Mr. S.M. Amin as Governor of the new province, on June 19, the question of which city - Sibolga or Kutaraja - would be the temporary capital of the province (during the occupation of Medan by the NST) became a major issue of debate. Acehnese and Tapanuli politicians quickly lined up in opposing camps on the issue. (129)

(128) Document 107, Nos. 18, 22, 40, 44, 85, 91 and 197/1948 (16 January - 20 November 1948). These reports refer to: the "Mahruraz Trading Company" transporting rubber from Langsa to Penang and Singapore and trucks, jeeps, diesel motors and radio transmitters in return; to agents of "Timur Pane" (this seems to refer to Bedjo) in Labuhan Bilik and of Sorta Lumbantobing in Singapore transporting rubber and palm oil from Labuhan Bilik for sale in Singapore; and to the wedana of Panai, Usman Effendi, trading between Labuhan Bilik and Singapore. Report No. 197 quotes the following market prices for British weapons in Singapore (in Straits dollars): rifles - $150 each, Tommy guns - $330, machine guns - $450 and pistols - $50.

(129) Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 184.
Governor Amin, who remained in Kutaraja, set the dispute in motion by announcing that the DPR for the new province would convene there. (130) Tapanuli politicians countered with demands that Sibolga should be the capital. Just over a month later, on July 26, the Dewan Pimpinan Pemuda Daerah Atjeh (Pemuda Leadership Council for the Aceh Region) added fuel to the dispute by issuing a resolution demanding that Kutaraja should be the temporary provincial capital because it enjoyed greater economic and strategic viability. (131) Two weeks later, however, Hasan (as Kompempus chairman), in the face of strong Tapanuli pressure, announced that the temporary capital would be located at Sibolga. (132) The reaction from Aceh was immediate. On August 14 a resolution by a joint committee of political parties demanded that Acehnese members of the DPR boycott any sessions held in Sibolga. (133)

With the flare up of civil war in Tapanuli between September and November, Tapanuli interest in the issue of the location of the provincial capital receded into the background.

(131) Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 184.
(132) Waspada 13 July 1948. 20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka, vol. 2; 207. Hasan seems to have been concerned to avoid charges that he, as an Acehnese, was promoting Acehnese provincial interests.
(133) Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 184.
Once the Hatta-sponsored settlement had brought the fighting to an end, the dispute re-emerged. Eventually as a compromise Hasan ordered that the first session of the DPR convene at the small town of Tapa'tuan on the southwestern coast of Aceh, halfway between Sibolga and Kutaraja, and that the question of the provincial capital should be decided by the DPR itself.

The DPR session began on December 13, with Governor Amin as chairman. Only 29 of the 45 members were present - 13 from Aceh, 11 from Sumatera Timur and 5 from Tapanuli. (134)

(134) For names of the 45 members, see ibid.; 186. The members of the DPR were appointed as representatives of each of the three residencies, not of political groups. The full breakdown of members was Sumatera Timur 20, Aceh 13 and Tapanuli 12. So far as political affiliation was concerned, of the 29 present at the session 14 were members of the two Islamic parties - Masyumi and PSI!, two were members of Parkindo and 11 were members of non-religious parties and organizations - the PKI, PNI, Pesindo, Partai Sosialis, Sobei and BTI. For the breakdown of these 29 according to residency and party affiliation, see ibid. Two of the Acehnese representatives were not members of any political organization.

The ideological divisions within the DPR emerged most clearly in the election for a five-member DPR executive committee (Badan Pekerdja). This divided members of religious organizations from those of the non-religious ones, cutting across the ethnic and regional divisions. Christian Tobas allied themselves with Moslem Acehnese and Mandailingers to elect a Badan Pekerdja composed of three Masyumi members, one from the PSI! and one from Parkindo. The reason for this seems to lie in the aftermath of the Madiun rebellion which was by now intensifying the Right versus Left polarization (in religious versus secularist terms) of Republican politics in North Sumatra. Those elected to the Badan Pekerdja were: M. Nur Ibrahimi (Masyumi/Aceh), M. Junan Nasution (Masyumi/Sumatera Timur), Jahja Siregar (Masyumi/Tapanuli), Amelz (PSII/Aceh) and Melanthol
The solidarity of the Acehnese minority eventually assured the choice of Kutaraja as provincial capital. (135)

Four days after the DPR session had concluded Dutch forces in the NST, backed by tanks and aircraft, crossed the van Mook line into South Asahan and Labuhan Batu. (136) TNI units retreated into Tapanuli. In quick succession inhabitants of the towns of Merbau, Rantau Prapat, Wingfoot, Negeri Lama and Labuhan Bilik suddenly faced Dutch troops patrolling the streets and Dutch officers occupying what only a few hours earlier had been Republican government and TNI offices. Within twenty four hours Republican control over Sumatera Timur Selatan had virtually ceased to exist. Most senior Republican civil servants had accompanied the TNI units in retreat into Tapanuli.

Siregar (Parkindo/Sumatera Timur). In terms of ethnicity, Ibrahimy and Amelz were Acehnese, Nasution was Mandailing, Jahja Siregar was Angkola and Melanthon Siregar was Toba. Immediately after the election for the Badan Pekerdja had been completed, the FDR grouping led by Xarim M.S. walked out in protest at the refusal of the religious party members to agree to an all-party Badan Pekerdja. ibid. 196.

(135) ibid.; 196-7. The final vote was 14 for Kutaraja against 7 for Sibolga. The vote on the provincial capital had been taken after the FDR faction had walked out of the session.

Four days later, on the 23rd, a strong Dutch armoured force moved out of Prapat and crossed into Tapanuli. Moving swiftly along the main highway to Sibolga, Dutch troops occupied Porsea, Balige, Siborongborong and Tarutung the same day. Surprised by the speed and strength of the attack, the ex-Brigade Banteng Negara units retreated into the countryside; some just south of Balige and others to the west coast of Lake Toba around Dolok Sanggul. The ex-Brigade XI units moved into the Bukit Barisan mountains north and south of Sibolga. Resident Lumbantobing and Kawilarang moved their headquarters to the mountain region of Rimbu Ampolu, about seven kilometers from Sibolga.

Next day, the 24th, the population of Sibolga found themselves under Dutch military occupation. Six days later Dutch units from Sibolga moved south, occupying Batang Toru on the 31st and then Padang Sidempuan on January 2. The brigades A and B retreated, setting up guerilla bases around Sipirok and south of Padang Sidempuan. Before leaving Padang Sidempuan the Brigade B put most of the public buildings to the torch. By January 14, Barus had fallen to the Dutch, then Sidikalang. The Napindo Halilintar moved northwest into southern Aceh. From the main towns, most Republican civil servants accompanied the TNI units into the countryside. In the face of the vastly superior mobility and weaponry Republican units had
abandoned all the major towns of Sumatera Timur Selatan and Tapanuli (excepting Mandailing) to Dutch occupation.

But aside from Dutch superiority in equipment, especially tanks and heavy trucks, to what extent had the internecine conflicts of 1948 contributed to the swiftness of the TNI retreat? The answer must be, a great deal. The TNI in December 1948 was in no condition to offer any coordinated defence. The civil war had produced a deeply factionalized defence system. By the time the Dutch offensive began the TNI in Tapanuli/Sumatera Timur Selatan had become atrophied into several encapsulated, exclusive sector commands, obsessed with their own economic and political interests and mutually suspicious of one another. This was a powerful supplement to the superiority of Dutch military equipment. (137)

(137) The other directly related important question is: to what extent had the internal dissension within the Republic in Tapanuli contributed to the Dutch decision to launch a military offensive at this time? It was partly so in that the Dutch decision to seek a military solution to their conflict with the Republic had been based on an assessment relating to both Java and Sumatra. Thus, the civil war in Tapanuli and the Madiun rebellion were equally contributory factors to the same decision. On the breakdown of the Dutch - Republican negotiations under the Renville Agreement and the Dutch decision on a military solution, see George Kahin (1952); 247-55 & 332-7 and Ray (1967); 125-64.
At Dutch military forces sped through Tapakuli, from the town towns — Forzaa, Belge, Siborongborong, Tarurung, Sibeiga, Siparok, Padang Sidempuan — Republican sympathizers in their thousands moved out. Peasants, politicians, civil servants and ordinary citizens accompanied the TNI into the countryside. (1)

In several towns, especially Siborongborong and Padang Sidempuan, government and other public buildings were set alight by the retreating TNI units. Many were destroyed beyond temporary repair. The arriving Dutch forces were met by extensively damaged government offices, warehouses, market-places, cinemas and schools. The population remaining in the towns consisted mainly of women, old men, very young children, Chinese traders and shops, government and former colonial civil servants — who had been awaiting a restoration of pre-war 'normality'. (2)

On 31 December 1948 the Netherlands Indies (Interim

(1) The Dutch District Administrative Advisor (Plaatselijke Bestuursadviseur) — PBA — Eza Belgie, Woudstra, reported to the newly arrived Territorial Administrative Advisor (Territoriale Bestuursadviseur) — TBA — for Tapakuli, Resident Heckman, that on his, Woudstra’s, arrival in Belgie with the Dutch occupation forces he found the city "deserted" with all republican civil servants gone. Document 606, 4 January 1949.

In mid-January, Heckman himself noted that despite the fact that many of the townpeople had begun returning to Sibolga, about a quarter of the houses in the city were still vacant. Document 606, 15 January 1949.

As Dutch military forces sped through Tapanuli, from the main towns - Porsea, Balige, Siborongborong, Tarutung, Sibolga, Sipirok, Padang Sidempuan - Republican sympathisers in their thousands moved out. Pemudas, politicians, civil servants and ordinary citizens accompanied the TNI into the countryside. (1) In several towns, especially Siborongborong and Padang Sidempuan, government and other public buildings were set alight by the retreating TNI units. Many were destroyed beyond temporary repair. The arriving Dutch forces were met by extensively damaged government offices, warehouses, market-places, cinemas and schools. The population remaining in the towns consisted mainly of women, old men, very young children, Chinese traders and those Indonesians - chiefly merchants and former colonial civil servants - who had been awaiting a restoration of pre-War 'normalcy'. (2)

On 31 December 1948 the Netherlands Indies (Interim

---

(1) The Dutch District Administrative Advisor (Plaatselijke Bestuursadviseur) - PBA - for Balige, Woudstra, reported to the newly arrived Territorial Administrative Advisor (Territoriaal Bestuursadviseur) - TBA - for Tapanuli, Resident Heckman, that on his, Woudstra's, arrival in Balige with the Dutch occupation forces he found the city "deserted" with all Republican civil servants gone. Document 606, 5 January 1949. In mid-January, Heckman himself noted that despite the fact that many of the townspeople had begun returning to Sibolga, about a quarter of the houses in the city were still vacant. Document 606, 15 January 1949.

Federal) government formally incorporated Tapanuli as a "special territory". Civil administration was headed by a Territoriaal Bestuursadviseur (Territorial Administrative Advisor) - TBA, subject to the provisions of the martial law regulations of March 1940. (3) The TBA, with headquarters in Sibolga, was to:

carry out tasks in the area to which he was assigned which, according to laws or administrative regulations, were to be performed by regional or local officials, Recombas, or Chiefs TB. He was further empowered to delegate whichever of these tasks he desired to the personnel of the civil service or to the local administrations. Instructions to the military commanders and to the TBAs called for cooperation between these two in administering the occupied areas. The military commander was to be in control but he was to see that the TBA was aided in any tasks which he had to perform. Such tasks entailed governing the civilian population as required in the light of military operations, reorganizing the civil administration, and issuing instructions to civil officials (except judges) who were engaged in this service. (4)

Beyond the urban enclaves of the TBA, local Republican military administrations consolidated themselves in the countryside, centered upon one or other of the main TNI Sektor and unit commands. (5) They were essentially guerilla (gerilja)

(3) Staatsblad Nos. 316, 317 & 318/1948. See Schiller (1955); 77.

(4) ibid.

administrations, functioning within the territorial confines of the warlord fiefdoms that had emerged out of the internecine conflicts of 1948, bereft of centralized direction.

While the new conditions of Dutch military occupation and the consequent greater pressures for survival turned the primary attentions of the warlords away from their individual and group interests and more towards the common anti-colonial struggle of the Republic for national independence, the long period of internecine conflicts had left its mark. Governmental institutions and authority structures had become severely compartmentalized. Consequently effective coordination of gerilya governments extended little further than the territorial boundaries of the TNI Sektor commands. Even the

in February, Resident Heckman noted that the state of the TBA administration was still "unsatisfactory" since effective TBA authority only extended to a radius of about five kilometers beyond the Dutch-occupied towns during the day and to a radius of barely two kilometers at night. The administration, he remarked, had no permanent contact with the peasantry. Document 606, 20 February 1949.

From the Republican camp, Pajung Bangun noted that in the Padang Lawas/Sipirok region "a (Republican) Military Government was effected by TNI Sektor I Sub-territory VII, in which military organizations and the civil administration were merged." Bangun (1949); 6. In Tanah Karo a kabupaten Emergency Military Government (Pemerintah Pertadbiran Militer Kabupaten Karo) was formed in Tiga Binanga on April 1. It supervised and controlled village and district administrations throughout the Karo highlands. See Gintings (1969); 148-9, 183-4 & 237-9. A photograph of the members of the Tanah Karo emergency government appears in Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 280 and Lukisan Revolusi; 243.
TNI commander Kawilarang and Resident Lumbantobing were themselves constricted by the territorial limits of the Sektor commands within which they had established their gerilya headquarters - Kawilarang in the Alas region of southern Aceh and Lumbantobing in north-central Tapanuli. Both were dependent for their safety upon the Sektor commanders within whose territories they had set up their respective headquarters. So far as the gerilya Republic in Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli was concerned the supervisory authority of both Kawilarang and Resident Lumbantobing during the first half of 1949 was much more symbolic than real. Their authority rested upon their positions as representatives of the Emergency Government of the Republic, now based in Aceh, and upon their function as intermediaries through whom pronouncements of the Emergency Government were transmitted to the several local gerilya governments in the two residencies.

One immediate consequence of the Dutch military occupation of Tapanuli was an expansion of local Republican gerilya

(6) A Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia (Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia) had been formed at Muara Labuh near Bukittinggi on 22 December 1948, two days after the Dutch had occupied Yogyakarta. The Republic's Minister for Economic Affairs, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, took over as Prime Minister of the Emergency Government. Shortly afterwards the government transferred to Kutaraja in Aceh, to escape the Dutch occupation of West Sumatra. Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 256. Propinsi Sumatera Tengah; 170-1. George Kahin (1952); 392. Audrey Kahin (1974); 107.
administrations in Sumatera Timur. A number of the TNI units which had initially moved into Tapanuli from Sumatera Timur in July 1947 now returned to the latter residency to set up guerilla bases in familiar territory. Units from brigades A and B moved back into Simalungun, where they had originally operated as *zasykar rakyat* in 1946, establishing operational bases and setting in motion the formation of local administrations. By mid-March *de facto* Republican village and sub-district administrations were operating in the Prapat, Tiga Dolok and Tanah Jawa regions. (7)

It was in Tanah Karo where the most spectacular resurgence of Republican authority occurred between January and March 1949. Supported and protected by strong forces from Selamat Ginting's *Napindo Halilintar*, which moved from Dairi back into Karo, and Djamin Gintings' Regiment V, which moved back to Karo from southern Aceh, local Republican administrations were in operative control of virtually all of Tanah Karo beyond Kabanjahe and Brastagi. (8) On April 1, an Emergency Military Government for

(7) Bangun (1949); 3-8 and (1950); 2. Also, Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 255.

(8) By February the NST government had acknowledged that a large part of Tanah Karo had been removed from the sphere of its authority and was in effect governed by *de facto* Republican military administrations. Document 22; 13. About a month later the NST government reported that Tanah Karo was the most unsafe territory within the *negara*, adding that the TNI units there had gained a "moral success" and were strongly
Kabupaten Karo was set up in Tiga Binanga. The Karo-based TNI units had even been able to initiate the establishment of gerilya Republican administrations in a number of villages in Langkat, Deli and Serdang, bordering on Tanah Karo. (9) Similar TNI-directed gerilya administrations were also in control of most of the western half of Langkat by March, protected by TNI units operating out of bases in Langsa. (10)

The main institution of gerilya government was that responsible for coordinating civil defence in a particular local region. By March 1949 village-based Peoples' Defence organizations, usually known as Pertahanan Rakjat Semesta - PRS, were functioning throughout Republican-controlled territory in Tapanuli and Sumatera Timur. Headed by the village or negeri chief and directed by the local TNI commander, the PRS organizations provided food, shelter and information to nearby TNI units. Women played an especially vital part in PRS operations, particularly in the transmission of supplies and information from Dutch or NST occupied towns to the gerilya based and supported by the local population. Republican forces, the report continued, walk openly through the markets carrying their weapons and constitute a symbol of the permanence of Republican authority in the region. Document 23; 7.

(9) See Gintings (1969); 111-37. Also, Document 23; 22.

(10) Nip Xarim et. al. (n.d.), vol. 2; 105-8. Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 255.
Letters to friends living in those regions occupied by Dutch troops were always sent in the care of young women. The letters, usually only a single large leaf or small piece of paper, would be carried inside the knot into which the young woman tied her hair. Also by this system, that is via the young women, the guerillas would acquire needed supplies from the Dutch occupied areas. Letters were always being sent in this manner to Sibolangit, a small town on the Brastagi-Medan highway, where the Friday market-day would find the town seething with humanity. ... People came to sell as well as to buy goods. There were those who came to meet friends and relatives. The coffee shops were packed with customers. Our guerillas too would sit around there and our supporters would be active. Young women came and went, buying supplies needed by our guerillas.

Information collected by the PRS proved invaluable in enabling Republican units to evade attacks by Dutch forces into the Republican-controlled countryside, as well as in assisting Republican units to ambush Dutch patrols and to attack or sabotage Dutch or NST controlled installations in the towns and on plantations. Also, via the PRS networks anti-Dutch/NST and pro-Republic propaganda was circulated through the occupied areas. Pamphlets were stuck on trees, houses and in market places. Circulars were passed from hand to hand calling for support for the Republic and for Indonesian independence, calling for attacks on Dutch and NST officials, and frequently naming Indonesian "collaborators" against whom retribution should be taken. In many areas of Tapanuli and

(11) (1969); 256.
Sumatera Timur anti-Dutch/NST sabotage groups were organized within the local PRS, or operated in close concert. (12)

All the gerilya administrations were well supplied with information about political developments both in Sumatra and Java. Most sektor and sub-sektor commands had powerful radio receivers (Japanese, British or Dutch) with which they could pick up transmissions from Medan, Siantar, Sibolga and even Jakarta. News of important developments—preparations by the Dutch for establishing a federal Indonesian state, the Netherlands-Republican ceasefire agreements and the return of the national Republican government to Yogyakarta at the beginning of July—were known at the main gerilya headquarters in Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli within days of the events in question having taken place. Via PRS courier networks, information from newspapers, TBA and NST government decrees as well as a panoply of rumour flowed regularly from the towns into

(12) Early in April the Dutch Assistant Resident in Balige reported that "The population is cooperating more and more with the lasykars. A close net of informants is organized in all hutas. In three months a very good system has been organized. The population does not dare to give us even one bit of information any more." Document 38.

Republican-controlled villages. (13)

Despite the lack of a centralized governmental and military command structure, the *gerilya* Republic was much more than a collection of *ad hoc* local military administrations surviving on the civil defence capabilities of the PRS organizations. In several regions *gerilya* governments controlled political and economic structures which enabled the Republic in those areas to remain relatively self-sufficient and able to resist Dutch or NST attempts at penetration. Both the rice producing region of South Tapanuli and the vegetable and fruit producing region of Tanah Karo were firmly under Republican control. Surpluses from these regions were either sold by the peasant producers in the nearest town, from where the goods would find their way either to the urban consumer markets in Tapanuli and Sumatera Timur or would be exported to Malaya and Singapore along trade networks run by the *gerilya* administrations and Chinese merchants. The *gerilya* administrations in Tanah Karo and South Tapanuli were able to finance much of their operations from taxes levied on this trade, both from the surplus producer and from those Chinese middlemen operating in Republican controlled territory. In Langkat and

(13) Dutch, NST and Republican newspapers and journals published in Medan, Siantar and Sibolga - *Waspada*, *Soeloeh Rakjat*, *Waktoe*, *Nieuweblad voor Sumatra*, *Utusan Tapanuli* - provided a great deal of information about political developments in Sumatra and Java, as well as overseas.
Labuhan Batu gerilya administrations controlled large areas of plantation land from where both foodstuffs as well as export crops (mainly rubber and palm oil) continued to be produced. Taken together, the several gerilya governments operated and controlled a trading network which extended over a far greater territorial sphere than either of those controlled by the TBA or the NST government. (14)

From Sumatera Timur the barter trade with Malaya and Singapore continued, although Dutch occupation of most of the outlets in Labuhan Batu and increased Dutch naval presence off the coast of Sumatera Timur had forced a reduction in the volume of trade during the first half of 1949, compared with the previous year. Nevertheless the trade which survived was by no means inconsiderable. For the Chinese traders involved there were still large profits to be made and they were willing to accept the risks involved. Sufficient military supplies to sustain the TNI guerilla operations thus continued to flow across the Malacca Straits from Penang and Singapore. From

(14) From Balige, the Dutch Assistant Resident reported in April that "The entire trade has come into the hands of the lasykars and is conducted entirely outside the (Dutch) occupied territories, bypassing Balige. In Balige the situation is getting worse. All Ketua Dewan Negeri (Chairmen of the Negeri councils) do what the lasykars order them to. Regular taxes of 12% are levied on incense produced for barter for weapons and ammunition. Everywhere rice deliveries (levies) are established and woe to he who tries to escape from it, he will find death." Document 38.


TNI bases in Langkat/Aceh during 1949, for example:

The produce from rubber plantations controlled and worked by (TNI) units were sold to various Chinese merchants or to the O.B. (15) concerned. The O.B. or the Chinese merchants who acted on behalf of the O.B. then organized the loading of the produce on to barges or speedboats and attempted to pierce the Dutch naval blockade of the Malacca Straits to Singapore. In the Atjeh region these smugglers' boats were better known as kapal tjorak. (16) This smuggling of produce from North Sumatra to Malaya for barter for materials required by the Republican armed forces was locally organized and provided dramatic experiences for the smugglers brave enough to take the risks involved. ... only a few were actually captured by the Dutch. (17)

On the return trips from Malaya various kapal tjorak would carry textiles, army boots, motor vehicles, spare parts and sometimes small arms and ammunition. (18)

Increased Dutch naval presence did bring a change in the major items exported from Sumatera Timur. Many TNI commanders turned their attentions away from bulky plantation produce such as rubber and more towards goods of small volume and high value per unit of size and weight. Particular attentions was given to the production and export of opium. (19) Also, a growing

(15) The Oesaha Bataljon, the administrative sections of TNI battalion commands in the region, which were responsible for supply.

(16) Literally "greedy boats".

(17) The Medan journal Waktoe reported on April 23 that between early February and mid-March the Dutch navy seized over 60 boats alleged to have been engaged in smuggling between Sumatra and Malaya. No indication is given as to how many of these boats had been operating from Sumatera Timur.

(18) Nip Xarim et. al. (n.d.), vol. 2; 143-4.

(19) Document 107, No. 91/1949 refers to opium from Sumatra.
volume of gold, silver and precious stones entered the barter trade out of Sumatera Timur. Much of this came from the large quantity of valuables which had been seized from the sultans and rajas of Sumatera Timur during the Social Revolution in March 1946. [20]

What of Republican military activity during the gerilya period of 1949? It was sufficiently frequent and territorially wide-ranging enough to serve notice on the NST government, the Dutch military command, the TBA administration in Tapanuli and the population in general that the Republic remained well and truly alive in North Sumatra. Throughout both residencies, attacks by armed Republican units on Dutch army patrols, on Dutch and Barisan Pengawal garrisons, on police posts, on NST and TBA government offices, on warehouses, plantations and public utilities grew more and more frequent during the first three months of 1949.

One important development during the gerilya period was a re-emergence of the old lashykir identity within the Republican

fetching 500 Straits dollars per kilogram in Malaya and Singapore.

military. Many former *lasykar* units, especially in Serdang, Simalungun, Asahan, Labuhan Batu and Sipirok/Padang Lawas/Balige, were now operating independently, free of any central command, living among and supported by the local population. Under these circumstances the old heroic *lasykar* ethic resurfaced to help bolster morale. This development was assisted by the fact that many leading *pergerakan* politicians such as Abdul Xarim M.S.,Saleh Umar, Natar Zainuddin, Jakub Siregar and Sarwono Sastrosumardjo had joined former *lasykar* units in the countryside with which they had previously been closely associated. (21) Under their influence and direction there re-emerged what amounted to *de facto* *lasykar rakyat* units - Napindo, BHL, Pesindo and Barisan Merah. In some areas radical Moslem leaders were instrumental in re-forming small *Hizbullah/Sabilillah* units.

As to the nature and scope of *gerilya* military operations, Dutch and NST government reports provide a revealing picture. In the case of Sumatera Timur, the monthly reports of political and economic developments in the NST from the Wali Negara's

(21) Abdul Xarim M.S. had joined his son Nip in the Langkat/Aceh border region. Saleh Umar, Jakub Siregar and Natar Zainuddin joined units from brigades A and B in Padang Lawas/South Tapanuli. Sarwono was with the former *Pesindo* units operating in the Deli-Serdang region. In North Tapanuli, Timur Pane joined his former deputy, Liberty Malao in directing guerilla operations there.
office provide a picture of widespread guerilla activity by armed Republican units.

**January**

Langkat - Considerable guerilla infiltration from Aceh. Attacks by these guerilla bands are centered upon Pangkalan Branden. The level of infiltration and the attacks are proving difficult to control. The situation on the outskirts of several plantations is now "very unpleasant". Guerilla units are also active around Tanjung Pura, Nam Unggas, Kwala Namu and Gebang. Plantation roads have been mined by guerillas. Military and police patrols and plantation guards are being shot at. Plantation equipment has been sabotaged and burned. Guerillas are even using mortars and artillery.

Tanah Karo - Movement of guerilla units from the highlands to the lowlands. Attacks on military and police posts and on public installations. Reprisals against suspected collaborators. Guerillas are part of the socio-cultural structure of Tanah Karo. "Up to now it is they who are lord and master and it is they who hold the initiative."

Simalungun - The area bordered by the roads from Lima Puluh to Siantar and from Lima Puluh to Kisaran, and the Tanah Jawa region form the bases of operations of guerilla units from South Asahan and South Tapanuli. The Barisan Pengewal has been used in counter-guerilla operations.

Upper Serdang - Small Karonese units have been active in sabotage operations and in reprisals against suspected collaborators.

South Asahan/Labuhan Batu - Sabotage actions and reprisals against collaborators have occurred in the Sungei Kepayang, Marbau, Siparepare and Aek Kota Batu regions. Travel to and from Rantau Prapat still has to be made by convoy. The indigenous (Malay) population is generally cooperating in the supply of information and is assisting in anti-guerilla operations. (22)

**February**

Infiltration of guerillas from Aceh to Langkat continues.

(22) Summarized from Document 22; 13-16.
Several major clashes have occurred in the Tanjung Pura region. Guerillas still active in the Pangkal'an Branden area.

Heightened guerilla activity in the central region of the NST, as far as the outskirts of Medan. Guerilla bands from Tanah Karo have expanded into upper Langkat, Deli and Serdang where they have linked up with local units. Travel, even by convoy, is getting more difficult. Cars on the Medan to Brastagi road are being shot at.

On the 17th a guerilla attack on the Klumpang/Klambir V tobacco estates (about 14 km. from Medan on the road to Binjei) resulted in the deaths of three Europeans (Dutch) plantation officials and in the destruction of 32 drying sheds. Indonesians working on the plantations were involved in the attacks. The action was planned from inside the plantations. (23)

In Simalungun, small sabotage units still operating in the Tanah Jawa region. Guerilla units from Samosir have moved into the Simalungun plateau where they have inflicted casualties on Barisan Pengawal troops and have seized some weapons.

Are still some active guerilla concentrations in Asahan. (24)

March

Shortage of labour on plantations has resulted in the employment of many former lasykarc rakyat. Also many squatters have been given jobs. Many of these people have supported or engaged in guerilla attacks on plantations. Guerilla activity in South Asahan/Labuhan Batu has

(23) A detailed account of gerilya attacks on the Klumpang/Klambir V tobacco estates and on several other tobacco plantations in the same region is given in Document 229; 11-21. The deaths of the European planters in the gerilya attacks on Klumpang/Klambir V became a cause célébre in the NST, focussing widespread public attention upon the scale of Republican opposition within the NST. The funeral for the three planters was virtually a state affair, attended by the Crown Commissioner, the Dutch military commander, General Scholten, and NST Cabinet members. See front page report, with photographs, in Nieuwsblad voor Sumatra 19 February 1949. Also, Oostkust van Sumatra Instituut Kroniek 1948-1949; 11.

(24) Summarized from Document 23; 3-8.
increased. Elsewhere in Sumatera Timur the situation remains much the same as during February. (25)

April

Activities by guerillas are now frequent and serious. High level of guerilla infiltration into Upper Langkat. Guerilla units are active in Upper Serdang, where the NST government in sub-districts Tanjung Muda Hulu, Tanjung Muda Hilir and Senembah Hulu has been seriously disorganized by guerilla activities. Increased movement of guerilla units into Tanah Jawa and Tiga Dolok in Simalungun. Further increases in guerilla activities in South Asahan/Labuhan Batu. (26)

Dutch and NST government reactions to the gerilya actions showed a growing unease and concern at the situation. Dutch military units were forced to move from one region to another with increasing frequency in order to deal with fresh out-breaks of gerilya activity. Dutch and NST forces began to take increasingly repressive counter measures against villages in areas of high-level gerilya activity. In the towns more and more prominent Republican activists were arrested, forcing others to go underground. Many joined their compatriots in the countryside. From the Republican camp as a whole the signs were unmistakable: the guerilla struggle was proving successful, the enemy was worried and unnerved. (27)

(27) Nip Xarim et. al. (n.d.), vol. 2; 180-200, 231-273.
Gintings (1969); 106 passim.
In Tapanuli, the TBA reports show a Dutch administration virtually under siege in its urban enclaves from Republican forces in complete control of the countryside. The picture that emerges from these reports can be summarized as follows:

January

Balige is a "beleagured fortress", continually under attack from TNI. TNI units control the Balige - Porsea road. TNI forces are operating on the outskirts of Tarutung and Siborongborong. Dutch patrols are under continuous attack. Roads and other public works have been sabotaged by guerillas. Ambushes and sniping attacks occur against Dutch patrols near Sibolga. TNI attacks have destroyed food stockpiles in Sibolga. In Padang Sidempuan, Republican "terrorists" active in the kampungs around the city. A large TNI force is operating around Batang Toru. The Sibolga - Tarutung road is continually under TNI attack. 13th: Dutch forces occupy Barus. TNI units are operating on the outskirts of the town. They have burned Chinese houses and business premises in Barus. (28)

February

Dutch forces in Tapanuli are still too small to effectively counter Republican military operations in the countryside. There has been an improvement in the efficiency of TNI guerilla operations in the Barus-Sibolga-Batang Toru-Padang Sidempuan region. The guerillas are well organized and well armed. Mobility of the guerillas and the clumsiness of Dutch forces is making pacification of the countryside difficult: compounded by the lack of cooperation from the local populations (with the TBA administration). In South Tapanuli Republican forces operate freely over large areas. They are able to supply themselves adequately, and are able to impress the local population that they hold a monopoly of power. (29)

(29) From Document 608; 4-5.
March

First half of March: Guerilla activity has increased in the Barus-Tarutung-Sidikalang region. Guerillas have new supplies of weapons and ammunition. Heavy guerilla attacks in the Sidikalang region. Villages along the Porsea - Lumbanlabu road are completely deserted. Guerillas still control this region. Ambushes of convoys along the Sibolga-Tarutung and Sibolga-Barus roads are increasing. We are suffering many losses. Anti-Republic elements in Tapanuli are criticising the Dutch for not making enough troops available to effectively occupy Tapanuli. They allege that inadequate occupation has made conditions worse than before the occupation. (30)

Late March: Further increase in guerilla activity, especially in the Sibolga-Tarutung-Balige-Porsea region. More convoys ambushed. Large guerilla forces surround Balige and Porsea. They frequently attack Dutch posts in the towns. (31)

In the Balige region, large guerilla units are located at Sidulang (6 km. from the town), Batumormor (behind Porsea) and Aek Raja (along the road to the highlands). Guerillas in the villages on the outskirts of Balige fire on Dutch convoys. Guerilla morale is high. They have automatic weapons. They have mortars in the villages around Balige with which they bombard the town. They control the road to Siborongborong. Guerilla attacks are becoming more daring. They are using larger forces. There have recently been attacks by well armed units over 200 strong on Laguboti, Porsea and Balige. It is the guerillas who hold the initiative. Food shortages and illness in Balige are increasing. "We cannot travel more than 500 meters outside Balige unarmed." (32)

On February 20 Resident Heckman reported that:

(30) From Document 609; 1-4.
(31) From Document 610; 1.
(32) From Document 38.
The whole of Republican Tapanuli looks sneeringly at how we minutely clean the towns, set up distribution systems, open schools and import rice and salt and soap and petrol, while in the meantime all the rest of the countryside is under a shadow government (whose leaders) write letters to one another in the name of Resident Lumbantobing and encourage one another that it really won't be long before the Dutch are out once again. (33)

With the TBA administration locked away in its urban fortresses and armoured convoys, TNI forces in Tapanuli had little need for the scale of sabotage operations effected in the Sumatera Timur countryside. Instead the central targets of *gerilya* military operations in Tapanuli were the Dutch occupation forces and those Indonesians collaborating with the TBA administration. (34)

Guerilla reprisals against "collaborators" were frequent and violent. Much more so than in Sumatera Timur. The number of Indonesians working for the TBA was considerably fewer than those working for the NST government. The former were consequently far more isolated and vulnerable than the latter. Often village heads, *negeri* chiefs, civil servants and politicians accused of collaborating with the TBA had their houses burned and property seized in guerilla raids. Sometimes the


alleged collaborators were arrested or killed. (35) Late in February the TBA, Resident Heckman, reported (36) that village, kuria and negeri chiefs appointed by the Dutch occupation administration in areas surrounding the occupied towns have moved into the towns to live, fearful of being kidnapped or killed by guerillas. Most, Heckman noted, had already had their houses burned down. A month later, he reported that no Indonesian working for the TBA was any longer safe outside the Dutch-occupied towns. (37)

The following are some examples of particular incidents. Early in January the house of the camat in Siborongborong was burned down and his cattle driven off, just four days after he had been appointed to that position by the TBA. Early in February the house of one of the leading sponsors of the Tapanuli State movement, Mr. Sjukur Soripada, in Batunadua (South Tapanuli) was plundered by guerillas the day after he left for Padang Sidempuan. Around the same time a number of village chiefs in the Padang Sidempuan region were arrested or killed in guerilla raids for allegedly cooperating with the TBA administration. Early in March the negeri chief of Hutagalung (North Tapanuli) who had joined the Tapanuli State movement was killed by guerillas and his house burned down. Also the wedana of Balige was killed in reprisal for one of his sons having collaborated with the Dutch. On April 7 a strong force of guerillas surrounded the village of Pasar Benualuhu in the Toba highlands where they arrested the deputy negeri chief for collaboration and shot him in front of the assembled populace. Document 606; 12 January & 25 March 1949. Document 608; 2-3. Document 609; 5. Document 38.


In Sumatera Timur, reprisals against collaborators also occurred with fairly regular frequency, but much less so than in Tapanuli. In most cases the reprisals were against village chiefs and civil servants in those areas bordering on regions controlled by Republican gerilya administrations. Pro-NST village chiefs or NST government officials within the operating vicinity of gerilya bases were the most frequent targets, being easily identifiable and accessible. (38)

In Tapanuli those who chose to work for the TBA administration fell into three categories. First were the people who had consistently opposed the Republic ever since its formation. In the main these were former hereditary chiefs and former colonial civil servants, many of whom had suffered during the Japanese occupation because of their close involvement in the Dutch colonial regime, who looked fondly to a restoration of the zaman normaal of pre-War days. Second were those who had become alienated from the Republic since August 1945, most of whom supported the proposals for a Negara Tapanuli within the Dutch-sponsored federal Indonesia. Third were those who had been left behind, whether by choice or necessity, in

(38) During April, for example, guerillas from Tanah Karo were reported (by the NST authorities) to have made more than 90 incursions into villages in Upper Deli where they exacted reprisals against village heads and other officials accused of "collaboration". By this time 70 village heads in the region no longer dared to live in their villages. Document 25; 5 & 23.
the exodus from the towns in the wake of the Dutch occupation. Many in this last category maintained communications with friends and relatives who had fled to the Republican-controlled countryside. Many of those who had fled Tapanuli to Sumatera Timur during 1947 and 1948 returned to work for the new TBA administration. They accompanied senior TBA officials into Tapanuli, in the immediate wake of the occupying Dutch military forces. Many were leading players in the Tapanuli State movement, who returned to Tapanuli as advisors to the TBA administration. Prominent among such returning expatriates were two prominent refugees from the internecine conflicts in Tapanuli in the early part of 1948, Sutan Mulia Radja and Raja Iskandar Tampubolon, and the Chairman of Perta, Eduard Nasution. Together they played leading roles in negotiations between TBA officials and local opponents of the Republic during the first weeks of the occupation. The negotiations themselves chiefly concerned two things: the speedy setting up of an operative TBA administration and the eventual establishment of a Negara Tapanuli.

Among those who gave an early commitment to the proposals for establishing a Negara Tapanuli and agreed to work with the TBA administration in order to achieve this, were Mr. Abdul Abas and Raja Barita Sinambela. Abas, who had been under house
detention in Sawahlunto, West Sumatra, since his arrest by Bedjo in September 1948, returned to Padang Sidempuan at the beginning of January. Soon afterwards, following discussions with the Dutch Assistant-Resident, M.A. Los (whom he had known before the War), Abas agreed to help sponsor a popular movement in South Tapanuli in support of the Tapanuli state. Sinambela, still in Tarutung, made a similar undertaking, following discussions with the Dutch Assistant-Resident, Luteyns. At the same time he accepted appointment as Bupati for Silindung and issued a public appeal to Malao to surrender and support the establishment of a Negara Tapanuli. (39)

Despite the public support of prominent community leaders like Abas, Sinambela, Sutan Mulia Radja, Raja Tampubolon and Eduard Nasution, the TBA administration found it increasingly difficult to set up an adequately staffed civil administration. In the first two or three weeks of the occupation most of the former colonial civil servants opposed to the Republic had accepted positions within the TBA. By March, individuals from this group had been appointed as bupatis or wedanas in Sibolga, Padang Sidempuan, Sipirok, Tarutung, Siborongborong, Balige, Porsea and Sidikalang. Assistant-Wedanas had been appointed

(39) On the early negotiations between Dutch officials and Abas and Sinambela, see Document 606, 5, 12 & 15 January 1949.
in Barus, Sorkam, Batang Toru, Sipahutar, Sarulla, Dolok Sanggul and Laguboti. Within the occupied towns and surrounding villages many of the old hereditary village and negeri chiefs who had been deposed since 1946 were restored to their former positions. But, there were far too few of these people to fill the gaps left by those officials who had joined the gerilya governments or who refused to work for the TBA, whether out of commitment to the Republic or fear of gerilya reprisal.

Despite widespread Dutch propaganda - via announcements from Resident Heckman, advertisements, editorials and leading articles in the TBA-sponsored newspapers, and offers of increased salaries - the TBA administration remained severely understaffed throughout its period of existence. (40) Commenting on the difficulty facing the TBA administration in effectively countering the gerilya Republic, the TBA's office in Sibolga reported in February: (41)

What can a pile of newspapers do against a rifle? What use is a good editorial, in which the federal political system in Indonesia and the promise of shortly forthcoming independence is explained, against a pamphlet from a terrorist leader who brands those who cooperate with the Dutch as traitors?


(41) Document 608; 6-7.
While the TBA government was perched perilously in the midst of what remained essentially Republican-controlled territory and while the NST government was having to deal with an expanding Republican guerilla movement, the Dutch-sponsored federal alternative to the unitary Republic was being proceeded with. In Tapanuli and Sumatera Timur this centered upon two parallel sets of plans: first, the creation of a Daerah Istimewa Tapanuli (Tapanuli Special Region), leading to the eventual establishment of a Negara Tapanuli, and second, the creation of a Sumatran federation linking all negaras and other territories on the island.

Plans for the formation of a Sumatran federation had emerged out of discussions in Jakarta late in 1948 between leaders of the Interim Federal Government, the Netherlands Indies administration, the NST and the Negara Sumatera Selatan. Both Dr. Mansoer and the Wali Negara Sumatera Selatan, Abdul Malik, gave their enthusiastic support to the idea. Soon afterwards, in early January, leaders of the Tapanuli State movement in Medan were included in discussions at which plans were drawn up to hold a Sumatra Conference, as a prelude to federation. The Tapanuli leaders eagerly supported the idea as a Sumatra federation would increase the chances of realizing their hopes for a Tapanuli State. (42) As for the

(42) Copy of letter from Raja Iskandar Tampubolon to his son,
Dutch, in adopting their postwar federal strategy (they) were counting on the ethnic and regional sentiments of the older generation they knew so well. The logical superstructure for the Negara ... in Sumatra was an all-Sumatra grouping to balance against Java and East Indonesia. (43)

In Tapanuli itself the idea of setting up a Daerah Istimewa Tapanuli as a constituent entity of a Sumatra federation had been proposed, early in January, by senior Dutch officials and those leaders of the Tapanuli State movement who had returned from Sumatera Timur, in the course of discussions with local federalist sympathisers. (44) Abas in Padang Sidempuan and Raja Sinambela in Tarutung gave their support to the proposals.

In the next few weeks, Abas, Sinambela, Resident Heckman in Sibolga, Assistant-Residents Los in Padang Sidempuan and Luteyns in Tarutung, Sutan Mulia Radja, Eduard Nasution and Raja Iskandar Tampubolon, held private talks with hundreds of

Raja H.A. Tampubolon, 22 March 1949, appended to Document 462.

(43) Reid (1971); 42.

(44) The constitutional frame of reference for the proposed Daerah Istimewa was the "BIO Decree" issued by the Netherlands government on 14 December 1948. This was "The blueprint of the structure and political articulation of this interim (federal) government and the way in which the envisaged ultimate Indonesian state was to be established ....". George Kahin (1952); 386-90.
federalist sympathisers in Padang Sidempuan, Sibolga and Tarutung. With the Dutch administration in Padang having already initiated discussions with federalist leaders in West Sumatra about the possible establishment of a Negara Minangkabau, federalists in Tapanuli had good reason to feel confident about the seriousness of Dutch intentions for setting up a Tapanuli State. Ad hoc committees of federalist supporters emerged in Tarutung, Sibolga and Padang Sidempuan to mobilize support for the Tapanuli State/Sumatra federation proposals and to plan tactics for their realization. (46)

The discussions and planning proceeded with caution. Both federalists and senior Dutch officials were well aware of the highly volatile nature of inter-regional, ethnic and religious relations in the residency. Memories of the internecine conflicts of 1948 were only too fresh. So too were memories of the abortive pre-War attempt at Tapanuli federation. Furthermore, they were aware that unless the Tapanuli State idea could gather an apparently extensive popular support it would have little hope of realization. Given the spotlight of international attention now focused upon Dutch actions in Indonesia, any Dutch-sponsored Tapanuli State would have to be

(45) Audrey Kahin (1974); 110.
patently democratic, even more so than in the case of the NST. This meant that popular support would have to be drawn away from the Republic and behind the federalist alternative. It was important that the Negara movement should be seen to be an autonomous one emanating from within Tapanuli, not one appearing to merely implement plans for a replica of the NST, already pre-determined in Medan and Jakarta. Hence it was decided to establish formally committees for each of the three main regions within the residency - North, Central (Sibolga) and South Tapanuli - to determine the status of Tapanuli, rather than specifically for the setting up of a Special Region or State.

Following several meetings between Dutch officials and prominent federalist supporters in Padang Sidempuan, Sibolga and Tarutung during February, the earlier ad hoc committees were formally constituted as Committees on the Status of Tapanuli (Panitia Status Tapanuli) - PST, for South, Central and North Tapanuli respectively. All three PSTs immediately issued resolutions calling for the setting up of a Daerah Istimewa Tapanuli within federal Indonesia. In Padang Sidempuan, the South Tapanuli PST, headed by a former president of the Padang Sidempuan District Court (Pengadilan Negeri), Mr. Sjukur Sopipada, and Mr. Abdul Abas, despatched Sutan Mulia Radja to negotiate with the Sibolga and Tarutung PSTs about establishing a single, all-Tapanuli status committee. A single committee,
they argued, would best serve Tapanuli State interests at the forthcoming Sumatra federation conference and in negotiations with the Netherlands Indies and Interim Federal governments.

On March 11, forty-seven representatives from the three

Negotiations between the three PSTs quickly produced agreement that a joint meeting of the status committees should be held in Sibolga on March 11. Soripada and Abas took the lead in preparing a draft Statute and Constitution for a Daerah Istimewa Tapanuli. (47)

But despite the expressed willingness of the three PSTs to work together, the old primordial divisions remained just below the surface. Throughout all the discussions, the vitally sensitive question of the regional/ethnic balance within any single Tapanuli PST was left unresolved. All that was agreed upon was that the positions of Chairman and vice-Chairman would rotate between representatives from North and South. Just four days before the Sibolga conference was due to begin Raja Iskandar Tampubolon wrote to his son in Holland

severely criticising PST leaders for engaging in "intrigues" aimed at maximising individual or group interests within the proposed all-Tapanuli committee. (48)

On March 11, forty-seven representatives from the three PSTs met in the Peoples' Bank (Volksbank) building in Sibolga for the all-Tapanuli conference. Twenty-three were from the North Tapanuli committee, fifteen from South Tapanuli and nine from Sibolga. The conference opened with speeches of welcome from the TBA, Resident Heckman, and the Dutch military commander in Sibolga, Lt. Col. Kroes. Mr. Abas was elected Conference Chairman. Raja Sinambela and Eduard Nasution (leaders of the North Tapanuli and Sibolga delegations respectively) were elected vice-Chairmen. Abas then addressed the delegates. Bitterly criticising developments in Tapanuli during the Japanese and Republican periods and specifically attacking the previous Republican administration for corruption and lack of authority, he called for the speedy formation of an autonomous Daerah Istimewa Tapanuli. (49) At the end of the first day a resolution was passed declaring that the conference

(48) Copy of letter from Raja Iskandar Tampubolon to Raja H.A. Tampubolon, 7 March 1949, appended to Document 462.

(49) Document 619; 5-6. Document 606, 25 March 1949. The Volksbank building in Sibolga had been the venue for sessions of the Tapanuli DPR prior to the Dutch occupation.
Acknowledged Tapanuli as a Daerah Istimewa with its own government, provisionally subordinate to the government of an Independent and Sovereign Federal Indonesian Nation or whatever Body anticipates it. (50)

Next day the conference approved an eight-point Statute (Statuut) for the Daerah Istimewa Tapanuli making the creation of an autonomous daerah istimewa a pre-condition for Tapanuli participation in the proposed Sumatran federation and the federal Indonesian state. Tapanuli interests, it stressed, must take priority over those of any federal entity within which the region may become incorporated. The whole tenor of the document was one of distinctly Tapanuli regional chauvinism. (51)

Discussion then turned to the draft constitution prepared and submitted by the South Tapanuli PST. Immediately inter-regional dissension surfaced. Intense disagreement developed over the question of the regional/ethnic balance within the Representative Council for the future Daerah Istimewa. Toba delegates made no attempt to hide their suspicions about the intentions lying behind the draft constitution prepared by the South Tapanuli PST. The northern delegates refused to accept a section of the constitution providing for an equal number of

(50) Document 416.
(51) Document 417.
seats on the Council for both North and South Tapanuli. They argued that the North should have more seats because of its larger population. In response southern delegates referred to the subordination and suffering South Tapanuli had experienced under northern domination during the Republican period, declaring that this should at last be brought to an end. (52)

The conference adjourned on the 14th, in an atmosphere charged with ethnocentric tension. No final decision had been taken on the constitutional question. And the delegates had failed to agree to the formation of a single PST to represent Tapanuli at the Sumatra conference due to begin in Medan in two weeks time. (53) Instead each of the three PSTs would send a separate delegation.

Two days after the conference ended Raja Iskandar Tampubolon wrote to his son in a mood of heavy frustration:

The illness of our people (the Toba Bataks) is still individualism with no consideration of the common good, in contrast with the more mature Padang Sidempuan (leaders) who understand their own capabilities ... but in our case everyone wants to play first violin, even if he lack the capability to do so. (54)

---

(53) ibid. Waspada 23 March 1949. Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 298.
(54) Copy of letter, dated 16 March 1949, appended to Document 462.
Six days later, in another letter, he complained:

I have already told you several things about the plotting and intrigue of certain persons who although they have no capabilities nevertheless try by all manner of means to move into the foreground. (55)

Tampubolon was bemoaning what he considered to be attempts by the North Tapanuli delegates, led by Raja Sinambela and the former MULO director from Balige, Eliab Siagian, to dominate the conference. At the same time, Siagian complained to Resident Heckman that the South Tapanuli delegates had attempted to ride roughshod over the conference. Heckman responded by warning the southern delegates not to act in a manner which could affront those from the North. (56)

No sooner had the Sibolga conference adjourned than Dr. Mansoer in Medan sent a telegram to Resident Heckman suggesting that, in view of the failure of the conference delegates to agree, North and South Tapanuli and Nias should each be made a separate region within the Sumatran federation. This, he went on, would avoid the "painful glueing together" and the "unhappy marriage" of North and South. (57) There was even a hint of

(55) Copy of letter, dated 22 March 1949, appended to Document 462.

(56) Document 606, 25 March 1949. Heckman, referring to the disagreements at the conference, and revealing the cultural frustrations of the expatriate colonial official, was moved to remark: "Oh those Bataks!"

delight that Malay interests would not have to deal with a united Tapanuli movement in the setting up of the Sumatran federation.

Despite the failure of the Sibolga conference to establish a single Tapanuli PST or to reach any conclusive constitutional agreements, none of the main PST leaders seem to have seriously feared for the future realization of their aims. Mostly this was because they had little reason to doubt Dutch commitment to the eventual creation of a Negara Tapanuli. (58)

Notwithstanding the frequent assertions about Tapanuli autonomy made at the Sibolga conference, Dutch involvement in the developments to date had been very close. (59) Resident Heckman, for example, had busied himself deeply in all the processes leading up to the Sibolga conference. (60) When the delegates from the three PSTs eventually departed to take part in the Sumatra federation conference, the TBA administration provided them with "plenty of money for food, entertainment and clothes in Medan". (61)

(58) On March 20 in Padang the Dutch established a "committee to determine the status of Minangkabau", providing further evidence of their commitment to the creation of new negaras in Sumatra. See Audrey Kahin (1974); 111.

(59) See Documents 555 and 561, both of which stress the urgency of forming a single daerah movement in Tapanuli.


(61) ibid.
On March 28, eighty-four delegates from sixteen regions in Sumatra met in Medan for the opening of the Sumatra conference, the *Muktamar Sumatera*. (62) The three Tapanuli PSTs together sent nineteen delegates, eleven from North Tapanuli, and four each from South Tapanuli and Sibolga. The NST was represented by eighteen delegates. (63)

(62) The sixteen regions represented were: Bengkulu, Jambi, Indragiri, Lampung, Minangkabau, Riau, Sibolga, Tapanuli Selatan, Tapanuli Utara, Sabang, Negara Sumatera Selatan, the NST, Bangka, Bengkalis, Biliton and Siak. The latter four regions attended only as observers. The use of the Arabic word *Muktamar* for the conference points to a stress on the Islamic (and by implication, non-Javanese) nature of Sumatran identity. It also points to the dominant roles played in the organization of the conference by the Islamic-oriented, and anti-Javanese, governments of the NST and the Negara Sumatera Selatan.


(63) Not surprisingly, no Tapanuli Batak were included in the NST delegation; eight of the eighteen members being Malay. The eighteen NST representatives were: Dr. Mansoer, Raja Kaliamsjah Sinaga, G.J. Forch, Tengku Hafas, G. van Gelder, Tengku Sulung, J.F. Keulemans, M. Lalisang, Tan Tjeng Bie, Datuk Kamil, Ngeradja Meliala, Tan Boen Djin, D.P. van Meerten, Tengku M. Bahar, Tengku M. Arifin, A.H.F. Rotty, Tengku Damrah and the Sultan of Asahan.

Members of the three Tapanuli delegations were:


**South Tapanuli** - Mr. Sjukur Soripada, Mr. Abdul Abas, Sutan Pangeran Nasution and Bachtiar Ananda.

**Sibolga** - Eduard Nasution, Zainal Basri, Raja Iskandar Tam-pubolon and Dr. A. Pohan.

Just prior to the opening of the *Muktamar*, Dr. Mansoer had
The Muktamar continued for five days, until April 2. Like the Sibolga conference earlier, it quickly became a forum for the venting of inter-regional and inter-ethnic hostilities, rather than the promotion of Sumatran unity. The various delegations were not even able to agree on whether a Sumatran federation should in fact be established, let alone the form that such a federation should take. In the end the conference approved a Manifest which simply declared that the twelve regions actually participating in the Muktamar would:

1. Make strenuous efforts to swiftly establish an Independent and Sovereign Federal Indonesian Nation composed of regions having equal status and equal rights and joined with the Netherlands in a partnership of equals. ... (and)
2. Endeavour to create a Sumatra which is strong and united ..... (64)

No specific mention was made of a Sumatran federation. Instead the Manifest limited itself to the vague reference to a "strong and united" Sumatra. The Muktamar then adjourned with an undertaking that a second Muktamar would be convened soon in Palembang (capital of the Negara Sumatera Selatan).

sent invitations to the Republican administrations in Aceh and Nias requesting that they send representatives. Copies of the invitations were dropped by Dutch aircraft over Takengon and Kutaraja on March 17 and over Gunung Sitoli (Nias) the following day. Both Republican administrations ignored the invitations. Text of the invitations is given in Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 291-2.

(64) Document 274. Also, see Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 322-4.
One particular aspect of disunity which had dominated the Muktamar was between the Tapanuli delegations, especially between South Tapanuli on one side and North Tapanuli and Sibolga on the other. On the second day of the conference the Chairman of the South Tapanuli PST, Mr. Sjukur Soripada, submitted a written memorandum regretting that it had not been possible for Tapanuli to be represented by a single delegation. Following the decision of the South Tapanuli PST to send its own four-member delegation, he explained, the TBA in Sibolga had urged the formation of a single fifteen-member all-Tapanuli delegation, consisting of eight representatives from the North, five from the South and two from Sibolga. But, said Soripada, the South Tapanuli PST was not prepared to accept a smaller representation than that afforded the North. It had, therefore, been forced to stand by its original decision to send a separate delegation. (65)

In reply to Soripada's memorandum, the North Tapanuli delegation submitted a statement declaring that the question of whether there was one or more Tapanuli delegations at the Muktamar was a minor problem, one resulting from the internal affairs of Tapanuli, which should not concern the conference. The Sibolga delegation, too, rejected the Tapanuli-unity idea

(65) Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 298-9.
even more strongly, declaring that if it were forced to merge into a single all-Tapanuli grouping it would withdraw from the conference altogether. \(66\)

Two days later, Soripada, in a rather extraordinary speech, opened up another sensitive and contentious issue: that of the representative nature of the delegations at the conference. The South Tapanuli delegation he blandly announced, made no claim to be fully representative of the people of South Tapanuli. .... we have not been legally elected or chosen by the people. We are not members of a Representative Council, because South Tapanuli does not yet have a Representative Council, but nevertheless we have dared to present our own point of view. This might possibly not match popular opinion in South Tapanuli, but we as human beings and as members of the community (mas'arakat) have a right to speak. .... We as members of the community bring a community voice not the voice of the people (rakjat), because this word "people" has created confusion during the past three years. .... Because of that I do not bring the voice of the people but the voice of the community. Humanity and community cannot be separated because one is fused with the other. \(67\)

The South Tapanuli PST, Soripada asserted, represented the traditional, communal values of the region, not necessarily the political loyalties of the mass of the population.

By contrast, both the North Tapanuli and Sibolga delegations

\(66\) ibid.; 299.

\(67\) Cited in ibid.; 302. Also, see Waspada 11 June 1949.
were eager to stress their popular representative nature. Soripada's statement, therefore, served to further exacerbate dissension within the PST movement as a whole. By the time the Muktamar had ended the divisions within the Tapanuli camp, especially that between North and South, had given rise to a popular pun which explained the major problem within the movement for a Tapanuli State as not one of "To be or not to be" but rather a matter of "Toba or not Toba". (68)

Soripada in fact had good reason to stress the communalist and cultural rather than popular representative nature of the PST movement. By the time of the Muktamar Sumatera neither the TBA administration nor the Tapanuli State movement had made any headway in gathering popular support within the occupied regions of Tapanuli. TBA officials reported that the great majority of former Republican civil servants still in the towns were strongly resisting Dutch overtures for cooperation and were continuing to affirm their loyalty to the Republic. (69) They expressed dislike of Dutch interference in Tapanuli affairs and continued to state their preference for the Republican era, notwithstanding the violent upheavals of 1946, 1947 and 1948.

The former Wedana of Tarutung, Tagor Lumbantobing, after

(68) Waśpada 16 May 1949.

rejecting Dutch offers to join the TBA, told Resident Heckman that the internecine conflicts of 1948 had merely been "the childhood illnesses of every independence struggle". (70)

By March 1949 an organized legal opposition to the TBA and PST had taken shape in Sibolga. This had emerged out of regular meetings of a number of former Republican civil servants held during February at the home of a former senior official with the Department of Social Welfare for Sumatra, Mohamad Nawi Harahap. The general purpose of the meetings was to plan a pro-Republican organization to oppose the PST movement. At a meeting on March 1, called specifically to consider an invitation to attend the PST Sibolga conference, they decided to constitute themselves into a Front Kaoem Repoebliek Indonesia (Community Front for the Republic of Indonesia) - FKRI. The FKRI, it was resolved, would defend and struggle, by legal means, for the importance, well-being and ideals of the Republic of Indonesia and disseminate propaganda on behalf of the Republic. (71) The invitation to the PST conference, was accepted on condition that the FKRI was allocated at least fifteen seats. This was refused.

(70) Document 607; 4. Lumbantobing had been replaced as wedana by Maruhum Hutabarat, the former TNI Prosecutor-General who was one of those arrested by the Brigade A in the September 10 Affair of 1948.

(71) Document 159. Also, Document 609; 5-6 and Document 150.
The day before the PST conference began the FKRI issued an open letter, signed by Harahap, attacking the conference as being nothing more than the plaything of "dictatorial elements" with a pre-War colonialist mentality, represented by people like the former Perta chairman and now Bupati of Sibolga, Eduard Nasution. The letter went on to attack, rather more mildly, Dutch involvement in such developments. (72) By the end of the month FKRI membership in Sibolga had increased to about 200. (73)

What of the pro-Republic legal opposition within the NST? It continued to be centered upon the Front Nasional, the farmers organizations (especially Sekata) and the educational and social welfare activities of the Mohamadiyah and Taman Siswa. Newspapers like Waspada and weeklies like Waktoe continued to take a strong pro-Republic stance. But for the first two months of 1949 this legal extension of the Republican movement within the NST maintained a low key, almost entirely because of restrictive measures taken against most of the senior Republican leaders remaining within the NST.

The day after the second Dutch military offensive into

(72) Document 160.
(73) Document 610; 2.
Tapanuli, the NST government had ordered a blanket prohibition on the publication of any material deemed to be pro-Republic or critical of either the NST itself, the BFO, the Netherlands Indies administration or the Netherlands government. (74)

During the next two months the order was enforced to the extent that hundreds of people were arrested for displaying or circulating Republican propaganda. Both Waspada and Waktoe were several times placed under temporary bans or had specific issues seized or censored. Several leading Republicans, including the Front Nasional chairman, Dr. Djabangoen, the Secretary, M.A. Dasuki, and the Taman Siswa chairman, Sugondo Kartoprodjo, were arrested and kept in custody throughout January. On February 23 the NST government prohibited NST government servants from joining the Front Nasional on the grounds that it was an organization aiming at the "destruction of the Negara". (75)

But NST government leaders were not merely intractable hardliners. They were political sophisticates and realists to the extent of being well aware of the still considerable support enjoyed by the Republic in Sumatera Timur. They

(74) Waktoe 10 January 1949.

(75) "Ketetapan Walinegara Soematera Timoer" No. 41/1949 in Warta Rasmi Negara Sumatera Timur, No. 3/1949. Also, see Oostkust van Sumatra Instituut Kroniek 1948-1949; 81.
realized that if this support was to be successfully undermined to the benefit of the Negara then a carrot had to accompany the stick in the application of NST government policies towards the Republic. In other words, Republican sympathisers had to be presented with a feasibly alternative road to merdeka, one which would make the continued existence of the NST within an independent Indonesia an acceptable compromise. Thus, at the end of February, Dr. Mansoer announced that the NST was willing to assist in achieving a settlement between the Republic and the Netherlands because there now were many Republican leaders who shared the same desire as the NST government for an end to the "current politics of deadlock". (76)

The initial effect of this NST approach was to increase uncertainty and division within the legal Republican organizations, especially the Front Nasional, which, despite its short period of inactivity, remained the focal point for coordination between the surviving legal organizations. Many moderate Republican leaders felt that conditions favoured a more cooperative stance towards the NST. On the other hand, the pergerakan saw the NST approaches as a sign of weakness and pressed for an intensification of militant opposition to it.

(76) Waktoe 10 January 1949.
By the end of March the *Front Nasional* leadership was seriously divided on this question. The FN chairman, Djabangoen, upon his release from custody at the end of January, found himself under pressure from *pergerakan* elements demanding that the *Front Nasional* adopt a more militant opposition to the NST. As a result he resigned the chairmanship shortly after his release. A replacement was not immediately elected as internal wrangling within the organization grew. The old division between cooperator and non-cooperator, which had plagued the pre-War nationalist movement, re-emerged. Only this time the central focus of the dispute was the NST. The new equivalent of the pre-War non-cooperators urged that the *Front Nasional* align itself closely with the *gerilya* struggle. (77) Counter to this, the cooperator pressed for the creation of an official, legal Republican opposition within the political structure of the NST, to the extent of the *Front Nasional* being represented in the *Dewan NST*. (78)

By April the *Front Nasional* was the focus of competing attentions from *pergerakan* Republicans on one side and the NST government on the other. The former perceived the *Front Nasional*...

(77) By February a number of *Sekata* branches had begun to organize sabotage groups among the squatting ex-plantation workers, in support of the guerilla struggle.

as a vehicle for unifying the struggle for national independence once more in the direction of social revolution. The latter were anxious to promote a cooperative Front Nasional leadership so as to avoid having to take prescriptive action against the organization and thereby drive more Republican supporters into the arms of the guerilla movement.

But while differences within the Front Nasional was affording the NST government an opportunity to exploit the pergerakan-moderates division within the non-gerilya sector of the Republican movement, dissension continued to develop within NST ranks itself. The land problem and the question of the future of the traditional kingdoms both continued to provide important stimuli to internal conflict.

Immediately following the Dutch military action, Malay pemuda from PADI, led by Ustadz Abdul Kadir, began to attack physically non-Malay squatter communities in the Deli plantation region, attempting to seize land for distribution to Malay farmers. After several bloody attacks, notably against Karonese squatters in the Deli Tua region, Kadir and some of the Malay pemuda were arrested by the Dutch and the violence abated. (79) Little was achieved, for the small quantities of

(79) Kadir was released several months later on the intercession of the Sultan of Deli. Sinar (1972); 15.
land seized from the squatters was immediately returned to the plantation companies or was soon reoccupied by returning squatters.

The burning question of Malay land rights had by now produced a militant, anti-government minority within the NST ruling elite. Led by Tengku Nikmutallah, one of the founders of the pro-sultanate PNST, they directed stringent criticism against the NST government for failing to pursue the recovery of Malay lands with sufficient vigour. By the end of January 1949 the Nikmatullah group had formed a splinter party, the Partai Ra'yat Soematera Timoer (Sumatera Timur People's Party) - PRST, which took as a central platform the recovery of Malay land from both non-Malay squatters and the large plantation companies. The PRST accused the NST government of having abandoned the rights of the Malay farmers in the interests of indigenous non-Malays and foreign corporations. (80)

The other important divisive issue within the NST elite, that of the status of the traditional kingdoms, especially the

(80) Document 22; 7-8. The plantation companies for their part complained about poor productivity caused by squatter occupation of estates land and the resultant shortage of labour. They continued to press for the resumption of the importation of contract labour from Java. Document 646. The AVROS Chairman asserted that the plantations in Sumatera Timur were short of 30,000 wage labourers.
Malay sultanates, continued to simmer. Between January and March the Sultan of Deli sponsored several demands for restoration of the pre-War status of the kingdoms, directed at the authorities in Jakarta and the Netherlands. On January 29 a resolution to this effect was issued in the name of the "Kingdom of Deli" (Keradjaan Negeri Deli). Signed by the sultan himself, by members of the royal council (raad van landegroten) and by the regional chiefs for Bedagai and Padang, the resolution (which was submitted to the Crown Commissioner in Medan) protested against the transfer to the NST of powers formerly vested in the Deli sultanate. It demanded the immediate restoration to the sultanate of all pre-War autonomous powers, pending a final decision on the future status of the traditional kingdoms within the federal Indonesian state. (81)

In Medan the Walinegara urged the Dutch authorities to settle the matter quickly, pointing out that the issue had already divided the orang asli population and could seriously damage the stability of the NST itself. (82) From Mansoer's point of view, it was final ratification of NST government

(81) Document 461. The resolution had been issued following a series of unsuccessful discussions between the Sultan, the Crown Commissioner and the Walinegara during January. Document 133.

(82) Document 23; 2.
authority over the traditional kingdoms which was most urgent. So long as the issue remained partially unresolved it provided a spur to sultanate interests to organize politically in opposition to the NST government.

By late February political parties had been formed in Serdang and Langkat to press for the restoration of sultanate autonomy. Taking their cue from the initiatives in Deli, the parties, called Partai Serdang Sepakat and Partai Langkat Sepakat, pressed essentially the same demands as the Deli Sepakat.

The pro-sultanate groupings in Sumatera Timur turned to more cooperative action between the kingdoms. On February 20 the Sultan of Deli convened a meeting of eleven orang asli rulers at his palace for this purpose. The eleven - the rulers of Asahan, Langkat, Serdang, Kualuh-Leidong, Indrapura, Kota-pinang, Lima Puluh, Tanah Datar, Siantar and Suku Dua - agreed that joint action in defence of the traditional kingdoms was imperative. As a result, on March 1 the Sultan of Deli and the other ten rulers submitted a Resolution (Qauloeelhoelhaq) to the Netherlands Indies and federal authorities, complaining that in the eighteen months since the NST came into being no

(83) ibid.
firm decision had been made about the future status of the "self-governing territories" in Sumatera Timur. The rulers reiterated their earlier assertions about the continued legality of the Short Declarations (Korte Verklaring) between the Sumatera Timur kingdoms and the Netherlands Indies government and declared their support for and loyalty to the terms of the contracts. They also re-stated the demand by the Sultan of Langkat the previous year for the establishment of a Council of rulers and adat chiefs as an essential institution within the NST political structure. For the moment at least the sultans and rajas had decided to bury their squabbles in the interests of what by now seemed an increasingly urgent need for common action in defence of their interests.

Throughout March the question of the status of the kingdoms remained at the forefront of political debate within the NST. At the session of the Dewan NST which opened on March 21, Dr. Mansoer, in his opening speech to the Council, showed no inclination to compromise with the rulers. He laid particular stress on the need to fully absorb the kingdoms within the NST in order to ensure complete autonomy for the NST itself. The NST government, he declared, was giving high priority to this.  

(84) Document 570.

(85) Document 24; 2-4.
It was far from reassuring to those pressing the claims of the traditional rulers. Debates within the Dewan during the next month returned continually to the question of the status of the kingdoms and brought into sharp focus the division between and pro- and anti-kingdom factions. An essential argument in the NST government's opposition to the rulers' demands had been the need to secure the territorial sovereignty of the state, which recognition of autonomous kingdoms within the NST would seriously compromise.

The second Dutch military action had brought the question of the territorial sovereignty of the NST to the forefront of political issues. With the military occupation of South Asahan and Labuhan Batu, construction of a territorially expanded negara became a major concern of NST government policy.

Within days of the Dutch occupation of the AsLab (Asahan Selatan/Labuhan Batu) region, NST government officials had moved into the main towns and begun to set up a skeletal local administrative structure. On January 6, NST government officials in AsLab organized the despatch of a delegation consisting of 245 village leaders to Medan, where they presented a petition to the Deputy Walinegara, Raja Kaliamsjah Sinaga, demanding

immediate incorporation of the A$lab territory into the NST. Mansoer, who was in Batavia at the time, returned to Medan on the 8th and held discussions with the delegation's leaders. Two days later the Dewan NST unanimously approved the petition. The petition and the Dewan's approval were then despatched to Jakarta. With Dutch prescriptions for the appearance of popular democratic processes satisfied, Dr. Beel, the High Commissioner for the Crown on January 26 decreed provisional recognition of the A$lab region as a part of the NST. On February 15 the territory was formally incorporated into the NST by decree of the Walinegara.

This rapid assertion of NST sovereignty over A$lab forced the attentions of the traditional rulers of that region to the question of their future status. Most importantly it led the Sultan of Asahan to mend his bridges with the Sultan of Deli.


(88) In October 1948 the office of Lt. Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies had been replaced by that of Hoge Verteegenwoordiger van de Kroon. With the establishment of the new office, Beel, the former Netherlands Prime Minister, took over from van Mook.

(89) Staatsblad No. 44/1949. See Bestuurvraagstukken, vol. 1, No. 1, 1949; 433. Also, Schiller (1955); 158.

(90) "Ketetapan Walinegara Soematera Timoer" No. 54/1949, in Warta Rasmi Negara Sumatera Timur No. 2/1949. On May 12 the Asahan/Labuhan Batu region was officially declared a region (wilayah) of the NST. "Ketetapan Walinegara Soematera Timoer" No. 84/1949, in Warta Rasmi Negara Sumatera Timur No. 12/1949.
and join the latter's initiatives in pressing for the restoration of the pre-War kingdoms. Hence Asahan, together with the rulers of Kotapinang and Kualuh-Leidong, were among those who put their signatures to the Sultan of Deli's Resolution of March 1.

The uncompleted plans and unresolved conflicts in both Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli now quite suddenly began to be deeply affected by important new developments taking place in Jakarta, developments which were to have a vital influence upon the course of events in the two Sumatran residencies. In particular, the Republican movement in both residencies began to be drawn much more tightly than before within the orbit of a national-oriented political authority, centered upon Java.

On April 14 the Republican and Netherlands governments commenced negotiations in Jakarta, under the auspices of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia. Just over three weeks later, on May 7, the two sides signed the so-called "Roem-van Royen Agreement", (91) providing for: an immediate ceasefire between Dutch and Republican forces throughout the archipelago, the restoration of the national Republican govern-

(91) Called after the leaders of the Republican and Netherlands delegations, Mr. Mohamad Roem and J.H. van Royen respectively.
ment to Yogyakarta and the convening of a "Round Table Conference" at the Hague to determine the conditions under which national sovereignty would be transferred to an independent federal state, the Republik Indonesia Serikat (Republic of the United States of Indonesia) - RIS. (92)

Ten days after the signing of the Roem-van Royen Agreement the Emergency Republican Government in Aceh, headed by Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, formally disbanded the province of North Sumatra. All three territories making up the province - Aceh, Tapanuli and Aslab - were put directly under central government control. At the same time, the Emergency Government and the Republican delegation at the Roem-van Royen negotiations refused to recognize the incorporation of Aslab into the NST. (93)

The former North Sumatra governor, Mr. S.M. Amin, was appointed Central Government Commissioner (Komisaris Pemerintah Pusat) for North Sumatra, with the task of coordinating the respective Republican administrations. Tapanuli and Aslab were once again made a single Military Region (Daerah Militer) with government powers to be exercised jointly by a Military Governor.

(92) George Kahin (1952); 421-5. Ray (1967); 176-8.
(93) Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 328-9.
(Gubernor Militer) and a Territorial Military Commander (Panglima Territorium Militer). (94) Dr. Ferdinand Lumbantobing was made Military Governor, while Kawilarang remained as military commander. Both were made responsible directly to the Emergency Government via the Kompampus. Kawilarang, as military commander, was also responsible to the Sumatra TNI commander, Col. Hidajat, in Kutaraja.

In Tapanuli, news of the terms of the Roem-van Royen Agreement was circulating widely through Balige, Tarutung, Sibolga, Padang Sidempuan and other towns along the highway between Medan and Padang within a day of the agreement having been signed. (95) Within PST circles the agreement brought a profound sense of gloom, causing many to despair of their hopes for a Negara Tapanuli being realized; (96) especially since the Netherlands authorities in Jakarta had been dragging their heels for some time on the question of formal recognition of Daerah Istimewa status for Tapanuli. It had been more than five weeks after the Sibolga PST conference before Jakarta made any official response to the conference resolutions. Even then


(95) Waspada 14 May 1949.

(96) Document 612; 5.
on April 23, the Secretary to the High Commissioner for the Crown in Jakarta had written to the "Chairman of the 'Pani-tia Status Seluruh Tapanuli'" in Sibolga merely acknowledging receipt of the Sibolga conference Resolution "with great interest" and vaguely promising official recognition of a provisional representative council for Tapanuli. (97)

With the signing of the Roem-van Royen Agreement, however, the Dutch became anxious to prevent a total collapse of the federalist movement in Tapanuli. On May 11 the High Commissioner for the Crown issued a decree recognizing the three PSTs as jointly constituting a Provisional Representative Council for Tapanuli (Dewan Perwakilan Sementara Tapanuli) - DPST. (98) But in the face of immediate protests from the BFO council, the UN Commission on Indonesia and the Republican delegation to the peace talks, the Dutch backed off from any further supportive actions on behalf of a Negara Tapanuli.

From Padang Sidempuan, Abas and Soripada left for Jakarta to press their case for a Daerah Istimewa Tapanuli at the center of events. The responses they found deeply depressing. The United States representative on the UN Commission, H. Merle

(97) Document 562.
(98) Staatsblad No.117/1949. See Bestuurvragestukken vol. 1, No. 1, 1949; 433. Also, Schiller (1955); 190.
Cochrane, informed Abas that the Commission supported the Republican claim to Tapanuli and considered Tapanuli to be occupied Republican territory. From the Dutch side, van Royen intimated to both Abas and Soripada that the possibilities for creating a Daerah Istimewa Tapanuli were fast disappearing. The Netherlands' Minister for Overseas Territories, van Maarseveen, was more bluntly negative, telling Abas that the Netherlands government now intended to accept the eventual restoration of all the TBA territories (including Tapanuli) to Republican control and that it would not even support separate representation for those territories at the planned Round Table Conference. The anti-Republic and federalist movements in the TBA territories, Maarseveen informed Abas, would henceforth have to look after their own future, without Dutch support. (99)

PST leaders were now well aware that if a Negara Tapanuli were to have any hope of realization they had to resolve immediately their internal differences and produce a movement with significant popular backing which could effectively compete with the Republic in Tapanuli. Soon after Abas and Soripada returned to Tapanuli from Jakarta, leaders from the three PSTs agreed that the establishment of a single PST movement for the residency was a matter of urgency. They

(99) Document 270.
agreed that at the forthcoming second Muktamar Sumatera, due to convene in Medan on May 27, Tapanuli would be represented by a single four-member delegation - Raja Barita Sinambela, Eliab Siagian, Mr. Abas and Sjukur Soripada. (100)

The Roem-van Royen Agreement also forced leaders of the three PSTs to realize that if the federal movement in Tapanuli was to have any chance of survival an accommodation had to be reached with the moderate wing of the Republican movement. Notwithstanding the decision to send a delegation to the second Muktamar Sumatera, PST leaders began to stress the need for the proposed Daerah Istimewa Tapanuli to be a constituent entity directly under a future independent federal Indonesian state, thereby virtually discarding any commitment to participation in a Sumatran federation. (101) At public meetings organized by the PSTs in Padang Sidempuan and Tarutung late in May specific appeals were made to Republicans to join in the creation of a Daerah Istimewa Tapanuli within an independent federal Indonesia. (102)

(100) Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 328.
(101) Federalist support in Tapanuli for the Sumatra federation had declined significantly since the first Muktamar, mainly because the proposed federation was increasingly regarded as merely a creature of the NST government and of Malay ethnic interests.
(102) At a meeting in Padang Sidempuan on May 22 Mr. Abas had asserted that both federalists and Republicans were in fact
These PST overtures to Republican supporters were, however, nullified almost from the time they were being made by actions of the Dutch military authorities in the residency. During the latter part of May, Dutch military police arrested hundreds of Republican supporters in Balige, Tarutung and Sibolga on suspicion of aiding "terrorist activities" directed against the TBA administration. Those arrested included the former Secretary to Resident Lumbantobing, Oberlin Lumbantobing, the former publisher of the Republican newspaper in Sibolga Suara Harian, Marsakap Hutabarat, the Chairman of Parkindo in Tarutung, Washington Lumbantobing, and the former Deputy Chairman of the DPR Tapanuli and PNI leader, S.M. Simandjuntak (103).

The arrests immediately intensified Republican antipathy towards the TBA administration and its local (federalist) allies, especially since news of the Roem-van Royen Agreement had already made it widely known that the days of Dutch occupation were numbered. Republican supporters in the TBA-controlled committed to a single aim, namely the establishment of a free and sovereign Indonesian state. The only difference between the two groups was that one preferred a federal system while the other preferred a unitary one. Waspada 6 June 1949. Document 612; 6-7.

(103) Waspada 1 June & 15 July 1949. The arrests had been made in the wake of a major Dutch military attack on gerilya bases in South Tapanuli, Padang Lawas, the Balige region and the Tarutung region, early in May. Document 612; 1.
urban areas were now busy consolidating their links with the *gerilya* movement in the countryside. They were in no mood for reaching accords with the federalist movement.

Within the NST, as news of the Roem-van Royen Agreement spread through the Republican movement it brought a sudden increase in guerilla activity. TNI and *lasykar* guerilla units expanded their areas of operations in Langkat, Deli, Serdang, Simalungun and Asahan. The incidence of guerilla attacks and sabotage, especially on the plantations, increased.

Reviewing developments during May, the Walinegara's office reported (104) that the Roem-van Royen Agreement had provided great stimulus to *gerilya* motivations and activity. Guerilla units were actively engaged in establishing Republican "bases" within the NST in order to claim these as Republican territory following any peace agreement. The general condition of "insecurity" within the NST, the report went on, has had a "paralyzing influence", with Republican supporters very active in mobilizing popular support for a restored Republican administration. (105)


(105) On June 27 the representative in Medan of the Interim Federal Government's Department of Economic Affairs,
The debilitating effects of the Roem-van Royen Agreement on the federalist movement throughout Sumatra were all too apparent by the time the second Muktamar Sumatera convened in Medan (instead of Palembang as originally planned) on May 28. (106) On the opening day the South Sumatran, NST, Djammi, Riouw, Minangkabau and Tapanuli delegations jointly sent telegrams to the UN Commission, to the Netherlands Minister for Overseas Territories and to the Chairman of the Second Chamber of the Netherlands States General criticising both the Netherlands government and the BFO for having ignored "the interests of Sumatra" in entering into the May 7 Agreement with the Republic. (107) Disappointment and pessimism over the Agreement dominated discussions at the Muktamar. The final Resolutions of the Muktamar expressed strong opposition to the terms of the Roem-van Royen Agreement and reiterated the earlier criticisms of the Netherlands and the BFO made in the telegram of the 28th. (108)

Seyffardt, wrote to the Secretary of the High Commissioner of the Crown in Jakarta that "Disorder, attacks and terror increase daily and we slide down a sloping plain at the rate of half mass-velocity squared (\(\frac{1}{2}MV^2\)), wherein M corresponds to Manscer, the mass of which is not small."

Document 564.


(107) Document 281.

The *Muktamar* closed with a Resolution declaring that a "provisional federation" of all states and special regions in Sumatra would be formed soon. But the Sumatra federation was already a lost cause. The delegates at the conference fully realized that with most of Sumatra now recognized by the Dutch as being *de facto* Republican territory, any real hope for a federation had vanished.

The final nail was hammered into the coffin of the Sumatran federation by the *Dewan NST* itself. A week after the conclusion of the second *Muktamar* the *Dewan* approved, by a margin of 18 to 11, a motion rejecting NST participation in the Sumatra federation on the grounds that to do so would destroy NST independence. Shortly afterwards the BFO in Jakarta also rejected the idea of a Sumatra federation and Mansoer announced that the NST would no longer consider joining such a federation.

Political divisions within the NST were now widening as both politicians and the general populace began to reassess the political future in the light of that which had taken place in Jakarta since early May. A growing number of NST politicians

---

(109) ibid.

(110) Document 26; 2-3 and Document 27; 1. Also, Document 566.

were becoming increasingly disgruntled with these developments. By the end of June, with the return of the Republican government to Yogyakarta imminent, the senior representative in Medan of the Interim Federal Government's Department of Economic Affairs, A.L.W. Seyffardt, reported that there were now three distinct, mutually conflicting interest groups within the Dewan NST opposing the NST government on major policy matters. First were the "real negara-minded": those committed to defending NST political autonomy against any interference, whether from the traditional rulers, the Republic or the federal government. Second was "the zelfbestuurenden group": those committed to a restoration of the traditional kingdoms. Third was a "Republican group": those anxious to reach an accommodation with the Republican movement. Together the

(112) The general public in Sumatera Timur, Seyffardt reported, views the NST government as "impotent" and regards the return of Republican control as "imminent". More and more people were consequently readjusting their political loyalties in the direction of the Republic. Most district chiefs were making compromises with local Republican groups, with the result that the authority of the NST government does not extend much beyond Medan. Shortly afterwards Seyffardt reported that anti-Dutch sentiments were growing amongst the NST elite. Many members of the Dewan NST, he said, were becoming strongly antipathetic towards the two Dutch members of the NST Cabinet, Forch and van Gelder, resenting the latter's influence in government policy making. This situation was seriously undermining the authority of Dr. Mansoer. Seyffardt suggested that Forch and van Gelder be removed from their government positions as early as possible. A week later he reported that Republican forces were ready to raise the Red and White flag in villages and kampungs throughout the NST, while in
three groups constituted a majority in the Dewan. Despite mutual differences, they had combined to reject the Sumatra federation. With all three groups having influential supporters in the policy-making councils of the NST government, the government itself was becoming increasingly hamstrung by internal dissension.

On June 30 the last Dutch soldier withdrew from Jogjakarta Residency, and Republican army units took over.... Six days later Soekarno and the other long-interned Republican leaders entered Jogjakarta triumphantly to a thunderous popular acclaim. On July 13 the Republican cabinet held its first meeting since the launching of the Dutch attack seven months before. At the same time Sjafruddin Prawiranegara handed back the mandate that Soekarno and Hatta had then given him as head of the Emergency Government. (113)

In Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli, Java and the Hague now loomed large in the perceptions of political leaders, Republican and federalist.

In Sumatera Timur there was an immediate revival of activity by the various legal Republican organizations, several of which issued statements welcoming the recent developments. (114)

Medan half the Dewan NST were already making their own compromises with the Republic. Documents 564, 565 & 566.

(113) George Kahin (1952); 427-8.

(114) See statements from the Front Nasional, Sekata and Mohamadiyah in Waspada 5, 6 & 8 July 1949. On the formation of a new Front Nasional executive, to replace that headed by Dr. Djabangoen, see Waspada 17 May 1949.
The news from Java injected new life into the entire spectrum of the legal Republican opposition in the NST. But most especially it brought a stiffening of resolve amongst the non-cooperative majority making up that opposition. Within the *Front Nasional* it brought a sudden undermining of the authority of the moderate, cooperative leadership, headed by the former *Bank Dagang Nasional* chairman, Elias Sutan Pangeran, that had been formed on May 17, following the resignation of Dr. Djabangoen. The non-cooperative political groups, chiefly those associated with the PNI and *Masyumi*, began making preparations to take control of the *Front Nasional*. At the same time, guerillas in the countryside stepped up their attacks on government and military installations, particularly upon the plantations. Attacks on plantations extended across the *negara*, from Langkat to Labuhan Batu. Warehouses, machinery and stockpiles of produce were damaged or destroyed. (115) TNI units, re-formed *lasykar rakyat*, plantation workers, squatter farmers all combined to widen the operations of the *gerilya* movement as a whole.

Amongst the NST elite, reactions to the Republic's restoration in Java varied. On July 12, a week after Sukarno, Hatta

---

and other leaders had returned to Yogyakarta and the day before the re-formation of the Republican cabinet, Mansoer issued a statement in Medan declaring that the NST would not recognize any ceasefire agreement reached between the Netherlands and the Republic which permitted Republican forces to remain within NST territory. Should this occur, he added, the Barisan Pengawal would take its own offensive action to drive out such Republican forces. (116) Mansoer and many other NST leaders were becoming increasingly bitter as the terms of the Roem-van Royen Agreement began to reach fruition.

Bitterness and anger, but more especially nervous apprehension, also spread through the ranks of that most conservative sector of the NST elite, those pressing the case of the traditional kingdoms. The sultans of Deli, Asahan and Batubara, the raja of Siantar and the sibayak of Barusjahe departed for Jakarta intending to press their case with the BFO and the High Commissioner for the Crown. Recognizing that the Republic was a reality that had to be lived with, the five traditional rulers modified their earlier demands. They proposed that government

---

Within hours of Mansoer's statement being released, Seyffardt reported that it had been "inspired by Forch and van Gelder" and had been made without reference to himself. Also, the Crown Commissioner in Medan and a leading member of the "pro-Republic" grouping within the NST elite, Tengku Hafas, had protested against the statement. Document 565. Also, Document 166; 2.
of the traditional kingdoms should lie jointly in the hands of the NST government and the rulers. (117)

Unfortunately times were now even less propitious than ever for the native aristocracies. The Inter-Indonesia Conference was about to begin and the ceasefire talks between the Republic and the Netherlands was proceeding towards a successful conclusion. (118) Under these circumstances neither Netherlands nor BFO leaders were willing to place the success of these negotiations at risk in the interests of local aristocracies. Consequently the only undertaking the Sumatera Timur rulers were able to get was a promise that their future would be considered further once the ceasefire had been achieved.

In Tapanuli, PST leaders were faced not only with having to pre-empt an impending restoration of the Republic but also with the problem of keeping alive a movement from which the number of defectors kept increasing. At a Padang Sidempuan meeting on June 26, and an earlier one in Tarutung, some of those present had openly urged the abandonment of the whole federalist movement and the acceptance of a restored Republican


(118) George Kahin (1952); 430-1. Schiller (1955); 61. Ray (1967); 178-9.
administration. (119) At the June 26 meeting in Padang Sidempuan, Sjukur Soripada announced that the BFO in Jakarta could no longer be relied upon to protect the interests of Tapanuli. (120) PST leaders throughout Tapanuli reasoned that the only hope for the survival of federalist ideals was to present any restored Republican administration with the fait accompli of governmental institutions controlled by federalist sympathisers, thereby forcing the former to reach some accommodation with the federalist movement. Establishment of a permanent, federalist-controlled representative council was an urgent essential in such a plan.

Throughout July federalist leaders in Tapanuli worked hard to counteract the depressing future facing them. The BFO and the UN Commission on Indonesia had reaffirmed the status of Tapanuli as occupied Republican territory, pursuant to the Roem-van Royen Agreement. The PST had been excluded from the Inter-Indonesia Conference. (121) Within the TBA-controlled regions a rapidly expanding Republican movement was emerging. Stimulated by news of the return of the Sukarno-Hatta government to Yogyakarta, branches of the FKRI in Sibolga,


Tarutung and Padang Sidempuan were building up a rapidly expanding popular movement under the general term Front Republikein. (122)

Shortly afterwards, in Sumatera Timur, the "pro-Republic" grouping within the NST elite (identified earlier by Seyffardt) brought pressure to bear on Mansoer to reach an accommodation with the Republic. They objected to the hard anti-Republic line being taken by the Director of the NST cabinet, Tengku Bahriun, and the two former NEFIS intelligence officers, Forch and van Gelder. Eventually on August 1 they succeeded in having Bahriun replaced by the former Republican Resident for Sumatera Timur, Tengku Hafas, whom they considered more likely to take a conciliatory, pragmatic approach towards the Republic. (123)

On August 2 the Republican and BFO delegations at the Inter-Indonesia Conference agreed on the basic principles for a provisional constitution of a federal Indonesian state. (124) Since agreements at the conference were to constitute joint Republican-BFO submissions to the Round Table Conference, scheduled to commence in The Hague on August 23, they were highly

---

(123) Document 166; 2-4.
(124) Schiller (1955); 24.
indicative of the future. In other words, the agreements formed guidelines to which both Republicans and federalists throughout Indonesia would have to adjust their thinking and behaviour.

Not only did the Inter-Indonesia Conference agreements acknowledge that the Republic would be the major constituent unit within a future federal Indonesia, but several points of the agreements had particularly important relevance to Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli. Firstly, it was agreed that the territory of the Republic would be that defined as such by the earlier Renville Agreement, with the proviso that the final status of South Asahan and Labuhan Batu would be a matter for subsequent negotiation. Tapanuli, therefore, was recognized as Republican territory. For the NST, this meant that the Dutch could no longer acknowledge the Aslab region as a permanent part of the negara. Secondly, the conference agreed that the final status of all the traditional kingdoms within a federal Indonesian state would have to be determined by the independent federal government itself. Thirdly, none of the constituent states of federal Indonesia would be permitted their own armed forces. Instead all Indo-

(125) Item 2 of "Communique 'Konperensi Inter-Indonesia 22 Djuli 1949'", in Konperensi Medja Bundar; 144.

(126) Item 4, in ibid.
determined in accordance with whether the region concerned was
Joint Committee in Jakarta, Composition of the LICS would be
the UN Commission on Indonesia, responsible to a Central
local Joint Committees - LICS, headed by a Representative of
Supervision of the ceasefire would be placed in the hands of
they held at the time of the signing of the agreement.
Republiccan and Dutch forces were to remain in the positions
effect from Java from August II and in Sumatra from the 15th.

This referred to the New-Van Kroyen Agreement, and would take
deliberations meeting in Jakarta concluded a ceasefire agreement.
the Inter-Indonesian Conference, the Republiccan and Netherlands

one day after the final agreements had been reached at


dated

federal army.

of the NSP would be placed in the hands of a TNI-dominated
Penanggulangan would cease to be a separate armed force and defence
following withdrawal of Dutch military forces, the burning
which the TNI would form the "core". This meant that
of sovereignty would be merged into a single federal army, of
military units in existence at the time of the transfer.

8.70
"Republican" or "BFO" (federal) territory within the terms of the Roem-van Royen Agreement. In the case of Sumatera Timur (deemed to be BFO territory) the LJC would include representatives of the TNI, Netherlands forces and the NST government. For Tapanuli (deemed Republican territory) the LJC would include representatives only of the Netherlands and Republican forces.

On August 5, the federal authorities moved to mollify the Sumatera Timur traditional rulers in the wake of the Inter-Indonesia Conference agreement. The Interim Federal Government established a Commission to advise on the problems associated with the restoration of autonomous powers to the traditional kingdoms within the NST, and to ascertain the wishes of the populations of the kingdoms as to the future pattern of political relations between the respective kingdoms and the NST. The Commission would be headed by a representative of the High Commissioner of the Crown and consist of four representatives of the kingdoms and four from the NST government. (131)

(130) Item III.7, in ibid.; 163.

(131) The Crown Commissioner in Medan, Mr. H.W.J. Sonius, was made Chairman. The other members of the commission were: the Sultan of Deli, the Sibayak of Barusjahe, Datuk Ahmad Kamil of Deli, Tengku Dzulkarnain of Kotapinang (representing the traditional kingdoms), Mr. Mahadi (Department of Justice), Tengku Abdul Hamid (Department of Economic Affairs), Madja Purba (Department of Interior) and Ngeradjai Meliala
But it was a token gesture. The Commission had no clear frame of reference nor was it empowered to make any specific recommendations. The Sultan of Deli finally acknowledged the new political realities when, in announcing a few days later that any agreement reached at the Round Table Conference should ensure that the political powers of the Sumatera Timur sultans was no less than that enjoyed by their counterparts in East Indonesia, he added that he fully supported the establishment of an independent federal Indonesia and accepted that Sukarno was the person most suited to be President.

Mansoer, too, moved away from the hard-line stance he had taken, (Dewan NST) (representing the NST government). Tengku Dzulkarnain was currently the State Secretary for Justice in the Interim Federal Government. Waspada 20 August 1949. Oostkust van Sumatra Instituut Kroniek 1948-1949; 43. A few days after the commission had been formed Datuk Kamil resigned to attend the Round Table Conference in The Hague. In his place the Acting Walinegara, Tengku Hafas, appointed the head of the NST Department of Interior and leader of the NST delegation on the Sumatera Timur LJC, Tengku Arifin. The first session of the commission, on August 18, collapsed in procedural wrangling as the Sultan of Deli refused to accept Arifin's appointment, on the grounds that it gave the NST government five members on the commission to the rulers' three. This dissension had been greatly assisted by the fact that personal animosity had long existed between the Sultan and Arifin. Document 166; 7-8.

Waspada 29 August 1949. Nine years later, however, the Sultan was to remark to the journalist James Mossman: "Sukarno is an hysterical and terribly ill-bred. I know perfectly well he hates me and would like to get rid of me." Mossman (1961); 75.
taken immediately following the Roem-van Royen Agreement.

On August 6, following a meeting with the Executive Council of the Front Nasional, he announced that, in view of the agreements reached at the Inter-Indonesia Conference, the NST government would officially recognize the Front Nasional as a legal organization. (133) Four days later the ban on NST civil servants joining the FN was removed. (134)

On August 3, the day after the conclusion of the Inter-Indonesia Conference and the same day that the Republic-Netherlands ceasefire agreement was announced, leaders of the three PSTs met in Sibolga for the initial session of the DPST. Abas was elected Chairman and Raja Sinambela deputy Chairman. At the end of the first day the meeting issued a Resolution demanding that Tapanuli be granted representation at the Round Table Conference as a federal territory, and asserting that the DPST would not recognize any Tapanuli representatives chosen by the Republic, the BFO, the Netherlands government or any authority other than the DPST itself. (135)

(133) Waspada 9 August 1949.

(134) "Ketetapan Walinegara Soematera Timoer" No. 219/1949, in Warta Rasmi Negara Sumatera Timur No. 37/1949. The Chairman of the Front Nasional, the decree stated, had assured the NST government that the FN's members would not engage in activity aimed at the destruction of the negara.

(135) Document 547. Also, Document 615; 4.
That same day, in Tarutung, fifteen prominent community leaders issued a "Manifesto" declaring their opposition to the setting up of the DPST and disagreeing with the "Tapanuli Special Region (Daerah Istimewa Tapanuli) idea of Abas, Soripada and Sinambela". Copies were sent to the TBA in Sibolga, the Republican government in Yogyakarta and to the Republic and BFO delegations to the Round Table Conference. The significant thing about the Manifesto was that the signatories included seven federalist sympathisers. (136)

By the time the DPST session closed on August 10 it had approved the establishment of a permanent fifty-five member Dewan Perwakilan, elected a five-member executive council (Badan Pekerdja) and elected Sjukur Soripada as regional head (Kepala Daerah) for the proposed Daerah Istimewa Tapanuli. (137)

Also, Soripada, Eliab Siagian and R.O. Simatupang were chosen to attend the Round Table Conference. Next day, the 11th, the

(136) See Waspada 10 & 11 August 1949.

(137) The Dewan Perwakilan would consist of 17 members each from North Tapanuli, South Tapanuli and Sibolga, plus two representatives each for the Chinese and "other foreign" minorities. Members elected to the Badan Pekerdja were: Eliab Siagian, R.O. Simatupang (head of the TBA Department of Information for Tapanuli), T.M. Sihombing (Inspector of Schools for Sibolga), P. Pasaribu (wedana of Siborongborong) and Maruhum Hutabarat (wedana of Tarutung). Significantly all five were Toba Bataks, apparently to compensate for the election of two South Tapanuli leaders, Abas and Soripada, as DPST Chairman and Kepala Daerah respectively. Waspada 13 August 1949. Document 615; 4-5.
FKRI in Sibolga submitted a Resolution to the TBA, the Republican government in Yogyakarta and the BFO in Jakarta declaring that Tapanuli was an "essential" part of the Republic and demanding the immediate disbandment of the three PSTs.\(^{(138)}\) On behalf of the DPST, Soripada urged the TBA to "nationalize" the civil administration in Tapanuli by quickly replacing all Dutch officials with Indonesians. The TBA refused, on the grounds that no administrative changes could be effected in Tapanuli until decisions to this effect had been made at the Hague conference, or until after an independent federal Indonesia had come into being.\(^{(139)}\)

The federalist-controlled administration in Tapanuli which the PST leaders had hoped to achieve before the Round Table Conference opened was still a very long way from realization. Moreover, with no representation on the Tapanuli LJC\(^{(140)}\) the federalists would have no say in whatever arrangements for territorial control were entered into between the Republican and Dutch military authorities, except insofar as they could influence the latter to protect their interests. But by the beginning of August, this influence had rapidly

\(^{(138)}\) Document 162. See Waspada 15 August 1949.

\(^{(139)}\) Document 616; 5. Document 559.

\(^{(140)}\) The Tapanuli LJC was to consist of six members; two each from the Republic, the TBA and the UN Commission.
On August 9 Dr. Mansoer and Raja Kaliamsjah left Medan for the Round Table Conference. They were accompanied by Datuk Kamil and Messrs. Forch and van Gelder. (141) Three days later, the three-member DPST delegation also departed for The Hague, accompanied by Mr. Abas. (142) In the eight days between the ceasefire coming into effect and the commencement of the Round Table Conference, the LJC's for Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli took shape.

On August 14 the TNI Divisi X command in Aceh appointed a six-member delegation - headed by the commander for the Langkat area, Major Mohamad Nazir - to represent the Republic on the Sumatera Timur LJC. (143) Even before this TNI commanders in some local areas had already begun preliminary discussions.

(141) The Dutch authorities in Medan reported that there was strong opposition within NST elite circles to the inclusion of Forch and van Gelder in the NST delegation to the Hague conference. Document 166; 1-2.

(142) The DPST delegation, along with those from other TBA territories, was not granted participatory rights in the conference but was allowed to attend the sessions where they could be called upon to explain their special interests.

(143) The Republican delegation consisted of four TNI officers - Nazir, Major Djamin Gintings, Major Wahab Macmour and Captain Mudihardjo, and two civilians - the bupati of Aceh Timur (Tengku Maimun Habsjah) and the head of the Customs Department in Kutaraja (Tajab). Waspada 15 August 1949. Nip Xarim et. al. (n.d.), vol. 2; 301-2.
on the ceasefire with their Dutch counterparts. By the 19th, Tengku Arifin and A.H.F. Rotty had been appointed to head the NST delegation to the LJC, and a three-member delegation from the UN Commission on Indonesia (led by the American Col. J.W. Alexander) had arrived in Medan. The same day Major Nazir's party reached Medan. Two days later the first session of the LJC commenced.

On August 18, the TNI commander, Kawilarang, arrived in Sibolga for preliminary talks with the Dutch military command. The first session of the Tapanuli LJC, they agreed, would be held on the 25th. In the meantime Kawilarang would establish a TNI liason office in Tarutung.

Two days later Resident Lumbantobing entered Sibolga to a tumultuous welcome from thousands of people lining the main street of the town. With Resident Heckman, senior TBA officials and dozens of Republican leaders on hand to greet him, the event became an emotion-charged triumphal entry. That evening, as

(144) Djamin Gintings notes that he had commenced talks in Kabanjahe with the Dutch commander for the Tanah Karo region on August 18, three days before the LJC in Medan met for the first time. Gintings (1969); 299-300.


(146) Waspada 20 August 1949.
Republican supporters celebrated in the town, Lumbantobing and Kawilarang were guests of honour at a reception at Hecker's official residence. (147)

Within a week of his return to Sibolga, Lumbantobing had made it clear that he intended to consolidate Republican authority via conciliation rather than confrontation. In a number of speeches he laid considerable stress on the need for peaceful cooperation between Republicans and federalists in the interests of Tapanuli unity. (148) Earlier, on August 15, the day that the ceasefire officially came into effect and five days before his return, the FKRI in Sibolga had begun circulating an "Open Letter" from Lumbantobing, addressed to all federalist sympathisers, calling on them to support the Republic in order that the special interests of Tapanuli would not be sacrificed through internal division. Those interests, the letter added, would best be served by a Republican rather than a federalist administration, because the former represented the majority popular sentiment in the region. (149) It was a propaganda

(148) Document 615; 3.
(149) Document 545.
approach that went to the heart of those emotions which had been the central focus for federalist appeals. Tactically Lumbantobing was seeking to present the Republic as a more able defender of federalist ideals than either the Dutch or the PST.

The NST government, temporarily under the direction of Tengku Hafas in the absence of Mansoer and Raja Kaliamsjah in Holland, made further conciliatory approaches towards the Republic. Now the tactics of compromise aimed at appropriating for the federalist movement the same trappings and symbols of nationalist legitimacy as that utilized by the Republic. On August 17 the NST government itself organized public celebrations to commemorate the fourth anniversary of the declaration of independence. At the main rally in Medan, Republican flags were flown alongside those of the NST and the Netherlands. The head of the NST Department of Information, O.K. Ramli, informed the crowd that:

We the Indonesian nation are no longer divided by differences between federalists or republicans, but together celebrate the 17th of August and actively commemorate this fourth anniversary with untold rejoicing and in an atmosphere of well-being. (150)

(150) Waspada 18 August 1949. Ramli went on to praise the nationalist symbolism of the Red and White flag, declaring that it had been the "national flag of Indonesia" since the time of the Majapahit empire. Other reports of the Medan rally are given in Wakteo 3 September 1949. Oostkust
The aim of NST leaders was to dramatize the federalist ideal, not so much as a clear alternative to the Republic's unitary state but as a more realizable variant within essentially the same nationalist mainstream. But, if the purpose was to convince moderate Republicans to make common cause with the NST in support of a federal Indonesia, the independence day celebrations achieved little. All the legal Republican organizations, including the Front Nasional, boycotted the NST-organized celebrations. (151)

By the time the Round Table Conference had opened in The Hague on August 23 the parallel developments of gerilya within and diplomasi without had restored the Republic to a position of political dominance in Tapanuli and enormously strengthened its position in balance-of-power terms in Sumatera Timur.


(151) Document 166; 5-6.
The months of the so-called guerrilla (guerilla-era) in
Tapanuli and Sumatera Timur had produced a marked increase
in popular support for the Republic. This is not to suggest
that some of those who, for ethnic, economic or ideological
reasons, were committed supporters of the federalist movement,
who viewed the Republic as pandering too much to the
Demands of radicals or extremists, switched sides as a result
of the guerrilla struggle. On the contrary, to these people
the guerrilla actions only served to confirm views about the
extremist nature of the Republic itself. Rather, it was
amongst the large, undefinable, people, rural and urban,
that the guerrilla activities produced increased support and
sympathy for the Republic.

CHAPTER 9

MERDEKA ACHIEVED

Although the great majority of people took little or no
active part in the guerrilla struggle, being far too preoccupied
with the day to day problems of survival, many came to see the
guerrillas as romantic heroes bearing promises of a new era of
prosperity. In the villages there were undoubtedly those who
had occasion to resent the economic demands made by the guerrillas
and who had been victims of arbitrary actions by guerrilla bands.
But in general, by August 1949 there were far more committed
supporters of the Republic throughout Tapanuli and Sumatera
Timur than there had been at the end of 1948. The eight months
of guerrilla struggle had greatly strengthened the commitment of
The months of the zaman gerilya (guerilla era) in Tapanuli and Sumatera Timur had produced a marked increase in popular support for the Republic. This is not to suggest that some of those who, for ethnic, economic or ideological reasons, were committed supporters of the federalist movement, or who viewed the Republic as pandering too much to the demands of radicals or extremists, switched sides as a result of the gerilya struggle. On the contrary, to these people the gerilya actions only served to confirm views about the extremist nature of the Republic itself. Rather, it was amongst the large, undefined mass of people, rural and urban, that the gerilya activities produced increased support and sympathy for the Republic.

Although the great majority of people took little or no active part in the gerilya struggle, being far too preoccupied with the day to day problems of survival, many came to see the gerilyas as romantic heroes bearing promises of a new era of prosperity. In the villages there were undoubtedly those who had occasion to resent the economic demands made by the gerilyas and who had been victims of arbitrary actions by gerilya bands. But in general, by August 1949 there were far more committed supporters of the Republic throughout Tapanuli and Sumatera Timur than there had been at the end of 1948. The eight months of gerilya struggle had greatly strengthened the commitment of
large sections of the populations, especially the rural sector, to the Republic.

Among active supporters of the Republic, the *gerilya* struggle helped to provide a greater sense of solidarity than had existed for a long time, if ever, before. The prevailing conditions of common adversity and sense of danger diverted attentions away from many of the earlier issues of factionalism. As Reid has concluded,

In terms of the sense of identity between elite townspeople and the rural mass, the guerilla period was a climax to the whole revolutionary process. Army officers, politicians, officials, and refugees of all sorts from the occupied cities were thrown on the hospitality of uneducated villagers. The contact was not always without friction, but its impact on both sides was profound. For many villagers the presence of these refugees and their cat-and-mouse encounters with Dutch patrols was the first real experience of revolution.

But factional consciousness and primordial loyalties could not be made to disappear overnight. In August, Bedjo, referring to protests made by the *Mohamadiyah* and HKBP in Tarutung about both TNI and Dutch troops burning houses in Tapanuli, could not resist stressing that these actions had only occurred in those regions commanded by his Toba Batak adversaries of 1948.

---

(1) Reid (1974); 155.

(2) On the protests, see *Waspada* 28 June & 2 July 1949.

(3) *Waspada* 1 September 1949.
Pajung Bangun,\(^4\) reporting on *gerilya* operations in the Padang Lawas/Sipirok region, noted that:

In our area there had arisen the sickness of mistrust and suspicions which ultimately forms a new front (a double/triple front) for (our) forces, so that there is always the danger of attack from the rear or from the flank which has to be guarded against, while also guarding against attacks by the enemy from the front.

The fundamental ideological divisions had been muted during the *gerilya* period but remained basically unchanged. The more militant confessional Moslems and Christians still had as much dislike as ever for those whom they considered secularists and atheists. The deep gulf separating the *pergerakan* and moderate extremities of the Republican political movement remained as wide as ever.

By September, as the Round Table Conference got under way, Republican *gerilya* forces moved to consolidate and expand their territorial control. In Sumatera Timur, Republican forces responded to the ceasefire agreement by curtailing military activity considerably. There were still a few isolated attacks on NST government installations and on plantations, but these were carried out mostly by small, independent *lasykar rakyat*.\(^5\)

This did not necessarily mean, however, that all TNI and *gerilya* commanders were willing to gracefully accept compromise arrangements.

\(^{(4)}\) Bangun (1949); 7.

\(^{(5)}\) See Document 166; 5.
ments with the NST. On the contrary, most continued to refuse to recognize NST sovereignty, merely agreeing instead to temporary ceasefire arrangements with the Dutch military forces. In a few cases, especially in Simalungun and Asahan, small laskar units refused to do even this.\(^{(6)}\)

During September and October, NST and Dutch representatives on the Sumatera Timur LJC submitted numerous complaints alleging gerilya activity by the TNI in all five wilayah of the Negara. While allowing for inevitable contextual exaggeration in the detailing of particular incidents, the series of complaints over this two month period shows the gerilya Republic continuing to undermine NST government authority throughout the countryside. NST and Dutch representatives on the LJC complained about TNI units establishing new posts, expanding recruitment in villages, requisitioning supplies and levying taxes in more and more rural areas, raiding plantations, arresting NST-appointed district and village chiefs, deposing others and replacing them with Republican supporters, temporarily occupying villages and raising the Republican flag.\(^{(7)}\)

\(^{(6)}\) Documents 214 and 215.

\(^{(7)}\) See Documents 157 and 299. Also, Document 180; 8. Document 181; 1-2. These sources list dozens of village chiefs, camats and wedanas dismissed by local TNI commanders and replaced by Republican supporters. Brief accounts of this continuing aspect of the guerilla struggle are also given in Nip Xarim et. al. (n.d.), vol. 2; 321-5 and Gintings (1969); 307.
By mid-October, Dutch authorities in Medan were reporting the expansion of "shadow" Republican administrations into previously NST-controlled territory throughout the NST.\(^{(8)}\) A month later, the Dutch reported growing numbers of NST police and plantation watchmen deserting to the TNI, taking their weapons with them.\(^{(9)}\)

From time to time Dutch, Barisan Pengawal or NST Police units would retaliate by raiding local TNI bases, seizing weapons and arresting suspected 'terrorists'. Periodically similar raids were made on the more openly pro-Republican villages and urban kampungs, usually in reprisal for an earlier gerilya raid on nearby plantations, military or police post.\(^{(10)}\)

Dutch and NST reprisals, however, in no way constituted serious resistance to the gradual expansion of territorial control by the TNI/gerilya administrations. The Dutch military command, now preparing for an impending total withdrawal from Indonesia, was unwilling to risk the casualties which more aggressive actions against Republican forces would bring. Moreover, a successful conclusion to the Round Table Conference was

---

\(^{(8)}\) Document 180; 5. The authority of the NST government, the report added, was continuing to diminish. ibid.; 1.

\(^{(9)}\) Document 181; 4.

\(^{(10)}\) Republican allegations of such raids are given in Document 529.
a matter of prime importance so far as the Dutch were concerned. They were, therefore, unwilling to risk any major military confrontation with the Republic which could prejudice the Hague negotiations.

This situation had in turn brought about a crisis of confidence within the Barisan Pengawal. Greatly outnumbered by Republican military forces, and almost completely reliant upon Dutch training, expertise and military support, it was in no condition to take the offensive against the TNI. At the same time there was deepening factionalism within the Barisan Pengawal officer corps. By October, the corps was clearly divided into two main factions. One, consisting mostly of members of the Malay aristocracy, directed their loyalties to the NST Defence Minister, the Sultan of Asahan. The other, mostly Simalungun Bataks and Karonese, directed loyalties to the corps commander, Colonel Djomat Purba. (11) By now Dutch assessments were that the Barisan Pengawal would probably not even be able to effectively "contain" the TNI in Sumatera Timur. (12)

In the more strictly civilian arena, the September-October period saw a further growth of legal Republican organizations

(12) ibid.
within the NST. (13) This was accompanied by a hardening of non-cooperative attitudes towards the NST, right across the spectrum of pro-Republic groups.

At the second conference of the *Front Nasional* in Medan on September 10 and 11, the cooperator Chairman, Elias Sutan Pangeran, was removed. In his place the conference elected the veteran nationalist Sugondo Kartoprodjo who, since his release from detention by the Dutch some months earlier, had consistently opposed recognition of the legality of the NST. This non-cooperative stance was adopted by the conference as a central element in the political program of the FN. The status of Sumatera Timur, it was declared, was still indeterminate and consequently remained a matter for final determination by a future independent federal Indonesian government. (14)

Shortly afterwards, a conference of fourteen local branches of *Sekata* took a similar non-cooperative stance. The conference re-elected Musa Pattipeluhu, who along with Sugondo had been jailed for a brief period during and after the second Dutch

(13) At the end of September there were about thirty-five legal pro-Republic social and political organizations in the NST. *ibid.*; 4.

military action, as Chairman of Sekata for Sumatera Timur. (15) The dominant sentiment at the conference was one of complete opposition to any cooperation or compromise with the NST which might in any way constitute legal recognition of the Negara. (16) By the end of October, several new branches of both the Front Nasional and Sekata had been formed. At the same time membership of existing branches increased significantly. Chiefly via the PRS, branches of both organizations were working in close association with a number of gerilya administrations. (17) Moreover, provisional leadership councils were re-formed for the two largest Republican political parties in Sumatera Timur, the Masyumi and the PNI. Also, PKI activists were re-forming the peasants' front, the Barisan Tani Indonesia - BTI, as a rural base for future reconstitution of the party itself. (18) Within two months of the opening of the Round Table Conference, a remarkably unified Republican political movement, linking the rural and urban extremities of the Republic and commanding the loyalties of thousands of people, emerged in Sumatera Timur.

(16) ibid.
For the moment at least all the major Republican social and political organizations, including Sekata, the Masyumi, the PNI and the BTI, had accepted the Front Nasional as an overall coordinating authority, representing the common interests of the Republic in opposition to those of the NST.

By contrast political dissension within the NST elite continued to develop, especially the two long-standing issues of the land problem and the future of the traditional kingdoms. Both issues were now being influenced directly by the Republican political revival in Sumatera Timur. Increasing political activity by Sekata and other pro-Republic farmers' organizations during September and October compounded the related problems of squatter occupation and labour shortage on the plantations. Experiencing the growing authority of the gerilya movement and with impending independence giving increasing credence to the promises by the farmers' organizations that once this happened plantation land would be redistributed to peasant farmers, more and more plantation workers abandoned wage labour and joined the growing army of squatter farmers.

With the NST government clearly in no position to effect the immediate eviction of these thousands of squatters, the plantation companies stepped up their demands for the importation of fresh contract labour from Java. The NST government, however,
remained firm in its opposition to such a solution. Mansoer, on his return from the Round Table Conference, declared that large numbers of new migrants from Java would pose such a security risk to the NST as to constitute a problem much bigger in the long run than the restrictions on plantation production currently caused by the labour shortage.

The already strained relations between the planters' organizations, AVROS and DPV, and the NST government deteriorated further. Mutual irritations between the two sides increased. As a result AVROS and DPV began to qualify their support for the NST and turned towards improving relations with the Republic. (19)

As to the problem of the traditional kingdoms, the special commission set up by the Interim Federal Government shuffled through several inconclusive meetings, in the face of increasing opposition within NST government ranks to any restoration of the rulers' powers. By October, a clear majority in the Dewan NST, mostly non-Malay members, had made it known that they would reject any attempt at restoration of the kingdoms. (20) They were unwilling to exacerbate the hostility of Republican


(20) Document 180; 1.
supporters and the non-Malay communities simply to serve the special interests of a Malay aristocracy already abandoned by its former colonial protectors. On October 21 these sentiments were given practical expression when the Dewan NST voted to abolish the pre-War autonomous unit of the Cultuurgebied Oost-kust van Sumatra, transferring all the powers and duties of its officials and institutions to the NST government. (21)

In Tapanuli the final demise of the federalist movement was taking place. By the end of October the Round Table Conference had finally rejected demands by DPST representatives in The Hague that Tapanuli be constituted a federal territory in the new independent state. Within Tapanuli itself, the several gerilya administrations consolidated their hold on the countryside. To federalist supporters there it was clear that the last vestiges of Dutch support for the federalist movement, and with it hopes for a Tapanuli state, had finally disappeared. Federalist leaders were left with two options, either to respond to Resident Lumbantobing's appeals to work within the Republic or to leave the residency for a safer environment. The alternative was to risk reprisals at the hands of the more extremist pergerakan elements in the gerilya movement. Hundreds, therefore, left Tapanuli for the NST. Those who chose to remain rushed to divest

(21) Warta Rasm Negara Sumatera Timur No. 52/1949. Also, see Document 181; 1. Schiller (1955); 137.
themselves of their federalist clothing and join the Republic while the residency administration was still in moderate hands. (22)

The Hague conference finally concluded on November 2 with the approval of an Interim Constitution for an independent federal state, the Republik Indonesia Serikat (Republic of the United States of Indonesia) - RIS. The Republic and the NST would constitute two of the sixteen states making up the RIS. (23) Tapanuli was declared a part of the Republic, pursuant to the provisions of the Renville and Roem-van Royen agreements. The Tapanuli state movement was finally interred.

In the case of the NST, two provisions of the Hague Agreement were to have particular importance upon the course of the conflict between Republican and federalist forces there. Firstly, the agreement kept alive the long standing rival Republican and NST claims to sovereignty over the Aslab region, by acknowledging both de facto NST administration of the region and de jure Republican claims to it under the Renville Agreement. (24)

(22) On the final demise of the Tapanuli federalist movement, see Document 616; 1-5 and Document 617; 3-7.

(23) The other fourteen federal states were: South Sumatra, Riouw, Bangka, Biliton, Pasundan, Central and East Java, Madura, East Indonesia, West Kalimantan, Greater Dayak, Banjarmasin, Southeast Kalimantan and East Kalimantan. See map in George Kahin (1952); 435. On the legal and constitutional status of the various states, see Schiller (1955).

(24) Specifically on the status of Aslab, see Article 2.1(a) of...
Determination of the final status of the region, whether it be part of the NST or the Republic, was left to the RIS government. Secondly, the Hague Agreement provided that all existing military forces - the TNI, Negara forces (including the Barisan Pengawal) and those KNIL troops not absorbed into the Royal Netherlands Army or demobilized - would together constitute the Armed Forces of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Serikat) - APRIS. In the NST this meant that the federal military command would be dominated by the vastly stronger TNI. The Republican movement in the NST was now provided with an extremely powerful protective umbrella.

Immediately the Round Table Conference had concluded, Abas

the Interim Constitution.

On October 9, about a month before the Hague Agreement, the NST government had acted to further consolidate their claim to the territory when the Dewan NST approved three government nominees as additional members of the Dewan to represent the AsLab region. The three were Raja Andak Amir, Tengku Amirjah and Tengku Ishak, all members of traditional ruling families from the region. Waspada 10 October 1949. Amirjah and Ishak had both been signatories to the petition presented by several South Tapanuli chiefs, led by Sutan Mulia Radja, in October 1948, to the Dutch authorities asking for Dutch military intervention in Tapanuli. Shortly before the Hague Agreement had been finalized, the sultans of Deli and Asahan sent an open letter to the NST delegation at the Round Table Conference expressing complete support for the official NST government policy of refusing to negotiate over the status of AsLab. Waspada 3 November 1949.
and Soripada announced from the Hague that the Tapanuli State Movement was at an end. Both declared that they did not intend to return to Tapanuli, but wished instead to resume legal practice in Medan. (25) Soripada on his return to Medan stated that he no longer saw any purpose in returning to Tapanuli. (26) All three PST organizations in Tapanuli were quickly disbanded (27) and the final exodus of federalist supporters from Tapanuli to the NST began. Departing senior Dutch TBA officials advised PST leaders, members of the DPST and Indonesians holding senior positions in the TBA administration to leave Tapanuli for their own safety. (28) Already the thousands of Republican supporters who had spent the months of Dutch occupation in the gerilya-controlled countryside were moving back into the towns: some returning to their homes, others coming to what new opportunities were offering with the restoration of the Republic. (29)

Despite Resident Lumbantobing's appeals for reconciliation between federalists and Republicans, the bitterness built up

(29) In the first few days of December an estimated 60,000 people moved into Padang Sidempuan from the surrounding countryside. Waspada 7 December 1949.
during the *gerilya* period against those who had collaborated with the Dutch occupation, remained strong. As more and more people who had participated in the *gerilya* movement sought their rewards in civil service jobs, only to discover that many former TBA officials were holding senior positions in the new Republican administration, resentments quickly developed. By the end of 1949 several local organizations of ex-*gerilya* fighters, especially in South Tapanuli, were demanding that former federalists and those who had collaborated with the TBA be dismissed from the Republican civil administration and their places taken by persons who had actively fought for the Republic. (30)

This movement to purge the Republican administration of TBA collaborators quickly became noticeably more pronounced and widespread in South Tapanuli than in the North. Similar anti-collaborationist demands certainly were made in North Tapanuli, particularly by groups around social revolutionary leaders like Saul Lumbantobing and Timur Pane, but in general Ferdinand Lumbantobing's authority in the Toba regions helped considerably in facilitating the acceptance of former federalists into the governmental system.

(30) On one such occasion, a "Union for the Development of the People of Indonesia" (*Serikat Pembangunan Rakjat Indonesia*), formed in Huta Padang (South Tapanuli), sent a Resolution to Governor Lumbantobing demanding that all civil servants who had worked for the TBA be replaced by former "guerilla fighters". *Waspada* 6 January 1950.
One important factor helping to produce different responses in North and South Tapanuli was that most of those who had worked with the Dutch during 1949 were Western educated and many were Dutch-trained civil servants from pre-War days. In the North, these people had educational and social backgrounds in common with most of the Republican elite there. In a socio-cultural context Republicans and federalists could talk the same language, thus greatly facilitating political reconciliation. In South Tapanuli, however, the situation was quite contrary. There the former federalist supporters were regarded by the powerful confessional Moslem sector of the Republican movement as being not only collaborators with Dutch colonialism but ipso facto heathens (kafirs). No common socio-cultural ground existed upon which political differences could be worked out.

South Tapanuli had also become the base for the small, militant neo-Marxist social revolutionary sector of the Republican movement in the residency. Prominent social revolutionaries like Jakub Siregar, Saleh Umar, Saragiras and Pajung Bangun, who had established political and military bases in the Sipirok/Padang Lawas region during 1949, were as implacably opposed to any reconciliation with the federalist movement as were their confessional Moslem counterparts.

While neo-Marxist social revolutionaries and confessional
Moslems remained bitter enemies between themselves, their common antipathy towards the federalist movement ensured that former pro-federalist civil servants in the South quickly had all avenues for reconciliation with the Republic closed off. Most soon resigned their jobs in the face of mounting pressure, especially the threat of physical reprisals against them. Some soon left to join their former colleagues in the relatively safer environment of the NST.

Despite the restoration of Dr. Lumbantobing's residency administration in Sibolga, the real rulers of Tapanuli at the end of 1949 were the sektor and sub-sektor TNI commanders, just as they had been a year earlier. It was these military officers, rather than civil servants or politicians, who still constituted the effective Republican ruling elite. They held a monopoly of force, controlled the production and distribution of food and other basic consumer items and controlled the collection of taxes. The Republic in Tapanuli was still dominated by the warlords of 1948 - Selamat Ginting in Dairi, Malao in North Tapanuli and Bedjo in South Tapanuli - each of whom still controlled local military governments enjoying high degrees of autonomy.

But the factors which had prompted these military commanders into the factional conflicts of 1947 and 1948 had receded
into the background. They had already consolidated their power and authority at the local level. Future status and rewards lay in participating in the new national governmental system and asserting authority as representatives of national institutions. Consequently a working alliance quickly developed between the main sektor commanders, who effectively controlled local government within their respective territories, and the restored residency civil administration. The former provided the coercive muscle. The latter provided political legitimacy.

But pragmatic alliances in the exercise of power did not negate the political conflicts produced by fundamental ideological differences.

One such conflict developed within the TNI/gerilya structure in Tapanuli in the immediate wake of the Hague Agreement, setting Saragiras' ex-BHL units from Brigade A against the rest of the TNI. Saragiras, supported by Jakub Siregar and Saleh Umar, refused to accept the terms of the Hague Agreement. As a result, Saragiras was reluctant to accept absorption of his Brigade A unit into a re-organized APRIS command structure. At the heart of the dispute was the continued commitment of Saragiras, Jakub Siregar and Saleh Umar to a social revolution. They refused to accept what they considered to be a sham, neocolonialist 'independence' negotiated at the Round Table Conference.
This put them directly in conflict with the rest of the TNI hierarchy in Tapanuli, including Bedjo and Pajung Bangun in the South, all of whom had accepted the Hague Agreement and were willing to exploit whatever opportunities the polity established pursuant to that agreement offered. With the support of Kawilarang, Resident Lumbantobing and the Tapanuli TNI commander, Ibrahim Adjie, Bedjo turned against his former ally. On instructions from Kawilarang and Adjie, Bedjo and Pajung Bangun moved troops into Saragiras' territorial base in the Gunung Tua region. After several clashes, Saragiras' force had been pushed into a rapidly diminishing territory. By mid-February 1950 both Jakub Siregar and Saleh Umar had been arrested by the TNI. They were jailed in Sibolga and charged with engaging in "illegal" activities. Saragiras was eventually captured near Perdagangan on July 21.

Meanwhile, with the signing of the Hague Agreement, the major unresolved aspect of the National Revolution - the conflict between the NST and the Republican movement in Sumatera Timur - was immediately intensified. Two important stimuli came into

(32) Waspad a 18 February 1950. Shortly after the arrests, Kawilarang announced that some 200 of Saragiras' followers had been captured in Tapanuli. See Waspad a 15 March 1950.
play. First was the protection which Republican supporters were now able to gain from the TNI-dominated federal military command. Second was the frequent and direct intervention of the Yogyakarta government in support of the Republican movement in the NST.

The federal (APRIS) defence command for North Sumatra, the Komando Tentera dan Teritorium Sumatera Utara - T & T.S.U., was officially installed at a ceremony in Medan on December 2, presided over by the Republic's Minister of Defence (the Sultan of Yogyakarta), the TNI Chief of Staff (Col. Nasution) and the Dutch military commander (Lt. Gen. Buurman van Vreeden). With one exception all senior staff positions in the T & T.S.U. were filled by TNI officers. The TNI commander, Col. Kawilarang, became APRIS commander for North Sumatra. A former staff officer with the TNI all-Sumatra command, Major Kartakusuma, was made chief of staff. Kawilarang's former deputy, Major Ibrahim Adjie, took over the APRIS command for Tapanuli. Command of the vitally important Medan district (corresponding approximately to the old Medan Area) was placed in the hands of the TNI's Regiment V commander in Tanah Karo, Major Djamin Gintings. The one exception to this TNI dominance was the appointment of the Barisan Pengawal commander, Djomat Purba, as APRIS commander for Sumatera Timur.
But the *Barisan Pengawal* was caught between a TNI-controlled high command and numerically superior TNI forces. (34) It was also denied control of the NST capital. Within days of the APRIS command being set up, Djamin Gintings moved a 500-strong battalion from his old regiment in Tanah Karo into Medan, to constitute the APRIS Medan garrison. Also in Medan, Kawilarang set up his command headquarters in Balistraat, barely a stone's throw from the scene of the first clash between Dutch and Republican forces in October 1945. (35)

Militarily the Republic in Sumatera Timur was in a overwhelmingly dominant position vis-a-vis the NST. In December 1949, the Crown Commissioner's office in Medan, referring to this situation and noting the vital importance of military strength in the future power struggle between the Republican movement and the NST, concluded that "The worse can be feared for the future of the Negara." (36)

At the same time as this new TNI-dominated APRIS command

(34) TNI units outnumbered the *Barisan Pengawal* by more than two to one, the relative strengths being approximately 9,000 to 4,000.


(36) Document 182; 1.
was being established, the unresolved conflict between the NST and the Republic over rival claims to the A$lab region was providing an issue for direct intervention by the Yogyakarta government in support of the Republican movement in Sumatera Timur. Immediately the Hague Agreement had been signed, the deputy Waliehagara, Raja Kaliamsjah, had announced in Medan that

Whoever attempts to separate South Asahan and Labuhan Batu (from the NST) will become our enemy. (37)

Shortly afterwards, the Republic's Deputy Prime Minister, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, declared from Yogyakarta that

South Asahan and Labuhan Batu are Renville territories and all Renville territories are legally part of the Republic. (38)

A few days later the Yogyakarta cabinet announced that a special commission, headed by the veteran nationalist and Taman Siswa chairman, Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, would leave immediately for the NST to carry out a plebescite in the A$lab region to "ascertain the wishes of the people of Asahan and Labuhan Batu" concerning the future status of that region. (39) The NST government responded by making it clear they regarded the A$lab issue as non-negotiable. In another re-organization of the Negara local government structure, Asahan and Labuhan Batu were made separate

(37) Waspada 15 November 1949.
(38) ibid.
local government regions (wilayah). (40) The Dewantoro commission, it was announced, would be allowed to come to Medan but would not be permitted to visit the Aslab region itself. (41) The NST government's prohibition ensured that Dewantoro's visit and the Aslab issue became of major importance in the eyes of Republican supporters. Dewantoro arrived in Medan on November 27, remaining there until December 9. (42) The visit established closer contact between the Republican movement in Sumatera Timur and the Yogyakarta government than ever before. Republican leaders in Medan were better than ever informed about national government policies. The entire Republican movement was provided with an enormous boost in morale. For the first time the national Republican government had intervened directly in Sumatera Timur to challenge the territorial sovereignty of the NST.


(41) Document 175; 1.

(42) Dewantoro was accompanied to Medan by Mohamad Hatta who was on his way to Aceh. Hatta spent the day in Medan during which he addressed a rally on the Medan Esplanade attended by thousands of Republicans supporters. He warned his listeners not to assume that the ideals of the National Revolution had already been achieved. Rather, Hatta declared, the nation has still to become united, a single entity, so that people could work together for justice and prosperity. Waspada 28 November 1950. Merdeka 30 November 1950.
The presence of Dewantoro himself, as a symbol of the Indonesian nationalist movement, was no less important. Along with Sukarno he had long been one of the premier idealogues of Indonesian national and cultural unity, of *kesatuan nasional*. (43) His presence in Sumatera Timur, moreover, brought added legitimacy and political importance, in national terms, to the *Front Nasional*, now headed by Dewantoro's *Taman Siswa* colleague Sugondo Kartoprodjo. (44)

During Dewantoro's stay in Medan the *Aslab* question blossomed into a focal rallying point for Republican opposition to the NST. The pro-Republic press, especially *Waspada*, strongly propagated the Republic's claims to the *Aslab* region, attacking continued NST "occupation" and "colonization" of the territory. All the Republican political organizations took up the call for a restoration of *Aslab* to the Republic. In Medan, Dewantoro received hundreds of personal representations and petitions from residents and community leaders from the *Aslab* region supporting these demands. Within Asahan and Labuhan Batu itself branches of Republican political organizations held public meetings and rallies to press opposition to NST control over the region. Under the overt protection of the TNI units in *Aslab*,

(43) See Dewantoro (1952).

(44) Sugondo Kartoprodjo had also been made a member of Dewantoro's special commission on *Aslab*. 
these activities quickly produced a vocal pro-Republic mass movement centered upon local branches of the *Front Nasional*.

On December 7, the Yogyakarta government formally incorporated *Aslab* as part of a Province of Tapanuli and South Sumatera Timur (*Propinsi Tapanuli-Sumatera Timur Selatan*). On the 9th, Dewantoro, before leaving Medan for Yogyakarta, announced that

the great majority of the people of South Asahan and Labuhan Batu wish to be united with the Republic of Indonesia.

But, important as they were, the Dewantoro visit and the *Aslab* issue were not the only important mobilizing forces behind the pro-Republic mass movement in the NST in the aftermath of the Hague Agreement. One other was frustration produced in *pergerakan* ranks by the Hague Agreement itself. Those Republican leaders who had remained committed to the ideals of social revolution were now angry and bitter with the *merdeka* of *diplo*masi. They saw the new (federal) polity still dominated by people whom they considered neo-colonialists or feudalists: in this case the moderates within the Republican elite and the NST ruling elite

---

(45) "Ketetapan Wakil Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia" No.15/1949. See The Liang Gie (1967); 126-7. Dr. Ferdinand Lumbantobing was confirmed as Military Governor of the province.

itself. They saw Dutch and other foreign domination of the capital and export sectors of the economy continuing. They saw the traditional rulers and hereditary chiefs in Sumatera Timur having recovered much of their social status and influence since the Social Revolution of March 1946, even though their political powers had been severely curtailed.

By mid-December, a number of activists associated with the PKI's trade union federation, Sobie (recently re-formed under Xarim M.S. as all-Sumatra Chairman) had been instrumental in gathering a number of labour unions and farmers' organizations into a central federation. On December 18 at a meeting in Medan of representatives from Republican labour and farmers' organizations, a labour federation, the Panitia Daerah Vaksentral Seluruh Indonesia, Sumatera Timur (Regional Committee of the All-Indonesia Central Trade Union Federation for Sumatera Timur) was formed. It was headed by a young activist associated with Sobie and the Shipping and Harbour Workers' Union (SBKP), Jusuf Adjitorop. Among the unions and farmers' organizations involved were Sobie, Sekata, the Cooperative of Indonesian Farmers (Rukun Tani Indonesia), the Motor Transport Workers' Union (Persatuan Buruh Motor), the Printing Workers' Union (Persatuan Buruh Pertjetakan), the Oil Workers' Union (Serikat Buruh Minjak), the Shipping and Harbour Workers' Union (Serikat Buruh Kapal dan Pelabuhan), and the Teachers' Association (Serikat Guru Indo-
During the latter part of December 1949, in Medan and other urban centres, an atmosphere of resurgent *pergerakan* militancy served to quicken political pulses and sharpen nervous tensions.\(^{48}\) Rival, competing political groups right across the political spectrum, Republican and federalist, prepared to maximise their respective positions before the independent federal state came into being. On December 26, the *Vaksentral* announced its full support for a strike by the Shipping and Harbour Workers' Union (SBKP) in Belawan in support of demands for higher wages. By the 29th nearly 1,000 workers at the port were on strike,\(^{49}\) in the organization of which the *Vaksentral* Chairman, Jusuf Adjitorop, had played a key role.


\(^{48}\) Five days after the formation of the Sumatera Timur *Vaksentral*, representatives from a total of sixty-five local youth organizations in North Sumatra (thirty-six from Sumatera Timur, thirteen from Tapanuli and sixteen from Aceh) met in Medan for an Indonesia Youth Conference for North Sumatra (*Konferensi Pemuda Indonesia Sumatera Timur*). It was chaired by Ishak Djanggawirana from Pesindo. The conference concluded after three days with the issue of a Resolution demanding abolition of the NST flag, the absorption of the *Dewan NST* into the former Sumatera Timur DPR and the re-employment of all former Republican civil servants in the NST bureaucracy. *Waspada* 30 December 1949. Document 285; 3.

So far as Adjitorop and other *Vaksentral* leaders were concerned the strike constituted an important test of the Republic's political strength against the NST and the federal state, and thereby against the continued hegemony of imperialist interests in Indonesia. With small *lasykar gerilya* units continuing to raid plantations and NST government installations in the countryside, with the growing militancy of the *Front Nasional*, the farmers' organizations and now the labour unions, rumours quickly circulated among federalist and moderate Republican circles in Sumatera Timur about an impending "Communist" uprising. (50)

On December 27 sovereignty was formally transferred from the Netherlands government to that of the RIS. In Medan an official ceremony to mark the event was held on the Esplanade, which was bedecked with RIS and NST flags. Neither the *Front Nasional* nor the *Vaksentral*, however, sent representatives. Both organizations announced that they were boycotting the ceremony, as a protest against the continued existence of the NST. (51)

From the moment the federal state was formally inaugurated,

(50) Documents 176; 3-4 and 177; 3. The prevalence of such rumours at that time has been confirmed by a number of informants.

powerful political forces within Sumatera Timur turned their attentions towards its destruction, and with it that of the NST. As Kahin\(^{(52)}\) had remarked nearly twenty-five years ago:

> With the transfer of sovereignty, the primary objective of the Indonesian revolution had been won. However, before the Indonesian people's focus of attention began to shift from the political to the socio-economic, there was one final major development in the political sphere. This was the "unitarian movement", a development which during the first seven months of 1950 completely overshadowed all others.

The movement was energized by the almost immediate popular reaction against the primarily Dutch-created federal political order with which the Hague Agreement had endowed the new Indonesian state. Until this vestige of the repudiated neo-colonial order had been shaken off, many Indonesians would not feel that their newly won political independence was complete. It was this reaction against and liquidation of the inherited federal system and its replacement by a unitarian form of government that constituted what the Indonesians referred to as the unitarian movement.

In the end,

> The whole federal structure which Dutch, Indonesian and United Nations negotiators had battled to erect ever since 1946 disappeared within eight months of its inauguration. For many convinced Republicans the RIS was only tolerable as a stepping stone to the true aim of the revolution, the unitary Republic proclaimed in 1945. ... The RIS settlement had been a compromise, the typical fruit of diplomasi, which stood in the way of a complete and satisfying victory over the Dutch. \(^{(53)}\)

The stirrings of a popularly-based unitarist movement in Sumatera Timur had already begun in the Tanah Karo region (the

\(^{(52)}\) George Kahin (1952); 446.

\(^{(53)}\) Reid (1974); 162.
region of the NST most solidly under *de facto* Republican control since the ceasefire) soon after the signing of the Hague Agreement. On November 28 a mass meeting convened by the Tanah KaroPRS in Tiga Nderkat (the capital of the regional Republican administration) had issued a *Resolusi Rakjat Kabupaten Karo Republik Indonesia* (Resolution of the People of Kabupaten Karo, Republic of Indonesia) which declared that:

> We, the people of Kabupaten Karo, Republic of Indonesia, together with the occupants of all villages still under Dutch military occupation in Kabupaten Karo, demand that the Central Government of the Republic of Indonesia bring the regions of Sumatera Timur in general and Kabupaten Karo in particular within the authority of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia. (54)

It was an unequivocal rejection of the provisions of the Hague Agreement; which the PRS leadership in Tiga Nderkat despatched immediately to the recently restored central government in Yogyakarta and to the Republic's delegation on the LJC in Medan.

Over the next month PRS leaders in Tiga Nderkat set about building up an anti-NST mass movement, based upon local PRS organizations throughout the Republican-controlled regions of Tanah Karo. On January 5, 1950 a coordinating *Panitia Resolusi Rakjat Tanah Karo* (Committee on the Resolution (of 28 November 1949) of the People of Tanah Karo) was formed in Tiga Nderkat for this purpose. (55) The same day a mass demonstration marched

---

(54) Document 548.

(55) *Waspada* 13 January 1950.
through the town demanding that Tanah Karo be incorporated into the Republic.

Two days later a similar movement emerged into the open in Aslab when a meeting of twenty-two village heads from the Kualuh Hulu region of southern Asahan issued a demand that South Asahan and Labuhan Batu be made part of the Republic of Indonesia.\(^{(56)}\) Less than a fortnight after the independent federal Indonesian state had come into being the NST was faced with two 'secessionist' movements.

January brought a mushrooming of Republican political organizations throughout Sumatera Timur - political party branches, trade unions, farmers' organizations. Dozens of branches of the Masyumi and PNI were formed, extending through all wilayah of the NST. New PKI and Parkindo branches were formed in a number of local centres, especially in Langkat, Deli and Simalungun.\(^{(57)}\) The three largest farmers' organizations, Sekata, Geraktani and BTI, also established dozens of new local branches.\(^{(58)}\)

---

\(^{(56)}\) *Waspada* 10 January 1950.

\(^{(57)}\) For reports on the establishment of new party branches, see *Waspada* 12, 13, 16, 17 & 23 January, 4 & 8 February 1950.

\(^{(58)}\) See *Waspada* 17, 20 & 28 January, 6 & 8 February 1950.
At the same time growing union militancy had widened the Belawan strike. By mid-January the number of striking workers had increased to about 3,000. The port itself was virtually at a standstill. Also about 250 workers at the Dutch-owned BPM oil refineries in Belawan, affiliated with the Oil Workers' Union (SBM), had joined the striking harbour workers.

By the time the Belawan strike was eventually settled on January 20, with agreement by the shipping companies and the NST government to most of the wage increase demanded by the unions, it had become a focal point of political opposition to the NST. All the major Republican political parties supported the strikers' demands. In several regions local committees were even formed to support the strike. In Kabanjahe, for example, a Panitia Penjokong Pemogokan Belawan (Committee in Support of the Belawan Strike) issued a statement expressing complete solidarity with and support for the striking workers.\(^{(59)}\) Kawilarang rejected demands from the NST government and the shipping companies for APRIS intervention. The APRIS command, he announced, would stay neutral in the affair and would not intervene in any way towards forcing the strikers back to work.\(^{(60)}\)

\(^{(59)}\) Waspada 17 January 1950.

\(^{(60)}\) Waspada 13 January 1950. Waktu 21 January 1950. Kawilarang did, however, send a small detachment of troops to unload essential supplies such as rice from the ships.
Barely had the Belawan strike been settled than news reached Sumatera Timur of the first major crack in the federal structure; namely, that on the 19th administration of the State of East Java (Negara Djawa Timur) had been taken over by the federal government. (61) This prompted the Front Nasional leadership in Medan to convene an "extraordinary conference" (konperensi luar biasa) on the 21st, at which a resolution was issued demanding an end to the NST and the incorporation of Sumatera Timur into the Republic. (62) Two days later the anti-federal, unitarist movement in Sumatera Timur was given its most important boost to date with the arrival in Medan of President Sukarno, on his way to India. Addressing a wildly cheering crowd of over 100,000 at Medan airport, he put his commitment to the unitarist ideal unequivocally.

We are one nation, not three, not four, but one Indonesian nation, even though we number 75 million. Still we are one. There is no Kalimantan nation, there is no Minangkabau nation, there is no Javanese, Balinese, Lombok, Sulawesi or other such nation. We are all part of the Indonesian nation. Furthermore, there is no Sumatera Timur nation. We are all part of a single nation, with a single fate. (63)

(61) See Schiller (1955); 337.
(62) Reports of the conference are given in Waspada 23 January 1950. Waktu 4 February 1950. Ichtisar Parlemen No. 22/1950. Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 343. Perdjuangan Rakjat; 153-4. Among the member-organizations represented at the extraordinary conference were the PNI, Masyumi, Parkindo, Vaksentral, Sekata, Geraktani, Mohamadiyah and Taman Siswa.
(63) Cited in Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 387. A contemporary report of Sukarno's visit to Medan is given in Merdeka
By the end of January a vocal unitarist movement - encompassing the Front Nasional, Vaksentral, political parties, social and religious organizations (such as Mohamadiyah, Taman Siswa and the HKBP), youth organizations, women's groups, trade unions, farmers' organizations as well as the local PRS organizations and TNI commands constituting the regional gerilya governments - had spread throughout the NST. Mass demonstrations, public meetings and resolutions, strikes, and occupation of plantation lands, all came to be directed in support of the unitary state and at the destruction of the NST. Strikes, of both urban and plantation labour in particular, increased in frequency. By mid-March the list of enterprises affected was long. They included factories at Belawan and Glugur, the Deli Harbour Authority, several Chinese-owned enterprises (both industrial and plantation), rubber estates, the Medan City Council, the Department of Health and the Medan nightwatchmen service. In a six week period more than 6,000 workers went on strike, for periods varying from one day to more than a month. (64)

Parallel with this, dozens of public demonstrations were held in protest at the continued existence of the NST. They

24 January 1950.

(64) For reports of the strikes, see Waspada 27 January, 4 & 21 February, 4 & 16 March 1950. Deli Data 1938-1951, bijlage I; 1-2.
were organized by branches of the Front Nasional, by political parties and by local gerilya administrations. Thousands of people in regional capitals and small towns throughout Sumatera Timur took to the streets to demand incorporation of either their particular region or of Sumatera Timur as a whole into the Republic.

Outside Medan, i.e. in Tanah Karo, Central Sumatera Timur (Serdang and Simalungun), South Sumatera Timur (Asahan and Labuhan Batu), Langkat and Deli there grew a movement known as the "Action for the People's Demands" (Aksi Tuntutan Rakjat). This Action for the People's Demands was for the Negara Sumatera Timur to be disbanded and (Sumatera Timur) merged with the Republic of Indonesia. (65)

NST local administrations, under pressure from pro-Republic groups, often tended to act preemptorily, thus stimulating more widespread and more organized expressions of anti-NST/anti-federal sentiments. Between January 23 and 27, for example, NST police in Serdang Hulu, Boven Deli and the Merbau region of Labuhan Batu arrested a number of Republican officials, thereby prompting large demonstrations against the arrests in Tiga Njuhur, Birubiru, Pancur Batu and Merbau. The demonstrations promulgated "People's Demands" (Tuntutan Rakjat) for the incorporation of

(65) Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 344. Between February 8 and 12, mass meetings organized by Front Nasional branches in Medan, Tebingtinggi, Kisaran, Tanjung Balai, Lubuk Pakam, Perbaungan, Indrapura, Pulau Batu and Kualat all passed resolutions supporting that passed at the extraordinary conference of the FN in Medan on January 22. Ichtisar Parlemen No. 27/1950.
Sumatera Timur into the Republic. In all cases the demonstrators forced the local NST administrations to release the detained Republican officials. (66) On February 1 the Republican newspaper *Waspada* described the growing conflict between the unitarist/ATR movement and the NST authorities as already constituting a "critical problem" (*soal hangat*).

As growing internal opposition to the *Negara* kept pace with the centrifugal forces which were breaking up the federal Indonesian state, NST leaders were only too well aware of an increasingly threatening situation. (67) On February 6 the Director of the NST cabinet, Tengku Hafas, announced that:

> Up until now the Government of the Negara Sumatera Timur has faced a number of difficulties in carrying out the tasks of government, because there exists in several places within the territory (of this state) a situation generally known as one of 'dual government' ... which results from the Emergency Military Government ... established by the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia prior to the transfer of sovereignty. (This) has given rise to internal conflicts which has destroyed our unity. (68)

Because of this situation, Hafas continued, the NST government had initiated talks with the RIS government at which the continued

---


(67) On February 9 the second of the federal states collapsed when the State of *Pasundan* (West Java) was placed under the authority of a federal government Commissioner. See George Kahin (1952); 455.

(68) *Waspada* 7 February 1950.
operations of *de facto* Republican (*gerilya*) administrations within NST territory would be a central issue. (69)

Even before the NST-RIS talks began, however, the most solidly entrenched of these *de facto* Republican administrations, that in Tanah Karo, had responded to NST government pressure with an impressive show of popular support. The catalyst to this had been a decision by the NST government to send police units from Medan to Kabanjahe, Tiga Nderkat, Tiga Serangkat and a number of smaller towns in the Karo region in an attempt to re-assert NST authority in the region. When a police unit, about 30 strong, arrived at the Republican capital Tiga Nderkat on February 11 it was met by a crowd of about 1,000 demonstrators (led by the chairman of the recently formed *Panitia Resolusi Rakjat*, Rendjong Bangun). The demonstrators refused to allow the unit to enter the town, forcing it to return to Kabanjahe. (70)

By now leaders of the *Aksi Tuntutan Rakjat* (ATR) movement in Tiga Nderkat, Kabanjahe, Brastagi and Batu Karang in Karo and in the Sibolangit region of Deli Hulu had jointly completed plans for Republican supporters from towns and villages throughout eastern Tanah Karo to "invade" Kabanjahe, close down the skeleton NST administration still there and complete the *de* ...

(69) ibid.

(70) *Waspada* 13 February 1950.
facto incorporation of Tanah Karo into the Republic. (71)

With some 50,000 anti-NST demonstrators gathered in Kabanjahe, (72) by February 14, the deputy Walinegara, Raja Kaliamsjah, went there in an attempt to negotiate with the ATR leaders. That afternoon the demonstrators gathered outside the NST government offices. They carried banners and shouted slogans demanding bubarkan Negara Sumatera Timur (destroy the Negara Sumatera Timur). ATR leaders read out an eight-point "People's Demand" (Tuntutan Rakjat) that Sumatera Timur be made part of the Republic. (73) This was greeted with roars of approval from the crowd. Several speeches then followed demanding an end to the NST. These too were received with noisy approval. Finally, Raja Kaliamsjah was allowed to address the crowd. Over noisy interruptions he undertook that the NST government would immediately enter into discussions with the Tanah Karo ATR. On announcing that he too was a nationalist, Kaliamsjah was greeted with shouts of bohong (nonsense). The rally eventually concluded about 7 pm. with the crowd singing Indonesia Raja. (74) Next day


(72) This estimate of the number of demonstrators is given by the NST government Chief Prosecutor in Kabanjahe. Document 202B.

(73) The full text of the Tuntutan Rakjat Tanah Karo is given in Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 344-5.

Kaliamsjah and a delegation of ATR leaders left for Medan to discuss the ATR demands.

But notwithstanding the negotiations in Medan, the demonstrations in Tanah Karo continued. Thousands more Republican supporters flocked daily into Kabanjahe. On the 16th the NST Chief Prosecutor in the town reported that thousands of demonstrators were sleeping in the main park and that if the "invasion" continued the city would be faced with a serious health problem. (75)

The demonstrators had now forced the closure of all NST government offices. In addition the TNI was openly assisting in the organization of the demonstration, especially following the arrival in Kabanjahe on the 16th of a Karonese TNI battalion. (76)

This unit, which had been sent there on the orders of Kawilarang, was commanded by Ulung Sitepu, a Karonese who had been a prominent lasykar and later TNI commander in the Tanah Karo region throughout the Revolution. Given the Karonese composition of the unit and Sitepu's close personal association with most of the ATR leaders, the arrival of his battalion provided a further spur to the anti-NST movement. (77)

(75) Document 202A.

(76) Document 14.

(77) Ulung Sitepu had played a leading part in the events of the Social Revolution in Tanah Karo. Kawilarang had ordered this battalion to Kabanjahe in response to a request from Dr. Mansoer for the APRIS to assist in maintaining order in the town. Sitepu had also been deputy commander, to Selamat Gintings, of the Napindo Halilintar.
In Medan negotiations between the NST government and the ATR delegation quickly broke down, both sides refusing to make any concessions to their rival claims to sovereignty over Tanah Karo. As a result, the demonstrations in Kabanjahe continued until the beginning of March, by which time the last remnants of the NST administration there had vanished. Most of the NST officials had left for Medan. The remainder had decided to join the Republican unitarist cause. (78)

As the ATR demonstrations in Kabanjahe got under way, the unitarist movement was developing an NST-wide momentum. On February 12 the arrest by NST police of more Republican officials in Merbau (Aslab) sparked a large anti-NST demonstration. During the next two days about 8,000 people, including labourers and squatter-farmers from nearby plantations, besieged NST government offices in Merbau pressing what were by now the usual unitarist demands. (79) On the 16th, while the negotiations between the NST and Tanah Karo ATR were under way, 688 Republican supporters from Aslab (including civil servants, village chiefs, Islamic religious leaders, political party leaders, representatives of local farmers' organizations and plantation workers) marched through Medan to the office of the NST Ministry of Interior.


There they presented a "Petition of the People of South Asahan and Labuhan Batu" (Utusan Rakjat Asahan Selatan dan Labuhan Batu), signed by 706 village leaders from Aslab, announcing recognition of the Republic of Indonesia as the only legal governmental authority in South Asahan and Labuhan Batu. (80)

In the meantime, the NST authorities in Merbau had been forced to release the arrested Republican officials.

On February 23 another anti-NST demonstration took place in Aslab when about 5,000 people demonstrated in Kotapinang in favour of the unitary state. Two days later a further demonstration, involving about 1,000 persons, took place in Sigambul (about 8 kilometers from Rantau Prapat). On the 28th about 1,500 people marched through Bangun Purba in Serdang in support of the Republic. On March 5 a similar demonstration took place in the capital of the Langkat sultanate, Tanjung Pura. On the 16th a second unitarist demonstration occurred in Kotapinang. (81)

(80) Waspada 14-17 February 1950. Waktu 4 March 1950. Rakjat Asahan dan Labuhan Batu Menjatukan Kehendaknja. Document 450. Perdjuangan Rakjat; 142. The full text of the Utusan Rakjat is given in Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 345. The 706 signatories to the petition claimed to represent about 75,000 people in Aslab. There were two important aspects to the petition itself. Firstly, it specifically rejected the earlier petition (in 1949) from 245 Aslab village chiefs to the NST government, which the latter had used to justify the incorporation of Aslab into the Negara. Secondly, the signatories to the current petition rejecting NST hegemony over Aslab included a number of those who signed the earlier, pro-NST, one.

(81) Waspada 1 & 2 March 1950. Rakjat Asahan dan Labuhan Batu
Of key importance to the whole unitarist/ATR movement in Sumatera Timur during February and March were the *Front Nasional* and the TNI. The former was the main organizing agent behind the anti-NST demonstrations in Asahan, Labuhan Batu, Langkat, Deli, Serdang and Simalungun. It was the Labuhan Batu branch of the *Front Nasional*, under the chairmanship of Ibrahim Nasution, which had taken the initiative in organizing the protest march to Medan on February 16, where the *Tuntutan Rakjat* was presented to the NST government. While organizationally the *Front Nasional* had played little role in the movement in Tanah Karo, many of the ATR leaders there were either members of, or closely associated with, local *Front Nasional* branches in that region. The FN leadership in Medan provided an important coordinating link between the Karo movement and the anti-NST demonstrations elsewhere. (82)

The TNI was no less a vital factor in the promotion of the

---

(82) On March 5 the Tanah Karo ATR appointed the former TNI commander in Dairi/Alas, Selamat Ginting, as its official spokesman in negotiations with the RIS government. Ginting, now in Medan, was personally close to the leadership councils of both the *Front Nasional* and the PNI in the NST capital. Document 460. During February and March the Medan leadership of the *Front Nasional* had participated in meetings in Tebingtinggi, Lubuk Pakam, Perbaungan, Indrapura, Kuala, Pancur Batu, Kisaran and Tanjung Balai, at which plans were drawn up for the holding of demonstrations and resolutions drafted in support of the unitarist cause. See *Waspad a* 22 March 1950. *Waktu* 4 February 1950. *Ichtiyar Parlemen* No. 27/1950.
unitarist movement. The predominance of TNI units within the APRIS forces in Sumatera Timur ensured vital physical protection for the unitarist movement. Kawilarang as APRIS commander and TNI control of the APRIS command ensured that Barisan Pengawal units could be kept relatively immobilized tactically, so far as their operational scope against the unitarist movement was concerned. (83) Sektor, sub-sektor and unit commanders openly supported anti-NST activities within their territories.

Concurrently with this rapid growth in the unitarist movement was an undermining of the NST local government structure. As popular support for the unitary state became more and more vocal, village chiefs and local government officials who had previously supported the NST began to re-assess their loyalties. Between January and April, hundreds of such people - district chiefs, village heads, teachers, policemen, plantation guards etc. - responded to the swelling opposition to the NST within their particular regions by defecting to the unitarist/Republican cause. They simply announced that they now recognized the unitary Republic as the only sovereign authority in Sumatera Timur. The defections spread through all six wilayah of the

(83) On February 21 Kawilarang's internal security powers were greatly increased when Sukarno, as RIS President, appointed him Military Governor (Gubernur Militer) for North Sumatra. Waspada 28 February 1950. Merdeka 2 March 1950.
Negara. (84)

Once again the plantations constituted a focal point of political opposition to the NST. In the first three months of 1950, especially after the plantation strikes got under way, still more plantation workers joined the already big population of squatter-farmers cultivating estates land. They in turn, were joined by Tapanuli Bataks living in Simalungun, by Karonese in Langkat, by newly arrived immigrants from Tapanuli itself and by others from the Karo highlands. In their thousands these people moved onto plantation lands bordering the highways from Medan to Tebingtinggi, Tanjung Balai and Rantau Prapat in the south; from Medan to Binjei and Tanjung Pura in the north; and in the Kampung Durian, Pasar Merah and Mariendal tobacco estates around Medan itself. (85)

The three largest farmers' organizations - Sekata, Geraktani and BTI - all operating under the Vaksentral umbrella and all affiliated with the Front Nasional, urged the continued occupation of the plantation lands: both as a "reward of the Revolution"


(85) Document 249; 8. Ridwan (1965); 61. Sinar (1972); 13. Cunningham (1958); 92.
(hadiah Revolusi) and as a means of destroying "colonialist", "imperialist" and "feudal" vested interests, namely, those of the foreign plantation companies and the NST elite. The farmers' organizations brought thousands of squatter-farmers to participate in the rallies and demonstrations supporting the unitary state.

By the beginning of March the anti-NST movement in Sumatera Timur was a vital element in the general collapse of the federal structure already well under way. Inevitably, therefore, national federal politics intervened more and more directly in the conflict between Republican and NST interests in Sumatera Timur. Key decisions affecting the fate of the NST were being made in Jakarta and Yogyakarta: a reality that was clear to all groups in the rival unitarist and federal camps. As a result, NST government leaders decided to secure a future through negotiations with the RIS and Republic. On the other side, anti-NST groups in Sumatera Timur decided to widen the campaign for the destruction of the Negara by working through the governing bodies of the federal state. By early March all the major Republican political organizations in Suma-

(86) Sinar (1972); 13. Sutter (1959); 723. Representatives of the plantation companies in Sumatera Timur claimed at the time that the strikes and land occupation was a direct result of the cargo-cult consequences of independence. Ichtiyar Parlemen No. 86/1950.
tera Timur were working through their representatives and sympathisers in the RIS parliament and government towards implementing the numerous resolutions already passed demanding an end to the NST.

On March 1 a motion calling for the recognition of Republican sovereignty over the Aslab territory was accepted for debate by the RIS parliament. The motion was introduced by a leading member of the Sumatera Timur executive of Masyumi, M. Junan Nasution. About a week later, following a short visit by the Republic's Prime Minister (Dr. Abdul Halim) and Minister of Interior (Susanto Tirtoprodjo) to Medan, the Republic, RIS and NST governments announced that they would hold tripartite talks to settle the question of the future status of Aslab. By this time the RIS parliament, following debate on the Nasution motion, had agreed to set up a special committee to investigate and make recommendations about the future status of Aslab. A few days later, on March 20, the committee, known as the Panitia Negara Republik Indonesia Serikat untuk Asahan Selatan dan Labuhan Batu (State Committee of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia for South Asahan and Labuhan Batu) was formed under the chairmanship of the Secretary General of the Department of Internal Affairs of the State of Pasundan,

Makmun Sumadipradja. (88) From Medan, Dr. Mansoer assured Hatta (as RIS Prime Minister) that the NST government would afford the Sumadipradja committee with all facilities necessary to carry out its investigations.

By the time Mansoer, the Republic's Prime Minister, Dr. Halim, and the federal government's Minister for Internal Affairs, Anak Agung Gde Agung, met in Jakarta on March 14 for the start of the tripartite talks, the federal system had crumbled even further. Between March 9 and 11 the RIS parliament approved the disbanding of the states of Central Java, East Java, Madura and Pasundan and the incorporation of all three regions into the Republic. (89) On the 19th the parliament accepted for debate a motion submitted by twenty-four members demanding the disbandment of the NST and the incorporation of Sumatera Timur into the Republic. The numerous resolutions by political and mass organizations in Sumatera Timur demanding an end to the NST, the motion declared, was ample evidence that the majority of the Sumatera Timur population rejected the "colonialist", Dutch-established Negara. (90)

---

(89) George Kahin (1952); 456. Schiller (1955); 432, n.10.
(90) The full text of the motion, officially entitled "Motion of the House of Representatives of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia for the Amalgamation of the Negara Sumatera Timur with the Republic of Indonesia"
signatories to this so-called Yamin Motion (Mosi Yamin)\(^{(91)}\) included four prominent Republican political leaders from Sumatera Timur - M. Junan Nasution, Sarwono Sastrosutardjo, Abdullah Jusuf and Dr. Sinaga.

The same day the Yamin Motion was introduced into the RIS parliament, Republican leaders in Medan opened up a new political offensive against the NST. A meeting of eighty-four representatives from member organizations of the Front Nasional decided to hold a Sumatera Timur People's Congress (Kongres Rakjat Sumatera Timur) - KRST, which would constitute a forum from which the unitarist demands could be presented as those of a single, united movement.\(^{(92)}\) By the end of March a central committee (Panitia Pusat KRST) had been formed, under the chairmanship of the publisher of Waspada, Mohamad Said, to organize the congress. Regional committees were being formed in each of the six wilayah of the Negara.\(^{(93)}\)

\[(Mosi Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat RIS Pergabungan Negara Sumatera Timur dengan Republik Indonesia), is given in Ichtisar Parlemen No. 27/1950. See also, Merdeka 22 March 1950.\]

(91) After Mr. Mohamad Yamin, who presented the motion to the RIS parliament on behalf of the twenty-four signatories.


(93) The other members of the Panitia Pusat were Jahja Jakub, Haji Abdul Rahman Sjihab, Sugondo Kartoprodjo, M.A. Dasuki, Ani Idrus, Ishak Djanggawirana, Abdul Wahid Er and B. Hutadjulu. Waspada 27 March 1950. On the establishment of
The NST was once again also under attack from the Republican labour unions. As a strike by about 3,000 DSM railway workers got under way in mid-March, the recently re-formed Plantation Workers' Union, Sarbupri, announced that plantation workers would strike in support. (98) Within a week several thousand plantation wage labourers had stopped work. By early April the number had grown to about 80,000 workers from 35 tobacco and 17 rubber estates. (99)

On April 6 the RIS cabinet announced that the strikes in Sumatera Timur constituted a "national crisis" (100) and that the Minister for Labour, Mr. Wilopo, would go to Medan to try and negotiate a settlement. In Yogyakarta, the Republican cabinet decided that the Republic's Labour Minister, Dr. Gani, would accompany Wilopo to Medan and participate in the negotiations. Not only was the RIS by now reduced to only three constituent states - the Republic, the NST and the State of East Indonesia - but the RIS parliament had already approved by the large majority of 73 to 11, the Yamin Motion declaring Sumatera Timur to be a part of the Republic. (101)

(100) Merdeka 7 April 1950.
The various KRST committees had little need for any excessive expenditure of effort in mobilizing popular support for unitarist demands. At a mass level the unitarist movement was growing under its own momentum as news of the collapse of the federal system and of opposition to the NST within the RIS parliament spread through informal rumour networks. Dozens of resolutions supporting the unitary state flowed from branches of political parties, trade unions, farmers' organizations, pemuda groups and religious and other social organizations. (94)

More and more NST local government officials shifted their allegiances to the Republic. (95) The RIS parliamentary committee on Aslab led by Makmun Sumodipradja on several occasions during its visit to Aslab was met by demonstrators demanding that the region be made part of the unitary Republic. (96) In one of its first reports back to the RIS parliament the committee concluded that "the political position of Republican groups (in Sumatera Timur) is far stronger than that of the NST." (97)

wilayah committees, see Waspada 4, 5, 6, 8, 11 & 15 April 1950. In political party terms, the Panitia Pusat represented an 'alliance' between the Masyumi, PNI, Pesindo, PKI and PSI. In the next five months this proved to be a very fragile alliance indeed.

(94) See Waspada 17, 21, 22, 25 & 28 March 1950.
(95) See Waspada 8, 21, 22 & 28 March 1950.
(96) Waspada 27 March 1950.
(97) Document 450.
Wilopo and Gani flew immediately to Medan where, after some intensive negotiations, they managed to secure an end to the strikes, getting the striking unions to accept offers of pay increases from the DSM and the plantation companies. (102) As a result of the strike some 30% of the tobacco crop had been destroyed. (103)

The scope of the labour unrest and the fact that settlement of the most recent strikes had depended upon the intercession of two prominent Republican politicians, provided NST leaders with ample evidence of the weakness of the Negara vis-a-vis Republican forces within Sumatera Timur. The plantation strike had illustrated the potential of the Republican movement to undermine the economic base of the Negara. Moreover, the NST no longer had any viable coercive power to bring to bear in such a situation. Kawilarang, for example, again made it clear that the APRIS command would not act on behalf of the NST in these circumstances. As Wilopo and Gani reached Medan, he announced that the strikes were justifiably a realization by the workers of their true worth. (104) Finally, the strikes were settled only through the personal influence which Wilopo
and Gani, as members of the national executive council of the PNI, were able to bring to bear on union leaders in Sumatera Timur. 

In Jakarta, Mansoer, who had been having talks there with Hatta, agreed to participate in a "Four Sided" (Segi Empat) conference with the RIS, Republic and East Indonesia governments, to decide the future viability of the federal system. (105) In Yogyakarta the Republican cabinet immediately limited the scope for compromise by deciding that, with the approval of the Yamin Motion by the RIS parliament, Sumatera Timur was de facto a part of the Republic. (106) In Medan, the KRST planning committee announced that the Kongres Rakjat in support of the unitary state would be held on April 27. KRST leaders refused a request from Hatta that the Kongres be postponed until the Segi Empat talks, due to commence on the 25th, had been concluded. Hatta, anxious to avoid a confrontation with the Republican movement in Sumatera Timur at this stage, postponed the federal talks

(105) The NST government announced that it would be represented at the Segi Empat talks by a seven-member delegation led by Dr. Mansoer. Waspada 18 & 21 April 1950.

(106) Waspada 24 April 1950. Merdeka 22 & 25 April 1950. A little earlier, in Medan, the deputy Walinegara (Raja Kaliamsjah) declared that approval of the Yamin Motion had no legal effect because the federal constitution guaranteed the political autonomy of the NST. Waktu 22 April 1950. The resolution by the Republican cabinet was a deliberate contradiction of Kaliamsjah's assertion.
On April 27 the Kongres Rakjat opened in a large former warehouse in Medan. The hall was festooned with Republican flags, portraits of President Sukarno and slogans supporting the unitary state concept. 417 delegates, representing pro-Republic organizations in the NST ranging from political parties to recreational associations, were present. So too was a delegation from the RIS government led by Hatta's representative, Wangsawidjaja, and the Deputy Chairman of the RIS parliament, Mr. Tambunan.

Despite the NST authorities having placed restrictions on press coverage of the Kongres, its significance as an assertion of the strength of the unitarist movement was widely known and discussed via the informal communication networks through the Negara. The atmosphere at the Kongres itself approached that of a celebration to mark the inevitable end of the NST and the federal Indonesian state.

Opening the Kongres, the KRST chairman, Mohamad Said,


declared that the central issue facing the Kongres was not the respective theoretical merits of federalism or unitarism as political systems, but the reality that the existing federal Indonesian state was a Dutch-created, neo-colonialist entity. The latter was now being rejected.

In many places, such West Java, Central Java, East Java, Madura, Kalimantan and South Sumatra the people are busy and jointly concentrating their energies on exterminating the colonial left-overs of Dr. van Mook. ... so long as there exist in Indonesia elements who defend the colonial remnants of van Mook it is immaterial if they are Unitarists or Federalists, and as long as such elements are not cleaned out political tensions will continue to be felt, like a thorn in the human flesh. ... Many resolutions, motions, demonstrations etc. have been effected by the people to press for the dissolution of the NST, not merely because of the federalist concepts which are professed by the leaders of that government, but because the people want to wipe out the remnants of van Mook's colonialism. (109)

Said then went on to direct criticism at the Hatta federal government for failing to adequately acknowledge these popular demands.

It appears to us that the Government is full of doubt and hesitancy in fulfilling the demands contained in these motions, resolutions and demonstrations, as though it does not accept the sincerity underlying them, and that they are the true wishes of the people. This has produced an extremely tense atmosphere. It seems to us that the Central Government in Jakarta, since it is located so far away, does not understand the real nature of political developments here and sometimes it seems to be enveloped in a cloud of incorrect proposals. (110)

(109) Translated from the text of Said's speech given in Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 347-52.

(110) ibid.; 350.
Throughout the three days of the Kongres, speeches and motions were made demanding an end to the NST and the incorporation of Sumatera Timur into the unitary Republic. Despite differing suggestions about tactics, there was solid unanimity about basic aims. The Kongres concluded with the unanimous approval of a lengthy resolution criticizing the RIS government for having delayed implementation of the Nasution and Yamin motions already passed by the RIS parliament. The resolution urged the RIS government to disband the NST and incorporate Sumatera Timur into the Republic as quickly as possible. (111)

To supervise implementation of the Kongres resolutions, a seven member Secretariat (Badan Secretariat Kongres Rakjat Sumatera Timur) was elected. The seven elected to it were: Mohamad Said, Jahja Jakub, Sugondo Kartoprodjo, M.A. Dasuki, Mr. Mohamad Jusuf, Haji Abdul Rahman Sjihab and Jusuf Adjitorop. Also, regional secretariats were elected for Deli/Serdang, Simalungun, Langkat, Karo, Asahan, Labuhan Batu and Medan. (112)

Immediately the Kongres had ended, Said, Jakub and Sugondo left for Jakarta and Yogyakarta to press for implementation of the

(111) The full text of the Kongres resolution is given in ibid.; 354-7. Also, see Waepada 2 May 1950. Other reports of the Kongres Rakjat are given in Waktu 6 & 13 May 1950. Merdeka 29 April & 3 May 1950. Perdjuangan Rakjat; 154.

(112) Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 363-4.
resolutions, by the RIS and Republican governments. (113)

While the Kongres Rakjat was still in progress, a group of federalist supporters associated with the PNST decided to act in support of the preservation of the NST and the Indonesian federal system. At a meeting in the house of the PNST chairman, Tengku Nikmatullah, in Medan on the night of April 28 they decided to convene an All-Sumatera Timur Peoples' Conference (Permusjawaratan Rakjat Se-Sumatera Timur) - PRSST. The purpose of the Conference, to be held in Medan on May 7, would be to press for an "orderly" and "legal" determination of the future status of Sumatera Timur in accordance with the "wishes of the people". (114)

Some six hundred delegates - NST government leaders, politicians, civil servants, traditional rulers and hereditary chiefs - were present when the Permusjawaratan Rakjat opened on May 7. So too was Hatta's personal representative, Wangsa-widjaja, who had also attended the KRST a few days earlier. Nikmatullah's opening speech placed the Permusjawaratan firmly in historical and social perspective. Firstly, the speech

(113) Waspada 8 May 1950.

(114) On May 1 the PRSST planning committee issued a statement specifically declaring that the KRST did not have the support of the majority of the people of Sumatera Timur. Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 364-5.
highlighted the basic irreconciliability of *pergerakan* and
*kerajaan* interests, once more directing memories back to the
Social Revolution. Secondly, it pointed to the need for
pragmatism and compromise with the 'moderate' Republic.

It is clear to us that in general there are two ideo-
logical streams (*aliran*) in Indonesia, namely leaders
loyal to an orderly struggle as demanded by President
Sukarno and Prime Minister Hatta, and the other *aliran*
which is continually taking a road incompatible with a
constitutional state, as for example in the social revo-
lution in Sumatera Timur in 1946. This was not approved
by our national leaders and was not endorsed by the Komite
Nasional Indonesia Pusat, because it was very clear, that
those who were victims of the social revolution, according
to the legal investigations of the Republic of Indonesia
itself were not guilty. The constitution of the Republic
of Indonesia is based on belief in One Supreme God,
humanity, family, social justice and democracy, but the
actions of the social revolution movement is contrary to
that and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia
itself from then until now has not yet been willing to
take action against the leaders of the movement that
disgraced our national (*kebangsaan*) struggle. ...

You already know, that the efforts of President Sukarno
and Drs. Mohamad Hatta have been directed towards the wish
for a constitutional state in all of Indonesia, but these
efforts have continually been side-stepped by illegal
*alirans*, like the Madiun rebellion in 1948. These two
*alirans* are continually in conflict with each other, one
striving to build a constitutional state and the other
striving to destroy that state. .... After peace had been
restored in Sumatera Timur (with the Hague Agreement), as
economic development proceeded step by step and the situa-
tion began to improve, political leaders who had earlier
fled, among them prominent leaders at the time of the social
revolution, returned to Sumatera Timur. Here they once
again began to actively interfere singing the old songs,
for example that the state smelled of colonialism, there
were people in it with colonial attitudes and other false
accusations.

At the time of the social revolution, which was promoted
by leaders disloyal to our national leaders Sukarno-Hatta,
they had carried out or ordered large-scale murder, robbery
and other illegal actions on the grounds that the victims
were Nica agents etc. .... (115)

The **Permusjawaratan** eventually closed with the issue of a Resolution urging that Indonesian independence be based on a federal state and the Pantjasila, that Sumatera Timur remain a constituent state of the RIS (firmly rejecting incorporation with the Republic of Indonesia as intended by the Yamin Motion) and that South Asahan and Labuhan Batu remain part of the NST. Certain groups, the Resolution added, had "illegally" and "undemocratically" compelled people in Sumatera Timur to profess unitarist principles. (116)

Once the **Permusjawaratan** ended, a five-member delegation, led by Nikmatullah, left for Jakarta to put the Conference resolutions to the RIS government, as a counter to that of the KRST. But in the context of larger events, the **Permusjawaratan Rakjat** was a requiem for a cause already lost. The structure of Malay and orang asli hegemony in Sumatera Timur had already virtually collapsed under pressure from the Republican/unitarist movement. Externally, the dismantling of the federal Indonesian state had proceeded too far for there to be any hope of recons-

---

(115) Translated from the text of Nikmatullah's speech given in *ibid.*; 365-70.

(116) *ibid.*; 371. A contemporary report of the **Permusjawaratan Rakjat** is given in *Waktu* 20 May 1950.
truction. Barely twenty-four hours after the *Permusjawaratan Rakjat* ended a special session of the *Dewan NST* gave its approval to the NST government commencing negotiations with the RIS specifically on the question of the eventual incorporation of Sumatera Timur into a unitary state. Three days later Dr. Mansoer joined President Sukowati of East Indonesia in empowering Hatta to act on behalf of their two governments in negotiations with the Republic on the final program for setting up the unitary state.

The only concession made to the future of the NST was acceptance by Hatta of an NST government proviso that the *Negara* would not be dismantled before the unitary state was formally established. NST government leaders were fearful that should Sumatera Timur be incorporated into the Republic before the unitary state was formed, political control of the *Negara* would fall into the hands of pergerakan groups, which the disintegrating federal government would be unable to control and which the government in Yogyakarta might be unwilling to control, even if they could. The horrific spectre of a

---


(119) George Kahin (1952); 461.
renewed Social Revolution in these circumstances loomed prominently in their minds. It was a possibility which Hatta was equally eager to avoid.

For these reasons Hatta had already refused to agree to the resolutions of the Kongres Rakjat. In a 40-minute discussion with the three visiting representatives from the KRST Secretariat, he rejected the Kongres resolutions and instructed the delegates that they should exercise "patience" so that orderly procedures could be followed in dismantling the federal system. (120)

If one speaks of Hatta and the group of 'administrators' who were associated with him in government leadership both before and after December 1949, their preoccupation was then almost entirely with the practical problems of the transition. They emphasized the need for legality and the maintenance of controls, the need for firm leadership and responsible politics, and the dangers of expecting too much from the new independence. (121)

The three KRST delegates in Java were disappointed and

(120) Merdeka 12 May 1950.

(121) Feith (1962); 33. Feith cites here the writings in late 1949 by Sukardjo Wirjo pranoto and Supomo. Hatta himself, while on an official visit to North Sumatra in November 1950, put no qualifications on his commitment to this approach. Speaking in Medan on November 21 he specifically attacked those whom he said were continuing to engage in "wild"/"illegal" (liar) behaviour and threatened that the government would take action against those who did not stop such actions. Every citizen, he emphasized, must act with "order" and "discipline". See the text of Hatta's speech in Perkundjungan Wakil Presiden ke Sumatera Utara; 3-17.
angry at Hatta's decision to support the NST government proviso, in contradiction to the Kongres Rakjat resolutions. (122) They had up to now felt confident of RIS government support. Earlier, the chairman of the RIS parliament, Mr. Sartono, had announced that the resolutions of the Kongres Rakjat were completely in line with the opinion of the RIS parliament, as expressed in its approval of the Yamin Motion. (123) Just a couple of hours before Hatta conveyed his decision to them, the KRST delegates had been told by President Sukarno that dissolution of the NST was now "no longer a problem." (124) Notwithstanding the vagueness of this statement, the three delegates felt confident that their representation in Jakarta had been successful. Hatta's decision was a severe blow to this.

Following the return of Said, Jakub and Sugondo to Medan, Hatta's program for setting up the unitary state became a cause célèbre within the ranks of the unitarist movement in Sumatera Timur. On May 19 that program was officially promulgated with the signing of a Charter of Agreement (Piagam Persetudjuan) between the RIS government (representing the NST and State of East Indonesia, as well as the federal state) and the Republic.

(122) Waktu 1 July 1950.
(123) Merdeka 9 May 1950.
The *Piagam Persetudjuan* announced that the parties had agreed to "implement in cooperation the formation of a Unitarian State ..." (125)

The secularist *pergerakan* sector of the unitarist movement, those groups belonging to or aligned with the PKI, *Pesindo* and the Saleh Umar/Jakub Siregar wing of the PNI - who remained most committed to the ideals of social revolution and who had been most bitter over the independence achieved by the Hague Agreement - reacted strongly against the Hatta-program. This spilled into open confrontation at a meeting of the KRST Secretariat in Medan on May 28. The *Vaksentral* chairman Jusuf Adjitorop together with Jahja Jakub presented a motion to the Secretariat which declared that the KRST no longer had confidence in the Hatta government. The *Masyumi* representative on the Secretariat, Haji Abdul Rahman Sjihab, rejected the motion in toto. Mohamad Said, Sugondo Kartoprodjo and Mohamad Jusuf also expressed opposition, on the grounds that the motion was unnecessarily confrontative and would seriously compromise the unity of the Republican/unitarist movement. (126) The meeting then adjourned to permit Said, Jakub and Sugondo to return to


(126) *Waktu* 1 July 1950.
Jakarta, this time accompanied by Mohamad Jusuf, to seek some compromise agreement with Hatta.

In Jakarta the four KRST delegates had two long discussions with Hatta. Jahja Jakub threatened that the unitarist movement in Sumatera Timur would withdraw support from the RIS government unless the latter complied with the resolutions of the Kongres Rakjat. Hatta however, refused to conciliate and referred the delegates to the commitments entered into by the RIS and Republican governments under the Piagam Perseptudjuan. For the second time the KRST delegation returned to Medan empty-handed. Jahja Jakub was determined to press ahead with the deferred no-confidence motion against Hatta.

On June 22 a joint meeting of the central and the seven wilayah secretariats of the KRST convened in Medan, to discuss the Hatta-program and the report of the four delegates back from Jakarta. Jakub and Adjitorop immediately re-introduced the earlier no-confidence motion against Hatta. In the course of an acrimonious discussion the Masyumi leader, Haji Abdul Rahman Sjihab, walked out, objecting to the motion being considered, as only 16 of the possible 28 secretariat members were present. Nevertheless, the motion was put to a vote and passed.

However, three of the four delegates to Jakarta - Mohamad Said, Sugondo and Mohamad Jusuf - all voted against it, reiterating their earlier objections to any open confrontation with the federal government. All three declared that such a drastic decision should only be taken by a full meeting of all organizations represented in the KRST. (128)

Approval of the motion of no-confidence brought to a head internal divisions that had been building up within the unitarist movement ever since the transfer of sovereignty at the end of December 1949. One pattern of internal division that had become articulated with particular clarity since December 27 was that dividing the national political parties. With the conclusion of armed struggle against the Dutch and the formal attainment of independence, the parties became important institutions through which nationalist credentials could be established, and access to the rewards of merdeka maximised. (129)

By March 1950 all the major national parties had been

(128) Waspada 23 & 28 June 1950. Waktu 1 July 1950. Merdeka 26 June 1950. Mohamad Said, at the time Chairman of the PNI for Sumatera Timur, had opposed the no-confidence motion at the KRST meeting despite the fact that two days earlier the regional leadership council of the PNI for Sumatera Timur had passed a resolution criticising the party's national leadership council for having supported the Piagam Persepdjuwan of May 19. Waspada 22 June 1950.

(129) See Feith (1962); 122 passim.
re-formed in Sumatera Timur: Masyumi, PNI, PKI, PSI, Pesindo, the (Protestant) Christian Party (now using the acronym Parkindo), the Partai Katholik and the (National-Communist) Murba party. As the unitarist movement gathered momentum, with the collapse of the federal system during the first three months of 1950, membership and branches of these parties expanded rapidly in Sumatera Timur. Individual and group identification with a particular party increased, party loyalty intensified and inter-party conflicts grew. As the attentions of the unitarist movement in Sumatera Timur became more and more focused upon Jakarta and Yogyakarta, the inter-party conflicts developing there served to intensify local inter-party divisions.

Following the KRST motion of no-confidence in Hatta, the regional leadership councils of the various parties in Sumatera Timur took their stands for or against. The Masyumi, Parkindo and Partai Katholik passed resolutions expressing full support for the Hatta-program and disassociating themselves from the no-confidence motion. In contradiction the PNI, PKI, Pesindo and Murba all expressed opposition to the Hatta-program.

(130) See ibid.; 46 passim.

and support for the no-confidence motion. (132)

Thus a basic ideological element in the inter-party disputes, that between religious and secularist-oriented parties, added a strong emotional content to the dispute and left little room for compromise. It marked a revival of the split between the religious and secularist parties that earlier had divided the last session of the North Sumatra DPR before the second

(132) Waspada 27-29 June 1950. The PNI more than other parties was divided on this question. Moderates on the party's leadership council for Sumatera Timur, including the Chairman, Mohamad Said, were personally opposed to any direct confrontation with Hatta and the RIS government. The more radical members, those constituting the pergerakan wing of the party (of which Saleh Umar and Jakub Siregar were the nominal leaders), on the other hand, were enthusiastically in support of the anti-Hatta resolution passed by the KRST. At the same time, however, the moderate grouping were only marginally less critical than their pergerakan opponents of the Hatta-program. See the articles by Mohamad Said in Waspada 21-24 June 1950. The real division within the leadership of the party in Sumatera Timur lay in the contradictory political implications separating moderates from pergerakan, flowing from their common opposition to the Hatta-program for the unitary state. The moderates were not prepared to directly challenge the legitimacy of the Hatta-government, while the pergerakan saw the Hatta-program as constituting an irrefutable reason why that legitimacy should be challenged. At the end of July the PNI regional leadership councils for Sumatra and North Sumatra announced that they were completely behind a recent declaration by the national party leadership that it was opposed to the Hatta-program. The two Sumatra party branches, the announcement added, absolutely disassociated themselves from the breakaway, pro-Hatta faction (the PNI Merdeka/Partai Rakjat Nasional), of the PNI in Java. Waspada 29 July, 3 August 1950.

On the split within the national leadership of the PNI, see Kepartaian di Indonesia; 126-7.
Dutch military action. Now, supporting the Hatta-program were the religious parties. (133) In opposition were the secularist parties.

Two conditions served to consolidate this situation. One was the reaction of party leaderships in Sumatera Timur to the conflict at the national level for and against the Hatta-program, which had set the Masyumi and the PNI respectively as the main protagonists. (134) The second was a local and more pragmatic factor. As a result of the energetic mass-mobilizing activities in Sumatera Timur by labour unions and farmers' organizations affiliated with the PKI and PNI, growing numbers of confessional Moslems and Christians joined organizations like Sekata, BTI or Sarbupri. Religious-party leaders began to fear for the stability of their natural constituencies and of a future domination of the political system by the PNI and PKI.

At the same time, a continuing theme and motive force behind the inter-party conflicts that had been stimulated by the Hatta-program was the old division between moderates and radicals were critical of Sarni and his supporters for having opposed Masyumi resolutions for supporting Tan Malaka against Hatta and for failing to count the party and the nature of that state, most definitely was.

(133) In mid-June the Masyumi leadership council for Sumatera Timur issued a Resolution declaring its support for the Hatta-program. This support, the resolution added, reflected "the political concepts of the Islamic faction in the Kongres Rakjat". Waspada 23 June 1950.

(134) See Feith (1962); 90-1.
pergerakan. This is not to suggest that the line-up of conflicting political parties in June 1950 was simply a mirror-image of opposing moderate and pergerakan groupings. The latter division existed within each party, including the PKI. (135) Rather the situation was that in general terms the parties leaned more to one side or the other on a moderates-pergerakan spectrum. By March 1950 leadership attitudes and policies of the PKI, Pesindo and the Jakub Siregar/Saleh Umar wing of the PNI were distinctly pergerakan-oriented, still emphasising the values and ideals of perjuangan and social revolution. By contrast, the Masyumi, Parkindo and PSI were oriented much more towards the moderate ideals of order and diplomacy. The pergerakan-moderates conflict, therefore, constituted an important facet of the religious versus secularist one. The unitary state itself was not an issue dividing moderates from pergerakan. The process and manner of its implementation, and the nature of that state, most definitely was.

(135) During 1950 there was growing dissatisfaction among a small radical faction of the PKI in Sumatera Timur with the Xarim M.S. leadership of the party in Sumatra. The radicals were critical of Xarim and his supporters for having opposed the Madiun rebellion, for supporting Tan Malaka against Musso and for failing to commit the party in Sumatra to a more immediate revolutionary strategy. On June 1, this faction established a rival PKI leadership council for North Sumatra, headed by two of the leading promoters of the Social Revolution of 1946 - the former Sumatera Timur Resident, Junus Nasution, and the former Barisan Merah laskar commander and former Bupati of Simalungun, Urbanus Pardede. Waspada 5 June 1950.
It is important to note, too, that in leadership terms the composition of the moderate and pergerakan wings of the Republican movement as a whole had changed considerably since the first years of the Revolution. Those confessional Moslems who in 1946 and 1947 had been enthusiastic proponents of militant anti-kerajaan and anti-Dutch policies were now strong proponents of order, legality and gradualism. A similar, and vitally important, shift in attitude had taken place within the senior ranks of the TNI officer-corps. The great majority now saw their interests best served by a consolidation of the law and order functions of the military within the unitary political system. With the physical armed struggle for independence over, most senior TNI officers were concerned to maximise their legitimacy as part of the new political order. That legitimacy had to be based upon their functions as defenders of order and stability of the independent state. The great majority of TNI officers had no comparable careers in the non-military arena to return to. In the course of the National Revolution they had acquired vested power and economic interests too large to place at risk in some new, unpredictable revolutionary situation.

The two men who headed the TNI/APRIS command for North Sumatra during 1950, Kawilarang and Malaudin Simbolon, had little sympathy with the secularist pergerakan. In January
Kawilarang had ordered the arrests of Jakub Siregar and Saleh Umar in Tapanuli.\(^{(136)}\) At the end of March Kawilarang, on instructions from the federal government, authorized the arrest by NST police of squatters in Deli and Serdang. Among those arrested were local organizers from Sekata and other farmers' organizations.\(^{(137)}\)

(Kawilarang had ordered the arrests following his intervention in the struggle between the Adjie/Bedjo and Saragiras/Jakub Siregar/Saleh Umar forces. At the end of December 1949, Kawilarang had ordered Saragiras, Jakub Siregar and Saleh Umar to report to the civilian government and TNI authorities in Sibolga. Saragiras refused, remaining with his unit in Padang Lawas. The other two made no immediate response. On January 12 Adjie threatened that all armed units which did not immediately place themselves directly under the authority of the TNI/APRIS command would be "hunted down". Saragiras again refused to comply. Shortly afterwards, Siregar was arrested while on his way to Sibolga. A little later Saleh Umar, too, was arrested. Waspada 17 January, 2, 8 & 18 February 1950.

Soon after the arrests Kawilarang confirmed that Siregar and Umar were being held on criminal charges of having misappropriated valuables seized during the Social Revolution and for investigation of allegations that they had been responsible for several killings carried out by the BHL during 1947. Waspada 15 March 1950.

(K) Prior to the arrests, Kawilarang had had discussions about ways of effecting the federal government instructions for a halt to further squatting. However, there was little room for compromise and the talks came to nothing. Soon after the arrests the Sekata chairman, Pattipeluhu, went to Jakarta where he protested to federal authorities about the arrests. The latter, however, remained adamantly that illegal occupation of plantation lands had to cease.

Kawilarang's decisions to take a hard-line against pergerakan radicals like Jakub Siregar and Saleh Umar and against the squatting movement do not necessarily run counter to his decision not to intervene against the Belawan strike and to lend TNI support to the ATR movement in Tanah Karo. In the two latter cases the issue was a clear one of the Republic versus the NST, rather than an internal political conflict within the Republic.
Simbolon (the former TNI commander for South Sumatra) who took over from Kawilarang in April, (138) was a Christian Toba, an active member of the HKBP, a committed anti-Communist and closely aligned with the Parkindo leadership in Medan and Tapanuli. His appointment immediately increased political pressure on the secularist pergerakan movement. He brought not only a determination to support the policies of the Hatta government but also a deep personal commitment to the ideals of the confessional Christian, anti-Marxist sector of the Republican movement in Sumatera Timur.

Simbolon soon became embroiled at the centre of the land problem. By early May the federal government and the APRIS command in Medan began to step up efforts to bring the occupation of estates land to an end. This was in response to urgent representations from the two planters associations AVROS and DPV. The plantation companies and the Hatta government were both seriously concerned at what they regarded as a dangerous increase in the militancy of the farmers' organizations in Sumatera Timur. (139) The latter, emboldened by the burgeoning anti-NST unitarist movement and reacting against earlier

(138) Kawilarang was made chief of operations against the South Moluccas rebellion. On Simbolon's appointment, see Merdeka 15 April 1950. Waspada 20 April 1950. Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 379.

(139) Document 249; 1. Iahtisar Parlemen No. 86/1950.
attempts by the APRIS command to stop the occupation of the estates lands, stepped up their demands for the redistribution of tanah concessie to peasant farmers. At the same time they encouraged further squatting as a means of direct action towards two related ends: the redistribution of foreign and kerajaan-controlled land and the destruction of the NST. (140)

On May 6 two members of the RIS Parliament - I.J. Kasimo and Jusuf Muda Dalam - arrived in Medan to investigate and report on the "land problem" in Sumatera Timur. (141) They were accompanied by Dr. Mansoer, with whom they had had discussions in Jakarta. During ten days in Medan, Kasimo and Muda Dalam had talks with the NST government, Col. Simbolon, AVROS and DPV, Sekata, Geraktani and the BTI.

NST leaders remained adamant that infringement of traditional Malay and orang asli land rights had to be stopped. Simbolon expressed concern over the threats which the squatting movement posed to the maintenance of law and order. The farmers' organizations reiterated their demands for redistribution of


(141) Kasimo was national chairman of the Partai Katholik. Muda Dalam was a representative of the PNI in the RIS parliament. They had been appointed at the parliamentary session on April 13.
plantation land. AVROS and DPV alone proved relatively conciliatory, agreeing to discuss compromise arrangements whereby some proportion of plantation lands could be redistributed to squatter farmers in return for an end to the land occupation. (142)

On May 17, the same day on which Kasimo and Muda Dalam left Medan to return to Jakarta, Simbolon issued a decree (Maklumat Gubernur Militer Sumatera Utara) re-affirming his supreme authority in North Sumatra for the maintenance of law and order. The Maklumat specifically placed plantation guards directly under his authority as military commander. (143) Five days later a joint decree (Maklumat Bersama) by Simbolon and Mansoer brought the land question to a stage of a major confrontation between the government (RIS and NST) and the farmers' organizations. Generally referred to as a "standfast order", the Maklumat Bersama threatened all persons illegally occupying government or plantation land after the date of the decree with prosecution and seizure of their belongings. (144) It was perhaps


(143) Waspada 22 May 1950.

the toughest line to date against the squatting movement. The
decree reaffirmed the anti-squatting legislation issued by the
NST government in 1948(145) and declared that any contravention
of the Maklumat Bersama would be considered a criminal in-
fringement of law and order.

Simbolon's decision to take such a hard-line, taken while
Kasimo and Muda Dalam were still concluding their negotiations
in Medan, had come out of fears that the squatting movement was
producing a mass radical movement which would be able to effec-
tively challenge existing governmental authority.(146) Simbolon
in particular and the moderate sector of the Republican elite
in general were concerned about growing influence that Marxist-
oriented social revolutionaries and the labour unions and
farmers' organizations aligned with the PNI and PKI were having
amongst the squatter-farmers and plantation labourers.

During April the PKI-affiliated farmers' organization,
BTI, had significantly expanded both its membership and branch

(145) Staatsblad Nos. 110 and 111/1950. See Warta Raemi Negara
Soematera Timoor No. 14/1948.

(146) In their report to the RIS parliament on May 27, Kasimo and
Muda Dalam noted that during discussions they had with
Simbolon on May 8 "The Military Governor was visibly fearful
that mounting chaos would develop if regulations prohibiting
illegal occupation of land were not quickly effected." Document 249; 8.
organization. The Chairman of the BTI central leadership council in Yogyakarta, Sardjono, had come to Medan to assist in programmatic and structural consolidation of the organization. He even took a leading role in the negotiations between the Sumatera Timur BTI and Kasimo and Muda Dalam. Furthermore, an increasingly closer working relationship was developing between the BTI and the three other labour organizations aligned with the PKI - Sarbupri, Sobsi and the Vaksentral. To those in the moderate camp these developments began to take on the threatening appearance of a renewed Communist anti-government movement.

The Simbolon-Mansoer Maklumat Bersama brought swift reaction from the farmers' organizations, but not in the direction

(147) ibid.; 1.

(148) At the beginning of June the Vaksentral leadership disbanded and amalgamated with Sobsi. Jusuf Adjitorop took over as Sobsi chairman for North Sumatra. Waspada 6 June 1950.

(149) An important stimulus to fears within moderate circles of "Communist" conspiracies had been provided by the appointment of the Sumatra PKI chairman, Xarim M.S., as Residen Diperbantukan bagi Kementerian Dalam Negeri Republik Indonesia (Resident Representing the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Indonesia) and made responsible for supervising the coordination of Republican government departments in Sumatera Timur. Waspada 14 February 1950. Even though the post was largely nominal and despite the opposition from the radical faction within the PKI to Xarim's "moderate" policies, his appointment was a disturbing development so far as the anti-Marxist wing of the Republican movement in Sumatera Timur was concerned. To most anti-Marxists in 1950 Xarim M.S. was still the "Communist" enemy No. 1 in Sumatra.
of moderation or compromise. *Sekata*, BTI and *Geraktani* openly defied the bans imposed by the decree. (150) Three conditions favoured such defiance. First, and most importantly, was the sheer momentum of the squatter movement; the thousands already in occupation of plantation land and the thousands more eager to take up their share of this *hadiah revolusi*. As one family occupied a piece of plantation land the motivations of perhaps two or more families to do the same increased. By the end of the first quarter of 1950, leaders of the farmers' organizations were themselves struggling to control and direct what was now a mass migration on to the plantations, characterized by a high level of spontaneity. While their role in stimulating this movement had been a vital one, by May 1950 their ability to contain it, even had they wanted to, was questionable.

Cunningham (151) has best described the squatter invasion through 1950 and thereafter:

The final enabling factor for the postwar agricultural migration lay in the victory of the Republic and the full transfer of sovereignty to it from the N.E.I. Government on December 27, 1949. ...

With this transfer of sovereignty, the battered remains of the dam which had been built around the East Coast by means of the plantation boundaries were washed away. Almost immediately, the invasion of plantation


(151) (1958); 91-2.
lands began. Javanese ex-labourers, ... led the assault. They occupied unused land on all the major roads near the cities. Land which had been cleared, farmed, and irrigated during the Japanese occupation was occupied first. Once this land was filled, other land which had been virgin territory or fallow land on estates was occupied by the settlers.

Recognizing the lack of governmental authority and often gaining the support of local Indonesian nationalist civil servants, the people lost all regard for boundaries. Since Indonesian adat land law, in general, recognizes cultivation, rather than concessions, as the valid basis for occupation, the people quickly planted banana plants on their one-hectare claims in order to establish their rights.

It was this general assault on the rich plantation land which immediately preceded the Batak agricultural migration. Living in an overcrowded area like Meat (in Tapanuli), the people reacted quickly to a new opportunity for relief. Feeling that they fully deserved this land won in revolution, the great movement began, not to take over the cultivated plantation land, but to occupy that which was not in use - that which had previously been deprived to them in their need. Strongly nationalist and anti-Western leaders wooed the people and urged this movement. Those leaders who opposed the movement in theory were unable to oppose it in fact, since the people poured onto the plantation land in such uncontrollable numbers. The revolutionary spirit still filled the minds of the people, and local police and Government authorities were afraid to act firmly, fearing angered retaliation by the crowd or by offended individuals. Three "standfast" orders were issued: one on May 22, 1950; a second on August 27, 1953; and the third on June 12, 1954. The repetition of the orders is testimony that they were ill-enforced and abortive.

Secondly, the Simbolon-Mansoer decree, the so-called "standfast" order, was swiftly compromised by a decision of the RIS parliament early in June approving recommendations by Kasimo and Muda Dalam that a proportion of plantation lands should be resumed by the federal government for redistribution to small-
holders. (152) The Kasimo-Muda Dalam plan gave those political leaders in Sumatera Timur who sought to promote and direct the squatter movement an important weapon with which to counter the May 22 decree, namely, that the squatters' claims now enjoyed an important degree of legitimacy at the national government level.

The third condition motivating defiance of the *Maklumat Bersama* was the strong support for the squatter movement within the TNI itself, amongst pro-Republic local government officials and within the plantation labour force. Quite a few of those who occupied estates' land in the early months of 1950 were former TNI soldiers, policemen or plantation guards. Others were relatives of TNI officers or of Republican government officials. Moreover, TNI officers, civilian government officials, plantation officials and politicians had already acquired political and financial interests in the squatter movement through acting as patrons for squatter farmers, in some cases for whole communities. Finally, there were those

(152) The recommendations were that 150,000 hectares of tobacco concession land and 150,000 hectares of uncultivated land from other plantation concessions should be appropriated for redistribution to existing squatters and to other landless peasants who could establish sufficient need. As a concession to NST ethnocentric sentiments, the report recommended that *orang asli* and long-term immigrant farmers be given freehold land, while recent immigrants should only be given leasehold land. Document 249; 9-11. Also, see *Waspada* 14 June 1950.
New TNI staff and field officers still more or less committed to the general pergerakan ideal which the squatter movement represented. Since that movement was directed primarily against NST and Dutch interests it was easily perceived by these TNI officers as an extension of the common National Revolution for which they had fought.

Taken together the ideological (i.e. nationalistic) and entrepreneurial appeal of the squatter movement was widespread through all levels of the non-NST civilian government and military institutions. Consequently, the scope available to Bon to actually bring sanctions, especially the use of armed force, to bear in support of the Maktumat Bersama was extremely limited. The only result achieved by the Maktumat Bersama was to focus more public attention upon the squatter movement, bringing more recruits into the squatter ranks.

On July 2, senior officials from the RIS and Republic of Indonesia Ministries of the Interior - Makmun Sumadi Pradja and

must be remembered that Simbolon had spent the greater part of the period of the Revolution outside North Sumatra. Despite his primordial ties to the socio-political structure of the region, his attitudes to a phenomena like the squatter movement were still relatively free of the complex emotions that affected the attitudes of those whose structure of reference was a close personal involvement in the motive that underlay that movement.
Sumitro Kolopaking respectively — arrived in Medan for discussions with unitarist and federalist leaders on the program for incorporating Sumatera Timur into the unitary state. Not that this program was at all negotiable in its basic essentials. Rather, the purpose of their visit was to seek the cooperation of all political groups in Sumatera Timur in the implementation of that program. They concentrated their discussions upon those groups most strongly opposed to the Hatta-program for setting-up the unitary state.

Immediately upon their arrival Makmun and Sumitro had a meeting with the KRST Secretariat. Makmun praised the KRST as having been the "nucleus of the national struggle in the Sumatera Timur region". In response the Secretariat presented the two delegates with a statement of "minimum conditions", reaffirming the decision of the Kongres Rakjat that the NST should be disbanded and Sumatera Timur made a part of the unitary Republic before the federal state was disbanded. (154)

The next day Makmun and Sumitro had discussions with the executive council of the PRSST, which presented them with a set of basic demands concerning the structure of the unitary state. This announced that,

... the Permusjawaratan Rakjat se-Sumatera Timur feels compelled to accept the Unitary State, but must assert the proviso that such Unitary State incorporate principles of federalism ... whereby the territory of Sumatera Timur, which includes Asahan Selatan and Labuhan Batu and such others that historically form part of Sumatera Timur, like the Langkat Sultanate and others, will form a single region with the widest possible autonomy and which stands directly below the Central Government without any other governmental authority in-between. (155)

In discussions with political parties and mass organizations Makmun and Sumitro received similar reassertions of basic demands and principles. The farmers' organizations, for example, strongly reiterated their demands for the redistribution of plantation land and refused to accept prohibitions on further land occupation or the evictions of squatter-farmers. (156)

All the political leaders and groups that Makmun and Sumitro spoke to accepted the inevitability of the implementation of the Hatta-program. But none made any compromises with basic principles underlying their opposition to that program.

On July 10 the federal government established a four-member Unitary State Preparatory Committee for Sumatera Timur (Panitia Persiapan Negara Kesatuan Sumatera Timur) - PPNKST, to implement the final incorporation of the NST into a unitary

(155) Translated from the text of the PRSST submission cited in Propinsi Sumatera Utara;374-7. Also, see Waspada 4 July 1950.

(156) Waspada 7 July 1950.
Republic of Indonesia. A senior official from the RIS Ministry of the Interior, Sarimin Reksodihardjo, was appointed Chairman of the committee. The other three members were the veteran nationalist Mr. Mohamad Jusuf, the former Deputy-Governor for North Sumatra, Mr. Mohamad Amin, and the deputy Walinegara of the NST, Raja Kaliamsjah. (157)

There were several good reasons for the choice of Sarimin as Chairman. He was a leading figure in the moderate wing of the PNI in Java and enjoyed good relations with many of the PNI leadership in Sumatera Timur. As chairman of the Interior Ministry's Agrarian Committee he had for some time been closely involved with the squatting problem in Sumatera Timur. Through this official position, and via his position in the PNI, he was also on amicable terms with the leadership of the largest of the farmers' organizations, Sekata.

On the 12th Sarimin arrived in Medan accompanied by the RIS Minister of the Interior, Anak Agung Gde Agung. Two days later Agung officially installed Sarimin, Mohamad Jusuf and Mohamad Amin as members of the PPNKST, at a ceremony in Medan.

The fourth appointee, Raja Kaliamsjah, withdrew on the grounds

that membership of the PPNKST would conflict with his duties as deputy Walinegara. (158) After six days of deliberations and discussions with NST and Republican political leaders, the PPNKST announced what it termed an Urgensi-Program (Urgency Program) for the incorporation of Sumatera Timur into the unitary state. (159)

Importantly the Urgensi-Program announced that once part of the unitary Republic, Sumatera Timur would cease to be a special autonomous region (daerah otonoom). Instead the region would become an administrative region (daerah administratief), in accordance with the Republic's Law No. 22 of 1948 concerning regional and local government. (160) With regard to the civil administration, priority would be given to the re-employment of all non-cooperator (anti-NST) civil servants. Those NST government leaders and civil servants who could not be absorbed into the new administration would be transferred either to the central government, to kabupaten administrations or to other

________________________________________________________________________


regions. (161) Finally, in a section dealing with "Agrarian and Economic Problems", the Urgensi-Program undertook to Plan the distribution of land which already has been and will be resumed from commercial enterprises to those small farmers who are in need of land. . . . (162)

In general the Urgensi-Program was accepted by all Republican political groups, even the more radical Marxist and social revolutionary-oriented factions, with little overt opposition. On the one hand the program had totally rejected the principles of special community rights and regional autonomy upon which the NST had been built. On the other hand it did not specifically reject the political priorities of any Republican group and was sufficiently vague for such priorities to be interpreted into its provisions. The program was, in other words, a document of deliberate political ambiguity, seen as such by all the competing Republican interest groups, thereby providing a basis of legitimacy from which competing political demands could later be argued and fought for.

One particular aspect of the program, nevertheless, brought immediate reaction within the ranks of the Republican/unitarist movement. This was the implication that some at least of the

(161) Item II, Urgensi-Program PPNKST.
(162) Item IV, Urgensi-Program PPNKST.
NST leaders and civil servants would be given official positions within the unitary state administration. Amongst pergerakan groups there was considerable antagonism towards this. Firstly, it seemed to re-confirm an implicit feature of the Hatta-program which pergerakan leaders had strongly opposed, namely a negation of the anti-colonialist principles for which they had struggled since 1945. Secondly, at a more pragmatic level, the infusion of federalist officials into the new unitary state bureaucracy would mean a strengthening of the moderate-conservative forces within the new political order.

Some on the moderate side of Republican politics readily welcomed the possibility of an infusion of conservative elements from the ex-NST elite into the unitary state bureaucracy, as an added protection against future pergerakan dominance. Most moderate leaders, however, remained ambivalent, finding it difficult to reconcile the tactical political advantages of this with their deeply held anti-NST sentiments. This was especially so in Masyumi, Parkindo and TNI circles where so many had once been at the forefront of pergerakan opposition to the NST elite, up to the time they accepted the Hague agreement as a satisfactory and orderly process to independence.

By contrast, there was little pleasure at the Urgensi-Program within the ranks of the NST elite. It had after all
announced the impending demise of East Sumatran autonomy and with it that of special orang asli and Malay rights and privileges. The more so since on the same day the program was issued, a Joint Declaration by the RIS and Republican Governments (Pernjataan Bersama Pemerintah RIS dan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia) on the unitary state provided that Sumatera Timur would be one of three second-level regions (Aceh and Tapanuli being the other two) within a single Province of North Sumatra. (163)

A couple of days later the Sultan of Deli announced that he no longer had any objections to the establishment of a unitary state - provided Sumatera Timur was granted adequate autonomy within it. (164) On the 23rd Raja Kaliamsjah then issued a five-point counter-program to that of the PPNKST. Specifically this asserted that Sumatera Timur must be

... an autonomous region within the Unitary State in accordance with the powers and authorities which were handed over by the Government of the Negara Sumatera Timur to the Government of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia. (165)

But these were protestations in requiem. The NST elite


(165) Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 383. Also, Waspada 26 July 1950.
had nothing left with which to bargain. The internal authority and political effectiveness of the Negara government had already collapsed from within, rendered increasingly impotent by the aggregate effects of the ATR movements, strikes, defections of local government officials (especially of hereditary chiefs) and by the expanding grass-roots influence of Republican political parties and mass organizations (especially the farmers' organizations and trade unions).

Yet the NST managed to survive as a political entity until the very end of the federal system, after all but one of the other federal states had collapsed. Why? Feith (166) has concluded that

The state of East Sumatra survived the unitarist tide until August 1950 partly because it was supported by local sultan families, partly because a major group of local Malay commoners looked to the sultans to protect them against economically stronger ethnic groups of new arrivals in this ethnically heterogenous area ... and partly because it had a small security battalion of its own.

However, this was a very small part of the reason, and rather over-estimates the relative political strength of NST forces vis-a-vis the Republican/unitarist movement in Sumatera Timur during 1950. In the main the survival of the NST until August 1950 had been possible because its leaders were able to

(166) (1962); 73, n. 43.
effectively exploit the internal political weakness of the Negara government in conjunction with the economic importance of the Sumatera Timur region, so as to make survival of the Negara an integral element in Hatta's program for orderly transition towards a stable unitary state. NST leaders had utilized the enormous national economic importance of the Sumatera Timur plantations to exploit Hatta's overriding concern for social and economic stability. Thus the very expanding internal opposition to the NST became an important bargaining card in the hands of NST government leaders in their negotiations with the RIS government.

To Hatta and his colleagues the imminent collapse of the NST by April 1950 posed horrific consequences, namely, economic and political disorder emanating out of a pergerakan-led victorious unitarist movement. In order to prevent such an eventuality, therefore, the NST government, once it had accepted the inevitability of a unitary state (as it had by this time), had to be preserved until, with the formation of the unitary state, it could be replaced in an orderly fashion by a moderate Republican administration.

By July this scenario had been realized. With that the NST elite had exhausted its bargaining cards and pergerakan opposition in Sumatera Timur to the Hatta-program could be
mollified by a final disavowal of the special interests of that elite, namely - East Sumatran autonomy and the protection of orang asli, Malay and kerajaan privileges.

Incorporation of Sumatera Timur into the proposed unitary state province of North Sumatra was set in motion on August 1 with the establishment of a Panitia Penjelenggara Pembentukan Propinsi Sumatera Utara (Preparatory Committee for the Formation of a Province of North Sumatra) - P4SU. (167) It was to consist of representatives of the three regions making up the Province of North Sumatra - Aceh, Tapanuli and the NST. Sarimin Reksodihardjo was appointed as Chairman of the P4SU and Acting Governor of North Sumatra, while retaining his earlier position of PPNKST Chairman. He was to hold both positions until a unitary state administration had been formed for Sumatera Timur, at which point the PPNKST would be disbanded. The P4SU would operate until a permanent governmental and administrative structure had been formed for the new Province. (168)


(168) Wasapada 19 August 1950. Suara Penerangan 30 January 1951; 9-10. Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 385. Persiapan Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 65 & 70-2. The Liang Gie (1967); 197-8 & 226. Schiller (1955); 340. The PPNKST was eventually disbanded on September 30. All its duties were transferred to a Koordinator Pemerintahan Sumatera Timur (Coordinator for the Government of Sumatera Timur). The P4SU was not disbanded until January 1951, when the first provincial Governor was appointed.
With the establishment of the P4SU, NST government leaders abandoned their last-ditch demands for the preservation of East Sumatran autonomy. Raja Kaliamsjah, in contrast with his earlier attitude towards the PPNKST, accepted appointment to the P4SU - even though the NST had not as yet been officially dissolved. The other two positions on the new committee were filled by the Republican residents of Aceh (Tengku Daud-sjah) and Tapanuli (Binanga Siregar).

By now hundreds of NST civil servants (especially at the senior levels of the bureaucracy) had resigned their jobs. Some because they could not bring themselves to contemplate working for a Republican government and were unwilling to assist actively in the final dismantling of the NST. Others because they felt they could expect little in the way of a future career under a Republican administration and were anxious to disavow official ties with the NST before that Republican administration came into being, thus hopefully making it easier for them to find alternative livelihoods.

Many of the NST officials who chose to remain at their posts and accept incorporation into the unitary state administration sought to make their accommodation with the Republic by joining Republican political parties. During the last week of July and the first two weeks of August perhaps two or three
hundred senior civil servants, those holding supervisory positions in Negara government departments did just this. (169) Most joined one of the two major parties: Masyumi or PNI. The rest joined either Parkindo (in the case of Christian Toba Bataks) or the PSI. (170)

With the Hatta-program being fully supported by Simbolon and his colleagues on the APRIS command, as well as by Masyumi and Parkindo leaders, the position of NST officials willing to accept incorporation into the unitary state bureaucracy, seemed at least temporarily safe. But they were pawns in a political game beyond their control. (171) Especially so in the case of those who could not or would not join Republican political parties. Certainly those NST officials who had

(169) This is a calculated guess based on approximations given by a number of informants.

(170) The acceptance of NST officials into the PNI, despite opposition by the Sumatera Timur party to the Hatta-program, is not as strange as may first appear. The Sumatera Timur branch and many local ones were still under the control of moderate leaders. They were quite willing to accept former NST officials willing to aver loyalty to the Republic, in the interests of boosting the moderate composition of the party.

(171) By the end of August the PPNKST had affirmed this uncertain future when it announced that all NST officials were to remain at their posts until their future had been determined by some permanent reorganization of the bureaucracy still to be planned. Waspada 28 August 1950. By the time the PPNKST had been disbanded, at the end of September, no firm plans had yet been decided upon. Suara Peneragahan 30 January 1951; 9.
chosen retirement from the political and governmental arena were only too well aware of this.

By the beginning of August the question of the absorption of NST civil servants into the unitary state apparatus had produced further serious dissension and uncertainty within the unitarist movement. (172) To many pergerakan leaders this seemed to be a replay of the developments which they had so vigorously opposed during the early months of the Revolution, before the Social Revolution of March 1946. From their standpoint real independence and a realization of the true ideals of the Revolution required a complete purge of former NST supporters from the political structure of the unitary Republic. At the same time many in the moderate camp, while accepting the pragmatic advantages of the policy of accommodation, nevertheless remained uneasy about the compromises this seemed to make to basic principles of the anti-colonialist and anti-federalist struggles. They disliked the idea of such a degree of accommodation with former enemies. In this respect anti-Malay primordialism was a strong motivating factor.

As the official end of the NST approached, following the setting up of the P4SU, tensions increased between the competing

(172) Waspada 2 August 1950.
political interests and rival groups within the unitarist movement. Pro- and anti-Hatta alliances lined up against each other. Tensions were compounded by uncertainty over structural details of the political institutions which were to replace those of the NST: details which were still to be determined by the federal government, the central Republican government, the PPNKST and the P4SU. None of the rival political groups in Sumatera Timur had any clear conception of the institutional arena within which they would have to operate in the immediate future.

On August 13 the Dewan NST approved legislation dissolving the NST and incorporating Sumatera Timur into the unitary Republic. (173) The Dewan itself was then disbanded. Interestingly this constituted a legalistic compliance with the KRST demands that the NST be disbanded before the incorporation of Sumatera Timur into the unitary state.

Next day the draft provisional constitution of the unitary Republic was approved by the two chambers of the federal parliament and by the Working Committee of the governing body of Republik Indonesia. President Soekarno signed the Constitution on August 15. (174)

(173) Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 395-7.
(174) Schiller (1955); 339.
The same day the Acting President of the Republic signed into effect the law incorporating Sumatera Timur, Tapanuli and Aceh into the unitary-state Province of North Sumatra. (175) Along with the NST the existing provinces of Tapanuli/Sumatera Timur Selatan and Aceh were disbanded. Aceh, Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli were each made a Residency within the new province. Medan was made the provincial capital. (176)

In Jakarta on August 15 Hatta submitted the resignation of the RIS cabinet to President Sukarno, who signed the provisional constitution of the unitary Republic into existence. The unitary state was officially proclaimed. An hour later in Medan, at a ceremony in the Military Governor's office, Dr. Mansoer formally surrendered all powers and authority of

(175) "Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-undang No. 5/1950". Waspada 28 August 1950. The full text of the law is given in Soerriadiradja (1953); 150-6 and Persiapan Propinsi Sumatera Utara; 34-43.

(176) The preamble to Law No. 5 provided that autonomous powers of the provincial government would be determined in accordance with the provisions of Law No. 22 of 1948. The autonomous and administrative powers of the provincial government would cover fifteen specific areas of government and would be delegated pursuant to Articles 23 and 24 of Law No. 22/1948. The actual transfer of these powers to the provincial government would have to be effected by further specific legislation. Law No. 5 made no mention of either the number or the territorial extent of sub-provincial regions, except for the three residencies making up the province; nor did it define the form of the sub-provincial administrations or their powers. These were to be determined in accordance with the provisions of Law No. 22/1948.
the NST government to the Chairman of the PPNKST. (177) Two days later, on the fifth anniversary of the declaration of independence, ceremonies to mark the inauguration of the unitary Republic were held throughout Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli.

The emergence of the unitary Republic in Sumatera Timur between 27 December 1949 and 15 August 1950 had been accompanied by the first disruptive stresses of the immediate post-colonial integrative process. (178) The myriad of groups representing the cultural, ideological and interest diversity of the unitarist movement began to flex their muscles in competition for maximum access to the resources of the new polity. The last stage of the Indonesian National Revolution laid open the conflicting ideals, interests and loyalties of this diversity. The struggle between them to define the independent unitary Republic had commenced. In the context of this struggle it was no coincidence that the ceremony to

---


(178) A process of integrative revolution which Clifford Geertz has described as "the aggregation of independently defined specifically outlined traditional primordial groups into larger, more diffuse units whose implicit frame of reference is not the local scene but the 'nation' - in the sense of the whole society encompassed by the new civil state." Geertz (1963); 153.
inaugurate the unitary state in North Sumatra had been held in the office of the Military Governor. Martial law still prevailed and Simbolon, as military commander, was the supreme political authority in the new province.

Civil authority had been made subordinate to military authority in all facets determined important in the implementation of regulations for the safeguarding of law and order in North Sumatra. (179)

It was tacit recognition, as the National Revolution concluded, of an endemic state of violence. The conditioning reality of the past eight years had become the frame of reference for the immediate future.

(179) *Waspada* 1 September 1950.
The course of the National Revolution in North Sumatra between 1942 and 1950 was peculiarly a product of the structural whole of North Sumatran society. The events of 1943-1950 had not just brought North Sumatra into an Indonesian nation state but, more importantly, had constituted a specifically North Sumatran dimension to the creative process of that state. Certainly those events had also constituted an integral part of a much larger struggle for national independence, encompassing both Java and the rest of Sumatra, and were seen as such both by those within as well as outside the two residencies. The events, vitally affecting the course of developments in the region, had been taken by outsiders - Japanese and Moluccan national Republican leadership on Java. But overall the events of the eight years had taken place with a high degree of regional isolation. At all times the leadership of the Republic and of the National Revolution in both Sumatra Timur and Tapanuli had remained in North Sumatran hands. The dominant values, aspirations and behaviour patterns of the Indonesian nationalist movement and the Republic in the two residencies were essentially North Sumatran.

While those actively participating in the National Revolution in North Sumatra had looked frequently for encouragement and at times for direction beyond the geographic

CHAPTER 10

ASSESSING THE REVOLUTION
The course of the National Revolution in North Sumatra between 1942 and 1950 was peculiarly a product of the structural whole of North Sumatran society. The events of 1942-1950 had not just brought North Sumatra into an Indonesian nation state but, more importantly, had constituted a specifically North Sumatran dimension to the creative process of that state. Certainly those events had also constituted an integral part of a much larger struggle for national independence, encompassing both Java and the rest of Sumatra; and were seen as such both by those within as well as outside the two residencies. Important initiatives, vitally affecting the course of developments in the region, had been taken by outsiders - Japanese, British, Dutch and the national Republican leadership on Java. But overall the events of the eight years had taken place with a high degree of regional isolation. At all times the leadership of the Republic and of the National Revolution in both Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli had remained in North Sumatran hands. The dominant values, aspirations and behaviour patterns of the Indonesian nationalist movement and the Republic in the two residencies were essentially North Sumatran.

While those actively participating in the National Revolution in North Sumatra had looked frequently for encouragement and at times for direction beyond the geographic
boundaries of the region, they had not done so as mere clients seeking to join, to establish their credentials for membership, in some already extant Indonesian nation. Rather, they saw themselves as equal partners in the creative process of that nation. While merdeka had been ultimately achieved at the centres of the former colonial empire - Jakarta and The Hague, and while the final boundaries of the nation state had been drawn at those centres, the National Revolution itself had taken place at the base, in the regions.

Between 1942 and 1950 the structural boundaries of North Sumatran society were widened to incorporate the reality of an Indonesian nation. It was this that constituted the National Revolution in Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli. Several themes dominated that process and together gave that National Revolution its essentially North Sumatran dimension: the intensity of inter-ethnic conflict; the breaking of the tightly-ordered, plantation economy of pre-1942 and the expansion of a much more fluid barter-trade economy; the mass movement on to the plantation lands; the high degree of regional isolation within which the events of 1942-1950 occurred; the destruction of traditional aristocracies and hereditary ruling elites; the emergence of the pemuda as a major political force; the emergence of the military as a governing institution. Together these produced fundamental
structural changes in North Sumatran society. In the larger historical process of that society a revolution had taken place between 1942 and 1950.

Analyses of the processes and phenomena of revolution in modern history of themselves constitute a significant library. The number and variety of premises from which such analyses proceed would warrant an encyclopaedia for listing. (1)

For the purposes of this study it is of limited relevance whether or not the events of 1942-1950 in North Sumatra constitute a revolution in terms of some other historical or

(1) Some of the better known of recent studies on revolution and some of the 'classic' works on the subject are as follows.

constructed model of revolution. (2) Instead, the important question is whether or not during that brief eight-year period the social structures of North Sumatra had undergone fundamental and drastic change, changes which were perceived as being a revolution by most of those who lived through them. (3) It is a historical and cultural question, having

The listing above represents only books on the subject. It does not represent the vast body of important articles that have appeared in newspapers and periodicals, nor pamphlets.

(2) See for example, Benedict Anderson's assertion that the developments in Indonesia between 1942 and 1950 do not amount to a "political" revolution, and that the reality of those developments fall short of the ideals of the French Revolution. Anderson (1970/71); 59-60. One can, however, no more isolate the factors that go to make up a purely "political" revolution any more than the reality of the French Revolution itself was able to match the ideals that dominated it. Wertheim, by contrast, recognizes that in any revolution: "the sequence of events escapes any attempt at stereotyping. This is logical if one takes into account the great variety of historical events gathered, ... under the general heading of revolution; it becomes even more understandable if one includes revolutions that miscarry among those to be considered. It would be surprising if it were otherwise. The actual course of revolutions is so dependent upon chance events, personal factors and specific historical circumstances that it needs a true Procrustes to believe that all these unique processes could be forced into one single and universal pattern." Wertheim (1974); 215.

(3) As Anthony Reid has concluded about the five years from 1945 to 1950: "The revolution provided the reference point and legitimation for all the major trends in Indonesian political life, whether Sukarno's 'guided democracy', the army's role in power, the communist or Islamic pursuit of the just society, the constitutional pattern of the nation, or the political style of the elite. It released unsuspected
institutional and cognitive aspects, not a question of comparative politics.

On the cognitive aspect, so far as any general assessment can be made it appears that most of those in Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli who experienced the developments of 1942-1950 did consider that they had lived through a period of revolution. It was from this perspective that, after 1950, they interpreted the past and looked to the future. After 1950 a majority of these people turned their attentions to consolidating those revolutionary changes into a secure and orderly future. At the same time, a minority who saw that revolution still incomplete concentrated their efforts upon securing its completion. In 1950 none of them, however, denied that a revolution had taken place.

From an 'objective' institutional perspective, the combined new forces, evident as much in Indonesian art and writing as in the intense demand for education and modernization. For the generation aged below thirty in 1945, in particular, the revolution was an intense personal liberation, shaking conventional standards and restraints and making all things possible.

"The terms 'revolution' has been officially discouraged in Indonesia recently as a description of the events 1945-1950. Nevertheless a revolution it was. The process begun in August-September 1945 in Java and Sumatra was not simply the capture of an administrative machine by a few nationalist politicians, but the temporary destruction of that machine by widespread popular forces beyond any leader's control." Reid (1974); 170-1.
effects of the removal of the colonial authority, the establish­ment of the nation state and national institutions, the disintegration of the traditional aristocracies, and the vastly increased horizontal and vertical mobility in the North Sumatra of 1950, had drastically altered the structure of relationships between the individual and civic authority, and between individual and individual. Fundamental changes had occurred in the structural patterns of North Sumatran society; which in terms of speed and degree had not occurred since the revolutionary changes of the 1870 to 1910 period. However, in the previous era, different societies had experienced those revolutionary changes at different times. Now, between 1942 and 1950, all those societies had undergone a revolution together; a revolution that joined them together in a common historical process and a common historical experience.

At the heart of the revolution between 1942 and 1950 was the confrontation between sub-national (local and regional) institutions, loyalties and consciousness with national Indonesian ones. A rapidly expanding national consciousness, interpreted through different, and often contradictory, sub-national values, came into play. Conflicts resulting from the contradictions between different sub-national loyalties and traditions became more intense. This set in motion the
undermining of the relative degrees of autonomy and stability enjoyed by sub-national social structures in 1942. The 1942-1950 period, therefore, marked more than merely a crisis in relations between the Dutch and the indigenous peoples of Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli. It was the first stage in the working out of the reality and meaning of "Indonesia" in the two residencies.

With the disintegration in 1945 of forty-odd years of a colonial system that had been based upon both the promotion of primordial consciousness (kin, ethnic, clan, religious) and the suppression of overt primordial conflicts at the same time, the latter quickly burst into the open. When after 1942 the relative stability provided the traditional social order by the Dutch colonial system collapsed, the rapid absorption of an Indonesian national consciousness into the several cultural traditions making up Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli had

(4) See Geertz (1963); 109-110.

(5) What occurred was a common phenomena in the decolonization process in ethnically plural societies. Thus: "Decolonization marked an important turning point in interethnic relations. The departure of the colonial third force meant that as the remaining ethnic collectivities struggled for power they no longer operated within the same limitations as they had in previous times..... what Ali A. Mazrui describes as 'the retribalization of politics, the resurgence of ethnic loyalties in situations of rivalry in the arena of resource allocation and domestic power politics'," Rothchild (1970); 603-4. See also, Mazrui (1969).
revolutionary effects upon each of the societies concerned. Social, political and economic horizons were suddenly widened greatly. New motivations and ambitions emerged to challenge the former social norms, which now were no longer able to provide the psychological and material security they once did. At the same time, these newly broadened cultural horizons and the new motivational forces at work within each cultural tradition, resulting from increasing horizontal and vertical social mobility after 1942, brought different primordial identities and loyalties into closer, more frequent contact — and conflict.

As the struggle to create the independent Republic threw different sub-national cultures together, the process of defining the independent nation set sub-national loyalties and traditions against one another. Dormant primordial stresses and conflicts became overt and active as the National Revolution imposed itself upon sub-national socio-political structures. As expanding national consciousness came into play, primordial conflicts became more intense. The resulting conflicts of loyalties brought severe stresses to bear upon sub-national social structures.

In this sense primordial loyalties and conflicts acted as a key motive force behind the National Revolution in North Sumatra. They provided a frame of reference against which national identity was interpreted and given meaning. For those
involved in the civil wars of 1947 and 1948, for example, it was the very strength of their nationalist consciousness that had produced the conditions making for internecine conflicts. Together primordial loyalties and national consciousness operated as mutually reinforcing factors. (6) Also, the conflicts between supporters of the unitary Republic on the one side and the federalist anti-Republic groups on the other was an essential part of this National Revolution. It represented the heart of the confrontation between national Indonesian and sub-national loyalties. There would have been no National Revolution in the two residencies without this confrontation. The resulting conflicts served to intensify nationalist consciousness among supporters of the unitary Republic. This, and the fact that it was the anti-Republic federalist groups in Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli who lost the struggle, was what

(6) "In the act of imposing a unitarian state on an ex-colonial plural society, parts of the postponed agenda were taken up. The unitarian abstraction was given concrete shape in a struggle to overcome subnational divisions that the struggle made acutely manifest. State-making raised choices between alternatives in which different groups had stakes; creating unity meant confronting disunity. ... The events of 1942-50 had drastically changed the lives of many of these men, detaching them from routine futures and plunging them into a chaos of opportunities (older people still commonly characterize the colonial period as a 'normal' time). ... In 1942-50, latent affiliations were activated and group biases confirmed; it was almost as if the sudden drastic expansion in personal freedom and the sense of being rudely kaleidoscoped out of old patterns into new ones required some reaffirmation of cultural identity to render the chaos interpretable." Emmerson (1974); 5-6.
made the National Revolution possible.

On the one hand, the stimulus to primordial loyalties and conflicts in North Sumatra, especially ethnic, provided by the events of 1942, became a dominating feature of post-independence politics in the region. On the other hand, by the end of 1950 the nation, the unitary Republic, had become a reality firmly rooted in the collective consciousness of all the sub-national socio-cultural 'worlds' making up the two residencies.

(7) "... if there is any part of Indonesia where inter-ethnic tensions have permeated social and political life since independence, it is North Sumatra." Castles (1972); 172. For accounts of the importance of ethnic loyalties and inter-ethnic conflicts in North Sumatra during the 1950s and 1960s, see: Smail (1968); Bruner (1959, 1959a, 1961, 1963 & 1972); Cunningham (1958); Liddle (1967, 1967a & 1970); Pederson (1969 & 1970); Haliman (1957) and Nawawi (1966).

(8) As Liddle has concluded in the case of Simalungun, "The events of the four-year revolution against the restoration of Dutch rule were of crucial importance in strengthening among the elite and extending to the population as a whole the sense of belonging to a common nation. Although guerilla organizations were commonly formed along ethnic and religious lines, members of all groups supported and participated in the Revolution. By 1950 the active opponents of independence were defeated and discredited and Simalungun was officially a part of the Republic of Indonesia. Among the members of the new political and governmental elite the idea of nationhood had by then taken deep root. In local society as a whole, through the medium of the revolutionary leadership, it had gained widespread acceptance in at least rudimentary form. ... as of 1950 commitment to the concept of an Indonesian nation was already firmly rooted among most segments of the political-governmental elite in Simalungun/Siantar and had
stability.\(^{(10)}\) In Mandailing, one anthropologist\(^{(11)}\) has noted the emergence of a new form of "Mandailing-Indonesian democracy" after 1950, in which the important elements were the self supporting nuclear family, the semi-independent village community and the greater independence of action being claimed by the youth. By the mid-1950s this had produced a new, post-Revolution phenomena: aimless assertiveness amongst the youth; dissatisfaction of some individuals with their life chances within the region; and a lack of attention to community matters in some villages. In Tanah Karo, the traditional administrative system of the Karo village, the \(\text{kesain}\) unit, disappeared as a consequence of the National Revolution in the region.\(^{(12)}\)

A major contributory factor in the development of revolutionary conditions in North Sumatra between 1942 and 1950 was the emergence of the \(\text{pemuda}\) as a self-conscious social group - alienated, ambitious, impetuous, violent. Especially through the \(\text{lasykar rakyat}\) and the TNI, the \(\text{pemuda}\) provided the motive force to challenge and set in motion the destruction of the structural cohesiveness of pre-1942 society. The large number of \(\text{pemuda}\) from non-(colonial) elite backgrounds helped

---

\(^{(10)}\) See Bruner (1959); 53-62.

\(^{(11)}\) Tugby (1960); 39 & 102.

\(^{(12)}\) Singarimbun (1967); 121.
to shake the rigidity of the pre-1942 class structure apart. Even though many of these non-elite pemuda who moved into elite positions in the late 1940s and 1950s aspired to the lifestyles and values of their colonial predecessors, their different class and cultural heritages and their vastly different experiences ensured a fundamental break with the past. They were the most vertically mobile sector of the population, strongly oriented towards an ethic of personal achievement. They contrasted greatly with the strong sense of hereditary inheritance and cultural representation that had characterized the pre-1942 elites.

The dysfunctional effects of the events of 1942-1950 upon the traditional socio-political structures brought about important changes in relations between elite and mass. Specifically they produced what some observers have discerned as a distinct elite-mass gap, manifest in both institutional and wider structural contexts. In North Tapanuli, for example, Bruner (13) has discerned the noticeable gap in administration between village and nation; a lack of integration between the higher levels of administration and those at the local level, and a lack of functioning social and political organizations at the village level which relate firmly to region and nation.

(13) (1959); 63.
In Simalungun, Liddle (14) has pointed to a distinct attitudinal and motivational gap that emerged after 1950 separating elite and mass.

Before 1942 the tightly organized and rigidly controlled system of regional and local "autonomy" in Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli, and the severe limitations on vertical mobility, meant that leadership interests and motivations tended to be contained within specific different levels in a larger pyramidal structure. Those in leadership positions at the middle and lower levels of the pyramid 'knew their place'. Their vested interests and ambitions were on the whole contained within the boundaries of the particular socio-economic level at which they exercised authority. After 1945, however, as mobility upwards from the middle and lower-middle levels increased and as motivations towards this upwards mobility grew, leadership interests at those levels became more transitory and exploitative. The attentions of all those at leadership levels in the two residencies came more and more to be focussed upon those above them rather than below.

Common ethnicity, common religion, clan relationships and ties through political organizations, all provided

(14) (1970); 4 passim.
functional links between elite and mass. But with the vastly increased social mobility since 1942, with the much greater area of opportunities available for the control of power and resources, community interests frequently became expendable in the scramble up the elite ladder.

At the mass level, idealism and cynicism became important correlates, providing insulation against despair in a highly unpredictable world. As the old socio-political order broke down, the new visions of an independent Indonesia, resulting from the growing nationalist consciousness, brought hopes for and belief in a prosperous future. At the same time cynicism developed to provide insulation against the despair which could, and frequently did, develop as the behaviour of those asserting rights to leadership of the National Revolution were seen to fall below the standards set by the ideals which they themselves espoused.

By the end of 1950 most of the institutions that had been basic to the stability of the social structures in North Sumatra at the beginning of 1942 had either been destroyed or been severely diminished in functional importance. Most obviously, the Dutch administrative and military presence had ended. The coercive force that had held disparate elements together within a relatively centralized political economy had
been removed. The indigenous hereditary elites that together had constituted the base upon which that Dutch-controlled political economy had functioned were no longer of any political significance. The legitimacy and authority of hereditary ruling families, at both village and supra-village levels, had undergone serious decline. The *kerajaan* as a whole was no longer a political institution of any consequence. Lineage and genealogy had ceased to be the important qualifications for positions of political authority that they had been in 1942. Rather, they had become a hindrance. While the Sumatera Timur *kerajaan* and the hereditary chieftain families of Tapamuli retained some political influence by virtue of their positions as *adat* leaders, their political authority in 1950 was miniscule to that which they had exercised in 1942.

Along with the political demise of the traditional aristocracies there occurred a significant decline in the primacy of *adat* as a source of political authority. *Adat* councils and law courts were either disbanded or, in the majority of cases, subsumed beneath new institutions having a superior legitimacy, one based upon the assertion of an Indonesian nationalist identity. (15) This is not to suggest that tradition and kinship

(15) See, Lev (1973); 16-18. However, Lev rather overstates the extent to which *adat* courts, and the authority of tradition and kinship, had been replaced by new national Indonesian
did not continue to be important factors in the exercise of political authority, they certainly did - no known revolution has yet been able to abolish this. Tradition and kinship still remained vital frames of reference: giving meaning to the new national identity of both individual and community; helping to link community to nation; and providing social and psychological security in the larger, less stable, more complex post-1950 world. (16) But the primacy enjoyed by adat institutions in the pre-1942 socio-political system was no more. Adat ceased to be the arbiter and legitimizer of political authority that it had been prior to the National Revolution.

Religious structures too had undergone some important changes. In the case of Islam, the Mohamadiyah and Jamiatul Washliyah together controlled and directed virtually the entire range of Islamic affairs in North Sumatra by 1950. The Malay-dominated Ittihadiyah declined rapidly in popular support and influence as a result of its kerajaan and NST links. Many of its Malay supporters shifted their allegiances to either Mohamadiyah or Jamiatul Washliyah. The result was that by 1950 Islam in North Sumatra was dominated by a strong national Indonesian identity and focus of loyalties. Yet this

institutions. The process was more one of sublimation rather than replacement.

diminution of local identity within Islam meant that Islam itself became a more clearly delineated facet of primordial loyalties. In the case of the other major religion, Christianity, the National Revolution broke the barriers that had restricted Christian religious activities in Sumatera Timur to within the Simalungun-centered enclave. By 1950 the expansion of Christian communities through the rest of Sumatera Timur was well under way. In the nine years between 1946 and 1955 the HKBP, for example, established 117 new churches in the residency; compared with the 80 that had been established there in the previous thirty-odd years. (17)

Accompanying the growth in both national and primordial consciousness between 1942 and 1950 was a significant expansion in corporate loyalties and corporate identity. Just as ethnic and religious identities were called upon by people to help define a social world in chaos, so corporate loyalties were forged, particularly within organizations and institutions combining both a communal identity and specific occupational interests, as a means towards material security. Strong corporate loyalties had of course long been a feature of the pre-War colonial civil service. This persisted after 1950, but the intensification of primordial loyalties during the

(17) See figures and maps in Cunningham (1958); 93-7.
revolution served to undermine them - the more so since with the emergence of military government between 1942 and 1950 the new Republican civilian bureaucracy could offer relatively less in the way of status or material rewards than its colonial predecessor. It was within the military, therefore, first the lasykar rakyat and later the TNI, that the strongest corporate ties developed.

As the military had grown from lasykar rakyat and TKR to warlord fiefdoms to a single military government for the province of North Sumatra, so too had the resources under military control. By 1950 the TNI was the dominant political and governmental institution in North Sumatra. Being a member of the TNI meant privileged access to status, power and material resources. The continuance of martial law after the unitary Republic had been formed in August 1950 enabled the military to consolidate its already extensive control over the political economy of the province. That control encompassed virtually the entire range of political activity and economic

(18) "At the end of the revolution of 1945-1949, the Indonesian army held a place of great power. Its leaders had refused from the outset to accept the principle of civilian control over military affairs, and the course of the revolution did nothing to convince them they had been wrong in maintaining their independence. In their eyes, the army had borne the brunt of the struggle against the Dutch, ... For the military leaders, the army embodied the spirit as well as the fighting strength of the revolution, ...". McVey (1971); 131.
enterprise: the supervision of government and public administration, the maintenance of law and order, and extensive involvement in the export-crop/barter-trade economy. (19)

Privilege, status and material rewards were powerful forces helping to build a strong corporate identity within the military.

The operations of political parties, the civilian bureaucracy, trade unions, mass organizations, plantations, peasant farmers, squatters, trade and commerce, government financing, social welfare, public works, etc. were contained or promoted, as the case may be, principally in consequence of de facto military control over and involvement in them. Freedom of action of those outside the military ultimately depended upon the extent to which they could exploit internal divisions (inter-unit, hierarchical, primordial or ideological) within the TNI regional command structure - the Tentera dan Territorium I (First Regional Military Command), TT-I. (20) This in itself

(19) In March a "Decree of the Military Commander, T.T.-I" (Maklumat Panglima T.T.-I) No.P.T.1/p4/51 prohibited the holding of any political meeting within the territory of the T.T.-I command without five days prior notice of such meeting having been given to the local security authorities. In July, two "Regulations of the Military Governor of North Sumatra" (Peraturan Gubernur Militer Sumatera Utara) Nos 72 and 75, prohibited strikes or work stoppages in any enterprise classified as a "vital enterprise" (perusahaan penting). The regulations defined as "vital" all those enterprises concerned with "communications (and) transport by land, sea and air", concerned with "the daily needs of the people" and concerned with "public health". See Waspada 5 February & 2 August 1950.

(20) The TT-I command encompassed Aceh, Sumatera Timur, Tapanuli
attested to the pervasive authority of military government in the region. It was a military that functioned as soldiers, policemen, administrators, managers and entrepreneurs. By 1950 the TNI in North Sumatra exhibited a distinctly garrison-cum-managerial character. Garrison in the sense of a strong emphasis upon internal security. Managerial in the sense of having administrative and entrepreneurial functions. (21)

The pattern of military government begun during the Japanese occupation had developed into a political norm between 1945 and 1950. Civilian politicians came to accept this as a fact of life. They regarded compromise and arrangements reached with the military as a normal, acceptable state of affairs. When martial law was abrogated in 1952, after twelve years, and Central Sumatra.


I am indebted to David Reeve for subsequently drawing my attention to a paper by Arthur K. Smith entitled 'Corporatism and the Garrison-Managerial State in Latin America', presented at the Annual Meeting of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Buffalo, New York, October 1974, which also draws on Lasswell's work, but which is an altogether much more sophisticated theoretical analysis than that being attempted here.
resulting changes in the scope of the political authority of the military were minimal. The TT-I commander (Simbolon) declared at a press conference called to announce the ending of martial law in the region that, notwithstanding such a change, the final responsibility for the maintenance of law and order "still remains within the authority of the military". (22) De jure changes, in other words, made little difference to the reality of military control. With military officers having extensive political and economic interests to protect, and the instruments of coercion with which to do so, the existence or absence of martial law was of minor significance so far as military dominance of the polity was concerned.

By 1950 the TT-I officer corps controlled a monopoly of force and most of the technological resources in the region. All those outside the military who aspired to the exercise of political authority consciously sought to establish alliances with senior army officers. They were alliances which constituted essential elements in the power-bases of non-military political leaders. Since 1950 no political organization in North Sumatra has been able to maintain, let alone expand, influence without the patronage and protection obtained from alliances within the TT-I. This applied to all political

(22) Suara Penerangan 12 July 1952; 3.
parties, including the PKI. The fortunes of political organizations changed as factional struggles altered power configurations within the military. Thus, after 1956 the influence of the Parkindo, Masyumi and the PSI declined as their allies within the TT-I lost out in the factional struggles. By 1966, it was the PKI, Partindo and the PNI that had fallen victim, as a result of control being established over the TT-I by those factions within it allied to anti-'left wing' and anti-secularist groups outside.

The political dominance of the military in North Sumatra, and its institutional cohesiveness, have been expanded and consolidated since 1950. But the diminution of primordial loyalties in favour of corporate ones has been a slow process. The reasons were simple. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s the TT-I was essentially a regional military force so far as its composition and interests of its officers were concerned. Thus, by the end of 1956:

Laid over this society like a thin wet sheet over a body, picking up a perfect imprint of the complexities of its shape, was the Bukit Barisan Division, incorporated in the Tentera dan Territorium I (TT-I, First Military Region). In all respects - its territorial arrangement, the ethnic background of its troops and officers, and their political leanings - it was not so much a division of the Indonesian Army as the military element in and

(23) An extremely detailed account of the factional conflicts at the time is given in Smail (1968).
of North Sumatra. (24)

Corporatism and primordial sentiments consequently were important dual facets of the structure of military government produced by the National Revolution in North Sumatra.

Corporate and primordial loyalties were not mutually exclusive. They were, and still are, overlapping facets of a single complex structure. On the one hand, primordial loyalties helped reinforce corporate identity by providing the corporate entity with cultural meaning. On the other hand, corporate ties frequently cut across and challenged primordial loyalties. The binding element holding these overlapping identity factors together within a single structure, and at the same time a product of their very existence, was a pattern of dyadic patron-client ties that became a major feature of the political system in the two residencies between 1942 and 1950. As existing social and economic structures lost their stability after 1942, as authority became more dispersed, individual social and economic security came to depend more and more upon personal relations; upon relationships between patrons and clients. (25)

(24) Smail (1968); 132.

(25) This development in North Sumatra was a case where "patron-client ties can be seen to arise within a state structure in which authority is dispersed and state activity limited in scope, and in which considerable separation exists between
Through such patron-client ties, corporate interests within particular institutional contexts were maximised, despite the absence of common ethnicity or common religion. An expanding structure of patron-client relations in North Sumatra between 1942 and 1950, extending through the military, the civilian bureaucracy and political organizations, helped to strengthen corporate loyalties. But primordial loyalties were not absent. They worked to reinforce existing patron-client ties within corporate boundaries as well as to help establish new ties across such boundaries.

In a period where the pre-1942 adat-based structures, operating under the supervision and protection of the colonial power, were breaking down, this structure of patron-client ties provided important brokerage functions and institutional coherence. By 1950 it was a major element in both Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli, serving to link new, supra-local, corporate and national loyalties to local and sub-national primordial ones, together in a single system. The structure of patron-client ties that developed in North Sumatra between 1942 and 1950 was, in other words, a basic part of the process of accommodation between the national Indonesian and the sub-national primordial dimensions of the societies in the region.

the levels of village, city and state." Weingrod (1968); 381.
The new expanded horizons of the several sub-national cultures in North Sumatra produced fundamental changes in the social structures of the two residencies. New ruling elites had emerged, vastly greater vertical and horizontal mobility had developed, and new challenges were made to the old adat-based norms of colonial society. In this sense the societies of both residencies had felt the impact of revolutionary changes between 1942 and 1950. But there were important differences resulting from particular kinds of change, or lack of, having taken place within one or other of the residencies. In Tapanuli no major upheaval took place in the economic structures of the residency, such as happened in Sumatera Timur after 1950. Instead the most spectacular immediate manifestation of the National Revolution in Tapanuli was the result of the revolution in attitudes and aspirations that had taken place there; which saw over 250,000 people (the vast majority of whom were Toba Bataks) move from Tapanuli to Sumatera Timur between 1950 and 1956 in search of land, jobs and other economic opportunities. (26) Particularly within North Tapanuli, community attitudes by 1950 were dominated by pervasive ambitions for education and 'modernization', for access to the resources that creation of the nation state had made available.

(26) See Cunningham (1958); vii, and Withington (1967); 155.
In Sumatera Timur it was the flood of migrants from Tapanuli after 1950 which consolidated the changes to the plantation-based economic structure already effected between 1942 and 1950, and transformed those earlier changes into a major upheaval. The tobacco plantations were dismembered. Between 1942 and 1955 some 120,000 migrants from Tapanuli and Aceh alone were estimated to have squatted on tobacco concession lands in the Deli region.\(^{(27)}\) This does not take into account the large numbers of Karonese who moved down from the Karo highlands and the additional numbers of former plantation labourers who also occupied concession lands after 1950. Between 1951 and 1957 the area of land available in Sumatera Timur for plantation tobacco production fell from 255,000 to 88,000 hectares. Of the 167,000 hectares removed from plantation

\(^{(27)}\) Estimate by the Ministry of Agriculture, Jakarta. See *Waspada* 5 March 1955. The Toba Batak constituted the largest single ethnic group among the Tapanuli migrants who moved on to the Sumatera Timur plantation lands. Next, but significantly fewer in numbers, were the Angkola from South Tapanuli. *Waspada* 17 June 1954. In May 1951 the Governor of North Sumatra, Abdul Hakim, told a special government conference in Medan that action would have to be taken to prevent migration from Tapanuli to Sumatera Timur becoming "like flocks of birds". The conference agreed that such migration would have to be "regulated". *Suara Penerangan* 22 May 1951. A few months earlier, in December 1950, Hatta, in Medan, had criticised the operations of land "agents" and "brokers" for "selling" or "leasing" plantation land to migrant farmers. *Waspada* 11 & 15 December 1950. By 1955, estimates Cunningham((1958); 107), migrants from Tapanuli were paying Javanese squatter farmers, or land agents, up to 5,000 rupiah per hectare for irrigable land.
use, 130,000 had been resumed for redistribution to squatter farmers, while the remaining 37,000 was 'illegally' occupied. (28)

As early as 1951 occupation of the plantation lands had reached the proportions of what one analyst has called an "invasion". (29)

By February 1956 the head of the Office for the Reorganization of Land Use (Kantor Reorganisasi Pemakaian Tanah) for Sumatera Timur had assessed the number of squatters occupying plantation land in the residency at 300,000. (30) Pelzer, in 1957, estimated that about half-a-million squatters, including women and children, were occupying about 115,000 hectares of former plantation land. (31)

(28) Cunningham (1958); 143.

(29) ibid.; 92. In November 1950, Hatta, in a speech in Medan, referred to the occupation of the plantation lands as "tremendous" (hebat) and "critical" (sulit). Perkundjungan Wakil Presiden ke Sumatera Utara; 11-12 & 76.

Much has been written about the occupation of the Sumatera Timur plantation lands during the 1950s and early 1960s. An extremely detailed picture of its scope, the innumerable attempts by national and provincial governments to contain it and the high level of political and inter-ethnic conflicts it produced, can be put together from the following sources:


(31) Pelzer (1957); 152-3. Also, see Cunningham (1958); 89. Pelzer also comments that "Whereas before 1940 the plantations of East Sumatra generally bordered on one another or
As a result of the invasion of the plantation lands, land rights (hak-hak tanah) and the land problem (soal tanah) in Sumatera Timur have remained a central political issue throughout the twenty-six years since the formation of the unitary Republic. They have provided a continuing stimulus to inter-ethnic conflicts in the residency. The intensity of the soal tanah in Sumatera Timur through the early 1950s was directly responsible for the fall of the national government, headed by Mr. Wilopo, in June 1953. In October that year it had brought about the dismissal of the North Sumatra governor, Abdul Hakim. (32) By the early 1970s the continuing political conflicts over the soal tanah were focussed upon attempts by Malay community leaders, notably the former PADI leader,

were separated only by narrow belts of village land, leaving no room for further development or for the expansion of peasant agriculture, today the once solid plantation complexes are honeycombed with squatter areas." (1957); 156. Of the 130,000 hectares of tobacco concession land resumed earlier, very little was actually redistributed to squatter-farmers.

In the seven years between 1954 and 1961 the population of Sumatera Timur increased by nearly 38%; much of the increase coming from the flood of migrants from Tapanuli attracted by the availability of former plantation land. The occupation of plantation lands, especially in the tobacco regions of Deli and Serdang, accounted largely for the doubling of the total land area used for smallholder peasant farming between 1952 and 1961. See Monografi Daerah Sumatera Timur; 36-7 & 53.

(32) The catalyst to the fall of the Wilopo government and Hakim's dismissal was the so-called "Tandjung Morawa Affair" (Peristiwa Tandjung Morawa) in March 1953. See Feith (1962); 294-6 and Waspada 8 & 13 October 1953.
Ustadz Abdul Kadir, to reassert the special rights of Malay farmers, as former *rakyat penunggu*, to the ex-plantation land being occupied by non-Malay squatter-farmers. (33)

The second of the major changes effected in the economic structure of Sumatera Timur - the barter or 'smuggling' trade - produced after 1950 a huge unrecorded proportion of the total economy of the region. Illegal exports of plantation crops (rubber, copra, palm oil, sisal, tobacco) - some obtained from the plantations themselves, the rest from peasant producers - flowed out from Sumatera Timur across the Malacca Straits to Malaya/Singapore; usually through the barter-trade networks of revolution days, still functioning through Chinese middlemen and with protection from local military and police authorities.

Merely estimating the proportion of the total regional economy that this illegal trade has constituted since 1950 is quite impossible. That it has been a significant proportion is without doubt. In the early 1950s senior provincial government leaders frequently announced intentions to curb "smuggling" operations across the Malacca Straits from Sumatera Timur. (34)


(34) See *Waspada* 20 December 1954 and 29 March 1956, for statements to this effect by governors Amin and Kumala Pontas.
But control of that trade was well beyond the scope of the civilian authorities. Military involvement in the trade was too long standing and too extensive; and the military showed no signs of wishing to surrender the profits and resources that could be acquired. By mid-1956 the TT-I command itself was openly operating a huge rubber-"smuggling" enterprise, the so-called "Teluk Nibung Affair". (35) It was an operation that attested to the permanent establishment of a major new facet of the regional economy, one from which enormous resources could be realized. Since 1950 some tens of thousands of persons in Sumatera Timur each year have received at least some proportion of their incomes from this unrecorded "smuggling" trade.

The 1942-1950 period had produced an economy in Sumatera Timur considerably more diversified and localized than that which had preceded it. A high proportion of regional production and monetary resources came from smallholder farming and from the "smuggling" trade. A new important group of part-time entrepreneurs - military officers and civilian officials - emerged.

(35) Detailed accounts of the Teluk Nibung "smuggling" operations, including estimates of quantities and values, are given in the following sources. Waspada, July 1956. Smail (1968); 136-8. Compton (1956). Dokumentasi Sumatera Utara: Kroniek 1961; 1-19. See also, Feith (1962); 498-9. The Teluk Nibung operations had been effected specially to meet specific needs at the time. However, it had been implemented through an existing, well-organized, infrastructure.
Also, the Chinese role in this regional economy had increased enormously from that of 1942. As the importance of the small-holder/"smuggling" trade aspects of the economy increased as a proportion of the total regional economy, so too did the importance of the Chinese merchant community - as middlemen, financiers and organizers. (36)

Finally, notwithstanding differences of degree in the effects of the 1942-1950 period upon each of the two residencies, in eight years the societies of both residencies were thrown violently into a new world. For the great majority of the population of Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli - Malay, Batak, kerajaan, youth, orang asli, soldier, civil servant, plantation worker, urban proletariat, peasant etc. - they were living in a fundamentally different world from that which they had known just eight years before. Not merely a world led by new elites, but one in which former aristocratic ruling classes (the sultans, rajas, tengkus, datuks and sultans of Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli) had been removed and, in the case of Sumatera Timur, one in which a previously privileged ethnic group - the Malays - had been reduced to subservience. The Indonesian nation state had become an integral part of the cultural worlds of Sumatera Timur and Tapanuli, and in the process had thrown those worlds into turmoil.

(36) See Allen & Donnithorne (1957); 247-8.
## APPENDIX

Monthly production (in tons) from plantations within the N.W. of rubber, palm oil, palm kernel and fibre: October 1947 to November 1948.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rubber</th>
<th>Palm Oil</th>
<th>Palm Kernel</th>
<th>Fibre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>111</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>583</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>1,223</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>1,724</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>3,474</td>
<td>1,111</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>2,970</td>
<td>2,265</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>3,383</td>
<td>2,902</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>3,843</td>
<td>3,742</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>4,363</td>
<td>3,976</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>3,168</td>
<td>4,349</td>
<td>1,230</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>5,333</td>
<td>5,669</td>
<td>1,508</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>7,947</td>
<td>1,988</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>8,420</td>
<td>7,204</td>
<td>1,827</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>6,670</td>
<td>7,086</td>
<td>1,807</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**

"Vorlag ... Nagara Soematers Timor ..." April 1948, p.10; May 1948, p.14; June 1948, p.15; July 1948, p.16.

APPENDIX 1

Monthly production (in tons) from plantations within the NST of rubber, palmoil, palmkernel and fibre: October 1947 to November 1948.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rubber</th>
<th>Palmoil</th>
<th>Palmkernel</th>
<th>Fibre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1947</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>1,223</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1948</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>1,724</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>2,423</td>
<td>1,415</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>2,970</td>
<td>2,265</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>3,293</td>
<td>2,902</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>3,843</td>
<td>3,742</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>4,363</td>
<td>3,976</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>5,168</td>
<td>4,849</td>
<td>1,230</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>5,353</td>
<td>5,669</td>
<td>1,508</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>6,290</td>
<td>7,947</td>
<td>1,988</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>6,420</td>
<td>7,204</td>
<td>1,827</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>6,670</td>
<td>7,096</td>
<td>1,807</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources
- "Verslag ... Negara Soematera Timoer ..." April 1948 p.10; May 1948, p.14; June 1948, p.10; July 1948, p.16.
At the end of August 1947 L. Hanson together with two Javanese arrived at Labuhan Bilik from Singapore in a 95-ton boat. (1) Hanson carried a letter of introduction from Mr. Oetoyo (representative of the Republic of Indonesia Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Singapore) attesting to his, Hanson's, trustworthiness and stating that Hanson had done much for the Republic. Hanson's two companions, Sudjadi and Tamtomo, also had letters from Oetoyo addressed to the Bupati of Labuhan Batu. Hanson's letter of introduction also stated that he had come to Labuhan Batu to trade and asked that the Republican authorities give him every assistance. As a result, Hanson's credentials were approved by the local officials. Hanson was then invited to go to Rantau Prapat to meet the Bupati. Hanson and Sudjadi first returned to Port Swettenham. Tamtomo went to Rantau Prapat.

Five days later Hanson returned to Labuhan Bilik with a cargo of petrol, diesel oil, lubricating oil and flour - all of which were in short supply in Labuhan Batu. He discharged part of the cargo in Labuhan Bilik. With the remainder he went to Rantau Prapat, leaving his boat and cargo upriver at

(1) See Document 240, No. 522.
Negeri Baru. While in Rantau Prapat Hanson was informed that the remainder of his cargo in Negeri Baru had been offloaded by troops of Sukardi's battalion (from Brigade XII). Hanson then returned to Labuhan Bilik with a cargo of latex sheets which he exchanged there with the Wedana for kampung (small-holder) rubber. (2)

Hanson and the Bupati had reached an agreement whereby they would split the profits of rubber exported by Hanson on a 50-50 basis and that Hanson would deliver imported goods at the cost price of their purchase. (3) Hanson informed the Bupati that 15% of the exported rubber had to be reserved for delivery to the Department of Welfare in Oetoyo's office in Singapore. In Labuhan Bilik, Hanson reached a similar agreement with the Wedana.

Thereafter Hanson imported into Labuhan Batu petrol, diesel and lubricating oils, cotton, rice, flour, tyres and machine parts. (4) The Bupati (in Rantau Prapat) paid for the

(2) The reasons to this particular exchange of goods is not made clear. Most probably Hanson's intention in exchanging the processed latex for kampung rubber (usually in crudely coagulated form) was a goodwill gesture aimed at convincing the Wedana to enter into an agreement for the regular supply of kampung rubber.

(3) Presumably this refers to the cost of purchase in Singapore.

(4) The need to import rice from Singapore to Labuhan Bilik,
goods in latex sheets. The Wedana (in Labuhan Bilik) paid in kampung rubber. By November 1947, Hanson had made four return trips between Labuhan Bilik and Singapore. (5)

In November 1947 the forces of Timur Pane occupied nearly all of Labuhan Batu. The Bupati was arrested. Captain Sukardi escaped to Padang Sidempuan. Labuhan Bilik itself was not occupied, but was blockaded. The Wedana left for Malaya. (6) He returned later, accompanied by Hanson, with 500 gunnysacks of rice. He then left again for Malaya with a cargo of rubber for delivery to Oetojo. In Singapore representatives of Captain Mudirudin took delivery of the rubber without Oetojo's knowledge. Oetojo then demanded $50,000 (Straits dollars) compensation from the Wedana, as a result of which a representative of Hanson's company in which usually obtained its rice supplies from the interior (and which later became a major port for the export of rice from South Tapanuli to Singapore), was probably a result of the port being cut off from the interior by Timur Pane's forces.


(6) Document 107, No. 567/1947 states that the Wedana had arrived in Singapore on October 3rd, where he already has $50,000 deposited to his credit in the Chinese Oversea Bank. The deposit had been made by a local Chinese merchant. During this visit the Wedana and Oetojo came into conflict over the former accusing Oetojo of wasting funds on high living. For other reports of the visit of the Wedana to Singapore, see Document 107, Nos 613 and 620/1947.
Singapore agreed to pay the money to Oetoyo. The **Wedana** then returned to Labuhan Bilik with another 120 sacks of rice.

At the beginning of 1948 the **Wedana** once more went to Singapore where he was informed that Hanson had not yet paid the $50,000 to Oetoyo. Hanson himself was not in Singapore. A representative of Hanson's office presented the **Wedana** with a statement of account signed by Hanson (7) and promised to investigate the matter. The **Wedana** then went to the office of Oetoyo where he was informed that Oetoyo had no connections with Hanson. In the meantime, Oetoyo's representatives in Labuhan Bilik had begun moves to have the **Wedana** removed from office because of corruption. The **Wedana** stayed in Singapore for a while. He was captured by the Dutch navy, however.

---

(7) A "Final statement of Account between Indonesian Government, L. Batoe-L. Bilik and L. Hanson, Wah Giap & Coy, Klang, Malacca and Singapore." dated 3 February 1947 and signed by "L. Hanson, Singapore" states that an amount of $28,481.07 is owed by the Republican authorities in Labuhan Batu. The Statement calculates the debt as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total sale of rubber as per agreement</td>
<td>222,686.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian Government's share of rubber sale, 50%</td>
<td>111,343.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale of 85 tons of rubber ex M.V. 'Coorabie'</td>
<td>73,482.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total of Indonesian money</td>
<td>184,825.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total value of goods delivered to Indonesia</td>
<td>107,078.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cash advanced to Indonesian officials</td>
<td>106,227.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td>$213,306.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total of cash and goods</td>
<td>$213,306.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total of sale of rubber</td>
<td>184,825.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deficit</strong></td>
<td><strong>$28,481.07</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Document 158.
as he was afraid to return to Labuhan Bilik. (8) Oetoyo has close connections with several Republican officials in Labuhan Bilik. They are regular guests at his house in Singapore. Oetoyo is still collecting 15% 'duties' on the barter trade between Labuhan Bilik and Singapore.

Earlier at the beginning of September 1947, Dr. Suroso (Oetoyo's deputy) had arrived in Labuhan Bilik from Singapore, accompanied by Sudjadi, with a letter from Oetoyo introducing Suroso as a representative of the Republic's Department of Welfare in Singapore, adding that he had come to Labuhan Bilik to discuss trade with the Bupati. Suroso had discussions with the Bupati in Rantau Prapat. He left with a cargo of latex. He was captured by the Dutch navy, however, and taken to Belawan. Sudjadi then took charge of exporting the rubber from Labuhan Bilik, using Chinese-owned tongkangs, on the same barter conditions as agreed to earlier between the Bupati and Hanson. In this case, however, no goods were brought back to Labuhan Bilik in return for the rubber.

At the end of September 1947 Ali Djajeng Prawiro arrived in Labuhan Bilik by speedboat from Singapore with an intro-

(8) Document 107, No. 40/1948 refers to the Wedana from Labuhan Bilik being in Singapore with $20,000 to spend on the purchase of ammunition and rice.
duction from Amir Sjarifudin (9) stating that he was "Head of the Ministry of Defence, Overseas Affairs" in Singapore. Prawiro announced that he worked in Singapore under the supervision of Oetoyo. He brought with him a cargo of weapons (16 sten guns and ammunition) and walkie-talkie radio-receivers for Suhardjo's command in Bukittinggi. At a meeting with government officials in Labuhan Bilik, Prawiro asked for payment for the goods as well as for a loan in goods and money. (Prawiro was on his way to Bukittinggi and said he would repay the loan to the Wedana when the latter next came to Singapore). The Wedana gave Prawiro 3,000 Straits dollars and arranged for the transport of 10 tons of latex and 2 tons of palm oil to Singapore on Prawiro's behalf. (10) The Wedana himself accompanied the cargo to Singapore where he presented Prawiro's I.O.U. to Oetoyo's office, receiving an acknowledgement (verklaring) in return.

At the beginning of January 1948 when the Wedana was again in Singapore he contacted Prawiro who promised to settle the I.O.U. within three days as he had to obtain the

(9) At the time Amir Sjarifudin was Prime Minister of the Republic as well as Minister of Defence.

money from Oetoyo. When the Wedana called back again on
Prawiro he had "disappeared". The Wedana then went to Oetoyo
who denied any connection with Prawiro.

The Wedana, who was in debt to one Tong Djoe of Cecil
Street, Singapore, on 23 October 1948 gave Tong Djoe the
verklaring he had received earlier from Oetoyo telling him
to collect the money direct from Bukittinggi. (11)

(11) Document 107, No. 177/1948 states that Usman Effendi,
the "former Wedana in Labuhan Bilik" has announced that
he no longer supports the Republic but has now become
a sympathiser of the federalist movement.
### APPENDIX 3

#### POPULATION OF SUMATERA TIMUR AND TAPANULI 1900-1930

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>SUMATERA TIMUR</th>
<th>TAPANULI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europeans</td>
<td>Indonesians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>2079</td>
<td>306035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>2667</td>
<td>450941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>6270</td>
<td>742215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>7882</td>
<td>1042930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>8263</td>
<td>1077830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>11079</td>
<td>1470395</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| % increase 1900-30 | 433.0 | 380.0 | 87.0 | 302.0 | 131.0 | 152.0 | 178.5 | 152.3 |

* Chinese - 103768, Others - 9208
* Chinese - 192822, Others -18904
**Chinese - 5704, Others - 645

Sources. Yearbook of the Netherlands East Indies 1920; 17.
Indisch Verslag, 1940; 15.
Statistisch Jaaroverzicht van Nederlandsch-Indie, 1929; 11-23.
Deli Data 1863-1938; 35.

(1) Includes the territory of Bengkalis/Siak Sri Indragiri.
# APPENDIX 4

**INDONESIAN POPULATION ACCORDING TO ETHNIC GROUP 1930**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Sumatera Timur Total</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Tapanuli (including Nias) Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Malays</strong></td>
<td>334,870</td>
<td>23.00</td>
<td>16,834</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Karonese</strong></td>
<td>145,429</td>
<td>9.98</td>
<td>8,921</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Simalungun</strong></td>
<td>95,144</td>
<td>6.53</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Javanese</strong></td>
<td>589,836</td>
<td>40.51</td>
<td>13,301</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pakpak/Dairi</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19,936</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Toba</strong></td>
<td>74,224</td>
<td>5.09</td>
<td>523,524</td>
<td>50.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Angkola</strong></td>
<td>6,706</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>79,849</td>
<td>7.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Padang Lawas</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>65,414</td>
<td>6.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mandailing</strong></td>
<td>45,308</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>89,475</td>
<td>8.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nias</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>194,939</td>
<td>18.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minangkabau</strong></td>
<td>50,677</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>9,868</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sundanese</strong></td>
<td>44,107</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>3,290</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Betawi</strong></td>
<td>8,882</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Banjarese</strong></td>
<td>31,266</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Others</strong></td>
<td>29,408</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>8,552</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources.** Indisch Verslag 1940; 38. Document 483; Bijlage I.
APPENDIX 5

POPULATION OF NATIVE STATES (ZELFBESTURENDE LANDSCHAPPEN) IN SUMATERA TIMUR 1927/30

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afdeeling</th>
<th>Indigenous Subjects 1927</th>
<th>Total Population 1930</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afdeeling Deli &amp; Serdang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deli</td>
<td>116,063</td>
<td>321,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serdang</td>
<td>59,143</td>
<td>149,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afdeeling Langkat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langkat</td>
<td>88,574</td>
<td>246,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afdeeling Asahan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahan</td>
<td>49,411</td>
<td>136,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indrapura</td>
<td>10,996</td>
<td>21,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suka Dua</td>
<td>5,932</td>
<td>16,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanah Datar</td>
<td>4,429</td>
<td>6,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasisir</td>
<td>2,605</td>
<td>3,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limapuluh</td>
<td>6,419</td>
<td>15,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kualu-Leidong</td>
<td>18,562</td>
<td>36,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kotapinang</td>
<td>12,820</td>
<td>26,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panai</td>
<td>10,667</td>
<td>17,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bila</td>
<td>16,790</td>
<td>55,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afdeeling Simalungun &amp; Karolanden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanah Jawa</td>
<td>25,331</td>
<td>85,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siantar</td>
<td>25,536</td>
<td>90,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panei</td>
<td>16,017</td>
<td>51,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raya</td>
<td>10,591</td>
<td>15,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dolok</td>
<td>8,710</td>
<td>11,271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purba</td>
<td>7,950</td>
<td>9,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silimakuta</td>
<td>5,135</td>
<td>6,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lingga</td>
<td>30,183</td>
<td>36,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barusjahe</td>
<td>8,522</td>
<td>8,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suka</td>
<td>12,581</td>
<td>14,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarinembah</td>
<td>17,732</td>
<td>20,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kutabuluh</td>
<td>3,547</td>
<td>7,439</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources. Statistisch Jaaroverzicht van Nederlandsch-Indie 1929; 35. Indisch Verslag 1940; 25.
### APPENDIX 6
### POPULATION BY AFDEELING ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS 1927 & 1930

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sumatera Timur</th>
<th>1927</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1927</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1927</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1927</th>
<th>1930</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deli &amp; Serdang</td>
<td>322,653</td>
<td>431,599</td>
<td>65,735</td>
<td>98,097</td>
<td>5,038</td>
<td>6,307</td>
<td>393,426</td>
<td>536,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langkat</td>
<td>160,623</td>
<td>217,857</td>
<td>27,124</td>
<td>35,691</td>
<td>1,139</td>
<td>1,324</td>
<td>188,886</td>
<td>254,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asahan</td>
<td>214,171</td>
<td>308,912</td>
<td>12,047</td>
<td>25,742</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>1,361</td>
<td>226,819</td>
<td>336,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simeloengoen &amp; Karo</td>
<td>261,017</td>
<td>352,741</td>
<td>11,549</td>
<td>17,158</td>
<td>1,290</td>
<td>1,864</td>
<td>273,856</td>
<td>371,763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengkalis</td>
<td>119,366</td>
<td>159,286</td>
<td>25,269</td>
<td>35,038</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>144,830</td>
<td>194,547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tapanuli</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sibolga</td>
<td>31,007</td>
<td>60,065</td>
<td>1,969</td>
<td>2,287</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>33,270</td>
<td>62,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Padang Sidempuan</td>
<td>235,254</td>
<td>277,048</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>1,357</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>236,366</td>
<td>278,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bataklanden</td>
<td>456,282</td>
<td>499,794</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>1,084</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>457,279</td>
<td>501,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nias</td>
<td>176,721</td>
<td>198,115</td>
<td>1,593</td>
<td>1,621</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>178,430</td>
<td>199,818</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources.** Statistisch Jaaroverzicht van Nederlandsch-Indie 1929; 16-19
Indisch Verslag 1940; 15.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Medan</th>
<th>Siantar</th>
<th>Tanjung</th>
<th>Tanjung Balai</th>
<th>Tebing tinggi</th>
<th>Binjai</th>
<th>Sibolga</th>
<th>Padang Sidempuan</th>
<th>Tarutung</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indonesians</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>23,823</td>
<td>6,096</td>
<td>3,126</td>
<td>5,133</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>4,547</td>
<td>3,240</td>
<td>1,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>23,332</td>
<td>5,265</td>
<td>2,199</td>
<td>4,201</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>3,205</td>
<td>3,445</td>
<td>469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>41,270</td>
<td>9,711</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>3,299</td>
<td>8,377</td>
<td>4,740</td>
<td>8,534</td>
<td>5,186</td>
<td>3,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increase 1920-30</strong></td>
<td>73.2%</td>
<td>59.3%</td>
<td>-35.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>87.7%</td>
<td>60.1%</td>
<td>182.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chinese &amp; Other Asians</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>18,297</td>
<td>3,161</td>
<td>1,582</td>
<td>2,674</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1,088</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>20,072</td>
<td>3,187</td>
<td>3,247</td>
<td>2,567</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1,845</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>31,021</td>
<td>5,454</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>3,371</td>
<td>5,334</td>
<td>4,321</td>
<td>1,993</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increase 1920-30</strong></td>
<td>69.5%</td>
<td>72.5%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>83.2%</td>
<td>83.0%</td>
<td>133.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Europeans</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>3,128</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>3,516</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>4,293</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increase 1920-30</strong></td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>-19.7%</td>
<td>-6.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>97.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>45,248</td>
<td>9,460</td>
<td>4,757</td>
<td>7,970</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>5,822</td>
<td>3,542</td>
<td>1,259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>46,920</td>
<td>8,726</td>
<td>5,481</td>
<td>6,927</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>5,306</td>
<td>3,851</td>
<td>687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>76,584</td>
<td>15,328</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>6,823</td>
<td>14,026</td>
<td>9,176</td>
<td>10,765</td>
<td>5,709</td>
<td>3,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increase 1920-30</strong></td>
<td>69.3%</td>
<td>62.0%</td>
<td>-14.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>85.0%</td>
<td>61.2%</td>
<td>173.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indisch Verslag 1940; 21.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alija, Henri J. W.
1956
"On the Role of Groote Merdeka: 19 Years
Dutch Landes Politiek in Indonesia 1846-1966"
(De Peltza, Eindhoven)

Aldian
1968
"Islamic Modernism in Indonesian Politics:
Mahdkejar in the Dutch Colonial Period"
(M.A. Thesis, University of Wisconsin)

Aligdrie, Hamid
1950
"Laporan Panitia Urusan Laut Negara DPR,
Kerja karakter kungungan ke-Sumatera Timur,
25 April 1950", in Tokisane Parliament, 8 July
1950

Allen, C.G. & Audrey G. Donnithorne
1957
Western Enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya:
A Study of Development (George
Allen & Unwin)

Almanak Sumatera, Tarib Timur 1958.
(Panitia Almanak Nasional
Sumatera, Komando Angkatan Daerah Sumatera,
Medan)

(Panitia Almanak Pemerintah Daerah Propinsi
Sumatera Utara, Medan)

Amin, Mr. Mohamad
1955
"Menasuki 1955", in Aljara (Medan), 28
January 1955

Amir, Dr. M.
1946
"Melatih Sejahtera", in Soeloeh Mendaka, 14-28
January 1946

Amin, H. Mohamad
1946
"Pemecahan dan Pembinaan", in Soekoto Peringatan,
Satya Tahun 241 Di Sumatera 12-8-45 - 17-8-46,
(Pemersintah Poesat Sumatera, Penentang Siakai)

Anderson, Benedict R.O'G.
1961
Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics Under the
Japanese Occupation: 1942-1946. (Interim
Report Series, Modern Indonesia Project,
Cornell University, Ithaca)
BOOKS, THESES, ARTICLES, PAMPHLETS & UNPUBLISHED PAPERS

Alers, Henri J.H.
1956  Om Een Rode of Groene Merdeka: 10 Jaren Binnenlandse Politiek Indonesie 1943-1953 (De Pelgrim, Eindhoven)

Alfian
1968  "Islamic Modernism in Indonesian Politics: Mohamadijah in the Dutch Colonial Period" (M.A. Thesis, University of Wisconsin)

Algadrie, Hamid
1950  "Laporan Panitya Urusan Luar Negeri DPR. RIS, tentang kundjungannja ke-Sumatera Timur, 13 April 1950", in Ichtisar Parlemen, 8 July 1950.

Allen, G.C. & Audrey G. Donnithorne
1957  Western Enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya: A Study in Economic Development (George Allen & Unwin, London)

Almanak Sumatera, Terbitan 1969. (Panitia Almanak Nasional Sumatera, Komando Antar Daerah Sumatera, Medan)

Almanak Pemerintah Daerah Propinsi Sumatera Utara 1969. (Panitia Almanak Pemerintah Daerah Propinsi Sumatera Utara, Medan)

Amin, Mr. Mohamad

Amir, Dr. M.
1946  "Melawat ke Djawa", in Soeloeh Merdeka, 14-26 January 1946.

Amrin, R. Mohamad
1946  "Keoeangan dan Pembinaan", in Boekoe Peringatan Satoe Tahoen NRI di Soematera 17-8-45 - 17-8-46. (Pemerintah Poesat Soematera, Pematang Siantar)

Anderson, Benedict R.O'G.
1966  "Japan: 'The Light of Asia'", in Josef Silverstein (ed.), *Southeast Asia in World War II: Four Essays*. (Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, Monograph Series No. 7)


Anders, J.  1826  *Mission to the East Coast of Sumatra*. (Blackwood, Edinburgh)


*Atlas van Tropisch Nederland*. (Topographisch Dienst & Koninklijk Nederlandsch Aardrijkskundig Genootschap, 1938)

Aziz, M.A.  1955  *Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia*. (Nijhoff, Hague)


Barzun, Jacques

Basrie, Hasan Z.T.
1954  "Tentang Pimpinan dan Struktur Pemerintahan di Sumatera Timur pada awal tahun 1946". (Unpubl., Medan)

Benda, Harry J. & Ruth T. McVey (eds).
1960  The Communist Uprisings of 1926-1927 in Indonesia: Key Documents (Interim Report Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, Ithaca.)

Benda, Harry J.

Benda, Harry J., Irikura & Kishi (eds.)
1965  Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia: Selected Documents. (Translation Series No. 6, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University)

Blake, D.J.

Boeke, J.H.
1947  The Evolution of the Netherlands Indies Economy. (Willink, Haarlem)

Boekoe Peringatan Satoe Tahoen NRI di Soematera 17-8-45 - 17-8-46. (Permerintah Poesat Soematera, Pematang Siantar, 1946)

Brandt, Willem

Brugmans, I.J., & ors.  


Bruner, Edward M. 


1974  Indonesian Homecoming: A Case Study in the Analysis of Ritual. (Addison-Wesley Module in Anthropology No.54).

Bukti. (Djabatan Penerangan Negara Sumatera Timur, Medan, 1949).

Castles, Lance 


1974  "Internecine Conflict in Tapanuli", in Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs, vol.8, no.1.

Compton, R. Boyd

Cool, M.F.J.
1941 Struktuurveranderingen in Nederlandsch-Indie in de laatste 25 jaar (Inter-Documentation Coy, Zurich, Microfiche - "Indonesian Nationalist Movement: Peasant Revolt (Printed Works Collection)", No.SE1279FF item SE-1586/1).

Couperous, Louis
1924 Eastward. (Hurst & Blackett, London).

Cunningham, C.E.
1958 Postwar Migrations of the Toba Bataks to East Sumatra. (Cultural Report Series No.5, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University).

Dahm, Bernhard

Darman, Lawrin


Daulae, H. Porkas

Deli Data 1863-1938. (Mededeling No.26 van het Oostkust van Sumatra Instituut).

Deli Data 1938-1951. (Mededeling No.36 van het Oostkust van Sumatra Instituut).
Dewan tara, 1952
Ki Hadjar
Dari Kebangunan Nasional Sampai Proklamasi Kemerdekaan Kenang'an Ki Hadjar Dewantara. (Endang, Jakarta).

Diepeveen, H.J. 1949

Dirgahayu Dwiwindu Lambang Bukit Barisan 26-6-1951/21-6-1967. (Medan, n.d.)

Djoko 1973

Djusni, M.K. & Aminuddin Nasir 1958
"Selajang Pandang Kenang'an Repolusi Dikota Medan", (Unpubl., Medan).


Donnison, F.S.V. 1956

Dootjes, F.J.J. 1938/9

20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka, vols. II & III. (Departemen Penerangan Indonesia, Jakarta, n.d.).

Elsbree, Willard H. 1953

Emmerson, Donald K. 1974
"Thoughts on 'Remembered History' as a Subject of Study, with reference to Indonesia's Revolution", in Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs, vol.8, no.1.


Feith, Herbert

Feith, Herbert & Lance Castles (eds.)

Foulcher, Keith R.

Furnivall, J.S.
1944  Netherlands India. (Cambridge University Press).
1948  Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India. (Cambridge University Press).

Gautama, Sudargo & Budi Harsono

Geertz, Clifford

General Agricultural Condition of Simaloengoen. (Gunseibu-Kezaibu, Pematang Siantar, 2602).

Gids voor de Oostkust van Sumatra (Deli). (Oostkust van Sumatra Instituut, Medan, 1940).

Gintings, Djamin
Haar, J.C.C.
1939  De Zelfbestuurspolitiek ten opzichte van de Korte Verklaringlandschappen in Nederlandsch-Indië. (A. Oosthoek's Uitgevers-Maatschappij, Utrecht).

Haar, B. ter

Haliman

Hall, D.G.E.

Hamka

Hanifah, Abu
1973  Tales of A Revolution. (Angus and Robertson, Sydney).

Harahap, E. St.
1960  Perihal Bangsa Batak. (Departemen P.P. dan K., Jakarta).

Harst, Simon van der
1945  Overzicht van de bestuurshervorming in de buitengewesten van Nederlandsche-Indië in het bijzonden op Sumatra. (Oesthoek's, Utrecht).

Hasan, Tk. Mohamad
Hasibuan, Sajuti

Hatta, Mohamad

Hirato, K. (ed.)
1943 Sendjinkoen dan Tentera Soekarela. (Badan Penjiaran Bunka-ka, Medan).

Hussain, Abdullah

Idrus, Ani

Ihromi, T.O.S.

Indratjaja, Ir.
1946 "Pekerjaan Oemoem", in Boekoe Peringatan Satoe Tahoen NRI di Soematera 17-8-45 - 17-8-46. (Pemerintah Poesat Soematera, Pematang Siantar).


Ismet, Drs.

Itagaki, Yoichi

Jongens, R.
1949    "De Deli Tabak in de Negara Sumatera Timur", in *Economisch Weekblad voor Indonesie*, vol.15, no.3.

Kadiran    1971    "Tjukilan sebahagian tentang data 2 pengalaman dalam kisah sedjarah perdjuangan Korps Brigade-Mobiel Kopolisian Republik Indonesia dalam menegakkan kemerdekaan Republik Indonesia". (Unpubl., Medan).


Kahin, Audrey    1974    "Some Preliminary Observations on West Sumatra During the Revolution", in *Indonesia*, no.18.


"Kissah: Tahun Pertama Proklamasi Dikota Medan". (Unpubl., Medan, no author, no date).

Klerck, E.S. de    1938    *History of the Netherlands East Indies*. (Brusse, Rotterdam).


Kroniek Dokumentasi No.4, Sekitar Pemogokan Buruh di Indonesia. (Kementerian Penerangan, Jakarta, 1951).

Kusumasumantri, Iwa (1963) Sedjarah Revolusi Indonesia. (Grafica, Jakarta).

"Lahirnya Angkatan Perang di Sumatera Timur", in Aneka Minggu (Medan), 12 May - 29 September 1970.


Langenberg, Michael van (1972) "The Establishment of the Republic of Indonesia in North Sumatra: Regional Differences and Political Factionalism", in Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs, vol.6, no.1.


"Laporan ringkas perdjuangan rakjat Kabupaten Karo sedjak agressi pertama sampai sekarang". (Unpubl., no author, no date). (Probably report by ATR Tanah Karo, 1950).


1973 "Judicial Unification in Post-Colonial Indonesia", in Indonesia, no.16.

1967a "Suku Simalungun: an Ethnic Group in Search of Representation", in Indonesia, no.3.


Lumbantobing, Dr. Ferdinand 1946 "Setahoen Pemerintahan NRI di Tapanoeli", in Boekoe Peringatan Satoe Tahoen NRI di Soematera 17-8-45 - 17-8-46. (Pemerintah Poesat Soematera, Pematang Siantar).

Lumbantobing, Rufinus 1946 "Satoe Tahoen Kedaulatan Rakjat Indonesia di Soematera", in Boekoe Peringatan Satoe Tahoen NRI di Soematera 17-8-45 - 17-8-46. (Pemerintah Poesat Soematera, Pematang Siantar).


Malaka, Tan
1947/9
"From Jail to Jail". (Annotated translation
of Dari Pendjara ke Pendjara by Helen Jarvis.
In preparation for publication.)

Mantel, K.
1948
"Bevolkingsoccupatie op Ondernemingsgronden",
in Economisch Weekblad voor Nederlands Indie,
14 Augustus 1948.

Marsden, William
1811
The History of Sumatra. (McCreery, London).

Maryanov, G.S.
1959
"Establishment of Regional Government in the
Republic of Indonesia". (Doctoral Thesis,
Indiana University).

Mazrui, Ali A.
1969
"Violent Contiguity and the Politics of Retribalization in Africa",

McVey, Ruth T.
1965
The Rise of Indonesian Communism. (Cornell
University Press, Ithaca N.Y.)

1971
"The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the
Indonesian Army" (part I), in Indonesia, no.11.

Meuraxa, Dada
1973
Sejarah Kebudayaan Suku-Suku di Sumatera Utara.
(Sastrawan, Medan).

Middendorp, W.
1929
"The Administration of the Outer Provinces of
the Netherlands East Indies", in B.J.O. Schrieke
(ed.), The Effect of Western Influence on the
Native Civilizations of the Malay Archipelago.
(Kolff, Batavia).

Mihardja, Achdiat K. (ed.)
1954
Polemik Kebudajaan. (Kementerian P.P dan K.,
Jakarta).

Milone, Pauline
1967
"Indische Culture and Its Relationship to
Urban Life", in Comparative Studies in Society
and History, vol.9, no.4.


Negara Soematera Timoer Sepintas Laloe. (Badan Penerangan Negara Soematera Timoer, 1948).


Nicholson, Norman K.  
1972  "The Fractional Model and the Study of Politics", in Comparative Political Studies, vol.5, no.3.

Niel, R. van  
1970  The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite. (van Hoeve, Hague).

Nishijima, S., K. Kishi & ors. (eds.)  

Noer, Deliar  


Nyhus, Edward  

Oei Liong Thay  
1948  "Sultan Deli Toeroenan XI dari Gotjoh Pahlawan", in Pantjawarna (Medan), th.1, no.1.

Okamura  
1945  Perdjoengan Singamangaradja jang ke-12. (Balatentara Pertahanan Soematera Oetara, Medan).

Paauw, Douglas (ed.)  


Pederson, Paul B.  
1970  

**Pelzer, Karl J.**

1957  
"The Agrarian Conflict in East Sumatra", in *Pacific Affairs*, June 1957.

1961  
"Western Impact on East Sumatra and North Tapanuli: the roles of the planter and the missionary", in *Journal of South-East Asian History*, vol.2, no.2.

**Pemandangan Ringkas Ekonomi dan Tata Negara Soematera Timoer.** (Negara Soematera Timoer, Medan, 1948).

"Pembunuhan Masal di Tebingtinggi". (Unpubl., no author, no date).

"Pengalaman Gerilja di Sumatera (Tapanuli Utara)", in *Madjalah Sedjarah Militer Angkatan Darat*, no.SA-22 (1964?).

**Petersen, H. Tscherning**

1948  
*Tropical Adventure: Sumatra, Land of Loveliness and Stern Destiny.* (Rolls, London).

**Piekaar, A.J.**

1949  
*Atjeh en de Oorlog met Japan.* (van Hoeve, Hague).

**Poeze, Harry A.**

1976  

**The Political Events in the Republic of Indonesia: a review of the developments in the Indonesian Republic (Java and Sumatra) since the Japanese surrender.** (Government of the Netherlands, New York, 1947).
Poppe, Janus
1948  "Political Developments in the Netherlands East Indies During and Immediately After the Japanese Occupation". (Doctoral Thesis, Georgetown University).

Post, Hans
1949  Bandjir Over Noord Sumatra. (PAX, Medan).

Prillwitz, P.M.
1948  "Production Possibilities of the Estates within the Demarcation Lines in Java and Sumatra", in The Economic Review of Indonesia, vol.2, no.3.

Prominent Factors in Japanese Military Psychology.  (Allied Translation and Interpreter Section, South West Pacific Area, Research Report No.76 (part IV), 7 February 1945.)

Propinsi Sumatera Tengah  ) See Republik Indonesia (below).
Propinsi Sumatera Utara  )

Purcell, Victor

Radjab, Mohamad
1949  Tjatatan di Sumatera.  (Balai Pustaka, Jakarta).


Raliby, Osman
1953  Documenta Historica.  (Bulan Bintang, Jakarta).

Ray, J.K.

Regeerings Almanak voor Nederlandsch-Indie 1942.  (Landsdrukkerij, Batavia).

Reid, Anthony J.


Reis van Z.E. den G.G. Jhr. Mr. A.W.L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer naar Sumatra's Oostkust, Atjeh en Onderhoorigheden, Nias en Tapanoeli, 4-27 Maart 1940. (Landsdrukkerij, Batavia, 1940).


Resink, G.J. 1968 *Indonesia's History Between the Myths*. (van Hoeve, Hague).

Ridder, Jacobus de 1935 *De invloed van de westersche cultures op de autochtoone bevolking ter Oostkust van Sumatra*. (Veenman & Zonen, Wageningen).


Rothchild, Donald 1970 "Ethnicity and Conflict Resolution", in *World Politics* vol.22, no.4.

1946  Empat Belas Boelan Pendoedoekan Inggeris di Indonesia. (Berita Antara, Medan).


"Salinan Daftar Ketetapan 2 Gubernur Propinsi Sumatera Tahun 1948, dari no.1 sampai no.49". (Kantor Gubernur, Medan).


Sastranegara, R. 1953  Hukum Tatanegara Indonesia Sedjak Perang Dunia ke-II. (Neijenhuis, Jakarta).

Schadee, W.H.M. 1918  Geschiedenis van Sumatra's Oostkust. (Oostkust van Sumatra Instituut, Mededeeling No.2, Amsterdam).


Schnitger, F.M. 1964  Forgotten Kingdoms in Sumatra. (Brill, Leiden)


Shinozaki, Mamoru

Siahaan, N.
1964 Sedjarah Kebudajaan Batak. (Napitupulu, Medan).

Siambotan, Lamsjamuddin

Sianipar, R.A. (ed.)
1958 Konperensi Pertama Pertanian se-Sumatera Utara. (Kemudi, Medan).

Sidartojo

Sihombing, O.D.P.
1962 Pemuda Indonesia Menentang Fasisme Djepang. (Sinar Djaja, Jakarta).

Sinar, Tengku Lukman
1971 Sari Sedjarah Serdang. (Lukman Sinar, Medan).


Singarimbun, Masri

1975 Singh, Rajendra, *Kinship, Descent and Alliance Among the Karo Batak*. (University of California).


1946 Siregar, Gindo, "Dewan Perwakilan Soematera", in Boekeo Peringatan Satoe Tahoern NRI di Soematera 17-8-45 - 17-8-46. (Pemerintah Poesat Soematera, Pematang Siantar).

1946 Siregar, Luat, "Pergolakan Rakjat Soematera Timoer dalam setahoen Merdeka", in Boekeo Peringatan Satoe Tahoern NRI di Soematera 17-8-45 - 17-8-46. (Pemerintah Poesat Soematera, Pematang Siantar).


1964a "On the Style of the Indonesian Revolutionaries". (International Conference on Asian History, Hong Kong, Paper No.89).


1923 Soangkoepon, Mangaradja, "Bataksche Adat", in Koloniale Studien, II.
Soeriadiredja, Wijaya (ed.)

Sarwono, Soetardjo S. & Mohamad Jusuf Abdullah
1946  Perdjoeangan Pemoeda Revolusioner (Poestaka Revolusioner, Pematang Siantar).

Steenhoven, G. van der
(Catholic University, Nijmegen. Publications on Adat Law, No.V).

Sumarsono, R.

Sunarko, R.
1954  Susunan Negara Kita, vol.3. (Djambatan, Jakarta).

Sutter, John O.

Tamboen, P.
1952  Adat Ihtiadat Karo. (Balai Pustaka, Jakarta).

Tarigan, Henry Guntur
1971  Struktur Sosial dan Organisasi Sosial Masjarakat Simalungun. (Bumisiliwangi, Bandung).


Tauchid, Mochammad

Teeuw, A.

Telefoongids Medan 1949.


1968 idem., vol.2.


Three Months of Truce on Java and Sumatra: documents submitted to the Committee of Good Offices by the Netherlands delegation and other related documents in the period 17 January 1948 - 30 April 1948. (Kolff, Batavia, n.d.)

Tichelman, G.L. 1936 "Timoer-Bataksch Reveil", in De Indische Gids, I.

1937 "Locaal Patriotisme in het Timoer-Bataksch gebied ter Sumatra's Oostkust", in De Indische Gids, I.

Tideman, J. 1922 Simeloengoen. (van Doesburgh, Leiden).

"Tjatatan Mengenai Beberapa Peristiwa di Tapanuli". (Unpubl., Pedjuang Republik Indonesia Medan Area (PRIMA), Medan).

Tobing, K. 1953 Sumatera Utara. (Lintasan Masa, Jakarta).

Tobing, Ph.O.L. 1964 "Dr. Nommensen and the rapid Christianisation and Development of North Tapanuli in Sumatra". (Unpubl., Makassar).


Visman, F.H. 1930 "De staatkundige organisatie van Sumatra's Oostkust en die van de Federated Malay States", in  *Koloniaal Studien*, II.


Volkstelling 1930, Deel IV: Inheemsche Bevolking van Sumatra. (Departement van Economische Zaken, Batavia, 1935).


Waal, R. van der 1959  *Richtlijnen voor een ontwikkelingsplan voor de Oostkust van Sumatra*. (Landbouwhogeschool, Wageningen).

Waard, J. de 1930 "Malaise ter Oostkust van Sumatra", in  *Koloniaal Studien*, I.
Wal, S.l. van der (ed.)
1972 idem., vol.2.
1973 idem., vol.3.

Weij, H.G. van der

Weingrod, Alex

Weisfelt, Jacobus
1972 De Deli Spoorweg Maatschappij als factor in de Economische Ontwikkeling van de Oostkust van Sumatra. (Bronder, Rotterdam).

Wertheim, W.F.

Westerling, Raymond

Wilner, Ann Ruth
1970 "Perspective on Military Elites as Rulers and Weilders of Power", in Journal of Comparative Administration, vol.2., no.3.

Withington, W.A.

1967  "Migration and Economic Development: some recent spatial changes in the population of rural Sumatra, Indonesia", in Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, vol. 58, no. 3.

Wolf, Charles  1948  The Indonesian Story: The Birth, Growth and Structure of the Indonesian Republic. (John Day, New York)


1970  "What Collaboration had to mean to our struggle for Independence". (Unpubl., Medan).


n.d.(a)  "Membangun Pemerintahan NRI". (Unpubl., Medan).


NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

(* indicates that only selected or available single issues of these items were consulted.)

Aneka Minggu (Medan) May-September 1970 (series entitled "Lahirnja Angkatan Perang di Sumatera Timur").

Aneta (Medan & Batavia)*

Batavia Nieuwsblad.*


De Opdracht. August-September 1946.


Free Press (Singapore).*

Het Dagblad (Jakarta).*

Ichtisar Isi Pers Dalam Doea Minggoe Teroetama Pers Di Indonesia (Pematang Siantar).*

Ichtisar Isi Pers dalam Saminggoe Teroetama Pers di Indonesia (Jakarta).*

Ichtisar Parlemen: Berita Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat R.I.S. (Jakarta).*

Indisch Verslag (Batavia). 1937-1940

Indonesia Merdeka (Pematang Siantar).*

Kebangoenan: Madjallah Resmi Kaboepaten Karo (Kabanjahe).*

Kerakjatan (Medan).*

Kesoema Negara: Soeara Angkatan Moeda Indonesia (Medan).*

Kita Sumatora Sinbun (Medan). 1943-1945.

Madjalah Kota Medan.*

Medan Bulletin.*

Merdeka (Jakarta). 1950.
Mimbar Oemoem (Medan).*
Mimbar Penerangan (Medan).*
New York Times.*
Nieuwsblad voor Sumatra (Medan).*
Oostkust van Sumatra Instituut Kroniek. 1922-1949.
Pandoe Negara (Pematang Siantar).*
Peradjoerit (Pematang Siantar).*
Pewarta Deli (Medan).*
Radikal (Kabanjahe).*
Samoedera (Tanjung Balai).*
Sinar Deli (Medan).*
Soeloeh Rakjat (Medan).*
Statisch Zakboeke voor Nederlandsch Indie. 1934-1939.
Straits Times (Singapore).*
Suara Penerangan (Medan).*
Sumatera Sinbun (Medan). 1942-1943.
Tentara (Pematang Siantar).*
The Times (London).*
DOCUMENTS

ABBREVIATIONS USED

ALF - Allied Land Forces.
AMACAB - Allied Military Administration Civil Affairs Branch.
AR - Algemene Rijksarchief (State Archives), The Hague.
AVROS - Algemene Vereniging van Rubberplanters ter Oostkust van Sumatra.
BZ - Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken (Ministry for Home Affairs), Archives, The Hague.
CMI - Centrale Militaire Inlichtingendienst.
Comkrost - Commissaris van de Kroon voor Sumatera Timuur.
DIST - Daerah Istimewa Soematera Timoor.
DPRD - Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Daerah.
DPV - Deli Planters Vereniging.
FKRI - Front Kaoem Repoeblik Indonesia.
Ged. HVK - Gedelegeerde de Hoge Vertegenwoordiger van de Kroon in Indonesia.
HVK - Hoge Vertegenwoordiger van de Kroon in Indonesia.
MD - Ministerie van Defensie (Ministry of Defence), Archives, The Hague.
Minog - Minister van Overzee Gebiedsdelen.
Nedinreg - Nederlandsch-Indie Regeerings.
Nefis - Netherlands Expeditionary Forces Intelligence Service.
NICA - Netherlands Indies Civil Administration.
Pardist - Partai Daerah Istimewa Soematera Timoor.
PBA - Plaatselijkbestuursambtenaar.
PNST - Partai Nasional Soematera Timoor.
PPNKST - Panitia Persiapan Negara Kesatuan, Sumatera Timur.
PSST - Panitia Status Seluruh Tapanuli.
Rapolsum - Regeringsadviseur voor Politieke Zaken op Sumatra.
Recomba - Regeringscommissaris voor Bestuursaangelegenheden.
Regvind - Regeerings van Indonesie.
TBA - Territoriaal Bestuursadviseur.
1. "Aantekeningen van Dr. Amir over de Indon. Revolutie." (appended to doc. 196) (BZ)


3. idem., 5 Augustus 1946. (BZ)

4. idem., 14 Augustus 1946. (BZ)

5. idem., 9 September 1946. (BZ)


11. Adviseur in Algemene Dienst, Batavia (A.T. Brand) to Directeur Kabinet, Batavia. Memo. 6 December 1949. (AR)


15. ALF Sumatra to 15 IND Corps. Signal CI ISUM No. 2, 12 October 1945. (BZ)


17. idem. "Maandverslag betreffende de politieke- en economische toestand in de Negara Soematera Timoer over de maand Augustus 1948." (BZ)

18. idem. September 1948. (BZ)

19. idem. October 1948. (BZ)


21. idem. December 1948. (BZ)

22. idem. "Verslag van de Politieke- en economische toestand in de Negara Soematera Timoer over de maand Januari 1949." (BZ)

23. idem. Februari 1949. (BZ)

24. idem. Maart 1949. (BZ)

25. idem. April 1949. (BZ)

26. idem. Mei 1949. (BZ)

27. idem. Juni 1949. (BZ)


30. AMACAB, Medan: "Gegevens over Dr. Mohamad Amir te Medan." 27 April 1946. (appended to doc. 198) (AR)

31. Amir, Dr. Mohamad: "Eerste contact met de Java-leiders tot vorming van de Republiek Indonesia." 5 October 1945. (appended to doc. 372) (BZ)
idem. "Gegevens betreffende politieke organisaties en leiders ter Oostkust van Sumatra." 5 October 1945. (appended to doc. 198) (AR)

idem. Statement dated Medan 2 May 1946. (appended to doc. 198) (AR)

"Poelau Soematera dizaman jang akan datang." (appended to doc. 199) (BZ)

"Stichting v./d. Republiek." (appended to doc. 200) (BZ)

"Terug in Sumatra." (appended to doc. 200) (BZ)

Assistent Resident voor Agrarische Zaken, Departement van Bestuur, Negara Soematera Timoer (Dr. C. Nagtegaal) to Voorzitter, AVROS, Medan. Letter No. 223/C.B. Geh. 27 December 1948. "Inzake beschikbaarstelling van ondernemingsgronden voor het oogstjaar 1949."

Assistent Resident Balige (T.G. Woudstra) to Rapolsum (van de Velde), Medan. "Beeld uit Balige." Letter, 8 April 1949. (BZ)

idem. 17 Juni 1949. (BZ)

Assistent Resident Asahan (W. Veenbaas): Dagrapport, 9 September 1947. (BZ)

"Dagrapport over Indrapoera." 12 September 1947 (BZ)

Assistent Resident van Langkat (J.W. Burger); "Rapport over de maand Augustus 1947." (BZ)

"Dagboek 2-6 September 1947." (BZ)

idem. 8-14 September 1947. (BZ) idem. 15-20 September 1947. (BZ)

Assistent Resident van Serdang (A.C.S. Moree): "Dagboek 3-12 September 1947." (BZ)


52. idem. No. 27, 9 Februari 1949. "Occupatie van erfpachtspercelen en landbouwconcessierende door de bevolking."


54. Beel (Batavia) to Sassen (Hague). Codetelegram No. T768, 22 Januari 1949. (BZ)

55. idem. Codetelegram No. 2118, 1 Februari 1949. (BZ)


57. "Bespreking ontwerp-statuuut Soematera Timoer op Woensdag 26 November 1948." (BZ)


61. Barisan Pemoeda Indonesia, Poetjoek Pimpinan Markas Besar, Medan. Instroeksi No. 16/P, 14 October 1945. (BZ)


63. idem. No. 2, 6 Januari 1946. (BZ)

64. idem. No. 5, 29 Januari 1946. (BZ)

65. idem. No. 5, (appended to doc. 105). (BZ)

66. idem. No. 6, 15 Maart 1946. (BZ)

67. idem. "Pasoekan V (Lima)." (report appended to doc.105) (BZ)
68. idem. "Rapport betreffende Majoor van der Lande." (appended to doc. 105) (BZ)

69. idem. "Een Chineesch 'hanengevecht'." (report appended to doc. 105) (BZ)

70. idem. "Verklaring afgelegd door den Indonesier Noekman, nadat hij wegens het dragen van ammunitie door de Br. M.P. op aanwijzing van een spion, werd gearresteerd." 13 Maart 1946. (BZ)

71. idem. "Berichtgeving over Tapanoeli." 12 Maart 1946. (BZ)

72. idem. "TRI - Eastcoast of Sumatra." (appended to doc. 104) (BZ)

73. idem. "De ontwikkeling van het Communisme op Sumatra." (appended to doc. 104) (BZ)


76. idem. to TBA Tapanuli, Sibolga. Letter No. 357/Geh., 17 September 1949. "Protest van de 'Front Kaum Republik Indonesia' tegen het regeringsbesluit houdende erkenning van de 'Panitia Status Seluruh Tapanoeli'." (BZ)

77. Chief Secretary, Kuala Lumpur to Consul General Netherlands, Singapore. Letter 7 January 1947. (BZ)

78. Chief Secretary, Federal Secretariat, Federation of Malaya to Consul General Netherlands, Singapore. Letter No. FS2197, April 1949. (BZ)

79. CMI, Batavia. Document No. 5209. 18 December 1948. (BZ)


82. idem. "Nominatieve opgave van civiele en militaire functionarissen en partijleiders in de Republiek op Sumatra." 15 December 1948. (AR)

84. idem. No. 98, 30 November 1948. "De opstand in Tapanoeli." (BZ)

85. idem. Volgno. 3352, 31 Maart 1949. "De PKI en de Voormalige TNI." (BZ)

86. idem. Signalement No. 21, 30 September 1948. "De ontwikkeling van de toestand in Z.-Sumatra's Oostkust." (BZ)

87. idem. No. 24, 6 October 1948. "Bagan Si Api-Api." (BZ)

88. idem. No. 28, 9 October 1948. "De situatie in Tapanoeli." (BZ)

89. idem. No. 38, 20 October 1948. "De Situatie in Tapanoeli." (BZ)

90. idem. No. 48, 30 October 1948. "Reactie van de Batakse bevolking op de militaire staatsgreep in Tapanoeli." (BZ)

91. idem. No. 47, 30 October 1948. "De militaire situatie in Tapanoeli." (BZ)

92. idem. No. 55, 8 November 1948. "De situatie in Tapanoeli." (BZ)

93. idem. No. 58, 15 November 1948. "De situatie in Tapanoeli." (BZ)

94. idem. No. 61, 22 November 1948. "De situatie in Tapanoeli." (BZ)

95. idem. No. 70, 9 December 1948. "De verklaring van Hatta over Sumatra." (BZ)

96. idem. No. 74, 5 Januari 1949. "Einde van het gevestigde communistische regiem in Tapanoeli en Zuid-Sumatra's Oostkust (Aahan) gevolg van de Nederlandse suivering." (BZ)

97. CMI, Tarutung. Persoverzicht No. 10/H, 21 Januari 1948. (AR)

98. CMI, Medan. Dagelijks persoverzicht No. 226H, 8 October 1948. (AR)

99. idem. No. 278H, 13 December 1948. (AR)

100. idem. Schrijven No. 15804/32, 2 December 1948. (AR)

101. idem. Politiedagrapport No. 121, 6 September 1949. (AR)

102. Comite DIST, Medan to PNST, Medan. Letter 18 October 1947. (AR)
103. idem. 27 October 1947. (AR)


111. idem. to Procureur-Generaal, Batavia. Letter No. 325/I/II, 10 November 1948. (AR)

112. idem. Letter No. 548/R, 3 December 1948. (AR)

113. idem. (van der Poel) to Procureur-Generaal, Batavia. Letter No. 3122-G-I, 27 October 1949. "Organisatie van de handel op Sumatra." (BZ)


117. idem. 15 Maart 1947. "Rapport over onderhoud met den Sultan van Deli." (BZ)

118. idem. 18 Maart 1947. "Bezoek van Dato Kamil, Rijksgroote van Deli aan Batavia." (BZ)

119. idem. 20 Maart 1947. "Rede van den Sultan van Deli voor H.M. Koningin." (BZ)

120. idem. to Procureur-Generaal, Batavia. Letter 4 Maart 1947. (AR)

121. idem. to Chief Secretary, Malayan Union. Letter 21 Maart 1947. (BZ)

122. idem. to Hoofd van den Immigratiedienst, Batavia. Letter 18 April 1947. (AR)

123. idem. to Onderhoofd der Algemene Recherche, Batavia. Letter 10 Januari 1948. (AR)

124. idem. to Minister voor Buitenlandse Zaken, Hague. Letter 30 Juni 1948. (AR)

125. idem. Letter 10 Augustus 1948. (AR)

126. idem. to Netherlands Ambassador, Bangkok. Letter 18 October 1948. (AR)

127. idem. to Directeur CMI, Batavia. Letter 21 October 1948. (AR)

128. idem. to Procureur-Generaal, Batavia. Letter 21 December 1948. (AR)


133. idem. Letter No. 389, 1 Februari 1949. "Verzoek
van de leden van het Zelfbestuur van Deli tot de facto herstel van genoemd zelfbestuur." (AR)

134. idem. to Algemeen Secretaris, Batavia. Letter No. 470 Geh., 15 Maart 1949. (AR)


136. Departement van Binnenlandse Bestuur, Batavia: "Bespreking Nederlandse en Indonesische Civiele en Militaire Authoriteiten ten huize Resident (Sumatera Timur) op 31 Maart 1947." (BZ)

137. Deputy Chief Secretary Malayan Union, Kuala Lumpur to Netherlands Consul General, Singapore. Letter 1 April 1947. (BZ)


142. idem. Memo., No.882/Geh., 10 April 1947. (BZ)

143. idem. to Directeur Kabinet, Batavia. Memo., 19 September 1947. "Zelfbesturen Oostkust van Sumatra." (AR)

143A. Directeur Kabinet, Batavia (Enthoven) to Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal, Batavia. Letter 8 Augustus 1947. (BZ)


145. Directeur CMI, Batavia. Signalement No.51, 3 November 1948. (BZ)

146. idem. to Commandant van het Leger, Batavia. Letter No. Kab./DCM 1/1040/Geh., 8 Februari 1949. (BZ)
147. idem. Letter No.1365, 14 Februari 1949. (BZ)
Note. This document actually deals with events in Tapanuli.
152. Directeur van Binnenlandsch Bestuur, Regeeringscommis­sarris voor de Bestuurshervorming, Batavia, to Gouverneur-Generaal, Batavia. Letter No. AB 7/8/1, 27 September 1941. "Voorbereiding groepsgemeenschap Tapanoeli." (BZ)
157. F.C.A. Delegation, Local Joint Committee, Medan, to Chairman, Local Joint Committee, Medan. 40 letters concerning "violations of ceasefire." No. 6, 30 September 1949 to No. 62, 10 November 1949. (appended to doc. 300). (AR)
159. FKRI, Sibolga: "Rapat Committee Pekerdja dari 'Badan Penggoempoelan Tenaga Repoeblikeinen' dalam 'status Tapanoe1i' di Sibolga pada tanggal 1 Maart 1949." (BZ)


162. idem. to TBA Tapanuli, Sibolga. Resolutie 11 Augustus 1949. (BZ)


168. idem. Brieftelegram No. 780, 22 October 1949. (BZ)

169. idem. Brieftelegram No. 778, 29 October 1949. (BZ)

170. idem. Telegram No. 778/Z. Geh., 4 November 1949. (AR)

171. idem. Telegram No. 800/Geh., 7 November 1949. (AR)


179. idem. to Regvind, Batavia. Codetelegram No. 4665, 18 October 1949. (AR)

180. idem. "Maandrapport over September 1949." (AR)

181. idem. October 1949. (AR)

182. idem. Kabinet Nota. "Weekrapport ... 10-17 December 1949." (AR)

183. Gewestelijke Recherche Oostkust van Sumatra te Medan: "Verslag betreffende de politieke aangelegendheden in de Residentie Oostkust van Sumatra over de maand..." Januari 1938 to Februari 1940. (BZ)

184. Gewestelijke Recherche Residentie Tapanoeli: "Politieke Politioneel Overzicht over de maand ..." Februari 1938 to September 1939. (BZ)


187. idem. to Recomba Noord-Sumatra, Medan. Letter No. 2609, 12 Augustus 1947. (AR)


189. idem. (Padang) to Commander ALF Sumatra. Letter No. 7, 26 October 1945. (BZ)

190. idem. (Padang): "Politiek Verslag Sumatra.", 17 Januari 1946. (BZ)
191. idem. (Medan): "Politiek Verslag Sumatra.", 27 Februari 1949. (BZ)

192. idem. "Politiek verslag Sumatra over de maand Februari 1946." (BZ)

193. idem. Maart 1946. (AR)
194. idem. April 1946. (AR)
195. idem. Mei 1946. (AR)

196. idem. (AMACAB) to Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal, Batavia. Codetelegram No. 1371, 27 Maart 1946. (BZ)

197. idem. Codetelegram No. 780, 28 Februari 1946. (BZ)

199. idem. Letter No. 3181/P.Z., 4 Juni 1946. (BZ)
200. idem. Letter No. 3405/P.Z., 13 Juni 1946. (BZ)
201. idem. Letter No. 3227/Ps.Z., 15 Juni 1946. "Verzoekschrift Delische Rijksgraven." (BZ)

201A. idem. Letter, 16 Juni 1946. (BZ)


202B. idem. Telegram 14 Februari 1950.


204. idem. KNIL/KL. Dagrapport v.d. Sectie Inlichtingen, 14 Februari 1949. (AR)

205. idem. 25 Juli 1949. (AR)
206. idem. 1 Augustus 1949. (AR)
207. idem. 4 Augustus 1949. (AR)
208. idem. 6 Augustus 1949. (AR)
209. idem. 16 Augustus 1949. (AR)
210. idem. 25 Augustus 1949. (AR)
211. idem. 15 Augustus 1949. (AR)
212. idem. 30 Augustus 1949. (AR)
213. idem. 12 September 1949. (AR)

214. idem. Kantoor Ceasefire. Dagrapport No. 6, 25 Augustus 1949. (AR)

215. idem. No. 7, 26 Augustus 1949. (AR)
216. idem. No. 17, 8 September 1949. (AR)

218. Hoofd van het Bureau der Landinrichting, Bogor (J.H. de Haan). "Reisrapport No. 6 naar Medan van 18 t/m 25 April 1948."

219. idem. "Reisrapport No. 7 naar Sumatra's Oostkust van 24-29 Mei 1948."

220. idem. "Reisrapport No. 10 naar de Negara Soematera Timoer van 27 t/m 31 Juli 1948."


222. idem. "Reisrapport No. 16 naar Medan van 25 Februari - 5 Maart 1949."


226. idem. to Voorzitter AVROS. Letter, 21 September 1949. "Verslag van de op 20 September 1949 te Lubuk Pakam gehouden Contact-Vergadering." (AR)


233. 26 Indian Division, Medan: "Weekly Intelligence Summary" No. 3, 4 November 1945 to No. 56, 9 November 1946. (MD)

234. idem. Signal No. 1/1105, 5 March 1946. (AR)

235. idem. No. 149, 6 March 1946. (AR)

236. idem. No. 1/1212, 8 March 1946. (AR)

237. idem. No. 1/1308, 11 March 1946. (AR)

238. idem. Signals concerning Social Revolution, North Sumatra: from Kabanjahe, Pematang Siantar, Tanjung Balai and Tanjung Pura. March 1946. (AR)


243. idem. "De uitvoering v. de wapenstilstand overeenkomst op Sumatra." 7 Maart 1947. (BZ)

244. idem. "Sumatra's Oostkust.", August 1947. (BZ)


246. idem. Kantoor Politieke Zaken, Batavia to Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal, Batavia. Letter No.Kab./201/1674/Pz,
29 January 1948. "Toestand in Bagan Si Api Api. (Levering wapens aan Chinese politie.)." (AR)


250. Kepala Djabatan Keuangan Republik Indonesia, Sumatera Utara (Kotaradja) to Indonesia Office, Penang. Letter, 28 June 1949. (AR)

251. Kepala Djabatan Pabean Republik Indonesia, Sumatera Utara (Kotaradja) to Atjeh Trading Company, Penang. Letter, 10 August 1949. (AR)


256. idem. to Sarwono Sastro Sutardjo, Instructor Pesindo Sumatra, Bukittinggi. Letter No. 34 IBI/SL, 12 October 1948. "Rantjangan serentak menumbangkan Mr. Oetojo." (AR)


262. "Kort verslag van de vergadering van het Bestuur der AVROS gehouden op Dinsdag 9 September 1947 ten 9 uur v.m. in de eetzaal van "De Soos" (H.V.A.-gebouw) te Medan." 9 September 1947. (BZ)

263. "Lapuran Panitia Persiapan mengenai permintaan Komite Status Tapanoeli untuk diterima sebagai anggota P.P.F." March 1949. (AR)


266. Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal, Batavia (H.J. van Mook) to Sultan Langkat. Letter, 29 November 1945. (BZ)


270. Los, M.A. (Assistent Resident, Padang Sidempuan) to van de Velde (Rapolsum) Batavia. Letter, 10 Juli 1949. (AR)

271. *idem.* "Verslag van het bezoek aan de linies ter bespreking van het verwijderen van enkele versterkingen
van de Laskar Ra'jat." 27 November 1946. (BZ)

272. Lovink (Batavia) to van Maarseveen (Hague). Code-telegram No. 10314, 5 November 1949. (AR)

273. van Maarseveen (Hague) to Lovink (Batavia). Code-telegram No. 5130, 5 November 1949. (AR)


278. idem. No. M9/No.33/Z. Geh., 16 Februari 1949. (AR)

279. idem. to Minister-President. Letter No.H8, 14 Februari 1949. (AR)


281. Muktamar Sumatera II: Telegram to UNCI, van Maarseveen & Chairman, 2nd Chamber States General. 28 May 1949. (AR)

282. Nainggolan, Dr. F.J. et. al. (Pematang Siantar) to Recomba, Medan. Petition dated 27 Augustus 1947. (appended to doc. 504) (BZ)

283. Nainggolan, Dr. F.J.: "Verslag van de oprichting van de 'Partij Rakyat Indonesia Serikat' in de Negara Soematera Timoer." 17 Juli 1948. (BZ)

284. Nazir Loebis: "Spion Indonesia di Singapura." (appended to doc. 112) (AR)

286. Nedinreg., Batavia to Gouverneur Sumatra. Codetelegram No. 9, 12 April 1946. (BZ)
287. idem. to Recomba, Medan. Codetelegram No. 2383/47, 1 Augustus 1947. (BZ)
290. idem. Augustus en September 1946. (AR)
291. idem. October 1946. (AR)
296. idem. Letter No. 48/G.E., 8 November 1946. "Voorlopige besprekingen te Medan over overdracht van spoorwegwerkplaats en telefooncentrale." (BZ)
299. Netherlands Delegation, Local Joint Committee, Medan to Chairman, Local Joint Committee, Medan. 29 letters dealing with "violations of ceasefire." No. 3650, 2 September 1949 to 4857, 9 November 1949. (all appended to doc. 300) (AR)
300. Nederlandse Civiele Vertegenwoordiger van de Plaatselijke Gemengde Commissie, Medan to Secretaris van Staat, Departement van Binnenlandse Zaken, Batavia.
Letter No. 65/P.G.C./Geh., 12 November 1949. (AR)

301. Notes made by Dr. Amir concerning the Indonesian Revolution." (appended to letter, Gouverneur, Chief C.O. AMACAB Sumatra to Procureur-Generaal, Batavia, No. 3401, 14 Juni 1946). (AR)

302. "Notulen van de tweede bijeenkomst van het voorlopige 'Local Truce Committee' te Medan, op Woensdag 6 November 1946." (appended to doc. 295) (BZ)

303. idem. 8 November 1946. (BZ)
304. idem. 7 November 1946. (appended to doc. 296) (BZ)

304A. Notulen der vergadering van de Technische Sub Commis­sie en der Plaatselijke Arbitrage Commissie voor het Bestand, te Medan op Vrijdag 27 December 1946. (BZ)

305. "Notulen van de vergadering der arbitrage-commissie inzake de bestandsovereenkomst in het gebouw Wilhel­minastraat-hoek-Balistraat op Dinsdag 26 November des avonds 18.00 uur." (appended to doc. 463) (BZ)

306. "Notulen bespreking ontwerp-statuut Soematera Timoer". 5 reports; 27 & 28 November, 1, 2 & 5 December 1947. (BZ)


311. idem. 15-30 Juni 1946. (BZ)
312. idem. 1-15 Juli 1946. (BZ)
313. idem. 16-31 Juli 1946. (BZ)
314. idem. 1-15 Augustus 1946. (AR)
315. idem. 16-31 Augustus 1946. (BZ)
316. idem. 1-15 September 1946. (BZ)
317. idem. 16 September - 15 October 1946. (BZ)
318. idem. 16-31 October 1946. (BZ)
319. idem. 1-15 November 1946. (BZ)
320. idem. 16-30 November 1946. (BZ)
321. idem. 1-15 December 1946. (BZ)
322. idem. 16-31 December 1946. (BZ)
323. idem. 1-15 Januari 1947. (BZ)
324. idem. 16-31 Januari 1947. (BZ)
325. idem. 1-15 Februari 1947. (BZ)
326. idem. 16-28 Februari 1947. (BZ)
327. idem. 1-15 Maart 1947. (BZ)
328. idem. 16-31 Maart 1947. (BZ)
329. idem. 1-30 April 1947. (BZ)
330. idem. 1-15 Mei 1947. (BZ)
331. idem. 16-31 Mei 1947. (BZ)
332. idem. 1-30 Juni 1947. (BZ)


335. idem. No. A102/55/2896, 17 Januari 1946. (AR)
335A. idem. No. Agno S466 EC5/31278, 2 April 1946. (AR)
336. idem. No.103/591/8665, 14 Augustus 1947. (AR)
337. idem. No.142, 12 November 1947. (AR)
338. idem. No.14603/28, 3 December 1947. (AR)
339. idem. No. 353/32 KF6/110756, 10 Januari 1948. (AR)
340. idem. No.19, 19 Februari 1948. (AR)
341. idem. No.A103/1020, 8 Maart 1948. (AR)
342. idem. No.A104/438, 10 Mei 1948. (AR)
343. idem. No.A104/455, 19 Mei 1948. (AR)
345. idem. No.97, 12 Juli 1948. (AR)
346. idem., 7-9 October 1949. (AR)

348. idem. Persuittrekkel. No.112/H, 10 Mei 1948; No.146/H, 11 Juni 1947; No.113, 1 October 1947; No.14603/28, 3 December 1947. (AR)

349. idem. to Directeur Nefis, Batavia. Letter No.11326, 23 Augustus 1948. (AR)
352. idem. to Kabinet van den Legercommandant, Batavia. Telegram, 25 Augustus 1948. (AR)

354. idem. "Rapport inzake derde en laatste onderhoud met Dr. M. Amir, arts. (plv. Gouverneur van Sumatra)." 8 Mei 1946. (MD)


357. idem. Ondervragingsrapport No.18, 9 October 1947. "N.R.I. Voorlichtingsdienst." (AR)

358. idem. Nefrap No.12922/13/a/x, 10 October 1947. " POLITIEKE INLICHTINGEN." (AR)


360. idem. No.152, 3 December 1947. (AR)


364. Nefis, Batavia (Sectie Japanse Zaken). Ondervragingsverslag No.14-037, 6 November 1947. (AR)


367. idem. No.14-040, 15 November 1947. (AR)


369. idem. No.8, 1 Juni 1946. "Verslag betreffende de politieke ontwikkeling op Sumatra." (BZ)

369A. idem. No.10, 3 Juli 1946. (BZ)

370. idem. No.14, 3 Juli 1946. (BZ)
371. idem. No.15, 16 October 1946. "Politiek overzicht van de door de Geallieerden bezette centra op Sumatra." (BZ)

372. idem. Signalement Ag.No. ADO/26701, 4 April 1946. "Betreffende de Indonesische politiek op Sumatra en de ontwikkeling van de verhouding tot Java." (BZ)

373. idem. Signalement Sumatra No.5, 11 April 1946. "Omtrent Abdoel Xarim ter Sumatra's Oostkust." (BZ)


375. idem. Signalement No.3, 23 Augustus 1948. (BZ)

376. idem. No.15, 23 September 1948. "De financiële positie van Republikeins Sumatra." (BZ)


380. idem. Publicatie No.4, 9 Mei 1946. "De houding der Chinezen op Sumatra." (BZ)

381. idem. No.7, 17 Juni 1946. "De rol door Dr. Amir gespeeld in de Sociale Revolutie ter S.O.K." (BZ)

382. idem. No.9, 20 Juni 1946. "Sumatra - verbindingen met Singapore. Speciaal van de TRI en contact met een Indonesisch Malaka leger." (BZ)

383. idem. No.12, 28 Juni 1946. "Sumatra volgens de Republikeinsche propaganda en de werkelijkheid." (BZ)

384. idem. No.14, 8 Juli 1946. "Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) - Sumatra." (BZ)
idem. No.18, 22 Juli 1946. "Politieke contact tusschen Sumatra en Malakka." (BZ)

idem. No.19, 12 Augustus 1946. "De invoer van vuurwapens, amunitie en militaire uniformen vanuit Malakka naar Sumatra." (BZ)

idem. No.21, 4 September 1946. "Regionale berichten betreffende de politieke ontwikkeling op Sumatra. (20-31 Juli 1946)." (BZ)


idem. No.23, 12 September 1946. "Communistische activiteiten op Sumatra onder buitenlandsche beïnvloeding." (BZ)


idem. No.28, 24 September 1946. "De penjelidik militair choesoes op Sumatra." (BZ)

idem. No.30, 30 September 1946. "Infiltratie van Atjehsche benden ter Sumatra's Oostkust." (BZ)

idem. No.31, 1 October 1946. "De politieke situatie op Bagan Si Api Api." (BZ)

idem. No.36, 28 October 1946. "Positie van Dr. A.K. Gani op Sumatra." (BZ)


idem. No.37, 10 October 1946. "Politiek contact tusschen Sumatra en Malakka." (BZ)

idem. No.38, 6 November 1946. "De PKI - Sumatra." (BZ)

idem. No.41, 10 December 1946. "De PKI - Sumatra." (BZ)

idem. No.42, 12 December 1946. "Nopens Dr. Boerhanoedin en Mohamad Samin Taib en hunne activiteiten." (BZ)


idem. No.INL/1.8/3/15, 7 Februari 1946. "Belangrijke besluiten der Moektamar Islam Sumatra." (BZ)

idem. "Order of Battle TRI Sumatra 28 February 1946." (MD)
404. idem. 20 August 1946. (MD)
405. idem. 20 November 1946. (MD)
406. idem. 15 January 1947. (MD)
407. idem. 20 April 1947. (MD)
408. idem. "Order of Battle Republikeinse Strijdkrachten op Sumatra, 5 Mei 1948." (MD)
409. idem. 15 September 1948. (MD)
411. idem., Hoofd Afdeling I (van Waardenburg) to Directeur Nefis, Batavia. Nota, 28 Maart 1946. "Verzoekschrift Delische Rijksgrooten." (BZ)
412. idem. Nota, 2 April 1946. "Verzoekschrift Delische Rijksgrooten." (BZ)
414. Panitia Sementara (Tapanuli), Medan: "Pendahoeloean", 1 November 1948. (appended to doc. 131) (BZ)
416. idem. Komunike No.1, 11 Maart 1949. (AR)
420. idem. 27 Augustus 1947. (BZ)
421. idem. 28 Augustus 1947. (BZ)
422. idem. 30 Augustus - 6 September 1947. (BZ)
423. idem. 8-12 September 1947. (BZ)
424. idem. 13-20 September 1947. (BZ)
425. idem. 21-25 September 1947. (BZ)
426. idem. 26-28 September 1947. (BZ)
427. idem. 29 September - 3 October 1947. (BZ)
428. idem. 5-12 October 1947. (BZ)


431. PBA Sibolga (H. Bartstra) to TBA Tapanuli. Letter No.381/Geh., 12 October 1949. "Protest van de 'Front Kaum Republik Indonesia' tegen het Regeringsbesluit houdende erkenning van de 'Panitia Status Seluruh Tapanoeli'." (BZ)

432. Pengoeroes Besar PNST. Medan to Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal (in Medan). Letter No.120, 1 October 1947. (AR)


441. Perdagangan Masjarakat Indonesia (Permai), Penang to Indonesia Office, Penang. Letter, 13 September 1949. (AR)

442. *idem.* Letter, 5 October 1949. (AR)

443. *idem.* Letter, 29 October 1949. (AR)

444. *idem.* Letter, 1 November 1949. (AR)


446. *idem.* Letter, 29 October 1949. (AR)


451. Piekaar, A.J. (Batavia) to HVK, Batavia. Letter, 10 Mei 1949. (AR)

452. idem. Letter No.44, 8 Juni 1949. "Opschorting staatkundige vormgeving en organisatie bestuur Bengkalis." (AR)

453. idem. to A.L.W. Seyffardt (Medan). Letter, 2 Juli 1949. (AR)

454. PNST, Medan: "Riwajat Partai Nasional Soematera Timoer Didirikan." (appended to doc. 432) (AR)

455. idem. "Beginsel-Programma dari Partai Nasional Soematera Timoer." (appended to doc. 432) (AR)


457. idem. "Daftar dari Pengoeroes Besar PNST." (appended to doc. 432) (AR)

458. Private Secretary, Governor, Malayan Union to Netherlands Consul General, Singapore. Letter, 13 April 1947. (AR)


461. Raad van Landsgroten, Keradjaan Negeri Deli, Medan:
Kepoetoesan, 29 Januari 1949. (appended to doc. 133) (AR)

462. Raja H.A.M. Tampobolon (Hague) to Dr. J.P. Bannier (Hague). Letter, 14 April 1949. (BZ)


465. idem. Codetelegram No.15/C, 16 Februari 1947. (BZ)


475. idem. to HVK, Batavia. Letter No.120/Z.G., 18 December 1948. "Zelfbesturen ter Oostkust van Sumatra." (AR)

476. idem. to Directeur Binnenlandse Bestuur, Batavia. Codetelegram No.23/C, 10 Maart 1947. (BZ)

477. idem. to Nedinst., Batavia. Telegram No.1121, 21 November 1947. (BZ)

478. idem. to Directeur Kabinet, Batavia. Letter No.2399, 8 Juni 1948. (BZ)

479. idem. to Secretaris van Staat voor Zelfbestuurszaken, Batavia. Letter No.120/Z.G., 18 Januari 1949. (AR)


484. idem. to Directeur Kabinet, Batavia. Letter, 15 October 1948. "Verslag van een dienstreis naar Sumatra's Oostkust van 5 t/m 9 October 1948." (AR)

484A. idem. "Memo betreffende Voorlopige Comite Tapanuli", 30 November 1948. (AR)

485. idem. (van de Velde): "Poging tot analyse van de toestand op Sumatra." 29 Mei 1949. (AR)

486. idem. "Politiek Verslag van Sumatra over November 1946." (AR)

487. idem. December 1946 en Januari 1947. (AR)

488. idem. Februari 1947. (AR)

489. idem. Maart en April 1947. (AR)

490. idem. Mei 1947. (AR)

491. idem. Juni 1947. (AR)

492. idem. Januari en Februari 1948. (AR)

493. idem. Maart 1948. (AR)

494. idem. (M.A. Los). April 1948. (AR)

495. idem. Mei 1948. (AR)

496. idem. Juni 1948. (AR)

497. idem. Juli 1948. (AR)

498. idem. Augustus 1948. (AR)

499. idem. September 1948. (AR)

500. idem. October 1948. (AR)

501. idem. (van de Velde). November 1948. (AR)


503. idem. Codetelegram No.3077, 30 Augustus 1947. (BZ)

507. idem. Codetelegram No.62, 17 September 1947. (BZ)
509. idem. to PNST, Medan. Letter, 8 November 1947. (AR)
510. idem. to Procureur-Generaal, Batavia. Rapport No. 104/J, 8 November 1947. (AR)
511. idem. to Walinegara Soematera Timoer. Letter No.171, 14 November 1947. (BZ)
512. idem. (van de Velde): "Rapport van den Recomba voor Noord-Sumatra over Augustus 1947." (AR)
513. idem. "Rapport ... eerste helft van September 1947." (BZ)
513A. idem. "Verslag betreffende de politieke en economische toestand van het bezettegebied van de Oostkust van Sumatra. Afgesloten op ultimo September 1947." (BZ)
514. idem. (Gerritsen). "Verslag betreffende de politieke en economische toestand van het bezettegebied van de Oostkust van Sumatra over de maand October 1947." (BZ)
515. idem. November 1947. (AR)
516. idem. December 1947. (BZ)
517. idem. Januari 1948. (BZ)
518. idem. Februari 1948. (BZ)
519. idem. "Verslag betreffende de politieke en economische toestand in de Negara Soematera Timoer over de maand Maart 1948." (AR)
520. idem. April 1948. (AR)
521. idem. Mei 1948. (AR)
522. idem. Juni 1948. (AR)
525. idem. No.1202, 9 October 1947. "Daerah Istimewa Soematera Timoer." (AR)
526. idem. "Radiospeech made by H.E. Dr. L. Beel, the Prime Minister, at December 19th, via Radio Medan." No. A.E. 687, 20 November 1947. (BZ)
527. Regvind., Batavia to Ged. HVK, Medan. Telegram No. 8708, 27 September 1949. (AR)
529. Republican Delegation, Local Joint Committee, Medan to Chairman, Local Joint Committee, Medan. 9 letters dealing with "violations of ceasefire". No.58, 10 September 1949 to No.734, 7 November 1949. (all appended to doc. 300) (AR)
531. "Report by Dr. Hidayat on the situation in South Sumatra's East Coast Area." 13 September 1948. (AR)
533. idem. "Verslag van Noord-Sumatra periode 16-31 Januari 1946." (BZ)
534. idem. 1-15 Februari 1946. (AR)
535. idem. 16-28 Februari 1946. (AR)
536. idem. 1-15 Maart 1946. (AR)
537. idem. 16-31 Maart 1946. (AR)
538. idem. 1-15 April 1946. (BZ)
539. idem. 16-30 April 1946. (BZ)
540. idem. 1-15 Mei 1946. (BZ)
541. idem. 16-31 Mei 1946. (BZ)
Residentie Recherche in Tapanoeli: "Verslag betreffende de politieke aangelegenheden in de Residentie Tapanoeli over de maand ..." Mei 1939 to February 1940. (BZ)


Residen Tapanuli Republik Indonesia (Dr. F. Lumbantobing): "Surat Terbuka" No.206/Gm/Kab., 15 Augustus 1949. (BZ)

"Resolusi I-V Muktamar Sumatera Ke-II." 29-30 Mei 1949. (AR)

"Resolutie. Voorlopige Vertegenwoordigen Raad van Tapanuli, Sibolga." 3 Augustus 1949. (BZ)

"Resolusi Rakjat Kabupaten Karo Republik Indonesia 1949." (Typescript, ATR Tanah Karo, n.d.)

Romme, Prof. Mr. C.P.M. to Minister van Overzeesche Gebiedsdeelen, Hague. Report dated 1 April 1947. (BZ)

"Samenvetting van het verhandele op de vergadering gehouden op Donderdag 13 November 1947 te 9 uur in de Landschapsvergaderszaal Soekamoelia, Medan."

Sassen (Hague) to Beel (Batavia). Codetelegram No. 856, 26 Januari 1949. (BZ)


idem. (A.J. Piekaar) to TBA Tapanuli. Codetelegram No.2959, 5 Maart 1949. (AR)
556. idem. Codetelegram No.4223, 25 April 1949. (BZ)
557. idem. Telegram, 12 Mei 1949. (BZ)
558. idem. Codetelegram No.6278, 16 Juli 1949. (AR)
560. idem. Letter No.BZX8/5/27, 8 November 1949. (AR)
561. idem. to Comkrost, Medan. Codetelegram No.2961, 5 Maart 1949. (AR)
562. Secretaris van de HVK, Batavia (Piekaar) to Voorzitter, Panitia Status Seluruh Tapanuli, Sibolga. Codetelegram No.12, 25 April 1949. (AR)
565. idem. Letter, 12 Juli 1949. (AR)
566. idem. to Secretaris van Staat voor Economische Zaken, Batavia. Letter No.908/Geh., 4 Juli 1949. (AR)
569. idem. to Lt. Gouverneur-Generaal, Batavia. Letter, 29 Januari 1946. (BZ)
570. Sultan of Deli et. al. to HVK, Batavia. Petition, 2 Maart 1949. "Qauloeheolhaq". (AR)
572. idem. Letter, October 1947 (no date). (AR)
573. Tengku Abdoellah Hod Dewa Sjachdan (of Langkat) to
Minister van Overzeese Gebiedsdeelen, Hague. Letter, 5 Mei 1946. (BZ)


575. Tengku Dr. Mansoer (Medan): "Korte Levensbeschrijving van Dr. Amir." (appended to doc. 198) (AR)


578. idem. to Recomba, Medan. Letter No.178, 10 November 1947. (BZ)


581. Ting Ching Lin (Medan) to Brondgeest (Medan). Letter, 24 September 1945. (BZ)


583. TBA Tapanuli (Heckman), Sibolga to Secretaris Binnenlandse Zaken, Batavia. Telegram No.219/ge, 27 Augustus 1949. (AR)

584. idem. No.234/ge, 6 September 1949. (AR)
585. idem. No.249/ge, 15 September 1949. (AR)
586. idem. No.248/ge, 15 September 1949. (AR)
587. idem. No.253/ge, 19 September 1949. (AR)
588. idem. No.269/ge, 28 September 1949. (AR)
589. idem. No.282/ge, 10 October 1949. (AR)
590. idem. No.293/ge, 19 October 1949. (AR)
591. idem. No.303/ge, 29 October 1949. (AR)
592. idem. No.313/ge, 9 November 1949. (AR)
593. *idem.* to HVK, Batavia. Telegram No.251/ge, 16 September 1949. (AR)

594. *idem.* No.259/ge, 21 September 1949. (AR)
595. *idem.* No.270/ge, 28 September 1949. (AR)
596. *idem.* No.278/ge, 5 October 1949. (AR)
597. *idem.* No.6884/APO.3, 13 October 1949. (AR)
598. *idem.* No.292/ge, 20 October 1949. (AR)
599. *idem.* No.298/ge, 26 October 1949. (AR)
600. *idem.* No.310/ge, 3 November 1949. (AR)
601. *idem.* No.312/ge, 9 November 1949. (AR)
602. *idem.* Codetelegram No.7915, 3 September 1949. (BZ)


606. *idem.* to van der Wal (Medan). 5 letters; dated 5, 12 & 15 Januari, 20 Februari & 25 Maart 1949. (BZ)


608. *idem.* 16 Januari - 15 Februari 1949. (BZ)
610. *idem.* 16 Maart - 1 April 1949. (BZ)

611. *idem.* "Politiek-economisch verslag over de maand April 1949." (BZ)

612. *idem.* Mei 1949. (BZ)
613. *idem.* Juni 1949. (BZ)
614. *idem.* Juli 1949. (BZ)
615. *idem.* Augustus 1949. (BZ)
616. *idem.* September 1949. (BZ)
617. *idem.* October 1949. (BZ)

618. *idem.* "Politiek-economisch verslag over het 1e half­jaar 1949." (BZ)


622. idem. No.10449/01X, 3 September 1948. "Militaire bezetting van Zuid S.O.K." (AR)

623. idem.: "Beschouwingen met betrekking tot 'Cease Fire and Stand Fast Order'." 27 Juli 1949. (AR)

624. Territoriaal tevens Troepencommando Noord-Sumatra, Medan: "Overzicht en ontwikkeling van de toestand van 26 Augustus tot 2 September 1948." (MD)

625. idem. 2-9 September 1948. (MD)
626. idem. 9-16 September 1948. (MD)
627. idem. 16-23 September 1948. (MD)
628. idem. 23-30 September 1948. (MD)
629. idem. 30 September - 7 October 1948. (MD)
630. idem. 7-14 October 1948. (MD)
631. idem. 14-21 October 1948. (MD)
632. idem. 21-28 October 1948. (MD)
633. idem. 28 October - 4 November 1948. (MD)
634. idem. 4-11 November 1948. (MD)
635. idem. 11-18 November 1948. (MD)
636. idem. 18-25 November 1948. (MD)
637. idem. 25 November - 2 December 1948. (MD)
638. idem. 2-9 December 1948. (MD)
639. idem. 9-16 December 1948. (MD)
640. idem. 19-22 December 1948. (MD)

641. idem. "Wekelijks Militaire Inlichtingenrapport." No.18, 5 Mei 1949 to No.33, 18 Augustus 1949. (MD)

642. idem. "Instructie voor de handhaving van order en rust in Noord-Sumatra en Sabang." No.134/03/6, 21 Februari 1949. (MD)

643. idem. "Beschouwingen omtrent de aanslagen op de tabaksondernemingen Klambir V en Klumpang op 17 Februari 1949." 31 Maart 1949. (BZ)

644. idem. Speciaal-Rapport No.2/A, 11 October 1949. (AR)


Werkcomite Dewan Sementara Soematera Timoer to PNST, Medan. Letter, 27 November 1947. (AR)

Widjojoatmodjo, Abdulkadir (for Committee Representing the Netherlands Government with the Committee of Good Offices), Batavia to Chairman, Security Council Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question. Letter No.93, 1 December 1947. (AR)

Wingender, Commander C.J. (O/C.A.D.C.S., Singapore): "Intelligence Received from the Field", No.13, 10 October 1945. (BZ)

idem. No.14, 12 October 1945. (BZ)

idem. No.16, 20 October 1945. (BZ)

idem. No.17, 24 October 1945. (BZ)

idem. No.18, 27 October 1945. (BZ)
659. idem. No.19, 31 October 1945. (BZ)
660. idem. No.20, 3 November 1945. (BZ)
661. idem. No.21, 7 November 1945. (BZ)


663. United States Department of State: Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, Honolulu: "Programs of Japan in Sumatra with Biographies." Assemblage No.59, 10 September 1945.

664. De Resident der Oostkust van Sumatra, "Politiek Verslag Oostkust van Sumatra le halfjaar 1938." (BZ)
665. idem. "...over hetjaar 1938". (BZ)
666. idem. "...le halfjaar 1939". (BZ)

667. De Resident van Tapanoeli, "Algemeen Verslag betreffende den Politiek en Toestand in de Residentie Tapanoeli over het eerste halfjaar 1939". (BZ)