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Painting Anzac
A history of Australia’s official war art scheme of the First World War

Volume 1

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract

During the final year of the First World War, Charles Bean, with the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) in France as Australia’s official war correspondent and then its official historian designate, asserted that the most important result for Australia from the war was its great unifying military tradition as the basis for future nationality. He later claimed in the official history that when the AIF first sailed it left a nation that did not yet know itself. Moreover, it left a nation which did not possess a military tradition. According to Bean that was what it needed.

This history of the Commonwealth of Australia’s official war art scheme of the First World War examines the processes by which Australia’s involvement in the conflict was given pictorial form as part of an official and publicly funded project of nation-building conceived by Bean – the project of the official representation of Anzac – which involved representing Anzac in a written history, pictures, photographs, cinema, trophies, relics, models, sculptures and, most importantly, in and as a national war museum. The fundamental object of this project was to construct a story of Australia’s part in the war – the story of Anzac – which would be told for posterity in and by a national war museum to be built in the nation’s capital as a monument to the AIF, ultimately the Australian War Memorial. The story Bean constructed was one with immense popular appeal and easily transmitted across generations, a story that told of the arrival on the world stage of a young nation through its supreme military performance and of the forging of a tradition known as Anzac.

Notwithstanding Bean’s absence of any relevant official standing, save for his position as the official historian, the story of Anzac he constructed became the official story. His control of so vast a project as Anzac’s official representation constituted a powerful tool in his hands with which to mould and communicate his conception of it. But while in the literature his involvement in the creation of the Anzac legend is universally acknowledged, his role in constructing the official version of it, at least in terms of a project he conceived of for its official representation, has not been recognised. Moreover, its pictorial representation as a factor in the legend’s creation and transmission has been overlooked. But the visual was the most potent means of representing Anzac with its immediate impact, general appeal and accessibility. This history fills that gap in knowledge.
Bean resolved to tell the story of Anzac in the national war museum primarily by visual means. That was how the military museums to which he was exposed growing up in England in the late Victorian years were organised, and he was fascinated with them. He was brought up in an imperial household which revered Britain’s military and naval traditions and was inculcated in the written and visual forms in which they were conventionally represented. These reflected a mode of representing war which was rooted in a storytelling tradition. Bean decided that the story of Anzac should be represented in substantially identical terms; in that way Australia could claim a place for itself among the nations with great traditions. To a significant degree their traditions were represented in military museums by the display of matériel, regalia, maps, models, pictorial records, trophies and relics. And notwithstanding the availability of photography, the basic work of representing such a tradition pictorially was performed by pictures of battles and other military scenes and portraits.

The official war art scheme commenced in 1917, but quasi-official efforts directed to producing a pictorial record of Australia’s part in the war were made during the final stages of the Gallipoli campaign in late 1915. By these efforts, in which Bean played the leading role, *The Anzac Book* was published in 1916. Its illustrations were the first to give pictorial form to Anzac taking as its essence the common Australian soldier. As the scheme evolved it had a civilian and a military aspect: the first involved the Commonwealth’s engagement of expatriate Australian artists living in England to visit the theatres of war and make pictures of events especially with regard to the AIF; the second involved the appointment of soldiers as artists for essentially the same purpose. The pictures made by the artists at the front went to the Commonwealth and later they and several other artists were commissioned to paint a series of large historical pictures illustrating the story of Anzac, and portraits of its principal actors, for the national war museum. Most of the historical pictures, largely of Bean’s choosing, depicted incidents in the story and were chosen for their heroic and didactic qualities with the aim of teaching object lessons to and inspiring future generations of Australians. These pictures, he claimed, would make Australia’s tradition.

This history shows that from the inception of the official war art scheme Bean assumed control of it, and as a critical element of the project of Anzac’s official representation he exercised control over it for four inextricably connected purposes: first, to create an image of Anzac that reflected his conception of the idea and ideals it represented; secondly, to ensure that the historical pictures illustrated the story of Anzac as he wished it told for posterity;
thirdly, to promote the idea that Anzac was a military tradition which could stand alongside the great traditions of other nations; and finally, to promote the idea that Australia’s future nationality should be defined by that tradition.
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## Abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>AAG</td>
<td>Assistant Adjutant-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFC</td>
<td>Australian Flying Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>Adjutant-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGNSW</td>
<td>Art Gallery of New South Wales</td>
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<td>AIF</td>
<td>Australian Imperial Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANMEF</td>
<td>Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWM</td>
<td>Australian War Museum/Memorial</td>
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<td>AWRS</td>
<td>Australian War Records Section</td>
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<td>AWMC</td>
<td>Australian War Museum Committee</td>
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<td>AWMF</td>
<td>Australian War Memorial Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEF</td>
<td>British Expeditionary Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOP</td>
<td><em>The Boys’ Own Paper</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>DAAG</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAG</td>
<td>Deputy Adjutant-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCM</td>
<td>Distinguished Conduct Medal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDMS</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Medical Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEF</td>
<td>Egyptian Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOC</td>
<td>General Officer Commanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEF</td>
<td>Mediterranean Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAA</td>
<td>National Archives of Australia</td>
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<td>NGV</td>
<td>National Gallery of Victoria</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWRC</td>
<td>National War Records Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAMC(T)</td>
<td>Royal Army Medical Corps (Territorial)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAN</td>
<td>Royal Australian Navy</td>
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<td>RUSI</td>
<td>Royal United Service Institute</td>
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<td>Victoria Cross</td>
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Introduction

This work is about the place of war and the military in Australia’s history. Its subject is an aspect of war’s cultural production, its pictorial representation. More specifically, it is a history of the arrangements made by the Commonwealth of Australia during and after the First World War to represent pictorially the part the nation was playing and had played in the conflict, its official war art scheme.

The war art scheme is an overlooked but important feature of Australia’s history regarded from both a cultural and military perspective. It formed part of an official and mostly publicly funded project of nation-building, referred to in this work as the project of the official representation of Anzac, which involved representing it in every conceivable form: in a written history, pictures, photographs, cinema, trophies, relics, models, sculptures and finally, but most importantly, in and as a national war museum. The premise of the project, according to Charles Bean who conceived it, during the war Australia’s official war correspondent and official historian designate, was that the most important result for Australia from the war was its great unifying military tradition as the basis for future nationality.¹ Though not alone in conceiving of Australia’s involvement in the war as its assumption of nationhood, no other person was invested with the means of giving their conception of it official form.² It was of fundamental importance to Bean that Australia’s part in the war be recorded and preserved for posterity. Not only that, but that an official story of Australia’s part in it be constructed – the story of Anzac – to be told forevermore by a national war museum given over to

¹ Cable, AIF Administrative Headquarters (Bean) to Defence Department, 12 September 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
² For a discussion of whether nations are made in war, including an overview of the position Australians held on that question in 1915, see Henry Reynolds, ‘Are nations really made in war?’, in Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds with Mark McKenna and Joy Damousi, What’s Wrong with Anzac? The Militarisation of Australian History, New South, Sydney, 2010, pp 24-44, esp pp 30-2, 39-41. Also see Craig Melrose, “‘A praise that never ages”: the Australian War Memorial and the “national interpretation” of the First World War, 1922-35’, PhD thesis, University of Queensland, 2005, chapter 1, ‘The Rise of Martial Nationalism in Australia, c 1870-1920’, esp pp 48-9, 52, 56, 59, 61-2, 74. In this an important study of triumphalism through the display of trophies as practised by the memorial during the inter-war period, Melrose traces what he claims to be the rise of martial nationalism in Australia in order to establish ‘the pertinent formative traditions upon whose basis the Memorial was conceptualised and predicated’. At the heart of this development were ideas imported from Europe to the effect that involvement in war proved a nation’s mettle, and that a nation was defined by its great battles. Thus, Melrose claims some in Australia searched for a military event that ‘might bring together the Australian nation’.
collecting, preserving and exhibiting its war records, ultimately the Australian War Memorial.\(^3\)

This history is not about the Anzac tradition or legend as such, but rather its pictorial representation. It accepts that in consequence of Australia’s involvement in the war there emerged a tradition by that name, either in fact or as an idea, and that divergent views are held as to its nature, evolution and significance. This work does not seek to enter what might be called the Anzac debate, a subject already boasting a vast literature of both the popular and scholarly kind.\(^4\) Instead, it examines the processes by which Anzac was given official pictorial form under the authority of the Commonwealth’s war art scheme. Yet there is an aspect of the Anzac debate to which attention must be drawn due to its importance in explaining the purpose of the project of Anzac’s official representation, and it is this: allowing that the tradition which emerged from the war was multifaceted, fundamentally it was a military tradition with a supposedly distinct national character which, according to Bean, filled a void in the nation’s make-up. The project of Anzac’s official representation was largely directed to encouraging belief in the existence of that tradition and of promoting the idea that Australia’s future nationality should be defined by it.

Nowhere in his writings did Bean seek to link the tradition or to explain its emergence by reference to the historic past, relevantly to the existence in Australia before the war of a military tradition. In fact, he made plain his view that Australia’s military heritage stood for little. Describing Australia in 1914, he said the attitude of Australians to the profession of arms was almost purely British, and while acknowledging that ‘Australian Forces’ had been involved in the Boer War, and long before that the Maori Wars, ‘the old British military tradition was cited by Australian soldiers as proudly as by the British Army itself.’\(^5\) The

\(^3\) The Australian War Memorial, as it has been known since 26 September 1925 when established under section 4 of the Australian War Memorial Act 1925, was known on its inception in 1917 as the Australian War Museum and for a short time in 1925 as the Australian War Memorial Museum. For reasons of economy it will be referred to as ‘the memorial’ unless for the sake of contextual clarity it is necessary to refer to it by one or other of its earlier names.

\(^4\) In this vast literature there are two essays which are essential reading for gaining an understanding of what the Anzac tradition is or might be and the debates about it, the subject entry ‘Anzac legend’ in The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, pp 37-42, and Joan Beaumont’s ‘The Anzac legend’ in Joan Beaumont (ed), Australia’s War, 1914-18, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, NSW, 1995, pp 149-80. For two recent collections of thought-provoking essays on the subject see Marilyn Lake et al, What’s Wrong with Anzac? and Craig Stockings (ed), Anzac’s Dirty Dozen: 12 Myths of Australian Military History, New South, Sydney, 2012, esp chapters 1, 2, 3, 6, 12.

\(^5\) Anzac to Amiens, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1983 (first published 1946), p 9. While Craig Stockings shows that Australia possessed a substantial military past before 25 April 1915, he acknowledges that in 1914
‘really stout tests’ the Australians encountered during the Boer War were not attended by such ‘conscious feeling of nationhood’ as Australians possessed, he claimed.\(^6\) When in the official history he described Australia’s position at the outbreak of war, he not only failed to refer to its involvement in previous wars, but claimed Australians hardly realised that ‘an Australian national character or even a nation existed’.\(^7\) It seems unnecessary to point out that Bean’s claims about Australia and Australians should not be treated as gospel; but as to the non-existence of an Australian tradition before the war, he was correct.

The recruitment of some 2,500 Australians from the eastern colonies for service in the Waikato militia during the Maori Wars of the 1860s, and the raising and dispatch of a New South Wales contingent to the Sudan in 1885,\(^8\) are not events which evidence such a tradition, both because of the absence of any national character and their insignificance militarily. Since white settlement the high point in Australia’s military history had been its involvement in the Boer War (1899-1902). In all, eight contingents largely raised from the states left Australia for South Africa, a total of 16,175 men.\(^9\) The final contingents sent went as the Australian Commonwealth Horse, but these first truly Australian units contributed little to Australian military history, the war having ended before half of the eight battalions involved reached the Cape. At no time did Australia make a contribution in its own right, and unsurprisingly its soldiers displayed strengths and weaknesses. But despite receiving mixed reviews, some in Australia entertained the idea that they might be ‘natural soldiers’.\(^10\) Whether or not they were, it is clear Australia did not emerge from that conflict in possession of the old British army was still Australia’s ancestral military force, ‘its default image of the real soldier’, and does not claim that it then possessed a military tradition. See ‘Australian military history doesn’t begin on Gallipoli’ in Stockings (ed), Anzac’s Dirty Dozen, pp 11-34, esp pp 30-1. Nor, incidentally, does Craig Wilcox in Red Coat Dreaming: How colonial Australia embraced the British Army, Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne, Victoria, 2009. As Wilcox explains, most chapters of his book take their bearing from a fragment of Australia’s military past – a medal, picture, diary, uniform – and then follow its tangible and intangible connections between colonial Australia and the old British army. He shows how few Australians were immune to the allure and historic associations of the British army, a phenomenon he describes as ‘red coat dreaming’.

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\(^6\) Bean, Anzac to Amiens, p 19.
\(^7\) Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Volume 1, The Story of Anzac from the Outbreak of War to the End of the First Phase of the Gallipoli Campaign, May 4, 1915, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1921, chapter 1, esp p 7. Also see Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Volume 6, The AIF in France: May 1918-The Armistice, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1942, the last of the six volumes of the official history he wrote, where at p 1094 he claims in summing up the AIF’s achievements that when it sailed away in October 1914 it left a nation that did not yet know itself. The clear implication is that when the AIF returned it found a nation that knew itself, having discovered itself in war.
\(^9\) Ibid., pp 55-64.
of a tradition. A national esprit de corps of a martial kind simply did not exist. As Grey explains the situation, when under the Federal Constitution the colonial military forces came under Commonwealth control, the forces it inherited were a polyglot lot consisting of permanent staff and specialist troops, paid militia and unpaid volunteer units, and each embodied different martial traditions.11

Nevertheless, it has suited writers since at least the mid-1950s to claim that Australia has a long and distinguished military tradition dating back to at least the Maori Wars and occasionally to the days of the New South Wales Corps which was raised in 1789.12 Unquestionably, Australia’s military history dates back to the earliest days of white settlement, and as Grey shows, the military played a prominent part in the affairs of the Australian colonies prior to Federation, initially by the British army until the withdrawal of its regiments in 1870, and thereafter by the respective colonial militaries.13 But that history neither leads to nor implies the existence of an Australian tradition prior to the First World War. Equally misleading are claims that Australia has a military heritage, at least to the extent this implies the existence of an inherited tradition, the origins of which can be traced back to colonial times.14 Such claims ignore the polyglot nature of the various militaries

11 Ibid., p 8.
12 See, for example, Norman Bartlett (ed), Australia at Arms, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1955, inside front flap of dust jacket; Robert Nelson et al, A pictorial history of Australians at War, Paul Hamlyn, Sydney, 1970, inside front flap of dust jacket. Both books claim to trace Australia’s military tradition from its beginnings to the present day. The first commences with the Maori Wars and the second with the raising of the New South Wales Corps. Significantly, both books are early examples of illustrated histories of Australia’s part in wars and contain numerous photographs and reproductions of pictures from the memorial’s collection. Recent examples of this form of popular storytelling are George Odgers’ two-volume set Diggers: The Australian Army, Navy and Air Force in Eleven Wars, Lansdowne, Sydney, 1994, and Peter Pedersen’s box set Anzacs at War: From Gallipoli to the Present Day, Crows Nest, an imprint of Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW, 2010. Both histories commence with the Maori Wars and are profusely illustrated with photographs and reproductions of pictures from the memorial’s collection.
13 A Military History of Australia, chapters 1-3. Only very recently Stockings and John Connor have taken up the cause of promoting a proper understanding of Australia’s military past before the landing on Gallipoli with the publication of a volume of essays under their joint editorship, Before the Anzac Dawn: a military history of Australia to 1915, NewSouth Publishing, Sydney, 2013.
14 Odgers makes such a claim in his introduction. See Diggers, vol 1, p 8. So too does Chris Clark in The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW, 2010, at p vii. All of Australia’s major battles whether taking place overseas or on Australian soil within recorded history should, Clark claims, ‘quite properly’ be placed within Australia’s military heritage. In The Diggers: Makers of the Australian Military Tradition, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1993, a selection of lives from the Australian Dictionary of Biography selected and condensed by Clark, he initially claims (at p xiv) that during the First World War Australians laid the foundations of a military tradition. But later, at the end of a section entitled ‘Colonial Beginnings’, he claims (at p 9) that during the First World War Australia’s military tradition was ‘affirmed’. These claims are irreconcilable.
inherited by the Commonwealth at Federation and encourage an uncritical acceptance of the idea that somehow the Anzac tradition has always been part of Australian military history.\textsuperscript{15}

Among several problems preventing the acceptance of these claims is one of critical importance for this history: the tradition which is claimed to have existed prior to the war is neither expressed in nor accompanied by a substantial pictorial record. Yet one might conclude from inspecting illustrated histories of Australia’s part in conflicts that such a record exists. However, on closer inspection what they present is a fragmentary record the various parts of which represent particular colonial forces. This record was created in response to local as opposed to national impulses, doubtless to satisfy the desires of such forces to commemorate their traditions and personnel.\textsuperscript{16} Such a claim does not deny that, for instance, the New South Wales Mounted Rifles depicted by Percy Spence during exercises in the bush in \textit{New South Wales Mounted Rifles} (1905)\textsuperscript{[1]}, or the 3rd NSW Volunteer Infantry Regiment represented in the person of Private Tucker by Frederick Tucker in \textit{Private Barff Tucker} (1886)\textsuperscript{[2]},\textsuperscript{17} each possessed an especial tradition. Such pictures occupy a proper place in the pictorial representation of Australia’s military history. Nevertheless, they neither represent a national tradition nor evidence one.

As Australia’s involvement in the Boer War represented the high point in its military history before the First World War, it is surprising that it did not lead to the production of a substantial painted record. Arguably, it was desirable to commemorate the important battles in which Australians had fought and the men who distinguished themselves during the

\textsuperscript{15} And it helps such writers in claiming the performance of Australia’s soldiers in the First World War was not unexpected to point to a pre-existing tradition. Why else, for instance, would Patrick Lindsay in \textit{The Spirit of the Digger} (Harper Collins, Sydney, second edition, 2011) commence chapter 4, ‘The Origins of the Digger’, with a statement that Australia’s military history began with the arrival of the First Fleet, and after briefly describing the military’s part in early colonial times, move on to discuss Australia’s involvement in the Maori Wars, the Sudan and the Boer War? Predictably, he claims (at p 40) that during the last conflict key ingredients of the Digger’s character – his independence and fighting spirit – became evident.

\textsuperscript{16} Stockings, for instance, likens the communal pride evident in local volunteer corps to that experienced on the creation of a local council and football team. See ‘Australian military history doesn’t begin on Gallipoli’ in Stockings (ed), \textit{Anzac’s Dirty Dozen}, p 22.

\textsuperscript{17} Private Tucker is shown wearing the Sudan medal. This medal, inscribed ‘Suakin, 1885’, was presented to members of the late New South Wales contingent at a ceremony which took place at Moore Park on 13 February 1886. The number and variety of metropolitan forces participating in a parade before the presentation of medals were considerable, some evidence of Grey’s claim as to their polyglot nature: Sydney Lancers, Illawarra Light Horse, West Camden Light Horse, Permanent Artillery, Volunteer Artillery, Engineer Corps, Torpedo Corps, 1st Regiment Volunteer Infantry and 2nd Regiment Volunteer Infantry (Metropolitan Companies), Metropolitan Reserve Corps, Volunteer Naval Artillery, Naval Brigade, and the Cadets. See ‘The Soudan medal’, \textit{Australian Town and Country Journal}, 23 January 1886, p 19; ‘The Soudan medal parade’, \textit{Sydney Morning Herald}, 13 February 1886, p 9.
conflict. Its progress was closely followed and reported in the daily press and it was not uncommon for stories to be illustrated. Yet there is no evidence that during the war or in the decade afterwards the government considered commissioning the painting of official pictures which could stand as a permanent record of the part Australia had played. The only picture known to have been painted of an incident occurring in the war is Charles Hammond’s *Australians and New Zealanders at Klerksdorp, 24 March 1901* (1904) [3], and then after an illustration appearing in the *London Illustrated News* by Richard Caton Woodville, a British artist. The problem, it seems, was that the part it played was too diffuse or had had an insufficient national aspect to inspire such a project. The insignificance of the war, during which six Australians were awarded the Victoria Cross, and of the military more generally, for the project of nation-building, was reflected in the 1912 decision of the Commonwealth’s recently established Historic Memorials Committee to commission the painting of official portraits of eighteen men, none of whom were or had been soldiers. Moreover, the committee restricted itself to commissioning portraits, apparently thinking that events in the nation’s history, such as its part in the recent war, did not warrant commemorating. But with Australia’s involvement in the First World War that thinking was abandoned: the

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18 This did not mean the men who served were not commemorated, but their commemoration was undertaken at the local level. For instance, in 1900 the photographs of 14 officers from various NSW contingents who were serving in South Africa were reproduced in a large poster-size chromolithograph entitled ‘NSW Officers at the Front’, now in the memorial’s collection (ART50125). Presumably it was produced for sale to the public.

19 A large contingent of Australian war correspondents arrived in South Africa to follow the war, and home-based artists worked with text supplied by correspondents to illustrate the conflict. See Fay Anderson and Richard Trembath, *Witnesses to war: the history of Australian conflict reporting*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2011, pp 32-8, esp p 33. Frank Wilkinson, who covered the war for the Sydney *Daily Telegraph*, the Melbourne *Age* and the Adelaide *Advertiser*, later published a memoir of his experiences and arranged for Norman H Hardy to illustrate his book from sketches and photographs he (Wilkinson) had made. See *Australia at the Front: A Colonial View of the Boer War*, John Long, London, 1901. A few of his illustrations, which are crude and of minor scenes, are in the memorial’s collection.

20 Woodville, who had not been in South Africa during the war, depicted several British wars in ‘death and glory’ style for the *Illustrated London News* recreating dramatic scenes in a wholly imaginative way. See Peter Johnson, *Front Line Artists*, Cassell, London, 1978, p 15; Pat Hodgson, *The War Illustrators*, Osprey, London, 1977, p 160. Hammond’s picture is in the memorial’s collection, but the circumstances of its painting and its provenance are unknown. Rather appropriately, given the dearth of paintings representing incidents in Australia’s military past, Stockings and Connor chose to illustrate the cover of *Before the Anzac Dawn* with a reproduction of the picture. William Moore said he knew of only four paintings connected with the Boer War, and Hammond’s was not one of them. Those he mentioned are not in the memorial’s collection and only one, JE Ward’s *Queenslanders at Sunnyside, their first baptism of fire*, depicted an incident from the war. See *The Story of Australian Art*, vol II, p 46.

21 ‘Historic Memorials. First list of portraits’, *Register*, 16 August 1912, p 7. They comprised a mix of former prime ministers and governors-general, the current prime minister (Andrew Fisher), the current governor-general, politicians, both living and dead, and judges.

22 Though hardly determinative, these seemingly minor facts cut across claims that have been made about the rise of martial nationalism in Australia before the First World War, at least within official circles.
pictorial representation of events in which it participated would play a critical role in Anzac’s official representation.

The Commonwealth’s war art scheme was established in 1917, but quasi-official efforts directed to producing a pictorial record of Australia’s part in the war were made on Gallipoli in late 1915. By these efforts, in which Bean played the leading role, *The Anzac Book* was published in London in 1916. It was profusely illustrated and its illustrations, especially those produced by a small team of soldier-artists under Bean’s direction, were the first to give pictorial form to Anzac, taking as its essence the common Australian soldier, memorably represented by David Barker as the battered, bloodied but never say die soldier of the book’s cover [4]. As the scheme evolved it had a civilian and a military aspect. The first involved the Commonwealth’s engagement of expatriate Australian artists living in England to visit the theatres of war and make pictures of events occurring in the war especially with regard to the Australian Imperial Force (AIF). The second involved the appointment of soldiers serving in the AIF as artists for essentially the same purpose. The ten in the first group – Will Dyson, H Septimus Power, Fred Leist, Charles Bryant, George Lambert, James Quinn, John Longstaff, A Henry Fullwood, Arthur Streeton and George Bell – were known as ‘official artists’, and the seven in the next – Frank Crozier, George Benson, Will Longstaff, James Scott, Louis McCubbin, Daryl Lindsay and James MacDonald – as ‘AIF artists’.23 The pictures made by the artists at the front went to the Commonwealth – or should have – and towards the end of the war and in the decade afterwards they and several other artists were commissioned to paint a series of large historical pictures of incidents, locations and conditions in the story of

23 Their biographies are largely irrelevant and will not be canvassed except in passing. Anyway, save for Crozier, Benson and Scott, each artist has an entry in the *Australian Dictionary of Biography* and this can be consulted. For the other three a dictionary, such as the *Concise Dictionary of Australian Artists* by Gwenda Robb and Elaine Smith, Robert Smith (ed), Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1993, can be consulted. Several of the artists have full-length biographies and most of the official artists are treated in the standard histories of Australian art, for instance in Bernard Smith’s *Australian Painting, 1788-2000*, with additional chapters by Terry Smith and Christopher Heathcote, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, fourth edition, 2001. Essentially, the official artists were academic painters who by the outbreak of war had established for themselves modest to successful art practices in London and had followed similar paths: less or more formal training in Australia, often at the National Gallery School in Melbourne, further training at one or more of the academies in Paris and occasionally in London, eventually becoming regular exhibitors at the Royal Academy and Paris salons and members of various artist societies, for instance the Royal Institute of Oil Painters and the Royal Society of Portrait Painters. By the end of the first decade of the 1900s the Australian artists in London had ‘colonised’ Chelsea and many or most were members of the Chelsea Arts Club which they treated as their ‘headquarters’. The AIF artists’ involvement in the war art scheme must be traced to their enlistment in the AIF in Australia where each was working as a professional artist, save for Benson who was a designer, and their subsequent war service. They also were academic painters and of them Longstaff, Scott and MacDonald had trained and worked in Europe.
Anzac, mostly specified by Bean, together with portraits of its principal actors, to go to the national war museum. These pictures, Bean variously claimed, would ‘make the tradition of our nation’, ‘embody the Australian tradition in the war’ and ‘cover the history and tradition of the A.I.F.’.\(^{24}\)

This history argues that from the inception of the war art scheme Bean assumed control of it, and as a critical element of the project of Anzac’s official representation he exercised control over it for four inextricably connected purposes: first, to create an image of Anzac that reflected his conception of the idea and ideals it represented; secondly, to ensure that the historical pictures illustrated the story of Anzac as he wished it told for handing down to posterity; thirdly, to promote the idea that Anzac was a military tradition which could stand alongside the great traditions of other nations; and finally, to promote the idea that Australia’s future nationality should be defined by that tradition.

The concept of ‘official’ is critical in this history. The ordinary meaning of ‘official’ when used adjectivally is authorised or issued authoritatively. One of the questions raised in this history is whether Bean held any relevant *official* standing first to propose and then direct the carrying out of a project the object of which was Anzac’s official representation; the answer is that he did not, but that he assumed de facto *official* standing and the Commonwealth acquiesced in this. More importantly, however, in the context of Anzac’s official representation, is that the concept connoted and still connotes authoritativeness in a double sense: authorised and approved by the Commonwealth. The concept attracts and encourages acceptance and resists scrutiny and disbelief. In the arena in which the war art scheme operated – pictorial representation – invoking it had important consequences. It transformed a mere picture into one which enjoyed an altogether different and enhanced status. Its effect when applied to pictures purporting to depict incidents in the Anzac story can be readily appreciated. An *official* picture was not only authorised and approved by the Commonwealth, it insinuated that as a representation of the incident it was historically accurate. But the

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\(^{24}\) Typescript, ‘Further memoir, together with appendices, by C.E.W. Bean, official historian, Australian Imperial Force, concerning the official records and history of the Australian Imperial Force; and the establishment of a memorial: In continuation of the memoir forwarded to the Minister for Defence by C.E.W. Bean in March 1918, giving the suggested scheme for the collection and organisation of the Australian War Records, Pictures, Photographs and Trophies into the Memorial which will embody for all time for our children the great national tradition of the Australian Imperial Force (to which scheme general approval was afterwards notified by the Government)’, 16 April 1919, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/360, pp 2, 3, Appendix L. For reasons of economy this document will be referred to as Bean’s second memoir.
concept applied to all pictures which purported to represent some aspect of the Anzac story, whether incidents, locations or conditions. This history argues that a picture’s official status did not depend on the circumstances of its production, or on the status of its creator; any picture acquired by the Commonwealth for the national war museum by the mere fact of its acquisition attained such a status.

Bean’s control of so vast a project as Anzac’s official representation was a powerful tool with which to communicate his conception of it. But while in the literature his involvement in the creation of the Anzac legend is universally acknowledged, his role in creating the official version of it, at least in terms of a project he conceived of for its official representation, has not been recognised. Moreover, its pictorial representation as a factor in the legend’s creation and transmission has been overlooked. But the visual was the most potent means of representing Anzac, with its immediate impact, general appeal and accessibility. Any visitor to the memorial who walks into the Gallipoli court (or any other court) will be struck by the vast array of visual material on display which tells the story of the campaign: the Lone Pine diorama, pictures, photographs, plan models, sculptures, trophies and relics. Although some text is provided on wall plaques, in display cabinets and for the diorama, the experience is essentially and intensely a visual one. This reflects the decision made by Bean early on to tell the Anzac story in the setting of the national war museum primarily by visual means.

This history argues that Bean decided that the manner of Anzac’s representation should replicate how Britain’s military and naval traditions were conventionally represented during the nineteenth century and in his lifetime. Brought up in an imperial household which revered Britain’s martial traditions and on a substantial diet of British military and naval history, and imbued with a military spirit, Bean decided he could pay no greater compliment to Australia’s armed forces, the AIF in particular, than to ensure that they were represented in substantially identical terms, and in so doing claim a place for Australia among the nations with great martial traditions: France, Germany, Russia and, pre-eminently, Britain. To a significant degree their traditions were represented in military museums by the display of matériel, regalia, maps, models, pictorial records, trophies and relics. And notwithstanding the advent of photography in the mid-nineteenth century, the essential work of representing

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25 For instance, when Beaumont addressed the issue of transmission of the Anzac legend she referred merely to the part played by the official history in transmitting it. Surprisingly, nor did she refer to the part played by the memorial in transmitting it. See ‘The Anzac legend’, pp 165-8.
such a tradition pictorially continued to be performed by pictures of land and sea battles and other military scenes and portraits. It was during visits as a boy and young adult to military museums and to the battlefield of Waterloo, which he combed for evidence of the battle, that Bean’s commemorative spirit was born, and it was this spirit that animated his plans to commemorate the AIF. As the war continued he predicted that ‘some great Australian city’ would one day have a war museum which contained a ‘magnificent collection’ rivalling ‘the great London collections, with their relics of Nelson and Wellington, the Crimea, the Mutiny, and the Soudan’. Having made the assumption that the most important result for Australia from the war was its great unifying military tradition as the basis for future nationality, Bean ensured it got its national war museum and the pictures and other objects to display in it which represented Anzac. Whether or not he successfully launched Anzac as the basis for a future nationality, there is no doubt that his conception of it became the official version.

No substantial literature devoted to the study of the war art scheme exists, and scholarship on the subject is negligible. Moreover, that scholarship neither compares in purpose nor in scope with this work, for no scholarly history of the scheme has hitherto been written. Although the published literature contains some longer but mostly shorter accounts of the scheme, first, they are unscholarly or contain minimal references, and then mostly to secondary sources, and next, they do not advance any particular claims about the scheme. This literature is characterised by an absence of critical evaluation of the scheme and consists largely of surveys of artists, or particular artists, and their pictures. The work of Ian Burn stands a


27 This contention is substantially shared by Melrose who while approaching the matter and expressing himself differently claims in his study that the fundamental object of the memorial was to represent Australia’s military success as the basis for a future nationality. See “‘A praise that never ages’”, chapter 3, ‘CEW Bean and the Plan for a Memorial’, esp pp 130, 149-56, 160. However, important differences exist between this work and his study: he does not consider the war art scheme as an element of Bean’s plan to establish the memorial, nor mentions its existence; instead, his focus is on showing Bean’s attachment to martial nationalism and to trophy-display in the memorial as a means of martial nationalist education of Australians. As the next chapter sets out to do, Melrose examined Bean’s beliefs and experiences relevant to his plan for the memorial. Relying substantially on published and unpublished accounts of Bean’s life, and a slight consideration of some of his pre-war writings, he claims that Bean’s plan was a product of his worldview and was ‘informed deeply [by] his passionate martial nationalism and Public School ethos of chivalrous conduct in achieving military victory through strength of limb, purity of heart, and boldness of spirit’, and that he was a martial nationalist, but not a bellicose militarist. See ibid., pp 130-141, 167-8. These claims are not inconsistent with those advanced in the next chapter.

28 Contrastingly, Melrose dubs the particular vision of Australia’s part in the war represented by the memorial the “national” interpretation. See ibid., p 130.

29 The first extended discussion of the art associated with Australia’s part in the war appeared in William Moore’s seminal work The Story of Australian Art (Angus & Robertson, 1934, vol II, chapter XI, ‘War’). While
little apart from this trend. In his survey of Australia’s art of the war Burn briefly describes the scheme more or less accurately, but ignores its examination. Instead, he presents an argument that some of the art that was produced – its landscapes – contributed to the construction of larger myths about the war by quoting and referring to the imagery of the Heidelberg school, thus connecting the earlier moment of artistic struggle for a sense of national individuality with the attainment of nationhood on the battlefields; and after the war contributed to redefining the landscape as a ‘pure’ landscape icon devoid of figurative and narrative elements which, as a metaphor, could embody the grief and national emotion associated with the war, but at the same time remain immune to any disillusionment of the postwar era. Importantly, Burn’s interesting argument does not depend on any evidentiary foundation, save for the pictures themselves, and ignores the processes by which the representation of Anzac was given official pictorial form. Thus, while his work presents a sophisticated argument as to the significance of the landscapes produced under the scheme within a tradition of Australian landscape painting, it probably does not qualify as scholarship on the scheme proper.

In the scholarship there exist two studies of the scheme, minor in length and scope, which appeared almost forty years apart, the first by Jennifer Turnbull and the second by Margaret Hutchison. Turnbull’s draws on some primary sources, but not extensively, and she presents an outline rather than an account of the scheme; instead, she devotes considerable attention to a discussion of the work of two official artists, Dyson and Lambert. And while she correctly identifies Bean as the motivating force behind and controlling influence over the scheme, she

adverting to the scheme Moore paid no attention to it, merely identifying the artists who participated in it and mentioning a few of their principal pictures. His discussion amounted to no more than a survey of all artists, official or otherwise, who made some contribution to Australia’s art of the war. (Also see Moore’s earlier three-page article, ‘The Australian official war artists’, Art in Australia, series 1, no 6, 1919, no page number.) After Moore, the chief contributor has been Anne Gray who described the scheme in her subject entry ‘War Art’ in Peter Dennis, Jeffrey Grey, Ewan Morris and Robin Prior with Jean Bou (eds), The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2nd edition, 2008, pp 566-73, and discussed it in A Henry Fullwood, War Paintings, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1983; Masterpieces of the Australian War Memorial with Gavin Fry, Rigby, Adelaide, 1982; ‘Australian artists of World War 1’, Quadrant, no 185-6, vol 27, January/February 1983, pp 19-23. A useful discussion of Australia’s art of the war, which includes brief mention of the scheme, can be found in Betty Churcher’s The Art of War, The Miegunyah Press, Melbourne, 2004, chapter 1, ‘The Birth of a Legend’.


neither examines the scheme nor advances any particular claims as to its objects and effects, save for offering that Bean wanted ‘the art’ produced under it and destined for the memorial to present ‘the bare facts, and nothing more’. These omissions and her slight offering diminish the contribution her study makes to scholarship.

To the extent that Hutchison presents a substantial argument as to the scheme’s object, her study is more significant in the contribution it makes to scholarship. It contains a general account of the scheme substantially drawn from secondary sources, though in seeking to establish her thesis she relies on some primary sources. This is that the sole object of the scheme as it operated both during and after the war was to create a precise and truthful visual record of the AIF’s part in the conflict for posterity, and that the commitment of the scheme’s ‘administrators’ – an odd term, its use obscures the extent of Bean’s involvement in and control over the scheme – to ‘documentary truth’ and ‘accuracy’ in creating such a record ‘demonstrates’ that the scheme’s object was not the ‘premeditated construction of a national myth’ (Anzac). This history disputes Hutchison’s contention that the scheme had a sole object. And while it can be accepted that the scheme’s object was not the ‘premeditated construction of a national myth’, its part in Bean’s project of the official representation of Anzac, the considerable evidence of the conception and carrying out of which Hutchison ignores, suggests that its objects were considerably wider than the creation of a precise and truthful visual record of the AIF’s part in the war. Ultimately, her study suffers from narrowness due to her failure to examine the scheme and to acknowledge its part in Bean’s project.

Earlier in this introduction it was explained that this history is not about the Anzac tradition or legend as such, but that it examines the processes by which Anzac was given official pictorial form under the Commonwealth’s war art scheme. The contribution it seeks to make to scholarship is the establishment through a rigorous attention to and close analysis of primary sources of a detailed and full account of the scheme which will lay the foundation for further work to be done in the area. Efforts to locate the scheme’s place in and connection to debates about Anzac, its nature, representation and significance, and to issues such as the commemoration of the war in Australia, the place of the war in the nation’s ‘memory’, and

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33 ‘Painting the war’, esp pp 6, 11, 18, 20, 36, 40, 42, 50-1.
the nature of Australian identity, have been intentionally ignored. These, of course, are all worthwhile projects for which this history can act as a springboard.
1 Beginnings: Bean, an official war correspondent and *The Anzac Book*

A military spirit

When this history commences in mid-November 1915 Bean will be found on Gallipoli as Australia’s official war correspondent with the AIF. He was there because he won the position in a ballot of members of the Australian Journalists’ Association which was asked by the government to nominate a man for the job. But this bare fact does not explain why he conceived of the project of Anzac’s official representation and the form it should take. The explanation lies in discovering his motives, and this necessarily involves examining his background and tracing the steps that led him to Gallipoli. When Bean splashed ashore at Anzac Cove on 25 April 1915 he was by virtue of background, education, interest and disposition imbued with a military spirit. Far from being a mere enthusiast of the military and the navy, his thinking was dominated by the celebration of their ideals. From early boyhood he was inculcated in Britain’s military and naval traditions and in the written and visual forms in which they were conventionally represented. As he entered adulthood and began writing, much of it was on military and naval themes. Significantly, some of his pre-war articles reveal him speculating about the nature of Australians’ response to a call to arms and the possible emergence of a national military tradition.

Bean was born in Bathurst on 18 November 1879, the first of three sons of Edwin and Lucy. The Beans were an ‘imperial family’. Edwin was born in Bombay, the son of a surgeon-major in the army of the East India Company, and in accordance with Anglo-Indian custom was educated in England, first at Clifton College near Bristol, and then at Oxford. From the start Edwin had wanted to enter the Indian Civil Service, but when he failed to gain entry to it

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1 As Bean recognised: ‘The historian has actual men and women, real characters, crowds, and choruses as the subject of his work; and it seems to me that if he cannot see that their qualities, motives and ideas in interplay combine to produce vast actual dramas ... then he is inadequate for his real task.’ See ‘The Writing of the Australian Official History of the Great War – Sources, Methods and Some Conclusions’, *Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society*, vol 24, pt 2, 1938, pp 85-112 at p 111.

2 This and Bean’s further biographical details given in the text were drawn from Dudley McCarthy, *Gallipoli to the Somme: the story of CEW Bean*, John Ferguson, Sydney, 1983, esp Chapters 1-5; KS Inglis, *CEW Bean, Australian Historian*, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, Queensland, 1970, esp pp 3-18; Kevin Fewster, *Bean’s Gallipoli: the diaries of Australia’s official war correspondent*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, third edition, 2007, pp 1-21; and Denis Winter, *Making the Legend: The War Writings of CEW Bean*, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, Queensland, 1992, pp 1-18. To minimise disruptions, and as the basic facts of Bean’s life until his arrival on Gallipoli are uncontroversial, references to pages in these works will be given only for claims the authors make about him which are important for this history and for material they quote.

3 Inglis, *CEW Bean, Australian Historian*, p 3.
he went to Australia instead. In 1877 he took up the position of headmaster of All Saints’ College at Bathurst. The family prospered, but in 1888 Edwin was forced by ill health to retire from his position; the next year he took his family to England. For the first two years the family spent its summers in Oxford and winters in Brussels, with Edwin taking charge of his sons’ education. Charles initially attended Brentwood School at Essex, of which Edwin had become headmaster in 1891, before entering Clifton as a boarder in 1894. From there he went on to Oxford where in 1902 he gained a second in classics. Like his father before him he tried unsuccessfully to enter the Indian Civil Service, and when disappointed worked instead for a degree in law which he gained in 1903. He taught briefly at Brentwood, travelled to the Canary Islands as tutor to a Scottish boy, and in late 1904 sailed for Australia. He was twenty-five and had been away for fifteen years.

What Bean had become was due largely to his father’s influence: ‘[A] great part of all that Jock, Monty [his brothers] and I ever knew or still know, we picked up from conversations with our father who ... constantly talked to us of what he had read’. 4 He and his brothers grew up in a ‘strongly imperial’ environment, 5 and while it is beyond the scope of this study to examine the question of what it meant to be ‘imperialistic’ in Britain in the late Victorian era, and to have been raised in an ‘imperial’ household, fundamentally in such a household, of which the Beans’ is likely to have been typical, Britain’s military and naval traditions were revered. If as some have suggested British society was essentially anti-militarist, 6 the Bean household was not: Edwin served in the volunteer force for most of Charles’s youth; 7 from 1892 he held a commission with the rank of second lieutenant; 8 he held a thorough knowledge of British military battles 9 and a fascination for the Waterloo battlefield which he imparted to Charles. 10 It was from Edwin that Charles acquired ‘a deep and longstanding interest in military matters’. 11

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4 Quoted in Winter, Making the Legend, p 5, from an account by Bean of his early life.
5 Fewster, Bean’s Gallipoli, p 2.
7 Winter, Making the Legend, p 3.
8 Document of appointment, 25 June 1892, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/837.
9 Winter, Making the Legend, p 3.
10 Letter, Bean to Tasker (a journalist), 18 October 1930, AWM 38, 3 DRL 6673/573, p 3.
11 Winter, Making the Legend, p 3.
Bean’s military education had begun in Bathurst. There he began to learn ‘the legends of the empire’, doubtless from his father. These were accounts of campaigns and battles drawn from Britain’s military history: Crécy, Agincourt, Trafalgar, Waterloo and Crimea, to name a few. It seems inescapable that such tales would excite the imagination of a young boy, and Bean was no exception. What he heard, saw and read stimulated a desire to express himself, and before he attained any real competency in writing he began to draw, mostly military and naval subjects. His brother Jock recalled that the urge to illustrate was very strong in Charles from early boyhood, and illustrating continued to be an important mode of self-expression for him. In Brussels, during the two years the family divided its time between the Continent and England, he received instruction from a drawing master, the extent of his formal art training. Evidence of his incipient fascination for all things military is a picture he made in January 1886 of four mounted cavalry resplendent in full uniform – blue tunics with gold trim, scarlet pants, boots, and black shakos with red trim – executed in colour pencils on paper board. Such was his proficiency in drawing, and in the recollection of detail, that Jock recalled him drawing battle scenes ‘out of his head’. But it was not solely through illustrating that he expressed his interest in the military and the navy; his education in England, and his many visits to the Continent, brought forth a regular correspondence home, and in his frequently illustrated letters he would describe his drilling in school regiments and visits to military and naval establishments.

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14 A number of sketchbooks and loose sketches from Bean’s time in England have survived. While diverse in subject matter, military and naval subjects predominate. The sketchbooks are in AWM, PR00283, 4/1; the loose sketches in PR00283, 4/3, 4/4.
15 McCarthy, *Gallipoli to the Somme*, p 31; Inglis, *CEW Bean, Australian Historian*, p 5. Judging by his published illustrations, his artistic abilities were modest and lay principally in the area of black-and-white illustration. Those appearing in one of his ‘navy’ books, *With the Flagship of the South* (1909), show the limited range in which he worked and also his fascination for warships.
16 It was sent to his grandfather Butler in Hobart, his mother’s father. The picture, in an envelope addressed to Butler and postmarked January 1886, is in AWM 38, 3DRL 7447/9.
18 For instance, in April 1893 Bean wrote excitedly to his mother from Southampton of a visit with his father to Portsmouth to inspect the navy’s fleet, past and present. They looked over Nelson’s Victory; they went all over the Hero, a 3rd class turret ship; they saw the Nelson practising her guns; and fifty men-of-war. He described all of this with accompanying illustrations, small black-and-white drawings of the ships in silhouette similar to those he later drew for his ‘navy’ books and *The Anzac Book*. Then, visiting Germany in August 1895, he wrote home describing the celebrations marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of the battle of Gravelotte and incorporated in his letter a watercolour painting of a march past. And in a letter written to his father from Clifton College in about 1896 he described the ‘motions’ in which his Rifle Corps regiment had been instructed
Bean entered Clifton College in 1894. He later explained that his time there altered his whole outlook on life: he learnt ‘to regard as one’s first interest the interest of the house and the school.’ It was at Clifton that his military education proper commenced, for the school was rich in military tradition. Bean undertook military training in the School Engineer Corps, and in the Rifle Corps. On entering Oxford in 1898 he served in the Oxford University Battalion of the Oxfordshire Light Infantry. His military education, however, was not confined to drilling. Winter claims that at Clifton and Oxford Bean read widely in military literature, including ‘the military classics of the nineteenth century’, and that it was from this he acquired his ‘wide-ranging military knowledge’. In a letter written to his father from Clifton in about 1896, he said he had begun the second of Alexander Kinglake’s eight-volume history of the Crimean War (1863-68) and was also reading William Le Queux’s The Great War in England in 1897 (1894), a fictional story of the invasion of England by coalition forces led by France and Russia. The latter, he claimed, contained ‘one or two small mistakes, such as imagining that ships can destroy land defences with ease’. Winter also claims that Bean read William Napier’s multi-volume history of Wellington’s peninsula campaigns and ‘carefully studied’ HT Siborne’s study of Waterloo. Bean did not leave the navy out of his budget of extra-curricular reading. Since visiting Portsmouth in 1893 he had read, he claimed, pretty well every book he could get hold of about the navy. At Clifton he

including ‘volley firing’. See letters, Bean to Lucy Bean, 14 April 1893, AWM 38, 3DRL 7447/21; Bean to Edwin and Lucy Bean, c 18 August 1895; Bean to Edwin Bean, c 1896; both in AWM 38, 3DRL 7447/5.

Letter, Bean to Tasker, 18 October 1930, AWM 38, 3 DRL 6673/573, p 6.

Inglis, CEW Bean, Australian Historian, p 6. Douglas Haig, who commanded the British Expeditionary Force in France, and William Birdwood, who commanded the AIF at Gallipoli and in France, were old boys.

McCarthy, Gallipoli to the Somme, p 38.

Ibid., p 41. When in 1902 Bean put his name forward for a position with the Civil Service of the Transvaal or Orange River Colonies, he claimed he could ‘ride and shoot’, had done some military engineering at Clifton, some military signalling at Oxford, and had served in the volunteer force for five years. See letter, Bean to Edwin Bean, c May 1902, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/897. This contains the draft of a letter he later sent to the Colonial Secretary.

Making the Legend, pp 3, 4.

Letter, Bean to Edwin Bean, c 1896, AWM 38, 3DRL 7447/5.

Making the Legend, p 4. Napier’s History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814 was published progressively in six volumes between 1828 and 1840; Siborne’s work, Waterloo letters, was published in 1891. Winter claims the concept of a multi-volume history focusing on battle, presumably a reference to Bean’s official history, came to him from Napier. Why he singled out Napier’s work is puzzling. The concept of a multi-volume history was commonplace and had been frequently utilised by the time Bean came to write his official history. Several such histories of the Boer War were published in London between 1900 and 1910, for example Louis Creswicke’s South Africa and the Transvaal War, in seven volumes, 1900-1902. It seems unlikely that Creswicke’s history, which was extensively illustrated, escaped Bean’s attention.

Quoted in McCarthy, Gallipoli to the Somme, p 35.
received the ‘Navy and Army’ magazine, his ‘chief interest in the week’, and the navy estimates constituted his chief interest in the year.\textsuperscript{27}

That during his formative years Bean had acquired a military spirit can be gathered from two letters written by his father to him at Oxford. In the first, dated 11 February 1900, Edwin discussed the war in South Africa.\textsuperscript{28} He introduced the subject with a seemingly innocuous remark, ‘Of course you are full of the war’. This acknowledged both the enormous coverage of the war in the press and his son’s vital interest in its progress. Edwin briefly entertained several speculations as to the immediate course of the war. These are evidence of a dialogue being carried on in specifics and involving a consideration, however slight, of military tactics. Edwin’s second letter, written a few days later, was prompted by one from Charles.\textsuperscript{29} In it he had told his father he was interested in applying for a commission in the Engineers Corps. Edwin told him, ‘If commissions in the Engineers are offered, and if you still feel enthusiastic on the subject, I have no objection to your sending in your name’, but cautioned, ‘I think one ought to feel a distinct “call” to that profession, as the soldier’s is a hard life and there is much self-sacrifice in it, and of course much risk.’ In a postscript he reminded Charles that at Clifton he had lived in ‘an army atmosphere’ and suggested, as if accounting for the spell under which his son had fallen while there, that he ‘might have been very sensitive to the tone of the place.’ In the event Bean did not apply for a commission, but whether it was his father’s advice that swayed him or some other factor is unclear.

Growing up in Britain during the late Victorian years encouraged Bean’s predisposition towards all things military. Of particular relevance is British society’s interest in the activities of the army and the concomitant existence of a vast and varied literature catering to that interest. For although its society may have been essentially anti-militaristic, exciting tales of the army’s activities in far-flung parts of the Empire offered vicarious enjoyment to British readers safe in their homes. In his study of the British army and society during the century following the battle of Waterloo, Edward Spiers explained:

\begin{quote}
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the role of the army in preserving and expanding the Empire attracted unprecedented interest. War, though still ‘a noise far away’,
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{28} Letter, Edwin Bean to Bean, 11 February 1900, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/897.
\textsuperscript{29} Letter, Edwin Bean to Bean, 14 February 1900, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/897.
\end{footnotes}
was a noise which aroused a more intense and popular appeal than ever before over a comparable period of time. War correspondents followed the army around the globe. Vivid and lyrical dispatches were telegraphed home. Minor reverses were described in apocalyptic terms; minor victories were hailed with paens of praise. Campaign histories and military biographies appeared in vast numbers, while writers of military fiction found an apparently insatiable market for romantic and idealistic accounts of martial adventure in distant parts of the Empire.30

This literature was complemented by a cornucopia of pictures depicting military subjects produced at the academic and popular levels. In Joan Hichberger’s study of the military’s representation in British art during the identical period studied by Spiers, she concentrated on the academic through an examination of the pictures exhibited by the Royal Academy during its annual exhibitions and found that (1) the period from 1874 until 1914 saw a dramatic increase in the number of battle pictures exhibited; (2) the period 1885-1914 was the most prolific time for the production of battle pictures; (3) during the Boer War there was an upsurge in the number of battle pictures and an even larger upswing in the number of genre depictions of the military; (4) in the period 1901-14 the proportion of battle pictures was higher than it had been at any time in the nineteenth century; and (5) during the entire period military genre paintings outnumbered battle pictures by more than two to one.31 Given Bean’s upbringing and interests it seems probable that during his youth and adulthood he attended the Academy’s exhibitions.32

Prominent in the literature referred to by Spiers was the illustrated popular press. Illustrated weekly newspapers made their appearance in 1842 with the publication of the Illustrated London News and in 1869 The Graphic, its most serious competitor.33 According to Hichberger, the most important single subject in either paper was colonial warfare, and she claims military scenes constituted nearly forty per cent of all their illustrations in an average year from 1875.34 Bean later advanced the influence of the illustrated press in Australia to

30 The Army and Society, p 206.
32 It is noteworthy that when Bean returned to England as the Sydney Morning Herald’s special correspondent he reviewed its exhibitions. See ‘The Royal Academy. One hundred and forty-second exhibition’, Sydney Morning Herald, 11 June 1910, p 5; ‘The Royal Academy. This year’s exhibition. The Australian artists’, Sydney Morning Herald, 6 June 1911, p 7.
33 Johnson, Front Line Artists, pp 9-10.
34 Images of the army, p 92.
explain why Australian soldiers proudly cited ‘the old British military tradition’. ‘Australians,’ he claimed, ‘almost as much as the English had been brought up on tales of Crécy and Agincourt, Trafalgar, Waterloo, the Indian Mutiny and the Crimean, Afghan, Zulu and other British wars; and bound volumes of the English illustrated papers, and pictures of some of these campaigns, were in constant use in many homes’. But it was exposure to military museums that made the profoundest impact on Bean. In a memoir he prepared late in his life relating the beginnings of the memorial, Bean traced his fascination with them to his many boyhood visits to the Waterloo battlefield with his father and Jock, which included a visit to the Hôtel du Musée where he and Jock would ‘steep’ themselves in the contents of the glass cases containing relics of the battle, and to his later visits to the museum of the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI) in London where he said he was ‘deeply impressed’ with the Nelson relics and the plan-model of Waterloo. Given Edwin’s abiding interest in the military, during the family’s trips to the Continent visits to military museums were likely compulsory, and there were several important institutions which could be visited. Wherever Bean visited he was exposed to the gamut of objects

35 Anzac to Amiens, p 9.
36 Another class of literature – children’s literature – is also likely to have left its mark on Bean. There seems little doubt that as a boy, and as an adolescent, he feasted on the imperial adventure stories which appeared in publications such as The Boy’s Own Paper (BOP), a British weekly magazine published for juvenile boys from 1879 which promoted imperial sentiment. See Patrick A Dunae, ‘Boys’ Literature and the Idea of Empire, 1870-1914’, Victorian Studies, vol 24, no 1, autumn 1980, pp 105-21, esp pp 106-11. According to Dunae, during the period coinciding with Bean’s adolescence the military aspect of empire dominated its imperial adventure tales, exemplified in the stories of a former war correspondent, George Henty. This tendency was also evident in juvenile novels, such as those of Gordon Stables, a retired Royal Navy surgeon, who specialised in nautical adventure tales.
37 Given Bean’s role in establishing the memorial it is puzzling why neither McCarthy nor Michael McKernan, who wrote an official history of the memorial, investigated this matter. McKernan’s history is Here is their spirit: a history of the Australian War Memorial 1917-1990, University of Queensland Press in association with the Australian War Memorial, St Lucia, Queensland, 1991.
38 Typescript, ‘The Beginnings of the Australian War Memorial’, c 1959, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/619, p 1. So great was Bean’s affection for his boyhood visits that in 1907 he formed around his recollections a short story, ‘Ninety Two Years Ago’. It is a fictionalised account of the battle seen through the eyes of a young infantryman, Jim Hodge. At one level the story is merely Bean’s reinvention of his boyhood visits: the narrator laments the disappearance of all evidence of the ‘great battle’ except for the few relics preserved in ‘a little hotel on the field’ (Hôtel du Musée). At another it allowed him to indulge his fascination for battles and to give rein to his descriptive powers. His battle is a colourful affair: there are charging cavalries ‘in beautiful green and blue uniforms, with whole yards of gold, and fur capes and monstrous hats’; black cannon balls, like ‘Dutch cheese’, hopping along the road knocking men over; one side of a German regiment is ‘blown down at one discharge’ from a French gun; squares of German infantry begin to slip as the ‘fire grew hotter’; and the British officers ‘simply gave death not a thought’ heading every charge. See manuscript in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/871.
39 For instance, the Musée de la Marine du Louvre; the National Museum of Artillery and the Historic Museum whose collections were displayed in separate wings of the Hôtel des Invalides until 1905; the Austrian Army
commonly exhibited and he could not have failed to notice that the museums were fashioned within the traditions they represented and generally organised in such a way as to tell a story.\textsuperscript{40} However, the only military museum Bean is known definitely to have visited is the RSUI’s.\textsuperscript{41} According to the official catalogue, its collection comprised 5,373 items.\textsuperscript{42} But in his memoir Bean mentioned only two, the Nelson relics and the plan-model of Waterloo. The catalogue lists several items associated with Nelson, from the bizarre – some of the spirit in which his body was preserved on board \textit{Victory} – to the prosaic – a paper knife made from the wood of the \textit{Victory}. Why these impressed him is elusive, but what most impressed him was the Waterloo model and the ideas about fidelity it contained. It was an enormous exhibit affording a complete representation of the ground on which the battle was fought, and as nearly as possible the disposition of the hostile armies at 7.45 pm on 18 June 1815, the turning point of the battle.\textsuperscript{43} It can be assumed it sparked discussions between Bean and his father. The model’s construction by a former British army officer, William Siborne, was the outcome of an ambitious project to depict the battle in three-dimensional form and with complete accuracy.\textsuperscript{44} It is certain Siborne’s efforts to achieve complete accuracy, emphasised in the museum’s catalogue, made a lasting impression on Bean:

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For a considerable time Captain Siborne was employed upon the field, in taking an accurate survey of the ground, and in ascertaining, with the greatest mathematical precision, the position and extent of every object and enclosure, and the level of the surface and its undulations. Every village, every house and farm-yard, every knot of trees, every field is given with the closest accuracy, from a six months’ personal observation, aided by the most authentic information ... Captain Siborne spared no exertion in endeavouring to procure accurate information as to the position of the divisions of both armies at [the] crisis of the battle. With the permission of the Commander-in-Chief he addressed every officer in the Service, who, from the command which he then held, or from some circumstance in which he was placed on that occasion, was likely to be able to afford assistance.

In late 1904, when Bean sailed for Australia, it must have seemed to him that the country to which he was headed would offer him no scope to express himself militarily: it had no army or navy to speak of, and no military tradition. He could have sought a place in Australia’s negligible permanent forces, or in its fledgling Defence Department, but there is no evidence he contemplated this. Probably he intended pursuing a legal career as before leaving England he was admitted to the New South Wales Bar. But on arriving he remained undecided as to what to do. His heart was ‘quite set on writing’, but as this offered no prospect of an immediate income he taught briefly at Sydney Grammar School before being employed as the associate to a Supreme Court judge. Still, he wished one day to make a living from writing and began submitting articles to Sydney newspapers in the hope of getting published. By a stroke of good fortune the war between Japan and Russia, and an imminent naval battle between the belligerents, provided him with the opportunity of demonstrating his writing ability and his knowledge of naval history.

On 13 April 1905 the Daily Telegraph published an article by Bean in which he discussed the looming battle between the Russian and Japanese fleets and the significance of the modern armoured battleship in naval defence. It is the precursor of his wartime dispatches and

46 He was admitted on 15 June 1904. See New South Wales Law Almanac 1908, p 48.
47 Gallipoli to the Somme, p 50. In the New South Wales Law Almanacs for 1906 and 1907, Bean is recorded as the associate to Justice William Owen.
48 ‘C.E.W.B.’, ‘The approaching sea fight in the Far East. Its place in naval history. Why it will be worth watching’, Daily Telegraph, 13 April 1905, p 5. This important article has never been discussed. It and numerous other articles by Bean published in newspapers between 1905 and 1914 on military and naval matters represent a significant body of work and important background to his appointment as Australia’s official war correspondent and his later conceptualisation of the project of Anzac’s official representation. But this aspect of
reveals much about his attitude towards war and his approach to representing it. It also shows he was not writing as a mere ‘student of naval history and naval strategy’, as he put it, but as someone claiming to possess considerable knowledge of such matters and the expertise to discuss contemporary defence issues. For him, the critical question was whether Britain’s decision to ‘[stake] its safety upon the building of armoured ships’ was vindicated. And this, he ventured, would be answered by the imminent naval battle, ‘in all probability ... the most important sea-fight since the days of Nelson.’ To impress upon the reader the significance of the ‘coming fight’ he gave a brief history of the modern warship employing the language in which the legends of the empire were conventionally told. Thus, men showed ‘unexampled courage’, ‘pluck’, and a ‘spirit ... of the sort that takes no denial’; fights were ‘most gallant’; and ships were ‘most gallantly handled and fought’. To write this way was unexceptional: it was the language of the popular press, BOP, and children’s and popular literature. It represented a cherished rhetoric which carried with it the militaristic ideas of the Edwardian world. But although Bean was a product of his time, as an all-embracing explanation for his writing and attitudes it denies the operation of free choice and the existence of heterogeneity in the societies in which he lived. Nevertheless, it can be accepted that his background and military outlook militated against departing from conventional forms of expression. Towards the end of his article he explained there would be a fight ‘to the bitter end’ and that it would be ‘worth watching.’ A moment’s reflection on the likely human toll should have told him that this was an injudicious remark. The ‘anxiously awaited’ battle took place in the Straits of Tsushima on 27-28 May 1905; the Japanese annihilated the Russian fleet. The casualties on the Russian side were catastrophic with 4,830 sailors killed.

Bean remained with the judge for about two years before deciding to practise as a barrister. His brief legal career was undistinguished. Fortunately, in June-July 1907 the Sydney Morning Herald published eight of his articles in a series entitled ‘Australia’ under the by-line ‘C.W.’ In one of these long and mostly speculative articles, he claimed that the ‘country-

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49 Reynolds, ‘Are nations really made in war?’, in Marilyn Lake et al, What’s Wrong with Anzac?, p 30.
50 Ian Gow, ‘The Battle of Tsushima’, in Revel Guest and Andrew St George (eds), History’s Turning Points, Boxtree, London, 1995, pp 169-83 at p 182. No details are available for the number of Russian wounded, nor of the fate of the 5,917 Russians taken prisoner 1,862 of whom were interned.
51 He took a room in Phillip Street, did some ‘devilling’, and waited for the briefs that never arrived. See McCarthy, Gallipoli to the Somme, p 52. The New South Wales Law Almanacs for 1908 and 1909 record him as a barrister in Wigram Chambers.
bred Australian’ was the ‘Australian par excellence’. A life lived in the bush, he asserted, was the life of an adventurer, ‘not so very different in a way from that of the sea-rovers of Queen Elizabeth’s time, who found the new world and worried the galleons from off all the oceans’. And he made of this man ‘the Briton re-born’, a kind of soldier-cum-adventurer connected through heritage and lineage to England’s military traditions. In paying tribute to him, Bean declared that ‘if only fifty thousand of him existed, it would be a contingent which neither his country nor the British Empire could afford to lose’, a remark doubly strange as made in peacetime and in a context which gave no hint as to why such a large number of men might be lost. But the implication was that they would be lost in a war.

In another article there was a good deal about fighting, killing and being killed. The Australian, Bean said, was always fighting with men (and nature). He suggested that fighting for oneself gave a man ‘pluck’, and that it was a ‘noble art’ in which ‘the men who fought in the Peninsula on Nelson’s ships were trained’. All this fighting had made of the Australian ‘as fine a fighting man as exists’ who would make the best soldier save for one defect, his hatred of authority. But this, he said, could be overcome: ‘If the right and reason of going to be killed is [made] clear to him, he will be killed cheerfully and with a very pretty courage, and will do a deal more damage than most before being killed’. In offering the dubious idea that a man might be killed ‘cheerfully’ or with ‘a very pretty courage’, Bean revealed a disinclination to think deeply about what he wrote. If he was expressing ideas then commonly held in Australian society – this should not be assumed – that would not seem to justify their promotion. Moreover, such an explanation ignores the circumstance that within Australian society at the time there were numerous individuals and groups who would have found the expression of such ideas repugnant and wrong; however, in discussions of Bean and his work the existence of contrary voices is never mentioned. His enthusiasm for the arrival of a military test and the forging of a military tradition, latent in this article, is unlikely to have been shared by even a fair cross-section of Australians.

54 As Reynolds points out, in the Western world in the years before 1914 many people devoted their energies to opposing militarism and supporting the international peace movement. See ‘Are nations really made in war?’ in Marilyn Lake et al, What’s Wrong with Anzac?, pp 36-41. For the situation in Australia prior to and during the war, see Malcolm Saunders and Ralph Summy, The Australian Peace Movement: A Short History, Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1986, pp 13-23.
In January 1908 Bean joined the *Sydney Morning Herald*. Initially assigned the law courts, police stations, public meetings, hospitals and fires, in July he travelled as his paper’s representative aboard *Powerful*, the flagship of the Royal Navy Squadron on the Australian station, on a voyage to rendezvous at Auckland with the American fleet. He later reassembled his reports, and supplementing them with black-and-white illustrations he made and photographs he took, published them as *With the Flagship of the South*.\(^{55}\) Inglis claims the book was Bean’s plea for an Australian navy.\(^{56}\) Perhaps it was, but more than this it was a celebration of the British Navy, warships and naval battle: ‘I want the reader to come with me a voyage on a British warship ... I want him to watch the firing of guns, fighting of battles, the manoeuvres and evolutions which ... give him a picture which he can get in no other way, a picture of the great fight which, Tsushima notwithstanding, has never yet been fought.’\(^{57}\) Ideas and language encountered in his ‘Tsushima’ and ‘Australia’ articles reappear: ‘the Empire must make ready to speak with anyone in the gates’; loyalty to King and country is a ‘power’ that would carry a man through things far worse than death – flame, thirst, starvation, torture, nerve-shattering times and awful, ghastly wounds – and make of him the most terrible enemy; *Powerful* had ‘the kind, sweet manners of a great gentleman’, but in battle transformed into a ‘great grey war-dog’ with ‘teeth bared and its lips curled back, and the dregs of the last explosion oozing from its reeking gun-muzzles’; an armour-piercing shell was a ‘wonderful machine’; guns could be ‘treacherous pets’; and training to be an officer in the British navy was to receive an education in ‘the finest school in the world’.\(^{58}\)

During 1910-12 Bean represented his paper in London and reported on the building of warships for the infant Australian navy. His book *Flagships Three* incorporated his reports and recounted ‘the coming of a first-born to the British Navy’, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN).\(^{59}\) He revisited the battle of Tsushima to tell the story of the destruction of the *Knyaz Suvoroff*, the Russian flagship, made possible by the publication of an eyewitness account.\(^{60}\) In typical style he related how having suffered direct hits it wandered in a half-circle, ‘a crippled mass, enveloped in smoke and flames’. This was the way a great modern flagship ‘came to her test’ and passed it with ‘everlasting honour’. The end was nigh: Japanese

\(^{55}\) T Werner Laurie, London, 1909.


\(^{57}\) *With the Flagship of the South*, p 1.

\(^{58}\) Ibid., pp 2, 37-8, 108, 4, 25, 107, 103, 123.

\(^{59}\) Alston Rivers, London, 1913, p x.

\(^{60}\) *Flagships Three*, pp 180-7. The eyewitness was a Russian officer, Captain Semenoff.
torpedo-boats attacked it as ‘hounds worry a dying stag.’ In ‘her dying moments’ Knyaz Suvoroff continued to fire though it had only one serviceable gun, ‘showing her determination to defend herself to the last moment of her existence’. After two attacks ‘she went to the bottom’ ending ‘a great story’ which, he asserted, ‘should go down to posterity as one of the most engrossing and moving stories of heroism upon the seas that has ever been written.’

He failed to mention the loss of the ship’s crew: in a complement of 948 only 20 officers survived.

Since his ‘Tsushima’ article almost ten years had passed, yet this article and his two navy books were harmonious both in terms of the ideas they contained and the language in which they were expressed. These reflected not only his military outlook but as well a mode of representing war which was rooted in a storytelling tradition and dependent on vivid description and the use of a stock of clichés and figures of speech. And this tradition had its counterpart in the visual arts with pictures of battles both on land and at sea, military and naval scenes, and portraits. Together they were the conventional forms in which Britain’s military and naval traditions were represented during the nineteenth century and in Bean’s lifetime. If anyone wished to promote the idea that a young nation had a military tradition, there would be no need to devise new forms for its representation.

**The official war correspondent**

Returning to Australia in 1913, from late June 1914 Bean contributed a daily commentary on the European crisis for his paper. When Great Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August, he wrote to Senator Millen, the Minister for Defence, requesting permission to accompany the military contingent Australia had offered to send to assist the ‘mother country’ as a newspaper ‘eyewitness’ reporter. He had coveted a ‘war correspondentship’ since at least April 1910, mentioning it to his parents.

On 13 August the British Army Council informed the government that it would permit each dominion to have one correspondent accompany its expeditionary force. After the government’s defeat at the general election, the incoming Minister for Defence, Senator

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61 Ibid., pp 183, 184, 185, 186, 187.
63 McCarthy, *Gallipoli to the Somme*, p 76.
64 Ibid., p 68.
George Pearce, asked the Australian Journalists’ Association to nominate a man to be attached as official correspondent to Australia’s forces. In a ballot of its members Bean won narrowly from Keith Murdoch of the Melbourne Herald, and on 26 September Pearce announced his appointment. At Pearce’s suggestion Bean went to Victoria Barracks in Melbourne to meet Major-General William Bridges, the commander of the AIF, and his chief of staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Brudenell White. They explained he would be graded as a captain ‘for the purposes of status’, but would not be given the actual rank. He told his mother he was not going in uniform, but was getting ‘a very close copy’ without buttons and badges made for himself in Melbourne. Although he went as a civilian a record of his ‘service’ in the AIF was maintained and he was addressed as ‘Captain Bean’ for the duration. His appointment included ‘the services of a batman’, and a junior clerk at the Argus, Arthur Bazley, filled that position.

On 21 October 1914 Bean walked up the gangplank of Orvieto berthed at Port Melbourne. Orvieto was the lead ship in a convoy of Australian and New Zealand transports which would carry these dominions’ first contingents of troops promised to Britain for its war against Germany. Bean was leaving with a further responsibility. During his visit to Victoria Barracks he was taken to Pearce who told him he hoped he would write the history of the Australian force after the war. Although he was not formally appointed official historian and engaged to write the history of Australia’s part in the war until July 1919, that he had been ‘engaged’ to write it was known before his departure. At a dinner given to him by Victorian journalists on 4 October, Pearce told the gathering that if Bean were permitted to go to the

67 McCarthy, Gallipoli to the Somme, pp 78-9.
68 Letter, Bean to Lucy Bean, 28 September 1914, AWM 38, 3DRL 7447/6.
69 Bean privately protested that he was addressed in person and in correspondence as ‘Captain Bean’. See Bean diary December 1915-January 1916, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/36/1, entry 31 January 1916, p 52. His service record discloses that he was appointed to the AIF on 28 September 1914 and graded as a captain. See Record of Officers’ Services, Charles Edwin Woodrow Bean service records, NAA. The official notification of his appointment stated that he was appointed official war correspondent with the AIF and graded as an officer (captain); his commission was terminated on 30 June 1919. See Commonwealth Gazette No 17/1916 (p 216); No 131/1919 (p 1797).
70 Letters, Defence Department to Bean, 28 September 1914, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/270; Bean to Edwin and Lucy Bean, 4 October 1914, AWM 38, 3DRL 7447/6.
71 McCarthy, Gallipoli to the Somme, p 381.
front – it was not certain he would receive permission – he would have something more to do than to report what he saw. Bean, he said, ‘would have to write the history of Australia’. 72

For Bean, leaving to go to war was the fulfilment of a dream. He had embarked on a great adventure, the greatest of his life. In his core he had not grown up: standing at the railing of Orvieto as it slid from its berth he remained a boy drawing battle scenes, or picking up imagined relics from a famous battlefield, his head full of England’s past military and naval glory. A week before he left he made a short speech at a farewell dinner given to him by the New South Wales Institute of Journalists. He told the ‘large gathering’ that he was not going without any knowledge: he knew the ‘field of Waterloo’, had lived as a youngster in France and Belgium, and knew the cathedrals of Bruges, Malines and Antwerp. 73 How Bean saw this knowledge as equipping him for the job of war correspondent is puzzling. Possibly he was not being serious, but he is not known to have been facetious. It seems he made these remarks seriously, honestly believing that such knowledge would assist him. That he made them reflects a fundamental naivety which he never lost, notwithstanding all that he saw and experienced of war. This manifested itself in a failure to see war otherwise than as a game, albeit a ‘beastly game’, to be played in gentlemanly fashion and in which a man ‘knows the way to die’. 74 And doubtless Bean carried in his head a poem by another Clifton old boy, Henry Newbolt, published in his last year at school, ‘Vitai Lampada’, in which the lesson learned on the school cricket field, and summed up in the poem’s refrain “Play up! Play up! And play the game!”’, is heard on the imperial battlefield and saves the day.

Embarking Orvieto, Bean described himself as a ‘well-meaning but most inadequate young pressman’ who

hardly knew the first thing about the history or practice of war. A schoolboy’s acquaintance with general history, an intense enjoyment of Tacitus’s account of the Roman campaigns in Germany of Caesar’s history of his civil war – but an enjoyment confined to the human interest of those narratives – a knowledge of the story and battlefield of Waterloo, both of which I had gone over again and again as a child with my father during a couple of winters spent in Belgium; and a few years of pleasant serving in school and university volunteers in

73 ‘War correspondent. Farewell to Mr Bean’, Sydney Morning Herald, 14 October 1914, p 12.
74 The quoted words are from Bean’s poem ‘Abdul’ which he contributed to The Anzac Book.
which I rose to the eminence of sergeant completed my military attainments. Like ninety nine of every hundred people in the British Empire at that time, I had no conception of the larger military organisations; I did not know what a division meant.75

Although not known for dissembling, in describing his military knowledge Bean was guilty of it. It is impossible to accept that he did not know what a division meant. He had more than a passing acquaintanceship with British military history, and he regarded himself as an expert on matters of defence and on the navy in particular. Chapter fourteen of With the Flagship, his ‘plea for an Australian navy’, was a carefully researched and argued paper. He had studied Prime Minister Alfred Deakin’s speech on defence policy made in the parliament on 13 December 1907.76 Before the war he had reported for his paper on the building of Australia’s warships and contributed a number of articles on defence topics. Although he had no direct experience of the military apart from his service in school, university and volunteer regiments, he was not nearly as uninformed and inexperienced as he suggested. Certainly, most of his knowledge had come from his upbringing and education, and from the experience he acquired writing his navy books and working as a journalist, but this did not count for nothing. As Winter points out when Bean left with the AIF he was no ignorant civilian. And with some justification, though a little ambitiously, he claims Bean’s ‘wide-ranging military knowledge and close identification with the military ethos belonged to a man who was a staff officer in all but title.’77

On 9 November, when the convoy was in the Indian Ocean, news of the presence of the German raider Emden was received. The cruiser Sydney, escorting the convoy, was sent to deal with the threat, and during the ensuing action off Cocos Islands Emden was destroyed, its commander running his vessel aground on the coral of North Keeling Island to avoid sinking. This was a defining moment in the RAN’s history: it was the first naval action involving an Australian warship during the war and its outcome was a decisive victory.78 On Orvieto, news of its outcome – the historic signal ‘Emden beached and done for’ – reached Bean. So arrived his first opportunity to report on the war. Discovering the facts when the

76 A printed copy of the speech published by the Commonwealth Government Printer is contained in Bean’s private records held in AWM, PR00283, 5/4. This contains underlining and a few calculations relating to defence expenditure made by Bean.
77 Making the Legend, p 4.
78 Apparently, this was never in doubt: Emden was no match for Sydney with its greater speed and firepower. See David Stevens (ed), The Royal Australian Navy, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2001, pp 39-41.
convoy reached Colombo, he fashioned a dispatch which was published in Australia on 4 December 1914. It largely consisted of straight-out reportage, but Bean’s proclivities can be detected in a number of passages: he reported British onlookers on Cocos Island describing *Emden* as ‘a very pretty little ship’; he described *Emden*’s tactics of drawing close to use its guns at short range as ‘the Emden’s game’; he described the battle as ‘one of the prettiest little naval actions that [had] been fought’; shells from a salvo fired by *Sydney* burst ‘in the enemy’s heart’. But he exercised commendable restraint when describing the condition of the *Emden*’s people as ‘pitiable’ and suggesting that ‘no one could describe or could wish to describe the state of affairs’ on the ship. Captain Glossop, *Sydney*’s commander, was horrified at what he saw: ‘Blood, guts, flesh, and uniforms were all scattered about. One of our shells had landed behind a gun shield, and had blown the whole gun crew into one pulp.’ The German toll was 134 dead and 65 wounded in a complement of 316; the Australian, 4 dead and more than a dozen wounded. Despite the Germans’ casualties, Bean applauded *Emden*’s ‘pluck’ in carrying on the fight when it was seriously damaged and unable to return fire and its refusal to surrender until ‘two more broadsides were fired into her.’

From Colombo the convoy sailed for Egypt disembarking the Australian and New Zealand contingents at Alexandria. It had been intended that they would proceed to England for training and then depart for the Western Front. However, Turkey’s recent entry into the war on Germany’s side, and the inability to receive more troops in the great training areas on Salisbury Plain that winter, meant that the Australians and New Zealanders would remain in Egypt. Here they trained with Bean watching, his eye very quickly becoming ‘an almost militarily professional one as he assessed tactical positions and manoeuvres, competence with weapons, physical endurance, discipline and morale.’ Meanwhile, in Britain, a plan was being drawn up to knock Turkey out of the war. Towards the end of March, after the failure of the navy to force the Narrows, Churchill’s plan to attack Turkey by the navy breaching the Dardanelles Strait supported by relatively minor military operations was abandoned in favour

81 Ibid.
82 McCarthy, *Gallipoli to the Somme*, p 89. Bazley has also claimed: ‘[Bean] quickly absorbed both knowledge and spirit, and staff and regimental leaders were equally impressed by his grasp of strategy and tactics and by his well balanced judgment.’ See ‘CEW Bean’, *Historical Studies*, p 149.
of ‘a grand attack by landing an army to fight upon the Peninsula while the fleet fought beside it on the sea.’ On 1 April all leave was cancelled as the Australians and New Zealanders, since formed into the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps or Anzac, were readied for the invasion. They would form part of a much larger force, the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF), which included British, French and British Indian soldiers. Initially, Bean was refused permission to accompany them, but that decision was reversed on 8 April. He was elated: ‘I am allowed to go attached to Gen. Bridges staff on giving a written undertaking that I will write nothing until permitted. It is a chance of a life time ... I shall eventually be able to give the Australian people an account of one of the most interesting events in History from a position closer than that of any observer who has been allowed to write his impressions in the present war.’ He went ashore at Anzac Cove at about 10.15 am on 25 April 1915.

Bean’s account of the landing appeared in Australian newspapers on 15 May. His was more circumspect than that penned by the English journalist Ellis Ashmead Bartlett whose report had appeared on 8 May, and supposedly more accurate, but he still managed to convey the significance of the event as he saw it: ‘But when all is said, the feat which will go down in history is that first Sunday’s fighting when three Australian Brigades stormed, in face of a heavy fire, tier after tier of cliffs and mountains, apparently as impregnable as Govett’s Leap. The sailors who saw the Third Brigade go up those heights and over successive summits like whirligig with wild cheers, and with bayonets flashing, speak of it with tears of enthusiasm in their eyes.’ It was, he claimed, a feat fit to rank beside ‘the battle of the heights of Abraham’, a decisive British military victory over a large French force in a battle fought outside the walls of the city of Quebec on 13 September 1759. His decision to compare the landing to a highly valued battle in British military history is significant. In various places Bean’s account tended to the colourful with his references to the Turks’ disinclination to ‘face our bayonets’, and in a story told to him of ‘one huge Queenslander’ ‘braining’ a Turk with the stock of his rifle, the veracity of which was confirmed when hours later a Turk was found on

83 Bean, Official History Vol 1, pp 200-1. Also see Grey, A Military History of Australia, pp 92-4.
84 Bean diary March-April 1915, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/3/1, entry 8 April 1915, pp 45-6.
87 In contrast Bartlett looked to the current war to find their value claiming they had proved themselves worthy to fight side by side with the heroes of Mons, the Aisne, Ypres, and Neuve Chapelle, battles fought on the Western Front by British, British Indian and French forces.
the beach with his head smashed in. Importantly, he applauded the idea of sacrifice: an officer had gone to the aid of a wounded man and was immediately killed by machine-gun fire, ‘riddled with bullets’. Of his death, Bean remarked: ‘It would be absurd to pretend that the life of an officer, like that one, was wasted.’ Others, he said, died ‘fighting like tigers.’

Bean’s successive dispatches remained faithful to the tidy self-imposed limits he established with his account of the landing. That is, they consisted of essentially straightforward factual reportage which he assured the Australian public was the truth. But in delivering the truth his reports were perceived by some as ‘colourless’ and insufficiently ‘exciting’ to satisfy the public’s appetite for accounts of ostentatious displays of heroism: in September 1915 the Melbourne dailies the Age and the Argus discontinued publishing his dispatches, apparently for these reasons. Still, they contained his own brand of colour and rhetoric and adhered to the mode of writing about war he had instituted a decade previously with his ‘Tsushima’ article. Thus, a charge is ‘gallant and desperate’, ‘splendid’ and a ‘wonderful rush’; men leap from the parapet ‘without the least hesitation’, retain their ‘dash and cheerfulness to the last’, are never seen to ‘falter’ or turn back unwounded, and throw bombs like cricket balls; and dispatch Turks with insouciance, as in his account of the incident in which Albert Jacka won the Victoria Cross.

It ends with Jacka’s mates coming upon him: ‘There was Jacka in the trench with an unlighted cigarette in his mouth and a flushed face. “Well, I managed to get the beggars, sir”, he said. In front of him was the trench literally blocked with Turks. He had shot five, and had just finished bayonetting (sic) the remaining two.’

Significantly, a thread running through his dispatches was his contention that the Australians’ performance evidenced a military tradition comparable to the best. His accounts of the charge of the Light Horse at the Nek on 7 August, for instance, show that he recognised its

value as a means of promoting Australia’s military standing. Four lines of light horsemen had made a suicidal charge against the Turkish position only to be shot down immediately; 372 of 600 attackers became casualties with 234 killed. Bean salvaged from this tragedy something he regarded as of everlasting value to the nation. He told Australians that ‘for sheer self-sacrifice and heroism [the] charge of the Australian Light Horse [was] unsurpassed in history’, thus placing the charge and the nation at the top of a list of past military actions judged for such qualities. In making that claim he intended enhancing Australia’s reputation in the eyes of the world and building on his contention that its tradition had been founded at the landing.

In an address to cadets at RMC Duntroon on Anzac Day 1923, Bean reminded them that as the first boats reached the shore of Anzac Cove, with men tumbling into the water and wading ashore, ‘the manhood of Australia was – for the first time in history – before the eyes of the world put to one of the crude, simple, terrible tests by which the world judges its nations.’ In passing that test he asserted that they had founded a tradition for Australia:

> What Crécy and Agincourt are for the British the Landing is for us: a story that will be told to young Australians at their mother’s knee as long as our nation lasts; it is an example of service and of manhood to be lived up to daily in peace. If ever the evil day comes ... when the graduates of Duntroon go again into action as members of an Australian army – they will have to create no fresh tradition. The standard by which they will be judged was set for them ... upon this morning eight years ago.

Bean’s insistence on characterising Australia’s soldiers’ performance as the founding of a tradition, when it was scarcely credible to suggest that such could be founded overnight, or perhaps even during the course of a campaign, betrays his military spirit. And this, it seems, explains why he assumed Australia aspired to attain a tradition when it had none, and no need of one.

**The Anzac Book**

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In mid-November 1915, 41,218 Australian and New Zealand soldiers were occupying Anzac Cove. Their commander, General William Birdwood, his general staff and Bean – probably the men as well – knew that the invasion was an unmitigated disaster. The greater number of the eventual 33,682 casualties had been suffered by August. Since then no offensive had occurred, and none was planned. The heat and flies of summer coupled with inadequate sanitation had taken its toll as dysentery and other intestinal maladies crippled the force. The occupation was now almost entirely concerned with disease and its effects. Winter had arrived and Bean observed that the men were ill-equipped to combat the freezing conditions; their winter clothing had not landed by 18 November. A fierce storm broke during the evening of the 17th devastating the beach and leaving only Williams’ pier standing. The drinking water was almost gone and the available reserves of food were ‘miserable’. Without a harbour, water and stores could not be landed in sufficient quantities to sustain the men. Bean thought they could hang on, ‘but at the cost of the utmost suffering’. Notwithstanding these desperate conditions for three weeks after 14 November a few of the men made a written and pictorial record of their experiences during the campaign.

Edited by Bean and containing stories, poems and illustrations ostensibly written and made by the men on Gallipoli, The Anzac Book was published by Cassell and Company in London in May 1916. Its pictorial contents were substantial with seventy-six illustrations: a striking

97 Bean, Official History Vol 2, p 854.
98 An Englishman, Birdwood was given administrative and operational command of the AIF after the death of General Bridges on 18 May 1915, shot by a sniper during his daily inspection of the firing line. Following the evacuation Birdwood took the AIF to France. He commanded 1 Anzac Corps during its campaigns on the Western Front until November 1917 when given command of the newly formed Australian Corps; in May 1918 he relinquished this to General John Monash. See AJ Hill, ‘Birdwood, William Riddell Birdwood (Baron Birdwood) (1865-1951)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/birdwood-william-riddell-baron-birdwood-5240/text8823, accessed 14 May 2013.
99 ‘Gallipoli’, The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, p 230. These casualties are made up of 26,111 (8,141 killed) Australians and 7,571 (2,431 killed) New Zealanders.
101 Ibid., p 76.
102 Bean diaries, November-December 1915, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/21/1, entry 28 November 1915, p 7; November 1915, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/20/1, entry 18 November 1915, p 69.
103 Bean diary November 1915, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/20/1, entry 18 November 1915, p 66.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid., pp 66-7.
106 Ibid., p 67.
colour picture as its cover; thirty-two full-page illustrations, twelve of which were in colour; and seventeen headpieces and tailpieces.\(^{108}\) Overwhelmingly they were humorous, and through the medium of jokes, cartoons and comical portraits the soldiers depicted the Anzacs’ character and the conditions in which they lived, fought and died. The arrangements Bean made to produce the illustrations inaugurated his assumption of control over Anzac’s official pictorial representation. Despite their informal and minor nature, his arrangements constituted the first effort made in that direction, and although the book was neither a government publication nor sponsored by it, it immediately acquired quasi-official status. To produce thirty-six illustrations – the core of the book’s pictorial contents and its professional component – Bean devised and supervised an ad hoc scheme under which he ‘commissioned’ a small team of soldier-artists to make them.\(^{109}\)

The story of the book from its conception to publication has been frequently told.\(^{110}\) It began life as an idea to produce a trench magazine to entertain the men on the peninsula presented by two intelligence officers to Bean who immediately embraced it;\(^{111}\) a committee was formed with General White as its chairman and it settled on the name ‘Anzac Magazine’;\(^{112}\) on 14 November a notice was circulated among all units inviting the men to submit literary and pictorial contributions to Bean by 8 December; prizes would be awarded for the best cover design, sketch and comic sketch or cartoon.\(^{113}\) Although the notice advised that the ‘editors’ reserved the right to publish all or any of the material submitted, there is no evidence that any committee member other than Bean selected and edited the contributions.

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\(^{108}\) A note regarding calculations: (1) in calculating the number of illustrations, works comprising multiple sketches, for example An Anzac Alphabet by JWS Henderson (26 sketches) (pp 115-18), were treated as single illustrations; and (2) in calculating the number of headpieces and tailpieces, substantial drawings in their own right employed as such, for example Gilbert Roach’s drawing over the prose sketch ‘A grey day in Gallipoli’ (p 106), were excluded.

\(^{109}\) Two claims about the book’s relationship to the official war art scheme are conventionally made. First, that the scheme had its conceptual origins in the book, and next, that the book’s ad hoc scheme established a precedent for attaching soldier-artists to the Australian War Records Section (AWRS) to make pictorial records. See Fry and Gray, Masterpieces of the Australian War Memorial, p 9; Gray, ‘War Art’, p 566; Gray, A Henry Fullwood, pp 23-4.


\(^{111}\) Bean diary November 1915, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/20/1, entry 13 November 1915, p 42. For a study of trench magazines see David Kent, From Trench to Troopship: The Experience of the Australian Imperial Force 1914-1919, Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 1999, esp chapter 1.

\(^{112}\) Bean, Two Men I Knew: William Bridges and Brudenell White, Founders of the A.I.F., Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1957, pp 116-7; Bean diary November 1915, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/20/1, entry 13 November 1915, pp 42-3.

\(^{113}\) Undated circular to all units 805/2, AWM 184, 1.
for publication. Moreover, on its publication the book contained an ‘Editor’s Note’ in which Bean described himself as editor, and he identified as the only other members of the book’s staff five artists and a clerk, Arthur Bazley, his batman.

Bean spent 5 and 6 December drawing and painting for the magazine. An inspection of The Anzac Book establishes that he made a substantial contribution to it: ten illustrations and a dinkus, One for Chanak, a black-and-white silhouette of a warship firing its guns, presumably at Chanak, a Turkish town on the eastern side of The Narrows, which was reproduced seven times. How can his contribution be explained? First, was there a proper basis for him contributing to it? After all, the magazine was to have been a publication by and for the soldiers, and he was a civilian. Strictly, he was not an Anzac. Next, it was one thing to be the magazine’s editor, but quite another to fulfil that role and also be a major contributor. Bean assumed this did not give rise to any difficulty, but it was he alone who judged that his work had sufficient artistic and literary merit – two of his poems were also published, ‘Non Nobis’ and ‘Abdul’ – to warrant being included in the magazine over the soldiers’ contributions he rejected.

On 8 December, the last day for submission of contributions, Bean recorded in his diary:

I have got stuff in from two artists besides Hewitt (sic) (an Adelaide poster and advertisement designer who has been sketching for the Army Corps). One is Crozier – a Melbourne artist – a private in the 22nd Battn now attached to 6 Bde H.Q. – a dreamy sort of chap with a delicate face – almost consumptive looking – who can do the serious lofty designing very capably, but who hardly is sufficiently worldly to know which of his own work will reproduce and which will not. I was opening a lot of rather poor drawing when I suddenly came upon a single study of a dirty shabby looking head carried out in a few bold black lines and coloured with red and blue pencil borrowed from the regimental office – by a private of the 5th Army Medical Corps – a head of one of the “first day” lot – quite as good as anything of Hassalls(?) and quite as bold. I went up and got hold of him at once. This same evening in came another man with a budget of almost exactly the same sort – I had the first man, Barker, in the dug out with me, and I pounced on this second man as well. Both are Sydney artists – both young chaps with very bright intelligent faces – the rather strong sharp Australian face. Both are in the

114 Bean diary November-December 1915, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/21/1, entries 5, 6 December 1915, p 41. On the following pages in his diary (pp 42-4), Bean drew several black-and-white silhouettes of warships for the magazine.
A.M.C. (5th and 6th F.Amb) and so is their chief rival, T. Collis (sic), a man who has sent in an excellent humorous sketch of a Turk. Spent all day going through contributions – my artists working all the while; Hewitt (sic) is on the more formal stuff; Barker and the new man will be on comic stuff (both have a sharp sense of humour); Crozier will be on the serious heavier designing.\textsuperscript{115}

This makes clear that he had decided to commission a number of soldier-artists to produce illustrations for the magazine to supplement, and more likely supplant, work submitted by other soldiers. Doubtless some of the published illustrations came to Bean direct from the soldiers, but the majority were made either by him or his artists. This revelation disrupts the widely held view that the book’s illustrations were made in the trenches, a view Bean promoted by misrepresenting in his Editor’s Note that the book was ‘produced in the lines at Gallipoli’, and that his team of artists was formed ‘in order to produce head- and tail-pieces and a few illustrations’.\textsuperscript{116} In fact, of the book’s seventy-six illustrations, his team contributed thirty-six; fifteen other soldiers contributed thirty; and Bean contributed ten. Moreover, the book’s dinkuses were substantially made by Bean and his team. The inclusion of his and his team’s work displaced at least thirty-four illustrations sent in by twenty-six soldiers.

By 8 December Bean had made significant progress commissioning illustrations for the magazine: he had selected his artists, assessed where their talents lay, and assigned them their work. In referring to them as ‘my artists’ and sometimes as ‘my small army’, he adopted a proprietorial tone connoting his control over them and their work. As his diary entry shows, they were working for him that day: W Otho Hewett ‘on the more formal stuff’; David Barker and the new man Cyril Leyshon-White ‘on the comic stuff’; and Frank Crozier ‘on the serious heavier designing’.\textsuperscript{117} The following day also found them working for him: ‘Had the 4 artists at work today.’\textsuperscript{118} Another artist, Ted Colles,\textsuperscript{119} who sent in the comic sketch of a Turk that so impressed him, would join his team after 11 December. Bean was fortunate to

\textsuperscript{115} Bean diary November-December 1915, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/21/1, entry 8 December 1915, pp 44, 46-7.

\textsuperscript{116} The Anzac Book, p xiii.

\textsuperscript{117} At enlistment each man gave his occupation as artist. See their respective attestation papers in William Otho Hewett service records; David Crothers Barker service records; Cyril Leyshon White service records; Frank Rossiter Crozier service records; all in NAA.

\textsuperscript{118} Bean diary November-December 1915, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/21/1, entry 9 December 1915, p 49.

\textsuperscript{119} At enlistment Fredrick Collis, whose professional name was ‘Ted Colles’, gave his occupation as journalist, but he worked extensively as an illustrator. See Attestation Paper of Persons Enlisted for Service Abroad, Fredrick Collis service records, NAA; letter, Colles to Officer in Charge, AWRS, 20 February, 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/1 Part 1.
have these men placed at his disposal as they were professional artists. None, it seems, was serving in a combat role; all were privates.

Bean decided to have the magazine produced in London when he discovered it was impossible to get work done in Athens to the desired standard. He persuaded General White to write to Sir George Reid, Australia’s High Commissioner in London, enlisting his assistance. On 8 December White wrote to Reid asking him to ‘arrange the production of [the] magazine by some first class firm of London publishers’. The committee’s aim, he said, was to produce a magazine that would be ‘a lasting memento of Anzac’, and he correctly ventured that the circumstances of its production would make it ‘quite historical’. But events were about to occur which altered the publication’s purpose and shape. On 23 November 1915 Lord Kitchener advised the British Government to withdraw its forces from the peninsula. The Dardanelles campaign had failed: it had had no prospect of succeeding. Although the British would not make a final decision for a fortnight, Birdwood immediately reduced the force at Anzac to a winter garrison. By 8 December, when the evacuation order arrived from England, it had been reduced to 36,000 men. On 10 December White told Bean he would be too busy over the coming days to work on the magazine, but did not explain why: he had been given the job of planning the evacuation. When on the 14th Bean learnt of it he altered his plans for the magazine.

Bean recognised that it would be the only publication of its kind ever produced on Gallipoli, and that it would no longer be made available to the men on the peninsula, but in the camps in Egypt to which they would be sent. As its original purpose had miscarried, his thoughts turned to transforming the publication into a more complete and permanent record of the

120 Bean diary November 1915, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/20/1, entry 13 November 1915, p 42; letter, White to Reid, 8 December 1915, AWM 184, 1. He had envisaged a magazine along the lines of Printers’ Pie. Published in London by The Sphere and The Tatler since 1903, Printers’ Pie was issued as an annual. The get-up of The Anzac Book was closely modelled on it, from its typeface and layout to its illustrations, which mostly took the form of illustrated jokes.
121 Letter, White to Reid, 8 December 1915, AWM 184, 1. Bean drafted the letter and White adopted it as his own. A draft has survived and is appended to Bean’s diary for November-December 1915, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/21/1.
123 Bean, Official History Vol 2, p 863.
124 Bean diary November-December 1915, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/21/1, entry 10 December 1915, opp p 50; Bean, Two Men I Knew, p 117.
125 Bean diary November-December 1915, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/21/1, entry 14 December 1915, pp 58-9.
campaign. In this form it would fulfil a grander purpose than he originally envisaged. As he explained in his Editor’s Note, the publication, which was to have been a ‘mere pastime’, had now become ‘a hundred times more precious as a souvenir.’ But as the souvenir of a disastrous campaign it would need to sound the right note, one that would neither demoralise the soldiers nor the public. Necessarily, no note of criticism of the military leadership could be sounded. Bean hoped the magazine would now reach a wider audience, and although this prospect brought with it greater editorial responsibility, it also offered him the opportunity of ameliorating the outcome of the campaign and of showing the world what Anzac was. While wishing to retain the magazine’s ‘trench’ flavour, he decided to present the soldiers’ contributions alongside an introduction by Birdwood; an account of the campaign by General Hamilton, the MEF’s former commander, appropriately entitled ‘The Story of Anzac’, drawn from his dispatches; and a series of ‘Special ANZAC Orders’ which included the order for the landing, a message from Kitchener commending the men for their ‘gallant and unflinching conduct’ throughout the campaign and, a late addition, a telegram from the King congratulating Birdwood on the successful evacuation. In this way the magazine would tell the story of the campaign from the landing to the evacuation, and could be presented as an ‘official’ publication. Moreover, it could be presented as evidence of an Australian tradition. (It has never mattered that New Zealanders were involved in the campaign and contributed to the book.) Understandably, it was essential that this tradition be represented as unique, and the magazine would play an important role in promoting its uniqueness. Preceding the appearance of the first volume of Bean’s official history by five years, The Anzac Book might be regarded as its unofficial first instalment. If the claims which have been made as to the reach and popularity of the book are substantially correct, it did much to establish in the public mind the idea that there existed such a tradition.

It seems certain Bean commissioned further work from his artists after the evacuation. Since 8 December they had been engaged on work given or suggested to them by him, and three artists continued working for him until 30 December. On 11 December Leyshon-White or Hewett left to be replaced by Colles, and by the 13th another had gone, leaving Barker,

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127 The Anzac Book, p xiii.
128 Ibid., pp ix-x, 71-95, 152-6.
129 Bean diary December 1915-January 1916, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/36/1, entry 30 December 1915, pp 5-6.
130 Bean diary November-December 1915, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/21/1, entry 11 December 1915, p 55.
131 Ibid., entry 14 December 1915, p 63.
Crozier and Colles in his team. That day Bean settled on the winners of the competitions in
the artistic category awarding prizes to Barker for the best cover design; Leyshon-White for
the best comic sketch; and Hewett for the best design.132 On 14 December Bean learnt that
White had given his three artists leave to accompany him to Imbros in advance of the
evacuation to continue their work, and on the 16th they and Bazley left while he remained at
Anzac Cove.133 He was evacuated to the Grafton during the night of the 17th.134 For him, the
evacuation was the end of an adventure, and a new one beckoned: ‘And so one is on an
adventure again – like the landing.’135 The final stages of the evacuation took place during the
night of 19 December with 10,000 men being withdrawn.136 On Imbros, the production team
stayed at ‘Château Pericles’, and working in a long byre which ran the length of one side of
the stone house, the artists finished their work while Bean did the bulk of the editing of the
magazine.137 On 29 December Bean and his ‘small army’ sailed by trawler for Mudros where
they were taken on board the Aragon.138 The following day his team disbanded.139 On 31
December, with the magazine substantially finished and the artists out of the way, Bean
travelled with Bazley to London.140

On 10 January 1916 Bean went to the Commonwealth’s offices and discovered that Reid had
done nothing to secure a publisher.141 He called on HC Smart, the officer in charge of the
Publicity Department, who immediately offered his assistance.142 They quickly settled on

132 Ibid., entry 13 December 1915, p 58.
133 Ibid., entries 14, 16 December 1915, pp 63, 76.
134 Fewster, Bean’s Gallipoli, p 253. But not before breaking up his dugout to prevent his furniture ending up as
a ‘curiosity’ in some Turkish officer’s home. See Bean diary December 1915, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/22/1, entry
17 December 1915, p 19.
135 Bean diary November-December 1915, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/21/1, entry 14 December 1915, p 65.
136 Bean, Official History Vol 2, pp 889-96.
137 Letter, Bazley to Mr James, 9 December 1963, AWM, MSS1316, folder 2/1.
138 Bean diary December 1915, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/24/1, entry 29 December 1915, p 43-5.
139 Bean diary December 1915-January 1916, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/36/1, entry 30 December 1915, pp 5-6.
140 Ibid., entry 31 December 1915, p 9.
141 Bean diary January-February 1916, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/37/1, entry 31 January 1916, p 14.
142 Born in Sydney in 1876, Henry Casimir Smart entered the NSW Public Service in 1892 and worked in the
Department of Agriculture for five years until taking up press work. During 1900-02 he saw service in the Boer
War. At various times he was Peking correspondent for the London Globe, acting editor of the Hong Kong
telegraph and editor of the Regiment and Army Graphic, and for four years until 1907 worked as a freelance
journalist in London. In 1907 he was employed in the Office of the Agent-General for New South Wales which
he left in April 1910 to work in the High Commissioner’s Offices. In 1911 he was appointed Officer-in-Charge
of Publicity. There is no evidence he had any background in art, although his work as a journalist and then as
publicity officer presumably brought him into contact with artists. See minute paper for Executive Council
(prepared by Department of External Affairs), 27 June 1913; memorandum, Smart to Prime Minister, 27 May
1927; application by Smart for superannuation benefits 9 October 1937; memorandum, Smart to Official
Secretary, 26 July 1938; all in NAA A461, G348/1/14; Reveille, 1 March 1934, p 21.
Cassells as the publisher. When it was that Bean decided to transform the magazine into a book is unclear, but by 21 January he was referring to it as the ‘Anzac Book’. Working together he and Smart had a final proof of the book, ‘completely ready for the press’, in the publisher’s hands by 15 February, but government restrictions on the importation of paper delayed its printing until 20 April when production finally got into full swing. However, further delays were experienced and the book did not appear until late May 1916.

Bean had probably hoped to see the book released slightly in advance of 25 April 1916, the first anniversary of the landing. This, he possibly reasoned, would give the book a tremendous kickstart, associating it in the public mind with the day’s celebrations and the expected extensive newspaper coverage of the event. But the delay of about one month in its appearance did not disadvantage its reception. It was released into a setting which had a well-developed popular rhetoric concerning Anzac. The coverage in the Sydney and Melbourne dailies of the anniversary celebrations had been comprehensive, and the Sydney Morning Herald’s is indicative of the treatment given the event. Over several articles the reader was provided with an education in the A to Z of Anzac: an account of the landing and the campaign; the significance of the landing and why it should be celebrated; the martial qualities and character of the Anzac; the existence and meaning of something called ‘the Anzac spirit’.

Given the occasion, it was essential that a representative of the government should make a public statement ascribing a value to the campaign to justify its human toll and offering words of comfort to the families and friends of soldiers who had been killed and wounded. It fell to Senator Pearce, Acting Prime Minister in the absence of Prime Minister Hughes who was in London, to do this. But Pearce withheld words of comfort. He declared that the campaign was a failure only in that its immediate object, the capture of Constantinople, was not attained. (It seems unlikely this washed with the public.) But whether it was a success or a failure was less important than the opportunity it had given Australia to prove itself

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143 Bean diary January-February 1916, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/37/1, entry 31 January 1916, p 27.
144 Bean diary December 1915-January 1916, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/36/1, entry 21 January 1916, p 46.
145 Circular No 5 Anzac Book Central Committee, 11 March 1916; Circular Anzac Book Central Committee, 20 April 1916; both in AWM 184, 1.
146 Sydney Morning Herald, 25 April 1916, pp 5, 8, 9, 10. Spread out over these pages were ten articles, two poems and a message from the King.
militarily. Ultimately, the campaign’s ‘success’ lay not in its outcome, but in the nature of Australia’s performance on the world stage and the founding of its tradition. In a prepared statement published in the paper Pearce made these matters plain: ‘In an army a knowledge of its past achievements is a mighty factor in its future success. *Before the war Australia had practically no army traditions*, and it is to the meaning of the Gallipoli campaign in this connection that I would direct attention to-day.’

He claimed the Australians had carried out ‘a feat of arms not exceeded by the most highly trained regulars of any nation of the world’, and that Australia’s citizen army now had its tradition, the ‘inspiring example of the Anzac heroes to live up to in [its] military work’. Although it was premature for him to claim that Australia had established a tradition, it suited his and the government’s purpose to promote that idea: it accommodated the existing popular rhetoric concerning Anzac and ascribed to Australia’s part in the disastrous campaign something of lasting value. It did not matter that he left the nature of the supposed tradition a little vague; what was critical was that it was said to be comparable to the tradition ‘of any nation of the world’.

Whether the public held any conception of the tradition to which Pearce had directed its attention, or appreciated the significance of his claim as to its establishment, is impossible to determine. But it seems probable it was seen as something bound up in its soldiers’ martial qualities and character. And on that matter the newspaper did not stint as it tirelessly explicated the Anzacs’ characteristics. The Anzacs never faltered though men were falling by the score and rushed on ‘heedless of the consequences’; they were ‘happy warriors’ who died ‘cheerfully’; they displayed ‘a skill, a courage, and a tenacity under circumstances of appalling difficulties’, ‘audacity and dash’, ‘sleepless valour’, ‘untiring resource’, ‘reckless daring’, ‘courage and endurance’, the ‘finest spirit of self-devotion’, ‘indomitable courage and dash in attack and the utmost steadiness in defence’ and ‘valour and fortitude’; they were uncomplaining in spite of hardships and privations and ‘always cheerful, always laughing and singing’. The public expected to find this man in *The Anzac Book*, and aided by a phalanx of reviewers Bean ensured that he was found.

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The book’s publication was greeted by rapturous applause.\textsuperscript{150} This was only to be expected given the book’s nature and the special circumstances of its production, but Bean was not prepared to leave its reception to chance. He cultivated the response he desired by including his Editor’s Note, a carefully constructed piece of writing designed to persuade readers of the uniqueness of the book and of its contributors. Of critical importance to him was that the book be received as a publication uniquely Anzac, representative of the soldiers who served on Gallipoli and a testament to their talents and versatility. To encourage this he misrepresented that the book was produced ‘in the lines at Anzac on Gallipoli’; the soldiers’ response to the call for contributions was ‘enormous’; and his team of artists made no more than ‘a few illustrations’\textsuperscript{151}

The illustrations were judged with an essentially uncritical eye. The consensus was that they were better than merely competent, but occasionally the praise was effusive: the illustrations alone justified purchasing the book; many were ‘beyond praise’; they reached ‘an astonishingly high level of excellence’; they contained ‘plenty of power’.\textsuperscript{152} Melbourne’s \textit{Table Talk} found merit in the work of Barker (‘admirable’), Crozier (‘striking’) and Colles (‘strong’).\textsuperscript{153} The singling out for praise of Bean’s artists’ illustrations was a frequent feature of the reviews, doubtless because of their professional appearance.\textsuperscript{154}


\textsuperscript{151}The Anzac Book, pp xiii-xiv. Understandably, these statements were accepted at face value. In any case, the material needed to scrutinise them – the soldiers’ literary and artistic submissions Bean rejected for publication – was unavailable. This remained in Bean’s possession until after 1963 when he, or perhaps his widow, donated it to the memorial. That Bean misrepresented the extent of the soldiers’ response to the call for contributions – only 150 soldiers in a population at Anzac which varied during the period between 41,218 and 36,011 sent in submissions – only became known in 1985 following the publication of David Kent’s study of the book’s literary contents. See DA Kent, ‘The Anzac Book and the Anzac Legend; CEW Bean as Editor and Image-Maker’, \textit{Historical Studies}, vol 21, no 84, April 1985, pp 376-90 at p 380. But Kent exposed only Bean’s misrepresentation as to the extent of the soldiers’ response; he missed or ignored the others.


\textsuperscript{153}\textit{Table Talk}, 29 June 1916.

and Colles were pronounced ‘masters of their craft’. No other artist-contributors, save for Bean, were mentioned. The *Bulletin* remarked that Barker, the major contributor of illustrations to the book and the artist to whom Bean had given the job of constructing an image of the Anzac, had made for himself ‘an Anzacian reputation’.

The *Anzac Book* has received negligible scholarly attention and its illustrations virtually none. The key figure in the scholarship is David Kent. In his 1985 study he compared the literary contributions rejected for publication with the published items and concluded that Bean had selected and edited work with the intention of presenting an image of the Anzac which reflected his conception of him and which he wished to promote for wide consumption. Kent claims that through his editorial activity Bean decisively established an image of the Anzac which was quickly absorbed into popular consciousness: a fighting man who was tough, inventive, loyal to his mates beyond the call of duty, a bit undisciplined (but only in non-essentials), chivalrous, gallant and sardonic. According to him, Bean chose only items which fitted this image and rejected those which told of the brutality, suffering and waste of life associated with warfare; of human weaknesses such as fear and cowardice; and of personal anguish or loss. And although he also chose contributions that documented the discomforts of a soldier’s life on Gallipoli, usually with grim humour, Kent claims he chose only items which fitted the image of Anzac he wished to memorialise. Kent’s essential findings have been largely adopted by a small community of historians who all agree that the image of Anzac Bean constructed and presented in the book gained popular acceptance giving impetus to the development of the Anzac legend.

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158 This is WF Mandle’s well-worn description of the quintessential Anzac from *Going it Alone: Australia’s National Identity in the Twentieth Century* (Allen Lane, Ringwood, 1978, p 4) which Kent quotes. Nothing has changed. It might be compared with Patrick Lindsay’s recent description: ‘The image of the Digger is derived from an intricate amalgam of qualities … mateship, courage, compassion, endurance, selflessness, loyalty, resourcefulness, devotion, independence, ingenuity, audacity, coolness, larrikinism and humour.’ See *The Spirit of the Digger*, p 16.


that he did not consider the book’s illustrations, save for referring to two he said supported his thesis, nor their relationship to the literary contents.\textsuperscript{161} Yet it seems obvious that Bean intended the pictorial and the literary contents to complement each other.\textsuperscript{162}

In settling on the book’s pictorial contents Bean had to balance his desire to present a particular image of Anzac while remaining faithful to the magazine’s original concept as a ‘trench’ publication. Practically, this involved deciding what to do with the soldiers’ contributions in the context of carrying out his program of commissioning his artists to make illustrations for the magazine. After submissions closed, he had received sixty-four illustrations sent in by thirty-seven soldiers.\textsuperscript{163} Given the number of illustrations published in the book, all of the soldiers’ contributions could have been included. Although during the editorial process it could be expected that some would be rejected for reasons relating to their quality and/or content, what explains Bean’s exclusion of thirty-four illustrations sent in by twenty-six soldiers, more than half the number he received?\textsuperscript{164} If Kent’s claim as to Bean’s editorial selectivity with respect to the book’s literary contents is correct, it might be assumed

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\textit{and National Mythology}, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 2004, pp 9, 70; EM Andrews, \textit{The Anzac Illusion: Anglo-Australian Relations during World War I}, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, pp 61-2; Peter Stanley, ‘Gallipoli and Pozieres: a legend and a memorial’, \textit{Australian Foreign Affairs Record}, vol 50, no 4, April 1985, pp 281-9 at p 283. Kent’s claim for the popularity of the book, to which these historians subscribe, rests on its bestseller status, and it can be accepted that it was widely disseminated and became popularly known. Evidence of the total number of books printed, and therefore sold, is fragmentary, but it is clear that at least 145,000 copies were printed – 105,000 of a first edition priced at 2/6d and 40,000 of a second cloth-bound edition priced at five shillings. See extract of account of Cassell and Company being Schedule “A” to letter, Evans to Bean, 13 December 1916; Cassell and Company royalty statement, 22 September 1916; circular Anzac Book Central Committee, ‘Anzac Book – Edition Reprinted for Christmas’, 27 September 1916; letter, Cassell and Company to Smart, 6 February 1918; all in AWM 184, 1; statement attached to letter, Bean to Grassick, 15 March 1918, AWM 184, 2.

\textsuperscript{161} Of the historians who have largely adopted Kent’s essential findings only Thomson discussed the book’s illustrations. He referred to a limited number as evidence, he said, of Bean’s aim to construct an image of the quintessential Anzac – Bean’s and Barker’s work figure prominently in his discussion. But he did not refer to the illustrations Bean rejected for publication. See \textit{Anzac Memories}, pp 66, 68.

\textsuperscript{162} While Yip appears to accept that Kent’s thesis applies equally to the book’s pictorial contents, he claims the soldiers were not without agency and made illustrations that were antithetical to the ideal image of the Anzac Bean wished to present in the book. However, his examination of the published and rejected illustrations does not range very far and he makes no other substantial claims.

\textsuperscript{163} This excludes his team’s submissions. Note: (1) in calculating the number of illustrations, works comprising multiple sketches were treated as single illustrations; and (2) each unsigned illustration or set of illustrations if obviously related, was counted as having been submitted by one soldier.

\textsuperscript{164} Calculating the number of rejected illustrations is problematic. In folder 3/1 of AWM, MSS1316 is a typed list of rejected literary and artistic contributions and the contributions themselves. When Kent examined this material for the purpose of analysing \textit{The Anzac Book}’s literary contents, he assumed the items listed and contained in MSS1316 constituted the whole of the material Bean rejected. Since the publication of the third edition of \textit{The Anzac Book}, that assumption is no longer correct, at least with respect to artistic contributions. Four rejected illustrations, neither listed nor contained in MSS1316, two by Crozier and two by Ivan Dimant, are reproduced in the new edition. No explanation as to why they were not in MSS1316 can be offered.
its pictorial contents resulted from the same process, that is, Bean rejected illustrations which either conflicted or were incompatible with the image of Anzac he wished to present. This might explain his rejection of a few illustrations, for instance Sergeant McHenry’s cartoon *Ain’t that stiff*, which referred to malingering and to the not uncommon practice of soldiers ingesting cordite to feign illness as a means of being evacuated, but not his wholesale exclusion of them. First, a number of rejected submissions were excluded but redrawn by his artists for publication. Next, several illustrations were plain funny and could not have compromised Bean’s intentions. For instance, Private Hore’s which made light of the danger of bathing in Anzac Cove by showing a swimming soldier who turns and calls out ‘Stop yer tickling Jock’ as Turkish bullets hit the water behind him; Private Boutcher’s *Types of Australian Dug-Outs* which depicted dugouts as suburban dwellings, ‘Seaview Terrace’, ‘Australian Villa’ and ‘A Semi Attached’; and Private Paul’s cartoon which commented on the endless digging involved during the occupation. He shows two soldiers digging a trench; one remarks to the other: ‘Blow me Bill if they only had us blokes digging one long sap to Constantinople we’d be knocking at the gate now.’

Nevertheless, Kent’s general thesis *does* explain Bean’s wholesale exclusion of the soldiers’ submissions. His clearing out of space to accommodate his and his team’s illustrations was actuated by the desire to create an image of Anzac which complemented its representation in the book’s literary contents. This was justified not because of the poor quality or inappropriate content of the submissions, but because generally they did not contribute to creating an image of Anzac he wished to present. There were two parts to his project: first, the creation of a memorable image of the Anzac, and next, the production of illustrations to complement poems and prose pieces which said something about Anzac, such as its adventurous spirit, selfless sacrifice and chivalry. The soldiers’ submissions were small-scale illustrations which showed the men in various comic attitudes and situations. They were fine as illustrated cartoons which made light of the privations and drudgery of a soldier’s life on Gallipoli, his relations with officers, and the ‘incompetence’ of reinforcements. But there was no uniformity in the men’s appearance, and there was not one that contained a fully realised

165 Other examples are two anonymous submissions, *Delusions*, showing a masked and caped figure standing in front of headstones under a night sky lit by lightning, and *Neath another Lonesome Pine*, showing a terrified, half-naked sergeant running to his dugout sign-posted ‘Ye Funkhole’, which acknowledged the soldiers’ fear.

166 There were four instances of this: Barker’s *Are you wounded, mate?* (after B Hartman); Leyshon-White’s *For Constantinople* (after BHC Price); Colles’s *The ’Ric*’ (after C McRae); *The new star* (after FJ Leigh). See *The Anzac Book*, pp 43, 160, 12, opp p 96.
representation of a soldier who might be presented as a type. If the book were to represent Anzac successfully, it was critical that it contain a memorable image or images of the Anzac. Moreover, the soldiers’ submissions failed to address anything of a more abstract nature capable of being understood as Anzac ideals.

It was the common Australian soldier who, as Bean saw it, encapsulated Anzac, and it was his satisfactory representation in the book that was critical for his purposes. What had struck him about the Australians during the campaign was their unique brand of heroism, their capacity to put up with and endure terrible privations with humour and cheerfulness. Bean settled on the character study to convey this quality and gave the job of illustrating the Anzac to Barker whose bold drawing style, he assessed, was peculiarly suited to the task. His work dominates the book’s pictorial contents. Of his fifteen illustrations approximately thirteen were new works Bean commissioned, and seven were privileged with full-page reproduction. They address three features of the Anzac’s character: first, his martial qualities and indomitable fighting spirit; secondly, his capacity to endure hardship with humour and cheerfulness; and thirdly, his physical prowess. Naturally, the first would enjoy primacy and be seen immediately on taking up the book. Barker’s cover illustration is a carefully constructed image of the archetypal Anzac [4]. The idea of this figure had already taken hold in the minds of a distant Australian public who had read newspaper reports of the bravery and derring-do of the AIF. And it had also taken hold in the minds of the soldiers who had survived since the landing, as what otherwise explains Barker’s conception of him? He shows an Australian soldier standing before the tattered but still strongly flying flag of the Empire, battered and bloodied but not nearly defeated: he is determined, steely-eyed and poised ready to continue the fight, his Enfield rifle with fixed bayonet grasped confidently in his large strong hands. Even the uniform fits the stereotype: the khaki tunic which displays no insignia of rank – he is a private – is worn casually, open at the throat and unbuttoned to the chest, reflecting the Anzac’s well-known disregard of and disdain for authority and the observance of the formal trappings of soldiering. Of the book’s numerous illustrations

167 Barker’s At the landing and here ever since and his cover design were probably made ‘in the lines’ and sent in to Bean in response to the call for contributions. The former is the ‘single study of a dirty shabby looking head’ Bean described in his diary entry of 8 December 1915. As none of Barker’s work is included in the rejected material in AWM, MSS1316, it should be assumed that everything he sent in was published.

168 But it is not his original design which can be found in AWM, MSS1316, folder 3. It is virtually identical to the book’s cover but has the year ‘1916’ printed in the image. With the evacuation came the necessity of altering the illustration by obliterating the year, and although this might have been achieved by overpainting, Barker executed a fresh work, probably at Bean’s request.
Barker’s cover is the most important in the message it conveyed. It sought to achieve several ends: first, and most importantly, to create a type for the Anzac; secondly, to inspire, among other things, respect and admiration for the Australian soldier, patriotism and a sense of duty; and thirdly, to encourage recruiting. Barker’s illustration fitted Bean’s requirements perfectly. It was memorable, and he expected it to be seen widely throughout Australia and among the AIF. At one fell swoop it would present his conception of the ideal Anzac. Arguably, it was his first ‘official’ pictorial representation.

Barker beat off competition from two teammates, Hewett and Crozier, to win the prize for best cover design. Hewett’s ANZAC, included as the frontispiece of the book but obviously a cover design, is remarkably restrained compared to Barker’s. Carefully drawn and coloured, it depicts soldier representatives of Australia and New Zealand in a passive mode. They are shown standing under the Union Jack holding their respective flags respectfully, almost tenderly, and there are no signs of war in evidence, though a warship can be seen quietly steaming in the distant background. It is a fine and respectful image which celebrates the co-operation between the two nations in the cause of the Empire, but hardly stirring in the sabre-rattling style of Barker’s. As the book’s cover it would not have done the job Bean envisaged for it. But Crozier’s submission was wholly unsuitable as the cover of a commemorative souvenir. Although he also produced an image of the Anzac as warrior, his transgressed the bounds of good taste. Its principal figure is an Australian soldier carrying his rifle with fixed bayonet who is stepping over the prone figure of a dead Turkish soldier whom, presumably, he has just dispatched. Bean is likely to have regarded the incorporation in the image of a dead Turk as too explicit a representation of the horrors of war, but in any case to depict the Australian arrogantly stepping over the Turk’s body could have suggested that he was indifferent to, or perhaps took pleasure in, killing the enemy. These were not qualities of the Anzac he wished to promote, even if they had some basis in fact.

The second feature of the Anzac’s character, his capacity to endure hardship with humour and cheerfulness, could be depicted in several ways and settings, but all would derive from the model of a man who was, according to Barker’s conception of him, rather more brawny.

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169 It attained enduring status. It has been reproduced in several relatively recent books whose subject is the Anzac legend, for example, in Thomson’s Anzac Memories (p 65); Seal’s Inventing Anzac (cover); and Andrews’ The Anzac Illusion (cover). Moreover, its exposure to successive generations of Australians has been assured by the publication of second and third editions of The Anzac Book (Sun Books, 1975; UNSW Press, 2010).

170 None of the nine cover designs sent in by other soldiers posed a serious threat to Barker’s.
than brainy, a robust physical type. This would also address the third feature of his character, his physicality. Barker’s ‘Are you wounded, mate?’ [7] is the reworking of a cartoon sent in by Corporal B Hartman, who was serving with the New Zealand Field Ambulance. It shows a wounded soldier being carried by stretcher-bearers. Although his body is hidden by a blanket, his head and the foot of a dangling leg are bandaged. Another soldier who passes asks, ‘Are you wounded, mate?’, and receives the reply, ‘D’yer think I’m doing this fer fun?’ Compared to Hartman’s cartoon [8], Barker’s is obviously the work of a professional artist. Bean’s decision to commission Barker to redraw the cartoon consigned the authentic work of a soldier who had produced it ‘in the lines’ to oblivion. What did Bean hope to achieve by his decision, apart from publishing a more professional looking cartoon? The answer is that Hartman’s cartoon provided Bean with the scope to fashion a type. For Hartman’s two-dimensional and non-descript figures Barker substituted soldiers with character-filled faces, and in the case of the lead stretcher-bearer a fully realised and convincing physical appearance. He is a man with obvious physical prowess, an impression emphasised by his strong square-jawed face and resolute expression. He was an ideal type. Later in the book, and now shown carrying a box of bombs, he appears in Luxuries for the Turks. [9] Complementing this form of his representation Barker developed another: an anonymous clown, now hard-boiled, who puts up with the discomforts and dangers of life on Gallipoli. Hartman’s cartoon also gave Barker the opportunity of representing this man. He is the soldier shown in profile, literally poking his head into the scene, who asks the inane question, ‘Are you wounded, mate?’ He is all character with his stretched neck, misshapen nose, exaggerated Adam’s apple and bulging eyes. He clearly derives from the soldier in Barker’s ‘Apricot Again!’; is virtually identical to the man in A present from home, and is closely related to the man in ‘At the landing and here ever since’ [9]. The reviewer with the Argus was much taken with this last man and thought he summed up the spirit of Anzac: ‘It is the face of a “veteran” – large jawed, badly in need of a shave, with ragged cap, a plastered shell splinter wound in his cheek, several front teeth missing, and smoking a “fag”, but wearing an engaging smile of perfect contentment. Such is the spirit of Anzac.’ The Anzac’s representation in the book starts and finishes with Barker’s work. However, in two portrait

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171 The Anzac Book, p 43.
172 Ibid., p 111.
173 Ibid., opp p 142, p 64, opp p 22.
174 ‘New Books ... The spirit of Anzac’, Argus, 7 July 1916, p 5.
studies, *Complaints of the season* and *Kitch*, Leyson-White presented a soldier who might be seen as a corrective to Barker’s conception of the Anzac as a rough, hard-boiled, physical type. In each he depicts a dopey looking and slightly injured young soldier with a cigarette dangling from his mouth. He does not fit the image of the Anzac as the quintessential fighting man; presumably he is there as evidence of his capacity to endure with cheerfulness.\textsuperscript{175}

Bean’s artistic contribution is problematic, and not only because he was a civilian.\textsuperscript{176} *The silver lining*, reproduced in colour as a full-page illustration, reveals his essentially romantic nature and a tendency to make unsound decisions on artistic matters. While obviously the showpiece of his contribution to the book, it is out of place in the souvenir of a military campaign and sits awkwardly among the other illustrations. It is an openly romantic picture: its subject is a sunset.\textsuperscript{177} The last rays of sunlight force through a mass of black clouds gathering over the distant island of Imbros to produce a broken band of light which extends across the sea to the edge of Anzac Cove where it dissolves in the wavelets rolling into the beach. In the foreground he drew a pier extending out to sea at the end of which he supplied the stick-like figure of a man who, presumably, is gazing at the sunset. He is a soldier-representative. From the picture’s design it can be inferred he is standing awestruck before the vision. Bean has painted a cliché, and this is confirmed by the picture’s title. Behind the man on the pier, but elided by Bean, is the scene of the disastrous occupation. Sensibly, the man has turned his back on it. Bean suggests there is reason to hope for a new beginning, and he offers a painted cliché as a palliative to the catastrophe: every cloud, he reassures his readers, has a silver lining. Cold comfort, one suspects, to the family and friends of killed, wounded and maimed soldiers back in Australia and New Zealand.

\textsuperscript{175} *The Anzac Book*, opp p 1, opp p 32. The work of Colles and Hewett did not contribute to the Anzac’s representation. Colles’s illustration *The new star* depicts a troubled Kaiser who is looking up anxiously at the night sky where he witnesses the birth of the new star of the picture’s title. The new star, of course, is Australia’s military which Colles is suggesting has arrived on the world stage. He has incorporated the head of an Australian soldier wearing a slouch hat in the point of a comet which is rushing on a collision course toward the stereotypical image of a Turk, presumably the Sultan, who lounges in the curve of a crescent moon hanging from which is a tag, ‘From Bill’. Hewett’s *ANZAC*, the frontispiece to the book, has been mentioned. Another full-page drawing by him, *Each one doing his bit*, depicts a snaking line of soldiers which disappears into the distance, each bringing something – biscuits, apricot jam, cigarettes, rum, milk, etc – to the maintenance of the force in occupation of the peninsula. It conveys the simple idea that among the Anzacs a co-operative spirit prevailed. Unsurprisingly, the second figure in the line is a knight in armour. See ibid., opp p 96; opp p 164.

\textsuperscript{176} A few of his illustrations depicted the Anzac as a robust physical type along the lines of Barker’s conception of him, but except for one full-page drawing of two sun-bronzed bare-chested water carriers, *Turkish Divisional Orders*, they were carried out in a minor key. See ibid., pp 8, 17, 97, 112.

\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., opp p 122.
Crozier’s illustrations also seem mostly out of place, probably because they reflect Bean’s thinking. They are neither humorous nor contribute to the image of the Anzac as conceived of by Barker. Most are fussy and overdrawn and generally incompatible with the appearance and tone of the book’s illustrations. Moreover, they contributed nothing toward representing the everyday conditions of life on Gallipoli. Each of Crozier’s eight illustrations was made to illustrate a poem, clear evidence that they were commissioned by Bean after he settled on the magazine’s literary contents.\(^\text{178}\) It can be assumed they reflect the results of discussions between the men as to how the theme of each poem might best be illustrated. Poems he illustrated, such as Bean’s ‘Non Nobis’ and CJN’s ‘Hill 60’, contain ideas about the campaign Bean wished to promote: respectively, renewal following death, and the persistence and comfort of love after death, conveyed in a treacly illustration of a young girl kneeling at her bedside praying.\(^\text{179}\) One full-page illustration, *Our fathers\(^{[10]}\)*,\(^\text{180}\) made to illustrate a poem with that title, articulated Bean’s belief that the invasion stood on the same footing as the adventures of Elizabethan sailors who once sailed the world on quests of discovery. Crozier’s picture blatantly promotes the idea that the Anzacs were latter-day Elizabethan sailor-explorers. He presents another, but rather more peaceful landing, the moment after a party of sailors has come ashore in a cove not unlike Anzac Cove. The three main figures, presumably the captain and his officers, occupy the foreground where they are shown standing on a small rise overlooking the beach. They are dressed in typical Elizabethan attire. Anchored in the cove is a galleon and the beach is a beehive of activity as supplies are being landed. When reviewing *The Anzac Book*, Archibald Strong claimed the picture was one of its best, and its symbol ‘apt’, ‘for the warriors of Anzac were right Elizabethans, not only in courage, endurance, and passion for adventure, but in that other vitality of spirit which finds expression in [the] book.’ That other vitality of spirit was their practise of the arts with which, Strong dubiously claimed, their quality as warriors was compatible.\(^\text{181}\)

\(^{178}\) If Crozier submitted work in response to the call for contributions, and Bean’s diary entry of 8 December 1915 suggests he did, it was not published. However, it is not with the rejected material contained in AWM, MSS1316. Now, with the publication of a third edition of *The Anzac Book*, it seems clear Crozier submitted at least two illustrations which Bean rejected: his cover design and a view of Anzac Cove with figures.\(^\text{179}\)

\(^{180}\) *The Anzac Book*, opp p 10, p 51.

\(^{181}\) Ibid., p 15.

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2 An official war art scheme

Following the evacuation of Gallipoli the AIF retired to Egypt where it regrouped and was strengthened by reinforcements from Australia. In mid-March 1916 the first divisions of the AIF commenced embarking for France to join the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in the war against the Germans on the Western Front.\(^1\) Bean followed the AIF to France where in the period before it undertook its first major action at Fromelles he was heavily involved selling *The Anzac Book* to soldiers.\(^2\) Its illustrations represented a modest start to creating a pictorial record of Australia’s part in the war, but they did not lead immediately to any effort by Bean or the government to create a more substantial record.

On 1 June 1916 near Fleurbaix in northern France, Bean was present when Prime Minister Hughes and the High Commissioner, Andrew Fisher, the immediately previous prime minister, reviewed the Australian battalions.\(^3\) Fisher had arrived in London on 30 January 1916, replacing the outgoing Sir George Reid.\(^4\) In late October 1915, when the fate of the Dardanelles campaign hung in the balance with the British Government remaining unconvinced of the necessity to evacuate Gallipoli, he had resigned as prime minister.\(^5\) Something of a patron of the arts during his prime ministership,\(^6\) he was instrumental in establishing the Historic Memorials Committee, a body which became responsible for commissioning the painting of official portraits of prominent Australian men. At the time of the review of the Australian battalions Bean described him as ‘a real straight good friend’ and his ‘sincere friend’,\(^7\) which possibly explains the considerable support Fisher later lent him in connection with the war art scheme.

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\(^1\) The 1st and 2nd Divisions were the first to leave; the 4th and 5th Divisions followed arriving in France in June; and the 3rd arrived in November 1916. See Bean, *Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Volume 3, The AIF in France 1916*, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1929, pp 66-71, 299, 300, 950.

\(^2\) Kent claims that Bean personally co-ordinated the sale of over 29,000 books during his visits to Australian units. See *The Anzac Book and the Anzac Legend*, p 388.

\(^3\) Bean, *Official History Vol 3*, p 471; Bean diary May-June 1916, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/44/1, entry 1 June 1916, pp 39-41.


\(^6\) Ibid., pp 183, 265; Bastian, *Andrew Fisher*, p 247.

\(^7\) Bean diary May-June 1916, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/44/1, entry 1 June 1916, p 42.
According to Grey, war in the Middle East was a poor preparation for the Western Front. However desperate conditions had been on Gallipoli, life in the rat-infested and waterlogged trenches of southern Belgium and northern France was often infinitely worse. And the Germans were a more skilful and deadly opponent than the Turks. The Australians avoided the terrible first day of the great offensive on the Somme launched by General Haig, commander-in-chief of the BEF, but on 18-19 July the 5th Division was committed to a feint attack near Fromelles suffering 5,533 casualties. Then, in mid-July, assigned the task of taking German positions around Pozières, the 1st and 2nd Divisions attained their objectives but at a cost of 17,000 casualties. Completing the AIF’s part in the offensive, in mid-August the 4th Division carried out several assaults on Mouquet Farm losing 4,649 men. On 3 September the Australian divisions were taken out of the line. In six weeks on the Somme the AIF lost 23,000 men, equalling the loss at Gallipoli in eight months.

Working in London at the time was Will Dyson, the Australian black-and-white artist and political cartoonist, who had made a name for himself since the start of the war with cartoons attacking war profiteering and German militarism. In January 1915 he published and concurrently exhibited at the Leicester Galleries a series of satiric cartoons on the demise of German culture entitled *Kultur Cartoons*, savagely depicting Germans and the Kaiser as warmongers. At the Savoy Hotel on 3 July 1916 he exhibited another series of satiric cartoons, *Will Dyson’s War Cartoons*. The British Committee, the exhibition’s organisers, arranged for a booklet to be published, priced at one shilling, containing a selection of the cartoons with descriptive letterpress by prominent Englishmen. On 19 July, as the AIF went into action at Fromelles, the committee’s secretary wrote to Fisher offering to sell the Commonwealth a number of the booklets ‘on special terms with a view to making them known in Australian circles’. The cartoons, he claimed, were the work of a ‘rising and brilliant young Australian artist’ and valuable for propaganda purposes. It seems doubtful

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8 A Military History of Australia, p 101.
9 Ibid., pp 102-3; ‘Western Front’, The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, pp 586-98 at pp 587-8. The companion’s editors claim the battle of Fromelles was ‘one of the most misconceived operations mounted by the British on the Western Front’, while the battles around Pozières and Mouquet Farm were ‘ill-conceived in the extreme’. For full accounts of the battles see Bean, Official History Vol 3, chapters XII-XXIII, and for the casualties suffered pp 442, 862-3. For shorter accounts see Bean, Anzac to Amiens, chapters XIV-XV.
11 Ibid., p 125.
Fisher gave the offer any serious consideration. He passed the letter to Muirhead Collins, the Official Secretary, who replied explaining that Fisher regretted having no funds at his disposal which would permit the purchase of booklets. The committee probably informed Dyson of the decision, but if he took it as a rebuff its effect on him was momentary.

On 23 August Dyson applied to the Commonwealth for permission to go to France and sketch the Australian troops. This is the date conventionally given as the date of commencement of Australia’s official war art scheme. But the evidence suggests the better view is that it commenced in late May 1917 when the government approved a proposal by Fisher to send Australian artists to France to paint pictures and to engage them formally on terms different to those governing Dyson’s engagement. Anyway, his application proceeded:

I am an Australian artist resident at present in England and am engaged as a black and white cartoonist. I write to suggest that it would be of interest to the people of Australia of today and in the future to see sketches illustrating the relationship of the Australians to the war and interpreting the feelings and character of the Australian troops in France and the feelings of the French towards them. As this could only be fittingly done by an Australian artist I wish to express my willingness to accept a commission to go to France with this end in view, my work while there to be the property of the Australian Government.

Fisher decided to accept Dyson’s offer. He knew his work, having recently purchased Anzac Day at the Abbey for the Commonwealth from his Savoy Hotel exhibition. However, he felt unable to commit the Commonwealth and cabled the Department of External Affairs seeking instructions.

13 Letter, Collins to Perris, 31 July 1916, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 1.
14 Letter, Dyson to Official Secretary, 23 August 1916, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 1.
16 McMullin, Will Dyson, p 126. The work appears on a list of ninety-one drawings and lithographs by Dyson prepared in the High Commissioner’s Offices. See list c 4 September 1920 in AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 3. Although the evidence suggests it was shipped to Australia, it is not in the memorial’s collection.
17 Cable, Fisher to Department of External Affairs, 24 August 1916, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 1. The Office of the High Commissioner of the Commonwealth in the United Kingdom was created by the High Commissioner Act 1909. Under section 4 the High Commissioner was required, inter alia, to carry out such instructions as he received from the minister respecting the commercial, financial, and general interests of the Commonwealth in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. It seems Fisher decided he had no authority to bind the Commonwealth to an arrangement of the kind proposed by Dyson without first obtaining the minister’s consent. Under administrative arrangements approved on 22 September 1915, the minister for the time being of the Department
‘gather impressions of Australians at war’, suggesting his sketches would constitute a ‘valuable record’. He said that Dyson’s work would be the Commonwealth’s property and that the artist had left the question of any remuneration ‘entirely’ to the government. As Dyson did not refer to remuneration in his letter, Fisher’s mention of it suggests that he or Collins had discussed that matter with him. In Australia, his offer was treated expeditiously, not by External Affairs, but by Senator Pearce to whom it was referred, probably because it appeared to involve a matter for the decision of the Defence Department. On 31 August Pearce cabled Fisher: ‘With reference to your telegram August 24th Dyson approved if War Office agree.’

No documents have survived or been located, if there were any, setting out Pearce’s deliberations over Dyson’s offer or his department’s recommendations on how he might decide it. This lack of documentation is a feature of government and other decision-making during this history, as is the mostly inadequate briefing papers occasionally prepared for decision-makers. It seems, then, that the government’s decision to accept Dyson’s offer was not the product of careful consideration, yet another feature of its and other decision-making. Where, for example, were Dyson’s sketches to be preserved? Would they be exhibited, and if so where? More importantly, no parameters were established for the arrangement: its duration was not defined; how were Dyson’s sketching activities to be regulated within the censorship regime that controlled the making and publication of written and pictorial material relating to the war; the question of Dyson’s remuneration was not settled; nor his status – would he be the Commonwealth’s employee or a contractor?; the question of responsibility for him was not addressed – would he travel and work under the protection of the AIF, but be subject to its control, and how and where was he to be accommodated and otherwise provisioned? Censorship was a serious matter. Anderson and Trembath suggest it was censorship that possibly most defined the reportage of the war in both written and pictorial form. Although the precise nature of the restrictions imposed on the making of sketches, illustrations, studies of External Affairs was made responsible for the High Commissioner. These arrangements had been in force since 13 April 1912. See prerogative orders of the Governor-General, Commonwealth Gazette, 22 September 1915, p 2405; 13 April 1912, p 475.

18 McCarthy claims that ‘obviously’ Smart and Fisher discussed with Dyson ‘the possibility of the appointment of war artists’ before he wrote. See Gallipoli to the Somme, p 262. No support for his claim can be found in the evidence.

19 Cable, Pearce to Fisher, 31 August 1916, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 1.

20 Witnesses to war, pp 44-5, 51-6, 75-6. However, in discussing the visual record of the war the authors ignored the work of artists confining their discussion to the work of the official photographers. See ibid., pp 75-82.
and pictures is unclear, it seems clear that an artist required a sketching permit issued by the War Office.²¹ Possibly there were restrictions on the subjects artists were permitted to record, and almost certainly there were restrictions on exhibiting pictures which were made at the front.²² Whatever the situation, there is no evidence that the Commonwealth informed Dyson of the applicable censorship regime or applied to the War Office for the issue of a sketching permit to him.

Collins informed Dyson of the government’s decision,²³ but it seems neither he nor Fisher had informed him that it would be necessary to apprise Birdwood of his proposal and obtain his consent to it. Colonel Percy Buckley, military adviser to the High Commissioner in London,²⁴ advised Dyson to prepare a ‘more precise statement regarding [his] commission’, probably telling him it was required for sending to Birdwood,²⁵ and he did so in the form of a letter:

The precise nature of my work in France would be to interpret in a series of drawings, for national preservation, the sentiments and special Australian characteristics of our Army. I should make no drawings of actual military operations or places – My drawings would be such studies of Australian soldiers and their neighbours as would be suggested to me by personal contact with our men in their European surroundings. What it would require for this is that I should be quartered for periods with Australians in zones where the facilities for such work would not be in or conflict with military requirements. The actual work would be done, in the first stages, in my quarters – that is the drawing itself – to be worked up while in England. I should carry no apparatus and should wish for no facilities for moving about, but it

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²¹ While evidence for this claim is scanty it seems to be correct. In his preface to the official photographic record of the war, Bean explained that sketching and the taking of photographs on the Western Front and elsewhere was ‘entirely prohibited’ (except at Gallipoli where apparently the prohibition was not enforced) until in 1915 such activities became permitted first by official photographers and later by official artists. See Bean and HS Gullett (eds), *Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Volume 12, Photographic Record of the War: Reproductions of Pictures taken by the Australian Official Photographers*, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1923, p v. Bean, however, did not refer to the requirement of a sketching permit. In the evidence this is first referred to in connection with Charles Bryant, an official artist, who required a permit issued by the War Office to sketch and paint at the ports of Le Havre and Boulogne. Other evidence suggests that sketching permits were required to be issued to the AIF artists. It seems that notwithstanding an artist’s appointment as an official artist he still required a permit, but that this requirement was not consistently enforced.

²² The titles at least of pictures proposed to be exhibited had to be cleared with the censor. See letter, Smart to Leist, 2 May 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/8 Part 1.

²³ Letter, Collins to Dyson, 1 September 1916, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 1.


²⁵ Letter, Dyson to Official Secretary, 12 September 1916, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 1.
would be advantageous for me to be in a position to avail myself of any such facilities as might offer.\textsuperscript{26}

On 19 September Collins wrote to Birdwood informing him of Dyson’s proposal and explaining that it had received government approval subject to obtaining the War Office’s agreement.\textsuperscript{27} He enclosed a copy of Dyson’s statement and said he understood there were artists at the front, but did not identify them.\textsuperscript{28} Birdwood replied on 27 September.\textsuperscript{29} Meanwhile, Fisher had visited the front and spoken with him about Dyson’s proposal. Birdwood told him he was willing to help as he thought ‘nothing but good’ could come of it, and that if the War Office sanctioned it Dyson would be treated ‘exactly in the same way’ as Bean.

On 3 October Collins wrote to the War Office seeking its consent to Dyson’s proposal.\textsuperscript{30} He made no effort to persuade it to give its consent and carelessly omitted to refer to essential information, such as that the government and Birdwood had approved it. And inexplicably, he failed to enclose Dyson’s statement setting out his precise intentions. When Dyson told him that Canada had appointed an artist, Richard Jack, to make pictures at the front and had made him a major in its army, Collins merely passed this information on to the War Office, and then with the erroneous observation that Jack’s position seemed to be ‘on the same lines as what we are asking.’\textsuperscript{31} There had been no suggestion that Dyson be given a commission in the AIF. Belatedly, Collins advised the War Office that Birdwood had been consulted, but conveyed nothing of his opinion. Perhaps unsurprisingly the War Office refused Dyson’s application.\textsuperscript{32} It informed Collins that ‘for the present no permanent artist [could] be appointed in addition to the official artist [then] serving with the British Armies in France.’ However, should the High Commissioner desire it, Dyson could visit the front ‘in one of the weekly parties in which are occasionally included visitors whom the [Army] Council desire

\textsuperscript{26} Second letter (statement), Dyson to Official Secretary, 12 September 1916, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 1.
\textsuperscript{27} Letter, Collins to Birdwood, 19 September 1916, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 1.
\textsuperscript{28} It seems Collins was referring to artists who had been engaged and sent to the front to make pictures on behalf of the British and Canadian Governments under its respective war art schemes both of which had commenced in 1916. For studies of these schemes see Meirion and Susie Harries, \textit{British Official War Art of the Twentieth Century}, Michael Joseph, London, 1983 and Maria Tippett, \textit{Art at the Service of War: Canada, Art, and the Great War}, University of Toronto, Toronto, 1984. For brief accounts see Laura Brandon, \textit{Art and War}, IB Tauris, London, 2007, pp 39-48.
\textsuperscript{29} Letter, Birdwood to Collins, 27 September 1916, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 1.
\textsuperscript{30} Letter, Collins to War Office, 3 October 1916, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 1.
\textsuperscript{31} Letter, Collins to War Office, 9 October 1916, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 1.
\textsuperscript{32} Letter, War Office to Collins, 24 October 1916, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 1.
to send out for some special object.’ With his application refused Dyson felt compelled to follow this path to France and, in the meantime, to apply to the Commonwealth for permission to sketch the Australians in camp in England.

Why the War Office refused Dyson’s application, and how its objection was overcome, have never been satisfactorily explained.\(^\text{33}\) Despite his desultory effort in putting Dyson’s case, Collins had made two things clear: first, the Australian Government was asking for permission to be given to Dyson ‘to visit France to gather impressions of the Australians at war from an Australian point of view’; and next, it was seeking the issue of a permit to enable him to be ‘quartered with the Australians’.\(^\text{34}\) Thus, his visit would be a peculiarly Australian affair. As a refusal of this request, the War Office’s response was a non sequitur. Collins had not suggested Dyson’s ‘appointment’ would be ‘permanent’, or that he was seeking to ‘serve’ with the British Army, or indeed the AIF. Seen in this light, the solution found to overcome the War Office’s objection – the granting to Dyson of an honorary commission in the AIF – appears to conflict with it.

Dyson’s offer anticipated a proposal made by Bean on 16 September 1916. An encounter with the *Anzac Book* artist Frank Crozier was the catalyst. Bean wrote to Pearce telling him of his encounter with Crozier, now on the clerical staff of General Gellibrand, and explained how Gellibrand had ‘very broadmindedly’ allowed him to roam about making sketches of Pozières as the battles raged, thinking they might be valuable to the official historian or to the Commonwealth as a ‘record’. He said Crozier’s sketches were ‘most accurate and well drawn’, and was writing ‘to inquire whether some arrangement might be made for the painting which results from [them] … to be acquired for an Australian National gallery’ or, as he also described it, ‘a Federal National Gallery of art’, which he supposed would someday ‘spring into existence’. He sought Pearce’s permission to give an assurance to Crozier, and to the ‘other best known Anzac Book artists’, ‘that if they [cared] to turn out one historical

\(^{33}\) McMullin claims the War Office would only permit one artist to remain indefinitely based at the General Headquarters of the armies it controlled in France, and he was the official British war artist Muirhead Bone. See *Will Dyson*, p 127. Presumably, this is his interpretation of the War Office’s letter to Collins of 24 October 1916, though he neither referred to it nor offered any evidence in support of his claim.

\(^{34}\) Letter, Collins to War Office, 3 October 1916, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 1.
picture each of what they actually saw (or know for certain to be accurate) the Government would be prepared to consider the purchase of such pictures for the nation.”

Here, and for the first time in a communication he addressed to the Commonwealth, Bean referred to the possible establishment of a national art gallery. Importantly, this gallery was not connected to any idea for a national war museum, or to any idea for a memorial, though its undoubted commemorative function was implicit in the circumstance that it would exhibit pictures depicting Australia’s part in the war. In a sense, the origin of the memorial’s art collection can be traced to this letter. Of critical importance is that in it Bean first expressed the idea that artists should paint historical pictures of incidents for the Commonwealth they had witnessed or were certain had occurred, implicitly from sketches they made in the field. This neatly describes the war art scheme’s objects, though Bean was not then proposing a scheme. But the seeds of it lay in his proposal. Moreover, a theme detected in his letter – fidelity – would become an important principle governing the painting of historical pictures for the Commonwealth.

Pearce reacted slowly to Bean’s proposal and when he did he shifted responsibility for its evaluation to others. Possibly he took the view that it did not raise a matter for the decision of Defence. More likely, however, he knew that responsibility for the High Commissioner was due to be transferred to the Prime Minister’s Department. And as he had decided that Fisher should be asked to investigate Bean’s proposal, the appropriate department to determine it was the prime minister’s. Thus, on 4 November 1916 Pearce prepared a minute paper for Hughes, to which he attached a copy of Bean’s proposal, suggesting that Fisher be ‘asked to report thereon giving estimate as to cost involved and his recommendations thereon.’ Pearce belatedly acknowledged Bean’s letter and informed him of how the matter stood.

While waiting to hear from Australia Bean came up with another proposal for Pearce. With an eye to his eventual writing of the official history, he wrote to him on 8 November 1916.

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35 Letter, Bean to Pearce, 16 September 1916, NAA A2, 1920/1044. Also see Bean diary, September-October 1916, AWM 38, 3DRL 666/60/1, entry 7 October 1916, p 113, where he claimed to have also asked Fisher if Crozier could paint some pictures for the nation, but there is no other evidence of that request.
36 These new administrative arrangements were then in transition and came into operation on 21 December 1916. See prerogative order of the Governor-General, Commonwealth Gazette, 21 December 1916, p 3451.
37 Minute paper, Pearce to Hughes, 4 November 1916, NAA A2, 1920/1044.
38 Letter, Pearce to Bean, c early November 1916, NAA A2, 1920/1044.
39 Letter, Bean to Pearce, 8 November 1916, AWM 93, 12/12/1 Part 2.
He told of ‘a set of most remarkable air photographs’ of the fighting at Pozières which General White was sending to him (Pearce). He said he intended going over the photos with a ‘microscopic glass’ before writing his account of the fighting, and he emphasised the need to preserve them so that ‘the little details which they contain may not become obscured.’ The photographs, he suggested, would ‘no doubt eventually find a place in some national Museum, when a national museum exists.’ Here, and for the first time, Bean referred to the probability that a museum would be established. It appeared to be separate from the national art gallery he mentioned in his proposal of 16 September 1916 concerning the Anzac Book artists. For the present, he was thinking along two lines: an art gallery and a national museum. If his letter fell short of actually proposing the creation of a museum, it seems certain he intended Pearce to understand it as such. He also sowed in Pearce’s mind the idea of collecting and exhibiting war relics. He offered to place in the museum ‘any little relics’ he had gathered and offered to describe on labels or in catalogues for the public the war exhibits there, ending: ‘I think such a Museum would add a great deal to the attractions of the Federal capital, and would ensure a certain number of pilgrims even from the very start.’ Bean’s description of visitors to the museum as ‘pilgrims’, connoting the idea of a journey to a sacred place, hinted at a deeper purpose he envisaged for it forming in his subconscious – the memorialisation of the AIF.

When Pearce received Bean’s letter he dealt with it as a matter for Defence. On 25 January 1917, Thomas Trumble, Acting Secretary of the Defence Department, replied to Bean. Trumble’s letter reached Bean well after he had refined his thinking and formulated a different proposal again which involved a scheme for the collection and preservation of ‘Australian Historical War Records’ – embracing photographs, cinema records, war relics and pictures – and the creation of a national (war) museum as the authority responsible for receiving and preserving them. But his letter remains important as containing if not a firm commitment by the government to establish a museum, then an acknowledgement of the desirability that it be established. Trumble informed Bean that the photographs of the fighting at Pozières would be carefully preserved and eventually ‘placed in the future Federal Museum as it is recognised that they are now and will be for all times amongst the foremost of our most valuable relics of this historic and world-wide war and will serve to remind future

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40 Letter, Trumble to Bean, 25 January 1917, AWM 93, 12/12/1 Part 2.
generations of the noble deeds carried out by our brave and tenacious troops in the fighting at Pozieres.’

When Trumble wrote to Bean, Dyson had been in France for almost a month as Australia’s ‘official artist’. But on 24 October 1916, with no word from the War Office as to the fate of his application, he wrote to Collins seeking permission to sketch the Australian troops in camp on Salisbury Plain. When Collins informed him of the War Office’s unfavourable decision, this merely fortified his resolve to get there. On 31 October he wrote to Collins suggesting that in view of the decision his request to begin his work with the soldiers in camp should be granted. So anxious was he to have his request granted that he wrote again the same day, stressing that he required no payment for the work he proposed doing and that his drawings would become the Commonwealth’s property without payment. Collins acceded to his proposal and communicated with Colonel Anderson, commandant of AIF Administrative Headquarters, who saw Dyson and made the necessary travel arrangements to get him to Salisbury Plain. Collins then wrote to the War Office asking that arrangements be made for Dyson to visit the front in one of its weekly parties, and on 9 December he was informed that the War Office had given him permission to visit with an official party for one week from 12 December.

Before Dyson departed for France a way around the War Office’s objection to his proposal was found. Who conceived the idea of granting him an honorary commission in the AIF is

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41 Such an appellation was not, however, then in use.
42 Letter, Dyson to Collins, 24 October 1916, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 1.
43 Letter, Dyson to Collins, 31 October 1916, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 1.
44 Second letter, Dyson to Collins, 31 October 1916, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 1. The source of Dyson’s anxiety to get started on his work for the Commonwealth may have been his wish to avoid compulsory military service in the British Army. He had received a call-up notice and commenced proceedings in a tribunal seeking to be excused from serving. It was only after Collins made representations to the War Office, pointing out that Dyson was to be employed by the Commonwealth, that he was excused ‘at present’. The episode can be traced in letters, Dyson to Collins, c 17 October 1916; Official Secretary to Chairman of Tribunal, 17 October 1916; Dyson to Collins, 19 October 1916; Dyson to Collins, 4 November 1916; Collins to Chairman of Tribunal, 6 November 1916; Collins to War Office, 6 November 1916; all in AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 1; AIF Administrative Headquarters to Mrs WH Dyson, 28 November 1916; War Office to Official Secretary, 20 November 1916; War Office to Official Secretary, 6 December 1916; all in AWM 16, 4351/2/13.
45 Memorandum, Collins to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 1 November 1916; letter, Collins to Dyson, 2 November 1916; letter, Dyson to Collins, 4 November 1916; all in AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 1; Anderson to Headquarters, AIF Depots in United Kingdom, 6 November 1916, AWM 16, 4351/2/13. His work sketching the Australian troops in camp on Salisbury Plain appears not to have survived. If Dyson made any drawings he failed to deliver them to the Commonwealth. There are none in the memorial’s collection.
46 Letter, Collins to War Office, 6 November 1916, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 1; letter, War Office to Collins, 8 December 1916; memorandum, Collins to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 8 December 1916; letter, AIF Administrative Headquarters to Dyson, 9 December 1916; all in AWM 16, 4351/2/13.
unclear. In late November 1916 Dyson and Anderson are likely to have discussed ways of overcoming the War Office’s objection. Dyson told Allen Box, Fisher’s private secretary, that Anderson wished to see his file, and Box sent this to him on 30 November. By 5 December a possible solution had been found. On that date Anderson wrote to 1st Anzac Corps headquarters in France explaining Dyson’s problem and suggesting that he be granted an honorary commission. He referred to Fisher’s ‘recent visit’ to the front and discussion with Birdwood – this must have been his September visit – and suggested that the reason why the War Office objected to Dyson’s proposal was his civilian status. This interpretation of the War Office’s objection, one not readily apparent from its letter of 24 October, appears to have been shared by Fisher. Anderson continued:

Mr. Fisher urges that [Dyson] be granted an honourary (sic) commission in the A.I.F. He desires no pay – simply payment of his carriage and keep. We, of course, would have to invite the consent of the War Office to utilising his services in this special way, but if we were to indicate our willingness to grant him an honourary (sic) commission, their scruples would probably be overcome, and they would grant us the permission we seek.

As Anderson claimed it was Fisher who was urging that Dyson be granted an honorary commission, it might reasonably be supposed that the idea was his. However, it seems possible that Dyson himself suggested the solution if he mentioned during discussions with Anderson that Richard Jack had been given a commission in the Canadian Army to enable him to go to the front and paint pictures. At 1st Anzac Corps headquarters Anderson’s proposal was promptly approved. Apart from Birdwood, and perhaps Lieutenant-Colonel Whitham, the Assistant Adjutant-General (AAG), the evidence does not reveal who else was involved in the decision. It seems possible that Birdwood consulted Bean on the matter.

47 Letter, Box to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 30 November 1916, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 1. Born in Melbourne in 1885, Edward Allen Box was a longstanding public servant who had entered the Commonwealth Public Service in 1903. He had been Fisher’s private secretary since 1912. In February 1918 he was appointed Official Secretary replacing the retiring Muirhead Collins. See letter, Box to Bean, 24 October 1934, AWM 43, A91; record of service of Edward Allen Box, no date, NAA, CP268/3; press release, ‘Australia’s New Official Secretary in London’, 12 February 1918, NAA, A2910, 442/2/9 Part 1.
48 Letter, Anderson to Headquarters 1st Anzac Corps, 5 December 1916, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 1.
49 It is clear Anderson consulted Dyson before preparing his letter. See letter, AIF Administrative Headquarters to Dyson, 9 December 1916, AWM 16, 4312/2/13, in which the proposal to grant him an honorary commission is mentioned.
50 This possibility arises because Bean later recalled that Birdwood with White treated him as his consultant on the question of Dyson’s appointment. See typescript, ‘The Beginnings of the Australian War Memorial’, c 1959, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/619, p 4.
Anyway, on 10 December Whitham wrote to AIF Administrative Headquarters in London, his letter including:

> With reference to your memo ... of 5th instant, relative to the employment of Mr. Will Dyson, the Australian Artist, to do certain work in connection with Australian Troops in France, the Lieutenant-General Commanding has approved of the proposal to grant Mr. Dyson a Commission as Lieutenant in the A.I.F. from to-day’s date, on the distinct understanding that such commission is honorary and temporary, and that he will not be entitled to any payment, allowances, or other expenses against the Commonwealth. Quarters and rations will be provided and necessary steamer and rail warrants will be issued to him.\(^{51}\)

There is no evidence that War Office approval was sought to grant Dyson an honorary commission, though Anderson supposed this would be necessary.\(^{52}\) And if the War Office’s objection to Dyson’s proposal had been to his civilian status, he should have realised that the effect of granting him an honorary commission would be to overcome it and obviate the necessity of seeking War Office approval at all. When Dyson was granted his commission he acquired a military status, albeit temporarily, which probably put him beyond the War Office’s reach. At all events the solution found for him would become a crucial feature of the war art scheme: all artists subsequently engaged by the Commonwealth to go to the front and make pictures for it were granted honorary commissions in the AIF without reference to the War Office.\(^{53}\)

The Commonwealth did not formalise Dyson’s engagement. To ascertain its terms it was necessary to refer to his offer of 23 August 1916 and his statement of 12 September 1916 describing the precise nature of his proposed work in France. Amazingly, there is no evidence that Fisher informed the government of the final arrangements he made with Dyson,

\(^{51}\) Letter, Whitham to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 10 December 1916, AWM 16, 4351/2/13.

\(^{52}\) Several telegrams passed between the War Office and AIF Administrative Headquarters showing that it knew of Dyson’s commission, but these merely fixed a date for him to report for duty. See War Office to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 29 December 1916; AIF Administrative Headquarters to War Office, 30 December 1916; War Office to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 30 December 1916; all in AWM 16, 4351/2/13.

\(^{53}\) Regulation 29 of *Australian Military Regulations 1916* (operative 1 October 1916) prescribed the limited rights attracted by the conferral of an honorary commission: ‘Honorary rank shall not confer the right of any command other than that to which the holder may be titled by reason of his substantive commission; but an officer holding honorary rank will, in virtue of such honorary rank, be titled to such other privileges, excepting pay, allowances, promotion, or retirement, as may belong to the corresponding substantive rank.’ Regulation 15 of *Military Regulations, 1913-1914 (General)*, the previous and now repealed regulations, was identical and governed Bean’s honorary commission.
notwithstanding that their precise nature had been left unhelpfully vague. Several important matters remained unresolved: the duration of his engagement; his remuneration; securing his compliance with the applicable censorship regime; his legal status – servant or contractor? The question of responsibility for him had, perhaps, become clearer, as his honorary commission brought him within the purview and, presumably, the protection of the AIF. But had he been killed or seriously wounded, and apparently he occasionally put himself in harm’s way, the question of responsibility for him would have quickly arisen. All things considered, the arrangements were a shambles.

On 4 January 1917, when Dyson crossed to France as Australia’s ‘official artist’, no decision had been made on Bean’s proposal that certain Anzac Book artists be invited to paint a historical picture each for the Commonwealth. Pearce, it will be recalled, had referred this to the Prime Minister’s Department with the recommendation that Fisher be asked to investigate it. On 5 December 1916, Hughes cabled Fisher:

Bean has advised Minister Defence Crozier on clerical staff General Gillibrand (sic) made sketches and notes of Pozieres. Suggests Government make offer Crozier if paints satisfactory picture purchase it. First, would serve as indication of quality and basis of arrangement as to series. Inquiries (sic) also whether Government prepared give assurance one best known Anzac Book artists will consider purchase one accurate historical picture from each. Glad to know your views this proposal giving estimate expense involved.

Fisher asked Box to deal with it, and on 8 and 21 December he and Bean exchanged letters. Box asked Bean for his assessment of the artists’ capabilities to paint military subjects and/or landscapes; to clarify whether they were to be invited to make sketches, ‘interesting in themselves and of value for the guidance of artists in doing large historical works in the years to come’, or ‘historical works for Australia suitable for a National collection’; and an indication of the likely cost. While this more than covered what Hughes wished to know, Box had come up with an idea: he wondered if steps should be taken to collect ‘every scrap of

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54 The AIF informed the government that Dyson had been granted an honorary commission and no more. See letter, Whitham to Secretary, Defence Department, 24 December 1916, Will Dyson service records, NAA.
55 McMullin, Will Dyson, pp 137, 139, 152.
56 Record of Service in the Field, Will Dyson service records, NAA.
57 Cable, Hughes to Fisher, 5 December 1916, AWM 93, 8/2/23.
58 Letters, Box to Bean, 8 December 1916; Bean to Box, 21 December 1916; both in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/50. The emphasis has been added.
decent stuff’ made by the soldiers ‘to be properly recorded, exhibited if desirable, and formed into a collection’, and that the Commonwealth purchase ‘accepted’ work at market rates. These, he suggested, would be invaluable as ‘an aid to the men who are going later on to place on canvas the war scenes that are going to be our Australian tradition’.

When Bean replied, he explained the privileged position occupied by the Anzac Book artists as witnesses of ‘events of enormous interest’. He ventured that although ‘great pictures’ of the events would be painted, ‘the picture of the scene as it was – and even the spirit of the scene as it was – [could] be painted, with knowledge, by a few men only.’ According to him, a picture made by a witness and exhibited in ‘a future Australian national gallery’ would have ‘in its own way … an interest greater than that of any other’, though not possessing the same ‘artistic value’. In his opinion a picture’s worth lay in its value as ‘historical evidence’, a point he emphasised by acting out an imaginary visit to the gallery and happening upon such a picture: ‘I read the inscription and say to myself: “This was painted by a man who actually saw the thing – he saw those things happening and this is his record of it”.’ Bean offered all this to persuade Fisher, and indirectly Hughes, of his proposal’s merits. His few contentions encapsulated almost his entire philosophy on Anzac’s pictorial representation. Bean moved on to discuss the artists’ abilities: he claimed they could make ‘a picture of what they saw with the spirit of what they saw and with a good technique’, and ‘in their own style’. But in case their merit had not been sufficiently proved, he suggested that ‘a perfectly direct and simple means of obtaining their work … [was] for the Commonwealth Government to let them know … that if they each produced such a picture or pictures, and if it were a satisfactory effort, the Government would favourably consider its purchase for the nation.’ (This is what he had proposed to Pearce.) Inexplicably, here Bean stopped: he failed to give an estimate of the likely cost of the pictures. He came finally to Box’s idea that the Commonwealth offer to purchase ‘accepted’ work from AIF men at market rates pronouncing it ‘a good one’.

Bean’s reply contained the entire information the Commonwealth received concerning his proposal, and its consideration by Fisher and the Prime Minister’s Department would not be the subject of any further evaluative process. From this point it ceased to be dealt with alone and was caught up in plans to establish a scheme for collecting and preserving Australia’s war records. When, on 8 February 1917, Fisher finally responded to Hughes’s cable of 5 December, he did so in the context of recommending that a ‘War Records Office’ be set up.
And although the government approved Bean’s proposal, and Box’s as well, neither was implemented. Then, on 26 April 1917, Fisher recommended to Hughes that the Commonwealth appoint additional Australian artists – that is, additional to Dyson – to go to the front and sketch the troops and for that purpose grant them honorary commissions in the AIF. This is the moment when the war art scheme was first proposed, but before it arrived several important events intervened.

On 6 February 1917 Bean composed a letter, the nominal addressee of which was Smart but the intended recipient Fisher, of decisive importance for establishing a path leading directly to the modern memorial and its vast collection. In his previous letters Bean had referred first to the probable establishment of a national art gallery and next to a national museum. The former, he suggested, would receive the historical pictures he hoped would be painted by the Anzac Book artists, and the latter the air photographs of the fighting at Pozières and relics. Now, in proposing a ‘complete scheme’ for collecting and preserving Australia’s military and non-military war records, it occurred to him that a single authority should be created to receive these records – a national (war) museum. He would never again suggest the creation of a separate national art gallery; it was subsumed in his idea for a museum, and if pictures depicting Australia’s part in the war were produced, they would go there.

Bean’s letter was prompted by a cable from Smart who apparently asked him to describe his scheme in order to put it up to Fisher and then the government. Conventionally, its genesis is attributed to discussions held between Bean and Smart in early 1917 after they visited the Canadian War Records Office and the government’s desire to have control of its military records. However, in his letter Bean confined himself to discussing Australia’s non-military records, identifying these as photographs, cinema records, pictures and relics. As to pictures, he summarised the position so far as he knew it: first, he told Smart that the government through the High Commissioner had made arrangements to preserve the drawings made by Dyson, ‘the Official artist’, the first recorded instance of such an appellation being applied to him. Next, he briefly restated his proposal of 16 September 1916 concerning the Anzac

59 Letter, Bean to Smart, 6 February 1917, AWM 93, 12/12/1 Part 3.
60 JL Treloar, ‘Report on the work of the Australian War Records Section from May 1917 to September 1918 by the Officer in Charge’, 30 September 1918, AWM 224, MSS555/1, esp pp 1-3.
61 Letter, Bean to Smart, 6 February 1917, AWM 93, 12/12/1 Part 3, p 3. This circumstance, when added to the fact that Dyson’s honorary commission dated from 10 December 1916, refutes the claim that it was in May 1917 that Dyson was appointed an official artist. See, for example, Gray, A Henry Fulwood, p 23; Gray, ‘War Art’, p
Book artists, which remained undecided, and connected this to Box’s idea of collecting every ‘scrap of decent stuff’ made by the soldiers: ‘Mr Box suggests, and I agree, that a small Committee, including one person who has knowledge of the historical value of these sketches, (who must have some knowledge of the events and places recorded) should pick out these sketches and assess the price to be offered.’ 62 Although Bean’s proposal, varied to accommodate Box’s idea, was never implemented, it remains relevant as a step along the way to the war art scheme. Moreover, his insistence that for a picture to be acquired for the nation it had to satisfy two requirements – its subject had to be an event of significance in the AIF’s part in the war and had to be accurately depicted – anticipated the control he would later exercise over the scheme. It will come as no surprise to discover in due course that it was Bean who became the arbiter of whether a picture satisfied these requirements. Of the many suggestions he made in relation to his scheme for collecting and preserving Australia’s war records, the most important for this history he expressed as follows:

There should be set up in Australia an authority for receiving these records, trophies, and relics. It is quite clear to my mind that this should be a NATIONAL MUSEUM. The buildings of course will not exist, but the collection which will be the nucleus of the National Historical treasures cannot be organised too early. The Anzac Book M.S.S. has been presented to the Australian Government for such a Museum, and is to be kept in the Commonwealth Parliamentary Library until such a Museum is established.63

The Commonwealth was now clearly on notice that its official war correspondent and official historian designate regarded the establishment of a national museum as a necessary fulfilment of the nation’s desire to preserve for posterity the records of the part it played in the war. Fisher was convinced, immediately cabling Hughes:

Consider nucleus of War Record Office should be set up as has been done by Canada for purpose of collection of historical material photographs sketches, trophies, etc., of Australia’s part in the war. Excellent record of war photographs has been made by this office already.

With reference to your cablegram 5th December, War sketches, after consultation with Bean consider three men – Crozier, White and Collis (sic) – with Australian Forces might each

566; Brandon, Art and War, p 50. Gray also mistakenly claims that until May 1917 Dyson made sketches in France in a civilian capacity. See ‘War Art’, p 566.
62 Letter, Bean to Smart, 6 February 1917, AWM 93, 12/12/1 Part 3, p 3. The emphasis is Bean’s.
63 Ibid., pp 4-5.
paint a picture of Australian troops in action as seen by them, and that Commonwealth Government might intimate to them if result approved and satisfactory Government would favorably (sic) consider purchase. Competent men in the Australian Forces might be invited to submit sketches and pictures to be judged at regular intervals by an Honorary Committee and if accepted paid for at market rates, to form part of collection for the Australian Government.  

The second paragraph purports to reply to Hughes’s cable of 5 December 1916 asking Fisher to investigate Bean’s proposal and also conveys the substance of Box’s proposal. The two were unrelated, but Hughes could be forgiven for thinking they were aspects of the same proposal. In any case, to the extent that Fisher did not provide him with an estimate of the likely cost of the historical pictures, his cable did not amount to the report on which he was waiting. This did not trouble Hughes who approved its proposals and cabled Fisher: ‘Your telegram 8th February, historical record Australia’s part in the war, I concur in your proposals. Glad to receive suggestions from you as to composition of honorary committee and generally for giving effect to scheme.’

The only document possibly put before Hughes to assist him in deciding Fisher’s proposals was a memorandum prepared in his department around 3 March 1917. It dealt with three proposals – Bean’s, under the heading ‘Paintings of Battle Scenes by Anzac Artists’; John Bridge and Co’s for a ‘National Memorial (Paintings)’; and Mr E Wrench’s for ‘An Overseas War Memorial (Monument)’. As the proposals by John Bridge and Co and Bean both involved commissioning pictures commemorating Australia’s part in the war, Hughes probably considered them together. But as the memorandum’s author neither evaluated them nor made any recommendations, the assistance it provided Hughes for decision-making purposes was infinitesimal. No documents have survived or been located recording the fate of

64 Cable, Fisher to Hughes, 8 February 1917, AWM 93, 8/2/23.
65 Cable, Hughes to Fisher, 26 March 1917, NAA A2, 1920/1044.
66 Memorandum, ‘National Memorials to Australian Soldiers’, Prime Minister’s Department, c 3 March 1917, NAA A2, 1920/1044. Hughes’s approval on 17 March 1917 of Fisher’s proposals is recorded in the margin of the memorandum as a handwritten note, probably made by Malcolm Shepherd, Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department.
67 As Fisher’s proposal that a war records office be set up was not mentioned in the memorandum, how Hughes decided it is elusive. The last proposal dealt with an expression of interest by the Overseas Club in London in establishing an overseas monumental memorial to the fallen and is not pertinent.
John Bridge and Co’s proposal, but it can be assumed it was rejected. Why Hughes preferred Bean’s is a mystery.  

While Hughes was considering Fisher’s proposals, Australia’s military authorities in London were taking steps to establish a war records office. The AIF wished to retain its original war diaries which were being sent to and kept permanently by the War Office. The Canadians, however, had an arrangement with the War Office under which they were permitted to retain the originals of their army’s war diaries. On 14 March 1917 Lieutenant-Colonel Griffiths, the new commandant of AIF Administrative Headquarters, wrote to the War Office informing it of the Australian Government’s intention to establish a war records section ‘on the same lines as now exist for Canada’ and asking for the ‘same concessions’ afforded the Canadians. The War Office promptly granted this request. Over the next two months the details of a scheme for collecting and preserving Australia’s military and non-military war records was worked out between the AIF and the Commonwealth.

Two important matters, however, still required resolution. The first was whether the war records office should be under military or civilian authority; after discussion it was decided it

68 According to the memorandum Lionel Bridge of John Bridge and Co Ltd, Sydney had written to Hughes suggesting that a picture or pictures be commissioned depicting ‘heroic stories’ and be given ‘an honoured (sic) place in the archives of the Australian nation.’ Bridge’s sentiments, as paraphrased by the memorandum’s author, could be Bean’s: the pictures would be a perpetual source of inspiration to Australian patriotism and a reminder of the distinguished part the nation had played in the conflict; no time should be lost in securing all possible data for the artist; the picture or pictures would retain ‘enduring interest’. In its design and purpose Bridge’s proposal anticipated Bean’s later scheme of pictures for the memorial, a scheme consisting of numerous historical pictures of incidents, locations and conditions in the story of Anzac and portraits of officers and other ranks who had rendered distinguished service. Bridge referred to the ‘inspiring effect’ produced by viewing Alphonse de Neuville’s The defence of Rorke’s Drift 1879 (1880) in the Sydney Art Gallery (AGNSW) and suggested that events such as Anzac could be ‘similarly recorded’. Bridge’s identification of de Neuville’s painting as the appropriate representational form for the depiction of Anzac events is pertinent for two reasons: first, no serious doubt could be entertained that Bean was familiar with the painting; and secondly, and more significantly, it substantially reflected Bean’s views and would inform his approach to the historical pictures commissioned to be painted for the Commonwealth. Bridge enclosed with his letter a ‘confidential report’ relating to his proposal prepared by the Australian artist Alfred Coffey who described a scheme for the painting of three large pictures (18 x 12 feet). Each should depict, he said, an ‘outstanding deed’ of the AIF and if pictorially possible have as its main feature ‘a deed by which one of our heroes won the Victoria Cross.’ In addition to these pictures Coffey proposed that his scheme should also provide for the beginning of a collection of portraits of ‘our Australian Military Heroes.’ He established a budget of £5,000 for carrying out his scheme to be raised by public subscription.

69 Letter, Griffiths to War Office, 14 March 1917, AWM 25, 1013/36.

70 Letter, War Office to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 22 March 1917, AWM 93, 12/12/1 Part 2.

71 Letters, Griffiths to Official Secretary, 28 March 1917; Collins to Birdwood, 28 March 1917; both in AWM 93, 12/12/1 Part 2; Griffiths to Whitham, 4 April 1917, AWM 16, 4379/1/41; Birdwood to Collins, 21 April 1917; Griffiths to Birdwood, 2 May 1917; Birdwood to Griffiths, 4 May 1917; Collins to Birdwood, 4 May 1917, with attached record of interview between Buckley, Griffiths and Smart on 4 May 1917 entitled ‘A.I.F. Records and Australian National Records’; all in AWM 93, 12/12/1 Part 2.
should be a military entity.\textsuperscript{72} The second was finding an officer to be placed in charge of the office. This introduces John Treloar, who is next in importance to Bean in this history.\textsuperscript{73} A lieutenant, Treloar was serving at 1st Anzac Corps headquarters where he was in charge of the Central Registry, appropriately a records office.\textsuperscript{74} Griffiths recommended him claiming he was ‘well fitted for [the] job’, adding that Bean thought he would be a ‘suitable man’.\textsuperscript{75} As General White was prepared to let him go, Whitham notified AIF Administrative Headquarters that he could be made available.\textsuperscript{76} Treloar, now promoted captain, crossed to England and on 16 May 1917 the Australian War Records Office (AWRS) commenced operations.\textsuperscript{77}

On 26 April 1917, Fisher had cabled Hughes:

Your telegram 26th March historical records High Commissioner has been in consultation with General Birdwood and complete scheme got out, copy will be forwarded. Dyson now in

\textsuperscript{72} Typescript, ‘A.I.F. Records and Australian National Records (London Committee) (in so far as they concern the war)’, c 28 March 1917, AWM 93, 12/12/1 Part 2; memorandum, White to Whitham, 19 April 1917, AWM 16, 4379/1/41; letters, Griffiths to Birdwood, 2 May 1917; Birdwood to Griffiths, 4 May 1917; both in AWM 93, 12/12/1 Part 2.\textsuperscript{73} Born in 1894 in Melbourne and educated in Victoria, when he left school Treloar initially worked as a clerk in the Defence Department before appointed to Military Staff Clerks at Victoria Barracks. According to Anne-Marie Condé, he had no art training or appreciation of art. He enlisted in the AIF on 16 August 1914 and was immediately promoted staff sergeant and attached to divisional headquarters. In October 1914 he embarked \textit{Orvieto} with the first contingent and was promoted warrant officer in Egypt. He went ashore at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915 and served as a clerk on the general staff until evacuated on 4 September suffering from enteric fever. Hospitalised and dangerously ill for a time, he was discharged in December 1915 and invalided to Australia. After recovering he applied for a commission in the AIF and was appointed lieutenant on 16 February 1916. A month later he was bound for Egypt. After serving at Heliopolis he embarked for France on 11 July 1916 and was seconded for duty as a ‘Superintending Clerk’ attached to 1st Anzac Corps headquarters. See Attestation Form, Military Forces of the Commonwealth, Permanent Forces, 16 May 1911; Attestation Paper of Persons Enlisted for Service Abroad; Statement of Service; Casualty Form-Active Service; Record of Service in the Field; Application for a Commission in the Australian Imperial Force, 14 February 1916; Record of Officers’ Services; all in John Linton Treloar service records, NAA. Also see Condé, ‘John Treloar, Official War Art and the Australian War Memorial, \textit{Australian Journal of Politics and History}, vol 53, no 3, 2007, pp 451-64 at pp 452, 455, 458; Denis Winter, ‘Treloar, John Linton (1894-1952)’, \textit{Australian Dictionary of Biography}, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/treloar-john-linton-8846/text155525, accessed 21 May 2013.\textsuperscript{74} Record of Service in the Field; Record of Officers’ Services; both in John Linton Treloar service records, NAA. Also see Condé, ‘John Treloar, Official War Art and the Australian War Memorial, \textit{Australian Journal of Politics and History}, vol 53, no 3, 2007, pp 451-64 at pp 452, 455, 458; Denis Winter, ‘Treloar, John Linton (1894-1952)’, \textit{Australian Dictionary of Biography}, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/treloar-john-linton-8846/text155525, accessed 21 May 2013.\textsuperscript{75} Letter, Griffiths to Whitham, 4 April 1917, AWM 16, 4379/1/41.\textsuperscript{76} Letter, White to Whitham, 19 April 1917; letter, Whitham to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 26 April 1917; both in AWM 16, 4379/1/41.\textsuperscript{77} Statement of Service; Record of Service in the Field; both in John Linton Treloar service records, NAA; letters, Smart to Bean, 16 May 1917, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286; Smart to Bean, 18 May 1917, AWM 93, 12/12/1 Part 3. For accounts of the creation and operation of the AWRS see Treloar, ‘Report on the work of the Australian War Records Section from May 1917 to September 1918 by the Officer in Charge’, AWM 224, MSS555/1; Ann Millar, ‘Gallipoli to Melbourne: The Australian War Memorial, 1915-19’, \textit{Journal of the Australian War Memorial}, vol 10, 1987, pp 33-42; Simon Cooke and Anna Froud, \textit{The Australian War Records Section}, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1989; McKernan, \textit{Here is their spirit}, pp 36-9, 42-6.
France with Honorary Commission as Lieutenant without pay or allowances for purpose of producing drawings of Australian soldiers and studies now recommend that Messrs Power and [Percy] Spence, Australian artists, should proceed to Western front immediately on same terms for 3 months with Honorary Commission, A.I.F., to produce pictures of war operations all work to become property of Commonwealth Government, and that they receive allowance £1 per day and cost of materials to be defrayed by Commonwealth and similar allowance be allowed to Dyson. High Commissioner would be glad Ministers’ (sic) approval to this proposal.78

Fisher’s recommendation appears out of nowhere, and no documents have survived or been located showing why he made it.79 This suggests it was impromptu. It can be assumed he personally did not come up with the idea, and it can also be assumed he neither formulated the proposed terms on which the artists should be sent nor selected them.80 The only known contemporary account of how the scheme emerged is Bean’s, set down in a memoir he prepared in March 1918 for Senator Pearce describing what had been done, and what should be done, to collect and preserve Australia’s war records.81 Under the heading ‘Artists’, he said:

The original suggestion as to artists was to allow some of our Anzac Book artists, members of the A.I.F. itself to paint their recollections of Anzac and Pozières for the future galleries of Australia. Messrs Box and Smart of the High Commissioner’s Office, suggested an enlargement of this scheme by the appointment of Australian artists outside the Force, who could be readily sent across [to] France with temporary commissions.82

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78 Cable, Fisher to Hughes, 26 April 1917, AWM 93, 8/2/23.
79 Most of what is known about the circumstances in which the war art scheme emerged must be pieced together from material copied from the files of the Prime Minister’s Department and Defence Department and made up as a file and preserved in the memorial’s archives, and from material in a file once maintained in the Prime Minister’s Department and preserved in the National Archives of Australia. These are AWM 93, 8/2/23, ‘Estimates War Museum Expenditure embodying principally proposals for war artists with terms and conditions of same (1915-1923)’, and NAA A2, 1920/1044, ‘Historic Memorials (War) Paintings by Anzac Artists’. By resorting to these Fisher’s cables to Australia can be read, but what led to them being sent, apart from what might reasonably be inferred from the fact of them, remains unknown. Although a number of artist files once maintained in the High Commissioner’s Offices have survived, none contain documents relating to Fisher’s initial recommendations to Hughes to establish a war art scheme.
80 Bastian claims that Fisher ‘directly’ organised the war art scheme. See Andrew Fisher, p 304. This overstates his involvement and is based entirely on the contents of Fisher’s annual reports as High Commissioner for 1916, 1917 and 1918.
81 Typescript, ‘The Australian war records. An account of the present development overseas and suggestions of course necessary to be taken at the end of the war’, March 1918, AWM 25, 1013/5. For reasons of economy this document will be referred to as Bean’s first memoir.
82 Ibid., p 6.
There is no reason to doubt this account. It was prepared relatively close in time to the events it describes when Bean’s recollection was fresh, and it formed part of an important document he was preparing for the government. Moreover, it is largely consistent with another account he set down in a memoir prepared late in his life:

While these things were happening [the creation of the AWRS] Smart had also suggested to me that Australia should appoint official artists – he was in constant touch with the Australian artists of whom a colony always existed at Chelsea. Will Dyson was the first to press for appointment – I think the High Commissioner probably first made the suggestion to Birdwood, who, with White, treated me as his consultant on the matter. Birdwood agreed. The official artists were selected by Smart and the supplies for them and administration in London were Smart’s duty at that time; at the front they worked under my instructions or guidance – so far as they had any – They were attached to divisions.  

In both accounts, prepared forty years apart, Smart figures prominently, and in each Bean credits him with having come up with the idea for a scheme, in the first with Box and in the next alone. This difference counts for little and does not afford a good reason to doubt it. However, while indicating that Smart suggested the idea to him Bean says nothing about any involvement he had in securing Fisher’s support of it. His diaries show he was in France, but that does not exclude his possible involvement in discussions and correspondence, though in the latter case one might have expected to find letters, and there are none. Still, it is difficult to accept that he played no part in gaining Fisher’s support of the idea, perhaps even proposing the terms for the artists’ engagement: Fisher, it will be recalled, was his ‘sincere friend’. However, all of this is speculation, as is suggesting an explanation for why the scheme emerged at this time. Part of it might be that pictures were now officially regarded as non-military records of Australia’s part in the war, and possibly ideas about how they could be acquired formed part of the discussions leading to the AWRS’s creation. And doubtless

84 McCarthy claims that at some unspecified time – this seems to be late 1916, which according to the evidence is too early – Bean ‘entered into the matter of the formal creation of a group of war artists when White and Birdwood raised this with him.’ See Gallipoli to the Somme, p 262. This claim is inconsistent with Bean’s own accounts, and while it can be accepted that Birdwood and White consulted him in relation to Dyson’s appointment, there is no evidence they were the source of the idea for a war art scheme. Moreover, it conflicts with Bean’s claim that White ‘supported’ a proposal that Australian artists should be sent to France. See Two Men I Knew, p 149. There is also no evidence which supports McMullin’s claim that Dyson was ‘closely involved in the expansion of the war art scheme’. See Will Dyson, pp 151-2.
the precedent created by Dyson’s engagement was a factor, as was the circumstance that Britain and Canada had war art schemes.

Hughes decided that Fisher’s proposal was one peculiarly for Defence and referred it to Trumble. Why he took this course is puzzling. Fisher’s proposal to establish a war records office had had about it an obvious military aspect thus warranting it being referred to Defence, but he decided it himself. Anyway, on 4 May 1917, and before anyone in Australia had considered his proposal, Fisher cabled Hughes again: ‘In continuation of my telegram of 26th April, re Historical Records, High Commissioner would be glad for authority to send five Australian leading Artists to the Front for a period of three months, each, on terms proposed in telegram.’ This was also referred to Defence. What had occurred since 26 April that decided Fisher to alter his proposal by increasing the number of artists is unknown. Smart reported this development to Bean in France, which supports the view that he was aware of the movements afoot in London to get artists to the front:

The High Commissioner sent a recommendation to Australia that six artists be given permission to proceed to France in order to paint pictures. We intend to select six [he meant five] of the best Australian artists for this work. Among them will be Power and [John] Longstaff. The idea is to send each of them over for about a month [Fisher had recommended three months]. I think the scheme will work very well. This means we will get a good deal of material, and after all there is plenty of room for all the good artists we can lay our hands on.

By whose definition were Power and Longstaff among the ‘best Australian artists’? If Bean’s accounts are correct, it was Smart’s. Although he was said to be ‘in constant touch’ with the colony of expatriate Australian artists at Chelsea, many or most of whom were members of the Chelsea Arts Club, treating it as their ‘headquarters’, the evidence does not show

85 Memorandum, Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department to Acting Secretary, Defence Department, 27 April 1917, AWM 93, 8/2/23.
86 Cable, Fisher to Hughes, 4 May 1917, AWM 93, 8/2/23.
87 Letter, Smart to Bean, 16 May 1917, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
88 AJ Daplyn, ‘Australian artists. At the academy and the salons’, Sydney Morning Herald, 16 August 1913, p 5. As to the distinctively Australian atmosphere of the Chelsea Arts Club, in an article written a few short years after the war, A Henry Fullwood, one of the official artists, recalled: ‘The Australian is usually in evidence, and, as he is not as quiet or as restrained as his brother, the British artist, many a visitor has suspected the place of being an Australian club.’ See AH Fullwood, ‘The Chelsea Arts Club’, Home, 1 March 1923, p 37. As to the significance of the club in the lives of expatriate Australian artists in London during the period 1909-1919, see Carol Mills, Expatriate Australian black-and-white artists: Ruby and Will Dyson and their circle in London,
whether any approach had been made to them. As whoever was selected to go to France would be required to work in the field in inhospitable and possibly dangerous conditions, one wonders if any assessment was made as to the abilities of the artists then being considered to work in them. There is no evidence that any such assessment was made. Perhaps it was assumed that as professional artists they would be able to adapt to these new working conditions and, if necessary, work in unfamiliar media. But the suggestion that Longstaff be sent to France made no sense: he was working exclusively in portraiture. And what had become of Percy Spence, whom Fisher mentioned in his earlier cable? Ultimately, what was known about the artists Smart mentioned and their work and why they were regarded as suitable for appointment are unknown.  

Defence considered Fisher’s proposal, apparently accepting that it was one peculiarly within its purview to decide. On 26 May 1917 Trumble sent a memorandum to the Prime Minister’s Department requesting that a cable be sent to Fisher in the following terms: ‘With reference to your telegram 4th May approval given Australian Artists proceed front on conditions stated. Decision re War Records Office will be forwarded shortly.’ The Prime Minister’s Department promptly complied and it seems did not give the matter separate consideration, sending a cable in identical terms to Fisher on 28 May. This is a key moment in this history: it heralds the commencement of the war art scheme, although no artists would be sent to

89 There is no evidence to support Gray’s claim that the artists were selected on the basis of their ‘specialist interests and abilities’ and expected to work within their ‘specialist interests’. See ‘War Art’, p 566. Rather, the evidence establishes that all appointments were made ad hoc without assessing the artist’s ‘specialist interests and abilities’. Further, it will shortly emerge that the artists were engaged by the Commonwealth under formal agreements which required them to produce a specified class of work irrespective of their ‘specialist interests’.  
90 Memorandum, Trumble to Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, 26 May 1917, AWM 93, 8/2/23.  
91 Memorandum, Shepherd to Acting Secretary, Defence Department, 6 June 1917, AWM 93, 8/2/23. Why the Prime Minister’s Department sent a cable in the form drafted by Defence is baffling and on its receipt by Fisher must have baffled him. It informed him that whether a war records office could be established was under consideration, but the AWRS had already been established in accordance with Hughes’s approval. Why the Prime Minister’s Department did not pick this up is anyone’s guess. That the error was made at all is evidence of a serious breakdown in communications between Defence and the Prime Minister’s Department and of incompetence in the latter department. But Fisher is not innocent of incompetence. He failed to correct Defence’s understanding. Thus, it later considered whether a war records office should be established within the High Commissioner’s Offices. On 7 July 1917 Trumble recommended its establishment to Pearce. See minute paper, Defence Department, ‘Australian War Museum and War Record Office’, 7 July 1917, AWM 93, 12/12/1 Part 2. Pearce decided the matter on 27 July: ‘Approved, provided that before any important development of this office is sanctioned by the High Commissioner he should obtain approval of Commonwealth Govt. We should also ask for an estimate of the annual expenditure involved in the above.’ Not only had he been put to the trouble of making an unnecessary decision, but the proposal to which he gave his qualified approval was one which had been abandoned in favour of the office being created as a section of AIF Administrative Headquarters.
France until September that year. No documents have survived or been located recording Pearce’s deliberations – it is certain he approved Fisher’s proposal – which led him to make his momentous decision. ‘Momentous’ because it commenced, without Pearce and others concerned in the decision realising it, a project, the object of which was Anzac’s official pictorial representation. Moreover, it established a tradition of appointing artists to record Australia’s part in future conflicts whether as combatants or as peacekeepers. The far-reaching effects of Pearce’s decision could hardly have been foretold, but if anyone was capable of sensing the direction in which it might lead, it was Bean who had steered the government down a path which would require it to establish a national war museum.

With the AWRS’s creation, considerable headway had been made in establishing a national war museum to which Australia’s war records would go after the war. It was critical to Bean’s plans that such a museum be established: he was convinced that the enduring nature of Australia’s tradition could only be guaranteed if its part in the conflict was permanently commemorated in and by an institution given over to collecting, preserving and exhibiting its war records. He was fearful that the record of its part in the war might become submerged in Britain’s record; already the British authorities had taken steps to establish an imperial war museum to which it seemed likely Australia’s records would go.92 Such an outcome would undermine Australia’s ability to commemorate its tradition separately from Britain’s, and could be averted only if the government committed itself to establishing a museum.

On 27 April 1917 Bean had written to Trumble informing him that a complete scheme for the ‘careful preservation and classification of all branches of records’ was being ‘drawn up’.93 After referring to pictures, photographs, trophies, cinema records and ‘intimate military records’, he said: ‘Quite unofficially I should like to suggest that when trophies etc. begin to arrive in Australia … there should be an Australian National Museum, however modest its beginning, to receive those which are of National interest …. It would eventually be the nucleus of the National picture gallery, the national historical museum, and the National library; and would be of such interest as to make a visit to the Federal Capital worth while for the inspection of these relics and pictures alone.’ Because he had the ear of the government he expected his ‘quite unofficial suggestion’ to be given serious consideration. Making it

92 Much later, the Australian Government informed London that it intended to establish its own museum. See letter, Governor-General to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 23 May 1918, AWM 93, 12/12/1 Part 1.
93 Letter, Bean to Trumble, 27 April 1917, AWM 93, 12/12/1 Part 2.
‘ unofficially’ did not diminish its importance, and it was unnecessary for him to have drawn to Trumble’s attention the fact that he held no relevant standing to make it. Of course, that had not inhibited his making suggestions on a variety of matters having nothing to do with his official roles. Already Bean was a powerful man, not in the usual sense, but because of his easy access to figures in the AIF and the government who possessed actual power and his ability to influence them. Nevertheless, he believed the prospects of his suggestion being taken up would be enhanced if it had official support, and for this he turned to General White.

In mid-July 1917 Bean and White devised a strategy to encourage the government to establish a museum: White would write to Trumble suggesting its creation, and afterwards Bean would write to him or Pearce making the same suggestion. They duly wrote, but by the time their letters reached Melbourne the government had already decided to establish a museum. Cabinet approved its establishment on 29 August 1917 in response to a proposal it had invited from the Exhibition Trustees in Melbourne, a statutory body given possession and control of the Exhibition Building for the purposes of public exhibitions. Defence belatedly informed AIF Administrative Headquarters that the government had decided to establish a museum and to place it for the time being under its direction. Then, on 22 December 1917, Defence transferred nine exhibits into the trustees’ custody thereby inaugurating the museum’s collection.

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95 Letters, White to Trumble, 19 July 1917; Bean to Pearce, 3 August 1917; both in AWM 93, 12/12/1 Part 2.
96 On 14 August 1917 Pearce met with Sir Henry Weedon, chairman of the Exhibition Trustees, and invited him to submit ‘a general outline of the proposed arrangements for a National collection of war relics and trophies’. On the 22nd Weedon proposed: the trustees would (1) carry out certain structural alterations to the Exhibition Building to increase the available floor space and then ‘undertake to house and exhibit a considerable collection’; (2) assume responsibility for the safe custody and preservation of the exhibits; (3) keep a register of exhibits; and (4) make the collection available to the Commonwealth whenever it asked for it. Pearce secured cabinet approval of it on three conditions: (1) the collection should remain the property of the Commonwealth; (2) no rental or subsidy was to be charged by the trustees for ‘storing and caring for the collection’; and (3) a committee should be formed ‘[f]or the purposes of the collection and to advise on any additions, purchases or acceptance of gifts etc. of any further trophies’ consisting of Weedon and the ministers for Navy, Defence and Home and Territories. As no briefing paper has survived or been located, what Pearce put before his ministerial colleagues to enable them to consider the proposal is unknown. See letter, Weedon to Pearce, 22 August 1917; memorandum, Pearce to Secretary, Defence Department, 29 August 1917; both in NAA A1, 1921/6401. For the Exhibition Building and its place as the museum’s first home, see David Dunstan, ‘A Mecca for Australians’, in David Dunstan et al, Victorian Icon: The Royal Exhibition Building, Melbourne, The Exhibition Trustees, Melbourne, 1996, pp 328-33.
97 Cable, Defence to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 30 November 1917, AWM 93, 12/12/1 Part 1.
98 Exhibition Trustees, ‘List of Exhibits received ... from the Department of Defence, Melbourne’, 22 December 1917, AWM 93, 12/12/1 Part 3. They comprised the original illustrations published in The Anzac Book, three
Although the government had approved the establishment of a war art scheme on 28 May 1917, a lengthy delay occurred before Power and Leist, the first official artists after Dyson, were engaged by the Commonwealth and given permission by the AIF to travel to France. Although this delay is not satisfactorily explained by the evidence, its causes are probably related to the position of the war and the reluctance or inability of the AIF to receive and accommodate artists at the front. In April and May 1917 the Australians made two assaults on the Hindenburg Line at Bullecourt, the second of which was successful, at a cost of 7,000 casualties, and in June they took part in the assault on Messines which, despite its success, cost 6,800 casualties. The second half of 1917 saw the Australians take part in the Allies’ great offensive at Ypres in the north (Third Ypres) which commenced on 31 July and ended in the mud at Passchendaele on 10 November. During the offensive the Australian divisions made successful assaults at Polygon Wood, Menin Road and Broodeseinde Ridge, but again success was expensive. A further 38,000 casualties were suffered for a total of 55,000 for the year.99

The first matter to be settled before sending any artist to the Western Front was formalising the terms of his engagement. This was merely sensible and would avoid the kinds of uncertainties arising with respect to Dyson’s engagement. Hughes had approved of artists being engaged upon the terms Fisher set out in his cable of 26 April 1917: (1) purpose – ‘to produce pictures of war operations’; (2) duration – three months; (3) each artist to be given an honorary commission in the AIF; (4) ‘all work to become the property of the Commonwealth Government’; (5) remuneration – a daily allowance of £1 plus the cost of materials. Smart instructed John Galbraith, the government’s solicitor in London,100 to prepare an agreement between Fisher, on behalf of the Commonwealth, and an artist, incorporating these terms.
This took the form of a document he called ‘Agreement for engagement of an Artist’ (Appendix I), and each artist subsequently engaged by the Commonwealth entered into an agreement substantially in those terms.\textsuperscript{101}

The agreement’s critical provision was clause 1: ‘THE Artist is hereby appointed on the terms and conditions herein contained to make studies drawings and sketches on behalf of the Commonwealth of events occurring in the present War and the battles now pending on the Western Front between the Allied Armies and the German Forces especially with regard to the Australian Imperial Forces.’ This is the provision Galbraith formulated which it seems he felt best expressed the purpose of an artist’s engagement as Fisher had described it, ‘to produce pictures of war operations’. It appears he was unhappy with ‘war operations’, perhaps thinking it vague, and in the interests of creating an obligation that was certain, or more certain, he substituted ‘events’ for it. Whether or not this substitution achieved greater certainty in defining the artist’s obligation, doubtless he made it to ensure that the artist was not given a free hand to record whatever he pleased. This could not have been the Commonwealth’s intention. But Galbraith went further, qualifying ‘events’ by the phrase ‘occurring in the present War and the battles now pending on the Western Front’ and the concluding words ‘especially with regard to the Australian Imperial Forces’. It seems he considered these necessary qualifications, and the second was particularly important as it would bring home to the artist that he should make a pictorial record of the AIF’s part in the war. Notwithstanding Galbraith’s efforts to protect the Commonwealth’s interests, the artists substantially ignored their obligation under clause 1 and made pictures of whatever they liked, the vast majority of which did not depict events occurring in the war, let alone events involving the AIF.

Galbraith’s instructions as to the terms on which artists were to be engaged varied from those approved by Hughes in two respects: first, provision was to be made requiring the artist to produce a minimum number of works, and next, provision was to be made for him to paint a historical picture for the Commonwealth if it so required. Clause 6 provided: ‘THE Commonwealth will defray the cost not exceeding Thirty Pounds of the necessary material or equipment required by the Artist for the purposes of such studies sketches or drawings which

\textsuperscript{101} Minute paper, ‘Official Artists engaged … for Australian Government’, ACS to Acting Accountant, 3 June 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/8 Part 1.
shall not be less than twenty-five in number and which are to be and remain the sole property of the Commonwealth but the Artist may at any time inspect the said studies sketches and drawings such inspection to be in the sole discretion of the Commonwealth.’ Except for specifying a minimum number of works to be made, this clause reflected a term Hughes had approved, and its meaning was clear: all work produced by the artist during his engagement would become the Commonwealth’s property, but at all events he would produce no fewer than twenty-five pictures. Unaccountably, Smart gave the clause an untenable meaning: the artist should produce a minimum of twenty-five pictures which would become the Commonwealth’s property, and any he produced over and above that number were his to keep.102 As he had the day-to-day management of the war art scheme but without, it should be stressed, adequate guidance or supervision, this meaning governed his dealings with the artists. Consequently, they withheld or were permitted to withhold pictures from the Commonwealth. But his interpretation conflicted with Fisher’s and Bean’s.103 Moreover, it conflicted with the Commonwealth’s official position and what it told the public: ‘The sketches made by the official artists at the front are the property of the Commonwealth without special payment’.104 Clause 8 provided: ‘THE Artist shall if required to do so by the Commonwealth paint a (picture or) composition of a battle scene or other operation in which the Australian Imperial Forces are represented at a price to be named by the Commonwealth and shall first submit to the Commonwealth for approval a sketch of such (picture or) composition.’ Who thought of asking Galbraith to include this provision in the agreement is not revealed by the evidence, but the likely candidates seem to be Bean or Smart acting on his recommendation. Anyhow, the clause assumed considerable importance from June 1918 onwards when Fisher sought government approval to place commissions with artists for the painting of large historical pictures of incidents, locations and conditions in the story of Anzac.

102 This is Gray’s position: ‘Any works produced over and above the specified number [she mistakenly claimed this varied from artist to artist] were the artist’s own property to dispose of as he wished’. See A Henry Fullwood, p 24. She neither referred to clause 6 nor offered any evidence in support of her claim.

103 In Fisher’s annual report as High Commissioner for 1917 he informed Hughes that all work made by the artists at the front was the property of the Commonwealth and that each artist ‘guaranteed’ he would make at least twenty-five sketches, the portrait painters excepted. See High Commissioner’s Report 1917, NAA A458, F108/8 Part 4, p 19. Also see Bean, first memoir, p 6.

104 ‘Australian war artists. The men and their work’, Argus, 2 August 1919, p 18. This notice was published by the Minister for the Home and Territories Department, the department responsible for the memorial.
The foregoing clauses were the agreement’s key provisions. Although it is possible to complain about the felicity of Galbraith’s expression, overall they were simple, clear and understandable except, apparently, by the artists and Smart. The agreement, however, had one serious defect: it did not include a provision giving the Commonwealth copyright in the pictures produced by the artist during his engagement, an unforgivable oversight. Galbraith did not, however, overlook the need to protect the Commonwealth from any suggestion that the artist was its employee. The agreement’s final clause sought to negative the existence of an employment relationship, successfully or not is debatable, which meant the artist was a contractor and responsible for himself. If death or injury befell him during his engagement, that was his lookout, or so the Commonwealth would have argued.

At the end of July 1917 Birdwood gave his approval to artists being sent to the front to make pictorial records of the AIF, and AIF Administrative Headquarters was instructed to arrange for Power and Leist to proceed to France ‘at an early date’. Power had been put forward by Fisher at the outset, but the first indication that Leist was being considered for appointment is a letter from Smart to him of 3 July. He informed Leist that the government had approved of his going ‘for the purpose of making sketches and paintings of events and features connected with the Australian Imperial Force’. Presumably, it was Smart who approached him, but whether he was always a candidate, or a last minute replacement for Percy Spence, who was initially coupled with Power to go to France, is unknown. The latter seems to be the case as the previous day Smart told Longstaff, who desired an appointment, that Fisher had ‘practically committed himself’ to Power and Spence going. August drifted by before arrangements were made to get Power and Leist to France. This gave them time to put together their kits, organise their painting materials, and enter into

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105 Another serious defect was the agreement’s failure to specify the applicable censorship regime which governed the making of pictorial records at the front and their publication and to impose an obligation on the artist to comply with it in all respects. But as things turned out there is no evidence that censorship had the slightest impact on the way in which the artists carried out their engagements.
106 Memoranda, Smart to Bean, 27 July 1917, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286; 31 July 1917, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/50.
107 Letter, Smart to Leist, 3 July 1917, AWM 18/7/8 Part 1. In fact, the government had given no such approval. Moreover, there is no evidence that Leist’s name had been put forward.
108 Letter, Smart to Longstaff, 2 July 1917, AWM 93, 18/7/9.
109 Letter, Bean to Smart, 8 August 1917, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/50. According to this, Dyson had advised that the artists ‘would want’ the following: camp bedstead with mattress and pillow; Wolseley valise and fleabag; kit bag; haversack; canvas bath and dish; towels; trench coat; field service boots – which could be had cheaply in France from ordnance; rubber boots; electric torch; soap and candle; and slippers.
agreements with the Commonwealth relating to their engagements. In the available time Smart could have informed the artists of the censorship regime applicable to them, but there is no evidence that he did, nor any that the Commonwealth or the AIF informed later official artists of the regime. During the month the AIF decided that Power should be attached to the headquarters of the 1st Division and Leist the 5th Division. Both divisions were fighting in Third Ypres. On 28 August Colonel Dodds, the Deputy Adjutant-General (DAG), informed the headquarters of each division that an artist would be reporting to it and conveying:

Hon. Lieut. H. S. Power [Hon. Lieut. F. Leist], an Australian Artist, has been appointed by the Commonwealth Government to paint pictures of places where the Australian troops have been operating, also of any other item likely to be of historical interest to Australians. This officer will be attached to your Divisional Headquarters during the 3 months he will be in France, and it is desired that every facility be afforded him to enable him to carry out his work.  

On 3 September 1917 Honorary Lieutenants Power and Leist finally arrived at Folkstone for the crossing. They were met by Bean who made a special trip to England to bring them to the front. The crossing was cancelled because of a report that mines had been sown in the Channel and the men were obliged to stay overnight in Folkstone. It seems probable they dined together that evening as Bean recorded his impressions of them in his diary. Leist impressed him as ‘a man of the world’ whose chief attraction was ‘his anxiety that Power should be chaperoned and well looked after, not left too soon to himself amongst strange scenes and people.’ Power struck him as a ‘lovable man’, ‘a very shy gauche chap, intensely nervous’, which he put down to his deafness. It is inconceivable that during the evening Bean did not discuss with the artists how he envisaged them carrying out their work.

As his diary contains no note of their discussions, it seems permissible to engage in a little well-founded speculation. Because their visit marked the commencement proper of the war art scheme, Bean impressed upon them, perhaps not in so many words, that there was much

110 Letter, Smart to Bean, 31 July 1917, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/50. Colonel Griffiths at AIF Administrative Headquarters ordered them.
111 Memorandum, Dodds to Headquarters, 1st & 5th Divisions, 28 August 1917, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/50.
112 Their commissions commenced on this date and continued until terminated on 31 March 1920. See notifications published in Commonwealth Gazette No 9/1918 (p 104); No 59/1920 (p 956). Also see Record of Officers’ Services, Harold Septimus Power service records; Record of Officers’ Services, Frederick William Leist service records; both in NAA.
113 Bean diary September 1917, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/88/1, entry 3 September 1917, p 34.
riding on their performance. They would, he told them, be arriving at the front at a critical moment in the war: a massive Allied offensive had been launched against the Germans at Ypres. Australia’s artillery had been heavily involved and he expected its infantry would soon be carrying out major attacks. They could expect to be at the front during these battles and this would offer them a multitude of subjects. Although he did not wish to be prescriptive, he stressed their role as eyewitnesses and the importance, in that context, of selecting subjects that had ‘record value’ or value as ‘historical evidence’. It was unnecessary for him to point out that their pictures should be literal representations of the subjects they selected: neither artist nor any who followed would have contemplated making any other kind of picture. He possibly explained to them that it was no part of their role to comment on the war, and that what was required were pictures which could stand as truthful and unadorned records of Australia’s part in the war. He is bound to have told them that their pictures would determine the subject of any historical picture they might be asked to paint on their return to London. The following day the group crossed to France and Bean brought the artists to the headquarters of 1st Anzac Corps at Hazebrouck, and on 5 September he delivered them to their respective divisional headquarters.114

On 2 November 1917, with the artists’ engagements drawing to a close, Smart wrote to Bean in relation to who next should be sent to France: ‘As Leist and Power will soon be finishing up, will you let me know whether the next two artists can be sent over. Streeton, who called here to-day, says he cannot go. The remaining artists on the list are:- Lambert, Longstaff, Fullwood, Spence. It will be two of these.’115 This is the first indication in the evidence of the existence of a list of artists being considered for appointment. Presumably, Bean was aware of their identities, and in mentioning them Smart was simply recapping for his convenience. Whether Bean replied cannot be established, but on 28 November Smart wrote again making an important suggestion: ‘It has occurred to me that it will be a good thing to send an artist to Palestine to paint A.I.F. stuff. There is not likely to be much work for our artists in France during the winter. Perhaps it would do if we sent one artist to France and one or two to Egypt. Will you please let me know what you think of the matter.’116 Bean endorsed Smart’s suggestion and said he had obtained the DAG’s authority to send one artist to Egypt, ‘time

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114 Ibid., entries 4, 5 September 1917, pp 35-6, 37.
115 Letter, Smart to Bean, 2 November 1917, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
116 Letter, Smart to Bean, 28 November 1917, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/197.
unlimited’. He instructed Smart to ‘get the name of the artist willing to go’ and apply to Griffiths to have him sent to Egypt. As to sending artists over during the winter, he disagreed with Smart suggesting there was still ‘a fair amount of winter stuff to be done’, including portraits. Smart replied on 4 December:

Percy Spence and Longstaff are unable to go to France during the winter. We are sending Bryant, whose work you perhaps know as a marine artist. He can also do a very good landscape. He would be very useful in making sketches of the disembarkation of Australian troops, and work of that sort. He could also collect material for the painting of pictures illustrating the sinking of the “BALLARAT” and “SOUTHLAND”. I have already sent him to see Colonel Griffiths, and they are putting him through. With reference to [the] artist for Palestine, we have asked Lambert to go there. I am now waiting to hear from him.

This is the first evidence that Bryant had been considered for appointment. He left for France on 12 December and was attached to the headquarters of the 2nd Division. Lambert agreed to go and left for Egypt on Christmas Day. Before leaving each entered into an agreement with the Commonwealth in the standard form. On 28 December Smart wrote to Bean reporting on their departures and informing him of what had been decided with respect to future appointments:

I forget whether I told you the decision in regard to the other artists. They have all been invited to go, including Streeton, Longstaff, Spence, Fullwood and Bell [a new addition to the list]. None of them will go in the winter. As soon as the weather improves I suggest that we invite Streeton, Fullwood and Longstaff to go over. Indeed, I have already asked them to do

117 Letter (fragment), Bean to Smart, 1 December 1917, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/197.
118 Later in December Bean proposed to Smart that Leist return to France in January 1918 for two months to paint a set of portraits, explaining that he had made ‘two or three good sketch portraits lately of well known officers’. However, the only portrait Leist is known to have made and delivered to the Commonwealth is of General Hobbs, the 5th Division’s commander. Although Smart supported the proposal Leist did not go. See letters, Bean to Smart, 21 December 1917; Smart to Bean, 29 December 1917; both in AWM 93, 18/7/8 Part 1.
119 Memorandum, Smart to Bean, 4 December 1917, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
120 Casualty Form-Active Service, Charles David Jones Bryant service records, NAA.
121 Letter, AIF Administrative Headquarters to Defence Department, 28 December 1917, George Washington Lambert service records, NAA.
122 Agreement between Andrew Fisher and Charles David Jones Bryant, 11 December 1917, AWM 93, 18/7/2; agreement between Andrew Fisher and George Washington Lambert, December 1917, Lambert family papers, MLMSS 97/7X. In Lambert’s agreement clause 1 was altered to reflect his different destination. He was obliged to make pictures ‘of events occurring in the present War and the battles now pending in Egypt and Palestine between the Allied Forces and the Turkish or other enemy Forces in Egypt or Palestine especially with regard to the Australian Imperial Forces’.
so. Streeton has been very troublesome. I am told he has attempted to induce other artists not to accept our offer from the start, but we have broken the combination down.  

As to Streeton, doubtless Smart had kept Bean informed of his dealings with the artist which led him to claim that he had been ‘very troublesome’. On 21 September 1917 Streeton, who had been corresponding with Smart in relation to an appointment, renounced all interest in the war art scheme and commenced a campaign to derail it by promoting the probably false idea that Australian artists were no longer interested in it, and by proposing an alternative scheme. And Smart could not persuade Streeton to alter his decision. While Streeton’s motivations are not entirely clear, they largely derived from his belief that Dyson, Power and Leist were ‘shirkers’ who had not done their duty by performing ‘war work’ as he and other Australian artists had. He made his grievances public by encouraging the Argus to publish a letter he had sent to Smart complaining about the Commonwealth’s treatment of him and discrediting the artists who were participating in its scheme by implying that they had ducked military service.  

In London in January 1918, Bean attended an exhibition by Dyson entitled Australia at War held at the Leicester Galleries in which he showed sixty-five drawings made on the Western Front in his capacity as ‘Official Artist, A.I.F.’. It was an important exhibition, not only for Dyson but for the Commonwealth as it was exhibiting the first fruits of its war art scheme, a

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123 Letter, Smart to Bean, 28 December 1917. AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
124 Streeton’s grievances and his campaign can be traced in letters, Streeton to Fisher, 21 September 1917; Smart to Streeton, 27 September 1917; Streeton to Smart, 4 October 1917; Smart to Streeton, 11 October 1917; Streeton to Smart, 12 October 1917, with attached list ‘War work by Australian Artists in London’; all in AWM 93, 18/7/12; Streeton to Spencer, 28 November 1917, quoted in Ann Galbally and Anne Gray (eds), Letters from Smike: The Letters of Arthur Streeton 1890-1943, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1989, pp 141-3; ‘Australian artists and war. To the editor of the Argus’, Argus, 17 December 1917, p 4. Fuelling Streeton’s actions was indignation. In January 1917 Bertram Mackennal, the English-born university scientist and administrator, anthropologist and connoisseur, who had lived in Australia since 1897. Mackennal and Spencer were Streeton’s close friends. Although Fisher immediately cabled Hughes seeking instructions, Mackennal’s recommendation was never decided, probably because it was lost sight of during the arrangements to establish the AWRS. The situation was exacerbated by misinformation supplied to Streeton by Mackennal or Spencer. According to Streeton, Fisher informed them that he was not wanted. This is improbable. In any case, his cable to Hughes establishes otherwise. Nonetheless, this probably false information infected his relations with the Commonwealth. See letter, Mackennal to Fisher, 26 January 1917, NAA A2, 1920/1044; cable, Fisher to Hughes, 31 January 1917, AWM 93, 8/2/23; letter, Streeton to Tom Roberts, 21 December 1917, in RH Croll (ed), Smike to Bulldog: Letters from Sir Arthur Streeton to Tom Roberts, Ure Smith, Sydney, 1946, pp 94-5 at p 94; Christopher Wray, Arthur Streeton, Painter of Light, Jacaranda, Milton, Queenslands, 1993, pp 132-4.
circumstance not lost on the *Sydney Morning Herald’s* Arthur Mason.\textsuperscript{126} Significantly, Dyson’s drawings were the first official representations of Anzac released into the public domain, *The Anzac Book* notwithstanding, and his conception of the men of the AIF established a stereotype for the Anzac’s representation. The *Manchester Guardian*’s critic observed: ‘[Dyson’s] Australian type is true to life. He is long and lean and lithe, with sloping shoulders, deep chest, and narrow hips, long-nosed, and with wide nostrils like a hunter. The head has a wilful challenging tilt, and the whole movement is loose … suggesting sudden action and big reserves of strength. He is not soldierly in the old drill-book sense, suggesting rather a sporting man or a serious prospector doing a queer job in a strange country in his own empiric way.’\textsuperscript{127}

On 18 January, while Dyson’s exhibition continued, Fisher cabled Hughes:

> Your telegram 28th May [1917] regarding Australian Artists for the Front, Power and Leist have been in France three months, have supplied excellent sketches operations A.I.F. Lambert now in Palestine with Light Horse. Bryant in France. Have invited Streeton, Longstaff to go to France when weather improves. Authority now asked to send out further artists Quinn, Coates, Fullwood, Bell, at £2 day for period not exceeding three months. Each of these artists will furnish Commonwealth Government with at least twenty five drawings without further expense. These drawings to form National Collection War Pictures. It is recommended each artist in addition be commissioned [to] paint large composition from sketches at price to be settled by Committee in London consisting of two Representatives Commonwealth Office, one Representative A.I.F. one representative Australian Artists. Price for each composition to be subject to your approval.\textsuperscript{128}

No documents have survived or been located recording Fisher’s deliberations or the material put before him in order to decide whether to ask the government for approval to expand the war art scheme. It seems unlikely the idea was his. More likely it derived from discussions between Bean, Smart and probably Box, the official secretary designate following the retirement of Muirhead Collins.\textsuperscript{129} Smart might have been expected to prepare a briefing paper for Fisher, perhaps in Box’s name to whom he now reported. The absence of such

\textsuperscript{126} ‘Australia at war’, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 6 April 1918, p 7.
\textsuperscript{127} Quoted in ‘Art of Will Dyson. “Reeks with realities.” Australian type true to life’, *Ballarat Courier*, 9 January 1918, p 3.
\textsuperscript{128} Cable, Fisher to Hughes, 18 January 1918, AWM 93, 8/2/23.
\textsuperscript{129} He retired on 19 September 1917. See High Commissioner’s Report 1917, NAA A458, F108/8 Part 4, p 2.
material suggests, once again, that Fisher’s decision was impromptu. What basis did he have for seeking a substantial expansion of the scheme which, if approved, would involve the Commonwealth assuming greater financial obligations and significantly more administrative work? He had no reliable information on which to base his decision, and no basis whatsoever for having informed Hughes that Power and Leist had supplied ‘excellent sketches’ of the AIF’s operations. Leist had not delivered his pictures, and although Power appears to have delivered his, they numbered no more than thirty-seven. At all events when Hughes received Fisher’s request he wanted nothing to do with it, and having sat on it for more than a fortnight he referred it to Defence ‘for favour of advice urgently.’

Meanwhile, on 8 February 1918 Bean crossed to France ‘to lay before [General] White a number of points about increasing the number and scope of artists’. He prepared a paper for his meeting and under the heading ‘Artists’ discussed the situation of the official artists and outlined a scheme for appointing soldiers as artists – the AIF artists – to act as ‘camouflage experts’ and also produce an ‘artistic record’ for the Commonwealth. Bean came away from his meeting with two things: first, an indication that the AIF was prepared to take further official artists, and next, an indication that it was minded to extend their commissions while they completed in London their work commenced at the front. But Birdwood would need to be consulted. Bean submitted to White that the artists would be occupied for at least three months finishing their pictures. And he argued that the ‘return’ to the artists, whom he claimed were ‘men of real distinction’, was their honorary rank, and for them to have to stop wearing their uniforms while they were busy doing work for the Commonwealth for ‘nothing’ was ‘putting their patriotism to a severe test.’

130 Letter, Smart to Leist, 24 January 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/8 Part 1.
131 Letter, Smart to Griffiths, 15 December 1917, AWM 16, 4351/2/19.
132 Memorandum, Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department to Acting Secretary, Defence Department, 4 February 1918, AWM 93, 8/2/23.
133 Bean diary, February 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/98/1, entry 8 February 1918, p 8.
135 Ibid., p 1. Just in January Bean had made a similar claim when seeking the extension of the commissions of Power and Leist while in London claiming they were ‘scarcely given an adequate compensation for their work’ and that the Commonwealth was getting their pictures for free. This was patently incorrect: they were paid a daily allowance of £1 while away; had their materials paid for up to a maximum of £30; were transported, accommodated and fed by the AIF; were paid a uniform allowance of £15; enjoyed the privilege of an honorary commission with the rank of lieutenant; and got closer to the action, a valuable benefit in itself, than other civilians save for war correspondents and notables. See letter, Bean to Griffiths, 10 January 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/1 Part 1.
Afterwards, Birdwood laid down a general principle: ‘The period during which rank may be retained [by the artists] on return may be extended in each case for such period as the Selection Committee [a reference, it seems, to a committee to be set up by Fisher to inspect the artists’ pictures] may recommend while the Artist is engaged in the completion of the work commenced abroad.’ This governed the position for the duration and beyond. In practice, so long as an artist was painting a historical picture or portrait for the Commonwealth his commission was continued. This was not a matter over which Fisher had any control, except to the extent of informing the AIF whether an artist continued to be engaged on work for the Commonwealth.

As to the number of official artists, Bean submitted to White that ‘we’ – the AIF – grant general standing authority for the attachment to the AIF of six artists at any one time, one at each of the five divisional headquarters and one at corps headquarters. He claimed that from ‘the point of view of Australia we cannot have too many pictures of this war’, and that the reluctance of Australian artists to accept the Commonwealth’s terms and visit the front had been overcome. There is no evidence that any such reluctance had been experienced, save for the disruption caused by Streeton. In fact, the reluctance of artists to follow Power and Leist to France had been the weather – most would not go during winter. Birdwood was unprepared to grant general standing authority for the attachment of six artists to the AIF. Instead, he instructed the DAG to write to AIF Administrative Headquarters conveying: ‘I am to say that the G.O.C., A.I.F. [Birdwood] desires that you will inform the High Commissioner that he approves of all Australian Artists deemed suitable by the Australian Government or the High Commissioner being afforded the opportunity of working for Australia’. The approval, Dodds continued, was on six terms all of which bar one – term (a) which related to the artists’ retention of their commissions – cut across, varied or repeated terms contained in

136 Letter, Dodds to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 12 February 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/288.
137 When the Commonwealth decided that an artist had finished his work for it, it informed AIF Administrative Headquarters of that fact and the AIF would terminate the artist’s commission and arrange to publish a notice in the Commonwealth Gazette stating that having completed duty as an artist his appointment in the AIF was terminated from a specified date. See, for instance, the notification of the termination of Power’s appointment in Commonwealth Gazette No 59/1920 (p 956).
139 Bean claimed there had been difficulties in getting Australian artists to go to France mainly due to the fact that Canada was offering them major’s rank and paying them £200 for one picture against ‘our Lieut. Rank, 25 sketches free, and the possibility that they may be asked to paint a picture if the price can be agreed on’. If Canada’s more attractive terms was the main cause of difficulties, then what explains the new readiness of Australian artists to accept the Commonwealth’s less attractive terms? Bean does not say.
140 Letter, Dodds to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 12 February 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/288.
the artists’ agreements with the Commonwealth. None were sought to be imposed on the artists and they operated only to the extent of regulating the duration of their commissions. The fact that the AIF formulated its own terms suggests that Birdwood and White had no knowledge of the Commonwealth’s agreements with the artists. Why the AIF’s general command was left in the dark on this important matter is inexplicable.

On 16 February 1918, shortly after these events but having no apparent connection to them, Quinn, the fifth official artist, was appointed and travelled to France. Before leaving he entered into an agreement with the Commonwealth in the standard form. This is significant: although he was exclusively a portraitist, clause 1 was not altered to reflect the fact that he would be painting portraits and not pictures of events. Galbraith can hardly be blamed for this oversight: Smart instructed him that Quinn was going ‘under the same arrangements as the other artists.’ When Longstaff, another portraitist, was appointed, he also entered into an agreement in the standard form.

In Australia, the wheels of government were turning slowly on Fisher’s request to expand the war art scheme. Since being referred to Defence its consideration had stalled. On 7 March Fisher cabled Hughes: ‘My telegrams 18th January, 22nd February – General Officer Commanding AIF anxious to have Australian Artists in France as early as possible. Early reply appreciated.’ (There is no evidence that Birdwood was anxious to get artists to France.) On 9 March Trumble sent a memorandum to the Prime Minister’s Department: ‘With reference to your minute of 4th February forwarding copy of a cablegram received from the High Commissioner’s Office, London, regarding the proposal to send Australian Artists to France for the purpose of furnishing the Commonwealth Government with

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141 For example, term (b) provided that Australia would have a first option over all pictures produced by the artists during the war at a price to be settled by ‘an agreed Board’. Another, term (f), sought to restrict the artists’ activities while in France to a ‘class of work’ notified by Fisher. Neither term was contained in the artist’s standard agreement. Another again, term (c), provided that the sketches made by the artists at the front would be the property of the Australian Government, but this was already provided for in clause 6 of their agreement.

142 Casualty Form-Active Service, James Peter Quinn service records, NAA.

143 Agreement between Andrew Fisher and James Peter Quinn, 14 February 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/13.

144 Letter, Smart to Galbraith, 5 February 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/13.

145 Cable, Fisher to Hughes, 7 March 1918, NAA A2, 1920/1044. Fisher’s cable of 22 February 1918 cannot be traced. Presumably, it was a reminder and contained no substantive content. A week later, Fisher sent Hughes a follow-up cable expressing concern about the continuing delay: ‘My telegram 18th January – War Artists – Fear miss opportunity on account Artists being held up awaiting decision. Should be glad of an early reply.’ See cable, Fisher to Hughes, 13 March 1918, NAA A2, 1920/1044.
drawings of the war, I have to inform you that approval of this proposal is recommended.\footnote{Memorandum, Trumble to Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, 9 March 1918, AWM 93, 8/2/23.} Again, no documents have survived or been located recording Defence’s deliberations over Fisher’s proposal. The absence of such material is disconcerting and suggests that no proper evaluation of it was performed. It is noteworthy that Defence merely \textit{recommended} that approval be given, leaving it open to Hughes to decide the proposal himself. But there is no evidence that he or his department gave it any consideration. Hughes finally cabled Fisher on 28 March: ‘Your telegram 18th January, Australian Artists for front – Proposal approved.’\footnote{Cable, Hughes to Fisher, 28 March 1918, AWM 93, 8/2/23.} Not only had he authorised the dispatch of five additional artists to France and the payment to them of a substantially increased daily allowance (£2), he had approved of each artist being commissioned to paint a historical picture for the Commonwealth from his sketches at a price to be settled by a committee to be formed in London for that purpose. Clause 8 of the artist’s agreement, which had catered for such a possibility, could now be invoked.

During March 1918 Bean prepared the first of two (unsolicited) memoirs on Australia’s war records for Senator Pearce. They are critical documents in the histories of the memorial and the war art scheme. In his letter to Pearce enclosing his first memoir, he explained: ‘As one’s final work upon [Australia’s war records], I wish to put down as completely as I can, the development of the Australian War Records Section, the work which it is doing now, and the ideas which one has for the future of Australian records; so that anyone reading this memoir can obtain from it, concisely, an exact understanding of the work which has been done or is in view, upon the Australian records here.’\footnote{Letter, Bean to Pearce, 8 March 1918, AWM 25, 1013/5.} He told him that the demands of the work of the official history – ‘if it is to be done at all’ – necessitated his giving up all work on war records. It will be recalled that the AWRS had commenced operations on 16 May 1917, and under Treloar’s management enormous progress had been achieved in the way of collecting and preserving records, progress Bean described in his memoir.

Towards the end of his memoir, when Bean turned his attention to the future, it became clear that it actually consisted of representations he was advancing in support of the idea that the totality of Australia’s war records be instituted and maintained for posterity as a memorial to the AIF:
THE GREAT FEDERAL WAR COLLECTIONS – A MEMORIAL OF THE A.I.F.

It is suggested that the great Federal War Collection if established at the Commonwealth Capital in a building worthy to be a memorial of the Australian Imperial Force, would be the finest monument ever raised to an army. This memorial to the A.I.F. would be a far grander and more sacred monument than the one raised to the individual leader of armies – Napoleon – by the French nation at the Invalides in Paris. The monument itself would contain within it the records of the Force, the pictures, trophies, and visible relics of its work. I would suggest that it should consist of three parts – the great central building to be the Museum, one wing to be the Gallery, the other wing to be the Library.¹⁴⁹

Earlier, he subdivided Australia’s war records into three branches – documentary, pictorial and material (relics and trophies) – and described what was encompassed by and what had been done in each. The array of visual material being collected was remarkable, as was his close involvement in each and every facet. The pictorial record he also subdivided into three categories – pictures, photographs and cinema – and under the heading ‘Artists’ described the war art scheme. He stated that all pictures made at the front by the artists were the property of the Commonwealth and that they ‘guaranteed’ there would be at least twenty-five of them, except for the portraitists who would make a smaller number of sketch portraits.¹⁵⁰ After returning to England their pictures would be inspected by a committee which would ‘judge what form of picture each artist [might] desirably paint for the Commonwealth [under clause 8 of their agreement].’¹⁵¹ This neatly explained the relationship between the artists’ pictures made at the front and their historical pictures. However, he made wildly exaggerated claims as to what had been achieved: ‘[t]he result already attained has been invaluable’; ‘[t]he collection of fine pictures actually made at the front … is already large and daily increasing’; ‘[s]ketch portraits of all leading officers, and of those whose names will be household words in Australia, are being painted’.¹⁵² When he wrote this the scheme’s results were rather more modest than he claimed: Power had delivered no more than thirty-seven pictures; Leist had

¹⁴⁹ Bean, first memoir, p 19. The idea was not new; he had expressed it in an article about the collection and preservation of Australia’s war records written for and published in The Anzac Bulletin in October 1917. In this he called for the establishment of ‘the three great centres of Australian national study – the National Australian Museum, the Australian National Gallery, and the National Australian Library’, or at least the establishment of a central authority to house Australia’s ‘precious and sacred records’. See ‘Australia’s Records. Preserved as Sacred Things. Pictures, Relics, and Writings.’, p 15.
¹⁵⁰ Bean, first memoir, p 6. When and who decided that the portraitists should produce a reduced number of pictures is not revealed in the evidence.
¹⁵¹ Ibid.
¹⁵² Ibid., pp 6, 7.
not delivered his; Bryant had just returned from France and had not delivered his; Quinn was in France; and Lambert was in Palestine. As to sketch portraits, the only one known to have been painted was Leist’s of Hobbs. Anyway, he then submitted that all pictures should belong to the authority which he recommended be established by the Commonwealth to look after Australia’s war records and be hung in the ‘National War Gallery’,153 one wing of the monument to the AIF he was pressing on the government to raise in the nation’s capital. Ultimately, it was his fervent wish that the history of the AIF should be ‘preserved and illustrated in the War Museum Gallery and Library’.154 The whole point of the war art scheme, then, was that it should play a part, possibly the largest part, in illustrating the history of the AIF. Not only the AIF, of course, but the three arms of Australia’s services: the AIF, the RAN and the Australian Flying Corps (AFC). The history to be illustrated was the story of the birth and development during the war of Australia’s tradition, that is, the story of Anzac.

In what capacity did Bean prepare his memoir? It seems obvious to suggest he intended it to produce an effect on the government. Like every Australian, he was entitled to make representations to it in order to bring about a desired result. Yet while most citizens did not expect their representations to be noticed, Bean expected that the government would give his every consideration and probably implement them, at least substantially. However, his only official position was as Australia’s war correspondent, and his memoir hardly qualified as journalism. Then, he was the official historian designate, and although one can see why it was critical for him to ensure that Australia’s war records were collected and preserved so that he could have recourse to them qua official historian, his memoir travelled well beyond that matter. The war art scheme, for instance, appears not to be connected to either of his official positions. Nor was his suggestion that a ‘War Museum Gallery and Library’ be established in the nation’s capital as the memorial to the AIF. In reality, his memoir consisted of a master plan for Anzac’s official representation. He had thought of and addressed every conceivable matter capable of contributing to its representation: a definitive history; its documentary records; pictures; photographs; cinema; trophies and relics; relations with other war museums

153 Ibid., p 19.
154 Ibid., p 21. The emphasis has been added.
in the Empire; and a memorial. 155 Not only was he the author of this plan, he also shaped the content of its various elements. The danger of leaving in one person’s hands the actual or effective control of so vast a project was that the image and understanding of Anzac to emerge from its carrying out would be his and his alone. And although Bean would have denied it, his memoir constituted the means by which he was claiming ownership of the project. 

Pearce found nothing in Bean’s memoir with which he disagreed and gave instructions for a cable to be sent to him, which included, ‘Minister congratulates Bean upon memorandum relating to War Records and in general cordially endorses proposal contained therein’. 156 Moreover, Trumble requested the Prime Minister’s Department to send a cable to Hughes, in transit to England, which included, ‘Minister Defence fully endorses proposals of official correspondent Bean in regard to collection of war records for Australia’. 157 Bean’s proposals were directed to marshalling all available resources for the carrying out of a project the object of which was Anzac’s official representation. But neither Pearce nor Hughes would have thought to characterise his proposals in this way, and probably neither man appreciated their real significance, or that Bean had positioned himself to direct their implementation.

The period from early May to late November 1918 is critical in this history, not only for reasons connected with the appointment of additional official artists. It will be convenient to deal with some of the events occurring during this period here, but others are better left for discussion in chapter 5. The latter events concern the emergence of a scheme conceived by Bean for the painting of a series of historical pictures of incidents, locations and conditions in the Anzac story and portraits of its principal actors which, in peacetime, became the war art scheme’s object. It grew out of the Commonwealth’s desire to commission each artist to paint a historical picture after returning from the front. But Fisher’s initial requests of the government for authority to place commissions, which he made in June 1918, took several months to decide. Over these months securing this authority dominated the proceedings of the war art scheme, and Bean’s thinking in particular. In July 1918, in anticipation of receiving

155 Ibid., pp 2-3 (general and unit histories), 5 (documentary records), 6-7 (pictures), 7-9 (photographs), 9-10 (cinema), 10-13 (trophies and relics), 13-15 (relations with other war museums), 19-22 (a memorial).
156 Cable, Defence Department to Bean, 31 May 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/621.
157 Memorandum, Trumble to Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, 31 May 1918, AWM 93, 12/12/1 Part 1. As Pearce referred to Bean as the ‘official correspondent’, perhaps it should be assumed that it was in this capacity he regarded him as having prepared his memoir.
authority to place commissions, he conceived a scheme for the painting of more than 200 pictures with the aim of illustrating the story of Anzac more or less comprehensively. With Fisher’s requests stalled, and realising that it would be impossible to secure government approval to carry out his scheme, Bean came up with a proposal for a new system of employing the official artists which involved appointing them as regular officers in the AIF in order to get the pictures in it painted gratis. Neither his picture scheme nor this last proposal came to pass.

During May 1918 three additional artists were appointed and crossed to France – Longstaff on the 3rd, Fullwood on the 10th and Streeton on the 14th. Smart had informed Bean on 12 April that the artists were held up because the AIF (mistakenly) believed they were portraittists. (Because of the state of the war it was unlikely that commanders and senior officers would have had the time or the inclination to sit.) He said he now had ‘ready to go’ Longstaff – ‘who, as you know, is an excellent landscape man as well as a portrait painter’ – and Fullwood and Streeton whom he described as landscape painters. He also said he had George Coates ready to go, but that the War Office had refused to release him from the British Army. Writing to Bean again on 19 April, Smart said that because of ‘the present crisis’ it was difficult to find accommodation for the artists. Actually, both accommodation and transport were extremely limited, but to meet Fisher’s wishes Birdwood asked his divisional commanders to do what they could to receive artists. On 23 April Bean informed Smart that three artists could be received by the 2nd, 3rd and 5th Divisions. By 2 May arrangements to get them to France were settled. On that date Smart wrote to Bean reporting

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158 Casualty-Form-Active Service, John Longstaff service records; Casualty Form-Active Service, Albert Henry Fullwood service records; Casualty Form-Active Service, Arthur Ernest Streeton service records; all in NAA.
159 Letter, Smart to Bean, 12 April 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
160 Coates, an academic painter specialising in portraiture, followed a similar path to London as the other official artists had and was a member of the colony of expatriate Australian artists at Chelsea. (He has an entry in the Australian Dictionary of Biography.) Although he was serving in the Royal Army Medical Corps (Territorial) and working as an orderly at the 3rd London General Hospital, Wandsworth, Smart’s claim that the British Army had refused to release him is incorrect. In fact, the War Office approved of Coates being loaned for temporary duty with the AIF from 27 February 1918. But when it transpired that the War Office would not agree to him being granted an honorary commission, it seems he declined to proceed with the arrangement. See letters, AIF Administrative Headquarters to Official Secretary, 20 February 1920; AIF Administrative Headquarters to Official Secretary, 20 March 1918; both in AWM 93, 19/7/4. Coates’ biographer and wife Dora Meeson Coates also misstates the position. See George Coates: His Art and his Life, JM Dent and Sons, London, 1937, p 118.
161 Memorandum, Smart to Bean, 19 April 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
162 Letter, AIF Administrative Headquarters to Official Secretary, 22 April 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
163 Handwritten note endorsed on memorandum, Smart to Bean, 19 April 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
on their impending departures and telling him that he had given them ‘general instructions’ as to what they should do.\footnote{164}

When, on 21 March 1918, the great German offensive was launched in the west, the Australian divisions were out of the line. Much of the ground hard-won by the Allies during 1917 was regained by the Germans. Put back in the line before Amiens in April, the Australians helped blunt an offensive which was running out of steam in any case. In the hiatus between April and July, with both sides recovering from their tremendous exertions, the Australians made significant gains of ground employing ‘peaceful penetration’: termed ‘minor aggression’, ground was gained and prisoners taken without any special organised effort and with minimal casualties. Command of the Australian Corps, which had been formed in November 1917 when its five divisions were grouped into a corps, was given to General John Monash when Birdwood went to the (British) Fifth Army in May. It was to the Amiens region on the Somme that the official artists appointed in May were sent. Longstaff was back in London when the Australians were used in the opening round of the Allies’ great offensive which brought victory in 1918, but Fullwood and Streeton remained at the front. At Hamel on 4 July the Australians attained all their objectives in less than two hours in a well-planned action. With the Canadians, they were heavily engaged in the battle of Amiens on 8 August – ‘the black day of the German army’ – but Fullwood and Streeton missed this. The AIF took a leading part in the advances which followed as the Allies pushed eastwards. Major battles were fought at Mont St Quentin and Péronne, during the approach on the Hindenburg Outpost Line, the breaking of the Hindenburg Line at Bellicourt, and in the AIF’s final infantry action of the war at Montbrehain on 5 October after which all its divisions were taken out of the line. During the year the AIF sustained 21,243 casualties, one-quarter of whom were killed.\footnote{165}

In London on 25 May 1918 an exhibition by the Commonwealth of Australian official war pictures and photographs opened at the Grafton Galleries. The 125 pictures it exhibited represented the first substantial public showing of the fruits of its war art scheme, Dyson’s earlier Australia at War exhibition notwithstanding. (His work was not shown.) The pictures

\footnote{164} Letter, Smart to Bean, 2 May 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286. \footnote{165} Grey, A Military History of Australia, pp 107-9. For full accounts of the AIF’s actions during 1918 see Bean, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Volume 5, The AIF in France: December 1917-May 1918, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1937; Official History Vol 6. For shorter accounts see Bean, Anzac to Amiens, chapters XXIII-XXIV, XXVI-XXVII.
made at the front by Power, Leist, Bryant and Quinn, or a selection of them, were shown, together with a few sent in by Lambert and Crozier – the latter being misdescribed as an official artist – and one by Arthur Burgess, an Australian marine painter who had no official status. Why it was thought appropriate to include his *The Emden’s fate* in the show is elusive. The Commonwealth’s dominion over the official representation of Australia’s part in the war was emphasised in the catalogue. A lengthy preamble described Australia’s efforts in the war establishing a context in which to consider the photographs and pictures. Under the heading ‘Sketches by Australian official artists’, the circumstances and object of their production were explained:

With the object of making a National Australian Collection of Pictures the Commonwealth Government commissioned Australian artists to proceed to the Front in France and Palestine. The sketches and impressions of some of these artists are now shown for the first time. From these sketches the artists have been commissioned by the Commonwealth Government to paint large compositions, which will find a permanent home in Australia.

Strangely, the exhibition passed virtually unnoticed in Australia: ‘strangely’ because it was for the benefit of Australians that the war art scheme had been established and the pictures made. The *Argus* reported that the show was opened by Margaret Fisher, Fisher’s wife, and was attended by several notables. In thanking the artists Mrs Fisher said they ‘had risked their lives to secure a priceless historical record of [Australia’s] gallant soldiers.’ Attending was General Hobbs, of whom portraits by Leist and Quinn were among the exhibits. He ‘eulogised’ the work of the photographers and artists and claimed it had been ‘no Cook’s tour’ for them. ‘In order’, he said, ‘faithfully to portray battle scenes, they had taken the same risks as the men who went over the top.’ Considering the occasion, this hyperbole, at least with respect to the artists, is unsurprising.

Presumably, the pictures satisfied the Commonwealth: there is no hint of any disappointment in the evidence, nor is there evidence that any official thought it necessary to re-evaluate the

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166 He has an entry in the *Concise Dictionary of Australian Artists*.  
168 Ibid., p 20. It was quite incorrect to state that artists had been commissioned to paint ‘large compositions’. No commissions had been placed, nor government authority sought to place them.  
war art scheme in light of the pictures. Quite the reverse: as the exhibition continued Smart prepared a report showing that so far as the Commonwealth was concerned, it was full steam ahead: Power and Leist would go to France again to collect material for their historical pictures and their commissions would be extended; the period of Lambert’s engagement had been extended to six months; Quinn had not worked out the period of his engagement and would return to France to paint further sketch portraits; although no decision had been made on the subject of Bryant’s historical picture this was imminent and his commission would be extended; Fullwood, Streepon and Longstaff were still in France; Bell would go next and was waiting on permission from the AIF to come through; a decision had been made to recommend to the government that another Australian artist, Charles Wheeler, who was serving in the British Army, be appointed to go to France on the same terms as the other artists.170

Any residual doubt as to who was directing the war art scheme is laid to rest by considering Bean’s activities during early June 1918. They show that he had assumed control of it. Smart is involved, but his role is confined to following. On 4 June Bean crossed to London and paid a number of visits to the Commonwealth’s exhibition of Australian official war pictures and photographs.171 He spent 9 June with Smart finalising the catalogue for an exhibition of photographs to go to Australia and ‘fixing [a] list of artists’.172 The following day he wrote to Smart providing him with instructions: he should write to Colonel Griffiths about Wheeler ‘on the following lines’ to secure his release from the British Army; he should ‘have the Australian Government requested to send Norman Lindsay to the Front’ on the usual terms; he should wire to Australia about his suggestion for Lambert’s composition pictures; three artists should be sent to France as soon as it could be arranged: Harold Parker, a sculptor, Blamire Young and Bell.173 For his part, Bean said he would inform Colonel Dodds of the subjects of the commissions going to Power and Leist and ask whether they could be sent across for a month each and retain their commissions for three months. As the official

170 Report, ‘Statement in regard to Australian official war artists’, c June 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/8 Part 1. The British Army refused to release Wheeler as his services as an instructor of a graduated battalion could not be spared. See letter, AIF Administrative Headquarters to Official Secretary, 24 July 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/323. Wheeler, an academic painter who studied at the National Gallery School in Melbourne, had travelled to London in 1912. When war was declared he enlisted in the 22nd Battalion, Royal Fusiliers. He has an entry in the Australian Dictionary of Biography.

171 Bean diary, June 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/114/1, entries 4, 5, 6, 7 June 1918, pp 1-4.

172 Ibid., entry 9 June 1918, pp 6-7.

173 Letter, Bean to Smart, 10 June 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
historian designate, one can understand Bean’s interest in the war art scheme, but his instructions to Smart reveal him as its motivating force and controlling influence.

During August 1918 Leist returned to England after a trip to France to collect data for his historical picture; Power left for France for the same purpose; and Fullwood and Streeton returned to England at the conclusion of their engagements. Quinn returned to France on 8 August to complete his engagement with instructions from Bean to paint portraits of specified officers. Longstaff, who cut short his initial visit, went again on 24 September, also with instructions from Bean. Nine official artists had visited the theatres of war. Bell, the tenth and final artist, had been waiting to go for several months. Smart recently sought permission to send him across and he also sought permission to send Streeton again for six weeks, ‘in view of the activities in France’. These permissions came through in early October: Bell was appointed and left on the 5th followed by Streeton on the 17th. They had not long been in France when the war ended on 11 November. Streeton returned to England on 25 November, but Bell stayed on until 7 April 1919.

Following the armistice Bean turned his attention to winding down the war art scheme. He made recommendations to Smart and AIF Administrative Headquarters directed to ensuring that the official artists finalised and handed over to the Commonwealth the pictures they had made at the front, and that their commissions were then terminated. There was some urgency associated with putting these measures in place. It had been arranged for Bean to lead an expedition to Gallipoli to leave London shortly after Christmas. As he tells the story, he obtained Birdwood’s authority to arrange for his return to Australia by way of Gallipoli,
‘taking with [him] such officers and others as [he] considered necessary’, to secure the records which would help him solve the many ‘riddles of Anzac’ with a view to writing the official account of the campaign. 181 This was the principal object of the expedition he named the ‘Australian Historical Mission’. 182 Another important object was the creation of ‘a visual catalogue of the landscape’ in the form of photographs and paintings of all places where the Australians had fought. 183 Requiring the services of an artist, Bean proposed Lambert whom, he told Box, was the ‘obvious man for the work’. 184 It was imperative, he explained, that Lambert accompany the mission because he had decided that the artist should paint two historical pictures, one of the landing at Anzac Cove and the other of the charge of the Light Horse at the Nek. When the government approved Lambert’s engagement, it continued the operation of the war art scheme, but in a different mode. 185

In late November 1918 the official artists exhibited their war pictures at an exhibition, *War and Peace*, which was organised by the Royal British Colonial Society of Artists in conjunction with the Society of Australian Artists and held at Burlington House. 186 Although works by Canadian, New Zealand and South African artists were included, the *Times* observed that ‘Australian artists play the largest part’. 187 It was only appropriate, then, for Fisher to officiate at the opening ceremony. 188 The exhibition opened with considerable fanfare: it was a gala event with contingents of the Australian, Canadian and other overseas forces and military bands taking part. 189 The *Times* congratulated the Commonwealth on its choice of artists and on the work they had done. 190 This praise amounted to commendation of its war art scheme; however, in the few reports of the exhibition discussion of the pictures

181 Gallipoli Mission, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1948, p 4.
182 Ibid., pp 4, 12. A second object was collecting ‘relics of the occupation of Gallipoli’ to be taken to Australia and preserved in the national war museum; and a third was investigating and reporting on the state of Australian war graves and cemeteries on the peninsula. See Bean, Gallipoli Mission, pp 5-12.
183 Janda Gooding, Gallipoli Revisited: In the footsteps of Charles Bean and the Australian Historical Mission, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 2009, p 41.
184 Letter, Bean to Box, 22 November 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
185 Lambert was appointed to make pictures in Gallipoli and Palestine ‘of places and of incidents in the late war in those countries in which the Australian Imperial Forces were engaged.’ See agreement between Andrew Fisher and George Washington Lambert, 17 January 1919, Lambert family papers, MLMSS 97/7X.
was superficial. The exhibition’s significance has never been noticed. It was meant to attract public attention, and with over 400 official pictures on display which it had ‘loaned’, the Commonwealth was presenting for public consumption near enough to the entire fruits of its war art scheme. Importantly, in representing Australia’s part in the war the pictures trumpeted the AIF’s achievements and the arrival on the world stage of a nation which could now claim to possess its own tradition. But in only one review, that appearing in the British Australasian, was it suggested that the pictures made a statement about the AIF: ‘[N]o purely imaginative battle pictures can move us as do these careful portrayals of the daily life for over four years of the young manhood of Australia, and the places they have carried with them into history.’

In early January 1919 Bean made various arrangements in connection with the project of Anzac’s official representation, mentioning some in a letter to his parents: ‘There was a vast amount to do just at the end; all my diaries to list – about 200 of them including one book of about 150,000 words; artists to see & arrange with for pictures of Anzac & France; British photographs to get hold of; artists’ visits to France to arrange for – authority to be obtained for motor cars for them; pictures to inspect, photographs to list – mostly enterprises connected with the completion of our records.’ (Surprisingly, he did not mention the most important enterprise of all, the drafting of his further report on Australia’s war records, his second memoir.) Nevertheless, he found time to visit the Canadian War Memorials Exhibition at Burlington House organised by the Canadian War Records Office. This was an extensive exhibition of 334 pictures which represented the Canadians’ part in the war, and it obviously invited comparison with the pictures painted by the Australian official and AIF.

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191 PG Konody’s discussion over two paragraphs was perhaps the lengthiest. See ‘War and Peace exhibition at the Academy’, Observer, 15 December 1918, p 5.
193 No exhibition of the pictures on anything like a similar scale has been since mounted. And the number of pictures was made greater still by the inclusion of works by some of the AIF artists: Louis McCubbin, James Scott and Crozier. See PG Konody, ‘War and Peace exhibition at the Academy’, Observer, 15 December 1918, p 5; ‘Overseas art exhibition’, Register, 25 January 1919, p 6.
195 Letter, Bean to Edwin and Lucy Bean, 19 January 1919, AWM 38, 3DRL 7447/7, p 3.
196 He had prepared a draft of this leaving a copy with Treloar before leaving London. See letter, Bean to Treloar, 3 February 1919, AWM 93, 18/1/29, p 2.
He passed on to his parents his impressions of Canada’s pictures which he claimed consisted of ‘a very interesting exhibit of curious styles of contemporary art’, but less interesting than Australia’s official pictures which, in any case, were ‘a suitable memorial’.

On 16 April 1919, aboard the Kildonan Castle en route to Australia at the conclusion of his mission to Gallipoli, Bean finalised his second memoir. A continuation of his first memoir, it contained his detailed suggestions for a scheme for the collection and organisation of Australia’s war records into a memorial to the AIF. As explained earlier, his first memoir consisted of a master plan for the official representation of Anzac. His second memoir described in detail the form each element in his plan should desirably take, from the structure of the official history he would write for the Commonwealth to the design of and accommodation to be provided in the building to be erected as the memorial to the AIF. For present purposes it is only necessary to refer to the section ‘Pictorial Records’. In this, he claimed that a ‘fine set of records for Australia’ was being produced by two groups of artists, the official and AIF artists. After describing the official and AIF war art schemes, he continued: ‘The Commonwealth owns all the sketches and sketch portraits made at the front by the Official Artists, and all the sketches and finished paintings and other work of the A.I.F. Artists during their commissions. This gives it a magnificent record of the war, painted down quickly on the spot as the artist sees it.’ In making this claim Bean was deluding himself and misrepresenting their value. To that point the official artists’ pictures numbered approximately 460, but this increased to approximately 670 through the addition of some 210 pictures made by Dyson, Lambert, Quinn, Longstaff, Fullwood, Streeton and Bell the details of which, together with the works themselves in most cases, the artists later furnished to the Commonwealth. (Later still, this number increased to 700 with the addition of thirty pictures produced by Bryant during a field trip he made to Rabaul in 1923 to make sketches

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197 Canadian War Memorials Exhibition, Burlington House, Piccadilly, January & February 1919, Canadian War Memorials Fund, exhibition catalogue, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/952. In 1928, while giving evidence before a Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works inquiring into the construction of the memorial, Bean asserted that Canada’s artists ‘were almost all of the new schools’ – he said he did not know whether they were vorticists or futurists – some of whom painted normal pictures but others painted pictures he thought would be almost insulting to the relatives of those who fought at the front. To his mind, Canada’s exhibition was more an exhibition of freak art than a record of the war. See Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, Report together with Minutes of Evidence relating to the proposed Australian War Memorial, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, 25 May 1928, p 4. The emphasis has been added.

198 Bean, second memoir, pp 1-2.

199 Ibid., p 2.

200 Ibid., Appendix H. According to this the artists had kept twenty-one pictures ‘for reference’.
of ‘places of interest’ relating to Australia’s 1914 campaign to capture German New Guinea.) Numerically, this seems to be a considerable achievement. But as the next chapter shows, save for Dyson the artists produced an insubstantial record of Australia’s part in the war, or of the war itself.
3 Official artists at the front

The official artists were engaged on an enterprise of great national importance. This is manifest from Fisher’s annual reports as High Commissioner to the Prime Minister. In his report for 1916, he informed Hughes that during the year he created a War Records Branch – not to be confused with the AWRS – ‘to make a proper record for national purposes of the Australian Imperial Force in the war’. He said he had arranged for six of the principal Australian artists living in England to visit the front in order ‘to make pictorial records of Australian troops.’ When, after the armistice, he prepared his report for 1917, the war art scheme, to the extent of engaging artists to visit the theatres of war, had terminated. Looking back, Fisher told Hughes that the purpose of appointing artists had been to obtain ‘a National Record in pictorial form of the operations of the Australian Imperial Force in France and Palestine’. And he summed up the scheme’s achievements: ‘There is now available an invaluable collection of sketches by Australia’s best artists of the operations depicting the Australian Army on the Western Front and in Palestine. From these sketches the artists will now be able at any time to paint large composition pictures which will form a permanent record for all time.’

Fisher’s statements establish that he had always envisaged that the artists would produce a record of the AIF’s operations, clause 1 of their agreement to one side. There was a good reason for this, though he left it unsaid: it was in the AIF’s operations that the idea of Anzac was expressed. Moreover, the pictures of its operations were critical stepping stones towards representing Anzac in the historical pictures to be painted depicting Australia’s part in the war. Fisher told Hughes: ‘It is hoped that eventually the Commonwealth Government will commission each artist to paint other pictures of the great events of the Great War, in which Australian Forces took so prominent a part, and which are destined as the years go by, to become unmistakable landmarks in Australian history and tradition.’

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1 High Commissioner’s Report 1916, NAA A458, F108/8 Part 3, pp 7-8. He actually made these arrangements in 1917. The War Records Branch came under the Publicity Department of which Smart was in charge.
2 Ibid., p 8.
5 High Commissioner’s Report 1918, NAA A458, F108/8 Part 5, p 25. As evidence of what the war art scheme had achieved, Fisher appended to his report the catalogue for the exhibition of official war pictures and
These considerations are important. If the pictures the artists made at the front failed to depict the AIF’s operations, the war art scheme would fail to achieve its objects and the national record would suffer an irremediable loss. Not only that, such loss would be borne financially by the Australian public which was funding the enterprise. The public was entitled to know how its money was being spent and to expect to get what it was paying for. Further, it was entitled to expect that the Commonwealth, having gone to the expense of preparing a formal agreement governing the artists’ engagements, would insist on them complying with it. Of course, the public had no idea of the arrangements made by the Commonwealth to engage artists to produce the desired pictorial record, apart from what was reported in the press, not necessarily a reliable source of information. For instance, the Argus erroneously reported that the artists were each obliged to produce twenty sketches for the Commonwealth ‘at a nominal price’ and while at the front were ‘given a free hand to sketch any incident which [suggested] itself as paintable.’

Actually, clause 1 of their agreement obliged them to paint pictures of events occurring in the war especially with regard to the AIF. But in any case it was or should have been obvious to them that they were being sent to the fronts to make pictures of the AIF’s war operations. If they were given a ‘free hand’ to paint whatever they liked, it was only because it was impossible for the Commonwealth to control their activities when they were in the field. What they did would not be known until they delivered their pictures, and if the Commonwealth was dissatisfied, it had no recourse. When they left for the fronts the Commonwealth was obliged to trust them to carry out their engagements in accordance with their agreements, if not strictly, then substantially. While at the fronts it was not unreasonable for them to exercise some discretion in their selection of subjects, but it remained incumbent on them to produce a majority of pictures which depicted events, or at least war operations, and that in most the AIF would be represented. Furthermore, as clause 6 specified that their pictures would become the Commonwealth’s property, they were obliged to hand them over,

photographs held at the Grafton Galleries in May 1918 (Appendix D); a list of the pictures made by the artists at the front, ‘List of war sketches and studies drawn by Australian official war artists’ (Appendix E); and the catalogue for Dyson’s Australia at War exhibition held at the Leicester Galleries in January 1918 (Appendix F).

6 ‘Australian artists. At the fighting fronts. Progress of war records’, Argus, 18 May 1918, p 7. Gray mistakenly claims that the specification of the artists’ contractual obligation was broad enough to give them a free hand to depict any scene which suggested itself as being paintable. See A Henry Fullwood, p 24. Although Gray quoted the relevant part of clause 1 of the artist’s agreement, she neither analysed it nor explored the factual matrix in which the agreement was prepared. Elsewhere she claims, again mistakenly, that the artists ‘were free to draw or paint whatever subject ... suited their talent and interest best’. See ‘War Art’, p 566.
even if the Commonwealth neglected to collect them. But in any case, there was nothing preventing it from collecting them.

Fisher claimed that the artists he appointed consisted of ‘every prominent Australian artist in Great Britain’ and ‘Australia’s best artists’. Whether or not such veneration was justified a consequence of their appointment was that they acquired an important and imperishable status. Simply, they were the only members of an exclusive club, a point made clear by Coates when he depicted them in *Australian official war artists 1916-1918* [11]. The picture gives a good idea of the prestige associated with an appointment. Coates presents the artists, appropriately all dressed in uniform, in a classical setting and pose which quotes Raphael’s treatment of the philosophers and scientists in his *School of Athens* (1510-11) [12]. They occupy several steps, either sitting or standing, leading up to a balcony bounded by a balustrade on the coping of which sits a large Roman urn. Coates is suggesting that as Australia’s official artists they stand on the same footing as the personages in Raphael’s work, and that they had rendered inestimable service to the nation. But did they?

I – Dyson

Travelling as a civilian in one of the War Office’s weekly parties visiting the front, Dyson arrived at the headquarters of 1st Anzac Corps at Heilly in northern France on 14 December 1916. The battle of the Somme had officially ended on 18 November, and during the

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7 High Commissioner’s Report 1917, NAA A458, F108/8 Part 4, pp 18, 19. In similar vein, Bean claimed they were ‘men of real distinction’ and ‘the leading Australian artists’. See typescript, ‘Matters for consultation with Gen. White, 9/2/18’, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/362, p 1; Bean, first memoir, p 6.
8 The memorial purchased this picture in 1946 from the estate of the late Cyril Steele who had acquired it from Coates. Steele, who died in 1939, was a successful Melbourne businessman. During the war he served in France as a gunner. See notice of auction by Leonard Joel Pty Ltd, *Argus*, 28 September 1946, p 30; ‘Funeral of Mr CA Steele’, *Argus*, 24 January 1939, p 3; Henry Cyril Augustus Steele service records, NAA.
9 Perhaps they had in a military capacity. The military treated them as if they were serving in the AIF by maintaining a record of their service during the continuance of their appointments, and after the war each artist was issued with three campaign medals: the 1914-15 Star, the British War Medal, and the Victory Medal. (See, for instance, Statement of Service, Arthur Ernest Streeton service records, NAA.) The qualification for each medal was ‘service’ in Australia’s armed forces and in the case of the first two medals for service in a prescribed theatre of war or overseas between certain dates. The issue of the 1914-15 Star is difficult to understand where the qualification to receive it – service in a theatre of war between 5 August 1914 and 31 December 1915 – was not satisfied by any artist. See Department of Defence brochure, ‘World War One Campaign Medals’, available on the website http://www.defence.gov.au/medals/.
10 Bean diary, December 1916-January 1917, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/68/1, entry 14 December 1916, p 5.
11 It will be recalled from chapter 2 that on 3 September 1916, after six disastrous weeks of fighting during the battle, the Australian divisions were taken out of the line. Rested at Ypres in a relatively quiet sector, in mid-October they were returned to the Somme where on 5 and 14 November they made two costly and unsuccessful
winter of 1916/17 the Australians garrisoned east of Flers. Fighting was rare and confined to small attacks and raids; the main battle was against the conditions of winter: the mud, rain and frostbite. On his arrival Dyson was taken to Bean who was expecting him. The next day Bean took him to Montauban, a small village on the Somme, where he and Herbertson, a British intelligence officer on Birdwood’s staff, ‘examined’ a German prisoner while Dyson sketched him. It is difficult to understand why Dyson was permitted to be present during the German’s interrogation, let alone sketch him. This almost certainly infringed British military law which incorporated the laws regarding prisoners of war contained in The Hague Rules. Perhaps more importantly, the permission the War Office had given Dyson to visit the front did not carry an entitlement to sketch while there, and in any case there is no evidence that he was issued with a sketching permit.

In Interrogation of a prisoner Dyson depicts the prisoner as a type representative of German soldiery, perhaps of Germans generally, and there is much of the Fritz character in his depiction with his lumpish appearance and large moustache. He is obviously being compared to the English officer whom Dyson suggests is superior: intelligent, refined and civilised. His drawing might well be the first ‘official’ work he made on the Western Front, perhaps the first under the war art scheme, but it was produced unlawfully. In applying to go to France he had assured the Commonwealth that he would make no drawings of ‘actual military operations’, but a prisoner’s interrogation plainly fits this description. Moreover, in making a drawing which did not depict ‘the sentiments and special Australian characteristics’
of the AIF, he departed from his avowed purpose in seeking to go to France. The making of this and two further drawings of German prisoners during his visit, *German prisoners on road construction work* and *German prisoners at the Corps Cage, Bazentin*, represented an auspicious start to his official work. But the Commonwealth overlooked the problems associated with their production, if it even appreciated them. In Dyson’s *Australia at War* exhibition held in January 1918, it showed *Interrogation of a prisoner.*

McMullin claims that while Bean viewed Dyson’s arrival with some misgivings, these quickly dissolved. By 16 December he had reason to believe that Dyson’s work would prove satisfactory:

> Dyson is an able man at his game, I can see. He has got hold of the weary detached way in which men come out of these trenches (perhaps Smart may have told him of it, for he was very struck with it). Anyway he has a pretty acute sympathy – and he will produce a drawing, he tells me, which will give the idea of it – “you know – a line of men, all going slowly along – no step more than about three inches – every man utterly detached as if they were living in a world by themselves [Coming Out on the Somme].” I wish he could see the men going in too – each one looking silently ahead of him; not sulky, but both resigned and determined too.

Bean’s diary entry constitutes some evidence that he shared with Dyson his view that Australian soldiers were remarkable in their capacity to cope with the experience of trench warfare. Importantly, Bean did not equate the soldiers’ attitude, in particular their detached weariness, with demoralisation or defeat; rather, this was further evidence of their heroism. According to Alistair Thomson, in his writing Bean redefined military heroism in the light of the changed conditions of warfare on the Western Front to reflect his view that the soldiers who endured the horrors of trench warfare displayed their own brand of heroism. While this hero of endurance was apparent in the contemporary understanding of the war, Thomson argues that Bean went further by representing that Australians endured better than soldiers of

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17 *Australia at War. Drawings on the Western Front by Lieut. Will Dyson, Official Artist, A.I.F.*, exhibition catalogue, number 30. It was exhibited as *Interrogation of a Prisoner at Montauban.*
18 *Will Dyson*, p 129. He offered no evidence in support of his claim.
19 Bean diary, December 1916-January 1917, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/68/1, entry 16 December 1916, pp 18-19.
20 “‘Steadfast until Death’? CEW Bean and the Representation of Australian Military Manhood”, *Australian Historical Studies*, vol 23, no 93, October 1989, pp 462-78 at pp 468-70. Thomson claims there is little evidence that Australian soldiers fared better than other soldiers in coping with trench warfare. Yet this idea still enjoys currency. For example, Patrick Lindsay says this about their capacity to endure: ‘Diggers from all wars have drawn on reserves of endurance, which have enabled them to overcome odds that would have defeated lesser soldiers’. See *The Spirit of the Digger*, p 17.
other armies, thus articulating his redefined version of heroism in terms of Australian national character. Dyson’s drawings contributed greatly to promoting Bean’s representation of the Anzac as the hero of endurance.

Dyson was struck by the soldiers’ stoicism and discussed this with Bean, possibly when showing him a portrait study of an Australian, *A sketch made in France in 1916* [14]. He drew a noble, perhaps tragic face, open and strong with square regular features. If this is an actual soldier, or an amalgam of soldiers to create a type, is unknown. It approximates the faces of the soldiers in the drawing he told Bean he intended making – *Coming out on the Somme* – and those in numerous other drawings. His expression captures the idea of that detached weariness he and Bean observed in the men, and its representation would become the dominant motif in his work. Dyson also came to regard the trait of endurance as a particular kind of heroism, the ‘dull, undecorative [sic] heroism’ associated with enduring the ‘[f]atigue, actual brutish and insensate’ of winter warfare on the Somme. 21 Ultimately, the features of Dyson’s work which most impressed Bean were his ability to represent the men’s capacity to endure hardship and the strain of war and to convey their plight sympathetically. In 1928 he told a parliamentary committee: ‘[Dyson] has left on record a series of drawings which, as far as I am aware, are the only pictures which adequately depict the utter weariness, misery, and distress of the men at the front during the winters of 1916 and 1917.’ 22

Dyson’s *Coming out on the Somme* (1916) [15] is a pivotal drawing as its conception is his solution to the problem of devising a representational form appropriate for his avowed task of ‘interpreting the feelings and character of the Australian troops’. Having seen the appalling conditions in which the soldiers lived and fought, he jettisoned any idea he might have held of depicting such conditions except cursorily. The spatial co-ordinates of the soldiers in his drawings are relatively unimportant, and generally he presents them in ambiguous landscapes and other settings. And setting is never offered at the risk of distracting attention away from the soldiers: their faces, attitudes and activities. In his conception of their representation it would also be necessary for the men to shed individuation in order to make them representative figures. Naturally, in an army a soldier will lose much if not all of his

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21 *Australia at War: Drawings at the Front by Lieut Will Dyson, Official Artist AIF*, with an introduction by GK Chesterton, Cecil Palmer & Hayward, London, 1918, p 42. This is a book containing reproductions of twenty drawings Dyson made at the front accompanied in each case by interpretative or descriptive text written by him.

22 *Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, Report together with Minutes of Evidence relating to the proposed Australian War Memorial*, p 4.
individuality, and so it is hardly surprising that the soldiers who people Dyson’s drawings look alike.

The subject of Coming out on the Somme is the soldiers. It can be assumed it depicts a scene, or the essence of a scene, Dyson witnessed. The sense it evokes pictorially is of a group of soldiers wearing capes, presumably as protection from the rain that is falling, moving across ground that is waterlogged. The terrain over or through which they move occupies the foreground and has been left substantially blank. That the soldiers’ journey is wearisome is suggested by their stooping postures and hidden burdens, the disappearance of their boots in the water as they walk, and the ‘weary detached’ look on the faces of two of the three main figures. As Dyson later described their journey, they moved ‘like chain gangs dragging invisible chains’. The landscape through which they move is indefinite. Where they are, where they have been, and where they are going, are not matters addressed pictorially; but the work’s title provides some of this information. Essentially, the drawing is an archetype and contains a summation of Dyson’s ideas on how he would represent the Anzac as the hero of endurance.

When Dyson returned to London arrangements were underway to return him to France, this time as an honorary lieutenant. On 4 January 1917, now dressed in the uniform of an AIF officer, he reported as ordered to the embarkation staff officer at Folkestone and crossed to France. So began his engagement as Australia’s first official artist. He reached the headquarters of 1st Anzac Corps, to which he was nominally attached, on 10 January. During 1917 and 1918 he was at the front, enjoying longer and shorter breaks in London, for approximately 56 weeks: 39 in 1917 and 17 in 1918. He left it for good on 21 October 1918. Bean later claimed that no other official artist of the war, British or Australian, saw one-tenth as much of the ‘real Western Front’ as had been seen by Dyson. His service records, while not constituting a definitive record of his movements between England and France, are the

23 Australia at War: Drawings at the Front, with an introduction by GK Chesterton, p 30.
24 Cable, War Office to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 30 December 1916, AWM 16, 4351/2/13.
25 Record of Service in the Field, Will Dyson service records, NAA.
26 It will be recalled that his commission commenced on 10 December 1916; it continued until terminated on 31 March 1920. See notifications published in Commonwealth Gazette No 54/1917 (p 738); No 59/1920 (p 956).
27 Casualty Form-Active Service, Will Dyson service records, NAA.
28 Casualty Form-Active Service; Record of Service in the Field; both in Will Dyson service records, NAA.
29 ‘Will Dyson, Artist and Soldier, Comrade of the A.I.F.’, Reveille, 1 February 1938, p 16. Bean excluded, possibly unwittingly, the Canadian and American official artists.
primary source of information on that subject. For his movements at the front, McMullin must be consulted. He gives a detailed account of these, the gist of which is that he trailed after the AIF, mostly with Bean, and accompanied him and others on several excursions to various sections of the front. During 1917 he was ‘twice wounded’. In February 1917 he was joined by Daryl Lindsay, ostensibly as his batman but really as his offisider, who remained with him until February 1918.

Dyson’s engagement was not governed by a formal agreement. As the Commonwealth had failed to define the duration of his engagement, effectively he was a free agent who could come and go as he pleased. And the question of his remuneration, if any, had also been left unresolved. After the war art scheme commenced, and on Bean’s recommendation, Smart obtained the Official Secretary’s approval to pay Dyson a daily allowance of £1 for a period of three months commencing on 28 May 1917. Thereafter, Smart secured approval to pay Dyson a daily allowance of £1 for further periods when he was ‘continuously employed on producing sketches, drawings and lithographs of the operations of the A.I.F. in France for National War Records’, whether or not he was in France. Ultimately, the Commonwealth paid him £547 as his remuneration covering the period 28 May 1917 to 27 November 1918;

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30 Will Dyson, chapter 3. McMullin’s principal sources are the artist’s letters to his brother Edward, Bean’s diaries, and a memoir by a brother-in-law, Daryl Lindsay, The Leafy Tree: My Family, FW Cheshire, Melbourne, 1965.

31 On neither occasion was he seriously injured, but they were very close shaves (Bean’s expression). As to the first, which occurred on 31 July 1917 at Messines, Dyson received a ‘very slight scratch’ to his cheek as he and Bean sought cover in a shell hole from German shrapnel chasing them as they walked from Wyt Schaete to Messines on the opening day of the Allied offensive, Third Ypres. See Bean diary, July–August 1917, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/83/1, entry 31 July 1917, p 28. The circumstances of the second incident, which occurred a day or so before 13 November 1917, were related by Dyson to Bean. He had been sketching near Westhoek when a (stray) German shell exploded nearby. The blast tumbled him over; on getting up he found he had sustained a cut in his forearm (this required six stitches), a sprained wrist and several scratches on his cheek. Some Canadians picked him up and treated him. Bean’s assessment was that Dyson had not been ‘badly cut’ but was ‘very badly shaken’. See Bean diary, November–December 1917, entry 15 November 1917, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/94/1, pp 2-4.

32 Lindsay, Leafy Tree, pp 110-11. McMullin claims Lindsay acted as Dyson’s batman. See Will Dyson, p 130.

33 Letter, Smart to Bean, 8 August 1917, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/50; minute paper, Smart to Official Secretary, 10 August 1917, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 3.

34 Memoranda (3), Smart to Official Secretary, 29 April 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 3. Smart’s mention of lithographs requires explanation. At Dyson’s suggestion, he lithographed thirty-two of his original drawings for the Commonwealth of which 50 sets were made and presented to national galleries and libraries, international governments, state governors and federal ministers. See Dyson, typed memorandum C, c 4 December 1917; memorandum, Smart to Official Secretary, 27 June 1918; both in AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 1; minute paper, Smart to Official Secretary, 14 November 1918; typescript, ‘Titles for lithographs by Lieut Will Dyson’, c 14 November 1918; memorandum to Smart, 23 April 1919, with attached list of recipients of sets of lithographs; all in AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 2.
and Smart also succeeded in having him paid a uniform allowance of £15 and £33 for the cost of materials.  

At Dyson’s suggestion, the Commonwealth authorised the publication of a collection of his war drawings in book form. He explained that Cecil Palmer & Hayward had approached him with a proposal to publish a book ‘taking all [the] risk’. Smart liaised with the publishers and applied to the Department of the Controller of Paper for the necessary certificate to enable the requisite supplies of paper to be obtained for printing the book. These applications, the first of which was refused, and a general shortage of paper, delayed publication of the book until December 1918 when it was offered for sale at a price of 7/6d. It had been finally agreed with the publishers that 5,000 copies of the book should be produced, but sales were disappointing and the publishers suffered a heavy loss.

Dyson produced about 200 drawings in consequence of having spent 56 weeks at the front, a considerable achievement. As he was not contractually bound to produce work of a

35 Payment voucher 3439 for £90, 24 September 1917; payment voucher 10638 for £92, 13 April 1918; letter, Official Secretary to Dyson, 22 October 1918; payment voucher 3534 for £92, 22 October 1918; memorandum, Acting Official Secretary to Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, 10 January 1920, advising of payment to Dyson of £273; all in AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 3; memorandum, Smart to Official Secretary, 31 January 1919; payment voucher 7784 for £15, 10 March 1919; memorandum, Smart to Official Secretary, 18 December 1918; all in AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 2. This refutes Bean’s claim that Dyson received no remuneration for his work. See Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, Report together with Minutes of Evidence relating to the proposed Australian War Memorial, p 4.

36 Australia at War: Drawings at the Front by Lieut Will Dyson, Official Artist AIF, with an introduction by GK Chesterton.

37 Dyson, typed memorandum D, c 4 December 1917, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 1; letter, Smart to Bean, 27 April 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/298; letter, Cecil Palmer & Hayward to Smart, 10 May 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 1; Smart, minute paper, 23 October 1918, AWM 27, 621/3; letter, AIF Publications Section to Cecil Palmer & Hayward, c late October 1918, AWM 27, 621/3; letter, Cecil Palmer & Hayward to AIF Publications Section, 16 April 1919, AWM 27, 621/3; letter, Cecil Palmer & Hayward to AIF Publications Section, 14 August 1919, AWM 27, 621/3.

38 With respect to the pictures produced at the front by the official and AIF artists, the Commonwealth’s record-keeping was substandard. Consequently, greater and lesser uncertainties exist as to the number and titles of the pictures the artists made and delivered to the Commonwealth. The more so as generally, and unaccountably, the pictures came into the memorial’s collection in tranches at various times, sometimes several years after the end of the war. Moreover, artists in both groups were permitted to retain pictures for reference purposes, and in several cases it seems the artist later failed to deliver up his pictures, or at least deliver them in a timely fashion. Associated with these uncertainties are difficulties encountered in tracing pictures on the various lists appended to Bean’s second memoir into the memorial’s collection, at least by relying on their details as recorded in its collection databases which contain numerous errors, commonly relating to the date and place of execution of works. Anyway, in the case of Dyson the best contemporary evidence of the number and titles of his drawings consists of memorandum, Official Secretary to Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, 3 March 1919, with attached list of works, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 3; Bean, second memoir, Appendix H; High Commissioner’s Report 1918, Appendix E; list of 111 works, c October 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 3. For reasons not found in the evidence, it seems Dyson withheld at least 26 additional drawings which the memorial subsequently
particular kind, he was free to make drawings of whatever he pleased. Nevertheless, he went to France, as he reminded the Commonwealth, with the intention of chronicling the ‘life and character’ of the AIF. 39 Although he excluded from his chronicle a record of the fighting, he otherwise recorded the everyday life of the men in the rest camps, dugouts and tunnels, and illustrated a wide range of their activities, including bathing in a shell-hole, lining up for meals, huddling around a brazier, leering at a French woman from a doorway in a village behind the lines (Back at Baire (1918) [16]), gathering fuel, enjoying home comforts, writing home and sitting or standing waiting. Despite this apparent width in subject matter, the dominant motif is the men’s weariness. And it is manifestly clear from contemporary reviews of his drawings that it was Dyson’s representation of the Anzac as the hero of endurance that was thought to define his work.

Even before their first public exhibition, a visitor to Australia House was struck by the way Dyson’s drawings conveyed ‘a wonderful impression of the terrible hardships of the campaign [during their winter on the Somme] born (sic) with stoical bravery by the Australian soldiers’. 40 The Sydney Morning Herald’s Arthur Mason visited Dyson’s Australia at War exhibition and reported: ‘[T]he majority of the pictures are sternly simple presentations of soldiers and the scenes of their soldier-life as grim, or melancholy, or pathetic figures within a surrounding of tragedy.’ 41 Another reviewer saw on the men’s faces the tragedy of war, ‘as we see them “dead beat” in their dug-out, going over the old-ground at Pozieres or coming down from the ridge’. 42 That reviewer could just as well have mentioned from among several other drawings the appearance of the wounded soldiers sitting outside a dressing station in Outside Colonel B...’s dressing station, Menin Road [17]. 43

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39 Typed memorandum, Dyson to the Commonwealth, c May 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 1.
40 Tear sheet, ‘Anzac war artist. Dyson’s studies described. Scenes in France pictured’, unknown newspaper, 20 August 1917, AWM 93, 8/2/23.
41 ‘Australia at War’, Sydney Morning Herald, 6 April 1918, p 7.
42 ‘Will Dyson’s drawings. Exhibition in London’, Western Argus (Kalgoorlie), 14 May 1918, p 2.
43 Other drawings in a similar vein include Back to the waggon lines after Polygon Wood (1917); Bringing up the stew (1917); Coming down from the ridge, Passchendaele (1917); Coming out at Hill 60 (1917); Dead beat, the tunnel, Hill 60 (1917); Eternal waiting (1917); Gathering fuel, Delville Wood (1917); Hanging about (c 1917); Jack and his offsider (1917); Labour battalion man (1917); Our pillbox, Westhoek Ridge, October (1917); The Shack, Trone’s Wood (c 1917); Waiting for the stew (c 1917-18).
the ‘peculiarity’ of his work was ‘his power to reveal the heroism of endurance’, and that ‘every drawing expresses his admiration of their endurance’. This view has persisted.

While Dyson’s drawings eschew the depiction of fighting, he did not neglect to represent Australian soldiers as warlike. Representing their capacity to endure was one thing, but their capacity to make war was also an important form of their representation. This martial aspect of his work has been overlooked. His soldiers are not uniformly represented as pitiable, a view easily come to after considering the literature, contemporary reviews of his drawings, and Bean’s opinions on their nature. The image of the Anzac he presents is more complex than the single faceted hero of endurance commonly understood as his conception of him. He did not represent his soldiers in the sabre-rattling style of Barker’s soldier on the cover of The Anzac Book, instead depicting them at the ready and occasionally directing operations. They are hardly threatening figures, at least not overtly so, being represented as steady, reliable and confident soldiers, possibly superior physically. Back at Mouquet Farm illustrates this point. Its subject is the fully realised soldier standing ahead of his mate who dominates the pictorial space. Dyson conveys the idea of a physical presence by presenting him at full height close to the picture plane and through the attention he gives to the detail of the lower part of his face, wrist and hands. The upper part of his face is shadowed by the brim of his helmet, but his eyes, just able to be made out, look straight-out and perhaps a little menacingly at the viewer. The lower part of his face shows a strong square jawline, a straight nose and a determined mouth. His neck, also shadowed, is thick and muscular. Dyson has given him thick strong wrists, large powerful hands and muscular legs, a masculinity emphasised by his puttees. A powerful man who exudes physical prowess, he is the archetypal Anzac: confident, capable, resourceful and a formidable warrior.

In Traffic control post to right of Pozières, Dyson presents him managing an admittedly minor operation with self-assurance and emphasises his physical superiority relative to other

44 ‘Mr Dyson’s war drawings’, Times Literary Supplement, 5 December 1918, p 596.
Allied soldiers. This was remarked upon by an English reviewer who said Dyson’s drawings were ‘wonderfully typical of the Australian fighter, a big loose-limbed man, with a vigorous face, full of determination’, ‘entirely different from our own [the Tommy]’. In the drawing Dyson shows an Australian soldier directing two Scottish soldiers. Although he presents him from the rear, he still conveys convincingly the idea of his physical prowess. He is another large and powerful man with a broad back and large sloping shoulders, a substantial waist, muscular buttocks and legs and large strong hands. His massive size is suggested by the way in which his coat flares out to accommodate his body. And he dwarfs the Scots who stand close to him. Dyson has drawn them as soft round bundles with barely a straight line between them. Contrastingly, the Australian is carefully delineated and bounded by clear space. His stance is all self-assurance: feet wide apart with his right leg thrust forward, his left arm relaxed by his side, and the attitude of his raised and slightly extended arm bespeaks confidence in the directions he is giving the Scots. Relative to him they appear vulnerable, tentative and physically inferior, even puny.

These drawings are not obviously martial and communicate their ideas subtly, which possibly explains why they have been overlooked. Yet they are important constructions of the Anzac. Dyson made other drawings which according to this argument illustrated his martial side. And it was appropriate that this form of his representation should feature on the cover of his book Australia at War [20]. This soldier stands at the end of a duckboard path which snakes off into the distance. Again, he is a large physical type with the same square face seen in many of Dyson’s drawings. Possibly he is weary, but that is the only untoward aspect of his presentation. Standing with his feet wide apart he has long arms, large strong hands and a thick neck protruding from which is an Adam’s apple, symbol of his masculinity. With his rifle slung over his shoulder he is resolute and ready to resume the fight. This form of the Anzac’s representation contradicts Bean’s claim that ‘there is no quality in [Dyson’s drawings] other than that which portrays the strain and toil of war.’

46 ‘Will Dyson’s drawings. Exhibition in London’, Western Argus (Kalgoorlie), 14 May 1918, p 2.
47 They include Company awaiting relief (1918); The dynamo, Hill 60 (1917); German prisoners near Messines (1917); Going up to the line near Vaux (1917); Looking for the battalion (1917); Patrolling in no-man’s-land on the Somme (1918); Reinforcements (1917).
48 Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, Report together with Minutes of Evidence relating to the proposed Australian War Memorial, p 4.
Dyson’s drawings occupy an important place in the project commenced by Bean with The Anzac Book of creating a pictorial form for the Anzac’s representation. When the artist arrived at the Western Front he continued that project, and he did so in circumstances where he and Bean agreed on the importance of recording for posterity the character of the men of the AIF. No other Australian artist would experience even remotely similar conditions, or get closer to living the life of an Australian infantryman at the front.49 So important did Bean regard the place of Dyson’s work in Anzac’s official representation that in his conception of the memorial building he envisaged that it would contain a separate room where his ‘unique collection’ could be kept together and exhibited,50 but this did not come to pass.

After the war Smart recognised that ‘owing to the nature of Dyson’s work’ it was not possible to commission him to paint a historical picture.51 However, Bean decided that Dyson should produce ten drawings showing the Australians’ humour.52 In October 1919 a commission to produce the drawings for £200 was placed with him.53 It was expected that he would execute these in black-and-white but he executed them in oil, delivering them to the Commonwealth in London in December 1920.54 Appropriately, one is entitled War weariness (‘Ain’t this bloomin’ war over yet?’) and shows a soldier sitting near the entrance steps to a cellar close to an improvised heater.

II – Power

When war was declared Power unsuccessfully attempted to enlist: the British Army rejected him as medically unfit, and his residence in England debarring him from enlisting in the AIF.55 At the Royal Academy’s exhibition in 1916 he showed two large pictures of mounted Light Horse, Anzacs and The enemy in sight [21].56 They presented rousing images of virile

49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., pp 4, 6. He had had this idea for several years, at least since 1923. See minutes of meeting between Australian War Memorial Building Sub-Committee and Federal Capital Advisory Committee, 21 December 1923, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/623, p 2.
51 Memorandum, Smart to Official Secretary, 27 November 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 3.
52 Bean, second memoir, Appendix F.
53 Minutes of meeting of National War Records Committee (NWRC), 13 October 1919; letter, Smart to Dyson, 15 October 1919; both in AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 3.
54 Letter, Dyson to Miss Mitchell (High Commissioner’s Offices), c early December 1920, AWM 93, 18/7/5 Part 3.
56 ‘Royal Academy. Australian artists’, Register, 28 April 1916, p 5; ‘Concerning People’, Register, 8 May 1916, p 4. In November 1916 the AGNSW acquired The enemy in sight. See Bernard Smith, A catalogue of Australian
cavalrymen astride magnificent horses, a desirable conception of ideal Australian manhood – the finest soldiers on the finest horses. Apparently, Power received ‘the greatest of assistance from official sources’ in connection with their painting: he found a light horseman at military headquarters – ‘the very type of man he wanted’ – who sat for him and also helped him manage the horses he brought into his studio.\(^{57}\) Already known to the Commonwealth, from the outset he was treated as a certainty for appointment as an official artist.

On 5 September 1917 Honorary Lieutenant Power arrived at the 1st Division’s headquarters, either at Wallon Cappel, west of Hazebrouck, or at Neuf Berquin, to its south-east.\(^{58}\) Hazebrouck is located close to the Belgian border to the east of which, beyond Ypres, lay the British front line. Where Power went during his engagement cannot be established, except it is known he went to Albert (from his Albert Cathedral), some distance to the south, and to Menin Road (from his Battle of Menin Road). The inability to trace his movements is due to his general failure to include in the titles of his pictures locations or other information from which a location might be deduced, seriously diminishing their value as records.

Power and Leist remained at the front for the duration of Third Ypres whose events offered a multitude of subjects, and it was these they were obliged to record. Third Ypres was the ‘great battle of 1917’, an offensive launched by the Allies with the object of straining the Germans’ morale to breaking point.\(^{59}\) It actually comprised ‘eleven great attacks’, for five of which the Australians formed the spearhead. The offensive would employ the step-by-step method: a mass of artillery, after crushing the enemy defences, would on the day of an attack lay a dense creeping barrage behind whose curtain the infantry would advance and occupy the ground, the artillery still protecting them from counter-attack. The guns would then be advanced and, as soon as possible, the process repeated. But this method was only effective in fine weather; in wet weather, with the ground a slough, it was impossible to carry out, with disastrous consequences. Australia’s artillery was used extensively during the fortnight’s bombardment preceding the offensive, but its infantry was not involved in the initial attacks.

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\(^{57}\) Concerning People, Register, 8 May 1916, p 4.

\(^{58}\) Bean, Official History Vol 4, p 732n.

\(^{59}\) What follows is drawn from Bean, Anzac to Amiens, chapter XXI.
However, on 16 September the 1st and 2nd Divisions marched through Ypres to a section of the front from which they would launch their first attacks. According to Bean, in the battles of Menin Road, Polygon Wood and Broodseinde the Australians enjoyed ‘the cleanest and most decisive victories they had yet fought’, but the fighting in the wet weather from early October doubled the casualties which mounted to 38,000 in eight weeks.

Power returned to England on 1 December 1917. On the 5th he called on Smart and told him he would deliver his pictures in about one week, a commitment it seems he kept. He had made about thirty-seven pictures, but how many he delivered to the Commonwealth is uncertain. On the evidence of his pictures it seems clear Power decided that the major contribution being made by Australian forces to Third Ypres was through its artillery, and that he should devote greatest attention to recording scenes in which it was involved. Doubtless colouring his view was that the artillery was almost wholly dependent on horses for transportation, and that as a horse painter the opportunities its depiction offered seemed limitless. He possibly had a legitimate basis for his view of the artillery’s contribution: during the weeks of the preliminary bombardment it had been heavily involved, suffering ‘casualties such as had never been inflicted on them before’. Thereafter, and during the offensive’s successive attacks, it continued to be heavily involved, but much less effectively in the wet and muddy conditions prevailing from early October which made it almost impossible to get the guns forward and the batteries into action. But however well-founded

60 Casualty Form-Active Service, Harold Septimus Power service records, NAA. As remuneration the Commonwealth paid him about £90 and a uniform allowance of £15. See ‘Statement of amounts paid to artists for pictures and travelling allowances’, attached to letter, Heyes to Trelar, 2 December 1926, AWM 93, 18/1/81.
61 On 15 December Smart encouraged Colonel Griffiths to inspect Power’s pictures assertig that he had done ‘some excellent work’. See letters, Smart to Bean, 6 December 1917, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286; Smart to Griffiths, 15 December 1917, AWM 16, 4351/2/19.
62 The best contemporary evidence of what Power produced is the catalogue for the Commonwealth’s exhibition of official war pictures and photographs held at the Grafton Galleries in May 1918 which lists thirty-seven works by him. See Catalogue of Australian Official War Pictures and Photographs, catalogue numbers 197-236. However, other evidence suggests he handed over fewer pictures, perhaps as few as twenty-five. See letter, Power to Smart, 20 November 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/314. Then, Appendix H of Bean’s second memoir lists thirty pictures, three of which were being kept by Power for reference purposes, while Appendix E of the High Commissioner’s Report for 1918 lists twenty-seven pictures.
63 Horses played a critical role on the Western Front. In addition to their use in cavalry units, they were used mainly for logistical support: reconnaissance; communication; pulling guns, ammunition wagons, ambulances, supply wagons, field kitchens and pigeon lofts; and carrying ammunition. See Elizabeth D Schaper, ‘Use of Animals’, in Spencer C Tucker, Laura Matysek Wood and Justin D Murphy (eds), The European Powers in the First World War: An Encyclopedia, Garland Publishing, New York and London, 1996, pp 52-4.
64 Bean, Anzac to Amiens, p 357.
65 For an idea of the conditions and obstacles which beset the artillery see Bean, Official History Vol 4, pp 902-6.
Power’s view, his concentration on the artillery led to an imbalance in his work, with too few pictures treating the infantry.

Power’s four pictures of the artillery in action define his visit, in the sense that they and no others contributed to creating an image which later figured prominently in Anzac’s official pictorial representation. They comprise two distinct forms: in one an artillery team is clearly moving, perhaps not galloping but straining to attain speed, and in the other it is stationary, or virtually so. Each contains three essential elements: a team of six horses, soldier-riders and a gun carriage or ammunition wagon. According to Power, these forms of the artillery’s representation encapsulated its involvement in Third Ypres. And each, he decided, could form the basis of a large historical picture of an incident from the offensive. This was an important decision, not only in the context of securing commissions to paint pictures for the Commonwealth, but also with a view to painting private pictures for exhibition and sale. The success of his Light Horse pictures exhibited at the Royal Academy during 1916 told him that pictures of Australia’s artillery in action would prove equally successful. He was right. Such pictures attained iconic status: they constitute a particular representation of Anzac, one which drew on and reiterated in a different setting late nineteenth century Australian representations of heroic bush life as portrayed, for instance, in Lambert’s picture of a team of horses pulling a wagon laden with bales of hay in *Across the black soil plains* (1899, AGNSW), and they occupy a special place in the catalogue of images of Anzac.

Power’s grandiosely entitled *War* [22] is the most fully developed of his artillery pictures and sums up his approach. It depicts a team of six straining horses being pressed by their handlers to attain speed as they pull a gun carriage across open ground under heavy German shelling. A cloud of shrapnel and debris rises behind the team as it is chased by shellfire, and in the sky an enemy plane is in hot pursuit. Three soldiers riding on the nearside of each pair of horses are expertly managing the team.66 The picture’s dramatic action gave it immediate appeal and Power successfully conveyed the danger and urgency attending the team’s dash to escape annihilation. In entitling it *War* he stole a march on Leist and the later official artists, staking a claim for the definitiveness of his image as a representation not only of the war, but of Australia’s part in it. It was an image he substantially reproduced in *Bringing up the guns*

66 In the official history Bean paid tribute to the riders of horses and drivers of horsedrawn vehicles claiming they belonged to the finest class of men Australia had produced, ‘unassuming, country-bred men.’ See *Official History Vol 4*, p 794.
shown at the Royal Academy during 1918 and later purchased by the memorial, and could adapt in making private pictures for exhibition and sale, such as A shell-swept road (1920, Geelong Art Gallery), and in carrying out commissions for the Commonwealth. When the wet weather set in during the latter stages of Third Ypres, Power produced Going into action and Heavy going in Flanders mud, pictures representing a condition of virtual stasis as men and beasts struggle to move gun carriages and limbers loaded with ammunition through a quagmire. In contrast to these works A shell swept road, a loosely drawn but convincing depiction of a galloping team under a sky filled with bursting shrapnel, shows the artillery’s dash over firm, or relatively firm ground.

Power’s pictures of the artillery were the clearest evidence of his particular abilities and interests, and he was commissioned to paint a succession of pictures of incidents involving the artillery: First Australian Division Artillery going into the 3rd Battle of Ypres (1919), Bringing up the ammunition, Flanders, Autumn 1917 (1920) and Saving the guns at Robecq (1920, revised 1934-6). Numerically, he made the largest contribution to Anzac’s official pictorial representation with the several pictures he painted for the Commonwealth under commission and those purchased from him. In addition to the three just mentioned, his other commissioned pictures were Stretcher bearers (1922), Damascus Incident (1923), The gunners, France (1924), The incident for which Lieutenant FH McNamara was awarded the VC (1924), Lieutenant General Sir Herbert Cox (1924), Lieutenant Colonel Richard Williams (1924), Camel Corps at Magdhaba (1925), Admiral Sir George Patey (1925), Leaders of the Australian Light Horse in Palestine, 1918 (1927), 8th August 1918 (1930) and Ziza (1935, revised 1937-8). And the major pictures purchased from him were Bringing up the guns, Canteen: some story: army canteen behind the lines in France (1918), Australian Artillery going into action at Harbonnières (1920) and Horse lines on the Somme (1920).

The concentration in Power’s work at the front on the artillery, and on horses in other settings, led to the infantry being under-represented. The infantry of the 1st Division fought two major battles during Third Ypres – Menin Road and Broodseinde – suffering enormous casualties. At Menin Road the loss was 2,562; at Broodseinde 2,207. See Bean, Official History Vol 4, pp 789n, 876n.
But where are Power’s pictures of incidents in these battles? There are none, save for Battle of Menin Road [26] and Reserves in the trenches, showing men in a rear trench watching the progress of a battle, and two pictures of two soldiers on an unnamed battlefield, each dubiously entitled Studies on the field of battle [27]. One might have expected that Power’s ready access to the men, and to the battlefields after they were made safe, would have led him to make more pictures recording for posterity aspects of the great battles then taking place. But with the exception of the pictures just mentioned, no contemporary pictorial records of the infantry’s part in the two battles, or of the battlefields, exist.

Power’s other pictures are a mixed bag and include his other treatments of equine subjects, consisting in the main of pictures of horses standing in lines under or adjacent to makeshift shelters and of pack horses standing still. Some incorporate faceless men who are seated or standing, for instance In the horse lines [28]. There are also several pictures of small groups of men in camp: some are sitting outside tents yarning, as in Camp stories [29], much like swagmen round a camp fire; others are shown peeling vegetables, cleaning harness and collecting meals from a field kitchen or makeshift cookhouses. They are static compositions which fail to evoke any drama and are really no more than scenes. And as records, their value is marginal. There is the occasional dynamic picture, such as Shell pack horse in the mud [30], which depicts two horses carrying ammunition, one being ridden, struggling through mud with shells and shrapnel bursting around them and a biplane overhead. But overall, Power’s pictures reveal a seeming reluctance on his part to engage in a substantial way with his subject: the war and the AIF’s experiences. Possibly only his artillery pictures reveal such an engagement. But the rest, the vast majority of which depict scenes of camp life, horse lines and pack horses, hardly did justice to the task entrusted to him by the Commonwealth of making pictures of events occurring in the war especially with regard to the AIF. In any case he depicted few events, at least of a substantial kind. Yet in the battlefields to the east of Ypres a human catastrophe of unimaginable proportions was unfolding. Nothing of this can be detected in his pictures.

68 Letter, Bean to Smart, 25 May 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
69 ‘Dubiously’, because it seems improbable that Power entered a battlefield while the battle was in progress.
70 The British alone lost 400,000 men and the Germans a similar number. See Bean, Anzac to Amiens, p 376. For damning accounts of Third Ypres see BH Liddell Hart, History of the First World War, Pan Macmillan, London,
Power made a second trip to France in August 1918 to collect data for a historical picture he had been asked to paint illustrating the 1st Divisional Artillery going into action during the opening of Third Ypres. (This was not an incident he had witnessed.) This and a trip Leist made to collect data for his historical picture are problematic. Although they were going on the Commonwealth’s payroll (£2 per day), Smart neglected to formalise their further engagements and to ensure that each artist understood that any pictures he made would become the Commonwealth’s property. If Smart believed that as they were going for the purpose of collecting data for their historical pictures they were not obliged to hand over their pictures, he was mistaken. It conflicted with Bean’s opinion.71 Anyway, instead of travelling to Ypres where the incident had occurred, Power travelled to the Amiens region on the Somme where the Allies’ offensive was underway. Thus, he must have gone to collect data relating to the 1st Division’s artillery teams. It is known that during his visit he made a number of pictures, two of which, *Corbie Abbey* and *German observation post, Mont St Quentin*, the memorial later purchased for £70.72 Then, in January 1920, he made a third trip to collect data for two further historical pictures of incidents involving the artillery he had been commissioned to paint; these became *Bringing up the ammunition, Flanders, Autumn 1917* and *Saving the guns at Robecq*. It can be assumed he kept any pictures he made.73

III – Leist

Early during the war Leist worked for the War Office designing recruiting posters, but he continued to paint and exhibit. In the exhibition of the Royal Institute of Oil Painters in 1916 he showed a portrait of a soldier, *Captain Forbes*, ‘the strongest figure work’ in the show.74 In July 1917 Smart informed Leist that the government had approved of his appointment as an official artist. Why he was chosen is unknown, but he was prominent in the colony of

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71 Letter, Bean to Smart, 27 November 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
72 As to this trip and the later purchases see Record of Service in the Field, Harold Septimus Power service records, NAA; memorandum, Smart to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 3 July 1918; letter, Smart to Bean, 12 July 1918; both in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/314; minutes of meeting of Art Committee, 3 May 1923, AWM 170, 4/1, resolutions 43, 44. His remuneration amounted to £38. See ‘Statement of amounts paid to artists for pictures and travelling allowances’, attached to letter, Treloar to Heyes, 27 May 1926, AWM 93, 18/1/81.
73 Memorandum, Smart to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 22 January 1920; letter, Smart to Power, 16 June 1920; letter, Power to Smart, 21 June 1920; all in AWM 93, 18/7/10; ‘Statement of amounts paid to artists for pictures and travelling allowances’, attached to letter, Treloar to Heyes, 27 May 1926, AWM 93, 18/1/81. On this occasion he was paid his travelling expenses of £10, but no daily allowance.
expatriate Australian artists at Chelsea and well-known to the Commonwealth’s officials.\textsuperscript{75} Anyhow, he was appointed and on 5 September 1917 Bean brought him to the 5th Division’s headquarters at Blaringhem, a hamlet west of Hazebrouck.\textsuperscript{76} The following day Leist reported to Smart that he was comfortably billeted and had started on work; Bean, he said, had been a ‘real brick’, looking after Power and him ‘like a father’.\textsuperscript{77} Shortly after arriving Bean asked him to produce an illustration for the cover of \textit{The A.I.F. Xmas Book}, a souvenir of the AIF’s experiences in France, and he agreed producing it in a few days.\textsuperscript{78} The Commonwealth had not engaged him to produce work for Bean, but that hardly mattered.

Like Power, Leist had arrived during Third Ypres and remained at the front for its duration. On 26-27 September the 5th Division’s infantry fought a successful action at Polygon Wood east of Ypres, but sustained terrible casualties losing 3,370 men.\textsuperscript{79} Doubtless news of this battle reached Leist and in the following weeks he could not have failed to have gained an appreciation of its significance for Australia and its tradition. As an event to be recorded pictorially for posterity its credentials were manifest, and within Leist’s narrow sphere of operations unrivalled. Although he did not witness the battle, he was present in the sector when it was fought, had access to the battlefield after the fight ended, and had access to the

\textsuperscript{75} Since 1912 he had been a member of a committee of artists advising the architects who were designing the new Commonwealth offices to be constructed on the Strand; in July 1913 he contributed paintings for the backdrop to an exhibit of Australian produce in the Commonwealth Pavilion at the Royal Agricultural Society of England’s show at Bristol for which Smart was responsible; and he and other Australian artists, including Dyson, contributed illustrations to the program for an exhibition game of Australian (Rules) Football played between teams of soldiers made up from the 3rd Australian Division and Australian Training Units at the Queen’s Club, West Kensington, on 28 October 1916. See ‘General cable news’, \textit{Argus}, 9 March 1912, p 19; ‘Australia in England … Royal Show of England at Bristol. Commonwealth and Western Australian exhibits’, \textit{West Australian}, 7 August 1913, p 4; ‘Australian Football in England’, \textit{Register}, 13 December 1916, p 8.

\textsuperscript{76} Bean, \textit{Official History Vol 4}, p 732n.

\textsuperscript{77} Letter, Leist to Smart, 6 September 1917, AWM 93, 18/7/8 Part 1.

\textsuperscript{78} Letter, Leist to Smart, 13 September 1917, AWM 93, 18/7/8 Part 1. During the latter part of 1917 Bean was closely involved in the publication of \textit{From the Australian Front}, known as \textit{The A.I.F. Xmas Book}, another project concerned with Anzac’s representation. Published by Cassells in December 1917, it served much the same purpose as \textit{The Anzac Book}, which it resembled. Save for an introduction by Birdwood, its contents were entirely pictorial with numerous official photographs and roughly thirty illustrations, mostly cartoons. Four artists who feature in this history contributed five illustrations: Leist (the cover), Dyson (two), and Crozier and Daryl Lindsay one each. Despite the slaughter experienced by the AIF since arriving on the Western Front, the humour of the cartoons was predictably up-beat and carefree. According to one review they ‘tell us that not all the mud, hardships, and dangers of Flanders and the Somme can sap an ounce of the inherent wit and good-fellowship of the Australian.’ See ‘From the Australian Front’, \textit{Sydney Morning Herald}, 23 February 1918, p 9. It seems the book was neither as successful nor as popular as \textit{The Anzac Book}. In January 1918 large numbers in the hands of the AIF Xmas Book Committee remained unsold and it decided to offer them for sale to the Australian public at 4/6d each – hitherto its sale had been restricted to the AIF. See leaflet, ‘Final sale of the two Australian souvenir books’, c January 1918, AWM 184, 1; ‘Australian war books’, \textit{Sydney Morning Herald}, 8 November 1918, p 4; ‘Valuable war souvenir’, \textit{Western Mail} (Perth), 6 December 1918, p 39.

\textsuperscript{79} Bean, \textit{Official History Vol 4}, p 831n.
men who fought in it. Thus, he enjoyed very considerable advantages in being able to produce a contemporary record of it, the same advantages Power enjoyed with respect to the battles of Menin Road and Broodseinde. But Leist ignored the imperative claim of the battle of Polygon Wood to representation and failed to produce a single picture of it.

Leist returned to England on 23 December 1917. He was slow to deliver his pictures to the Commonwealth. By 9 April 1918 he had not done so prompting Smart to send him a terse telegram: ‘Will you please deliver your war pictures here by tomorrow noon.’ He did, but without titles. Smart desperately needed them in connection with the Commonwealth’s exhibition of official war pictures and photographs to be held at the Grafton Galleries, and he was obliged to send him another terse communication: ‘Will you please let me have the titles to your pictures by to-morrow, as I have to submit them to the Censor, and then send them to the printers for the Catalogue.’ Leist complied and showed thirty-seven pictures in the exhibition. In the absence of any list of his pictures prepared at the time, save for the list in the catalogue, it might be assumed that what he showed constituted all of the work he had made in France, but this appears not to be the case. Some he showed did not go to the Commonwealth, and others he made were not shown, for instance Blaringhem Church [31], typical of his work. By 23 October 1918 the Commonwealth had come into possession of fifty-two of Leist’s pictures which included a number he made during a second trip to France in June 1918.

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80 Casualty Form-Active Service, Frederick William Leist service records, NAA. Leist overstayed the length of his engagement by almost three weeks, but he was not remunerated for this period. As remuneration the Commonwealth paid him £91 and a uniform allowance of £15. See memorandum, Acting Accountant to Chief Paymaster, AIF, 21 November 1917, AWM 93, 18/7/8 Part 1; ‘Statement of amounts paid to artists for pictures and travelling allowances’, attached to letter, Heyes to Treloar, 2 December 1926, AWM 93, 18/1/81.
81 Telegram, Smart to Leist, 9 April 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/8 Part 1. Smart initially asked him for them in late January 1918. See letter, Smart to Leist, 24 January 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/8 Part 1.
82 Letter, Smart to Leist, 2 May 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/8 Part 1.
83 Catalogue of Australian Official War Pictures and Photographs, catalogue numbers 151-188.
84 It seems Leist did not deliver “The First Wave,” Polygon Wood; “Café Mademoiselle?”; A “Gun Pit,” Hill Sixty; A Rest Camp, Reninghelst; Trouble on the Menin Road; Death’s Highway; and Zero to the Commonwealth. They are not in the memorial’s collection. The title of the first picture suggests Leist made a picture of the infantry moving off towards the battle, but not too much should be made of this in the absence of the picture.
85 Typescript, ‘List of Pictures Handed to Lieut F Leist on the 23/10/18’, AWM 93, 18/7/8 Part 1. The pictures were returned to Leist to enable him to go through them and select those he wished to show at the War and Peace exhibition to be held in November 1918. See letter, Smart to Leist, 6 November 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/8 Part 1. Precisely how many pictures he made and delivered to the Commonwealth is uncertain. Appendix H of Bean’s second memoir lists fifty-nine pictures, six of which Leist was keeping for reference purposes, while Appendix E of the High Commissioner’s Report for 1918 lists fifty-three pictures.
On the evidence of his pictures it is clear Leist treated his engagements as an exercise in landscape painting. As Third Ypres raged, he painted features of the villages and surrounding countryside in and near Blaringhem, Dickebusch, Rackingham, Reninghelst, Vlamertinghe, Secus and Steenvorde, locations west of Ypres. And although attached to the 5th Division, he inexplicably travelled south to Pozières where there was no fighting. When he went to France again in June 1918 to collect data for his historical picture, he stayed at St Gratien north of Amiens on the Somme and painted subjects in the immediate area while the Australians were fighting in the opening round of the Allies’ great offensive. No matter when and where he went, landscapes were the order of the day: churches, canals, chateaus, farmhouses and highways are the subjects of the vast majority of his pictures, for instance Dickebusch Church [32] and Canal at Blaringhem [33]. They are congenial pictures, mostly loosely executed and sensitively coloured, but have very little connection to the war. And none could form the basis of a large historical picture he might be asked to paint on his return. A few pictures evoke a sense of drama, for instance Cloth Hall, Ypres [34], depicting the surreal appearance of the bombed out ruins of the medieval Cloth Hall, and Craterland [35], his only picture of an ‘event’ showing a moonscape of water-filled crater holes and shattered tree stumps through which a group of German prisoners walks along a duckboard path carrying a wounded soldier on a stretcher. The few soldiers appearing in his pictures are small and undeveloped figures who are incidental to the landscape or scene, as in Resting on the road to the front and Camp kitchens, Rackingham [36]. Only occasionally are they larger, as in Ditched and Lewis Gun in action [37], but they remain featureless. When he devoted an entire picture to them, he made Wet weather kit showing two soldiers ‘modelling’ their wet weather gear. Strangely, the figure on which he lavished most attention was that of a nun in Lace making.

During April 1918 Leist gave an interview to Arthur Mason describing his experiences at the front. His account is a revelation. Its uninhibited drama and excitement contrasts starkly with the restraint and peacefulness of his pictures. He described long marches; a continuous shock of his nerves; the memory of a cold perspiration during nightly bombing raids by German Gothas; and a life-threatening visit to the front line on which he was taken by Bean.

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86 This must be a confection. To produce it there is little doubt Leist would have had to expose himself to enemy fire. More likely he got the men to act out the scene well behind the lines.
87 ‘Mr Fred Leist at the front. Painting the war’, Sydney Morning Herald, 25 June 1918, p 6.
Bean took him to where a battle had just been fought in order that he might ‘really see something’. Expecting to die at any moment, his excursion ‘consisted very largely of near shell-bursts, deafening explosions, constant duckings and dodgings in hope of avoiding the same, frequent plunges at full length into the mud of the gutter-trench, and then a sudden dreadful sight of a strew of dead Germans heaped upon the field with all the devastating effect of that battle-ground spectacle.’ Looking back he saw the ground lifting up in ‘great puffs’, ‘spouting in all directions under a heavy bombardment’. Leist conveyed none of this in his pictures.

During June 1918 Smart and Bean decided that Leist should be commissioned to paint a historical picture for the Commonwealth illustrating the battle of Polygon Wood.  

This was a strange decision as he had made no pictures of the battle during his visit to the front. For the purpose of collecting data for the picture, he made a further trip to France on the Commonwealth’s payroll. Leaving on 27 June, he was again attached to the headquarters of the 5th Division, now at St Gratien. What data Leist hoped to collect here is elusive as the incident he expected to be commissioned to paint occurred at Ypres. Returning to England on 3 August, Leist informed Smart that he had collected ‘a lot of good material for [his] Battle Pictures’. There is no evidence that Smart asked him for his pictures, nor any clear evidence that Leist handed over any more than perhaps seven or so pictures. Following the armistice, Bean instructed Smart: ‘Will you make sure that Streeton is handing over to us a second series of sketches as a record of his second visit to France? Leist should have done so, and I think Power is doing so. I would not be inclined to give Leist a further opportunity of going abroad unless he undertakes to hand over to us his work up to the hilt.’

Smart duly wrote to Leist asking for a list of his pictures and the pictures themselves, but there is no evidence he complied. Yet in June 1920 he claimed to Bean that he had given everything he produced in

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88 Extract from letter, Bean to Smart, 10 June 1918; letter, Smart to Bean, 24 June 1918; both in AWM 93, 18/7/8 Part 1.
89 Memorandum, Smart to Official Secretary, 26 June 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/8 Part 1.
90 Letter, AIF Administrative Headquarters to Official Secretary, 27 June 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/8 Part 1; Casualty Form-Active Service, Frederick William Leist service records, NAA.
91 Letter, Leist to Smart, 7 August 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/8 Part 1. As remuneration the Commonwealth paid him £78, calculated at £2 per day. See ‘Statement of amounts paid to artists for pictures and travelling allowances’ attached to letter, Heyes to Treloar, 2 December 1926, AWM 93, 18/1/81.
92 Letter, Bean to Smart, 27 November 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
93 Letter, Smart to Leist, 4 December 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/8 Part 1.
France to the Commonwealth. Leist made a third trip to France in June 1919 on the Commonwealth’s payroll, once again to collect data for his picture illustrating the battle of Polygon Wood, ultimately *Australian infantry attack in Polygon Wood* (1919). It can be assumed he kept any pictures he made during this trip. Later, he was commissioned to paint three further historical pictures for the Commonwealth: *Capture of Mont St Quentin* (1920), *The taking of Lone Pine* (1921) and *Sinking of the Southland* (1927).

**IV – Bryant**

Bryant’s appointment was probably made out of desperation to find an artist willing to go to France during the winter. During November 1917 Smart had looked for an artist and fell on Bryant whom he discovered was an established marine painter. When war was declared Bryant continued to paint and exhibit but added to his repertoire pictures illustrating incidents in the war, some of which were reproduced in the *Sydney Mail*. His appointment is difficult to understand. As a marine painter there was nothing for him to do within his specialty at the 2nd Division’s headquarters in Belgium to which he was headed. Moreover, there would be little in the way of action to record as the belligerents were wintering. In any case, he was not a figure painter. Smart realised this as in recommending Bryant he gave his appointment a marine slant: ‘In addition to doing work in France, Mr Bryant can also make pictures illustrating the embarkation and disembarkation of Australian troops. He would also be able to collect material for the painting of a picture illustrating the sinking of the

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94 Letter, Leist to Bean, 5 July 1920, AWM 93, 18/1/72. His claim seems to be incorrect. A number of pictures in Australian public collections suggest, by virtue of their titles and dates, that he withheld work, for example, *The pigeon loft* (1917); *Battle of Mont St Quentin* (1918) (both in AGNSW); *The Somme* (1917) (NGV). Leist showed *The pigeon loft and The Somme* in an exhibition in September 1927 alongside several other war pictures: *Tanks Going into Action at the Battle of Hamel, 1918; Ypres Salient, 1917; The Road to Death, Polygon Wood, 1917; The Chateau, St Gratin, France, 1918; The Road to the Front*. It is impossible to determine where and when he made these pictures. See *Exhibition of paintings by Fred Leist, ROI, RBA*, catalogue for exhibition, Fine Art Society’s Galleries, Melbourne, 1 to 14 September 1927, State Library of Victoria.

95 Memorandum, Smart to Official Secretary, 27 May 1919; letters, Smart to Leist, 3 June 1919; AIF Administrative Headquarters to Official Secretary, 10 June 1919; all in AWM 93, 18/7/8 Part 1. As remuneration the Commonwealth paid him £20. See ‘Statement of amounts paid to artists for pictures and travelling allowances’ attached to letter, Treloar to Heyes, 27 May 1926, AWM 93, 18/1/81.

96 Smart wrote to Bryant on 30 November 1917 offering him an appointment which he promptly accepted. See letters, Smart to Bryant, 30 November 1917; Bryant to Official Secretary, 2 December 1917; both in AWM 93, 18/7/2.

97 For instance, a drawing illustrating 12-inch naval guns engaged against land batteries on the Belgian coast, and another illustrating the flight across the English Channel of some of the 34 British naval aeroplanes that had raided the German centres on the Belgian coast in February 1915. See *Sydney Mail*, 10 February 1915, pp 18-19; 14 April 1915, p 16.
His first suggestion was taken up, but his second was nonsensical. The transport Ballarat carrying 1,600 men and cargo was sunk with no loss of life by a German submarine in the English Channel on Anzac Day 1917. Reports of its sinking applauded the Australians’ conduct: their discipline, coolness and heroism. It was this that warranted depicting. But Smart’s suggestion that Bryant collect material for the picture in France made no sense: the vessel lay at the bottom of the Channel, and if he was to interview witnesses – hardly an appropriate task for an artist – first they would need to be identified and then found.

On 12 December 1917 Honorary Lieutenant Bryant crossed to Boulogne and was transported to the 2nd Division’s headquarters near Ploegsteert in Belgium. His engagement got off to a bad start and never really improved: his painting materials had not arrived, but in any case the freezing conditions were unsuitable for painting. On Christmas Eve he wrote to Smart: ‘I’m feeling very fit but conditions for painting are very bad owing to the extreme cold – paint freezing all the time, these three months are no doubt the worst for working, but I’m going to do my best to get something done.’ Little wonder that when Bryant met Bean in early January 1918 they spoke about his ‘doing some work at Boulogne’. Smart initiated steps to obtain the War Office’s permission for him ‘to make sketches at Boulogne or any other port where Australian troops embark or disembark.’ Towards the end of January the War Office issued a sketching permit authorising Bryant to sketch or paint at Le Havre and Boulogne from 25 January to 28 February. When Bean was asked to specify the work Bryant should carry out, he advised: ‘Lieut Chas. Bryant is desired to make sketches in

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98 Minute paper, Smart to Assistant Secretary, 3 December 1917, AWM 93, 18/7/2.
100 When Smart reported to Bean that Bryant was being sent to France, he expanded on this suggestion to include another possible task for him: collecting material for a picture of the Southland incident. See memorandum, Smart to Bean, 4 December 1917, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286. This was still sillier: the incident, in which the troopship was torpedoed but did not sink, occurred in the Mediterranean on 3 September 1915. Where Bryant was headed there was no data to collect relating to it. And the ship had since been sunk by a German submarine. See Clydebuilt database, http://www.clydesite.co.uk/clydebuilt/viewship.asp?id=2189, accessed 22 April 2013.
101 Record of Service in the Field, Charles David Jones Bryant service records, NAA. His commission commenced on this date and continued until terminated on 20 December 1918. See notifications published in Commonwealth Gazette No 52/1918 (p 650); No 37/1919 (p 438).
102 Letter, Bryant to Smart, 24 December 1917, AWM 93, 18/7/2.
103 Letters, Bean to Smart, 2 January 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286; Bryant to Smart, 12 January 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/2.
104 Memorandum, Smart to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 9 January 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/17.
105 Letter, AIF Administrative Headquarters to DAG, AIF, Attached Headquarters, Australian Corps, France, 31 January 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/2.
colour of the (1) embarkation of Australian wounded on hospital ships at ports in France; (2) of leave men, of A.I.F. on board ships or going on ships from France; & [3] any similar subject of Australian interest (e.g. hospital barges on river) if within the scope of his authority from G.H.Q.\textsuperscript{106} Although these instructions probably had the effect of suspending for the duration of Bryant’s permit his contractual obligation to make pictures of events especially with regard to the AIF, it is clear they required him to record subjects which depicted Australians or were ‘of Australian interest’.

Bryant’s permit, doubtless accompanied by Bean’s instructions, arrived at the 2nd Division’s headquarters around 10 February.\textsuperscript{107} Its late arrival reduced his available time in the ports to roughly two weeks. Earlier, on 12 January, Bryant had asked Smart for an extension of his engagement; when he left for the ports a month later his request remained unanswered.\textsuperscript{108} And when he returned, Smart informed him that the arrangement could not be extended.\textsuperscript{109} He packed up and returned to London arriving on 15 March.\textsuperscript{110} By the opening of the Commonwealth’s exhibition of official war pictures and photographs on 25 May, it had received thirty-five pictures from Bryant, the number he showed.\textsuperscript{111} However, this did not constitute the whole of his work: the evidence suggests he made forty-seven pictures, all of which should have gone to the Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{112}

Bryant arrived at the front after Third Ypres. During the winter of 1917/18 the Australian divisions took turns in holding the front line along a sector assigned to them which extended from Hill 60-Hollebeke in the north (south of Ypres) to the French city of Armentières in the south.\textsuperscript{113} This sector took in the Wytschaete-Messines area from which the Germans were driven at the commencement of the Allies’ offensive in June 1917 (the battle of Messines). During his visit the 2nd Division held the line at Ploegsteert from 16 December 1917 to 29 January 1918, and again from 8 March, a week before his return to England. Thus, he had

\textsuperscript{106} Letter, Treloar to Smart, 31 January 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/2; Bean, undated manuscript, AWM 16, 4351/2/17.
\textsuperscript{107} Letter, Bryant to Smart, 12 February 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/2.
\textsuperscript{108} Letter, Bryant to Smart, 2 March 1918; Smart to Bryant, 9 March 1918; both in AWM 93, 18/7/2.
\textsuperscript{109} Casualty Form-Active Service, Charles David Jones Bryant service records, NAA. As remuneration the Commonwealth paid him £90. See letter, Chief Paymaster, AIF to Accountant, Office of the High Commissioner, 14 June 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/2. It is certain he also received a uniform allowance of £15.
\textsuperscript{110} Letter, Bryant to Smart, 10 April 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/2; Catalogue of Australian Official War Pictures and Photographs, catalogue numbers 241-75.
\textsuperscript{111} Typescript, ‘Titles of oil paintings by Lieut Charles Bryant’, c 25 October 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/2.
\textsuperscript{112} Bean, Official History Vol 5, p 34.
ample opportunity of observing the men at close quarters and recording something of their activities and experiences, just as Dyson had done during the Somme winter of 1916/17. During 1917 the 2nd Division suffered terrible losses, and the privations associated with holding the line were not inconsiderable, although in terms of fighting the winter campaign at Messines was ‘extremely quiet’. But there was a major difficulty: he was not a figure painter. What then was he to do? There is no evidence that Bean steered him in any direction, save for specifying the work he should do in the ports. Bryant, then, was left to his own devices. As figure work and portraiture were beyond him, all that was left was landscape. And according to Smart he could ‘do a very good landscape’. In that case, there were famous battlegrounds nearby which had seen recent fighting by the Australians waiting to be recorded. But he did not venture to them.

The subjects of Bryant’s pictures fall into three broad groups drawn from (1) the vicinity of Messines where, at Ploegsteert, the 2nd Division was holding the line; (2) the vicinity of the old Somme battlefield where the Australians had fought during 1916; and (3) the ports of Boulogne and Le Havre. Significantly, none of his pictures could have formed the basis of a historical picture he might be asked to paint. And assessing the contribution they made to recording Australia’s part in the war is problematic because at least thirteen pictures are known only by their titles. The evidence suggests that possibly nine pictures were returned to Bryant for reference purposes, but never recovered from him, and another five were returned to him on the basis they were his property. Despite this difficulty, in most cases the subjects of these missing pictures can be deduced from their titles. Constrained by his apparent shortcomings as a figure painter, it is unsurprising that the vast majority of his pictures are landscapes and marine subjects.

Overall, the subjects of Bryant’s pictures are neither events nor war operations, and only a few include Australian content. The first group of about twenty-one pictures, the subjects of

114 Bean put these at 12,375. See Official History Vol 4, p 684n.
115 Bean, Official History Vol 5, p 35.
116 Memorandum, Smart to Bean, 4 December 1917, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
117 Letter, Smart to Bryant, 28 January 1919, with attached two receipts, AWM 93, 18/7/2. The first receipt covers pictures ‘lent’ by the Commonwealth to Bryant for reference purposes, and the second covers those which Bryant claimed were his. But the titles of the pictures in the latter group suggest they were made during and not after his engagement, and therefore were the Commonwealth’s property. Appendix H of Bean’s second memoir lists forty-three pictures, nine of which were being kept by Bryant for reference purposes, while Appendix E of the High Commissioner’s Report for 1918 lists thirty-five pictures.
which he drew from the Messines region, almost without exception depict aspects of the war ravaged landscape: craters, shell holes, the land itself and damaged structures on it such as churches, observation posts and other buildings, for instance the devastated village shown in *A street in Neuve Englis* [38] and the exploded mine crater in *Ultimo Crater* [39]. Sometimes they include small figures representing soldiers but their size and undeveloped nature deny them the status of subjects. An occasional picture, such as *Motor transports on the Armentières-Bailleul Road* [40], depicts minor war operations.¹¹⁸ The subjects of the next group of about ten pictures he made during his visit to the old Somme battlefield are also features of the war ravaged landscape and include ruined churches and a famous AIF landmark, "Gibralter", *strong point, Pozières* [41]. The final group of about fourteen pictures he made during his visit to the ports are disappointing, especially as he was working in his specialty. Some in a sense depict war operations, but unusually their scenes are static. They are pleasant works, loosely executed in an impressionistic style and attractively coloured, but convey nothing of the hustle and bustle one associates with ports, especially during wartime. His most animated and Australian picture is of a contingent of soldiers leaving a ship, *Australian troops disembarking at Boulogne* [42]. Although Bean’s instructions were that Bryant should depict Australian soldiers going on and coming off ships, only one did, and the hospital and leave ships he painted, for instance *Hospital ships, Le Havre* [43], are unidentifiable and have no readily apparent connection to the Australians.

By 22 November 1918 Bryant’s only work for the Commonwealth was a commission to paint a picture of the sinking of the *Southland*.¹¹⁹ This had been provisionally allocated to him subject to obtaining government approval, and this had come through.¹²⁰ But he did not paint it: in accordance with a recommendation made by Bean a picture illustrating the sailing of the 1st Australian Division from Albany was substituted for it.¹²¹ Later, at Bryant’s suggestion, the subject was altered again to the first convoy at sea in November 1914.¹²² He duly painted *First convoy at sea* delivering it to the Commonwealth in London in April 1920.¹²³ Its subject

¹¹⁸ In this group are three crude pencil sketches of soldiers, evidence that Bryant was not a capable figure painter.
¹¹⁹ Letters, Smart to Bryant, 19 November 1918; Smart to Bean, 22 November 1918; both in AWM 93, 18/7/2. This led to his commission being immediately terminated. See letter, Dodds to Official Secretary, 11 December 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/2.
¹²⁰ Letter, Smart to Bryant, 10 December 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12.
¹²¹ Letter, Smart to Bryant, 6 January 1919; Smart, memorandum, 8 January 1919; both in AWM 93, 18/7/2.
¹²² Letters, Bryant to Smart, 5 July 1919; Smart to Bryant, 8 September 1919; Smart to Galbraith, 8 September 1919; all in AWM 93, 18/7/2.
¹²³ File note, 12 April 1920, AWM 93, 18/7/2.
had no connection to his visit to Belgium and France during the war, and to paint it he had to rely on photographs supplied to him of episodes connected with the voyage of the first convoy to Egypt and his own inspection of ships at various docks in England.\textsuperscript{124} After returning to Australia he was commissioned to paint three historical pictures of naval incidents: \textit{Australian Squadron in Blanche Bay, New Britain} (1924), \textit{Landing at Kabakaul} (1925) and \textit{AE2 in the Sea of Marmora, April 1915} (1925).

In June 1921, when Treloar wrote to Bean about the painting of two historical pictures of incidents from Australia’s campaign in September 1914 to capture German New Guinea, he ventured that it was essential for the artist engaged to paint them – ultimately Bryant – to visit the Islands and make studies.\textsuperscript{125} He claimed that ‘a collection of sketches of places in the Islands prominent in the story of their capture’ would be a valuable addition to the memorial’s collection. Their capture, although involving little fighting, was still ‘the first blow in the war struck by Australia’, making it desirable that an ‘art record’ be secured. Treloar proposed that an official artist visit the islands on similar terms to those which governed the artists’ visits to the fronts during the war: he should have his passage paid, be supplied with materials, and paid a daily allowance of £2 in consideration of his handing over all sketches which should not number less than twenty-five.

In June 1922 Treloar obtained approval of his proposal from the Australian War Museum Committee (AWMC),\textsuperscript{126} but it took until August 1923 to settle on Bryant as the artist to go and finalise the conditions of his engagement.\textsuperscript{127} Two amendments were made to the approved conditions.\textsuperscript{128} First, his sketches should include places specified by Seaforth Mackenzie, the official historian of the campaign. This was a sensible innovation which minimised the artist’s discretion to paint whatever he liked and ensured that the memorial would get the records it wanted. Next, although Bryant remained bound to hand over all of

\textsuperscript{124} Letters, Treloar to Bryant, 16 January 1919, AWM 16, 4372/41/9; Bryant to Smart, 23 November 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/2.

\textsuperscript{125} Letter, Treloar to Bean, 27 June 1921, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287. For an account of this campaign see Seaforth Mackenzie, \textit{Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Volume 10, The Australians at Rabaul: The Capture and Administration of the German Possessions in the Southern Pacific}, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1927, chapters III-V.

\textsuperscript{126} Director’s statement ‘Visit of official artist to Rabaul’ attached to agenda for meeting of AWMC on 14 June 1922; minutes of meeting of AWMC, 14 June 1922, resolution 79; both in AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1. Treloar estimated the cost of the visit at £275.

\textsuperscript{127} Letters, Treloar to Bean, 29 June 1923, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/294; Treloar to Bryant, 28 July 1923; Pretty to Bryant, 22 August 1923; both in AWM 93, 18/2/21.

\textsuperscript{128} Letter, Pretty to Bryant, 22 August 1923, AWM 93, 18/2/21.
his work, after the memorial chose twenty-five pictures it would return what was left to him. Why this amendment was made is unknown; it denied the memorial the opportunity of selling his ‘excess sketches’, as Treloar had suggested might be done to defray the cost of the visit.

Bryant finally left for Rabaul on 5 September 1923 and on returning submitted fifty-one sketches from which thirty were selected ‘as of record interest’. The pictures from his visit still in the memorial’s collection mostly depict landmarks, harbours, waterfronts, scenery and ‘places of interest’, for instance Wireless station, Bita Paka, Rabaul [44], the capture of which was the objective of the operation carried out on 11 September 1914 by members of the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force (ANMEF) dispatched to capture the islands. They also include re-enactments of two events occurring during the campaign, Hoisting the Union Jack, Rabaul, 13 September 1914 [45] and Marching through Rabaul.

V – Lambert

When war was declared Lambert apparently made two unsuccessful attempts to enlist, first in the AIF, only to be told he had to ‘enrol’ in Australia, and next in the British Army, which rejected him ‘probably owing to his age’. (Oddly, Amy, his wife and biographer, mentions neither attempt.) Disappointed, he joined a volunteer training corps and taught men of military age to ride until obtaining a position in Wales as a divisional works officer with a government department responsible for maintaining timber supplies for the war effort. The job was difficult and involved long hours and took its toll; in November 1917 he was obliged to resign, his health and nerves having collapsed under the stress of the work. It was at about this time that Lambert was approached by Australia House and sounded out about

129 Acting director’s report attached to minutes of meeting of AWMC 11 October 1923, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1, item ‘Visit of artist to Rabaul’, Pretty, handwritten file note, 14 March 1924, AWM 93, 18/2/21. Albert Pretty was acting director of the memorial in Treloar’s absence. Why it was left to him to make the selection is a mystery; the memorial had had an art committee since January 1921, more about which later. If Bryant was away for two months as planned, say 60 days, his remuneration would have amounted to £120.
130 Andrew Motion, The Lamberts: George, Constant and Kit, Chatto and Windus, London, 1986, p 61. This is an old claim, impossible to verify, which first saw light immediately after the artist’s death. See, for example, Bean, ‘Captain George Lambert: A Tribute’, Reveille, 30 June 1930, p 2.
131 Gooding, Gallipoli Revisited, p 29. Although she refers to an application by Lambert to enlist in the British Army dated 3 December 1915 in the Lambert family papers, MLMSS 97/4, there is no evidence that he presented himself for enlistment. He was required to complete page 4 of the application by providing details of his health in advance of submitting to a medical examination, but this page is blank suggesting he did not proceed with it.
133 Ibid., pp 72-3.
undertaking ‘War Records work’.

At the same time, he received an offer from the Canadians to undertake similar work for them. But working for Australia held a special attraction for him, and he delayed deciding in case it made him a definite offer. This arrived on 23 November when Smart invited him to visit France. But within days Smart had a brainstorm suggesting to Bean, probably with Lambert in mind, that an artist be sent to Palestine. Bean agreed but left it to him to find an artist. On 4 December Smart wrote to Lambert now asking whether he was available to proceed to Palestine in order to make sketches of the operations of the Australian Imperial Force there. On the 6th Lambert sent Smart a telegram: ‘Available if conditions suitable to me. Hope to call this week.’ Smart reported to Bean: ‘As Lambert is one of the best men, I think it would be a good thing for him to go to Egypt.’ Bean did not disagree.

By 12 December 1917, when the War Office was making arrangements for Lambert to travel to Egypt after the 19th, he had agreed on suitable conditions with the Commonwealth. Although he entered into an artist’s agreement in the standard form, altered to reflect his different destination, Lambert secured more favourable terms than the earlier artists by convincing the Commonwealth to pay him double the daily allowance. Moreover, the Commonwealth furnished him with a general letter of introduction signed by Fisher himself: ‘This is to certify that Mr George Washington Lambert has been commissioned by the Commonwealth Government to paint sketches of the operations of the Australian Imperial Force in Egypt.’

134 Ibid., p 73. It will be recalled that by 2 November 1917 Lambert was on Smart’s list of artists.
135 Ibid.
136 Motion, The Lamberts, p 64.
137 Letter, Smart to Lambert, 23 November 1917, quoted in Lambert, Thirty years of an artist’s life, p 73.
138 Letter, Smart to Bean, 28 November 1917, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/197.
139 Letter (fragment), Bean to Smart, 1 December 1917, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/197.
140 Letter, Smart to Lambert, 4 December 1917, quoted in Lambert, Thirty years of an artist’s life, p 74.
141 Quoted in memorandum, Smart to Bean, 6 December 1917, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/302.
142 Ibid.
143 The events traced in these communications refute Bean’s claim that he was involved in securing the artist’s services: ‘The writer obtained leave of A.I.F. Headquarters to make the offer [to Lambert], hurried to London, and over dinner at the Chelsea Arts Club put the proposal to Lambert, and was delighted to find it wholeheartedly accepted.’ See ‘Captain George Lambert: A Tribute’. More likely this occurred, if it occurred at all, when he was engaged in January 1919 to accompany the Australian Historical Mission to Gallipoli.
144 Letter, AIF Administrative Headquarters to Official Secretary, 12 December 1917, AWM 25, 1013/29 Part 2.
145 Agreement between Andrew Fisher and George Washington Lambert, December 1917, Lambert family papers, MLMSS 97/7X. Fisher committed the Commonwealth to paying Lambert a daily allowance of £2 without government approval. It will be recalled from chapter 2 that Fisher sought approval to pay such an allowance to the artists on 18 January 1918 and that approval to do so was given on 28 March 1918. Thus, Gray’s claim that by December 1917 the pay for official artists was £2 per day is incorrect. See George Lambert: Art and Artifice 1873-1930, Craftsman House, Sydney, 1996, chapter 9, footnote 2, p 185; ‘War Art’, p 566.
Force in Egypt and Palestine. I shall be glad if every facility can be given to Mr Lambert in this work.'

Carrying this in his baggage and dressed as an AIF officer, on Christmas morning 1917 Honorary Lieutenant Lambert made his way to Waterloo Station and boarded the 11.35 am train for Southampton with orders to report to the embarkation commandant. His departure was delayed as the Channel was heavily mined, but a day or so later he sailed for Alexandria, arriving there on 13 January 1918.

Lambert arrived during the final stages of the Palestine campaign. The Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF), which included the Light Horse, had cleared the Turks from the Sinai by February 1917. During these operations the Australians were involved in battles at Romani (4-5 August 1916), Magdhaba (23 December 1916) and Rafa (9 January 1917). Thereafter, the EEF stood poised to take the war to the Turks in Palestine. The key to southern Palestine was the town of Gaza on which the Turkish defences hinged. At the third attempt to seize it in late October 1917, the GOC, General Allenby, determined to take it by attacking the further end of the Turkish defensive line around the town of Beersheba. The plan proved a spectacular success with mounted Light Horse charging and running over the Turkish defences of Beersheba on 31 October, and opening the way for the Desert Mounted Corps under General Chauvel to seize the high ground towards Khuweilfe. After further hard fighting the Turks abandoned Gaza and retreated northwards. Several weeks of hard fighting followed before Jerusalem was taken in early December 1917. During the month further minor actions on the coast and to the north of Jerusalem carried the British front line further northwards to the position it occupied when Lambert arrived in Egypt. In February 1918 Allenby initiated plans to occupy the western side of the Jordan Valley with a general advance on the enemy: the Turks were driven from their positions and they withdrew their

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146 Letter, Fisher to ‘To whom it may concern’, 17 December 1917, AWM 25, 1013/29 Part 2.
147 Letter, AIF Administrative Headquarters to Lambert, 24 December 1917. AWM 25, 1013/29 Part 2. His commission commenced on this date and continued until terminated on 31 March 1920. See notifications published in Commonwealth Gazette No 52/1918 (p 650); No 59/1920 (p 956). During this period his commission was upgraded to that of Honorary Captain, to date from 17 January 1919, when he left with Bean on the Australian Historical Mission to Gallipoli. See notification published in Commonwealth Gazette No 56/1919 (p 755).
148 Lambert, Thirty years of an artist’s life, p 76; Casualty Form-Active Service, George Washington Lambert service records, NAA.
149 Unless otherwise indicated the following account is taken from the subject entry ‘Palestine Campaign’, The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, pp 405-9. For a concise account of the campaign see Jean Bou, Australia’s Palestine Campaign, Army History Unit, Canberra, 2010. The official account is HS Gullett, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Volume 7, The Australian Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1923.
150 Gullett, Official History Vol 7, pp 526-8, 536.
whole force from both sides of the Jericho road, in the process abandoning Jericho. To the east, across the Jordan, they took up defensive positions around the Ghoraniye bridgehead; in the north they were driven beyond the Wady Auja. The British front line now began at the coast north of the Auja River; from there it ran south-east before turning abruptly south on meeting the Jordan River to follow its western reach to the Dead Sea.  

Lambert went first to Cairo, the location of Australian Headquarters, Egypt, before travelling to Moascar near Ismalia on the Suez Canal, the location of Australia’s base camp. He remained there while permission for him to travel to Palestine was obtained. In early February he passed over the Canal at Ferry Port into the Sinai and began his journey northwards. On 12 February he applied for an extension of his engagement until the end of June claiming that he needed the extra time to complete ‘the work required’. He was granted an extension of six weeks. Continuing north from Richon le Zion, he visited Nalin on 20-21 February before turning east and visiting Jerusalem and then Jericho. In early March he travelled south surveying ‘the old battle-grounds’ at Beersheba, Romani and Magdhaba en route to Cairo which he reached on 29 March.

For the whole of April Lambert stayed in Cairo spending several days on the outskirts of the city at Abbassia and Ghezireh. On 7 April, Australian Headquarters, Egypt applied for a further extension of Lambert’s engagement of two months, claiming he could not embark due to ‘shipping difficulties’. Around 18 May he was granted a further extension of six weeks, but by then he was on his way back to Cairo having briefly visited Palestine again. Lieutenant-Colonel Fulton, commandant of Australian Headquarters, Egypt, had approved
this visit claiming that Lambert was ‘desirous of proceeding to the 1st [Light Horse] Brigade for further front line experience in connection with his work’. He left Cairo for the headquarters of the Desert Mounted Corps at Talaat ed Dumm on 7 May but returned on the 19th. If, as Fulton claimed, Lambert wished to gain further ‘front line experience’, he had left Cairo too late to get it. News of operations east of the Jordan River, the object of which was to gain control of an area around Es Salt, had possibly excited his desire to get closer to the action, but these operations were unsuccessful and terminated on 4 May. During his visit he worked mostly in the Jordan Valley producing a handful of works, refuting the romantic picture later drawn by HS Gullett of Lambert walking out ‘day after day in the blinding heat and choking dust to sit without cover for hours at his labour of love.’

It seems possible that Lambert had wished to remain in the Middle East indefinitely. On 21 May Chauvel wrote to AIF Administrative Headquarters recommending that his commission be extended until the termination of the war and that he be allowed to remain in the Middle East, explaining: ‘His work speaks for itself and although this campaign may not be of the same military interest in the future as that in the main theatre of war, on account of the historical and religious associations of the country it will be of more interest to the Australian public generally and it lends itself to artistic effort very much more so.’ But Lambert had had a change of heart and now wished to return to England. On 23 May he embarked the Canberra for the voyage home and arrived in London on 7 June 1918. He had been away for 165 days and had made about 125 pictures: forty-nine oil paintings and seventy-six drawings.

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161 Casualty Form-Active Service, George Washington Lambert service records, NAA. Also see Movement Order, Kantara Military Railway, 18 May 1918, Lambert family papers, MLMSS 97/4. This authorised a journey from Jerusalem to Kantara on the Suez Canal.
162 For a detailed account of these operations see Gullett, *Official History Vol 7*, chapters 35, 36. For a concise account see Bou, *Australia’s Palestine Campaign*, pp 88, 91-2, 94.
163 ‘Lambert and the Light Horse’, *Art in Australia*, Lambert Memorial Number, third series, no 33, August-September 1930, no page number.
165 Cable, Descorps to Stralis, 22 May 1918, AWM 25, 1013/29 Part 2.
166 Casualty Form-Active Service, George Washington Lambert service records, NAA; letter, Lambert to Fisher, c 26 September 1918, AWM 93, 18/77 Part 1.
The number of works Lambert produced and their perceived quality impressed Smart. On 9 June 1918 he told Bean that Lambert had returned with ‘a wonderful collection of sketches’, adding: ‘He is whole hearted – has brought in every little sketch and study and only wishes to do all he can to make a grand record of the Light Horse in Palestine.’\(^{168}\) Smart was convinced that Lambert was the only artist who should be given the job of completing the pictorial record begun of the part played by the Light Horse in the Palestine campaign. When Gullett suggested that Power be sent out to continue the job, he emphatically rejected his suggestion, telling him that Lambert had ‘entered into the task of collecting Australia’s records more enthusiastically than any of the other official artists’ and had ‘expressed the desire that he be allowed to supply the artist’s record of the A.I.F. in Palestine’.\(^{169}\) Bean agreed with Smart, and although they proposed that Lambert return to Egypt after a couple of months, this did not eventuate.\(^{170}\)

Gullett was in Palestine where he was responsible for organising the collection and preservation of Australia’s war records in the Middle East.\(^{171}\) Although he held no authority over Lambert, his responsibility for records brought him into contact with the artist from whom, he said, he stood clear and allowed to go his own way except for an occasional suggestion.\(^{172}\) On 18 May, the day before Lambert left Talaat ed Dumm to return to Cairo, Gullett wrote to Treloar.\(^{173}\) He discussed the work of ‘artists’, which included the official photographer Frank Hurley who also had been there, and asked that he try to send out another

‘Statement[s] of amounts paid to artists for pictures and travelling allowances’ attached to letters, Treloar to Heyes, 27 May 1926; Heyes to Treloar, 2 December 1926; both in AWM 93, 18/1/81. On this basis he was overpaid £18 (9 days).

\(^{168}\) Bean diary, June 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/114/1, entry 9 June 1918, pp 6-7.

\(^{169}\) Letters, Gullett to Treloar, 19 May 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/621; Treloar to Smart, 25 May 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/19; Treloar to Gullett, 18 June 1918, AWM 25, 1013/29 Part 2.

\(^{170}\) Letters, Treloar to Gullett, 18 June 1918, AWM 25, 1013/29 Part 2; Bean to Smart, 21 June 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/302.

\(^{171}\) A journalist by occupation, in 1915 Gullett was appointed official Australian correspondent with the British and French armies on the Western Front. He returned to Australia in 1916 and on 20 July 1916 enlisted in the AIF. After training as a gunner he returned to England arriving in April 1917. In August 1917 he was promoted lieutenant (temporary) and attached to the headquarters of 1st Anzac Corps for duty with Bean. In November 1917 he travelled to Egypt and was attached to various headquarters and units in an administrative capacity. In May 1918 he was appointed officer in charge of the EEF subsection of the AWRS which was responsible for collecting and preserving Australia’s war records in the Middle East, a post he held briefly. On 3 August 1918 he was appointed official correspondent with the AIF in Egypt with the rank of captain. He was briefly the memorial’s first director. There is no evidence he held a background in art. See Henry Somer Gullett service records, NAA; AJ Hill, ‘Gullett, Sir Henry Somer (1878-1940)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, [http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/gullett-sir-henry-somer-harry-448/text11157](http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/gullett-sir-henry-somer-harry-448/text11157), accessed 31 August 2013.

\(^{172}\) Letter, Gullett to Treloar, 19 May 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/621.

\(^{173}\) Ibid.
artist ‘at once’ suggesting Power would be ‘the best man’. While acknowledging that Lambert had done ‘good work’, and had not been ‘altogether idle’ in Cairo, he regretted having had no control over him and ventured that it would have been ‘far better’ had he been working under him in order ‘to get the best work done’. He claimed that had he been responsible he could have had Lambert and Hurley back in London weeks earlier. Although the precise nature of Gullett’s concerns is unclear, it seems he was concerned about the lack of control over Lambert’s activities and time wasting. The first concern in particular was real and applied to all official artists; as it was never addressed the Commonwealth got the pictorial record its artists wanted, and not what it wanted.

Smart and Bean were deluding themselves if they actually believed Lambert’s pictures represented ‘a grand record of the Light Horse in Palestine’. Had they looked carefully they would have noticed that the Light Horse hardly featured, except as the subjects of numerous pencil portraits he executed, for instance of General Chauvel [46]. While creating a valuable archive of the contemporary likenesses of men who served in the campaign, making approximately fifty portraits could not be justified by the terms of his engagement. He also made several pencil portraits of various characters he encountered, for instance of Mrs Chisholm, who managed a soldiers’ canteen at Kantara, *Mrs Alice Chisholm of Kantara*. Of his 125 pictures over seventy were pencil portraits. No one concerned in Lambert’s appointment could have envisaged that he would devote a substantial part of his engagement to portraiture.

Then, the majority of Lambert’s oil paintings were virtually picture postcards, landscapes in which no event or war operation is occurring and containing no or insubstantial evidence of the Light Horse or, for that matter, of the war. It should have been clear to Smart and Bean that Lambert had treated his engagement as an adventure in landscape painting. It is puzzling how this escaped them. But their perceptual apparatus and critical faculties were immobilised before Lambert’s ‘little panels of warfare among the arid, sun-parched hills and clefts of the Holy Land’, as the *Observer*’s critic described them, which he said were ‘brilliant and extraordinarily deft oil sketches, full of life and local colour’. To have described them as ‘little panels of warfare’ was a misnomer, because the one thing they did not depict was warfare.

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In pictures such as *Jerusalem from below the Mount of Olives* and *Gaza, from Anzac Ridge* [47], the light horseman Lambert includes is a mere incident of the landscape who might well have been left out. His inclusion did not make them war pictures or records of the war. When Lambert included Major Stodart, his guide around the battlefields, in his studies of Romani – *Khurbet Sihan* and *Romani, Mount Royston in the background* [48] – which feature soldiers’ graves, he produced a discordant and stagey effect by assigning Stodart the role of graveside mourner. In the latter work this effect is enhanced by the inclusion of a camel and its attendants resting, but clearly posing, beside the graves. For the purpose of making studies of the landscape to be utilised in painting historical pictures of incidents in Australia’s part in the war, it was unnecessary to populate these scenes with actors. It was similarly unnecessary to include the tiny figure of a soldier lying before his camel in *Wady bed between El Arish and Magdhaba* and of a horse and rider, presumably a mounted light horseman, in *The Road to Jericho* [49], as figurative elements in order, perhaps, to give an idea of scale. In these pictures the soldiers functioned as mere props. They made no contribution to producing a ‘grand record of the Light Horse in Palestine’. Nor did the few pictures Lambert made of events. He got closest to doing this at Nalin in northern Palestine, some distance from the British front line, with pictures of light horsemen manning ‘sangars’, small fortified positions built from rocks and rubble. In *Front line sangar, with the 7th Light Horse* [50], he shows four soldiers standing in a sangar with their heads exposed: one points, perhaps to the Turkish lines, and another rests his rifle on the rock wall. Clearly, they are in no danger of being shot. This and a companion picture, *Jebel Saba, near Nalin*, a view looking up at a sangar behind the wall of which two soldiers can be just seen, are slight works which are records of the landscape and not of the men and hardly qualify as records of events. In other pictures, also essentially landscapes, such as *The Road to Jerusalem* and *Mounted troops move through a defile in Palestine* [51], Lambert presents relatively distant views of the passage of mounted light horsemen across rough roads and through gorges. Not really connected to these pictures are several he made of encampments, such as *Mouth of the Wady El Arish* and *Moascar, from Major ‘Banjo’ Paterson’s tent* [52], the latter in any case more a picture of the famous poet’s horse than of the camp. These last pictures are records of places occupied by the Australians well away from the front line in Palestine.

Lambert made other pictures which successfully distracted Smart and Bean from critically evaluating his work. There were several brightly coloured pictures of horses, donkeys and
camels, and equally colourful pictures of Eastern ‘exotica’ including a view of Cairo’s notorious brothel district, *The Wassah, Cairo* [53], pyramids and Roman ruins, a Bedouin thief, an Egyptian girl, Arabs, and Arab settlements, as in *Arab huts, Jericho* [54]. There were also several landscapes which depicted places mentioned in or associated with the Bible and biblical times which carried their own exotic and romantic allure, for instance *Monastery in the ravine of Wady Kelt*, showing the monastery of St George on the edge of the precipitous cliffs of the Wady Kelt a few miles above Jericho, and *The Dead Sea, from the Mount of Olives* [55]. These kinds of pictures, which make up the bulk of Lambert’s work, bore no relation to the war. That he made them during the continuance of a war in the region is merely coincidental. They are not war pictures, and it is quite impossible to justify them by reference to the terms of his engagement.175

According to Lambert, Smart ‘promised’ that awaiting his return would be a commission to paint a historical picture depicting an incident involving the Light Horse. When this did not eventuate, he complained vociferously. He claimed the Commonwealth’s treatment of him was scandalous and that in delivering all of his work to the Commonwealth he had gone further than his contract demanded.176 He also wrote to Fisher claiming he had (1) carried out his work in a way ‘even more efficiently and prolifically than was expected’; (2) arrived home ‘full of enthusiasm to carry out the larger pictures the studies for which had cost [him] such strenuous journeys and labour’; (3) given to Australia the whole of his time and work from 25 December 1917 until the end of August 1918; and (4) made sacrifices that now looked to him like ‘an excess of patriotism’.177 Really, his situation was no different to that of other official artists who were waiting to commence work on pictures which had been

175 Conventionally, they are ‘justified’ on artistic grounds, notably by Gray who has considered them on several occasions. See *Art and artifice*, chapters 9 and 10; *George W Lambert Retrospective: Heroes and Icons*, National Gallery of Australia, Canberra, 2007, pp 22-4, 45, 137-44; *George Lambert Catalogue Raisonné*, pp 69-79, 154-72. In her discussions Gray recounts Lambert’s ‘war service’ but fails to refer to his agreement; the only criteria she employs in evaluating his pictures are of an artistic kind. Lambert, she claims, employed a direct painting method recording the appearance of the motif before him paying attention to colours, the light and space, and simplified the scene by imposing on it a sense of structure through focussing on its underlying forms and patterns to create a harmonious design. Employing these means he produced ‘dazzling views’ such as *The Road to Jericho* and *Sunrise over the Dead Sea, from headquarters Desert Corps*, works with ‘delicious colour harmonies’ which captured ‘the largeness of space and the dazzling full light of Palestine’; and others such as *Katib Gannit*, a watercolour of the abstract forms of the landscape which captured ‘the glaring heat of the desert’ and its ‘palpitating atmosphere’. See *Art and artifice*, pp 100-1, 102, 104; *Heroes and Icons*, pp 23, 45, 143.

176 Letters, Lambert to Smart, 9 September 1918; Lambert to Smart, 6 October 1918; both in AWM 93, 18/7/7 Part 1.

177 Letter, Lambert to Fisher, c 26 September 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/7 Part 1.
provisionally allocated to them subject to receiving government approval. Anyhow, his disappointments were finally swept away when the Commonwealth made him an especial offer, one that guaranteed him the most prestigious commissions of the war art scheme, commissions to paint pictures of the landing and of the charge of the Light Horse at the Nek. It will be recalled that in late November 1918 Bean proposed that Lambert accompany the Australian Historical Mission to Gallipoli with a view to his painting them. Box approved the proposal after Smart advised him that if Lambert were permitted to go, it was ‘certain that a most valuable pictorial record could be obtained’. Initially, Lambert resisted the offer, but he soon succumbed proposing various terms on which he said he was prepared to go.

In early January 1919 Lambert’s offer came under discussion and alternative terms were formulated. The view was taken that he could not be engaged by the Commonwealth, and no alternative terms could be offered to him, without first obtaining government approval. On 7 January Fisher cabled the Prime Minister’s Department:

_In order to obtain pictorial record operations of A.I.F. in Gallipoli recommend that Lieutenant Lambert official war artist proceed with Captain Bean to Gallipoli. At the present time there is no record available. Bean can point out to Lambert main incidents on spot from which Lambert could make sketches which would be available all time for painting of main incidents. A.I.F. [meaning Bean] strongly supports this recommendation. Recommend that Lambert be sent on the following terms (1) Period six months (2) Pay £2 per day and travelling expenses (3) £50 for artists material (4) £500 for one composition picture to measure about 10 feet by six (5) That Lambert deliver to Government all sketches and drawings made by him which shall not number less than 100. As Bean leaving for Gallipoli about January 10th would be glad to have reply by that time._

According to this cable, Lambert would be going in order to make a pictorial record of the AIF’s operations on Gallipoli. But of course, all operations had ceased with the evacuation.

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178 And in one respect he was better placed as he had wheedled out of the Commonwealth a ‘salary’ of £84 paid to him after he returned which covered the period 17 June to 28 July 1918. See ‘Statement of amounts paid to artists for pictures and travelling allowances’ attached to letter, Heyes to Treloar, 2 December 1926, AWM 93, 18/1/81. The basis on which this salary was paid is not disclosed by the evidence.

179 Memorandum, Smart to Official Secretary, 29 November 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/7 Part 1.

180 Letters, Smart to Lambert, 4 December 1918; Lambert to Smart, 11 December 1918; Smart to Bean, 20 December 1918; Lambert to Smart, 24 December 1918; all in AWM 93, 18/7/7 Part 1. Lambert’s terms are irrelevant as he agreed to other terms at an interview with Box on 15 January 1919. Lambert had just then been engaged to paint a picture of the charge of the Light Horse at Beersheba for £500. See agreement between Andrew Fisher and George Washington Lambert, 4 December 1918, Lambert family papers, MLMSS 97/7X.

181 Cable, Fisher to Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, 7 January 1919, AWM 93, 8/2/23. The emphasis has been added.
Thus, perhaps it should be assumed that what Fisher envisaged was that Lambert would produce a pictorial record of any evidence of past operations. Anyway, the late dispatch of his cable gave the government virtually no time in which to consider his proposal. As was customary, the Prime Minister’s Department referred it to Defence for advice.\footnote{Memorandum, Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department to Secretary, Defence Department, 8 January 1919, AWM 93, 8/2/23.} Trumble gave the matter immediate attention and recommended that the proposal be approved: ‘There is scarcely time to obtain the advice of the Historic Memorials Committee on this proposal but, as the principle of employing artists to paint war pictures has already been established and there is no record of the Gallipoli operations, the commissioning of Lieut. Lambert for this purpose would appear to be justified, and is recommended accordingly under the conditions set out [in Fisher’s cable].’\footnote{Memorandum, Trumble to Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, 10 January 1919, NAA A2, 1920/1044.} The Prime Minister’s Department immediately acted on his recommendation, evidence that it did not give Fisher’s proposal separate consideration. On 10 January Watt cabled Fisher: ‘With reference to your telegram of 7th January Lambert proposal approved under conditions specified. As no expense for Artists Material previously provided presume that you are satisfied as to justification of expense £50 in present case.’\footnote{Cable, Watt to Fisher, 10 January 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/7 Part 1. In the continuing absence from Australia of Hughes, Watt was Acting Prime Minister. Watt was wrong in claiming that no expense for artist’s materials had been previously provided for. In fact, clause 6 of the standard artist’s agreement made provision for this in the sum of £30.}

Since the dispatch of Fisher’s cable a fundamental rethinking had taken place in London as to the nature of Lambert’s engagement. It had been decided that he should visit Palestine again, presumably with a view to making a pictorial record of the AIF’s operations there. How this decision was reached is not disclosed by the evidence, but as it involved a significant enlargement in the scope of Lambert’s engagement, and increased expenditure by the Commonwealth, it is remarkable that Fisher never sought government approval for it. Of course, there already existed an official pictorial record of the AIF’s operations in the Middle East, Lambert’s very own. The absence of documents showing how the Commonwealth conceived of sending Lambert to Palestine suggests the idea was impromptu.\footnote{As at 12 January the idea had not been thought of. See letter, Bean to Edwin and Lucy Bean, 12 January 1919, AWM 38, 3DRL 7447/7. In this Bean told his parents that after the mission finished its work on Gallipoli Lambert would be returning to England.} Its genesis...
might be traced to something Gullett said to Smart in December 1918. When Gullett was told of Bean’s anxiety to have Lambert accompany him to Gallipoli, he said he was very anxious to have him ‘go out there in order to get more stuff from Palestine’. If this constituted the impetus for expanding the scope of his engagement it was hopelessly vague and provided no justification for doing so. Significantly, there is no evidence that Gullett had a program of work in mind for Lambert.

On 15 January Box and Lambert thrashed out terms acceptable to each which would see the artist join Bean’s mission. It seems probable that at this meeting Lambert first learnt of the Commonwealth’s desire to have him return to Palestine. After the meeting, Box instructed Smart to arrange for an agreement to be prepared engaging Lambert to proceed to Gallipoli and Palestine in accordance ‘with [the] approval of the Acting Prime Minister’. In fact, Box’s instructions differed materially from Watt’s approval: (1) Lambert’s engagement would now take in Palestine; (2) his remuneration was increased to £3 per day; and (3) his obligation to produce a minimum number of works was waived. Amazingly, there is no evidence that Fisher informed the government of the variations to the approved terms he authorised. On short notice Galbraith produced an agreement which evidently met with the approval of both Lambert and Fisher; they signed it on 17 January.

The agreement’s critical provision was clause 1: ‘The artist is hereby appointed on the terms and conditions herein contained to make studies drawings and sketches or pictures in Gallipoli and Palestine on behalf of the Commonwealth of places and of incidents in the late war in those countries in which the Australian Imperial Forces were engaged.’ Doubtless Galbraith modelled this on clause 1 of the standard artist’s agreement. But its wording reflects hasty drafting and is a mishmash. In his cable Fisher had suggested, in effect, that Lambert paint pictures of ‘operations’ and ‘incidents’, but not ‘places’ which appears in the clause. Galbraith rejected ‘operations’, possibly appreciating that the AIF was no longer

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186 Letter, Smart to Bean, 20 December 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/7 Part 1.
187 Minute paper, Box to Smart, 15 January 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/7 Part 1.
188 On Bean’s recommendation Lambert’s commission in the AIF was upgraded to captain. This was one of the considerations which induced him to undertake the engagement. See letter, Bean to Dodds, 16 January 1919, AWM 16, 4372/41/1. This aspect of the Commonwealth’s arrangements with Lambert had not featured in Box’s memorandum.
189 Agreement between Andrew Fisher and George Washington Lambert, 17 January 1919, Lambert family papers, MLMSS 97/7X. Strangely, or perhaps not, in the few discussions in the literature of the work Lambert carried out on Gallipoli and in Palestine his agreement is not mentioned.
engaged in operations, but inexplicably retained ‘incidents’. The resulting phrase, ‘of places and of incidents’, created two general subjects for depiction, and both were qualified by the same mix of criteria, ‘in the late war in those countries in which the Australian Imperial Forces were engaged.’ But what was a place in the late war in which the AIF were engaged? This made no sense. And how could Lambert depict an incident which had occurred in the past? This was impossible. The clause was a shambles. Probably all that Galbraith intended, but failed to achieve, was to create an obligation which required Lambert to make pictures of places where incidents involving the AIF had occurred during the war.

Lambert’s agreement contained other provisions the meanings of which were clear, or relatively clear. Clause 7 was a more robust version of clause 6 of the standard artist’s agreement: ‘The Commonwealth will defray the cost not exceeding fifty pounds of the necessary material or equipment required by the artist for the purpose of making such studies sketches drawings or pictures which shall be delivered to the High Commissioner for Australia in London for and on behalf of the Commonwealth of Australia. The whole of the said studies sketches drawings or pictures shall be delivered to and remain the sole property of the Commonwealth.’ This made it clear that everything Lambert produced would belong to the Commonwealth. And Clause 8 provided: ‘All rights to and copyright of all studies sketches drawings or pictures which have been or shall be provided by the artist under this or previous agreements with the High Commissioner for Australia shall be vested in the Commonwealth.’ Lambert’s earlier agreement failed to secure the copyright in his pictures for the Commonwealth; this clause now purported to overcome that serious deficiency retrospectively.

On 18 January 1919 the members of the mission assembled at Victoria Station and boarded the boat train for Southampton.\(^{190}\) After the crossing they endured a long train journey from Le Havre to Taranto in Italy, broken up by brief stays in Paris and Rome. From Taranto the mission undertook successive voyages, first to Malta and then to Chanak via Crete and Lemnos, arriving on 6 February.\(^{191}\) During an enforced one-week stay in Chanak due to bad weather, Lambert produced several pictures including views towards Gallipoli over the windswept and churned up waters of The Narrows, *Dardanelles from Chanak, effects of*


\(^{191}\) For accounts of the mission’s journey see Bean, *Gallipoli Mission*, chapter 3; Gooding, *Gallipoli Revisited*, pp 45, 47, 50.
blizzard on Gallipoli and Gallipoli, from the Chanak side [56]. Strictly, these views are not related to the story of Anzac.¹⁹² During the campaign no Australians looked at Gallipoli from Chanak; all of the action in which they were involved occurred on the other side of the peninsula and at Helles, its tip, during May 1915. Anyhow, Lambert’s real work was waiting for him across the water, and on 14 February an ‘old steel motor-lighter’ brought the mission to Kilid Bahr on the eastern shore of the peninsula for the journey to Anzac Cove.¹⁹³

How Lambert spent his time on Gallipoli was critical to the mission achieving a key objective, Anzac’s pictorial representation. The appearance of Anzac Cove and the locations where the major actions had occurred would reflect most closely their appearance during the occupation, allowing of course for any clearing operations since carried out by the Turks, the activities of animals, and changes wrought by the weather. It would only be a matter of time before the landscape returned to its pre-invasion state and all evidence of the hostilities disappeared. During a stay of 25 days Lambert produced seventeen pictures: fourteen oil paintings and three drawings.¹⁹⁴ Gray claims that Lambert visited the sites of all major actions.¹⁹⁵ If he did, he made records of only four: Anzac Cove, the Nek, Lone Pine and Achi Baba from Tommy’s Trench at Helles. Seven pictures do not depict places where incidents occurred: Behind the Turkish lines, Gallipoli; The artist’s assistant, Gallipoli; Gallipoli wildflowers; Major Zeki Bey [57], a pencil portrait of the mission’s Turkish guide; Rest gully and pack mule; Burnt gully, Gallipoli [58] and Study of Arbutus shrub, Gallipoli. Possibly only seven of his remaining pictures contributed to creating a record of the AIF’s past operations at Anzac.

Lambert painted ANZAC Cove [59] from a rise inside the southern arm of the cove. It depicts the gentle curve of the famous beach to its termination below the hill known as Ari Burnu. Here and there on the beach he shows objects connected with the occupation: part of a pier, a large box, timbers and a small white building. From Ari Burnu the hills adjacent to it and

¹⁹² But Gooding suggests otherwise. See Gallipoli Revisited, p 59
¹⁹³ Bean, Gallipoli Mission, pp 45-6.
¹⁹⁴ This calculation was made by consulting Gray’s George Lambert Catalogue Raisonné in which she identifies fourteen works as having been made on Gallipoli – eleven paintings (P296-306) and three drawings (D194-196) – and adding to this number three works she missed: Burnt gully, Gallipoli; Achi Baba, from Tommy’s Trench, Helles; River Clyde at Cape Helles. Gooding mentioned these in George Lambert: Gallipoli and Palestine landscapes, exhibition catalogue, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 2007, and reproduced them in Gallipoli Revisited at pp 89, 160, 163.
¹⁹⁵ Gray, George Lambert Catalogue Raisonné, p 84, note to painting P296. Also see Gray, Art and artifice, p 96; Heroes and Icons, p 23.
overlooking the beach rise gently to their highest point, Plugge’s Plateau. Behind Ari Burnu can be seen a sliver of the bright blue water of Suvla Bay and the hills beyond. In the foreground he painted a horse grazing on the hillside, ruining the work: with its central location and dark brown colour it ‘blocks’ the view of the cove and claims all the attention. This criticism aside, the picture in any case is a very general view of the cove, hardly qualifying as a substantial record of the place where Australia’s tradition was born. His *ANZAC, from Gaba Tepe* is more remote. In this picture, painted from a Turkish gun position at Gaba Tepe, the cove is represented in the distance as the barest indentation at the end of a long curve of coastline containing within its arc a hemisphere of deep blue water. It was an inefficient use of his limited time to make this picture when there were several sites of incidents to record closer to Anzac Cove which held greater claims to his attention.

At Walker’s Ridge Lambert made one picture of the location of the Light Horse’s charge on 7 August 1915, *The Nek, Walker’s Ridge, site of the charge of the Light Horse* [60]. He shows the ground over which the charge was made from a position proximate to the Light Horse’s jumping-off point. It is a peculiarly Australian perspective, as Lambert made clear by including an Australian soldier seated on a slight rise gazing across the ground towards the Turkish lines. His inclusion introduces a narrative element, inviting the viewer to participate in his remembrance of the event made more melancholy by the evidence of human loss in front of him in the form of a bleached white skull and thigh bone. Lambert summarised the landscape’s key features giving the impression of an uneven red-brown terrain covered with scrubby low bushes and other vegetation, now lushly green after nearly four years, petering out to become bare earth closer to the Turkish lines. In the background Lambert carefully recorded the outline and colours of the Sari Bair Range. The sense of space in the middle ground where the charge was made is cramped, making it difficult to imagine it populated by more than a few men at a time. While his picture represented the Australians’ viewpoint, for historical purposes it was equally important to make a record of the ground as seen from the Turkish lines in order to represent and bring home to Australians the unassailable field of view and fire the Turks enjoyed over the Light Horse and the folly of their attacks. His failure to do so left a large gap in the pictorial record of the incident.

Lambert’s picture of the location of the Australians’ assault on Lone Pine, *Lone Pine, looking towards the Nek, Walker’s Ridge*, presumably is an accurate topographical record of the landscape: low-lying dense shrub of mottled greens tinged with browns and beiges, a slowly
rising hill in the background, and a grey-blue sky. But for its title, and the presence of human bones in the foreground, the landscape gives no hint of the ferocious and bloody fight that took place on and beneath it in a maze of trenches over 6-9 August 1915, or of its extraordinary cost. According to Bean, the blow dealt the Turks was ‘a terrible one’, with a loss of 5,000 men, and as a ‘demonstration’ was the most effective within the experience of infantry commanders of the AIF. Given its significance, it seems doubtful that Lambert was justified in making a single picture of the scene. Among Lambert’s remaining pictures which arguably contributed to creating a record of the AIF’s operations at Anzac are two of the Sphinx, a distinctive landform at the coastal edge of the Sari Bair Range, easily picked out from Plugge’s Plateau [61]. Its distinctiveness and association with the Anzac story possibly warranted it being recorded; it ‘witnessed’ much fighting. Rounding out his work were pictures of more marginal value: one of his assistant, Trooper Spruce, posing as a dead soldier on the rear slopes of a Turkish trench known as Johnston’s Jolly, Study of a dead trooper, Gallipoli (Pro Patria), and Gallipoli, looking towards Anafarta, a generalised landscape incorporating a profile of the Sphinx.

On 7 March Lambert rode down to Helles with Bean to study the battlefield over which the 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade made an unsuccessful and costly advance to take the village of Krithia on 8 May 1915. According to Bean, they ‘found the whole ground exactly as it was that day, and Lambert painted it in very much the same evening light.’ His picture, Achi Baba, from Tommy’s Trench, Helles [62], painted from a slightly elevated vantage point, consists of a panorama of the battlefield executed in mottled greens, browns and yellows looking towards the old Turkish lines and behind them the unattainable Achi Baba. Because of his choice of viewpoint, it fails to convey the impossible difficulties which confronted the Australians in attempting a daylight uphill frontal advance over a considerable distance across open ground into the teeth of the Turks’ lethal fusillade. Australia’s 2nd Brigade and the New Zealand Infantry Brigade were decimated suffering losses of 771 and 1,056

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196 The 1st Division suffered over 2,200 casualties. The official account of this action occupies more than 70 pages. See Bean, Official History Vol 2, chapter XVIII. For a brief account see Bean, Anzac to Amiens, pp 145-9. 197 Bean, Official History Vol 2, p 566. 198 More remarkable is that the painting of the picture of the incident was given to Leist who never visited Gallipoli. 199 Letter, Bean to Edwin and Lucy Bean, 10 March 1919, AWM 38, 3DRL 7447/7. 200 Ibid. 201 Bean, Official History Vol 2, pp 22-41.
respectively.\textsuperscript{202} The advance, in fact the entire battle, was a debacle.\textsuperscript{203} None of this, of course, can be gathered from Lambert’s topographical study. Still, he said it was ‘a very carefully considered landscape’ from which he could ‘do a big one if necessary’.\textsuperscript{204}

On 9 March Lambert made a picture of the harbour at V Beach at Cape Helles, \textit{River Clyde at Cape Helles} [63], showing the ruined fort at Seddelbahr, the collier \textit{River Clyde} and two other vessels which had been sunk for a breakwater. It was here, at the pier beside the \textit{River Clyde}, that the four battalions and field ambulance of the 2nd Brigade were landed on 6 May 1915 and marched up through the olive groves and flowering fields, over 1,000 of its officers and men to death and catastrophic injury. Perhaps this fact justified making the picture. That evening Lambert wrote in his journal: ‘We embark on a French [it was Greek] boat for Constantinople to-morrow at ten-thirty and I cannot tell you [Amy] how pleased I am at getting clear of this graveyard, beautiful as it is, \textit{nor can I explain how satisfied I am to have done the work I have done.}\textsuperscript{205} The next day the mission’s members boarded a Greek steamer for Constantinople.\textsuperscript{206}

Bean took the mission back to Egypt on some British returning rolling stock,\textsuperscript{207} finally arriving in Cairo on 26 March.\textsuperscript{208} During the journey, broken by short stays at Aleppo and Jerusalem, Lambert produced a handful of works including an attractive postcard picture, \textit{Jerusalem from the top of the Dung Gate} [64]. He had been in Cairo a week when his health broke down: the effects of malaria, dysentry and severe exhaustion, and an unspecified heart problem, landed him in the 14th Australian General Hospital at Abbassia where he remained for about eight weeks.\textsuperscript{209} During his hospitalisation he painted \textit{Balcony of troopers’ ward, 14th Australian General Hospital, Abbassia} [65], a touching picture of the courtship between a light horseman and a nurse, and \textit{Courtyard, 14th Australian General Hospital, Abbassia},

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{202} Ibid., pp 40-1.
\item \textsuperscript{203} According to Robin Prior, the assault was one of the most misconceived episodes in a misconceived battle. See Gallipoli: \textit{The End of the Myth}, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2009, p 144.
\item \textsuperscript{204} Lambert journal quoted in Lambert, \textit{Thirty years of an artist’s life}, p 114. The painting of a picture of the incident went to Wheeler who never visited Gallipoli, but Lambert’s picture was lent to him for the purpose of carrying out his commission. See letter, Treloar to Curator, Australian War Memorial Museum, Sydney, 11 June 1926, AWM 93, 18/2/22.
\item \textsuperscript{205} Lambert, \textit{Thirty years of an artist’s life}, p 114. The emphasis has been added.
\item \textsuperscript{206} Bean, \textit{Gallipoli Mission}, p 309.
\item \textsuperscript{207} Ibid., pp 309-10. He had intended to take it back by sea.
\item \textsuperscript{208} Gooding, \textit{Gallipoli Revisited}, p 182.
\item \textsuperscript{209} According to his service records, Lambert was admitted on 2 April 1919 and discharged on 31 May 1919. See Casualty Form-Active Service, George Washington Lambert service records, NAA.
\end{itemize}
possibly valuable as a record of the hospital which had treated numerous dying and injured Australian soldiers. When his recovery seemed certain, Lambert applied for a three-month extension of his engagement; Fisher gave him an extra six weeks.²¹⁰

Following his discharge Lambert undertook another long train journey, this time to Semakh, a small village at the southern tip of Lake Tiberias, the location of a fierce fight on 25 September 1918 between regiments of the 4th Light Horse Brigade and mostly German troops who were resolutely defending certain railway buildings.²¹¹ It seems likely Gullett directed Lambert to Semakh.²¹² Here he made four oil paintings. The incident, though relatively important in the context of the final stages of the campaign, hardly justified this attention, especially as he had given the locations of major actions on Gallipoli cursory or no treatment at all. And only one work, *Sunrise Semakh, looking towards Yarmuk Gorge* [66], possibly shows the scene of the fight. At Tiberias, captured by the 3rd Light Horse Brigade on 25 September 1918 after a short fight with a rear guard,²¹³ Lambert painted *Tiberias* [67], a postcard-like view of the town. Effectively, he was retracing the pursuit by Chauvel’s Desert Mounted Corps of the retreating Turkish armies in the face of the Megiddo offensive which began on 19 September 1918.²¹⁴ From Tiberias he travelled to a bridge crossing on the upper Jordan at Jisr Benat Yakub which was destroyed by retreating Turkish/German forces but made serviceable by engineers of the Desert Mounted Corps allowing the pursuit to continue.²¹⁵ Here he made *Jisr Benat Yakub: the bridge repaired by an Australian unit* and *The ford over the Jordan at Jisr Benat Yakub*. Resuming the ‘pursuit’ he passed through Sasa and Kaukab, in each of which rear guards had to be overcome, to arrive at Barada Gorge on 14 June 1919.²¹⁶

On 30 September 1918 the 5th Light Horse Brigade was sent to cut the Damascus-Beirut Road to prevent the enemy from making good an escape from Damascus by that route. It

²¹⁰ Letters, Lambert to Fisher, 6 May 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/7 Part 3; Australian Headquarters, Egypt to Lambert, 31 May 1919, AWM 25, 10/3/29 Part 2.
²¹¹ For a brief account of this fight see Bou, *Australia’s Palestine Campaign*, pp 123, 125-6.
²¹² During the mission’s journey from London to Gallipoli the men had met in Paris and it seems probable that Gullett instructed Lambert to make a record of the Light Horse’s part during the final stages of the Palestine campaign. Gullett was in Paris with Hughes as his press liaison officer for the Paris Peace Conference. See Gooding, *Gallipoli Revisited*, p 47.
²¹⁴ Ibid., chapter 4, esp pp 112-3, 115-7, 121.
²¹⁵ Ibid., p 132.
²¹⁶ Bou, *Australia’s Palestine Campaign*, p 133. Gray claims that Lambert was at Barada Gorge between 14 and 18 June 1919. See *George Lambert Catalogue Raisonné*, note to painting P324, p 90.
climbed the heights above the gorge which the road, the railway and the Barada River all passed through. A large Turkish/German column entered the gorge and when it refused to surrender, the Australians, joined by a French regiment and a New Zealand machine-gun squadron, fired on it doing ‘terrible damage’ killing more than 350 men. Lambert recognised the probable appeal of a picture depicting the incident. He took his time studying the scene from every perspective and made three paintings on which he could draw if he later decided to paint such a picture, among them *Barada Gorge, looking from Damascus* [68], showing the gorge from the machine-gun position of the 5th Light Horse Brigade. Finishing these Lambert decided he had done enough in Palestine and was free to return to Cairo. Visiting Amman and Es Salt, east of the Jordan where the Anzac Mounted Division under General Chaytor performed creditably during the end game, ‘must’, he said, ‘be left to some future date’. His trip had yielded eleven oil paintings.

During his return journey Lambert stopped at Kantara, where he made an unfinished oil sketch, *Sand cart and team, Kantara; 1st Brigade embarking, Kantara and General Chaytor’s tent, Kantara camp* [69], before travelling on to Cairo arriving on 24 June. Until his departure five weeks’ later, Lambert produced very few works, perhaps only two of which were valuable as records of Australia’s part in the war. By 30 June he was in Moascar where he remained until 22 July when he reported to Australian Headquarters in Cairo.

The once enormous base camp was being broken up as the demobilisation continued and he recorded its last stages in *The last tents of Moascar* [70] and *Moascar after the evacuation*. Save for two pencil portraits of AIF men, his other pictures were of places of interest: the canal at Ismailia, the road to Mena showing the pyramids, and the Nile from Ghezira. Since leaving Damascus on 18 June his output had been negligible: sixteen works made up of ten oil paintings and six drawings. This hardly justified the six-week extension of his engagement.

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217 Bou, *Australia’s Palestine Campaign*, p 135. Gullett described the incident as ‘sheer slaughter’: ‘For miles the bed of the gorge was a shambles of Turks and Germans, camels and horses and mules. Never in the campaign had the machine-gunners found such a target.’ See *Official History Vol 7*, p 754.

218 Gray, *George Lambert Catalogue Raisonné*, note to painting P326, p 90.


220 This was calculated by consulting Gray, *George Lambert Catalogue Raisonné*, paintings P316-326.

221 Casualty Form-Active Service, George Washington Lambert service records, NAA.


223 This was calculated by consulting Gray, *George Lambert Catalogue Raisonné*: ten paintings (P327-336) and six drawings (D201-206).
On 2 August 1919 Lambert embarked the *Caledonia* at Port Said for the voyage to Marseilles, the first leg of his return journey to London which he finally reached about 28 August.224 He had been away for 223 days, and as remuneration the Commonwealth paid him £669.225 His engagement yielded sixty-seven works: fifty-three oil paintings and fourteen drawings, just over half the number of works he had made during his shorter wartime engagement.226 This difference warranted investigating, even if nothing could be done about it, especially as significant public funds had been expended in sending Lambert to Gallipoli and Palestine to produce pictures. But he hung on to his pictures, apparently for reference purposes, and only delivered them to the Commonwealth on 19 January 1921 just before sailing for Australia.227

The best opportunity of evaluating his performance presented itself when his pictures arrived in Melbourne and were delivered to the memorial, but it was foregone and no evaluation was ever performed.228

No difference in Lambert’s approach, that is, with respect to his subject selection, can be detected in the pictures he produced during his two engagements. This seems surprising, if only because he carried them out under vastly different conditions, the first during and the second after the war. Moreover, the agreements which governed them set different criteria for the pictures he should produce: under the first he was obliged to make pictures of events occurring in the war especially with regard to the AIF, and under the second he was obliged to make pictures of places and of incidents in the late war in which the AIF were engaged. This difference was significant and should have produced obviously different collections of pictures. At all events, the common element in these criteria was the requirement that Lambert represent the AIF, either directly by representing its part in events or operations, or indirectly by representing places and things which had a substantial connection to it and the

224 Casualty Form-Active Service, George Washington Lambert service records, NAA.
225 ‘Statement[s] of amounts paid to artists for pictures and travelling allowances’ attached to letters, Treloar to Heyes, 27 May 1926; Heyes to Treloar, 2 December 1926; both in AWM 93, 18/1/81.
226 Figures derived from Gray’s *George Lambert Catalogue Raisonné* should be regarded as the baseline: sixty-three works comprising forty-nine oils (P289-337) and fourteen drawings (D193-206). The number of oils should be increased by four to take account of the three she missed (specified in an earlier footnote) and *Taurus mountains*, painted on the reverse side of *Achi Baba, from Tommy’s Trench, Helles*. See Gooding, *Gallipoli Revisited*, p 168.
227 Letters, Lambert to Smart, 17 February 1920; 21 January 1921; both in AWM 93, 18/7/7 Part 3.
228 On Lambert’s death Bean mistakenly claimed that the artist had carried out his contracts with ‘the most scrupulous conscientiousness’, and also mistakenly claimed that he had sent in his notebooks and odd pencil studies besides his pictures. (This last matter is taken up in chapter 5.) See ‘Captain George Lambert: A Tribute’.
part it had played in the war. It is very doubtful that Lambert’s pictures satisfied even this general criterion.

When Lambert returned to London he resumed working on his commission to paint a picture of the Light Horse’s charge at Beersheba. Then, in October 1919, he accepted commissions to paint pictures of the landing, the charge of the Light Horse at the Nek, and a battle in Palestine, ultimately Romani.\textsuperscript{229} These were plum commissions the completion of which proved very troublesome and generated a sizeable correspondence. He did, however, eventually complete them, and additional commissions as well: \textit{The Charge of the Australian Light Horse at Beersheba, 1917} (1920), \textit{Anzac, the landing} (1922), \textit{The charge of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade at the Nek, 7 August 1915} (1924), \textit{Charles Bean} (1924), \textit{Battle of Romani, 4 August 1916} (1927) and \textit{Barada Gorge, 30 September 1918} (1927).

\textbf{VI} – Quinn

First mentioned by Smart in December 1917 when discussing with Bean about getting Leist to France during the winter to paint portraits, on 18 January 1918 Quinn was offered an appointment to go and paint ‘pictures of the A.I.F.’,\textsuperscript{230} that is, portraits. He could not very well do anything else as he worked exclusively as a portraitist. Too old for military service when war was declared, Quinn continued to paint and exhibit. During 1916 he painted a posthumous portrait of an Australian who had served in the British Army and was killed at Albert, \textit{Major Thomas Grice} [71]. It generally reflects the style of portrait he would paint for the Commonwealth: with his looser handling of paint and by presenting Grice against a light background, it departs from the dark tonal manner – commonly described as tonal realism, or tonal illusionism – which held sway in the formal portraiture of the time.\textsuperscript{231}

\textsuperscript{229} Letters, Smart to Lambert, 16 October 1919; Lambert to Smart, 21 October 1919; both in AWM 93, 18/7/7 Part 3; agreements (3) between Andrew Fisher and George Washington Lambert each dated 16 February 1920 engaging the artist to paint pictures of the landing (£500), the charge of the Light Horse at the Nek (£400), and the battle of Romani (£400), Lambert family papers, MLMSS 97/7X. On Gullett’s recommendation, the sums to be paid Lambert for his pictures of the Nek and Romani were increased to £500 each. See memorandum, Gullett to Home and Territories Department, 19 April 1920; letter, Home and Territories to Director, Australian War Museum, 22 April 1920; both in AWM 93, 18/2/28 Part 1.

\textsuperscript{230} Letters, Smart to Quinn, 12, 24 January 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/13.

\textsuperscript{231} As head of the National Gallery School since 1892, Bernard Hall trained his students in the art of illusionism based on a system conceived tonally. In this the painted surface is slowly built up working outwards from a dark background to a light or lighter middle ground where form is sharply painted in great detail, thus creating an effect of realism. In portraiture, subjects are set against a dark and non-specific background to create the illusion they possess volume and occupy space. Hall’s training, the full impact of which Quinn avoided despite studying
On 30 January 1918 the AIF informed the Official Secretary that Birdwood had approved of Quinn coming to France and that arrangements were being made with the War Office for him to leave ‘as early as possible after the 7th [of] February for the purpose of obtaining pictorial records of the Australian Imperial Force in France.’  

Smart instructed Galbraith to prepare an agreement between Fisher and Quinn whom he said was going ‘under the same arrangements as the other artists’. Yet the standard artist’s agreement was inapt for engaging a portraitist. And although clause 8 of Quinn’s agreement was modified to provide for the possibility that he might be asked to paint a portrait instead of a battle scene, his obligation under clause 1 was not altered. Thus, he promised to make no fewer than twenty-five pictures of events occurring in the war especially with regard to the AIF.

At the last moment Quinn postponed his departure to enable him to carry on with private work he had in hand. Smart was unimpressed, informing him that AIF Administrative Headquarters had been put to ‘some inconvenience’ in arranging for him to travel on 8 February. So extensive were Quinn’s private commitments that before he left Smart and Bean took steps to confine his visit to two weeks. Each wrote separately to the DAG explaining his situation and asking that he be returned to England after a fortnight. Bean explained that as Quinn had several pictures wanting to be finished for the Royal Academy’s exhibition, he wished to return for ‘a few days’. More important, however, than settling the length of his stay, was specifying the work he should do. Whom he should paint was not a matter to be left to him. To avoid possible embarrassment, Smart furnished him with instructions: ‘In connection with your work in France, arrangements have been made for you to paint sketch portraits of General Birdwood, General Maclagan, and six Brigadier-Generals at the National Gallery School, produced a generation of highly competent portrait painters who with few exceptions remained faithful to the illusionist portrait. See Smith, *Australian Painting*, pp 161, 171.

Clause 3 of the standard artist’s agreement was altered to permit him to break his three-month engagement and return to England to attend to his private painting commitments: ‘3. THE artist shall give his services for a total period of Three months but such period is not to be a continuing period and the Artist shall be at liberty to break the period at any time for the purpose of returning to England to attend to his private affairs.’ However, to create a disincentive to his breaking the engagement more than twice, there was added to the end of clause 4, ‘In the event of the Artist breaking the engagement more than twice during the said period under the provisions of the preceding clause his fares will not be defrayed by the Commonwealth but must be borne by the Artist himself.’ Quinn’s is the only instance of the standard artist’s agreement being amended to cater for an artist’s special circumstances.

Letter, AIF Administrative Headquarters to Official Secretary, 30 January 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/13.  

Letter, Smart to Galbraith, 5 February 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/13.  

Agreement between Andrew Fisher and James Peter Quinn, 14 February 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/13.  

Letter, Smart to Quinn, 8 February 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/13.  

Letter, Bean to DAG, 14 February 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/315. Smart told the DAG basically the same story. See memorandum, Smart to DAG, 15 February 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/13.
who will be indicated by the D.A.G. Smart also asked the DAG to facilitate Quinn carrying out his instructions, claiming he was ‘the best of our Australian portrait painters’, a claim Longstaff and Lambert would have hotly disputed.

On 16 February Honorary Lieutenant Quinn finally crossed to France and was taken to Australian Corps headquarters at Flêtre in northern France. As previously arranged, he stayed only briefly returning to London on 8 March. On returning he reported having painted sketch portraits of Generals Birdwood, Monash, Walker and Hobbs, and having started one of White. Although it had been intended to return him to France after he finished his portraits to be sent in to the Royal Academy, for reasons not found in the evidence he did not return until August 1918. Meanwhile, he painted a three-quarter length portrait of General Howse without Smart’s permission. This gave rise to a dispute with the artist only resolved through Bean’s intervention: the Commonwealth agreed to take Howse’s portrait as one of the fifteen sketch portraits Quinn undertook to paint for it. It could count itself fortunate in acquiring a portrait of obvious quality of one of the AIF’s most distinguished officers, Major-General Sir Neville Howse, VC.

At the Commonwealth’s exhibition of official war pictures and photographs in May 1918, Quinn showed three of the four portraits he made during his visit to France including General Sir William Birdwood and Lieutenant-General Sir John Monash. Monash’s portrait is an important work. Then commander of the 3rd Division, but soon to be given command of the Australian Corps, Quinn portrays him as he appeared shortly before the Germans launched their great offensive in the west on 21 March 1918, their last-ditch effort

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238 Letter, Smart to Quinn, 15 February 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/13. Not until after the war was consideration given to the painting of portraits of non-commissioned officers and other ranks.
239 Second memorandum, Smart to DAG, 15 February 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/13.
240 Casualty Form-Active Service, James Peter Quinn service records, NAA. This is the commencement date of his commission which continued until terminated on 31 December 1919. See notifications published in Commonwealth Gazette No 79/1918 (p 1174); No 42/1920 (p 765).
241 Memorandum, Smart to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 10 July 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/13.
242 Smart, file note, 12 March 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/13.
243 The dispute arose in April 1918 when Smart received word that Quinn had painted or was painting Howse’s portrait. Smart informed him that if he painted the portrait then it was his ‘own arrangement’ and he instructed him not to do any work unless he received instructions from ‘this office’. Quinn claimed he painted it at the request of General Griffiths. In January 1919 Bean intervened and sensibly resolved the dispute on the basis mentioned. See letter, Smart to Quinn, 19 April 1918; memorandum, ‘MM’ (High Commissioner’s Offices) to Smart, 29 April 1918; letter, Smart to Quinn, 1 May 1918; all in AWM 93, 18/7/13; letters, Bean to Captain Brain, AIF Administrative Headquarters, 16 January 1919; Bean to Quinn, 16 January 1919; both in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
244 Catalogue of Australian Official War Pictures and Photographs, catalogue numbers 212-14.
to defeat the Allies. It is a devastatingly incisive and essentially unflattering study. He is weary and the strain of war shows on his thin face, and he appears uncertain and anxious, characteristics not usually associated with Monash and not evident in other likenesses of him, for instance John Longstaff’s half-length portrait, *Lieutenant General Sir John Monash* (1919) [75]. It is certain Monash preferred Longstaff’s portrait, a replica of which he asked the artist to make as a Christmas present for his wife. The two portraits are very different in their style and portrayal of Monash. In Longstaff’s, which stylistically adheres to the illusionist portrait, he is portrayed as he wished to be remembered: a confident, intelligent, clear thinking and resolute commander.

Quinn arrived in France with instructions to paint Birdwood’s portrait. That was as it should be: as commander of the Australian Corps he was first cab off the rank. The opportunity of representing him, as Smart observed, was a ‘plum’ job. As befitting Birdwood’s position, Quinn depicted him in a substantial half-length portrait [73], convincingly presenting him as a physical presence. While it can be assumed Quinn produced a good likeness, his is no mere portrait. In originating the word ‘Anzac’, and in naming the beach on Gallipoli where the Australians landed ‘Anzac Cove’, Birdwood possessed a seemingly indisputable claim to being regarded as the primogenitor of Anzac. A shame, then, that he was British. Anyway, Quinn posed him before the flag of the nation whose army he commanded and its insignia, the rising sun badge. Compared to the appearance of Monash in Quinn’s portrait of him, Birdwood looks remarkably well-fed, healthy and worry-free. In his face there is no evidence that he acknowledged his responsibility, partial or whole it does not matter, for leading thousands of Australians to their deaths since planning the Anzac landing with his staff. If he recognised it, it sat lightly on him. It has been claimed that as a commander Birdwood was not a great intellect; perhaps this comes through in Quinn’s reading of him.

On 10 July 1918 Smart initiated arrangements to get Quinn back to France to complete his engagement. On 20 July the DAG informed AIF Administrative Headquarters that approval had been given for Quinn to proceed overseas ‘on any convenient date’ and to

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246 Memorandum, Smart to Bean, 11 April 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/315.
248 ‘Birdwood, Field Marshal Sir William (13 September 1865-17 May 1951)’, *The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History*, pp 87-8 at p 88.
249 Memorandum, Smart to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 10 July 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/13.
report to the 3rd Division’s headquarters. In advance of his departure Smart asked Bean to specify the portraits he wished Quinn – and also Longstaff – to paint. He also wrote to Quinn telling him that instructions as to the portraits he should paint would be given to him by Bean, and that as he was going to the 3rd Division he should start by making portraits of its commander (General Gellibrand) and brigadier-general (McNicoll). It is surprising that Bean, and not Monash, by then commander of the Australian Corps, was asked to specify the officers of whom portraits should be made. Quinn postponed his departure once again, on this occasion because the painting materials he left at Flêtre during his initial visit had gone missing. He finally left on 9 August and proceeded to the headquarters of the 3rd Division near Amiens on the Somme.

Quinn had to wait for nearly a fortnight until Bean wrote to him on 22 August providing him with instructions: ‘The portraits marked for you are as follows. A few names have been added to the 15 arranged in case some of the former have gone on leave or are otherwise out of reach.’ He named sixteen officers, grouping them under headquarters – Generals Birdwood, Dodds and White (5th Army); Generals Monash and Foott (Australian Corps); Generals Walker, Glasgow and Heane and Chaplain Dexter (1st Division); Generals Wisdom and Phillips (2nd Division); Generals Gellibrand, McNicoll and Goddard (3rd Division); Generals Brand and Leane (4th Division); Colonel Lloyd (12th Army Artillery Brigade). Bean’s reference to ‘the 15 arranged’ meant that it had been agreed with Quinn that he should paint fifteen sketch portraits for the Commonwealth. Although no records have survived or been located disclosing how this arrangement was made, it seems clear that clause 6 of Quinn’s agreement, which obliged him to make no fewer than twenty-five pictures, was put aside. This was a significant variation which should have been documented, if not carried out by formal amendment. That this did not occur is further evidence of the Commonwealth’s disregard of minimal standards of administration in connection with the war art scheme.

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250 Letter, Dodds to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 20 July 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/315.
251 Extract from letter, Smart to Bean, 7 August 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/13; memorandum, Smart to Bean, 8 August 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/315.
252 Letter, Smart to Quinn, 8 August 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/315.
253 Letter, Quinn to Smart, 8 July 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/13; memorandum, Smart to Bean, 10 July 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/315; letter, AIF Administrative Headquarters to Official Secretary, 29 July 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/13.
254 Memorandum, Smart to Acting Accountant, 9 August 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/13; Casualty Form-Active Service, James Peter Quinn service records, NAA.
255 Letter, Bean to Quinn, 22 August 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/315.
Bean’s instructions were slightly puzzling. As Quinn had already made sketch portraits of Birdwood, Monash and Walker, and had started White’s, it was unnecessary and potentially confusing to have included their names in his list. But Quinn was not misled: he did not paint additional portraits of them and counted those already made against the fifteen he had undertaken to produce. Of the officers in Bean’s list, Quinn painted portraits of Dodds, Glasgow, Heane, Gellibrand and Dexter. And he also painted a portrait of General Bennett who was not on the list. On 9 September 1918, having spent a month away, Quinn returned to England.256 His early return might be explained by the general unavailability of the officers to sit for him during a critical stage of the Allies’ offensive. It seems clear, however, that he continued working on the portraits in London as officers arriving on leave became available to sit for him.

On 7 November 1918 Smart sent a telegram to Quinn informing him that the Commonwealth had decided to commission him to paint two finished portraits for £100 each. This rocked the artist, who immediately replied:

Your telegram informing me that the Commonwealth has commissioned me to paint two portraits for £100 each came this morning. You did not mention anything about size so I presume you must mean small portraits, head and shoulders for which my price is 100 guineas, size from 24-20 [inches] to 25-30. I feel rather disappointed as I have already painted 10 portraits at the front of different generals for the Commonwealth which are practically finished works, all of these 25-30 for which I have received nothing but my pay while in France as a Lieutenant. I certainly understood from you when I started these that the Commonwealth would commission those painting portraits as well as those doing subject pictures to paint larger portraits later on. My lowest price for a half length is two hundred guineas and for a full length 400 guineas at the least but I have received much more than that. However I am quite ready to do the head and shoulders size if that is all they want but I think they ought to consider that I have already painted 10 portraits for them of that size for which I have received nothing.257

Quinn’s complaints were possibly justified. Having painted ten ‘practically finished’ portraits for nothing but his pay, it now seemed the Commonwealth wanted more of the same at the

256 Record of Service in the Field, James Peter Quinn service records, NAA; memorandum, Smart to Acting Accountant, 16 September 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/13.
257 Letter, Quinn to Smart, 8 November 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/13.
lowest possible prices. Ultimately, he accepted commissions to paint a three-quarter length portrait of Birdwood and a half-length portrait of General Chauvel, both for £200. The resulting works – *General Sir William Birdwood* (1919) and *Lieutenant General Sir Harry Chauvel* (1919) – had been delivered to the Commonwealth by November 1919. After the war Quinn painted two further portraits under commissions: *Rear Admiral John Glossop* (1920) and *Brigadier-General Clement Smith* (1921).

On 20 November 1918 Quinn informed Smart that he had in his studio the portraits of Birdwood, White, Glasgow, Gellibrand, Dodds, Heane, Bennett and Dexter and also the finished portrait of Howse, ‘if the Commonwealth [cares] to have it’. He had been hanging on to them, he explained, in the expectation of getting extra sittings, but now wondered whether it would be better to leave them ‘in the sketchy way in which [he] painted them at the front.’ Whether Quinn continued to work on them is unclear, but in May 1919 he successfully claimed £49/17/- from the Commonwealth for the time he spent in London on Howse’s portrait, on finishing other portraits, and for the materials he used. Although this suggests he had finished working on the portraits, they remained in his possession until 13 November 1919 when he delivered the seven still with him to Australia House. Of the fifteen portraits he had undertaken to paint for the Commonwealth he painted twelve, including Howse’s. Why he failed to paint the requisite number is unknown. In any case, there is no evidence the Commonwealth asked him to make good the shortfall.

Although the Commonwealth treated Quinn exclusively as a portraitist, during his visits to France he painted subject pictures. Yet the Commonwealth – Smart – did not want them. In the run-up to the *War and Peace* exhibition held in late November 1918, Smart became aware

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258 His pay amounted to £108 calculated at £2 per day for the 54 days he spent in France and he also received a uniform allowance of £15. See ‘Statement of amounts paid to artists for pictures and travelling allowances’ attached to letter, Heyes to Treloar, 2 December 1926, AWM 93, 18/1/81.
259 Smart, memorandum, 7 February 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/13. Although Quinn entered into a formal agreement with the Commonwealth to carry out these commissions, it has not survived or been located. See letter, Smart to Galbraith, 15 February 1919; memorandum, Smart to Official Secretary, 27 February 1919; both in AWM 93, 18/7/13.
260 File note, 13 November 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/13.
261 For these Quinn was paid £100 and £75 respectively. See ‘Statement of amounts paid to artists for pictures and travelling allowances’ attached to letter, Treloar to Heyes, 27 May 1926, AWM 93, 18/1/81.
262 Letter, Quinn to Smart, 20 November 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/13.
263 Letter (claim), Quinn to Smart, 17 May 1919; memorandum, Smart to Official Secretary, 23 May 1919; both in AWM 93, 18/7/13. Fisher’s approval is endorsed on the memorandum.
264 File note, 13 November 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/13. They were shipped to Australia on 20 December 1919. See list of Quinn’s pictures endorsed with shipping details, 1 September 1920, AWM 93, 18/7/13. Dexter’s portrait is no longer in the memorial’s collection.
that Quinn had sent in at least four subject pictures obviously made in France: *On the Albert-Peronne Road, Mont St Quentin, Corbie Cathedral* and *Horse lines at Bray.*\(^{265}\) When he discovered this he did nothing about them. Moreover, he made no enquiry of Quinn as to whether he had made other pictures in France. And when the artist told him he had ‘some sketches of places etc of interest’ in his studio, adding, ‘I have a picture of Mt St Quentin at the International exhibition. I have also colour sketches of the front line in Flanders’, Smart did nothing about them either.\(^{266}\)

**VII – Longstaff**

When war was declared Longstaff was one of London’s most sought after portrait painters. In 1916 he ‘enrolled’ as a special constable, but his duties are unlikely to have been onerous as he continued to paint and exhibit and also attended to his responsibilities to the Art Gallery of New South Wales as a member of its board of trustees and its overseas representative.\(^{267}\) By 16 May 1917 he was a candidate for appointment as an official artist,\(^{268}\) which suggests that it was early envisaged that a portraitist would be sent to France. In early July 1917 Longstaff was expressing an interest in going, but when Collins explained to him that Fisher had ‘practically committed himself’ to Power and Spence, he said this suited him as he had some

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\(^{265}\) Letter. Abbot (a friend of Quinn who wrote as he was indisposed) to Smart, with enclosed list, 13 November 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/13.

\(^{266}\) Letter. Quinn to Smart, 20 November 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/13. The story of Quinn’s subject pictures continued. In 1927 Quinn was introduced to Tasman Heyes in London by Coates. (Heyes served with the AWRS in France during 1918 and after the war was employed by the memorial.) Quinn told Heyes he had ‘numerous sketches’ which he made in France and offered to sell the memorial *Mont St Quentin overlooking Peronne, September 1918* and *Clery Hill, Mont St Quentin in distance* for £75 and £100 respectively, or £150 for both. Heyes sent photographs of them to Treloar. It seems they were finished pictures worked up from his sketches. Bean, who saw the photographs, did not recommend their purchase, and he did not think to enquire whether Quinn held the sketches on which they were based or other works he may have made in France. Treloar was simply indifferent to their possible existence. See letters, Heyes to Treloar, 21 April 1927; Heyes to Treloar, 28 April 1927; both in AWM 93, 18/2/26; Treloar to Bean, 23 June 1927; Bean to Treloar, 2 July 1927; both in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/315. Meanwhile, Quinn had written to Monash to see if he could use his influence to secure for him a commission to paint a subject picture. Monash referred his letter to Treloar. In this Quinn lamented that he had been unable to use for Australia ‘much material [sketches]’ he had done on the Somme. Treloar told Monash that Quinn was known to the memorial as a portraitist, and that the works he handed over at the conclusion of his engagement as an official artist were confined to portraits. He did nothing about Quinn’s sketches. Apart from seven sketches contained in a sketchbook of Quinn’s acquired by the memorial in relatively recent times (ART19884), all others are presumed lost. See letters, Monash to Treloar, 25 July 1927; Treloar to Monash, 5 August 1927; both in AWM 93, 18/2/26.

\(^{267}\) As its adviser he was obliged to identify works for purchase and personally conduct the negotiations for their acquisition, often delicate and protracted. See Joske, *Debonair Jack*, pp 114-17.

\(^{268}\) Letter. Smart to Bean, 16 May 1917, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286. This fact refutes the claim made by Galbally and Gray that Longstaff’s appointment, among others, came about as a result of the unsuccessful proposals Streeton put forward after July 1917 for the establishment of ‘a first-rate war art programme’ comparable in scale to those of the British and Canadians. See *Letters from Smike*, p 133.
work to finish.\footnote{Letters, Collins to Longstaff, 2 July 1917; Longstaff to Collins, 3 July 1917; both in AWM 93, 18/7/9.} On 2 November 1917, when Smart offered Longstaff an appointment, he explained that he would be required to ‘make sketches of incidents and places which will be of interest for a National War Collection’.\footnote{Letter, Smart to Longstaff, 2 November 1917, AWM 93, 18/7/9.} But the timing of this offer was inconvenient, and Longstaff gave it short shrift: ‘Whilst I am very desirous of going to France to make records and collect material for a picture, I do not on the terms offered by you see my way to absenting myself from London during the – to me – most important months of the year’.\footnote{Letter, Longstaff to Smart, 6 November 1917, AWM 93, 18/7/9.} His mention of collecting material for a picture shows he believed that if appointed he would not be confined to portraiture.

Around 4 February 1918 Smart applied to the AIF for permission for Longstaff to go to France in late March, and in accordance with his instructions Galbraith prepared an artist’s agreement in standard form which Longstaff duly signed.\footnote{Letters, Smart to Longstaff, 4 February 1918; Galbraith to Official Secretary, 7 March 1918; Smart to Longstaff, 9 March 1918; all in AWM 93, 18/7/9. His agreement has not survived or been located.} His departure was postponed at the last moment. On 28 March AIF Administrative Headquarters informed the Official Secretary that it had received a telegram from AIF Headquarters in France directing that Longstaff’s visit ‘be deferred for the present’.\footnote{Letter, AIF Administrative Headquarters to Official Secretary, 28 March 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/9.} The reason for this is almost certainly to have been connected to ‘the present crisis’ – a major offensive was launched by the Germans on 21 March – and now both accommodation and transportation for artists coming to France were extremely limited.\footnote{Letter, AIF Administrative Headquarters to Official Secretary, 22 April 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.} On 29 April the AIF informed the Official Secretary that Longstaff could now be accommodated at the headquarters of the 3rd Division, and that the artist should prepare to leave on 3 May.\footnote{Letter, AIF Administrative Headquarters to Official Secretary, 29 April 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/9.} The day before his departure, Smart provided him with instructions:

> With reference to your work for the Commonwealth Government in France, I have already explained to you in conversation what we would like you to do.

> Among other things, will you please paint sketch portraits of General Monash, and each of the Brigadiers in the 3rd Division, to which you will be attached. Will you also paint sketch portraits of any other officers or non-commissioned officers or men who, in the opinion of the Officer Commanding 3rd Division, should be done.
We are particularly anxious to have sketches and studies of operations. You will no doubt be able to collect data of many incidents in the recent German offensive. 276

These make clear that notwithstanding that his agreement obliged him to paint pictures of events occurring in the war, he was also expected to paint portraits, a matter his agreement did not address. His position, then, at least initially, was different to Quinn’s who it seems was expected to paint portraits exclusively from the outset. Yet Longstaff’s agreement was no less inapt for failing to define the purpose of his engagement more accurately and failing to include provisions catering to his situation.

On 3 May Honorary Lieutenant Longstaff finally crossed to France where, according to his service records, he was attached to Australian Corps headquarters located at Bertangles north of Amiens. 277 He stayed just over a month returning to London on 7 June. 278 The evidence gives no indication as to why he returned. Towards the end of June Smart wrote to him asking to be informed of the sketch portraits he had completed and when he could return to France. 279 Longstaff advised he had painted portraits of Brigadier-General McNicoll and Lieutenant-Colonels Jess and Jackson and expected to complete a portrait of Monash in about ten days. 280 He next told him: ‘I have also several painted sketches of landscape. The bulk of the work however I hope to do during my next visit when I also intend to collect material for a picture commemorating some striking incident in connection with the Australian troops on the Western Front.’ As he had made work other than portraits, it is puzzling why none of it was recovered from him, save for In the park near Corps Headquarters at Bertangles [76]. 281

Longstaff’s hopes of returning to France ‘in about three weeks’ time’ were not realised. When, on 7 August, Smart informed Bean that he had requested the AIF to arrange to get him across, he explained that Monash wanted Longstaff back at Corps headquarters as soon as possible. 282 Although there is no evidence of Monash having made such a request, the men

276 Letter, Smart to Longstaff, 2 May 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/9. The emphasis has been added.
277 Record of Service in the Field, John Longstaff service records, NAA. His commission commenced on this date and continued until terminated on 31 December 1919. See notifications published in Commonwealth Gazette No 117/1918 (p 1649); No 42/1920 (p 765).
278 Record of Service in the Field, John Longstaff service records, NAA; letter, Longstaff to Smart, c 7 June 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/9.
279 Letter, Smart to Longstaff, 29 June 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/9.
280 Letter, Longstaff to Smart, 4 July 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/9. Jackson’s portrait is no longer in the memorial’s collection.
281 Nothing is known of the others. Presumably they are lost.
282 Letter, Smart to Bean, 7 August 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/9.
had commenced a friendly correspondence from which it is clear that Monash was anxious to give Longstaff any further sittings he required, probably with respect to a commission he had received from the Art Gallery of New South Wales to paint a standing portrait of him.\textsuperscript{283} Thereafter, Longstaff’s departure was postponed on several occasions, the last so that he might visit a son in Rouen who had been seriously wounded.\textsuperscript{284} He finally left on 28 September.\textsuperscript{285}

On 23 August, in advance of Longstaff’s departure, Bean wrote to AIF Administrative Headquarters providing it with a list of the officers whose portraits the artist should paint and explaining that he had added one or two names ‘over the 15 arranged’ in case one or more of them were away.\textsuperscript{286} There were sixteen names on his list: Generals Blamey, Coxen, Bennett, Mackay, Rosenthal, Robertson, Martin, Cannan, Grimwade, Maclagan, Burgess, Herring and Smyth; and Colonels Salisbury, Murray and Butler.\textsuperscript{287} Longstaff, like Quinn, had undertaken to paint fifteen sketch portraits for the Commonwealth. Bean’s instructions settled another matter. If, when Longstaff was appointed, no decision had been made as to whether he should paint pictures of events or portraits or a mix of both, it was now finally decided that he should paint portraits exclusively.

Longstaff stayed in France only a matter of days returning to London on 6 October.\textsuperscript{288} Although the AIF understood he would be returning ‘in about a week’s time’, he never returned.\textsuperscript{289} Of his three-month engagement he had spent forty-four days in France.\textsuperscript{290} Smart immediately asked Longstaff to provide a list of the portraits he had completed under ‘the arrangement’ made with him,\textsuperscript{291} but there is no evidence he replied. Later, on 20 November, Longstaff informed Smart that he was still engaged on painting portraits and that he had an

\begin{footnotes}
\item[283] Letters, Monash to Longstaff, 1 August 1918, 10 September 1918, reproduced in Joske, \textit{Debonair Jack}, pp 122-3.
\item[284] Letters, AIF Administrative Headquarters to AIF Headquarters, France, 10, 30 August 1918; AIF Administrative Headquarters to AIF Headquarters, France, 5 September 1918; memorandum, Smart to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 9 September 1918; letters, AIF Administrative Headquarters to AIF Headquarters, France, 10, 24 September 1918; all in AWM 93, 18/7/9.
\item[285] Record of Service in the Field, John Longstaff service records, NAA.
\item[286] Letter, Bean to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 23 August 1918, AWM 3DRL 6673/306.
\item[287] Longstaff did not paint portraits of Blamey, Bennett (but Quinn did), Martin, Cannan, Maclagan, Burgess, Smyth, Salisbury and Murray on Bean’s list.
\item[288] Letter, AIF Administrative Headquarters to AIF Headquarters, France, 11 October 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/9.
\item[289] Ibid.
\item[290] Memorandum, ‘A.M.’ to Smart, 3 September 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/9. As remuneration the Commonwealth paid him £88 and a uniform allowance of £15. See ‘Statement of amounts paid to artists for pictures and travelling allowances’ attached to letter, Heyes to Treloar, 2 December 1926, AWM 93, 18/1/81.
\item[291] Letter, Smart to Longstaff, 16 October 1916, AWM 93, 18/7/9.
\end{footnotes}
arrangement with AIF Administrative Headquarters under which it would inform him when any of his subjects were in London so that he could arrange sittings.\textsuperscript{292} It seems he had finished them by early September 1919 when he made a claim on the Commonwealth for thirty-five days’ work spent on the portraits of Brigadier-Generals Coxen, Mackay, Grimwade and Herring and Colonel Maguire. This and an earlier claim for seven days he spent painting Monash’s portrait were promptly allowed.\textsuperscript{293} Inexplicably, he delayed making them available to the Commonwealth until 17 February 1920.\textsuperscript{294} He had painted twelve of the fifteen portraits he undertook to paint for it. Why he failed to paint the requisite number is unknown, as is why the Commonwealth did not insist on him making good the shortfall.

After the war Longstaff accepted commissions to paint portraits of Generals Monash and White, agreeing to paint a half-length portrait of Monash and a large head and shoulders portrait of White, both for \£200.\textsuperscript{295} Completed by early November 1919, Longstaff immediately sent his portrait of Monash to the Royal Portrait Society for exhibition,\textsuperscript{296} and it was not until February 1920 that he gave both portraits up.\textsuperscript{297} The Acting Official Secretary claimed that White’s portrait, \textit{General Sir Cyril Brudenell White (1919)}\textsuperscript{[77]}, was not a good likeness.\textsuperscript{298} During an interview with Treloar in Melbourne on 30 August 1920 Longstaff undertook to ‘improve’ it, but he only managed to ‘finish it’ just before the museum opened in Melbourne on Anzac Day 1922.\textsuperscript{299} Treloar thanked Longstaff for the ‘sacrifices’ he had made to finish it in time for the opening and heaped praise on his work: ‘Your portraits have been much admired and I fancy that several Generals whose portraits are in the Museum are sorry that we did not entrust the commissions to you.’\textsuperscript{300}

\textsuperscript{292} Letter, Longstaff to Smart, 20 November 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/9.
\textsuperscript{293} These claims totalled \£84. See letter, Longstaff to Smart, 20 November 1918; memorandum, Smart to Official Secretary, 5 December 1918; typescript, ‘Dr to J Longstaff’, 3 September 1919, certified correct by Smart; memorandum, Smart to Official Secretary, 3 September 1919; all in AWM 93, 18/7/9.
\textsuperscript{294} Letter, Smart to Longstaff, 17 February 1920, AWM 93, 18/7/9.
\textsuperscript{295} Bean, memorandum, 6 January 1919; letter, Longstaff to Smart, 23 January 1919; memorandum, Smart to Official Secretary, 6 February 1919; minute paper, Smart to Official Secretary, 15 February 1919; letters, Smart to Galbraith, 15 February 1919; Longstaff to Miss Mackenzie (High Commissioner’s Offices), 24 February 1919; memorandum, Smart to Official Secretary, 27 February 1919; all in AWM 93, 18/7/9. Longstaff’s formal agreement to carry out with these commissions has not survived or been located.
\textsuperscript{296} Letter, Longstaff to Smart, 3 November 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/9.
\textsuperscript{297} Letter, Smart to Longstaff, 17 February 1920, AWM 93, 18/7/9.
\textsuperscript{298} Memorandum, Acting Official Secretary to Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, 20 February 1920, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/306.
\textsuperscript{299} Treloar, file note, 30 August 1920; letter, Treloar to Longstaff, 1 November 1920; both in AWM 93, 18/1/6; letter, Treloar to Longstaff, 28 April 1922, AWM 93, 18/4/15.
\textsuperscript{300} Letter, Treloar to Longstaff, 28 April 1922, AWM 93, 18/4/15.
During the 1920s Longstaff painted eight further portraits for the memorial: Brigadier-General Charles Cox (1921), Commander Henry Feakes (1921), Leading signalman John Varcoe (1921), Brigadier-General Evan Wisdom (1923), Sergeant Walter (Wally) Brown, VC (1928), Private William Currey, VC (1928), Corporal Edward Picton (1928) and Sergeant James Maguire (1929).301

VIII – Fullwood

When, on 2 November 1917, Fullwood appeared on Smart’s list of artists, he was waiting to be discharged from the RAMC(T) in which he had served since April 1915, working as an orderly at the 3rd London General Hospital at Wandsworth.302 But on receiving his discharge he declined Smart’s invitation to go to France during the winter.303 On 7 February 1918 Fullwood renewed contact with Smart, telling him: ‘I shall be at your service to go to the front by the end of this month if it can be fixed up’.304 It could not, and like Longstaff’s departure, his was delayed by the crisis caused by the German offensive.305 While waiting, Fullwood signed the standard artist’s agreement.306 On 2 May Smart furnished him with instructions, leaving the following note: ‘Mr Fullwood called. I explained to him fully the nature of his work.’307 Doubtless these were identical to those he had given Longstaff, that is, the Commonwealth was ‘particularly anxious’ to have pictures of operations relating to the German offensive.

On 10 May Honorary Lieutenant Fullwood crossed to France and as had been arranged he travelled to the headquarters of the 5th Division located at St Gratien.308 Shortly after arriving he identified ‘a splendid subject’ and told Smart he hoped to be asked to make a picture of

301 Apart from the portraits of Cox and Feakes, for which Longstaff was paid £75 each, all other portraits attracted a fee of £100. See finance sub-committee, ‘Detailed statement of commitments on pictures’, 21 March 1922; draft estimates 1926/27, 27 March 1926, ‘Item 4 – Pictures and Portraits’; both in AWM 170, 2/1.
302 Character (and discharge) certificate No 541074, 16 November 1917, AWM 3DRL/6692; Gray, A Henry Fullwood, p 21. He was no longer physically fit for war service.
303 Letter, Smart to Bean, 28 December 1917, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
304 Letter, Fullwood to Smart, 7 February 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/6.
305 Letter, Smart to Fullwood, 12 February 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/6.
306 Letters, Smart to AIF Administrative Headquarters; Smart to Fullwood; Smart to Galbraith; all dated 5 April 1918 and in AWM 93, 18/7/6; agreement between Andrew Fisher and Albert Henry Fullwood, 7 May 1918, AWM 3DRL/6692.
307 Smart, file note, 2 May 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/6.
308 Letter, AIF Administrative Headquarters to Official Secretary, 4 May 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/6; Record of Service in the Field, Albert Henry Fullwood service records, NAA. Fullwood’s commission commenced on this date and continued until terminated on 31 December 1919. See notifications published in Commonwealth Gazette No 145/1918 (p 1831); No 42/1920 (p 765).
it.\textsuperscript{309} This was the AIF’s night counter-attack on Villers-Bretonneux which occurred on 28 April 1918. He said he was collecting material for the picture and concentrating all his efforts on it, including ‘getting very valuable descriptions & advise (sic) all round’. This suggests he made sketches for it, but if he did, he failed to deliver them to the Commonwealth. Nor was he asked for them. Thus, further valuable pictorial records were lost. Fullwood returned to London on 3 August having spent 86 days away.\textsuperscript{310} During his visit the Germans’ offensive was halted, then repulsed, and the Allies had gone on the offensive. Monash carried out a well-planned action at Hamel on 4 July, ‘a brilliant success’.\textsuperscript{311} Numerous events were occurring involving the AIF which commanded his attention. As if reminding Fullwood of his responsibilities, early during his engagement Smart sent him a copy of his agreement.\textsuperscript{312} It had no effect: he produced pictures of whatever he liked, assiduously avoiding his obligation to record events especially involving the AIF. Around 9 August Fullwood provided Smart with a list of the forty pictures he had made, all watercolours.\textsuperscript{313} Gray claims Fullwood observed ‘heavy fighting’.\textsuperscript{314} If he did, then as \textit{Attack on Hamel-Vaire [78]} shows, he observed it from a considerable distance representing it as whitish clouds of earth and debris on the horizon, presumably created by shellfire, and small dark scratches in the sky probably intended to represent bursting shrapnel. Still, it is a valuable if somewhat distant record of the opening of the battle of Hamel and might have formed the basis of a historical picture he was commissioned to paint. This picture and another, \textit{5th Division staff officers at Coisy viewing Amiens being shelled}, are his only works depicting events. He did not venture far afield, finding the vast majority of his subjects in the towns and villages in his immediate area: Daours, Bussy, Bertangles, Heilly, Allonville, Coisy and St Gratien. He depicted ‘everyday subjects’, such as ‘guards doing duty and clerks at their desks as well as

\textsuperscript{309} Letter, Fullwood to Smart, 18 May 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/6.
\textsuperscript{310} Casualty Form-Active Service, Albert Henry Fullwood service records, NAA; letter, AIF Administrative Headquarters to AIF Headquarters, France, 10 August 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/6. As remuneration the Commonwealth paid him £184 (overpaying him by 6 days) and a uniform allowance of £15. See ‘Statement of amounts paid to artists for pictures and travelling allowances’ attached to letter, Heyes to Treloar, 2 December 1926, AWM 93, 18/1/81. Smart later obtained Fisher’s approval to Fullwood retaining the overpayment of £12 on the basis that he had carried on with his work after returning to London. See memorandum, Smart to Official Secretary, 6 June 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/6.
\textsuperscript{311} Monash quoted in Grey, \textit{A Military History of Australia}, p 108.
\textsuperscript{312} Letter, Smart to Fullwood, 18 May 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/6.
\textsuperscript{313} Manuscript, ‘List of sketches by Lt AH Fullwood done in France from May to August 1918’, c 9 August 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/6. Appendix H of Bean’s second memoir lists forty-one pictures four of which Fullwood was keeping for reference purposes, while Appendix E of the High Commissioner’s Report for 1918 lists thirty-seven pictures.
\textsuperscript{314} \textit{A Henry Fullwood}, p 25. This is a dubious claim for which she offered no evidence.
the moments, treasured by soldiers, of writing home and receiving mail’, and ‘picturesque views of their environment’.\textsuperscript{315} They are congenial pictures which evoke no drama, so congenial one could be forgiven for thinking that the AIF’s experience on the Western Front amounted to wandering around picturesque towns and villages, like the soldiers shown standing in a street in Coisy in Men of the 5th Division resting at Coisy [79], yarning in streets, byways and pleasant camps as in 15th Brigade, 5th Division, camp in Allonville Woods [80], and if performing staff duties, working in chateaus or other comfortable surroundings as in Officer commanding signals, St Gratien [81]. As a record of life behind the lines Fullwood’s pictures of almost universally pipe-smoking soldiers are possibly valuable, if repetitious, but in concentrating on describing this life he presented a skewed picture of the real life and experience of the common Australian soldier.

Fullwood made a potentially important picture of an incident showing the Australians removing the body of the German ace Baron von Richthofen from his wrecked aircraft, Death of Baron von Richthofen [82]. Actually, it is a reconstruction of the incident as Richthofen was brought down on 21 April, before Fullwood arrived. Its potential importance lies largely in its value as painted testimony establishing, or at least claiming, that the German was brought down by two Australian Lewis gunners with the 53rd Battery, Gunners Evans and Bates.\textsuperscript{316} Of particular significance is Fullwood’s assertion that his picture was an ‘official record’. In the official history, Bean examined the circumstances of Richthofen’s death.\textsuperscript{317} He considered, he claimed, the complete ‘relevant first-hand evidence’, but notably not Fullwood’s picture, and concluded that the fatal shot was probably fired by Sergeant Popkin, also with the 53rd Battery, who was manning a Vickers gun. His conclusion transformed the incident into one particularly important in the history of the AIF’s part in the war, warranting its pictorial representation. It seems it was for this reason that Bean asked Louis McCubbin, an AIF artist who claimed to be an eyewitness, to paint a picture of the incident, but he never did.\textsuperscript{318}

\textsuperscript{315} Gray, A Henry Fullwood, pp 26, 27.
\textsuperscript{316} Fullwood inscribed his picture: ‘Death of Capt Baron von Richthofen/brought down by Lewis Gunners 21 April 1918/No 598 Gunner WJ Evans + No 3081 Gunner R Bates 53 Battery/14 Aust FA/5th Div AIF/ (official record)’. See Gray, A Henry Fullwood, p 86, catalogue details for work number 5.
\textsuperscript{317} Official History Vol 5, Appendix No 4. While referring to the testimony of Gunner Evans, he did not refer to Gunner Bates.
\textsuperscript{318} Bean second memoir, Appendix G. Incidentally, in examining the circumstances of Richthofen’s death, Bean did not refer to McCubbin as an eyewitness whose testimony was recorded.
After the armistice Fullwood secured a further engagement in order to depict ‘incidents’ – his word – associated with the Australians going into Germany, a record of which he claimed ‘must be made outside photography’. Box instructed Smart that the artist should be ‘carefully selected’, remain with the troops for one month, and that his remuneration and conditions of appointment should otherwise be the same as under previous arrangements approved by the government. As Power could not go because of ill-health, Fullwood, according to Smart ‘the next best man’, was engaged. One important change was made to the previous arrangements: on this occasion the artist would be required ‘to supply not less than 12 sketches’. Unsatisfactorily, no further agreement was prepared. Fullwood left on 9 December 1918 and was told to report to Bean at Australian Corps headquarters. Smart was very clear on why he had been sent, telling Box: ‘The A.I.F. were particularly anxious that another artist be sent to France to make sketches of the advance of the Australian army towards Germany and in Germany.’ Box wondered whether any Australian division was actually going into Germany, but Fullwood had already left. His engagement had not been carefully thought out and its object could not be achieved. By 20 November it had been decided to reduce the size of the force to enter Germany, and the Australian Corps would now hold the area between the rivers Meuse and Sambre and the cities of Dinant and Charleroi, both in Belgium, and Avesnes in France. Fullwood returned to London on 4 January 1919 having spent twenty-six days away. On 24 March he delivered twelve pictures to Smart; these did not depict incidents showing the Australians’ advance towards Germany, or any ‘incidents’ at all.

319 Letter, Fullwood to Smart, 15 November 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/6.
320 Memorandum, Box to Smart, 22 November 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/6.
321 Letters, Smart to Bean, 29 November 1918; Smart to Fullwood, 5 December 1918; memorandum, Smart to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 6 December 1918; letter, Smart to Bean, 6 December 1918; all in AWM 93, 18/7/6.
322 Memoranda, Smart to Official Secretary, 9 December 1918; Smart to Fullwood, 9 December 1918; both in AWM 93, 18/7/6.
323 Memoranda, Smart to Fullwood, 9 December 1918; Smart to Official Secretary, 18 December 1918; both in AWM 93, 18/7/6.
324 Memorandum, Smart to Official Secretary, 18 December 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/6.
325 Handwritten note, Box to Smart, 13 December 1918, endorsed on memorandum, Smart to Box, 9 December 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/6.
326 Bean, Official History Vol 6, p 1053.
327 Letter, AIF Administrative Headquarters to AIF Headquarters, France, 7 January 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/6. As remuneration the Commonwealth paid him £52. See memorandum, Acting Accountant to Smart, 8 May 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/6.
328 Typescript, ‘Received from Lieut AH Fullwood ... 12 sketches done in France and Belgium Dec 1918-January 1919’, 24 March 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/6.
According to his pictures Fullwood undertook a whirlwind tour: starting at Oisemont in western France he passed through Solré-le-Château in north-western France on his way to Ham-sur-Heure south of Charleroi in Belgium, and then travelled to Ypres in Belgium. The rationale for such a tour is elusive, but perhaps it was this: the headquarters of the 3rd Division were at Oisemont, those of the 5th Division at Solré-le-Château, and those of the Australian Corps at Ham-sur-Heure. But there was no Australian presence at Ypres. His pictures, save for *Effect of explosion of munition train, Solré-le-Château* [83], are basically the same as those he made during his earlier engagement: town squares peopled by civilians and soldiers, for instance *Market square at ham-sur-Heure* [84], the ubiquitous chateau, as in *Château at Ham-sur-Heure (Prince of Wales’s visit)*, and views of the countryside. These did not add substantially to the record he had already made, and his inclusion of small khaki-clad figures, apparently representing Australian soldiers, did not transform them into records of the AIF’s operations in war’s aftermath. And as he must have known that Power and Leist made pictures in Ypres during the war, there was no warrant for his making further pictures in that region.

Fullwood was anxious to receive a commission to paint the AIF’s night counter-attack on Villers-Bretonneux and made a sketch of his proposed picture.329 However, on 6 January 1919 Bean and Smart decided to ask him to submit instead a sketch of the Australians’ attack on Péronne, ‘as outlined by Capt Bean’.330 This was a strange decision: the incident occurred in September 1918 when Fullwood was in England and he had not been over the ground where the attack was made. It is certain Bean had in mind a particular moment in the attack he wished Fullwood to depict, and thus his treatment of the subject would need to accommodate Bean’s conception of how it should be represented. He made two cartoons and Bean adjudicated on them, purporting to represent the National War Records Committee (NWRC):

> I approved the cartoons submitted by Lieut. Fullwood for “Attack by 53rd [Battalion] on Peronne, Sept. 1. 1918”. I think that a combination of the two cartoons would be the best. They are very similar. The oil cartoon would be most historically correct of the two but I like

329 Letters, Smart to Bean, 9 August 1918; Fullwood to Smart, 20 October 1918; both in AWM 93, 18/7/6.
330 Smart and Bean handwritten note, 6 January 1919; memorandum, Smart to Fullwood, 6 January 1919; both in AWM 93, 18/7/6.
the grouping in [the] foreground of the watercolour. I consider that Lt Fullwood should be commissioned to paint this picture.331

Why Bean was pronouncing on the adequacy of Fullwood’s compositional strategy for the picture when other members of the committee – two British artists, Sir Luke Fildes and Algernon Talmage – held the necessary expertise to do so is puzzling. At all events Fullwood was commissioned to paint it.332 At one stage he asked to go to France to study the ground but decided to work from photographs.333 He finished Attack on Péronne [85] in June 1919.334 Although the picture was accepted, Fullwood’s figure work was considered unsatisfactory, and the NWRC decided he should not be commissioned to paint a second battle picture, remarking that he ‘had had his chance’.335 At the committee’s request Fullwood reluctantly carried out ‘a little further work on the figures’,336 but the result did not satisfy Bean – the figures were historically inaccurate – and in September 1921 he revised the picture again.337

IX – Streeton

Streeton’s participation in the war art scheme is marked by the Commonwealth’s serious mismanagement of him and the artist’s disregard of his contractual obligations, perhaps stemming from his antipathy towards the Commonwealth.338 The Commonwealth failed to collect all of the work he made in France during his engagements. And Streeton delivered virtually the bare minimum number of works he apparently believed he was obliged to

331 Bean, handwritten note ‘Australian War Pictures Committee’, 16 January 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/6. As fully explained in chapter 5, the NWRC was established by Fisher in May 1918 ostensibly to inspect the pictures made by the official artists at the front and on the basis of its inspection to decide on the subjects of historical pictures they should be commissioned to paint. Bean as representing the AIF and Smart the High Commissioner were two of the four members of the NWRC.
332 Minute paper, Smart to Official Secretary, ‘Composition picture to be painted by Lieut A Henry Fullwood for National War Records’, 15 February 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/6.
333 Smart, file note, 5 June 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/6.
334 Letter, Fullwood to Smart, 26 June 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/6.
335 Smart, file note, 1 July 1919; ‘Note of inspection of national war records painting by Sir Luke Fildes, RA’, 25 August 1919; extract from minutes of meeting of NWRC, 13 October 1919; both in AWM 93, 18/7/6; letter, Smart to Bean, 16 October 1919, AWM 93, 18/2/10.
336 Memorandum by Smart, ‘Lieut Fullwood’s picture illustrating the attack on Peronne’, 4 December 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/6.
337 Letters, Bean to Treloar, 8 July 1921, AWM 93, 18/2/10; Treloar to Bean, 27 September 1921, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/299.
338 In the literature the Commonwealth’s mismanagement of Streeton’s appointments and his disregard of his contractual obligations have not been noticed. The artist’s animosity towards the Commonwealth has been noticed only by Wray. See Arthur Streeton, pp 132-4, 137-8, 140-2.
produce for it, keeping about 108 works and his sketchbooks. Irrespective of their quality, this loss was costly: the national record lost out and so did the Australian taxpayer.

When war was declared Streton was visiting Australia. Returning to London, he joined a volunteer regiment wanting ‘to do his bit’. On 24 April 1915, along with some twenty members of the Chelsea Arts Club including Coates, Fullwood and Tom Roberts, he enlisted in the RAMC(T) and was posted to the 3rd London General Hospital at Wandsworth. Initially he worked as an orderly dressing wounds, but was later appointed recreation officer and put in charge of the hospital’s new recreation room. Still, the work involved long hours and according to Streton was ‘hard, dirty, and dangerous’. It finally took its toll and he was discharged medically unfit on 17 February 1917. Going to the country to recuperate, he was ‘in dire need of an income’. Never far from his thoughts was the Commonwealth’s ill-treatment of him. When he heard of Fisher’s plans to send Australian artists to France, he immediately wrote to him asking for details. So began an unhappy correspondence which ended with Streton renouncing all interest in the war art scheme.

In January 1918 Smart once again invited Streton to go to France and found that he was no longer averse to going. Streton asked for the conditions of appointment; Smart supplied these; Streton said he would be glad to go in ‘warm weather’; Smart told him the conditions of appointment had not changed and that he would send him a draft agreement; on 21 April Streton informed him that he had set about obtaining a uniform and was putting together a

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339 It will emerge that Streton delivered fifty works to the Commonwealth, thirty-seven from his first engagement and thirteen from his second. But according to him, he made 158 works in France. See The Arthur Streeton Catalogue, Osboldstone, Melbourne, 1935, catalogue numbers 531-78, 582, 586-8, 590, 598-601, 610-16, 619-712. According to the information Streton supplied in his catalogue, the media in which he executed these works were watercolour, pencil, sepia and chalk, evidence they were made in France. The few oil pictures he made during 1918 were excluded from the calculation on the basis that he did not execute works in oil when in the field. See Anne Gray, Streeton in France 1918, exhibition catalogue, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 30 April-31 August 1982, p 3.

340 Wray, Arthur Streton, p 129.

341 Ibid.; Gray, Streeton in France 1918, p 3; Coates, George Coates, pp 94-5.

342 This occurred in October 1915. See Mary Eagle, The Oil Paintings of Arthur Streeton in the National Gallery of Australia, National Art Gallery of Australia, Canberra, 1994, p 205 (chronology).

343 Letter, Streton to Smart, 12 October 1917, AWM 93, 18/7/12.

344 Attestation Paper of Persons enlisted for Service Abroad, c 4 May 1918, answer to question 11, Arthur Ernest Streton service records, NAA.


346 Galbally and Gray, Letters from Smike, p 132.

347 Letter, Streton to Fisher, 10 July 1917, AWM 93, 18/7/12.

348 Letters, Smart to Streton, 22 January 1918; Streton to Smart, 25 January 1918; both in AWM 93, 18/7/12.
kit.\textsuperscript{349} Thereafter, Smart instructed Galbraith to prepare an agreement ‘on the same lines as the others’; he told Bean that Streeton would be leaving ‘in a few days’ and that he had given him ‘general instructions’ as to what he should do; and Streeton signed the standard artist’s agreement.\textsuperscript{350} On 14 May Honorary Lieutenant Streeton proceeded to France for attachment to the headquarters of the 2nd Division.\textsuperscript{351}

At Boulogne Streeton received ‘gas instruction’ before enduring a long train journey to Poulanville, the railhead near Amiens, from whence he and his baggage weighing 100lbs were transported by lorry to St Gratien, the location of the 2nd Division’s headquarters, arriving there on the 20th.\textsuperscript{352} On 4 June he reported to Smart that he was ‘going well’ and ‘accumulating work’,\textsuperscript{353} a topic he occasionally mentioned in his letters home.\textsuperscript{354} Uppermost in his mind were the number of works he was obliged to produce and deliver to the Commonwealth, how many more he might hand over, and how he would select those to be handed over. He had arrived in France apparently believing that all works he made over the twenty-five specified in his agreement were his to keep. In a letter to his wife Nora, written the day of his arrival at St Gratien, he told her: ‘The “Trustees of Melbourne Gallery” want to acquire some of my work done here. – Well I must try tho’ the first pick to a certain number must go to “Australia House” then I’m free to do things for myself & the Gallery Trustees.’\textsuperscript{355} Holding this belief he could give the Commonwealth the bare minimum number of works and keep the rest, and perhaps the best, for himself.

Streeton’s belief was unreasonable, and probably he did not genuinely hold it. During his earlier dealings with the Commonwealth, Smart informed him that the work done by an artist at the front would ‘remain the sole property of the Commonwealth’, and that an artist was

\textsuperscript{349} Letters, Streeton to Smart, 20 February 1918; Smart to Streeton, 21 February 1918; Streeton to Smart, 16 April 1918; Smart to Streeton, 18 April 1918; Streeton to Smart, 21 April 1918; all in AWM 93, 18/7/12.

\textsuperscript{350} Letter, Smart to Galbraith, 29 April 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12; letter, Smart to Bean, 2 May 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286; agreement between Andrew Fisher and Arthur Streeton dated 3 May 1918; AWM 93, 18/7/12.

\textsuperscript{351} Casualty Form-Active Service, Arthur Ernest Streeton service records, NAA; letter, AIF Administrative Headquarters to Official Secretary, 4 May 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12. This is the commencement date of his commission which continued until terminated on 31 December 1919. See notifications published in Commonwealth Gazette No 125/1918 (p 1703), No 42/1920 (p 765).

\textsuperscript{352} This is Streeton’s account of his journey. See ‘Great War through an artist’s eyes’, Herald (Melbourne), 25 April 1936, p 14.

\textsuperscript{353} Letter, Streeton to Smart, 4 June 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12.

\textsuperscript{354} For example, letters, Streeton to Smart, 4, 19 June 1918; both in AWM 93, 18/7/12; Streeton to Tom Roberts, 6 & 20 July 1918; both quoted in Galbally and Gray, Letters from Smike, pp 148, 149.

\textsuperscript{355} Letter, Streeton to Nora Streeton, 20 May 1918, quoted in Galbally and Gray, Letters from Smike, pp 146-7 at p 147.
expected to provide the Commonwealth with ‘at least twenty-five sketches’. However, a later exchange of letters possibly confused him. On 16 April 1918 Streeton wrote to Smart suggesting that he split his ‘25 sketches’ between oil paintings and wash drawings, and Smart replied that his suggestion was ‘quite acceptable’. It was a careless response, capable of leading Streeton to believe that notwithstanding the earlier information he had been given, he was obliged to deliver no more than twenty-five works. But clause 6 of his agreement clarified his obligation. Moreover, clause 7, which provided that during his engagement he should devote his ‘whole time’ to carrying out ‘the intention of the agreement’, told him he was not free to do things for himself and other parties. He was no simpleton, being experienced, intelligent and possessing considerable business acumen. Later, when he fell into dispute with the Commonwealth over the issue of copyright in the pictures he had handed over, his personal conduct of negotiations to resolve the dispute shows that he was familiar with legal concepts and documents.

Before Streeton left for France Smart furnished him with ‘general instructions’. As he was given them around 2 May, undoubtedly they were identical to those Smart had given Longstaff and Fullwood, that is, the Commonwealth was ‘particularly anxious’ to have sketches and studies of incidents and operations relating to the German offensive. Although a landscape painter, Streeton must have appreciated that he had not been engaged to produce a collection of landscapes. And Smart’s instructions made clear what the Commonwealth wanted, as did clause 1 of his agreement which required him to produce pictures of events occurring in the war especially with regard to the AIF. On its face, this requirement created difficulties for him, as he might have assumed that pictures of events generally included figures. But as he stressed to Smart during his visit, he was ‘\textit{not} a figure painter’. This limitation in his abilities restricted his subjects to a narrow range not involving figure work, at least of a substantial kind, and defeated the point of his engagement. But allowing that he was not a figure painter, representing events remained well within his capabilities employing a pictorial language he had invented decades ago. In \textit{Fire’s On} (1891,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{356} Letters, Smart to Streeton, 20 July 1917; 21 February 1918; both in AWM 93, 18/7/12.
\item \textsuperscript{357} Letters, Streeton to Smart, 16 April 1918; Smart to Streeton, 18 April 1918; both in AWM 93, 18/7/12.
\item \textsuperscript{358} Wehner, \textit{Arthur Streeton of Longacres}, pp 17, 75.
\item \textsuperscript{359} During the negotiations he prepared and proposed the wording of a clause dealing with copyright to go into an agreement with the Commonwealth. See letter, Streeton to Smart, 25 July 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/12.
\item \textsuperscript{360} Letter, Smart to Longstaff, 2 May 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/9.
\item \textsuperscript{361} Letter, Streeton to Smart, 15 July 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12. The emphasis is Streeton’s.
\end{itemize}
AGNSW), he recorded the aftermath of an event he witnessed in which two workers were killed and another seriously injured during blasting operations at the Lapstone railway tunnel. Although subordinating the event, its drama and tragic outcome to the depiction of the landscape, his picture remained a record of the incident as it affected him, possibly indifferently. People play a small part in Streeton’s art, but it has been claimed that this was more a matter of personal style than some real inability to carry out figure work.362 Thus, there was no actual impediment to his making pictures of events.

From St Gratien, Streeton struck out on painting trips to the nearby cities, towns and villages: Amiens, Glisy, Villers-Bretonneux, Corbie, Heilly, Allonville, Poulainville and Villers-Bocage. He hoped, he told Smart, to bring back ‘a representative & varied collection’.363 Nearing the end of his engagement, Streeton left for Boulogne before 8 August, the date on which the Allies’ great offensive was launched, claiming he had run out of painting materials.364 He arrived back in London on 14 August having been away for 93 days.365 Around 2 September he delivered thirty-seven works to the Commonwealth: thirty watercolours and seven pencil drawings.366 Notwithstanding clause 1 of his agreement, during his engagement he avoided depicting events or operations involving the AIF, at least of a substantial kind, and the men do not feature in his work, except incidentally.367

Among the works Streeton delivered possibly only two, Gas alert [86] and General Birdwood bidding farewell to headquarters staff, St Gratien [87], depict events in any real sense. Gas alert evokes a semblance of drama, the only drama in his pictures, and General Birdwood bidding farewell is a straight-out commemorative work which records an important event in the AIF’s history. However, the subjects of his other pictures of events or operations are insignificant: a distant view of plummeting British observation balloons shot down by the Germans; soldiers cleaning harness; a soldier setting up a field telegraph; a wounded soldier

362 Gray, Streeton in France 1918, p 4.
363 Letter, Streeton to Smart, 19 June 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12.
364 Letter, Streeton to Smart, 23 September 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12; Streeton, ‘Great War through an artist’s eyes’, Herald (Melbourne), 25 April 1936, p 14.
365 Letter, Streeton to Smart, 2 September 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12; Record of Service in the Field, Arthur Ernest Streeton service records, NAA. As remuneration the Commonwealth paid him £186 and a uniform allowance of £15. See ‘Statement[s] of amounts paid to artists for pictures and travelling expenses’ attached to letters, Treloar to Heyes, 27 May 1926; Heyes to Treloar, 2 December 1926; both in AWM 93, 18/1/81.
366 Streeton, manuscript, ‘Mr Streeton’s list’, c 2 September 1918; letter, Smart to Streeton, 2 September 1918, with attached typed list of works; both in AWM 93, 18/7/12.
367 Although Streeton’s war work is invariably mentioned and occasionally briefly discussed, it is very rarely examined, and never in the context of what he was engaged to do.
being treated at a dressing station; a soldier operating a telephone switchboard; and staff clerks at work. The most plausible explanation for this paucity of pictures depicting events is Streeton’s claimed inability to carry out figure work. Another is the claim sometimes made that restrictions placed on the official artists’ movements prevented them from witnessing events.\footnote{As to this see, for example, Anne Gray, ‘Arthur Streeton (1867-1943), Amiens the key of the west’, in Wilkins (ed), Artists in Action, pp 30-1 at p 31. But Gray fails to refer to any evidence in support of her claim. If it is correct, what explanation might be offered for the pictures of Dyson and Power which appear to have been made close or relatively close to the action? In any case, with respect to different artists – Fullwood and Lambert – Gray claims they observed the war at close quarters. See A Henry Fullwood, p 25; Art and Artifice, p 95; Heroes and Icons, p 23.}

Not that Streeton ever referred to such restrictions. But even allowing that it was impossible, or at least difficult, for him to venture closer to the front line in order to record the hostilities,\footnote{Not, however, according to Anne Kern, who asserts that Streeton was often in the trenches within 46 metres of the front line. See Arthur Streeton, the man and his art, Heidelberg Publishing Company, Sydney, 1981, p 37.} there were myriad other events that he witnessed and could have depicted which had a more substantial connection to the war, and to the part being played in it by the AIF, than those in his pictures. There were the operations of the 2nd Division which was almost continuously in the line during his visit and which took part in the major action of the period, the battle of Hamel. Streeton ignored these subjects, preferring to record places and things: guns, vehicles, an aircraft, a searchlight, camouflage, a shell hole, ammunition dumps, ruined buildings, dressing stations, a hospital, a prisoner-of-war compound, various headquarters, a sanitary section camp, an aerodrome, a field telegraph, a cathedral. He also made several expansive landscapes, really no more than topographical sketches, including two each of the L’Hallue and Somme valleys.

Overall, Streeton’s works comprise a mixed bag. Realistically, none could have formed the basis of a historical picture depicting a battle or other operation involving the AIF he might have been commissioned to paint under clause 8 of his agreement. However, other arrangements in that regard were canvassed with Streeton during his trip, and these led to him being commissioned to paint a picture of a subject which, according to Bean, would show a distant view of the opening of the battle of Hamel, The Somme Valley near Corbie.\footnote{Letter, Bean to Streeton, 20 November 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/322.} On 9 July Smart wrote to Streeton asking: ‘Will you please let me have your suggestions about a composition picture. You will, of course, take the most outstanding event.’\footnote{Letter, Smart to Streeton, 9 July 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12. The emphasis has been added.} Streeton replied describing two designs ‘for a fine picture’.\footnote{Letter, Streeton to Smart, 15 July 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12.}
which would make ‘a grand landscape view of the arena or scene of operations during March’. He stressed that as Villers-Bretonneux would be shown in the distance, ‘shell bursts & strife generally would become small & subservient in the look of the thing’. The second design, proposed in case Smart preferred ‘something of a nearer view of operations’, was for a picture of Villers-Bretonneux. He said he might paint the entrance to the village and the Australian troops who, he pointed out, ‘would have to be comparatively a small item in the general scene’ as he was not a figure painter, and it was no good his attempting groups of figures in the foreground. For each design Streeton provided a sketch, and on the first he indicated various landmarks. According to these sketches, his first design described the view in The Somme Valley near Corbie, and the second a picture for which Streeton made an oil sketch known as Villers-Bretonneux. When replying Smart told Streeton his designs were ‘excellent’, and he did not deviate from them. First, Smart had given him tacit approval to proceed with them. And next, they reflected his interests and limitations as an artist. As a landscape painter his interest lay in depicting broad-vista landscapes seen from a virtual lookout – ‘heroic landscapes’ – and in these any human activity could be rendered minuscule or, better still, not at all. Whether in employing such an approach he could produce satisfactory pictures of events occurring in the war in which the AIF was participating is arguable. But Bean saw no problem with them.

Streeton’s depiction of the men in his pictures deserves special comment. Gas alert [86] and General Birdwood bidding farewell to headquarters staff, St Gratien [87], pictures of events, contain figures, rare in his work at the front. And their treatment shows that he had very little interest in depicting human activity. His interest in both pictures was the architecture: the

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373 Originally entitled Re-capture of Villers-Bretonneux, 24th and 25th April, 1918, Streeton showed it during his exhibition of war pictures held at the Alpine Club Gallery in June 1919. See With the Australians on the Somme. Pictures by Lt Arthur Streeton, Official Artist attached to 2nd Division, exhibition catalogue, Alpine Club Gallery, London, June 1919, State Library of NSW, Dixson Collection, lot 6. It was acquired by the AGNSW from Streeton in May 1920. See ‘Mr Streeton’s pictures’, Sydney Morning Herald, 12 May 1920, p 8. 375 Letter, Smart to Streeton, 19 July 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12.
374 Bean appreciated Streeton’s interests and limitations and intended recommending to the Commonwealth that he be commissioned to paint historical pictures whose subjects reflected them. As more fully explained in chapter 5, on 23 July 1918, while Streeton was in France, Bean formulated a provisional scheme of pictures he wished painted illustrating the history of the AIF, and in this he allocated Streeton a picture described as ‘Panorama of Somme-Ancre field’. Thereafter, in proposing subjects for Streeton, he did not deviate from his conviction that the artist was peculiarly suited to painting broad-vista landscapes. (As to this see, for instance, Bean’s letter to Gullett of 3 January 1920 in AWM 93, 18/2/10.) In Appendix F to his second memoir, which lists the large pictures making up a complete scheme of pictures he wished painted illustrating the history of the AIF, he allocated three such pictures to Streeton: ‘The opening of the battle of Hamel’; ‘Panorama of Somme valley, etc, at Peronne’; ‘The battle of the Hindenburg Line’. Of these Streeton was only ever commissioned to paint the first.
wrecked buildings in which the drama of the gas alert was occurring and the impressive chateau at St Gratien. The attention he devoted to representing the structures he denied the men, rendering them on a small, almost minuscule scale. They have no recognisable physical features, and therefore no minds, hearts, feelings or experience of the war. They are included only for the purposes of establishing a context or scale, as in Staff clerks at work, headquarters, St Gratien [88], ostensibly a picture of the clerks but actually of the cavernous space in which they are working which is dominated by two classical columns and attendant decorative features. When he includes the men in other pictures, such as in Motor lorries, Coisy [89], Ammunition dump, Glisy and Cleaning harness, L’Hallue Valley, their treatment is substantially the same and cursory. In looking at his pictures one could be forgiven for thinking the war was being prosecuted without the substantial involvement of humans and without any harm being done to them.

Streeton claimed the Commonwealth was pleased with the way in which he fulfilled his contract. Only six days after he delivered his pictures, Smart wrote to him asking whether he could go to France again for six weeks ‘on the same terms as before’. Smart had secured Fisher’s approval to send him over ‘in view of the great activities of the Australian Army in France’. Presumably, he was being sent to make pictures of these activities. But Streeton, who had returned from France without any pictures of events involving the AIF, was a poor choice. Of course, the artist did not see it that way: he jumped at the further opportunity. While waiting to leave he wrote to Smart informing him of the basis on which he was prepared to go: ‘I am willing to go to France for 6 weeks for the same purpose & on the same terms as before the only difference being that I go for 6 weeks instead of as previously 3 months – as there is this time no contract drawn up so far, I agree to produce for and hand over to [the] Commonwealth Govt. half the previous number of works 25 ... Thus I will hand over to you on my return at least 13 paintings or drawings.’ He was not asked to sign an agreement relating to his further engagement, but prudence dictated that this be done. As Streeton understood his earlier agreement, there is a deceptiveness in his agreeing to produce

376 Letter, Streeton to Baldwin Spencer, 11 October 1918, quoted in Galbally and Gray, Letters from Smike, pp 151-3 at p 152.
377 Letter, Smart to Streeton, 6 September 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12.
378 Memorandum, Smart to Official Secretary, 6 September 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12. Fisher’s approval of 7 September 1918 is endorsed on this.
379 Letter, Streeton to Smart, 12 September 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12.
380 Letter, Streeton to Smart, 3 October 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12. The emphasis has been added.
‘half the previous number of works’ – actually thirty-seven – and to hand over at ‘at least’ thirteen works, when he said he was willing to go ‘on the same terms as before’. His later public statements asserting ownership of the pictures he retained at the conclusion of his engagements, made when there was no need to do so, suggest he was laying the groundwork to be able to claim that he had misunderstood his agreement if he were ever asked to hand over his work.

There is no evidence that Smart replied to Streeton’s letter, nor any that he referred his ‘terms’ to Box or Fisher for their approval, though this was necessary. It is manifestly clear on a consideration of the whole of the evidence that Smart had no authority whatsoever to bind the Commonwealth to any arrangement.\(^{381}\) It seems it did not occur to Smart to refer Streeton’s terms to his superiors because his understanding of an artist’s obligation under clause 6 of the standard agreement coincided with Streeton’s. After delivering the pictures from his first trip, Streeton had written to Smart in connection with an exhibition he (Smart) was planning to hold: ‘I should like to show an additional lot of work I did in France over the amount required by our contract.’\(^{382}\) Here was the opportunity to correct Streeton’s understanding and ask him for the rest of his pictures, but Smart merely told him there would be room for his additional work.\(^{383}\)

Streeton spelt out how he intended carrying out his further engagement for another reason. He wished to dispel any hopes the Commonwealth might have of receiving ‘supplementary’ works.\(^{384}\) Since returning from France he had reflected on his ‘generosity’ and regretted it. Writing to Baldwin Spencer, he told him: ‘The Austn. Govt. seem pleased with the way I fulfilled my contract. It was to hand over 25 drawings or sketches – & I handed over 37 – a foolish thing to do – & not to be repeated – things given are seldom valued it makes [them] cheap’.\(^{385}\) He said he was going over again and that if he came back with another collection

\(^{381}\) As Smart had no authority to incur any expenditure without prior approval, obviously he had none to bind the Commonwealth to a contractual arrangement. See memorandum, Assistant Official Secretary to Official Secretary, 26 November 1920, AWM 93, 19/7/4. In this the Assistant Official Secretary complained about Smart incurring expenditure without approval and asked that he be censured.

\(^{382}\) Letter, Streeton to Smart, 2 September 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12. This exhibition did not eventuate.

\(^{383}\) Letter, Smart to Streeton, 6 September 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12.

\(^{384}\) When after his first trip Streeton delivered his pictures they were accompanied by a list in two parts, the first containing twenty-five works, and the second, which he headed ‘Supplementary’, containing twelve. See Streeton, manuscript, ‘Mr Streeton’s list’, c 2 September 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12.

\(^{385}\) Letter, Streeton to Spencer, 11 October 1918, quoted in Galbally and Gray, Letters from Smike, pp 151-3 at p 152. The emphasis is Streeton’s.
of pictures, ‘somebody will pay for them, & at a good figure they’ll be worth it – I’m not doing any 10 guinea sketches this time – & as for patriotism – I’ve done that.’ Thus, he viewed his further engagement as a commercial venture; he was not going out of any sense of duty. He had his eyes fixed on the future, and in it he assessed there would be a lucrative market for his war pictures. He foresaw ‘a flood of war sketches’ entering the market, but claimed: ‘[M]y collection when shown will be different & will have a certain market value – I suppose if I presented 100 works of the war free to Australia, someone could say: Oh, how nice of him, I suppose they don’t take long, he just knocks them off you know’. The man who wrote this was embittered: Streeton was nursing a grudge against the Commonwealth.

Streeton’s early return to France was frustrated by delays the artist said he regretted: ‘It seems a pity the delay, and all that fine subject between Villers-Bretonneux & Peronne’.

Stirred into action by Bean, the AIF arranged for Streeton to leave on 10 October, but his departure was postponed until the 17th while he recovered from influenza. Although he was due to leave after the AIF’s divisions had come out of the line – the infantry’s last action was fought at Montbrehain on 5 October – Streeton had been exhorting Smart to organise transportation to get him to various destinations close to the Hindenburg Line where, he said, ‘the important subjects he should be recording for you for Australia’ lay. But after crossing to France, Streeton found his own transport. He ‘got in touch with a general’ at the 2nd Division’s headquarters who took him in a car ‘to look from the best positions in the celebrated Mt St. Quentin’, and by 26 October he had made one or two slight studies ‘of the Mount’ and several others of ‘these ruins’ (Péronne). Although it seems he was billeted in Péronne, he travelled further east visiting Bellicourt, Le Cateau and Cambrai. On returning to London he told Roberts that he had seen ‘all the desolate area from Villers Bretonneux to Bellicourt’, and had been lucky to also see ‘part of Cambrai, Bapaume, Albert & Pozieres, Bourlon Wood etc.’ The experience, he said, had been ‘worth any amount of hardship’.

386 Letter, Streeton to Smart, 23 September 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12.
387 Letter, Bean to DAG, 24 September 1918; memorandum, AIF Administrative Headquarters to Official Secretary, 2 October 1918; letter, Streeton to Smart, 4 October 1918; letter, Streeton to Smart, 8 October 1918; memorandum, AIF Administrative Headquarters to Official Secretary, 9 October 1918; all in AWM 93, 18/7/12; Casualty Form-Active Service, Arthur Ernest Streeton service records, NAA.
388 Letter, Streeton to Smart, 15 October 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12.
389 Letters, Streeton to Smart, 22 October 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12; Streeton to Nora Streeton, 26 October 1918, quoted in Galbally and Gray, Letters from Smike, pp 153-4 at p 153.
It ended with his departure for England on 25 November.\footnote{Casualty Form-Active Service, Arthur Ernest Streeton service records, NAA.} Arriving at Victoria Station the following evening, he left most of his records in its cloakroom, but assured Smart that as soon as he recovered – ‘I’m a bit knocked out at present’ – he would collect, complete and hand them over.\footnote{Letter, Streeton to Smart, 27 November 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12.} His trip had occupied 41 days.\footnote{On this occasion the Commonwealth paid him remuneration of £82. See ‘Statement of amounts paid to artists for pictures and travelling expenses’ attached to letter, Treloar to Heyes, 27 May 1926, AWM 93, 18/1/81.}

After returning, Streeton was offered a commission to paint a picture ‘illustrating the Australian troops moving through to the second phase of the attack on the south of the Somme on the morning of August 8th [1918]’.\footnote{Letter, Smart to Streeton, 10 December 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12.} Why he was offered this commission when he did not witness the attack is a mystery, and further evidence that those managing the war art scheme had little idea of what they were doing. Although Streeton was nowhere near the Somme on 8 August, he promptly accepted the commission.\footnote{Letter, Streeton to Smart, 14 December 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12.} Its subject continued to be described as Smart had done in his letter, but Streeton painted a subject which Bean thought was a distant view of the opening of the battle of Hamel. He alone recognised that the oil sketch Streeton made for the picture and left with Smart did not depict operations on 8 August.\footnote{Streeton left a further oil sketch, Villers-Bretonneux, with Smart. See letter, Streeton to Smart, 26 September 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12. It seems clear these oil sketches were based on the two designs of subjects Streeton described and illustrated for Smart in his letter of 15 July 1918 in AWM 93, 18/7/12.} Bean had written to Streeton on 20 November 1918 late during his second trip telling him:

> It has been decided that the first picture which you should be asked to paint for the Commonwealth Government will be a picture of the great offensive on the Somme which was launched on August 8th, or else a picture on the lines of the sketch which you sent in of (I think) of Hamel showing Corbie and the Somme Valley and the hills in the background. The argument against the latter is that it was not one of our most important battles [in fact it was and became regarded as such]; but on the other hand, it was a battle which you personally witnessed, I believe, and therefore, if you think yourself that this would be the subject which you yourself would prefer to paint, that subject will be chosen.\footnote{Letter, Bean to Streeton, 20 November 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/322.}

Streeton, then, was free to choose whichever subject suited him, and he chose the latter. But in making that choice he was content to proceed with its painting as if it depicted operations
on 8 August, including executing an agreement relating to such a commission. Really, the picture’s war subject was a matter of indifference to him. As he had described it to Smart, it was ‘a grand landscape view of the arena or scene of operations during March [1918]’. It was not his intention to depict a particular event, or any event at all. From first to last his picture was a panorama which contained no discernible action and no substantial evidence of the war; its subject attracted him because he was convinced it was ‘the finest landscape subject’ in northern France. He never claimed it depicted the opening of the battle of Hamel; that was Bean’s construction of it. The beauty of his picture was that it was so general it could be offered on several bases without attracting criticism or disagreement. With the Somme appearing in the scene, the picture could be offered as being related to famous ancient British battles which had involved attempts to cross the river, the battles of Crècy and Agincourt, and so claim a place for Australia in the broad sweep of military history.

On 22 May 1919 Streeton delivered The Somme Valley near Corbie [90] to Australia House accompanied by ‘a key to the picture’, a sketch on which he indicated various landmarks. From this it should have been obvious to Smart, and Treloar who was deputising for Bean on the NWRC, that it did not depict what it purported to depict. And if, in accordance with Smart’s initial specification of the subject it showed the Australians ‘moving through’ during a phase of their attack, they enjoyed a considerable advantage over the Germans being invisible. None of this Smart and Treloar picked up, even with the assistance of Streeton’s ‘key’. The Commonwealth promptly accepted the picture. Later, in March 1921, Treloar

400 Letters, Smart to Streeton, 9 January 1919; Streeton to Smart, 10 February 1919; both in AWM 93, 18/7/12. The agreement referred to in these letters has not survived or been located.

401 Letter, Streeton to Smart, 15 July 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12.

402 Ibid.

403 This is what Treloar did in his descriptive letterpress for the picture when it was reproduced in the memorial’s 1933 publication Australian Chivalry which contained colour and duo-tone reproductions of some of its more important official pictures. See JL Treloar (ed), Australian Chivalry, Australian War Memorial, Sydney, 1933, plate 44. In this Treloar adopted Bean’s construction of the picture to claim that in the distance could be seen the bombardment of the German positions near Albert during the battle of Hamel.

404 Letter, Streeton to Officer in Charge, War Art Records, Australia House, 22 May 1919, with attached sketch, AWM 93, 18/7/12.

405 Nor, in recent times, did Gray or Wray. In her catalogue for the exhibition Streeton in France 1918, Gray included in the picture’s title in brackets the subject Streeton was to have depicted, The Second Phase of the Australian Attack on the South of the Somme on the morning of August 8th 1918. She quoted from Streeton’s letter to Smart of 15 July 1918 (giving to it an incorrect date of 9 July) in which he described his design for the picture. Quite obviously it could not show operations which had not occurred, but in any case Streeton had pointed out that it showed ‘the arena or scene of operations during March [1918]’. See Streeton in France 1918, p 6. Wray also claims the picture shows operations on 8 August and ‘resulted’ from Streeton’s first trip during which he did not witness them. See Arthur Streeton, p 137.

406 Minutes of meeting of NWRC, 6 June 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/12.
wrote to Streeton to ascertain which, as between ‘The Battle of Hamel’ and ‘The Opening of the Second Phase of the Australians’ Attack on the 8th August 1918’, was the picture’s ‘correct title’, and the artist replied it was the latter.\textsuperscript{407} Its title, correct or otherwise, was one thing, its subject was quite another; in the case of this picture it was plainly irrelevant.

Streeton delivered the pictures from his second trip to Smart on 27 January 1919.\textsuperscript{408} In accordance with his ‘agreement’ with the Commonwealth, he handed over thirteen works: eleven watercolours and two pencil drawings. This was a miserable return for six weeks’ paid work. Still more disappointing were their subjects. Apart from recording a distant view of Mont St Quentin (\textit{Mont St Quentin}), merely a topographical sketch, and the entrance to the St Quentin Canal tunnel at Bellicourt, \textit{Bellicourt: entrance to St Quentin Tunnel [91]}, his other works did not depict ‘important subjects’, or events. Most were of locations in and around Péronne. The attack on Péronne was important, but the ruined buildings and other structures he recorded, which included a temporary wooden bridge, a sugar beet factory, the citadel, the Hotel de Ville and the church of St Jean, were not. Only \textit{Australians burning effigy of Kaiser in square, Armistice Day [92]} depicted an event. This was an interesting but unimportant subject. But in any case, Streeton subordinated the event’s depiction to the careful rendering of the ruined buildings surrounding the square. To the east at Feuillères he made a pencil sketch of a section of a bridge and at Chuignolles near Amiens a picture of a captured German naval gun. None of his works included soldiers, save for the ant-like figures in his picture of the burning effigy of the Kaiser. Realistically, none could form the basis of a historical picture depicting a battle or other operation involving the AIF, unless he turned \textit{Mont St Quentin} into a panorama in which the critical assault on it by the Australians would be suggested by distant puffs of smoke,\textsuperscript{409} or incorporated \textit{Bellicourt: entrance to St Quentin Tunnel} in a panorama suggesting the attack by Australian and American troops on the Hindenburg Line on 29 September 1918, during which the entrance to the St Quentin Canal was captured.\textsuperscript{410}

\textsuperscript{407} Letters, Treloar to Streeton, 22 March 1921; Streeton to Treloar, 15 April 1921; both in AWM 93, 18/2/10.
\textsuperscript{408} Streeton, manuscript, ‘Lt A Streeton’s 2nd list of war records, 17 Oct to 26 Nov 1918’, endorsed ‘Received 13 drawings’, 27 January 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/12.
\textsuperscript{409} Such a picture, \textit{Mount St Quentin}, is in the NGV’s collection, a gift by Streeton in 1926. It is a large oil painting which he executed in 1919 in London, presumably from sketches and studies made during his trip.
\textsuperscript{410} In 1919 Streeton painted, or began to paint, such a picture for the Commonwealth with the title \textit{The Battle of the Hindenburg Line}, but because of a dispute over its price he refused to part with it taking it with him to Australia. Later, in 1935, the memorial purchased it from him as \textit{Bellicourt Tunnel} (1920).
On 13 October 1919 the NWRC resolved to place a commission with Streeton to paint a picture to be entitled ‘The Battle of the Hindenburg Line’ for £300.\textsuperscript{411} When he was offered this commission, a dispute immediately erupted over the price, a reduction of £100 in the price paid to him for his first picture.\textsuperscript{412} When the Commonwealth failed to respond in a timely fashion to his offer to paint a smaller picture of the subject for £300, he decided to pack away the work, then underway, and take it to Australia where, he said, if the government cared to acquire anything further of his work, ‘they can buy in the open market, like anyone else.’\textsuperscript{413} For Streeton, this dispute was the last straw in his steadily deteriorating relations with the Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{414}

In June 1919 Streeton held an exhibition of his war pictures at the Alpine Club Gallery in London showing twenty-five oil paintings and twenty watercolours.\textsuperscript{415} In the catalogue he explained that (1) he painted the oil paintings in London from studies he made on the Somme front after ‘his work executed under contract with the Commonwealth Government had been completed’; (2) he painted the watercolours ‘on the field’; and (3) all the pictures were his property. As he said he made the watercolours ‘on the field’, there exists not the slightest doubt that he did so during his official engagements. Thus, they were the Commonwealth’s property, as were the studies he made ‘on the Somme Front’ on which his oil paintings were based.

\textsuperscript{411} Extract of minutes of meeting of NWRC, 13 October 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/12.
\textsuperscript{412} The course of this dispute can be traced in letters, Smart to Streeton, 15 October 1919; Streeton to Smart, 28 October 1919; Streeton to Smart, 6 November 1919; Smart to Streeton, 7 November 1919; Streeton to Smart, 11 November 1919; Streeton to Smart, 13 November 1919; Smart to Bean, 20 November 1919; Streeton to Smart, 21 November 1919; all in AWM 93, 18/7/12.
\textsuperscript{413} Letter, Streeton to Smart, 2 December 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/12.
\textsuperscript{414} First, he had had to suffer an inexplicable and interminable delay before being paid the balance of £200 due to him for The Somme Valley near Corbie. Payment was not made until 2 November 1919, and only after Streeton threatened to instruct his solicitor to collect the debt. See letter, Streeton to Smart, c 30 October 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/12. Next, there arose a dispute over the ownership of copyright in his pictures. This dispute dragged on for several months and was only resolved in August 1919, apparently on the basis of Streeton assigning to the Commonwealth the copyright in the works he had delivered to it. As already mentioned, Streeton personally conducted the negotiations with the Commonwealth which led to its resolution including preparing two wordings of a clause to go into an agreement covering copyright. The course of this dispute can be traced in letters, Smart to Streeton, 28 February 1919; Streeton to Smart, 4 March 1919; Streeton to Smart, 7 March 1919; Streeton to Box, 7 May 1919, with attached memorandum containing suggested wording of clause relating to copyright; Smart to Streeton, 7 July 1919; Streeton to Smart, 12 July 1919; Smart to Streeton, 17 July 1919; Streeton to Smart, 25 July 1919; Smart to Streeton, 28 July 1919; memorandum, Smart to Official Secretary, 1 August 1919; all in AWM 93, 18/7/12.
\textsuperscript{415} With the Australians on the Somme. Pictures by Lt Arthur Streeton, Official Artist attached to 2nd Division, exhibition catalogue. On show were his study for The Somme Valley near Corbie, under the title 8th August, The Australian Advance, and several major oil pictures three of which were later acquired by national galleries – Boulogne and Villers-Bretonneux (AGNSW) and Mount St Quentin (NGV) – and one by the memorial, Amiens, the key of the west (1918).
Streeton returned to Australia in 1920.\textsuperscript{416} He brought with him his war pictures and also his antipathy towards the Commonwealth. On 15 March he held a substantial exhibition in Melbourne showing seventy-eight works, sixty-one of which were war pictures: twenty-five oil paintings and thirty-six watercolours.\textsuperscript{417} In a note in the catalogue, he stated: ‘The artist retains the copyright on (sic) all his pictures.’ Clearly, his dispute with the Commonwealth over the issue of copyright still rankled with him. Then, on 10 May he held another substantial exhibition, this time in Sydney, showing eighty-three works of which fifty-six were war pictures: twenty-two oil paintings and thirty-four watercolours.\textsuperscript{418} In the catalogue, and before listing his works, Streeton included a note, ‘Pictures relating to the war are those produced over and above the Artist’s contracts with the Commonwealth Government’, and at the end of the list a further note, ‘The Artist retains the copyright of all his works.’ The second but not the first note had appeared in the catalogue of his Melbourne exhibition. Why he included it is puzzling. The Commonwealth had never claimed that he withheld works, nor it seems apprehended that he had. Possibly Streeton thought it merely prudent to include the note to explain the situation, but prudence would not dictate its inclusion if he had no basis for thinking that the Commonwealth was going to ask him for his pictures, or to explain why he had them. Anyway, after the exhibition closed he put away his war pictures for several years.

In July 1926 Streeton donated 117 war pictures in his possession to several institutions and individuals, not including the memorial.\textsuperscript{419} Many of these were, or once were, the Commonwealth’s property.\textsuperscript{420} Chief among his beneficiaries was the Naval and Military Club,

\textsuperscript{417} \textit{Catalogue of the exhibition of Mr Streeton’s pictures}, Victorian Art Societies’ Gallery East Melbourne, March 1920, State Library of NSW, Dixson Collection. The oil paintings were lots 2, 4-9, 11-15, 17, 19-23, 25-29, 32 and 36, and the watercolours lots 3-7, 9-32, 34-6 and 39-42.
\textsuperscript{418} \textit{Catalogue of the final exhibition of Arthur Streeton’s pictures}, Gallery of the Education Department, Sydney, 10 May 1920, State Library of NSW, Dixson Collection. The oil paintings were lots 1-4, 8, 10, 12-13, 15, 17-18, 20-1, 25, 28, 30, 33, 35-6 and 38-40, and the watercolours lots 42-60, 62-9 and 71-7.
\textsuperscript{420} By July 1926 any action available to the Commonwealth against Streeton under his agreements to recover work made by him during his official engagements and withheld by him is likely to have been extinguished under relevant legislation limiting the time in which actions based on a contract could be brought – 6 years from the date of breach – unless the Commonwealth could successfully argue first that his formal agreement operated as a deed, in which case it had 12 years from the date of breach in which to bring an action, and next that it extended to his second engagement.
Melbourne which received about eighty works. Writing to Bean, Treloar commented: ‘It is a pity we quarrelled with Mr Streeton otherwise we might have been included in his list of beneficiaries.’ Bean was philosophical: ‘Can’t be helped unfortunately.’ Coinciding with the announcement of his gifts Streeton held an exhibition of all 117 works at the Fine Arts Gallery in Melbourne. He illustrated the cover of the catalogue with a drawing which substantially reproduced *Amiens Cathedral [93]*, a work he delivered to the Commonwealth after his first trip to France, infringing its copyright in the work. But this infringement was trifling alongside his wholesale disposal of the former Commonwealth property. To head off any suggestion that the pictures might not have been his to dispose of, he included a note in the catalogue: ‘The production of War Records by the Artist was greatly in excess of the requirements of Australia House in 1918; and the more important of these works were done after the Artist had completed his work for the Commonwealth Government.’ This closely followed the wording of his note in the catalogue of his exhibition in Sydney in May 1920. By including such notes in his catalogues he was promoting in a public way a stance he had adopted with respect to his contractual obligation from the moment he arrived at St Gratien on 20 May 1918, that is, any pictures he made over and above the twenty-five – thirteen during his second engagement – he had contracted to produce and deliver to the Commonwealth were his to keep.

In the exhibition, Streeton showed twelve oil paintings, sixty-three watercolours and forty-two pencil studies. Except for his pencil studies, he had shown several of the oils and watercolours in previous shows starting with his exhibition at the Alpine Club Gallery in June 1919. It is beyond doubt, based on the note he included in the catalogue of that exhibition, that as the watercolours and pencil studies – 105 works – were made ‘on the field’, they had once been the Commonwealth’s property. By any test this was a large collection of works by arguably Australia’s pre-eminent landscape painter executed on the battlefields of the

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421 Warren Perry, *The Naval and Military Club, Melbourne: A History of its First Hundred Years, 1881-1981*, Naval and Military Club, Melbourne in conjunction with Lothian Publishing Company, 1981, pp 132-3. Streeton, Perry states, became a member of the club on 18 October 1923 and a life member on 29 July 1926. When the club folded in 2009 it sold off Streeton’s pictures including 18 watercolours he made in France during his official engagements. According to the auctioneers’ art specialists these were estimated to realise between $156,000 and $236,000. See Deutscher and Hackett, ‘The Naval and Military Club Collection’, auction catalogue, Melbourne, 21 and 22 July 2009. These works were lots 1-5 and 11-23.

422 Letter, Treloar to Bean, 14 July 1926, AWM 93, 18/1/22.

423 Bean, handwritten note on Treloar’s letter to him of 14 July 1926.

Western Front. They constituted a priceless archive of records of places and things associated with the experience of and part played by the AIF during the war, notwithstanding that few, if any, depicted events or operations in which it had been involved. The appearance of such a large collection of works, many of which were unknown, should have attracted the attention of Treloar and Bean and prompted them to investigate whether Streeton had delivered to the Commonwealth all of the work he had made during his official engagements. If they were distracted at the time of Streeton’s exhibitions in 1920 – Bean was at Tuggeranong immersed in writing the first volume of the official history and Treloar was busy establishing the war museum in Melbourne – by 1926 their responsibilities to the memorial were such that irrespective of distractions they were obliged to be vigilant and to investigate events which potentially affected it. And Streeton’s disposal of 117 war pictures was a very significant event.

As Treloar had a catalogue of the exhibition placed in a file, it can be inferred he visited the show. And although Bean, who was in Sydney, had no similar opportunity, he possessed something more valuable than proximity to the works: an intimate knowledge of the workings of the war art scheme including the nature and extent of the official artists’ obligations under their agreements. On numerous occasions during and shortly after the war he expressed the opinion that all work made by the artists during their engagements was the Commonwealth’s property. Had he forgotten this, or had he decided that given the time that had passed since Streeton was in France it was too late to raise the matter with him? The question is unanswerable. Anyway, there is no evidence that either man did anything other than express regret at the memorial missing out on getting some of the pictures. Realistically, the exhibition presented the last opportunity of redressing the situation, and as it slipped away, so did the prospect of recovering any of the works.

In July 1927 Streeton wrote to Treloar asking for a list of his works in the memorial’s collection in connection with ‘compiling a complete catalogue of my work executed since 1884 for publication in book form.’ He expressed regret at having given so many of his works to the Naval and Military Club where, he said, ‘nearly 90 of them are still lying unpacked in the basement’, and said he now wished he had given them to the memorial. He

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425 File AWM 93, 18/1/22 entitled ‘Catalogue of work executed by Arthur Streeton. Correspondence’.
426 Letter, Streeton to Treloar, 2 July 1927, AWM 93, 18/1/22. This would take him many years to complete finally appearing in 1935 as *The Arthur Streeton Catalogue*. 
explained that he had asked the club to transfer the works to the memorial, but his request had gone unanswered. Writing to Streeton enclosing a list of his works, Treloar wondered whether he might repeat his request of the club, but if he did nothing came of it.\(^{427}\)

In October 2007 the memorial purchased from Oliver Streeton, Streeton’s grandson, seven of the artist’s wartime sketchbooks for $42,000 with the assistance of a grant of $32,000 from the National Cultural Heritage Account.\(^{428}\) According to a newspaper report of the transaction, the sketchbooks contained ‘all the studies’ Streeton had done for the paintings and watercolours in the memorial’s collection. Its head of art was reported as saying: ‘What’s particularly exciting is that there are sketches which refer to the three big oil paintings which [Streeton] was commissioned to do for the memorial.’\(^{429}\) There seems to be no doubt that the sketchbooks contained ‘studies sketches or drawings’ made by Streeton in France during his official engagements. Thus, they had been the Commonwealth’s property. Having ‘acquired’ them in 1918, it reacquired them in 2007 courtesy of the Australian taxpayer.

**X – Bell**

Before the war Bell’s life revolved around the Chelsea arts scene.\(^{430}\) On 9 December 1915 he attempted to enlist in the British Army but was rejected because of his flat feet.\(^{431}\) He undertook munitions work and later worked with the ‘Arsenal Branch’ ‘for a long period’.\(^{432}\) In December 1917 Smart offered him an appointment, but he declined to go to France during

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\(^{427}\) Letter, Treloar to Streeton, 11 July 1927, with attached list, AWM 93, 18/1/22. The list contained 50 works including *The Somme Valley near Corbie*. Years later, through the efforts begun in 1935 of Chauvel, a member of the memorial’s board, the Naval and Military Club gave thirty-four of Streeton’s works it longer wanted to the memorial. They were variously described as ‘not worth framing’, ‘the very roughest of sketches’, and ‘not worth the freight to Canberra’. Treloar consulted one or two artists who expressed the opinion that although unfinished, they would be of ‘real value’. By September 1937 the mostly pencil works had been transferred to the memorial and accessioned. See letters, Chauvel to Treloar, 5 December 1935; Treloar to Chauvel, 6 December 1935; Treloar to Major Maxted, 25 June 1937; Treloar to Secretary, Naval and Military Club, 24 September 1937; memoranda, Treloar to Bain, 1 October 1937; Bain to Treloar, 7 October 1937, with attached list; all in AWM 93, 18/1/22.


\(^{429}\) Presumably, she was referring to *The Somme Valley near Corbie, Bellicourt tunnel and Amiens, the key of the west*. But of these only the first was commissioned from Streeton. As explained in chapter 5, in 1935 the memorial purchased the other two pictures from Streeton for £350.


\(^{431}\) Attestation Paper of Persons enlisted for Service Abroad, George Henry Frederick Bell service records, NAA, answer to question 13.

\(^{432}\) Letter, Australian Munitions Workers to Official Secretary, 15 January 1920, AWM 93, 18/7/1.
the winter. When the ‘commission’ Smart promised to him for the next summer had not materialised by 20 August, Bell wrote to him asking that he ‘push on the arrangements’, pointing out that he had been waiting to go for months and had ‘subordinated’ his arrangements in the expectation of being appointed. Smart immediately requested the AIF to arrange to get him to France, but this could not be done until 5 October. On that date Honorary Lieutenant Bell proceeded to France with orders to report to the headquarters of the 4th Division.

Bell’s appointment had come very late in the war when the Germans were in retreat and an Allied victory was assured. In recent days the Australians had fought along a front to the west of the Hindenburg Line in northern France, between the towns of Bellicourt and Bellenglise. In order to attack and penetrate the main line, it was necessary to make incursions at various points through the Hindenburg Outpost Line, and in this the 1st and 4th Divisions achieved a measure of success before being relieved and sent to the rear soon after 18 September. In early November the 1st and 4th Divisions returned to areas adjacent to the new front line, which had moved further east following the breaching of the Hindenburg Line, and on the 10th were arriving in the Le Cateau region. The next day the armistice was signed. Ordered to occupy Dinant in Belgium, the 4th Division arrived in the city on 16 December.

The timing of Bell’s appointment narrowed his range of subjects to the extent that the Australians were no longer fighting, yet under his agreement he remained obliged to make pictures of events occurring in the war especially with regard to the AIF. That there was no fighting did not mean that all war operations had ceased. But the circumstances in which Bell found himself made him uncertain as to how he should proceed. He required direction, and the person to provide it was Bean. It seems probable that Smart left it to Bell to work this out

433 Letter, Smart to Bean, 28 December 1917, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
434 Letter, Bell to Smart, 20 August 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/1.
435 Memorandum, Smart to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 28 August 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/1; Service and Casualty Form, George Henry Frederick Bell service records, NAA; letter, AIF Administrative Headquarters to Official Secretary, 2 October 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/1. His commission commenced on this date and continued until terminated on 31 December 1919. See notifications published in Commonwealth Gazette No 9/1919 (p 78); No 42/1920 (p 765). Before leaving he signed the standard artist’s agreement. See letter, Galbraith to Smart, 7 October 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/1. It has not survived or been located.
436 Bean, Official History Vol 6, p 935.
437 Ibid., pp 1049, 1053.
438 Ibid.; list of suggested incidents for Bell to paint involving the 4th Division attached to letter, Treloar to Smart, 28 May 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/1.
with Bean who knew he was coming. But the timing of his arrival was awry as Bean was going on leave. It seems clear Bell expected to receive Bean’s guidance: after arriving he wrote to him but was told that he had just returned from leave and would not be able to see him until the end of the first week in November. The evidence does not disclose whether they met, but it seems unlikely Bean could have spared the time in the aftermath of the armistice. Thus, Bell probably devised his own program of work.

From the titles of Bell’s pictures, and from other evidence, it seems clear he accompanied the 4th Division when it moved up into the Le Cateau region in November: he carried out much of his work in Le Cateau itself and in the nearby towns and villages of St Benin, Basuel, St Souplet, Busigny, Ors, Catillon-sur Sambre and la Haie Menneresse. On 29 December, with his engagement drawing to a close, he sought its extension:

My contract with the War Records Branch of Australia House terminates on 6th January 1919. Owing to the mobile nature of the warfare when I joined this Division in October last, and the sudden cessation of hostilities, I was unable to get sufficient sketches to enable me to complete my part of the contract. I have now begun a series of pictures of great interest and historical value to the Division. I would therefore ask to be allowed to remain with the Division until this work is completed.

His request was supported by General Maclagan, commander of the 4th Division, who sent it to AIF Administrative Headquarters with the comment: ‘[I]t would be most inadvisable from a historical point of view for Lieutenant Bell to leave duty at present.’ Bean, to whom Bell’s request was referred, recommended that it be granted. Bell’s proposed ‘series of pictures of great interest and historical value to the Division’ consisted of a series of portraits of its command and general staff. It can be assumed Maclagan and Bean knew this, and that Maclagan specified the officers of whom Bell should paint portraits. Box extended Bell’s engagement, but only to 6 February 1919, and subject to him handing over all of his work.

439 Letter, Smart to Bean, 4 October 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/1.
440 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 20 October 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/10.
441 Memorandum, War Correspondents’ Headquarters to Bell, 31 October 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/292.
442 Letter, Bell to 4th Division Headquarters, 29 December 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/1. He also wrote to Smart enclosing a copy of this letter and explained that as the division had been ‘continually moving’ he had had ‘not much chance of getting sketches of any value’. See letter, Bell to Smart, 29 December 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/1.
443 Letter, AIF Administrative Headquarters to Official Secretary, 9 January 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/1.
444 Letter, Bean to Smart, 15 January 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/1.
445 Memorandum, Smart to Official Secretary, 16 January 1919; cable, Smart to Bell, 16 January 1919; both in AWM 93, 18/7/1.
It was unnecessary to impose this condition as he was already obliged to do so under his agreement. His extension proved insufficient to enable him to complete his series. He again enlisted Maclagan’s support who asked that Bell be permitted to stay on to paint two remaining portraits. The Commonwealth raised no objection to this, but said he would not be paid beyond 6 February. This seems not to have mattered to him: he remained abroad for two further months finally returning to England on 7 April 1919. He had spent six months in France and Belgium, longer than any other official artist save for Dyson. On 25 June 1919 he delivered his ‘quota of pictures’ to Smart, thirty-six pictures consisting of twelve oil portraits and nineteen oil and five watercolour sketches.

By 29 December 1918, when Bell first applied for an extension of his engagement, he was in Dinant and had made nearly all his twenty-four subject pictures, mostly drawn from the Le Cateau region, sketches he told Smart had no value. In expressing this view he was undoubtedly right. None represent events or war and post-war operations, and the men really do not feature in them. Moreover, none could form the basis of a historical picture of an incident involving the AIF he might be invited to paint. The subjects of the vast majority of these pictures are of places and things showing the destruction wreaked on them by the war: railways, bridges, tanks, guns, a crashed German plane, a dugout, a farm, churches and villages, such as Le Cateau [94]. There are also a few pictures of bivouacs and headquarters, his only works featuring the men, and one of graves at St Souplet. As records of Australia’s part in the war, even during its aftermath, their value is negligible. However, Bell’s twelve portraits fall into a different category. Still, their value is confined to commemorating a particular division of the AIF, and then its officers at the expense of its non-commissioned officers and other ranks, save for Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Murray who enlisted as a private and rose through the ranks. Only Murray, Maclagan, Major-General Glasgow and Brigadier-General Leane made the hanging list, a list of sixty-one people whose portraits were later

446 Cable, Maclagan to Smart, 28 February 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/1. Also see letter, Bell to Smart, 28 February 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/1.
447 Cable, Smart to Bell, c 11 March 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/1.
448 Service and Casualty Form, George Henry Frederick Bell service records, NAA; letter, Bell to Smart, 25 April 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/1.
449 Letter, Bell to Smart, 29 December 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/1.
authorised to be hung permanently in the memorial. His portraits are mostly in the dark tonal manner, such as Major General Ewen Sinclair-MacLagan [95]. Only when he made a portrait of an anonymous soldier – not part of his series – appropriately entitled A digger [96], did he lighten his tone significantly.

When Bell returned to London, Smart and Treloar, the latter deputising for Bean on the NWRC, were hard pressed to come up with a subject for his historical picture. The reason for this, as Smart explained to Treloar, was that Bell arrived in France ‘too late to see any of the actual fighting.’ Although this was correct, there were myriad incidents occurring in the Le Cateau region involving the AIF which he could have recorded with a view to painting a historical picture on his return. Bell suggested a race meeting in France at which a large body of AIF men was present, but Smart dismissed this as unsuitable. He ventured that a suitable subject might be the 4th Division entering Dinant, and he asked Treloar whether he ‘could name one or two outstanding incidents in connection with the 4th Division’ which could be put to Bell. Treloar sent Smart a list of eight incidents – compiled by an AWRS officer responsible for the division’s records – none of which was drawn from the fighting in which it had been involved, but included its entry into Dinant. It seems incredible that between them they could not come up with a single incident from the history of the division’s fighting during 1918 worth illustrating. Anyhow, on 6 June 1919 the NWRC resolved to commission Bell to paint a picture of the 4th Division marching through Dinant. Only a few days later Bell suggested an alternative subject, the battle of Hamel which occurred on 4 July 1918. Smart immediately approved of Bell painting it. However, there were two problems: Bell had neither witnessed the battle nor surveyed the battleground. To overcome the second problem Bell was authorised to go to France for no more than ten days during which he would receive a daily allowance of £2. He left on 11 July 1919 and returned on the 20th.

If during the trip he made any pictures or sketches, and it should be assumed he did, he did.

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451 Letter, Smart to Treloar, 13 May 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/1.
452 Ibid.
453 Letter, Treloar to Smart, 28 May 1919, with attached list of suggested incidents for Bell to paint involving the 4th Division, AWM 93, 18/7/1.
454 Minutes of meeting of NWRC, 6 June 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/1.
455 Letter, Bell to Smart, 11 June 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/1.
456 Letters, Smart to Treloar, 12 June 1919, AWM 93, 18/1/29; Smart to Bean, 26 June 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/1.
457 Memorandum, Smart to Official Secretary, 27 June 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/1.
458 Service and Casualty Form, George Henry Frederick Bell service records, NAA. As remuneration the Commonwealth paid him £20. See debit note to Chief Paymaster, AIF, 12 November 1919, certified correct by Smart, AWM 93, 18/7/1.
not deliver them to the Commonwealth. Ill-health prevented him from starting the picture in England, and he was given permission to paint it in Australia, eventually completing *Dawn at Hamel, 4 July 1918* in 1921.

During the early 1920s Bell received commissions to paint four further pictures for the memorial: a portrait, *Sergeant William ‘Rusty’ Ruthven* (1920), and three character studies illustrating the work of various branches of the services, *Laying the duckboards, France 1917* (1924), *Signaller* (1924) and *Australian engineers constructing a bridge at Eterpigny* (1925).460

459 Memorandum, Smart to Director, Australian War Museum, 24 December 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/1.

460 A fee of £100 was paid to Bell for each of these commissions. See ‘Detailed statement of commitments on pictures’ tabled at meeting of finance sub-committee, 21 March 1922, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1, p 3; agreement between the Commonwealth and George Bell, 26 March 1923, AWM 93, 18/2/20, under which Bell was commissioned to paint the three character studies.
4 The AIF artists

In February 1918 the project of Anzac’s official pictorial representation grew a limb with the AIF establishing a scheme – the AIF scheme – to appoint seven soldiers as artists to the AWRS. It operated independently of the Commonwealth’s scheme and its objects, at least initially, were different. However, their separateness was more apparent than real: they shared a single controlling mind, Bean’s. During the production of *The Anzac Book* Bean became impressed with the artistic talent within the AIF, and he took to the Western Front the idea that more use could be made of it. Moreover, he was convinced of the privileged position of a soldier, who was also an artist, to be able to record an event he witnessed and experienced. It did not matter that the resultant picture might be inferior artistically to one made by a professional artist who neither witnessed nor experienced it. For him, a picture’s worth lay in its value as ‘historical evidence’, and fundamentally this could only ever be supplied by a witness. Now, although under the official scheme civilian professional artists were sent to the front and thus enabled to record events they witnessed, quite apart from the problem of exposing them to the danger of death or injury, they were not soldiers with a soldier’s knowledge, experience and sensibilities, and therefore inferior as recorders of war events.

In October 1917 Bean decided to employ Private Crozier, one of the *Anzac Book* artists, on the painting of historical pictures of subjects he specified for the national record. On 24 October he informed Treloar that Crozier was to be attached to the AWRS in London for three months ‘with a view to his getting paintings of Anzac and Pozières done.’¹ A significant step had been taken: first, it brought within the purview of the AWRS, perhaps temporarily, the production of pictures; and next, it suggested a cheap and effective means of producing them through the military’s control over artists who were soldiers. And importantly, it implicitly recognised Bean’s ‘right’ to specify the subjects of pictures intended to illustrate the story of Anzac.

Bean, of course, recognised the benefits of an attachment such as Crozier’s. Unlike official artists, soldiers had signed up for the duration and could be ordered to paint such pictures as

¹ Letter, Bean to Treloar, 24 October 1917, AWM 16, 4351/2/20.
the military pleased. In this way, the Commonwealth could acquire pictures at no expense other than a soldier’s ordinary pay and the cost of his upkeep, which it had to meet in any case, and the cost of supplying him with painting materials. But Bean did not immediately propose a scheme for employing soldier-artists to paint pictures, probably recognising that it was unlikely to receive support. It had no military benefit: soldiers should be performing duties which furthered Australia’s military effort and it was difficult to see how by giving them brushes and instructing them to paint pictures this could be achieved. If Bean intended promoting such a scheme he had to find a reason justifying it militarily. In late January 1918 a reason was found – camouflage!

It will be recalled that in February 1918 Bean crossed to France to lay before General White a number of points about increasing the number and scope of artists. Before going he wrote to White, and among several topics discussed ‘the best employment of our artistic personnel’. He wished to make a suggestion, but warned it might seem ‘wild’. Dyson had suggested it: ‘We believe that to get the full military combatant value out of your artists they could be used to teach the troops – especially the infantry and artillery, at schools or on the ground, the knowledge of what is and what is not effective camouflage – effective concealment.’ Five or six men who were ‘first class’ but not ‘fancy’ artists, and who were as used to shellfire as anyone, knew the front and were soldiers, could do the job, he said. Taking them away from their current duties was justified, he claimed, because ‘if they managed to deceive a single plane on a single night they might well preserve four or five times their number to the force within twenty four hours.’ And if a camouflage unit were established by posting to it ‘AIF artists’ – the first recorded use of that term – ‘we should get some of their work for records’. White embraced Bean’s proposal telling him, ‘Your plan seems to be a very wise one and I am referring it to the chief [Birdwood].’

During their meeting on 9 February White approved the creation of a scheme for employing soldiers as artists which subordinated their performance of camouflage duties to the task of making pictures:

It should be notified in A.I.F. orders that seven artists are to be attached, one to each division, one to Corps, and one to A.I.F. headquarters.

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2 Letter, Bean to White, c late January 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/197A.
3 Letter, White to Bean, 3 February 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/362.
That they will be subject to A.W.R.S. control but may be required for camouflage duties by divisions or Corps. (A.I.F. headquarters man to do record work for hospitals as required).

An independent board to be asked to judge merits of artists work.

Artists to be transferred at present rank if officers; to take rank as lieutenants if not officers before transfer.

All their artistic work to belong to state.⁴

Birdwood made one change to White’s approval: the artists would retain their present ranks during a three-month probation period and thereafter be promoted lieutenants.⁵ Their decision launched a scheme for producing pictures, presumably of the part the AIF was playing in the war, which would operate side by side with the official scheme but exclusively under military control. Strangely, the AIF thought it unnecessary to seek Defence’s approval to establish it. Anyway, government scrutiny of the scheme had been avoided, and on this basis alone the advantages it enjoyed over the official scheme were considerable. But its substantial advantage was having the services of seven artists continuously available who were subject to military control.

Where does Bean fit in all this? Securing approval of the scheme was a singular achievement. Under it a team of artists would carry out his instructions as relayed to them by Treloar who acted strictly in accordance with his directions. His input was exclusively of an administrative kind; there was an enormous amount of administration associated with the scheme which he and his staff carried out, not always efficiently. He never ventured into the artistic arena and played no part in devising the artists’ work. That was Bean’s exclusive province. The AIF scheme, of which he immediately assumed de facto control, constituted another valuable means with which to shape Anzac’s pictorial representation. And as a civilian his standing to direct its operations, fundamentally a military undertaking, was obscure.

White’s approval, as amended by Birdwood, was cast in the formal language of a notice and published in AIF Orders on 15 February 1918. Under the heading ‘Vacancies for Artists’, there appeared:

⁴ Typescript, ‘Gen White’s suggestions’, attached to typescript, ‘Matters for consultation with Gen White, 9/2/18’, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/362. The emphasis has been added. Also see White’s handwritten note, ‘Enlisted Artists’, c 9 February 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
1. Applications are invited from members of the A.I.F. to fill appointments as artists under the Australian War Records Section, Administrative Headquarters, A.I.F., London, to be distributed as follows:

(a) One attached to the Medical Section at Administrative Headquarters, A.I.F.
(b) One attached Headquarters, Australian Corps.
(c) One attached Headquarters each Australian Division.

2. Artists will be subject to the control of the War Records Section, but they may be required for camouflage duties under such conditions as may be issued by the General Staff.

3. Necessary equipment and materials will be issued by the Australian War Records Section.

4. All artistic work produced by them will be the property of the Australian Government. They will not be permitted to undertake work for any other authority or person nor for their personal gain.

5. Successful applicants will, in the first instance, be appointed in their present rank for a period of three months on probation. At the end of this period those who are confirmed in their appointments may be granted honorary rank on the General List with pay of Lieutenant. Those holding commissions will be transferred to the General List with their present rank.

6. Applications will be submitted before 15th March, 1918, addressed direct to the Officer in Charge, Australian War Records Section, Administrative Headquarters, A.I.F., 130, Horseferry Road, London, S.W. 1, accompanied by specimens of work and a record of the war service of the applicant.⁶

If the scheme’s objects remained vague, at least the conditions on which soldiers were to be appointed were spelt out. But not the precise nature of their duties, though it was made clear they might be required to perform camouflage duties. According to paragraph 1, six artists were headed for France where, even in the back areas, danger lurked. Nevertheless, for a number of soldiers the attraction of an appointment, whatever it involved, proved irresistible, and over the following weeks the AWRS received 114 applications for the position of artist.⁷

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⁶ AIF Orders, 26 February 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286. The date of 15 February 1918 derives from applications sent in by soldiers, for example, by the Anzac Book artist Ted Colles dated 20 February 1918 in AWM 16, 4351/2/1 Part 1. The notice was published on several occasions.
⁷ Letter, Treloar to Bean, 12 April 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
A week after applications closed Bean asked Smart ‘to fix up a meeting of our [British] Artists’ to judge the pictures sent in by the soldiers. But Smart vetoed such use being made of Sir Frank Brangwyn and Algernon Talmage who were slated to become members of the High Commissioner’s committee – the NWRC. He told Treloar it was not part of its ‘legitimate duties’, and in view of their status he could not convene a meeting ‘just for the purpose of judging the work of our artists’. He organised an alternative committee consisting of Power, Leist and John Longstaff and appointed 10 April 1918 as the date for it to meet, consider the applications and select the artists. Smart ventured that ‘a Committee of Australian Artists would carry on the work just as well, and probably take more trouble than the bigger men.’ Before the committee met he added Dyson to it. Treloar regarded Smart’s arrangements as satisfactory because, as he told Bean, ‘what was mostly needed was professional advice’.

On 10 April Dyson, Power, Leist and John Longstaff assembled at the AWRS’s offices. According to their three-line report, they ‘inspected the specimens of work submitted by the applicants’ and after ‘careful consideration’ selected ‘the best 10 and placed them in the following order of merit’: for medical, Driver Daryl Lindsay; for camouflage, Private Crozier, 2nd Lieutenant George Benson, Staff Sergeant James MacDonald, Private Louis McCubbin,
Private James Scott, Captain Will Longstaff, Lance Corporal Edward Frings, Driver Cecil Percival and Private Hector Paterson. Of the first seven artists five were serving in England and two in France. Treloar reported to Bean that the committee selected ten artists at his request ‘in order that no difficulty might arise in the event of one of the men selected being unable to take up the appointment.’ It carefully considered each of the 114 applications, but he said no more about how it had gone about its task. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the only criterion the committee employed during its deliberations was artistic merit. Treloar passed on that Dyson ‘considered the applications showed the existence of much more talent than he had ever thought was in the A.I.F.’, gratifying news as Bean had long suspected this.

Colonel Dodds, the DAG, decided that the men should complete a course of instruction in camouflage before taking up their appointments. Crozier’s selection created an immediate problem. Treloar explained to Bean that if he were sent to France to take up one of the positions that would hinder his getting on with the pictures he was painting for him, and if he did not go that would leave one of the headquarters without a camouflage instructor. On balance, Treloar thought it would be best to leave one of the positions temporarily unfilled, and he told Bean he intended asking Griffiths to recommend that course. In recommending it to Dodds, Griffiths explained that Crozier was engaged on painting pictures of Gallipoli and Pozières which Bean was ‘particularly anxious’ he should complete. Dodds accepted his recommendation, and although Crozier completed a camouflage course he remained in London for the duration.

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13 Typescript, ‘Report of a committee appointed to select 7 artists required for work in the Australian War Records Section’, 10 April 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
14 Cable, AIF Administrative Headquarters to Australian Corps Headquarters, France, 12 April 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2.
15 Letter, Treloar to Bean, 12 April 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
16 Letters, Griffiths to Dodds, 13 April 1918; Dodds to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 22 April 1918; both in AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2. Griffiths noted that as the artists when not required for camouflage duties would be required to ‘paint pictures for the Australian Government’, they would require sketching permits. This is further evidence that an artist was prohibited from making sketches until a permit authorising that activity was issued to him. It might be noted that Griffiths had been promoted Brigadier-General (Temporary) on 1 January 1918. See Record of Officers’ Services, Thomas Griffiths service records, NAA.
17 Letter, Treloar to Bean, 12 April 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
18 Letter, Griffiths to Dodds, 13 April 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2.
19 Letter, Dodds to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 5 May 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2. As originally conceived the AIF scheme was confined to catering to the situation on the Western Front, but Treloar realised that similar needs existed in the Middle East. As a result of his suggestion that ‘some provision should be made for ensuring that the records of the operations of Australian troops in Egypt and Palestine should be as complete in every way as the records of the troops in France’, the GOC, AIF in Egypt, General Chauvel, approved the appointment of one artist. Applications were invited and on 26 October 1918 David Barker of Anzac Book fame
On 22 April Dodds requested AIF Administrative Headquarters to arrange for Crozier, MacDonald, Scott and Longstaff, and Lindsay if ‘considered necessary’, to attend a camouflage course in England. Similar arrangements, he said, were being made for Benson and McCubbin to attend a course in France. While these arrangements were being made Dodds decided the men’s allocation to the various divisional headquarters in France. On 5 May he wrote to AIF Administrative Headquarters and other interested parties, which included Bean, advising that Scott would go to the 1st Division, Longstaff the 2nd, McCubbin the 3rd, Benson the 4th and MacDonald the 5th.

While waiting for the artists to assemble in France, Bean announced to Treloar a crucial decision that would shape the way in which the Anzac story was represented in the national war museum. He had decided that in order to illustrate the AIF’s battles, models of the battlefields should be constructed and exhibited. Not models such as had been made by the British employing ‘clever mechanics or carpenters’, but models elevated into ‘a sort of true art’ in order to give the public ‘a real picture, with the atmosphere, the gradations of shade and colour, the feeling of the scene, created by an artist.’ They would be ‘half picture, half sculpture’, and a ‘genuine realism’ would be aimed at such as would explain the scene not only to one’s brain, but to one’s sensibility, so he claimed. According to him, ‘[m]ost people will agree that these are the most interesting form of exhibit; and there is no reason why an was appointed and attached to the AWRS as ‘Official Artist’, apparently at the behest of HS Gullett who as official correspondent with the AIF in Egypt was based in Cairo. Although Gullett urged that Barker be sent into the field, this did not occur. Moreover, there is no evidence he produced any pictorial records during his short appointment which ended with his departure for Australia on 25 December 1918 for ‘Special Reasons’. These related to seeing through the press Australia in Palestine, an illustrated account of the AIF’s campaign co-edited by Gullett and Charles Barrett and of which he was the ‘Art Editor’. Treloar was disappointed, saying he disliked anything ‘which [had] the appearance of letting the troops in Palestine down as far as War Records [were] concerned.’ They had been badly let down. To the extent the AIF scheme operated in the Middle East it was a thorough failure. Treloar consoled himself with the knowledge that the pictorial representation of the Light Horse had received the attention of Lambert, ‘the best official artist’; but as chapter 3 showed this was false comfort. See letters, Treloar to Commandant, AIF Administrative Headquarters, 25 February 1918; Griffiths to GOC, AIF in Egypt, 17 April 1918; both in AWM 16, 4351/2/16; letter, Barker to Officer in Charge, AWRS, 20 September 1918, AWM 25, 1013/35; Dinning, Report No 1, EEF Subsection, AWRS, c late September 1918, paragraph (2); Dinning, Report No 5, 6 December 1918, paragraph (2); both in AWM 25, 1013/37; cables, Gullett to Stralis, 30 October 1918; Dinning to Gullett, 31 October 1918; both in AWM 25, 1013/35; letter, Treloar to Dinning, 5 March 1919, AWM 25, 1013/46; Casualty Form-Active Service, David Crothers Barker service records, NAA. After Gullett, Lieutenant Hector Dinning was made officer in charge of the AWRS’s subsection in Egypt designated ‘No 1 (EEF) Subsection, AWRS’. He furnished Treloar with regular reports on the activities of the AWRS in that theatre of war.

20 Letter, Dodds to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 22 April 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2. It was unnecessary for Lindsay to undertake a course given the nature of his work at Sidcup.

21 Letter, Dodds to AIF Administrative Headquarters and others, 5 May 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2.

22 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 14 May 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/364.
inventive artist should not make them an expression of true art as well.’ And he claimed: ‘If our Museum contains such things it will become the centre for pilgrimage not only for Australians but for the world.’ So was born the modelling scheme which would feature a series of dioramas illustrating several of the AIF’s significant battles. Bean explained to Treloar that ‘artistic help’ was needed to carry it out. During the war an artist would be required to make studies for the models, notes as to colour, figures, the general run of the country and the shelling to which it was subjected, ‘and so forth’. And although he would not perform any construction work, he would need to draw up a scheme of what he wanted done by those involved in building the models and then contrive the means of representing men, objects, woods, shellbursts, ‘etc.’ and of creating atmosphere. After the war he and a number of men under his direction would work on the models. The modelling scheme, although a critical element of the project of Anzac’s official representation, is beyond the scope of this study. Still, aspects of it will require canvassing because of its impact on the AIF scheme.

On 20 May Longstaff, MacDonald, Crozier and Scott commenced a ten-day camouflage course at the Special Works School at Kensington Gardens. Each man passed but only Longstaff qualified as an instructor. Strangely, as the point of their appointments was to have them act as instructors, the failure of MacDonald and Scott to so qualify was of no consequence. On 6 June Longstaff, Scott and McDonald left for France with orders to report to their divisions. In France, McCubbin and Benson completed their camouflage courses and arrived at their divisional headquarters by 12 and 23 May respectively. Benson’s experience is indicative of how the artists’ arrival was marked by problems caused by inadequate planning and Bean’s failure to meet and explain to them what he expected of them. Though he understood this was necessary, he had left it to Dodds to arrange a meeting with

23 Models did not feature in Bean’s original plan for Anzac’s official representation, his first memoir. But they featured prominently in his second memoir with the planned construction of forty models. See Bean, second memoir, Appendix M. For a consideration of the modelling scheme see Laura Back and Laura Webster, Moments in Time: Dioramas at the Australian War Memorial, New Holland Publishers, Sydney, 2008.
24 Letters, Treloar to Commandant, Special Works School, 18 May 1918; Griffiths to Headquarters, AIF Depots in UK (re Longstaff), 13 May 1918; both in AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2.
25 Certificates of Efficiency and Results of Examination attached to letter, Commandant, Special Works School to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 3 June 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2. Longstaff placed easily first with 80% followed by Scott (70.5%), MacDonald (64%) and Crozier (60.5%).
26 Letters, Treloar to Headquarters, 1st, 2nd and 5th Divisions, 4 June 1918; telegram, AIF Administrative Headquarters to Australian Corps, 5 June 1918; all in AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2.
27 Letters, McCubbin to Officer in Charge, AWRS, 12 May 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 1; Benson to Treloar, 23 May 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/3. Whether either man qualified as an instructor is unknown.
the artists to ‘talk the work over’. For whatever reason this was not immediately arranged. Thus, in the divisions to which they were sent there was confusion as to their duties and they were unable to start on any work. Benson complained to Treloar that his division was not ‘sufficiently informed’ as to his position, except it knew he was to be ‘a sort of traveller in camouflage’, and he had no painting materials. He had tried to see Bean, but found he was ‘a far distance away’. He asked Treloar for ‘full instructions’ and his sketching permit. Also waiting on instructions was Lieutenant Sid Gullett, the officer in charge of the AWRS’s subsection in France. The subsection’s work was critical for the purpose of collecting and preserving Australia’s war records. Its principal activity was collecting objects: trophies captured from the enemy; relics of any kind; and ‘articles of historical or sentimental value’.

After Gullett arrived in France Dodds circulated a memorandum announcing his appointment and describing his duties:

(a) To explain to units the objects and work of the Section;

(b) To keep them in touch with what has been accomplished and what is in hand for ensuring the collection of complete official records, of museum exhibits, of photographic and cinema records, of works of art, etc.

(c) To assist units in compiling war diaries which will ensure their achievements receiving in history the recognition they deserve and which will provide material for future study by the Australian military authorities with a view to effecting improvements in the organization, training &c. of the army;

(d) To supervise the collection of material for [the] war museum;

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28 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 25 May 1918, AWM 16, 4353/1/4.
29 Letter, Benson to Treloar, 23 May 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/3. By 21 June 1918 he remained without painting materials. See letter, Benson to Treloar, 21 June 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/3.
30 Designated ‘No. 2 (BEF) Subsection, AWRS’, the AWRS’s subsection in France was established around 19 February 1918 coinciding with Gullett’s appointment as its officer in charge. He was a cousin of HS Gullett. An engineering works manager before the war, he was plucked from the 29th Battalion with which he had served since arriving in France on 8 November 1916. Why Gullett was chosen is unknown, but by virtue of his training, experience and personality he was an excellent choice. Most of what is known of the activities of the AIF artists, and much else besides, derives from his comprehensive weekly reports to Treloar. See letter, Gullett to Treloar, 10 May 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2; Gullett, typescript, ‘Report on the formation and operations of the BEF Subsection Aust War Records Section’, 2 November 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/66, p 7; Attestation Paper of Persons Enlisted for Service Abroad; Casualty Form-Active Service; both in Sidney Wolton Gullett service records, NAA.
(e) To carry out administrative arrangements in connection with the official photographers and artists, and supervision of the work of the artists to be appointed to the [War Records] Section.\textsuperscript{32}

For Gullett, even without the burden of having to look after the AIF artists, his duties were daunting. Towards the end of May Treloar prepared draft instructions dealing with the artists’ duties and their control, and on the 28th Griffiths sent these to Dodds for his approval.\textsuperscript{33} Dodds approved them without amendment and on 11 June circulated them among all interested parties, Bean included.\textsuperscript{34} As constituting the AIF’s final position on the artists’ duties, their importance cannot be gainsaid. Under the heading ‘Control’ it was first made clear they came under Gullett, and next their duties were described:

The primary duty of these artists will be to act as advisers and instructors in camouflage as may be required by the General Staff of the divisions to which they are attached, who will issue instructions as to what they are required to do.

When not required for camouflage duties they will be employed in painting pictures for the Australian Government. The subject of these pictures will as a rule be left to their discretion except that any one of them may be required to paint some special subject considered desirable by the Australian War Records Section or by the Official Correspondent [Bean].\textsuperscript{35}

These duties, then, were the AIF scheme’s objects. In contrast to the position of the official artists, who were obliged under their agreements with the Commonwealth to make pictures of events occurring in the war especially with regard to the AIF, the AIF artists were given a free hand to paint whatever they pleased, subject to being asked to paint ‘some special subject’ by Bean or the AWRS. It was not sensible to leave the selection of subjects so entirely in their hands. The pictures made by the official artists at the front were evidence of what would

\textsuperscript{32} AIF Circular Memo 10/566, 25 March 1918, AWM 25, 1013/4.
\textsuperscript{33} Letter, Griffiths to DAG, AIF, 28 May 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2. Bean had also drawn up suggested orders and instructions relating to the artists and given these to White. They were never finalised or adopted. One major difference between the two was that Bean made the artists’ primary duty the production of pictorial records; whereas Treloar made it the performance of camouflage duties. See Bean, typescript, ‘Suggestions for orders & instructions re camouflage artists’, c 27 May 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286. Also see Bean diary, May 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/112/1, entry 27 May 1918, p 36.
\textsuperscript{34} Letter, Dodds to Gullett and others, 11 June 1918, with attached typescript, ‘Instructions regarding the control work etc of the Australian War Records Section artists in France’, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid. The instructions did not end with describing the artists’ duties. They also made provision on a range of other matters: each artist was to keep a weekly diary showing the time he spent on camouflage work and war record work respectively; accommodation, rationing and movements; reports and casualties; leave; painting materials; and, importantly, the disposal of completed pictures which were to be handed, together with their titles, to Gullett who would arrange for their dispatch to London.
result from permitting this. Thus, it was essential that they be given a program of work to follow, allowing them some discretion to record subjects they considered specially noteworthy or appealing. After all, they were soldiers accustomed to receiving and carrying out orders, and it seems likely they expected to receive if not orders, then at least fairly specific directions as to what they should paint.

Gullett tried to get in touch with the artists during the week ending 30 June 1918. It was time he did. He had had no contact with them and had no idea what they were doing. And he now held instructions as to their duties. He managed to visit all divisional headquarters save for the 1st where Scott was located, but succeeded in seeing only Benson. He was dissatisfied with what he discovered. At the 2nd Division Longstaff was ‘busy all day’ running a camouflage school, but they did not understand ‘the objects of the Artists’; at the 3rd he was told McCubbin was ‘just pottering around doing odd jobs’; at the 4th Benson told him he was ‘wasting his time’ and had ‘no definite camouflage work’ and no painting materials; and at the 5th he was told they were not satisfied with MacDonald as they had expected, but had not got, ‘a highly-expert camouflage expert’. To remedy this situation Gullett suggested to Treloar:

I would suggest the advisability of having some sort of a conference of these men at an early date, as Capt. Bean mentioned before. There seems to be great uncertainty as to their work, and although each division has received the circular D.A.G. 10/575 regarding these men [instructions as to their duties and control], there seems to be a tendency to confine them to camouflage only. Also the artists, excepting Capt. Longstaff, do not seem to have settled down to their work at all as yet.

A conference between Bean and the artists was hastily arranged and took place on 6 July at Australian Corps headquarters at Bertangles. Only Benson, MacDonald and McCubbin attended. Gullett’s account of the conference shows that it achieved very little and any direction the artists received was negligible. Bean discussed camouflage ‘fully’ and impressed on them that they should make it ‘their first duty’ and that pictures ‘should be more or less secondary’. It appears he discussed pictures in the context of his modelling

37 Letter, Dodds to Headquarters, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Divisions, 2 July 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
38 ‘Notes on conference held at 4 pm on 6.7.18 at Bertangles’, Appendix I to Gullett, Report No 17, week ending 7 July 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 3.
scheme; its imperatives now dominated his thinking. He explained that it was desirable for an artist to concentrate ‘largely on data and material’ for the models. Several ‘typical subjects’ were mentioned, such as sunken roads, railway embankments, ‘gun valleys’ and dugouts, and these were specifically mentioned in connection with the scheme. This could have led the artists to conclude that these were the subjects they should depict in their pictures, or at least concentrate on. They were not very interesting subjects, nor were they events or scenes in which the AIF would figure. The greatest value from having the artists continuously at the front would be obtained if they followed the AIF and recorded incidents and war operations in which it participated. It is incomprehensible why Bean did not tell the artists that these should be the subjects of their pictures. There was little point in having them make pictures of ‘typical subjects’. This was a gross under-utilisation of their special abilities as soldier-artists.

In the end, Bean decided that the way forward was to ask the artists to answer a series of questions, apparently with a view to deciding their work on the basis of their replies. But what should they do in the meantime, save for recording ‘typical subjects’? And how Longstaff and Scott, who did not attend the conference, were expected to proceed is elusive.

On 8 July Gullett wrote to each artist with a list of ‘queries’, doubtless formulated by Bean, the object of which, he explained, was ‘to gain information which may be of use in allocating any special duties, either by Mr Bean or the [AWRS].’ With a little foresight all necessary investigations to establish the men’s experience and opinions could have been carried out shortly after their selection. The step now taken proved to be time-wasting and unproductive. There is no evidence that Bean made any use of the information supplied by the artists, at least while they were in the field. It neither led him to devise a program of work for them nor to allocate them any ‘special duties’. Although under the promulgated instructions the selection of subjects for pictures was ‘as a rule’ left to their discretion, what they needed was a program of work to follow, or at least fairly specific directions, without which they were bound to be directionless. Treloar recognised this. Writing to Gullett, he said ‘it would have been an advantage if [the artists’] plan of work had been outlined before they went to France’ and that it was necessary for Bean to devise it.

Gullett asked each artist to supply the following information:

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39 Letter, Gullett to ‘all AIF Artists’, 8 July 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
1. **WAR EXPERIENCE:**
   
   (a) At what date you came overseas.
   (b) What battles you were present at.
   (c) What position or place you occupied in the battle.
   (d) Your opinion as to scenes or events particularly worth recording.

2. **SCHEMES SUGGESTED FOR PICTURES OR MODELS:**
   
   (a) A brief summary of your idea as to a scheme for suitable and typical models, to be finished by A.I.F. artists, and as outlined by Mr Bean.
   (b) Your suggestions as to suitable special pictures, and their order of precedence.
   (c) Your suggestions regarding sketch subjects, and order of precedence.

3. Any further suggestions you may have regarding special features of your own work or specialities.\(^41\)

Answering these ‘queries’ imposed an onerous and unexpected obligation on the artists. Bean’s desire to know their war experience is explicable only on the basis that he was gathering information in order to decide the subjects of the historical pictures he was planning to ask them to paint. If their suggestions as to ‘special pictures’ and ‘sketch subjects’ were required to devise a program of work for them, when Bean received these a program did not emerge. Nor any instructions as to the subjects they should paint. Consequently, each artist was obliged to devise his own program of work. Still, the artists could not have failed to understand that their obligation was to produce pictures recording the part being played by the AIF in the prosecution of the war. If Bean apprehended that they did not understand or were unsure of their obligation, it was his responsibility to explain it to them. And in any case it should have been spelt out to them.

The events at the conference, and Bean’s desire to have the information sought in paragraph 2(a) of his ‘queries’, suggest that considerations relating to the modelling scheme were impinging on the AIF scheme. Paragraph 2(a) signalled his desire to involve the artists, or some of them, in carrying it out. The artists had not signed up for this, and McCubbin apart probably did not want to be involved; this would take them away from painting pictures, the reason they had applied for the position of AIF artist. Benson remarked that Bean’s scheme was ‘so comprehensive’ he had nothing to add, but offered that models of other subjects, such

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\(^41\) Letter, Gullett to ‘all AIF Artists’, 8 July 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
as ‘transport’, a typical dressing station and Mena Camp might be ‘instructive’.\textsuperscript{42} Scott made no substantial suggestions and Longstaff none at all, remarking: ‘I do not understand what models are required’.\textsuperscript{43} There is no evidence that MacDonald ever replied to Gullett’s letter. However, McCubbin’s substantial response decided his fate.\textsuperscript{44} At war’s end he was assigned to the modelling team as its ‘landscape artist’.

By the end of July 1918 no headway had been made in getting the artists working on pictures. Longstaff was stuck doing camouflage work;\textsuperscript{45} McCubbin and Benson had only recently received their painting materials;\textsuperscript{46} Scott had not been sighted; MacDonald it seems was not doing much; and no program of work or instructions had been furnished to them.\textsuperscript{47} Treloar was hoping that a conference could be arranged ‘to get certain doubtful points cleared up’.\textsuperscript{48} Bean’s next decision hardly improved the situation. Under the conditions of their appointment the artists would retain their existing rank for three months while on probation, and if their appointments were confirmed the men not holding a substantive rank would be granted an honorary commission. Treloar believed the success of the AIF scheme hinged on these men receiving commissions: ‘With reference to the artists, it is thought that \textit{satisfactory results} will not be obtained until they all hold commissions.’\textsuperscript{49} That issue would soon need tackling: as according to Dodds the artists’ appointments commenced on 5 May, their probation period would end on 5 August 1918.\textsuperscript{50} Inevitably, a means of assessing the artists’ performance had to be devised in order to decide whether to confirm their appointments.

Bean came up with the following:

\begin{quote}
[It would be well, before confirming the artist’s rank, to have the work of all those in France collected by the A.W.R.S., B.E.F. Branch for myself and Anderson to see; to have a thorough scrutiny and comparing of their diaries; to ask the General Staff for a report on them. I fancy
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{42} Letter, Benson to Gullett, 16 July 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
\textsuperscript{43} Letter, Longstaff to Officer in Charge, BEF Subsection, AWRS, c mid-July 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
\textsuperscript{44} He made detailed suggestions as to how the models might be constructed and viewed to advantage in the museum. See letter, McCubbin to Officer in Charge, BEF Subsection, AWRS, 11 July 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
\textsuperscript{45} Letter, Longstaff to Officer in Charge, BEF Subsection, AWRS, c mid-July 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
\textsuperscript{46} Gullett, Report No 17, week ending 7 July 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 3, paragraph 2(b). They received these from Bean who had had them in his possession since 11 June 1918. See letter, Bean to Gullett, 11 June 1918, AWM 25, 1013/1 Part 7.
\textsuperscript{47} This, despite Bean having the artists’ replies to his ‘queries’. See letter, Gullett to Bean, 27 July 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
\textsuperscript{48} Letter, Treloar to Gullett, 31 July 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2.
\textsuperscript{49} Letter, Treloar to Gullett, 15 July 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 3. The emphasis has been added.
\textsuperscript{50} Letter, Dodds to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 9 August 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2.
Anderson will be away, but I can quite well judge of their artistic capacities and fitness. Gullett and I would then report to you [Treloar], upon them. Once these artists get their commissions they are fixed and we may as well therefore get the best men. It is quite possible that we should find that some of them are scarcely of the enthusiasm that is required. In any case the knowledge that their work is under review will not do them any harm.\footnote{Letter, Bean to Treloar, 20 July 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286. Also see letter, Gullett to Treloar, 22 July 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2.}

This was an unwieldy process bound to cause, as it did, further delays in getting the artists to a point where they would become productive. As a matter of principle there could be no objection to asking the men to make their work available for inspection, but this raised the spectre of a new round of judging. Possibly in order to avoid delays, Bean appointed himself arbiter of artistic merit, although his original idea was to enlist the assistance of Wallace Anderson, the AWRS’s museums officer,\footnote{An artist and sculptor, Anderson was seconded to the AWRS from the 23rd Battalion on 12 April 1918. See Nominal Roll, BEF Subsection, AWRS, c 3 June 1918, AWM 25, 1013/1 Part 7; Casualty Form-Active Service, William Wallace Anderson service records, NAA. As museums officer, Anderson’s foremost duty was collecting and despatching ‘trophies, relics, representative stores, equipment and material used by [the AIF] in the operations’. See Gullett, typescript, ‘Museums Officer. Duties, general memos, and suggestions’, 1 April 1918, AWM 16, 4378/1/8. Anderson has an entry in the Australian Dictionary of Biography.} in judging the men’s work. Leaving aside the question of whether Bean was qualified to judge their work, he held no relevant authority to do so.

On 2 August Griffiths wrote to all five divisional headquarters making two requests: first, any pictures painted by the AWRS artist attached to it should be sent to Gullett; and next, a report should be sent to AIF Administrative Headquarters ‘on the work carried out by this artist, and whether you consider his appointment should be confirmed.’\footnote{Letter, Griffiths to Headquarters, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Divisions, 2 August 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2.} Clearly, he had endorsed Bean’s course of action. Reporting to Bean on what had been done, Treloar asked him to ‘forward a recommendation as to whether or not [the men’s] appointments should be confirmed’ after he inspected their work and saw the reports of the divisional headquarters.\footnote{Letter, Treloar to Bean, 2 August 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.} Predictably, the artists’ pictures were delivered to Gullett in dribs and drabs and it was not until 24 August that Bean inspected them, recording in his diary: ‘Scott’s work is excellent. So is Benson’s. Longstaff is mechanical, and worth least of any, and McCubbin’s rather scratchy. MacDonald has done very little at all – one unfinished landscape of a not very suitable sort. He has broken up in health – it was never strong – and been sent to the base
asking to go back to Australia which will be allowed him by the medical board almost certainly.' 55 He recommended that the appointments of Scott, McCubbin, Longstaff and Benson be confirmed and urged that Scott and McCubbin be given their commissions ‘without delay’ without which they were working ‘under great difficulties’. 56 As to MacDonald, the amount of work he had sent in and the subjects he had chosen did not justify his appointment being confirmed. He added that except for Longstaff, the artists had not been used for camouflage at all. 57 The raison d’être for establishing the AIF scheme had lapsed. On 9 September Griffiths informed Dodds that Bean had inspected the men’s pictures and recommended that all appointments except MacDonald’s be confirmed. 58 On 18 September Dodds issued instructions for the publication in AIF Orders of notices having the effect of confirming the men’s appointments and announcing that Lindsay, Crozier, Scott and McCubbin were honorary lieutenants effective as of 6 September. 59

How did the AIF scheme stand as at 6 September? Even without MacDonald’s unexpected departure, which left the 5th Division without an artist for the duration, it had not been a success. Its primary object, which was to get the full military combatant value out of serving artists by having them teach the troops camouflage, had miscarried. And a combination of inadequate planning, administrative delays, time wasting, and the failure to assign the artists a program of work, had frustrated the achievement of its secondary object, the painting of pictures. Moreover, the work so far produced was considered substandard, at least by Treloar

55 Bean diary, June-September 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/116/1, entry 24 August 1918, p 97.
56 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 28 August 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2.
57 This was not entirely correct. Benson, as Bean acknowledged in his letter, had done some work of this sort; and according to General Glasgow commanding the 1st Division, Scott had delivered several instructive and useful lectures on camouflage. See letter, Glasgow to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 13 August 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2.
58 Letter, Griffiths to Headquarters, AIF, France, 9 September 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2. Dodds had been working under the misapprehension that the selection committee ‘which previously recommended their appointment’ would inspect the men’s pictures. However, Griffiths explained that this was impossible as three members of the committee were in France. See letter, Dodds to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 28 August 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2.
59 Letter, Dodds to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 18 September 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2. This involved transferring the men from their existing units and posting them for duty as artists to new units, for instance. Scott was transferred from the 50th Battalion to Headquarters, 3rd Division. The notices appeared on 24 September. See AIF Orders, 24 September 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6. Incidentally, Treloar with the support of Griffiths had unsuccessfully conducted a campaign to have the appointments of Lindsay and Crozier confirmed, and their honorary commissions given them, earlier than the men in France on the basis that they had been working as artists for much longer than three months. But Dodds disagreed saying it was undesirable that they be given preferential treatment. See letters, Griffiths to AIF Headquarters, France, 1 August 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2; Treloar to Bean, 2 August 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286; Dodds to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 9 August 1918; Griffiths to Dodds, 17 August 1918; both in AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2.
and Gullett. It appeared to Treloar that the pictures sent in suffered from ‘too much attention’ having been devoted to ‘landscapes and scenes without any human interest’. (With this observation Treloar accurately identified the fundamental deficiency in the work of all artists at the front.) And while Gullett agreed he thought Benson had succeeded in putting ‘life’ in his pictures; he said he had spoken to the artists about the problem. Whether Bean held the same view is unknown. According to Gullett, he did not express any opinion other than of general satisfaction with the artists. Another and serious problem with the pictures was that the descriptions given them were generally ‘very vague’. Gullett had noticed this too and obtained the artists’ assurances that they would do better in the future. From the outset keeping them supplied with painting materials had been a problem. But after 5 August, when the artists’ probation period ended, perhaps the biggest problem was the delay in getting the artists confirmed in their appointments and the continuing hardships being experienced by Scott and McCubbin. Now, with their appointments confirmed and all men holding commissions, and with no real prospect of being diverted to camouflage work, it was reasonable to suppose that henceforth they would make concerted efforts to produce a substantial collection of pictures.

On 22 September Gullett reported having seen all artists who were ‘working well’. With word arriving that their appointments were confirmed and their ‘promotions’ approved, he commented: ‘This is exceedingly satisfactory and everything should now run very smoothly and good results be obtained.’ In fact, better results had been obtained since early September. The artists, he claimed, were doing ‘good work’ despite having to move constantly, and all

60 Letter, Treloar to Gullett, 9 September 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6.
61 Gullett, Report No 27, week ending 15 September 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6, paragraph 3(d).
62 Ibid., paragraph 3(c).
64 Gullett, Report No 27, week ending 15 September 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6, paragraph 3(b).
65 Letter, Treloar to Gullett, 15 July 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 3; Gullett, Report No 21, week ending 4 August 1918, paragraph 3(a); Report No 22, week ending 11 August 1918, paragraph 4(a); letters, Treloar to Gullett, 11 August 1918; Gullett to Treloar, 15 August 1918; Treloar to Gullett, 23 August 1918; all in AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 5; Gullett, Report No 26, week ending 1 September 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6, paragraph 3(a).
66 Gullett, Report No 26, week ending 8 September 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6, paragraph 3(d). Also see letter, Gullett to Treloar, 7 August 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2; Gullett, Report No 23, week ending 18 August 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 5, paragraph 3(b); Report No 24, week ending 25 August 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6, paragraph 3(e).
were ‘working satisfactorily’. And the problem of keeping them supplied with materials appears to have been resolved. On 29 September Gullett reported that although he had had little opportunity of visiting the artists because of ‘the unsettled state of the divisions’, he gathered that ‘all [were] in great heart over their appointments and promotions and [were] doing good work’. A week later he claimed that generally the artists’ work was improving ‘both in subject and execution’. He was now receiving pictures regularly, but their descriptions continued to be inadequate. If it appeared the AIF scheme was at last producing satisfactory results, its success was less than complete. On the issue of replacing MacDonald, inaction and vacillation led to a failure to replace him. Then, on 2 November 1918, arrangements proposed by General Dodds to establish a modelling scheme under the auspices of the AWRS settled the issue by recommending that a sculptor be appointed in his

68 Gullett, Report No 26, week ending 8 September 1918, paragraph 3(a); Report No 27, week ending 15 September 1918, paragraph 3(a); both in AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6.
69 Gullett, Report No 26, week ending 8 September 1918, paragraph 3(b); Report No 28, week ending 22 September 1918, paragraph 3(e)(i); both in AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6.
70 Gullett, Report No 28, week ending 29 September 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6, paragraph 3(a).
71 Gullett, Report No 29, week ending 6 October 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6, paragraph 3(f).
72 Gullett, Report No 25, week ending 1 September 1918, paragraph 3(a); Report No 26, week ending 8 September 1918, paragraph 3(c); Report No 28, week ending 22 September 1918, paragraphs 3(c), 3(d); Report No 29, week ending 29 September 1918, paragraph 3(c); Report No 30, week ending 6 October 1918, paragraphs 3(a), 3(e); letter, Gullett to Treloar, 1 November 1918; Gullett, Report No 34, week ending 3 November 1918, paragraph 3; all in AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6. All the while the subsection’s main business of collecting material for the national war museum was going on apace. The efforts made and expense incurred in locating, collecting, receiving, recording and dispatching to French ports for shipment to London all manner of trophies and relics – mostly captured German weapons, such as bayonets, rifles, pistols, machine guns, field guns and minenwerfers, but also every kind of equipment – were enormous. Understandably, Gullett’s reports were largely devoted to reporting on these activities with detailed appendices routinely accompanying them which described the objects received and occasionally gave their histories. Clearly, managing the AIF artists was a sideline. By war’s end unit trophies alone, being trophies claimed by units of the AIF which captured them in battle, included 3,700 guns, a German tank, a railway gun, 500 trench mortars (minenwerfers) and 500 cases of minor trophies and relics, all of which were transported to Australia. See Gullett, Report No 10, week ending 19 May 1918, Appendices II and III; Report No 11, week ending 26 May 1918, Appendix II; both in AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 2; Report No 21, week ending 4 August 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 5, Appendix IV; letter, Gullett to ‘G’, 14 September 1918, AWM 16, 4379/1/1 Part 3, p 2; Bean, typescript, ‘The Australian War Museum’, c July 1919, NAA A1, 1919/9418, paragraph 2; memorandum (by Home and Territories?), ‘Australian war trophies etc, urgent matters’, c August 1919, NAA A1, 1921/6401, pp 1-2. Although the collection of trophies and relics for display in the museum was a critical element in the project of Anzac’s official representation, consideration of it is beyond the scope of this study. Mark Clayton has traced the history of the trophy collection in ‘To the victor belongs the spoils: A history of the Australian war trophy collection’, Sabretache, vol 36, no 3, July/September 1995, part 1, pp 11-22; vol 36, no 4, October/December 1995, part 2, pp 12-29; vol 37, no 1, January/March 1996, part 3, pp 3-26. Also see Melrose, ‘“A praise that never ages”’, esp chapters 4, 5, 6; McKernan, Here is their spirit, chapter 2, ‘Collecting’. Although three ‘reserve’ artists were selected to cater for the situation that had arisen, Treloar was against filling the vacancy with Percival or Paterson – Frings had been killed – and cast about for another man, mentioning Lieutenant WR Coleman, Gunner GK Townshend and Private ASH Picking as candidates, and he asked Anderson to consult Bean and Dyson on the man’s selection. See Gullett, Report No 23, week ending 18 August 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 5, paragraph 3(d); letters, Treloar to Gullett, 26 August 1918; Treloar to Gullett, 4 October 1918; both in AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2. Frings was killed in action in Belgium on 26 March 1918. See Casualty Form-Active Service, Edward Franz Hubert Frings service records, NAA.
stead.\textsuperscript{74} In this connection he proposed that Anderson be placed in charge of the work and that an AIF artist be appointed as ‘landscape artist’. Bean’s preference was for McCubbin and he got the job.\textsuperscript{75} The arrangements proposed by Dodds were approved on 8 November.\textsuperscript{76} This approval, and the cessation of hostilities on the 11th, determined the future course of the AIF scheme. Save for providing the artists with a studio in London where they could work up their pictures made in France and paint the historical pictures Bean allocated to them, it became concerned with the modelling scheme.

The desirability of the artists visiting London to work on their pictures had long been recognised by Treloar and Gullett.\textsuperscript{77} By 9 September Treloar had located ‘a very suitable’ studio at 87 Clifton Hill, St John’s Wood, telling Gullett: ‘It is sufficiently large to enable three artists to work in it at a time. In addition it has attached to it a large room which would be suitable for a workshop if we push on with our scheme for modelling.’\textsuperscript{78} When the last of the Australian divisions was taken out of the line on 5 October, Gullett suggested to Treloar that ‘this period of Corps rest is one that would be very suitable for [the artists] to spend in the studio’.\textsuperscript{79} Treloar agreed.\textsuperscript{80} The studio, he told Gullett, was expected to become available during the week, and he said he would ask the DAG to approve of Longstaff and Scott coming across for two months. Towards the end of October the AWRS entered into possession of its studio.\textsuperscript{81} The timing was propitious as hostilities were about to cease. With the DAG’s approval, Longstaff and Scott travelled to England arriving on 8 and 12

\textsuperscript{74} Letter, Dodds to AIF Headquarters, France, 2 November 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6. Predictably, Bean was behind these arrangements. See letter, Bean to Treloar, 20 October 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/10. Dodds, now commandant of AIF Administrative Headquarters, had been promoted Brigadier-General (Temporary) on 1 June 1918. See Record of Officers’ Services, Thomas Henry Dodds, service records, NAA.

\textsuperscript{75} Letter, Bean to Treloar, 20 October 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/10. Actually, he said either Scott or McCubbin could do the work, but possibly Scott would do it best ‘if his work in other directions is not too important’, which it was. Bean ‘reserved’ Scott for ‘other work’, presumably the painting of historical pictures he proposed allocating to him. See Gullett, Report No 37, week ending 24 November 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6, paragraph 3(b).

\textsuperscript{76} Letter, Lieutenant-Colonel Wynter, AAG, AIF to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 8 November 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6.

\textsuperscript{77} Letters, Treloar to Bean, 18 May 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286; Gullett to Treloar, 22 July 1918; Treloar to Gullett, 31 July 1918; both in AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2; Treloar to Bean, 2 August 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.

\textsuperscript{78} Letter, Treloar to Gullett, 9 September 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6. Also see Treloar, typescript, ‘Report on the work of the AWRS from May 1917 to September 1918’, AWM 224, MSS553 Part 2. Another studio was taken at 1 Logan Studios, Logan Place, Earls Court specifically for the modelling team.

\textsuperscript{79} Report No 31, week ending 13 October 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6, paragraph 3(b).

\textsuperscript{80} Letter, Treloar to Gullett, 21 October 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6.

\textsuperscript{81} Letter, Treloar to Bean, 31 October 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
November. Shortly afterwards they were joined by Benson who left France on the 28th. McCubbin probably went into the studio during November. He had gone to England on a fortnight’s leave around 29 October. With all the artists now in England, the war phase of the AIF scheme ended.

On 31 October 1918 an important moment in the war art scheme arrived. In advance of Scott and Longstaff arriving from France, Treloar informed Bean that the St John’s Wood studio was available and asked: ‘Will you therefore please let me know what pictures you wish them to paint, in order that their work may fit in with the general scheme which you have drawn up.’ On 23 July 1918 Bean had drawn up a ‘general scheme’ under which he proposed that the official and AIF artists should paint a series of historical pictures of incidents, locations and conditions in the story of Anzac, several of which he designated ‘Big Pictures’, and numerous portraits of officers. Thus, the substantial benefit of the AIF scheme as it had evolved was that Bean could direct the AIF artists, through the agency of Treloar, to paint various historical pictures in his picture scheme – but not portraits which he allocated to the official artists – without the Commonwealth incurring any expense and so acquire pictures for the national war museum which he feared could not otherwise be acquired because of their cost. Not since arranging the illustrations to appear in The Anzac Book did Bean have under his control a team of artists in one location available to carry out a program of work devised by him. To suggest the artists were working for the AWRS, though literally correct,

82 Casualty Form-Active Service, William Frederick Longstaff service records; Casualty Form-Active Service, James Fraser Scott service records; NAA.
83 Gullett, Report No 38, week ending 2 December 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6, paragraph 3. Also see Casualty Form-Active Service, George Courtney Benson service records, NAA.
84 McCubbin returned to France on 12 December 1918 as the modelling team’s landscape artist. On 22 December Lieutenants Anderson, McCubbin and Web Gilbert assembled at Mont-sur-Marchienne in Belgium and reported to Gullett ‘for duty in connection with the model scheme’. Gilbert, a sculptor, was appointed on 10 December from outside the AIF. The team, assisted by various personnel, spent the best part of a year in France surveying the battlefields and collecting data for the construction of models. It finished up around 18 December 1919 when its members returned to London. See Gullett, Report No 33, week ending 27 October 1918, paragraph 3; Report No 41, week ending 22 December 1918, paragraph 3; both in AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6; Casualty Form-Active Service, Louis Frederick McCubbin service records; Service and Casualty Form, William Wallace Anderson service records; Service and Casualty Form, Charles Web Gilbert service records; NAA.
85 Letter, Treloar to Bean, 31 October 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286. The emphasis has been added.
86 The scheme was contained in four documents: ‘Historical Pictures A.I.F.’; ‘Programme for individual artists. Big Pictures’; ‘Officers of A.I.F. of whom portraits are desired’; ‘Sketch Portraits AIF. Table of Portraits for Official Artists’. These are attachments to two letters from Bean to Treloar, both dated 23 July 1918, in AWM 93, 18/1/29. Bean gave no indication of the intended size of the ‘Big Pictures’, nor of the ‘large historical pictures’ he later proposed be painted in his second memoir. On the basis of the size of the composition pictures Fisher first proposed be painted by the official artists under their agreements, it seems a ‘big’ or ‘large’ picture was 6 feet x 8 feet, or 183 centimetres x 244 centimetres. See cables, Fisher to Hughes, 24, 26 June 1918, AWM 93, 8/2/23.
ignores the de facto control Bean exercised over them. Really, they were working for him. And oddly, at the fundamental level Treloar reported to and took instructions from Bean in relation to the artists, a civilian with neither relevant standing nor authority over him. Anyway, Bean duly notified Treloar of the pictures he wished the artists to paint, ostensibly allocating to them the subjects they knew best, and by 6 December he had distributed their work to them.\textsuperscript{87} Importantly, Treloar explained to Griffiths that the subjects of their pictures ‘were laid down with a view to providing a complete pictorial record of the part played by Australia in the war.’\textsuperscript{88}

It will be recalled that en route to Australia at the conclusion of his Gallipoli mission Bean finalised his second memoir. In this he claimed the AIF artists had produced 218 small paintings and sketches at the front and in London.\textsuperscript{89} In making this claim he undoubtedly relied on information supplied to him by Treloar. As will emerge, this calculation was incorrect and overstated the artists’ achievement. Crozier to one side, who in any case was in London, the evidence shows that Bean’s confidence in the ability of soldier-artists to make a satisfactory pictorial record of the part Australia was playing in the war on the Western Front was ill-founded, and that their knowledge of the front ultimately had counted for nothing. Between them, Benson, Longstaff, Scott, McCubbin and MacDonald produced 180 pictures, an inconsiderable achievement even allowing that they suffered various difficulties and were inadequately supervised. Yet it is the quality of their pictures, and not their number, that establishes the extent to which their efforts failed to produce a satisfactory record of the AIF’s part in the great Allied offensive of 1918. With no program of work to follow or instructions as to what they should do, they were directionless. Essentially, their pictures consist of the same mixed bag produced by the official artists. However, the AIF scheme was not a complete failure. In his second memoir Bean explained that he had allocated thirty-three large historical pictures to the AIF artists for painting which would go to the Commonwealth without payment.\textsuperscript{90} This, finally, was the substantial benefit accruing to the Commonwealth under the scheme; at least it should have been. But the artists neither adhered strictly to Bean’s allocations nor carried out the entire program of work he allocated to them. Ultimately, they painted about eighteen large historical pictures, more or less in accordance

\textsuperscript{87} Letter, Treloar to Bean, 6 December 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286; Bean, second memoir, Appendix K.
\textsuperscript{88} Memorandum, Treloar to Griffiths, 7 January 1920, AWM 93, 18/2/10. The emphasis has been added.
\textsuperscript{89} Second memoir, pp 1-2, Appendix I.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., pp 2-3, Appendix G. Also see Appendix K.
with Bean’s specifications, and about eighty-four additional larger and smaller finished pictures of various subjects. If the pictures McCubbin made while the modelling scheme’s landscape artist are included, this number increases to about 160.

On 22 March 1920, when McCubbin and Anderson embarked the Ceramic at Suez for the voyage to Australia, the AIF scheme reached its closing stages.\textsuperscript{91} For its continuance it had depended on the artists remaining in the AIF, but they, like thousands of other Australians in Europe when the war ended, looked forward to being demobilised and returned to Australia. For Crozier, Benson, Longstaff and Scott, their release came slowly. Meanwhile, they worked up their pictures made in France, painted the historical pictures Bean allocated to them, or some of them, and painted pictures of other subjects which appealed to them. Treloar endeavoured to keep in touch with them and monitor their work, and he impressed on them the desirability of continuing to work on their program of pictures without regard to the possible date of their repatriation.\textsuperscript{92} For two months from 29 April 1919 Scott worked with the modelling team in France.\textsuperscript{93} Then, on 30 October 1919 the group lost Crozier and Benson when they embarked for Australia.\textsuperscript{94} Thereafter, Longstaff and Scott received permission to be discharged in England, and by 22 April 1920 both had been discharged.\textsuperscript{95} In Australia, Crozier and Benson continued working on their pictures for a time, and on 19 June 1920 they were finally discharged.\textsuperscript{96} By that date the AIF scheme had terminated.

I – Crozier

Crozier, a professional artist from Melbourne, enlisted in March 1915 and arrived on Gallipoli on 30 August.\textsuperscript{97} His involvement in Anzac’s pictorial representation began with his

\textsuperscript{91} The modelling team, sent out from London to Port Said in January 1920, had recently surveyed the Romani battlefield for the purpose of constructing a diorama of the battle. See Casualty Form-Active Service, Louis Frederick McCubbin service records; Service and Casualty Form, William Wallace Anderson service records; Service and Casualty Form, Charles Web Gilbert service records; NAA.

\textsuperscript{92} Letters, Treloar to Longstaff, 12 May 1919; Treloar to Scott, 10 July 1919; both in AWM 16, 4372/41/1.

\textsuperscript{93} Casualty Form-Active Service, James Fraser Scott service records, NAA.

\textsuperscript{94} Casualty Form-Active Service, Frank Rossiter Crozier service records; Casualty Form-Active Service, George Courtney Benson service records; NAA.

\textsuperscript{95} Record of Officers’ Services; form ‘Discharge in UK’; both in James Fraser Scott service records; Officer’s Record of Service; form ‘Discharge in UK’; both in William Frederick Longstaff service records; NAA.

\textsuperscript{96} Letter, Treloar to Pretty, 27 March 1920, AWM 93, 18/1/66; Record of Officers’ Services, Frank Rossiter Crozier service records; Record of Officers’ Services, George Courtney Benson service records; both in NAA; \textit{Commonwealth Gazette} No 58/1920 (p 929). In his letter to Pretty Treloar claimed that Crozier and Benson had done ‘much good work’ for the museum since returning.

\textsuperscript{97} Attestation Paper of Persons Enlisted for Service Abroad; Casualty Form-Active Service; both in Frank Rossiter Crozier service records, NAA.
work on *The Anzac Book*. After the evacuation he went to France where he served at various headquarters, at one stage as Birdwood’s escort, until in October 1917 Bean decided to attach him to the AWRS to paint four historical pictures. Critical to his decision was that Crozier witnessed the events and scenes he wished him to paint: Anzac Cove, the bombardment of Pozières, Sausage Valley, and a scene during the fighting at Pozières. Bean put enormous stock in the circumstance that so far as he knew Crozier was the only artist who witnessed the battle for Pozières. When applications were invited for the position of AIF artist, Crozier formally applied. His selection was virtually assured as he continued to be engaged on painting Bean’s pictures, the reason he was permitted to remain in London.

Crozier’s position was very different to that of the AIF artists who went to France. The latter might be obliged to act as camouflage instructors; he could paint pictures exclusively. And while the men in France were expected to produce pictures in the field, he painted finished pictures. In addition to the historical pictures he painted for Bean, over a two-year period he painted about fifty-five small oil pictures. Presumably, the raw material for these and his historical pictures consisted of the accumulated sketches and studies he had made since enlisting. In London, save for painting Bean’s pictures, it seems he was free to paint such pictures as he wished. Nevertheless, the critical issue for him remained subject selection. Necessarily, his choice of subjects was largely constrained by his available material, though he also had his memory and imagination to draw on.

The subject of Crozier’s pictures is the men. There are no pure landscapes, and no pictures of damaged churches and other structures on the land, nor any of damaged vehicles, weapons or war debris. When structures and objects appear in his pictures, their function is to establish a setting for the men, or to fill out a scene in which they are actors. And landscape functions in essentially the same way: the men are commonly presented in an indeterminate area of war-
torn land littered with debris. When he wishes to suggest a specific location, he mentions it in the picture’s title, otherwise the men could be anywhere on the Western Front. He presents them in various mostly prosaic situations: sitting at a supply dump, around a camp fire or in a dugout, or just sitting; walking or marching along a road, through a war-torn landscape or ruins; entering or passing through ruined villages; leaving their billet; working as stretcher-bearers; performing fatigue duties; leading packhorses; resting; watching; gearing up; going into the line; bathing; and so forth. A departure from this succession of subjects is a touching picture he made of a wounded soldier being ministered to by a nurse at a casualty clearing station in France, Nurse and patient, 3rd CCS [97], one of the rare pictures in Australia’s official art of the war which includes the representation of a woman. It seems Crozier’s intention was to create a record of the men, rather than of the war. With few exceptions his pictures do not depict larger events. Instead, he depicts minor incidents or scenes which are personal to the men who appear in them and which eschew overt reference to the larger events going on around them and in which they were involved.

A feature of Crozier’s pictures is his refusal to produce bellicose images and images glorifying war and applauding sacrifice. Thus, they represent a radical departure from his conception of the Australian soldier as the rampaging bayonet-wielding fighter for the cover of The Anzac Book [6]. Missing entirely are representations of heroic action and of fighting. And he produced no battle scenes save for depicting the bombardment of Pozières, but showed this as a distant affair. His approach, possibly influenced by Dyson, was to depict the everyday life of the common Australian soldier to the point of his going into the line and in the aftermath of fighting, and to draw attention in several pictures to the loss of life associated with war and the mental strain and physical tiredness experienced by the men. These pictures represent commentary on war, though not of a trenchant kind, rarely found in Australia’s official art of the war.

In three pictures Crozier explicitly represented the outcome of war as the loss of life. This serious subject warranted much greater attention than it was given by Australia’s artists. And Crozier’s own contributions were made on a small scale, ignoring the possibilities the subject

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104 For the sake of complete accuracy it should be noted that included in his fifty-five small oil pictures are three set in Egypt and one at Anzac Cove.
105 Given this picture’s accession number (ART13338) it appears to have entered the memorial’s collection after 1936, but its date of execution is given as circa 1918 and its place of execution as France. If Crozier painted it in France, then he did so before 1918.
offered for depiction in large pictures. In *Casualty* [98], a picture unusual for its religious symbolism, he shows a soldier standing in a war-torn landscape holding the dead body of a soldier he has lifted from the ground. The disposition of the figures resembles a pietà: the living soldier cradles the body of his dead mate and mourns his loss. It is a powerful image, but its impact is greatly diminished by its size and the lack of detail in the figures whose faces are blank areas of paint. *The search for identity discs* [99] treats the same subject, but here the living soldier bends over the dead soldier going about the grisly task of locating and removing his identity discs. Although Crozier might have made its subject clearer pictorially – the dead soldier is a confusion of colours lost in the similar tones of the battlefield – it still communicates a powerful and altogether different message to the numerous run-of-the-mill pictures he and the other artists produced. He struck a sentimental note in *Grave of a pal* [100] to present a soldier standing before a friend’s grave marked with a cross, a subject Dyson treated in *One of the old platoon* [101]. The scene in Crozier’s picture is a war-torn landscape overhung by massed predominantly grey clouds, the form of its representation that is derigueur in his work, contributing to its maudlin mood. However, while Dyson made the soldier paying his respects the focus of his energies, carefully drawing him and providing him with personality, Crozier threw his energies into creating the scene and supplied a pint-sized and ill-defined figure for his soldier.

*Through the saps to Pozières* [102], one of Crozier’s most developed representations of the men, shows a group of soldiers moving along a trench headed towards the fighting over the horizon. He paid uncommon attention to delineating the figures of the men in the foreground, five of whom are in the trench, while the last, the man who attracts attention, walks above them along its edge. As he shows them in profile with their backs slightly turned towards the audience they remain unknown. If their mood can be detected it lies in their manner of walking, which seems slow and unenthusiastic, and their posture, which seems more hunched than upright. This suggests the men’s mood is one of resignation, a suggestion confirmed by the air of gloom created by Crozier’s subdued palette and the massed grey-white clouds into which dirty brown smoke drifts from the distant battle. *On the way* [103], which might be regarded as a companion piece, evokes a similar mood. Crozier presents another group of soldiers, this time getting ready to move out. The two main figures, again carefully delineated, neither engage with each other nor with their assumed audience. Each man is absorbed in his own thoughts: one kneels attending to his kit and the other leans on his rifle with his head
bowed. In the middle ground and in the background there are several other soldiers who seem similarly preoccupied, many with bowed heads. With so many bowed heads it is unsurprising that the impression gained is that the men are downcast. A deathly silence hangs over the scene, an affect suggested by the absence of communication among the soldiers. *Tired out* [104], which treats the men’s exhaustion, depicts three soldiers seated at the bottom of a hillock strewn with debris. Behind the men appears to be the partly caved-in entrance to a tunnel and in front of them are two water-filled shell craters. In the middle ground a soldier stands alone, looking down. The hillock and adjacent land are painted in various shades of brown and the scene takes place under a leaden sky. The atmosphere is deathly quiet, as in *On the way*. The men do not converse, they merely sit, seemingly rooted to the spot, and stare out, so complete is their exhaustion.

The above notwithstanding, overall Crozier’s work was unambitious and repetitive. Yet of all the AIF artists he spent the most time in London enjoying the benefits of a long and continuous stay. Possibly this turned out to be a disadvantage: he was denied the stimuli offered at the front and the opportunity of recording incidents as they occurred. Although his pictures were finished, their value as records was considerably less than those made on-the-spot by his colleagues in France. Moreover, as he produced them away from the front their very authenticity was questionable. But ultimately the major weakness of his pictures was their failure to make a substantial contribution to illustrating the AIF’s story in the war. If Crozier preferred to avoid depicting larger events in which it was involved, it remained desirable that he should paint pictures of scenes which were somehow distinctively Australian, not only by virtue of the soldiers’ dress and equipment, though these matters were important, or by the titles he gave his works, but because they claimed to represent something particular about the AIF and the experience of its men, rather than of soldiers generally. This is what Crozier should have aimed to represent in his pictures but failed to do. He produced a series of pictures within a narrow range of subject matter which, while featuring the men, reflected a kind of dutiful recording of them, and no more.

In London, Crozier substantially carried out the assignment Bean gave him when attached to the AWRS painting *Bombardment of Pozières, July 1916* (1918), *Sausage Valley* (1919), *The beach at Anzac* (1919) and *Snow scene near Mametz* (1919). Why he painted the Mametz

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[106] Seven pictures include the word ‘diggers’ or ‘digger’ in their titles and one includes the word ‘Australians’.
picture instead of a scene during the fighting at Pozières which Bean wanted is unknown.\footnote{Also for unknown reasons Crozier did not paint pictures of five further subjects Bean allocated to him: (1) in the old German trenches, Pozières; (2) in a dugout at Pozières; (3) the Somme winter-landscape towards Flers-the duckboards; (4) the fatigue party, Somme; (5) the battle of Bullecourt. See Bean, second memoir, Appendix K.} With the possible exception of his picture of the bombardment, they depict locations and conditions in the Anzac story rather than particular incidents. Each is an amalgam of scenes apparently witnessed by Crozier and reassembled by him to produce a picture which, while claiming to represent a particular scene, is merely representative of several he saw.

Sausage Valley \footnote{\textit{Official History Vol 3}, p 473. The description of the valley which follows is taken from pp 473-4.} [105], for instance, is representative of scenes occurring daily for six weeks from 19 July 1916 and tells part of the story of the battle for Pozières. Sausage Valley, known to the Australians as Sausage ‘Gully’, was the main avenue of approach to the Australian fighting area, and according to Bean ‘its constant traffic and busy life’ recalled to some troops their memories of the beach at Anzac.\footnote{\textit{Official History Vol 3}, p 473.} The route taken by transport and men was a bare track worn by continuous traffic and in appearance the area was remarkable for having lost most of its former covering of grass exposing the white chalk-earth or red-brown soil which was crossed in every direction by hundreds of dusty tracks. In wet weather every track and shell-hole grew slimy with white or red mud. Crozier’s picture shows a throng of vehicles and men moving through the valley. It convincingly conveys the idea that it was a beehive of activity, but little of what is going on has been made comprehensible, possibly intentionally. The sense evoked is one of confusion, doubtless contributed to by the chalk dust thrown up the traffic moving along the track.

Crozier’s \textit{The beach at Anzac} [106] is a record of the occupation of Anzac Cove. As Crozier arrived on Gallipoli in August 1915, it should be assumed the scene he represents is one he observed after that date. It is clear the Anzacs have been in occupation for some time, sufficient at least for them to have constructed piers and several structures on the narrow beach and to have instituted a regimen for the unloading and distribution of supplies, including water, which had to be brought to shore by boat to support their occupation. Thus, the beach is a beehive of activity. While obviously a military occupation the scene is curiously peaceful, almost idyllic, as dozens of soldiers go about their activities unmolested and seemingly in complete safety. As there is no evidence of hostilities the picture might suggest, quite wrongly, a peaceful occupation. It contradicts Treloar’s claim that as the cove
was open to the view of Turkish observers and shelled daily to the end of the campaign it was more dangerous than the front line. The main figure, a water carrier, walks unhurriedly on a slope above the shoreline making a lie of the fact that water-carrying was one of the least loved and most dangerous jobs. Crozier’s picture successfully conceals the occupation’s true nature, its failure militarily and its attendant casualties and general misery. Of course, he was not obliged to present that side of things, and in any case Bean did not want it presented. He wanted Crozier to paint a rosy picture which likened the invasion to the arrival of Elizabethan sailors in the cove of a new land during a voyage of discovery, just as he had done in his illustration *Our fathers [10]* for The Anzac Book.

After his discharge Crozier’s involvement in the war art scheme did not end. During the early 1920s the memorial acquired five minor pictures from him, all supposedly made during 1918 when he was attached to the AWRS, and a more substantial picture, *The tank’s first stunt, Flers 1916* (1922) for £100. He also carried out two portrait commissions of soldiers who made the memorial’s hanging list, *Sergeant William Martin* (1921) [107], considered ‘a very bad portrait’, and *Sergeant Stan McDougall, VC, MM* (1921), and an equestrian portrait of Martin, *Sergeant William Martin on horseback* (1921). Finally, and importantly, the memorial acquired three historical pictures from him depicting incidents from and conditions during the Gallipoli campaign: *The first boat load* (1923), another picture of the landing, *Trench life at Anzac* (1923) and *Death of Lieutenant NJ Greig 12 July 1915* (1923).[114]

II – Benson

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110 Minutes of meeting of Art Committee, 11 May 1922, AWM 170, 4/1. The minor pictures were acquired for £100. See letter, Treloar to Secretary, Home & Territories Department, 13 September 1920, AWM 93, 18/3/16.
111 By Bernard Hall and AG Pretty. See letter, Pretty to Bean, 14 April 1924, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287.
112 Crozier was paid £100 for each head and shoulders portrait, and presumably the same sum for the equestrian portrait, although no evidence has been located disclosing its price or the circumstances of its painting. See ‘Detailed statement of commitments on pictures’ tabled at meeting of finance sub-committee, 21 March 1922, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1.
113 Crozier was paid £350 for this picture. See minutes of meeting of Art Committee, 14 December 1923, AWM 170, 4/1, resolution 46.
114 Crozier was paid £200 for each picture. See minutes of meeting of Art Committee, 3 May 1923, resolution 41; minutes of meeting of Art Committee, 14 December 1923, resolution 49; both in AWM 170, 4/1. Later, in the mid-1930s, Crozier was employed by the memorial for a time in some form of advisory capacity, and later he convinced Treloar to allow him to paint pictures of war subjects for the memorial to be offered for sale to the public by its sales representatives. This venture failed, and it seems Crozier left his pictures with the memorial, about thirty of them. See Treloar, file note, 22 October 1936; letters, Treloar to Swenson, 11 November 1936; Treloar to Baglin, 18 December 1936; Treloar to Crozier, 29 July 1937; all in AWM 93, 21/1/66.
A designer from Melbourne, Benson enlisted in September 1914. His artistic abilities were recognised by the military authorities who in the days before the invasion employed him preparing panoramic drawings of the peninsula from Nibrunesi Point to Cape Helles. His *Suvla Bay* [108], made on 22 April 1915 from the deck of HMS *Queen*, counts as one of the first representations of Anzac. He went ashore on 25 April and until evacuated in September suffering fever was principally engaged making reconnaissance sketches. After lengthy service in France he was sent to England on an artillery course and on 14 March 1918 promoted second lieutenant. When applying for the position of AIF artist Benson submitted two black-and-white drawings – he asked that these be returned to ‘Will Dyson’s place’ suggesting he and Dyson enjoyed a relationship, further evidence that the selection committee lacked impartiality – a panorama of Mount Kemmel and a view of the Hindenburg Line. However, his claims for selection rested more securely on a large body of work not shown to the committee. He owned a sketchbook, maintained since enlisting, which contained about 100 sketches, a record of his observations of the AIF’s experience: the voyage to Egypt; encounters with Egyptian life, the Pyramids and Mena Camp; Gallipoli; the Western Front.

Benson spent six months in France during 1918 commencing on 23 May and ending on 28 November with his departure for England. Whenever not required to perform camouflage work his and the other AIF artists’ duty was to paint pictures for ‘the Australian Government’. Throughout he remained with the 4th Division, and as he was not called upon to perform any substantial camouflage work, he could spend his time producing pictures. In carrying out his duties he enjoyed the advantages of being an experienced soldier. He was

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115 Attestation Paper of Persons Enlisted for Service Abroad, George Courtney Benson service records, NAA.
116 Letter, Benson to Officer in Charge, AWRS, 10 March 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 1.
117 It forms part of his sketchbook.
118 Letter, Benson to Officer in Charge, AWRS, 10 March 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 1; Casualty Form-Active Service, George Courtney Benson service records, NAA.
119 Casualty Form-Active Service, George Courtney Benson service records, NAA.
120 Letters, Benson to Officer in Charge, AWRS, 10 March 1918; Treloar to Benson, 17 March 1918; Treloar to Benson, 7 May 1918; all in AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 1. McMullin claims the men were friends. See Will Dyson, p 207.
121 When Benson showed it to Treloar after the war it was purchased by the memorial for £100. See letter, Treloar to Bean, 8 November 1920, AWM 93, 12/4/47; minutes of meeting of Art Committee, 4 February 1921, AWM 170, 4/1, resolution 3(b).
122 Letter, Benson to Treloar, 23 May 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 1; Casualty Form-Active Service, George Courtney Benson service records, NAA.
123 Paragraph 1, typescript, ‘Instructions regarding the control work etc of the Australian War Records Section artists in France’, attached to letter, Dodds to Gullett and others, 11 June 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
in France during a period which saw the Allied armies sweep to victory, and his division’s involvement was substantial: it participated in operations known as ‘peaceful penetration’; it played important roles in the battle of Hamel and during the Allied offensive launched on 8 August; and a lesser role in the advance to the Hindenburg Outpost Line in mid-September. After its last advance the division was taken out of the line; its war ended. But Benson did not withdraw with it. Trailing after the Australian divisions remaining in the line, it seems he was not too far behind them when they breached the Hindenburg Line in late September and the infantry fought its last action of the war at Montbrehain on 5 October. Even then he did not retire. As the armistice approached the 4th Division was arriving in the Le Cateau region. The armistice found him in or near Busigny. Although his movements cannot be traced in the evidence, the titles of his pictures suggest he got as far as Le Cateau. Wherever he went the available subjects were inexhaustible, and doubtless he appreciated, or should have appreciated, that events and operations in which the AIF was involved, and in particular the 4th Division, were the subjects demanding his attention.

On 14 October Benson told Gullett he had ‘about 50 sketches in hand’. But according to a list of his pictures in Bean’s second memoir, he made thirty-two pictures in France: eleven watercolours, one ink drawing, twelve pencil drawings and eight untitled sketches executed in unspecified media. Seventeen of these were ‘unfinished’. As this list was prepared well after Benson returned to London, perhaps it should be assumed it is a complete record of his pictures, but if not that, then a complete record of the pictures he delivered to the AWRS. Yet the correctness of either assumption is doubtful. For reasons not found in the evidence, Bean’s list contains several works Benson made in his sketchbook, which he retained, and twelve works with titles which cannot be traced into the memorial’s collection. When these

124 For brief details of its part in operations during this period see Bean, Anzac to Amiens, pp 459-62, 469-74, 482-5. For detailed accounts Bean’s Official History Vol 6 should be consulted.
125 Bean, Official History Vol 6, p 935.
126 Ibid., p 1053.
127 Letter, Benson to Gullett, 14 October 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 1.
128 Bean, second memoir, Appendix I.
129 Benson and his colleagues were obliged to deliver their pictures to the AWRS in accordance with the conditions of their appointment as AIF artists. Paragraph 4 of the notice ‘Vacancies for Artists’ published in AIF Orders provided: ‘All artistic work produced by [the artists] will be the property of the Australian Government. They will not be permitted to undertake work for any other authority or person nor for their personal gain.’ Moreover, paragraph 6 of the instructions regarding their duties and control promulgated on 11 June 1918 provided: ‘Completed pictures, together with their titles, will be handed to the Officer i/c, BEF Sub-Section, who will arrange their transmission to the AWRS London.’ See AIF Orders, 26 February 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286; typescript, ‘Instructions regarding the control work etc of the Australian War Records Section artists in France’, attached to letter, Dodds to Gullett and others, 11 June 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
works are excluded, it appears Benson handed over thirteen pictures to the AWRS.\textsuperscript{130} This is a dismal achievement which suggests that Gullett’s assessment of him as ‘not very hard working’ was accurate.\textsuperscript{131} Gullett’s failure to mention receiving any pictures from him after 24 August 1918, and his infrequent mention of seeing him, seem explicable by his laziness. Benson surfaced at the armistice when he was seen once and twice supplied with painting materials.\textsuperscript{132} Although Gullett claimed he was ‘doing good work’, the evidence suggests he was doing very little. Why he required further supplies is a mystery. It appears he produced no works of subjects in the Le Cateau region, or for that matter anywhere else. If he made any works, he made them in his sketchbook: a pencil drawing Busigny and a watercolour Wagons parked at Busigny after Armistice.

Benson’s selection of subjects did nothing to ameliorate his performance. It reflects the tendencies detected in the work of other artists made at the front. On their evidence, Benson manifestly failed to make a record of the AIF’s operations during the period from 23 May 1918 to the armistice, surely the point of his appointment, and he ignored completely the 4th Division’s operations. With so few works each subject might be described: soldiers unloading rations from a wagon; soldiers unloading ammunition from a limber at night; a panoramic view of Bapaume; a damaged tank, On the road to Flers, February 1917 [109]; chinese labourers walking through a village, Chinese Labour Corps [110]; a sugar mill; buildings serving as headquarters; a chateau; soldiers building a dummy tank; a regimental aid post; a ruined barn.

The status of the work Benson committed to his sketchbook after his appointment as an AIF artist is problematic. He continued to make sketches in it, about forty of them. These, of course, were the Commonwealth’s property and Benson should have handed them over to the AWRS. At all events, and hardly unexpectedly, they consist of a grab bag of subjects: a soldier on his bicycle; soldiers bathing; a linesman; soldiers loading supply tanks; a wounded German soldier; soldiers walking along the road; stretcher-bearers [111]; houses; churches;

\textsuperscript{130} In the absence of contemporary evidence of the pictures Benson made in France in 1918, save for Bean’s list of them, substantial reliance has had to be placed on the details of his works held by the memorial and recorded in its collection databases.

\textsuperscript{131} Gullett expressed this view to Treloar during the assessment process to determine whether his appointment should be confirmed. See Gullett, Report No 24, week ending 25 August 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6, paragraph 3(d)(iii).

\textsuperscript{132} Gullett, Report No 36, week ending 17 November 1918, paragraph 3; Report No 37, week ending 24 November 1918, paragraph 3(a); both in AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6.
tents; bomb-damaged buildings; war-ravaged landscapes; panoramas; topography; transports; a grounded plane; a four-poster bed; gun emplacements and pits; regimental aid posts; and French citizenry. As Benson made these works ‘privately’, perhaps it is unfair to criticise him on the score of their disparate nature. Still, they constitute a flimsy record of the AIF’s operations.

In London, Benson was to have painted several large historical pictures allocated to him by Bean: (1) the 1st Division training in the desert; (2) the landing; (3) Shrapnel Gully or the beach; (4) his (Benson’s) impression of Pozières; (5) the mines at Messines; (6) a panorama of the Ypres battlefield from Kemmel; (7) a mounted escort of German prisoners; and (8) stretcher bearers.¹³³ He did not adhere to this allocation: save for painting a picture of the seventh subject, and painting pictures of the first and sixth subjects for a fee after he was discharged from the AIF, he overlooked the others. Nevertheless, by the time of his discharge he had painted seventeen pictures.¹³⁴ How he settled on their subjects, apart from the one Bean definitely specified, is unknown. At any rate, he painted three large pictures of historical subjects, presumably to satisfy Bean’s requirements, Anzac looking south (1919), a panorama taking in the land above and adjacent to Anzac Cove, convincing evidence of the foolishness of the invasion, The man with the donkey, Anzac 1915 (1919), illustrating an authentic Gallipoli story which by the time of its painting had attained legendary status, and The Drover (1919-20) [112], depicting a lone Australian soldier on horseback unconcernedly trailing after a line of German prisoners shambling along a road, a homage to the virtues of a life lived in rural Australia where skills there learnt, such as droving cattle or sheep, could be usefully employed in wartime.¹³⁵

Benson also painted fourteen additional works including large pictures of soldiers, Infantryman (1919-20) [174], Lewis gunner (1919-20) and Gunner (1919-20), doubtless intended as types, and eleven smaller pictures consisting of a mix of landscapes, scenes,

¹³³ Bean, second memoir, Appendix K.
¹³⁴ This calculation is based on Benson’s works held by the memorial and recorded in its collection databases after correcting the details given for the date and/or place of execution of several pictures on the ground that there is no evidence Benson executed any works in oil in France, either before or after his appointment as an AIF artist.
¹³⁵ When the picture was reproduced in Australian Chivalry it was accompanied by an explanatory text in which Treloar claimed: ‘Before joining the A.I.F., a large proportion of the men of the light horse regiments had lived on stations and farms, where driving sheep or cattle is a regular occurrence, and the habit of trailing on horseback behind a flock or a herd was far too deeply ingrained to be shed even under the changed conditions of active service.’ See Australian Chivalry, ‘The cling of custom’, plate 35.
conditions and incidents, all made during 1919: *Shell Green, Gallipoli; Samothrace from Anzac, 1915; Sketch for walking wounded; Welcome Wood near Vaux-Somme; 4th Division on their way to the Somme November 1916; The ration limber: a Somme winter sketch; Guns going forward; Corbie from above, 12th Infantry Brigade HQ; 43rd Battery position at Ecous, St Mein, France, under shellfire, April 1917; Noreuil Valley, morning of attack on Bullecourt, May 1917; and HMS Albion aground off Gaba Tepe, May 1915.*

*Shell Green, Gallipoli* [113] illustrates how censorship, self-imposed or imposed on Benson with the public’s assumed sensibilities in mind, affected Anzac’s representation. Once ashore on Gallipoli Benson made several private pictures in his sketchbook, among them a small pencil drawing, *Burying the meat, Shell Green* [114], dated 22 May 1915. This is brutally frank and honest in its depiction of a grim reality of the occupation. It shows two soldiers unceremoniously dragging a dead soldier by his feet across Shell Green for burial, doubtless a common sight. In titling his work *Burying the meat* Benson’s bitterness is unmistakable, as is his pointed commentary on war’s wastefulness. Its rawness made it quite unsuitable for public consumption. When he painted *Shell Green, Gallipoli* for Bean, he presents a remarkably different view of the location. His scene suggests a pleasant, lazy afternoon spent by the sea. A number of soldiers are present: several are on the beach while others are lounging around sitting or standing on a slight rise. Two soldiers, one carrying water containers and the other a pack, walk unhurriedly along a track leading to the beach. There is no evidence of hostilities and no hint of the everpresent danger of death or serious wounding to which soldiers were exposed when moving about Shell Green. It was not called ‘Shell Green’ for nothing. To the side of the track are two graves marked by leaning crosses, but their presence does not disturb the scene’s tranquility. Missing from the picture is the truth-telling Benson engaged in when making his private drawing, instead misrepresenting the occupation as an idyll.

Benson’s work on the war art scheme did not end with his discharge. In November 1920 he showed Treloar his sketchbook, and this and a picture, *Mont Kemmel from near Hill 60*, were purchased.136 As this was not a panorama of the Ypres battlefield Bean had asked him to paint in London, but merely a picture of the distant hill, why it was acquired is elusive. Then,

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136 The picture was acquired from Benson for £150. See minutes of meeting of Art Committee, 4 February 1921, AWM 170, 4/1, resolution 3(a). The memorial’s dating of the picture as circa 1917 is obviously wrong. Benson probably made it in London or in Melbourne.
in 1921, he painted *Training in the desert, Mena* under his only commission,\(^{137}\) another picture he had been asked to paint in London. In May 1922 he unsuccessfully tried to sell the memorial a number of works.\(^{138}\)

### III – Will Longstaff

When war was declared Longstaff, a Boer War veteran, was dividing his time between his farm at Eltham near Melbourne and his studio in the city.\(^{139}\) On 16 September 1915 he obtained a commission in the 1st Remount Unit.\(^{140}\) Promoted captain and appointed adjutant, he served in Egypt for seventeen months until suffering a ‘retinal haemorrhage’ which caused temporary blindness in his right eye.\(^{141}\) Sent to England, when he applied for the position of AIF artist he was second-in-command of ‘B’ Sub-Depot at Westham.\(^{142}\) In his application he said the only available specimens of his work were a few sketches brought from Egypt.\(^{143}\) This proved no disadvantage: he was selected, completed a camouflage course and left for France on 6 June 1918 to join the 2nd Division.

Until late July 1918 Longstaff did very little painting, explaining to Gullett that he had been engaged ‘on camouflage work only’.\(^{144}\) On 7 August he wrote to General Rosenthal, commanding the 2nd Division, informing him that since joining the division he had spent one-third of the time on ‘art work’ and the rest on camouflage work.\(^{145}\) He said he had about seven pictures ‘complete’ and ‘about twenty-six sketches of interesting subjects’ requiring completion. (It seems certain he made these sketches in a sketchbook he later retained.) All that he required to complete them was to get into a studio; he would have to wait until

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\(^{137}\) He painted this picture for a fee of £250. See agreement between Benson and the Commonwealth, 14 February 1921, AWM 93, 18/1/66.

\(^{138}\) His offer of an oil picture, *Self sacrifice at Messines*, was rejected on the mistaken ground that its subject was already represented in the memorial’s collection. And his offer of three drawings, *POW cage at Bussy les Dauours, Ammunition Mules* and *Searching for Wounded*, was rejected on the spurious ground that their subjects were better represented by photographs and cinema in which the memorial’s collection was rich, which it was not. See minutes of meeting of Art Committee, 11 May 1922, AWM 170, 4/1.

\(^{139}\) ‘A tale of sin from Melbourne’, *Evelyn Observer and Bourke East Record*, 1 July 1910, p 3.

\(^{140}\) Application for a Commission, 16 September 1915, William Frederick Longstaff service records, NAA.

\(^{141}\) Record of Officers’ Services; Casualty Form-Active Service; Proceedings of a Medical Board, 1 October 1917; William Frederick Longstaff service records, NAA.

\(^{142}\) Record of Service in the Field, William Frederick Longstaff service records, NAA.

\(^{143}\) Letter, Longstaff to Officer in Charge, AWRS, c March 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 1.

\(^{144}\) Letter, Longstaff to Officer in Charge, BEF Subsection, AWRS, c mid-July 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.

\(^{145}\) Letter, Longstaff to headquarters, 2nd Division, 7 August 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2. He was accounting for the pictures he had completed, a step in the process of assessing whether his appointment should be confirmed.
November 1918 for this opportunity. Meanwhile, he would have to carry on and make such pictures as he could and collect material for later use. Apparently recognising his responsibilities, he told Rosenthal he was ‘going forward to-night to follow this Battle [the Allied offensive launched on 8 August], and should get a tremendous amount of good material to work from’.

Longstaff’s appointment was confirmed, though Bean assessed his work as ‘mechanical’ and ‘worth least of any’. Gullett considered him ‘very industrious’,146 but for the remainder of his time in France his industriousness deserted him. He produced very few pictures. Gullett rarely mentioned him in his weekly reports and there is no evidence he delivered any pictures after the assessment process concluded. If he followed the battle of 8 August, he made a single picture of it, Australians Advancing from Villers-Bretonneux, August 8th 1918 [115].

As for his division, much still lay ahead of it until relieved on 5 October 1918 after its fight at Montbrehain. In particular, its feat in capturing Mont St Quentin and Péronne along with the 3rd Division between 31 August and 2 September 1918 was held by many Australian soldiers to be the AIF’s most brilliant achievement.147 Of these battles Longstaff made two pictures of Mont St Quentin, one of which is Mont St Quentin [116], presenting in each a panorama of the battlefield and the distant hill. What he was doing is elusive because it seems he made only three watercolours, those just mentioned.

Longstaff produced nineteen watercolours in France.148 This was a dismal achievement, even allowing that his camouflage duties largely prevented him from painting until late July. He was in France continuously during a critical period of the war and in which the 2nd Division played an important role. It should have been obvious to him that it was his responsibility to record its operations. That he did not even vaguely do this is confounding. According to the titles and descriptions of his pictures, he drew the vast majority of his subjects from a region on the Somme west of the front encompassing Amiens, Corbie, Villers-Bretonneux, Glisy, Querrieu and Bresle. Streeton, with whom Longstaff was billeted, also found his subjects in

146 Gullett expressed this view to Treloar during the assessment process to determine whether Longstaff’s appointment should be confirmed. See Gullett, Report No 24, week ending 25 August 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6, paragraph 3(d)(i).
147 Bean, Official History Vol 6, p 873.
148 Bean, second memoir, Appendix I. Of these Longstaff retained ten for reference purposes. Predictably, all of the listed works cannot be traced into the memorial’s collection according to their titles and descriptions.
this region and they occasionally worked together. During their ‘association’ they painted similar subjects, each avoiding war operations. The scene in *Australians Advancing from Villers-Bretonneux, August 8th 1918* aside, in any case an unconvincing depiction of battle, Longstaff’s subjects were churches – he made three pictures of Amiens Cathedral, including *Amiens Cathedral* [117], two of Bresle Church, and one of Corbie Church; a wrecked supply tank; a dressing station, *Main dressing station, Querrieu* [118]; artillery mules; motor lorries on a road; the Somme valley (painting it three times); the ruins of a building; a salvage dump; and dugouts. In these pictures the 2nd Division was not under-represented, it was ignored.150

Bean allocated six pictures to Longstaff for painting in London: (1) Amiens, March 1918; (2) the bombing raid at Abbeville, April 1918; (3) the night attack of the 13th Brigade at Villers-Bretonneux, April 1918; (4) ‘Our ‘Planes’, either the 2nd Squadron at Cambrai, November 1917, or the 4th Squadron at Lille, July 1918; (5) the offensive of 8 August 1918 before Amiens; and (6) the Hindenburg Line near Bellicourt, 18 or 29 September 1918.151 While all these events occurred on the Western Front, the first three took place when Longstaff was in England. Why, then, they were allocated to him is inexplicable. Anyway, he stuck relatively closely to Bean’s allocation painting five pictures: *Amiens from near Querrieu* (1918-19), depicting the countryside between Querrieu and Amiens, *Night attack by 13th Brigade on Villers-Bretonneux* (1919), *War planes of the Australian Flying Corps* (1920), *8th August, 1918* (1920) and *Breaking the Hindenburg Line* (1918). The bombing raid at Abbeville missed out. Still, he was industrious as he had not been in France. By 31 December 1919, 149

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149 Letter, Streeton to Smart, 19 June 1918, AWM 93, 18/7/12; Anne Gray, ‘Will Longstaff’s sketch-book’, *Journal of the Australian War Memorial*, no 3, October 1983, pp 52-3 at p 53.

150 It fared no better in the work Longstaff made in a sketchbook he maintained in France while an AIF artist the existence of which only came to light in 1983 when his daughter presented it to the memorial. Containing fifty-three drawings executed in pencil, many with colour washes, the earliest is dated 11 July 1918 and the latest 9 August 1918. Contrary to the conditions of his appointment, he failed to deliver it to the AWRS. Because images are unavailable, the drawings are known only by their titles and sundry details given by the memorial in its collection databases. Their subjects are humdrum and include guns; memorial crosses; ammunition and salvage dumps; parked trucks; donkeys and horses; street scenes; landscapes; a church; a village; soldiers mending wire; and tanks. There is a focus on Villers-Bretonneux and Mont St Quentin, mostly taking the form of panoramic landscapes, suggesting he was collecting material looking ahead to the time he would enter a studio. He failed to treat the 2nd Division at all and avoided depicting scenes of battle and other war operations, save for a drawing of the Mont St Quentin battlefield showing men and tanks advancing towards the Germans and one of a dead German in wire entanglements. As well as working in Glisy, Villers-Bretonneux, Amiens and Mont St Quentin, he travelled west to Abbeville, the location of No 3 Australian General Hospital, and sketched the interior of its acute surgical ward, its buildings and grounds. Where the pictorial representation of the part played by the Australian Army Medical Corps in the war was neglected, these sketches are valuable records. See Gray, ‘Will Longstaff’s sketch-book’, pp 52-3.

151 Bean, second memoir, Appendix K.
when detached from the AWRS pending his discharge, he had painted nine additional and mostly smaller pictures save for *Battle scene* (1918), a large picture apparently depicting a German gun in the middleground and prisoners in the foreground. The other eight pictures were *Australian 9.2" howitzer* (1919), *Villers-Bretonneux, Ruins of the Church* (1918-19), *Water Scene* (1918-19), *El Arish, Sinai Peninsula* (1918-19), *Masaid* (1918-19), these last three of scenes in Egypt, *Dugouts near Villers-Bretonneux* (1918-19), *Ammunition wagon at dump* (1918) and *Templeux looking back to Péronne* (1918).152

The AFC’s history during the war was neglected in Anzac’s pictorial representation, notwithstanding that a volume of the official history was dedicated to telling its story.153 Bean allocated Longstaff alternative incidents in which the AFC featured: during the battle of Cambrai on 20 November 1917 the 2nd Squadron ‘made a fine name’; while during two raids on 16 and 17 August 1918 the 2nd and 4th Squadrons led attacks against the German aerodromes at Lomme and Haubourdin on the outskirts of Lille wrecking the hangars and workshops and destroying fifty-four aircraft on the ground.154 But he depicted neither incident, instead painting a commemorative work featuring the planes of both squadrons flying in a smoke-filled sky in an arrangement suggestive of aerobatics, *War planes of the Australian Flying Corps* [119]. The only picture of an incident involving the AFC painted for the memorial was Power’s *The incident for which Lieutenant FH McNamara was awarded the VC* (1924). And save for a few watercolours of aerodromes and single aircraft on the ground, for instance Streeton’s *Old S13, struck off strength after 10 months’ service* [120] and Fullwood’s *AIF aerodrome near Bertangles*, Longstaff’s is the only other work representing the AFC.

Longstaff’s *8th August, 1918* [121], an enormous picture which purports to depict a scene from the opening of the great Allied offensive, failed to represent Anzac adequately. In showing Australian artillery moving forward from Villers-Bretonneux, Longstaff presents a view looking back to Amiens where on the horizon the outline of its famous cathedral can be seen. Dominating the picture is a column of captured German soldiers who are walking towards Amiens, away from the fighting. Longstaff could have represented this column as

152 This list was constructed from the details of Longstaff’s works held by the memorial and recorded in its collection databases.
members of a vanquished army, and in a sense he did, but without unnecessary ballyhoo and sensitive to the enemy as just other soldiers who, having performed their duty, were now glad to be out of the fighting. The two men at the back of the column cut a touching scene as one drapes his arm over his comrade’s shoulder in a show of German mateship. They have survived the war, but not the crew of a German field gun they are about to pass who sprawl dead around their gun. Meanwhile, Australian artillery hurtles past them headed to the battle. As commemorating Australia’s part in the Germans’ black day of the war it seems the picture did not satisfy Bean, perhaps because its subject was not clearly the Australians, but rather the Germans, particularly the two rearmost who occupy the centre foreground. Bean was sensitive to the necessity, as he saw it, of depicting Australian action, conduct and ideals in pictures for the memorial, and Longstaff’s picture diverted attention from these things and was therefore unsuitable for transmitting the version of the Anzac story he wished to promote. This seems to be the reason why in 1927 the memorial decided it was desirable to include a picture of the subject in its collection when it already held one. In so deciding it did not refer to Longstaff’s picture, even in passing.¹⁵⁵ Power’s 8th August 1918 (1930) [122] as a representation of Australia’s part in this pivotal moment in the war did what Longstaff’s treatment did not. Power presents a massive show of Australian arms moving determinedly eastwards towards the front line: a main column of infantry flanked by artillery teams with two tanks rumbling along in the throng, and not a German in sight.

Late in 1919 Longstaff approached Treloar, now in Australia, with a proposal that he remain in the AIF for a further year to continue painting pictures for the national record; Treloar referred it to the Defence Department.¹⁵⁶ Defence refused it on the basis that if further pictures were required the memorial would place commissions to have them painted. Treloar pointed out to Longstaff its decision was inevitable: ‘As you may imagine, the strongest pressure is being brought to bear out here to reduce expenditure. We have managed to get essentials for the War Museum but no more. The Defence Department was not prepared to continue your employment in the A.I.F. for another 12 months, and the Home & Territories

¹⁵⁵ Minutes of meeting of Art Committee, 7 March 1927, AWM 170, 4/1, resolution 82.
¹⁵⁶ Letter, Treloar to Longstaff, 10 December 1919, AWM 93, 8/2/23. From 20 to 31 August 1919 Longstaff made an eleven-day trip to France, presumably to research a picture or pictures he was working on, probably for one set in Villers-Bretonneux. It seems this trip convinced him of the necessity of getting back to France to carry out further field work, apparently with a view to painting another series of battle pictures, but an application he made for leave to do so was refused. See Casualty Form-Active Service; Application for Leave. Prior to return to Australia, 17 September 1919; letter, Longstaff to Officer in Charge, AWRS, 17 September 1919; all in William Frederick Longstaff service records, NAA.
Department, under which the War Museum is placed, could not provide the money for your salary.  

Longstaff immediately applied for a discharge in England. Although his application was immediately approved, it was not until 22 April 1920 that he was discharged; on Treloar’s recommendation his service was extended for six weeks to permit him to paint, or finish painting, *8th August, 1918* and *War planes of the Australian Flying Corps.* So ended his work on the war art scheme, but he was not finished representing Anzac. During the 1920s he painted a series of pictures featuring ghostly representations of Australian soldiers including *Menin Gate at Midnight (Ghosts of Menin Gate)* (1927); donated to the Commonwealth by Lord Woolavington in 1928, the picture immediately entered the memorial’s collection.

**IV – Scott**

The New Zealand-born Scott, a professional artist living in Adelaide, enlisted in May 1916. He arrived in France in time for Third Ypres, but on 25 September 1917, while located in supports behind Zonnebeke, was slightly wounded. He was returned to England and hospitalised and following his discharge posted to No 1 Command Depot at Sutton Veny from where he applied for the position of AIF artist. Whatever specimens of work Scott submitted convinced the selection committee of his suitability for appointment, and after completing a camouflage course, he left for France arriving at the 1st Division’s headquarters around 14 June 1918. While the other artists travelled to the Somme sector, he went to northern France, probably to St-Sylvestre-Cappel.

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157 Letter, Treloar to Longstaff, 10 December 1919, AWM 93, 8/2/23.
158 Application for a Discharge in a Country other than Australia, 15 December 1919, William Frederick Longstaff service records, NAA.
159 Letter, AIF Administrative Headquarters to Longstaff, 7 January 1920; Casualty Form-Active Service; William Frederick Longstaff service records, NAA.
160 Cable, AIF Headquarters, London to Defence, 3 January 1920; memorandum, Treloar to Griffiths, 7 January 1920; cable, Defence to AIF Headquarters, London, 8 January 1920; all in AWM 93, 18/2/10. Scott’s service was also extended by six weeks to permit him to paint two pictures: ibid. The decision came down to money, with Treloar persuading Griffiths that the men’s extra pay and allowances of £75/12/- and £65/2/- respectively was justified given the nature of their work on national records.
161 Attestation Paper of Persons Enlisted for Service Abroad, James Fraser Scott service records, NAA.
162 He suffered a mild gun shot wound to his left hand and neck. See letter, Scott to Gullett, 19 July 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286; Casualty Form-Active Service; letter, Officer in Charge, Base Records to Mrs C Scott (Scott’s mother), 1 December 1917; both in James Fraser Scott service records, NAA.
163 Casualty Form-Active Service, James Fraser Scott service records, NAA; letter, Scott to Officer in Charge, AWRS, 9 March 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 1.
164 Casualty Form-Active Service, James Fraser Scott service records, NAA.
During the summer the 1st Division occupied the ground between Strazeele and Merris and carried out several successful sorties in operations known as ‘peaceful penetration’. In May and June 1918 German posts were taken almost daily, but from mid-July the Australians encountered stiffer resistance. Larger offensives were then undertaken culminating in the capture of Merris on 29-30 July. Between 31 July and 2 August the division was relieved, but its respite was momentary. Events were unfolding on the Somme requiring its urgent attendance; it entrained for the journey south arriving at the battlefield on 8 August.

Throughout this period Scott had been geographically distant from Gullett, whose headquarters were at Ailly-sur-Somme west of Amiens, and also from Bean, although he saw him for ‘a few minutes’ on 12 July. Now, coming south with his division, Scott entered the fold.

Scott arrived in time to participate in the assessment process to determine if his appointment should be confirmed. But in this he was at a disadvantage, having had to come south without the approximately eight pictures he made in Flanders. In terms of his selection of subjects, these set the pattern for his further work. Apart from Daylight raid, France, which depicts a raid carried out by the Australians along the Strazeele front, his subjects are mundane: a view of a camp of Nissen huts at St-Sylvestre-Cappel serving as the 1st Division’s headquarters; a march-past beside a church in Pradelles; a view of Cassel’s market square crowded with various vehicles; an interior view of a Nissen hut used as offices, Nissen hut, St Sylvestre Chapelle; and interior views of observation posts. These subjects hardly did justice to the many audacious raids his division successfully carried out during the summer.

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165 Bean, Anzac to Amiens, p 455.
166 Ibid.
168 Ibid., pp 438-9.
169 Bean, Anzac to Amiens, p 474.
171 Letter, Scott to Gullett, 19 July 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286; Bean diary, June-September 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/116/1, entry 12 July 1918, p 25a.
172 These had been sent to Samer for storage with the 1st Division’s kits. See Gullett, Report No 24, week ending 25 August 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6, paragraph 3(h).
173 He had shown a view to Bean who commented that it was ‘excellently typical’. See Bean diary, June-September 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/116/1, entry 12 July 1918, p 25a.
174 The climax occurred on 11 July 1918 when two small patrols captured a whole garrison of the German front line opposing them – 68 men and 7 machine-guns. For Bean’s account of this and earlier ‘extraordinarily daring patrols’ carried out between 29 June and 9 July 1918, see Official History Vol 6, pp 409-27.
In the Somme sector Scott got down to work and by 18 August had delivered about nine pictures to Gullett. Reporting to Treloar, Gullett said he had been ‘in close and frequent touch’ with Scott and was ‘very favourably impressed’ with him, particularly as he was ‘working cheerfully under very adverse conditions’, largely due to his lack of a substantive rank. General Glasgow, commanding the 1st Division, also spoke well of him, and in recommending that his appointment be confirmed said: ‘He has delivered several instructive and useful lectures on “Camouflage” and made every use of his opportunities as an Artist while with the Division.’ Bean pronounced Scott’s pictures ‘excellent’, his appointment was duly confirmed and an honorary commission conferred on him with effect on 6 September 1918.

Scott produced about forty-three pictures in France consisting of equal numbers of oils and watercolours. His most productive period was August, doubtless because he knew his performance was being evaluated. Concentrating on subjects he found in his immediate area, at Corbie, Aubigny and Villers-Bretonneux, he produced about twenty-two pictures. But he did not neglect the Allied offensive completely. Trailing after the Australians as they advanced east, he made a handful of pictures at Bayonvillers, Foucaucourt and Proyart, but whether he gave proper attention to the offensive is doubtful. His pictures are of structures, camps and equipment; interior and exterior views of churches; bridges; the Australian hospital at Aubigny; encampments of the artillery such as 1st Field Artillery Brigade, Aubigny 1918 [124]; a field gun; a chateau at Villers-Bretonneux used as headquarters; wrecked tanks; and ruined buildings. While making these his division was engaged in the battle losing 1,931 men during the period 7-14 August. Although by Western Front standards such casualties were slight, for the AIF they were catastrophic. Scott’s efforts to address this and other tragedies in his pictures, such as those he made of casualties at dressing and casualty clearing stations on 10, 11 and 23 August, were desultory compared to his efforts in depicting Corbie Abbey, not once but three times: Interior of Corbie Abbey, showing effect of shell-fire [125]; Corbie Abbey showing effects of shellfire; Bombed cathedral ruins. In following the advance the farthest point he reached was Proyart where he

175 Gullett, Report No 23, week ending 18 August 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 5, paragraph 3(b).
176 Ibid., paragraph 3(c); Gullett, Report No 24, week ending 25 August 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6, paragraph 3(d)(iv).
177 Letter, Glasgow to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 13 August 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2.
178 Bean, second memoir, Appendix I.
179 Bean, Official History Vol 6, p 684.
made a picture of a German machine-gun post. At nearby Foucaucourt he made another picture of a captured German machine-gun post, *Machine gunner killed at his post near Foucaucourt*. These two and the three Scott made of dressing and casualty clearing stations, four if *Captured German casualty clearing station, 1918 [126]* is included, constitute the totality of the works he made recording the advance. He had made no pictures of Australians going into battle, none of the battles, and none of the men, save as small figures in a few scenes, for instance in *End of day’s rush, forward loading post* showing wounded soldiers on stretchers being loaded into field ambulances at a casualty clearing station.

During September Scott’s production fell away and by the end of the month had ceased entirely.¹⁸⁰ He produced about sixteen pictures finding his subjects further east, at Halle, Mont St Quentin, Péronne, Tincourt, Buire and Templeux-le-Guérard, reflecting the Allies’ progress during the month in advancing towards the Hindenburg Line. The battles for Mont St Quentin and Péronne had been decided when he arrived at Halle around 9 September, making a picture of the bridge built across the Somme before the attack on Mont St Quentin, *Somme bridge, Halle*. Of course, all that Scott could do was record the aftermath of these battles. To that end he made three pictures at Mont St Quentin: *Nissen hut, Mont St Quentin [127]*; a still life, *Flowers gathered at Mont St Quentin*; and a view of captured trenches on the summit of the hill, *Mont St Quentin [128]*. At Péronne he recorded the terrible devastation caused to the town during its bombardment. Apart from a view of the trenched landscape looking from an old German position, his remaining five pictures show the town’s ruined buildings: its church, citadel, gates, town square and houses, as in *Péronne [129]*. At Buire he made *Office of the General Officer Commanding, Buire [130]* and depicted an observation position, and at Templeux-le-Guérard he made another picture of a captured enemy machine-gun post, *Enemy machine-gun position [131]*, showing two dead Germans lying near their gun. In Tincourt he painted Australian soldiers playing quoits, and this picture and another of a cookhouse are his only works which feature the men. Although the advance was continuing, around 28 September Scott turned around and headed back to Villers-Bretonneux stopping at Bray to make a picture of a bridge, *Bray-sur-Somme*. He made no pictures during his remaining six weeks in France. Although he lost ten days in October when he was lent to Anderson to work

¹⁸⁰ This claim is based on the dating of his forty-three pictures in Appendix I of Bean’s second memoir. The calculations of the number of pictures Scott made in Flanders and then in the Somme sector appearing in the text are substantially based on Appendix I and less so on the details of his pictures held by the memorial and recorded in its collection databases.
on the modelling scheme, and made a return trip to Samer to retrieve his pictures, his failure to make any pictures during this period is inexplicable.

Bean allocated seven pictures to Scott for painting in London: (1) the death of Major Black at Bullecourt on 11 April 1917; (2) the Menin Road or the Ypres battlefield as he saw it; (3) the runner at Ypres; (4) the last fight of Captain Hammond at Morlancourt in June 1918; (5) the patrol in the corn at Merri in July 1918; (6) the attack by the 53rd and 54th Battalions towards the old ramparts at Péronne on 1 September 1918; and (7) the pillbox.\textsuperscript{181} Comparatively industrious in France, during his year in the studio Scott overlooked painting Hammond’s death and the attack at Péronne and only managed to paint a few pictures, among them \textit{Death of Major Black} (1919),\textsuperscript{182} \textit{4th Division Artillery and Infantry moving into battle} (1919) [132], an impressive show of Australian arms taking part in the Allied offensive on the Somme during 1918, \textit{The Runner} (1919) and \textit{German pillbox} (1919).

Scott’s representation of a runner failed to reflect Bean’s conception of this important figure. In the official history he described their work and paid tribute to them, observing that they ‘drew on themselves the special admiration of their mates’.\textsuperscript{183} Messages had occasionally to be carried by men running for the most part over the open; on other occasions by men making their way in the dark through unfamiliar territory amid barbed-wire belts.\textsuperscript{184} Typical of runners was their determination to deliver their messages. When Private Angel’s legs were paralysed from a wound in his back, he dragged himself forward to an officer in the distance and gave him the message. Picked up two hours later, his claimed ‘first words’ were: ‘Has that message been delivered?’\textsuperscript{185} Bean relates how a young runner, Private Mactier, came to be posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.\textsuperscript{186} Armed with a revolver and several bombs, he was sent back at Mont St Quentin to discover the reason for a stoppage. Encountering a

\begin{footnotes}
\item[181] Bean, second memoir, Appendix K.
\item[182] Scott possibly painted three pictures of this subject; not one was apparently considered satisfactory for hanging. See letter, Treloar to Bean, 16 March 1922, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/323. In addition to \textit{Death of Major Black} (1919), Scott painted \textit{Battle scene} (1919) in London which according to the details of the work given by the memorial in its collection databases ‘refers’ to the death of Black, and another, \textit{Battle of the Somme (Death of Major Black)} (1918-1932), which was deaccessioned and presented to the village of Bullecourt on 23 April 1988. As to this last picture see Elizabeth Burness, ‘Collection Note: The Death of Major Percy Black’, \textit{Journal of the Australian War Memorial}, no 15, October 1989, pp 45-6, which includes a reproduction of the work. Wheeler later painted a replacement picture, \textit{The death of Major Black} (1923).
\item[183] \textit{Official History Vol 3}, p 519.
\item[184] Ibid., p 533; \textit{Official History Vol 6}, p 1001.
\item[185] \textit{Official History Vol 3}, p 598n. The official history is full of these kinds of anecdotes and of ‘first’ and ‘last words’.
\item[186] \textit{Official History Vol 6}, pp 835-6.
\end{footnotes}
German patrol he ran through it, overcame two machine-gun crews by bombing them and was killed as he ran to attack another gun. He successfully cleared the stoppage.

Scott’s *The Runner* [133] is a dark picture which shows a soldier walking on muddy and water-logged ground; immediately behind him a number of other soldiers are shown walking along a duckboard path carrying duckboards. In the distance along the horizon line a band of yellow/orange suggests an ongoing battle. The soldier, who is presumably carrying a message, appears to be unarmed save for a staff which he uses to steady his progress as he makes his way over the soggy terrain. Armed with a staff he cuts a strange figure, a biblical character transported from the Holy Land to a quagmire on the Western Front millennia in the future. It can be assumed that in conceiving the subject Bean envisaged a picture which referred explicitly to the runner’s hazardous occupation, but in his treatment of it Scott ignored this. His runner walks towards the rear in an unhurried and unconcerned fashion, giving the misleading impression that in terms of danger his occupation was benign. Bean aimed to represent the typical, and Scott’s representation was hardly that. Wheeler’s *The Runner* (1923) does what Scott’s failed to do: it illustrates both the spirit of runners and the perilous nature of their work. He shows a battlefield with bombed buildings and explosions in the background. In the foreground a young soldier crawls along the ground with his left arm outstretched holding a note. This is high theatre. The inference is that he has been wounded, probably mortally, but his only thought is to deliver the message. It seems that Wheeler’s dramatic scene was suggested by Major-General Nevill Smyth who witnessed the incident at Pozières.187 And Bean recounted it in the official history: a runner crossing a road at Pozières was mortally wounded by a shell. He died with his message held high in the air between his fingers. A party came upon him ‘still holding out the paper’, and relieving him of it delivered it to its destination.188

During 1919 Scott did not work exclusively painting pictures in London. It will be recalled he spent two months in France working with the modelling team. And he also carried out some minor private work.189 Towards the end of the year Scott offered, as Longstaff had done, ‘to continue in the employment of the Australian Government preparing pictures for [its]

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187 Letter, Treloar to Smyth, 15 September 1925, AWM 93, 18/2/14.
188 *Official History Vol 3*, p 598n.
national collections’, and with the same result: Defence refused his offer and indicated that it would not authorise his employment on war records beyond 31 December 1919. He decided to stay in England. On 13 January 1920 he applied for a discharge in that country offering that as an artist England was ‘a much better field’ and that he was able to maintain himself working in his profession. He was discharged on 31 March. Like Longstaff, Scott’s service was extended by six weeks, in his case to permit him to paint The Runner and German pillbox, and during this period he briefly returned to France to obtain material for them. His discharge marked the end of his part in the war art scheme.

V – McCubbin

McCubbin, a professional artist from Melbourne, enlisted in May 1916. After training in the medical corps he arrived in France in November 1917 and was posted to 10th Field Ambulance. He was in the line at Armentières and Ploegsteert, but not during any specific battle, and saw action as a stretcher-bearer ‘up forward’ during the battles on the Somme occurring from 27 March to 27 April 1918 on the Corbie-Vaux sectors. When applying for the position of AIF artist he explained that because his unit had been in the line for the last month he could only submit ‘a few slight examples’ of his work. ‘Slight’ they may have been, but they convinced the selection committee of his suitability for appointment. After completing a camouflage course he arrived at the 3rd Division’s headquarters around 12 May 1918.

For more than two months McCubbin performed little work of any kind. When Gullett visited his division during the week ending 30 June 1918, he was told McCubbin was ‘just pottering around doing odd jobs’. As he did not date the bulk of his work, it has been impossible to

190 Letter, Treloar to Scott, 10 December 1919, AWM 93, 8/2/23.
191 Application for a Discharge in a Country other then Australia, 13 January 1920, James Fraser Scott service records, NAA. But he was barely able to maintain himself and died in poverty on 25 April 1932. See ‘Artist’s death. Tragic circumstances. Mr JF Scott’s last picture’, Sydney Morning Herald, 27 April 1932, p 11.
192 Record of Officers’ Services, James Fraser Scott service records, NAA.
193 Casualty Form-Active Service, James Fraser Scott service records, NAA.
194 Attestation Paper of Persons Enlisted for Service Abroad, Louis Frederick McCubbin service records, NAA.
195 No 11 Australian General Hospital, Training Certificate Hospital Course, 13 April 1917; Casualty Form-Active Service; both in Louis Frederick McCubbin service records, NAA.
196 Letter, McCubbin to Officer in Charge, BEF Subsection, AWR S, 11 July 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
197 Letter, McCubbin to Officer in Charge, AWRS, 7 March 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 1.
198 They were possibly five watercolour landscapes made in 1917 when in the Messines sector, later included in Appendix I of Bean’s memoir. After his selection he agreed to let them go to the national collection. See letter, McCubbin to Officer in Charge, AWRS, 12 May 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 1.
199 Ibid.
establish the pictures he produced during this period. His earliest dated work, *Bombardment near Albert* [134], was made on 25 June. On 6 July he, Benson and MacDonald attended the conference with Bean at Bertangles during which the correspondent unveiled his modelling scheme. There is no evidence that after the conference McCubbin threw himself into his work, at least that is the inference from the fact that a solitary picture is dated to July – *Main Corbie-Amiens Road and main dressing station of 11th Field Ambulance* – which he made on the 18th. The encouragement to become productive arrived in early August when he became aware that his performance was being evaluated. Predictably, this produced a flurry of activity and between 8 and 11 August, coinciding with the commencement of the Allied offensive, he made at least seven pictures. The timing was propitious: it gave him the opportunity of recording the AIF’s part in the offensive and of producing pictures of combined figure and landscape subjects, the class of work he claimed was his ‘speciality’. Doubtless he appreciated that a significant moment in the war had arrived, but no sense of this, or of the 3rd Division’s part in it, can be gathered from his pictures. Working to the west of the starting line in an area encompassing Corbie, Sailly-le-Sec, Accroche Wood, Hamel, Vaire Wood and Hamelet, he recorded war and less damaged landscapes, such as *Hamelet, looking from old German front line* [135], ruined villages such as *Hamel 11/8/18* [136], and wrecked vehicles. The men do not feature in his pictures, notwithstanding that the entire Australian Corps was in the sector. Moreover, his division, committed to the attack from the outset, suffered 1,095 casualties during the period 7-14 August. A picture he made on 9 August, *Ruined village, Sailly-le-Sec* [137], which depicts a line of horsedrawn wagons and limbers passing through the village on its way to the battle, is the closest he came to recording its involvement. In terms of subject selection, his efforts during these few days established the pattern for his later work.

When around 18 September McCubbin received word that an honorary commission had been conferred on him, his time in France was drawing to a close. By then he had reached and perhaps returned from Péronne, the farthest point in a journey eastwards he made behind the Australians as they advanced towards the Hindenburg Line. At Mont St Quentin and Péronne

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200 This and the other dates of his pictures given in the text derive from the dates attributed to them in Appendix I of Bean’s second memoir.
201 Letter, McCubbin to Officer in Charge, BEF Subsection, AWRS, 11 July 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
203 It will be recalled that McCubbin went to England on leave around 29 October 1918.
he made about fourteen pictures – the latest is dated 13 September – including *Mont St Quentin, summit of the mount, painted soon after the battle* [138] and *Citadel, Péronne* [139], and on the way there, or perhaps on the way back, he made about twelve pictures in villages and towns along the Somme River where the 3rd Division had fought and passed through – Étinehem, Bray-sur-Somme, Cappy, Suzanne, Curlu and Cléry-sur-Somme. Whether after producing this work he remained sufficiently motivated to make further pictures is doubtful. If he made any between mid-September and late October 1918, he found his subjects in an area now well west of the front line encompassing Amiens, Corbie, Bussy-les-Daours, Villers-Bretonneux, Glisy, Coisy, and Sailly-le-Sec, for instance *Street at Glisy* [140].

From late August 1918 onwards Gullett scarcely mentioned McCubbin in his weekly reports, some evidence that he was not carrying out any substantial work. On 22 September Gullett reported to Treloar that McCubbin had ‘a number of paintings ready’ and that they would be sent across ‘within the next few days’.204 This did not occur, apparently because McCubbin did not deliver them to Gullett. Towards the end of October Treloar was becoming concerned about the artist’s performance, telling Gullett: ‘It is noticed that not much material [he meant no material] is coming through from Lieut. McCubbin. Is there any special reason for this?’205 By the time Gullett replied the artist had left for England and the need to address Treloar’s specific question disappeared. Still, he allayed his concerns telling him that before McCubbin left he claimed to have ‘about 40 sketches and paintings nearly completed’ and ventured that he took these with him.206 It seems he did and that Treloar, whom McCubbin visited on 1 November, was now satisfied.207

McCubbin later claimed that he made seventy-eight pictures in France, all of which he handed to the AWRS.208 The vast majority of them are watercolours with roughly fifteen oil pictures and ten pencil drawings making up the rest.209 Judged numerically this seems an impressive performance, especially when compared to the performances of Benson, Longstaff and Scott. However, judged by the criterion of subject matter, his pictures largely consist of the same mixed bag produced by the others. His smorgasbord approach reflects the

204 Gullet, Report No 28, week ending 22 September 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6, paragraph 3(d).
206 Letter, Gullett to Treloar, 1 November 1918, AWM 25, 1013/25 Part 6.
208 Letter, McCubbin to Officer in Charge, AWRS, 28 December 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
209 Some reliance has had to be placed on the details of McCubbin’s pictures held by the memorial and recorded in its collection databases. For instance, in Bean’s list nine sketches without descriptions are referred to globally.
mistaken view that in terms of subjects it was better to produce a little of everything than a lot of a few.

With McCubbin’s training and experience in the medical corps, including working as a stretcher-bearer, he was peculiarly suited to making a study of the treatment of the wounded and dying ‘up forward’ and in the dressing and casualty clearing stations and how they were transported from the battlefield to the rear. But he eschewed making even a single picture of this important subject, unless Main dressing station Amiens road [141] counts. Such a study need not have been undertaken at the expense of recording other subjects; he had ample time and opportunity to supplement it with pictures of landscapes; ruined villages and street scenes; camps and headquarters, as in 3rd Pioneer Battalion Camp near Bussy [142]; the passage of soldiers, wagons, trucks and artillery through villages and along roads; churches and other buildings; horse lines; bridges; plummeting observation balloons and aircraft; tanks, trucks, guns and other equipment; and railways, the vast array of subjects making up his work. Although several of his pictures contain representations of the men his treatment of them is cursory, as in In Étinehem which shows a group of soldiers on horseback travelling through the ruined town. He repeated this general scene in several other pictures, including Étinehem, Clery, Railway near Péronne, At a water point, Street at Glisy and Ruined church. But whenever and in whatever context they appear he renders them as small sketchy figures with a minimum of detail. In no real sense are they pictures of combined figure and landscape subjects, his ‘speciality’. Only The battle of Mont St Quentin in progress as seen from a ridge near Clery and painted between 2am and 4am on the day of the battle depicts an incident of any moment, and then at a distance.210 Although Péronne, heavy artillery advancing through the town [143] does not appear to depict a special incident in the AIF’s history, his line of howitzers passing through the smoking ruins of the town is a striking image and a significant advance on other pictures of incidents he made, such as Valley of the Somme near Bussy [144]. The ‘incident’ it represents, the passage of a train of articulated general service wagons and limbers along a road, is secondary to representing the landscape – its contours, features, vegetation and colours – and the prevailing atmosphere. His interest in capturing these elements anticipated his work with the modelling team. In this he could ignore all other

210 But as Peter Stanley points out, the claim advanced by the picture’s title is ‘curious’ in circumstances where it was dark during the times McCubbin specified he painted it and, more significantly, the second attack had not begun. It began at 6am. See Men of Mont St Quentin: Between Victory and Death, Scribe Books, Melbourne, 2009, pp 143-4.
distracting elements and focus entirely on the landscape. But it was premature for him to have followed such an approach, and in doing so he did the 3rd Division a disservice by failing to record its operations in a substantial way.

By 6 December 1918, when Treloar notified the AIF artists ensconced in the St John’s Wood studio of the pictures Bean wished them to paint, it had been decided to employ McCubbin as the modelling scheme’s landscape artist. That decision is reflected in Bean assigning him the painting of only three pictures: (1) ‘the fall of Richthofen’; (2) the road to the battle through Sailly-le-Sec on 8 August 1918; and (3) the fight for Mont St Quentin as he saw it on 31 August–1 September 1918.211 As Bean explained: ‘Lieut. McCubbin’s main work will be the production of an effect giving the artistic value (the actual spirit of the day and of the fight – the living atmosphere) to the landscape models of which he will be in charge under Lieut. Anderson.’212 His work with the modelling team in Belgium, France and Egypt, and after his return to Australia on the models, prevented him from giving the pictures any attention until 1921 when he painted 3rd Division Artillery passing through Sailly-le-Sec, August 1918, a worked up version of Ruined village, Sailly-le-Sec which he made during the war. However, for reasons not discovered in the evidence, he never painted the other pictures. This is confounding given his status as a witness of the events they were intended to depict.

According to Bean’s conceptualisation of the modelling scheme, McCubbin’s role was critical as the responsibility of creating a convincing illusion of battlefield atmosphere would fall on him. His work in the field, then, would be largely taken up with recording the conditions of light and the colours of battlefields assumed or known to have existed at the times the battles were fought, but also with making topographical studies to guide the modellers in constructing accurate relief models of the battlefields. Although this was the focus of his work, he would still be engaged in producing pictures. Whether he made mere notes, sketches and studies sufficient to permit him to give ‘artistic value’ to the models, or pictures in their own right, appears to have been left to McCubbin. He followed the latter course. As his work with the team appears not to have been the subject of any system of record-keeping, establishing the pictures he made is problematic.213 It seems he made roughly

211 Bean, second memoir, Appendix K.
212 Ibid.
213 In the absence of any contemporary records, substantial reliance has had to be placed on the details of McCubbin’s works held by the memorial and recorded in its collection databases. It seems clear they entered the
seventy pictures executed in oil and watercolour and on supports of various kinds and sizes. According to their titles, during a fifteen-month period he visited several locations on the Western Front and in Egypt: Bellenglise, Bellicourt, Bony, Bullecourt, le Catelet, Corbie, Dernancourt, Gueudecourt, Mont St Quentin, Péronne, Romani, Templeux-le-Guérard, Vaussur-Somme, le Verguier, Villers-Bretonneux, Lamotte-Warfusée, and Messines, Zonnebeke, Broodseinde, Nonne Boschen and Polygon Wood in the Ypres sector.

The concentration of pictures McCubbin made at Villers-Bretonneux, in the Ypres sector and at Romani, and to a lesser extent at Mont St Quentin and Dernancourt, is explicable on the basis that it was planned to construct a plan model of Villers-Bretonneux and dioramas representing incidents from the battles fought at the other locations. Doubtless his pictures were intended to serve as reference material on which he could draw when painting the fabricated landscapes and backgrounds of the dioramas to create a convincing illusion of the particular battlefield. However, after he had recourse to the pictures for this purpose their value did not evaporate. And it is tolerably clear from the care and attention he gave to their making, evident in his panorama of Dernancourt in four sections of which Panorama of Dernancourt (1919) is an example, and his watercolours of sandhills at Romani, for instance Desert sandhills: sketch for Romani model (1920), that he regarded them both as pictures and as reference material.214 The pictures he made of other locations, places which had seen lesser fights involving the AIF, cannot be explained on the basis that he required reference material for later use on models. They include panoramic views of Corbie and the Somme valley and pictures of the entrance to the St Quentin Canal at Bellicourt. Otherwise their subjects are wrecked landscapes, buildings – especially churches – and villages. Still, and notwithstanding that these pictures were unlikely to be used in connection with the modelling scheme, they added to the national storehouse of pictures which Bean would have claimed represented places in or connected to the Anzac story.215

collection haphazardly in smaller or larger groups the vast majority of which were accessioned in the early 1930s, evidence, perhaps, that Treloar did not regard them as pictures in their own right but merely material for use in constructing the models.

214 However, it may be doubted whether it had been strictly necessary for him to visit the battlefields when he later painted the landscapes and backgrounds for dioramas of battlefields he visited but did not sketch – Pozières and Bullecourt – and of those he never visited – Lone Pine, Magdhaba and Semakh. See the checklist of First World War dioramas in Back and Webster, Moments in Time, pp 72-80.

215 McCubbin’s work on the modelling scheme did not end with the models (dioramas) proper. During 1923–4 he painted seven oil pictures to complement a series of nine small dioramas entitled Evacuation of the wounded illustrating the successive stages in the treatment of the wounded after their evacuation from a battlefield
Possibly in recognition of McCubbin’s devotion to the modelling scheme and related projects, in the late 1920s the memorial commissioned him to paint a historical picture the subject of which was the logical terminus of Bean’s scheme of pictures – as to which see chapter 5 – the passage of three RAN destroyers through the Dardanelles on 12 November 1918 as part of the Allied fleet which sailed to Constantinople. While the destroyers ahead were steaming through the straits, Parramatta’s commander requested permission to fly as a tribute to members of the AIF killed at Anzac an Australian blue ensign which had been presented by the people of Parramatta in pre-war days. The answer given was: ‘The Commonwealth blue ensign may be flown at the portyard in honour of Australia’s glorious dead.’ The destroyers immediately hoisted their largest blue ensigns and kept them flying until they arrived at Constantinople early next morning. After the usual scramble to ascertain vital details of the incident – in this case the position of the ships in the channel, their formation, colour and location of their numbers – McCubbin painted RAN tribute to Anzac dead, Dardanelles, 12th November 1918 (1928) [145]. It shows the Yarra, Torrens and Parramatta in line formation steaming in mid-channel behind other vessels in the fleet. On their port side is a cliff of the peninsula, the terminus of two rainbows which issue from an amalgam of dark grey and white cumulus clouds. From their position in the channel it is clear the ships will shortly pass beneath the virtual arch created by the intermingling of the rainbows and clouds to enter, according to the picture’s rhetoric, a brighter and more peaceful future.

starting with a regimental aid post, moving through dressing and casualty clearing stations to a general hospital, and ending with a hospital ship. This series apparently depicts the arrangements made for the evacuation of the wounded during the battle of Messines in June 1917. His pictures were exhibited interspersed between the dioramas for the purpose of ‘linking the narrative together’. Predictably, the disposal of the dead does not feature in the dioramas or the pictures, although one might have thought that illustrating this was essential in order to give a complete picture of the military’s arrangements for treating the wounded and caring for the dying and the dead. During 1926-8, or perhaps in 1930, McCubbin contributed to creating another series of nine small dioramas entitled Transportation of supplies, Palestine, 1916 illustrating the successive stages of the system of transporting the supplies necessary in order to wage war from Deir el Belah on the Mediterranean coast through the desert to the battle zone. For this series McCubbin painted eight oil pictures which were exhibited interspersed between the dioramas to illustrate their connection. See Back and Webster, Moments in Time, pp 23, 36-9, 81-2, 82-3. Strangely, they do not discuss the pictures. It appears that three pictures from the first series and the dioram making up the second series have been deaccessioned.

216 Although not entirely clear, it seems McCubbin painted the picture as part of his employment duties with the memorial and received no payment for it. See letters, Treloar to Heyes, 5 June 1928, AWM 93, 18/4/43; 13 April 1929, AWM 93, 24.

217 Australian Chivalry, ‘Saluting the fallen’, plate 52.

218 Letters, Bean to Griffiths, 11 November 1927; Bean to Lieutenant-Commander Hill, 11 November 1927; Griffiths to Bazley, 15 November 1927; Bean to Griffiths, 9 December 1927; all in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/309.

219 McCubbin painted another historical picture during his employment with the memorial, the ceremony inaugurating it conducted in Canberra on Anzac Day 1929. In the presence of Prime Minister Stanley Bruce,
VI – Lindsay

A draughtsman before the war, Lindsay enlisted in February 1916 and was attached to the Australian Army Service Corps (AASC) as a driver of horsedrawn general service wagons. He arrived in France in November 1916 and was stationed at Nieppe, his unit serving the Armentières sector which got ‘pretty hot at times’. In February 1917 someone pulled strings and got him attached to 1st Anzac Corps as Dyson’s batman. According to Lindsay, he and Dyson saw a great deal of the campaigns during 1917, and at Dyson’s urging he filled sketchbooks with drawings of ‘Diggers’ in various attitudes and settings. Representative of this work is France, 1917 [146] depicting a transportation line of the AASC.

In London in early 1918, Lindsay ran into an old friend at AIF Administrative Headquarters who asked whether he could draw. After admitting he could ‘in an amateurish kind of way’, he was taken to General Howse, the Deputy Director of Medical Services (DDMS), who told him that Lieutenant-Colonel Newland, in charge of the Australian section for facial restoration at the Queen’s Hospital, needed someone urgently who could do medical diagrams. He travelled

dignitaries and a large gathering of members of the public, the Governor-General, Lord Stonehaven, unveiled a commemorative stone, the memorial’s virtual foundation stone. (See ‘Anzac Day. Celebration in Canberra. National war memorial. Unveiling of commemorative stone’, Canberra Times, 23 April 1929, p 1.) It was a significant event in the nation’s history, arguably standing behind the inauguration of the Commonwealth in Centennial Park on 1 January 1901, the opening of the first Commonwealth Parliament on 1 May 1901, and the landing at Anzac Cove on 25 April 1915. The first escaped the attention of an artist, but not of photographers; the second was painted by Tom Roberts; and the third by Lambert. The sweeping panoramic view McCubbin presents in The inauguration of the Australian War Memorial, Canberra, ANZAC Day 1929 (1929) is taken from the foot of Mount Ainslie looking towards Old Parliament House. It can only be seen indistinctly, an error made by McCubbin who should have ensured that in the minds of the picture’s audience the ceremony and the seat of government were connected. From a slightly elevated viewpoint he describes a distant crowd of people standing in a semi-circle in a field. There is obviously something important going on as the crowd is ranged around several tall flagpoles on which flags fly, and in the middle ground perhaps a dais can be made out. However, the nature of the event would be a mystery without the picture’s title. Most of the picture is taken up with the landscape, the large tree in the right foreground, the green fields and hills proximate to the crowd, and behind it in the distance a line of blue hills and an expanse of blue sky with a few white clouds.

Attestation Paper of Persons Enlisted for Service Abroad; Statement of Service; both in Daryl Ernest Lindsay service records, NAA.

Lindsay, The Leafy Tree, p 108; Casualty Form-Active Service, Daryl Ernest Lindsay service records, NAA.

Lindsay, The Leafy Tree, pp 110-11; Casualty Form-Active Service, Daryl Ernest Lindsay service records, NAA. McMullin claims that ‘presumably’ Dyson was instrumental in getting Lindsay transferred suggesting this was done because his brother-in-law Reg Lindsay had recently been killed in action. See Will Dyson, p 130.

Lindsay, The Leafy Tree, p 113. On returning to Australia, Lindsay sold 36 of these drawings to the Mitchell Library. Predominantly watercolours, they depict a wide variety of subjects. See Lindsay, The Leafy Tree, p 124; Mitchell Library, PXD 502.

It seems Lindsay gave twenty-seven pictures from 1917, mostly watercolours, to the Commonwealth before returning to Australia. See letter, Treloar to Lindsay, 1 June 1920, AWM 93, 18/163. Moreover, in February 1920 the memorial acquired two Lindsay pictures from Bean for £17/17/-.

See letter, Treloar to Bean, with attached claim form, 16 February 1920, AWM 38, 3DRL 7447/25 Part 3.
down to Sidcup, saw Newland, and agreed to ‘have a shot at it’. By 22 February he had been provisionally selected as the ‘medical’ AIF artist and was working at Sidcup. Although he later formally applied for the position, apparently submitting fourteen specimens of his work, his circumstances made it imperative that he be selected.

For over a year Lindsay worked at the hospital making instructional diagrams of surgical procedures carried out to repair or alleviate the mostly horrific injuries suffered by soldiers to their faces and jaws. Lindsay claims he became ‘deeply and increasingly interested’ in the work and would stay up half the night to reduce a complicated plastic operation to diagrammatical terms that could be understood by other surgeons and students. It seems he became highly proficient in making these diagrams: some were used by Harold Gillies, senior surgeon to the English section at Sidcup, in his book on plastic surgery. More importantly in the present context Lindsay also made exquisitely detailed watercolour portraits of soldiers depicting their appearance before and after undergoing restorative surgery, such as those he made of Private Randy before [147] and after his operation [148]. In May 1919 Lindsay returned to Australia on the same ship as Newland in order that he might complete his surgical diagrams during the voyage. At the request of the DDMS, he stayed on in the army for three months to produce diagrams which were needed for ‘research purposes’.

During August 1919 Lindsay held a successful exhibition of seventy-seven war drawings and watercolours at the Decoration Galleries in Melbourne. In the catalogue Bean testified to the ‘truth’ with which Lindsay had depicted the men and scenes in his pictures. Later that year fourteen illustrations from his exhibition were reproduced in book form as Daryl Lindsay’s ‘Digger’ Book (Sun Art Studios, Melbourne) to which Bean wrote a foreword eulogising the

225 Lindsay, The Leafy Tree, pp 113-14.
226 Letter, Lindsay to Officer in Charge, AWRS, 12 March 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 1. More especially as it was supported by a testimonial from Newland who said he had seen Lindsay’s drawings and paintings of war injuries.
227 Examples of these were later reproduced in the official history of the Australia’s army medical services in the war. See AG Butler, The Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services in the War of 1914-18, Volume III, Special Problems and Services, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1943, ‘Work of the Australian Facio-Maxillary Section of the Queen Mary Hospital, Sidcup, England 1917-19’, p 328 et seq.
228 Lindsay, The Leafy Tree, p 117.
229 Ibid.
230 Memorandum, Director Medical Services, AIF to DAAG, AIF, 9 April 1919; letter, Major Norman, Repatriation and Demobilisation Dept, AIF to Treloar, 24 April 1919; both in AWM 16, 4351/2/11; Casualty Form-Active Service, Daryl Ernest Lindsay service records, NAA; Lindsay, The Leafy Tree, p 123.
231 Ibid., ‘Lieut Lindsay’s sketches’, Argus, 19 August 1919, p 6.
artist’s efforts in France during the war and his ‘fine collection’. The vast majority of the illustrations showed the men, and overall they comprised a study of the Anzac in various guises, chief among them the typical infantryman shown walking along duckboards. The year continued to be productive with Lindsay contributing more of the same to Padre W Devine’s *The Story of a Battalion* (Melville and Mullen, Melbourne).

The work performed by Lindsay at the Queen’s Hospital was important and valuable for its facio-maxillary surgeons and its patient-soldiers. Certainly this work was immeasurably more important and valuable than his pictures illustrating aspects of the war experience of ‘Diggers’ on the Western Front, or for that matter the pictures made at the front by the official and AIF artists. His instructional diagrams to one side, his watercolours are really portraits of the Anzac, but of an entirely different order to his representation in other pictures. They consist of another mode of Anzac’s representation: the soldiers’ facial injuries, like those Lindsay meticulously recorded in *Potts* [149] and *Greive* [150], represent one of several realities of Anzac. But this was not a reality that Bean or the government wished to draw attention to or promote. It sent entirely the wrong message. Thus, Lindsay’s portraits could never be exhibited, more especially in the memorial to be erected to the AIF.\(^{233}\) Or at least that would have been Bean’s view. Those not retained by the medical authorities at Sidcup were kept separately with the medical records of the AIF where they could do no harm.\(^{234}\)

Lindsay was never offered a commission to paint a historical picture. However, because of the time he spent at Sidcup he was peculiarly placed to paint a special picture depicting some aspect of hospital life involving the treatment and care of wounded AIF men. Although this had occurred to Bean, who in his second memoir allocated Lindsay the painting of ‘hospital scenes’, they were never made.\(^{235}\)

\(^{233}\) For a discussion of visual anxiety prompted by and aversion to being exposed to images of soldiers’ facial disfigurement and mutilation suffered during service in the First World War, which refers to the work done at the Queen’s Hospital, see Suzannah Biernoff, ‘The Rhetoric of Disfigurement in First World War Britain’, *Social History of Medicine*, vol 24, no 3, 2011, pp 666-85.

\(^{234}\) Bean, second memoir, p 3. It seems they are now held in the archives of the Royal Australasian College of Surgeons in Melbourne.

\(^{235}\) Ibid., Appendices K, L. When, in 1924, Lindsay offered to paint a picture for the museum of the advanced dressing station of the 7th Australian Field Ambulance during the attack on Bullecourt in May 1917, based on a sketch he had made of a scene he witnessed, Bean declined the offer claiming the scene was of ‘[i]nsufficient interest to us to add it to our collection’. This was a strange decision. See letters, Pretty to Bean, 27 May 1924; Bean to Pretty, 6 June 1924; Pretty to Bean, 11 June 1924; Bean to Pretty, 13 June 1924; all in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/305.
VII – MacDonald

When MacDonald enlisted in September 1914 he was an established artist with a long history of training and teaching in art. On Gallipoli on 26 April he suffered gun shot wounds to his shoulder and ribs. Evacuated to Egypt for treatment and briefly hospitalised, he was later classified unfit for active service and employed in clerical positions before attached to the Australian Army Pay Corps and sent to England. After his selection as an AIF artist he was hospitalised suffering from chronic dyspepsia; he told the medical staff he had been dyspeptic ‘off and on’ for the last twenty years. Given his poor health and the prospect of having to work in difficult and unfamiliar conditions, MacDonald should have abandoned taking up his appointment. In France, he complained endlessly to Gullett about his health and the ‘bad conditions’ and put him to ‘much trouble’ to collect his work. Evacuated to England in August 1918 for medical boarding, he was invalided to Australia.

MacDonald’s departure from the AIF scheme was a disappointment to Bean who thought his ability as an artist ‘would have made him useful had he been otherwise suitable’. In France he produced twenty-four pictures, sixteen in crayon and eight in oil, nine of which carried titles including An opening of an attack, Tanks at Blangy, Shellhole at Bois d’Ecardraineuse and Observation balloon. Bean’s criticism of MacDonald that he did very little seems unjustified when his output is compared to Benson’s and Longstaff’s over a much longer period. His other criticism, his choice of subjects, also seems unjustified. From his pictures’ titles, including titles subsequently assigned, for instance Diggers bathing, Man watching dirigible, Blacksmith shoeing a horse in a war-damaged building and Musicians cycling, his subjects are no different to those chosen by the other artists. And in a minor respect his selections were more varied as he made portraits of two enlisted men in the Cyclist Corps.

236 Attestation Paper of Persons Enlisted for Service Abroad, James Stuart MacDonald service records, NAA.
237 Casualty Form-Active Service, James Stuart MacDonald service records, NAA.
238 Ibid.
239 Casualty Form-Active Service; Medical Case Sheet, 2nd Australian Auxiliary Hospital, Southall, April 1918; both in James Stuart MacDonald service records, NAA.
241 Letter, Commander, 5th Division to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 20 August 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2; Casualty Form-Active Service; Medical Report on an Invalid, 25 September 1918; both in James Stuart MacDonald service records, NAA.
242 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 28 August 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/15 Part 2.
243 Bean, second memoir, Appendix I, p 5. According to the memorial’s collection databases only nine of his works remain in its collection.
Corporal Whitechurch and Private Dart, bequeathing to them and their corps a measure of immortality.
5 Bean’s picture scheme

At the heart of the war art scheme is a series of about 70 large historical pictures representing incidents, locations and conditions in the story of Anzac commencing with Bryant’s Landing at Kabakaul (1925), an incident from Australia’s earliest campaign of the war to capture German New Guinea, and ending with HMAS Australia at the surrender of the German fleet in the Firth of Forth (1920) by Burgess which depicts Australia leading the capital ships of the British port line at the surrender of the German High Seas Fleet on 21 November 1918. These pictures were produced as a direct result of Bean’s efforts to see to it that the story he wished told in the national war museum for posterity was illustrated. There they would complement the telling of the story through the display of other exhibits including portraits of its principal actors, models, trophies, relics, photographs, sculptures and dioramas, and together would promote the idea that Anzac was a military tradition.

Bean’s picture scheme had modest beginnings. It will be recalled that clause 8 of the artist’s agreement allowed that the Commonwealth might require an official artist to paint a picture ‘of a battle scene or other operation’ in which the AIF was represented. On 18 January 1918, when Fisher cabled Hughes proposing the appointment of additional official artists, he recommended that each artist be commissioned to paint a ‘large composition’ from his sketches at a price to be settled by a committee in London.1 In his first memoir on Australia’s war records, Bean explained:

[T]hese sketches are inspected by a Committee ... [which] will judge what form of picture each artist may desirably paint for the Commonwealth ... I earnestly hope that while their impressions are still fresh, each of these artists may be permitted to paint two big pictures for the Commonwealth. Firstly a picture containing the artist’s own most striking impression of the Front, and secondly, a picture of some historic incident, of which the eyewitnesses can still be obtained, and the scene can still be visited more or less in its original condition.2

During May 1918 the composition of the NWRC, the committee referred to by Bean in the above excerpt from his first memoir, was settled. Its members were Smart representing the

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1 How Fisher’s proposal was dealt with culminating in Hughes approving it on 28 March 1918 was traced in chapter 2.
2 Bean, first memoir, pp 6-7.
High Commissioner, Bean representing the AIF, and two British artists, Sir Luke Fildes and Algernon Talmage. Its role, Fisher had told Hughes, would be to fix the prices of the pictures the official artists were commissioned to paint, but according to Bean it would also inspect their sketches with a view to deciding what picture each artist might paint for the Commonwealth. It was Fisher who decided that Bean should serve on the NWRC as the AIF’s representative. His decision seems explicable on the basis that Bean was the official war correspondent and the official historian designate, and was therefore presumed to hold authority from the AIF to advance its interests in the matter of its pictorial representation. However, he held no actual authority to represent it on this or any other matter.

On 13 May the NWRC met to decide the subjects of the pictures to be painted by Power and Leist. Treloar deputised for Bean, who was in France, and furnished him with an account of what transpired. The meeting and what flowed from it are important for several reasons. First, Bean had envisaged that each artist would be asked to paint two pictures: one illustrating his most vivid impression and ‘a special interest picture of an historical incident described to [him] by eye witnesses’. However, the committee decided to ask each artist to paint a single picture: their most vivid impression. There was a good reason for limiting each artist to one picture – this was the limit of the approval Fisher had obtained – but its decision to ask them to paint their most vivid impression is inexplicable and contradicted clause 8 of their agreements. Treloar recalled that Smart ‘seemed anxious that at first the artists should not be asked to paint a picture of a special historical incident’. This made no sense.

Next, the committee could not agree on the prices to be paid the artists. It is clear from Treloar’s account that he and Smart were looking to Fildes and Talmage to provide guidance on this matter, but they held divergent opinions on what Power should be paid: Fildes suggested a minimum of £500 while Talmage considered £800 ‘a suitable sum’. Then, they

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3 Memoranda, Smart to Bean, 13 February 1918; 9 May 1918; both in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286. At the last moment Fildes replaced Sir Frank Brangwyn who was recovering from an illness. Why it was thought necessary to involve British artists in Australia’s war art scheme is elusive, but it might be speculated that it was to give it credibility. Some support for this can be found in the reporting in Australia of Fildes’ appointment. See, for example, ‘Australian war pictures’, West Australian, 16 May 1918, p 5.
4 Cable, Fisher to Hughes, 18 January 1918, AWM 93, 8/2/23.
5 Memorandum, Smart to Bean, 13 February 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
6 Letter, Smart to Bean, 8 April 1918; Bean, handwritten note on cable, Smart to Bean, 8 April 1918; letter, Treloar to Bean, 18 May 1918; all in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
7 Letter, Treloar to Bean, 18 May 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
8 Ibid., p 1.
9 Ibid., p 2.
were disinclined to suggest a price to be paid to Leist whose work ‘was obviously not worth the same’ as Power’s. Their disinclination stemmed from the belief that ‘in pricing the work of the artists they were practically fixing their position in relation to one another, which might perhaps hurt the artists’ feelings and affect their future.’ Thus, the committee proved itself incapable of fulfilling the role Fisher had assigned to it, and its involvement in fixing prices ceased.

Finally, and most importantly, the meeting was the only occasion the NRWC decided the subjects of pictures. And its decision to ask Leist to paint a picture of a heavy gun in action gave rise to a disagreement between Smart and Bean which was resolved only after Bean, purporting to speak for the AIF, expressed vehement opposition to it. In accordance with Bean’s instructions, Treloar advocated that Leist should paint an incident during the battle of Polygon Wood which occurred during his visit to the front. But the other members of the committee were against him:

After inspecting the work of Mr Power, the committee decided that he should be asked to paint either a picture of an artillery gun team struggling through shell torn and boggy ground, or one of a battery in action with the pack horses bringing up the ammunition. These were both pictures of which he has already made sketches in France ... With respect to Mr Leist’s work, I must confess that I felt disappointed. It did not seem to grip one like Mr Power’s did. Eventually it was decided to get him to paint a picture of a heavy gun in action, a sketch of which he submitted. I drew attention to the fact that this might seem to be giving undue prominence to artillery, but there really seemed no other subject which could be with greater advantage allotted Leist.10

This shows that the committee – perhaps it was only Fildes and Talmage – understood the relationship between the artists’ pictures made at the front and their historical pictures: the former should determine the subjects of the latter. And it also shows the difficulties the committee encountered finding a subject for Leist based on his work at the front, even if it was to be his most vivid impression. The committee was right to reject Treloar’s (Bean’s) contention that he be asked to depict an incident from the battle of Polygon Wood on the basis that he had not made any pictures of it, nor, for that matter, of any other battle during

10 Ibid., pp 1-2.
Third Ypres. But Bean did not see it that way. On learning of the committee’s decision he wrote to Smart:

In reference to pictures, Treloar tells me that the decision of the Artists Committee appeared to be that Leist as well as Power should paint a picture of the artillery. The whole weight of my influence as representative of the A.I.F. would be against this; the trials of the infantry and its deeds are infinitely the most necessary of record and of handing down to posterity and there are not too many of our artists who can do it. Leist is one of those who certainly can best do so. If it is possible I urgently press upon the committee on behalf of the A.I.F. this point. The heavy guns however much they may appeal to an artist have very little part in our force. The battle of Polygon Wood is what the A.I.F. would wish Leist to paint, and it seems to us that in this matter of the subject the A.I.F. opinion should be paramount, unless there are very important reasons to urge upon the other side. Sorry to seem opposive, but this is a point on which I would fight for the obvious wishes of the force with all the strength I possess. I know that you will do your best to help us in this matter. It really is an important one to us – every authority here from highest to lowest would think the same way as I. And I suppose that that is why an A.I.F. representative is on the committee.\(^{11}\)

It is clear Bean had consulted no one on the question of Leist’s subject. The decision to ask him to paint the battle of Polygon Wood did not reflect ‘A.I.F. opinion’ at all. His opinion that ‘the trials of the infantry and its deeds [were] infinitely the most necessary of record and of handing down to posterity’ might have been shared by the AIF’s commanders, but there was unlikely to be unanimity on which battle in Third Ypres, let alone a particular incident, should be represented. Were not the claims to representation of the battles of Menin Road and Broodseinde equally strong? And Bean’s view that the artillery had ‘very little part in our force’ was plainly wrong. Moreover, he had no proper basis for claiming that Leist could ‘best’ paint a picture of the infantry during the battle. As the committee recognised, Leist’s work at the front furnished no proof that he could. What emerges from Bean’s response is not that the AIF’s opinion was paramount, but rather his own.

When Smart replied he put Bean’s concerns to rest telling him there was no intention of asking Leist to paint an artillery picture.\(^{12}\) The intention, he claimed, ‘was, and always has

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\(^{11}\) Letter, Bean to Smart, 25 May 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.

\(^{12}\) Letter, Smart to Bean, 29 May 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286. Improbably, Treloar misunderstood what had been decided.
been, to ask Leist to first of all paint the battle of Polygon Wood.’ If that is right, Smart did not understand the relationship between the artists’ pictures made at the front and their historical pictures, or if he did, he regarded it as unimportant. This led him to explain his understanding of the role Fildes and Talmage should play: ‘In regard to subjects to be painted, I hardly think that this is a matter for the Committee. It is rather a matter to be settled between yourself representing the A.I.F. and this office, and in these circumstances we can always be in agreement. The value of Talmage and Fildes is to state what in their opinion is a fair price for the pictures to be painted. It is a matter then for the Commonwealth Government to accept the recommendation in regard to price or offer such a price as they consider a fair one.’ But as he knew, their role in stating a fair price for the pictures was a dead letter.

Critical, however, was Smart’s cutting down of the British artists’ role by excluding them from involvement in deciding the subjects of pictures.\textsuperscript{13} It is doubtful he sought anyone’s approval to redefine their role. But on this matter he encountered no resistance from Bean who probably welcomed their exclusion from this aspect of the committee’s functions. Smart and Bean’s decision to commission Leist to paint the battle of Polygon Wood ignored the relationship between the artists’ pictures made at the front and their historical pictures.\textsuperscript{14} Thus, a matter once the raison d’être for establishing the war art scheme was ignored. If the pictures an artist made at the front could conceivably form the basis of a historical picture, that was all to the good. But that necessity had become inessential. And notwithstanding what Smart had said about his role in deciding subjects, in reality Bean specified them and he merely agreed. For the present he wished to avoid further misunderstandings: ‘The position as it now stands is that (1) Power to paint a picture illustrating guns going into action, or a specific incident to be named by you of guns going into action, (2) Leist to paint the battle of Polygon Wood. Is this agreed?’ Not only did Bean agree, in each case he specified the particular incident to be represented and provided the artist with a detailed account of it.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{13} When eventually commissions were placed with the official artists in London to paint historical pictures for the Commonwealth, the NWRC’s role was confined to approving a cartoon of the picture submitted by the artist and certifying that he had satisfactorily completed his commission as a necessary step before payment of the agreed price could be made to him.

\textsuperscript{14} Nevertheless, it was subsequently restated by Fisher in his annual report as High Commissioner for 1917. See High Commissioner’s Report 1917, NAA A458, F108/8 Part 4, p 19.

\textsuperscript{15} As to Power’s picture see letter, Smart to Bean, 4 July 1918; Bean, typescript, ‘Subject for Lieut. Power’s picture’, 8 July 1918; both in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/314.
In late June 1918 Fisher made his first requests of the government for authority to place commissions with artists to paint historical pictures. Although Hughes was in England, and William Watt was Acting Prime Minister, Fisher addressed himself to Hughes:

My telegram 18th January, your telegram 28th March, Australian Artists mentioned have been in France or Palestine. Each artist supplied 25 to 50 sketches. Recommend artists be commissioned paint composition pictures 8 feet wide as follows:– Leist – Battle Polygon Wood price £400, Power – First Australian Divisional Artillery going into action July 31st £400, Bryant – Sinking “Southland” £250, Burgess ‘Sydney-Emden’ fight £300. Recommendation supported by A.I.F.16

And four days later:

My telegram 24th June recommend Lambert be commissioned to paint composition picture approximately 8 x 6 feet illustrating Australian Light Horse in action; price £500. Recommendation supported by A.I.F. Lambert has presented to Commonwealth Government excellent collection consisting of over 150 oil watercolour drawings and sketches Australian Light Horse.17

As had become customary, the Prime Minister’s Department referred Fisher’s cables to Defence ‘for favor of consideration.’18 The subjects of Power and Leist’s pictures were settled shortly after the NWRC met on 13 May, but there is no evidence that the committee had since met to decide the subjects and artists of any further commissions to be placed. Nor is there any evidence showing how the commissions for Bryant, Burgess and Lambert were decided, though it seems certain they represent Bean’s decisions. As Burgess was not an official artist, why Fisher thought to recommend that a commission be placed with him, irrespective of his stature as a marine painter, is baffling. Then, there are the prices Fisher recommended be paid to the artists. There is no evidence how these were arrived at: presumably Smart and Bean came up with them as Fildes and Talmage were not involved in fixing prices, but on what they relied is a mystery. Although Fisher claimed his recommendations were supported by the AIF, they actually derived from Bean.

16 Cable, Fisher to Hughes, 24 June 1918, AWM 93, 8/2/23.
17 Cable, Fisher to Hughes, 28 June 1918, AWM 93, 8/2/23.
18 Memoranda, Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department to Secretary, Department of Defence, 26 June, 1 July 1918, AWM 93, 8/2/23.
By 11 July 1918, Thomas Trumble, Acting Secretary of the Defence Department, had considered Fisher’s cables. On that date he prepared a minute paper for Pearce on the subject of ‘Australian artists at the war front’. 19 By way of introduction he noted that Defence had been consulted by the Prime Minister’s Department on every proposal by Fisher to send Australian artists to the front to make sketches, ‘with the possibility later on of being commissioned to paint composition pictures’, and that it had ‘generally concurred in the [proposed] arrangements’. Now, he continued, ‘a definite recommendation’ for the placing of five commissions to paint composition pictures at a cost of £1,850 had been received. It seems likely the cost involved shocked Trumble, as it did Pearce, and that it was this that induced Defence to recommend to the Prime Minister’s Department that the whole question of the war art scheme be reconsidered. However, Trumble had an argument against the commissioning of paintings: ‘The fact that photography and cinematography can portray anything visible would appear to circumscribe the extent to which paintings are necessary or desirable in a Museum that is mainly intended to perpetuate the memory of the first military effort.’ 20 Still, he recognised that this was a complex question, ‘hardly [one] which this Department is competent to advise upon’. Although there was something in his contention, it was very late to be raising a matter of principle. Defence had been on notice that Bean regarded pictures illustrating Australia’s part in the war as essential for the national war museum, most recently in his first memoir the proposals in which Pearce ‘fully endorsed’. 21 (This suggests Defence had not studied it.) Although it was perhaps a little late to retreat from that position and shift decision-making responsibility to the Prime Minister, that is what Defence did. Trumble recommended ‘that the question of detailing Australian Artists to make sketches at the war fronts, with the possibility of later on being commissioned to paint composition pictures, be again considered by the Government in the light of the expense involved, with a view to laying down a definite policy and that subsequently the matter be dealt with by the Prime Minister’s Department acting on the advice of the Federal Art Advisory Committee.’ 22 Of course, ‘a definite policy’ had been required from the outset, as had defined areas of responsibility and competent, if not qualified, people to manage the scheme in accordance with appropriate guidelines. None of this had been thought of. The

19 Minute paper, 11 July 1918, AWM 93, 8/2/23.
20 Ibid., p 1.
21 Memorandum, Trumble to Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, 31 May 1918, AWM 93, 12/12/1 Part 1.
22 Trumble, minute paper, 11 July 1918, AWM 93, 8/2/23, pp 1-2.
prospect of ‘a definite policy’ now being established seemed remote. Trumble lamely ended, ‘Of course, any paintings produced, relative to the war, would find a fitting home in the Australian War Museum.’ 23 After Pearce read his paper he applied a rubber stamp ‘APPROVED’ to it adding his initials and the date, 15 July. Trumble wasted no time in communicating what had become Pearce’s recommendation to the Prime Minister’s Department. He sent a memorandum to it the next day, and save for including a new and more appropriate introduction and making minor cosmetic changes, its main text remained unchanged.24 When it arrived it set the cat among the pigeons.

While Defence was seeking to put a brake on the expenditure of public funds on the acquisition of pictures for the museum and questioning their place in it, Bean arrived at a number of critical decisions for the project of Anzac’s official representation which would increase such expenditure substantially. Writing to Treloar from France on 22 July 1918, he said he had drawn up a ‘general plan of operations ... for the providing of the material of our National Memorial to the A.I.F.’25 In this connection he identified money as the major obstacle to carrying out the project: ‘The big difficulty which I see facing the scheme after the war is the intensely stringent tying up of the purse strings.’ Thus, he had decided that so far as possible all museum and gallery work should be finalised before the end of the war. His next decision, the reason for the first, was earth-shattering. Since setting down his ideas for the museum in his first memoir he had substantially revised his thinking on the place in it of historical pictures. Put simply, he had decided that the Anzac story should be illustrated comprehensively. He told Treloar that he had drawn up ‘a provisional scheme of the pictures which will be required so far as can at present be judged’.26 It consisted of a grand scheme of picture-making which covered ‘the history of the A.I.F. to the present’.27 But its coverage was hardly comprehensive: it ended in mid-July 1918; there were no pictures of the campaign to capture German New Guinea; merely one and two respectively from the histories of the AFC and RAN; and none of the campaign in Egypt and Palestine. Many more pictures would be required to cover the AIF’s history in the war. Yet as it then stood his scheme consisted of

23 Ibid., p 2.
24 Memorandum, Trumble to Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, 16 July 1918, AWM 93, 8/2/23.
25 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 22 July 1918, AWM 93, 18/1/29, p 1.
26 Ibid., p 2. The emphasis has been added. As noted in chapter 4, the scheme was contained in four documents, ‘Historical Pictures A.I.F.’, ‘Programme for individual artists. Big Pictures’, ‘Officers of A.I.F. of whom portraits are desired’ and ‘Sketch Portraits AIF. Table of Portraits for Official Artists’, attachments to two letters from Bean to Treloar both dated 23 July 1918 in AWM 93, 18/1/29.
27 Letter, Bean to Dodds, 26 August 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/54, pp 1-2.
more than 200 pictures to be painted by fifteen artists and was made up of 90 historical pictures, thirty-one of which he designated ‘Big Pictures’, and 110 portraits of individuals and groups. Merely to have conceived such a grandiose scheme might well have had Bean branded a madman. Had it come to Pearce’s attention it may have led him to reappraise Bean and look more carefully at his proposals and the capacity in which he had advanced them. But what seems certain is that he would have taken steps to quash it. Fortunately for Bean, there is no evidence that it ever came to his or the government’s notice.

Although Bean’s provisional scheme of pictures was never implemented, it represents the high point in his thinking on how to illustrate the story of Anzac he wished told, and its elements can be found in the scheme as it was later carried out. The historical pictures he specified in it reflect his commitment to a form of storytelling that was narrative-based. Although given Bean’s background this hardly qualifies as revelatory, it nonetheless explains his approach. He largely reduced the AIF’s history to a series of incidents arranged chronologically commencing with the departure in October 1914 of the convoy of ships carrying away the AIF, and ending with an attack made at Strazeele on 11 July 1918 by a patrol from the 1st Division. Interspersed were landscapes (panoramas and general views), pictures showing conditions and features of battlefields, and a few illustrating typical work, for instance the work of runners and stretcher-bearers. When represented the incidents were to accord with the facts. Bean made this clear by creating a column in his list of historical pictures entitled ‘Authority for facts’ in which he referred to a mix of persons, military units and photographs for each incident to whom and to which the artist was to resort in establishing the facts. Importantly, the incidents were not chosen merely for their value in illustrating the AIF’s history, but also its character, and this obliged him to select from among thousands of acts of individual bravery a number which, if illustrated, would serve as an object lesson and a source of inspiration for future generations of Australians. To achieve this he largely settled on a picture which depicted the death of an individual who had selflessly sacrificed his life, or lost his life in disregard of his personal safety, in order to achieve an outcome: for instance, to save the lives of others, to further an attack which had stalled, or to defend a position against all odds.28 Self-sacrifice as an Anzac ideal occupied a prominent

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28 There were ten such pictures representing the deaths of (1) Chaplain Andrew Gillison; (2) Lieutenant Richard Keiran; (3) Major Arthur Hutchinson; (4) Captain Charles Littler; (5) Lieutenant Albert Clifford; (6) Major
place in Bean’s thinking, and it was not confined to the actions of individuals. It could be ascribed to a body of men acting together and represented pictorially, most famously in the charge of the Light Horse at the Nek, an incident in his list of historical pictures.

Bean’s decision to propose the carrying out of a picture scheme led to another important decision. He had decided ‘to suggest that the system of official artists be modified by giving them all a certain rank; instructing them to work to a certain scheme; letting them give their whole time and effort thenceforward, during the war, like that of other officers, to the work of their country, their rank being commensurate with their work.’ He was proposing that the artists be appointed regular serving officers in the AIF and instructed to paint such of the pictures in his scheme as were allocated to them by the DAG. Simply, he wished them put in yokes and made to paint the pictures gratis, save for their pay and upkeep. This was the only way he could see his scheme being carried out because, as he told Dodds, it would be ‘exceedingly expensive for the Commonwealth if anything like the number of pictures required by the Commonwealth Memorial collection is to be obtained’. If approved his proposal would deliver to Australia ‘a set of historical pictures which she can get by no means under any other arrangement’. But it was fanciful, and had it come before Pearce for decision, as it was bound to as Minister for Defence, he would have rejected it out of hand. Still, Bean garnered support for it from the AIF, Fisher and Hughes, and though put formally to the government, it was never decided.

In Australia, Fisher’s requests for authority to place commissions with artists to paint historical pictures had received no attention. Since recommending to the Prime Minister’s Department that the whole question of commissioning paintings for the museum be gone into carefully, Pearce’s attitude had hardened. He revisited the matter on 27 August when dealing with a request referred to him to have an artist and private in the AIF employed in Australia ‘to paint war scenes of historical interest.’ Pearce informed Watt that he would not agree to

Percy Black; (7) Captain Meysey Hammond; (8) Colonel Henry MacLaurin; (9) Colonel Robert Scobie; (10) General William Bridges. See ibid., pp 1-2. Of these only Black’s death was represented.

29 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 22 July 1918, AWM 93, 18/1/29, p 2.

30 Letter, Bean to Dodds, 26 August 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/54, p 2.

31 Ibid., p 3.

32 Letter, Pearce to Watt, 27 August 1918, AWM 93, 8/2/23, p 1. The artist was Elioth Gruner. Norman Lindsay had petitioned the premier of New South Wales, William Holman, to help find Gruner employment ‘as a painter with the troops’. Lindsay placed Gruner next to Streeton as Australia’s finest landscape painter, adding: ‘I know that some of the artists at the front are very second rate men and none are up to Gruner’s standard.’ See letter,
Defence incurring ‘any expense in connection with the engagement of artists in Australia’ as he did not consider that paintings were ‘absolutely necessary’ for the purpose of the museum. He referred to Fisher’s requests and continued:

I would strongly urge, if it has not already been done, that the whole question be carefully gone into by your Department. The recommendation of the High Commissioner above referred to involved an expenditure of £1850. The necessity for this expenditure is doubted but, as this Department does not possess any facilities for advice, it has been suggested that your Department take the matter in hand with a view to a definite policy being decided upon. I fear that, unless something is done in this direction considerable and unjustified expenditure will have to be met later.

By leaving the matter in the hands of the Prime Minister’s Department Pearce lost the opportunity of refusing or curtailing Fisher’s requests. Had he recommended to Watt that approval be refused, there is no telling how the matter might have ended. What is certain, however, is that a definite policy was well overdue and Pearce was acting responsibly in urging Watt to reappraise ‘the whole question’ in light of his concerns. But despite his urging no definite policy was established. Still more surprising, his advice was ignored.

In London, the government’s failure to answer Fisher’s cables of 24 and 28 June was causing consternation. On 31 August Fisher cabled the Prime Minister’s Department:

AUSTRALIAN ARTISTS – see my telegram 24th June; have painted and delivered this office most valuable collection sketches of A.I.F. France and Palestine. These pictures creating widespread interest here and valued many times more than nominal amount paid Artists in the form of subsistence allowance. Artists now waiting paint composition pictures as outlined my cables January 18th, 24th. Would be glad to have urgent reply to my telegram 24th June re price composition pictures. Artists fear if Australia unable use their services they must accept offers made them by British Government to do other work.

Testifying to gross incompetence within the Prime Minister’s Department, it sent a copy of the cable to Defence endorsed with the usual note, ‘Referred for information and favor of

Lindsay to Holman, 9 July 1918, attached to letter, Secretary, Premier’s Department to Secretary, Defence Department, 18 July 1918, AWM 93, 8/2/23.
33 Letter, Pearce to Watt, 27 August 1918, AWM 93, 8/2/23.
34 Cable, Fisher to Prime Minister’s Department, 31 August 1918, AWM 93, 8/2/23. There is no evidence that the pictures Power, Leist and Bryant had made at the front had generated ‘widespread interest’, nor any of a possible migration of official artists to other schemes, British or Canadian.
attention.\textsuperscript{35} There was no justification in referring the matter to Defence when it had already received its recommendation: Trumble’s memorandum to the Prime Minister’s Department of 16 July could not have been clearer.

When by the end of the first week in September 1918 no word had come from Australia, Bean panicked. It became urgent for him to get to England to organise a new cheaper and more efficient system for the official artists ‘by which [they] shall be officers in the A.I.F. doing their work for their country like everyone else’.\textsuperscript{36} (This was the system he had described to Treloar and Dodds.) In London on 9 September he outlined his new system to Smart and Box and ‘they agreed to the whole programme’.\textsuperscript{37} The next day he saw Fisher and Smart together and ‘arranged the whole scheme’.\textsuperscript{38} On 12 September he sent ‘a very warm cable to Pearce, supporting one from [Fisher], in favour of our new system of artists’.\textsuperscript{39} In this he proposed that a corps of no more than ten artists be formed under Birdwood whose work, ‘including large composition pictures as required’, would belong to the Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{40} They would be given captain’s rank but major’s pay and work ‘entirely for the Commonwealth’. This, he said, was a ‘far [more] economical and effective system’ than paying the artists between £300 and £500 for each picture, and he supported it ‘with all [his] power’. Bean intended this system to deliver the more than 200 pictures in his provisional picture scheme, but did not mention it. Still, he made clear the object aimed at: ‘Most important result for Australia from war is the great unifying [military] tradition as basis for future nationality and it is logically right that small corps artists should be formed to consolidate tradition [pictorially].’ In this seemingly insignificant statement Bean revealed his fundamental motive for instituting the project of Anzac’s official representation: the promotion and acceptance of the idea that by virtue of its part in the war Australia had acquired a tradition and that it was this, and apparently nothing else, which should define a future nationality.

Bean’s cable preceded Fisher’s by eight days though logically it should have followed. Also, they were sent to different recipients. How in these circumstances they could have believed

\textsuperscript{35} Memorandum, Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department to Secretary, Defence Department, 2 September 1918, AWM 93, 8/2/23.
\textsuperscript{36} Bean diary, September 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/116A/1, entry 9 September 1918, no pagination.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., entry 10 September 1918.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., entry 11 September 1918.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., entry 12 September 1918.
\textsuperscript{40} Cable, AIF Administrative Headquarters (Bean) to Defence, 12 September 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
that their respective cables supported the other is baffling. Anyway, when Defence received Bean’s cable it wanted nothing to do with it. It immediately cabled AIF Administrative Headquarters: ‘Whole question is under consideration Prime Minister’s Department.’ Meanwhile, Fisher had sent his cable to the Prime Minister’s Department:

Reference composition Memorial Pictures by Australian Artists who have visited the front obtained details made special sketches on the understanding my telegram 18th January and approved your telegram 28th March Committee recommended pictures contained in cables 24th June and 28th June at price named Leist, Battle Polygon Wood £400, Power First Australian Division Artillery going into Action 31st July £400. Bryant Sinking “Southland” £250; Burgess, “Sydney-Emden” fight £300; Lambert Australian Light Horse going into Action Beersheba price £500. Position is Artists who have fulfilled their part of contract cannot obtain decision. Since then Streeton, Fullwood, Quinn, Longstaff have been to the front and delivered sketches in accordance with contract recommended; Streeton £400, Fullwood £300, Quinn two portraits £100 each, Longstaff two portraits £100 each, if unable to give approval this proposal recommend as an alternative Artists not exceeding ten be appointed Captain A.I.F. with Majors pay for duration of war on understanding they devote services to Commonwealth similarly to other officers, whole work including composition pictures become property Commonwealth Government. If pictures by outsiders of any peculiar interest to Australia of special portraits of Australian Officers, Victoria Cross men and so on, an extra sum not exceeding £1,000 is asked, prices paid to be approved by High Commissioner if it is intended have adequate record War. Strongly urge like British and Canadians we undertake it without delay, while scenes are fresh, desired effect obtainable on spot.

This cable is a jumble of disparate thoughts, hardly worthy of a former prime minister. It did not replicate even substantially Bean’s cable to Defence. In fact, Bean’s new system for the official artists was advanced merely as an alternative to commissioning them to paint pictures, and then described in the barest detail. Fortunately, the early part of the cable setting out the position with respect to historical pictures just made sense. Fisher was proposing that commissions for six additional pictures of unspecified subjects be placed with Streeton, Fullwood, Quinn and Longstaff at a cost of £1,100. In that regard there is no evidence the NWRC had resolved to place them, nor any that it had met and decided the subject of

41 Cable, Defence to AIF Administrative Headquarters, 1 October 1918, AWM 93, 8/2/23.
42 Cable, Fisher to Prime Minister’s Department, 20 September 1918, AWM 93, 8/2/23.
Lambert’s picture. Predictably, when Fisher’s cable was received the Prime Minister’s Department merely sent a copy to Defence ‘for information and favor of attention’.  

Bean’s exasperation at the government’s inability to decide probably explains why on 5 October he set down a brief account of the war art scheme and the position it had reached. Understandably, most of it was devoted to the current impasse. He referred to the work of the NWRC and said it had recommended ‘the painting of several pictures which are only a small proportion of those which will be needed if the tradition of the A.I.F. is to be worthily supported by the pictures of its great battles and battlefields.’ He would make no clearer statement of the object of his picture scheme. The sketches the artists had made and were making at the front were one thing, and in his opinion represented a valuable archive of records of the AIF’s operations made on the spot, but for the purpose of illustrating the AIF’s story in the national war museum dedicated to its memory, and of promoting the idea that Australia possessed a tradition, it was essential to have pictures painted which illustrated the narrative and portrayed the leading actors in it.

On 9 October Smart sent a note to Bean telling him that no word had been received from Australia. The timing was providential: Hughes was about to travel to France to tour the Australian front with a party of English publicists. Joseph Cook, a former prime minister and now Minister for the Navy, would accompany him. Bean approached Hughes and Cook about establishing his new system for the official artists. Whatever he put to them had the desired effect; he told Smart: ‘Mr Hughes said he would cable for me supporting it – also Cook. Dean [Percy Dean, Hughes’s private secretary] arranged with me to send this recommendation from Hughes. Has it gone? If not will you get Dean to put it through at once.’ That Bean had access to Hughes and Cook on what surely was a trivial matter reflects his powerful position. Anyway, as promised Hughes eventually cabled Watt:

Re Australian Artists at the front arrangements unsatisfactory and valuable material is being lost to the country. Artists should be appointed to the A.I.F. and give their whole service to

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43 Memorandum, Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department to Secretary, Defence Department, 23 September 1918, AWM 93, 8/2/23.  
44 Typescript, ‘Memo re Australian artists’, 5 October 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.  
45 Memorandum, Smart to Bean, 9 October 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.  
46 ‘General cable news’, Sydney Morning Herald, 9 October 1918, p 11.  
47 Bean, undated handwritten message endorsed on memorandum, Smart to Bean, 9 October 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
the Government during the war and for such a time afterwards as may be necessary. This method much more economical and effective and much better business arrangement for all concerned. If ten artists appointed including two Seascape painters with the rank of Captain and pay of Major, it would meet with wishes of Artists themselves but above all would result in the acquisition of many priceless mementos of Australian fighting which must surely otherwise be lost. I strongly urge this policy which, to be of use should be enforced forthwith. As things are some of the finest and some absolutely unique, opportunities are being lost.48

Touring the Australian front with a group of English publicists was hardly conducive to Hughes making considered recommendations with respect to the war art scheme about which he is unlikely to have had much more than a superficial understanding. It seems unlikely Bean informed him that the rationale behind his new system was to get the more than 200 pictures in his picture scheme painted. At any rate, without the resources of his department available to him, including the benefit of a briefing paper, prudence dictated that Hughes should refrain from making any recommendation. The matters Bean had raised with him were being dealt with in Australia, and he should have allowed them to run their course without seeking to influence their outcome. But his attempt to do so was in vain: even before he sent his cable Fisher’s requests for authority to place commissions had been decided by the Historic Memorials Committee.

Established in late December 1911, apparently on Fisher’s initiative when prime minister and treasurer, the Historic Memorials Committee was made responsible for supervising the expenditure of votes for historic memorials of representative men who had played ‘great parts in the history of Federated Australia’.49 At a meeting of the committee on 20 February 1912

48 Cable, Hughes to Watt, 21 October 1918, NAA, A2 1920/1044. It seems likely that Bean drafted this cable. At any rate, Hughes’s warnings of the imminent loss of ‘valuable material’, ‘priceless mementos’ and ‘unique opportunities’ are certain to have derived from Bean. But no great loss would be suffered if his new system were not implemented. The Commonwealth could engage artists to return to the Western Front to survey the battlefields and gather material for the painting of their historical pictures. In fact, it had already done so. The material from which historical pictures were to be painted was likely to remain available for the foreseeable future. Of course, the real point of Bean’s new system was not to avoid the imminent loss of ‘valuable material’, but to get the 200 pictures in his picture scheme painted. And with Hughes’s backing he was very confident of securing government approval of it. Writing to Treloar on 20 October from Cannes where he was holidaying, Bean provided him with instructions for the establishment of his corps of artists which he asked be passed to Smart and Dodds if, while he was away, word came from Australia approving his new system. Reminding him of his picture scheme he said that ‘the moment [the artists’] appointment is allowed I will get [Birdwood] to give them each their work’. See letter, Bean to Treloar, 20 October 1918, AWM 16, 4351/2/10.
49 ‘Founders of Federation. Historic Memorials’, Argus, 1 January 1912, p 6. During his budget speech on 26 October 1911, Fisher said that £500 had been provided for ‘historic memorials to distinguished men connected
chaired by Fisher, it resolved that the memorials ‘should take the shape of oil paintings of some of the leaders of the Federation movement, and a committee of four Australian artists [should] be appointed to advise about the carrying out of this programme.’ In October 1918 it remained the only government body responsible for carrying out publicly funded programs with the object of acquiring works of art of a memorial kind, and in that regard had available to it the advice of an Art Advisory Board. The painting of the historical pictures for which Fisher was seeking approval had an obvious memorial purpose, and if approved would be painted at public expense. To this point the war art scheme had been permitted to develop according to a number of ad hoc decisions and without sufficient, or perhaps any, scrutiny. That scrutiny was well overdue and the government was now presented with the opportunity of examining the scheme in the context of Fisher’s requests, and in particular Defence’s concerns.

The committee met in Melbourne on 17 October 1918. According to the minutes of the meeting, which was chaired by Watt, consideration ‘was given to the question of the acquisition of paintings dealing with activities of the A.I.F. in connection with the war.’ There is no evidence that prior to considering that question the committee had taken advice from the Art Advisory Board, as Defence had recommended. Malcolm Shepherd, Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department, ‘read a history of the proposals submitted by the High Commissioner’; whether this referred to Defence’s concerns cannot be established as the minutes do not record the content of any discussion, and Shepherd’s paper has not survived or been located. It was essential that Shepherd place before the committee a summary of Bean’s proposals for the establishment of a national war museum as a memorial to the AIF – in his first memoir – including the place in it of pictures, but there is no evidence he did. After considering the question before it, the committee resolved that ‘the artists mentioned be


50 ‘Federal affairs. Historic memorials’, Mercury, 21 February 1912, p 5. A committee of artists was duly formed and named ‘Art Advisory Board’. See ‘Concerning people’, Register, 9 April 1912, p 4. This, perhaps, was the body Trumble intended to refer to in his memorandum to the Prime Minister’s Department of 16 July 1918 but misnamed the Federal Art Advisory Committee.

51 Minutes of meeting of Historic Memorials Committee, 17 October 1918, NAA A2, 1920/1044.

52 An undated paper entitled ‘Australian Historical Records of the War’ in a file entitled ‘Histories Memorials (War) Paintings by Anzac Artists’ maintained by the Prime Minister’s Department (NAA A2, 1920/1044) may be the paper Shepherd read. It is an ordinary piece of writing which purports to trace the history of the war art scheme by reference to the proposals received by and approvals given by Hughes down to Fisher’s unresolved requests. The paper is incomplete as it fails to refer to all relevant events and in its detail contains several inaccuracies. It makes no reference to Defence’s concerns.
commissioned to carry out the work referred to and that they be paid one third of the cost of the completed work, the balance to be paid when the work is completed to the satisfaction of the Board in London [possibly a reference to the NWRC].\(^{53}\) Remarkably, the committee did not baulk at approving expenditure on six pictures without knowing their subjects. The minutes record that Watt undertook to arrange for payment of the cost of the paintings (£2,950) out of ‘war funds’.

Even without the benefit of Shepherd’s paper, it seems improbable that the committee went into the whole question of commissioning paintings for the national war museum ‘carefully’ or perhaps at all, and unless its resolution can be characterised as ‘a definite policy’, a dubious contention, none was established. The minutes suggest the committee’s decision was impromptu and not the product of careful consideration. The opportunity, then, for the government to scrutinise Fisher’s proposals and, in the course, the war art scheme, was foregone. Notwithstanding that the matter, as Trumble and Pearce had recognised, involved a question of principle, let alone an important question of the appropriateness of spending public funds on acquiring pictures, none was determined. Although the committee’s decision was its first and only involvement in the war art scheme, it set a course from which there would be no turning back.

On 31 October Watt informed Fisher of the government’s approval: ‘Your telegram 20th September war paintings at suggestion Minister for Defence matter referred to Historic Memorials Committee and approval now given purchase of pictures recommended your telegram 20th September, total cost £2,950, one third cost completed work to be paid artist when commission issued, balance when work completed to satisfaction Board in London.’\(^{54}\) Almost as an afterthought, he added, ‘Please inform Hughes in reply to his telegram 21st October on this subject.’ Smart now informed Bean of the government’s decision.\(^{55}\) He was philosophical: ‘The Government has at last wired agreeing to the list of pictures which we [he] suggested that our artists should paint, but not to the scheme of the “Artists” Corp. Well, it is not so good as that scheme by which each artist would work just like any other member of the

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\(^{53}\) The minutes listed the artists and specified the prices to be paid to them; the subjects of the commissions for Power, Leist, Bryant and Burgess were specified, but not those for Streeton, Fullwood, Quinn and Longstaff.

\(^{54}\) Cable, Watt to Fisher, 31 October 1918, NAA A2, 1920/1044. Shortly afterwards Watt approved a request by Fisher that one-half of the agreed price of a picture be paid in advance to the artists. See cables, Fisher to Watt, 29 November 1918; Watt to Fisher, 5 December 1918; both in NAA A2, 1920/1044.

\(^{55}\) Letter, Smart to Bean, 4 November 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
A.I.F., for the good of his country. But it is a good step in advance. They have approved of pictures costing £2950.\textsuperscript{56}

On 16 December the Prime Minister’s Department belatedly informed Defence of its decision.\textsuperscript{57} Shepherd explained that at a recent meeting of the Historic Memorials Committee – it was hardly recent – it recommended the placing of commissions with artists for the painting of eleven pictures at a cost of £2,950, and acting on such recommendation Watt had undertaken to have the cost of the pictures met out of war funds. Shepherd’s final paragraph suggests that his department had always held the view that matters concerning the war art scheme fell peculiarly within Defence’s province: ‘Whilst this Department, through the Historic Memorials Committee, will be pleased to render every assistance in this matter in an advisory capacity, it is considered that the question is primarily one for attention by your Department, to which the paintings will be forwarded for inclusion in the Australian War Museum, and the Acting Prime Minister will be glad, therefore, if your Department will make the necessary provision as regards funds.’

On 3 January 1919, having read Shepherd’s memorandum, Pearce instructed Trumble: ‘In view of the final paragraph arrange accordingly. All expenditure on War Museum should be kept in a separate account for eventual transfer to the [Department] which will control the Museum [Home and Territories].\textsuperscript{58} This instruction is the only evidence of Pearce’s reaction to Shepherd’s memorandum. Undoubtedly, he appreciated that it did not indicate whether the Prime Minister’s Department had gone into the whole question of commissioning paintings for the museum and established a definite policy, and he may have concluded that it had ignored Defence’s recommendation, save for involving the Historic Memorials Committee. Possibly he no longer cared; the matter had been taken out of his hands and he could look forward to a time when responsibility for the museum would pass to the Home and Territories Department. In fact, he was already laying the groundwork for this writing to its minister, Patrick Glynn, on 2 January.\textsuperscript{59} Pointing out that ‘eventually’ the museum would come under his department, he recommended that ‘temporarily’ it would be better to allow it to remain with Defence. Nevertheless, he suggested that Glynn immediately become the

\textsuperscript{56} Bean diary, September-December 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 606/117/1, entry 13 November 1918, p 81.

\textsuperscript{57} Memorandum, Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department to Secretary, Defence Department, 16 December 1918, AWM 93, 8/2/23.

\textsuperscript{58} Pearce, handwritten message to Secretary, 3 January 1919, endorsed on Shepherd’s memorandum.

\textsuperscript{59} Letter, Pearce to Glynn, 2 January 1919, NAA A1, 1921/6401.
chairman of the AWMC which cabinet had established in August 1917 to manage the museum.\textsuperscript{60} Its members were Hughes, Glynn, Pearce, Cook in his capacity as Minister for the Navy, and Sir Henry Weedon.\textsuperscript{61} By 30 January cabinet had decided that Glynn should be the committee’s chairman and that Hughes should cease to be a member of it.\textsuperscript{62}

In London during the first two weeks of January 1919 Bean made various arrangements in connection with the war art scheme. His imminent departure for Gallipoli with the Australian Historical Mission meant that commissioning artists to paint the pictures authorised by the government would have to be left to Smart and that someone would have to take his place on the NWRC. Moreover, he had other ideas for his picture scheme; these too would have to be left with Smart. Accordingly, he furnished him with detailed instructions:

1. I should like Treloar to take my place on the Committee for authorising the official artists’ pictures. Can you arrange this?
2. ....................
3. Camps are being prepared by Treloar and the A.W.R.S. in France for the official artists [and modelling team] ... Treloar will let you know when they are ready [the official artists could not be accommodated]. Will you get Power, Leist and Wheeler ready to cross [he didn’t]. Wheeler should make studies of the battlefields, troops and historic sites, and keep in mind a possible picture of a trench in a Somme battle bombardment or the fighting in the Somme (1916); Leist – (i) the incident in Polygon Wood in which Lt. Turnour lost his life (he had done a first rate cartoon) – and (ii) a possible: Battle of Mt. St. Quentin [he painted this]; Power’s the 12th [Australian Field Artillery Brigade] saving its guns at Robecq [he painted this].
4. Sir Luke Fildes advised £50 for Silas’ picture [Digging in at Pope’s Hill: end of a great day] ... I have seen Silas and he will accept it. Do not trouble to cable – I will put it to the Government out there and advise you. I recommend that further subjects for Silas (scenes at which he was present) be: (i) the Roll Call after the Landing (or after May 2); (ii) The charge of the 4th [Australian Infantry Brigade] in the Bloody Angle on May 2-1915 [he painted these].

\textsuperscript{60} As to the committee’s establishment see memorandum, Pearce to Secretary, Defence Department, 29 August 1917, NAA A1, 1921/6401. Its name was settled at its first meeting on 26 June 1918. See minutes of meeting of AWMC, 26 June 1918, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1. At this meeting William Trahair was appointed its secretary pro tem. See Glynn, memorandum, 4 July 1918, NAA A1, 1921/6401.

\textsuperscript{61} Letter, Pearce to Glynn, 2 January 1919, NAA A1, 1921/6401.

\textsuperscript{62} Memorandum, Trumble to Secretary, Home and Territories Department, 30 January 1919, NAA A1, 1921/6401. Pearce had earlier pointed out to Glynn that it would be impossible to get the Prime Minister to attend meetings. See letter, Pearce to Glynn, 2 January 1919, NAA A1, 1921/6401.
5. I will send you a list of the further pictures for all artists which I suggest. See that Fullwood keeps his figures small and more or less distant.

6. With regard to Quinn’s and Longstaff’s portraits, do as you and Treloar think best as to amount to be paid. I think £100 is rather a small amount for an official portrait. Let me know what you decide.

7. I have suggested to Quinn, Brain [at AIF Administrative Headquarters], and yourself that we take Quinn’s portrait sketch of Howse in place of one of the other 15 subjects on his list, and that he send it in with the rest. I have sent to Brain and you complete lists for Longstaff’s and Quinn’s portraits and a suggestion that Leist should paint [General] Elliott and 5th [Division] Generals, and some others [he didn’t].

8. I approve of Leist’s Polygon picture and of Fullwood’s Peronne provided the figures are distant.

9. A sketch of Bretonneux by Fullwood from the other side is not bad provided figures in foreground are shadowy and not too large – this for possible second picture [this did not eventuate].

10. ...................

11. Take note of the clause concerning copyright to be inserted in all contracts; it has been suggested to Galbraith that it should cover all past as well as future pictures. I think the clause drafted does this. If there is a doubt as to old copyright as a consideration for future pictures [the artists] are to be asked to put on paper the transfer of copyright in pictures already delivered. Galbraith will know if the copyright was covered in the old agreements [it wasn’t].

During 1919 Smart arranged to commission the official artists – and Burgess – to paint the eleven pictures approved by the government. To that end they were required to enter into formal agreements with the Commonwealth. Once again, Galbraith was instructed to prepare an agreement. Smart had put this in train in November 1918 telling Bean that a draft agreement would be submitted to the NWRC when he came to London. The evidence establishes that the agreement Galbraith prepared took the form of the document reproduced in Appendix II. It was rudimentary and did not contain a clause regulating how the artist’s

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63 Letter, Bean to Smart, c mid-January 1919, AWM 93, 18/1/29. The emphasis is Bean’s.
64 Memorandum, Smart to Bean, 6 November 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286. Although there is no evidence that the draft agreement was placed before the NWRC – Fildes and Talmage had no interest in it – it seems probable Smart showed it to Bean and asked for his comments.
65 Memorandum, NWRC (Smart) to Director, Australian War Museum, 8 October 1920, with attached form of agreement, AWM 93, 18/1/3. According to Smart, this agreement was entered into by Lambert, Streeton, Leist, Power, Fullwood, Longstaff, Quinn, Coates, Burgess and Bryant.
sketch and the completed picture were to be approved by the NWRC and the consequences of the sketch or picture failing to receive its approval. The extent of the ‘protection’ afforded the Commonwealth was confined to the sketch. Clause 2 provided that if the committee was dissatisfied with it, it could ask the artist to submit ‘a further sketch of the same subject or a fresh sketch of a different subject for their final decision.’ Presumably, if the committee remained dissatisfied with this further or fresh sketch the Commonwealth could terminate the agreement, but the clause did not provide for termination. And the agreement made no provision for what would occur if the completed picture did not meet with the committee’s approval, a serious omission. Notwithstanding these deficiencies, it at least secured for the Commonwealth copyright in the picture and in the studies the artist made for it, and also purported to secure copyright for it in the pictures he had made at the front (clause 5). It seems this agreement was used for all commissions placed in England during 1919 and 1920. For commissions placed in Australia, a vastly improved agreement was prepared by the Commonwealth Crown Solicitor which contained provisions on a range of additional matters including clauses providing for the agreement to be cancelled if either the artist’s sketch or the completed picture failed to meet with the approval of the director of the museum, and the refund to the Commonwealth of all money paid to the artist (Appendix III).66

During his journey to Gallipoli Bean formulated a new picture scheme. On 3 February 1919 he wrote to Treloar enclosing five lists involving the expenditure of £15,000 on pictures for the museum: 1st List – £3,450; 2nd List – £5,000; 3rd List – £2,200; 4th List – £2,400; and 5th List – £1,950.67 The first list contained the eleven approved pictures costing £2,950 and a further picture to be painted by Lambert for £500 of a Gallipoli subject, government approval for which was obtained before he left with Bean for Gallipoli.68 He told Treloar: ‘I will try

66 In July 1920 the Home and Territories Department asked the Attorney-General’s Department to prepare a form of agreement for use in commissioning artists to paint pictures for the museum. After the Commonwealth Crown Solicitor had prepared the agreement in Appendix III, Home and Territories asked whether the agreement used in England should not be used in Australia, and a copy was obtained from the High Commissioner and furnished to the Crown Solicitor. He produced an opinion in which he expressed the view that the High Commissioner’s agreement did not appear to be ‘as suitable’ as his. See letters, Home & Territories to Attorney-General’s Department, 8 July 1920; Home & Territories to Attorney-General’s Department, 3 December 1920; opinion of Crown Solicitor, 11 December 1920; all in AWM 93, 18/1/3.
67 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 3 February 1919, with enclosed typescript, ‘Australian War Memorial Pictures (Commissioned)’ dated 2 February 1919 and signed by Bean as ‘Official War Correspondent, A.I.F.’
68 Since obtaining these approvals Bean had decided on the subjects of the pictures to be painted by Streeton – the opening of the battle of Hamel; Fullwood – the attack on Péronne by the 53rd Battalion; Quinn – portraits of Birdwood and White; Longstaff – portraits of Monash and Griffiths; Lambert – the landing; and had altered the subject of Bryant’s picture from the Southland incident to the sailing of the 1st Australian Division from Albany.
and get them [the government] to spend the £5,000 (2nd list) as soon as I get out [to Australia]; and the 3rd, 4th, and 5th lists, in that order if I can get the War Memorials Fund established. If the Committee (you and Smart) will adopt the lists as a suggestion and let me know in Egypt that you have done so, it will be of assistance. I want to get the £5,000 out of Government money and the remainder out of the War Memorials Fund.\footnote{The War Memorials Fund was established and called the Trust Fund Australian War Records Publication Account. Its nature is explained later in this chapter.}

Bean’s new picture scheme was a substantially cut down version of his provisional scheme of more than 200 pictures. He had had to scrap this when his new system for employing the official artists failed to receive government approval. Still, he wished the Anzac story illustrated as comprehensively as possible, and it should be assumed that what he was now proposing was a scheme of the necessary subjects to be represented if justice were to be done to it. Understandably, in the seventy or eighty pictures making up his scheme there was a concentration of pictures of incidents. There were about forty such pictures, but not all incidents were specified. Bean provided for Lambert to paint four Palestine pictures and for each of seven artists to paint a picture of their ‘most vivid impression’ of the AIF in France or Palestine. He also provided for Dyson to produce a maximum of twenty-two drawings showing the humour of the Australian troops,\footnote{In the second list, Bean allocated Dyson ten humorous drawings. But in the fourth list he would have the choice of executing one picture or twelve humorous drawings. See Bean, typescript, ‘Australian War Memorial Pictures (Commissioned)’, 2 February 1919, AWM 93, 18/1/29, pp 2, 3.} and for a few pictures of general subjects, for instance of stretcher-bearers and of ‘the supreme sacrifice’. The number of portraits had been drastically cut from 110 to thirteen.

If, superficially, Bean’s new picture scheme appeared complete, he was adding to it quietly by requiring the AIF artists, ensconced in the St John’s Wood studio, to paint historical pictures. These were being painted for the Commonwealth gratis, and though the artists might not be of the first rank, their pictures would extend appreciably the coverage of the Anzac story in his five lists. And Bean made clear to Treloar that he had not discounted the possibility of commissioning them to paint pictures for a fee: ‘For any further lists I should consider the claims of our A.I.F. artists very strongly. But one would have to have their finished pictures out there [Australia] for the Committee [AWMC] and Minister to see, first, as they will not yet be known generally in Australia by their work.’\footnote{Letter, Bean to Treloar, 3 February 1919, AWM 93, 18/1/29.} As things turned out
only Benson and Crozier painted pictures for a fee, and then only a handful. Hitherto the part
the AIF artists had played in Anzac’s official pictorial representation had travelled along a
parallel but different path to that of the official artists, and their existence and activities, even
within government circles, were little known. However, Bean planned to publicise them and
their work, and to embrace them as fully-fledged participants in his project.

It will be recalled that en route to Australia Bean finalised his second memoir, an elaboration
of his master plan for Anzac’s official representation. In the present context it is sufficient to
note that under the heading ‘Pictorial Records’, Bean referred to the desirability of the
Commonwealth carrying out a scheme for the acquisition of ‘larger paintings of incidents’
which, he claimed, ‘will make the tradition of our nation’.72 This scheme consisted of the
pictures specified in his five lists, reproduced in Appendix F of his memoir, together with
thirty-three pictures he had asked the AIF artists to paint specified in Appendix G. When
combined, they consisted of the ‘whole scheme of large pictures to embody the Australian
tradition in the war (showing how far the various episodes, battles, etc., will be represented
on the walls of the gallery)’ he described in Appendix L.73 This ‘whole scheme’ contained
about 100 pictures thus rivalling, except in the area of portraits, his provisional scheme. He
now hoped to have around seventy large historical pictures of incidents, locations and
conditions in the Anzac story painted for the museum.

Meanwhile, Patrick Glynn was taking steps to ensure that the museum was established on a
scale considerably more modest than that envisaged by Bean. On 31 March 1919 he chaired a
meeting of the AWMC at which its members agreed that ‘it was desirable to limit the scope
of the collection to really historical memorials and trophies’, otherwise ‘the area covered and
the expense incurred would be very great’.74 The committee said it was important to establish
‘some definite idea as to [the] scope of the Museum and how limitation to really significant
war memorials [could] be realised’. Glynn was threatening to act responsibly, but on Bean’s
arrival in Melbourne his and the committee’s concerns to keep the museum to reasonable
limits were swept away. How this occurred cannot be satisfactorily explained, but it seems
Bean simply walked in, presented his plan for the museum, and secured the committee’s
approval of it without a hitch.

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72 Second memoir, pp 1-3 at p 2.
73 Ibid., p 3.
74 Glynn, memorandum, 31 March 1919, NAA A1, 1921/6401.
When Bean disembarked on 7 May, he had already agreed to act as the museum’s caretaker director until a permanent director was appointed. At a meeting with Glynn on 12 June, he disabused the minister of the idea that the museum should be established on a relatively limited basis. It is clear from Glynn’s note of the meeting that he had had no real appreciation of the scope of Bean’s proposals for it. Even afterwards his understanding was incomplete: he did not read Bean’s first memoir until 20 June and said he had had no time to read his second memoir. Still, his meeting had been useful as he now understood that Bean did not envisage some penny-ante museum. On the subject of pictures, Bean explained that arrangements were ongoing in England for the painting of pictures for the museum; that he planned to suggest subjects for other pictures; and that consideration might be given to meeting the expense from a fund established with the proceeds of sale of photographs and certain publications. Between them they settled important business: the expansion of the AWMC by appointing additional members, Bean included, and the appointment of HS Gullett as the museum’s director. After the meeting Glynn took these matters to cabinet and obtained approval of them.

Glynn had planned for the AWMC to meet after its additional members were appointed. Thus, on 20 July the committee’s secretary wrote to the minister – and presumably each other member – informing him that a meeting was convened for 31 July. He enclosed an agenda, actually a substantial paper entitled ‘Outline of a scheme for the Australian War Museum’ prepared by Bean. In its scope and content it represented a continuation of his first and

76 Glynn, file note, 12 June 1919, NAA A1, 1921/6401.
77 Glynn, file note, 20 June 1919, NAA A1, 1921/6401. There is no evidence he ever did.
78 Glynn, file note, 12 June 1919, NAA A1, 1921/6401, p 1. It seems certain this was the Trust Fund Australian War Records Publication Account.
80 Glynn, handwritten file note, 19 June 1919, endorsed on his file note of 12 June 1919, NAA A1, 1921/6401. Also see Glynn, file note, 20 June 1919, NAA A1, 1921/6401. When Glynn invited the persons approved by cabinet to serve on the committee, he explained that it was responsible for establishing out of the trophies, pictures and other national records of the AIF and RAN a museum which would be regarded as a memorial to the men who fell in the war and ‘eventually stand in the Seat of Government of Australia’. He assured them that the committee, ‘having an expert staff, is generally required to decide only important matters of principle, which will require few meetings and not a great call on time.’ It was far too early in the museum’s life to be claiming that it had ‘an expert staff’. It clearly did not. At all events, only Douglas Mawson, General White and Rear Admiral William Creswell of the invitees accepted Glynn’s invitation. See letter, Glynn to Douglas Mawson, 28 June 1919, NAA A1, 1921/6401; McKernan, *Here is their spirit*, p 65.
82 Memorandum, Trahair to Glynn, 20 July 1919, NAA A1, 1921/6401.
second memoirs with one critical difference – he had reduced their various proposals to a series of resolutions which in that form discouraged debate and encouraged adoption. Moreover, in his paper he defined the AWMC’s functions and ‘the Commonwealth collection’, described what should be done with its every element, outlined arrangements for establishing temporary museums, and described the ‘final museum building’. In modern parlance it was a business plan for the museum, carefully thought out and addressing every conceivable matter and amplified whenever necessary by providing further information in several appendices.

Bean’s paper also more or less explicitly set out a number of ‘important matters of principle’ for the committee’s decision. Relevantly, it would be asked to decide whether paintings were ‘absolutely necessary’ for the museum, to employ Pearce’s phraseology. The decision of the Prime Minister’s Department, acting on the advice of the Historic Memorials Committee, to authorise the painting of eleven pictures in Bean’s first list hardly constituted ‘a definite policy’ on that important question. Effectively, the committee would now be asked to decide it, but it was in no position to do so. In the manner in which Bean presented the question in his paper – surreptitiously – he revealed nothing of the background and invited no discussion of it. (Of course, the government knew this background and was liable to place it before the committee.) If the committee members expected to examine and debate matters before deciding them, they soon discovered that Bean had relieved them of that responsibility by presenting for their adoption a series of carefully formulated resolutions. Save for signifying their assent to them, they were redundant.

Bean provided limited information on the subject of ‘the official pictures’. He mentioned, without providing any context, that the museum’s collection of sketches made by the official artists was complete and comprised about 600 to 700 small pictures. He then claimed that a scheme had been ‘in operation’ for the painting of seventy large pictures covering the history of the AIF and of the RAN, ‘for 40 of which a price would have to be paid’, and that the painting of ten of these had been authorised. What scheme was this? Probably it was the

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84 According to Bean the AWMC had two functions: (1) it had to receive, classify, describe, and allocate to the different states or districts, to certain institutions and to the Commonwealth, the collection of trophies and relics on their way from England to Australia; and (2) it had to establish from a selection of (a) the Commonwealth share of the trophies and relics, (b) the battle models, (c) the official pictures and photographs and (d) historic documents, maps and air-photos, the ‘Commonwealth War Museum which will be Australia’s National Memorial to the Australians who fell in the war’. See ibid., p 1.

85 Ibid., paragraphs 5(e), 6(e), pp 5, 6.
scheme of large pictures he described in Appendix L of his second memoir which included those he had allocated to the AIF artists for painting. But the government had not approved its carrying out, and it certainly was not ‘in operation’. In fact, the government had neither been asked for nor given its imprimatur to the concept of a series of large pictures covering the history of Australia’s part in the war being painted for the museum. It had merely approved the painting of the eleven pictures comprising the first list. Thus, it was misleading for Bean to have informed the committee that such a scheme was ‘in operation’. He was liable, in any case, to place before it the scheme he claimed was in operation to permit it to judge of its worth and to inform it that he had plans for the painting of many more pictures which, in his opinion, were necessary to illustrate the Anzac story to be told in the museum. But he did neither. Moreover, he neither identified the thirty pictures for which he claimed no payment was required nor the artists who were painting them, obviously essential information. How in these circumstances he expected the committee to make an informed decision on his request ‘for authority for a further instalment of the picture scheme’ is puzzling.86

Bean secured the passing of a resolution to the effect that a number of artists, both official and unofficial, be commissioned to paint for the museum thirty-five pictures described by him in Appendix A to his paper at prices not greater than those specified in it and costing no more than £5,000.87 The commissioning of the pictures was expressed to be subject to the approval of the NWRC, but it was a toothless tiger which neither fixed the prices of pictures nor specified their subjects. Its role with respect to these and the earlier commissions which had been authorised was confined to approving the artist’s cartoon and the finished picture, but only to the extent of certifying that he had satisfactorily carried out his contract.88 At all events, the pictures now authorised to be painted, which appeared under the heading ‘Second List’, were identical to those Bean had specified under the same heading in Appendix F to his second memoir, save for five additional pictures expected to cost no more then £500.89 In ‘persuading’ the committee to pass his resolution Bean got its members to decide the

86 Ibid., paragraph 6(e), p 5.
87 Ibid., pp 13, 15, Appendix A.
88 In a note in Appendix A Bean stated that cartoons of all pictures would have to be passed by the NWRC, and that it would have to approve the prices of the pictures as given in the list. Although Smart organised for meetings of the NWRC to be held at which it resolved to place commissions, the meetings were a farce. The committee slavishly followed the list.
89 The list also provided for a sculpture to be made by Web Gilbert for £300 and for the purchase up to a maximum of £200 of etchings by British official artists, drawings by a Colonel Marsh, and etchings by David Barker of Anzac Book fame.
important question of principle left unresolved by the government: were paintings for the museum absolutely necessary and was expenditure on them justified? Not that the committee is likely to have understood the significance latent in the resolution it voted on. Nor even Bean, perhaps. Nevertheless, in passing the resolution the committee resolved that question once and for all, and it would never be asked again.90

The committee resolved to acquaint the people of Australia with the names of the artists who had worked officially for the nation during the war by publishing their names in the press.91 This reflected Bean’s view that the museum should take steps for the official and AIF artists to be accorded a measure of public recognition for the valuable service they had rendered and at the same time inform the public of the essentials of the official art-making programs. The day after the meeting, Bean sent a draft statement in pursuance of the resolution to Glynn for his consideration.92 He promptly approved and sent it to the press. In its Saturday edition of 2 August the Argus published it in an inconspicuous location where it possibly escaped the attention of readers.93 The statement identified all artists by name, briefly mentioned their war service and the subjects of their pictures, and claimed they had ‘served Australia well’. It then described the war art scheme in a nutshell: ‘The sketches made by the official artists at the front are the property of the Commonwealth without special payment, except for expenses, and all pictures by the A.I.F. artists during the term of their appointment belong similarly to the Government. The only pictures for which the official artists are specially paid are certain larger paintings of historical subjects which are painted on their return from the front.’

90 Evidence of proceedings at the meeting consists of a copy of Bean’s paper signed by Bean, Glynn, Weedon, White, George Wise, Assistant Minister for Defence, and an unidentified sixth man probably sent along by the Department of the Navy. See ‘Outline of a scheme for the Australian War Museum’, c July 1919, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1, p 20. Although no formal minutes were taken out, it appears the committee passed fifteen resolutions, from approving Bean’s general scheme for the museum as described in his paper to resolving to take particular action with respect to a wide range of matters including pictures, all without amendment. It can be assumed that any discussion of his proposals was negligible. Significantly, there is no evidence that in advance of the meeting Glynn or his department had scrutinised Bean’s paper and its far-reaching proposals. Moreover, Bean’s standing to have voted is problematic. Earlier, when arrangements were made to appoint additional members to the AWMC, Glynn assumed that Bean would serve on it. However, it is not at all certain whether cabinet had approved this. Nevertheless, at the meeting Bean behaved as if he were a member and voted on the proposed resolutions – his own – another instance of him acting without any relevant standing. It was only on 4 August 1919 that Glynn recommended that Bean be appointed to the AWMC. See Minute Paper for the Executive Council, 4 August 1919, NAA A1, 1921/6401. A marginal note indicates that his recommendation was approved by the Governor-General on 13 August 1919.
91 ‘Outline of a scheme for the Australian War Museum’, c July 1919, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1, resolution 6, p 19.
92 Letter, Bean to Glynn, 1 August 1919, with enclosed statement, NAA A1, 1921/6401.
On 6 August 1919 the Prime Minister’s Department cabled Fisher instructing him to complete ‘forthwith’ the first and second lists in Bean’s memoir within the current financial year at prices recommended by the NRWC, ‘but not to exceed [the] sums specified in list’, and to ship the finished pictures to Australia. Simultaneously with the dispatch of this cable Bean wrote to Smart. He asked him to push on with the completion of the pictures on the first list authorised during the previous financial year, pointing out that as the museum had to provide funds for any portion of them which were uncompleted at year end, it was essential to know exactly what liabilities were outstanding for such pictures so that provision could be made for them in the museum’s estimates of expenditure for the current financial year. The museum had ‘not very much money’, he explained, and if such liabilities were not adequately provided for it would result in having to cut down on pictures authorised on the second list. Smart had no real interest in this information: his role was limited to placing commissions and ensuring they were satisfactorily completed. If and when they were completed, the artists would be paid in England from funds made available to the High Commissioner without reference to the museum which, according to Bean, was now operating under financial constraints peculiar to it. In the present context, the importance of Bean having conveyed this information to Smart is that it presaged the commencement of the museum’s troubles in securing funds to carry out its picture scheme.

Until the official artists drifted back to Australia the process of having pictures painted was organised in England where Smart superintended all necessary arrangements including running the NWRC. Although the minutes of its meetings suggest they were conducted with formality and involved actual decision-making, they were informal affairs at which no substantive decisions were made. When the second list of pictures finally received the committee’s attention on 13 October 1919, it purported to decide to commission various artists to paint various pictures at various prices but merely followed the list from which it had no authority to depart. It might ‘decide’ that it was inadvisable to give Fullwood further commissions, or it might baulk at commissioning Ellis Silas, an amateur artist, to paint

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94 Cable, Prime Minister’s Department to Fisher, 6 August 1919, NAA A2, 1920/1044.
95 Letter, Bean to Smart, 6 August 1919, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
96 Cable, Fisher to Prime Minister’s Department, 23 October 1919, NAA A2, 1920/1044.
97 Extract of minutes of meeting of NWRC, 13 October 1919, AWM 93, 18/7/11. Silas has an entry in the Australian Dictionary of Biography. During the war he published a book of sketches of the Gallipoli campaign, largely made on the peninsula when serving in the AIF as a signaller, Crusading at Anzac anno Domini 1915, British-Australasian, London, 1916.
pictures of three incidents occurring on Gallipoli allotted to him on the list for £50 each, but in both cases it sought instructions from Australia.

The case of Silas provoked a lengthy explanation by Bean to Gullett, who became the museum’s director on 18 August 1919, as to why he should paint the pictures which included: ‘I know enough about painting to know that they are pictures which would be passable – but the point is that they are the recollections of an eyewitness of what ought to be three events of intense interest – and it seems to me that if we let slip the chance of getting the only record of those events which will ever be possible, we shall have left undone something that we ought to do for posterity. I personally would feel most uncomfortable about it.’ When Gullett replied he said both he and Treloar, the museum’s assistant director since early September, endorsed his view about Silas, and he remarked that although one could expect to get ‘superior treatment and imagination’ in a picture painted by an official artist, ‘you will never get the same truth and feeling’.

This reflected Bean’s long-held opinion as to the intrinsic worth of a record of an event made by an artist-witness.

A pattern relating to the artists’ completion of their pictures quickly developed and continued for so long as they were painted under the picture scheme. They took their time painting them, not infrequently taking years to do so. These delays contributed substantially to the museum’s difficulties in securing the necessary funds from Treasury to carry on with the picture scheme as its commitments on uncompleted pictures had to be carried forward over several financial years. But the artists had the museum over a barrel: they had researched their subjects and received all necessary data to enable them to paint their pictures; many had had cartoons approved; some had received advances on approval of their cartoons; and most when pressed made promises to finish their pictures which they could never keep or never intended to keep.

98 Bean recommended Gullett for the position believing he had the necessary political wherewithal to guide the museum through its first important year with a view to Treloar replacing him as director at year’s end. See cable, Bean to Treloar, 18 June 1919, AWM 16, 4372/41/2; Glynn, file note, 20 June 1919, NAA A1, 1921/6401; Bean, ‘Outline of a scheme for the Australian War Museum’, c July 1919, p 8; Gullett, director’s report for meeting of AWMC to be held on 10 September 1919; both in AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1.

99 Letter, Bean to Gullett, 1 December 1919, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286. The events in question were the start of Quinn’s Post on 25 April 1915; the attack by the 4th Brigade at the Bloody Angle on 2 May 1915; and the roll call of companies of the 16th Battalion following a disastrous attack on 3 May 1915.

100 Director’s report for meeting of AWMC to be held on 10 September 1919, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1.

101 Letter, Gullett to Bean, 6 December 1919, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.

102 And the enormous stock he placed in such a picture may be judged by the fact that he assessed Silas as not more than a third rate artist. See letter, Bean to Treloar, 28 January 1920, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287.
The museum was reluctant to press an artist too hard lest this resulted in an inferior picture.\(^\text{103}\) And it was very reluctant to cancel a commission as this meant starting over again or, worse still, that Treasury might deduct the value of the picture from future advances further reducing the chance of getting it painted. The delicate balancing act the museum was obliged to perform was recognised by Bean, who in March 1920 told Treloar: ‘It is important ... I think, to keep the artists in collar, so that they do not take other work before ours. I should say that an extension for 6 months, provided the funds for this year do not lapse, would be advisable.’\(^\text{104}\) Towards the end of 1920 an obviously exasperated Smart wrote to Treloar: ‘I am constantly in touch with the artists concerned, and am continually urging them to finish their pictures as early as possible.’\(^\text{105}\) As Bean and Treloar would come to realise, the museum was in collar and not the artists.

Early in September 1920 Treloar, the museum’s director since 1 June 1920,\(^\text{106}\) suggested to Bean that the time was opportune ‘to prepare a further scheme for pictures’.\(^\text{107}\) It was opportune, he claimed, because the museum had a fund of £10,000 behind it. This was the Trust Fund Australian War Records Publication Account which contained no public funds and was earmarked for use in acquiring additional exhibits for the museum.\(^\text{108}\) Treloar envisaged including in this further scheme a number of pictures of incidents from the

\(^{103}\) As to this see, for example, letter, Smart to Power, 6 July 1920, AWM 93, 18/7/10.
\(^{104}\) Letter, Bean to Treloar, 13 March 1920, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287. By this date only five of the eight historical pictures on the first list had been completed and none on the second list. See statement setting out the position with respect to all pictures enclosed with letter, Smart to Bean, 29 March 1920, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287.
\(^{105}\) Undated letter, Smart to Treloar, attached to letter, Treloar to Bean, 22 December 1920, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287.
\(^{106}\) Minutes of meeting of AWMC, 12 May 1920, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1. Gullett had resigned as director.
\(^{107}\) Letter, Treloar to Bean, 9 September 1920, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287.
\(^{108}\) The Trust Fund Australian War Records Publication Account was a special trust fund established in 1916 with the profits from the sale of The Anzac Book, and to which the profits from the sale of other publications, such as the AIF Christmas Book and Dyson’s Australia at War, were added. Among the resolutions passed by the AWMC on 31 July 1919 was one accepting the principle that this fund should be utilised ‘for the purpose of providing further pictures or exhibits’ for the museum, and that there should be paid into it the profits from the sale of various publications and reproductions of official photographs and pictures, and the balance standing to the credit of an account, ‘A.I.F. Publications Section (London)’. In fact, this account was the special trust fund established in 1916. By January 1921 the fund had grown to £10,000 and the intention was to let it grow into a substantial endowment fund the interest on which would help the museum in future years to add ‘various special exhibits’ to its collections. By section 11 of the Australian War Memorial Act 1925, the Australian War Memorial Fund (AWMF) was established with the balance standing to the credit of the Trust Fund Australian War Records Publication Account, and section 10(2)(a) empowered the memorial’s board of management to acquire additional exhibits from moneys available in it. For reasons of economy hereafter this special trust fund will be referred to as the AWMF. As to all of this see memorandum, Bean to Chief Paymaster, AIF, c 14 March 1918, AWM 184, 2; Bean, ‘Outline of a scheme for the Australian War Museum’, c July 1919, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1, p 16, Appendix B; letter, Treloar to Bean, 10 January 1921, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287.
histories of the RAN and of the Light Horse in the war, as well as several portraits. He said he had been in contact with Arthur Jose, the official historian of the RAN, who had given him a short list of incidents which might be represented. There is no indication in his letter as to whether he had in mind any particular incidents in the history of the Light Horse, but for those he included in what became the third list of pictures he consulted Gullett, its official historian, whom he later described as ‘the guardian of the Light Horse interests’. When Bean replied, he merely lent his support to the idea without more.

By 10 January 1921 Treloar had definitely decided ‘to try and get the Committee to authorise a further list [of pictures]’. He sent a list to Bean explaining that he wished to submit it to the AWMC at its next meeting. This meeting had to be held within the next fortnight, he claimed, but he was proceeding with undue haste and on false assumptions concerning the museum’s finances. He reminded Bean that several pictures and portraits were still required, and that the Light Horse’s representation was not ‘comparatively sufficient’. The list of battles, he explained, had been prepared following Bean’s recommendations in his second memoir and Gullett’s recommendations for the Light Horse, and he had added three or four pictures to cover ‘important battles’. Generally, he based the prices on those paid and payable for pictures on the first list, but in all cases he left open the question of artists until he could speak with him. Importantly, he explained that it was now unnecessary to utilise the AWMF to pay for the pictures, and that they could be paid for from public funds, money parliament voted for the museum:

A splendid opportunity has now occurred … for getting the pictures we require without breaking into this fund. It has occurred this way. For the financial year 1919/20 the Treasury gave us £30,000. We spent £7,000 and showed all our commitments in our estimates, expecting that the amount in hand would be deducted from the amount which Parliament would be asked to authorise us to spend during the current financial year. This made our estimates about £46,000. This sum has now been authorised, making the total available for expenditure in this financial year £63,000 (approximately). You will see, therefore, that our estimated expenditure for this year is £46,000, and that we will have a surplus authorised of

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109 By the end of December 1920 Gullett had provided Treloar with a ‘rough list’ of seven pictures only one of which was not included in the third list. See letter, Gullett to Treloar, 24 December 1920, AWM 93, 18/2/8.
110 Letter, Treloar to Gullett, 28 February 1923, AWM PR01618
111 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 17 September 1920, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
112 Letter, Treloar to Bean, 10 January 1921, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287.
approximately £17,000. I therefore consider we should take advantage of this and try and get the Committee to authorise a further list.

As fully explained in Appendix IV, while Treloar’s mathematics were faultless they proceeded on the basis of an accounting error made in calculating the museum’s commitments on pictures in annual estimates of expenditure furnished to Treasury. These bore little or no relation to the museum’s expected actual expenditure on pictures for the following year, with the result that its estimates were overstated. When in September 1921 Treasury came to understand this, it informed the museum of its intention to withhold £30,000 of the £40,000 parliament had voted for it for the 1920/21 financial year.113 Treloar’s surplus of £17,000 became a deficit of £13,000 overnight: the museum now had to deal with a serious financial crisis.

For the meeting of the AWMC on 17 January 1921 Treloar placed on the agenda his proposal to acquire additional pictures. His proposed list comprised eighteen historical pictures and thirty portraits.114 He claimed their satisfactory quality would be guaranteed by employing only ‘tried’ official or AIF artists; for commissions carried out in Australia by he, Bean and Gullett inspecting and passing the artists’ cartoons and pictures; and for commissions carried out in England by the NWRC doing likewise.115 Treloar prepared a superficially detailed statement dealing with his proposal in which he summarised the museum’s financial position utilising the calculations he had made for Bean, and indicating that the cost of the pictures of £9,550 could be met out of the museum’s surplus funds of £17,781.116 He explained:

It is the general opinion that the pictures and other art records [of the museum] will retain their interest longer than any of the other records. In most cases their value will greatly appreciate with the passage of time. The Canadian War Memorial consists almost entirely of pictures and had cost that Dominion over £40,000 at the end of 1918. Up to the present Australia has spent less than £20,000. The collection is not by any means complete, as will be

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113 Treloar, statement, ‘Reduction of war museum estimates’, attached to agenda for meeting of AWMC, 12 September 1921, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1.
114 Third List of Pictures annexed to minutes of meeting of AWMC, 17 January 1921, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1. As Treloar was averse to any large picture being painted for the museum of ‘a non-incident subject’, there were no such pictures in his list. See letter, Treloar to Gullett, 5 December 1921, AWM 93, 18/2/8. The portraits are separately considered below.
116 Ibid.
readily agreed when it is known that the important events shown on the attached list are not included.

The meeting was chaired by Alexander Poynton, Minister for Home and Territories since February 1920, and attended by Bean, William Laird Smith, Minister for the Navy, White, Weedon, Mawson and Alfred Martin Treacy, Acting Naval Secretary to the Naval Board. Of these attendees only Bean, White and Weedon were involved in the AWMC’s meeting of 31 July 1919 at which Bean secured approval of his second list of pictures. The knowledge the others could have had of the important background to that meeting was likely non-existent or negligible. But if they wished to examine Treloar’s proposal to acquire additional pictures at a cost of £9,550 to the public, and consider whether it should be postponed, trimmed, or perhaps even rejected, he had provided them with minimal information in his statement, certainly insufficient to encourage examination and debate. The less informed committee members likely reasoned that as a previous list had been authorised, and as Treloar was claiming that the museum’s collection was by no means complete, and that in any case pictures were a good investment, the correct decision was to support his proposal. Moreover, as a ‘policy’ had been established whereby the museum would acquire pictures substantially on Bean’s recommendation – its only ‘policy’ – to approve the proposal was merely to give effect to it. Even so, they might have wished to know the subjects of the pictures in the previous lists, and how many were completed and outstanding. Such matters could not be discovered in Treloar’s statement. Once again, the committee was being asked to decide an important proposal without being informed of all matters relevant to deciding it. Predictably, the committee approved it: ‘The Committee authorised the Director to arrange for the painting of the additional pictures included in the list submitted to members with the agenda, at a total cost not exceeding £9,550.’

This approval was secured at a price. Someone – who is unknown – sought to introduce a safeguard in connection with carrying out the picture scheme by proposing that an expert on

117 Perhaps it goes without saying that Treloar, like Bean before him on the occasion of the AWMC’s meeting on 31 July 1919, failed to include in his statement any information about the AIF artists’ historical pictures and their subjects.

118 Minutes of meeting of AWMC, 17 January 1921, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1, resolution 45(a). In August 1931, Treloar informed the Department of Home Affairs, previously Home and Territories, that the lists of pictures paid for from public funds ‘were prepared or formulated after careful consideration by special committees appointed for this purpose shortly after the War Memorial was established in Australia in 1919.’ But as the above discussion shows, this grossly misrepresented the position. See memorandum, Treloar to Secretary, Department of Home Affairs, 19 August 1931, AWM 93, 8/1/20.
art be engaged to advise Bean, Gullett and Treloar in relation to inspecting and passing the pictures painted in Australia. This was merely sensible and recognised, at least implicitly, that they were unqualified to decide artistic questions. However, insufficient thought, more probably no thought at all, was given to this expert’s role. The committee merely resolved: ‘In the agenda it was recommended that Mr Bean, Mr Gullett, and the Director should be entrusted with the inspection and passing of pictures painted by artists in Australia. The Committee considered that these gentlemen should have the advice of an artist. The Committee therefore instructed the Director to invite Mr Bernard Hall, Director, National Art Gallery Melbourne, to accept the position of adviser or, if he is unable to do that, to nominate an artist competent to act in that capacity.’ Treloar interpreted this instruction as authorising him to form an art committee, though it clearly did not. If such a committee were formed, its responsibilities and powers would need to be defined, matters the AWMC never addressed, thus leaving it to Treloar to invent them.

Treloar immediately wrote to Hall, his letter including:

The Australian War Museum has recently approved of commissions being placed with the Australian official and A.I.F. artists for pictures required to complete the national war records, for which the Museum Committee is responsible.

2. The War Museum Committee has entrusted the placing of these commissions and the inspection to a Committee which will be known as the Australian War Museum Art Committee [it had done no such thing]. The War Museum Committee will be glad to learn if you will sit upon this Art Committee as Art Adviser. The other members of the Committee will be Messrs. C.E.W. Bean and H.S. Gullett, the Official Historians, who are members of the War Museum Committee, and the Director, Australian War Museum.

119 There is some evidence that Bean was rather more uncertain when it came to artistic questions than this history might suggest. Two instances will suffice to show this. First, in 1922, when Hilda Rix Nicholas offered the portrait of an anonymous Anzac, A man (1921), to the museum, he would not decide on its purchase without first obtaining ‘an artist’s opinion’. And next, when in 1931 Crozier offered the memorial a picture of a digger, before recommending its purchase he required ‘the independent opinion of an artist as to the draftsmanship and quality of the painting as a work of art’. See minutes of meeting of Art Committee, 29 August 1922, AWM 170, 4/1; Heyes, file note, 31 January 1931, AWM 93, 18/3/16. As to Treloar, he made his position plain: ‘I do not regard myself as competent to judge the capacity of any artist.’ See letter, Treloar to Lieutenant Wallis, 23 May 1941, AWM 315, 326/002/002 01. And as previously mentioned there is no evidence that Gullett held a background in art.

120 Minutes of meeting of AWMC, 17 January 1921, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1, resolution 45(b).

121 Letter, Treloar to Hall, 21 January 1921, AWM 315, 235/004/003.
This told Hall nothing about his role on the committee, merely telling him that he would be its ‘Art Adviser’. This had no effect on Hall who responded by return: ‘I shall be very pleased to act as Art Adviser on the Australian War Museum Art Committee with the two gentlemen named.’ Treloar next convened a meeting of the committee, of which he made himself a member, for 4 February. He had decided that its work should be conducted with formality, that is, at meetings convened on notice and in accordance with agendas and with minutes prepared recording its decisions. An agenda was prepared which included as an item of business: ‘To receive explanation from Director, Australian War Museum, of his proposal for dealing with Third List of Pictures.’ The meeting went ahead notwithstanding the ‘unavoidable absence’ of Bean and Hall; Treloar and Gullett decided ‘to pass resolutions subject to the approval of at least one of the absent members’. Thus, they were inventing their own procedural rules as they went along.

The minutes of the meeting record that Treloar’s proposals for the third list were ‘agreed to’ and continue: ‘The proposals embody that after consultation with Mr Gullett on Palestine subjects and Mr Bean on all other subjects the Director shall make a definite recommendation

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122 Letter, Hall to Treloar, 21 January 1921, AWM 315, 235/004/003. Hall served continuously on the art committee until his death in London on 14 February 1935. At a meeting of the memorial’s board of management on 21 March 1935, it noted that Hall had died leaving the art committee with only two members, Bean and Gullett. It resolved to defer consideration of the appointment of someone to replace Hall until the memorial was established in Canberra. Hall was not replaced until February 1941; his replacement was Louis McCubbin. See extracts from agenda for and minutes of meeting of Board of Management, 21 March 1935, AWM 315, 235/004/003; minutes of meeting of Board of Management, 3 February 1941, AWM 170, 1/43, resolution 260. For Hall’s biographical details see Ann E Galbally, ‘Hall, Lindsay Bernard (1859-1935)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/hall-lindsay-bernard-6528/text11209, accessed 20 September 2013.

123 An incomplete record of the business conducted by the art committee during this history exists. Records of any meetings which took place after 15 July 1927 have not survived or been located. Until that date 19 meetings had taken place, but haphazardly: 1921 (6 meetings); 1922 (2); 1923 (2); 1924 (3); 1925 (1); 1926 (2); 1927 (3). And the attendance of its members was also haphazard: Bean (7 meetings); Gullett (14); Hall (12). The committee survived the memorial’s establishment under the Australian War Memorial Act 1925 to be reconstituted pursuant to a delegation of the Board of Management under section 9 of the Act made on 16 December 1926 to operate retrospectively from 12 May 1926. In accordance with this delegation, the committee was constituted by Bean, Gullett and Hall and given the following powers and functions: (a) the allocation of commissions for the painting of pictures authorised by the Board of Management or by the AWMC prior to the appointment of the board; (b) the approval of works of art painted on commission; and (c) the advising in regard to the acceptance or rejection of works of art offered for purchase. See minutes of meeting of Board of Management and attachments, 16 December 1926, AWM 170, 1/5.

124 Agenda for meeting of Art Committee to be held on 4 February 1921, AWM 93, 4/4/3, item 2. There were other important items of business on the agenda including noting the form of agreement the Commonwealth Crown Solicitor had prepared under which artists were to be engaged to paint pictures for the museum (Appendix III). It continued to be used during this history save for the substitution of the word ‘Memorial’ for ‘Museum’ wherever appearing after the commencement of the Australian War Memorial Act 1925.

125 Minutes of meeting of Art Committee, 4 February 1921, AWM 170, 4/1.
to the Committee for the placing of commissions with A.I.F. and official artists.'

These were farcical: Treloar, as director, would consult with Bean and Gullett, presumably in their capacities as official historians, and make a definite recommendation to the committee of which he and the other two were members. Having decided what commissions should be placed and with whom, a meeting of the committee would be convened for the purpose of resolving to do what they had already decided. Did Hall have a role to play in this? And how was it envisaged that he would use his art expertise in this process? Outnumbered in any case, there was no likelihood of his disputing the others’ decisions. Anyway, Treloar’s proposals confirm Bean’s standing as the only person whose opinions on the pictorial representation of Anzac really mattered, this notwithstanding that Gullett was to be consulted on Palestine subjects. Gullett did express his opinion from time to time, but if it conflicted with Bean’s he changed it and fell in with him. So did Treloar.

Hall’s first involvement as a member of the art committee occurred around 29 April 1921 in relation to the proposed purchase of a small picture by Lambert, *Light Horse in Action, East of the Jordan*, now known as *Es Salt raid* (1918) [151], which depicted an incident during the Palestine campaign. The committee, ostensibly constituted by Hall, Treloar and Gullett, resolved to acquire it. It became customary for the committee to inspect a picture on offer to the museum or completed under commission, and Hall attended at the museum’s offices and inspected Lambert’s picture. There is no evidence that prior to attending his role on the committee was explained to him. As he could not judge the picture for its record value, presumably he approved of its purchase judged for its artistic merit, and probably the reasonableness of its price. According to Treloar, Gullett and Bean were satisfied with it from a record point of view and thought its asking price of £100 was reasonable. Treloar’s role in all of this, for he too was a committee member, is elusive. Anyway, no problem arose with

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126 Ibid., resolution 2.
127 And Gullett consulted Chauvel on these subjects. See letters, Chauvel to Gullett, 29 November 1921; Gullett to Treloar, 24 January 1922; both in AWM 93, 18/2/8.
128 Minutes of meeting of Art Committee, 29 April 1921, AWM 170, 4/1. Notwithstanding the existence of these minutes, it seems that no meeting actually took place. See memorandum, Treloar to Secretary, Australian War Museum Art Committee, 27 April 1921, AWM 93, 18/2/8. According to this, it was not practicable to convene a meeting as it was inconvenient for Bean and Gullett to attend, and it was undesirable to have a meeting to deal with a single subject.
129 Minutes of meeting of Art Committee, 29 April 1921, AWM 170, 4/1, resolution 12.
130 Memorandum, Treloar to Secretary, Australian War Museum Art Committee, 27 April 1921, AWM 93, 18/2/8.
131 Ibid.
respect to the picture. But what if a picture had artistic merit but little or no record value? How should these competing considerations be resolved? And what was Hall’s role in the overall assessment of a picture? Treloar’s failure to have informed him of his role was bound to give rise to problems, and they arose in May 1921 when he was asked to express his opinion on several of Power’s pictures the museum wished to acquire. After Hall inspected them, Treloar reported to Bean:

He [Hall] sometimes feels embarrassed because he finds that we are very keen on pictures of which he does not form a favourable opinion … and finds that we have no time for a picture which he considers very good … He of course realises that art is not necessarily the predominant note we aim at in our collections. I have tried to make clear his responsibility to him by explaining that the Committee wanted his expert advice with a view to ensuring that it gets good value for money spent on pictures.132

If art was not necessarily the predominant note the museum aimed at in its collections, then presumably it was record value. However, art or artistic merit was not considered wholly irrelevant. For instance, in May 1923 Treloar and Gullett had been discussing ‘the question of raising the art value’ of the museum’s collection. (This led nowhere.) This induced them to approve the purchase of a picture by Power, *Corbie Abbey* (1918) [152], for £70 relying on Hall’s advice that it had ‘an exceptionally high art value’.133 However, it had no record value. Moreover, the museum already held other pictures of the subject.134 Generally, however, art value weighed rather less in the scales than record value, and its weight was largely rolled up in a consideration of whether at the price a picture could be acquired it represented ‘good value’. Hall’s role as ‘Art Adviser’, then, boiled down to that of an appraiser.

As the subjects of the historical pictures on the authorised lists received Bean’s imprimatur or were recommended by him, no question arose as to whether they should be represented. But occasionally that question arose in connection with the subject of a picture offered to the museum or proposed to be painted for it. And when it did Bean acted as arbiter. In his arguments for and against the representation of various subjects can be discovered the ‘policy’ governing how Anzac should be represented pictorially, never more fulsomely than in

132 Letter, Treloar to Bean, 5 May 1921, AWM 93, 18/3/29.
133 Letter, Treloar to Bean, 10 May 1923, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287.
134 Incidentally, Bean would have opposed the picture’s acquisition because it was a ‘still subject’, as opposed to a ‘moving event’, and Corbie church was not of very vital interest to the museum. See letter, Bean to Treloar, 15 May 1923, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287.
relation to the subjects of a picture painted by Crozier and another he proposed painting. These cases also show that Treloar had no separate conception of how Anzac should be represented, and how his thinking on that matter, and also Gullett’s, was undeveloped.

On 11 May 1922 the art committee, constituted by Gullett, Hall and Treloar, resolved to acquire Crozier’s *Kamerad*. Although its decision was not expressed to be subject to Bean’s approval, it nevertheless was. When apprised of it, Bean wrote to Treloar indicating his opposition to the purchase:

> I have always had rather a horror of the ‘Kamerade’ joke and the kamerade story, especially after having seen a large number of Australian soldiers surrender to the Germans at Bullecourt. The sticking of a bayonet into a lot of unarmed men was usually the end of a charge, and although it was necessary it was not heroic, nor the sort of thing one likes to dwell on. It was the subject of a lot of crude boasting and glorification during the war, although the majority of fellows do not like to talk about it now, and Crozier’s picture impresses me as being the result of that frame of mind. Anyway it brings it irresistibly back to me. That is the reason why I do not like to think of that sort of picture in our memorial collection.

While it has proved impossible to establish the precise nature of the ‘Kamerade’ joke and story, they almost certainly relate to some Australians’ practice of giving ‘no quarter’, that is, of killing surrendered soldiers or of refusing to take prisoners. As Bean knew, the practice was forbidden by British military law which incorporated *The Hague Rules*. Although it is outside the scope of this study to examine his dubious claim that bayoneting unarmed men was necessary, that he made it at all reflects his determination to protect the AIF’s reputation and its ‘tradition’. As Dale Blair argues, in his official history Bean refrained from seriously judging or questioning the Australians’ practice of ‘no quarter’, instead adopting a general and passive view that accepted the inevitability of such incidents occurring in war. If the practice went on, then according to Bean it should not be publicised and a picture which depicted, hinted at, or potentially brought it to mind, was unsuitable for the museum. To draw

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135 Minutes of meeting of Art Committee, 11 May 1922, AWM 170, 4/1.
136 Extract from letter, Bean to Treloar, 18 May 1922, AWM 93, 18/3/16. The emphasis has been added.
139 Blair, *No Quarter*, pp 6-7; ‘The nonsense of universal Australian ‘fair play’ in war’, pp 115-17.
attention to unsavoury aspects of the actions of some Australians during the war was antithetical to Anzac’s official representation, a project which by that time had achieved a physical shape with the display of pictures and other exhibits in the museum recently opened in Melbourne and described as ‘a tribute to the men of the A.I.F.’. With its opening an official image of Anzac entered the public domain: it was only necessary now to promote, protect and preserve it. And Bean reasoned that in part this should be achieved by a form of censorship imposed on the public to prevent it from being exposed to pictures such as Kamerad. When Treloar received Bean’s views he sought Gullett’s advice. He claimed the art committee had recommended purchasing the picture knowing that Bean was opposed to its purchase, but hoping he would modify his opinion ‘as a result of discussion’. However, his vehement opposition to acquiring the picture rendered any discussion with him pointless. The important point here is that Treloar and Gullett had regarded its subject as one appropriate for representation in the museum: either they did not understand or completely share Bean’s views about how Anzac should be represented, at least pictorially. Gullett promptly resiled from his earlier decision: ‘Of course I agree with Mr Bean about the Crozier picture.’ Its purchase was instantly dropped.

In June 1923 Bean was obliged to expand upon his views in connection with a picture Crozier wished to paint for the museum of assaulting troops entering a village. Sensibly, Treloar sought Bean’s opinion before authorising Crozier to proceed with it; he was ‘set against purchasing it’, explaining:

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140 Fittingly, the museum opened on Anzac Day 1922. See ‘Australian War Museum. Opening on April 25. Most interesting display’, Argus, 18 April 1922, p 5, in which the quoted words appeared. According to this article, which was carried by the Brisbane Courier, Sydney Morning Herald and the Kalgoorlie Miner, among other dailies, the museum’s object was ‘to reconstruct the phases of war and to illustrate the manner in which military, scientific, and business brains decided that modern war should be conducted.’ This neither did justice to nor accurately described its object. The West Australian got closer to the mark when it claimed that the museum provided ‘the necessary complement to Captain Bean’s History’. See ‘Australia’s war record’, West Australian, 26 April 1922, p 6. Visitors to the museum had to wait until October 1922 before a guidebook became available, The Relics and Records of Australia’s effort in the Defence of the Empire. 1914-1918, Australian War Museum, Melbourne, 1922. When it appeared it was praised as ‘a compendium of valuable historical information attaching to the various exhibits’, ‘almost a history in brief of Australia’s part in the war’. See ‘The Australian War Museum’, Advertiser, 5 October 1922, p 11.

141 Yet Bean had no difficulty authorising the illustration of the cover of the guidebook with a detailed black-and-white drawing of the Anzac as warrior, a fierce and determined Australian soldier in full battle dress lunging forward with his rifle, bayonet fixed, at an unseen enemy of the Empire. Perhaps it should be assumed the enemy soldier out of picture is armed. At all events this illustration survived the museum’s relocation to Sydney in April 1925 to be reproduced on the cover of the new guidebook and several subsequent editions.

142 Letter, Treloar to Gullett, 26 May 1922, AWM 93, 18/3/16.

143 Extract from letter, Gullett to Treloar, 31 May 1922, AWM 93, 18/3/16.
To my mind there is a clear line which ought to guide us in the buying of pictures other than those which we order. Are they a memorial and a suitable memorial of our men? To my mind this picture and others of the same sort cannot by any reasonable construction be brought within the category of a suitable memorial. If the picture represented some incident in the story of the A.I.F., which could illustrate the quality of the A.I.F. and inspirit future generations to imitate and admire that quality, then it would be quite different. There will be plenty of such incidents if we try to look for them … But I think that we should now confine ourselves to portraying such definite incidents … I feel nothing but pride and intense interest in reading the actual things which our boys did in the war, or seeing pictures of them, and feel also that great constructive qualities can be imbued into the younger generation which studies them: that the actual result of Percy Black’s death will be twenty sheep stations carved out of apparently hopeless desert; or the result of Murray’s steadfastness an honesty and steadfastness in some youngster which will perhaps guide him through all sorts of difficulties when he is Mayor of Sydney, or town clerk or dustman even … To sum up – I fear a policy which might lead us to have a picture gallery containing pictures of what war is rather than of what our men did. Do I make clear the distinction? … I do not think [our subjects] should include, unless for a very definite reason in each case portrayals of the sort of thing our men did (or might have done). 144

The importance of Bean’s statement as setting out what effectively was the policy which governed not only Anzac’s pictorial representation, but the entire project of its official representation, cannot be overstated. Superficially straightforward, it is complicated containing layers of meaning. One might be forgiven for thinking it was produced as an exercise in sophistry. As a ‘policy’ it stood capable of being successfully invoked to justify the acquisition or rejection of any picture, a justification ultimately dependent on the proponent’s inclination and ability to mount an argument. Bean’s unconvincing contention that there should be a different criterion for purchasing as opposed to commissioning pictures to one side, it seems that for a picture to qualify as ‘a suitable memorial to our men’ its subject had to be one ‘which could illustrate the quality of the A.I.F. and inspirit future generations to imitate and admire that quality’. As a criterion this was hopelessly vague, but as Bean was the sole arbiter of the qualities of the AIF to be represented it caused no difficulties. Presumably, all of the pictures of incidents on the authorised lists satisfied this

144 Letters, Treloar to Bean, 31 May 1923, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/297; Bean to Treloar, 7 June 1923, AWM 93, 18/3/16.
criterion. But then he said he feared a policy which might lead the museum to have ‘a picture gallery containing pictures of what war is rather than what our men did’. This distinction was artificial. To a greater or lesser extent the vast majority of historical pictures on the authorised lists, and those purchased by the museum, represented ‘what war is’, notwithstanding that they also represented ‘what our men did’. Having read Bean’s letter Treloar informed him that he agreed with his views and attempted to distil them: ‘The distinction between pictures illustrating how warfare is waged, and those illustrating incidents in the history of the A.I.F., is quite clear to both of us.’145 Unsurprisingly, his distillation failed to do justice to Bean’s explication of what should and should not be represented, but in any case the distinction Treloar identified was unreal.146

The timing of this one-sided discussion between Bean and Treloar was propitious. In it, Bean emphasised what he claimed was the memorial nature of the museum, and he was troubled by the tendency the institution’s description as a museum had to obscure its ‘true’ nature. In the Senate on 22 August 1923, Pearce, now Minister for Home and Territories and the AWMC’s chairman, announced that the government regarded the museum as ‘the Australian National Memorial’, and that it intended establishing a building to be erected in Canberra where it would stand for all time ‘as the memorial of the nation to those who fought for the freedom of Australia and civilization in the late war’.147 ‘The collection’, he explained, ‘which consists of pictures, relics and the engraved names of every Australian who fought in the late war, will be dedicated to the memory of those who served the nation in the great world conflict.’148 His announcement conferred on the museum a political dimension, which was to represent Anzac and give it permanent form. The government, however, had given no real thought to what it had sanctioned. Had it paused to evaluate the museum’s short history critically, it might have dawned on it that it was sanctioning the representation for posterity of a particular version of Anzac, Bean’s. Perhaps it would not have been unhappy to discover this: the utility of a monolithic version of Anzac as Bean had conceived it was obvious.

145 Letter, Treloar to Bean, 27 June 1923, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/297.
146 When Treloar informed Crozier that his offer was unacceptable, he explained that the museum did not require pictures showing how modern war was waged, but only pictures of incidents in the history of the AIF. See letter, Treloar to Crozier, 13 June 1923, AWM 93, 18/3/16.
147 Hansard, Senate, 22 August 1923, p 3265; acting director’s report for meeting of AWMC to be held on 11 October 1923, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1, annexure ‘A’.
148 There is not a little irony in Pearce’s acknowledgment of the proper place of pictures in the museum given his attitude during the war.
On 11 October 1923 the AWMC resolved that the museum’s title was misleading – how it did not say – and should be altered to ‘The Australian War Memorial’ forthwith.\(^{149}\) Pearce, when announcing the museum’s closure in Melbourne because of the risk of fire in the Exhibition Building and its relocation to Sydney, explained that the alteration in its title ‘was in keeping with the arrangement made by the Federal Ministry that the collections of records, relics, pictures, photographs, and models, when housed in a monumental building at Canberra, should constitute the Commonwealth’s memorial to those who had fallen in the war.’\(^{150}\)

Relocating the museum to Sydney was an enormous logistical exercise.\(^{151}\) It was not until 3 April 1925 that the Australian War Memorial Museum – it had been decided that until housed in Canberra the museum should be ‘popularly known’ by that title\(^{152}\) – was relocated to Sydney and officially opened by the Governor-General, Lord Forster, in the presence of a host of notables including Bean and Lambert.\(^{153}\) The speakers laid emphasis, not for the first time and not nearly the last, on the ‘fact’ that the memorial museum was not intended to glorify war.\(^{154}\) If it did not glorify war, on which question minds differed and still differ, there was no argument that it glorified the AIF. Pearce pointed out that in the government’s view it ‘was not for the purpose of the glorification of war’. Bean was unimpressed with the emphasis the speakers laid on this point, suggesting they were not right ‘in making it an object lesson to preach a moral’.\(^{155}\) He saw the matter rather more simply: the museum, he claimed, ‘is a memorial of dead Australians – their relics and records’. This was a gross simplification of the multiple understandings of the museum likely gained by members of the public visiting it.

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\(^{149}\) Minutes of meeting of AWMC, 11 October 1923, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1, resolution 102.

\(^{150}\) ‘War museum. Soon to be closed. Authorities fear fire’, Argus, 13 October 1923, p 31. Also see minutes of meeting of AWMC, 11 October 1923, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1, resolution 103.

\(^{151}\) This task fell to Albert Pretty, the museum’s chief librarian, who was appointed acting director during Treloar’s absence for two years from 1 August 1923. He had been lent to the British Empire Exhibition Commission for duty as secretary. See director’s report attached to agenda for meeting of AWMC to be held on 4 April 1923, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1, item 5 ‘Direction’.

\(^{152}\) Minutes of meeting AWMC, 12 January 1925, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1, resolution 127.


\(^{154}\) ‘War museum. Officially opened. Lord Forster’s tribute. Spirit of diggers’, Sydney Morning Herald, 4 April 1925, p 17. The memorial museum in Sydney closed in 1935 to enable the collection to be relocated to Canberra where the construction of the permanent building was underway. See McKernan, Here is their spirit, pp 152-4. In hindsight its closure was premature by six years. The memorial in Canberra was not officially opened until 11 November 1941.

\(^{155}\) Letter, Bean to Treloar, 19 April 1925, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/667, p 3.
After the opening ceremony Bean was the guest of the New South Wales Institute of Journalists at a luncheon at Farmer’s. He impressed upon the gathering the worth of the official history he was compiling and the importance of ensuring that it should be as accurate as possible. His approach, he explained, was much like a photographer who placed on his plates pictures which would last forever, for he was creating a ‘word picture of events as they had actually occurred from the words of actual witnesses of the events’. And the stories the history told of the deeds of the men of the AIF were unsurpassed by any regiment of any infantry in the history of the world. In making this claim he was getting carried away, but it very clearly shows his intention to place Australia’s tradition at the top of the tree. The events related in his history – the Anzac story – were stories that should be preserved for future generations of Australians, he claimed: ‘Stories of a few men holding back hordes of Turks, so that their colleagues might retire, and the gallant deeds of the men of Western Australia and Victoria on Gallipoli were those that inspired the ideals of a nation, and enable it to look steadfastly into the future.’ He did not refer to the museum memorial; he did not need to. Its role in representing and perpetuating these stories was obvious to his audience. And in its various courts illustrating the campaigns, each ‘a unique and compact volume of history of Australia’s war effort’, the historical pictures would make their important contribution to transmitting them.

On 19 August 1925 Pearce introduced in the Senate the War Memorial Bill: it had an easy passage through both houses and on 26 September the Australian War Memorial Act 1925 was assented to and commenced. Section 3 established a Commonwealth Memorial of the Australians who died in the war beginning on 4 August 1914 to be known as the ‘Australian War Memorial’ and consisting of the Commonwealth’s collection of war relics – defined to mean the relics, records, models, pictures, photographs and other articles comprising the Australian War Museum – and such building for the accommodation of such relics as might be constructed. The conferral of statutory status on the memorial ensured to the extent possible – for there remained the remote possibility that the Act might be repealed and the memorial dismantled – its permanence and gave legitimacy to the project of Anzac’s official representation on which Bean had for so long been engaged.

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156 ‘War history. An epic story. For future generations. Mr Bean honoured by journalists’, Sydney Morning Herald, 4 April 1925, p 16.
157 The Relics and Records of Australia’s effort in the Defence of the Empire (1925), p 7.
158 McKernan, Here is their spirit, pp 90-1.
During the 1920s and until the mid-1930s the memorial placed commissions with artists in Australia for the painting of historical pictures authorised on the third list, one on the second list, and a few additional pictures not appearing on any list. The artists employed were drawn from the ranks of the official and AIF artists – Streeton, Fullwood, Will Longstaff and Scott were overlooked159 – and three ‘outsiders’ were also employed – Wheeler, Coates and William McInnes.160 This was a matter on which Bean and Treloar always agreed. For various reasons, which included scarce funds and a growing concern over the size of the collection and the ability to hang it in the space available in the memorial building to be built in Canberra,161 commissions to paint several pictures on the second and third lists were never placed.162 Sometimes the approval to paint them was utilised to have other pictures painted, for instance, the approval on the second list to paint a picture of the second attack at Bullecourt was used to have a picture of Major Percy Black’s death repainted.163 Meanwhile, unallotted pictures were carried forward in the memorial’s estimates of its commitments on pictures until substituted or allowed to lapse.164 Gullett, for instance, substituted pictures of the Camel Corps at Magdhaba and of Lieutenant McNamara’s thrilling aeroplane rescue of Captain Rutherford near Gaza for two incidents on the third list. For a picture of the Damascus incident on the third list, Gullett settled on the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade’s gallop

159 Streeton because he was difficult to deal with; Fullwood because he could not draw figures; and Longstaff and Scott because they failed when painting big pictures. See letter, Bean to Treloar, 3 July 1921, AWM 93, 18/2/8, p 5.

160 Another academic painter, McInnes specialised in portraiture. He has an entry in the Australian Dictionary of Biography.

161 As to concerns over the size of the collection and how it could be exhibited see, for example, letters, Bean to Griffiths, 6 December 1927, AWM 93, 18/1/5; Bean to Treloar, 3 July 1936, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/314. When Bean gave evidence before the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works in 1928, he asserted that the AWMC was ‘already limiting its programme of pictures in accordance with space’. See Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, Report together with Minutes of Evidence relating to the proposed Australian War Memorial, p 7.

162 On the second list there were a picture of the retaking of Villers-Bretonneux on 25 April 1918; two pictures allotted to Streeton, one a panorama of the Somme Valley at Péronne and the other of the battle of the Hindenburg Line; and a picture of the first battle of the Somme. On the third list there were pictures of the second attack at Bullecourt; the tank redoubt incident; the capture of a Turkish general at Gaza; the 1st Light Horse Brigade at Abu Tellul, July 1918; the attack on Sari Bair; and the leaders in conference at Anzac on the first night when the decision to hold on was reached (a group portrait).

163 Letter, Treloar to Bean, 27 June 1927, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287. Also see letters, Treloar to Bean, 16 March 1922; Bean to Treloar, 20 March 1922; both in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/323; minutes of meeting of Art Committee, 14 December 1923, AWM 170, 4/1, resolution 47. It will be recalled that Scott painted as many as three pictures of the subject for the memorial gratis; none was thought satisfactory to hang.

164 For instance, pictures of the retaking of Villers-Bretonneux (second list) and the attack on Sari Bair (third list) were still being shown in the memorial’s estimates in February 1927. See draft estimates attached to letter, Treloar to Bean, 21 February 1927, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/304. This document sets out all uncompleted historical pictures, single and group portraits, and character studies in the authorised picture scheme.
into Damascus on 1 October 1918. The painting of an additional picture from the AIF’s campaign in France, the subject of which was ‘8th August, 1918’, was authorised in 1927 to ensure its adequate representation in the memorial. Also in 1927, McCubbin was commissioned to paint a picture depicting the passage of three RAN destroyers through the Dardanelles Straits on 12 November 1918 as part of the Allied fleet which sailed to Constantinople.

By 1932 the picture scheme had been substantially completed. However, for a considerable time the memorial had had in mind acquiring a picture of an incident from the Palestine campaign occurring at Ziza. Chauvel and former Colonel Donald Cameron of the 5th Light Horse Regiment, both members of the memorial’s board, were ‘very anxious’ to have the picture painted. But as Treloar explained to Cameron, the financial position of the account from which the memorial would have to pay for the picture was ‘not very strong’. Another consideration was that the memorial was continuing to incur expenditure on pictures at taxpayers’ expense, and this had caused it embarrassment and attracted criticism. Nevertheless, in December 1933 he secured approval to place a commission for the picture’s painting on the basis that it was required to complete the Light Horse’s representation. This commission was the last incident authorised to be painted by the memorial during this history, marking the completion of its picture scheme. Sixteen years had passed since Bean first proposed to the government the carrying out of a scheme for the painting of a series of historical pictures and portraits. During the initial arrangements made to establish the memorial on a proper footing, Bean had had to trim his scheme, and due to a combination of factors, the most important of which was the memorial’s finances, it remained trimmed. A number of pictures he hoped would be painted fell by the wayside, but some losses were made good with pictures of other incidents. And over the period the memorial purchased

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165 After consulting General Wilson, a former commander of a Light Horse brigade. See letter, Wilson to Gullett, 17 February 1921, AWM 93, 18/2/29.
166 Minutes of meeting of Art Committee, 7 March 1927, AWM 170, 4/1, resolution 82; letter, Treloar to Bean, 16 January 1929, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/314. It will be recalled that Will Longstaff had painted a picture of the subject for the memorial gratis.
167 Letters, Treloar to Bean, 13 September 1932, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/314; Treloar to Power, 19 October 1932, AWM 93, 18/4/40 Part 2, p 6.
168 Presumably the AWMF. See letter, Treloar to Cameron, 17 June 1933, AWM 93, 18/4/40 Part 2.
169 Letter, Treloar to Bazley, 5 September 1933, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/314; memorandum, Treloar to Finance Committee, 14 February 1935, AWM 93, 18/4/40 Part 2. For this reason Treloar wished to keep secret plans to incur further expenditure on pictures.
170 Extracts from agenda and minutes of meeting of Finance Committee held on 11 December 1933, AWM 93, 18/4/40 Part 2.
other pictures which extended the coverage of the story of Anzac. Together, these pictures (Appendix V) illustrate the official story.

With the picture scheme substantially completed and other sales opportunities ‘practically exhausted’, Treloar conceived of bringing out a book of reproductions of the official pictures. If the observance and celebration of Anzac Day 1932 is a reliable guide, Australians had not lost the slightest interest in the Anzac story, and a book which told that story largely pictorially was likely to be a success. Published in 1933 as Australian Chivalry, it was Treloar’s creation from first to last. Each of the fifty-two pictures was accompanied by a ‘story’ of its subject describing the event ‘with special emphasis on the phase shown in the picture’. These stories were written in a ‘popular style’ because the book was intended for the ‘masses’. Its subject was the ‘story’ of the Australian forces, that is, the story of Anzac, and to tell it the pictures were organised substantially chronologically. In effect, the book was a highly condensed version of the official story.

Treloar explained the significance of the book’s title in his preface. Its writing, he confessed, had caused him a great deal of anxiety as he wished to ‘get away from the trite and use instead something which would appeal to the imagination’:

We wanted to idealise the soldier, believing that this would be a welcome contrast with the debased viewpoint commonly adopted in war books. We wanted also to convey the idea that the War Memorial Collection does not exist for the glorification of war, but that the exhibits

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171 Throughout his directorship Treloar exploited various opportunities to augment the memorial’s funds. In its first ever guidebook, visitors to the museum were encouraged to acquire their own ‘war souvenir’. A range of souvenirs was on offer, including ‘high class’ colour reproductions of four official war pictures. See letter, Treloar to Bazley, 26 October 1932, AWM 38, 3DRL 8042/60, p 1; The Relics and Records of Australia’s effort in the Defence of the Empire (1922), pp 54, 82.

172 Anzac Day 1932 was the high point of the year; even a cursory review of newspaper accounts of the occasion establishes this. The coverage of the day’s events in dailies published around the nation was staggering: messages from the King, the Prime Minister and the Governor-General were reproduced; editorials, poems, letters to the editor and soldiers’ recollections were published. And virtually every article had something to say on the matter of the importance of the day. For instance, it was claimed that the birth of Australia as a nation lay behind the word ‘Anzac’. The Mercury’s editorial claimed Anzac Day was the anniversary of Australia’s ‘first effort as a united nation on the field of battle’. That was true. And it went on to quote Bean’s claim in the official history that at the landing the Anzacs ‘purchased a tradition beyond all human power to appraise, and set for all time the standard of conduct for the Australian and New Zealand soldier’. So attractive in the popular sense was this idea that the nation’s birth corresponded with the birth of its tradition that it has proven impossible to upset. See ‘Anzac Day spirit. League’s message to schools. Plans complete’, Advertiser, 22 April 1932, p 19; ‘Anzac Day’, Mercury, 25 April 1932, p 6.

173 Letter, Treloar to Bazley, 26 October 1932, AWM 38, 3DRL 8042/60, p 1.

174 Ibid. Treloar had enlisted Bazley’s assistance to check them.

175 Letter, Treloar to Bazley, 2 December 1932, AWM 38, 3DRL 8042/60, p 1.
are in effect a plea for peace and a memorial of qualities for which there is as much need in time of peace as there is in time of war. Personally I think the title is a good one and I hope that Dr Bean will agree [he did].

His preface is a mix of rhetoric and propaganda. The book, he claimed, illustrated the ‘impressive fact’ that Australia’s servicemen – women were not mentioned – were inspired by a ‘high sense of honour, disdain of danger and death, love of adventure, compassion for the weak and oppressed, self-sacrifice, and altruism’, traits which, according to ‘a learned dean’, were the embodiment of chivalry. Anzacs, then, were latter-day knights who rode forth inspired and bound by the chivalric code. All that had changed was their appearance, for now the ‘slouched hat replaced the crested heaume, the sombre khaki tunic the mail hauberk, and the magazine rifle the sword and lance’. Of course, all of this was utter nonsense, apparently designed to capture the imagination of the masses and encourage them to purchase the book. He failed to refer to Anzac, its tradition and qualities, nor to the fact that the book told its story, but that was hardly necessary.

### Portraits

An extensive program for the painting of portraits was slow to develop due largely to the memorial’s limited funds, though compared to historical pictures their cost was much less. The first and second lists of pictures authorised the painting of ten portraits. This hardly did justice to Bean’s early grand vision of commemorating more than 100 individuals in portraits for the museum. Early on commissions were placed ad hoc. During 1920 Gullett and Treloar decided, with Bean’s concurrence, that about fifteen additional portraits should be painted. This was before the AWMC established a policy governing how subjects were to be selected, including specifying the extent to which each branch of the services was to be represented and the overall number of portraits to be painted. But Treloar recognised the need for such a policy. In September 1920 he informed John Longstaff, who had enquired after commissions,

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176 Letter, Treloar to Bazley, 2 December 1932, AWM 38, 3DRL 8042/60, p 2.

177 Their cost ranged from between £75 and £100 for a head and shoulders portrait. Rather appropriately, the most expensive portrait painted for the memorial was Bean’s at £150, the sum paid to Lambert. See letter, Pretty to Lambert, AWM 93, 18/4/9.

178 Letters, Gullett to Bean, 13 January 1920; Bean to Gullett, 17 January 1920; Treloar to Bean, 20 May 1920; all in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287; memorandum, Secretary, Home and Territories Department to Official Secretary, 20 May 1920, NAA A2, 1920/1044; letters, Bean to Treloar, 24 May 1920; Treloar to Bean, 7 July 1920; Treloar to Bean, 9 September 1920; all in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287. Five men whose portraits were painted at a cost of £478/10/- did not make the memorial’s hanging list: Generals Edwin Tivey, Neville Smyth, Cecil Foott and James Legge and Sergeant Stanley McDougall.
that no decision had been made regarding the painting of additional portraits, ‘chiefly because
we wish to prepare a list now which will completely provide for our collection of
portraits’.179 This, he said, involved ‘a careful examination of records and consultation with
senior officers and historians’. Despite this advice, there is no evidence that he examined any
records, or consulted any persons, before asking the AWMC to authorise an extensive
program for the painting of portraits.

In the agenda for the committee’s meeting on 17 January 1921, at which it authorised the
third list of pictures, Treloar explained:

As regards portraits, these have hitherto practically been limited to very distinguished officers.
Several of these returned to Australia before their portraits could be arranged for overseas,
and it becomes necessary to have them painted locally. It is also considered desirable that
representatives of the non-commissioned ranks should be included in the collection. Instead
of providing for this by a few portraits of distinguished men such as V.C. winners, it is
proposed to secure a small series of character studies in a setting as regards pose and
surroundings typical of the work of the arm of the service concerned. These will be accurate
in all details of uniform, equipment, etc. and will be a very fine and unique record.180

The list contained thirty portraits: three of groups, thirteen of officers, and fourteen of other
ranks described as ‘character studies’.181 Although each portrait category presented different
problems, the most serious arose with respect to the officers – how had they been selected?
As to this point they had ‘practically been limited to very distinguished officers’, the
committee was entitled to assume that the officers Treloar selected were likewise ‘very
distinguished’. Certainly, there is no evidence that his selection provoked any debate. The
character studies were not intended to depict particular individuals, but rather the work
typically performed by various arms and services of the AIF, for instance the work of the
signallers and pioneers. And the group portraits would depict several officers, the identities of
whom had not been settled, in historical settings.

It became accepted that the subjects of individual portraits had to satisfy a single criterion.
When the question of commissioning several portraits in addition to those authorised on the

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179 Letter, Treloar to Longstaff, 27 September 1920, AWM 93, 18/1/6.
180 Agenda for meeting of AWMC, 17 January 1921, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1, agenda item 3, ‘Additional pictures
for the war museum collections’, p 1.
181 Third List of Pictures annexed to minutes of meeting of AWMC, 17 January 1921, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1.
third list came before the AWMC in February 1922, Treloar explained that all previous subjects were selected following the *principle* that only officers whose ‘exceptionally distinguished service in the field’ justified the perpetuation of their memory should be chosen.\(^{182}\) There was no argument that this was the correct principle.\(^{183}\) But there remained the problem of selecting the subjects. As a result of representations made to him, Pearce suggested that Monash and Chauvel be asked for their opinion on the adequacy of the subjects whose portraits had been painted or were awaiting painting.\(^{184}\) Treloar prepared and sent the generals a list of forty-one officers and other ranks and asked them to also nominate a number of junior or non-commissioned officers whose portraits might be painted.\(^{185}\) Monash said there were officers on Treloar’s list whose records were ‘not more distinguished’ than those of the other infantry and artillery brigadiers who served during 1918, and in furnishing a list of sixteen additional officers submitted that ‘of no single one could it be said that he is not fully deserving of a place of honour in the national records’.\(^{186}\) Chauvel nominated six officers whose portraits he said *should* be included.\(^{187}\) And together they recommended eighteen junior officers and other ranks who were worthy of being represented.\(^{188}\)

Their recommendations, though helpful, did not provide the committee with the necessary guidance it required to decide the subjects of additional portraits, and it was left to Treloar to suggest some basic guidelines: (1) he proposed, on the basis that the representative nature of the portrait collection was the chief consideration, that the number of portraits of junior officers and other ranks should be equal to that of senior officers; (2) he claimed that unless the number of portraits was ‘strictly limited’, the honour of being represented would lose its value; and (3) he pointed out that unless the number of portraits was limited it would be

\(^{182}\) Director’s report attached to agenda for meeting of AWMC to be held on 24 February 1922, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1, agenda item ‘Additional portraits for the war museum’s collections’, p 1.

\(^{183}\) Expressing himself only slightly differently, Bean said that what was important was ensuring that the portraits hung in the museum were ‘of people whose merits so exceptionally deserved to be recorded’. See letter, Bean to Treloar, 22 May 1923, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287.

\(^{184}\) Director’s report attached to agenda for meeting of AWMC to be held on 24 February 1922, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1, agenda item ‘Additional portraits for the war museum’s collections’, p 1.

\(^{185}\) ‘List of portraits to be hung in Australian War Museum’, attached to director’s report attached to agenda for meeting of AWMC to be held on 24 February 1922, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1, agenda item ‘Additional portraits for the war museum’s collections’, p 1.

\(^{186}\) Ibid., pp 1-2.

\(^{187}\) Ibid., p 2.

\(^{188}\) Ibid., pp 3-4.
impossible to find the necessary wall space to hang them.\footnote{Ibid., p 4.} The AWMC adopted his suggestions and resolved to limit the number of portraits to sixty with about half that number to consist of junior officers and other ranks.\footnote{Minutes of meeting of AWMC, 27 February 1922, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1, resolution 68.} It directed Treloar to prepare a list of sixty members of the AIF ‘considered most worthy of this honour’, but a year passed and still he had not produced a list. Perhaps for this reason in April 1923 the AWMC appointed a sub-committee to inquire into and report on who should be included in the list.\footnote{Minutes of meeting of AWMC, 4 April 1923, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1, resolution 95.}

On 9 October 1923 the portraits sub-committee, the members of which were Chauvel, White, Bean and Commodore George Hyde, decided on the identities of the men and one woman worthy of the honour of having their portraits painted and hung in the museum.\footnote{Minutes of meeting of AWMC, 4 April 1923, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1, resolution 95.} While acknowledging that there were other cases ‘equally deserving’, the sub-committee claimed that its selection was ‘an adequate representation of the Australian forces engaged in the war’. Its list of fifty-eight names consisted of thirty-one senior officers and twenty-seven junior ranks. Of the twenty-two senior officers Monash and Chauvel had put forward, only four were included, but their suggestions with respect to junior officers and other ranks met with more success with fourteen of their eighteen men included.

On 11 October the AWMC adopted the sub-committee’s recommendations adding two senior officers and Bean to its list.\footnote{Minutes of meeting of AWMC, 11 October 1923, AWM 170, 1/2 Part 1, resolution 105.} Treloar had now merely to place commissions for the painting of portraits of men on the hanging list whose portraits had not already been painted; by 1928 those that were ultimately painted had been completed. Portraits of all except for seven men on the list were obtained.\footnote{This takes into account the sketch portraits of eleven men on the list painted by Quinn, Longstaff and Bell during or shortly after the war. A decision seems to have been made, probably for financial reasons, not to repaint their portraits. The final accounting of portraits as between senior officers and other ranks was 32 as against 21, excluding Bean. This reflects a distribution of portraits among the services of AIF, 41; Light Horse, 11; RAN, 5; AFC, 3.} And no further commissions were placed save for an equestrian portrait of Chauvel painted by McInnes, \textit{Lieutenant General Sir Harry Chauvel} (1938), to replace Quinn’s portrait of him which was considered ‘a very poor one’.\footnote{Letter, Treloar to Bean, 16 July 1936, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/310. Treloar thought it might cost as much as £200.}
Throughout, decisions about the artists who should be commissioned to paint the portraits were made ad hoc. No criteria were established for their selection, though it was accepted that commissions should be placed with ‘the best possible artists’ to ensure that the museum got ‘the best possible portraits’. But a major difficulty was the apparent paucity of decent portraitists. In May 1920 Bean complained to Treloar that the chief difficulty in getting portraits painted was that there were ‘few painters of really good portraits’ to choose from in Australia. In February 1924, when Pretty cast about for artists to whom commissions might be entrusted to paint several outstanding portraits of men living in Melbourne and Sydney, he told Bean his difficulty was ‘the paucity of portrait painters at present available’. Bean did not disagree. Ultimately, sixteen artists were used: Lawson Balfour, Bell, Norman Carter, Coates, Crozier, Bernard Hall, Henry Harrison, Lambert, John Longstaff, McInnes, Power, Quinn, Florence Rodway, Daphne Taylor, Wheeler, and Leslie Wilkie. Longstaff and McInnes were the most used. It is impossible to judge whether this group represented ‘the best possible artists’, but it seems the standard of portraits was variable and generally disappointing.

Purchases

During this history the memorial purchased several pictures. Before the Australian War Memorial Act 1925 commenced, and the establishment thereunder of the AWMF, purchases were funded from public revenue, money parliament voted for the memorial, and the Trust

196 Letter, Treloar to Bean, 17 March 1921, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287, quoting Gullett’s opinion.
197 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 25 May 1920, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287. His claim is debatable.
198 Letter, Pretty, to Bean, 21 February 1924, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287.
199 The results of an examination of portraits carried out by Gullett and Hall in April 1924 were disappointing: ‘Considerable difficulty was found in arriving at a standard. It was early realised that if it was to be a fairly high one, then far more portraits would have to be discarded than we [the museum] could at present expect to afford to replace.’ See letter, Pretty to Bean, 14 April 1924, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287. They identified several portraits requiring revision or repainting.
200 It also received a few donations, notably Will Longstaff’s Menin Gate at Midnight (Ghosts of Menin Road) (1927). In 1928 Prime Minister Stanley Bruce accepted an offer made by Lord Woolavington to give the picture, for which he reportedly paid 2,000 guineas, to the Commonwealth on condition that it was ‘worthily hung [in] Canberra’. Bruce approved of the picture entering the memorial’s collection. It shows a host of ghostly soldiers who have risen from a cornfield strewn with blood-red poppies and march towards the Menin Gate Memorial in Ypres. It is a frankly sentimental picture with obvious popular appeal. Its popularity then as now might be partly explained by the fact that it did not invite scrutiny for its historical accuracy. To understand and respond to it did not require the viewer to read and digest an account of an incident in the Anzac story. It had universal appeal. See ‘“Ghosts of Menin Gate.” Federal Ministry accepts gift’, Argus, 21 January 1928, p 28; undated paper entitled ‘Presentation to the Commonwealth of Captain W Longstaff’s picture “Ghosts of Menin Gate”’, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/307; Anne Gray, ‘Will Longstaff’s Menin Gate at midnight’, Journal of the Australian War Memorial, no 12, April 1988, pp 47-50.
Fund Australian War Records Publication Account, the predecessor of the AWMF. Unlike other collecting institutions of the period, the memorial never established a purchasing policy. To the extent it had a policy it was Bean who largely decided whether and why a picture should be purchased. That situation did not change after the art committee was formed, even though Hall was eminently qualified to develop a policy.\(^{201}\) Nor did the committee ever operate as a purchasing body, regularly going out into the market to identify pictures for purchase. Its excursions into the market were limited to occasionally inspecting pictures being shown at the exhibitions of former official and AIF artists, and at the memorial exhibitions of such artists who had died, notably Lambert’s.\(^{202}\)

In the ordinary course consideration of a picture with a view to its purchase was triggered by an offer from an artist to sell it to the memorial at a specified price. This often produced a round of correspondence between Treloar and Bean, and occasionally included Gullett. In the time after the art committee was established, a meeting would be convened to consider the offer. The committee’s decisions do not reflect the application of settled criteria, nor even a consistent approach. The two grounds upon which they appear to have been made were record value and art value. Record value was a vague concept which, depending on the content given it and the context in which it was invoked, could produce variable and sometimes inexplicable outcomes. And although the term was frequently invoked, usually to justify a picture’s rejection, no one bothered to give it meaning. There are virtually no instances where the record value of a picture is identified, save for the bald assertion that it had record value, and its meaning must be deduced from any reasons advanced for a picture’s rejection. With no fixed meaning, record value as a criterion gave decision-makers – really just Bean – a wide discretion to accept or reject a picture as they pleased. Presumably, to

\(^{201}\) Cox, The National Gallery of Victoria, pp 55-9, 62-3. Interestingly, Hall believed that a committee as a purchaser got poor results.

\(^{202}\) Held in September 1930, the memorial acquired four pictures and twelve sketchbooks from the exhibition, selected by Bean and Gullett, at a cost of £250. See letters, Treloar to Bean, 28 August 1930; Bean to Treloar, 13 September 1930, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/303; Treloar to Bain, 28 October 1930; Bain to Treloar, 6 November 1930, with attached list ‘Particulars of sketch and pocket note books procured from the Lambert Memorial Fund Committee’; both in AWM 265, 46/1/3. Because of its already extensive holdings of Lambert’s works, Treloar advised Bean that purchasing further works would be justified only if they were of ‘special interest either from an art or historical viewpoint’, and that if works were identified the concurrence of Hall should be secured to their acquisition. It seems doubtful that Bean (and Gullett) followed this advice; certainly Hall’s opinion was never sought. The pictures, *Arabs by the sea*, *Mounted troops move through a defile in Palestine*, *Light horse company on a hill* and *Light horseman, mounted*, did not add materially to the pictures Lambert had made during his visits to the Middle East and Gallipoli and delivered to the Commonwealth. And the sketchbooks were once the Commonwealth’s property under Lambert’s formal agreements engaging him to go to the front.
qualify as a record a picture had either to depict an incident in the Anzac story or an aspect of the experience of Australia’s forces during the war. The evidence suggests that a picture’s record value embraced factors such as whether its subject was represented with historical accuracy; had a relation to the war; was adequately represented in the collection; was memorial in nature; was Australian; was a special incident; and filled a gap in the collection.

The purchases made during the early 1920s of minor pictures, small and relatively cheap works which did not depict important incidents in the Anzac story, were inconsiderable and are of no especial interest. Most were acquired utilising funds from the AWMF. It appears the first purchase of a major picture was Coates’ *Casualty Clearing Station* (1920) [153], acquired for £300 in 1920, depicting the arrival of a wounded Australian soldier at a casualty clearing station on the Western Front. Although its subject had undoubted record value, the picture was an imaginative work. Coates spent the war working in the 3rd London General Hospital at Wandsworth and apparently drew on his experiences to paint the picture, lending it a measure of authenticity. Painted in England, in February 1920 Fisher cabled Australia seeking authority to acquire it. The proposal was referred to the museum, and doubtless to Bean. As a safeguard against the risk of acquiring a picture that was not historically accurate, someone, most probably Bean, proposed a condition: the picture could be acquired if a medical officer who served at a casualty clearing station certified its record value. A Major Morris at Australia House ‘certified’ the picture subject to the correction of ‘some minor details’.

In May 1921 the museum purchased four major pictures by Power in advance of a substantial exhibition the artist was mounting, the most substantial purchase it made during this history measured by cost. This transaction reveals much that was unsatisfactory about the

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203 Letter, Secretary, Home and Territories to Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, 17 July 1920, NAA A2, 1920/1044. This refers to a cable that had been sent by the High Commissioner on 7 February 1920.
204 Cable, Prime Minister’s Department to Fisher, 20 July 1920, AWM 93, 19/7/4.
205 Letter, Morris to Smart, 9 September 1920, AWM 93, 19/7/4. Morris neither explicitly referred to its record value nor claimed to have served at a casualty clearing station. In the early 1920s the museum acquired another picture by Coates, *First Australian wounded at Gallipoli arriving at Wandsworth Hospital, London* (1921). This depicted an important event in the Anzac story; in this case its record value was indisputable as Coates could speak to the subject with the authority of a witness. The wounded began arriving in early November 1915. See ‘Australian wounded. Large number in England. Warm clothing wanted for Gallipoli’, *Advertiser*, 22 November 1915, p 8. Although evidence of the picture’s price has not been located, it might be assumed that it was also £300.
way the art committee made decisions. Treloar, Gullett and Bean inspected Power’s pictures and identified three they were keen on acquiring – *Bringing up the guns* [23], *Horse lines on the Somme* (1920), *Canteen: Some Story: army canteen behind the lines in France* (1918) – but baulked at paying Power’s prices.²⁰⁷ Treloar negotiated a package deal with him: the museum would acquire them and a fourth but not greatly desired picture, *Australian Artillery going into action at Harbonnières* (1920), with an asking price of £400, all for £1,300.²⁰⁸ Initially, Treloar, Gullett and Bean overlooked the Harbonnières picture as it was not ‘accurate in details’, and *Bringing up the guns* was not entirely satisfactory as the team it showed seemed ‘too spick and span’.²⁰⁹

Treloar argued for proceeding with the package deal because they were all Royal Academy pictures and at the prices they could be acquired were ‘very good value’.²¹⁰ In making his argument he did not recapitulate on the views he, Bean and Gullett had come to with respect to the record value of the pictures, and it might be inferred from this that that criterion had played a relatively small part in their decision. He did, however, raise one matter that was troubling him: he was worried about perceptions and wished to avoid the museum acquiring ‘an undesirable reputation for rather indiscriminate buying’. But then again, he went on, the subject to be illustrated – the Anzac story – was ‘so vast’ and the pictures the museum had were ‘so limited’ – this was untrue – that it was ‘really very difficult to decide against any picture’. Arguments such as these, invented momentarily when making an important decision, show that a purchasing policy was desperately needed. When Treloar sought the approval of Home and Territories to purchase the pictures, he misleadingly informed it that he, Bean and Gullett considered *all* pictures were satisfactory ‘from a record point of view’.²¹¹

The decision to acquire *Bringing up the guns* and the Harbonnières picture was impossible to justify. Each was a record of a gun team going into action. When Power exhibited *Bringing up the guns* in Australia, he said it showed the 101st Australian Battery moving up at the

²⁰⁷ Memorandum, Treloar to Secretary, Home and Territories, 10 May 1921, AWM 93, 18/3/29. His prices were £800, £600 and £300 respectively.
²⁰⁸ Letter, Treloar to Bean, 5 May 1921, AWM 93, 18/3/29.
²⁰⁹ Ibid.
²¹⁰ Ibid., memorandum, Treloar to Secretary, Home and Territories, 10 May 1921, AWM 93, 18/3/29. After Hall inspected the pictures he confirmed that they were well worth the prices offered by the museum.
²¹¹ Memorandum, Treloar to Secretary, Home and Territories, 10 May 1921, AWM 93, 18/3/29. The department duly gave its approval. See letter, Secretary, Home and Territories to Treloar, 21 May 1921, AWM 93, 18/3/29. At Treloar’s suggestion it authorised payment for *Horse lines on the Somme* (£300) out of the museum’s vote and the rest (£1,000) out the AWMF.
battle of Passchendaele (Third Ypres).\textsuperscript{212} There is no evidence that Bean disputed his claim. And as Power was in Flanders during Third Ypres, perhaps this constituted a good reason for thinking his picture depicted an event he had witnessed. It generally accords with and derives its authenticity from the pictures of gun teams he made during his visit to the front, in particular \textit{War} \textsuperscript{[22]} on which it is obviously based. But was its record value such that its acquisition was justified? Power had treated the subject of a gun team going into action during Third Ypres in \textit{First Australian Division Artillery going into the 3rd Battle of Ypres} (1919) \textsuperscript{[154]}, a picture he painted for the Commonwealth on Bean’s recommendation. This was the necessary record of the artillery’s part in that famous battle and purchasing \textit{Bringing up the guns} was doubling up. And the purchase of the Harbonnières picture, which purported to depict a gun team going into action during the battle of Amiens in August 1918, was not easily justified. It was not ‘accurate in details’, thus affecting its record value, and Bean was not entirely convinced by it complaining that it appeared to him ‘a little too like a hunting picture’.\textsuperscript{213} Perhaps what persuaded him to agree to its purchase was that he said he had seen a similar incident on 9 or 10 August 1918.\textsuperscript{214} But Power was not then in France, thus the picture was largely an imaginative work. At all events the purchase of two large artillery pictures when the museum already held one was hardly justified and might well be characterised as ‘rather indiscriminate buying’.

\textit{Horse lines on the Somme} should have been passed over on the ground that it had insufficient record value. It shows a large number of horses being prepared for battle in the Somme area, but it does not purport to depict an incident from or preceding any particular battle. Power witnessed such scenes at the front: they are the subject of five pictures he made for the Commonwealth, and acquiring \textit{Horse lines} did not add materially to these records. What the art committee saw as its distinctive record value is elusive. \textit{Canteen: Some Story: army canteen behind the lines in France}, which showed a group of soldiers sitting in a canteen listening to a story told by a soldier, had a record value, probably lying in its detailed and apparently accurate description of the interior of the canteen and of the several Australian soldiers in the scene. Nevertheless, the decision to acquire the picture was unjustified. It was


\textsuperscript{213} Letter, Bean to Treloar, c 9 May 1921, AWM 93, 18/3/29.

\textsuperscript{214} Ibid.
based on a picture Power had made during his visit to Flanders in 1917 and in the museum’s collection, *Some story. A canteen*, and its status as the authentic on-the-spot record made by a witness could not be matched by the finished picture. In any case, to acquire it was another instance of doubling up.

During this history the memorial’s decisions to acquire pictures both of a minor and major kind proceeded ad hoc. Hilda Rix Nicholas’s *A Mother of France* (1914) [155], depicting an old woman sitting in her kitchen, had no record value and no obvious relation to the war, but was preferred to *A man* (1921) [156], which she also offered, a picture of a typical Anzac having undoubted record value.\(^{215}\) Then, it will be recalled that Power’s *Corbie Abbey* was acquired because it had ‘an exceptionally high art value’; but it had no record value and the museum already held other pictures of the same subject. The decision to acquire Bryant’s *Boulogne in wartime, January 1918* (1923) [157] ignored the circumstance that the artist had treated the subject and painted two very similar scenes in pictures he made for the Commonwealth during his wartime visit to Boulogne.\(^{216}\) Bean recommended the purchase of Crozier’s *The first boat load* and *Death of Lieutenant NJ Greig 12 July 1915* although neither was ‘absolutely correct in detail’, but each ‘very truly represent[ed] the spirit of the subject’.\(^{217}\) Treloar was against purchasing Lambert’s *Barada Gorge, 30 September 1918* (1921-7) which depicted the massacre by Allied forces of a Turkish/German column entering the gorge as its subject was ‘unheroic and one of the savage incidents of the war’, and thus unsuitable for commemoration; yet he was overborne by Bean who pointed out that as the dead Turks would be ‘mere specks’, ‘the subject would not be obviously horrible’.\(^{218}\) Then, there is the memorial’s purchase in 1935 of Streeton’s *Bellicourt tunnel* (1920) and *Amiens, the key of the west* (1918) [158] for £350. This was actuated solely by Bean’s desire to have

\(^{215}\) *A Mother of France* was acquired for £75. See minutes of meeting of Art Committee, 29 August 1922, AWM 170, 4/1.

\(^{216}\) Letters, Treloar to Hall, 15 June 1923; Hall to Treloar, 18 June 1923; memorandum, Treloar to Secretary, Home and Territories, 22 June 1923; all in AWM 93, 18/1/61; agreement between the Commonwealth and Bryant 12 July 1923 relating to the purchase of the picture, AWM 93, 18/7/2; letter, Secretary, Home and Territories to Treloar, 23 July 1923, AWM 93, 18/2/21. In accordance with Treloar’s request Home and Territories authorised payment for the picture (£150) out of the museum’s vote.

\(^{217}\) Letter, Bean to Pretty, 10 December 1923, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/297. Pretty appears to have obtained authority to pay for the pictures (£550) out of the museum’s vote. See letter, Pretty to Secretary, Home and Territories, 4 January 1924, AWM 93, 18/3/16. He misleadingly informed the department that the pictures had ‘considerable historical value’.

\(^{218}\) Letters, Treloar to Bazley, 9 April 1926; Bean to Treloar, 10 July 1926; both in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/302; extract from agenda and minutes of meeting of Finance Committee on 8 November 1927, AWM 93, 18/2/28 Part 2. The committee approved an increase in the price to be paid Lambert for the picture from £100 to £200 and also authorised payment for it out of the AWMF.
them for the memorial. By this date Hall was dead and the art committee’s surviving members were Bean and Gullett. Yet there is no evidence Gullett was consulted. This shows that the art committee’s role in vetting purchases was more artificial than real and that essentially it functioned as a committee of one, Bean. Presumably, he believed the art value of Streeton’s pictures was considerable, and perhaps he was right. But their record value, except as more or less contemporary records of land over which the Australians had fought, was negligible. Only Bellicourt tunnel purports to depict an event, but then at a remove. Really, they are not war pictures but typical Streeton ‘heroic landscapes’.

Bean’s interest in acquiring Bellicourt tunnel, which led to his discovery of Amiens, the key of the west, began in 1928. The transaction can be traced in letters, Treloar to McCubbin, 14 August 1928, AWM 93, 18/1/22; Treloar to Bean, 8 March 1930; Treloar to Bean, 12 March 1930; both in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/322; Treloar, file note, 8 April 1930, AWM 93, 18/1/22; letters, Bean to Streeton, 16 June 1933, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/322; Streeton to Bean, 19 June 1933, AWM 93, 18/1/22; Bean to Streeton, 23 June 1933; Treloar to Bean, 21 July 1933; Bean to Streeton, 24 July 1933; all in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/322; Streeton to Bean, 9 August 1933, AWM 93, 18/1/22; Bean to Streeton, 22 August 1933; Treloar to Bean, 13 November 1935; Bean to Streeton, 18 November 1935; all in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/322; Streeton to Bean, 20 November 1935, AWM 93, 18/1/22; Bean to Streeton, 21 November 1935, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/322; Treloar to Streeton, 26 November 1935; Streeton to Bean, 2 December 1935; both in AWM 93, 18/1/22. There seems to be no doubt that the pictures were paid for out of the AWMF. Interestingly, according to The Arthur Streeton Catalogue (catalogue numbers 714-15), both pictures were in the possession – ownership? – of Streeton’s son Oliver at the time of their sale.
In order to carry out the project of Anzac’s official pictorial representation Bean literally had a blank canvas to work on. He could go about it much as he pleased, so long as he stuck to the conventional forms of the military’s, and also the navy’s, representation in British art. There were, in any case, no other forms peculiarly suited to his purpose of illustrating the story of Anzac he wished told for posterity in the memorial, including of course its leading actors. By adhering to them he could guarantee the production of a series of pictures which were realistic, comprehensible and easily communicated the story and its meaning. Moreover, no other forms of Anzac’s representation could promote successfully the idea that it was a military tradition.

Exerting a constant influence over decisions on how Anzac should be represented was the intended audience for the pictures and other exhibits displayed in the memorial. This was the public, or as Treloar unkindly described them, ‘the masses’, for whose benefit the memorial had been established and its exhibits collected and produced. This was so obvious there was no need to refer to or acknowledge the fact, except on the rare occasion when a proposed exhibit had about it undesirable features. This rarely arose in connection with a picture, but when it did, Bean acted as protector of the public’s sensibilities shielding them from exposure to pictures which glorified war, were unheroic, or unnecessarily showed how war was waged. He, Gullett and Treloar had no faith in the public’s capacity for discernment and did not accord it even minimal sophistication. Gullett expressed most clearly the consensus when he said that ‘the average non-cultural mind’ was the mind of the main visitor to the memorial, and that such a person had no capacity to understand exhibits whose meanings were not crystal clear. Thus, exhibits with obscure meanings and those which were potentially controversial should not be acquired, nor those that ‘the average Australian’ would find ‘gruesome and harrowing’. Even if such works had undoubted artistic merit they should not be acquired because, he claimed, visitors were not looking for art but were visiting ‘in a spirit of reverence and not a little sorrow’. Essentially, this trio achieved by what was in effect a

1 Letter, Treloar to Bazley, 26 October 1932, AWM 38, 3DRL 8042/60, p 2.
2 See, for example, extract from letter, Bean to Treloar, 18 May 1922; letter, Bean to Treloar, 7 June 1923; both in AWM 93, 18/3/16; letters, Treloar to Bean, 9 April 1926; Bean to Treloar, 12 April 1926; Bean to Treloar, 10 July 1926; all in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/302.
3 Letter, Gullett to Bean, 10 February 1926, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/302.
form of censorship the avoidance and discouragement of any critical evaluation or minimal discussion of the memorial’s exhibits. This was as it should be: uncritical acceptance of all that the memorial represented was the order of the day.

Finally, Anzac’s official pictorial representation boiled down to two questions: what and who should be represented? Because the subjects of the historical pictures on the authorised lists and of those purchased by the memorial were substantially specified by Bean or received his imprimatur, there was always available a ready-made answer to the first question. For a time an answer to the second question eluded the memorial until a ‘hanging list’ was established, though it was always accepted as a principle that only persons who had rendered ‘exceptionally distinguished service in the field’ should be represented. The pictures considered in this chapter do not serve merely as further illustrations of Anzac’s official representation, but in appropriate cases are interrogated to discover what they might conceal with respect to their production, to expose Bean’s thinking on how and why Anzac should be represented in particular ways, and to pose questions about their place in the Anzac story and the nation’s history, their historical accuracy and assumed memorial nature.

I – Historical pictures

Anzac’s representation in the historical pictures, though primarily governed by subject matter, was treated by Bean as a mixed question of the picture’s design, its intended message and its historical accuracy. And any discussion of that question occurred ad hoc with Bean directing or influencing the outcome. Consequently, he substantially dictated how subjects should be represented, though of course the ideas behind their representation and his involvement in the production of the pictures were necessarily concealed from the public. Bean’s desire to acquire pictures of incidents in the Anzac story was not motivated solely by his desire to see them illustrated in order to carry the story further. The vast majority were represented in order to promote a range of ideals he claimed epitomised Anzac and which included the

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4 Pictures of locations and conditions caused no particular problem, but those of incidents were potentially and often problematic. When an artist was engaged to paint a picture of an incident, theoretically the question of how to represent it passed to him, but the memorial retained substantial control over the picture’s development by requiring him to submit a cartoon of the picture for approval and reserving to itself the right to reject the finished picture if it did not meet with its approval. These safeguards were contained in the agreements the Commonwealth entered into with artists for commissions placed in Australia. See clauses 3 and 7 of the agreement in Appendix III. No equivalent safeguards were contained in the agreements the Commonwealth entered into with artists for commissions placed in England. Nevertheless, it was afforded some protection with respect to the artist’s cartoon. See clause 2 of the agreement in Appendix II.
performance of duty, patriotism, heroism, loyalty to one’s mates, self-sacrifice, nonchalance to danger, discipline, endurance and steadfastness, not forgetting of course martial prowess. These ideals, which he considered ‘the chief point of the story’ to be depicted, would, he hoped, teach object lessons to and inspirit future generations of Australians and lay the ground for a future nationality.

For Bean and Treloar, ensuring historical accuracy in the representation of incidents was their fundamental objective, and to that end and to the extent possible they closely supervised the production of pictures. Writing in 1936 about the revisions Power had been required to make to Saving the guns at Robecq (1920, revised 1934-6), Treloar said: ‘We have always endeavoured to ensure the accuracy of paintings so that they can be handed down to posterity with the assurance that their veracity is vouched for by men with first-hand knowledge of the subjects depicted.’ He, in particular, was anxious ‘not to leave the slightest opportunity for criticism by the many sharp-eyed outspoken critics who view [the] pictures’. It was to answer criticism of Lambert’s depiction of the men in his Anzac, the landing 1915 wearing hats instead of caps, that he took the unusual step of inserting in the memorial’s first guidebook a note justifying the artist’s decision. So seriously did he and Bean regard their responsibilities to ensure the historical accuracy of pictures, that when they satisfied themselves that Saving the guns at Robecq did not accord with the facts they withdrew it from exhibition. Generally, however, Bean’s attitude was more flexible than Treloar’s: if a picture was otherwise ‘good’, as in the case of Power’s 8th August which had received a deal

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5 Letter, Bean to Heyes, 9 May 1928, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/323.
6 In a small book written by Bean and published shortly after the war which he addressed to ‘young Australians’, he impressed on them that the men of the AIF, especially those whom ‘the bullet took’, had given Australia into their hands, and he exhorted them to give their lives to Australia, as the men of the AIF had done, to take up the work only begun at Anzac, Pozières, Broodseinde and Villers-Bretonneux, and to ‘enlist in this great, generous fight for Australia, to place and keep [their] country, if possible, amongst the greatest countries in the world’. See In Your Hands, Australians, Cassell and Company, London, 1918, esp chapters 1 & 2 at pp 7-8, 10, 15-17.
7 Bound up with achieving this objective was another, ‘ensuring that the Commonwealth [received] good value for the moneys [it] expended’. See letter, Treloar to Bean, 9 June 1927, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/323.
8 Letter, Treloar to Colonel Adams, 2 May 1936, AWM 93, 18/1/42.
9 Letter, Treloar to Power, 30 March 1933, AWM 93, 18/4/40 Part 2. In 1936, Treloar told a Colonel Adams: ‘Most of the former diggers who inspect our collection may not know much about art, but they are very quick to detect mistakes in colour patches, equipment, etc!’ See letter, Treloar to Colonel Adams, 6 April 1936, AWM 93, 18/1/42.
10 The Relics and Records of Australia’s effort in the Defence of the Empire (1922), p 14. This criticism commenced immediately after the picture went on show when the museum opened in Melbourne on Anzac Day 1922. See letters, Treloar to Bean, 29 April 1922, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/302; Bean to Treloar, 5 May 1922, AWM 93, 18/2/8. According to Bean, a sufficient proportion of men wore hats, which he put at 7 or 8 per cent, making Lambert’s treatment justified.
11 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 4 September 1933, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/314.
of harsh criticism from participants in the battle, the memorial, he said, could ignore ‘a few mistakes in military technical details’ and accept the picture without alteration.\textsuperscript{12} Occasionally, he relaxed the requirement of historical accuracy even further: he recommended that Crozier’s \textit{Death of Lieutenant NJ Greig 12 July 1915} be accepted because while not absolutely correct, it truly represented the spirit of the subject.\textsuperscript{13} But Treloar was relentless in his efforts to establish whether a picture was accurate, and if he satisfied himself that it was inaccurate, he dogged the artist until he corrected it, however long this took.\textsuperscript{14}

Most of the historical pictures on the first and second lists were painted in England, and therefore Bean and Treloar were unable to exercise close supervision over their production. In England, the NWRC played no role in policing their historical accuracy. Nevertheless, if when a picture arrived in Australia it was found to contain inaccuracies which desirably should be corrected, Treloar took steps to encourage the artist to revise it. Generally this proved difficult as invariably the artist had been paid in full and often remained in England. The situation was very different for commissions placed in Australia. But even so Treloar observed that experience had shown ‘that it is very rarely that a painting does not require alterations’.\textsuperscript{15} In the ordinary course he arranged to have a picture inspected by men who participated in or had personal knowledge of the incident it depicted and asked them to critique it, and depending on his view of their criticisms, and after consulting Bean, took up with the artist the question of revising it, invariably carefully stipulating the necessary revisions.\textsuperscript{16} As the memorial could refuse to accept the picture and withhold payment of the agreed fee, this was usually sufficient motivation for an artist to carry them out.

\textsuperscript{12} Letter, Bean to Treloar, 25 September 1932, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/314.
\textsuperscript{13} Letter, Bean to Pretty, 10 December 1923, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/297.
\textsuperscript{14} The case of Power’s \textit{8th August} is a good example of Treloar’s persistence. When he had a photograph of the picture he did the rounds; established that it contained inaccuracies; batted them back and forth; decided which had to be corrected and which could be left; negotiated with Power over the revisions; and got him to revise it, the entire process taking more than two years. See letters, Treloar to Bean, 18 March 1931, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/314; Treloar to Monash, 30 April 1931, AWM 93, 18/4/40 Part 2; Monash to Treloar, 4 May 1931; Treloar to Bean, 11 June 1931; Bean to Treloar, 18 June 1931; all in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/314; Treloar to Power, 18 August 1931; Treloar to Monash, 19 August 1931; Treloar to Power, 19 October 1932; Treloar to Power, 5 January 1933; undated typescript (list of revisions) entitled “‘August 8, 1918’ by HS Power”; all in AWM 93, 18/4/40 Part 2; letter, Treloar to Power, 30 March 1933; memorandum, Treloar to Miss Harris, 20 June 1933; both in AWM 93, 18/1/42.
\textsuperscript{15} Memorandum, Treloar to Finance Committee, 14 February 1935, AWM 93, 18/4/40 Part 2.
\textsuperscript{16} For instance, the revisions Power was requested to make to \textit{8th August} were: (1) haversacks to replace packs; (2) straps of steel helmets to be around the back of the head and not beneath the chin; (3) colour patches to be shown; (4) horses’ tails should not be severely docked; (5) the man resting on the right-hand side of the picture wearing a Red Cross brassard should be holding a stretcher and not a rifle; and (6) both stretcher-bearers should
On 11 September 1914 a party of naval reservists made an unopposed landing on the Gazelle Peninsula, New Britain. So began Australia’s first land operation of the war. The party was from the ANEMF, a combined army and navy contingent assigned the task of capturing German New Guinea. Its orders were to capture a radio station believed to be operating at Bitapaka seven kilometres inland. As the party advanced along the main road it encountered resistance from a combined force of German and Melanesian soldiers, but it prevailed at a cost of six officers and men killed or died of wounds and four wounded.\(^\text{17}\) The campaign’s representation had to wait until allotted two pictures on the third list. One subject was almost settled, the Australian squadron at anchor in Blanche Bay, but according to Bean if this were painted it would produce ‘a mere picture of ships’; his preference was for pictures of the ‘brave and exciting dash’ variety.\(^\text{18}\) On this occasion Treloar prevailed, pointing out that the picture had historic interest as it would show the Australian fleet as it was at the outbreak of war.\(^\text{19}\) The other subject was undecided. The steps Treloar took to decide this reveal Bean’s conviction that the Anzac story should be represented in heroic terms and whenever possible by an individual’s heroism.

Treloar consulted Seaforth Mackenzie, the official historian of the campaign, who suggested three incidents: (1) the hoisting of the flag at Rabaul on 12 September 1914; (2) the landing at Kabakaual; and (3) the fighting on the Bitapaka road.\(^\text{20}\) His preference was the first incident, claiming it was of ‘outstanding historical importance to Australia’.\(^\text{21}\) The ceremony, he said, was the only one during the war in which Australia hoisted the British flag as the result of the surrender of enemy territory, and several ‘prominent personalities’ attended. Bean, however, was convinced a picture of the fighting on the Bitapaka road was ‘the right one’, explaining to Treloar: ‘It was the first occasion on which Australian blood was shed in the war; it was rather a fine little action and the officers who were killed were both gallant and patriotic men of a particularly fine type. They were the first to lay down their lives for their country. Moreover I think that it is not a bad thing to record that New Guinea was not taken from the

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\(^\text{17}\) For an account of the landing and fighting see Mackenzie, Official History Vol 10, pp 53-67, 72-3.

\(^\text{18}\) Letter, Bean to Treloar, 6 July 1923, AWM 93, 18/2/21.

\(^\text{19}\) Letter, Treloar to Bean, 20 July 1920, AWM 93, 18/2/21.

\(^\text{20}\) Letters, Treloar to Mackenzie, 10 June 1921; Mackenzie to Treloar, 6 April 1922; both in AWM 93, 18/2/21.

\(^\text{21}\) Letter, Mackenzie to Treloar, 6 April 1922, AWM 93, 18/2/21.
Germans without fighting.' He later identified an incident during the fighting he believed should be depicted, the death of a young medical officer, Captain Brian Pockley, who had given his Red Cross brassard to a stretcher-bearer: ‘Not only was this most gallant action responsible for his death, but he was I think the first Australian to be mortally wounded.’ Moreover, he pointed out to Treloar that incidents of courage were those he and Gullett considered ‘most suitable’ for representation. Treloar immediately embraced Bean’s suggestion, hardly surprising given that in newspaper accounts of Pockley’s death it was described as ‘a noble example of unostentatious heroism’. His act was not only courageous, it amounted to self-sacrifice, an Anzac ideal Bean wished to represent and promote. But there was a problem: in light of the known circumstances of Pockley’s death the picture would necessarily have to show the moment of his wounding, by which time he had given up his brassard to Stoker Kember, and so the fineness of his death would not be conveyed unless licence were taken in its depiction. Then, after all this discussion, the subject was suddenly dropped and replaced by the landing at Kabakaul.

Bryant’s Landing at Kabakaul [159] shows a tropical paradise: a semi-circular sweep of Kabakaul Bay, its narrow sandy beach fringed with palm trees, and in the distance the volcanic cones of the Mother and the South Daughter. Extending into the bay is a rubble breakwater, and at this a launch is landing soldiers, some of whom have set off towards the shore; approaching is another launch carrying more soldiers. In the bay lie three Australian warships, Sydney, Warrego and Yarra; they would have nothing to do. Despite the fact that

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22 Letters, Treloar to Bean, 9 May 1922; Bean to Treloar, 12 May 1922; both in AWM 93, 18/2/21. The emphasis has been added.
23 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 2 July 1923, AWM 93, 18/2/21. He was wrong in thinking that Pockley was the first Australian mortally wounded. This distinction went to Able Seaman Williams who was shot through the stomach and died that afternoon on the Berrima, as did Pockley. According to Mackenzie, Pockley tended to Williams and sent him to the rear with Stoker Kember, taking off his Red Cross brassard and tying it around Kember’s hat. This done he started to return along the road to the front when he was shot. See Official History Vol 10, p 59.
24 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 6 July 1923, AWM 93, 18/2/21.
25 Letter, Treloar to Bean, 20 July 1923, AWM 93, 18/2/21.
27 So convinced was he of its didactic value he later suggested to Treloar the painting of a series of twelve heroic actions in the AIF’s history which would instil the ‘lesson of self-sacrifice’ into the youth of Australia. See letter, Bean to Treloar, 24 July 1926, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/302. The series was never painted.
28 Letter, Treloar to Bryant, 28 July 1923, AWM 93, 18/2/21. No reason for this can be found in the evidence, except that in earlier correspondence fears had been expressed as to Bryant’s ability to paint figures. See, for example, letters, Treloar to Bean, 9 May 1922; Bean to Treloar, 12 May 1922; both in AWM 93, 18/2/21.
what is taking place is an invasion of a German protectorate, the scene is strangely tranquil. Is it really an invasion? Did the Australians expect to encounter enemy resistance when they landed? It seems not, because the landing party’s members have taken no steps to make smaller targets of themselves. They could not have known that the Germans had taken no precautions against a possible landing by, for instance, establishing defensive positions concealed among the palms ringing the shoreline. In carrying out a landing in broad daylight as depicted by Bryant, the Australians were exposing themselves to annihilation. Anyway, the ease with which the party came ashore was an unreliable guide as to what lay ahead. Among the ant-size figures and specks of soldiers at the breakwater and in the approaching launch are men who would not see out the day. They could at least claim the rare distinction of being the first Australians killed in the war. And Pockley’s action in particular, Mackenzie claimed, was ‘consonant with the best traditions of the Australian Army’.  

Benson’s *Training in the desert, Mena* [160] depicts the AIF training in Egypt, the real start of the Anzac story. In the official history Bean devoted an entire chapter to describing the picture’s subject and claimed that the training of the 1st Division was one of the AIF’s finest achievements. Its intensity was exceptional, with very limited leave allowed in Cairo after hours: ‘All day long [except Sundays], in every valley of the Sahara for miles around the Pyramids, were groups or lines of men advancing, retiring, drilling, or squatted near their piled arms listening to their officer.’ It continued without let-up for several months and was carried out with enormous dedication. But it had not been all work and no play. In the first weeks most Australians had climbed the Pyramids where some left their names inscribed beside those of Napoleon’s soldiers of 1798. For Bean, the significance of these activities lay beyond sightseeing and vandalism. Here among the monuments of a great ancient civilisation, a fledgling nation with no military tradition, but aspiring to one, rubbed shoulders with an old European power with a centuries-old tradition. On the battlefield where Napoleon’s forces vanquished the Mamluk army at the battle of the Pyramids on 21 July 1798, the AIF now trained. Only good could come of this coincidence, or so it was thought.

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29 Mackenzie makes clear that the Germans were alive to the possibility of a landing by Allied forces, had had tidings of the appearance of British (Australian) warships in the bay, and were actively patrolling the main road. See *Official History Vol 10*, pp 55-6.
30 Ibid., p 59.
32 Ibid., p 125.
From an elevated rocky outcrop Benson shows the AIF exercising in a desert valley overlooked by the Pyramids. On the valley floor there can be indistinctly seen large squares and smaller groups of soldiers exercising. In the middle ground, three mounted soldiers escort two horsedrawn covered wagons. Closer, on a slope leading down into the valley, a contingent of soldiers passes under the watchful eye of two officers, one standing and the other on horseback, while two Egyptians dressed in white gallibaya look on with interest. But these figures and the manoeuvres play second fiddle to the scene on the elevated rocky outcrop which is crowded with people. Prominent is a signaller holding aloft a blue-and-white flag, doubtless communicating an instruction to the soldiers below. Seated on the precipice is another soldier following the exercises through field-glasses, and still another tending horses. But holding centre stage is a soldier relaxing on a ledge with a cigarette nonchalantly clamped in his mouth. As his field-glasses are in easy reach and signal flags lie nearby, he is obviously a signaller. With his wide-brimmed hat tilted back slightly, his sleeves rolled up and a bemused expression on his face, he presents as a confident young man, a confidence emphasised by his steady gaze directed outwards to his audience. Without doubt he is the real subject of the picture, which functions much as a photograph sent home would, that is, as a snapshot of a young man in an exotic setting a long way from home on a great adventure. That is the picture’s import, and not as its title misleadingly claims the training of the AIF. The scene, however, is incomplete. To the soldier’s side Benson shows two Egyptian women dressed in colourful sebleh, obviously fruit sellers, one of whom has approached offering to sell him an orange.34

To the extent Benson’s picture features Egyptians it is unlikely to be historically accurate. While it can be assumed the depiction of the AIF’s exercises is accurate, the Orientalist scene taking place on the rocky outcrop overlooking the training grounds, with Egyptian fruit sellers offering to sell their wares to the young soldier, is unlikely to have a factual basis. Given the terms of Benson’s agreement with the Commonwealth to paint the picture, which required him to first obtain approval of his cartoon, it should be assumed Bean approved his

34 Doubtless assailing him with cries of ‘Oringees, varee nice, varee sweet’. In Australian Chivalry Treloar explained that on the fringes of the training areas ‘enterprising natives’ would set up and the fruit sellers with their ‘Oringees, varee nice, varee sweet’ found eager purchasers among the parched diggers enjoying a respite. See ‘Strenuous Sahara days’, plate 6.
design.\textsuperscript{35} But herein lies a problem. It might be accepted that Egyptian sellers of refreshments, produce and wares set up on the perimeter of camps and perhaps along the routes taken by the soldiers to the training areas to attract custom, but it seems improbable they would have been permitted to come into close proximity of soldiers who, as shown in Benson’s picture, were performing military duties. There is no evidence in the official history that this was permitted, and significantly in no official photograph of the AIF training are Egyptians in evidence. Not only is the scene unlikely to have a factual basis, but so too the seemingly insignificant detail of the two Egyptians shown observing the exercises. Thus, Benson departed, and was authorised to depart, from historical accuracy in order to introduce local colour. This, he may have reasoned, was necessary to communicate successfully the idea that the young Anzac was enjoying a great adventure. The idea that Australians who rushed to enlist had embarked on a great adventure accorded with Bean’s view, and was what he wished to promote, even after he knew the toll exacted on them.

A picture of an incident involving Australia’s submarine \textit{AE2} was authorised on the third list. Great care in selecting the incident was necessary because the memorial, according to Treloar, was ‘keenly desirous of ensuring that the permanent record of the Australian Navy which it will collect and hand down to posterity will be quite as worthy as that secured for the A.I.F.’\textsuperscript{36} It took him and Bean three years to decide on the incident. The problem lay in \textit{AE2}’s short but dramatic career which ended with its scuttling. To coincide with the invasion of Gallipoli, \textit{AE2} was ordered to attempt a submerged passage of the Dardanelles Strait and if it reached the Sea of Marmara its captain, Lieutenant-Commander Stoker, was authorised to ‘take what measures he chose to block enemy traffic between the Bosphorous and the Dardanelles’ and disrupt the resupply of Turkish forces on the peninsula.\textsuperscript{37} Mines and strong currents posed formidable navigational difficulties, but against the odds \textit{AE2} got through managing to torpedo a small Turkish cruiser along the way. Stoker’s orders were to ‘run amok’, and although over the next five days he made six further attacks none succeeded. On

\textsuperscript{35} Although nothing is known of the steps Benson took to research the subject before settling on his design, already he had some knowledge of it. He spent several months in Egypt before the invasion of Gallipoli, probably at Mena Camp, and is likely to have witnessed the AIF exercising in the desert. While there he made several sketches in his sketchbook, many of ‘Egyptian Types’, a few of Mena village and street scenes in Cairo, and three landscapes featuring pyramids, but none of the AIF training. This was no disadvantage as the memorial held numerous official photographs of the AIF’s time in Egypt, some showing manoeuvres.

\textsuperscript{36} Letter, Treloar to Haggard, 22 March 1923, AWM 93, 18/2/12. Finally, a record confined to seven pictures.

\textsuperscript{37} Arthur W Jose, \textit{Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Volume 9}, The Royal Australian Navy, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1928, p 241. This account of \textit{AE2}’s mission derives from Jose (pp 239-48).
30 April the end came when AE2 began to rise uncontrollably and surfaced only a mile from
a Turkish torpedo boat. An attempted dive had to be aborted and the boat broke surface stern
first whereupon it immediately came under fire and was hit. With AE2’s pressure hull pierced,
Stoker had no choice but to scuttle his command. All of the crew were saved.

Treloar sought the opinion of the official historian of the RAN who advised ‘the best picture’
would be ‘the AE2 very much down by the bow, having just risen … in the presence of a
Turkish destroyer and gunboat’. The final moments of the AE2 was hardly an appropriate
incident in its career to commemorate. Before a final decision was made, Bean described his
preference: ‘I think any brave incident in the early history of our Navy is worth recalling, and
a mere picture of ships is not one which would help found a tradition for the youth of our
Navy.’

Judged by a criterion of heroism, a picture of the AE2’s surrender did not fit the bill;
nevertheless, Bean supported Jose’s recommendation. Moreover, he wished to see figures
added which would emphasise the Australians’ humiliation: ‘I think ... that the figures of the
Turks and of our own poor disappointed chaps, when they came face to face, would be the
only fitting record of the incident.’

Neither he nor Treloar seem to have appreciated the negative effect such a scene was likely to have on ‘the youth of our Navy’, let alone AE2’s surviving crew. Fortunately, Jose saw sense: he decided that a picture of the tail end of the
submarine crowded with its crew in the act of surrender was not inspiring and would not
appeal to anyone. Why it was not immediately dropped is puzzling; it remained in
contention until July 1923. By then Treloar had consulted certain ‘naval people’, including
Commander Haggard, first lieutenant on AE2, and understandably they expressed the view
that the loss of the boat was not a satisfactory subject and wished it dropped. As ‘some
brave incident’ capable of being represented could not be found in AE2’s history, Treloar
proposed a picture showing it hoisting the white ensign in the Sea of Marmara. Bean

38 Letters, Treloar to Jose, 10 June 1921, AWM 93, 18/2/21; Treloar to Bean, 21 June 1921, AWM 93, 18/2/12.
39 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 6 July 1923, AWM 93, 18/2/21. Of the picture of the Sydney-Emden fight painted by
Burgess, Bean remarked that it really represented the heroism of Emden’s crew rather than Sydney’s.
40 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 26 June 1921, AWM 93, 18/2/12.
41 They were picked up by the Turks and spent the next three years in frequently brutal confinement in Turkish
prisons. See Jose, Official History Vol 9, p 241.
42 Letter, Jose to Treloar, 28 August 1922, AWM 93, 18/2/12.
43 Letter, Treloar to Bean, with attached statement, 30 July 1923, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/294.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
congratulated him on his choice, but this makes no sense given his dislike for ‘a mere picture of ships’.

There is no satisfactory evidence that the incident represented by Bryant in *AE2 in the Sea of Marmora, April 1915* [161] occurred. He shows the submarine cruising on the surface, a white ensign flying conspicuously from a mast of its conning tower. To *AE2*’s starboard a number of fishing boats are sailing, one quite closely, and behind them in the distance is the outline of a coast. It looks suspiciously like the submarine is taking part in a mismatched regatta. According to Stoker’s account of *AE2*’s exploits, it occasionally proceeded on the surface, and on 26 April it spent part of the day on the surface ‘changing batteries, making good defects, and examining fishing-boats.’ As this is Stoker’s only mention of fishing boats, perhaps it should be assumed it is this occasion Bryant shows in his picture. On the basis of his account, then, the scene appears to have some slight foundation, but the problem is the white ensign. Stoker made no mention of ordering the flag to be hoisted, and the probabilities suggest this did not occur. Although *AE2* was ordered to make its presence felt in the Sea of Marmara, and by its mere presence hopefully disrupt Turkish shipping, to suppose that Stoker set out to attract hostile attention by ordering the flag flown is fantastic. His account establishes that the submarine spent most of its time underwater endeavouring to carry out attacks and diving to evade attacks. Moreover, in the photographs of *AE2* in the memorial’s collection, only one shows it flying a white ensign, and then from a mast at the stern.

When Haggard inspected the picture he said he thought it was ‘quite a good picture of the subject’, but doubted there was a special mast for flying the flag, suggesting it was probably flown from the wireless mast. This might suggest he accepted the picture’s contention that *AE2* flew the ensign, but not too much should be made of his remarks where he was unsure as to the mast on which it was flown, where Stoker made no mention of ordering it hoisted, and where the photographic evidence suggests it was rarely flown and then at the stern. Ultimately, whether or not there was a proper basis for claiming that the ensign was hoisted, it was essential to show it flying from the submarine in the picture. In the context of the

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46 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 2 August 1923, AWM 93, 18/2/12.
48 For such an important picture it is puzzling why the memorial took no steps to check the position with Stoker.
49 Photograph 301364.
50 Treloar, file note, 4 November 1925, AWM 93, 18/2/12.
outcome of AE2’s mission, its only substantial achievement was its brave, daring and skilful passage through the Dardanelles Strait. And the only way that success could practically be represented was to show the boat brazenly cruising on the surface of the Sea of Marmara with its white ensign hoisted, not at the stern but on ‘a special mast’ fixed to its conning tower. Such a vision could not have been understood by the Turks other than as a triumphal gesture. And perhaps, as Bean hoped, it stood capable of inspiring the founding of a tradition ‘for the youth of our Navy’.

Bean’s hopes of communicating the significance of Anzac pictorially largely rested on the satisfactory painting of pictures representing the landing and the charge of the Light Horse at the Nek. For him, these two episodes in Australia’s part in the war encapsulated what Anzac represented. The first was the moment when its tradition was founded, or so he claimed. And the second was when a group of young men representative of Australia’s finest manhood unquestioningly and unhesitatingly sacrificed themselves for the nation. The obvious potency of pictures of these events lay in their appeal to patriotism, and to their contention that what motivated the men’s actions was a tradition which bound them. Neither would represent an individual’s heroism, but rather the heroism of numerous anonymous men climbing the impossibly steep cliff rising from the beach to Plugge’s Plateau, and those charging headlong into the annihilating rifle and machine-gun fire of the Turks. Strangely, they would represent national disasters. Yet in Bean’s view each event made a substantial, and importantly an Australian, contribution to the history of warfare to which hitherto it had made none.

Lambert finished Anzac, the landing 1915 [162] in time for it to be included in the museum’s displays for its official opening in Melbourne on Anzac Day 1922. According to newspaper reports of the opening, his picture both dominated and illuminated the Gallipoli section. The Herald’s critic claimed it conveyed a ‘declaration of sacrifice and achievement in a way that no other war picture has done’. Lambert attempted to depict the steps in the landing from the beach to the plateau, but concentrated on representing the difficulty of the climb. Thus, in the bottom left-hand corner he shows a glimpse of the cove with two boats beached and a
procession of ant-like figures making their way off the beach and onto the slope, while in the
top right-hand corner he shows far fewer ant-like figures who have reached the plateau.
Dominating the lower section of the picture is a massive red-brown wedge of hillside covered
with clambering khaki-clad soldiers who are almost indistinguishable from the terrain; over a
rocky ground sparsely covered with scrub and pitted with gullies they clamber with packs on
their backs and rifles in their hands. This mass of soldiers struggling up the hillside connects
the two corners of the picture, making clear the difficulty they faced and the remarkable
achievement of the few who reached the plateau. Some, of course, never reached it; they are
shown lying in all attitudes on the rocks and in the gullies where they fell: these are the dead,
dying, wounded and injured. Although there are no Turks in the picture they are nearby, as
evidenced by their shrapnel bursting over the hillside. Beyond it Lambert shows in the pale
yellow light of dawn the skyline of ridges overlooking Anzac Cove recognisable by its
landmark the Sphinx.

The memorial promoted the picture as historically accurate, claiming that Lambert had gone
over the ground ‘minutely’, and that unlike many traditional battle pictures his was ‘an
almost exact representation of the actual scene on that fateful April morning, when the Glory
of Anzac was revealed’. Despite its apparent popularity, it seems doubtful it successfully
conveys the idea that the landing was a remarkable feat, one that according to Bean would go
down in history. It fails to convey his idea that the Anzacs’ assault on Ari Burnu was
comparable to that of a whirligig, or approached a storming; the picture suggests the assault
was a slow and painstaking affair not attended by displays of showiness or heroics. The men
on the slope are a slowly creeping mass, their principal enemy being the terrain which they
must climb and not the Turks they have come to put to the sword. It seems unlikely that this
image stood capable of being understood as representing Australia’s triumphant march into
history and its arrival on the world stage. The landing was a disaster on the basis of that day’s
casualties alone.

The charge of the Light Horse at the Nek was also a national disaster. It was neither
appropriate nor accurate to describe it, as the memorial did, as ‘that wonderful episode in our

Bean’s official account of the landing see Official History Vol 1, pp 245-80.
56 Bean put these at 2,000 including 800 killed. See Official History Vol 1, p 566.
country’s history’. If represented pictorially it would not commemorate an incident of Australian triumph, but rather the slaughter of numerous young Australians, light horsemen from the 8th and 10th Light Horse acting as infantry, shot down by Turks as they charged towards them across no-man’s-land. Moreover, the tragedy was the outcome of an initial blunder made worse by ineffectual local command. The attack was one of a series of attacks to be launched at several locations simultaneously on 7 August designed to seize the high ground between Hill 971 and Chunuk Bair. The operation was complex and had limited prospects of succeeding. For the plan to succeed it had to be executed with split-second timing, but with respect to the attack at the Nek, the bombardment of the Turkish positions stopped seven minutes before it was due to be made. According to the official history, although the premature cessation of the bombardment ‘will probably never be explained’, the evidence suggests there was ‘some mistake in the timing of watches.’ The attack was ordered by the local command to go ahead despite the lack of protecting shellfire and the absence of the New Zealand infantry, who were supposed to assault simultaneously down the ridge but were in no position to do so. Four lines of light horsemen charged only to be shot down immediately. Of 600 attackers 372 became casualties with 234 killed. The Turks suffered no loss.

The charge of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade at the Nek, 7 August 1915 [163] was many years in the making, but Lambert was satisfied claiming it epitomised ‘the Gallipoli spirit of our forces’. When first exhibited in Sydney it was generously praised as a realistic and chilling representation of the grim reality of war which avoided the spectacular element. The latter claim was erroneous: not only does the picture contain spectacular elements, it presents a spectacle. Table Talk dubiously claimed that it was ‘a lasting memorial to the gallant Anzacs’. Against the backdrop of a low mountain range painted in purple hues beneath a narrow hazy yellow-blue sky, Lambert presents an expanse of mottled yellow-red-brown

58 This ‘infamous charge’ was an example of the breakdown in communications between the front line and the brigade staff that characterised operations on Gallipoli. See Grey, A Military History of Australia, p 97.
59 This account derives from ‘Gallipoli’, The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, p 229. For a full account see Bean, Official History Vol 2, pp 607-24.
60 Ibid., pp 612-13.
61 Ibid., p 623-4.
62 Letter, Lambert to Bean, c late June 1924, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/303.
64 ‘Lambert’s Gallipoli picture’, Table Talk, 18 September 1924, p 14.
land. On closer inspection it becomes clear that over this land numerous khaki-clad soldiers in shirt sleeves and wearing a mix of hats and helmets are running, falling, tumbling and sprawling in the direction of a trench in the middle ground occupied by Turkish soldiers who are firing their rifles to good effect at the onrushing Australians. Eyewitnesses watching from Pope’s Hill later said they saw the first line go forward and suddenly grow limp and sink to the earth as if the men’s limbs had become string.65 In the picture several men lie on the ground, presumably killed or wounded. The five main figures in the bottom left-hand corner appear to have left or are leaving their trench. In this area a few light horsemen are lying killed or wounded, suggesting they were shot on getting out. The distance the Australians had to charge over no-man’s-land to reach the Turks’ front trench ranged from twenty to sixty yards, and although the terrain was relatively level, it was rough and covered with the spikey stumps of bullet-riddled rhododendron bushes. In the middle distance Lambert shows the Turkish front trench only indistinctly: it is thinly populated, failing to reflect the situation described in the official history with hundreds of the enemy lining their front trench two-deep.66 He also shows a few Australians falling close to the Turkish trench; according to the official history a few got this far.67 But the vast majority of men killed or wounded in the first three lines lay five or six yards from the parapet.68 As Lambert’s picture showed the third line’s charge,69 the number of killed or wounded lying near the parapet should have been more numerous than his six men. Overall, he showed relatively few men, perhaps no more than twenty-five. Of course, his picture necessarily presents a narrow view of the charge: he was obliged to compress the action and confine it spatially given his intention to show a few men close-up leaving their trench.

What was it about the charge that convinced Bean of the necessity of representing it in a picture for the memorial? Clearly, he regarded it as one of the two key events in the Anzac story. But it was not for this reason alone he wished to have a permanent pictorial record made of it. The charge made a deep and lasting impression on him. In his Gallipoli dispatches

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65 Bean, Official History Vol 2, p 614. But Lambert’s depiction scarcely conveys the devastating fire the Australians met. Bean claimed that on no other occasion during the war did Australians face fire approaching in volume that which concentrated on the Nek. See ibid., pp 622-3.
66 Ibid., p 613.
67 Ibid., pp 614, 615, 618.
68 Ibid., p 614.
69 According to Bean’s interpretation of it. See ‘The Gallipoli Nek. Lambert’s great work. For the war museum’, Sydney Morning Herald, 11 September 1924, p 8. This article included a description of the event provided by Bean.
he opined that ‘for sheer self-sacrifice and heroism’ the charge was unsurpassed in history. Its value as a means of promoting the Anzac ideal of self-sacrifice and of building on his contention that Australia’s tradition was comparable to the best was unarguable. Moreover, he believed it furnished convincing evidence of a feature of Australian character he had identified and written of many years previously, the willingness of Australians to be killed if they saw the necessity. In claiming the Australian was ‘as fine a fighting man as exists’, save for his hatred of authority, he had claimed: ‘If the right and reason of going to be killed is clear to him, he will be killed cheerfully and with a very pretty courage’. He would say that the light horsemen’s charge was proof positive of this contention. But there was no ‘right and reason’ associated with making several attacks over open ground in the face of annihilating fire. It was either an avoidable tragedy, or one the scale of which could have been much reduced had there been effective local command. Even Bean expressed the view that ‘no valid reason [existed] for flinging away the later lines after the first had utterly failed’. And he recognised that the grievous result of the attack was the needless loss of lives precious to their nation. Every man in the second, third and fourth lines knew that when his turn came to attack he would meet certain death, yet this did not engender a second’s hesitation. They did not falter, Bean claimed, because believing that their small part in the operation was possibly crucial to its outcome, they refused to ‘let down’ their mates. Their refusal to do so apparently constituted the ‘right and reason’ of going to be killed, and when the moment arrived, they unhesitatingly leapt forward to be killed cheerfully and with a very pretty courage. It was this unswerving loyalty to one’s mates in the face of certain death that Bean hoped the picture would represent and promote. But whether or not it conveys this idea, the fact remains that what it shows are young Australians being killed, a national disaster and an inglorious episode in the nation’s history.

Crozier painted *Death of Lieutenant NJ Greig 12 July 1915* [164] at Bean’s suggestion. He was supplied with a draft chapter from Bean’s official history containing an account of the

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70 When Lambert’s picture was reproduced in *Australian Chivalry*, Treloar suggested the charge did not so much rival the British cavalry’s charge against the Russian guns at Balaclava, with which he compared it, as surpass it. See ‘Australia’s Gallant Six Hundred’, plate 14.
72 *Official History Vol 2*, p 631.
73 Ibid., p 632.
74 Ibid., pp 615, 616-17.
75 Ibid., pp 616-17.
76 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 7 June 1923, AWM 93, 18/3/16.
incident and annotated photographs taken by Hubert Wilkins showing the location of Greig’s death.\textsuperscript{77} Bean’s account relied on one given to him by Zeki Bey, a Turkish officer who witnessed the incident and was lent to him during his Gallipoli mission to provide information of the Turkish side.\textsuperscript{78} Until Greig’s last sighting, Bean could describe the incident from the Australian side. In broad daylight a raid by a party led by Greig was made on a crater which opened into a Turkish position known as ‘German Officers’ Trench’. The opening had been barred by the Turks with a grille of barbed wire. The party rushed the crater where it met and killed a number of Turkish guards, but it then came under attack from bombs thrown into the crater from German Officers’ Trench. Two of the party were killed and the rest, including Greig, wounded. Greig ordered his men to retreat: ‘The rearmost of them, on reaching safety, reported that he had last seen [Greig] standing at the tunnel-mouth, revolver in his hand, his head bleeding, holding back the Turks while his men retired.’\textsuperscript{79} He was not seen again; initially listed as ‘missing’, his status was later altered to ‘killed in action’.\textsuperscript{80} But nothing concrete was known of how he died.

On Gallipoli in February 1919, Zeki Bey described to Bean the death of a ‘very handsome, fair-haired, square shouldered boy, and a very gallant officer’ – Greig – in his trenches early in the campaign:

As I came opposite the crater … I found facing me at the far side of the crater a young Anglo-Saxon officer. He was a splendid looking boy and he was leaning with his back to the crater and his revolver in his hand facing some of our men. I shouted at once ‘Don’t kill that officer, take him prisoner’. Our men turned to me and said ‘He refuses to surrender, Major, we have tried to catch him’. At that moment the boy sank back and fell at the bottom of the crater. We went out and picked him up and I found that his leg had been broken by a bomb. He was dying at the time when I first saw him and he could only have lived a few moments after. He was carried away to the rear of our trenches and I wish that I could tell you where his grave was for he was certainly buried by my people.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{77} Letter, Bean to Treloar, 2 July 1923, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/297. Also see Bean, \textit{Official History Vol 2}, chapter XI, ‘German Officers’ Trench’, pp 338–40.
\textsuperscript{78} Bean, \textit{Gallipoli Mission}, pp 172-3, 178. A transcript of the Turk’s account may have accompanied the draft chapter. A copy of this is in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/297.
\textsuperscript{80} Casualty Form-Active Service, Norman James Greig service records, NAA.
\textsuperscript{81} Transcript of Zeki Bey’s account in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/297.
Bean now had the whole story, one worth telling in the official history and illustrating in a picture for the memorial. A commonplace event had attained significance through Zeki Bey’s failed attempt to save Greig. Representing this would be the fulcrum of the picture. It could be offered as evidence of the Anzac ideals of bravery and self-sacrifice, and of an erstwhile enemy’s recognition and approval of them.

In considering Crozier’s ‘rough sketch’ of his picture Bean’s primary concern was to see that it was accurate. While pronouncing it ‘excellent’, he made a suggestion concerning its design and intended affect. ‘There might’, he said, ‘be several more Turkish heads in the picture; and if one were an officer (Zeki Bey, of whom we have many portraits among Wilkins’ Gallipoli photos) who might have his hand on the sleeve of the left hand Turk, telling him to spare Greig, *this would carry the story further*.’

In proposing this he was stage-managing the scene. Whether it was permissible for him to do so is debatable. According to Zeki Bey, it did not happen. As his command that Greig be spared could not be represented pictorially, the licence Bean took of substituting for it a gesture having the same effect might be thought justified. This was the feature of the story that made it worth telling.

Crozier’s picture is of a type routinely found in the British illustrated popular press of the late Victorian years which was committed to serving up to the public illustrated stories from Britain’s colonial wars. Reflecting longstanding British sentiments about ‘Orientals’, Crozier presents a group of bloodthirsty and terrifying cutlass-wielding Turkish soldiers in a trench, one of whom is straining to dispatch Greig, who is shown armed merely with a revolver standing in a shallow crater. He is a diminutive and poorly drawn figure in the overall composition. As represented by Crozier, he hardly fits Zeki Bey’s description of him as a very handsome square-shouldered boy, clearly an imposing figure. His face, despite Crozier’s efforts to make it recognisably Greig’s, is non-distinctive. His depiction of Greig is in marked contrast to his treatment of the Turks who project a convincing physical presence and have ‘recognisable’ faces. The soldier restrained by Zeki Bey is a stereotype, a swarthy man to whom Crozier gave Semitic features and a fierce countenance. To restrain him Zeki Bey

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82 Letters, Treloar to Bean, 1 August 1923, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/297; Bean to Pretty, 6 August 1923, AWM 93, 18/3/16. The underlining is Bean’s but the other emphasis has been added.

83 Greig’s father was asked to loan photographs of his son to enable Crozier to as faithfully as possible portray his features. See letter, Pretty to David Greig, 3 October 1923, AWM 93, 18/3/16. It seems the father complied with this request. An inset photograph of Greig was reproduced in the official history, no doubt to carry the story of his death further. See Bean, *Official History, Vol 2*, photograph, ‘The blown-out Australian tunnel and “Greig’s” crater leading into German Officers’ Trench’, facing p 340.
has had to grasp his forearm, rather more than placing his hand on his sleeve. There seems little doubt he is the focus of the picture, irresistibly drawing attention away from Greig. Also diverting attention from him is the figure of a sixth Turk in the trench who appears uninvolved in the drama. Wearing a fez and a strange smile, he looks directly out of the picture. His presence and unwanted engagement with the audience – among whom may be counted Greig’s parents – are unsettling elements. As he served no purpose in telling the story, Crozier should have omitted him.

Presumably, the picture was intended to commemorate Greig and not Zeki Bey’s action in seeking to spare him. But Crozier’s design illustrated the story from the Turkish perspective. If the picture was to have had any chance of successfully commemorating Greig’s courage and self-sacrifice, its design had to be different, reversing the viewpoint to present the Australian in the foreground holding off the Turks in the background. In this Greig would necessarily have become the focus of attention. If it was thought necessary to illustrate Zeki Bey’s part in the drama, this could still have been achieved, perhaps more explicitly than in the picture he painted. But that was not to be and the Turks stole the show. What Greig’s parents made of the picture – it seems certain they saw it – cannot be known, but it seems unlikely they regarded it as a suitable memorial to their dead son. It was all well and good for Bean to seek to use the example of Greig’s death to inspirit future generations to admire and imitate his conduct – a dubious use in the first place – but what about the possible effect this might have on his family? Either this was an irrelevancy or he simply assumed that that was what they wished. Whether any parent might regard the depiction of the moment of a son’s death as an incident in his life to be commemorated seems highly unlikely.

Leist’s Sinking of the Southland [165] does not as its title misleading suggests depict the vessel’s sinking. Its subject would be the ‘casual nonchalant bearing of Australian soldiers in danger [which] was their most typical characteristic’, Bean claimed. This was an Anzac ideal he wished to promote. But Treloar saw difficulties in the picture successfully suggesting ‘the danger which made the steadiness of the troops such a tribute to their discipline’. For

84 And a younger son Robert was killed in action in Belgium during Third Ypres on 9 October 1917. See Casualty Form-Active Service, Robert Charles Gordon Greig service records, NAA.
86 Letter, Treloar to Bean, 16 June 1923, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/323.
one thing, the vessel never had more than a slight list, and though danger might in other circumstances be suggested by depicting panic in a few men, that solution could not be used here. Bean proposed a design to meet his concerns which Leist substantially followed:

I think the simplest point of view would be one looking from outside the boat inboard over the ship’s bulwarks on the highest deck, and showing the row of men, with strong determined faces, standing fronting you and waiting for whatever might happen; a few ropes from the davits in the foreground and a block or two indicating that a boat had been lowered, and the line of determined faces – say seven or eight of them – showing the manner in which the men faced danger.87

The ‘whole point of the picture’, he told Treloar, was to represent the exemplary conduct of the men, and it offered, he said, the ‘opportunity for a fine study of the faces of the diggers’ as they stood at their stations.88 Moreover, it offered the opportunity of portraying ‘the typical Australian face’, as in Bean’s view no other picture commissioned for the memorial afforded ‘a good chance for a similar study’.89 The incident, however, was hardly clear cut: its controversial aspects suggested that some men were guilty of panic and indiscipline and this led to unnecessary fatalities, including Colonel Richard Linton’s death. These aspects would need to be elided when it was represented, an example of Bean manipulating the facts in order to present the AIF in the best possible light. He would do so in the face of the findings of a Court of Inquiry and information passed to him by Treloar, obtained from an eyewitness, that ‘a small percentage of the men were unsteady’ after the ship was torpedoed.90 It was for this reason that Treloar suggested that a more appropriate subject was the sinking of the Ballarat, which actually sank, but without any loss of life, and was ‘a fine example of discipline’.

On 2 September 1915 while carrying units of the 2nd Division from Alexandria to Gallipoli, Southland was struck by a torpedo fired by a German submarine. Taking on water the order was given to abandon ship. According to the official history, the troops ran to their boat stations without disorder and stood quietly awaiting directions.91 Thereafter, they maintained

87 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 2 July 1923, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/323.
88 Letters, Bean to Treloar, 2 August 1923, AWM 93, 18/2/23; Bean to Pretty, 10 August 1923, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/323.
89 Letter, Bean to Pretty, 10 August 1923, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/323.
90 Letter, Treloar to Bazley, 1 July 1927, AWM 93, 18/2/24.
perfect discipline standing quietly or as ordered steadily lowering and manning the boats. While acknowledging the occurrence of incidents of boats falling, having been released inexpertly or prematurely, and of boats capsizing in the water, Bean claimed these were caused by some of the stewards and stokers ‘breaking from control’. Apart from the deaths caused when the torpedo exploded, the other deaths were drownings occurring during the melee when boats fell and were overturned. Thirty-two Australians died: most drowned, among them Linton whose boat was overturned. The Court of Inquiry found that after the torpedoking the discipline maintained both by the troops and the ship’s crew was generally of a high order, but that ‘local instances of some amount of panic occurred, which led to the rushing of one boat (No. 12 by some Stewards and Firemen) and to the lowering of some boats with undue haste and consequent accident’.92

Leist shows a section of the ship side-on and at an incline to suggest it has listed. Standing against the railing on the promenade deck is a sizeable group of men wearing life jackets who are watching proceedings concerned with the lowering of lifeboats; most are dressed in shorts and wear caps, though the two in the centre of the picture, one of whom has crossed his arms, are bareheaded. These two men in particular are intended to represent the men’s nonchalant attitude towards danger: they are obviously conversing, probably sharing a joke. But there is nothing amusing about the activities going on around them: a boat to their left dangles precariously; attempts are being made by a number of soldiers, one of whom stands on the ship’s railing and another on its seaward side, to lower it; to the right of the main group watching from the promenade deck more soldiers are hanging from and pulling on ropes, presumably attached to boats out of picture which have not been lowered successfully. The men, however, appear unconcerned; in fact, to the extent that faces can be made out, several wear bemused expressions. There is not in the scene any evidence of the panic and unsteadiness among some of the men which the Court of Inquiry found had existed, and of course no indication that any lives were lost as a result of the lowering and capsizing of boats. Unlike other pictures which were inspected by eyewitnesses to vet their accuracy, Leist’s was not. Bean viewed the picture in his studio and approved it himself.93

93 Letters, Bain to Treloar, 12 September 1928; Bean to Treloar, 29 October 1928; both in AWM 93, 18/2/24.
The battle of Pozières had an imperative claim to being represented in a picture for the memorial.94 Although the slightly earlier battle of Fromelles was the AIF’s introduction to the Western Front, Pozières was the ‘greatest battle’ it fought, at least during 1916.95 As a battle marked by the wholesale slaughter of thousands of Australians, there was a proper basis for applying to it the epithet ‘greatest’. Bean claimed that the field of battle was ‘more consecrated by Australian fighting and more hallowed by Australian blood than any field which has ever existed or is likely to exist in Europe’.96 The battle was catastrophic: the 1st, 2nd and 4th Divisions suffered 23,000 casualties in six weeks, a rate of attrition not matched for the duration of the war. Of this number 6,741 men were killed. The battle was notable for both sides’ massive artillery bombardments, notably the Germans’ relentless bombardment of the village after it was captured and occupied by the Australians on 23 July. The Australians’ attack itself was preceded by a mighty bombardment designed to dislodge the Germans.97 With bombardments dominating the battle, how should it be represented? Even in their midst there remained scope for individual heroics: several acts of bravery were performed resulting in five Victoria Crosses being awarded, two posthumously, four at Pozières and one at Mouquet Farm.98 Depicting one of these might have attracted Bean, but he settled instead on a subject more representative of the battle.

In Bombardment of Pozières, July 1916 [166] Crozier claims that this is what a bombardment looked like from somewhere behind the Australian lines. A bombardment could only ever be represented pictorially as a distant affair: a series of explosions on the horizon suggested by numerous plumes of earth, dust and smoke in shades of dirty white, brown and grey, and above the plumes billows of debris similarly coloured. So Crozier shows it. Whether some feature of his picture made it distinctively of Pozières seems unlikely, at least to the untrained eye. Anyhow, irrespective of which side’s bombardment he represented – the evidence points to a German bombardment – what he could not suggest was the terrifying noise it made and the unspeakable destruction it caused. It would involve a considerable feat of imagination when looking at his picture to supply these details. But beneath and within its painted plumes

94 The recounting of the battle proper in the official history occupies 368 pages. See Bean, Official History Vol 3, pp 494-861.
95 Letter, Bean to Box, 21 December 1916, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/50. Possibly reflecting this assessment the recounting of the battle of Fromelles occupies a mere 120 pages in the official history. See Bean, Official History Vol 3, pp 328-447.
97 Bean, Anzac to Amiens, p 241.
countless Australian or German soldiers were being annihilated. And all the while the few Australian soldiers sitting and standing on a slight ridge watch the spectacle. The picture, while illustrating how modern war was waged through massive artillery bombardments, still managed to conceal its devastating effects.99

The battle held great significance for Australians and deserved to be commemorated to honour those who fought in it. Depending on the form of commemoration, theoretically it offered to survivors and grieving families a means with which to remember – if they wished to – and a source of comfort in their loss and grief. But it seems doubtful that Crozier’s picture could achieve this. It seems to show a bombardment of the Australians by the Germans; it closely follows a photograph of their bombardment taken by a British official photographer and reproduced by Bean as the frontispiece to a collection of his ‘letters’ written in France and published in London during the war as Letters from France (Cassell and Company, 1917). The photograph, Australians watching the bombardment of Pozières, is captioned: ‘Their mates were beneath that bombardment at the time’. Obviously, he felt no compunction reproducing in a book intended to be read in Australia a photograph which, although not showing the fate of the men beneath the bombardment, might bring this to the mind of thoughtful readers some of whom could be members of the families of soldiers killed, maimed and psychologically damaged at Pozières. In fact, the photograph’s caption positively encouraged thoughts of the men’s fate.

In his official and private accounts of the battle Bean described the devastating effects on the Australians of their constant shelling by the Germans. One description, taken from his diary, proceeds: ‘The men are simply turned in there [Pozières] as into some ghastly giant mincing machine. The [men] have to stay there while shell after huge shell descends with a shriek close beside them – each one an acute mental torture – each shrieking tearing crash bringing a promise to each man – instantaneous – I will tear you into ghastly wounds – I will rend your flesh and pulp an arm or a leg – fling you, half a gaping, quivering man like these that you see smashed around you, one by one, to lie there rotting and blackening like all things you saw by the awful roadside, or in that sickening dusty crater. Ten or twenty times a minute

99 Wheeler’s The Battle of Messines (1923) is to the same effect. The picture depicts the instant on 7 June 1917 when nineteen mines set by the Allies under the Germans’ trenches were detonated annihilating an estimated 10,000 men. From the Australians’ front trench in the foreground several men observe the explosions on the horizon, but the human catastrophe taking place is successfully concealed.
every man in the trench has that instant fear thrust tight upon his shoulders.' This reality, so vividly painted, stands ill beside his description of the men’s reaction to the bombardment in *Letters from France*: ‘What is a barrage against such troops! They went through it as you would go through a summer shower’. This is rank propaganda which presented a quite false picture of the men’s experience. Why, then, did he wish to see the battle commemorated with a picture of the Australians’ bombardment? There is no satisfactory answer to this question, save that it suited his propagandist purposes.

From the outset Bean wanted Major Percy Black’s death during the 4th Brigade’s attack at Bullecourt on 11 April 1917 represented in a picture for the memorial. It was, he claimed, ‘a great incident’. It was an important subject, the representation of which would build on his contention that the self-sacrifice by an individual in the nation’s cause was an Anzac ideal to be admired and emulated by future generations. In the official history he made the most of the incident’s storytelling potential, describing Black as ‘the old prospector, known from Yilgarn to the Murchison’, who rose from the ranks and achieved the distinction of being regarded as ‘the bravest in the A.I.F.’ Black, ‘a man who had never failed’, fitted perfectly Bean’s conception of the ideal Anzac.

According to the official history, Black’s brigade had never faced ‘a more formidable task’; its objectives were the capture of two trenches forming part of the Hindenburg Line, and the attack would be made in the snow. Appreciating the enormity of the task, and believing he would die, as the midnight conference broke up he said to Colonels Peck and Drake-Brockman: ‘Well, goodbye colonel – I mayn’t come back, but we’ll get the Hindenburg Line.’ When the brigade attacked, Black discovered that insufficiently broken wire entanglements lay between his company and the first objective: the plan that tanks would clear a passage for the advancing infantry had failed. Faced with what seemed an ‘almost insuperable difficulty’,
he urged his men on – ‘Come on, boys, [bugger] the tanks!’ – and led them through the wire ‘under a hurricane fusillade’. Reaching and capturing the first trench, Black immediately led out his second wave with the intention of seizing the second trench 170 yards away, but more than half-way across lay a narrow belt of wire which was entirely uncut. Here the men clustered and came under heavy fire; many were hit, but Black led the survivors along the entanglement until he found an opening and got them through. At that point he ordered his runner to return to Peck and Drake-Brockman with a message: ‘Tell them the first objective is gained and I am pushing on to the second.’ Finishing these words he fell dead, shot through the head, but his men rushed the second trench bombing and shooting at the Germans, many of whom broke.

Wheeler’s *The death of Major Black* (1923) [167] depicts the instant of Black’s death at the wire entanglement. He shows the major, recognisable by his handlebar moustache, crumpling after being shot. Behind him can be seen the gap in the wire to which he led his men, and beyond the wire the backs of perhaps five soldiers who have gone through. In front of them is an open snow-covered expanse which they will need to cross to reach the second trench. On Black’s side of the wire Wheeler shows nine soldiers, excluding the major. In arranging them he did not show them clustering along the entanglement as in the official account, departing from historical accuracy in order, perhaps, to clarify his composition. Of these soldiers four have been shot down; one is inexplicably trying to climb over the wire; and the remaining four are walking upright in a leisurely fashion towards the wire, seemingly unconcerned about the ‘heavy fire’ directed at them, two with their rifles slung over their shoulders. It should be assumed the soldier closest to Black is the runner to whom he has just given his message for delivery to the rear. Wheeler’s depiction of the incident is unlikely to be accurate. His contention that soldiers casually walked along and near the wire while subject to ‘annihilating fire’ is incredible, and on this basis alone it is a wonder Bean did not dismiss the picture. But in any case there is no evidence of that ‘annihilating fire’, save for its effects on the crumpling major and the other shot soldiers. Frankly, Wheeler failed to produce a convincing depiction of a battle. The incident occupies the middle ground and is presented horizontally for the width of the picture, a sensible enough design, but his arrangement of the men along and near the wire resembles a tableau of cut-outs; the figures are stiff and do not suggest movement. In fact, the entire scene lacks animation and conviction and fails to convey any drama.
When Bean and Smart were discussing the subject of the first historical picture Leist should paint, it will be recalled that Bean insisted he paint an incident involving the infantry during the battle of Polygon Wood, claiming that the trials of the infantry and its deeds were infinitely the most necessary of record and of handing down to posterity. He later settled on a picture which would commemorate the heroism of an individual, Lieutenant John Turnour. Though the infantry’s trials and deeds manifested themselves in multiple ways, he chose to represent the Anzac ideal of self-sacrifice. According to the story of the incident, during an attack on 26 September 1917 Turnour’s company encountered a German pillbox the intense fire from which was holding up the advance. Dividing his company into two, Turnour instructed them to attack the pillbox from the flanks while he charged it from the front drawing the enemy’s fire. He was met with a hail of machine-gun fire and mortally wounded, but his men swept forward enveloping and silencing the pillbox.  

Bean’s investigations of the incident revealed very little. A document he prepared for Leist setting out what he had discovered began: ‘References to this officer’s death are very sparse in the diaries of 15th Brigade and 59th Battalion, practically the only reference being in the narrative of Colonel Mason, C.O. 59th Battalion’. And continued: ‘There is nothing to indicate either the exact time when Lt Turnour was mortally wounded, or in what operation.’ In his narrative Mason merely noted that during the preparations for the attack Turnour impressed by the manner in which he supervised the distribution of material in the dark and under shell-fire. However, attached to Bean’s document were recommendations made for the conferral of awards on members of the 15th Brigade; in this it was recommended that Turnour be commended for his conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty, giving the following details: ‘In the attack on Polygon Wood on 26th September [Turnour] commanded “C” Coy. In the advance some men were held up by a large pillbox. Lieut. Turnour took charge and gave the order to prepare to charge, and led the charge on the pillbox, which was captured. Lieut. Turnour was badly wounded and subsequently died of [his] wounds.’ This constituted the best evidence of Turnour’s story, and although more was reliably known about other incidents which occurred during the battle, Bean decided to proceed with the

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106 This is the account Treloar provided to accompany the reproduction of the picture in Australian Chivalry. See ‘Field Forts in Flanders’, plate 36. Also see Guide to Australian War Memorial 1941, p 61, where it was claimed that Turnour, ‘by drawing the enemy fire upon himself, sacrificed his life in order to allow his men to envelop the [pillbox] and seize it from the flank’.

107 Perhaps for this reason the official history does not contain an account of the incident.

picture making use of the little he had discovered. Working with this scanty material, Leist could imaginatively construct a picture of the incident which if not strictly historical, very truly represented its spirit.

The bottom half of *Australian infantry attack in Polygon Wood* [168] shows a trench system occupied by Australians. In the middle distance is a German pillbox with two loopholes, the pillbox in Turnour’s story which held up the attack. In the trenches there are seven infantrymen only one of whom is firing with his rifle on the pillbox. Immediately to his left another soldier is leaning against the back wall of the trench while two other soldiers approach him from his left. These soldiers are relatively well protected from the intense rifle and machine-gun fire issuing from the pillbox, which Leist does not show. Above this group Turnour is depicted standing in open ground just forward of the parapet caught in the instant of crumpling having been shot; he holds a revolver aloft in his outstretched right arm. A soldier behind him is possibly trying to support his fall. To Turnour’s right, but still in the trenches, are two other soldiers who appear to be doing nothing at all. Now according to the story of the incident, Turnour led the charge on the pillbox drawing the enemy’s fire while two parties of his men advanced on it from the flanks. Leist shows these parties: the party on the right has left the trenches but the party on the left is still climbing out. Significantly, in the picture Turnour is the only man who has charged. The rest of his company have remained in the trenches, which hardly reflects well on them, and as only one of them is firing on the pillbox, Turnour’s covering fire was completely inadequate. Really, Leist’s representation is fantastic. It is improbable that armed with a revolver and charging alone with no substantial covering fire Turnour could distract the Germans’ attention and keep them occupied. Yet, that is the picture’s contention.109

II – Group Portraits

Only three of the four group portraits authorised on the third list were painted.110 Despite involving portraiture, they are historical pictures. For their painting, Treloar claimed topography was of secondary importance and that the main considerations were ‘the

109 One with which Bean completely agreed. He told Leist he liked his picture ‘very well’ and thought it ‘excellent’. See letter, Bean to Leist, 22 August 1920, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/304.

110 In addition to the two discussed in the text a third, *Leaders of the Australian Light Horse in Palestine, 1918* (1927), was painted by Power. It is a terse formal record of ten officers mounted on their chargers arranged frieze-like across the picture and shown atop a rocky outcrop apparently surveying the Jordan Valley.
arrangement of the figures and the portrait painting’. The latter were important, but not more so than their settings. As the pictures would represent key events in the Anzac story, it was critical that their settings, and all else besides, were represented accurately. And up to a point Bean and Treloar went to lengths to ensure they were. However, Bean’s concept of historical accuracy was flexible, and the licence he authorised in their representation was considerable.

Coates’ General William Bridges and his staff watching the manoeuvres of the 1st Australian Division in the desert in Egypt, March 1915 (1926) [169] and McInnes’s Farewell to Anzac 20th December 1915 (1927) [170] function as bookends to the Gallipoli campaign. Each contains very different ideas about Anzac. The scene in the first communicates a sense of purpose and optimism: purpose in the meticulous planning of the forthcoming invasion of Turkey, the nation’s first large-scale military action, and optimism in its outcome. But the scene in the next communicates an opposite sense, one of despondency as the completeness of the campaign’s failure and its human cost sink in among its survivors. Considered together these scenes jar, presenting an unstable and confusing image of Anzac encouraging viewers to ask: if Australia’s command was as thorough and far-sighted in its planning of the campaign as Coates suggests, how did it end in failure and disarray as shown by McInnes?

The commission to paint a picture of Bridges and his staff by the Pyramids followed a rocky path to completion. There were two critical aspects of the picture: the identities of the officers to be included and their disposition. The first required early resolution as it would determine the latter and the picture’s design. Naturally, Bean was expected to contribute to resolving both issues. He recommended that seven officers be shown – Bridges and Colonels White, Hobbs, M’Cay, MacLaurin, Patterson and Marshall – pointing out that Colonels Maclagan, Selheim and Howse were ‘never present’ during exercises. But Treloar favoured including Maclagan and Howse because of the important part each played in the Gallipoli operations, adding: ‘[T]heir inclusion would make the group a complete one of the staff and leaders of the Australian Division which landed at Anzac, and I should say

111 Letter, Treloar to Bean, 25 February 1921, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287.
112 In Meeson’s biography of Coates she relates the many difficulties they experienced in carrying out the completing the picture. See George Coates, pp 142, 149-52, 158, 164, 165, 168, 170, 173, 175-6, 179-80, 183, 187-8, 191. And she explains her limited involvement in its painting at pp 187-8.
113 Letter, Treloar to Bean, 27 June 1921, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287.
114 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 3 July 1921, AWM 93, 18/2/8.
that this advantage would outweigh the possible objection that it might make the picture inaccurate from a record point of view.\textsuperscript{115} Bean acquiesced.\textsuperscript{116}

Settling on a design proved troublesome. The position Bridges would occupy was accepted as pivotal and would govern the disposition of the other officers. When Coates supplied Treloar with a first design, he sent a photograph of it to Bean and discussed it in the context of that issue:

\begin{quote}
Coates has suggested that the figure sitting down in the front on the left should be General Bridges. Personally I think, however, that General Bridges and General White should be close together. To adopt Mr Coates’ suggestion would, I think, suggest an aloofness on the part of General Bridges which, while it might be quite correct as regards his attitude toward the remainder of his staff, was certainly not the attitude he adopted toward his chief staff officer. The figure behind the sitting figure might be made General White, but the relative position would suggest (or I imagine it would suggest) a familiarity which was not part of the relations between these two. In the circumstances it might be advisable to put General Bridges and General White in the centre of the group, leaving the two figures on the left to be comparative off-siders such as General Howse and General Hobbs. However, I am quite sure that you will decide upon the happiest arrangement.\textsuperscript{117}
\end{quote}

When Bean replied he canvassed the position Bridges should occupy, the position of White relative to him, the positions of the other officers to be shown relative to Bridges and each other – excluding Marshall who by agreement was left out – and their attitudes, which he thought were too informal and would not have been permitted by either Bridges or White.\textsuperscript{118}

The critical matter for him when discussing the men’s disposition was Bridges’ personality, the dominant feature of which he said was his detachment. But he completely agreed with Treloar that Bridges and White should be shown together in the centre of the group, and that the rest of his staff should be shown ‘not exactly separate, but a little apart – sufficiently to suggest detachment’. Coates’ arrangement suggested that Bridges was ‘genial’, which he was not. Treloar next raised the problem of showing Bridges and White sitting on the ground. Bean was happy with this, reminding Treloar that this was what Bridges customarily did and

\begin{footnotes}
\item[115] Letter, Treloar to Bean, 10 November 1921, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287.
\item[116] Letter, Bean to Treloar, 12 November 1921, AWM 93, 18/4/15.
\item[117] Letter, Treloar to Bean, 8 December 1921, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/296. The emphasis has been added.
\item[118] Letter, Bean to Treloar, 12 December 1921, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/296.
\end{footnotes}
that there were photographs showing him sitting watching exercises. But Treloar felt his sitting position was ‘neither easy nor graceful’, and he ‘took upon himself to risk a little license (sic)’ by introducing a folding camp table and seating the men at it. Bean was against this, pointing out that Bridges’ ‘ungracefulness’ was part of his personality, but gave in: ‘On the whole I think a camp-table would not be very characteristic of Australian Staffs and would prefer the sitting attitude. But it is not a matter of great importance’. Other matters would need to be resolved – the placement of the Pyramids, the position of the sun, the officers’ uniforms and their portraiture – but the scene’s design was now settled.

Coates suggests that on a beautiful Egyptian day in March 1915, Bridges and his staff stationed themselves on high ground overlooking a desert valley near Mena to watch, and doubtless direct, the AIF’s exercises. Behind them is the Great Pyramid of Giza, symbol of a great ancient civilisation which could count among its qualities a martial spirit. More recently, Napoleon had visited Egypt and successfully waged war beneath the Pyramids. How fitting, then, that Bridges and his staff are captured in the act of planning the invasion in the same location. The eight officers agreed upon by Bean and Treloar form a superficially tight group, but on closer inspection it is not. Employing Treloar’s innovation, Coates shows Bridges in the forefront seated at a small table with a map on his knees. He occupies the centre of the composition and Coates has pushed him a little forward, no doubt to emphasise his position as commander and also, perhaps, his detachment. From beneath the brim of his peaked cap he stares straight out of the scene. The kneeling figure to his left is MacLaurin, who also looks out. In this there is probably an unintended symmetry; neither survived the campaign. They are both pointedly posing for the artist, seemingly disinterested in what the others, except perhaps for Hobbs, are following. White, who is also seated at the table, is looking away to his left. As he and Bridges are obviously engaged in separate activities, the necessary close co-operation between them, so vital for the conduct of the campaign, is startlingly not in evidence, a bad omen if ever there was one. To the far left Howse stands apart, possibly because as a doctor he had no role to play during the exercises, yet he still follows them. Farther to his left are the standing figures of Hobbs, who does not appear to be following them, Patterson who seems to be, and M’Cay and Maclagan who definitely are with the latter.

119 Letters, Treloar to Bean, 17 December, 1921; Bean to Treloar, 19 December 1921; both in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/296.
120 Letter, Treloar to Bean, 17 December 1921, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/296.
121 Letters, Bean to Treloar, 19 December 1921; 3 January 1922; both in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/296.
explaining a point to his colleague. Of course, each member of the group is smartly turned out. The profusion of maps and other papers in the scene conveys the impression of military leaders who are highly organised in directing the exercises and, inferentially, in their planning of the campaign. They are shown in control of their army and its destiny. Understandably, they could not be represented otherwise. Order and calm pervade the scene inspiring confidence in their abilities and the successful outcome of the forthcoming campaign. Was that confidence misplaced? McInnes suggests it was.

McInnes depicts an episode from the evacuation of Gallipoli. When such a picture was authorised on the third list its subject was unspecified. It was a difficult subject: the evacuation was carried out surreptitiously and its final stages took place under cover of darkness. It was a feat of masterly planning, and as the high point of a campaign that had no comparable success, it was essential that it be commemorated. Bean suggested as ‘very suitable’ a picture showing a reunion of officers who had not met since the days of Mena in the saloon of a transport carrying them away from the peninsula. As Treloar could not suggest a better alternative, Bean’s subject was adopted. The substantial problem with it was determining the officers who were present in the saloon of the *Arran*, the troopship Bean specified. He and Treloar conducted separate inquiries to discover their identities and found that Monash was the only senior officer who could with certainty be said to have been present. Treloar wondered whether in these circumstances the subject should be altered, but Bean disagreed and proposed that as he knew that officers who had not been together for months were reunited on a transport, the more important of those concerned in the evacuation could be put in.

Bean constructed a list of eleven officers, and when Treloar objected to their number, pointing out that the substantial portraiture now involved took insufficient account of the small fee payable for the picture (£250), Bean brushed his concerns aside. Except for one or two prominent officers, portraits of the others could be ‘very sketchy being seen through

122 Letter, Treloar to Bean, 27 June 1921, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287.
123 Bean was mistaken in his identification. No Allied ship engaged in the Dardanelles campaign by that name has been identified.
124 Letters, Treloar to Bean, 30 June 1922; Bean to Major Locke, 31 July 1922; Bean to Major Nicholson, 17 August 1922; Bean to Treloar, 27 September 1922; all in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/306.
125 Letters, Treloar to Bean, 30 June 1922; Bean to Treloar, 5 July 1922; both in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/306.
126 Letter, Treloar to Bean, 29 September 1922, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/306.
the haze of smoke and not painted to great scale'. And he ‘laid down’ an arrangement that McInnes followed: Generals Monash, Holmes and Glasfurd and Captain Littler should occupy the foreground and the others – Paton, Antill, Nicholson, Cass, Midgley, Locke and Biddle – should be shown ‘somewhere recognisable in the background’. He understood the proposed picture was not ‘strictly historical’, but claimed it was ‘true in spirit’. This was his justification for manufacturing a scene which he did not witness and about which he had discovered nothing. Bean knew, he claimed, that reunions had occurred on several ships, but having decided to represent a reunion on the Arran, he could not establish who was there save for Monash and his brigade major, Major Locke. To overcome this paucity of evidence he decided to ‘[put] together in one saloon all the last officers to leave shore’. This scene was not historical and consisted of an amalgam of several reunions he assumed had occurred.

McInnes shows what might be a hotel lounge crowded with soldiers but in fact is the saloon of the Arran which is carrying away the last officers to leave Anzac Cove. It is 20 December 1915, the night the evacuation was completed. McInnes creates a scene substantially as Bean imagined it: ‘the saloon was filled with light in which through the smoke could be seen the faces of many officers who had not seen one another for five or ten months, all yarning and smoking together.’ In the foreground, McInnes presents the principal actors in the scene: Monash, Glasfurd and Holmes. Behind them is a press of men, many more than the eight other officers who were required to be shown, and a drinks waiter balancing a tray can be seen threading his way through the throng. There is an obvious din making it difficult to hear and to be heard. All of this McInnes convincingly conveys. But if in proposing the subject Bean aimed at promoting the idea that in the aftermath of the evacuation there existed a community of spirit, with men renewing the bonds of friendship, McInnes failed to give him what he wanted. He clears out the space in the foreground for the generals. That was as it should be, emphasising their elevated status relative to the other ranks who are crammed into

127 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 2 October 1922, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/306.
128 Letter, Treloar to Bean, 9 June 1927, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/310.
129 Letter, Bean to Major Nicholson, 17 August 1922, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/306.
130 This is what Treloar discovered. See letter, Treloar to Bean, 30 June 1922, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/306.
131 Letter, Bean to Major Nicholson, 17 August 1922, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/306.
132 When the memorial exhibited McInnes’s picture it did not explain that it was a confection, in fact quite the reverse: ‘It is a scene in the saloon of the Arran as she left Anzac.’ See Guide to Australian War Memorial, p 19. The emphasis has been added.
133 Letter, Bean to Major Nicholson, 17 August 1922, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/306.
the shallow space of the background. The AIF’s supposed egalitarianism is not on show here. Standing to the side of Glasfurd, the central figure wearing a pith helmet, are two officers, one of whom is presumably Littler, who are leaning into a discussion apparently being led by Holmes, the seated figure farthest to the right. Despite the availability of unoccupied chairs they remain standing, from which it might be inferred that they have not been invited to sit – their rank would have counted against them – though one is leaning on the backrest of a chair. These junior officers are attending to Holmes while Glasfurd and Monash are not.

Glasfurd, despite his proximity to Holmes and the two officers, stands alone preoccupied with his thoughts and stares out of the picture, seemingly shell-shocked. He is obviously not participating in the discussion. And Monash is isolated from the others: he sits alone at a table in the left foreground, a bottle of beer standing within easy reach but possibly untouched. The way he is sitting emphasises his isolation: his chair is turned away from the table but not nearly far enough in order to face Holmes; and he shows his back and left side to Glasfurd and the two officers. The attitude of his head is ambiguous: he might be looking at and listening to Holmes, but the distance between them and the din in the saloon make that unlikely. More likely, he is looking at something or someone out of picture to the right or, like Glasfurd, is staring sightlessly. If, against the evidence in the image Holmes and Monash are conversing, neither of them is giving the other his full attention. The better view is that Monash has chosen to be alone: he is downcast, doubtless thinking on the outcome of the campaign and of the 8,000 dead Australians left behind. The scene is a metaphor for the failed campaign: disorder is the order of the day as the rank and file jostle for space, an opportunity to be heard, and a numbing drink of alcohol. And their commanders, the generals who have cleared for themselves a decent space in front of the crush, are disengaged from each other, seemingly embarrassed by their failure. The scene Coates presented in his picture now seems faintly ridiculous.\footnote{The fourth group portrait was never painted. Its subject was the conference held by the leaders of Anzac in Bridges’ hastily constructed dugout at Anzac Cove on the evening of the day of the invasion when the decision was made to dig in and hold on. That conference does not add lustre to the Anzac story, nor its participants. At the end of the first day the invasion plans lay in ruins and some leaders believed that a Turkish counter-attack, which would decimate their forces, was imminent. Bridges and Godley, the New Zealand commander, recommended to Birdwood an immediate evacuation, but when Birdwood placed their recommendation before General Hamilton, the MEE’s commander, he rejected it as unfeasible. (For Bean’s account of the conference and how the decision was made see \textit{Official History Vol 1}, pp 455-61.) Bridges, Godley and Birdwood do not come out well from this episode: according to Robin Prior, each lost his nerve and could not decide, or could not decide correctly. (See \textit{Gallipoli: The End of the Myth}, pp 119-23.) What then would the picture have shown?}
III – Portraits

Portraiture occupied a critical place in Anzac’s pictorial representation. The sixty-one people whose portraits were authorised to be hung in the memorial – excluding Bean, and perhaps even him – were regarded by those who selected them as the representatives of Anzac, its ideals and achievements. In the memorial the likenesses of the men – and one woman – would constitute tangible evidence of their part in the Anzac story. Accompanying each face would be that person’s story, explaining his or her distinction and encouraging admiration and emulation of them and reflection on their deeds. They would acquire permanent celebrity. Importantly, they were representatives of a citizen army who had voluntarily undertaken service in the nation’s cause. Although some were professional soldiers and navy men, most were ordinary citizens who came from all walks of life. From a national perspective, their portraits were the best possible advertisement for Anzac. And regarded as an investment, the program which saw them produced at a cost of about £5,000 would repay itself over and over without end. Ultimately, achieving good likenesses, though strived for, did not matter. Within a generation whether or not they were accurate would cease to be important. What mattered was what these persons represented, and it was this that would endure.

With few exceptions the memorial’s portraits were painted in the dark tonal manner then favoured for formal portraiture. No useful purpose would be served in going through them, however, a few might be discussed. But not before discussing Bean’s portrait, which sits a little awkwardly among the others. His portrait was authorised on the third list and he was

Obviously not indecision. The scene was bleak: it was late at night and drizzling. Bridges, Godley and Birdwood were inside the dugout conferring, their whole lighting consisting of a couple of guttering candles and Bridges’ electric torch. (As to this scene see Bean’s note which incorporated a sketch attached to letter, Treloar to John Longstaff, 29 November 1921, AWM 93, 18/4/15.) A number of other officers were standing outside in the dark, some talking in small groups. Because of the difficulty with the lighting, Bean thought only the interior of the dugout could be depicted, in which case strictly only Bridges, Godley and Birdwood could be shown. However, he wanted more men included: ‘There must have been occasions when some of those who stood outside were invited into the dugout and I think a little licence would be allowable.’ (See letter, Bean to Treloar, 12 November 1921, AWM 93, 18/4/15.) The resulting picture would not have been historical.

135 When the memorial opened in 1941 forty-seven of the authorised portraits actually painted went on display. In its guidebook each person’s distinction was set out immediately beneath the reference to their portrait. See Guide to Australian War Memorial, pp 1, 4, 10, 13, 14, 16, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 32, 33, 49, 50, 52, 60, 61, 62, 63, 78, 79, 80, 81, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89.

136 The memorial’s failure to promote them as celebrities, as was done at the turn of the century for the leading officers of the British army in Celebrities of the Army, edited by Charles Robinson and published in London by George Newnes in 1900, represented the loss of a promotional opportunity. This book contained reproductions of the portraits of 69 officers accompanied in each case by a biography laying emphasis on their military service.
later added to the hanging list, its only civilian. As the bearer of the Anzac tradition and the person responsible for its official representation, it was inevitable that he be commemorated. But his portrait was very nearly not painted. Bean initially declined to sit, explaining that as one of the main organisers of the memorial he could not possibly accept the honour. But Treloar left his portrait on the list. Bean did not object to this but asked Treloar to ensure that it did not appear on any list given to the press. Its painting remained in abeyance until after Bean was added to the hanging list, when Lambert accepted a commission to paint it for £150. What persuaded Bean to alter his earlier decision is unknown, but in agreeing to sit he conferred on himself an honour which he said should be reserved for ‘people whose merits so exceptionally deserved to be recorded’. He sat for Lambert in his Randwick studio on several days during late June and early July 1924, and by 9 July his portrait was finished.

Charles Bean [171] is virtually a three-quarter length portrait. It is undoubtedly a good likeness: with his thin rather bird-like face and carrot-red hair Bean is instantly recognisable. The attitude in which Lambert posed him, for he is obviously posing, is stiff and artificial. Seated on a chair and set against a blank red-brown background, Bean is shown turned in three-quarter view, but more towards half profile. He is looking at and listening to someone, at least that is the inference to be drawn from the fact that he is holding a small notebook and a pencil in his hands. It appears he has stopped writing momentarily. The articles Lambert has placed in Bean’s hands are, he claims, the indicia of his profession. But what profession is it? The picture does not make this clear, though Lambert referred to it as the ‘portrait of Charles Bean Historian’. Does he look like a historian, and in any case, what does a historian look like? His garb further confuses the issue. When sittings were being arranged Bean told Lambert that he wished to be painted in his ‘old trenchcoat’, explaining it was the only uniform he ever really wore. And it is this he is shown wearing. But a trench coat is hardly an article of clothing associated with historians. Although essentially a military garment it was not confined to army use, and it became a popular garment during and after

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137 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 2 March 1921, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287.
138 Letter, Treloar to Bean, 20 December 1921, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287.
139 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 22 December 1921, AWM 93, 18/2/8.
140 Letter, Pretty to Lambert, 12 December 1923, AWM 93, 18/4/9.
141 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 22 May 1923, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287.
142 Letter, Bean to Lambert, 24 June 1924; telegram, Lambert to Bean, 25 June 1924; letter, Bean to Lambert, 26 June 1924; all in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/467; letter, Lambert to Pretty, 9 July 1924, AWM 93, 18/2/28 Part 1.
143 Letter, Lambert to Pretty, 9 July 1924, AWM 93, 18/2/28 Part 1.
144 Letter, Bean to Lambert, 24 June 1924, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/467.
the war. As worn by Bean while holding a notebook and a pencil he gives every appearance of being a reporter, hardly surprising as that is what he was. Bean’s decision to be painted wearing his trench coat, instead of the ‘very close copy of a uniform’ he had had made for himself, was almost certainly motivated by his desire to avoid any suggestion in the setting of the memorial that he was an AIF man, because contrary to what he told Lambert, he often wore his uniform.

Quinn’s three-quarter length portrait Rear Admiral John Glossop [172] departs from the conventions of the illusionist portrait. He presents the captain of the Sydney and the hero, conqueror and destroyer of the German raider Emden as the antithesis of the conventional hero. Despite its formality, Quinn produced an intimate and sympathetic study of Glossop. In posing him front-on against a lighter and loosely painted background, Quinn revealed him whole, in effect providing access to him. Significantly, Glossop makes eye contact with his audience: his gaze, while steady and suggestive of an inner strength and confidence, is neither challenging nor arrogant. He stands quietly at ease, his hands clasped in front of him holding his hat, resplendently dressed in his dark blue uniform: a double-breasted jacket with gold buttons, its sleeves banded with gold braid, worn over a white wing collared shirt and finished with a thickly tied dark blue tie. Although cutting an impressive figure he has a careworn and kind face, consistent with assessments of him as a genuinely humane man, one who was anxious to avoid his enemy’s suffering. So long, however, as it was not inconsistent with doing his duty, for he was ‘deeply patriotic’. In ordering that the grounded Emden be fired on when its commander refused to lower his ship’s battle ensign, Glossop apparently said he felt ‘almost like a murderer’. Despite the virtues of Quinn’s portrait it contains a false note: behind Glossop in the bottom left-hand corner he painted a ship ablaze with black smoke pouring forth. It is unquestionably a picture of the destroyed Emden, and although


146 In photographs E00064, G01314, G01561, E03292, PS1398, A05381, E01429 in the memorial’s collection Bean is wearing his uniform.

147 That is how the public was asked to remember Glossop. See ‘Conqueror of the Emden. Death in England. Vice-Admiral J Glossop’, Argus, 26 December 1934, p 7; ‘Emden’s destroyer. Death of Vice-Admiral Glossop’, West Australian, 26 December 1934, p 6.


149 Ibid.
Glossop’s responsibility for its destruction gave him the status of a hero, its appearance in his portrait jars with Quinn’s otherwise sympathetic portrayal of him.

Bernard Hall’s Warrant Officer David O’Keeffe (1924) [173] is a fine example of the illusionist portrait. The supposed paucity of quality portraitists had led Pretty to suggest that Hall be offered a few portraits. 150 Given his stature in art circles and his position as a member of the art committee, it is understandable Hall took considerable trouble over O’Keeffe’s portrait. Shortly after he was engaged Pretty wrote to him: ‘It has occurred to me that probably it would be helpful to you if you knew something about the deeds of valour which gained O’Keeffe his distinction. It might help you to understand the type of man with which you are dealing.’ 151 And he set out in some detail the circumstances in which O’Keeffe won his Distinguished Conduct Medal and gained a Bar to it. This was sensible and reveals Pretty’s insight into the nature of portraiture. He also understood that it involved collaboration between the artist and the sitter, and so ended: ‘I trust you are getting on all right with your subject.’ There was no difficulty on that score as O’Keeffe was ‘very good about sitting’. 152 The difficulty lay with Hall: unhappy with his first and second efforts, he painted a third portrait which he submitted to and was accepted by the memorial. 153

O’Keeffe, a stretcher-bearer in the 10th Field Ambulance, is shown posed in three-quarter turn. He has a fine head and a strong character-filled face, and it is evident Hall went to great lengths to produce a good likeness and convincing depiction of the man. His steady gaze is an intelligent looking which suggests both his dependability and ability to organise and motivate the men around him. At Messines he cleared casualties under heavy fire from the regimental aid post and skilfully and coolly organised stretcher-bearers and brought in wounded, moving them to the advanced dressing station on a trolley drawn by a mule. 154 These actions gained him his DCM, and he won a Bar to it for rescuing wounded during a bombardment at Passchendaele. O’Keeffe’s face reveals him as a fundamentally kind and compassionate man and contains no trace of arrogance. During the portrait’s painting an issue arose as to whether

150 Letters, Pretty to Bean, 21 February 1924; Bean to Pretty, 25 February 1924; both in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287.
151 Letter, Pretty to Hall, 22 April 1924, AWM 93, 18/4/39.
152 Letter, Hall to Pretty, 3 June 1924, AWM 93, 18/4/39.
153 Letters, Hall to Pretty, 25 May 1924; Hall to Pretty, 3 June 1924; Hall to Pretty, 29 September 1924; all in AWM 93, 18/4/39.
he should be shown wearing a closed collar pattern jacket – this was correct from a record point of view – and Pretty told Hall not to worry too much about its plainness, remarking: ‘So long as you get a strong and faithful portrayal of the face and just do the best that circumstances will allow with the jacket, everything will be quite all right. The chief point, I should say, should be the impression of the character the portrait should create.’ There is no doubt Hall achieved this, successfully portraying O’Keeffe as an exemplary Anzac, worthy of being commemorated in the memorial. But neither did he scrimp on O’Keeffe’s tunic, which he carefully painted right down to the lustrous brown Sam Browne belt.

IV – Character studies

The painting of a series of character studies derived from Treloar’s desire to make the memorial’s collection ‘as widely representative as possible’. They would show men ‘in a setting as regards pose and surroundings typical of the work of the arm of the service concerned’. The series sparked debate between Treloar and Bean as to the form each study should take frustrating its carrying out, and only six of the authorised fourteen studies were painted. At one stage Bean wanted to give the names of the men chosen as typical figures; this misunderstood the series’ point. Then he suggested they would be ‘too logical orderly and complete for execution as big pictures’ to be hung in the memorial, and while acknowledging that he had voted in favour of the series, he said he would have preferred

155 Letter, Pretty to Hall, 14 August 1924. AWM 93, 18/4/39.
156 O’Keeffe was fortunate but others on the hanging list were shabbily treated and missed out on receiving the honour which had been conferred on them. Brigadier-General Alfred Bessell-Browne and Sergeant Ingvarson missed out because they lived in Western Australia and the memorial did not send an artist out from the eastern states to paint their portraits; Major Archdale Bolingbroke missed out because the memorial did not send an artist to Brisbane, the only city he could get to from Nambour where he was farming, to paint his portrait; Sergeant Hector McLean, who lived in Bell, Queensland, missed out for the same reason, although he too offered to travel to Brisbane; Lieutenant Louis Mathias missed out because although initially located in Woollahra, by the time the memorial sought to arrange sittings for him he had moved and could not be traced. See letters, Treloar to Bean, 9 August 1929, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287; Bolingbroke to Pretty, 29 November 1923; Pretty to Bolingbroke, 5 December 1923; both in AWM 93, 18/4/21; McLean to Pretty, 25 November 1923, AWM 93, 18/4/18; Mathias to Pretty, 21 November 1923;Heyes to Mathias, 13 June 1928, marked ‘returned unclaimed’; both in AWM 93, 18/4/23.
157 Letter, Treloar to Bean, 20 May 1920, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287.
159 Letters, Treloar to Bean, 27 June 1921; 4 August 1921; 20 December 1921; all in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287; Bean to Treloar, 23 July 1921, AWM 93, 18/2/8. The completed studies were: Strecher bearers (1922) by Power; The Runner (1923) by Wheeler; Laying the duckboards, France 1917 (1923) by Bell; Signaller (1924) also by Bell; The gunners, France (1925) by Power; The Digger (1926) by Wheeler. Each study cost £100.
160 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 2 March 1921, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287.
‘more portraits of brave men’. Treloar told him: ‘I know you do not like them … I think you believe that I want to secure a series of studies showing the men of the different arms of the service in their correct dress, the result of the whole being something like the illustrations included in the military handbooks. What I actually intended, however, was a series showing the different services engaged in their particular work, preferably in suitable incidents which occurred.’ Whether or not Bean eventually grasped Treloar’s idea, the series was relegated last place in the picture scheme, probably because of the memorial’s finances.

Of the completed studies the most important for the project of Anzac’s official representation was that of the infantryman. Treloar’s initial idea was for a picture somewhat similar, he said, to a photograph entitled A Hop Over, which showed Australian soldiers leaving their trench to attack. In advancing it, he said: ‘I cannot imagine a pose which would more clearly suggest the readiness, fearlessness, and determination, of the infantry soldier.’ What Bean thought of it is unknown, but after two years the form of the study remained unsettled. There were then three suggestions for ‘our typical infantryman’ under consideration, the third being favoured: (1) a halt by a roadside with a few recumbent figures and the one standing supporting his pack on his rifle, and with a carefree smile; (2) a small party of three or four men searching out their battalion in the forward area during Third Ypres; and (3) the figure of an infantryman in a forward post waiting for a barrage to lift during the last months of the war. None of these appealed to Bean, who proposed:

How about an infantryman in the yard or the loft at his billet (or even in the trench, though I think the man sitting in the straw would be better) writing his home letter? It was very often his last, and it shows that our careless chaps thought much of their homes and it suggests the shortness of the infantryman’s life, and is a great change on our general run of subjects. We have any amount of pictures of infantry in full kit and in battle, and a Digger, with a tunic loosened and without his kit, writing home seems to me an interesting subject and one which I have seen all over France and Gallipoli.

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161 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 23 July 1921, AWM 93, 18/2/8. Still, he made suggestions for the settings of the various studies. As a typical setting for the infantryman, he suggested a trench during the battle of the Somme (1916).
162 Letter, Treloar to Bean, 20 December 1921, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287.
163 Letter, Treloar to Bean, 27 June 1921, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287. This could be photograph E05429 in the memorial’s collection taken by Frank Hurley.
164 Letter, Pretty to Bean, 12 December 1923, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287.
165 Letter, Bean to Pretty, 15 December 1923, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287.
Perhaps this was a common scene, but it hardly accorded with the public’s conception of the typical infantryman. Bean’s was a genre scene typical of late Victorian pictures, albeit in a military setting, which encouraged the audience to introduce narrative elements in order to carry the story further: who was the soldier writing to, what did his letter say, how would the recipient react to reading it if he did not survive, did he survive? The subject functioned at the level of sentiment. For members of the audience capable of understanding such a picture in the setting of a war museum, possibly it would bring home to them the fact of the shortness of the infantryman’s life, but its meaning was likely to be lost on most. Really, it was a little obscure. Bean’s subject was neither a character study of the typical infantryman nor a representation of the ‘work’ of the infantry. It was a poor choice. When a decision was finally made as to the form the study should take, neither his suggestion nor any of the others was adopted.

It seems undeniable that during the war the public formed an image of the typical Anzac. The public constructed this, or more likely had it constructed for them, from various supposedly common qualities of Australia’s soldiers. So familiar is his image, even now, that he hardly warrants describing: he was (is) a fighting man who was tough, inventive, loyal to his mates beyond the call of duty, a bit undisciplined (but only in non-essentials), chivalrous, gallant and sardonic. However, giving him pictorial form seems to have presented a problem. One might have expected that well before 1926, when Wheeler painted The Digger [175], the war art scheme would have produced an official picture of him. Only in 1922 the memorial had passed up the opportunity of acquiring a picture which probably fit the bill, Hilda Rix Nicholas’s A man [156]. Anyway, it appears the view was taken that in Dyson’s extensive collection of drawings of the AIF in France there was not a single representation of a soldier.

166 WF Mandle, Going it Alone, p 4.
167 Nicholas had offered the memorial A Mother of France (1914) and A man for 175 guineas each. The latter was a half-length portrait of an infantryman in full kit, his face shown in half profile. This anonymous man with his powerful physique, strong face and determined gaze, is Nicholas’s conception of a type found in the AIF, perhaps the best of types, for he is without doubt presented as the ideal Anzac. But it was rejected by the memorial’s art committee. As Hall and Gullett were unable to attend its meeting, the committee was constituted by Bean and Treloar. Bean thought A Mother of France should be purchased and was in favour of purchasing A man, ‘but considered an artist’s opinion should be obtained’. Treloar was in favour of purchasing the former but not the latter, although his reasons are unknown. In Hall’s absence McCubbin, still employed by the memorial on the modelling scheme, was summoned and asked for his opinion. He agreed that A Mother of France should be acquired but advised against acquiring A man pointing out that it had ‘several weaknesses’ (not specified in the minutes). In the result, A Mother of France was purchased and A man was returned to Nicholas. No matter, that decision was reversed in 1979 when the memorial purchased the picture, doubtless for a price considerably more than the paltry sum Nicholas had been prepared to take for it (£75). See minutes of meeting of Art Committee, 29 August 1922, AWM 170, 4/1. For a discussion of the picture see Speck, Painting Ghosts, p 79.
who could be presented as the typical Anzac. (This was clearly wrong.) Dyson’s drawings to one side, there were then at least three pictures in the memorial’s collection which could lay claim to being representations of him: Barker’s soldier on the cover of The Anzac Book [4], Bell’s A digger [96] and Benson’s Infantryman [174]. If they were considered, about which there is no evidence, it seems none fit the bill. And of these candidates, Benson’s infantryman would have been unacceptable: his lithe and tidily groomed young pipe-smoking soldier was as far away from the public’s idea of the typical Anzac and Treloar’s conception of him as one could imagine.

In Wheeler’s picture all elements of the earlier suggestions as to the form the study should take – elaborate settings, multiple figures, narrative content – have been discarded in favour of presenting a single soldier. This had always been the simplest solution, but in no real sense does the picture represent the work of the infantryman. Wheeler presents the soldier front-on and in full view: he appears to be standing in a field a little distance from the battle which continues to rage and shown indistinctly in the background. By agreement between Bean and Treloar, he is shown wearing the colour patch of the 1st Battalion.168 Physically, he is unexceptional, not at all like the powerful and imposing soldier in Dyson’s Back at Mouquet Farm [18]. With a cigarette stuck in his mouth he seems relaxed as he holds the barrel of his rifle, its stock resting on the ground. Possibly he has just come out of the line. He looks at his audience wearing an expression somewhere between a forced smile and a grimace. There is nothing remarkable or memorable about his appearance, but possibly that is the point. If his face shows signs of strain, that is only to be expected. He is young, but not so young, and has a regular face.169 It is not, however, ‘the hard bitten typical face’ of the rank and file Bean once described to Treloar.170 When Bean saw the picture he remarked that Wheeler had not got ‘one of our finest types, but probably a fair average which is, I suppose, what we should require.’171 This, it seems, did not amount to complete satisfaction with his representation, as he immediately prayed that Lambert would ‘give us his ideal Australian for a light horseman’. Did Wheeler succeed in producing an ‘interpretation of the character’ of the typical

168 Letters, Treloar to Bean, 9 June 1926; Bazley to Treloar, 11 June 1926; both in AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/323; Treloar to Wheeler, 13 July 1926, AWM 93, 18/2/14. They dismissed two other alternatives.
169 Wheeler’s sketch was accepted with the stipulation that he should ‘get a good Australian type’. See letter, Treloar to Wheeler, 15 February 1926, AWM 93, 18/2/14.
170 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 3 July 1920, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287.
171 Letter, Bean to Treloar, 10 July 1926, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/323.
infantryman as Treloar had hoped? The memorial thought so. It promoted the idea that however different the men of the AIF were, they nonetheless shared a character, the defining features of which were humour and courage: ‘[T]he types of men were most diverse and it will be agreed that they formed a representative cross-section of Australian manhood. Whether the subject of this portrait is to be regarded as a person or as a type there is no mistaking the fact that both humour and courage animate his features.’

172 Letter, Treloar to Bean, 4 August 1921, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/287.
173 Guide to Australian War Memorial, p 53. It was to be expected, then, that Wheeler’s picture would appear in Australian Chivalry (plate 50). There it was shown accompanied by a poem by Will H Ogilvie, The Australian, a paean to the Digger in which the concluding line of each stanza is: ‘The bravest thing God ever made!’
Conclusion

The fundamental object of the project of Anzac’s official representation was to construct a story of Australia’s part in the war – the story of Anzac – to be told for posterity in a national war museum to be built in the nation’s capital as a monument to the AIF, ultimately the memorial, thus inspiring in Australians, Bean hoped, a ‘conscious feeling of nationhood’ associated with having acquired a military tradition, a tradition that would form the basis for a future nationality. Superficially, this project was an initiative of the Commonwealth, and in a sense it was given that it authorised its carrying out and paid for it out of public funds, but there was nothing about it that reflected government thinking. From first to last it was Bean’s project, yet his want of any relevant official standing to propose and direct its carrying out proved irrelevant. The story he constructed was one with immense popular appeal and easily transmitted across generations, a story that told of the arrival on the world stage of a young nation through its supreme military performance, the equal of any known in military history, and of the forging of a tradition known as Anzac.

Well before March 1918, when his project emerged as a developed plan for instituting and maintaining for posterity the totality of Australia’s war records as a memorial to the AIF – his first memoir – Bean was convinced of the ability of pictures to communicate, possibly more effectively than any other representational form, the story of Anzac. His work on The Anzac Book and his early plan to have certain of its artists paint historical pictures for the Commonwealth showed the way to the official war art scheme, its virtual extension with the establishment of the AIF scheme, and midway through 1918 to a scheme of pictures he conceived of for the purpose of illustrating the AIF’s history in the war comprehensively and commemorating numerous individuals in portraits. In urging the government to adopt a new system for employing the official artists which would see the pictures in his scheme painted gratis, Bean revealed the fundamental object of the project of Anzac’s official representation and the substantial role in it he assigned to pictures: ‘Most important result for Australia from war is the great unifying [military] tradition as basis for future nationality and it is logically right that small corps artists should be formed to consolidate tradition.’

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1 Cable, AIF Administrative Headquarters (Bean) to Defence, 12 September 1918, AWM 38, 3DRL 6673/286.
The official war art scheme was the longest continuously running publicly funded program in Australian history directed to producing and acquiring pictures for the nation, and the most expensive. Technically, it is still running: the memorial continues to acquire pictures and sketchbooks depicting Australia’s part in the war. More than 1,400 pictures of all types were acquired by the Commonwealth from the scheme’s commencement in 1917 until just prior to the Second World War at a cost of more than £28,500, the bulk of which was provided by the public.² According to Treloar, by 1933 the memorial’s collection of pictures was valued conservatively at £75,000.³ Their quality as works of art was not a matter seriously considered during this history, but in any case ‘art’ was of secondary consideration. Of foremost importance was their value as records showing the part Australia was playing and had played in the war. But a picture’s real worth, at least in the setting of the memorial, lay not so much in its record value as in its capacity to tell or contribute to telling the story of Anzac. When Gullett asserted that visitors did not come looking for art, possibly he was right. Doubtless they came for many reasons, but primarily they came in search of a story of Australia’s part in the war. What they were offered was a story largely told visually by its exhibits. The pictures peculiarly suitable for storytelling purposes were the old tried and tested kinds found in British art for the representation of the military and the navy, and these are what they saw.

During this history numerous complaints were made about the war art scheme, including: it was not carefully thought out and proceeded ad hoc; decision-making barely reached a minimal standard; it was characterised by poor administration and inadequate documentation; it proceeded in the absence of any policies; the Commonwealth failed to collect pictures and sketchbooks from artists which were its property; it occasionally purchased pictures and sketchbooks once its property, sometimes for a considerable sum; it permitted artists working for it in the theatres of war to make pictures of whatever they liked; it commissioned pictures depicting subjects of doubtful historical accuracy; it acquired pictures with no or insufficient

² This sum represents the total direct costs incurred by the Commonwealth and associated with carrying out the scheme, that is, the daily and other allowances paid to the official artists and the cost of the pictures it commissioned and purchased, but excludes incidental expenditure such as framing, glazing, exhibition expenses, printing costs and other sundry expenses, often referred to in the evidence but not collected for the purposes of this study. The indirect costs were doubtless considerable but cannot be estimated. They include the costs of transporting, accommodating and provisioning the official and AIF artists, the soldier’s pay of the AIF artists, and the costs incurred by the High Commissioner’s Offices, the AWRS and the memorial in connection with administering the scheme.

³ *Australian Chivalry*, preface.
record value; it rejected others with clear record value; it occasionally purchased pictures it had once rejected at substantially increased sums. When it is acknowledged that the scheme was conceived as something for the public good and largely funded by it, cumulatively the several complaints made about it amount to maladministration. Of course, the loser in this was the public: it was entitled to expect that its funds were expended prudently and that the scheme delivered for its benefit a substantial, complete and quality collection of pictures representing the part Australia played in the war.

When during the war the war art scheme was launched shortcomings in its conception and administration might be excused by citing the exigencies of the war, but the problem with this is that the scheme was conceived in the Commonwealth’s offices in London, approved by the government in Melbourne, and administered exclusively by the Commonwealth and AIF Administrative Headquarters in London, save for the supervision of artists working in the theatres of war which this history has shown was inadequate or non-existent. Moreover, it should not be assumed that wartime administration generally suffered because of the pressures associated with the conduct of the war. But in any case matters concerning the scheme’s conception and administration were hardly of the taxing variety and missteps could have been avoided by careful thinking and the exercise of reasonable care. Then, when after the war the scheme continued and evolved initially under the auspices of the Australian War Museum and later the memorial, both Commonwealth institutions which attracted significant public funding, what possible plausible excuse could be offered for the further and in some cases continuing shortcomings in the scheme’s administration?

As this history has shown the fundamental problem with the war art scheme was Bean, and as its architect and ‘director’ its shortcomings must substantially be laid at his feet. His influence over the scheme was all-pervasive, notwithstanding that there were directors, committees, sub-committees and boards of management responsible for governing the memorial’s affairs. And he encountered no real interference or disagreement with his ideas. It is unsurprising, then, that notwithstanding the scheme’s shortcomings Bean is likely to have regarded it as a complete success, especially in the context of his project. Certainly there is no evidence that he ever acknowledged its shortcomings. The pictures it produced, from the ‘magnificent’ collection of pictures made by the artists at the front to the large historical pictures of incidents, locations and conditions in the Anzac story, were evidence not only of those splendid qualities which made the Australian soldier “the greatest individual fighter in
the war”, according to Marshal Foch, commander of the Allied forces during 1918, but of the ‘great army’ in which he served.4 The pictures displayed in the memorial’s various courts spoke directly to visitors, as did the portraits of the story’s principal actors, and constituted convincing evidence that Australia possessed a great military tradition.

As explained in the introduction the objective of this history was to produce by recourse to primary sources a detailed and full account of the Commonwealth’s war art scheme, and in the course examine the processes by which Anzac was given official pictorial form. Of course, this history does not purport to be the last word on the scheme, nor even a definitive account of it. Nevertheless, it represents the foundation from which all future work on the scheme can proceed. Moreover, it represents a starting point for further work to be done in areas not only directly concerned with the representation of Anzac, but those concerned with investigating the genesis and evolution of commemorative forms and practices with respect to the part Australia played in the First World War, the place of the war in the nation’s ‘memory’, and the impact of the war in shaping Australian identity.

Although superficially narrow in its focus this history has necessarily ranged more widely in order to contextualise the war art scheme as one element in Bean’s project of the official representation of Anzac. Thus, the critical documents in which he described his project, his first and second memoirs and his substantial paper ‘Outline of a scheme for the Australian War Museum’ which he presented to the Australian War Museum Committee at a meeting in late July 1919, were analysed to a greater or lesser extent. This analysis reveals that Bean’s project was adopted by the government holus-bolus without substantial or possibly any debate, a revelation that is disquieting and warrants investigation. Effectively, Bean was permitted to hijack and determine as he pleased the important question of what form the nation’s commemoration of its part in the war should take. And according to him the appropriate form was a national war museum filled with pictures and other objects which together testified to Australia’s military success and to the existence of its new-found military tradition. While other and arguably more appropriate commemorative forms existed, these were not considered. In the literature, the circumstances in which Bean’s project came to be

4 ‘Foreword’, The Relics and Records of Australia’s effort in the Defence of the Empire (1922).
adopted have not been subjected to any critical evaluation.\textsuperscript{5} This history, then, encourages an investigation of these circumstances the results of which should contribute to understandings of how the memorial came to be Australia’s principal form of commemoration of the part it played in the war.

With respect to the literature devoted to the study of the war art scheme canvassed in the introduction, this history has corrected the errors it contains, both of a serious and minor kind. If further work is done on the scheme recourse to this history should discourage their repetition and the making of new factual errors. If revisited, one matter hitherto previously overlooked should be addressed, and this is the legal and other framework in which artists were engaged by the Commonwealth and the AIF to produce pictures in the theatres of war. It is now clear that the official artists were engaged by the Commonwealth under formal agreements which obliged them to produce pictures of a certain kind; and while the position of the AIF artists is not nearly so clear, their ‘duties’ as set forth in AIF orders and instructions and communicated to them verbally largely prescribed the kinds of pictures they were expected to produce. In any fresh consideration of the pictures adequate notice should be taken of the legal and other framework in which the artists produced them.

The first part of the war art scheme involved artists visiting the theatres of war and making pictures of the part Australia was playing in the war. Dyson apart, the performance of the official and AIF artists was mediocre. He produced a substantial body of work mostly representing the common Australian soldier as the hero of endurance, but a few as a physically powerful, capable and resourceful soldier, the Anzac as warrior. The other official artists produced work of no real value. Ignoring their contractual obligation to make pictures of events occurring in the war especially with regard to the AIF, they produced a mixed bag

\textsuperscript{5} KS Inglis, for instance, in his seminal essay ‘A Sacred Place: The Making of the Australian War Memorial’, \textit{War & Society}, vol 3, no 2, September 1985, pp 99-126, does not refer to the suite of critical documents identified in the text. And while McKernan does, concentrating on Bean’s paper ‘Outline of a scheme for the Australian War Museum’ which he presented to the AWMC at the meeting in late July 1919, he neither considers the adequacy of any debate that took place before Bean’s project was adopted, nor whether its adoption had the effect of fixing the form that the commemoration of Australia’s part in the war would take. See \textit{Here is their spirit}, pp 57-8, 60-1, 64-6. Melrose refers to Bean’s first memoir, mentions his second in passing, and focuses on his substantial paper ‘Outline of a scheme for the Australian War Museum’ the plan in which, he claims, was one of deliberate nation-building based upon military success and to be conducted through the display of war trophies. But like McKernan he neither considers the adequacy of any debate that took place before the plan was adopted, nor whether its adoption had the effect of fixing the form that the commemoration of Australia’s part in the war would take, at least explicitly. See ‘“A praise that never ages”’, chapter 3, ‘CEW Bean and the Plan for a Memorial’, esp pp 149-56, 160.
of pictures which failed to represent in a substantial way either events or war operations in which it was involved. Their agreement to one side, it remains tolerably clear that they were expected to produce a record of the part Australia was playing in the war, and this they did not do. Their pictures are not distinctively Australian in content. Consequently, they barely qualify as representations of Anzac. Theoretically, they were to constitute the basis for the painting of large pictures of battles or other operations in which the AIF participated, but none really did except for Power’s pictures of artillery teams in action during Third Ypres. Of course, in a relatively large number of pictures exceptions to their run-of-the-mill quality will be found, but they are rarely found. Then, except for some of Crozier’s work in London and Lindsay’s in Sidcup, the foregoing remarks apply equally to the pictures produced by the AIF artists who, although not bound to produce work of a particular kind, failed to appreciate that they were obliged to produce a record of the part Australia was playing in the war. Crozier produced a number of memorable pictures on the subject of the human loss occasioned by war, a subject which warranted much greater treatment than it was given. These and some of his other pictures represent commentary on war, but overall such commentary, at least of a substantial kind, is absent in the work of the official and AIF artists. Quite unintentionally the only work which tackled the war head-on and commented on its appalling destructiveness was Lindsay’s. His exquisitely detailed watercolour portraits of facially disfigured soldiers are distinctively Australian as none of the other pictures are and represent another and hidden side of Anzac. They are frightening and sobering images.

Notwithstanding the praise Bean lavished on the pictures made at the front, they had limited storytelling potential and were largely inadequate for the purpose of illustrating the Anzac story. This did not mean that they and the smaller finished pictures of various subjects painted by the AIF artists in London had no role to play in telling the story. Possibly they would be little seen by visitors to the memorial, except when occasionally brought up from the dungeons for special exhibitions, or if reproduced in publications. Still, they were available for posterity, and in response to changing attitudes, needs and fashions could be offered up to the public whenever the occasion to do so arose. And on each showing they would contribute something to reinvigorating the Anzac story.

The second part of the scheme involved the production of large historical pictures illustrating the Anzac story and of portraits commemorating its leading actors. Bean variously claimed that these pictures would ‘make the tradition of our nation’, ‘embody the Australian tradition
in the war’ and ‘cover the history and tradition of the A.I.F.’ Most of the historical pictures, largely of his choosing, purported to depict actual incidents in the story. But they rarely functioned as mere illustrations of the incidents, and never solely to show what war was and how Australians waged it, and were chosen for their heroic and didactic qualities. Bean’s theory was that they would teach lessons to the youth of Australia and future generations, most frequently the lesson of self-sacrifice which, according to him, was the highest Anzac ideal. It did not imply heroism, it was heroism. Moreover, it implied the recognition of duty: duty to one’s country, army, unit and mates. He hoped that if such incidents were represented in pictures, they would inspire future generations and serve to encourage them to give their lives and thought to Australia.7 Thus, pictures of national disasters, such as Lambert’s of the landing and the charge of the Light Horse at the Nek, and pictures depicting the deaths of individuals such as Greig, Turnour and Black, could be offered up to members of the public visiting the memorial as illustrating the pinnacle of a citizen’s selfless conduct in the nation’s cause, conduct to be admired and emulated.

Other historical pictures carried the Anzac story further by representing the military achievements and character of Australia’s forces: the AIF’s part in the battles of Lone Pine, Romani, Messines, Hamel, Mont St Quentin and Péronne; the might of its infantry and artillery shown advancing on the Germans during the opening of the Allied offensive on 8 August 1918; the dash and horsemanship of its artillery teams and of the Light Horse during its famous charge at Beersheba; the coolness and audacity of McNamara’s desert aeroplane rescue of Rutherford from a posse of chasing Turks; the men’s discipline and steadiness on the ‘sinking’ Southland; the mateship and camaraderie of its officers in the saloon of the Arran following the evacuation of Gallipoli; the skill and daring of AE2’s submerged passage of the Dardanelles Strait to get into the Sea of Marmara; the RAN’s might in Sydney’s destruction of the German raider Emden; the usefulness in wartime of skills learnt in the bush, such as droving, in herding German prisoners of war to the rear; the AIF’s fearlessness under the German bombardment of Pozières, to the men a mere ‘summer shower’. And, of course, by promoting the idea that the men who enlisted in the AIF were on a great adventure, as suggested by the cocky young signaller in Benson’s picture of the AIF training in the desert.

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6 Bean, second memoir, pp 2, 3, Appendix L.
7 Bean, In Your Hands, Australians, pp 16-17.
Bean’s involvement in the process of producing the historical pictures was close. Although they were intended to be historically accurate, in his hands the concept of historical accuracy was flexible and could be manipulated to suit his purposes, principally to emphasise the message he intended a picture to convey or to carry further the story it depicted. And on occasion he ignored it if the manner of an incident’s depiction was ‘true in spirit’. The extent to which he was prepared to tinker with the known facts, or to furnish them if they were unknown, varied depending on the circumstances and what was at stake. For instance, he persisted with depicting Turnour’s death in order to represent the virtue of self-sacrifice, authorising the incident’s substantial invention when he could discover nothing concrete about it. The reunion depicted by McInnes in his evacuation picture is a scene he invented. The licence he took in designing the picture of Greig’s death to draw attention to Zeki Bey’s desire to spare the Australian was invention by another name. And he authorised other perhaps less serious departures from the known facts in order to carry the story further: the inclusion of the Orientalist scene in Benson’s picture of the AIF training in the desert; the depiction of AE2 brazenly flying its white ensign when there was no satisfactory evidence that it had; Crozier’s misleading representation of the occupation of Anzac Cove as a summer idyll on a foreign shore.

Importantly, however the historical pictures were acquired by the memorial, and irrespective of Bean’s interventions in their design, they are official pictures of Anzac, that is, pictures presented with the seal of approval of the Commonwealth which in effect certifies their veracity. Official pictures do not lie, or so the Commonwealth would have the public believe. Nor do official histories and other official stories of Australia’s part in the war, however told. Effectively, they are immune from attack, at least of the successful sort, despite the best efforts of historians and academics. In the end the problem with the historical pictures, and much else besides in the memorial’s representation of Australia’s part in the First World War, the source and nature of which can be traced to Bean, is the part they have played and continue to play in transmitting a particular version of the story of Anzac almost entirely constructed by him, one carrying a claim for the existence of an Australian military tradition and its fundamental importance in defining nationality. His is the official story.
Epilogue

The project of Anzac’s official representation was (is) a project without end, and when Britain declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939, marking the commencement of what became known as the Second World War, it received fresh impetus. Australia too was now at war again. In the context of ‘the gathering of international storm clouds’, it was reported that in their messages on Anzac Day 1939, almost without exception leaders in the different fields of public life directed particular attention to the need for “the spirit of Anzac to live on”, and the Advertiser remarked that Australia ‘must continue to live up to the tradition of service established on April 25, 1915’. The old rhetoric was good for another war, with the Sydney Morning Herald’s editorial declaring that ‘[t]o few armies in history, especially untrained and without soldierly tradition, can it have been so dramatically given to leap at once into military renown’, and that ‘Anzac gave the Australians at once a name which rings like a battle-cry, and a tradition’.

The declaration of war had an immediate effect on the memorial. It recognised that it might be required to play a role in collecting, preserving and exhibiting Australia’s records of this new war. Thus, on 4 October 1939 its board of management met and considered the question of the memorial’s position ‘in relation to the present war’, unanimously resolving that given its statutorily conferred objects, which limited its scope of activities to the commemoration of Australia’s part in the First World War, the memorial should proceed ‘vigorously’ with the completion of its building in Canberra and the installation of its collections. Still, it at least resolved to offer to co-operate with the Defence Department and the Ministry of Information with respect to the collection of records and relics of the present war.

On 6 January 1940, and in accordance with a recommendation made by the Minister for Information, the government approved the formation of a war records section ‘to obtain cinema films and photographs and to collect historical records and relics’ for passing to his

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1 ‘Anzac day reflections’, Advertiser, 26 April 1939, p 22.
3 Minutes of meeting of Board of Management, 4 October 1941, AWM 170, 1/40, resolution 235. Incidentally, Treloar immediately left the memorial for the duration of the war to become director of the recently created Ministry of Information, and Tasman Heyes was appointed acting director. See resolution 234; agenda for meeting, agenda item 3, ‘Appointment of Acting Director’, AWM 170, 1/40.
department and thence to the memorial for preservation. Already, then, the memorial was regarded as the proper home of the nation’s records of the new war. Importantly, the minister also recommended: ‘Later it may be proposed that a few official war artists be attached to the forces as was done in 1916-19.’ A year passed with no action being taken on that front. Then, on 7 January 1941, the government approved the appointment of Ivor Hele, who was serving with the second AIF in the Middle East, as an official artist. With this approval the official war art scheme of the Second World War commenced. Two further appointments quickly followed, those of Harold Herbert and Frank Norton.

Recognising these and other related developments, on 3 February 1941 the memorial’s board resolved to recommend to the government that its scope be extended so as to include ‘the relics, records, models, pictures, cinematograph films, photographs, and other articles of the [present] war’, and that its Act be amended accordingly. In making that decision the board was acknowledging, if not explicitly then certainly implicitly, the memorial’s responsibility for incorporating the record of Australia’s part in the war in the project of Anzac’s official representation of which it was the custodian. However, beyond deciding this it seems the memorial had no involvement in the war art scheme until 15 September 1941 when its board made two important decisions:

1. The Board decided that it would accept responsibility for the control, maintenance, and appointment of official war artists commissioned to provide the artistic records of Australia’s war effort.
2. In accepting this responsibility the Board delegated authority to its Art Committee … to appoint and control the official war artists.

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4 War Cabinet Minute on Agendum No 6/1940, 6 January 1940, NAA, A1196, 43/501/2.
6 War Cabinet Minute No 680, 7 January 1941, NAA, A2671, 43/1941.
7 Ibid.; War Cabinet Minute No 749, 4 February 1941, NAA, A2671, 43/1941.
8 Minutes of meeting of Board of Management, 3 February 1941, AWM 170, 1/43, resolution 253. It was also resolved to fill the vacancies on the Art Committee created by the deaths of Bernard Hall and HS Gullett by appointing Chauvel and McCubbin to the committee. See resolution 260. It will be recalled that Hall had died in February 1935; Gullett recently died in an air crash (13 August 1940). The government accepted the memorial’s recommendation that its Act be amended, but this did not occur until 1952 when the Australian War Memorial Act 1952 commenced. By section 3 the memorial’s activities were extended to include the commemoration of Australians dying on or as a result of ‘active service’, which was defined to mean active service in war or in war-like operations by members of the naval, military or air forces of the Commonwealth, or of any naval or military force of the Queen raised in Australia before the establishment of the Commonwealth.
9 Minutes of meeting of Board of Management, 15 September 1941, AWM 170, 1/44, resolution 266.
Fractionally earlier, on 13 September 1941, the memorial’s art committee, now constituted by Bean, Chauvel and McCubbin, met and decided various matters in connection with the scheme: the theatres of war and ‘Australian centres’ to which the official artists should be sent; from numerous applications the memorial had received for the position of official war artist the next seven artists to be appointed; and the terms of their appointment.\textsuperscript{10} The memorial had acted prematurely, but on the understanding that the government intended asking it to look after the official artists, for it was not until 1 October 1941 that cabinet decided that the control and management of the artists should be transferred from the Department of Information to the memorial.\textsuperscript{11}

The official war art scheme of the First World War was largely conducted away from the public gaze, and Bean and his followers ensured that modernism and its advocates made no impact on it. But the memorial soon discovered that times had changed. Contemporary (modern) Australian artists demanded to play a part in producing a pictorial record of Australia’s part in the new war, and a battle between the memorial and the contemporary art movement erupted and was conducted on the public stage. But that is another story.

\textsuperscript{10} Minutes of meeting of Art Committee, 13 September 1941, AWM 170, 4/2, resolutions 7, 8, 10.
\textsuperscript{11} War Cabinet Minute No 38, 1 October 1941, NAA, A2671, 43/1941.