From ANZUS to SEATO - A Study of Australian Foreign Policy, 1950-54

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by
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Table of Contents

Synopsis ii.
Declaration iii.
Acknowledgements iv.

Chapter

I Introduction 1.


III Britain Presses for Association with ANZUS, 1952-53 112.


VI Conclusion 399.

Appendix 408.

Bibliography 425.
Synopsis

This thesis is primarily concerned with the questions of why Australia joined the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), which was concluded in September 1954 among eight nations (Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Great Britain, France, Thailand, the Philippines and Pakistan) and why Australia entered into a military alliance in Southeast Asia backed by the United States. It is argued that Australia’s actions can be explained in four ways. First, Australia quested for a Southeast Asian pact in order to complement the limited value of the security guarantee afforded it by the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and the US) security treaty signed in September 1951. Second, Australia was anxious to make some concession to Britain to compensate for that country’s exclusion from the ANZUS pact. Third, Australia participated in a defence treaty in the Southeast Asian region in order to counterbalance what was perceived to be Indonesian adventurism in West New Guinea. The final and decisive factor was Australian anxiety to contain the perceived threat of communist expansionism and invasion, especially after the fall of Dien Bien Phu in early May 1954.
Declaration

I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgement any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.

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Chapter I
Introduction

At 6:00 p.m., Manila time on 8 September, 1954 the foreign ministers of five Western and three Asian nations (Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Great Britain, France, Thailand, the Philippines and Pakistan) concluded the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). The Southeast Asian pact was a direct response to the Geneva settlement on Indo-China reached in July 1954. The collective pact was established by those eight countries as a means of sustaining permanently a favourable balance of power in Southeast Asia brought about by the settlement. SEATO certainly marked America's formal involvement in the defence of the Southeast Asian mainland for the first time in history. The security treaty also marked Australia's formal involvement in Southeast Asian international power politics. Australia, for the first time in history, assumed a formal and supplementary role in the maintenance of the balance of power in the Southeast Asian region. This thesis undertakes a study on Australia's search for SEATO, and is primarily concerned with the problem why Australia joined the Southeast Asian security treaty.

In 1962 George Modelski published, SEATO: Six Studies, which contained essays on the origins, the development and the organisation of SEATO. In the book, Leicester C. Webb produced a pioneering study on the subject of Australia's involvement in SEATO based on published documents. He argued
that Australia joined SEATO in order to supplement the security guarantee afforded it by the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and the US) security treaty concluded in September 1951; to help compensate the United Kingdom for being left out of ANZUS; and to help prevent communist powers from establishing a dominant position in Southeast Asia.¹

In recent years, there have been references to the subject of Australia’s policy towards SEATO in works by Gregory Pemberton, Peter Edwards, Russell Trood and John Murphy.² But these recent works have been primarily concerned with tracing the evolution of Australian policy in Indo-China from the resumption of French colonial rule in 1945, through the developing turbulence of the revolution, and up to the commitment of Australian ground forces to Vietnam in 1965. The specific question of why Australia joined SEATO has been only marginal to these works. References to Australian policy on SEATO have also been provided in works by David Lowe and David Lee. Lowe discussed the issue in the context of Canberra’s redirection of Australia’s defence effort after release from its military obligations in the Middle East in the period 1948-54.³ Lee emphasised Australia’s wish for joint defence planning with the Americans in

the period 1952-57. But these works, too, have not taken up in any specific and detailed way the question of why Australia joined SEATO.

This thesis presents the first comprehensive and specific account of the motives for Australian participation in SEATO based on primary sources. It draws on published archival materials on the foreign relations of the United States, unpublished Australian archival materials recently declassified under the Freedom of Information Act, and published and unpublished New Zealand archival materials. Chapter II looks at the origins of the ANZUS pact and at perceptions in Canberra that there was a need to build on the security guarantee afforded Australia in that treaty. In Chapter III, the thesis takes up the issue of Britain's exclusion from ANZUS and the consequent pressure on Australia and New Zealand to look for a way of salvaging Britain's security role in the Asian-Pacific region. Chapter IV deals with Indonesia's campaign to wrest control of West New Guinea and how this encouraged Canberra in its search for additional ways of guaranteeing security in Asia. Chapter V reviews the turbulent developments in Indo-China, culminating in the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the subsequent Geneva Conference, and how these events confirmed Australia in its view that there was a need to supplement ANZUS with a new security arrangement covering areas on the Asian mainland.

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As already indicated, there are references to some - but by no means, all - of these events in the existing literature. But this thesis breaks new ground by offering an integrated and comprehensive account of why Australia joined SEATO. In the process, it seeks to place this development in the wider context of the evolution of post-war Australian policy with regards to security in Asia.

The Liberal-Country coalition government led by Prime Minister Robert Menzies assumed power from the Labor government in early December 1949 with a stronger sense of Australia’s vulnerability to external threats and of its inadequacy in dealing with the external environment with its own resources. Perceiving Southeast Asia as politically turbulent and militarily vulnerable and Communist China as a major threat to the area, and fearing a possible resurgent Japanese aggression, the Menzies government energetically sought to improve the terms of Australia’s physical survival and security in the Pacific area and Asia by creating a Pacific military alliance with the United States and to secure a long-term American guarantee of the defence of the Southwest Pacific area. As a means of inducing the US to underwrite its security, in mid-1950 Australia gave the US practical evidence of its readiness to assume obligations and responsibilities within the ambit of US influence by diverting its forces stationed in Japan to the Korean battlefield. Taking advantage of the US proposal for a Japanese peace treaty, which would allow unlimited Japanese rearmament, the Menzies government also pressed for adequate security assurances from the United States to protect Australia from a rearmed Japan through the creation of a Pacific alliance. Although the United States was consistently anxious to
reassure the wartime Pacific allies, including Australia, against a future Japanese threat, it was nonetheless still reluctant to give a formal defence guarantee to Australia and New Zealand even after the outbreak of the Korean War. But with China’s full entry into the Korean fighting at the end of 1950, America’s fear of possible communist control over Japan, a keystone of US power in the Pacific, was sharpened, and the US moved to consolidate the containment of communism in Northeast Asia. As part of a plan to strengthen its own strategic position in the Northwest Pacific, the United States saw a growing need for immediate revitalisation of Japanese power once again on a moderate scale, and a consequent enhanced need to enlist the political support of the wartime Pacific allies for the former enemy’s rearmament. At the same time, the US saw a need to induce Australia and New Zealand to assume a supplementary role for the defence of American bases and troops in the Japanese islands and the Ryukyus. The idea of formalising the wartime alliance with the Southwest Pacific nations in the form of ANZUS was fundamentally accepted by the US as a means of enhancing American security interests in Northeast Asia.

In the years 1952-53, Australia and New Zealand were bedevilled by pressures exerted by Britain for its own association with ANZUS. Unwilling to see the Pacific dominions discuss Pacific defence matters with the Americans unchaperoned by the mother country, and wishing to compensate for wounded British international prestige and Commonwealth family feeling inflicted by the creation of ANZUS, the British government persistently attempted to gain entrance to ANZUS discussions either as an observer or a full participant. But
the repeated British requests for an effective consultative role in ANZUS were completely rebuffed by the ANZUS powers. Failing in the attempt to secure an effective connection with ANZUS, the British government then attempted to reduce the value of ANZUS and to deter Australia and New Zealand from developing a closer defence relationship with the US. By proposing to revitalise the ANZAM (Australian, New Zealand and Malayan area) arrangement, mainly concerned during 1949-52 with the development of strategic planning in the field of sea communications in the Southwest Pacific, and by proposing to focus the arrangement more closely on the defence of Malaya, the UK tried to have Australia and New Zealand shoulder a heavier Cold War burden within the British Commonwealth orbit. Greatly susceptible to charges by Britain of disloyalty to the British and Commonwealth connection as a result of the creation and development of ANZUS, and acknowledging the need to consolidate Australia’s security in the Pacific and Asia, Australia supported the British proposal for a larger Australian contribution to Malayan defence through the establishment of a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve.

The Menzies government was also faced with the dispute between Holland and Indonesia over the determination of the future status of West New Guinea. The government opposed Indonesia’s claim to sovereignty over the western part of New Guinea and endeavoured to stiffen Dutch resolve to retain full control. Showing great sensitivity to any alteration of sovereignty on its doorstep, Australia also desired to stake out a role as an active participant in any Indonesian-Dutch negotiation. As a result of the Menzies government’s
interventionist stance, public controversy developed between Australia and Indonesia over the question of the disposition of the western part of New Guinea. With the internal political situation in Indonesia deteriorating as a result of the “October 17 Affair” of 1952 concerning the reform of Indonesia’s enormous guerrilla Army, and with moves towards extremist domination of the country, the West New Guinea claim came to be used by Jakarta as a means of diverting public attention from accumulating domestic and economic problems. In the face of the worsening domestic situation in its next-door neighbour, Australia strengthened its aversion to seeing the transfer of sovereignty of half of New Guinea to Indonesia. Determined to insulate itself from a potentially hostile Asian environment, Australia attempted to bolster Dutch determination to preserve a permanent presence in West New Guinea by concluding an administrative agreement between the western and eastern parts of New Guinea in July 1953.

Beginning in early 1950 with political recognition of the French puppet regime led by President Bao Dai in Vietnam, which the French had installed in power as a means of turning a colonial war into a civil war, the Menzies government also allied itself with America’s Indo-China policy of forcibly suppressing Indo-Chinese insurgent forces striving for independence from the French. In early 1953, against a background of enhanced importance of Southeast Asia to the US as a result of the Korean War, Australia also became involved in the Indo-China war by agreeing to making economic and military aid available to the French. Nonetheless, in spite of America’s massive and
Australia's token assistance to the French, by early 1954 about two-thirds of Indo-China had been virtually controlled by the resistance forces. Given the unfavourable military balance on the battlefield, French public and parliamentary pressure for ending the war was uncontrollable, and a decision was made by the Great Powers (the US, the UK, Soviet Russia and France) in February 1954 to call an international conference in Geneva on the question of restoring peace in Indo-China. This decision was soon followed by a mass offensive by Vietnamese resistance forces, the Viet Minh, against the French-held fortress of Dien Bien Phu. In order to bolster French resolve to continue the war effort and to create a strong bargaining position at the Geneva talks, the US at the end of March proposed "united action": joint military intervention with its allies in the Indo-China war. But the American proposal met British and subsequently Australian opposition, and the US was finally forced to accept the concept of a peaceful solution to the Indo-China conflict. The Geneva settlement, which was reached in July and which terminated the eight-year French Indo-China war, gave the Viet Minh only half of the territorial base of Vietnam, and completely denied the claims of Laotian and Cambodian rebel forces, thereby diplomatically establishing a far more favourable strategic balance for the Western powers than the one obtaining on the battlefield. In order to preserve permanently the favourable military balance of power in Southeast Asia created by the Geneva settlement, SEATO was established in September 1954.

The period covered by this thesis is 1950-54. Historical research on Australian foreign policy during this period has great significance, because the
years 1950-54 marked a distinct phase in which many of the principles and assumptions that would, during the ensuing years, underpin Australian foreign policy during the Cold War were firmly established. The Menzies government rose to power with a perception that Australia’s security environment threatened to become a mid-twentieth century Balkans, an area of political instability and power vacuum created by the sudden emergence of many independent states in Asia with uncertain and shifting foundations, and that possible major threats to this environment would probably come from either Japan or China. This government therefore sought to import some cohesion and stability to the region by upholding the European colonial presence on the one hand and seeking the intervention of American power on the other. At the same time, Australia showed its readiness to undertake increasing responsibilities and obligations in Asia and the Pacific to sustain a European and American presence. In return for accepting the US proposal for a Japanese peace treaty and a commitment to defend the American presence in Northeast Asia, Australia, with the creation of the ANZUS alliance, achieved the objective of ensuring that America’s outer-defence perimeter in the Pacific extended beyond the Philippines to Australia and New Zealand, and that the US assumed a peace-time permanent role in the preservation of the balance of power in the Southwest Pacific. By assuming a larger role in the defence of British interests in Malaya with the revitalisation of ANZAM, Australia also exerted itself to prevent the sphere of British Commonwealth influence in Asia from contracting, and to sustain the capacity of the United Kingdom to maintain its position as a Great Power. By embarking upon cooperation with the Dutch in the economic development of West New
Guinea with the conclusion of an administrative agreement, Australia also attempted to buttress Dutch resolve to remain a permanent Pacific Power. Moreover, by showing Australia's readiness to cooperate with the United States in the preservation of the Southeast Asian strategic balance created by the Geneva settlement, the Menzies government, through its role in the establishment of SEATO, helped ensure a formal American military commitment to the defence of mainland Southeast Asia, and, as a result of this commitment, the Southeast Asian region came within the ambit of US influence.

Thus, in the period 1950-54, Australia's post-war western-oriented posture in international affairs crystallised, particularly in the form of the strategy of building or consolidating the spheres of American and European influence as a means of insulating Australia from a perceived hostile Asian environment. Reflecting as they did the complex situation in Asia in which Australia found itself in the post-war world, and involving Australia deeply in Asian and the Pacific affairs, ANZUS, ANZAM, the administrative agreement with the Netherlands and SEATO were nevertheless in essence a series of means to protect Australia from Asia. Australia's attempts to expand the ambit of American influence in Asia, to prevent the contraction of the British Commonwealth orbit in the area and to preserve the Dutch presence in West New Guinea were testimony that Australia was still strongly conscious of itself as an isolated fragment of Europe in an Asian setting, and that it still assumed that the development of Asian international politics could be determined by Western powers.
Chapter II
The ANZUS Treaty Negotiations, 1950-51

The ANZUS security treaty, signed on 1 September, 1951 between Australia, New Zealand and the United States, marked the culmination of Australia’s long-standing endeavours to engage the United States in the Southwest Pacific and to link it to Australia’s security requirements. Since the early days of Federation, Australia, as part of its adaptation to the shifting balance of power in the Asian-Pacific region, had been raising the concept of forming a military alliance which would include the United States. The proposal to create a Pacific alliance backed by the United States clearly represented an attempt by Australia to adjust itself to the contraction of British influence and power in the Pacific and to deter or balance a perceived threat or threats from Asia. In September 1909, in the face of the emergence of Japan as a major Asian power as a result of the victory in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 and of a major change in British Far Eastern policy in 1905 which included the withdrawal of the Royal Navy’s cruisers from the Pacific, Prime Minister Alfred Deakin proposed to the US “the agreement of the extension of a Monroe Doctrine to all the countries around the Pacific Ocean.”¹ Witnessing the breach by Japan of the treaty systems set by the

Washington Conference of 1921-22 and the corresponding emergence of regional
instability in Europe, in May 1937 Prime Minister Joseph Lyons proposed to the first
plenary session of the Imperial Conference “a regional understanding and a pact of
non-aggression in the Pacific.” In 1945-46, when Dr H. V. Evatt, Minister for
External Affairs, began to raise doubts about the effectiveness of the United Nations,
he turned to the possibility of an American alliance to ensure Australian security from a
resurgent Japan. By taking advantage of America’s desire to continue to use the base
facilities on Manus Island, 200 miles north of mainland Australian New Guinea, he
tried in vain to turn the American desire into a practical guarantee of Australia’s
territorial integrity. In February 1949, when Australia found that the US had already
regarded Japan as a potential member of the free world nations rather than as a former

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enemy and consequently changed its Occupation policies towards Japan, and that communist victory had been all but assured in China, Evatt again in the House of Representatives talked about the need and the importance of Australia’s incorporation into the sphere of American influence. But in spite of these Australian quests for enlisting an American security guarantee, the United States, except for the special circumstances of the Second World War, did not perceive strategic value in the formation of a Pacific pact with Australia. While the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in April 1949 committed the US to the defence of Western Europe in peace-time, it was not immediately accompanied by an American readiness to involve itself permanently in peace-time in the preservation of a global balance.

This Chapter discusses the ANZUS treaty negotiations conducted during 1950-51, and focuses upon why the US overcame its long-standing reluctance to involve itself permanently in peace-time in the preservation of the balance of power in the Southwest Pacific and entered into a military alliance with Australia and New Zealand. Recently some revisionist views on the origins of ANZUS based on primary sources have been expressed by some scholars and historians. Philip Dorling, Thomas-Durrell Young and W. David McIntyre have argued that ANZUS was created as part of US-UK military co-operation in the Middle East, and that the treaty was based upon America’s expectation of the ability and willingness of Australia and New Zealand to make a substantial contribution to the global strategy of the United Kingdom and the United States in the Middle East. David McLean has, on the other hand, advanced the

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argument that ANZUS was created as part of America's policy of containing communism in the general context of the Cold War. It is argued in this Chapter that the change in American policy towards the Southwest Pacific evidenced in the conclusion of ANZUS was influenced chiefly by the development of American policy towards Japan. In the US view, ANZUS was a product of the combination of two factors. The first of these was the American desire of reassuring Australia and New Zealand against a resurgence of Japanese aggression. In this connection, the wartime alliance during 1942-45, which brought the two countries into close and effective military association with the US, and Australian and New Zealand involvement in the Allied Occupation policy-making and administration of Japan such as the Far Eastern Commission (FEC), the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) and the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) provided a necessary foundation for the

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8 On the basis of Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference Agreements reached in December 1945, in January 1946 the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) was established in Washington to formulate Allied Occupation policies. It was made up of eleven nations who had played some significant part in the Pacific War, and the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) was set up in Tokyo to consult with and advise the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) about the implementation of the surrender terms. The ACJ consisted of representatives of the US, the Soviet Union, China and one representative of the combined British Commonwealth. W. Macmahon Ball, professor of Melbourne University, became the joint Commonwealth representative on the Allied Council.

9 The British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF), made up of contingents from India, Britain, New Zealand as well as from Australia, was organised under an Australian Commander-in-Chief, first Sir John Northcott and later Sir Horace Robertson. In February 1946, 37,000 BCOF, of which Australia supplied 12,000 troops, arrived in Tokyo. Between January 1947 and November 1948, with the agreement of the US government, the United Kingdom, Indian and New Zealand contingents were completely withdrawn, and as of 1 March, 1950 BCOF was reduced to a small force of Australian personnel. The strength was 2,356, which consisted of one Army battalion, one Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) squadron and a naval port party plus administrative personnel. See “Memorandum from Allen Brown, Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department, to Sir Frederick Shedden, Secretary of the Department of Defence, 31 March, 1950” in AA, A4639/XM1, Vol. 4.
negotiation of the tripartite security treaty. Secondly, America’s conclusion of a military alliance with the Southwest Pacific nations was based on its strategic need and expectation of involving Australia and New Zealand in the defence of Northeast Asia, particularly of American troops and bases stationed and retained in the main islands of Japan and the Ryukyus. Clearly linked up with the defence of the area of the world that the United States saw as being of great significance in supporting its interests in the regional and global strategic balances, ANZUS was created by the United States as part of consolidating America’s strategic position in Northeast Asia, particularly Japan.

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On 10 December, 1949 the Australian Liberal Party leader, Robert Gordon Menzies, with his Country Party ally, Arthur Fadden, defeated the Chifley Labor government in the federal elections and returned to power with 74 of the 123 seats in a House of Representatives. Prime Minister Menzies appointed Percy Spender as the Minister for External Affairs at the latter’s request. On 9 March 1950, in his first major address to the House of Representatives, Spender put forward a Pacific defence pact as official Australian policy and, with exceptional vigour and urgency, embarked upon the task of improving the terms of Australia’s physical survival and security.

There were three primary factors that motivated Spender to propose a Pacific defence pact backed by the United States. The first of these was his perception of a need for Australia to adjust to the contraction of British influence and power in the Pacific area. Spender’s wish for an alliance system with the US as a supplement to the
declining value of Britain’s security role in the Pacific had already been shown in 1938, one year after he entered Federal Politics. On 5 October 1938, in addressing the House of Representatives on foreign policy at the time of the Munich crisis, Spender, as a private and independent member of Parliament, expressed strong doubt about the reliability of the British guarantee to Australian security:

In view of what has taken place during the last two years, and particularly during the course of the last week, two conclusions appear to be obvious: first, that the balance of power in Europe has shifted; and secondly, that the British Government is no longer the strong force in international affairs than it formerly was ... It is because I realise that the balance of power has shifted and the British Empire is more vulnerable now than it has been for years, that the conviction is borne in upon me that Australia must play a greater part than we have in making our Empire a stronger and more potent for peace throughout the world.

Spender added that, because of British vulnerability, the extent of the support afforded by Britain to Australia would be much less than Australia had been led to expect. In the same debate, he further challenged the view that Singapore would protect Australia, questioning whether it could withstand an attack from the rear.  

Being the Minister for the Army during 1940-41 and a member of the Australian Advisory War Council during 1940-45, and accordingly well aware of the steps taken to secure aid from the United States and of the wartime machinery built up for collaboration with the Americans, Spender was deeply impressed with the lessons of war in the Pacific theatre. In 1944, with war still continuing and with memories still fresh of Australia’s situation following the fall of Singapore in February 1942, he wrote a small monograph, entitled Australia’s Foreign Policy-The Next Phase, in which he

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stated that “the linking of England with Australia through the Indian Ocean is one of the most awkward of Imperial strategic problems,” asserting that “geographical facts point to strategic links with the United States as one of the most important imperatives in Australian foreign policy.”  

Traditional reliance upon Britain as the primary protector for Australia’s defence, which had proved impracticable in 1942, became even less possible not only because of the British withdrawal after 1946 from India, Burma and Ceylon, but also because of the fact that Britain became more closely tied in matters of planning and strategy to its partners in NATO than to governments of British Commonwealth and, therefore, accepted the primacy in global defence of the Atlantic area. In February 1949 Spender said that “the future peace of the whole Pacific rested, almost entirely, upon the United States.”

However, there were two other major factors that made Spender appreciate the urgency of relying upon a foreign power outside of the British Commonwealth of Nations and of obtaining a security guarantee from the United States. One of these was the unstable and volatile condition of Southeast Asia. The change of government in Australia in December 1949 was concurrent with the final success of the communist armies on the mainland of China. This success, the communist-led insurgency movements in Indo-China, Malaya, Burma, the Philippines, and Thailand, the instability of Indonesia and the intensification of the Cold War in Europe made a decisive impact upon Spender’s perception of the outside world and the strategies and policies which he adopted towards the region of Southeast Asia. It was apparent that Spender

viewed the existence of the Chinese communist regime within the context of a bipolar world. In his first major address to Parliament on foreign affairs on 9 March 1950, while not affirming that the success of the Chinese communist revolution was the result of Soviet imperialism, he nonetheless argued that “the changes have played into the hands of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in its search for new satellites.”

Perceiving Communist China as a major threat to the peace in the regional system of Southeast Asia, the Minister for External Affairs argued that the communist victory in China threw the whole political and diplomatic situation in Asia into uncertainty. By enunciating an early form of what came to be called the “domino theory” of communism for Southeast Asia, Spender strongly doubted that the nations of Southeast Asia could withstand communist pressures on their own without some sort of external assistance:

Should the forces of Communism prevail and Vietnam come under the heels of Communist China, Malaya is in danger of being outflanked and it, together with Thailand, Burma, and Indonesia, will become the next direct object of further Communist activities.¹⁴

With a strong sense of national insecurity and of increasing regional sensitivity, Spender conceived of two methods for the stabilisation of Australia’s security environment. The first of these was the economic aid and assistance proposals for Southeast Asia by the British Commonwealth of Nations, in anticipation of United States participation. Spender’s scheme for consolidating the economies of the independent states of Southeast Asia and for assisting them to develop the means of defending themselves had been presented and adopted in the form of the Colombo

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 627. This speech is also provided in Neville K. Meaney, Australia and the World: a Documentary History from the 1870s to the 1970s, p. 560.
Plan, initially called the Spender Plan, at the British Commonwealth Foreign Ministers Conference in Colombo in January 1950. However, the Colombo Plan was basically a long-term measure for ameliorating conditions which were conducive to the spread of communism. Events in Asia could move too quickly to allow time for economic and political measures alone to take effect.

It was therefore secondly considered by Spender as a more immediate effective means that a defensive military agreement should be created in the area consisting of nations with a vital interest in the stability of Asia and the Pacific and with the capability of undertaking military commitments. Particularly viewing America as the country with the greatest countervailing strength to resist the pressure of communism, he thought that any regional security pact could not acquire military credibility unless it linked up with American military strength. This was shown in his speech of 9 March 1950:

The security of Australia, and with it, our prosperity and our freedom to pursue our way of life is, of course, what is uppermost in our minds when we determine the form and direction of foreign policy. The cultivation of friendly relations with our neighbours and with like-minded countries everywhere in the world has as its ultimate objective the protection of Australia against aggression from any quarter and in any guise ... It is therefore desirable that all Governments who are

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15 The British Commonwealth Foreign Ministers Conference (Colombo Conference) was held from 9 January to 14, 1950. The Conference decided to establish a permanent Consultative Committee to review the short and long-term economic problems of Asian countries. This Committee held its first meeting in May 1950 at Sydney, where it made several recommendations which set the pattern for the future organisation of foreign aid. Of these, the most important were that Asian Commonwealth countries should draw up six-year public authority developmental programmes to begin from 1 July, 1951; that the non-Commonwealth countries of South and South East Asia should be invited to do so; and that a Bureau of Technical Cooperation should be established at Colombo. At a further meeting of the committee held in London in September 1950, the definitive Colombo Plan was drawn up. It was to operate in two distinct but related parts: the Economic Development Programme and the Technical Cooperation Scheme. For an account of the origins and development of the Colombo Plan, see Sir Percy Spender, *Exercises in Diplomacy: the ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan*, New York: New York University Press, 1969, pp. 191-294. For a recent study of the origins of the Colombo Plan through the use of Australian archives, see David M. Lowe, “Spender and the Colombo Plan, 1950”, *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. 40, No.2 (September 1994), pp. 162-176.
directly interested in the preservation of peace throughout South and South East Asia and in the advancement of human welfare under the democratic system should consider immediately whether some form of regional pact for common defence is a practical possibility ... What I envisage is a defensive military arrangement having as its basis a firm agreement between the countries that have a vital interest in the stability of Asia and the Pacific, and which are at the same time capable of undertaking military commitments. I would like to think that Australia, the United Kingdom, and I fervently hope such other Commonwealth countries as might wish to do so should be given the opportunity of associating themselves with it, providing, as I have said, they are capable of contributing military commitments. I have in mind particularly the United States of America, whose participation would give such a pact substance that it would otherwise lack. Indeed, it would be rather meaningless without her.\textsuperscript{16}

Spender's quest for the incorporation of Australia within the ambit of American influence also stemmed from the uncertainties in Northeast Asia. The dangers which might flow from a rearmed Japan was one of factors which compelled Spender forward in his search for some effective security arrangement with the United States. Unlike the preceding Labor government, the Liberal-Country coalition government in early 1950 certainly appeared unwilling to place the problem of a Japanese peace settlement above the Cold War and to allow its stance towards Japan to disrupt a probable general improvement in Australia's relations with the United States. In fact, by appreciating the disadvantage of the concept of making Japan a permanent passive captive in an Asian-Pacific international system strictly based upon wartime agreements of the Second World War, the Departments of External Affairs and Defence indicated their willingness to accept an American plan for making Japan an anti-communist bulwark in the Far East. In a memorandum prepared for the British Commonwealth

Working Party in May, the Joint Planning Committee (JPC) of the Department of Defence assessed as follows the strategic importance of the Japanese islands to the Western powers:

In war, the need to maintain sea and air communication and to conduct a strategic bombing offensive against the mainland of Asia will necessitate the use of bases over a wide area, including the Ryukyus and the Japanese islands themselves.

The Departments of External Affairs and Defence also acknowledged that, if Japan were to be drawn into the communist orbit and its large industrial potentialities were added to the strength of Russia and China, the consequent shift in the balance of power would be disastrous for all free world nations, including Australia. Accordingly, the view was entertained by these Departments that Japan's external security in the post-treaty period should be taken care of by a bilateral US-Japan base arrangement, whereby the US should retain bases and troops in Japan, and by United States strategic trusteeship over the Ryukyu islands. With regard to the internal security of Japan, they were also prepared to accept the creation of an adequate but strictly defined Japanese police force and of a coast guard service.

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17 A conference for the British Commonwealth Working Party on the issue of a Japanese peace treaty was held in London from 1 May to 17, 1950. The object of the conference was to consider the details of the terms of a peace settlement. The decision to establish the Working Party had been made at the suggestion of British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, at the Colombo Conference in January 1950.

18 The Joint Planning Committee (JPC) was established on 19 February, 1945 and consisted of three service representatives of the rank of Colonel or equivalent and worked directly to the Defence Committee. Members of the JPC were Colonel J.G.N. Wilton, Director of Military and Operations and Plans, Captain Alan McNicol, Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff and Group Captain, A.M. Murdoch, Director of Air Staff Plans and Policy. The function of the JPC was to advise the Defence Committee on (a) operational plans of defence planning; (b) appreciation and plans for combined operations and coordination of inter-service training; and (c) strategic appreciations.

19 “Minute No. 52 by the Defence Committee, 20 and 27 April, 1950” in AA, A5954/1, 1819/5.


21 Ibid.
However, even though the Menzies conservative government saw a vital interest in keeping Japan out of communist hands, and the consequent need to create the means to ensure Japan's external and internal security against communism, it was nevertheless strongly opposed to America's probable scheme for Japan's status as an active participant in the Cold War with the revitalisation of Japanese military power. Although the Joint Planning Committee, on the basis of a British Chiefs of Staff memorandum of December 1949 circulated to Australia at the Colombo Conference of January 1950, proposed partial Japanese rearmament by permitting "Japan to raise an army under US supervision," the Defence Committee, the final decision-making body in the Australian Defence Department and External Affairs were unwilling to accept the reactivation of Japanese armed forces. To keep Japan from revitalising its own military power, External Affairs insisted that a peace treaty should include the comprehensive substance of the Far Eastern Commission policy directives, which totally prohibited any military activity by the Japanese, including the creation of a military organisation, the production of military equipment and the stockpiling of strategic materials, etc.

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22 "Minute No. 52 by the Defence Committee, 20 and 27 April, 1950" in AA, A5954/1, 1819/5. In December 1949 the British Joint Chiefs of Staff drew up a memorandum on a peace treaty with Japan, in which they expressed the desirability for Japan to create a 200,000-man Japanese army for its own national security. See Yoichi Kibata, "Tainichi Kowa to Igirisu no Asia Seisaku (The Japanese Peace Settlement and Britain's Asian Policy)" in Akio Watanabe and Seigen Miyasato (eds.), San Francisco Kowa (The San Francisco Peace Settlement), Tokyo: Todai Shuppan, 1986, pp. 167-169.

23 The Defence Committee was made up of Air Marshall G. Jones, Chief of Air Staff, Rear Admiral Sir John Collins, Chief of Naval Staff, Lieutenant-General S.F. Rowell, Chief of General Staff, and F.O. Chilton representing the Secretary of the Defence Department.


It was apparent that Australia’s assertion of the need for rigid security control over Japan was motivated by a political consideration more directly related to Australia’s domestic situation. Even in early 1950, in spite of the aggressiveness of Soviet communism in Europe and the growing communist pressures in Southeast Asia, the public in Australia still viewed Japan as a primary threat and were deeply preoccupied with a possible reemergence of Japan as a military power. In an Australian Gallup Poll conducted in May/June 1949, whereas 48% of the public had backed up the concept of using and strengthening West Germany as a barrier against Russia, only 22% of the public had, on the other hand, supported the idea of using Japan as an ally against communism, and the rest had expressed strong concern to maintain Japan’s impotence and to keep it under close surveillance. In an Australian Gallup Poll conducted in February/March 1950, by listing Japan’s treatment of war prisoners during World War II, 56% of the public strongly opposed Japan’s participation in the Melbourne Olympic Games to be held in 1956, showing the retention of their feeling of horror and indignation about Japan.

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In early 1950, America’s response to Spender’s proposed Pacific pact was very negative and cautious within the general context of the Cold War. Although Spender’s speech of 9 March undoubtedly impressed upon the State Department keener

27 Ibid., February/March 1950.
appreciation by the Menzies government of the dangers to Australian security attendant upon communist advances in Asia, the concentration of Australia’s diplomatic interest upon Southeast Asia\(^\text{28}\) and the strong need felt by Australia for strategic dependence upon the US as a dominant Pacific power,\(^\text{29}\) it nonetheless did not automatically overcome America’s misgivings about the wisdom of a Pacific alliance. Not having delineated clearly Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific as an integral theatre of the Cold War, the Truman administration in early 1950 was both reluctant to intrude into the traditional domains of the Western colonial powers and to disturb existing power relationships in those regions. This had been set forth in a famous speech by the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, to the National Press Cub in Washington on 10 January 1950. By showing in the speech that America’s Far Eastern policies revolved around its outer-defence perimeter running from the Aleutians, through Japan and the Ryukyus to the Philippines, Acheson implicitly stressed that the emphasis in America’s strategic priority in the Pacific was placed north of the equator, and that the Asian mainland states and the regional states south of the equator were not the subject of America’s defence commitment.\(^\text{30}\)

Although the Acheson speech was partly aimed at publicising America’s determination to minimise further involvement in China’s civil war, it was also intended to reveal the essence of official US Asian-Pacific policies, embodied in the National Security Council (NSC) resolution 48/2. NSC 48/2, which had been approved by President Truman on 30 December 1949, was buttressed by the realistic and modest


American concept of the limited containment of Soviet Russia and of espousing the cause of non-communist nationalism. In order to check the spread of Soviet communism, and faced with the emergence of communist-controlled China, there was indeed a need for improving the US power position in the Pacific Ocean. The policy paper, however, admonished against the isolation of Communist China in the international community by paving the way for its trade relations with the Western world and for the ultimate recognition by the US of its regime as a legitimate government. NSC 48/2 also placed the Truman administration on record against defending Formosa or sustaining anti-communist forces within China, although it acknowledged some "diplomatic and economic" aid to the island might continue.

Referring to Southeast Asia, there was certainly some recognition of the problem arising from the juxtaposition of communist-controlled China with the semi-colonial economy of the area, and, in effect, the NSC staff expressed some anxiety about the repercussions that the success of the Chinese communists would have on Southeast Asian states. But basically viewing the major tasks facing those states as their nationalist struggle against colonialism rather than that against communism, the United States doubted the appropriateness of coercing those states into mobilisation for the resistance to communist encroachment. "Any regional association of non-communist states," the NSC paper stated,

32 Ibid.
must be the result of a genuine desire on the part of the participating nations to cooperate for mutual benefit in solving the political, economic, social and cultural problems of the area. The United States must not take such an active part in the early stages of the formation of such an association that it will be subject to the charge of using the Asiatic nations to further United State ambitions.\textsuperscript{33}

Fearing the repetition of the fiasco of US China policy and of being exposed to a charge of imperialism by its association with the Western colonial powers, America was unwilling to supply strong leadership adequate to remedy existing conditions in Southeast Asia.

With the policy-line towards the Far East backed by a clear recognition of national priorities and by the principle of discriminate power application, the Truman administration did not take a favourable view of the Australian proposal for a Pacific pact. Whereas Spender’s concept of a Pacific alliance was viewed by hawkish American Republican members as a means of strengthening America’s hard-line policies towards the Far East and, in fact, led to a renewed advocacy by Senator William Knowland of California of an anti-communist pact in Asia on 17 March 1950,\textsuperscript{34} the US government did not recognise any strategic value in the formation of a military alliance with Australia in the Cold War and, still less, any need to assume a balancing role in the maintenance of security in the Southwest Pacific.

Being interviewed by Owen Davis, first secretary of the Australian Embassy in Washington on 21 March, Walton Butterworth, Assistant Secretary of State for Far

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{34} As one of the China bloc of orthodox Republicans and chairman of the Republican Policy Committee, Senator Knowland urged the conclusion of a defence pact between the US, Australia, the Philippines, Nationalist China, Indonesia and other Southeast Asian states on 2 March, and again broached a similar concept on 17 March. See Canberra Times, 18 March, 1950.
Eastern Affairs, fully sympathised with Spender’s proposed pact. However, he strongly questioned the “indigenous” capabilities on the part of Asian-Pacific states to operate a collective security treaty and to band together in a common resistance against Russian expansion.35 Since the end of 1949, Butterworth had been attracting increasing attack from the opponents of the US China policy because of his career as General Marshall’s chief assistant in China during the Marshall mission of December 1945-January 1947.36 But he did not show in this meeting any idea or wish to use a Pacific alliance proposal as a political instrument for parrying strong attacks from Senator Joseph McCarthy and other Republican members for being soft on communism in Asia. In a telegram sent to Pete Jarman, American Ambassador to Australia, Acheson, while appreciating the supportive stance expressed by Spender towards Australia’s relations with the US, and welcoming his initiative in the Colombo Plan, stressed that the first consideration, before any development of a military alliance in Southeast Asia, was to foster regional consciousness and to improve economic and internal security conditions.37 In Acheson’s view, the major arena of great power conflict was still Europe, and the nature of threats in Europe and Asia was different. In the Atlantic, the threat was military; in the Pacific, it was political and psychological. His hope in Asia was to refurbish America’s image as the “successful” decoloniser by using the economic largesse of 75 million dollars programmed in NSC 48/2 to promote political stability in the new nations of Southeast Asia.38

At approximately 4:00 a.m., local time on 25 June, 1950 ninety thousand North Korean troops crossed the 38th Parallel and invaded South Korea. The outbreak of the Korean War certainly provided Spender with an opportunity to substantiate the allegations of his speech of 9 March and added point to his fears of communism. In a statement to the House of Representatives on 26 June, Spender, by stressing the seriousness of the Korean situation, showed his interpretation of the war as a practical indication that the centre of world gravity was shifting to the Pacific area from Europe. “It is proper,” he stated, “that the Australian people should understand that, if Southern Korea falls under the domination of Communist imperialism, the strategic picture of Asia as it affects Japan and the whole of the area of the North Pacific will undergo a radical change and will increase the dangers to the whole of South and South East Asia.” In the light of what was then taking place in Korea, Spender also argued, the need for a Pacific pact became more urgent.39

The fighting in Korea occurred at a time when the Australian government had been consulting with the US government about the timing and method of the withdrawal of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) from Japan, already reduced by 1950 to a skeleton force of 2,353 Australian personnel.40 The consultations had

followed the Australian Cabinet decision of 31 March 1950, which directed the government to withdraw Australian forces from Japan at the earliest possible moment in connection with the introduction of a scheme for national service. However, in the face of the Korean attack, Australia reversed the Cabinet decision and was quick to range itself alongside the United States. To support American combat troops despatched from Japan, on 29 June, in compliance with the United Nations (UN) Security Council recommendation that UN members should furnish military assistance to the Republic of Korea, Australia placed two naval escorts of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), then in Japanese waters, at the disposal of the United Nations. The next day the Australian Mustang air fighter squadron, which was under the command of BCOF, was also placed at the disposal of the United Nations through US authorities.

However, Spender did not regard the commitment of Australian naval and air force units to Korea as a sufficient gesture either in carrying out UN requests in a case of clear aggression or in helping the United States in an emergency. This was particularly true after External Affairs at 8:00 p.m., on 30 June (ten minutes after the announcement of the commitment of an air fighter squadron to Korea) received a cable from the Australian Embassy in Washington, which reported that "the Korean attack has given fresh impetus to the consideration of Spender's initiative and ideas." Impressed by the obvious anxiety of the State Department to obtain backing as soon as

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42 Ibid., p. 430, 30 June, 1950, Statement by Menzies.
44 "Cablegram No. 481 from the Australian Embassy, Washington to External Affairs, 30 June, 1950" in AA, A5460/1, 217/6, part 1.
possible and their genuine pleasure at Australia’s prompt response, an Embassy staff member reasoned that, with the Korean attack, the State Department had appreciated that “prior consultation between Australia and the US would have been helpful in meeting the sudden crisis,” and that “some machinery for automatic consultation would be helpful in meeting future crises.”

Receiving the cable, Spender seemed to recognise the favourable opportunity presented to Australia by the needs of the United States in the Korean conflict. Greatly preoccupied with possible advantage to be gained from further direct Australian support for the American action, he was anxious to fully demonstrate Australia’s readiness to link an expanded regional and global role with America’s Cold War struggle. At a Cabinet meeting held just prior to Menzies’ departure for London and Washington in early July, the Minister for External Affairs strongly urged the commitment of Australian land forces to Korea. But Menzies as well as the Chiefs of Staff, both of whom were anxious about the adverse influence of any additional commitment to Korea upon the availability of forces for British Commonwealth defence co-operation, particularly in Malaya and the Middle East, were firmly against Spender’s plea. Moreover, not only following the British lead religiously, but also fearing a possible leadership challenge from Spender, the Prime Minister consistently sought to undermine the Minister for External Affairs’ political

45 Ibid.
46 Prime Minister Menzies began his flight to London on 9 July 1950. He stayed in London during 13-22 July and visited the United States during 27 July -7 August.

On 14 July, in the face of the rapidly deteriorating situation in Korea, the UN Secretary General, Trygrve Lie, sent a communication to fifty-two members of the United Nations, requesting them to consider supplying ground forces for Korea. On receipt of Lie's appeal the next day, Spender cabled Menzies personally in London to warn that "the heat may be put on us for such further aid" and to request Menzies telegram his general reactions to Acting Prime Minister Fadden or himself.\footnote{Robert O'Neill, *op.cit.*, p. 64.} There being no response from the Prime Minister, Spender was strongly agitated at the thought of any delay and again wrote to Menzies on 17 July that "[f]rom Australia's long-term point of view, any additional aid we can give to the US now, small though it may be, will repay us in the future one hundred fold," adding that "if we refrain from giving any further aid, we may lose an opportunity of cementing friendship with the US, which may not easily present itself again."\footnote{"Cablegram No. 3352 from Spender to Menzies, 17 July, 1950" in *AA*, A462/2, 443/1/8, part 1. See also Robert O'Neill, *op.cit.*, p. 65; Gavan McCormack, *op.cit.*, p. 100; Philip W. Dorling, *op.cit.*, pp. 59-61; Gregory Pemberton, *All the Way: Australia's Road to Vietnam*, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1987, p. 19; and W. David McIntyre, *op.cit.*, pp. 276-277.}

Just after receiving the cable from Spender, Menzies attended a British Cabinet meeting, at which British ministers expressed the fear that Korea might turn out to be a diversion.\footnote{W. David McIntyre, *op.cit.*, p. 275.} The Australian Prime Minister readily accepted British advice, restraining Spender from initiating further moves. He pointed out that the British government thought that there was "great
danger in allowing the Korean affair to disturb our strategic planning based on the importance of the Middle East and on our national service scheme.'\textsuperscript{53}

However, during the second half of July, the North Korean forces swept forward in a sustained offensive to achieve their most dramatic gains of the first part of the war. By 23 July they had torn through the allied defences and forced a withdrawal to the line of the Naktong River, leaving only the southeast corner of the Korean peninsular under UN control. Under these circumstances, the British Cabinet, at around 4:00 p.m., on 25 July decided to offer ground forces to the UN command.\textsuperscript{54} On the morning of the next day, James Marjoribanks, official Secretary of the British High Commissioner to Canberra, informed Alan Watt, who had replaced Dr John Burton as the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs on 19 June, that the British government would be announcing the decision at 8:00 p.m. eastern Australian time.\textsuperscript{55} Informed by Watt of the British intention, Spender was determined that Britain should not be allowed to appear a readier ally of the US than Australia, deciding that Australia must preempt the undesirable effect of the British announcement on Australian prospects for a Pacific pact by announcing a commitment of ground forces first.\textsuperscript{56} At 7:00 p.m., on 26 July, the decision to commit Australian land troops to the Korean


\textsuperscript{54} Robert O’Neill, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 69-70; and W. David McIntyre, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 275.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., p. 75; Sir Alan Watt, \textit{Australian Diplomat}, p. 175; Sir Percy Spender, \textit{Politics and a Man}, p. 283; and Glen St. J. Barclay, \textit{Friends in High Places}, p. 75.

\textsuperscript{56} Robert O’Neill, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 79
theatre was announced by Fadden,⁵⁷ and the next day, when Menzies arrived in Washington, he was willy-nilly forced to accept Spender's fait accompli.⁵⁸

Australia's contribution to the Korean War evoked a respect in America for its utility as a worthy ally in the Pacific. Impressed by the prompt reaction, the Bureau of European Affairs in a memorandum of 24 July explicitly denied the strategic irrelevance of Australia's role in the defence of the Western world: "Our interests in Australia arise from the fact that it is an important member of the British Commonwealth, basically friendly towards the United States, sharing the same democratic traditions and aspirations and allied with us in the present struggle against Communist imperialism." The memorandum further continued: "Our co-operation with Australia in World War II was particularly close, and we could expect such co-operation in any future conflict to be of comparable value."⁵⁹ The American respect for and expectation of Australia's role as an effective contributor in combating communism had been reflected not only in the approval of the revised bill of the Mutual Defence Assistance scheme in the US House foreign affairs committee on 11 July,⁶⁰ but also in a radio and television address by President Truman on 19 July. Commending Australia and other nations for their support in Korea, Truman stated that "we must assist free nations associated with us in common defence to augment

⁵⁸ Robert O'Neill, op.cit., p. 79. Spender's initiative in sending Australian ground forces to the Korean battlefield was given strong support from the Australian public. In an Australian Gallup Poll conducted in July-August, 1950, 71% of the public approved sending Australian infantry and artillery to Korea, with 20% opposing and 9% having no opinion. See Australian Gallup Poll, July-August, 1950.
their military strength, and, in order to enable nations associated with us to make their maximum contribution to our common defence, further assistance on our part will be required.\footnote{Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950, Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962, pp. 537-542; and Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. II, Garden City: Doubleday, 1956, p. 348.} Further evidence of US recognition of Australia’s importance was also manifested in an overwhelming ovation from US Congressional members when Prime Minister Menzies made separate addresses to the Senate and the House of Representatives on 1 August\footnote{Current Notes on International Affairs, Vol. 21, pp. 572-576, 1 August, 1950, Addresses by Menzies. See also R.N. Rosecrance, op.cit., p. 184; and Gavan McCormack, op.cit., p. 102.} and in his success in obtaining a loan of $350 million to carry out a five-year economic development and immigration programme.\footnote{“Report prepared by the Department of State, undated and unsigned” in FRUS, 1950, Vol. VI, pp. 207-221. See also Robert O’Neill, op.cit., p. 80; Gavan McCormack, op.cit., p. 102; and Philip W. Dorling, op.cit., p. 87.} In the US view, its support for Australia’s economic development was of importance in relation to Australia’s contribution to the economic recovery of the United Kingdom and to the enhancing of “the role which Australia ... could play in military matters in the Pacific.”\footnote{“Background Memorandum prepared in the Department of State, 24 July, 1950” in FRUS, 1950, Vol. VI, pp. 200-201.}

Given strong stimulus by the fighting in Korea, and determined not to miss the chance arising from the practical demonstration of Australia’s loyalty to the cause of anti-communism, on 8 August, 1950 Spender set out on a major overseas journey. After making a stop-over visit to London from mid-August to early September, where Prime Minister Clement Attlee and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin evinced “not even an intellectual interest in the Pact,”\footnote{Sir Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, pp. 33-37.} on 12 September the Minister for External Affairs arrived in New York and continued on to Washington to call on Truman the
By taking advantage of a brief courtesy call, Spender reminded the President of the significance of Australia’s role in the maintenance of a regional and global balance of power. Explaining that Australia’s chief contribution in the international theatre would not necessarily be confined to the Southwest Pacific and within the British Commonwealth, Spender showed that Australia was ready to involve itself deeply in the mainstream of international politics and to shoulder a proper role in areas which the US considered vital to its own security. “Australia,” he said, “could be counted upon in any emergency to give the utmost of her manpower and equipment to meet all new crises.”

Advancing the further argument that the readiness of Australia to assume an expanded role in regional and global affairs would be greatly influenced by the lack of any body which could give Australia a suitable voice in the determination of policy and the shaping of events likely to affect its vital interests, Spender pressed the case upon the President for Australia’s direct entry into US planning at the central level: “In a world crisis such as now existed, many important decisions affecting Australia were being made, without Australia’s participation, by the Atlantic pact powers and the European powers under the leadership of the Big Three.” “Australia was entitled to a voice,” he stressed, “in determining the course of events in the Pacific area, and, through some regional security arrangement, with a reproduction in substance of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, it would prove possible for her to play some

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66 Spender arrived in the United States with overwhelming support from the Australian public for his proposal for a Pacific defence pact. In an Australian Gallup Poll conducted in June-July, 1950, 87% of the public were in favour of the Pacific pact backed by the US, with 7% against and 6% non-committal. See Australian Gallup Poll, June-July, 1950.

part in framing global strategy." In response, Truman, while expressing appreciation of the commitment of all three Australian services to Korea, showed that he took almost no interest in pursuing the matter of a Pacific pact, preferring to have his subordinates, particularly Acheson, seek a satisfactory formula.68

But in spite of Truman’s cool response, Spender maintained the momentum of his campaign by repeating his arguments to a press conference at the Australian Embassy in Washington later that day.69 On 14 September he proceeded to the US Senate and House foreign affairs committees, presenting Australia as no beggar of favours but a “producer” of security as much as a “consumer”.70 He stressed that Australia did not seek any one way deal, but that it, as one of America’s spear-carriers, was ready to pull its weight according to its strength and resources. As “evidenced by the Australian action in sending troops and naval and air support to fight in Korea,” he stated, “Australia continues to stand ready to send her men to fight on foreign shores.”71 At the same time, he asserted that the capacity of Australia to undertake an expanded regional and global role within the sphere of American influence would be directly affected by the answer to the question whether the security of Australia’s own shores would be assured. A US security guarantee afforded by the creation of a Pacific alliance, he emphasised, would release Australia from concentrating exclusively on its own local defence and further enable it to assist in American remedial action at

68 Ibid.
69 Sydney Morning Herald, 15 September, 1950.
71 “Memorandum of Conversation by Horace H. Smith, Senate Liaison Officer, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, 14 September, 1950” in FRUS, 1950, Vol. VI, pp. 214-217; and Sir Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, pp. 41-42.
distant points. Spender continued that Australia, which had demonstrated in Korea its readiness to contribute to the maintenance of free world defence, should reasonably have a fair say in most of the international decisions now being made by the friendly powers. Even Luxembourg, Spender stated, which could play a much smaller part than Australia in the discharge of regional and world responsibilities, had a right under NATO to participate in the formulation of world strategy. In response, Senator Tom Connally, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, noted that, while the desirability of such a pact had long been under consideration in the United States, this discussion had not yet reached the point of action. But he added it was useful to have the view of Spender.

To continue to "sow the seeds" for a Pacific pact, on 15 September the Minister for External Affairs flew back to New York, where, after having a brief conversation with Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large, on the same day, he met Acheson three days later. The Secretary of State was assisted by George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, who was, at this time, particularly responsible for Australia. In a memorandum prepared for Acheson on 15 September, Perkins had astutely appreciated Spender's case for Australia's readiness to play a wider operational role in world affairs and for Australia's ambitions for a significant consultative role in world strategy. But concerning the need for the US to extend its Pacific defence perimeter beyond the Philippines and to give a security guarantee to

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72 Jean Spender, op. cit., p. 21.
73 "Notes for Discussion, 15 September, 1950" in AA, A5460/1, 217/6, part 1; and Sir Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, p. 43.
Australia, he was sceptical, suggesting that Acheson should take a cautious attitude along the lines of NSC 48/2.  

Spender opened the meeting with Acheson by stating Australia’s willingness to accept greater regional and international responsibilities, with strong emphasis upon those beyond the Commonwealth framework, and went on to stress that Australia’s readiness to assume an expanded role in regional and global affairs should be reasonably accompanied by the integration of Australia into the American Pacific defence perimeter and by an attempt to afford it a voice in decisions affecting the welfare of the Australian people. On Spender’s desire for a formal treaty arrangement and machinery, Acheson, in accordance with Perkins’ suggestion, was “as closed as an oyster,” countering the proposal for a Pacific pact by citing the difficulties in membership, geographical scope and the nature of commitments. However, the Secretary of State suggested to the Australian Minister, “the best place to discuss these matters was within the context of Japanese peace negotiations.”

Thus Spender had achieved little with his Korean War argument beyond some acknowledgment of Australia’s increasing relevance to the Pacific balance and of a sense of its planning responsibilities in regional and global affairs, but the Secretary of State had now directed him to the road which was ultimately to lead to his goal.

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74 “Memorandum by Perkins to Acheson, 15 September, 1950” in FRUS, 1950, Vol. VI, pp. 218-222. This memorandum is also provided in Neville K. Meaney, Australia and the World, pp. 567-569.
75 Memorandum of Conversation by Acheson, 18 September, 1950” in FRUS, 1950, Vol. VI, pp. 222-223; and Sir Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, p. 44.
Accompanied by David W. McNicol, second secretary of the Australian Embassy, Washington, Spender next spoke to John Foster Dulles, who was at this time Consultant to the Secretary of State with the special responsibilities regarding a peace settlement for Japan. Before entering talks with Dulles, Spender and McNicol were fully aware of a press conference given by Dulles on 15 September, which followed the Truman Statement on the previous day announcing the start of preliminary US negotiations with other FEC nations on the peace settlement. In his New York press conference, Dulles not only had set forth the US intention to work out some arrangement for the retention of US troops and bases in post-treaty Japan, but he had also made it clear that the Truman administration “[did] not contemplate any restrictions on rearmament by Japan in case the Japanese people want to rearm.”

The statement made by Dulles obviously publicised the essence of NSC 60/1 resolution, which envisaged US national interests being secured with the conclusion of a peace treaty. NSC 60/1, which was approved by President Truman on 8 September 1950, was the result of protracted discussions between the State and Defense Departments and General MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), for over a year over the definition of US national interests in relation to a Japanese peace treaty. It contained the security requirements demanded by the US

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Defense Department, such as the denial of the natural, industrial and manpower resources of Japan to the USSR, exclusive strategic control of the Ryukyu islands, and a strategic trusteeship over the Marianas, Caroline and Marshall islands. The NSC paper also defined the nature of US bases in post-treaty Japan as a potential offensive strategic base from which to mount warfare against the Soviets and Communist China as well as a defensive military base primarily aimed at keeping Japan from communist hands. In formulating the NSC document, the Pentagon also insisted upon Japan’s future status as an active military alliance partner of the US with no restrictions on rearmament. A peace treaty, the document stated,

must not contain any prohibition, direct or indirect, now or in the future, of Japan’s inalienable right to self-defence in case of external attack and to possess the means to exercise that right.78

Thus the US objective towards Japan in concluding a peace treaty was firmly defined as a Far Eastern bulwark with no restrictions on rearmament.

The statement made by Dulles was conveyed to External Affairs, headed by Watt, and to Spender in New York by McNicol on 15 September, and McNicol showed an astute insight into the trend of US thought on a peace treaty:

Timing and publication of Dulles’ remarks suggests that [the] United States has reached a firm position which it will not be disposed to modify as a result of the informal discussions with other FEC nations.79

78 “Memorandum from Allison, 4 September, 1950” in FRUS, 1950, Vol. VI, pp. 1290-1291; “Memorandum from Acheson to Louis Johnson, Defense Secretary, 7 September, 1950” in FRUS, 1950, Vol. VI, pp. 1293-1296; and Dean Acheson, op.cit., p. 434. For a full and detailed account of policy-planning within the US government on a Japanese peace treaty leading to the formulation of NSC 60/1, see Hiroyuki Umetsu, op.cit., pp. 30-60.
Implicit in McNicol's observation was that the peace treaty might eventually have to be of the type the United States wanted. Aware of US thinking on the peace treaty, and no doubt recalling Acheson's advice, Spender now decided to keep his arguments on a Pacific pact "tied as closely as possible to the negotiations of the Japanese Peace Treaty" and to exploit his Pacific pact proposal as a substitute means of reassuring the wartime US Pacific allies against a resurgent Japan in place of restrictive clauses within the terms of the peace treaty proposed by the US.

On 22 September, as part of preliminary US negotiations with other FEC nations, Spender was approached by Dulles in a private room just off the delegation Lounge at Lake Success. The meeting lasted for about twenty minutes. Opening the "foundation discussion for ANZUS," Dulles, without any preliminaries, presented to Spender a seven-point memorandum, which left no doubt that the United States intended to revitalise the former enemy once again as a military power on an unconditional basis in the long-term future. Dulles then explained the philosophy of the American proposal. Stating the view that a Japanese peace settlement was no longer a single problem but a part of the struggle in which the Western world and especially the US was involved with Soviet Russia, he pointed out that it was in the self-interest of the US that "Japan should be denied to the USSR and attracted to the side of the Western democracies." The treaty accordingly should be one, he stated, which would not engender Japanese resentment but rather one which would tend to attract their adherence to the Western world. Dulles went on to support his argument by pointing to the experience of the Versailles Treaty, in which he, as a reparation adviser in the American delegation, had

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80 Sir Percy Spender, *Exercises in Diplomacy*, p. 56.
81 Ibid., p. 48.
witnessed that “the Allies had failed to enforce restrictive provisions such as prohibition of rearmament.” The Treaty of Versailles, he argued, had established not only the uselessness of such treaty provisions but also the impossibility of policing them. Resentment and hostility would be their “net result” were they included in the proposed Japanese peace treaty.²²

By reacting visibly to Dulles’ proposal for Japanese rearmament, Spender left Dulles in no doubt as to where Australia stood. “As he [Spender] read the memorandum,” John M. Allison, Director of Northeast Asian Affairs in the State Department, wrote in his memoirs, “his face grew more and more suffused with colour. At one point, I thought he would burst a blood vessel.”³³ Spender made it clear to Dulles that

Australia’s immediate and primary concern was security against future Japanese aggression and Australia would not under any circumstances subscribe to a treaty with Japan unless there were adequate assurances acceptable to Australia affording her protection against future Japanese aggression.³⁴

The Minister for External Affairs continued that, since the early part of the year, Australia had been seeking to create some kind of Pacific pact to which Australia and the US would be parties, but that he had made no headway at all. Australia, he stated, was in a geographical sense on the periphery of the world, and, in this isolated position, it was being asked by the United States to “take Japan on trust while at the

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same time the US was not prepared to consider any regional security arrangement in the Pacific.” “A formal commitment by the United States,” which would guarantee Australia’s security against Japanese aggression, Spender stressed, “might go some way to allay our fears,” thereby facilitating Australia’s acceptance of the American peace proposal. Aside from the objective danger, there were “political consequences” of the most basic sort if Australia were asked to accept the proposed US peace without an attendant security treaty. In response, Dulles stated that Australia would be protected by the continued US presence in post-treaty Japan. However, in conclusion, he observed that he recognised the Menzies government’s political difficulties in relation to the peace treaty and stated, “some compromise solution might have to be found.”

Shortly after this meeting, Spender placed the Australian Embassy in Washington and the Australian delegation to the United Nations on full alert in the expectation that the United States would soon give a specific answer to a Pacific pact proposal. He then flew back to London to attend a further meeting of the Commonwealth Consultative Committee of the Colombo Plan. However, by 6 October, when Spender arrived back in New York again, he found that no response had come from the State Department, in spite of Dulles’ remark that “some compromise solution might have to be found.” The Minister for External Affairs instructed Keith C.O. Shann, first secretary of the Australian mission to the UN, through the United States delegation at the United Nations, to press the State Department for a specific response to his

85 Ibid.
proposal for a pact. Meeting with John Ross, deputy US representative to the Security Council, on 8 October, Shann told the American that a Pacific defence pact “was a subject uppermost in Spender’s mind,” and that Spender was “unable to make much progress because of an indefinite attitude on the part of the United States.” All that was needed was a sign from the US that they were seriously interested in talking about it. To this, Ross promised a reply by 10 October.87

Later that day, in a memorandum reporting his conversation with Ross, Shann told Spender that the Truman administration did not see any need for a Pacific alliance as part of its containment policy in the Pacific: “The United States had been unresponsive, and the recent extension of [NATO] arrangements to Greece and Turkey would not make an explanation of their attitude to the Australian people any easier.” “The closeness of Australia-US relations,” he also hinted, might be of itself “a bar to regional arrangements on the ground that no pact was required between friends.”88

Shann was affected by the fifth session of the NATO Council meeting held in New York during 15-26 September, where Secretary of State Acheson had used the crisis of the Korean War as an opportunity to argue for US goals in Europe, particularly the arming of West Germany, the stationing of American forces on Western European soil, and the admission of Greece and Turkey into full membership of NATO in October 1951.89 Given the relatively minor emphasis of US foreign policy on the Far East as

87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
opposed to Europe, Shann went on to suggest, the only viable way and means of inducing the United States to take an interest in the pact proposal was to use the US need to reassure its wartime Pacific allies against a rearmed Japan:

A Pacific defence pact was connected with a Japanese peace treaty in that, if the United States wanted us to agree to a “soft” peace treaty, there would have to be alternative security arrangements to satisfy the Australian people.\(^90\)

Shann’s comments were perceptive and accorded with the approach which Spender was now taking.

In the meantime, Spender’s persistence was beginning to make an increasing impact upon Washington’s top policy-planners. Immediately after talking with Shann, Ross pressured Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, to devise a security formula for Australia. Since “Spender was leaving for home in a week or ten days” and had to “give his people a definite indication of United States views regarding a Pacific pact,” Ross stated, Spender was requesting an “unequivocal reaction” from the United States. Spender also felt, Ross reported, “if the work being done on a Japanese peace treaty involved an easy peace for Japan, then Australia must have something in place of a strong peace treaty.”\(^91\)

On 9 October Rusk prepared a memorandum, sending it to Elbert G. Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. As a means of enlisting Australian and New Zealand support for the US proposal for a peace treaty, Rusk devised a formula for a presidential declaration linking Australia and New Zealand with


the United States. "The co-operation and support of these countries," he told Matthews, "will be of increasing importance to us during the coming year as we face the peculiarly difficult" problem "of the negotiation of a Japanese peace treaty." Clearly respecting Australian and New Zealand status as America's wartime allies in the Pacific war and as Occupation partners in Japan, and consequently acknowledging the political desirability of reassuring those states from the danger of a Japanese threat, Rusk was anxious to obtain their concurrence in the terms of a peace treaty. Moreover, since NSC 60/1 decision of 8 September, which completely left out of the US proposal for a peace treaty specific restraints upon rearmament, thereby posing a serious danger to the security of the wartime US allies in the Pacific, it was fully realised by him that to reassure Australia and New Zealand in the context of Japanese rearmament had become more urgent. Rusk therefore also proposed a bilateral consultative pact between Australia and the United States. "It has become increasingly evident," he observed, "that some diplomatic exchange between Australia and the United States which ... would provide for military and political consultation would be welcomed by the Australian Government." By attempting to afford an effective voice for Australia in US military planning, particularly the development of Japanese rearmament, he desired to reassure Australia against a future Japanese threat.92

Before any further steps were taken, however, Rusk considered that further clarification of Spender's views on the pact would be required, particularly on British membership and the degree of formality of the arrangement. Rusk told Matthews that, although Spender "has proposed a Pacific pact to include Australia, New Zealand, the

Philippines, the US and the UK,” America’s association with the British in the Pacific would “vitiate our own position in the Far East,” and that the adherence of British protectorates in the Asian mainland would “weaken the effect” of any arrangement. Moreover, Rusk argued that, whereas Spender desired a formal direct US guarantee of Australia’s defence, “it is recognized that the JCS may not wish to enter into military commitments more specific than those implied in the general position of [the] defence line through Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines.” Consequently, on 10 October Ross conveyed an “interim reply” to Shann to the effect that the United States “could not see how it could give Spender an unequivocal reply” about a Pacific pact unless they had a clear idea of what Spender had in mind, particularly the membership and the type of obligation.

Later that day, in a further memorandum reporting his conversation with Ross, Shann reiterated the view that the United States was reluctant to acknowledge the need for a pact as part of its containment policy in the Pacific. Again he encouraged Spender to continue using the Japan factor in Australian domestic politics as the major argument and to push the need for formalisation of security assurances in the context of a “soft” peace treaty:

I don’t think the Americans want the Pact, but they are not going to tell us in so many words, especially with the Japanese peace treaty coming up. The latter may be our chance to force the issue if they want us to agree to a “soft” peace.

93 Ibid.
94 “Memorandum from Shann to Spender, 10 October, 1950” in AA, AA1984/25; and Sir Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, p. 56.
On 11 October one of the Australian mission to the UN was approached by McLelland of US delegation to the UN and asked how long Spender was likely to be in New York, since Rusk hoped to be able to meet Spender at an early date. On the same day McNicol was also asked by Allison whether Australia still insisted upon UK membership of the pact. To this, McNicol replied that, while Spender desired it and hoped it could be brought about, he had good reason to doubt whether the UK really wished to joint the pact. Furthermore, on 12 October Spender was given an urgent message from John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for UN Affairs, which informed Spender of his desire to see him immediately. At Rusk’s instruction, Hickerson had flown in from Washington to ascertain Spender’s views more fully.

Assisted by Ward P. Allen of the Bureau of European Affairs, Hickerson lunched with Spender and Sir Keith Officer, Australian Ambassador to France, at Lake Success in New York. In accordance with Rusk’s instruction, Hickerson stated that he wanted to ask certain questions about a Pacific pact, particularly with regard to membership, the nature and purpose. In response to the inquiries, Spender stated what he had in mind was an arrangement including the US, Australia, New Zealand, the UK and the Philippines. But Australia, he added, “would be prepared to consider any other nation or nations in the region interested in any Pacific security who would materially contribute to the strength of the pact.” In regard to the nature of the pact, he explained what he wanted was something on the lines of Article V of NATO, but otherwise would be content with a rather simple instrument. The substance of the idea

97 Ibid.
98 Sir Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, p. 58.
was, the Minister for External Affairs argued, "an attack on any of the parties or an act of aggression inside [a] certain agreed area would affect all the parties to the pact." In turn, Allen indicated that the North Atlantic Treaty would become operative in the event of an attack on certain countries within its region although they were not parties, wondering whether Australia had in mind embracing the same concept. In response, Spender stated that the relevant strategic area extended through Indonesia, Malaya, Thailand, Indo-China and, at or within those boundaries, it might be provided that an attack would be considered an attack on the parties, but would not oblige them to the specific assistance of the non-party initially attacked.  

Questioning the military value of a pact, whose defence area would be confined to the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asian areas, Hickerson pondered whether the pact would really serve a strategic purpose in the defence of the free world. To this, the Australian Minister answered that a Pacific pact was an instrument to assist the US in the struggle against advancing communism in the Pacific, and that it would greatly help Australia to discharge its regional and world responsibilities. Following Shann's suggestion, Spender further argued that a military pact with the US would afford the Menzies government an effective means of facilitating public acceptance of the American peace proposal:

- A Pacific pact would make Australian policy on a peace treaty with Japan less difficult. There was real fear in Australia of the people of Japan again falling into the hands of [a] militaristic clique bent on aggression. But if Australia could rely upon America, the risk would be much reduced and public misgivings abated. Australia would not be

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prepared to contemplate a resurgent Japan which would again threaten her.\textsuperscript{101}

As a result of his talks with Spender, Hickerson fully surveyed "the lie of the land," giving Warren Austin, US representative at the United Nations, his observations, which should be reported back to his senior, Dean Rusk. He thought that "there are still major difficulties" in relation to British membership. But he agreed that "some bilateral agreement" which would let Australia's voice be heard should be explored. Arguing that the Menzies government was strongly torn between the need to follow US leadership and popular pressure in Australia for long-term guarantees of Japanese disarmament and demilitarisation, he agreed on the need to reassure Australia against a rearmed Japan. "In short," Hickerson remarked, "the Australian Government's main concern is public opinion rather than any invocation of a Pact in the immediate future."\textsuperscript{102}

Hickerson's observations were then transmitted to the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, headed by Allison, to await Rusk's return from the Wake Island Conference. In his meeting with McNicol and Arthur Tange, Assistant Secretary of the Department of External Affairs and a member of the Australian mission to the UN, on 16 October Allison sarcastically conveyed the impression that the US government considered "Australia's security problems in relation to the proposed peace treaty with Japan as fundamentally a domestic political problem facing the Australian Government and one

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{102} "Telegram from Austin to Acheson, 12 October, 1950" in FRUS, 1950, Vol. VI, pp. 148-152.
with which accordingly the USA would not wish to be concerned.”\textsuperscript{103} Tange subsequently observed: “Allison’s assessment of Australia’s position suggests that the United States might well decide to let the Australian Government settle its own problem with the electorates in much the same way as we will do with the Congress.” McNicol also argued that Australia’s bargaining position was not as strong in the peace negotiations with the US as Shann had thought: “The United States probably considers that Australia, because of its close relations with the US and its interests in the Pacific, will not wish to refuse to be a party even to the sort of treaty contemplated by the United States.”\textsuperscript{104}

C.T. Moodie, first secretary of the Australian Embassy in Washington, was the least hopeful, exploring an alternative means of interest in the US in Australia’s security environment. On 21 October Moodie sent a letter to Paul Hasluck, Liberal member for Curtin, Western Australia, who had suggested an Indian Ocean pact at a meeting of the Adelaide University Liberal Union on 25 September and in the Australian Parliament two days later. By revealing in the letter the lack of any progress on Spender’s Pacific pact negotiations in the US, Moodie placed what was considered to be a last hope on Hasluck’s proposal for an Indian Ocean pact:

I am pleased indeed that someone is starting to talk about the Indian Ocean, because I feel there has not even been any rudimentary attention given to it by our strategists and pact advocates. Incidentally, there might be much more chance of getting the USA interested in our idea of regional pacts if we do not talk only about a Pacific pact.\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{103} “Inter-office memorandum from McNicol to Tange, 16 October, 1950” in AA, AA1984/25, 1950; and Sir Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, p. 60.
\textsuperscript{104} “Inter-office memorandum from McNicol to Tange, 18 October, 1950” in AA, A1838, 535/6, part 1.
\textsuperscript{105} “Letter from Moodie to Hasluck, 21 October, 1950” in AA, A5460, 217/6, part 1.
In the meantime, while the Australians were reacting to the discouraging statement made by Allison, the US government had been further discussing Spender's proposed Pacific pact. At the Wake Island Conference held on 15 October, Rusk urged the President to take up the matter of a Pacific pact. Whereas General MacArthur did not see any need for the creation of a military alliance in the Pacific, citing "the lack of homogeneity of the Pacific states," he nonetheless implicitly supported Rusk's concept of an informal US guarantee. "If the President would make an announcement like the Truman Doctrine," the General stressed, "it would have a great effect" upon the Far Eastern states.106 Arriving back in Washington on 17 October, Rusk met Dulles three days later and obtained his support for the concept of a presidential declaration.107 Rusk went on to meet Perkins, and they agreed that the State Department should prepare a joint memorandum responding to Spender's proposed pact, particularly on the matter of Australia's entry into US planning for Japanese rearmament.108 Drafted in the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, and concurred in by the Bureaus of European Affairs and of Far Eastern Affairs on 27 October, the memorandum argued that a Pacific defence treaty was unnecessary, because the alliance forged through Allied military co-operation in Korea represented a confluence of interests that a formal treaty would only reaffirm, not create. "Our defence of South Korea," it stated, "is more than ample proof to Australia that we would defend them if attacked." Since what Spender really wanted was "closer participation in all stages of high-level Washington planning which might later involve the disposition of Australian

108 "Memorandum of Conversation by Rusk, 23 October, 1950" in United States National Archives, Truman Library, RG59 Box 4130, 790.5/10.
forces and material,” the memorandum then suggested that “Spender’s and Australia’s needs would be substantially met if we were to accept in Washington a high-level Australian military mission.”\(^\text{109}\)

One or two days after the formulation of the joint memorandum, Rusk formally conveyed his desire to meet Spender,\(^\text{110}\) and on 30 October he and Dulles called on the Australian Minister at the Plaza Hotel on 5th Avenue in New York. Prefacing that the conversation was tentative and non-committal, Rusk stated that “Australia’s position was carefully considered and the manner in which Australia’s security could be safeguarded was explored by the United States.” After listening closely to Spender’s argument along the lines of his conversation with Hickerson, Rusk began by arguing against any formal Pacific pact on the ground that “it would necessarily involve the exclusion of certain countries in the Far East, leaving an undesirable impression that those countries would be left to fend for themselves against Communist aggression.” However, he stated that one possible method might be “for the President to make a suitable statement” to the effect that Australian-US comradeship during and since the war in the Pacific remained a very strong link binding two countries one to another, and that the US would or could be relied upon to come to Australia’s assistance in the event of aggression against it.

In response, Spender told Rusk that “this was not at all sufficient.” It did not meet the argument on both the need for regional security of a permanent character and for machinery enabling Australia to play a constant part in the determination of such policy

\(^{110}\) Sir Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, p. 63.
for security. In reply, Rusk stated that the United States had “tentatively” considered “the possibilities of setting up of a formal military machinery in the Pacific to deal with problems between the USA and Australia and of a political liaison between the Pacific area and the North Atlantic Organisation so as to permit Australia to participate in global discussions.” Such a proposal, Spender responded, “would only go to meet one of his claims, but would not meet in any way a major case for a Pacific security treaty.” Without answering further Spender’s response, Rusk then asked Spender whether it was his understanding that a commitment by the United States in the South Pacific would include New Zealand. “I was unable to speak on behalf of New Zealand,” Spender replied. But he told Rusk that “since we saw the security of each of our countries in terms of the security of both of them, Australia would certainly not want New Zealand to be excluded from any American commitment.”

This meeting, as Spender recorded in his memoirs, clearly marked a “definite turning point” in his Pacific pact negotiations, and hope now returned to the Australians. Although Rusk’s proposal for a presidential declaration fell far short of Spender’s desire for a formal US guarantee of Australia’s defence, it nonetheless signified that the US government had recognised the strong concern created for Australia and New Zealand by the American proposal for non-restrictive Japanese rearmament, and that they had a strong desire to reassure those states against a resurgence of Japanese aggression. Also, Rusk’s suggestion of the establishment of a


112 Sir Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, p. 64.
formal machinery for Australia to participate in global planning implied to the Australians that the United States had already recognised Australia’s international status and regional role in the Pacific. "The impression which I gained from Rusk was," Spender wrote in a personal cable to Watt, "that the United States would genuinely endeavour to find a solution to meet our security need ... Rusk’s reaction was more sympathetic than any I have had up to date and I am not (repeat not) without hope that the United States will do something to meet our position."113

Leaving New York for Ottawa on 31 October, and flying on to San Francisco on 3 November, where Spender prepared a draft statement for Parliament on his Pacific pact negotiations, on the evening of 15 November the Minister for External Affairs arrived back in Sydney via Los Angeles and Honolulu, and found that circumstances were working in his favour. On the same day Rusk told the National Conference on United States Foreign Policy that it would be necessary in the context of the Japanese peace treaty "to arrange for some security machinery which will give such countries as the Philippines or, for example, Australia as well as ourselves, if you like, assurance that reviving Japanese militarism would not produce fresh aggression in the area."114

Reporting to the Cabinet his Pacific pact negotiations six days later, Spender appeared in the House of Representatives on 28 November and stated triumphantly that

I found in the United States that a most genuine friendship exists towards Australia and Australians, which, I need hardly say, is warmly reciprocated. The association between our two countries had never, at any time, been more intimate, and the discussion I have had could not

have been on a more cordial or understanding basis. It might be said that there is no doubt, at this moment, that this warm-hearted nation would immediately and effectively come to our aid in the event of an act of aggression against Australia. But it is not one-way traffic in obligations with which Australia is concerned ... What we desire is a permanent regional basis of collective security, constructed in accordance with the United Nations Charter, which has as its pivotal point some obligation comparable to that as set forth in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty - namely that an armed attack upon one shall be deemed an armed attack on all. We desire to see formal machinery set up to which, among others, the United States of America and ourselves are parties, which will enable us effectively to plan the use of our resources and military power in the interests of peace in the geographical areas of the world in which we live. But world security problems can not be dealt with in geographical compartments. We desire, therefore, to see established a political liaison between whatever Pacific security arrangements may be accomplished, and the existing North Atlantic and Western European Organisation, so that Australia shall not be denied its right to have a suitable voice in the determination of policy and the shaping of events which deeply affect Australia wherever they may take place.

Spender continued that it would be inappropriate for him to say at this time what would be the outcome of his discussions in the United States, but he concluded: "I am not without hope that at a comparatively early date, it will be found possible to embody into formal machinery an acceptable solution to the important problems."115

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Just as Spender was reporting his proposed Pacific pact negotiations in the US to Parliament, the Truman administration was rapidly moving towards altering American ideas sharply about the area of the principal communist threat and their estimates of the potential dangers of Soviet and Chinese power in Asia and the Pacific. This American

move resulted from Communist China’s massive counter-offensive against UN forces on the Korean battlefield, which had been launched at the end of November 1950.

In the early days of the Korean War, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), with the civil war still incomplete and burdened with enormous problems of organisation and reconstruction, indicated little interest in fighting in Korea. But with the success of the amphibious attack on Inchon by UN forces on 15 September and the subsequent US moves towards crossing the 38th Parallel, the PRC not only publicly began to indicate intense concern over developments in Korea, but also started full-scale preparations for military intervention in Korea. On 17 September members of the Central Military Committee of the Chinese Communist Party met and decided to send a group of military officers to North Korea to “get familiar with general situations [and] make surveys of Korean topography.”\(^{116}\) The Committee also decided to place on full alert more than 250,000 troops of the former Fourth Field Army, which had already been deployed in northeastern province in early August. Soon after, discussions were opened with Soviet Russia about possible Chinese-Soviet cooperation in intervening in Korea, and a general understanding was reached that, if the Chinese land forces entered the Korean War, the Soviet Union would send its air forces to Korea to provide an air umbrella for the Chinese.\(^{117}\)

On 1 October, one day after the Third Division of the South Korean Army crossed the 38th Parallel, North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung, who had tried in vain to obtain


\(^{117}\) Ibid., p. 17.
direct military assistance from the Soviets two days before, asked the Chinese to enter the war. The next day Chairman Mao Zedong convened an emergency meeting of the Party Politburo Standing Committee, at which it was decided that China would send its troops to Korea in the event that American troops crossed the 38th Parallel, and that Peng Duhuai would command Chinese troops in Korea. The decision was soon telegraphed to Stalin from Mao, and on the same day (2 October) the Premier and Foreign Minister, Zhou Enlai, summoned the Indian Ambassador to Beijing, K.M. Pannikar, to a dramatic midnight meeting at the Ministry of Chinese Foreign Affairs, notifying him of the Chinese government’s decision. At the same time, Zhou let it be known that “if only South Koreans crossed the line, China would not enter.”

Zhou’s statement was immediately conveyed to Washington from Pannikar, and the Bureaux of Northeast Asian Affairs and Chinese Affairs of the State Department discussed the implications of the Chinese statement. The Bureaux concluded that US troops should not cross the 38th Parallel, suggesting to Rusk that “taking due note of

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Zhou Enlai’s exception in favor of the South Korean forces,” consideration should be given to “using only South Korean troops for the subjugation of North Korea.” But these counsels of caution were rejected at the top-level, because Washington top policy-makers discounted the credibility of the Indian Ambassador to Beijing as the channel of communication and the Chinese Premier and Foreign Minister as an authoritative spokesman, doubting the possibility of full-scale Chinese entry into Korea. On 7 October a formal resolution was passed by the UN General Assembly giving the Commander authorisation to cross the 38th Parallel and to unify Korea under President Syngman Rhee. Spurred by the momentum, the first main unit of the US Eighth Army crossed the 38th Parallel and began moving towards North Korean capital of Pyongyang.

Carefully reweighing the serious risks involved in Chinese participation in the Korean War, and reconfirming Stalin’s assurances that Soviet air forces would provide the Chinese with an umbrella over Chinese-Korean border, on 18 October Mao issued an order to Peng to move Chinese troops into Korea. The following day, when UN forces occupied Pyongyang, Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River and entered Korea. Beginning with the first stiff resistance against South Korean forces and the US Eighth


123 Truman writes in his memoirs: “Mr Pannikar had in the past played the game of the Chinese Communists fairly regularly so that his statement would not be taken as that of an impartial observer.” See Harry S. Truman, op. cit., p. 362.

124 At a meeting of State Department officials held on 4 October, 1950, when the question of crossing the 38th parallel was discussed, Acheson remarked that: “The only proper course to take was a firm and courageous one and we should not be unduly frightened at what was probably a Chinese Communist bluff.” See “Memorandum of Conversation by Allison, 4 October, 1950” in FRUS, 1950, Vol. VII, pp. 868-869.

Army on 25 October at Chongju, less than forty miles of the Yalu, Chinese Communist troops subsequently surrounded UN forces, which had advanced towards the Yalu along the west coast, and decimated them in ambush. On the east coast, a South Korean division ran into Chinese fire near Chongjin Reservoir, about thirty miles below the Manchurian border, and on 2 November the American seventh marine regiment arrived to relieve the South Korean forces and fought a five-day battle.

However, from 7 November Chinese and North Korean forces suddenly broke contact with UN forces in order both to induce enemy forces to march forward and then to eliminate them by superior forces attacking from the rear and on their flanks and to wait for the arrival from Soviet Russia of two air force divisions that would defend the Yalu River. On 24 November, when MacArthur launched his final offensive to win the war, UN forces did enter areas where Chinese troops had laid their trap. The next day six battalions of Chinese troops began a vigorous counteroffensive against the UN forces on the eastern and western fronts. After two days, the entire right flank of the UN forces was collapsing, and MacArthur "plunged from the height of optimism to the bottom of his depressive cycle." Wiring the Pentagon at 4:45 p.m., Tokyo time on 28 November, he called the commitment of the Chinese to Korea "an entirely new war," requesting both permission to bomb Manchuria and

127 Ibid.
130 Dean Acheson, op.cit., p. 469.
authorisation to incorporate Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) forces in his command. But operational caution was soon made discordant by the dose of rhetorical combativeness which followed - perhaps intended to deceive domestic militants about the change in strategic course as well as to discourage the enemy from pressing their offensive. On 29 November Acheson spoke of Beijing’s intervention in Korea as an “act of brazen aggression,” while Truman, in a press conference the next day, mentioned the possibility of America’s use of the atomic bomb on China. Under the pressure of events in Asia and partisan attacks on the administration, the American hostility towards the PRC was dramatically heightened, and traditional sympathy for the underdog of the Far East was now completely superseded by the fear of the awakened giant of Asia.

The disastrous defeat which the intervening Chinese forces had inflicted on MacArthur’s command in northern Korea and the subsequent US fear that the UN

forces would be expelled from Korea altogether strongly accentuated the vulnerability of Japan, a keystone of American power in Asia. In Washington, anxieties about possible Japanese subjugation to communist pressure and the subsequent unfavourable strategic balance for the Western world were prevalent in discussions. Acheson, for example, stated: "Recent developments in Asia, and particularly in Korea indicated that the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist regime are moving to dominate Asia."

"It is probable," the Secretary of State declared,

that a principal objective is Japan, the industrial and human resources of which nation have for many years been dominant in Asia which, if added to the resources now possessed by the Soviet Union, would greatly alter the balance of power in the world to the disadvantages of the United States and its allies. Under these circumstances, the task of preventing Japan from falling under Communist influence is increasingly great.\textsuperscript{137}

Acheson’s sense of increased gravity over the security of Japan was shared by most of Washington' top policy-makers. Dulles, Rusk and Allison were convinced that China’s assault against the UN forces was the first fruit of the Sino-Soviet mutual defence treaty of February 1950 and a prelude to the building of a direct threat against Japan. Their concern was further strengthened by the insight into the traditional role of the Korean peninsula as a defence perimeter for the defence of Japan. "If there is a clear choice as between Japan and Korea," Rusk stated, "priority must go to Japan."

But the US "should not overlook the close connection between our posture in Korea and our ability to defend Japan, because of the highly important political and psychological factors involved."\textsuperscript{138} In the face of the possible American expulsion

\textsuperscript{137} "Memorandum from Acheson to George C. Marshall, Defense Secretary, 13 December, 1950" in \textit{FRUS}, 1950, Vol. VI, pp. 1363-1367. This memorandum is also provided in Neville K. Meaney, \textit{Australia and the World}, pp. 570-572.

from Korea, Dulles not only evinced a keen sensitivity to Japanese perception of American power, but was also anxious about the continued Japanese allegiance to the cause of the free world. He remarked: "The Japanese people and their leaders are coming increasingly to feel the danger of throwing in their lot with us in view of the fact that the Communist power seems to be closing in upon them, and also upon their normal sources of food supply from Indo-China, Siam and Burma." "Our information points to increasing doubt," Dulles went on to say, "on the part of the Japanese leaders as to the wisdom of any definitive committal to our cause at the present time unless perhaps under conditions as to military and economic security which it would not be easy for us to fulfil." \[139\]

Given these circumstances, Dulles and other State Department officials felt that the United States must now take positive action to reassert its leadership in Northeast Asia, particularly in order to rebuild American credibility among the Japanese and to restore their confidence in US power. State Department officials were now deeply preoccupied with the task of devising a new US policy towards East Asia rooted in the vital US relationship with Japan. Their main concern was to consolidate the American hold on Japan and to improve the terms of Japan's existence and survival in the free world. To demonstrate America's "ability to protect Japan from the risks that she would take in aligning herself with the free world," it was strongly argued in the State Department that the United States should "make a basic strategic decision to commit substantial sea and air power to the defense of the Pacific island chain." \[140\]

\[139\] "Memorandum from Dulles to Acheson, 4 January, 1951" in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, part 1, pp. 781-783.
However, the American policy-makers were unwilling to have a heavy burden placed entirely upon the United States alone. Anxious to ally its own deterrent power with the conventional forces of Pacific states, the Truman administration now turned its attention towards immediately developing a rearmed Japan as an active participant in the Cold War. But to revitalise the former enemy once again as an immediate military power with no restrictions on rearmament and to strengthen Japan’s adherence to the anti-communist cause, the United States had to make it a top priority to end the Occupation and to conclude a peace treaty; under the Occupation, the Far Eastern Commission directives constituted serious impediments to the implementation of Japanese rearmament, and if the US violated the FEC policy directives, particularly those concerned with rearmament, it would completely undermine MacArthur’s position as SCAP.141 The Truman administration was therefore faced even more urgently with the need to reassure its wartime Pacific allies, particularly Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines, in order to obtain their assent to a peace treaty, which would permit Japanese rearmament. Moreover, in order to strengthen Japan’s pivotal role in the Far East, the United States now also hoped to induce its wartime Pacific allies to assume a share of the burden of balancing growing Soviet-Chinese military power in Northeast Asia, particularly that directed towards Japan.

141 “Memorandum from Rusk to Earl D. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the Army, 22 June, 1951” in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, part 1, pp. 1138-1141.
Out of these considerations there emerged a proposal for a Pacific Ocean pact from a policy-planning unit within the State Department. On 2 December 1950, six days after the massive Chinese counter-offensive in Korea, Allison wrote to Dulles that

In my opinion, we should endeavor to get the Japanese to agree, with respect to their own defense and the defense of the Japan area, to furnish ground forces (the US furnishing ground forces only until Japanese forces could take over) while the United States and such other of our Allies as agreed with us and would come in on our terms, would furnish air and naval forces. The fact that Japan would not have air and naval forces would go far, it seems to me, towards reassuring our allies that the arrangement would be one primarily for defense of Japan and the Japanese area. This agreement should be couched in UN Charter terms as far as possible and consideration might well be given to having Japan become a co-signatory of any possible mutual defence arrangements which would be entered into with New Zealand, Australia and the Philippines.142

In a further memorandum of 7 December, Allison formally forwarded to Dulles not only the concept of committing US sea and air power to the Pacific Ocean but also his general proposal for a Pacific collective security pact, "which would have the dual purpose of defending Japan from Communist aggression and assuring our friends that Japan would be on their side and not a menace to them."

The next day, accompanied by Colonel C. Stanton Babcock, military adviser to Dulles, Allison met with Dulles to discuss these proposals.144 After these discussions, Dulles penned a memorandum to Acheson, stressing that, before the implications of America's retreat in Korea and Soviet effort to exploit the situation began to undermine Japanese willingness to side with the West, it was imperative to take urgent action, and urging Acheson to dispatch a presidential mission to Japan and other friendly Pacific states "to

exchange views” with those nations. Acheson agreed that discussion should be opened with the Defense Department, and on 13 December wrote to the Defense Secretary, George C. Marshall. Pressing for a State Department plan for the dispatch of a presidential mission to the Far Eastern states, the Secretary of State strongly assured the American military that a Pacific Ocean pact was not a substitute for a bilateral US-Japan base arrangement aimed at securing Japan as an offensive as well as a defensive strategic base in the Cold War, but a supplement to that arrangement.

In their reply of 28 December, the Pentagon violently opposed the State Department’s proposals, viewing the deepening debacle in Korea with the greatest alarm. Fearing the possible failure to use Japan as a continued major base of operations in Korea, US military officers opposed full independence for Japan prior to the resolution of the situation in Korea. They were also not pleased with the concept of a Pacific pact and, still less, with any intention to commit substantial armed forces to the Pacific Ocean. The US commitment to the Ocean area, they argued, “would remove the incentive to the Japanese to provide adequately for their own security.”

On 3 January 1951, one day before Seoul once again changed hands as the UN forces were driven south, Dulles, accompanied by Allison and Babcock, called at the Pentagon. At that meeting, the American Chiefs of Staff acknowledged the need to regain the relative US power position in the Far East by accepting the concept of both

145 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
a commitment of US sea and air power to the defence of the Pacific Ocean and of a Pacific pact. But with large numbers of American troops committed to Korea and Europe vulnerable to a possible Soviet invasion, the defence officials attached provisos for their agreement to the Pacific pact. These included the strict limitation of the pact membership to the Pacific Ocean states, US non-involvement in the defence of Hong Kong, and, in relation to this, the exclusion of the UK from the pact membership. The Pentagon also still maintained their opposition to the dispatch of a US mission to Japan for fear of provoking the USSR.\textsuperscript{149}

On 4 January, within the State Department, Allison drew up a draft of a Pacific collective security treaty,\textsuperscript{150} and on the same day Dulles forwarded an explanatory memorandum to Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large.\textsuperscript{151} With regard to membership, Dulles reported to Jessup, the proposed parties of the pact consisted of six nations (the US, Japan, the Philippines, possibly Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand) having major island positions in the Pacific Ocean, but Indonesia was mentioned only as a courtesy. Turning to the objectives of the pact, Dulles said that one of the objectives was to "give sufficient reassurance to Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines so that they will consent to a peace treaty with Japan which will not contain limitations upon rearmament."\textsuperscript{152} In order to ensure that this objective was achieved, he added, it was essential that "the United States should not become

\textsuperscript{149} "Telegram from Acheson to Sebald, 3 January, 1951" in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, part 1, pp. 778-779; and "Memorandum from Allison to Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large, 4 January, 1951" in FRUS, Vol. VI, part 1, pp. 152-153.

\textsuperscript{150} "Memorandum from Allison to Jessup, 4 January, 1951" in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, part 1, pp. 132-134.

\textsuperscript{151} "Memorandum from Dulles to Jessup, 4 January, 1951" in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, part 1, pp. 132-137.

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.
committed to the Pact unless it is assured that the other Parties will agree to the kind of a Japanese Peace Treaty the United States feels is necessary.” In connection with giving reassurance to the wartime Pacific allies, Dulles continued, the State Department planned to establish a defence council under a Pacific Ocean Council whereby Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines could be afforded a “voice in how Japan’s defence forces progressed.”

But the defence council under a Pacific Ocean Council was also related to another objective of the pact: namely, it was designed to facilitate the welding of the resources of strength of the wartime US allies to the centre of American power in East Asia as well as to reassure those states against a future Japanese threat. By giving those states access to America’s policy-planning, the State Department hoped to have the wartime US allies join with the US in studying measures to ensure the protection of Japan and to mobilise those states to take an effective and united action in the event of an attack upon Japan from communist powers. The next objective, Dulles went on to say, was to revitalise Japanese military power “as part of an international security organisation rather than merely as a national status.” This, he observed, “would be responsive to what seems to be the preponderant wish of the Japanese people and their leaders and might make it possible for Japan to rearm without a head-on collision with the present Japanese Constitution.” It was hoped by Dulles that Japan would commit moderate ground forces to the Pacific Ocean pact.

In a further conference with American military officers held on 8 January, Dulles emphasised the urgency of the situation, persuading the Pentagon to give ground on the dispatch of a presidential mission to the Far Eastern states, and a State-Defence Department joint memorandum setting forth the terms of reference for a presidential mission was agreed. In a letter of 10 January, Truman elevated Dulles from Consultant to the Secretary of State to a special representative of the President, with the personal rank of Ambassador, giving him supplementary instructions beyond NSC 60/1 of 8 September 1950. Before setting out on a long journey to the Far Eastern states, Dulles appeared in the US House and Senate foreign affairs committees. He then met the British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Oliver Franks, on 12 January. Franks was accompanied by Herbert Graves, Counsellor to the Embassy. Stressing the urgent need “to ensure a reasonable degree of security to Japan,” while at the same time “to give some reassurance to” the wartime US allies against a resurgent Japan, Dulles informed the British of America’s intention to establish the Pacific Ocean as a strategic unity through the creation of a Pacific pact. While Franks did not indicate any discomposure, Graves was dismayed at the American plan to intrude into a traditional British domain and to replace Britain as the chief protector in the defence of the Pacific dominions.

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157 “Memorandum by Allison, 12 January, 1951” in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, part 1, pp. 792-795, 139-140.
With the urgent broad objective of integrating and strengthening Japan as part of a US-Soviet/Chinese balance of power in the Northwest Pacific, the US presidential mission, headed by John Foster Dulles, arrived at Haneda International Airport on 25 January 1951. There were two primary and specific objectives which the Dulles mission was intended to achieve in the Tokyo talks. The first of these was to get Japan to accept an American plan for its post-treaty role as an offensive as well as a defensive strategic base in the Cold War by persuading the Japanese government to agree to the stationing of US bases and troops in post-treaty Japan on a basis similar to that of the Occupation. The second was to have Japan accept a US plan for Japan’s status as an active and immediate military alliance partner of the US by seeking the Japanese agreement to the creation of moderate ground forces.

On 28 January, escorted by William J. Sebald, US political adviser in Japan, Dulles conferred with General MacArthur in the Dai-Ichi Building facing the moat of Tokyo’s Imperial Palace. The special American envoy strongly requested the General’s cooperation to secure Japan’s acceptance of the US proposal for the same stationing terms for US troops and bases in post-treaty Japan as those under the Occupation. MacArthur responded by saying that he did not like to take part in the day-to-day discussions, arguing that his participation might “evoke possible charges that he was employing his powers as SCAP.” However, the General assured Dulles that “[i]f difficulties developed,” he would definitely intervene to “throw his influence into the balance.” With strong assurances given by MacArthur on the problem of a

bilateral US-Japan base arrangement, Dulles subsequently left the negotiations on that matter to staff-level talks and devoted all his energies towards the problem of rearmament.

Conferring on 29 January with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida at the Mitsui main office building in central Tokyo, Dulles, after hearing Yoshida’s argument on the need for Japan-China trade, pressed the Japanese Prime Minister for the reactivation of Japanese defence forces. Yoshida resisted forcefully, citing the danger that any precipitate rearmament “would bring back the Japanese militarists who had now gone underground and might expose the State to the danger of again being dominated by the military.” Since Yoshida had firmly disapproved of the ascendancy of the military before and during the Pacific war and had been imprisoned for a time in the latter part of the war, as Allison records in his memoirs, he had a “genuine fear” of seeing the old guard of the Japanese armed forces making a comeback. Whereas, at this time, the Japanese public had a strong sense of military insecurity against communist aggressiveness and, in a Public Opinion Poll published by the Mainichi Shimbun on 3 January 1951, 65.8% of the public saw a strong need for reestablishing Japanese military forces, Yoshida nonetheless thought that rearmament should not precede the legislative procedure which would ensure civilian control. Another reason cited by Yoshida was economy. While the Korean War had conferred on Japan considerable financial benefits amounting to $16,200,800

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161 Mainichi Shimbun, 3 January, 1951.
during the period of June-November 1950, and Yoshida himself was overjoyed at the economic boom offered by the conflagration, he nonetheless thought that the delicate state of recovery within the economy meant that it would be rash to contemplate a significant defence burden falling on Japanese shoulders. The Prime Minister therefore declared to Dulles: "The creation of a military force just a time when Japan was beginning to get on its feet financially would be severe strain and probably result in a lower standard of living." "Here again," Yoshida added, "time would be necessary in order to lay a sound foundation for the economic support of any rearmament."

In response, Dulles stated, "in the present state of the world, it was necessary for all nations that wanted to remain part of the free world to make sacrifices." Outlining some of the costs which the people of the United States were bearing in Korea, he inquired whether the Premier was taking the position that "the dangers mentioned constituted a reason for doing nothing or merely a recognition of obstacles to be overcome." There being no response from Yoshida, Dulles then resorted to an argument relating to an ability to support the UN: "At the present time, free nations of the world through the UN were endeavouring to create a system of collective security and ... it was necessary for all who expected to benefit by such a system to make contributions in accordance with their own means and abilities." "No one," he stressed, "would expect the Japanese contribution at present to be large but it was felt

163 Asahi Shimbun, 9 December, 1950.
that Japan should be willing to make at least a token contribution and a commitment to
the general cause of collective security."\textsuperscript{167} The concept of support of collective
security seemed to appeal to Yoshida, and he did say that Japan would be willing to
make some contribution. But, as Allison observed, "no indication ... was given as to
what form such a contribution might take, and it appeared that Mr Yoshida did not
wish at this time to be definitely committed in any manner."\textsuperscript{168}

Returning to the diplomatic section of the General Headquarters (GHQ) quite
dissatisfied, Dulles described his talks with Yoshida as a "puff ball performance," and
stated that he found it very difficult to get the conversation around to a point where he
could get any reaction at all from Yoshida.\textsuperscript{169} Sebald also stated Yoshida's remarks
were "more in the nature of feelers rather than any effort to come to grips with the real
problems."\textsuperscript{170}

Dulles immediately directed Sebald to convey his irritation to the
Japanese, and Sebald then spoke to Katsuo Okazaki, chief Cabinet secretary, urging
him to advise Yoshida to get to work and to stop stalling, since time was too short for
these "circuitous methods."\textsuperscript{171}

Dulles' chagrin and frustration may have been somewhat assuaged by his meeting
with Japanese industrialists on the same day. They showed a positive attitude towards
rearmament, expecting a great economic gain by the remobilisation of Japanese arms

\textsuperscript{167} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{171} "William J. Sebald with Russell Brines, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 262.
industries. But the American emissary was nonetheless again discouraged by Yoshida’s stance on rearmament. On 31 January Dulles again went to the Mitsui main office building, where the second round of talks with Yoshida was held. The meeting was dominated by Dulles’ appeal to the Prime Minister to make prompt accommodation to the significant change in the Far Eastern international power situation. Explaining the significance of Japan’s role for the maintenance of the balance of power in Asia, he tried to persuade Yoshida to accept an American plan for Japan’s status as an active participant in the Cold War:

The thing that I worry about in the short-term is that Japan will not recreate adequate defence forces. There is no worry in our minds about an unduly large force, naval or air forces ... Americans can not envision our troops being indefinitely committed to defending an unarmed Japan: America is not willing to station forces in Japan for very long unless the Japanese do something on their own account. If Japan should be incorporated into the orbit of the Western world, sooner or later, Japan must pull its weight in the boat.

Dulles went on to emphasise that Japan’s positive contribution to the defence of the free world was needed as part of a US plan to restore the balance of power in the Pacific: “We must have some local defence force to combine with the deterrent effect of our striking power. If Japanese power were added to that of the US and other Pacific allies, the strategic position in the free world would be consolidated.” He further stated that America was, through the creation of a proposed Pacific offshore

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172 Chitoshi Yanaga, Big Business in Japanese Politics, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968, pp. 139-140. For a full and detailed account of Japanese business circles’ views of a peace treaty, a security arrangement and rearmament, see Mainichi Shimbun (English), 5 February, 1951. Mainichi used four pages for introducing leading Japanese economic leaders’ views.

island pact, intending to establish an international framework within which Japan could create a military force as part of an international security organisation rather than merely on a national status. Dulles suggested this would be responsive to the preponderant wish of the Japanese people and it might make it possible for Japan to rearm without a head-on collision with the present Constitution. Yoshida was greatly impressed with the idea of a Pacific pact, but he replied that "rearmament was out of the question for Japan at this time," stating that it was his idea to entrust the defence of the country to United States forces, and that the strengthening of the National Police Reserve Force in numbers and equipment could be an "adequate contribution" to that of the US in safeguarding national security.174

In the wake of the Dulles-Yoshida talks, US officials continued to push the Japanese government for remilitarisation. At a staff-level meeting held on 1 February, Earl D. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the Army, and General Carter B. Magruder, Special Assistant for Occupied Areas in the Office of the Secretary of the Army, strongly urged the Japanese to recreate military forces by referring to the changed strategic situation in the Far East resulting from the massive Chinese communist counter-offensive in Korea:

The intervention of Chinese forces in the Korean hostilities confirmed the emergence of the People’s Republic of China as a formidable military force in Asia. Under this startling transformation of the situation in the Pacific and the visible threat across the Sea of Japan, it would be foolish of Japan not to develop military strength to the point where she could provide for her own national defence.175

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174 Ibid.
175 "Staff-level meeting, 1 February, 1951" in JFMA, 1951, B'-0009, part 2, pp. 95-113; and Kumao Nishimuра, op. cit., pp. 90-94. See also Masamichi Inoki, op. cit., pp. 402-403; Michael M. Yoshitsu, op. cit., pp. 57-59; and Chihiro Hosoya, op. cit., pp. 171-172, 175.
The US military officers and Allison then pressed Japanese Foreign Ministry officers for their views of the specific form of Japan's contribution to the collective pact proposed by the US. Kumao Nishimura, Director of the Treaty Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, and Sadao Iguchi, Vice Minister at the Foreign Ministry, resisted the American demand for the reactivation of defence forces, claiming that Japan lacked the basic resources required for the establishment of modern military forces, that the burden of rearment at this time could immediately destroy the Japanese economy, and that the Japanese people would fall into poverty, thus engendering social unrest which the communists wanted. "Harnessing Japan's industrial potential rather than its soldiers," Nishimura also argued, "would make the greatest contribution to America's aims in East Asia." Determined not to be delayed in their policy to develop Japanese military strength as part of a US programme for reinforcing the American presence in the Northwest Pacific, the US military officers went on to push for the creation of Japanese ground forces. Besides the request for the creation of land forces, the American officers further pressured the Japanese to establish a central defence agency corresponding to the US Defense Department. On these proposals, the Japanese officials made no response.\textsuperscript{176}

In the meantime, by obtaining the Yoshida government's agreement to the proposed American requirements for post-treaty bases and troops in Japan, the American mission made a breakthrough on a bilateral US-Japan base arrangement. Prior to the staff-level meeting of 1 February, Nishimura, Iguchi and Jiro Shirasu, personal adviser to Yoshida, were strongly worried about the deteriorating

\textsuperscript{176} Ibid.
negotiations, suggesting to the Prime Minister that the talks should be concentrated on
the "specific problem."\(^{177}\) With the approval of Yoshida, the Japanese officials
submitted at the staff-level talks of 1 February a document, entitled "A Plan for Japan-
US Cooperation for Mutual Security." In it, the Japanese government not only
requested that the duration of a bilateral base arrangement should be limited to ten
years, but also called on the United States to agree that stationing terms for post-treaty
US forces and bases should be determined on a reciprocal basis by the establishment of
a US-Japan joint committee. Glancing at this document, Allison, Johnson, Magruder
and Babcock remarked sarcastically, "How helpful this is!" While maintaining their
overbearing attitude towards the Japanese Foreign Ministry officers, the State and
Defense Departments officials gave some comments on the draft. Expressing the hope
that the time-limit of a bilateral base arrangement should be more flexible, they asked
for a phrase, "until the security of Japan should be effectively guaranteed by an
alternative arrangement." The American officials then closed in upon the core of the
problem, strongly requesting the right of unlimited movement in the Japanese
archipelago. "Requirements of the United States security forces for facilities and areas
in Japan," they reasoned, "would never be static. They would be revised, from time to
time, based on a reasonable estimate of the world situation, the state of readiness of
the forces concerned and enemy capabilities."\(^{178}\)

At a staff-level meeting held on 2 February, United States officials displayed all of
their negotiating cards, presenting to the Japanese a memorandum, entitled "United
States-Japanese Bilateral Agreement on Security" dealing with post-treaty US forces

\(^{177}\) Kumao Nishimura, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 90.

\(^{178}\) "Staff-level meeting, 1 February, 1951" in \textit{JFMA}, 1951, B'-0009, part 2, pp. 95-113.
and bases. The draft arrangement made clear the sweeping nature of the American claim to military rights to utilise Japan as an advanced military base for offensive operations in the Cold War. Portion of Chapter 1 of the draft reads: “The Governments of the United States and of Japan agree that, in consequence of the accelerated speed and power of modern war, the entire land mass of the Japan area shall be regarded as a potential area of defensive disposition and manoeuvre of military forces ...” It went on to read, “the Supreme Commander of all forces in Japan ... shall have the authority to use such land areas, installations and facilities in the Japan area and to make such strategic and tactical dispositions of military forces as he may deem necessary ...”

As Roger Dingman has suggested, the draft treaty reflected a strong US belief that “adding her weight to the strategic balance in favour of the free world by retaining advanced bases was far more important than catering to whims of the Japanese people.” The US terms for the continued stationing of American armed forces and bases in post-treaty Japan had been unilaterally and firmly formulated by the United States without leaving any room for meeting Japanese requests and reservations. This the Japanese fully realised from this meeting. While showing their readiness to accept substantive clauses of the US document, the Japanese officials were strongly concerned about the chances of the arrangement’s passing through the Japanese Diet. They therefore protested that “the arrangement enumerating a series of rights and privileges of the US forces would stimulate domestic fears over a belligerent Japan and

179 “Staff-level meeting, 2 February, 1951” in JFMA, 1951, B’-0009, part 2, pp. 114-115; and Kumao Nishimura, op.cit., pp. 90-94.
would imply to the Japanese that the Occupation would continue after independence," urging the US officials to draw up another document, which would not require US Congress and Japanese Diet ratification.\(^{181}\)

On the evening of the same day (2 February), Nishimura and Iguchi went to Oiso, Kanagawa Prefecture, where Yoshida's villa was located. Reporting the course of the negotiations, the Foreign Ministry officers urged Yoshida to accept the American requirements relating to bases and forces in post-treaty Japan. They also recommended the appropriate measure to avoid breakdown in the rearmament talks. Although Yoshida was still unwilling to agree to the central point in Dulles' mind: namely, an undertaking by Japan to contribute to its own security by means of a formal rearmament programme,\(^{182}\) he nonetheless did consider preempting a further American request for the revitalisation of Japanese power.\(^{183}\) The Prime Minister as well as Nishimura and Iguchi also hoped that concessions on rearmament might ensure an iron-clad US guarantee for Japan's defence under a bilateral base arrangement. Yoshida told the Japanese officials that they should prepare a document, entitled "Initial Steps for Rearmament Program."\(^{184}\) Drafted in the Yoshida villa by Nishimura and Iguchi on lines laid down by the Prime Minister, the document comprised two main points: first, the establishment of a 50,000-man National Defence Force; and,

\(^{181}\) Staff-level meeting, 2 February, 1951" in JFMA, 1951, B'-0009, part 2, pp. 114-115; and Kumano Nishimura, op.cit., pp. 90-94. See also Michael M. Yoshitsu, op.cit., p. 59; and Chihiro Hosoya, op.cit., p. 172.


\(^{183}\) Michael M. Ysohitsu, op.cit., pp. 61-62.

second, the creation of a Peace Preservation Agency, which would correspond to the US Defense Department, and of a Defense Planning Office, which would correspond to a general staff headquarters.  

With the signature of the Prime Minister, the document was forwarded to the State and Defense Department officials of the Dulles mission and SCAP on 3 February. Besides the document, the Japanese government, while expressing its agreement to American requirements in relation to bases and forces in post-treaty Japan, made a formal request to formulate another security treaty, which would not require US Senate and Diet ratification. Three days later, when Yoshida returned to his official residence in Tokyo, a further staff-level meeting was held, at which American officials presented three documents. One stipulated Japan’s right of individual and collective self-defence to be incorporated in a peace treaty as well as its ability to sign a collective security pact. The others contained a framework of a bilateral base arrangement and an administrative arrangement listing legal privileges for US forces in Japan. Reading through these documents, Nishimura and Iguchi were greatly disturbed at the second document, because it merely “implicitly” incorporated Japan within the American nuclear umbrella. In spite of Yoshida’s promise to establish a 50,000-man National Defence Force, the United States could not give its “direct” guarantee to Japan’s defence against external attack, because the Yoshida proposal, as Allison remarked to the Japanese officials, fell far short of the requirements of the Vandenberg resolution of May 1948, which stipulated “self-defence” and “mutual

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185 Ibid.
187 "Staff-level meeting, 5 February, 1951" in JFMA, 1951, B’-0009, part 2, pp. 119-146; and Kumao Nishimura, op.cit., pp. 93-94. See also Michael M. Yoshitsu, op.cit., pp. 62-64.
On 7 February Dulles wired Washington, informing Rusk that Japan had substantially accepted an American plan for its role as a Far Eastern military bastion in the Cold War.\(^{189}\)

The acceptance by the Yoshida government of the proposed American requirements for post-treaty US troop deployment undoubtedly pleased the Dulles mission.\(^{190}\) However, the maintenance of Yoshida’s and Foreign Ministry officials’ reservations about rearmament and their failure to agree to the status of an effective participant in the Pacific pact apparently made Dulles and his staff have some doubts about the utility of the US proposal for a Pacific Ocean pact, designed in part to develop the military strength of Japan as part of an international security organisation. As a result of talks with Yoshida, Dulles as well as Allison certainly acknowledged that the Prime Minister had favourably viewed the concept of the collective pact proposed by the United States. Later, appearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Dulles claimed that Japan showed no desire for a Japanese national army, but that it did indicate “a willingness to contribute to an international force, preferably under the United Nations or some regional security pact.” The Japanese, he continued, “say that is not a violation of their Constitution.”\(^{191}\)

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\(^{188}\) Ibid. The Vandenberg Resolution was approved by the US Congress on 11 June, 1948. As a necessary condition for US conclusion of a regional security alliance, it stated as follows: “Association of the United States, by constitutional processes, with such regional and other collective arrangements, is based upon continuous and effective self-help and mutual assistance.” For text of the Vandenberg Resolution, see “Senate Resolution 239 (Vandenberg Resolution), 11 June, 1948” in FRUS, 1948, Vol. III, pp. 135-136.

\(^{189}\) “Telegram from Dulles to Rusk, 7 February, 1951” in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, part 1, p. 869.

\(^{190}\) At a staff-level meeting held on 10 February, Dulles remarked that, “the Mission had achieved an acceptance of its approach by the Japanese which went beyond formal political acceptance.” See “Memorandum by Fearey, 10 February, 1951” in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, part 1, pp. 871-873.

But Dulles’ idea of a viable way for reactivating Japanese defence forces was nonetheless shifting in the direction of recruiting former Imperial officers into the National Police Reserve Force, which had been permitted by MacArthur to be established in early August 1950, and of converting the Force to full combat capability. Since the concept of a heavily-equipped National Police Reserve Force had been originally raised by General MacArthur in early January 1951, in the course of the Tokyo talks, State and Defense officers of the Dulles mission had been in touch with Major General Whitfield P. Shepard, Chief of the Civil Affairs Section of the General Headquarters (GHQ) and chief military adviser to the National Police Reserve Force. It was agreed at those meetings that young former Imperial Japanese Army officers would be further released from the purge at the earliest possible moment. They also agreed that the present 75,000-man National Police Reserve Force would be provided with heavy equipment, such as tanks and artillery. Finding an alternative viable formula for future Japanese rearmament, Dulles therefore observed that he “did not consider it as important from the Japanese point of view that there be a Pacific pact as he had before he went to Japan. Japan could probably get around its Constitution

192 “Telegram from MacArthur to the Department of Army, 3 January, 1951” in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, part 1, p. 884; and “Telegram from MacArthur to the Department of Army, 8 January, 1951” in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, part 1, pp. 884-885.
193 With a directive issued by SCAP on 30 October, 1950, 10,000 persons including a number of prominent government officials and more than 3,000 former non-career military personnel had already been released from the purge, and, with a directive issued by SCAP on 10 November, 3,250 former junior officers had been removed from the purge. For an account of the purge and depurge of Japanese government officials and former military officers, see Hans Baerweld, The Purge of Japanese Leaders and the Occupation, Berkeley: California University Press, 1959; Philip R. Pricigallow, The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Operations in the East, 1945-51, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979; and Marion and Susie Harries, Sheathing the Sword: the Demilitarisation of Japan, London: Hanish Hamilton, 1987.
without the benefit of such a pact.” Thus the collective pact proposed by the US, which was in part intended to legitimise a renewed Japanese military capability, had partly lost its purpose.

Moreover, in the course of the Tokyo talks, a further factor undermining the proposed US pact had been added to Japanese unwillingness to undertake rearmament. In his meeting with Dulles held on 2 February 1951, Sir Alvary Gascoigne, political representative of the British liaison mission to SCAP, had expressed the UK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) position, which squarely opposed the US plan to ensure the Pacific offshore island chain as a strategic unity and to replace Britain as the chief protector of Australia and New Zealand. Gascoigne began by saying, “it would be an undeniable advantage as giving assurance to Australia and New Zealand of United States protection” but Britain considered “that could be obtained without resorting to [the] elaborate machinery of [a] Pacific Defense Council.” He also pointed out that the proposed Pacific pact would inflict a serious damage on UK prestige as a major power:

“From [the] standpoint of [the] United Kingdom’s position as a world power,” the proposed Pacific Ocean pact “would be interpreted in [the] Pacific and elsewhere as [a] renunciation of [Great Britain’s] responsibilities and possibly as [an] evidence of rift in policy between [the] UK and US.” Listing the adverse psychological influences of the separate identification of the Pacific Ocean for security purposes upon mainland Asia, he further argued that, at the present time, “exclusion of [the Asian] mainland countries would encourage aggression against Malaya, Indochina, Burma and


196 “Telegram from Dulles to Rusk, 2 February, 1951” in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, part 1, pp. 143-144; and “Letter from the UK High Commissioner, Canberra, Edward Williams, to External Affairs, 5 February, 1951” in AA, A5954, Box 1819.
Gascoigne also added that Britain “strongly opposed to the idea of a Pacific Defense Organization which would exclude the United Kingdom,” stressing that he “could not help feeling that the UK would want to be included ‘in the first place’.”

Shortly after this meeting, Dulles conceived of the possibility of UK joining the proposed pact, while excluding the British protectorates on mainland Asia, and this notion was wired to Rusk on the same day. In response, on 8 February the head of Far Eastern Affairs wrote back to Tokyo opposing Dulles’ idea on the ground that British participation in the proposed pact would greatly contribute to a colonial aura. Instructing Dulles to explore possible solutions to the difficulties created by the British objection in the forthcoming discussions in Canberra, Rusk suggested alternative possible arrangements: “In addition to [the] concept agreed upon here before your departure, other possibilities include [a] US unilateral declaration, [a] series of bilateral agreements ([the] US with Australia, New Zealand, [the] Philippines, Japan respectively) or [a] tripartite agreement ([the] US, Australia, New Zealand).”

Following this telegram, three hours later, Rusk again penned a telegram to Dulles, which covered his talks with the New Zealand Prime Minister, Sidney G. Holland. Holland had been in Washington during 5-8 February. Rusk told Dulles that, although New Zealand was reluctant to see a pact unchaperoned by British participation, Holland was nonetheless “receptive to [the] mention of [a] trilateral arrangement

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197 Ibid.
200 “Telegram from Rusk to Dulles, 8 February, 1951” in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, part 1, pp. 150-151.
between NZ, Austral[ia], and [the] US and foresaw no difficulties with [the] UK or [the] Commonwealth in such a plan.”

Thus the US proposal for a Pacific Ocean pact came unstuck in two important respects. Firstly, the Japanese remained opposed to the idea of moderate rearmament, and secondly, the British emerged as strongly opposed to the US concept of a multilateral Pacific pact without their membership. But in spite of these obstacles encountered in the course of the Tokyo talks, Dulles hoped that the Japanese opposition to moderate rearmament would be temporary. He therefore still saw the political desirability of reassuring Australia and New Zealand and the Philippines against a resurgence of Japanese aggression so as to have those states accept the US proposal for a Japanese peace treaty, which imposed no limitations upon Japanese rearmament. He was also still anxious to involve the military strength of Australia and New Zealand in the defence of Northeast Asia and to have those states and the Philippines committed to assist the US in the defence of Japan, a key-sector in the balance of power in East Asia. These were the primary objectives which the Dulles mission had in mind when they arrived in Darwin, the capital of the Northern Territory of Australia, on the morning of 14 February 1951 by way of the Philippines.

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In advance of the arrival of the Dulles mission, Australia had been fully informed of the US proposal for a Pacific Ocean pact and formulated its response. On 9 December

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201 “Telegram from Rusk to Dulles, 8 February, 1951” in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, part 1, pp. 151-152.
1950 an initial report on the US proposal for a pact was conveyed to Canberra through Norman Makin, Australian Ambassador to the US, and this was followed by a series of reports sent by the Australian Embassy in Washington. External Affairs in Canberra also received the British JCS position on the proposed US pact on 5 February, through the UK High Commissioner in Canberra, Edward Williams, which position had already been expressed in the Dulles-Gascoign talks of 2 February.

Three days later, there followed a warning letter from the British Cabinet, forwarded to Arthur Fadden, Acting Prime Minister, through Williams. Reiterating the UK JCS position, the British government expressed its strong anxiety about the undermining of the military commitment of Australia and New Zealand to the Middle East as a result of the involvement of those states in the defence of Japan. In an attempt to deter the two antipodean states from being drawn permanently into the growing ambit of American influence and to prevent the predominance of US influence over those states, Britain also suggested that Australia and New Zealand should be reconciled to “a US Declaration at the government (and not planning) level which would in effect guarantee the sea approaches” to those states.

Conferring in Victoria Barracks in Melbourne on the same day (8 February), the Australian Defence Committee made a response to the US proposal. The response was cool for two reasons: the possible participation of Indonesia in the pact proposal;

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203 “Letter from Williams to Arthur Fadden, Acting Prime Minister, 5 February, 1951” in AA, A5954, Box 1819.
and the adverse effect of the proposed US pact upon ANZAM (Australia, New Zealand and Malayan area) arrangement, developed between Australia, the UK and New Zealand at the initiative of Australia since early 1949. Given the ongoing confrontation over the sovereignty of West New Guinea between Holland, Indonesia and Australia in consequence of Indonesia's claim to the island, the Defence Committee could not at all consider Indonesia to be a reliable ally of Australia. Moreover, Australian military planners, from the end of 1950 onwards, had been exploring the problem of the low-level coordination of strategic planning in the field of sea communications between the ANZAM area and the Pacific area, for which the US JCS had responsibility, through Arthur W. Radford, US Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific (CINCPAC). In these circumstances, the Defence Chiefs feared that existing British Commonwealth defence planning and coordinated low-level military planning between the ANZAM and the US Pacific area might be compromised by an arrangement centred on Japan.

On 7 February, in External Affairs, the first draft of a Cabinet submission setting forth Australia's positions on the forthcoming negotiations with Dulles had been drawn up by Lawrence McIntyre, a Counsellor in the Department. Such was the importance of an American guarantee to Australian security that McIntyre accepted United States determination to exclude from the pact any part of the Asian mainland and any commitments that might be entailed thereon, thereby ensuring the exclusion of Britain from the proposed pact. This also meant that Australia's near northern neighbourhood

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195 "Minute No. 27 by Defence Committee: Visit to Australia of Mr J.F. Dulles, 8 February, 1951" in AA, A5954/1, 1819/5.
206 Ibid. The ANZAM arrangement and the West New Guinea problem will be fully discussed in Chapters III and IV respectively.
would be partially unprotected by the pact. In view of the general state of insecurity that prevailed throughout Southeast Asia under the threat of communist aggression, Spender, from the outset of his proposal for a Pacific pact, had in mind the inclusion of the Southeast Asian mainland within the scope of a formal American defence commitment. But in his draft of a Cabinet submission, McIntyre advised Spender not to press for the extension of the pact's defence scope to the Asian mainland, because the inclusion of Southeast Asia in the defence area of the proposed pact, he thought, would immediately raise the question of British and French participation in the pact, and this would be soon followed by possible requests from the Netherlands and Portugal for admission to the pact. He also argued that, if Australia demanded the embracing of Southeast Asia in the geographical scope of the pact, "the United States may well firmly resist any extension to the Asian mainland, where an obligation would have to be accepted without distinction between South East Asian countries now resisting communisation."207

Given America's unwillingness to underwrite the security of Southeast Asia, McIntyre also claimed that "to try to persuade the United States to extend the scope of the pact to include Hong Kong and at least some of the mainland territories" would undermine even "[US] willingness to extend her Pacific defence perimeter beyond the Philippines to include Australia and New Zealand." The US proposal for a Pacific pact, even if its defence scope was strictly confined to the offshore island chain, he insisted, "represents a considerable advance in United States thinking" about the defence of the Southwest Pacific. Stressing the importance of not discouraging

America's interest in entering into a security treaty with the Pacific dominions, McIntryre recommended that Australia should now be reconciled to a US scheme for “projecting the Pact as a defensive arrangement facing West rather than North (from South and South East Asia).” In fixing the geographical defence scope of the proposed pact, Australia’s aim, he stated,

should be to present the Pact so far as possible in a separate and distinct context from that of the protection of the countries of South and South East Asia. This need not be allowed to imply that we are convinced of the hopelessness of resisting Communism in South and South East Asia. It would only mean that we regard the latter as a separate problem, to be met by other arrangements.208

McIntyre then proceeded to define Australia’s objective to be achieved in the forthcoming negotiations with Dulles and contemplated the means to that end. The Counsellor opposed accepting Japan as a direct alliance partner of Australia. “Our acceptance of this,” McIntyre stated, “which would turn Japan from an enemy into a firm ally overnight, would give rise to political complications in Australia and possibly abroad, for example, in our relations with Southeast Asia.”209 Refraining from giving any comments on the Philippines’ inclusion, McIntyre suggested that Australia should seek Dulles’ reaction to “an arrangement confined to the United States, Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific south of the Equator” in a formal treaty form.210 As a quid pro quo for obtaining American consent to such an arrangement, he clearly contemplated Australia’s acceptance of the treaty of peace with Japan in the terms proposed by the United States. But in his view, this would not be sufficient to obtain from the US the formality of a pact in the form of a treaty. The

208 Ibid (Emphasis Added).
209 Ibid.
210 Ibid.
most that Australia could expect from its acceptance of the proposed US peace terms,
he thought, would be an informal US guarantee in the form of a presidential
declaration. Expressing the view that the Southwest Pacific area had no separate
geographical military significance for the US, the Counsellor argued that Australian
agreement in itself to the US proposal for a “soft” Japanese peace treaty could not
elicit a formal American commitment to the Southwest Pacific. In order to obtain a
formal security treaty from the US, McIntyre appeared to believe it necessary for
Australia to accept the provision of a less specific commitment towards the Northwest
Pacific:

The United States ... is thinking in terms of protecting and maintaining
unbroken the offshore island chain extending from the Aleutians
through Japan and southward to Australia and New Zealand. The
Americans regard Japan as an important link in the defensive chain, and
as a potential bulwark against the spread of Communism. Notwithstanding our misgivings, we may find it necessary to go some
distance towards meeting United States wishes ... In particular, we
should lose no chance in encouraging any signs that the United States is
not determined to press for the kind of multi-lateral obligations
involving rigid commitments between, for instance, territories at
opposite ends of the island chain.211

The next day Arthur Tange, Assistant Secretary, forwarded a memorandum to
Watt, giving comments on the Japanese aspect of the draft submission. Tange
certainly agreed to the view that Australia should not be a signatory to a Pacific pact
embracing the former enemy. However, he demurred at McIntyre’s view that
US policy towards the Southwest Pacific was basically being developed as part of
consolidating the American strategic position in Northeast Asia. So confident was he
that the Southwest Pacific had its own separate strategic value for the United States
that he said:

211 Ibid.
The Cabinet submission appears to imply that, if we take a firm position at the outset on Japan, we will prejudice the prospects of getting what we want from the Americans. I am inclined to differ and to believe that we should begin by stating all reasonable objections to our undertaking advance commitments in Asia at all, whether [on] the mainland or offshore. At least, this would be a basis from which to test United States motives in producing those proposals. Why is it necessary for American policy towards Japan, which we assume to be one designed to revive Japanese strength and use Japan as an outpost of American strength, to build regional machinery involving Australia and New Zealand for this purpose? I would have thought that it was open to the United States to make arrangements bilaterally with Japan. Is it that they want to help us, and think that inclusion of Japan in formal arrangements (which may be unnecessary) will enable them to get Congressional support for doing something for us which they could not do by an arrangement confined to the South Pacific?  

Given his view of the separate geo-strategic importance of the area south of the equator for the US, Tange saw no need for a further quid pro quo for an American agreement to a three-cornered formal treaty, except for Australia’s consent to the terms of the proposed US peace treaty. He therefore opposed McIntyre’s view of a need for a less specific Australian commitment to the Northwest Pacific.

In his final draft for Cabinet submission of 15 February, Spender accepted McIntyre’s suggestion that to press the Americans to include the Asian mainland in the defence scope of the pact would negate US willingness to underwrite the security of Australia; he was determined not to argue for the inclusion of the area in the defence scope of the pact. Spender wrote in his submission: “We can accept at the outset the United States desire not to extend the arrangement to the Asian mainland, with the possible contingency of entanglement and heavy commitment in land warfare on the Asian mainland.”  

The Minister for External Affairs went on to agree to the view

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212 “Memorandum from Tange to Watt, 8 February, 1951” in AA, A1838/2, 532/11, part 2.
213 “Cabinet submission No. 263, 15 February, 1951” in AA, A5940/1, C228 (Emphasis Added).
that Australia’s objective in the forthcoming discussions with Dulles should be “to try to obtain United States consent to enter into a firm tripartite agreement ... between the United States, Australia [and] New Zealand.” As a means of achieving this objective, he foresaw Australia’s acceptance of the proposed US “soft” peace terms. However, Spender doubted that Australian agreement in itself to the terms of the proposed US peace treaty would induce the US to formalise its security relations with Australia and New Zealand. Sharing McIntyre’s view of the trend of America’s thought about the Pacific defence, he did not think that the United States would extend its formal commitments to Australia and New Zealand unless an arrangement was linked with the area which the US considered vital to its own security. In order to secure a formal American security guarantee of Australia’s defence, the Minister for External Affairs believed that it would be necessary for Australia to provide a further quid pro quo to the US besides Australia’s acceptance of the terms of the proposed US peace treaty. This led to Spender supporting McIntyre’s view of a need for a less specific Australian commitment to Northeast Asia. He suggested that “the importance of obtaining a United States guarantee is so prominent that we may have to consider whether, in order to obtain it, we may not be called upon to go at least part of the way towards meeting the United States desire for a wider multilateral security arrangement.”

Whereas Australia defined its objective to be achieved in the forthcoming negotiations with Dulles as a formal tripartite security treaty, and, as a means to this objective, contemplated the acceptance of the terms of the proposed US peace treaty and the provision of a less specific Australian commitment to the Northwest Pacific,

214 Ibid.
New Zealand nonetheless did not share this objective and the means proposed to achieve it. New Zealand's preference was to seek a presidential declaration linking Australia, New Zealand and the US by using its acceptance of the clauses of the US proposal for a peace treaty as the only viable quid pro quo. As in the case of Australia, New Zealand certainly considered the possibility of a formal three-cornered pact confined to the Southwest Pacific. However, Wellington was even more strongly aware than Canberra of the geographical strategic insignificance of the area south of the equator for the US. "The United States," the Chiefs of Staff Committee of New Zealand argued,

> can not give a direct and precise guarantee to New Zealand and Australia which are in any case remote from the centre of danger ... The area of direct concern to the United States is the line of islands flanking the Asian continent from the Aleutians through Japan to the Philippines. The immediate threat is to the Philippines and Japan. The United States has a defence commitment with the Philippines, but arrangements for the defence of Japan have yet to be considered. It appears to be the opinion of the American Administration that it is only in connection with these arrangements that sufficient Congressional and public support could be given for an extension of American commitments to Australia and New Zealand.\(^{215}\)

Given its clear recognition that US policies towards the countries south of the equator were basically developed as a means of enhancing US interests in Northeast Asia, New Zealand doubted the prospect of peace-time US involvement in the defence of the Southwest Pacific unless it was accompanied by a New Zealand defence commitment to Japan and the Philippines. As a further quid pro quo for obtaining a formal US guarantee of its defence, in addition to its acceptance of the proposed US peace terms, New Zealand did consider the provision of a military commitment to the

defence of Northeast Asia. However, in view of its limited resources and of its strong concern about serious diminution of the capacity for sending forces to the Middle East in the event of a global war, it was reluctant to accept any new commitments in the Pacific area and Asia. It was also considered by New Zealand as a quid pro quo to be offered to the US the offer of potential bases in its territory for operations in Antarctica, but it was soon realised that Antarctica did not have the same strategic significance as the Arctic. Finding no further “fair price” that might be paid for a formal US guarantee beyond its acceptance of the proposed US peace treaty, New Zealand had no choice but to reconcile itself to an informal American guarantee provided by a presidential declaration. In a memorandum which contained a brief to be used by the New Zealand Minister for External Affairs, Frederick W. Doidge, in his forthcoming talks with Dulles, the Department of External Affairs affirmed that America’s proposal for committing New Zealand to the defence of Japan constituted “the weakening of the British Commonwealth” and “the grave misdirection of our military effort.” The Department suggested to the Minister that, since Wellington did not feel “in the short term ... any immediate threat to New Zealand in the Pacific, ... [n]o formal pact is required for [the purpose of safeguarding its security], although ... a presidential statement would be useful.”

Preliminary discussions between Spender and Doidge were held in Canberra on 12 and 13 February. In those discussions, Spender demurred at the New Zealand proposal, claiming that Australia would not be satisfied with a simple informal

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216 “Minutes of a Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and officers of the Department of External Affairs, 6 February, 1951” in DNZER, Vol. III, pp. 564-568.
217 “Memorandum for Doidge, 8 February, 1951” in New Zealand Archives (hereafter cited as NZA), EA1, 111/3/3, part 3.
American guarantee. The more preferable arrangement was, he stressed, a "treaty in solemn form." Admonishing New Zealand for its concern over the Near Eastern defence, and brushing aside its apprehension about UK exclusion from the pact, Spender indicated that he was greatly seized with the urgency of securing a formal pact out of the favourable bargaining conditions created by United States determination to consolidate America's strategic position in Northeast Asia. He emphasised to the New Zealander that, since the presence of Dulles might offer the "last opportunity" of obtaining any form of guarantee from the United States, this opportunity must not in any way be lost. The Australian Minister then showed that, besides its acceptance of the terms of the American proposal for a peace treaty, which would permit unlimited Japanese rearmament, Canberra was now inclined to accept the American preference for an Australian and New Zealand commitment to the defence of Japan, if this proved to be a necessary condition of an American guarantee. Australia and New Zealand, he stressed to Doidge, must make "some concession as to the obligations of a Pact," and he referred to the fact that "Australia would prefer any obligations in respect of Japan to be limited," although it was not clearly indicated how this could be done without reducing the value of the pact for the other partners seeking an American guarantee. In the final analysis, Doidge did not object to a tripartite pact between Australia, New Zealand and the United States.

219 Ibid.
221 Ibid; and Sir Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, pp. 103-104.
Opening the Canberra talks at Parliament House on 15 February, Dulles devoted all his energies on the first and second days towards winning Australia and New Zealand over to the US view on a Japanese peace treaty, which would permit unlimited Japanese rearmament. Reviewing the position of the US and Soviet Russia in relation to strategic materials, and affirming the strategic centrality of the Japanese islands in the US Asian strategy, Dulles referred to the Australian and New Zealand viewpoint that specific limitations should be written into the peace treaty to prevent Japanese rearmament. By citing the Versailles Treaty and America's unwillingness to police any restrictive terms of a peace treaty, Dulles strongly countered the Australian and New Zealand arguments. Dulles then emphasised that restrictions on Japan's right to rearm were unnecessary, arguing that the United States was thinking about Japan's status in the Cold War in terms of creating a "screen of force" in the areas which it was prepared to identify with its own security, and that it was not necessary for Japan to have full-scale forces to meet air, sea and land attack upon it. In response, Spender told Dulles that "[t]he feeling of the Australian public against a Japanese treaty which provided no control over Japan's rearmament was very strong." If no security safeguards were imposed upon Japan, it was quite possible, he argued, that "Japan would stand aside in a general war between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies and when both sides were exhausted, she could move in and help herself to the territories she had coveted in the past." The American emissary riposted that such restrictive covenants to be contained in a peace treaty would completely undermine the

American objective of making Japan “feel that she was being brought back into the community of nations and ... relationships of equality with other nations.”

Later that day, Spender reported the course of the negotiations to Cabinet and obtained support from other colleagues for the objective to be achieved in his talks with Dulles. At a resumed session on the morning of 16 February, Spender persistently maintained his stance of resistance to unlimited Japanese rearmament by using to the utmost “the negotiating value of Australia’s agreement to sign a peace treaty as a lever to obtain an effective security guarantee for Australia.” He told Dulles that, “while his review gave good grounds for concluding that Japan did not in the immediate years ahead present any menace to peace, we were not satisfied that, in the long run, it was wholly unlikely she would not.” There was a distinct danger, he argued, that “if we pursued a line of policy thought expedient to meet immediate perils, we would blind our eyes to ultimate possibilities and consequences.” From an Australian standpoint, Spender continued, though it was necessary to do all Australia could to meet the threat of Soviet imperialism, “we had to protect ourselves against the possible resurgence of Japanese imperialism and a revival of the Japanese police state.” Dulles responded that the United States was absolutely confident that “if Japan is basically committed to the free world and accepts US troops in and around its territories, we will have complete control over any rearmament plans Japan may adopt.” A further factor, he argued, “would be international regulation of the flow of raw materials.” These two factors, the American emissary stressed, would seem to

227 Ibid.
take care of the problem of a resurgent Japan better than any words which might be
included in a peace treaty.\textsuperscript{228} To this, Doidge stated that “Dulles’ explanation of the
controls to which Japan would in any event be subject to a world-wide system of raw
materials collections and the presence of US troops in Japan was highly convincing for
the short-term period,” but that “Dulles’ exposition did not seem to cover the long-
term possibilities.”\textsuperscript{229}

Resuming the conversation on the afternoon of 16 February, Dulles further
responded to Spender’s and Doidge’s arguments. The US, he stated, faced a hard
choice between seeking a friendly Japan and forcing it into the arms of Soviet Russia
and Communist China. “Whatever the ultimate future held, we were presented within
the foreseeable future with the challenge of Soviet imperialism and we had constantly
to keep this before us.”\textsuperscript{230} If a Japanese peace treaty contained a lot of disabilities, he
insisted, Japanese pride would be hurt and they would become restive, making more
likely that they would go on the Soviet side. Restrictions which amounted to
“branding Japan as a third rate power” would defeat America’s own ends.\textsuperscript{231} Even the
US proposal for generous peace terms, Dulles asserted, was not absolutely guaranteed
to attract and adhere Japan to the Western world. In response, Spender told the
American envoy that “we have felt that, if we were to go to the people and Parliament
and say that we must approve a Japanese treaty of the type desired by the United

\textsuperscript{228} “Memorandum by Robert A. Fearay of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, 16 February, 1951”
in \textit{FRUS,} 1951, Vol. VI, part 1, p. 160; and “Notes on Discussions in Canberra with Dulles” in AA,
A5954, Box 1819, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{229} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{230} Sir Percy Spender, \textit{Exercises in Diplomacy,} p. 125.
\textsuperscript{231} “Memorandum by Fearay, 16 February, 1951” in \textit{FRUS,} 1951, Vol. VI, part 1, p. 161; and “Notes
on the Australian-New Zealand-United States Talks in Canberra, 15-17 February, 1951” in \textit{DNZER,}
States, without a corollary security arrangement for Australia, it would mean political oblivion for our party.”

The willingness of Australia and New Zealand to accept the US version of a Japanese peace treaty, he insisted, would be conditioned by the degree to which the United States would formalise its security relations to them. He then urged Dulles that talks on a Japanese peace treaty should be deferred until the clarification of a security treaty. Dulles was sympathetic. “Our proposals are not easily saleable to your people,” he said. “It is reasonable for you to want to have something to meet Australian and New Zealand public opinion.” Dulles made it clear that “there is no hesitation or reluctance on our part as regards the substance of what you want.”

The special American envoy then inquired whether it was possible to include both Japan and the Philippines in a prospective security arrangement. In regard to Japanese participation, Spender claimed that Australia “could hardly be expected at this period of time - less than five years from the cessation of hostilities in the Pacific - to sit down with the Japanese for joint military staff talks,” but that he fully supported “the long-term desirability of a general Pacific pact, including Japan.” Doidge also stated that both Australia and New Zealand would have a “hard job” of selling to the public any arrangement which would include Japan. Dulles understood Australian and New Zealand positions, saying that the question of Japanese participation would be held in abeyance until Japan was in a position to play its full part. Regarding Philippine participation, Spender in private showed his willingness to accept the Philippines as an

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232 “Memorandum by Fearcy, 16 February, 1951” in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, part 1, p. 158; and “Notes on Discussion in Canberra with Dulles” in AA, A5954, Box 1819, p.1.
234 Ibid.
original member of the pact in case the US pushed hard for its insistence, but he stressed the desirability of the United States entering into a separate agreement with that country on terms similar to one between the US, Australia and New Zealand.235

Dulles admitted that Spender’s suggestion was worthwhile examining, reserving America’s position on the Philippines’ participation, and suggesting that the officials might examine the substance of a tripartite security arrangement, particularly the “obligations” to be undertaken by the prospective members.236 Under the Vandenberg Resolution of 19 May 1948, Dulles asserted, any security treaty to which the US was a party, had to be based on the twin essentials of mutuality of obligation and effective self-help.237 In this connection, he referred to the fact that even a security treaty limited to the Southwest Pacific would have to consider Japan’s role as an essential link in the American Pacific defence perimeter:

From the point of view of the military defence of the area, Japan is in a critical position. The attack may come from the south through Indonesia, but is more likely in the north through Japan. Our military people feel that Japan is the anchor position and that if it were lost, it will make it difficult to hold the rest. So any commitments we make will from our standpoint have to be premised on the total view we take of the defence of the whole Pacific area. This does not mean that every country will have to be in an arrangement. It simply means that we will not be prepared to act except on the basis of the overall strategic picture.  


237 Sir Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, p. 128.

Dulles here appeared to be alluding to a possible Australian and New Zealand commitment to the security of Japan.

From the evening of 16 February to the morning session of the next day, Australian, New Zealand and American officers were engaged in the formulation of a draft of a security treaty. In the process of drafting the security treaty, US concern was directed towards creating an ANZUS treaty as a means of reassuring Australia and New Zealand in the face of the proposed rearmament provisions of the peace treaty. By asking for the insertion of Article IV into the security treaty, the Americans gave sufficient reassurance to the wartime Pacific allies so that they would assent to the proposed US peace treaty. "Each Party recognises that an armed attack in the Pacific area upon any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." America's attention then turned towards seeking a security contribution by Australia and New Zealand in order to consolidate the American strategic position in the Northwest Pacific. In the formulation of the security treaty, the draft submitted to the American officials by the Australian and New Zealand representatives suggested that the defence area of the security treaty should be limited to an area south of the equator, corresponding generally with the wartime South and Southwest Pacific areas. But the American officials brushed aside the draft, pressuring Australia and New Zealand to assume a share of the burden of balancing growing Soviet-Chinese military power in Northeast Asia:

the question would be raised when the treaty was under examination in the Senate-as to what consideration was being offered to the United

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States. American Samoa was the only American territory covered within the area of the South and Southwest Pacific and... Congress was most unlikely to regard this as adequate consideration.  

"Such a disparity would scarcely be acceptable," the Americans argued, "to the Congress of the United States if the effect would be to secure an Australian and New Zealand guarantee only of American Samoa, whereas the metropolitan island territories of Australia and New Zealand would be guaranteed by the United States."  

If there were to be reasonable balance of obligations under the pact, they strongly insisted, the area covered would have to be large enough to include an area which the US considered essential to its own security.

Demanding that the scope of the application of the mutual assistance pledge of the Treaty should be broadened, the American officers pressed the Australian and New Zealand officials for the insertion of Article V, which referred to the whole Pacific, into the draft security treaty:

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific, or on its armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific.

By means of this clause, the operative area of the security treaty extended not only to attacks on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties and island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific but also to attacks on "its armed forces, public vessels, or

aircraft in the Pacific.” The wording, “its armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific,” clearly pointed to the US forces stationed in the Philippines, the Ryukyus and the main islands of Japan. As long as the United States continued to maintain its forces in the Philippines, Ryukyus and Japan, Australia and New Zealand would be, by means of this clause, obliged to provide those islands with a defence commitment. If the Philippines were included, they would also be obliged to commit forces to the defence of US forces in the Ryukyus and Japan.

In his later meeting with the US military establishment on 11 April 1951, Dulles set out his view on Australian, New Zealand and, possibly Philippine military contribution in relation to the defence of Japan:

All the nations concerned equally would be pledged to help to defend Japan if it were attacked unless we failed to go to the assistance of Japan ourselves ... There would be no problem so long as the attack came while the US forces remained there.\(^\text{243}\)

At a press conference held in Tokyo on 22 April 1951, when he was again in Japan and was queried whether an ANZUS treaty would come into play if US troops in Japan were attacked, he replied extemporaneously. “If there were an attack upon the US forces that were stationed in Japan, Okinawa or the Philippines,” Dulles stated, “that would be deemed to be an attack upon the US in the Pacific for purposes of that pact.”\(^\text{244}\) In a brief prepared for the second ANZUS Council meeting held in Washington in early September 1953, the New Zealand Department of External Affairs also unreservedly admitted that

\(^{243}\) “Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-JCS Meeting, 11 April, 1951” in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, part 1, pp. 192-201.

\(^{244}\) Asahi Shimbun, 27 and 29 April, 1951; Nippon Times, 25 April, 1951; “Telegram from Doidge to Dulles, 23 April, 1951” in DNZER, Vol. III, p. 717; and “Telegram from Berendson to Doidge, 26 April, 1951” in DNZER, Vol. III, p. 718.
Included within the scope of ANZUS is the important North Pacific area... [the area of]... almost exclusively... United States responsibility... [U]nder the terms of the ANZUS Treaty, the United States would, in an emergency in that area, call upon Australia and New Zealand for assistance in repelling aggression...  

By proposing the insertion of Articles VII and VIII into the draft security treaty, the American officials further reassured Australia and New Zealand against fears of renewed Japanese aggression, and, at the same time, attempted to preserve the strategic value placed upon those states’ security role in the Pacific in relation to Japan. Article VII of the draft security treaty reads as follows:

The Parties hereby establish a Council on which each of them shall be represented to consider matters concerning the implementation of the Treaty. The Council shall be so organised to be able to meet promptly at any time and may set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary to accomplish its purposes.

The underlined wording “subsidiary bodies” implied the setting up of a Defence Council and the accompanying military committee comprising the American, Australian, New Zealand and, possibly Philippine Joint Chiefs of Staff. It also made it possible for Australian, New Zealand and, possibly Philippine military missions to participate in the US JCS defence planning and to involve those states closely in US international strategy.

Article VIII of the security treaty states:

The Parties recognise that this Treaty may be more effectively implemented in association with other states and groups of States not

parties to the Treaty. The Council, established by Article VII, shall therefore maintain the closest possible relations with and consult with States in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the Pacific area. The Council shall also co-ordinate its planning so far as possible with that of other regional organisations and association of States of which one or more of the Parties are members.²⁴⁸

The underlined last sentence of this Article had two main objectives. The first was to permit co-ordination of military planning between a military committee under an ANZUS treaty and the counterpart that might be established under a bilateral US-Japan base arrangement (the Japan-US Security Treaty). In other words, this Article was a functional clause for combining an ANZUS treaty with a bilateral US-Japan base arrangement. Secondly, the last sentence was intended to meet Spender’s ambitions to link the proposed security treaty with NATO for the purpose of transmitting Australian views connected with the Pacific area to the European nations and of exerting influence upon NATO policy-planning. It also made it possible to coordinate military planning between a military committee under an ANZUS treaty and the counterpart under NATO, consisting of twelve nations’ Chiefs of Staff.²⁴⁹

Although the American officials did not contemplate anything as elaborate as NATO and did not desire to duplicate its organisation, these articles nonetheless showed that Dulles was really sympathetic to Australian desire to obtain some continuous mode of consultation in the Pentagon’s defence planning. They also indicated his intention to integrate an ANZUS treaty into the defence of Japan

and to step up the role of Australia, New Zealand and, possibly the Philippines as joint guarantors for the protection of the former enemy. By exposing the Southwest Pacific nations and the Philippines to US military planning for the Pacific, he clearly hoped to ensure a viable means to foster in them a sense of responsibility and obligation to fight in aiding the US in the defence of Japan and to maintain prompt readiness to render assistance to the centre of American power in East Asia. At a JCS-State Department meeting on 11 April, Dulles stressed that, as long as Australia, New Zealand and, possibly the Philippines were competent to go to the defence of Japan, the disclosure of US plans for the Pacific would be relevant. Since, in his view, Australian and New Zealand reception of Japan as a direct alliance partner would be made possible “in two or three years,” access of those states to the development of Japan’s post-treaty rearmament was an effective vehicle to dissipate the vestiges of their wartime hatred and bitterness and to facilitate Japan’s participation in an ANZUS treaty.

By presenting the Preamble of the security treaty on the morning session of 17 February, Dulles further made Spender and Doidge recognise an ANZUS treaty as constituting “one component of the series of security arrangements for the protection of the offshore island chain in the Pacific.” The second recital of the Preamble reads:

Noting that the United States already has arrangements pursuant to which its armed forces are stationed in the Philippines, and has armed forces and administrative responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty, may also station armed forces in and about Japan to assist in the preservation of peace and security in the Japan area ...

250 “Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-JCS Meeting, 11 April, 1951” in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, part 1, pp. 192-201.
251 Ibid.
252 J.G. Starke, op.cit., p. 94.
As Dulles wrote to MacArthur on 2 March 1951, this paragraph was designed to recognize the strategic inter-dependence between an ANZUS treaty and the US military presence in the Northwest Pacific "in the event that Japan and the Philippines are not initially members of the Pact." Thus an ANZUS treaty was created both as a means of reassuring Australia and New Zealand against a rearmed Japan and as a means of strengthening Japan's pivotal role in the Far East.

In early March, 1951 the British Chiefs of Staff and Cabinet formulated their attitude towards an ANZUS treaty. While accepting the concept of Australia and New Zealand being incorporated into the ambit of American influence, the British opposed the Phillipines' participation for fear of the likely adverse psychological effect of their inclusion upon the countries on the Asian mainland. This decision was conveyed to the State Department on 5 April by Sir Oliver Franks, and on 14 April the Americans accepted the British objection. During April-July, Articles VII and VIII of the draft security treaty, concerned with preparations and planning to meet hypothetical cases of aggression, encountered strong opposition from the Pentagon. In consequence, the provisions for a military planning organisation and joint planning

256 "Memorandum of Conversation by Allison, 14 April, 1951" in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, part 1, pp. 204-206.
were eliminated from those articles. On 12 July Dulles, Spender, who had now replaced Makin as Ambassador to the US on 8 June, and Carl Berendsen, New Zealand Ambassador to Washington, initialled the final draft of the ANZUS treaty. On 1 September, at the Presidio of San Francisco, representatives of Australia, New Zealand and the United States concluded the ANZUS treaty. On 8 September, about six years after the termination of hostilities between Japan and the Allied Powers, the Japanese Peace Treaty was signed in San Francisco by forty eight nations, and this was followed by the conclusion of the Japan-US Security Treaty four hours later. The structure of the peace in the Pacific was further complemented on 30 August by the conclusion of the Philippine-US Mutual Defence Treaty. This agreement, which did not supersede the agreement between the two nations respecting military bases signed at Manila on 14 March 1947, not only reassured the Philippines against a rearmed Japan, but also provided for possible Philippine assistance to the US forces in Japan.

Conclusion

In early March, 1950 Spender broached a proposal for a Pacific military alliance backed by the United States. The proposal was intended not only to adjust Australia to the contraction of British power and influence in the Asian-Pacific region, but also to meet the threats posed by growing communist expansion and a possible resurgence of Japan as a military power. In early 1950 Spender could not make any progress on a Pacific pact because of US reluctance to disturb existing power relationships in Asia.

258 "Draft United States-Philippine Security Treaty prepared in the Department of State, 16 August, 1951" in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, part 1, pp. 234-236. In the US-Philippine mutual defence treaty, the same article as Article V of ANZUS, which defined the scope of the application of the mutual assistance pledge of the Treaty as the whole Pacific, was inserted into Article V.
However, the outbreak of the Korean War provided an opportunity to promote an alliance with the US. By diverting its forces stationed in Japan to the Korean battlefield, Australia gave the US the practical evidence of its willingness to accept the diplomatic and strategic assumptions underlying the containment doctrine. However, even after the Korean attack and in the course of Spender’s visit to the US, America was still unwilling to involve itself permanently in peace time in the maintenance of the balance of power in the Southwest Pacific. But the United States considered Australia’s security in terms of the need to reassure its wartime allies from the danger of a rearmed Japan. In mid-October a means of reassuring Australia and New Zealand against a resurgent Japan was devised by the US in the form of a presidential declaration as well as a plan for Australia’s access to America’s military planning in the Pacific.

Full-scale entry of Communist China into the Korean hostilities and its massive counter-offensive at the end of 1950 provoked strong US concern over the protection of Japan from the danger of communism. To step up the defence of American security interests in the Japanese islands, the United States contemplated a series of measures. These included: the formal commitment of American sea and air power to the Pacific offshore island chain; the immediate revitalisation of Japanese power; the provision of reassurance to the wartime Pacific allies against a resurgent Japan; and the involvement of Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines in the defence of Japan. To facilitate the achievement of these means, the United States proposed a Pacific Ocean pact. But the American pact proposal was undermined because of Japanese unwillingness to undertake moderate rearmament and British opposition to a multi-lateral pact without
its membership. However, this did not deter Dulles from visiting Australia. By offering reassurance to the wartime Pacific allies against a resurgent Japan in the way of a formal pact, Dulles obtained their approval for the terms of proposed US peace with Japan. At the same time, the US obliged Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines to assist US forces in the protection of Japan. Thus ANZUS was created by the US as a means of obtaining the Pacific dominions' support for a US plan for unlimited Japanese rearmament and of enlisting the commitment of those states to the defence of the Northwest Pacific. However, because of America’s unwillingness to make a formal defence commitment to mainland Asia, the security treaty did not include the Southeast Asian mainland in its defence scope. Here lay the origin of Australia’s quest for another military alliance backed by the United States. This quest represented an attempt by Australia to complement the limited capability of ANZUS to contain communism in Asia:

A number of scholars and historians have argued that ANZUS was created by the United States as a quid pro quo for Australia's acceptance of the US proposal for a Japanese peace treaty.\(^\text{259}\) This Chapter has reconfirmed and expanded the argument. However, as J.G. Starke and Trevor Reese have argued and this Chapter has reconfirmed and expanded, Australian agreement in itself to the terms of proposed US peace treaty with Japan did not induce the US to formalise its security relations with

Australia and New Zealand. At the time of 1951, America’s security thinking about the Pacific still revolved around the area north of the equator; the United States did not recognise the separate geo-strategic value of the Southwest Pacific area. Given the trend of America’s thought about the Pacific defence, the US would have been reluctant to provide a formal security guarantee to Australia and New Zealand merely in return for their consent to the proposed US peace treaty with Japan. In order to obtain a formal security pact from the US, Australia and New Zealand had to pay a further price in the form of the provision of a defence commitment to Northeast Asia, the area which the US saw as being of great importance in supporting its interests in the regional and global strategic balances.

Chapter III
Britain Presses For Association With ANZUS, 1952-53

The ANZUS security treaty inflicted a serious blow to British international prestige and to Commonwealth cohesion; it symbolised an independent defence treaty, for the first time in Australian and New Zealand history, with a foreign power outside of the British Commonwealth of Nations unchaperoned by the mother country and the formal replacement of the United Kingdom with the United States as the chief guarantor of the Pacific dominions' security. In the years 1952-53, the British government embarked upon securing compensation for wounded British prestige and Commonwealth family feeling brought about by the creation of ANZUS, and upon counterbalancing the exclusion of Britain from ANZUS by attempting to gain entrance for the British to ANZUS deliberations on a direct or indirect basis. In consequence, Australia, New Zealand and the US came under strong pressure from Britain for its own association with ANZUS. But the United States was adamant in resolving to maintain ANZUS as a narrow and limited working arrangement for fear of saddling it with the colonial heritage of the past and in order to avoid the difficulties of justifying the non-inclusion of other powers. The British insistence on an effective consultative role in ANZUS discussions thus put a strain on Anglo-American relations; Australia and New Zealand stood somewhere between the United States and Britain on the question of giving Britain an effective connection with ANZUS. Torn between their sentimental ties with the United Kingdom and their practical security ties with the United States, the Pacific dominions struggled with the task of reconciling continued
loyalty to Britain with intimate and vital relations with the United States. This Chapter examines how the United Kingdom government responded to the development of Australian-New Zealand-American security relationship during 1952-53 and how the ANZUS powers coped with the British reaction.

Since the ending of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1922, Britain had been forced to recognise that its security and that of its Empire rested largely upon United States resources and strength, and the Second World War in effect rammed home the extent of this dependence. Nevertheless, it was still beyond British recognition in the post-World War II era that the United States, by underwriting the security of Australia and New Zealand, would be involved permanently in peace-time in the preservation of the balance of power in the Southwest Pacific. As Sir Esler Dening, Under Secretary of State in the UK Foreign Office, told Lewis W. Douglas, American Ambassador to London, on 29 March 1949, in the British view, the concept of Australia forming a military alliance with the US in peace-time was nothing more than "a pipe dream" of Australian politicians and newspapermen. In London, the ANZUS treaty with its pointed exclusion of Britain from membership therefore came as something of a shock. When the security treaty was brought before the British Labour government in early March 1951, the British Cabinet was in an uproar over the proposal to grant a formal US security guarantee to Australia and New Zealand, with some members charging that it would be regarded as evidence of a renunciation of British interests in the Far

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East and others arguing that the United Kingdom was being unduly subservient to the
United States in the Pacific.3

But ANZUS came just at the time of the Anglo-Iranian crisis resulting from Iranian
Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh's attempt to nationalise the oil industry, which
was made on 2 May 1951. Given this situation, the Attlee Labour government decided
that there were circumstances in which it would not pay to protect British overseas
investment by British arms alone. British military officers therefore acknowledged the
value of an American defence commitment to Australia and New Zealand in terms of a
greater sense of security to strengthen the capacity and willingness of those states to
assume wider responsibilities in the Middle East.4 Britain's exclusion from ANZUS
did not seem to worry the British Chiefs of Staff unduly. Addressing Parliament on 19
April, the British Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, publicised the British
government's acceptance of ANZUS. Admitting that "it would not have been
unwelcome to us if we had been included in the proposed Pact," Morrison nonetheless
welcomed ANZUS as "a most valuable contribution to the security of the
Commonwealth" and "as complementary to the understandings of mutual support and
co-operation between our own country, Australia and New Zealand."5 This was
followed by a statement by Kenneth Younger, Minister for State, six days later in the

3 Richie Ovendale, The English-Speaking Alliance: Britain, the United States, the Dominions and the
Kowa to Igirisu no Asia Seisaku (The Japanese Peace Settlement and Britain's Asian Policy)" in
Akio Watanabe and Seigen Miyasato (eds.), San Francisco Kowa (The San Francisco Peace
Settlement), Tokyo: Todai Shuppan, 1986, pp. 176-177; John Williams, "ANZUS: a Blow to Britain's
David McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact: Policy-Making, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1945-55.
4 Ibid.
5 UK Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. 484, p.2007, 19 April, 1951, Statement by
Morrison
House of Commons, in which Younger stated that the British government regarded ANZUS "as a most useful contribution to agreed Commonwealth strategy."  

But these government arguments did not at all convince British conservative parliamentarians. For them, ANZUS was harder to take. Anthony Eden argued in the House of Commons on 19 April that Britain ought to be included in the ANZUS alliance, since "any threat to either Australia or New Zealand must always be calculated as a threat to our own country," and "our Malayan interests make us essentially a Pacific power."  

In a parliamentary debate held on 25 April, Eden reiterated his demand for British association with ANZUS on the ground that "there can be no effective Pacific defence that does not include Britain and Malaya."  

By describing ANZUS as "another example of the decline of British influence under the present dying Socialist government," future Defence Minister Duncan Sandys also showed his unwillingness to accept the virtual substitution of America for Britain in security roles in the Southwest Pacific by the creation of the treaty. Criticising the Attlee Labour government for failure to secure the inclusion of Britain, on 25 July future Prime Minister Harold Macmillan greatly regretted that "a pact of this importance should be entered into by two members of the Commonwealth without the admission of the Mother Country."  

In the election campaign for the House of Commons, conservative politicians not only attacked the Labour government for having condoned the "snub" to the UK involved in British exclusion from ANZUS, but also appealed to the public to reassert British influence over the Pacific

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6 Ibid., Vol. 487, p. 388, 20 April, 1951, Statement by Younger.
7 Ibid., Vol. 484, pp. 2007-2008, 19 April, 1951, Statement by Eden.
9 Ibid., p. 391, 25 April, 1951, Statement by Sandys.
dominions by associating Britain with ANZUS. Along with a pledge to bring recovery to the British economy, the Tory election platform was quite effective in the general election held on 25 October, and the next day Winston Churchill, extraordinaire empire statesman, resumed the premiership, with Anthony Eden as Foreign Secretary.

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Immediately after the Churchill government was installed in power, a major British newspaper, the Manchester Guardian, predicted an attempt by the government to reverse the Labour government's decision on ANZUS or to gain immediate admission into the ANZUS treaty. However, the British conservative government did not attempt either to upset or disrupt the preceding Attlee government's decision to accept the tripartite security treaty or to make an immediate approach to the ANZUS powers for British association with ANZUS. Still less, did it undertake to deter Australia, New Zealand and the US from completing the ratification procedures for the treaty or from launching its implementation phase. Basically admitting the value of ANZUS as a means of maintaining security in the Southwest Pacific, and as a supplementary boost to British Commonwealth defence, the Churchill government initially attempted to ameliorate the exclusive character of ANZUS by demanding direct or indirect British participation in the treaty discussions.

Immediately after the signature of the ANZUS treaty on 1 September 1951, Richard Casey, who had succeeded Spender in late April as Minister for External Affairs, directed Spender to enter into preliminary discussions with the Americans.

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concerning the implementation of the security treaty. On 1 October Spender conferred with George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, submitting tentative proposals concerning an organisational structure for the Council. In regard to political machinery, Spender envisaged a political committee in Washington consisting of ambassadors for Australia and New Zealand and a high-level State Department official, together with a Secretariat consisting of officials from each Embassy and the State Department to advise and prepare materials for the Council. To ensure the ANZUS treaty as an effective vehicle for Australia's entry into US military planning at the central level, Spender also schemed to set up both a military committee in Washington consisting of senior service advisers to the Australian and New Zealand Ambassadors and comparable ranking officers of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, plus a military committee in Honolulu consisting of US Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific (CINCPAC) and Australian and New Zealand Chiefs of Staff.\(^\text{12}\)

Continuing discussion of an organisational structure for ANZUS, Spender next spoke to Myron M. Cowen on 5 December. Since this period saw Dulles devoting his energies towards the problem of ratification of the Japanese peace treaty and other related security treaties in the US Senate, Cowen, former American Ambassador to Australia during July 1948 to March 1949, and Ambassador to the Philippines during March 1949-November 1951, had been appointed as Consultant to the Secretary of State on 23 October, with special responsibility for the execution of the security

\(^{12}\) "Note for Spender from McNicol, 1 October, 1951" in AA, A5460/1, 217/6, part 3; "Cablegram No. 1735 from Spender to Casey, 1 October, 1951" in AA, A5460/1, 217/6, part 3; "Cipher message No. W46 from the Head of the Australian Joint Service Staff, F.R.W. Scherger, to Frederick Shedden, 4 October, 1951" in AA, A816/52, 19/301/1244; and "Note for McNicol from C.T. Moodie, Counsellor of the Australian Embassy, Washington, 8 October, 1951" in AA, A5460, 217/6, part 3.
treaties with the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. His appointment had been effective from 15 November 1951.\textsuperscript{13}

Opening the conversation, Cowen told Spender that the State Department would prefer to place maximum emphasis on the political rather than the military aspects of the Council, since the US Joint Chiefs of Staff would not want to be committed to regular meetings. In response, Spender emphasised the importance of a continuous mode of consultation between the ANZUS powers. Not only did he express his view about the need for a political committee and a Secretariat, but he also pressed for his concept of a military committee both in Washington as a planning headquarters and in Honolulu as an executive headquarters.\textsuperscript{14} In his meeting with Cowen five days later, Spender, accompanied by Casey, emphasised the importance of preserving Australia's significant consultative role in regional and global affairs by requesting that the Council should not be made simply "a paper organisation." The Australian Ambassador went on to suggest a list of specific areas for Australian-American military co-operation, which particularly included the development of Australia as a military supply base in the Cold War, intelligence co-operation, the determination of Australia's role both in the cold war and a possible hot war, the interchange of personnel, the coordination of Pacific planning and global planning, etc.\textsuperscript{15}

But preliminary discussions about the implementation of the ANZUS treaty were completely suspended until early March 1952; the US Defense Department was

\textsuperscript{13} "Department of State for the Press, No. 960, 23 October, 1951" in \textit{AA}, A1838/289, 532/11, part 5.
\textsuperscript{14} "Note for Spender from McNicol, 11 December, 1951" in \textit{AA}, A5460/1, 217/6, part 3.
strongly discouraging the State Department from discussing any military implementation of the treaty with Australia until the Japanese Peace Treaty, the US-Japan Security Treaty, the US-Philippine Mutual Defence Treaty and ANZUS had been ratified by the US Senate. Since the US government contemplated that those treaties would be ratified by the US Congress as "one package," and were still conducting negotiations with the Japanese about administrative arrangement listing legal privileges for US forces in post-treaty Japan until the end of February, the Pentagon was unwilling to discuss the implementation of any of these four treaties until they obtained a strong Japanese commitment and assurance about legal privileges for American forces in the Japanese islands.

With a growing consciousness of America's superpower status, the US military establishment also opposed Spender's plan for military machinery under the Council. Viewing possible Australian and New Zealand entree into America's world defence strategy as a "serious and far-reaching impairment to the present and projected status of United States planning for a global war," the Joint Chiefs of Staff asserted that there should not be any basis in the ANZUS treaty by which "pressure could be exerted to commit the United States to a military effort which is disproportionate to its overall responsibilities and commitments." Moreover, since the American officers believed that the general defence of the Pacific Ocean would inevitably rest far more on the exercise of US air and naval power than on the employment of local land

they were greatly anxious to retain their ability to make America's mobile striking power operate with the greatest flexibility and freedom of action in all future contingencies. "There should be no tendency," the JCS argued, "to reduce, without compensating military advantage, United States military freedom of action, or to give Australia and New Zealand the power of veto over the type and scope of plans evolved."\(^{20}\)

With the completion of the negotiations on administrative arrangement between Japan and the US on 28 February 1952, and in anticipation of the forthcoming US Senate ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty and other related security treaties, on 9 March Spender paid a social call on Cowen. In the course of the conversation, Spender was left with the impression that an attempt might be made by the military authorities in the US government "to lessen the importance of the Council" and "to nibble away the functions of the Council."\(^{21}\) In a further meeting held five days later, accompanied by L.K. Munro, who had succeeded Carl Berendsen on 26 February as New Zealand Ambassador to Washington, Spender expressed to Cowen his strong concern at the possibility of any attempt being made "to water down" his proposal for military machinery, stressing that the Council should be made "a going concern, giving us a direct voice in determination both of Pacific as well as global policy." The Australian Ambassador also argued that "our acceptance of [a] Japanese Peace Treaty we did not like" should "be counterbalanced by fullest implementation of the Tripartite

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Treaty.” In view of the US military’s possible attempt to diminish the functions and prestige of the Council, Spender appealed to Casey that it was of urgent importance for an ANZUS Council meeting to be held shortly after the treaty was ratified. In response, Casey wrote back to Spender that, while he shared Spender’s concern about Pentagon apathy towards Australia’s plan "to extract full value from the Pact," he and the Department of External Affairs nonetheless thought that the Council would be held around the end of August either in Washington or in Honolulu.

With the ratification by the US Senate of the Japanese peace and three other security treaties on 20 March, and with the resignation of Dulles as Consultant to the Secretary of State five days later, it was soon arranged by the US government that those treaties would enter into force on 29 April. On 2 April Spender held a further meeting with Cowen, pressing for the earliest possible holding of the Council shortly after the coming into force of ANZUS. In response, Cowen stated that he personally would like to see the first meeting of the Council being held in Australia during the Coral Sea Week celebrations. At this meeting, Spender was again informed by Cowen of the lack of Pentagon intention to make the Council a "body of substance". The next day Spender cabled Casey, reporting his conversation with Cowen, and showing an astute insight into one of the reasons for the US military's unwillingness to cooperate with Australia in joint defence planning. "The Department of Defence," the Australian Ambassador argued,

23 “Cablegram No. 382 from Spender to Casey, 18 March, 1952” in AA, A1838/2, 532/13/2.
25 “Cablegram No. 470 from Spender to Casey, 3 April, 1952” in AA, A1838/2, 851/18/3, part 3.
are more concerned about military problems as between themselves and Japan and [their] attention is directed to the North Western rather than the South West Pacific Area.

From the Pentagon's point of view, Spender thought, the area south of the equator in the Pacific had no separate geographical strategic significance.\(^{26}\)

Spender's insight into the trend of US military thinking was strongly corroborated on 28 April, when the State Department conferred with the Pentagon about an organisational structure for ANZUS. Emphasising that ANZUS was basically a security framework for Australia's international adulthood, State Department officials asked the Pentagon to suggest some machinery for fulfilling Spender's ambitions that Australia should have a significant consultative role in Pentagon planning. What the Australians wanted, John M. Allison, Director of the Far Eastern Affairs Bureau, stressed, was "the feeling that they are treated equally and that they do not have to go through London on all these matters." For his part, Cowen explained to the Pentagon that the Australians really wanted "to have some forum of their own which is distinct from London so that they can feel grown up." Strongly concerned about the possible consequences of the entry into superpower policy-planning of the small and middle powers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Omar Bradley, countered by saying: "We don't want a formal organisation. If we do get one, we will have to get one with everyone else." Bradley then declared to the State Department officers that the Southwest Pacific was a strategic backwater that would not at all require military planning in the Cold War:

\[\text{We don't anticipate much trouble in the Southern Pacific in the vicinity of Australia ... We don't want to hamstring ourselves by an excess of}\]

\(^{26}\) Ibid.
formal planning. We hope that trouble will never get down as far as Australia and New Zealand.

The State Department officers finally gave ground, and, at the end of this meeting, it was agreed between the State and Defense Departments that military machinery for ANZUS should be made up of military representatives attached to the Council, and that CINCPAC, Admiral Radford, would be the American representative.  

The American proposal was conveyed to the Australians and New Zealanders on 13 May, when C.T. Moodie, Counsellor of the Australian Embassy, Washington, and Munro met with Cowen. The American proposal, which would simply permit Australia and New Zealand to conduct consultations with the American regional field commander, fell far short of Spender's ambitions for Australia gaining direct access to America's military thought at the central level. It was also not even sufficient to obtain knowledge of America's planning for the whole Pacific. Although Radford's area responsibility certainly covered Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, it nonetheless did not include South Korea and Japan, a key-sector in the balance of power in the Pacific, whose area responsibility lay with the Commander-in-Chief in the Far East (CINCFE), General Mark Clark.

Although Spender was quite dissatisfied with the US proposal for ANZUS military machinery, he was nonetheless aware of the disadvantages of rejecting the proposal outright. Fully alive to the trend of US thought about the defence of the Southwest

27 "Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions of a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, 23 April, 1952" in FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. XII, part 1, pp. 80-85.
Pacific, and of US reluctance to join with Australia in joint defence planning, he took advantage of Prime Minister Menzies' visit to the US to search out an alternative vehicle for gaining for Australia a voice in world strategy. On 17 May, when Menzies arrived in Washington, Spender spoke to Alan Watt, Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, and F.O. Chilton, Acting Secretary of the Department of Defence, who were members of the Menzies delegation. Explaining the American proposal, which certainly reflected a Pentagon attempt to reduce the value of ANZUS, Spender requested the views of the Australian defence people about machinery for ANZUS. In response, Chilton told Spender that the Australian Chiefs of Staff did not see any need for formalised machinery as a means of obtaining Australia's access to US world strategy, and that the Defence Department's idea was a mutual accreditation of defence representatives among each of the Defence Departments of the ANZUS powers. Failing this, Chilton added, the head of the Australian Joint Service Staff (AJSS) in Washington, the successor staff of a war-time special military mission to the US, F.R.W. Scherger, "should be taken into greater confidence by the United States defence machinery in an informal manner." While expressing no opposition to the Defence Department's concept, Spender nevertheless hinted at the possibility of Australia's direct or indirect participation in NATO.29

Accompanied by Spender, on 19 May Menzies called at the State Department to hold talks with Acheson. By pointing out "the difficulties for Australia in deciding where to make her most effective contribution in a global war and the need for access by Australia to global strategic planning," Menzies emphasised the importance for

29 "Note of Conference between Menzies, Spender, and members of the Australian Delegation, 17 May, 1952" in AA, A5954/1, 1793/5.
Australia "to have access to NATO information and the right of being heard when our interests were affected." In response, Acheson argued that Australia's belief that NATO was engaged in global planning was "based on [a] fundamental misconception." NATO dealt solely with the defence of Europe, and there was "no place now where international global planning is taking place." Following this meeting, Menzies, accompanied by Spender and Chilton, drove to the Pentagon two days later, where he met Defense Secretary, Robert A. Lovett, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Stressing the importance of Australia being effectively consulted in regional and global planning, Menzies pressed for the concept of a mutual accreditation of defence representatives, and particularly requested that an Australian defence representative should be accredited to the Pentagon. In reply, Bradley, clearly bearing in mind the American proposal for ANZUS military machinery, suggested that "machinery at Radford level should be a trial," and went on to say that Radford, as Commander-in-Chief, was given a clear assignment by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pacific. To this, Menzies responded that "it was in the broader aspects of strategy that we sought a voice where our interests were concerned." It was finally agreed at this meeting that the question of military machinery would be fully discussed at the first meeting of the ANZUS Council.


31 "Cablegram No. 2112 from Menzies to Fadden, 26 May, 1952" in AA, A5954/1, 1418/3; and "Top-secret and personal letter from Chilton to Shedden, 27 May, 1952" in AA, A5954/1, 1793/5.
Prime Minister Menzies then flew on to Ottawa, and continued by ship to London, which he reached on 26 May, and where the Churchill conservative government had formulated their attitude towards the forthcoming ANZUS Council meeting. While the British government took no interest in Australia's quest for joint defence planning with the Americans, it was nonetheless carefully considering formulae for associating Britain with ANZUS. These were embodied in two proposals. The first proposal, formulated in the Foreign Office on 8 May, dealt with the ultimate British objectives towards ANZUS: namely, the extension of ANZUS membership to include the United Kingdom, France (for Indo-China) and possibly the Philippines as well and the reconstructing of ANZUS on NATO lines.\(^{32}\) The second proposal, also formulated in the Foreign Office on 15 May, dealt with immediate British objectives towards ANZUS. Taking fully into account the likely consequences upon the British domestic situation and upon British Commonwealth prestige of the exclusion of Britain from meetings of the ANZUS Council, the proposal included a request from Britain for observer status at the Council meeting, and, in the event of the establishment of a military committee under ANZUS, a request for active participation in the Committee in view of British interests in the ANZAM area.\(^{33}\) These two proposals were discussed at a Cabinet meeting held on 20 May, and, as a result of the discussion, the first proposal was dropped and the second adopted as the British position towards meetings of the ANZUS Council.\(^{34}\)

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In anticipation of a demand for UK association with ANZUS, Menzies, in his meeting on 27 May with Lord Salisbury, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, emphasised the disadvantages accompanying any extension of membership of the tripartite treaty. "If any suggestion were now put forward for extending the membership," the Prime Minister stated, "the US proposal for a Pacific Ocean Pact," which had been raised at the end of 1950, "would be revived," and this conception, which would make Australia a direct alliance partner of Japan and the Philippines, would still be "wholly unacceptable to public opinion in Australia." Menzies declared that before the question of an expanded membership, or of the association of other countries could be taken up, the practical machinery for ANZUS "should be brought into operation without further delay."

In his meeting with Churchill later on the same day, the Australian Prime Minister, by repeating the above arguments, sought to deter the British Prime Minister from raising the question of direct or indirect British admission into ANZUS. It was also argued by Menzies that "the Americans were afraid that the inclusion of the United Kingdom might lead them into commitments on the mainland of Southeast Asia, e.g., Indo-china, Siam and Burma."

After holding talks with UK Minister for Defence, Lord Alexander, on 30 May, Menzies next spoke to Eden in the Ministry of Defence building on 3 June. Menzies frankly told Eden that he was averse to UK association with ANZUS at the present time, since it would inevitably raise the question of associating countries such as Japan.

35 "Prime Minister’s Discussions in London, May 1952" in AA, A5954/1, 1418/2; and "Note of a Meeting of Ministers held in the Commonwealth Secretary’s Room, 27 May, 1952" in AA, A5954/1, 1793/1.
36 "Prime Minister’s Discussions in London, May 1952" in AA, A5954/1, 1418/2; and "Minutes of a Meeting in the Prime Minister’s Room, House of Commons, 27 May, 1952" in AA, A5954/1, 1793/1.
37 "Minutes of a Ministerial Conference Held on 30 May, 1952" in AA, A5954/1, 1793/1.
and the Philippines, and there would, as a result, be further delay before the first meeting of the ANZUS Council. Eden countered by saying that "public opinion in the United Kingdom would find it hard to understand the absence of United Kingdom representatives at meetings of the ANZUS Council and would accuse the government in the United Kingdom of failing to support the interests of the partners of the Commonwealth." Eden also added that he did not think that the Americans would maintain the argument that the Philippines and Japan had the same interest or right to express their views about Pacific problems as the United Kingdom. In closing the discussion, the British Foreign Secretary informed Menzies that he would draft a telegram for Acheson requesting some sort of British association with ANZUS.38

Later that day, at a dinner given by Eden at the Foreign Office, Menzies and Watt were shown a telegram to be sent to Washington, which contained a request for observer status for Britain at the ANZUS Council and for full British participation in any military committee that might be established under ANZUS.39 The British proposal was formally forwarded to Acheson, through Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador to Washington, on 6 June,40 and to Casey through James Marjoribanks, Acting UK High Commissioner for Australia, on 19 June.41

The request made by Britain for direct and indirect admission to ANZUS had apparently placed Australia in a difficult position. Given his attachment to the British

38 “Minutes of a Meeting held in the Ministry of Defence, 3 June, 1952” in AA, A5954/1, 1793/1.
39 “Top-secret and personal letter from Watt to Lawrence McIntyre, Acting Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, 9 June, 1952” in AA, A1838/1, 550/2/2.
40 “Cablegram No. 793, from Spender to Casey, 10 June, 1952” in AA, A1838/2, 851/18/3, part 3; and “Memorandum of Conversation by Acheson, 6 June, 1952” in FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. XII, part 1, pp. 105-106.
Commonwealth and to the British constitutional monarchy, Menzies had become very receptive to the British request. "In my view, we should not place any obstacle in United Kingdom efforts" to join meetings of the ANZUS Council "as an observer," Menzies cabled Casey and Spender, "provided the Americans are willing to play and provided the United Kingdom request does not involve our acceptance of a string of other countries in the same capacity." In view of British association with Australia and New Zealand in the ANZAM area, the Prime Minister also regarded it as appropriate to arrange for UK participation in ANZUS on the military side. Spender was, on the other hand, inclined to ignore the sensitivities of the British and to make light of British problems, and was more concerned about the difficulties posed for the US by British association with ANZUS. He also attached great importance to immediately putting the Australian-American security relationship on an operational track. "While I fully appreciate ... the strength of the Prime Minister's observations," Spender wrote back to Menzies, "before any questions of 'observers' or any extension of the Pact to include other nations should arise, the Council should first be established." Casey, who had had a long diplomatic career record which included posts in both London and Washington, was a balanced person. He clearly sympathised with the difficulties for the British government arising from the lack of any contact with ANZUS. The Churchill government, he said, "seemed to be ... unnecessarily concerned about the political effect in England of their having no contact with" the ANZUS Council. Nevertheless, Casey was determined not to allow his sympathy with the British to jeopardise the immediate implementation of ANZUS. "We share your views," Casey

42 "Cablegram No.2236 and No.84 from Menzies to Casey and Spender, 5 June, 1952" in AA, A5954/1, 1418/3.
43 "Cablegram No. 784 from Spender to Menzies, 6 June, 1952" in AA, A1838/276, 686/6, part 1A.
told Spender,"about caution in extending 'observer' rights to [the] United Kingdom or other countries."44

With these unreconciled views on the question of the British association with ANZUS, Menzies arrived in Washington on 18 June on his way back to Sydney from London. Conferring with Acheson in the State Department two days later, the Prime Minister raised the question of UK representation at the ANZUS Council meeting as an observer. Explaining his discussion with Eden, and Eden's anxiety about the political effect of Britain's exclusion from the Council, Menzies told Acheson that "Australia would be happy to have a British observer," provided that the proposal would not lead to indefinite delay in the first meeting of the Council or raise the question of similar claims by other countries. In reply, Acheson stressed that there was no formula whatever for Britain to be invited to participate in meetings of the ANZUS Council on an ad hoc basis, pointing out that "acceptance as an observer of any country, however close and friendly, would immediately raise the question of observers from other countries being present." At the conclusion of the discussion, it was agreed that the question of British association would be taken up at the first meeting of the ANZUS Council. Acheson and Menzies also finally agreed that the first meeting of the Council would be held in Honolulu in early August,45 and this agreement was announced by a State Department press officer on the same day.46

45 "Memorandum No.858 from Menzies to Thomas White, Australian High Commissioner, London, 2 June, 1952" in AA, A1838/269, TS (Top-Secret)532/13/1/1; "Cablegram No. 860 from Menzies to Fadden, 21 June, 1952" in AA, AWM (Australian War Memorial) 89, B.1/70; and "Cablegram No. 859 from Menzies to Holland, 21 June, 1952" in AA, AWM89, B.1/70.
46 "Cablegram No.905 from Spender to Casey, 1 July, 1952" in AA, A1838/289, 532/13/2/1, part 1.
With the ANZUS Council meeting impending, the Churchill government continued to exert pressure upon the ANZUS powers for association with the Council discussions. On 24 June, Ben Cockram, Acting United Kingdom High Commissioner, Canberra, called on Casey, asking for observer status for the British at the Council meeting by referring to the possible "political effect" in England of their absence from the Council.\(^{47}\) Taking advantage of Acheson's visit to London, Eden also conferred with the Secretary of State on 28 June. While assuring Acheson that the UK was not in any sense trying to "gate crash" the ANZUS Council, Eden nevertheless stated that Britain was very anxious to be associated with the ANZUS pact because of the possible public reaction against the exclusion. In reply, Acheson told Eden that it was of urgent importance to execute the ANZUS treaty before any question of the expansion of membership was allowed to, and that there was a possibility of a revival of the US proposal for an offshore island pact. Acheson also expressed his fear that "[i]f the United Kingdom were admitted, it would be difficult to exclude the Philippines or for that matter Indonesia if they wished to join." To this, Eden argued that the United Kingdom was surely in a different category from the Philippines and Indonesia. "If Australia and New Zealand were attacked," the Foreign Secretary stated, "the United Kingdom would automatically leap to their aid. This could hardly be said for the Philippines and Indonesia."\(^{48}\)

In the meantime, following the Acheson-Menzies agreement of 20 June, External Affairs in Canberra pressed ahead with preparations for the ANZUS Council meeting.


In early July a series of documents expressing Australia's positions for the Council were formulated in External Affairs. These documents were then discussed between Casey and Frederick Shedden, Secretary of the Department of Defence, on 14 July, and between Casey and Philip McBride, Minister for Defence, on 22 July. On 24 July these documents were forwarded to Acheson through Spender. On the question of military machinery under the ANZUS Council, Australia, while fully appreciating the drawbacks of rejecting the proposed American machinery under CINCPAC, nonetheless put forward two proposals. The first of these was for a military committee in Washington consisting of the Australian and New Zealand Joint Service Staffs and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the second was for the mutual accreditation of defence representatives to each of the Defence Departments among the ANZUS powers. As a means of ensuring Australia's full entry into US strategic planning, Australia further proposed its own participation in NATO in an informal capacity.

In regard to the matter of British association with ANZUS, while Casey took the basic position that the problem of British participation should not be allowed to interfere with the implementation of ANZUS, he nonetheless endeavoured to find a way of satisfying British pride by considering two formulae for British participation that would "not create an embarrassing precedent for the Americans in relation to France, the Philippines, etc." He canvassed proposals for the despatch of a British
observer to the Council and its subordinate committee either as a representative of NATO or as a representative of ANZAM. But since McBride opposed the latter option on the ground that "the ANZAM countries are already represented by two members (Australia and New Zealand)," Casey's letter to Eden, sent on 18 July, to sound out the Foreign Secretary's views, only contained his proposal for the presence of the British in the Council and the subordinate committee as a representative of NATO. Eden, however, on 26 July rejected the proposal, arguing that the participation of Britain simply on behalf of NATO completely ignored Britain's status and role "as a Pacific power." Thus Casey was forced to proceed to the ANZUS Council meeting with no viable solution to the question of British association with ANZUS.

On 24 and 25 July the New Zealand government submitted to Canberra a series of documents outlining Wellington's positions for the Council meeting. Although Wellington certainly shared Australian views about the need for establishing a military committee in Washington and for ensuring some Australasian access to NATO as a means of overcoming isolation from central Western military planning, there were nonetheless differences in position between Australia and New Zealand concerning the question of British association with ANZUS. Setting great store by the Commonwealth, and New Zealand's relationship with Britain in particular, the New

54 "Top-secret and personal letter from Casey to Eden, 18 July, 1952" in A5954/19, 1425/5.
56 "Memorandum No. 275 from J.S. Cumpston, Official Secretary of the Australian High Commissioner's Office, Wellington, to Watt, 24 July, 1952" in A1838/1, 532/13/2/1/1. New Zealand views on military machinery for ANZUS are included in this memorandum.
Zealand government actively supported any move that would give the UK some official and semi-official relationship with the ANZUS pact. For New Zealand, more than for Australia, adjustment to the new power situation in the Pacific was very difficult because of the strength of the sentimental link with Britain. Wellington was still reluctant to accept that New Zealand's security could no longer be guaranteed within the Commonwealth alone. "In New Zealand," as Peter Heydon, Australian High Commissioner to Wellington, reported to Casey, "there is very little real sentiment in favour of closer relations with the United States, nor realisation of the withdrawal, actual or likely, of British power from the Pacific." Casey also wrote in his diary that the New Zealanders still considered their country "an outpost of European civilisation. Obviously they do not feel the hot breath of Asia on their necks to the extent that we do." Between 1951 and 1956, British influence in New Zealand was especially marked when the ranking officers of the Royal New Zealand Navy and the Royal New Zealand Air Force were both British officers seconded from the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force respectively. Moreover, the New Zealand government strongly supported British inclusion as an effective means of countering the likely predominance of Australian and American influence in the working of the tripartite treaty. "From New Zealand's point of view," a brief for New Zealand delegation to the ANZUS Council meeting stated,

60 T.B. Millar (ed.), *Australian Foreign Minister: the Diaries of R.G. Casey, 1951-60*, p. 82.
British participation would be a most useful counter-weight which would help to guard against the Council being influenced too much by Australia or the United States or both. United Kingdom participation would undoubtedly give a stability to the Council which might otherwise be lacking.  

On 2 August, 1952 Australian, New Zealand and American delegations to the first meeting of the ANZUS Council arrived at the Kaneohe naval air station in Honolulu, scene of the first Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbour. While the Australian delegation consisted of 13 members headed by Casey and the New Zealand delegation comprised 9 members headed by Clifton Webb, Minister for External Affairs, the American delegation entered Kaneohe with a staff of 26 members, headed by Acheson. However, in spite of the large American delegation, there was no "top brass" from the Pentagon, such as the Chiefs of Staff or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Representing the US military establishment was the Pacific regional field commander, Admiral Radford. Although Radford's attendance was justified by the State Department in terms of its respect for "Radford's leading role in the Pacific," it nonetheless symbolised the military insignificance of ANZUS from the American point of view.

Prior to the opening of the ANZUS Council meeting, on the evening of 3 August Casey called on Acheson, seeking to clear the ground for the meeting. Stating the view that he was "under considerable pressure from the British to have them brought into ANZUS planning," the Australian Minister asked Acheson about American views on the question of British association with ANZUS. In reply, Acheson made it quite clear to Casey that "it was quite impossible for the United Kingdom to have

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62 "Brief for the Council Meeting: Relationship with the United Kingdom, 25 July, 1952" in AA, A1838/1, 532/13/2/1/3; and NZA, EA1, 111/3/3/24.
representation of any sort at this conference" without precipitating similar claims from other nations. With his understanding of America's position, and with the aim of forestalling New Zealand's campaign for British association with ANZUS, Casey then proposed a formula for assuming joint responsibility for the exclusion of the British from the ANZUS Council by saying that "he did not believe it was right for Australia and New Zealand to allow the blame to be placed on the Secretary." Referring to the matter of military planning under ANZUS, Casey pressed the case upon Acheson for Australia's direct entry into US planning at the central level by establishing a military committee in Washington. To this, Acheson responded by saying that it was not possible for Australia to expect any access to the Pentagon. Australian and New Zealand impressions that "the Pentagon was the centre of global thought" was a complete misconception, Acheson stressed. The real planning was being done by Admiral Radford and his staff in Hawaii, and if the Australians and New Zealanders really wanted contact with the military planning operations, this was the place for it.

At 9:00 a.m., Honolulu time on 4 August, the first meeting of the ANZUS Council was officially opened with some fanfare, and on the morning session of that day, it was agreed among the ANZUS powers to hold annual Council meetings attended by the three Ministers themselves with the location rotating: to hold meetings of ANZUS deputies consisting of Spender, Munro, and US Under-Secretary of State Bruce on a special basis: and to create a Secretariat comprising appropriate officers from the Australian and New Zealand Embassies in Washington and the State Department. The

discussion then turned to the question of military machinery for ANZUS. To help reinforce the credibility of American support under ANZUS, Casey put forward the case for accreditation in Washington of an Australian military representative, stressing Australia's desire as well to have an American accredited to the Defence Department in Melbourne. To support Casey's case, Shedden also told Acheson that Australia wanted to "know the American mind regarding Pacific defence," and went on to argue that "it was impossible to plan for the hot war without knowing what role Australia should play in the Cold War." In response, the Secretary of State completely denied that American military planning was concentrated in Washington. In the event of an attack in the Far East, Acheson stressed, "plans were made by CINCPAC. So far as knowledge of the Pacific area was concerned, there was no better place to get it than Admiral Radford, whose recommendations affect thinking back in Washington." It was decided at the conclusion of the discussion that the question of military machinery would be postponed for further discussion.65

The afternoon session of the first day saw the discussion mainly dealing with the matter of British association with ANZUS. New Zealand Minister for External Affairs Webb pressed for a formula for "the widest possible association of the UK with the ANZUS Council," arguing that "the UK felt that, as a Pacific power, it should not be left out of an organisation in which two other members of the Commonwealth were

taking part." Every effort should be made to bring the UK to associate with the Council in an intimate way. In reply, Acheson emphasised that there was no way whatever "of associating ourselves with the UK" without bringing in other nations. The admission of the British into ANZUS either on a direct or indirect basis, Acheson went on to stress, would completely change the basic character of ANZUS:

Were the UK now brought in, we could have difficulty with other countries also awaiting an ANZUS link—with the French, for example—and we would soon have a group of colonial powers dealing with Asian problems.

It was further emphasized by Acheson that it was necessary to avoid any step carrying the possible implication that ANZUS represented either a revival of "western imperialism" or an instrument of "white supremacy" in the Pacific. Finally, Acheson, Casey, and Webb agreed on a formula for taking joint responsibility for the exclusion of the British.66

Acheson then spent all sessions of the second day and the morning session of the third day surveying the security situation in the Pacific, and on the afternoon session of the third day (6 August), the question of military machinery was again discussed. Opening the conversation in that session, Casey expressed his desire to have Australia participate in NATO in an informal capacity, and also reiterated his view of the need

66Ibid.
for some form of association of an Australian military representative to the US Chiefs of Staff. Completely rejecting Casey's proposal for Australia's informal participation in NATO, Acheson also opposed the concept of mutual accreditation of military representatives among the ANZUS partners on the ground that "no country had accreditation of the kind Australia desired in Washington." By making the case in favour of Honolulu as the best centre for any military planning, Acheson then pressured Casey and Webb to accept the American proposals about military machinery. "United States planning," the Secretary of State asserted, "is developed on a regional basis under regional Commanders in particular regions ... and not on a global basis." Admiral Radford was "the centre of plans and recommendations in the Pacific." It was not true, Acheson added, that "Honolulu was an outpost in contrast with Washington as the centre." Casey and Webb finally gave ground, concurring in the American proposal that one military representative from each of the ANZUS nations should be accredited to the ANZUS Council, and that Radford would be the American representative.67

On 7 August the first ANZUS Council meeting was officially closed with the issuance of a joint communique, which not only explained the continuing political and military machinery for ANZUS, but also contained a pledge by the ANZUS powers to

maintain the treaty on a limited tripartite basis. Since "the Council is just beginning to evolve its own tripartite organisation and program," the communique declared that it would be premature at this early stage in its development to attempt to establish relationships with other states or regional organizations. Later that day, Casey cabled Eden, regretting to say that, after "extensive discussion," the three ANZUS powers found it impractical "to include United Kingdom observers without granting the same status to some other countries whose association with ANZUS would gravely complicate our proceedings." The first meeting of the ANZUS Council evoked various reactions from among nations around the world. In the Philippines, there was a deep and bitter controversy over the fact that the Philippine government had not been invited to participate in the meeting. Since the signing of the ANZUS treaty in September 1951, the Philippine government and Opposition parties had been inclined to regard the treaty as undermining the special historical and emotional ties between the Philippines and the US, especially because the US-Philippines Mutual Defence treaty had not yet come into force because of the delay by the Philippine Senate in ratifying the Japanese peace treaty. Moreover, with a presidential election scheduled for the following year,

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69 "Cablegram No. 5 from Casey to Eden, 7 August, 1952" in AA, A1838/289, 532/13/2/1, part 2.
criticism of the Honolulu conference and the lack of Philippine participation was
compounded by political consideration.\textsuperscript{70}

On 10 August Senator Jose Laurel, leader of the Nationalista Party and former head
government during the Japanese Occupation
of a wartime puppet Y, led the Opposition barrage by criticising ANZUS
as an alliance of predominantly white nations and condemning the Honolulu meeting as
a "modern version of pre-war colonialism." He also demanded that the white nations'
alliance should be balanced by the admission of Asian nations, including the
Philippines.\textsuperscript{71} Reflecting the Opposition leader's criticism, the Philippine press also
attacked the whole basis of ANZUS as a means devised by three "Caucasian powers"
of perpetuating white domination of the destiny of Asia.\textsuperscript{72} Senator Recto of the
Nationalista Party strongly attacked President Quirino for taking the side of "White
Australia" by failing to send an observer to the ANZUS Council meeting. In a signed
article in the \textit{Philippine Herald} dated 17 August, he also expressed concern about the
strategic position of the Philippines being overshadowed by ANZUS: "A final defence
line in the Pacific may have been drawn up at the Honolulu conference which would
exclude the Philippines; priority may have been given in the matter of supplies and
armed assistance to Australia and New Zealand."\textsuperscript{73} In a radio broadcast on 18 August,
Senator Laurel also supported Recto's view by declaring that the United States was
giving preferential treatment to Australia and New Zealand in their defence needs and

\textsuperscript{70} "Memorandum No. 327 from T.W. Holland, third secretary of the Australian Legation, Manila, to
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., and \textit{Dominion} (Wellington), 11 August, 1952.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Herald} (Philippine), 17 August, 1952.
was neglecting the defence of the Philippines by failing to implement the US-Philippine mutual defence treaty.\textsuperscript{74}

To counteract the barrage of criticism which came from Laurel and Recto, President Quirino was obliged to assure the Opposition that no racial discrimination against the Philippines was intended by the outcome of the ANZUS Council meeting, and that the ANZUS pact and the Philippine-United States mutual defence pact were two of a kind and identical in aims. Quirino also urged Senators to ratify the Japanese peace treaty in order to bring the mutual defence treaty into operation.\textsuperscript{75} At the same time, the Philippine President launched a strenuous campaign for American help in assuaging the Opposition agitation and for some devices to modify the exclusively white character of ANZUS. In a press conference held on 5 August, Quirino spoke about the need for the creation of a five power Pacific alliance by proposing the fusion of the US-Japan Security Treaty, the US-Philippine mutual defence treaty, and ANZUS.\textsuperscript{76} This theme was developed by Foreign Secretary Elizalde on 7 August.\textsuperscript{77} In his meeting with Allison held on 11 August, Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations, Carlos Romulo, citing the Opposition criticism of the exclusion of Asian nations from the Honolulu conference, requested that urgent consideration should now be given to the formation of a "Pacific pact between the US and those Pacific states which now have security treaty relationships with it."\textsuperscript{78} The next day Romulo met

\textsuperscript{75} "Note:History of Pacific Union Idea, prepared by External Affairs, undated and unsigned" in AA, A4311/1, 94/3.
\textsuperscript{76} "Memorandum No. 327 from T.V. Holland to Watt, 11 August, 1952" in AA, A1838/289, 532/13/4; and New York Times, 6 August, 1952.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} "Memorandum by Allison to Acheson, 11 August, 1952" in FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. XII, part 1, pp. 204-205.
with Acheson, urging upon him the need to offset the white character of ANZUS by the admission of the Philippines and Japan to the treaty.\textsuperscript{79} On the same day Robert Regalla, Philippine Consul-General both to Australia and New Zealand, told a Rotary Club audience in Sydney that, "in order to make these three separate Pacific pacts be more effective, they should be integrated and broadened in their scope, so as to make them into one comprehensive Pacific alliance."\textsuperscript{80}

In response to the growing agitation in the Philippines and the campaign by the Philippine leaders for a Pacific alliance, the Truman administration reassured the Philippines, which were regarded by the Americans as a "showcase of democracy in Asia,"\textsuperscript{81} about their exclusion from the ANZUS Council meeting. On 19 August the State Department instructed the American Ambassador to the Philippines, Admiral Spruance, to bring the US-Philippine mutual defence treaty into force immediately without waiting for concurrence by the Philippine Senate in ratifying the Japanese peace treaty,\textsuperscript{82} and on 27 August, with exchange of the instruments of ratification, the security treaty came into force.\textsuperscript{83} By despatching Allison to the Philippines as part of his six weeks' tour of Asia from 26 September, the State Department gave further reassurance to the Philippines in a bid to moderate their agitation. During his stay in the Philippines between 29 September and 6 October, Allison denied that ANZUS was

\textsuperscript{79} "Telegram No. 311 from Acheson to US Ambassador to Manila, Admiral Spruance, 4 September, 1952" in \textit{FRUS}, 1952-54, Vol. XII, part 2, pp. 496-497.

\textsuperscript{80} "Speech by Robert Regala at Rotary Club in Sydney, 12 August, 1952" in \textit{AA}, A1838/289, 532/13/1; and \textit{Sydney Morning Herald}, 13 August, 1952.


\textsuperscript{82} "Telegram No. 310 from Acting Secretary of State to Spruance, 19 August, 1952" in \textit{FRUS}, 1952-54, Vol. XII, part 2, pp. 494-496.

\textsuperscript{83} "Memorandum No. 354 from H.W. Bullock to Watt, 29 August, 1952" in \textit{AA}, A1838/283, 250/10/7/10, part 2.
an instrument to control Pacific affairs and, at the same time, strongly urged the Philippines to resume normal diplomatic relations with Japan by the ratification of the Japanese peace treaty. "The delay in ratifying the Japanese peace treaty," Allison stressed, "was hindering the formation of a more comprehensive defence network for the Pacific ..." As a further effective means of pacifying Philippine resentment at exclusion from the ANZUS conference, the US government also held a defence conference in Manila on 27-28 October under auspices of the Philippine-US mutual defence treaty. With the participation of Allison, Admiral Radford and Quirino, the conference mainly concentrated on discussing the procurement of further arms from the Americans, the full-scale reactivation of military facilities at Subic Bay naval base and Clark air base, and the consequent need for financial assistance to the Philippines.

In Britain, the Churchill government came under strong fire from the press and the Opposition over British exclusion from the Honolulu conference. Before the ANZUS Council meeting, it had been generally assumed in British press circles that one of the aims of the meeting would be to discuss extension of membership of ANZUS, and that this discussion would immediately lead to the admission of Britain to the security treaty. But, after the Council meeting, especially in the period August-October 1952, British newspapers expressed pained surprise and even bitter incredulity at the rejection of Britain's request to send an observer, and some newspapers were greatly

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84 "Ministerial Despatch No. 17 from George Moore, Australian Consulate General in Manila, to Casey, 6 October, 1952" in AA, A5954/1, 2272/2.
85 "Ministerial Despatch No. 18 from Moore to Casey, 10 November, 1952" in AA, A5954/1, 2272/2; and "Telegram No. 316 from Allen to Acheson, 29 October, 1952" in FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. XII, part 2, pp. 506-507.
angered and alarmed at the outcome of the Honolulu meeting. Regarding the Honolulu conference as "a break in the family," the Daily Mirror argued that British non-inclusion in ANZUS was a "slight to the Mother Country." "The world is forming a habit of treating Britain like a poor relation to be lectured, pushed around, or ignored."\(^{87}\) Stating the view that ANZUS was the most damaging blow to British prestige and Imperial unity to date, the Scotsman also expressed concern over the predominance of US influence over the Pacific dominions unless ANZUS were extended. "Australia and New Zealand were in a US trap in that they were obliged to follow US policy without being strong enough to influence it."\(^{88}\)

The Daily Mail also joined in the criticism. "It is utterly wrong," the paper said, "that they [Australia and New Zealand] should even seem to cast adrift from Britain and hitch their wagons [sic] to another star [sic]."\(^{89}\) By arguing that an automatic British commitment to defend the two antipodean states in the event of a war should reasonably be accompanied by a voice for the mother country in any security treaty concerned with those nations, the Sunday Sun strongly criticised the British government for being left out of ANZUS discussions. "War for New Zealand or Australia means war for Britain, too," the paper stated. "Is this to be yet another Government completely, utterly and absolutely out of touch with Empire necessities?"\(^{90}\) Supporting the argument in the Sunday Sun, the weekly Economist magazine also remarked: "To place it [Britain] on a par with the Philippines is one of those specious and unnatural arguments" designed to exclude Britain from ANZUS

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\(^{87}\) Daily Mirror. 28 September, 1952.
\(^{88}\) Scotsman. 10 September, 1952.
\(^{89}\) Daily Mail. 30 September, 1952.
\(^{90}\) Sunday Sun. 10 August, 1952.
deliberations.\(^91\) Showing some anti-American prejudice, but hitting the nail on the head, the *Manchester Guardian* insisted that the United States was instrumental in excluding Britain from the ANZUS Council,\(^92\) while the *Daily Express* showed less perceptiveness in attacking Casey as "the architect of Britain's exclusion."\(^93\)

A spate of press comment criticising the exclusion of the United Kingdom from ANZUS was adroitly seized upon by the Labour Opposition in Parliament. On 14 October, when the foreign affairs debate opened in the House of Commons, Prime Minister Churchill was not only asked by the Labour Opposition to publicise communications between Britain and the ANZUS powers relating to the British request for observer status at the ANZUS Council, but also came under violent attack from Labour members over Britain's exclusion. Hale of the Labour Party played a spearhead role in condemning Churchill for the exclusion of the British from ANZUS consultations, arguing that "the weakness and timidity with which he appears to acquiesce in this rebuff conflict strongly with his philosophy on the election platform."\(^94\) Ascribing the absence of the British at ANZUS deliberations to "the result of meekness which the present government have shown in their attitude to the Americans," Paget of Labour argued that Britain's exclusion underlined "the great lack of consideration shown to the obvious interests of this country." Hynd of Labour saw evidence that "the United States do not wish to be implicated in the defence of Malaya and Singapore." In response to Opposition criticism, Churchill admitted that he was

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\(^92\) *Manchester Guardian*, 27 September, 1952.
\(^93\) *Daily Express*, 14 October, 1952.
dissatisfied with the outcome of the ANZUS Council: "I have never concealed the fact that I regret the solution which has now for the present been reached."\textsuperscript{95}

British newspaper comments criticising the exclusion of the UK from the Honolulu conference were strongly echoed in some of the press both in Australia and New Zealand, and the uproar in Great Britain also found echo in the Australian and New Zealand Parliaments. Referring to British resentment at the exclusion from ANZUS, Haworth of the Labor Opposition, in the House of Representatives on 12 September, demanded of Casey that "Australia should sponsor a movement with the object of having the United Kingdom represented" at future ANZUS discussions. Casey replied that British participation was unnecessary, because Britain was being kept fully informed of ANZUS discussions.\textsuperscript{96} In the parliamentary debate held on 17 September, James of Labor condemned the Menzies government for succumbing to pressure from the US on the exclusion of the mother country from ANZUS discussions, and for dishonouring Australia's "debt of gratitude to our Mother Country in order to lean on our wealthy American cousin." In reply, Casey stated that ANZUS would not entail "any drawing away from the Mother Country," and went on to declare that Australia had already reached a certain degree of adulthood internationally. "To my mind," the Minister stressed, "it is not by any means necessary that every self-governing member of the Commonwealth should be a party to every treaty or arrangement entered into with the United States of America."\textsuperscript{97} On 6 October Ward of Labor Party claimed that Britain's automatic commitment to the

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., Statements by Paget and Churchill.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., Vol. 219, pp. 2492-2493, 17 September, 1952, Statements by Ward and Casey.
defence of the Pacific dominions in the event of an attack on them should earn "the right of Great Britain to participate... in the deliberations of ANZUS," requesting the Minister for External Affairs to arrange a consultative role for the British in the working of the tripartite security treaty. In response, Casey told the Labor parliamentarians that British participation in ANZUS would strengthen the white character of the treaty, and that Australia's defence discussions with a foreign power would not necessarily need to be monitored by the mother country.98

In New Zealand, where public opinion was still more sensitive on the issues of Commonwealth unity, there was painfully controversial debate in Parliament. On 8 October Walter Nash, leader of the Labour Opposition, demanded of Webb that he should arrange for the British to participate in ANZUS consultations on the ground that plans "for the defence of the British Commonwealth may be jeopardised unless the government of the United Kingdom is fully informed through its own representatives of all commitments of New Zealand for defence purposes." In reply, Webb, while showing the government's strong emotional attachment to the mother country and its concern for its responsibilities for the defence of the British Commonwealth, assured Labour parliamentarians that "there can be no question of our entering into any commitments in respect of defence without fullest consultation with the United Kingdom."99 In the parliamentary debate conducted on 14 October, Nash was persistent in his campaign for the addition of the British to ANZUS deliberations. Referring to the New Zealand public's "disappointment and surprise" at the exclusion of the British from ANZUS, Nash claimed that "in view of the common ties that unite

Britain and New Zealand, and in the tradition of those inspiring words, "Where Britain stands, we stand; where Britain goes, we go," the government's active support for the admission of Britain to ANZUS "would meet with unanimous approval in this country." In response, Webb told Parliament that New Zealand could not go counter to the joint decision of the ANZUS Council meeting. On 23 October, while Nash still continued to press the government to arrange for British membership in ANZUS, Mathison of the Labour Party censured Prime Minister Holland by declaring that ANZUS was "the beginning of breakup of the Empire." Prime Minister Holland emotionally countered by saying that Mathison "should have some sense. I want to see the Empire strengthened, and no action will ever be taken by me that is capable of being construed as contributing to the break-up of the Empire."

Behind the scenes, the Churchill government was continuing to turn up the heat on the ANZUS powers to establish some form of association with the ANZUS alliance. On 1 September Eden wrote a personal message to Casey, rebutting the arguments Casey had used in his cable of 7 August to reject Britain's application for observer status. The United Kingdom claim for ANZUS association, Eden argued, was not "merely based on the strength of British interests in Malaya and South East Asia generally," but also on the special Commonwealth relationships between Britain and the two antipodean states. "If either Australia or New Zealand is attacked," Eden stressed, "the United Kingdom will at once and without question be at war with the aggressor. This is not the case as regards France, Holland, the Philippines or any other country." Eden also urged Casey to review the matter of British association quickly so

100 Ibid., p. 1893, 14 October, 1952, Statements by Nash and Webb.
101 Ibid., p. 2068, 23 October, 1952, Statements by Nash, Mathison and Holland.
that a British officer could be sent to meetings of ANZUS military representatives which would be held in Honolulu on 22-25 September. The personal message of Eden was also conveyed to Acheson through Franks the next day.

In order to ascertain the American position on a "second request" for British admission to ANZUS, on 10 September L.J. Lawrey, first secretary of the Australian Embassy in Washington, accompanied by George Laking, Counsellor at the New Zealand Embassy in Washington, conferred with Heydon Raynor, Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs. At this meeting, Laking saw great difficulty for New Zealand in rejecting a further British request. However, Raynor, while citing the adverse reaction in the Philippines to the Honolulu meeting, stressed the importance of observing the joint decision of the ANZUS Council. After informing the Defence Department of the American views, and seeking to deter New Zealand from departing from the agreement reached at the ANZUS meeting, on 12 September Casey wrote back to Eden. The Minister told his counterpart in the UK that, while Australia fully appreciated the political difficulties for the British government and the special British position in relation to Australian and New Zealand defence, "we ourselves are unable at this stage to work out any scheme which would be of use to the United Kingdom." The Casey message was followed

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102 "Personal and confidential message from Eden to Casey, 1 September, 1952" in AA, A5954/19, 1425/5. See also John Williams, "ANZUS: a Blow to Britain's self-esteem", op.cit., p. 254.
105 "Letter from Casey to McBride, 12 September, 1952" in AA, A5954/19, 1425/5.
107 "Cablegram No. 3427 from External Affairs to Australian High Commissioner's Office, London, 12 September, 1952" in AA, A1207/23, 57/5675. Casey's message to Eden is included in this cablegram.
by one from Acheson to Eden on 18 September, in which the Secretary of State turned down the British request by emphasising the undesirability of increasing Asian suspicions of ANZUS as a "White Man's Pact" through British entrance to the treaty.¹⁰⁸

The campaign by the Churchill government to gain entrance to ANZUS was greatly intensified in early October, when details of meetings of ANZUS military representatives became available. Conferring in Honolulu during 22-25 September, the military representatives decided on the holding of meetings of ANZUS staff planners in Honolulu in November and defined the planning tasks as including a review of the military situation in Southeast Asia, the development of a strategic assessment of the area, and the determination of possible courses of action to meet the current threat in the area. At this conference, the Australian representatives enthusiastically proposed as ANZUS planning tasks the development of strategic planning in the Southwest Pacific through the high-level co-ordination of ANZAM planning with that for the ANZUS region and the determination of roles for the ANZUS powers in both cold and hot wars. However, the American representative, Admiral Radford, did not favourably respond to these proposals. Australia was greatly disturbed that the American proposals involved ANZUS in the development of military planning for Southeast Asia, where British and French interests were deeply involved. Even more disturbing was the fact that the planning tasks for the ANZUS staff planners completely duplicated those for the Five Power Conference on Southeast Asia, which consisted of Australia, New Zealand, the US, Britain and France. The conference had been

¹⁰⁸ "Message from Acheson to Eden, 18 September, 1952" in AA, A1838/1, 686/4, part 1.
proposed by Acheson on 27 June, 1952 when he met with the British Foreign Secretary and the French Foreign Minister in London, and was scheduled to be held in Washington on 6 October. Australia feared that ANZUS might soon lose its military value.\textsuperscript{109}

Given its stronger emotional attachment to the mother country and higher value placed on its relationship with Britain, New Zealand was in a more distressed position as a result of the proposal by the ANZUS military representatives' conference. Receiving the report of the military representatives on 1 October, New Zealand Cabinet decided the next day that Major General W.G. Gentry, Chief of the New Zealand General Staff, should send a message to Radford. The message contained both a request for the postponement of any meeting of ANZUS staff planners until the results of the Five Power Conference on Southeast Asia became available, and a request for full British participation in the staff planners' meetings in view of the fact that the planning tasks "would cover an area in which the United Kingdom have interests and are vitally concerned."\textsuperscript{110}

On the same day (2 October) Casey obtained a cable from Webb containing these requests,\textsuperscript{111} and promptly responded by urging the New Zealand Minister for External Affairs to refrain from sending the message from Gentry to Radford.\textsuperscript{112} He then called an emergency Cabinet meeting on that day. Opposing New Zealand's request for the postponement of any meeting of ANZUS staff planners, Cabinet decided to press

\textsuperscript{109} "Minute Paper: Military Representative to the ANZUS Council, 22-25 September, 1952" in AA, AS954/24, 1421/1.
\textsuperscript{110} "Cabinet Meeting, 2 October, 1952" in NZA, 807/51d, (52) 39.
\textsuperscript{111} "Cablegram No. 65 from Webb to Casey, 2 October, 1952" in AA, A1838/1, 686/4, part 1.
\textsuperscript{112} "Cablegram No. 73 from Casey to Webb, 2 October, 1952" in AA, A1838/1, 686/4, part 1.
ahead with the meetings as planned. While admitting the disadvantage that "pressing on with the proposed task would offend the UK by proceeding with a study of an area with which" the United Kingdom was substantially concerned, members of Cabinet nonetheless recognised that "a lack of enthusiasm in carrying out the proposed initial task ... as proposed by the Military representatives, involves the risk of offending the United States." Referring to the request by New Zealand for full participant status for the British at ANZUS staff planners' conference, Cabinet decided that, in view of the possibility of the demand by "the Philippines and France for similar treatment to that given to the British," it was "unwise to press for British participation at this stage." The Cabinet decision was conveyed to Webb through Casey the next day, and in his telephone conversation with Alister McIntosh, Secretary of the New Zealand Department of External Affairs, conducted three days later, Watt strongly requested New Zealand to review its position.

On 6 October Casey received a personal message from Eden, which included a request for an active British participation in meetings of ANZUS staff planners in view of the special British position relating to Commonwealth relationships with Australia and New Zealand, and of the possible adverse impact of ANZUS planning upon British interests in Southeast Asia. The next day there followed a message from Churchill to Menzies, in which the British Prime Minister requested an effective consultative role

113 "Top-secret memorandum from Shedden to Watt, 6 October, 1952" in AA, A1838/1, 686/4, part 1.
115 "Cablegram No. 74 from Casey to Webb, 3 October, 1952" in AA, A1838/1, 686/4, part 1.
116 "Record of Conversation with McIntosh by Watt, 6 October, 1952" in AA, A1838/289, 532/13/2/1/5.
117 "Cablegram No. 4047 from Australian High Commissioner's Office, London to External Affairs, 6 October, 1952" in AA, A5954/24, 1425/1. Eden's message is included in this cable.
for the British in ANZUS discussions by showing his determination not to allow the Pacific dominions to develop an exclusive Asian defence planning with the Americans.

"It would be a serious event in history," Churchill declared, "if Australia and New Zealand were to adopt a policy of considering the defence of the Pacific with the United States alone, and excluding Great Britain from all part of the discussions."\(^{118}\) By censuring Casey as "an apostate to the Empire," Churchill also expressed his resentment at the exclusion of the British from ANZUS discussions.\(^{119}\)

The British requests at this time apparently reflected the views of the British military establishment as well as those of the political leaders. The British Chiefs of Staff had initially had no strong feeling about the lack of any British consultative role in ANZUS deliberations, and, in effect, Ian Jacob, Chief of Staff officer to the UK Ministry of Defence, had told Shedden in a letter of 24 September that, although "there has been a good deal of feeling on the political side here about our not being permitted to send observers" to ANZUS discussions, "I don't personally feel so strongly about it in view of the very close links we have in military matters with you."\(^{120}\) Since this period also saw Australian and British military officers co-operating in the explosion test of the first British atomic bomb, which was carried out on 3 October in the Monte Bello islands, an uninhabited group off the northwest coast of Australia, the British

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118 "Cablegram No. 106 from Lord Swinton, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations Office, to Prime Minister’s Department, 7 October, 1952" in AA, A5954/24, 1421/1. Churchill’s message is contained in this cable. See also John Williams, “ANZUS: a Blow to Britain’s self-esteem”, op.cit., p. 255; and T.B. Millar (ed.), Australian Foreign Minister: the Diaries of R.G. Casey, 1951-60, p. 90.


120 "Top-secret letter from Ian Jacob to Shedden, 24 September, 1952" in AA, A5954/24, 1421/3.
military may not have liked to estrange the Australian defence people on the ANZUS issue.\textsuperscript{121}

However, when British military officers received the report of meetings of ANZUS military representatives in early October, they were not at all comfortable at the expansion of the scope of ANZUS military planning to include Southeast Asia, in which British and French interests were deeply involved. They also doubted the effectiveness of ANZUS military planning in the area without the active participation of the British and French.\textsuperscript{122} Moreover, the British Chiefs of Staff feared that Australia and New Zealand might be committed to support what they saw as America's bellicose policy in Southeast Asia in consequence of the development of military planning with the Americans in the area.\textsuperscript{123} It had already turned out that, at a conference of an ad hoc four-power committee on Southeast Asia including Australia, Britain, France and the United States, with New Zealand participating as an observer, which had been held in Washington on 1-5 February 1952, there were differences of views between the British and American military officers about the appropriate way to contain Communist China in Southeast Asia. While the Americans insisted on the bombing of communication centres in China and the blockade of the Chinese coast as possible courses of action in the event of direct Chinese intervention

\textsuperscript{121} For an account of the first British atomic bomb test at Monte Bello, which marked Britain's entry into the ranks of atomic powers alongside the US and Soviet Russia, see Lorna Arnold, \textit{A Very Special Relationship: British Atomic Weapon Trials in Australia}, London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1987, pp. 1-53.

\textsuperscript{122} "Top-secret letter from R. Bierwirth, Head of Australian Joint Services Staff, London, to Shedden, 15 October, 1952" in AA, A5954/24, 1421/1.

\textsuperscript{123} "Cablegram No. 4371 from Waller to Watt, 30 October, 1952" in AA, A1838/1, 686/6, part 2.
in Southeast Asia, the British opposed these possible courses of action, fearing to provoke the Chinese and to undermine British interests in Hong Kong.\textsuperscript{124}

In the face of a third strong request for British admission to ANZUS, this time with the intervention of Churchill, Casey was concerned that New Zealand would be dangerously receptive to the British request, and therefore on 7 October he sent a cable to Webb. While acknowledging British concern about the possible adverse consequences of the expansion of ANZUS military planning to Southeast Asia, Casey nonetheless urged New Zealand not to go counter to the agreement reached at the ANZUS Council meeting, and not to insist on British participation in any meeting of ANZUS staff planners.\textsuperscript{125} Emphasising the importance of not antagonising the Americans, Menzies also, in a cable sent to Holland two days later, encouraged New Zealand to reconsider its position of insisting upon the entrance of the British into ANZUS.\textsuperscript{126} In reply, Holland told Menzies the following day that New Zealand would agree not to press for full British participation in any meeting of ANZUS staff planners,\textsuperscript{127} and on 12 October Menzies wrote a personal message to Churchill, rejecting the UK request for the presence of the British at meetings of ANZUS staff planners. While "Australia would welcome British participation" provided it was not accompanied by similar claims of other nations, he stated, "I have no reason whatever to suppose that a joint approach by the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand to the United States would succeed in changing the present position."\textsuperscript{128}

\textsuperscript{124} "South East Asia: Report of Ad Hoc Committee, 5 February, 1952" in \textsc{AA}, A5954/2, 2301/2.
\textsuperscript{125} "Cablegram No. 76 from Casey to Webb, 7 October, 1952" in \textsc{AA}, A1838/1. 686/4, part 1.
\textsuperscript{126} "Cablegram No. 77 from Menzies to Holland, 9 October, 1952" in \textsc{AA}, A1838/269, TS (Top-Secret)532/13/1/1.
\textsuperscript{127} "Cablegram No. 67 from Holland to Menzies, 10 October, 1952" in \textsc{AA}, A1209/23, 57/5675.
\textsuperscript{128} "Cablegram No. 108 from External Affairs to Lord Swinton, 12 October, 1952" in \textsc{AA}, A1838/1, 6686/6, part 2. Menzies' message to Churchill is included in this cable.
Although New Zealand agreed not to press its claim for British association with any meeting of ANZUS staff planners, it nonetheless, in view of the duplication of planning tasks by ANZUS staff planners and the Five Power Conference, and for fear of stimulating further agitation in Britain over non-inclusion, still insisted upon postponing meetings of ANZUS staff planners. In the face of this somewhat unenthusiastic New Zealand stance towards ANZUS, Australia entertained anxiety about a possible decline in the value of the security treaty. Watt observed to Casey that "if Australia now suggests postponement of November 1st meeting" in compliance with New Zealand's request, "the Americans may think that this results not from consideration of merits of problem, but merely from United Kingdom pressure." "Such [an] impression," Watt added, "would be unfortunate" for Australian-American relations. \(^\text{129}\) In reply, Casey told Watt that the New Zealand tail should be promptly tacked on to the Australian dog, stressing that "we should do nothing to interfere with [the] ANZUS planners meeting [on] November 1st."\(^\text{130}\) Spender was more irritated. It was essential, he remarked to Moodie, for the ANZUS staff planners' meeting to "be held in November as planned ... Australia should resist all attempts to postpone [any] meeting or water down agenda or vitiate discussion."\(^\text{131}\)

On 22 October Watt telephoned Foss Shanahan, Deputy Secretary of the New Zealand Department of External Affairs, encouraging the New Zealander to proceed with meetings of ANZUS Staff planners as planned.\(^\text{132}\) Not only did the Secretary

\(^\text{129}\) "Cablegram No. 203 from Watt to Casey, 16 October, 1952" in AA, A5954/22, 2303/2.

\(^\text{130}\) "Cablegram No. 337 from Casey to Watt, 18 October, 1952" in AA, A1838/1, 686/4, part 1.


\(^\text{132}\) "Record of Conversation with Shanahan by Watt, 22 October, 1952" in AA, A1838/1, 686/4, part 1.
point out the danger of New Zealand's decision as being interpreted by the US "as a result of United Kingdom pressure," but he also emphasised the importance of demonstrating the sincerity of New Zealand as an alliance partner of the US. Two days later, Watt again phoned Shanahan to urge him to change New Zealand's position. But New Zealand was still adamant, and on the same day Menzies personally wrote to Holland, urging the New Zealand Prime Minister to rethink Wellington's position in relation to the timing of meetings of the staff planners. "If we show reluctance to proceed with ANZUS planning as envisaged," Menzies stressed, "it is possible that the Americans may cool off about the whole business so far as New Zealand and Australia are concerned." Menzies also informed Holland that, since the Five Power Conference on Southeast Asia held on 6 October "did not make headway because of the differences of views between the US and the UK about possible courses of action in the event of direct Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia," this "leaves ANZUS for the present as the only continuing organisation available for full and frank discussion with the United States of South East Asia defence problems." In response, on 26 October Holland agreed with Menzies' argument on the importance of preserving the value of ANZUS from the Australasian point of view, but, because New Zealand needed to be fully briefed on the results of the Five Power Conference, he proposed deferring meetings of ANZUS staff planners until 6 November. In the final analysis, the Australian Defence Department and Admiral Radford agreed to New

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135 "Cablegram No. 71 from Holland to Menzies, 26 October, 1952" in AA, A1838/1, 686/4, part 1.
Zealand’s proposal, and on 6 November ANZUS staff planners finally conferred in Honolulu to consider ways and means of holding Southeast Asia for the West.

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Given the rejection by the ANZUS powers of the repeated British requests for direct and indirect admission to ANZUS consultations, the Churchill government at the end of 1952 was obliged to accept the arguments developed by Australia, New Zealand and the US for freezing the membership of ANZUS, and realised the futility of further requests for entrance into ANZUS. On 14 November Bishop of the UK Foreign Office told Keith Waller, Australian External Affairs officer in London, that

... nothing should be done to jeopardise its [ANZUS] development. [The] United Kingdom should cease pressure for membership of ANZUS and accept [the] validity of American arguments about [the] impossibility of extending [the] pact.

Bishop’s views were also conveyed from Frank Corner, New Zealand External Affairs officer in London, to McIntosh. Corner reported that

Certainly I think the United Kingdom are no longer interested in ANZUS ... Bishop told me the other day that we would hear no more fuss and be subject to no more pressure for United Kingdom membership.

However, even if the British government virtually abandoned its campaign for inclusion in ANZUS, it nonetheless could not allow the ANZUS treaty to set itself up

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137 “Memorandum from Shedden to Watt, 23 January, 1953” in A A, A1838/1, 684/4, part 2. The report by the ANZUS staff planners is included in this memorandum.
139 “Secret letter from Corner to McIntosh, 20 February, 1953” in NZA, EA1, 316/4/1, part 3.
as a planning body for the region of Southeast Asia, where British interests were substantially involved. Still less, was it prepared to allow Australia and New Zealand to concentrate on the defence of American interests to the neglect of British interests in Asia. The Churchill government therefore changed its tactics for counterbalancing Britain's exclusion from ANZUS in the direction of diminishing the significance of ANZUS. By proposing to revitalise the ANZAM (Australian, New Zealand, and Malayan area) arrangement, and having Australia and New Zealand shoulder a heavier defence burden in the Commonwealth orbit, the British government now attempted to deter Australia and New Zealand from being drawn more deeply into the growing sphere of American influence and developing closer security relationships with the United States.

Largely as a result of Australian initiative, a contingency planning organisation known as ANZAM had been developed in 1949 after several years of negotiations between the British and Australian Prime Ministers. Based on Australian defence machinery, with the British and New Zealand armed services participating through their respective liaison officers in Melbourne, ANZAM was a service-level organization, and none of its participating countries was under any political commitment as a result of the planning. Since each retained direct responsibility for home defence (in Britain's case, for the defence of Malaya, and its other dependencies in the region), ANZAM was in effect confined to planning the wartime co-ordination of the defence of sea communications in the ANZAM area, which covered the eastern Indian Ocean, Malaya, Thailand south of the Kra Isthmus, Indonesia, and the area south of the equator which was bounded by the Cook Islands in the east. ANZAM
was also intended to provide the basis of wartime command in the region.¹⁴⁰ As a result of an agreement between the UK and US Chiefs of Staff reached on 23 October 1950, the discussion was then opened on low-level co-ordination of planning for sea communications between the ANZAM area and the Pacific area, for which the United States held responsibility. Between 26 February and 2 March 1951, Admiral Sir John Collins, Australian Chief of Naval Staff, held a series of conferences with Admiral Radford in Honolulu, in which the United States, while not regarding the ANZAM region as a likely war theatre, did recognise the importance of the region at the service level for the following purposes; escort, convoy routing and diversion of traffic; reconnaissance; and search and rescue.¹⁴¹ A plan for sea communications in the ANZAM region was completed a year later.

Australia also, along with New Zealand, helped the British to suppress communist terrorist insurgency in Malaya, which erupted in June 1948. In anticipation of communist success approaching its climax in China, on 18 August, 1949 the New Zealand Labour Prime Minister, Peter Fraser, on the basis of the Cabinet decision reached at the end of July, announced that a Dakota transport flight of the RNZAF (Royal New Zealand Air Force) would be based at Singapore “to assist and afford


relief to the United Kingdom Air Force in Hong Kong.” Three naval frigates would also go to Hong Kong if required.\(^{142}\) Subsequently, the New Zealand aircraft arrived in Singapore and were placed under the command of the British Air Officer Commanding, Far Eastern Command. Initially the flight operated as a transport service between Singapore and Hong Kong, but its role was later expanded to include the airdrop of supplies to British units in Malaya.\(^{143}\) In mid-1950 the New Zealand naval vessels also became available for use in Malaya. The Chifley Labor government for its part, viewing the insurgency in the British protectorate as reflecting nationalist aspirations and economic conditions, consistently refrained from sending any Australian forces to Malaya. However, Menzies government saw the events in Malaya as part of “the global pattern of imperialistic Communist aggression” directed by the Soviet Union\(^ {144}\) and met a British request for military intervention. On 31 May, 1950 Menzies publicised the Cabinet decision of 19 May that Australia would provide a transport squadron of Dakota aircraft for supply dropping and general transport service in Malaya.\(^ {145}\) Two days after the outbreak of the Korean War (27 June), the Australian Cabinet, convinced that the war in Korea had borne out Australian perception of the militancy of communism in Asia, decided to give further support to British operations in Malaya in the form of a squadron of heavy bombers,\(^ {146}\) and the decision was announced by Menzies on the same day.\(^ {147}\)


\(^{143}\) Peter Edwards with Gregory Pemberton, op.cit., pp. 59-60.


\(^{146}\) Peter Edwards with Gregory Pemberton, op.cit., p. 97.

\(^{147}\) Current Notes on International Affairs. Vol. 21, pp. 420-421, 27 June, 1950, Statement by Menzies. Britain, in the course of 1950-53, deployed in Malaya 2 and a half divisions plus certain independent units, 4 fighter squadrons, 2 and a half bomber squadrons, 3 coastal squadrons and 3 transport squadrons. The number of armed forces were 34,500. There were 23 infantry battalions - 7
At the same time as Australia developed its wartime defence planning for sea communications in the Southwest Pacific and rendered assistance to the British in an anti-terrorist activity in Malaya, it was also involved in the defence of the Middle East. When the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshall Sir William Slim, visited Melbourne and Canberra during 12-21 June 1950, Australia agreed to prepare plans for deployment of its air and land forces to the Middle East in the event of a so-called hot war; namely, a general and total war with Soviet Russia. Consequently, Australia's strategic planning provided for plans to be developed concurrently on the possible deployment of a contingent to the Middle East or to Malaya.148 In the fall of 1951 Australia was faced with British pressure to send its forces to support Near Eastern defence. At a conference of British Commonwealth defence ministers held on 12-21 June 1951, in the face of the Iranian crisis and an unstable Egyptian situation, Slim urged upon the Australian Minister for Defence, Sir Philip McBride, the despatch of a Commonwealth force to the Middle East as "tangible evidence of solidarity of the Commonwealth."149 On 27 November the Australian Cabinet decided to station an RAAF (Royal Australian Air Force) wing of 2 squadrons in the Middle East during early 1952.150 and the decision was ultimately announced by Prime Minister Menzies on 5 March 1952.151

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151 Sydney Morning Herald, 6 March, 1952. The Menzies government’s decision to send airmen to the Middle East gained support from the Australian public. In an Australian Gallup Poll conducted in
However, soon after Menzies announced Australia's commitment to the defence of the Middle East, the Churchill government changed its defence doctrine and its defence priorities in overseas commitments. By adopting the concept of nuclear deterrence, the British government planned to reduce the British conventional forces and to curtail the Attlee government's proposed large-scale rearmament. This stemmed not only from the strained British financial situation, but also from the estimations that there was a low possibility of the outbreak of a hot war with Soviet Russia in Europe and the Middle East in consequence of the forthcoming development of thermonuclear weapons.

In the course of his visit to the United States during January-February 1952, Churchill had conferred with the Pentagon, and been deeply impressed with the awesome effects of thermonuclear weapons which the Americans would first test in November 1952. Immediately on his return, Churchill asked the British Chiefs of Staff to undertake a major reappraisal of strategic doctrine in the light of the new technological developments. In early July 1952 the British military produced a Global Strategy Paper, in which the view was expressed that the development of the hydrogen...

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April 1952, 54% of the public were in favour of Australian contribution to the Middle East, with 29% against and 17% non-committal. See Australian Gallup Poll, April 1952.

Before the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June, 1950 the Attlee Labour government spent on defence 780 million sterling pounds a year. Under strong pressure from the USA following the outbreak of the war in Korea and in order to prove its credentials as an effective alliance partner in NATO, the British government in early August 1950 increased defence expenditure to a total of 3,600 sterling pounds over the next three years, or an average of 1,200 million sterling pounds per annum. This meant that the UK government increased the total expenditure on defence from approximately 8% of the national income to over 10%. See “Personal message from Attlee to Fadden, 3 August, 1950” in AA, A1209/23, 57/4591, part 1; and “Letter from Marjoribanks to Brown, 4 October, 1950” in AA, A1209/23, 57/4591, part 1. In December 1950 defence expenditure increased to 4,700 million sterling pounds over the next three years. See “Statement on Defence 1953 presented by the Minister for Defence to Parliament, February 1953” in AA, A1209/23, 57/4591, part 1.
bomb, because of its terrible destructive potential, would render war less likely, especially in Europe and the Middle East. The Paper also suggested that Britain's heavy burden of defence responsibilities would be significantly reduced if, in future, more weight was given in defence planning to the deterrent effect of atomic and hydrogen bombs. The Paper went on to advocate a decrease in the number of British overseas commitments and a reduction of troops devoted to conventional warfare. However, it was acknowledged by the Chiefs of Staff that a strategy of nuclear deterrence offered no solution to the problem of fighting guerrilla insurgents in the Far East, particularly in Malaya, where a substantial commitment of conventional forces would be required over a protracted period. In this connection, the British military establishment admitted the need for Commonwealth alliance partners, such as Australia and New Zealand, to contribute substantial armed forces to the defence of Malaya. Thus, in British defence planning, Southeast Asia now in a sense had higher priority than the Middle East.

With the approval of Churchill and the Cabinet, the Global Strategy Paper was forwarded to Australia on 29 July, and it was also discussed with the American

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military when the British Chiefs of Staff visited the US at the end of August. On 15 September a document, entitled "Coordination of Allied Military Effort in the Far East", which the British Chiefs of Staff had formulated, was conveyed to Australia. In it, the UK, responding to a change in recent British strategic doctrine, implicitly suggested a review of the concept of ANZAM.

Between 27 November and 12 December 1952, the British Commonwealth Economic Conference was held in London, and on the last day of the conference, Churchill conferred with Menzies and Holland at No. 10 Downing Street. The 77 year-old British Prime Minister opened the conversation by stating that he "was most anxious to find a solution of the problem caused by the exclusion of the United Kingdom from ANZUS." Expressing his strong displeasure at the extension of the scope of ANZUS planning "throughout the Pacific theatre, including Southeast Asia," Churchill told the Dominion Prime Ministers that "it was not reasonable that such planning should go forward without the direct assistance of the United Kingdom and perhaps of France whose interests were closely involved."

Taking full advantage of the susceptibility of Australia and New Zealand to British pressure as a result of the problem of British association with ANZUS, Churchill then presented a document, entitled "The Future of ANZAM." As a means of revitalising the ANZAM arrangement, the document advocated changing it from the wartime organisation into a peace-time one by establishing on a permanent basis the ANZAM

157 "Minute of a Meeting held at No. 10 Downing Street, 12 December, 1952" in AA, A5954/1, 1424/1; and NZA, EA1, 156/2/4/1, part 1.
Chiefs of Staff in Melbourne, comprising representatives of the Australian, UK and New Zealand Chiefs of Staff. Arguing that ANZAM should be even more closely concerned than before with the defence of Malaya, particularly its external defence, the document proposed placing the defence of Malaya under joint responsibility by seeking a larger Australian and New Zealand contribution to the defence of the territory. Commensurate with that contribution, the document proposed the transfer of the primary planning responsibility for the external defence of Malaya from the British Defence Co-ordinating Committee (BDCC) in Singapore to the ANZAM Chiefs of Staff Committee. While admitting the need to rely upon the Commonwealth partners for the assumption of operational and planning responsibilities in Malayan defence, the document nonetheless reflected a strong British desire both to involve the United States in the defence of Southeast Asia and to "have an effective voice" to influence American Far Eastern policy.\textsuperscript{158}

Prime Minister Menzies was very receptive to the British proposal for a review of ANZAM, because, prior to opening of the conference, Australia had become fully aware of the need for it to adjust to the change in British defence doctrine and to assume wider responsibilities in the Commonwealth orbit as a means of parrying further British pressure for its own association with ANZUS. When Australia initially received a report that the British Chiefs of Staff had been reviewing the concept of ANZAM, senior officials in the Department of External Affairs were very sceptical. "There are snares in this," Watt remarked. "Unless very carefully handled with the Americans, it would frighten them off ANZUS." "It might also be a means," he

\textsuperscript{158} "Memorandum by the Chief of Staff Committee COS (52) 685, 22 December, 1952" in AA, A1209/23, 57/5670. This memorandum was handed to Menzies and Holland by Churchill on 12 December, 1952.
continued, "of serving British policy which" might prevent "ANZUS from formulating effective Pacific defence plans."\textsuperscript{159} Since the British proposal came at a time when "the British defence effort was contracting," "it may scarcely be an exaggeration to suggest," Watt also stated, that the British suggestion "springs not so much from a desire to ensure that there shall be effective military planning for the Pacific as to endeavour to ensure that a body like ANZUS shall not recommend some particular plans for the Pacific to which the United Kingdom is at present opposed."\textsuperscript{160}

However, senior officers in the Department of External Affairs fully acknowledged the need for Australia to adapt to the change in British defence doctrine. If the basic objective of the British proposal "is to hold Malaya," Watt argued, "we can not reasonably refuse any offer to collaborate with the British."\textsuperscript{161} David Hay, defence liaison officer in the Department of External Affairs, also admitted that "[t]he ANZAM organisation itself needs review," since "it was conceived at a time when the Cold War was really cold and when the only alternative was a global hot war," and "the concept of a prolonged cold war of the present type and the new concept of a limited war (i.e. offensive action by China without overt Russian support) were not conceived."\textsuperscript{162} Moreover, it was fully recognised by the Department of External Affairs that continued British pressure for inclusion in ANZUS could endanger the value of ANZUS. "From the purely Australian point of view," Hay told Watt, "the risk of a further unsuccessful

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\item \textsuperscript{159} "Memorandum: Some thoughts on the ANZUS-ANZAM Item in London, undated and unsigned 1952" in AA, A1209/55, 57/4252.
\item \textsuperscript{160} "Memorandum by Watt: ANZUS-Forthcoming Discussions in London, 10 December, 1952" in AA, A1209/23, 57/5716 (Emphasis in Original).
\item \textsuperscript{161} "Memorandum: Some Thoughts on the ANZUS-ANZAM Item in London, undated and unsigned 1952" in AA, A1209/55, 57/4252.
\item \textsuperscript{162} "Memorandum from David Hay to Watt: United Kingdom Association with ANZUS, 12 November, 1952" in AA, A1209/23, 57/5716.
\end{itemize}
approach to the United States in favour of United Kingdom association with ANZUS lies in the real possibility that American interest in the whole ANZUS idea might be reduced.”

As a means of placating the British pressure for entry into ANZUS and of maintaining the vitality of ANZUS, senior officers in the Department of External Affairs therefore appreciated the importance of Australia now demonstrating its status and role as a Commonwealth alliance partner of the British. "Whatever the outcome of the discussions in London," Watt wrote in the brief to be used by Menzies at the British Commonwealth Economic Conference,

it is suggested that, from the start, Australia should put forward positive suggestions for British-Australian co-operation in military planning in the Pacific [so that] public opinion in England and Australia would be forced to realise that - whatever the outcome of the ANZUS dispute - Australia was ready and willing, and had actually proposed means of the closest possible military discussions with the United Kingdom on Far Eastern matters.

Backed by the recommendations formulated in the Department of External Affairs, Menzies, in his meeting with Churchill, gave strong support to Churchill's proposal for the development of ANZAM as a British Commonwealth Pacific organisation. He went on to argue for a linkage of ANZUS and ANZAM as a devise for co-ordinating United States and British Commonwealth strategies in Southeast Asia. The steps which Menzies considered for the ANZUS-ANZAM linkage included: first, to give reality to ANZAM planning; second, to make the Americans realise the significance of ANZAM; and third, to arrange a system of liaison on a high military level between ANZUS and ANZAM. As a natural consequence of these procedures, it would follow that the planning done separately in ANZUS and ANZAM would become the

responsibility of a joint ANZUS/ANZAM Committee. New Zealand Prime Minister Holland for his part expressed strong support for the British and Australian proposals, because Wellington was anxious to create some arrangement or machinery that would recognise Great Britain again as a Great Power in Asia. Holland told Churchill and Menzies that “admission of [the] United Kindom as an observer in ANZUS would be quite insufficient, for this would be beneath the dignity of [the] United Kingdom which must be a full partner in Far Eastern planning.” He claimed that “a marriage of ANZUS and ANZAM ... would be [a] prelude to joint machinery for control of the whole Pacific, including Southeast Asia.” As an agreed plan between Churchill, Menzies and Holland, the concept of an ANZAM review and of an ANZUS-ANZAM linkage was then conveyed to the United States when Churchill met with the President-designate, Dwight Eisenhower, in Washington on 5 January 1953.

At the same time as the British government was proposing to push ahead with its scheme for a review of ANZAM, it also intended to develop the Five Power Staff Agency for Southeast Asia into formalised machinery with the aim of diminishing the importance of ANZUS. At a meeting of the foreign ministers of France, the United States and Britain held in Paris on 16 December 1952, it had been proposed that a Five Power Staff Agency for Southeast Asia comprising the US, Australia, New Zealand, France and Britain should be established for liaison on intelligence and other

166 “Outward telegram No. 9 from Webb to Menzies, 13 January, 1953” in NZA, EA1, 156/2/4/1, part 1; and “Memorandum by Defence Secretariat, P.P. O’Brien, 19 May, 1953” in NZA, EA1, 153/35/4, part 1.
matters. As a short-term plan for the development of the Five Power Staff Agency, the British government hoped that the planning function of ANZUS would be absorbed by the Agency, with the pact remaining alive merely as a political agreement between the three countries concerned. Under a long-term plan, the Five Power Staff Agency would undertake the work envisaged for ANZUS and ANZAM, and it would then develop into a political and military command structure along NATO lines for Southeast Asia. Britain regarded the Five Power Staff Agency as a definite step towards obtaining an effective consultative role for the British in Pacific planning and towards the ultimate requirement of co-ordinating Allied strategies and policies for Southeast Asia.

While Australia supported the British proposal for a review of ANZAM, and also helped develop the argument of an ANZUS-ANZAM linkage, it was nonetheless crystal clear to Australia that the British vision of the Five Power Staff Agency represented an almost overt British attempt to undermine an individual identity and value of ANZUS. It was of great importance for Australia to obtain the views of the United States on the development of the Five Power Staff Agency and, at the same time, to ensure that ANZUS would not in any way be overshadowed by the Agency.

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168 "Record of Conversation with M. Roche, French Ambassador to Canberra, by Watt, 2 January, 1953" in AA, A1838/269, TS (Top-Secret)686/1, part 3.
Australia therefore felt it to be an urgent matter to hold meetings of the ANZUS Council as early as possible.

On 1 January, 1953 Spender cabled Casey to report that the British approach towards the Five Power Staff Agency "was not unconnected with" Britain's exclusion from ANZUS deliberations, and that, indeed, it was part of an attempt by the British to compensate for their exclusion from ANZUS. In order to "offset any danger that the ANZUS Council and military machinery thereunder might be bypassed," Spender urged the Minister that consideration should now "be given to the calling of a meeting of the Council ... very shortly after" the Eisenhower administration took office.\(^{170}\) Casey agreed with Spender's view that ANZUS should not be submerged into the Five Power Staff Agency, and that ANZUS as well as ANZAM should maintain a separate identity and value. Since the development of the Five Power Staff Agency and Australia's proposal for an ANZUS-ANZAM linkage would be significantly influenced by the Eisenhower administration's East Asian policy, the Minister also concurred that "it would be important to learn the broad outline of United States policy, particularly in relation to the Far East and South East Asia."\(^{171}\) On 13 January Casey instructed Spender to obtain American views on the timing of an ANZUS Council meeting,\(^{172}\) and the next day he cabled Webb, seeking New Zealand's views on the holding of early meetings of the Council.\(^{173}\)

\(^{170}\) "Cablegram No. 4 from Spender to Casey, 2 January, 1953" in AA, A5954/1, 1424/1.

\(^{171}\) "Letter from Casey to McBride, 9 January, 1953" in AA, A1838/283, 532/13/2/2B.

\(^{172}\) "Cablegram No. 22 from Casey to Spender, 13 January, 1953" in AA, A5954/24, 2304/1.

\(^{173}\) "Cablegram No. 8 from Casey to Webb, 14 January, 1953" in AA, A4534/2, 48/7, part 1.
A week later, Webb responded to the Australian proposal by stating that it would be quite untimely "to press for an early meeting of the ANZUS Council at least at this juncture," arguing that because the agitation in Britain over its exclusion from ANZUS discussions had just been damped down, it would not at all be desirable to rekindle the controversy. Reporting the outcome of a discussion between Moodie and Andrew Foster, Deputy Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, held on 25 January, Spender told Casey on 2 February that the State Department not only agreed that "if there was no action, its original ANZUS impetus might be lost," but also entertained the possibility of holding meetings of the ANZUS Council "during the next 2 or 3 months" if New Zealand's concurrence could be obtained. On 15 February an instruction was issued to J.S. Cumpston, official secretary of the Australian High Commissioner's office, Wellington, by James Plimsoll, Acting Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, to press New Zealand to agree to an early ANZUS Council meeting. Expressing Australia's strong apprehension about the British inclination to pursue the Five Power Staff Agency to the detriment of ANZUS, and emphasising the need to keep ANZUS operational, Cumpston, in his meetings with McIntosh and Shannahahan held on 20 and 24 February, attempted to persuade the officers of New Zealand Department of External Affairs to concur in the need for early meetings of the Council. But Australia's sister nation was consistently unresponsive, showing great timidity in pressing ahead with an ANZUS Council meeting for fear of reawakening agitation in the mother country.

174 "Cablegram No. 4 from Webb to Casey, 21 January, 1953" in AA, A1838/2, 532/13/2/13.
175 "Cablegram No. 12 from Spender to Casey, 2 February, 1953" in AA, A5461/1, 1/4/2A, part 3.
In the meantime, the British government pressed Australia and New Zealand to agree to a visit to Australia by UK military planners in order to review the concept of ANZAM. This proposal was conveyed to Shedden through Harcourt Smith, UK High Commissioner in Canberra, on 2 March.\(^\text{178}\) But Australia was very reluctant to accept the British proposal. On 6 March Shedden told McBride that "the re-examination of the ANZAM concept should not be undertaken until" American views were known on the development of the Five Power Staff Agency. Before consulting with the British further, it was essential, Shedden thought, to hold meetings of the ANZUS Council.\(^\text{179}\) Concurring in the views of the Defence Department, Casey advised Menzies on 18 March that "we should approach very cautiously the proposal of the United Kingdom government on military discussions as a first step in the re-examination of the ANZAM concept." Given the British idea that the Five Power Staff Agency would eventually absorb the substantial functions of ANZUS and ANZAM, Casey thought that "the future of ANZAM would be affected by the outcome of discussion in the near future on the proposal for the Five Power Staff Agency."\(^\text{180}\) On 25 March Menzies wrote to Harcourt Smith, describing the undesirability of opening "talks for the purpose of re-examining ANZAM."\(^\text{181}\)

In order to obtain American views on the development of the Five Power Staff Agency for Southeast Asia, Australia continued to canvass the prospect of persuading New Zealand of the need for early meetings of the ANZUS Council. On 27 March

\(^{178}\) "Letter from Harcourt Smith to Frederich Shedden, 2 March, 1953" in AA, A1838/269, TS (Top-Secret)687/1, part 3.

\(^{179}\) "Letter from Shedden to McBride, 6 March, 1953" in AA, A816/58, 14/301/533.

\(^{180}\) "Letter from Casey to Menzies, 18 March, 1953" in AA, A1209/23, 57/5670.

Plimsoll met Richard Byrd, Counsellor of the US Embassy in Canberra, and was informed that the US government saw no difficulty in holding meetings of the ANZUS Council in early June.\(^{182}\) The American view on the timing of the Council meeting was conveyed to Webb from Casey the next day,\(^{183}\) but on 1 April Cumpston reported that the New Zealand Minister for External Affairs opposed the holding of meetings of the ANZUS Council in early June on the ground that the calling of meetings at that stage "would draw unnecessary attention with a considerable amount of adverse publicity."

In Webb's view, meetings in September when all ministers would be in the United Nations "would be held on a much more informal basis."\(^{184}\) Sending a personal and confidential letter on the same day, Casey responded to Webb's letter. Emphasising the importance of learning the Eisenhower administration's Far Eastern policy at an early date, he strongly cautioned New Zealand "against the danger of ANZUS lapsing through lack of interest." "A formal guarantee contained in a Treaty," Casey stressed, "can become a dead letter if the Organisation established by it is allowed to atrophy."\(^{185}\) In reply, Webb argued to Casey that "it would be wise not to rekindle United Kingdom resentment" by holding early meetings of the ANZUS Council. The New Zealander also scoffed at Australia's concern about decline in the value of ANZUS as nothing more than exaggeration: "I have no fears whatever that the Americans will let ANZUS lapse" in the absence of early meetings of the Council.\(^{186}\)

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\(^{182}\) "Record of Conversation with Byrd by Plimso\textit{il}, 27 March, 1953" in AA, A1838/2, 532/13/1/1.

\(^{183}\) "Cablegram No. 82 from Casey to Webb, 28 March, 1953" in AA, A1209/23, 57/5674.

\(^{184}\) "Cablegram No. 74 from Cumpston to Casey, 1 April, 1953" in AA, A1838/283, 532/13/1/1.

\(^{185}\) "Personal and confidential letter from Casey to Webb, 1 April, 1953" in AA, A1838/269, TS (Top-Secret)686/1, part 3.

\(^{186}\) "Letter from Webb to Casey, 17 April, 1953" in AA, A1838/269, TS (Top-Secret)686/1, part 3.
Besides the fear of confronting again the British government's displeasure at the exclusion from ANZUS deliberations, Webb and his Cabinet colleagues were concerned that early meetings of the ANZUS Council would add fuel to Opposition criticism of ANZUS. On 21 April the foreign affairs debate opened in New Zealand Parliament, where the Holland government came once again under assault from the Opposition in relation to the problem of British association with ANZUS. The Labour Opposition pressed the government for the publication of ANZUS discussions at the British Commonwealth Economic Conference held in December 1952. Labour parliamentarians then questioned the value of ANZUS to New Zealand defence, accusing the government of "selling out the Commonwealth to the United States in the hope of obtaining dollar aid." The government was also grilled by the Opposition over whether the British government had really "signified its full acceptance of" the tripartite security treaty. In the parliamentary debate conducted on 28 April, Nash rebuffed the government's argument that United Kingdom membership would disrupt the ANZUS alliance, strongly demanding of the National Party government that "Britain should be included ... in the pact now," because, he argued,

She is just as powerful a guarantee to this country, but with much more feeling, than the United States ... Britain is with us all the time, spending her millions to make our country safe to enable us to produce the goods that are required.  

Given his view that Great Britain was still an effective producer rather than a consumer of security in the Pacific-Asian region, the leader of the Labour Opposition wondered

whether the security treaty which did not include the UK would really serve the national interests of New Zealand.

Prime Minister Holland riposted that Labour parliamentarians “should never lose sight of the final objectives of the ANZUS Agreement, which is that, in the event of hostilities opening up and our men fighting in another area ... the security of the shores of this country [would be] guaranteed by the full force of United States Army, Navy and Air Force ...” The ANZUS Agreement “is of the greatest importance,” he claimed, because it would provide “a protection which has never before been available to this country ... [T]he decision we took to sign the ANZUS Agreement was right and proper in every way.” Nevertheless, Holland strongly assured the Labour Opposition that the Wellington government was anxious for the British to buy back a Great Power position in Asia and “to participate in any discussions on the area in which they were concerned.” The United Kingdom “had every right to take part in such discussions.” A suitable and viable means of achieving this, the Prime Minister went on to declare, “would be found in a development of Five Power discussions that have been going on for some time.” While the New Zealand government at this time supported the Australian proposal for an ANZUS-ANZAM linkage as a substitute formula for Britain’s entry into ANZUS consultations, it nonetheless regarded it as inevitable that ANZUS and ANZAM would, in the long-term future, be merged into the Five Power Staff Agency.

189 Ibid., 1953, Statement by Holland.
190 Ibid.
While Australia had been urging on New Zealand the necessity for an early ANZUS Council meeting, between 6 and 9 April a preliminary conference for the establishment of a Five Power Staff Agency for Southeast Asia had been convened in Pearl Harbour. There it was recommended that each of the five powers should designate a military representative to help facilitate co-ordination of plans, including a full exchange of intelligence, communication procedures and other essential information. A recommendation was also made that the respective military representatives should designate one or more staff officers in order to undertake planning studies on possible courses of action to counter further Chinese communist aggression in Southeast Asia. A report on the preliminary conference for a Five Power Staff Agency, which had been drafted by the Australian representative at the conference, Air Vice-Marshall V.E. Hancock of the RAAF, was transmitted to Watt from Shedden on 9 April.\textsuperscript{192} It was then submitted to Menzies from McBride on 17 April.\textsuperscript{193}

The outcome of the preliminary conference for the Agency apparently accentuated anxiety in Australia that the military function of ANZUS would be substantially absorbed into the Five Power Staff Agency, because the planning tasks allocated to the Staff Agency planners completely duplicated those of the ANZUS staff planners, who had met on 6 November 1952. Moreover, given the participation of Britain and France, the Staff Agency planners' report would, it was feared, be more comprehensive and detailed than the ANZUS staff planners' report. "It is apparent," McBride told Menzies, "that the accent on planning for South East Asia has been transferred from an

\textsuperscript{192} "Memorandum from F.G. Shedden to Watt: Five Power Staff Agency Preliminary Meeting-Progress Report by Australian representative, 9 April, 1953" in AA, A816/30, 11/301/855.

\textsuperscript{193} "Memorandum from McBride to Menzies: Conference of Military Representatives of the Five Power Nations in the South East Asia Area, 6-10 April, 17 April, 1953" in AA, A816/30, 11/301/855.
ANZUS to a Five Power basis." The Defence Minister also expressed strong concern that the Five Power Staff Agency might, in the long-term future, develop into a command organisation embracing ANZUS and ANZAM. On 24 April the Joint Planning Committee (JPC) discussed the Pearl Harbour conference report, expressing the view that "certain of the ANZUS planning tasks have been undertaken by the Five Powers," and sharing McBride's concern at the possible merging of ANZUS and ANZAM into the Staff Agency.

Department of External Affairs officers also harboured anxiety over the possible impotence of the military function of ANZUS. Ralph Harry, Assistant Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, wrote to Hay that the development of the Staff Agency as envisaged at the Pearl Harbour conference would inevitably lead to "the suspension by ANZUS of its military planning and concentration on political consultation." Concurring in Harry's view, Hay informed Watt that the proposed plan of studies by the Five Power Staff Agency "would seem to render redundant at least some of the current ANZUS military planning." Hay went on to point out the possibility that the Staff Agency would eventually absorb the whole functions of ANZUS and ANZAM. But he affirmed that the Five Power Staff Agency would not in any way provide Australia with the same advantages as ANZAM and ANZUS, because he thought that "there may be a real danger of the Organisation developing an inner ring [of the Big Three] from which there will be a tendency to exclude Australia and

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194 Ibid.
197 "Draft Telegram from Watt to Shedden formulated by David Hay on 28 April, 1953" in AA, A1838/269, TS (Top-Secret)654/8/3/2, part 2.
New Zealand." In order to avoid reducing Australia to a subordinate position in the Pacific and to maintain Australia's entry into US political and military thinking, Hay emphasised to the Secretary that it was important that "we should ensure ... that existing organisations such as ANZAM and ANZUS are preserved in essentials."198

It was now even more urgent that Australia should obtain an assessment of the American attitude towards the development of the Five Power Staff Agency. Given the great reluctance of New Zealand to hold meetings of the ANZUS Council, Hay suggested to Watt in early May that Australia should now intensify its own diplomatic activities to obtain US views.199 Watt agreed, telegraphing Spender on 16 May that American views were required by Australia

in considering any suggestion that [the] probable future of [a] Five Power Staff Agency is such as to make ANZAM or ANZUS, or both unnecessary; or that functions carried out in ANZUS and ANZAM, or both are being carried out even more effectively in [a] Five Power Staff Agency.200

Ten days later Spender submitted a formal note to Elbert G. Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary of State, requesting the Eisenhower administration's views on the future development of the Staff Agency and on its relationships with ANZUS and ANZAM.201 The next day Arthur Tange, who had been acting as the Minister in the Australian Embassy in Washington since January 1953, called at the State Department to meet Foster. Foster informed Tange that, given the Pentagon's reluctance to underwrite the security of mainland Asia, the United States did not think that the Five

198 Ibid.
200 "Cablegram No. 388 from Watt to Spender, 16 May, 1953" in AA, A5461/1, 2/4/1A, part 2.
201 "Telegram No. ENY316 from Spender to Watt, 26 May, 1953" in AA, A5461/1, 2/4/1, part 2; and "Memorandum from Foster to Matthews, 29 May, 1953" in FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. XII, part 2, pp. 316-317.
Power Staff Agency should be "a formal and elaborate organisation." The Agency should "rest on an ad hoc, on call-need-to-know basis." Foster also argued that any formalisation of the Staff Agency "would run again into pressure from the Philippines, Japan, etc. for participation." Concerning the relationships of the Agency with ANZUS and ANZAM, the American official assured the Australian that there was no prospect whatever that the Agency would supplant ANZUS and ANZAM machineries. "We have been very pleased," Foster stated, "by the progress made by the ANZUS Military Representatives group," and "[w]e should be interested to learn of any ideas that may come out of conversations" among the Commonwealth of Nations on the reformation of ANZAM. Tange then sought American views on the concept of an ANZUS-ANZAM linkage as a device for co-ordinating American and British Commonwealth strategies in South East Asia. On this, Foster was completely non-committal.202

On 29 May Spender wrote a letter to Menzies, reporting the results of the discussions with the Americans. He told Menzies that "the Pentagon were opposed to" the Five Power Staff Agency "developing into an Agency for planning operations," and that "it was not regarded as any substitute for military machinery under ANZUS." The American military "regarded ANZUS as [a] ... body with ... real authority to consider military problems" in the Pacific.203 In a personal telegram forwarded to Casey and Menzies on 4 June, Spender also reported that the Americans were "reserving their position on the question of establishing a formal relationship between ANZUS and ANZAM." However, in spite of the American attitude, the Australian

203 "Top-secret and personal letter from Spender and Menzies, 29 May, 1953" in AA, A1838/269, TS (Top-Secret)/686/1, part 3.
Ambassador counselled Casey and Menzies that, now that “the Americans foresee at present no significant development of the scope of the Five Power Staff Agency” and had no intention to undermine a separate identity and value of ANZUS and ANZAM, now was the time to put the quietus on Churchill’s attempt to “reduce ANZUS to bare bone” by agreeing to the British proposal for opening talks on a review of the ANZAM concept. 204

Timed to coincide with the Coronation of Elizabeth II, the British Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference was held in London between 3 and 18 June 1953. By suggesting the creation of a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, Britain at this conference set forth a specific way and form for Australia and New Zealand to make a larger contribution to the defence of Malaya. On 6 June, when Sir Neville Brownjohn, Chief of Staff officer to the UK Minister for Defence, conferred with R.G. Pollard, Australian defence adviser to the conference, the British officer talked about "an impossibly heavy UK Cold War burden" and referred to "the possibility of the other Dominions relieving the UK of some of this burden." In anticipation of an armistice agreement in Korea (which would be finally achieved on 27 July), Brownjohn then sounded out Pollard on the retaining of Commonwealth forces in Malaya as a Strategic Reserve when they were relieved of Korean duties. 205 This sounding was repeated to Pollard by the UK Minister for Defence, Lord Alexander, on 8 June. 206 Two days later, Menzies, Holland and Churchill finally agreed that one each of the United

204 “Telegram No. 47 and No. 573 from Spender to Menzies (London) and Casey, 4 June, 1953” in AA, A5461/1, 1/4/2A, part 3.
206 Ibid.
Kingdom and New Zealand Chiefs of Staff would visit Australia to exchange views on an ANZAM review, and that this should be preceded by talks at planning level.207

Eleven days after finishing the conference (29 June), Alexander sent a formal letter to Menzies, requesting Australia to assume some of the roles and missions presently allocated to the United Kingdom in Malaya by agreeing to the establishment of a Strategic Reserve. The British government, Alexander stated,

would like to see the Commonwealth taking the lead in the formation of such a Reserve, the logical location of which would be Malaya. The United Kingdom will be prepared to play its part. But as you will understand from ... our world-wide commitments, there are limits to what we can do. We can not form an adequate Reserve on our own.

The British Defence Minister then proposed that the nucleus of a Strategic Reserve "would be found in the forces in Malaya and in the Australian and New Zealand contingents in Korea as and when the latter can be released by the United Nations Command."208

The British proposal for the creation of a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve was a corollary of the projected future reduction of its conventional forces in consequence of adopting the strategy of nuclear deterrence. Australia clearly realised that it had to accept the British proposal for a Strategic Reserve as part of Australia's adaptation to the future diminution of British military power in Southeast Asia. By complementing the decline in Britain's security role in Asia with Australia's increasing regional role, Canberra had to keep the sphere of British Commonwealth influence in the area from

207 "Minutes of a Meeting held at No. 10 Downing Street, London, 10 June, 1953" in NZA, EA1, 111/3/3/1, part 1.
contracting and to uphold the capacity of the UK to remain a global power. External Affairs also welcomed the establishment of a Strategic Reserve as a means of inducing future formal US involvement in the defence of mainland Asia and of substantiating the Australian "claim to an effective voice" in American planning for the area.209

The Defence Department for its part, realising the inadequacy of Australia's own strength, and having some doubts about the feasibility of the British idea of a self-contained British Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, saw a need to rely upon United States strength in the creation of the Reserve. "The Commonwealth itself," the Joint Planning Committee stated in a report dated 11 August, "could not provide a balanced force of sufficient magnitude to constitute an adequate deterrent against Chinese communist aggression and be capable of effective contribution." "In association with forces which may be permitted by other friendly nations, however," the Committee concluded, "a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve would be of considerable value."210 A larger Australian contribution to Malayan defence, the Committee also hoped, would lead to Australia gaining an effective consultative role in Allied defence strategy for Asia. These views were confirmed by the Defence Committee on 13 August.211

Between 24 August and 3 September, Australian, British and New Zealand military planners held a series of meetings in Melbourne. They concluded that, with the development of the H-bomb, there was very little likelihood of a hot war with Soviet

209 "Memorandum from Watt to Shedden, 5 August, 1953" in AA, A1838/269, TS (Top-Secret) 682/22, part 1; and "Memorandum from David Hay to Horton, 5 August, 1953" in AA, A1838/269, TS (Top-Secret) 682/22, part 1.
211 "Summary of Conclusions of Paper by Defence Committee, 13 August, 1953" in AA, A5954/1, 1464/1.
Russia in the Middle East, and that Southeast Asia and the Pacific would become the
most gravely threatened areas for the Western allies. However, in spite of the
decreased importance of the Middle East in UK defence planning, the British officers
took the view that, having regard to the unrest in the Middle East, the redeployment to
Malaya of Australian and New Zealand squadrons at present stationed in Malta and
Cyprus respectively would be most unwelcome at the present time.\footnote{212}

The discussion then turned to the reformation of ANZAM. It was agreed that
ANZAM should now be made a peace-time organisation by establishing the ANZAM
Chiefs of Staff on a permanent basis in Melbourne, and that the primary planning
responsibility for the external defence of Malaya would now be transferred to the
ANZAM Chiefs of Staff. In regard to the establishment of a Commonwealth Strategic
Reserve, the British military officers informed their Australian and New Zealand
counterparts that the UK "looked on the Strategic Reserve as a safeguard which would
permit them to reduce the level of their forces engaged in security duties" in Malaya,
thereby pressing Australia and New Zealand to take over a larger share of UK defence
obligations in Asia. While New Zealand showed that, in view of other commitments, it
would be unable to make any contribution to the proposed Reserve,\footnote{213} Australia
agreed to take the lead in the creation of the Reserve. At the same time, Australian
military officials indicated that a Strategic Reserve, consisting of Australian and New
Zealand contingents and forces in Malaya, would be quite inadequate to deter a large-

\footnote{212} "Note of Meeting of UK, Australian and New Zealand Planners, Melbourne, August-September
\footnote{213} Ibid.
scale Chinese attack on Malaya, and that it would need the assistance of American strength.\textsuperscript{214}

On 15 October 1953, the very day when Britain conducted an explosion test of the second atomic bomb north of Woomera, South Australia,\textsuperscript{215} Sir John Harding, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, arrived in Australia. After meeting with Menzies in Canberra the next day, Harding stayed in Melbourne during 17-21 October to hold discussions with the Australian and New Zealand Chiefs of Staff. Harding confirmed the military planners' suggestion that the primary planning responsibility for the external defence of Malaya should be transferred to the ANZAM Chiefs of Staff Committee to be established on a permanent basis in peace-time in Melbourne, saying that "[u]ntil such time as a Supreme Allied Command is established ... strategic direction" should "be exercised by the ANZAM Chiefs of Staff, by means of directives issued to the three Commands [for] Malayan area; Australian Maritime area; and New Zealand Maritime area." Successfully persuading reluctant New Zealand to agree to participate in the creation of a Strategic Reserve, Harding also obtained Australian and New Zealand's consent to assuming wider operational responsibility and obligation in

\textsuperscript{214} "Planning Paper No. 4: British Commonwealth Defence Discussions - Meeting of United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australian Planners, 24 August-3 September, 1953" in AA, A5954/37, 1463/1.

\textsuperscript{215} Intensive preparations by Australia and the United Kingdom, extending over a period of about ten months, culminated in the successful explosion of an atomic weapon in South Australia on 15 October. For an account of the second explosion, see Lorna Arnold, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 54-75; and "Memorandum from T. Davin, official secretary, New Zealand High Commissioner's Office, Canberra, to McIntosh, 31 October, 1953" in NZA, EA1, 63/5/10, part 2. The public in Australia were, like the Menzies government, generous enough to permit Britain to use the soil on the Australian continent for the explosion of atomic bombs. In an Australian Gallup Poll conducted in August-September 1953, 52\% of the public favoured exploding atomic bombs in central Australia, with 28\% opposing and 20\% undecided. Supporters argued that "[a]tomic research is necessary," that "Australia must be safeguarded," and that "[w]e must keep up with other nations." Opponents, on the other hand, argued that "the after-effects might be bad," and that "[i]t's a waste of money." See Australian Gallup Poll, August/September 1953.
the defence of Malaya. The Reserve was to be based on an army brigade group, comprising an Australian battalion and other Australian and British units. An Australian destroyer or frigate would supplement the Royal Navy's ships in the region, with occasional visits from an Australian aircraft-carrier and one or more New Zealand frigates. A bomber squadron and a fighter squadron from the RAAF would be added to the Royal Air Force (RAF) units in Malaya, with the possible addition later of the two RAAF fighter squadrons and two and a half squadrons from the Royal New Zealand Air Force in the Middle East. However, it was recognised that, to make the Strategic Reserve really effective, it would have to rely upon American strength, and that, in the field of logistics and infrastructure, active cooperation of the United States would be required.

As a quid pro quo for the new Australian and New Zealand contribution to the defence of Malaya, Harding now proposed that Australian land, air and naval forces, and New Zealand air and naval forces except for land forces should in future be released from their commitment to the defence of the Middle East. Thus the primary planning responsibility for the external defence of Malaya would now be transferred to Australia from Britain, with operational responsibility for the defence of the territory being placed on a joint basis between the UK, Australia and New Zealand. At the


same time, Australian external and defence concern would now overwhelmingly focus upon Southeast Asia.

The recommendations made by Harding during his visit to Australia were to be called "the Harding Report" and now awaited the approval of the three governments concerned.

Conclusion

During 1952-53, the Churchill government expressed its resentment over the exclusion of Britain from ANZUS and launched a campaign for the reassertion of British influence over the Pacific dominions. Concerned about the political effect in the UK of its having no connection with the ANZUS discussions, and bearing in mind its extensive interests in the Pacific as well as its Commonwealth ties with Australia and New Zealand, the British government tried to rectify its exclusion from ANZUS by demanding direct or indirect admission to ANZUS deliberations. However, the repeated British requests were rebuffed by the ANZUS powers. America was unwilling to widen the membership of ANZUS, holding that, if the UK were admitted, it would be difficult to resist the claims of other Asian and European powers with interests in the Pacific. Australia, while appreciating the political difficulties for Britain arising from the exclusion from ANZUS, realised that to press the Americans for British association would antagonise the United States and hinder efforts to transform ANZUS into a working reality. New Zealand, on the other hand, actively supported the British request, valuing its relationship with Britain more highly and fearing the
possible domination of ANZUS by Australia and the US. However, Wellington finally yielded on the matter.

The determination of the ANZUS powers to retain the security treaty on a tripartite basis forced the British government to change its tactics for counterbalancing Britain's exclusion from ANZUS. The Churchill government attempted to diminish the significance of ANZUS by proposing to revitalise the ANZAM agreement. The British proposal arose from a change in British defence doctrine. The adoption by the UK government of the strategy of nuclear deterrence led the government to plan for the future reduction of its conventional forces and to rely more upon its Commonwealth partners for the defence of British interests in Asia. The British government then used its ANZAM proposal as a response to the development of the security relationship between Australia, New Zealand and the US, and sought to deter the Pacific dominions from being drawn more deeply into the sphere of American influence. In order to reduce the value of the ANZUS alliance, the United Kingdom also proposed the formalisation of the Five Power Staff Agency and urged that it absorb substantial functions of ANZUS and ANZAM. However, the United States was unwilling to turn the Staff Agency into a formal body. This led to Australia and New Zealand finally agreeing to the British proposal for developing ANZAM into a British Commonwealth Pacific Organisation.

Australia agreed to the British proposal for revitalising ANZAM and for focussing it more closely on the defence of Malaya as a way of adjusting to the diminution of British power in Southeast Asia. Canberra had to shoulder a heavier Cold War burden
in order to prevent the contraction of the British Commonwealth orbit in Asia and to sustain the capacity of the United Kingdom to maintain its position as a Great Power.

As well, Australia accepted the UK proposal for the reformation of ANZAM as a means of preserving the significance of the ANZUS security treaty as it was. By reaffirming Australia's status and role as a Commonwealth alliance partner of the British in the form of participation in a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in Malaya, Australia sought to block Britain's further pressure for admission to ANZUS and to maintain the vitality of the security treaty with the US. By accepting the British proposal for the revitalisation of ANZAM, Australia now clearly attempted to balance its commitment to the United States under ANZUS and its commitments under Commonwealth arrangement. Thus the blow to British international prestige and to Commonwealth cohesion dealt by the creation of ANZUS was softened by the emphasis Australia and New Zealand now placed on the ties and unwritten commitments of the British Commonwealth. Nevertheless, because of the secrecy surrounding ANZAM, it was not a final solution to the political problem in the UK arising from Britain's exclusion from ANZUS. SEATO, which would recognise the United Kingdom again as a Great Power in Asia, would go a long way towards solving that problem.
Chapter IV
Australia and Indonesian Adventurism in West New Guinea, 1950-1953

New Guinea, the largest of the world’s islands after Greenland, lies in the Southwest Pacific, directly north of Australia and at the eastern extremity of the Indonesian archipelago. After the Second World War, West New Guinea became an object of bitter dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia over the determination of its sovereignty, with the former insisting on retaining the territory as part of the Dutch Kingdom, and the latter claiming annexation of the territory into the new Republic. Given New Guinea’s role as the geographical terminus of the island chain protruding from Asia, and possessing Papua as a protectorate and northeast New Guinea as a trust territory, Australia was not on any account indifferent to the two nations’ conflicting claims to sovereignty over the western part of New Guinea. Fearing the erosion of New Guinea’s role as an effective shield for Australia’s defence, and suspicious of Indonesia’s ambitions over Papua and East New Guinea, Australia did not wish the Dutch to transfer sovereignty over West New Guinea to the Jakarta government. Australia’s policy was therefore consistently directed towards stiffening the Dutch position on retention of full sovereignty and control over the territory, and, at the same time, getting Indonesia to relinquish its claim for sovereignty. Briefly tracing the origin of the West New Guinea dispute, this Chapter discusses the Menzies government’s approach to the conflict in the period 1950-53.
New Guinea’s first contact with the European-centred international system was made in 1605 when one of twelve Dutch vessels, which had sailed to the Malay Archipelago, discovered the south coast of New Guinea, together with the north coast of Australia. But because of the poverty of its natural resources, the fierceness of its native peoples and the unhealthiness of the coastal areas, New Guinea remained an unwanted and largely unclaimed land for the next two centuries. In 1828, in an attempt to forestall annexationist ambitions over New Guinea by other European powers, above all, Britain, and to consolidate New Guinea’s role as a barrier against intrusion into the jealously-guarded monopoly of the spice islands in the Moluccas, the Netherlands government, which had taken over the Dutch East India Company at the end of the eighteenth century, laid claim to West New Guinea from the 141st meridian and included it within the boundaries of the Netherlands East Indies. In 1884, when Britain (under strong pressure from the Australian colonial governments) and Germany claimed sovereignty over the rest of New Guinea, with Britain taking the south-east section of the island and Germany the north-east, the whole of New Guinea was brought into the power system of the modern world.

3 Ibid., pp. 7, 12-13.
Out of the inescapable necessity, the Dutch government at the turn of the 20th century assumed the financial and administrative burden of the defence of West New Guinea. In 1898 the Dutch allocated 115,000 guilders from the Netherlands East Indies budget for the establishment of an administration of the territory.\(^6\) Permanent administrative posts were established in Fakfak on the southwest coast and Manokwari on the northwest coast in the same year and in Merauke on the southeastern corner of the territory in 1902.\(^7\) In the 1920's and 1930's, Dutch big business also displayed interest in West New Guinea, particularly in order to counter the intrusion of German and Japanese economic interests. Having lost its colonies, including north-eastern New Guinea, as a result of the First World War, Germany entertained definite colonial ambitions over West New Guinea as early as 1923. In that year the German company Phoenix, with headquarters in Manokwari and a branch office in Ambon, applied for concessions for coconut plantations in West New Guinea.\(^8\) Soon afterwards, the Japanese began to show interest in West New Guinea. They repeatedly attempted to gain concessions in the territory, but the Dutch consistently thwarted these efforts. However, the pressure increased, and in 1931 the Japanese firm Nanyo Kaihatsu Kaisha (Company) obtained a concession of about 5,500 hectares for an experimental cotton plantation. By 1935 the concession area covered approximately 13,500 acres. Following their successful experiment in growing cotton, in 1935 the Japanese company asked the Dutch government for permission to import a thousand Japanese families; but the request was rejected out of hand.\(^9\)

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\(^6\) Ibid., p. 19.
The establishment of a German and Japanese economic presence produced an acute awareness among the Hollander that active Dutch involvement in West New Guinea was indispensable. In 1935 the Netherlands New Guinea Oil Company, jointly sponsored by Secony, Shell and the Pacific Oil Company, was established; and the next year the Company obtained a concession of nearly 25 million acres. Explorations were begun, and oil was struck at three fields in the Vogelkop on the west coast. Between 1936 and 1939, the Dutch companies also conducted exploration for gold in West New Guinea. This was partly influenced by the fact that appreciable amounts of gold had been discovered in the eastern part of New Guinea in 1877, and that gold became the most valuable export item from Papua New Guinea in the 1930's. Spending approximately 2 million guilders on exploratory work, the Dutch companies discovered small quantities of gold. A further Dutch economic presence was manifested in the middle of 1938 when the Netherlands Company for New Guinea was founded by fifteen large Dutch enterprises, and the Company established an experimental rubber plantation at Genjem near Hollandia, the capital of Dutch New Guinea and located on the northeastern corner of the territory.

Along with Dutch economic activities in West New Guinea, the 1930's also saw the advocacy to transform Netherlands New Guinea into a Eurasian (Netherlands-Indies Dutchmen) homeland. Both in the Dutch East Indies and in the Netherlands, a number

12 Arend Lijphart, op.cit., p. 51.
13 Ibid., pp. 85-86.
of New Guinea colonisation societies were established, exerting pressure upon the Dutch government and the Dutch Indies administration to establish the Dutch-part of New Guinea as a Eurasian fatherland. The worsening situation of the Eurasians in the Dutch East Indies as a result of the world economic depression induced more and more of them to look favourably on the Eurasian fatherland idea, and the actual Eurasian colonisation started in early 1933. Beginning with the settlement of 73 persons in Hollandia and 156 persons in Manokwari in the same year, about 600 Eurasians had emigrated to West New Guinea from the Dutch East Indies by the end of the 1930's.14

During the Second World War, the Japanese occupied all of Dutch New Guinea, except for Merauke in the extreme south-eastern corner of the territory, where the Dutch flag kept flying throughout the war.15 In the course of the Occupation, the Japanese not only inflicted serious damage on the Dutch economic interests in West New Guinea, but also dealt a death-blow to the small Eurasian communities there. Only 10 per cent of the settlers survived the war. The men were either killed in military actions against the Japanese or were executed by the Japanese after being captured. The women and children were placed in concentration camps, which few of them survived.16

However, in spite of the suffering of the Eurasians under the Japanese Occupation, the concept of establishing West New Guinea as a Eurasian fatherland reasserted itself

14 Ibid., pp. 69-83.
15 Ibid., p. 86; and Albert Hyma, op.cit, p. 223.
16 Arend Lijphart, op.cit., p. 77.
with vigour among the Eurasians after the defeat of Japan in the Second World War and the proclamation of Indonesian independence on 17 August, 1945. The impending liquidation of Dutch colonial rule in the Netherlands East Indies and the strong desire of the Eurasians to remain outside the control of an independent Indonesian government gave a special urgency to their appeal. Backed by a number of Eurasian colonisation groups both in the Dutch East Indies and Holland, and bolstered by their active lobbying to the Dutch Indies administration and the Dutch government, the Eurasian appeal certainly provided the basis for the evolution by the Netherlands government of a territorial conception of Indonesia deprived of West New Guinea.

At a Pangkalpinang conference on the small island of Bangka, off Sumatra, held in early October 1946, Dutch representatives informed the Indonesians of Holland’s intention to separate New Guinea from the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia and to designate Dutch New Guinea as a Eurasian fatherland. Two months later, a conference was again convened at Den Pasar in Bali, where the Dutch representatives argued against the inclusion of New Guinea in the transfer of sovereignty on the ground that the task of developing the territory would be too much for the new state. At those conferences, Indonesian representatives strongly opposed the idea of Dutch retention of sovereignty over West New Guinea, claiming Indonesian sovereignty over the territory. Arguing that Indonesia was legal heir to all of the former Netherlands

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17 Ibid., pp. 89-105. See also Stephen V. Harris and Colin Brown, *Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Australia: the Irian Jaya Problem of 1984*, Australia-Asia Papers No. 29, Centre for the Study of Australian-Asian Relations, Griffith University, Brisbane, 1985, p. 3.


East Indies, they insisted that the territory of the Indonesian Republic should extend from the island of Sabang, off the northern tip of Sumatra, to Merauke on the border of Australian New Guinea. From the very first, every action taken by the leaders of the Indonesian nationalist movement had been based on the conviction that they had been acting on behalf of all the varied peoples included within the administrative boundaries of the former Netherlands East Indies. In fact, at a meeting convened at the initiative of the Japanese Occupation authorities in July 1945, with 64 Indonesian leaders present, only 6 had voted for the idea of the former territory of the Netherlands East Indies omitting New Guinea as the basis of a future Indonesian state. The rest had been in favour of either (a) a Greater Indonesia embracing Malaya, British Borneo and Portuguese Timor as well as the former Netherlands East Indies, or (b) all of the former territory of the Netherlands East Indies.\(^{20}\)

During 1947-49, the Dutch position on the retention of sovereignty over West New Guinea was strengthened by factors other than the concept of ensuring the future of the territory as a place of refuge for the Eurasians. The first of these was a strong desire by the Dutch conservatives to salvage something from the Pacific and to keep West New Guinea as a last relic for the Netherlands Crown. The loss of the Dutch East Indies as a result of the forthcoming independence of Indonesia threatened to change the character of Holland from a country with a world outlook to a merely continental European state. Faced with the loss of this compensation for Holland’s political inferiority, the Dutch conservatives looked for a possible substitute and a way

to minimise the loss of national prestige. West New Guinea, they thought, could serve as a symbol that Holland was still a major colonial power and had emerged from the Indonesian crisis in a strong position.\(^{21}\) In addition to the desire to make New Guinea a symbol of Dutch colonial grandeur, there was also the concept of a moral mission to the primitive peoples of New Guinea. For the Hollanders, particularly the Calvinist parties drawing upon the background of their unique politico-religious culture, the continuation of Dutch rule in West New Guinea became increasingly involved with the doing of God’s will and the execution of a moral mission for the protection of the interests of the indigenous inhabitants. As the Cold War intensified, this moral mission concept was bolstered by the argument that the Netherlands had an obligation to keep New Guinea’s inhabitants out of communist hands.\(^{22}\)

Between 23 August and 2 November 1949, a Round Table Conference (RTC) was convened in the historic “Ridderzaal (Hall of Knights)” in the Hague, in which in 1581 the Dutch nation had declared its independence from Spain through the States General of the Republic of the United Netherlands.\(^{23}\) The conference was attended by the United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) consisting of Australia, Belgium and the US,\(^{24}\) a Dutch delegation and two Indonesian delegations representing the


\(^{22}\) Ibid.


\(^{24}\) On 25 August, 1947, about one month after the first Dutch “police” action which was in fact a Dutch military attack on the Indonesian Republic, a United Nations Security Council Good Offices Committee (GOC) on Indonesian question was set up, with the terms of reference being given by the Security Council. On 20 October GOC held its first official meeting. Australia’s support for Indonesia’s independence movement no doubt prompted Indonesia to name Australia as its representative; Belgium was nominated as Holland’s spokesman; and the United States was nominated by Holland and Indonesia as the impartial third party. On 28 January, 1949 the Security Council reconstituted the GOC, and three days later formally replaced it with a new body, the United Nations Commission on Indonesia (UNCI).
Republicans and the Federalists. 25 For the well-publicized uncompromising divergent views between the Dutch and Indonesians on the question of sovereignty over West New Guinea, the RTC decided at the outset to delay discussion of the question until sufficient progress had been made on other issues, particularly the terms and modalities of Indonesian independence. On 30 September, more than a month after the Conference commenced, discussion was initiated on the West New Guinea issue, and it soon became apparent that the respective viewpoints were quite irreconcilable. Under strong pressure from conservative parliamentarians, Dutch delegates argued that West New Guinea was not part of Indonesia either geographically or ethnologically, insisting that it should remain under Dutch sovereignty. Similarly, fearing political repercussions at home if they yielded on the issue of West New Guinea, Indonesian delegates insisted that the boundaries of the Indonesian state should cover the whole territory of the former Netherlands East Indies. From Indonesia’s standpoint, to be deprived of West New Guinea would constitute a denial of the full and unfettered transfer of sovereignty to which they had been committed. 26

In mid-October, when the entire Hague Conference seemed in danger of collapsing because of both sides’ intransigence on the issue of West New Guinea, Dutch

25 The Republican delegation consisted of the Javanese who favoured the centralization of government in a unitary state in order to ensure their rule over minorities in a future independent state. The Federalist delegation comprised minorities such as the Sundanese, Balinese, etc who were in favour of the federal concept in order to guarantee their freedom and autonomy against the domination of the Javanese.

delegates requested assistance from the Australian representative to the UNCI, T.K. Critchley and from representatives of Belgium and the US. Before attending the Round Table Conference, Critchley had become very familiar with the conflicting claims of the Dutch and Indonesians to sovereignty over West New Guinea. In fact, the first memorandum setting forth Australia's attitude towards the question of the disposition of West New Guinea had been drawn up by him on 11 June, 1947 for submission to the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Dr John Burton.27

Instructions which Critchley had received from External Affairs before leaving for the Hague had therefore largely been based upon this memorandum, and had included the basic stance of the Chifley Labor government towards the question of West New Guinea, that Australia should support the retention of full Dutch control over the territory. As reasons for Australia's support for the maintenance of Dutch sovereignty over West New Guinea, it expressed the fear that Indonesian control of West New Guinea "might introduce the general Asiatic tendency towards the hatred of the white man into the territory," thereby having great repercussions upon Papua and East New Guinea, which were once again under Australian control. It was also argued that "the incorporation of Netherlands New Guinea into Indonesia would widen what is really a purely artificial distinction between the two parts of New Guinea," and that "[a]ny hopes for a Melanesian nation at some future date would be considerably diminished." Fear was further expressed that "unstable conditions in the territory" as a result of Indonesia's annexation of Dutch New Guinea "would attract extremist and Communist influence," thereby undermining New Guinea's role as a shield for Australia's defence.

In view of possible Indonesian preoccupation with internal security and reconstruction after its independence, it also argued, the Indonesians could not establish effective administrative control over New Guinea.\(^\text{28}\)

However, the Labor government regarded Western New Guinea as an issue on which Australia should not play an active role, taking the view that the question of sovereignty over the territory should be resolved solely between Indonesia and the Netherlands. As Prime Minister J.B. Chifley remarked to the House of Representatives on 16 September, 1949, “Australian policy in the matter is not to attempt actively to influence any negotiations at the Hague on the future control of Dutch New Guinea. The Commonwealth considers that this must be left to the Dutch and the Indonesians to work out among themselves.”\(^\text{29}\) Dr H. V. Evatt, Minister for External Affairs, also told Parliament on 7 October that “whatever authority operates in Dutch New Guinea [was] primarily [a] matter for the Dutch and Indonesian governments.”\(^\text{30}\) This certainly showed the Labor government’s difficulty in reconciling its support and sympathetic attitude towards the Indonesian nationalist movement with its opposition to Indonesian control of West New Guinea. The Labor government’s support for the Indonesian Republic in its struggle against the Dutch arose mainly from a vivid memory of Dutch inability to serve as an effective bulwark against attack from the north during the Second World War and from pressure from communist-led waterside workers, who had opposed the reestablishment of Dutch rule

\(^{28}\) “Memorandum from HNT of Southeast Asian Section to Lawrence McIntyre, 11 July, 1949” in AA, A1838/278, 400/1/11/1/1, part 2; “Memorandum from T. Pyman to McIntyre, 28 July, 1949” in AA, A1838/278, 401/3/1/1, part 7; and “Unnumbered cablegram from Burton to Crutchley, 28 July, 1949” in AA, A1838/278, 401/3/1/1, part 7.

\(^{29}\) Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 204, p. 603, 16 September, 1949, Statement by Chifley.

\(^{30}\) Ibid., p.1120, 7 October, 1949, Statement by Evatt.
over Indonesia and imposed a ban on Dutch shipping to Indonesia, and other trade
union organisations, who had extended support to the ban.\textsuperscript{31} As a result of Australia’s
support for Indonesia’s independent movement, the general friendly relations were
maintained during 1945-49. The Labor government therefore did not like the West
New Guinea issue interfering with the general Indonesian-Australian good relations.
An instruction to Critchley from External Affairs stated that “[o]pen opposition by
Australia to the incorporation of the territory in the USI (United States of Indonesia)
might lose for Australia the goodwill of future Government of the USI.”\textsuperscript{32}

In accordance with instructions from Canberra, Critchley consistently refrained
from expressing publicly Australia’s attitude towards the issue of West New Guinea in
the course of the Round Table Conference, and continued to urge Dutch and
Indonesian delegates to entrust the discussion of sovereignty over Dutch New Guinea
to future negotiations between the two countries.\textsuperscript{33} Faced with the danger of the
whole RTC agreement foundering on the question of West New Guinea, and with a
tense internal situation in Indonesia arising from the Indonesians’ impatience with the
slow progress of the Hague Conference, at the end of October Critchley actively
promoted the concept of postponing a definite settlement of the New Guinea issue in
order to permit the RTC to conclude with a successful solution of all other major

\textsuperscript{31} For an account of Australian attitudes and policies towards Indonesian independence, see Margaret
George, \textit{op.cit.}; C.W.P. Waters, \textit{The Independence of Indonesia as an issue in Anglo-Australian
J.A.C. Mackie, “Australia and Indonesia, 1945-60” in Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper (eds.),
\textit{op.cit.}, pp. 272-281; and Gordon Greenwood, \textit{Approaches to Asia: Australian Postwar Policies and

\textsuperscript{32} “Memorandum from HNT of Southeast Asian Section to McIntryre, 11 July, 1949” in AA,
A1838/278, 400/1/11/1/1, part 2.

\textsuperscript{33} “Cablegram No. C8 from Critchley to Burton, 3 September, 1949” in AA, A1838/278, 309/1/1,
part 1.
problems. Although, in the last stages of the negotiations, Dutch representatives, as a way out of the impasse, proposed the concept of a Dutch trusteeship under the United Nations over West New Guinea, and Belgian, American and Australian representatives supported the concept, the Indonesians nonetheless completely rejected the Dutch proposal. On the evening of 29 October the UNCI communicated Critchley's proposed formula to the Indonesian and Dutch delegates, calling for the maintenance of the status quo of the Residency of West New Guinea with the stipulation that, within a year from the date of the transfer of sovereignty, the question of the territory’s status would be determined through negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands. The next day the Dutch delegates accepted the formula, and the following day the Indonesian delegates followed suit. On 2 November the Round Table Conference was officially closed with Critchley’s proposed formula incorporated in Article 2 of the Charter on the Transfer of Sovereignty.

The emergence of the Dutch government from the RTC still in possession of a territorial remnant of its former empire in the Indonesian archipelago in consequence of the Australian representative’s proposal was decisive in obtaining the two-thirds majority vote in the Dutch Parliament in mid-December 1949 required for the approval of the RTC agreements, which particularly stipulated the terms and modalities of Indonesian independence. On 27 December formal ceremonies were held for the transfer of sovereignty both in the Hague and Jakarta, whereby three and a half centuries of Dutch rule in the Netherlands East Indies was brought to an end, and a

35 Ibid.
Governments
Netherlands-Indonesia-Union on the basis of sovereign equality was brought into existence. The next day Achmed Sukarno, who had been elected President of the Indonesian Republic on 16 December, made a triumphant entry into Jakarta after an absence of four years.

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The Menzies government, installed in power in early December 1949, supported the basic stance of the Labor government on the question of the disposition of the western part of New Guinea, endorsing the major arguments advanced by the Labor government against Indonesian claims to sovereignty over the territory. However, it was very critical of the Labor government's contemplated way and manner for involving Australia in the question of the determination of the status of West New Guinea. While the Chifley government, for fear of losing the general Indonesian friendship towards Australia as maintained since 1945, had regarded the question of West New Guinea as being appropriately resolved solely between Indonesia and the Netherlands, the Menzies government more strongly appreciated that Australia's vital interests would be at stake in the determination of the future status of Dutch New Guinea. The Liberal-Country coalition government took the view that Australia should exercise an active and direct influence over bilateral Indonesian-Dutch negotiations on determining sovereignty over West New Guinea, and that, to that end, Australia should claim an effective consultative role in any negotiation. The interventionist stance taken by the Menzies government on the New Guinea issue encountered strong opposition on the part of the US, the UK and Holland.
On 7 February, 1950 the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Percy Spender, convened a Cabinet meeting, at which he explained the Menzies government’s basic stance, that Australia would support the maintenance of full Dutch sovereignty and control over West New Guinea, and that Australia would not permit Indonesia to participate directly or indirectly in the administration of the territory. As the reason for opposing Indonesia’s claim for sovereignty over Dutch New Guinea, the Minister argued that “the peoples of Dutch New Guinea have little or nothing in common, except a past common administration, with the peoples of Indonesia,” and that Indonesian control over the territory would significantly diminish Australian hopes for a future Melanesian nation consisting of the western and eastern parts of New Guinea. Emphasising the need to set forth Australia’s position on the New Guinea issue clearly to Amsterdam and Jakarta from the outset, Spender presented to other Cabinet members draft letters to be sent to the Indonesian and Dutch governments. The draft would point out to both parties Australia’s direct strategic interests in the determination of the future status of Dutch New Guinea and Australia’s resolve to be involved directly in any bilateral negotiation over New Guinea.\(^{36}\)

With the approval of Cabinet,\(^{37}\) the following day Spender wrote to P.E. Teppema, Netherlands Consulate-General in Canberra, setting out the Australian position, and requesting the views of the Dutch government on the submission of a letter to the

\(^{36}\)“Note for Cabinet by Spender, 7 February, 1950” in AA, A1838/283, 3036/6/1, part 1.

Jakarta government. Similar letters were also turned in to the British and American diplomatic missions in Canberra on the same day.

The US government was slow to respond to Spender's letter. However, the British and Dutch governments quickly brushed aside this third party interference in the West New Guinea matter. On 17 February W. Garnett, official secretary of the UK High Commissioner's Office, Canberra, forwarded a letter to Burton, deterring Canberra from submitting a letter to the Indonesian government. The subject of Dutch New Guinea, he claimed, "is essentially one for settlement between the Dutch and the Indonesians." Any Australian "approach to the Indonesians," the British argued, "would be almost certain to result in a rebuff, followed by new insistent claims on the part of Indonesia to the territory concerned." Once the prestige and pride of the Indonesians were engaged on the New Guinea issue, Garnett insisted, it "might reduce any hopes of their adopting a more conciliatory tone later" and hinder the amicable solutions of the problem. Three days later Teppema wrote back to Spender, affirming that the Netherlands government did not at all like Australia's interference in the matter. If Canberra were to submit a letter to Indonesia at this stage, he claimed, it would "necessarily touch the Indonesian sentiments" and adversely affect "the harmonious atmosphere between the partners of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union."

In consequence, it "may ... carry the risk that an objective approach to the problems at

stake [will] be frustrated. In view of the British and Dutch objections, Spender decided to refrain from sending a letter to Indonesia for the time being.

Combining the portfolio of Minister for Territories with the demanding portfolio of Minister for External Affairs, from mid-March to mid-April 1950 Spender made an extensive tour of the islands of the Southwest Pacific, including Australian New Guinea, as well as the Philippines. After returning to Canberra, he found that at the end of March, the question of West New Guinea had been taken up at the first Governments Ministerial Conference held in Jakarta under the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, a shadowy arrangement for consultation between the two states which was intended to have something of the binding effect achieved by the British Commonwealth tie. It was decided at the conference to institute a mixed joint fact-finding commission consisting of three members from each side to investigate the wishes of the local inhabitants and to submit a policy recommendation on New Guinea for later consideration by a special Union conference on the matter. It was also reported that, in the discussions, a proposal for some sort of condominium (joint sovereignty) over West New Guinea by Holland and Indonesia was put forward.

Concerned about the possibility of the Dutch relinquishing full sovereignty over New Guinea, and determined that Australia should not be allowed to become a voiceless pawn on the New Guinea issue, on 20 April Spender wrote to Teppema. In it, the Minister complained that the decision on the establishment of a Dutch-Indonesian joint commission had been made with no opportunity for Australia to be consulted. Expressing his strong apprehension about a possible compromise between Indonesia and Holland, such as joint sovereignty over West New Guinea, Spender claimed that any direct or indirect part played by Indonesia in the administration of Dutch New Guinea would run completely counter to Australia's national interests. The establishment of a joint fact-finding commission and possible submission of a policy recommendation by the commission, the Minister declared, made it urgent for Australia to submit an aide-memoire to the Jakarta government. The aide-memoire would make it crystal clear to the Jakarta government that Australia had a serious concern about the possibility of a compromise on the New Guinea issue, and that, in the event of some compromise being reached, Australia would have “a claim, not only to be consulted, but also to be considered as the sole, or at least, part administrator of Dutch New Guinea as trustee or otherwise.” On the same day similar letters were again submitted to the UK and US diplomatic missions in Canberra, and the next day the aide-memoire was sent from Burton to John Hood, Australian Ambassador-designate to Indonesia, with an instruction that he should turn in the document to the Indonesian government by 1 May.

43 "Top-secret letter from Spender to Teppema, 20 April, 1950" in AA, A1838/283, 3036/6/1, part 1.
44 "Top-secret letter from Burton to Hood, 21 April, 1950" in AA, A1838/283, 3036/6/1, part 1.
For fear of stiffening the Indonesian attitude towards the New Guinea problem, not only Britain and Holland, but the United States also attempted to prevent the Menzies government from intervening actively in the issue. In an aide-memoire submitted to Spender on 28 April, Pete Jarman, American Ambassador to Australia, claimed that any determination of the future status of West New Guinea was fundamentally a bilateral problem between the Dutch and Indonesian, and that "intervention contemplated by the Government of Australia would be disturbing and prejudicial to the solution of the problem" of New Guinea. It was also argued that Australia's active involvement in the West New Guinea issue "would seriously prejudice Australia's position in relation to Asian countries and vitiate against [sic] Australia taking any lead in that area," for example, the Colombo Plan. The next day Edward Williams, UK High Commissioner, Canberra, sent a letter to Burton. In it, the UK government again strongly opposed Australia's interference on the grounds that "the Australian Government at present have no standing in this question," and that the submission of an aide-memoire by Australia to Indonesia "will undoubtedly increase their suspicions (and if it is published, those of other South East Asian countries) regarding Western nations in Southeast Asia." Writing back to Spender on 5 May, Teppema assured Australia that the establishment of a joint fact-finding commission would not mean any weakening of the Netherlands' determination to retain full sovereignty over New Guinea. However, he again attempted to deter Canberra from taking any action against Jakarta. The Netherlands government, he argued, "can not assume any responsibility for the consequences which such a demarche might have

45 "Aide-memoire from Jarman to Spender, 28 April, 1950" in AA, A1838/283, 3036/6/1, part 1.
47 "Letter from Williams to Burton, 29 April, 1950" in AA, A1838/283, 3036/6/1, part 1.
with regard to the result of the consultation between the Netherlands and Indonesia as agreed upon at the Round Table Conference."  

However, in spite of United States, British and Dutch opposition, Spender and Burton were undeterred and persistent. At this time, Spender and Burton clashed over the policy of establishing a military alliance with the US, which would eventually bear fruit in ANZUS. However, Burton responded positively to Spender's leadership and initiative on the question of New Guinea. On 3 May Burton had written back to Garnett, claiming that, in view of the vital nature of the question of New Guinea to Australia's national interests, Australia could not on any account be reconciled to the status of a passive bystander in any bilateral Dutch-Indonesian negotiation, and setting out Canberra's resolute intention to submit an aide-memoire to Indonesia after the presentation of credentials by Hood as Ambassador to the Jakarta government. On the same day a similar letter was passed on to Jarman from Spender. A week later the Minister for External Affairs showed in a letter to Teppema that Australia was still determined to submit an aide-memoire to Indonesia, which would make it clear that Australia did not regard Indonesia as having any valid claim to West New Guinea, and that, in the event of any change of status over the territory, Australia would press a claim to participation in the future administration of Dutch New Guinea.

48 "Top-secret letter from Teppema to Spender, 5 May, 1950" in AA, A1838/283, 3036/6/1, part 1. An aide memoire submitted by the Dutch Government is attached to the letter.
49 Sir Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, pp. 27-32.
52 "Top-secret letter from Spender to Teppema, 10 May, 1950" in AA, A1838/283, 3036/6/1, part 1.
In response, at a session of the NATO Council meeting held in Paris on 13 May, Secretary of State Acheson, British Foreign Secretary Bevin and Dutch Foreign Minister Stikker formed a joint resolve to oppose Australia’s interference, with these foreign ministers agreeing that the problem of New Guinea should be worked out between the Dutch and Indonesians alone, and that the proposed Australian approach to Indonesia over Dutch New Guinea would “involve the danger of East-West split.”

In accordance with this joint resolve, James Majoribanks, official secretary of the UK High Commissioner’s Office, Canberra, wrote to Burton, strongly requesting Australia to desist from sending an aide-memoire to Indonesia until the outcome of the joint fact-finding commission was available. Reiterating America’s position that the question of West New Guinea should be determined by bilateral Dutch-Indonesian negotiations, Jarman informed Burton that the United States greatly regretted the “Australian manner of intervention.”

Expressing strong concern that the disclosure of Australia’s position would strengthen the hands of extremists in Indonesia, Teppema argued to Spender that Amsterdam would “entirely dissociate itself from” the consequences of Australia’s proposed approach upon Indonesian-Dutch relations. In the face of repeated pressures by the British, American and Dutch, Spender and Burton were forced to withhold sending an aide-memoire to Indonesia.

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From the end of May 1950, however, contrary to American, British and Dutch expectation, the question of the disposition of Western New Guinea began to develop into public controversy between Indonesia and Australia. The prestige and pride of the Indonesian government, particularly that of President Sukarno, now began to be engaged deeply on the problem. On 19 May, the day when Hood presented his credentials as Ambassador to Indonesia, he conferred with L.N. Palar of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, at which meeting the Indonesian officer talked about Jakarta’s desire for the inclusion of West New Guinea in its new state, hinting that “if any other status were given to New Guinea, there would be irresistible political infiltration from Indonesia which would inevitably spread to Australian New Guinea.”

In commemoration of the 42nd anniversary of the Indonesian national movement the next day, Sukarno made a nation-wide broadcast speech appealing to the Indonesian people to unite for the annexation of West New Guinea as part of their continued struggle for eliminating the last vestiges of Dutch colonialism. “West Irian must return to our fold!,” he said. “If we are united, West Irian will certainly return to our fold! If we are united!” In an interview with a Reuter correspondent on 23 May, the Indonesian President reiterated his claim for sovereignty over West New Guinea, saying that, since the old days of Indonesia before “the Dutch Occupation which started in the 17th century, the Papuans of New Guinea have been considered politically and racially Indonesians.” “So long as Dutch New Guinea was not in the Indonesian fold,” Sukarno argued, “there would always remain something not fulfilled in our national aspirations.”

In response to these statements, Spender announced on 22 May the recall of Hood to Australia for consultations, thereby implicitly showing where Australia stood on the New Guinea question. Addressing Parliament on 1 June, the Australian Minister also indicated Canberra’s resolve to protect the territories of Papua and New Guinea, which had been transformed in 1949 into a single administration, from possible Indonesian infiltration. “It is most important,” Spender asserted, “that the Territories should be kept free of subversive influences and steps will be taken by legislation and otherwise to see that they are not exposed to this menace.” To “hold these territories from external aggressors,” he emphasised that Australia’s efforts should be directed towards “active and progressive ... economic development.” At the same time, Spender stressed the importance of developing defence and security measures, such as reestablishing the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles as a Unit of the Australian Citizen Force; forming a Papua New Guinea Division of the Royal Australian Navy; and establishing a Native Regiment as part of the Australian Military Force.

Addressing the Indonesian people in a radio speech on 6 June, Sukarno repeated Indonesia’s claim for control of Dutch New Guinea. In order to further discuss responses to counter the statements coming from Jakarta, Spender convened a Cabinet meeting on 7 June, at which, in spite of American, British and Dutch opposition, he indicated his intention to issue a statement publicising Australia’s position on the issue.

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60 “Cablegram No. 179 from Burton to Hood, 22 May, 1950” in AA, A1838/283, 3036/6/1, part 1; and ANETA (English Translation), 26 and 28 May, 1950.
63 Daily Mirror, June 6, 1950.
of Dutch New Guinea. With the approval of Cabinet, the Minister made a speech to the House of Representatives the next day, in which he categorically denied that Indonesia had any valid claim to Dutch New Guinea:

it can not be conceded that the claim to extend Indonesian sovereignty over Western New Guinea is in any way relevant to the accomplished achievement of political independence by the Indonesian people themselves.

In view of the possible likely effect of the disposition of the western part of New Guinea upon Australia's vital national interests, Spender went on to say:

Should discussions between the Netherlands and Indonesia trend towards any arrangement which would alter the status of Western New Guinea, the matter is no longer one merely for these two parties themselves ... the question of the future of the territory is not solely one for Indonesia and the Netherlands, but is potentially also a matter of wider concern, and it is the view of the Australian Government that, in this, Australia's interests should also be taken into account.

The statement made by Spender was backed up by the Deputy Leader of the Opposition, Dr Evatt, when he said that "[e]thnic considerations precluded the inclusion of Dutch New Guinea in Indonesia. A change in the status of the area means a very great threat to security." Evatt also argued that "[t]here should be a direct and open attempt to ask the Indonesian and Netherlands Governments to permit Australia to take part in the settlement talks." The public in Australia also gave strong support to Spender's policy towards West New Guinea. In an Australian Gallup Poll conducted in March-April 1950, 80% of the public opposed Indonesian control over Netherlands New Guinea, with 6% in favour and 13% non-committal. Support also

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67 Australian Gallup Poll, March/April, 1950.
came from Australia's sister nation when the New Zealand Minister for External Affairs, Frederick Doidge, stated in a speech to a meeting of the Royal Empire Society that, since "Australia controls Eastern New Guinea, Australia has a very direct interest in the whole area based on continuity and strategic security." "New Zealand," the Minister went on to say, "has a direct interest, too, since Australia's security is essential to New Zealand ... Australia is right in being diplomatically firm in the face of Dr Sukarno's claims." New Zealand public opinion and newspaper comments also strongly supported Australia on the question of West New Guinea.

Spender's speech of 8 June came at a time when the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was visiting Indonesia. Flanked by the main foreign supporter of the Indonesian revolution and the main anti-colonial leader in Asia, on the same day that Spender made a speech to Parliament, Sukarno addressed a mass meeting in front of the President's Palace. "India and Indonesia are independent states," the President said, "but our struggle will not stop until the whole of Indonesia is in our hands, including Irian. The fire of our struggle will continue to burn until Irian has become part of Indonesian territory." Speaking to a mass meeting of 100,000 people at Bandung on 11 June, the Indonesian President, again in the company of Nehru, once more emphasised his New Guinea claim within the context of the continuation of the

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69 For a brief account of New Zealand's public opinion and newspaper comments on the issue of West New Guinea, see "Ministerial Despach No. 10 from A.R. Cutler, Australian High Commissioner, Wellington, to Spender, 23 June, 1950" in AA, A4534, 45/1/2, part 1. New Zealand archives relating to the West New Guinea dispute remain completely restricted.

Indonesian revolution.\textsuperscript{71} Making a short stop-over visit at Surabaya airport on 13 June, Sukarno in a press conference appealed to the Indonesian people to burn the flames of their struggle for independence until the incorporation of New Guinea into Indonesia.\textsuperscript{72} Three days later, when the President was interviewed by a UP correspondent in Jakarta, he reiterated his previously expressed standpoint, and went on to say that, as long as "there were reactionary elements in Irian who guided anti-Indonesian sentiment," the real aspiration for national independence would not be fulfilled.\textsuperscript{73} The Indonesian demand for the annexation of Netherlands New Guinea was supported by Nehru when, in reply to a question by a Jakarta newspaper correspondent, he stated that "[a] geographical and historical approach gives weight to the Indonesian claim to West New Guinea."\textsuperscript{74} At a press conference held in Singapore on 18 June, Nehru also argued that "if the Dutch remained in West New Guinea, it would be a continued irritant to the Indonesians."\textsuperscript{75}

The development of the Australian-Indonesian public controversy over the question of West New Guinea and the deepening commitment of Sukarno's prestige to the claim for sovereignty over the territory apparently did not please the US, Britain, Holland and some sections of the Indonesian government. In a conversation with an official of the Australian Embassy in Washington, John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for UN Affairs, told the Australian that "many people [in the State Department] find it difficult to appreciate" Australia's position, and that Australia

\textsuperscript{71} "Cablegram No. 244 from Hood to Burton, 12 June, 1950" in \textit{AA}, A4357/2, 259/3.
\textsuperscript{72} "Cablegram No. 248 from Hood to Burton, 14 June, 1950" in \textit{AA}, A1838/278, 400/1/11/1/3, part 2; and \textit{ANTARA} (English Translation), 13 June, 1950.
\textsuperscript{73} "Cablegram No. 268 from Hood to Burton, 17 June, 1950" in \textit{AA}, A4357/2, 259/2.
\textsuperscript{74} "Note by D.W/C.G. to T.W. Cutts of Southeast Asian Section, 28 June, 1950" in \textit{AA}, A4357/2, 259/2.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
“precipitated the situation with which” it was faced.76 Britain also expressed displeasure with Australia’s impetuous action by saying that “Australia has shown her hand prematurely.”77 The Netherlands government for its part was concerned that the public wrangling between Jakarta and Canberra would strengthen the hands of extremists in Indonesia and bring about the decline in influence of moderate elements.78 Since bilateral trade talks were to begin at the end of August between Canberra and Jakarta, some officials in the Indonesian Foreign Ministry were reluctant to see the question of West New Guinea become a dominant factor in Indonesian-Australian relations. To prevent the worsening of ties with Australia, Dr Tam Bunun of the Foreign Ministry saw a need to send a government mission or a parliamentary mission to Canberra to explain Indonesia’s position on the New Guinea issue.79 Interviewed by Hood on 28 June, Prime Minister Hatta also greatly regretted that the New Guinea issue had become a prominent object of concern in Indonesian-Australian relationship. At the same time, he was critical of Sukarno’s way of using the New Guinea appeal as a means of creating national sentiment in Indonesia, being apprehensive that Sukarno’s attitude would leave the Indonesians little room for manoeuvring in the forthcoming negotiations.80

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76 “Ministerial Despatch No. 28 from Makin to Spender, 13 June, 1950” in AA, A1838/278, 400/1/11/1/1, part 2.
78 “Cablegram No. 175 from the Australian Embassy, the Hague, to External Affairs, 21 June, 1950” in AA, A1838/238, 400/1/11/1/3, part 2.
The public quarrelling over the question of Dutch New Guinea between Australia and Indonesia was greatly intensified in August 1950 when Indonesia was transformed from a federal state into a unitary state and when Spender visited the Hague. The Constitution agreed at the Round Table Conference between Indonesia and Holland had stipulated that the United States of Indonesia would consist of 16 autonomous states constituting a federal Republic. In the belief that a federal system would be more suitable for such a far-flung archipelago as Indonesia, and in order to guarantee the freedom and autonomy of the minorities in a future independent state, the Dutch had strongly sponsored the federal concept. But shortly after the achievement of formal independence, the Indonesian government had begun to take steps to dissolve the federal organisation of its government and replace it with a unitary Republic of Indonesia. The centralisation of government in the unitary state meant the removal of all obstacles to rule by the Javanese over the area outside Java and Sumatra. Celebrating the fifth anniversary of the declaration of Indonesian independence on 17 August, Sukarno proclaimed the formal disappearance of Indonesia’s federal system and its replacement by a unitary state. Concomitant with the proclamation of a unitary state, the Cabinet, headed by Hatta, resigned.81

On the occasion of the proclamation of a unitary state, the Indonesian President also addressed government officials, the diplomatic corps and a crowd of several hundred thousand people who thronged the palace compound. In relation to the

question of West New Guinea, Sukarno strongly urged the Indonesian people, as part of their continued struggle for removing the last vestiges of Dutch colonialism, to continue to fight for the return of the disputed territory to Indonesia. The West New Guinea problem, the President declared,

is not a trifling question; this is a major issue. I am afraid that the Dutch don’t understand that the Irian issue is a very major problem for us ... The Irian issue is a colonial problem, a matter of being colonised or free. A part of our country is still colonised by the Dutch and this we will not accept. We like that our whole country will be free without exception from Sabang as far as Merauke ... This is a national task which can not be evaded. Because we have pledged that we will fight till the end of time as long as one part of our country - however small that part may be - is not yet free! ... For once again, I declare: We will not stop fighting! We will continue fighting! We will keep on fighting whatever may come until West Irian has been returned to our fold!  

Sukarno drew loud applause from the crowd when he made an implied threat in his address. "[I]f settlement by negotiations can not be arrived at within this year," he remarked, "a major conflict will arise on the issue of who will be in power in that island from then onward."

In response to the speech from Jakarta, Spender, who had set out on an overseas trip on 6 August and was staying in Paris, held a press conference on 17 August, in which he asserted that Indonesian claim for sovereignty over Dutch New Guinea was based on empty foundations and empty enthusiasm, criticising the Indonesian President for whipping up popular feeling for the purpose of encouraging ideas of national unity among a people who were at widely differing levels of political self-consciousness. In

view of Australia’s vital interests being involved in the New Guinea dispute, Spender also persisted in staking out a role as an active participant in the settlement of the dispute.83 Prime Minister Menzies, who was in Auckland on his way home from London and Washington, also declared that “we regard ourselves as vitally concerned in any settlement made in relation to Dutch New Guinea,” countering Sukarno’s speech by showing Canberra’s resolve not to permit any entry of the Asians on Australia’s doorstep.84 To this, the Indonesian Ambassador to Australia, Dr Oetoyo, responded by arguing that “Australian support of continued Dutch control of West New Guinea was inconsistent with Australia’s historic sponsoring of Indonesian independence.”85 By affirming that the New Guinea issue was now basically an Indonesian-Dutch problem, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry also, in a formal statement issued on 22 August, strongly opposed Australia’s stance of intervening actively in the issue.86

Leaving Paris on 22 August and staying in Berlin on 25-26 August, Spender paid an official visit to the Hague on the evening of 27 August.87 When the Australian Minister arrived in the Hague, he found that Dutch opinion was not so much united on the New Guinea issue as he had expected, and that, in effect, strong currents for compromise were running in some quarters. The position of the Dutch government, consisting of the Labour, Catholic, Liberal and Christian Historical Union Parties, was that the Dutch should retain full sovereignty and control over West New Guinea. This

84 Canberra Times, 22 August, 1950; and Sydney Morning Herald, 22 August, 1950.
85 Canberra Times, 22 August, 1950.
87 “Note: Minister’s schedule for an overseas trip, August-November 1950, undated and unsigned” in AA, A1838/1, 80/3/3/1.
position had been strengthened by the alteration of Indonesia from a federal state to a unitary state, because the Dutch government looked upon this as a betrayal and as a first step towards domination by extremists in the Indonesian government. Desiring to see Holland maintain its international prestige, and affected by the opinions of the Dutch civilians and soldiers who arrived back in the Netherlands from Indonesia in the course of 1950, the Dutch public supported government policy. In Dutch Gallup Polls conducted in the spring and autumn of 1950, about 60 per cent of the public were in favour of Dutch control, with about 10 per cent favouring Indonesian control and most of the rest being non-committal.\(^8\) Wishing to make West New Guinea a symbol of Dutch colonial grandeur, Dutch military officers were also for continued Dutch sovereignty over the territory. So were the Dutch Christian missions, which, with the aid of government subsidies, greatly expanded their operations in 1950 for converting the Papuans to Christianity and taking care of their education and medical needs.\(^9\)

However, at the same time, there were those who strongly doubted the feasibility of continued Dutch control over New Guinea. The attitudes of some sections of the government parties were somewhat different from that of the government. With a long tradition of anti-colonialism, some members of the Labour Party were in favour of a Dutch trusteeship under the UN over West New Guinea. The trusteeship, in their

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\(^8\) For an account of these polls, see Arend Lijphart, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 125.

opinion, would have the merit of confirming Dutch sovereignty internationally and invalidating Asian criticism of Dutch colonialism. Although the Christian Historical Party enthusiastically supported full Dutch sovereignty over New Guinea, some members of the Catholic and Liberal Parties nonetheless favoured a compromise solution to the New Guinea question, because they were subject to pressures from the Dutch business community. In accordance with the economic clause of the RTC agreement, Dutch big business held extensive and large investment in Indonesia, valued in excess of one billion dollars, and, at the same time, handled an important share of Indonesia's domestic and foreign trade. They therefore felt that the continuation of Dutch sovereignty over West New Guinea would be detrimental to the development of friendly relations between the two countries and would jeopardise Dutch economic interests in Indonesia. They also doubted that the economic potentialities of Netherlands New Guinea would be comparable to those of Indonesia. This view was also held by a large majority of the 17,500 Dutch people still living in Indonesia. They felt their employment and security threatened by the stubborn determination of the Dutch government to hold onto New Guinea. In this period also, the concept of making Dutch New Guinea a fatherland of Eurasians was gradually losing its currency in the Netherlands as the practical difficulties experienced by the Eurasians who emigrated to West New Guinea became apparent.90

Given the trend of Dutch thought about West New Guinea, Spender, during his visit to the Hague, attempted to step up Holland’s resolve to retain full sovereignty

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90 In December 1949, there had been 1,000 Eurasians in West New Guinea. Beginning with the arrival of the first large group of Eurasians consisting of 550 people on 31 December, 1949, the number of Eurasians who had precipitately fled from Indonesia increased to 8,516 by the end of 1950. See Arend Lijphart, *op.cit.*, pp. 131-132.
over New Guinea. By expounding the unreasonableness and artificiality of the Indonesian claim for sovereignty over Dutch New Guinea in a long statement made on 29 August, Spender made it crystal clear to the Dutch that Australia's stand on the question of the disposition of the western part of New Guinea was completely on the side of the Netherlands. "The Australian Government," the Minister said,

does not consider that Indonesia had any valid claim to Dutch New Guinea, the future of which is of supreme and vital importance to the Australian people ... The whole of New Guinea including Dutch New Guinea is not in any way geographically part of Indonesia. If it belongs to any specially geographical area, then it belongs to that part of the world which may be fairly described as the Australian continental Group ... The people of Dutch New Guinea are the same people as inhabit Australian New Guinea and Australian Papua ... The people therefore of the whole of the mainland of New Guinea are of the one race ... They are approximately of the same degree of social development with the same general ethnic background, culture and traditions. Dutch New Guinea is accordingly an integral part of New Guinea as a whole ... The territory and people of New Guinea are neither geographically nor racially part of Indonesia ... Its people have no racial affinity with the peoples of Indonesia ... In the view of the Australian Government, there is no substance in any claim that because Dutch New Guinea was formerly administered as part of the colonial administration of the Dutch Government, it therefore should, in the events which have happened, belong to the Republic of Indonesia. Such a claim has neither reason nor merit and is wholly irrelevant.

"If the claim of Indonesia to Dutch New Guinea were conceded to any degree at all," Spender also stated, "it would be but a matter of time, no matter how genuine may be assurances to the contrary, when the claim will be pushed further so as to include the Trust Territory of Australian New Guinea and its people."91

In his subsequent discussion with Dutch Foreign Minister Stikkerr held on the same day, Spender consistently attempted to shore up the Dutch position on the New Guinea issue, and, at the same time, to seek strong assurances from Amsterdam about their intention to retain full control over the territory. Explaining the special character of Dutch New Guinea as distinct from that of Indonesia, the Australian Minister made it known to Stikker that “the Australian Government’s view was wholly opposed to any entry, direct or indirect, by Indonesia into Dutch New Guinea.” “It would be a great crime,” Spender also argued, “against humanity arbitrarily to divide a people who in any case were just beginning to grope towards civilisation and who should prepare through education and tutelage eventually to take [a] place in the world as a separate nation.” By showing Australia’s readiness to collaborate with the Dutch government in the defence and administrative problems of the New Guinea mainland, the Minister went on to propose that Australia’s concern about New Guinea’s status should be translated into effective and concrete support for the Dutch. In response, while not excluding the possibility of such cooperation in the future, Stikker was quite non-committal for the time being for fear of stimulating Indonesian sensitivities. Continuing his energetic diplomatic activities late in the day and early on the morning of the next day, Spender met with the American, British, Canadian and Indian Ambassadors in the Hague to press for the complete groundlessness of Jakarta’s demand for the annexation of West New Guinea.

92 “Cablegram No. 4126 from Spender to Menzies, 1 September, 1950” in AA, A1838/276, 3036/6/1, part 2.
93 Ibid.
Spender's visit to the Hague evoked a stinging rebuke from the Jakarta government and, in consequence, Australian-Indonesian relations were greatly strained. Addressing a mass meeting of Indonesians at Malang in East Java on 30 August, Sukarno responded to Spender's speech of 29 August. Indonesia's demand for the annexation of Dutch New Guinea, he retorted, was not based on racial and ethnological grounds, but on historical grounds. The President also argued that, in the modern world, the same race did not always belong to the same nation. “The population of West and East New Guinea are similar. Indeed this is so- they also have the same fuzzy hair,” he stated. “The population of East and West Timor is similar too, but the Portuguese do not say that she must have West Timor on that ground. The population of South and North Borneo is also similar, yet the English do not say that South Borneo must be incorporated with North Borneo which they possess.”

Repeating the arguments advanced by the President in an official statement issued the next day, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry assailed as unwarranted Australia's intervention in the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands: “Australia had no right to thwart us in our claim on West Irian.” As a result of Spender’s visit, Indonesian press opinion was clearly in an excitable state, with some newspapers calling Australia’s interference in the New Guinea matter “Kangaroo Imperialism,” and others advocating a boycott of Dutch business interests in Indonesia and calling for the settlement of the dispute by force in the event that negotiations on this problem did not yield favourable results.

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“Cablegram No. 455 from Hood to Watt, 31 August, 1950” in AA, A1838/278, 400/1/11/1/3, part 3; Daily Telegraph, 1 September, 1950; and Canberra Times, 1 September, 1950.

“Cablegram No. 456 from Hood to Watt, 1 September, 1950” in AA, A1838/278, 400/1/11/1/3, part 3.

“Memorandum No. 458 from H. Gilchrist, Secretary to the Australian Embassy, Jakarta, to Watt, 30 August, 1950” in AA, A1838/278, 400/1/11/1/3, part 3.
Anxious about the growing anti-Australian sentiment in Indonesia and the likely adverse effect of it upon Australian-Indonesian relations, on 1 September Hood wrote a personal cable to Alan Watt, who had replaced Dr Burton as the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs on 19 June. Hood emphasised the need for some direct talks with the Jakarta government. If the excitable state of Indonesian opinion "is not somehow checked," the Australian Ambassador stated, "I fear we may be in for great difficulties." "I think the situation has now clarified to the point at which some direct or frank exchange between the Governments could not only not be refused but might also be expected." In Hood's view, Indonesia was just as important strategically as New Guinea, and Australia could not afford a hostile neighbour on its northern flank. But for Spender, Australian-Dutch relations had to be given priority over Australian-Indonesian relations. He therefore counselled against Hood's suggestion by insisting that, if a conciliatory "approach is made ... at the present time" to the Jakarta government, "the danger is that we will be jockeyed into a position which will antagonise the Dutch who are working with us and who [are] prepare[d] to stand firm." "We should do nothing," the Minister stressed, "which would in the slightest degree be inconsistent with the attitude we have taken up."

Having left the Hague on 30 August, Spender next went to Britain, where he stayed during 30 August-7 September and then sailed to the United States, where he sojourned between 12 September and 31 October. But given the complete classification of Australian archives, it is impossible to know the details of discussions

97 "Cablegram No. 457 from Hood to Watt, 1 September, 1950" in AA, A4537/2, 259/3.
which Spender conducted with British and American officials on the West New Guinea issue at this time. Nevertheless, it seems certain that, in these discussions, the Australian Minister urged the British and US officials to bolster the Dutch position on full sovereignty over the western part of New Guinea and to use their influence to induce Indonesia to relinquish its claim for the annexation of the territory. It is also likely that he did not get any favourable response from either the UK or the US. Britain was anxious not to allow itself to become involved in any way in the New Guinea affair, because it feared that to give public support to what might be regarded by the Asians as a Dutch attempt to preserve “colonialism” would prejudice United Kingdom relations with Southeast Asia as a whole. Moreover, given the support of the Indian government for Sukarno’s demand for the incorporation of New Guinea into Indonesia, the United Kingdom felt that it could not “afford a Commonwealth split on such a relatively minor issue as Netherlands New Guinea.”

Like the United Kingdom, the United States also took a neutral stance on the New Guinea issue. This partly reflected a US perception that West New Guinea held only a peripheral importance in US national security interests. In a memorandum of 27 April 1950, the Defense Department had told the State Department that they perceived that “no major strategic interests of the United States were involved in the disposition of Netherlands New Guinea,” suggesting that the United States should not exert any influence upon the Dutch and Indonesians on the matter of West New Guinea. Even after the outbreak of the Korean War, the Pentagon did not recognise the

100 “Memorandum from Burns to Rusk, 27 April, 1950” in FRUS, 1950, Vol. VI, p. 987.
separate geographical strategic significance of the Southwest Pacific, including New Guinea. In the expectation of a strategic reassessment by the United States of the area south of the equator in the Pacific in consequence of the outbreak of the Korean War, the Dutch government contributed its naval forces, then in Dutch New Guinea waters, to the Korean battle, and then made an offer to the US government on 19 July of the use of Dutch New Guinea by American forces as a strategic base in the Cold War.\footnote{Memorandum from Burns to Rusk, 28 August, 1950" in FRUS, 1950, Vol. VI, pp. 1058-1059; and "Cablegram No. 3540 from Harrison to Watt, 26 July, 1950" in AA, A1838/283, 3036/6/1, part 1.}

However, on 2 October the US military completely spurned the Dutch offer, arguing that the establishment of a military base in such a strategic backwater as the Southwest Pacific would not on any account serve the defence of the free world. They repeated that US strategic interests were not at all at stake in the disposition of Dutch New Guinea.\footnote{Memorandum from Kreps, Acting Executive Secretary to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to Acheson, 2 October, 1950" in FRUS, 1950, Vol. VI, p. 1074.}

The neutral American stance on the determination of the future status of West New Guinea was also a product of confrontation between the European Bureau and the Far Eastern and Southeast Asian Bureaux within the State Department. Respecting the Netherlands' status and role as an alliance partner in NATO, the European Bureau believed that the interest of the inhabitants of Dutch New Guinea would be best served by the continuation of Dutch control over the territory, and that Dutch control would provide better insurance against possible communist infiltration into the territory than would be the incorporation of the territory into Indonesia. The Far Eastern and Southeast Asian Bureaux, on the other hand, argued that a settlement of the New Guinea question totally unsatisfactory to Indonesia would generate friction with the
Netherlands and would be prejudicial to stability in the region of Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{103}

These Bureaux also respected Indonesia’s future role as a significant import and export market for Japan. Indonesian-Japanese trade had been opened on 1 July, 1950 with the permission of the American Occupation authorities in Japan,\textsuperscript{104} and the United States expected that Indonesia would provide an important outlet for the export of Japanese textiles.\textsuperscript{105} At the initiative of the Far Eastern and Southeast Asian Bureaux, the United States therefore, from the outset of Indonesian independence, while respecting Indonesia’s independent and neutral foreign policy, had been taking a series of steps to induce Indonesia to take sides with the Western camp. These included: the provision of $5 million assistance to Indonesia for the strengthening and arming of the country’s constabulary;\textsuperscript{106} the offer of a loan of $100 million from the American Export/Import Bank for the rehabilitation of Indonesia’s war-damaged economy and for obtaining capital equipment from the US;\textsuperscript{107} and the provision of $13 million of Economic Co-operation Administration (ECA) fund aid to cover technical advice on the building of social capital, especially harbour works, bridges and railways.\textsuperscript{108}

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Spender got back to Australia on 15 November from the United States by way of Canada. By the time of Spender’s arrival, an Indonesian government mission, headed


\textsuperscript{104} \textit{ANTARA} (English Translation), 2 July, 1950.


\textsuperscript{108} “Memorandum from H. Gilchrist to Watt: United States Aid to Indonesia, 17 May, 1951” in \textit{AA}, A1838/264, 250/10/7/6, part 3.
by the Foreign Minister, Mohammed Roem, had started for the Hague in the hope of
reaching a last-minute settlement on the question of West New Guinea before the
twelve month time-limit set by the Round Table Conference of 1949 expired. On 20
November the first session of the Ministerial Union Conference began and lasted until
29 November. The discussions mainly concentrated upon the reconfirmation of
Indonesia remaining in the Dutch monetary sphere, the renewal of a trade agreement
between Holland and Indonesia, the determination of rules of procedure and
organisation for the Union Court of Arbitration and an agreement on the stationing of
a Dutch military training mission in Indonesia for three years.\(^{109}\) On 24 November
Indonesian and Dutch delegates also agreed that the question of the determination of
the status of West New Guinea would be discussed at the second session of the Union
Ministerial Conference, which would start from 4 December, and this agreement was
conveyed to Spender from Alfred Stirling, Australian Ambassador to the Hague, on
the same day.\(^{110}\)

Notwithstanding the unfavourable reaction from both the UK and the US on the
New Guinea issue which Spender had probably received during his visit, the Australian
Minister was still aware of the importance of the influence of both countries in the
settlement of the West New Guinea dispute. Two and a half hours after receiving the
cable from Stirling, Spender telegraphed Eric Harrison, Australian Resident Minister,
London, and Norman Makin, Australian Ambassador, Washington, urging them to
exert prompt strong pressure upon the UK and the US so that, in the forthcoming

\(^{109}\) "Cablegram No. 452 from Australian Embassy, the Hague to External Affairs, 29 November,
1950" in \textit{AA, A1838/276, 3036/6/1, part 2.}

\(^{110}\) "Cablegram No. 440 from Stirling to Spender, 24 November, 1950" in \textit{AA, A1838/276, 3036/6/1,}
part 2.
negotiations, "their influence should be used immediately both to stiffen the Dutch to maintain their sovereignty in Dutch New Guinea and to discourage the Indonesians from being intransigent on this issue."\textsuperscript{111}

Spender's views and his request for the exercise of United States influence were conveyed on the same day from Makin to Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. But hoping for a satisfactory solution being found between Indonesia and Holland alone, the United States was still unwilling to use its influence in the negotiations. Rusk's response to Australia's request was that the Australian government was "possibly over-rating United States influence in Indonesia."\textsuperscript{112} Britain also maintained an attitude of impartiality. Understanding the UK reluctance to intervene in the New Guinea issue, Harrison refrained from conveying Spender's request for the exertion of UK influence in the negotiations, and, instead, on 27 November he wrote back to Spender. In view of Britain's fear of giving rise to suspicions among Asian countries and of the likely adverse reaction from India as a result of any UK interference, Harrison reported to the Minister that Australia's approach to the British would not "have the effect of inducing the United Kingdom to take a more positive role."\textsuperscript{113} To this, Spender angrily retorted in a cable of 30 November that Harrison's view "that the United Kingdom attitude on New Guinea can not be greatly influenced by any representation Australia makes ... is unfounded." "It is inconceivable to me," Spender stated, "that London can, or should be allowed to,

\textsuperscript{111} "Cablegram No. 655 and 5893 from Spender to Harrison and Makin, 24 November, 1950" in AA, A1838/276, 3036/6/1, part 2.
\textsuperscript{112} "Cablegram No. 1030 from Makin to Spender, 24 November, 1950" in AA, A1838/276, 3036/6/1, part 2.
\textsuperscript{113} "Cablegram No. 5954 from Harrison to Spender, 27 November, 1950" in AA, A1838/238, 400/1/11/1/3, part 4.
regard the Indian attitude towards Dutch New Guinea as more important than the Australian attitude." On 1 December Harrison made known to Gordon Walker, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Spender's views of the importance of UK influence in the Dutch-Indonesian talks, but Walker responded that it was not at all "appropriate for us to impress our views [on] the Indonesian Government."^115

The second session of the Dutch-Indonesian Ministerial Conference began its discussions on the problem of West New Guinea on 4 December, a little over three weeks from the deadline, and, from the outset, the Indonesian delegation displayed all of their negotiating cards. The first proposal which Roem presented to the Dutch Minister for Overseas Territories, Van Maarseveen, was a plan whereby the transfer of de jure and de facto Indonesian sovereignty over West New Guinea would be agreed to by 27 December, and sovereignty transfer would be enacted in the middle of 1951 after a further conference was held to deal with the protection of Dutch business interests in the territory. When this proposal was rejected by the Dutch delegates on the basis of the Dutch Cabinet's decision of 4 December, the Indonesians made concessions, submitting on 7 December a plan to transfer de jure sovereignty over West New Guinea to Indonesia. At the same time, Roem also proposed joint administrative control over the western part of New Guinea. The proposal would specifically give preferential treatment to Dutch economic interests, would employ Dutch persons in the administration, would allow the immigration of Dutch nationals

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and would guarantee freedom of religion, while aiding the humanitarian work of religious missions.\textsuperscript{116}

The Indonesian proposal was then discussed at a meeting of the Dutch Cabinet on 8 December, and Cabinet members seemed divided on the proposal. Economic Affairs Minister Van Brink strongly doubted the reasonableness of keeping Dutch New Guinea in Holland's hands, taking the view that, if New Guinea were given up, relations with Indonesia would improve and Dutch commercial difficulties would disappear.\textsuperscript{117} Secretary General of the Dutch Foreign Ministry Blom also insisted that there should be some compromise on the question of Dutch New Guinea, citing the possible adverse effect upon Dutch economic interests in Indonesia and on the welfare and safety of Dutch people living in Indonesia in the event of breakdown of the negotiations.\textsuperscript{118} Treasurer Lieftinck also saw some merit in the Indonesian proposal for continued Dutch administration under Indonesian sovereignty in West New Guinea in terms of maintaining Dutch investment in Indonesia as an important source of revenue for the Dutch.\textsuperscript{119}


\textsuperscript{117} There is no minute in Australian Archives on a meeting of the Dutch Cabinet held on 8 December. But a series of cablegrams from the Australian Embassy, the Hague explains the views of the Dutch Ministers on Indonesian-Dutch negotiations. For an account of Van Brinks' view, see "Cablegram No. 433 from Stirling to Watt, 22 November, 1950" in \textit{AA}, A1838/276, 3036/6/1, part 2.

\textsuperscript{118} For an account of Blom's view, see "Cablegram No. 471 from Stirling to Watt, 5 December, 1950" in \textit{AA}, A1838/276, 3036/6/1, part 2; and "Cablegram No. 478 from Stirling to Watt, 6 December, 1950" in \textit{AA}, A1838/276, 3036/6/1, part 2.

\textsuperscript{119} For an account of Lieftinck's view see "Cablegram No. 446 from Stirling to Watt, 28 November, 1950" in \textit{AA}, A1838/276, 3036/6/1, part 2; "Cablegram No. 451 from Stirling to Watt, 29 November, 1950" in \textit{AA}, A1838/238, 400/1/11/1/3, part 4; and "Cablegram No. 484 from Stirling to Watt, 7 December, 1950" in \textit{AA}, A1838/276, 3036/6/1, part 3.
However, these views went unheeded by other Cabinet members, and on 9 December Van Maarseveen expressed the view that the Indonesian proposal was unacceptable. After a further 30 minutes discussion on the morning of 11 December, the negotiations were adjourned. A week later Roem returned to Jakarta, where he reported the course of the negotiations to Parliament and Cabinet, sounding out other Cabinet members on the possibility of making some concession on sovereignty over West New Guinea. However, fearing the political consequences in Indonesia, the Indonesian Cabinet rejected considering any concession on the question of sovereignty.

In this period, as a result of a series of political parties' conferences in Indonesia and of the passing of an increasing number of resolutions in Parliament demanding the incorporation of West New Guinea and advocating the boycott of Dutch economic interests, the Jakarta government was under considerable domestic pressures.

When the head of the Indonesian delegation arrived back in the Hague on 21 December, he therefore had no new proposals, except for the one providing for the transfer of legal sovereignty to Indonesia with an agreement on joint administration of West New Guinea. In a resumed discussion on 23 December, Roem repeated the formerly expressed Indonesian proposal, but the Dutch adamantly refused the proposal for immediate formal transfer of sovereignty to Jakarta. Three days later the Dutch delegate, at the initiative of Stikker, outlined the concept of joint sovereignty over West New Guinea by transferring formal sovereignty to the nebulous Netherlands-

121 "Cablegram No. 672 from Stirling to Watt, 29 December, 1950" in AA, A1838/276, 3036/6/1, part 2.
Indonesian Union, while, at the same time, retaining for the Dutch de facto administrative control over the territory. However, the Indonesian representative remarked that he could not accept the Dutch proposal, arguing that nothing less than formal Indonesian sovereignty was compatible with the nationalist basis of its claim, and that the idea of an exclusive Dutch administrative control over West Irian was quite unacceptable to public opinion in Indonesia. On 27 December, the anniversary of the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia, the one year, during which the RTC had envisaged settlement of the status of West New Guinea being reached, expired, and the Ministerial Conference dispersed. Consequently, the status quo was preserved.

The breakdown in negotiations over the question of West New Guinea gave great relief to the Australian government. However, like other nations, Australia was concerned about the likely effect of the deadlock in the Indonesian-Dutch talks upon the internal situations both in Indonesia and Holland. On the evening of 27 December, when news of the breakdown in negotiations came to Jakarta, Prime Minister Mohammed Natsir, who had assumed office on 22 August, called an emergency Cabinet meeting, at which discussion was mainly focused on measures to be taken to deal with the internal situation. Reluctant to see 27 December come and go without any indication that his earlier threats had been more than bluff, President Sukarno insisted that pressure of various kinds should be put on Dutch business interests in Indonesia. Opposing the President's view, Natsir stated that the government should not allow instigations, intimidations, boycotts, or strikes to influence the atmosphere in Indonesia, and the great majority of Cabinet members sided with the Prime Minister,

thereby causing Sukarno not a little humiliation. As a result of the Cabinet decision and the subsequent issuance of a government statement to discourage unconstitutional acts, reactions in Indonesia were less dramatic than had been expected.

However, the Indonesian President subsequently attempted to compensate for the humiliation inflicted on him at the Cabinet meeting by exerting pressure upon the Nationalist Party (PNI), of which he was in fact an originator, and other factions in the Indonesian Parliament to urge the Cabinet to follow a radical line against the Dutch and their interests in Indonesia. In consequence, in the parliamentary debates opened in early January 1951, a number of parliamentarians demanded that the Dutch-Indonesian Union under the Dutch crown, which was Indonesia’s one permanent diplomatic link with the West, should be liquidated, and that the RTC agreement, which included a guarantee of Dutch investments in Indonesia, should be abrogated. Faced with these pressures, the Prime Minister was compelled to take a bellicose stance on Dutch-Indonesian relations. Outlining the course to be followed with regard to West New Guinea in his statement to Parliament on 3 January, Natsir declared that “any negotiation which does not result in sovereignty over West Irian being transferred to Indonesia will result in Indonesian-Dutch relations becoming more strained and tense.” In subsequent weeks, Natsir was greatly susceptible to pressure from the groups seeking the downfall of his administration, and was obliged to concentrate his energies on the task of political survival. On 22 March he resigned the premiership.

123 “Cablegram No. 685 from Hood to Watt, 28 December, 1950” in AA, A1838/276, 3036/6/1, part 2. See also Herbert Feith, op.cit., p. 163; and Ide Anak Agunggde Agung, op.cit., p. 91.
In Holland, the Dutch government led by Prime Minister Willem Drees came under strong pressure from the left for further concessions to Indonesia and under strong criticism from the right for a concession proposal already made at the last conference. In an interview arranged on 5 January, the leader of the Labour Party in the Senate, J. Van Der Goes Naters, insisted on the transfer of de jure sovereignty over New Guinea to Indonesia with the retention for the Dutch of de facto administrative control of the territory, arguing that "co-operation with Indonesia was more important than West New Guinea." The parliamentary leader of the Catholic Party, Professor Romme, spoke at a party meeting held on January 15 in support of the concept of joint sovereignty over the western part of New Guinea, with the Dutch retaining full administrative control over the territory. The maintenance of full Dutch control over Netherlands New Guinea, Romme argued, would lead to the abrogation by Indonesia of the Union Statute and the RTC agreement, thereby damaging Dutch business interests in Indonesia. De Kadt of the Labour Party for his part insisted in the parliamentary debate conducted on 19 January that the Dutch should transfer de jure and de facto sovereignty over New Guinea to Indonesia on the grounds that "New Guinea was too great a financial burden," and that "retention would prejudice Dutch obligations in Europe."

On the other hand, conservative parliamentarians were adamant about retaining full Dutch sovereignty and control over West New Guinea. Some parliamentarians argued in the debate on 19 January that the Dutch had already given away sovereignty over

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the Netherlands East Indies and could not afford to give away sovereignty over New Guinea. Wishing to see the Dutch retain West New Guinea as a symbol of colonial grandeur, Welter of the Catholic National Opposition also claimed that “New Guinea must remain Dutch at any price,” and that the concept of joint sovereignty was quite unacceptable. Tilanuak of the Christian Historical Party also stated that, in terms of Holland’s moral mission to the primitive peoples of New Guinea and of its obligation to keep New Guinea from falling into communist hands, any “diminution of Dutch sovereignty was not justified.” Conservative parliamentarians in turn condemned the government for having proved itself unfitted for office by presenting a concession proposal for joint sovereignty at the last conference, and this criticism led to the resignation of Stikker as Foreign Minister on 24 January. On the same day the whole Cabinet followed him.

In the ensuing months, particularly during March-September 1951, the question of West New Guinea was put into “cold storage.” In Holland, on 17 March Prime Minister Drees reorganised the new coalition Cabinet consisting of the Labour, Catholic, Christian Historical and Liberal Parties plus independents. Although the New Guinea issue was not an important factor in the formation of the Cabinet, there was nonetheless general agreement among the main parties that the problem of the determination of the future status of West New Guinea should be shelved in view of the great urgency of other problems in which differences of opinion were also pronounced. Addressing Parliament on 19 March, Drees indicated the principle of a

128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
130 “Memorandum formulated in the Pacific Division of the Department of External Affairs, undated and unsigned, March 1951” in AA, A1838/278, 400/1/11/1/6, part 1.
"cold storage" policy on New Guinea by stating that the Dutch government would 
"adopt a waiting attitude and deal with events as they arise."\textsuperscript{131} In his subsequent 
statement to the Senate during the budget debate on 11 April, Drees again confirmed 
the ice box policy by doubting that "any useful purpose would be served by" a step at 
this stage towards further negotiations on New Guinea with Indonesia.\textsuperscript{132}

In Indonesia, on 26 April Prime Minister Wirjosandjojo Sukiman organised a new 
Cabinet. The Cabinet came under the predominant influence of the moderate Muslim 
party, Masjumi (Madjalis Sjure Muslim Indonesia), which had been founded by the 
Japanese in November 1943 during their Occupation as a means of conveying their 
wishes and requirements to the Muslim community as a whole. The Sukiman 
government made clear its intention to press ahead with anti-communist and pro-
western policies. In relation to policy on the question of West New Guinea, Sukiman 
and the Foreign Minister, Achmed Subardjo, were determined to place strong restraints 
upon Sukarno in making inflammatory speeches, and, at the same time, fundamentally 
accepted the policy of "cold storage." In a statement to Parliament on 28 May, 
Sukiman indicated that, in view of the government's preoccupation with urgent 
internal problems and of the government's desire to avoid the emergence of Indonesia 
in a form likely to prejudice its international relations, the government was content to 
let the matter rest for the time being.\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{131} "Memorandum from T.W. Cutts of the Pacific Division to Watt, 1 June, 1951" in \textit{AA}, A1838/278, 
400/1/11/1/6, part 1.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{133} "Memorandum from Lawrence McIntyre, Assistant Secretary, to Casey, 30 July, 1951" in \textit{AA}, 
A1838/278, 400/1/11/1/6, part 2.
The change in governments in both Holland and Indonesia almost coincided with the time when Richard Casey replaced Spender as the Minister for External Affairs on 26 April. The new External Affairs Minister also supported the policy of “cold storage” on the question of West New Guinea. Given the formation of an anti-communist and conservative government in Jakarta, Casey, unlike the hawkish predecessor, did not like to stiffen the Indonesian attitude and to strengthen the hands of extremists by reigniting the public controversy over New Guinea. Casey saw Australia’s interest as encouraging the inclination of the Dutch and Indonesians to shelve the West New Guinea issue and as not taking any special Australian initiative which might revive the issue as a matter of public debate.134

The policy of keeping the West New Guinea issue on ice, which the parties concerned adopted and Australia supported, removed the issue from a prominent object of concern in Indonesian-Australian relations and brought about general improvement in relations of the two countries. On 20 September an Indonesian government mission, headed by Subardjo, arrived in Sydney on a goodwill visit on their way back to Jakarta from San Francisco, where the Indonesian Foreign Minister had signed the Japanese Peace Treaty. Comprising the Foreign Minister, two members of Parliament, one official of the Department of Economic Affairs and four officers of Foreign Ministry, the Indonesian mission stayed in Australia until 24 September to discuss a number of issues with Australian officials. Prominent among many topics taken up in the discussions was the problem of the participation of Indonesia in the Colombo Plan. Although, simultaneously with the conclusion of a trade agreement

134 Ibid.
between Australia and Indonesia on 23 October 1950, the Jakarta government had already joined the Colombo Plan informally and had received technical aid from the Australian government on a bilateral basis, Australian officials in these discussions sounded out the Indonesians on the possibility of formal participation in the Colombo Plan. But Indonesian officials were completely non-committal; they feared that formal participation by Indonesia in such a "collective organisation" as the Colombo Plan would be interpreted within Indonesia as undermining Indonesia's independent and neutral foreign policy.

Taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by the visit of the Indonesian goodwill mission, External Affairs officers in Australia also informally sought an explanation of Indonesia's position on West New Guinea. In the course of the visit to Canberra of Subardjo and his party both on 22 and 23 September, T.W. Cutts of the Pacific Division had several long talks with Dr Abu Hanifah, Consultant to the Indonesian Foreign Minister. Being a member of the Executive Council of the Masjumi Party, Hanifah enjoyed considerable influence within the party. When asked about the sincerity of the Indonesian claim for sovereignty over West New Guinea, Hanifah unreservedly expressed the view that Sukarno's demand for the annexation of the western part of New Guinea was merely a unifying factor for nation-building in

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135 Negotiations were conducted from 28 August to 1 September, 1950 for the opening of Australian-Indonesian trade. On 23 October Canberra and Jakarta exchanged notes about the operation of a trade agreement, and on 14 November the agreement came into force. For an account of the trade talks of 1950 and the subsequent development of Australian-Indonesian trade, see the following file: AA, A1838/302, 752/1/2. Summary of the trade talks of 1950 is included in "Memorandum No. 617/1950 from Hood to Watt, 28 November, 1950" in AA, A1838/302, 752/1/2.

136 "Memorandum by Arthur Tange: Conversation with Abu Hanifah held on 20 September, 1951" in AA, A1838/283, 3034/10/1, part 1; "Memorandum by Arthur Tange: Conversation with Darmawan held on 21 September, 1951" in AA, A1838/283, 3034/10/1, part 1; and "Savingram No. 19 from External Affairs to Australian Embassy, Washington, 12 October, 1951" in AA, A1838/278, 3034/10/1, part 1.
Indonesia. "When President Sukarno made statements regarding Indonesia’s national claims to West New Guinea, sometimes in extravagant terms," Hanifah stated, this was for home consumption only. Although neither the Masjumi Party nor the Government wished to provoke a crisis over the West New Guinea issue, it was necessary from time to time for the President to let off steam about it. The Communists in Indonesia were in the habit of making propaganda out of the Government’s failure to recover West New Guinea for the Indonesian nation, and it was necessary to ‘take the wind out of their sails’ to prevent their exploiting the nationalist sentiment involved in the New Guinea issue.  

In his subsequent discussion with Ralph Harry of the Pacific Division held on 23 September, Hanifah reiterated his view that “statements by President Sukarno were primarily for domestic consumption, with the object of unifying the country,” expressing the hope that Australia would not take Sukarno’s appeals too seriously. The statements made by Hanifah were exactly what Casey called in his radio statement of 27 September reporting Subardjo’s visit a step towards “a better understanding of our mutual problems.”

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However, the policy of putting the West New Guinea dispute into “cold storage” did not last long. From October 1951, when the Indonesian government began to sound out the Dutch government on the possibility of taking up the question as an agenda item at the next Ministerial Conference, the question of West New Guinea

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137 "Memorandum from T.W. Cutts to Wait, 24 September, 1951" in AA, A1838/283, 3034/10/1, part 1.
139 "Cablegram No. 325 from External Affairs to Australian Embassy, Jakarta, 27 September, 1951" in AA, A1838/278, 400/1/11/1/6, part 2.
was gradually returning to the field of agitation. There were two factors that urged the Jakarta government to contemplate reopening negotiations with the Dutch government on the issue of West New Guinea. The first of these was the US State Department’s inclination in this period to seek a solution to the New Guinea problem satisfactory to the Indonesian side, and the subsequent Indonesian expectation of American support for its claim for sovereignty over the territory. Whereas the Sukiman government, by signing the Japanese Peace Treaty, strongly indicated its capacity to develop a pro-American policy in the field of foreign affairs, the truly conservative character of the Sukiman government was also clearly demonstrated by its anti-communist campaign in domestic politics. In August 1951, in the face of a series of strikes guided by the numerous communist-led trade unions which seriously threatened the economy, the Indonesian government had conducted a nation-wide wave of arrests, mostly of communists. In the space of a few weeks, 15,000 people were arrested.140

This incident certainly enhanced Indonesia’s credibility among the Americans as the country likely to offer allegiance to the cause of anti-communism. Greatly respecting the Sukiman government’s pro-western and anti-communist policies, and acknowledging the need for the continued existence of the Sukiman regime, the State Department, particularly the Far Eastern and Southeast Asian Bureaux rapidly moved in the direction of welding Indonesia formally into the Western bloc. As an inducement for Indonesia to join the Western camp, these Bureaux considered that a

solution to the West New Guinea problem in the form of fulfilling Indonesian demands for the annexation of the territory was essential. If the Dutch New Guinea problem was not settled immediately and favourably for Indonesia, they feared, the present Indonesian government would fall and be replaced by a government more to the left. In their view, a settlement of the West New Guinea dispute favourable to Indonesia was a quid pro quo for obtaining Jakarta’s formal commitment to the cause of the free world.  

These efforts by the Far Eastern and Southeast Asian Affairs Bureaux towards seeking a settlement on the West New Guinea dispute were also influenced by the conclusion of the ANZUS treaty on 1 September, 1951. Expecting that the formal American security guarantee to Australia and New Zealand afforded by ANZUS would significantly diminish Australia’s concern about the status of West New Guinea, officers of these Bureaux regarded the creation of ANZUS as a good opportunity to push ahead with the settlement of the New Guinea dispute to the advantage of the Indonesians. A specific plan for a settlement which these Bureaux drew up would provide for the transfer of political sovereignty to Indonesia, while, at the same time, guaranteeing Dutch economic interests and privileges in West New Guinea.


143 “Memorandum from Lacy to Allison, 7 December, 1951” in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, part 1, pp. 744-746.
Encouraged by the US move towards a settlement of the West New Guinea dispute amenable to Indonesia, the Jakarta government began to take the West New Guinea issue out of “cold storage.” On 12 October Foreign Minister Subardjo handed the American Ambassador to Indonesia, Merle Cochran, an aide-memoire, in which the Indonesian government proposed the transfer of de jure sovereignty over the western part of New Guinea to Jakarta, with an agreement providing for joint administrative control and economic development of the territory by the Netherlands, Australia and the United States for twenty-five years.\footnote{“An aide momoire from Subardjo to Cochran, 12 October, 1951” in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, pp. 719-720; and “Cablegram No. GA60 from Casey to Menzies, 16 November, 1951” in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part IB.} This proposal did represent a further Indonesian concession in that, while allowing for Dutch, US and Australian participation in the administration of the territory, it withdrew a plan for the Indonesians to take over the administration of West New Guinea. In his conversation with Cochran, Subardjo also asked the United States to use its influence upon the Dutch government to reopen negotiations on the West New Guinea issue on the basis of the Indonesian proposal. Subsequently, utilising the opportunity of the attendance of foreign ministers at the United Nations General Assembly meeting held in Paris in November, Subardjo presented the Indonesian proposal to Stikker on 14 November,\footnote{“Telegram from American Ambassador to France, Bruce, to Acheson, 16 November, 1951” in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, pp. 722-724.} and to Casey two days later.\footnote{“Cablegram No. GA60 from Casey to Menzies, 16 November, 1951” in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part IB.}

Another factor making for the reactivation of the West New Guinea issue was the Dutch parliamentary action in early November to amend the Constitution so as to
include West New Guinea specifically within the territory of the Kingdom. The existing constitutional provisions regarding Holland’s overseas territories had been amended in 1948, and Article I of the Constitution still mentioned Indonesia as part of the Netherlands Kingdom by stipulating that “[t]he Kingdom of the Netherlands comprises the territory of the Netherlands, Indonesia, Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles.” In order to bring the Constitution up to date, the Dutch government, with the approval of the Cabinet, proposed a series of constitutional amendments, and, in consequence, “Indonesia” was removed and “New Guinea” added to Article I, which then read as follows: “The territory of the Kingdom of the Netherlands comprises the Netherlands, Surinam, the Netherlands Antilles and Netherlands New Guinea.” The amendment was passed by the Dutch Second Chamber (Senate) by 55 to 22.147

The Dutch constitutional revision caused widespread indignation in the Indonesian press, which described it as a “sly trick,” “not in keeping with the transfer of sovereignty” and “closing the door to further negotiations in New Guinea.”148 Official Indonesian reactions were also violent and vociferous. On 10 November Prime Minister Sukiman protested to the Dutch High Commissioner in Jakarta that the Dutch action to incorporate Netherlands New Guinea was “a faintly veiled attempt to prejudice the New Guinea question,” terming the action an “unfriendly and unilateral act.”149 To this, the Netherlands government replied five days later, expressing its astonishment at the reaction of the Indonesian government, and claiming the purely

148 “Cablegram No. 448 from Hood to Watt, 9 November, 1951” in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part IB.
149 “Cablegram No. 1478 from Watt to Spender, 23 November, 1951” in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part IB. See also Robert C. Bone Jr., op.cit., p. 114.
technical and innocuous character of the proposed constitutional changes. In response to the sharp press and public reaction against the Dutch constitutional amendment, the Jakarta government was now moved to seek a settlement on the West New Guinea dispute. On 11 November it formally proposed that the question of West New Guinea should be raised as one of the topics at the Union Ministerial meeting. In reply, on 22 November the Amsterdam government reluctantly agreed to the Indonesian proposal, and on 5 December an Indonesian government mission, headed by Professor Supomo, arrived in the Hague.

However, the talks were temporarily postponed following Indonesia's seizure of a consignment of arms and ammunition bound for Dutch New Guinea from Dutch vessels in Jakarta. Spurred by the momentum of growing popular agitation about West New Guinea as a result of the Dutch parliamentary action, on 7 December a regional field military commander at Tandjong Priok (port of Jakarta) seized 137 cases of arms, ammunition, explosives and general stores consigned to the Netherlands naval and military authorities in Dutch New Guinea from two Dutch freighters, "Blistar" and "Talisse." The incident was followed by a month-long communications between the Dutch and the Indonesians, and negotiations on the determination of the future status of West New Guinea finally began on 15 January 1952.

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150 "Cablegram No. 675 from Stirling to Watt, 16 November, 1951" in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part 1B. See also Robert C. Bone Jr., op.cit., p. 114.
151 "Cablegram No. 666 from Stirling to Watt, 13 November, 1951" in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part 1B.
152 "Cablegram No. 467 from Hood to Watt, 22 November, 1951" in AA, A1838/284, 3036/6/1, part 1B.
153 For an account of the Indonesian seizure of the Dutch freighters, see Leslie H. Palmier, op.cit., p. 83; and Robert C. Bone Jr., op.cit., p. 114.
154 "UK Foreign Office Saviogram No. 69 from A.G. Steward to Eden, 19 December, 1951" in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part 2A; "Cablegram No. 755 from Stirling to Watt, 12 December, 1951" in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part 2A; "Cablegram No. 553 from Stirling to Watt, 30 December, 1951"
In the period preceding the reopening the Indonesian-Dutch conference on New Guinea, Australia had urged the Indonesian, Dutch and US governments to maintain the “cold storage” policy on West New Guinea. This Australian concern to keep the issue on ice reflected a desire that the West New Guinea dispute should be subordinate to the general improvement of Australian-Indonesian relations brought about by the visit of the Subardjo goodwill mission. On 16 November 1951, when it became apparent that the policy of keeping the Dutch New Guinea issue in abeyance had been overtaken by the Subardjo’s proposal and the Dutch parliamentary action, Casey, who was in Paris, wrote a personal cable to Menzies, in which he stated that “[i]t was a pity that any relatively small matter should be allowed to intervene to disturb our relations that I had hoped were developing satisfactorily.”

Meeting with Subardjo in Paris on 29 November, Casey attempted to deter the Indonesians from taking the West New Guinea issue out of “cold storage,” arguing that West New Guinea had no significant value for Indonesia other than prestige. At the same time, the Australian Minister emphasised the importance of maintaining friendly Australian-Indonesian relations. “We in Australia,” Casey claimed,

have been trying very hard to get our relations with Indonesia onto the best possible footing, and we like to think that we have had some success ... the main problem confronting Indonesia and Australia is the possibility of Communists driving south from China. Against this eventuality, Australia and Indonesia and other countries to the northwards can only exert their full strength by being on the best possible terms with each other and co-operating to the full ... In this combination of circumstances, it is clearly bad value for Indonesia to

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155 “Cablegram No. GA60 from Casey to Menzies, 16 November, 1951” in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part 1B.
create ... a major point of friction over Dutch New Guinea, which would completely bedevil our relations with them.¹⁵⁶

Australia’s concern to keep the New Guinea issue on ice and to remove the issue from the field of agitation was also a reflection of Australia’s desire to avoid antagonising the Americans on the problem. In the period October-December 1951, officials in the Australian Embassy in Washington energetically held a series of conversations with American officers in the Department of State to persuade the US to use its influence upon Indonesia to damp down the West New Guinea issue. As a result of these discussions, Australia clearly acknowledged the trend of thought in the Far Eastern and Southeast Asian Bureaux that, out of a wish to bolster the conservative Sukiman government, and in anticipation of a possible decline in Australia’s concern about the status of West New Guinea following the creation of ANZUS, they were actively moving in the direction of seeking a settlement on the issue satisfactory to Indonesia. By giving Jakarta a victory on Dutch New Guinea, they hoped to incorporate Indonesia formally into the orbit of the free world. Reflecting on the trend of US thinking, the Australians drew certain conclusions. “I think we have to remember,” Watt told Casey, “that in this matter [of West New Guinea], Australian interests do not necessarily coincide with those of the United States.”¹⁵⁷ Spender, who had been Ambassador to Washington since 8 June 1951, agreed with Watt’s view, admitting that “[i]n my opinion, the United States attitude, whilst technically neutral, is not so, since their frequently expressed advice to the Indonesians to settle the matter around a table is, in fact, an encouragement to the

¹⁵⁶ “Cablegram No. 6260 from Casey to Menzies, 29 November, 1951” in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part 1B.
¹⁵⁷ “Cablegram No. 6385 from Watt to Casey, November 28, 1951” in AA, A1838/276, 3036/6/1, part 3.
Indonesians to pursue this issue." Given the perceived incongruence of Australian-American interests on the question of the disposition of West New Guinea, a "cold storage" policy was probably the wisest option. Moreover, since the ANZUS treaty was about to go before the US Senate for ratification, it was important that Australia should not antagonise the Americans on the West New Guinea issue.

America's formal attitude towards the forthcoming West New Guinea conference remained limited to neutrality because of the ongoing confrontation between the European Bureau and the Far Eastern and Southeast Asian Bureaux. For a time prior to the Conference, particularly in December 1951, Cochran and officials in the Far Eastern and Southeast Asian Bureaux had pressed the US administration for a redefinition of the US position on West New Guinea. Wiring Washington on 6 December, Cochran advised Acheson that it was important to prevent the Indonesian government from leaning to the left, urging him to change America's "position on Netherlands New Guinea in order to accommodate Indonesia at the expense of America's other friends, the Netherlands and Australia." In response, William Lacy, Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, prepared a memorandum the next day and sent it to John M. Allison, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. In view of the need to ensure the continued existence of the conservative government in Jakarta and of the need to bring Indonesia into the ambit of American influence, Lacy claimed, "United States interests may no longer be served by a position of neutrality" on West New Guinea. He then indicated that his Bureau

158 "Cablegram No. 2108 from Spender to Casey, 14 December, 1951" in AA, A1838/276, 3036/6/1, part 3 (Emphasis Added).
159 "Memorandum from Cuts to McIntyre, 3 January, 1952" in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part 2A.
160 "Telegram No. 817 from Cochran to Acheson, 7 December, 1951" in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, p. 746.
contemplated a viable formula for settlement through the transfer of legal sovereignty over Dutch New Guinea to Indonesia, with an agreement guaranteeing Dutch business interests on the territory.\(^1\) Allison agreed to Lacy's view, suggesting that discussion should be immediately opened with the European Bureau.

On 12 December Allison and Lacy conferred with James C. Bonbright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, in order to establish a US position for the forthcoming New Guinea conference. By arguing that "the stability of the present or any future moderate government in Indonesia would be jeopardised by failure to acquire sovereignty over Netherlands New Guinea within a reasonable time," Allison and Lacy highlighted the unwisdom of maintaining the present US position of neutrality. Bonbright, however, saw no need for the US to intervene actively in the New Guinea issue at this stage, requesting that the administration should refrain from "suggesting ... a substantive solution" until Dutch elections scheduled for June next year were held, because "it would [then] ... be more possible than it is now to get the Dutch to consider a compromise solution for the Dutch New Guinea issue."\(^2\) Consequently, instructions issued by the State Department on 22 January, 1952 to the American Ambassadors to Jakarta and Amsterdam contained no mention of the need for America's pressure on the parties concerned.\(^3\)

In the meantime, at the Union Ministerial Conference at the Hague, which had opened on 15 January, the Indonesians, without proceeding on the basis of the

\(^{1}\) "Memorandum by Lacy to Allison, 7 December, 1951" in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, pp. 744-746.
\(^{2}\) "Memorandum of Conversation by Scott, officer in charge of Swiss and Benelux affairs, 12 December, 1951" in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, part 1, pp. 753-755.
\(^{3}\) "Cablegram No. 65 from Stirling to Watt, 29 January, 1952" in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part 2A.
Subardjo proposal, adopted a stronger negotiating position than at the last conference. This partly resulted from the inclusion in the Indonesian delegation of an extremist element, Mohammed Yamin, a confidant of President Sukarno. They consistently demanded the transfer of both de jure and de facto sovereignty over West New Guinea to Indonesia, and, because of the adamant Indonesian demand, the conference struck a snag on 23 January. After holding a Cabinet meeting five days later, the Dutch delegates in a resumed session of 1 February replied to the Indonesians that the Dutch government had no intention of carrying on negotiations on the basis of the transfer of de jure and de facto sovereignty to Indonesia. They, however, told the Indonesians that, if Indonesia wanted to refer the West New Guinea issue for settlement to the International Court of Justice, the Dutch were ready to discuss such a procedure.

Returning to Jakarta on 6 February for consultations with the Indonesian Cabinet, and staying for twelve days, Yamin arrived back in the Hague on 18 February. At a resumed formal meeting which took place the next day, Professor Supomo explained on the basis of a Cabinet instruction that the Jakarta government could not accept a proposal for the reference of the question of sovereignty over New Guinea to an international tribunal. He argued that the Dutch proposal would only settle a juridical, and not the political issue, which was of real concern to the Indonesian government. Proposing that the question of juridical sovereignty should be shelved, Supomo told

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164 “Memorandum by Cutts to Watt, 20 January, 1952” in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part 2A.
165 “Cablegram No. 57 from Stirling to Watt, 26 January, 1952” in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part 2A.
166 “Cablegram No. 26 from Stirling to Watt, 2 February, 1952” in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part 2A.
167 “UK Foreign Office savingram No. 23 from the Hague to Foreign Office, 20 February, 1952” in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part 2A.
the Dutch that the Indonesian delegation wanted to end the conference with some sort of formula—an agreement to set up a mixed permanent commission which would review the joint administration of West New Guinea.\textsuperscript{168} At a Cabinet meeting held on 21 February, the Netherlands Ministers considered the Indonesian proposal, and agreed that four men from each delegation should meet the next week to discuss possible terms of reference of the commission.\textsuperscript{169}

However, discussion on the creation of a permanent commission on New Guinea was suddenly suspended because of a Cabinet crisis in Indonesia, which had been brought about by Subardjo's signature in early January of an agreement between Indonesia and the United States regarding military aid to Indonesia under the Mutual Security Act and the subsequent rivalry between Masjumi and PNI. On 26 February, when the conservative Sukiman Cabinet tendered its resignation, Supomo announced the recall of the Indonesian delegation, and on 2 March the Indonesian government mission came back to Jakarta empty-handed.

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After the Union Ministerial Conference of January-February 1952, any kind of compromise on the determination of the future status of Western New Guinea between the two countries through negotiations became more and more difficult to achieve because of the trend of both Dutch and Indonesian domestic politics. On 25 and 26

\textsuperscript{168} "Cablegram No. 143 from Stirling to Watt, 22 February, 1952" in \textit{AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part 2A.}
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid.
June a general election for the Lower House of the Dutch Parliament was held: the results of the major parties were as follows: Labour Party 30 (formerly 27); Catholic Party 30 (32); Christian Historical Party 9 (9); Liberal Party 9 (8); Anti-Revolutionary Party 12 (13); and Communist Party 6 (8). While the increase in the Labour Party's representation aroused some anxiety among the Australians as to the prospect of this Party pressing other parties to give up sovereignty over New Guinea in favour of an international solution, the inclusion in the new Drees Cabinet of the intensely conservative Anti-Revolutionary Party nevertheless meant that the Dutch attitude towards maintaining full sovereignty and control over West New Guinea was greatly hardened.

In Indonesia, on 3 April Dr Wilopo, Minister for Economics in the Sukiman government, took office with the combined portfolios of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, and the nucleus of the Cabinet was formed by PNI, from which Wilopo stemmed, and Masjumi. On 10 May, five weeks after assuming power, the new Prime Minister made a policy statement to Parliament. Although Wilopo declared in sober and realistic terms that the government would continue struggle for the annexation of West Irian, it was nonetheless clear from the tone of his statement that the new Jakarta government intended to play down all foreign policy matters, including the New Guinea issue, in order to concentrate its efforts upon urgent domestic problems, especially in the area of the economy.

170 "Cablegram No. 367 from Stirling to Watt, 26 June, 1952" in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part 3B.
171 "Memorandum formulated by Southeast Asian Sub-Section for Casey, 27 June, 1952" in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part 3B.
172 "Ministerial Despatch No. 52 from Hood to Casey, 15 May, 1952" in AA, A816/1, 19/305/142. See also Robert C. Bone Jr., op. cit., p. 116; and Ide Anak Agunggde Agung, op. cit., pp. 95-96.
The outbreak of hostilities in Korea, not long after Indonesia's independence, had certainly created an active demand for some of Indonesia's exports, such as rubber and tin. This boosted the country's foreign trade position and general economic recovery. However, in 1952 the situation deteriorated. Prices of rubber and tin, which constituted 70 per cent of Indonesia's total exports, slumped. From January to July, the price of tin fell by 36 per cent and that of rubber by 30 per cent. In 1950 Indonesia enjoyed a favourable balance of payments of 2,200 million rupiah, which declined to 1,300 million in 1951 and in 1952 was converted to a deficit larger than the surplus of the year before. In his policy statement of 10 May, Wilopo admitted that Indonesia's economic prospects were gloomy as a result of the probable loss of revenue based upon export duties in the period of falling export prices.

As a means of raising government revenue and of reducing imports, the Wilopo government in August placed 100 per cent surcharges on such items as watches, men's and women's clothing, stationery and shoes, and 200 per cent surcharges on toys, ice chests, car radios and various jewellery items. The next step taken by the government was to oblige importers to submit a 40 per cent prepayment of the total value of their imports at the time of receiving an import license. On 1 September the government

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174 "Ministerial Despatch No. 52 from Hood to Casey, 15 May, 1952" in AA, A816/1, 19/305/142. See also Robert C. Bone Jr., op.cit., p. 116; and Herbert Feith, op.cit., pp. 95-96.
also established an allocation system for imports, with direct government controls over an importer’s total expenditure of foreign exchange.\textsuperscript{175}

At the same time, in order to cut down on drastically government spending, the Wilopo government planned to reorganise and rationalise government public services, above all, the armed forces. But the government’s attempt to reform the Indonesian Army developed into the “October 17 Affair,” which had a decisive influence upon the future course of events in Indonesia.

Upon the inauguration of the Wilopo government, the task of reorganisation of the Army had been entrusted to the Minister for Defence, Sultan Hamengku Buwono XI. He drew up a plan to accelerate the demobilisation of the swollen and unmanageable guerrilla Army of about 800,000 officers and men to a modern professional Army of 200,000 with high standards of organisation. The Sultan’s Army reorganisation plan was strongly supported by the two officers of highest rank - Major General Simatupang, Chief of Staff of the armed forces, and General Nasution, the Army Chief of Staff. The plan also received support from the Netherlands military training mission in Indonesia, an advisory unit of 1,100 officers that had been created after mutual consultation in the Hague in December 1950.

However, the anti-demobilisation cry was soon raised both from the armed forces and in Parliament. Opposition to the Sultan’s modernisation scheme came primarily from a group of officers who had received training in “ideological army methods.”

\textsuperscript{175} Herbert Feith, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 247.
during the Japanese Occupation. For these Japanese-trained officers, the proposed reform seemed designed to force them out of the service. As well, they feared that those elements who had been trained in the Dutch colonial force would be in an advantageous position for retention under the proposed rationalisation. One of the Japanese-trained officers, Colonel Bambang Supeno, conveyed his fear and grievances to Parliament and the President. In the parliamentary debates conducted during August-October, there was strong opposition from among those elements who feared that the new Army reformation plan would destroy the old revolutionary spirit of the Army, and that Western influence would gain ground. They also charged that demobilisation was dangerous at this time, because, if the discharged men were not given treatment commensurate with their revolutionary service, this might well drive them to join rebel and bandit groups.

On 16 October the Indonesian Parliament passed the Manai Sophian motion demanding changes in the leadership and organisation of the Defence Ministry and armed forces. The motion was virtually a direction to the Prime Minister to call for the resignation of the Defence Minister and the Chiefs of Staff. The next day (17 October) the Sultan, Simatupang and Nasution carried out something similar to a coup d'etat by organising a mass demonstration. Carrying banners and placards which called for the dissolution of Parliament and for speedy general elections, about 30,000 demonstrators stormed the parliament building and smashed some furniture. The demonstrators then marched to the President's Palace, about a mile away. About the time of their arrival at the Palace, the Army deployed a strong military guard in the palace ground and also brought up four field guns and trained them over the crowd and upon the Palace itself.
High-ranking officers and some of the regional commanders then entered the Presidential Palace. They requested Sukarno to dissolve the Parliament and to appoint a more representative body, arguing that the present members of the Parliament were selfish, irresponsible and neglectful of the people’s interests. The President then emerged before the crowd, appealing for calm and promising to convey their views to the government. Just after the dispersal of the demonstration, well-known opponents of the Sultan, including Sukiman and Yamin, were taken into “protective custody” by the Army and three newspapers -all critical of the Defence Minister- were suspended.176

For a few days, the position of Sukarno and of PNI, who opposed the Army reform, was greatly weakened, and Jakarta came under the control of the reformist Army groups. But, before long, it turned out that the ranking officers who sided with the Defence Minister became scapegoats for the incident: and they were removed from their posts, with the Sultan himself resigning on 2 January, 1953. The repercussions of the incident in Jakarta were also felt throughout Indonesia. A week after the Jakarta incident, disturbances between the reformist Army groups and the opponents of the Army reform occurred in East Java, East Indonesia and South Sumatra, with the result that army commands changed hands to the advantage of the opponents of the Sultan. Thus the Army rationalisation plan failed, with Indonesia’s economy deteriorating

further. As a result of the "October 17 Affair", Indonesia's politics also almost completely moved in the direction of control by extremist elements. After the affair, the Wilopo government was largely at the mercy of the radical nationalist factions in PNI and Parliament.\textsuperscript{177}

The apparent inability of the Indonesian government to put their domestic house in order strongly buttressed the determination of the Dutch government to stay in Netherlands New Guinea. Opinion in the Netherlands was genuinely shocked and disillusioned with the disorder of political life in Indonesia and the mismanagement of the economy. The feeling that New Guinea was a symbol of the Dutch position in the world now changed to a feeling that New Guinea symbolised Dutch prestige vis-a-vis the Indonesians. Recalling the pre-war Dutch estimate of themselves as one of the world's best colonial rulers, the Netherlands were now determined to make West New Guinea into a spectacular showcase of success which would present a sharp contrast with conditions in Indonesia. In the course of the Senate debates on the 1953 budget conducted on 30 October, the Dutch government spokesman declared to the world Holland's determination to retain West New Guinea for an indefinite period and to develop it economically on a long-term basis. "The standpoint of the Cabinet is," he stated,

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that sovereignty, de jure and de facto, over this overseas territory [West New Guinea] is with the Kingdom of the Netherlands. As a signatory of the Charter of the United Nations, the Kingdom took upon itself the obligations contained in Article 73 of the Charter to promote the development of this country and its inhabitants, to consider this administration as a sacred trust and, in accordance with Article 73e of the Charter, to report to the United Nations regularly on this; all this to be done until such time that the inhabitants of New Guinea are able to
\end{quote}
decide themselves about their future. The Government sees no point in a resumption of discussion with Indonesia on the status of New Guinea.

The government spokesman repeated that "[t]he Government can not consider relinquishing New Guinea or restricting sovereignty over that area or accepting a mandate."\textsuperscript{178}

The government statement gained strong support from most of the major parties in Holland, because they were similarly disillusioned with the deteriorating internal situation in Indonesia. Whereas some sections of the Labour Party had formerly favoured the concept of a Dutch trusteeship under the UN over West New Guinea, they now fully supported the government’s determination to retain sovereignty over the western part of New Guinea and to press ahead with the economic development of the territory.\textsuperscript{179} The Catholic and Liberal Parties also stood firmly on the side of the government’s position, because they were gradually released from the pressure of the Dutch business community. In view of the increasingly unfavourable political climate, many Dutch entrepreneurs now showed their reluctance to reinvest in Indonesia, and as early as 1953 they started of their own accord to diminish their business activities in Indonesia, gradually shifting their interests to other parts of the Third World, such as Malaya, Singapore, Thailand, Ethiopia and East Africa and Latin America.\textsuperscript{180}

\textsuperscript{178} "Text of Statement by the Netherlands Government, 30 October, 1952" in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part 5; "Cablegram No. 589 from Stirling to Watt, 30 October, 1952" in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part 5; Canberra Times 31 October, 1952; "Cablegram No. 247 from Watt to Casey, 31 October, 1952" in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part 5; "UK Foreign Office Telegram No. 907 from Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations to UK High Commissioner, Canberra, 4 November, 1952" in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part 5; and "Memorandum of Conversation by Homer M. Byington Jr., Adviser to the UN Delegation at the UN General Assembly, 31 October, 1952" in FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. XII, pp. 840-841.

\textsuperscript{179} Arend Liiphart, op.cit., pp. 182-189.

\textsuperscript{180} Malcolm Caldwell and Erst Utrecht, Indonesia, Sydney: Alternative Publishing Co., 1979, pp. 103-104; and "Ministerial Despatch No. 26 from J.C.G. Kevin, Australian Ambassador to Jakarta, to Casey, 3 September, 1954" in AA, A816/1, 19/305/155.
Dutch investors hesitated, Japan now began to play an increasing role in the Indonesian economy. In the middle of 1952 Japan had already become the second largest source of Indonesian imports after the United States.\textsuperscript{181} With the initialling in Tokyo on 18 January, 1952 of an Interim Agreement on Reparations, whereby Indonesia would get reparations in services, such as the production of goods and machinery, the salvaging of the sunken vessels and technical assistance, Japanese business activities in Indonesia had greatly increased. Projects included: the establishment of an iron-mining works at Langgan in South Sumatra by the Yawata Iron and Steel Works; the operations by a Japanese company of oil wells in Atjeh, North Sumatra; the setting up of new companies by the “Nanpo Shinrin KK” to exploit forests in Borneo, Sumatra and West New Guinea; Japanese capital investment in the building of an Indonesian inter-island shipping company; and the setting up of camera and tyre factories by several Japanese companies at Malang and Jember in East Java, etc.\textsuperscript{182}

As clear evidence of Holland’s determination to push ahead with the economic development of Western New Guinea, on 21 February, 1953 the Netherlands government appointed, as Governor of Netherlands New Guinea, a member of the Anti-Revolutionary Party, Dr Jan Van Baal. The appointment of Van Baal was basically intended to strengthen New Guinea administration with experts on New Guinea instead of old Netherlands East Indies officials.\textsuperscript{183} Although during 1950-52 the indeterminate political status of Dutch New Guinea had held up developmental

\textsuperscript{181} "Memorandum No. 88 from J.C.G. Kevin to Tange, 23 January, 1954: Indonesian-Japanese Trade Relations" in AA, A1838/2, 752/2, part 4A.
\textsuperscript{182} "Ministerial Despatch No. 9 from Kevin to Casey: Japanese Activities in Indonesia, 19 August, 1953" in AA, A5954/1, 2279/1.
\textsuperscript{183} "Cablegram No. 47 from Stirling to Watt, 22 February, 1953" in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part 5.
plans for the territory, and had also discouraged Dutch firms except for the International Nickel Company and the New Guinea Petroleum Company from investing capital in New Guinea, under Van Baal’s governorship, the Dutch budget for New Guinea rapidly increased and Dutch business activities also expanded. Along with the plan for the reorganisation of the New Guinea administration, the Netherlands government indicated its intention to step up defence measures for West New Guinea as a result of the growing concern expressed in the Dutch Parliament during December 1952 about the adequacy of military protection of the territory from Indonesian infiltration. Since early 1950 Dutch New Guinea had been defended by 1,500 Royal Netherlands Army troops, one Papuan Company, two Dutch destroyers, four patrol vessels, a number of small craft plus three Catalina and three Dakota aircraft. In early 1952 the Catalinas increased to six, and some 300 Marines were sent to the territory as a “crack striking force” with the purpose of preventing Indonesian infiltration. In the face of the worsening internal situation in Indonesia, in April 1953 the Dutch government planned to replace the Army personnel, the remnant of the Netherlands Indies Army, with a regiment of Marines from the Netherlands, together with a further increase of Catalinas and the assignment of two additional destroyers to New Guinea waters.

The deteriorating internal situation in Indonesia undoubtedly strengthened Australia’s aversion to seeing the sovereignty of Dutch New Guinea pass to the control

184 “Memorandum from Cutts to Watt, 14 February, 1952” in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part 2A.
185 Ibid.
of a state whose internal political complexion and external alignment were uncertain. In consequence, Australia now moved to reinforce the determination of the Dutch government to remain a permanent Pacific Power. In early March 1953 the Netherlands government requested Australia to allow the overhaul in Melbourne of the Dutch ship “Snellius,” a survey vessel stationed in New Guinea waters. In response, Canberra agreed that the overhaul could be conducted for three weeks from 13 March.\textsuperscript{187} In December 1952 Australia also received a sounding by the Dutch government on the purchase of 20 Catalina aircraft for use in the defence of West New Guinea. After conducting discussions about the offer between the Departments of External Affairs, Treasury and Supply for about six months, in May 1953 the Menzies government decided to offer 26 obsolescent Catalinas valued at a total of 15,000 Australian pounds to the Netherlands as an outright gift with the proviso that they would be used for the defence of the western part of New Guinea. The delivery of the aircraft was made in early 1954.\textsuperscript{188}

In order to further bolster Holland’s determination to retain full sovereignty over West New Guinea for an indefinite period, Australia also decided to proceed with administrative co-operation between Papua and New Guinea and Dutch New Guinea. Up until February 1950 the western and eastern halves of New Guinea had had as little contact as if they had been separated by half a world instead of an arbitrary jungle frontier. Port Moresby, the capital of Papua and New Guinea, had no official lines of communication with Hollandia, and the territories had no trade contact. Still less,

\textsuperscript{187} “Letter from the Netherlands Embassy, Canberra to External Affairs, 3 March, 1953” in AA, A1838/280, 3036/10/1, part 1; and “Letter from External Affairs to the Netherlands Embassy, Canberra, 10 March, 1953” in AA, A1838/280, 3036/10/1, part 1.

\textsuperscript{188} “Cablegram No. 177 from Watt to Stirling, 15 May, 1953” in AA, A1838/276, 3036/6/1, part 6A.
there was no direct mail or radio service, and no transport service by air or sea between the territories. Not until 10 February 1950, in response to a request made by the Dutch on 4 March 1949, did Australia agree to establish regular radio communication between the western and eastern parts of New Guinea in order to prevent border incidents.\textsuperscript{189} Subsequently, taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by survey flights undertaken by Qantas Empire Airways during 21-23 May, 1951 between Hollandia and Lae, the administration officers of Papua and New Guinea landed in the capital of West New Guinea and met with their Dutch counterparts.\textsuperscript{190} Finally in early November of that year, General Van Waadenburg, Governor of Netherlands New Guinea, sailed into Port Moresby in a Dutch destroyer, conducting discussions with J.K. Murray, Administrator of Australian New Guinea, especially about the Dutch plan for economic development of the territory.\textsuperscript{191}

In the face of the worsening of Indonesia’s domestic situation and the subsequent Dutch determination to maintain a permanent presence in Western New Guinea, the Menzies government resolved to promote closer linkage between the western and eastern parts of New Guinea. On 5 February, 1953 Casey convened a Cabinet meeting, at which he obtained other Ministers’ consent “to co-operate with them [the Dutch] at the administrative level in the solution of common problems relating to the administration of our respective territories.” In order to explore the “ways and means of the Cabinet decision,” it was also decided at the meeting that an officer from the

\textsuperscript{189} “Letter from Spender to Teppema, 10 February, 1950” in \textit{AA}, A1838/278, 309/1/1, part 2.

\textsuperscript{190} “Letter from J.K. Murray to Paul Hasluck, Minister for Territories, 26 May, 1951” in \textit{AA}, A1838/278, 309/1/1, part 2; and “Letter from the Department of District of Services and Native Affairs to the Government Secretary, Port Moresby, 28 May, 1951” in \textit{AA}, A1838/278, 309/1/1, part 2.

\textsuperscript{191} “Letter from Murray to Hasluck, Minister for Territories, 21 November, 1951” in \textit{AA}, A1838/278, 309/1/1, part 2.
Department of External Affairs should visit Papua and New Guinea and Dutch New Guinea. About two weeks later, the Amsterdam government was informed of the Cabinet decision, and, during 27 February-14 March, H.S. Burnett, head of the South Pacific sub-section of the Department of External Affairs, visited the western and eastern parts of New Guinea. After conducting extensive discussions with administrative officers both at the central and regional level, on 2 April Burnett submitted a comprehensive 31-page report to Casey, setting out possible specific fields for closer liaison between the two administrations. Placing special emphasis upon ameliorating the effects of isolation, a great handicap to the administration in Netherlands New Guinea, Burnett’s report suggested the opening of a regular inter-territorial civil air service, the promotion of co-operation between technical services divisions of the respective administrations, the co-ordination of economic developmental plans, the development of inter-territorial trade, the opening of an Australian consulate at Hollandia and the co-ordination of defence planning between the two territories.

By informing Stirling on 27 April of the scheduled visit to Australia of the Dutch Foreign Minister, Joseph Luns, and of the Dutch Minister for Overseas Territories, Dr KernKamp, the Netherlands government responded favourably to Australia’s readiness to promote closer co-operation between Papua and New Guinea and Dutch New Guinea. Prior to the visit of Holland’s Ministers, in early May the head of the

192 “Cabinet Decision No. 643, 5 February, 1953” in AA, A1838/283, 309/1/1, part 2A.
193 “Cablegram No. 48 from Watt to Stirling, 18 February, 1953” in AA, A1838/283, 309/1/1, part 2A.
194 “Memorandum from PMH: JPC of South Pacific Division to Casey, 15 April, 1953” in AA, A1838/289, 309/1/1, part 2A. Burnett’s report is included in this memorandum.
195 “Cablegram No. 141 from Stirling to Watt, 27 April, 1953” in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part 6A.
Ministry of Overseas Territories, B. Krijgar, called at the Department of External Affairs in Canberra to discuss the question of co-operation. It was revealed in the discussion between Krijgar and Ralph Harry of the Pacific Division that there was a divergence of approach to administrative co-operation between the Netherlands and Australia. The Dutch suggested that it would be desirable to set up a permanent committee both at the Hague and in Canberra to administer the co-operation programmes. Harry, however, opposed the suggestion because of Australia's budget limitations. Krijgar was told that Australia did not envisage a necessity for any intergovernmental agreement or organisation, and that the best results could be obtained on an ad hoc basis at the administrative level in New Guinea. In the discussion, it was decided to defer action on this question until the forthcoming visit of Foreign Minister Luns.196

Amidst mounting press speculation from Jakarta about the prospect of a defence treaty between Australia and Holland directed against Indonesia, Luns, accompanied by three Foreign Ministry officials, arrived in Sydney on 29 June and stayed in Australia until 8 July. Luns's visit overlapped with that of KernKamp, who was in Australia during 3-10 July. On his arrival at Mascot airport, the Dutch Foreign Minister completely denied that Holland contemplated any military treaty with Australia, or that it had any intention to seek membership of the ANZUS pact.197 Flying to Canberra the next day, Luns conferred with Casey in the Department of External Affairs. Luns agreed in this meeting that there should not be an inter-

196 "Memorandum from Harry to Watt, 15 May, 1953" in AA, A1838/283, 309/1/1, part 2A. A record of conversation between Harry and Krijgar is contained in this memorandum.
197 "ABC News, 29 June, 1953" in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part 6A.
governmental formal agreement on the question of co-operation between Netherlands New Guinea and Australian New Guinea. Turning to the question of the future development of New Guinea, Luns told Casey that Holland saw some advantages in the provision of reparations by the Japanese in the form of technical and other assistance. Japan's involvement in developmental projects in New Guinea, the Dutch argued, "would amount to recognition of Netherlands sovereignty by an Asian power."

To this, Casey and Watt stressed the sensitivity of Australian public opinion on the question of Japan.\(^{198}\)

In a subsequent discussion held in the Department of External Affairs on 1 July, Luns and Casey agreed on the desirability of establishing a direct shipping link between Australia and West New Guinea and of opening an inter-territorial air service between Wewak in the north of New Guinea and Hollandia.\(^{199}\) On 4 July Casey and KemKamp also agreed on the need for development of trade between Australia and Dutch New Guinea on a significant scale, particularly the import of agricultural machinery from Australia and the export of timber from West New Guinea.\(^{200}\) Three days later, at a staff-level meeting between External Affairs and Territories officers and their Netherlands counterparts, agreement was reached on co-operation items affecting the

\(^{198}\) "Record of Conversation between Luns and Casey, 30 June, 1953" in AA, A1838/276, 3036/6/1, part 4.


\(^{200}\) "Record of Conversation between Casey and KemKamp, 4 July, 1953" in AA, A1838/278, 309/1/1, part 4. Australian-Dutch New Guinea trade was opened in May 1950 with the import by Australia of petroleum from West New Guinea, but not until 1952 was the trade placed on a reciprocal basis with the export from Australia of canned meat, rice and flour. The figures for import from West New Guinea were 173,000 (Australian pounds) in 1950, 366,000 in 1951-52, 275,000 in 1952-53, 356,000 in 1953-54 and 1,066,000 in 1954-55. The figures for the export from Australia to West New Guinea were 4,000 (Australian pounds) in 1952-53, 79,000 in 1953-54 and 481,000 in 1954-55. See "Memorandum, undated and unsigned, 1955: Australian-Dutch New Guinea Trade" in AA, A1838/280, 3036/10/12, part 1A.
western and eastern parts of New Guinea. These included: (a) border demarcation; (b) co-ordination of common policies in the sphere of the social, economic and political advancement of the native peoples; (c) exchange of information obtained by border patrol officers through direct contact; (d) the establishment of direct telegraphic communication between Hollandia and Port Moresby; (e) the establishment of an air service between Wewak and Hollandia; (f) exchange of information and periodic consultation between specialists in the field of agriculture, stock and fisheries, health and education; and (g) the establishment of a shipping link between Australia and Netherlands New Guinea.²⁰¹

The administrative agreement was tantamount to formal recognition by Australia of Dutch sovereignty over West New Guinea and, at the same time, was a step towards the creation of a future Melanesian nation consisting of the western and eastern parts of New Guinea. The agreement was approved by the Australian government in early September and by the Netherlands government in early January 1954.

As well as encouraging the Dutch in their determination to retain sovereignty over West New Guinea, Australia, in response to the worsening internal situation in Indonesia, pressured the US to use its influence upon Jakarta to have it abandon the Indonesian claim for sovereignty. However, Washington officials were still not at all convinced of the dangers to Australian defence that would follow from Indonesian control of West New Guinea. In a conversation with C.T. Moodie, Counsellor at the Australian Embassy in Washington, Philip Bonsal, who had replaced William Lacy as

²⁰¹ "Memorandum formulated in the Department of Territories: Meeting on Dutch Cooperation in New Guinea, 7 July, 1953" in AA, A4968/2, 25/9/2/3/2.
the Director of the Southeast Asian Bureau, was very critical of the uncompromising Dutch stand on New Guinea, expressing the hope that "the Dutch would not be so stiff as to provoke the Indonesians into actions that would make the situation worse." He also cautioned against Australia's over-confidence in America's influence in Indonesia.202 Bonsal then told an officer in the Dutch Embassy in Washington that, since "Indonesia was ultimately destined to become a great power or a nearly great power, it was most important for every attempt to be made to remove causes of dispute before that day arrived."203 Stressing the importance of fostering "some Indonesian orientation to the West" and of welding Indonesia into the orbit of the free world, Allison argued to Moodie that, "so long as the Dutch New Guinea issue remained," Indonesia "could not really evolve a stable government."204 Bonsal subsequently told an officer in the Netherlands Embassy in Washington that he did not think that the transfer of sovereignty over West New Guinea to Indonesia "would be prejudicial to Australian security."205 Interviewed by an official in the Australian Embassy in Washington, Allison frankly expressed the view that "[f]or the Dutch and Australians to stand pat and adopt a rigid attitude did not help the situation in any way." The head of the Far Eastern Affairs Bureau went on to argue that Canberra should now alter its position on New Guinea:

The hard fact had to be faced that sovereignty over Dutch New Guinea would at some time have to pass from the Dutch to the Indonesians. If this did not come about, Dutch New Guinea would continue to be a

203 "Memorandum No. 1471 from C.T. Moodie to Watt, 26 November, 1952" in AA, A5461/1, 2/14, part 2.
204 "Memorandum by C.T. Moodie to Spender, 4 December, 1952" in AA, A5461/1, 2/14, part 2.
205 "Savingram No. 37 from Australian Embassy, Washington to External Affairs, 26 February, 1953" in AA, A5461/1, 2/14, part 3.
source of irritation and friction between the free world and Indonesia.\textsuperscript{206}

For the Far Eastern and Southeast Asian Bureaux, the solution of the problem of the determination of the status of West New Guinea in a way favourable to Jakarta was still a quid pro quo for the incorporation of Indonesia into the ambit of US influence.

In the meantime, in Indonesia, on 30 July 1953, following the resignation of the Wilopo government of 2 June over a policy confrontation between PNI and Masjumi on land policy in Sumatra, Dr Ali Sastroamidjojo, former Ambassador to the US and a member of PNI, organised a new Cabinet. The formation of the Ali government marked a triumph of the assertive nationalists over the moderates which had markedly prevailed in the previous government. The pattern was all too clearly reflected in the composition of the Ali Cabinet, in which the most questionable and demagogue currents were richly represented. Excluding members of Masjumi, the Cabinet contained a number of relatively new political figures and an appreciable proportion of members with leftist tendencies. Moreover, although not represented in the Cabinet, the Communist Party (PKI) had considerable passive influence, because, possessing so narrow a majority in Parliament, the Cabinet might find itself rescued on occasion by communist votes. Utilising the exclusion of Masjumi from the Cabinet, the Ali government also cleaned out of key positions in the civil service and armed forces those officers known to be sympathetic to the Opposition, with the result that the administration system was deteriorating into an unreliable, incompetent and rapacious machine. Given the lack of stability and orderly administration in Indonesia, the West

\textsuperscript{206} "Savingram No. 39 from the Australian Embassy, Washington to External Affairs, 4 March, 1953" in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part 5.
New Guinea issue now came to be used as a means of diverting public attention from Indonesia’s rising economic and domestic problems. In order to mobilise popular sentiment in support of the national campaign to recover Netherlands New Guinea, the Jakarta government in December established the Bureau of West Irian Affairs under the office of the Prime Minister and the administrative units at the regional level. In consequence, the New Guinea problem was kept alive from day to day by a steady steam of government propaganda and vituperative press commentary.\textsuperscript{207}

The formation of a Cabinet in Indonesia without Masjumi greatly surprised both the United States and Australia. It aroused strong alarm and fear in both nations of the possibility of communisation in Indonesia. Noting the leftist tendencies of the Ali government, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the US in a Special Estimate dated 18 September expressed strong concern about “the pro-Communist inclination of certain members of the Cabinet and the tendency they will have to place their supporters in key positions in the bureaucracy, the armed forces and the police.” Evaluating probable future trends in Indonesia, the CIA concluded that “[o]n the basis of present indications, we believe that the Communists will increase their influence in Indonesia as a result of the tenure of the present Cabinet.”\textsuperscript{208}

\begin{footnotes}
\item “Special Estimate No. SE51 by CIA, 18 September, 1953” in FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. XII, pp. 386-387.
\end{footnotes}
Director under the Eisenhower administration, Allen Dulles, reported to a National Security Council (NSC) meeting about "the increasing trend towards a breakdown of Governmental authority in Indonesia," telling other NSC members that "everything was moving in the wrong direction from the US point of view. The situation, in short, was one of steady deterioration." Dulles then declared that there was a possibility that Indonesia would be communised in the near future. Since "at least eight of the twenty cabinet ministers were pro-Communists, ... the present Government could be best described as a Popular Front."\(^{209}\)

Australia was similarly perturbed at the trend towards the disintegration of government in Indonesia and the consequent possible increase of communist influence. "Though we do not see the Communist Party there as being sufficiently strong to seize power at present," Casey wrote to the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, on 27 November, "the danger lies in the Government eventually becoming so weak that extreme forces can take over for lack of any real opposition." The internal weakness of Indonesia and the emergence of that country as an undependable and untrustworthy neighbour liable to fall under communist influence, Casey also admitted, reinforced the Australian position that Dutch New Guinea should not be allowed to pass under the control of Jakarta:

The internal disturbances in Indonesia point up the new threat which there would be to Australia if West New Guinea pass into their hands - not merely a possible military threat but also the likelihood they would stir up dissension among inhabitants of Australian New Guinea.\(^{210}\)


\(^{210}\) "Cablegram No. 3751 from Casey to Eden, 27 November, 1953" in AA, A1838/278, 3004/13/3, part 1.
The Defence Department shared the Department of External Affairs' concern about possible communisation in Indonesia. The Joint Planning Committee (JPC) expressed the view in a report of 14 December that "there are strong possibilities of their [the Communists] increasing their influence within the Government by peaceful penetration." "If allowed to form armed para-military forces or if provided with outside military assistance," the Committee also argued, "the Communists could undertake revolt in a selected area with a reasonable chance of initial success and the subsequent holding of limited objective." The JPC was also apprehensive about the danger to the lines of sea communication within the ANZAM region as a result of possible communisation in Indonesia.211

On the other hand, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)212 had become greatly anxious to have its own intelligence capacity in Indonesia. As a source of current military information about the Indonesian affairs, Australia had completely depended upon service attachés attached to the US and British Embassies in Jakarta. The United States maintained three military attachés and the United Kingdom two in their own Embassies. As a result of the conclusion of an intelligence agreement between the US and Britain in August 1947 and of a similar agreement between Australia and the US in early July 1950, Australia was entitled to sharing in American as well as UK intelligence on the world affairs. However, in the face of the worsening domestic...

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212 The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) was established by the Curtin Labor government on 1 January, 1944 and comprised Director of National Intelligence, Director of Military Intelligence, Controller of Joint Intelligence and a representative of the Department of External Affairs. The JIC was responsible to the Defence Committee for (a) the control, through the Controller of the Joint Intelligence, of the intelligence policy of the Joint Intelligence Machinery; (b) the preparation of reports, appreciation etc. as may be required; and (c) liaison as necessary with the Joint Planning Committee and the appropriate Defence Scientific advisory body.
situation in Indonesia, Australian intelligence officers strongly acknowledged the
insufficiency of relying upon military information about the Indonesian affairs supplied
by US and UK service representatives in Jakarta. The JIC's desire to have its own
intelligence facility in Indonesia was also stepped up by the Dutch government's
decision in late June 1953 to withdraw a 1,100 military training mission from
Indonesia. The decision followed the breakdown of talks between Indonesia and
Holland in mid-April on the renewal of the agreement on the stationing of a military
mission. Under mounting anti-foreign, especially anti-Dutch sentiment in Indonesia,
the Dutch military establishment was unwilling to continue to offer a military
mission. The withdrawal of the Netherlands military training mission signified to
Australia that "Indonesian armed forces, already ill-disciplined and divided, will
become an even less effective force than at present" in dealing with the internal
situation. In mid-July 1953 the JIC made a proposal for the appointment of a
military attaché to the Australian Embassy in Jakarta on the ground that "the more
rapid the deterioration in the internal security situation, the greater will become our
intelligence need in Indonesia." The Intelligence Committee emphasised the value

213 For an account of Indonesian-Dutch talks on the renewal of the agreement on the stationing of a
Dutch military mission and the subsequent Dutch decision to withdraw a military mission, see the
following file: A1838/278, 3034/10/4/2, part 1; and A5954/1, 14/2/2 in AA. By mid-November 1953,
1,100 Dutch military mission stationed in Indonesia had declined to 400. See "Letter from Ben
Cockram, Acting UK High Commissioner, Canberra, to Watt, 18 November, 1953" in AA, A5954/1,
14/2/2. In mid-December, 1953 all of Dutch Army and Air training officers were completely
withdrawn, with about 30 to 40 Navy officers remaining. See "Savingram No. 68 from the Australian
Embassy, Jakarta to External Affairs, 18 December, 1953" in AA, A5954/1, 14/2/2. At the end of
July, 1954 the remaining Navy training officers were also completely pulled out of Indonesia. See
"Memorandum No. 552 from Fernandez to Tange, 5 August, 1954" in AA, A1838/278, 3036/6/1, part
10. In addition to offering a military training mission to Indonesia, the Dutch military also, in the
course of 1951-53, trained Indonesian cadets (46 for the Army and 21 for the Navy) in the
Netherlands. See "Cablegram No. 406 from the Australian Embassy, the Hague to External Affairs,
214 "Cablegram No. 86 from the Australian Embassy, Jakarta to External Affairs, 19 March, 1953" in
215 "Memorandum No. 537 from David Hay to the Australian Embassy, Jakarta, 20 July, 1953" in
AA, A1838/278, 3034/10/4/2, part 1; and "Memorandum from David Hay to Watt, 12 August, 1953"
of the presence of an Australian service attaché "as a potential source of information on areas controlled by the Indonesian Army." The proposal made by the JIC was approved by the Defence Committee on 13 August.²¹⁶

The rapidly deteriorating situation in Indonesia in the direction of possible communisation also strongly spurred the Defence Department to further its military plans in the event of an Indonesian attack on West New Guinea. The plan, which had been developed since May 1951, envisaged preventing an Indonesian landing on Dutch New Guinea by using Darwin, the capital of Northern Territory of Australia, as a forward base. The plan also provided for the despatch of Australian naval forces to West New Guinea for support of Dutch troops and marines from the Manus Island naval base, which had been remobilised in July 1950 with the expenditure of 100,000 Australian pounds.²¹⁷ Since Netherlands troops and marines were deployed at seven key points: Hollandia, Biak, Manokwari, Sorong, Fakfak, Kaimana and Merauke, Manus indeed provided a suitable base for support for the Dutch in Hollandia and Biak, an island off the north coast of West New Guinea and the main military base. In the face of the increased possibility of an Indonesian invasion of Western New Guinea following the establishment of the Ali government, defence expenditure for the Manus Island base facilities and troops now increased to 2,653,257 Australian pounds.²¹⁸

Thus a threat loomed large in the Southwest Pacific and, with it, a need for Australia to incorporate itself more deeply into the sphere of American influence. It

²¹⁶ "Memorandum from David Hay to Watt, 30 August" in AA, A1838/278, 3034/10/4/2, part 1.
²¹⁷ "Minute No. 9 by Chiefs of Staff Committee, 17 May, 1951" in AA, A816/1, 19/305/163.
²¹⁸ "Minute No. 269 by Defence Committee, 29 October, 1953" in AA, A816/14, 7/301/64.
seemed that Australia was anxious to obtain additional American guarantees of its own defence in order to supplement one contained in ANZUS. At the same time, Australia was more anxious for the US to make a formal commitment to the Southeast Asian mainland, because it feared that the spread of communism in Indo-China would encourage further communist activity in Indonesia. Casey stated that, since "the deterioration of the situation in Indo-China would ... influence the further growth of Communism in Indonesia, ... [t]he need to press our policy [of encouraging an American commitment to Southeast Asia] has been strengthened ..."219 Australia's search for a military alliance in Southeast Asia backed by the US was now given new stimulus.

Conclusion

After the Second World War, the question of the disposition of the western part of New Guinea developed into a bone of contention between Holland and Indonesia. The Dutch insisted on the retention of sovereignty and control over the territory in order to promote West New Guinea as a Eurasian homeland, to make the territory a symbol of Dutch colonial grandeur and to discharge what the government in Holland saw as its moral mission to the allegedly primitive peoples of New Guinea. Indonesia, on the other hand, considering itself as legal heir to all of the former Netherlands East Indies, claimed that the territory of the Indonesian state should extend from the island of Sabang to Merauke on the border of Australian New Guinea.

Given New Guinea’s role as the geographical terminus of the island chain protruding from Asia, and possessing Papua and New Guinea as a protectorate and a trust territory respectively, Australia was not at all indifferent to the two nations’ conflicting claims to sovereignty over West New Guinea. Fearful of the possible erosion of New Guinea’s role as an effective shield for Australia’s defence, and anxious about Indonesia’s ambitions with regard to Australian New Guinea, the Chifley Labor government had no wish to see Indonesian rule extended to any part of New Guinea. The Menzies government shared the major arguments advanced by the Labor government against Indonesia’s claim for sovereignty over Dutch New Guinea. However, it was more sensitive than Labor to any proposed change in the political status of Western New Guinea. The government felt that Australia should claim a consultative role in bilateral Dutch-Indonesian negotiations on the determination of the future status of West New Guinea so as to influence these negotiations. Canberra’s interventionist stance was opposed by the US, the UK and Holland. Nevertheless, from mid-1950 onwards, friction developed between Canberra and Jakarta, with Sukarno arguing for the annexation of Dutch New Guinea as part of Indonesia’s continuing struggle to eliminate the last vestiges of Dutch colonialism and Spender censuring Indonesia’s claim as based on completely empty foundations. When Spender visited the Hague, the public wrangling greatly intensified.

Efforts to find a solution to the problem of West New Guinea at the Union Ministerial Conference held at the Hague in late 1950 broke down because of Indonesia’s intransigence on its claim for formal sovereignty and Holland’s refusal to accept Indonesia’s demand. Subsequently, the West New Guinea issue was put into
"cold storage," and Australian-Indonesian relations warmed, with Subardjo visiting Canberra on a goodwill mission. However, this situation soon changed. Aware that the United States was seeking a solution to the West New Guinea issue favourable to Jakarta, and pressed by public and press agitation over Dutch constitutional amendment, Indonesia took the New Guinea issue out of "cold storage". At the Union Ministerial Conference held at the Hague in early 1952, the Dutch and Indonesians, explored the idea of a mixed commission on joint administration of West New Guinea. However, the talks were suspended.

After the conference, any attempt to seek a solution to the West New Guinea issue through the channel of bilateral negotiations was completely abandoned because of the trend of domestic politics in both Holland and Indonesia. Particularly in Indonesia, the deteriorating economic situation caused the Jakarta government to plan for rationalisation and modernisation of the enormous guerrilla Army inherited from the war against the Dutch. But the government’s attempt to reform the Army resulted in the "October 17 Affair". In response to the deteriorating internal situation in Indonesia, the Dutch government signified its intention to retain sovereignty over New Guinea on a long-term basis and to develop the territory economically. Australia responded to the worsening domestic situation in Indonesia by encouraging Holland’s determination to remain a permanent Pacific Power, not least by concluding an agreement in July 1953 on administrative co-operation between Australian New Guinea and West New Guinea. With the formation of the Ali government in Indonesia at the end of July 1953, the victory of extremist nationalists overt moderate elements was complete, and Australia as well as the US was greatly alarmed at the possibility of
a communist takeover in Indonesia. Thus the Menzies government's concern about
external threats was reinforced, and Australia's desire to obtain additional guarantees
of its own defence from the US seemed to be strengthened. Canberra's fear that the
further growth of communism in Indonesia would be encouraged by the spread of
communism in Indo-China also made Australia more anxious than ever to commit the
US to the defence of the Southeast Asian mainland.
Chapter V
The Dien Bien Phu Crisis
and the Birth of SEATO, 1954

By early 1954 the Indo-China war, which had begun in late 1946 between the French and Vietnamese rebel forces (the Viet Minh) led by communist Ho Chi Minh, had been deeply incorporated into the Cold War confrontation, with the US having borne about 80 per cent of the cost of the war to the French, and Communist China having provided the Viet Minh with substantial material and technical aid. In mid-February 1954 a decision was made at Berlin by the Big Four (the Soviet Union, the US, the UK, and France) to convene an international conference at Geneva from late April to discuss the question of restoring peace in Indo-China. This decision subsequently prompted the Viet Minh to launch a major assault against the French-held fortress of Dien Bien Phu in the far northwest of Viet Nam to strengthen their bargaining position at Geneva. The decision to call the Geneva Conference and the battle for Dien Bien Phu in turn precipitated one of the gravest international crises since the end of the Second World War and one of the deepest rifts in the Western alliance. The United States for the first time contemplated the prospect of direct military intervention in the Indo-China fighting.

The Indo-China crisis came to a head as Australia faced a general election for the House of Representatives, which was set for 29 May. Although the Menzies government acknowledged that it could not commit the future government to a long-term policy for Indo-China, it was nonetheless not in any way indifferent to a situation
in Asia that would greatly influence Australia's security environment. In the course of
the Dien Bien Phu crisis, Australia pursued two objectives: first, to prevent the Viet
Minh and other resistance forces, such as the Pathet Lao in Laos and the Khmer
Issarak in Cambodia, from establishing a dominant position in Indo-China; and,
second, to preserve America's willingness to underwrite the security of Southeast
Asia, manifested in the American proposal for armed intervention. This Chapter, after
surveying the precise manner in which the US and Australia moved to a position
directly supporting French colonialism in Indo-China during 1945-53, discusses the
Australian approach to the Dien Bien Phu crisis, alongside the US, British and French
approaches. It then traces the creation of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation
(SEATO).

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The disruptions caused by the overthrow of European predominance by the
Japanese in Southeast Asia during World War II forced the United States to define its
interests in the struggles of Asian peoples to end European imperialism. Within
Japanese-occupied Southeast Asia, French Indo-China received the greatest American
attention, although it did not rank high on the list of foreign policy priorities of the US.
In the course of the war, the United States assumed that it would be instrumental in
determining the post-war status of Indo-China. Convinced that France had become a
decadent nation, no longer deserving the status of a major power as a result of the
collapse of the French resistance against Germany in 1940, President F.D. Roosevelt
harboured a personal scheme for preventing the resumption of French rule and for
establishing instead an international trusteeship which would lead to eventual independence. Beginning with an approach to the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, in March 1943, the President consistently sounded out Soviet, Chinese and British views on the trusteeship plan at a series of Great Power conferences in the period 1943-45. While gaining support from the Chinese and Soviets, the idea of trusteeship was nonetheless opposed by the British, who feared that Roosevelt's anticolonial designs might extend to their possessions in Asia. The American President's trusteeship concept also met resistance within the US government. The Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed an unequivocal commitment to the establishment of a trusteeship under the UN for fear of weakening American control over the Japanese-mandated islands in the Pacific which they deemed vital for post-war US security. Initially divided over the post-war plan for Indo-China, the State Department, at the initiative of the European Affairs Bureau, became increasingly indifferent to nationalism, and felt that the United States should not jeopardise its relations with its European allies by meddling in colonial affairs.¹

The Indo-Chinese trusteeship scheme vanished with the death of Roosevelt and the inauguration of Harry Truman in power in April 1945. Established at a time when United States foreign policy towards Soviet Russia was undergoing a general reappraisal as a result of the imposition of a pro-Soviet government in Rumania and of Russian refusal to accept the Anglo-American interpretation of the Yalta Agreement on Poland, the Truman administration deferred to the reassertion of French sovereignty in the interests of improving relations with France. A State Department position paper, drawn up in June 1945, insisted that American interests in Europe and the Far East could be best promoted through cooperation with the colonial powers, and that the US should carefully avoid any action that might undermine Western influence in the colonial areas. At the Potsdam Conference held in July 1945, the US and UK drew up the procedure for the control of Indo-China pending the reestablishment of French colonialism by agreeing that the liberation of Indo-China and the acceptance of Japanese surrender should be accomplished by the British south of the 16th Parallel and by the Chinese north of that line.

Coinciding with the proclamation of independence by the Viet Minh on 2 September 1945 before exultant crowds in Hanoi, Chinese troops entered Indo-China from the north and British forces arrived in the south. Beginning as early as October...
1945, US ships and crews in increasing numbers transported French troops to Saigon. By the time the last British units had left Vietnam in March 1946, a total of some 65,000 French soldiers had been inserted into the southern half of Vietnam. Under the aegis of Kuomintang military power, the French were also allowed to take over from the Chinese the garrisoning of Hanoi and all but one of the other major cities and towns in northern Vietnam. In addition to standing behind and reinforcing British and Chinese actions on behalf of the French, the United States itself made a massive material contribution to the French effort to reconquer Indo-China. With the withdrawal of British and Chinese troops in the spring of 1946, the French were allowed to keep US lend-lease war material which had been earlier supplied on the expectation that it would be used in the invasion of Japan. Moreover, with a full-scale conflict starting between the French and the Viet Minh on 20 November 1946, Washington extended a direct credit of $160 million for the purchase of what was benignly described as "vehicles and industrial equipment for war in Vietnam."4

With the full-scale development of the Cold War in Europe following the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947 and the announcement of the Marshall Plan in June, the principle of anti-colonialism was even more deeply submerged beneath the expediency of alliance politics in Europe. Since American policy was strongly reoriented towards building stable and prosperous European governments that would stand as bulwarks against Russian expansion, the Truman administration found it increasingly difficult to dissociate the US from the actions of the colonial powers. To ensure that France would cooperate for the defence of

Western Europe, America left the French to handle the Indo-China question in their own way.

In addition to the need for bolstering the French role in the containment policy in Europe, America’s Indo-China policy began to be affected after 1948 by other two factors. The first of these was the American need to ensure Southeast Asia as an export/import market for Japan. In the period 1945-47, America’s policy objective towards Japan, which was reflected in the Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive, was to make Japan a permanent passive captive in an Asian-Pacific international system by placing the former enemy under a long-term control and surveillance of Allied Powers. However, with the adoption of a National Security Council (NSC) resolution 13/2 on 9 October 1948, the United States formally accepted the conception that Japan should be treated less as a defeated enemy and more as a potential member of the family of free nations. To create the economic foundation for Japan’s role as an ally capable of providing bases and industrial resources against Soviet Russia, the Truman administration regarded it as essential to provide as much access as possible to the raw materials and markets of Southeast Asia. While, under the Occupation regime, traditional Sino-Japanese trade had been maintained since 1945, the United States nonetheless did not expect that this would be sufficient to sustain Japan’s economic self-sufficiency and to lessen Tokyo’s dependence upon Washington’s aid. This was because of internal chaos arising from the civil war in China. As a means of facilitating

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5 The Basic Initial Surrender Directive was wired to General MacArthur from President Truman on 29 August, 1945. But it was not given formal approval by the President until 6 September, 1945. For the text of the Directive, see “Basic Initial Surrender Directive to General MacArthur, 24 October, 1951” in DNZER, Vol. II, pp. 11-13.

6 "Note by the NSC Executive Secretary, Sydney W. Souers, to President Truman, 7 October, 1948" in FRUS, 1948, Vol. VI, pp. 857-862. President Truman approved the Note on 9 October, 1948.
Japan's reemergence as a major industrial power, American interests thus pointed towards the stabilisation of Southeast Asia and preventing the area from falling into communist hands.\(^7\)

Secondly, the US policy supporting the reassertion of French sovereignty over Indo-China was influenced by the need to manage domestic politics in the United States. The establishment of the communist regime in China in October 1949 had been accompanied by a growth of anti-communist sentiment in America, and the impact of the loss of China in US domestic politics ensured that no administration acquiesced in communist control over additional Asian territory. This consideration was decisive in a formal US declaration against Ho Chi Minh and for the French. On 7 February 1950, by recognising the Bao Dai regime as an "independent state within the French Union," which the French had installed in power as a means of transforming the Indo-China colonial war into a civil war, the US now closely identified itself with French political actions intended to defeat the Viet Minh.\(^8\) On 8 May, by announcing the provision of

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$10 million financial assistance directly to the Associated States of Indo-China (Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos), the US began to underwrite the French war effort in Indo-China.\(^9\)

In early 1950, by following the American lead in recognising the Bao Dai regime, Australia, along with Britain, salvaged America's isolated position, which paralleled American association with the discredited Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) regime in the Chinese civil war. During the French colonial rule in Indo-China, which had started in 1887 with the despatch of the Governor-General, the Australian colonial governments and later federal government had given little attention to the area. This was due both to the mutual antagonism that existed between the French empire and the British empire, and to the French proclivity to direct their colonies exclusively towards the metropole.\(^10\) In the 1930's Australia, anxious about Japan's aggressive moves on the Chinese mainland, despatched a series of government missions to Asian countries mainly in order to conduct independent intelligence activities about Japan. These included: the Tonkin mission of 1934; the Latham mission of the same year; the Sanderson mission of 1936; and the Hawker mission of the same year.\(^11\) However, itinerary Indo-China was not on the \(^\checkmark\) of those missions. Not until as early as 1940, when the Japanese superseded the French in Indo-China, did the Australian government recognise the importance of the region. The Indo-Chinese area was viewed as a piece...

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\(^{10}\) Pheuiphang Ngousouath, *Strategic Involvement and International Partnership: Australia's Post-1975 Relations with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam*, Brisbane: Griffith University, Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, Australia-Asia Papers No. 68, 1993, p. 3.

\(^{11}\) For a recent account of these missions based on archival materials, see Wayne Gobert, *The Origins of Australian Diplomatic Intelligence in Asia, 1933-1941*, Canberra: Australian National University, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, No. 96, 1992.
of territory which the Japanese could use as a forward base to advance into other Southeast Asian states and the Southwest Pacific.\textsuperscript{12} During the Second World War, particularly the latter stages of the war, Australia gave support to American intelligence officers in Indo-China, who were encouraging revolutionary movements in order to facilitate counter-offensive against Japan.\textsuperscript{13} However, in the post-war period, the Labor government’s Minister for External Affairs, Dr Evatt, was inclined to favour the policy of restoring French rule in Indo-China, a policy squarely opposed to the Labor government’s policy towards Indonesian independence.\textsuperscript{14}

Since the Elysee Agreement signed in Paris on 8 March 1949, in which France had recognised Vietnam’s independence within the French Union, while retaining responsibility for foreign affairs, defence, finance, and other special privileges, the US government had been pressing the British and Australian governments to recognise the Bao Dai regime. In the autumn of 1949, American pressure for the support of its position as a lone partner of France in a losing colonial enterprise increased with the success of the Chinese communist revolution and growing anti-communist sentiment in the US. The British Labour government, concerned about both the possible loss of a strategic bulwark separating Communist China from Southeast Asia, and possible adverse effect upon British interests in Malaya as a result of a French withdrawal from Indo-China, was willing to recognise the Bao Dai regime with some qualifications.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{12} Pheuiphang Ngousyauthn, \textit{Strategic Involvement and International Partnership: Australia’s Post-1975 Relations with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam}, p. 3.


\textsuperscript{15} "UK JIC (Joint Intelligence Committee) Report/FE (49)6, Undated, 1949" in \textit{AA}, A1838/278, 462/9/1/2.
However, the Australian Labor government refrained from making a formal decision on “whether it would recognise the Bao Dai regime or what degree of recognition, if any, should be accorded to the regime.”

As soon as the Menzies government took over power from the Labor government in early December 1949, it also faced the problem of recognition of the Bao Dai regime. At the Colombo Conference held in early January 1950, the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, strongly defended the soundness of the French policy of transferring limited sovereignty to Vietnam, emphasising that immediate transfer of full sovereignty to Vietnam “would plunge the state into administrative and economic chaos.” He then urged the other Commonwealth governments to accord de facto but not de jure recognition to the Bao Dai regime. Sharing Bevin’s concerns about transferring full sovereignty to Vietnam, and arguing for recognition that the French presence in Indo-China, whatever its imperfections, was vital to the preservation of Western interests in Southeast Asia, Percy Spender, Minister for External Affairs, supported Bevin’s suggestion.

On 30 January, two days after the ratification of the Elysee Agreement by the French National Assembly, the Soviet Union unconditionally recognised the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), headed by Ho Chi Minh. In view of the unqualified Soviet recognition of the Viet Minh, the UK government decided not to qualify its own recognition of the three Associated States by the use of the word “de facto”. However, this still did not amount to de jure recognition.

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16 “Cablegram No. 285 from External Affairs to Australian High Commissioner’s Office, New Delhi, 9 September, 1949” in AA, A1838/2, 461/3/1/1.
17 “Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the Conference at Colombo, 12 January, 1950” in AA, A1838/1, 532/5/2/1. See also Peter Edwards with Gregory Pemberton, op. cit., pp. 82-83.
regime of the previous day, Spender announced Australia's recognition of the Bao Dai regime without any reservation, thereby showing Australia's willingness to share with the US and Britain the risks inherent in supporting the French puppet regime. In response to a French request for war material for use in Indo-China, in mid-June the United Kingdom also began to offer a limited quantity of equipment.

The outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June, 1950 strengthened American resolve to underwrite French efforts to suppress Ho Chi Minh and other rebel forces. There were three main reasons for this. One was America's growing need for the reactivation of West German armed forces and a consequent need for enlisting French support for the rearmament of the former enemy. Since September 1949, about three months after the Soviet explosion of the atomic bomb, the United States had been arguing the need to weld West Germany formally into the Western bloc and the need for a German military contribution to NATO. At the fifth session of the NATO Council during 15-26 September 1950, Secretary of State Acheson used the crisis of the Korean War as an opportunity to argue for the defence build-up of NATO by proposing the raising of West German ground forces to help to counter Soviet superiority in conventional military strength in Eastern Europe. However, with vivid memories of the past, the French were unwilling to see the creation of a new German national army. In order to make unpopular German rearmament acceptable to the French public, the French government wanted the development of a German army to be undertaken only as part of an international force through creating a European

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Defence Community (EDC) consisting of France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. On 24 October, 1950 the French Prime Minister, Rene Plevan, proposed that German rearmament should take place within the structure of a European army, into which national contingents would be integrated at the level of the smallest possible unit. The treaty establishing a supranational European army, which was signed by the foreign ministers of the component states of the EDC on 27 May 1952, envisaged a West German contribution to the European Army as being a 12 division (500,000-men) contingent.  

Although the French government had been the moving spirit behind the concept of a European army primarily in order to prevent Germany from having a national military force, it had nonetheless been increasingly seized by second thoughts about its brainchild. In consequence, the French had become the most doubtful factor in ratification of the treaty. The reason for the erosion in French support for EDC was a growing sense of self-doubt and continuing apprehension over Germany. The French had regarded their neighbour to the east as a perennial enemy since 1870, and many Frenchmen simply did not consider Russia to be a threat, preferring that Germany should be weak and helpless than strong enough to serve as an effective barrier to a possible Russian invasion. French obligations overseas also affected the chances for EDC's ratification. While the French Expeditionary Corps were fighting a distant war

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in Indo-China, and while France was committed to the defence of French North Africa
and had its troops deployed elsewhere throughout a vast empire, Germany's
prospective forces under EDC would be concentrated in Europe, not dissipated in
foreign lands. This circumstance, combined with growing German strength, raised the
possibility that West Germany would ultimately gain the ascendancy in a European
merged army.

The United States clearly understood that France could not increase its military and
financial efforts in Indo-China while at the same time participating in EDC, and that, as
long as France did more in Indo-China, it would have fewer resources on the European
Continent with which to counterbalance German forces. To facilitate a grand plan for
a European military build-up and to prevent France from diluting its NATO obligations
in Europe, the United States assumed an increasing share of the burden of the war in
Indo-China now borne by France. In 1951 America's economic and technical aid to
the Associated States totalled at least $21.8 million, and military aid at least $425.7
million. In 1952 economic and technical aid increased to $24.6 million, and military
aid $520 million. This constituted about 40 per cent of the total cost of the war to the
French.

22 For an account of the linkage of EDC with the French Indo-China War, see John R. Nordell Jr.,
Dien Bien Phu and Bermuda: Setting the Stage for the Military and Diplomatic Climax to the French
Indo-China war, 20 November-9 December 1953, Ph.D dissertation, Pennsylvania State University,
1988, pp. 64-73; Lawrence S. Kaplan, “The United States, NATO and French Indo-China” in
Lawrence S. Kaplan, Denise Artaud and Mark R. Rubin (eds.), op.cit., pp. 229-269; Richard H.
Immerman, “Prologue: Perceptions by the United States of its Interests in Indo-China” in Lawrence S.
Kaplan, Denise Artaud and Mark R. Rubin (eds.), op.cit., pp. 13-14; and Frederick W. Marks III,
3 (August 1990), pp. 297-322.

System that Worked, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1979, p. 46; and Anthony Eden, The
The Korean War, particularly the full-scale entry of Chinese forces into Korea at the end of 1950, affected significantly American perceptions of communism, and, in consequence, contributed to the definitive extension of containment principles to Southeast Asia. In early August 1950 John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State in charge of the Japanese peace treaty negotiations, had opposed shifting the emphasis of US Cold War strategy from the limited containment of Soviet Russia to that of world-wide communism. But in the face of massive Chinese counter-offensive against the UN forces in Korea on 25 November, he now admitted the need for dealing with Communist China and the USSR as monolithic and unified communism:

Developments in Asia confirm that there is a comprehensive program, in which the Soviet and Chinese Communists are co-operating, designed at a present phase to eliminate all Western influence on the Asian mainland and probably also in relation to Japan, France, the Philippines and Indonesia ... What has happened shows that our policies have been sound in so far as they have recognised the impossibility of separating the Chinese and Soviet Communists, at least for the predictable future. The mistake has been inadequate appraisal of the danger that resulted from the hostile alliance. Through underestimating the risks, we may have been sucked into a major military disaster in Korea.25

In this context, Ho Chi Minh was definitely perceived by the US as an instrument of a Soviet drive for domination directed and controlled by the Kremlin. Any lingering doubt in the minds of US leaders as to the real nature of the separate communist

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24 In a memorandum of 4 August 1950, which was submitted to Acheson on 7 August, Dulles stated: “I think we should consider whether, from the standpoint of Asian policy, we ought not now to stand on the proposition that we are defending the independent nationalism of the new Asiatic states, where Russia is seeking to destroy that independence, using Communism as the device. Our present policy of attacking communism and not attacking Russia seems to me to be doomed to failure.” See “Memorandum by Dulles to Acheson, 7 August, 1950” in FRUS, 1950, Vol. VI, pp. 128-130.
rebellions in Southeast Asia, and as to their possible link to a master-minding communist control centre in Moscow, which had still existed before the outbreak of the Korean War and even for a while after the war, vanished completely. Losing sight of the nationalist component of the Indo-Chinese revolution, the United States now came to focus exclusively on the communist component.

With Washington viewing communism as monolithic and Soviet, Chinese and Viet Minh actions as being simply different facets of one global force, the French military campaign against the Viet Minh on China's southern flank now came to be regarded as an effort to contain Communist China. In the subsequent months and years, the Truman administration was deeply preoccupied with the possibility of Chinese intervention in Indo-China. Explicitly defining the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the actual enemy of the US, NSC resolution 48/5, drawn up on 17 May 1951, referred to the possibility that "Communist China ... may increase its support to Ho Chi Minh to include the use of Chinese forces in Indo-China."\(^{26}\) With Korean armistice talks starting in early July, America's fear of possible Chinese intervention in the Indo-China war increased. In mid-December Acheson suggested to the NSC that the US should prepare a document setting out the possible courses of action both (a) to deter a Chinese invasion of Indo-China, and (b) to be taken in the event of the contingency of a Chinese invasion.\(^{27}\) In response, a document, entitled NSC 124, was drawn up by in mid-February 1952.\(^{28}\) After extensive discussions for about five months, it was adopted with some slight modification in the form of NSC 124/2 on 25 June. To deter

\(^{26}\) "NSC 48/5: Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary, James Lay, 17 May, 1951" in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, part 1, pp. 33-63.  
\(^{27}\) FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. XII, part 1, p. 45, footnote No. 3.  
a Chinese invasion of Indo-China, the document advocated a joint Allied warning to Communist China, and, in the event of a Chinese invasion, a naval blockade as well as interdiction of Chinese communication lines with naval and air forces. To enlist Allied nations' support for the proposals, the US military conferred with their counterparts in the UK, France, Australia, and New Zealand at the Five Power Ad Hoc Committee in early February and at a Five Power Military Conference on Southeast Asia in mid-October. However, the proposed US actions to be taken in the event of a Chinese invasion were strongly opposed by Britain, which feared provocation of the Chinese and the undermining of British interests in Hong Kong.

The Korean War greatly enhanced the role of the Southeast Asian region as an export/import market for Japan, since traditional Sino-Japanese trade was almost completely severed as a result of a trade embargo imposed by the US on Communist China with the aim of impairing the latter's potential for military activity. On 6 December, 1950 General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), directed the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry to issue an ordinance banning the export and import of strategic materials to China proper, Manchuria, North Korea, Hong Kong and Macao. The ordinance was to last for only one month, but on 26 December the Japanese Cabinet, on the

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30 "Memorandum by the US Member of the Five Power Ad Hoc Committee on Southeast Asia (Davies) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 February, 1952" in FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. XII, part 1, pp. 36-44; and "Report of the Five Power Military Conference on Southeast Asia, 17 October, 1952" in FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. XII, part 1, pp. 230-232.

31 Asahi Shimbun, 7 December, 1950; and Nippon Times, 7 December, 1950; and Current Notes on International Affairs, Vol. 21, p. 850.
recommendation of SCAP, decided to extend the restrictions for an indefinite period.\textsuperscript{32} The ban imposed by the Japanese government affected almost all commodities except textiles, sundry goods, bicycles, and canned food stuffs. The import of coking coal was promptly switched from Communist China to Canada, the US and Vietnam, as was the import of iron ore to Malaya and the Philippines.\textsuperscript{33} As a result of a UN General Assembly resolution adopted in mid-May 1951 for an embargo against North Korea and the PRC, the list of embargo items was greatly expanded. Japan was placed under trade controls at levels much tighter than those of the members of COCOM, an international organisation for exercising trade controls towards communist countries, which had been established in Paris at the end of 1949.\textsuperscript{34} Even after the recovery of Japanese independence in late April 1952, strict trade restrictions on Sino-Japanese trade were maintained and were eventually formalised in August 1952 when Japan joined COCOM and a subsidiary working group called the China Committee (CHINCOM).\textsuperscript{35} By the end of 1952 the volume of Japanese trade with China had plunged deeply, reaching its nadir in 1952, with China accounting for only 0.04 per cent of Japan's total exports and 0.7 per cent of Japan's total imports.\textsuperscript{36}

At the same time as the US government had been tightening its control over Sino-Japanese trade, it had been pressing ahead with a scheme to make the area of Southeast Asia as a substitute export/import market for Japan in place of mainland

\textsuperscript{32} "Memorandum by External Affairs: Steps Taken by Various Countries to Control Exports to China and Hong Kong, 19 January, 1951" in AA, A621/1, 789, part 1.
\textsuperscript{34} Resolution Adopted by General Assembly at its 330th Plenary Meeting on 18 May, 1951" in AA, A5954/1, 1697/3.
\textsuperscript{36} Yoko Yasuhara, "Japan, Communist China and Export Controls in Asia, 1948-52", op.cit., p. 85.
China. This scheme was promoted all in the name of Japan-US economic cooperation. The United States envisaged that Japan would function as a modest supplier of military goods to Southeast Asia through US military aid programmes and as a supplier of capital goods for the exploitation of raw materials in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, Southeast Asia would serve as an important producer of strategic raw materials for Japanese industrial remobilisation, alongside the US, Formosa, India and Portuguese Goa. The plan was formally broached by the US Defense Department to the State Department in mid-February 1951. During mid-April-early May, Major General W.F. Marquat, chief of SCAP's Economic and Scientific Section, went to the US, where he conferred with officials of the Truman administration and representatives of private US firms about a post-treaty American plan for the full-scale remobilisation of Japanese arms industries and for the procurement of raw materials for that purpose from Southeast Asia.

Upon his return to Tokyo on 10 May, Marquat publicised a US programme for Japan-US economic co-operation, urging the Japanese to develop their industries into a workshop for Southeast Asia:

The US is deeply concerned that Japan be accorded world markets and sources of raw materials supply on a non-discriminatory basis ... The US is deeply cognisant of the advantages entailed in including Japan in its emergency procurement program ... The United States believes that Japan's industrial potential may be utilised advantageously to a maximum extent to increase raw material production and industrial potential in Southeast Asia. An attractive opportunity exists for Japan to supply Southeast Asia and other areas with capital and consumer goods not now available from normal sources in countries engaged in

37 "Memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Burns) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews), 20 February, 1951" in FRUS, 1951, Vol. VI, part 1, pp. 887-888.
war production. To these ends, efforts should be exerted to enlist the support of the various US economic aid and technical missions in Southeast Asia to develop programs linked to overall US-Japan economic co-operation.\(^39\)

The Marquat statement obviously set the stage in which the future course of Japan's economic policies would be determined, and the impact of the statement was strongly felt. A significant move was made in the reamalgamation of subsidiary firms of the Zaibatsu, the pre-war large trading and industrial concerns, which had been ordered by the Occupation authorities to decentralise and to split into smaller firms. The Mitsubishi Trading Co., for example, which had been divided into as many as 160 smaller firms, was now merged into about 20 as of November 1951, and the Mitsubishi move in turn induced the merger of subsidiary firms of the other Zaibatsu, such as Mitsui, Fuji (Nakajima), Yasuda, Furukawa and Sumitomo.\(^40\) In order to help technological improvement in Japanese firms, major American firms entered into a series of long-term technical aid contracts, especially in the field of heavy industry and chemical industry. To cite an example, the Toyo Carrier Kogyo Co., which would in early June 1953 have a contract with the US government for export to Indo-China of 60 light bombers (Fletcher FD-25 type),\(^41\) was now bolstered technologically by Carrier Corp of the US, the world's then largest manufacturer of aircraft after the Lockheed Corporation.\(^42\)

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\(^{39}\) "Memorandum No. 422 from J.A. Forsythe for Head of Mission in Tokyo to Watt, 18 May, 1951" in AA, A1838/283, 479/1/4, part 2; and "Press Release by SCAP, 16 May, 1951" in AA, A1838/283, 479/1/4, part 2.


\(^{41}\) Financial Times, 3 June, 1953.

\(^{42}\) "Weekly Situation Report from the Australian Mission, Tokyo to External Affairs, 1 June, 1951" in AA, A1838/1, 3103/2/1/1, part 2.
Paralleling preparations for Japanese industrial remobilisation, a move was made to ensure the procurement of raw materials from Southeast Asia. During July 1951-January 1952, a large-scale composite mission of SCAP and Japanese government officials, headed by Kenneth Morrow, Special Assistant to the Economic and Scientific Section of SCAP, visited South and Southeast Asian countries in order to investigate the prospect of both exploiting raw materials in those nations through the investment of Japanese capital and increasing the flow of raw materials to Japan from those nations. As a result, a series of long-term comprehensive investment and procurement contracts were arranged.\footnote{43} In mid-March 1952 the US government did place a formal order with the Japanese government for the export of military equipment to Indo-China, amounting to $7 million.\footnote{44} With the coming into force of the peace treaty on 29 April and the consequent removal of the Far Eastern Commission directives prohibiting Japanese arms production under the Occupation regime, about half of 878

\footnote{43} The Morrow mission certainly played a vital role in creating a closer linkage between Japan and Southeast Asia. The countries which the mission visited included Malaya, the Philippines, Burma, Indonesia, India, Portuguese Goa, Thailand, in addition to Hong Kong and Formosa. The most hopeful signs appeared in Malaya and the Philippines. In Malaya, the mission obtained a pledge that the iron ore production of the Dangan mine would increase from 800,000 metric tons to 1,250,000 metric tons per annum. To increase the production, it was agreed that the installation of 64 miles of railway line, automatic loading facilities and some modern mining equipment would be needed at a cost of approximately $20 million, $5 million of which would come from the United States and $15 million from Japan. In the Philippines, the composite mission gave a promise of a loan of $1 million from funds of the ECA (Economic Cooperation Administration) of the US government to the Philippine Iron Mines Company to expand production of iron ore at Larap on Luzon, and of having one Japanese company furnish the necessary working capital for the increase of production. For the development of the iron ore mine at Surigao, which was believed to be the largest in Asia, Morrow also agreed that SCAP would interest Japanese companies in a tie-up between the projected Philippine corporation and Japanese companies. In Formosa, the Philippines and Burma, there was an agreement that development projects for coal mining, which would involve the co-operation of local mining companies and Japanese companies financed through American funds, would begin or be negotiated. In India, however, the mission realised that a great deal of development and rehabilitation had to be done before Japan could receive larger quantities of iron ore. See "Memorandum No. 13 from N.S. Currie, third secretary of the Australian Mission, Tokyo, to Watt, 5 January, 1952" in AA, CP529/1/1, 16/5/194; and "Departmental Despatch No. 5 from the Australian Mission, Tokyo to External Affairs, 1 February, 1952" in AA, CP529/1/1, 16/5/194.

former arsenals, initially designated as reparations by the Occupation authorities, were completely remobilised to manufacture arms.\textsuperscript{45}

Such was the importance of Southeast Asia as an export/import market for Japan that the American Chiefs of Staff expressed in a memorandum forwarded to Defense Secretary Charles Wilson on 28 July, 1952 the idea of a defence linkage between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the development of Japan’s military potential and her continuing Western orientation will be greatly influenced by the state of her economic well-being, and that this in turn will be significantly affected by Japan’s ability to retain access to her historic markets and the sources of food and raw materials in Southeast Asia. Viewed in this context, United States objectives with respect to Southeast Asia and United States objectives with respect to Japan would appear to be inseparably related.

Given their view of the importance of Japan’s dependence upon Southeast Asia for its economic survival and security, the JCS affirmed that “the loss of Southeast Asia to the [communist world] would almost inevitably force Japan into an eventual accommodation with the Communist-controlled areas in Asia,” thereby undermining the whole US strategic position in the Far East.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{45} Financial Times, 15 May, 1952; and “UK Economic Report on Japan No. 2, 3 May, 1952” in AA, A606/1, R/40/1/113. Of 878 former arsenals, 724 were privately-owned and 154 were government-owned. The control of these munitions plants was transferred to the Japanese government on 5 July, 1951. See “Memorandum from Jamieson to Watt, 5 March, 1952” in AA, A1838/278, 535/6/2, part 1. With the enforcement of the peace treaty, all privately-owned arsenals were released to the former owners of the Zaibatsu and other firms. Some of government-owned arsenals were retained for use in conjunction with the Japan-US Security Treaty, and the rest were sold to big private firms at a low price. The Yawata Iron and Steel Company, the largest steel manufacturer in Japan, for example, bought the premises and factory of the former public naval arsenal in Yamaguchi Prefecture and designated it as a second factory. See “UK Economic Report on Japan, No. 10, 10 November, 1953” in AA, A609/1, 532/107/12, part 1.

\textsuperscript{46} “Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, Harold Wilson, 28 July, 1952” in FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. XIV, part 2, pp. 1289-1290.
It was in this context of the increased importance of Southeast Asia for the United States as a result of the Korean war, and the consequent intensified American concern to suppress Ho Chi Minh’s and other rebel forces that Australia, as of early 1953, was determined to be involved in the Indo-Chinese war by providing economic and military assistance to the French. In early February Richard Casey, Minister for External Affairs, formally invited Jean Letourneau, French Minister in charge of relations with the Associated States, to come to Australia. A dominant factor influencing Casey’s invitation to Letourneau was his perception of a need to demonstrate Australia’s worth as a de facto ally of the United States in the ANZUS alliance; Casey had told Acheson at the first meeting of the ANZUS Council held in August 1952 that Australia was willing to help the French in Indo-China to encourage them to fight on. The Australian Minister was also affected by a sense of competition with New Zealand in the reaffirmation of loyalty to the cause of anti-communism; Australia’s sister nation had already in June 1952 provided a quantity of small arms and ammunition to the French.

47 “Record of Conversation with M. Roche, French Ambassador to Australia, by Watt, 9 February, 1953” in AA, A1838/278, 30/2/10/1/1, part 1. See also Peter Edwards with Gregory Pemberton, op.cit., p. 112.
48 “Note by Chairman of Joint Planning Committee of Discussions at First Meeting of ANZUS Council, 4-6 August, 1952” in AA, A816/45, 14/30/510; and “Minute for the first ANZUS Council Meeting, prepared by A.H. Tange, Undated” in AA, A1838/1, 532/13/2/1/4/1.
49 In December 1951 the New Zealand Cabinet decided that France should be offered, free of charge, 13,000 rifles, 600 machine guns of various types and nearly three quarter of a million rounds of small ammunition. This military equipment was largely of American origin, procured under Lend-Lease during World War II. After obtaining America’s concurrence in the re-transfer, a substantial portion of the arms was carried as far as Singapore on HMNZS “Bellona” during the course of its voyage to the United Kingdom in June 1952. See “Memorandum for Holland, 25 July, 1952” in NZA, EA1, 316/4/8/2, part 1. The military equipment finally arrived in Indo-China in September. On 15 September, 1952 New Zealand Minister for External Affairs Webb announced that, as a result of negotiations conducted through the New Zealand legation in Paris, a quantity of surplus arms and ammunition had been provided to the French authorities in Indo-China. See Herald (Melbourne), 16 September, 1953. The New Zealand government regarded the offer of the military equipment “as evidence of its recognition of the importance of Indo-China to the security of South East Asia and of the fact that France has long been carrying a heavy burden there in the fight against Communist activities.” See “Memorandum for Holland, 25 July, 1952” in NZA, EA1, 316/4/8/2, part 1.
Accepting Casey's invitation in mid-February, Letourneau paid an official visit to Australia during 9-15 March. Substantial talks were conducted between him, Casey and Philip McBride, Minister for Defence, in Melbourne on 9 March. It was agreed in those talks that Australia would provide economic aid of 250,000 Australian pounds for the 1953 fiscal year under the Colombo Plan to the Associated States, with which motor trucks, livestock, rolling stock and other items could be made available quickly. The French Minister and McBride also concurred that a French technical military mission should be sent from Indo-China to Australia to assess the military equipment that Australia could offer. In the course of the discussion, McBride also suggested that the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) should train five pilots and one navigator each year from the Vietnamese Air Force, but Letourneau did not respond favourably because of language difficulties. In subsequent days, in an attempt to show to the world and to the French and Australian public the value of the French Minister's visit, Casey and the Department of External Affairs arranged for Letourneau to meet with Prime Minister Menzies, the Ministers of Air and Navy, to sit in Parliament as a distinguished visitor, to attend a Cabinet dinner and to speak to the Joint Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament. Significantly, in a joint communiqué issued on 11 March, Australia indicated explicit recognition that "the efforts of the French forces and the forces of the Associated States against communist insurrection

50 "Cablegram No. 22 from Quinn to Watt, 13 February, 1953" in AA, A1838/278, 30/2/10/10/1, part 1.
51 "Notes of Meeting with Letourneau, 9 March, 1953" in AA, A816/1, 19/311/200. See also Peter Edwards with Gregory Pemberton, op. cit., p. 113.
52 "Memorandum No. 95 from D.O. Hay to Australian Minister, Saigon, 7 April, 1953" in AA, A4529/2, 50/1/1/1/153.
53 Peter Edwards with Gregory Pemberton, op. cit., p. 113.
in this region were an essential contribution to the common security of the free world."  

In accordance with the agreement reached during Letourneau's visit, between 18 May and 18 June a French technical military mission comprising three officers stayed in Australia. Before this visit, the government departments concerned in Australia, at the initiative of McBride, had discussed the details of military goods to be supplied to the French, having concluded that Australia could make its best contribution to the French war effort by offering about 300 obsolescent Mustang, Mosquito and Oxford aircraft.  

However, the investigation by the French officers of the availability of the military equipment to be supplied by Australia revealed that Australia could give only token military assistance to the French war effort in Indo-China. Since a large part of the French and Vietnamese military equipment was of United States origin and Australia's military equipment was not yet standardised with American designs, the French did not show any interest in the proffered list of military items, which were of British origin. The only available military equipment of interest to the French were guns, explosives, radios, transport equipment of US origin procured under Lend-Lease during World War II and clothing. Thus even in 1953, Australia was only of limited value as an alliance partner of the US.

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56 “Cablegram No. 49 from External Affairs to Australian Embassy, Paris, 1 June, 1953” in AA, A4534/1, 16/8/1; and “Memorandum from E.W. Hicks, Secretary of the Department of Air to F.G. Shedden, 3 June, 1953” in AA, A5954/1, 2295/4. See also Peter Edwards with Gregory Pemberton, op.cit., pp. 115-116. The Menzies government’s decision to give military equipment to France for use in Indo-China was generally approved by the public in Australia. In an Australian Gallup Poll conducted in April-May 1953, 48% favoured giving the French military aid, with 29% opposing and 23% non-committal. See Australian Gallup Poll, April/May, 1953.
After completing his visit to Australia, Letourneau accompanied the French Prime Minister, Rene Mayer, to the United States at the end of March, where Dwight Eisenhower had been installed in power in January 1953 with John Foster Dulles as the Secretary of State. The Eisenhower administration inherited the Truman administration's policy of forcibly suppressing Indo-Chinese insurgent forces in terms of the US need to bolster the French as an alliance partner in NATO, to contain Communist China and to ensure Southeast Asia as an export/import market for Japan. Moreover, having exploited the alleged "loss" of China by the Democrats in the election campaign in 1952, Eisenhower and Dulles acknowledged that the US, for domestic political reasons, could ill afford to "lose" additional territory to communism.

But, in spite of the Eisenhower administration's determination to search for a military solution to the Indo-China war, the military balance on the Indo-China battlefield was quite unfavourable for the French. During 1951-52 French troops in Viet Nam had found themselves more and more on the defensive and obliged to yield control over increasing amounts of territory to the Viet Minh. By the spring of 1953 the Viet Minh had extended their authority over more than two-thirds of the area of Tonkin. In the central and southern areas, they held most of the coastal regions all the way down to the outskirts of Saigon, and about half of the Mekong Delta was firmly in their hands. To procure military goods from Free Thai resistance forces, the Viet Minh also, in collaboration with Khmer Issarak forces, took control over much of the Cambodian coast in the Gulf of Siam. Free Thai resistance forces had been organised in 1943 with the connivance of British and American secret services and had stockpiled

tons of weapons supplied by Allied forces during the Second World War. However, from the end of 1949 the Thailand government, headed by Field Marshall Pibun Songkhram, launched a crackdown on Free Thai resistance forces. As a result, the supply of military items from Thailand to the Viet Minh had stopped by the end of 1952. In order to have substantial access to Chinese supplies through Laos, in early 1953 Ho Chi Minh’s forces invaded to the country, expanding their operations dramatically. Accompanied by Lao People’s Liberation Army personnel, estimated to number about three hundred or less, the Viet Minh virtually overran some provinces of northern and central Laos, such as Phong Saly, Luang Prabang, Xieng Khouang and Sam Neua. On 19 April the Pathet Lao “resistance government” was formally established in Sam Neua by Prince Souvannouvong under the close supervision of the Viet Minh.  

The Eisenhower administration was also quite unhappy with French policy in Indochina. The Bao Dai government was unable to mobilise national sentiment sufficient to compete with the Viet Minh; French-sponsored Vietnamese independence and the Vietnamese National Army had not gained headway as the US desired. During 1951-52 the French had certainly transferred some administrative responsibilities, including postal services, customs services, agricultural services and railways and the iron and steel industry to the Vietnamese, and, as a result, the number of French administrative officers had declined from 7,000 to 1,400 in 1952 in 1947, but they still retained responsibilities for foreign affairs, defence, finance and other special privileges.  

Vietnamese National Army, which had been established on 4-5 November, 1950 with a
target strength of 115,000 by the end of 1951, had barely reached a theoretical total of
38,000 by 1951. The figure of 115,000 was reached in 1953, but the Army was
plagued by desertion and a shortage of officers because of the lack of a good cause for
fighting. In the case of Laos and Cambodia, while the French conferred considerable
political autonomy under constitutional monarchies, they still maintained military
control without making any attempt to form national armies. Furthermore, the Laotian
and Cambodian economies were in the hands of the French, the Chinese and the
Vietnamese, and most of the administrative officers in those states were Vietnamese.  

In their meeting with Letourneau and Mayer held on 26 March, Eisenhower and
Dulles did not mention any French policy in Laos and Cambodia. However, they
complained that the French were not making adequate progress in developing
the national army of Vietnam and not undertaking offensive military operations. As
a result of the US complaint, a military plan was presented to US military officials by
Letourneau. This promised new French efforts to foster indigenous resistance to
communism and to mount an offensive against the Viet Minh, aiming at victory by the
spring of 1955. In early July the Mayer government was replaced by a government
headed by Joseph Laniel. To enhance Vietnamese morale in the war effort, and to
elicit further American assistance, Laniel promised to "perfect" the independence of the
Associate States by turning over responsibilities exercised by France. Shortly after,
General Henry Navarre, who had been appointed as military commander in Indo-China

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60 Ibid., pp. 92-95; and Ellen J. Hammer, The Struggle for Indo-China, 1940-1955. Stanford: Stanford
61 "Telegram from Dulles to the Embassy in France, 27 March, 1953" in FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. VIII,
part 1, pp. 432-434.
in May, presented for American approval a strategic concept based upon the
Létourneau plan. The so-called Navarre Plan called for a vast augmentation of the
Vietnamese National Army with the raising of another 100,000 troops and the
establishment of a new training programme, along with the commitment to Indo-China
of an additional nine battalions of French regulars. Navarre proposed to withdraw his
scattered forces from their isolated garrisons, combine them with the new forces
available to him and initiate a major offensive to drive the Viet Minh from their
stronghold in the Red River Delta. While the US government was very sceptical of
the feasibility of the Navarre Plan, it nonetheless respected the Laniel government as
the last French government committed to a military solution to the Indo-Chinese
conflict. After extracting a formal French promise to pursue the Navarre Plan with
determination, the US agreed in September to provide the French with an additional
$385 million in military assistance.

The Navarre Plan was presented to Australia and New Zealand at the time of the
second ANZUS Council meeting held in Washington on 9-10 September 1953.
Although, like Dulles, Casey had some doubts about the feasibility of the French plan,
he was nonetheless encouraged by a statement made by Dulles that, "should the Indo-

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62 For an account of the Navarre Plan, see George McT. Kahin, Intervention, pp. 44-45; George C.
Herring, America's Longest War, pp. 25-27; William C. Gibbons, op. cit., pp. 121-149; George C.
Herring, "Franco-American Conflict in Indo-China, 1950-54" in Lawrence S. Kaplan, Denise Artaud
and Mark R. Rubin (eds.), Dien Bien Phu and the Crisis of Franco-American Relations, 1954-55,
Robert Buzzanco, "Prologue to Tragedy: US Military Opposition to Intervention in Vietnam, 1950-
23; Dean Acheson, op. cit., p. 677; George C. Herring and Richard H. Immerman, "Eisenhower,
Dulles and Dien Bien Phu: The Day We Didn't Go to War; Revisited", Journal of American History,
Vol. 71, No. 2 (September 1984), pp. 344-345; and James Cable, The Geneva Conference of 1954 on
63 "Memorandum of Discussion of the 161st Meeting of the National Security Council, 9 September,
China situation show signs of further deterioration, the Americans were ready to concern themselves more intimately with it.” At the Council meeting, Casey also pressed for Australia’s intimate cooperation with the Pentagon in relation to logistical planning; the French technical military mission’s visit to Australia had strongly impressed on the Departments of External Affairs and Defence the need to standardise Australia’s military equipment with that of America. The revelation of Australia’s limited value as an effective contributor to the US policy of containing communism in Southeast Asia had also made External Affairs and Defence even more anxious that Australia should have a substantial weight in the balance of power in the Pacific. As a means of repositioning Australia from the periphery of US strategy in the Pacific to the centre, External Affairs and Defence officers now planned for the development of Australia as a principal workshop in the Southwest Pacific from which to provide military goods to Southeast Asia and other Far Eastern states through US military aid programmes. To that end, they desired Australia’s entry into the Far Eastern military goods procurement programmes of the Mutual Security Agency of the US government, which was called the “offshore procurement” programmes.

In his discussions at the second ANZUS Council with Dulles and Admiral Arthur Radford, who had been promoted in May 1953 from the Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific (CINCPAC) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Casey explained that France was reluctant to accept military assistance from Australia, because Australia’s military equipment did not conform to US standards. The Minister emphasised that Australia’s military equipment needed to be standardised with American designs. In

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64 “Memorandum from Shedden to the Department of Defence Production, 27 August, 1953, AA, AS954/24, 1421/5.”
reply, Radford stated that the question of standardisation was "a matter for
government to government discussion," and that the Australian government, with the
approval of Cabinet, should formally make a proposal to the US government. Casey in
turn drew America’s attention to the problem of the effective use of the production
capacity of Australia in the field of defence supplies for the free world. He advanced
the opinion that, should large-scale American financial and technical aid be available to
Australian defence industries, the country could become a supplementary source of
production and supply of military goods to the US for the prosecution of the Cold War
in Asia:

Australia had an office comparable to the US Office of Defense
Mobilization, although not so highly developed ... Australia's capacity
to produce military items exceeded the power to finance them.
Moreover, it could produce quantities in excess of its own military
use.\(^{65}\)

Casey repeatedly stressed that "Australia had excess munitions manufacturing capacity
in certain stated categories which we could not at present financially develop." The
Minister for External Affairs went on to request that Australia should be incorporated
into the offshore procurement programmes so that it could serve as a rival Allied
logistic base to Japan. To this, Radford answered that the question of developing
Australia as a Far Eastern military factory would depend upon the degree of
standardisation of Australia’s military equipment with American designs, and that, after
standardisation, Defense Mobilization Office in the US might be interested in having
some “particulars” on Australia’s industrial and manufacturing capacity.\(^{66}\)

\(^{65}\) "Confidential Cablegram No. 965 from Casey to Menzies, 10 September, 1953" in AA, A5954/19,
1425/4; “Telegram No. 983 from Casey to Menizes, 14 September, 1953” in AA, A5461/1, 1/4/2A,
part 3; and “United States Minutes of the Second Meeting of the ANZUS Council” in FRUS, 1952-54,
Vol. XII, part 1, pp. 344-351.

\(^{66}\) Ibid. For an account of the later Australian quest for standardisation of military items with
American designs and for the development of Australia as an Allied logistic base, which was
During October-November 1953, French military officers in Indo-China were greatly concerned that more than half of Laos would be controlled by Laotian resistance forces with the support of the Viet Minh. In order to prevent that from occurring, they saw a need to block efforts by the Viet Minh to invade Laos. On 20 November Navarre implemented his hastily improvised airborne attack plan, called "Operation Castor". On that day six battalions of French and Vietnamese paratroopers dropped at Dien Bien Phu, and occupied the village. Dien Bien Phu was located 187
miles west of Hanoi and 8 miles from the Laotian border and provided the centre of a fertile opium growing district to the Viet Minh. Subsequently, Navarre was determined to force battle with the Viet Minh in the northwest of Vietnam by using Dien Bien Phu as an offensive base. He directed his troops to construct a garrison ringed with barbed wire and bunkers in a broad valley surrounded by hills as high as one thousand feet, and dispatched another twelve battalions of regulars supported by aircraft and artillery. The Viet Minh Commander, Vo Nguyen Giap, was determined to keep the French from reoccupying the north-western region. Recognising that the French were in a trap, he issued an order to his troops on 6 December to lay siege to the French fortress.

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However, in spite of General Navarre's success in launching "Operation Castor," war-weariness among the French public over the long drawn out and costly Far Eastern war, and the consequent Opposition parties' demand in the French Parliament for a peaceful solution to the fighting had increased greatly by the end of 1953. While, in a French Gallup Poll conducted in 1948, 52 per cent of the French public had wanted to carry on the war in Indo-China until it was won, in May 1953 only 15 per cent of the public hoped for continuation of the fighting. In the French National Assembly, especially after the signing of the Korean War armistice on 27 July 1953, not only the communists, who occupied one-sixth of the Assembly, but also Radicals


and Socialists strongly wondered whether it would be possible to create real, lasting peace in the Far East when there was war in other parts of Asia. Pressure was applied to the Laniel government to open direct negotiations with Ho Chi Minh as the sole way out of the impasse in Indo-China.\(^6^9\)

Under mounting pressure at home to extricate France from the seven-year-old war, the French government was forced to explore an opportunity to make a public gesture for a negotiated settlement. The opportunity came at the Berlin Conference held between 25 January and 18 February 1954, when the foreign ministers of the US, the UK, and France met with the Soviet foreign minister for the first time in five years. At the conference, Soviet foreign minister Molotov proposed a five-power conference, including Communist China, to discuss the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China. Anxious to bring back a substantive sign of the government's interest in ending the war, the French foreign minister, Georges Bidault, saw the Soviet proposal as a promising diplomatic opening, persistently urging Dulles to accept the idea of a five power conference on Indo-China.

The Soviet proposal and the French pressure distressed Dulles, because, in the light of the unfavourable military balance for the French in the Indo-China war, he did not think it opportune to seek a diplomatic solution to the conflict. The military balance on the Indo-China battlefield in early 1954 was as follows: about 80 per cent of Viet Nam was virtually under the control of the Viet Minh; about 70 per cent of Laos was controlled by Pathet Lao resistance forces in collaboration with the Viet Minh; and

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about 20 per cent of Cambodia was controlled by Khmer Issarak resistance forces again with Viet Minh support. For domestic political reasons, the American Secretary of State also "did not want the status of China to be equated with the Big Four" in consequence of the adoption of a five power conference formula. But fearful that the French Parliament might endanger the ratification of EDC if the US blocked French willingness for a negotiated settlement, Dulles finally agreed to place Indo-China on the agenda at talks in Geneva. In return for the American agreement, the UK, Soviet and French foreign ministers accepted America's insistence on wide participation concerning the conference membership. The participants would consist of "other interested states" besides the Big Four and China. In the course of the Berlin Conference, however, no definition of "other interested states" was made.

In the formulation of its approach to the forthcoming Geneva Conference, the United States did not alter its former determination to seek a military solution to the

Indo-China war. The Eisenhower administration's position on Indo-China had been embodied in NSC 5405, approved by the President on 16 January. Still confident in the will of the French Union forces to continue the fighting in Indo-China and in the development of indigenous resistance to communism by the promotion of independence for the Associated States, the US, in the document, urged the continuation of the French war effort in Indo-China with all possible available means.72

After the Berlin Conference, this position was reconfirmed by the US government as its approach to the Geneva Conference. On 26 February a staff member of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS), Edmund A. Gullion, submitted an extensive memorandum to the Director of the PPS, Robert R. Bowie. In it, Gullion reviewed, as a means of ending the Indo-China war, the formulae for the partition of Indo-China and the creation of coalition governments. But he declared that both these formulae were unacceptable to the US, because the partition "would be considered as the ultimate sell-out by most Vietnamese" and the coalition would, given the enormous prestige of Ho Chi Minh, "promptly lead to consolidation of all of Vietnam under the communists, with the subversion of all of Southeast Asia to follow thereafter." Gullion suggested that the US "should try to persuade the French that the war should go on, using whatever inducements we can," including , in the last resort, the use of US forces.73

The American military also did not question the State Department's assumption that a negotiated settlement would undermine American interests. Defense Secretary Wilson argued to Dulles that the partition or coalition formula as a means of ending the

fighting in Indo-China "would, in all probability, lead to the loss of Indo-China to the Communists and deal a damaging blow to the national will of other countries of the Far East to oppose Communism." Wilson suggested that the US position on the Geneva Conference should be the "continuance of the fighting with the objective of seeking a military victory."74

The American approach to the Geneva Conference was completely different from the one adopted by Britain. No longer confident in the French will to continue the war effort or in the prospect of fostering indigenous Vietnamese resistance to communism, Britain saw the Geneva Conference as a great opportunity to terminate the fighting in Indo-China. Prior to the Berlin Conference, the British Foreign Office had taken the position that the UK should sustain the French government in its policy of refusing to negotiate on an Indo-China settlement.75

However, the outcome of the Berlin Conference caused London to change its position. A briefing paper, formulated in the UK Foreign Office at the end of March to be used as guidance by the British delegation at the Geneva Conference, expressed strong doubt about French intentions and capabilities to continue the fighting in Indo-China: "[T]he will to press on to a military victory has quite disappeared in France ... militarily- the initiative remains with the Vietminh."76 The paper also affirmed that, politically, the conditions necessary to inspire all-out popular support for the national struggle had not yet been created and would not be created in Vietnam. Given their perception of the lack of French will to continue the fighting and of the low prospect

75 James Cable, op.cit., pp. 41-42.
76 Ibid., p. 44.
of the development of indigenous fighting capability, the British Foreign Office did not think that the provision of any American inducement to sustain the French war effort, which might include, in the last resort, the employment of US forces, would have any effect. Believing that any further continued fighting would tip the military balance further in favour of the Viet Minh and other resistance forces, and concerned about the consequences for British interests in Malaya of a fall of the whole of Indo-China to the communists, Britain saw its interests lying in the earliest possible termination of the war by means of a diplomatic solution. Examining a number of formulae for ending the war, the UK Foreign Office favoured the partition of Vietnam, although they took the position that the partition would not apply to Laos and Cambodia.77

In the formulation of its approach to the Geneva Conference, the French government did not adopt a peaceful solution to the fighting as an official position. While recognising that they could not afford to appear unreceptive to any possibility of the ending of the war in view of public and parliamentary pressure, Laniel and Bidault did not regard the Geneva Conference as offering an opportunity for the complete or substantial termination of the fighting. Unwilling to make a settlement based on recognition of present communist gains on the battlefield, the Laniel government took the position that it would still seek a military solution to the Indo-China conflict until a more favourable military balance could be created. The most that the French ministers hoped to gain from the Geneva Conference was the possibility of inducing Communist China to renounce all assistance to the Viet Minh in return for American concessions in the form of the recognition of Communist China, the admission of the People's

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Republic to the UN, and the lifting of the trade embargo against that country. As a quid pro quo for US concessions, the French had in mind an undertaking of speedy acceptance of EDC. From understandable motives of national pride, the French tended to exaggerate both Chinese responsibility for the insurrection in Indo-China and the dependence of the Viet Minh on Chinese military assistance. In consequence, they still underestimated the separate fighting capability of the Viet Minh and were reluctant to deal with Ho Chi Minh as an equal negotiating partner at Geneva.8

The final report on the Berlin Conference on the problem of Indo-China had been cabled to Canberra from the Australian mission in Berlin on 18 February.79 In the course of the conference, Australia, like the United States, had considered that, in the light of the unfavourable military balance for the French in Indo-China, it would not be all timely to seek a negotiated settlement, and that it would be in Australia’s interests to pursue the armed struggle.80 Therefore, the Great Powers agreement on exploring a diplomatic solution to the Indo-China conflict at Geneva came as something of a surprise to the Australian government.81

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81 “Memorandum from John Rowland to Tange, 2 March, 1954” in AA, A1838/T184, 3004/13/3, part 1.
After the Berlin Conference, the Menzies government acknowledged that it had to refrain from forming an official Australian position on the Indo-China problem in view of the forthcoming general election, and that it could not commit the future government to a long-term policy for Indo-China. Nevertheless, the Departments of External Affairs and Defence were far from indifferent to a situation which they believed would greatly influence Australia’s security environment, and proceeded to formulate tentative positions on the Geneva Conference. On 2 March John Rowland of the Southeast Asia Section of the Pacific Division wrote to Arthur Tange, who had replaced Alan Watt as the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs in March 1954. Expressing confidence in the growth of Vietnamese resistance to communist expansion, and in the subsequent emergence of a more favourable military situation, Rowland advised the Secretary that Australia should not seek a peaceful solution to the Indo-China conflict. In view of the unfavourable military balance at the present time for the West, Rowland stated, "[w]hatever may emerge from the negotiations, ... it seems logical to suggest that the Western position in Indo-China will be weakened" as a result of political or territorial concessions by the French to the Viet Minh.82

Australian military officers also considered that Australian national interests would be best served by the continuation of the fighting in Indo-China. Examining the partition of Vietnam and of the whole of Indo-China as a means of ending the war, they spurned the partition concept on the ground that "the will to resist Communism in South East Asia would be seriously undermined and the indigenous communists would ... become increasingly active, particularly in Malaya." Having faith in the future

82 Ibid.
establishment of military superiority by the French through turning the Vietnamese National Army into "an effective fighting machine," the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and the Joint Planning Committee (JPC) expressed the view that cessation of the hostilities in Indo-China at this stage ... would certainly be against the interest of the Western Powers. Conversely, it is in the interests of the Western Powers that military action be continued until such time as the Associated States are capable of defending themselves against Communism.83

The views expressed by the Departments of External Affairs and Defence on Australia's approach to the Geneva Conference was finally embodied in early April in a tentative position paper. The position paper, submitted for Casey, stated that “a cease-fire now on any conditions acceptable to the Vietminh would pave the way to the loss of Vietnam, and ultimately of Indo-China, to Communism.” “The best course” for Australia to take, the paper declared, “would be to induce the French Government to fight on, and strengthen it to resist communist proposals for a settlement which would risk the loss of Indo-China.”84

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In the meantime, the decision of the Berlin Conference to call a conference in Geneva for late April 1954 on the issue of Indo-China had prompted the Viet Minh to mount a major offensive against the French Union forces at Dien Bien Phu. In early March the Viet Minh combatant strength at Dien Bien Phu reached 49,500 men, with

31,500 logistical support personnel and another 23,000 communist support troops and personnel strung out along the communication lines. On the French side, there were a total of 13,200 men in the valley, of whom about 6,600 to 7,000 could be counted on as front-line combatants. Possessing numerical superiority in man-power, and having substantial access to Chinese supplies through Laos, the Viet Minh launched an all-out attack at Dien Bien Phu at 17:15 p.m., local time on 13 March. Within twenty-four hours, they had seized hills such as Gabrielle and Beatrice, the outposts established by France to protect the fortress in the valley below. The heavy Viet Minh guns quickly made resupply impossible except by parachute drop.

In the face of an intense Viet Minh offensive at Dien Bien Phu, the Eisenhower administration was greatly concerned that the fall of the French fortress to the Viet Minh would soon be followed by the erosion of French and Vietnamese will to continue the struggle in Indo-China. Fears were also entertained that, as a result of a defeat at Dien Bien Phu, public and parliamentary pressure in France would be hardened to a point where the Laniel government would be forced to accept a compromise settlement at the forthcoming Geneva talks which would largely rest on recognition of present communist gains in the Indo-China war. As a means of shoring up French and Vietnamese determination to wage the war in Indo-China, and of making it certain that the French would not enter the Geneva Conference in the shadow of a defeat, and would not thus accept a settlement which would leave the communists in a dominant position in Indo-China, there surfaced in policy-planning within the US government a proposal for direct military intervention in the Indo-China

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85 Bernard Fall, op.cit., pp. 133-134.
war. However, before establishing a US position, there arose some divergences of views between Admiral Radford and Dulles about the form and the timing of direct American military intervention.

On 20 March General Paul Ely, Chairman of the French Chiefs of Staff, arrived in Washington at the invitation of Admiral Radford. Conferring on the same day with Radford, who was accompanied by some officers of State and Defense Departments and Vice President Richard Nixon, Ely warned his US counterpart that "the current assault on Dien Bien Phu by the Viet Minh was ... designed to afford the Communists a position of strength from which to negotiate at Geneva," and that "a major defeat" of the French at Dien Bien Phu "would have serious adverse effects" upon the morale and determination of the French to continue the struggle. As a result of this meeting, Radford was strongly worried that a defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu would immediately be followed by a collapse of Franco-Vietnamese resistance to communism. He also feared that defeat at Dien Bien Phu would eventually lead to the loss of all of Southeast Asia.

In conveying these fears to Eisenhower on 24 March, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged immediate and unilateral American military intervention to save Dien Bien Phu. The "US must be prepared," he advised, "to act promptly and in force possibly to a frantic and belated request by the French for US intervention." Meeting with Ely again on the next day, Radford informally suggested the concept of a night-

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86 "Memorandum by Captain G.W. Anderson, USN Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford), 21 March, 1954" in FRUS, 1952-54, Vol.XIII, part 1, pp. 1137-1140.
time raid against the perimeter of Dien Bien Phu by the US Air Force and Navy. The plan, conceived by joint American and French military officers in Vietnam and code-named Operation Vulture, called for about 60 B-29 heavy bombers to take off from Clark air base near Manila under escort of 150 fighters of the Seventh Fleet, conduct one or several raids around the garrison and eliminate Viet Minh troops, communications and artillery installations.\(^8\)

Dulles was very critical of Radford's proposal for immediate and unilateral US military intervention in Indo-China. Given the imperfect implementation of the French provision for independence to the Associated States, Dulles recognised that the US Congress would not permit the administration to take action which would substantially substitute the US for French colonialism in Indo-China. Anxious about the drain on US resources, he was also reluctant to have a heavy burden placed entirely upon the United States alone, and keen to associate America's striking power with the conventional forces of US allies. Regarding US Congressional approval and the support of US allies for US military intervention as essential requirements, Dulles did not place so much emphasis on reversing the tide of battle at Dien Bien Phu as Radford did. Dulles' concept of multilateral military intervention with Congressional approval, which was later called "united action," was basically to meet the contingencies of a sudden French military collapse or a breakdown of the Geneva Conference and the subsequent continuation of the war. At the same time, it was intended to demonstrate the political solidarity of the Western powers to strengthen France's bargaining position at Geneva. For the implementation of multilateral military intervention, Dulles

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schemed to set up an ad hoc coalition composed of the US, the UK, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Associated States, Thailand and the Philippines.89

When Dulles met with other members of the NSC on 25 March, he strongly opposed Radford's proposed immediate and unilateral American military intervention for the relief of Dien Bien Phu. The Secretary of State argued that he "did not believe that there was any need for the Council to proceed on the assumption of an immediate French military withdrawal." While suggesting the possibility of taking action under the UN, the Secretary of State nonetheless pointed out the difficulty in mobilising Asian nations at the UN for the defence of French colonialism. French opposition to the internationalisation of the war for fear of the possible effects upon its African colonies also posed problems. Dulles then suggested the desirability of basing US armed intervention in Indo-China upon the support of US allies through the formation of an ad hoc alliance. While remaining neutral as between Dulles and Radford, Eisenhower saw the desirability of America's military intervention being placed on a collective basis. The overwhelming tide of opinion in the NSC meeting inclined towards the concept of multilateral military intervention with Congressional support.90

But Radford was not at all impressed with the proceedings of the NSC meeting. Attending a joint meeting of State and Defense Department officials the next day, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs emphasised that "the US ... must be prepared to act promptly and in force to a last-minute French request for help," and added that, "if the

French waited too long before asking for help, there would probably be not so much we could do.\(^{91}\)

In order to counter Radford’s persistent insistence upon immediate and unilateral US intervention, and to deter a further Viet Minh offensive at Dien Bien Phu, Dulles publicised the concept of "united action." In an address before the Overseas Press Club in New York on 29 March, Dulles said:

Under the conditions of today, the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and the Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole free Community. The United States feels that this possibility should not be passively accepted but should be met by united action. This might involve serious risks. But these risks are far less than those that will face us a few years from now if we dare not be resolute today.\(^{92}\)

Regardless of Dulles’ "united action" speech, the French position at Dien Bien Phu deteriorated rapidly during the closing days of March, with General Giap’s forces assaulting the main bastions of the fortress, reducing the French stronghold to a triangle with sides of about 2,500 yards and capturing the northern side of the airfield. So strong was Radford’s conviction that the time to act quickly had arrived that on 31 March he convened a special emergency meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs, however, did not see the necessity for any immediate offer of assistance by US naval and air forces to Indo-China; they did not believe that the outcome of the Dien Bien Phu operation would decisively affect the military balance in the Indo-China

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The objection raised by the Service Chiefs was decisive in stalling the concept of immediate and unilateral American military intervention. At a NSC meeting held on 1 April, Eisenhower suggested that, in the light of the Service Chiefs' opposition, he would like the subject of immediate intervention dropped for the moment. Radford finally agreed in his meeting with Eisenhower, Dulles and Wilson the following day that he would no longer insist on immediate US armed intervention; he thought that the outcome at Dien Bien Phu "would be determined within a matter of hours," and that "the situation was not one which called for any US participation."

At a meeting with eight Congressional leaders on 3 April, State and Defense officials sought their views on the concept of military intervention, and Congressional leaders answered by stressing that the US should by all means act in concert with its allies, particularly Britain, after the transfer of full sovereignty to the Associated States. The next day, when Eisenhower conferred with Dulles and Radford at the White House, the President stipulated that America's intervention in Indo-China would be contingent upon two preconditions: namely, the implementation by the French of full and complete independence for the Associated States; and the agreement of US allies. Thus the idea of immediate and unilateral US intervention to retrieve the


military situation at Dien Bien Phu was completely renounced, and America's military action was now to be placed on a joint basis.

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The American proposal for military intervention in Indo-China sharply exposed the fundamental differences in American and British approaches to the Geneva Conference. Britain had been briefed on the US proposal on 2 April at a meeting held between Dulles and Roger Makins, British Ambassador to Washington. Referring to the danger of "a French collapse" in the Indo-China war and "of [the] French accepting a settlement at Geneva which would be disastrous to the free world," Dulles told Makins that he wanted to seek UK support for the creation of an ad hoc coalition for joint military intervention as a means of sustaining French and Vietnamese determination to continue the fighting. To this, Makins stated that the British government regarded "the deterioration of the situation in Indo-China in more pessimistic terms" than the US government. Illustrating UK support for a peaceful solution to the Indo-China conflict, he argued that the British believed that "partition was the least undesirable" formula as a means of ending the war.98

In response, Eisenhower wrote to Churchill on 4 April, declaring that the US government had no intention whatever of searching for a peaceful solution: "[O]ur painstaking search for a way out of the impasse has reluctantly forced us to the conclusion that there is no negotiated solution to the Indo-China problem ..."

Expressing the view that the urgent matter facing the US and UK was to stiffen the French and Vietnamese resolve to continue the fighting, the US President urged Churchill to fall in with the American plan for the creation of an ad hoc coalition, and suggested that Dulles might fly to London within a few days to discuss his proposal.99 By sending a personal memorandum to Eden two days later, Dulles also tried to urge the British to change their position in relation to the Geneva talks. The US government, he stressed, could not in any way "agree to any arrangement which [would] directly or indirectly result in the turnover of the area to Communist control."100

On 11 April, accompanied by some State Department officials, Dulles arrived in London, and held talks with Eden. The Secretary of State urged his British counterpart both to rethink the British position in relation to the Geneva Conference and to commit the British to the formation of an ad hoc coalition. If "some new element were not injected into the situation," he argued, "[the] French might be disposed at Geneva to seek an agreement which would have the effect of turning Indo-China over to the Communists." Dulles also warned that "the political and psychological effects [of the loss of Dien Bien Phu] would lead to a situation where the will of France and the Associate States to continue the struggle no longer existed." But Eden was not impressed with Dulles' arguments. Arguing against seeking a military solution to the Indo-China conflict, he opposed the formation of an ad hoc coalition for multilateral military intervention by expressing his concern about the

100 "Memorandum by Aldrich to Eden, 6 April, 1954" in FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. XVI, pp. 496-497. Dulles' memorandum is included in this memorandum.
possible risk of direct Chinese intervention and the invocation of the Sino-Soviet mutual defence treaty of February 1950. Eden went on to argue that a collective security pact in Southeast Asia should be established after the Geneva Conference "either to support a settlement or, in the event of the failure of the conference, to prevent further deterioration of the military situation in Indo-China."\footnote{101}{"Memorandum of Conversation by MacArthur, 11 April, 1954" in FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. XIII, part 1, pp. 1307-1308; Anthony Eden, op.cit., pp. 106-109; and James Cable, op.cit., pp. 56-57.}

The next day Douglas MacArthur II, Counsellor to the Department of State, and Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, met with Dennis Allen of the UK Foreign Office, but the meeting again revealed the complete differences in American and British approaches to the solution to the Indo-China conflict. The American officers showed that the United States was still determined to seek a military solution to the fighting by saying that "we [are] opposed to any settlement which directly or indirectly turn[s] the area over to the Communists." In response, Allen said that the UK approach to the Indo-China problem was to seek a peaceful solution on the basis of "the territorial division of Vietnam." "If a settlement on this basis were arrived at, hostilities would come to an end," he argued. Stressing the futility of an American attempt to bolster French and Vietnamese determination to continue the war irrespective of the Dien Bien Phu battle, Allen then opposed the concept of military intervention and of the formation of an ad hoc alliance for that purpose.\footnote{102}{"Memorandum of Conversation by Robertson and MacArthur, 12 April, 1954" in FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. XIII, part 1, pp. 1311-1313.} But the British nonetheless did acknowledge the need to show the political solidarity among the Western powers as a bargaining lever in the Geneva
negotiations. Allen therefore agreed to issue a joint communique on 13 April to the following effect:

We are ready to take part with the other countries principally concerned in an examination of the possibility of establishing a collective defence [treaty] within the Charter of the United Nations Organisation to assure the peace and freedom of South East Asia and the Western Pacific.\textsuperscript{103}

The communique, however, left unresolved the timing of the establishment of a collective security treaty. For the Americans, "a collective defence" treaty meant an ad hoc coalition for military intervention, while, for the British, it implied a future defence treaty to be established after the Geneva Conference.\textsuperscript{104}

On 13 April Dulles and his entourage went to Paris, and met with Bidault and French government officials. Explaining fully the ideas underlying his proposal for "united action," Dulles sought French agreement to the formation of an ad hoc coalition for Southeast Asia. However, Bidault was anxious not to give the public an impression that the Geneva Conference was prejudged a failure, saying that, under mounting public and parliamentary pressure, the French government "can not do anything at Geneva which gives the impression that the conference is not likely, from the start, to reach results ..." "Nothing can be done before Geneva, which would allow it to be said or thought that anything had been decided beforehand about what was to be done if Geneva failed."\textsuperscript{105} The French Minister also insisted that the sudden creation of an ad hoc alliance for military intervention would risk a hardening of the

\textsuperscript{103} Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 30, No. 774, 26 April, 1954, p. 622.
\textsuperscript{104} "Telegram from Dulles to the Department of State, 13 April, 1954" in FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. XIII, part 1, pp. 1321-1322.
Chinese attitude, for Red China's willingness to accept a compromise at the Geneva talks was crucial for France. Bidault also indicated that France was loath to combine with Asian states such as Thailand and the Philippines in an ad hoc coalition. The implication of French dependence upon Asian powers for the defence of Indo-China, the French Minister argued, would greatly undermine France's status as one of the Great Powers and would encourage unrest in France's African colonies. But Bidault finally recognised the need for showing the political solidarity of the Western Powers before Geneva, agreeing to a joint communiqué similar to the one drafted by the US and UK.

In a subsequent discussion with Bidault the following day, Dulles strongly pressed for the complete and full independence of the Associated States, including the right for them to withdraw from the French Union. It needed to be clear, he said, that the "united action" proposed by the US "was to preserve real independence for the states in the area." In response, Bidault stated that if the ties between the Associated States and France were severed, French public opinion would not support the continuation of the war.

Dulles' concept of "united action" had been communicated to Canberra as a result of a meeting held in the State Department between Spender, L.K. Munro, New Zealand Ambassador to Washington, Dulles, and Radford on 4 April. At that meeting, Dulles expressed his concern about the serious psychological and political blow to the French

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107 David L. Anderson, op.cit., p. 34.
and Vietnamese as a result of the likely fall of Dien Bien Phu, stressing the need for preventing the erosion of French and Vietnamese determination to continue the war effort. Unless some urgent action were to be taken, the Secretary of State warned, the French might agree to a settlement at Geneva on terms that Vietnam and possibly Laos and Cambodia would be swallowed up into the communist orbit. By emphasising that the loss of Indo-China would greatly upset the balance of power in the Asian-Pacific region, Dulles tried to make Spender and Munro appreciate the gravity of the present situation in Vietnam:

... if Indo-China went ... would South East Asia go, with all the strategic materials from South East Asia falling into the hands of the Communists, [it] would have far-reaching consequences on the capacity of Japan to survive, [thereby] oblig[ing] [Japan] to trade with Communist China and [to] becom[e] more closely associated with the Communist world.

If Japan were to fall into communist hands, the Secretary of State went on, “the consequences of the most serious kind would or ... could ensue not only for the free world, but particularly for Australia and New Zealand.”

Turning to the “united action” proposal, Dulles remarked that US Congressional leaders regarded British participation as indispensable, but that the US administration respected Australian and New Zealand role in the armed intervention scheme. The Secretary of State warned that America would “fall back on fortress America if US allies did not see fit to regard the present situation as so serious as to justify the formation of a coalition,” pressing Australia and New Zealand to “indicate within a

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short period of time that they were prepared to give direct military assistance.” In concluding his remarks, Dulles asserted that

it was strong evidence of American eagerness that, in spite of the fact that they had concluded an armistice in Korea and were facing elections this year, they were ready to undertake fresh commitments in Indo-China if others would join with them.

Radford then explained that the United States was not considering the use of land forces in the joint military intervention, and that he felt that “with air and naval assistance, and with the training in the wet season of Vietnamese troops, together with the implementation by the French of their political promises, the situation can be rectified.” The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs specifically suggested that Australia should make available its aircraft career, and that New Zealand should contribute the same type of naval forces as in the case of Korea.\textsuperscript{111}

Spender made it clear at that meeting that Australia was in no position whatever to commit the government because of an election scheduled for 29 May. He claimed that “his Government as a dying one might be disinclined to take the step proposed by Dulles.” However, Spender was impressed with “a fresh urgency in US policy because of ... the increasing deterioration in the position in Indo-China and the consequent necessity for ... urgent action.” At the same time, he was strongly impressed with America’s readiness to underwrite the defence of Southeast Asia. This made him greatly anxious to preserve America’s willingness to involve itself permanently in the maintenance of the balance of power in Southeast Asia. Cabling Casey two days later, the Australian Ambassador urged the Minister to consider a conditional agreement for

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.
"united action" in order to make it certain that increased US interest in the security of Southeast Asia would not wane:

One of the primary aims of our policy over recent years has been, as I understand it, to achieve the acceptance by the USA of responsibility for S.E.[South East] Asia. It is for consideration whether, if we fail to respond at all to the opportunity now presented, what US reactions are likely to be if and when areas closer to Australia are in jeopardy.\(^{112}\)

Spender also felt that ANZUS alliance relations demanded that Australia should enter the proposed coalition. "[C]onditional indication of our willingness" to join in an ad hoc coalition "will at least ensure that our credit with the US is unimpaired." The Ambassador also stressed that, "[i]f united action ... were agreed to be taken, it would have a fair chance of stiffening French and Vietnamese will to resist," thereby making it certain that "[the] French do not run out on some negotiated settlement of a kind which could start the slide of Indo-China into Communism."\(^{113}\)

On the same day (6 April) a Cabinet meeting was called, at which ministers rejected Spender's suggestion. Cabinet ministers took the view that America's policy of encouraging the French Union forces to continue the armed struggle fully accorded with the Australian approach to the Geneva Conference. They also shared the American desire to devise a means to sustain French and Vietnamese fighting capabilities in the face of the deteriorating situation at Dien Bien Phu. However, Cabinet fully acknowledged that Australia could not make any formal decision on its participation in the proposed "united action" until after a general election. At the same

\(^{112}\) "Cablegram No. 326 from Spender to Casey, 6 April, 1954" in A5462/1, 2/4/1, part 2 (Emphasis in Original).

\(^{113}\) Ibid.
time, Cabinet ministers feared that, given the imperfect implementation of the French provision of independence to the Associated States, Australian participation in "united action" would be interpreted by Asian countries as substituting Australia and other allies for French colonialism in Indo-China. "[I]t would be undesirable," minutes of the meeting stated, "for Australia to appear to be meddling on the Asian mainland on behalf of a colonial power." Nevertheless, Cabinet members were anxious to ensure that increased US interest in the defence of Southeast Asia would not wane. "It [is] important," Cabinet argued,

[for] Australia not to appear to the United States to be lukewarm in supporting proposals designed to ensure that communism in South East Asia [is] checked ... Australia should not permit the United States Government and the United States people to think that Australia is reluctant to lend its aid to the United States in an area which is of particular concern to Australia and on the first occasion when the United States called on Australia for assistance.\(^\text{114}\)

Just after the Cabinet meeting, the Department of External Affairs received a cable from London that the British government would invite Dulles to London for talks with UK ministers and officials on the proposed "united action."\(^\text{115}\) At a Cabinet meeting held three days later, ministers agreed that Dulles' trip to Europe would give Australia "some breathing space" and make it less urgent for Australia to give a definite reply: "[T]he position was still fluid ... and ... there might be some changes in the proposal as a result of Mr Dulles' visit to Europe."\(^\text{116}\) However, Australia was completely kept in


\(^{115}\) "Cablegram No. 991 from the Australian High Commissioner's Office, London to External Affairs, 6 April, 1954" in AA, A5954/1, 2299/1.

\(^{116}\) "Minutes of Meeting of Cabinet: Decision No. 988, 9 April, 1954" in AA, A4907/XM1, Vol. 3.
the dark as to Dulles' discussions with Eden and Bidault. The Department of External Affairs complained to the Australian diplomatic missions in Washington and London of the lack of information. Not until the afternoon of 13 April were a brief summary of the Eden-Dulles meeting and a UK-US joint communiqué conveyed to the Department of External Affairs from the Australian High Commissioner's Office, London. However, in spite of its dissatisfaction with lack of information, Canberra was quick to associate itself with the UK-US joint communiqué in order not to discourage enhanced American interest in the defence of Southeast Asia and to help demonstrate Western solidarity in the run-up to the Geneva talks. In a statement issued the next day, Philip McBride, Defence Minister and Acting Minister for External Affairs, indicated Canberra's readiness to join any consultation for an examination of the possibility of establishing a system of collective defence for Southeast Asia.

While anxious not to undermine America's readiness to assume a future balancing role in Southeast Asia, Australia, particularly the Defence Department, nonetheless began to contest America's Indo-China policy and its proposal for military intervention. In mid-April, realising the disadvantages of any continued fighting in Indo-China, Australian defence officials completely changed their former tentative position on the Geneva Conference from favouring a military solution to a diplomatic one. The Defence Department's former tentative position of urging the French and Vietnamese to continue the struggle was based upon the Department's confidence in

119 “Cablegram No. 83 from External Affairs to Australian High Commissioner's Office, London, 14 April, 1954” in AA, A1838/2, 532/13/1, part 2.
the morale and will of the French to continue the war and in the growth of indigenous Vietnamese resistance to communism. It also rested upon their expectation that the arrival of the monsoon season in mid-May would stop the Viet Minh offensive against the French Union forces because of supply difficulties. But on 10 April two important cables arrived at External Affairs from Alan Watt, Australian High Commissioner to Singapore, and John P. Quinn, Australian Consulate-General in Saigon. After reporting the low prospect of the French holding Dien Bien Phu, Watt claimed that "[i]t is unwise to assume that commencement of the monsoon season will prevent [the] Viet Minh from" continuing to mount an offensive against the French. Quinn also reported on the likely impact of the fall of Dien Bien Phu on the morale and will of the French and Vietnamese to continue the struggle. A "V.M. [Viet Minh] victory [at Dien Bien Phu]," he stated, "would give tremendous boost to V.M. forces anywhere and attract fence-sitters in volume ... Recruiting of Vietnamese National Army would be adversely affected." The Australian Consulate-General also informed Canberra that, following a victory at Dien Bien Phu, Viet Minh forces would be "in a position to give immediate support to an offensive against the [Hanoi] Delta" after reorganising their forces.

These two cables obviously forced the Australian Defence Department to rethink their former position in relation to the solution to the Indo-China conflict. In their meetings held on 13 and 14 April, the JPC and the JIC now favoured the earliest possible termination of the fighting in Indo-China through a diplomatic solution, a view

120 "Record of Conversation with Irwin, Canadian High Commissioner in Canberra, by Tange, 10 April, 1954" in AA, A1838/276, TS (Top-Secret)383/4/1, part 1.
121 "Cablegram No. 197 from Watt to Tange, 10 April, 1954" in AA, A5954/17, 2299/1.
122 "Cablegram No. 74 from J.P. Quinn to Tange, 10 April, 1954" in AA, A5954/17, 2299/1/
which paralleled British approach to the Geneva Conference. The two Committees argued that

The onset of the monsoon would slow down, but not stop [Viet Minh] operations, and would hamper the French more than the Viet Minh in that it will adversely affect their air operations.

It was also the argument of the JPC and the JIC that

While the strategic importance of Dien Bien Phu is recognised, it is considered that the major effect of its loss would be moral. Not only would it adversely affect the French at home as well as in Indo-China, but it would have a marked effect on Vietnam recruitment and [the] 'will to fight' and would correspondingly boost the morale of the Viet Minh. 123

Under these circumstances, the defence officers implicitly affirmed that the prolongation of the fighting would, possibly in the near future, lead to the whole of Indo-China falling into communist hands, and that the provision of any allied inducement, including particularly even multilateral military intervention, would not sustain French and Vietnamese determination to continue the fighting. The Committees also pointed out that “[a]ir support alone, which would appear to be the extent of the present United States proposal ... could not prevent the flow of supplies” to the Viet Minh. The JPC and the JIC suggested that the best course for Australia to take on the Indo-China problem would be the ceasefire. However, as to a means of ending the Indo-China war, the Committees could not yet find any specific formula. “It is difficult to see,” they argued, “how any of the current proposals for a cease-fire (such as a coalition or a partition) would effectively achieve the Allied objective of preventing the ultimate fall of Indo-China to the Communists.”

123 “Report No. 18 of Meetings by the Joint Planning Committee and Joint Intelligence Committee, 13 and 14 April, 1954” in AA, A5954/24, 2298/2.
In its approach to the Geneva Conference and its response to the proposed US military intervention, New Zealand largely followed Britain's lead. New Zealand's wish to preserve good relations with the United Kingdom was, in this period, accentuated by the controversy over British association with ANZUS during 1952-53 and the visit of Queen Elizabeth II in April 1954. At a Cabinet meeting convened on 6 April to discuss the US proposal for “united action”, Prime Minister Sidney G. Holland indicated that he was anxious for New Zealand action to be conditional upon the agreement of the British:

[I]t had been a declared maxim of New Zealand policy that ‘Where Britain goes, we go’ etc. United Kingdom participation was essential to avoid the charge that New Zealand and Australia also, for that matter, were doing what they were told by the United States of America.\(^\text{124}\)

New Zealand was also not convinced of the wisdom of the American policy of encouraging the continuation of the fighting in Indo-China. For a time, the New Zealand High Commissioner in London, F.W. Doidge, and Ambassador to the US Munro urged the government to favour the US policy of seeking a military solution to the Indo-China conflict and to join in an ad hoc coalition for military intervention. In a confidential letter sent to the Minister for External Affairs, Clifton Webb, Doidge claimed:

they [the Americans] are surely right in believing that it is disastrous to negotiate with Communists except from a position of strength, and we are not yet in a position of strength in Indo-China. Therefore our interests seem to lie with the Americans in discouraging a negotiated settlement at Geneva at this particular time.\(^\text{125}\)

\(^{124}\) “Note prepared by Foss Shanahan, 6 April, 1954” in NZA, EA1, 316/4/1, part 1.
\(^{125}\) “Confidential letter from Doidge to Webb, 30 March, 1954” in NZA, EA1, 101/2/8/1, part 1.
Munro also argued: “I feel that, as we value our close relations with the United States under the ANZUS treaty and as we must attach profound significance to the effects of the passing of Indo-China under Communist domination, then we have little alternative but to join the coalition.”

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However, Webb, and the Department of External Affairs saw New Zealand interests being best served by the earliest possible ending of the war through a negotiated settlement. Having little confidence in the capacity of the French to continue the war or in the prospect of developing indigenous resistance to communism, they believed that any continued fighting in Indo-China would not only place the whole of Indo-China under communist control, but also have serious consequences on British interests in Southeast Asia. The New Zealand government also did not think that America's proposal for joint military intervention would contribute to the sustaining of French and Vietnamese determination to continue the fighting. As reasons for opposing America's proposed "united action", New Zealand also cited the difficulties in mobilising public and parliamentary opinion for "any action which did not have a satisfactory United Nations ... backing," and the possibility of the involvement of China in the Indo-China war. Moreover, with its aloofness from Asian affairs and with a strong European outlook, New Zealand was unwilling to conclude even an informal treaty relationship with Asian states by the formation of an ad hoc coalition.

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126 “Inward telegram No. 94 from Munro to Webb, 5 April, 1954” in NZA, EA1, 316/4/1, part 6.
From the end of April to early May 1954, Dulles continued his efforts to prevail upon the British to change their position on the Geneva Conference and to agree to the formation of an ad hoc alliance for concerted military intervention in Indo-China. Back in Paris on 21 April for a NATO Council meeting, the US Secretary of State conferred with Eden two days later, appealing to the British on the need for "united action" as a means of bolstering French and Vietnamese determination to continue the fighting and of making it certain that the French would not enter the Geneva Conference in the shadow of a defeat. Eden resisted, arguing that an American attempt to sustain the French war effort was quite ineffective, and that "United States intervention might initiate World War Three."  

On 24 April Dulles met with Bidault, seeking definite assurances from the French about the continuation of the war in spite of heavy French losses at Dien Bien Phu. Dulles then, accompanied by Radford, held talks with Eden. By highlighting the necessity for shoring up French and Vietnamese morale and will to continue the fighting in the face of the imminent fall of Dien Bien Phu, Dulles sought a political commitment from the British for the formation of an ad hoc coalition. "There appeared to be no chance," he stressed, "of keeping the French fighting in Indo-China unless they knew that the British and the United States were going to be there with

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them. "If the British would go along with us," he went on to say, "the President was then prepared to seek Congressional approval for intervention by the United States with the armed forces in Indo-China." Radford then showed that, as a specific contribution from the British to the proposed military intervention, he had in mind Royal Air Force (RAF) squadrons from Malaya or Hong Kong. Stressing the unlikelihood of the French and Vietnamese continuing the fighting for a long time even with America's direct military support, Eden stated that the UK could not offer any political commitment to the formation of an ad hoc coalition. He also argued that a joint Western military intervention would provoke Chinese entry into Indo-China. To this, Radford countered by saying that he "had never thought the Chinese Communists would intervene if we went into Indo-China."

When Eden, after holding a Cabinet meeting, proceeded to Geneva on April 25 and met with Dulles, he reaffirmed that the UK government was still determined to seek a peaceful solution to the Indo-China conflict on the basis of a territorial division of Vietnam. The British Foreign Secretary also indicated that the British had no intention whatever of joining "a military operation, which in itself [would] be ineffective and might well bring the world to the verge of a major war." By arguing that any continued fighting in Indo-China would tip the military balance further in favour of the Viet Minh and other resistance forces, Eden, in a further meeting with Dulles and Radford, expressed strong doubts about America's policy of encouraging

131 "Telegram No. 89 from Webb to Alderton, 26 April, 1954" in AA, A1838/269, TS (Top-Secret)383/4/1, NZ, part 1; and Anthony Eden, op.cit., pp. 116-119.
the French and Vietnamese to continue the struggle. He repeated that, in his view, America's proposed military intervention "would enhance the risk of Chinese intervention and possibly further expansion of the war."\textsuperscript{133}

In response, Dulles emphasised that the United States was quite unhappy about British advice to the French to terminate the fighting. "I considered it of utmost importance," he said, "that we both keep [the] French in [a] mood to fight on in Indo-China." Eden replied with some heat that all he "had been thinking of had been a cease-fire with adequate safeguards and controls." He then scoffed at the concept of military intervention by saying that it "would be a 'terrible business', bigger than Korea, which would get us nowhere."\textsuperscript{134} Meeting with Eden again on 1 May, Dulles strongly urged the British to reconsider their position in relation to Geneva and to participate in an ad hoc coalition with at least moral support in the event of military support not being available. But Eden was unmoved.\textsuperscript{135}

In the face of British persistence on the Geneva Conference and London refusal to join in an ad hoc coalition, the Eisenhower administration now began to have strong doubts about the sincerity of the UK as an alliance partner in an Asian crisis, and, at the same time, to entertain the hope that other US allies, particularly Australia and New Zealand, might play a greater role in joint military intervention. Having returned to Washington from his European trip on 28 April, Radford attended a NSC meeting

\textsuperscript{133} "Telegram from Dulles to the Department of State, 26 April, 1954" in \textit{FRUS}, 1952-54, Vol. XVI, pp. 575-576.

\textsuperscript{134} "Telegram from Dulles to the State Department, 27 April, 1954" in \textit{FRUS}, 1952-54, Vol. XVI, pp. 576-577.

the following day, at which he strongly criticised the parochial British attitude towards Asian affairs. The British were "presently unprepared," he reported, "to participate in collective action on any matter involving commitment of British resources or incurring any risks unless some British territor[ies] [are] under imminent threat." The UK approach to the Indo-China problem "seemed strictly and narrowly in terms of local UK interest, without adequate regard for the future of other areas of the Far East including Japan." As the other reasons for British opposition to the concept of military intervention, Radford also cited British fear of possible Chinese intervention and of an atomic threat from Russia.

Given the unwillingness of the British to join the creation of an ad hoc coalition, Harold Stassen, Director of the Mutual Security Agency, and Nixon argued for unilateral American military intervention. The US, Nixon advised, should not "let the British have a veto over our freedom of action." To this, Eisenhower replied that "[a] collective policy with our allies was the only posture which was consistent with US national interest." "To go in unilaterally in Indo-China or other areas of the world, which were endangered," he continued, "amounted to an attempt to police the entire world." Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State, then intervened to say that, even if Britain was not in favour of military intervention, "it was quite possible that Australia and New Zealand [w]ould join the regional grouping after the national election in Australia."136 In anticipation of a greater role in the Indo-China affairs on

the part of Australia and New Zealand, the US proposed that an ad hoc ANZUS meeting should be held in Geneva on 2 May.\(^{137}\)

However, in spite of America’s growing expectation of support from the Pacific dominions for joint military intervention, Casey and the Department of External Affairs, like the Defence Department, had already realised the folly of America’s Indo-China policy and of its proposed "united action." Having left Sydney to attend the Korean phase of the Geneva Conference on 12 April, one day before the announcement by Prime Minister Menzies of the Petrov Affair,\(^{138}\) Casey arrived in Geneva on 25 April. In the course of his journey to Geneva, he stopped over at Singapore, Saigon, Calcutta, London and Paris and conferred with British, French, Vietnamese and Indian ministers and officials on the issue of Indo-China. As a result of his stop-over visits, Casey was fully informed of the British approach to the Geneva Conference, of the inevitability of a French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and of possible serious consequences upon French and Vietnamese fighting capabilities of the fall of the French fortress. He therefore concluded that any continued fighting in Indo-China would tip the military balance further to the advantage of the Viet Minh and other

\(^{137}\) "Cablegram No. 75 from Casey to McBride and Tange, 29 April, 1954" in AA, A1838/283, 3004/11/8, part 2.

\(^{138}\) On 3 April, 1954 an official of the Soviet Embassy in Canberra, Vladimir Petrov, having defected from the Soviet service, sought and was granted political asylum in Australia. On his defection, Petrov handed over to the Australian Secret Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) many documents, mostly in Russian, referring to Soviet espionage in Australia. He also made statements which suggested that some people in Australia were conscious or unwilling agents of Soviet policy. In a document brought by Petrov from the Soviet Embassy, three members of Federal Opposition leader Evatt’s secretariat were named as active helpers of Soviet espionage. Petrov’s defection was dramatically announced to Parliament by Menzies on 13 April, the last day of sitting before the House rose for general election the following month. On 23 April, 1954 diplomatic relations between Canberra and Moscow were broken off until 1959. The Petrov affair did help the Menzies government to return to office in the general election held on 29 May, but its more long-term effects included damage to a number of Australians and a division within the Australian Labor Party (ALP). For an account of the Petrov Affair, see especially Robert Manne, *The Petrov Affair: Politics and Espionage*, Sydney: Pergamon, 1987 and Michael Thwaites, *Truth Will Out: ASIO and the Petrovs*, Sydney: Collins, 1980.
resistance forces. This led to Casey favouring the idea of the earliest possible termination of the Indo-China struggle through a peaceful solution. In a cable sent to Menzies and McBride on 25 April, the Minister for External Affairs opposed America's Indo-China policy and any proposal for military intervention. "I believe that the proposed American action is wrong," he argued,

because (1) it will not stop the loss of Dien Bien Phu; (2) it would have no United Nations backing: (3) it would put us wrong in world opinion, particularly in Asia; (4) it would probably embroil us with Communist China; [and] (5) it would wreck the Geneva Conference.

Immediately on receiving the cable from Casey, McBride spoke to Menzies, and both concluded that America's policy of seeking a military solution to the Indo-China conflict and the proposed US military intervention for that purpose would not be wise. But McBride and Menzies wondered how the Australian government could reconcile its opposition to America's Indo-China policy and proposed military intervention with its desire to involve the United States permanently in the maintenance of the balance of power in Southeast Asia. Cabling back to Casey on 26 April, McBride expressed the dilemma which Australia now faced in the development of its Indo-China policy. "This latest [American] proposal," he argued,

raises difficult problems of handling Americans. It is in the interest of Australia and of British Commonwealth generally that the United States should remain interested in the security of Southeast Asia. We do not want the United States to feel they are being continually rebuffed and we want to avoid United States making some consequent decision to

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base their future defence plans on assumption of no American involvement in this region.  

One of the solutions to the dilemma which the Department of External Affairs considered was to continue to use the forthcoming general election as a justifiable excuse for maintaining Australia’s non-committal stance on America’s proposed military intervention. Another solution was to urge the US and UK to start early talks on a future collective security treaty to be established after the Geneva Conference in order to make it certain that America’s increased interest in the defence of Southeast Asia would not wane. Distinguishing clearly between the immediate question of an ad hoc coalition for military intervention and the long-term issue of a collective security treaty, Tange informed Casey on 1 May that, although Australia wanted no action on the formation of an ad hoc coalition, it nonetheless would like early talks on a future collective pact as the surest means of ensuring future US involvement in the defence of Southeast Asia.

Casey agreed with Tange’s suggestion, taking up the matter with Eden the next day. However, Eden did not want any talks on a future collective security treaty during the Geneva Conference; he thought it would predetermine the membership of the pact and would undermine support from Asian nations for a British scheme for a territorial partition of Vietnam as a means of ending the Indo-China war. In consequence of the British opposition, Casey at the ad hoc ANZUS meeting held on the same day in Geneva refrained from urging Dulles to start early talks on a collective security pact.

141 “Cablegram No. GC2 from McBride to Casey, 26 April, 1954” in AA, A5954/17, 2299/2.
142 “Telegram No. 78 from Tange to Casey, 1 May, 1954” in AA, A5462/1, 2/4/1.
At that meeting, Dulles sought Australia's views about the formation of an ad hoc coalition for military intervention. Casey replied that "the forthcoming general elections inhibited his government from taking any positive action at this time." But the Australian Minister assured the American that, "if his party [were to] win the elections, Australia would take a much more positive position in this field." Webb, on the other hand, implicitly showed his government's opposition to America's policy of seeking a military solution to the Indo-China conflict. "The possibility of holding a line following partition," he argued, "might represent the best prospect" for terminating the fighting. While understanding Australia's tight spot because of the election, Dulles nonetheless stressed the need for taking some audible and visible action to create a strong negotiating position for the Western powers at the Geneva talks. He consequently proposed technical discussions by the Five Power Staff Agency on Southeast Asia, which was established in early 1953 on an ad hoc basis for the purpose of the exchange of intelligence, communications and other information, and consisted of US, UK, French, Australian and New Zealand military representatives.  

The minutes of the ANZUS Council meeting were cabled to Canberra from Casey on 4 May, but Tange did not believe that technical discussions by the Five Power Staff Agency would be a sure means of preserving increased US interest in the defence of Southeast Asia. To make it certain that the United States would, in the future, formally involve itself permanently in the defence of Southeast Asia, Tange thought it

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important to begin early political talks on a future collective security pact. In a cable sent to Watt, who was acting as the head of the Australian delegation to the Geneva Conference, he expressed strong concern at a possible decline in US interest in the security of Australia's northern outer defence perimeter if no action was taken on a future collective pact:

[The] acceptance of [the] United Kingdom position apparently to do nothing in public until the Geneva Conference has finished opens a distinct danger [to the security of Australia].

Perturbed by local and American press reports about the developing rift between the UK and US over a solution to the Indo-China conflict, the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs wanted action at the political level on a future collective pact as a means of restoring the appearance of Anglo-American solidarity. "It seems important," he cabled back to Casey, "that Dulles should be able as soon as possible to announce publicly that a group of nations, including the United Kingdom, has begun preliminary discussions on collective defence for South East Asia." In response, Watt spoke to Eden about the matter of a future collective pact at a meeting of the British Commonwealth officials held on 4 May, reporting that Britain, for fear of possible alienation of Asian states from a settlement at Geneva and of the predetermination of the parties to the pact, was unwilling to proceed with any public talks on a collective pact.

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145 "Cablegram No. 9 from Tange to Watt, 4 May, 1954" in AA_A4534/2, 48/7, part 2.
146 "Cablegram No. 256 from Tange to Casey, 4 May, 1954" in AA_A1838/283, 3004/11/1, part 2.
147 "Telegram No. GC 28 from Watt to Tange, 4 May, 1954" in AA_A5462/1, 1/4/2.
On 7 May, the day Casey arrived back in Sydney for the election campaign, the central redoubt of Dien Bien Phu fell to the Viet Minh. The next day the Indo-China phase of the Geneva Conference opened with participants from the Big Four, Communist China, the Viet Minh and the three Associated States of Indo-China. The Chinese delegation was headed by Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai and the Viet Minh by Foreign Minister Pham Van Dong. The Viet Minh delegation did include two representatives of the Khmer Issarak and one representative of the Pathet Lao, although they were not distinguishable from the Vietnamese. Opening the first opening session of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China at 4:30 p.m., the head of the Viet Minh delegation showed that he had come to the international conference with a grandiose scheme for a territorial partition of the whole of Indo-China. He therefore requested a formal conference invitation for the resistance forces of Laos and Cambodia, and an international recognition of those forces. Bidault countered by saying that the Pathet Lao and the Khmer Issarak were "ghosts", and insisted that the problems of Cambodia and Laos could be simply solved by the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces, and that the civil war in Viet Nam and the direct invasion of Laos and Cambodia by the Viet Minh could not be dealt with on the same basis. In subsequent plenary sessions, the Viet Minh persistently insisted on the formal presence at the conference of the fellow resistance forces of Cambodia and Laos. As a result of the Viet Minh's recalcitrant demand, substantial discussions soon came to a standstill,

and the conference was turned into a series of diatribes between the communist and non-communist delegations about responsibility for the Indo-China war.

In the course of the Geneva Conference, the Eisenhower administration continued to show America's determination to press ahead with joint military intervention. Immediately after the fall of Dien Bien Phu on 7 May, Dulles, who had returned to Washington from Geneva on 4 May, made a radio and television address to the nation. In it, after praising the gallant fighting spirit of the French Union forces at Dien Bien Phu, he foreshadowed the possibility of military intervention: "We would be gravely concerned if an armistice or cease-fire were reached at Geneva, which would provide a road to a Communist take-over and further aggression." "If this occurs, or if hostilities continue," Dulles affirmed, "then the need will be more urgent to create the conditions for united action in defence of the area." At a meeting with Munro the next day, the Secretary of State made it clear that "we do not exclude in our thinking a possible participation in Indo-China if the proper conditions existed."

Conferring on 10 May at the State Department with Carlos Romulo, personal adviser to the Philippine President, Dulles informed the Filipino that the United States was still confident in the will of the French Union forces to continue the fighting in Indo-China in spite of the fall of Dien Bien Phu to Vietnamese rebel forces. At the same time, he emphasised to Romulo that the US government was still resolutely...
determined to seek a military solution to the conflict. The US, he said, "held little hope for any constructive results at Geneva."¹⁵² In the course of a press conference held in Washington the following day, Dulles referred to the question of Indo-China, saying that, since the outcome of the Dien Bien Phu operation did not decisively affect the military balance on the Indo-China battlefield, the US saw no need for immediate military intervention in the war. However, the Secretary of State made it known to reporters that his proposal for "united action" was partly to meet the contingency of a sudden collapse of French resistance. "If the Geneva Conference is prolonged indefinitely and the situation in Indo-China threatens to disintegrate," he said, "it might be necessary to reach multilateral decisions among the interested nations without waiting for an end of the talks at Geneva."¹⁵³

From mid-May, the US government entered into negotiations with the French government about conditions for joint military intervention. In the course of the negotiations, the US sought agreement on training of native troops and on a command structure for joint military intervention. At the same time, to make it certain that the proposed US "united action" would protect the independent states of Indo-China, the Americans urged the French to promote the real independence for the Associated States, including the right of those states to secede from the French Union. At this time, the French government viewed the possibility of collective military intervention favourably; with negotiations at Geneva showing little prospect of progress, it was preparing for the continuation of the war. However, it was unwilling to agree to the possibility of the departure of the Associated States from the French Union on the

¹⁵² "Memorandum of Conversation by the Officer in Charge of Philippine Affairs, 10 May, 1954" in FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. XII, part 1, pp. 474-475.

Given the adamant refusal by the United Kingdom to join in an ad hoc coalition, the Eisenhower administration was, in this period, almost completely determined to proceed with "united action" without the participation of Britain. Telegraphing to Bedell Smith, who was acting as the head of the US delegation to the Geneva Conference, Dulles hinted that "it might not be indispensable that the UK participates at the outset."\footnote{"Telegram from Dulles to Smith, 8 May, 1954" in \textit{FRUS}, 1952-54, Vol. XVI, pp. 728-729.} Discussing the "united action" proposal with Eisenhower on 11 May, Dulles advised the President that the United States should not make intervention conditional on British backing by pointing out that, while the non-participation of Britain had its grave disadvantages in indicating a certain breach, there were perhaps greater disadvantages in a situation where we were obviously subject to UK veto, which in turn was largely subject to Chinese Communist veto. Thereby a chain [would be] forged which tended to make us impotent and to encourage Chinese Communist aggression to a point where the whole position in the Pacific would be endangered and the risk of general war increased.\footnote{"Memorandum of Conversation by Dulles, 11 May, 1954" in \textit{FRUS}, 1952-54, Vol. XIII, part 2, pp. 1532-1533.}

With the increasing American distrust of the UK as an alliance partner in an Asian crisis, the US was even more hopeful that Australia and New Zealand would be reliable
and trustworthy allies. In a telegram sent to the US Ambassador to France, Douglas Dillon, Dulles expressed his conviction that Australia and New Zealand "would probably accept following Australian elections if [the] US invoke[d] ANZUS."

Meeting with the President at the White House on 19 May, Dulles reminded Eisenhower that America's proposed military intervention "did not make UK active participation a necessary condition." Eisenhower agreed to this, but he "emphasised the indispensability also of Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand and, of course, the Associated States." The following day Dulles conferred with Spender and Webb, who was in Washington on his way back to Wellington from Geneva, explaining mounting US Congressional criticism of the UK as a US ally:

Recent events had provoked strong anti-British reaction, particularly in Congress. Even those Senators ... who had been among the most warmhearted advocates of foreign aid, were beginning to wonder whether it was worthwhile if the support of one's allies could not be counted on in a crisis.

"If the United Kingdom is unable to join," the Secretary of State emphasised, "the United States is prepared to persevere with an organisation which does not include the United Kingdom," thereby implicitly expressing a strong expectation of Australia and New Zealand playing a greater role in a military intervention scheme.

In the course of the Geneva Conference, Australia was still in an ambivalent position in relation to America's Indo-China policy and proposed "united action." The Menzies government was obsessed with the fear that, if no action were taken on a future collective security pact to be established after the Geneva Conference, increased

159 "Telegram No. 15 from Spender to Tange, 21 May, 1954" in A A, A5462/1, 2/4/1, part 3; and "Inward Telegram No. 170 from Webb to Holland, 20 May, 1954" in NZA, EA1, 316/4/1, part 7..
US interest in the defence of Southeast Asia would decline. By continuing to pressure the UK to change its stance on going ahead with talks on a collective pact, Australia was consistently trying to obtain strong assurances that the US would, in the future, assume a balancing role in the regional system of Southeast Asia. Since early May, not only Watt, but also Rowland, who was in Geneva as a member of the Australian delegation, had been lobbying intensively his counterpart in the UK to proceed with early talks on a collective security treaty. The United States, aware of the likely adverse effect upon Asian opinion of the Five Power Staff Agency proceeding with military discussions, supported the Australian move for early talks on a collective security pact. On 10 May, at the instruction of Dulles, Bedell Smith formally proposed to Eden that early political talks on a future collective pact should start parallel with those by the Five Power Staff Agency. Smith emphasised that it was important to press ahead with talks on a collective defence pact in order to avoid the impression by prospective Asian members of the pact that participating countries at the Five Power Staff Agency would constitute an inner group of the proposed pact.

However, the next day the British Foreign Secretary, while favouring the talks by the Five Power Staff Agency for the purpose of obtaining exact information from the French about the Indo-China military situation, opposed going ahead with political and public talks on a collective security treaty. Eden reiterated that the UK could not commit itself to an attempt to predetermine "the exact composition" of the future security treaty and to undermine Asian support for a settlement at Geneva.

161 "Telegram No. 26 from Watt to Casey and Tange, 13 May, 1954" in AA, A5462/1, 2/4/1, part 3.
162 Ibid.
response, Casey wrote to Eden on 13 May, appealing to the British for an early start on "examination of [the] possibility of collective defence for South East Asia." The Australian Minister stressed to his counterpart in Britain that

Question whether there should be ... political consultations on a collective defence involves in our view a judgement as to not merely [the] best means of winning Asian support, but also [the] military urgency of preparing a defensive coalition and [the] effect on Communists at Geneva of our acting or failing to act.\(^{163}\)

Casey also argued that some early action on a collective security treaty "would ... bolster United States interest in South East Asia which Australia greatly welcomes." Since the French-American negotiations on the conditions for joint military intervention evoked British resentment and, consequently, UK-US relations further deteriorated, the Australian Minister was more anxious than ever to take a step in the direction of "healing the serious breach in British-American relations."\(^{164}\) But Casey's message did not influence British thinking. London remained determined to associate the so-called Colombo powers (India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Indonesia and Burma) with both a settlement at Geneva and a future collective pact in Southeast Asia. On 22 May Eden wrote back to Casey, arguing against any immediate talks on the proposed pact. "These delicate negotiations," he asserted, "can not be rushed," and "[p]ractical progress in this direction can only be made after [the] Geneva Conference."\(^{165}\)

The Menzies government was also seized with the fear that the prolongation and continuation of the war in Indo-China, which the US adopted as a policy, would tip the

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\(^{163}\) "Telegram No. GC18 from Casey to Watt, 13 May, 1954" in AA, A5462/1, 2/4/1, part 3. Casey's message is included in this telegram.


military balance on the battlefield further to the advantage of the Viet Minh and their allies and would thereby unfavourably affect Australia’s security environment. This fear, and the consequent Australian desire to seek the earliest possible cessation of the Indo-China conflict by means of a peaceful solution was greatly strengthened in mid-May, when the Viet Minh shifted their offensive against the French Union forces from Dien Bien Phu to the Tonkin Delta. On 23 May Casey sent a personal cable to Watt, stating that "[the] Hanoi Delta is progressively more threatened and may be lost with a progressively worse bargaining position for our side." Under these circumstances, any continued fighting would not at all serve the interests of Australia. "Optimum would be an armistice," Casey argued, "with some political solution (even entailing partition)." 166

With the military situation further deteriorating in Indo-China, and the military balance actually moving further in favour of the Viet Minh, Australia could no longer afford to remain non-committal in its attitude towards the Indo-China issue by using the forthcoming election as an excuse. The urgent task now was to urge the US to change its Indo-China policy in the direction of a peaceful solution and to renounce its proposal for military intervention. On 26 May, three days before the election and with the approval of Casey, External Affairs drew up a departmental telegram setting out Australia’s tentative positions on the issue of Indo-China. External Affairs affirmed that America’s Indo-China policy of exhorting the French and Vietnamese to continue the fighting was not wise. The danger of possible Chinese intervention and of subsequent third World War was also cited in opposition to America’s proposed joint

military intervention. Emphasising the need for the earliest possible cessation of hostilities in Indo-China by means of a negotiated settlement, External Affairs declared that Australia now favoured a formula for territorial division of Vietnam as a means of ending the fighting. "We Australians," the departmental telegram stated,

do not repeat not necessarily reject [the] possibility of [a] partition of Vietnam (combined possibly with preservation of Laos and Cambodia) as an acceptable settlement (provided it is supported by [an] effective "guarantee").

The departmental telegram was sent to the major Australian overseas posts on the same day, and it was submitted by Tange the next day to the US Ambassador to Australia, Amos J. Peaslee. Peaslee was surprised at Australia now favouring a peaceful solution to the Indo-China war and a partition of Viet Nam. Such a "change [Australian policy]," he claimed, "would not accord with his understanding of the United States Government's policy on Indo-China." To this, Tange responded that "the telegram ... did not represent a new departure [and] was an attempt to crystallise our thinking on matters of considerable importance." The United States now understood that the Menzies government had continued to conceal its opposition to America's Indo-China policy and proposed "united action" by utilising the general election as an excuse.

In early June, 1954 the Eisenhower administration was forced to switch its Indo-China policy from a military solution to a diplomatic one and thereby to renounce its proposal for joint military intervention with US allies. The change in the American policy was largely brought about by two factors. The primary factor was the deteriorating military and political situation in Vietnam. The hopelessness of France’s military and political position was described poignantly by General Etienne Valluy, commander of French ground forces in Indo-China, in his talks with American military officials in Washington during the first week of June. General Valluy affirmed that the military position of the French and Vietnamese armies had already deteriorated to the point at which it could not be redeemed by outside intervention:

... his troops were tired; their morale was visibly low; the effectiveness by the French commands had decreased; the French and Bao Dai’s Vietnamese troops had lost confidence in one another; and his mobilisation was a failure; his government was discredited; and in the south, there was conflict between the Vietnamese troops (in the French Command) and the population of the area with the civilian population in general leaning more and more towards the Viet Minh.

If the Tonkin Delta were lost, the General also declared, the military line could not be reestablished elsewhere, and neither the French nor the Vietnamese auxiliaries would continue the fight.\footnote{George McT. Kahin, \textit{Intervention}, pp. 51-52.}

The secondary factor that influenced the switch in American policy was Australia’s opposition. Meeting with Dulles on 4 June, Spender informed the US government of the Menzies government’s formal positions on America’s Indo-China policy and on the
proposal for military intervention. In the general election held on 29 May, the Menzies government had been returned to power but with a reduced majority in the House of Representatives. Five days later, Cabinet met and confirmed the tentative views expressed in the departmental telegram of 26 May. Ministers agreed that Australia’s policy on the issue of Indo-China should be directed towards two objectives. One was to retain America’s willingness to involve itself permanently in the preservation of the balance of power in South East Asia. Cabinet noted that “as it has been shown during the last war that the United Kingdom had only limited power in the Pacific, Australia could not afford to allow the United States interest in this area to be reduced.” In order not to risk a contraction of America’s increased interest in the defence of Southeast Asia, Cabinet ministers decided that Australia should urge the UK to agree to start political talks on a future collective pact, authorising the Minister for External Affairs to agree to talks on a collective defence pact being held at an early date.

The other objective was to prevent communist resistance forces from establishing a dominant position in Indo-China. In this connection, Cabinet affirmed that America’s policy of seeking a military solution to the Indo-China conflict and the US proposal for military intervention would not serve Australian interests:

The consequences to Australia backing a United States decision to ‘internationalise the conflict’ were exceedingly serious. It would mean that Australia would be taking part in a war from which all other members of the British Commonwealth … would, on present indications, be standing aloof. It would be a war which appeared to us likely to require the use of forces greatly

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171 “Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet: Decision No. 1055” in AA, A4907/XM1, Vol. 3 and in AA, A1838/1, 383/4/1A.
in excess of any numbers ... and, moreover, a war which might well lead to the use of atomic weapons and even lead into a third world war.\textsuperscript{172}

Noting that “[t]he Vietminh in fact held about 80% of Vietnam,” and that “there was very little support for the French from the local people,” Cabinet also affirmed that any continued fighting in Indo-China would greatly tip the military balance in favour of the Viet Minh and other insurgent forces, and would eventually lead to the fall of the whole of Indo-China into communist hands. Australian policy therefore, the Cabinet decided, should be developed to urge the United States to change its Indo-China policy in the direction of a diplomatic solution on the basis of a partition of Vietnam and to abandon the proposal for collective military intervention.\textsuperscript{173} In spite of their recognition of the importance of preserving America’s increased interest in the defence of Southeast Asia, Cabinet members nonetheless felt that “Australia’s destiny was not so completely wrapped up with the United States as to support them in action which Australia regarded as wrong.”\textsuperscript{174}

As a result of the Valluy report and Australia’s formal views on the issue of Indo-China, the US government largely renounced its policy of encouraging the French and Vietnamese to continue the fighting in Indo-China and its proposal for “united action”. In a further meeting with Spender on the evening of 5 June, Dulles indicated that he was now inclined to adopt a peaceful solution to the Indo-China war. “France would have to accept whatever terms they would get,” he stated, “if they were to obtain a cease-fire.” He also hinted that “the US would not engage in unilateral intervention ...

\textsuperscript{172} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{174} “Submission No. 683 for Cabinet: Indo-China by R.G. Casey, 4 June, 1954” in A\textit{A}, A4940/1, C928.
without the support of Australia and New Zealand.”  

By pointing out the deteriorating situation in Indo-China, Bedell Smith in Geneva also urged Dulles not only to revise America’s Indo-China policy but also to seek the earliest possible cessation of the fighting in Indo-China by means of a “partition” formula. In response, Dulles indicated to Smith that the US was now considering ruling out the possibility of military intervention. “With the passage of time and the increasing deterioration of the situation,” he said, “what was possible at the time of our original proposal could become impossible.”

On 11 June the Five Power Staff Agency finished its week-long discussions on Indo-China in Washington. The Chiefs of Staff gave serious attention to the critical situation in the Tonkin Delta, pointing out the prospect of a strong coordinated offensive by the Viet Minh from mid-June. To counter the Viet Minh’s further offensive and to stabilise the situation in the Delta, the Five Power Staff Agency estimated the need for outside assistance at three divisions and about 300 aircraft.

Although the discussions were technical, the military representatives nonetheless implicitly appeared to oppose any continued fighting in Indo-China and to favour the termination of the war by a peaceful solution as quickly as possible.

The next day the Laniel government, which the US had regarded as the last French government committed to a military solution to the Indo-China war, was defeated in the National Assembly on the issue of Indo-China by a vote of 306 to 293. The government resigned the following day. Cabling Dulles two days later, Dillon recommended that, in view of the fall of the Laniel government, “the deterioration of the military situation in Indo-China” and “the reluctance of the ANZUS powers to take action,” the President should no longer request the authorisation of military intervention from the Congress.\(^\text{179}\) The Secretary of State promptly telegraphed back to Dillon, admitting that America's policy of seeking a military solution to the Indo-China conflict and its proposal for military intervention as a means of sustaining the French and Vietnamese resolve to continue the fighting had virtually failed, not least because

the morale of the Vietnamese Government, armed forces and civilians has deteriorated gravely; the French are forced to contemplate a fall-back which would leave virtually the entire Tonkin Delta population in hostile hands and the Saigon area is faced with political disintegration.\(^\text{180}\)

At a meeting of State Department officials held on 15 June, Director of the Policy Planning Staff Bowie warned that, should the Viet Minh defeat the French in the Tonkin Delta and the strategic balance favour the Viet Minh further, they would “obtain even more than they had asked for at Geneva.” Stressing that America’s national interests would now be best served by the termination of the fighting through a peaceful solution, he pressed for a formula for territorial division of Vietnam as the


best means of ending the war.\textsuperscript{181} By portraying the increasing rate of desertion among the Vietnamese and the lowering of the morale and will to fight by the French and Vietnamese troops, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Allen Dulles emphasised at a meeting of the NSC on 17 June the ineffectiveness and futility of America’s policy of exhorting the French and Vietnamese to continue the struggle. Secretary of State Dulles agreed with his brother’s views, stating that now was the time “to let the French get out of Indo-China entirely and then to try to rebuild from the foundations.”\textsuperscript{182}

On the same day as the US formally revised its Indo-China policy from a military solution to a peaceful one and renounced its proposal for military intervention, a government, led by Pierre Mendès-France and committed to a negotiated settlement on the Indo-China war, was established in Paris. Leaving Geneva on 20 June, and returning to Washington three days later via Paris, Bedell Smith had no reservations in reporting to Dulles that “the United States had no other choice than to accept reluctantly the general results of the military defeat.”\textsuperscript{183} In a subsequent discussion with Eisenhower attended by Congressional leaders, he proposed that the US should now be prepared to accept “a partition of Vietnam [and] Communist control of about one-half to one-third of Laos” but with no communist control of Cambodia.\textsuperscript{184}


Having sensed that the Americans had modified their own previous policy to a considerable extent, and that the Anglo-American confrontation over the solution to the Indo-China conflict would be substantially resolved, on 15 June British Prime Minister Churchill announced in the House of Commons that he and Eden would fly to the United States on 24 June.\(^{185}\) Prior to the Churchill and Eden visit to the US, the British Foreign Secretary broke the deadlock in the Geneva negotiations by meeting with Zhou Enlai on 16 June. At that meeting, Zhou indicated that the Chinese saw no need for territorial division of Laos and Cambodia, and were very ready to accept the Western contention that the problems of Laos and Cambodia could be simply resolved by the withdrawal of the Viet Minh from those states. This meant that he would persuade the Viet Minh in effect to sell out the interests of their allies, the Pathet Lao and the Khmer Issarak. Zhou, however, expressed concern about a possible American attempt to establish bases in those territories.\(^{186}\) Subsequently, on 23 June Mendes-France met with Zhou in Bern, north-eastern Switzerland, and they agreed that Pham Van Dong and Jean Chauvel, French Ambassador to Switzerland, would discuss the problem “whether a basis can be found for a territorial settlement in Vietnam or not.”\(^{187}\)

Accompanied by British Foreign Office officials, Churchill and Eden visited Washington on 25 June. At a staff-level meeting held on the next day, American

\(^{185}\) [UK Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. 542, p. 662, Statement by Churchill.]


officials showed that the United States had now adopted a peaceful solution to the Indo-China conflict, accepting the inevitability of a partitioned Viet Nam. The American and British officers then proceeded to formulate a joint US-UK position concerning requirements which the US and UK would "respect" as a settlement in Geneva. The requirements included particularly assurance of the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from Laos and Cambodia, the preservation of the integrity and independence of those states and the preservation of the southern half of Vietnam as a non-communist state south of a line drawn approximately along the 18th Parallel. In the course of defining the joint US-UK position, however, differences of views emerged. For the UK, this position was an "optimum solution", because the British were not at all convinced that these requirements could be accepted by the communist side in the light of the actual military balance on the battlefield. Similarly, the Americans were also not at all confident that these requirements would be acceptable to the Viet Minh, but these nonetheless represented the "minimum" requirements which the US could accept politically. As a result of a further staff-level meeting, agreement was also reached on the establishment of a joint Anglo-American study group in Washington, which would examine, among other things, the steps that would be necessary for a collective security pact in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{188} The United States now definitely indicated that it would, in the future, assume a balancing role in the regional system of Southeast Asia.

As a result of the Spender-Dulles conversation of 5 June, Casey and the Department of External Affairs had clearly learned that the United States virtually revised its Indo-China policy and renounced its proposal for "united action." They also foresaw that the Americans and the British would soon agree on a formula for ending the fighting in Indo-China based on territorial division of Vietnam. From mid-June Canberra started its diplomatic activities enlisting support from Asian states, not least, the Colombo powers, for the creation of a partitioned Vietnam. Leaving for Geneva again on 7 June, Casey had a long conversation with Prime Minister Nehru in his stop-over visit to New Delhi on 10 June. The Minister emphasised that, unless the principal Asian countries were associated with a settlement in Indo-China, it would not be enduring, pressing for India's support for the concept of territorial division of Vietnam. To this, Nehru replied that, since "the Communists were negotiating from strength and [the West] side from weakness," "some price had to be paid and partition seemed the only practicable price."<sup>189</sup> Nehru's strong support for territorial division of Vietnam as a settlement at Geneva induced the Ceylon Prime Minister, John Kotelawara, to side with the concept.<sup>190</sup>

In Burma, C.T. Moodie, Australian Consulate-General in Rangoon, spoke to Prime Minister U Nu. Moodie claimed that "it would be anomalous for any [support] of any Indo-China settlement to be given by Western countries alone, since the problem was in disagreement with essentially one of Asian security." Nu was not the Australian views, indicating Burma's interest in the responsibility for supervising a settlement at

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In the course of his stay in Geneva during 13-18 June, Casey talked with Zhou as well as Eden and Bedell Smith, obtaining strong assurances that a settlement at Geneva would proceed along the lines of a partition of Vietnam. Casey was also impressed with Zhou's personality. He told Watt that the Chinese premier had "a reassuring sort of face." On his way to Washington, the Australian Minister stopped over at Karachi on 20 June. Conferring with an official of the Pakistan Department of the Interior, Casey expressed the hope that, if a reasonable settlement were negotiated at Geneva, the non-communist countries of Asia would give support to it. In reply, the Pakistani stated that he "had strong views as to the need to draw [a] line to prevent further Communist encroachment." An approach was also made to Indonesian Prime Minister Ali by J.C.G. Kevin, Australian Ambassador to Jakarta. However, Ali completely refused to associate Indonesia with the creation of another divided country in Asia for fear of losing support in domestic politics from the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). PKI gave strong moral support to the Viet Minh's armed struggle, believing that a reasonable settlement at Geneva would be the cession of the whole territory of Vietnam to communist insurgents.

Arriving in Washington on 26 June, Casey conferred with Dulles and Munro at an ad hoc meeting of the ANZUS Council held on 30 June. At the meeting, Casey and Munro expressed strong satisfaction with the UK-US agreement on an approach to the

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191 "Record of Conversation with the Austrian Charge D'Affairs, De Ottlo Eiselberg by Tange and Booker, 18 June, 1954" in AA, A1838/283, 3004/11/8, part 4.
solution to the Indo-China conflict and on the establishment of a study group on a collective security pact. In the course of the discussion, Casey and Munro were also strongly impressed that American views had crystallised on the need to salvage Laos and Cambodia from the wreck and as much as possible of Vietnam; Dulles talked about the need to build up the local defence of South Vietnam and to provide economic aid in the post-Geneva period; he also referred to the possible insertion in a collective security pact of a provision that would enable infiltration and indirect communist aggression to be coped with. However, as Casey observed, “Dulles was noticeably gloomy with respect to” the prospect of what the US considered an acceptable agreement reached at Geneva. The Secretary of State also feared that the creation of a partitioned country in Indo-China would further estrange Asian neutralist countries from America’s Asian policies. To this, Casey strongly assured Dulles that the concept of territorial division of Vietnam gained support from the Colombo powers except Indonesia.196

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The joint US-UK position on an Indo-China settlement was communicated to the French government on 30 June, and two days later, in his meeting with Dong in Geneva, Chauvel presented it to the Viet Minh as requirements being capable of international acceptance.197 But the Viet Minh, buoyed by the favourable development of the political and military situation for them, did not at all change their

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uncompromising stand. The Viet Minh, particularly its extremists, were, at this time, confident that they could overrun the Hanoi Delta during the next dry season and very possibly most of the rest of French-controlled Vietnam within a year. Under mounting pressure from extremist elements, Dong consistently insisted on the partition of Vietnam along the 13th Parallel, which meant that the Viet Minh could control about 80 per cent of the country. Concerning the issue of an election, the Viet Minh also proposed it be held within six months after the cessation of hostilities, while the French suggested that an election should be held within eighteen to twenty two months after ceasefire. By this time, Dong had virtually renounced his insistence on the partition of Cambodia. However, he persistently demanded international recognition of Pathet Lao resistance forces and a territorial concession for them; the Viet Minh apparently regarded the Laotian resistance movement as a more valuable asset than the Cambodian resistance movement.\(^{198}\)

In the face of the persistent Viet Minh demands, Mendes-France asked the US government to send Dulles or Bedell Smith back to Geneva so that the West could present a strong and united front. Since the return of Smith from Geneva on 20 June, the American delegation to the Geneva Conference had been headed by Alexis Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. After holding talks with Mendes-France, Ambassador Dillon telegraphed Dulles on 4 July, advising him to upgrade the US delegation at Geneva in order “to influence the French to stand

firm or to exert restraining influence upon the Communists." Eden also supported the Mendes-France proposal, requesting in a personal message to Dulles the presence of Bedell Smith at Geneva in view of "Smith's intimate knowledge of personalities involved at Geneva and of the manner in which the situation had developed." Dulles opposed the upgrading of the US delegation above the level of middle rank, arguing that the US was greatly concerned that a settlement at Geneva could be reached along the joint US-UK position, and that America, for domestic political reasons, could not acknowledge the legitimacy of communist control over any segment of Southeast Asia. But Eisenhower's personal secretary, James Hagarty, was very critical of Dulles. If "Dulles or Bedell Smith did not return," he told the President, "America would look like a little boy sucking in his tent." The President then advised Dulles to fly to Paris immediately for a private meeting with Mendes-France and Eden. The American Secretary of State stayed in Paris during 13-14 July. As a result of his conversation with Mendes-France and Eden, Dulles finally agreed that Bedell Smith would return to Geneva on 16 July on condition that the US would not associate itself formally with "any agreement which would appear to guarantee to the Communists the fruits of their aggression." Another result of Dulles' trip to Europe was that he and Mendes-France agreed to bring the Indo-China issue before the UN in the event of failure at the Geneva talks.

In the meantime, in Washington, the British-US study group had commenced talks on the establishment of a collective security treaty in South East Asia on 7 July. The talks lasted for ten days. Problems relating to the projected collective security arrangement mainly focused upon operative articles, membership, structure, duration, the defence area, and the nature of commitment. The most difficult question was that concerning membership of the treaty. Wishing to avoid the appearance of the reemergence of white colonialism, and regarding it as being important to engage the interest of the Colombo powers in resistance to communist expansion, Britain insisted upon the widest possible representation of Asian states. The United States, on the other hand, was willing to contemplate a security treaty whose only Asian adherents were Thailand and the Philippines. The Anglo-American officers also discussed action in the event of failure to get a negotiated settlement at Geneva, and the sense of the discussion was that it would then become more urgent to press forward at once with the creation of a collective security arrangement even with limited Asian membership, and also to take action to strengthen Siam, Laos, Cambodia and free Vietnam. It was considered that a rescue operation to extricate the French from the Tonkin Delta might be necessary.

Dulles' trip to Europe and the restoration of Anglo-American solidarity as a result of the opening of the discussions on a collective security treaty had apparently made some impact upon the Geneva talks. At a meeting with Mendes-France held on 13

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207 "Memorandum from F.J. Blake to Tange, 8 July, 1954" in AA, A5462/1, 2/4/1, part 5B.
208 "UK Foreign Office telegram No. 1430 from Scott to Eden, 8 July, 1954" in AA, A4968/2, 25/16/13, part 1.
July, Dong, accompanied by Zhou, remarked that "he was ready to go as far as [the] 16th Parallel" as the partition line of Viet Nam. This certainly represented a great concession by the Viet Minh. But, at the same time, Dong still insisted on elections being held within six months after the cessation of hostilities, and also expressed Viet Minh reluctance to sell out the interests of Pathet Lao resistance forces by urging a territorial partition of Laos.\(^{209}\) Even after the return of Bedell Smith to Geneva on 16 July, the Viet Minh remained unwilling to make further concessions, demanding the earliest possible holding of elections in Vietnam, and asserting that about half of Laos should be awarded to the Pathet Lao.\(^{210}\) Not until 19 July, when Dong met with Mendes-France, did the head of the Viet Minh delegation accept July 1956 as the latest date for elections in Vietnam.\(^{211}\) Under strong pressure from the Chinese premier, Dong also, in his meeting with Chauvel on the morning of 20 July, abandoned his demand for international recognition of Pathet Lao resistance forces and for a territorial concession for them.\(^{212}\) On the afternoon of that day, Eden, Molotov, Zhou, Mendes-France and Dong conferred at the French villa, and at that conference, the Soviet foreign minister proposed a compromise on the 17th Parallel as the line of demarcation in Vietnam. Although the 17th Parallel was thirty minutes south of the line specified in the joint Anglo-American position, Eden and Mendes-France nonetheless accepted the Soviet proposal. Under strong pressure from the Chinese and Soviets, Dong also reluctantly accepted it.\(^{213}\)

\(^{212}\) Ibid.
\(^{213}\) Robert F. Randle, op. cit., p. 339; and Townsend Hoopes, op. cit., p. 137.
During the night of 20-21 July, separate bilateral cease-fire agreements for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were concluded, and an unsigned Final Declaration was issued by the conference on 21 July. In addition, unilateral declarations were made by the delegations of Cambodia, Laos and France with respect to provisions of the settlement. The agreements for the cessation of hostilities, the Final Declaration and the unilateral declarations constituted the agreements of the Geneva Conference. By refraining from associating itself formally with the outcome of the Geneva Conference, the United States avoided endorsing the defeat of France’s all-out effort to block the thrust of Vietnamese nationalism. But by issuing a unilateral declaration, the United States did acquiesce in the legitimacy of communist control over half of Viet Nam. Taking note of what had been agreed at the Geneva talks, Bedell Smith declared that the Americans would not disturb the settlement by “the threat or the use of force”. 214

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The Geneva settlement established a favourable balance of power in Southeast Asia for the Western powers; it was not in any way a settlement based on recognition of existing communist gains on the battlefield of Indo-China; it gave the Viet Minh significantly less than they had seemingly earned on the battlefield. By agreeing to the Geneva settlement, the Viet Minh were forced to withdraw their troops from southern Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia, while, at the same time, the communist resistance movements in Laos and Cambodia which the Viet Minh had supported were completely denied political roles in the Laotian and Cambodian settlements.

Moreover, the Viet Minh had to accept division of Viet Nam at the 17th Parallel, a line of demarcation well to the north of their initial demands.

The Eisenhower administration admitted that the Viet Minh had emerged from Geneva with international recognition and a solid territorial base, and that this had inflicted serious damage on US prestige. However, it acknowledged that the Western powers had done well at Geneva, rejoicing in the outcome of the settlement. At a meeting of the NSC held on 22 July, Dulles conceded that “[t]he Communist demands had turned out to be relatively moderate in terms of their actual capabilities” on the battlefield. The Churchill government was also pleased with the Geneva settlement. Whereas Eden admitted to his Cabinet colleagues on 23 July that “it must be assumed that when elections were held in Viet Nam in July 1956, the Communists would win them,” he nonetheless regarded his big achievement at the Geneva talks as being in the settlements for Laos and Cambodia. “The essence of the settlement was,” he stated, “that Laos and Cambodia should remain as an independent and neutral buffer between China and Siam.” The Menzies government also appreciated that the Western powers had secured a far more favourable settlement than warranted by the military situation. “One can ... safely say,” Lawrence McIntyre, External Affairs officer in London, wrote to Tange on 29 July.

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218 By the closing stages of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China, the Australian Delegation to the Conference on Korea had been disbanded, and Watt and Rowland had left Geneva. To keep an eye on the last stages of the conference on Indo-China, McIntyre was sent from London to Geneva, and Ralph L. Harry, Australian Consulate-General in Geneva, was also there to report. See Sir Alan Watt, op.cit., p. 217.
that a majority of concessions made in order to get a settlement in the last two or three feverish days came from the Communist side ... The result is that the French got a settlement that, on the stark military facts, they really had no right to expect.\(^{219}\)

McIntyre went on to observe that the “détente” achieved by the Geneva settlement “might last for a while,” but he was greatly pessimistic about the future prospect of Indo-China. He told Tange that “the long-term portents” were “ominous.”

In order to preserve permanently the favourable but fragile balance of power in South East Asia created by the Geneva settlement, it was now urgently important for the Western powers to press ahead with the establishment of a collective security pact. It had been agreed between Eden and Bedell Smith in Geneva on 19 July that every effort should be made to persuade the Southeast Asian countries, particularly the Colombo powers, to associate themselves not only with the Geneva settlement but also with a collective security treaty in Southeast Asia.\(^{220}\) In accordance with the agreement, Eden sent messages to the five Colombo powers both on 20 and 24 July, requesting their views on participation in a Southeast Asian collective pact. For fear of undermining India’s neutrality and non-alignment, Nehru indicated in his message sent back to Eden on 2 August that the Delhi government had no hesitation in dissociating itself completely from the proposed pact,\(^{221}\) and Indonesia and Burma followed suit.\(^{222}\) Ceylon was more sympathetic to the concept of a collective pact, but eventually


\(^{221}\) “Message from Nehru to Eden, 2 August, 1954” in AA, A5462/1, 2/4/1, part 6.

\(^{222}\) “Message U Nu, Burmese Prime Minister, to Eden, 2 August, 1954” in AA, A5462/1, 2/4/1, part 6; and “UK Foreign Office telegram No. Y335, 30 July, 1954” in AA, A4968/2, 25/16/13, part 2.
decided against joining. But to America's dismay and surprise, on 5 August Prime Minister Mohammed Ali formally expressed Pakistan's desire for participation in a collective pact in the Southeast Asian region. Pakistan's interest was largely motivated by its expectation that joining an American-sponsored alliance would entitle it to receive American economic and military aid in greater quantity, and was heightened by the consideration that India would not be signing up.

While the US government had initially tried to discourage Pakistan's participation for fear of increasing India's hostility towards the collective pact, it was nonetheless eventually reconciled to the idea that Pakistan's admission “might have [a] favourable effect on Burma and Ceylon” and on their later association with the proposed treaty. Australia had also initially been loath to have Pakistan join the proposed security treaty; as Malcolm Booker of the European Division of the Department of External Affairs stated, in the event of Pakistan joining the pact, Australia's “commitments would then be transformed from the specific one of resisting Chinese Communist encroachments in South East Asia to a global one involving possible resistance to an attack by the Soviet Union southwards in the direction of the Indian peninsula.” But finally Australia believed that bringing Pakistan to the collective pact would help

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223 “Message from Sir John Kotelawara, Ceylon Prime Minister, to Eden, 4 August, 1954” in AA. A5462/1, 2/4/1, part 6.
227 “Memorandum from Malcolm Booker to James Plimsoll, Assistant Secretary, 14 July, 1954” in AA, A1838/278, TS (Top-Secret), 383/1/2, part 3.
prevent the security treaty from being regarded as purely a European or White Man’s pact, and therefore did not oppose Pakistan’s membership.  

Subsequently, discussions on the creation of the pact were conducted informally in a series of ANZUS Deputies’ meetings held in Washington on 6, 11, 13, 16, 19 and 23 August, with Spender, Munro, and Bedell Smith in attendance. The British Minister in Washington, Robert Scott, also attended the meetings. In the course of the preliminary informal meetings, differences of opinion emerged over the extent of the military commitment that should be involved in the proposed treaty. The United Kingdom and Australia viewed the proposed pact in terms of establishing machinery which would be adequate to sustain fairly extensive planning and make provision for readily available forces. The British Chiefs of Staff particularly had in mind the establishment of a Military Council at the Chiefs of Staff level and of a Military Executive Committee at a lower level, together with a small Secretariat for intelligence and other purposes. On forces, they also envisaged that there should be a SEATO (the South East Asia Treaty Organisation) mobile defence reserve force consisting of ground, naval and air forces earmarked by member countries and designated to act as “international fire brigade.” Commonwealth contribution should be a Strategic Reserve, which had been proposed in the Harding Report of October 1953. Nevertheless, the UK did not like to see the ANZAM concept and organisation abolished completely. “If SEADO [SEATO] is established,” the British Chiefs of Staff argued, “it will cover the military requirements of ANZAM.” However, “[t]he

228 “Telegram No. 512 from Tange to Spender, 4 August, 1954” in AA, A5462/1, 2/4/1, part 6.
ANZAM organisation as at present planned could not be subordinated to either a supreme commander or to a regional military committee.²³⁰

The Australian Chiefs of Staff also envisioned that the proposed pact should establish a joint military command, similar to the NATO command, to which standing forces would be assigned. On Australia’s contribution to SEATO, they expressed the view that Australia “would ... make available the forces envisaged as part of the strategic reserve” without giving “the impression ... that the use of such a force would be confined to Malaya.”²³¹ But the Australian military, like its counterpart in the UK, were anxious to preserve the ANZAM organisation as it was, and to ensure the separate identity of a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in a SEATO mobile defence reserve force. However, the Defence Department’s views of the Australian contribution to the proposed pact were not shared by the Prime Minister’s Department as well as the Department of External Affairs. Allen Brown, Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department, was very critical of the defence officials’ views. He wrote to Menzies that

The forces required under SEATO would need to be many times bigger than those contemplated for a strategic reserve. It would, therefore, misleading to think that the forces contemplated for a strategic reserve would be anything like adequate for SEATO.²³²

Brown suggested that Australia’s military contribution should not be decided “until we have ... definite indications as to United States intentions, and until the suggested

military machinery is in operation." He also expressed the view that the future of ANZAM could not be defined until SEATO took more definite shape.

On the other hand, for the United States, the proposed Southeast Asian pact was intended to deter open aggression and subversion without substantial US commitments. As Dulles wrote on 28 July, the US did "not envisage [a] SEA [South East Asia] pact developing into [a] NATO-type organisation with large permanent machinery under which large local forces-in-being are to be created with substantial US financial support and to which [the] US would be committed [to] contribute forces for local defence." Dulles thought that the United States could best contribute to the defence of Southeast Asia by developing a mobile deterrent force deployed in the Pacific Ocean plus strategically placed reserves stationed in Okinawa. He did not believe that the United States should scatter American power into showpieces of ineffective size by establishing substantial stationary US ground forces in forward areas of Southeast Asia.

The American military did not question Dulles' views of US contribution to SEATO. They thought that the United States could counter open aggression by the Chinese communists into Southeast Asia by sea and air power deployed in the Pacific offshore island chain. To combat subversion and infiltration in the non-communist states of Southeast Asia, they believed that a series of measures, such as US assistance in building up local security forces, US economic support and underground intelligence support would be sufficient. The stationing of American ground troops in the

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Southeast Asian region would not be required. As well, fearful of reducing United States military freedom of action, the US military argued against "the development of combined regional military plans along the NATO pattern," and insisted that SEATO should be "a consultative arrangement which would lead to the development of national plans so coordinated as to increase the mutual effectiveness of the defence effort of the countries concerned."²³⁴

Another difference of opinion, which emerged in the preliminary informal discussions on a collective pact, was concerned with the scope of the proposed treaty. By proposing the insertion of the word "Communist" into the Preamble and paragraph 1 of Article IV of the main text, the United States wished the proposed Southeast Asian pact to be directed exclusively against communist aggression. The US insistence was partly motivated by a desire to facilitate ratification of the proposed treaty in the Senate. Since the United States had no territorial position of its own in the area of Southeast Asia, it was not possible for the United States to say that any aggression occurring anywhere in this region was something which would endanger the peace and safety of the United States. Another reason was that the use of word "Communist" was the simplest way to ward off commitments so that the proposed treaty could not be invoked for purposes not intended by its sponsors. The US feared that the proposed treaty would draw the United States into colonial disputes and inter-regional rivalries between non-communist states, such as the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan.²³⁵

²³⁵ "UK Foreign Office telegram No. 1882 from Scott to Eden, 26 August, 1954" in AA, A1838/269, 654/8/10/1, part 3.
However, Australia was anxious to ensure that the proposed pact would give Australia the best protection against all eventualities; it did not regard communist expansion and invasion as the only potential threat in the area of Southeast Asia.

"Qualifying ‘aggression’ by the word ‘Communist,’” James Plimsoll, Assistant Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, wrote,

would limit the degree of protection given to Australia by confining it to protection against one sort of aggression. It must be remembered that the treaty could be in existence for many years and that we have not only to think of the situation as it confronted us in the present year. There was, for example, the possibility of an Indonesian attack on West New Guinea. There was also another possibility that Ho Chi Minh, for example, while remaining Communist, might split with the Communist world as Marshall Tito had done [in 1948] and, in that case, we might not have the treaty directed against Communism as such ... I did not myself think that defection by Ho Chi Minh was at all likely in the immediate future, but when one is drawing up a long-term treaty, one has to take account of various possibilities, ... [including] Japanese aggression.236

Moreover, Australia, like the United Kingdom, was still concerned to widen Asian membership of the proposed pact in the future, and was conscious that to point at communism as the only potential aggressor would not enhance the attractiveness of the proposed treaty to Asian countries.237

The ministerial conference to establish the South East Asia Treaty Organisation was held in Manila between 6 and 8 September, with representatives of four Anglo-Saxon powers (the US, the UK, Australia and France) and three Asian states (the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan). The ministerial conference was preceded by discussions among officials which lasted from 1 to 4 September, when agreement on

236 "Record of Conversation with Foss Shanahan by Plimsoll, 29 August, 1954" in AA, A1838/269, TS (Top-Secret) 654/8/14/4, part 1A.
non-controversial articles of the proposed treaty was basically reached. One day before the opening of the Manila Conference, Casey called on Dulles to discuss the organisational structure of SEATO. At that meeting, Casey showed that Australia saw in SEATO an opportunity to get the Americans to undertake joint planning and to give a firm indication of what its own role would be in any war in the region of Southeast Asia. The Minister stressed the Australian government’s earnest hope that the United States would agree to the establishment of effective military machinery under the proposed treaty, and would participate in planning for the defence of Southeast Asia. If security considerations should inhibit the US from undertaking eight-power joint military planning, it was desirable, Casey also claimed, to proceed with military planning among the white Anglo-Saxon powers, particularly the ANZUS powers plus the UK. The Australian Minister was anxious to obtain in SEATO a compensation for Britain’s exclusion from ANZUS deliberations. To make the security treaty really effective both as a protection against overt aggression and as a counter-subversion organisation, Casey went on, there was a need for the establishment of standing forces in Southeast Asia and for a specific American commitment to the area. To this, Dulles indicated that the United States was anxious to avoid undertakings that would limit its freedom to dispose of its military forces, and had no intention of earmarking specific American forces for SEATO. “If the US started earmarking forces for here, there and everywhere,” the Secretary of State argued, “it would run out of forces very rapidly since its commitments were global.” Dulles emphasised that US contribution in the event of aggression in the SEATO area would be made primarily in terms of sea and
air power deployed in the Pacific offshore island chain, particularly Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines.²³⁸

In his opening speech at the first plenary session of the Manila Conference held on the morning of 6 September, the American Secretary of State reiterated the US intention to avoid cumbersome organisation and detailed commitments under SEATO. For “the free nations to attempt to maintain or support formidable land-based forces at every danger point throughout,” he stressed, “would be self-destructive.” “So far as the United States is concerned, its responsibilities are so vast and so far flung that we believe that we serve best by developing the deterrent of mobile striking power plus strategically placed reserves.”²³⁹ In the second plenary session of the conference held on the afternoon of that day, the question of military machinery, which would be covered by Article V of SEATO, was discussed. However, for fear of Asian nations making similar requests, Casey refrained from pressing for joint defence planning and for the earmarking of American ground forces for the area of Southeast Asia. Article V of SEATO therefore merely provided for the establishment of a Council consisting of representatives of all the Parities “to consider matters concerning the implementation of the Treaty,” but left the nature of any subsidiary machinery undefined.²⁴⁰

In the third plenary session of the Manila Conference held on the morning of 7 September, Articles II, IV and III of the security treaty were discussed. In Article II, the participating members agreed that the purposes of SEATO would be to resist overt armed aggression and to counter “subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.” In the case of overt aggression, the parties agreed in paragraph 1 of Article IV that they “will ... act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.” If any member were threatened by means other than an armed attack, e.g. subversive infiltration, paragraph 2 of Article IV states, “the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defence.” This paragraph was interpreted to mean that SEATO could take no action to counter subversion or other actions short of open attack without a unanimous agreement among the member states. These paragraphs of Article IV prescribing the parties’ response in the event of direct and indirect aggression largely accorded with the wishes of Australia, since, as one senior official stated, Canberra

want[s] the United States to have freedom to react instantly if there is a substantial act of aggression and we are gravely threatened; at the same time, we want to exercise some restraint against minor incidents becoming regarded as a ground for war, and we would want to have consultations as far as possible.

In Article III, the parties pledged to “strengthen ... free institutions” of the non-communist states of Southeast Asia and, at the same time, “to promote economic progress and social well-being” of those states. For the economic development of the


non-communist states of the area, the US planned to utilise "Japan's industrial capacity and her ability to promote capital" investment.\textsuperscript{243}

In this session, the defence scope of the security treaty was also defined. This involved two questions. One was which territories of the parties would be protected by the security treaty. It had been generally agreed before the ministerial conference that the western limit of the treaty's defence scope would be East Pakistan, but that West Pakistan would be regarded as being outside the treaty area.\textsuperscript{244} However, for fear that Pakistan should sign the security treaty, other participating members agreed that West Pakistan would be covered by the defence scope.\textsuperscript{245} On the matter of fixing the southern limit of the defence scope, there were some differences of views between Australia and New Zealand. A brief for the New Zealand delegation at the Manila Conference did not contain any demand for the inclusion of the Southwest Pacific in the defence scope of the treaty. Wellington did not want Australia and New Zealand included in the defence scope because of the provisions of the security treaty against subversion; it did not want to be in the position where another country could ask New Zealand why it was not taking more action to combat subversion. As Shanahan stated, New Zealand did "not want McCarthyism pushed on us by a treaty."\textsuperscript{246} Wellington also argued that, since any attack on Australia and New Zealand would come through Asia, the inclusion of those states in the geographical scope would not make any real


\textsuperscript{245} "Cablegram No. MS37 from Casey to Tange, 7 September, 1954" in AA, A1838/283, 3004/11/8, part 10; and "Verbatim Proceedings of the Third Plenary Session, Manila Conference, 7 September, 1954" in FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. XII, part 1, pp. 862-896.

\textsuperscript{246} "Record of Conversation with Shanahan by Plimsoll, 29 August, 1954" in AA, A1838/269, TS (Top-Secret) 654/8/14/2, part 1.
difference to Australian and New Zealand security. However, Canberra was anxious
to obtain an additional protection to Australia and to complement the limited value of
American guarantees of Australia’s defence contained in ANZUS. Plimsoll stated that
Australia “looked upon SEATO as something giving protection to this country against
an attack.” Finally, Canberra’s desire was fulfilled in the first sentence of Article
VIII, which reads as follows:

As used in this Treaty, the Treaty Area is the general area of South East Asia
including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of
the South West Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30
minutes north latitude.

Another question which related to the definition of the geographical scope of the
security treaty was whether other areas or states would be brought within its defence
scope. This concerned the problem of Designating Indo-China states as areas covered
by the security treaty. The United States, by proposing to directly name the states of
Indo-China in the main text of the security treaty, wanted to make it crystal clear to the
communist powers that SEATO would give military backing to a settlement at
Geneva. It also wished to contain in the main text a definite warning to the communist
states not to upset the Geneva settlement by force.248 While Australia made no firm
decision on the way of designation,249 New Zealand favoured the idea of directly
Designating Associated States in the main text of the treaty. Paragraph 1 of Article IV
of a New Zealand draft treaty stated that

Each Parties recognises that aggression by means of armed attack in the Treaty
Area against any of the parties or against Cambodia, Laos and the Territory

247 “Record of Conversation with Shanahan by Plimsoll, 29 August, 1954” in AA, A1838/269, TS
(Top-Secret) 654/8/14/2, part 1.
part 1, pp. 784-787; and “Telegram from Spruance to the Department of State, 4 September, 1954” in
249 “Minutes of Meeting between Menzies, Fadden, Casey and McBride, 25 August, 1954” in AA,
under the jurisdiction of the government of the State of Vietnam ... would endanger its own peace and safety ... 250

However, the United Kingdom opposed the inclusion of any direct reference to Laos and Cambodia in the main text of the treaty, arguing that the designation of those states in the text would create strong impression among the communist powers that the defence of Laos and Cambodia were explicitly placed under a collective responsibility of the member states of SEATO. This, Britain claimed, would appear to “contravene the spirit of the Geneva settlement,” since an undertaking was given by Eden to Zhou at Geneva that Laos and Cambodia would not be included as members of the proposed security treaty. 251 The UK insisted that Laos and Cambodia should be named in a separate protocol as areas covered by the treaty. As well, Britain asserted that SEATO members could not make any permanent designation of south Vietnam as an area covered by the security treaty, since the Geneva settlement envisaged the ultimate re-unification of Vietnam. If this occurred under communist auspices, the UK argued, the security treaty might be placed in the anomalous position of protecting communist-controlled territory. The United Kingdom insisted on provisional designation of south Vietnam by proposing in a separate protocol a phrase “this designation to lapse on the unification of Vietnam by the elections prescribed in the final declaration of the Geneva

251 “Unsigned Memorandum: SEATO Definition of Area, 24 August, 1954” in AA, A1838/269, TS (Top-Secret) 654/8/14/4, part 1A. As already mentioned, in his meeting with Eden on 16 June, Zhou expressed concern about a possible American attempt to establish bases in Laos and Cambodia. In subsequent discussions with the British Foreign Secretary held on 13, 17 and 20 July, Zhou repeatedly voiced anxiety about American intentions. To this, Eden reassured Zhou that the US had no intention to establish bases in Laos and Cambodia. As well, the British gave reassurance to the Chinese premier that the Western powers did not intend to have Laos and Cambodia participate in a collective security treaty as full participants. See Geoffrey Warner, “From Geneva to Manila: British Policy Towards Indo-China and SEATO, May-September 1954” in Lawrence S. Kaplan, Denise Artaud, and Mark R. Rubin (eds.), op. cit., p. 161.
Conference on Indo-China.” The proposed UK protocol would also permit subsequent designation of states and territories by unanimous consent of the parties.252

Finally, France reconciled the US, New Zealand and the UK views. It urged the US and New Zealand to refrain from making any direct reference to Indo-China states in the main text of the treaty and to agree to direct designation of those states in a separate protocol. At the same time, it persuaded the UK to consent to indirect designation of Indo-China states in the main text. The French also persuaded the British to withdraw its insistence on temporary designation of south Vietnam in a protocol by saying that the accompanying protocol would be subject to change to suit the subsequent situation in Vietnam.253 The French mediation efforts bore fruit in paragraph 1 of Article IV of the main text and paragraph 2 of Protocol to SEATO.

Paragraph 1 of Article IV reads as follows:

Each party recognises that [ ] aggression by means of armed attack in the Treaty Area against any of the Parties or against any state or territory which the parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate would endanger its own peace and safety ...

Paragraph 2 of Protocol states that

The Parties to the South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty unanimously designate for the purposes of Article IV of the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the state of Vietnam.

Thus SEATO guaranteed the Geneva settlement, and Laos, Cambodia and south Vietnam were put under the treaty’s protection.

252 “United Kingdom Comments on SEATO Draft up to the 18th August, 1954” in AA, A1838/269, TS (Top-Secret) 654/8/14/2, part 1; and “Memorandum from the British Embassy to the Department of State, undated” in FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. XII, part 1, p. 762.

The inclusion of West Pakistan in the defence scope of SEATO made it urgent for the US to explore a formula for reconciling its desire to have the security treaty directed exclusively against communist aggression with other parties’ desire to have it directed against all contingencies. In the same session, Dulles showed that, because of opposition by all countries except Thailand, the United States had been thinking of accepting the elimination of the word “Communist” from the Preamble and paragraph 1 of Article IV of the treaty and of attaching to the treaty a reservation that, in so far as the US was concerned, it applied only to a communist attack. This solution of the problem left Australia in an awkward position. At 2:19 p.m., Manila time, Casey cabled Menzies and Senator Spicer, Acting Minister for External Affairs, requesting their views on whether Australia should make a reservation similar to that proposed by the US. Cabinet was convened at 2:00 p.m., eastern Australian standard time, at which, apart from the fact that an American reservation would substantially reduce the treaty’s protective role for Australia, Cabinet members noted that the American proposal would leave Australia in the anomalous position of accepting an undertaking which would be more onerous than that accepted by the United States. Cabinet was therefore concerned about the acceptance by the Parliament of the proposed treaty. It was decided that Casey should be instructed to sign the treaty with the same reservation concerning the interpretation of aggression as was proposed by the United

254 Ibid.
255 “Cablegram No. MS32 from Casey to Menzies and Spicer, 7 September, 1954” in AA, A1838/1, 383/4/1, part 3.
The Cabinet decision was immediately transmitted from Plimsoll to Watt, who was in Manila as a member of the Australian delegation.

At around the same time as Cabinet had been meeting, Casey had been discussing with the United Kingdom representative, Lord Reading, and the New Zealand representative, Webb, whether they had also been considering making a reservation on similar lines to that of the Americans. Reading and Webb indicated that their governments were not so disturbed as the Australian Cabinet at the fact that Britain and New Zealand were undertaking obligations wider in extent than those assumed by the United States. Reporting the New Zealand and British attitude in a cable sent at 4:09 p.m., Manila time, Casey urged Menzies and Spicer to reverse the Cabinet decision by arguing that "we can not put into the Treaty, by way of [a] reservation, any suggestion that open warfare may come about between two countries of the Commonwealth [India and Pakistan]." With no response from Canberra, in the fifth session of the Manila Conference held on the morning of 8 September, Casey, in accordance with his Cabinet instruction, reluctantly suggested that Australia would want to attach the same reservation as the Americans qualifying the nature of aggression. Following Australia's suggestion, the Philippines, along with other

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258 On 30 August, 1954 the French National Assembly rejected ratification of the EDC treaty. This prevented Eden from attending the Manila Conference, because he had to devote his energies to finding an alternative salvage plan for EDC. Eden's intensive diplomatic activities in European capitals between 11 and 17 September finally bore fruit in the Western European Union (WEU), which was created by an agreement to extend the Brussels Treaty Organisation to include the Federal Republic of Germany as well as Italy.
260 Ibid.
representatives, insisted on making a similar reservation. Greatly perturbed at this turn of events, Dulles now hinted at the possible breakdown of the conference.\textsuperscript{261}

Phoning Menzies at lunchtime of the same day, Casey strongly warned that “a signature by Australia with a reservation like the American one would cause consternation at Manila and might prejudice the whole treaty.”\textsuperscript{262} At 3:00 p.m., the Australian Cabinet met again to consider the matter. Still concerned at the domestic implications of Australia appearing to enter into obligations to commit forces in non-communist wars in Southeast Asia when the Americans were not so committed, Cabinet reconfirmed the former decision. But, at the same time, Casey was instructed that if, in his opinion, insistence upon an Australian reservation would produce “an inevitable breakdown” of the conference, he should sign the treaty without a reservation but with a statement affirming Australia’s right to enter a reservation before ratifying the treaty.\textsuperscript{263} The Cabinet decision was conveyed to Casey by Senator Spicer in a telephone conversation. At 6:00 p.m., Manila time, the Southeast Asia collective defence treaty was signed by eight nations in the course of the sixth session of the conference. At the time of signature, Casey issued the following statement: “I shall sign subject to the right of the Australian government to review the Treaty prior to ratification in accordance with Australian constitutional practice.”\textsuperscript{264}

\textsuperscript{261} “Telegram from Dulles to the State Department, 8 September, 1954” in \textit{FRUS}, 1952-54, Vol. XII, part 1, pp. 897-898.

\textsuperscript{262} “Attachment to Cabinet Decision No. 30, 8 September, 1954” in \textit{AA}, A1838/269, TS (Top-Secret)654/8/4/2, part 2.


\textsuperscript{264} “Editorial Note” in \textit{FRUS}, 1952-54, Vol. XII, part 1, p. 898; and Sir Alan Watt, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 222. Australia’s joining in SEATO was given overwhelming support from the Australian public. In an Australian Gallup Poll conducted in May-June 1954, 77% of the public favoured Australian
After finishing discussions at the Manila Conference, Casey continued to pursue the idea of combined military planning under SEATO and the earmarking of American ground troops for the defence of Southeast Asia. Arriving in London on 15 September via Rangoon, Casey met with Churchill and Sir John Harding, Chief of the Imperial General Staff. In these conversations, Casey stressed the need for SEATO to create a deterrent like NATO with a command structure and standing forces. To that end, the Minister described the importance of developing military planning, particularly among the ANZUS powers and Britain, and of obtaining a specific American commitment to SEATO. With the support of the British, Casey flew to Washington on 17 September. Accompanied by Spender, the Minister called on Radford at the Pentagon and told him that “some planning and consultation between Manila signatories was necessary to arrive at forces that signatories would individually agree to maintain and earmark to meet eventualities in the Treaty area.” Radford, however, did not think that there was any need for military planning in the SEATO area or for earmarking US forces for particular tasks in Asia.

In his conversation with Dulles five days later, the Australian Minister stressed the insufficiency of the contribution of US sea and air power as a means of deterring open aggression by the Chinese communists into Southeast Asia. At the same time, Casey

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emphasised that the strengthening of indigenous defence systems of Southeast Asia through the provision of economic and military assistance and the rendering of intelligence support would be quite insufficient to combat subversion and infiltration. He canvassed the desirability of creating adequate military machinery backed by standing forces to meet any contingencies that might arise. However, Dulles repeated the established US position. At a hastily arranged ANZUS Council meeting on 11 October, Casey, assuming that security considerations would inhibit the SEATO powers from getting into detailed war planning on an eight-power basis, reiterated that substantial military discussions for SEATO purposes should be conducted under cover of ANZUS with UK participation. He also urged Dulles that the United States should support SEATO with specific commitments of ground troops. In response, Dulles showed that the US was opposed to the Australian scheme for retaining strategic direction of Southeast Asia in the hands of the white Anglo-Saxon powers, and went on to argue that, "[w]ith world-wide responsibilities of the US, it was not wise for us to make an allocation of military strength to the area."

In the face of America's unwillingness to develop combined defence planning for Southeast Asia and to earmark specific US armed forces for the defence of the area, Australia now turned its attention again to the Harding Report. As "the promising way... to attract the United States to participate in joint strategic planning," and to

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269 "Letter from McBride to Menzies, 6 October, 1954" in AA, A5954/33, 1428/44.
induce the US to commit more firmly to the defence of Southeast Asia, Australia was now determined to press ahead with the establishment of a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve. With the approval of Cabinet, on 12 October Menzies wrote to Harcourt Smith, UK High Commissioner, Canberra, expressing the Australian government's agreement to going forward with the creation of a Strategic Reserve in Malaya. Thus Australia's contribution to a British Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, which would include the despatch of land forces as well as more air and naval forces, now came to be intended to modify the American concept of elastic defence in the Southeast Asian area and to overcome its reluctance to station ground troops in the area, thereby enhancing SEATO's value as a deterrent to an overt attack by Communist China and as a counter-insurgency organisation.

Conclusion

By early 1954 the US government had accepted that control of Indo-China by the Viet Minh and other resistance forces would be detrimental to the interests of the United States and had underwritten the French war effort to suppress the Indo-China rebels. This came largely from the American need to bolster the French as an alliance partner in NATO, to contain Communist China, to ensure Southeast Asia as an export/import market for Japan and to take account of domestic politics in the United States. Even after the Berlin Conference of February 1954, the United States did not waver in its determination to defeat insurgent forces by military force. Still confident in French and Vietnamese will to continue the fighting and in the development of indigenous Vietnamese resistance to communism, the US, in its approach to the

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Geneva conference, adopted a policy of seeking a military solution. This policy was publicised when France faced an offensive by the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu. US concern that the fall of Dien Bien Phu would erode French and Vietnamese morale and will to continue the fighting, and that this would unfavourably affect the French negotiating position at Geneva caused the United States to propose joint military intervention with its allies. But the American Indo-China policy and the US proposal for military intervention were strongly opposed by the British. No longer confident in French will to continue the war effort or in the prospect of fostering indigenous Vietnamese resistance to communism, the UK did not believe that the provision of any American or allied inducement would effectively bolster French and Vietnamese morale and will. Britain's approach was a peaceful solution on the basis of territorial division of Viet Nam.

A number of scholars and historians have recently argued that the British-US confrontation in the course of the Indo-China crisis of 1954 arose from and revolved around the US proposal for Allied military intervention. However, this is the wrong

argument. This Chapter has argued that the confrontation came from and revolved around the basically different UK-US approaches to a solution to the Indo-China war. The proposed US "united action" was a means to sustain the policy of searching for a military solution.

The Anglo-American confrontation over the problem of Indo-China, as some scholars and historians have discussed and this Chapter has more fully elaborated, provided an opportunity for Australia to influence US policy-planning. In the course of the Dien Bien Phu crisis, Canberra pursued two objectives. One was to prevent the Viet Minh and other resistance forces from establishing a dominant position in Indo-China. To that end, Australia initially supported the American policy of seeking a military solution. However, following their assessment of the likely impact of the fall of Dien Bien Phu upon French and Vietnamese fighting capabilities, the Defence Department realised the folly of the armed struggle. In consequence, they came to oppose America's Indo-China policy and its proposal for armed intervention. Casey and the Department of External Affairs soon came around to the view. But by using the impending general election as an excuse, Australia refrained from expressing its opposition, thereby fostering America's expectation of its role in the armed intervention scheme. At the same time, in the course of the Dien Bien Phu crisis, Australia was anxious not to discourage America's increased interest in the defence of Southeast Asia. Australia's second objective was therefore directed towards obtaining

strong assurances that the United States would, in the future, be formally and
permanently involved in preserving the balance of power in Southeast Asia. To that
end, Australia pressured the UK as well as the US to start early talks on a collective
security pact. But this was opposed by Britain.

With the military situation in the Tonkin Delta deteriorating from mid-May, and
the military balance actually moving further in favour of the Viet Minh, Australia
could no\textsuperscript{y} longe\textsuperscript{r} conceal opposition to America's Indo-China policy and
proposed armed intervention. Canberra strongly urged the US to renounce its policy
of encouraging the French and Vietnamese to continue the fighting and to seek a
peaceful solution. These Australian views, finally embodied in a formal document, as
Gregory Pemberton has argued, made some impact upon the United States in
renouncing its proposal for "united action.\textsuperscript{373} However, as this Chapter has argued,
they were merely a supplementary and additional factor. The decisive factor that
brought about the revision of America's Indo-China policy and of the contemplated
means to sustain that policy was US understanding of lack of the French and
Vietnamese fighting capabilities following the fall of Dien Bien Phu. If the US had still
been confident in the will of the French Union forces to continue the struggle and had
expected that a more favourable military balance could be created by a military
solution, it would never have adopted a peaceful solution and might have continued to
consider the possibility of armed intervention with other states even without the
participation of Britain and Australia. US fear that the continued armed struggle
would tip the military balance further to the advantage of communist insurgents caused

\textsuperscript{373} Gregory Pemberton, "Australia, the United States, and the Indo-China crisis of 1954", \textit{op.cit.}, pp.
45-66.
the US to adopt the policy of seeking a negotiated settlement and to abandon its proposed "united action." In the course of the visit of Churchill and Eden to Washington, agreement was reached between the UK and the US on an approach to a solution to the Indo-China conflict and on specific formulae for ending the fighting.

The Geneva settlement, finally arrived at in mid-July, prevented communist resistance forces from establishing a dominant position in Indo-China by conceding the Viet Minh only half of the territorial base of Vietnam, and by completely denying a political role for Pathet Lao and Khmer Issarak resistance forces in Laos and Cambodia. The settlement did not at all reflect the actual military strength of communist rebel forces on the battlefield. To preserve permanently the favourable but fragile military balance of power in Southeast Asia created by the Geneva settlement, SEATO was concluded among eight nations. By forming SEATO, the United States now showed its determination to involve itself permanently in the preservation of the balance of power in Southeast Asia created by the Geneva settlement, although it did not commit specific armed forces to the defence of the area. By joining SEATO, Australia also now showed to the US its willingness to cooperate to sustain the favourable Southeast Asian strategic balance and its readiness to support the maintenance of the independence of south Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to the extent of fighting for them. Thus with the creation of the Geneva settlement and of SEATO, Australia was successful in attaining the objectives which it had been pursuing in the course of the Dien Bien Phu crisis.
Chapter VI
Conclusion

SEATO was the first formal regional association in the Southeast Asian area in the post-World War II period. The security treaty was indeed a watershed both in the region’s relations with the outside world and in American and Australian relations with Southeast Asia. It provided an important avenue for Southeast Asia to play a role in global politics. At the same time, it offered an important avenue for the US and Australia to play a role in Southeast Asian international politics. SEATO symbolised America’s formal involvement in the defence of the Southeast Asian mainland. It also marked Australia’s assumption of a formal role in the maintenance of the balance of power in the Southeast Asian region. There have been numerous accounts of Australia’s response to security developments in Asia since the end of World War II and of Canberra’s search for ways of guaranteeing Australian security. Australian policy towards SEATO has often been referred to in these accounts, but it has usually been marginal to the discussions. This thesis has sought to correct this by providing an integrated and comprehensive account of why Australia joined SEATO.

This thesis has argued that the Australian search for a military alliance in mainland Southeast Asia arose from the desire to complement the limited value of the ANZUS alliance in protecting the Australian continent from all quarters. In early 1950, Spender, alive to the danger of what might occur from a resurgent Japanese aggression

1 See above, Chapter I (Introduction), pp. 2-3.
and what looked like an aggressive Communist China, broached a proposal for a Pacific alliance with the US. He planned to obtain a long-term US guarantee of the defence of Southeast Asia as well as the Southwest Pacific. He was encouraged in this direction by the fighting in Korea. By diverting Australian forces from Japan to Korea, Canberra gave the US practical evidence of Australia's readiness to undertake a wider regional and global role. When Spender discussed the concept of a Pacific pact with top American officials, he indicated that he had in mind, as prospective members of the pact, Australia, New Zealand, the UK, the Philippines and the US, and that the defence scope of the pact would cover not only the Southwest Pacific, but also the Southeast Asian mainland. Spender's quest for a Pacific pact caused the US to devise a formula for reassuring the wartime Pacific allies against a rearmed Japan in the form of a presidential declaration. It also came up with a plan for Australia's involvement in US planning on Japanese rearmament. But the US remained unwilling to involve itself permanently in peace-time in the preservation of the balance of power in the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia.

Later, faced with Communist China's massive counter-offensive in Korea, Washington showed its readiness to underwrite the defence of the Southwest Pacific by proposing a Pacific Ocean pact. However, the US made it clear that, at that time, it was unwilling to provide a guarantee of the defence of mainland Asian states. It was for this reason that Britain, concerned about the security of Malaya, opposed the Pacific Ocean pact idea. Nevertheless, the United States was eventually able to win the support of its wartime Pacific allies. Through the creation of ANZUS and the Philippine-US mutual defence treaty, it was able to reassure those states against a
future Japanese threat and to obtain their approval of a plan to revitalise Japanese power on an unconditional basis. As well, the US obliged Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines to assist US forces in the protection of Japan from a communist threat. Washington created ANZUS and the US-Philippine mutual defence treaty as a counterweight to a Soviet-Chinese military potential directed towards Japan and as a supplement to a forwardly deployed American military presence in Northeast Asia. Thus Australia and New Zealand were formally incorporated into the sphere of US influence. However, consistent with America’s reluctance to make a formal commitment to the defence of mainland Southeast Asia, ANZUS did not include this area in its coverage. In consequence, Australia’s security environment was still partially vulnerable to communist expansion and invasion.

It has also been argued that the Menzies government searched for a military pact in Southeast Asia in an attempt to mollify Britain over its exclusion from ANZUS. In the years 1952-53 Australia and New Zealand were bedevilled by pressure exerted by the United Kingdom for its own association with ANZUS. Concerned about the political effect in the UK of having no connection with discussions among Australia, New Zealand and the US, the Churchill government demanded direct or indirect admission to the deliberations. Britain also felt that its extensive interests in the Pacific as well as its Commonwealth ties with the Pacific dominions entitled it to some relationship with ANZUS. However, the repeated British requests were completely rebuffed by the ANZUS powers. This forced the British government to change its tactics with regards to its exclusion from ANZUS. By proposing to revitalise the ANZAM arrangement and to involve it more deeply in the defence of British interests in Malaya, London
attempted to diminish the significance of ANZUS. Britain sought to deter the Pacific dominions from being drawn more deeply into the sphere of US influence by having those states assume a larger military role in the British Commonwealth orbit.

Australia for its part realised that it had to adjust to the contraction of the British presence by involving itself more deeply in the defence of Malaya. As well, the prospect of partially compensating for Britain's exclusion from ANZUS gave Australia another reason for supporting the proposal for the ANZAM reformation. Canberra hoped that the reaffirmation of Australia's status and role as a Commonwealth alliance partner of Britain in the form of its participation in a Strategic Reserve in Malaya would block further London pressure for association with ANZUS and preserve the value of the tripartite security treaty as it was. Nevertheless, because of the secret nature of ANZAM, this particular demonstration of dominion loyalty to the United Kingdom did not offer an ideal solution to the political problem in the UK arising from Britain's exclusion from ANZUS. In consequence, Australia still felt the need to seek a security treaty or some other machinery that would recognise Britain's right to say in Western policy in Asia.

This thesis has also argued that Australia's search for a Southeast Asian pact backed by the US was influenced by the deteriorating situation in Indonesia and the fear of an Indonesian attack on Dutch New Guinea. When the Menzies government came to power, Australian-Indonesian relations were dominated by the West New Guinea issue. The dispute between Holland and Indonesia over the determination of sovereignty for the territory originated in the Dutch desire to ensure West New Guinea
as a Eurasian homeland. Given New Guinea’s role as the geographical terminus of the island chain protruding from Asia, and given its role in the protectorate and trust territory of Papua and New Guinea, Canberra was far from indifferent to the two nations’ conflicting claims to sovereignty over the western part of New Guinea. Fearing the erosion of New Guinea’s role as an effective bulwark for Australia’s defence, and wary of the possibility of covetous Indonesian eyes being cast over Papua and New Guinea, the Menzies government had no wish to see Indonesian rule extended to any part of New Guinea. The government’s high sensitivity to any change in the political status of Dutch New Guinea caused it to seek a voice in Indonesian-Dutch negotiations on New Guinea. But in spite of Australia’s interventionist stance, during 1950-52, discussions on the West New Guinea issue were conducted on a bilateral basis, with two Indonesian-Dutch Union Conferences being held.

Subsequently, developments in domestic politics in both Holland and Indonesia were a hindrance to a negotiated settlement. In Indonesia, the economic situation deteriorated, and this caused the Jakarta government to plan for the transformation of its enormous guerrilla Army into a professional Army. But the government’s attempt at Army reform resulted in the “October 17 Affair,” which paved the wary for the domination of Parliament and Administration by extremist nationalists. The worsening internal situation in Indonesia evoked responses from the Hague and Canberra, with the former determining to retain full sovereignty over New Guinea on a long-term basis and to develop the territory economically, and the latter strengthening its support for Holland’s resolve to preserve a permanent presence in New Guinea. Both nations concluded an administrative agreement between the eastern and western parts of the
island. When the Ali government was established in Indonesia, the victory of extremist nationalists over moderates was confirmed, and Australia and the US became alarmed at the possibility of a communist takeover in Indonesia. Canberra feared that further communist gains in Indonesia would be encouraged by the spread of communism in Indo-China. This made Australia more anxious than ever to see a formal American commitment to the defence of the Southeast Asian mainland.

It has also been the argument of this thesis that Australian anxiety to contain the perceived threat of communist expansion and invasion was the major factor that encouraged Canberra to seek a military pact in Southeast Asia. The menace of communism increased when the Viet Minh mounted an intensive offensive against the French fortress at Dien Bien Phu. The United States, by proposing a joint military intervention with its allies, demonstrated its unwavering determination to forcibly suppress the resistance forces of Indo-China. It also demonstrated its resolve to discourage the French from making a settlement at Geneva on the basis of recognition of existing communist gains on the battlefield. Canberra initially supported the American policy of seeking a military solution to the Indo-China conflict as a means of preventing the rebels in Indo-China from establishing a dominant position. But following its assessment of the likely impact of the fall of Dien Bien Phu upon the French and Vietnamese capacity to carry on the war, it realised that any continued fighting in Indo-China would tip the military balance on the battlefield further in favour of communist resistance forces. It sided with a policy of searching for a peaceful solution, which paralleled the view held by Britain. Nevertheless, the Menzies government attempted to reconcile its opposition to America's Indo-China policy with
its desire not to discourage America’s increased interest in the defence of Southeast Asia. While concealing its opposition to US Indo-China policy by using the impending general election as an excuse, Canberra pursued the objective of obtaining strong assurances that the United States would, in the future, be formally and permanently involved in the preservation of the balance of power in the Southeast Asian region. To that end, Australia pressured the UK as well the US to start early political talks on a collective security pact to be established after the Geneva Conference.

When the military situation in the Tonkin Delta deteriorated, and the military balance actually shifted further in favour of Vietnamese insurgent forces, Australia’s sense of crisis that the prolongation of the fighting in Indo-China would unfavourably affect its own security environment greatly increased. Canberra could no longer maintain its non-committed stance on America’s Indo-China policy. It urged the United States to abandon its encouragement of the French and Vietnamese military effort and instead to seek a negotiated settlement on Indo-China on the basis of a partition of Vietnam. The revelation of Australia’s opposition to America’s Indo-China policy occurred at a time when the US began to recognise lack of fighting capabilities of the French Union forces and the disadvantages of continued armed struggle. It therefore did not undermine America’s willingness to underwrite the defence of Southeast Asia. By agreeing with the UK to set up a study group on a collective security pact, the US acknowledged the need to assume a permanent balancing role in guaranteeing a settlement at Geneva. The Geneva settlement favoured the national interests of the Western bloc by giving the Viet Minh only half of the territorial base of Vietnam and by completely denying a political role for Pathet
Lao and Khmer Issarak rebel forces. Finally, SEATO, which was established with the primary aim of permanently preserving the favourable but fragile balance of power in Southeast Asia created by the Geneva settlement, provided for formal US involvement in the defence of Southeast Asia.

Thus, for Australia, SEATO was a supplement to the limited value of the security guarantee afforded it by the ANZUS pact; was a counter to pressures exerted by the United Kingdom upon both Australia and New Zealand for its own association with ANZUS; was a counterweight to perceived Indonesian adventurism on West New Guinea; and was a means of containing communism in Southeast Asia. With the creation of ANZUS, the revitalisation of ANZAM, the conclusion of an administrative agreement with the Dutch and full participation in SEATO, Australia achieved its aims of preserving the European colonial presence and of securing American involvement in its own security environment. At the same time, Australia was drawn deeply into regional concerns in association with the European powers and the United States, and became involved in the preservation of Western interests in Asia. In order to obtain a long-term American guarantee of the defence of the Southwest Pacific region, Australia accepted a US plan for unconditional revitalisation of Japanese military power and a commitment to protect American troops and bases in the territories of the former enemy. In order to prevent the sphere of British Commonwealth influence in Asia from contracting and to sustain the capacity of the UK to maintain its position as a Great Power, Australia assumed some of the roles and missions thus far allocated to Britain in the defence of Malaya. In order to preserve a permanent Dutch presence in West New Guinea, Australia translated its concern about New Guinea's status into
effective and concrete support for the Dutch in the form of an administrative agreement. In order to encourage a formal American commitment to the defence of the Southeast Asian mainland, Australia demonstrated its readiness to fight for the preservation of the independence of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Thus, in the period 1950-54, Australia’s post-war western-oriented posture in international affairs crystallised, particularly in the form of the strategy of building or consolidating the spheres of American and European influence as a means of insulating Australia from a perceived hostile Asian environment. However, later events would prove that many of the principles and assumptions underpinning Australian foreign policy, which were firmly established during 1950-54, were based on empty foundations.
Appendix

1. The Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand and the United States (ANZUS), September 1, 1951.

The Parties to this Treaty, 

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area, 

Noting that the United States already has arrangements pursuant to which its armed forces are stationed in the Philippines, and has armed forces and administrative responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and, upon the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty, may also station armed forces in and about Japan to assist in the preservation of peace and security in the Japan area, 

Recognising that Australia and New Zealand as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific Area, 

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific Area, and
Desiring further to co-ordinate their efforts for collective defence for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area,

Therefore declare and agree as follows:

**Article I**

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

**Article II**

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

**Article III**

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.
Article VI
Each Party recognises that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Article V
For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

Article VI
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article VII
The Parties hereby establish a Council consisting of their Foreign Ministers or deputies to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet at any time.

Article VIII
Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area and the development by the United Nations of more effective means to maintain international peace and security, the Council established by Article VII is authorised to maintain a consultative relationship with states, regional organisations, associations of states, or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the purpose of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that area.

**Article IX**

The Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of Australia, which will notify each of the other signatories of such deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratification of the signatories have been deposited.

**Article X**

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may cease to be a member of the Council established by Article VII one year after notice has been given to the Government of Australia, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of such notice.

**Article XI**

This Treaty in the English language shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of Australia. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of each of the other signatories.

Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference on the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China, in which the representatives of Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America took part.

1. The Conference takes note of the agreements ending hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam and organising international control and the supervision of the execution of the provisions of these agreements.

2. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the ending of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam; the Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreements on the cessation of hostilities will permit Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam henceforth to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations.

3. The Conference takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and of Laos of their intention to adopt measures permitting all citizens to take their place in the national community, in particular by participating in the next general elections, which, in conformity with the constitution of each of these countries,
shall take place in the course of the year 1955, by secret ballot and in conditions of respect for fundamental freedoms.

4. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet Nam prohibiting the introduction into Viet Nam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as all kinds of arms and munitions. The Conference also takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos of their resolution not to request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel or in instructors, except for the purpose of the effective defence of their territory and, in the case of Laos, to the extent defined by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Laos.

5. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet Nam to the effect that no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zones of the two parties, the latter having the obligation to see that the zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of any military alliance and shall not be utilised for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. The Conference also takes note of the declarations of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to the effect that they will not join in any agreement with other States if this agreement included the obligation to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or, in the case of Laos, with the principles of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos or, so long as their security is not threatened, the obligation to
establish bases on Cambodian or Laotian territory for the military forces of foreign Powers.

6. The Conference recognises that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Viet Nam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political and territorial boundary. The Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provision set out in the present declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future of a political settlement in Viet Nam.

7. The Conference declares that, so far as Viet Nam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the Member States of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from July 20, 1955 onwards.
8. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities intended to ensure the protection of individuals and of property must be most strictly applied and must, in particular, allow everyone in Viet Nam to decide freely in which zone he wishes to live.

9. The competent representative authorities of the Northern and Southern zones of Viet Nam, as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia, must not permit any individual or collective reprisals against persons who have collaborated in any way with one of the parties during the war, or against members of such persons' families.

10. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the Government of the French Republic to the effect that it is ready to withdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam, at the request of the Governments concerned and within periods which shall be fixed by agreement between the parties except in the cases where, by agreement between the parties, a certain number of French troops shall remain at specified points and for a specified time.

11. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government to the effect that for the settlement of all the problems connected with the re-establishment and consolidation of peace in Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam, the French Government will proceed from the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam.

12. In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam, each member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the
territorial integrity of the above-mentioned States, and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

13. The members of the Conference agree to consult one another on any question which may be referred to them by the International Supervisory Commission, in order to study such measures as may prove necessary to ensure that the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam are respected.

3. The South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), September 8, 1954.

(A) Text of the Treaty

The Parties to this Treaty

Recognising the sovereign equality of all the Parties,

Reiterating their faith in the purposes of principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments,

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights of self-determination of peoples, and declaring that they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and secure
the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities,

Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being and development of all peoples in the Treaty Area,

Intending to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that any potential aggressor will appreciate that the Parties stand together in the area, and

Desiring further to co-ordinate their efforts for collective defence for the preservation of peace and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

**Article I**

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

**Article II**
In order effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

Article III

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and cooperate with one another in the further development of economic measure, including technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of governments toward these ends.

Article IV

1. Each Party recognises that aggression by means of armed attack in the Treaty Area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the Treaty Area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the
peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measure which should be taken for the common defence.

3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the governments concerned.

**Article V**

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the Treaty Area may from time to time require. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet at any time.

**Article VI**

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of any of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third Party is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.
Any other State in a position to further the objectives of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the area may, by unanimous agreement of the Parties, be invited to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article VIII

As used in this Treaty, the 'Treaty Area' is the general area of South East Asia including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of the South West Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, amend this Article to include within the Treaty Area the territory of any State acceding to this Treaty in accordance with Article VII or otherwise to change the Treaty Area.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the other signatories.

2. The Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall notify all the other signatories of such deposit.
3. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the instruments of ratification of a majority of the signatories shall have been deposited, and shall come into effect with respect to each other State on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

Article X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article XI

The English text of this Treaty is binding on the Parties, but when the Parties have agreed to the French text thereof and have so notified the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, the French text shall be equally authentic and binding on the Parties.

(B) Understanding of the United States of America

The United States of America in executing the present Treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to Communist
aggression but affirms that, in the event of other aggression or armed attack, it will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done at Manila, this eighth day of September 1954.

(C) Protocol to the South East Asia Treaty Organisation(SEATO)

Designation of states and territory as to which provisions of Article IV and Article III are to be applicable:

The Parties to the South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty unanimously designate for the purposes of Article IV of the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam.

The Parties further agree that the above-mentioned states and territory shall be eligible in respect of the economic measures contemplated by Article III.

This Protocol shall enter into force simultaneously with the coming into force of the Treaty.
In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Protocol to the South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty.

(D) The Pacific Charter

The delegates of Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, the Kingdom of Thailand, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America:

Desiring to establish a firm basis for common action to maintain peace and security in South East Asia and the South West Pacific:

Convinced that common action to this end in order to be worthy and effective must be inspired by the highest principles of justice and liberty:

Do hereby proclaim:

First, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities;
Second, they are each prepared to continue taking effective practical measures to ensure conditions favourable to the orderly achievement of the foregoing purposes in accordance with their constitutional processes;

Third, they will continue to cooperate in the economic, social and cultural fields in order to promote higher living standards, economic progress and social well-being in this region.

Fourth, as declared in the South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty, they are determined to prevent or counter by appropriate means any attempt in the Treaty Area to subvert their freedom or to destroy their sovereign or territorial integrity.
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467


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