"The Ţigan is not a man": The Ţigan Other as catalyst for Romanian ethnonational identity

Shannon Woodcock

University of Sydney, Department of History

Dissertation for PhD June 2005

The University of Sydney

Copyright in relation to this Thesis

Under the Copyright Act 1968 (several provision of which are referred to below), this material must be used only under the normal conditions of scholarly fair dealing for the purposes of research, criticism or review. In particular no results or conclusions should be extracted from it, nor should it be copied or closely parahrased in whole or in part without the written consent of the author. Proper written acknowledgement should be made for any assistance obtained from this material.

Under Section 35 (2) of the Copyright Act 1968 'the author of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work is the owner of any copyright subsisting in the work'. By virtue of Section 32 (1) copyright 'subsists in an original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work that is unpublished' land of which the author was an Australian citizen, an Australian protected person or a person resident in Australia.

The Act, by Section 36 (1) provides : 'Subject to this Act, the copyright in a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work is infringed by a person who, not being the owner of the copyright and without the licence of the owner of the copyright, does in Australia, or authorises the doing in Australia of, any act comprised in the copyright'.

Section 31 (1) (a) (i) provides that copyright includes the exclusive right to 'reproduce the work in a material form'. Thus, copyright is infringed by a person who, not being the owner of the copyright, reproduces or authorises the reproduction of a work, or of more than a reasonable part of the work, in a material form, unless the reproduction is a 'fair dealing' with the work 'for the purpose of research or study' as further defined in Sections 40 and 41 of the Act.

Section 51 (2) provides that "Where a manuscript, or a copy, of material of other similar literary work that has not been published is kept in a library of a university or other similar institution or in an archives, the copyright in the material or other work is not infringed by the making of a copy of the material or other work by or on behalf of the officer in charge of the library or archives if the copy is supplied to a person who satisfies an authorized officer of the library or archives that he requires the copy for the purpose of research or study'.

* Thesis' includes ' treatise', ' dissertation' and other similar productions.

Contents

Introduction 3

1. The Ţigan Other as catalyst for the creation of modern Romania 52

2. "The Ţigan is not a Man": Reading Romanian subaltern selves and Others through folklore 108

3. The Ţigan Other within: Romanian socialism and silence 157

4. The Ţigan *bişniţari* as post-revolutionary thief 222

5. The "mafia of vegetables" and the Ţigan *bişniţari* in Bucharest produce markets 291

6. Romania and EUrope: Roma, Rroma and Ţigani 346

7. Ethnicity and the policing of gendered spaces: Romanian women and Ţigan men in Bucharest 393

Conclusion 439

Appendix 450

Bibliography 474

Introduction

The Ţigan as Other of Romanian ethnonational identity

This dissertation explores how different groups of Romanians have constructed and mobilized stereotypes of Ţigani throughout history, and how the Ţigan Other discourse has functioned as a catalyst of modern ethnonational Romanian identity since the Romanian nation was first imagined. The Ţigan Other was created in legislation and society as a class of slaves against which Romanian society could claim an independent identity. Then Ţigani were the Other that Romanian elite "unslaved" in the nineteenth century to consecrate Romanian identity as a benevolent and modern European ethnonation. Under socialism, the Ţigan Other represented an enemy of "the (socialist Romanian) people," stereotyped as non-productive capitalists in the law and by citizens who needed to constitute themselves as lawful in relation to the ideal socialist Other. Discourses of Ţigani as immoral traders in the open market after 1989 built on socialist period stereotypes and were fuelled by postsocialist anxieties about everyday economic fluctuations. A specific example of this is the myth of the "Ţigan vegetable mafia" that supposedly threatens farmers to sell their fresh produce to Romanian citizens for high prices. In recent years, the Ţigan Other masquerading as Romanian has been the preeminent discursive device to explain why Romania has

not been accepted in the European Union. Finally, contemporary Romanian women in Bucharest construct Ţigan men as sexual predators, despite their most common experiences of violence being located in their own homes at the hands of Romanian men.

This is not a thesis about Romani people, who constitute approximately 10% of the Romanian population, although it is Romani people that Romanians have consistently marginalized and attacked as Ţigani.[1] In contemporary Romania, violent racist slurs against individuals identified as Ţigani because of their skin color, language, behaviour, or economic level are pervasive and powerful. Romani communities and individuals suffer constant discrimination at many different social and institutional levels as a result of anti-Ţigan stereotypical discourse. It was in response to the virulence of anti-Ţigan discourses that I began to think about the unique and central place of the Ţigan Other in Romanian society, where Ţigani are debated with fierce anger so often, and articulated by Romanians in minute stereotypical detail with enormous effort. The Ţigan Other

[1] Because the Ţigan Other can only function under this name and only in Romanian society, I use Romanian language structures to refer to the Ţigan Other. *Ţigan* is singular, *Ţigani* is the plural form. Rather than use the Romanian variations of gendered *Ţigani*, I will only use these two simple forms. When the *Ţigan* subject is female I will specify this fact. When Romanian texts occasionally use plural and articulated forms of this word, I reproduce these as written. I use the accepted English language terms of *Roma* as a noun and *Romani* as an adjective to refer to self-identifying Romani individuals and communities, but I use the name of the Romanian Romani dialect spoken in Bucharest, *Romanes*, to refer to the Romani language. In chapters where name spelling plays a vital role in constructing a specific kind of Ţigan Other, I will specify the ways I use these terms. All translations in this text are the work of the author, unless otherwise cited.

cannot be relinquished by the dominant Romanian ethnonational discourse of identity because it performs a wide range of vital functions within the process of Romanian ethnonational self-articulation.

This thesis traces the central place, the ambivalent and privileged position, of the Ţigan Other in discourses of Romanian ethnonational identity. I perceive this text as a basic map of the stereotypical discourses that create and maintain the Ţigan Other in their historical context. This work is a first step in a different direction towards discussing why individuals identified as Ţigani are persecuted with such violence in Romania. I do not believe this study can be useful to those identified and attacked as Ţigani, mostly Romani people, who already have multiple and dynamic strategies of defence and plans for social change, and from whom I have learnt much about performance and discourse. I hope this map will clearly sketch the localized and complex historical details of Romanian stereotypes of Ţigani for activists and academics interested in developing more critical analyzes, discussions and strategies for resistance.

This dissertation is not an examination of the relationship between Roma and the stereotypical Ţigan Other. However, this relationship is the crucial question that enables this project, this map, to be legible in contemporary Romania. In the fourteenth century Roma were an identifiable group, sharing language, traditions, an origin in northern India, and a recent history of moving west with the Byzantine and Ottoman empires. In the regions that are now Romania, Roma

were enslaved and named "Ţigani," a term that specifically referred to their status as a slave class, rather than an ethnicity in the way we understand it today. In the nineteenth century, this class of slaves called Ţigani were articulated by a group of young Romanian elites as "a people" in the modern ethnonational sense, as the Other of the new discourse of an ethnic Romanian "people." Ţigani were legally emancipated from slavery but they remained the non-Romanian slaves-without-masters *within* but not *of* the Romanian ethnonation. Romani individuals were thereby identified as Ţigani by stereotypes of an inherent "nature" linked to, claiming to be manifest in, physical signifiers of the body. In this way, characteristics of a "Ţigan people" of Other origin, nature and nationality were fixed in Romani people, and this enabled the articulation of a similarly fixed "Romanian people." In a cycle producing and enforcing the Ţigan Other even today, Roma with darker skin or distinguished dress are identified as Ţigani, marginalized in education, and thereby are often only able to attain jobs of low socio-economic status like garbage collecting and cleaning. Stereotypical discourse then re-presents this socio-economic marginalization as a manifestation of an intrinsic quality of "Ţigani." This means that widespread hatred against abstract stereotypes of dirty, uncivilized, nomadic Ţigani find their application against individuals who are identified as such by their Romani language, dress, or occupations. Many Romani people struggle daily with being identified and discriminated against as Ţigani. Romani people may or may not identify themselves with stereotypes of Ţigani; within Romani communities most do not.

My close association with various Romani communities in Bucharest since 1997 has taught me a lot about the spaces between Roma and Țigan identities – the former as a heterogenous and dynamic self-ascribed ethnicity, and the latter as a stereotypical Other that can be discursively mobilized for various social functions.[2] In my everyday experiences as a non-Romani Australian in Romani communities of Bucharest, Romani individuals often performed stereotypes of the Țigan Other in order to watch my reaction, a kind of test as to whether I understood the difference between Roma and the stereotypical Romanian projection of Țigani. At my first meeting with the well known Romani activist and writer Vasile Ionescu, who is notorious for his low tolerance of people wasting his time, he paused in the middle of a serious discussion and asked me for my palm. He was watching my face as he took my hand, and, surprised, I laughed at the perversion of the traditional *gadje* stereotype of a Țigan reading palms – no Căldărari man would seriously offer to read palms! After I laughed, everyone else in the room laughed too – a kind of relief that I had understood one performative example of the strategies employed by Roma in everyday life in both the Romani and the *gadje* world.

This is a study of how the Țigan Other is constructed in Romanian stereotypical discourse, not of Romani identity.

---

[2] I lived in Romania from February 1997 until March 1999. I began my Doctoral studies in 2000, and spent an average of 9 months per year living in Bucharest between 2000 and 2003. Since living in Albania from late 2003, I have only spent three months in Romania, but I continue to work with Romanian Romani intellectuals and activists who now live throughout Europe.

The peculiarity of the Romanian case

Modern ethnonational Romanian identity has been created through invocing and reproducing the Ţigan as Other to simultaneously invoke and re-produce the Romanian self. Romania is unique not simply because it was the only place to legally enslave all Roma as Ţigani, and because it has the largest percentage of Romani citizens now (approximately 10%). Romania is unique because Ţigani play a central role in everyday life. As Colin Clark notes in the context of British representations of Romani people, 'contemporary representations dig deep into a rich seam of already existing, historically developed – if unsophisticated- 'exotic' and/or demonizing stereotypes.'[3] This historical thesis is fundamentally interdisciplinary as a strategy to approach how the Ţigan Other has been re-presented in dynamic situations through historically developed stereotypical discourses in Romania. The Romanian stereotypical Ţigani and "Gypsies" share the recurrent themes of Otherness that Clark distils, including blackness and savagery (as Other to the national identity), nobility, occultism, crime as a "Gypsy" tradition and overt sexuality.[4] These tropes enable discrimination against "Gypsies" throughout many countries in Europe, but Romania is unique in the historical intensity with which multiple discourses have created a negative

---

[3] "Severity has often enraged but never subdued a gipsy: the history and making of European Romani stereotypes' pp.226-246 in Susan Tebbutt and Nicholas Saul *The Role of the Romanies: Images and Counter-Images of 'Gypsies'/Romanies in European Culture* Liverpool University Press, Liverpool 2004 p.243.

[4] Ibid. pp.230-234.

Ţigan Other to a Romanian ethnic identity. This is a study of the Ţigan Other as a product of Romanian society, and not a study of all negative images linked to Romani people in Europe, although certain stereotypes and discourses are similar in content across national borders.[5] I would like to present at the outset some examples of the place of the Ţigan Other in everyday life in Romania.

Major texts and schoolbooks of Romanian history fail to include the fact that ALL ethnic Roma were slaves of the principalities of Wallachia and Moldova between 1385 and 1844, and these slaves were called "Ţigani." In 1859, when Romania was named thus, there were approximately 400 000 Romani people who were "unslaved," but they remained a distinct socio-economic (marginalized) group that the Romanian state and Romanian speaking peasants continued to call Ţigani. 400 000 is a significant number, especially as it included a vital skilled tradesmen sector of the economy, but the widely distributed English language text book *A History of the Romanians* by American author Kurt Treptow contains no reference to either Roma or Ţigani.[6]

---

[5] The reasons for the commonalities between negative stereotypes of Ţigani across Europe is because these stereotypes were all created by similarly rural, pre-national and Christian societies and based on signifiers of Romani culture. The main features of Roma that non-Romanian negative stereotypes used as articulated signifiers were their unknown origin, nomadism, distinctive dress and language, and the nature of their occupations. All of these signifiers were construed to function in different periods and environments in different manifestations of the Gypsy/Tsinganoi/Zigeuner/cigany discourses.

[6] Kurt Treptow *A History of Romania* Center for Romanian Studies, Iaşi 1996. Treptow is currently serving a Romanian prison sentence for using children to make pornographic movies.

Immediately following the lynching of the dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu in December 1989, rumours that he was in fact Ţigan, not ethnic Romanian, filled newspapers and became "common knowledge." In the first free elections of 1990, high profile representatives of both the leading National Salvation Front and their (dissident) opponents insulted each other with the word "Ţigan," in tandem with ideological names (communist/capitalist), insults that linked the Ţigan Other with ideological regimes and implied a threat to "the Romanian people." When the miners marched on Bucharest in 1990 they were ordered to attack 'Ţigan hooligans' in the anti-communist demonstrations in Piaţa Universităţii. The miners also terrorized Romani communities on the periphery of Bucharest that were not involved with the political protests, because they were identified as Ţigani. Murders in these attacks remain unpunished by the Romanian state. Until very recently, newspaper advertisements for job vacancies (including at the Romanian Ministry of Work) included the line 'No Ţigani need apply' without fear of reproach.

During my fieldwork, ethnic Romanian women have warned me countless times that I should be careful of Ţigan men who rape (see Chapter Seven), and of Ţigan traders who cheat (Chapters Four and Five). The leading ethnic Romanian historian of "Ţigani" in Romania, Viorel Achim, refused to call his book a study of Roma in Romania because, as he told me in a personal interview, the concept of Romani rights is a Jewish conspiracy developed as revenge for Romanian anti-

Semitism in World War Two.[7] A Romanian World Health Organization public relations representative explained to me that most diseases in Romania are introduced and spread by Ţigani. I was refused access to archived files in the Romanian Academy when I asked directly for information about Roma "after they were "unslaved," because- the librarian explained in a loud voice- 'Ţigani were never slaves, Romanians are still slaves to Ţigani!'[8] Many Romanians I met were outraged that a foreigner would think there was a Romani culture and language worth studying separate from stereotypes of Ţigani, and most Romani I met were astonished that a *gadje* would recognize the same fact.

In contemporary Romania, the Ţigan Other functions as the prime and vital Other of Romanian ethnonational identity.

I focus on Romanian discourses of the Ţigan Other to the exclusion of Hungarian, Saxon and Jewish ethnic Others of Romanian ethnonational identity. It would not only be too broad a topic to address and compare all four groups in one dissertation, but, most importantly, the Ţigan Other extends throughout history uniquely and consistently as an inferior Other incomparably more pervasive in everyday Romanian identity performance than Hungarian or Jewish Others. Romanian stereotypes of Hungarian and Jewish identities reflect/ed historical social structure and present/ed them as "superior" threats to the formation and

[7] Viorel Achim *Ţiganii în istoria României* Editură Enciclopedia, Bucharest 1998.
[8] This interchange took place at the Photography Collection room of the Romanian Academy Library in October 2000.

maintenance of a Romanian nation at critical moments in history. Hungary was widely perceived as a territorial threat to Romania; Transylvania only became part of the Romanian nation in 1919. Jewish individuals were prominent in urban communities and businesses until World War Two. The Ţigan Other, by contrast, has been consistently vital in the efforts of Romanian statesmen, peasants, and citizens of every regime as the Other that can be civilized by a Romanian people to claim Romanian civilization *against* Hungarian, Jewish and EUropean culture and institutions. It is interesting that in studies specifically addressing the history of Hungarians, Jews and Saxons (Germans) in Romania, the Ţigan Other is not addressed, despite the fact that Ţigani played a vital role in the multi-ethnic Hapsburg Empire, just as in the Romanian principalities.[9] This dissertation is limited to Romanian discourses of the Ţigan Other in historical contexts.

The Romanian Ţigan Other in academic texts

Very few academics have treated the Ţigan Other in Romania seriously, and none have done so in isolation or at length. As noted above, the importance of Ţigani

[9] In Nancy Wingfield (ed) *Creating the Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe*, for example, there is no mention of Romani slaves or "Ţigani." Berghahn, New York 2003. This is very surprising, but in line with the history of such texts that simply elide Ţigani. For a history of images of Jews in Romania see Andrei Oişteanu *Imaginea evreului în cultura română* Humanitas, Bucharest 2001. Leon Volovici *Nationalist Ideology and Antisemitism: The Case of Romanian Intellectuals in the 1930s* The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Oxford, Seoul, New York, Tokyo 1991.

and Roma in Romanian economic, social and national history is usually completely ignored in general historical or sociological studies. Surprisingly, this is also the case for those Romanian academics who specifically interrogate the construction of modern Romanian ethnonational identity, such as Lucian Boia and Sorin Mitu. This field approaches the precious topic of national identity through discourse or 'myth' (in Boia's terminology), and such texts are peripheral to Romanian intellectual ways of understanding Romanian identity. Boia writes about the construction of a national imaginary, and while he mentions once 'the pre-eminence of the Ţigani in the local European imagination,' he focuses on many different historical discourses, including the communist period, without commenting on the role of 400 000 slaves as Ţigani in Romanian history.[10] Even more disturbing is that in his English language textbook called *Romania: a borderland of Europe*, Boia often refers to "Gypsies" in absolutely undeconstructed stereotypes of the Ţigan Other as primitive criminals holding "the Romanian people" at ransom.[11] I will refer to these texts throughout the thesis as evidence of the Ţigan Other discourse.

Sorin Mitu's *National Identity of Romanians in Transylvania* is another study that approaches Romanian ethnonational identity as a project of historical production, yet this text devotes 4 of 280 pages to "The Romanians compared to the

[10] Lucian Boia *Pentru o istorie a imaginarului* Humanitas, Bucharest 2000.
[11] Lucian Boia *Romania: Borderland of Europe* Reaktion Books, London 2001.

Gypsies."[12] Mitu argues that Romanians consistently compared their own group status to the even lower status group of 'Gypsies' in Transylvania as a kind of self-flagellation for accepting an almost equally oppressed social position. This study is the deepest Romanian work that I know relating to the permanent vital role of the Țigan Other in pre-modern Romanian identity construction, and yet Mitu does not explain how exactly simple 'offensive comparison' of Romanians with Țigani was able to spur the production of a nation.[13] I take this question much further in the first chapter of this thesis.[14]

The Role of the Romanies: Images and counter images of "Gypsies"/Romanies in European Culture (2004) is an original text specifically focused on the function of the Romani as Other. As editors Susan Tebbutt and Nicholas Saul write in the introduction, this text is not only about the roles that Romani people are expected to play, but how identities are formed in relation to these expectations.[15] This volume is a contribution to the international field of "Romani scholarship" that is often a reproduction of stereotypes, or lacking in the theoretical tools to deconstruct stereotypes as separate to self-ascribed and dynamic ethnic identities. In Yaron Matras' contribution to this volume he writes that language has itself

---

[12]Sorin Mitu *National Identity of Romanians in Transylvania* trans. Sorana Corneanu, Central European University Press, Budapest and New York 2001.
[13] Mitu op.cit. p.76.
[14] I have presented the first two chapters of this thesis to historians of the University of Bucharest on two occasions and they have been very supportive of and interested in my research.
[15] Susan Tebbutt and Nicholas Saul "The role of the romanies: images and counter images" Introduction to Tebbutt and Saul, op.cit. pp.1-11.

constituted the "Gypsy" subject, and the word has two meanings, the 'real people' and the image of 'Gypsies.'[16] In my opinion, using the name "Gypsy" or "Ţigan" for people of Romani ethnicity in Romania is simply a confusion of a stereotypical discourse with a self-ascribed identity that is inaccurate at best and irresponsible at worst. It is not possible to argue, as many Romanians do, that the name "Ţigan" is used because "Rom" sounds similar to Romanian. Tebbutt and Saul's text is a valuable contribution to how academics can "imagine and counter imagine" the differences between self identifying Romani communities and the stereotypes of Ţigani/Gypsies that Roma battle not to be identified with in everyday life.

The problem of conflating the constructed image of the Ţigan Other and real Roma is pervasive and offensive in the numerous academic works on Romanian history that do acknowledge (albeit briefly) the central role of the Ţigan Other in Romanian society. As we saw with Mitu's text above, it has become standard practice to translate Ţigan as "Gypsy," but Gypsy, in English, has a totally different gamut of stereotypes, and is much more positive in Western society than the entirely negative Romanian "Ţigan." It is also the case that academics sometimes translate "Ţigan" as "Roma," assuming that anti-Ţigan stereotypes are reflections of Roma realities. This indicates a failure to deliberate on the fact that real Roma people are not simply exaggerated into Ţigani in stereotypes, but that

[16] Yaron Matras "The role of language in mystifying and demystifying gypsy identity" pp.53-78 in Tebbutt and Saul op. cit.

the stereotyptical Ţigan Other exists independently, projected from Romanian sources and pinned to contemporary signifiers located in space and people, who are most often Roma. Unfortunately, scholars rarely focus on the complexity and dynamics of stereotypical discourses, and what attention they do pay the issue usually conflates Roma with the Ţigan Other.

Katherine Verdery, for example, often refers to the power of the "Gypsy" as Other in Romania, but has not focused in depth on how exactly this Other has functioned throughout history. Verdery uses the name "Gypsy" in English to describe both stereotypes of Ţigani (in Romanian) and real Romani self identified communities. She states that in postsocialist Romania, 'images of Gypsies have become important symbols for discussing particular kinds of social dislocation' and that 'almost any conversation in Romania, in cities as well as in villages, can turn into an impassioned attack on Gypsies.'[17] Verdery argues that 'these attitudes indicate significant resistance toward the effects of market reforms, for which Gypsies are getting the blame.'[18] While Verdery presents the "Gypsy" Other as so pervasive a 'symbol' as to function in 'almost any conversation,' she concludes that "Gypsies," as a real community it seems, 'get the blame.' When Verdery writes "Gypsies" instead of "Roma people identified as the Gypsy Other," the whole system of the Gypsy as symbol is conflated with actually existing and self-identifying Romani communities, foreclosing any solution for the problem under

[17] Katherine Verdery *What was socialism and what comes next?* Princeton University Press, Princeton 1996. p.97, 98.
[18] Verdery 1996 op.cit. p.99.

discussion. This is exactly how the stereotypical Țigan Other functions within Romanian discourse, as a construction that claims to be located in the bodies of existing Romani people, as a biological reality rather than a dynamic chain of signifiers mobilized in historically developed discourse to deal with contemporary social anxieties of identification. When an academic writing about the Romanian context uses the same pejorative term "Gypsy" to refer to stereotypical Țigani **and** Romani people, this further binds the fantasmatic Țigan Other to an existing ethnic community. Recognising that the 'symbol' or the 'scapegoat,' either of these two common explanations, of the Țigan Other is a fantastic construction independent of Romani culture rather than stemming from it, would enable academics to deconstruct the role of ethnic discourses more effectively.

Finally, it is valid to ask why English language texts refer to the Țigan stereotypical Other as "Gypsy," when the stereotypes and the discourses in which this Other is mobilized are very different to the "Gypsy" Other in Britain or America. The reader of a specialist academic text about Romanian society is able to comprehend that the Țigan Other is very different from the "Gypsy" Other of other countries, or that stereotypes of the Țigan Other are not merely exaggerations of a Romani cultural reality, but that they are produced and function in a unique way. Using "Gypsy" homogenises stereotypical discourses of Others that affect very different Romani communities in very different contexts throughout Europe and beyond. Even more disturbing is the willingness of contemporary and respected academics to believe that the word Gypsy has to be

favoured over the term Roma in order for readers not to confuse Roma with Romanian. In a recent anthology edited by political scientists John Dryzek and Leslie Holmes, only the chapter about Romania uses the word "Gypsy," while the rest of the book uses "Roma," and a footnote states that this is because "Roma" should not be confused with "Romanians."[19] These kind of textual events are flashing signs of the central value of the Ţigan Other to Romanian identity, but most academics ignore them, and thereby choose to conflate real Romani communities with a unique and projected Other of Romanian ethnonational identity.

This is a history thesis with an interdisciplinary approach to researching and writing history. I have taken a chronological historical approach to the question in order to trace how the construction of the Ţigan has developed over time, the same stereotypical content mobilized in different settings, incorporating new discourses of class, nation and ideology. The work of postcolonial historians with the subaltern Other has influenced my approach to the Ţigan Other. The tools used to explore how subaltern members of colonial societies were created are also useful for a study of the production of the Ţigan Other. Discourse analysis is vital to understand how an identity can be articulated so powerfully that real individuals identified as signifying within the discourse are constantly discriminated against and even murdered systematically. The interdisciplinarity of

[19] John S. Dryzek and Leslie T. Holmes (eds) *Post-Communist Democratization: Political Discourses across Thirteen Countries* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002.

this thesis follows from my methodology of identifying predominant discourses of the Ţigan Other and then seeking to develop a methodology of research that suits the research question. In addition to archival research and textual analysis I use anthropological and sociological methodologies and sources, such as surveys, qualitative interviewing and participant observation. I perceive this combination of techniques and sources as a vital project for a historian, and take seriously Foucault and Spivak's challenges that each discipline and its tools be understood in their historically developed context with their specific strengths and weaknesses.[20] I benefited from the many examples of postsocialist anthropologists whose texts provide a great range of methodological examples and set a high standard for research.

Major terms and concepts

Many of the terms I use here are drawn from the field of postcolonial history, and rely to some extent on psychoanalytical structures of interpretation.[21] I consider

---

[20] Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak "Can the subaltern speak?" pp.271-313 in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds) *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* Basingstoke, Macmillan 1988 and *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present* Harvard University Press, Massachusetts and London 1999.

[21] Homi K. Bhabha *The Location of Culture* Routledge, London and New York 1994. Dipesh Chakrabarty *Provincializing Europe: postcolonial thought and historical difference* Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford 2000. Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (eds) *Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography* Oxford University Press, New York 1988. Achille Mbembe *On the Postcolony* University of California Press, Berkeley, Los

Renata Salecl's applications of Lacanian psychoanalysis to postsocialist societies useful, and I note that Verdery's work utilizes some Lacanian concepts without importing a need to describe or interrogate the possibility of an entire Lacanian system of analysis.[22]

When I state that the Ţigan is an Other of Romanian identity, I use "the Other" to mean the fantastical identity that is articulated as not of "our kind," the "not us" that simultaneously enables an articulation of what then defines an "us." In this thesis I look at the Ţigan Other as the constructed projection of what is not "Romanian." This is a common usage of the capital "O" to signify that the factors articulated to form the one not-of-us, the Other, are often those characteristics the "us" wants to displace in the construction of their own identity. Therefore, the Other is constructed with an investment of anxiety that comes from the "us" and produces the existence of the "Other" through stereotypes as fixed. This enables a simultaneous claim to a fixed identity of the self. The Other is both the locus of "our" desires and the threat that prevents "us" from realizing an ideal identity articulated as intrinsic. An important theoretical point is that the Other is constructed and then attacked as embodying difference, but if this difference is

---

Angeles and London 2001. David Spurr *The Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing and Imperial Administration* Duke University Press, Durham and London 1993.

[22] Renata Salecl *The Spoils of Freedom: Psychoanalysis and feminism after the fall of socialism* Routledge, London 1994. *(Per)versions of Love and Hate* Verso, London and New York 2001, and "Where is the center?" 3 June 2000 p.2 online articlewww.westfaelischer-kunstverein.de/archiv/2000/ausstellungen/whereis/vortraege/salecl.pdf

erased, for example if the Romani street cleaner identified as Ţigan Other educates himself and integrates with "us," this is an even bigger threat to the Romanian identity, which is proven to be attainable by outsiders, and therefore less than an inherent characteristic of those who call themselves Romanian. The Other is stereotyped as inherently and irredeemably Other, signified by physical markers such as skin color, clothes or language. As Verdery notes, the Other can be read through the motif of theft, "they" steal from "us" in many ways. This academic usage of the theme of theft is one level of the theoretical framework of the Other. The Other is often constructed as thief of "our" enjoyment (for example "I would be a better socialist citizen if I didn't buy illegal goods from Ţigani, they steal my ability to fulfil the ideal socialist identity") or even the thief of something "we" never had (in nostalgic discourse, "it was better then, before Ţigani took over the market"). It is possible, therefore, to approach the concept of the Ţigan Other through the themes of its emergence in discourse, through the stereotypes that are used to construct the Other.

The Other is constructed in a discursive chain of stereotypes linked to signifiers. A stereotype is a way of knowing a subject, a creation of knowledge and thereby a simultaneous creation of the subject. Because a stereotype cannot be "true" (not because all Romanians cannot be racist, but because all Romanians cannot be racist at any given moment), subjects are constituted by many stereotypes that function in recognition of each other. This is why stereotypes of a certain subject do not follow each other coherently; they are very often in contradiction with each

other. This structure ensures the capture of the subject in a particular position, or multiple particular positions in the complex case of the Țigan Other. For example, Țigani are stereotyped as lazy and unable to work like Romanians, but also as secretly conniving to steal the jobs of Romanians. There are multiple stereotypes so that they can be invoked in a chain to create a coherent Other that suits the discursive needs of a particular moment. For example, because of the complementary stereotypes that Țigani work in invisible family networks and only pretend to be impoverished salespeople, those Țigani in the market can remain both lazy and a secret controlling black market mafia. It is the availability of these nodes of knowledge that enable the enunciation of the Țigan Other in any form.

The Țigan Other can be articulated in an anxious and wide range of stereotypes and stereotypical discourses, mobilized in relation to different signifiers or themes at different times. This is one way we know the Țigan Other is so important – common anxieties in the community are articulated through the Țigan Other, either as the invisible mafia in the vegetable market who force the prices to be high, or as the illegal migrants to the European Union who destroy Romania's international relations. In all of these cases, however, the Țigan Other is not identifiable by one or two stable signifiers, rather the Țigan Other is constructed as identifiable by a range of signifiers as vast as the stereotypes. Some signifiers are tied to physical signs such as color or language, and others to visible behavior such as street selling, standing at the back of a crowded bus, drinking in a certain

pub, or wearing old shoes. The Ţigan Other is constituted by a range of stereotypes that are difficult to pin to just one person, and yet easy to pin to individuals when required or abstract individuals located in the frame of public spaces from the seclusion of one's private home. In this way, signifying Ţigan is also tied to particular spatial locations; Romanian spaces are constituted through the Ţigan Other just as certain environments signify Ţigan.

It is not important whether or not an individual *believes* the stereotypes of the Ţigan Other that they mobilize, what is important is that these stereotypes function in a given context, that they are invoked for a purpose. This is why logically arguing against stereotypes can only work in limited circumstances. Stereotypical discourses construct an Other for a purpose, and the motivation itself needs to be dissembled, ruptured or redirected in order for stereotypes to lose their interpellative function. This is why certain stereotypes are applied to specific experiences in a given period; because there is a need for the Other at this discursive location. The first chapter of this thesis traces, for example, the process by which nineteenth century Romanian statesmen began to articulate the Ţigan Other as a modern ethnic "people," the uncivilized "not us" of the first articulations of a modern ethnonational Romanian identity. Each chapter of this thesis explores how various Romanian groups mobilized and developed a particular stereotypical discourse of the Ţigan Other at a particular moment in Romanian history.

In this dissertation I interrogate a particularly modern concept of the Romanian nation, which is constructed in discourse and institutions as a natural expression of a united "people," as an ethnic group defined as sharing the same origin, race, language and culture. This discourse of the nation is constituted by the twin discourses of ethnicity and gender, that claim to be natural categories, and function as boundaries marking the "in" and "out," or "us" and "them," or "people" and "minorities" or "Others" of the nation. I particularly focus on ethnicity in this dissertation, which, like gender, functions pervasively in modern societies through masking the fact that identities of ethnicity are constructed in discourses, and by claiming that these identities are manifest in the body. As Judith Butler notes, 'the essence of identity that genders otherwise purport to express are fabrications manufactured and sustained through corporeal signs and other discursive means.' [23] While gender identity claims, for example, that women are weaker and hence produces difference as if it comes from the body, so ethnicity works by presenting blackness, or the occupation of street selling (as nomadic inclination) as signs of 'innate' biological Otherness. These identities are dynamic, constantly negotiated and heavily policed. In this thesis I am interested in how the ethnic Romanian nation produces its Ţigan Other from within its simultaneously produced self in various temporal and physical places.

---

[23] Judith Butler *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* Routledge, New York 1990 p.136.

While ethnicity is the major lense through which I read the Țigan Other, the Other is also constantly and necessarily gendered. In my understanding, the normative Țigan Other can sometimes be constructed in stereotype as feminine (generally unintelligent, naïve, primitive and Asiatic) in comparison to the normative masculine (intelligent, progressive, rational and European) Romanian self. In other stereotypes the Țigan is gendered masculine, an unpredictable, violent and threatening Other to a rational and passive Romanian ethnonational self. These different features may function within the same trope or discourse. The Țigan other is constructed as a dynamic and shifting Other precisely to enable the same allowances to the Romanian self, and so a detailed interrogation of how shifting stereotypes can be categorized as masculine or feminine would be a massive separate project. In the final chapter of this thesis I look more closely at how discourses of gender and ethnicity interact in contemporary Romania with an example of Romanian women's ethnicization of gendered violence in public space. Anthropologist Marisca Milikowski defines ethnicization as 'the formation of social boundaries aiming to protect the integrity of (presumed) ethnic-cultural heritages.'[24] This is a useful way to approach how Romanian women claim their place and protection within the ethnonation through the ethnicization (as Țigan) and externalization (into public space) of their experiences of sexual violence in the home.

---

[24] Marisca Milikowski "Exploring a Model of De-Ethnicization: The Case of Turkish Television in the Netherlands" pp.443-468 in *The European Journal of Communication* Vol. 15, No. 4, 2000.

Which Romanians am I writing about?

I do not claim that the stereotypical discourses I explore are used by every Romanian person at a particular moment, but only that the discourses I identify were/are powerful and pervasive, functioning throughout specific social groups/classes of Romanian society. These predominant discourses are layers of language and knowledge available across classes and ethnic groups throughout history, and as such can be mobilized by any Romanian to produce meaning. It is also the case that signifiers within these discourses, such as the words *bişniţari* or Ţigani, function to interpellate a discursive Other even if the author of the words does not necessarily intend such meanings to be produced. In this way, the predominance of the knowledge of the Ţigan Other in discourse does ensure that the meanings I address here were and are powerful enough to function beyond authorial intent, although I largely rely on sources where authorial intent is conscious. Even if many Romanian individuals disagree with the discourses used to create the Ţigan Other, they understand what is meant in the complex and broad system of knowledge of this Other. My personal experience as a foreigner who moved to Romania was that I was taught how to understand these discourses in personal communication with friends, students, strangers in market places, government and NGO settings, and through the media. My education about the Ţigan Other was considered by Romanian acquaintances and friends to be a matter of vital importance. While not all Romanians "believe" that the worst

stereotypes of Ţigani actually apply to all Romani individuals, this link between Ţigani and Romani people is unquestioned "evidence" of the validity of at least some stereotypes. I would argue that the vast majority of Romanians know what the stereotypes are and how they are applied and that all Romanians already function within this specific system of knowledge even if they choose to refute it. This thesis is my acquiescence and answer to the relentless centrality of the Ţigan Other discourse in Romanian everyday life.

I try to identify exactly which groups of people utilized and propelled specific formations of the Ţigan Other, and each chapter focuses on a particular location of enunciation and actors who created and maintained a particular kind of Ţigan Other. Of course Romani Romanians can invoke and use the Ţigan Other also, in fact I met some Romani people who articulated an elusive Ţigan ethnic Other to Romani Romanians, sometimes in the same situations as ethnic Romanians, sometimes not. In a conversation with a young Romani ambient seller in Piata Cringasi in Bucharest in 2002 he asked me which Romani group I was staying with, and then replied, horrified, 'but the Căldărari are Ţigani!' I asked if he had a problem with Ţigani, and he answered that they were dangerous criminals. Taking advantage of his Romani ethnicity and the usual stereotypical links I replied 'but aren't you a Ţigan? Are you dangerous?' He laughed, understanding my point that any Romani child with dark skin selling sponges in a market could be labelled "Ţigan," then he explained that he lived in an orphanage where he was baptised and said 'those Căldărari are Ţigan, they don't know God.' So we see

here one Romani identification of Ţigan with stereotypical signifiers of criminality, but also other social signifiers in a particular context, such as religion, in inter-Romani ethnic articulation. As Alaina Lemon demonstrates in her study of Russian Romani communities and their perceptions and performances of various Romani ethnicities, the stereotypical "Ţigan" (or "Gypsy," in Lemon's text) is a range of signifiers available in a localized discursive chain to all members of a society, across Romani Romanian (and differently in Russian) communities.[25]

This dissertation focuses on Bucharest and on discourses amongst ethnic Romanians, although all the discourses I describe were or are performed throughout the country. In Bucharest, Ţigani are the threatening Other most often conjured up by the media and individuals; issues of the Hungarian minority seem very distant, although Transylvania remains a central part of the concept of a rich and expansive Romanian homeland. There are regional variations of intensity with which the Ţigan Other is used throughout Romania, but I am confident that the discourses described in the following chapters can be mobilized in every regional corner of the country.[26]

---

[25] Lemon uses "Gypsy" to refer to stereotypial identity, and Roma as the reference for self-identified ethnic Romani people.

[26] The discourses I examine in this thesis are also evident in regional press such as *Ziua de Vest*, and regional issues of the nation wide *România Liberă, Evenimentul Zilei,* and *Adevărul.*

I take specific nodes of the Ţigan Other discourse for examination, not just a broad history of Romanian identity and the place of Ţigani within famous historical events. Living in Romania over a period of five years enabled me to identify the discourses that strikingly relied on the Ţigan Other in everyday life and in history. In the research of contemporary discourses I was made aware through everyday communication and repetition, and in the historical research my interest was intensified by silences in the texts. After identifying the most important tropes, I developed different research methodologies from various kinds of sources according to each topic of research. Alaina Lemon's work is an influential example of academic interrogation of different formations of stereotypical knowledge of Others and selves, and I gained much methodological courage as an historian from her analyzes of discursive events performed in the theaters, markets and conversations of everyday postsocialist life.[27]

Methodological notes

The methodologies I have used vary according to the specificities of the Ţigan Other in particular discourses. As my aim was to map how the Ţigan Other functions and is maintained in specific moments of history, I draw on a wide body

[27] Alaina Lemon "Talking Transit and Spectating Transition: The Moscow Metro" pp. 14-39 in D. Berdahl, M. Bunzl, M. Lampland (eds) *Altering States: Ethnographies of Transition in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union* University of Michigan Press, Michigan 2000 and *Between Two Fires: Gypsy performance and Romani memory from Pushkin to postsocialism* Duke University Press, Durham and London 2000.

of secondary literature concerning Romanian history, especially critical scholars such as Katherine Verdery, Maria Bucur, Gail Kligman and Lucian Boia.[28] I critically use the relatively small body of Romanian literature that claims to deal with "Ţigani" as, overall, a catalogue of stereotypical narratives, with the exception of Viorel Achim's historical research. Achim's text (*The History of Ţigani in Romania*) is a rich source of archival documentation of Romani history in Romania, and a detailed exhibition of how one can create a stereotypical Ţigan Other from an array of historical sources about Roma that even seem to illustrate the contrary. In assessing these texts I relied on the knowledge of Romani culture and history that I had gained within the Romani community (I personally "know" that Roma are not "pagans," "cannibals" or "pathological criminals"). I also benefited from the company of the spectacular group of Romanian Romani intellectuals who write Romani anthropology and critical accounts of the relationship between Roma and Ţigani in history. These scholars include Vasile Burtea, Vasile Ionescu, Valeriu Nicolae, Delia Grigore and Nicolae Gheorghe.[29]

---

[28] Lucian Boia *Mitologia ştiintifica a comunismului* Humanitas, Bucharest 1999. Maria Bucur *Eugenics and Modernization in Interwar Romania* Pittsburgh University Press, Pittsburgh 2002. Gail Kligman *The Politics of Duplicity: Controlling Reproduction in Ceauşescu's Romania* University of California Press, Los Angeles and London 1998.

[29] Vasile Burtea *Rromii in Contextul Socio-economic al Dezvoltare României* Doctoral Thesis, Faculty of Sociology, Psychology and Pedagogy, University of Bucharest, Bucharest 1993. Vasile Ionescu and Nicolae Gheorghe *Roma and the Media* Roma Center for Social Intervention and Studies (Romani CRISS), Bucharest 2000. Nicolae Gheorghe "Roma-Gypsy Ethnicity in Eastern Europe" pp.829-844 in *Social Research* Vol. 58 Issue 4, Winter 1991. Delia Grigore *Romanipen-ul (Rromani dharma) şi Mistică Familiei: Familia Tradiţională în Communitaţile de Rromi dîn arealul Românesc* Organizaţia Salvaţi Copii, Bucharest 2001. Vasile Ionescu (ed.) *O Mie de ani de Singuratate, Rromii în*

International literature about Roma and discrimination also includes authors that note the relationship between self identified ethnicity and Țigan/Gypsy Others, such as Ian Hancock, Ilona Klimova, Paloma Gay y Blasco, Ken Lee, Alaina Lemon, and the recently published anthology edited by Tebbutt and Saul.[30] Useful texts analysing discourse in postsocialist societies include Svetlana Boym, Caroline Humphreys, Alena V. Ledeneva, Sergei Oushakine, Nancy Ries and Jan Urban.[31]

---

proza Românească Editură Centrului Rromilor pentru Politici Publice "Aven Amentza," Bucharest 2000.

[30] Ian Hancock, Ian *The Pariah Syndrome* Ann Arbour Press, Michigan 1988, "The Roma: Myth and Reality" in *Patrin Web Journal*, 2001 http://www.geocities.com/Paris/5121/mythandreality.htm, "Duty and Beauty, Possession and Truth: The Claim of Lexical Impoverishment as Control" *Patrin Web journal* 2001. http://www.geocities.com/Paris/5121/lexicontrol.htm. Paloma Gay y Blasco *Gypsies in Madrid: Sex, Gender and the Performance of Identity* Berg, Oxford and New York 1999. "Gypsy/Roma diasporas. A comparative perspective" pp.173-188 in *Social Anthropology* Vol.10 Nr. 2, 2002, "'This is not a place for civilized people' Isolation, enforced education and resistance among Spanish Gypsies" pp.208-221 in A. Bashford and C. Strange (eds) *Isolation: places and practices of exclusion* Routledge, London and New York 2003.

[31] Svetlana Boym *Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia* Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London 1994. Caroline Humphrey and Stephen Hugh-Jones *Barter, exchange and value; an anthropological approach* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York and Melbourne 1992.
Caroline Humphrey, Caroline "Traders, "Disorder" and Citizenship Regimes in Provincial Russia" in Michael Burawoy and Katherine Verdery (eds) *Uncertain Transition* Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham 1999. Alena V. Ledeneva *Russia's Economy of Favours: Blat, networking and informal exchange* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York and Melbourne 1998. Sergei Alexei Oushakine "The Quantity of Style: Imaginary Consumption in the Post-Soviet Russia" pp.97-120 in *Theory, Culture and Society* Vol.17 Nr. 5, 2000. Nancy Ries *Culture and Conversation during Perestroika* Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 1997. Jan Urban "Nationalism as a Totalitarian Ideology" pp. 775-779 in *Social Research* Vol.58 issue 4 Winter 1991.

In addition to traditional historical sources and published literature, I have used the mainstream press, qualitative interviews, quantitative open ended surveys and participant observation oral narratives in order to access different discourses of the Ţigan Other. When I did interviews, I provided respondents with information about the project and gained their consent in line with the ethical research requirements of the University of Melbourne.[32] All research that I conducted, including the surveys and interviews in the name of the organization Aven Amentza and the University of Bucharest, was only conducted after providing the respondent with information about the study and gaining their signature and statement of consent. All written consent forms, surveys, recorded cassette tapes and notes of interviews are in the possession of the author in Sydney, Australia. My research methodologies (sampling, transcription) and specific means of gaining ethical consent are outlined in Appendix One. The written results of a survey of 140 students in Bucharest are translated and presented in Appendix One for the reader to gain a basic insight into how a cross selection of young educated people discuss Romani communities through Ţigan stereotypes, an indication of just how pervasive anti-Ţigan discourses are. For one research project I collaborated with a postgraduate student of sociology at the University of Bucharest in the collection of oral sources. This collaboration enabled us to both take advantage of our specific qualities, to compare our understandings and interpretations of findings, and to access more information than we could

[32] I gained my ethical clearance for research procedures during the time I was a PhD candidate at the University of Melbourne, 2000-2001.

individually. It was agreed as part of this collaboration that both of us would keep and retain rights to all interview transcripts.

Outline of the chapters

The dissertation begins with a study of how the Ţigan Other was created through slavery in the principalities of Wallachia, Moldova and Transylvania. As previously mentioned, the fact that all Romani peoples were enslaved and articulated in law and social norms as Ţigani is not a widely known or studied fact in Romanian history. The chapter examines the ways that legislation constituted Ţigani as a group that required slavery in order to overcome their supposedly intrinsic reluctance to work, and then justified the economic control of the productive value of Romani craftsmen. It was through stereotypical discourse that Romani individuals became a class of slaves, identified only as the property of owners, as "Ţigani." I trace how the Ţigan Other was re-articulated by a generation of Romanians (the 1848-ers) as an inferior "people" against which a new modern Romanian ethnonation could demonstrate a benevolent European humanism. The movement for *dezrobirea*, the "unslaving" of a Ţigan "people," enabled a specifically ethnic Romanian identity to claim they were an enlightened European "people" deserving of their own nation. In the new unified Romania, Ţigani continued to be named Ţigani, though they were now articulated as an intrinsically Othered ethnic "people," existing within the Romanian nation, but not of it. The Ţigan slave was "unslaved" only to become a Ţigan without a

master, a slave-without-master. From the time of *dezrobirea*, the Ţigan Other remained an entirely Romanian construction that functioned in a range of social and political discourses as the subject against which ethnonational Romanian identity claimed a civilized European identity.

In the first chapter I use the writings of nineteenth century intellectual and Romanian nationalist Mihail Kogalniceanu as a source for how the Ţigan Other was stereotyped before, through and after *dezrobirea*. Kogalniceanu wrote about Ţigani throughout his life, his most detailed works produced at ages 25 and 79, in 1837 and 1891.[33] These sources provide insights into how the Ţigan slave was "unslaved" to remain an inferior ethnic group named Ţigani. I also look at how Romanian 1848-er literature and theater used Ţigan protagonists to build a Romanian ethnonational consciousness, especially amongst illiterate and marginalized Romanian speaking peasants. This analysis of Kogalniceanu's work in the context of other 1848-er writings on Ţigani is an original contribution to the study of elite texts of the nineteenth century and how they produced the modern Romanian nation.

Chapter Two explores how Romanian speaking peasants of the nineteenth century produced distance between themselves (as tithed peasants) and Ţigani (as slaves).

[33] Mihail Kogalniceanu *Esquise sur l'histoire, les moeurs et la langue des cigains, connus en France sous le nom de Bohémiens* Berlin, Librarie de B. Behr, Oberwaldstrasse 1837 and "Dezrobirea ţiganilor, ştergerea privilegiilor boiereşti, emanciparea ţăranilor" a speech given at the Romanian Academy, April 1, 1891.

Since there have not been any studies of this question, and since most Romanian speaking peasants were illiterate in the nineteenth century, I interrogate the vast collections of Romanian folklorists as sources of subaltern oral history.[34] Ţigani feature prominently in the genres of proverbs, folktales and anecdotes, often in combination with characters representing other social classes; landowners (*boiers*) clergy, judges, and the Romanian peasants. While the actual stereotypes deployed and developed are vital to the project of tracing the production of the Ţigan Other, I also ask the more difficult questions that folklorists have ignored, such as why something is funny, and how an ethnic slur interpellates a functioning social Other. My approach then, is to read the distances between the groups depicted in sources, to understand how the place of the Ţigan Other shifts within the broader schema of inter-group relations in order to produce the "meanings" of the popular jokes or proverbs. It is clear that different genres suit different functions. In proverbs, the Ţigan Other is produced as a fixed (Godless, lazy, cheating) Other of "man" as a normative category, whereas longer jokes and anecdotes play on the ambivalence of Ţigan stereotypes and the anxious impossibility of fixing the Ţigan Other in one particular discourse of identification. While proverbs produce a moral, good Romanian peasant against his Ţigan Other, the longer genres often pose the Ţigan Other against higher social groups such as *boiers* and priests, also Others to Romanian speaking peasants.

---

[34] Major texts include I.C. Hintescu *Proverbele Românilor* Editură Facla, Timişoara 1985, Sabina-Cornelia Stroescu (ed) *Snoava Populară Românească* Editură Minerva, Bucharest 1975, Iuliu A. Zanne *Proverbele Românilor* Vol. 1-7 Editură Librariei Socecu şi Companie, Bucharest 1895.

This new approach to stereotypes in folklore deepens the available interpretations of what kind of Other the Ţigan was, exploring the ambivalence and dynamics of stereotypical discourse throughout the subaltern groups of society. The Ţigan Other was a central location in elite and subaltern discourses of Romanian identities throughout the nineteenth century, upon which Romanian speaking classes relied in order to claim their own privileged places in society.

The chapter that follows nineteenth century folklore addresses Ţigani during the socialist period, but I would like to explain the chronological elision of the interwar period at this point. As numerous Romanian and international historians have noted, the period following Romania's incorporation of Transylvania with the Treaty of Trianon in 1919 was a period of intensified discourses of Romanian ethnonational identity against primarily Hungarian and Jewish ethnic Others. Maria Bucur and Irina Livezeanu have both written detailed studies of how pervasive the policy actions of nationalist Romanians were, anxious to claim their own unique and natural rights to the entire society, specifically articulated as an ethnic claim.[35] These articulations were largely against formerly "superior" ethnic groups, such as Hungarians and Jews, and claimed "the Romanian people" amongst rural, Romanian speaking peasants. Indigenous fascist movements such as the Iron Guard also relied upon this support base, fusing orthodox Christian

[35] Bucur op.cit. and Irina Livezeanu *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building and Ethnic Struggle 1918-1930* Cornell University Press, London 1995.

and ethnic Romanian peasant symbolism, as well as mobilizing anti-Hungarian and anti-Jewish discourses against which Romanian followers could articulate their own identity.[36]

The Hungarian and Jewish ethnic minorities were Othered in different ways, reflecting the anxieties of the new and vulnerable Romanian ethnonation. Hungarians had responded to the Treaty of Trianon with the slogan 'No, no, never' (*Nem nem soha!*) and the significant percentage of urban Hungarians living within the new Romanian borders were an everyday reminder of the former social order and spur to anxieties of territorial loss. Jews were a non-Christian ethnic Other, stereotyped as controlling the economy through urban business and economics. Romanian academics, philosophers, politicians, religious movements and representatives constructed Romanian ethnic identity as an intrinsic harmony with nature and honest hardwork simultaneous with their construction of Jewish (non-Christian, economically rapacious) and Hungarian (territorially aggressive) culture as threats to the Romanian nation. As the nation was considered the natural form of expression for the existence of "the Romanian people," these groups were produced anew as threat to the Romanian nation. As such, Jews and Hungarians were the primary stereotypical ethnic Others against which post Trianon and pre-socialist Romanian national identity relied, though in very different ways to the Ţigan Other.

---

[36] Radu Ioanid "The Sacralised Politics of the Romanian Iron Guard" pp.419-453 in *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* Vol. 5, No. 3, Winter 2004.

In the interwar period, neither Roma nor Ţigani were of concern to Romanian politicians, fascist movements, academics or philosophers of "the people." A sign of how much energy was redirected towards the production of non-Ţigan ethnic Others is that Romani organized themselves into unions, self-identifying (often against the stereotypical Ţigan Other identity) as a unique modern ethnic group, without interest or repression from any Romanian institution. Roma held meetings and printed newspapers to discuss ways of improving the impoverished situation of Romani people (who were marginalized and often barred from Romanian education as Ţigani). Significant numbers of Romani men joined the Romanian military in World War Two. This is not to say that Ţigani did not remain a vital inferior Other, but merely that between 1909 (when debates about the *numerus clausus* and Jews became heated) and 1939 (when Romania entered the war with Germany) the major discourses of ethnic Others focused on the construction of Hungarian and Jewish Others in Romania.

In World War Two these interwar discursive constructions affected both Romania and Hungary's decision to enter the war, and the particular way that genocide was implemented against Romani communities. Just as Roma had been constructed as Ţigani, an inferior Other unworthy of national defensive attention during the interwar period, so the specific way that 36 000 Roma (by Romanian government estimates) were deported to Transnistria under the Antonescu government in World War Two as "Ţigani" shows us that neither Roma nor Ţigani were an

accepted ethnic group in society. The Romanian government defined Ţigani as a social group composed of nomads and criminals, rather than a primarily ethnic group as Jews were. Still, this definition ascribed stereotypical characteristics as intrinsic, not socially developed. The Romanian authorities declared they would deport as Ţigan anyone who was unemployed or without permanent abode. These characteristics were linked to stereotypical signifiers such as anyone who worked in the occupation of metal work, or had dark skin and Romani ethnicity; in fact all Roma identified as Ţigani were deported. In one case, six families of Turks were accidentally deported along with 62 families of "Ţigani" from Oceakov region and fought to be returned on the basis that though they had dark skin, they were not Ţigan.[37] In cases where Romanians petitioned to have their Ţigan workers returned because they were sedentary communities and valuable laborers, this was denied. Romanian historian Viorel Achim argues (disconcertingly in line with Nazi logic) that Ţigani were deported as criminals defined as a social group, but it is clear from the evidence that Ţigani were considered an ethnic group with intrinsic and generalized negative traits, signified primarily by the physical, cultural and social attributes of Romani people. In my conversations with Romani Romanian holocaust survivors I was left with no doubt that whole families of Roma from different cultural and regional groups were victimized in the Holocaust because they were identified as Ţigani, considered an Other inferior and biologically unique ethnic/racial group in society at that time. This is a vital part of history that requires much more research.

[37] Achim op.cit. p.142.

Chapter three takes the entire socialist period as a frame for interrogating the formal state non-existence of Ţigani, but the vital role of the Ţigan Other in everyday life as the Other of the good Romanian socialist citizen. At the end of the war in 1945, the small Romanian Communist Party addressed Romani Organizations regrouped in Bucharest as "Romani brothers and sisters," but by the time they took control in 1947, both Romani and Ţigan existence had been erased from formal government documents as an ethnic or a cultural minority in the Socialist Republic of Romania. Romanian texts published during the socialist period do not mention Roma or Ţigani as minorities, but foreign academics who lived in socialist Romania such as Sam Beck, Trond Gilberg and Michael Stewart do.[38]

It became clear to me that discourses of Ţigani that I heard in the field after 1997 pre-dated 1990 because people framed postsocialist stereotypes of the Ţigan Other in juxtaposition with a socialist period "before." Likewise, I heard jokes about Ţigani from the socialist period highlighting that Ţigani had been identified as a particular kind of Other even while the state denied their existence. The

---

[38] Sam Beck "Ethnicity, Class and Public Policy: Tsigani-Gypsies in Socialist Romania" pp.109-127 in *Giessener Hefte Fur Tsiganologie* Vol. 3 Issue 4 1986. Trond Gilberg "Modernization, Human Rights and Nationalism: The Case of Romania" pp.185-211 in George Klein and Milan J. Reban (eds) *The Politics of Ethnicity in Eastern Europe* Columbia University Press, New York 1981. Michael Stewart "Gypsies, the work ethic, and Hungarian socialism" pp.187-203 in C.M. Hann (ed) *Socialism: Ideals, Ideologies and Local Practice* Routledge, London 1993.

major sources of my information for this chapter of research come from oral histories collected through informal discussions and formal interviews with Romanian Romani and non-Romani individuals about this period. I chaired a weekly discussion group about "Romani Culture," open to the public in the Romanes Language Department of the Faculty of Philology at the University of Bucharest, through which I met a wide range of people with specific interests in talking about Romani history, and about the stereotypical Ţigan Other.[39] Many regular attendants were young adults of Romani ancestry whose parents had taken advantage of the social mobility and urbanization of the 1970s and 1980s to move far from their families and establish themselves as specifically "not Ţigan" Romanians. In order to avoid being identified as Ţigani, they rejected signifiers of Romani culture, such as music, dress, language, and even family (origins). I formally interviewed these people to discover which stereotypical discourses constituted Ţigani in the socialist period and how being identified thus would affect an individual in Romanian socialist society. Ţigani were stereotyped as non-productive and capitalist in lifestyle, incapable of living in a modern, socialist way (such as in an apartment block and working regular hours for the state).

Before 1989, Ţigani were associated with petty traders who brought goods illegally across the borders and "speculated" (sold) illicit goods such as

[39] The methodology of this discussion group and selection and consent of interview participants is fully explained in Appendix One. These interviews were conducted with signed consent forms, and were not recorded; only notes were taken. These notes are in the possession of the author.

contraceptive pills and cigarettes. In the third chapter I use theorists of socialist systems such as Renata Salecl to discuss the central role that the Ţigan as illegal trader Other played in the socialist system, not only because they provided goods in a period of shortage, but because through such acts they enabled the consumer to implicate themselves in an anti-social (anti-state) act. As long as everyday citizens felt that they had committed a crime against the state, they remained bound to the system and less likely to accuse the government or ideology of failure due to their feelings of responsibility for the delayed arrival of the socialist utopian society. The Ţigan Other, therefore, played the role not of ethnic Other, but as Other to ethnic Romanian socialist citizens under the socialist regime. The Ţigan Other was mobilized for the displacement of anxieties regarding the regime itself, through which Romanians Othered their ability to perform as "good socialists," and as a symbol of complicity with both the state and with crimes against it.

Chapter Four looks at the many roles that the Ţigan Other played in the period of upheaval and confusion that followed the 1989 revolution. The Ţigan Other was widely invoked to enable ethnic Romanians to displace their own former complicity with the socialist regime and to deal with new changes in public space and consumption. For example, Ceauşescu and the *securitate* were retrospectively incarnated as Ţigani, as inhuman dictators who had not been of the Romanian people. Specific socialist projects such as the physical destruction of central Bucharest were likewise blamed on Ţigani who had supposedly damaged houses

with their uncivilised behavior, to such an irreparable extent that the government bulldozers were necessary. In the actual violence of the 1989 revolution and 1990 protests, Ţigani were the elusive Others against whom various parties, especially Ion Iliescu and the National Salvation Front, incited the Romanian public and the armed miners of the Jiu valley to fight. In this period, the shifting and multiple signifiers of Ţigan identity, as dark skinned people, as street traders, as students protesting in a square or as Romani Romanians living in peripheral suburbs of Bucharest, were advantageous to elites who wanted to maintain confusion and a fear of violence in the wider population.

The Ţigan Other of the socialist period survived the transition to postsocialism in the familiar socialist form of illegal trader, considered a "social parasite." In the chaos of imported goods and uncontrolled street trading that followed the fall of Romania's state and border controls in December 1989, the Ţigan Other of trade became synonymously known by the old name of "speculator," and the most popular reference "*bişniţari*," from the English word "business." The sudden open market was popularly understood through socialist period discourses of trade as potentially immoral and disorderly, and new anxieties about the future of domestic production, employment, inflation, state control and price setting were projected onto a powerful Ţigan Other who was characterized as controlling entire economies. Popular discourse mobilized old stereotypes of Ţigani as nomadic bands of lazy thieves and incorporated new stereotypes of Ţigan mafia secretly busy masterminding the downfall of the Romanian nation. Elite political

discourses of the period encouraged the use of the elusive, ubiquitous Ţigan Other rather than educating the public about a capitalist system. The aim of this chapter is to frame the spectrum of stereotypes that were used to construct the postsocialist Ţigan as *bişniţari* Other as a strong basis for Chapters Five, Six and Seven, that focus on specific nodes of discourse producing Ţigani in postsocialist Romania.

Sources for the postsocialist period are plentiful, and Chapter Four interrogates relationships between consumption and Ţigani in the post-revolutionary Romanian mainstream press, elite political discourses, and personal experiences gained through interviews with Romanians. The press is a great source for the early 1990s, because of the new free environment and also because journalists not only presented discourses of the political elites but also reproduced popular rumours as ways of explaining economic and social phenomena. The media is also a documentation of a (belated) rebellion against politicians dominating "news." In terms of texts, I draw on the vast field of economic anthropologists who have studied postsocialist consumption such as Caroline Humphrey, Yulian Konstantinov, Roy Dilley, Katherine Verdery, Sergei Oushakine and Liviu Chelcea.[40] There is also a growing body of scholars that analyze discourses of

[40] Liviu Chelcea and Puiu Lăţea *România profundă in communism. Dileme identitare, istorie locală şi economie secundară la Săntana* Nemira, Bucharest 2000. Liviu Chelcea "Informalization and Structuration in Bucharest's Marketplaces" unpublished paper, 2003. Liviu Chelcea, Livia Constantinescu, and Cosmin Radu "Marketplaces, Morality and Political Practices: The Geography of Shopping in Two Districts of Bucharest" pp.185-221 in *Romanian*

politicians (Daniel Barbu), the revolution itself (Ruxandra Cesereanu, Sam Beck) and national identity (Lucian Boia, Vladimir Tismăneanu).[41] In the postsocialist period some Romanian non-Roma published various small books claiming to describe "Ţigan culture," and these texts are valuable as basic transcriptions of stereotypical discourses of Ţigani (Tudor Amza, Lucian Cherata, Nicolae Crisan, Emmanuelle Pons).[42] Criticism of these texts about Ţigani is facilitated by the even larger number of quality studies of Romani culture and the discrimination faced by Roma as "Ţigani" written by Romanian Romani intellectuals such as Delia Grigore, Vasile Ionescu, Vasile Burtea and Nicolae Gheorghe. Reports and studies conducted by organizations such as Aven Amentza, Project on Ethnic

---

Journal of Society and Politics Volume 3 Issue 2, 2003. Roy Dilley *Contesting Markets: analyzes of Ideology, discourse and practice* Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1992. Yulian Konstantinov "Hunting for gaps through boundaries: Gypsy tactics for economic survival in the context of the second phase of post-totalitarian changes in Bulgaria" pp.237-251 in *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Sciences* Vol.7 Issue 3 1994. Yulian Konstantinov, Gideon M. Kressel and Thuen Trond "Outclassed by former outcasts: petty trading in Varna" pp.729-745 in *American Ethnologist* Vol.25 Issue 4 1998.

[41] Daniel Barbu *Republica Absentă: politica şi societate în România postcomunistă* Nemira, Bucharest 1999. Sam Beck "Opposition and Dissent: the Romanian opposition's symbolic use of space in June 1990" pp.1-16.Working Papers on Transitions from State Socialism series, Cornell University Project on Comparative Institutional Analysis, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and New York. Ruxandra Cesereanu "Fenomenul "Piaţa Universităţii 1990" *Revista 22* Anul XIV Nr. 696., and *Decembrie '89: Deconstrucţia unei revoluţii* Polirom, Bucharest 2004. Vladimir Tismăneanu *Stalinism for all Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism* University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London 2003.

[42] Tudor Amza *Fenomenul infractional în rindul ţiganilor: Activitaţi specific Poliţiei Române pentru protenjarea etniei şi prevenirea faptelor antisociale* Academy of Police "Alexandru Ioan Cuza," Bucharest 1995. Lucian Cherata *Istoria Ţiganilor: origine, specific, limba* Editură Z, Bucharest 1992. Niculae Crisan *Ţigani: Mit şi Realitate* Editură Albatros, Bucharest 1999.
Emmanuelle Pons *Ţiganii din România: o minoritate în tranziţie* Compania Altfel, Bucharest 1995.

Relations and the Romani Center for Social Intervention and Studies (Romani CRISS) are also valuable.

Chapter Five develops from the Ţigan *bişniţari* and explores a specific discourse of the "Ţigan vegetable mafia" ("*mafia legumelor*"). In my everyday shopping experiences and in mainstream media in the late 1990s, people and journalists often informed me that the price of fresh produce in the open produce markets was high compared to wages because a "Ţigan mafia" threatens the "real producers," who are then forced to either hand over their goods to Ţigani, or to sell them with a high price. It was never specified exactly how this happened, but the stereotypes of Ţigani organized in family mafia groups, dishonest and violent, were invoked as Other to honest hard working Romanian farmers. The Ţigan Other was thereby an effective tool to ethnicize and displace public dismay and anger at inflation rates and costs from an issue of economics and government policy.

My research traces how this "Ţigan mafia of vegetables" functions not only for the general shopping Romanian public, but inside the marketplace, for the traders, administrators, Romani ambient sellers, and the customers at the level of interaction with these groups. The most suitable research methodology, therefore, was participant observation in three central fresh produce market places in

Bucharest over three months in 2002.[43] In this time I observed and spoke with different groups in the market, recorded interviews with consent, and paid special attention to how traders performed themselves for consumers.

I found that market traders understood the wholesale and retail structure of the economy very clearly; they spoke about it being better for the farmer to sell to the trader who would take the goods to market. But traders simultaneously harboured the same ideas as customers that the market place should be the privileged place of the "real producer," the farmer who grows the produce should be the one in the market. This was the discourse under socialism too, when the state controlled the prices of the produce and thereby alleviated the market trader of any blame for prices or lack of produce. In the postsocialist period, how prices can be established without a central government decision has been a constant anxiety, articulated not through attacks against the producer, but by displacing blame onto the Ţigan Other. Producers, though they understand well why the prices are a certain level, also perform themselves as victims of a Ţigan mafia Other that forces them to sell with a higher price. In this way they avoid discussing the awkward issue of why are prices high with customers, and instead they gain customer sympathy and consequently profit. The Ţigan Other is thereby vital in dealing with everyday anxieties about the economy and the place of traditional Romanian identity, the farmer, in a capitalist system, even more than a decade after the fall of the socialist centrally controlled marketing system.

[43] See the Appendix for full research project details.

New postsocialist anxieties about Romania in relation to western Europe also mobilize the Ţigan Other. The rhetorical construction of the period following the downfall of Ceauşescu as a "return to Europe" has been noted by scholars as a performance of unconditional adherence to an abstract "Europe" that naturalizes Romania as a nation unnaturally severed from Europe by the communist empire after World War Two. Accession to the European Union is widely considered the formal benchmark of acceptance of the natural Romanian place in Europe. As accession procedures prove demanding, and as international criticism is directed towards Romanians as unwelcome invaders of Western European spaces and markets, Romanian discourses deal with a feared refutation of their European identity by claiming that the new EUrope misrecognizes Ţigani as Romanians. This interpretation is disseminated in the media, blaming the stereotypical Ţigan Other as nomadic criminals who discredit Romanian accession chances.

The paradox of the situation is that the EU requires Romania to relinquish exactly that which enables its self-articulation as European, the Ţigan Other as inferior to ethnic Romanian identity. This chapter examines how Romanian discourses responded to international pressure to stop using the word "Ţigan" and to refer to Roma as such. Of course this demand itself conflated a constructed stereotypical Ţigan Other with self-identifying Roma, which I do not believe was a useful step for Roma, but Romanians responded by suggesting a third term already in use by certain Romani activists, the spelling of Roma with a double "r," as "Rroma."

Since this time, discriminatory practices such as showing the faces of dark skinned Romanian citizens accused of criminal offences on television with the subtitle "Rroma" have re-produced a EUropean Ţigan Other within Romanian discourses as Rroma. I argue that the extra "r" inscribes the name of the Ţigan subject in the context of EUropean discourses, as an Other that only Romanians can know, which the rest of Europe cannot yet recognize. As one Romanian intellectual entitled his critique of the (in)effectiveness of this new European political correctness, 'Just between us, we know all Rroma are Ţigani.'[44]

This chapter relies on extensive press sources to trace how Ţigani are used in Romanian discourses of European Union Accession, and how the new Rroma subject signifies Ţigan. I do not use any extremist racist media, such as Corneliu Vadim Tudor's Greater Romania Party newspaper, but the discourse in this press is anyway noted by analysts as well integrated in the mainstream Romanian media discourse. I rely on the major daily spreadsheets from Bucharest for my press sources, cross examined in relation to the international and specifically French media reports from which Romanian journalists glean their understandings of what "Europe" thinks of Romania. I focus on incidents of international renown where the Ţigan Other was invoked specifically as the Rroma Other, signifying concessions made to ethnonational knowledge for European recognition. These

[44] Ghinea, Cristian "Intre noi fie vorba, rromii tot Ţigani sint" in *Dilema* 19 October 2001, p. 3.

examples most clearly demonstrate Romanian anxiety about "belonging" in EUrope.

The final chapter of this dissertation investigates the relationship between discourses of ethnic and gendered Others in the postsocialist Romanian ethnonation. As with other chapters, it was my personal experience of a pervasive discourse performed by Romanian women about Ţigan men raping women in public space at night that led me to question how this combination of gender, ethnicity and public space violence functioned. I use personal interviews as qualitative sources to find the discursive links between male Ţigan Others and ethnic Romanian women's discourses and experiences of sexual violence.[45] While Romanian women discursively constructed Ţigan men as sexual threats to ethnic Romanian female subjects, the actual experiences of violence amongst the women I interviewed were in private homes at the hands of ethnic Romanian men. The chapter discusses how the gendered and ethnicized Ţigan Other functions as a kind of displacement for gendered Romanian ways of talking about sexual violence.

My aim in this dissertation is to map the basic course of the construction of the Ţigan Other within Romanian society throughout history. I hope that the reader will find in this work substantial evidence of the central role of the Ţigan Other as catalyst for the articulation of multiple Romanian identities, and understand how

[45] See the Appendix for details of the research methodology.

stereotypical discourses that produce the Ţigan Other change according to the identification needs of "the Romanian people." This map is a basis for the development of strategies against stereotypes that continue to wound Romani individuals identified as Ţigani, and a starting point for deeper research into the kinds of powers and anxieties maintained and produced around the Ţigan Other in Romanian ethnonational discourses.

Chapter One

The Ţigan Other as catalyst for the creation of modern Romania

Few Romanians know that between 1385 and 1844 every ethnic Rom in the Romanian principalities of Wallachia and Moldova was captured and made a slave of the state, to be bought by landowners and the clergy.[46] Likewise, Romanian scholars rarely include the fact of institutionalized slavery in accounts of Romanian history. Enslaved Roma communities were called "Ţigani," from the name "*Tsiganoi*," widely used for Romani populations in the Byzantine period that moved west with the Ottoman forces.[47] In the late fourteenth century many

---

[46] In 1844 the Principality of Moldova decided that the state would no longer purchase slaves, but actual full legal emancipation was not completed across the Romanian lands until 1856. History textbooks for school have never and still do not include the fact of Roma enslavement as Ţigani, nor the fact that anti-slavery laws were a vital platform of the formation of the Romanian state. For an interesting contemporary poll of public Romanian knowledge, see http://rroma.siteuri.ro/sclavia-rromilor.php, last accessed 21-11-2005. Over a six month period internet poll, 75% of respondents said they did not know, and 45% of all respondents stated that they did not believe that Roma were slaves in Romania. Also see the Appendix for the responses to my open-ended survey from 2001. Consider that 2 respondents mentioned slavery (#7, #61), while eleven wrote about Ţigani originating/coming from outside Romania (see #17, 31, 46, 71, 79, 81, 83, 91, 95, 100 and 122).

[47] Scholarly interest in the question of Roma origins began with *Die Zigeuner. Ein historischer Versuch uber die Lebensart und Verfassung, Sitten und die Schicksahle dieses Volks in Europa* Gottingen, Dieterich 1787. Studies of the origin of the Roma primarily use linguistic evidence to agree that they were groups who left India in the eleventh century and travelled west. See Ian Hancock "The Roma: Myth and Reality" in *Patrin* 2000 p.3. Viorel Achim claims with

southern Balkan landowners gave Romanian *boiers* (landowners) gifts of Ţigani as slaves. The Romanian principalities declared that any free Roma who moved across Romanian lands would immediately become slaves of the state, to be sold to private owners, to monastery estates, or to private *boiers*. All slaves were called Ţigani as well as sclavi, and this underclass constituted approximately 7% of the population of the Romanian principalities in the mid nineteenth century. The first Romanian ethnonationalist statesmen made the "unslaving" (*dezrobirea*) of the Ţigani one of their primary objectives in the 1848 revolution, along with land reform for peasants and state independence.[48] Considering the significant role of Ţigani in Romanian economic, social and political development, elite silence regarding this history is a signpost that there is much to be discussed regarding the Ţigan Other.

The Romanian historian Viorel Achim opens his comprehensive study of "Ţigani" in the history of Romania with the statement that 'in a traditional approach, the history of Romania could be written without a single mention of Ţigani.'[49] Although leading 1848 elite intellectuals wrote many historical and literary pieces about Ţigani, only a very small number of Romanian historians and sociologists

---

(generally accepted) secondary evidence that Ţigani were first recorded in Serbia in 1348, in Bulgaria in 1378, in Wallachia in 1385, Transylvania in 1422 and Moldova in 1428. See Viorel Achim *Ţiganii în istoria României* 1998 p.28.

[48] I use the literal translation of *dezrobirea*, "unslaving," throughout this chapter because it is a different word to emancipation (*emancipare*), liberation (*eliberare*) and manumission, which were not the words used. As I will discuss in this chapter, Kogalniceanu was very careful not to use any words other than *dezrobirea* for the process.

[49] Achim op.cit.p.1.

did so in the twentieth century. Those who have focused on Ţigani include Aurel Boia (1938), George Potra (1939), Ion Chelcea (1944) and Viorel Achim (1998).[50] The elision of slavery and "unslaving" as foundational acts of the Romanian nation is especially striking in communist period works that sought historical examples of bourgeois dictatorship, where slavery would have been a useful example but was not taken up. Similarly, postsocialist historians have rarely mentioned that slavery was an institution annulled only with the formation of modern Romania. Even Lucian Boia's extensive study of "myths" in Romanian national discourses adds its own silence to the project of forgetting slavery and *dezrobirea* in the modern imaginings of the nation. Collections or biographies of the major 1848-ers who campaigned against slavery, such as Mihail Kogalniceanu, construe *dezrobirea* as an abstract reference to the tithed Romanian peasants or as evidence that Romanian intellectuals were abreast of international enlightenment thought, contributing to the argument for Romania's "natural" place in European culture.[51] Since most texts do not even mention Ţigan

---

[50] Aurel Boia "Integrarea ţiganilor din Iant (Nasaud) în comunitatea românească a satului" *Sociologie românească* III, nr. 7-9, 1938. Ion Chelcea *Ţiganii din România* Ethnographic Monograph, Bucuresti 1944.

[51] There is specifically one quotation that can be used in both these ways. In his 1890 speech at the Romanian Academy, Kogalniceanu enumerated his lifetime achievements as the *dezrobirea* of Ţigani slaves and the emancipation of the Romanian peasants. He addressed the topics in this order, and began the second with the statement 'the black slavery was annulled half a century ago, but the white slavery took many more years.' In the context he clearly referred to Ţigani slaves as black, but the most common way of presenting it in anthologies is that this refers to the American continent and the abolitionist movement. This "spin" makes Kogalniceanu seem internationally aware as well as eliding the topic of Ţigan slavery in Romania. For excellent examples of texts that consistently edit Kogalniceanu's words out of context so that they become abstract quotations see

slavery, it stands to reason that they also omit an analysis of the fact that Ţigani remained in the same or worsened economic and social positions after *dezrobirea* as before. The fact that the governments overseeing the legislative *dezrobirea* of Ţigani made absolutely no provisions (apart from how much compensation to give the owners) for the 250 000 "unslaved" Roma who had to negotiate new terms of indentured labor is another aspect of silence in Romanian national history that deserves interrogation.

This chapter begins with a brief overview of the status of Ţigani as a segregated social class of slaves in the full sense of the word. I want to illustrate that the status of Ţigani was not as a group outside society, but as a class within that required constant subjugation and control. Ţigan slaves were an economically and socially integral part of Romanian society, discursively constructed as ambivalent subjects of laws and social convention. As Homi Bhabha (regarding colonial societies) and Orlando Patterson (regarding slaves in American society) elaborate, the 'form of governmentality marks out a subject people.'[52] The marking of a slave class constitutes an Other that demands domination in the discourses of the master, an Other that is thereby in a position of enunciative power, constantly threatening the discursive right to being mastered. This chapter compares the

---

also Anonymous editor *Tainele Inimei* Editură Minerva, Bucharest 1973 and I.D. Pirvanescu *Reflectii, colectia cogito de Mihail Kogalniceanu* Editură Albatros, Bucharest 1988.

[52] Homi K. Bhabha *The Location of Culture* Routledge, London and New York 1994 p.70. See also Orlando Patterson *Slavery and social death: a comparative study* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London 1982.

stereotypical discourses of Ţigani mobilized in legislation throughout the centuries of slavery with those of the generation of Romanian intellectuals who fought for *dezrobirea*. The discourses of both periods utilize the same ambivalent stereotypes, the Ţigan constructed as a "noble savage," childlike, uncivilized and wild enough to require despotic control, and then a new kind of enlightened master. The revolutionary generation of 1848 articulated the modern ethnic Romanian people as worthy of their own European nation state through their ability to extend the gift of *dezrobirea* to Ţigan slaves.

I address the question of what kind of Other the "unslaved" Ţigan became in the modern Romanian nation that was based on shared ethnicity, language, history and territory for the first time. I argue that the act of *dezrobirea* was a foundational act of the Romanian state (literally, since it was announced with the first revolutionary uprising of 1848), and thereby consecrated Ţigani as both (ethnic, linguistic and historical) Other subject of the Romanian ethnonation, and an Other inextricably *within* the nation. Indeed, in Romania the name "Ţigan," which had primarily signified a social group as property, continued to be the name used to articulate former slaves as a non-Romanian ethnic and social group. The "unslaving" of Ţigani to become Ţigani was a vital part of the process of narrating a new modern Romanian ethnonational identity.

Reading the centrality of *dezrobirea* to the foundation of the Romanian ethnonation explains in part why the Ţigan Other has remained a central figure in

discourses of Romanian national identity throughout the different periods addressed in this dissertation. In this chapter I discuss how politicians and historians became silent following the legal "unslaving" of Ţigani, while writers produced plays and stories for public consumption that contrasted and constructed a stereotypical Romanian ethnic identity against the Ţigan other as a way of showing what Romanians were not to become. Using the Ţigan Other as protagonist in popular theater enabled Romanians to learn what *not* to do in order to constitute a nation.

The arrival of Roma and the creation of Ţigani in Wallachia, Transylvania and Moldova

The arrival of Romani people who were named "Ţigani" is well documented in the annals of state administrators, monasteries and private landowners who captured, received or bought them as slaves. In 1359 and 1390, Wallachia and Moldova became Metropolitan seats of the Church of Byzantium and of the Patriarchy of Constantinople (respectively). Voivodes (heads of state) of the Basarab and Bogdan dynasties ruled these principalities until the end of the sixteenth century. The Voivode ruled the council of *boiers* (feudal land owners), and the estate of the clergy was influential. Peasants (*ţarani*), who were mostly Romanian speaking in these regions, identified with the region in which they lived and constituted a tithed underclass. The first written record of Ţigan slaves

in Wallachia was made in 1385 when Vladislav I gave a donation of 40 *salase* (40 families, about 300 individuals) of *Ţigani* to Voivode Dan I of Wallachia. There was a large influx of similar sized Ţigan slave groups over the next 20 years.[53] These Ţigani were considered a separate social class named *sclavi* or *robi* (both meaning slave), and were the property of their owner to be used for labor or sold.

In Moldova, the first large groups of slaves were distinguished as ethnic Tatars who came from the north in the late fourteenth century, and the first Ţigan slaves arrived in 1428.[54] The state authorities registered Ţigan and Tatar *sclavi* as different groups within the single "slave" category, and differentiated the two groups by the Tatar preference for built houses rather than tents, by language, and by their names.[55] *Sclavi* were absolutely owned by the state if not by a private

---

[53] *Documenta Româniae Historică, B., Tara Românească 1* Editură Acadamie RPR, Bucharest 1966 pp.25-28, 42-45, 98-100, 167-168, 187-188, 247-250, 265-268, 337-341.

[54] The first time Ţigan slaves are mentioned in Moldovan documents is Alexander the Good's donation of 31 *salase* of Roma and 12 *curţi* of Tatars to the Bistriţa monastery in 1428. *Documenta Româniaie Historică, B, Moldova I* Editură Acadamie RPR, Bucharest 1975 pp.109-110.

[55] Achim overviews and clarifies the confusion throughout Romanian history stemming from Kogalniceanu's statement that Ţigan slaves came from the north. This was reprinted in texts by historians such as Nicolae Iorga and even theoretically rationalized by claims that Tatars and Ţigani were confused. See Mihail Kogalniceanu *Esquisse sur l'histoire, les moeurs at la langue des Cigains* Berlin 1837 pp.6-9 and Nicolae Iorga *Anciens documents de droit Roumain* Datina Românească, Paris and Bucharest 1930 pp. 22-23. Achim is quite confusing to read because he uses the word 'ţiganeasca' meaning 'Ţigan style' as a contemporary adjective to describe the first Tatar slaves. For example, in one sentence he states 'according to Moldovan documents, Tatar slaves were the first strata of a ţiganeasca population amongst us, the second being that of the Ţigani who came from south of the Danube.' In this way he uses the term Ţiganeasca to describe a period predating the arrival of Ţigani! This indicates the intensity and

owner, and they had no rights to appeal to the court or the state directly. The ethnicity of slaves was consistently noted by the state, but after 1488 only Ţigan slaves were recorded.[56] In this way, the link between individuals of Romani ethnicity and Ţigan slaves was established as a social pariah class before intellectual elites mobilized ethnonational discourses as the primary social differentiation in the nineteenth century. Achim argues that the word "Ţigan" became synonymous with "slave" in the fifteenth century.[57] We will discuss in length how the differences between Ţigani as a social class and as an ethnic group developed in the nineteenth century.

Once in the possession of the state (Ţigani *domneşti*), a slave could be donated, sold or exchanged to become the property of a monastery (Ţigani *mănăstereşti*) or a landowner (Ţigani *boiereşti*). Slaves of the state, and occasionally those of private owners, were required to pay taxes to the Voivode and to work a minimum number of days per month. Ţigani were an important economic class, especially those who worked in trades rather than agriculture, who the state required to pay enormous sums for the right to practice their trade. Ţigani *domneşti* can be separated into two broad categories of those that settled in the villages (*vătraşi*) and those that were nomadic (*lăieşi*), meaning they worked their

---

naturalization of the link between the social group called slaves and the ethnic Other "Ţigan." Even when talking about an ethnic group who were slaves, the specialist describes them as a 'Ţigan style population!'

[56] According to Achim, Tatar slaves were probably taken from people settled on the lands after the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century and either bought or negotiated their freedom. Achim p.24.

[57] Ibid. p.33.

master's land in harvest season, and travelled within the limits of their owner's property looking for work. Occupations were primarily the skilled trades of Romani tradition such as metalwork, woodwork, gold panning, horse breeding and petty trade. Ţigani were also widely used for agricultural seasonal work, but overall they constituted the valuable artisan class in agrarian Romanian society.[58]

The situation of Ţigani was different in the Hungarian Kingdom of Transylvania. In 1422 King Sigismund of Luxembourg gave the first Ţigani in Transylvania the social position of 'royal serfs,' and decreed that individual groups of Ţigani must answer and appeal directly to the King for permission to use Transylvanian territory, and to decide what taxes they had to pay directly to the King.[59] By the sixteenth century, a special position of "Voivode of Ţigani" was appointed to take care of the fiscal, juridical and administrative concerns of Ţigani as a unique group below the other social groups in society.[60] Groups of Ţigani lived in a range of situations, sometimes choosing a place to live sometimes ordered by the Voivode to work in a particular village, but they were consistently a group below the social hierarchy. Hapsburg rule continued to treat Ţigani as separate to the

---

[58] The best description of Romani trades in the period they were known as Ţigani can be found in Vasile Burtea *Rromii in Contextul Socio-economic al Dezvoltare României* unpublished doctoral thesis of the University of Bucharest, Faculty of Sociology, Psychology and Pedagogy, Bucharest 1993.

[59] Achim p.45.

[60] Ibid. p.46, 62, 63. Achim references B. Mezey, L.Pomogyi, J.Tauber *A magyarországi cigánykerdes dokumentumokban 1422-1985* Budapest 1986 pp.78-79.

other communities, especially under Empress Maria Teresa (1740-1780) and her son Joseph II (1765-90).

While it is clear that Ţigani constituted a slave class throughout the principalities of what is now Romania, the issue of who was at the time a "Romanian" (in any modern sense) is much more difficult. Peasants in all principalities most often spoke what is now called Romanian, and were identified as a class of *ţărani,* meaning peasants. Peasants, however, identified themselves primarily by the region in which they lived. The famous statesman Mihail Kogalniceanu noted in the late nineteenth century that 'the word Romanian wasn't even used in Moldova and Muntenia, being replaced by the provincial names "muntean" and "moldovan."[61] In Wallachia, the word *rumâni* specifically referred to the social class of unfree peasants tithed to large landowners and monasteries. In Moldova, the Romanian speaking, "unfree" peasants were called *vecini*, and in Transylvania, socially below the Hungarian and Saxon ethnic peasants, were Romanian speaking tithed peasants called *iobagi.*[62]

[61] Mihail Kogalniceanu's speech at the Romanian Academy, Bucharest 13 April 1891.
[62] Achim op.cit. p.40.

The vital role of Ţigan slaves

Romanian historians who have mentioned Ţigan slavery have generally avoided detailed descriptions of their vital economic place in society or the intensity of administrative, juridical and social energy used to articulate their exact position.[63] George Potra's 1939 study is a notable exception. Potra argues that Ţigani were enslaved because they were an economic force powerful enough to warrant harnessing. Achim agrees that this was the case in Transylvania, but argues that the Romanian economy was not developed enough for Ţigani to be considered an 'economic force.' Instead Achim states that 'the occupation and mode of life of different categories of Ţigani were the system by which they were classified.'[64]

---

[63] Romanian historians of the socialist period especially note Ţigani but do not provide an analysis of their exact role. A good example of this is Vlad Giurescu *Political Ideas and the Enlightenment in the Romanian Principalities 1750-1831* Columbia University Press, New York 1971. The text divides Romanian social classes into *boiers*, peasants and the bourgeosie, then includes three paragraphs about 'the problem of the Ţigani slaves' at the end of the chapter, p.103. Giurescu describes eighteenth century government measures to 'improve the fate of this category,' but does not put slavery or slaves in his matrix of pre-socialist Romanian society.

[64] Achim's discussion of why Ţigani were enslaved argues that because state slavery existed as an institution at this time in Bulgaria and Serbia, and because Ţigani were charged a special tax within the Ottoman empire, then all Ţigani, including those who were not owned by any state or monastery and crossed into Romanian lands, 'were anyway already a kind of slave' that 'changing lands, just changed one owner for another. Their social condition did not suffer essential changes' p.33. This argument is a ridiculous attempt to ignore the historical fact that Ţigani were considered a specific social, ethnic and occupational group within the Ottoman empire, they were not slaves. Some groups of Roma that travelled with armies (as cooks, craftsmen, making the tents) were enslaved as prisoners of war by conquering armies, but in other areas, such as Albania, Roma were never known as 'Ţigani' or treated as slaves. Achim's argument that Ţigani

This conclusion nonetheless defines the social place of Ţigani as a unique class of craftsmen and traders in the feudal economy. When such a new and large group of mobile and valuable skilled workers arrived in the feudal and burgeoning capitalist cultures of the Romanian lands, this doubtlessly produced anxiety amongst different groups in society. The enslavement of such a group required a lot of anxious energy, and enslavement is never a static category. A class of slaves, especially in significant numbers with valuable craft skills, has to be produced and maintained in many different ways.

In addition to the fact of Ţigan economic importance, the extent and detail of legislation that articulated and controlled Ţigani illustrates how Ţigani were constantly produced and maintained as a slave class by those who owned them. Laws concerning Ţigani determined not only how much they cost and how much they would pay in taxes (depending on their trade), but also who they could marry, where they could live, and how they would be punished for attempting to escape. The Ţigan slave, therefore, required a lot of physical and psychological energy to produce and to maintain. This was not a pre-determined neat social group, but a system that required a high psychological and social investment on the part of the masters, who not only had to define themselves in the role of rightful owners, but, more importantly, to create a Ţigan Other that required enslavement. To this end, non-slave social groups produced a range of

---

were already slaves that simply changed regimes is reminiscent of the American pro-slavery argument that the Africans brought as slaves were already slaves of another African group and so pre-existed this period of ownership.

stereotypical discourses that articulated the Ţigan as intrinsically inferior, incapable of a "civilized" lifestyle, and as lazy, despite the everyday economic evidence that the exact opposite was the case. One way to understand the energy behind these discourses that produced Ţigani as slaves who needed masters is to remember that the elite social groups were interested in harnessing the energy of productive Roma communities. To harness this group as slaves also benefited the maintenance of the social hierarchy, providing peasants with an even lower social class against which elites could articulate them as "free."

The case of Transylvania was different to the principalities. The rulers delegated work to Ţigani in different communities, and Ţigani paid taxes to the Voivode/Empress/King. Taxes were much higher for lucrative trades like gold washing and metalwork. Roma groups that settled on the estates of landowners were specifically named Ţigan serfs, and large numbers of Roma lived on the outskirts of Saxon and settlements and retained their individual liberty, working in trades such as those in the Romanian principalities. All of these occupational groups were considered Ţigan serfs, identified as a separate and the lowest social class by occupation, language and cultural signifiers like dress and housing. Roma (as Ţigani) were important service providers to the Saxon (ethnic German) communities, but they were not considered "citizens" and were outside socio-economic developments. Though landowners often confused Ţigan serfs with Romanian peasants in everyday life, they were, conceptually, a totally separate

and inferior category to even Romanian serfs.[65] In the 1772 census of Transylvania, Roma were found to constitute 2.55% of the population, with 38 590 people, half of whom were described as nomadic (unsettled).[66]

Under the Hapsburg Empire in the second half of the eighteenth century, Ţigani were targeted for settlement and "civilization." Achim concludes that these serious attempts under Empress Maria Teresa and Emperor Josef II were motivated by the fiscal need to harness the economic productivity of Ţigan groups, especially those in occupations such as the gold panners in the Banat region.[67] Maria Teresa passed decrees for the sedentarization of Ţigani that required land owners to find them a place of residence, instructed authorities to confiscate horses and carts, and introduced compulsory authorization permits for Ţigani to leave the village or town.[68] These laws aimed to monitor movement of groups and clarify occupations and tax rates.

The Hapsburg law of 1761 required all Ţigani to register with the local authorities under the new names "new peasants" (*ţărani noi*), new farmers (*neu bauer*), or

---

[65] Sorin Mitu *National Identity of Romanians in Transylvania* trans. Sorana Corneanu, Central European University Press, Budapest and New York 2001 p.74.

[66] Radutiu, A. "Populatia Transilvaniei in anul 1773 a lui Iosif al II lea" in Manuila, S. (ed.) *Studii de Demografie. Studii Privind Societatea Românească între secolele XVI-XX* Cluj-Napoca 1995 pp.76-77.

[67] Achim op.cit. pp.69-70.

[68] I.H. Schwicker *Die Zigeuner in Ungarn und Siebenburgen* Wien & Taschen, Vienna 1883 pp.53-56.

new Hungarians (*uj magyarok*) in the place of their former name, "Ţigani."[69] Firstly, these terms reflect the social groups of Transylvanian society. Note that peasants (*ţărani*) and farmers (*bauer*) are occupational categories, but they corresponded with ethnic groups through the language of the title. The Hungarian group is the only one solely identified by their ethnicity, as *Magyarok*. The law was implemented with Ţigani recorded as "new" groups, not as simply to be re-categorized as Hungarians, peasants or farmers. The act of becoming a new Hungarian/peasant/farmer was therefore the disavowal of being Ţigan, and since the new identity was also ethnicized, we can assume there is an implication of the disavowal of Roma ethnicity as Ţigan implicit in the law.

The word "new" identified former-Ţigani precisely by that which could not be claimed, an identity of fixed origin as Hungarian, German or Romanian. Where "new" was written, it signified "*not* of origin of" and "Ţigan who is now" or "mimic of" *Magyarok*, *ţărani* or *bauer*. As postcolonial theorists explain, such identification marks the Other as a subject that may look like but can never reproduce the claimed identity.[70] The words *uj*, *noi* or *neur* marked and named

---

[69] Achim op.cit.p.70. Achim used the numbers of "Ţigani" registered in conscription to illustrate how the number of people named in this category fell over the years in comparison with an increase in "new ţarani." He concluded that many Ţigani did register this new name change.

[70] Bhabha op.cit. pp.85-92. The position of the Other mimic of colonial/dominating culture has its own space of agency, but the marking of the Ţigani with 'new' marked a supposedly inherent difference of origin, un-recoverable. This example may function in the same way that the phrase 'new Australian' was used in post World War Two Australia when southern European immigrants needed to be Othered in a different way to racial explanations.

the uneraseable gap of origin between the non-Ţigan Other and "real" *Magyarok*, *ţărani* and *bauer*. This legislation of name registration seems in excess of economic control, but in fact it served to mark the Ţigan slave class as such in a more permanent way, *within* the ethnic and occupational intersections of society.

Many Hapsburg laws that followed under the rule of Joseph II produced the Ţigan Other as a unique social group even as they claimed to legislate for assimilation of this group. In the decrees of 1767 the Romanes language was banned, marriages between Ţigani were forbidden, and mixed marriages were strictly regulated.[71] Every Roma child of five years of age was to be removed and raised in a non-Roma family thereafter. In 1783 Hapsburg ordinances concerning Roma included the banning of tents, child removal at 2 years of age minimum and 4 years maximum, the punishment of 24 lashings for anyone who spoke the Romanes language or ate human corpse, and the limiting of Romani musicians 'as much as possible.'[72] The basic assumption of these laws was that Ţigani had intrinsic qualities with thereby intrinsic stereotypical symptoms that could be removed from the community.[73] The Ţigan was therefore produced as an Other identified

---

[71] Grellman op.cit. pp.147-150 and Burtea op. cit. p.123.

[72] Stories of Roma cannibalism flourished in the media of the German-speaking world at the time of Joseph II's ordinances. In one Hungarian village, allegations of cannibal killings resulted in villagers murdering 200 Roma as retribution before the arrival of the King's investigation team, which found the alleged victims alive and well. See Grellman, Kogalniceanu (1937) and W. Willems et al. (ed.) *Gypsies and Other Itinerant Groups: A Sociohistorical Approach* Macmillan Press, London 1998 pp.43-44.

[73] The Hapsburg edict forbidding inter-Roma marriages reflected the eighteenth century conviction that one could 'civilize' people through genetic and social

by fantastical stereotypical symptoms like cannibalism, as well as signifiers that coincided with real Romani traditions, such as language, music and dress.

Moldova and Wallachia had even larger Ţigan populations and similarly produced the Ţigan Other through laws that claimed to respond to Ţigani as intrinsically uncivilized, lazy, nomadic and thieving. All the big monasteries and *boiers* had Ţigan slaves that enabled them to participate in the economy in the fifteenth century, and legislation concerning Ţigani consistently guarded the interests of the slave-holders to increase their stock. Until a brief period of freedom to marry outside the Ţigan class in the period of Phanariot rule (1743-1785), legislation forbid Ţigan slaves from marrying into freedom, while ensuring that offspring of slaves automatically became the owner's property. Ţigan slaves were big business in the Romanian principalities.

Amongst the occupational groups of Ţigani *vătraşi* (town Ţigani) were grooms, coachmen, cooks, petty merchants and the servants of the houses (including women who were responsible for the upbringing of the *boier's* children in some cases).[74] Ţigani *lăieşi* included *Ursari* (entertainers with bears), *Căldărari* (blacksmiths) *Lautari* (musicians) *Aurari* (gold panners) and *Lingurari* (wood

---

contact. The previously discussed Romanian principalities' inverse banning of mixed Roma/*gadje* marriages, in contrast, was based on what became the dominant nineteenth century theory of pollution of the superior group through contact with inferior peoples. Specifically relating to Roma in Europe and these theories see Willems op.cit.pp.41-42.

[74] Burtea op.cit. p.130.

workers). Slaves with trade occupations usually had a designated work period for their owner's profit, such as one in every three weeks, and if they were not house slaves, the "free" time could be used to work in one's trade for the money on which they lived and from which they paid taxes.[75] The slaves paid a tax for the right to practice their trade, and the *Aurari* (gold panners) paid more than all other categories. Ţigani *vătraşi* were sedentary in villages and sometimes worked alongside or for Romanian peasants, but they always remained separated in 'stark contrast' to the social status of peasants, even though peasants were tithed to the landowners.[76]

Laws consistently constructed Ţigan slaves as the clear property of owners, not as citizens. The treatment of slaves was left to individual owners, with the exception of cases of murder by a slave, which were the responsibility of the state. If a non-slave killed the slave of another owner, the law stated that the murderer must replace the slave with one of equal age and physical condition. If a slave killed a free man, the slave had no right to appear in court, but was charged with the death penalty and offered to the plaintiff to do with him what he wanted. If a slave murdered another slave, the state charged him with the death penalty and handed

---

[75] This is an example from the Secul Monastery. See Cicanci O. "Aspecte dîn viaţa robilor de la Mănăstirea Secul în veacurile XVII-XVIII" pp. 81-90 in *Than Rromano: studii despre Rromii* anul III nr 4-5 1999/2000 p.84.

[76] Achim p.183. Note that references to the landless lack of freedom peasants labored under do not refer to them as *sclavi* or *robi* and definitely not Ţigani, but as un-free, un-landed or tithed, assuming freedom and landed as the intrinsic qualities of the peasant. Ţigani on the other hand were "unslaved," defined consistently by their relation with legal bondage.

him to the wronged owner to replace the murdered slave. The owner could proceed as he wished.[77] From these basic laws we can see that the Ţigan Other was legally constructed as the asset of an owner-citizen for economic purposes.

Likewise, the laws that marriage between slaves required the consent of the owners illustrate the complete extent to which the state and society created slaves as assets of the owner. Until 1743, married Ţigan couples remained separate if they had different owners and owners divided any slave offspring equally between themselves. If a non-slave married a slave, their status became that of Ţigan, thus protecting Ţigani as *boier* assets. In 1743 the Moldovan Phanariot Prince Constantin Mavrocordat revized the laws to prioritize the sanctity of marriage over ownership, preventing the separation of married couples. Although the law assured compensation to the owner who lost a slave in the form of receiving the couple's offspring as their property, these reforms were "illusory" in the face of the powerful nobility and even the clergy, who simply ignored them.[78] Still, so many marriages took place between *rumâni* and Ţigani after 1743, that in 1785 another decree again banned marriages between the two groups. Under the 1785 legislation, Ţigani had to be of the second free generation if they wanted to

---

[77] Achim pp.40-41 using N. Grigoras "Robia în Moldova" pp.31-79 in *Anuarul Institutului de istorie şi arheologie* "A.D.Xenopol" Vol. IV, Iaşi 1967 pp.43-52. Achim relies quite heavily on Grigoras, at times even using sentences that differ by only one word.

[78] Achim op.cit. p.38 citing Gh. I. Bratianu "Doua Veacuri de le Reforma lui Constantin Mavrocordat 1746-1946" in *Anele Academie Române, Memoriile Sectiunii Istorice XXIX* Editură Academiei Romane, Bucharest 1947 p.450. D.M. Crowe *A History of the Gypsies* St Martin's Press, New York 1994 p.111.

marry with *rumâni*. It is striking that this law names an individual who was not born into the social class of Ţigani as Ţigan. This indicates that those in the social group were constructed as immutably so, though this is not a concept of ethnicity in the modern sense.

There was obviously a significant interest for all parties (except those enslaved) in maintaining the Ţigan slave class as characterized by immutable differences with the Romanian peasant population. Indeed, Achim marvels that Ţigani freed from being Ţigani became 'simply peasants or skilled craftsmen in villages and towns...losing the ethnic identity they had amongst the Ţigani.'[79] This observation highlights that Ţigani were socially identified primarily by their slave status, not only by occupation or a concept of an ethnic group. Aside from Achim's reluctance to admit it, the facts show, therefore, that Ţigani were not a radically Other community due to their own inability to integrate with ethnic Romanian populations. This period of Roma integration in Romanian communities free of the Ţigan slave identity alerts the historian that there was elite (juridical, economical, political and religious) investment in the discursive production of Ţigani as a separate people requiring enslavement. Laws controlling marriage and movement created, naturalized and reproduced a segregated Ţigan slave group in society, which was ethnicized as Other.

[79] Achim op.cit. p.56.

In each region of the three principalities, a single administrative position monitored Ţigan slaves. In Moldova and Wallachia, the state created 'a network of state workers, organized hierarchically in each territory, that was occupied with all aspects of relations between Ţigani and the state and between Ţigani and the other inhabitants of the land.'[80] This network, according to the documents Achim presents, seems to have been singularly occupied with ensuring that Ţigani paid taxes and were punished for avoiding work. The stereotype of Ţigani as lazy, work shy and unintelligent is pervasive in justifying these controls. As we will see in the next chapter, these stereotypes were re-produced in popular oral culture and folklore, but we also find evidence of these stereotypes in the annals of owners and state monitors of Ţigani.

There is a small body of work that has explored Ţigan slave uprisings and resistance, and these studies analyze how state authorities and owners recorded incidents, and thereby how they constructed the rebellious actions of the Ţigan slave Other. Ian Hancock has written of a group revolt following the murder of a slave by a landowner, and Cicanci examines the history of the Secul Monastery in Moldova. [81] Cicanci enumerates three common ways that the Roma slaves (working in agriculture) resisted their status, through subordination at work,

[80] Achim op.cit. p.40.

[81] Ian Hancock *The Pariah Syndrome* Ann Arbour, Michigan 1988 p.37. See Cicanci op.cit. p.84. These texts are not published as part of mainstream Romanian historiography, but in small circulation Romani specialist journals composed of theoretically complex and historically well-sourced pieces. The impact such academic works should have on contemporary Romanian historiography is massive, and will be addressed further in a later chapter.

running away, and revolt. One of the major forms of insubordination was for slaves to simply not go where they were sent to work. Included in the documents of the monastery were deeds signed by 'Ţigani' who were repeat offenders, pledging 'to cause no trouble to the saints of the monastery through either words or acts of dissemblement.'[82] The scribes of the monastery documented the reasons for absenteeism with comments that Ţigani were unable to work without parental supervision and that offenders had 'decided to go somewhere else.'[83] These phrases indicate that owners used stereotypes of Ţigani as lazy, childish and simply absent or weak minded rather than noting the absences for the signs of rebellion they were. Denial of slave agency, therefore, was mobilized through stereotypes of Ţigani as intrinsically inferior.

Why did authorities, owners and intellectuals persist with such elaborate discursive creations of Ţigani as unable to work effectively when they benefited so clearly from their labor? Why, for example, did administrators record such reasons for slave absenteeism, when it was clearly a logical slave resistance to working for the master's gain?[84] We can be certain that the amount of laws controlling Ţigani aimed to harness their economic productivity. Therefore we can conclude that by articulating Ţigani as lazy, childlike and "uncivilized," the

---

[82] Cicanci p.86.
[83] Ibid.
[84] Cicanci did note that some documents of the period drew a link between cases of rebellion (such as all the slaves of a monastery running away at once) and excessive abuses of owners. Cicanci citing *Pravilnicească condica 1780* p.37 and 164.

masters aimed to gain further social control through producing Ţigani as socially and intrinsically Other to the rest of the community, a group that could not function outside of slavery. Such an articulation prevents discussion of the fact that, indeed, Ţigani could not exist outside of slavery - they were not a pre-existing united ethnic group. The production of Ţigani as an ethnicized Other through stereotypes was vital to the naturalization of slavery in Romanian society.

In the Romanian context I have described, Stuart Hall's concept of the relationship between slaves and owners, as 'an articulation between different modes of production, structured in some relation of dominance' is useful.[85] The production of the (economically independent and valuable) Ţigan as incapable of work aims to cover the logical anxiety of the master ("how will I make them work under my control?") and create a Ţigan Other that *requires* state social and economic control. If we look at this from another perspective, Ţigani did need a master to simply *exist* within the Romanian context, because without a master the Ţigan was a Romani tradesperson. To clarify, anxious masters worked hard to legislatively control Ţigani as a very successful class of mobile traders in Romanian feudal society. Stereotyping Ţigani as lazy and unproductive nomads was part of the larger (legislative and physical) attempt to produce Ţigani as slaves in the face of their real economic potentiality.[86]

---

[85]Stuart Hall "Race, Articulation and Societies Structured in Dominance" pp.305-345 in *Sociological Theories, Race and Colonialism* Unesco, Paris 1980 p.320.

[86] This pattern of stereotyping resembles the structure of European colonial discourses of colonized and enslaved peoples in a general sense. British masters

As a final example of how the Ţigan other was constructed before the nineteenth century and what purpose this served, let us take the mysterious case of the omnipresent *netoţi*. The *netoţi* (meaning "bad" or "stupid") were elusive groups of not-yet-enslaved or fugitive Roma who lived on the run from the Romanian authorities and supposedly survived by stealing food and clothing. All three major historians of Ţigani in history, Kogalniceanu, Potra and Achim, write about wild bands of criminal Ţigani (the popular Balkan mountain *haidute*) without specified historical evidence. Potra describes the *netoţi* as

> distinguished from all the other categories of Ţigan through their courage and cunning, sharpened on account of the many difficulties they had to suffer... *netoţi* are naturally cruel, resorting to the knife and the axe at the smallest misunderstanding. I believe they are descended of the old Ţigan chiefs, under whose leadership the Ţigani came from India. The *netoţi* didn't suffer the yoke of slavery, and if caught they have no rest until they run with their unique master – freedom.[87]

---

articulated slaves as inferior precisely because they were anxious about their physiological superiority, and the articulation of slaves as culturally and biologically uncivilized provided one discourse of justification for precarious mastery in the form of the "white man's burden."

[87] George Potra *Contibuţiuni la Istoricul Ţiganilor din România* Bucharest 1939, 86. Another unreferenced "nineteenth century writer" described *netoţi* as 'half wild, half dressed, eating dog meat because there is nothing else, a people of Ţigan who succeeding to gain their liberty running in wild-ness and living as primitives, robbing the occasional passerby.' André Stanescu "Sclavia Rromilor

Here we see the stereotypes that will recur throughout Romanian history until the present. The *netoți* are descended from the original Țigani, of anOther, Asian origin and therefore created as more authentic than *vătrași* Țigani in their characteristics. They possess the traits of animal instinct rather than of human civilization, they are violent, courageous, cunning, wild and nomadic. The *netoți* is a strong savage that embodies the kind of slave the master conjects and fears in order to harden his resolve and control. The *netoți* is the wild Other that enables the articulation of a master that must be cruel in order to civilize those Țigani whose 'natural master' is a primitive 'freedom.'

Achim describes the *netoți* as 'so named due to their way of life, having no trades, living as animals, with no style of shelter, no tents or wagons, wandering about the country on foot, in groups of 20-30 families, living from thieving and pillaging.'[88] When I asked him in person, Achim said that this was a general description he gained from reading extensive archival references written by law enforcement authorities, although he does not cite any of these references.[89] It is interesting to note that Achim's *netoți* is much less "noble savage" of ancient, courageous, freedom-loving ancestry, and much more unskilled, animal like, aimless and criminal. This description has more in common with the discourse of

---

in Țarile Roman" *Istoria și Cultură Minoritați Rroma* December 2004 http://rroma.siteuri.ro/sclavia-rromilor.php, last accessed 21-11-2005.

[88] Achim op.cit. p.78.

[89] Personal interview with Viorel Achim, 19 July 2002.

Țigani in 1990s Romania than Potra's *netoți* of 1937. At the level of secondary sources, considering the lack of historical references, we can read the *netoți* Other as a discursive creation that enables authors to project predominant contemporary stereotypical discourses onto Țigani of the slavery period.

According to the documentary evidence available, authorities of the time *were* occupied with recording and searching for escaped Țigani, showing the state's interest to recover the private property of monasteries and *boiers.* The interest of the state was to maintain Țigani as an institutionalized slave class. The extent to which (unreferenced) details of *netoți* synchronize with contemporary stereotypical discourses of the Țigan Other is also interesting. Throughout modern Romanian history, social and elite discourses have articulated Țigani as wild and uncivilized, an animal-like Other that requires institutionalized control to prevent them harming the other (Romanian) groups in society. The fixed Otherness of the Țigan (slave) as wild and rebellious, at once an object of 'desire and derision,' simultaneously fixes Romanian identity as civilized and capable of civilizing Țigani.

Stereotypical constructions of Ţigani in the nineteenth century- how Kogalniceanu introduced Ţigani to the world

In the rest of this chapter I will argue that when intellectuals of the Romanian nationalist movement (the 1848-ers, or *paşoptişti*) placed *dezrobirea* (the "unslaving") of Ţigani on their shortlist of national priorities, their arguments for *dezrobirea* relied on the same stereotypes of the Ţigan Other that had been used to justify enslavement. I will explore what kind of Romanian identity was enshrined with the foundational act of *dezrobirea* in the Romanian nation and, consequently, what kind of Ţigan Other was produced in this moment, and how this Other was consolidated in "national consciousness."

We have deduced from historical documents that the amount of energy spent to maintain the Ţigan as a slave class was significant, and that this relied on producing Ţigani as slaves in various stereotypical discourses. The next chapter reads folklore to understand how the majority of society understood the Ţigan Other, and here we will discuss the elite discourses of the nineteenth century and how they presented Ţigani for a national and international literary audience. Mihail Kogalniceanu, a Moldovan educated in France and Berlin at the behest of the ruling Prince Mihai Sturdza, wrote about Ţigani in Moldovan society throughout his long life. He was the most prominent and constant advocate of *dezrobirea*, and was prolific between 1837 and 1865 on this issue. One of the

best sources through which to explore stereotypical discourses of the Ţigan Other before and after *dezrobirea* is to compare Kogalniceanu's representations of Ţigani in 1837, before he implemented his ideas, and then again in a long memorial speech in 1891.

Kogalniceanu first wrote about Ţigani as an appendix to a volume about Moldova that Alexander Humbolt asked him to write while he was studying in Berlin. The short essay borrowed from and contributed to the substantial body of international "research" that already existed concerning Roma as Ţigani, and is the first Romanian history text concerning Ţigani.[90] At the time that Kogalniceanu wrote this appendix, he was grappling with the issue of whether there could be a future "people" or even a nation of Romanians. In his recollections of this period in Berlin, Kogalniceanu notes 'I was the first one to use in French the words *rouman* and *roumanie*. In Berlin at the times of my studies and even in cultivated society, the names Moldova and Wallachia were as little known. I was called "the black Greek" because my hair was dark.'[91] Considering that even peasants in these lands did not call themselves "Romanians" at this time, the idea of creating a

[90] A comparative reading of Kogalniceanu's text enables one to trace which texts he had previously read, Grellman and Schwicker especially. Willem op. cit. traces Grellman's stories back to other authors also, although Grellman claimed they were all original. Regarding the stories of Gypsy cannibalism it is useful to note that, more broadly, Bhabha specifically addresses the role of cannibalism stereotypes as sites to read the ambivalence of the hegemonic structure, 'the signal points of identification and alienation, scenes of fear and desire, phobia and fetish' which serve to prevent closure for the subject and 'open the road to fantasy.' See Bhabha op.cit.p.72.

[91] From Mihail Kogalniceanu's speech at the Academiei Române, Bucharest, 13 April 1891.

modern nation of Romanian speaking "people" must have seemed a difficult task. Kogalniceanu immersed himself in the projects of modern nations, impressed by the concept of political equality over birth privileges of the French Revolution and with the Prussian land reforms and economic structures.

As Bhabha writes, stereotypes are not 'an ascription of prior identities, but their production in the syntax of the scenario of racist discourse.'[92] Kogalniceanu's early essay must be taken not only as a recapitulation of existing stereotypes of the Ţigan Other, but a new articulation of a Ţigan "people" (*popor*), a vital reflective appendix to his articulation of 'the Romanian people.'

Kogalniceanu's Ţigani were produced from a spectrum of existing and contradictory stereotypes, highlighting and attempting to capture the anxieties projected as the Ţigan slave Other. Throughout the text Kogalniceanu represents Ţigani as both the romantic 'noble savage' and the corrupted uncivilized Other. Kogalniceanu states numerous times that the institution of slavery should be blamed for Ţigani 'sunken in the greatest ignorance and barbarity,'[93] but since he stereotypes Ţigani through pre-existing negative stereotypes, and as needing civilized Europeans to assist them, he reproduces the Ţigan Other in much the same discourse that already existed in Romania. For example, Kogalniceanu's

---

[92] Bhabha op.cit. p.81.

[93] Page one of the preface to Mihail Kogalniceanu's *Esquise sur l'histoire, les moeurs et la langue des cigains, connus en France sous le nom de Bohémiens* Librarie de B. Behr, Oberwaldstrasse, Berlin 1837.

Ţigan men 'are of tall stature and noble countenance, with the form of Greek statues and bronze skin,' then two pages later the reader is informed that 'all Ţigani are dirty.'[94] Ţigani are said to have 'no beliefs but fetishism and destiny' and 'baptise children not from faith, but from wanting a place in the cemetery,' a depiction of Ţigani as non-Christian Others in a deeply religious Romanian peasant society.[95] Kogalniceanu writes that 'nostalgia' causes Ţigani to suffer if separated from family, and insinuates that this is a primitive emotion despite the sedentary, extended form of Romanian families. Kogalniceanu refutes rumours that Ţigani are cannibalistic; his long explanations of the rumours themselves conclude with the assertion that 'while the newspapers of the past were full of stories of how they decapitated people...now they just eat corn maize or stolen turkey,' thereby naturalizing theft as a positive development from cannibalism![96] The text recounts stereotypes in order to debunk them with others that intellectuals and common people could more easily incorporate into everyday stereotypical discourse, such as Ţigani as thieves rather than cannibals.

In Kogalniceanu's statements against slavery we can read some interesting approaches to the Ţigan Other.[97] Kogalniceanu revamped gendered stereotypes

---

[94] Mihail Kogalniceanu 1837 op.cit. pp.23-26.
[95] Ibid. p.27.
[96] Mihail Kogalniceanu 1837 op.cit. All of these stereotypes of Ţigani, as pagan, primitive in extended families yet neglectful of children, and as unskilled thieves, remain the basis of contemporary stereotypes.
[97] In socialist period anthologies of quotations of Kogalniceanu's letters and diaries, extracts are edited to such an extent that only abstract and misconstrued snippets remain. I did not do extensive archival work to find Kogalniceanu's

of the romanticized "noble savage" Ţigan women with an abolitionist slant so that Ţigan women are still 'ravishing,' but their 'sparkling black eyes' also 'big enough to read all their sad fate.'[98] The Ţigan woman's eyes sparkle even when full of a sad fate. It is also interesting to note that Kogalniceanu was already making brief notes about what kind of place Ţigani would have in a new nation state of Romanians. Though he was worried by the lack of an active modern entrepreneurial class, and he had detailed the distinct capitalist trader and craftsman roles that Ţigani played in Moldovan society, Kogalniceanu construed a lazy and generally incapable Ţigan worker in the same text. Regarding the possible roles of Ţigani in a modern society, he wrote that '*vătraşi* (town Ţigani) have the best musical talents, are the most civilized and deserve total freedom...they may be able to be put to work in agriculture...or in factories.'[99] In this single quotation we can see that Kogalniceanu produced the free and civilized Ţigan Other as capable of factory or agricultural work, simply variations of the enslaved role of the Ţigan Other in a modernised state. Kogalniceanu did not write about a class of skilled entrepreneurs to fit the mobile, productive and skilled occupations he had previously described. The quotation also defines worthiness for freedom on the basis of 'civilization,' a comment echoed in the preface of the text where he points out the worthiness of European nations according to their willingness to civilize Ţigani.

---

original documents other than the major texts he wrote about Ţigani and slavery, I formed the context to read the core sources in this section by reading widely in 1848-er writings.

[98] Kogalniceanu 1837 op.cit. p.23.

[99] Kogalniceanu 1837 op.cit. p.28.

> They form philanthropic societies for the abolition of slavery in America at the same time that they forget that in Europe there are 400 000 Ţigan slaves, 200 000 of those sunken in the greatest ignorance and barbarity. And no-one cares to civilize this people.

This quotation implies that 'caring to civilize' Ţigani is an indication of enlightened philanthropy that the Romanian nationalists have recognized even before other European intellectuals. Indeed, as Kogalniceanu began to campaign internationally and in Moldova, Wallachia and Transylvania for a united nation of Romanian speaking people's, one of his prime policy concerns was the *dezrobirea* of Ţigani slaves. If Kogalniceanu perceived the Ţigan Other through so many negative stereotypes, then how did he argue for their *dezrobirea*? In the following section, I will argue that it was in fact productive for Kogalniceanu to reproduce the stereotypical Ţigan Other of the slavery period, a corrupted noble savage, because "unslaving" such an "uncivilized" Other demonstrated a humanism, benevolence, and sacrifice that proved the worthiness of Romania to be recognized as a modern European nation. It was the act of "unslaving" the inferior Ţigan slave Other that enabled the ethnic Romanian nation to claim its foundation as a modern European enlightened nation.

The production of Romania as European ethnonation

A discussion of the kinds of discourses used by elites to create a Romanian ethnonational identity is a good way to understand the place of the Ţigan Other in the modern Romanian nation.

Firstly, Kogalniceanu and his contemporaries faced difficulties in convincing both local Romanian elite and international statesmen that a Romanian nation could exist. At home the biggest issue was dealing with the *boiers* and elite who had to be swayed by discourses of the morality and enlightened European-ness of giving peasants land, giving up their slaves, and allowing equal political rights for men. In addition, the largest part of the population, the 80% Romanian speaking peasants who were to be the new citizens of such a state, identified themselves primarily by region (Moldovan, Muntenian) and social class (*rumân*, *ţărani*, *iobagi*).[100] Debates over political theory and practice were therefore confined primarily to debates amongst the smallest elite part of the population. As a result, formal government activities concentrated on compensation for former elite rather than land reform and *dezrobirea* itself.

[100] The statistic is from Keith Hitchins *Rumania 1866-1947* Clarendon Press, Oxford 1994 p.10. The statement that these peasants didn't refer to themselves as Romanians is from Kogalniceanu 1891.

The Romanian nationalist movement also faced opposition from the Hapsburg, Russian and Ottoman Empires, who wanted to keep Romanians under their respective rule. In 1843, Kogalniceanu clearly stated his vision of a future Romanian nation state when he said 'I view as my country everywhere where Romanian is spoken, and as the national history the history of all of Moldova, before the dismembering of Wallachia, and of the brothers in Transylvania.'[101] On January 31 1844, after campaigning amongst the Moldovan councillors, they agreed that the state would no longer buy Ţigan slaves, and that those currently the property of the state would be "unslaved." The 1848-ers, a generation younger than those who had made the decision, reacted to this news with enthusiasm and praised the *boiers* who had supported the law as specifically Romanian and "civilized."[102] Kogalniceanu published a special supplement 'praising the great reforms' in the newspaper that he edited, and personally stated that 'on the same footing as the most civilized states in principles of morality and justice, all Romanians, all lovers of humanity, all partisans of new ideas, have

---

[101] Mihail Kogalniceanu speech at Academie Mihaileană, Iaşi 1843 cited in K. Treptow *A History of Romania* Center for Romanian Studies, Iaşi 1996 p.241.

[102] Achim concludes from the evidence, however, that after the first "unslaving" of state Ţigan slaves in 1844, *boiers* realized that Ţigani without masters were often treated with contempt by the authorities, and many were re-employed by *boiers* with the same taxation rate as the Romanian peasants, which was higher tax than for Ţigani owned by the *boier*, thereby making him a greater profit. Achim argues that this is why *boier* resistance to continued *dezrobirea* was low, despite those who did wait until the government assured them that compensation would be paid. Achim writes that 'we cannot speak of a sentiment of humanitarianism that led the state to this gesture (of *dezrobirea*), but their political interest. The *boiers* had won a new workforce' p.93.

united their voices to applaud an act that gives release to a whole people.'[103] This quotation exemplifies how Kogalniceanu articulated *dezrobirea* as an act of a united ethnic Romanian humanitarian state, on a par with other European nations. At the same time, Kogalniceanu articulated the 'released' slaves as a people fit to receive the great acts of the Romanian people. That Romanians are "a people," and a different people to Ţigani, is implicit in the statement.

In 1848, Romanians in Iaşi (Moldova), Bucharest (Wallachia) and Arad (Transylvania) began revolutions for Romanian unity and independence.[104] The 1848 uprisings in Moldova and Transylvania were quickly defeated, but the Wallachian revolution that began on June 9 1848 forced Prince Bibescu to abdicate and established a revolutionary government.[105] On June 14 1848 the new government's first decrees ratified the tricolor Romanian flag, abolished *boier* titles and censorship, and created a new national guard.[106] The fourteenth point of the new nation decreed the *dezrobirea* of Ţigani slaves with state compensation.[107] The decree did not specify where "unslaved" slaves should go. Many were made homeless and migrated westward out of the Romanian lands of

[103] Mihail Kogalniceanu "Dezrobirea Ţiganilor" p.1, supplement to *Propăşirea* Nr. 5, 1844.
[104] The Transylvanian uprising was led by Avram Iancu.
[105] This revolutionary government included Kogalniceanu's allies in enlightened European governance; Nicolae Balcescu, Gheorghe Magheru, A.C. Golescu, C.A. Rosetti and Ion Heliade Radulescu.
[106] Constantin Giurescu *History of Bucharest* translated by S. Gorjan, Publishing House for Sports and Tourism, Bucharest 1976 p.53.
[107] The decree stated that all owners were to be issued with yellow cards for each slave "unslaved" and that this card would be compensated by the government when they had funds. Achim op.cit. p.96.

their enslavement. The act of *dezrobirea*, therefore, was one of the founding decrees of the first united Romanian government, considered a central tenet of the new European ethnic nation.

The revolution was defeated in September 1848 by invading Russian and Turkish troops (and slavery re-instated), but it did result in the formalization of widespread demands for Romanian national unity and socio-economic reform, including *dezrobirea*, in both Moldova and Wallachia. The management of the principalities became a matter of European interest after Russia lost the Crimean War (1853-56), and the seven powers that signed the Paris peace treaty in 1856 decided that Wallachia and Moldavia were still under Ottoman suzerainty, but also under their collective guarantee of the peace treaty. This collective decided that local assemblies would decide on how to internally structure the principalities in the future.

The 1848-ers decided on a constitutional monarchy to run the principalities, and in 1857 these assemblies convened in Bucharest and Iaşi and decided to elect the same Prince as ruler in both principalities. At this meeting, Mihail Kogalniceanu argued that a united nation state was the natural form for

> 'this people, homogenous, identical as no others, because they have the same origin, the same name, the same language, the same religion, the same history, the same civilization, the same institutions, the same laws

and customs, the same fears and hopes, the same needs to be satisfied, the same boundaries to guard, the same pains of the past, the same assured future, and, in the end, the same mission to carry out.'[108]

This statement covers almost every aspect possible in the modern discursive construction of "a nation," the vital component being the argument that citizens are united by language, origin, religion and history. This articulation of the new ethnonation of Romania left no space for groups of differing language or origin.[109]

Despite Ottoman and Austrian opposition, in 1859 the powers decided in favor of allowing both principalities to be led by Alexandru Ioan Cuza. As of February 1862, the united principalities became a nation state named Romania. In 1864, Kogalniceanu and Cuza dissolved the assembly when they refused to pass the Agrarian Reform Law, a law that gave peasants property, but did not include any discussion of land for "unslaved" Ţigani.

Michael Salman, the scholar of anti-slavery movements around the world, has argued that the 'campaign for human rights did not call upon self-determining

---

[108] Quoted in Iorga op.cit.p.96 from Kogalniceanu's speech on the occasion of the meetings of the Wallachian and Moldovan Ad-hoc Assemblies, October 7 1857.
[109] Keith Hitchins notes that the new Romanian nation was defined by ethnicity, language and history but not religion. *A Nation Discovered: Romanian intellectuals in Transylvania and the idea of Nation 1700-1848* Romanian Encyclopaedic Publishing House, Bucharest 1999 p.173.

nation-states to end slavery as much as it took part in the determination of which people were fit to govern themselves as nations and which people needed to be colonized.'[110] As Treptow notes, 'the generation of 1848 was preoccupied with becoming European,' and Kogalniceanu and other Romanian abolitionists discursively relied on the "unslaving" of Ţigani as a means to produce a united ethnic Romanian nation worthy of self-government in the eyes of Europe.[111] The argument against slavery enabled a united ethnic Romania to civilize the Ţigan Other as a means of identifying their own new nation as civilized and worthy of independence in the eyes of modern Europe. As George Potra wrote in 1939, 'the idea and fact (of *dezrobirea)* was welcomed by foreigners, from whom we asked for the recognition of certain rights.'[112]

Support for this rationale can draw on what we have already discussed. The lack of forethought or afterthought regarding what would happen to Ţigani after slavery is evidence that uncivilized Ţigani slaves provided an object upon which the ethnic Romanian nation could cut its humanitarian baby teeth. Secondly, Kogalniceanu used the Ţigan Other as example of a "people" and thereby created a matrix of ethnic and social identifications separating the Romanian people from the Ţigan Other people. This was done in discourse throughout the decades of

---

[110] Michael Salman *The Embarrassment of Slavery: controversies over Bondage and Nationalism in the American Colonial Philippines* University of California Press, Los Angeles and London 2001 p.13.
[111] Kurt Treptow (ed) *Romania and Western Civilization* The Center for Romanian Studies, Iaşi 1996 p.13.
[112] Potra op.cit. in the edition republished by Cartea Veche, Bucharest 2001 p.111.

fighting for the creation of a Romanian nation, and was a prioritized argument and discourse at every major political moment; in 1844, 1848, 1856 and 1864. Re-producing Ţigani as "a people" ensured that they would exist as an ethnic category in the new terms of defining the nation, even after "the Romanian people" had extended them the gift of *dezrobirea.* It is very telling that *dezrobirea* was not a quiet, shameful retraction of laws, but a drawn out and much discussed and celebrated step-by-step process. This shows that elites did not perceive *dezrobirea* as the righting of a wrong that blighted an existing nation, but rather a joyous symbol of the birth of a new nation, the consecrating act of a united ethnic Romanian people 'on a footing with the most civilized states.'[113]

A close examination of the procedures and silences of *dezrobirea* and the kind of Ţigan other produced in this process is useful to assess this argument.

What kind of "unslaving" was *dezrobirea*?

The actual steps taken in the process of *dezrobirea* were legislative, and these laws dealt with the issue of how much compensation would be paid to owners, including monasteries. There were no government measures, in terms of legislation or social policy that addressed the supposed change in status of more

[113] Kogalniceanu 1844 op.cit.

than 250 000 people.[114] Ţigani continued to be called Ţigani, but were no longer considered a prioritized state concern after the final law of *dezrobirea* in 1856. When a *boier*'s slaves became free men then they no longer had the right to live on his property, and this resulted in large numbers of homeless Roma. Many Roma travelled in search of places to stop and work for a living, and these Roma were identified as Ţigani. Many Roma also made agreements with their former owners to continue living on that land in his employ, and they paid taxes at the higher rate of non-Ţigani for the pleasure. These Roma continued to be called Ţigani, despite their legal status as free men.

As Ţigani continued to be a landless marginal population identified as outside of Romanian social and institutional structures, the only significant change made by legal *dezrobirea* was the end of the spectacle of slaves for sale in the markets. This aspect of the institution of Ţigan slavery had been a visible display that was often noted by foreign travellers in the Romanian lands. Kogalniceanu was aware of the abolitionist movement in America and he was also aware that many foreign commentaries on Romania included descriptions of the ways that Ţigani were 'treated little better than animals.'[115] After *dezrobirea* Roma continued to be identified as Ţigani and to "negotiate" their lives with landowners, but legal

---

[114] The figure of 250 000 is the calculation of Achim p.98.

[115] William Wilkinson *An Account of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia* London 1820 p.175. Other foreign travellers who recorded the most brutal scenes of Ţigani being sold in marketplaces and raped by random Romanians included Elias Regnault *Histoire politique et sociale des Principautés Danubiennes* Paris 1855 pp.329-346.

dezrobirea did erase the aspects of the institution that had been visible to the European eye, and it eased the demands of Kogalniceanu that Romanians "unslave" as a moral act. Kogalniceanu's *dezrobirea* enabled statesmen to claim for Romania a moral right to inclusion amongst the modern European nations, and it retained the pariah class of Ţigani desperate for work and outside state institutions or citizenship.

The Romanian elite wrote constitutions and policies 'suited to the middle class' when over 80% of the population were peasants and the number of Ţigani was reckoned as 250 000, 20% of the urban population.[116] As the historian of Romania Paul E. Michelson writes, there were major 'contradictions between the ideals of reform and the interests of those who were supposed to carry it out,' and land reforms were 'neither well-planned or well-executed.'[117] Leading Romanian statesman Nicolae Balcescu said in 1850 that 'the revolution of 1848 wanted that the Romanians would not only be free, but also landowners, without which liberty and equality are lies.'[118] Prince Cuza and Kogalniceanu 'reaffirmed the inviolability of private land as the social foundation of the nation' in the 1864

---

[116] 120 000 per country; 9.81% of the Moldovan population, and 5% in Wallachia, from Achim op.cit.p.82. 20% of urban population in 1832. Statistics from Keith Hitchins *The Romanians 1774-1866* Clarendon Press, Oxford 1996 p.10.

[117] Paul E. Michelson *Conflict and Crisis: Romanian Political Development 1861-1871* Garland Publishing Inc., New York and London 1987 p.32 and p.77.

[118] Anon "1848" Theme issue Nr.60 Sfera Politicii, published by Fundatiei Societatea Civila, Bucharest, May 1998 p.6. www.dntb.ro/sfera/arhiva/nr60/articole/articol2text.htm, last accessed 21-11-2005.

reforms.[119] Ţigani were not included as part of the Romanian population that should receive land in reforms. The only suggestion for Ţigani was factory work, such as the brief statement by Kogalniceanu in his 1837 essay. In 1841 a member of the Moldovan administrative Assembly published a detailed plan to 'teach them (Ţigani) order, economics, morals and religion' by settling them in 'agricultural-industrial colonies' where they would be used for 'productive work' and 'given three days visiting rights per month.'[120] The implicit designation of Ţigan identity in these plans is as a controlled and productive working class, stereotypes formed in reaction to the reality of Roma as largely skilled craftsmen whose fiscal capacity made them an attractive group to control. The 1848-ers thereby conceived of the post-*dezrobirea* Ţigan Other with the same stereotypes as when they were a slave class, and the place of former slaves was written into the new Romanian state as Other to basic citizen rights such as owning property.

The silence of intellectuals who had campaigned for *dezrobirea* regarding the effects it immediately had on Ţigani communities themselves is striking. As Achim states, in the period after *dezrobirea* 'the exploitation of Ţigani was, in general, greater than before' due to the need amongst suddenly homeless Roma to find places to live while working.[121] Kogalniceanu did not write any lengthy articles or plan any social policies for Ţigani. He did not count them amongst

---

[119] Hitchins 1996 op.cit. p.306.
[120] This author was on the Administrative Council of the Moldovan Principality at the time. T. Diamant *Scrieri economice* Bucharest 1958 pp.116-121.
[121] Achim op.cit.p.79

Romanians who needed land or representation before the state. The single serious memoir of the process of *dezrobirea* is Kogalniceanu's famous last speech at the Romanian Academy in 1890, which is addressed later in this chapter.

What kind of Ţigan was produced through *dezrobirea?*

Dezrobirea produced a Ţigan Other within the modern matrix of ethnic national identities. As Romanians were articulated as an ethnic group deserving national independence as a "people," Kogalniceanu referred to Ţigani also as a "people," but not a part of "the Romanian people." As enlightened 1848-ers urged "the Romanian people" to put themselves 'on a footing with the most civilized states' through "unslaving" Ţigani. The verbs "freedom," "eliberation," "emancipation" or "manumission" were not used by politicians.[122] Ţigani were to be "unslaved," but to remain under the name "Ţigan," a word signifying an Other history, origin, and social position to Romanians. The Ţigan Other had only existed by this name as systematic and institutionalized slaves of the state; they were created as such in Romania. Ţigani existed within the new nation as an Other origin to Romanians, an Other history and social place to ethnic Romanians, but they could not be *of* the Romanian nation.

---

[122] Some of the journalistic pieces published after the acts were passed used these words freely to describe the new status of Ţigani, and historians use them too. Kogalniceanu was very careful not to do so.

One useful way to conceptualize the place of the Ţigan Other after *dezrobirea* was as a Ţigan slave without a master. This approach encapsulates the way that the stereotypes used to construct the Ţigan as slave were also the stereotypes that constructed the Ţigan object of *dezrobirea*. As American sociologist Orlando Patterson notes, there was 'a universal conception of manumission as a gift from the master,' the freed slave was expected to be grateful for the master's generosity.[123] In the Romanian case, we have seen that the effects of *dezrobirea* on the income and social place of the Ţigani slaves was not considered in political debates, indeed it is as if the single legal act of *dezrobirea* was all that actually existed of the discussion and legislation that took place over twenty years. The Ţigan slaves were "unslaved" and given the gift of the same name. If the only gift was the abolishment of ownership of slaves, but Ţigani remained named and identified as "slaves," then in fact they became Ţigan slaves without masters.

This situation bears great similarities with the southern states of the United States of America, where Ira Berlin notes that 'freedmen were considered as slaves

---

[123] Patterson op.cit. 1982 p.241. I do not intend to draw an unproblematized correlation between the case of slavery of Africans in the United States of America and Roma as Ţigani in Romania. A study critically comparing the Romanian and American cases would be valuable, especially considering the emerging literature that assumes Romania ran parallel with America in the aspect of slavery and humanitarian emancipation. For example see Mihaela Mudure "From the Gypsies to the African Americans" pp. 58-73 in the *Journal for the study of Religions and ideologies* No.4 /Spring 2003. Also on line at http://hiphi.ubbcluj.ro/JSRI/html%20version/index/no_4/mihaela _mudure - articol.htm, last accessed 21-11-2005.

without masters.'[124] As in Patterson's observations in the American context of colonial discourse, 'the freedman continued to be viewed as something of an anomaly and, like all persons in transitional states, was regarded as potentially dangerous.'[125] Indeed, the Ţigan not only remained named as slave, defined as an 'object of mastery' but was also stereotyped in the same way, as requiring civilization (albeit by a modern enlightened nation state this time). After 470 years of discursive rationale for absolute control of Ţigani as uncivilized, lazy and potential criminals, it is no surprise that the "unslaved" Ţigani could be perceived as more dangerous than the previous slave Ţigan.[126] Remember the pervasive image of the netoţi Ţigani that, unenslaved, wild and violent, terrorized Romanian communities and made the most use of their recaptured freedom?

The new relationship of the Ţigan as slave without master to the Romanian nation was as decidedly not belonging, but always within. It was Other to but *within* the Romanian ethnonational self. As intellectuals, artists, statesmen started to deliberately intensify discourses of 'the Romanian national identity,' the Ţigan Other was the negative image against which a positive Romanian stereotypical identity could be constructed. The Ţigan Other was an object within the nation upon which anxieties about "the Romanian people" could be projected, blamed and dealt with. The following chapters of this dissertation address how this has

---

[124] Ira Berlin *Slaves without Masters The Free Negro in the Antebellum South* Vintage Books, Pantheon Books, New York 1976.
[125] Patterson op.cit. p.249.
[126] Berlin op.cit. p.13.

functioned in various periods of Romanian history, but let us turn to Kogalniceanu and how he represented the Ţigan Other after *dezrobirea.*

In a long speech at the Romanian academy in 1890, Kogalniceanu categorizes his lifetime achievements into three main topics; the *dezrobirea* of Ţigani, the annulment of birth privileges of social class and the proclamation of civil and political equality for all Romania's sons" and the emancipation of the peasants (*ţărani*).[127] Kogalniceanu presents *dezrobirea* as the struggle of 1848-ers with slave owners to allow the laws to pass. After listing the dates of the decrees, he concludes with the optimistic statement that

> the emancipating reforms soon had their salutary effects, and apart from the Ţigani still living in camps and apart from the Ursari still taming their beasts, they also worked the land. Almost all the other groups of Ţigani have blended into the mass of the nation. One can only differentiate them by their Asian colored faces and if you pay attention to their strong imaginations; otherwise we find them in all the classes of our society. Although not fifty years have passed since the proclamation of the emancipation the Ţigani gave us factory owners, artists, distinguished officers, good administrators, doctors and even parliamentary speakers.

---

[127] "Dezrobirea Ţiganlor, ştergerea privilegiilor boiereşti, emanciparea ţăranilor" a speech given at the Romanian Academy, April 1, 1891 and reprinted in *Scrieri Literare*, Editură 100+1, Bucharest 2000.

As an historian, I was struck by Kogalniceanu's elision of issues regarding the severe problems that followed *dezrobirea*. It is significant that he saw *dezrobirea*, even in retrospect, as an act that only included the end of legal control of Ţigani. The structure of Kogalniceanu's reference to the society of 1890 is telling. Note that he uses specifically physical verbs and signifiers, that Ţigani 'have *blended* into' not society, but 'the nation.' He next highlights those who have not blended in as signified by anOther origin (Asia), a stereotype that is specifically ethnic rather than social. Kogalniceanu mobilizes the historically repeated stereotype that one can recognize a Ţigan not only by the color of skin, but also by a 'strong imagination.' This phrase implies all the negative stereotypes of the Ţigan Other (nomadism, promiscuity, musical talent, laziness at work) that were central in the period of slavery to explain slave resistance as the intrinsic inability of the Ţigan Other to work and live in a "civilized" way. By providing these exceptions to Ţigan assimilation in his contemporary Romanian community, Kogalniceanu located the Ţigan without master as displaying characteristics tied to their non-Romanian (Asian) origins. Such a stereotypical equation maintains the social location of Ţigani as within but not *of* the ethnic Romanian nation.

The Ţigan slave-without-master and the development of Romanian ethnonational consciousness

In addition to silence and one speech, what evidence can be found to understand how Ţigani were valuable Others in nineteenth century articulations of a Romanian ethnonational identity? The field in which Ţigani were most often discussed was literature, including plays and stories that were performed and published in popular Romanian newspapers and theaters. This is explained by the fact that many of the 1848-ers were prolific journalists and playwrights as well as politicians. In the period following the formation of Romania with the unification of the principalities, the development of a "national consciousness" of the specificities of Romanian "people" was a priority for the intellectual and literary elite. Many nineteenth century writers believed that literature should be 'moral and instructive,' and the 1848-ers especially wrote 'inspired by a belief inherited from the enlightenment that literature had an inherently didactic value.'[128] The Ţigan Other was a vital character in many different literary pieces and served multiple purposes. Ţigani functioned as objects against which the normative Romanian reader could assess their own capacity for sympathy, humanism, tolerance, and political independence.

[128] Hitchins 1996 op.cit. p.126 and p.187.

In Fagan Yellin's introduction to Harriet Beecher Stowe's famous abolitionist novel *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, the American author states that the novel 'dramatizes the successful struggle of white Americans to achieve sympathy and feeling with slaves,' redeeming the American nation through this sympathy.[129] This observation could be equally applied to the purpose of one category of post-*dezrobirea* literature by Romanians about Țigani.[130] The 1848-er Radu Rosetti, for example, described Țigani (in a short fiction piece) as 'degraded' to being 'lazy, drunken, dirty, opening their mouths only to lie and cheat, always ready to steal or do anything to procure a drink,' and then stated that 'even these characteristics do not merit the true torture' of slavery.[131] With such a comment, it is the willingness of the Romanian giving the gift of *dezrobirea* to such a group of people that is valorized, while the stereotypes of Țigani are reinforced.

---

[129] Fagan Yellin, "Introduction" pp.vii-xxvii Harriet Beecher Stowe *Uncle Tom's Cabin* Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York 1998 p.xvi.

[130] *Uncle Tom's Cabin* was translated and published in Romania in 1853, only one year after its American release, and another translation came out soon after. Kogalniceanu wrote the preface for the first of the two translations, and they generated discussion in the contemporary Moldovan press. For a brief overview of Kogalniceanu's awareness of the American abolitionist debates, see the previously cited paper by Mihaela Mudure. Contemporary historian Dan Berindei claims that the first historic novel was in fact an adaptation of "Uncle Tom's Cabin" about Țigani slaves see Vasile Alexandrescu–Urechia *Coliba Mariucai* 1855. Also see Dan Berindei *Epoca Unirii* Corvin Press, Bucharest 2000 p.229.

[131] Radu Rosetti "Amintiri. Ce-am auzit de la alții" pp.5-11 in Vasile Ionescu (ed) *O Mie de ani de singurătate. Rromii în proza românească* Aven Amentza, Bucharest 2000 p.6. This text is a 630 page anthology of writing about Țigani and Roma through Romanian history and includes 27 authors.

Another striking example of 1848-er literature is Costache Negruzzi's short story tellingly entitled 'Why Ţigani are not Romanians.'[132] The story describes a scene of the Romanian narrator strolling through a village reading and reflecting on Mihail Kogalniceanu's essay '*Esquisse sur l'origine et la langue des Cigains.*' When a Ţigan neighbour asks the protagonist what he is reading, the Romanian kindly explains to the Ţigan that it is the history of his own "people." The Ţigan 'protests with a distressed air' to the version recounted to him by the Romanian, and then proceeds with his own outlandish explanations of how Ţigani came to be in Romania. The Ţigan becomes hysterical, recounting his stories to the disbelieving Romanian who merely smiles at the 'ignorance' of the Ţigan. The story thereby explains 'why Ţigani are not Romanians' by showing that Romanians know more about Ţigani than Ţigani themselves! From one position of interpretation, it is true that Ţigani cannot be Romanian because their construction was indeed a product of the Romanian protagonist.

1848-er Vasile Alecsandri's body of work with Ţigan subjects are nostalgic for a romanticized Ţigan Other, free, childlike and noble, that cannot exist in his contemporary Romania. In one piece, *History of a Dukedom*, the content refers to a "band of Ţigani," who live an idealized, nomadic life in the forests. Another piece entitled "Porojan" tells the story of a Romanian narrator's long lost childhood friend, who was a Ţigan. The wistful nostalgia of these pieces is made

[132] Costache Negruzzi "Pentru ce Ţigani nu sînt români" pp.74-84 in Vasile Ionescu op.cit.

possible by the impossibility of the situations being actualized; Ţigani in Romania were a policed slave class. As Salecl notes, nostalgia is often for a 'past that never existed in the way it is remembered.'[133] One can be nostalgic for nomadic happy Ţigani as long as it was never possible for Ţigani to live free in Romanian forests in the past, and as long as one's Ţigan friends remain firm vestiges of childhood, socio-economically segregated in adulthood. The case of a Romanian narrator citing a long lost childhood friend who was Ţigan is interesting in that it is often used as a discursive claim to a privileged knowledge of the Other.[134]

A final example of the way that the Ţigan Other was constructed after *dezrobirea* through familiar stereotypical discourses of the slavery period is the hit theatrical performance of Ioan Budai-Deleanu's piece *Ţiganiada*. Originally written in 1800, published only in 1875, this 'mock-heroic poem of the imaginary exploits of Ţigani under Vlad Tepes' was performed throughout the country to much acclaim in the period after the unification of the principalities and the *dezrobirea* of Ţigani.[135] The theater in this period was 'prized it as a civilizing agent, a

---

[133] Renata Salecl "Where is the center?" 3. June 2000 p.2 online article www.westfaelischerkunstverein.de/archiv/2000/ausstellungen/whereis/vortraege/salecl.pdf, last accessed 13-7-2004. Note that the romanticization of Roma as "Gypsies" in Australia, America and the United Kingdom also relies on stereotypes of carefree nomadism at one with nature, uncorrupted by the modern city.

[134] The statement "I am not a racist; my best friend was a Ţigan when I was a child" remains a common discursive trope in contemporary Romania, often used by politicians and everyday people, as Delia Grigore pointed out to me.

[135] Nicolae Iorga *A History of Romania* edition translated by J.T.McCabe, Fisher Unwin Ltd, London 1925 p.209. Two detailed studies of the text of the *Ţiganiada* have been recently published, and it is fascinating that neither devote any space to

powerful means of moral and aesthetic education especially suited to a nation just entering the world of modern culture.'[136] The *Ţiganiada* was considered a valuable didactic exercise for Romanian audiences that could not access written sources like newspapers.

The storyline of the *Ţiganiada* is about a group of Ţigani under the rule of Vlad Tepeş who realize that their right to self–government is being violated. The Ţigani organize into a political unit, petition the Voivode, and create their own state. Once they have a government, the Ţigani find that they cannot obey their own laws, and realize they need someone else to rule over them after all. Set in a period in which Ţigani really were armed to fight against the Turks, Budai-Deleanu's epic utilizes common ethnic stereotypes of Ţigani in order to express serious Enlightenment political thought about representation, democracy and "national peoples."[137]

---

asking why it is that Ţigani are the satirical protagonists of the play. The text relies heavily on stereotypes of Ţigani, but the authors consistently ignore this fact and analyze the text according to its implied analogy to "the Romanian people." One author notes that the comedy is 'ironic' and 'fantastic' because 'it is the attempt of Ţigani to have a country and a name...thwarted only by nature.' Valy Ceia *Narativ şi Descriptiv în Ţiganiada lui Budai-Deleanu* Editură Universităţii de Vest, Timişoara 2002 p.26. Another critical text goes so far as to analyze the repetition of terms such as 'vulture' and 'crow' as 'synonyms for Ţigani,' but never discusses how stereotypes of the Ţigan Other function. G.I.Tohăneanu *Neajungerea limbii: Comentarii la Ţiganiada de Budai-Deleanu* Editură Universităţii de Vest, Timişoara 2001 p.41.

[136] Hitchins 1996 op.cit. p.195.

[137] Klaus Bochmann "Minorităţile în conştiinţa majorităţii: Un caz clasic, Rromii în cultura şi folclorul românesc" pp.75-79 in *Than Rromano: Studii despre Rromi* Anul III Nr. 4-5 1999/2000 p.78. Bochmann notes the basic political role of

Benedict Anderson notes that this genre of tongue-in-cheek utopian sagas of "the people" often took the (colonial) Other as protagonist and were a way of criticizing contemporary society, as well as suggesting possibilities for future national developments.[138] The plot of the play, in which the ludicrous horror of Ţigani gaining political/social power is at the last minute thwarted by their essentially incapable nature (they simply cannot organize, work or think hard enough), re-produces the place of Ţigan in post- *dezrobirea* society as requiring governance. From another perspective this can be seen as the Ţigan Other exhibiting their own inability to govern themselves and thus justifying their governance (or enslavement) by Romanians.

Budai-Deleanu's *Ţiganiada* was successful because it used the intersecting identifications of social class and ethnicity. Romanian peasants recognized in the Ţigan protagonists a group that was technically similar to their own unlanded status. But the Ţigan was still essentially *not* Romanian and inferior, so the actions of the Ţigan government that led to its collapse were also considered Other than Romanian, and were re-created as Other in the performance. Indeed, while Romanian audiences may have laughed because they identified with the Ţigan Others in the play, the desire of the Romanian viewers to differentiate

---

Budai-Deleanu's comedy and the presence of Roma stereotypes as critical to the humour of the play.

[138] Anderson, B. *Imagined Communities; Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* Verso Press, London and New York, revized edition 1991 p.69.

themselves from Ţigani as a slave class ensured the didactic element of the performance. As Sorin Mitu notes in his study of Romanian identity in Transylvania, the *Ţiganiada* projected the Romanian self image manifest in 'the rather ofensive comparison' with Ţigani, and 'grotesquely deformed that image into exaggerated or parodic figures.'[139] Mitu concludes that Budai-Deleanu used this specific metaphor to 'urge Romanians to try and change things for the better;' the horror of becoming *as* Ţigani was the anxious impetus supposed to stay with the audience.[140] Romanian peasants were introduced to knowledge about how a nation should be run and concepts of representation for themselves through their ability to recognize stereotyped Ţigan Others as *not* Romanian. In this way the Ţigan Other was a useful instrument to instruct Romanian peasants how to be ethnic Romanian citizens of a new modern nation.

Through literature, the 1848-er elites produced and performed the post-*dezrobirea* Ţigan Other with the same stereotypical discourses through which they had articulated the Ţigan slave. The Ţigan Other functioned in a new way for this generation, however, it enabled the unification of ethnic Romanians as humanist and enlightened Europeans worthy of national self determination.

---

[139] Mitu op.cit. p.76.
[140] Ibid.

Conclusion

Roma who entered Romania as free individuals or as slaves all became and remained slaves referred to as Țigani that were economically vital to the economies of the Romanian principalities. They were controlled and constructed as a slave class separate to the tithed Romanian speaking peasants by legislation that made them property of the state, monasteries and private owners. Țigani were discursively constructed as a distinct cultural group worthy of enslavement through the legislative and social propagation institutionalisation of stereotypes of Țigani as incapable of work, lazy and uncivilized.

Nineteenth century leading intellectuals, primarily Mihail Kogalniceanu, identified the "unslaving" of Țigani as vital for the creation of a new ethnic Romanian modern state that Europe would recognize. But the Țigan Other that was presented as subject of *dezrobirea* was articulated as the Țigan Other as slave had been before, as an Other that required mastery or the gift of a state that would civilize them. Kogalniceanu invoked "the Romanian people" as a united entity formed in the benevolent extension of *dezrobirea* to a Țigan "people," not a Țigan class. In creating Țigani as a "people" he thus made Țigani an ethnic Other *of* the Romanian people, a group that could only exist within the Romanian nation. The Țigan Other was, therefore, an object that enabled the production of a new

ethnonation named Romania, recognized by Europe as modern and civilized through its performance of *dezrobirea*.

In addition, the Ţigan Other was vital after the formation of the state to create a consciousness of a "Romanian people" amongst peasants who had not identified themselves primarily by ethnicity before. Literature and theater were mechanisms of creating this ethnonational consciousness, and plays and stories with Ţigan protagonists were performed throughout the country. Many of these pieces presented romanticized or impoverished and helpless Ţigani as subjects enabling the wisdom and guidance of Romanian characters. Plays such as *Ţiganiada* (that still plays today), used Ţigani as comical anti-heroes, demonstrating to rural peasants how a government worked and why Romanians were fit to run their own, because they were not Ţigani.

The stereotypes of Ţigan slaves that were used to create a distinct class for economic profit were re-iterated by Romanian nationalists of the nineteenth century to claim the existence of a modern European Romanian ethnonation. The Ţigani that legislation and social hierarchies produced in the fourteenth century were characterized by the same stereotypes as those that have functioned throughout Romanian history and since the nineteenth century. In the nineteenth century, Romanian nationalists transformed Ţigan slaves into ethnic Ţigan slaves-without-masters through *dezrobirea*. The Ţigan Other thereby facilitated the formation of the modern Romanian ethnonation.

Chapter Two

"The Ţigan is not a Man": Reading Romanian subaltern selves and Others through folklore

For more than five hundred years prior to the unification of the principalities of Moldova, Wallachia and Transylvania as modern Romania in 1859, Roma as Ţigan slaves occupied the distinctly lowest position in every social hierarchy, while fulfilling vital roles as laborers, craftsmen and entertainers. Romanian peasants in these years may have been "free men," but in reality their position as uneducated tithed serfs without voting privileges left them in a predicament of subalternity. The upper classes of *boiers* (landowners) and clergy swelled in number in the early nineteenth century as the Greek princes sold titles to rich landowners and industrialization progressed. It was from these classes that the first ethno-nationalist Romanian statesmen such as Mihail Kogalniceanu emerged, defining national identity in modern terms of consanguinity and excluding Other groups deemed to be ethnic.

The Romanian historian Viorel Achim calculates that Roma slaves constituted 7.13% of the population in 1856, in the same period that Romanian peasants constituted 75% of the population in Wallachia, 70% in Moldova, and 53.1% in

Transylvania.[141] Roma were recognized and named after their position of slaves, as Ţigani, and this name, signifying social and ethnic otherness, remained after the "unslaving" (*dezrobirea*) of Ţigani. In name, then, slaves continued to be called slaves after the category was officially outlawed. As the former chapter explored, Romanian statesmen utilized the Ţigan Other as the (negative) contrast against which conscious developments of ethno-national self awareness were provoked and formed amongst the Romanian peasantry.

This chapter raises the question of how Romanian peasants of the nineteenth century articulated Ţigan identity before and after the end of slavery in 1856. As Romani slavery is the subject of only a handful of studies, I utilize primary sources to explore how non-elite illiterate society articulated Ţigani, specifically through nineteenth century collections of Romanian proverbs and anecdotes. These sources enable the historian to discuss the ways that relationships between classes and ethnic groups were articulated in Romanian folk culture. In comparison with sources such as municipal judicial reports, folklore captures the repeated enunciations of societies in a freer medium of everyday communication, rather than in the language and gaze of a bureaucrat in a government institution.

This chapter is not a selection of proverbs and anecdotes from the many thorough collections of Romanian folklore, but an exploration of how these popular sources

[141] Viorel Achim *Ţiganii în Istoria României* Editură Enciclopedică, Bucharest 1998. Keith Hitchins *The Romanians 1774-1866* Oxford University Press, New York 1996 p.177 and 199.

created meaning in their social context and for the project of the Ţigan Other.[142] Considering the subalternity of the speakers of folklore in the nineteenth century, I find the theoretical tools developed by historians of the subaltern useful to explore the relationships between Romanian peasant, *boier*, clergy classes and the Ţigan Other (as social and ethnic other). I specifically draw on the work of Homi Bhabha to problematize stereotypes – not as carrying a literal meaning, but as an articulation of the relationship between the speaker and the Other. My reading of primary sources not only traces which stereotypes were deployed to constitute the Ţigan Other as subject, but uses the theoretical approaches of Judith Butler to explore the nature of power attributed to the Ţigan Other as inferior/enslaved Other when it is given a 'possibility for social existence through injurious speech.'[143]

Romanian Society in the Nineteenth Century

The nineteenth century was one of great change, although the *boier*, clergy and judiciary classes remained at the top of the social and economic scale. There were significant legal changes in land ownership and status regarding individual freedom that emanated from the rulers down through the ranks of society, but there was low social mobility for the lowest classes; Romanian peasants and

[142] The most thorough Romanian collection is Iuliu A. Zanne *Proverbele Românilor* Vol. 1-7 Editură Librariei Socec şi Companie, Bucharest 1895.
[143] Judith Butler *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative* Routledge, New York and London 1997 p.2.

Țigan slaves. Even after *dezrobirea*, Țigan slaves remained in established skilled occupations on the margins of society, regardless of the economic and social value of these positions. Țigani were treated with little respect as the lowest group in society, and were differentiated as ethnically, socially and (increasingly) biologically Other to ethnic Romanian peasants.

Although serfdom was abolished in the Romanian principalities of Moldova and Wallachia in 1745 and 1749 under Phanariot rule, free peasants, the vast majority Romanian speaking, were still obliged to pay heavy taxes. Many were required to sell their allotted land to the *boiers* in order to fulfill these taxation duties. Peasants dependent on leasing land from (lay or ecclesiastical) landlords and paying with tithes and labor became known as *clacaşi*. The position of peasants declined throughout the nineteenth century, so that by 1845 *clacași* formed 75% of the population in Wallachia and 70% in Moldova.[144] In the Austro-Hapsburg territory of Transylvania in 1850, 59% of the population was Romanian speaking, and 90% of these were peasants.[145] Statistics cited by the Romanian Minister of Education in 1925 pegged illiteracy in 1899 at 78% overall, and 85% in the countryside.[146]

---

[144] Hitchins op.cit. p.177.
[145] Ibid.p.199.
[146] From Ministerul Instructiunii *Lege pentru învațamântul primar al statului si învațamântul normal-primar* Editură Cartea Românească, 1925 as cited in Irina Livezeanu *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building and Ethnic Struggle 1918-1930* Cornell University Press, London 1995 p.31.

As commerce and agriculture developed in the Romanian principalities in the 1830s and 1840s, the urban middle classes grew.[147] Due to the sale of titles in the previous fifty years, the number of boiers swelled and they co-operated with the clergy to form the highest tiers in the social hierarchy. It was the education of this class that shaped the generation known as the 1848-ers, the Romanians who moved to unify the principalities as a modern nation, 'an ethnic conception which embraced all social classes, even *clacaşi*.'[148] The concept of a Romanian "people," consanguine and united in ethnicity and (Romanian Orthodox) religion, inspired intellectuals like Kogalniceanu to attempt land reform to address the striking social and economic distance between peasants ("the people") and those who governed them. They were also responding to violent uprisings of Romanian peasants against *boiers* that spread in disorganized manifestations from 1821 throughout the century.[149]

As discussed in the previous chapter, the ethnic Romanian elites who called for an independent ethnonation simultaneously petitioned for the abolition of Ţigan slavery and recognition of Romanians as "a people" of unique and European culture. A significant body of political and literary work of the emancipation

[147] Hitchins op. cit.178.
[148] Ibid p.19.
[149] For in depth studies of the 1821 uprisings see M.T. Radu *1821: Tudor Vladimirescu şi revoluţia din Ţara Românească* Craiova 1978. For the 1830s and 1840s Oltenian movements see Gheorghe Platon *Geneza revoluţiei române de la 1848* Iaşi 1985. For the 1888 peasant uprising (and the relationship of such violent events to the reforms of the united principalities) see Constantin Corbu *Răscoala ţăranilor de la 1888* Bucharest 1978 and N. Adăniloaie *Răscoala ţăranilor din 1888* Bucharest 1988.

period focused on humanist rationale for *dezrobirea*, forming a sizeable source for the historian to examine how Romanian social and intellectual elites articulated Ţigan identity and its place in the Romanian nation as evidence of their benevolent European attitudes. But what do we know about how Romanian peasants of the nineteenth century viewed Ţigani?

Romanian historians have generally interpreted the importance of ethnicity and class in the formation of modern Romanian identities according to the dominant political and social discourses of the time. Historians have rarely problematized or deconstructed the role that ethnicity played in determining who would be in what place in society or not, and there has been no critique of how Romanian ethnonational identity was formed in relation to the articulation of an inferior Ţigan Other. There are no studies of how Romanian peasant and Ţigan or Romani communities related to each other in the nineteenth century, but, as I argued in the first chapter, the Ţigan Other was vital to the elite project of demonstrating to Romanian peasants their ethnonational uniqueness of "character."

I use folkloric sources to explore what the Ţigan Other represented in terms of a unique social and ethnic identity, and especially in relation to the Romanian peasant identity. An examination of the history and discipline of folklore collection and studies will frame my analysis.

Folklore as historical discipline and resource

In the nineteenth century, the collection of "traditional wisdoms" from (specifically illiterate and rural) "folk" became a widespread discipline. The Grimm Brothers published their first book in 1812, the word "folklore" was coined by an English intellectual in 1846, and debates about the methodology of collection developed into defined ranks of professional and amateur folklorists by the end of the century.[150] The collection of folklore located "authentic wisdom" in illiterate peasant knowledge, yet relied on rural elites (teachers, low level clerics) to access these sources.[151] The links between romanticism, nationalism and folklore are made clear in nineteenth century definitions of folklore that claimed to uncover the "spirit" of "the (ethno-national) people."

The Enlightenment-era obsession of early folklorists with "scientific" collection and collation and their enthusiasm to publish exhaustive lists of regional variations make folklore collections a valuable resource for contemporary historians. The most reputable nineteenth century sources are rich in comparative content and detail, and clear about their purpose as records of "the people." Romanian folkloric collections of the nineteenth century relied upon a small,

---

[150] See Alan Dundes (ed.) preface to *International Folkloristics: Classic Contributions by the Founders of Folklore* Rowman and Littlefield, Oxford 1999.
[151] For an interesting overview of the development of the discipline of folklore in relation to sociology see Mark Freeman's paper as presented at the 2000 Conference 'Folklore and the Historian,' reviewed in *Folklore* Vol.112 Iss.2, October 2001 pp.218-222.

integrated community of rural elites to furnish their sources. These elites were usually raised in the community where they collected sources, and usually worked as teachers or bureaucrats amongst their informants.[152]

The first Romanian folklorists in Moldova and Wallachia came from the western educated Romanian landowning classes of the early nineteenth century. As we have seen in the first chapter, there was much debate amongst the elite Romanian nationalists as to the nature of "the Romanian people." The questions posed were whether such a people could become a modern nation, and secondly, whether this nation could be recognized as European. Mihail Kogalniceanu considered the recovery of 'wisdom' from illiterate peasants to be a means of understanding 'naive forms of popular genius.'[153] In 1848 the first collection of Romanian folkloric pieces was by published by the intellectual Vasile Alecsandri, entitled *Manifestations of the Romanian Soul.*[154] It is interesting to note that Kogalniceanu even privileged folklore over the developed field of history, stating in the 1850s that 'all those occupied with national history did nothing of relevance other than the biographies of great men, of no rank with the people, the spring guardians of the movement and creativity, without whom the masters of history would have found nothing.'[155]

---

[152] Ovid Bîrlea "Principiile Cercetorii Folclorice" pp.201-217 *Revue d'Ethnographie et de Folklore*, Vol. 11, No.3 1966 p.202.
[153] For a detailed overview of the history of Romanian folklore see Gheorghe Vrabie *Conceptul de Folklor la Români* Unknown Publisher, Craiova 1947 p.13.
[154] Ibid. p.17.
[155] Mihail Kogalniceanu, *Opere* Editură Dacia, Bucharest p. 86.

Vrabie explains the discipline of folklore and its methodology as 'between romanticism and scientism,' compiled with the assistance of rural elites, and utilizing a comparative philological-historical method for categorization.[156] The major genres in Romanian folklore of the nineteenth century were legends, short stories and proverbs (paremiology).[157] In terms of methodology, the socialist period folklorists are useful because they pay particular attention to signs of 'class antagonism' that can be read in nineteenth century folklore collections. Ovid Bîrlea, a reputable Romanian socialist period folklorist, stresses the importance of questioning nineteenth century methodology as a situated class conflict between 'the people' and the researcher. He concludes, however, that the collectors of this period, while 'capitalists,' were in fact 'of' the people in order to be considered 'authentic' researchers.[158] Collection methodologies of the nineteenth century were not restricted to rural elite initiatives. The press was used to call for sources and provoke and coordinate amateur collectors. Romanian historian Dan Berindei notes that the press played the 'role of catalyst of different social forces and

---

[156] Vrabie, op.cit. p.32-33.

[157] Mihai Canciovici "Preface" p.v-xlvii in Sabina-Cornelia Stroescu (ed) *Snoava Populară Românească* Editură Minerva, Bucharest, 1975, pg. v.

[158] Bîrlea, op cit. In the socialist period, folklore was given a little more freedom than other disciplines, especially to work with other Soviet bloc countries. Reading 'through' the socialist-speak of the period is somewhat more rewarding in folkloric journals than those of sociology or history or architecture.

brought them to the center.'[159] A significant number of the primary sources I use in this research were originally printed in the press of the period.

The content of the massive nineteenth century Romanian folklore collections display a dynamic range of identifications of class, gender and ethnicity. Folklorists never considered Ţigani a unique category of folklore, but Ţigan subjects are pervasive throughout the genres and, as we will see in the examples, they are not depicted in stagnant or one dimensional ways. Ţigan characters are simultaneously lazy, clever, stupid, conniving, childlike, untrustworthy, honest, and down to earth representatives that stand up against the upper classes, and are often depicted as more animal than human. In trying to understand how these dynamic representations of the Ţigan Other can be understood, it is helpful to refer to the significant scholarship written in the late twentieth century on ethnic slurs in folklore.

The vast majority of studies of ethnic slurs are little more than collections of sources that do not question the purpose of or mechanisms that enable ethnic slurs in proverbial or anecdotal form. The first dedicated collection of ethnic slurs was a two volume German compilation in 1863, entitled *Internationale Titulaturen.*[160] Following this text, Ronack's 1944 *Dictionary of International Slurs* was the

[159] Berindei op cit p.224. See also Dan Berindei "Dezvoltarea presei bucureştene în perioda formarii şi organizarii statului national Român" pp.666-684 in *Studii* XV, Nr. 3 1962.
[160] Baron Otto von Reinsburg-Düringsfeld *Internationale Titulaturen* Hermann Fries, Liepzig 1863.

latest international comparative compilation of major folkloric sources, articulating a broad range of ethnic and national groups.[161] Ronack listed a range of pan-European 'anti-Gypsy' (sic) proverbs, noting the spelling of "Gypsy" with a small "g" amongst 'educated people who should know better' as an example of discrimination that results from the fact that 'Gypsies, unlike Negroes, do not air their grievances as a body.'[162] This reading of English perceptions of "Gypsies" is insightful, but Ronack does not explain why it is that ethnic slurs are considered capable of wounding. Alan Dundes, a major contemporary figure in the field of proverb study (alongside Wolfgang Mieder and Neal Norrick), identifies the stereotype as the factor that makes a folkloric source an ethnic slur.[163] Dundes also fails to take his analysis into an explanation of why stereotypes can wound or slur. These cases exemplify the problems of folkloric research and usage in general, which is their failure to engage with the significant body of academic work concerning the role and nature of stereotypes and speech acts in the last twenty years. The central question I pose in the analyzes of folklore later in this chapter is *how* certain "ethnic slurs" or stereotypes have a powerful effect.

---

[161] Abraham Ronack *A Dictionary of International Slurs* Sci-art Publishers, Massachusetts 1979.
[162] Ronack op.cit. p.37.
[163] Alan Dundes "Slurs International: Folk Comparisons of Ethnicity and National Character" in Wolfgang Mieder (ed.) *Wise Words: Essays on* the *Proverb* Garland Publishing Inc., New York and London 1994 p.184.

How does folklore make meaning?

In addressing how folklore makes meaning, we move through the questions of whether the "folk" really used/created the source, how the source was categorized by the collector, how the specific genre of the source influenced its recording, how to understand the historical context of the oral tradition, and the question of performative context. Most studies of "context" focus on elite literary/political deployment because historians cannot as easily access sources that illustrate the natural usage (or intensity) of oral traditions by historical subaltern groups. This difficult issue of quantification and qualification reminds the researcher that the category "subaltern group" can be an imposed academic category that ignores the limits and capacity of the individual to claim agency in speech acts. Individuals, however, were (and are) homogenized in the sources we rely upon for their recovery, such as folkloric compendiums, indicating the value of a project that traces the ways that group identity was constructed. It was not just statesmen and literati who articulated and brought into discursive existence an ethnonational, politicized Romanian peasant class, but also folklorists who recorded certain oral traditions and omitted incalculable others. These traditions were a shared community resource of stereotypical knowledge, which could be invoked by individuals in individual speech acts in a myriad of ways. The limitations to recovering individual voices needs to be recognized in any attempt to search for

the subaltern voice within these sources, but the predominant discourses available to all individuals in a certain community can certainly be charted.

Proverbs

Paremiology (the study of proverbs) has been a major genre in Romanian folklore since the early nineteenth century. Transylvanian collections of Romanian language proverbs written by Uniate priests are found in archives dating back to 1816.[164] The Romanian folklorist I.G. Hintescu specialized in Transylvanian proverbs and compiled twenty collections in the nineteenth century.[165] In 1838 the literary supplement of the first Romanian gazette of Transylvania (*Gazeta de Transilvania*) published a program for the collection of Romanian 'customs, stories and proverbs.'[166] This article outlined the close connections between language, national history and national awareness and explained what details budding folklorists should provide with submissions. The fact that submitted folklore may have been altered for coherence or literary value problematizes the

---

[164] L. Demény and I. Vlăduțiu "Contribuții documentare la începuturile culegerilor creației populare orale Românesti în Transilvania" pp.627-640 in *Revue d'Ethnographie et de Folklore* Vol. 10 Nr.6 1965. Uniate priests also wrote the first treatises of Romanian national sovereignty as prefaces to their prayer books in the mid-eighteenth century. See Keith Hitchins *The Idea of Nation: the Romanians of Transylvania 1691-1849*, Editură Stiintifica şi Enciclopedica, Bucharest 1985.

[165] See the informative prefaces of I.C. Chitimia pp.1-12 and C. Negreanu pp.13-28 in the 1985 edition of I.G.Hintescu's *Proverbele Românilor.*

[166] Unsigned "Foae pentru minte, inimă şi literatură" *Gazeta de Transilvania* 7 May 1838. See also Demény et al, op cit p.628.

folklorists' claim to voice the wisdom of "the Romanian people." Likewise, there is no way of verifying the currency any particular proverb or anecdote enjoyed. It is important to remember, however, that close ties bound the recently developed rural elites (often living in the village where they were born) to the target communities. The details given about how to collect folklore and the projects' supervision by scholars are also factors that somewhat standardized methodology, making it easier to assess sources collected by different individuals.

In 1876, Hintescu published a call for the study of proverbs as 'expressions of the spirit of many centuries, now formed from their mouths' in the journal *Filosofia Poporului*.[167] This definition encapsulates a range of defining characteristics of the proverb; namely the perception that an independently recognized and culturally specific unit of speech is, or at least functions as, a weighted form of "community wisdom." Extended debates over the definition of a proverb began in the twentieth century, prior to which the formerly stated traditional understanding was widely accepted. Recent debates on how to define a proverb reflect a concern with structure, and definitions fall into two broad categories of linguistic and structural definitions. Mieder listed 55 separate and specific definitions of proverbs in 1993, but I will outline just a few basic features.[168]

---

[167]C. Negreanu op.cit.p.20.

[168] For the 55 (structural and traditional) definitions see Wolfgang Mieder "A Proverb is a Short Sentence of Wisdom: Popular Views of the Proverb" pp.18-40 in Mieder *Proverbs are never out of Season: Popular Wisdom in the Modern Age* Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford 1993 pp.20-23.

The proverb has a short, fixed form (metaphoric or literal), is used in oral communication, and is recognizable as a "traditional" unit. Proverbs may be didactic, can have a range of linguistic structures, and may rely on poetic features. As "traditional" units, proverbs invoke an (imagined) community wisdom and thus function through the mobilization of a range of identification systems within any given deployment. As pre-enunciated units of fixed form, proverbs can be framed or manipulated in order for the speaker to create meaning through, but in difference to, the traditional proverb.[169] The structure of the proverb is therefore vital. The selection of proverbs we will examine illustrates how the structure of a proverb can constitute one subject in relation to another utilizing (re-presenting) existing stereotypes, or how it can elaborate a stereotype.

I have selected proverbs from Iuliu A. Zanne's *Proverbele Românilor* of 1895, the largest compilation of Romanian proverbs from his own and other Romanian collections.[170] Zanne was fastidious with details of location and dates of collection, and his eight volume series categorizes variations of single proverbs together without attempting to categorize proverbs by themes, meanings or

---

[169] As Pavel Ruxandru notes, 'the proverb lives in collective and individual memory independent of functioning contexts in which it could possibly be applied, but correlates with the cultural system active in community knowledge' from *Proverb si Context* Doctoral Thesis, University of Bucharest, Faculty of Letters 1996 p.256. It is also useful to note P. Zunther's characterization of proverbs as 'narrative micro-discourse, actively behaving, functioning and transforming untethered and de-temporalised, open to all investments of values which modify the structure in profusion.' See "L'Epiphonème Proverbial" in *Revue des Sciences Humaines* Nr. 3, 1976 p.324.

[170] Zanne op.cit.

structures. The fact that the work includes proverbs from the period before and after *dezrobirea* provides a range of historically specific references of interest to our project. Zanne also provides a short 'explanation' for every proverb in his collection. This assists the reader not only in historically specific terminology (especially for farm equipment!), but with an insight into how an elite specialist of the period chose to elide or place ethnicity in designating and elucidating meanings of speech acts that refer to /rely on the Ţigan Other as subject.

In 1999, a German academic named Klaus Bochmann wrote a short article about proverbs he selected from Zanne's collection relating to Ţigani. Bochmann's 1999 study of Ţigan proverbs in Zanne contained no mention of Zanne's explanations of proverbial meaning or discussion of how he himself came to understand the proverbs.[171] The study approached the proverbs as the 'construction of a minority by the majority,' and concluded that 'Roma play, in their thoughts, mentality and language a truly central role' for Romanians. Bochmann identified 120 proverbs from Zanne's Sixth Volume as negative stereotypes, but did not discuss how or why the centrality of the Other is expressed and constituted through speech acts, and thus foreclosed an exploration of the anxious ambivalence of articulations of identity. As I have made clear, I also consider it vital to differentiate the subjects named Ţigani in Romanian folklore from self-identifying Roma. By taking all references to Ţigani as simply

[171] Klaus Bochmann "Minorităţile în conştiinţa majorităţii: Un caz clasic, Rromii în cultura şi folclorul românesc" in *Than Romano: Studii despre Rromi* Anul III, 1999/2000 Nr.4-5 pp.75-79.

pejorative terminology for self identifying Roma, Bochmann repeats the simple act of generalizing an ethnic stereotype to a group that does not need to identify itself thus. This is the same problem as the knowledge of the proverb itself, that it creates a Ţigan subject through pinning stereotypes to existing individuals and refusing them the right to be identified thereafter as other than naturalized Ţigan subjects.[172] Without an acknowledgement of the ambivalence at the core of stereotypical discourse, Bochmann's study becomes a re-iteration of the very stereotypical speech acts he disdains. This study reads proverbs as ambivalent projections of selves and Others and their relative places in Romanian nineteenth century society.

The proverbs selected here provide an overview of the major and different stereotypical discourses within which the Ţigan Other is constituted and functions. Some proverbs develop a particular stereotype, defining the Ţigan Other in relation to Romanian ethnicity/religion/tradition, while others utilize the Ţigan subject as a signifying link to these discourses. My selections reflect the proportion of variants listed by Zanne in his ten volumes. It is important to note that many of the proverbs Zanne records that interpellate Ţigan subjects are also familiar to me from contemporary usage in Bucharest in the 1990s. This knowledge of the deployment of proverbs regarding Ţigani in post socialist speech acts is of small benefit in a discussion of what such words meant one

[172] This action, paradoxically, strengthens links between the Ţigan Other and Romani individuals in contemporary discourse also as will be discussed further in Chapter Six.

hundred years ago, but does show that the linguistic form at least has been of long lasting social value. These 'popular wisdoms' and the force they deploy in other periods of Romanian history will be addressed throughout the thesis, and so the content and discussion of the selected proverbs is vital for an understanding of contemporary Romanian articulations of Țigani.

I have translated proverbs literally rather than choosing an English language equivalent structure to express a meaning, so that the specific signifiers are legible to non-Romanian readers. The inclusion of Zanne's Romanian original in the text is intended to enable the reader to discern rhyme, meter, alliteration and structure, which are integral to the functioning of proverbs in communication. Some of the proverbs are adjectival or proverbial phrases, though their inclusion in Zanne indicates that they create meaning through invoking stereotypical discourses elaborated in "proper" proverbs of the collection. Zanne reproduces proverbs using the spelling of their transcribers, which accounts for some discrepancies reproduced here.

Zanne cites numerous proverbs which are specific to the period of Țigan slavery, including

Cu slugele, ca cu câini, cuvinte scurte, ca se le înțeleagă[173]

With slaves, as with dogs, short words so they understand

The noun *sluga* refers specifically to a slave or servant of any ethnicity, so that this proverb primarily articulates a distinction between masters and slaves, rather than specifically Romanians and Țigani. This distinction interpellates the (master dependent) subject as of intelligence comparable to dogs, as judged through the ability to understand (presumably Romanian) language. While Zanne may intend us to assume the speaking group are illiterate Romanian peasants, the proverb itself can be of didactic use for both the servant and master class, a prescription for inter-class relations. If spoken by a peasant, this proverb may be understood in two ways; as both a comment on how a (free) Romanian peasant is to speak to Țigan slaves, and as a didactic articulation prescribing the relations between social classes. Both scenarios rely on and produce class/social difference as constituted by innate intelligence.

Considering that Zanne does not record the first dated collection of this proverb, it is possible to speculate that this reference to slaves who cannot understand (language) may have developed from the fact that many Romani slaves spoke Romanes, and Romanian peasants were often house servants for non-Romanian

[173] Zanne op.cit.Vol VIII p.571 #12393. All of the Țigan protagonists in these proverbs are male. If they were female it would be written as Țigancă (singular) or Țiganci (plural). The normative Țigan protagonist is gendered masculine, as is the Romanian.

(Greek, Russian) *boiers*. In both cases, language was an identifying factor and, in the case of Ţigani, a source of anxiety for non-Roma as a marker of difference within the wider community.

The following greetings/proverbs specify the Ţigan as subject

Sănătate, şi moarte in Ţigan [174]

Health, and death to Ţigani

Sănătate în Români, moarte in Ţigan

Health to Romanians, death to Ţigani

Zanne explains this as 'a greeting which means 'health and may death only strike Ţigani' and notes that it remains from the time of slavery. '*Sănătate*' was a common greeting, and the diametrical structure of the statement, which contrasts health to death, also thereby interpellates the Ţigan subject as the Other of the Romanian. Zanne's collection claims to represent oral traditions of the Romanian peasant, and it is interesting to note that in this example 'Ţigan' functions as/is constitutive of an Other to Romanians even when the topic/usage of the greeting doesn't relate to 'real' individuals. The place of the Ţigan Other in this example is as an identity against which the everyday (ethnic) existence of Romanians is articulated. If, as Zanne notes, this 'proverb' was actually used as a greeting, then

[174] Zanne op.cit.Vol II p.705 #5829.

the invocation of the Ţigan Other can be read as vital to the constitution of the ethnic Romanian subject, if only to be brought to life as a recipient of death.

Does this greeting tell us anything about Romanian peasant – Ţigani relations during the period when the latter were enslaved? While Achim stresses in his work the continuous, harmonious and economically mutually beneficial relations between these groups, the Self-Other identity structure manifest in the greeting highlights the extent of articulated difference between the groups. Whether this difference was primarily articulated as ethnic, social or cultural can only be approached by remembering that it was in the nineteenth century that Romanian ethnicity was articulated by Romanian elites as superceding class/social distinctions. In the century prior, Romanian peasants were in the vast majority landless and bound to pay taxes and labor to the growing landowning classes. The formal status of these Romanian peasants as 'free men' was the only institutionally recognized factor of differentiation between them and Ţigani. The necessity of constituting the Ţigan subject as inferior Other to Romanian peasants can be read as a project driven by the anxiousness of the subaltern Romanian social position, which was practically similar to but legislatively and socially not slave to the state. This small but vital difference is enunciated and repeated through the greeting's overt dichotomization of ethnic Romanians and Ţigani.

Ţiganul nu-i om [175]

The Ţigan is not a man/person

Zanne explains that this proverb is used 'when one wants to mock a Ţigan, to say he has nothing in common with men and put him to shame in the world'. It is interesting to note that the Romanian verb translated here as 'mock/insult' (*batjocură*) is in fact a composite of the verbs 'to beat' and 'to play'. While Zanne's description avoids any reference to social hierarchy, one must ask if it is within this context that such a 'beating game' is powered and fought. The structure of the proverb (A≠B), in combination with our assumed (Romanian peasant) speakers, places the subjects in mutually exclusive relation to each other. The definition of B (*om*) against which A (*Ţiganul*) is defined is the clue to understanding which places A cannot occupy within the speaker's community. As previously noted, Romanian peasants were in the vast majority *like* slaves, while legally holding 'free men' status. This singular difference was constituted, supported and buttressed by a range of stereotypical discourses of ethnic, biological and social difference. The proverb's disavowal of the humanity of Ţigani (metaphorically and/or physically) simultaneously disavows the right of Ţigani to a humanist place in society and avows the right of the speaker to a social position recognizable as "man." In the nineteenth century, the claim of the subaltern Romanian peasant to be "man" was the claim to a place in the modern

[175] Zanne op.cit.Vol VI p.354 #14190.

nation state. The proverb can thereby be read as a project of placement of the subaltern self in relation to the elite structures of the State, enabled through the constitution of the Other.

Doi oameni şi un Ţigan[176]

Two men and one Ţigan

This proverb is a variation on the former theme, where Ţigani are articulated as Other to men/humans. Zanne's explanation of its appropriate use "when you want to humiliate a Ţigan who is putting himself on a rank with other people" makes it clear that the Other, is not in the same category as "other people," that this proverb is invoked in order to put an Other "back in their place." The proverb is structured so that the Ţigan Other is the Other of men in the general sense, not just in relation to men. For example, if the proverb had read "Two Ţigani and one man," it would constitute the Ţigan subject as less than, or half a normative male subject, but in the structure "two men and a Ţigan," the Ţigan exists as the Other of man itself, rather than a portion of the categorical Self. The Ţigan is therefore constituted not as a "lesser" man, but an Other to man.

Nici tata domn, nici ţiganul om[177]

As my father's not a master, the Ţigan isn't a person

---

[176] Zanne op.cit.Vol VI p.355 #14193.
[177] Zanne op.cit.Vol VI p.369 #14221.

The speaker in this proverb articulates three separate hierarchical classes, that of the master, the Romanian peasant (the speaker) and the Ţigan. The 'neither/nor' structure, another common proverbial feature, relies upon each clause being categorical and exclusive to convey its meaning. In this way, the speaker articulates (and constitutes) a rigid and established social/class hierarchy wherein the Ţigan can not only never be considered a man, but the (peasant) speaker can never be considered a master. The social hierarchy is naturalized as patrilineal inheritance, through which the Romanian peasant states his disqualification, at the same time as the Ţigan is barred from claiming access to the partrilineal structure at all. This construction of social hierarchy wherein the speaker assumes both an inferior (to the master) and superior (to the Ţigan) position is a manifestation of the complex ambivalence that powers the master-slave dynamic, as will be addressed at length in the following section.

Toti Ţiganii nu plăteu cît un crestin[178]

All the Ţigani are not worth as much as one Christian

This proverb evidences how religion was used as an organizing identification in the construction of Ţigani as (inferior) Others to Romanian peasants. The privileging of Christianity as primary identification for Romanian subjects enables the constitution of the Ţigan Other as that which fails to fulfill Christian

[178] Zanne op.cit.Vol VI p.354 #14194.

criteria.[179] It follows from such a construction that Ţigani can thereby 'naturally' embody all un-Christian virtues, and such virtues then constitute both the Christian and their Other as essential claims of inalienable identity. This proverb is multifunctional; it can be used to comment on the (lack of) sincere piety of Ţigani, but also as a general comment on the inferiority/Otherness of Ţigani that interlinks with other stereotypical discourses of identity. It is interesting that the Ţigan Other is produced as Other even to the values of equality in the eyes of God in this proverb, a factor common to the construction of slaves as moral Others in the United States as well.

Ţiganul manâncă cînd poate, ţăranul când i-e foame, boierul când vrea bucătaru'[180]

The Ţigan eats when he can, the Romanian peasant when he's hungry and the *boier* when the cook wants.

The proverb interpellates three class subjects, and the Ţigan, who eats only when he can, is at the lowest position in the trilogy. Zanne's description of its purpose as 'a (peasant) satire of *boiers*' elides the role of the Ţigan subject. Until the early nineteenth century, peasants called themselves "*ţărani*", until, after much discussion, the educated statesmen of the time decided that this could also become

[179] Jews were also stereotyped in ways very similar to this. See Andrei Oişteanu *Imaginea evreului în culture română* Humanitas, Bucharest 2001.
[180] Zanne op.cit.Vol III p.629 #8715.

the name of "a people."[181] The use of the word "peasant" instead of Romanian may indicate that this particular version of a common proverb aims to differentiate between the (increasing) urban communities and Romanians in rural communities. This differentiation references the constitution of the *Ţărani* (rural peasant) subject as "authentic" Romanian, the location of "the spirit of the people." In this way, the Romanian subject is to be considered the "real" Romanian in his natural state. The proverb thereby constructs as it stereotypes the three classes; Ţigani as impoverished, Romanian peasants as the normative model, and *boiers* as affluent but also slaves to their own servants. It is only the peasant who is truly free and his own master. The stereotype of Ţigani as naturally poor is widely deployed and linked with other stereotypical discourses, such as in the following proverb.

Boierul când îi e foame se plimbă, Ţiganul fluieră, ţăranul îşi bate nevasta[182]
When the *boier* is hungry he cries, the Ţigani whistles and the peasant beats his wife.

Utilizing the same three class model, this proverb claims to interpellate its subjects in their "true colors." *Boiers* are stereotyped as emasculated and helpless, passive in the face of "real life." The Ţigan Other is unaffected by the (normal

[181] For Kogalniceanu's discussion of how Romanians should call themselves, see "Dezrobirea Ţiganilor, ştergerea privilegiilor boiereşti, emanciparea ţăranilor" a speech given at the Romanian Academy, April 1, 1891 and reprinted in *Scrieri Literare*, Editură 100+1, Bucharest 2000, p.131.
[182] Zanne op.cit.Vol II p.643 #10889.

state) of hunger, his whistling a common stereotype of Ţigani as "naturally" musical. The Romanian peasant shows his "nature" by beating his wife, an ambivalent interaction with the gendered Other which is nonetheless considered (in both the nineteenth century and contemporary Romania) a responsibility of men.[183] There is undeniably a significant degree of introspection and self-parody in the Romanian peasant's stereotypical self-presentation, but it is also clear that inhabiting masculinity (in disciplining one's wife) is a more favorable identity than emasculation. While the Romanian *boier* and peasant classes are interpellated through a gendered prism of passivity/violent action, the Ţigan subject is constituted outside these actively gendered poles. The whistling of the Ţigan is the obliviousness of the savage Other to his natural(ized) state of hunger.

Zanne's collection of proverbs also lists 'to sing like a Ţigan' (*să cânte ţigăneşte*)[184] even though by definition and common usage, *ţigăneşte* is simply an adverb. Music is naturalized as essential to the Ţigan Other, a childlike, primitive, emotional identity. Like a child's actions, the singing of Ţigani is also annoying after a while, and so, in contemporary usage, *să cânte ţigăneşte* expresses a sense of exasperation with someone who refuses to desist in an annoying behavior

[183] Proverbs that recommend the beating of wives abound. While no specific studies have been done in Romania on the functioning of such proverbs as "money is for spending and wives are for beating," numerous feminist studies note their pervasiveness. See Otila Dragomir (ed) *Femei, Cuvinte şi Imagini: Perspective Feministe* Polirom, Bucharest 2002.
[184] Zanne op.cit.Vol III p.523 #8361 and #8363.

unless you give them what they want. This is usually applied to someone performing a 'natural' action such as complaining or crying.

Throughout the period of slavery, Roma performed as musicians for Romanian *boiers*, with a unique repertoire and musical style. Following the emancipation of slaves, many Roma performed while traveling throughout the country in search of employment, and were regular musicians at common fairs (which were held by *boiers* as money-spinners).[185] Roma who traveled through the summer also used music and staged folk festivals in villages; in cases such as the Paparuda festival, villagers had to make donations to the dancing and singing virgins dressed in leaves in order for the rain/fertility dance to have an effect. The depiction of one such event by the Romanian historical novelist Zaharia Stancu has the Romani-as-Ţigan *bulibaşa* (leader) ordering the parade to end only when enough money has been collected.[186] Whether such a depiction reflects the reality of Romani performances is irrelevant, the presentation of Ţigan musicality in this case reflects the Romanian articulation of what it means to 'sing *ţigăneşte.*'

My link between Zanne's 'to sing without end' and contemporary meanings are supported by Bochmann in his brief overview of the Zanne collection. Bochmann puts *tocmeală ţigănească* ('haggling Ţigani style') in a category described as

[185] Hitchins 1996 op.cit.p.107.
[186] Zaharia Stancu *Satra* Trans. Roy Macgregor-Hastie, Abelard-Schuman, London and New York 1973.

'stereotypes of Roma as deceptive.'[187] Without explaining his understanding, it is difficult to accept this as anything other than a categorization that aims to capture the degree of distrust of the Other on the part of the speaker. Indeed, Ţigani are stereotyped as having a natural skill for extracting money/cheating Romanians, which is invoked in both "singing" and "haggling" *ţigănească.*[188]

Reputable Romanian-English dictionaries list the verb *a se ţigănii* as meaning to haggle, and there is no shortage of nineteenth century proverbs that present Ţigani as deceptive and miserly in trade.[189] Any list includes the following:

Bani au şi Ţiganii, dar omenie n-au[190]

Even Ţigani have money, but people don't

Bani au şi Ţiganii, dar cinste nu

Even Ţigani have money, but they don't have honesty

---

[187] Bochmann op.cit.

[188] The stereotype of Ţigani as cheating and haggling in trade is the focus of three chapters of this thesis related to the postsocialist period. It is notable therefore that the Ţigan Other and economic exchanges have been Other in Romanian peasant society since the first arrival of the Roma and their enslavement.

[189] Leon Leviţchi *Dicţionar Român-Englez* Editură 100+1, Bucharest 2000 p.1009.

[190] Zanne op.cit.Vol V p.35-36 #11091. It is interesting to note that an anonymous reader of the volume of Zanne held by the Central University Library of Bucharest had, apparently not realizing that the long list continued over the page, written in a number of variations of this proverb himself. This was the single graffiti style intervention in the total collection of volumes, a diligence that indicates the pertinence and pervasiveness of these proverbs in contemporary Romania. Contemporary deployments of this specific proverb will be addressed at length later in the thesis.

These proverbs utilize schema familiar to us from earlier examples, the interpellation of the Ţigan as excluded Other to "people." The statement that even Ţigani have money refers to the fact that skilled Ţigan slaves were productive and profitable small businessmen despite their slave status outside the social hierarchy. The increased industry, commerce and trade of the nineteenth century, simultaneous with the romanticization of "authentic" Romanian (rural, traditional) culture led to new anxieties and articulations of these features and their relationship to identity amongst the Romanian peasant classes.[191] As we saw in the former chapter, political literary elite of the mid nineteenth century wrote plays and stories that articulated the Romanian peasant as locus of "real" ethnonational identity, and this social strata was considered privileged by future generations of intellectuals and leaders. As discussed in the former chapter, it was precisely because Roma were diverse in professions and valuable in the economic community that they were discursively constructed as lazy, cheating and dishonest Ţigan slaves.[192] The anxiety of ruling classes towards Ţigani is belied in the quantity of laws controlling Ţigan movement and economic taxes. The second proverb overtly articulates the Ţigan subject as acquiring wealth through an inherent lack of honesty, a stereotype that produces a slave Other that needs scrutiny rather than freedom in their everyday business. The structure of

[191] For a study of the ways such anxieties were expressed and addressed through the education system in the late nineteenth century see the first sections of Livezeanu op.cit.
[192] Achim op.cit. p.123.

the proverb makes it clear that while *even* Ţigani *may* have money, such individuals are categorically *without* honesty. This stereotypical construction of Ţigani as succeeding only through dishonest means is in keeping with the stereotype of Ţigani as naturally impoverished and therefore needing to steal, a construction of Ţigani that re-situated them as requiring control (a slave Other) in the reality of Roma skilled traders who were economically integral to Romanian society.[193]

Mai bine tocmeală ţigănească, dar plată omenescă/negustorească[194]

Its better to haggle like a Ţigan but to pay honestly/commercially

Zanne notes that this proverb is specific to Bucharest, a reflection of the incorporation of stereotypes of Ţigani in new urban and economic contexts. The first variation, in which haggling *ţigănească* is presented as incompatible with honest transactions, reflects the constructions of stereotypes articulated in former proverbs of Ţigani as un-Christian and profiteering. Zanne's explanation of the second variation as 'its good to hold your own while you're haggling, but then pay with cash' implies that in urban centers, where Ţigani were certainly more involved with (ambient) trade than Romanian peasants, their style of payment was not cash, but does not specifically state what the (dubious) alternatives were. This proverb illustrates that depictions of dishonest

[193] Again this is in keeping with the general noble savage discourse. In their natural state childlike, Ţigani are instinctive, musical and poor, but in the unnatural (urban, commercial) state they become aberrant, dishonest, immoral, promiscuous.

[194] Zanne op.cit. Vol.V p.632 #13007.

Ţigani were linked with anxieties of commerce and the rapidly changing relationship between rural and urban centers of Romanian principalities in the nineteenth century. The "place" of Ţigani in urban Romanian society remained as Other, despite the different (and ambiguous) semantic contexts.

De la ţigan cărbuni şi de la ungur pinteni să nu cumperi [195]

Don't buy from the Ţigan who sells coal or the spurious Hungarian.

This proverb constructs both ethnic Ţigani and Hungarian subjects and can therefore be assumed to be of Transylvanian origin. These Others are constituted by their professions which are designated stereotypical ethnic attributes; the Ţigan coal carriers, the lowest occupation of the rapidly expanding cities, and the Hungarians as spurious and dishonest, referring to their positions as more involved in urban economics and bureaucracy (in Transylvania) than Romanians. The structure of the proverb as a warning about the entire ethnic group relies on discourses of racial alterity wherein even the lowest Ţigan is untrustworthy, and every Hungarian is likewise intent on robbing Romanians. Alin Ciupală, a Romanian historian of the nineteenth century notes that this stereotypical image of *ţigan cărbuni* discursively functioned through its link in common knowledge to the saying that 'Ţigani will steal even the coal from your hands' (meaning even something which leaves a clear trace of the theft).[196] As Ciupală notes, such

[195] Zanne op.cit. Vol VI p.363 #14212.
[196] Personal communication, 13 November 2002.

knowledge can be historically validated, when not through folkloric compilations, then by close and extensive research of sources of the period such as diarists and local clerics.

The most valuable meaning of this proverb is not that it registers the occupations of the articulated subjects, but their articulated places in relation to the Romanian speaker. The Hungarian occupies an (urban and economic) position superior to that of the Romanian, while the Ţigan, occupying the lowest place in the social hierarchy, is articulated as unworthy of Romanian trust or economic patronage. Indeed, the Ţigan Other throughout Romanian history is articulated as irredeemably "below" ethnic Romanians, while Hungarians, as with Jewish Others of different periods, are articulated as occupying positions of (disdained) superiority.

Ţigani are often constructed as innately lacking in the "Christian" concept of family loyalty, as well as trustworthiness and general humanity:

Ţiganul când a ajuns domn, întîiu pe tata-seu a spînzurat [197]
A Ţigan, when he becomes master, hangs his own father first

This proverb clearly constructs the Ţigan subject as Other to filial piety (in a patriarchal peasant society), even implying that such disloyalty is the immoral trade-

[197] Zanne op.cit. Vol VI p.363 #14196.

off the Ţigan Other uses to "reach above" his social place. The proverb posits that even if the "natural" social hierarchy is overcome by the ethnic Other (if Ţigani become masters), the Ţigan remains Other through his constitution as morally inferior and culturally Other. In this way, the proverb functions as an established structural guide for how to cover the inherent gap in certain stereotypes of the Ţigan Other. Even if the Ţigan proves himself and escapes the lowest place in the social body, such an aberration is anxiously recovered as merely the demonstration of the Other's low moral standing. In this proverb we can see the connections between stereotypical discourses and the moments they are brought to rupture (as impossibly over-determining their subjects) and re-covered by complementary discursive deployment.

Finally, an examination of just a few of the many proverbs that constitute and utilize Ţigan subjects as of inferior intelligence, incapable of foresight or logic:

A facut ca ţiganul care s-a săturat intâiu cu frunză, şi în urmă, a mâncat poama[198]

To do as the Ţigan who, tired of eating leaves, then eats the fruit

S-a săturat ca ţiganul cu frunză

To be as full of something as the Ţigan is of leaves

[198] Zanne op.cit. Vol IV p.115 #9246.

Zanne simply notes that these proverbs 'refer to the stupid.' The semantic content and context of the proverb is important as it again relies upon the construction of Ţigani as impoverished (to be eating leaves). If the proverbs are supposed to illustrate stupidity, then the stupidity of the Ţigan subject rests in his inability to identify which part of the tree to eat first, the leaves or the fruit. Responsibility for poverty/hunger is thereby placed with the subject; it is stupidity that ensures Ţigani are poor, an essentialization that constitutes the social body as organized naturally according to the abilities (intelligence) of ethnic groups.

Even though the proverb seems most easily deployable as a comment on stupidity (ie in a conversation between two Romanian farmers about a third party's behavior), its reliance upon the Ţigan subject signifies within a series of stereotypical discourses and means that it not only utilizes existing discursive constructions of the Other, but produces these subjects anew in each deployment.

O murit de foame ca Ţigani între pâni [199]

To die of hunger like a Ţigan surrounded by bread

Ţiganul la mal se-neacă

To drown like a Ţigan just before he reaches the shore

[199] Zanne Vol III p.562 #8493.

These examples, which Zanne explains as meaning 'to not see what is before your eyes' also function metaphorically and constitute the Ţigan subject in their deployment. The Ţigan subject dies of hunger/drowns due to his own stupidity (corroborated by other proverbs) and without this particular stereotype, Zanne's meaning cannot apply. In this way, articulations of ethnic Others are constantly circulated and re-constituted in discourses, even when they serve as signifiers and not subjects of oral tradition.[200]

With this brief selection of proverbs I have charted the mobilization of stereotypical discourses constituting the Ţigan subject as essentially musical, dishonest, annoying/troublesome, stupid, lacking Christian virtues and familial loyalty, and deceptive for financial gain. Ţigani are consistently articulated as radically Other to Romanian peasant speakers. These proverbs illustrate the "place" of Ţigani in relation to Romanians as lower in a fixed social hierarchy in the nineteenth century. Although relating to different contexts, the range of

[200] It is interesting to note that George Cosbuc, one of the noted Romanian paremiologists of the twentieth century uses the proverb 'to drown like a Ţigan at the shore' as an example of a proverb that functions 'in the spirit of humor'. Coşbuc, *Despre literatură şi limbă* Editură de stat pentru literatură şi artă, Bucharest 1960 p.209. Surprised by this choice of proverb as the example for such a category, and knowing that this proverb is rarely used in contemporary Romania, I asked the young male librarian on duty at the library his opinion on the "humor" explanation. His explanation was that this proverb 'is more about a sad disappointment, of trying and just not being able to reach the goal.' The differences in "meaning" between Coşbuc in 1960 and a librarian in 2000 possibly reflect the different societies and their needs for expression (the optimistic determinism of the socialist period and the disappointments of the postsocialist period). This is an example of how the Ţigan Other changes in meaning throughout time and discursive context.

stereotypical discourses serve as interlinked "explanatory" units for when the over-determined fixity of Otherness is necessarily brought to crisis by the inherent lack of the signified subject. In these ways, stereotypical discourses pick up where others collapse, as a network of articulations that anxiously produce a consistent, inferior Other for the speaking self. The Ţigan Other is both with money and poor, both non-man and capable of becoming, according to various stereotypes. The genre of proverbs, as independent succinct units, is a useful way of approaching the various Romanian peasant articulations of the Ţigan Other.

Anecdotes

Anecdotes are short stories with characters developed in an elaborate scenario that provide a more complex insight into how subjects are articulated in relation to each other. It was only in the period of socialism that Romanian folklorists began to concentrate on the isolation of a genre of anecdotes, historically collected as short or humorous stories. Canciovici, writing in the 1970s, noted that while respected Romanian folklorists of the nineteenth century had collected anecdotes (such as Haşdeu, Şăineanu and Gaster), and Nicolae Iorga elaborated on Gaster's naming of this as a specific genre, there had not been any specialized studies of anecdotes until his contemporary, Ovid Bîrlea's 1971 study.[201] For Romanian folklorists in the socialist period who did not want to study proletariat ballads,

[201] Canciovici op.cit. and Bîrlea op.cit.

historical anecdotes posed an interesting alternative. As 'intentionally satirized thoughts regarding daily life,' anecdotes provide detailed case studies of class, gender and social relations from the feudal and capitalist periods.[202] An analysis of how socialist period folklorists presented nineteenth century anecdotes is a topic that requires its own unique study.

The text chosen for the anecdotes in this paper is one volume of a project co-ordinated by Bîrlea that categorized and collated anecdotes.[203] The leader of the group at the Institute of Ethnography and Folklore in Bucharest, Sabina-Cornelia Stroescu, clearly defined the perimeters of categorization of anecdotes and recorded vital information of location and date of publication. While volumes relating to "psychological deficiencies," "physiological defects" and "jokes" all contain Ţigan subjects, the volume I draw from here is entitled "social relations." The folklorists divided this category into three sections; the fool, master-servant, and authorities (lay and religious). 42 of 284 anecdotes have a Ţigan protagonist, the majority in the "master-slave" section. While Canciovici's introductory preface to the collection explains the depictions of social classes as products of feudal and then capitalist society, his three page attempt to explain why Ţigani are so pervasive is intriguing. Slipping between socialist theory (class antagonism) and Romanian national socialist knowledge (the Ţigan question was "resolved" with the dictatorship of the proletariat so this is simply an example of what was

[202] Bîrlea, op.cit.p.xi.
[203] Stroescu op.cit.

before), Canciovici concludes that the representations of Ţigani in the anecdotes should in fact be taken literally![204]

What is important is that folklorists in this period compiled anecdotes from their most common sources, the newspapers, journals and calendars of the late nineteenth century. These sources are thereby different in audience and transmission to proverbs, having had a (presumably secondary) audience of literate and urban Romanians. While anecdotes may have originated with illiterate Romanian peasants, they were widely circulated amongst members of the higher classes. Indeed, as most anecdotes thrive on a humorous reversal of standard social relations, or "class antagonism," the fact that multiple classes of society supported their transmission highlights their vital function as manifestations of the anxiety of the identity project for all involved, the ambivalence and intense identification of all classes with the nineteenth century creation of a Romanian "people." This investment will be explored through the following readings of selected Romanian anecdotes of the nineteenth century.

In the majority of anecdotes, Ţigani are plotted against representatives of authority; masters, priests or judges. The stereotypical negative characteristics of the Ţigan thwart the hegemonic system, a humorous satire of authority through

[204] 'Sometimes the Ţigan mimes stupidity and naivity, inducing his adversaries to make mistakes...there also exist situations when the Ţigan reveals a real defect recognizable in the (Ţigan) people. These defects are arrogance, stupidity, laziness and haughtiness, appearing in anecdotes and influencing the thoughts of the dominant class and popular mentality.' Canciovici Ibid.p.xxv.

the ethnic inferiority of the over-determined Other.[205] The success of the supposedly inferior Other expresses the ambivalence and anxiety of the entire hierarchical identity project. The following examples depict the three major figures of authority; the mayor, the *boier* and the priest.

> There was once a judge who thought that Ţigani were better witnesses than others because, due to their stupidity, they couldn't conceal lies like Romanians could. And so the people in that area, in order to win their trials, were seeking Ţigan witnesses. But one day a powerful man, a Mayor of a village trying to buy the hand of a widow, brought as a witness Stan Cioroipan.[206] When the judge asked him to swear he raised both hands.
>
> -Why do you raise both hands? asked the astonished judge.
>
> -Well, because the other Ţigan didn't come to swear as well, as the mayor said he would, and we've both been paid to tell the same lie, said the Ţigan.[207]

---

[205] For more a more detailed study of "the fool" see C. Buzinschi *Păcală şi Tîndală* Editură Minerva, Bucharest 1973. This field has received attention throughout European folklore schools but a study of the role of ethnicity in "fool tales" has, to my knowledge, yet to be published.

[206] This character's name is a variation of the word *cioroi* (crow) a derogatory term for Ţigan which plays on the color and concept of (essential) blackness (of color and bad luck). The reader is alerted by this name that the character is Ţigan.

[207] Cited in Stroescu op.cit. p.228, originally from *Liga Deşteptarea* Bucharest 1912 (the publication of the Alliance of Lawyers)

A Ţigan and a priest entered together the house of a Romanian peasant where they had seen smoke in the chimney. The fire was burning but there was no one in the house; looking around they discovered a roast suckling pig on the stove.

-oh what a fat piglet! Said the Ţigan, walking around the fire, what a fat piglet and there's no one here to see us!

-but what kind of thoughts are these, Ţigan? asked the priest, who wanted the pig all for himself.

-What thoughts do I have you ask, father? My thought would be to leave the spit for your holyness and to get the piglet for myself

-Don't touch it Ţigan, for, cross my heart and hope to die, whatever you are going to do to that piglet I am going to do to you!

-Oh, then if this is your intention, be careful not to break your promise father! Said the Ţigan.

A second later the Ţigan stuck his finger under the piglet's tail and then licked his finger.

-Now your holyness should do to me that which I did to the piglet!

-Phew! The priest spat, damn crow, how he tricked me!

And he left the house and the pig to the Ţigan.[208]

---

[208] Stroescu p.135-136. From *Calendar pentru basme, balade, cîntece populare, tradiţiuni, poveşti, păcălituri, ghicitori* Bucharest, 1877. Found in Muntenia and Moldova.

-Ţigan, said the master to the servant, the hour hand points to two o'clock, hurry up- at five o'clock I want you to be here.

When the crow returned it was six o'clock

-You're late, damned Ţigan, the master shouted at the Ţigan, is the hour hand pointing to the five?

-well no, but its easy for him sir, to walk around all day in this cool room![209]

The anecdotes all play a Ţigan character off against higher authority figures, with the Romanian peasant a figure present in absence. All authority figures are shown for their "true colors." The Mayor and the legal system is corrupt, the priest is not averse to stealing from the peasants, and the master is demanding. Each anecdote is framed in terms that also place the Romanian peasant in the social structure. Romanians are too discerning to be witnesses, it is the warm civilized home of the absent hard-working peasant from which the priest and Ţigani connive to steal, and the Ţigan servant works in a position similar to many Romanian servants. Ţigani are depicted as corruptible, stupid, thieving, lazy and, by implication, the Romanian peasant as proud, clever, honest and hardworking.

It is the supposedly inferior ethnic Ţigan subject who subverts Romanian authority. In every situation the Ţigan ruptures the totalizing knowledge of the Other performed in the stereotype. This leaves a residue of uncertainty as to

[209] Stroescu op.cit.p.190.

whether or not the Other is "really" as stupid/clumsy as is depicted, or if he uses his cleverness to play the stereotyped image for gain. The anecdote plays out the ambivalent relationships between power structures in society, and the enjoyment of the shifting power relations is the thrill of pleasure and fear that works on the knowledge that each power position resists totalization. The pleasure and danger of stereotypical discourse is that the inherent lack of the signifying position, the supplementarity of the slave position, returns to displace the existing "natural" social hierarchies and identities.

> Once the master was incredibly happy, God knows why, and he began to talk to his Ţigan named Ganciu. He gave him a drink and invited him to dinner. The master was in an excellent mood! The Ţigan, when he saw he was being treated like a high guest, that he was welcome at his master's table, thought the heavens had come down to him and soon he began to think that he was even better than his master! He began to deliver toasts in honor of the master, and in honor of the 'little masters' and in the end he even began to talk to his master about various things, as if he was talking to his brother.
>
> But at a certain point the master got angry:
>
> -Listen, damn crow, pay attention, you've become too talkative and you almost look down on me, who do you think you're talking to? Some mate of yours from when you were guarding the pigs? Do you think we have guarded pigs together?

-Oh no! the Ţigan answered, No master, bless you; you have been guarding them all by yourself![210]

In order for the scene to be set for a humorous anecdote, the reader must take as established the social hierarchy whereby the master does not invite the slave to his table. When this occurs, the story clearly becomes framed as a tale of people "out of place." The characters represent the extremes of the social order, enabling identification of the story as one of "different places for different people," applicable to Romanian peasants as both servants of landlords and superiors to Ţigani. One reading of the meaning of the anecdote can orient it to this central master-slave dichotomy, a story of places of the self and Others.

Articulations of identity claim fixed points of identification and origin for subjects, a simultaneous recognition and disavowal of difference that is always disturbed by the question of re-presentation or construction. Indeed, it is always in relation to the place of the slave Other that the desire of the master is articulated, and this phantasmatic space of possession that no one can singly or fixedly occupy enables the possibility of the inversion of roles. The returned gaze of the slave, the threat of the trace of loss in the 'slave' signifying position, is brought to rupture in the dining room of the master, where, the master can imagine correctly, the slave wants to take his place. It is the place of

[210] Cited in Stroescu p.157. From *Gazeta ţăranilor* Societatea pentru "Cultura Ţăranilor," printed in Bucharest, distributed in Muşeteşti-Argeş 1892-1899.

identification, 'caught in the tension of demand and desire' which splits, so that the fantasy of the slave is in fact to take the place of the master 'while keeping his place in the slave's avenging anger'.[211]

It is not the master self or the slave Other, 'but the disturbing distance in-between' that is the pleasure and terror of Otherness. The gaze of the slave brings to rupture the inherent lack or the impossibility of fixed origin in the identity of the master self, allowing the possibility of reverse positions. When the master invokes the social discourse of mastery in addressing the Other (do you think we have guarded pigs together?), the horror is that the place of identification slips. The Ţigan vacates his subject position in his response (No master! You have been guarding them *all by yourself!*) and the identity of the master is emptied. The "power" of the master requires the slave Other's gaze to allow it its dominant location in discourse by fulfilling the position of slave.

In this anecdote, the structure of stereotypical racialized discourse is bared in its inherent lack, a crisis that is a form of power for the subaltern Other. The Romanian peasant storyteller/audience can imagine both master and slave subject positions; as hegemonic in relation to Ţigan slaves, and as the subaltern slaves of landowners. The humor of the anecdote therefore comes from its graphic display of the power of the subaltern, where, as Bhabha argues, 'hope emerges surely and surreptitiously in the strategic return of that difference that informs and deforms

[211] Bhabha op.cit. Chapter Two "Interrogating Identity" pp.40-65.

the image of identity...revealing that dangerous place where identity and aggressivity are twinned.'[212] It is this agency that powers the obsessive repetition of stereotypical discourse, which makes the telling of such stories both thrilling and terrifying.

The following anecdote utilizes multiple chains of stereotypical discourse and justifies the social hierarchy through the Romanian's knowledge of the Ţigan Other:

> A Ţigan and a Romanian were traveling once, and on their path they found a purse full of money. The Romanian saw it first, and the Ţigan picked it up, and thus they couldn't share its contents. Eventually the Romanian said to the Ţigan
>
> -You know what? Whoever tells the biggest lie shall take the purse and its contents.
>
> The Ţigan agreed and began his lie.
>
> -My father was once a very wealthy man, he had cattle, oxen, cows, sheep and pigs; and his houses! If you could see them! Gracious! Not even the country judges had such houses!
>
> The Romanian told him he was right in everything he said, saying 'It could have been so, but now it is my turn'

[212] Bhabha op.cit. p.62.

-My father was also wealthy, maybe wealthier than yours; he had cattle, good land and beautiful houses. But, more than that, he had a mare who would give birth every year to a colt and a Ţigan.

-You're lying! Said the Ţigan

-That was my intention! Said the Romanian, tying the purse to his belt.[213]

The Other is usually stereotyped in seemingly opposite extremes; as both savage and obedient, rampantly sexual and innocent, primitive and simplistic and yet an accomplished liar and 'manipulator of social forces'.[214] 'What is being dramatized is a separation – *between* races, cultures, histories *within* histories – a separation between *before* and *after* that repeats obsessively the mythical moment or disjunction.'[215] This separation denies the Other the capacity for Self-knowledge while creating the possibility of 'reform', justifying the Romanian's right to mastery through their capacity to know the enslaved subject.

The narrative plot of who can tell the biggest lie highlights the disjunction between the Ţigan as innocent/stupid and capable of lying/conniving. The Ţigan does lie well, for it was almost inconceivable for a Ţigan to own property or be wealthy at this time. Only the Romanian, however, can claim to know the origins of the Ţigan. The pivot of the anecdote, therefore, is the deployment of the concept of origin. As was discussed earlier, identity requires a claim to fixed

[213] Stroescu op.cit.p.170 from *Calindarul Poporului* Sibiu 1901 p.121.
[214] Bhabha op.cit.p.82.
[215] Bhabha op.cit.p.82.

origin, in pursuit of which the Other is articulated in necessarily excessive stereotypes. The Romanian's 'lie' that Ţigani are born of horses ties into a chain of stereotypical discourse that fixes the origins of Ţigani as Other than human (such as the previously mentioned proverb 'the Ţigan is not a man'). The voice of the Ţigan that cries 'you lie!' is the supplement of the unprovable, the excess of the stereotype that disturbs those who produce it. The wit/irony is that this return does not displace the Romanian discourse, but the Ţigan's own subject position as the *after* of savagery, displacing the lying Ţigan to the *before* position of innocent subject who cannot claim to hold the knowledge of his own origin. The power of knowledge of origin of the Other is recovered by the discursive strategies of Romanian identity, thereby justifying the social hierarchy even while maintaining the ambivalence that powers stereotypical discourse.

Conclusion

This chapter has grappled with the question of how to read a subaltern community's articulations of anOther subaltern group. The extensive sources of nineteenth century folklore, a discipline that claimed to capture the voice of 'the people' through a detailed methodology, provide a rich ground for subaltern identity research. The nature of these sources leads to a questioning of the context of historical speech acts and of the possibility of ever claiming knowledge of a 'total' speech act. Indeed, approaching folkloric sources as articulations of

the places of (over-determined) subjects in relation to each other enables the historian to trace how Others are constituted and deployed through speech acts in the interests of an articulation of (speaker) self identity.

Proverbial and anecdotal sources develop stereotypes of the Other as well as deploying them as signifiers within wider discourses of essentialized ethnic identity. Through nineteenth century folkloric sources we have traced the interpellation of the Ţigan as Other to the ethnic Romanian self through stereotypes. The Ţigan Other (less than human, impoverished, stupid, dishonest and un-Christian) is a project through which "the Romanian" is simultaneously constructed as hard working, honest, Christian and a naturally free man. The prevalence and power of speech acts that produced the Ţigan as ethnic Other in Romanian peasant society will become clear as we move to explore contemporary mobilizations of these historically located stereotypes.

Chapter Three

The Ţigan Other Within:

Romanian socialism and silence

While Ceauşescu claimed to 'strengthen the spirit of friendship and brotherhood among all working people,' institutions and communities of Romanian socialism relied upon not only class, but ethnic, national and gendered identities to determine who was considered "inside" and which groups were excluded as Others of the nation.[216] As the Romanian Communist Party moved through different periods of institutionalization and consolidation, "enemies of the working class," of "the socialist nation," and of "the Romanian people" were the Others against which national socialism's "new society" was imagined. Ethnicization of these groups through stereotypes developed prior to socialism was vital to the project of creating ideologically specific (Romanian ethnonationalist socialist) Others. Publicly available official sources of the period are empty of references to Ţigani, since only ethnic groups with external nation states were considered to be of "co-inhabiting national minority" status.[217] It is unlikely, however, that the discourses that enabled massive deportations of

---

[216] From a speech delivered by Nicolae Ceauşescu August 15, 1981. Cited in Ceauşescu *The Nation and the Co-Inhabiting Nationalities in the Contemporary Epoch* Meridiane Publishing House, Bucharest 1983.

[217] This was the phrase used under socialism for recognized ethnic minorities in Romania.

individuals identified as Ţigani to labor camps during World War Two simply ceased to function after the war. It is also impossible that the Ţigan Other became such a powerful specter during the 1989 revolution had the stereotypes not functioned pervasively throughout the 1980s. Despite the textual silence, Romanians who lived through socialism can recount a myriad of specifically socialist period stereotypes of the Ţigan Other as 'social parasite' and secret trader, evidencing the power of the Ţigan Other in informal if not formal state discourse.

This thesis uses a range of sources to explore how the Ţigan Other was a fantastic projection of behavioral characteristics that Romanian socialist citizens needed to discursively distance from their new socialist identities. This chapter reads anthropological and historical texts about Romanian society to analyze the socialist state's unwritten codes of practice regarding individuals recognized as Ţigani. These sources not only exemplify the marginality of the Ţigan Other to narratives perceived as the primary focus of socialism (such as class), but also return to the Ţigan Other on a regular basis, as in everyday discursive patterns. In personal narratives of socialist history, for example, Ţigani appear as the socially marginalized illegal street traders of contraception and other imported products, as the street cleaners, the nomads outside the law, the farm laborers living on the periphery of town, and as friendly colorful whores in urban Bucharest.[218] These stereotypes of the Ţigan Other as nomadic, outside the state, promiscuous and

[218] For example Petre Popescu *The Return* Grove Press, New York 1997.

occupied with otherwise spurned trades, are consistent with those of the Ţigan slave and the un-slaved Ţigan Other. What changed in the socialist period was the specific nature of the Otherness of the Ţigan, articulated in socialist conceptual language of "social parasitism" and as an "enemy of the (ethnonational) socialist Romanian people."

The first section of this chapter aims to describe the nature and function of the Ţigan Other specifically in the period of the establishment of socialism (the 1940s and 1950s) and then in the period of late socialism, the 1980s. One major resource for the latter period is qualitative analysis of how ethnic Roma Romanians deliberately performed themselves as not being Ţigan in order to access the benefits available only to ethnic Romanians in Romanian socialist society. Through studying which signifiers self identifying Roma found to be linked to the stereotypical discourses of the Ţigan Other in their personal experience, it is possible to learn about the nature of the fantastic Ţigan Other, and to explore the dynamic ways that this Other has been projected onto Roma individuals and communities. Using such a source is also an acknowledgement of the everyday strategies of ethnicized citizens, especially Roma, to perform themselves within predominant social discourses of identity. This is a testimony to the need for interrogation of the relationships between ethnic stereotypes and signifiers in the case of Roma and Ţigan ethnic Others.

The second section of this chapter critiques pervasive postrevolutionary popular discourses of Ţigan collusion with the socialist state as central to postsocialist discourses of ethnonational Romanian victimization and innocence in socialist history. This reading builds on the long discussion of how individuals functioned within socialist society contained in the first section. The postsocialist displacement of collaboration in the most traumatic periods of socialist history onto the ethnonational Ţigan Other enables many forms of ethnonational Romanian identity to maintain a distance from the most disturbing questions of complicity and even to re-member the recent past with positive nostalgia.

The textual sources available for the topic of ethnicity and Romanian socialism, real and ideological, are limited in number. As American sociologist Trond Gilberg has noted, people used ethnic jokes and slurs in everyday communication in socialist Romania, but these cannot be conclusively traced in publications or the media of the period.[219] The works of American anthropologists who wrote at the time of Romanian socialism are of great importance. The studies of Katherine Verdery, David Kideckel, Steven Sampson, Sam Beck and Gail Kligman provide the most thorough examinations of socialist (and postsocialist) society, as they all have the awareness of critical anthropologists, personal experience in Romanian socialist society, and interest in subtle ethnic discourses. These scholars, especially Verdery and Kligman, analyze the rhetoric of the socialist state in

[219] Trond Gilberg "Modernization, Human Rights and Nationalism: The Case of Romania" pp.185-211 in George Klein and Milan Reban (eds) *The Politics of Ethnicity in Eastern Europe*, Columbia University Press, New York 1981 p.193.

relation to the lived experiences of citizens, highlighting ethnonational and gendered discourses as constitutive of the socialist system. Verdery's interrogations of the historical development of ethnonationalism as the primary discourse of socialist Romania, and Kligman's study of how the female body was policed for "the people" are impressive academic histories written with sources relevant across disciplinary traditions.[220] The increasing number of Romani Romanians writing and researching the socialist period, such as Vasile Burtea and Nicolae Gheorghe, have made invaluable contributions to the field.[221] There is also a new body of research work from inside Romania relating to all kinds of experiences of material culture, politics, and culture of the socialist period.[222] These works, alongside personal narratives of the period, have been vital in providing me with contextual knowledge of what feels to be such an elusive and unrecorded recent history.

---

[220] Gail Kligman *The Politics of Duplicity: Controlling Reproduction in Ceauşescu's Romania* University of California Press, Los Angeles and London 1998, Katherine Verdery *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu's Romania* University of California Press, Los Angeles and Oxford 1991 and Verdery *What was socialism and what comes next?* Princeton University Press, Princeton 1996.

[221] Nicolae Gheorghe "Roma-Gypsy ethnicity" in *Social Research* vol. 58 Nr.4 Winter 1991. Vasile Burtea *Rromii in contextul socio-economic al dezvoltare* Doctoral Thesis, Sociology Faculty, University of Bucharest 1993.

[222] Paul Cernat, Ion Manolescu, Angelo Mitchievici, Ioan Stanomire *Explorări în Comunismul românesc* Polirom Bucharest, 2004. Adrian Neculau (ed) *Viaţa Cotidiană în Comunism* Polirom, Bucharest 2004.

Politics, Ethnicity and the Romanian Communist Party

At the end of the Second World War, Romania was under Soviet occupation, and various Romanian political parties struggled with the Communist Party for control of the Romanian government. These struggles ended in May 1947 when the communists arrested all opponents and sentenced the leader of the National Peasant Party, Iuliu Maniu, to life imprisonment. The Romanian King abdicated and fled in December 1947, and on February 21 1948, the Communist Party, renamed the Romanian Worker's Party (RWP), became the sole power bearer in Romania. Although selected other political parties continued to exist, these groups were wholly subordinate to and deprived of all resources by the RWP.

Katherine Verdery notes that by World War Two, "the Nation" and "the People" as conceptual categories had 'become the basis for interaction across the whole spectrum of political and cultural life.'[223] The Nation was a 'unitary symbolic space that denied diversity, even as the actual space was rent by diversity' and the Nation was Romanian in ethnicity.[224] The mammoth task of the Communist Party was to gain public support, to claim to represent the interests of the Romanian ethnonation. However, at the time they came to power, the RWP was led by politicians who were not considered ethnic Romanians, with (atheist) Romanians

---

[223] Katherine Verdery *National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu's Romania* University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London 1991, p.70.
[224] Ibid. p.71.

from Jewish families holding key positions, such as Ana Pauker. Communism in Romania had developed from collaborations across ethnic groups, but it had always been predominantly non-ethnic Romanian in composition. In 1930, Hungarians formed over one quarter of Romanian Communist Party (RCP) membership, but were 8% of the country's population; Jews formed almost 20% and were only 4% of the population; Russians, Ukrainians and Bulgarians formed 18% of the membership and 5% of the population, while Romanians comprised 75% of the total population but less than a quarter of the RCP membership.[225] The overwhelming majority of ethnic Romanians worked in agrarian production while the other ethnic groups constituted the bulk of urban and professional Romanian citizens. Tismăneanu argues that 'Romanian communism could never fully overcome its pariah genealogy... the party elite had been made up primarily of allogenic elements with little understanding of the country's national values.'[226] The Party portrayed Romania as a 'multinational imperialist country' even as the concept of the ethnic Romanian Nation gained predominance in the wider community.[227] After the war, communism was an ideology perceived by the majority of Romanians as Jewish and foreign, and Shafir identifies this perception of non-Romanian participation as one of the major barriers to the

[225]Michael Shafir *Romania: Politics, Economics, Society* Frances Pinter Publishers, London 1985 p.26.
[226] Vladimir Tismăneanu *Stalinism for all Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism* University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London 2003, p.24.
[227] Ibid.

institutionalization of communism.[228] The embeddedness of the (ethnic Romanian) Nation in political and cultural discourses and institutions complicated the introduction of the new ideological movement, and resulted in the RCP reproducing Romanian nationalism throughout their rule.[229]

The institutionalization of communism was difficult for a number of reasons, including its basic image as a "foreign" ideology, the Soviet occupation and the RCP's support of Russian territorial claims in the north.[230] Ethnic Romanian identity had been consistently articulated as agrarian, and the shift to an ideology of industrialization and collectivization, especially considering the lack of technology for modernization, challenged the application of Stalinist development plans. These factors required a unique approach by RCP leaders even as they faced Stalin's insistence on Soviet style reform. One of the most serious factors in the establishment period, however, was that the RCP leaders visibly responsible for decision making and implementation of unpopular reforms like land collectivization were, despite their ambivalent and hybrid self-identifications, perceived as non-Romanian in ethnicity, such as Ana Pauker, whose family were Jewish.[231]

---

[228] Tismăneanu 2003 op.cit. p.9.
[229] Verdery op. cit. p.71.
[230] For insight into the urban proletariat's distrust of communism see Vladimir Tismăneanu "Understanding national Stalinism: reflections on Ceauşescu's socialism" pp.155-173 in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* Vol. 32 1999, p.161.
[231] Robert Levy *Ana Pauker: The Rise and Fall of a Jewish Communist*, University of California Press, Los Angeles and London 2001.

Ethnicity was a primary discursive framework for understanding and presenting socialism in Romania from its introduction. Nationalization of the economy and voluntary collectivization began in 1948, including the nationalization (the forced seizure) of businesses and properties from "bourgeois" Romanian citizens. These "bourgeois" citizens were mostly urban Romanian Jews, who had constituted the majority of the pre-war urban classes working in commerce and professions. Despite the desperate need for professionals (such as engineers, doctors and teachers), it was this educated class of urban ethnic minorities who were first affected by the nationalization policies of the RWP. Important leaders of the party, especially the (ethnic Romanian) leader Gheorghe Gheorgiu-Dej, considered this class inextricably linked with an ethnic community identity stereotyped by Romanians as untrustworthy, despite their importance to postwar development. The multiple stereotypes and identifications of ethnicity were a site of significance and contestation from the very beginning. Perceptions of ethnic minorities as Other to the Romanian Nation were simply modified in socialist discourses of class; they did not disappear.

The ambivalence with which the socialist government and Romanian society treated the Romanian Jewish community in the early socialist period provides valuable insight into how the socialist system was constructed through ethnicized discourses privileging ethnic Romanian citizens in the Nation. At the end of

1945, 353 000 Romanian Jews, half of the pre-war population, had survived.[232] Tens of thousands of survivors immediately fled through Hungary to Palestine, while economic reforms and nationalization decrees of the late 1940s, coupled with increasing anti-Semitism (partly a result of the perception that Jews comprised the majority of the communist government) led to overwhelming numbers of applications for emigration.[233] In socialist terms, urban Jews were bourgeois cosmopolitans, and there was much debate amongst communists as to whether this meant redeemable class enemies capable of participating in the workers' struggle.[234] The formation of the state of Israel and subsequent demands by some Jewish Romanians for emigration intensified distrust of Jewish Romanians claiming to be of "the People" and the Nation, especially in the inner RWP. At various stages the RWP alternately banned and promoted Jewish emigration. [235] Communist treatment of the Jewish Romanian community is an

---

[232] Liviu Rotman "Romanian Jewry: The First Decade after the Holocaust" in Randolph L. Braham (ed) *The Tragedy of Romanian Jewry* Columbia University Press, New York 1994, pp.287-8.

[233] Levy points out that although Jews comprised a 'large number of Central Committee and regional party apparatchiks', they 'by no means predominated at the top of party leadership' and 'comprised no more than 10% of the *securitate* in 1949.' The impression of pervasive Jewish presence was, Levy claims, a result of anti-semitic propaganda.

[234] Levy pp.163-182.

[235] 3 600 Jews were allowed to emigrate to Israel in December-January 1948/49 in the name of building communism in Israel, at the same time that borders to the west were closed due to the escape of "enemy elements" and Zionism was opposed in line with the Stalinist policy. Levy p.168-169. 15 500 people left for Israel between November 1949 and April 1950 through specific legal loopholes, after which the number jumped to 37000 over the next two months. The astonishing figure of 220 000 applications for emigration visas within just two weeks in the spring of 1949 led to the government's swift closure of all emigration possibilities once again. Levy p.173.

example of how enemies identified as such by the Party on the grounds of class corresponded with those long held to be ethnic Others of the Romanian peasantry, and the ambivalence with which such Others were treated in Romanian society is manifest in the nature of state policy. German and Hungarian individuals and communities were also targeted in the years of socialist establishment, and, as with Jews, the characteristics identified as inimical to Romanian socialism were continuous with pre-socialist stereotypical constructions of ethnic Others. [236]

Furthermore, in the process of the collectivization of agriculture, socialist definitions of and debates about class enemies pervasively relied on ethnicized discourses privileging ethnic Romanian citizens. It was not only small land holding peasants who feared the loss of their hard won land in collectivization (from 1948), but also those who owned larger plots, especially those identified as belonging to the class of kulaks, *chiaburi* in Romanian socialist language.[237] The RWP burdened *chiaburi* with unattainable quotas and forced requisition as a means of implementing collectivization, especially between 1950 and 1955. There were continued arguments about how to define *chiaburi*, about what it was that differentiated them from peasants. Land ownership was one way of

---

[236] German and Hungarian Romanians were perceived as threats to the territorial integrity of the nation, urban rather than rural, wealthier than Romanians, and they often worked in commerce or owned larger land plots.

[237] Ibid. pp.90-134. Levy's account of Pauker's period as Agricultural Secretary details the development of collectivization policy. For a detailed study of collectives see David A. Kideckel *The Solitude of Collectivism: Romanian Villagers to the Revolution and Beyond* Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 1993.

identifying *chiaburi* (those who owned over more than 20ha) but there was a simultaneous definition of the land owning class as enemies of the working class.[238] In practice, the RWP identified *chiaburi* enemies of the working classes as those holding a higher socio-economic position than the poorest peasants. These people were often Hungarian or German farmers, especially in Transylvania. In some cases, party officials simply targeted the least poor of homogenously poor Romanian villagers in order to fulfill the 'de-kulakization' quotas for the central committee.[239] The American anthropologist David Kideckel noted in his study of collectivization in Hirseni, a village in the Olt region, that the new party cadres of the early 1950s were mostly ethnic Romanian former Iron Guard members who saw RCP membership and collectivization as an opportunity to improve their political standing.[240] Enemies identified on the grounds of class corresponded, therefore, with those long held to be ethnic Others to the Romanian peasantry. Romanian socialists of all ethnic minorities of the period consistently utilized ethnicized discourses privileging ethnic Romanian citizens alongside similarly ambivalent discourses of class.

Ethnic Romanian leaders in the RWP also mobilized pro-Romanian and anti-ethnic minority discourses in tandem with socialist discourses of 'cosmopolitan' enemies to displace public anger with the Party onto Other-than-Romanian Party

[238] Levy 2001 p.119.
[239] Kideckel 1993 pp.84-86.
[240] Ibid. p.87.

members.[241] As increasing force was used to implement collectivization from 1950, ethnic Romanian Gheorgiu-Dej increasingly articulated a "faction" of Jewish Romanian leaders as responsible for hardships.[242] His rise to undisputed leadership of Romania rested heavily upon his image as not only ethnic Romanian, but as capable of discerning and purging "cosmopolitan" elements in the government. Official historiography throughout Ceauşescu's rule highlighted the non-Romanian ethnic composition of early communist party bodies as 'responsible for its isolation and lack of communication with the "real" Romanian proletariat.'[243] The new socialist language of class, collectivization and industry, therefore, fits as the new skin for the old ceremony of identifying and persecuting ethnic Others of the Romanian ethnoNation.

Did Ţigani exist under socialism?

Mihnea Berindei, a Romanian sociologist, wrote in 1983 that in the 1950s 'Romanians were more anti Semitic, anti-Ţigan, and anti-Hungarian than before the war.'[244] We have seen from the previous discussion that there were particular discriminations against Hungarian and Jewish minorities, but it is more difficult to

---

[241] It's important to note that being ethnic Romanian or not was a matter of articulation not of birth. Ana Pauker, for example, was from a long lineage of Romanian born Jews, had renounced religion when she became a communist and she was a Romanian citizen.
[242] Kideckel 1993 pp.86-90.
[243] Tismăneanu 2003 p.66.
[244] Mihnea Berindei "Les minorités nationales en Roumanie" in Roumanie: crise et repression in *L'Alternative*, Nr. 20, January 1983.

locate popular sentiments concerning Ţigani in the post war period. General history texts of the socialist period make no mention of government dealings with Ţigani, and even Achim's largely unsourced eleven page outline of "Ţigani under the communist regime" begins by pointing out that 'for many years the authorities were not occupied in any way with the fate of Ţigani.'[245] Ţigani were never recognized as an ethnic minority by the socialist state, but there are clues in formal records that their presence as Others of a socialist ethnonational Romanian identity functioned throughout Romanian society, and therefore also through its institutions. The most significant example is that the Romanian Communist Party actively campaigned amongst self-identifying Roma groups in the early post war years. In the electoral campaign of 1946 the communist led Alliance of Democratic Parties addressed a convened meeting of Roma with the statement 'Roma brothers and Roma sisters!' (*Fraţi Romi şi surori Romnite*!), clearly aware of Roma self-identification and political mobilization as such, which had been organized in the 1920s.[246] Party awareness of the existence and potential importance of Roma self-identified ethnicity is also evidenced by the 1948 banning of the General Union of Roma of Romania (*Uniunea Generală a Romilor din România*), which had reformed after World War Two under the leadership of Gheorghe Niculescu.[247]

---

[245] Viorel Achim *Ţiganii în istoria României* Editură Enciclopedica, Bucharest 1998 p.54.
[246] From Lucian Cherata *Istoria Ţiganilor: origine, specific, limba* Editură Z, Bucharest 1992 p.48.
[247] Achim op. cit. p.153.

No mention is made of the Roma community as an ethnic minority after 1948. The motivation for the shift from campaigning for the Union of Roma to banning them reflects the general strategy of the RCP in the early years of gaining power and consolidation. Prior to the RCP's consolidation of power and banning of all other political parties in 1947, they had campaigned for popular support amongst existing and non-threatening Romanian parties of all ethnic groups. Indeed, it was in keeping with what Tismăneanu identifies as early Romanian communist ideology of Romania as a 'multinational imperialist country' that the communists did recognize the right to unique representation of Romanian Roma as an ethnic minority. The refusal to recognize Roma organizations once in power is in line with the ruling Party's need to sublimate all ethnic minorities to a unitary concept of the Romanian proletariat, ostensibly united by class rather than divided by ethnicity.

Although both Roma and Ţigani officially ceased to exist in post war Romania, it is certain from ethnicized economic and occupational divisions that they continued to be ethnic Others to Romanian communities. Rural communities of Roma rarely owned land (especially after World War Two) and, while playing a vital role in the community as tradesmen and workers, they were consistently marginalized from ethnic Romanian society *as* Ţigani.[248] The question, therefore, is if the Romanian Communist Party ceased to recognize Roma as an ethnic

[248] This marginalization, as always, perpetuated a cycle of communities and individuals discriminated against in terms of housing and social and economic participation.

minority, yet there is evidence that differentiation of Ţigani continued in the same ways it had before socialism, then what was the place of the Ţigan Other in "new socialist society"? If Ţigani were no longer a significant ethnic Other in post war (becoming) socialist Romanian society, then it would be logical to expect that they were merely considered a uniquely impoverished group, unique because of a long and well documented history of economic and social (thereby class) enslavement and exclusion. If this was the case, even assuming the social stigma of centuries of exclusion could be dismantled, then one would assume that those formerly identified as Ţigani were landless, impoverished, and therefore perfect candidates for becoming proletarian citizens. Were Ţigani, as marginalized workers *par excellence*, amongst the primary beneficiaries of collectivization of agriculture and industrialization?

It was ethnic Romanians, however, who first joined and later dominated the collectives, perpetuating marginalization of Ţigani in the new structures. Roma identified as Ţigani were as marginalized in collective involvement as they were in village society, hired at the lowest rank of casual labor, the first to suffer unemployment (which was formally non existent), and in general more impoverished than ethnic Romanians.[249] Vasile Burtea, a Romani Romanian professor of sociology, calculates that 48% of Roma worked in agriculture in the

[249] Gheorghe 1991 op.cit. and Burtea 1993. Elena and Catalin Zamfir *Ţiganii: între ignorare şi ingrijorare* Editură Alternativ, Bucharest, 1993. Ina Zoon *La Periferia societăţii: Rromii şi serviciile publice în România* Open Society Institute, Cluj Napoca 2001.

socialist period, the majority hired as seasonal workers, the lowest place in the economic and social hierarchy of the collective.[250] Kideckel observed in Hirseni that individuals identified as Ţigani were 'actively avoided... disparaged... pitied and condescended to,' even though they filled 'important niches' in the Olt economy as traditional craftsmen, animal husbandry workers and small traders.[251] Kideckel interprets this situation as a result of the 'transitional' status of Ţigani, inferior to a community that valued patrimonial attachment to the land. Kideckel also notes that by 1960 the entire village had electricity and road connections linking localities by public transport, but the large Romani community articulated as Ţigan remained in a marginal settlement of 'shacks' without electricity.[252] These Ţigani worked in the factory and in the collective when labor was needed, yet their physical segregation from the village and its amenities was maintained by threat of violence from local authorities and the community in general.[253] Kideckel's insight into the details of how ethnic Romanian communities created and maintained Ţigan communities is specific to a single region of Romania, but is corroborated by numerous Romani Romanian sociologists in post 1989 accounts of other agricultural collectives.[254]

---

[250] Burtea 1993 p.141.
[251] Kideckel 1993 pp.175-177.
[252] Ibid. p.94.
[253] Ibid. p.100. Kideckel relates the story of a Roma elder's house being torched by a group of Romanian villagers as "payback" for his attempting to move to a house in the village. There were many documented cases of communal violence against Roma and Ţigan communities after 1990 in addition to those obviously unrecorded before 1990.
[254] Burtea and Zoon op.cit.

It is clear that Roma formerly recognized as Ţigani continued to be recognized as such and actively marginalized in the new system. To explain this fact we need to consider the central role of patrimonial land ownership to Romanian peasant identity and, likewise, the integrated (albeit marginalized) place of Ţigan occupations within Romanian peasant society as service providers, such as metal craft and labor supply.[255] Ţigani were integrated in peasant society as the Others of dominant ethnic communities and this was reflected in occupations performed in the community.[256] Before socialism, many Romanians worked on family owned land and utilized discourses of production and self-reliance, Ţigan Others were not landed, and were viewed by the Romanians as "unproductive," although they were vital service providers. The place of Ţigani in the community was vital as the discursive antithesis of the ideal of Romanian peasant identity.[257] This ethnic differentiation did not change under socialism, even if the name "Ţigan" was no longer officially considered a unique ethnic group. Just as concepts of land ownership from before the war continued to mediate land usage and practices throughout socialism and after, the ethnicized structure of society on the land, with Ţigani as the unlanded ethnic Others of Romanians, also remained in modified form.

---

[255] Burtea and Zoon op. cit. Note that Achim does assume that Ţigani, as the poorest group, were the most eager to join and profited most from collectivization, a position for which he provides no sources or argued evidence. Achim 1998 p.154.

[256] See Michael Stewart "Gypsies, the work ethic, and Hungarian socialism" in C.M. Hann (ed) *Socialism: Ideals, Ideologies and Local Practice* Routledge, London 1993 pp.187-203.

[257] Kideckel 1993 p.158-9.

The socialist government did violently provoke significant changes in traditional occupations. Not only was rural society entirely re-orientated in its relation to the land through collectivization, but industrialization led to a massive new labor force, supported by extensive urban planning. As previously mentioned, Ţigani were usually assigned the lowest positions in collectives, hired as a labor force for the busy seasons and unsupported during the winter months. Some groups turned to seasonal relocation, moving with their communities to the margins of larger settlements for the winter period in order to support themselves with craftsmanship. In socialist ideology, 'work becomes a moral necessity, to work is to be.'[258] Individuals who were employed only seasonally, or those who traveled or supported themselves in a sedentary lifestyle by performing traditional trades and services, were deemed "social parasites." This phrase was officially used throughout the 1960s and came to be punishable by prison and forced labor under Decree 153/1970.[259] The category of "social parasite" could be applied to any individual not performing a "useful" function for society. This included those avoiding "respectable work" or attempting to make a profit. As Stewart explains, the line between useful service to the community and usury was unclear, so that a Roma man 'offering to mend a peasant's fence might be tolerated as performing a useful function, but if during his work he noticed, say, a machine in the yard and

---

[258] Lucian Boia *Mitologia stiintifica a comunismului* Humanitas, Bucharest 1999 p.123.
[259] Emmanuelle Pons *Ţiganii din Romania: o minoritate în tranziţie* Compania Altfel, Bucharest 1995 p.34.

offered to buy it (in order to later sell it at a profit), this would reveal' a tendency towards social parasitism.[260] Under these terms, the continued exclusion of Roma from agricultural work and the attempts of Roma to pursue traditional occupations resulted in behavior deemed demonstrative of "retrograde mentality." Since both part time agricultural and trade work necessitated seasonal relocations, the resulting "nomadism" was also designated a sign of "parasitism" in the new socialist vocabulary.[261] This "deviant behavior" was essentialized as Ţigan behavior, thus masking the fact that Romanian society deliberately perpetuated the conditions that made it difficult for individuals identified as Ţigani to live anything other than Ţigan lifestyles.[262] Historical stereotypical discourses of the Ţigan Other as lazy, nomadic and shirking responsibilities were therefore intrinsic to socialist period discourses of the Ţigan Other as 'social parasite' of 'retrograde' and 'deviant mentality.'

It was a contentious claim of socialist ideology, however, that retrograde mentality and social parasitism could be overcome through re-education.[263] With this in mind, in Roma communities with high underemployment (thereby Ţigan), sections of the community, be it all men of a certain age or family groups, were forcibly relocated to industrial plants that had difficulty recruiting labor due to the

---

[260] Stewart 1993 p.190.
[261] Achim 1998 p.160.
[262] Gheorghe op.cit.1991.
[263] See Boia 1999 for a historical overview of debates concerning ideological enemies that could and could not be re-educated.

danger of the work or the isolation of the plant.[264] Ţigan men were often arrested and charged as social parasites to enable the state to summon a labor force for monumental state projects such as the infamous Danube Canal and, in the 1980s, for the building of Ceauşescu's enormous *Casa Poporului* (House of the People).[265] Berindei cites a letter written by a Romanian woman to a French newspaper in 1982 explaining that when work was not available, Roma were often arrested on various charges of 'not being presentable, despite their training, simply because they are Ţigani.'[266]

Verdery's 1996 study of the nature of the socialist economy as an economy of lack illustrates how underemployment was endemic to the system itself.[267] In Romania, as in other socialist regimes of the period, workers of all ethnicities experienced lack of work for unpredictable and significant periods of time.[268] Those identified as Ţigani were placed at the bottom of the workforce hierarchy (which existed through and despite ideological equality) and were thereby forced to find income within the new structures. Just as other Romanians increasingly found themselves doing, income was often gained by pilfering state owned products for personal trade. Pre-socialist stereotypical discourses of inferior

---

[264] Achim 1998 p.155 (Note that Achim phrases this practice as the state fulfilling its responsibility to settle citizens where there is work available. Also based on personal communication with Delia Grigore (in her capacity as vice president Aven Amentza, NGO/education/research) 12 January 2003.
[265] Ibid.
[266] Cited in Berendei 1983.
[267] Verdery 1996 pp.19-57.
[268] Ibid pp.20-23.

Ţigani and the correlating socio-economic position of this group were thereby transformed to maintain the same effects within socialist discourses. In this way, the Ţigan Other conceived as social parasite was a recognizable identity developed from pre-socialist Romanian stereotypes.

Ceauşescu and late socialism

Internationally respected Romanian historian Lucian Boia refers to the 1950s as the years of repression, when Gheorghiu-Dej's government toed the Stalinist line and doggedly industrialized and collectivized.[269] The capital of Bucharest was "modernized" on a grand scale through the development of industry and the necessary accompaniments of high-density accommodation, food and transport provision. The population of Bucharest rose from 992 000 people in 1941 to 1 367 000 in 1963, and reached two million by 1980.[270]

Following the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1958 Gheorghiu-Dej used an increasingly nationalist and non-Soviet line, an approach that was taken up and radicalized by his successor in 1965, Nicolae Ceauşescu. Many sources depict the first decade of Ceauşescu's rule as a relatively liberal "thaw," but this perspective fails to note that it was less than a decade before his most repressive laws were in

[269] Lucian Boia *Romania: Borderland of Europe* Reaktion Books, London 2001 p.145.
[270] Constantin C. Giurescu *Istoria Bucurestilor* Editură Pentru Literatura, Bucharest 1966 p.232.

place, and that many measures began in this period. In 1966 Ceauşescu banned abortion in a country where women had no access to contraception. This produced an immediate population explosion and was the beginning of an obsessive ethnonationalist drive for an homogenous population of "new Romanian socialist citizens."[271]

In 1968 Ceauşescu established the first "Council of Co-inhabiting National Minorities." This was (and often still is) hailed by many Romanian intellectuals as a sign of liberalism, due to the fact that for a short period "co-inhabiting national minorities" were allowed to publish in languages other than Romanian, and numerous (Jewish, German, Hungarian) theaters functioned. In fact, Ceauşescu's definition of ethnic minorities as co-inhabiting national minorities was an essentialization of the Nation as the "natural expression of a spirit of a people," transforming citizens of Romania into "de jure citizens" of irredeemably Othered "spirit."[272] The phrase "co-inhabiting" referred to Ceauşescu's argument that certain people of other nations had wandered into Romania (rearticulating the historical continuity of Romanians in Transylvania), where "they found there a civilization superior in development."[273] Ethnicity was defined in Ceauşescu's regime as an inalienable property, with ethnic Romanians inalienable citizens, and

---

[271] See Kligman op.cit.
[272] These phrases are used consistently in Ceauşescu's rhetoric. For the argument that Hungarians and Germans immigrated to established Romanian lands because they found there a superior culture, see p.34.
[273] Ceauşescu op.cit.p.86.

Other groups inalienably outside this group.[274] Romanian ethnicity was discursively constructed as an intrinsic quality, so that Nelson noted in his political study of Ceauşescu's Romania that to be ethnic Romanian was the second most important factor for an individual's political advancement, second only to the prime factor of being male.[275]

How to avoid signifying Ţigan in Ceauşescu's Romania

The concept of ethnicity in relation to Roma and Ţigani in Ceauşescu's Romania is much more difficult to trace. Neither Roma nor Ţigani were officially recognized as a "co-inhabiting national minority" by Ceauşescu's regime.[276] According to historical materialism, if a people had not created a nation state, this was an indication of a low level of civilization. Officially and legally then, Roma did not exist at all, and indeed, being Romani under socialism "wasn't so bad" as

---

[274] Understanding this concept of ethnicity makes it easier to understand how the exchange of German and Jewish "co-inhabiting national minorities" for hard currency was supported by the Romanian state throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In 1966 there were 43000 Jews in Romania, in 1977, 25000, and in 1992, 9000. Boia 2000 p.144. German population statistics dropped from 359 000 in 1977, to 119 000 in 1992. In addition to payments per person from the former Federal Republic of Germany and Israel, in 1982 the Romanian government required all applicants for emigration to repay in hard currency the cost of their state education. As per Decree no. 402, 1 November 1982, *Official Bulletin* no. 95 1 November 1982. Cited in Anneli Ute Gabanyi *The Ceauşescu Cult* Romanian Cultural Foundation Publishing House, Bucharest 2000 p.374.

[275] Nelson op.cit. p.150.

[276] I specify Roma, because there were Romani intellectuals in Romania at the time who 'campaigned' for the inclusion of Roma as an ethnic minority. These calls for acknowledgement, however, were often made using the name "Ţigan," due to the refusal of officials to recognize even the word Roma.

long as one was not labeled Ţigan![277] What this means is that being Roma under socialism was not a problem unless you were recognized as non-Romanian in ethnicity. The question therefore is what kind of signifiers was one to avoid in order to not be labeled Ţigan, and how did this performance of ethnicity interact with supposedly biological characteristics of ethnicity?

These questions and their answers came from my personal experience as a researcher in postsocialist Romania. In a weekly discussion group on the topic "Romani Culture," open to the public and held in the Faculty of Letters, Romanes Department, in Bucharest, I became aware that many people who attended were Romani Romanians who had grown up with their ethnic identity considered a family and social taboo. Aware that various (cultural, linguistic, occupational, demographic) signifiers of Romani ethnicity signified Ţigan, non-Romanian ethnicity, many Romani families took advantage of the social mobility available for the first time in an urbanized industrialized Romania. In pursuit of a life without persecution based on identification as Ţigani, incalculable numbers of Roma moved to big cities, cut ties with family and friends, adopted different cultural signifiers and became educated professionals throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The experiences of these Roma who set out to avoid being identified as Ţigani and ended up in a discussion group about Romani identity decades later, highlight that the Ţigan Other was signified in specific and powerful ways under socialism. It is clear then that the Ţigan Other was a recognizable Other of the

[277] From personal interview P. 12 October 2002.

Romanian socialist citizen, but that discrimination against this group was not treated as a social issue in literature and reports of the period. Through interviews that I conducted with self-identifying Romani Romanians who had actively performed not being Ţigani in the socialist period (the sample gleaned from the public discussion groups), we can examine what factors signified "Ţigan" identity and then discuss how these signs functioned in stereotypical discourses of ethnonational socialist identity in this period.[278]

Roma that performed Romanian ethnicity did do so in a variety of ways, reflecting personal choices and interpretations of ethnic identity and social policing. There was not a wide range of details within narratives, however, and definite common themes, which are the focus of this section. The common element to all interviewees was a knowledge that to be identified as Ţigan was not just a negative, but a dangerous business, and that avoiding this danger could best be done in an urban environment through signifying only Romanian culture and through socialist education. Not signifying Ţigan invariably included absolute rejection of all cultural signs such as music, traditional fashion and language. All respondents referred to no longer listening to music that Romanians would consider "Ţigan." Many families stopped using and teaching their children Romanes language, as it had then, as now, connotations of being "not a real language" but a primitive form of communication. It must also be considered that signifiers such as clothes and music strongly related to the geographical origin of

[278] See Appendix One.

city dwellers, and part of becoming urban and modern in the socialist period was, as strongly evidenced in glossy magazines of the period, about wearing "modern" fashion and understanding "modern socialist culture."[279] Cultural signifiers of being modern, socialist and Romanian were not only ethnic (such as not speaking Romanes) but also involved refutations of regional (rural) and class (peasant class) signifiers. The Ţigan Other, therefore, was cross signified through these stereotypical discourses.

Respondents recounted separation from extended family that were left behind in rural areas. One respondent, who moved with her sister and parents to Bucharest at age six, remembered that they never visited the extended family again.[280] Another respondent remembered the experience of leaving her primary school in Bucharest and seeing her grandfather, from the country, waiting for her at the gate. She was so afraid of being seen by the others to have a Ţigan grandfather that she avoided meeting him and walked home alone. 'This fear that was greater than my pain and shame, this was what it meant to be Ţigan.'[281] This respondent also pointed out that from this story we can see that the historical stigma of being Ţigan was internalized by some Romani individuals.'[282]

---

[279] Magazines for women, and women themselves of course, stressed fashion under the socialist system, as in other contemporaneous European societies.
[280] Interview J. 1 October 2002.
[281] Interview D. 7 August 2002.
[282] Ibid.

Roma who made the shift from networks of identification that could signify Ţigan ethnicity also stressed the importance of excelling in the socialist education system, becoming professionals rather than manual workers. A large proportion of post 1989 Romani professionals and intellectuals come from such families, who openly claimed their Roma identity only in private or not at all prior to the revolution. While manual workers received equal if not higher pay than clerical or intellectual workers, this choice reflected, in the opinion of Czech sociologist Milan Simecka, 'the parents' hope that education would provide their children with a kind of defense against the manipulations of the Party because their children would better understand the mysteries of politics that they themselves did not.'[283] On a simpler level, the primary signification of Ţigan identity, as will be discussed in the next pages, was occupation, usually visible and uneducated jobs, not professions. Being educated for a profession, therefore, was the most important long term strategy against being identified as Ţigan.

The color of one's skin was not necessarily a signifier of being Ţigan, unless it was accompanied by other strong Ţigan signifiers such as language or occupation. Considering the important place of stereotypes of blackness (with words like "crow" and adjectives like "dark" and "swarthy") in discourses of the Ţigan Other, I was interested in the role that an individual's skin tone played in how other people designated their ethnic identity. Even respondents with darker skin

[283] Milan Simecka *The Restoration of Order* London, Verso, 1984 p.114 as cited in Renata Salecl 1994 p.44. Although Simecka writes about socialism more broadly, I believe his insights are applicable to the Romanian situation.

than average (roughly speaking) did not articulate color as a signifier without my direct questions. When I asked directly if respondents believed skin tone to influence 'recognitions' of Ţigani, all respondents answered that skin tone had no bearing on perception, unless in combination with other cultural signifiers. Cultural signifiers such as fashion, however, as one respondent pointed out, also shifted, so that in various periods, long flowing Ţigan style skirts were an accepted Romanian fashion, discursively recognized as such over previous significations of Ţigan fashion.[284] The marginal role of skin tone or color in recognition of Ţigan ethnic Others could also highlight the fact that in Romania very many non-Romani Romanians have olive and darker skin tones, and to claim these biological signs as manifesting Ţigan identity would be a serious offence to many Romanians.[285] In this way, it could be the fact that many ethnic Romanians also signify Ţigan in skin tone that both maintains it as a primary symptom of Otherness that the Self needs to return to and reject, even as this taboo similarity prevents color becoming a primary stereotype of the Ţigan Other. The occupation of a person was the most powerful signifier of Ţigan alterity.

---

[284] Interview S. 8 August 2002.

[285] It is fascinating that while sun tans and dark skin are fetished in contemporary Romanian culture, the sign of dark skin can be deliberately used to offend someone also, for example by asking is someone has a good suntan because they have Ţigani in their family. For a wide-ranging study in the significations of suntans, ethnicity and gender see Sara Ahmed "Animated Borders: Skin, Colour and Tanning" in Margaret Shildrick and Janet Price (eds) *Vital Signs: Feminist Reconfigurations of the Bio/logical Body* Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1998.

Ţigani as illegal traders in socialist spaces

Ţigani were visible in "Ţigan occupations" such as street cleaners and garbage collectors, occupations that fit with the stereotypes of Ţigani as uneducated, dirty and nomadic. But it was especially ambient traders as Ţigani that played a visible and privileged role in discourses of citizenship and consumption, and in everyday encounters throughout the socialist period. When government control of the market places became more severe in the 1980s, ambient traders (those without permanent registered stalls, often selling "black market" goods) moved out of the formal market zones in order to avoid arrest as speculators.[286] Ţigan traders were often the only chance that other Romanians had to access "luxury" items such as biros and foreign hygiene products. The importance of consumption under the socialist regime is well documented. A pair of blue jeans was worth much more than their production value; they were not only rare items, but symbolized transgression of ideological and international borders. Ţigan ambient traders were also the most common source of illegal contraception on the black market.[287] Burtea notes that in a society of severe shortages where queuing was endemic, ambient Ţigani were linked in a negative way with the black market

[286] Personal Interviews with Cristian Ciontoiu, Market Supervisor/Chairman since 1970,18 July 2002.
[287] Richard Wagner *Exit* Verso, London and New York 1990 p.100.

despite (and I will argue because of) the fact that Romanians utilized their services for access to goods.[288]

Verdery provides an important reading of the negative perceptions of trade by highlighting the importance placed by the socialist system on production. While capitalism calculates the value of exchange, socialism prioritizes production. The traditional peasant perception of trade as bad and production as good translated, under socialism, into making a living by trade being seen as dirty and dishonest in opposition to the morality of a life of production. This discourse in its modified form maintained (and still maintains, in 2005) the Ţigan as the Other of honest production. The chronic shortages endemic to socialism, however, required workers to utilize informal networks for acquisition, and "dirty" transactions with traders provided such rare and valuable items as medicine and contraception. How then did productionist discourses interact with the everyday need of people to trade to obtain basic necessities the socialist system could not (but claimed to) provide? What was the role of the Ţigan Other in this process?

In Romanian socialist society, everybody was familiar with underemployment and with taking advantage of what could be obtained from one's workplace. Although production was superior to exchange, people relied on the (illegal) market in order to access basic goods and services.[289] What is interesting then is that it was the

[288] Burtea op cit.119 and Ciontoiu Personal interview 18 July 2002.
[289] Burtea op.cit. p.98.

Ţigan Other that socialist citizens articulated as lazy (failing to work to their ability) and thieves (through selling on the black market for profit). This displacement function from the Self to the Other is the key to how the Ţigan Others functioned as a key node of trading under socialism. Utilizing pre-existing peasant discourses that placed production above exchange, we know from the studies of Kideckel and Verdery that under socialist rule, profit gained through exchange was perceived as "dirty" money in comparison to the much espoused "moral" benefits of work and production. Verdery uses this production/exchange dichotomy as the explanation for ambient traders being identified as Ţigani, thieves and social parasites, Others to the socialist ethnoRomanian "way of life."[290]

In order to explore the nature of this ethnic Othering, an overview of how socialism functioned in Romania is useful.

Socialism and its Others; the place of the Ţigan Other

Everyday Romanians participated in "deviant" behavior, such as black market trading, which was necessary for survival. How did the Ţigan Other function pervasively within socialist society linked with anti-social practices, when

[290] Verdery 1996 pp.97-101.

Romanian individuals also acted against state regulations? This section discusses how the socialist system was organized around the vital place of the Ţigan as the Other within the Romanian nation.

A good place to begin to understand how Romanian socialism functioned is through the gap between what the state claimed to provide and what it delivered. This gap loomed large in the 1980s in Romania; the state machine printed huge signs "educating" pregnant women as to daily nutritional intake requirements even as shops stocked nothing from the list. Workers went to factories in order to perform their moral duty of working to the best of their abilities in order to become new socialist men, but found no materials with which to produce. An individual may have railed against class enemies of the workers in political meetings, but left early in order to accompany a friend on a trip to exchange cigarettes for meat in a village outside Bucharest. Many Romanian sociologists deal with questions of citizen complicity by claiming that citizens complied or collaborated in order to survive.[291] Repressive apparati existed in the forms of secret police, the gulag, and the forced isolation of individuals. As no one knew the real extent of state control, fear was amplified in tandem with rumors of

[291] For Romanian sources see the first volume of the journal *Sociologie Românească* Bucharest 1990, with the theme "Frica şi Communismul" (Fear and Communism) especially Ilie Badescu "Contribuţii asupra revoluţiei din decembrie" pp.31-48 and Dr. Sorin Radulescu "Logica ambivalenţiei şi 'efectele perverse' al ideologie totalitare epoca dictaturii" pp. 49-54. Boia simply states that people learnt to survive. Boia 2000 pp.49-54. For an overview of these issues see Steven Sampson "Towards an Anthropology of Collaboration in Eastern Europe" pp.107-118 in *Culture and History* Vol. 8 1991.

absolute control. By the 1970s, and through the tightening restrictions of the 1980s, physical repression was no longer the primary threat, but isolation from society and the Party was more feared as dangerous for the future of one's family.[292] The studies of American sociologists Trond Gilberg and Steven Sampson consistently focus on the perplexities of 'how a feeling of "oneness" was maintained without material reward,' and the importance of rumors and networks for procurement and survival in socialist Romania.[293] The works of Katherine Verdery, Gail Kligman and Renata Salecl provide the most sophisticated analyzes of the relationship between the duplicities of the socialist citizen within the specific ethnonational socialist contexts of repression and state economic structure.

Verdery's project traces the importance of the ethnonational discourse in Romanian socialism and understands the system to have been, at every level, a

---

[292] Boia's interpretation is that 'either people had become resigned, or they no longer dared to move. There was no longer any repression because there was no longer anything to repress. The securitate –a reality, but also an obsession, a myth- was watching.' Boia 2000 p.145. For the particularities of 'self management' rhetoric see also Renata Salecl *The Spoils of Freedom: Psychoanalysis and feminism after the fall of socialism* Routledge, London, 1994, and Daniel N. Nelson "Workers in a Workers' State" pp.174-197 in Daniel Nelson (ed) *Romania in the 1980s* Westview Press, Colorado 1981.

[293] Trond Gilberg "Political Socialisation in Romania: Prospects and Performance" pp. 142-173 in Nelson op.cit., Sampson, Steven "'May you live only by your salary!' The unplanned economy of Eastern Europe" pp.120-145 in *Crime and Social Justice* Volume 13. See also Verdery "Ethnic Relations, Economies of Shortage and the Transition in Eastern Europe" in C.M. Hann (ed) *Socialism: Ideals, Ideologies and Local Practice* Routledge, London 1993.

utilization of an us/them identity structure.[294] In this structure, one identifies one's Others in order to identify oneself. The self is thereby reliant on 'Others' for its existence. Verdery identifies the Party as the 'enemy' against which citizens in Romania identified themselves as a collective 'us,' and claims that the strength of ethnonational discourse in this period is evidenced by the continuing centrality of ethnonationalism through the 'crisis in self-conception' after 1989.[295] Verdery's work leads to a question of why, if all socialist citizens shared the Party as enemy other, there was no earlier revolt. How were people "complicit" in the continuation, therefore, of the Party enemy, and how did the duplicitous identities of citizens function to bind them to silence? Salecl directly approaches these questions in a way Verdery's work never claims to, demonstrating the usefulness of a Lacanian reading of socialist regimes in their unique contexts. Verdery's thorough academic explication of the Romanian experience works well alongside Salecl's broader readings of socialist systems.

Salecl argues that socialist regimes functioned precisely through the duplicity of public obedience coupled with the kind of private resistance Havel depicted as the common experience of everyday socialist man.[296] In the economies of socialist regimes, characterized by a failure to meet the daily needs of citizens, "new socialist men" were driven to non-socialist actions such as illegal trade and

---

[294] Verdery 1996 pp.92-97.
[295] Ibid p.94.
[296] This very brief outline is drawn from much larger works, see Salecl 1994 and Renata Salecl *(Per)verions of Love and Hate* Verso London New York 1998.

stealing from the workplace. The socialist system thereby ensured that individuals would fail to inhabit the ideal identity of socialist society, which therefore remained a promised future development. As long as individuals continued to perform publicly for this socialist future, their private resistance was in fact what bound them to the socialist state they criticized. The vital components in this process were the secret police (or a popular fear of their power) and 'the enemy of the nation and socialism', which was 'ever present but never visible.'[297] The socialist state was one in which public trials and mysterious disappearances of colleagues and neighbors served to intimidate the population by not only showing that the elusive enemy was amongst 'us', but by indicating that the state is capable of identifying such enemies. There was not one individual, of course, who was not forced to participate in some activity that they themselves identified through their public, socialist self as the behavior of an enemy of the state (such as buying on the black market). In this way,

> [T]he government achieved its desired end of getting the populace to identify with the image of the 'good citizen, fully devoted to the cause of communism' precisely by creating a situation in which everyone could recognize him or herself as a potential enemy of society. The fact that nobody believed the official discourse caused feelings of guilt and bad conscience which encouraged identification with the position of the enemy, with the position which had to remain secret and at the same

[297] Salecl 1999 p.49.

> time ever present. And for this effect, it was essential that the enemy suddenly appear in the form of a neighbor, a colleague or even a spouse. It was up to everyone to recognize the enemy and to acknowledge that he or she could be the next to be discovered as the enemy.[298]

The impossibility of the goals set by the socialist ideology created irony and distance in subjects, a successful barrier to ideological activity and participation that could create danger of a real revolt. Salecl provides a Lacanian answer to a question that other scholars steer clear of: how did ideological rituals such as the constant public rallies function with an audience of cynics?[299] Such rallies were performed by citizens inhabiting their ideal public selves for the gaze of the big Other, future socialist society. In public performances, 'everybody knows that the emperor is naked' and the slogans are empty, but appearances must be maintained in order to conceal the fact that the emperor is naked from the Other of utopian socialist society.[300] Even if everyday people don't "believe in" the future promised by the big Other, they believe that the big Other exists, that the Other of the state is working for this future. In this way, it doesn't matter if people don't believe, the big Other still functions, people still believe that they are being watched and policed by this Other. The 1989 "revolutions" in Romania were mass

---

[298] Salecl 1999 op.cit. p.50.

[299] Boia 2000 p.125 talks about the exciting nationalist language of the 1960s rallies.

[300] For a more detailed explanation see Salecl 1994 p.56 and John Borneman *Subversions of International Order: Studies in the Political Anthropology of Culture State University* of New York Press, New York 1998.

rallies in which, against a background of domestic and international revolutionary precedents, of freezing weather and exasperation with the inhumane standards of living imposed by the Party, Romanians in the street collectively dissolved the existence of the big Other. In this moment, individuals renounced their distance from ideological discourse, thereby breaking the binds of silence created through inhabiting the double spaces constitutive of the socialist state.[301]

Let us return to the question of what kind of Other Ţigani were in the Romanian socialist state and their function in socialist society. We know that pre-socialist ethnic (Hungarian, German, Jewish) Others were doubly invoked as class Others throughout socialist rule (especially in the early period). External ideological enemies of socialism were identified as Western ethnonational groups (Americans, French, British). Verdery even notes that in mainstream discourses of the 1980s, *Securitate* agents were articulated as 'a different race of people.'[302] Ethnicity was integral to the identification of (class and ideological) Others in Romanian socialism.

Ceauşescu's discourses of co-inhabiting nationalities, as previously discussed, rigidified the concept of nation as a homogenous and natural expression of 'the spirit of a people.' This approach did not destabilize Others of the past, but did

[301] For an overview of readings of the Romanian Revolution of 1989 see Ruxandra Cesereanu *Decembrie '89: Deconstrucţia unei revoluţii* Polirom, Bucharest 2004.
[302] Verdery 1996 p.95.

serve to bind ethnic to national signifiers. Ţigani, uniquely, were never considered a (co-inhabiting) nationality by the Romanian state, but were, as in the period of *dezrobirea*, an established Other within; ubiquitous, inalienable and yet inalienably Other to ethnic Romanians. The examples of Roma who aimed to avoid identification as Ţigani illustrate that the Ţigan functioned as a symbol invoking a range of stereotypes that claimed to be intrinsic to individuals. The success of these individuals who performed Romanian ethnic identity, who effectively performed *not being Ţigan*, highlights that the signifiers that tethered Ţigan identity to individuals were not primarily the color of one's skin or any other biological trait. The Ţigan Other became, in the socialist period, a vital factor for defining a specific form of socialist Romanian ethnonational identity, building on established pre-socialist stereotypes.

Verdery's understanding of the ethnic symbolism of Ţigani as Other in socialist Romania centers upon a metanarrative of theft. In a psychoanalytic understanding, the Other threatens to steal one's enjoyment through threatening to ruin the ideal "way of life." As Zizek notes, 'what really bothers "us" about the Other is the way he organizes his enjoyment,' which is perceived to be somehow secret or unobtainable.[303] What is concealed 'by imputing to the Other the theft of enjoyment is the traumatic fact that we never possessed what was allegedly stolen

[303] Slavoj Zizek *Tarrying with the Negative* Duke Univeristy Press, Duram 1993 p.203.

from us.'[304] By defining the Ţigan Other as refusing to work and stealing from the workplace, therefore, Romanian citizens did not simply displace their own actions, but inhabited an ideal position for the gaze of the big Other of future socialist society. The Romanian worker could not only blame Ţigani for workplace theft, but in doing so fulfill a positive role within socialist society, by identifying the enemies of "the people." The failure of the citizen to reach the promised fulfillment of socialist utopia, to be able to be live as the posters proclaiming success of the proletariat suggested, could be displaced onto the identification of the internal Other. Therefore the Ţigan who refused to work, from the perspective of a Romanian citizen, stole from the socialist citizen the ability to create and enjoy the utopian socialist society of the big Other. The Ţigan as thief thereby simultaneously enabled the Romanian socialist citizen to avoid the traumatic reality that the ideal identity could not be inhabited, that the gap between the announced standards of a socialist society and the reality of lack in everyday life was a necessary and functioning "glitch" in the system.[305]

The state's identification of 'social parasites' was, therefore, an institutional corroboration of the common effort to sustain the big Other of socialist utopia. Through constantly seeking to identify and eliminate the internal enemy from

---

[304] Zizek op.cit. p.203.

[305] In the next chapter we will see that this theoretical reading can be easily applied to the way the Ţigan Other becomes primarily *bişniţari* in the postsocialist period, the word *bişniţari* comes from the translation of the English word for business (*bişniţă*) and means someone who trades illegally, implying that such an action is to the detriment of the ethnonational, Romanian, and free-market people.

within the whole, the state also performed for the gaze of a big Other of future socialist society. The fact that socialist ideology constructed an impossible goal (how can anyone work if there are no materials available?), as previously discussed, is the means by which its citizens were bound in duplicity to the big Other and distanced from participating in the ideology itself. As with the Ţigan thieves of the workplace, however, Ţigan Others as traders masked the traumatic inability of (public) Romanian socialist citizens to live without the black market structures that deferred the achievement of the utopian socialist society. The Ţigan Other was as necessary for the Romanian socialist citizen's self perception as the black market was for the state's maintenance of control over the proletariat class.

Ţigan Others were not just one dimensional scapegoats of duplicitous survival practices, therefore, but the site of more complex and intersecting discourses. If we refer again to a woman who purchased contraception on the street, she not only circumscribed her ability to be a good socialist as she participated in an illegal transaction, but she also failed to inhabit her ideal identity as (productive) woman in the gaze of the (socialist) big Other.[306] The Ţigan trader who is a last resort for contraceptives thereby becomes the symbol of a citizen's failure to inhabit the ideal socialist role in a specifically gendered way.

[306] The pressure on women to be "heroes of the nation" was intense. Not only were gynaecological examinations a workplace routine and all medical professionals assigned quotas for pregnancies (even dentists!), couples without children were taxed at a higher level. See Kligman 1998.

"Those socialists were not Romanian!" Postsocialist discourses of Ţigani in socialist history

From the first days of the revolution in December 1989, ethnicized discourses linking the Ţigan Other with violence, capitalism, public space, and socialism were pervasive. The Ţigan Other again became the primary ethnic Other of the Romanian ethnonational self in a new series of postsocialist stereotypes that nevertheless relied on historically developed stereotypes of Ţigani as primitive nomads who work in illegal trade and public space. In this section I will examine just a few of the ways that the Ţigan Other has been vital in postsocialist discourses re-membering the socialist past, where essentially illogical discourses of Ţigan-socialist state collusion are pervasive and important. The Ţigan Other was and is invoked by academics and everyday Romanians alike as the menacing cause behind the actions of the recent past, especially in relation to the introduction and establishment of communism, the dictatorship of Ceauşescu, and the physical mutilation and reconstruction of city spaces. I will argue that, as with the role of the Ţigan Other in the period of socialism itself, postsocialist discourses of the socialist Ţigan Other enabled Romanians to maintain a distance from the history of socialism and even to remember the former state and society with nostalgia.

Any research of how socialism has been remembered after the revolution needs to acknowledge the predominance of nostalgic discourses for the socialist past. With the possibility of a closed dictatorship quite surely out of reach in postsocialist Romania, people who were adults in 1989 publicly lament (in trains, post office queues and pension offices) the socialist period as an "easier" life of job security, having money ("even if there was no food then, now there is food but no money") and annual holidays at the Black Sea. The "atmosphere of fear" is invoked as a gentle refutation, if at all, and there is an established collective silence regarding popular collaboration or passivity, led by now democratic politicians who quickly re-membered their pasts as dissident Party members.[307] Within this scene, the Ţigan Other functions in various moonlighting roles as the historical actor onto which those socialist deeds difficult to reconcile with the nostalgic discourse are displaced and Othered.

A prime example of how the past is ethnicized to maintain a specific version of history is the common discourse that the origins of socialism in Romania were "foreign" (Jewish) interventions in the Romanian nation. In these discourses, Gheorghiu-Dej's scapegoating of Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca as ethnic foreigners remains the dominant narrative in postsocialist Romanian memoirs and

---

[307] See Alexandru Zub *Oglinzi Retrovizoare: Istorie, memorie şi morală în România* Editură Polirom, Iasi 2002. Andrei Plesu and Petre Roman *Transformari, inertii, dezordini: 22 de luni dupa 22 decembrie 1989* Editură Polirom, Iasi 2002. Boia 2001 p.188 and Verdery 1996. It is important to note that nostalgia for the past can be performed alongside the seemingly contradictory discourse of land nationalization as theft.

histories of early socialism.[308] In Lucian Boia's recent overview of Romanian history, for example, he states that the Soviets encouraged Jewish leadership in the Romanian Communist party and *securitate* because 'coming from quite marginal sectors of society, there was no way they could be expected to feel bound to any tradition.'[309] Elsewhere, Boia concludes that 'by supporting the Communist regime, they (Jews) were, in a sense, getting their own back for what the Antonescu regime had done.'[310] Boia, a Romanian historian of international repute, thereby essentializes ethnonational identity in the same way Ceauşescu did. The pervasiveness of his view reflects a continuing social reliance on fixed ethnonational identities which functions not only to displace responsibility for the establishment of socialism in Romania onto ethnic Others, but also therein to fix rily the role of ethnic Romanians as unquestionable for socialist government actions of this period, which cannot be the case.[311]

While Boia makes no mentions of Ţigani as privileged by the Gheorgiu-Dej regime, in his historical text, Viorel Achim presents the common postsocialist discourse that Ţigani held superior positions in the early Party apparatus. Achim's

---

[308] See especially Levy 2001 Introduction p.1-15 and Tismăneanu 2003 pp.65-66.
[309] Boia 2000 p.116.
[310] Ibid p.211.
[311] I say that this strategy of ethnic Othering only serves to fix temporarily the role of essentially ethnonational Romanians because, in line with the general approach to self and Other identity articulations, the discourse itself is powered by ambivalence. An ability to talk about Romanain complicity through discourses of betrayal also exists, though it is a marginal trope primarily exercised in small publications and narratives rather than in the media and public space performances such as the nostalgia discourse.

paragraph long description in *The History of Ţigani in Romania* exemplifies the logic and stereotypes necessary to maintain the discourse. He begins by stating that Ţigani were moved to positions of power as part of a policy for promoting ethnic minorities in the first years of socialism, and that the installation of Ţigan mayors in 'not a few communes...destroyed the social hierarchy.'[312] Following this, landless Ţigani 'were amongst the first to join the collectives' and because communist ideology favored the poor, Ţigani profited. Achim then states that 'after some years, when there began to be a need for people with a certain level of education and competence, the party rapidly rid itself of these elements,' and yet some Ţigani still made careers in the upper echelons of the party. He concludes by stating that 'their ascension was not because of ethnicity,' but because they came from the lowest class.

Achim's historical perspective exemplifies the stereotypical discourse of the ethnic Other. The information he presents as facts are not supported by any factual evidence, but rather seem to be constructed from the central ideological possibility that Ţigani could have been recognized as a working class group to be favored under socialist rule. As discussed earlier in this chapter, this was not at all the case; the Ţigan identity in Romanian society continued to function as a projection of that which was Other of "the socialist Romanian people." Achim's discourse swings between the Other as thief of Romanian freedom, and, through the stereotype of the Other as incompetent, simultaneously thief of rightfully

[312]All quotes from Achim 1998 p.154.

Romanian jobs, the usual contradictory twin discourse of the lazy Other that nevertheless steals "our" jobs. Achim vacillates between the Ţigan as proponent of Romanian socialism and as thief of Romanian liberty (through preventing competence in Romanian socialist government). The fact that Achim begins by stating that Ţigani were privileged primarily as an ethnic group and concludes by stating that it was rather an issue of class, an oft repeated feature in his work, signposts the impossibility of articulating the Ţigan Other as a fixed subject, and the importance to the broader discourse of the dual projection of the Ţigan as both social and ethnic Other. Achim's text is a good example of the ambiguous, shifting discourse of Ţigan responsibility for socialism throughout oral and written narratives of precise periods in history such as the broad category of 'institutionalization of socialism.' It is not the case that there is a single clear and factually supported argument for Roma recognized as Ţigani in positions of socialist power, but rather that the Ţigan Other has become a useful Other for application to individual discourses of the past as the need arises. The Ţigan as ethnicized socialist actor is an Other available to Romanian postsocialist ethnonational discourses that can neither allow questions of ethnic Romanian complicity in socialist actions in their contemporary performance of European democracy, nor relinquish nostalgia for the socialist past.

While the myth of socialism's origin in Romania is understandably a flashpoint in historical discourse, another important question that must be dealt with in postsocialist Romanian discourse that desires a nostalgic and guilt-free

remembrance of the past is the most recent period, the horrific 1980s under the leadership of Nicolae Ceauşescu. The 1980s were a period of food and electricity shortages, and yet these most recent sufferings are somehow displaced by those who perform nostalgia for the past. One mechanism through which nostalgia for the 1980s is made possible is through the placing of all blame on the shoulders of Nicolae Ceauşescu and the supposed evil wife behind all his idealistic motives, Elena Ceauşescu. In this way, only the leaders can be blamed for the terrors of socialism, while the rest of the population were simply victims of their demands. With this strategic scapegoating of the leaders in mind, let us turn to one of the most rampant rumors produced in the months following the revolution; that Ceauşescu himself was not in fact an ethnic Romanian, but an ethnic Ţigan.[313]

Academics who charted the revolution such as Katherine Verdery, Steven Sampson and Laszlo Foszto note that this rumor was pervasive and important in Bucharest in 1990, and it continued to circulate in the media throughout the 1990s, with regular scoops on 'new evidence' for the case. Foszto's insightful study of the rumor cites a Bucharest newspaper of January 1990 that claimed Ceauşescu had mixed Tatar and Ţigan parents.[314] A Romanian citizen of the (50

---

[313] Verdery 1996 p.95, Steven Sampson "Towards an Anthropology of Collaboration in Eastern Europe" *Culture and History* 8, 1991 p.116. Adrian Cioroianu "Oltenia, predictibilă" in *Dilema* Nr.532 and Ratesh Nestor *Romania The Entangled Revolution* Praeger Press, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, New York and London 1991 p.124.

[314] Taken from *Viaţa Capitaliei* no.3 03 January 1990 p.2 cited in Foszto op.cit. p.77 Rumors also abounded that leading Party members and *Securitate* henchmen were Ţigan, reported in the September 1991 Human Rights Watch as 'a common

000 strong) Tatar community replied to the editor of the newspaper horrified that the writer could insinuate that something so 'monstrous' as the 'horrible combination' of a Tatar 'crossbreeding' with a Ţigan could be blamed on the ethnic Tatar community. In this case, the labeling of Ceauşescu as non-Romanian and therefore monstrous was not displaced, but shifted solely onto the primary Other of the nation, the Ţigan. The Romani sociologist Nicolae Gheorghe, in addition to Verdery, Sampson, Ratesh and Foszto, argues that by depicting Ceauşescu as Ţigan 'Romanians try to avoid their feeling of culpability for the contributions they made to the social and political system of the regime.'[315] And as Verdery specified, 'this image...feeds readily into a search for other enemies of the nation to expel.'[316] Foszto named the shifting ethnicity of the dictator 'semantic contamination' that 'initially aims at the tyrant then turns to the opposite direction, blaming the (Ţigan) collectivity that is supposed to give birth to the tyrant.'[317] That Ceauşescu was brought back to life as ethnic Ţigan in postsocialism is a significant indication of the centrality of the Ţigan Other in Romanian society, especially as the projected site of displacement for negative

---

assumption that Roma people were among the leading members of the *Securitate*, a classic case of people refusing to believe that their oppressors were actually as 'pure' Romanians as themselves.' Sourced by a letter from Prof. Constantine Brancovan, private secretary to King Michael p.87. It is necessary to note that the Report only uses the word "Roma" throughout. I do not think the original letter used the word Roma in 1990; the King was no more sensitive to Roma being attacked as Ţigani than other groups. *Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Persecution of Gypsies in Romania* New York, September 1991.

[315] Nicolae Gheorghe as cited in Caroline Bourgine "L'echappee belle" *French Culture* Bucharest, 6 April 1990.

[316] Verdery 1996 p.95.

[317] Foszto op.cit. p.81.

facets of the socialist past. As Verdery noted early in the postsocialist period, before 1989 it was communists who were articulated as the alien "them" amongst a Romanian "us," then after 1989 it was non-Romanian ethnic Others.[318]

The Ţigan Other as Ceauşescu's demolition team

It is often the case that the most traumatic experiences endured by a society continue to be treated in social discourse into the future, and so it is with the case of the extensive spatial inscriptions that Ceauşescu inflicted upon the landscapes of major Romanian cities. While the "rational" re-organization of the entire country was instigated under Gheorghiu-Dej, who razed villages and built new industrial cities of high-density apartments, Ceauşescu accelerated these plans in a project called systematization.[319] Between 1980 and 1989, Ceauşescu destroyed almost 25% of Bucharest's inner city, leveling its topography to build a complex of gigantic monumental style boulevards (and the second largest building in the world, the House of the Republic) as a manifestation of the multilateral development of socialist Romanian society.[320] Approximately 40 000 people

---

[318] Verdery 1996 p.96.

[319] Explanations and justifications for systematization can be traced throughout the entire socialist period in A*rhitectura*, the Bucharest published journal of the Union of Romanian Architects. The 1970s saw an intensified focus on systematization of major urban historical centers, and on a much wider scale than Gheorghiu-Dej had pursued.

[320] The most comprehensive overview of this project is provided by Maria Cavalcanti *Urban Reconstruction and Autocratic Regimes; a case study of Bucharest* Doctoral Thesis, Oxford Brookes University 1994.

were relocated from their homes in central Bucharest in this period.[321] The traumatic effects of and mechanisms for dealing with these massive changes amongst Bucharest's inhabitants are evidenced by the nature of spatial perceptions and uses documented in various studies. In the case of Bucharest, pervasive postsocialist discourses that continue to return to the trauma of socialist period "systematizations" articulate the Ţigan Other as a major protagonist, alongside Ceauşescu, in the destruction of the city center.

The built environment, to use Dovey's metaphor, is a frame for human society.[322] Not only are constructions and spaces physical determinants of how people organize their movements, but a part of the whole that individuals read and articulate as holding meaning. As Foucault stipulated, it is the political that imputes power to and through architecture; architecture itself is not inherently political.[323] In this way, a 'democratic' urban planning initiative may be one that invites user feedback, not only building a space with physical properties in line with people's desires, but allowing people to view themselves in the frame of the space. Ceauşescu's 'civic center' was to be the physical manifestation of multilaterally developed socialist society, but far from being a democratic process, only Ceauşescu and possibly some few close collaborators knew what the final new street plan would be.

---

[321] Salecl 1998 p.100.
[322] Kim Dovey *Framing Places: Mediating power in built form* Routledge, London and New York 1999 p.1.
[323] Paul Rabinow (ed) *The Foucault Reader*, Penguin, London 1991 pp.244-247.

Ceauşescu consistently referred to the three paths towards achieving a 'new man' and 'new society' as cultural, socio-economic, and architectural and urbanistic.[324] The work began in the early 1980s and not only razed topographical features such as hills, but imposed entirely new street plans. The people in Bucharest were not given information as to the present or future designs. Even engineers and builders worked with a plan for just one section of one building, not knowing what the larger project was.[325] People living in areas marked for "systematization" were informed that their properties would be bought by the state, and that they would be relocated to an apartment block at the end of a designated period, usually about one month. Residents were relocated along with their neighbors, so that whole communities were transferred to new areas on the margins of the city, where public transport and other services were grossly inadequate.[326] Many relocatees returned to their old areas to watch at a distance the demolition process of their homes and local historical sites, but such visits were clandestine and silent due to fear that those who showed signs of protest would be arrested.[327] Gheorghe Leahu, an architect who worked on the project, notes that 'anyone who showed an

---

[324] Dorel Abraham "The social impact of the built environment developmental policy: from central planning to a market oriented economy" in *Romanian Journal of Sociology* Volume II Issues 1-2 Bucharest 1991 pp.53-62.

[325] For an examination of the effects of public absence in the civic center project, see Constantin Petcu "Totalitarian City: Bucharest 1980-9, semio-clinical files" Chapter 13 in Neil Leach (ed) *Architecture and Revolution* Routledge, London and New York 1999.

[326] Gheorghe Leahu *Bucureştiul Disparut* Editură Arta Grafica, Bucharest 1994 p.177.

[327] Interview with families evicted from Vacareşti, 14 October 2000, Bucharest.

interest in the demolition process or collective or personal memory was suspected of being an enemy of the people and arrested and punished'.[328]

Following the revolution, architects and dissidents alike rallied against the imposing remnants of a totalitarian regime, leading to a decade of debates about how to 'rehabilitate' the city, focusing on the House of the People at the center of the new topography.[329] In 1989 and 1990, the House of the People was referred to in a range of disparaging ways (such as "the wedding cake" and "the house of communist monstrosity").[330] However, the ways that Romanian people chose to speak about the House of the People reflected not only disgust but also the socialist period discourse of its construction, a belief that it was a symbol of modernity and the achievement of "the Romanian people." The first detailed study of people's attitudes to the new architecture was the research of a Brazilian doctoral student, Maria Cavalcanti. Cavalcanti concluded in 1992 that even

---

[328] Leahu op.cit. p.6-7.

[329] Restructuring the civic center was on the agenda of the Romanian Union of Architects in 1990, and a national competition for ideas was held in 1991. For the most succinct summary of these events see Augustin Ioan *Power, Play and National Identity: Politics of Modernization in Central and Eastern European Architecture, the Romanian File* Romanian Cultural Foundation Publishing House, Bucharest 1999 and Ioan *Arhitectura şi Puterea* Agerfilm SRL, Bucharest 2001. In 1995 an international conference drew professional attention to the unique history and architecture of space in Bucharest from such respected scholars as Neil Leach, Bernard Tschumi, Renata Salecl, Daniel Libeskind, Fredric Jameson, and Doina Petrescu *Architecture and Revolution* edited by Neil Leach is the product of this conference. For a detailed examination of the first 235 projects and the judging procedures see the catalogue *Bucuresti 2000: International Urban Planning Competition* Simetria, Bucharest 1996.

[330] Maria Cavalcanti "Public Response to totalitarian ideal settings: the case of the civic center of Bucharest" from *Power by Design* unpublished paper 1992 p.466.

though 95.8% of Romanian people did not agree with the process underlying the construction of the Civic Center, 'they accepted the new built form as an achievement of the Romanian people and a symbol of modernity.'[331] In 1995, a Romanian sociologist's study of the spatial perceptions of Bucharesteans, concluded that the House of the People had assumed a centrality in the image of the city held by its residents.[332] The re-incorporation of the House into the body of the postsocialist city seems to be an interaction of elite institutional efforts (such as renaming the House of the People the House of the Parliament and using it for public entertainment) and 'popular' responses to its symbolism in everyday life 'before.' [333] The House is recognized in postsocialist Romania as representing the efforts of the same "people" it was built in the name of.

---

[331] Cavalcanti 1992 op.cit. p.468. Cavalcanti's research found that 80% of respondents identified the House as Casa Poporului, while 13.8% used pejorative terminology to describe it. 16.3% of respondents considered the house to be important and 44% found it very important as a symbol of Bucharest as a modern capital. 26.7% of respondents felt it 'symbolised the achievements of the Romanian people' p.466.

[332] Cristina Buica, Marina Popescu, Odette Tomescu "Bucureştiul vazut de Bucureşteni: Reprezentarii speciale ale spaţiului urban" pp.111-115 in *Revista de Cercetari Sociale* Volume 3 1995. Respondents consistently represented the location of the House as more geographically central than it actually was, often placing it in the center of the old district when provided with a map of the main thoroughfares.

[333]In 1999, the municipality began to use the Boulevard in front of the as yet skeletal 'National Library' and the House for free public 'spectaculars', such as skateboarding shows sponsored by Coca Cola, and international music acts. The actual use of the House itself has been popularized through its role as a conference/reception center; before 1995 the only person to have spoken from 'Ceauşescu's balcony' was Michael Jackson, but soon thereafter the House hosted the wedding of the national football icon Hagi, as well as events such as the national launch of Hustler magazine. Another way of reading the successful incorporation of the House of the People in postsocialist Romanian society, is through the changes in public relationships with the building. In 1997, tours of

Alongside this discursive transformation of socialist eyesore and embarrassment into symbol of "the Romanian people" in postsocialist discourses of the socialist past, Bucharesteans perform a unique discourse that links the destruction of the old Bucharest with Ţigani who supposedly worked in tandem with Ceauşescu. The common discourse claims that Ceauşescu placed Ţigani in the nationalized (confiscated) houses of the Jews (and, in Transylvania, Germans) who emigrated as a policy to physically destroy the old inner city. This discourse persists despite the large number of Romanians who were relocated for the "systematizations," so overriding contrary experiences in the community. It is also interesting that orally performed discourses that claim the destroyed houses were Jewish or German ethnic property elide the thirty year period in which these homes were nationalized by socialists and occupied by ethnic Romanians.

In his 1999 study entitled *Ţigani: Myth and Reality*, Niculae Crişan presents the following discourse as fact:

> In all cities, but especially the capital, before the houses could be demolished, the whole district had to be dilapidated. An indubitable sign

---

the House catered primarily for foreigners, and the gap between the ideology of its conception and lived socialism was made clear in the narratives provided by the tour guide, detailing how "the Romanian people" suffered throughout the period of its construction. In 2002, the majority of visitors were Romanians and tour guide narratives of the House were watertight homages to the productive capacities of the Romanian people.

of demolition was the appearance of Ţigani in the area. The hiding places in which they imposed themselves were temporary, lasting only until the bulldozers liquidated one after another. They stay like this, but they don't mind, moving is in their blood, and before they leave they might earn some honest money as cleaners or, under the table, as dealers of goods resulting from the demolitions.'[334]

This extract illustrates the central stereotypes of the Ţigan Other as nomadic and unable to live in a house, thereby a willing and suitable accomplice to destruction of the city. Crişan's account also makes it clear that Ţigani are vital to the discourse, but not logically vital to the destruction of the city; one would logically assume that the first indubitable sign of destruction was the forced eviction and relocation of residents from the buildings, followed by the arrival of bulldozers. The discourse provides no account of any Ţigani actually destroying buildings, rather he tells us that there are people who work scavenging and clearing the rubble of the buildings destroyed by anonymous actors. Cleaners under the socialist, as with the postsocialist government, were and are recognized as Ţigani, and yet even with this possible explanation for their appearance at the site of demolition, Crişan still ties them into the overall picture as symbols and agents of active destruction of the city.

---

[334] Niculae Crişan *Ţigani: Mit şi Realitate* Editură Albatros Bucharest 1999 p.52. Crişan continues with lengthy descriptions of personally observed scenarios like this one.

Viorel Achim presents similar information:

> In all the cities, a large number of Ţigani were installed in nationalized houses. This situation was the creation of the 1970s and 1980s. They ensured that districts of nationalized houses in urban areas became impoverished, having their eventual demolition in mind. We can affirm that, in receiving places, Ţigani from the city profited from the full range of social benefits of the communist regime.[335]

Interviewing Achim, who is a historian in the Nicolae Iorga Institute of History, about his sources for this information, Achim explained that there was a secret report written after the 1977 census results. This secret report, according to Achim, proves that the government identified Ţigani as 'destroying any houses received from the community and state. The policy then developed by the government was that if they wanted to destroy a street, or the whole of downtown, they brought in Ţigani; it was clear that this illiterate, uneducated people would destroy the town. For example, in Dudeşti, when the Jews emigrated for a couple of years thousands of houses were abandoned, and in the late 1960s Ţigani were installed in them as the first step in the government policy to demolish the houses.'[336] Firstly, let us note that in this statement, Achim's evidence for the report of 1977 is an event of the 1960s. When I asked Achim how he knew this

---

[335] Achim op.cit. p.156.
[336] Personal interview with Viorel Achim 19 July 2002.

policy if the report was secret and inaccessible, he answered that 'everyone in the city knew.' I put it to him that, by his own standards, this was not reliable historical evidence of a government policy and he responded 'I was a student at the time and for all the people this was common knowledge; people in other cities also know.'[337] These long examples sketch the fantastical contours of the discourse under examination, and the fact that respected historians such as Achim invest in them so heavily is a solid indication of their centrality to ways of remembering the recent past.

The discursive existence of a secret plan in this postsocialist discourse manifests the socialist citizen's bind of both believing there was a big Other being performed for (with a cohesive and policed intention and goal) and the citizen's guilt of being unable to understand how the system worked (how to be a good socialist). As argued earlier, the state's identification of enemies relied on individuals' abilities to relate to the enemy in themselves, and this itself generated

---

[337] Recent extensive research has provided information on the specific demographic realities of the inner city throughout socialism, see Liviu Chelcea "Grupuri marginale in zone centrale: gentrificare, drepturi de proprietate şi acumulare primitiva postsocialista in Bucuresti" in *Sociologie Românească, Jurnal de Asociaţia Română de Sociologie* New series 3-4 2000 p.51-68. In an interview with the author he specified that in the case of Dudeşti, Roma were a minority of inhabitants (with government contracts) before the deportation of Jews after 1950. Following the departure of the Jewish community, the Roma often lived with more people in an apartment than was allowed due to the difficulty of gaining residency in Bucharest. Chelcea notes that he doesn't believe there was ever a policy of Roma or Ţigani being moved into the city as the discourse states, pointing out that socialist policies, when written down, were anyway inevitably 'subverted' by the way they were enacted. Personal Interview 27 July 2002.

the identification of enemy elements, not plans.[338] A plan must be believed to have existed in order for the big Other to be kept in place, whether in contemporaneous or nostalgic discourse. In the discourses addressed in this chapter, those who use them want to continue to believe that there was an ideal socialist Other for whom the performance was necessary. Although the way the House was built was considered wrong in 1992, it remained as evidence that "the Romanian people" of those times had "achieved" in the gaze of the big socialist Other. The Ţigan Other functions in this postsocialist discourse as it did in the socialist period, as a displacement of fear of complicity with the traumatic destructions of the city. The revolution of 1989, when the big Other was collectively renounced, transformed Ceauşescu into an individual, Ţigan despot rather than a feared and even loved leader. The discursive link of Ţigani with Ceauşescu in a plan to destroy the city allows "the Romanian people" to continue to exist as innocent victims through identifying and circumscribing an internal Other who could be considered complicit with the regime.

The discourse of Ţigani destroying houses when bulldozers were obviously the mechanism for doing so mobilizes the stereotype of the Ţigan Other as uncivilized, unable to live in houses without destroying them. The discourse also thereby sutures the traumatic gap between state rhetoric and lived experiences of "civilization" in the 1980s, when urban Romanians were forced to live in

[338] Indeed, this is precisely the reason why socialist plans would always become something else!

"uncivilized" conditions. The architectural theorist Augustin Ioan notes there was a 'contagious enthusiasm' amongst Romanians in the 1960s and 1970s to move into the new apartment blocks in 'order to live in civilized conditions.'[339] In fact, living a 'civilized' life in these blocks was impossible from the beginning; water supply and sewerage was inefficient or even non-existent. In the modernized apartments, many urban Romanians lived a variation of the peasant lifestyles they had lived before, carrying water, living without central heating, and trying to stockpile and preserve food for seasonal shortages.[340] To articulate Ţigani as incapable of civilized living and as the destroyers of the old homes can be seen as a way of distancing the ethnoRomanian "people" from the trauma of failing to achieve "civilized" lifestyles under the socialist regime, enabling a more enjoyable (nostalgic) remembering of the recent past.

The fact that Ţigani were often constructed as inhabiting the 'nationalized houses' of Germans and Jews is also a signpost of significance. In fact, property belonging to Jews and Germans in cities had been nationalized by the early 1950s.[341] The discourse thereby elides the persecution of Jews and Germans under Ántonescu, Gheorgiu-Dej, and Ceauşescu's nationalist socialism and re-members Jewish and German minorities as objects of nostalgia. When these historical facts are elided, and when the superior ethnic Others are juxtaposed

[339] Ioan 1999 p.197.
[340] For details of these conditions see especially Ioan 1999 p.197-8, Leahu p.117, and Kligman 1998.
[341] Interview with L. Chelcea 27 July 2002.

with uncivilized Ţigani, the "departure" of the Jews and Germans can be remembered on the traumatic level at which it surely functioned. The recent French-Romanian film *Tren de Vie*, set in World War Two, exemplifies this trauma in a scene where the Romanian villagers are gathered and lamenting the destruction of their village economy and social structure now that they have deported 'their' Jews.[342] Boia notes that in postsocialist Romania 'when the economy is scarcely moving, they (Romanians) have every reason to think nostalgically of the Jews and Germans who have left'.[343] What is interesting is that even Boia's account fails to mention that Jews and Germans were persecuted, deported, and prevented from playing serious economic roles (other than providing businesses and property for the state) since the 1940s. In this way, the stereotypical Jews and Germans (educated, influential businessmen) are made objects of nostalgia. In the postsocialist discourse, responsibility for the "destruction" of the (physical and social) place of Jews and Germans is displaced onto the Ţigan Other, allowing "the Romanian people" to be innocent victims lamenting the loss of their Others in the same anti-Semitic and nationalist discourses which forced the "departure" of real communities. In this way the Other remains present in post socialist Romanian society, anti-Semitism is transmitted, transmuted and consolidated even (or especially!) in the absence of Jews.

---

[342] *Tren de Vie* dir. Radu Miahileanu 1998.
[343] Boia 2001 p.212.

The ethnicized discourse of Ţigani as having taken over the nationalized houses and destroyed them has been unashamedly mobilized by elite players in the postsocialist competition for profit such as the government and international real estate developers. Throughout the 1990s, the Romanian governments have consistently frayed property restitution laws in order to evict the tenants installed before 1989, while preventing previous owners regaining title.[344] This has resulted in a huge wave of people made homeless, despite holding both title and rent title. Victims of evictions often literally have no place to go, and the common action is to build a makeshift construction outside one's previous home and live on the footpath. These 'eviction protests' are very common throughout the inner city, and protesters are usually identified in the press as Ţigani (regardless of their ethnicity), implying these individuals were illegally installed in the first place.[345] The stereotype of Ţigani as destructive, uncivilized, nomadic

---

[344]For a brief overview see Mariana Bechir "The confiscated houses – the eternal failure of the Romanian state" *Evenimentul Zilei* 12 November 1998.

[345] While evictees are articulated as Ţigani, it is no surprise that Roma, as the most marginalized group in Romanian postsocialist society and identified through stereotypical discourses as Ţigani, suffer higher rates of eviction than Romanians. See Zoon 2001 p. 105-128 and European Roma Rights *Center State of Impunity: Human Rights Abuse of Roma in Romania* Budapest September 2001 pp. 90-95. International developers realize this 'old' inner city area holds the most potential for development and are aware of the power of ethnic discourse in Romania for achieving what they need to make a profit. David Howe, a manager of a major foreign real estate company in Bucharest stated in a personal interview with me that 'Calea Moşilor would be great to develop, but Ţigan pose a physical problem...and even though the Romanian communities don't care about bad publicity from evicting them, since they know all Ţigan are illegal anyway, international companies can't afford the bad press...you need to bring in the police, and then the human rights organizations make a noise about it.' Personal interview with David Howe, Bucharest 13 October 2000.

and poor is thereby mobilized and projected by the political elite onto individuals who fail to fit with the current postsocialist order.

The pervasive discourse of Ţigani as collaborators with a secret socialist government policy for the physical destruction of Bucharest is, therefore, a vital corollary to nostalgic discourses of the socialist past. In seeking to retain a place in the symbolic network for "the Romanian people," the traumatic aspects of identity in the socialist period are identified, ethnicized and distanced as Ţigani. 'For the subject, the very process of remembering is an attempt to put and keep the big Other firmly in its place, to secure the existence of the symbolic order' so that one can achieve some certainty about his or her identity.[346] "The Romanian people" continue to exist in postsocialist Romania through the incorporation of the symbolic House in new discourses of nationalism and democracy. The existence of "the people," however, is also dependent upon the excision of the traumatic realities and suture of coherent of socialist subjects. This excision and suture are performed through the Ţigan ethnic Other.

[346] Salecl 1998 p.88.

Conclusion

The Ţigan Other played an important role throughout the socialist period, enabling the Romanian ethnonational identity to articulate its existence in specifically socialist terms.

Ethnicized discourses were used to Other the institutionalization of socialism itself, and the Ţigan Other, in its socialist incarnation as "social parasite" enabled pre-socialist Romanian discourses of identity as agricultural production to become a socialist Romanian identity fetishizing production more generally. The role of the Ţigan other was as the non-productive 'social parasite' who performed the social services (such as trade) that were vital to survival though irreconcilable with socialist Romanian identity as producers of the nation. Pre-socialist stereotypes of Ţigani as nomadic, uneducated, poor, dirty and immoral were drawn upon and developed to create an Other required in the socialist state, the Ţigan as illegal importer and black market trader. Through Othering the trade of illegal goods, the socialist citizen/consumer could elide the traumatic gap between what the state claimed to provide and what few things were actually available. The Ţigan Other was not an external minority group in formal socialist policy, therefore, because they were the Other within the system, vital to its existence.

Contrary to the socialist period, when the Ţigan Other was the enemy of the socialist state, after the revolution of 1989, Romanian ethnonational articulations of a new democratic self created and mobilized a retrospective Ţigan Other as collaborator with the socialist state against the innocent Romanian citizen. This collaborator Ţigan Other was/is used in discourses of historical moments that are particularly traumatic, to explain how socialism was introduced in the first place (no longer with Romanian support, but with incompetent Ţigan infiltration in the upper echelons of government), and how Ceauşescu (as the suddenly single Romanian socialist) was such a dictator (he was in fact not ethnic Romanian, but Ţigan). The persistent discourse of Ţigani as Ceauşescu's tool for the destruction of Bucharest functions in multiple ways. The fantastic projection of the Ţigan demolition plot in popular discourse enables elision of the fact that it was Romanians who occupied the houses of other minority groups. In this way, the story of Ţigani who physically destroyed the actual city of Bucharest also displaces Romanian culpability for the destruction of Romanian Jews and Germans in the same narrative. The "systematization" of Bucharest was in fact a very traumatic incursion, effectively eradicating the built environment, the physical frame, of a complex community structure, and the Ţigan Other provides a closely related but not-one-of-us villain for people to focus their loss on, rather than to question their own complicity in the system.

The most important conclusion is that Romanian ethnonational socialism used pre-socialist ethnicized stereotypes of Others to bring meaning to socialist

discourses of class and production. The Ţigan Other was maintained as the central Other of ethnonational Romanian identity under socialism. The Ţigan was not an external "nationality" to "the People" but entirely within the Romanian Nation, constantly requiring circumscription as a means of delineating what it actually meant to be a "good" Romanian citizen. Using the unique source of Roma Romanians who deliberately performed themselves so as not to be recognized as Ţigani in the socialist period enables a deeper understanding of what stereotypes composed the socialist period Ţigan Other, and it is important to note the peripheral role of skin color as signifier of Ţigan identity. The socialist Ţigan Other was stereotyped, as in earlier periods, as lazy, non-productive, uneducated and not of "the Romanian people," but this was signified primarily by the occupation of an individual, as in prior periods. Trade was illegal as "speculation" in the socialist system, and the constant projection of this practice onto the Ţigan Other amidst "the socialist people" highlights production and consumption as sites of anxiety within the discourse of the Romanian Self under socialism.

The socialist period Ţigan Other was vital in multiple ways to not only the project of the socialist system itself, but also to the postsocialist project of displacing Romanian ethnonational complicity with socialism after the revolution.

Chapter 4

The Ţigan *bişniţari* as post-revolutionary thief

When Romanian writer Petre Popescu returned from America after the 1989 revolution, he wrote that 'there were thousands of *bişniţari*, aggressive young con men, hanging around at airports, in hotels, on street corners. There were a few by that metro entrance too, next to the brashly made up girls.'[347] We see here an impression of overwhelming numbers of masculine *bişniţari* (street traders), aggressive and brash in public space, linked in this quote with the other famous offence in public space occupations, prostitution. To exemplify the importance of this series of stereotypes in the discourse of the Ţigan as primary Other in Romanian postsocialist society, it is interesting to note the opening sentence of historian Viorel Achim's article in an edition of the journal *Dilema* with the theme "Ţigani." Achim opens with the statement that 'one of the problems that has appeared in our public space after the fall of communism is the population of Ţigani.'[348] Not only does Achim articulate Ţigani as a problem, but a problem located precisely in "our" (ethnic Romanian) public space.

Trade, money and "the market" are not static categories of defined practice, but are only ever understood through discourses that explain how they function.

---

[347] Petre Popescu *The Return* Grove Press, New York 1997 p.254.
[348] Viorel Achim "Cît de veche este la noi "problema" Ţiganilor (romilor)?" in *Dilema* thematic issue "Ţiganii" Nr. 314, February 1999.

Identity is constructed and represented through consumption. Katherine Verdery notes of the postsocialist period that 'persistent continuities with the socialist order are at least as striking as disruptions of it.'[349] In the first months, and even years, of postsocialist Romania, trade continued to be perceived through the socialist period lens as a Ţigan occupation, signifying a continuation of the discursive construction of trade as illegal and shameful speculation. The Ţigan Other as *bişniţari*, a term meaning someone who is involved with *bişniţa*, from the English word "business," is mysterious, illegal, dirty and Other to Romanian ethnic identity. This chapter traces the centrality of the Ţigan Other as enabling discussion and negotiation of new anxieties and factors in the first years of Romanian postsocialist society, specifically through the discourse of the Ţigan Other as *bişniţari*.

The *bişniţari* Ţigan enabled the creation of an ethnic Romanian postsocialist nation with discursive understandings of economics, state institutions and public space that show clear continuity with pre-1989 discourses. People used the Ţigan *bişniţari* Other to interpret their sudden ability to go shopping at street stalls for imported clothing and consumer items in 1990, and when they needed to explain

---

[349] From Katherine Verdery *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies* Columbia University Press, New York 1999 p.24. Denise Roman also stresses that 'postcommunism must be recognized not only as a blunt reaction to communism, but as a profound transformation and a discursive hybrid stemming out from an ample past that transcends totalitarianism into precommunism, while also continuously coalescing western influences.' Roman *Fragmented Identities: Popular Culture, Sex and Everyday Life in Postcommunist Romania* Lexington Books, New York and Oxford 2003 p.26.

the feelings of simultaneous excitement, repulsion and disappointment at these exchanges. I choose the *bişniţari* Ţigan as the point from which to unravel many discourses of ethnic alterity because in the period that I lived in Bucharest, from 1997 until 2002, this stereotype remained pervasive and powerful in everyday life. Both this chapter and the next examine how the Ţigan *bişniţari* Other has been used to negotiate changing relationships of individuals in postsocialist Romania with concepts of ethnonational identity, consumption, and the exchange of money and products in different public spaces.

Verdery also stresses that 'socialist homogenization left a relatively undifferentiated social field that nationalists can claim to represent on behalf of the nation as a whole. But the meaning of "nation" has shifted: it has become ethnic.'[350] Indeed, in the opinion of political scientist Daniel Barbu, the interest of the (postsocialist Romanian) nation is promoted solely under the heading of ethnic interest.[351] Renata Salecl observes that this phenomenon is recognizable across postsocialist Eastern European societies that 'now attempt to assume a kind of distance toward the official ideological universe, with the only positive reference point at their disposal their national identity.'[352] Immediately after the 1989 revolution in Romania, stereotypical discourses of Hungarians, Germans

---

[350] Katherine Verdery *What was Socialism, and what comes next?* Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey 1996 p.94.
[351] Daniel Barbu *Republica Absentă: politica şi societate în România postcomunistă* Nemira, Bucharest 1999 p.142.
[352] Renata Salecl *The Spoils of Freedom: psychoanalysis and feminism after the fall of socialism* Routledge, London and New York 1994 p.20.

and Jewish ethnic minorities were mobilized as potential threats to "the Romanian people" (through land restitution and international pressure). It was the Ţigan Other, however, that was the primary scapegoat for postsocialist anxieties about everyday experiences of unemployment, democracy, the open market, European Union accession and capitalism. Stereotypes of Ţigani as speculators, thieves and enemies of "the people" that were current in the socialist period intensified in postsocialist Romanian society, often being signified within the term *bişniţari*.

Historians of postsocialist Romania such as Katherine Verdery, Gail Kligman, Steven Sampson and Sam Beck have elaborated the centrality of stereotypes of Ţigani *bişniţari* in postsocialist Romanian ethnonationalism. In international academic forums throughout the 1990s such as the Project for Ethnic Relations, academics consistently mentioned that "Ţigani" were the group perceived as most heavily involved in black market activities.[353] The centrality of Ţigani as "scapegoats" for ethnic Romanian anxiety is referred to across studies of

[353] Report of Project on Ethnic Relations (PER) conference *Images and Issues: Coverage of the Roma in the Mass Media in Romania* June 27-28 1997, published by PER, Bucharest. Participants included Ivan Gheorghe, Vasile Ionescu, Nicolae Gheorghe, Jenifer Tanaka, Livia Plaks and Dan Pavel. PER conferences and the reports they produce are fascinating historical documents of how participants from different groups approach issues. See, for example the report of the Project for Ethnic Relations *Romanian-American Symposium on Inter-Ethnic Relations* June 17-18, 1991, where discussion largely addressed the issue of which ethnic groups deserved to be discussed, divided on predominantly Romanian and Hungarian ethno-national lines. American delegates argued for consideration of the Roma minority.

Romanian society in general, though very rarely explored.[354] The discourse of the Ţigan *bişniţari* Other became important when "business" became visible in Romanian public space in new ways immediately after the 1989 revolution, especially as street trade. The discursive chain linking stereotypes of commerce, dirt, disorder and the Ţigan Other was and is possible through the medium of public space trade and visibility. The media constructed a negative image of Ţigani, who were 'described as thieves, beggars, profiteering businessmen (*afacerişti*), illiterate, dirty, and a community of delinquents.'[355]

---

[354] The esteemed Romanian historian Alexandru Zub is one example. He notes that Ţigani have been scapegoats in Romanian society since the revolution, but doesn't elaborate on how this functions. Zub *Oglinzi Retrovizoare: Istorie, memorie şi morală în Romania în dialog cu Sorin Antohi* Polirom, Iasi 2002 p.136. I personally point out that the problem with naming Ţigani as "scapegoats" is that this assumes self-identifying Roma must identify with the Ţigan stereotypes. Other authors who supposedly specialize in hate speech often revert to an uncritical reliance on negative stereotypes when dealing with anti-Ţigan discourses. One example is Ruxandra Cesereanu who wrote that 'in postcommunism two reactions have come up time and time again; anti-Magyarism stimulated by chauvinistic nationalism of some extreme parties, and anti-Ţiganism, catalyzed by excessive infractions of this ethnic group that is difficult to control administratively and socially' Cesereanu *Imaginarul violent al românilor* Humanitas, Bucharest 1993 p.11. As Roma Romanian representative to the OSCE Nicolae Gheorghe wrote more specifically in 1991, "Romanies operating as entrepreneurs (in postsocialist Romania) are easily identified as targets for expressing the anxieties, fears and hostility of those social groups and strata who feel endangered by the economic crisis and changes brought by the transition' in "Roma-Gypsy Ethnicity in Eastern Europe" pp.829-844 in *Social Research* Vol.58 Issue 4 Winter 1991 p.837.

[355] Open Society Institute report *Programul de monitorizare a accesului UE: Drepturile minorităţilor în România (minoritatea romilor)* www.romanothan.ro/document/reports/rap_ue_romani.htm Last accessed 21-11-2005, p.3.

Throughout this chapter I draw on the increasing number of critical sociological sources that have been published in and outside of Romania since 1990. Scholars who engage with consumption as a marker of identity, such as Caroline Humphreys, Katherine Verdery, Yulian Konstantinov, Sergei Oushakine, Alena Ledeneva, Russell Belk and Roy Dilley have been especially insightful.[356] My research is also enriched by the wealth of academic studies of ethnic Romani Romanians such as Vasile Burtea, Nicolae Gheorghe, Vasile Ionescu and Valeriu Nicolae against mobilizations of the Țigan Other. The media of the period is a vital source of information about how Țigani were consistently linked with trade through stereotypical discourses after the revolution. As the Romanian anthropologist Liviu Chelcea notes, one 'remarkable outcome of the expansion and generalization of markets after 1989 was the impressive amount of public commentaries and lamentations about prices, subsistence insecurity, fraud, cheating, unjust earnings, immorality or speculation related to the growth of retail

[356] Caroline Humphrey and Stephen Hugh-Jones *Barter, Exchange and Value; an anthropological approach* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge New York and Melbourne 1992. Caroline Humphrey "Traders, "Disorder" and Citizenship Regimes in Provincial Russia" in Burawoy and Verdery (eds) *Uncertain Transition*, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham 1999, Yulian Konstantinov "Hunting for gaps through boundaries: Gypsy tactics for economic survival in the context of the second phase of post-totalitarian changes in Bulgaria" pp.237-251 in *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 7 Issue 3 1994. Yulian Konstantinov, Gideon M. Kressel and Trond Thuen "Outclassed by former outcasts: petty trading in Varna" pp.729-745 in *American Ethnologist* 25(4) 1998, Alena V. Ledeneva *Russia's Economy of Favours: Blat, networking and informal exchange* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York and Melbourne 1998, Russell L. Belk and Magda Paun "Ethnicity and Consumption in Romania" pp.180-208 in Janeen Costa and Garry Bamossy (eds) *Marketing in a multicultural world: ethnicity, nationalism and cultural identity* Sage, Thousand Oaks, 1995. Roy Dilley *Contesting Markets: analyzes of ideology, discourse and practice* Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1992.

trade.'[357] In this chapter I utilize the observations of local analysts of media and discourse to compliment my own reading of the vast sources available in Romanian libraries and archives, including Daniel Barbu and Ruxandra Cesereanu.

The discourses I examine in this chapter reflect a particularly Bucharest centered approach to Romanian ethnonationalist identity, from a city with an estimated 350000 Roma, and without any other large visible communities of ethnic minorities, such as Hungarians constitute in Transylvania.[358] Still, these discourses of Ţigani as *bişniţari* function on a national Romanian scale, as evidenced by violent regional mobilizations against communities identified as Ţigani throughout the postsocialist period in villages and cities all over Romania as well as in the heart of Bucharest in the June 1990 *Piaţa Universităţii* miner attacks. It is important to reflect again that while both Hungarian and Romanian groups have attacked "Ţigani," it was and continues to be largely Roma who have suffered physical violence and the constant threat of violence when identified as Ţigani. While this thesis is a study of how the Ţigan Other functions in different

---

[357] Liviu Chelcea "Informalization and Structuration in Bucharest's Marketplaces" unpublished paper, 2003, based on research conducted with Cosmin Radu and Livia Constantinescu under the Invisible College between October 2002 and June 2003. See also Liviu Chelcea, Livia Constantinescu and Cosmin Radu "Marketplaces, Morality and Political Practices: The Geography of Shopping in Two Districts of Bucharest" *Romanian Journal of Society and Politics* Vol.3 Issue 2 pp.185-221.

[358] The figure of Roma in Bucharest is from Vasile Burtea's Doctoral thesis *Rromii în Contextul Socio-economic al Dezvoltarii României* University of Bucharest, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Pedagogy, 1993 p.133.

times and locations, the physical and violent results of the pervasiveness of these stereotypes always affect real people, and most often those of Romani ethnicity.[359]

The Ţigan Other is a dynamic node of knowledge under constant re-construction through multiple predominant stereotypical discourses. The *bişniţari* stereotype is one of the major ethnic Others produced from within postsocialist Romanian discourses of self-identity. While the *bişniţari* Other is most often interchangeable with the Ţigan Other, it cannot be understood as being synonymous with or wholly equal to the Ţigan in every situation of its invocation, although the two are inextricably linked. The relationship between the Ţigan and the *bişniţari* Other is powerful because either can invoke a range of stereotypical discourses that have been historically articulated. This chapter therefore outlines which stereotypes are invoked through the *bişniţari* Other, with the major categories being stereotypes of trade, public space and mafia networks. Each of these stereotypical fields of knowledge function in the unique Romanian postsocialist setting through historically developed discourses of the Ţigan Other. At the end of the chapter I will address the roles that the media and elite discourses have played in

---

[359] African-Romanian community members, who may have darker skin than Romanians without an African parent, have also suffered attacks against them as Ţigani in the postsocialist period. See Fidelie Ndomba Kalambayi *"Mulatto" Young Women Living in Bucharest: their lives and self perceptions* Masters Dissertation, Department of Gender Studies, Central European University, June 2002 p.19.

propagating and perpetuating the function of the postsocialist Ţigan Other as primarily the *bişniţari* Other.

Consumption and the Ţigan *bişniţari* in post revolutionary public space

In the weeks following the revolution, Romanian citizens were able to move freely in public space, and also able to freely browse or buy imported goods at makeshift stalls in the street. This possibility of consumption was striking for numerous reasons. Firstly, the National Salvation Front (NSF) ruling interim body immediately made many more foodstuffs available by halting the export of domestic products and opening food stocks reserved for Party members.[360] Secondly, border control relaxed, enabling those with experience, entrepreneurial courage and enough capital to embark on small trading journeys abroad, returning to sell products such as clothes, jewelry and consumables otherwise unavailable in Romania.[361] The products brought by these traders were sold at stalls in markets

---

[360] Calinescu and Tismăneanu op cit. p. 54. The authors surmise that the NSF hoped these measures would 'permit them to postpone serious economic reforms indefinitely.'

[361] Many ethnic Roma were involved in trade, see Elena and Catalin Zamfir *Ţigani: între ignorare şi îngrijorare* Editură Alternative, Bucharest 1993 p.159-166. The involvement of Roma in post socialist cross-border "illegal" trade can be understood by considering, as Konstantinov and Sik and Wallace highlight, actors in trade practices were those who had to develop economic skills under communism for survival, most often socially marginalized groups including Roma. Konstantinov 1994 and 1998 and Endre Sik and Claire Wallace "The

places, or from large bags in busy thoroughfares such as underground metro stations and near large apartment blocks in Bucharest. Those who sold the goods were identified as Ţigani for a variety of reasons that will be discussed below.

This was the first time that Romanians born after the institutionalization of socialism could experience *Strada Lipscani*, the historical trading center of Bucharest, operating as a well-stocked and bustling commercial space. As noted in the previous chapter, the experience of street trade was familiar to Romanians under socialism as an illegal shameful and dangerous practice, when traders were considered thieves that profited without working (from exchange rather than production).[362] Under socialism, trade had been monitored; all goods for sale and sold were recorded, and the prices of goods were set by the Party, a practice understood as ensuring the "real" value of goods was calculated by those who knew the production costs. Goods for sale in the shops and agricultural markets of the 1980s were articulated as Romanian products to be sold back to Romanians, within the same discourse of price being determined by domestic production value. The post revolution atmosphere of un-controlled prices, imported goods, and traders in public spaces that were previously not state sanctioned market places, created anxiety as well as excitement. The Ţigan as ethnic Other of Romanians was widely mobilized in the form of the *bişniţari*

Development of Open-air Markets in East-Central Europe" pp.697-715 in *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* Vol.23, 1999 p.700.

[362] For a concise description of the differences between socialist and postsocialist concepts of production and trade as discursive dichotomies (honest/dishonest, dirty/clean) see Verdery 1996 pp.19-29, 203-228.

stereotype in order to explain these changes in public space and consumption that did not fit with pre-revolution ideals of what it meant to be a "good" Romanian, meaning a "productive" worker rather than making profit from "speculation" (retail).

Verdery writes that the prevalence of 'Gypsy-bashing' resulted from the Gypsies' (sic) 'somewhat greater visibility in the flourishing petty commerce that has accompanied market reforms.'[363] Verdery also notes that after 1990, 'longstanding stereotypes' of Ţigani were 'mobilized more insistently than ever, though the forms of the stereotypes suggest that the problem is markets and the dislocations of economic reform.'[364] It is useful then to interrogate the anxieties surrounding trade and the ensuing implications of the Ţigan *bişniţari* stereotype, with a cursory unraveling of how (through old and new stereotypes) Ţigani *bişniţari* are presented in various narratives of post-revolution public space in Bucharest.

There are numerous narratives written by Romanians who returned from exile immediately after the revolution that contain extended descriptions of the visibility of Ţigani. In Petru Popescu's account of 1990 Romania he writes

---

[363] Verdery 1996 p.98. Verdery uses the word "Gypsy" to refer to both self identifying Roma and the fantastical Ţigan Other she recognizes as a powerful symbol for Romanian discourses. This is problematic because from Verdery's statement we still do not know what factors made petty commerce visible as ethnic Roma, "Gypsy" or Ţigan.

[364] Verdery 1996 op.cit.

> I saw many more Gypsies (sic) than in my time, their look was almost middle eastern, the tan of their skins deeper, with a purplish under-hue, while Romanians' ranged from a rugged peasant olive to an elegant urban ivory. As we passed *bişniţari* hassling pedestrians, I saw that many were Gypsy. They weren't at all subtle, "hey boss, where are you going? Got dollars? Want a hotel with girls?" [365]

In this passage Popescu notes the visibility of 'Gypsies' and elaborates on the biological difference between the eastern, darker (purplish?!) skinned 'Gypsy' and the rugged or elegant skinned Romanian. He links the 'hassling' visibility of *bişniţari* with 'Gypsies' and conceptually links their trade in currency with prostitution.

Andrei Codrescu also makes continual references to "Gypsies" in the account of his return to 1990 Romania, but most often in the context of a pervasive Romanian obsession with being "overtaken" by "them." He noted a taxi driver lamenting

[365] Popescu op.cit. p.255. As with Verdery, Codrescu, and Human Rights Watch reports, Popescu consistently uses the term "Gypsy" in English.

> this country's being sold piecemeal by Gypsy speculators, torn apart by Hungarians and emigres, cheated by Jews... the government is bankrupt![366]

This excerpt usefully sketches how different ethnic Others were depicted in stereotypical discourse. While the Gypsy (Ţigan) speculator sells 'the country,' the Hungarian represents the threat of Transylvanian secession, the Jew cheats, and the government is powerless and empty.[367] In fact, it was these three ethnic Others that the National Salvation Front consistently presented as threats to the Romanian nation throughout the xenophobic post-revolutionary media campaigns.[368] While Codrescu consistently observes and criticizes the anti-Gypsy/Hungarian/Jew 'hatred, resentment and despair...that played lento over every encounter,' he also utilizes the discourses himself as a kind of humorous

---

[366] Andrei Codrescu *The Hole in the Flag: A Romanian Exile's Story of Return and Revolution* William Morrow and Company, New York 1991 p.218. I reckon that Codrescu chose the English word "speculators" due to te pervasiveness of the term *'speculanţi,'* in Romanian discourse of the time, even though he wrote directly in English. "Speculator" was often used as a synonym for *bişniţari* for small traders.

[367] Verdery discusses how there can be anti-Semitism without Jews in post-socialist Romania in Verdery 1996 p.99-100.

[368] Monica Ibram "Romania in the television era or the prison of the fading reality" pp.284-295 in Mihaela Czobor-Lupp and Stefan J. Lupp (eds) *Moral, legal and political values in Romanian culture* The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Bucharest, 1998 p.286. See also Dan Oprescu *Un pas greşit in direcţia cea buna: românia şi minoritaţile naţionale* (1990-2000) Bucharest 21 January 2001. www.mma.ro/database/message/doprescu1ro.html.

deliberation on the possibility of new "Gypsy" power in postsocialist Romania.[369] For example,

> Quite possibly everyone was rumored to run the country. My money was on the one eyed Gypsy with the shiny suit who hung out on the corner by Hotel Bucharest with a stack of English-language picture books called *Scenes from the Romanian Revolution.*[370]

> A little gypsy beggar girl ran up to me when I got out of the car and poured forth a tragic lament belied by her ruddy good looks. 'My mother is dead' she cried 'and my father too, and my brother has no legs and my sister's a baby! They robbed us they beat me, and my dirty little hand's all that keeps them living and the family name still in the world!' Watching the little girl with an air of seeming unconcern, a Gypsy man with a black hat pulled low over his eyes leaned, smoking, against a wall. Three older females of his tribe squatted like multicolored onions on the ground, playing cards. The government had given the Gypsies certain minority rights (to the dismay of most other citizens), including representation in parliament and the right to their national dress. They now walked the streets dressed proudly, the men in black suits with red or yellow silk kerchiefs round their necks, the barefoot women wrapped in bright fabrics

[369] Codrescu op.cit. p.236.
[370] Ibid p.212.

with gold coin necklaces between their barely covered breasts.[371]

In this narrative, Codrescu mobilizes commonplace stereotypes of Ţigani as lazy adults that force their children to beg in the streets while they watch 'unconcerned,' and he describes them as 'tribes' rather than families, groups or *satras*. The term 'tribe' re-produces a primitive Ţigan Other with large families, which is also a stereotype that can link with discourses of a Ţigan mafia (as is later discussed). There is no doubt that some Roma beg, just as some Romanians beg, some lean against walls to smoke, or squat on the ground to play cards. What is interesting is that Codrescu presents this entirely negative stereotypical image of Ţigani in public space as a prelude for raising the issue of minority rights, presented as a gift (not a right) from the Romanian government. This is reminiscent of the ways that nineteenth century Romanian statesmen discussed *dezrobirea* as a gift extended from a European nation to an uncivilized Ţigan slave people.

Codrescu's narrative presents 'Gypsies' as 'colorful clothes horses' visible in public space, one of the major stereotypes in historical orientalist discourse of Roma as Others according to the specialist in Romani cultural history, Susan Tebbutt.[372] Tebbutt comments on the stereotypical references to (highly

---

[371] Codrescu op.cit. p.223.
[372] Susan Tebbutt "Disproportional Representation: Romanies and European Art" pp.159-177 in Susan Tebbutt and Nicholas Saul (eds) *The Role of the Romanies:*

implausible) bare-breasted-ness of Romani women as a way of invoking the discourse of Ţigan female promiscuity.[373] Indeed, the traditional Roma clothes of the *Căldărari* ethnic group that Codrescu could have been attempting to describe would not entail 'barely covered breasts,' although this familiar stereotype fits with the image of (sexual) freedom loving primitive Ţigani/Gypsies in Romanian public space that he wants to convey. The postsocialist visibility of Roma people in traditional dress and of street traders is linked in these examples with Ţigani (Gypsies) articulated in the same old historical discourses; as exotic, biological and cultural Others to Romanian ethnicity.

These preliminary examples illustrate that the Ţigani of postsocialism are composed of historical stereotypes wielded in new ways. The challenge then is to understand how the elements of pre 1990 and post revolutionary stereotypes together compose the Ţigan as specifically *bişniţari* Other in postsocialist Romania.

The Otherness of trade

In the early 1990s in Romania, individual experiences and elite discourses of trade and consumption were understood through discourses that showed

---

Images and Counter-Images of 'Gypsies'/Romanies in European Culture Liverpool University Press, Liverpool 2004 p.165.

[373] Tebbutt op. cit. p.166.

continuity with socialist discourses. The Ţigan Other was a mechanism for Othering the anxieties of these experiences. As Verdery explains, socialist systems 'produced the illusion of agency and obscured the anarchy and chaos that actually went on behind the scenes.'[374] 'Market exchange obscures the social relations surrounding production and distribution.' [375] When the market opened in Romania in 1990, people looked for the invisible hand that controlled the market and set the prices. *Bişniţari* were stereotyped in popular, media and political discourse as the group responsible for market fluctuations, a new postsocialist breed of socialist style "speculators."

As Yulian Konstantinov notes in the context of postsocialist Bulgaria, those who understand how the market works, the traders themselves, are not the ones whose discourse is at the center of public and political discussions of the market. Trader discourses were also marginal to the prevalent social ways of understanding the market in Romania, a result of traders themselves being considered marginal and dangerous to society in the previous decades. Thus in the early 1990s, as under socialism, 'trade, when performed by private actors, was considered an irregular and immoral form of activity.'[376] Individual trade was widely perceived as dishonest profit without production, and questions about how prices were set, inflation, and the origin of the goods caused anxiety to non-trader consumers, who

[374] Verdery 1996 p.181.
[375] Ibid.
[376] Trond Thuen "The Significance of Borders in the East European Transition" *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* Vol. 23, 1999 pp.738-757, p.741.

promptly named the Ţigan *bişniţari* as the Other representing these issues.[377] In the following section I will outline various aspects of everyday trade and consumption in postsocialist Romania that are sites of anxiety, and explore the role of the Ţigan Other as a symbol that enables individuals to address their anxieties through discourses of the Ţigan *bişniţari*. As part of this approach I will outline the content of the stereotypes of the Ţigan *bişniţari* Other as a dishonest, un-European, mafia style monopoly.

"How can the Ţigan *bişniţari* know what it costs?"

Under socialism, prices for all products were set by the Party, including for vegetables at the agricultural market. These set prices, displayed in fresh produce markets and state run stores (*Aprozars*) on a board called the *mercurial*, were (supposedly) based on the production value as determined by the Party as overseer of the domestic economy. In socialist markets and stores, however, there always existed a parallel price range for "extra" value on products. Customers essentially paid more money on the black market for products that were, to varying extents, hidden from the formal state economy. In agricultural markets, for example, the socialist citizen purchased goods from the state sanctioned trader, but "extra" prices were perceived as such in fixed relation to the state's set value of products. The "extra" paid by the consumer acknowledged the

[377] The public discourse that linked ethnic Others with what he terms 'middle men,' or 'speculators' is explored by Chelcea 2003.

demand/cost dynamic and the costs of distribution and production that the state did not calculate, but which everyone understood. In this way, paying extra at a market was definitely part of the socialist economy of lack, even acting as a kind of pressure relief valve for the lack of consumable items that the population faced. When shortages became severe in the 1980s, this parallel economy 'had a considerable role in reinforcing silent opposition to the communist regime.'[378]

After 1990, in contrast, there was no longer any formal state institution monitoring the pricing of goods. According to Verdery, 'many Romanians' saw the profits gained from trade as a form of theft, and 'numerous Romanians, from the most refined intellectual on through unskilled laborers, accounted for the problems they faced as caused by *bişniţa* and the Gypsies who supposedly monopolize it.'[379] In my personal conversations and interviews with women who were middle aged in 1990, it was not unusual for them to explain that they couldn't understand how a product's value could be calculated without knowing where it came from and its production cost in time and money. In the post revolution environment, with the influx of imported goods and the slump in domestic production coupled with massive inflation, the setting of prices was a very different practice to that under the socialist system. The man who was chief administrator of an inner city agricultural produce market in Bucharest between

---

[378] Victor Neumann *Between Words and Reality: studies on the politics of recognition and the changes of regime in contemporary Romania* The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Series IVA, Vol. 15 Washington, 2000 p.65.
[379] Verdery, 1996 p.98.

1989 and 1994 recalled when I interviewed him that there was great confusion amongst the market traders themselves when the state stopped setting the daily prices of the *mercurial* in December 1989.[380] He says that traders decided to continue making a *mercurial* themselves with prices set daily in a collective meeting of traders. Essentially, this meant that traders did set the prices according to market factors, but that even they were not comfortable with presenting price-setting as anything other than state controlled. The market-made *mercurial* was discontinued only in late 1992.[381]

From this example we can see that postsocialist Romanian understandings of how products should be priced were based on the socialist discourse of production as "honest" labor. An "honest" price, therefore, was based on the production value of the item. As Humphrey explains, under socialism the citizen 'was ideologically constituted as legitimately producing and consuming only within the state sphere...thus consumption was in theory not alienated.'[382] This relied upon the concept of a united entity called the Romanian nation that produced and consumed items in a closed economic circuit independently of international trade. Romanian political scientist Aurelian Crăiuțu has called this 'an irrational model

---

[380] Personal interview with the market administrator of Piața Matache, 13 July 2002.

[381] Personal interview with the market administrator of Piața Matache, 13 July 2002.

[382] Humphrey in Caroline Humphrey and Stephen Hugh Barter (eds) *Exchange and Value; an anthropological approach* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, Port Chester, Melbourne, Sydney 1992 p.63.

of "immisering growth."'[383] The concept of traders setting their own prices without having produced the goods themselves (as in the case of many imported items), could not be easily accommodated in this concept of items being valued by their production cost alone.

Indeed, Mihăilescu's study of dominant stereotypes amongst Romanians in the post revolutionary period points out that 'confused ideas about capitalism without capitalists,' propagated by NSF slogans and lack of information, influenced how people understood street trade.[384] The free pricing of the open market was widely labeled a dishonest practice, and very often considered theft. In this case, it is no surprise that traders were called *bişniţari* and Ţigani interchangeably – the ethnicization of *bişniţa* as non-Romanian was a reflection of the popular discourse that imported goods without set production based prices were destructive to Romania's national and Romanians' individual economies, a threat from outside "the (ethnic) Romanian people."

---

[383] Aurelian Crăiuţu "Light at the end of the tunnel: Romania 1989-1998" pp.169-193 in Geoffrey Pridham and Tom Gallagher (eds) *Experimenting with Democracy: Regime Change in the Balkans* Routledge, London and New York 2000 p.171.

[384] Ioan Mihăilescu "Mental Stereotypes in the First years of Post-Totalitarian Romania" pp.315-324 in *Government and Opposition* Vol.28 Issue 3 Summer 1993 pp.315-324.

As inflation skyrocketed to 200% after June 1990, the discourse blaming Ţigani *bişniţari* for rising prices intensified.[385] As Verdery writes, within socialist discourse the state should control the prices and therefore the value of money, and in the new situation inflation was widely understood within the established practice of articulating Ţigani as manipulating prices for their own dishonest profit. This articulation of Ţigani as destructive to the Romanian economy was very similar to preceding socialist period mainstream (Party) discourses of black market trade as speculation and parasitism that threatened the Romanian working class. In addition, Verdery notes that the lack of certain items, especially state produced goods that ceased to be available because the factories or collectives had ceased to produce them, coupled with the unemployment of formerly state employed citizens, led to a parallel discourse of Ţigani *bişniţari* as thieves of Romanian products themselves. This stereotype was based on the reckoning that *bişniţari* must steal Romanian goods to trade for those they import through unchecked borders. This rationale makes sense within the framework of a closed economy such as Romania was in the late socialist period, where state enterprises would trade one product for another in order to complete their own production line. But more importantly, this discourse constructs the Ţigan *bişniţari* Other as transgressor of Romanian national boundaries, and selling Romanian products outside of the nation itself constitutes an even greater transgression.

---

[385] In June 1990 Petre Roman's cabinet chose a reform plan creating a private sector and liberalizing prices, much the same reforms as in Prague in 1990. The Lei was floated in summer 1991. See Stelian Tănase *Miracolul revoluţiei* Humanitas, Bucharest 1999 p.366.

The Ţigan as thief of consumption enjoyment

To discuss Romanian understandings of open market trade as a continuation of socialist period discourses, it is necessary to address the fact that many Romanians *did* purchase products on the illegal black market at some stage in their lives under communism.[386] In Timişoara, for example, Romanians went to "Ţigani' in the market place to buy illegal contraceptive pills smuggled in from Yugoslavia.[387] As Romanian write Denise Roman notes, a real 'blue jeans mystique' traversed the youth generations of the mid 1970s, continuing into the 1980s. Young Romanians would employ all their networking skills to find a foreign visitor at the Black Sea from whom they could purchase a pair of blue jeans.[388] Roman notes that Romanian communist society was a "prestige based" consumer society, not a "monied" one, 'founded on status-related access to possession and consumption in spite of the assertions of equality and classless

---

[386] For an interesting study of how Romanians discursively reconstructed their experiences of acquiring goods in the 1980s, see Simina Radu-Bucurenci *Queuing in Narratives about the 1980s in Romania* Masters dissertation of the Department of History, Central European University, 2004. This study highlights that 'no one said they just relied on shops for food' (p.34) and the ethnicized nature of "speculation" as a Ţigan/"Gypsy" practice (p.38). See also Liviu Chelcea *Overcoming shortage under socialism: consumers and goods in a Romanian village in the 1980s* Masters dissertation, Department of History, Central European University, June 1998 and Liviu Chelcea and Puiu Lăţea *România profundă in comunism. Dileme identitare, istorie locală şi economie secundară la Săntana* Nemira, Bucharest 2000.

[387] Neumann op.cit. p. 44 and Wagner op.cit. p.100.

[388] Roman op.cit. 2003 p.62.

society in official discourses.'[389] Products illegally acquired had an "extra" value precisely because they were so hard to come by. Blue jeans and contraceptive pills were thereby priced by their exchange value, not their production value.

It struck me when asking Romanian women questions about how it had felt to shop in the newly bustling *Strada Lipscani* in the spring of 1990, that many expressed a sense of disappointment with the sudden availability of consumer items for sale. A woman who was 25 years old in 1990 stated in a personal interview that 'before, having a pair of jeans meant something, it showed that you knew people. After, you could buy jeans anywhere, and only for money! You only had to give them the money and everyone could have a pair of blue jeans.'[390] Renata Salecl argues that "under the socialist regimes... private spaces created to elude Party control made possible a very particular kind of agency and enjoyment that does not exist in democratic society. The same goes for consumerism. Because of lack of western goods, owning a simple pair of jeans, for example, produced an excitement that is beyond the grasp of people accustomed to the Western type of market.'[391] The loss of restrictions that made the acquisition of specific products difficult, and thereby increased their prestige, can also be understood as a form of theft of enjoyment from the consumer, which is attributed to the trader by the consumer. Indeed, in one interview I had with three women who were 15 and 16 years old in 1990, the shift between pre and post socialist

[389] Ibid. p.50.
[390] Personal interview I.M., 30 July 2002.
[391] Salecl op.cit. p.5

articulations of the Ţigan trader were clearly based on the difference between the value of the products Ţigani sold before and after the revolution.

A: at least under Ceauşescu there were no Ţigani

B: no, everyone was the same…

C: then the Ţigani were the ones at the market selling children's jewelry.

B: yes! The Ţigani brought things back from Yugoslavia for the market!

C: I loved that jewelry…the same kind they now sell on huge tables of the rubbish.

At the beginning of this exchange, the past is a time before Ţigani, but it becomes clear that it is simply the *negative* kind of Ţigani they are describing as in the present that did not exist then. The speakers articulate both before and after Ţigani as *physically* existing, but those before were positive because they sold jewelry in the market place, while those after became negative because of the quantity of the product they sold in the market. In this excerpt of discourse, the perception of the product itself depreciates in value in the postsocialist period, because they became widely available rather than symbols of rare import (border transgression) and value. The Ţigan is the Other linked to the lamented devaluation of enjoyment in consumption, a devaluation resulting from the

opening of borders and the influx of goods, affecting the loss of value of products within the prestige based exchange system.

For the purposes of furthering this analysis, let us seriously consider Neumann's statement that the illegal availability of western goods "reinforced silent opposition to the communist regime." In combination with this, consider Salecl's reading of former dissidents feeling nostalgic for the past because under the gaze of the socialist state they could create a "private space to enjoy that is not possible under democracy."[392] In this way it is possible to read the disappointment of post revolution consumption not only as the decrease in prestige of individual items, but the loss of a greater enjoyment that black market consumption provided when it was an act against the state, a means for individuals to claim a "private space" of (publicly displayed!) resistance. If the Ţigan *bişniţari* is the Other identified as stealing this enjoyment, then in the first place the Ţigan Other is scapegoated for the loss of enjoyment that occurred because the regime changed and signs of prestige changed. In addition, articulations of the Ţigan *bişniţari* as thief of enjoyment through making goods easily available masks the fact that people enjoyed consuming under the socialist regime. This enables postsocialist Romanians to re-member themselves in the socialist period as powerless victims of the repressive regime. This is not to say that consuming on the black market excluded citizens from having been victims of a repressive regime, but that the

[392] Neumann op.cit.p.65, Salecl p.5.

issue of enjoyment (and "power") gained through shopping transactions within their context is much more subtle and complex.

The Ţigan Other, therefore, is articulated as responsible for what is in fact a loss of enjoyment inflicted with the loss of particular organization of the socialist state. Through the new discourse of the Ţigan Other as *bişniţari*, Romanians not only displace the real reason for their loss of enjoyment in consumption, but create a new Other against which to articulate themselves as prevented from fulfilling their enjoyment. The ethnic component of the Ţigan Other enables a new postsocialist discourse of surviving as a Romanian ethnonational identity, when under socialism the enjoyment was to articulate oneself as a consumer within socialism.

As an example, let's look at a narrative that Popescu presents as the words of one hotel receptionist in 1990, linking the past of Romanians suffering under Ceauşescu with the present of Romanians suffering under Ţigani within the field of consumption and reproduction. The hotel receptionist said

> "He killed us ... now we're back breathing, but we're too weak to do anything but breathe, and we're being drowned in gypsies. (sic)"
>
> "In what?"
>
> "Gypsies. We have three million of them now. He passed those laws against contraception, remember? Well, the Romanians evaded the laws

as best they could, they aborted illegally, even went to jail for it. But the gypsies, they took full advantage."[393]

In the first place, it is clear that blue jeans prestige value is very different to the trauma created by the pronatal legislation of the Ceauşescu regime.[394] Another observation is the speaker's discursive elision of the fact that Ţigani were known in the socialist period as the illegal black market procurers of contraception, so in a significant way they facilitated Romanian contraceptive dissidence. The narrative displaces Romanian complicity in the trauma of Ceauşescu's pronatal policy by linking the dictator and his policy not with 'the Romanian people" but with ethnic Ţigani (often stereotyped as promiscuous) as against an ethnic Romanian "us." The representation of illegal black market actions of Romanians against pronatal policy as dissident actions thereby makes this memory of (reproductive) dissidence a new private space of resistance, its own enjoyment, under the contemporary threat of the Ţigan Other population.[395] The Ţigan Other in this case functions in a specifically postsocialist discourse of the Romanian

[393] Popescu op.cit. p. 249. Popescu uses the word "gypsy" without capital letters.
[394] For more information see Gail Kligman *The Politics of Duplicity: Controlling Reproduction in Ceauşescu's Romania* University of California Press, Berkeley 1999.
[395] The discourse of Ţigani becoming numerically greater than ethnic Romanians has been a powerful discourse in postsocialist Romania, as in postsocialist Hungary and Slovakia. The reporting of the 2002 census in Romania reflected the way that this discourse is perpetuated by the media, who wrote headlines that did not reflect the reality of the gross underreporting of Roma in the census, but rather exaggerated an unreal "threat" of Roma "taking over" Romania. As we will see in the next chapters, this discourse fits very well with Romanian discourses blaming the trials of European Union accession on a western European confusion of Romanians with Roma ethnicity.

ethnonation as under (biological) threat. The Ţigan Other simultaneously takes the place of collaborator with the former Ceauşescu regime against "the Romanian people," and thus enables an articulation of "the Romanian people" as victims both before and after the 1989 revolution. Indeed, Andrei Codrescu's conclusion regarding the constant anti-Ţigan paranoia in 1990 was that "the nationalist urge, this need for hate and 'purification' was a way to assuage the guilt for getting on so well during the Ceauşescu years.'[396] The Ţigan Other was invoked for many different purposes in the early 1990s, and many of the stereotypes were as much about reinvigorated Romanian identities as a European ethnonation as about dealing with the recent past of socialism.

The nature of Ţigan *bişniţa* as unEuropean

The rhetorical construction of the period following the downfall of socialist dictators as a "return to Europe" has been noted by scholars throughout postsocialist Europe.[397] This discourse performs an 'unconditional adherence to an abstract "Europe"' and naturalizes Romania as a European nation unnaturally

---

[396] Codrescu op.cit. p.237.

[397] Barbu op.cit.p.269. notes that the power of the concept of a "return to Europe" as a 'theme which could immediately organize a certain consensus in the majority of postcommunist society.' Also see Nicole Lindstrom "From Permissive Consensus to Contentious Politics: Varieties of Euroskepticism in Croatia and Slovenia" Presented to the Cornell Mellon-Sawyer Seminar, "Towards a Transnational and Transcultural Europe," 9 April 2002. Lindstrom identifies the "return to Europe" as 'a prominent rhetorical device in Central and East European (CEE) self-determination movements' p.1.

severed (politically, culturally, geographically) from Europe by the communist empire after World War Two.[398] The discourse is anxious, most often articulating what is not European in greater depth than what is, and very often presenting discourses that follow directly from the socialist period as "European." The Ţigan Other has been projected as a manifestation of that within Romania which is not European, and as an explanation for Europe's hesitancy to accept Romanian accession.

Trade is a perfect example of the paradoxical way that Romanians articulate the Ţigan Other as that which prevents them from being recognized as "European." Trade is visible in public space, is an everyday contact with larger abstract economic changes, and was discursively constructed in the 1990s as an un-European practice preventing Romania's "return to Europe" rather than facilitating it. The flood of imports from "unknown" and "eastern" destinations, unregulated private trade, and the nature of the trade in public space were articulated in the press as un-European, dirty, oriental, unregulated, Ţigan, and criminal. These reactions demonstrate continuity with socialist discourses of "order" in public space and economics. It is even ironic that there was a popular conception that Bucharest should return to being a European city by halting "unregulated trade" (meaning "open market practice"), especially in public spaces and especially by people identified (often only through trade!) as ethnic non-Romanian, as Ţigani. The linking of ethnic and non-European aspects of negative

[398] Vladimir Tismăneanu *Încet, spre Europă* Polirom, Bucharest 2000 p.182-3.

trade enabled Romanian discourses of identity to anxiously separate pre-socialist trader past (linked with the Ottoman empire) and socialist pasts to facilitate an ethnonational, discursive "return to Europe."

Barbu notes that 'the dependent individualism born under totalitarianism identified public space as a domain of exclusive competence of the state,' and the postsocialist street filled with markets was not identified as a European capitalism, but as something Asiatic and barbarian.[399] In an overview of newspapers from Bucharest in 1990, I was struck by how often major dailies of the National Salvation Front (NSF) and, later, other major newspapers, utilized seemingly random large photographs of (relatively) dark skinned street traders, especially those selling second hand goods. One issue of the pro-NSF newspaper (*Patima Albă*) for example, had a large photograph on the front page of a Roma woman and man (with dark skin and dressed somewhat traditionally) selling a pair of shoes with the headline "The mafia of commercial speculators and of the street stubbornly continues," and over the page a photo of an ambient seller with dark skin with the caption "Post revolutionary trade."[400] Such newspaper images

---

[399] Barbu op.cit. p.70. In the context of the former USSR, Caroline Humphrey writes that 'neither unfinished municipal buildings, with heaps of bricks and tangled, unused pipes, nor the disintegrating fragments of the past are regarded as constituting "disorder"...but the physical evidence of new individual activities is not seen as the people's doing. Trading is kept away spatially from government buildings and otherwise seems "disorderly" wherever it happens. A foreign or colorful appearance is noted immediately, registered, and resented.' Humphrey 1999 p.42.

[400] *Patima Albă* Anul 1 Nr. 9, 7-12 July 1990.

functioned as a visual discursive link between the various stereotypes of trade as non-Romanian, as Ţigan, that were articulated in greater length in articles.

One Bucharest daily decried that 'in the end Romania has entered Europe, but also the Orient!'[401] An article entitled "With a wheelbarrow through Bucharest" lamented that 'Bucharest has always been dirty but now people abandon their black market chocolate wrappers and "opposition" newspapers wherever they like. *Bişniţari*, speculators, prostitutes, pickpockets, idlers and delinquents of all kinds put a serious question mark over what we desire: Bucharest: a European city.'[402] The first contextual note is that this article was published late in 1990, after more than seven months of street trade and after Iliescu's consolidation of power (albeit through physical and political violence). Even with this level of order resumed in society, Bucharest was still presented as threatened specifically by non-Romanian traders. According to the article, the dangerous products were opposition newspapers and black market candy. While one can understand the former being specifically derided, (perhaps the journalist perceived pluralism of the press as disorder or threat) it is interesting that her stress on candy wrappers resonátes with socialist societies' fascination with items of western consumerism such as Coca Cola and chewing gum as pollutant representations of everyday capitalist life. The stance against trade, therefore, linked with socialist period

---

[401] *Patima Albă* Ibid.
[402] Marina Almăşan *Patima Albă* Anul 1 Nr.14, 11-17 August 1990.

discourses in which foreign signifiers such as candy wrappers represented foreign ideology.

The non-Romanian-ness of Ţigani, *bişniţari* and public spaces of trade was graphically described in an article entitled "Frenzy of buying and selling in (Strada) Lipscani."[403] The journalist bemoans that the street she 'loved so much as a child...has turned into a monstrous bazaar that combines swarming oriental misery and prostitution with gangster style corruption.'[404] The busy trading space of *Strada Lipscani* was not only perceived as un-European, but as monstrously such; not as wealth but as 'swarming oriental misery,' and not as free trade, but as mafia-like gangster networks that sell human beings. This depiction of an un-European mafia trading in women's bodies was pervasive in relation to the Ţigan *bişniţari* Other since 1990. In his publication funded by the Romanian Ministry of Culture in 1999, Nicolae Crişan wrote that 'Ţigani sell, or try to sell, everything. Beginning with their bodies- prostitution, even of infants, has taken unimagined proportions- it also ends with the fruit of the body: of the children, who they sell at the markets or other certain locations, just as any other kind of good.'[405] This

---

[403] *Patima Albă* Anul 1 Nr. 7, 21-26 June 1990.
[404] *Patima Albă* Anul 1 Nr. 7, 21-26 June 1990.
[405] Crişan op.cit. p.156. Crişan also footnotes prices supposedly charged for buying children, though he cites no sources. The stereotype of Ţigani as more likely to prostitute or sell their children has formed the misinformed basis of programs focused on Roma communities in the anti-trafficking NGO world. In Romania and Albania, real Roma communities, subject to international anti-trafficking scare campaigns, are now, in 2005, even more afraid to send their children to non-Roma schools. This situation is a good example of how

stereotype has old historical roots in central Europe, where Roma people were not enslaved, but persecuted as un-Christian and supposedly cannibalistic Others. In this way, media and popular discourses widely employed stereotypes of essential Ţigan Otherness as part of the chain of stereotypes forming the Ţigan as postsocialist *bişniţari* Other.

It is interesting, and not really surprising, that the author above refers to the (socialist) *Strada Lipscani* of her childhood without recognizing that it was 'a frenzy of buying and selling' throughout its pre-socialist history, as the trans-Ottoman and European trading place. The feeling of being alienated from Bucharest is in fact a feeling of not recognizing the city's return to a European past, a feeling that socialist public spaces were, post 1990, alienated by trade. If we consider that so much of pre-socialist (or even pre-1982) Bucharest was physically annihilated with Ceauşescu's systematizations of the 1980s, it also makes sense that those few old areas left standing in the center, such as the *Lipscani* area, are considered the historical and thereby historically European parts of the city.[406] Academic studies have detailed that in the early 1990s there

---

stereotypes of Ţigani affect Roma communities and reinforce marginalization, even in new ways.

[406] For details of how the city space of Bucharest changed during the Ceauşescu period see Dinu C. Giurescu *The Razing of Romania's Past* International Preservation Report, World Monuments Fund, The Bath Press, Great Britain 1990, Derrick Danta "Ceauşescu's Bucharest" *Geographic Review* Vol.83 April 1993 pp.170-182, Barry Bergdoll "Remaking Bucharest: Are Ideas Enough?" pp.49-51 in *Architectural Record* Vol.184 November 1996. Cristina Buica, Marina Popescu, and Odette Tomescu "Bucureştiul văzut de bucureşteni" pp.111-115 in *Revista de Cercetări Sociale* Vol.3 1995. The authors noted that the

was a feeling of alienation from what was essentially a new city, and it is no surprise then that these new appearances in the old city were upsetting from the perspective of citizens being able to feel familiar in "the heart" of the capital city. The presence of trade in post revolutionary public space was distanced from Romanian identity as European through its Othering as non-Romanian Ţigan *bişniţari* behavior in Romanian public space.

Ţigani as mafia and postsocialist monopolies

The Ţigan *bişniţari* Other was articulated as functioning within a supposed network often referred to as a "Ţigan mafia" or a monopoly of *bişniţari*, both with implications of a network for some kind of business. The concept of mafia, as Verdery has also noted, was a popular way for people to talk about economic changes in postsocialist society, because it gave people a way to explain widespread and problematic new situations. While there was definitely a "mafia" in terms of 'horizontal relations of reciprocity' operating in postsocialist Romania, "the mafia" is actually a symbol.[407] Ţigani *bişniţari* as mafia are perceived as the hidden force that controls the market when in fact the state has collapsed or is weak, and people are used to blaming the state for prices, employment issues and business development. The mafia is a symbol that people

---

perception of Ţigani was of an "invasion" or an "illegitimate penetration" of the city.

[407] This definition of mafia comes from Verdery 1996 p.218.

use to address and express the ambivalence they feel about political, economic and social changes experienced in everyday life.

The concept of mafia is a fluid designation that incorporates visible changes – such as the increase in petty trade labeled a monopoly of Ţigani *bişniţarii*, and mafia is often ethnicized because it can mobilize the same stereotypes used for the primary ethnic Other of the society. The stereotype of the Ţigani *bişniţari* mafia relies on stereotypes of Ţigani as historically active nomadic traders with a non-Romanian moral code and large families. As with all stereotypical discourses, the actual stereotypes that function together contradict each other, or do not logically correspond. In the case of the Ţigan *bişniţari*, the discourse of a mafia hysterically constructs the ethnic Other as constituting the black market, a network that controls all trade and thereby national economics. At the same time, as we have discussed in previous sections, trade itself was considered non-productive and lazy labor, and traders were considered cheats unwilling or too lazy to do "real work." As Konstantinov has noted, the trader on the street is a vital symbol of supposedly secret mafia networks behind the scene, but the understandings of trade held by its practitioners are not part of the internally contradictory stereotypical discourse used by the non-trading population to rationalize mystified and Othered economics structures. The identification of street traders as Ţigani *bişniţari* thereby both creates and supports the stereotype of an Other economy where the natural wealth of the nation is supposedly stolen.

The concept of a Ţigan mafia has remained pervasive in the Romanian media since 1990. Romanian historian Lucian Boia notes in his English language text on Romania that 'the gypsy mafia regularly features in the mass media in connection with kidnapping, fighting, prostitution and so on. Indeed, newspapers thrive on describing alleged perpetrators of all kinds of crime as mafia.'[408] Various pre-socialist and socialist period stereotypes of Ţigani were incorporated into the new discourses of postsocialist Ţigani *bişniţari* in order to mobilize powerful concepts of Ţigan mafia and monopolies in post revolution Romanian society. In Septimiu Chelcea's 1994 research into the social psychology of Romanian society in transition, respondents ascribed Ţigani (as an ethnic group) less positive and more negative characteristics than any other group.[409] 29.9% said Ţigani were thieves, 16.6% said lazy, 15.8% said dirty and dishonest, and other negative factors were violent, stupid, bad, aggressive and criminals. The positive characteristics of a supposedly ethnic group called Ţigani were that they were united (26.6%) artistic (9.8%) good at craftwork (5.2%) and with a strong commercial spirit.[410] While the overwhelmingly negative characteristics are familiar to us through the other sources already examined, it is interesting to note the nature of the positive perceptions; not only do we find the primitive 'artistic' Ţigan, but the "strong commercial spirit" which, in combination with being "united" composes the Ţigan mafia stereotypical identity. The following

---

[408] Lucian Boia *Romania: Borderland of Europe* Reaktion, London 2001 p.216.
[409] Septimiu Chelcea *Personalitate şi Societate in Tranziţiei: studii de psihologie sociala* Editură Societatea Stiinţa şi Technica, Bucharest 1994 pp.176-296.
[410] Ibid.

paragraphs trace the interactions of stereotypes of Ţigani as visible traders, and ethnicized violent criminals utilizing primitive family structures that together function as "the Ţigan mafia."

One basic stereotype in the discourse is that the Ţigan mafia of the postsocialist period were the pre-1989 networks of illegal trade and theft structured and somehow legalized. The discourse claims that 'infractors big and small came to Bucharest immediately after the events in December 1989, when it became an open city. Then began the period of transition of the mafia from primitive forms of organizations which existed in the time of communism, to consistent and profitable structures.' [411] This narrative of origin of the postsocialist Ţigan *bişniţari* mafia is expressed (here by a large daily newspaper journalist) in the mass media. The Ţigan mafia Other is produced with the responsibility for not only transition period economic changes, but also the failure of the socialist system due to a pre-existing 'primitive' organized criminality. Wagner goes so far as to claim that 'in the mass media 'criminal' is equal to Ţigan.'[412] The economic phenomena of postsocialism, such as closure of huge factories that supposedly produced the wealth of the people, and the devaluation of the currency, were

[411] Mihai Belu "Harta lumii interlope din Romania" *Cotidianul* 26 June 2001. Russell L. Belk and Magda Paun also explained that 'the black market activities of gypsies (sic) before the revolution have since been transformed into small shops and stalls selling clothing, small electronics, cosmetics, imported alcohol, cigarettes musical tapes, used goods, and other hard to find products.' Belk and Paun "Ethnicity and Consumption in Romania" in Costa and Bamossy op.cit. p.201.
[412] Wagner 1996 op.cit. p.128.

introduced with a new language of capitalism and individual liberty, but were widely interpreted through meanings of the socialist period. In this way, "workers" conceived as producers were articulated as abandoned by the state. Even an academic writing in the intellectual weekly *Dilema* described 'one phenomenon of the system of transition- the capitalization of thieves and decapitalization of workers.'[413] In this way, the socialist period stereotypes of Ţigani also function in the role of postsocialist ethnic Other, especially in aspects of everyday economic experiences.

In his 1999 text *Ţigani: Myth and Reality* Nicolae Crişan claims to disentangle stereotype from reality, yet he writes (in the quotation of an anonymous "Ţigan") that 'our Ţigani return to commerce because there is a lack of work, and in response they organize a network controlling trade that brings goods from the west. Our Ţigani also make business, buy blouses, cigarettes, chewing gum, perfume and smelling soaps and come home and sell it here, paying taxes and with clean earnings. In the absence of regulations, Ţigani who don't like to work speculate and eat the swans in Vienna, and the shame is on the heads of those who work, and not on those who are lazy.' [414] In this description, people who work in (unproductive) commerce do so in reaction to a lack of (productive) work, they control trade in a network and goods come from outside the country. These are symptoms of the "mafia." The anonymous speaker differentiates between hard

[413] Vintila Mihailescu "Suc alb, suc negru" *Dilema* Nr. 534, July 2003.
[414] Crişan op.cit. p.162.

working Ţigani who pay taxes and earn 'clean' money, and lazy ones who 'speculate.' The discourse Crişan presents is an example of how the Ţigan Other can be construed as a bridge transporting socialist period discourses to the new open market postsocialist context.

The question remains as to how and why mafia were specifically ethnic Ţigan in the early postsocialist period? Primarily, the congruence between historical and contemporary stereotypes of ethnic Ţigani fit with the new needs of the "mafia" image; stereotypes of a primitive culture of family and violence, people who travel and trade (or steal and speculate). The historical ethnicization of ambient and illicit street trade as Ţigan was a factor that made Ţigani the perfect Other to identify with highly visible postsocialist street trade, regardless of the actual percentages of dark skinned people or ethnic Roma (so people identifiable in other ways as Ţigani) working in this field. The visibility of occupations identified as "Ţigan jobs" is striking because ambient traders do not own businesses or infrastructure, and street cleaners are in the street. It is exactly these factors of visibility that suit the inclusion of traders and street cleaners as Ţigani into stereotypical forms of knowledge about invisible Ţigan *bişniţari* mafia networks. The mafia as stereotype functions precisely because it cannot be traced, but it requires an identifiable and ubiquitous visible signifier of its existence. The Ţigan *bişniţari* Other is the perfect construct for such a job because it can be identified in a range of historically developed corporeal subjects

(color of skin, a body standing with a bag in a market) and is closely connected with concepts of dishonest 'business,' with *bişniţa*.

The Ţigan *bişniţari* mafia is often produced with stereotypes borrowed from popular culture, such as Hollywood movies of Italians in America. The Romanian author cited above, Nicolae Crişan, uses Italian mafia imagery to describe an incident of Roma trade in Bucharest as 'a scene of the mafia, Ţigan godfathers meeting and redistributing goods, that will be sent like black caravans to all regions of the country.'[415] This dramatic imagery transforms the commonplace observation of some people identified as Ţigani loading up a car with unknown goods into an image invoking American television style criminal drama. The Romanian Ţigan *bişniţari* mafia is actively created with the import of Hollywood mafia stereotypes that are familiar to everyday Romanians from television. The fact that this example is from a text funded by the Romanian Ministry of Culture that claims to differentiate between the myths and realities of the Ţigan Other highlights the intensity with which the Ţigan Other is articulated. [416]

---

[415]Crişan op. cit. p.155. Note that Crişan reports this taking place in Piaţa Unirii, which is the location of major department stores where people of all ethnicities can be seen packing goods into vehicles. Cross-border traders usually arrive at the major train stations on international lines, not at the central metro station where there are the most police. These basic logical knowledges are entirely overlooked and surpassed by the pervasive stereotypes of Ţigani *bişniţari* mafia.

[416] The claim of differentiating between myths and realities of Ţigani is itself a strategy of masking the fact that the entire stereotype is projected from within Romanian society. A more accurate title would be "delineating which stereotypes of the Ţigan Other we can pin to identifiable minority groups."

Ambient traders in Bucharest are often of Romani ethnicity, and usually do work in families, trading the same products in a shared market or length of footpath. Family networks for work are visible. This is often cited as evidence of "behind the scenes" organized economic networks, but this link in the stereotype is not logical; if the whole family is on the street then who exactly is doing what "behind the scenes"? The fact that ambient traders (identified as Ţigani *bişniţari*) sell imported goods of unknown origins and signify to consumers that they cross borders also creates an anxiety that powers the discourses of the "mafia" stereotype. The stereotype of Ţigani as biologically capable of transgressing these borders (ironic considering the history of forced Roma slavery) was often used under socialism, and continues to be used now to explain how Ţigani supposedly trade across borders more than Romanians. Boia writes, for example, that 'when Gypsies (sic) want to leave the country, they go without troubling much about visas, as Romanians have to.'[417] This historically rooted stereotype of nomadism works in combination with the stereotype of Ţigani having large primitive extended family networks across borders that assist them in (illegal) travel and trade. As will be discussed in a later chapter, this stereotype functions in Romanian discourses of the European Union and the image of Romanians and Ţigani as illegal transgressors of its borders.

Romanian perceptions of border crossing have changed over time, but many scholars have written about the intense anxiety that borders symbolize for the

[417] Boia op.cit. p.216.

majority of Romanians, as well as other postsocialist citizens.[418] Mihaela Miroiu has noted that there is still a general fear of authorities and a 'hierarchical inferiority complex' that comes to the fore in dealing with border police after the long years of people not being able to transgress the physical limits of the nation.[419] As Konstantinov demonstrates, traders' routes and strategies for bringing goods across borders are largely unknown to consumers, and so the occupation of importing and exporting goods remains mysterious in popular discourse. These anxieties of goods and individuals crossing borders are therefore projected as Ţigan Other *bişniţari* networks that transgress the boundaries of the (ethno)nation.

The visibility of families working in small trade is often cited as evidence supporting the stereotype that Ţigan families are primitive extended organizations that "look out for each other."[420] Numerous respondents in the survey I conducted

---

[418] Anyone who has travelled across borders with locals in formerly socialist countries has perhaps experienced the anxiety that builds to a tense silence as the border approaches and the palpable relief once it is crossed. For accounts corroborating this effect see Roman 2003. Many studies of cross border trade and trader-tourism in postsocialist regions note the anxiety about borders that traders have to overcome in order to work. The best study concerning borders in postsocialist trade is Thuen 1999.

[419] Mihaela Miroiu *Societatea Retro* Editură Trei, Bucharest 1999.

[420] Many scholars of cross border postsocialist trade note that family and trusted extended networks are vital to enable even small profits in the risky business of international small business without institutional protection. In terms of visibility, market and street traders often work in small family groups because the enterprise needs enough people to watch and sell the goods, and the families that earn a living from street trade do not usually have other occupations. See Claire Wallace (in association with Oksana Shmulyar and Vasil Bedzir) "Investing in Social Capital: The Case of Small-Scale, Cross-Border Traders in Post-Communist

at Bucharest University (see Appendix One) drew a link between 'primitive' lifestyles, large Roma families and crime. This concept of extended family can be contrasted with the urban postsocialist Romanian nuclear family unit, which is much smaller in size than families were before mass urbanization. While the movement into apartment blocks from extended families living on the land was praised at the time as "modernization," people living in Bucharest in the 1980s came to realize the importance of connections with family in villages as a way of gaining basic foodstuffs that were scarce in the city.[421] Part of the stereotype of the primitive Ţigan extended family is that they are more violent than Romanian families, and this construction can be read as manifesting insecurities about Romanian nuclear family structures and isolation. Evidence for this anxiety can be found in the way that census results are reported, with the numbers of ethnic minorities and their higher birth rates calculated into the future to show that "the Romanian people" is under numerical threat from Others.[422]

Central Europe" pp. 751-771 in *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* Vol.23, Konstantinov, Kressel and Thuen, 1998 and Konstantinov 1994.

[421] For insight into the desires and anxieties of urbanization under Ceauşescu see Augustin Ioan "The monumental slums: or how one can dwell in an inferno and feel good about it too" *Martor* 2000 pp.1-8 p.6. For interesting analyzes of Bucharest's public spaces and architecture through the century see Augustin Ioan *Power, Play and National Identity: Politics of Modernization in Central and East-European Architecture: the Romanian File* The Romanian Cultural Foundation Publishing House, Bucharest 1999 and Renata Salecl "'For the Love of the Nation: Ceauşescu's Disneyland" in *(Per)versions of Love and Hate* Verso, New York 2001.

[422] A.G. "1.2 *million ţigani*?" in *România Liberă* 11 July 2002. Every newspaper printed articles about the census results with the focus on supposed numbers of Ţigani over a month long period.

The stereotype of extended Ţigan families that work together links with the stereotype of extended criminal networks of violent Ţigani. In his training manual for police cadets which is taught to every Romanian Police Academy student, Tudor Amza instructs readers that 'when you see a Ţigan executing an infraction you can be certain that nearby there are other Ţigan infractors who watch his back and will intervene with a sound signal or even with violent force if police appear or if any victims or witnesses have observed the infractional activity.'[423] Amza then continues to explain that 'in a group Ţigani have a reckless courage and act with maximum cruelty to annihilate the resistance of victims.'[424] This text is a valuable summary of every hysterical stereotype of violent Ţigan criminal behavior that I have ever heard, all presented as biological characteristics. Amza uses sensationalist media headlines as a source of evidence of the pathological criminality of Ţigani, and then police rely on this single "training manual" for information on how to deal with crime and the public. Brigadier General Mircea Bot, then head of the Bucharest police department, exemplified the position of Romanian law enforcement agencies regarding Ţigani when he made extensive comments in a major national newspaper about 'Gypsy criminality and Gypsy gangs' in 1999. Bot asserted that 'there are Gypsies who are born criminals and ...do not know anything other than how to commit criminal acts' and 'up until now Gypsy people were used to stealing and robbing, while

---

[423] Tudor Amza *Fenomenul infractional în rindul ţiganilor: Activitaţi specific Poliţiei Române pentru protenjarea etniei şi prevenirea faptelor antisociale* Academy of Police "Alexandru Ioan Cuza," Bucharest 1995 p. 104.
[424] Ibid p.104.

now they are focused on financial criminal acts.'[425] The article was printed alongside a list of the addresses of 'Gypsy criminals in Bucharest,' which was a measure recommended in Tudor Amza's manual in the interest of "public safety." Police behavior occurs within and perpetuates a closed circle of knowledge as the police force is trained with media sensationalism as evidence of Ţigan crime, interprets Ţigani as criminals, and then feeds the media with their reports on crime as a disproportionately Ţigan occupation.[426]

Another example of the pervasive effect of constant media and police stereotypes of the violent, primitive Ţigan family is the way that commuters (Roma or Romanian) pick-pocketed on buses rarely confront their attackers, believing that even if there are only two "Ţigani" on the bus, they will go and get their families and take violent revenge against them after the crime, as described in Amza's text above.[427] Firstly, in my personal research people consistently used the term Ţigan

---

[425] cited in Ibid p.49 from *România Liberă*, December 4 1999. Also cited in Marius Gavrilescu and Adrian Tudor *Democraţia la pachet: Elita politica in România postcomunista* Compania, Bucharest 2002 p.7.

[426] In fact, serious crimes such as rape and murder have much lower infraction rates for Roma, and other crimes are not committed by a number of Roma disproportionate to their population. Project on Ethnic Relations 1997 op.cit. p.7.

[427] As noted, we cannot know the extent to which Amza's text reflects this discourse or creates it through training police who "warn" the public. Another interesting point is that beggars are often articulated as violent in the media, for example an Unsigned article in *Libertatea* article described 'Romanian pickpockets of color armed with accordions for begging.' "Viena sub teroarea Ţiganlor romani" 20 August 2003. Beggars mobilize ambivalence as the key to their occupation, but this example highlights that visible performances of poverty as "Ţigan" can be considered a violent act by audiences who link the impoverished Ţigan Other with the gamut of negative stereotypes under discussion.

for pickpockets, regardless of which ethnic group they were actually from; anyone who steals on a bus can be referred to as Ţigani. Despite the various points at which the logic of this discourse fails (the thieves being a minority on the bus, how they would find the victim again later? why they would make a serious crime from a small robbery?), this discourse of Ţigan brutality in extended family networks is a pervasive and powerful discourse. In my personal experience, the police also believed in and feared far-fetched stereotypes of Ţigani criminals being connected in secret vengeful networks, which resulted in a failure of police or community to react effectively against *anyone* who steals on public transport.[428] In this discourse the Ţigan Other as constructed through the media

[428] Over a period of five years I heard many Romanians lamenting being robbed on public transport in Bucharest and the thieves were most often referred to as Ţigani. On one occasion when I was accompanying a friend who was robbed on the bus, we followed the thieves to their home, then went to the nearby police station. At the station (beside Piaţa Galaţi) the policemen said that they knew the thieves, but that they were Ţigani mafia criminals whose house was connected by underground tunnel to their families' houses, and so they could not attempt to catch them. Instead the police offered us the infamous photograph albums filled with photographs of dark skinned men and suggested that if we chose ten for a line up, then select one, it would be just for him to be accused of the crime, since he was sure to be a Ţigan criminal also. One of the problems with the photo-album selection strategy is that individuals who have not ever been prosecuted for a crime have their pictures taken by police and included in the album. The photograph albums were a recommendation of Amza's training manual for police cadets, which advised in Section 3.2 'Measure for combating with greater resoluteness anti-social deeds committed by Ţigani' pp.145-148. 'At all district inspectorates, municipal and village police stations assure the photography and fingerprinting of all Ţigani living under the supervised area. Simultaneously institutionalize obligatory organization and permanent actualization of albums with photographs of Ţigan infractors (thieves, cheats, rapists, swindlers, pickpockets, house burglers, thieves who steal from friends etc). Paying special attention to the groups of Ţigani who travel between localities in order to commit crimes, the albums can be presented for recognition of suspects by those injured or witnesses. The same attention should be paid to groups of mixed infractors

and popular stereotypes as violent organized networks of criminals is pervasive throughout the public as well as the police force. The fact that everyday people and police choose to act as if they believe they are hostage to elusive Ţigani thieves with criminal families, at the cost of their wallets, or their macho masculine law enforcing identities, is a serious indication of the central role that the Ţigan Other plays in society. In the context of public transport and pickpocketing, the Romanian community chooses to articulate itself as passive victim of the Ţigan Other, and one can only conclude that the position in which the honest Romanian is discursively constructed as helpless before the Ţigan Other must function as a vital part of the broader stereotypical discourses of the Ţigan Other. Indeed, the European Union and other international human rights organizations have put increasing pressure on Romania since 1990 to halt institutionalized racism against Romani communities, and in Chapter Six I will discuss the importance of the Ţigan Other who victimizes good Romanians for international dialogues about Romanian ethnic identity.

It is not just closed police training facilities, nationalist politicians and the daily mass media that rely on stereotypical discourses of the Ţigan *bişniţari* Other to displace important economic and social questions, but the discourses of the ruling elite and their institutions. In his election campaign of 2000, the notorious right wing nationalist of the Greater Romania Party, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, promised

---

composed of Ţigani and Romanians, or Ţigani and foreigners, especially Arabs, with whom it seems they have reached an understanding of zones of influence.' Amza p.148.

to destroy the "gypsy mafia that controls Romania."[429] The following speech, for example, was then President Ion Iliescu's response to a journalist's question of whether Romanian ethnic minorities such as Roma had a right to complain:

> In Romania there are no people detained or persecuted for their opinions or due to their ethnicity. Concerning what you said about the persecution of Ţigani, this is not an ethnic problem, nor a Romanian problem. This is a social problem found all over Europe. We're speaking of a parasitical way of life of a category of Ţigani – which is unjustly generalized to the whole minority of Ţigani - which finds its expression in illegal and unsocial actions; theft, speculation, prostitution, pimping etc. In essence, this is a mode of life based on consumption without production. Once the state authorities fell, after the revolution, this mode of life was exacerbated. At the base of the problem are legislative faults, a lack of intervention and decisions on behalf of the authorities. In some cases groups have acted uncontrollably in this mode of life. Not one of these events had an ethnic character; they were not unjustly against Ţigani as an ethnic group, but against Ţigani as a group of infractors.[430]

---

[429] European Roma Rights Center *State of Impunity: Human Rights Abuses of Roma in Romania* European Roma Rights Center Country Report Series Nr. 10, Budapest 2001 p.18.

[430] Interview of Portuguese journalist Henrique Antunes Ferreira from *Diario de Noticias* with the President of Romania, Ion Iliescu 22 February 1996, reprinted as "Minorităţii – au dreptate?" in *Dimineaţa* 24 February 1996, Nr. 203, p.13 online version www.kappa.ro/news/palco/pco-203.html last accessed 18-02-2003.

While the reporter asked Iliescu specifically about the complaints of the Romani community in Romania, Iliescu responded regarding "Ţigani," thereby pinning the stereotypical discourses of Ţigani to self-identifying Roma as a matter of fact. Iliescu stated that Ţigani were a problem for the whole of Europe (implying that not only Romanians react against them), before making the requisite statement that not *all* Ţigani are a problem. The tactic of claiming that Ţigani are a social rather than an ethnic problem is a way of avoiding the issue of ethnic relations and also displacing the responsibility for finding solutions from the government to the group itself.[431] Iliescu uses socialist period language and concepts when he refers to Ţigani as having a 'parasitical way of life' based on 'consumption without production,' incredible considering this interview took place in 1996, after six years of a supposedly open market under his leadership in Romania. The 'illegal and unsocial actions' attributed to Ţigani across Europe by the then President included 'theft, speculation, prostitution and pimping,' the range of stereotypical crimes we have seen attributed to the popular discourse of Ţigani *bişniţari* throughout the postsocialist period, based on stereotypes of criminality and promiscuity used against Ţigani since before the nineteenth century. Iliescu links Ţigan activities with specific post–revolution mafia discourses when he states that 'after the revolution, this way of life was exacerbated.' He then turns the original question about injustices against Roma around to blame the criminal

[431] This point is also made in Project on Ethnic Relations 1997 op.cit. p.5.

justice system which, he argues, should intervene more decisively against Ţigani, finally defined by the President as 'a group of infractors.'

It is clear that if the President communicated with the international press on questions of human rights through such stereotypical discourses of Ţigani, then this had an effect on popular anti-Ţigan discourses. In the final section of this chapter I will briefly look at the various ways that elite discourses and institutions in postsocialist Romania have created, corroborated and perpetuated the existence of the Ţigan *bişniţari* as ethnic Other.

Postsocialist elite discourses of the Ţigan *bişniţari*

Postsocialist Romanian politicians such as Ion Iliescu and the NSF used the Ţigan *bişniţari* Other to articulate the postsocialist Romanian national identity as solely ethnic from the beginning of 1990.[432] Ţigani were constructed as Others outside the Romanian ethnonation when new government institutions were modeled, and Iliescu mobilized the stereotypes of the Ţigan *bişniţari* as a dishonest Other that threatened the Romanian nation through international theft and trade in mafia networks. The NSF used ethnicized discourses and controlled the television media to present Ţigani as a ubiquitous threat, while Iliescu avoided commenting directly on issues of reform or ideology. Iliescu's policy overall was an aversion

[432] Barbu stated that the nation was promoted as solely ethnic, and solely ethnic Romanian in the postsocialist period Barbu op.cit. p.142

to clarification of issues, and a preference for discourses of ethnic segregation and subversion. The Romanian government encouraged, enacted and condoned violence against communities identified as Ţigan in identity. In this section I will briefly explore some of the major events of post-revolutionary politics and how elites produced the Ţigan Other in these contexts to displace popular opposition and create an environment where fear of ethnic Others was greater than any knowledge about political or economic policy.

Verdery notes that ethnic groups were an important way for Romanians to organize communal identities before 1989, and as people politically grouped according to their ethnicity in the post revolutionary months, the Hungarian ethnic minority especially became a significant political force.[433] Each ethnic group was presented by the former communist and new NSF powers as a different kind of threat, all inflated and bearing only the most distant relation to reality. Hungarians were presented as the major threat to Romania's national existence with the specter of succession, Saxon-Romanian émigré communities were presented as a threat if they returned to claim land relinquished to the socialist government, and Jews, as Verdery noted, were an ominous threat without even existing in significant numbers.[434] It was the Ţigan Other that became, as in the past, the

[433] Verdery1993 p.182

[434] F. Lobont and D. Stone "Antisemitism in Post-Communist Romania" pp.65-71 in *Jewish Quarterly* Winter 2001-2, Michael Shafir "Jews and Antisemites in Romania since the Death of Rabbi Rosen" pp.147-155 in *East European Jewish Affairs* Vol.24 Iss.2 1994. In the Romanian census of January 1992, the ethnic population of Romania was calculated at total population 22 760 449. 89.4% of

primary Other and scapegoat of the period, an elusive subject that could be blamed for symptoms of the powerful anxieties about a shifting future. It was socially and economically marginalized self-identifying Romani communities and individuals with visible "Ţigan" occupations such as street cleaning and small trade who were identified as Ţigani and then the visible targets of the Ţigan *bişniţari* discourse. The NSF developed and used these groups as Ţigan Others that enabled leaders to avoid popular criticism and concern through diversion. Social anxieties were redirected into the ethnic sphere, against Ţigani, on many specific occasions as well as throughout the first years of postsocialism in Romania. As the deputy Prime Minister announced in June 1990, in the midst of mass protests over the re-election of former communist party bureaucrats, Ţigani were the Other identified as 'social scum and a danger for society.'[435]

According to Romanian commentator Stelian Tanase, in the months following the revolution the 'dominant political culture was suspicion and distrust, violence,

---

people declared themselves ethnic Romanians (20 352 980), 7.1% Hungarians (409 723), 1.8% Roma (119 436), 0.5% Germans (66 833) and 0.3% Ukrainians (38 688). From Peter Jordan "Romania" pp.184-223 in Christina Bratt Paulston and Donald Peckham *Linguistic Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe* Multilingual Matters Ltd, Clevedon, Philadelphia, Toronto, Sydney, Johannesburg 1998 p.196. The gross under representation of Roma in this census is a result of implementation, but it is interesting to note that despite the same implementation procedures in the 2001 census, more Roma declared their ethnicity thus, likely a result of more than a decade of activism towards demanding recognition and positive ethnic representation by Romani Romanians.

[435] Katrin Reemstma "Between Freedom and Persecution: Roma in Romania" in Tore Bjorgo and Robert Witte *Racist Violence in Europe* St Martins Press, New York, 1993.

discrimination and fear.'[436] Real dissidents and ethnic minorities who were paraded as allies on television in the days following the revolution were distanced from the NSF,[437] and national minorities were 'accommodated and co-opted into the government.' [438] Under decree Nr 81, 9 February 1990, regulating the representation of national minorities in the Provisory Council of National Unions, Roma were one of 12 minority groups recognized with the creation of the Democratic Union of Roma, but in the first election of June 1990, only a single deputy was voted in.[439] In the second elections of September 1992, no direct representative from the Romani community was elected, though Article 59(2) of the 1991 Constitution provided the right to one representative for Roma in the position of deputy.[440] In his close analysis of the 1991 constitution, the Romanian

---

[436] Tănase 1999 op.cit. p.357.

[437] This was stated by Laszlo Tokes, the Hungarian priest credited with beginning the revolution in Timişoara in December 1989, see Tokes' memoirs *The Fall of Tyrants: The Incredible Story of One Pastor's Witness, the People of Romania, and the Overthrow of Ceauşescu* Crossway Books, Wheaton Illinois 1991 p.196-197.

[438] Lavinia Stan "Comparing Post-Communist Governance: A Case Study" *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* Vol. 18, No.3 September 2002, pp.77-108, p.79.

[439] Emmanuelle Pons *Ţiganii din Romania: o minoritate în Tranziţie* Compania Press, Bucharest 1999 p.118.

[440] Pons op.cit. p.119. Barbu said this constitution was 'confused in conception, ambiguous in doctrine, invested with authority under a state of law the type of state organization that the communist regime fabricated for 50 years.' Barbu op. cit.p. 136-7. In Herman Schwartz *The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe* University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 2000, Romania is mentioned only as having had 'serious setbacks' to constitutional justice and 'where the Iliescu regime was semi-authoritarian from the start, the court was subservient to the president from the start.' p.226 Political scientist Attila Agh refers to the system of parliamentary representation for minorities in Iliescu's Romania as 'fake representation' *The Politics of Central Europe* SAGE publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi 1998 p.209.

political scientist Ion Barbu concludes that the Romanian constitution defines nationality as ethnic rather than civic, with serious implications for the rights to representation of those defined as minorities with the Romanian nation.[441] While I personally believe that Romani representatives should not necessarily take the responsibility of answering to anti-Ţigan discourses, the lack of state support for the organization of representation for Roma, as the largest and most vulnerable ethnic minority amongst Romanians, directly contributed to a situation where the government themselves could make Romani communities the targets of popular anxiety and racist sentiment. This occurs because the stereotypes of the Ţigan Other were applied to Romani organizations at the same time as Romani intellectuals, politicians and activists were prevented from formal access or recourse to the debates.

Iliescu's strategy throughout the post-revolutionary months and years seems, in retrospect, to have been the maintenance of popular anxiety and confusion through his failure to clearly explain economic, ideological or political future plans to the public, while directing the negative sentiments of this confusion towards ethnic Others constructed through familiar socialist period discourses of threats to "the nation." In Iliescu's speech on December 22 he did not use the word "revolution," and he never promised free press, open markets or private property.[442] In fact, Iliescu's first campaigns specifically attacked abstract

[441] Barbu op.cit. pp.142-144.
[442] Gallagher op.cit. p.73 and Tănase op.cit.1999 p.357.

concepts of market reform such as privatization and foreign investment. In speeches, language of "fights" and "battles" was used by an NSF "us" (*noi*) to create the image of a dominant party of national protection under the onslaught of ethnic Others.[443] Verdery notes that Iliescu made his 'opposition to market reforms appear as a defense of national values,'[444] and one of the NSF slogans was 'we shall never sell our country.'[445] The latter slogan actively invokes a (socialist) understanding of the free market meaning the sale of commonly owned "national" wealth, the spectre of those who sell the country were the *bişniţari* Others. Within days of the 23 January 1990 declaration that the NSF would run for election, Iliescu began talking about 'separatist trends' in Transylvania and created an alliance with the right wing nationalist party *Vatra Românească* (Romanian Homeland Party). [446]

Iliescu presented the Ţigan *bişniţari* Other as a central discursive symbol in his discourse against market reform, and he systematically controlled the media to an 'unjust extent' to ensure that his position was the only one with vast coverage.[447]

---

[443] Gavrilescu op.cit. p.259.
[444] Verdery 1996 p.91.
[445] Gallagher 1995 p.102.
[446] Gallagher 1995 p.83, Iliescu always kept the right wing close. The Party of National Unity of Romanians (PUNR) in Transylvania was established15 March 1990 and packed with sympathizers of Vatra Romaneasca and former securitate. For a study of right in postsocialist Romanian politics see Gabriel Andreescu *Extremismul de Dreapta în România,* Ethnocultural Diversity Resource Center, Cluj Napoca 2003 and Michael Shafir "The Inheritors: the Romanian Radical Right Since 1989" pp.71-89 in *East European Jewish Affairs* Vol. 24 Iss.1, 1994.
[447] Thomas Carothers *Assessing Democracy Assistance: the case of Romania* Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington 1996 p.15. see also

According to Hall, NSF newspapers were 'politically biased, anti-democratic and xenophobic...and consistently engaged in disinformation and slander characteristic of the Ceauşescu apparatus.'[448] NSF slogans consistently labeled opposition politicians, intellectuals and protesters "Ţigani." Petre Roman, for example, was termed *Petre Bişniţarul* in 1990, meaning "Peter the *bişniţari*."[449] When opposition politicians and intellectuals were named Ţigani *bişniţari*, this invoked the stereotypes of thieves, illegal speculators and ethnic Others of Romanians, thereby implying that their policies would steal from "the Romanian people." In this way, Ţigani (as ethnic Others) and *bişniţari* (as dishonest traders) were linked as enemy Others of the honest, productive Romanian ethnonation in the immediately post revolutionary period. Politicians used the image of the Tigani *bişniţari* against their opponents to capitalize on the concerns of voting Romanians. As long as the terms of the debate remained ethnicized through elite and media discourses of Hungarians, Jews and Ţigani against "the Romanian people," then the Tigan Other was a valuable tool for discrediting opposition and

---

Joshua L. Dorosin *Romania: a dream deferred the 1990 elections and prospects for future democracy* International Foundation for Electoral Systems. Dorosin notes there were 'genuine and documented instances of violence and intimidation of parties in opposition to the NSF in 1990 (p.10) and that there were 'reasonable complaints' by opposition parties about unfair limited access to media (p.2). Andrei Pleşu specified that *România Liberă* and *Adevărul* newspapers suffered from a lack of paper after they began opposing the NSF in early 1990, see Pleşu (with Petre Román and Elena Ştefoi) *Transformări, inerţii, dezordini: 22 de luni după 22 decembrie 1989* Polirom, Bucharest 2002. See also Capiţă (op cit), Mark Almond *The rise and fall of Nicolae and Elena Ceauşescu* Chapmans, London 1992, and Richard A Hall "The dynamics of media independence in post Ceauşescu Romania pp.102-123 in Patrick O'Neil *Post-Communism and the Media in Eastern Europe* Frank Cass, London and Portland 1997.

[448] Hall op.cit. p.102.

[449] Pleşu op.cit. p.63.

genuine popular protest. Ţigani and *bişniţari* became interchangeable signifiers of stereotypical discourse, not exactly synonyms but inextricably related.

Peter Gross's analysis of the Romanian media in this period stresses that television controlled by the National Salvation Front heavily relied on visuals of everyday chaos in public city spaces while major political events or discussions with the political opposition were ignored.[450] When anti-communist protesters gathered in *Piaţa Universităţii* against Iliescu becoming the President following the June 1990 election,[451] most Romanians watched the protest on television, which aired images of the protesters as mostly dark skinned ambient traders, as Ţigani *bişniţari*. The Ţigan Other of the socialist period, speculator, illegal trader and Other to 'state order,' was re-presented by Iliescu's postsocialist media as the familiar illegal and non-productive Other, this time threatening the stability of the

[450] Peter Gross *Mass Media in Revolution and National Development: The Romanian Laboratory* Iowa State University Press, Anies 1996.

[451] Iliescu was voted President with 85% of the popular vote, but many questions were raised concerning the electoral process. Former socialist Silviu Brucan referred to the June protests as a 'phenomenon of legitimate expression of the hostile feelings against the communist dictatorship.' Brucan *The Wasted Generation, Memoirs of the Romanian Journey from Capitalism to Socialism and Back* Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford 1993 p.190. Protesters in Piaţa Universităţii were composed of students and 'professionals like doctors, engineers, technical personnel and many skilled workers, whose services were likely to be in demand in a new market situation.' See Matei Calinescu and Vladimir Tismâneanu "The 1989 Revolution and Romania's Future" pp.42-59 in *Problems of Communism* Volume January-April 1991, p.55. For a thorough interrogation of the events of early 1990 see Katherine Verdery and Gail Kligman "Romania after Ceauşescu: Post-Communist Communism?" in Ivo Banac (ed) *Eastern Europe in Revolution* Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 1992 pp.117-147. For information about the role of the Securitate in the June protests see Mihai Sturdza "The Miners' Crackdown on the Opposition: A Review of the Evidence" pp. 25-33 in *Report on Eastern Europe* 11 January, 1991.

nation by protesting against the government. Ruxandra Cesereanu concludes from her analysis of major newspapers that protesters were most often referred to as 'thieves, opportunists, careerists, corrupt, businessmen, cheats, a nomenclatura of the streets, gangsters, and *lăutari.*'[452] The dominant image projected in these adjectives is that the protesters were criminals of various kinds, but the interesting descriptive name in the group is *lăutari*, which is the name of a group of Romani that specialize in music. In this case, Romani music signifies Ţigan identity. Furthermore, Cesereanu elaborated that one can see 'a racist inclination' in the way that newspapers referred to the 'Ţiganzation' of the *Piaţa Universităţii* protest.[453] Newspapers harked on the tents of participants (cortorari) as an invocation of Ţigan nomadism, thereby linking with *bişniţari*, and depicted participants as 'Ţigani hired for political *bişniţă,*' inferring that the government was even controlled by illegal kinds of trade offs.[454] Verdery and Kligman

---

[452] Cesereanu 2003 p.91. A poll conducted by the National Institute for Public Opinion found that 55% of the Romanians agreed with the miners coming on 14 June to violently disband the protest. Considering that most people were suspicious of the new governing elite as former socialists and also considering that most Romanians only received information about the protest in Piaţa Universităţii from the television and newspaper, one can calculate that 55% is a relatively low number of people who agreed with the NSF position on disbanding the protest. These statistics were first printed in "Ce gindesc Oamenii" in *Adevărul* July 18 1990 and cited in Dorel Abraham "Post-Revolutionary Social Phenomena in Romania: "The University Square" and the violent collective behaviour of June 13th to 15th" pp.121-130 in *Romanian Journal of Sociology* Issue 1-2 1990 p.130. For studies of how Lăutari relate to ethnicity, discrimination, and the word "Ţigan," see Paul Nixon *Sociality - Music- Dance: Human figurations in a Transylvanian valley* Goteburg University Press, Goteburg 1998 and Speranta Radulescu *Taifasuri despre muzica ţiganeasca / Chats about gypsy music* Paideia, Bucharest 2004.

[453] Cesereanu p.98.

[454] Ibid. It is also important to note that a year later, when the miners returned to

explicitly refer to the link between *bişniţari* and Ţigani in the *Piaţa Universităţii* protests;

> Petty commerce –called *bişniţa-* became a major element in publicity about the demonstration. Several newspapers, television, and other sources presented the demonstrators as *bişniţari*, also alleging that their tents were sites of prostitution and drug use. Significantly, Gypsies formed a high percentage of the *bişniţari*, which meant that what became a public condemnation of "petty commerce" in the demonstration was also a public condemnation of Gypsies. The issue ran deeper than the demonstration, for many Romanians see Gypsies as the principal villains in the ongoing shortages in Romanian society...The unfolding events thus conjoined racism and uncertainty about the consequences of marketization.[455]

A special 1990 Human Rights Watch report, however, draws a more direct link to media depiction of protesters as Ţigani (Gypsies) as a deliberate attempt to de-legitimize the opposition;

Bucharest to demand attention to their regional and occupational problems, they again chanted slogans against the faction that broke with Iliescu in the old discourses of ethnicized socialist thinking. The miner slogans in the 25-27 September 1991 marches were also 'Jos vînzătorii, hoţii, petre bişniţari' ("Down with sellers, thieves and Petre bişniţari" Cesereanu p.311.

[455] Verdery and Kligman op.cit. p.131

state controlled television has been accused of inciting the Romanian population to violence by its often inaccurate and inflammatory portrayal of Gypsies during the marathon demonstrations in *Piața Universității* in the spring of 1990. Television cameras often lingered on Gypsies who were selling goods in the square. This was a clear effort to discredit the political opposition by giving the impression that the majority of demonstrators were Gypsies (ie thieves, black market dealers and drifters). Television carried this inaccurate reporting further on June 13, 1990, when the director for the television services, Mr Valeriu, went on the air and announced that the television studios had been attacked and destroyed by the Gypsies, calling on the Romanian population to protect and defend the institution. During the following two days, June 14-15, vigilante mobs of miners arrived in Bucharest and among other things, sought out and attacked Gypsy quarters around Bucharest.[456]

Iliescu violently dispersed the protesters by calling the miners of the Jiu Valley to

---

[456] Human Rights Watch Report *Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Persecution of Gypsies in Romania* New York, September 1991 p. 88. Again in this case we see the problem with using "Gypsy" in English. In the report when they describe the media and words of Romanians, they translated Gypsy from Țigan, but when they say mobs attacked Gypsy quarters, it places this pejorative name on self identifying Roma people who do not necessarily identify with the name Țigan in the same way that it is used in Romanian mainstream discourse. In fact, through using the one English word "Gypsy" in this specific case, the injustice caused to Romani people precisely because they are identified as a pejorative Other is elided and the violence of this misrecognition re-enacted. For information concerning the revolution and human rights see Human Rights Watch Report *Since the Revolution: Human Rights in Romania* New York, March 1991.

march on Bucharest and assault protesters. The miners attacked innocent bystanders, protesters and people with dark skin that they came across in disparate parts of the city. Trains full of miners were sent to attack suburbs identified as "Ţigan places" with largely Romani populations far from the city.[457] The kind of people attacked indicate that miners, who chanted slogans against *bişniţari* and Ţigani, victimized those they could identify as Ţigan. Sam Beck notes that the government ordered 'Ţigan' street sweepers to clean up blood after the June 1990 protests, which 'reproduced Romanian stereotypes of Ţigan behaviour... supporting the predisposition of Romanians to despise them.'[458] Finally, in Iliescu's broadcasted thankyou speech to the miners he stated 'the enemies of the state are peripheral, parasites,' which echoed terminology used to identify and disgrace traders under socialism as Ţigani. The Ţigan Other of the socialist period, illegal trader and parasite of the state, was re-produced throughout major televised events of the revolution in order to sway public opinion against those who protested against Iliescu and the new government. Through televised images of the "speculating" Ţigan of the socialist period and post revolutionary trade in public space as a Ţigan *bişniţari* activity, Iliescu was in fact invoking the meaning of Ţigan non-Romanian Others as threats to the Romanian ethnonation.

---

[457] Verdery and Kligman, op.cit. 1992. Sam Beck "Opposition and Dissent: the Romanian opposition's symbolic use of space in June 1990" from the Working Papers on Transitions from State Socialism series, Cornell University Project on Comparative Institutional Analysis, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and New York.

[458] Beck op.cit. p.13.

By the end of 1990, Hate Watch had reported fifteen incidents of Romanian organized violence against Romani communities, and Vasile Burtea counted 47 cases of 'collective violence' against Romani communities between January 1990 and January 1998.[459] The governmental structures throughout this period did not intervene, but did continue to use the Țigan Other as elusive representative for the anxieties of the time. As a group of academics and activists discussed in 1994, 'the belief, accurate or not, that the police as well as other political authorities are supportive of, or indifferent to, violence against a minority is itself a contributor to ethnic tensions.'[460] In the Romanian case, the media consistently 'instrumentalized racism in the population and directed it against Roma.'[461] In extreme cases, such as the Hadarani massacre of 1991, the media made the Roma the cause of their own victimization and the lack of police intervention in the attack was presented in the media as an example of popular justice rather than a crime.[462] It is important to note again that if the media sided with Romanian violence against Romani people identified as Țigani, and the police were (and are) trained from manuals of media extracts, then knowledge of the criminality of the

---

[459] Vasile Burtea, *Rromii în Contextul Socio-economic al Dezvoltare Romaniei,* Doctoral Thesis, Faculty of Sociology, Psychology and Pedagogy, University of Bucharest, Bucharest 1993 p.137.

[460] Project on Ethnic Relations *Countering Anti-Romani Violence in Eastern Europe: The Snagov Conference and Related Efforts* Warsaw, September 1994.

[461] Katrin Reemstma "Between Freedom and Persecution: Roma in Romania" in Tore Bjorgo and Robert Witte *Racist Violence in Europe* St Martins Press, New York 1993 p.199.

[462] In Hadarani ethnic Romanians met in the town square with arms and marched together to the Romani area of town where they destroyed Romani owned houses and attacked Romani individuals in response to an alleged robbery of a local Romanian. See Cristina Hanganu "Cutting edge: the Romanian press and Roma 1990-94" *Roma Rights* Vol. 4 1999.

Ţigan *bişniţari* is produced in a closed circle. The PER report on mass media representation of Roma concluded that 'the failure of central authorities to publicly and persistently condemn ethnic violence sends ambiguous messages to a population already saturated with negative images of the Roma.'[463] I would argue, however, that there was no ambiguity in the stance of a government that did not prosecute police, army officers, or citizens who led attacks against Romani people as Ţigani, and even less ambiguity in the speeches of Iliescu that link a discourse of 'parasitical' Ţigani with images of Romani ambient traders. Stereotypical discourses of the Ţigan as *bişniţari* Other to postsocialist ethnonational Romanian identity were deliberately and relentlessly propagated by the post-revolutionary ruling elite and government.

Finally, the impact of elite discursive utilization of ethnic others has been studied by a number of Romanian analysts. Ioan Mihailescu's detailed study of popular discourses concludes that Romanian citizens had a distorted and contradictory understanding of the political scene.[464] Mihailescu notes that respondents overwhelmingly agreed that 'the critical economic and social state of the country is mostly due to hostile treacherous forces that want to harm Romania.'[465] The political scientist Alina Mungiu-Pippidi has also consistently interrogated the role of ethnic nationalism in different aspects of Romanian citizen activity and

[463] Project on Ethnic Relations 1997 op.cit. p.3.
[464] Ioan Mihailescu "Mental Stereotypes in the First years of Post-Totalitarian Romania" in *Government and Opposition* Vol.28, Issue 3, Summer 1993 p.318.
[465] Ibid. p.317.

identity. In a 2001 survey, Mungiu-Pippidi found that 62% of her sample believed 'there were groups within Romania that pose a threat to national sovereignty,' and 44.6% said there were ethnic groups in Romania that constantly act against the national interest.'[466] Mungiu-Pippidi takes this as indicative of 'paranoid nationalism,' and while anxieties of national sovereignty most likely relate to the Hungarian ethnic minority, the fact that paranoid nationalism has such a hold shows the centrality of the ethnicized discourse in postsocialist articulations of change and identity.

Far from being considered a marginal form of hate speech, the discourses of the right wing are pervasive and common in everyday life in Romania. During the presidential election campaign between the extremist Corneliu Vadim Tudor (Greater Romania Party) and Adrian Nastase (Social Democratic Party) in 2000, Tudor spoke on television without fear of reproach about the 'typology of the Ţigan mafia that always attacks in hate, controls the markets and violates not just children and their parents but all of our people.'[467] According to Vladimir Tismăneanu and Katherine Verdery, the media 'created a climate in which

---

[466] Only 15% disagreed with that there were groups that threatened national sovereignty. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Denisa Mândruţă "Ready for Europe? Deconstructing National Identity, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in post-communist Europe" pp.135-159 in Alexandru Zub şi Adrian Cioflâncă (eds) *Globalism şi Dileme Identitare: perspective româneşti* Editură Universităţii "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" Iaşi 2002 p.139.

[467] www.romanothan.ro/document/reports/rap_ue_romani.htm 'Programul de monitorizare a accesuluui UE. Drepturile minorităţilor în România (minoritatea romilor)' Protv 14-11-2000.

Tudor's inflammatory rhetoric of castigation appeared normal. [468] Despite losing the election, the Greater Romania Party did compete with an image accepted as close to mainstream.[469] Finally, Iliescu continued to rely on discourses that linked the Ţigan *bişniţari* Other with mysterious "monopolies" that controlled "the market." In February 2000, in a speech entitled "Trust in everyone and chances for all" Iliescu described the 'dangers of transition for Romania' as 'polarization, excessive greed, dictatorship, poverty, monopolies, social marginalization, discretionary and abusive barriers of the state, bureaucracy, suffocation of the markets, violence and criminality, lack of transparency in public administration.'[470] While half of these problems fell to his responsibility as President, the other half relate to the stereotypes of Ţigani *bişniţari* that became stronger in the late 1990s. For example, the stereotype of the Ţigan *bişniţari* as monopolizing and suffocating markets by using violence and bribing local administration remained powerful through the 1990s long after the visual power of the Ţigan *bişniţari* as ambient newspaper trader had faded. Stereotypes of Ţigani *bişniţari* now especially relate to the agricultural markets where people

---

[468] Vladimir Tismăneanu and Gail Kligman "Romania's First Postcommunist Decade: From Iliescu to Iliescu" *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol.10 No. 1 Winter 2001 p.6 of 10.

[469] See Cosmin Popa "Political Parties in Romania, 2000-2004: Between Tradition and Reform" pp.79-113 in Georgi Karasimeonov (ed) *Political Parties and the Consolidation of Democracy in South Eastern Europe* Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Institute for Political and Legal Studies, Sofia 2004 p.93-94.

[470] Gavrilescu 2002 p265. "Încredere în fiecare, şanse pentru toţi!" Motion presented at the Democratic Party National Convention, Bucharest, 18 Februarie 2000.

shop everyday and complain about the prices. This kind of Ţigan *bişniţari* is the focus of the following chapter.

Conclusion

Throughout the 1990s the Ţigan *bişniţari* Other enabled the articulation at elite, media and popular levels, of a postsocialist Romanian identity that was focused on an ethnic concept of the Nation. The Ţigan *bişniţari* Other was a visible symbol discursively constructed in multiple stereotypical discourses in order to deal with changes and anxieties regarding both new economic, ideological and social issues, and the anxieties of the recent past and the socialist regime. In a climate of confusion perpetuated by Ion Iliescu and the NSF's media control, people used discourses of the socialist period to grapple with new changes in everyday life.

One of the major changes was the influx of imported goods of unknown origin across previously closed borders, and the visibility of trade in the streets. This was widely considered illegal and immoral speculation, in line with socialist discourses, and street trade became the image that linked discourses about economic changes such as inflation and unemployment. The Ţigan *bişniţari* was non-productive and therefore still parasitical, the symbol to be blamed for loss of

enjoyment of consumption, especially as inflation escalated and the state refused to clearly explain or take action with issues of privatization or industry.

Other stereotypes of Ţigani, who had been considered ethnic others under socialism, were mobilized to explain postsocialist phenomena. For example the stereotype of Ţigani families as primitive, large and nomadic was part of the construction of an Other that crossed borders and co-ordinated trading ventures. The stereotypes of Ţigani as "natural" traders, cheats and social parasites were used to explain how traders made their prices outside of the closed socialist economy where prices had been established by the supposed cost of production. Also, the large families and criminality stereotypes combined to form the useful stereotype of a mafia network of Ţigani *bişniţari*, a vital link between visible street traders of small cheap goods with dark skin or Roma ethnicity (identified as Ţigani) and the seemingly inexplicable economic forces at play. Ţigani *bişniţari* could thereby be blamed for a lack of products and inflation, as well as general public space issues like political protest. All of these stereotypes displaced anxiety about the ethnic Romanian nation onto a Ţigan Other that threatened its existence.

The role of elite discourses in establishing and perpetuating the Ţigan *bişniţari* as central Other is significant. Iliescu continually used Ţigani *bişniţari* to explain away valid political opposition and to redirect popular confusion from issues of the political, ideological and economic structure of the state into the sphere of

ethnic threat to the Romanian nation. Iliescu perpetuated violence in his speeches, his direction of the television and print media, and he condoned violence against minorities identified as Țigani when it was perpetrated by the police and ordinary citizens.

SMILE ! YOUR HAVING A GREAT DAY

Chapter Five

The "mafia of vegetables" and the Ţigan *bişniţari* in Bucharest produce markets

In my everyday shopping encounters in Bucharest between 1997 and 2002, I was aware that shoppers consistently explained the cost of fresh produce as the consequence of a Ţigan *bişniţari* mafia that forced ethnic Romanian farmers to sell with high prices. Customers commonly referred to farmer traders as "real producers," (*producătorii adevăraţi*) and consumers explained the market pricing structure through concepts of mafia rather than free market forces of supply, demand or cost effectiveness. At the same time, produce sellers in the agricultural markets of Bucharest performed themselves as "real producers" in order to gain customer trust, deliberately invoking an elusive Ţigan Other as *un*real producer who usurped honest trade by buying and re-selling produce, effectively retail selling. It became clear that within the market place the economic practices of the traders themselves, wholesaling, retailing and earning a profit, were not the common discourses through which consumers and traders communicated in the space of the transaction itself. Instead, both parties performed the ethnicized discourse of "real" and "unreal" producers that relied on the Ţigan Other as *bişniţari* in order to enable a competitive market environment. In this chapter I explore the ways that traders in Bucharest's agricultural markets

in 2002 mobilized the *bişnițari* Țigan discourse in different situations as a way of understanding the central function of this ethnic other in Romanian society more than a decade after the opening of the market in 1990.

My research methodology consisted of media analysis of the "real producer" and market pricing discourses over a period of five years, with two months intensive observation and interviewing in three produce markets in Bucharest. The participation and interviews were completed in collaboration with a Romanian postgraduate student of the University of Bucharest, Faculty of Sociology. The three markets I studied were Piața Bucur Obor, with its reputation for the cheapest prices, the most "mafia" control and chaotic *țiganească* produce and ambience, Piața Amzei, an expensive, well reputed market between Piața Revoluției and Piața Romană in the center of town, and Piața Matache, a lesser known locally servicing market close to the north train station, *Gara de Nord.*[471] This chapter includes significant extracts of respondent narratives that I selected for their representative and insightful nature. My aim is to work from the starting point of respondents' articulations of their place in the market, the importance of the "real producer" and the shifting image of the Țigan Other that they project.

[471] For full details of the collaborative methodology see Appendix One.

Stereotypes of Ţigani and Bucharest spaces

The Ţigan Other located in the agricultural produce markets of Bucharest in 2002 was composed of a chain of stereotypes that incorporated the Ţigan *bişniţari* stereotype developed throughout the 1990s and discussed in the previous chapter. The Ţigan *bişniţari* Other, stereotyped as a trader who dishonestly profits without producing anything, is linked with stereotypes of mafia networks that control the prices in specifically agricultural markets to the detriment of the Romanian shopper. This discourse is pervasive in the media and in everyday life, and to explore its function one must also examine how traders of the market places are represented. In fact, the Romanian farmer, the "real producer," is articulated as the rightful trader of the agricultural markets, a privileged identity that is threatened by Ţigani "unreal producers," who are discursively constructed as "invaders" of the urban markets. The "unreal" Others of the "real producers" are identified interchangeably as Ţigani, *bişniţari*, speculators and *commercianţi*, each term linking with a range of different stereotypes and signifiers. This chapter will overview how the Ţigan Other as "mafia of vegetables" is constructed in media and trader discourses as a means of redirecting consumer stress and simultaneously producing the identity of an honest Romanian "real producer."

After twelve years of postsocialist open market economics, there remains a discourse that ethnicizes open-air market spaces as non Romanian, and specifically as "Ţigan places." In an informal conversation with a group of students about how non-Romanian travel guide-books depict Bucharest and Romanians in Bucharest in 2002, I was surprised that they took issue with a *Lonely Planet* suggestion that tourists visit Piaţa Bucur Obor market 'to experience the bustling chaos of Romania.'[472] Bucur Obor market is a loud, busy, and very big market full of traders and shoppers from all over the country. But the students were vocal and adamant that Bucur Obor was not a Romanian place, but a "Ţigan place." When I asked what exactly it meant for a place to be a "Ţigan place," they mobilized the stereotypical discourse of the Ţigan *bişniţari* who steals and illegally trades inferior quality goods (especially imported non-food products) for profit, and they described the market space itself as '*ţigănească*,' meaning "Ţigan style."[473] Of the three markets studied in this

[472] Informal discussion with sociology students at the University of Bucharest, 24 June 2002.

[473] As Oprescu notes, the word Ţigan is also used as an adjective in the form '*ţigănească*' to mean a place that is stereotyped as like/of Ţigani, meaning not Romanian, inferior quality, uncontrolled, dangerous and dirty. Out of curiosity I showed this one passage from the *Lonely Planet* to many other people of different generations, and it was mostly young people between 18 and 30 who took exception to Bucur Obor being named a Romanian rather than a Ţigan place. This generational specificity is a question beyond the scope of this chapter, though it is an important research question. Two reasons for this group to Other Bucur Obor might be that there were other options for young consumers in Bucharest by 2002 (shopping malls, privatised department stores) and they associated market shopping with older people. It is also possible that having been children at the time of the revolution, this generation does not appreciate the bustling fullness of an open-air market as do older generations that experienced

paper, only one is generally considered non- *ţiganească*, Piaţa Amzei, because it is a small neat produce-only market place in the very center of town, while Piaţa Matache and Piaţa Bucur Obor have all kinds of products as well as fresh produce. This discourse performed in informal settings in everyday Bucharest life illustrates that the perception of open market spaces was still a division between "good" trading spaces and "Ţigan" trading space in 2002, and that this discourse links with other popular ways of discussing prices and products that rely on the Ţigan Other.

Journalists, consumers and traders themselves use the Ţigan "mafia of vegetables" (*mafia legumelor*) to explain high market prices. This discourse details an elusive but ubiquitous Ţigan *bişniţari/commercianţi* mafia that forces honest Romanian peasants to sell fruit and vegetables at high prices, and remains preeminent over common capitalist concepts of supply and demand. At the heart of this narrative is the Romanian "real producer" identity as an honest Other being pushed out of the market place by dishonest non-Romanian Others. This particular projection of the Ţigan Other draws on anxieties of changing shopping practices and larger economic structures. This chapter begins with an overview of the privileged position of the Romanian peasant in Romanian market places throughout history, and then moves to a discussion of how the media and the traders themselves presented the Ţigan mafia/*bişniţari* Other in 2002. The second

---

severe shortage and shopping as a struggle through the 1980s. This chapter focuses only on market traders and shoppers in open-air markets.

half of the chapter is devoted to trader narratives of their own identities, and traces the reliance of their claims to "real producer" status on the Ţigan Other. All traders, to various degrees, perceived the market space as the natural place for "real producers" (*producătorii adevăraţi*) and articulated "unreal producers" (*producători neadevăraţi*) as a threat to the "real producers." The links between un-real producers, *bişniţari* and Ţigani are dynamic and shifting signifiers from a range of stereotypical tropes. The final section of the chapter is a discussion of how "real producers" ethnicize *bişniţari* as Ţigani to gain a degree of power through being a "real" trader in the competitive economic open market.

The privileged position of the Romanian peasant (*ţăran*) in the market

Romanian historian Lucian Boia argues that the peasantry has been 'considered the fundamental class of Romania society and the depositary of the national spirit and traditions.'[474] The Transylvanian school of academics first articulated a unitary "people" composed of the Romanian speaking, orthodox peasant communities in the eighteenth century.[475] Likewise, the nineteenth century Moldavian and Wallachian elite leaders of a movement for a modern Romanian

[474] Lucian Boia *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness* Central European University Press, Budapest 2001 p.70.
[475] Sorin Mitu *National Identity of Romanians in Transylvania* trans. Sorana Corneanu, Central European University Press, Budapest and New York 2001.

nation identified Romanian speaking peasants as the rightful citizens. These Romanian peasants were to be given their own land as a sign of their new place in a modern nation, consecrated as "the people" through land reform and through "unslaving" the Țigan Other.[476]

In Romanian folklore the *țăran* was stereotyped as honest and hardworking, albeit gullible and downtrodden. Romanian nationalists writing literature from the period of "national awakening" in 1848 romanticized these qualities as a "pure Romanian civilization." The lauded poet Mihai Eminescu identified in peasants 'the settled wisdom of a people that develops in conformity with its own genius.'[477] The Romanian archaeologist Vasile Pârvan described *țărani* as 'happy and good-humored in peacetime, furious and cruel only in war, but usually ruled by good sense, and always turning back to their ancient optimistic faith in gods and men.'[478] The development of the disciplines of psychology and philosophy in Romania also conceived a unique national identity based on a supposedly fixed peasant reality. The sociologist Constantin Radulescu-Motru, for example, wrote many works about developing a Romanian society based on 'peasantism'

---

[476] In fact, despite the attempted land reforms of 1864, peasants remained largely without land and economically bound to the *boier* classes until 1918. David Mitrany *The Land and the Peasant in Romania: the war and agrarian reform 1917-1921* originally Gale University Press, 1930. Reprinted by Greenwood Press, New York 1968.

[477] The words of Eminescu as cited by G. Panu *Amintiri de la "Junimea Vol.1"* Editură Remus Cioflec, Bucharest 1942 p.99-100 cited in Boia op. cit. p.39.

[478] Vasile Pârvan *Getica: O Protoistorie a Daciei* Cultura Națională, Bucharest 1926 p.173.

(*ţăranismul*) as a religion in harmony with 'the Romanian nature.'[479] The indigenous Romanian fascist movement of the interwar period, the Legionaires of the Archangel Michael, also turned to the rural Romanian peasant majority of the population for their support base, rather than the urban non-Romanian classes, combining a unique range of traditional peasant motifs and discourses.[480]

Prior to the socialist period, the place of Romanian peasant identity in the urban centers was in the open market place. Peasants with their produce were the bulk of the traders at the core of the geographical space of the market, while Roma ambient traders recognized as Ţigani often sold corn or flowers, played music or brought dancing bears to the periphery of the market. Marketplaces were an important place for all groups of society to meet and do business, and the actual structures showed how much attention was invested in the location. The central market place, named *Hala Unirii* and located in the space of what is now Piaţa Unirii, was built between 1865 and 1870 as a proud model of a French market hall

---

[479]Constantin Radulescu-Motru *Ţaranismul: un suflet şi o politică* Bucharest 1924 in Ioan Stanomir and Laurentiu Vlad *A fi conservator: antologie, comentarii şi bibliografie* University of Bucharest Institute of Political Research, Editură Meridiane, Bucharest 2002 p.363.

[480] For specific references about the relationship of the interwar Romanian fascist movements with the Romanian peasant as an ideal identity see Judith Keene, *Fighting For Franco: International Volunteers in Nationalist Spain during the Spanish Civil War, 1936-39* Leicester University Press, London and New York 2001 p.217-218.
Joseph Rothschild, *East Central Europe between the Two World Wars* University of Washington Press, Seattle & London 1974 p.307-308 and Eugen Weber "The Men of the Archangel" in George L. Mosse (ed.) *International Fascism: New Thoughts and New Approaches* SAGE Publications, London & Beverly Hills 1979 p. 317-343.

in Paris. This was one of the major structures, along with Bucharest's own *Arc de Triumf*, underground tunnels and coffee houses that justified Bucharesteans referring to their city as "Little Paris."

Under socialism, collectivization of agricultural land and other pushes to "modernize" the peasantry indicated that leaders considered *ţărani* well rooted in tradition and character, and thereby in need of severe treatment.[481] The resistance of small groups of peasants against the socialist government, in the forms of refusing to sign their lands to "the people" or deliberately killing a calf for meat rather than giving it to the collective, have been stories and signs at the heart of what dissident culture there was against socialism. It is true that under socialism formal discourse increasingly articulated peasants as "backward," but this was an ambivalent discourse, especially as people who moved into "modern" new apartment blocks in Bucharest in the 1980s very quickly realized the necessity of contacts in rural areas with whom they could trade goods for fresh food. In many

[481] Throughout the socialist period domestic production in rural households was heavily monitored (and resisted) and Ceauşescu's systematization drives of the 1970s and 1980s reflected the continuing socialist preoccupation with 'modernization' of the people through urbanization In fact Ceauşescu's systematization program had as harsh an effect in rural Romania as in its urban center. See Dinu C. Giurescu *The Razing of Romania's Past International Preservation Report* World Monuments Fund, The Bath Press, Great Britain 1990. For the effects of systematization see Gheorghe Leahu *Bucureştiul Disparut* Editură Arta Grafica, Bucharest 1994. Dorel Abraham "The Social Impact of the Built Environment Development Policy: From Central Planning to a Market Oriented Economy" pp.53-62 in *Romanian Journal of Sociology* Vol.II Issue 1-2 1991. Karina Kreja "Architecture and Urbanisation in the Real Socialism Times in Romania" in CST Transylvania http:///www.rrz.uni-hamburg.de/AEGEE/CST-TRANS/e_karina.html last accessed 6-12-1998.

ways this created a backlash of nostalgia for the *ţăran* way of life that the socialist citizen had to leave behind. Nostalgia for a supposedly dying way of (peasant) life was institutionalized by the State in the form of the Romanian Peasants Museum in Bucharest, a life-sized shrine to the traditional lifestyle of the Romanian peasant. While many ideas about what it meant to be "Romanian" shifted in the socialist period, the *ţăran* as the origin of "the Romanian people" remained a privileged identity in discourses of Romanian culture and identity.

I want to suggest a number of factors that enabled the *ţăran* and agricultural trade to remain a unique space in the everyday experiences of commerce for postsocialist Bucharesteans. Firstly, the agricultural market places remained in the same places they had been before the revolution, where they were state sanctioned spaces for socialist trade. Although Romanians knew that the state dictated price list displayed on the *mercurial* was the standard against which you offered to pay for quality goods, the fact that the *mercurial* remained in the early 1990s made the market place system of pricing seem continuous with socialist period pricing. As the market administrator of Piaţa Matache remembered, this semblance of an invisible hand determining prices was a reassuring sight for customers and even traders through the months of spiraling prices and inflation of the early 1990s.[482] This meant that trade experiences in the produce market places were not a chaotic haggling over a price set by the trader, but proceeded as

[482] Personal interview with the market administrator of Piaţa Matache 13 July 2002.

they always had under socialism, with the price being set by supply and demand, but seeming to be set by the state.

Products in the agricultural markets also remained the same as in the socialist period, limited in the winter months and abundant in the spring. This pattern reassured consumers that the products were from Romania; their origin was known to be of the nation, rather than unknown goods. New imported products, such as bananas, symbolized the opening of borders, but were not sold on the same tables as the staple market produce. Finally, the agricultural markets were not locations of makeshift ambient traders or imported goods; those places were separate from the fresh produce markets, which remained calm and without new traders (at the beginning). The agricultural market came to represent a moral space of trade in the postsocialist period due to the fact that they appeared just as they had under socialism.

As many state businesses closed in the postsocialist period, more Romanians returned to former family owned small land plots and villages to make a living from subsistence farming. By the year 2002 Romania ranked second in Europe with 51.4% of the population considered 'rural' and 41.7% of the national labor force employed in agriculture.[483] As Kaneff notes in his study of small farmer traders at Bulgarian markets, the shame of turning from an esteemed profession

[483] "Eurostat" cited in The Commission on Romania's Progress Towards Accession *Annual Report on European Union Accession 2000* published 8 November 2000 p.18.

such as teaching (with a low state salary) to trading in the market could be tempered by the pride of selling produce that one produced in excess of subsistence level.[484] In this way, agricultural trade was seen as a legitimate part of the honest productive work of farming, a very different image to that of *bişniţa*, or traders of goods not produced by the seller. The traditional centrality of the *ţărani* identity to Romanian ethnonational identity combined with the traditional importance of the space of the agricultural market ensured that these markets remained unique locations in everyday postsocialist economic discourse.

Finally, in the years since 1990 there has been a demystification of cross-border petty trading and everyday concepts of trade, markets and currency. One example Verdery details regarding the pyramid schemes of the mid 1990s, is that these "scams" re-organized the ways that people dealt with money. Western style supermarkets have moved into the Romanian market and encouraged particular ways of understanding trade and pricing, and market research has shown that young professionals are drawn to these supermarkets for the wider variety of international products available, and because they are perceived as cheaper than shopping in the markets.[485] Many more people have also traveled across international borders now, or know someone who has. Agricultural produce, however, is still widely depicted in the media as valued by its honest production

[484]Deema Kaneff "The Shame and Pride of Market Activity: Morality, Identity and Trading in Postsocialist Rural Bulgaria" pp.33-51 in Ruth Mandel and Caroline Humphrey *Markets and Moralities* Berg, Oxford and New York 2002.
[485] One can access a range of statistical polling results by Daedalus Consulting on http://www.daedalus.ro/en/index.php?P=319 last accessed 21-11-2005.

costs, and is presented as a product that should not be devalued by trading for profit.

The unique place of agriculture may stem from the fact that it is seen as a product of the natural resources of "the nation," thereby considered a kind of natural wealth. Indeed, the media often patronizes farmers and farming as passive and innocent (and naïve and ignorant), requiring protection from modernization as if they are a kind of "native species" of ethnic Romania. A newspaper article in 2003, for example, argued against a government proposal to give farming plots to Roma Romanian illegal migrants sent back from France, by stating that *țărani* are gullible, that Țigani have no affinity with working the land, and that 'the government has an obligation to leave the *țărani* in peace, otherwise the bread of Romania will suffer much.'[486] This discursive construction of agriculture is unique amongst other spheres of everyday economics, which have changed to reflect more market orientated understandings.

Postsocialist *țărani* in Bucharest are therefore the "real producers" who belong in market spaces. The focus of state and EU projects to renovate open-air markets for hygiene, including the construction of new air-conditioned buildings for dairy and meat produce, has consolidated the traditional role of market places. The

[486] This article makes it clear that ethnic Roma or Țigani cannot be *țărani,* and that Romanian *țărani* are considered a special category that should be protected from 'the blasphemy' of inter-ethnic communities. See Cosma Popiliu "La sapa, manca-ti-as" *Cronica Română* 29 August 2003.

press presents these renovations to the public as consistent with how market places are traditionally valued in Bucharest. In this way, attempts to open wholesale agricultural acquisition centers where farmers sell to retailers who then sell in the markets with permits stating the origin of the produce (so with an acquisition certificate citing the number of the farmer's production certificate) have been misconstrued in line with old discourses about markets that place the real producer in the market. The public understands recent changes in very different ways to the EU (inspired) reformers. The aim to move the farmer out of the market to make way for retail selling is constructed in the press as the "real producer" under threat from an outside force, the Ţigan mafia, specifically the "mafia of vegetables." This ethnic Other fits with established postsocialist discourses of the Ţigan *bişniţari* and keeps public discussion at the level of an ethnicized threat of the Other against the Romanian, rather than about economics. The following section looks at how the media and the traders themselves understand the "real Producer's" place in the market, and the vital role of the Ţigan Other in the articulation of this place.

Media productions of the "real producer" and the Ţigan mafia of vegetables

The way that the media produces the "real producer" as rightful trader constantly threatened by the Ţigan Other in Bucharest's markets is a powerful discourse for

multiple reasons. Extracts from the media showcase the different aspects of the stereotypical discourse of the Ţigan Other and enable a deconstruction of the factors that combine to produce the "real producer" through that which threatens it. The media is a very powerful opinion-making and discourse propagating tool, in line with Konstantinov's observation that non-trading groups and actors (such as journalists and shoppers) most often produce the discourses explaining market trade. Traders in market places are agile at utilizing multiple discourses of their place and experience, and it is vital that they can perform the discourses customers expect in order to establish trust and an economic relationship with their clients. An examination of media discourses of the "real producer" therefore enables us to understand how customers expect traders to act, but it is also a fact that traders themselves read and see the media and can place themselves in the pervasive discourses of broader society. This section thereby overviews media discourse of the "real producer" and its vital Ţigan Other as a prerequisite for an examination of how and when traders articulate themselves as "real producers" and the role of the Ţigan Other in such a mobilization.

As a strategic point of departure, the Romanian media has consistently confused one basic reform implemented under European Union accession processes, that of having two kinds of permits, production and acquisition, in the market place. Media reports (until 2005) of wholesale and retail facilities and the legality of traders in the markets (who can be producers or retailers) all present the issue as one of allowing "real producers" to sell in the market places. Instead of

addressing the clear fact that retailers are legal in the markets as well, journalists use various strategies and often mobilize the "invisible hand" of a Țigan mafia to explain government reforms and everyday market issues.

One article entitled "Government inventories encourage the mafia of the market" argues that the government should check production certificates at the farms rather than wasting the time of the 'honest producers' in the market place.[487] Such a recommendation acts on the assumption that only farmers should be in the market. The article stipulates that farmers should be checked at the farms because 'intermediaries with certificates who inflate prices,' are in the markets forcing 'real producers' to sell with higher prices. The inference of the term 'intermediaries with certificates' is that these are non-producers with false production certificates. In fact 'intermediaries with certificates' are retailers with acquisition permits just as legal as production certificates, but this article demonstrates the media construction that only farmers ('honest producers') have the right to sell in the market. The headline link between government policy and encouragement of 'mafia of the market' demonstrates the ways that the signifier 'mafia' fits easily with the concept of an invisible controlling hand behind economic factors.

---

[487] Valentin Mateescu "Invenții guvernamentale de încurajare a mafiei piețelor Controlul certificatelor de producator la sursă a fost uitat de Blănculescu" *România Liberă* 22 Octombrie 2004.

Another example of how the media constructs "real producers" within reports of agricultural sector reforms was an article in the daily spreadsheet *România Liberă* in March 2003.[488] The article calls for government subsidization of space for vegetable producers in wholesale centers, and is (despite the usual demand for state intervention in the market) a logical and factual account of how badly organized commercial societies of farmers simply failed to pay their rent. Amidst this clear description of how the farmers lost their space in the center because they failed to pay rent, however, the author states that 'anyway, peasants prefer to take their goods directly to the street markets of Bucharest or other cities.'[489] This comment insinuates that the "real" problem is that peasants prefer selling in the marketplaces as opposed to wholesale selling. In the context of the information presented, this sentence makes no sense other than to remove the "real producer" from a discussion of players in the wholesale and retail produce market and re-

[488] Aida Dănăila "Dacă Piata de Gros Bucureşti s-a mai revigorat, în centerle de colectare bate vântul" *România Liberă* 18 Noiembrie 2003. Another article on the same topic of closed wholesale infrastructure in August 2004 began with the prelude "For a long time we have heard nothing from the government but that they are fighting to stop speculation in the markets, so that fruit and vegetables will be sold at lower prices. The truth is totally different to the reality presented by the state, which, through its passive attitude and lack of concrete measures, in fact encourages speculation in the market." The author recognizes that wholesale selling would stop 'speculation' (which I take to be black market wholesale acquisition) but he fails to recognize that legal acquisition can take place anywhere as long as the documents are noted, and he makes a confused assumption that institutionalized wholesale acquisition will result in cheaper prices. Unsigned "Centru de colectare ridicat cu bani europeni, transformat în depozit de haine. Statul încurajează specula în piețe" *România Liberă* 09 August 2004.

[489] Dănăila, op.cit.

place them where they belong, in the open-air produce markets selling directly to the public.

The focus of media reports concerning the fresh produce markets was most often high prices, and articles most often blamed Ţigan *bişniţari* mafia for these prices. In my personal experience, one has to search in government reports or agricultural journals, or speak to farmers or economists, to find answers other than "Ţigani" for the high prices of fresh produce. As sociologist Vasile Burtea notes, since 1990 the range of mainstream media sources have consistently 'played on the idea that prices can be explained as interethnic conflict rather than a market reality' by perpetuating the concept of a Ţigan mafia of traders who control "real producers" and the pricing system of the market.[490] In the following passage Burtea outlines how anxieties about new market forces are projected to the public as caused by "interethnic stress," with the focus on 'Ţigan speculators' rather than market realities.[491]

> Bucur Obor Market and Matache Market are dominated by Roma, and the "speculated price" that you can see practiced there is the cheapest in Bucharest, even in all the country. Speculation is the illegal practice of those who have commerce "in their blood," those who learnt it from the

[490] Vasile Burtea *Rromii în Contextul Socio-economic al Dezvoltăre României* Doctoral thesis for the University of Bucharest, Department of Sociology, 1993 p.122.
[491] Ibid.

streets, and it is important because they make more profit than with a fixed price. Those with fixed prices know it and to salvage something despite their deficiencies, they tell stories of interethnic stress, which hurried journalists then tell to readers governed by sensationalism. Then the traders offer their fixed price to the public as a sign of their good intentions and their position of power, which doesn't exist in the reality of everyday life. In fact their protective measures are nothing but vulgar signs of disdain in the face of those they govern; offering them false explanations and solutions, moving attention from their pathetic actions to the more spectacular and convenient zone of interethnic relations. If producer-seller-consumer relations work conforming to the prescriptions of politicians, journalists or the Government, the producers spend more than they earn, produce doubles in price, traders have to sell at impossibly high prices, and the consumers will have to do a purifying fast. Much more than this and much more seriously, the interethnic domain will become the theater of confrontation, with the most dire consequences.[492]

The following extract from *Ţiganii: Myth and Reality*, a text published with funding from the Romanian Minister of Culture, is a more direct performance of the ethnicized "mafia of vegetables" discourse.[493]

---

[492] Burtea op.cit.

[493] Niculae Crişan *Ţiganii: Mit şi Realitate* Editură Albatros, Bucharest, with the support of the Ministry of Culture of Romania, 1999.

No mafia of the first grade have withdrawn from their practices, you can observe them in the big markets of the cities and of the capital where the majority of stalls that sell vegetables, fruit and greens are held by Țigani. They stay the night until dawn, lying in wait for the peasants at the city limits, they buy all the goods wholesale then transport them to the tables, where they decide amongst themselves to set the price and sell the goods for extra profit. Doing this is not so simple, because the law does not permit traders other than the agricultural produce Editură rs, and then Țigani, who are not workers of land and gardens, make false "production certificates" to present to the market controls; they buy under the table from the authentic producers, even from the village mayors, or they grease the handles of diverse doors in the many institutions with powers in this area, in other words they are the underground spring, which is not insignificant, of corruption in the rural areas and local administration.'[494]

In this account, Crişan directly states that only "real producers" can sell in market places, which was simply not true at the time he wrote this text. Amongst the stereotypes of the Țigan mafia of vegetables are historical stereotypes. Țigani supposedly do not work the land, yet they constitute pervasive illegal networks that lurk on the peripheries of cities at night, in the market, and even surreptitiously in village city councils. This narrative strongly resembles the

[494] Crişan op.cit. pp.155-156.

common discourse as it was performed amongst consumers in everyday life in 2002, a narrative I was familiar with in Bucharest prior to this specific research.

For an example of how "an everyday person" can invoke the Ţigan *bişniţari* Other it is also useful to look at internet chat sites as a resource. Though the identities of individuals posting messages is not known, one can easily access messages posted over a long period of time and assess their context in a chain conversation of texts.[495] In the politically moderate and easygoing virtual forum of *Cafeneaua* in 2004, for example, a posted question asking "Why is Romania so expensive?" received a number of answers, amongst which the following was written.[496]

> Maybe you don't know that the agricultural markets in Romania are controlled by *bişniţari/rromi*, who buy produce from peasants for next to nothing and resell it twice as expensive. They tried the introduction of production certificates - a legitimation for the peasant-seller to show at the gate of the market but it is completely since the production certificates

[495] The sheer volume of matches for a google.com search of the words "Ţigan *bişniţari*" or "mafia Ţigani" highlight that the discourses are pervasive in virtual chatting discourses about a wide range of topics, as well as in actual market places.

[496] Racist comments in the press and the internet are increasingly attacked, due in part to the young Romani community involved in intensive internet and media watch projects. This response did not cause a stir amongst the chatters, and was not attacked as a racist comment.

are also purchased with money. In concrete terms, marketers (*pieţar*) in Romania have much bigger incomes than engineers or economists.[497]

It is interesting to note that the author blames *bişniţari/Rromi* (the implications of spelling *Rromi* this way will be addressed in the following chapter) for prices in the market, but also depicts the authorities ("they" of the market) as being corrupt, bribed to give false certificates. A newspaper report in *Cronica Româna* in 2003 also presents the opinion of the administrator of the market in question, in a way that exemplifies Burtea's observation that those involved in trade utilize the Ţigan Other to justify and explain pricing structure. Note however that this article was published a full decade after Burtea's description, with the same discourse that was pervasive in the early 1990s. The article was headlined "Ţigani monopolize the agricultural market of Baia Mare."[498]

Peasants are obliged to sell produce to Ţigani at the market entrance and then it is resold at a price 15-20% higher. The Mayor has affirmed that "pure and simple, peasants are robbed on the highway." The Ţigani with stalls have production certificates issued by the correct authorities. The director of the market (Florin Adiel) asked "How can we encourage

---

[497] Unsigned Scump # 8730, 2 February 2004. http://www.cafeneaua.com/node/view/500.

[498] "Ţigani au monopolizat pieţele agroalimentare din Baia Mare" *Cronica Română* cited in Inforom 20-08-2003, Anul 3 Nr. 606. As time passes, scandals about agricultural markets continue to be reported more in the regions of Romania, and especially in Braşov and Moldova in 2003 and 2004.

someone to make commerce with agricultural goods when they are not their produce? The Ţigan sellers put on an additional commercial price rise, which is enough, luckily, to prevent them selling the produce. Society cannot make a *mercurial* and cannot chase away people with production certificates. Ţigani pay rent on their stalls. From a legal point of view it's perfectly covered and I don't know what the local authorities can do."[499]

In this account, both the Mayor and the market administrator denounce high prices in the market as the result of non-producer Ţigan activities and reaffirm the market place as the domain of peasants, who are threatened by non-Romanian non-producers. It is interesting that the journalist presents both the administrator and the government as without fault; the blame is placed on an implied legalized ethnic network of "highway robbery." This displacement of economic factors onto established discourses of Ţigani as thieves is used throughout society, even (or especially) by mayors and market administrators who could easily explain the facts of retail stalls in the markets through profit margins for traders. The Ţigan Other is invoked in order to Other the 'additional commercial price rise' (the profit margin) of the ethnic Romanian "real producer," enabling the latter to remain constructed as an honest worker in the socialist discursive sense, one who doesn't work for profit, but for "the people."

[499] "Ţigani au monopolizat pieţele agroalimentare din Baia Mare" op.cit.

Yet another Romanian media example of the discourse implicates wholesale buying structures in the discourse of Ţigan "speculators" threatening "real producers" in their place as market traders.

> "Speculation in the market continues without measure." This is what the producers say, that especially Ţigani, with certificates obtained from relatives and from the mayor's of the regions, burst in through wholesale markets or the big markets such as Obor, beginning from 5 o'clock in the morning, they buy goods from the real producers at low prices, most often obtained through blackmail and threats and then they sell them in all the markets with enormous prices. The obstinacy of the authorities: that they don't see. Is this good?[500]

Even in the "intellectual" press, there have been rare but insightful treatments of the specific discourse of Ţigan mafia in Bucharest's agricultural markets. The weekly journal *Dilema* published an investigative assessment of how 'free and organized' the largest Bucharest market, Bucur Obor, was.[501] The journalist questioned the administrator as to whether any kind of 'mafia' controlled "real producers," to which the administrator responded 'the word Mafia is in fashion, but its application to Obor is an exaggeration.' Despite this statement, the journalist concludes that 'in spite of small abuses, when sellers, usually Romi,

[500] http://www.jurnalulnostru.from.ro/topstiri.htm, under subtitle "Specula," last accessed 26-11-2005.
[501] Andrei Manolescu "Libertate şi reguli în Obor" *Dilema* Vol. 226

who are more united, "reserve" tables during the night, not leaving places for the peasants...Obor can be called free.'[502] In this case, even after a direct rebuttal, the journalist still ends the article with a stereotype of Ţigani as "more united," an allusion to mafia-style tactics against the peasants familiar to us from the previous chapter.[503] The Ţigan Other in this specific construction facilitates the production of a "real producer" as naturally placed in the market, thus maintaining the privileged location of the Romanian peasant in Bucharest's marketplaces even in their physical absence.

Ţigani *bişniţari* stereotypes therefore frame the production of the Romanian "real producer" identity as privileged inhabitant of Bucharest's agricultural markets. The Ţigan Other in particularly postsocialist form is vital for the maintenance of the produce market space as a unique location for discussions of issues such as ethnicity and everyday economics. The entire discourse of the Ţigan mafia that forces "real producers" to raise prices or sell to retailers is used in the media and the public to explain problems such as inflation, open market price settings, the role of wholesale and retail and their respective roles in the market, and the place of the Romanian peasant in the postsocialist consumption experiences of urban citizens. The next section explores how traders themselves negotiate their own place in these popular discourses and in their personal trading experiences.

---

[502] Ibid.

[503] The fact that the author uses the word Romi, in my opinion and as will be discussed in the next chapter, is a sign of the political correctness of substituting "Romi" for the word 'Ţigan." This is not the influence of the *Dilema* journal, as they named a whole issue "Ţigani" only some months later.

"Real producers" talk about the market

Traders in the fresh produce markets of this research project articulated themselves as both the "real producers" from the popular discourse formerly discussed, and also as agents within a capitalist market who worked hard to make a profit.[504] Overall, traders seemed to narrate themselves as "real producers" who deserved a privileged place in the markets, and this was noticeable even in the ways that they described their experiences of wholesale and retail selling. Traders clearly understood the structure of market stall costs (with the expensive stalls at the front and the cheaper at the back) and of the different permits needed for selling and buying produce, yet they consistently obfuscated the administrative structure of the market to present the farmer as the only rightful trader in the market. Rather than this being a conscious strategy in interviews, traders seemed to genuinely understand their capitalist dealings with the market simultaneously with the "moral" meanings of trade that were socialist period discourses. The minority of market traders who were under about 40 years of age were more likely to construct their experiences in the market discursively in capitalist terms of cost effectiveness and profit rather than as "real producers" and Others. Finally, traders did refer to ethnic Others that threatened their positions in

[504] This section and the remainder of the chapter relies heavily on interviews I conducted over a two month period of participant observation in the markets in Bucharest. Quotations are taken from taped interviews or interchanges taped with the permission of the respondents. These cassettes are in the possession of the author in Sydney, Australia.

different ways, but in more generalized and secondary ways than in the popular discourse of Ţigan mafia.

Traders used the terms Ţigani, *bişniţari*, *comercianţi*, or a "mafia," or simply "they" interchangeably to refer to anyone who made their work more difficult. By shifting between terminology and signifiers of these actors, traders perpetuated the discourse of a pervasive but elusive Other, rather than blaming a specific group of identifiable individuals in their workplace. In this section I use extracts from trader dialogues in order to analyze the different discourses used by traders, with the focus on the "real producer" self-articulation and then specifically how traders invoke ethnicity within this frame.

Throughout the research, traders almost always insisted on showing me their production certificate, explained that it was "real"(*adevarat*) and then told me that you could buy one for 500 000 lei at the city hall. It was clear from the beginning that traders considered it very important that I, as a researcher, believed they were "real producers" and knew not to trust everyone who had one of these certificates to be an authentic "real producer." The only trader who began by showing us her acquisition (as opposed to production) certificate was a woman who identified herself as ethnic Roma, and displayed her document with the phrase 'Why should I be ashamed to acquire and sell goods in the market? My family is poor, I have

no land, I sell what I can afford and hope to work tomorrow.'[505] It was therefore only a trader marginalized by her ethnicity, poverty and physical appearance (as dark skinned signifying Ţigan) signifying these factors that stated her legal status as an acquisition trader, and even then with a primary vocal refutation of this as a 'shameful' status, highlighting that it is usually perceived as such.

In general, traders articulated "real producers" as the rightful traders of fresh produce markets. One old woman, for example, lamented that

> I am old and its hard to bring the vegetables to Bucharest, but the retailers are taking over now, and acid rain is killing the crop. Young people from the peasants should do something to keep the markets going.[506]

In this presentation, the trader doesn't articulate her interests by "market" standards of labor and cost effectiveness, for instance by recognizing that it would be in her interests to sell to the retailers, but rather places retailers with other threats to production such as acid rain. The assumption of the trader is that peasants should be selling their own produce at the markets. Another trader in Piaţa Amzei, a young man who began to work in the market only since he lost his job in 1997, stated that while the parking and the administration was good in the market, the lack of a special section for "real producers" made it hard to find a

[505] Piaţa Matache 15 July 2002 #15.
[506] Piaţa Amzei, 3 July 2002 #1.

place.[507] Despite having told me that he was formerly employed in a factory, and now as full time trader, the interviewee showed us his Certificate of Production, and explained that you have to pay 500 000 lei to the mayor for a false certificate, but that his certificate was real. This series of actions; showing the certificate, pointing out that it was for production, saying that you can buy a false one at the city hall, and then insisting that the certificate in question was "real," was performed by the vast majority of traders in recorded and off-the-record interactions. This highlights a priority amongst traders to prove a "real producer" identity, at least to interviewers 'from the university.'

An older female trader in Piața Amzei responded to the question "Has anything changed for the better since 1990?" with the following dialogue:

> Absolutely nothing, nothing; before we could sell, now we can't. My husband heard on the radio that the prefectures of Bucharest said producers should have priority, the state should give them stalls, the people that run the market should talk nicely to them. Now, as a producer, nobody talks nicely to you or gives you a stall, here is a mafia that no one escapes from, from the city hall to the lower levels.
>
> Interviewer - What does the mafia do?
>
> They give the good stalls to the people with (*gesture, under the table money*), for example an old lady came to the market without a license last

[507] Piața Amzei, 15 July 2002 #4.

year and they threw all her produce in the street and the woman started to cry, she had no stall no place to put the produce. Now they want to make changes in the market, and there won't be enough room for all of us. Now all the products are given as a bribe to the city hall. Everyday they come from city hall with cars to load up with goods,

Interviewer - Do you have anything else to say about what happens here?

I have a lot to say, but I can't, we are too small...for instance I went home for two months to work the potatoes and when I came back this stall was given to someone else.

(Pause)

Back home there was a deputy minister who still worked the land; how good it is for a man to know the land and how to hoe. He who works the land, no matter what position he has, will work, he who is educated to work will work no matter what his profession is, he who is taught to steal will steal just the same.

(Pause)

What would Stefan the Great say now to see all the Turks back in Romania?[508]

There are various points in this dialogue worth addressing. In the first place, this woman notes a distinct depreciation in the social standing of the producer in the market after 1989, and included this devaluation and disrespect as an important

[508] Piața Amzei, 15 July 2002 #3.

change. One of her statements is that the state should provide the stalls for the producers, an opinion that relies on the state as controlling and planning the economy.[509] She reacts to the injustice of an old female peasant without a license being thrown out of the market because she thinks that the rightful place of the producer is in the market, and that the concept of paying for a license is thereby a form of theft. In her discourse, city hall is invested with the power to give producers respect and to take it away ("now, as a producer, nobody talks nicely to you.") The mafia, therefore, becomes "city hall," a network of impenetrable and invisible logic and connections. She even gives an example of an anonymous government official who was unique in that he 'worked the land,' highlighting her concept of "real" labor as productive rather than administrative. The respondent made a final inference that a foreign ethnic group had taken over "again." I am sure that she does not really believe that ethnic Turks have returned, but uses this as an allegory of non-European non-Christian foreign domination, a vague reference that, as with her understanding of the role of the state, harks back to socialist period perceptions of national defensiveness rather than open trade and a market economy. This final comment provides insight into the usefulness of ethnicization of threats to "the nation" amongst Romanian traders.

[509] It is useful to note that in Piața Amzei stall holders pay their rent daily, and it is the common system of paying more for the stalls closest to the front of the market. A receipt is given for each transaction, and stall holders need to pay for their table while they are away if they wish to reserve the place.

Interviews with market administrators showed that on the question of who should be in the market, their answers differed according to their age. The younger 32 year old had worked as a market administrator since 1992 and argued that 'retailers are the future of the market. Why do the peasants come? They have work to do with the land, and in the supermarket now you can buy all kinds of things, whatever you want. This way of selling, with variety, is the future.'[510] This is a post-1990 understanding and vocalization of consumption and trade.

In an interview with a 49 year old administrator who had worked in Bucharest markets since he was 17, he showed an adherence to the idea that only real producers should be in the marketplace by his confused articulation of the role of retailers, despite his clear understanding of the paperwork and permits that makes them legal. In response to the question 'Are the majority of traders here people who grow the produce themselves?' he answered

> There are more categories of people that sell here now; commercial agents that buy and sell, speculators, they pay taxes, all that stuff, then the other category is from Bucharest, *şmecheri* (cheats). People call them speculators, but they are not speculators, you should not sell the stuff because...it's wrongly understood this word, they have a bad intention. If you want to sell stuff with a higher price, nobody will buy it from you, so the speculator uses the same price as everyone else, the difference is, he

[510] Piaţa Amzei, 11 July 2002.

goes to the peasant's place and buys 1000 kg and the peasant is satisfied he doesn't have to drive, use the gas, any other kind of arrangement, and then he sells it for 5000 lei. I give you the numbers of cucumbers, it's normal, the trick is to get the paper from the community of the peasant, you go and pay that secretary 100 000 lei and they write on the certificate of production potatoes, onions, tomatoes, anything you want... he doesn't even know what the seed of the vegetables looks like! But if they were fair at the city hall they wouldn't write all these vegetables. He only has 100 square meters and on the certificate is written potatoes, onions, everything....its all legal here at the market, the *şmecherie* (trick) is done at the city hall.[511]

The most important point is that the only word the market administrator uses for those who buy the goods from the peasants for retail, even with acquisition certificates, is "speculator," a word with totally negative connotations. He has difficulty clarifying the difference between legal and illegal "speculators;" he had trouble because the term only enables the negative stereotypical identity of an illegal trader. The administrator explains a scenario of a trader buying bulk goods from the peasant as a negative procedure in itself, even though he ponders aloud that peasants are "satisfied" by these deals and that these traders sell the produce in the market at the same price as the peasants. The administrator resolves this paradox of why commercial agents are bad by invoking the common

[511] Piaţa Matache, 14 July 2002.

discourse of speculators as false producers, as bribing officials for production certificates (illegal activity) rather than trading with acquisition certificates. In this description, the administrator displaces the *şmecherie* to other formal institutions outside the market place, such as local governments, just as traders do. At the same time he presumes, through articulating speculators as those 'who don't even know what the seed of the vegetable looks like,' the market as a place for real producers of agricultural goods. This older administrator discursively constructs the market place as privileged location of peasants while the younger administrator communicates in the open market discourse of retailers providing better products to the customer and service to the farmers. This highlights the impact of socialist period discourses on the way postsocialist changes are understood in the case of the produce market as a place for "real producers" distributing their goods according to their production value, rather than market forces determining prices at exchange value and separating the product from the "real producer" at the point of sale.

The following dialogue between the interviewer and three middle-aged male traders at a stall introduces one way that the concept of Romanian ethnic "real producers" in markets meets with the Others of "the mafia" and "the government."

> A- Here in the market it is the exploitation of men by men, the market is not controlled or exploited by specific people.

B- No, its controlled by the mafia…

A- Yes, here in the market you can see, I came here five years ago with grapes and they kicked me out…

Interviewer-who is the mafia? Are they together with the administration?

A- yeah, the administration are the most corrupt, that's where the money goes.

(he points at a stall and says) –They are un-real producers (*producătorii neadevărați*)

C- She doesn't even know how the tomatoes are grown!

B- Don't point around because they can see us!

A- Intruders (*intruşii*) we call them. There is no control of this, I have been here for a week and I haven't seen anyone.

B- I've been here several years and I have only seen one control. And then all the stalls were empty. (*meaning people knew there would be an inspection*)[512]

Interviewer-So how should the market be?

A- There should be certain people that make controls.

Interviewer- And how should things change?

A- People are too afraid to talk. For example, my wife has a second child now and she doesn't receive any social assistance money for this child,

[512] Chelcea notes that inspections in the marketplaces were usually forewarned, providing more of a media spectacle of 'asserting public authorities' care for the citizens' and a 'feel good strategy,' than a serious attempt to 'improve the purchasing power of the population.' Chelcea op.cit. p.136.

but Adrian Nastase talks about the declining birth rate; Romanians should have more babies, of course this is because he does nothing to support the people! Until Vadim Tudor comes to clean it up (*se face curăţenie*), but maybe they're also watching for me...maybe they will then see me as belonging to the other side.[513]

The "mafia" in this case are not 'specific people,' except for those pointed out as "un-real producers." When the interviewer asks for specific suggestions to make things better, the trader deflects the direct question by saying that people are afraid to talk, but perhaps we can understand from his narrative that he feels there is no one specific to talk about ("no specific mafia") and no one to complain to ("someone certain should make the controls.") In response, this trader turns to the ethnonationalist defensive discourse of needing to have a greater ethnic Romanian population, a powerful rhetorical device from the period of Ceauşescu's Romania. Respondent A openly places his political loyalties with the formerly communist radical ethnonationalist Corneliu Vadim Tudor, who also heavily relies on rhetoric of a non-specific, government supported, ethnicized mafia. The general and shifting Others in this dialogue are typical of the ways that traders talked amongst themselves in the markets researched. While media discourses pinned economic experiences to a central concept of a Ţigan mafia Other, trader discourses focused more on the central role of the "real producer" and generalized threats to this position across a range of ambiguous Others.

[513] Piaţa Amzei, 13 July 2002 #3.

How is it, though, that traders who refer to retailers as "intruders," can also understand market mechanisms, such as wholesale centers, as a positive factor? Chelcea also notes this phenomenon in his research, that traders who were theoretically against 'middle men' in the market place, still wanted to see wholesale companies in the marketplace.[514] Let us first examine an extract from one of the personal interviews that presents a relatively coherent trader discourse.

> I come here (to Piața Obor) twice a week because I look for the places where I can sell better. We don't really have a place here because, you can see my face, I look like a Țigan. Things have changed very much in the market place. Things are not what they used to be. Many peasants prefer not to stay here, they sell their stuff wholesale, but look! There are plenty of empty stalls! Everyone says there is a wholesale problem! *(he means a lack of wholesale facilities)* The police come here and give fines if you don't have a certificate, and many peasants say they can't get stalls. It's not true - look there are stalls, but people have things to do back home, so they sell all their stuff 1-2000 lei cheaper and go home. Peasants complain that they don't have stalls but it's not true. There are free stalls, but this is what they want; they sell all the goods at once, wholesale, and go home. The others that sell the stuff later on are privatized people that

[514] Chelcea uses the word 'middle men' to refer to the retailers, or "unreal producers" see Chelcea op.cit. p.136.

buy most of the stuff from Obor, many of them have acquisition permits, and then take the goods to their stalls. For instance, I sell melons; they didn't want to take them until I showed the production certificate, then they came with their acquisition permit. They can come and buy from me... the melon here is 13 000, go to another market and you'll find it for 20 000, but if someone asks me for 50kg, I'll give that to him, it is to my advantage.

Interviewer-Does anyone set or control the prices here?

Nobody sets prices here, everyone can choose the price he or she wants. If I want to I can sell at 2000 lei because it's mine and I do what I want. Nobody else invested work and money in the product so nobody else can know the price.[515]

The statement at the very beginning about being identified as Ţigan clearly links color, ethnicity and the perceived role of the Ţigan individual with the effect of not being considered as deserving a place in the market. It is made clear in this interview that the market is not a place for Ţigani, but a place for "real producers." This trader clearly describes the processes of acquisition and trading in the market place, and it is important that he actively debunks the discourses of peasants (as "real producers") not being able to find stalls. The last statement shows that he understands it as his right to sell his product to whoever he likes for however much he calculates is enough, but it is interesting that the words he uses

[515] Piaţa Bucur Obor, 8 August 2002 #2

to explain this right relate to an understanding of product value based on production cost ("nobody else invested work and money in the product so nobody else can know the price").

Another trader, after explaining that he sells wholesale when he has a lot of produce, or work to do back home (so recognizing that wholesale is profitable for him) went on to exclaim "I sell firsthand at the wholesale market, then others come and they sell it again! Can you imagine! When it gets here it has already been sold three times!"[516] While this trader understands the usefulness and pricing mechanisms of wholesale selling, his comment exemplifies what is essentially disdain for the alienation of the product from its production value. This is an example of how traders can simultaneously understand and function in the very different discourses of the open market and pre-1990 socialist discourses of production and value.

Let us turn then to the question of how traders use the Ţigan *bişniţari* discourse as a specifically ethnicized Othering of certain forms of trade.

[516] Piaţa Bucur Obor, 8 August 2002 #5.

"Real producers" and the Ţigan Other in the market place

Traders often referred to Ţigani not as a fixed and defined identity, but as a dynamic signifier that could relate to a range of specific stereotypical Others. "Ţigani" were most often those who committed certain acts of cheating, elusive "speculators" who were always there but not recognizable in any one way. As previously discussed, stereotypes of illegal "speculators" as out of place in the Romanian market place of the "real producer" are often linked with signifiers such as the color of skin. In the following interview with a middle aged male trader in Piaţa Matache, the respondent spoke directly to the issue of Ţigani in the market place.

Interviewer- What problems do you have in your work selling?

- Well, the problems depend on how they get the goods - not only Ţigani but Romanians too. It depends on how they get the goods, and if they are keen on their prices or they lower their prices, we don't like that. They are glad to get 3 000 or 4000 lei/kg more. Sometimes they put a stone (on the scales) so their profit is bigger.

Interviewer- The Ţigani do this?

- Generally more the dark skins, also in Bucur Obor, which is renowned for Ţigani. This is the way they've always done it. What do you think? Have they ever enjoyed work? They sell old clothes, you wonder about

the things they come up with. But there are some more developed than others, they can count, they can sell, they are more developed. Not all are able to do that. Some come here and can't even calculate. You can tell from the way they ask you. They are illiterate, there are more like these.

Interviewer- Do they undercut the Romanians in business here?

- I can't say they undercut us –the price is too strong for them to come and make you do anything. I don't think they have any chance of doing anything like that, at least not in this market.

Interviewer- So, are there more of the so-called real producers than the real producers here?

-No, there are both, but they (so-called producers) are not the majority. You can tell them from their faces, they are dark skinned.[517]

As we see from this discourse, the Ţigan Other is linked by the trader with the signifier of darker skin, but is otherwise elusive, not identifiable by a specific kind of stall or product. The stereotypes of the Ţigan Other invoked by this trader were laziness, illegal acquisition of products and intellectual inferiority. These negative characteristics, identifiable in an individual also through the biological characteristic of skin color, constitute a Ţigan Other to the hardworking, honest and rightfully placed Romanian "real producer."

[517] Piaţa Matache, 15 July 2002.

It is noteworthy that the trader openly states that Ţigani who lower their prices are not good for the business of the peasant traders, although the peasant prices are "strong" enough to withstand being undercut. Therefore the problem articulated by the trader is not an economic problem or a threat to his profit, but rather an ethnicized threat to the space of the trade itself and the "real producer," displacing contemporary economic practices of the open market onto an historical ('this is the way they've always done it') ethnic Ţigan Other. It is noteworthy that in the cycle of the trader's discourse he continually returns to the ambiguous signifier of color of skin when asked specific questions about who or how many "un-real producers" there actually are. The signifier of skin color can only function in tandem with other negative stereotypes, and so the strategy of naming this as primary signifier enables the trader to identify Others in theory while avoiding naming specific individuals and communities. The "un-real producer" Ţigan Other is necessary for the maintenance of a threatened ethnic Romanian "real producer" who then discursively constructs (for the customer) the maintenance of high prices as a sign of ethnic strength. This Ţigan Other must be elusive in order to function as a persistent threat – one cannot eradicate an enemy that is difficult to actually find. [518]

---

[518] As discussed in previous chapters, the Ţigan Other has most often been articulated as identifiable by occupation in public space in postsocialist Romania. The example of the trader in this chapter is an example of when color, a seemingly clear signifier, is actually much more dynamic and difficult to identify that one would expect, and this signifier is invoked because it benefits the subject articulating the Ţigan Other. For insight into how concepts of blackness function independently of any measurable skin color in postsocialist Russia see Alaina Lemon "Talking Transit and Spectating Transition: The Moscow Metro" in

Another trader in the main hall of Piața Matache linked speculators, retailers and Țigani:[519]

> - I have been coming here for 25 years and things have got better, especially since a few years ago. There is more cleanliness and order and police do their duty to drive away the *bișnițari* better.
>
> Interviewer- So before that the *bișnițari* were more involved?
>
> - Well somehow they, the *bișnițari*, are still in charge. They buy stuff and sell. But, what I think is dubious is that there were controls and they didn't find anything wrong. Everybody had production certificates, be they from Buzău or Arad. How can a person from Dâmbovița district grow and bring peaches to the market? Or fruit... I know there are clear orders...we had production certificates that were valid until the first of July. Now they must be changed and the order from the city hall is that the peasant should declare what he can sell. Now it should be clear. If there is a second control, they should check the stalls and confront them with their certificate or, worse, they should make some controls at the respective city hall "Mr Dobrescu grows melons and tomatoes." Somehow for us, the real producers, it would have been better if we had

---

Berdahl, D., Bunzl, M., Lampland, M. (eds) *Altering States: Ethnographies of Transition in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, University of Michigan Press, Michigan 2000.

[519] Piața Matache 15 July 2002.

an acquisition center. I can't stay here all the time so I would go to this center...let them sell for a profit, not with the same price...even if you would gain 100 000 more, I think the time I lose here is worth 300 000.

Interviewer- the people with false certificates, are they Romanians?

- They are Ţigani too, especially Ţigani. But who gives them these certificates? How is that possible? Because they do check you at city hall, to make sure you have land, if you have paid the taxes, but then it doesn't matter?

(a dark skinned ambient trader walks by)

Interviewer- Are there many of those kinds of sellers?

- Those Ţigani come with different things, wherever they bring them from, but they don't make trouble for our trade. But I think the police are in too much demand here, there are only one or two and they can't oversee the whole market...they are not enough to oversee all the selling, but honestly it's better for us if they (*ambient Ţigani*) buy and sell, they put prices a little higher, so beside them we can sell at a better price too.[520]

So we see here that the trader names Ţigani *bişniţari* as "unreal producers" with false certificates, and sees the market as the rightful place of "real producers," even as he talks about how an acquisition center would be better for peasants. In this narrative, then, the trader doesn't acknowledge the linking fact that it is legal

[520] Piaţa Matache, 23 July 2002 #1.

to sell in the market with a certificate of acquisition. This trader uses "Ţigan" as an adjective for unreal producer traders in the market place, with negative stereotypical connotations of dishonesty and illegality. The central equation of the trader's discourse is that "unreal producers" are always illegal in the market and are associated with not real Romanians, with the ethnic Ţigan Other. The association of "unreal producers" with illegality and threat to the real producer exists as a primary discursive link despite not only the administrative reality of retail trade in the market (permitted with acquisition certificates), but also the trader's own admission that these traders do not threaten "real producer" business. Ambient sellers, for example, are also "Ţigani," but the trader explains that the ambient Ţigani enable peasants to raise their prices. This shows that the ethnicized Ţigan Other trading in the market place has a different meaning depending on which specific group of traders (retailers or ambient sellers) the trader refers to. The Ţigan Other is always illegal, recognized as sometimes useful to the trader's business, and simultaneously articulated (in various and elusive forms) as the identifiable threat to the "real producer." This extract demonstrates the way that an individual trader simultaneously recognizes illegal market factors that benefit him (ambient traders) and discursively rejects legal market factors that are detrimental to his business (retail traders) – and both groups are articulated as Ţigan Other to his status as Romanian "real producer."

An example of the various meanings "Ţigan" can have in the market place was performed by a self-identified Romani trader. After she told me that she was Căldărari and had been selling in Piaţa Matache for four years, I asked her

- Are there more Roma or Romanians selling in this market?

- I don't know how many Roma there are here. There are Rudari, Lingurari – you can tell the difference right? There are barely any Ţigani, I haven't seen any here. We are peasants.

Interviewer- Are there a majority of producers here?

- There are both producers and *bişniţari*, but the *bişniţari* haven't shown up yet. I hear that all these stalls will be theirs, that we are only allowed here until the first of August. After that the *bişniţari* will be here.

Interviewer– What exactly do *bişniţari* do?

- They buy the goods then sell them more expensively. Here in the market place. They were everywhere here and in Obor last year, but now I don't know. This is what I hear, that they buy and sell.[521]

This Romani trader simply used "Roma" for people who identify themselves as such, and "Ţigani" as the antonym for peasant/producer and a synonym for *bişniţari*, who she then discursively constructs as the elusive high pricing retailer, a kind of intruder to the market, that is familiar to us from other traders' narratives. The mysterious and ominous rumor that "the *bişniţari* are coming"

[521] Piaţa Matache, 18 July 2002 #4.

highlights that those in the market places do not have secure knowledge of what will happen, regarding administration, in the future. Especially since 2000, when market place "sectorization" began, there were many rumors about peasant traders not being allowed to move inside the new hall.

It is reasonable to conclude that traders in the markets were more intent on articulating themselves as "real producers" than specifying signifiers of the elusive, "un-real producer." In trader discourses, signifiers for Ţigan/ *bişniţari* / speculator/ mafia identification constantly shifted and seemed to function precisely because they could not be pinned to individual groups or persons or even organizations. In the following transcript, for example, the Other that threatens the real producer shifts between the categories of retailers, Ţigani, and regional Others.

> Interviewer- What would you change in the market if you could change anything?
>
> - Well, the peasants sell everything to the retailers now, they should check in the market to see if the Ţigani have real production certificates
>
> Interviewer- But are there are many more Romanians than Ţigani here?
>
> - No, we are interbred...but they have the power of money
>
> Interviewer- So Ţigani are better at business?
>
> - No, they don't know what to do with business...
>
> - (*man at the next stall interjects*) We are all the same!

Interviewer- If they sell do they undercut your business?

- No, because the Ţigani buy it from us, from the producers, they come to us to buy because they don't know how to work the land with a hoe. Do they know how to work? Do they know how to water the land?[522] So they go and sell with a profit somewhere else. Others buy from somewhere else and come here to sell…

Interviewer- Ţigani do this?

- The *bişniţari*! They go to the producer and buy then sell more expensive

Interviewer- Do Romanians do the same thing?

- NO! Romanians are producers!

(man at the next stall interjects) Romanians are only producers!

- Our Romanians anyway, from our village, don't do that. We are vegetable farmers from Jilava. And those Ţigani (pointing at another stall), they grow their potatoes. They are real producers, Jilava potato people, too.[523]

In this interview I deliberately posed follow up questions when the respondent mobilized stereotypes of the Ţigan Other (as "natural" trader, as easily dishonest). In each question I took his reference to "Ţigani" as an ethnic category, but the trader constantly shied away from pinning Ţigan identity primarily to ethnicity

[522] This particular style of speaking with the rhetorical questions 'Do they know how to work the land? Do they know the hoe? Have they ever known how to work?' were recurring phrases in trader narratives of the "intruders" amongst the market traders.

[523] Piaţa Amzei, 2 August #1.

only, highlighting the vital role of the *bişniţari* part of the Ţigan stereotype. Traders were always forthcoming in performing themselves as "real producers," but reluctant to name or identify an individual who fulfilled the Ţigan *bişniţari* stereotype. As we see from the above passage, respondents who invoked the Ţigan *bişniţari* Other against the Romanian real producer relied on both the ethnic and the social (trade practice) components of the stereotype.

As discussed earlier in this section, popular media and discourse most often focused on the issue of high prices in the market, and primarily invoked the supposed cause of the problem in the form of the ethnic Ţigan *bişniţari* Other. As is clear from our interviews with traders, however, they were primarily occupied with articulating themselves as occupying their rightful place in the market as "real producers," an ethnic Romanian identity with its attendant stereotypes of honesty and productive labor. While the media and popular discourse presupposed the "real producer" as honest and innocent market trader displaced by the Ţigan *bişniţari* Other, the focus of this consumer discourse was more on the evil latter than the presumed point of origin, the "real producer." We see from the way that traders avoided pinning the Ţigan *bişniţari* stereotype to specific individuals that there was a significant difference in the way they performed themselves within the mainstream consumer discourse – traders were more interested in stressing their own rightful position- while the consumer discourse focused on articulating threats to this place.

The elusive Ţigan Other in customer-trader interaction

Many features of trader-customer interaction demonstrated a mutual communication through the discourse of the trader as a "real producer." For example, customers would ask questions about the weather in a sympathetic way or they would ask about the origin of the produce (and perhaps then discuss that region's physical characteristics). Most common, however, were discussions where both sides lamented the tough economic conditions that made buying produce an expensive exercise. In these discussions, consumers were sympathetic to the plight of the "real producers," just as the traders often extended economic support in the form of an extra couple of potatoes or by providing credit for pensioners, cleaning staff, or women with children. I had the distinct feeling that the mutual lament and performance of empathy for the other's economic plight was a mechanism to smooth the transaction itself, and that the trader performing themselves as a "real producer" was vital to the exchange. The "real producer" often performed their identity through comments about the season's produce or the weather, but also very often through their position as supposedly threatened by the Ţigan "unreal producer" Other.

On three occasions, I witnessed customers initiate discussions with traders on the topic of supposed Ţigan *bişniţari* mafia "controlling" the prices. In two of these cases, the traders simply agreed with the customer and made cursory comments in

the style of "what can we do about them" while completing the transaction. This was in keeping with the way that traders rarely pinned the Ţigan identity to an actual individual or even a fixed signifier in interviews, as previously described. On one occasion, however, the following customer interaction transpired while the cassette tape was recording.

> Interviewer– has anything changed in the market?
>
> Trader- Things are better now in Piaţa Matache, more organized, there are police, no Ţigani, so you can sell with whatever price you want. There are Ţigani but they're speculators, they buy from the producers…
>
> Consumer (interjecting)- They don't buy the stuff, they kick you in the head and take it with force!
>
> Trader (*to interviewer in presence of consumer*) – Once I left all my tomatoes in the car and went away and when I came back they were all gone…
>
> Consumer 2- They should kick all Ţigani out! They kill us with their prices!
>
> Trader- Ţigani should go and work the land, they don't have any education.[524]

Even in this case, it is interesting to note the way that the trader responded in the face of strong anti-Ţigan comments from the client.[525] While the trader is making

[524] Piaţa Matache 15 July 2002 #15.

a point that seems to present Ţigani simply as retailers (albeit with the word "speculator"), he immediately provides a comment to feed into the customer's discourse of Ţigani controlling markets with physical crimes. The second customer directs his comment against Ţigani as Others that threatened a unitary Romanian "us" (they kill us with their prices). The trader does not refute the discourse invoked by the second customer regarding prices being high because of Ţigani, but rather makes a comment within the preferred trader discourse; he implies that those in the market should be those who work the land, by stating that Ţigani do not. The trader is in fact articulating the rightful place in the market of the (Romanian) "real producer" through the projected Ţigan Other, while the customers are articulating an ethnic Ţigan Other as the reason why they are paying high prices. It is the ethnic Ţigan Other that makes this dialogue, and this economic exchange, possible.

The traders I observed never deliberately invoked an ethnicized Ţigan Other in their conversations with customers, but other stereotypes of the ethnic Romanian "real producer," as hard working honest farmer at the mercy of the elements of nature were an important part of communication. When one part of the stereotypical chain of knowledge of the Romanian peasant Other of urban Romanians is invoked, it links closely with the other stereotypes in the chain. In this way, just because the Ţigan mafia is not directly mentioned, it does not mean

[525] This customer's comment about Ţigani is quite normal in everyday discourse in Romania.

that they are not in the unspoken repertoire at the disposal of the customer and the trader, as shown by the conversation transcribed above. The act of selling and buying vegetables in the market place is a site of anxiety for a range of reasons, and one reason is the interaction and process of negotiation of the price in everyday market exchanges. Buying and selling in the market is not an objective or exact science. Traders offering kinds of credit to regular shoppers, and making small discounts for those who buy bulk or who claim certain (possibly ethnonational) moral positions (such as mothers and pensioners). In this dynamic of trade, the Țigan Other and "real producer" discourse of the produce market serves as a moral position weighing on the side of the trader. This leads one to the question of who benefits from the discourse of the "real producer" threatened by the Țigan Other in the marketplace?

Who benefits from the "Țigan mafia of vegetables" Other?

After more than a decade of open market experience, why is the image of an ethnicized mafia attacking honest Romanian peasants still a powerful and pervasive discourse in the media and for everyday shopping experiences? Primarily, we can appreciate that the agricultural market and its "real producer" are important in multiple historically developed discourses of Romanian ethnonational identity. As the journalist Manolescu notes, Romanians' perceptions of market places as places for peasants to trade is not only rare in

Europe, but flies in the face of basic issues of product quality and availability factors, as retailers provide better and not necessarily more expensive produce.[526] Peasant traders also expressed their preference for selling wholesale, even while they performed a parallel discourse of the Ţigan *bişniţari* Other that prevented them from selling in the market. Who is it, then, that benefits from the discourse of the Ţigan *bişniţari* who makes prices high? If all parties benefit in terms of quality of produce and by market calculations of cost effectiveness, why is the Ţigan *bişniţari* Other still used to enable "real producer" identity?

Firstly, it is convenient for the media and popular discourse to continue to mobilize stereotypes of the ethnic Ţigan Other. The *bişniţari* Other was established in the early 1990s and functioned in media discourses and popular rumours as the force behind a market that was inexplicable to everyday life and people. The question of why those in the business of trade perpetuate the discourse then becomes important. As we have seen in various examples, those who were in charge (market administrators, Mayors) did speak correctly about what was happening, but depending on their individual understandings of the role of the market they framed their understandings of new European Union standard regulations in very different ways. In addition, even if the administrator or mayor interviewed said one thing, very often it was re-presented in the media within the sensational and familiar framework of the ethnic Ţigan mafia of *bişniţari* again.

---

[526] Andrei Manolescu "Libertate şi reguli în Obor" *Dilema* Vol. 226 May 2001.

As Konstantinov notes in his extensive Bulgarian case studies, market traders do not have the moral or practical social power to put forward their own experiences. Traders therefore perform to inhabit the position that signifies most powerfully in the dominant discourse of consumers, the position of the Romanian "real producer." The Ţigan / *comercianţi* / *bişniţari* mafia enables traders to occupy a privileged position in the moral structure of the community in which they trade. Performance of the discourse, even while stressing the aspect of "real producer" identity, is therefore an economic strategy of its own. In her study of traders in Sri Lanka and how they articulated their own practices, Sarah Southwold-Llewellyn concludes that "the principles of economic maximization and of moral economy are not in opposition, but are intrinsically bound together. The myth is maintained by traders, their customers and policy-makers...as a bridge between opposing principles of social organization at a time of economic and social transition, and used to conceptualise the conflict between the traditional agrarian ideal and the market oriented economy.'[527] Such is the case with the Ţigan Other who functions as a mediating symptom of the conflicting discourses of the "real producer" as honest market trader, and the economic reality of trade as an activity for profit in a competitive market environment.

---

[527] Sarah Southwold-Llewellyn "The Creation of an Outsider's Myth: The Mudalali of Sri Lanka" pp.175-197 in Hans-Dieter Evers and Heiko Schrader *The moral economy of trade: ethnicity and developing markets* Routledge, London and New York 1994 p.175.

Chapter Six

Romania and EUrope: Roma, Rroma and Ţigani

In November 2002, a Romanian journalist named Lia Epure published an editorial attacking Romanian authorities for 'playing the democratic role' and failing to prevent 'thieves, hooligans and criminals' from going to the west and disgracing all Romanians.[528] Epure entitled her article *Rromânia*, a play on the Romanian government's spelling of *Rroma*, and concluded that if Romanians 'continue to accept identification with abnormals, then we will be become Rromânia.' In response to vocal Roma and human rights group protests, Epure published a second article defending her right to say what 'even the president of the European Commission knows,' that Romanians are not accepted as EUropean 'because of Ţigani.'[529] While intellectuals and anti-racists protested against Epure's article as

---

[528] Lia Lucia Epure "Rromânia" in *Ziua de Vest* 16 November 2002.

[529] Epure's article in response to protests was entitled "*Tevez baftalo*!" a mispronunciation of a phrase in Romanes, published in *Ziua de Vest* 27 November 2002. For full transcripts of email protests, the organization of a campaign to combat racism in the Romanian mass media, an article concerning the legality of Epure's statements, Epure's articles and letters of support from Romanian journalists, see the archives of the Romanothan website Forrom e-group 16 – 29 November 2002. www.romanothan.ro/cgi-bin/forrom. I am using the name EUrope to refer to the Europe that exists as a united bloc under the European Union, a EUrope that also embodies a range of myths regarding a superior history of European and Western 'civilization.' I use the term "the West" to refer to an almost all inclusive "outside of Romania" that includes EUrope and other societies deemed Western in reference to Romania. EUrope refers specifically to the other places accessible with European Union membership, while the West is a more elusive and wider category.

inciting racial hatred, Epure and her Romanian journalist supporters argued that protests infringed the democratic right to 'observation, opinion and attitude.'[530]

This chapter explores the way that Romania's continued marginalization in EUrope is blamed, at both elite and popular levels of Romanian discourse, on the actions of the Ţigan Other misrecognized by EUrope as Romanian. Just as the *bişniţari* Ţigan functioned as symbol in the post revolution years, in the period of intensification of EU accession negotiations, especially in 2002, the Ţigan Other was increasingly scapegoated in the media and in popular discourse as the unEUropean Other to naturally EUropean ethnic Romanians. The Ţigan Other misrecognized as Romanian was presented in popular discourse, the media and even at government level as the reason for the West's continued denial of a place for Romania in EUrope. In the same period, the Romanian public was consistently informed through the local media of EU funded programs for the development of *Rroma* communities. The media often incorporated the universalizing rhetoric of elite discourses of democratic EUrope, in particular concepts of human rights and equal opportunity, into existing Romanian popular discourses of the Ţigan (as) Romani Other. This chapter uses the Romanian

---

[530] Epure, "*Tevez baftalo.*" It is important to note that Epure is a Romanian journalist who was prosecuted by the Romanian Government for defamation, resulting in her having to pay a fine. She considers herself a veteran of free speech campaigning, and in her replies to protesters seemed to equate anti discrimination legislation with government repression of constitutional rights to free speech. For contextual information see Reporters without Borders, *Freedom of the Press annual report on Romania 2003* at www.rsf.fr, last accessed 28-11-2005.

media as a source to explore the ways in which popular Romanian discourses contest the meaning of elite EUropean discourses through the specific site of the ethnic Other as Ţigan, Roma and *Rroma.* The name *Rroma* may have been adopted by human rights groups as a mark of respect for an ethnic group, but in popular Romanian discourses the word *Rroma* is co-opted into a willful misrecognition that equates it with the pre-existing stereotypical discourses of the Ţigan Other. These discursive struggles for meaning of the site of the Ţigan Other highlight the centrality of ethnicity and especially of the ethnic Other to Romanian ethno-national identity in the contemporary period.

The European Union has been widely criticized for its 'democracy deficit,' especially regarding the exclusion of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from government negotiations behind closed doors.[531] The democracy deficit is evidenced at the broadest level by ordinary Romanians who have limited access to information, and rely on the media to transmit information of elite (government level) decisions, which they then apply to everyday situations of economic difficulty. The result is a widening gap between what I will call elite discourses of EUrope, (used by high ranking officials, proponents of civil society) and popular Romanian discourses, which understand social changes as threatening ethnic Romanian community rights. In Romania, the media is most often the link between elite level discourses of EUrope and the bulk of the population, who

[531] James A. Goldston "Roma Rights, Roma Wrongs (Gypsies in Europe)" in *Foreign Affairs* March-April 2002 Vol. 81 Issue 2 p.146.

respond to popular discourses. In recent years, the media has come under increasing scrutiny from inside and outside the industry. The European Union has funded many conferences, workshops, studies and publications for Romanian journalists concerning awareness of racism in the media, and Romani NGOS and journalists have debated at length the differences between free speech and inciting racial hatred, and objective reporting from "scandal sells."[532] Recent changes have been propelled by a new wave of postsocialist journalists interested in reversing previous trends, an awareness amongst these journalists that an economically positive future lies in EUrope, and, importantly, the organized network of anti-discrimination protesters in combination with new watchdog organizations that can prosecute discriminatory press.[533] An overview of the discourses of EUrope most common in the media is one way to understand what information is presented to the majority of the population.

---

[532] For an overview of recent conferences specifically concerning Roma and the media in Romania see the Romani CRISS reports on The Contact Point of Roma NGOs with the Media *Roma and media* pp.8-18 Bucharest 2000 (listing 15 public debates, ten conferences, and two major inter-NGO public education campaigns) and the report by Project on Ethnic Relations, *Images and Issues: Coverage of the Roma in the Mass Media in Romania* conference June 27-28, 1997.

[533] Under EU pressure, the Romanian Government adopted Ordinance 137 on the Prevention and Punishment of All Forms of Discrimination in August 2000, but did not provide any funding for the formation of a body to implement this legislation until the formation of the National Council Against Discrimination in 2002. Despite being grossly underfunded and overtaxed, the existence of the body has caused major public debate and enabled NGO protests against media racism to carry some weight. Still, the legislation fails to address a range of discriminatory practices and is impeded by the lack of judiciary experienced in the legislation. For more information see Romanița Iordache and Andreea Tabacu "Not Yet Viable: Anti-Discrimination Action in Romania" in *Roma Rights* Nr. 1-2 2003, and Ina Zoon *La Periferia societății: Rromii și serviciile publice în România*, Open Society Institute 2001 pp.23-48.

The chief of the delegation of the European Commission in Romania, Jonathan Scheele, stated in 2003 that the press is the 'translator that explains integration for the everyday man to understand.'[534] Journalists also present ideas and facts through existing frameworks for understanding, contextualizing new information in familiar discourses. The preference of the Romanian media for scandals and racist stereotyping over less provocative reporting has been the subject of many Romanian and EUropean conferences and projects since 1990.[535] This chapter uses the media as the main source for investigating popular discourses of Țigani and the European Union (EU) because it plays the key role in providing "evidence" for popular stereotypes of Țigani, the EU and international relations. The media not only utilizes dominant discourses, it creates new knowledges through incorporating new subject positions and information into existing discourses and re-presenting these knowledges back to the public.

My aim in this chapter, as in the former and the following, is to present what I believe is a predominant discourse of the Țigan Other that functions as a central node of knowledge to articulate Romanian ethnonational identity. In addition to

[534] Mircea Vasilescu "Nu este importantă viteza cu care are loc acest proces, ci calitatea lui" am interview with Jonathan Scheele *Dilema* Nr. 531 June 2003.
[535] Concerning objectivity in postsocialist media specific to Romania see Mihai Coman "Romanian Journalism in a transition period 1990-1992" pp.81-98 in Gerd Hallemberger and Michael Krzeminski (eds) *Osten Europa Medienlandschaft in Umbruch* Berlin, Vistas, 1994. For information specific to Roma in the Romanian press see *Images and Issues: Coverage of the Roma in the mass media in Romania* A project on Ethnic Relations Conference Reports, Sinaia, Romania June 27-28 1997.

the media, therefore, I use sources such as published and unpublished reports of civil society, academic journals, and internet and print sources of non governmental organizations (NGOs). In an attempt to gather sources demonstrating the limited range of Țigan Other discourses, I also personally conducted a survey with a sample of 140 respondents in Bucharest universities in order to create more resources for exploring the different discourses people used to discuss the issues of this chapter. The survey consisted of a single open-ended question and provided a double sided blank page for a written response. The question was 'What are the differences between Romanians and Roma?' and the majority of people wrote a full page response as a minimum. The answers demonstrated a consistent range of discourses with few variations that were repeatedly utilized across a wide demographic sample, and especially in the unlimited medium of open-ended response that was volunteered by respondents. I use these survey responses in balance with the media and other print sources and they are transcribed in Appendix One.[536]

Romania, the (misunderstood) problem child of the east

In the winter months of 2001-2002, the talk amongst university students in Bucharest was of the imminent removal of Schengen visa requirements for

[536] I conducted the survey in October 2001 in three different faculties of Bucharest University on a random sample of students then cross-analyzed by gender, faculty of study and ethnicity.

Romanian citizens. Throughout 2002, I observed that Romanians of all ethnicities were able to illegally pay border officials 50 USD or Euros to waive the compulsory 500 Euros cash that travelers were required to carry for access to Hungary and other European countries. The lifting of visa restrictions was important for the Romanians I met as both a symbol of being acknowledged as 'naturally' European, and as a way to access the West. As noted in a recent study of markets and migration in the EU, freedom of movement is central to the ideology of the EU, and the desire for cheap illegal labor in EU countries is an acknowledged part of this free movement.[537] As Romanian political journalist Bogdan Chirieac has pointed out, French and Romanian governments expected the participation of Romanians in black market work after Schengen visa relaxation, and it 'brought the reserves of the Romanian National bank to an unprecedented level, stimulating consumption and economic growth.'[538] Working in Western Europe without a visa/work permit is a crime, as is overstaying the three month limit, yet Chirieac noted that those who participated in the former were not usually those responsible for trafficking and money laundering in the European Union.[539]

---

[537] Adrian Favell and Randall Hansen "Markets against Politics: migration, Eu enlargement and the idea of Europe" pp.581-602 in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* Vol.28 Issue 4, October 2002.
[538] Bogdan Chirieac "Cerşetorii despart Parisul de Bucureşti?" *Adevărul* 1 October 2002.
[539] Ibid.

The French and Romanian press, however, focused on Romani Romanian beggars in France as the symbols and supposed perpetrators of crime, linking this visible minority with powerful (albeit abstract) signifiers such as 'the Mafia' and 'human trafficking.' The way the French press depicted Romanians throughout 2002 was obsessively noted by the Romanian press, and considered a series of judgements as to whether Romania was a EUropean nation. The disproportionate focus on France and its comments concerning Romania in the Romanian press manifests the historically grounded Romanian preoccupation with identifying itself as closely related to French social and political culture. The rise of racist populist right wing politics has been widely documented in Western Europe,[540] and images of Eastern postsocialist states waiting for the chance to flood western Europe with 'waves of migrants' were used by mainstream media sources in 2002 to describe the influx of workers from Romania, 'the problem child of Europe.'[541] Throughout 2002, *Le Monde* ran approximately 32 long articles (more than 500 words) about Romanian illegal immigrants in France in 2002, compared with only seven in *La Tribune* and 26 in the right wing *Le Figaro.*[542] *Le Monde's* Bucharest correspondent, the Romanian journalist Mirel Bran, was responsible for the

[540] For solid research on this issue see Peter Fysh and Jim Wolfreys *The Politics of Racism in France* Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2003.

[541] Mirel Bran "Les Tsiganes Handicapes, de la Roumanie a l'Europe des riches" *Le Monde* 12 July 2002.

[542] According to searches of the electronic archives of *La Tribune*, there were seven articles that concerned Romanian deportation from/human trafficking in France, and no articles found in 2002 under the search phrase of "*Tsiganes*." The 26 articles found in *Le Figaro* were categorized under "Romanian" and the search term "*Tsiganes*" recovered only three articles concerning illegal activities in France. The French right wing press recovered a majority of cultural topics (music, film, dance, festivals) under "*Tsiganes*," as did the other newspapers.

majority of the articles in *Le Monde*, and his contributions were often longer and made more unsourced claims than others. While Bran stopped short of lobbying for ethnic Romanians, his articles consistently placed responsibility on *Les Tsiganes*, who he treated as an ethnic group distinct from Romanians, despite their Romanian citizenship.[543]

In the French press, beggars, especially the handicapped, were the most common examples of Romanian *Tsiganes*. One of Bran's articles begins by stating that 'the *Tsiganes* Mafia that exploits handicapped people, far from being a fiction, is the latest reflection of Romania in France.'[544] Articles usually included the fact that *les Tsiganes* find this name offensive and prefer to be called Rom, while continuing to use *les Tsiganes*. One report included the information that '*Tsiganes* are a dispersed nation without a sovereign territory...but they have a national anthem, "we are walking, we are walking."'[545] In the same article, the countries of origin of *Tsiganes* populations are listed, but only EU candidate countries. Mirel Bran's articles brought Romanian stereotypical discourses into the French press, such as the simultaneous depiction of Romanian Ţigani as both impoverished and secretly rich, as both persecuted in Romania, and the owners of

---

[543] Bran is a prominent figure in Romanian journalism, especially after he published an article criticizing Romanian policy regarding NATO, to which the government responded with legal prosecution for defamation of Romania's reputation, and international attention turned to Romanian press restrictions. Information about this scandal available at the Journalists Without Borders web site at www.rsf.fr.

[544] Ibid.

[545] Unsigned "Une Nation Dispersée" *Le Monde* 5 June 2002.

'*Tsiganes* palaces.'[546] The French press gave peripheral attention to French NGO protests against the French Government and police treatment of Roma.

Throughout 2002, the Romanian press reported articles from the French Press, and as negotiations resumed between the French Foreign Minister and Romanian Prime Minister (Adrian Nastase) in July, the tone in both the Romanian and French media became more alarmed. The anxiety of the Romanian press concerned the reintroduction of visas. In August 2002 a bilateral agreement was signed between France and Romania to return all 'irregular' migrants to their country of origin, and the resulting deportations of Romanian citizens were reported by both the French and Romanian Press. On 16 October 2002, *Le Figaro* published an article claiming that "10 days after the agreement between Paris and Bucharest, 800 Romanians will be expelled," and deportees were described as being ethnic *Roumain* and Rom.[547] The next day's headline in the Romanian daily *Libertatea* was "Eight hundred Ţigan Romanians sent home from France."[548] Romanian newspapers often reported information so that it seemed as if the French press had conflated Ţigani with Romanians (when in fact the French press distinguished the two groups on ethnicity rather than recognizing them by citizenship), and as if Ţigani were the vast majority of "irregulars." The predominant argument in the Romanian press was that all Romanian citizens

---

[546] Mirel Bran, *Le Monde* 13 July 2002.
[547] Unsigned "Des Roumains expulses de Paris" Le Figaro 16 October 2002
[548] Unsigned "800 de Ţiganii român, trimis acasa din franţa" *Libertatea* 17 October 2002.

arrested as criminals in France were Ţigani, who had been misrecognized as Romanians by the French. Ţigani were thereby depicted as actively destroying the European identity of Romanians in EUrope. Central to this argument, of course, is the perception of Ţigani as the ethnic Other of the ethnonational Romanian self, regardless of what is written in one's passport.

Occasional overt conflation of Ţigani or Roma with ethnic Romanians in the French press received much attention. When the French dictionary *Le Petit Robert* printed a picture of identifiably Romani people beside the Romanian entry in the October 2002 supplement, international Romanian organizations, local press, and Romanian politicians protested until March 2003. The dictionary stated that Romanian was an Indo-European language and placed a picture of a Venetian gondola beside Italy, a photograph of the royal guard beside England, and 'a tribe of impoverished Ţigani, standing amongst some miserable looking tents' beside Romania.[549] The use of the image was described by journalists, intellectuals and politicians as 'scandalous,' 'unjust and offensive,' and an 'insult and outrage to national dignity.'[550] The World Union of Free Romanians pointed out in a letter published in *Le Monde* that Romania is the only country in south

[549] "Disputa dintre Gheorghe Pruteanu şi dicţionarul Le Robert" 13 February 2003.

[550] In order of the articles from which the quotes were taken; Unsigned, *Evenimentul Zilei* 18 October 2002, AM Press, "Dicţionarul 'Petit Robert 2002" prezinta România printr-o poza cu satra de Ţigani' 20 October 2002, and *Le Monde* article response 9 February 2003 by Senator Gheorghe Pruteanu.

Eastern Europe with 60% Latin words, claiming a commonality of origin with France.[551]

One anonymous Romanian journalist understood the article as 'our big sister France, saying Romanians aren't Romanians, but Ţigani,' and lamented that 'though it is expected that with the age of French culture the names of Brancuşi, Enescu, Elena Vacarescu, Stefan Lupascu, Coana, Eliade, Eugen Ionesco and so many others are not at the top of the list, we still have to ask: on what basis can Romanians be identified as Ţigani?'[552] The majority of commentators referred to a shared cultural and intellectual sisterhood between Romania and France to claim Romania was naturally European, and that any negative images in Europe were the result of mistaken identity. Critics of EUropean treatment of Romania thereby argued for recognition of their 'natural' place as a EUropean nation with a discourse that avoided critical analysis of the process of identity formation taking place within EUrope itself.[553] The press communicated the discourse of Ţigani as preventing Romanian acceptance in the abstract EUropean homeland between

---

[551] AM Press 20 October 2002.

[552] Unsigned "România ca o satra de Ţiganii?" *Evenimentul Zilei* 18 October 2002.

[553] The Othering of Ţigani could be compared to how EUrope Others candidate countries. There is not only literature about racism in the EU but an awareness of this in Romania, and amongst the Romanian elite. See the interview with Philip Etienne, the French diplomat in Bucharest in *Adevărul*, 14 December 2002. In this article Bogdan Chiriac asks if there is French xenophobia and the diplomat avoids the question. My interest in the media presentation of Romanian awareness of anti-Romanian sentiment is addressed later in this chapter.

different social groups and classes united by an ethnonational Romanian discourse.

The sheer volume of reports in all kinds of Romanian newspapers, from tabloids to political journals, concerning deportations and highlighting the Romanians involved as ethnic Ţigani, shows that the Romanian press believed the issue was of public interest.[554] The majority of articles described repatriated Romanian citizens as ethnic Ţigan beggars and thieves, regardless of whether there was evidence for these claims.[555] Deportations were reported in all major newspapers. For example, three Romanian newspapers announced a repatriation of Ţigani from France on 4 December 2002, and the next day four more newspapers covered the same story.[556] Six out of these seven articles specified the deportees as Ţigani in their headline. When the Inspector General of Frontier Police released information that 13 555 Romanian citizens had been repatriated from countries worldwide in 2001, the ethnicity of repatriated persons was not

---

[554] This has also been acknowledged at various conferences and meetings between Roma and journalists.

[555] See the protests of Vasile Ionescu and Gheorghe Nicolae against this generalization in *Roma and Media* Romani CRISS (Roma Center for Social Intervention and Studies), Bucharest 2000.

[556] Newspapers with correspondents in Paris printed articles first. On the 4 December 2002 Unsigned,"Circuitul rromilor in Europa" in *Cotidianul*, Dan Burlac "Ghetoul Ţiganlor români, "ras" de poliţia franceza" in *Evenimentul Zilei*, Oana Mihai "Ieri a inceput evecuarea unei tabere de Ţiganii români din Franţa" in *Ultima Ora*, 5 December 2002 unsigned "22 de Ţiganii au fost expulzaţi din Franţa" in *Azi* and *Curentul*, Dan Vasile, "Franţa a mai expulzat 22 de Ţiganii români" in *Gardianul*, E.N 'Ţiganii uşuiţi din Franţa", Unsigned in *Curierul National* "Escală speciala pentru Ţigani trimisi din Franţa."

recorded, yet two major Romanian newspapers reported that 'the majority were Ţigan.'[557]

The Romanian press descriptions of Ţigani in EUropean spaces rely on stereotypes of the Ţigan Other such as those described in the previous chapters of this thesis. For example, a Project on Ethnic Relations report noted that articles often depicted Roma as a nomadic race of economic opportunists rather than legitimate asylum seekers.[558] Ţigan nomadism was often described by Romanian reporters as a kind of colonization. One newspaper article claimed 'only three countries remain unattacked' and 'unoccupied' by 'Ţigani, the criminals of Romania...who profit until they're full.'[559] In my survey research, an 18 year old university student in Bucharest wrote in response to the question 'what is the difference between Romanians and Roma?,' that 'Ţigani are a kind of invader, colonizers who were too lazy to find their own country.'[560] NGOs and the French press often reported that Romanians and Ţigani being deported had homes, jobs and children who attended French school, yet the Romanian press depicted

[557] Unsigned "Se-ntoarce acasa diaspora interlopa" *Jurnalul National*, 17 December 2002, Nicolae Militaru 'Pentru infracţiuni comise in lumea larga' *Adevărul* 23 December 2002, and see also Ionescu and Nicolae 2000 op. cit.p.11.

[558] Unsigned "Circuitul rromilor in Europa" *Cotidianul* 4 December 2002, see also Oana Mihai "Ieri a inceput evacuarea unei tabere de Ţiganii români din Franţa" *Ultima Ora* 4 December 2002 and the next day this story covered by *AZI, Curentul, Gardianul,* and *Curierul Naţional.* See also the Project on Ethnic Relations report of the conference *Roma and the Law: Demythologizing the 'Gypsy Criminality' Stereotype* Paris, France 7-8 October 1999, report printed in 2000.

[559] Eugen Ciufu "Doar trei tari au ramas 'neatacate"; suedia, danemarca şi norvegia' *Curentul* 17 October 2002.

[560] Survey, University of Bucharest Respondent #100. See Appendix One.

'ghettoes of Ţigani' who segregated themselves, refused to interact with the host community, and lived in dire poverty worse than in Romania.[561]

In 2002, Romanian authors primarily stereotyped Romanians deported from western EUropean countries as beggars and thieves. The internationally respected and much published Romanian historian Lucian Boia wrote in his English language text book about Romanian history and society that 'wherever Gypsies go they make a laughing stock of Romania' through their 'traditional practice of begging.'[562] In addition to representing poverty, Romanian beggars identified as Ţigani are represented in the Romanian media (and in popular discourse) as rich members of organized Ţigan mafia networks, just as in the *bişniţari* stereotypes discussed in the previous chapters. The major daily newspaper *Evenimentul Zilei* claimed that 'after 1990, thousands of Ţigani invaded the Italian peninsula, beggars who leave their jobs in Mercedes.' [563] To explain how Romanian *Tsiganes* looked so poor yet supposedly had 'castles' back home, *Le Monde's* Mirel Bran quoted a Romanian researcher of unknown position at the *Maison des sciences de l'homme* in Paris as saying that 'it is the elites who migrate and try to

[561] For the article about children and school see Andrei Badin "81 de Ţiganii vor fi expulzati din Franţa" *România Liberă* 13 February 2003 and 4 December 2002, Dan Burlac "Ghetoul Ţiganiilor români 'ras' de poliţia franceza" 4 December 2003.
[562] Lucian Boia *Romania* Reaktion Books, London 2001 p.219.
[563] Unsigned "Ţiganii român urmarit de carabinieri cu elicopterul" *Evenimentul Zilei* 17 January 2003.

exploit the invisible opportunities of Europe.'[564] The conceptual invocation of 'visiblility' warns (and assures) the reader that the beggars symbolizing Romanian/Ţigan irregulars in France are merely the tip of the iceberg, fronts for a larger invisible base of elite Ţigan Mafia.

In many different arenas, beggars and mafia are both placed under the rubric of "people trafficking." A paper presented by Marin Nicolae, Prosecutor of the Court of Buzau, at a conference on human trafficking in Romania in October 2002, directly linked street beggars with human trafficking.[565] French investigative journalism in Romania has unsuccessfully attempted to find convincing proof that individuals travelling legally to Western Europe are part of people trafficking operations. A story in a major daily Romanian tabloid about the forced repatriation of asylum seekers was framed by the headline 'Ţigani refuse to be repatriated unless paid,' implying that to travel to the West and be repatriated is itself a profitable business.[566] In one case, individuals who were repatriated to Romania were reported as saying they destroyed their passports so they could work for longer than three months, yet the headline sketched a continental passport racket, reading 'Passports sent from the west to be falsified for new

---

[564] Mirel Bran "Une communauté fracture é dans un pays mal en point" *Le Monde* 13 July 2002 and Mirel Bran "Les Tsiganes handicapes, de la Roumanie a l'Europe des riches"

[565] Run by the VIIIth conference of criminology ("Metodologia de investigare a infractiunilor de trafic de persoane, avand ca scop exploatarea activitatii de cersetorie") in Busteni, Romania 31 October 2002.

[566] Unsigned "Ţiganii nu se repatriaza nici daca primesc bani" *Libertatea* 22 January 2003.

migrations: Ţigani expelled from Europe will reorganize.'[567] The implication of this article, that there exist mafia style organized networks for Ţigan emigration, contradicts all available information about the experiences of those involved.

Blaming Ţigani for EUrope's failure to recognize Romania as EUropean was pervasive in the Romanian press and popular discourse in 2002. The daily newspaper *România Liberă* published a range of solicited public opinions on the topic 'national minorities of Romania,' in which one housewife complained that 'Ţigani do bad things (*ne fac de ras*) in Europe and because of this we Romanians are also seen badly.' A young man said 'I only hope that when I get out I won't be mistaken for a Ţigan.'[568] In my open-ended survey at Bucharest University in 2001, before the scandals of 2002, six percent of respondents primarily articulated Ţigani and Roma as destroying Romania's international reputation.[569] This figure seems small, but the fact that an open question concerning Romani ethnicity prompts such direct and extrapolated responses is telling. One student wrote that Roma are 'thieves with an unEuropean mentality, nomadic and unable to integrate. Roma have destroyed the image of Romania in the world.'[570]

---

[567] Eugen Ciufu "Pasapoarte trimise din vest pentru a fi falsificate în scopul unor noi migrari: Ţiganii expulzati din europea se reorganizeaza" *Curentul* 16 October 2002.

[568] Adrian Bucurescu "Sondaj de opinie: ce parere aveţi despre minoritaţile naţionale din românia?" *România Liberă* 1 November 2002.

[569] The survey asked about "Rroma," and people answered regarding the stereotypical Ţigan Other. This has a lot to do with the merging of meaning Rroma as Ţigan at the time of the survey, as this chapter goes on to argue.

[570] Survey, University of Bucharest, respondent #103, 2001.

Romanian heads of state have also participated in the construction of a reality in which Ţigan criminal forces foiled Romania's destiny as a respected EUropean nation. In 2001 Petre Roman, then Foreign Minister of Romania, stated that the Romanian government had an obligation 'to protect 23 million Romanians against the few thousand Ţigani who are preventing the country from getting off the EU visa blacklist.'[571] After negotiations with France in 2002, Prime Minister Adrian Nastase assured his party prefects that 'the Ţigan problem is not only a problem for Romania, but a European problem.'[572] In this way, sharing the same Ţigan Other with France is re-presented as a sign of a Romanian EUropean identity.

These mechanisms of displacement of non-EUropean behavior onto Ţigani enables those who inhabit an ethnic Romanian identity to claim a place in EUrope, but this strategy simultaneously circumscribes a critical approach to how EUrope performs its own identity through stereotypical discourses of Others, such as Romanians. It is important to note that the stereotypical discourse which claims for Romania an inalienably European origin and cultural identity, has

[571] Direct quote from Dragos Popa "Romani – Romania – Romanian: The Roma: A Challenge to the EU enlargement" unpublished paper presented at the conference "Bigger and better? The European Union, Enlargement and Reform" Toronto, 31 May 2002 p. 15-16 sourced as from an article entitled "Romanian Foreign Minister connects Visa problem to Roma" *România Liberă* March 23 2000. This quote is also cited unsourced in James A. Goldston "Roma Rights, Roma Wrongs (Gypsies in Europe)" *Foreign Affairs* Vol.81 Issue 2 p.146 March-April 2002.

[572] Nastase quoted in Unsigned "Problema Ţiganilor nu este doar a României, ci a intregii Europe" *România Liberă* 10 September 2002. See also Nastase's speech at the European Policy Center, Brussels June 6 2002 entitled "Romania in the European Union and the Future of Europe.' Note p.5 where Nastase positions Romania as the external borderland to the east of the EU.

ruptures and contradictions as do those of the Ţigan Other. Indeed, there are a range of discourses that articulate Romanians as historically failing to inhabit European identity, and when the discourse of Romania as EUropean is performed, it is always in the context of the availability of these other discourses. For example, while the discourse we have examined calls on a shared Romanian-French cultural history, there are many jokes that poke fun at this assumption. Other stereotypical discourses that co-exist in contradiction concern Romanians as hardworking and simultaneously cunning and deceptive (*şmecheri*).[573] Pride in the supposedly Romanian cultural trait of accepting one's place, as embodied in the proverb 'kiss the hand you cannot bite' is understood as cowardice in other discourses of ethnonational identity.[574]

While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss in detail the patterns of ambivalence and self-deprecation within Romanian ethno-nationalist selfhood, it is valuable to acknowledge these as a way of understanding the fuller picture of Romanian articulations of Ţigan alterity. The existence of discourses blaming an innate Romanian inability to perform EUropean identity throw into relief the high stakes of maintaining the image of EUropean origins through the Ţigan Other. This context explains to some extent the intense reliance on the Ţigan Other in

[573] For more insight see Ana Blandiana "Criza de Incredere" in *Ghicitul în mulţimi* Editură Atlas, Bucharest 2000.

[574] For a discussion of this double side of Romanian identity in historical context see Dennis Deletant "Between Tradition and Modernity" pp.318-332 in Dennis Deletant and Maurice Pearton (eds) *Romanian Observed: Studies in contemporary Romanian History* Encyclopaedic Publishing House, Bucharest 1998.

relating to the international sphere. In other words the Ţigan Other enables the discourse of fixed EUropean identity in the context of competing ways of knowing the Romanian self.

Nametags, identities and the European Union

The Romanian government refused to use the name "Roma" in formal documents until 2000, 'in order to avoid confusion between *Rom/Roma* and *România.*'[575] The European Union accepted the name "Roma" in 1980, but Romanian politicians, journalists, and some intellectuals supported the continued use of the word Ţigan. This is another point Boia makes in his English language textbook on Romania, that 'as the word Ţigan has come to be pejorative, Gypsies insist on being called by the name they use themselves, *Romi* ("Roma"). Roma is uncomfortably similar to "Romanian," although the words have quite different origins. How can foreigners be expected to make such fine distinctions?'[576] It is only in the Romanian language that this similarity is evident (though not easily confusable). In English the difference is between Romanian and Roma, in French *Roumain* and *Rom*, and in German *Rumänien* and *Rom*. I have never noticed a linguistic or phonetic confusion between the two terms in any of the media or

[575] Minister for External Affairs Teodor Melescanu, Memorandum Nr. H03/169 January 1995. See also Jennifer Tanaka "Rroma in Romania Struggle for Self-identification" on *Patrin Web Journal* 1995 http://www.geocities.com/Paris/5121/rroma.html, last accessed 21-11-2005.
[576] Boia op. cit. p. 219.

government references to Romanians and Roma that I have read in the above languages. The debate over confusion between the two words can be read as the Romanian fear of confusion between the two distinct identities signified by the terms. Many of my survey respondents emphasized the similarity of names as problematic. One young woman wrote

> First of all, we must not confuse *Rom* with *Român*. Roma are an ethnicity from Romania, and they are Romanian citizens, but they have their own customs and particularly problems; they are uneducated and have a bad reputation which, in the West, leads to Romanians mistakenly being called Roma.[577]

Another stressed that

> the primary difference is how the two words are written; this is very important. There is a difference of culture and of origin. Romanians and Roma may live in the same country, but they have different traditions and cultures. Romanians and Roma are often mistaken for one another, but Romanians have inhabited these lands for centuries, while the Roma colonized our country. They are a minority.[578]

In a response of standard rhetorical severity, a young man wrote that

---

[577] Survey, University of Bucharest, respondent #32, 2001.
[578] Survey, University of Bucharest, respondent #57, 2001.

> Roma are not Roma, but Ţigani. Ţigani are thieves, criminals, pickpockets etc, Ţigani are a migratory people who migrated here from India. They have no culture. They chose the name *Rrom* to make associations with the word *Român*.'[579]

The name, in this context, signifies differences of origin and culture, both allegedly innate. An important point is that the word Roma became widely used in Romania when various Roma groups and individuals identified themselves as such after 1989. The support of international organizations, including the United Nations, the European Union and various NGOs, for use of the term Roma, and the opposition from most sectors of Romanian society, sparked intense debates. These raised awareness of both names and their interpretations throughout Romanian society. The Romanian government decreed that the term "Rroma" would replace the term Ţigan in public administration in 2000, with a silent, extra 'r' to avoid any confusion.[580] Many Romanians refused to use the name Roma, even in 2003. A taxi driver in a vox pops on ethnic minorities chose to comment thus, 'I don't have a problem with Ţigani, but I don't want to call them Romi. The same way I don't like to use comrade (*tovaraşi)* from the time of Nicu'.[581]

---

[579] Survey, University of Bucharest, respondent #79, 2001.

[580] Mugur Isarescu, Prime Minister of Romania, Memorandum Nr. .D2/1094 "Terms used for the naming of Roma/Ţigan ethnicity" 29 February 2000. It is noteworthy that this memorandum was issued under the Constantinescu government, before Iliescu's return to power. The suggestion of spelling Rroma with the extra (silent) r came from the Roma community at the height of debate over naming in 1994.

[581] Bucurescu "Sondaj de opinie" op cit. quoting Gheorghe Trica, driver.

This man not only identifies Ţigani as a group one may "have problems" with, but he compares his aversion to the name Roma with the rhetoric of the socialist past, distancing both concepts from his contemporary reality. The value of the word 'comrade' as representative of the socialist period is a very powerful node of knowledge, linking not only to ideological (socialist) Others, but the everyday complicity of all Romanians in the system of naming themselves. "Comrade" is an utterance that lay and lies at the heart of a myriad of knowledges of socialism; it is the catalyst for discourses of living and remembering socialism. The respondent's link between Othering in the (socialist) past and the (Ţigan) present, therefore, is yet another indication of the powerful status of the Ţigani/Rrom Other as a unique discursive node of specifically post-socialist anxiety.

It is not just Romanians with possibly a meager knowledge of or willingness to understand Romani ethnic identity who refuse to use the name Roma choose. Viorel Achim, the Romanian scholar who has written the most detailed historical study of Roma in Romania so far, named his study *Ţiganii in the History of Romania* (1998) and refuses to use the name "Roma."[582] Although Achim knows the history of Roma enslavement better than anyone, he denies that Roma are an ethnic group, instead perceiving Ţigani as 'one of the most serious social

[582] Achim's study is aptly titled; his reading of archival material and numerical fact through the Romanian stereotypical discourses of the Ţigan Other means that he has indeed written a history of Ţigani in Romania, rather than a history of Roma. Viorel Achim *Ţiganii în istoria României* Editură Enciclopedia, Bucharest 1998.

problems in Romania.'[583] In one of three interviews I conducted with Achim, he explained that the term "Roma" is 'a political name for a new identity. The 'Roma question' is a conspiracy of the west against the eastern countries. How can anyone justify a minority group receiving so much attention and money?'[584] Achim considers that those who claim Romani ethnicity profit from the conspiracy of the West, which aims to both discredit Romania and support Ţigani as usurpers of ethnic Romanian rights.[585] While Achim's theory is more sophisticated (and confusing) than most, the focus on Roma as a politically strategic minority group who receive attention and money that ethnic Romanians

---

[583] To recognize Roma as a social group rather than an ethnic group is common amongst many groups in contemporary Europe. Goldston notes that the European Union itself chooses to understand Roma communities in this way, as citizens of particular countries who need to be recognized only as minorities discriminated against in a social sense. This approach elides a discussion of the nature of stereotypes of Ţigan as racial and ethnic other which cause and justify social marginalization.

[584] Personal interview with Viorel Achim 19 July 2002.

[585] Achim 1998, p.192. In the interview Achim compared Roma in EUrope with the Jews claiming Israel to the detriment of Palestine, calling themselves Israelis, a supposed fabrication orchestrated by international forces. Interestingly enough then, the homeland that Achim resents Roma claiming is EUrope. His linking of Jews with Roma in a network of anti-Romanian international conspiracy fits logically in the postsocialist anti-semitic discourses explicated at length by Denise Roman. In this discourse, 'the mythical Jew' is considered the epicenter of international conspiracy against the nation,' and Roman includes Leon Volovici's extension of the centrality of 'the Jew' as being embodied by any other, such as Hungarians or Gypsies (sic). Denise Roman *Fragmented Identities: Popular Culture, Sex, and Everyday Life in Postcommunist Romania* Lexington Books, New York and Oxford, 2003 p.75-92. Volovici fails to explain how the Jewish Other is transmitted through various social periods and discourses as the all inclusive archetypal Other and this raises questions of how the prioritization of the Jewish Other affects scholarship and understandings of the Othering of different groups in different societies. For more on this issue see Leon Volovici "Mit şi Realitate" Louis Ulrich (trans.) *Sfera Politicii* Vol. 32 1995 pp.4-8 and Andrei Oişteanu *Imaginea evreului în cultura română* Humanitas, Bucharest 2001.

do not, is a focus shared with popular discourses since the beginning of EU accession negotiations in the late 1990s. Indeed, despite the low priority of human rights in the 80 000 pages of EU laws and regulations for accession, the changes in the fields of ethnic minorities, gender mainstreaming and the de-criminalization of homosexuality have stirred the most publicity and debate.[586] Of these concerns, 'the Roma issue,' more often reported as 'the Ţigan problem,' receives the most media attention.

In 2001, the Soros-funded Open Society Institute's EU accession monitoring program for the protection of minorities in Romania concluded that 'insufficient political will and inadequate intergovernmental coordination are largely to blame for the long period of relative inactivity' in Romania, and that 'overall, the series of meetings in the year 2000 failed to bring any kind of progress towards adoption of a national strategy' for the Roma minority.[587] In the same year, an extensive survey by the Ethnocultural Diversity Research Center, a research body also funded by the Open Society Institute, found that 24% of Romanians believed ethnic minorities (Hungarian and Roma) "received too many rights."[588] It is my

---

[586] Melanie H. Ram "Minority Relations in Multiethnic societies: Asssessing the European Union Factor in Romania" pp.63-90 in *Romanian Journal of Society and Politics* Vol. 1 Nr. 2, 2001.

[587] Open Society Institute EU Accession Monitoring Program *Protecţia Minorităţilor în România* Central European University Press, Budapest and New York, 2001 p.103.

[588] Centrul de Resurse pentru Diversitate Etnoculturală Barometrul Relaţiilor Ethnice Metro Media Transilvania, November 2001. Also available via www.edrc.ro. This organization is a member of the Soros Open Network. The study details the methodology of the project. 24% of Romanians think minorities

opinion that the discrepancy between the ethnic Romanian population perception that Roma receive disproportionate attention, money and rights and the reality as stated by Roma groups and international assessment teams, is not the result of visible new evidence of Roma wealth, but of Romanian media representation of Roma as Ţigani favored by the EU.

The Romanian Romani NGO Romani CRISS (*Centrul Romilor pentru Intervenţie Sociala şi Studii*) conducted a study of the daily newspaper *Ziua* in 1998 and 1999 and found the most commonly occurring nouns in articles concerning Ţigani and Roma (these names were used in equal measure) to be damages, injury, arrest, weapons, theft and clan. The study found that negative stereotypes of 'Ţigan infractors' and 'violent Ţigani' were twice as common as (what the study assumed to be) positive stereotypes of 'Ţigan traditions.'[589] As negotiations with the European Union began and progressed, the Romanian media significantly changed the way they reported Roma overall. As a result of pressure from civil society (NGOs and intellectuals), the press released a greater amount of information concerning the political and cultural roles of Roma. It is clear from media sources throughout the 1990s that reports of Ţigani as other than criminals

(including Hungarians and "Rromi") have too many rights, 61% say they have as much as they need, 12% say they have too few rights. For interest, 61% of Rromi and 64% of Hungarians said minorities had too few rights. Ibid. p.26.

[589] Viorel Anăstăsoaie "Imaginea Romilor în presa românească" pp.163-165 in Viorel Anăstăsoaie and Daniele Tarnovschi (eds) *Proiecte pentru Romii din România, 1990-2000* Centrul de Resurse pentru Diversitate Etnoculturală, Cluj Napoca, 2001. As will be addressed, articles classified as 'positive' in subject are often presented in negative ways: so that Romani traditions are presented as primitive and contrasted with 'civilized' customs.

did increase, but in a very specific way. Not only did the number of articles linking Ţigani with violent crimes remain grossly disproportionate with the rate of convictions of ethnic Roma compared with Romanians, but these stereotypes remained predominant in print and television press, and now appeared alongside articles concerning EUropean and Romanian government assistance for Roma.

The Romania CRISS study found that in each of the five major dailies monitored, articles concerning infractions were significantly more common than articles concerning Roma in politics and programs for educational development (in order of appearance).[590] A Hungarian study reflected the same trend with more specific categories, noting 25% of articles concerning Roma in 1997 were about 'criminality' 25% about 'interethnic conflict', 20% were about 'social security and possessions,' and 18% were about 'governmental politics and assistance.'[591] Stereotypes of Ţigani as violent were accompanied by 'objective' information about (often fabricated) amounts of money and power that Roma supposedly received from the Romanian government and the EU, and it was in this context that EUropean concepts of 'positive discrimination' and 'human rights' were introduced.[592] These trends are constant in all major newspapers, but as a single

---

[590] Romani CRISS report of the Contact Point of Roma NGOs with the media *Roma and Media* Bucharest, 2000, pp.29-31.

[591] Gabor Bernath and Vera Messing "As Cutaways, Only in Mute" *Roma in the Hungarian Media* Office for National and Ethnic Minorities, Budapest 1998. See the results in Romani CRISS *Roma and the Media* 2000 pp.32-36.

[592] One example is the recurring report that Roma receive payments from Germany as compensation for the systematic deportations of Roma during World War Two. These reports not only obfuscate the struggles of Roma NGOs for

example, the day after running a story on Ţigan Romanian thieves in Ireland, *Evenimentul Zilei* printed an article entitled "Ţigan women from Iveşti learn the alphabet so they too can drive convertibles."[593] While this article ostensibly addresses positive developments in the Romani community, and would be classified as such by both of the previous studies, the overtones are clear. The first paragraph explains that 'Ţigan women of the Căldărari people from Galaţi have hit the books. They are learning the alphabet, learning the sum of 2 plus 2, and basic good manners. They come to school directly from their palaces filled with furniture and electrical goods.'[594] The article stipulates that the Alliance for Unity of Rroma initiated the literacy program, financed by a German foundation. The insinuations of this single example, that uneducated Roma receive unwarranted and excessive international support when in fact they are richer than Romanians, are standard fare in the Romanian media.

The Romanian media frames stereotypes according to new EUropean language in quite sophisticated ways. One article described the arrest of a member of the

---

recognition of the *Porajmos* against Romanian Roma (which continues with little success), but generate uncertainty and distrust within the Romanian Roma community. Roma NGO internet Forums are often used to debunk media attacks on individual leaders, see Florin Cioaba's refutation of allegations published in three major newspapers that he received 250 million lei compensation. Romanothan Forum. www.romanothan.ro/cgi-bin/forrom, 14 February 2003.

[593] Alina Comşa-Durbacă "Ţigăncile din Iveşti învaţă alfabetul ca să-şi conducă decapotabilele" *Evenimentul Zilei* 7 November 2001 p.3. A picture of women dressed traditionally sitting crammed on undersized benches surrounded by 6 men and women who are not dressed like Roma (who we can assume are the teachers) accompanied the article.

[594] "Ţigăncile din Iveşti învaţă alfabetul ca să-şi conducă decapotabilele" op.cit.

'Ţigan mafia of metal collecting firms' and 'not a quarter of an hour later, the appearance at the Police door of a delegation of Căldărari (Roma) who appealed (the arrest) as against human rights.'[595] In examples such as this, EUropean language is deployed in disjunctive terms that make it seem contradictory, such as a 'delegation' of Ţigani. Concepts such as human rights are popularized as violations of ethnic Romanian rights as lawful rights. The Romanian journalist Epure replied to international protests against her racist scapegoating of Ţigani with the statement that 'you can't discriminate against the color of skin, but you can discriminate against people who break the law.'[596] In this way, the media's overrepresentation of Roma as criminals serves as justification for discrimination against Roma in popular (and media) discourses, simultaneously re-framing EUropean discourses of human rights as rights outside the (Romanian) law.

In addition to this misrepresentation and implications of preferential EUropean treatment, the media began to use both names, "Roma" and "Ţigani." Headlines continued to refer to Ţigani in the vast majority, but, as evidenced by the Romani CRISS study, the word Roma was interchanged throughout. In this way, the meaning of the word Roma changed from the early 1990s, when it was a way that a political and intellectual elite referred to themselves, to become a name pervasively linked with the 'threat' that EUrope privileges Roma/Ţigani over

[595] Razvan Popa "Satra 'metalurgistilor' din Sinteşti nu s-a sinchisit de ordonanta lui Nastase: Ţiganii au gasit noi mijloace pentru a trafica metale feroase şi neferoase" *Adevărul* 17 December 2002.
[596] Lia Lucia Epure "Tevez Baftalo!" editorial in *Ziua de Vest* 26 November 2002.

Romanians. As one Romanian newspaper article noted 'before 1990, the Romanian public didn't know what or who were "Romi"...but the problem now is that the word means exactly the same thing as the word Ţigani.'[597] Viorel Achim refuses to use the word Roma in speech, but he mixes the use of Ţigan and Roma in his text, thereby merging the signified subject of Roma with the Ţigan Other. This does not contradict his stance against the use of Roma as a self title chosen by Romani people, in fact it co-opts the intended meaning of the word as an ethnic community and positions it as a synonymous term for the Ţigan Other. As Dan Oprescu, a Romanian activist for Romani rights noted, 'it is clear that they can say Roma in different ways, even 'angels,' in fact, but if the reality doesn't change, even 'angels' will come to be pejorative.'[598]

The Romanian media's sensationalist penchant for representing the Ţigan Other as violent criminal accentuates an overall lack of clear concise information provided by government sources concerning the everyday problems faced by people of all ethnicities in contemporary Romania. While the media reports organized corruption in all sectors of government, there are no answers for readers wondering when they will be able to find work, or afford to buy meat in the market with meager wages. EU monitoring reports up to 2003 consistently noted that Romania did not exhibit a free market, functioning judiciary or

[597] Unsigned "Ţiganii, o problema doar in Estul Europei: Experimentul "Speranţa" *Cotidianul* 19 October 2001.
[598] Dan Oprescu "Un pas greşit in directia cea buna: românia şi minoritatile nationale" (1990-2000) www.mma.ro/database/message/doprescu1ro.html, last accessed 21-01-2001.

responsible legislative process.[599] As outlined in the previous chapter, the Ţigan Other functions as a form of knowledge in shopping experiences of Romanians, the most accessible way of understanding economics considering the dearth of information provided to the public by any government sources. Reports of Roma receiving programs of development therefore fall on the ears of a society with a massively understated 8.1% unemployment, and net monthly average wage of almost 4 million lei a month (in 2002), at the time approximately 120 USD.[600] Government programs often try to appease complaints by providing symbols the people recognize from former times as prosperity, but these are ineffectual and fail to convey helpful information concerning economic processes. One example of this strategy was the government decision in 2001 to open a chain of subsidized supermarkets for pensioners rather than increasing the pension to match inflation rates.[601] The success of this illogical economic move is that it is discursively understood through socialist period discourses as an initiative providing special services for the target group; the venture is not understood from an open market economic point of view. With the lack of information and a stable but difficult economic situation, people use the invisible hand of the Ţigan mafia to explain

[599] The European Commission Report for 2002 concluded that Romania did not have a functional open market.
[600] Romanian National Institute of Statistics, www.insse.ro.
[601] It is interesting to note that in the television coverage of the opening day of the supermarket, the viewer saw not only pensioners shopping for staple products at a lower price, but each pensioner shopping with a younger man or woman and a trolley full of the maximum number of goods allowed for each pension card. The government effectively created a subsidized wholesale shopping network that entrepreneurs can access by utilizing a pensioner relative/contact.

unemployment and market prices.[602] Media articles that claim the government's priorities as 'putting Rromii in the parliament' and drawing links between the government and Ţigan mafia widen the gap of trust between the majority Romanian population and the government.[603] The near victory of the right wing Corneliu Vadim Tudor and his Greater Romania party in the 2000 presidential elections was understood by academics such as Michael Shafir, Katherine Verdery and Vladimir Tismaneanu as reflecting the appeal of defensive Romanian ethnonationalism. Vadim Tudor railed against the 'Ţigan mafia, who rape not only women and children, but all that is ours.'[604]

The Romanian intellectual Andrei Pleşu warned in an article printed in the intellectual journal *22* in 2002 that unless some symbols or visions are found to link a united Europe with the way people perceive their place in it, Romania will develop the infrastructure without the interiority.[605] While Pleşu's rhetoric does not clarify exactly how to imbue new symbols with supposedly valuable interiority for forms, it reveals much about the shifts in meaning that are now being contested within the new infrastructures of European accession. As popular

[602] Katherine Verdery *What was socialism and what comes next?* Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996 pp. 216-220.
[603] Teodora Georgescu "Prioritate guvernamentală în 2002: Năstase bagă rromi în poliţie" *Evenimentul Zilei* 20 December 2001, p.6 The headline of the article is quite misleading, as the half a page text makes only one reference to Roma as being encouraged to enter the police force.
[604] Quoted from Pro TV talk show 14 November 2000, and cited in the *Progamul de Monitorizare a Accesului UE. Drepturile Minorităţilor in România*, Vasile Ionescu, Romanothan.
[605] Andrei Pleşu "Unitatea europeana trebuie reinventata" *Revista 22* Nr. .197, 13 May 2002.

discourse incorporates the rhetoric of EUrope, especially using the media's constructions, it is encoded within the schema of uncertainty the majority of Romanians experience, so that new symbols appear in well-known stereotypical discourses and thereby form new knowledges of contemporary issues.

Paradoxically then, the Ţigan Other enables ethnonational discourses of a Romanian self to claim an origin and place in EUrope, at the same time as EUrope demands that the Ţigan Other be relinquished by Romania as a sign of EUropean identity. Epure's articles manifest this double bind. On the one hand Epure blames Ţigani for attacking 'the equilibrium of European civilization,' while on the other she blames the Romanian authorities who refuse to make laws preventing Roma from leaving the country for 'fear of accusations' from the West as not 'playing their role in democracy.'[606] Epure blames Western European democracy for preventing the abuse of human rights that would supposedly enable Romania to be perceived **as** EUropean (democratic). As Vasile Ionescu, a Romanian Romani activist, has responded to Epure's claim to a place for Romania in EUrope that is predicated upon the violation of the very concepts of free movement.[607] In her follow up article, Epure clarified that indeed she was

[606] Epure "Rromania" 16 November 2002.

[607] Vasile Ionescu's comments and the ensuing debate can be found in the archives of the Romanothan "Inforrom" Buletin de Informare şi Monitorizare a Presei, www.romanothan.ro. In fact Epure rightfully claims that Peter Schneider, the President of the European Parliamentary Commission, says the same thing as her; the difference is that he understands the ways that concepts such as human rights and minorities interact in the EUropean discourses, so he can mobilize them in a logical system without incurring criticism so easily. In this way, Epure's

making a stand in front of 'European institutions...a revolt against lawlessness' and aiming to assure Romania its deserved recognition within and access to EUrope. In addition, Epure claimed that protests that her statements incited racial hatred were 'undemocratic.'

Epure's paradox is not merely an individual case of conceptual confusion, but is performed on a nation wide scale in the stereotypical discourses of Ţigani and Roma that we have examined in an international context up to this point. In order to achieve EU accession, Romania must begin to demonstrate equitable access for the very Other which has thus far enabled the claims of Romanian identity as naturally EUropean. As we have seen, the dominant discourses in Romanian society have adopted the language of EUrope, but in ways that reconfigure meanings of the Ţigani/Roma Other to serve new purposes. The gap between the elite government/civil society and popular discourses of Europe does not simply widen, but is transgressed by networks of signifiers with multiple meanings that are increasingly rich in meaning and contested. The next section explores the contestation of ethnic identity within the new language of EUrope through looking at a third term, "Rroma."

---

argument actually exposes the leaps in logic at the heart of EUropean identity formation; masked/embodied in the language of civil society, it purports to be anti-racist while embodying racism in new forms.

Popular concepts of and resistance to a EUropean Rromania

Epure concludes her first article with the statement that if Romanians 'continue to accept being associated with abnormals, we will become, in the end, Rromania.' This is a play on third way of naming Roma, as Rroma, which was adopted by the Romanian government in 2000 to avoid the possibility of confusion between the Romanian terms *Romi* and *Români* in international contexts. Rroma is used in elite discourses (public administration, civil society), but in popular discourse it is often used in imaginative conjugations such as "Rromania," implying a national Romanian domination by, loss of identity and subservience to, Rroma (as Ţigani). Epure envisages a future under 'democratic' rule as 'Rromania, a land of abnormals.' In a tabloid article that said what many Romanians openly expressed, Viorel Chifu described a time when 'Romanians will be begging Ţigani for food, for the money they get from their foreign donations.'[608] Chifu concluded that 'in some years we'll be writing Romanian with two "r"s, and ethnic Romanians will be fighting in the parliament to gain any rights. This is not a grotesque scene, but a simple alternative to Romania, a land the history books will say entered NATO in 2000, and later the EU, and all thanks to cooperative living between Romanians and Ţigani.'[609] As the word is perceived as being born of demands from Romani groups and the EU, it is often used to signify a loss of Romanian identity to

[608] Viorel Chifu "Hai, da ţigane ceva şi lu' asta micu'!" *Gardianul* 2 October 2002.
[609] Chifu op.cit.

Ţigani as forced by EUropean accession. As an article in the intellectual weekly *Dilema* pointed out, Roma and Ţigani are recognized by Romanians through the stereotypes the media presents. The author used the title "From Rrom to Man" (*De la Rrom la Om*), to highlight that far from being used as a term of respect, *Rrom* is used to mean stereotypical Ţigani undeserving of human rights.[610] The extra "r" in Rroma is read as a kind of birthmark that is used in Romanian popular discourse to invoke and refer to exactly what it was supposed to prevent: the conflation of ethnic Romanians and Ţigani in the eyes of Europe. How then has the extra 'r' been deployed in Romanian discourses of ethnic identity and Otherness?

In the month of October 2001, a debate raged in Romania sparked by the Mayor of Piatra Neamt, a city in the north of Romania, who announced that he would construct a district especially for Rroma, six kilometers outside the city limits, patrolled by police and surrounded by barbed wire.[611] The Mayor's project was reported in all the major Romanian newspapers, and the Mayor's statement was consistently transcribed using the term *Rroma*. The plan was announced in the wake of similar segregated housing projects in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and protests immediately erupted from Romanian and international Romani and

[610] Marian Chiriac "De la rrom la om" *Dilema* Nr. 460 2001. Note that in this section I continue to refer to Roma as Roma, and any other spellings reflect those of the author, or Ţigan as the Ţigan sterotypical Other.
[611] The district was to be named Hope.

non-Romani organizations calling the proposal apartheid.[612] The Romanian press was quick to report that international newspapers such as The Guardian, had negatively reported the case of the Mayor, highlighting sensitivity to the gaze of EUrope. There was a furore in the Romanian parliament, and a representative of the Mayor's political party (Social Democracy Party) appeared live on a popular evening talk show to explain that a journalist had twisted the Mayor's words. 'In fact there is no barbed wire, the wire is the normal kind, and it gives the area a very nice look...moreover, the Mayor has no problem with Ţigani.'[613] Until the politician's use of the word "Ţigani," the formal debate had used the term Roma, and the politician's slip to the pejorative, (especially as it was to deny that the Mayor had a problem with them!), caught the attention of the host, the other guests, and the Romanians who were watching the program with me at home. Vasile Ionescu, a Romani intellectual and activist who was live in the studio, noted the slip and responded that the mayor and the politician should both should 'pay attention to language.'[614] I understood the meaning of Ionescu's comment to be that although the politicians and media were using EUropean language, "everyone knows" the Mayor was saying *Rroma* but meaning Ţigani.

---

[612] Livia Cimpoeru ""The Guardian" din nou despre Români: Ghetoul ţigănesc de la Piatra Neamţ comparat cu lagărele de exterminare" *Evenimentul Zilei* 5 November 2001 p.2.
[613] Quote of Vasile Dancu on Marius Tuca Show, 12 October 2001, quoted in Cristian Ghinea "Intre noi fie vorba, rromii tot Ţigan sint" *Dilema* 19 October 2001, p.3.
[614] Ibid.

After Vasile Ionescu put forward his opinion against the relocation and segregation of the scheme, viewers telephoned the program live to air to denounce the 'ungratefulness' of people calling the plan racist, demanding that if Ţigani (sic) didn't want 'special privileges,' Romanians should receive houses.[615] The next day, the local councils of Deva and Baia Mare announced that they too would respond to complaints from 'Rroma' in substandard living conditions by providing relocation to new 'special zones for Ţigani,' funded with money from the EU.[616] In drawing explicit attention to the EU as funding these programs, local councils ostensibly toed the line of EU discourses of equity for minorities, and simultaneously invoked the 'popular knowledge' that Ţigani received privileges Romanians didn't. In this way, elite discourses of EUropean style human rights were re-configured within a specifically Romanian ethnicized context to mean very different things at the grass roots level than at the level of EUropean enunciation.

Alongside articles outlining criticism of the Mayor's plan as discrimination against Roma, much coverage was given to the Timişoara local council's decision to dėmolish large Romani houses, the so-called Ţigan castles, due to 'provocations of authority' in the form of incomplete paperwork. The insinuation

---

[615] Ghinea op.cit.

[616] Petru Popovici "Dupa modelul Piatra Neamţ: cartier pentru Ţiganii şi la Deva" and "Şi romii din Baia Mare vor fi mutaţi" *Adevărul* 13 October 2001 p.12 (note the interchanging use of Ţigan and Roma). See also *Adevărul* 16 October 2001 p.1, *Evenimentul Zilei* 16 October 2001 p.6 and Pro TV news reports 13 October 2001.

was that Romani people are so rich they consider themselves outside Romanian law.[617] As we will later explore, newspaper cartoons made fun of the idea that there could be racism against Rroma, and reflected the view that Romanians are disadvantaged in comparison to the EU supported Rroma.[618]

On 14 October, the Prime Minister Adrian Nastase commented to the press that he 'could not speak seriously of a program of integration of Roma while thinking in terms of ghettos.'[619] This statement put the Romanian Government on the side of elite EUropean rather than popular discourse, and the rest of the article described local leaders and members of parliament as feeling that Nastase was 'extremely ungrateful for their initiatives regarding the Ţigan problem.'[620] By overtly referring to the "Ţigan problem," the media placed Nastase on the side of the ethnonational Other, as a leader who fails to defend the rights of ethnic Romanians. On the same day, one of the major daily papers, *Evenimentul Zilei*, put the outspoken President of the Romanian Roma Party, Madalin Voicu, in the 'good news' column for his position in favor of the 'district for Ţigani' in Piatra

---

[617] From Dragos Boţa "Ţiganii au reocupat în forţă palatul cu turnuleţe, din Timişoara: sfinând autorităţile" *Adevărul* 16 October 2001 p.16. See also Geogreta Petrovici "Palat ţigănesc demolat de Primăria Timişoarei" *Evenimentul Zilei* 12 October 2001 p.2, Adrian Cercelescu, "Palate de milioane de dolari, goale pe dinăuntru" *Adevărul* 17 October 2001 p. 1 and 9. Dragos Boţa " 'Mascaţii' I-au scos pe cei care sa baricadaseră în palatul cu turnuleţe" *Adevărul* 17 October, 2001 p.1, Ion Medoia "Demolarea palatelor ţiganeşti, cu ţipete, lacrimi şi... 'mascaţi'" *România Liberă* 17 October 2001, p.24.

[618] Especially cartoon in *Adevărul* 13 Oct. 2001 p.1 and *Evenimentul Zilei* 5 November 2001.

[619] C.D. "Adrian Nastatse gloseaza pe tema Ţiganii" *Adevărul* 15 October 2001. p.15.

[620] Ibid.

Neamț (with the condition that the guards did not impede the right of free circulation).[621]

The whole debate was extensively covered in the daily press, and gained the attention of the intellectual community. An article by Christian Ghinea, entitled "Just between us, Rroma are all Țigani" appeared in the weekly intellectual periodical *Dilema* on the 19 October, pointing out the duplicitous meaning of the word "Rroma."[622] Ghinea wrote that 'amongst us, Romanians, we can speak openly...it can't be discrimination, because we have a law against that, but just between us, *Țigani* are all *Țigani*, and we know best.'[623] This article is invaluable evidence of the way that "everybody knows," and the fact that the "real" knowledge Romanians have, that all Țigani are as they appear in Romanian stereotypes, is opposed to the misrecognition, at the EUropean level, of Țigani as Rroma.

In his *Dilema* article, Ghinea described the whole Piatra Neamț debate, from announcing a district for *Rroma*, to the public outcry that Romanians suffer while

---

[621] *Evenimentul Zilei* 15 October 2001 p.4. Madalin Voicu, a Romanian Rom, is currently being prosecuted by a coalition of Roma NGOs for racism; he is renowned for supporting the punishment of castration for rapists and for treating all Roma as stereotypical Țigan.
[622] Ghinea op.cit.
[623] For a concise report on the state of Romania's anti discrimination laws see Romanița Iordache and Andreea Tabacu "Not Yet Viable: Anti-Discrimination Action in Romania" *Roma Rights* Nr. 1-2 Notebook section 2003.

Țigani receive privileges, as a 'flippant, stupid joke.'[624] But jokes, especially in Romania, serve to 'expose the gap between the official representational system and the realities of everyday life.'[625] Just as before 1989, though to a lesser extent, jokes form an unofficial public discourse in postsocialist Romania. The local government official was not joking about the segregation of an ethnic community, he was joking about the fact that this segregation was no longer considered official discourse. The joke is funny to those who perceive a contradiction between the EUropean language of human rights, and the rights of the Romanian majority to segregate the Romani minority as Țigani, as Epure expressed in her articles. The anxiety of the general public over the issue was reflected in the extent and intensity of interest. In talk shows, vox pops, and phone and internet polls, Romanians voiced their anger over the perceived failure of the Romanian government to meet the needs of the Romanian community, assuming that a finite resource of 'rights' had been redirected to stereotypical Țigani by EUropean guidelines.

The extra "r" in Rroma can be understood as marking the site where knowledges of selves and Others are contested. It represents EUrope's claim that Roma identified as Țigani deserve equality with Romanians, and simultaneously

[624] Ghinea op. cit.

[625] For a study of the nature of jokes in postsocialist Russia see Anna Krylova "Saying 'Lenin' and meaning 'party'; subversion and laughter in Soviet and post-soviet society" pp.243-265 in *Consuming Russia: Popular culture, sex and society since Gorbachev* Adele Marie Barker (ed) Duke University Press, Durham and London, 1999. For specifically Romanian discussions of joking see Richard Wagener *Exit* Verso press, London and New York 1990, p.99.

signifies the popular Romanian knowledge, that Ţigani do not deserve EUropean rights. Ghinea's article outlines the specific stereotypes of Ţigani as lazy, dirty and thieving, and explains that contradictions of the stereotypes in the form of individual exceptions ("any Rroma amongst them"), are resolved by simply saying "it's a shame he's Ţigan." In this way, exceptions to stereotypical Ţigani are named Rroma, but cannot be "authentic;" Ţigani are innately Ţigan. Indeed, the Romanian philosopher Mihaela Miroiu understands the difference between Rroma and Ţigani as 'the new exceptionalism,' people came to be familiar with the word Roma, and now Rroma is again the politically active exception which must be proven wrong.[626]

Debate in the postsocialist period has constantly returned to the question of whether Ţigani are a social, racial or ethnic group, with public opinion (and opinions of intellectuals such as Achim) favoring the argument that Roma/Ţigani are a social group.[627] This argument claims there are no differences between

---

[626] Mihaela Miroiu *Societatea Retro* Editură Trei, Bucharest 1999 p.128. Note that the Romanian political scientist Alina Mungiu-Pippidi also attempts to differentiate between Roma as an authentic ethnic group (with jobs and education) and Ţigan as 'a kind of social etiquette' (as beggars and thieves). Her approach seems confused and problematic. See Alina Mungiu-Pippidi *Politica după Comunism* Humanitas, Bucharest, 2002 p.208.

[627] For a concise summary of the logic of this discussion see Unsigned "Ţigani, o problema doar in estul europei" *Cotidianul* 19 October 2001 'any Romanian with sensitive observation can see that the majority of the ethnic Ţigan are not so much more pigmented than ethnic Romanians...those Ţigan in Romania that accede to higher social positions can no longer be easily recognized as Ţigan and thus they evade being recognized as such... this brings us to the conclusion that in Romania the term Ţigan means an ethnicity with differing elements of language, and social

Romanians and Roma that justify special treatment for the latter group. But if the reasoning was honestly that only social conditions, a lack of education or opportunity, differentiated Roma from Romanians, then the logical step would be to provide positive discrimination, as the EUropean discourse advocates, to level social standards. The hidden presumption of the argument that Ţigani are a social group, however, is that Ţigani are incapable of living in social standards equal with Romanians. In this way, EUropean demands that Roma receive equitable access are not refuted because Romanians are racist or discriminate against an ethnic group ("we have laws against that"), but because Ţigani are constructed as a social group that is innately Other to EUropean civilization.[628]

At the same time as the debate as to whether Ţigani were social or racial others hit a high in 2002, Rroma became a popular subject of newspaper cartoons, in which they were primarily signified by being colored black. As previous chapters have illustrated, this draws on historically articulated stereotypes of the Ţigan Other as black skinned.[629] In the postsocialist period, skin color remains a significant

---

conduct, or in Romania and other places Ţigan were not discriminated against as an ethnicity but on criteria of social conduct.'

[628] It is interesting that Achim's work after his book was to provide figures for the German Holocaust compensation fund. Achim focused on proving that the deportations of Roma during World War Two were not as racial Others, but social outcasts, despite the fact that nomadic Roma were deported as innately criminal, and sedentary Roma were murdered as masquerading nomadic criminals.

[629] Oral traditions that used nicknames like 'crow' for individuals identified as Ţigani remain popular in the common anti-Ţigan graffitti of right wing groups throughout Bucharest. See the headlines from publications of the group Noua Dreapta that are printed posters on the street as well as on the internet. www.nouadreapta.org last accessed 27-11-2005.

marker of criminality, with newspaper reports detailing the color of (alleged) offenders skin and printing photographs of men with dark skin.[630] Ţigani were linked with Arabs in the post September 11 2001 period, with one November 2001 headline reading "Benladen, born of Rromi parents,' and the use of the term "jihad" in relation to "Ţigan mafia."[631] As anecdotal evidence, on the day after the Trade Towers attack, a Romanian cab driver told me 'well you know why it happened, we're lucky not to have so many blacks here...only the Ţigani.' Ţigani are linked in a racial trajectory by black skin as signifier, marking the subject as a criminal (terrorist) threat to the Romanian nation. Linking Ţigani with black and un-EUropean skin color served as a discursive link between innate un-European identity, as Other to Romanians as ethnic Europeans.

---

[630] Newspapers not only print photos of tough looking dark skinned young men as Ţigan criminals, but also especially photographs of individuals with physical defects, especially men who are cross eyed or photos where people look less than astute. Small physical defects recognized in people identified as Ţigan are narrated in everyday Romanian life as resulting from the stereotypes of immoral promiscuity and incest in Ţigan families.

[631] S.T. "Benladen, născut din părinţi rromi" *Evenimentul Zilei* Front Page, 5 November 2001. The actual story claims that a child born to Roma parents in a rural community in Romania was named Benladen. In addition, the article notes that 'for a moment the child was abandoned by the mother, who ran away from the hospital. The child has not yet been registered at the Civil Registry, where it is possible they will refuse to accept the name Benladen.' The inclusion of the stereotype that a Roma mother can abandon a baby 'for a moment' resonates with the Romanian stereotype of Roma women as irresponsible mothers to blame for the massive number of children left in orphanages during the Ceausescu period. Headlines such as 'The jihad of the Văcăroiu and Vîntu Mafias' heralded the entry of language associated with Muslim terrorists in stereotypical discourses of the Ţigan Other, *Evenimentul Zilei* 12 October 2001 p.3.

In the cartoons that related to Rroma in the period of the Piatra Neamt scandal, the color black became, along with the extra 'r,' a primary marker of Ţigani. One cartoon, printed at the height of the scandal, depicts shabbily dressed Romanians coloring their skin black with shoe polish in order to join a queue of traditionally dressed Roma.[632] The sign on the wall reads 'here we are giving away houses for *Rromi*,' and the Romanian woman is saying "Perhaps this way they'll give us a free house too." The cartoon represents the popular feeling that Ţigani receive privileges while Romanians suffer, and the use of the word Rroma locates this situation as specifically EUropean. My point is that even as the debates claim knowledge of the Ţigan Other as social group as a way to reject EUropean accusations of Romanian racism, the Ţigan Other is racially marked by the color of his skin.

In one cartoon, printed in the midst of NGO protests against racial discrimination and articles concerning Al Qaeda and terrorism, a black man (who, in the context of Romania and the contemporary debate) we can assume is Ţigan, speaks to a surprised looking policeman.[633] The Romanian policeman is dressed entirely in black, including the black balaclava and baton uniform of the special brigades. These are the uniforms worn by police who raid houses, and, as noted in many NGO complaints, often Romani districts. The black man asks the policeman 'you've never felt persecuted because of your color?' I interpret the cartoon in

[632] *Evenimentul Zilei* 5 November 2001.
[633] *Adevărul* 13 October 2001.

the context of the contemporary debate to be pointing out the 'irony' of Ţigani claiming they are discriminated against, when, according to the media and popular discourse, it is the police who have to work so hard to try and defend Romanians from the (criminal) violations of Ţigani. As in Ghinea's article, popular Romanian discourse answers EUropean charges of racial discrimination by pointing out that 'it can't be discrimination, we have laws for that.'[634] The cartoon parodies EUropean claims that the police discriminate against Ţigani and associates the ethnic Other with criminality, a trait marked in the color of his skin.

Conclusion

The central role that the Ţigan Other plays in enabling Romanians to articulate themselves as European in postsocialist society is evidenced in multiple ways. The press, reflecting and creating public interest, hysterically monitors international reactions to Romanian accession and migration, and displaces blame for criminal activities onto Ţigani masquerading in Europe as Romanians. The actions of the Ţigan Other are widely articulated as the reason why Romania is not yet accepted into the European Union, which is constructed as signifying acceptance as a European People. Paradoxically, it is precisely this reliance on and discrimination against individuals identified as projected ethnic Others that the European Union stipulates as Romania's downfall.

---

[634] Ghinea op.cit.

The depth of Romanian anxiety about their place in Europe is exemplified in the long discursive struggle over the name of the Ţigan Other that has followed EUrope's request that they relinquish the Ţigan Other. The popular and elite Romanian refusal to stop referring to the Romani minority as Ţigani is a signpost of the need in Romanian ethnonational discourse to claim that their fantastic stereotypical Ţigan Other is inherent in self-identifying Roma. By accepting to use the term "Rroma" in formal documents, the content of the Ţigan Other, understood by Romanians as a knowledge denied by an ignorant EUrope, was marked within new EUropean discourses. In this way, Romanian anxiety about Europe's acceptance of Romania and failure to recognize the role of the Ţigan as uncivilized, unEuropean Other is incorporated into the new interpellated identity of the Rroma Other. As the Ţigan slaves of the nineteenth century were "unslaved" to remain Ţigan slaves-without-masters, so the twenty-first century Ţigan Other is denied by an ignorant Europe, and this injustice is marked within their new name as Rroma in Romanian ethnonational EUropean discourse. The Ţigan Other as Rroma is the site upon which anxieties about EUropean identity are projected and contested in contemporary Romania.

Chapter 7

Ethnicity and the policing of gendered spaces: Romanian women and Ţigan men in Bucharest

This thesis traces the ways that predominant Romanian ethnonational discourses in various periods have constructed the Ţigan Other from a range of stereotypes. The stereotypical Ţigan Other is primarily articulated as an ethnic Other to a normative masculine Romanian identity. Although we have so far privileged ethnicity as the matrix from within which the Ţigan Other is produced, modern ethnonational Romanian identity is constituted by the twin discourses of gender and ethnicity. This chapter will explore how gendered Romanian subjects mobilize the specifically masculine Ţigan Other in contemporary discourses relating to sexual violence and public space in Bucharest.

As a feminist academic, I am critical of scholars who incorporate a final chapter on "gender" as if it is an afterthought, or a token to political correctness. From the same perspective, I was constantly aware of the primary importance of ethnicity as an interpellative category of the Ţigan Other, which is nevertheless always gendered. As an activist against discrimination against Romani Romanians as Ţigani, I am also convinced that the construction of the Ţigan Other can be most effectively approached through ethnic discourses, with a constant alertness to the

moments when gender functions in the foreground of Romanian anti-Ţigan discourses. This chapter, therefore, exists for the same reason the others do, because it relates to a specific stereotypical discourse of the ethnicized Ţigan Other that is predominant in a particular time and place. Gender is defined in this work as a series of acts and gestures that are 'performative in the sense that the essence or identity that they otherwise purport to express are fabrications manufactured and sustained through corporeal signs and other discursive means.'[635] Gender is intrinsic to discourses of ethnicity, and the discourse addressed in this chapter is a unique contemporary example of how Romanian women specifically need and use the Ţigan Other.

Before turning to the discursive theme of the chapter, it is useful to sketch briefly how the Ţigan Other has been gendered in ethnonational Romanian discourses throughout history. Both male and female Ţigani have been stereotyped as primitive and uncivilized, and these stereotypes have always had a component relating to Ţigani as promiscuous and sexually aggressive. Stereotypes of Ţigani as "closer to nature," disdainful of state institutions and irreligious also functioned to construct Ţigan men and women as subjects without distinction or control in sexual activity. The stereotype of Ţigani as immoral and irreverent of biblical principles of fidelity and marriage works with the biblical stereotype of sex as evil and the downfall of man, buttressing stereotypes of the Ţigan Other as sexual

[635] Judith Butler *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* Routledge, New York 1990 p.136.

threat to civilized and God-fearing Romanians. Ţigan women, as the gendered objects of the male gaze, are most often stereotyped in relation to sexuality and appearance; as beautiful, promiscuous and, simultaneously, deceptive and cunning. While popular folktales of the nineteenth century used masculine Ţigan protagonists to exemplify laziness, stupidity and shrewd relationships in business, female Ţigani appear only as witches who masquerade in beautiful, alluring and sexually available bodies only to later show their true colors as jealous, thieving, nagging, and even cannibalistic, ugly women.

This stereotyped sexual aggression in the uncivilized Other is common to many colonial discourses and is widely considered by post-colonial theorists to be a projection of the anxieties of the colonial/Romanian identity. In the case of Romanian history, the predominant articulation of Ţigan women as promiscuous and immoral by nature justified the legal right of any Romanian man to rape any Ţigan female slave, and the right of slave owners to rape and impregnate female slaves with the aim of increasing their slave property numbers. Throughout this chapter I draw on examples from colonial histories as comparisons for the Romanian Ţigan situation, not because the Ţigan Other is a common construction, but because broader contextual analyzes are beneficial when there is not yet an indigenous theoretical approach to the problem.

The stereotypes of Ţigan women as magically deceptive, beautiful and lascivious have also been used throughout history to stereotype Ţigan women as good at

selling.[636] Romani women identified as Ţigani in public space by their occupations or dress are stereotyped as the workers and decoys for Ţigan *bişniţari* male mafia behind the scenes, who supposedly control "their" women with aggression.[637] Ţigan men are the brains and the action behind illegal mafia and trading, depicted as violent and unfaithful towards passive Ţigan wives.[638] Stereotypes of Ţigan women are consistent throughout history, as the beautiful, sexually available victims of Ţigan male sexual aggression and control. It is the Ţigan male who is projected as the major ethnicized Other of Romanian identity, manifest in the normative male Ţigan slave, the normative male protagonist of

---

[636] These stereotypes are often played on by Romani traders widely identified as Ţigani, many offer to read palms while doing ambient sales. In one personal interview I asked a group of Romani women working in Piaţa Bucur Obor if Ţigan women really do have special powers to sell better (as Romanians claim). They laughed in recognition of this Romanian stereotype, and one women answered 'Yes! We are so good at selling that we still stand here with these boxes of cigarettes!' Piaţa Bucur Obor 6 August 2002, #13. Lemon also notes the pervasiveness of the discourse that Ţigan women "bewitch" innocent consumers into giving them money. Alaina Lemon *Between Two Fires: Gypsy performance and Romani memory from Pushkin to postsocialism* Duke University Press, Durham and London 2000 pp.71-72.

[637] Tudor Amza's guide for police, for example, states that 'if you are in your apartment and a group of Ţigan women arrives, be sure that within a day or two you will be relieved of your jewelry or other objects of value. This may happen when you are stopped in the street, in the park, or in other public places.' This comment presents the Ţigan female Other as omen of Ţigan violence in public space. *Fenomenul infractional în rindul ţiganilor: Activitaţi specific Poliţiei Române pentru protenjarea etniei şi prevenirea faptelor antisociale* Academy of Police "Alexandru Ioan Cuza," Bucharest 1995 p.105.

[638] This structure simultaneously constructs the Romanian male as capable of saving beautiful Ţigan women from the aggressive uncivilized Ţigan men who control them, thereby creating a way for Romanian men to manifest a form of masculinity. For the role of this discursive formation in colonial cultures also see Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak "Can the subaltern speak?" pp.271-313 in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds) *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* Basingstoke, Macmillan 1988, p.296.

popular anecdotes and jokes, and the postsocialist Ţigan *bişniţari* and mafia discourses of contemporary Romania.

Considering that the Romanian ethnonation is discursively constructed by masculine voices, even as there is a vital place for women within it, it is not surprising that the Ţigan Other has been most often produced as normative masculine in gender. This chapter, however, looks at a striking example of Romanian women's voices within discourses of the Ţigan Other. In Romanian women's writings and actions throughout history, I do not know of any references to Ţigani that differ from the predominant ethnic-Other discourses also propagated by male Romanians. In Romanian history there have been no Romanian women's organization concerned with the gendered Ţigan Other woman, or even with the Ţigan Other as an ethnic or social category.[639] Both male and female Romanians participate in these stereotypical constructions of the Ţigan *bişniţari* and Ţigani as non-European Others preventing Romanian EU accession, and the Ţigan Other most often invoked is masculine and heterosexual.

---

[639] Alin Ciupală, a contemporary Romanian historian specialized in nineteenth century Romanian women and activist organizations, has conducted extensive archival research and published texts on this topic, but has not ever found an example of a Romanian woman or women's organization working with Ţigani, women or men. Personal Interview 15 May 2004. See also Ciupală's text *Femeia în societatea românească a secolului al XIX-lea* Editură Meridiane, Bucharest 2003. There is similarly no mention of Ţigani in Stefania Mihailescu's anthology of historical Romanian women's texts entitled *Din Istoria Feminismului Românesc: Antologie de texte (1838-1929)* Polirom, Bucharest 2002. Enikő Magyari-Vincze teaches a course on anthropology of Romani communities, but I do not know of any published or unpublished academic investigation of the construction of the Ţigan Other.

Nevertheless, the overarching stereotype of the Țigan Other regarding sexuality is as uncivilized, immoral and promiscuous (linking with concepts of the selling of bodies, trafficking in children and prostitution). It is also a fact that if discussing gender and the Țigan Other, the lascivious and beguiling Țigan woman is stereotyped as a threat to (innocent and moral) Romanian men, while Țigan men are sexually aggressive and a sexual threat to Romanian women.

This chapter is vital to the thesis because it traces a pervasive and powerful Romanian women's discursive construction of the masculine Țigan Other as sexual threat in public space. In the following sections of this chapter I explore the unique feminine Romanian subject position from which individual women perform the specific discourse of the Țigan male as sexual threat, and I discuss why it is specifically the Țigan Other that is used. In the final section I briefly turn to the way that this gendered Romanian discourse renders silent the discourses of Romani women (identified and treated as Țigani). This chapter is necessarily focused on the factors of production of the Țigan male Other as particular violent threat in Bucharest, which means focused on how gender is also reproduced in contemporary discourses of a specifically Romanian feminine ideal.

The prescriptive discourse of Romanian women in Bucharest

Throughout the period in which I conducted research in Bucharest as a foreign Romanian-speaking woman, I inhabited a unique position, often seen by Romanian women as vulnerable and ignorant regarding the dangers of Bucharest's public space. Between 1997 and 2002, in informal and formal meetings, in bars, universities and private homes, female Romanian friends, colleagues and strangers repeatedly performed a series of explanatory warnings about how a woman needed to behave in the city.[640] I call this a prescriptive discourse because it was pervasive and identifiable as a kind of warning. Women initiated the prescriptive discourse with the statement that women should not walk alone in the city at night because it is dangerous. In response to the question of why, the answer was "Ţigani." When I would question why, women answered with the word "rape." This prescriptive discourse was also performed for Romanian women new to Bucharest and as a reminder for Bucharesteans, for example, when a woman mentioned that she intended to travel home alone. In cases such as this, it would be enough to warn the woman, or to mention "Ţigani;" people did not openly talk about or utter the word "rape." This discourse functioned as a series of signposts to wider discourses of sexual violence and danger in public space.

---

[640] I was aware of this discourse through 1997-1999 and began making notes of each occasion it was presented to me in 2000. Rarely did a new female acquaintance *not* elaborate or refer to this discourse.

The striking uniformity and repetition of this prescriptive discourse led me to various questions that now structure this chapter. Firstly, what is the unstated discursive link between the various terms of engagement ('danger'-'Țigan '-'rape')? *Is* rape really the issue, and what is the role of the Țigan Other in women's narratives of real experiences of violence? To answer these questions, it is first necessary to explore how the construction of the ideal Romanian ethnonational woman is "placed" in postsocialist Romanian society. I was struck with the fact that women warned me against sexual violence from an explicitly non-Romanian Other in the midst of a society where domestic violence, in my experience, was not a source of outrage or even surprise.

There is a large body of research and literature concerning violence against women in postsocialist Romania. These sources are vital background checks for discussions of why certain discourses function. In the first place, it is important to ascertain through statistical evidence what violence women experience. Statistics indicate that domestic violence is very common compared to rape in public space, but that rape by ethnic Romani men who can be identified as Țigani never shows on surveys of actual experiences.[641] The questions of this chapter, as with the

[641] Gallup Organization Romania Survey "Violenței împotriva femeilor" conducted 12-23 April 2003, Bucharest, published 27 May 2003 shows that 2% of respondents were raped in public space, while 20% stated they had been physically abused in their own home. http://www.gallup.ro/romana/poll_ro/releases_ro/pr030527_ro/pr030527_ro.htm, last accessed 27-11-2005.

former, do not relate to statistical realities, but discursive performances that produce and explain the everyday through the stereotypical Ţigan Other. Romanian anthropological studies, especially those undertaken by scholars at Babeş-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, focus on relevant issues of how women articulate their experiences of sexuality and violence, but most often within the family structure. Although these studies, primarily those by Enikő Magyari-Vincze, analyze the intersections of ethnic and gendered identity, they concentrate on Hungarian and Romanian stereotypes and experiences of each other, and, being located in the home, do not mention the Ţigan Other of public space in any capacity.[642] There is, in addition, an absence of basic critique of the fact that stereotypes of Ţigani are not simply facts exaggerated to debatable extents from factual communities. This means that many studies that do relate to stereotypes merely measure their occurrence, or presume that they relate to a "real" problem of Ţigan mafia/ sexual violence/ primitive culture.[643]

It is also a statistical fact that rape and murder convictions are lower for Roma than Romanians in proportion to their population size. Project on Ethnic Relations *Images and Issues: Coverage of the Roma in the Mass Media in Romania* report of conference June 27-28, 1997 p.7. Exact statistics are impossible to calculate due to severe underreporting of rapes, lack of prosecutions, and lack of available statistics including ethnicity (inclusion of which is a debated issue anyway).

[642] Magyari-Vincze, Enikő (ed) *Femei şi Bărbaţi în Clujul Multietnic Volume 1-3* Editură Fundaţiei Desire, Cluj-Napoca 2001 and *Diferenţa care conteaza: Diversitatea social-culturală prin lentila antropologiei feministe* Editură Fundaţiei Desire, Cluj-Napoca 2002.

[643] See LorenaVăetişi's study of local and international observations and readings of child slavery, the virginity cult and Ţigani in the the recent marriage of an important Romanian Romani fammily pp.16-25 in *Discursuri identitare şi intersectoralitate: O analiză privind identitatea de gen şi identitatea etnică în cazul femeilor rrome* Masters thesis for Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca 2004.

Contrary to what one might hope from the significant number of contemporary Romanian feminist writers, they are deafeningly silent on the role of the Ţigan as ethnic Other in how Romanian women claim social positions and rights. On occasion, established and influential feminists have themselves projected the masculine Ţigan Other as threat to an ideal Romanian feminist subject.[644] These texts are vital to an analysis of how "the Romanian woman" is articulated and policed in society through the Ţigan rapist discourse but also, unfortunately, as examples of the discourse of the Ţigan Other as sexual threat.

One exception to these fields and their silences is a recent postgraduate dissertation by Lorena Văetişi that studies how self-identified Romani adolescents perceive themselves as gendered and ethnic subjects in Romanian society.[645] The study discusses the ways that these young women perceive how they are stereotyped by Romanian women; as whores, as sexy, as thinking violence is normal, as uneducated, as poor. This chapter, however, is the first study that I know of to address how the masculine Ţigan Other is vital to postsocialist

[644] The feminist movement in Romania, as in other parts of the world, works with sexuality before ethnicity issues in Bucharest. Bucharest feminist organizations are strong allies of organizations for gay rights such as ACCEPT but not of any Romani organizations. This is not the case with feminist movements in the multiethnic centers of Cluj-Napoca and Timişoara, but highlights again the Bucharest focus of my research. It is Bucharest which claims the "real Romanian" identity, and from which many media discourses are produced.
[645] Văetişi op. cit.

Romanian women's articulations of their place in relation to sexual violence and public/private space.

To explore the discourse and these issues, I designed an open-ended interview structure using Romanian surveys and studies of women's experiences of violence, and conducted individual and group surveys in summer 2002.[646] A sample of forty-five Romanian respondents aged 18-35 (including eleven men, the majority in group interviews), recruited through social and professional networks partook in interviews lasting approximately one hour each. The interview questions were open-ended and conducted informally to encourage respondents to utilize their own discourses and control the discussion. I had a set series of questions as prompts for when respondents exhausted their own narratives. The first question was always which areas of the city the respondent considered dangerous, so that while setting the frame as urban public space, there was no prompt as to ethnic signifiers. The interview structure created a conversational setting in which respondents were free to articulate their perceived position in relation to the interviewer (myself). As a non-native Romanian-speaking woman connected to respondents through social or academic networks, I observed that respondents used language suitable for a local Romanian speaker, and yet were sensitive to explaining their meanings at length to ensure that I

[646] I designed a survey influenced by surveys conducted by Romanian organizations, see Report of Asociația pentru Promovarea Femeii din România (July 2002), and Tatiana Olteanu *Studiu de opinie privind violența asupra femeii in familie* 1998 (www.pitesti.ro/grado/studiu_ro.html) last accessed 5-8-2002.

understood specific inferences. Respondents were patient in answering questions for an inquisitive Australian, and there was a level of trust through shared language and culturally specific knowledge as well as through the assumption of shared experiences as a woman.

These 45 qualitative interviews provide specific information about the range of discourses used by a sample of Romanian women to articulate their gendered experiences and encounters in public spaces in Bucharest. Interviews usually covered a discussion of the issues of sexual violence in public space, the place of women in postsocialist Romania, anxieties about public and private spaces and how the ideal postsocialist Romanian woman is to be recognized in these spaces. I asked about the Țigan Other and sexual violence, and I asked about individuals' personal experiences of violence.

Real space encounters of the Other kind

In addition to being the physical location of encounters, places exist as discursive frames for Others. As Lemon notes in her study of discourses of national identity in the Moscow metro, such 'narratives achieve forceful validity not only because they seem to be grounded in concrete spaces but also because they intersect

familiar discourses and images depicting authority, culture and belonging.'[647] To explore the constitutive role of gender in public spaces and encounters, therefore, it is useful to take what we know about the functioning discourses of gender in post socialist Romania and then examine how Romanian women frame their experiences in public places. Discourses of the Other in and through public space reflect the power of anticipated real space encounters with the Other and create a 'grammar of surfaces' through which intense negotiations of ethnic and gendered identities are performed.[648] In articulating the Other in public space, this common discursive frame also provides a useful corollary for its oppositional frame, the private sphere, the home. As will be discussed at length, the "grammar of surfaces" that Romanian women use as public space and ethnic Other can be read as encoded so as to displace attention from (even while creating) a metaphorical representation of the private sphere and the gendered Other.

The place of Romanian 'woman' in postsocialist Romania

Since the fall of Ceauşescu, new hybrids of national, ethnic and gendered identities have been under intense negotiation in Romanian society. This process is often masked as a 'retraditionalization' to pre-regime values, a masking that

[647] Alaina Lemon "Talking Transit and Spectating Transition: The Moscow Metro" pp.14-39 in D. Berdahl, M. Bunzl and M. Lampland (eds) *Altering States: Ethnographies of Transition in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union* University of Michigan Press, Michigan 2000 p.14.
[648] Ibid p.28.

goes hand in hand with the normalization of gender roles as essential to bodies.[649] In tension with the postsocialist mainstream project defining gender through 'traditional' values, are popular movements towards "modern" feminine models, such as those presented by *Cosmopolitan* magazine, which basically embody both traditional (married, childbearing) women and "modern" (career woman and sexy women) women in the feminine ideal. This combination of models of femininity resembles the complex and necessarily shifting representations of 'woman' espoused by European Union politics. Unlike the categories of ethnic minorities, trade and industrial production, however, the European Union category of 'gender mainstreaming,' which requires that Romania show 'political will' to incorporate a 'gender equality perspective' in all policies, has been largely ignored by the Romanian state and the European Union.[650]

European Union support and funding has enabled the development of a network of non-governmental organizations attempting to identify and deal with issues facing women in Romania. These organizations have produced a significant number of surveys and studies highlighting the alarming rate of violence against women in the home. To some extent, the focus of these studies on gendered violence in the private sphere reflects the assumption that the place of women is

---

[649] See Adriana Baban "Women's Sexuality and Reproductive Behaviour in Post-Ceauşescu Romania: A Psychological Approach" in Gal and Kligman (eds) *Reproducing Gender* Princeton University Press, New Jersey 2000.

[650] Council of Europe Gender Mainstreaming – conceptual frameworks, methodology and presentation of good practices Final Report of the Group of Specialists on Mainstreaming Strasbourg, February 1999.

in the home as naturalized site of reproduction, and that women can claim a right to safety within the institution of marriage that is not extended to the public sphere.[651] A recent European Union funded survey concluded that 73% of respondents had experienced domestic violence.[652] The right of men to 'discipline' women who fail to inhabit the feminine ideal (too assertive, not physically attractive enough) is a pervasive approach, as is blaming the female victim.[653] A severe lack of institutional support for and the social stigmatisation of single mothers is a barrier to real change, despite increased discussions and surveys. The Romanian parliament initiated legislation against violence in the home in November 2001, adopted it years later in March 2003, and the legislation was only applied in court in late 2004.[654] Even though rape within marriage is now a criminal offence, police routinely refuse to intervene in 'matters between the husband and his family' when called for domestic violence, and violence between ex/partners in the street is also considered a 'private matter.'[655] 'Private'

---

[651] A recent issue of the intellectual newspaper *Dilema,* for example, chose "domestic violence" as its theme. The majority of contributors (all female) began their articles by stating that violence in the home was most damaging because it is the natural place of women. *Dilema* Issue 530, 30 May-5 June, 2003.

[652]Asociația pentru Promovarea Femeii din România Project "Centrul de Informare, Educație şi Consiliere Timişoara pentru femeile şi fețele victime ale violenței domestice şi abuzului sexual" a survey of opinions conducted 5-7 July 2002, financed through the PHARE-ACCESS program.

[653] 46% of respondents stated that in cases of domestic violence both the victim and the aggressor were responsible for the attack. Ibid.

[654]For an overview of the problems with making the legislation applicable (which can be summarized as lack of will on the part of the government) see Cristian Patrasconiu "Alianta "DA", împotriva violenței în familie" *Ziua de Vest* 11 November 2003.

[655] Mugur Daniel Ciumăgeanu "Vorbele bune" *Dilema* Nr. 530, 30 May – 5 June 2003 and Stela Seghiuța "Violența domestică – în lume şi în România" *Dilema*

space is constituted by gender, the feminine claimed by the masculine subject; it is not an arbitrary physical distinction.[656]

Gender, therefore, is constructed through and manifest in spaces. The single Romanian non-governmental organization that uses the term 'feminist' in its name, the Society for Feminist Analysis (ANA) has prioritized issues of women in relation to public space since its foundation. Laura Grunberg, one of the founders and a leading Romanian feminist, explains in the organization's journal that 'for a long time ANA was considered a kind of infant which needed to be thrown into the fight against the authorities, the poverty, the pollution, the street

---

Nr. 530, 30 May – 5 June 2003. www.algoritma.ro/dilema/530. The Romanian Police Force now has a page on their website displaying their new stance against violence in the family. On this one page site they explain that "until recently it was supposed that women were the most common victims of violence in the family, but recent research has discovered that in fact the number of victimized men is large" and that "the principal function of the family is to raise children." Amongst all the EUropean language on this one page, therefore, we find the same old ideas of a masculine police force; that women belong in the home raising children, and that a focus on women being victimized by men is still not accepted. Webpage "Violența in Familie," http://www.politiaromana.ro/violenta_in_familie.htm, last accessed 27-11-2005. In fact, according to a survey done by Fundația Sanse Egale pentru Femei, in 1998, only 8% of aggressors in family violence were women, while 92% were men. http://www.proiectns.org/archives/000050.html, last accessed 27-11-2005.

[656] Note that the section of the penal code which could be applied to the not uncommon sight of domestic violence in public space would be article 200, which applies to 'public scandal.' See Human Rights Watch International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission Report *Public Scandals: Sexual Orientation and Criminal Law in Romania* Arta Grafica, New York and London 1998. Romanian legislation does not address sexual harassment and violence in public space. Together these factors plot the construction of gendered spaces and places in Romanian society.

dogs and the Ţigani of the area.'[657] This description locates the feminist fight in public space, specifying the ethnic Other alongside animal and chemical threats to a vulnerable feminine (albeit feminist) subject.

Romanian mainstream media reports of women being bashed and raped in public and private space are detailed in media narratives similar in style to pornographic prose, with the victim's address, school and age provided. Initials usually replace the victim's name, a farcical pretence of privacy protection characteristic of the unnamed pornographic object.[658] The function of these reports as social discourses of sex crime bears a striking resemblance to those addressed by Caputi in *The Age of Sex Crime* (1987). Caputi argues that the adult men's press (and in Romania, the "serious" news sections of dailies, where rape stories appear, are written by and for men) heroizes sex crime as active, and that patriarchal identification with the perpetrator 'correspondingly demands that women play along by identifying with the sexual victim.'[659] Numerous scholars have documented 'mass responses of titillation...and expressions of envy or amusement' amongst men regarding sex/violent crimes against women, reflecting pleasurable identification of men with the actions.[660] Indeed, Denise Roman notes in her study of postsocialist Romania that 'rape is always sensational

[657] Laura Grunberg "Stories from the time I tried to be a good Foisoreanca" in *ANAlize: Revista de Studii Feministe* Vol. 5 August 1999, p.16.
[658] Lindsey Rose "From atrocity to data: historiographies of rape in Former Yugoslavia and the gendering of genocide" pp.59-79 in *Patterns of Prejudice* Vol. 36 Issue 4, 2002.
[659] Jane Caputi *The Age of Sex Crime* The Women's Press, London, 1987 p.47.
[660] Ibid. p.46.

news...designed to stir laughter and not compassion.'[661] In this way, 'all instances of sexual terror serve as lessons for all women,' and pervasive social discourses of violent sexual crime against Romanian women serve to construct the public sphere as dangerous.[662] This phenomenon is not restricted to Romania; the same issues can be found in Australia or France, but Romanian women's advocacy and protest groups are more marginalized than in the West, and such newspaper articles and examples are very common and rarely challenged in Romania.

The familiar theme is, of course, that women who are outside "natural" boundaries of private space or marriage invite sexual violence from men. In theory, the private sphere offers sisters, wives and mothers of men protection from rape, a protection of the "traditional" place of women as reproducers in the home. Women reproduce the ethnonation as well as individual families, and have been targeted as responsible for Romanian ethnonational continuance since the formation of the modern nation.[663] The terror of sexual violence in public space compounds the need for a safe private sphere, explaining to some extent the disparities in postsocialist Romanian discourse between the importance of "catching a man" and real experiences of married life (where the man at home is

---

[661] Denise Roman *Fragmented Identities: Popular Culture, Sex, and Everyday Life in Postcommunist Romania* Lexington Books, New York and Oxford 2003, p.105.

[662] Caputi op.cit. p.47.

[663] See Maria Bucur *Eugenics and Modernization in Interwar Romania* Pittsburgh University Press, Pittsburgh 2002, and Irina Livezeanu *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building and Ethnic Struggle 1918-1930* Cornell University Press, London 1995.

the most dangerous one). The paradox of women being assured protection within the private sphere, where sexual violence is more likely to occur, is also not unique to Romania, but is a basic feature of the patriarchal system. But what is unique to postsocialist society is the serious intensity with which the new models of femininity have been adopted by Romanian women since 1989, bringing a temporal intensification of the same problems as found amongst western women. The new models of femininity require subjects to be in excess of the ideal feminine subject. The "career woman," for example, remains primarily a sexual object and site of reproduction; recognition as an intelligent individual is reliant upon primary fulfilment of the feminine ideal. This natural woman who is not only feminine (reproductive) but also successful in the public sphere is the "superwoman," while the woman who chooses a career over family is deemed unnatural, an aberration of femininity. The absence of any accepted subcultures of femininity in contemporary Romania reflects the dominance of the masculine ideal in society.

The Romanian feminine ideal is a sexual object for men, while victims of sexual violence are held responsible for attracting the desire of men. In this construction, women who fulfil the feminine ideal in public space suffer sexual violence. The place of women in postsocialist Romania is therefore a double bind that discursively chains women to the terror of sexual violence in the location of the feminine ideal. Private space is the safe place for the reproducer/sexual object, protected by the patriarchal claim extended in marriage. Domestic violence,

therefore, becomes what may be termed a lesser or necessary evil in opposition to the dangers facing women outside the institution of marriage or the family home.

Women's prescriptive discourses: placing danger within the patriarchy

The warnings women issue to each other place the sexual threat of the Ţigan Other in public space, which one could assume reflects personal experiences of sexual violence such as rape as occurring largely in public space. There is a distinct lack of information specifically about public space and violence against women in Romania, but we do know that 85% of reported rapists are men known to the victim, and 61% of rapes are committed in private homes, usually that of the victim.[664] Using ethnicity as part of the power of rape is also common, in societies as "peaceful" as Australia as well as Kosovo or South Africa. One would assume that women raped by a stranger, especially of a despised supposedly ethnic minority (such as a "Ţigan") would also be more likely to claim the protection of related men and report the crime, so that statistics, if anything, would weigh on the side of overrepresentation of unknown rapists. As previously mentioned however, there is not a disproportionate (to the ratio of population) number of Romani men or "Ţigani" convicted for serious crimes such as rape or murder. This section draws on qualitative interviews with Romanian

[664] Ina Curic and Lorena Văetişi *Inegalitatea de gen: violenţa invizibilă* Editură Eikon, Cluj-Napoca 2005 p.35.

women about their experiences and perceptions of spaces in Bucharest and experienced violence in order to explore how these women negotiate gendered places in public space.

I began each interview with the question of what places in Bucharest the respondent considered dangerous. Some respondents primarily answered that everywhere was equally dangerous, but the vast majority named suburbs of Bucharest where they did not reside.[665] When prompted with "why?," approximately seventy percent of respondents answered that these places were dangerous "because it's a Țigan area," while the remaining minority identified potential threats in general terms for men such as *baieții de cartier*, culturally translatable as "boys in the hood," with connotations of young men organized in gangs capable of violence or criminal activity. Expanding further on why Țigani /groups of men posed a danger, respondents detailed a chain of scenarios including pickpockets on public transport, being talked to or asked out on the street, being touched by men, and rape.

Respondents thereby linked the Țigan Other with a series of physical actions invoking sexual violence. Just as rape is presented in the prescriptive discourse as

[665] Most cited 'dangerous' suburbs were, in order of frequency, Ferentari, Rahova, Pantelimon and Cringași. This articulation of 'new' (socialist period) suburbs as dangerous in opposition to the old 'authentic' center of Bucharest is in keeping with postsocialist discursive articulation of Ceaușescu's 'new city' as corrupt, and the pre-Ceaușescu city as genuine. See C. Buica, M. Popescu, and O. Tomescu "Bucureștiul vazut de Bucureșteni; reprezentarii speciale ale spațiului urban" in *Revista de Cercetari Sociale* Vol 3 1995 p.111-115.

the threat facing women in public space, the interviews suggest that respondents held rape to be the most severe in a trajectory of acts of sexual violence. Despite their lack of a common name, the trajectory of sexual violence mapped by Romanian respondents includes forms of verbal and physical harassment. One of the leading Romanian feminists, Mihaela Miroiu, considers widespread sexual harassment on Romanian streets a 'socialization for rape,' while Sorina Neculaescu, another local activist, terms sexual harassment 'mini-rape.'[666] Romanian feminist academics thereby understand and situate the role of sexual harassment as a stage clearly linked to rape. The prescriptive discourse links Ţigani directly with rape, but it can be that the utterance "rape" signifies the most traumatic example from a series of violent acts in public space. Rape is the only sexual offence taken seriously by law, and also conveys the strongest meaning in the shortest time. If the threat of sexual violence in public space is primarily a means for ethnonational male subjects to constitute women as sites of reproduction in the ways briefly discussed, it is little wonder that there is no accepted or public discourse against sexual harassment in public space.[667]

---

[666] Mihaela Miroiu "Experienţele Femeilor" in *Gen şi Societate* Alternative, Bucharest, 1997 and Sorina Neculaescu "Corpul Femeii – Trofeu al Dominaţiei Masculine" in *ANAlize* September 2000, pp.15-16.

[667] This is not to say that Romanian women do not discuss domestic violence with friends, family, or health workers. My discussion relates to the lack of a widespread popular discourse that deals with the most common form of violence experienced by the respondents in my research. How Romanian women articulate their experiences of domestic violence amongst family and friends is a separate and important question. I will use the term sexual harassment to mean any unwelcome verbal or physical sexual approaches in public spaces such as the street and public transport. For more about sexual harassment and its history as a

Indeed, respondents most often articulated verbal harassment as 'a kind of stress,' and, consistent with media and social discourses, the term "sexual harassment" was never used. This lack of a name for a commonly occurring and feared practice reflects its normalization. 'Pretend not to notice' was the general response concerning how a woman should react to being approached by men in the street, because 'a response will just provoke them' or 'if you answer it means you want him to touch you.'[668] This situates verbal harassment in a series of possible actions and places responsibility for physical attack on the object of attention. Responsibility is placed on women through the widespread social understanding of rape as a sexual act incited by the feminine ideal. The Romanian woman who manifests her supposedly natural role as sexual object is therefore also responsible for defending herself against men fulfilling the masculine ideal through acts of sexual aggression in public space. Numerous respondents said that only women who want to be touched are assaulted, even while citing cases that did not conform to this theory.

One respondent explained that she always wore jeans and no make up on her face in public space to avoid attention from men, and then recounted a recent experience of being groped in the street by two 'younger and weaker' male

---

term in postsocialist societies see Daskalova, pp.337-369, Fuszara, pp.259-285 and Grunberg pp.307-336 in Gal and Kligman 2000.

[668] Respondent J. 3 July 2002, and E. 3 July 2002.

children of about 13 years of age.[669] This respondent began her story by pondering whether she had attracted these boys because she looked 'too girly,' illustrating the pervasiveness of interpreting harassment as an issue rooted in the appearance of women and their role as sexual objects for men. A postgraduate respondent spoke at length of the way that men in groups laughed while addressing sexual comments to passing women, noting that 'a real man can make a woman afraid in front of his friends.'[670] These men perform for the masculine gaze and not for the gaze of the sexual object, corroborating Caputi's insights into how social discourses of sexual violence are a point of masculine identification (often expressed in laughter) that identifies all women as potential victims.

Indeed, respondents consistently elaborated the fact that they were always afraid of sexual violence in public space. One young woman described the feelings of her friend who had to walk home alone at night after work; 'nothing has ever happened to her but she can't relax...she doesn't think 'oh, it will be ok', no, every night she is still stressed even if nothing has happened, my friend can't relax at night, you never know when something will happen.'[671] This description is about the fact that fear of public space is not based on real rape events, but corroborated daily by sexual harassment and resultant anxiety. Night was considered more dangerous than daytime, possibly due to the perception that

[669] Respondent E. 3 July 2002. Note the respondent's articulation of her harassers as 'weaker,' showing the rupture of discourses that construct feminine 'weakness' as a biological trait.
[670] Respondent J. 3 July 2002.
[671] Group Interview A. 12 July 2002.

"normal people" are at home with their families at night time as much as issues of darkness.[672] The fear of sexual violence, perpetuated through events and their pervasive media coverage in social discourses of sex crimes, is of a threat located anywhere and anytime in public space.

The question of who female respondents would approach for help in public space received a variety of responses, all variations on the theme of the masculine ideal. A Romanian man who "looked nice" was the most common answer. One respondent reckoned 'not the police, they work with the criminals...a man, a Romanian man...not a woman – what could a woman do?'[673] One group of women collectively concluded that they would find a shop space with a policeman or a security guard. Each of these responses illustrates the nature of safe space for the feminine gendered subject as a space claimed by the ethnic Romanian masculine subject.

While the first interview question about dangerous places in Bucharest consistently led to discourses of gendered violence in public space, fear of sexual harassment and rape, no respondents raised the issue of domestic violence. After letting respondents exhaust the topic of violence in public space, I led them through a series of questions as to whether they believed domestic violence took

[672] These results showing greater fear of public space at night is a standard survey response. In the Gallup survey of 2003 op.cit., 45% of women said they didn't feel safe in the streets of Bucharest in the day, while 84% didn't feel safe at night.
[673] Personal Interview L. 30 June 2002.

place in their area, in their block, and then amongst their family and friends.[674] Three respondents of twenty-six *individual* interviews with women said that they had *not* witnessed or experienced violence in their personal life from partners or family. All twenty-three other respondents volunteered the information that they had experienced violence at the hands of male partners and/or family members. In every case the perpetrator of the violence was of Romanian ethnicity. Seven respondents articulated their level of education as source of their ability to 'walk away' from the perpetrator, but none of these respondents spoke of the fact that the perpetrators of violence against them had all been educated to an equal or higher level than themselves. Recent Romanian surveys corroborate the high percentage of personal experiences of violence in the family, but such surveys often also claim severe difference between high domestic violence in lower socio-economic groups and lower violence in higher socio-economic groups, which is not at all the case in my interview sample.[675]

---

[674] This structure of asking the three progressively "closer to home" steps is a common practice in sentence subject surveys, in Romania as elsewhere.

[675] According to the 2003 Gallup survey op.cit. 76% of respondents had been verbally abused, 46% victims of behavior control, 29% physically threatened, 27% physically abused, and 11% were victims of sexual abuse. According to statistics published by the Centrul Pilot pentru Femeile Victime ale Violentei Domestice in Bucharest, in 1998, 74% of women victims of domestic violence were attacked by their husbands, 4% by a defacto male partner, 7% by ex-husbands and 15% by other relatives. http://www.proiectns.org/archives/000050.html, last accessed 27-11-2005.
There are many methodological questions about such inferences and conclusions. I personally noted that educated respondents simply had fewer discourses of lament available to them to integrate their personal experiences of violence with their discourses of public space violence. While women with lower education, with whom I lived throughout the years of this research, often lamented their "fate" as victims of violence, respondents in this research did not do so. As long

The range of paradoxes raised in the personal interviews I conducted are also writ large in the Gallup Organization survey of Violence Against Women conducted in Bucharest in 2003, and an analysis of the logic manifest in these statistics is useful for a summary of the major issues at hand. Firstly, the Gallup study divides violence against women into four categories; the emotional state of women, violence in the family, sexual harassment, and violence in public space. According to the survey, the majority of respondents who experienced sexual violence experienced it at home at the hands of their husbands. The interesting factor of this categorization is the separation of sexual harassment (defined by the survey writers as a 'designated space such as work or school') and public violence (defined by the survey writers as 'the city'). An unspecified number of women defined sexual harassment within the survey as including strangers in public space and husbands, but the survey was structured to separate the street from other public spaces such as schools and the workforce. This signifies the street and work/school as radically separated spaces from the outset and therefore presupposing a different 'grammar of surfaces' (and therefore a "grammar of 'rights'" also) in the street and in the public sphere of education and work.

---

as survey writers and analysts ignore the subtleties of available discourses for narration and their own presumptions, the fact of violence against highly educated women will remain a shameful and displaced issue, ultimately affecting even individuals far removed from their realities, such as individuals identified as Ţigani.

There is a striking difference between responses regarding the nature and frequency of violence in each category. Firstly, in the category of sexual harassment at school or work 17% of women stated they had experienced harassment. 44% of women harassed stated they did nothing in response, 10% filed a complaint and 12% resigned from work to avoid the problem. This means that only 1.7% of the total sample complained, a small amount.[676] While the sexual harassment survey asked respondents to particularly state what behavior they had experienced and exactly what action they themselves took against the aggressor, the section on public space violence only asked follow up questions to respondents who were raped (2%, 16 women) and asked if they reported this to the police (5 of 16 individuals had). This primarily shows that rape is the definition by which violence in public space is measured, despite the fact that women in the survey twice defined (at the beginning of each section) sexual harassment as both verbal and physical and occurring in both private and public space. The secondary observation we can make is that the survey's choice of what questions to ask victims of violence in both spaces reflects an important fact: women in work and school are expected to have a certain amount of power to address the attacker themselves, verbally or with an internal complaint. According to the survey, women who are victims in public space, in addition to

[676] It could be argued that making a complaint is a more serious process with greater implications than 'angry verbal reprimanding,' but I do not think this is always the case. Secondly, if this is the case, then why isn't 'angry verbal reprimanding' a category of self-defense given to respondents who were harassed themselves?

only being statistically recognized if they are raped, are only considered to have redress to their attacker through the police.

Even more interesting is the comparison between how witnesses of violence against women in these spaces reported their experiences. 12% of women witnessed sexual harassment in school or at work, 50% of whom said they reprimanded the aggressor verbally, meaning 6% of the total sample of women. This is a very high sample, especially surprising compared with the 1.7% of all women who made a complaint against their attacker themselves. What this response shows is not that women have more courage standing up for others than themselves, but that at the time that women answered the survey, a comparatively large percentage of them positively conceived their ability to verbally reprimand an aggressor in a work or school space. This perception of a woman's right to speak back to an aggressor demonstrated by respondents reflects the survey's structural expectation that women in work and school places have various actions of recourse through which (and even inferring a responsibility) to defend themselves.

The survey category of witnesses to public space aggression shows a radically different perception of a woman's ability to speak back to an aggressor, and the perceived dangers of public space compared to private. In the first place, while only 42% of women considered domestic violence widespread in Bucharest, 68% of women stated that public space violence was widespread in Bucharest.

Respondents consistently stated that they had witnessed acts against women in public space at a much higher rate than they had experienced these attacks themselves. 'Almost half' of respondents had witnessed a physical or sexual attack against a woman in Bucharest, yet only 8% had personally experienced such an attack. 69% of respondents reported that they had witnessed a verbal attack against a woman, while 33% said they had personally experienced a verbal attack, and 46% of respondents said they had witnessed a women being robbed while only 25% had personally experienced this.[677] It is clear and curious that these statistics show that double the number of women claim to have witnessed attacks as to experienced them. Considering the wide range of sampled respondents, it is interesting that this gap between witnessed and experienced violence in public space mirrors the gap between respondents' perceptions of danger as higher in public space than in the home, contrary to their actual experiences. We can only conclude that women expect more but experience much less violence in the street than at home.

The survey did not, contrary to the category regarding sexual harassment, ask women what they did in response to attacks witnessed in public space, the survey instead asked women if 'anyone' helped the victim. 80% of women who witnessed these crimes in public space said that 'no-one' helped the victim. From the structure of the question and from the high percentage of responses in the

[677] There was no question clarifying how robbery is a specifically gendered crime (for example compared to how many of the respondents had witnessed a man being robbed in Bucharest).

negative, we see that women are not expected by the survey writers, and they do not expect themselves, to act on behalf of other women attacked in public space. This is a stark difference to the questions posed and the answers in the category of harassment in the workplace. In addition, the survey asked women who witnessed verbal and physical attacks in public space if they expected that anyone would help them in such a situation, and 72% of all women sampled stated that they did not expect anyone would help them either. From the structure of the survey and the extreme responses of women claiming to be powerless, vulnerable and accepting these roles as victims of public space crime, it is clear that violence in the public sphere is discursively constructed as the most dangerous.

Respondents in the survey considered public space violence more serious than domestic violence, as in the personal interviews conducted for this study, and the survey also posited rape as the "endpoint" category of public space offence, as in the discourse of Bucharest women examined in this chapter. The survey reflects and produces the place of woman as located in certain spaces more so than others. Women reported feeling unsafe in public space, and witnessing large numbers of violent acts against other women, but they did not, they could not, recount their own active experiences. In public spaces, women are not given the possibility (in the survey) and do not claim a possibility (in their own recounted experiences) of speaking back or taking action against verbal or physical aggression. Rather, they articulate the expectation of public attack without help from the community. The survey questions and answers regarding violence at work or school are a different

scenario. In these spheres women are expected (in survey answers) to respond to violence against them and their colleagues. Even though we see that actual actions against aggressors are rare, women in these spheres are articulated by institutions and by themselves as having the right to safety in the space.

The Gallup survey structure and results highlight what I have previously argued, that the place of woman in Romanian society is in the private sphere, the home, and (increasingly) in the semi-public spheres of work and school.[678] The place of woman in the street is *as* a victim of violence, not as a wife, worker or student. No popular discourse articulates women as being able to reject everyday violence in city streets, and women themselves do not articulate a claim to this right in this survey. Rather, respondents seek protection in the heterosexual ethnonational institutions of society; only rape can be prosecuted by the state or even popularly recognized as unlawful aggression. The overall message is that public space is not the place of Romanian women.

The Gallup poll does not mention ethnic minorities or Ţigani, although it does show that most acts of physical violence occur within Romanian families, and that "Ţigan" cannot function as a logical node of knowledge, as it does in everyday Bucharest discourse. The Gallup survey renders the ethnic Ţigan Other, in all its powerful symbols, invisible. From the perspective of my research, *beginning from*

[678] The perception of the school and work as 'semi-public' spheres is not surprising when one considers the long history of naturalising Romanian women in workplaces and educational institutions. Bucur op.cit. and Livezeanu op.cit.

the Ţigan Other's central role as discursive signpost for violent threat in public space, this silence is suspicious. For anyone who has discussed public space or violence in Bucharest, the absence of the Ţigan Other is suspicious. Likewise, what is to be made of the fact that 23 of 26 respondents in my qualitative surveys experienced violence at the hands of Romanian men in the private sphere, none experienced rape by men they would term Ţigan, and yet all ethnicized the masculine threat of sexual violence in public space as Ţigan?

Ţigan Others and Bucharest spaces

The Ţigan Other as repeatedly invoked by the prescriptive discourses of Romanian women, therefore, directly conjures a gamut of anxieties regarding the threat of sexual violence against the ethnic Romanian female body in city spaces. An interesting model for mediating the intersections of gendered discourses of ethnic Others is the work of Avtah Brah, especially her study of an English community in the midst of post World War Two immigrations.[679] Noting discourses amongst women that discursively embodied the black ethnic Other intruder as a form of aggressive masculinity, Brah considers this a women's discourse about male aggression displaced onto the ethnic Other through a transmutation of the formerly colonized Other into colonizer. Through articulating

[679] Avtah Brah "The scent of memory: strangers, our own and others" pp.272-290 in Avtah Brah and Annie E. Coombes *Hybridity and its Discontents: Politics, Science Culture* Routledge, London and New York 2000.

the ethnic Other as aggressive masculinity, 'the discourse converts the trangressed against into the transgressors.'[680] Ania Loomba also notes that 'if colonial power is repeatedly expressed as a white man's possession of black men and women, colonial fears center around the rape of white women by black men.'[681] The Ţigan Other in Romania is not the returning colonial Other of post war England, but the context of Brah's work and that of the research at hand are similar in many ways. Firstly, the influx of migrants to Brah's subject community in the context of post war society resulted in a similar situation for local communities as that of postsocialist Romania. Both societies were characterized by dissolved ethnonational ideologies (of empire in Britain, and of the ideal socialist Other in Romania), changing economic and class structures (resulting in higher unemployment), and a strong sense of anxiety about the future that manifest in ethnonational discourses against racial and ethnic Others. In England, locals articulated themselves against the colonial immigrants working in factories as too educated for manual labor, at the same time as they blamed these Others for "stealing" their jobs. Likewise, ethnic Romanians continued to articulate trade as immoral and uncivilized in the postsocialist period, identifying the Ţigan Other in

---

[680] Brah op.cit. p.277.

[681] Ania Loomba *Colonialism/Postcolonialism* Routledge, London and New York 1998 p. 164. The specific reasoning for this reading is the master's identity as master predicated on his identification in the slave of one who wishes to take his place as master, on a return of desire from the slave Other. The anecdote of the slave eating at the masters' table addressed in the second chapter of this thesis relies on the same identification structure although here we include the gendered Other of the master, his woman, and sexual desire as an element of the equation.

visible street trade even as they floundered in anxiety about unemployment in the midst of closing industries and changing social values.

As also formerly discussed, the Ţigan Other is articulated in contemporary Romanian society as a kind of non-native intruder and colonizer. While Romanian ethnonational discourse primarily denies through silence the fact of Roma enslavement as Ţigani, when slavery is acknowledged it is justified as a necessary restraint on an uncivilized and nomadic primitive people by a developed state. As discussed in Chapter Four, there is a popular stereotype in contemporary Romania that Ţigani are intruders and nomads who *chose* to stay in Romania.[682] This highlights that in contemporary Romania there is a trope within discourses of the Ţigan Other that presents them as colonizers rather than the formerly enslaved, similar to the way that the English in Brah's study re-present the colonial Others as transgressors rather than the formerly oppressed.

Brah's study shows that the dominant community articulated the ethnic masculine Other as a sexual threat in public space. Likewise, in Romania the Ţigan Other is always placed in public space, and Ţigan men are considered threats to Romanian women as sexual predators. The evidence for both Brah's colonial Other and the Ţigan as threat is located by their interlocutors in the very visibility of these

[682] See Appendix One for the responses to my open-ended survey from 2001. Consider that 2 respondents mentioned slavery (#7, #61), while eleven wrote about Ţigani coming from other origins into Romanian national space (see #17, 31, 46, 71, 79, 81, 83, 91, 95, 100 and 122).

groups, usually in the public spaces of the markets and streets. Public space is the frame that enables identification and articulation of the Ţigan Other as threat of sexual violence, as in Brah's English community.

All of these stereotypes articulate the Ţigan Other in public space as lazy, immoral, and engaged in illegal trade and sexual violence. The vital components that enable the Ţigan Other to function in Romanian discourse are visibility and the re-presentation of the Ţigan Other as trangressor. The illegal, lazy, dangerous, hyper-sexualised Other transgresses "order" simply by being visible in public space, and is then articulated as controlling public space (through mafia, trade or simply their "lurking" presence). The discursive construction of public space and its control by ethnic Others not only creates a fixed "grammar of surfaces" for real space encounters, but uses this essential grammar to explain, justify and strengthen Romanian ethnic control of space and women as defence in postsocialist society. In this way, the Ţigan as threat of sexual violence to Romanian women fits within the paradigm of stereotypical discourse of the Ţigan Other as *bişniţari* mafia.

Finally, in Brah's study it was English men who propagated the stereotype of immigrants as sexual threats to "their" women at a time when they considered the ethnic structure of the community as under threat. Similarly, discourses of ethnic Romanians as under threat from other ethnic minorities, and especially from the supposedly high birth rates in Romani (as Ţigan) communities, have circulated

since the fall of socialism in Romania. The family is considered by both men and women to be a bastion of society, and the family in these cases is a heterosexual male who protects a woman in return for her fulfilment of the reproductive feminine ideal. In these situations, women speaking against the sexual violence of their ethnic Romanian men in the home is considered to be against predominant loyalties to one's family/male protector and "people."[683] When women reproduce discourses of male aggression displaced onto the ethnic Other, they need to be considered differently to the discourses performed by their "protective" husbands, they must be read from the specific location of their utterance, from inside the (privately) policed and violent sphere of the ethnicized feminine ideal, in the family. It is no surprise that women often choose to displace the sexual violence they experience within the family, when the family is the primary unit that claims to offer women any protection within predominant ethnonational discourses.

Romanian women can function within and mobilize both ethnic and gendered matrices through the performance of the prescriptive discourse linking Ţigan men, sexual violence and public space. The discourse presents the worse case scenario

[683] This has also been a debate from within other communities stereotyped as uncivilized and aggressive, such as indigenous communities in Australia, where indigenous women have argued that defence of the ethnic group from stereotypical discourse is of primary importance, before discussing the problems of masculine aggression within the family. In the history of both feminism and the Aboriginal rights movement, it has been difficult to establish solidarity of women across ethnic groups against male violence, because this is feared to break the strength of the family unit, which is considered vital for the survival and protection of the ethnic or ethnonational group.

as an encounter in which the ethnic subaltern utilizes the power of the masculine subject to claim the feminine subject, overriding the naturalized ethnic hierarchy. Through fulfilling and fixing the dominant Romanian gender roles, the Romanian woman earns the right to protection by the Romanian masculine ideal. Invoking the ethnic Other is a claim for ethnic defensiveness as protection of the Romanian feminine subject.

The preference amongst respondents to turn to Romanian men for help in public space is an expression of this strategy for survival, demonstrating that these women recognize Romanian masculine models as the policemen/monitors of the boundaries of the ethnonation. The fact that the same respondents experienced the most violence in the supposedly safe private sphere at the hands of the ethnic masculine ideal who they claim protects them, however, highlights the power (im)balance intrinsic to the function of the ethnonational social body. What forms of agency can therefore be identified in women's projections of the Ţigan Other as threat in public space?

Women's discourses and the question of agency

Women in postsocialist Romania constantly negotiate and contest gendered identities in order to avoid physical violence against them as women. When women warn each other that simply being in public space invites sexual violence,

and when they do this by invoking the Țigan Other as key node, they strategically interact with their environment. From the outset, a primary assumption might be that the purpose of the discourse is to enable women to protect themselves from the dangers of sexual violence that they perceive as coming from men identified as ethnic Țigani in public space.

Importantly, the agency of the discourse at hand is not any kind of advocacy for a radical break with or subversion of the place of women in the gendered matrix of the ethnonational body. This is not a discourse prescribing radical protest or even strategies for self-defence. Rather the discourse fixes the feminine subject as naturally in the private sphere and attempts to claim the promise of Romanian masculine protection. The ethnicization of the masculine threat in public space places women in the privileged and vulnerable place of the Romanian feminine ideal. When the discourse mobilizes predominant ethnonational Romanian discourses of the feminine subject, this subject is placed so as to require the protection of the Romanian masculine ideal against the ethnic threat of the Țigan Other. This movement constitutes and consolidates the private sphere (constructed through heterosexual institutions such as marriage) as the natural place of the feminine subject, in contrast with the masculine threat outside. It is clear from the personal interviews conducted, however, that Romanian women most often face violence within their own homes at the hands of family or friends. The naturalization of gendered spatial spheres within the prescriptive discourse then

complicates the possibility of articulating violence within the 'safe' place of the home as unnatural.

The public performance of a discourse placing danger in city spaces can perhaps be read as a precise reaction to this very difficulty of talking about violence within the ethnonational social body and the personal home. The ethnicization of the masculine threat as Ţigan enables Romanian women to communicate the prescriptive discourse without fear of being policed by Romanian men, scapegoating the ethnic Other fits with dominant and pervasive stereotypical anti-Ţigan tropes performed in all kinds of contexts. Invoking Ţigani displaces attention from the specifically gendered nature of the threat.

Most importantly in my interpretation, therefore, naming the masculine threat as Ţigan enables the interlocutor to elide the fact that Romanian men are complicit in sexual violence against women in both public and private space. As previously mentioned, the women I personally interviewed did not link their many discourses of sexual threat in public space with their relatively short and stark encounters of violence in the home. Talking about sexual violence and fear in public space with the action displaced onto the acceptable ethnonational Other allows women to discuss the traumatic effects of never feeling safe, without forcing them to confront the most horrifying aspect of their experiences; that it is within the very sphere they articulate as safe that they suffer the most. In the long term, recognition of this fact is necessary for women to be able to critique how legal

and media discourses perpetuate and encourage masculine identification with sexual violence. There can not be critical interrogation of the fact that Romanian society relies upon sexual violence to construct gendered places as "natural" while masculine aggression against women is disassociated from ethnic Romanian masculinity. The fantastic projection of Ţigan men as threats to Romanian women intensifies stereotypical discourses of the Ţigan Other and contributes to the severe marginalization of Romani individuals and communities identified as Ţigan. This precludes an interrogation of how the Romanian gendered matrix relies upon producing and reproducing ethnic Others to strengthen and normalize its own hegemony. For this reason, Romanian feminists who write about violent threats to Romanian women within the ethnonational context are doing a disservice to themselves through choosing to ignore the role of the Ţigan Other in the ways women talk about and understand violence.

One may argue that in this case the Ţigan Other is vital for Romanian women simply to protect themselves, as an Other that enables communication and education about traumatic institutionalized sexual violence in the home, albeit displaced onto another schema. However, the imperative structure of the discourse, stating that one must or should not go out alone, circumscribes activity and places responsibility for sexual violence on the feminine subject who fails to inhabit the feminine ideal as located in private space. Warning women not to go in the streets if they want to avoid rape ignores the realities of sexual, physical and psychological violence women suffer in the home and places responsibility

on women for their own victimisation. It also leaves unacknowledged the fact that the ethnonational Romanian masculine ideal can never fulfil its promise of protection within the established "rules" of heterosexual family life. It seems that the threat of the Ţigan Other warns women against transgressing the feminine ideal by placing themselves in public space, while everyday experiences of violence at the hands of Romanian men in the home are blamed on the failure of women to fulfil the feminine ideal in private space. As long as women claim protection from gendered violence as gendered subjects within the ethnonational Romanian social institutions by displacing their experiences onto the ethnic Ţigan Other, the inherent violence of the gendered ethnonational body cannot be addressed.

Subaltern agency and the ethnic Other

Having discussed the agency of the Romanian women who perform the prescriptive discourse, it is necessary to also discuss how Romanian women's discourses of ethnicized sexual violence elide, naturalize and silence issues of sexual violence that Romani women face. Historically, stereotypes of men in general as having "sexual needs" and Ţigani in particular as being controlled by primitive "urges" have been utilized in Romanian society to justify the sexual abuse of Romani women (identified as Ţigani) by both Romanian and Romani men. While male Ţigan slaves faced a punishment of death for raping a

Romanian woman in the legal code of Moldavia, non-Romani men were free to rape Romani women, who were considered naturally lascivious, without fear of punishment.[684] The stereotype of Romani women as seductive, deceptive and promiscuous is also prevalent in postsocialist Romania. In addition to being victims of domestic violence in the home, Romani women face greater barriers than Romanian women to access the Romanian legal system, resulting in severe under-representation of violent crime against this community. The invisibility of Romani women's experiences in Romanian women's discourses reflects their circumscription from the imagined gendered community of Romanian women. Articulating all Ţigani as Others to the Romanian ethnonational community unjustly prevents Romani citizens of Romania (identified as Ţigani) from accessing basic services, let alone a supportive recognition in the community.

The predominant articulation of women naturalized in the *faux*-privileged sphere of the family as reproducers and mothers of the (ethno)nation also directly relies on constructing the Ţigan feminine Other as against "the Romanian people." There are two major stereotypical discourses of the Ţigan Other as woman, both of which have been briefly raised in recent chapters. One narrative claims that under Ceauşescu's pro-natal legislation, Ţigani were encouraged to have more

[684] See the forty-article Code of Vasile Lupu, Hospodar of Moldavia (1634-1654) Section 39 "[The free man] who, yielding to love, meets a girl in the road and embraces her, shall not be punished at all." Ian Hancock "Conditions under Slavery" Chapter III in *The Pariah Syndrome* 1988 available through Patrin Web Journal http://www.geocities.com/Paris/5121/pariah-ch3.htm last accessed 27-11-2004.

children so as to outnumber Romanians, threatening the ethnonation not from outside, but from within. The other stereotypical discourse is that Ţigani weren't civilized enough to use contraception,[685] then they gave away their children to state orphanages, thereby forcing the state to pay for their children.[686] The Romanian Self in these discourses is constituted as civilized through using contraception and also under threat from the Ţigan other as fertile, primitive and uncontrollably sexual. Romanian newspapers regularly publish articles claiming that Ţigani will 'take over' Romania. In June 2005, for example, the major daily newspaper Ziua published an article entitled "Rrominia" claiming that in 50-60 years Romania will be populated by Ţigani.[687]

In these particular discourses the Ţigan Other acts in tandem with the socialist state against the modern Romanian ethnonation.

---

[685] Even today, the stereotypes of Ţigani amongst aid/health workers lead to presuppositions that Romani people cannot tell the time, or remember how to take a daily pill, that their men will not allow them to control their own bodies, or that they are too poor to understand family planning as a priority.

[686] The scandalously overcrowded and unattended Romanian orphanages of the early 1990s were presented to the West as containing children with serious behavioural problems from isolation and lack of human care, but within Romania these children and their appalling condition was explained and Othered through popular discourses of orphans as Ţigan children with racially caused mental deficiencies. See Petru Popescu *The Return* Grove Press, New York 1997, p.346 for just one recounted example of this discourse.

[687] Unsigned "Rrominia" *Ziua* 10 June 2005. Note the spelling of Romania with the double r and its connotations of EUrope sanctioned disaster for ethnic Romanians.

Conclusion

In this chapter we see the complexities of gendered ethnonational Romanian women's mobilisations of a unique form of the stereotypical Ţigan Other as sexually violent masculine Other located in public space. Romanian women utilize the Ţigan Other by drawing on historically developed stereotypes of "primitive" sexuality, aggression, and location in the public spaces of the city. While the strategies and effects of the discourse warning women to avoid public space for fear of Ţigan rapists are multiple, shifting and open for discussion, there are certainties within this discourse. The Ţigan Other is mobilized by the gendered others of the predominant ethnonational Romanian identity in an attempt to placate and invoke the protection of normative masculine Romanian identity. The ethnicization of the masculine threat as Ţigan simultaneously disavows Romanian masculine complicity in sexual violence and claims protection for the Romanian feminine subject within the naturalized gender roles of the hegemonic ethnic group. Female interlocutors create a space to displace and discuss their fears and experiences of traumatic violence through this discourse, but in articulating the perpetrator as the central ethnic Other, they likewise displace their own ability to discuss the fact of violence in the private sphere at the hands of Romanian men.

While the effects of this discourse debatably consolidate the dominance of Romanian masculinity, its existence illustrates a dynamic strategy for the negotiation of gender and its places in everyday life amongst women in the Bucharest. As indigenous feminism and campaigns for gender equality gain stride amongst Romanian proponents of a EUropean civil society, discourses amongst women that recognize the vulnerability of gendered *and* ethnic subjects within Romanian society could prove to be the link that enables widespread and critical debate about gendered and ethnicized bodies in postsocialist Romanian social spaces.

Conclusion

This thesis has attempted to trace the dynamic central role of the Ţigan Other in modern ethnonational discourses of Romanian identity. From its legislative and social conception as a means to control Romani people as slaves, the Ţigan Other has been deployed to benefit performers of Romanian ethnonational identities in multiple and unique ways. It is certain that the Ţigan Other is a vital tool that is mobilized by individuals at all levels of society to deal with specific anxieties concerning the maintenance of coherent Romanian ethnonational identities. Throughout this thesis we have seen the Ţigan Other invoked as a solution for anxieties of ethnic identity in the modern nation, for anxieties of ideology, of spaces, of gendered bodies and of everyday practice.

The stereotypes used to create the Ţigan Other have not radically shifted since the fifteenth century, when Ţigan slaves were articulated as nomadic, uncivilized, lazy, pagan and threatening. These same stereotypes remain the staple nodes of knowledge in stereotypical discourses that extend and intensify throughout history. As the need arises, specific variations of different stereotypes of the Ţigan Other can be discursively pinned to any new signifier that arises and causes anxiety, such as the trader of imported goods in a newly open market. Stereotypes of the Ţigan Other *need* to be varied and contradictory to aid the interpellator's decisive (albeit temporary) capture of the Other as such. The simultaneously lazy

and black-market-busy postsocialist Ţigan must be articulated in this contradictory way in order to assure the Romanian self thus articulated as helpless that their speaker position and identity is likewise fixed. Of course, this does not lessen the anxiety of the Romanian identity, but it does provide a socially encouraged redirection of this anxiety onto an ethnic Other, enabling the maintenance of a similarly contradictory stereotypical European Romanian ethnonational identity (albeit temporarily).

The kinds of stereotypes that became predominant in different periods, therefore, are signposts for the anxieties of wider Romanian society. In the nineteenth century, Romanian peasants articulated a social distance between Ţigan slaves and their own indentured position. By creating an Other described as innately lower in the social hierarchy than themselves, they thereby claimed for themselves an innately higher position in relation to the projected Ţigan. Throughout socialism, the Ţigan Other as social parasite, stealing the imminence of communist paradise from Romanians through their illegal trade, enabled consuming Romanians to displace their own fear of complicity with this ideological crime against the socialist future (and thus "the Romanian people"). During the fall of socialism the Ţigan Other again changed face, becoming the evil collaborators of an externally imposed socialist empire, against an innocent Romanian people. The Ţigan is both flipsides of the same motivation, both the failure of "the people" to become "good" socialists, and their failure to stand up against socialist persecution as dissidents. The Ţigan Other was the discursive

strategy that facilitated the availability of both of these interpretive options (even simultaneously!) to an entire society.

The anxieties of postsocialism are different again to the socialist period. The Ţigan Other is mobilized by the press, the President and normal citizens across classes to explain the anxieties of everyday trade and consumption, and wider anxieties about the nature of governance, social order, gender roles and international identity. Firstly, small business was identified as Ţigan and blamed for the stolen *jouissance* of clandestine socialist period consumption, while another Ţigan was responsible for inflation and unemployment, anxiously constituted by socialist period discourses of trade as immoral theft against moral production. In 1990, the Ţigan *bişniţari* manifest anxieties about the revolution, about not only the loss of the socialist Other but the new suddenly democratic rulers. The evidence of the power of discourse is not just that miners heard in Iliescu's urge against 'social parasites' an order to attack Ţigani, but that this order was taken to the point of physical violence against all people who could be identified as Ţigani in Bucharest. Not just traders and "uncivilized" (democratic) students were attacked, but people with dark skin (African Romanians) and peripheral suburbs of ethnic Roma. "The people" consecrated their "return to Europe" with the blood of innocent people identified through the name "Ţigan" with all their anxieties about change and loss. The Ţigan Other was vital to the practice of revolution by a "Romanian people."

The importance of the ethnicized Ţigan Other to postsocialist Romanian society articulating itself as inherently European is highlighted in the tragic comedy of discourses regarding Romania's relationship with the European Union. While the EU demands that "the Romanian people" stop attacking Romanian Romani people as Ţigani in order to be accepted as European (signified by EU accession), Romanian ethnonational discourse's primary solution to this anxiety is to deflect Europe's disappointed gaze again onto the Ţigan Other, articulating Ţigani as the barrier to Romanian success in Europe. As Romanian anxiety concerning the awry European gaze intensifies, so too do applications of the stereotypical anti-Ţigan (as nomadic, criminal, uncivilized, non-Romanian) discourse in everyday life. There is no discourse in Romanian society that can articulate the need for a deconstruction of or end to the Ţigan Other, the Ţigan is the key Other against which Romanian identity, in every period, has attempted to fix itself.

After a decade of capitalism in postsocialist Romania, the Ţigan Other is also the vegetable mafia that enables the performance and existence of the 'real producer' Romanian peasant farmer as he was created in the nineteenth century. The Ţigan Other is every Romanian who il/legally crosses international borders (nomadic criminals), who works selling imported produce (mafia businessmen controlling the national economy), the Ţigan Other is every pickpocket on a bus (violent, primitive, criminal) and every child in the orphanage (primitive, promiscuous, uneducated). Reflecting the normative masculinity of the Romanian self, the Ţigan man is the protagonist of folkloric trickery and the invisible mafia of

contemporary Romania. Reflecting the position of the Romanian woman in ethnonational Romanian identity discourses, the Ţigan woman slips from beautiful object of sexual freedom to the ugly whore Other. It is interesting then that the Romanian woman's place as object of masculine Romanian violence and control relies on a specifically gendered Ţigan Other, in the form of the rapist in public space, to articulate and displace women's traumatic experiences as victims of Romanian male aggression. In the Romanian women's discourse of Ţigan men as sexual predators in public space, the threat to the Romanian woman as feminine ideal; as chaste, belonging to a Romanian man and in the home, is projected from the site of actual trauma, the site of the ideal feminine, onto the more convenient site of the ethnic Ţigan Other in public space. The Ţigan Other is used by gendered Romanian subjects, by the women who warn each other and by the press, to buttress the patriarchal order that constitutes Romanian society. Romanian society pervasively relies on the Ţigan as gendered ethnic Other to maintain its claim to a fixed identity and order.

Wider implications

I hope that this thesis has illustrated how the Ţigan Other functions as an identity mobilized from within the project to create and maintain Romanian ethnonational identities. The stereotypical discourses used to create the Ţigan Other are powered by anxiety and have multiplied throughout history. The Ţigan Other is

not an exaggeration from signifiers of Romani culture, but stereotypes of the Other have consistently sought to link supposedly inherent characteristics such as nomadism and stupidity to identifiable physical signifiers such as black skin or Romani music. This is the usual project of identity, to mask the fact of discursive creation by claiming to be located in the body. It is this structure of identity that has resulted in Romani people being systematically and violently discriminated against as Ţigani in Romania, and for this reason I consider it a related question of academic responsibility to ask how this map of historical construction can be used to attempt an everyday practical deconstruction of the Ţigan Other.

I could not have completed any research project about anti-Ţigan hatred in Romania without the constant laughter and support of Roma in Bucharest. The nature of this thesis is my contribution to the strategies I learnt from everyday Romani people who deal with intense and constant discrimination against them as Ţigani. To fight against discrimination, you cannot simply refute the negative stereotypes of the Ţigan Other, you cannot refute stereotypes of Ţigani with facts of Romani life. Primarily, stereotypes function in chains, so that if one is contradicted there are many more that can be invoked as "evidence" of the Ţigan Other. The logic of these chains is not coherent, it is specifically developed to enable escape from logical refutation and argument, to enable the Ţigan Other to function for Romanian identity discourse in moments of crisis and anxiety. Secondly, refutation of stereotypes requires a similarly fixed (stereotypical) claim to knowledge, which is most often in the form of presenting Romani culture as a

counter-fact to stereotypes of the Ţigan Other. Invoking Romani culture or facts of discrimination in an argument against the Ţigan Other will simply tether Romani individuals to the Ţigan Other even more tightly, following which the Ţigan Other discourse will always slip beyond the reach of logical argumentation.

This thesis is a response to my observation that to fight the complex stereotypical discourses of the Ţigan Other, one needs to be as well versed in their everyday performance as the other speaker, and one needs to understand the full gamut of historically developed contexts of enunciation. An historical knowledge of the Ţigan Other is most powerful in combination with an understanding of why the Ţigan was produced as such in specific moments in Romanian society. Essentially, to fight the discourse of the Ţigan Other, one has to know its structure, its standard performances and its weak points of anxiety, as well as those who invoke it. It is clear from this study that the Ţigan Other is not a stable and fixed identity, but an ambivalent and anxious projection. As we observed in the chapter of this thesis about Romanian folklore, the master relies on the slave being in a particular place to claim for himself the position of mastery, and simply refusing to *be* in this position is an intensely destabilizing power available to individuals faced with interpellation as Ţigani. This exact ambivalence and anxiety is often played upon by Romani individuals in everyday life as a form of resistance to being discriminated against as Ţigani.

The most effective anti-Ţigan strategies I have seen are performed without theoretical articulation by everyday Romani Romanians, and by Romani organizations against discrimination in Bucharest. As an anecdotal example, I was once in a small shop in Bucharest when a Romani woman (identifiable by her traditional dress) entered. The salesman called out in a loud voice to the other customers 'be careful, there is a Ţigan in the shop!' At this, the Romani woman looked around and loudly said "Where? Where is the Ţigan?" This refusal of the subject to answer to the pejorative interpellation directed at her effectively disrupted the attempt of the shopkeeper to link stereotypes of the Ţigan Other with Romani cultural signifiers.[688] She disrupted the gaze and the stereotypical discourse of the shopkeeper. When discrimination is commonplace, many Roma survive by refusing to "own" the negative stereotypical characteristics that non-Romani communities ascribe to them, and it would do Romani and non-Romani activists and academics well to learn a lesson from this strategy. Of course there

[688] Deliberately refusing to be interpellated in the racist discourse despite physical signifiers such as color of skin has also been common through the history of African-American resistance in the United States. The classic text *Nigger* by Dick Gregory is a wonderful example. On the back of the book Gregory uses an anecdote where he walks into a restaurant and when the waitress tells him 'we don't serve colored people here' he responds ' That's alright, I don't eat colored people, bring me a whole fried chicken.' In this anecdote Gregory simply refuses to be interpellated as 'colored.' *Nigger* Pocket Books, New York, London, Toronto, Sydney 1964, reprinted 1986. The popular and controversial African American comedian David Chappelle also heavily relies on playing within stereotypical discourse for his work. In one skit, Chappelle plays an old blind black Ku Klux Klan member who, when surrounded by white men shouting 'nigger out,' joins in their chorus and successfully brings the signification of black skin with "nigger" to rupture. See *The Chappelle Show* Season One NTSC, Paramount Pictures 2004.

are many situations, such as physical attacks, when Romani people cannot simply refuse to be interpellated as Ţigani and these cases need to be treated, but I am speaking here of particular kinds of everyday discrimination.

Romani and non-Romani academics and activists can protest against discrimination directed through the name "Ţigan" without insisting that Romani people answer to the name themselves. The inaccurate conflation of stereotypical Ţigani with Roma currently permeates academia and activist NGOs (such as Human Rights Watch). It is dangerous that academics, report writers and consultants link every discourse against Ţigani in a newspaper to Romani communities as hate speech.[689] This not only links the stereotypes of the Ţigan Other to real Romani communities, but also homogenizes Roma as one broad Ţigan community. Academics and activists need to first understand that the Ţigan Other is not an exaggeration of real Romani culture, and to also take responsibility to interrogate whether (let alone the extent to which) such discourses mobilize real (and what kinds of) action against specific Romani communities.

Protesting against stereotypes of the Ţigan Other need not be entirely separate from pointing out the issues facing Romani communities. One successful

[689] This also happens with Romani activists, and is conditioned by not only a desire for striking physical evidence of pervasive and devastating everyday unreported discrimination, but also due to (often arbitrary) limitations imposed by donor agencies.

example of protest against stereotypes of the Ţigan Other simultaneously highlighted that it is the Romani community that bears the brunt of these discourses. In 2001, the Romanian press widely reported that Ţigan Romanians had been arrested for eating the swans in a public park in Vienna. This image was used as evidence that uncivilized Ţigani were responsible for Romania's failure to accede to the European Union, and the public discussion did not raise the ridiculousness of the image, but moved straight into a much performed and angry debate about what to do to prevent Ţigani being recognized as Romanian. Aven Amentza, a Romani NGO in Bucharest, made a public protest of barbequing chicken on the footpath outside the Austrian embassy in Bucharest, handing pieces of barbequed chicken to Romanian passers-by on serviettes. The protest thereby drew together both Roma and ethnic Romanians, sharing food in protest against a discriminatory Western Europe. In this way, the anxiety of the Romanian discourse about European identity was displaced again from the Ţigan Other to "the West" itself, represented by the Austrian embassy. Through the action of sharing the consumption of the food, both Romanian and Roma Romanians inhabited the stereotype of the uncivilized Other of western Europe. In my experience, Romani protests against the ways that discourses of the Ţigan Other affect Roma are effective precisely because many Roma are sensitive to how Romani culture is deliberately conflated with signifiers of the Ţigan Other.[690]

[690] Romani organizations very often respond to crisis situations, so they understand the specific discourses that are working to identify Roma as Ţigani. Of course there are also many cases in Romani community work where agendas conflate fighting the Ţigan Other with fighting for Romani rights. In intellectual

The most immediate need is for academics to think about how naming all discriminatory articulations in Romania and the individuals interpellated by them as "Gypsy" further binds stereotypes to individuals and homogenizes Romani identities. Studies of injustices against Roma in Romania should also take this into account and consider carefully which problems one chooses to "own" and which to refute as issues of the Ţigan Other discourse. To do this requires an understanding of the complicated relationship between these identities. This study is an exploration of how to study the historical development of stereotypical discourses of the Ţigan Other with the aim of illustrating the complexity of the anxious construction, and the recurring fact of its creation by a society constructing their own ethnonational identity in opposition.

---

and historical work especially it is a question of where to draw the line, such as in projects like collecting nineteenth century references to Ţigani and Romani together; how does one decide where the stereotypes end and the references to real Romani slave culture begin. I hope that this thesis is instrumental in pointing out some new ways to approach these problems.

APPENDIX

Part One

Methodology and ethics in research with people

My research of contemporary discourses of the Ţigan Other in Romania has very often entailed finding ways to record what is a pervasive and constantly performed chain of stereotypical discourses in Romanian society. In everyday life, my interaction with Romanian market traders, commuters on public transport, students, colleagues, friends and spontaneous acquaintances all required and enhanced my knowledge of anti-Ţigan discourse. I kept notes of passing conversations over a period of five years, but drew on more traditional and verifiable sources for this dissertation. Below I describe the numerous research strategies I employed, how I dealt with ethical concerns in their procedure, and questions of verifiability for future academics.

Personal interviews and discussion groups

Interviews conducted in person in Romania through 2000 and 2001 were conducted with the clearance of the University of Melbourne Human Research Ethics Committee. See http://www.unimelb.edu.au/ExecServ/Srvol1/r4-0173.htm In accordance with the committee's guidelines and project clearance, respondents were provided with an information sheet about the project and a consent form that they signed and returned to the author. All participation was on the proviso that

the respondent could terminate the interview and withdraw statements if and when they chose. As per regulations, these information and signed consent forms are kept in a locked filing cabinet in the author's possession in Sydney, Australia.

43 of the interviews conducted with 45 women and men about violence in 2002 were not recorded on tape, but answers were written and charted in notes as the respondents spoke. All interviewees read an information sheet and signed a consent form before the interview.

I held discussion groups at the University of Bucharest in the Romanes Language department every Saturday morning through October-December, 2001. In these classes I took general notes without any names of participants and usually approached participants to continue or restate their discussions in a formalized interview setting, conducted with information and consent forms as previously explained. Many personal interviews were the result of people met in weekly discussion groups I hosted.

Collaboration in participation-observation research 2002

From July- September 2002 I collaborated with a Romanian postgraduate from the Department of Sociology, University of Bucharest. We decided to work together to collect primary data about the ways that agricultural markets

functioned from the perspectives of all participants. Over a period of three months we worked independently in open-air markets and transcribed and discussed findings together. We approached market traders with a scripted explanation of our project and recorded their consent to participate on tape. We observed and spoke with many people but only recorded interviews are used in this dissertation. We transcribed tapes in full as a collaboration to ensure accuracy and discuss discourses mobilized by respondents. The tapes and transcripts of the research are in my possession in Sydney, Australia.

As a note about the rights to use this information, the agreement I made with my colleague was that she had equal rights to access and use the transcripts. I discussed my ideas about the interpretation of these discourses with her, and she read a draft of my paper.

Surveying

I did a survey of 140 students in Bucharest University faculties (commerce, sociology, mathematics, philology and history) in 2001 as part of a volunteer project for *Aven Amentza*, a Romani Non Governmental Organization. I personally approached random respondents, every fourth person as a sample, with an information sheet about the project and explained that it was an anonymous survey. Before beginning the survey, I gave respondents a consent form to return

signed with their survey. The survey was a single question and respondents were given one blank page on which to write their open-ended response with as many or few words as they chose.

The survey asked the single question:

In your opinion, what are the differences between Romanians and Rroma?

In opinia dumneavoastra, care sunt diferențele dintre Români şi Rromi?

The handwritten responses to the survey were translated and transcribed by myself.

The original survey forms are in the author's possession in Sydney, Australia.

Copies of the results are available in electronic transcript from the author.

Part Two

The Survey Responses The responses given in this survey are printed below in English only. Respondents are categorized into the departments in which they study.

When a handwritten response used capital letters, I also transcribed them as such. All spellings of "Țigani" and "Roma" and their variations are as they were in the surveys.

Code:

#. Age / gender / ethnicity. Response.

gender : m/f

ethnicity: r=Romanian, h=Hungarian, rr=Rom.

Commerce Faculty

1.20/m/r. It's a difference of civilization, culture and behavior. They're a black spot on the image of the country.

2.22/m/h. The differences are of a cultural nature and a mode of life. Romanians pay more attention to details when aiming at certain goals. On the other hand, Rroma have only one purpose, to profit, no matter how they get it.

3.21/m/r. There are linguistic differences which don't matter, and cultural differences, but the most important are differences of mentality; especially related to a code of values; things that are dishonorable.

4.25/m/r. There are very many differences; social, cultural and maybe even political and educational. I am not an anti-racist, but I consider that there is a certain amount of danger for us as Romanian citizens

5.19/m/r. The differences between the two ethnicities are only constituted by the fact that their history is very different to ours. They came from India. But the most important difference is their deficient status in culture and education. It's a minus for Romania to join the EU. I hope that Roma will be able to integrate in Romanian society, but it will take a lot of effort.

6.21/m/r. The majority of Roma are uncivilized, disrespectful and thieves (though usually in collusion with Romanians). There are exceptions that are good-willed. It's a shame that they're poor because of the indifferent maltreatment of the majority of Romanians (or rather of the 'rich') without as much respect as they deserve, Ţigani women are very beautiful! Pay attention!

7.21/m/r. The difference is very big. They are a race that served the Romanians until Cuza abolished slavery. It wasn't possible to raise their cultural values, it seems as if they remain in the state of slavery.

8.22/m/r. In my opinion there aren't big differences between the two ethnicities except the 'inadaptability' of the Roma thanks to the special discrimination they suffered historically. I think that a better education level will break the inter-ethnic barriers.

9.20/m/r/. Many are thieves, many are dirty, but there are many more that are exceptions.

10. 2-/m/r. Roma are a shame to the Romanian nation.

11.21/m/r. The difference is the cultural origin of the people. Because they are Muslim, Roma have another culture a different mode of life and you can find this in every aspect; cultural, social and economic.

12.21/m/r. In my opinion there aren't significant differences. The differences that do exist are in part due to the discrimination that was against them, through their long history, including recently. But there is also a reticence on the part of this population to accept the Romanian way of life.

13.21/m/r. In the first place it's a difference of words, which sound similar but mean two different things; Romanians means a citizen born in Romania and Roma meaning a citizen belonging to the ethnic group "rrom," a minority ethnicity of Romania.

14.20/m/r. The difference isn't very large, probably just language, culture and level of civilization.

15.19/m/r. I consider that we live in a democratic country and the world has all the same rights and should have the same access to the privileges of society. Because physical differences remain, and it's normal, but from the legal point of view discrimination shouldn't exist.

16.19/f/r. In my opinion the difference between Romanians and Roma isn't big, just the level of living and even of education.

17.19/f/r. Roma are another nationality. They came from India. Romanians have always been on this territory, they were formed here. Roma are a minority. They are not well perceived in our country or in other countries. They have different customs to Romanians and a different style of dress. They have many children.

18.19/f/r. Very few have schooling because they don't consider it necessary for work. They retain their law in traditions regarding marriage and thus remains the idea that the woman needs to be subjugated to the man. Roma are in contrast with Romanians in that they always force violence through using vulgar language. They receive fabulous wealth on the basis of burglary and stealing which I don't think they even put to any use other than stately houses and vulgar jewelry, they can use their intelligence (though they have little enough of this) in better ways

than helping themselves to succeed in stealing and begging. Because many people are like this, the majority of Roma have a reproachable character.

19.18/f/r. I think the differences can be usually be seen in behavior, more or less thanks to the fact that Roma don't have much civilization, are still working with their primitive ideas, and they remain with many customs and the same habits as these traditions. They disturb me because they are lazy, they don't adapt to society, even in many small cases, yet those that leave for other countries make negative advertisements of Romania through the bad things they do.

20.38/f/r. Differences of culture, civilization, knowledge and "fair play."

21.24/f/r. I think the differences between Roma and Romanians come in the first place from the different levels of education. Roma, thanks to their culture, don't have in the majority access to superior education (high school or university). Roma live in their groups to feel good together and very few amongst them succeed in getting anything to show for themselves. Romanians are prejudiced against Roma in a condemnatory way – I think that every time there is a culture with their habits there will usually exist points of divergence and problems between the two groups.

22. --- many differences.

23.21/f/r. The principal difference is of ethnicity, from which the differences of culture and civilization result; education, behavior and moral code.

24.19/f/r. Of behavior and education

25. 19/f/r. There isn't any real difference in my opinion, it all depends on education.

26.21/f/r. In the first place I think it's a difference in the field of education. The majority of Romanians have superior education and occupy the important positions in all economic domains.

27.19/f/r. Romanians have their traditions and customs and roma have theirs. They are different ethnicities that live on the same territory. Romanians are more amiable and responsive and understanding in times of need. Roma should be more polite.

28.20/f/r. Education, about 90%.

29. 21/f/r. Its not possible to generalize, but probably differences of culture and education, of social state and language.

30. 23/f/r. There exist cultural differences, but this is not necessarily the problem. The real problem is discrimination between both groups, and even if there are efforts to remove this situation at the institutional level, they remain at the personal level. Another difference is possibly the difference in level of education and civilization in the two communities.

31. 21/f/r. The differences between Romanians and Roma, in my opinion, are cultural, economic and social differences. If we take the example of social life, Romanians have jobs in the majority yet I don't think Roma have occupations in this way. After you finish school you don't meet too many. There is a need to recognize that we Romanians consider them inferior because they come from somewhere 'in the south' and thanks to the mode of living of the Roma we don't accept their integration in society.

32. --- First of all, we must not confuse *Rom* with *Român*. Roma are an ethnicity from Romania, and they are Romanian citizens, but they have their own customs and particularly problems; they are uneducated and have a bad reputation, which, in the West, leads to Romanians mistakenly being called Roma.

Sociology Faculty

33.21/f/r. A different culture with a different way of living and thinking.

34.21/f/r. Cultural difference and a different mentality.

35 23/f/r. In my opinion the single differences are of culture and tradition. Apart from this, it depends on each individual.

36. 22/f/r. Not one.

37. 19/f/r. There are none.

38. 19/f/r. I think there are differences of culture and language

39. 19/f/r. There aren't any differences.

40. 20/f/r. First of all in our society, which is still based on old mentalities there are differences in the way a Roma is treated in all social aspects. Roma are treated more often than they should be with disrespect and they have to deal with a lot of prejudice from Romanians. Second of all Romanians have somewhat of an excuse because most Roms don't behave and don't submit to the generally accepted laws.

41. 20/f/-. Roma are a national minority especially after the demographic statistics changed in the last ten years. Their rights are ignored most of the time.

42. 24/f/r. I don't see any differences other than color of skin. We're all humans.

43.21/f/-. 1.Difference of culture and socialization 2.need to see the sufferings and problems of roma integration into society.

44.24/f/r. For me there is no difference between the two ethnicities.

45. 25/f/r. In principle there is no difference

46. 22/f/r. Roma are not Romanian! Roma do not originate from Romania! Romania is my country. The differences can be found in every facet; from physical to psychological and educational. EVERY ROMA STEALS!

47. 22/f/r. Of culture, education, behavior and probably level of aspiration.

48. 19/f/Rr. In my opinion there are no differences between the two groups, just differences of culture and of customs.

49. 21/f/Rr. The differences between Romanians and Roma are social status and cultural differences.

50. 22/f/r. Differences of culture, education, way of life and mentality.

51.21/f/Rr. There are no differences between Romanians and Roma.

52. 21/f/r. Differences of tradition and culture.

53. 19/f/r. Very big difference in mentality. We are two peoples with no commonalities of tradition.

54. 22/f/r. The difference is essentially one of structure. I think that from birth Roma are especially raised in a scheme of behavior which cannot be changed no matter what process of socialization. And unfortunately the majority of this scheme is negative. For example the instinct to deceive, lie and steal.

55. 23/f/r. Different culture, traditions, customs, different mode of life, different way of thinking.

56. 20/f/r. Different mode of culture and tradition. One of the differences is scrounging/pinching and bad civilization, of course it also happens amongst Romanians.

57. 19/f/r. The primary difference is how the two words are written, this is very important. There is a difference of culture and of origin. Romanians and Roma may live in the same country, but they have different traditions and cultures. Romanians and Roma are often mistaken for one another, but Romanians have inhabited these lands for centuries, while the Roma colonized our country. They are a minority.

58. 20/f/-. In Romania the Roma are disdained and they try to remove this in diverse ways. They are violent, vulgar, dishonest (in a different way to Romanians) and for Romanians they represent danger. Their behavior is determined by Romanians' attitudes towards them.

59. 18/f/r. There is no difference except perhaps physically. We are all human beings.

60. 25/f/r. In my opinion it's a cultural difference but their explanation has as a base a specific condition of socialization. I think its easy to enumerate the differences but hard to understand exactly when one doesn't have access to their cultural model.

61. 19/f/r/. There are always people who consider Roma different or their behavior hard to handle. You can say Roma are Romanian citizens, slaves by virtue of their birth in Romania. The Roma have low levels of education due to a

lack of money which prevents them going to school, because of this they are known for committing the crimes to gain enough to live in a decent way.

62. 21/f/r. Culturally they have different cultural patterns that generate difference styles/modes of living which are not always integrated with the Romanian style of life, resulting in continuing conflicts between the ethnic groups.

63. 22/f/r. Regarding the rights and obligations of citizens of a state there exist no differences between Romanians and Roma. At the same time there exist many similarities in mode of behavior and thought and feeling. In each of these areas there also exist customs of a cultural basis, every ethnicity having the right to their personal culture, religion, ethnicity.

64. 24/m/r. Culture, mentality, Roma have a different acceptance, exclusion and a society of self-exclusion from Romanian society. And for the Romanians, they have a tendency to victimize the Rroma.

65. 21/m/rr. In my opinion the difference between Romanians and roma are especially at the cultural level. The Romanians are not willing to recognize Roma traditions and culture because it is one of the oldest and possibly more honorable from the point of view of homogeneity and at the same time diversity.

66. 19/m/r. Romanians are white and Roma are black. WE all have good parts and bad parts, we are people.

67. 19/m/r. culture, education and customs.

68. 20/m/rr. In my opinion Roma are different to Romanians in culture, education and knowledge etc.

Mathematics Faculty

69. 18/f/r. The color of skin, mode of life, civilization, concepts of life and family, culture, language they speak, education.

70.20/f/r. Its only a language difference, other differences don't exist.

71. 18/f/r. Romanians are citizens of Romania, people who have Romanian citizenship. Roma are a minority nationality in the territory of Romania.

72.18/f/r. The difference is not only with the color of the skin, but also with mentality and the mode of living.

73. 19/f/r. In my opinion it seems the differences are of color, education, mentality and social position.

74. 25/f/r. Romanians are civilized! In my opinion, Roma do not have the capacity to adapt to society.

75. 20/f/r. This is in general an exaggerated subject, too much is done on the subject of Ţigani (Roma). Ţigani are pure and simple an ethnic minority in Romania, as in many other countries in the West and the south east of Europe but not only there. I think its interesting about nomad Ţigani, its true they are a curiosity for us, but we recognize that they are few, and that the majority have a life identical to ours, people in the same situation as Romanians.

76. 21/f/r. Compared with Romanians, ţiganii are uncivilized and lacking ethics and sometimes violent. They don't have adequate education and have a different culture. Naturally there are exceptions, but in general Ţigani are very different in behavior and principles.

77. 22/m/r. In normal life there is no difference between us, but maybe excessive television attention created differences.

78. 24/m/r. The differences are in education and behavior, better to say in mentality. Ţigani won't progress and don't want to integrate, they have the nomad spirit and the barbarian in their blood. Ţigani move throughout Romania conferring a climate of uncertainty and fear amongst the ranks of the civilized population.

79. 10/m/r. Roma are not Roma, but Ţigani. Ţigani are thieves, criminals, pickpockets etc, Ţigani are a migratory people who migrated here from India. They have no culture. They chose the name *Rrom* to make associations with the word *Român*.

80. 20/m/r. In the first place you need to observe (walk in the street!) that Roma (ţiganii) have another color skin, and then you can see more if you want to walk further, through the outside areas of the districts of Bucharest/

81. 18/m/r. Romanians come from Romania and Dacia. Roma are the same as Indians. As a good point though, Roma look more beautiful.

82. 19/m/r. Color of skin, education, concept of society and regulations, the number of kids.

83. 21/m/r. Roma are ţiganii. A migratory people who come from India.

84. 20/m/r. No comment.

Philology Faculty

85. 19/f/r. They are two different cultures with two different modes of life, each with their own mentality and psychology. From the social point of view you can observe that the fundamental differences refer to the level of civilization where the differences of cultures come from and their modes of action and thought.

86. 21/f/r. The differences between Romanians and Roma are at the level of the mode of living, culture and civilization. The differences are accentuated and often the need for education leads to violence.

87. 22/f/-. Differences of civilization, culture and education.

88. 21.f/r. The primary difference is of civilization. There are very few but some civilized Roma. They are not able to achieve culture, often they become violent from the differences between them and us, Romanians.

89. 19/f/r. There are no big differences, only language. We are all people and have many differences. Their behavior is often very strange!

90. 20/f/r. The color of skin, mentality and language they use.

91. 22/f/r. The word "Romanian" denotes a citizen of the state of Romanian and in the first place generically referring to ethnicity, a Romanian is a citizen who has Romanian origin, the people formed with 2000 years of mixing of the pre-existent population of the actual territory of Romania (dacia) and the resulting population. The Romanian language is the language of Romanian people/ethnicity in which are elements of Latin origin and neo-roman is approximately 90%. Roma is the word that refers to a person from the nomad tribes of Țigani, a long

time on this territory. The expression comes from the term 'civis romanus' (Romanian citizen) from the period of roman decline.

92. 20/f/r. Even though I am not prejudiced, I am absolutely convinced that Roma steal more than Romanians and that they act more hatefully than Romanians. All this is caused by lack of education, I don't think more than 10% of Roma have a high school certificate.

93. 18/f/r. Differences come from culture and ethnicity. More than this, Roma are a minority, so the issue is how to get rights in the state, and the problems of discrimination show up here, need a certain examination of rights and freedom.

94. 21/f/r. Of color and conception.

95. 19/f/r. Romanians are civilized, educated, speak a language, a different culture, descended from latin. Roma are nomadic, unschooled, uneducated, with Indian forefathers, unorganized and without traditions.

96.20/f/r. Ethnicity and education.

97. 20/f/r. Ethnic origins and culture.

98. 19/f/r. Roma are a minority compared with Romanians, there are differences of culture and mentality.

99. 18/f/r. Only an ethnic difference. I am a tolerant person who doesn't differentiate between ethnicities, I love everyone equally.

100. 18/f/r. The Roma represent a nomadic people stabilized in significant numbers on the territory of Romania. Roma or țiganii also exist in Spain and France. Roma do not represent the Romanian people. Romanians are deeply rooted on this territory, from the time of Dacia. Roma, who are also Slavic and

Hungarian, are a kind of invaders, colonizers who didn't leave to find their own country but stayed here, to confuse the two ethnicities would be a very grave error. The Roma are tolerated by the Romanian people but need to learn or "borrow" and to use the societal, cultural and economic norms of the country in which they stay.

101. 20/f/r. I think there is a difference of mentality, mode of life and culture. If you consider Romanians, very many go to school, but I know very few Roma accept schools as a new form of culture, they say they want to raise children in 'their culture.' Possibly if they accepted other forms of culture they would behave differently and there would maybe be a different kind of relationship between is. Both them and us say we have a different culture, but we are all the same nationality, Romanian.

102. 18/f/r. Romanians are CIVILIZED, RRomi are NOT. Romanians are CULTIVATED, the majority of Rroma are ILLITERATE. Romanians have nothing in common with the ancestry of Roma, the Romanian people has been on these lands for centuries while the roma are a nomadic people without a country, without cultural identity, without a moral code.

103. 20/f/r. The majority of Romanians are civilized and educated while Roma represent the negative element in our society. Through their behavior, Roma have destroyed the image of Romania in the world. They revolt and say they don't have the same rights as Romanians, but instead of educating themselves they do nothing but wrong in society.

104. 19/f/r. Basically there are not so many differences. Only cultural and educational. The roma don't benefit from the same educational system although they are allowed to and could. I mean some of them do, but most of them don't. People say that Romanians treat Roma in a bad manner, but that's not true! It's not a general case, you just do that with those who steal stuff or do something wrong, but that's valid for Romanians too. Another thing is that they don't like to work (again-most of them) but some Romanians are like this too.

105. 21/f/r. The Romanians and the Țigani have very different cultural backgrounds, the latter being more traditional. It's a culture where women are not equal to men, and they should obey them. Women are even refused the right to learn (there are exceptions though). On the whole Țigani are less civilized. I think the țiganii care less about hygiene and they're egocentric. They have their own rules and they don't care about the rules of the society they live in. They are also a lot less polite. I know Romanians have a lot to learn too, they are far from having a "healthy" mentality, and I'm aware of the fact that what I said about the Țigani is not true about each one of them.

106. 19/f/r. I am not a racist, I don't see any difference between Romanians and Roma.

107. 19/f/r. There is absolutely no difference.

108. 19/f/r. In my opinion there is no difference between Romanians and Roma.

109. 20/f/r. Well I guess that the main difference is the ethnic one. For instance, I'm Romanian, I am an orthodox believer, I have different traditions and I belong to a different culture than a rom does; he or she may be of another faith, islam

very often, have different values that he/she identifies with. Leaving aside the ethnic differences, we are equal citizens of the same country.

110.23/f/-. Of ethnicity.

111.21/f/r. In the first place it's about difference of ethnicity. Unfortunately there is confusion at the international level, which is not permissible, between the two nations. But the differences are of mentality, tradition, concepts and culture.

113. 21/f/r. Difference of ethnicity, style of life, of language, roma have their own language which includes many Romanian words, of values in the case of Roma money is the first place and the family is second and the rest doesn't matter; the Roma are preparing intellectuals. Not many exist and they don't have any interest in this sense.

114. 22/f/r. Romanians are civilized, clean, sincere, original, and traditional. Roma have a very low level of humanism, they cheat, and they are very kitsch in their taste. They are dirty.

115.21/f/r. I think its an ethnic difference, cultural, language, more or less thats it – a different mode of life, principles and of culture.

116. 19/f/r. Color of skin, education, ancestry, culture, lifestyle, dress, ethics, language, civilization, their interests.

117. 21/f/moldovan. The roma do not forget where they come from but the Romanian, when he gets money, even forgets his mother.

118.20/f/r. I think that culture and civilization is the main factor. Looking at the actual situation, Roma don't have a very good reputation in our society, for their stealing, misery, lack of culture, and violence seem to be the main characteristics

of this ethnicity. Excepting the negative elements of the population we call țiganii, roma are a nomad population without cultural and spiritual identity.

119. 20/f/r. There are cultural differences that include the model of existence and attitudes of society. For example, it's a well-known roma tradition to buy a wife who is decided from birth. Not wanting to generalize, but it is well-known that the aggressive conduct of Roma (this also exists among Romanians but there is a fear of Roma amongst Romanians). In customs they are seen as dirty, uneducated, aggressive, thieves and many other negative images. Personally I appreciate the culture of the nomadic Țigani with wagons and belly dancing and the women tell fortunes.

120. 21/f/r. The differences between Romanians and Roma are, besides the obvious ethnic, physical aspects and color of skin, differences of mentality and culture. I don't think this is a solid motive for discrimination. In theory, if Roma were more receptive of the hand that we Romanians extend to them, everything would be easier and there wouldn't be so many inter-ethnic conflicts. Overall, to answer your question, the principle difference between the two ethnicities is education (school and family) or, more exactly, a need for Roma Romanians to be more preoccupied with education for themselves and their children.

121. 20/f/r. From what I know, the difference is ethnic, Romanians and Roma having totally different origins. The Roma bring specific values and an unusual perspective to life. I personally don't like the majority of them and think they do bad things for the image of Romania.

122. 21/f/r. Roma are a migratory population who stabilized in Romania, while Romanians are native here. Roma do not integrate in the community and are renowned for stealing, illegal activities and being imprisoned. They are not going to schoool and Roma live in a precarious situation, many not having any notion of hygiene.

123. 25/m/r. Of blood.

124/ 22/m/-. Of place of origin, personality.

125/ 22/m/citizen of the world. Romanians don't exist and neither do Roma. Not with capital letters. There exist romanians and roma. If there exists a nature essential to Romanians and Roma anything that tries to modify these natures (politics or social) is a ridiculous attempt. Futile. This is the hidden presupposition in your question and my response.

126. 24/m/r. I think the primary differences are in the ranks of education, the sense resulting from their history that Roma haven't had access to education in the same way it was needed to live under the law because of marginalization. I don't think any other differences exist.

127. 26/m/r. The most important differences are in the order of culture and civilization and very few Roma have higher studies and those who live by their own work are few. It's a pity that these differences cannot be seen in the civilized world, and the Romanians are considered Țigani. It's correct that not all Romanians are honest, but from this point to considering them Țigani I would say is a great difference.

128. 22/m/r. Apart from evident differences (such as color, better said nuances), there are differences of the Roma representing another population same way as Hungarians or Germans... even as a nation that is co-living within Romania. I don't have the space or time to detail the differences but I think it would be more interesting to ask Roma this question.

129. 19/m/r. Of education and culture.

History Department

130. 21/f/r. The differences between Romanians and Roma are very big, the biggest is that Roma are lazy and dirty and run from work as much as possible, this doesn't mean that all of them are like that, and it doesn't mean that Romanians don't have that defect. The problem is of mentality. The Roma don't know honesty or correct behavior.

1331. 22/f/r. A difference of color and education

132. 20/f/r. Not one.

133. 22/f/r. The differences are mostly of the social kind, Roma are not well perceived because of the problems they create.

134. 20/f/r/ Not one, we're all human.

135. 21/f/-. It's a habit of nationality in the first rank. In general Roma are considered inferior because of their lack of education for many of them.

136. 19/f/-. The Roma don't know how to use soap. The percentage of Roma thieves is much higher than of Romanian thieves! The Roma are not even

interested in making a culture or trade, they have no interest in entering into a respectable position in society where they have rights but also responsibility.

137. 20/m/r. The difference is that black pigeons are roma and the white ones are Romanian. Roma are interested in Opel VW, Fiat, Dacia 1100... but these machines are the ones they steal.

138. 20/m/r. There is a difference of culture, Roma are not well perceived, even perceived very badly by the nation thanks to their own behavior.

139. 20/m/r. The Romanians are the majority of citizens of Romania, difference of color, history and origin.

140. 36/m/Japanese. Skin color, language.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books and Articles

Abraham, Dorel "Post-Revolutionary Social Phenomena in Romania: "The University Square" and the violent collective behaviour of June 13th to 15th" *Romanian Journal of Sociology* Issue 1-2 1990.

Abraham, Dorel "The social impact of the built environment developmental policy: from central planning to a market oriented economy" pp. 53-62 in *Romanian Journal of Sociology* II 1-2 Bucharest 1991.

Achim, Viorel *Ţiganii în istoria României* Editură Enciclopedia, Bucharest 1998.

Achim, Viorel "Cît de veche este la noi "problema" Ţiganilor (romilor)?" in *Dilema* thematic issue "Ţiganii" Nr. 314, February 1999.

Adăniloaie, N. *Răscoala Ţăranilor din 1888* Bucharest 1988.

Agh, Attila *The Politics of Central Europe* SAGE publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi 1998.

Ahmed, Sara "Animated Borders: Skin, Colour and Tanning" in Margaret Shildrick and Janet Price (eds) *Vital Signs: Feminist Reconfigurations of the Bio/logical Body* Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1998.

Almond, Mark *The rise and fall of Nicolae and Elena Ceauşescu* Chapmans, London 1992.

Amza, Tudor *Fenomenul infractional în rindul ţiganilor: Activitaţi specific Poliţiei Române pentru protenjarea etniei şi prevenirea faptelor antisociale*, Academy of Police "Alexandru Ioan Cuza," Bucharest 1995.

Anăstăsoaie, Viorel "Imaginea Romilor în presa românească" pp.163-165 in Viorel Anăstăsoaie and Daniele Tarnovschi (eds) *Proiecte pentru Romii din România 1990-2000* Centrul de Resurse pentru Diversitate Etnoculturală, Cluj Napoca 2001.

Anderson, Benedict *Imagined Communities; Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* revized edition Verso Press, London and New York 1991.

Andreescu, Gabriel *Extremismul de Dreapta în România* Ethnocultural Diversity Resource Center, Cluj Napoca 2003.

Anon (ed) *Tâinele Inimei* Editură Minerva, Bucharest 1973.

Anon (ed) *Documenta Româniae Historica, B.,Tara Româneasca 1* Editură Acadamie PR, Bucharest 1966.

Anon (ed) *Documenta Româniaie Historica, B., Moldova I* Editură Acadamie RPR, Bucharest 1975.

Anon "1848" Theme issue *Sfera Politicii* Nr.60, published by Fundatiei Societatea Civila, Bucharest, May 1998 p.6. www.dntb.ro/sfera/arhiva/nr60/articole /articol2text.htm, last accessed 21-11-2005.

Baban, Adriana "Women's Sexuality and Reproductive Behaviour in Post-Ceauşescu Romania: A Psychological Approach" in Susan Gal and Gail Kligman (eds) *Reproducing Gender*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey 2000.

Badescu, Ilie "Contribuții asupra revoluției din decembrie" pp.31-48 in *Sociologie Românească* Bucharest 1990.

Banac, Ivo (ed.) *Eastern Europe in Revolution* Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 1992.

Barbu, Daniel *Republica Absentă: politica şi societate în România postcomunistă* Nemira, Bucharest 1999.

Barbulescu, Alina "Violența intrafamilială şi neliniştea justiției" *Dilema* Nr. 530, 30 May 2003.

Beck, Sam "Ethnicity, Class and Public Policy: Tsigani-Gypsies in Socialist Romania" pp.109-127 in *Giessener Hefte Fur Tsiganologie* Vol. 3 Issue 4 1986.

Beck, Sam "Opposition and Dissent: the Romanian opposition's symbolic use of space in June 1990" pp.1-16.Working Papers on Transitions from State Socialism series, Cornell University Project on Comparative Institutional Analysis, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and New York 1991.

Beecher Stowe, Harriet *Uncle Tom's Cabin* Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York 1998.

Belk, Russell L. and Paun, Magda "Ethnicity and Consumption in Romania" in Janeen Costa and Garry Bamossy (eds) *Marketing in a multicultural world: ethnicity, nationalism and cultural identity* Sage, Thousand Oak 1995.

Bergdoll, Barry "Remaking Bucharest: Are Ideas Enough?" pp. 49-51 in *Architectural Record* Vol. 184 November 1996.

Berindei, Dan "Dezvoltarea presei bucurestene în perioda formarii şi organizarii statului national Român" pp. 666-684 in *Studii* XV Nr. 3 1962.

Berindei, Dan *Epoca Unirii* Corvin Press, Bucharest 2000.

Berindei, Mihnea "Les minorités nationales en Roumanie" in Roumanie: crise et repression in *L'Alternative* Nr. 20, January 1983.

Berlin, Ira *Slaves without Masters The Free Negro in the Antebellum South* Vintage Books Pantheon Books, New York 1976.

Bernath, Gabor and Messing, Vera "As Cutaways, Only in Mute" in *Roma in the Hungarian Media* Office for National and Ethnic Minorities, Budapest 1998.

Bhabha, Homi K. *The Location of Culture* Routledge, London and New York 1994.

Bîrlea, Ovid 'Principiile Cercetorii Folclorice' pp.201-217 in *Revue d'Ethnographie et de Folklore* Vol. 11, Nr.3 1966.

Bjorgo, Tore and Witte, Robert *Racist Violence in Europe* St Martins Press, New York 1993.

Blandiana, Ana "Criza de Incredere" in *Ghicitul în mulţimi* Editură Atlas, Bucharest 2000.

Bochmann, Klaus "Minorităţile în conştiinţa majorităţii: Un caz clasic, Rromii în cultura şi folclorul românesc" pp.75-79 in *Than Romano: Studii despre Rromi* Anul III, Nr.4-5, 1999/2000.

Boia, Aurel "Integrarea ţiganilor din Iant (Nasaud) în comunitatea românească a satului" *Sociologie românească* III, nr. 7-9, 1938.

Boia, Lucian *Mitologia ştiintifica a comunismului* Humanitas, Bucharest 1999.

Boia, Lucian *Pentru o istorie a imaginarului* Humanitas, Bucharest 2000.

Boia, Lucian *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness* Central European University Press, Budapest 2001.

Boia, Lucian *Romania: Borderland of Europe* Reaktion Books, London 2001.

Borneman, John *Subversions of International Order: Studies in the Political Anthropology of Culture* State University of New York Press, New York 1998.

Bourgine, Caroline "L'echappee belle" *French Culture* Bucharest, 6 April 1990.

Boym, Svetlana *Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia* Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London 1994.

Brah, Avtah "The scent of memory: strangers, our own and others" pp. 272-290 in Avtah Brah and Annie E. Coombes (eds) *Hybridity and its Discontents: Politics, Science Culture* Routledge, London and New York 2000.

Bratianu, Gh. I. "Două Veacuri de le Reforma lui Constantin Mavrocordat 1746-1946" in *Anele Academie Romane, Memoriile Secţiunii Istorice XXIX* Editură Academiei Romane, Bucharest 1947.

Bratt Paulston, Christina and Peckham, Donald *Linguistic Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe* Multilingual Matters Ltd, Clevedon, Philadelphia, Toronto, Sydney and Johannesburg 1998.

Brucan, Silviu *The Wasted Generation, Memoirs of the Romanian Journey from Capitalism to Socialism and Back* Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford 1993.

Bucur, Maria *Eugenics and Modernization in Interwar Romania* Pittsburgh University Press, Pittsburgh 2002.

Budai Deleanu, Ion *Ţiganiada* Editură Amarcord, Timisoara, 1999.

Buica, Cristina, Popescu, Marina, Tomescu, Odette "Bucureştiul văzut de bucureşteni: reprezentarii speciale ale spaţiului urban" pp. 111-115 in *Revista de Cercetari Sociale* Vol.3 1995.

Burtea, Vasile *Rromii în Contextul Socio-economic al Dezvoltare României* Doctoral Thesis, Faculty of Sociology, Psychology and Pedagogy, University of Bucharest, Bucharest 1993.

Butler, Judith *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* Routledge, New York 1990.

Butler, Judith *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative* Routledge, New York and London 1997

Buzinschi, C. *Păcală şi Tîndală* Editură Minerva, Bucharest 1973.

Călinescu, Matei and Tismăneanu, Vladimir "The 1989 Revolution and Romania's Future" pp.42-59 in *Problems of Communism* Jan.-April 1991.

Canciovici, Mihai "Preface" pp. v-xlvii in Sabina-Cornelia Stroescu (ed.) *Snoava Populară Românească* Editură Minerva, Bucharest 1975.

Căpiţă, Carol "Romania" *Country Reports on Media* May 9, 2000.

Caputi, Jane *The Age of Sex Crime* The Women's Press, London 1987.

Carothers, Thomas "Romania" in Larry Garber and Eric Bjornlund (eds.) *The New Democratic Frontier: A Country by Country Report on Elections in Central and Eastern Europe* National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Washington D.C. 1992.

Carothers, Thomas *Assessing Democracy Assistance: the case of Romania* Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington 1996.

Castellan, G. *The History of the Romanians* East European Monographs, Boulder 1989.

Cavalcanti, Maria "Public Response to totalitarian ideal settings: the case of the civic center of Bucharest" from *Power by Design*, unpublished paper 1992.

Cavalcanti, Maria *Urban Reconstruction and Autocratic Regimes; a case study of Bucharest* Doctoral Thesis, Oxford Brookes University 1994.

Ceauşescu, Nicolae *The Nation and the Co-inhabiting Nationalities in the Contemporary Epoch*, Meridiane Press, Bucharest 1983.

Ceia, Valy *Narativ şi Descriptiv în Ţiganiada lui Budai-Deleanu* Editură Universităţii de Vest, Timişoara 2002.

Cernat, Paul, Manolescu, Ion, Mitchievici, Angelo and Stanomire, Ioan *Explorări în Comunismul românesc* Polirom Bucharest, 2004.

Cesereanu, Ruxandra *Imaginarul violent al românilor* Humanitas, Bucharest 1993.

Cesereanu, Ruxandra "Fenomenul "Piaţa Universităţii 1990" *Revista 22* Anul XIV Nr.696.

Cesereanu, Ruxandra *Decembrie '89: Deconstrucţia unei revoluţii* Polirom, Bucharest 2004.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh *Provincializing Europe: postcolonial thought and historical difference* Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford 2000.

Chelcea, Ion *Ţiganii din România* Ethnographic Monograph, Bucuresti 1944.

Chelcea, Liviu *Overcoming shortage under socialism: consumers and goods in a Romanian village in the 1980s* Masters dissertation, Department of History, Central European University, June 1998.

Chelcea, Liviu "Grupuri marginale în zone centrale: gentrificare, drepturi de proprietate şi acumulare primitiva postsocialista în Bucuresti" in *Sociologie Românească, Jurnal de Asociaţia Română de Sociologie*, New Series 3-4/2000.

Chelcea, Liviu and Lăţea, Puiu *România profundă in comunism. Dileme identitare, istorie locală şi economie secundară la Săntana* Nemira, Bucharest 2000.

Chelcea, Liviu "Informalization and Structuration in Bucharest's Marketplaces" unpublished paper, 2003.

Chelcea, Liviu, Constantinescu, Livia and Radu, Cosmin "Marketplaces, Morality and Political Practices: The Geography of Shopping in Two Districts of Bucharest" pp.185-221 in *Romanian Journal of Society and Politics* Volume 3 Issue 2, 2003.

Chelcea, Septimiu *Personalitate şi Societate in Tranziţiei: studii de psihologie sociala* Editură Societatea Stiinţa şi Technica, Bucharest 1994 pp.176-296.

Cherata, Lucian *Istoria Ţiganilor: origine, specific, limba* Editură Z, Bucharest 1992.

Chiriac, Marian "De la rrom la om" *Dilema* Nr. 460, January 2 2003.

Chitimia, I. C. "Preface" pp. 1-12 in I.C. Hintescu *Proverbele Românilor* Editură Facla, Timişoara 1985.

Cicanci O. "Aspecte din viața robilor de la Mânâstirea Secul în veacurile XVII-XVIII", 81-90 in *Than Rromano: studii despre Rromii*, 1999/2000 anul III nr 4-5, p.86.

Cioroianu, Adrian "Oltenia, predictibilă" *Dilema* Nr. 532, 13 June 2003.

Ciumăgeanu, Mugur Daniel "Vorbele bune" in *Dilema* Nr. 530, 30 May 2003.

Ciupală, Alin *Femeia în societatea românească a secolulului al XIX-lea* Editură Meridiane, Bucharest 2003.

Codrescu, Andrei *The Hole in the Flag: A Romanian Exile's Story of Return and Revolution* William Morrow and Company, New York 1991.

Coman, Mihai "Romanian Journalism in a transition period 1990-1992" pp.81-98 in Gerd Hallemberger and Michael Krzeminski (eds) *Osten Europa Medienlandschaft in Umbruch* Vistas, Berlin 1994.

Corbu, Constantin *Rascoala Țăranilor de la 1888* Bucharest 1978.

Cosbuc, George *Despre literatură şi limbă* Editură de stat pentru literatură şi artă, Bucharest 1960.

Cosma, Ghizela, Magyari-Vincze, Enikő and Pecican, Ovidiu *Prezinte Feminine: Studii despre femei în România* Editură Fundaţiei Desire, Cluj-Napoca 2002.

Costa, Janeen and Bamossy, Garry (eds) *Marketing in a multicultural world: ethnicity, nationalism and cultural identity* Sage, Thousand Oak 1995.

Crăiuţu, Aurelian "Light at the end of the tunnel: Romania 1989-1998" pp.169-193 in Geoffrey Pridham and Tom Gallagher (eds) *Experimenting with Democracy: Regime Change in the Balkans* Routledge, London and New York 2000.

Crişan, Niculae *Ţigani: Mit şi realitate* Editură Albatros, Bucharest 1999.

Crowe, D. M. *A History of the Gypsies* St Martin's Press, New York 1994.

Curic, Ina and Văetişi, Lorena *Inegalitatea de gen: violenţa invizibilă* Editură Eikon, Cluj-Napoca 2005.

Czaga, Peter *The State Returns to the Land: the Rebirth of Interventionist Agricultural Policies in Hunngary, Poland and Romania* Masters dissertation, International Relations and European Studies Program, Central European University 13 June 1997.

Danta, Derrick "Ceauşescu's Bucharest" pp.170-182 in *Geographic Review* Vol. 83, April 1993.

Deletant, Dennis "Between Tradition and Modernity" pp. 318-332 in Dennis Deletant and Maurice Pearton (eds) *Romanian Observed: Studies in contemporary Romanian History* Encyclopaedic Publishing House, Bucharest 1998.

Demény, L. and Vlăduțiu, I. "Contribuții documentare la începuturile celegerilor creației populare orale Românesti în Transilvania" pp. 627-640 in *Revue d'Ethnographie et de Folklore* Vol. 10 Nr.6, 1965.

Diamant, T. *S`crieri economice* Bucharest 1958.

Dilley, Roy *Contesting Markets: analyzes of ideology, discourse and practice* Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1992.

Dovey, Kim *Framing Places: Mediating power in built form* Routledge, London and New York 1999.

Dragomir, Otila (ed.) *Femei, Cuvinte şi Imagini: Perspective Feministe* Polirom, Bucharest 2002.

Dryzek, John S. and Holmes, Leslie T. (eds) *Post-Communist Democratization: Political Discourses across Thirteen Countries* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002.

Dundes, Alan "Slurs International: Folk Comparisons of Ethnicity and National Character" in Wolfgang Mieder (ed.) *Wise Words: Essays on* the *Proverb* Garland Publishing Inc., New York and London 1994.

Dundes, Alan (ed.) *International Folkloristics: Classic Contributions by the Founders of Folklore* Rowman and Littlefield, Oxford 1999.

European Roma Rights Center *State of Impunity: Human Rights Abuse of Roma in Romania* September 2001, Budapest.

Favell, Adrian and Hansen, Randall "Markets against Politics: migration, EU enlargement and the idea of Europe" pp. 581-602 in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* Vol.28 Issue 4, October 2002.

Foszto, Laszlo "The tyrant, the terrorists and "Disruptive elements": Aliens in the Romanian revolution of December 1989" pp.71-84 in Viorel Anăstăasoaie, Csilla Könczei, Enikő Magyari-Vincze and Ovidiu Pecicanö (eds) *Breaking the Wall: representing anthropology and anthropological representations in post-communist Europe* Efes, Cluj-Napoca 2000.

Freeman, Mark "Review of the 2000 Conference 'Folklore and the Historian'" pp. 218-222 in *Folklore* Vol.112 Issue 2, October 2001.

Fysh, Peter and Wolfreys, Jim *The Politics of Racism in France* Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2003.

Gabanyi, Anneli Ute *The Ceauşescu Cult* Romanian Cultural Foundation Publishing House, Bucharest 2000.

Gal, Susan and Kligman, Gail (eds) *Reproducing Gender* Princeton University Press, New Jersey 2000.

Gallagher, Tom *Romania after Ceauşescu: the politics of Intolerance* Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1995.

Gavrilescu, Marius and Tudor, Adrian *Democraţia la pachet: Elita politica in România postcomunista* Compania, Bucharet 2002.

Gay y Blasco, Paloma *Gypsies in Madrid: Sex, Gender and the Performance of Identity* Berg, Oxford 1999.

Gay y Blasco, Paloma "We Don't Know Our Descent': How Gitanos Manage the Past" pp.631-647 in *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* Vol. 7 Nr. 4 2001.

Gay y Blasco, Paloma "Gypsy/Roma Diasporas: Introducing a Comparative Perspective" pp.173-188 in *Social Anthropology, the Journal of the European Association of Social Anthropologists* Vol. 10 Nr. 2 2002.

Gay y Blasco, Paloma "This is not a place for civilized people' Isolation, enforced education and resistance among Spanish Gypsies" pp.208-221 in Carolyn Strange and Alison Bashford (eds) *Isolation: places and practices of exclusion* Routledge, London and New York 2003.

Gheorghe, Nicolae "Roma-Gypsy Ethnicity in Eastern Europe" pp.829-844 in *Social Research* Vol. 58 Issue 4, Winter 1991.

Ghinea, Cristian "Între noi fie vorba, rromii tot Ţigani sint" in *Dilema* Nr. 246, 19 October 2001.

Ghinea, Cristian "Miniştri care nu au citit programul politic al PSD" *Dilema* Nr. 502, October 2002.

Gilberg, Trond "Political Socialisation in Romania: Prospects and Performance" pp. 142-173 in David Nelson (ed.) *Romania in the 1980s* Westview Press, Colorado 1981.

Gilberg, Trond "Modernization, Human Rights and Nationalism: The Case of Romania" pp.185-211 in George Klein and Milan Reban (eds) *The Politics of Ethnicity in Eastern Europe* Columbia University Press, New York 1981.

Giurescu, Constantin C. *Istoria Bucureştilor* Editură Pentru Literatură, Bucharest 1966.

Giurescu, Constantin *History of Bucharest* trans. Gorjan, S., Publishing House for Sports and Tourism, Bucharest 1976.

Giurescu, Dinu C. *The Razing of Romania's Past* International Preservation Report, World Monuments Fund, The Bath Press, Great Britain 1990.

Giurescu, Vlad *Political Ideas and the Enlightenment in the Romanian Principalities 1750-1831* Columbia University Press, New York 1971.

Goldston, James A. "Roma Rights, Roma Wrongs (Gypsies in Europe)" pp.146 in *Foreign Affairs* March-April Volume 81 Issue 2, 2002.

Gregory, Dick *Nigger* Pocket Books, New York, London, Toronto, Sydney first printed 1964, reprinted 1986.

Grellman, H.M.G. *Die Zigeuner. Ein historischer Versuch uber die Lebensart und Verfassung, Sitten und die Schicksahle dieses Volks in Europa* Gottingen, Dieterich, 1787.

Grigoras, Nicolae. *Istoria Dreptului Romanesc* Bucharest 1980.

Grigore, Delia *Romanipen-ul (Rromani dharma) şi Mistică Familiei: Familia Tradiţională în Communitaţile de Rromi din arealul Românesc* Organizaţia Salvaţi Copii, Bucharest 2001.

Groome, F. H. *Gypsy Folk Tales* Herbert Jenkins, London 1899.

Gross, Peter *Mass Media in Revoltuion and National Development: The Romanian Laboratory* Iowa State University Press, Anies 1996.

Grunberg, Laura "Stories from the time I tried to be a good Foisoreanca" p.16 in *ANAlize: Revista de Studii Feministe* Vol.5 August 1999.

Guha, Ranajit and Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (eds) *Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography* Oxford University Press, New York 1988.

Hall, Richard A "The dynamics of media independence in post Ceauşescu Romania pp.102-123 in Patrick O'Neil *Post-Communism and the Media in Eastern Europe* Frank Cass, London and Portland 1997.

Hall, Stuart "Race, Articulation and Societies Structured in Dominance" pp.305-345 in *Sociological Theories, Race and Colonialism* Unesco, Paris 1980.

Hancock, Ian *The Pariah Syndrome* Ann Arbour Press, Michigan 1988.

Hancock, I. "The Roma: Myth and Reality" in *Patrin Web Journal* 2001. http://www.geocities.com/Paris/5121/mythandreality.htm, last accessed 27-11-2005.

Hancock, I. "Duty and Beauty, Possession and Truth: The Claim of Lexical Impoverishment as Control" *Patrin Web Journal* 2001. http://www.geocities.com/Paris/5121/lexicontrol.htm, last accessed 27-11-2005.

Hanganu, Cristina "Cutting edge: the Romanian press and Roma 1990-94" *Roma Rights* Vol. 4 1999.

Hann, C.M. (ed.) *Socialism: Ideals, Ideologies and Local Practice* Routledge, London 1993.

Hintescu, I.C. *Proverbele Românilor* Editură Facla, Timişoara 1985.

Hitchins, Keith *The Idea of Nation: the Romanians of Transylvania 1691-1849* Editură Stiintifica şi Enciclopedica, Bucharest 1985.

Hitchins, Keith *Rumania 1866-1947* Clarendon Press, Oxford 1994.

Hitchins, Keith *The Romanians 1774-1866* Clarendon Press, Oxford 1996

Hitchins, Keith *A Nation Discovered: Romanian intellectuals in Transylvania and the idea of Nation 1700-1848* Romanian Encyclopaedic Publishing House, Bucharest 1999.

Hoban, M. (ed.) *Calatorii Straini despre Ţarile Romane* Editură Stiintifica, Bucharest 1968.

Hobsbawm, E.J. *The Age of Revolution 1789-1848* Mentor, New York 1964.

Hughes, James, Grewndolyn, Sasse and Gordon, Claire "Saying 'Maybe' to the 'Return to Europe': Elites and the Political Space for Euroskepticism in Central and Eastern Europe." *European Union Politics* Vol.3, 2000.

Human Rights Watch International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission Report 1998 *Public Scandals: Sexual Orientation and Criminal Law in Romania*, Arta Grafica, New York and London, 1998.

Human Rights Watch Report *Since the Revolution: Human Rights in Romania* New York, March 1991.

Human Rights Watch Report *Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Persecution of Gypsies in Romania* New York, September 1991.

Humphrey, Caroline and Hugh-Jones, Stephen *Barter, Exchange and Value; an anthropological approach* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York and Melbourne 1992.

Humphrey, Caroline "Traders, "Disorder" and Citizenship Regimes in Provincial Russia" in Michael Burawoy and Katherine Verdery (eds) *Uncertain Transition* Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham 1999.

Ibram, Monica "Romania in the television era or the prison of the fading reality" pp.284-295 in Mihaela Czobor-Lupp and Stefan J. Lupp (eds) *Moral, legal and political values in Romanian culture* The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Bucharest 1998.

Ioan, Augustin *Power, Play and National Identity: Politics of Modernization in Central and Eastern European Architecture, the Romanian File* Romanian Cultural Foundation Publishing House, Bucharest 1999.

Ioan, Augustin "The monumental slums: or how one can dwell in an inferno and feel good about it too" pp.1-8 in *Martor* Bucharest 2000.

Ioan, Augustin *Arhitectura şi Puterea* Agerfilm SRL, Bucharest 2001.

Ionescu, Vasile (ed.) *O Mie de ani de Singuratate, Rromii în proza Românească* Editură Centrului Rromilor pentru Politici Publice "Aven Amentza," Bucharest 2000.

Ionescu, Vasile and Gheorghe, Nicolae *Roma and the Media* Roma Center for Social Intervention and Studies (Romani CRISS), Bucharest 2000.

Ioanid, Radu "The Sacralised Politics of the Romanian Iron Guard" pp.419-453 in *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* Vol. 5, No. 3, Winter 2004.

Iordache, Romanita and Tabacu, Andreea "Not Yet Viable: Anti-Discrimination Action in Romania" notebook section (unpaged) in *Roma Rights* Nr.1-2, 2003.

Iorga, Nicolae. *A History of Romania* translated edition by McCabe, J. T. Fisher Unwin Ltd, London 1925.

Iorga, N. *Anciens documents de droit Roumain* Datina Românească, Paris and Bucharest 1930.

Jaszi, O. *The Dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarch* Univeristy of Chicago Press, Chicago 1929.

Jordan, Peter "Romania" pp.184-223 in Christina Bratt Paulston and Donald Peckham *Linguistic Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe* Multilingual Matters Ltd, Clevedon, Philadelphia, Toronto, Sydney and Johannesburg 1998.

Kalambayi, Fidelie Ndomba *"Mulatto" Young Women Living in Bucharest: their lives and self perceptions* Masters dissertation, Department of Gender Studies, Central European University June 2002.

Kaneff, Deema "The Shame and Pride of Market Activity: Morality, Identity and Trading in Postsocialist Rural Bulgaria" pp.33-51 in Ruth Mandel and Caroline Humphrey *Markets and Moralities* Berg, Oxford and New York 2002.

Keene, Judith *Fighting For Franco: International Volunteers in Nationalist Spain during the Spanish Civil War, 1936-39* Leicester University Press, London and New York 2001.

Kideckel, David A. *The Solitude of Collectivism: Romanian Villagers to the Revolution and Beyond* Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 1993.

Kideckel, David A. " Autoethnography as Political Resistance: A Case from Socialist Romania" in Deborah Reed-Danahay *Auto/Ethnography: Rewriting the self and the social* Berg, Oxford 1997.

Kligman, Gail *The Politics of Duplicity: Controlling Reproduction in Ceauşescu's Romania* University of California Press, Los Angeles and London 1998.

Klimova-Alexander, Ilona *The Romani Voice in World Politics: The United Nations and Non-State Actors* Ashgate, Aldershot 2005.

Kogalniceanu, Mihail *Esquise sur l'histoire, les moeurs et la langue des cigains, connus en France sous le nom de Bohémiens* Berlin, Librarie de B. Behr, Oberwaldstrasse 1837.

Kogalniceanu, Mihail "Speech on the occasion of the meetings of the Wallachian and Moldovan Ad-hoc Assemblies, October 7, 1857" in Nicolae Iorga *A History of Romania* edition translated by J.T.McCabe, Fisher Unwin Ltd, London 1925.

Kogalniceanu, Mihail "Dezrobirea Ţiganilor" p.1, supplement to *Propăşirea* Nr 5, 1844.

Kogalniceanu, Mihail "Dezrobirea ţiganilor, ştergerea privilegiilor boiereşti, emanciparea ţăranilor" a speech given at the Romanian Academy, April 1, 1891 and reprinted in *Scrieri Literare* Editură 100+1, Bucharest 2000.

Konstantinov, Yulian "Hunting for gaps through boundaries: Gypsy tactics for economic survival in the context of the second phase of post-totalitarian changes in Bulgaria" pp.237-251 in *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Sciences* Vol.7 Issue 3 1994.

Konstantinov, Yulian, Kressel, Gideon M. and Thuen, Trond "Outclassed by former outcasts: petty trading in Varna" pp.729-745 in *American Ethnologist* Vol.25 Issue 4 1998.

Kreja, Karina "Architecture and Urbanisation in the Real Socialism Times in Romania" in CST Transylvania http:///www.rrz.uni-hamburg.de/AEGEE/CST-TRANS/e_karina.html, last accessed 6-12-1998.

Krylova, Anna "Saying 'Lenin' and meaning 'party'; subversion and laughter in Soviet and post-soviet society" pp. 243-265 in Adele Marie Barker (ed.) *Consuming Russia: Popular culture, sex and society since Gorbachev*, Duke University Press, Durham and London 1999.

Leach, Neil (ed.) *Architecture and Revolution* Routledge, London and New York 1999.

Leahu, Gheorghe *Bucureştiul Disparut* Editură Arta Grafica, Bucharest 1994.

Ledeneva, Alena V. *Russia's Economy of Favours: Blat, networking and informal exchange* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York and Melbourne 1998.

Lemon, Alaina "Talking Transit and Spectating Transition: The Moscow Metro" pp. 14-39 in D. Berdahl, M. Bunzl, M. Lampland (eds) *Altering States: Ethnographies of Transition in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union* University of Michigan Press, Michigan 2000.

Lemon, Alaina *Between Two Fires: Gypsy performance and Romani memory from Pushkin to postsocialism* Duke University Press, Durham and London 2000.

Levițchi, Leon *Dicționar Român-Englez* Editură 100+1, Bucharest 2000.

Levy, Robert *Ana Pauker: The Rise and Fall of a Jewish Communist* University of California Press, Los Angeles and London 2001.

Lindstrom, Nicole *From Permissive Consensus to Contentious Politics: Varieties of Euroskepticism in Croatia and Slovenia* Presented to the Cornell Mellon-Sawyer Seminar, "Towards a Transnational and Transcultural Europe" 9 April 2002.

Livezeanu, Irina *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building and Ethnic Struggle 1918-1930* Cornell University Press, London 1995.

Lobont, F. and Stone, D. "Antisemitism in Post-Communist Romania" *Jewish Quarterly* Winter 2001-2.

Loomba, Ania *Colonialism/Postcolonialism* Routledge, London and New York 1998.

Magyari-Vincze, Enikő (ed) *Femei şi Bărbaţi în Clujul Multietnic Volume 1-3* Editură Fundaţiei Desire, Cluj-Napoca 2001.

Magyari-Vincze, Enikő *Diferenţa care conteaza: Diversitatea social-culturală prin lentila antropologiei feministe* Editură Fundaţiei Desire, Cluj-Napoca 2002.

Manolescu, Andrei "Libertate şi reguli în Obor" *Dilema* Nr. 226, May 2001.

Mezey, B., Pomogyi, L., Tauber J., *A magyarországi cigánykerdes dokumentumokban 1422-1985* Budapest 1986.

Mbembe, Achille *On the Postcolony* University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London 2001.

Michelson, Paul E. *Conflict and Crisis: Romanian Political Development 1861-1871* Garland Publishing Inc., New York and London 1987.

Mieder, Wolfgang "A Proverb is a Short Sentence of Wisdom: Popular Views of the Proverb" pp. 18-40 in Wolfgang Mieder (ed.) *Proverbs are never out of Season: Popular Wisdom in the Modern Age* Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford 1993.

Mihăilescu, Ioan "Mental Stereotypes in the First years of Post-Totalitarian Romania" in *Government and Opposition* Vol.28 Issue 3 Summer 1993.

Mihăilescu, Stefania *Din Istoria Feminismului Românesc: Antologie de texte (1838-1929)* Polirom, Bucharest 2002.

Mihăilescu, Vintila "Suc alb, suc negru" *Dilema* Nr. 534 June 2003.

Milikowski, Marisca "Exploring a Model of De-Ethnicization: The Case of Turkish Television in the Netherlands" pp.443-468 in *The European Journal of Communication* Vol. 15, No. 4, 2000.

Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights *Lifting the Last Curtain: A Report on Domestic Violence in Romania* Minneapolis 1995.

Mircea, I.R. "Termenii rob, serb şi holop in documentele slave şi romane" in *Studii şi cercetari stiintifice* Iaşi 1950.

Miroiu, Mihaela *Gen şi Societate* Alternative, Bucharest 1997.

Miroiu, Mihaela *Societatea Retro* Editură Trei, Bucharest 1999.

Mitrany, David *The Land and the Peasant in Romania: the war and agrarian reform 1917-1921* originally Gale University Press, 1930, reprinted by Greenwood Press, New York 1968.

Mitu, Sorin *National Identity of Romanians in Transylvania* trans. Sorana Corneanu, Central European University Press, Budapest and New York 2001.

Mudure, Mihaela "From the Gypsies to the African Americans" pp. 58-73 in *Journal for the study of Religions and ideologies* No.4 /Spring 2003.

Mugur, Daniel "Vorbele bune" in *Dilema* Nr. 530, May 2003.

Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina *Politica după Comunism* Humanitas, Bucharest 2002.

Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina and Mândruță, Denisa "Ready for Europe? Deconstructing National Identity, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in post-communist Europe" pp.135-159 in Alexandru Zub and Adrian Cioflâncă (eds) *Globalism şi Dileme Identitare: perspective româneşti* Editură Universității "Alexandru Ioan Cuza," Iaşi 2002.

Neculaescu, Sorina "Corpul Femeii – Trofeu al Dominației Masculine" pp.15-16 in *ANAlize* September 2000.

Neculau, Adrian (ed) *Viața Cotidiană în Comunism* Polirom, Bucharest 2004.

Negreanu, C. "Preface" pp.13-28 in I.C. Hintescu *Proverbele Românilor*, Editură Facla, Timişoara 1985.

Negruzzi, Costache "Pentru ce Țiganii nu sint români" pp.74-84 in Vasile Ionescu (ed.) *O Mie de ani de Singuratate, Rromii in proza Românească* Editură Centrului Rromilor pentru Politici Publice "Aven Amentza," Bucharest 2000.

Nelson, Daniel Romania in the 1980s Westview Press, Colorado 1981.

Nelson, Daniel *Romanian Politics in the Ceauşescu Era* Gorson and Breach Science Publishers, London and New York 1988.

Nestor, Ratesh *Romania: The Entangled Revolution* Praeger Press, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, New York and London 1991.

Neumann, Victor *Between Words and Reality: studies on the politics of recognition and the changes of regime in contemporary Romania* The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy Series IVA, Vol.15 Washington 2000.

Nicolau, Irina *Graffiti (December 1989-January 1990)* published by the Muzeul Ţaranului Roman, Bucharest 1999.

Nixon, Paul *Sociality - Music- Dance: Human figurations in a Transylvanian valley* Goteburg University Press, Goteburg 1998.

Oişteanu, Andrei *Imaginea evreului în cultura română* Humanitas, Bucharest 2001.

O'Neil, Patrick *Post-Communism and the Media in Eastern Europe* Frank Cass, London and Portland 1997.

Open Society Institute, European Union Accession Monitoring Program *Protecţia Minorităţilor în România*, Central European University Press, Budapest and New York 2001.

Oushakine, Sergei Alexei "The Quantity of Style: Imaginary Consumption in the Post-Soviet Russia" pp.97-120 in *Theory, Culture and Society* Vol.17 Nr 5, 2000.

Papcostea, Serban "Captive Clio: Romanian Historiography under Communist Rule" pp.181-206 in *European History Quarterly* Vol. 26, 1996.

Panaitescu, P.P. *Emigrația Polonă și Revoluția Română dela 1848* unmarked publisher, Bucharest 1929.

Panu, G. *Amintiri de la "Junimea Vol.1" din Iași* Editură Remus Cioflec, Bucharest 1942.

Patterson, Orlando *Slavery and social death: a comparative study* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London 1982.

Pârvan, Vasile *Getica: O Protoistorie a Daciei* Cultura Națională, Bucharest 1926.

Petcu, Constantin "Totalitarian City: Bucharest 1980-9, semio-clinical files" Chapter 13 in Neil Leach (ed.) *Architecture and Revolution* Routledge, London and New York 1999.

Pirvanescu, I.D. *Reflecții, colectia cogito de Mihail Kogalniceanu* Editură Albatros, Bucharest 1988.

Platon, Gheorghe *Geneza revoluţiei române de la 1848* Ed. Universităţii "Al. I. Cuza," Iaşi 1985.

Pleşu, Andrei "Unitatea europeana trebuie reinventata" *Revista 22* Nr. 197, 13 May 2002.

Pleşu, Andrei, Roman, Petre and Ştefoi, Elena *Transformari, inertii, dezordini: 22 de luni dupa 22 decembrie 1989* Editură Polirom, Iaşi 2002.

Pogany, Istvan *The Roma Cafe: Human Rights and the Plight of the Romani People* Pluto Press, London and Virginia 2004.

Pons, Emmanuelle *Ţiganii din Romania: o minoritate în tranziţie* Compania Altfel, Bucharest 1995.

Pop, I.A. *Romanians and Romania: A Brief History* trans. Dumitrescu, A. and Nan, I., East European Monographs, Boulder 1999.

Popa, Cosmin "Political Parties in Romania, 2000-2004: Between Tradition and Reform" pp.79-113 in Georgi Karasimeonov (ed.) *Political Parties and the Consolidation of Democracy in South Eastern Europe* Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Institute for Political and Legal Studies, Sofia 2004.

Popa, Dragos "Romani – Romania – Romanian: The Roma: A Challenge to the EU enlargement" unpublished paper presented at the "Bigger and better? The European Union, Enlargement and Reform" conference in Toronto, 31 May 2002.

Popescu, Petru *The Return* Grove Press, New York 1997.

Potra, G. *Contibuțiuni la Istoricul Țiganilor din România* first published 1939, republished by Cartea Veche, Bucharest 2001.

Project for Ethnic Relations *Romanian-American Symposium on Inter-Ethnic Relations* June 17-18, 1991.

Project on Ethnic Relations *Countering Anti-Romani Violence in Eastern Europe: The Snagov Conference and Related Efforts* Warsaw, September 1994.

Project on Ethnic Relations, 1997 *Images and Issues: Coverage of the Roma in the Mass Media in Romania* conference, June 27-28, 1997.

Project on Ethnic Relations report of the conference *Roma and the Law: Demythologizing the 'Gypsy Criminality' Stereotype* Paris, France October 7-8, 1999 Report printed in 2000.

Rabinow, Paul (ed.) *The Foucault Reader* Penguin, London 1991.

Radu-Bucurenci, Simina *Queuing in Narratives about the 1980s in Romania* Masters Dissertation, Department of History, Central European University 2004.

Radu, M. T. *1821: Tudor Vladimirescu şi revoluţia din Ţara Românească* Craiova 1978.

Radulescu, Sorin "Logica ambivalentei şi 'efectele perverse' al ideologie totalitare în epoca dictaturii" pp. 49-54 in *Sociologie Românească* Bucharest 1990.

Radulescu, Speranta *Taifasuri despre muzica ţiganeasca / Chats about gypsy music* Paideia, Bucharest 2004.

Radulescu-Motru, Constantin "Ţaranismul; un suflet şi o politică" Bucharest 1924 in Ioan Stanomir and Laurentiu Vlad *A fi conservator: antologie, comentarii şi bibliografie de. Universitatea din Bucureşti* Institutul de cercetari politice, Editură Meridiane, Bucharest 2002.

Radutiu, A. "Populaţia Transilvaniei in anul 1773 a lui Iosif al II lea" pp. 76-77 in S. Manuila (ed.) *Studii de Demografie. Studii Privind Societatea Românească între secolele XVI-XX* Cluj-Napoca 1995.

Ram, Melanie H. "Minority Relations in Multiethnic societies: Asssessing the European Union Factor in Romania" pp. 63-90 in *Romanian Journal of Society and Politics* Vol. 1 Nr. 2, 2001.

Reemstma, Katrin "Between Freedom and Persecution: Roma in Romania" in Tore Bjorgo and Robert Witte *Racist Violence in Europe* St Martins Press, New York 1993.

Regnault, Elias *Histoire politique et sociale des Principautés Danubiennes* Paris 1855.

Ries, Nancy *Culture and Conversation during Perestroika* Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 1997.

Roman, Denise *Fragmented Identities: Popular Culture, Sex, and Everyday Life in Postcommunist Romania* Lexington Books, New York and Oxford 2003.

Ronack, Abraham *A Dictionary of International Slurs* Sci-art Publishers, Massachusetts 1979.

Rose, Lindsey "From atrocity to data: historiographies of rape in Former Yugoslavia and the gendering of genocide" pp.59-79 in *Patterns of Prejudice* Vol. 36 Issue 4, 2002.

Rosen, Rabbi Moses *Dangers, Tests and Miracles: The remarkable life story of Chief Rabbi Rosen of Romania as told to Joseph Finklestone* London 1990.

Rosetti, Radu "Amintiri. Ce-am auzit de la altii" pp. 5-10 in Vasile Ionescu (ed.) *O Mie de ani de Singuratate, Rromii in proza Românească* Editură Centrului Rromilor pentru Politici Publice "Aven Amentza," Bucharest 2000.

Rothschild, Joseph *East Central Europe between the Two World Wars* University of Washington Press, Seattle & London 1974.

Rotman, Liviu "Romanian Jewry: The First Decade after the Holocaust" pp. 287-8 in Randolph L. Braham (ed.) *The Tragedy of Romanian Jewry* Columbia University Press, New York 1994.

Ruxandru, Pavel *Proverb şi Context* Doctoral thesis, University of Bucharest, Faculty of Letters 1996.

Salecl, Renata *The Spoils of Freedom: Psychoanalysis and feminism after the fall of socialism* Routledge, London 1994.

Salecl, Renata "Where is the center?" 3 June 2000 p.2 online article www.westfaelischer-kunstverein.de/archiv/2000/ausstellungen/whereis/vortraege/

salecl.pdf, last accessed 13-7-2004.

Salecl, Renata *(Per)versions of Love and Hate* Verso, London and New York 1998.

Salman, Michael *The Embarrassment of Slavery: controversies over Bondage and Nationalism in the American Colonial Philippines* University of California Press, Los Angeles and London 2001.

Sampson, Steven "Towards an Anthropology of Collaboration in Eastern Europe" pp. 107-118 in *Culture and History* Vol. 8, 1991.

Sampson, Steven "'May you live only by your salary!' The unplanned economy of Eastern Europe" pp. 120-145 in *Crime and Social Justice* Volume 13.

Schwartz, Herman *The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe* University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 2000.

Schwicker, I.H. *Die Zigeuner in Ungarn und Siebenburgen* Wien & Taschen, Vienna 1883.

Seghiuța, Stela "Violența domestică – în lume şi în România" in *Dilema* Nr. 530, 30 May 2003.

Seton-Watson, H. *History of the Romanians* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1934.

Shafir, Michael *Romania: Politics, Economics, Society* Frances Pinter Publishers, London 1985.

Shafir, Michael "The Inheritors: the Romanian Radical Right Since 1989" in *East European Jewish Affairs* Vol.24 Issue 1, 1994.

Shafir, Michael "Jews and Antisemites in Romania since the Death of Rabbi Rosen" in *East European Jewish Affairs* Vol.24 Issue 2, 1994.

Sik, Endre and Wallace, Claire "The Development of Open-air Markets in East-Central Europe" *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* Vol.23, 1999.

Simecka, Milan *The Restoration of Order* Verso, London 1984.

Southwold-Llewellyn, Sarah "The Creation of an Outsider's Myth: The Mudalali of Sri Lanka" pp.175-197 in Hans-Dieter Evers and Heiko Schrader *The moral economy of trade: ethnicity and developing markets* Routledge, London and New York 1994.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty "Can the subaltern speak?" pp.271-313 in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds) *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* Macmillan, Basingstoke 1988.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present* Harvard University Press, Massachusetts and London 1999.

Spurr, David *The Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing and Imperial Administration* Duke University Press, Durham and London 1993.

Stan, Lavinia "Comparing Post-Communist Governance: A Case Study" pp.77-109 in *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* Frank Case, London Vol. 18, No.3 September 2002.

Stancu, Zaharia *Satra* Trans. Roy Macgregor-Hastie, Abelard-Schuman, London and New York 1973.

Stanescu, André "Sclavia Rromilor in Tarile Roman" *Istoria şi Cultura Minorităţii Rroma* December 2004 http://rroma.3x.ro/sclavia-rromilor.html, last accessed 21-11-2005.

Stanomir, Ioan and Vlad, Laurentiu *A fi conservator: antologie, comentarii şi bibliografie* University of Bucharest Institute of Political Research, Editură Meridiane, Bucharest 2002.

Stewart, Michael "Gypsies, the work ethic and Hungarian Socialism" pp.187-203 in C.M. Hann (ed.) *Socialism: Ideals, Ideologies and Local Practice* Routledge, London 1993.

Stroescu, Sabina-Cornelia (ed.) *Snoava Populară Românească* Editură Minerva, Bucharest 1975.

Sturdza, Mihai "The Miners' Crackdown on the Opposition: A Review of the Evidence" *Report on Eastern Europe* January 11, 1991.

Tanaka, Jenifer "Rroma in Romania Struggle for Self-identification" *Patrin Web Journal*. http://www.geocities.com/Paris/5121/rroma.htm, last accessed 21-11-2005.

Tanase, Stelian *Miracolul revoluţiei* Humanitas, Bucharest 1999.

Tebbutt, Susan "Disproportional Representation: Romanies and European Art" pp.159-177 in Susan Tebbutt and Nicholas Saul *The Role of the Romanies: Images and Counter-Images of 'Gypsies'/Romanies in European Culture* Liverpool University Press, Liverpool 2004.

Tebbutt, Susan and Saul, Nicholas *The Role of the Romanies: Images and Counter-Images of 'Gypsies'/Romanies in European Culture* Liverpool University Press, Liverpool 2004.

Thuen, Trond "The Significance of Borders in the East European Transition" pp.738-757 in *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* Vol.23, 1999.

Tismăneanu, Vladimir "Understanding national Stalinism: reflections on Ceauşescu's socialism" pp.155-173 in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* Vol.32, 1999.

Tismăneanu, Vladimir *Încet, spre Europă* Polirom, Bucharest 2000.

Tismăneanu, Vladimir and Gail Kligman "Romania's First Postcommunist Decade: From Iliescu to Iliescu" *East European Constitutional Review* Vol.10 No. 1 Winter 2001.

Tismăneanu, Vladimir *Stalinism for all Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism* University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London 2003.

Tohăneanu, G.I. *Neajungerea limbii: Comentarii la Ţiganiada de Budai-Deleanu* Editură Universităţii de Vest, Timişoara 2001.

Tokes, Laszlo *The Fall of Tyrants: The Incredible Story of One Pastor's Witness, the People of Romania, and the Overthrow of Ceauşescu* Crossway Books, Wheaton, Illinois 1991.

Treptow, Kurt (ed.) *Romania and Western Civilization* The Center for Romanian Studies, Iaşi 1996.

Treptow, K. *A History of Romania* Center for Romanian Studies, Iaşi 1996.

Turpin, Jennifer *Reinventing the Soviet Self: media and social change in the former Soviet Union* Praeger press, Connecticut and London 1995.

Urban, Jan "Nationalism as a Totalitarian Ideology" pp. 775-779 in *Social Research* Vol.58 Issue 4 Winter 1991.

Văetişi, Lorena *Discursuri identitare şi intersectoralitate: O analiză privind identitatea de gen şi identitatea etnică în cazul femeilor rrome* Masters thesis for Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca 2004.

Vasecka, Imrich and Vasecka, Michal "Recent Romani Migration from Slovakia to EU Member States: Romani Reaction to Discrimination or Romani Ethno-Tourism?" in *Nationalities Papers* Vol. 31, No. 1, 2003.

Vasilescu, Mircea "Nu este importantă viteza cu care are loc acest proces, ci calitatea lui" an interview with Jonathan Scheele in *Dilema* Nr.531, 6 June 2003.

Verdery, Katherine *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu's Romania* University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles and Oxford 1991.

Verdery, Katherine and Kligman, Gail "Romania after Ceauşescu: Post-Communist Communism?" in Ivo Banac (ed.) *Eastern Europe in Revolution* Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 1992.

Verdery, Katherine "Ethnic Relations, Economies of Shortage and the Transition in Eastern Europe" in C.M. Hann (ed.) *Socialism: Ideals, Ideologies and Local Practice* Routledge, London 1993.

Verdery, Katherine. *What was socialism and what comes next?* Princeton University Press, Princeton 1996.

Verdery, Katherine *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies* Columbia University Press, New York 1999.

Verdery, Katherine *The Vanishing Hectare: property and value in postsocialist Transylvania* Cornell University Press, New York 2003.

Volovici, Leon *Nationalist Ideology and Antisemitism: The Case of Romanian Intellectuals in the 1930s* The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Oxford, Seoul, New York, Tokyo 1991.

Volovici, Leon "Mit şi Realitate" Louis Ulrich (trans.) pp.4-8 in *Sfera Politicii* Vol.32 1995.

von Reinsburg-Düringsfeld, Baron Otto *Internationale Titulaturen* Hermann Fries, Liepzig 1863.

Vrabie, Gheorghe *Conceptul de Folklor la Români* Unknown publisher, Craiova, 1947.

Wagner, Richard *Exit* Verso Press, London and New York 1990.

Wallace, Claire (in association with Oksana Shmulyar and Vasil Bedzir) "Investing in Social Capital: The Case of Small-Scale, Cross-Border Traders in Post-Communist Central Europe" pp.751-771 in *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* Vol.23, 1999.

Weber, Eugen "The Men of the Archangel" in George L. Mosse (ed.) *International Fascism: New Thoughts and New Approaches* SAGE Publications, London & Beverly Hills 1979.

Wilkinson, William *An Account of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia* London 1820.

Willems, W. et al. (ed.) *Gypsies and Other Itinerant Groups: A Sociohistorical Approach* Macmillan Press, London 1998.

Wingfield, Nancy (ed.) *Creating the Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe* Berghahn, New York 2003.

Woodcock, Shannon "Become black and you will be free! Romani women's laughter and dance in protests against the *gadje* Ţigan Other" presented at the Conference entitled *Roma and Sinti in Europe: ambivalence and atrocity* European Studies Society, University of Sydney, 22 May 2003.

Yellin, Fagan "Introduction" pp.vii-xxvii Harriet Beecher Stowe *Uncle Tom's Cabin* Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York 1998.

Zamfir, Elena and Zamfir, Catalin *Ţiganii: între ignorare şi îngrijorare* Editură Alternativ, Bucharest 1993.

Zanne, Luliu A *Proverbele Românilor Vol. 1-7* Editură Librariei Socecu şi Companie, Bucharest 1895.

Zizek, Slavoj *Tarrying with the Negative* Duke University Press, Duram 1993.

Zoon, Ina *La Periferia societății: Rromii şi serviciile publice în România* Open Society Institute, Cluj Napoca 2001.

Zub, Alexandru *Oglinzi Retrovizoare: Istorie, memorie şi morală în România (in dialog cu Sorin Antohi)* Editură Polirom, Iaşi 2002.

Zub, Alexander şi Cioflâncă, Adrian (eds) *Globalism şi Dileme Identitare: perspective româneşti* Editură Universității "Alexandru Ioan Cuza," Iaşi 2002.

Zunther, P. "L'Epiphoneme Proverbial" in *Revue des Sciences Humaines* Nr. 3, 1976.

Newspaper Articles

When the author is only initials, listed first initial.

Articles without authors listed as "Unsigned."

Alexandru, Petra "Prefectul de Timiş se luptă cu mafia legumelor" *Ziua de Vest* 17 August 2004.

A.G. "1.2 million ţigani?" in *România Liberă* 11 July 2002

Almăşan, Marina "With a wheelbarrow through Bucharest" *Patima Albă*, Anul 1 Nr. 14 11-17 August 1990.

Badin, Andrei "81 de Ţiganii vor fi expulzati din Franţa" *România Liberă* 13 February 2003.

Bechir, Mariana "The confiscated houses – the eternal failure of the Romanian state" *Evenimentul Zilei* 12 November 1998.

Belu, Mihai "Harta lumii interlope din România" *Cotidianul* 26 June 2001.

Boţa, Dragos "Ţiganiii au reocupat în forţă palatul cu turnuleţe, din Timişoara: sfinând autorităţile" *Adevărul* 16 October 2001.

Boţa, Dragos "Mascaţii" I-au scos pe cei care sa baricadaseră în palatul cu turnuleţe" *Adevărul* 17 October 2001.

Bran, Mirel "Les Tsiganes Handicapes, de la Roumanie a l'Europe des riches" *Le Monde* 12 July 2002.

Bran, Mirel "Une communaute fracture e dans un pays mal en point" *Le Monde* 13 July 2002.

Bucurescu, Adrian "Sondaj de opinie: ce parere aveți despre minoritățile nationale din România" *România Liberă* 1 November 2002.

Burlac, Dan "Ghetoul Țiganiilor români, "ras" de poliția franceza" *Evenimentul Zilei* 4 December 2002.

C.D. "Adrian Nastatse gloseaza pe tema Țiganii" *Adevărul* 15 October 2001.

Cercelescu, Adrian "Palate de milioane de dolari, goale pe dinăuntru" *Adevărul* 17 October 2001.

Chifu, Viorel "Hai, da țigane ceva şi lu' asta micu'!" *Gardianul* 2 October 2002.

Chirieac, Bogdan "Cerşetorii despart Parisul de Bucureşti?" *Adevărul* 1 October 2002.

Cimpoeru, Livia ""The Guardian" din nou despre Români: Ghetoul țigănesc de la Piatra Neamț comparat cu lagărele de exterminare" *Evenimentul Zilei* 5 November 2001.

Ciufu, Eugen "Pasapoarte trimise din vest pentru a fi falsificate în scopul unor noi migrari: Țiganii expulzati din europa se reorganizeaza" *Curentul* 16 October 2002.

Ciufu, Eugen "Doar trei tari au ramas "neatacate"; suedia, danemarca şi norvegia' *Curentul* 17 October 2002.

Comşa-Durbacă, Alina "Țigăncile din Iveşti învață alfabetul ca să-şi conducă decapotabilele" *Evenimentul Zilei* 7 November 2001.

Dănăila, Aida "Dacă Piața de Gros Bucureşti s-a mai revigorat, în centerle de colectare bate vântul" *România Liberă* 18 Noiembrie 2003.

Dobrater, Lucian "Rromul tot țigan ramine" *Evenimentul Zilei* 12 August 2002.

E.N 'Țiganii uşuiți din Franța" *Evenimentul Zilei* 5 December 2002

Epure, Lia Lucia "Rromânia" *Ziua de Vest* 16 November 2002.

Epure, Lia Lucia "Tevez baftalo!" *Ziua de Vest* 27 November 2002.

Ferreira, Henrique Antunes from *Diario de Noticias* interview with the President of Romania, Ion Iliescu 22 February 1996, reprinted as "Minorițeii – au dreptate?" in *Dimineața* 24 February 1996, Nr. 203, p.13 online version www.kappa.ro/news/palco/pco-203.html, last accessed 18-2-2003.

Georgescu, Teodora "Prioritate guvernamentală în 2002: Năstase bagă rromi în poliție" *Evenimentul Zilei* 20 December 2001.

Mateescu, Valentin "Invenții guvernamentale de încurajare a mafiei piețelor Controlul certificatelor de producator la sursă a fost uitat de Blănculescu" *România Liberă* 22 Octombrie 2004.

Medoia, Ion "Demolarea palatelor țiganeşti, cu țipete, lacrimi şi... 'mascați'" *România Liberă* 17 October 2001.

Mihai, Oana "Ieri a inceput evacuarea unei tabere de Țiganii români din Franța" *Ultima Ora* 4 December 2002.

Militaru, Nicolae "Pentru infracțiuni comise în lumea larga" *Adevărul* 23 December 2002.

Patrasconiu, Cristian "Alianta "DA", împotriva violenţei în familie" *Ziua de Vest* 11 Novermber 2003.

Petrescu, Maria "Pericol de balcanizare şi îmbolnăvire" *Ziua de Vest* 9 September 2002.

Petrovici, Geogreta "Palat ţigănesc demolat de Primăria Timişoarei" *Evenimentul Zilei* 12 October 2001.

Popa, Razvan "Satra 'metalurgistilor' din Sinteşti nu s-a închisit de ordonanta lui Nastase: Ţiganii au gasit noi mijloace pentru a trafica metale feroase şi neferoase" *Adevărul* 17 December 2002.

Popiliu, Cosma "La sapa, manca-ti-as" *Cronică Română* 29 August 2003.

Popovici, Petru "Dupa modelul Piatra Neamţ: cartier pentru Ţiganii şi la Deva" and "Şi romii din Baia Mare vor fi mutati" *Adevărul* 13 October 2001.

Pruteanu, Gheorghe "Dictionarul 'Petit Robert 2002" prezinta Romania printr-o poza cu satra de ţiganii" *Le Monde* 9 February 2003.

S.T. "Benladen, născut din părinţi rromi" *Evenimentul Zilei* 5 November 2001.

Vasile, Dan "Franța a mai expulzat 22 de Țiganii români" *Gardianul* 5 December 2002.

Unsigned "Foae pentru minte, inimă şi literatură" *Gazeta de Transilvania* 7 May 1838.

Unsigned *Patima Albă* Anul Nr. 9 July 7-12 1990.

Unsigned 'The jihad of the Văcăroiu and Vîntu Mafias' *Evenimentul Zilei* 12 October 2001.

Unsigned "Țiganii, o problema doar in Estul Europei: Experimentul "Speranța" " *Cotidianul* 19 October 2001.

Unsigned "Une Nation Dispersé" *Le Monde* 5 June 2002.

Unsigned "Problema țiganilor nu este doar a României, ci a intregii Europe" *România Liberă* 10 September 2002.

Unsigned "Des Roumains expulsés de Paris" *Le Figaro* 16 October, 2002.

Unsigned "800 de Țiganii români, trimis acasa din franța" *Libertatea* 17 October 2002.

Unsigned "România ca o satra de Ţiganii?" *Evenimentul Zile* 18 October 2002.

Unsigned "Escala speciala pentru Ţiganii trimisi din Franţa" *Curierul National* 4 December 2002.

Unsigned "Circuitul rromilor in Europa" *Cotidianul* 4 December 2002.

Unsigned "22 de Ţiganii au fost expulzaţi din Franţa" *Azi*, *Currentul* 5 December 2002.

Unsigned "Interview with Phillip Etienne, French diplomat in Bucharest" *Adevărul* 14 December
2002.

Unsigned "Se-ntoarce acasa diaspora interlopa" *Jurnalul National*, 17 December 2002.

Unsigned "Ţiganii român urmarit de carabinieri cu elicopterul" *Evenimentul Zilei* 17 January 2003.

Unsigned "Disputa dintre Gheorghe Pruteanu şi dicţionarul Le Robert" *AM Press* 13 February 2003.

Unsigned "Ţiganii nu se repatriaza nici daca primesc bani" *Libertatea* 22 January 2003.

Unsigned "Ţiganii au monopolizat pieţele agroalimentare din Baia Mare" *Cronica Romana* as cited in Inforom 20-08-2003, Anul 3 Nr. 606.

Unsigned "Romanian pickpockets of color armed with accordions for begging" and "Viena sub teroarea Ţiganilor romani" *Libertatea* 20 August 2003.

Unsigned "Centru de colectare ridicat cu bani europeni, transformat în depozit de haine. Statul încurajează specula în pieţe" *România Liberă* 9 August 2004.

Unsigned "Rrominia" *Ziua* 10 June 2005.

Internet Articles and Reports

Asociaţia pentru Promovarea Femeii din România, Project "Centrul de Informare, Educaţie şi Consiliere Timişoara pentru femeile şi feţele victime ale violenţei domestice şi abuzului sexual" a survey of opinions conducted 5-7-July 2002, financed through the PHARE-ACCESS program.
http://www.gov.ro/drmpa/publicatii/observator/6.doc, last accessed 15-5-2005.

Tatiana Olteanu *Studiu de opinie privind violența asupra femeii în familie* 1998 www.pitesti.ro/grado/studiu_ro.html, last accessed 5-8-2002.

Centrul de Resurse pentru Diversitate Etnoculturală *Barometrul Relațiilor Ethnice* Metro Media Transilvania, November 2001. Also available via www.edrc.ro, last accessed 27-11-2005.

Centrul Pilot pentru Femeile Victime ale Violenței Domestice în Bucureşti, 1998, http://www.proiectns.org/archives/000050.html, last accessed 27-11-2005

Commission on Romania's Progress Towards Accession *Annual Report on European Union Accession 2000* published 8 November 2000.

Council of Europe Gender Mainstreaming *Conceptual frameworks, methodology and presentation of good practices* Final Report of the Group of Specialists on Mainstreaming Strassbourg, February 1999.

Dorosin, Joshua L. *Romania: a dream deferred the 1990 elections and prospects for future democracy* International Foundation for Electoral Systems 1990. http://www.ifes.org/searchable/ifes_site/reg_activities/reports/execsum/rom90.htm

European Union Monitor of Progress of EU Accession Report. The Rights of the Roma Minority in Romania 'Programul de monitorizare a accesuluui UE. Drepturile minorităţilor în România (minoritatea romilor)' Protv 14 November 2000 www.romanothan.ro/document/reports/rap_ue_romani.html, last accessed 27-11-2000.

Gallup Organization Romania Survey "Violenţei împotriva femeilor" conducted 12-23 April 2003, Bucharest, published 27 May 2003. http://www.gallup.ro/romana/poll_ro/releases_ro/pr030527_ro/pr030527_ro.htm, last accessed 27-11-2005.

Oprescu, Dan "Un pas gresit in directia cea buna: romania şi minoritaţile nationale (1990-2000)" Bucharest 21 January 2001 www.mma.ro/database/message/doprescu1ro.html.

Reporters without Borders, *Freedom of the Press annual report on Romania 2003* at www.rsf.fr.

Romani CRISS şi Agentia de Monitizoare a Presei Prezentarea romilor in presa românească, Report February-August 2000.

Unpublished Government Documents

Roman, Petre "Termeni folositi pentru denumirea etniei romilor/ţiganilor" *Memorandum of the Minister of External Affairs* 29 February 2000.

Nastase's speech at the European Policy Center, Brussels June 6 2002 entitled "Romanian in the European Union and the Future of Europe' p.5

Minister for External Affairs Teodor Melescanu, Memorandum Nr. H03/169 January 1995.

Mugur Isarescu, Prime Minister of Romania, Memorandum Nr.D2/1094, 29 February 2000 entitled 'Terms used for the naming of Roma/Ţigani ethnicity.'

Interviews

Achim, Viorel 19 July 2002.

Ciupală, Alin 11 November 2002 and 15 May 2004.

Chelcea, Liviu 27 July 2002.

Ciontoiu, Cristian Market Supervisor/Chairman since 1970, 18 July 2002.

Delia Grigore, 20 October, 2001 and (in her capacity as vice president Aven Amentza, NGO/education/research) 12 January 2003.

Howe, David Bucharest, 13 October 2000.

Ionescu, Vasile and Delia Grigore August 12, 2001.

Interview with families evicted from Vacareşti, Bucharest, 14 October 2000.

Market administrator of Piața Matache, 13 July 2002.

Internet Sites of Information (as of December 2005)

Patrin Web Journal – Extensive academic articles on Romani culture and history, maintained by Ian Hancock http://www.geocities.com/Paris/5121/patrin.htm

Rromanthan website, including the 'Inforrom' Buletin of press information and monitoring. www.rromanthan.ro

Romanian National Institute of Statistics, www.insse.ro

Romanian Government (official website until 2005) "The State of the Romanian Society after the 1996-2000 Governance" http://domino.kappa.ro/guvern/programul.nsf/0/6BF6B8BAB20B0DE2C22569DE0045F63C?OpenDocument

Romanian Police Website, page "Violența in Familie," http://www.politiaromana.ro/violenta_in_familie.htm