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Schooling Faith:

Religious discourse, neo-liberal hegemony and the neo-Calvinist ‘parent-controlled’ schooling movement

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Gender and Cultural Studies,
School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry,
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences

14 November 2013
Statement of Originality

I declare that the research presented here is my own original work and has not been submitted to any other institution for the award of a degree.

Signed:

[Signature]

Date: 14 November 2013
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Abstract

Since the mid-1990s, there has been a sustained growth in religious schooling in Australia generally and with it, an intense dispute has swirled around the acceptability and desirability of this trend. In turn, these debates in the realm of education are not separate from broader questions arising in ostensibly secular-liberal nations like Australia over what has been termed the ‘new visibility of religion’ in public life.

In this thesis, I bring the questions surrounding the new public visibility of religion to bear specifically on the issue of religious schooling in Australia. In the first half, I offer an extended genealogical account of how education in such schools has come to be officially defined as concerned with the transmission of private beliefs in supernatural objects alongside the delivery of state-mandated training requirements. The antecedents for this definition lie, I contend, in the nominalist, Protestant and Anglo-liberal inheritance of the present neo-liberal regime.

On the basis of this, I consider the effects of such a definition of religious schooling with reference to the case of the Neo-Calvinist ‘Parent-Controlled’ schooling movement in the latter half of this thesis. This religious schooling movement was initiated in the 1950s in explicit opposition to the mainstream education system in Australia, advancing instead an expansive view of religious discourse as affecting all educational practices. The movement remains insistent on its religiously distinctive ‘foundational values’ despite its present integration into the mainstream education
system today. I examine how this is negotiated in the discourse of the NCPC schooling movement within the present conjuncture.

Through this specific example, I submit that the new visibility of religious schooling in Australia is predicated on two conditions of acceptability defined by the hegemonic discourse of neo-liberalism: firstly, that religious schooling is able to conform to a broad consensus on the purpose of schooling as a means of training worker-citizens; and secondly, religion of the sort articulated by such religious schooling adopts a form marketable to consumers, who are free to choose schools on the basis of their private preferences. This has implications not only for the way religion is conceived in religious schools that are currently operant, but also for those whose religious discourses are less amenable to such articulations.
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### Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AACS</td>
<td>Australian Association of Christian Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACARA</td>
<td>Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASCRG</td>
<td>Australian Standard Classification of Religious Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Australian Labor Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEN</td>
<td>Christian Education National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Australia and National Party Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPCS</td>
<td>Christian Parent Controlled Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEEWR</td>
<td>Australian Government Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPAC</td>
<td>Economic Planning and Advisory Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCEETYA</td>
<td>Ministerial Council for Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCPC</td>
<td>Neo-Calvinist ‘Parent-Controlled’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NICE</td>
<td>National Institute for Christian Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>State of New South Wales, Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUPCCS</td>
<td>National Union for Parent Controlled Christian Schools</td>
</tr>
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Faith-based schools… are the new engine rooms of muscular fundamentalist religion, where a literalist interpretation of the Bible, Koran or Torah dictates curriculum. […] Allowing the gifts of the Enlightenment to be chipped away in the classrooms of fundamentalism is a dangerous path. Governments should act before it is too late. (John Kaye, New South Wales Member of Parliament, as cited in 2008)

Is it just me or has anyone else noticed that the arguments against choice in schooling are becoming increasingly divisive and anti-religious? […] If we want a truly generous and open future for all, we will do well to support the right to choose, and to celebrate the place of beliefs and values in the progress of our nation. (Stephen O’Doherty, Chief Executive of Christian Schools Australia, 2008)

The lessons kids learn in government schools – resilience, motivation, community and tolerance – hold them in much better stead than hand-holding, spoon-feeding, mollycoddling and segregation […] The independent and Christian schools are divisive, discriminatory, reliant on hand-outs and
implicitly teach children that some kids deserve nicer playgrounds than others. (Catherine Deveney, comedian, social commentator and columnist, 2011)

Research, both nationally and internationally, also concludes that Catholic and independent schools, even after adjusting for a school’s socio-economic profile, are able to achieve stronger results that government schools in areas like academic standards, completion rates and entry to tertiary studies. (Kevin Donnelly, director of Education Standards Institute and newspaper columnist, 2011)

Since the mid-1990s, there has been a sustained growth in religious schooling in Australia and with it, an intense and at times polemical dispute has swirled, as is demonstrated by the agonistic positions of public figures and commentators quoted in the epigraphs above. This is perhaps unsurprising for, as a cursory reading of the above statements evince, what are considered to be at stake in these debates over religious schooling in Australia are questions about some of the most cherished ideals of contemporary liberal societies, not least rational and critical thinking as ‘gifts of the Enlightenment’; freedoms of choice, belief and values; the qualities of citizenship like ‘resilience, motivation, community and tolerance’; and the desired ends of education like ‘academic standards, completion rates and entry to tertiary studies.’
In turn, these debates in the realm of education are not separate from broader questions arising in ostensibly secular-liberal nations like Australia over what has been termed the ‘new visibility of religion’ (Hoelzl & Ward, 2008). This latter concept refers to social trends like the rapid growth of Pentecostalism in Latin America, Africa and Asia, as well as in Australia (see Connell, 2005), the growth of New Age spiritualities in Western societies (see Redden, 2011); the invocations of religious motifs by prominent political leaders such as Tony Blair in the United Kingdom, George W. Bush in the United States and John Howard in Australia (see respectively, Parmar, 2005; Maddox, 2005), and violent ‘irruptions’ of religion into the political sphere of the West in events like 9/11 in New York, 7/7 in London and the Bali bombings of 2002. Put pithily by Ward (2004), what this new visibility of religion or the post-secular condition entails is ‘not simply the refusal of religion to go away but, more significantly, the new public visibility of religion,’ that is, ‘the point where religion has a public voice [and] religion becomes political again’ (p. 3).

These trends and events have raised new questions about the place of religion in avowedly secular and liberal societies.

Apart from the problematic of what the new visibility of religion might mean for secular and liberal societies, these broader trends, events and questions have also spurred the renewed questioning of secularism and liberalism themselves as historically and culturally particular ways of defining society and human being. So while prominent social theorists like Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor have called into question the secular as an apparently universal principle or more
developmentally advanced vantage point from which to judge particular religions on the one hand, a range of scholars such as Talal Asad, Wendy Brown, Craig Calhoun, William Cavanaugh, William Connolly, Timothy Fitzgerald, Stanley Fish, Saba Mahmood and John Milbank have, on the other hand, challenged the alleged political neutrality and superiority of liberal regimes in adjudicating between religious differences on the basis of a secular, non-religious ethos. These broader questions, I shall argue in this thesis, also bear significance for the apparently more local debates over the place of religious schooling in Australia and its relation to schooling that is considered both secular and public.

With regard to the secular, in the first place, increasing doubt has been cast on its definition as a progressively ‘liberated’ sphere of non-religion that approximates to rational knowledge without illusions. Taylor (2007) for example, in his magisterial account of secular modernity entitled *A Secular Age*, labels such definitions as based on untenable ‘subtraction stories’ whereby religion is sloughed off and ‘[w]hat emerges from this process – modernity or secularity – is to be understood in terms of underlying features of human nature which were there all along, but had been impeded by what is now set aside’ (p. 22). What this view of the secular bears is a narrative of a progressive diminishment of religion in the public sphere and its replacement by rational thought, which is also known as the process of ‘secularisation.’ Such an understanding is based on a strict secular/religious dichotomy in conjunction with the notion that the latter will eventually supplant the former. This view has been pervasive in liberal societies, and is perhaps especially pronounced within scholarly circles (Mendieta & VanAntwerpen, 2011). Yet
Habermas (2010) as a onetime exemplar of such a view points out, it is now evident that there is no intrinsic connection ‘between societal modernization and religion’s increasing loss of significance, a connection that would be so close that we could count on the disappearance of religion’ (p. 1).

In light of the questions raised by Taylor and Habermas, Mendieta and VanAntwerpen (2011) thus surmise that such ‘dominant stories about religion and public life are myths that bear little relation to either our political life or our everyday experience’ because, on the one hand, ‘[r]eligion is neither merely private... nor purely irrational’ and on the other hand, ‘the public sphere is neither a realm of straightforward rational deliberation nor a smooth space of unforced assent’ (p. 1). This brings to the fore fresh questions about the common sense, dichotomous construal of the secular/religious and its corresponding boundaries of the public/private, as well as renewed attention to the historical and political conditions that have given rise to them.

The latter dichotomy of public/private is also related to the avowed neutrality of formally non-religious (or secular) liberal regimes. On this point, critics have pointed to the normative political thrust of the liberal search for principles and procedures that mediate between different conceptions of life, and which are expressed in the liberal ideals of tolerance, openness and multiculturalism (Robertson, 2001). Fish (1999), for instance, highlights how, within societies built on this basis, it is supposed that if every citizen agrees to ‘confine his or her religious
life to the heart and the chapel, religion would flourish without interference from the state, and the state would flourish without interference from religion’ (p. 177). Hence a public/private demarcation is established whereby the line between them is drawn from what is claimed to be ‘a vantage point that is neutral between competing religious views, all of which are equally cabined and equally protected’ (Fish, 1999, p. 177). This construal of society is predominant in Anglo-liberal societies such as Australia and constitutes the ‘common sense’ of public political discourse that seems to be above reproach (Milbank, 2004). As Mahmood (2003) highlights, ‘the idea that the liberal political system is the best arrangement for all human societies, regardless of their diverse histories and conceptual and material resources, is rarely questioned these days’ (p. 19). Yet such a claim to neutrality is untenable because the liberal conception of religion inevitably rests upon and advances partisan beliefs about society, authority, rationality and the nature of the self, which is in turn a product of provincial histories and politics (Robertson, 2001).

Taken together, then, what these theorists and scholars bring to the fore is that neither secular rationality nor liberal procedures are ‘merely given’ or capable of mediating religious differences on a universal basis and in a neutral way; any construal of the secular/religious and public/private is in their view always historically and politically contingent and particular. This problematisation of common sense categories at a more general level raises questions that have a bearing on the religious schooling debates in Australia today. For example, how does the historicity of these categories make us rethink the relationship between non-religious politics vis-à-vis religious social groups? Is the secular-liberal construal of society
along these lines necessarily the most desirable one? What does this understanding preclude, under what kinds of presuppositions and for what ends?

In this thesis, I seek to bring the questions of the new visibility of religion at the broader level, as well as the interrogation of the predominance of secular and liberal presuppositions by social theorists and scholars, to bear on the issue of religious schooling in Australia. To do this will require addressing the conjunction between ‘religion’ and ‘education’ in the form of contemporary religious schooling in Australia. In the first three chapters of this thesis, I seek to broadly historicise the present common sense around these terms by asking what and who defines religion and education? As well, how have these come to be so defined, particularly along the lines of public/private and secular/religious?

On the basis of findings to these questions, I also inquire into their political implications by asking: How are these definitions acted upon in the present? What are the effects of such definitions on religious schooling? And, within the present conjuncture, for what ends? In the latter three chapters of this thesis, I approach these questions by looking more closely at the relationship between a type of religious ‘private’ schooling – the neo-Calvinist ‘parent-controlled’ (NCPC) schooling movement – in its context within the Australian education system, which is in turn embedded within the broader configurations of socio-political order. In particular, I seek to interpret the discursive processes at the conjunction, on the one hand, of the dominant discourse in Anglo-liberal societies today – neo-liberalism – as ‘the
common sense and key ‘shared mental model’ [of] a globalizing world’ (Cerny, 2008, p. 2), and on the other hand the religious discourses of the neo-Calvinist type of religious schooling.

NCPC schooling represents an interesting instance of religious schooling that Australian social analyst Marion Maddox (2011) has termed an ‘overlooked sector in Australia’s education market,’ and one which warrants attention because of an apparent paradox whereby, ‘such schools profess – and teach – potentially controversial positions about the relationship between church and state and about Christian citizens’ position in relation to secular law’ and at the same time, ‘receive a substantial proportion – in many cases, the majority – of their funds from the state’ (p. 300). While the selection of this particular type of religious schooling inevitably excludes a deeper engagement with other, potentially insightful cases (e.g. Catholic, Islamic, Jewish, Adventist, etc.), I submit below that the peculiar position of NCPC schooling within the present Australian education market as argued by Maddox, as well as the peculiar historical passage of this schooling movement, presents as an instructive case for broader questions about the new visibility of religious schooling in Australia today.

My hypothesis is that despite the persistent debates over the appropriateness or inappropriateness of ‘religion in education’ as manifest most prominently in the form of religious schools in the mainstream education system, the very question of what constitutes ‘religion’ or ‘education’ themselves, their assumed modus operandi and
the relationship between these two elements have been centred on the one hand around a historically and politically contingent conception of what it means to educate, and on the other hand an equally historically and politically contingent conception of religion vis-à-vis the ostensibly secular public sphere. In addition, I also seek to explore in detail the interrelations between these two spheres and how they are articulated in the institution of religious schooling through the example of NCPC schooling.

In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I shall offer a working definition of religious education in the form of religious schooling and canvass the impetus for the debates surrounding it, most prominently the relative growth of enrolments in religious schools sine the mid-1990s. This represents a particular manifestation in the field of education of the new public visibility of religion at a broader, societal level. I then offer a broad sketch of the positions in the debates over these trends, which can be understood as coalescing around the interrelated dichotomies of public/private and secular/religious. In addition, I also intersperse the descriptions of these various positions with some critical questions raised by the abovementioned scholars regarding the apparent universality and neutrality of secular and liberal assumptions about social order, which all sides of the debate appear to implicitly draw upon. Following this, I shall foreground how I arrived at the problematic of religious education and the present social order via the insights of liberation theology and critical pedagogy during my time as a teacher in religious and non-religious schools. This will serve to locate the researcher in the research by foregrounding some of the background influences that I bring to this thesis (du Preez, 2008). Arising from this, I
then elaborate some reasons for why I have chosen to focus on the NCPC schooling movement and why I have chosen to characterise the present socio-political order as neo-liberal. This will be followed by a brief description of the theoretical approach taken in this thesis, which can be understood broadly as form of conjunctural analysis informed by the discipline of cultural studies. Such an approach, I shall argue, allows for an attentive portrayal of how particular traditions have construed religious education – in this case, the liberal and neo-Calvinist traditions – as well as the interactions between them within specific socio-political contexts. Finally, I present an outline of how the following chapters of this thesis are structured and the key questions that these chapters are designed to address.

The new visibility of religious schooling in Australia

Religious education in Australia as manifest in the form of religious private schooling can be preliminarily understood as a conjunction of ‘religion’ and ‘education’ as officially defined by the government. That is, with regard to the latter, they denote institutions that typically teach much the same general curriculum as other schools, and share the state and federal government aim of preparing children for their future lives of citizenship and employment in exchange for government funding. In addition, owing to their particular ‘religious affiliations,’ it is supposed that they also seek to pass on a particular set of religious beliefs about a ‘supernatural Being, Thing or Principle’ and the associated conducts arising from such beliefs (Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS], 2006). This arrangement is outlined in an
overview given by the Australian Government’s Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (2011):

States and territories have the primary responsibility for funding state government schools. They also provide supplementary assistance to non-government schools. The Australian Government is the primary source of public funding for non-government schools, while also providing supplementary assistance to government schools. Most non-government schools have some religious affiliation, with approximately two-thirds of non-government school students enrolled in Catholic schools.

The recent growth of such religious, formally ‘non-government’ or ‘private’ schools in Australia has been conspicuous. In the most populous state of New South Wales (NSW) alone, for example, some 330,000 students or thirty-three per cent of the state’s total attend religious schools (God in the Classroom, 2003). The Independent Schools Council of Australia (2012) has declared that eighty-five per cent of independent schools have a religious affiliation, while Catholic schools alone account for over twenty-percent of total student enrolments in Australia. In total, enrolments in NSW’s 904 non-government schools grew by fifteen percent between 1996 and 2002 against the national average of thirteen percent (ABS, 2006). This growth in both relative and absolute numbers of students has also been paralleled by
a numerical growth of religious schools. According to a *Sydney Morning Herald* report in 2003, in NSW alone there were 586 Catholic schools, 90 Christian, 53 Anglican, 23 Seventh Day Adventist, 13 Islamic, and eight Jewish schools, as well as clusters of schools of other religious traditions (God in the Classroom, 2003). The same report also states that 26 religious schools were opened in NSW between January 2000 and March 2003 at an average rate of one every six weeks.

According to the ABS (2012), there were 9,435 Australian schools in 2011, comprising 6,705 government schools, 1,710 Catholic schools and 1,020 Independent schools. While state-run schools continue to educate the majority of students in Australia – as of 2011, there were almost twice as many students attending government schools (2,315,253) as there were attending non-government schools (1,226,556) – the number of students in the independent schools sector has increased by 35 per cent since 2001 (ABS, 2012).

![Number of Schools, by affiliation—2011](image)

*Figure 1: Number of Schools, by affiliation (ABS, 2012)*
So while the split between enrolments at government schools to non-government schools was sixty-nine per cent and thirty-one per cent respectively in 2001, by 2011 the split of students between government and non-government schools was sixty-five per cent and thirty-five per cent respectively (ABS, 2012). These figures reinforce the long-term drift of students from government schools to non-government schools.

Figure 2: Number of full-time and part-time students by affiliation, 2001-2011 (ABS, 2012)

In addition, of the increase in absolute student numbers in Australia from 2010 to 2011, the largest proportional increase in student numbers also occurred in independent schools, where student numbers rose by close to two per cent (9,257), followed by Catholic schools at one and a half per cent (10,683), and government schools by half a per cent (10,994). This is in continuity with the long term trend of more pronounced relative growth in student numbers at independent schools. Since 2001, for instance, the number of students at independent schools has increased by close to thirty-five per cent (129,151). Over the same time, the number of students at
Catholic and government schools increased by eleven per cent (75,402) and two per cent (40,650) respectively (ABS, 2012).

![Proportion of Full-time and Part-time Students by Affiliation—2001, 2006 and 2011](image)

*Figure 3: Proportion of Full-time and Part-time students by affiliation, 2001, 2006 and 2011 (ABS, 2012)*

These trends indicating the relative growth of religious schooling are a *cause célèbre* amongst public figures of a broadly liberal-secularist perspective like NSW Minister of Parliament John Kaye, who express concern at these trends and what it might mean for education as a modern national enterprise for training rational thinkers. Conversely, for proponents of religious schools like Chief Executive of Christian Schools Australia Stephen O’Doherty, the same trends are an encouraging affirmation signalling a freedom of religion and choice for parents. A particular focal point of this debate is whether religious schooling contributes or diminishes societal cohesion in an ostensibly liberal, non-religious (or secular) nation, and therefore whether religious private schools should be permitted and funded over and/or alongside state-run public ones owing to the national benefits accruing from each type of schooling. For social and media commentators opposed to religious schooling
like Catherine Deveney, the answer to this question is overwhelmingly to the negative with reference to the skills needed for citizenship in a plural society, which religious schools supposedly encumber. Conversely for others like Kevin Donnelly, the academic performance of students in such schools as measured by standardised tests and post-school destinations of their graduates suggest that they are to be considered a national good.

**Contours of the debate over religious schooling**

In addition to the media commentaries offered above, but also raising similar questions, are the more scholarly or research-informed debates over religious schooling in Australia. In light of the definition of religious schools as entailing a conjunction of ‘education’ and ‘religion’ as described above, the debates over religious schooling along the public/private and secular/religious lines surveyed here can also be understood as corresponding respectively to the function of religious schools as schools with regard to the general aim of schooling to train students for citizenship and employment as a public good on the one hand, and with regard to the religious function of religious schools, which is taken to be the transmission of particular and private beliefs and values on the other. It is useful at present to offer a sketch of them in order to orient my research to what I – following the work of critical scholars of religion and secularity – consider to be some their shared yet questionable bases.
The first of these lines can be seen as part of a broader debate over *public/private* schooling of which religion is one element of contention alongside other demographic factors like socioeconomic status and ethnicity. For those who argue along this line, the key question appears to be about whether religious private schooling – which is partly funded by the Australian Federal Government – is to the benefit or detriment of the nation and its general populace, or what is known as ‘the public.’ This way of framing the question is in turn predicated on the broader liberal axiom, as shall be outlined more fully below, that freedoms such as religious belief belong alongside others like consumer choices, sexual preferences and so on in private. These private freedoms are in turn guaranteed by a general ‘public’ agreement on the common rights and responsibilities of citizens (Ackerman, 1980). Thus, the debates over religious schooling concern whether it represents an over-privileging of the private sphere of religious choices to the detriment of the public agreement to educate citizens for a liberal polity.

For critics of religious schooling, religion is considered to have encroached on the public terrain of liberal and secular schooling, which is taken to be a neutral space between all particular traditions and cultures. So, for example, the prominent Australian commentator on education Simon Marginson (1993) in his early work *Education and Public Policy in Australia* asserts that the fundamental difference between secular public and religious private schools is that the former are universal, open and democratic while the latter are not. Thus, Marginson argues, private schooling of any sort does not have the obligations and constraints that are incumbent upon state-run public schools. On the issue of inclusion, more
specifically, he asserts – while acknowledging that few ‘private’ schools formally pick and choose from the whole population – ‘all private schools are to some degree selective in comparison with public schools’ (p. 200). In this sense, Marginson’s critique of private schooling implies that religious schools, by their very operation on religious lines, are effectively exclusive and discriminatory while public schools are universally accessible.

Along similar lines but stated more explicitly, education scholar Anthony Potts (1999) highlights the ‘religious and historical dimensions’ at stake in the public/private schooling debate (para. 15). Against the growing trend in private religious schooling, Potts (1999) posits the argument that by ‘allowing every tinpot fundamentalist religious group to start schools with federal funding with funds withdrawn from the allocation to government schools,’ is likely to ‘resurrect, in a multifaceted form, the sectarian divide that blighted Australia for most of its history until the 1970s’ (para. 33). Also bringing the arguments of cohesion and inclusion versus sectarianism and exclusivity to bear on the public/private debate are Deb Wilkinson, Richard Deniss and Andrew Macintosh (2004) of the Canberra-based think-tank The Australia Institute, who concur with the early-Marginson and Potts by arguing that the private religious schools cannot achieve the degree of inclusiveness said to be ‘inherent in the public school system’ (p. viii).

Approaching religious education in this way raises the question of how the notion of ‘the public’ as a universally accessible and inclusive space has come to be
seen as distinct in character from ‘the religious,’ which is understood as a private affair of free choices. To be sure, religion in this reckoning is recognised and even protected as a private belief, but it is also cordoned off insofar as it is kept rigorously beyond the bounds of empirical understanding in the public sphere, which is demarcated by the boundaries of the nation-state. Religious language should thus remain private and its entry into the public sphere is legitimate only to the extent that it can be rendered in (ideally rational) terms that are not specifically religious (Calhoun, 2011). On this basis, the determinant of whether religious schools should be permitted as part of the education system or not pivots on whether the former, which concerns private beliefs, can contribute something to the general public in the form of high-quality education and a tolerant and harmonious society. Yet these prescriptions themselves beg the key question of how ‘education’ is defined and the type of society, public and nation envisioned as normative, and to which religious schooling is in turn obliged to tolerate and be in harmony with.

Interestingly, this understanding of privatised religion vis-à-vis the nation’s public as the ultimate political purpose is also shared by proponents of religious schooling. Conservative education scholar Jennifer Buckingham (2010), for example, rejects the implication that such schools are by nature undemocratic, undermine social cohesion and give rise to intolerant attitudes. Drawing on survey data in her research, Buckingham (2010) agrees with the likes of Wilkinson et al about the public good, differing sharply from the latter only insofar as the data she deploys indicates the opposite – that is, ‘that people who attended non-government schools (which are usually religious schools) do not express opinions that are less socially
liberal or less tolerant of difference than people who attended government schools’ (p. ix). Likewise, education scholar Dick Carpenter (2012) defends Protestant Christian schools as a public good. He does this by appeal to the ‘valuable Western ideals’ that such schools are claimed to promote, which contribute to the health of Western nations like Australia that are said to be built on a ‘Christian intellectual and moral heritage.’ Yet as with the critics of religious schooling, questions arise as to how the public good, the national good and good citizenship are defined, and to which such things as ‘Christian heritage’ or ‘diversity’ are supposed to accrue.

The debate along the public/private line and the question of what best serves the national good brings forth a second, corollary debate over religious schooling in Australia: one that is contested along a secular/religious axis. There are two discernible points of contention along this line. Firstly, some tend to focus more specifically on the political tendencies that are assumed to be inherent in religion itself and the consequences this may have on the nation and its public. For example, sociologists Colin Symes and Kalervo Gulson (2008) in their survey of ‘new’ Christian schools in Australia argue that such schools are inherently conservative and connect directly to right-wing politics. New Christian schools, according to Symes and Gulson (2008), are built upon an evangelical, fundamentalist and prosperity gospel nexus, which ‘intimates that God has substantial equity in capitalism’ (p. 240). Likewise, education scholar John Knight (1984, 1985) draws on a case study of Seventh Day Adventist schooling to argue that such schools are undergirded by a certain religious fundamentalism, which is tied to a broader conservative attack on public education. He warns that while Christian fundamentalists in education may be considered by many to be a ‘wholesome and benign’ minority, they actually bear a
plot to transform Australia into a ‘totalitarian fundamentalist Christian society’ (Smith & Knight, 1978, p. 226).

For both Symes and Gulson and Knight, secularity and liberalism function as general societal norms while the religious represents a particular and potentially dangerous anomaly. For these critics of religious schooling, the proliferation of the latter represents a perilous trajectory that serves to undermine the cohesion of the social order predicated on a liberal, secular education as opposed to divisive, sectarian tendencies. In this they are joined by sociologist Andrew Jakubowicz (2009), who argues that the rise of religious schooling is symptomatic of ‘ethno-religious racism’ (p. 4). For him, such ethno-religious racism leads to a sectarianism that can only be mediated by the affirmation of secularism as a principle by the Australian Government and its institutions.

Interestingly, by insisting on some inherent or essential conservatism of religion in general and Christianity in particular, these progressive critics of religious schooling share a common presumption made by a long line of conservative politicians such as former Australian Prime Minister Howard and former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Margaret Thatcher. For both long-serving politicians, as will be discussed further in Chapter 5, Christianity is indeed intrinsically coupled with a certain politics that leads to free-enterprise economics. The point emphasised at present is that assuming an essence of religion – and by implication, religious education – necessarily gives rise to certain type of politics, Symes and Gulson and Knight on the one side and on the other, Howard and Thatcher, appear to abide by what Wendy Brown (2008) labels the ‘culturalization of
politics.’ This view holds, whether implicitly or explicitly, that every cultural formation (including religion) has a discernible essence that defines it, and so all subsequent political positions taken can be explained as a necessary consequence of that prior essence. Yet do religious schools and their traditions bear a tangible, unchanging essence that necessitates a specific approach to society and politics? Or can the political position of religion and religious schooling be explained in other ways?

The notion of secularism as a principle of government that attenuates religious divisiveness is also shared by social and educational commentators Chris Bonnor and Jane Caro in their book *A Stupid Country: How Australia is dismantling public education* (2007), which is intended to be a defence of public schools against the encroachments of private schooling, including religiously-based schools. For these authors, secularism and secular instruction are taken to be neutral beyond religious differences. Hence, they assert: ‘We should start asking what impact schools that are built around specific religious beliefs might have on cohesion in the wider community’ (Bonnor & Caro, 2007, p. 99). This assumption that social cohesion and the good of the nation are linked to a secular education – by contrast to particularistic forms religious education based on disparate, possibly ‘sectarian’ traditions that are antithetical to it – draws on a particular narrative of the development of education in Australia shared by many secularist critics of religious schooling like Jakubowicz, Symes and Gulson, all of whom attribute the ‘success’ of Australia as a modern nation to the establishment of a liberal and secular education system. This narrative advanced by the critics abovementioned can thus be seen as a story that heralds secularism as the saviour of the Australian nation from divisiveness and sectarian
religious strife. A secular public in this estimation thus offers a vantage point beyond religious differences from where social divisions can be attenuated.

This, of course, raises questions about the alleged neutrality of the secular view and secularism, not least because in the reckoning of the abovementioned critics, secularism appears to be defined only negatively – that is, the absence of religion or what is left after religion fades. Yet might it be the case that, as Calhoun, Juergensmeyer and VanAntwerpen (2011) contend, secularism is neither in itself neutral nor merely an absence (of religion), but rather a normative stance variously entailing ‘an ideology, a worldview, a stance towards religion, a constitutional framework [or] an aspect of some other project [like] a science or a particular philosophical system’ (p. 5)? This is an important question because the very deployment of the term ‘secular’ always signifies a reference to the secular/religious dichotomy, which presumes upon not only a definition of the apparently secular (public) space itself, but also the realm of the religious (Calhoun et al, 2011). It is therefore important to inquire into the shifting and reciprocal relations between the two categories, for how the secular has emerged as a mode of educating in Australia is also concomitantly how religious education has emerged as its defining opposite.

By contrast to critics of religious schooling, its contemporary proponents like historian Stuart Piggin (2006) argue that religion – specifically Christianity – is a form of ‘spiritual capital’ that in fact enriches social institutions such as the education system (p. 2; also 2004). Thus, he argues, far from fermenting social divisions, the Christian religion has in fact been integral to the formation of Australia as a modern nation. However, those who appeal to such notions of ‘Christian
heritage’ like Piggin and Carpenter have the added burden of demonstrating how such a heritage might exist given that Christians in Australia – incorporating disparate groups like Roman Catholics, Anglicans, Presbyterians, Baptists and others – have valued a wide range of often inconsistent things on the basis of different, often conflicting interpretations of traditional texts and ways of life. From a different angle and with regard to religious schooling more generally, education scholars John Scott and Ann Armstrong (2011) also frame their arguments in terms of the modern nation as the key point of reference, albeit a multicultural and globalising one. They argue that because of multiculturalism and globalisation, schooling in Australia should rightly include a ‘faith-based dimension.’ In this reckoning, religious schools can contribute to society in general as long as they can affirm the value of the individual through their particular religious lexicons. Yet this position brings us back to the question of what constitutes the good of the nation that religious schools are meant to serve and who decides.

It thus appears that a common underpinning of the different positions in the debate over religious schooling, whether fought along the public/private or secular/religious lines, is an idea of Australia as a modern nation and its public, which is rightly served by institutions within the education system. On this basis, the point of contention is whether religious schools, which are based on private beliefs, should be permitted as part of the education system or not depending on whether they can contribute something in the form of a ‘good education’ and social cohesion. This is in turn predicated on two assumptions corresponding to the conjunction of religion with school-based education: firstly, that there is a certain understanding of the ‘religious’ as private vis-à-vis the ‘secular’ as public, and secondly, that there is
an agreement on what ‘good education’ entails. In this thesis, I shall problematise these two assumptions, which I understand to be borne by a broadly liberal tradition and articulated specifically within a neo-liberal context.

**On liberalism and neo-liberalism**

By the term *neo-liberal*, as I shall argue in more detail in Chapter 3, I denote a dominant interpretation of social reality that has shaped contemporary Anglo-liberal societies like Australia. I am cognisant that ‘neo-liberalism’ is a notoriously slippery term that is difficult to abstract theoretically from its concrete manifestations. In contemporary scholarship, the use of this term ‘straddles a wide range of social, political and economic phenomena at different levels of complexity’ (Saad-Filho and Johnston, 2005, p. 1). However, I take the term ‘neo-liberal’ to name the present socio-political order in Australia because with regard to religion and religious education, it is especially useful as a heuristic term in that it highlights some continuities with the presuppositions of liberalism as an intellectual and political movement, while at the same time representing a novel configuration of it in the present historical moment. I shall presently give a brief explication of what I mean by liberal and neo-liberal, and how their continuities and discontinuities relate to religion.

Liberalism, as will be explicated more fully in Chapter 2, can be characterised as a discourse that is formally concerned with upholding the freedom of individuals to be in charge of their own lives and choices (Raz, 1994, p. 105). Thus, liberal forms
of political order claim to be neutral about different ways of life, claiming no position about what the ‘good life’ should entail and so shifting questions about normative values out of the public sphere and into the private (Clayton, 2005, sec. 7). As mentioned above, religion under liberalism is regarded as properly belonging to the private sphere as an expression of individual free choice. The public sphere – most prominently manifest in the institutional apparatuses of the state – is formally concerned only with the most effective means of administering, adjudicating and guaranteeing the expression of individual rights and free choices (MacIntyre, 1998a). In order to sustain this normative vision of individual freedom then, liberalism in practice requires a contingent settlement between two poles: politically, it implies that collective decision-making should involve a constitutional state with limited but substantive powers of economic and social intervention, which seeks to ‘limit the anarchy of self-interest’ through the enforcement of contractual agreements (MacIntyre as cited in Bielskis, 2005, p. 119); and economically, it endorses the expansion of the capitalist market economy – that is, the institution of conditions whereby individuals’ free choices based on private preferences can be expressed and mediated by monetised exchange in as many realms of social life as practicable (Jessop, 2002).

On this basis and in the first instance, the neo-liberal perspective on social order should be seen as neo-liberal insofar as it emphasises one aspect of liberalism over the other (without negating it entirely). To put it simply, neo-liberalism at the broadest level is driven by a vision of the inexorable expansion and convergence of global capitalist markets – what is popularly termed ‘globalisation’ (Unger, 1998). This apparent ‘fact’ of social and political life in turn necessitates a type of nation-
state that seeks to forge a citizenry capable of securing employment and prosperity in
expectation of such global trends, as well as the institution and facilitation of internal
markets as an efficient means of achieving this goal (Wiseman, 1998, p. 43). In this
sense, a neo-liberal regime can be understood as privileging the economic pole of
liberalism – that is, private preferences mediated by market exchange – while
maintaining the role of the state as an adjudicator, regulator and facilitator of the
latter, thus remaining in continuity with a broadly liberal form of government.
Religion in such a context, as scholars like Ward (2006), Kitiarsa (2010) and Turner
(2011) have variously argued, is at once considered private as in traditional
liberalism and yet newly visible insofar as it represents an expression of the private
preferences of individuals in the market.

This expansion of the market highlights the fact that while the neo-liberal view
of social order can be seen as in continuity with liberal presuppositions about the
necessary co-presence of the state and the market, it also represents a new
configuration of the relationship between the two. As such, it is also neo-liberal. As
Treanor (2005, para. 18) characterises it, neo-liberalism is a novel discourse on the
arrangement of society insofar as it insists on a hitherto unprecedented intensification
and expansion of the market into social life by increasing the number, frequency,
repeatability, and formalisation of contractual exchange. The telos of neo-liberalism
is a world where all human actions are modelled on individualised market
transactions and conducted in competition with other individuals on a global scale
(Treanor, 2005, para. 17). The state and its diverse institutional apparatuses,
including the education system, are thus seen as responsible for the facilitation of this
globalising vision and the production of particular subjects that inhabit this increasingly marketised environment (Foucault, 1979; also Rose & Miller, 1992).

Preliminarily, therefore, to designate the contemporary Australian socio-political order as a neo-liberal regime is to say that its legislations, policies, institutions and constituent social practices are defined by a vision of the inexorable globalisation of world markets as defined by neo-liberal discourse and are preoccupied by positing a response adequate to it. This is chiefly manifest in the form of a state that, through the education system, seeks to prepare a citizenry capable of maximising their opportunities in the face of such global trends, as well as the institution and facilitation of a market in education as the most efficient means of achieving this goal. The question then arises as to the place and role of religious private schooling in relation to this broader, formally secular public vision and its instrumentalities of the state and the market.

Before outlining my critical approach to the conceptions of religion and education in Australia, I shall presently foreground the circumstances and influences that have led me to question the dominant understandings of these two terms. This will take the form of background considerations that have led me to this thesis. du Preez (2008) terms such information ‘parenthetical considerations,’ which implies bringing forth issues not sufficiently critical to the overall argument to be included in the main body of work, yet containing background and contextual information about the researcher that demands a place in the research, albeit in parenthetical form (du Preez, 2008, pp. 510-511). In particular, it involves outlining some autobiographical
details that express something of the genesis of the present research – that is, how is it that I am here, now, doing this study on religion and education in Australia?

**Excursus: Arriving at the non-neutrality of religion and education**

You can’t be neutral on a moving train. (Zinn, 1994)

I was born and spent the early years of my childhood in Malaysia, a formally Muslim country that is not technically an Islamic State. From as early as I can recall, my days from dawn to dusk were punctuated by the rhythms of the call to prayer from the neighbourhood mosque’s loudspeaker. Even though I was a non-Muslim from an animist family, from a young age I could see the differentiated character of Islam embodied in the lives of my friends, neighbours and their families and extended relations: some were outwardly pious and spoke often about what they had learnt from their Qur’ān study classes, with a few peers even performing in public Qur’ān recitations with proud family members in the audience; others played in heavy metal and punk rock bands; some were heavily involved with the skateboarding subculture; others spent most of their weekends evading the hot sun reading books like H.G. Wells’s War of the Worlds and the English folktale Robin Hood (two of our group favourites); most held a desire to participate in the Hajj one day, insha’Allah. Islam was neither a compartment of their lives nor something merely for the privacy of their individual households; for just as they never ceased or
diminished being Muslim through the manifold activities they participated in, so there was never one Islam that they embodied, but rather a variety.

In my adult years while completing degrees in economics, politics and education in Australia, I associated with many friends who were avowedly evangelical Christians and I often attended church with them. While this particular brand of Christianity struck me at many points as difficult to reconcile with my experiences and studies of society and cultural differences, I came to realise that even evangelical Christianity was not one, but carried within it internal debates and was embodied differently amongst its adherents. This led me to a study of Christianity more concertedly, but contrary to my Evangelical friends, I have always felt a pull toward the more radical interpretations of liberation theology, which included works of Black, feminist, queer and third-world theologians like Juan Luis Segundo, Gustavo Gutiérrez, Leonardo and Clodovis Boff, James Cone, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the Rainbow Spirit Elders, Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza and Marcella Althaus-Reid. From the work of these writers, I learnt that religion is neither neutral nor merely supernatural, standing ‘above’ the fray of society, culture, economics and politics; rather, it always presumes upon and expresses itself in concrete practices (or praxis) and institutions in relation to the broader socio-political context. As Segundo (1976) puts it straightforwardly, the perspective of liberation theology rejects ‘the naïve belief that [religious] language is applied to human realities inside some antiseptic laboratory that is totally immune to the ideological tendencies and struggles of the present day’ (p. 7).
As a young schoolteacher, I was also significantly influenced by Paulo Freire’s *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1995[1970]), which remains the most well-thumbed book in my collection of works on critical pedagogy. In particular, Freire’s insistence on the impossibility of educational neutrality impressed itself heavily upon me in a workplace increasingly occupied by the delivery of state-mandated content.

Consistent with what I had learnt about religion through the abovementioned radical theologians, he argues that in education too:

> There is no such thing as a neutral education process.

> Education either functions as an instrument which is used to facilitate integration of the younger generation into the logic of the present system and bring about conformity or it becomes the practice of freedom, the means by which men and women deal critically and creatively with reality and discover how to participate in the transformation of their world. (Freire, 1995[1970], p. 34)

This insight about the non-neutrality of education is also affirmed by adherents of critical pedagogy who have followed after Freire. As one such adherent, I thus affirm Joe Kincheloe’s (2008) point in his *Critical Pedagogy Primer* where he characterises critical pedagogy’s practitioners as ‘aware that every minute of every hour that teachers teach, they are faced with complex decisions concerning justice, democracy, and competing ethical claims’ (p. 1). The central tenet of critical pedagogy thus maintains that education is always-already ethically and politically
normative both as regards the form of education and its content. That is, ‘the classroom, curricula, and school structures teachers enter are not neutral sites waiting to be shaped by educational professionals,’ for ‘these contexts are shaped in the same ways language and knowledge are constructed, as historical power makes particular practices seem natural – as if they could have been constructed in no other way’ (Kincheloe, 2008, p. 2). In sum, contra the instrumental or technical view of education that is neutral to questions of class, gender, race, religion and history and is primarily concerned with the transmission of ‘how-to’ knowledge – for example, knowledge on how to pass examinations, how to be a good citizen, how to achieve success at work, and so on – critical pedagogy taught me as a teacher to always inquire into the relationship between education and the broader socio-political order in the different situations of my practice (Giroux, 1988).

Yet what I had learnt from Freire and other critical pedagogues on the non-neutrality of education and the liberation theologians on the non-neutrality of religion sat increasingly uncomfortably over the six years that I spent as a high-school teacher in Sydney. In a relatively short teaching career that involved work in both state-run public and so-called private schools, both self-identified religious and non-religious schools, I grew more aware of some problem in these categorisations: firstly, despite these categories, all schools seemed to serve the same primary functions through similar educational practices – i.e. teaching from set curricula, standardised assessment and examinations, reporting involving rating and ranking students, and a significant emphasis, especially in the latter years of schooling, on securing desirable post-school destinations. What differed were the languages in which these were framed.
Secondly and closely related was the experience that despite the identifications of schools along the secular/religious and public/private line and the heated debates in the media and internet around this difference as typified above by Kaye, O’Doherty, Deveney and Donnelly, religious private schools seemed to share a lot of practices with non-religious public schools and vice-versa. Such similarities, apart from the explicitly educational practices mentioned above, included the shaping of the academic calendar around Easter holidays, Christmas celebrations as well as national commemorations like ANZAC, Australia and Melbourne Cup days. Finally and above all, it seemed peculiar to me that despite the gravity of tone and frequency of public arguments around the place of religion, values and social purpose in the different types of schools, year after year much credence was given to the ranking of schools and individual students in the state-wide Higher School Certificate (HSC) results, fuelled in no small part by popular media. For example, in my final year of high school teaching in 2010, the Sydney Morning Herald newspaper released its annual ‘HSC Performance’ league table which measures the ‘success rate’ of schools measured by the results achieved by its students (‘HSC Performance,’ 2010). A cursory glance at the schools listed in the top twenty is instructive to my point (see Table 1):
### Table 1: HSC 2010 Top School Performances (‘HSC Performance,’ 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>2010 Rank</th>
<th>2010 Success Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>James Ruse Agricultural High School</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sydney Girls High School</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hornsby Girls High School</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baulkham Hills High School</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney Girls High School</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney Boys High School</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Beaches Secondary College Manly Campus</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sydney Boys High School</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney Grammar School</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCEGGS Darlinghurst</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbotsleigh</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ascham School</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Street High School</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kambala</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malek Fahd Islamic School</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moriah College</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normanhurst Boys High School</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St George Girls High School</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pymble Ladies’ College</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loreto Kirribilli</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this list, there are eleven formally ‘government’ public schools and nine ‘non-government’ private schools, the latter of which consists of three Anglican schools, one Roman Catholic, one Uniting Church, one Orthodox Jewish, one Islamic, one non-denominational and one secular school. Beyond these differences amongst the twenty schools, however, lies one commonality: despite all the wrangling debates over religion, values and social purpose, all these schools are ultimately commensurable, measurable and comparable on a single scale.
Observing this, it seemed to me in light of Freire’s critical pedagogy that despite the cursory nod to democratic values, diversity and opportunity, the direction of the education system in Australia was not neutral, but tended generally to encourage competitive individualism and the homogenisation of form and content at the service of a broader political program, or what Freire may term the ‘integration of the younger generation into the logic of the present system.’ Thus, questions arose in my mind as to what this present system is and what its logic entails, as well as how this present system is served by education though schooling. Yet while the measures of ‘performance’ and ‘success’ appeared to increasingly cut across substantive differences between schools, the public debates over religious schooling were simultaneously reaching a climactic point owing to a high-profile incident in the Sydney suburb of Camden.

On 17 October 2007, the local government council of Camden made public an application from the Quranic Society – a private religious institution based in Sydney – to build Camden College, a primary and high school for 600 students (see Senescall & Narushima, 2007). This proposal generated a wave of dissent from local residents, with a protest rally involving up to 1,000 people and up to 3,000 formal submissions to the local council expressing disdain at the possibility of an Islamic school in their area of residence for various reasons. Tensions reached a climax in November 2007 when two pigs heads – considered ḥarām or ‘sinful’ within the Islamic tradition (see Al-Qardawi, 2001, p. 42) – were rammed on metal stakes with an Australian flag draped between them at the school’s proposed site (Camden Council Rejects Islamic School, 2008). In the midst of this controversy, I noted that several Protestant churches (i.e. Anglican, Lutheran, Presbyterian and Baptist) in
Camden had also issued a pointed letter attacking the idea of religious education predicated on the Islamic faith (see Churches Unite Against Islamic School, 2009). According to the letter, the school is to be opposed because by contrast to forms of ‘acceptable’ religion in Australia which deal with supernatural concerns in the private sphere, Islam is not a private religion:

The Quranic Society espouses a world view which is not compatible with broad, Australian, egalitarian culture... in direct opposition to the expectation[s] outlined by the Australian government.

[...]

In Australia, we have learned the secret of living peacefully with others, respecting one another’s religious and philosophical beliefs. In fact, most world religions are capable of living in harmony in our community. This is because [religions] are predominately ‘spiritual’ in nature and look forward to the ultimate resolution of mankind’s struggles in a ‘life beyond this world.’

[...]

Islam however, is not simply a private religion. It is driven by a powerful political agenda. It is an ideology with a plan for world domination. The ideology backs into the religious belief system… Muslim people are challenged not to be
content until all non-Islamic laws are replaced by Shariah law… The proposed Islamic legal system—built on Quranic teaching—seeks to legislate in areas of personal life that Australians would find impossible to accept or tolerate. (Camden Ministers Fraternal, 2008)

Notwithstanding my scepticism regarding the unverified claims about a generalised Muslim intention for ‘world domination’ and the alleged aim held by ‘Muslim people’ for all non-Islamic laws to be replaced by shari‘ah law, I noted that this letter from established Protestant churches expressed three interrelated assumptions about the place of religion and religious education in contemporary Australia: firstly, that religions and religious education are to conform to mainstream Australian culture and the ‘expectations outlined by the Australian government’; secondly, those ‘world religions’ that are acceptable are necessarily otherworldly and confined to the private realm for the sake of ‘living in harmony’; thirdly, and consequently, any religion or religious education that seeks to govern all areas of life is unacceptable.

This incident raised many questions in my mind around the question of religious education more generally – and religious schooling more particularly as its most conspicuous institutional expression – within the present educational system in Australia. Taken together with the questions I had about the present system and its logic, I now also began to ask some questions that would form the basis for this thesis: Are some forms of religious schooling considered more acceptable than others
and how has this come to be decided? If so, then how are the religious claims and values of such ‘acceptable’ religious schools understood to be substantiated in the context of the present educational system? Are particular religious schools so different if, in their manifold variety, they can be rated and ranked beside differently religious and non-religious schools? And, if religion does not exist as a transcendent object above the fray of history, society and politics but always involves immanent practices, then what is the role of religious schooling within the present social order?

These critical questions coincide with the new public visibility of religion in ostensibly secular-liberal societies and speak directly to the debate over its presence in the educational apparatus of the Australian State. Taking the NCPC schooling movement as a particular instance of ‘acceptable’ religious schooling in Australia – a movement whose religious bases I have some familiarity with owing to several years of teaching in a NCPC school\(^1\) – this thesis can be seen as an initial step on the way to seeking answers to these questions, questions that are at once social and personal, public and private, secular and religious, and always inescapably political.

A conjunctural approach to discourse, tradition and hegemony

According to Ward (2004, p. 4), the new visibility of religion in the public sphere is occurring at the same time as the latter sphere itself undergoing change, which means that the crucial task in this present moment is an investigation of the

\(^1\) In this time, I also completed a Certificate in Christian Education on the foundations for a neo-Calvinist approach to education, as well as a course on the ‘development of Christian schooling in Australia,’ which provided a historical perspective on the development of neo-Calvinist schooling alongside other forms of religious and non-religious schooling in Australia. Both courses were conducted by the National Institute for Christian Education, which is the teacher education arm of the NCPC schooling movement and an accredited provider of higher education courses. See Chapter 4.
connection between the two forms of cultural change. In the first half of this thesis, I seek to contribute to this task by looking broadly to the historical antecedents of the present understanding of religious education vis-à-vis non-religious (or secular) education in Australia. This will be followed in the latter half by a critical inquiry into the place of religious schooling within the present socio-political context and the effects of the latter on the former. In this regard, I shall look at the example of the NCPC schooling movement as a specific type of religious schooling within an educational system structured along neo-liberal lines. Apart from the status of NCPC schooling in academic research as ‘an overlooked sector in the Australian education market’ and my own facility with its religious underpinnings mentioned above, I submit that the NCPC schooling movement presents as an important and instructive instance of religious schooling for three further reasons brought to the fore by the Protestant churches in the case of the proposed Islamic school in Camden.

Firstly, with regard to the claimed necessity for religions to accept mainstream Australian cultural values and abide by the expectations of the government, the NCPC schooling movement was initiated in the 1950s explicitly as a movement opposed to the mainstream, state-run education system in Australia (Justins, 2002). For the Dutch neo-Calvinist migrants who were the impetus for the movement, as will be detailed further in Chapter 4, their expansive religious vision led them to regard mainstream Australian culture’s impact on education at the time – including shared moral expectations that students be ‘courteous towards older people and do many good deeds’ and ‘goodness, friendliness, politeness’ (as cited in Justins, 2002, p. 59) – as radically insufficient without God and hence unacceptable in itself. Concurrently and secondly, in light of broader questions regarding the ‘acceptability’
or ‘unacceptability’ of certain religious schools owing to their acceptance or refusal to confine religion to the private realm for the sake of ‘living in harmony,’ the NCPC schooling movement in Australia was marked at the outset by the refusal to bracket its religious discourse off from aspects of schooling and life considered to be non-religious. As NCPC schooling proponent Janet Nyhouse (1980) asserts:

The children will be taught about the effects of sin, the misery and suffering it causes in our countries and throughout the world, and the task of the body of Christ in bringing redemption to bear on all of life. The Christian school is a place where children are prepared to be the salt of the earth, to bring renewal and reformation to the world. (p. 83)

The charge to bring ‘redemption to bear on all of life’ and ‘bring renewal and reformation to the world’ brings up the third reason why the NCPC schooling case is instructive; for if it is the case that any religion or religious education that seeks to govern all areas of life is unacceptable, then why is it that the NCPC schooling movement – with its insistence on the all-pervasiveness of its religious discourse in education – is not only acceptable as rare a exception to the education system, but now incorporates over 80 schools across Australia with approximately 23,000 students and 2,000 teaching staff (CEN, 2010)? More specifically, how does NCPC schooling render itself amenable to the broader education system and in turn, how does the education system render NCPC schooling amenable to its goals? The passage of the NCPC schooling movement from an antagonistic alternative to the
mainstream education system to its current status as an institutional feature of the latter thus presents as a potentially illuminating story of religious schooling in Australia, in particular of what constitutes ‘acceptable’ forms of religion in education and how this is managed in relation to the present neo-liberal regime.

In order to discern the place and role of the NCPC schooling movement as an instance of religious schooling in the present socio-political order, I submit that the crucial focus should lie on how the religious language and practices of the former are elaborated in relation to non-religious language and practices within shifting historical and political contexts (see Salvatore, 2007). In this way, I understand its religious aspects not merely as a set of beliefs but as a discourse, which, as I shall elaborate further below, entails ‘an entire practice which works like an economy (and as a language) distributing and proportioning reality through a series of substitutions and exchanges’ (Milbank, 2009b, p. 109).

As such, I do not regard religion as a universally identifiable ‘thing’ by recourse to an essence – for example, faith or sublime experiences – but rather as involving a diversity of complex (re)interpretations and (re)formulations across time and space, not least in relation to that against which it is defined – that is, the non-religious or secular. This is an important point because as mentioned above, ‘religion’ and ‘the secular’ are mutually implicated and how they are defined and demarcated does not stand apart from those historical and political contexts in which such definitions and demarcations are put into effect (Asad, 2001). Thus, as Asad (1993) points out, objects considered to be religious symbols in a particular context – for example, the Qur’an or the name ‘Jesus Christ’ in Islamic or Christian types of
schools respectively – ‘cannot be understood independently of their historical relations with non-religious symbols or of their articulations in and of social life, in which work and power are always crucial’ (pp. 53-54). What he means by ‘work and power’ I take to mean the connection between religious language and particular social practices on the one hand, and broader political relations on the other.

Elsewhere, for instance, Asad (2001) states in different terms that religious ‘faith’ is ‘a relationship created through, maintained by, and expressed in practice’ (i.e. work), while the secular entails not merely a lack of religion, but the imposition of politically normative ‘behaviours, knowledges and sensibilities in modern life’ (i.e. power) (pp. 208, 25). This connection between religious and secular is also highlighted by MacIntyre (1998a), who comments about the conceptual difficulties he has faced in segregating the area of religious belief and practice from the rest of social life – that is, ‘treating it as a *sui generis* form of life with its own standards internal to it’ (p. 257). This is because ‘the claims embodied in the uses of religious language and practice are in crucial ways inseparable from a variety of nonreligious metaphysical, scientific, and moral claims’ (MacIntyre, 1998a, p. 257).

Following these broad prescriptions about how the religious and non-religious should be seen as mutually defined within the context of broader political relations, how then should the relationship between religious schooling and its socio-political situation in Australia be approached in my specific case at hand? To inquire into the NCPC schooling movement as a particular instance of religious schooling in relation to the broader neo-liberal context, I adopt a general mode of inquiry that can be characterised as a ‘conjunctural analysis’ in the discipline of cultural studies.
Following the work of cultural studies scholar Stuart Hall (e.g. 1988), Lawrence Grossberg (2010) defines a ‘conjuncture’ as:

[C]haracterized by an articulation, accumulation, and condensation of contradictions, a fusion of different currents or circumstances. A conjuncture is a description of a social formation as fractured and conflictual, along multiple axes, planes and scales, constantly in search of temporary balances or structural stabilities through a variety of practices and processes of struggle and negotiation. (pp. 40-41; also 2006)

Based on this, an analysis of conjunctures can thus be broadly understood as an approach that is attentive to the configuration of different historical tendencies and political elements into a stable set of societal and institutional arrangements that prevail in a given time and place, forming what I have labelled a regime, albeit only contingently and temporarily (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 106; also Grossberg, 2010, pp. 25, 317n42). So, in the present case, religious schooling can be seen as a conjuncture based on specific understandings of ‘religion’ and ‘education.’ The function and meaning of religion in education from such a view cannot be determined as given, but is dependent upon how it articulates with other social forces within a specific time and place (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) – that is, in this case, how the relation among religious and non-religious elements are established such that the meaning of both are modified as a result of the articulatory practice. This point is well explicated by Hall (1996), who argues that while ‘in one historical-
social formation after another, religion has been bound up in particular ways, wired up very directly, as the cultural and ideological underpinning of a particular structure of power’ (p. 142), nonetheless what characterises religion must be sought within specific conjunctures. This is because:

Religion has no necessary political connotation... it has no necessary, intrinsic, transhistorical belongingness. Its meaning – political and ideological—comes precisely from its position within a formation. It comes with what else it is articulated to. Since those articulations are not inevitable… religion can be articulated in more than one way. (Hall, 1996, p. 142)

Religion in this approach should thus not be supposed as having a fixed or essential meaning, but should be understood in relation to specific political relations (e.g. schools within a neo-liberal context) and their deployment by specific movements (e.g. NCPC schooling movement). As Redden (2011, p. 658) points out following Hall, these specificities inflect, develop and engage with religion to construct narratives that transform people’s awareness of themselves and their potential in directions that cannot be determined a priori. So Christianity, for example, ‘has been articulated with groups that advance very different social agendas and associated subject positions, from political liberation to colonial civilizing missions and the domestication of social conservatism’ (Redden, 2011, p. 659). This point is also elaborated by Žižek, Santner & Reinhard (2005), who point out
specifically with regard to the Jewish and Christian commandments to ‘love God’ or ‘love your neighbour’ that the meaning of these injunctions cannot be taken as self-evident, even for those who claim adherence to them:

[For] just as love of God can be interpreted in terms of many divergent practices, from private meditation to public martyrdom, so the intent and extent of the commandment to love the neighbor are obscure and have frequently been points of radical disagreement and sectarian division, even in mainstream interpretation. (p. 5)

Hence, in the present thesis, I maintain that the ‘religious’ aspects of religious education cannot be taken as self-contained units of belief that either have secondary effects on education, or are themselves secondary effects. Rather, it should be characterised as a product of the conjuncture that is religious schooling today, that is, specific articulations within a specific socio-political context between different interpretations of what constitutes ‘religious education’ as borne by different historical lineages, or what I following Asad (1986) have termed discursive traditions.

The concept of discursive traditions used in this thesis emphasises the historicity of the present and the attempted coherence of subjectivities, practices and institutions within particular socio-political situations. It brings to the fore the historical specificity of ways of understanding that frame, discipline and order
perceptions, actions and participation in the world. As an analytical device, it
involves the concatenation of two theoretical concepts: ‘discourse’ and ‘tradition.’
Briefly put, a discourse is here defined as any ‘relational totality of signifying
sequences that together constitute a more or less coherent framework for what can be
said and done.’ (Torfing, 1999, p. 300) This notion of discourse signals the centrality
of interpretations of meaning in every aspect of social life. When a particular
discourse achieves moral, intellectual and political dominance through the
agglomeration of other discourses under its particular set of norms, values, views and
interpretations of the world, it can be considered hegemonic – that is, ‘what is at a
given moment accepted as the ‘natural’ order, jointly with the common sense that
accompanies it’ (Mouffe, 2009, p. 549; also Gramsci, 1971, pp. 630-656).

It is important to note that by ‘agglomeration’ I do not mean that the
proponents of a dominant interpretation simply compel those who hold to other
understandings; rather, as Strinati (1995) points out, the notion of hegemony
following Italian Marxist writer Antonio Gramsci holds that: ‘subordinated groups
accept the ideas, values and leadership of the dominant group not because they are
physically or mentally induced to do so, nor because they are ideologically
indoctrinated, but because they have reason of their own’ (p. 166, emphasis added).
As such, when considering the example of the NCPC schooling movement in the
second half of this thesis, I take it as important to focus on its particular discourse as
a specific instance of religious schooling in this thesis, for such attention is necessary
in order to discern the ‘reasons of their own’ that may explain their place within a
regime structured according to neo-liberal discourse.
In turn, if a hegemonic discourse regulates social life through the institution of its interpretation of the world, which also involves the suppression and exclusion of other interpretations – for example, by establishing a system of schooling based on a certain construal of ‘good education’ over others or encouraging certain forms of religious expression and excluding others through state power – then it can be characterised as a regime. By this latter term, I denote specific forms of government that call attention both to the rule of particular groups, as well as the particular routine practices – that is, a regimen – that come to constitute a way of life in a given historical conjuncture (Cantor, 1995). Drawn from the Greek notion of politeia (i.e. polity), it foregrounds the political establishment and direction of every society, which consists in setting the form of its institutional arrangements and routine practices, as well as the horizons of its expectations and aspirations. The political philosopher Leo Strauss (1988[1956]) offers an apt description of this key term:

Regime is the order, the form, which gives society its character… Regime is the form of life as living together, the manner of living of society and in society, since this manner depends decisively on the predominance of human beings of a certain type, on the manifest domination of society by human beings of a certain type. Regime means that whole, which we today are in the habit of viewing primarily in a fragmentized form: regime means simultaneously the form of life of a society, its style of life, its moral taste, form of society, form of state, form of government, spirit of laws. (p. 36)
Following this broad definition, a regime can thus be taken to denote a form of rule, or more specifically a ruling element, within any given society and the ruling norms embodied within it (Zuckert and Zuckert, 2006, p. 191). As such, every regime can be characterised as the institution of social practices, most prominently through policies and legislation, which are based on a particular interpretation of the world – that is, a hegemonic discourse. According to Michel Foucault (1980, p. 131), such a discursive regime – or what he aptly terms a ‘regime of truth’ – works not only to promote and make commonsense its vision of life and the future, but also to discipline and coerce conformity with it through institutions, primarily the state and its constituent apparatuses such as the education system, legislation and social policies: ‘their power is persuading people to their logic; to believe and act in relation to this logic.’ (Dodge, 2004, p. 205; also Grossberg, 2010, pp. 25, 317n42) In this thesis, I use the concept of regime to characterise the institution of a particular hegemonic discourse – neo-liberalism – and its normative ideals over others and through that to explain a host of related phenomena like religion and education within its purview (Cantor, 1995).
If the theoretical concept of discourse foregrounds the political relations between contending interpretive frames that seek to inscribe meaning to reality in a given conjuncture, then \textit{tradition} on the other hand is a heuristic device that stresses the historicity of all discourses. According to Hirschkind (1995), the concept of discursive traditions names the politically contingent and historically evolving sets of meanings embodied in the languages, practices and institutions that are embedded in societies or social groups. According to this perspective therefore, all human beings live in a stream of history and are hence always already located in traditions of discourse.

Tradition so understood should thus not be taken as an inert body of sedimented knowledges and practices from the past, but rather the ‘continuity of meaning in history through its re-articulation and re-actualisation \textit{[because]} tradition is both the condition and the \textit{process} of our understanding.’ (Bielskis, 2005: 106) In this sense, discursive traditions can be defined as the historically evolving set of
discourses embodied in the practices and institutions of various social groups vis-à-vis their contingent historical and political circumstances, and which are deeply imbricated in the material life of those inhabiting them. In the first three chapters of this thesis, I seek to demonstrate by means of a genealogy of the concept of ‘religious education’ how the present neo-liberal regime is built upon a particular discursive tradition – namely, the Anglo-liberal tradition. In these chapters, I construct a broad narrative about how religious education has been conceived in this tradition over time and the key historical antecedents that have given rise to present conceptions.

In the latter three chapters of this thesis, I turn from the broad genealogical story of religious education within the neo-liberal regime to focus more specifically on the NCPC schooling movement in relation to it. The point of this analytical move is to foreground the manner in which the respective inherited presuppositions arising from the discursive tradition of the latter interact with that of the former. My primary goal in these chapters is thus to discern the historical and contemporary processes by which, and the extent to which, the discourses of NCPC schooling are rendered amenable to the dominant discourse of neo-liberalism and what effects this might have on NCPC schooling specifically, and the question of religious schooling more generally. On a broader level, I seek to contribute to the broader debates over the new public visibility of religion by pointing to the historical and political processes of how it has unfolded (and is unfolding) in the field of school education in Australia, as well as how the categories of secular/religious and public/private may be inadequate for capturing the manner in which the hegemony of neo-liberal
discourse is sustained by a regime that traverses, through various instruments, these dichotomies at the same time as it upholds them.

**The long route through history: Thesis in outline**

In his sweeping account of religion and the secular, Taylor (2007, pp. 90-95) cautions against ‘straight path accounts’ of modern secularity as a linear, progressive realisation of a rational and scientifically ordered world, where an autonomous nature is said to be ‘freed’ from a religious outlook. Following Taylor’s advice for my own, far humbler thesis project, I shall address the question of how religious schooling is related to the neo-liberal regime in the present by taking a path described by philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1991, pp. 24-25) as the ‘long route of hermeneutic detours,’ particularly through history (also Kearney, 2006, pp. ix-xi). For in order to come to grips with how particular commonsense ‘facts’ come to be so, ‘we do not begin with pure reflective consciousness,’ for such a task can only be ‘accomplished by means of a long detour through those significations of history and culture that reside outside our immediate consciousness’ (Ricoeur as cited in Kearney, 2004, p. 13).

Following Ricoeur’s analytical metaphor of a long route of detours, I shall in the first place seek to offer a genealogical account of how religion and religious education *vis-à-vis* secular education came to be politically constituted by such contemporaneously commonsense distinctions as secular/religious and public/private, as well as its corollaries like natural/supernatural, other-worldly/this-
worldly and beliefs/practices. On the basis of this detour through history, I will then seek to discern how the NCPC schooling movement as an instance of religious education in Australia positions itself and is positioned in relation to neo-liberal regime, and whether the present debates along the public/private and secular/religious lines are adequate for capturing this.

In Chapter 1, I establish a framework for a genealogical account of the way religion and religious education is defined in official discourse and presupposed in debates over religious schooling in Australia today. Structured as a prolegomenon (i.e. preliminary observations and interpretive key; see Kant, 1977; Lukes, 1971) to the rest of this thesis, I begin by asking: What is religious education, particularly as expressed in the form of religious schooling in Australia? I begin addressing this question by means of an extended engagement with the debates that surround it along the public/private and secular/religious lines and how representatives of each position might negatively or positively construe religious schooling. In addition, I examine through various critical scholars of religion and secularism some of the presuppositions that the various positions in these debates may implicitly rely upon in their understanding of what religious schooling entails. I then go on to specify how religious education is officially understood by governmental and juridical institutions in Australia today before historicising the present definition of religious education as a product of a particular discursive tradition, specifically the Anglo-liberal tradition. Given that the focus, even at the most general level, is driven by a critical inquiry into how religion and religious education are construed in Australia today, I neither pretend to offer a comprehensive history of liberalism or education in the European West, Britain or even Australia, nor a comprehensive history of Christianity in the
West, Britain or Australia let alone a history of religions in general. Rather, what I seek to offer is a particular historicised account of how religious education has come to be defined, debated and acted upon over time in relevant geographic and cultural spheres insofar as it explains the Australian case. In short, my genealogical accounts in Chapters 2 and 3 are governed by the question: How has religious education come to be defined and positioned as it is in Australia today?

Drawing on this conception of tradition as it has been successively developed in the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Alasdair MacIntyre and Talal Asad, I begin addressing this question by interpreting what I understand to be the historical antecedents of religious education in what I call the Anglo-liberal discursive tradition to its overlapping influences from nominalism, Protestantism and early-English liberalism in Chapter 2. In addition, I also counter-pose the commonsense framing of religious education along the public/private and secular/religious lines with the notion of hegemony and the related concept of the ‘integral state’ from Gramsci and others (e.g. Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). In doing so, I seek to demonstrate how the public/private and secular/religious distinctions in Anglo-liberal discourse – one presupposed by nearly all the positions in the debate over religious schooling in Australia – mask a latent ‘circuit of power’ between the two spheres that reinforce hegemonic judgments of acceptable and unacceptable religious education and by what standards and for which purposes such judgments can be made.

The operation of this circuit of power is further demonstrated in Chapter 3 through a consideration of how ‘secular’ and ‘public’ schooling in Australia and particularly the ‘mother colony’ of New South Wales was established after
colonisation in 1788. In this chapter, I develop the Gramscian reading introduced in the previous chapter to underscore the populist politics involved in this establishment of state-run public education in the late Nineteenth century and the concomitant institution of a nominalist, Protestant and liberal definition of its ‘other’—practices of religious education that are considered amenable and acceptable for the progress of the nation versus those that are not, specifically Roman Catholic education.

Following this, I chart how religious education in this discursive tradition was built upon through the period of nation-building under what I label a broadly social liberal regime geared towards securing the good of the nation, to its eventual supplanting by the prevailing neo-liberal regime oriented toward preparing the nation for the globalisation of capitalist markets through the standardisation of education and the institution of a market in school choice.

In such a context, how is religious education as expressed in the NCPC schooling movement to be understood? In order to address this question, I shift focus in Chapter 4 by introducing religious education as it is understood in a discursive tradition adjacent to the Anglo-liberal one— that of the neo-Calvinist tradition—stressing their points of divergence and overlap. In particular, I trace the genealogy of the NCPC schooling movement by interpreting the development of neo-Calvinist discourse on religious education from the expansive theo-political teachings of second generation Protestant Reformer John Calvin, through the politics of Theo Van Prinsterer and Abraham Kuyper in nineteenth-century Netherlands, to a movement in Australia borne by post-Second World War Dutch migrants for a particular type of schooling based on religious education as it is understood in this tradition. After an account of its inception and growth in Australia from the 1950s-on, I outline some of
the theological principles and ‘foundational values’ of contemporary neo-Calvinist
‘parent-controlled’ schools, the latter specifically emphasising the primacy of
parental responsibility over the education of their children and the vision of training
‘responsive disciples’ who will glorify God/Christ in every arena of social life. I
close this chapter by posing questions relating to the conjunction between the NCPC
schooling movement – as bearers of a particular discursive tradition of religious
education – and the discourse of the broader neo-liberal regime in Australia built on
the presuppositions of the Anglo-liberal discursive tradition. In particular, I ask: How
does the NCPC schooling movement relate its theologically-informed foundational
values to the neo-liberal imperative to prepare the citizenry for globalisation,
specifically though the institution of standardised education and a market for school
choice?

In attempting to answer this question, Chapters 5 and 6 draw on the discursive
antecedents of the neo-Calvinist and Anglo-liberal traditions outlined in the previous
chapters that undergird the contemporary NCPC schooling movement and the
prevailing neo-liberal discourse respectively, as well as a consideration of the
discursive processes that characterise the relations between the two in the context of
the present institutional arrangements in Australian education. In order to discern the
logics of the neo-liberal regime, I have chosen to focus on Australian Government
policy platforms and documents pertaining to education. This emphasis is based on
the assumption that policy discourses generate discursive ‘commonsense’ insofar as
they ‘produce frameworks of sense and obviousness within which policy is thought,
talked and written about’ (Ball, 2005, p. 44). Here, I follow Easton’s understanding
of policy as ‘the authoritative allocation of values’ (as cited in Rizvi & Lingard,
2010, p. 7). By drawing from a variety of key Government policies and declarations, I argue that this gives an indication of the regulatory logics that constitute the broader neo-liberal regime and that frame the NCPC schooling movement.

Specifically in Chapter 5, I deal with the relationship between the NCPC schooling movement’s avowed foundational value of training ‘responsive disciples’ by actualising their God-given gifts and talents, and the neo-liberal ‘public purpose of schooling,’ which is to train students as future worker-citizens to be productive and employable under conditions of an (allegedly) inevitable globalising labour market. In taking into account the discursive antecedents of both the neo-Calvinist and Anglo-liberal traditions, I argue that the mediating nexus between the two discourses on education are federally-imposed measures of standards, which function to regulate schools through accountability requirements and comparative ratings. On the basis of such regulations, as I shall explore in Chapter 6, the institution of a national market for school choice is also made possible under a neo-liberal regime insofar as these standardised measures provide a uniform scale for comparison between choices. The relationship between this marketisation and the NCPC schooling movement’s foundational value of parental responsibility is considered, again taking into account the discursive antecedents of both the neo-Calvinist and Anglo-liberal traditions and the discursive processes that mark the relationship between the NCPC schooling movement and its broader neo-liberal context in the present. In both Chapters 5 and 6, a Gramscian reading as used in the previous chapters will be elaborated to demonstrate how the hegemonic regime is sustained through the circuit of power encompassing regulation through policies and legislation flowing in one direction, and consent by the NCPC schooling movement
flowing in the other. In other words, it involves discursive processes that belie any simple bifurcation of religious schooling along the public/private or secular/religious lines.

In the concluding chapter of this thesis, I return to the debate over the new visibility of religious schooling in Australia on the basis of the entire argument unfolded in these chapters. In particular, I restate the arguments presented in this thesis and relate these to the present categorisations of religious schooling along the secular/religious and public/private lines. In cognisance of the limitations of this thesis, I also gesture towards further research that can be done, in particular conjunctural analyses of the discursive traditions and political positioning of non-Christian religious education in contemporary Australia. Finally, I close by drawing on the findings in this thesis to put forward some provisional responses and further questions regarding the new visibility of religion in Australia and other societies similarly structured along (neo)liberal-secular lines.
Chapter 1 – A prolegomenon to genealogies of religious education

Introduction

This chapter is intended to function as a prolegomenon for the chapters that follow in this thesis. The broad question that governs this chapter is the following: What is religious education, particularly in the form of religious schooling? I begin by foregrounding how religious education – in particular its most prominent institutional manifestation in the form of religious schooling – is officially understood by governmental and juridical institutions in Australia in the present historical conjuncture. Having sketched what religious education is as defined officially, I then historicise the present definitions of religious education by asking: How has it come to be defined as such? In order to address this question, I draw primarily on the analytical device of ‘discursive traditions’ as developed variously in the work of hermeneutic scholar Hans-Georg Gadamer, moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre and anthropologist Talal Asad. On the basis of this approach, the subsequent three chapters will then locate the prevailing definition of religious education as a product of a particular Anglo-liberal discursive tradition, one that was implanted into Australia after colonisation in 1788 and subsequently built upon, as well as how religious education is defined in an adjacent discursive tradition – that of neo-Calvinism.

How is religious education officially conceived in contemporary Australia?
Contemporary religious education in Australia can be seen as a conjunction of two key elements – ‘religion’ and ‘education’ – both of which are complex terms that frequently recur in political and policy debates. With regard to the first term, the difficulties faced in trying to define it and its relation to broader social formations and politics are not lost on many Australian political theorists such as Smith, Vromen and Cook (2006), who in their popular handbook *Keywords in Australian Politics* have called attention to ‘religion’ as ‘a notoriously difficult concept’ (p. 152).

Nevertheless, in order to determine how religious education is conceived in Australia today, I have taken as a starting point the official definitions of each term – that is, ‘religion’ on the one hand and ‘education’ on the other – as expressed in the conjuncture of religious schooling in government policy and subsequently debated in the field of politics. First of all, the complications arising from trying to define religion as a variegated phenomenon are not lost at the level of policymaking and government. As the official statistical apparatus of the Federal Government – the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS, 2006) – readily admits: ‘Precise definition of the concept of religion, or of what generally constitutes ‘a religion,’ is difficult, if not impossible, because of the intangible and wide-ranging nature of the topic.’

\[2\] Despite their initial caveat, Smith et al (2006) nevertheless assert that ‘religion’ is commonly differentiated from ‘spirituality’ in Australian political discourse insofar as ‘religion is usually defined in a sociological way as shared beliefs, experiences and practices relating to the sacred that unite people into more or less organised group’ while ‘spirituality’ designates the belief in ‘the sacred’ – ‘[which] may encompass one or more gods, as well as other forces that transcend or go beyond everyday human experiences’ (p. 152) – at the level of the individual. However, it is clear from Smith at al neither where the demarcation of ‘religion’ from ‘spirituality’ lies, nor what role it plays in the relations between individuals and groups. I submit, following the work of Carette and King (2005), that the contemporary definition of the difference between religion and spirituality, just like the distinctions between the religious and the secular or religion and the public that are the focus of the present thesis, cannot be understood without a consideration of the specific historical and political antecedents that have given rise to this distinction, as well as the social and political uses of this distinction and its effects.
Having acknowledged the near impossibility of the task, however, the ABS nonetheless provides a working definition of what constitutes a religion for the purposes of classification – known as the Australian Standard Classification of Religious Groups (ASCRG):

Generally, a religion is regarded as a set of beliefs and practices, usually involving acknowledgment of a divine or higher being or power, by which people order the conduct of their lives both practically and in a moral sense. (ABS, 2006)

The ASCRG’s definition of religion as a mixture of beliefs, practices and a cognitive assent to ‘a Supernatural Being giving some form and meaning to existence’ (ABS, 2006) refers specifically to a landmark ruling in the High Court of Australia: the 1982-83 Church of the New Faith v Commissioner for Pay-Roll Tax (Vic) case. In this matter, the High Court held that the beliefs, practices and observances of the Church of the New Faith (i.e. Scientology) were to be recognized as a religion in the state of Victoria. As part of the ruling, it was stated that:

For the purposes of the law, the criteria of religion are twofold: first, belief in a Supernatural Being, Thing or Principle; and second, the acceptance of canons of conduct in order to give effect to that belief, though canons of conduct which offend against the ordinary laws are outside the area of any immunity, privilege or
right conferred on the grounds of religion. (*Church of the New Faith v. Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax [Vic], 1982-3*)

Thus, religion for the purposes of the ASCRG as well as its legal definition as stipulated by the High Court of Australia can be summarised as twofold: firstly and primarily, religion is a *belief* in a Supernatural Being, Thing or Principle – i.e. an extra-empirical object/s; and secondly as a consequence of such belief, particular types of conduct that are taken to arise from that prior belief. What is noteworthy about this governmental definition of religion is its generality: by its own parameters, it is broad enough to encompass mental states, concerns and practices that are not conventionally considered to be religious. For example, patriotism expressed in the form of avowed loyalty to the nation-state accompanied by participation in national celebrations and pilgrimages to iconic sites of military battle or, alternatively, an intellectual and practical commitment to a Marxist revolution, would qualify as ‘religion’ under the terms of such a definition (see respectively, Marvin & Ingle, 1999 and Irons, 2001, p.295). However, that such beliefs and practices are not considered to be categorised as such for governmental purposes raises the question of how religion is defined and for what purposes. As Asad (1989) suggests, rather than attempt to demarcate what is within the sphere of religion and what is not, a better question would be: ‘how does power create religion?’ (p. 45) More specifically with regard to the concerns of this thesis, what are the politics underlying the categorisation of certain forms of education as religious and others as non-religious or secular?
Having sketched the prevailing definition of religion for the purposes of legal and official classification, it is now appropriate to canvass the prevailing definition of the second term in the articulation of religious education: that is, of education as it pertains to schooling, which is the primary focus of this thesis. According to the Australian Government Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR), education through schooling is described as a key training ground for its future citizens, workers and indeed, for the prospects of the nation as a whole:

Australia’s future depends on a high quality and dynamic school education system to provide students with foundation skills, values, knowledge and understanding necessary for lifelong learning, employment and full participation in society. The education system is of the highest standard and enjoys international renown. (DEEWR, 2011)

Schooling described as such serves the stated function of developing subjects committed to the continuous accumulation of skills and knowledge throughout an individual lifetime, their employment prospects and civic participation. Where then, can religious education in the form of religious schooling be located with regard to this national imperative of education? According to the DEEWR (2011) and as mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, primary and secondary schools in Australia are formally divided into ‘government’ and ‘non-government’ schools,
with the latter consisting mostly of schools with some religious affiliation (approximately 94 per cent).

Thus, under the present institutional arrangements, Australian schooling consists of two broad sectors along which the non-religious or secular/religious distinction corresponds broadly with the categories of government/non-government – or synonymously, public/private – respectively. However, despite their non-government and private status, religious schools remain funded and governed by the Australian Federal and State governments (DEEWR, 2011). While the regulatory conditions underlying such a commitment to religious schools on the part of successive Federal and State governments will be touched on in the later chapters of this thesis, which focus on the effects of such conditions on the form and content of religious education particularly in NCPC schooling, suffice to point out at present that for the purposes of classification and governance, education in religious schools is categorised as a form of schooling that is considered non-government and private. However, such schools are still obligated to administer, to a large extent, the ‘foundation skills, values, knowledge and understanding’ held as necessary for the good of the nation and its citizens. Within the Australian context, the articulation of religion and education in the form of religious schooling thus denotes a particular conjunction of belief in a Supernatural Being, Thing or Principle with its associated moral conduct on the one hand, and the training of desired citizens and workers on the other.
Such a conjunction is evident in the public discourse of politicians and policymakers when articulating the appropriate relationship between the two elements. For example, Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard, when pressed on the question of religion and religious institutions' provision of social services, including education, asserts:

I think the church in contemporary society, obviously it is the mainstay, the sort of wellspring of faith and belief and existence for literally millions of Australians, and that’s to be respected [...] Government does what it can and can provide resources, but often the real innovation, the real human touch comes from churches, comes from not-for-profit organizations, that then take those resources and use them in their own special way. (as cited in Stephens, 2010)

From this statement, two points should be noted: firstly, the conventional regard of religion and religious institutions as per the legal and official governmental definition as a ‘wellspring of faith and belief and existence’ that then produces ‘real innovation, the real human touch’; and secondly, the relationship of the Australian Government to such religious institutions as one of ‘providing resources.’ With regard to religious schooling, the precise nature of such ‘resourcing’ in the form of standardised guidelines on various aspects of schooling will be considered in more detail in later chapters. More specifically, the following statement by Barry McGaw,
Chair of the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA), can be seen as indicative of how religious education in such institutions may be conceived. Speaking on the planned design and implementation of a nationwide standardised curriculum in 2013/14, he states:

We’ve got to make a clearer statement of what the whole curriculum will look like and what its time demands will be [...] My aim would be that the total curriculum would not command more than 80 per cent of a student’s time, the equivalent of four days a week. The rest of the time is for all the other things that schools do: the camping, excursions, cultural activities, the religious education in faith-based schools. We must leave space for these important things.

(McGaw as cited in Milburn, 2011)

McGaw here defines ‘religious education’ as one element in ‘faith-based schools’ that approximates to 20 per cent of school time or one school day, as well as setting it in a relation of equivalence to other ‘important things’ such as camping, excursions, etc. Drawing from the official legal and governmental definitions of ‘religion’ and ‘education’ in conjunction with McGaw’s positioning of religious education and Gillard’s articulation of the role of religious institutions such as schools vis-à-vis the Australian Government, a general definition of how religious

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3 All states and territories in Australia will implement the proposed national curriculum in 2013 with the exception of the state of NSW, which will implement the national curriculum in 2014. See ‘Lack of funds, uncertainty delay NSW national curriculum start date’ (2011).
education in religious schools is conceived in the present may be summarised as follows: Religious schools typically teach much the same general curriculum as common schools, and share the general aim of preparing children for the aims of citizenship and employment; but, in addition, they seek to pass on a particular set of religious beliefs about extra-empirical objects and their associated moral conducts. This latter objective is commonly defined as religious education. In light of this, the debates over religious schooling along the public/private and secular/religious lines surveyed in the previous chapter can thus also be understood as corresponding respectively to the function of religious schools as schools with regard to the general aim of schooling to train students for citizenship and employment as a public good on the one hand, and with regard to the religious function of religious schools, which is taken to be the transmission of particular and private beliefs and values on the other.

The contingencies of religion and education

The historical narratives of a cultural history pay particular attention to change or ‘ruptures’ in knowledge and how these changes order, intern, and enclose social, cultural, and political action. When considering educational history, the concern is how ideas construct, shape, coordinate, and constitute social practices through which individuals ‘reason’ about their participation and identity. (Popkewitz, Franklin & Pereyra, 2001, p. x)
So far, I have outlined how religious education, especially as it pertains to the institutional form of religious schooling, is held to be concerned with the delivery of educational services in a religious context. Yet such a definition elides the question of how ‘religion’ and indeed ‘education’ themselves have come to be understood as such. As critical pedagogues such as Paulo Freire (e.g. 1972), Ira Shor (1992), Peter McLaren (1989), bell hooks (1994) and Henry Giroux (1988; 1992) have brought to the fore in the past several decades, the two prevalent educational myths within liberal social orders are that education is a neutral activity, and consequently that education is – or should be – an apolitical activity involving the transmission of necessary ‘know-how’ (also Torres, 1998). According to such a liberal perspective, education – including education not directly controlled by the liberal state – is subject to the requirement of neutrality, which is understood as the eschewal of any particular conception of political or ethical good in the delivery of key ‘educational resources’ (Elliot & Hatton, 1994, pp. 52-54). By contrast, the position taken here concurs with critical pedagogy’s refusal to regard how education is defined as politically neutral or innocently technical. As McLaren (2009) elaborates, school knowledge in education is inextricably tied to differential power relations (or what I call politics) in history and society:

Critical educational theorists view school knowledge as historically and socially rooted and interest bound.

Knowledge acquired in school – or anywhere, for that matter – is never neutral or objective but is ordered and structured in particular ways; its emphasis and exclusions partake in a
silent logic. Knowledge is a social construction deeply rooted in the nexus of power relations. (p. 63)

If historicity and politics are part and parcel of how education is conceived in the present, then one may say the same thing with regards to ‘religion.’ That is to say how religion is defined is not neutral trans-historically or trans-culturally. As with ‘education,’ variations in the historical relationships between power and knowledge are such that the search for a universal or neutral definition of religion constitutes a futile exercise. Asad (1993, p. 29) argues, for example, that ‘there cannot be a universal definition of religion, not only because its constituent elements and relationships are historically specific, but because that definition is itself the historical product of discursive processes.’ Any attempt, therefore, to produce a universal or neutral definition of religion constitutes a denial of the historical specificity of religious phenomena, as well as the historically specific interplays of power and knowledge that define religion (and non-religion) in particular ways for particular societies. To define religion is thus always a politically partial act (Asad, 2001, p. 220). The work of religious studies scholar Timothy Fitzgerald (1995, p. 35) concurs with Asad’s argument, pointing out that the usage of the words ‘religion,’ ‘religions’ and ‘world religions’ by scholars of society and culture often betrays a certain ‘fuzziness, ambiguity and contradictoriness.’ He argues that phenomena categorised as ‘religion’ must always be understood first in their political function as the opposite of the modern secular state and rational science in Anglo-European societies, and historically peculiar insofar as ‘the invention of ‘religions’ in modern
discourse is also the invention of the secular state and the modern idea of ‘science’ as essentially different from ‘religion’” (Fitzgerald, 2008a).

What Asad and Fitzgerald are referring to as the categorisation of religion and its invention as an essentially distinct domain can be understood as a consequence of an influential perspective in the social sciences about the secularisation of the public realm, which has been labelled ‘modernisation theory’ (Hurd, 2004, pp. 242, 244). Summarily put, modernisation theory consists of a methodological assumption that religion is concerned essentially with irrational beliefs (commonly labelled as ‘faith’) and subjective values, an assumption that is in turn predicated on a social scientific creed of a progressive and functional ‘differentiation of social institutions’ whereby such irrational and subjective aspects of life are confined to the private sphere apart from the public realm, which is rationally administered. ‘As societies grow and become more elaborate,’ according to a leading proponent of this view sociologist Steve Bruce (2009, pp. 147), ‘they evolve specialised roles and institutions are created to handle specific functions previously embodied in one role or institution’ (also Tschannen, 1991). So while religion may have performed an integral function in a socially homogenous context, modernisation theory holds that the institutional pluralism of modern society propels the loss of religious monopolies on social functions and the decline of religion – for example, where modern institutions like schools, workplaces, government bureaucracy and psychological counseling services take over the functions of confessional education, vocational direction, political mediation and moral guidance that once belonged to religion (Bruce, 1996).
This view is in turn built upon Max Weber’s (1949, 1978) general theory of social evolution toward delineated ‘spheres’ of state, society and culture each with its own separate forms of rationality (see also Habermas 1984[1981], pp. 143-271). Most prominently for Weber, there are two forms of rationality in each sphere – namely, value rationality and instrumental rationality (Weber, 1978) – which are distinguished by orientations regarded as mutually exclusive: commitments based on conventions and convictions in the former case and commitments to strict calculability based on empirical evidence in the latter (Oakes, 2003, pp. 39). For Weber (1949), those aspects that make up value rationality are counterpoised to empirically-grounded rationality, which is the domain of ‘free’ human thought and action unencumbered by the former: ‘[Therefore] we associate the measure of an empirical ‘feeling of freedom’ with those actions which we are conscious of performing rationally – i.e. in the absence of physical and psychic ‘coercion,’ emotional ‘affects’ and ‘accidental’ disturbances of the clarity of judgment’ (pp. 124-125).

So as instrumental rationality in each sphere grows with modernisation according to this Weberian rendering of social development, religion as an archetypical form of value rationality is increasingly rendered as irrational. This is because ‘[f]rom the standpoint of instrumental rationality… value rationality is always irrational, and increasingly so as the [instrumental] value to which the action is oriented is elevated to the status of the absolute value’ (Weber, 1978, p. 26). In consequence of this modernisation process, religion is supposed to be increasingly privatised because, as Nandy (1990, p. 129) describes this view, ‘managing the public realm is [seen as] a science which is essentially universal and [...] religion, to
the extent it is opposed to the Baconian world-image of science, is an open or potential threat to any polity.’ This presupposition of modernisation theory has in turn informed the secularist assumption in such disciplines as economics, political science, sociology and education studies about the ‘relative autonomy of state, economy and civil society’ and the intellectual habit of treating each of these – especially the state and economy – as separate from the proper domain of religion, which belongs to civil society as a matter of private volition (Calhoun et al 2011, p. 4). The domain of social science, by contrast, was to be ‘value free.’

This normative lens presents as a teleological narrative of modernity. The progressive emptying of religion from the public realm can be most prominently seen in the influential works of sociologist Peter Berger in The Sacred Canopy (1967) and social theorist Jürgen Habermas’s The Theory of Communicative Action (1984[1981]), which was published as the first volume of an indicatively titled series on Reason and the Rationalization of Society. In his work, Berger examined the challenges posed to religion in the modern world by secularization and pluralism, focusing on the interplay between these two phenomena whereby secularization generates pluralism by undermining the plausibility structure of monopolistic religious institutions and beliefs while pluralism, in turn, relativises the taken-for-granted or ‘objective’ nature of religious meaning systems, thereby encouraging the growth of the secular sphere at the expense of the religious sphere (see also Karlenzig, 1998). Since then, Berger (1999: 2) has revised his initial assertion, arguing on the basis of religious revivals globally that ‘the assumption that we live in a secularized world is false’ because the world today ‘is as furiously religious as it ever was and in some places more so than ever.’ So while this ‘does not mean that
there is no such thing as secularization,’ he argues, it does mean that ‘this phenomenon is by no means the direct and inevitable result of modernity’ (Berger, 2001, p. 445).

In a similar vein, Habermas (1984[1981], p. 77) also assumed that with the development of modern, pluralised liberal societies, the function of religion in fostering social integration is essentially transferred to a secular, consensus-based ‘communicative reason’: ‘[For] the socially integrative and expressive functions that were at first fulfilled by ritual practice pass over to communicative action [and] the authority of the holy is gradually replaced by the authority of an achieved consensus’ (see also Reder and Schmidt, 2010). As for Berger, Habermas (2006) has more recently admitted that what was once thought of as a universal process of secularisation through modernisation and rationalisation of the public sphere now appears to be a very culturally-specific deviation:

The significance of religions used for political ends has meanwhile grown the world over. Against this background, the split within the West is rather perceived as if Europe were isolating itself from the rest of the world. Seen in terms of world history, Max Weber’s ‘Occidental Rationalism’ now appears to be the actual deviation. [...] In this way, the Occident’s own image of modernity seems, as in a psychological experiment, to undergo a switchover: the normal model for the future of all other cultures suddenly becomes a special-case scenario. (p. 2)
What the recent admissions of Berger and Habermas highlight is that, as with education, how religion is understood in relation to the secular is relative to the particular political and historical circumstances within a given context. As Berger (2001, p. 445) asserts, it has ‘becomes an important task for the [study] of religion to map the phenomenon of secularization – both geographically and sociologically – not as the paradigmatic situation of religion in the contemporary world, but as one situation among others.’ Therefore, I argue, religion can neither be accurately defined apart from a consideration of the prevailing discourses in specific times and places, nor by recourse to a supposed teleological supersession of religion by a rationalised secular sphere. There is, in other words, no trans-historical and trans-cultural essence of religion or secularity, but at different times and places and for different purposes some things have been categorised as religious or non-religious (i.e. secular) (Cavanaugh, 2009, p. 119). Short of specifying the historical and political contingencies that give rise to such categorisations, there is a tendency to reify both the religious and the secular by recourse to static categories that render analysis simplistic. As Fitzgerald (2008) elaborates:

In any given context of modernity we are always dealing with ‘religion’ in various binary oppositions, which are all dependent on the bottom-line distinction between religion and whatever is assumed to be non-religion, now referred to rhetorically as the secular. In discussions about religion, its separation from, and thus relation to, other discursive non-religious domains such as science, politics or economics is
usually only acknowledged tacitly and in passing, if at all, conveying (say) an untroubled and unquestioned sense that religion and politics or religion and science or religion and economics are essentially distinct, and thus in danger of getting confused.

In light of this type of questioning, Strenski (2010) has argued for shifting the notion of religion as a reified ‘thing’ that can or ought to be defined in the abstract toward an understanding of the term as one that ‘needs to be defined variously as contexts and strategies of inquiry change’ (p. 11). And with regard to such contexts and strategies of inquiry, Nye (2008) highlights the additional problem that because the term religion ‘means many different things, and so there are many different ways in which we can say something is ‘religious’,’ there is thus ‘no activity, no way of thinking or talking, and no particular type of place or text which is intrinsically religious’ (p. 17). Yet if there is no essential content that marks certain groups or institutions as a priori religious, then the fact that such a marker is used to define some and not others should prompt an awareness of the inevitably historical and political contingencies that give rise to specific definitions (Moosa, 2006, p. 123), and consequently how such definitions are part of a broader regimes that produce particular social effects through the very designation of some things as religious or non-religious and secular (see Coronil, 1996, pp. 77-78).

Given that historical and political specificities define, demarcate and fix both what is commonly understood as religion and education in a given time and place,
Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis seek to elucidate how the present conceptions of religious education in Australia as an Anglo-liberal society – particularly in its contemporary institutional form of religious schooling – are descended from the historically and politically contingent ways in which these categories have been differently defined and demarcated over time. In particular, I shall seek to produce a genealogy of its avowedly secular-liberal frame, pointing to the nominalist and Protestant theological inheritance of Anglo-liberal discourse. This will be held in comparison to how religious education has been conceived in an adjacent historical discourse in Chapter 4 – the neo-Calvinist tradition – which will bring to the fore the historical specificities of both and establish a context for explaining the relationship between them in the present conjuncture. Before launching into the genealogies of religious education in these respective traditions, however, it is necessary to explain the bases and efficacy of some key conceptual tools such as genealogy and discursive traditions that I will use for the task.

**Why genealogies of religious education?**

So if it is the case, as I have thus far argued, that both the definitions of religion and education in the present are contingent upon the particular discourses prevailing at a particular time and place, then prior questions as regards the specific historical and political conditions that have given rise to the predominant definitions of religious education inevitably emerge. How, for example, did it come to be assumed by juridical and governmental discourses in the present, as well as in the debates that swirl around them, that religious education is composed of belief in a
Supernatural Being, Thing or Principle with its associated moral conduct on the one hand, and the training of desired citizens and workers on the other? If what constitute the core components of religious education are particular discourses, practices, communities and institutions, then how does this differ from the history of non-religious education? More specifically, what is the relationship between education constituted as religious, and hence, private vis-à-vis public and secular education, how did this division come about, and what are the political effects of such a division?

The purpose of the genealogies advanced in the chapters that follow is to reconnect generic definitions of religious education in the present with categories such as the political, the economy and the state with which it has been intertwined for most of Western European history (Taylor, 2007, pp. 25-90). In doing so, I call into question the categorisation of religious aspects of education in religious schools as something that exists in and for itself, as something autonomous and essentially distinct from other spheres of knowledge and practice (Fitzgerald, 2008a, p. 5-6). By way of contrast between two distinct but adjacent traditions, I shall argue that religious education as it is conceived in the Australian present is an effect of the particular historical shifts in the discourses of what sociologist of religion José Casanova (2006, p. 11) terms the ‘Anglo-Protestant cultural area’ – what I have termed the Anglo-liberal tradition following a common parlance in political theory (e.g. Hay, 2010; Mudge, 2008) – in particular the creation of an apparently autonomous non-religious or public sphere from its religious beginnings. This supposed autonomous sphere then constructs and authorises its ‘other’ – religion and
religious education for the purposes of transmitting belief and values – while educational practices are concerned with the ‘commonsense’ and ‘objective’ task of cultivating economic and state subjects.

The primary aim of the genealogies of education in this thesis is to seek to demonstrate how the question and problem, and indeed the political arrangements, that define religious education in Australia, are a result of contingent and contested turns in the history of European Christianity and the colonial settlement of Australia, not as the outcome of inevitable laws or necessary trends. History understood as such, following Popkewitz et al (2001, p. 4), ‘is an understanding of the present and collective memory as the weaving together of multiple historical configurations that establishes connections that make for common sense.’ Thus the genealogical approach taken here, by mining the complex interactions and conflicts that have given rise to the taken for granted understandings and institutional arrangements such as religious education in the present ‘makes possible a ‘suspension of history itself’; that is, it makes visible what is assumed through the narratives that join time, space and the individual’ (Popkewitz et al, 2001, p. 4).

As social theorist Roberto Unger (2004) argues in his work, genealogies of existing institutional arrangements are able to address what he calls the ‘mythical history’ of contemporary Western societies that retrospectively rationalises its configuration of social order as ‘the necessary expression of deep-seated economic, organizational, or psychological imperatives’ (pp. 174-175). In opposition to such mythical histories, a genealogical approach takes as its task the unearthing of the
effective history of a seemingly ‘natural’ institutional arrangement, tracing its history to the effects of various beliefs and practices – including purportedly transcendental or universal ones – and which brings to the fore the ‘radical historicity of everything we may be tempted to think of as permanent’ (Jameson, 1981, p. 372; also Howarth, 2002, p. 128; Gadamer, 2004[1975], pp. xxix-xxxi, 300-301). The fruits of such an approach to history, according to Walter Benjamin, is that it enables a critical engagement with the present by making its production of collective memories available for scrutiny and revision (cited in Popkewitz et al, 2001, p. 4).

With regard to the question of religious education in different traditions, its actions, practices and institutions are described by reference to the historical lineage that informs them, which is defined not by an essence or fixed principles of religion or secularity or education, but as the particular slice of the past that best explains the assumptions and arrangements of the present (see Bevir, 2008). As such, the genealogies that follow in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 do not so much bracket questions of ‘truth’ and ‘value’ as operate on the assumption that ‘truth’ or ‘value’ do not stand in a position of exteriority to politics, but is always ‘a thing of this world’ (Foucault, 1980, p. 131), and as such is internally connected to relations of power and politics within specific historical conjunctures (Howarth, 2002, p. 128). While this will

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4 It is important to note the terms ‘effective history,’ ‘historicity,’ ‘to historicise’ or ‘historicised accounts’ as used in this thesis stand in contrast with what is known as ‘historicism.’ The former terms name an interpretative approach to the past that seeks to ‘bring us up short against the radical difference of other societies and of their lived experience, and against the radical historicity of everything we may be tempted to think of as permanent (the structure of the psyche, the body, and the senses, fully as much as ‘values,’ emotional reactions, and the like)’ (Jameson, 1981, p. 372). By contrast, the latter term denotes accounts of the past encompassing univocal, linear and distinct stages of development, and which are often taken to be universal. As Chakrabarty (2000) defines it, historicism is ‘a mode of thinking about history in which one assumed that any object under investigation retained a unity of conception throughout its existence and attained full expression through a process of development in secular, historical time’ (p. xiv).
inevitably involve a consideration of how religion and education have been conceived in the past insofar as religious education is a derivative concept from broader discourses around its two constituent elements, the primary aim here is a ‘history of the present.’ As Foucault (1977, pp. 30-31) points out, the writing of history is not so much an unlocking of the unfathomable remoteness of the past because any writing of history will always be a history of writing the present (see also Roth, 1981). Thus, the genealogies produced in the following chapters make no claim to being a comprehensive ‘history of education’ or ‘history of religion’ in Anglo-liberal societies. The more modest task that is attempted in Chapters 2 and 3 is a focused exploration of how religious education in Australia came to be defined as it is via the continuities and discontinuities within the Anglo-liberal tradition. This is followed by a comparison in Chapter 4 with religious education as it is understood within the neo-Calvinist tradition that emerged in Australia most prominently the Post-War years, while Chapters 5 and 6 will then explore the interaction between both and specify some effects of the way religious education has been conceived and acted upon in the present conjuncture. As such, it draws on historical discourses only insofar as they address the question: How has religious education come to be defined in Australia as it is today? Summarily put, then, the concern of the chapters immediately following is on how the historicity of the present continues to shape the presuppositions about what religious education is and where it belongs in relation to the broader socio-political order. Having traced the varying conceptions of religious education within the adjacent traditions of Anglo-liberalism and neo-Calvinism, the later chapters will then proceed to examine how the particular religious discourse of the NCPC schooling movement based in the latter relates to the hegemonic discourse
of the present neo-liberal regime in Australia, which is built on the basis of the former.

**Discursive traditions**

Men [sic] make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like an Alp on the brains of the living. (Marx, 1972)

As mentioned in the introduction, the concept of a ‘discursive tradition’ emphasises the historicity of the present and the attempted coherence of subjectivities, practices and institutions within particular social and political contexts. It brings to the fore the historical specificity of ways of understanding that frame, discipline and order perceptions, actions and participation in the world. It involves a concatenation of two theoretical concepts: discourse and tradition. Discourses, as interpretive frameworks of meaning, are not merely secondary descriptors to pre-existent objects, but rather ‘systematically form the objects of which they speak’ (Foucault, 2002[1972], p. 49). What the notion of discourse draws attention to is that all ‘facts’ are interpreted against the background of a prior schema, which includes patterns of meaning that may be visual, spatial or temporal, and may comprise anything from face-to-face interaction to the definition of national boundaries. The
‘objects’ that discourses carve out (or ‘form’ in Foucault’s words) include all the things that are seen, referred to and taken for granted as actually existing ‘out there’ (Parker, 1999, p. 3). The articulation of a variety of such meaningful interpretations of reality into a relatively unified and stabilised whole under the aegis of one discourse, including the exclusion of discourses considered ‘unacceptable,’ is defined here as a hegemonic discourse (Torfing, 1999, p. 301). Put simply by Jessop (1982), hegemony is in this approach a ‘discourse of discourses’ (p. 199). In turn, if a hegemonic discourse configures institutional apparatuses and its associated mechanisms to sustain and reproduce itself – for example, a certain type of education system and a legislated procedure for regulating performance respectively – then it can be described as a regime (or a ‘regime of truth’; see Hall, 2001, pp. 76-77).

These mechanisms or ‘technologies of power’ according to Foucault (1980) seek to regulate life within its purview down to its ‘capillary form of existence’ (p. 39) – that is, the level of mundane and commonsense detail of ‘everyday’ routines – in order to inhere and cohere various social practices like religion or schooling according to its interpretation of reality.5

Following the discourse theory elaborated by Ernesto Laclau (1990, 1996, 2005), Chantal Mouffe (2000; 2005; 2005a) and others (e.g. Chia, 1994, 2000; Torfing, 1999; Glynos and Howarth, 2007; Parker, 1990, 1990a, 1992), I understand discourse to be ontologically primary in analysis insofar as ‘the very possibility of

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5 To emphasise the primacy of interpretation is not to deny that ‘objects’ exist beyond human perception; it is rather to posit that the very act of naming an object is already an interpretive act, which relies upon recognising the object within an entire schema of language and meaning. Laclau and Mouffe (in Laclau 1990, p. 101) propose a helpful example: ‘A stone exists independently of any system of social relations… [But] it is, for instance, either a projectile or an object of aesthetic contemplation only within a specific discursive configuration.’
perception, thought and action depends on the structuration of a certain meaningful field which pre-exists any factual immediacy’ (Laclau, 1993, p. 431), albeit one in which meaning is constantly renegotiated (see Torfing, 1999, p. 85). In short, insofar as life, practices and institutions are embedded in systems of meaning, the notion of discourse(s) foregrounds the point that all such systems of meaning are always particular interpretations of the world.

Tradition, on the other hand, is a heuristic device that stresses the historicity of all discourses. As Hans-Georg Gadamer (2004[1972], p. 277) points out, all human beings are inescapably situated within tradition and history; that is, to exist at all is to be always already participating in a common body of inherited assumptions, frameworks, methods and practices within a shared form of life discourses that have a history, which in turn provide the tools for its subjects to know and act in the world. Traditions thus bear the continuity of meaning in history through its lived rearticulation and re-actualisation, according to Gadamer (Bielskis, 2005, p. 106). Likewise, for Alasdair MacIntyre, who draws upon this aspect of Gadamer’s work (see MacIntyre, 1976; also Bielskis, 2005, p. 107-116), to reason or judge anything in life is to measure according to criteria that have been developed within historically-specific traditions in which people have been formed and their associated presuppositions. According to his historicising construal of different forms of life, even commonly used notions like ‘rationality’ or ‘justice’ are argued to make sense only within the context of traditions, for: ‘Rationality itself, whether theoretical or practical, is a concept with a history: indeed, since there are a diversity of traditions of enquiry with [diverse] histories, there are, so it will turn out, rationalities rather
than rationality, just as it will also turn out that there are justices rather than justice’ (MacIntyre, 1988: 9).

More specifically, the concatenation of discourse with tradition is drawn from the work of anthropologist Talal Asad, who combines the concept of tradition from MacIntyre with Foucault’s conception of discourse in the academic practice of constructing genealogies. In brief, a genealogy as deployed by Foucault can be conceived as an exercise in ‘counter-memory’ that is attentive to the historical contingencies that have given rise to prevailing discourses – or accepted knowledge(s) – in the present. It is:

[A] perspectival form of historical analysis concerned with tracing out discontinuous lines of ‘descent’ (identifying ‘the accidents, the minute deviations – or conversely the complete reversals – the errors, the false appraisals and the faulty calculations that give birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us’) as well as ‘emergence’ (that is, the particular play of forces and powers that produce effects of knowledge). (Scott, 2006, pp. 138-139; see also Foucault, 1984)

If genealogy is, on the one hand, a practice that seeks to pinpoint the specific historical and political forces that have coalesced incidentally to give rise to
discourses in the present – ‘a way of (re)telling history by tracing contingencies that have come together to form an apparently natural development’ (Asad, 2006, p. 234) – then tradition on the other hand can be characterised as a preoccupation with ‘the ways in which historical forms of life, binding experience to authority, are built up over periods of time into regularities of practice, mentality and disposition’ (Scott, 2006: 140). In short, while a genealogy tends to emphasise the discontinuities in the history of a discourse, tradition emphasises the continuities that have given rise to certain interpretations of the world in the present.

Combining these two concepts into the heuristic device of ‘discursive tradition’ is thus for Asad (1986, p. 7) an effective means of studying the history of how religious movements and institutions such as Islam and Christianity connect ‘variously with the formation of moral selves, the manipulation of populations (or resistance to it), and the production of appropriate knowledges’ (see also Asad, 2006, pp. 233-235). Mahmood (2005, p. 115) parallels this notion of discursive tradition to Foucault’s concept of a ‘discursive formation,’ which denotes ‘a form of relation between the past and present predicated on a system of rules that demarcate both the limits and the possibility of what is sayable, doable, and recognizable as a comprehensible event in all its manifest forms.’ In this sense, it can be defined as the historically evolving set of discourses embodied in the practices and institutions of various social groups vis-à-vis their contingent historical and political circumstances, and which are deeply imbricated in the material life of those inhabiting them. To discuss a discursive tradition therefore implies attending to specific articulations of material processes, structures, and practices, including practices of reasoning and
expression, embedded in the society or social group under study (Hirschkind, 1995; also Zaman, 2002: 5-6; Faisal, 2011).

In this thesis, I deploy the concept of discursive traditions primarily as a means to discern how historically constructed discourses shape, coordinate and constitute social practices through which the relationship between educational practice and religiosity is ‘reasoned,’ in particular within the Anglo-liberal and neo-Calvinist traditions. Drawing on the framework put forward by Asad as well as that of Gadamer and MacIntyre, I submit that the concept of a discursive tradition furnishes three axioms that enable attentiveness toward the historical constitution of how the self, others, social practices and institutional formations come to be understood within particular moments in time.

Firstly, the concept of discursive traditions brings to the fore the inescapably historical basis of all present ways of knowing and being. What this means is that all human subjects can only come to grasp objects of knowledge or enquiry – e.g. what constitutes ‘religion’ or ‘education’ – from the vantage point afforded by a relationship to some specific social and intellectual past through affiliation to some particular tradition of discourse, thereby extending the history of that tradition into the present (see MacIntyre, 1988, p. 401). ‘From the beginning to the end of our journey to understand,’ as Tracy (1981) puts it, ‘we find ourselves in a particular linguistic tradition (primarily our native language) which carries with it certain specifiable ways of viewing the world, certain ‘forms of life’ which we did not invent but find ourselves, critically and really, within’ (p. 100). Hence, tradition
plays a vital role as an ontological and explanatory concept; for insofar as discourses in the present are marked by historicity, all beliefs and practices that emerge from them must have their roots in some tradition whether they are considered aesthetic or practical, sacred or secular, legendary or factual, pre-modern or scientific, valued because of their lineage or their reasonableness (Bevir, 2000, p. 42).

In this sense, the category of discursive tradition functions for the purposes of the present genealogical research because it highlights how particular conceptions, practices and institutions of religious education vary within different discourses with different historical frames. Tradition thus functions as a heuristic for ‘social inheritances’ that constitute the necessary background to the beliefs, subjectivities and practices people adopt and perform (Bevir, 2000, p. 31; also Kögler, 1999, p. 26). It names the common body of assumptions, frameworks, methods and practices inherited over time within a shared form of life, which in turn provide the tools for its subjects to know and act in the world: ‘History does not belong to us; we belong to it. Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self evident way in the family, society and state in which we live.’ (Gadamer, 2004[1972], pp. 277) Thus, insofar as all human beings are embedded in particular cultural histories, all attempts at perception and understanding are thus always already interpenetrated by discursively mediated and historically determined meanings – that is, by traditions – which render particular human actions and beliefs intelligible against the background of a shared pre-understandings and others unintelligible by reference to it. This includes the customs, rituals, knowledge(s), political regimes, governmental and social institutions and so
on, which are shaped and reshaped within a broader authoritative discourse inherited from the past (Faisal, 2011, p. 9).

This notion of tradition as both historical transmission and perpetual movement brings up the second axiom: because it highlights the inescapable location of all subjects and objects of knowledge within historicity, the concept of discursive traditions makes clear the both the limits of discourses as well as their openness to contingency. Traditions can in this sense be understood along the lines of what Ludwig Wittgenstein (2009) calls ‘language-games’ that engender particular ‘forms of life,’ each with their own distinctive logics of language and practice developed over time and into which participants are initiated (sec. 332-335; also Thiselton, 1980, p. 376). However, unlike certain implications of Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘forms of life’ that presume a self-referential linguistic group in a sui generis manner (e.g. Lindbeck, 1984), traditions are understood here not to be self-enclosed totalities, but rather historically dynamic and always changing starting points for their participants (Lawn, 2004, pp. 19-40). Gadamer, for example, insists that tradition should be seen as a ‘weak totality’: ‘The idea of the whole is itself to be understood only relatively. The totality of meaning that has to be understood in history or tradition is never the meaning of the totality of history’ (as cited in Roberts, 1995, p. 166).

As such, to approach a discourse as a tradition does not imply a uni-linear, static account of reality or history; for while traditions furnish discourses for creating
order and orientation in the process of ordering the societal environment and human behaviour in such an environment, they are also to be understood as enabling human cultural practices, critique and challenge, which is essentially and historically unpredictable in its modalities (Bauman, 1973, pp. 82, 146-149; also Rorty, 1989, pp. 3-43). Understood as historically-constituted horizons that are both limiting and enabling, discursive traditions are thus taken neither merely nostalgically nor as suggestive of a homogenous unity over time. Rather, the emphasis of this concept is to highlight how all practices and institutions such as education and schooling – whether religious or non-religious – are predicated on a relation with a past marked by debate and conflict.

Thirdly and further to the genealogical efficacy of the concept of discursive traditions, the latter also foregrounds how both avowedly religious and non-religious (i.e. secular) subjectivities, practices and institutional formations arise from particular cultural histories. More specifically, it makes the point that the ways in which religion and religious education are understood, identified and acted upon is always a product of particular historical and political contexts. For if tradition constitutes the inescapable background to human life, then it is possible to give an account of particular traditions out of the general flux of history by tracing the temporal and conceptual connections that flow out of particular object or objects of its discourse for explanatory purposes (Bevir, 2000, p. 50). However, to trace continuity and connections of a particular object or objects of discourse within a tradition is not to presume a linear account of its ‘development,’ but rather to attend to the shifting ways in which such discursive objects may be conceived owing to
conflicts and debates within and between traditions. According to MacIntyre (1984, p. 222) then, a ‘living tradition’ – i.e. one that persists in the present – is a historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods and values which constitute that tradition. Therefore, they are marked by two types of conflict: On the one hand, ‘those with critics and enemies external to the tradition who reject all or at least key parts of those fundamental agreements,’ and on the other hand, ‘those internal, interpretative debates through which the meaning and rationale of the fundamental agreements come to be expressed and by whose progress a tradition is constituted.’ (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 12)

So with regard to the question of religious education, the concept of discursive traditions highlights that it cannot be seen as an absolute, metaphysical, unchanging or even linearly evolving object of discourse, but rather one that is historically contingent and a product of conflicting claims within and between traditions (Zaman, 2002, p. 4). As Islamic studies scholar Ebrahim Moosa (2003) argues, such historicizing of traditions is critical to an understanding of the present because it provides ‘a narrative as to why things had changed and to get an accurate picture of how ideas, practices, and beliefs were implemented in the past,’ and more importantly, ‘it helps us understand how two identical ideas applied in different epochs may actually have opposite outcomes’ (p. 31). I thus take the task of genealogies of religious education, such as the ones advanced in the following chapters, as offering perspicacious historicised accounts of how religious education has come to be defined in the present within two particular discursive traditions, as
well as the political contexts and conflicts that have given rise to their respective definitions of it.

Conclusion

In this prolegomenon, I sought to respond to the question: What is religious education, particularly in the form of religious schooling? I began by outlining how religious education is officially understood by governmental and juridical institutions in Australia in the present – that is, as a conjunction of ‘religion’ defined primarily as beliefs about a supernatural Being, Thing or Principle with an associated set of values/ethics, and ‘education’ through schooling defined as schooling as a key training institution for future citizens, workers and the prosperity of the nation as a whole. Within the Australian context, then, the combination of religion and education in the form of religious schooling denotes an institutional conjunction of belief in a Supernatural Being, Thing or Principle with its associated practices and values/ethics on the one hand with the training of desired citizens and workers on the other. The debates over religious schooling along the public/private and secular/religious lines can thus be seen as corresponding respectively to the educative function of religious schools with regard to the general aim of schooling to train students for citizenship and employment on the one hand, and with regard to the religious function of religious schools, which is taken to be the transmission of belief and values on the other.
In seeking to answer a subsequent question – that is, how has religious education come to be defined in this way? – I sought to foreground how the official definition of religious education and the presuppositions of the debates surrounding it are based on contingent historical and political settlements. To demonstrate this, I argued that genealogical accounts are efficacious for historicising the terms under which religious education is presently understood. When conducted using the analytical device of ‘discursive traditions’ as developed variously in the work of Gadamer, MacIntyre and Asad, I conjectured, it enables an attentiveness toward the historical constitution of knowledges of the self, others, social practices and institutional formations within particular moments in history that have given rise to the present commonsense understandings of religious education. This is so for three reasons: firstly, the concept of discursive traditions brings to the fore the inescapably historical basis of all present ways of knowing and being; secondly, it highlights both the limits of discourses as well as their openness to contingency; and thirdly, it foregrounds how both avowedly religious and secular subjectivities, practices (e.g. education) and institutional formations (e.g. schools) are not ‘natural’ or ‘inevitable,’ but rather arise from particular cultural histories inflected by particular political conflicts and contexts.

The task of the genealogies that follow will thus be to discern how religious education has been defined over time in two, adjacent discursive traditions – the Anglo-liberal and the neo-Calvinist. In the next chapter, I begin with a genealogy of how religion and religious education are construed in the Anglo-liberal tradition that
constitutes the basis for Australian political discourse. Specifically, I trace the lineage of this definition back to three key historical moments: the cleavage of religion from practical reason in late-medieval nominalist theology; the primacy of individual belief as the locus of religion in the Protestant reformation; and the development of nominalist and Protestant definitions of religion in early-liberal discourse.
Chapter 2 - Religious education in the Anglo-liberal tradition

All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts not only because of their historical development… but also because of their systematic structure. (Schmitt, 2005, p. 36)

Introduction

In the introduction, I mapped out some of the representative positions in the present debates over the merit and appropriateness of religious schools in Australia, intimating that the competing positions along the secular/religious and public/private lines operate on several shared premises, not least of which are the presupposition of these categorical dichotomies themselves. In this chapter, I seek to historicise the prevailing understanding of religious education, calling into question the liberal terrain upon which the contending perspectives are grounded. I do so by conducting a genealogy of how religious education has been positioned within the Anglo-liberal tradition upon which the Australian political system has been constructed – that is, as the transmission of some belief in a Supernatural Being, Thing or Principle and practices and conduct that are taken to be an effect of such prior belief – by tracing the complex historical imbrications between pre- and post-Protestant theology and the emergent territorial states of early-modern Europe. I begin by defining liberalism as a particular discursive tradition before offering a historical account of three moments that have given rise to its conception of religion more broadly and religious
education more specifically: firstly, that religion and religious education are primarily concerned with supernatural objects that are outside the realm of worldly reason; secondly, that the locus of religion and religious education is the belief of the individual in a supernatural God; and thirdly, that religious education represents the cultivation of belief in the private sphere while in the public sphere of politics, such beliefs are inappropriate and excluded.

**Liberalism as a discursive tradition**

The Australian debate over the appropriateness of religious education pivots on the oft-repeated division between the public and private – with public schools held to be operating on a neutral and universally-accessible basis in contrast to religious private schools with their particularistic beliefs. That the latter have in recent times encroached on the terrain of schooling is predicated both on the broader liberal assumptions that institutions named ‘public’ and ‘secular’ are neutral between all particular traditions, and that religious institutions are necessarily ‘private’ insofar as the locus of religiosity resides in the subjective beliefs of individuals and groups.

Liberalism can be broadly defined as a political theory or a normative political doctrine of government which ‘treats the maintenance of individual liberty as an end in itself, and therefore views liberty as setting limits of principle both to the legitimate objectives of government [by the state] and to the manner in which those objectives might legitimately be pursued’ (Hindess, 2004, pp. 27-28). On this basis, because the ethos of liberalism is concerned with what Raz (1994, p. 175)
summarises as ‘uphold[ing] the value for people of being in charge of their own life, charting its course by their successive choices,’ liberal government claims to be neutral about different ways of life, claiming that the state should take no position about what the ‘good life’ should entail and so shifting questions about normative values out of the public sphere and into the private (Clayton, 2005). This, however, means that liberalism cannot merely be taken as an absence of restraint against choosing as one wants – what prominent liberal theorist Isaiah Berlin (1967) terms ‘negative liberty’ – but is itself a normative modus operandi for ordering society: Because liberalism asserts that each individual has a right to pursue good or value in his or her own way, and because the versions of good or value individuals pursue are inevitably mutually incompatible, these are confined to the private sphere; the public sphere is formally concerned only with the most effective means of administering, adjudicating and guaranteeing the expression of individual rights and free choices – what in liberal discourse is termed ‘liberty’ and ‘justice’ respectively (MacIntyre, 1998, pp. 235-238; 1998a, 258; also Hindess, 2004). In this reckoning, insofar as religion is a form of discourse that makes certain substantive claims about the nature of life and reality, it must remain in the private sphere and have no place in public-political deliberation, which is taken to be a non-religious (or secular) space that is neutral to all claims (Schindler, 2011, pp. 71-73).

Yet is this terrain – that is, one that presupposes universalising, ahistorical, rational and ‘objective’ basis that mediates between differences in particularistic faiths, beliefs and values of religion – tenable? It is the burden of this chapter to demonstrate that the construal of religion and religious education within the prevailing regime, despite its apparent universality and neutrality, is itself a product
of a particular tradition with its own authoritative texts and figures, hierarchies of value, distributions of political power, institutional configurations and boundaries that determine acceptability and inclusion against unacceptability and exclusion, just like any other tradition. However, where liberalism differs from other traditions is that it does not normally recognise itself as a particular tradition; as MacIntyre (1988) argues, political regimes based on liberalism sustain the impression that they are beyond all traditions and particularities and are thus able to provide the very ground for competing traditions:

In the course of history liberalism, which began as an appeal to alleged principles of shared rationality against what was felt to be the tyranny of tradition, has itself been transformed into a tradition whose continuities are partly defined by the interminability of the debate over such principles. (p. 335)

Such an alleged universality and neutrality of liberalism as a clearinghouse for the debates between other traditions may be understood, following Unger (2004, pp. 173-176, 180-230), as predicated on a myth of its own necessity. What he means is that as a particular discourse, liberal discourse retrospectively rationalises its configuration of institutional arrangements as the only plausible order of society. While the focus of Unger’s analysis is predominantly on the assumptions underlying the institutional configurations of the economy in Anglo-liberal societies, this is no less the case for the manner in which religion and religious education are understood in these contexts. By positioning the prevailing liberal presuppositions as a product
of a particular tradition, then, I take as the task of this and the following chapter to unearth the genealogy of this discourse, tracing the history of the present to the effects of various beliefs and practices – including purportedly necessary or universalising ones, and which brings to the fore its irreducible historicity.

As mentioned in the introduction, to use discursive tradition as a heuristic device for situating the particularity of the prevailing liberal socio-political arrangements is to insist on both its historicity and discursive constitution; for ‘we cannot adequately identify either our own commitments or those of others in the argumentative conflicts of the present except by situating them within those histories which made them what they have now become’ (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 13). Yet insofar as the present socio-political arrangements appear (temporarily) to be in good working order for many of its participants, its historical and discursive particularities that are the presupposition of its constituent activities and enquiries may well remain just that: unarticulated presuppositions which are never themselves the objects of attention and enquiry. As MacIntyre points out following the work of Thomas Kuhn (1996[1962]) on the historical conditions leading to epistemic crises of established ways of thinking, it is ‘generally only when traditions either fail and disintegrate or are challenged do their adherents become aware of them as traditions and begin to theorise about them’ (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 8). In a similar vein, I argue that the growth of certain religious institutions and movements in Anglo-liberal and ostensibly secular societies, many of whom may not share the same presuppositions to those which predominate in such societies, presents a unique historical challenge not only because of what Hoezl and Ward (2009) call the ‘new visibility of religion,’
but also to the new visibility of secular-liberalism itself as a product of a provincial tradition (Chakrabarty, 2000, pp. 4, 243; Turner, 2011, p. 128).

Framed as such, I argue that the prevailing account of religious education in Australia presupposes the history of one particular discursive tradition – the Anglo-liberal tradition. As such, it obscures the specificity, historicity and contingency of the prevailing definition of religious education which, as Schmitt (2005, p. 36) points out (quoted in the epigraph above), entails a particular theological and religious inheritance. Put more pointedly by Surin (1990), modern liberal society ‘was ‘produced’ along with the ‘western’ society that emerged out of Christendom, a society which, though it may today largely repudiate Christianity, is nonetheless one that is thoroughly inflected by its Christian past’ (p. 84). More specifically, as I shall show in what follows, the definition of religious education in contemporary Australia has been marked by the passage of religion from its definition in medieval Latin Christendom as encompassing localised and diverse pedagogical, moral, social and political practices to the present understanding of it as sets of beliefs that may be appended onto schooling, which is in turn run as a hegemonic practice for the prevailing neo-liberal regime. I shall partially trace the historical lineage of the prevailing definition of religious education to an inheritance arising from three identifiable moments in the Anglo-liberal tradition: firstly, the theological and socio-political shifts associated with the rise of nominalism and the cleavage of religious belief from practical reason and material objects in the late-medieval period; secondly, the individualisation and nationalisation of religion as an effect of the Protestant Reformation; and the regulation and legitimation of a particular Protestant form of religion in the private sphere of the early-modern liberal state. This will then
form the background to the next chapter, where the development of institutional arrangements deriving from the Anglo-liberal tradition in Australia will be sketched, specifically how religious education came to be established, construed as ‘values’ rendered serviceable to the nation-state, and finally positioned as a ‘value-added’ option in the formation of a market in school education.

**Religion/world: Nominalism and the cleavage of belief from practical reason**

The notion of religion and religious education as a separate sphere from that of the secular and secular education is a taken for granted presupposition in contemporary educational studies in Australia (see critics of religious schooling in the introduction; also Bonnor & Caro, 2007, pp. 141-158). Yet as Milbank (1990) points out, the concept of political secularity as a space apart from the religious did not always exist, for: ‘Once there was no secular and the secular was not latent, waiting to fill more space with the steam of the ‘purely human,’ when the pressure of the sacred was relaxed’ (p. 9). Rather, ‘the secular as a domain had to be imagined, both in theory and in practice.’ So while the use of the term ‘secular’ is often defined negatively – that is, implying a realm of non-religion or what is left after religion fades – it is not in itself neutral; rather, it is itself a normative political project. It is thus useful for the present purposes to explore how it is that contemporary religious education has come to be constituted as the opposite to secular education.

The beginnings of religious education as it is contemporaneously defined can be traced to the thirteenth century development of nominalism by Franciscan
theologians John Duns Scotus (c.1265-1308) and William of Ockham (c.1288-c.1348). Nominalism, which posited the divine as utterly transcendent and only arbitrarily connected to the world and its inhabitants, arose as a challenge to the hegemony of medieval scholasticism and its legitimation of the hitherto prevailing ecclesiastical and feudal regime. According to medieval scholasticism – whose exemplar Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) synthesised elements of Aristotelian and Islamic philosophy with the theology of Augustine – all intellect and human endeavour are understood to naturally aspire to the ‘knowledge of God’ (Davies, 1992, p. 21ff.; Burrell, 2004; also Fakhry, 1968; Bullough, 1996). Thus, the aspiration of human practices, whether mundane actions such as eating or more complex ones involving scholastic, artisanal or agrarian crafts, was understood to be intrinsically connected to divine transcendence insofar as all particular practices were at the service of a natural teleology; religion and practice formed an interlocking whole that I define as practical reason – where there is a continual interplay between ends and means, as well as between thought and action. Reason understood as such primarily involves concern with the concrete and embodied rather than abstract and disembodied, embraces moral judgment and cosmological worldviews that are often tacit rather than formalised, and involves know-how rather than propositional knowledge – including what is sometimes referred to as ‘practical wisdom’ (Sayer, 2011, p. 61). Religious life understood through practical reason, far from emphasising the primacy of belief, was ‘sensually rich’ insofar as participants ‘encountered God in the physical environment, through the five senses. The Christian faith of the Middle Ages was firmly anchored in the body: the body of the cosmos, the body of the person, the Body of Christ’ (Goizueta, 2006, p. 173).
Correspondingly, the educative processes in these domains thus involved induction into the historically-accreted practices considered rational within the community of specific craft through master-apprentice relations. As Macintyre (1990) describes, it involved the direction of an authoritative master that guided others toward the ‘natural ends’ of a given type of activity:

The authority of a master within a craft is both more and other than a matter of exemplifying the best standards so far. It is also and most importantly a matter of knowing how to go further and especially how to direct others towards going further, using what can be learned from the tradition afforded by the past to move towards the telos [i.e. ends] of fully perfected work… (pp. 65-66)

This view of educative processes corresponded with the socio-political arrangements of feudalism, which maintained that each person was born into a relatively distinct, unchangeable, and unquestionable place in the socio-political hierarchy ordained by the Christian God (Hobson & Sharman, 2005, pp. 81-85; also Kayatekin & Charusheela, 2004). For most, therefore, education was intrinsically religious and the religious was practical insofar as it was based on acquiring the ability to perform the craft and social functions that each was born into. Conversely, because all such activity possessed natural ends and the socio-political arrangements were conceived as the natural order ultimately ordained by God, the passage of life itself could itself be broadly understood as intrinsically educational. As Goering (2004) describes in his study of the thirteenth-century English parish, what might
today be regarded as religious education occurred throughout the communal life of its participants:

Most thirteenth-century parishioners saw formation in faith not as a clerical monopoly, or even much of a clerical responsibility, but rather as a family and community activity. Nor was it narrowly centered on the parish church, at least not on the sanctuary or the altar, which was the priest’s domain, but on the nave, the church porch, the churchyard, and the streets and houses of the town or village. (p. 216)

It is evident from Goering’s account that such ‘formation in faith’ was not demarcated along clear institutional lines that separated the religious from the non-religious, but was rather diffuse throughout life itself. Put more generally, the relationship between education and religion was held to be one and the same insofar as, according to Aquinas, ‘the idea of the divine wisdom, moving all things to their due end, has the nature of law,’ and hence, ‘the eternal law is nothing other than the idea of the divine wisdom insofar as it directs all acts and movements’ (as cited in Oakley, 1961, p. 67).

Education as such, being intrinsically religious, was defined as attainment of the knowledge of God. In this schema, such knowledge would entail a ‘bottom-up’ articulation that ascended from the empirical multiplicity of the finite world and human practices upward through abstract universals such as ‘the True’ (verum) or
‘the Good’ (*bonum*) toward the divine, which was held to be its natural completion (*telos*) (see Eco, 1988, p. 56ff). As Fromm (1969) depicts of common craftspeople, the ends of educational, religious, political, economic and moral spheres intersected in the practical reason exercised in various occupations:

The craftsmen since the later part of the Middle Ages were united in their guilds. Each master had one or two apprentices and the number of masters was in some relation to the needs of the community. Although there were always some who had to struggle hard to earn enough to survive, by and large the guild member could be sure that he could live by his hand’s work. If he made good chairs, shoes, bread, saddles, and so on, he did all that was necessary to be sure of living safely on the level which was traditionally assigned to his social position. He could rely on his ‘good works’…

[...]

There is no place in medieval theory for economic activity which is not related to a moral end. (pp. 69, 71)

Conversely, to knowingly engage in bad or shoddy practice was considered a breach of this religious, moral and intellectual order. As Sears (2006, p. 228) points out in her detailed reading of Thirteenth Century craft practices, it was not an uncommon preventative measure for masters joining the trade guilds to be asked to swear that they would work according to true and good uses and customs of the trade.
for the sake of the saints, Holy Gospels or God. This approach to particular practices and things as analogous to a transcendent unity is known as the doctrine of *analogia entis* (‘analogy of being’), which presupposes that insofar as ‘God is the cause of creation, creation will express *something* of the character of God, however faintly or tangentially’ (Oliver, 2009, p. 13). Insofar as human knowledge is finite and thus insufficient to comprehend the Divine *in toto*, held Aquinas, it must then be ‘completed’ by authority, which resides in the teachings of the catholic (i.e. ‘universal’) Church (Tillich, 1968, p. 186).

In this view, education as the attainment of practical reason was itself inscribed into the socio-political configuration of Medieval Latin Christendom, which operated on the basis of a ‘natural law’ conception of status and hierarchy (Taylor, 2004, pp. 9-10). For the law itself, understood as such by Aquinas, is ‘nothing else than a dictate of practical reason emanating from the ruler who governs a complete community,’ and it follows therefore, ‘that the whole community of the universe is governed by the divine reason’ (as cited in Oakley, 1961, p. 67). The socio-political arrangements of feudalism, simply put, were predicated on a God understood as a providential placeholder insofar as ‘everything-that-is’ (i.e. human beings, objects, nature, etc.) exists in a way as to be distinct from the divine, but was held together by it in a ‘natural hierarchy’ (Burrell, 2004, pp. 88-89). Fromm (1969, p. 57) describes this as a time where subjects typically occupied a ‘chained’ location with little mobility either socially or geographically. In general, he explains, this meant:

[H]aving a distinct, unchangeable, and unquestionable place in the social world from the moment of birth, man [*sic*] was rooted in a
structuralised whole... A person was identical with his role in society; he was a peasant, an artisan, a knight and not an individual who happened to have this or that occupation. [For] the social order was conceived as a natural order... (Fromm, 1969, p. 58)

Economic activity and work in such a system were also understood to be sustained by moral and theological ends insofar as ‘economic interests are subordinate to the real business of life, which is salvation [and] economic conduct is one aspect of personal conduct upon which as on other parts of it, the rules of morality are binding.’ (Tawney, 1964, p. 31) This form of social order was one where, as Taylor (2007) surmises of the medieval age in the West, ‘God’s felt presence in the world’ was diffuse. This presence can be summed up in a threefold way: firstly, in the natural world in which people lived in, ‘which has its place in the cosmos they imagined, testified to divine purpose and action’; secondly, God was also implicated in the very existence of society itself so that ‘[a] kingdom could only be conceived as grounded in something higher than mere human action in secular time’ (pp.25-26; see also Berman, 1981, p. 16; Capra, 1982, p. 52). In addition, this also extended to the manifold societal and economic institutions insofar as ‘the life of the various associations which made up society, parishes, boroughs, guilds, and so on, were woven with ritual and worship’; and thirdly, people lived in an ‘enchanted’ world, which describes ‘a world of spirits, demons, and moral forces.’ In such a world, ‘the Christian God was the ultimate guarantee that good would triumph or at least hold the plentiful forces of darkness at bay.’ (Taylor, 2007, p. 25) In short, Taylor (2007) posits: ‘One could not but encounter God everywhere’ (p. 25).
‘Religion’ in such a context was thus not understood as a generalised system of beliefs, but rather named the specificity of pedagogical techniques such as practical and moral habits or monastic rituals that augmented an acquired virtue of sanctity. Aquinas, for example, wrote two main addresses in which declensions of the word religion (Latin: *religio*) appear in the title and both are defenses of religious orders while one used *religio* in the specific sense of something approximating devotional practices (Cavanaugh, 2009, p. 64). Described as such, religion (*religio*) names ‘the activity by which man [*sic*] gives the proper reverence to God through actions which specifically pertain to divine worship’ (Aquinas as cited in Harvey, 2008, p. 111; also Asad, 1993, p. 83-124). The particular modes in which such religion-as-practice was undertaken were locally-defined and ranged across the terrain of Medieval Latin Christendom. In this sense, historical sociologist Martin Stringer (2005, p. 235) distinguishes between ‘dominant’ and ‘demotic’ levels of religious discourse in this time, with the former pertaining to more formal practices of the institutional Church while the latter entailing such practices as devotions at local shrines and to local saints, popular processions and others. Yet despite this discernible difference, he also points out that ‘[e]ach level of religious discourse clearly interacts, to a greater or lesser extent, with all the others, but need not overlap in terms of perceived contradictions or tensions’ (as cited in Goizueta, 2009, p. 52). For this reason, Asad (1983) surmises that there was little direct regulation and enforced uniformity of religion by Church authorities and where such regulation was imposed, it was specifically targeted and dedicated to ensuring that the manifold practices were ultimately analogically unified:
In the Middle Ages such discourses ranged over an enormous space, defining and creating religion… The medieval Church did not attempt to establish absolute uniformity of practice; on the contrary, its authoritative discourse was always concerned to specify differences, gradations, exceptions. What it sought was the subjection of all practice to a unified authority, to a single authentic source which could tell truth from falsehood. (p. 238)

The point of canvassing the medieval conceptions of socio-political order vis-à-vis religiosity is to highlight that the category of religion in the medieval epoch is quite different from that in modern liberal societies. Religion in this reckoning, far from being a uniform structure of belief, was always differently distributed and manifest through the particular ways in which it created and worked through institutions, the different types subjects which it shaped and responded to, and different categories of knowledge which it authorised and made available. In short, religion did not give rise to types of education or training; religion itself named the differentiated modes of pedagogical practice. Thus, for example, Aquinas can state both a religious unity in that ‘[a]ll knowers know God implicitly in all they know’ (as cited in Cunningham, 2001, p. 292), and a plurality insofar as ‘[a]ll things known are in the knower in a way appropriate to the knower’ (as cited in Marshall, 1989, p. 374). The modern liberal assumption that there is an essence of religion isolable in history apart from society and politics is thus untenable because even within Western
Europe as a broad cultural sphere there has never been a structural uniformity to religion that can be abstracted and made universally viable.

If medieval religion named the particular and localised practices through which subjects – most commonly monks – sought to render themselves more reverent to God, then how did the present notion of religion in Australia as a set of beliefs with no intrinsic relation to practical reason and the material world arise? A basis for this modern rendering can be traced to the political rejection – following the failure of the Crusades, the loss of significant Christian colonies in the Levant and the rise of Islamic military power in the late-Thirteenth Century (Gillespie, 2008, p. 21) – of allegedly Muslim-inflected Aristotelian influences in medieval (Thomistic) theology by the Archbishop of Canterbury Robert Kilwardy and Bishop of Paris Etienne Tempier (Oakley and Urdang, 1966, pp. 100-101; also Korkut, 2011). Most prominently in the year 1277, Tempier condemned over two hundred true or alleged Aristotelian positions and gave forceful expression to a growing fear among theologians and clerics that the metaphysical necessitarianism of Aristotle (and by implication, Aquinas) and his Muslim commentators like Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, 980–1037) and Averroës (Ibn Rušd, 1126-1198) was ‘blasphemously’ invading ‘the Cardinal Prerogative of Divinity, Omnipotence’ and ‘chaining up [God’s] armies in the adamantine fetters of Destiny’ (as cited in Oakley and Urdang, 1966, pp. 100-101; also White, 1978, p. 51). This official Condemnation, which stressed the omnipotence of the Christian God beyond reason, was in turn developed into a systematic anti-Thomistic theology by Franciscans Scotus and Ockham (Gillespie, 2008, p. 23).
Where for medieval realism the finite might apprehend the infinite through situated practices, Scotus posited that there is an unbridgeable chasm between the finite and the infinite (Pickstock, 1998, p. 123; Dupré, 1993, pp. 93-113; also Taylor, 2007, pp. 94, 144). According to this latter discourse – the ‘nominalism’ referred to earlier – the finite human being cannot grasp the infinite divine logos at all. This meant that the sense of Good or Truth, as well as knowledge of the divine, cannot be attained through concrete, finite practices ‘ascending’ to the infinite as posited by Aquinas and the worldview of analogia entis. For Scotus, there is no resemblance between human practices and the world vis-à-vis the divine, thus excluding any possibility of figural or analogical determinations of God that give any degree of substantive knowledge about what is Good or True (Pickstock, 1998, p. 123). What this apparently obscure theological shift entails is the radical separation of human practical reason and the world from the divine because a vast quantitative gap is established between the finite and the infinite.

By emphasising the absolute omnipotence and utter imperceptibility of God, nominalist theology attacked the universals and natural ends upon which the medieval worldview (including its educative practices) had hitherto been predicated. Therefore, contra Aquinas, for whom particular actions and/or objects are understood to participate in the divine through the multiplicity of the socio-political order, for Scotus there is only one way open to receive God: the way of revelation received by the authority of the Church (Tillich, 1968). What this engendered was a shift from a synthetic view of revelation as pervasive in the manifold practices of the social body across Christendom (i.e. the corpus Christianum) to a centralisation and concentration of power to the institutional Church as the sole locus of religious
revelation. In turn, this marks a crucial staging post towards what Oliver (2009, p. 22) has described as the ‘bracketing of God’ from the world. For insofar as God is taken to be distant, this very distance opens up the possibility of a space for which God is largely irrelevant; this space is hence autonomous, self-standing and governed by laws and causes apart from the divine (Oliver, 2009, p. 22; also Nasr, 1988). Thus the conception of ‘the secular’ (Latin: *saeculum*) which had since Augustine of Hippo (354-430) denoted a time between the temporal order and its divinely-appointed apocalyptic end (see Markus, 1988), was transposed onto the world as a spatial order in parallel to the religious one (Calhoun et al, 2011, pp. 12-20).

This nominalist discourse initiated by Scotus is further developed a century later in the influential work of Ockham, who rejected the teleological approach to the understanding of nature and work that was presupposed by Medieval Latin Christendom. God, according to Ockham, cannot be approached at all by practical reason or nature, whether in the form of observation or ritualised monastic disciplines or moral and vocational learning; the divine can be reached only by the gratuitous will of God and individual subjection to Biblical revelation (Gillespie, 2008, p. 24). In a manner that prefigured the Protestant reformation, Ockham held that even in the latter aspect, human subjects can only attain to the knowledge of the divine and the Bible if the ‘habit of grace’ from God enables them to receive the revelation of God (Tillich, 1968). What this effectively meant was that *religio* came increasingly to be redefined from the (now futile) educative practices to systems of belief that could be embraced voluntarily by individuals about what is ultimately true and important in their lives (Harvey, 2008, p. 111). According to Harrison (1990, p. 12), it was Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464), cardinal bishop of Brixen (Austria) who
first systematised this nominalist rendering of religion by attributing different modes of faith as the result of epistemic limitations of finite human beings, with a single, infinite reality standing behind the heterogenous expressions. Again, this was a political move taken within Latin Christendom in relation to growing Islamic military power; Cusa was apparently so shaken by the violent fall of Constantinople to the Turkish forces of Sultan Mehmed II in 1453 that he wrote his treatise *De Pace Fidei* in an attempt to arrive at some principle of dialogue and unity among the peoples of the earth, who worshipped in many different ways (Franke, 2006, p. 64; Nederman, 2011, p. 355). What is novel about Cusa’s use of *religio*\(^6\) is that practices are not essential to it (and in fact are considered burdensome); rather, ‘*religio* is a universal, interior impulse that stands behind the multiplicity of rites’ (Cavanaugh, 2009, p. 70).

This shift toward nominalism produced an important break in the medieval *weltanschauung* and in consequence, how religious education was understood. For while the divine had hitherto been apprehensible insofar it performed the function of a transcendent capstone for the socio-political order, it was now separated from the world by an infinite distance and knowable only through faith as *belief* (Dupré, 1993, p. 3) In such a schema, the religious as expressed in practical reason is replaced by an appeal to divine revelation and mystical experience. For Ockham for example, actions are ultimately made right or wrong by a divine command, so even if educated or trained forms of reason may dictate that an act is right or wrong, ‘the agent does not always recognize that the action’s rightness or wrongness depends upon a divine command’ (Osborne, 2005, p. 1). Thus, knowledge of God and the moral rules

\(^6\) The full phrase from Cusa is ‘*religio una in rituum verietate*’ (‘one religion behind the many rites’) (see Laursen, 1999, p. xvii n4)
enjoined by the divine are taken to have no immanent justification at all (MacIntyre, 1967, p. 119).

The nominalist interventions of Scotus and Ockham also mark a crucial staging point in the move towards modern liberal understandings of religion whereby the latter’s concern with a Supernatural Being, Principle or Thing is understood to lie beyond the realm of reason. This version of God as both infinitely powerful and utterly inscrutable posited a radically unsettling break from medieval realism, which while conceiving of God as infinite, nonetheless held that divine glory and goodness were manifest and attainable in nature everywhere. By contrast, the nominalist God ‘was frighteningly omnipotent, utterly beyond human ken, and a continual threat to human well-being. Moreover, this God could never be captured in words and consequently could be experienced only as a titanic question that evoked awe and dread.’ (Gillespie, 2008, p. 15) Divine commandments in this schema became arbitrary edicts which demanded a non-rational obedience (MacIntyre, 1967, p. 119).

This fissure of the medieval view of religion led to an important consequence that continues to have profound effects on the Anglo-liberal tradition’s construal of religious education, as well as the relationship between religion and society more broadly: a chasm is established between religion on the one hand, and practical reason and materiality on the other. For if subjects can neither apprehend God in their particular social locations and experiences in the world, nor through scholastic learning or practices inherent in their given vocations, then faith in revelation apart from reason becomes the only means of accessing the divine. In addition for Ockham, the locus of revelation and divine command is ultimately the individual
conscience. In so arguing, Ockham draws a sharp distinction between the realms of morality and religion; individual conscience becomes a parameter of practical, moral action whilst obedience is a religious duty (Shogimen, 2001, p. 618). As Eastern Orthodox theologian David Bentley Hart (2003) notes, the nominalism of Ockham, Scotus and others would come to reshape the very foundational understandings of religiosity in Latin Christendom; for insofar as this discourse succeeded in shattering the unity of faith and practical reason, it became for most Christian religion – both Catholic and Protestant – more or less axiomatic that ‘faith, to be faith, must be blind’ (p. 133). Simultaneously, theology in Latin Christendom started to conclude that human beings have two separate final ends – a natural and a supernatural one – and that the first remains substantially independent of the former; the notion of the secular as a parallel realm of ‘pure nature’ was thus conceivable (Pinckaers, 2005, pp. 359, 365; also Nasr, 1989). Paradoxically then, as Milbank (2007) points out, the beginnings of the secular as a space was a move internal to Christian theology that sought to emphasise the omnipotence of God:

[T]he secularising gesture which permitted its arrival was entirely a theological gesture, and even one which sought to conserve the transcendence of God and the priority of the supernatural, by insisting on the sheer ‘naturalness’ and self-sufficiency of human beings without grace, as a backdrop for augmenting [divine] grace’s sheer gratuity. (pp. 13-14)
In sum, the rise of nominalist theology in Latin Christendom marked the
decline of medieval realism and its attempt to formulate an integrated culture
predicated on Christian metaphysics. The withdrawal of the transcendent component
in culture begun under nominalism has, argues Dupré (1993), been completed in
modern liberal societies so that while it is not the case that contemporary culture
denies the existence of God or of the divine, the notion of divine transcendence plays
no vital role in the integration of culture – ‘Symbolic universes became sovereign
realms, beholden only to self-made rules’ (pp. 696-697). By positing the separation
of the world into distinct realms of natural and supernatural, then, nominalism can
thus be seen as an important staging point in the axiomatic division of religion on the
one hand and worldly practical reason on the other. As will be argued below, it also
forms the basis of other distinctions like religion/practice in the Protestant
Reformation and religion/public in the early-modern liberalism of John Locke, and
which persist in contemporary liberal discourse on religion which emphasises the
primacy of privatised belief and religious education as the transmission of such
beliefs (see Dupré, 1994, pp. 44, 48).

**Religion/practice: The Protestant reformation and the individualisation of belief**

…the very concept of religion as such – as an entity with any
distinction whatever from other human phenomena – is a
function of the same processes and historical moments that
generate the individualistic concept of it. (Arnal as cited in
Fitzgerald, 2007, p. 1)
The definition of religion as belief in an extra-empirical deity quite apart from practical reason set in motion by nominalist discourse in the late-Middle Ages would be most prominently developed in the early-modern period by the Protestant reformer Martin Luther who, in seeking to overcome the concentration of religious authority in the Roman Church and the gulf between human beings and the inscrutable, distant and terrifying God of nominalism, would come in turn to construct a theological and socio-political edifice on the basis of its presuppositions (Schaff, 1910; Gillespie, 2008, pp. 101-128; Knight, 2007, pp. 64-68). In doing so, Luther’s Protestant Reformation would come to be a key moment for the modern liberal conceptualisation of religious education as concerned with moral practices that flow out of personal belief.

As well, as I shall elaborate in the following section, the socio-political implications of Luther’s theology is also a foundational moment in the ideological development of early-modern liberal nation-states and the systems of schooling that would come to be their key apparatus for mass education. Three overlapping aspects of Luther’s theological and political articulations will be considered here that are judged to have had the most enduring effect on the way religion – and in turn, religious education – are conceived in the Anglo-liberal tradition: firstly, the individualisation of faith as (unreasonable) belief by delimiting the locus of religion to the ‘inner’ life, which represents a radicalisation of nominalist theology; secondly, as a consequence of this individualisation, Luther’s rendering of ‘outer’ practices as a mere expression of the freedom of ‘inner’ religion, thus rendering practical reason and ‘worldly’ practices as incidental – though still important – to faith itself as belief;
and thirdly, because practical reason is not intrinsic to religion, the former is
appropriately governed by secular authorities that secure the conditions for ‘true
religion’ defined as individual faith. In turn, this discourse on religion gave rise, as
can be expected, to new configurations of religious education, in particular the
institution of standardised mass schooling that sought to construct a society where
religiosity was cultivated in the ‘inner’ self while ‘outer’ social practices were
directed toward obedience to the sovereign state.

Firstly, in seeking to break the hold of a centralised Roman Church Luther saw
as authoritarian and corrupt, he combined mysticism with a specifically nominalist
conception of Christianity as a *religion centred on the interior life of the believer*, in
particular one that centred on the individual encounter with God mediated through
the Bible as the ‘Word of God’ (Luther, 1962[1523], p. 392; see also Taylor, 2007, p.
43-83; Tillich, 1968, p. 242-245). The discursive structure of this novel formulation
can be best captured in Luther’s confession before the imperial and papal authorities
at the Diet of Worms7 (*Reichstag zu Worms*) in 1521:

> I have been overcome by the scriptural references which I
> adduced and my conscience is bound by God’s Word.
> Therefore I neither can nor will revoke anything since it is
> neither certain nor right to act against one’s conscience. (as
cited in Lohse, 1960, p. 348)

7 The Diet of Worms 1521 was an imperial assembly of the Holy Roman Empire held in Worms,
Germany, where Luther was compelled to answer to local, imperial and papal authorities for his
public claims against the Church (see Bainton, 1978, pp. 167-190). ‘Diet’ as used here refers to a
deliberative assembly.
The importance of Luther’s statement lies in two, interrelated points: firstly, the role accorded to the individual conscience as the locus of revelation, and to which religious authorities had to appeal for legitimacy; and secondly, the primacy of scriptural references as self-evidently ‘God’s Word’ and hence as the normative authority for the individual conscience. The phrase of ‘God’s Word’ for Luther is predicated on the notion that the Bible contains Christ himself for the one who believes. In other words, the Bible itself is the sole medium through which the individual conscience comes to deal with, concentrate on or drive toward Christ; it contains within it ‘powerfully and Spiritually the word of God which deal with Christ and His work’ (Tillich, 1968, p. 243). In this formulation, it is evident that late-medieval nominalism is one of the key sources from which Luther drew, even though he openly spurned the theological discourses that had preceded him. Luther’s fideism – that is, ‘[t]he attitude of those who hold that the proper Christian attitude is to accept doctrines ‘by faith,’ without questioning their origin, significance, or rationality’ (Gonzalez, 2005, p. 63) – is a reflection of Ockham’s nominalism in that both posited an inscrutable, absolute and voluntarist God (i.e. defined primarily by his omnipotent will; see Gonzalez, 2005, pp. 180-181) knowable only by faith as belief. However, where Ockham surmises from this that the locus of revelation is to be found in the institutional Roman Catholic church, for Luther salvation is an individual revelation to be gained by faith alone (sola fides) through the encounter with scripture alone (sola scriptura) (Kennedy, 2000, p. 34). Consonant with this formulation, Luther and the Protestant reformers after him insisted on using the Bible

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8 Luther asserts that: ‘If I know what I believe, I know the content of the Scripture, since the Scripture does not contain anything except Christ’ (as cited in Tillich, 1968, p. 243).
as the sole guide for faith, thus rejecting church tradition, natural revelation or practical reason as additional sources of truth.

With the overwhelming emphasis on the individual vis-à-vis the Bible came a new, distinctly Protestant emphasis on personal piety; each Christian, now justified by faith as belief and not ‘good works’ (i.e. practices), stood free from condemnation but in direct, unmediated relationship with God. As Nelson (2004, p. 16) points out, Protestants elevated the vernacular Bible to a place of prominence and authority in their communities while simultaneously eschewing images, saints, relics, pilgrimages, holy days and rituals as ‘superstitions’ that were extrinsic to true religion. Concomitantly, the scholastic discourse on religious education was equally belittled. Luther explains that depending too much on inherited traditions for theological concepts results in a ‘Babel of philosophy,’ preferring instead to call believers over and over again to use the ‘words of Christ in simple faith’ (as cited in Gray, 2007, p. 187). Here, Luther’s nominalism is most apparently evinced in his constant exhortation for the ‘simple faith’ of the individual in contrast to natural reason insofar as such reason is offended by the unreasonable volition of God:

Common sense and natural reason are highly offended that God by his mere will deserts, hardens, and damns, as if he is delighted in sins and in such eternal torments, he who is said to be of such mercy and goodness. [...] There is no use trying to get away from this by ingenious distinctions. Natural reason, however much it is offended, must admit the
consequences of the omniscience and omnipotence of God.

(as cited in Bainton, 1978, p. 197)

With regard to religious education therefore, reason – whether attained practically or by theoretical learning – cannot for Luther grasp any transcendent telos; for this purpose one has to rely on revelation in the Word of God alone. But even then revelation does not yield a foundation for a teleological morality of practices, concerned as it is primarily with exposing the sinfulness of the humans and their dependence on God alone as regards their individual salvation (MacIntyre, 1998[1967], pp. 78-79; also Alfsvåg, 2005). The Protestant reformation was thus, on one level, a direct attack on the remainders of practical reason as intrinsically educative for religious ends. Yet on another level, the Protestant reformation was not merely a destructive force on religious education; on the contrary, the necessity for instituting a new order of things based on the identification of the Christian life with faith in the Word rather than worldly practices required that the Christian had access to the Word in the form of the gospel. Hence, what was impressed upon newly Protestant populations represented an intensification of religious education through the proliferation of technologies such as printed material – most prominently Luther’s translation of the Bible into the German vernacular – as well as stipulations on the reform of liturgy, catechisms and later, schools. Consequently, while Luther’s Protestantism emphasised individual faith as separate from worldly reason and practice, it was not devoid of political effects – most prominently as a central moment in the consolidation of the authority of the sovereign territorial state.

According to Edwards (2007), ‘the principal political effect of the production of a
common written language inscribed in increasingly widely circulated printed literature was, in concert with the Lutheran denunciation of the Romanists, a greater identification between the temporal authorities and the German-speaking populations over which they ruled’ (p. 14).

Despite Luther’s strong emphasis on the primacy of individual faith, it would be incorrect to conclude that he, the Protestant reformers who followed him, or the secular authorities that supported them were unconcerned with outward practices. Rather, as Tawney (1964) points out: ‘If anything, indeed, their tendency was to interpret [socio-political relations] with more rigorous severity, as a protest against the moral laxity of the Renaissance, and, in particular, against the avarice which was thought to be peculiarly the sin of Rome’ (p. 89). The difference between the emergent Protestant discourse on religion and practices and its medieval predecessor was – and this represents its second enduring effect on the Anglo-liberal tradition – the former’s division of human nature into two: soul and flesh, ‘inner’ and ‘outer,’ religion (or faith) and practices (or works). What now matters is not the action done or left undone, but the faith that moved the agent (MacIntyre, 1967, p. 122). The relationship of practices to faith is thus considered to be nominal, extrinsic and secondary as expressed in the High Court of Australia’s definition of religion primarily as belief.

According to Luther, in encountering the revelation of God by faith through the scriptures, freedom is something possessed by the ‘inner’ human person alone and therefore, ‘it is evident that no external thing has any influence in producing Christian righteousness or freedom, or in producing unrighteousness or servitude’ (as
cited in Edwards, 2007, p. 9). In other words, whatever effects the world has on the external flesh of a person has no impact on the essential ‘inner’ freedom guaranteed by faith. Yet practices in the form of good works in the ‘outer’ world still have a function: ‘the point of good works is that they constrain the external or fleshly man and thus instruct men to be faithful to the Word of God’ (Edwards, 2007, p. 10) In other words, while the Christian person does not need works, they should nevertheless be done so that ‘man may not go idle and may discipline and care for his body’ (Luther as cited in Marcuse, 2008[1972], p. 15). Practices in this account thus serve the secondary function of regulating the ‘sinful body,’ which is struggling against inner freedom of belief, as a discipline and a divine service. As Marcuse (2008[1972]) aptly describes, this discourse radically reconfigures the relationship of human persons to their practices (or praxis) insofar as for Luther and Protestantism:

...the true human subject is never the subject of praxis. Thereby the person is relieved to a previously unknown degree from the responsibility for his [sic] praxis, while at the same time he has become free for all types of praxis: the person secure in his inner freedom and fullness can only now really throw himself into outer praxis, for he knows that in so doing nothing can basically happen to him. And the separation of deed and doer, person and praxis, already posits the ‘double morality’ which, in the form of the separation of ‘office’ and ‘person’ forms one of the foundation stones of Luther’s ethics. (p. 14)
The immediate political effect of what Marcuse terms ‘double morality’ whereby the inner freedom of faith is primary and cleaved from its secondary practices of outer morality was to radicalise certain elements of the Protestant reformation such as the Anabaptist movement. According to the proponents of the latter such as Thomas Müntzer and his revolutionary followers who raised the Peasant Rebellion (1524-1525), this new freedom could only be realised with the total subordination of the secular realm to the Word of God; all princes had to heed the call of God or be exterminated (Edwards, 2007, p. 20; Gillespie, 2008, p. 111). Luther, having argued that inspiration trumped outward acts of morality and obedience, thus had to articulate a paradoxical theology of worldly politics that sustained his emphasis on inner faith while encouraging civil obedience. In order to do this, he extends the nominalist division between faith and reason into a political doctrine: every Christian, according to him, is simultaneously subject to ‘Two Kingdoms’ or ‘Two Governances’ – the spiritual and the temporal. Luther posits that this division of the socio-political world represents a divine sanction: ‘God has provided for [people] a different government beyond the Christian estate and

9 The Peasant Rebellion of 1524-25 was a widespread and popular revolt in the German-speaking areas of Central Europe. It can be understood as a culmination of a series of smaller scale and local revolts. In turn, these were triggered by the social dislocations wrought by the collapsing feudal order and the rise of a monetary economy, which allowed for a greater concentration of wealth amongst provincial rulers. According to Drummond (1979): ‘The slow conversion of the German - and especially the Saxon - economy to a monetary one, with the increased exploitation of the great silver mines in Saxony and on the borders with Bohemia, led to an upheaval in all social relations which was uncontrollable and which was widely interpreted as the onset of the end of the world. This upheaval affected all layers of society - in the towns, where the guild system was crumbling; in the country, where peasants were gradually forced to accept new measures and taxes, to pay in money what had previously been paid in kind, to abandon the land for the towns. […] The Saxon princes... were the wealthiest in Germany and possibly in Europe. The mines sunk in their lands yielded reliable silver for trade and for nascent industry’ (p. 64). It was in this context that Saxon theologian Thomas Müntzer articulated a theo-political discourse of civil disobedience, drawing widespread support from those whose livelihoods had been severely affected by these developments. As Drummond (1979) points out: ‘In his life Müntzer preached and was active principally [among the peasants and urban lower classes] and his supporters... were almost exclusively plebeian, burgher, or from the mining communities’ (p. 66). Müntzer considered Luther’s acquiescent approach to civil authorities to be ‘selling the Reformation to the highest bidder by serving both God and the princes of Saxony’ (as cited in Drummond, 1979, p. 64). For the contrast of political implications between Anabaptist and Lutheran discourses, see also Stayer (1991, pp. 45-92, 107-159).
kingdom of God’ in the absence of which sinful ‘men [sic] would devour one another, seeing that the whole world is evil and that among thousands there is scarcely a single true Christian’ (1962[1523], p. 91).

For Luther therefore, secular authorities are part of God’s provision of order in the wake of the fall of humankind into sin. Because the governed in any sovereign’s territory is assumed by Luther to consist mainly of ‘non-authentic’ Christians, the role assigned to this provision is politically fundamental; it is essential to the government of non-Christians by a Christian ruler (McNiell, 1941, p. 226). Secular, temporal authority is ultimately ‘but a very small matter in the sight of God’ and it is no more than a means for punishing wrongdoing, but even where it is run by corrupt people a Christian should obey it for ‘my faith in God still pursues its own course and does its job, for I do not have to believe what the temporal power believes’ (Luther as cited in Edwards, 2007, p. 12). Disobedience to secular authorities ranging from the active rebellion of the Anabaptists and peasant rebels to the people that ‘speak evil of the government and curse it’ are thus considered sinful (Luther as cited in Edwards, 2007, p. 12). In sum, Luther posits the primacy of faith in the inner person as the locus of revelation while insisting that outer practices have no intrinsic religious efficacy on the one hand, and paradoxically on the other, asserting the necessity for obedience to secular authorities who are ordained as part of God’s natural law in a sinful world. In the face of the Peasant Rebellion, this articulation of inner faith and outer obedience forms the basis of Luther’s appeal to secular authorities to institute systematic mass education to preserve the spiritual and temporal welfare of the German nation (Luke, 1989, p. 83ff.; Lenz, 2005, pp. 9-18).
This paradox in Protestant theology following Luther and its political effects brings to the fore its third historical contribution to the liberal discourse on religion: that because religion as faith is centred on the individual’s inner belief, *the realm of outer practices is legitimately ordered by secular authorities for the purpose of securing conditions for ‘true religion.’* Consistent with his articulation of the ‘two kingdoms’ and opposition to the Peasant Rebellion, Luther maintains that order in the worldly kingdom protects righteousness in the kingdom of heaven. Secular authority is always justified as God’s plan insofar as it is compatible with the leading of a Christian life – so long as it does not actively interfere with a Christian’s personal faith – it is to be presumed part of God’s natural order¹⁰ (Edwards, 2007, p. 17).

Thus, while Luther’s Protestant theology sought to preserve the primacy of individual faith as the locus of revelation, the political effects it engendered represented a radical reconfiguration of religion vis-à-vis secular authorities that had hitherto prevailed. Coercive power, under the Protestant schema, is ordained by God but is given exclusively to the secular authorities so that social order may be maintained; institutional forms of religion such as the church are left with ‘a merely suasive authority, that of preaching the Word of God’ (Cavanaugh, 2002, p. 23). As such, religious institutions were not merely minimized in relation to personal faith,

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¹⁰The extent of this is exemplified in his publication on ‘Whether Soldiers Too Can Be Saved,’ where Luther compares the murder involved in soldiery to the practice of necessary amputation for the sake of preserving civil order: ‘when I think of a soldier fulfilling his duty of office by punishing the wicked, and creating so much misery, it seems an un-Christian work completely contrary to Christian love. But when I think of how it protects the good and keeps and preserves wife and child, house and farm, property, and honour and peace, then I see how precious and godly this work is; and I observe that it amputates a leg or a hand, so that the whole body may not perish’ (Luther as cited in Edwards, 2007, p. 17). The positing of the civil order as an end in itself owing to God’s will is in marked deviation to the Medieval discourse of social formation, whereby Christian subjects are subordinate to the sovereign – at least in theory – only insofar as the sovereign is subordinate to the ‘highest good’ given by natural law.
but were also redefined as subordinate in temporal matters to the power of secular authority. An independent jurisdiction is thus carved out and handed over to the secular authorities while the church is consigned to the task of religious education in a manner still presupposed in modern liberal societies: i.e. as the purely interior government of the souls of its members while their bodies are handed over to the secular authorities (Cavanaugh, 2002, p. 25; Skinner, 1978, p. 15).

As Tillich (1968, p. 254) points out, this political arrangement may well have been brought about by an ‘emergency situation’ wrought by the Protestant rupture with the Roman Catholic Church, for there were no bishops or ecclesiastical authorities and yet the church needed administration and regulation to oversee its reformation: ‘So emergency bishops were created, and there was nobody else who could be this except the electors and princes. [Thus] the church became more or less… a department of the state administration, and the princes became the arbiters of the church.’ While such secular authorities were not considered to rightfully have a claim on religious matters, they were now responsible for administering the *ius circa sacrum* or ‘law around the sacred’ for the churches in their territories (Tillich, 1968, p. 254; see also Knight, 2007, p. 68). However, even though this may well have been articulated as a pragmatic administrative tactic, it had the lasting political effect of demarcating the authority of churches at the boundaries of ‘secular matters.’ Ecclesial boundaries were henceforth relocated within the territorial boundaries of the sovereign’s territories.

By positing the sovereign territorial state as the highest earthly authority for governing the practical world of their populations, the Protestant reformation
legitimated the ‘realization of a single, unquestioned political centre would make equivalent and equal each individual before the law, thereby freeing from the caprice of local custom and sub-loyalties which would divide them from fellow citizens’ (Cavanaugh, 2002, p. 74). Freed from such ‘caprice,’ the allegiance of the individual to the sovereign territorial state becomes the sole political association that necessarily binds the individual (Harvey, 2008, p. 114). In short, Protestantism, by casting religion as subject to the secular government, establishes temporal authority absolute priority over religious authority in all matters concerning worldly conduct. As Luther himself asserts:

> I say therefore that since the temporal power is ordained of God to punish the wicked and protect the good, it should be left free to perform its office in the whole body of Christendom without restriction and without respect to persons, whether it affects pope, bishops, priests, monks, nuns, or anyone else. (as cited in Edwards, 2007, p. 13)

Under this socio-political configuration, Protestant Christianity thus becomes paradigmatic of ‘religion’ as defined in the liberal discursive tradition: a name for systematised sets of beliefs based on the interior lives of individuals and which may engender practices and codes of conduct, but ones which must be in conformity with the rules of governing authorities. As Cavanaugh (1995, p. 411) surmises, religion may henceforth ‘take different cultural and symbolic expressions, but it remains a
universal essence distinct from political power which then must be translated into
publicly acceptable ‘values’ in order to become public currency.’

This translation of religion to publicly acceptable values is most evident in the
way religious education was conceived and arguably still is. Indeed, Luther urged the
establishment of a vast network of compulsory schooling in Protestant territories on
the basis of both spiritual and temporal exigencies in an effort to appeal to Protestant
rulers who, in his reckoning, were the only ones capable of enforcing it (Lenz, 2005,
p. 10). According to him, schools serve the function of training future citizens even if
the spiritual considerations were subtracted from it:

Now if (as we have assumed) there were no souls, and there
were no need at all of schools and languages for the sake of
the Scriptures and of God, this one consideration alone would
be sufficient to justify the establishment everywhere of the
very best schools for both boys and girls, namely, that in
order to maintain its temporal estate outwardly the world
must have good and capable men and women, men able to
rule well over land and people, women able to manage the
household and train children and servants aright. (Luther,
1967[1566], p. 60)

This type of reasoning was made effective in the period from 1539-1600 by
rulers and administrators in Protestant territories (see Green, 1979, pp. 105-108).
According to the excavation of discourses surrounding education in this period conducted by Carmen Luke (1989; 1989a), mandatory schooling for children emerged from this context and was seen by civic authorities and Protestant reformers alike as the most effective means of enforcing law and order among youth who, as adults, ‘would hopefully embody the kind of self-discipline, piety, morality, and obedience to civil and spiritual authority needed to build and uphold a unified state and church’ (Luke, 1989, pp. 71-72). For if the key to salvation, following Luther’s theology, lay in the personal faith in God’s grace through the individual’s reading of the Bible as ‘Word of God,’ then only individual confrontation with the divine words would enable an authentic and unmediated relationship between God and the individual. As Luke (1989, p. 70) points out, this theological impetus – along with political antagonisms arising from internal and external threats – gave rise to Luther’s urgency to ensure the masses knew how to read and in turn, his appointment of former pupil and collaborator Philip Melanchthon to establish a system of mass and compulsory schooling within which to institutionalize the learner and learning process (also Kusukawa, 1999).

While undoubtedly inflected theologically, the push for schools was also seen as the most pragmatic way for civic authorities to bring about order of thought and behaviour among peoples of a spiritually and socially disunified nation-state (Luke, 1989, p. 70). More particularly, such education sought to create obedient, pious, and diligent subjects of their German princes to avoid the sorts of revolts typified by the Peasant Rebellion (Luke, 1989a, pp. 79-81; Fromm, 1969, pp. 101-102; Marcuse, 2008[1972], p. 18), as well as to defend the Protestant territories against
encroachments by Roman Catholic and Turkish Islamic forces\textsuperscript{11} (Lenz, 2005, pp. 12-13; Luke, 1989, p. 131). As Melanchthon (1988) asserts in an address delivered upon the opening of a new school in Nuremberg in 1526: ‘In the well constituted state the first task for schools is to teach youth, for they are the seedbed of the city’ (p. 63)

Thus, by the late sixteenth century, Lutheran-inspired ‘folk schools’ proliferated across German provinces and displayed a regularity and repetition of instructional procedures, curricular content and state administration procedures such as school inspections and extensive record keeping that constitute the many of the principal formal characteristics of the modern education systems (Luke, 1989, p. 80; Luke, 1989a, pp. 111-131; Lotz-Heumann, 2008, pp. 251-254; Green, 1979, pp. 96-105) More broadly, religious education and territorial sovereignty were fused together in a ‘large scale surveillance network’ (Luke, 1989, p. 84), and the technologies of this surveillance were standardised confessions of faith, liturgical uniformity, and moral policing, enforced by frequent visitations of local churches by officials of church and state (Cavanaugh, 2009, p. 170; Luke, 1989, p. 83ff).

In sum, the Protestant reformation triggered by Luther and his followers can be seen to have three, overlapping impacts on how religion is conceived in liberal discourse today: firstly, by developing the nominalist definition of faith as belief by delimiting its locus to the ‘inner’ life of individual subjects, it plays a key role in the formation of the modern liberal conception of ‘religion’ as private belief in a

\textsuperscript{11} A widely distributed and regularly sung Lutheran hymn in schools of the time contained the words:
Maintain us, Lord, within thy word,
And fend off mur’d’rous Pope and Turk,
Who Jesus Christ, thy very Son,
Strive to bring down from his throne’ (quoted in Mathis, 2009, p. 2).
Supernatural Being, Principle or Thing; secondly and consequently, ‘outer’ worldly practices, while still important, are no longer seen as intrinsic or primary to religion, but are rather merely expressions of inner faith or enacted to secure the conditions for such a faith, thus cementing the priority of belief as the key feature of religion; and thirdly, because practical reason is not intrinsic to religion in itself, worldly practices are appropriately subject to and governed by secular authorities who are appointed by God’s natural law, and hence appropriate religious conduct in the political realm should ultimately seek only to secure the conditions for ‘true religion’ defined as belief.

Through this articulation of Protestant theological discourse with the pragmatic politics of territorial sovereignty during the reformation, the territorial state thus assumed a greater authority and responsibility over the socio-political order in its entirety, including its sovereignty over religious institutions. This dependence of churches on the patronage of secular authorities had significant effects. As Gray (2007, p. 185) points out, the Protestant reformed churches lacked an explicitly separate institution that could support disagreements with the state—as it was, the churches were governed and controlled by state apparatuses to limit critique and, more importantly, curtail the opportunity for competing spiritual centres of authority to arise. In this context, the institution of compulsory and systematic schooling can be seen as necessity arising from the desired sustenance and perpetuation of this new socio-political arrangement. In turn, this can be seen to furnish two significant moments in the conceptualisation of religious education in the liberal tradition: on the one hand, the shift of ultimate authority over education from the church to the sovereign state (Luke, 1989, p. 131) and on the other, the diffusion of a certain

**Religion/public: The Anglo-liberal state and belief in the private sphere**

While comprehensive schooling did not arrive in Luther’s lifetime, Prussia had by the end of the eighteenth century inaugurated a national system of public schools for all children as ‘the modern state increasingly [considered] teaching as falling under its sole jurisdiction, following the principle that the church is within the state.’ (Julia, 2006, p. 162) Scholar of Christian education Brian Hill (1985, p. 40) likewise argues in a celebratory tone that ‘it was a significant commentary on Luther’s approach that the passage of time had so weakened its religious rationale that a law in 1803 released the schools from the obligation to uphold any particular religious confession.’ The usual explanation given for this transition of educational responsibility from church to state parallels a broader historical narrative within the Anglo-liberal tradition: that of a shift in Europe from theocratic coercion to religious freedom and tolerance, with a corresponding institutionalisation of a separation between church (or religion) and the (secular) state. While proponents of this account occupy diverse positions within the Anglo-liberal tradition and by no means concur on every detail regarding antecedents and key players, there appears to be a broad
agreement amongst scholars on the necessity of the separation of religion from the political sphere because it is held to be irrational, other-worldly and prone to violence. This then serves as a condition of possibility for the emergence of modern liberal states that can be understood to be broadly situated within the Anglo-liberal tradition’s narrative of the triumph of the peaceable liberal state over religious violence. This is expounded concisely and with rhetorical flair by Fukuyama (1992):

There was a time when religion played an all-powerful role in European politics, with Protestants and Catholics organizing themselves into political factions and squandering the wealth of Europe in sectarian wars. English liberalism... emerged in direct reaction to the religious fanaticism of the English Civil War. Contrary to those who at the time believed that religion was a necessary and permanent feature of the political landscape,

*liberalism vanquished religion in Europe.* (p. 271; emphasis in original)

By contrast to this narrative, I concur broadly with such diverse scholars as Karl Marx (1992, p. 222), Michel Foucault (2007, p. 229) and Giorgio Agamben

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12 So for Quentin Skinner (1978, p. 352) it was the *politique* theorists of sixteenth and seventeenth century France for coming to the conclusion that ‘if there were to be any prospect of achieving civic peace, the powers of the State would have to be divorced from the duty to uphold any particular faith’; for Judith Shklar (1984, p. 5) it was Michel de Montaigne who rejected the cruelty of institutional Christianity that pre-empted the alternatives of ‘cruel military and moral repression and violence, and a self-restraining tolerance [born out of the cruelties of the religious civil wars] that fences in the powerful to protect the freedom and safety of every citizen’; and for Ian Hunter (2005, p. 7-8), the liberal state’s policy of toleration can be understood as the innovation of ‘Brandenburg-Prussia’s leading ‘civil philosophers’—Samuel Pufendorf and Christian Thomasius—[who] had grounded private religious freedom not in the subjective right of individuals but in the state’s refusal to enforce confessional imperatives’ (see also Hunter, 2001). Such positions may be multiplied with some differences in detail (see also Stout, 1981, p. 235-238; Rawls, 1993, p. xx-xxv; Kymlicka, 1996, p. 2-3).
(2007) that the emergence of the modern liberal state is better understood as a shift from one Christian-inflected regime to another Christian-inflected regime, particularly one with a Protestant and nominalist cultural horizon that continued to be operative. From this perspective, the triumphal liberal-secularist accounts are arguably misleading insofar as they largely ignore the extent to which the discourses and norms produced by Protestant and nominalist presuppositions continued to operate within, and indeed abet the emergence of the modern liberal state (see Martin, 2010, pp. 34-35). Particularly important with regard to conceptions of religious education is that this view fails to bring into relief what Martin (2010, p. 59ff.) labels the ‘circulation of power’ that constitutes the liberal hegemony of modern European states whereby the discourse produced by ‘privatised’ institutions such as (and perhaps especially) religious institutions perform the social function of habituating citizens for the state. In turn, the state, as the regulator of public affairs, grants recognition to certain religious institutions within its sovereign territory by recourse to dominant discourses of acceptable religiosity and social civility.

In this section, I shall furnish a genealogy of such a liberal socio-political arrangement, which will be specifically focused on how the concern of religious education came to be defined as the cultivation of private religious convictions on the one hand and governed as a deliverer of educational services on behalf of the state on the other. This is centred on two moments broadly corresponding to Martin’s diagram of the ‘circulation of power’ in liberal states: firstly, the post-Protestant reformation consolidation of the state as sovereign over religion and religious institutions within its territory, and which regulates the operations of the latter; and
secondly, the diffusion of a Protestant and nominalist hegemony that defines religion, ‘God’s law’ and civility through religious education for the sustenance of the state.

Firstly, as mentioned in the previous section, one of the key political effects of the Protestant reformation following Luther was the increased authority of the territorial state over the socio-political order in its territories, which included sovereignty over religious institutions, over and against the Roman Catholic Church. This was formalised under the Augsburg Settlement of 1555, which saw the legal division of Christendom between its Catholic and Protestant territories (Hughes, 1992, p. 58ff). Most significantly, the treaty established at Augsburg granted territorial sovereigns the right to determine ecclesial affiliation of their subjects, to which the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* (‘whose realm, his religion’) is often (mistakenly\(^\text{13}\)) attributed. It is at this point that the narratives within the Anglo-liberal tradition have traced what sociologists have termed the ‘process of social differentiation’ in which the original unity of Latin Christendom gave way to religious divisions along confessional\(^\text{14}\) lines (see Gorski, 2000, p. 157; see Figure 5 below). Hunter and Saunders (2002), for example, argue from this perspective that the post-Protestant reformation period saw ‘the splitting of the ‘universal’ church into several rival confessions, and the emergence of a series of territorial states bent on asserting their sovereignty against the supranational structures of the Holy Roman Empire and the Papal Church’ (p. 3). Thus Confessional Europe, where Christian

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\(^{13}\) Cavanaugh (2009, p. 74) points out that the doctrine of *cuius regio, eius religio*, which is usually attributed to the Augsburg Settlement (1555), was in fact invented by a German jurist around 1600 and could not have been used by the writers of the treaty.

\(^{14}\) ‘Confessional’ as used here refers to Christian churches – particularly Lutheran and Reformed (Calvinist) churches – whose fundamental doctrines are stated in particular documents called ‘confessions.’ A ‘confession of faith’ is thus both an act by which the doctrine of a church is declared and the resulting document from such an act, for example, the Augsburg Confession of 1530, Westminster Confession of 1646, etc (Gonzalez, 2005, pp. 37-38).
universalism in the medieval times was supplanted by religious particularism that is understood to be the source of conflict that led to the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), otherwise labelled as the ‘wars of religion.’ The history of European modernity is thus marked, in this account, by a distinctive ‘quest for security’ from the violence and insecurity of the ‘religious wars’ which eventually found a solution in the emergence of the secular state and its ‘liberal sensibility’ (Mavelli, 2011, p. 5).

![Diagram of the transition from medieval to confessional churches](image)

*Figure 5: Conventional understanding of confessionalisation as religious differentiation leading to the 'wars of religion' (Gorski, 2000, p. 151)*

By contrast, however, recent work on the confessional states has highlighted that the process of social differentiation was also accompanied by a process of religious, social, cultural and political *de-differentiation*; that is, according to Gorski (2000, p. 152), while on the religious level there was an apparent splintering of the once dominant Roman Church, within territorial bounds confessionalization also involved the re-imposition of state-led ecclesiastical discipline on both the clergy and the laity. On a societal level, confessionalization involved efforts to ‘Christianize’ everyday life, and to bring individual conduct into line with Biblical law, a campaign...
in which church and state often joined hands. On the cultural level, confessionalization involved efforts to suppress popular ‘superstitions’ and to impose a new, more ‘fully Christian’ ethos. Finally, on the political level, confessionalization meant a deepening of the alliance between church and state and a tightening of the relationship between confessional and ‘national’ identity. In doing so, the territorial sovereigns exploited the potential for social cohesion and the capacity to mobilize allegiances of religious tradition to sharpen the boundaries of the religious communities and make them coextensive with the boundaries of the state (Mavelli, 2011, p. 6). Thus, an argument could equally be made that far from a simple causal relation between religious differentiation and the Thirty Years War, it was in fact the emergence of European territorial states as sovereign over their respective churches that was the focus of antagonisms (see Figure 6). More specifically, to the extent that the emerging states willingly contributed to amplifying confessional differences in order to establish its sovereignty it may be argued, along with Cavanaugh (2009, p. 162), that the wars of religion were not the events which necessitated the birth of the modern State as peaceable saviour, but rather were themselves the means — ‘the birthpangs’ — through which the state came to life (see also Mavelli, 2011, p. 6).
Figure 6: More recent understandings of confessionalisation as social, cultural, religious and political
differentiation within nation-states and differentiation between nation-states. (Gorski, 2000, p. 152)

So while the official adoption of reformed religion contributed to the power of
different territorial sovereigns in different ways, the process of confessionalisation in
Europe saw a trend toward the absorption of religious institutions – along with their
educative functions – into the state, as had occurred in the Protestant territories in
Germany after Luther. For example, Henry VIII in England, Christian III in
Denmark, and a dozen leading German princes, confiscated church property within
their territories or absorbed into their states adjoining bishoprics or monastic estates,
which enabled a firmer grip on education from school level to universities
(Cavanaugh, 2009, p. 169). According to Turner (2011), the modern process known
as ‘secularisation’ can be understood in this historical context – that is, where
‘ecclesial property was handed over to a secular authority’ (p. 128; also
Sommerville, 1992, pp. 111-128). For religious institutions such as schools, such secularisation meant ‘the nation’ now formed its institutional apex and ‘territory’ demarcated its bounds. Consequently, the process of de-differentiation which took place within territorial states saw secular and ecclesiastical bureaucracies expand in parallel and become intertwined, which helped consolidate a more intensive form of the state; for now, the articulation of sovereign power to religious institutions, which integrated the governing, disciplining and educative functions formerly belonging to the church, ‘provided the means to regulate, down to the parish level, changes which had the potential to reach every subject’ (Cavanaugh, 2009, p. 169). The work of social historian of the sixteenth and seventeenth century German confessional state R. Po-Chia Hsia concurs with this, describing the confessionalisation process as a key moment in the history of the state’s sovereignty over life in its territories, in particular its ability to deploy religion for the ends of national identity. ‘Conformity required coercion,’ argues Hsia (1989), which gave rise to the Church and state formation of ‘an inextricable matrix of power for enforcing discipline and confessionalism’ (p. 6) Thus, the history of confessionalization in early modern Germany is, according to him, not so much the history of religious sectarianism so much as the history of the territorial state.

This trend toward de-differentiation was intensified with the political stability established under the Treaty of Westphalia (c.1648), for hence the European civil authorities who were newly minted as nation-states were temporarily freed from boundary disputes and wars caused by sudden changes in confessional and political allegiances to focus on the administration of the spiritual and social dimensions of
the people within their realms (Tilly, 1992, p. 61). The Treaty helped to establish the principle of state sovereignty which remained in force for centuries and allowed for the absorption of ecclesial properties and educational institutions into nation-states.

Following the ideas of the Enlightenment thinkers Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Samuel Pufendorf and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, post-Westphalian sovereignty too was eventually modified as liberal ideas began to challenge the authority of the monarchs in Europe (Fosson, 2007, p. 33). The emergent liberal notion of ‘popular sovereignty’ required that sovereignty reside in the hands of the people as ultimately, according to this discourse, it was the will of the people that gave legitimacy to the law. This idea that sovereignty emanated from the will of the constituent people began to challenge and eventually superseded the perception, created at Westphalia, that sovereignty was held by a single ruler. This type of popular sovereignty is synonymous with ‘public opinion’ as broadly understood today, which as Gramsci argues, ‘was born on the eve of the collapse of the absolutist State’ (as cited in Buttigieg, 2005, p. 46). Henceforth, the modern (i.e. constitutional) state can be characterised by its general function as a factor of cohesion or unity for a

15 I acknowledge that a definition of the modern state is one that has been a subject of long debates by theorists from the political sciences, history, economics, sociology and cultural studies. In the most basic sense, the modern state can be characterised as a distinct ensemble of institutions that has the authority to make the rules which govern society, with the distinct trait – in the words of Max Weber – of possessing a ‘monopoly on legitimate violence’ within a specific territory (Marshall, 1998, p. 635). Beyond this basic definition, further theoretical elaborations on the state can be broadly characterised as: (1) liberal-pluralist, which generally sees the state as acting in the interests of the individual and group constituents in society (e.g. Galston, 1991, pp. 79-97); (2) Marxist, which sees the state primarily in its role within a capitalist mode of production in order to attenuate social class conflict (e.g. Poulantzas, 1974); (3) autonomous, which sees the state as encompassing personnel who have interests of their own, and who pursue them independently of the various groups in society (e.g. Nordlinger, 1981); or (4) decentred, which sees the state not as a unified agent – following a certain reading of Foucault on ‘governmentality’ – but as decomposed into distinct apparatuses, agencies, departments and other units each with specific tasks for governing aspects of social life (e.g. Rose & Miller, 2008, pp. 53-113). In this thesis, I draw primarily from the work of Gramsci alongside the later works of Foucault (1979, pp. 92-93) and Poulantzas (1980, pp. 126-129) in arguing that seen genealogically, the modern liberal state is a – if not the – crucial ‘institutional crystallization’ or ‘material condensation’ of contingent hegemonic relations within a given political regime (also Jessop, 2007). This is a conception of the modern state that incorporates the liberal-pluralist stress on social consensus, the Marxist emphasis on social conflict and the decentred perspective on a multiplicity of state apparatuses all within a single theoretical framework.
differentiated and divided social formation and whose precise place, particular form, institutional arrangements and boundaries reflect a ‘material condensation’ (Poulantzas, 1980, pp. 128-129, 145) or ‘institutional crystallization’ (Foucault, 1979, pp. 92-93) of unequal social relations that prevail within a given political regime (see also Mayo, 2011). In short, the state is no longer the body of the sovereign, but ‘a complex social relation that reflects the changing balance of social forces in a determinate conjuncture’ (Jessop, 1982, pp. 221).

The success of the Treaty of Westphalia in cementing state sovereignty and liberalism in spurring the evolution of governmental arrangements from the figure of the Sovereign to ‘popular sovereignty’ eventually gave rise to what Foucault (2009, pp. 337-358) has labelled ‘Reason of State’ (*raison d’état*). By contrast to the medieval Christian notion of temporal authority subordinated to supernatural ends whereby ‘just government was government in accord with a hierarchy of human, natural and divine laws’ (Bell, 2001, p. 23), the emergent modern conception of government according to Reason of State operates on its opposite: a nominalist logic of aggregation, whereby the state is seen as the institutional embodiment of the will of its constituent people. The novelty of Reason of State was thus its predicate that the state as the expression of sovereign will was not accountable to any transcendent law or principle. Instead, the principles of government are immanent in the state itself or, to put it in other terms, government comes to be concerned with the perpetuity and economic prosperity of the state as the highest good in itself (Bell, 2001, p. 24). As Foucault (2009, pp. 338, 340) surmises, the end of the Reason of State is the state itself, and if there is something like perfection, happiness, or felicity, it will only ever be the perfection, happiness or felicity of the state itself.
This in turn requires an articulation (and sometimes exclusion) of the disparate historical traditions and particularities such as religious bodies contained within its territorial bounds, which are amalgamated to form a unifying narrative of history whereby the state comes to be the bearer of their collective fate. As Poulantzas (1980) describes it, the state:

[I]tself has no original legitimacy in the body of the sovereign, but is successively grounded in the people-nation, whose destiny it represents. This State realizes a movement of individualization and unification; constitutes the people-nation in the further sense of representing its historical orientation; and assigns a goal to it, marking out what becomes a path. (p. 113)

The Reason of State thus entailed a new, pastoral kind of relationship between the state and the individual, for while the logic of the former is concerned first and foremost with strengthening and perpetuating the state, it acknowledges that its strength and economic prosperity lie in its population. The state now takes an abiding interest in the individual details of its subjects’ lives. Each individual is now addressed in terms of how their particular existence may contribute to or detract from the state’s strength (Bell, 2001, p. 24). It is within the logic of this emergent population-territory-wealth nexus that the reactivation of religious education re-emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, specifically in the form of religious institutions as a means of moral formation. As Foucault (2007, pp. 229,
230) argues, the socio-political shifts in the sixteenth century onwards did not represent an absolute diminution of religious pastoralism but rather, ‘an intensification of the religious pastorate in its spiritual forms... [and] also in its extension and temporal efficiency’ through a development of ‘forms of the activity of conducting men outside of ecclesiastical authority.’ For the tendency towards Reason of State, far from being an ethos ‘that began to identify the ends of government with the purely ‘worldly’ security and prosperity of a territory and its population’ over the ‘unity of [‘other-worldly’] faith’ (Hunter, 1995, p. 438; emphasis added), was in Protestant states undergirded by the hegemony of Protestant norms that defined terms such as ‘religion’ and ‘civility’ in historically and geographically particular ways.

The persistence of these assumptions is best exemplified in the work of British Enlightenment pioneer John Locke (1632-1704), a political writer and government official whose work on the division of religious and civil (i.e. public) realms continues to be a source of authority for the Anglo-liberal configuration of society (Uzgalis, 2010; also Kennedy, 2006, p. 93; Roover and Balagangadhara, 2008, p. 524ff; in Australia, see Gascoigne, 2002, pp. 39-44). Locke is commonly lauded in this tradition as ‘the philosopher of the Anglo-Saxons [who] championed consensual parliamentary politics and economic individualism’ (Kennedy, 2006, p. 93) and as one of the key founders of modern Anglo-liberal democracy, which is ‘a system clearly descended from Lockean liberalism’ (Zuckert, 2002, p. 1). Indeed, Kateb (2009) goes so far as to argue that Locke, being ‘a major intellectual source of the process we call modern ‘secularization,’’ made an ‘unequaled contribution to the emergence of secularism in general and political secularism in particular’ (pp. 1006,
1001). Given his authoritative status within the liberal tradition to the extent that ‘it is largely due to Locke’s influence that [liberal] beliefs are so widespread today’ (Forster, 2005, p. 21), I shall deal more closely with Locke as both an exemplary instance and a foundational source of the liberal discourse on religion and politics. This will be done in two parts: firstly, with regard to Locke’s political principles on the appropriate place of religion in the politics of liberal society; and secondly, his prescriptions on the function and manner of religious education that stem from these principles. The interplay of these two moments, I argue, foregrounds both the regulation of religion by the state as well as the persistence of progressively ‘secularised’ nominalist and Protestant presuppositions in the Anglo-liberal discourse on society and politics.

Over twenty-two years, beginning with An Essay Concerning Toleration (1667) and ending with A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), Locke set out to assault the socio-political arrangements of the confessional state, which had conferred upon sovereigns both the right and the duty to establish true religion within their territories, order the outward form of the church and punish those who refused to conform (Stanton, 2006, p. 85; also Coffey, 2000). Against this, he sought to demarcate the appropriate bounds of both religion and the politics of state that in time would become liberal orthodoxy (Stanton, 2006, p. 86), one that sought to ‘distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion, and settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other’ (Locke, 2003, p. 218). In a seventeenth-century English society where there existed more than one Christian denomination, Locke asserted that for the sake of civil order, no denomination may use the state to dominate, enfeeble, or eliminate other denominations, and the state
may not use its power for its own purposes to do the same (Kateb, 2009, p. 1018). In order to do this, he articulated a political doctrine for what Forster has appropriately termed ‘belief regulation,’ which consists firstly in distinguishing between substantive religious discourse as opinion about uncertain mysteries and public reason as those ‘common offices of humanity and friendship’ demonstrable by natural law and empirical observation (Locke as cited in Forster, 2005, p. 52), and secondly by extending this distinction to his version of an overlapping ‘twofold society’ of religion/politics that ‘almost all men in the world are members’ (Locke as cited in Roover and Balagangadhara, 2008, p. 530). Consistent with the nominalist presuppositions advanced by Scotus and Ockham abovementioned, Locke argues both that God is infinite and thus cannot be approached by finite human minds, as well as the empirical arbitrariness of the connection between human ‘ideas’ and empirically perceived ‘objects’ in the world (as cited in Forster, 2005, pp. 58-63). As Forster (2005, p. 62) points out, Locke’s insistence on the distinction between ideas and the objects that create them is far from a mere epistemological technicality; it plays a key role in belief regulation insofar as it sets limits to mental powers and hence its inadequacy for substantive ideas about ‘metaphysical objects such as God and other spirits.’ On this basis, Locke defines ‘realm of religion’ as stemming from the individual soul, which is concerned only about the ‘bare fact’ that eternal life has been promised to people (i.e. Protestants) and that this ultimate end should guide conduct (see also Forster, 2005, pp. 64-65):
Every man has an immortal soul, capable of eternal happiness or misery; whose happiness depending on his believing and doing those things in life, which are necessary to the obtaining of God’s favour, and are prescribed by God to that end. [...] seeing one man does not violate the right of another, by his erroneous opinions, and undue manner of worship, nor is his perdition any prejudice to another man’s affairs; therefore the care of each man’s salvation belongs only to himself. (Locke, 2003, p. 242)

On this basis, the realm of religion is defined by Locke as the province of the immortal souls of all humans, who strive for salvation by worshipping God. Thus, its primary end is the otherworldly salvation of the individual soul. By contrast, the realm of civil society/government, according to Locke, lacks concern for otherworldly ends, but rather is concerned only with the socio-political order of this world. He defines the latter as follows:

But besides their souls, which are immortal, men have also their temporal lives here upon earth; the state whereof being frail and fleeting, and the duration uncertain, they have need of several outward conveniencies to the support thereof, which are to be procured by pains and industry... But the pravity of mankind being such, that they had rather injuriously prey upon the fruits of other men’s labours than
take pains to provide for themselves; the necessity of preserving men in the possession of what honest industry has already acquired, and also of preserving their liberty and strength, whereby they may acquire what they farther want, obliges men to enter into society with one another; that by mutual assistance and joint force, they may secure unto each other their properties, in the things that contribute to the comfort and happiness of this life... (Locke, 2003, p. 242)

Here, it is important to note as De Roover and Balagangadhara (2008, p. 532) have done, that Locke’s conceptual scheme is virtually identical to the theology of ‘Christian freedom’ advanced by Luther – i.e. where the individual’s ‘inner’ freedom of belief exists simultaneously with the necessity of an ‘outer’ government for civil order, without which sinful human beings would either ‘devour one another’ or, in Locke’s terms, ‘the pravity of mankind’ would tend to ‘injuriously prey upon the fruits of other men’s labours than take pains to provide for themselves.’ It is no surprise, therefore, that scholars such as Forster (2005), Stanton (2006), Dunn (1969) and others have insisted on the theological background of apparently universal liberal categories inherited from Locke, not least the liberal model of separating religion from politics that he and later liberal thinkers advanced as a secularized replica of the Protestant theology of Christian liberty and separation of the ‘two kingdoms,’ which is in turn predicated on a specifically nominalist view of religion as individual faith in eternal life and public reason as based on empirical facts extrinsic to faith. This division of the social world into two spheres persists in the contemporary principle of
toleration in liberal discourse: a public-political sphere of interpersonal transactions regarding ‘bare facts’ and a private sphere of religion or substantive conceptions of the good derived from – as defined by the High Court of Australia – ‘belief in a Supernatural Being, Principle or Thing.’ As long as the rule of law is respected for the sake of civil order, according to this prevailing view, the liberal state ought not to interfere in the religious and moral life of its subjects (see De Roover and Balagangadhara, 2008, p. 527). It is perhaps unsurprising that this view prevailed in the emergent Anglo-liberal society in the seventeenth century and its colonies like Australia in the eighteenth century, as Goldie argues, because the language of ‘civil religion’ and its synthesis of civility and individual piety stemmed from the Protestant Reformers’ theology of the church-state and ‘were among the most pervasive concepts in early modern Europe’ (as cited in Fitzgerald, 2008, p. 162). In sum, this schema holds that the state should remain indifferent to questions of religion defined as individual belief while on actions and practices, insofar as they affect civil order, religion is subordinate to the state.

However, it is precisely on the question of ‘civil order’ that the interconnectedness latent in the separate spheres of public politics and private religion in Locke (and liberal discourse more generally) becomes most apparent: how was ‘civil order’ to be determined, according to Locke? While the contemporary liberal model of separation between politics/religion and its corresponding public/private demarcation is detectable in its early form in Locke’s influential political pamphlets, to project the associated modern division of secular/religious back to Locke would be anachronistic. As Martin (2010: 58-108) demonstrates through a close reading of Locke’s texts, despite the latter’s insistence on the
separation of civil government from matters of religion, he nonetheless insists that ‘God’s moral law’ remains an immutable precondition for the conduct of a liberal society based on contract and consent (as cited in Martin, 2010, pp. 63, 76; also Forster, 2005, p. 53). The moral law, argues Locke, is discernible because of the universality of the ‘law of nature’: a principle instituted by God that sets the boundaries to individual liberty understood as the innate power of reason for freedom of conscience and religious belief, and which in turn shapes the character of government as embodying the consent of the majority (Hindess, 2007, p. 5).

For Locke, writing in the Christian context of seventeenth-century England amongst other Christian European powers, to fall back on such a theological legitimation of political institutions, however minimal, was not beyond the pale (Forster, 2005, p. 22). The existence of God, then, far from being an ‘other-worldly’ concern removed from ‘worldly’ government for the sake of civil order, was in fact the ground of its moral legitimacy. In fact, the basic preconditions for appropriate conduct, or for abiding by the law of nature according to Locke, includes the belief in at least all of the following: one must know that God exists, one must know that God has not appointed any one individual an authority over another in the state of nature, and one must realize that the belief in God’s existence (and his willingness to punish vice) is necessary for keeping contracts (Martin, 2010, p. 77). It is with reference to these reasons that atheists, Roman Catholics and some Muslims, according to Locke, should not be tolerated; the former, involving a rejection of ‘God’s moral law,’ is regarded by Locke (2002, p. 211) variously as a criminal and insane while the latter two, pledging ‘foreign’ allegiances to the pope or ‘blind obedience to the mufti of Constantinople’ represented seditious segments of the population that contradicted
the ‘law of nature’ and hence, failed to respect natural liberty and the natural character of government (see also Locke, 2003, pp. 240-241). In other words, although claiming to be instituted by a universal law of nature, civil order is in fact defined by the particular religious discourse of Anglo-liberal societies of that time – a Protestant theological minimalism (that accommodated the Church of England and dissenting groups) that, as Zagorin (2003) points out, presumes a consensus on the ‘essentials’: e.g. ‘the role of Christ as savior and redeemer’ and ‘obvious moral truths on which no one disagrees’ (p. 113).

Yet given the particularity and indeed novelty of Locke’s universal claims regarding the moral law and the law of nature, how are individuals to come to an acknowledgment of this ‘truth’ about their powers of reason and the character of government? The answer, in short, was education. Education is crucial according to Locke because it provides the character formation necessary for becoming a person and for being a responsible citizen (see Yolton, 1968, p. 3). For despite the insistence that humans are ‘subject to the rule of natural law which was ultimately God’s law made known to man [sic] through the voice of reason’ (Crantson, 1969, p. 11), Locke maintains that the majority of people take as certain and true the ‘errors’ passed down to them by local customs, religious traditions and other ‘untrustworthy’ sources, rather than employ their own ‘reason’ to discern for themselves truth from error (Martin, 2010, p. 72). As he argues in his highly influential 1693 treatise Some Thoughts Concerning Education:

The great mistake I have observed in people’s breeding their children has been, that this has not been taken care enough of
its due season; that the mind has not been made obedient to
discipline, and pliant to reason, when at first it was most
tender, most easy to be bowed. (Locke, 1996, sec. 34)

In order to ensure the habituation of ‘pliant’ young into reasonable and free
individuals as they are ‘supposed to be’ under the law of nature, Locke points
precisely to religious education and its theological content that, under his political
schema, are now considered beyond the purview of the public-politics of the state.
As the epistemological foundation of this regime of education, argues Locke (1996),
‘there ought very early to be imprinted on his [sic] mind a true notion of God, as of
the independent supreme Being, Author, and Maker of all things, from whom we
receive all our good, who loves us, and gives us all things: and, consequent to this,
instil into him a love and reverence of this Supreme Being’ while pedagogically, he
prescribes ‘keeping children constantly morning and evening to acts of devotion to
God, as to their Maker, Preserver, and Benefactor, in some plain and short form of
prayer, suitable to their age and capacity’ (sec. 136). With regard to the content of
education, Locke (1996) prescribes ‘the Lord’s prayer, the creed, and ten
commandments, [and] it is necessary he should learn perfectly by heart; but, I think,
not by reading them himself in his primer, but by somebody’s repeating them to him,
even before he can read’ (sec. 157). Such educational practices, Locke assumes, will
be of much more use to them in not only in other-worldly religion, but also as a
foundation for this-worldly knowledge and moral behaviour.
Here, the paradox that characterises Locke’s, and indeed the Anglo-liberal tradition’s demarcation of religion/politics and private/public becomes apparent; for if a citizen or public official (e.g. magistrate, civil servant or politician) were to be habituated according to Locke’s educational prescriptions, then the public ‘reason’ that s/he employs and deploys to discern what is true or false according to the law of nature will be, in no small part, derived from the religious education s/he and others have received. In turn, because citizens are the constituents of the liberal state and its apparatuses under popular sovereignty, the judicial-administrative definition of religion, as well as the demarcation of what forms should be tolerated or excluded, will tend to approximate and legitimate prevailing understandings. Thus, if it is the case that, for Locke and the liberal tradition more broadly, the ends of education are the welfare and prosperity of the nation, which is in turn measured by the personal happiness and social usefulness of its citizens (see Deighton, 1971, p. 20), then the division between the private ‘religious sphere’ and ‘religious education’ on the one hand and the public ‘political sphere’ on the other must be seen as inextricably connected; for insofar as such private institutions and discourses serve to inform, enable and delimit what is good, tolerable, appropriate and civilised in the public sphere, then the liberal discourse on the separation between the two spheres can be said to mask the ‘circulation of power’ between state and private institutions whose production of discourse goes unnoticed and undiagnosed, and, because it is considered inconsequential to politics, is free to circulate (Martin, 2010, p. 90).

Locke’s import in establishing the ‘common sense’ liberal categories regarding religion and politics –predicated as they are on particular nominalist and Protestant theological assumptions – can be discerned in the discourses of this tradition that
defines religion as a private matter of belief. However, it is at this point that a paradox surfaces in the liberal separation of religion and education: for while insisting that religion belongs in the private sphere, being primarily concerned with ‘other-worldly’ things and hence by nature separate from the public sphere, it obscures the functioning of religious institutions in habituating citizens that will occupy the latter sphere. This discursive slippage thus renders unintelligible the role of ‘private’ institutions like religious schools as social, material and temporal institutions concerned with the training and disciplining of religious subjects who believe, desire and enact certain things, subjects who will also come to occupy the positions of citizen, magistrate, government officials, etc. What Locke’s political categorisations in conjunction with his educational prescriptions actually effected was that so-called private institutions, which at their inception encompassed Protestant sects, schools and families, educate children in the discourses necessary for governing society for civil order. However, what constituted threats to civil order was determined explicitly by recourse to the ‘truths’ of seventeenth century Protestant theology and theism, which was produced and circulated by ‘private,’ ‘religious’ institutions (Martin, 2010, pp. 88-89).

More specifically, religion that was tolerated excludes certain traditions (such as Roman Catholicism or Islam) that were considered to be a danger to civil order; the basis for such a political decision was the definition of religion as primarily private belief and acceptable moral conduct, which was a feature of precisely the type of religion (i.e. a broad Protestantism) that was tolerated and taught to children. Turner (2011, p. 8) is thus accurate in the case of Locke when he states that ‘the Enlightenment philosophers were hostile to institutionalised Christianity, specifically
the Roman Catholic Church, rather than to religion *per se.*’ This is further evinced in the enshrinement of Locke’s prescriptions in England’s *Toleration Act of 1689*\(^{16}\), which specifically excluded the Roman Catholic minority as a threat to English society, can be seen as an effect of this (re)productive circuit between the two spheres (see Cavanaugh, 2002, pp. 39-41). Such a circuit of power, according to Foucault (1980, pp. 158-160), tends to take the form of a pyramid whereby the apex (e.g. the state) and the lower elements of the hierarchy (e.g. religious institutions) stand in a relationship of mutual support and conditioning. Religious education, which is defined and governed by state regulations to cultivate ‘acceptable’ private beliefs on the one hand and public citizen-subjects for the state on the other, can be seen as an institutional conduit for this purpose.

The operant circuit of power between ‘private’ religious education and the ‘public’ political sphere is perhaps best explicated through the work of Antonio Gramsci. By contrast to liberal discourse that draws a strict delimitation of the state as the sphere of public-politics and religion, religious education and other such institutions as belonging to the private sphere, Gramsci regarded the latter – which he terms ‘civil society’ – as an integral part of the state. In his view, civil society or the private sphere, far from being inimical to the state is, in fact, its most resilient constitutive element, even though the most immediately visible aspect of the state is public-political society, with which it is often (mistakenly) identified (Buttigieg, 1995, pp. 4).

\(^{16}\) The *Toleration Act of 1689* was an act of the English Parliament that granted freedom of worship to Nonconformist Protestants (e.g. Presbyterians, Baptists and Congregationalists). The act did not apply to Catholics and Unitarians and maintained the existing social and political restrictions (including exclusion from political office) for Nonconformists. For the politics leading up to the passing of this act, see Spurr (1989).
For Gramsci, therefore, the public political sphere and private civil society are in fact part of the one ‘integral State’: a sociopolitical order characterized by a hegemonic equilibrium constituted by a ‘combination of force and consent which are balanced in varying proportions, without force prevailing too greatly over consent’ (as cited in Fontana, 2002, p. 159). In this schema is a recognition that coercion and domination by force are not the only, nor necessarily the most effective, means of control and government in society; rather, the circuit of power between political society (i.e. what in liberal discourse is called ‘government,’ or ‘the state’) and civil society (i.e. the ‘private sector’ or ‘private sphere’ in liberal discourse) mutually reinforce each other to the advantage of certain strata, groups, and institutions (Buttigieg, 1995, pp. 6-7). This is encapsulated in Gramsci’s (1971) formulation of ‘State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion’ (p. 532). As he elaborates, this view of the state incorporates both public and private initiatives that seek to harness a population for particular ends:

[E]very State is ethical in as much as one of its most important functions is to raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level, a level (or type) which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development, and hence to the interests of the ruling classes. The school as a positive educative function, and the courts as a repressive and negative educative function, are the
most important State activities in this sense: but, in reality, a multitude of other so-called private initiatives and activities tend to the same end—initiatives and activities which form the apparatus of the political and cultural hegemony of the ruling classes. (Gramsci, 1971, p. 526)

Thus, from a Gramscian reading, civil society or the private sphere as that ‘vast network of contacts, associations, families, churches, and informal gatherings in which people move from day to day without direct involvement from the state’ is best described not as the sphere of freedom and consent as asserted by Locke, but of hegemony (Litowitz, 2000, p. 515) – i.e. the terrain of socio-political struggle whereby eventually a ‘particular social force assumes the representation of a totality that is radically incommensurable with it’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. x). In short, if civil society conceived as a site of private organizations is itself the locus of ethico-political effects, its relation with the state as a public instance becomes blurred (Laclau, 2000, p. 50); The term ‘state’ is thus better understood as a synthesis and the interpenetration of the two spheres via regulation and hegemony (see Fontana, 2002, p. 159).
While the operations of particular contexts of liberal hegemony and its relationship to religious education will be explored in more detail in the following chapter, suffice to state at present that the liberal demarcation of public/private spheres tends to obscure the complex, political interrelation between the two spheres. By contrast to the strict distinction between private religion and religious education on the one hand and the public politics of the state on the other that is derived from the inheritance of nominalism, Protestantism and Lockean liberalism, the Gramscian notion of the integral state highlights the intricate, organic relationships between private civil society and public-political society that enable particular ‘private’ discourses (e.g. Anglo-liberal forms of religion such as Protestantism) not only to gain dominance within the state but also, and more importantly, to maintain it by structuring, excluding and/or subordinating other discourses (e.g. Catholicism and Islam) (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 182ff).

Further, once such a discursive tradition is sedimented and codified into legal doctrines in the form of laws such as the British *Toleration Act of 1689*, it serves to
further naturalise and legitimate/exclude certain discourses, institutions and practices by recourse to its own definitions and logics. That is, discourse codified into law sustains particular hegemonic arrangements and meanings by excluding and closing off alternative understandings, as well as by positing ‘common sense’ meanings of discursive categories (e.g. religion, education, public, private, etc.) that are broadly accepted as legitimate (see Litowitz, 2000, p. 545-548). As will be argued in the following chapter on the evolution of the dominant discourse around religious education in Australia, the establishment and codification of ‘religion’ as defined within the Anglo-liberal tradition, not least in the legislation on school education, authorises and produces a set of educational institutions and practices that belie their particularistic beginnings in nominalist and Protestant theology.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I sketched three key moments in the Anglo-liberal tradition’s conception of religion as a particular set of beliefs in a supernatural Being, Thing or principle that give rise to a set of values and conducts, and religious education broadly defined as the transmission of such religion. It is defined as such in Anglo-liberal discourse, I argued, in large part owing to an inheritance from the discourses of nominalism, Protestantism and English liberalism as exemplified in the work of John Locke. I also argued that the institutional arrangements prescribed by the liberal tradition in the formal ‘separation’ between the public sphere of politics on the one hand and the private sphere of religious belief on the other belies the interconnected relations between the two spheres. In particular, the liberal insistence on such a
separation tends to obscure how the theological discourses of nominalism and Protestant religion in England gave rise to hegemonic assumptions about religion through its ‘private’ influence on ‘public’ citizens and officials who, in turn, determine what forms of religion are acceptable or unacceptable for civil order. This is done, I argued, through so-called private religious education and its formation of subjects that eventually come to inhabit the realm of public politics and the state.

Rather than accepting the liberal framework of a separation between religion and politics, which is itself predicated on a nominalist rendering of religion as belief apart from practical reason and a Protestant separation of ‘Two Kingdoms,’ I posited an alternative view based on Antonio Gramsci’s notion of the ‘integral state.’ In the latter schema, so-called ‘private’ institutions or what Gramsci calls ‘civil society’ – the vast network of contacts, associations, families, churches, and informal gatherings in which people move from day to day without direct involvement from the state – is actually the site of hegemony whereby dominant discourses are disseminated at the level of popular belief, a feat that cannot be accomplished by force but only through messages, codes and the wide acceptance of a particular discourse and its way of representing reality (Litowitz, 2000, p. 524). Such popular beliefs – or common sense – then form the basis for the public sphere involving, amongst other things, the institution of the state, legislation, legal doctrine and politics. As such, the public sphere of politics encompassing these elements is better seen as forming a ‘circuit of power’ in conjunction with the private sphere of religion. In turn, religious education can be seen in this schema as a conduit for the circulation of dominant discourses insofar as its ‘acceptable’ forms are regulated by
the state on the one hand, while on the other it (re)produces constituent citizens of
the state that adjudge ‘acceptability’ by reference to their religious education.

In the following chapter, I shall proceed by offering a genealogy of how this
Anglo-liberal discursive tradition as it was extended and developed in Australia after
1788. Focusing on the colony of New South Wales in particular, I shall account for
how religious education came to be institutionalised as consisting primarily of the
transmission of belief with secondary values and conducts on the one hand and on
the other, the regulated and standardised delivery of government-approved
educational services for the training of desired citizens and workers on the other.
Through various configurations of the hegemonic liberal arrangements in Australia
over time, I shall argue that the presuppositions about religion and religious
education inherited from nominalism and Protestantism outlined in this chapter
remain not only evident, but are instrumental in providing the conditions of
possibility for the articulation of religious educational institutions to the prevailing
socio-political order.
Chapter 3 – The development of religious education in Australia

It may be a happy accident that this effort of defining religion converges with the liberal demand in our time that it be kept quite separate from politics, law, and science – spaces in which varieties of power and reason articulate our distinctively modern life. The definition is at once a strategy (for secular liberals) of the confinement, and (for liberal Christians) of the defence of religion. (Asad, 1993, p. 28)

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I sketched three key moments in the Anglo-liberal tradition’s conception of religion as a particular set of beliefs in a supernatural Being, Thing or principle and their associated values/ethics. Religious education conceived on such a basis, I argued, can in large part be understood as an inheritance from the discourses of nominalism’s separation of religion from worldly practical reason, which was developed in Protestantism’s emphasis on the primacy of ‘inner’ belief over ‘outer’ practices and objects, and which was in turn developed into English liberalism’s demarcation of religion in the private sphere and politics in the public sphere as exemplified in the work of John Locke. I also argued that the institutional arrangements prescribed by the liberal discursive tradition in the form of the latter separation fails to make apparent the interconnected relations between the two spheres. In particular, the liberal insistence on such a separation tends to obscure how
the predominant discourses of nominalism and Protestant religion in England sustain hegemonic assumptions about religion through its private influence on public citizens and officials who, in turn, determine what forms of religion are acceptable or unacceptable for civil order. In particular, this is done through so-called private religious education and its formation of subjects that inhabit the realm of public politics.

In this chapter, I seek to trace the extension and development of the Anglo-liberal discourse on religion and religious education to Australia. The focus here is on the changing configurations of liberal discourse and how such changes have affected the way religious education is conceived and articulated within broader socio-political configurations. I shall do this by identifying three moments that have given rise to its official conception and political articulation in the present: Firstly, I outline the political institution of the nominalist and Protestant-inflected assumptions about religion as belief in extra-empirical objects, which dominated liberal conceptions of religious education amongst government officials and the majority populace from the early-colonial period. Driven in no small part by populist anti-Catholic sentiment, this dominant discourse would be codified into two key pieces of legislation in the nineteenth-century ‘mother colony’ of New South Wales: that is, the 1866 Public Schools Act (NSW) and the 1880 Public Instruction Act (NSW), which would come to frame debates over religious education in that state to the present (Turney, 1969, p. ix). The most persistent impact of these acts, I argue, is the political institution of Anglo-liberal forms of religion in education – that is, religion that is tolerated and indeed encouraged both defines and is defined by hegemonic definitions of what constitutes religious education, its proper function and
appropriate boundaries. Conversely, religious education that fails to abide by such a definition and demarcation is labelled ‘sectarian’ and excluded, as was the case with Roman Catholic schools up to the 1960s.

Secondly, I explore how the liberal definition and demarcation of religious education enables the latter to be articulated toward nation-building under broadly ‘social liberal’ arrangements that prevailed from the time of Federation in 1901 to the 1980s. That is, religious education, while considered to belong in the private sphere of civil society, if exercised appropriately under hegemonic conditions, is actually productive of certain morals and values that accrue to the nation. Such values include certain moral and ethical norms normally categorised under the heading of ‘citizenship.’ In this regard, I focus on how the discourses around the 1880 Public Instruction Act framed the place of religious education, and how these themes are picked up and developed in the highly influential 1973 Schools in Australia report – better known as the Karmel Report – which was implemented as policy by the Whitlam government in 1974 and re-opened the possibility of religious schools receiving funding as an articulated part of the nation-state’s educational apparatus. However, I argue, by abstracting the values of religious education from their loci within particular traditions and articulating religious schools onto the terrain of state regulation alongside non-religious schools, this policy simultaneously reinforced the nominalist and Protestant presuppositions about religion and religious education primarily concerning private convictions as borne by Anglo-liberal discourse. This, I argue, paved the way for competition between schools on the basis of the strict division between education as the objective of training citizens and workers.
regardless of the particularities of school or tradition, and religion as abstract values/ethics that appeal to the preferences of individual students and families.

Thirdly, on this basis, I seek to discern how these assumptions about the place and function of religion vis-a-vis education persist in the shift from social liberal toward so-called ‘neo-liberal’ imperatives in the 1980s, the difference being a regulatory (re)configuration away from goals articulated for the good of the nation-state toward education for a competitive labour market that is allegedly globalising inexorably. School education incorporating both religious and non-religious schools are tasked with habituating students with the skills necessary to compete in such a globalising labour market, and the means held to ensure the transmission of such skills is the discipline of competitive market relations both between and within schools. However, contrary to popular representations of neo-liberalism, such market relations are by no means naturally ‘free,’ but rather require persistent facilitation and regulation by state managers, not least through the institution of standardised accountability measures that allow for comparisons to be made between students, schools and Australian schooling on aggregate. On the hegemonic terrain of neo-liberal marketisation, the values of religious education, having been abstracted from their substantive traditions and practices as defined in Anglo-liberal discourse, then serve religious schools as a ‘value-added’ option in the competitive market for individual students and parents as clients and customers of educational services.

Religious education in Australia: Foundational politics
The whole history of educational development in Australia from the earliest beginning shows the application of ideas and methods which we share with the mother country. (Francis Anderson in 1914, as cited in Turney, 1969)

Reflecting the fledgling liberal discourse of late eighteenth-century England, early colonial governmental and religious authorities saw education as crucial in securing the moral and social ‘improvement’ of the whole population, including convict and indigenous populations. Such education was initially conducted by the Anglican Church (i.e. the Church of England) and aided by the state, the former being regarded as the Established Church in New South Wales (NSW) in the decades immediately after British settlement in 1788 (Wilkinson, Caldwell, Selleck, Harris and Dettman, 2006, p. 2). According to Gascoigne (2002), the impulses of Protestant Christianity – especially in its Evangelical forms most prominent in New South Wales under the influence of First Fleet Anglican chaplain Richard Johnson and his successor Samuel Marsden – and the ideals of the Anglo-liberal tradition often converged in their approach to problems in Australia such as education: ‘both in their different ways could subscribe to the basic tenet that the world could be improved and human beings made better as the result of conscious human planning and disciplined endeavour’ (pp. 6-7).

This state-sponsored Anglican monopoly ended after the 1829 Catholic Emancipation Act (UK) for British colonies generally and more specifically in NSW, with the 1836 Church Act. This resulted in the recognition of four ‘Established
Churches’ and a corresponding four state-aided denominational school systems providing elementary education: Anglican, Catholic, Presbyterian and Methodist (Barcan, 1965, pp. 51-52). In 1848, National schools were added as a fifth system in New South Wales. These systems were organised under two boards: the Board of National Education for state-run National schools, and the Denominational Schools Board for the church-run schools (Barcan, 1965, p. 83).

However, this arrangement proved to be neither efficient for the governmental purpose of extending school-based education to the population, the numbers of which had swelled since the cessation of convict transportation in 1840 and the waves of new migrants from Britain, nor with regard to the finances of the colonial administration with an apparent oversupply of schools that simultaneously increased government expenditure while failing to reach the majority of the population. Given this situation, the unification of the boards into one single authority became a popular demand insofar as it was perceived that ‘the placing of all the schools under one authority would... remove all the disorders inherent in the heterogeneous systems that had grown up.’ (Fogarty, 1959, p. 62) The direction of all the Australian colonies in the nineteenth century was thus driven toward the centralisation of control over schooling as the solution to the policy problems of educational extension and financial prudence, with legislation passed to this effect in South Australia in 1851, Queensland in 1860 and Victoria in 1862 (O’Farrell, 1985, p.151; Jones, 1974, p.17). Yet denominational opposition to such moves remained strong until the passing of the 1866 Public Schools Act in the case of New South Wales by a coalition of forces under Premier James Martin, Colonial Secretary Henry Parkes and educational administrator William Wilkins (Barcan, 1965, p. 127). The formation of this
legislative act effectively articulated the popular consent of nonconformist
Protestants and the majority of the Anglican laity. In addition, at this point, Roman
Catholic liberals in parliament like William A. Duncan and Michael Fitzpatrick were
also content to work with other liberals to achieve the common objective of
improving school education through the 1866 Act (Haines, 1979, p.63; also

The 1866 Public Schools Act, according to Morris (1969, p. 171), had two
significant and lasting impacts on education in New South Wales to which pragmatic
and ideological justifications can arguably be attached respectively: firstly, it brought
all public education under the control of a single board, an apparently ‘independent’
Council of Education; and secondly, it expanded the reach of the public school
system (previously known as National Schools) while simultaneously reducing the
religious denominational schools to a subsidiary position. With regard to the first
point, some of the main justifications of the Public Schools Act were pragmatic: to
save money by amalgamating the Board of National Education and the
Denominational Schools Board, provide more schools that were particularly needed
in rural areas, rationalising economic and material resources and ending wasteful
competition between denominational and national schools in the same area (Barcan,
1965, p. 127). With regard to the second point, the Act was buoyed in no small part
by the growing current of secular and liberal feeling which, having achieved the
abolition of state aid to churches in 1862, now proceeded to curtail the role of the
latter in elementary education (Barcan, 1965, pp. 127-128).
Thus the Public Schools Act sought, under the stated justification of promoting greater efficiency in teaching, the establishment of dominance of the administrators of the national system over the four denominational systems (Barcan, 1965, p. 127). However, it is important to note that ‘liberal’ and indeed ‘secular’ did not denote, at that point, a sphere of non-religion. Rather, as evinced by the most ardent supporters of the centralised system and the abolition of state aid to religious schools – for example the Presbyterian clergyman and politician John Dunmore Lang and James Greenwood, Baptist minister and founder of the Public Schools League (est. 1873) – the call for liberal and secular education was driven in large part by the non-Anglican Protestant convictions strongly opposed to ‘sectarian teaching,’ advocating instead a ‘complete secularism’ in schools (Fogarty, 1959, pp. 122, 121). Insofar as ‘liberalism’ denoted, as it did for Locke, a broadly ‘anti-dogmatic principle’ undergirded by a theological minimalism about morality and civility, and ‘secular’ included the various non-dogmatic types of religious instruction defined as the ‘general principles of Christianity,’ ‘Bible without note or comment’ and ‘general religious teaching as distinguished from dogmatic and polemical theology’ that specifically excluded creeds, catechisms and rituals then the 1866 Public Schools Act can be seen as a significant shift in Australian education toward a liberal and secular system (Fogarty, 1959; also Morris, 1969, p. 175).

Such trends toward liberal and secular schooling were resisted by the Roman Catholic Church and in their Provincial Council of 1869, the Australian bishops defined education by contrast to the emergent liberal secular principles. Education, according to the bishops, ‘must take place in, and be infused by, a religious atmosphere which would act upon the child’s whole character of mind and heart’
By this standard, of course, all schemes of secular education – including those that admitted a separate religious component as favoured by many Protestants in the colony – were considered fundamentally defective. As then-Archbishop Polding remarked, the vice was their ‘sin of omission’ and their attempt to achieve a sort of general Christianity a ‘specious assumption’ (O’Farrell, 1985, pp.160-161). These statements by the Roman Catholic bishops in 1869 were made, according to O’Farrell (1985, pp.161), in the face of prevalent social attitudes that were overwhelmingly anti-Catholic in two forms: Protestant and secularist. For while the denominational system had both Protestant and Roman Catholic schools within it, suspicion of Catholics – who were also predominantly Irish – proved sufficient to divide the majority Anglo-Protestant population. By 1869, a large section of Protestant opinion was opposed or indifferent to the continuation of the denominational system, but if its continuance benefited Roman Catholics, then this seemed to many Protestants to be a good reason to demand that it cease (O’Farrell, 1985, p.161). As O’Farrell (1985), describes it, ‘in the early 1850s, a liberal tolerance of religion in education had hardened into a belief that church opposition to change was simply reactionary and selfish deriving from awareness that educational progress would be an enemy of religious obscurantism’ (p.162).

In the period of 1865-79 under the Council of Education, therefore, the nonconformist Protestant denominations voluntarily abandoned two-thirds of their own schools in favour of the public schools. By the second half of the nineteenth century, Anglican opinion and educational practice had also exhibited a gradual shift from firm denominational opposition to align closely with a general Protestant position. This effectively split the opinion in the majority Anglican community
broadly between the clergy and laity, and sometimes among the clergy themselves (Fogarty, 1959, pp. 131-132). Parkes, whose objective was to establish a single school system run by the state, had himself counted on the division within the majority Anglican church in his political calculation: ‘From the first, the lay members of the English Church did not warmly sympathise with the heated feelings of their clergy; and in the course of time, the clergymen themselves, for the most part, withdrew from the conflict and accepted the new system’ (as cited in Fogarty, 1959: 134). By 1879, a number of well-known Anglican denominational schools had been abandoned contrary to the Bishops’ express wishes and members of the 1879 Anglican Synod were openly encouraged to agree with the withdrawal of state aid and the acceptance of the government system (Fogarty, 1959, p. 133). As a prominent lay member of the Anglican community asserted at the 1879 Synod, ‘if the clergy wished for the assistance of the laity they must face the inevitable doom of the denominational schools,’ which meant having to ‘separate from their old allies of the Roman Catholic Church in this respect, and endeavour to give religious instruction in harmony with the inevitable course of the law of the land’ (Gibbs as cited in Fogarty, 1959, p. 134). The most strident tendencies were evident in the Sydney Anglican archdiocese, which was evangelical and substantially staffed with Ulster clergymen (i.e. Protestant Irish loyal to the British Crown) and active members of the ultra-Protestant Orange Order, and who were inclined to see denominational education as solely serving the interests of Rome and thus any Anglican support that might strengthen the Roman Catholic cause as misguided (O’Farrell, 1985, p.163). Conversely, the Roman Catholic Archbishop Polding lambasted Parkes’s moves to centralise schooling under the state as ‘an infidel system of education’ that dealt the ‘heaviest blow that could have been struck at the
welfare and true liberty of our people... by destroying gradually denominational education’ (as cited in O’Farrell, 1985, p.151).

Thus, while Protestant grievance in the earlier stages of the debate over the denominational system was directed predominantly by nonconformists against both Anglican and Roman Catholic churches, by the 1870s when the former had closed a great number of their schools, the antagonism was concentrated on the latter who retained its opposition to amalgamating its schools with the proposed state-run system (Forgarty, 1959, p. 142). The popular movement for the abolishment of state aid to denominational schools can hence be understood, in large part, by the perceived unacceptability for Protestants to ‘compromise’ on that demand if it meant a conferral of a special advantage on the Catholic Church; for there existed a fear amongst the majority Protestant population of what Catholics might do with this advantage (Forgarty, 1959, p. 142-143). Politician and Presbyterian clergyman John Dunmore Lang, for example, argued that the Catholic defence of its own educational institutions was a ‘hostile movement on the part of the Romish priests and bishops,’ and which was nothing but an attempted grab ‘for power, for pelf, and for the means of proselytising unwary Protestants to Romanism’ (as cited in Fogarty, 1959, p. 143). Likewise in 1872, the Protestant Political Association was established with the expressed intention to be a bulwark against a perceived advance of ‘that political conspiracy against the rights and liberties of man, commonly called the Church of Rome’ (as cited in Fogarty, 1959, p. 143). Indeed the popular sentiment for a secular, state-run education at the time was buoyed by so strident a populist Protestant discourse buttressed by a suspicion of Roman Catholics that at meetings in support of secular and state-run education:
Some went to extremes in expressing their hatred for Rome. The Reverend Zachary Barry, for example, would assert that ‘he would not barter a [single] Protestant child for 50,000 Catholic children’; others would rouse their audiences to vociferous replies by calling upon them to answer questions like the following: did they want ‘the Queen of England [to] rule this country or the Pope of Rome.’ (Fogarty, 1959, p. 143)

Interestingly, in this period, the discourses deployed in defence of Anglican denominational schools also began to draw on anti-Catholic populism, with some Anglican heads warning of a looming Catholic separatism that would be a danger to the British system of liberal society established in Australia. Anglican Bishop Barker in Sydney, for example, warned in 1876 that Protestants who were disposed to turn against the denominational schools that they would call into existence a dual system of education of ‘the very worst kind’ by handing over education of the children of Roman Catholics to ‘Jesuits, Marists, Redemptorists, Premonstrants, and others’ over whose teaching they would have no control, thus creating a system of ‘closed schools’ which would grow and an army of ‘aliens, enemies of the English crown, of English laws, and of that constitution which declares that no foreign prince, or prelate, or Pope [should] have dominion in England’ (as cited in Fogarty, 1959, p. 144).
The mobilisation of such anti-Catholic discourse, shared in general by Protestant groups at the time, was undergirded by nominalist, Protestant and liberal ways of understanding religion (cf. Fogarty, 1959, p. 143). More specifically, this antagonism was fuelled by two sources: firstly, suspicion of the predominantly Irish Catholics as disloyal subjects of the British Crown and harbouring what the Protestant Political Association in 1872 called a ‘political conspiracy against the rights and liberties of man, commonly called the Church of Rome’ (as cited in O’Farrell, 1985, pp.163-164); and secondly, particularly Protestant ways of understanding religion that led to an aversion to Roman Catholic practices of devotion and doctrines, and above all its religious leaders – what Frances (2011) describes as the Anglo-Protestant disregard for Irish Catholicism as ‘an inferior form of Christianity, characterized by superstition and dominated by ignorant and misguided priests’ (p. 444). By effectively articulating the shared suspicion of Catholicism, the emergent discourse on liberal and state-run secular education also managed to divide the majority of the Anglican laity from their leaders’ support of denominational schools, thus creating a formidable ‘historical bloc’ for a state-controlled system of education with the sole object of ‘preventing the establishment of Roman Catholic schools throughout the colony’ (Perry as cited in Fogarty, 1959, p. 145). For the Protestant majority and liberals, to support the denominational system of education came to be taken as tantamount to supporting the perpetuation of Catholic schools. While this historic bloc also included some liberals who had no desire to destroy religion or weaken Catholicism, it was reasoned that the interests of Australian education as a whole were best served by using the authority of the state in spite of the Roman Catholic position (O’Farrell, 1985, p.164).
The shift towards the political institution of a state-run liberal and secular education can thus be seen as driven, in large part, by a hegemonic Protestant-liberal populism. A brief consideration of the discursive structure of populism, or what Laclau and Mouffe (1985, pp. 130-131) have described as a ‘two nation’ approach to national politics, is instructive at this point. According to Laclau (2005, p. 93ff), two of the *sine qua non* dimensions of populism are, firstly, a bond of equivalence constructed between disparate individuals and groups within a social formation beyond a vague feeling of solidarity toward a generalised demand, and secondly, the need for an internal frontier that unifies those partial and particular demands against a common ‘enemy’; for it is only through the recognition of the same enemy in a plurality of mutually exclusive positions that a historical bloc – whether constituted as ‘the nation,’ ‘the people’ or simply ‘we’ – acquires a sense of its own identity, hence the notion of ‘two nations.’ In the case of education in New South Wales, the passage from the *1868 Public Schools Act* through the populist Protestant ferment to the *1880 Public Instruction Act* can be seen as an outcome of the political institution of liberal-Protestant demands for a secular education run by the state and a desired elimination of Catholic education as the enemy within. As Fogarty describes the situation in Australia circa-1879 in language reminiscent of Gramsci, Laclau and Mouffe, Protestant populism fused with ardent educational secularism and formed a historical bloc for state-run education on the basis of shared demands for ‘the nation’ against its ‘unjust and oppressive,’ ‘hateful and anti-national’ rivals:

In this way great numbers of Protestants were brought over into the camp of the secularists. The result was a formidable bloc. To the arguments of one group were added the grievances the other and
the joint presentation of their case took on an added degree of consistency and conviction: education had been on a denominational basis, but had proved unsatisfactory; now it was unjust and oppressive, hateful and anti-national as well. Having laid the foundations of a new system, the state could no longer be expected to tolerate a rival one. (Fogarty, 1959, p. 148)

Therefore, it was upon the popular consent of the Protestant majority that Parkes’s push for ‘one state school system’ under a single ‘unit of administration’ enshrined in the *1880 Public Instruction Act* was dependent (as cited in Fogarty, 1959, p. 158; cf. Barcan, 1965, p. 150). In practice there emerged a great deal of common ground between the liberal push for state schools and the Protestant churches insofar as state schools permitted children to receive both a ‘general,’ non-dogmatic Christian education as part of the secular curriculum – which included the teaching of Christian morals through scripture, the use of the Lord’s Prayer and the celebration of Christian festivals (Potts, 1999) – and specific religious instruction during allocated school hours from ministers of their own denominations. Apart from the obvious Protestant influence, the inheritance of nominalist presuppositions is also evident insofar as religious education was seen as divisible between a general ‘secular’ education and a specific religious instruction, with the latter implying no intrinsic practices that may constitute the former. It was the case, as Gascoigne (2002) points out, that ‘[i]n a culture which emphasised the extent to which Christianity could be combined with the major intellectual legacies of the [British] Enlightenment – an emphasis on individual rights, a belief in reason, and the
possibility of progress – schools and churches were seen as having a common civilising mission’ (p. 114). In turn, those who opposed the *modus operandi* of this liberal-Protestant historical bloc under the aegis of ‘the nation,’ in particular the Catholic population were regarded as its retrograde enemies. As Parkes characterises the latter, the ‘whole power of these people is used against the enlightened progress of the age’ (as cited in Morris, 1969, p. 176).

For Catholics, by contrast, such an arrangement was unacceptable precisely because of liberalism’s covert nominalist and Protestant presuppositions. Indeed, the foundational assumption of this liberal framing of ‘general religious education’ (i.e. broad Christian values and morals) as suitable for secular instruction while ‘special religious education’ (i.e. dogmatic theology) as merely adventitious and accessory – an assumption made by the populist Protestant push for a state-run system, as well as by Parkes and his main education advisor Wilkins in their design of a liberal state schooling system (cf. Fogarty, 1959, p. 186) – was rejected by the Catholic Church. For the latter, any education which overlooked doctrine was defective insofar as Christian dogmas were not merely nominally linked to character-development and educational practice as implied by the popular movement for state-run education (Fogarty, 1959, p. 186). As Roman Catholic Archbishop of Sydney John Polding explained in 1879, the ideal of education in Catholic discourse was a unity of religion and practices; this meant not only learning the content of religious doctrines, but also the ‘daily and hourly moulding of disposition which should follow and become the practical application [of it]’ (as cited in Fogarty, 1959, p. 187). Thus for the Catholic Church, to consign the entirety of religious instruction or doctrinal observance to one period of the day or one day out of seven was objectionable; on the contrary,
Christian education was regarded as a ‘thing of life’ with the mutual influence of the parts and every kind of instruction imparted to students should be interpenetrated by Catholic doctrine, by Catholic feeling and practice (Fogarty, 1959, p. 187). In short, by contrast to the nominalist presupposition of religion as predominantly belief with only a nominal connection to practices, and the formal Protestant and liberal separation between religion in private life contra a secular public life (albeit informed by a generalised Christian morality and values), Catholics insisted on the totality of education and life as religious.

It was on the basis of religion defined as such that in 1879, the Catholic Archbishop of Sydney Roger Vaughan and his three subordinate bishops issued a Joint Pastoral letter attacking the then-existent system of state education in New South Wales as ‘seed-plots of future immorality, infidelity and lawlessness, being calculated to debase the standard of human excellence, and corrupt the political, social, and individual life of future citizens’ (as cited in Franklin, 2006, p. 88). According to Haines (1979), Vaughan’s move was deliberately intended to harness the Irish laity’s ‘feeling of social inferiority to the development of Catholicism’ by invoking themes of separate a Irish history, identity and struggle by positing Catholic education as ‘the only tenable intellectual position and that it was noble to fight and suffer for it’ (p.153). The immediate political effects of the Pastoral Letter, whatever its intentions, were the immediate withdrawal of large numbers of Catholic children from the public schools to Catholic schools, and the exacerbation of popular anti-Catholic sentiment that would see the passage of the 1880 Public Instruction Act.
The passing of the *1880 Public Instruction Act*, which arguably remains the normative legal basis for the avowedly ‘free, compulsory and secular’ public education system in New South Wales (Walker, 1970, p. 22), can thus be seen both as a retaliation to the *Joint Pastoral* and an opportunity seized by the architects of the state-run system of education, buoyed in no small part by soaring populist anti-Catholicism. Parliamentarians, for example, regarded the Joint Pastoral as an ‘audacious [and] seditious attack... on the Government’ (cited in Fogarty, 1959, p. 252), while the *Sydney Morning Herald* newspaper called upon the citizens of New South Wales to avenge the insults hurled at the nation’s schools (Fogarty, 1959, p. 250). Parkes thus framed the Bill for the 1880 Act as an outcome of his opposition to ‘the disposition to establish an ecclesiastical tyranny in the country, dangerous to the liberty of the subject [and] dangerous to the growth of the free national spirit’ (as cited in Gascoigne, 2002, p. 114).

Supported by the Presbyterian, Methodist, Baptist and Congregational Churches as well as a large segment of the Anglican Church and a notable Anglo-Jewish minority\(^{17}\), all of whom were satisfied with the clause for separate religious

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\(^{17}\)In the period under consideration, the cultural characteristics of this minority group could be characterised as predominantly English. Prominent historian of Australian Jewish settlement Susan Rutland (2001) describes the communal life of the ‘Anglo-Jewry’ in this period as reflecting an articulation of ‘both Jewish tradition and English culture’ and that such ‘anglicising of Judaism was to be of great importance in the development of the early Australian Jewish community, which was reliant on the British chief rabbinate until the 1930s’ (p. 5). This Anglo-Jewish identification was evident in the Judaic religious practices of this milieu, which were modelled on the Anglican Church (see New South Wales Jewish Board of Deputies, 2009). This cultural hybridity partially explains why the position of Jewish education taken by this minority group was articulated with the Anglo-Protestant historical bloc for ‘secular education’ against (Catholic-dominated) ‘religious education’ (see Solomon, 1970, p.8). Despite the existence of separate Jewish schools in Australia in the nineteenth century, the Jewish minority’s support for the ‘secular education’ acts of 1872 in Victoria and 1880 in New South Wales were based on their identification with the broader political demand by Protestant nonconformists — that is, for a particular and contingent form of religious equality (see Solomon, 1970, pp. 9-10; see also Solomon, 1968). However, as with any hegemonic bloc, the articulation of Jewish education with secular schools was not permanent but historically contingent. Indeed, as economic and political circumstances changed in the twentieth century — specifically the
instruction in state-run schools by visiting clergymen and the ability of regular teachers in these schools to deliver ‘non-denominational scripture lessons’ and a ‘general religious education,’ the Bill passed by forty-two votes to six. By this time no Roman Catholic politician publicly supported the Bill: all six members of the NSW Parliament who voted against the Bill were Catholics while four other Catholic members did not record their votes\(^\text{18}\) (Haines, 1979, p.178). The lasting political outcome of the 1880 Act is concisely described by Sherington and Campbell (2004):

> The legacy which the establishment of colonial public schools left was thus closely associated with the nineteenth century colonial liberal middle class Protestant agenda. Bureaucratically and centrally managed in the apparent interests of efficiency and good order, Australian public schools offered a secular education which was essentially a form of common Protestantism. Left out of this settlement, the Roman Catholic Church and its communities had to build schools based on local parishes and religious orders pledged to uphold the faith against the threat of the secular state. (p.62)

Henceforth, education in New South Wales (and in Australia more generally; see Jones, 1974, p.17; Thompson, 1994, pp.18-19) was both compulsory and divided, consisting of a ‘secular’ education run by the state and a Catholic education system
run predominantly by religious orders (Fogarty, 1959, pp. 208-289), notwithstanding some elite Anglican Grammar schools serving a small segment of the population. It is also from this time onward that the term ‘private school’ no longer referred specifically to the small, private-venture school run as a profit-making establishment by a teacher-owner; the term now frequently extended to include the numerous Catholic and some Anglican schools, almost all of which were maintained by (or associated with) a church (Barcan, 1965, p. 172).

At this point, it is again useful to recall the Gramscian notion of the integral state – that is, State = political society (i.e. public sphere) + civil society (i.e. private sphere) – to explain the political institution of the 1880 Act that continues to frame the debates over religion and religious education in schools. As described in the previous chapter, the notion of the integral state rejects the Lockean liberal bifurcation between public/private, preferring to foreground the ‘circuit of power’ that operates between these formally divided spheres. In this frame, the passage of the 1880 Public Instruction Act was far from being what had been popularly described by the liberal discourse at the time as educational progress in the form of a ‘gradual emancipation of primary education from ecclesiastical surveillance [that was] bound to be achieved’ due to ‘the operation of an inevitable law,’ as proclaimed by civil servant William Wilkins in 1879 (cited in Barcan, 1965, p. 166). Rather, it can instead be understood as the institution of hegemonic nominalist, Protestant and liberal assumptions about religious education against the Catholic view (see Figure 8).
Figure 8: Liberal and Protestant assumptions about how ‘religious education’ is to be conducted become institutionalized in the form of ‘Public education’ for the good of the nation, which includes a ‘General Religious Education’ element. This is counter-posed to the Roman Catholic forms of religious education, which are taken to be opposed to the good of the nation.

For the 1880 Public Instruction Act, insofar as it defined ‘secular instruction’ to include ‘religious teaching as distinct from dogmatical or polemical theology’ (sec. 7), can be understood to presume a common understanding of what constitutes ‘general’ religious teaching and morality that is good for the nation; a commonality afforded only by a broadly Protestant consensus sustained by ‘privatised’ religion. In addition, the division of the school day between such secular instruction and ‘religious education,’ in which ‘a portion of each day not more than one hour [to be] set apart when the children of any one religious persuasion may be instructed by the clergymen or other religious teacher of such persuasion’ (sec. 17), can be seen as the legal and institutional development of the Lockean liberal distinction between public and private spheres, which as I argued in the previous chapter can itself an inheritance drawn from the nominalist cleavage of religion from practical reason and the Protestant distinction between the ‘Two Kingdoms.’ As Campbell and Sherington (2007, p. 35), Ely (1978, pp. 16-19, 51-52) and Connell and Irving (1980, pp. 126-
127) have variously concurred in their readings of Australian history, the politics and administration of education was part of a cultural consensus that emerged among the predominantly Protestant middle-class in the mid-to-late nineteenth century. For these Protestants, with their more individual-oriented theological tendencies and liberal social outlooks, state-administered secular education was not perceived as a move away from religious education, but an institutionalisation of religious education that allowed both its specific teachings to be carried on in the realm of the ‘private’ and the public inculcation of a general religious education — mostly concerning morals and civility — that are necessary for the prosperity of the nation that guarantees such an arrangement.

**Religious education in Australia for the national good**

The new nation-states tend to look at religion and ethnicity the way the 19th-century colonial powers looked at distant cultures which came under their domination — at best as ‘things’ to be studied, ‘engineered,’ ghettoed, museumized or preserved in reservations; at worst as inferior cultures opposed to the principles of modern living and inconsistent with the game of modern politics, science and development, and therefore deservedly facing extinction. (Nandy, 1990, p. 140)
The Australian passage from a series of colonies to a federated nation-state, akin to the passage of its European forebears, required the ‘reformation of subjectivities and the reorganization of social fields in which subjects act and are acted upon’ toward the cultivation of ‘the desire for progress’ both for the good of individuals and by extension, the good of the nation (Asad, 1992, pp. 337, 339; Hunter, 1994). On this pedagogical mission, as I have mentioned above following Gascoigne (2002, pp. 1-14ff), Protestant Christianity in Australia coalesced with the broader Enlightenment discourse of the Anglo-liberal tradition in their mutual commitment to the ‘improvement’ of the population. Yet as Gascoigne (2002) also rightly points out, the apparently universal ends to which such improvement was directed ‘inevitably reflected what British white society considered as desirable goals; these were defined by concepts such as industry, sobriety and the advancement of prosperity’ (p. 21). Built upon this hegemonic discourse, the emergence of Australia as a modern nation-state can be understood to have encompassed the allegiance of disparate individuals and groups based on the assumption that the state provided the necessary public goods (e.g. an education directed toward ‘industry, sobriety and the advancement of prosperity’), which would in turn enable the majority of people – i.e. those considered to be part of the ‘nation’ – to be free to achieve their own private goods (Gascoigne, 2002; cf. Bielskis, 2008, p. 50). As Williams and Young (1994) surmise, the architecture of such liberal nation-states is predicated on a strictly Lockean distinction between the public/private spheres whereby:

[T]he State should be a neutral framework within which competing conceptions of the good can be equally pursued.
Linked to such notions of a neutral state, indeed required by them, is the notion of ‘civil society’ characterized as a realm of freedom in which individuals engage in formally uncoerced transactions. Finally, this complex of concepts requires a certain notion of the self, a free choosing individual who is the best, indeed the only judge, of his interests. ... [It] is this free individual who is at the core of liberal belief. (p. 93)

In order to sustain this normative vision of individual freedom then, liberalism in practice requires a contingent settlement between two poles: *politically*, it implies that collective decision-making should involve a constitutional state with limited but substantive powers of economic and social intervention, and which seeks ‘limit the anarchy of the self-interest’ through the enforcement of contractual agreements (MacIntyre as cited in Bielskis, 2005, p. 119); and *economically*, it endorses the expansion of the capitalist market economy – that is, the institutional expression of individuals’ free choices through monetized exchange, which may be extended into as many realms of social practice as possible (Jessop, 2002, pp. 47-48). In a social order conceived upon individuals who seek their own preferences, then, policy debate and political disagreement tend to oscillate between two recognizable and predictable positions:

[T]he contending parties agree... there are only two alternative modes of social life open to us, one in which the
free and arbitrary choices of individuals are sovereign and
one in which [state] bureaucracy is sovereign, precisely so
that it may limit the free and arbitrary choices of individuals.

[...] the society in which we live is one in which bureaucracy
and individualism are partners as well as antagonists.

(MacIntyre, 1985, p. 35)

In this way, liberal discourse has always framed society and politics in what
Grassl (2011, p. 2) calls a ‘dichotomous social ontology’: of self versus others and
individual versus the state. Society, in such a reckoning, is understood as a
contingent aggregate of individuals, and government as a coercive institution
necessitated by the anti-social propensities of the human soul (Grassl, 2011). Being
predicated on such a dichotomous social ontology, regimes built on the basis of the
liberal discursive tradition are marked by an irreducible co-presence of a capitalist
market economy for the expression of private preferences through exchange, and
some form of state regulation in order to institute, facilitate, regulate and delimit the
operation of the market – a co-presence that corresponds to the distinction of private
and public spheres respectively (Bielskis, 2005, p. 120; Chakrabarty, 2000, pp. 4, 41-
42; also Connolly, 1989). As Lindblom (1977) portrays it, ‘the greatest distinction
between one government and another is the degree to which market replaces
government or government replaces market’ (p. ix; also Underhill, 2003).

This general characterisation also holds in the particular case of the liberal
socio-political order in Australia (Jones, 2002, pp. 58-59; also 1994), which from the
period beginning at the federation of colonies and territories in 1901 to the 1980s can broadly be characterised as weighted toward the collaboration of particular instruments of bureaucratic statecraft that directed and delimited the market economy under the sign of the nation-state and the national economy (Brown, Halsey, Lauder and Wells, 1997; also Wells, 1989). Such a governmental configuration can be understood as the contingent historical balance of multiple political forces and wills intersecting to form a temporary regime that abetted orderly social arrangements, secured economic growth and the social reproduction of free liberal subjects known as ‘citizens’ notwithstanding the historical exclusions of specific groups such as indigenous peoples, women, immigrants and people differently able to the status of full citizenship in Australia (see McGrath, 1993; also Meekosha and Dowse, 1997).

In Australia, this liberal socio-political arrangement can be broadly characterised by social liberal configurations that upheld a more interventionist role for the state in both facilitating and correcting the operation of market forces for economic growth and distribution, as well as in shaping the identities held by its citizens for service to the nation-state (Sawer, 1993, 2000; also Beitz, 1999). This social liberal regime – variously known as the ‘new liberalism’ or the ‘welfare state,’ which reached its apogee in the post-war period (Jones, 2003) – was broadly buttressed by a steady economic growth via macroeconomic and welfare state policies, social contracts articulated between capital, labour and the state, and government intervention to promote investment, stability and consumption (Broomhill, 2001, p. 122). At the sub-national level, the state and territory governments also abetted economic growth by facilitating political stability and social reproduction through a redistributive tax system, the provision of public
economic and social infrastructure services such as education (Broomhill, 2001, p. 123; Low, 1995, p. 211; also Kratke and Schmoll, 1991). Brown et al (1997) have labelled this arrangement in liberal Western nations ‘economic nationalism,’ which was undergirded by the ideals of prosperity, security and opportunity for their respective citizens: ‘What tied these three elements of economic nationalism together was the view that the nation state not only had the power to deliver prosperity, security, and opportunity, but that it had a responsibility to do so’ (p. 2). In short, with reference to the governmental problematic stated above, social policies in this version of a liberal regime can be broadly characterised by the prevalence of state regulation in the market economy through bureaucracies geared toward the economic prosperity of the nation (see Figure 9).

![Figure 9: A social liberal regime as tending toward state regulation of the market economy](image)

Education in such a regime can also be broadly characterised by its articulation to the project of a ‘national good,’ where it was ‘the right and duty of the state to assume responsibility for education.’ (Apelt and Lingard, 1993, p. 62) For religious
schools, with the exception of Catholic schools (until the 1960s)\(^\text{19}\), having been secularised and centralised under the respective state Education Acts in the late-nineteenth century for the ‘good’ and ‘progress’ of the nation, reflected the mix of liberal governmental aims and assumptions about education in relation to the social liberal configuration. Of these, two are most prominent: firstly, that economic efficiency in advanced industrial societies depended on getting the most talented people into the most important and technically demanding jobs, regardless of their social circumstances and therefore correlatively, that educational opportunities needed to be extended, given that the vast majority of jobs were predicted to become increasingly skilled, requiring extensive periods of formal education (Brown et al, 1997, p. 4).

According to Ely (1978), effective arguments for the state-directed schooling arrangement in this period from the 1880 Public Instruction Act (NSW) onward were discursively framed on a notion of ‘meritocracy’ in academic schools and technical education designed for a ‘skilled workforce,’ which were predicated on extending opportunities from the elite to those children who were ‘ambitious and able on the outer tracks of the social relay race’ (p. 75) – that is, the working classes. Conversely, the consequences of educational inferiority were framed as having dire economic and political implications for the nation as a whole. Schools, therefore,

\(^{19}\)In the early-1960s, the financial status of Catholic schools had reached a crisis point. By this time, as Potts (1992) explains of the political situation, many Catholic communities could no longer fund increasingly costly schooling: ‘The nature of schooling had changed, and a single teacher in front of a class of 60 or more students simply could not cope with newer approaches to teaching and learning. Catholics waged increasingly desperate political campaigns, such as the closing in 1962 of the Catholic schools in the city of Goulburn, not far from the national capital of Canberra. Such a measure placed unbearable strains on the state school system. After more than 20 years in opposition and following bitter debates, the Federal Labor Party decided that it would gain office only by giving up its opposition to state aid for church schools, thereby securing a proportion of the Catholic vote. [...]The Labor Party was elected nationally in December 1972. Part of the reason for its success was its new policy on school funding.’
were understood to be intimately attached to social liberal arrangements and, as Holbrook and Bessant (1987) have highlighted, the education system as a whole was harnessed as a national macroeconomic instrument, for example to facilitate (or delay) the entry of young workers into the labour market, in particular during periods of economic downturn and high unemployment or, alternatively, for the planned expansion of technological knowhow of the national labour force. The notion of the nation-state as the ultimate reference point for education thus gained ground, largely through the argument that the needs of national development were identical with the interests of the population as a whole (cf. Price, 1984/5, p. 46).

Secondly, education was seen as contributing to the operation of Australian liberal democracy through the training of its constituent citizens. From its formal institutionalisation in the late nineteenth century in Australia, the liberal system of mass education was targeted at what Goodson (1990) has described as a ‘grand project of modern nation-building’ (pp. 219, 227-228). Apart from the training of skilled labour for the national economy, this also involved what Elias (1994) has termed a ‘civilising process’ whereby standards regulating bodily functions (e.g. hygiene), social etiquette (e.g. appropriate conduct between children and adults, men and women, social superiors and subordinates, etc) and attitudes to violence (e.g. the state’s legitimate monopoly on violence) are inculcated into subjects as expectations of social conduct (also Boyd, Pudsey & Wadham, 2007, p. 111). This was indeed one of the perceived urgencies upon which the late-nineteenth century architects of the various ‘free, compulsory and secular’ education acts in Australia legitimated their policies was the expressed confidence that mass schooling would produce ‘good citizens,’ i.e. ‘children who would respect authority, follow the ‘democratic’
processes, and generally act in the manner in which they were instructed in the schools’ (Bessant, 1984, p. 10).

The conditions of possibility for an education geared toward industry and national citizenship were provided by the architecture of educational systems in Australia such as the 1880 Public Instruction Act in NSW, which as mentioned above, was informed strongly by a consensus emphasising a nominalist model of religious life informed by Protestant and liberal discourses. This meant that religious education in its ‘general’ form sought to cultivate generalised Christian morals while its ‘specific’ forms bore no intrinsic connection with particular practices of education; hence, religious education as a whole was made more pliable to the social outlook of the emergent liberal nation-state. For the historical bloc of Protestants and liberals who inaugurated it, state-administered ‘secular’ education was not perceived as a move away from Christian instruction, but rather allowed the ‘inner’ freedom for an individual relationship with God and the inculcation of ‘outer’ practices, which included accepted habits of civility and industry for the overriding purpose of making the nation, in action and in law, ‘the symbol of common citizenship.’ (Gregory, 1973, p. 118; also Austin, 1961)

In sum, then, education in the social liberal regime can be seen as predicated on meeting the needs of national prosperity and the production of good citizens. As Hunter (1996) puts it in general terms, ‘education emerged as a new domain of government in which the school would take shape as an instrument for training whole populations in the capacities required for participation in more sophisticated forms of social, economic, and political life’ (p. 155). More specifically, it was
proposed that educational policies and reforms targeted toward these ends would then enable ‘meritocratic social mobility, and strengthen communities and nation-building’ (Botrell & Goodwin, 2011, p. 25). In the course of the twentieth century, this emphasis on education as a necessary means of training productive workers and good citizens under a social liberal arrangement meant was that religious education in Australia increasingly existed in a context that no longer sustained the latter as a necessary form of ‘moral chaplaincy for the majority’ (Crawford & Rossiter, 1996; Rossiter, 2010). Religious schools can thus be seen to have had several options for operating and retaining legitimacy in such a context and, in general, three paths were taken in Australia.

Firstly, religious education could withdraw from the public realm and remain privatised by focusing on the ‘inner’ beliefs of its students. This is the route taken by many Protestant and Anglican schools in NSW following the 1880 Public Instruction Act, willingly relinquishing their educational functions and subsumed into an emerging state system in which a general background of non-denominational Christian beliefs and values was more or less generally taken for granted (Roberts, 1989: 31; cf. Judge, 2001, p. 467). Such ‘secular’ education administered by the state was further supplemented by a proviso within the Act for ‘special religious teaching’ in which a portion of each day was to be set apart for instruction by religious teachers of particular persuasions.

A second approach to religious education in an emergent liberal social order was taken predominantly by the elite, Church-affiliated grammar schools who argued
for the exemplary societal consequences of particular beliefs or values that they had transmitted to individuals. According to Williams and Carpenter (1991), these traditionally self-funded non-Catholic religious schools maintained the traditions of the British Grammar schools in that they were designed to provide an elite education for the offspring of the social and economic elite: ‘The virtues that built and maintained the British Empire are the virtues developed in these schools: discipline, self-reliance, courage, judgement, integrity, adaptability – all the virtues necessary to produce a Christian gentleman/woman, and the leaders of the nation’ (see also Gronn, 1992; Teese, 1995).

A third option provided a path for religious education – in both Protestant and Catholic (after 1962) schools – to retain their confessional identities while retaining some legitimacy for operating schools within a liberal socio-political order. Such schools attempted to shape individual students’ beliefs and morals according to an ethical comportment at once linked to a particular religious tradition and generalisable to the majority. The individual students would then go into the public realm with a purpose according to particular sets of personal ethics, or what has come to be popularly represented as ‘values’ (Wright, 2004, pp. 20-21; also Clarke, 2006). This third option has received an enormous boost in Australia since the early 1970s, where the national direction of schooling was problematised in order to foster equality of opportunity and diversity through the distribution of state funding for

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20 Indeed the modern notion of ‘values’ demonstrably presupposes a nominalist understanding of morality and ethics, coming to mean the pattern of life preferences expressed by a collection of like-minded individuals. According to Clarke (2006), values as a way of expressing religious morality is ‘a relatively recent invention, compared with such words as ‘ethics,’ ‘morals’ or ‘virtues.’ Whereas those words hark back to Graeco-Roman philosophers, before Christian times, ‘values’ seems to be a product of the recent economic age. It displaced ‘virtue’ and ‘vice,’ as the modern age sought more utilitarian or malleable means of describing what society judges desirable.’
state-run schools and existing religious schools, as well as the then-emergent ‘community schools’ – such as those established by adherents of Montessori, Steiner, independent Christian and other minority faiths (Hunter, 1994, pp. 126-131; also Marginson, 1993, pp. 200-228; Modway, 2004, pp. 38-59). Exemplary of such concerns was the 1973 *Schools in Australia* report produced by the Interim Committee of the Australian Schools Commission – better known as the Karmel Report after its chairperson – and its implementation by the Whitlam Government in 1974, which (amongst other measures for educational equality) made provisions for religious schools to begin to receive substantial financial support from governments, both Federal and State (Karmel, 1974; also Crittenden, 1974; Boyd, 1987). As will be touched on in Chapter 4, it was in the context of such an amenable policy environment that the neo-Calvinist ‘parent-controlled’ schooling movement acquired an institutionalised presence in the field of Australian education.

The commonality between these three historical options for religious education in Australia is evident: in the liberal socio-political order that has emerged since its implantation from colonisation, particular religious traditions have had to conform to nominalist and Protestant assumptions about religious education whereby the moral teachings of particular traditions are increasingly abstracted from their realization in the form of collective practices – including educational practices – that are their embodiment. By positing the realm of the personal and private as the locus of religiosity and religious values, liberal types of political regimes presume to separate religion from the public, collective and practical basis that renders its traditions viable across time.
Yet as Bauman (1991) points out, such a transvaluation of religion from the ‘outer’ world to the ‘inner’ worlds of individuals is precisely one of the processes upon which the ‘assimilatory project’ central to the development of modern European-style liberal societies is historically based; that is, ‘an exercise in discrediting and disempowering the potentially competitive, communal or corporative sources of social authority’ (p. 106). Such a project was part and parcel of the process of dismantling older, deeply rooted forms of communal life which may have provided alternative, or potentially even oppositional, frameworks of social power to the nation-state (van Krieken, 2005). In place of such variegated communal life, the modern liberal state effects what Milbank (1997, pp. 268-292) describes as a ‘simple space,’ which shifts the overlapping jurisdictions and levels of authority within varied communal contexts (i.e. ‘complex space’) to one characterized by a duality of individual and state to whom allegiance is owed in a way that trumps all other allegiances (also Cavanaugh, 2004, p. 251).

Within a social liberal regime, then, the assimilation of individual differences into the national space is predicated on the denigration of differing communal identities so that ‘tolerant treatment of individuals was inextricably linked to intolerance aimed at collectivities, their ways of life, their values, and above all, their value-legitimating powers’ (Bauman, 1991, p. 107). Thus, any substantively differing form of life, conception of morality and/or political practices may up to a point be held as a private option by individuals or groups, but any attempt to embody it in public life must be proscribed for the good of the nation. Indeed, it is precisely this qualification to citizenship as a necessary condition for membership in the nation that, despite its claim to cultural and religious neutrality, reveals the liberal socio-
political order as predicated on one particular tradition amongst others; for it does indeed have its own normative conception of the good, which it is ‘engaged in imposing politically, legally, socially, and culturally wherever it has the power to do so, but also that in so doing its toleration of rival conceptions of the good in the public arena is severely limited’ (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 336). As Van Krieken (2005) depicts in his analysis of liberal government in modern Australia and assimilation:

The price to be paid by individuals for entry into liberal citizenship in the modern state… has always been to leave all their previous communal cultural identities behind, apart from some remnant in the form of quaint customs wheeled out at ceremonial occasions.

Such a socio-political context undoubtedly opens up the cultural landscape for the emergence and growth of religious institutions and the tolerance of religious education defined within its discursive parameters. This was especially so following the 1973 Karmel Report, which saw the re-integration of religious schools into a national system on the pretext of a ‘devolution of responsibility.’ As the report states:

The Committee favours less rather than more centralised control over the operation of schools. Responsibility should be devolved as far as possible upon the people involved in the actual task of schooling, in consultation with the parents of the pupils whom they teach and, at senior levels, with the
students themselves. Its belief in this grass-roots approach to
the control of the schools reflects a conviction that
responsibility will be most effectively discharged where the
people entrusted with making the decisions are also the
people responsible for carrying them out, with an obligation
to justify them, and in a position to profit from their
experience (sec. 2.4)

Yet, while autonomy was granted to religious schools through the Karmel
Report’s ‘belief in this grass-roots approach to the control of the schools’ on the one
hand, on the other hand, due to the ‘obligation to justify’ their decisions according to
the predetermined responsibilities involved in ‘the actual task of schooling,’ they
were rearticulated along with state schools onto a ‘single plane of administrative
comparisons,’ thus enabling their problematisation as a governmental object of state
bureaucracy for ‘making them more equal, at least from the point of view of their
contribution to the economic prosperity and social security of the state’ (Hunter,
1994: 111). Religious education under such an arrangement must appeal to a broader
social legitimacy – or what the Karmel Report terms as ‘responsibility’ and its
‘obligation to justify’ decisions – if this growth is going to continue, a legitimacy
only attainable by translating the particularities of religious discourse into the
hegemonic discourse of the social liberal regime.
Drawing again on Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985, p. 130) analytical framework, one can describe this form of hegemony as ‘one nation’ politics\textsuperscript{21}, which entails the differential absorption of demands by particular religious education groups (including Catholic schools, the former ‘enemy within’). The politics of social liberalism and its expression in the field of education through the Karmel Report thus stands in marked contrast to the populist institution of the \textit{1880 Public Instruction Act (NSW)} through a ‘two nations’ politics of equivalence against an internal enemy. This means that different religious schools can be included alongside state-run schools, but only by assuming a mediating function in which their students are mainstreamed into the norms, practices and institutional arrangements of the prevailing social liberal regime’s educational requirements and in so doing, framing religious commitments in a manner conducive to the economic prosperity and social security of the nation-state – i.e. either as private belief or publicly generalisable ‘values’ abstracted from their particular discursive traditions (cf. Wright, 2004, p. 21) (see \textit{Figure 10}).

\textsuperscript{21} However, as Laclau and Mouffe (1985) are also quick to point out, such a bureaucratic state politics is based on a ‘positivist illusion’ that assumes that ‘the ensemble of the social can be absorbed in the intelligible and ordered framework of a society’ (p. 130). In this case, for example, the method of differential absorption of different educational demands required on the one hand a breaking of the liberal-Protestant chains of equivalence that instituted ‘public’ state-run education and assimilating other traditions of education as objective educational differences within the system – that is, transforming them into part of the ‘national education system’ – but on the other hand, doing so also displaced the frontier of antagonism to the periphery of the social. Under social liberalism and economic nationalism, this frontier beyond ‘society’ was primarily demarcated by the boundaries of the nation-state.
Figure 10: Religious education administered through regulations and directed towards the good of the nation

For example Roberts (1989), with regard to the history of education in Australia up to the 1980s, articulates just such an appeal for legitimacy by correlating the ‘dynamism’ of colonial education with its Christian inflection, arguing that the success of Australian education as a whole would be served by a restoration of this arrangement:

[The] Bible-based church-related school of early colonial times was remarkably successful in meeting the academic and spiritual/moral needs of the younger generation of that day. …when certain principles undergirding this Christian school movement were disregarded, Australian education began to lose its dynamic. It is suggested that this Christian dynamic can and must be restored to Australian education today. (p. 25)
What Roberts’s intervention as an apologist for Christian schooling demonstrates is a distinct reliance on the liberal discursive tradition that has been outlined in this chapter so far: firstly, the categorical distinction he draws between ‘academic’ and ‘spiritual/moral’ in his celebration of colonial education’s success is consistent with the nominalist and Protestant presuppositions of the liberal discursive tradition and its strict bifurcation between public/private and practices/religion, with academic matters corresponding with the first terms in each binary and religion with the second terms; in addition, by articulating the ‘Christian dynamic’ with the dynamic of Australian education as a whole, Roberts presupposes that the ends of religious education correlate with the ends of the hegemonic consensus of the time – that is, religious education serves the ‘good of the nation.’ Religious schools, albeit bearing the title of ‘private schools,’ are thus in this reckoning evidently part-and-parcel of the integral state under a social liberal regime.

The insistence of the separation of private/public spheres and its concomitant division between religious communities in the former and the formally secular nation-state in the latter thus seeks to effect a ‘projection of all social feelings into the state’ (Fromm, 1955, p. 141) as the ultimate point of cohesion for social existence under the social liberal arrangement. In such a schema, religious education becomes a means by which particular ‘values’ can be made amenable to the general project of nation-building. In order to function as such, however, such a strategy requires that religious schools either abstract their particular commitments and practices derived from traditions into a ‘neutral’ discourse that disarticulates certain publically generalisable ‘values’ from its particularities, or else keep religion private and away
from interfering in the educative tasks common to the public. This is a requirement that has intensified in the time since the 1973 Karmel Report, paradoxically, under the signs of school ‘choice’ and ‘diversity’ associated with the rise of neo-liberal hegemony over social liberal discourse and its subsequent reconfiguration of the liberal regime.

Religious education in Australia as a market good

On globalisation, nowhere [at the Commonwealth Government National Strategies Conference] was there a ‘Little Australia’ perspective. The force and inevitability of continued internationalisation was recognised and accepted from all quarters as was the potential for deriving major benefit from pursuing a global orientation for the country’s affairs. What is now recognised as unavoidable, has also become a strongly shared objective, that is, for Australia to develop fully as a global nation to achieve its national goals. (Economic Advisory and Planning Committee [EPAC], 1995, p. 5)

The neo-liberal regime in Australia can be seen to have arisen out of the successive crises of its social liberal predecessor. For despite a prolonged period of sustained national prosperity from the late 1940s in Australia, by the late 1960s the strain was beginning to show in the prevailing institutional arrangements and its
ability to sustain a regime of economic growth and social stability. Due to the multi-layered economic, social and geopolitical nature of the crisis, not all of the difficulties could be resolved satisfactorily in order to re-establish some kind of stable settlement (Lloyd, 2008, p. 49). Thus, the disintegration of the social liberal regime brought about a period of transition in Australia beginning in the late-1980s. It was in this period of crisis that neo-liberalism – a hitherto marginal discourse that had emerged as a minority reaction against the welfare state in the 1930s and 1940s – gained ascendency throughout the 1980s-90s to become the *modus operandi* of political institutions and state bureaucracies (see Cahill, 2004a, 2004b, 2010; also Pusey, 1991). Insofar as it has since become, and remains, the hegemonic discourse, neo-liberal presuppositions are shared across the spectrum of policy-making in Australia, where the conservative and ‘Third Way’ social democratic policy makers have generally presupposed an important new ‘fact’ about socio-political life: the view that there is an international process of economic convergence known as ‘globalisation’ that is inevitable and inexorable.

As Sjolander (1996) and Hirst and Thompson (1992, 1995; also 1996) explain, there is a widespread belief amongst politicians and policy-makers that globalisation entails, at its most basic level, an economic process with political consequences, a

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22 The period lasting from the mid-1970s to the early-1990s was characterized by a series of crises that steadily decomposed the social liberal arrangement in Australia. Where such crises led to the eventual failure of the social liberal regime in Australia, the factors may be understood as threefold: firstly, a failure to secure a regime of capital accumulation due to cyclical crises of productivity and accumulation as well as ‘stagflation’ (Broomhill, 2008: 21; Bell & Quiggin, 2008: 73); secondly, a failure to secure the social reproduction due to dissatisfaction amongst employers at the increased power of the labour movement and its gains in wages and working conditions (Broomhill, 2008: 21), as well as broader social instability on several fronts including ‘economic (e.g. stagflation, mining boom and ‘Dutch disease’), cultural (e.g. Asian immigration, feminism, Aborigines), and geopolitical (e.g. British EEC membership, Asian wars and Asian trade engagement) [that led] to a shift of ideology, culture and public policy by the early 80s’ (Lloyd, 2008: 49); and thirdly, external crises in the form of the oil price rises in late 1979 that slowed global growth rates, causing Australia’s current account to deteriorate dramatically in 1980-1 and again in 1981-2, which in turn slowed economic growth further and trebled foreign debt in a short period of time (Broomhill, 2008: 22).
process which is described as the transformation of the business environment where goods, capital, and knowledge flow freely across international boundaries abetted by advances in transportation and information and communications technology. This is undergirded by a broadly shared narrative that ‘from the 1970s onwards we have witnessed the creation of a truly global economy, one in which world market forces are stronger than even the most powerful states’ so that nation-states are being ‘subsumed into one global economy’ (Hirst and Thompson, 1995, p. 414). Driven by changing investment strategies of financial markets and transnational corporations, it is believed, globalisation heralds a significant restructuring of the global capitalist economy – the heralding of a global market in goods, services, knowledge and hence, the labour required to produce these. What neo-liberal discourse thus gives rise to is an interpretation of the socio-political world that assumes that ‘emergent trade and investment patterns are seen to create their own necessary pressures on the political organization of the world economy and the space available for state response,’ so that all peoples and states are equally subject to the logics of globalisation – which are on the whole beneficial and necessary – and that societies have no choice but to ‘adapt’ to the new international economic conjuncture (Sjolander, 1996, pp. 608, 604).

As a consequence of these inexorable global ‘facts,’ neo-liberal discourse maintains that states are consigned to the role of regulators and facilitators in the adaptation of the national economy to the new realities of convergent international economic structures – or what political philosopher John Gray (1998) has dubbed a ‘false dawn’ parasitic on an Enlightenment myth of progress towards a ‘universal civilisation by way of the worldwide spread of western – and more particularly,
Anglo-Saxon – practices and values’ (p. 215). In this view, all that remains for nation-states to do is ‘creat[e] the policy environment, both nationally and internationally, which favours the globalization of production and service industries’ (Sjolander, 1996, pp. 608-609). This has the effect of increasingly constraining parties of the right and the left to adopt similar political agendas, often blaming ‘difficult political choices on their lack of choice, citing the foreclosure of options born of the pressures of globalization’ (Sjolander, 1996, pp. 608-609), although their rhetorical framing of the ways in which this task is to be met may differ slightly. In general, what this shared vision of globalisation implies is that states should generally ‘provide those social and public services international capital deems essential and at the lowest possible overhead cost,’ and more specifically pertaining to education is the supposition that because capital is mobile and will locate wherever economic advantage dictates but labour is both nationally located and relatively static, the state must aid the latter to adjust itself to meet the new pressures of international competitiveness (Hirst and Thompson, 1995, p. 414).

In Australia, as Frankel (2001, p. 26-35) explains, the policies of the mainstream political parties – that is, the Australian Labor Party and the Coalition (of Liberal and National Parties) – both share this presupposition of the need to reform Australian institutions and populace for globalisation, although their policies differ owing to the competing industry sectors and other cultural and political sources of influence that prevail within them. Differences aside, however, the apparent exposure of Australia’s economy and society to international market forces has led successive governments to frame internal reforms as a response to these external pressures. This is typified by what Frankel (2001, p. 27) has termed the project of ‘Australia Inc.’
whereby globalisation becomes the pretext used by governments and business groups to forge a new political economic entity consisting of a transition to a modern nationwide market society. This new level of national standardisation then allows for the institution of markets that can achieve mobility across State and national lines through the use of corporate performance criteria that seek to augment efficiency (see Frankel, 2001, p. 25). According to the logic of this concerted political project:

The exposure of Australia’s economy and society to international pressures and developments has necessitated a parallel ‘nationalisation’ of institutional and market forces. [...] within the Australian federation we are witnessing the consolidation of national political and economic fields over the historical dominance of State spheres. State political fields remain important, but cultural and economic processes carried out at State level continue to be rationalised or integrated nationally. (Frankel, 2001, p. 24)

As Frankel (2001, p. 24) goes on to list as an example, and as I shall elaborate below with regard to the field of education in Australia, this has involved a parallel expansion, on the one hand, of a national standardisation of education that seeks to prepare future worker-citizens in the face of a globalising labour market, and on the other hand, the institution and facilitation of a market in school choice in order to harness competitive efficiencies in meeting these training requirements. The mediating nexus between education standardisation and the market is the regulatory
mechanism of accountability measures, which as I shall elaborate further in Chapter 5, establishes a plane of statistical equivalence between schools and disparate communities across the national territory (Lingard, 2010, p. 131). The important point to restate here is this: that insofar as this presupposition about globalisation is understood as necessitating the reconfiguration of institutions like education is shared across the mainstream of politics and policy-making as common sense, the prevailing regime in Australia can be understood as structured by a hegemonic neo-liberal discourse.

As a theoretical concept, neo-liberalism has recently been subject to contestation due to its wide usage and hence an apparently inconsistent definition. According to Clarke (2008), for example, the term suffers from ‘promiscuity (hanging out with various theoretical perspectives), omnipresence (treated as a universal or global phenomenon), and omnipotence (identified as the cause of a wide variety of social, political and economic changes),’ so much so that he claims ‘the concept of neo-liberalism is now so overused that it should be retired’ (p. 135). Likewise, Grossberg argues that the term is used in a way that assumes the rhetoric of its ideologues to be the truth of things. Consequently, ‘we tend to believe or take at face values ‘their’ stories, and then assume that our task is to show their negative effects, in the end assuming and reenacting the claim that there really is a neoliberal order’ (Grossberg, 2010, p. 107). While I address the specificities of what I interpret to be a neo-liberal regime below in a way that attempts to circumvent such criticisms of conceptual haziness or uncritical adoption of ‘face value’ assumptions, I also contend along with Hall (2011, p. 10) that neo-liberalism as a concept remains a useful, albeit provisional, analytical device at a general level in order to describe
some recent economic and political trends driven by a perceived globalisation of markets, especially in relation to the broader liberal discursive tradition outlined above of which it represents a specific configuration (hence the prefix ‘neo’) (Hall, 2011, pp. 12-16).

In addition, I argue that compared to other commonly used terms often for naming the present conjuncture like ‘neoclassical economics,’ ‘global capitalism’ or ‘globalisation,’ neo-liberalism appears to be the most comprehensive term because each of these potential alternatives only capture certain aspects of the present regime (see Haley and Davis, 2008, pp. 71-72): neoclassical economics designating a school of economic theory propounded by Hayek, Milton Friedman and others generally associated with the Chicago School of Economics; global capitalism describing a broad organisational tendency in terms of transnational production and marketing; and ‘globalisation,’ as mentioned above, as a vision of the inevitable convergence of global market economies. To name the present regime neo-liberal, I argue, has the benefit of capturing both the political and economic components of its discourse while accounting for neoclassical economic theory and its subsequent development into ‘Human Capital’ and ‘Public Choice’ theories that provide an intellectual basis for the neo-liberal regime, as well as presupposing global capitalism as its normative transnational project and globalisation as its teleological vision. It is important to note that while such a characterisation functions as an ideal type, neo-liberal policy expressions are divergent across time and place. Political economist David Harvey (2006) describes this divergence as ‘pragmatic neoliberalism’ or the difference between neo-liberalism in theory and in practice. He suggests that while the theory advances ‘individual liberty and freedom [as] the high point of civilization’ and then
goes on to argue that ‘individual liberty and freedom can best be protected and achieved by an institutional structure, made up of strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade,’ successive economic crises since the 1980s have meant that ‘there were some major adjustments that occurred in the theory’ to suit different circumstances. This implies that the shape neo-liberal regime in Australia is likely to bear both particular institutional arrangements suited to its historical and political context as well as general tendencies that align with the broader traits of neo-liberalism.

As a starting point, then, I shall take as a starting point Harvey’s (2005) widely cited definition of neo-liberalism:

[Neo-liberalism] is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. It must also set up those military, defence, police, and legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets. (p. 2)
On the basis of Harvey’s definition, neo-liberalism as an ideal type can be broadly understood as a mutation of two discursive elements within the Anglo-liberal tradition hitherto outlined: firstly, a restructuring of the role of the state as providing the necessary infrastructural conditions for globalising markets – including regulatory frameworks and the training of future worker-citizens as potential labour; and secondly, that market exchange in all spheres represents the most effective means for generating efficient outcomes in relation to that prior end. I shall presently elaborate on these two, interlocking elements in relation to the genealogy of liberalism furnished so far before moving onto a consideration of how education in general, and religious education in particular, are framed within such a regime.

In the first instance, despite the rhetoric of ‘deregulation’ or ‘privatisation,’ neo-liberal discourse prescribes a restructuring of the state’s role (rather than its reduction in an absolute sense): a selective removal of regulations in some industries and a reduction in welfare measures while, at the same time, enhancing industry assistance such as the linking of education policy to industry demands and increasing ‘law and order’ expenditures (Jones, 1996, p. 30). For insofar as neo-liberalism remains formally committed to the liberal paradigm of security and prosperity of formally free individuals through the contingent governmental balancing of the market economy and state regulation, as argued above, neo-liberal regimes are likewise marked by an inescapable co-presence of market individualism and state regulation. In short, a change in the form of the state under a different political regime ‘by no means presages the end of the state’ (Bobbitt, 2002, p. xxiii).
While often framed in the libertarian rhetoric of deregulation and the juxtaposition of the market and the state in antagonistic terms, then, market individualism and state regulation can in practice be seen as two moments encompassed within the neo-liberal regime. These two moments have been described by Peck and Tickell (2002) as constituting a ‘roll-back’ moment focused on the restructuring of prior social liberal arrangements along the lines of private sector corporations – which were characteristic of the ‘commercialisation’ reforms of Australian public sector services (rather than an absolute withdrawal of the state per se) under the Coalition government led by John Howard from the mid-1990s to mid-2000s that sought to simultaneously reduce the size of the public service while increasing its productivity (Dixon, Kouzmin & Korac-Kakabadse, 1996; Rundle, 2001) – and a ‘roll-out’ moment that seeks to construct and consolidate neo-liberal markets through regulatory mechanisms – the latter moment being characteristic of ‘Third Way’ social democratic governments typified in Australia by the government of the Australian Labor Party led by Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard in the late-2000s (Pierson and Castles, 2002; see also Gamble, 2001).

Thus, contrary to the representation of neo-liberalism by its proponents and some of its detractors as engendering a withdrawal of the state, neo-liberalism in practice requires a strong regulatory state to institute and create the right conditions for markets, regulate their operation and attenuate their more pernicious effects at the level of industries, groups and individuals (Chang, 1997; Levi-Faur, 2005). More pointedly put, the popular neo-liberal rhetoric of the state as somehow ‘outside’ and therefore ‘interfering’ with economic markets is unworkable, for, as Jones (1996) points out:

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There is no such thing as a pure economic system of free market forces, there never has been in the past and there could not be in the future [because] [t]he state has been integral in providing the conditions for the continual success of capitalism. Capitalist competition (so-called ‘market forces’) has required perennial state assistance – in the form of subsidies or rationalisation measures, especially in times of crisis. (pp. 29-30)

Indeed, as institutional economist Ha-Joon Chang (2001: 6) comments, attempts at defining a free market apart from a consideration of its political institution is at the deepest level a pointless exercise because no market is in the end ‘free’: ‘[A]ll markets have some state regulations on who can participate in which markets and on what terms.’ (also Chang, 1994; Fligstein, 1990) In addition, extra cost responsibilities for the state also arise due to the new layers of bureaucracy that have been created to facilitate and regulate ‘deregulated’ markets (Cahill, 2009: 13). Political commentator Chris Berg (2008), for example, has drawn together data from Australia to illustrate how the quantities of ‘subordinate legislation’ – that is, laws for regulation – actually increased significantly in the historical periods of the 1980s-2000s and during the Howard Coalition Government of 1996-2007, both of which are commonly characterised as neo-liberal (see Figures 11 and 12).
To simply accept such characterisations of neo-liberalism as entailing a ‘smaller state’ owing to deregulation and privatisation *en toto* is to risk missing the ways in which the state is the key institutional ingredient for marketisation in Australia (Grenfell, 2004: 84). In light of this, neo-liberalism is better seen as a
reconfigured type of liberal regime with a state apparatus whose mission is to facilitate and regulate institutions that prepare Australia and its citizenry for the impending globalisation of the economy, in conjunction with a tendency to emphasise the efficacy of market exchange for fostering competitive behaviour and disciplining inefficient performance\(^{23}\) – a project Robison (2006) and others have encapsulated as ‘forging the market state’ (see Figure 13; also Wiseman, 1998, p. 38). While consistent with a broad Anglo-liberal social arrangement, the key differences between the social liberal nation-state and the neo-liberal market-state are captured concisely by legal and political theorist Philip Bobbit (2002):

> Whereas the nation-state, with its mass free public education, universal franchise, and social security policies, promised to guarantee the welfare of the nation, the market-state promises instead to maximize the opportunity of the people and, thus, tends to privatize many state activities and to make voting and representative government less influential and more responsive to the market. (p. 211)

\(^{23}\) This is why pronouncements heralding the ‘end of neo-liberalism,’ such as those of former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in his essay ‘The Global Financial Crisis’ (2009), are mistaken. Such conclusions are based on a misunderstanding of neo-liberalism as constituted by a ‘retreat of the state.’ According to this logic, the return of regulation necessarily marks the end of neo-liberalism. However, contrary to neo-liberal theory, neo-liberalism in practice has seen the state play an active and indeed expanding role in the creation, facilitation and maintenance of neo-liberalism. Even after the ‘financial crisis’ of 2008, the dominant means of ‘rescue’ implemented by various neo-liberal regimes worldwide have involved not curtailing the operation of markets in finance, for example, but rather an injection of liquidity into financial markets. As Cahill (2009, pp. 13-14) points out, such actions are consistent with the *modus operandi* of neo-liberal regimes, which over three decades have seen the growth of the state through the proliferation of new social and economic regulations that aid in the ‘marketisation’ of various sectors.
Figure 13: A neo-liberal regime as entailing an emphasis on market exchange, with the state as an active regulator, institutor and facilitator of the market economy.

In the second instance, for its popular appeal, neo-liberalism can be understood to deploy elements of classical Anglo-liberal discourse (e.g. Locke) with its rhetoric on individual freedom, private property rights and contractualism, but with a greater emphasis on competitive market exchange as the medium of social relations and means of social discipline that guarantees performance (cf. Hall, 2011, p. 16; Gill, 1995). For the proponents of neo-liberal discourse, this emphasis recalls a return to the concerns of liberal political economy; that is, the standpoint of the market, the sphere of voluntary commodity exchange regulated by law whose proper functioning is considered to be an important end in itself, as well as the best means to the achievement of certain national ends (Gamble, 1979, p. 5). A chief instance of this process in the field of education is the measurement of human potential in the discourse of ‘Human Capital Theory,’ which posits the possession of education and skill of individuals as a saleable commodity on the globalising labour market (Luke, 1997), and which represents in practice the ‘liberation of individual entrepreneurial freedoms’ under neo-liberalism in Harvey’s definition above. In short, this discourse is the political expression of the belief that market value represents a good measure of human value and market exchange is the primordial form of human freedom (Gray, 1996, p. 21).
This intensification of market logics under neo-liberalism for the purposes of market exchangeability can also be seen as consistent with the logics of nominalism and Protestantism within the Anglo-liberal tradition in its rejection of the intrinsic or divine value of people and things. As argued in the previous chapter, insofar as nominalism advocated severance of the divine from the immanent and worldly, and Protestantism subsequently defined religion as individual belief that would in the liberal tradition come to be demarcated as the ‘private’ sphere, it endowed with sanction – or at least indifference – the subordination of both people and the environment to the needs of the state and the economy, both of which had previously been considered to occupy positions, arrangements and roles of social, political, cosmic and religious significance (Fromm, 1969, pp. 58-59, 70-72; Milbank, 2009, p. 20). The ‘de-sacralisation’ of human practices and the environment within this discursive tradition are, at least in part, the conditions of possibility for the rejection of intrinsic qualitative value of different human labours and material objects for their commensurable, quantitative value as determined by what others are willing to pay for it. Within a neo-liberal market, as Milbank (2009) points out, ‘any notions of ‘just wage’ or ‘just price’ which would symbolize the ‘sacred’ worth of roles and items for a specific society must be abandoned’ (p. 31).

These twin tendencies in neo-liberal discourse – a restructured market-state to prepare for the onslaught of globalising markets and the emphasis on market exchange and discipline – have been widespread in the field of education in Australia. Two intertwined features in particular can be noted that correspond to these: firstly, the proliferation of accountability measures in order to facilitate the regulation of educational institutions towards the end of creating skilled worker-
citizens, the operation and enforcement of which highlights the ever-present role of
the market-state; and secondly, on the basis of such accountability measures, the
institution of a market for ‘choice’ between competing educational institutions,
which it is believed will generate efficiencies for the achievement of educational
objectives defined by the neo-liberal regime.

The market-state and education

With regard to the restructuring of the state vis-à-vis education, the period of
crisis in the social liberal regime inevitably saw Australian schooling come under
intense scrutiny. Yet while the education system was being significantly blamed for
social and economic problems of the 1970s and 1980s, the power of education to
deliver the goals of the emergent regime has never been questioned in official circles
(Brown et al, 1997, pp. 7-8). Indeed, according to Brown et al (1997), there is now a
‘consensus’ on both the left and right of the political spectrum defining education as
‘the key to future economic prosperity’ (p. 7). This consensus on education as a
means to economic success was evident in Australia, where between 1981 and 1987,
21 major reports on education were produced by state and federal education
authorities, as well as complementary reports linking education to labour market
structures, technological change and youth policy (Marginson, 1993, p.148ff.).
Unsurprisingly, a Commonwealth Department of Employment, Education and
Training (DEET) report in 1987 summed up Australia’s poor productivity
performance, low rates of technological innovation and exposure to volatile
commodity prices from the 1970s to the mid-1980s as a question of the adequacy of
the national skills base and the hitherto prevailing educational arrangements that provide for skill formation (Marginson, 1993, p.148ff.).

Likewise, in a paper entitled *Strengthening Australia’s Schools* (1988), neo-liberal education policy reformer and one-time Federal Treasurer John Dawkins called for a national focus on student assessment and standards monitoring in order to ascertain the attainment of skills deemed necessary for Australia’s global economic competitiveness. A report similarly disposed was released by the Economic Planning and Advisory Council (1986), underlining the necessity of education for ‘upgrading the quality of the stock of human capital’ (p. 12; see also Dawkins, 1985). As a DEET report entitled *Meeting Australia’s skill needs* asserted in 1987, all education must now be seen as part-and-parcel of national macroeconomic policy:

The primary question then is no longer whether education and training are factors in economic performance, but rather what needs to be done to improve their provision, by what means, and which directions and where responsibility for action lies. As a complement to broader macroeconomic policy measures, these ‘structural’ issues will demand closer attention over the next few years if Australia is to successfully negotiate the major adjustment tasks with which it is currently faced. (DEET, 1987, p. 4)
This unequivocal positioning of the education system as linked to macroeconomic goals is also tied up with an accompanying tendency that a range of scholars such as Meredyth (1998), Marginson (1997), Connell (2003) and Lingard (2000) have described as an increasing ‘marketisation’ of educational institutions in Australia. Neo-liberal reforms, it is argued, have involved successive Australian governments emphasising ‘choice’ within an expanding educational market, appealing to discourses of flexibility, enterprise and autonomy for legitimacy and treating students, families and employers as customers and clients of education (Lucas, Pudsey, Wadham and Boyd, 2007, p. 79). In turn, schools are to compete for customers and clients of their services primarily by reference to their achievements as measured on the basis of their efficiency as determined by accountability measures – most prominently results in standardised testing, and secondarily on the ‘values’ such as religious affiliation that may influence the choices of potential customers and clients who seek to provide what Ball (2003) describes as a ‘morally adequate account of themselves’ through their schooling preferences (p. 117; see also Campbell, Proctor & Sherington, 2009, pp. 160-178). This has led to the downplaying of the contribution of education as a generalised good for the nation as was characteristic of the social liberal regime and, concomitantly, an emphasis on the private benefits of education accruing to individuals that are well-prepared to compete effectively in the perceived globalisation of the labour market, which in turn fulfils the market-state’s imperative for the formation of a more flexible, multi-skilled workforce (Lucas et al, 2007, p. 97; also Avis, 2000; Meredyth, 1998).

Under the neo-liberal regime, then, education in general and schooling in particular are framed as a key means of ‘habituation’ for the allegedly new globally
competitive labour market (White, 1997, p. 236). The 1990s, for example, saw four key publicly commissioned reports that sought to align the demands for economic growth and international competitiveness: firstly and most significantly, the *Young People's Participation in Post-Compulsory Education and Training* (Australian Education Council and Ministers for Vocational Education, Employment and Training, 1991) report, also known as the Finn Review after its committee chair, IBM executive Brian Finn. This review introduced the language of ‘competencies’ through its identification of ‘six key areas of competence’ that were necessary for students in senior secondary schools and above – i.e. Language and Communication, Numeracy, Scientific and Technological Understanding, Cultural Understanding, Problem-solving, and Personal and Interpersonal Skills (Lugg, 2002, p. 311) – which remain the skeletal underpinning across all Australian schooling systems. The three key documents that followed – *The Australian Vocational Certificate and Training System* (Employment and Skills Foundation Council, 1992; also known as the ‘Carmichael Report’), *Putting general education to work* (AEC and MOVEET, 1992; also known as the ‘Mayer Committee Report’) and the *Setting National Skills Standards* (National Training Board, 1991) paper – were all concerned with the dissemination and implementation of the Finn Review, as well as the practical alignment of schooling curricula with the key competencies ‘determined by business, industry and the unions to be relevant to the existing and future needs of Australia’s workplaces’ (Lugg, 2002, p. 311)

Taken together, a shift is detectable in the ends to which education is directed: for while the earlier social liberal regime emphasised educational policies for what was considered a national good as exemplified in the Karmel Report of 1973, a
second Karmel Report – the 1985 *Quality of Education Review Committee* – subsequently produced by Australian Federal Government signified a new insistence on common competencies and skills that were supposedly required by workers to be competitive in a global market. Indeed, Lingard and Rizvi (2002) point out that already from the time of the first Karmel Report in the mid-1970s, governments at state and federal levels were concerned to ensure the ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ of institutions such as schools, with ‘efficiency/effectiveness’ defined as ‘doing more with less and stressing outcomes rather than inputs,’ accompanied by a push towards ‘more managerialist and market-driven priorities’ (p. 10). Of particular importance is the accompanying propagation of accountability measures that regulate schools, facilitate relative comparisons and competition between schools in Australia, as well as rendering Australian schools on aggregate measurable and comparable on a global scale (Rizvi and Lingard, 2009, p. 18).

In both religious and non-religious sectors of Australian schooling alike, such policy revisions have been evident in the increasingly standardised approaches to evaluation and comparison in educational governance that were first signalled in the later Karmel Report and developed further in the 1988 *Strengthening Australia’s Schools* report – known as the Dawkins Report – which called for a national focus on student assessment and standards monitoring in order to ascertain the attainment of skills (Rowe, 1999). This has led to the proliferation of standardised testing and reporting across schooling systems for the purposes of ascertaining the relative efficiency of individual schools in comparison to one another in achieving national economic imperatives (Singh, 1990). Rowe (1999) concurs, echoing Lingard and Rizvi’s diagnosis that such standards are a result of a shift in policy toward markets,
especially for the purposes of disciplining poor performance: ‘the focus on allowing market forces to predominate makes it possible for governments and educational regulatory bodies to locate blame for ‘poor performance’ or ‘ineffectiveness’ at the local and/or school level.’ Consistent with my argument regarding the inevitable ‘balancing act’ characteristic of liberal regimes, therefore, neo-liberalism according to these authors should be envisaged not so much as the absolute rule of deregulation or privatisation, but rather as encompassing a less directly interventionist regulation with greater control over coordination and policy development or ‘steering,’ insisting on more efficient educational service delivery or ‘rowing’ by private providers – what is known as ‘government at a distance’ or simply ‘governance’ (Van Gramberg and Bassett, 2005, p. 2; also Jessop, 1998, 1999). The particular regulatory instruments deployed for such ‘steering’ – such as legislation (Berg, 2008), audits (Power, 1997) and inspections (Braithwaite, Healy and Dwan, 2005) – can be understood in this regard as what Rose and Miller (1992), following Foucault, call ‘technologies of government’ that channel the conduct of individuals and groups on the one hand, and abet competitive market exchange and discipline on the other.

It is important at this point to note that while the differences between the first and second Karmel Reports may well mark a discontinuity, as Rowe, Lingard and Rizvi variously suggest, between a social liberal or ‘social democratic’ policy ethos on the one hand and a neo-liberal, market-driven one on the other, I argue in concurrence with Hunter (1994, p. 122-136) that this passage is also intelligible in part as being continuous with the ‘problematic of government’ within the Anglo-liberal discursive tradition. For the precondition for establishing a market for choice in schooling, in particular one involving different religious schools and non-religious
schools, requires in the first place a levelling of substantive plurality of practices and ends between schools onto a simple space in order to render them comparable on a common scale. This, as I have outlined above, was a key achievement of the first Karmel Report: the articulation of religious schools and non-religious schools on a single plane of administrative comparisons was effected by a nominalistic presupposition that the ‘religious’ dimension of religious schooling is extrinsically related – and hence merely incidental for administrative purposes – to ‘schooling-in-general’ that can be regulated. In this way, regulation through the state provided, and indeed still provides, the institutional preconditions for a market in education based on the private preferences of its consumers; for the religious aspects of such schools do not bear out substantively on the type of education received, but merely provide added ‘values’ that may figure favourably or otherwise depending on the preferences of the individual student or family.

This continuity is also detected by Luke (1997), who charts the changes within the education system broadly (and tertiary education more particularly). He points out likewise that beginning in what I have termed the social liberal period, education reform:

[W]as legitimated in terms of the expansion of access and equity while the latter has stressed accountability for the expenditure of public funds through ‘quality assurance.’ The former was justified as a strategy for the expansion of technological and educational expertise nationally; the latter on the premise that such expansion... could be monitored and
regulated through quantification and centralised evaluation
and planning.

By the 1990s, as Luke (1997) goes on to point out, ‘educational policy and institutional practice [were] being pushed along a continuum towards reduced government expenditure, and increased marketisation and privatisation of remaining state-supported operations,’ whereby the existence of educational institutions ‘depends almost exclusively now on rationalised and quantified performativity in an increasingly less regulated educational market’ (p. 1). While I have argued and will argue further below and in the chapters that follow that such a marketisation does not entail less but more – albeit different – regulation, the point to be stressed here is both the discontinuity and continuity between the educational policies of the social liberal period and the new directions they have taken under a neo-liberal regime.

With regard to religious education, then, the proliferation of regulatory measures for ‘governance’ and the marketisation of education under the neo-liberal regime marks a discontinuity from the social liberal regime insofar as more religious schools are permitted to enter the market, with each permitted to achieve the stipulated standards in different ways. However, it also represents continuity with the preceding regime insofar as both share the presuppositions of the liberal discursive tradition: a definition of religion primarily as belief with no intrinsic relationship to practices and its consignment to the private sphere. Religious schools – despite their formal status as ‘private’ educational service providers in the market for school choice – thus remain linked to the (integral) market-state insofar as they are regulated
and steered through various accountability measures. The key difference is that they are articulated to the imperatives defined by neo-liberal discourse, which is to train worker-citizens in preparation for globalisation, as opposed to equality or diversity for good of the nation as with the previous social liberal regime (see Figure 14).

Figure 14: Religious education steered through regulation and linked to the market state for the imperatives of neo-liberal discourse

If the 1973 Karmel Report marked the moment when such so-called ‘private’ religious schools were initially brought into the purview of the state, then the growth of such schools under this administrative arrangement was augmented by the 1996 abolition of the Commonwealth Government’s New Schools Policy. This latter policy, which was established in 1985 by the then-Labor Federal Government in partnership with various State governments, enforced a set of guidelines that were intended to promote the principle of ‘planned educational provision’ to maximise the use of national funding resources and to discourage the duplication of school services (Ryan and Watson, 2004, p. 11). Under these guidelines, prospective new private
schools were required to demonstrate that their existence would not have an adverse impact on existing schools – both state-run public and religious or non-religious private – within a given geographical area (Ryan and Watson, 2004, p. 11). The abolition of this policy in 1996 by the Howard Coalition government marked the lifting of federal restrictions on the establishment of new non-government schools, and as a result is widely seen as a deregulation and marketisation of the schooling sector that resulted in a substantial change in the number and size of private schools – including religious schools – as well as making Federal funding accessible for the establishment and maintenance of such schools (see McMorrow, 2008).

Yet, as I have argued, such moves toward a marketisation of schooling do not represent a deregulation or privatisation of schooling and a diminution of state involvement in a strict sense. Rather, they entail on the one level what is known as a reduction of ‘barriers to entry into the market’ for new private schools (as ‘entrant firms’ in neoclassical economic theory; see Pehrsson, 2009), while on another level it involves a simultaneous re-regulation of religious ‘private’ schools on another level with respect to their articulation to the imperatives of the neo-liberal regime. In this reckoning, the state – albeit restructured as a market-state – still plays a key role by providing the infrastructure for the market in school choice and through the ‘rationalisation’ and ‘harmonisation’ of disparate educational efforts in line with the development of human capital for global competitiveness. This concurs with attempts being made in neo-liberal regimes around the world, according to education and Gramsci scholar Peter Mayo (2011), to leave as little as possible in schooling to the vagaries of difference despite the neo-liberal rhetoric of ‘free choice.’ As he goes on to elaborate, this is most evident with ‘the onset of standardization, league tables,
classifications and... more recently, harmonization,’ which renders ‘agencies of the state, or those that work in tandem with the state through a loose network (a process of governance rather than government), more accountable, more subject to surveillance and ultimately more rationalized’ (p. 61).

As regards Australia, such state-led ‘rationalisation’ and ‘harmonisation’ is underscored by the operation and enforcement of regulatory instruments for measuring accountability, which have the effect of increased state governance of schools, including religious schools as formally private agencies ‘that work in tandem with the state,’ to use Mayo’s expression (see Van Gramberg and Basset, 2005, p. 2). This development while novel is perhaps unsurprising, for the precondition for markets as a clearinghouse for preferences is precisely state regulations that institute certain standards for which the measure of success is a school’s effectiveness in organizing and ordering the conduct of individual schools according to ‘objective’ needs of training predetermined by the hegemonic discourse while leaving religious schools for example free to pursue their ‘subjective’ preferences. The rationale behind the contemporary policies that regulate performance through accountability measures can thus be understood as the institution of conditions for a market in schooling whereby competition between schools of qualitatively different traditions is made possible by reference to common standards. As will be explicated in Chapter 5 with reference to NCPC schooling, religious schooling arising from particular traditions may exist and express their religious discourse as long as the established standards of schooling are delivered. This then enables its expressions of religiosity to be exercised ‘acceptably’ within the
bounds of a hegemonic discourse that defines the public purpose of education (see Wright, 2004, p. 24).

The proliferation of regulatory instruments in the form of accountability measures is best exemplified in the present emphasis on standardised testing and reporting. For instance, in the Australian Commonwealth Government’s standardised National Assessment Program – Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) introduced in 2008 and the introduction of the My School website in 2010, which makes publicly accessible and comparable certain sets of demographic information derived from individual schools, as well as results from NAPLAN tests and post-school destinations of each. According to the Government-issued Information for Parents (ACARA, 2010a) brochure:

From January 2010, you [i.e. parents] will be able to access a range of information about schools, including the number of full-time teachers, number of student enrolments, attendance rates, school-level NAPLAN results, and post-secondary school outcomes in some states and territories. My School will also provide an opportunity for schools to showcase their mission statement and achievements to the wider public on their school’s profile page. […] You can quickly locate performance and contextual information about schools in your community and compare them with statistically similar schools across the country.
According to Barton (as cited in Beckman & Cooper, 2004), what informs such an accountability mechanism for comparing and contrasting is both the linking of funding arrangements to measurable efficiencies in performance, as well as the expectation that schools will become more effective, efficient and generally improve their educational performance because of competition for students (and parental preferences). While My School is by no means the first or only standardised testing and reporting mechanism in Australian schooling, as I shall explain in Chapter 5, it is significant as the culmination of over two decades of rationalisation and harmonisation of assessment and reporting across the states and territories. This is because My School along with NAPLAN serve as exemplars of the neo-liberal construal of schooling in the nexus of regulation and marketisation in the two ways touched on by Barton. Firstly, while these accountability measures are presented as the objective way of rating school performance, standardised measures like NAPLAN and My School function effectively as steering mechanisms that ensure schools comply to the ‘public purpose of education’ as defined by neo-liberal discourse. The sheer scale and scope of these measures represent an unprecedented regulatory coordination of schooling by the Federal Government for the end of training worker-citizens.

Secondly, as apparently ‘value-free’ accountability instruments that measure the relative effectiveness of various schools in achieving given objectives, standardising measures like NAPLAN and My School facilitate a market for school choice by rendering all schools comparable and commensurable on a national scale, as well as on smaller scales between schools in proximate locales and ‘statistically similar schools,’ all of which are meant to increase the ability of parents to choose
led by calculative decisions on the most effective means of obtaining desired educational outcomes for their children (Lucas et al, 2007, pp. 80-81; also Teese and Posel, 2003) – or in the words of former Minister of Education and current Prime Minister Julia Gillard, let ‘parents vote with their feet’ (as cited in Caro, 2008).

**The marketisation of education**

This latter point, as I shall explain in more detail in Chapter 6, highlights how such accountability measures and consumer preferences in the market become mutually reinforcing through the regulation and facilitation of the market-state (Ranson, 2003: 466) – most prominently through the framework of what has come to be known as ‘Public Choice Theory.’ In brief, public choice theory, according to its chief advocate James Buchanan (2003), presupposes that ‘human interaction depends critically on predictable responses to measurable incentives’ – that is, individual preference maximisation – and so ‘extends the idea of the profit motive from the economic sphere to the sphere of collective action’ (p. 15). Hence, it is assumed that by making performance measurements of schools known, individual students and/or families will respond through their choices in a way that maximises their educational benefits. In turn, schools will be compelled to increase their performance as measured by such scales or else face public censure and possible closure. As neoclassical economist and advocate of public choice in schooling Catherine Hoxby (2003) asserts: ‘The basic logic is that choice would give schools greater incentives to be productive because less productive schools would lose students to more productive schools’ (p. 288).
Religious schools in such a reckoning come to be seen as offering either values that stand alongside but separate from the facts of educational performance, or as nominally ‘value-added’ religious education that supplements the established public purpose, as some scholars analysing the field of religious education have already intimated of similar experiences in the US and UK (e.g. Carnoy, 2000; McPherson, 1993; Morris, 2005; Schagen & Schagen, 2005). Value-adding with regard to religious schools concerns whether the latter adds a positive benefit to the education process, and are concerned with discerning whether, quantitatively, religious schools perform more successfully than other schools in standardised tests or, qualitatively, whether religious schools create a more ‘caring, supportive and well-ordered environment would provide a climate in which teaching and learning would flourish, and that... would lead in turn to high achievement.’ (Schagen & Schagen, 2005, pp. 213-214)

According to a study of Australian private schools by Meadmore and Meadmore (2004), such value-adding takes on increased importance in a competitive market for school choice because: ‘Decisions about the value-addedness of education are central to school selection. Parents are actively engaged in accessing the school market and choosing the right school, as well as supporting their children through the increasingly lengthy schooling process’ (p. 378). Hence schools, in an appeal to potential clients (i.e. students and parents) in the marketplace of schools, are at pains to demonstrate their value-added services in promotional activities: ‘All possibilities are targeted and various angles used as vantage points, ranging from prospective parents to alumni, from commercial sponsorships to endowments, from community
participation to an emphasis on individual achievement’ (Meadmore and Meadmore, 2004, p. 378). With regard to religious schools in particular, Meadmore and Meadmore (2004) point out that the shift toward competition in the market for school choice has seen the repackaging of traditional religious discourses from substantive principles to value-added qualities as ‘selling points’:

In the promotional literature of these [Christian] schools, it is increasingly apparent that seemingly unpopular Christian principles can be taken up for market advantage in new ways. Parents seeking to purchase self-esteem and/or emotional literacy in an educational package can be captured through the judicious articulation of religious rhetoric in which the spiritual and the emotional are closely relational. Paradoxically, at a time when church attendance is steadily declining, Christian values, as promulgated by the schools… are becoming more important as a selling point. (p. 384)

In so (re)defining religious discourse, however, religious schools run the risk of naturalising the hegemonic definitions of ‘religion’ and ‘education’ within the present regime. Such schools (notwithstanding the possible protestations both within and without) are then liable to be concerned less about the development of inquiry and critique within and between particular discursive traditions regarding the appropriate ends of education – what Paul Ricoeur (2004) calls a ‘conflict of interpretations’ – and more about the percentage of students who attain the requisite
results, proceed to prestigious post-school universities and careers, and/or present as an attractive choice according to the demands of the market with reference to each school’s effectiveness in achieving the ends of the present hegemonic discourse on education’s purpose (see Nixon, Walker & Carr, 2004, p. 168). Within this prevailing order of things, then, religious schools may seek leverage by marketing how the values that it inculcates into individual students are at once derived from particular discursive traditions and amenable to ‘performance’ defined by the prevailing neo-liberal regime. ‘In a secular commercial culture,’ Turner (2011) surmises broadly, ‘religious belief and practice is infused with commercial ideas and practices about selling religion and marketing religious institutions’ (p. 150).

This phenomenon can be compared to a movement in the US towards what Michael Apple (2006) describes as ‘conservative modernisation,’ which is a hegemonic project incorporating not only the agenda of neo-liberal politicians who want educational policy to be centered around competitive, contractual exchanges in a market economy, but also includes the articulation of conservative evangelical Christians. The latter are described as seeking to bring their particular ‘values’ on theology, national politics and gender and race relations to bear on segments of the population through the assertion of ‘parental choice’ in the market for schooling. According to Apple (2006), then, it is this conservative religious complement to neo-liberal education policy that draws proponents of religious schooling in the US.

So far, I have conjectured broadly at some of the processes by which religious schools in general may become articulated to politically hegemonic imperatives in Australia in the present time. However, any such articulation between the discourse
of the neo-liberal regime and particular types of religious schooling need to be examined more closely in order to discern how this might occur through specific religious discourses. In other words, how do religious schools that arise from different discursive traditions negotiate and relate to this dominant discourse. And in turn, how does the neo-liberal regime accommodate such schools within the bounds of its Anglo-liberal presuppositions?

In the remaining chapters of this thesis, I shall draw on the NCPC schooling movement as an example of a type of religious private schooling that operates within this contemporary context. This movement is an interesting example because of its passage from an explicitly antagonistic discourse to the then-mainstream education system in Australia in the 1950s to its present status as a growing institutional presence within it. How does NCPC schooling negotiate its simultaneous insistence, on the one hand, of its fidelity to the movement’s unique founding principles that define all education as inherently religious in stark contrast with the Anglo-liberal tradition, and on the other hand function as a schooling movement that is accountable to the standards of the present regime and its marketisation of schooling? Before turning to this question in Chapters 5 and 6, however, it is necessary to provide an account of religious education as understood within the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition and the conditions of its emergence in Australia. This is the concern of the following chapter.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have sought to offer a genealogy of how the Anglo-liberal discursive tradition was extended and developed in Australia after 1788 – in particular in the colony of New South Wales – and particularly how it came to define religious education as consisting of the transmission of belief in a Supernatural Being, Thing or Principle with its associated practices and values/ethics on the one hand, and the governed and standardised delivery of government-approved educational services for the training of desired citizens and workers on the other.

In the first section of this chapter, I registered the politics at the foundation of the education system in NSW and Australia more generally in relation to the Anglo-liberal discursive tradition. In particular, I focused on the establishment of a ‘secular’ schooling system and conversely, the conflict between Roman Catholic discourse and the discourse of the emergent system over the appropriate place of religion in education. The institution of the former over the latter, I argued, can be understood to be an effect of the political rapprochement between Protestant and liberal discourses that gave rise to a historic bloc. While the hegemonic Anglo-liberal tradition presupposed a nominal connection between particular religions and general educational practices, as well as the Protestant definition of religion as primarily a matter of private conviction with a secondary connection to public morality, the former insisted on a definition of religion as intrinsic to educational and social practices. As I have outlined above, the passage from the 1866 Public Schools Act to the 1880 Public Instruction Act in NSW – which distinguished, on the one hand, between a ‘general’ religious education consisting of some Christian practices and morals that were considered secular owing to their generality within the historic bloc, and on the other hand a ‘specific’ religious education based on particular Protestant
traditions – can be understood as an expression of the predominance of Anglo-liberal definitions of religious education buoyed by a fervent politics of anti-Catholicism. For the liberal regime, religious education, if it is to exist must be at once generalisable to the civic needs of the majority and/or confined to specific times (i.e. in the allocated hours after school) and places (i.e. at Churches on Sundays and in the inner life of the individual).

In the following section, I considered how this discursive tradition was developed in the period of nation-building under the hegemony of a social liberal regime, and specifically the place and function of religious education within such a regime. Given the interminable problematic of government in liberal regimes – that is, a constant negotiation between the institution of a market for the expression of individual preferences (i.e. liberal ‘freedom’) and state regulation to facilitate and delimit the operation of the market – social liberalism in Australia from the time of Federation in 1901 to the 1980s can be understood as a series of institutional configurations weighed toward the latter aspect for the sake of a ‘national good.’ Religious education as defined according to the Anglo-liberal discursive tradition thus had to occupy either the public realm by recourse to broadly generalisable ‘values,’ or remain confined to the realm of private devotion. This was especially so after the 1973 Karmel Report and the re-establishment of state funding for religious schools, where the possibility of school autonomy through ‘devolution of responsibility’ was coupled with a ‘responsibility to justify’ school practices in accordance with what were considered the ‘actual tasks of schooling.’ So while so-called ‘independent’ or ‘private’ schools based on particular religious (and non-religious) traditions proliferated in this time, they were simultaneously levelled onto
a simple space of administrative comparison with reference to their contribution to the hegemonically-defined ‘national good.’ Religious particularities in such schools were thus positioned as ‘values’ that were incidental to the ‘fact’ of education (i.e. its practices), which was geared to the training of workers and citizens.

Finally, I critically examined the broad impacts on education of the shift from a social liberal regime to a neo-liberal regime from the 1980s-on, which can be characterised by a shift away from nation-building toward an emphasis explicated in numerous reports on forging a nation populated with skilled worker-citizens for what is presumed to be a globalising world market economy. However, I also made the point that while neo-liberal regimes are often characterised as dogmatically and rhetorically positing free markets, state regulation is still required in order to institute, facilitate, regulate and delimit such markets. The state, which can be labelled the ‘market-state’ owing to its restructured socio-political function, is evident in the proliferation of accountability measures like standardised testing and reporting in order to regulate schools across the nation in alignment with the educational imperatives of the neo-liberal regime. By establishing a simple space of commensurability and comparability between schools on the basis of these measurements – a process that I argued was initiated beginning with the 1973 Karmel Report and culminating in the 1996 abolition of the New Schools Policy – the market-state thus creates the regulatory conditions of possibility for the marketisation of education based on parental choice. The religious elements of religious schooling are thus confined to expressing private ‘values’ apart from the public ‘facts’ of education defined by the hegemonic discourse, and/or function as
‘value-added’ supplements that appeal to the private preferences of parents as consumers in the market for school choice.

In Chapters 5 and 6, I shall address the question of how a particular type of religious education that was initiated as an explicitly antagonistic response to the mainstream educational system in Australia has come to function within and be accommodated by it. Through the case of the NCPC schooling movement, I explore the discursive antecedents and processes through which particular types of religious education may become integrated within the present neo-liberal regime. Before turning to this task, however, it is necessary to provide an account of religious education as it is understood within the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition, how it emerged in Australia and what it claims to be uniquely offering educationally.
Chapter 4 – ‘Christ, who is Sovereign over all’: Religious education in the neo-Calvinist tradition

Oh, no single piece of our mental world is to be hermetically sealed off from the rest, and there is not a square inch in the whole domain of our human existence over which Christ, who is Sovereign over all, does not cry: ‘Mine!’ (Kuyper, 1998[1880], p. 488)

Introduction

The NCPC schooling movement, as mentioned with reference to Maddox (2011) in the introduction, is an overlooked sector in the Australian education market because it has received little attention in scholarly literature. Yet this type of religious schooling is an important case because it simultaneously asserts positions that may appear to be in contrast to the prevailing understanding of religious education and its place in the formation of citizens on the one hand and, on the other, receives funding from the Australian Government as a result of its ability to demonstrate accountability to state-mandated standards and its viability as an option in the schooling market. How, then, does the NCPC schooling movement legitimate itself both to the adherents of the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition that may insist on the former principle and the requirements of the prevailing regime built on the Anglo-liberal tradition? While I shall address this question more specifically in the following chapters, my purpose in this chapter is to first understand the discursive
tradition from which NCPC schools arise in order to discern their unique construal of religious education and how this is negotiated within the Australian context. In doing so, I seek to chart how a religious schooling movement that initially emerged to challenge the ‘commonsense’ of privatised religious education in Australia proliferated and became an institutional feature of the Australian education system.

It is necessary to attend to the task abovementioned because the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition, while representing an adjacent one to the dominant Anglo-liberal tradition (i.e. in being both originally Western European and inaugurated at the Protestant Reformation), has been developed in ways that are not reducible to the latter, much less a generalised notion of religion or religious education. As Asad (1999) points out, the ‘historical elements of what come to be conceptualized as religion have disparate trajectories’ (p. 192). Hence, I argue, it is important when studying a particular type of religious discourse to first seek to understand what it means when it uses particular terms and how its way of interpreting the world has come to be as it is.

Following Asad’s exhortation to attend to the specific historical trajectories of what is categorized as religion today, I explore a discursive tradition of religious education in this chapter that stands adjacent to the dominant Anglo-liberal one: that of NCPC schools from its genealogical antecedents in Calvin’s theo-political vision of social order, to the politics of Dutch neo-Calvinism of van Prinsterer and Kuypers, to Dutch migrants to Australia who inherited this tradition and inaugurated the NCPC schooling movement. I begin by considering the initial similarities and differences between Calvinism and the Protestantism of Luther, especially as it
pertains to the relationship between theology, politics and education. This is followed by an account of how the NCPC schooling movement arose as a consequence of an initial antagonism between the neo-Calvinist tradition and the understanding of religious education in Australia predicated on the Anglo-liberal tradition, an antagonism that was placated by the articulation of neo-Calvinist schools within the broader Australian schooling system. I follow this by outlining key theological themes of NCPC schools today, and how they can be understood as being in continuity with their Calvinist and Dutch neo-Calvinist tradition while being a novel iteration of it in a new context. I conclude by posing the question of how NCPC schooling, with its unique theological convictions and educationally specific ‘foundational values,’ articulates these in the present neo-liberal context.

**Calvin and the sovereignty of God**

According to the historical accounts recorded by education scholar Charles Justins (2002), the neo-Calvinist ‘parent-controlled’ (NCPC) schooling movement in Australia was initiated in the early-1960s by Dutch migrants of a neo-Calvinist tradition. Neo-Calvinism as a type of religious discourse can be traced to a novel iteration of the creeds of the Calvinist tradition (Mouw, 1989), derived from the life and work of the second generation Swiss reformer and ‘preeminent theological systematizer’ (Greengrass, 2008, p. 113) John Calvin. According to Greengrass (2008), ‘Calvin’s overwhelming ambition was to create a single, overarching theological framework that would unite God’s truth and human wisdom’ (p. 113), a framework that was laid out most prominently in his influential 1559 *Institutes of the
Christian Religion. While it is unnecessary to rehearse at length Calvin’s formidable social and theological corpus, it is important to note three interrelated points in the latter’s instructions on the relationship between Christians and their socio-political contexts that are most germane to the eventual development of NCPC schooling vis-à-vis the Anglo-liberal tradition.

Firstly, and akin to the theology of Luther, Calvin built upon the dominant nominalist presuppositions of the Protestant Reformation. Like the former, Calvin stressed the irrational will of God as the primary attribute of divine omnipotence. Unlike Luther, however, he envisaged this will of God to be all-pervasive in the world and not just within the inner-worlds of believers or in certain Protestant territories. According to Tillich (1968, pp. 264-265), Calvin conceived of a general operation of God in preserving and governing the world, so that everything that exists depends on divine movement. This is known as the doctrine of ‘providence,’ whereby: ‘God is the world’s perpetual preserver, not by a certain universal action actuating the whole machine of the world and all its respective parts, but by a particular providence sustaining, nourishing, and providing for everything he has made’ (as cited in Tillich, 1968, p. 265). The whole world, to summarise the foundational basis of Calvin’s framework, is a ‘theatre erected for displaying the glory of God’ (Calvin, 2008[1559], I, sec. 5.5).

Yet unlike the discourse of natural law advanced by medieval scholasticism whereby all human practices aiming toward a good in the material and finite world are seen to participate in the divine, Calvin maintains the nominalist understanding of God and the good as utterly beyond human effort. ‘For what the schoolmen advance
concerning the priority of charity to faith and hope,’ he argues, ‘is a mere reverie of a
distempered imagination’ (Calvin, 2008[1559], III, sec. 2.41). Hence for Calvin, all
things in the world have a merely instrumental character at the hand of divine
omnipotence: ‘Things are used as instruments of God’s acting, according to his
pleasure.’ (Tillich, 1968, p. 265) This notion of the instrumentality of the world and
things also brings up a key point of contrast with Luther, for whom all worldly
practices are in vain insofar as the inner faith is sufficient for attaining God’s grace.
For on the one hand, Calvin too believed – if not more so – in the futility of human
effort in attaining to anything good let alone the divine, arguing that: ‘All we assign
to man is that, by his impurity he pollutes and contaminates the very works which
were good’ (Calvin, 2008[1559], III, sec. 15.3). Yet on the other hand, there is an
increased emphasis in Calvin on the importance of moral effort in the world. This is
so not because of some good innate to the practices or things, but because in doing so
the Christian demonstrates outwardly that they are amongst those who acknowledge
the supremacy of God in the world:

[I]n all our cares, toils, annoyances and other burdens, it will be no
small alleviation to know that all these are under the
superintendence of God. The magistrate will more willingly
perform his office, and the father of the family confine himself to
his proper sphere. Every one in his particular mode of life will,
without refining, suffer its inconveniences, cares, uneasiness, and
anxiety, persuaded that God has laid on the burden. (Calvin,
2008[1559], III, sec. 10.6)
This novel understanding of worldly practice combined with a nominalistic understanding of divine omnipotence thus drives an apparent ‘necessity of unceasing human effort’ and ‘the development of a frantic activity and a striving to do something’ (Fromm, 1969, p. 110) amongst certain adherents of Calvin’s theology (see also Weber, 2002, pp. 32-33). So while in Protestantism under Luther there was a formal separation between the ‘Two Kingdoms’ corresponding in practice to a division between an outer-world of practices and politics and an inner-life of religion, for Calvin this was dissolved insofar as the sovereignty of God and his glorification affects all things. Yet it is important to re-emphasise that for Calvinism, the relationship between religion and practice presupposes a nominal relationship between them; for all subjects and objects in the world are merely instruments through which an utterly powerful God works in every moment (Tillich, 1968, p. 265). As Marcuse (2008[1972], p. 24) points out, this novel synthesis of religion and practice manifests itself in the political realism and pragmatism of Calvin’s followers, particularly in the concept of an ‘occupation as a vocation’ and Calvin’s extensive and intensive theo-political prescriptions for government that is appropriate to the sovereignty of God.

This brings up the second key point in Calvin’s teachings that have persistent influence on NCPC schooling: his approach to government. Akin to Luther, Calvin also distinguishes between two jurisdictions that he considered ‘things completely distinct’: i.e. ‘Christ’s spiritual Kingdom’ on the one hand and ‘the world’ and its ‘authorities’ on the other (Calvin, 2008[1559], IV, sec. 20.22; Marcuse, 2008[1972], p. 23). However, unlike Luther, Calvin insists that though distinct they ‘are not at
variance’ and do not represent ‘Two Kingdoms.’ For the latter, the distinction is merely functional because God is ultimately sovereign over all the world; while for Luther (1962[1523], p. 91) civil authorities are necessary as a means of controlling evil given that ‘the whole world is evil and that among thousands there is scarcely a single true Christian,’ for Calvin (2008[1559]) even that which is apparently evil is an instrument of divine will insofar as God ‘fulfils his righteous will by the wicked wills of men’ (I, sec. 28.3). Regarding this, Tillich (1968, p. 266) explains that:

Such statements which seem to make God the cause of evil are only understandable in the light of Calvin’s idea that the world is the ‘theatre of the divine glory.’ God shows his glory in the scene we call the world. In order to do this, he causes evil, even moral evil. Calvin said that to think that God permits evil because of freedom is frivolous, because God acts in everything that goes on; the evil man follows the will of God although he does not follow [God’s] command.

So while Calvin also sees the necessity of state coercion as a means of attenuating evil arising from the sinfulness of human beings (Calvin, 2008[1559], IV, sec. 20.31), he posits that the state too is subordinate to God’s sovereignty. This formulation presents a unique ‘theo-political’ synthesis, for while the ‘outer’ civil authorities are a God-ordained magistracy of a different order to the ‘inner’ government of the soul by the church, the former ‘has as its appointed end to cherish and protect the outward worship of God, to defend sound doctrine of piety and the
position of the church, to adjust our life to the society of men [sic]… and to promote
general peace and tranquility’ (Calvin, 2008[1559], IV, sec. 20.22). In addition,
Calvin’s prescriptions for civil government differ markedly from Luther’s notion of
‘law around the sacred’ (ius circa sacram). While for Luther civil authorities have
jurisdiction over all matters except the religious, for Calvin (2008[1559]) it ‘prevents
idolatry, sacrilege against God’s name, blasphemies against His truth, and other
public offenses against religion’ (Institutes, IV, sec. 20.22). It can thus be supposed
that Calvin does not conceive of the social order as constituted by Two Kingdoms
like Luther but one; the role of Christians is to submit to the state, which in turn has
been entrusted to enforce God’s laws, for ‘authority over all things on earth is in the
hands of kings and other rulers [by] divine providence and holy ordinance’ (Calvin,
2008[1559], IV, sec. 20.20; see also IV, sec. 20.22). This direct ordination of the
system of worldly authorities by God, when combined with the nominalist and
Calvinist concept of God as an absolutely inscrutable ‘sovereign,’ has the effect of
increasing the power of civil authorities (Marcuse, 2008[1972], p. 26). In fact,
‘[Calvin] goes so far as to argue that revelation is the basis of temporal law!’ (Boer,
2009, p. 10)

It is useful to place Calvin’s theo-political vision of societal order in the socio-
political context of Calvin’s discursive production – that is, the theocratic city-state
of Geneva in the sixteenth century; for ‘the Reformed church established there by
Calvin was not a church of voluntary membership, but a city-state church, [thus]
Calvin accepted that the church needed the support of the secular arm in order to
enforce discipline.’ (Lotz-Heumann, 2008, p. 254; also Benedict, 2004, pp. 460-489)
Therefore, Calvin’s theo-political vision of social order, based as it is on the
pragmatics of both religion and government, eschews a sharp division between temporal and spiritual realms; thus ‘more than the Lutheran does the Calvinist feel himself [sic] to be placed in the midst of life and the world with a positive God-given task with regard to material and spiritual culture, and with regard to social and political life’ (van de Pol, 1964, p. 149; also Marcuse, 2008[1972], pp. 27-28; Weber, 2002[1905]).

However, it is here that a peculiar paradox is latent in Calvin’s theocratic conception of civil authority. For while his discourse on the ‘sovereignty of God’ over all aspects of life is emphatic in its insistence on the obedience due to civil authority ‘since their [i.e. rulers’] power is from God’ (Calvin, 2008[1559], IV, sec. 20.22), Calvin (2008[1559]) allows an exception: penultimate obedience to temporal authorities must not be allowed to interfere with ultimate obedience to God:

…but that obedience [to authorities] is never to lead us away from obedience to Him [i.e. God], to whose will the desires of all kings ought to be subject, to whose decrees all their commands ought to yield, to whose majesty their sceptres ought to be submitted. And, indeed, how preposterous were it, in pleasing men [sic], to incur the offence of Him for whose sake you obey men! The Lord, therefore, is King of kings. When He opens His sacred mouth, He alone is to be heard, instead of all and above all. We are subject to the men who rule over us, but subject only in the Lord. (IV, sec. 20.32)
Thus, while Calvin’s discourse predominantly legitimates the office of civil authorities and the duty of submission to them, he does not foreclose, as does Protestantism after Luther, the possibility of or justification for disobedience and indeed revolt against an officiating authority that is perceived to be violating God’s law (Boer, 2009, 2009a; Hall, 2003; Marcuse, 2008[1972], p. 25; van Gelderen, 1992, pp. 266-269). Thus, while all worldly power was understood by Calvin to be a ‘derivative right’ insofar as ‘authority is a jurisdiction as it were delegated from God,’ insofar as ‘obedience to the officiating authority leads to transgression of [God’s] law, this authority loses its right to obedience’ (Marcuse, 2008[1972], pp. 26, 25; see also Troeltsch, 1992[1931], pp. 616-629).

The last of Calvin’s instructions of relevance here deals with the religious education of children. Calvin (2008[1559], II, sec. 8.49; also IV, sec. 19.13) held that ‘Godly’ parents were expected to nurture their children physically and spiritually, which included strict discipline including corporal punishments such as beating in moderation. Calvin like Luther placed significant importance on learning beginning at a young age so as not to ‘leave the Church a desert for [the] children’ (as cited in Morrison, 2001). In addition to theological application, Calvin’s emphasis on parenting and childrearing within families can also be seen as a pragmatic political move to secure a comprehensive social order structured by a clear hierarchy of authority and predicated on the sovereignty of God:

It was firstly a necessary consequence of the toppling of the Catholic hierarchy; with the collapse of the (personal and
instrumental) mediations it had set up between the individual and God, the responsibility for the salvation of the souls of those not yet responsible for themselves, and for their preparation for the Christian life, fell back on the family and on its head, who was almost given a priestly consecration. On the other hand, since authority of the temporal rulers was tied directly to the authority of the *pater familias* (all temporal rulers, all ‘lords’ became ‘fathers’), their authority was consolidated in a very particular direction. The subordination of the individual to the temporal ruler appears just as ‘natural,’ obvious, and ‘eternal’ as subordination to the authority of the father in meant to be, both deriving from the same divinely ordained source (Marcuse, 2008[1972], p. 30).

In addition to reinforcing the patriarchal family, Calvin also reorganized the existing elementary schools in Geneva – the *schola privata* and *schola publica* – for wider access to children, stressing disciplined behavior, cleanliness and promptness while teachers were elevated to one of the four divinely ordained orders of office in the church (Sundquist, 1990, p. 94). Like Luther in curricular matters, Calvin was convinced that for every person to be ‘adequately equipped to ‘rightly divide’ God’s Word, he or she had to be educated in language and the humanities. To that end he founded an academy for Geneva’s children, believing that all education must be fundamentally religious’ (Armstrong, 1992).
In sum, three points of Calvin’s theo-political vision have been most influential in the development of the NCPC schooling movement. Firstly, building upon the nominalist notion of God as an inscrutable force, Calvin envisaged the sovereignty of God to be all-pervasive in the world and not just within the inner-worlds of believers as with Protestantism under Luther. However, this expansive view of the power of God in the world – which is known as the doctrine of ‘providence’ – stands in contrast to the Scholastic notion of goodness and divinity being immanent to particular practices and the world at large. For Calvin all practices and things in the world have an instrumental character for the sake of demonstrating God’s utterly transcendent sovereignty, and hence it is incumbent upon Christians to work in the world in order to demonstrate their cognizance of this. This basis gives rise to the second and third key points in Calvin’s theo-political corpus that is of relevance to the development of NCPC schooling: that is, the sovereignty of God over civil authorities and the family. With regards to these, Calvin conceptualizes all such authority to be bestowed upon by God for God’s purposes. In the case of civil authorities then, Calvin envisages government to be functional insofar as it is an instrument of God that carries out what is required to sustain social order and punish offences against religion. For this reason, Christians are obliged to obey government authorities as a norm. However, he also considers the authority of government to be derivative. So in the event of an antagonism between God’s rule and the rule of civil authorities, the former takes precedence and the Christian is obliged to resist the latter. Likewise in the sphere of the family, Calvin frames parents also as derivative authorities instituted by God with the expectation that they will nurture their children in a manner congruent with this conception of the sovereignty of God. The development of these three points of Calvin’s theo-political discourse can be
discerned in the discourse of the NCPC schooling movement, which can be understood to align itself firmly within the Calvinist tradition via its novel reconfiguration in the Dutch Reformed Church, or what is called ‘neo-Calvinism.’

**Neo-Calvinism and sphere sovereignty**

Neo-Calvinism emerged in the context of the resurgence of interest in Calvinistic Christianity in the Netherlands in the mid-to-late nineteenth century (Bartholomew, 2004). The peculiarity of this ‘revival’ of interest was not merely its sociological attributes insofar as large numbers of professing Christians ‘placed great emphasis on God’s work with the soul’ and on ‘personal knowledge of belonging to those ‘who are known by God’’ (van de Pol, 1964, p. 182; also Bartholomew, 2004; McGoldrick, 2000). More significantly, it was also a unique iteration of Calvinism that attempted to push the focus of faith further from the private sphere and into ‘a vigorous social movement intent on proclaiming and advancing the Lordship of Jesus Christ over all of life’ (Bartholomew, 2004). Wolters (1983) describes members of the movement as cognisant that ‘their views were a development, not simply a restatement, of the classical Calvinism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries’ (p. 5). In fact, the label ‘neo-Calvinism’ was, according to Naugle (2001), originally coined by Kuyper’s opponents, ‘but was eventually accepted by him and his followers since it suggested that their views were not simply a restatement of the reformer’s original convictions, but were a positive and progressive development of them’ (n25).
By contrast to their North Atlantic Calvinist counterparts, who adopted a more ‘Puritan’ emphasis on personal piety and a ‘Christian experience and… corporate revival based upon the preaching of the Bible and wrought by the Holy Spirit’ (Kapic & Gleason, 2004, p. 32; also Packer, 1994), these continental Calvinists insisted that Christianity must be understood as ‘world-formative’ (Wolterstorff, 1983). In other words, while both forms of Calvinism ‘recognise the presence of that which is inferior or evil in human society, the difference [is] that otherworldly Christianity turns away from this world to seek something better outside of it, while world-formative Christianity seeks to transform society to better it’ (Gousmett, 1991, p. 3).

Out of this theological ferment emerged the Dutch ‘Anti-Revolutionary Party’ (Dutch: Anti-Revolutionaire Partij [ARP]) – a political organisation vehemently opposed to the liberal-enlightenment underpinnings of the 1789 French Revolution – and its leading politicians Guillame Groen van Prinsterer and his successor Abraham Kuyper, whose work formed the theological basis of NCPC schools. Van Prinsterer was an overtly devout Calvinist statesman and historian who founded the ARP and who tried in the decades after the great liberal breakthrough to transform the ‘spiritual-cultural conservatism’ of the neo-Calvinist movement into an anti-liberal political conservatism (von der Dunk, 1978, p. 746). One of the key anti-liberal struggles of van Prinsterer was in the debate over schooling. He argued that the state, having been separated from the church, could not govern education according to its own discretion and insight without destructive ends (Justins, 2002, p. 37). Particularly for van Prinsterer, the liberal state as such should be regarded as what Calvin deemed an ‘ungodly ruler’ and thus had no claim on parents who regard the
education provided by state-run schools to be contrary to Christian faith. To compel them, he argued, is tantamount to coercion:

Parents who, with or without sufficient grounds, are convinced that the direction of education in existing schools is un-Christian, must not be prevented from giving their children such education, directly or indirectly, for which they believe they can give account to God. Coercion – I say it openly – is unbearable and ought to be ended. It is a presumption originating with theories of the revolution that holds that children are considered to be the property of the state, disregarding the rights of parents (as cited in van Brummelen, 1986, p. 23; see also Justins, 2002, p. 37).

Further, van Prinsterer maintained that where state-run schooling was imposed on the people without regard to their religious convictions, then the people were to be considered ‘oppressed’ because despite its claims to neutrality, such education was ‘religionless education… forced upon a Christian nation’ (quoted in Van Essen and Morton, 1990, p. 84; see also Justins, 2002: 37). However despite his pioneering articulation of neo-Calvinism into a political party, the movement did not achieve wide influence until van Prinster found in Kuyper an articulate and ideologically compatible successor (Rodgers, 1992).
Kuyper is particularly influential in the NCPC schooling movement. As a clergyman, former Prime Minister of the Netherlands (1901-1905), a respected theorist of political philosophy, and founder of the Free University of Amsterdam, it was Kuyper’s unique and systematic early twentieth-century re-articulation of the Calvinist tradition that has remained persuasive in the stated vision and mission of the NCPC schools (Naugle, 2001; Justins, 2002, pp. 38-40; Edlin and Thompson, 2006). In particular, Kuyper opposed pietist forms of Christianity that, like Luther, separated the ‘inner’ from ‘outer’ person, soul from body, and existence in the world from heaven. In an 1898 lecture entitled ‘Calvinism as a Life System,’ for example, Kuyper (2007[1931], p. 22) drew a sharp distinction between what he saw as Lutheran Protestantism’s overriding concern with soteriology (i.e. how faith justifies individuals before an inscrutable God) and Calvinism, which he interprets as being a total form of life predicated on ‘the general cosmological principle of the sovereignty of God.’

Developing Calvin’s insistence on the sovereignty of God, Kuyper (2007[1931]) put forward a political vision for neo-Calvinism with what he held to be its universal implications: ‘[That] the Sovereignty of God holds good for all the world, is true for all nations, and is of force in all authority which man [sic] exercises over man; even the authority which parents possess over children’ (p. 85). Thus, asserted Kuyper, the omnipotence of God had normative implications over all aspects of reality, life, thought, and culture (Naugle, 2001). This social and theological vision is crystallised in his assertion, often quoted in writings and documents of the NCPC schooling movement: ‘there is not a square inch in the whole domain of our human existence over which Christ, who is Sovereign over all,
does not cry: ‘Mine!’” (Kuyper, 1998, p. 488) On this basis, then, Kuyper developed an expansive vision encompassing politics, art, families, commerce, intellectual life and the entire social order more generally, a vision crystallized in his conception of sphere sovereignty, which would come to be extremely influential in the NCPC schooling movement.

For Kuyper, sphere sovereignty is effective in three distinct areas under which all human life fell: the state, society and the church. With regard to the first, Kuyper (2007[1931]) argued in line with Calvin that the authority of the state was derivative, for ‘all authority of governments on earth originates from the sovereignty of God alone’ (p. 82). Hence, the state is delegated sovereignty over the sphere of human coexistence merely in order to umpire the relations between its members and not as an authority unto itself – whether by popular or state sovereignty24 – but merely as an instrument of God’s providence (Kuyper, 2007[1931], p. 83; cf. Budziszewski, 2006, p. 58). However, given its delegated sovereign status, every other sphere ‘has an obligation to render whatever dues necessary for the maintenance of the overall unity of society as protected by the State’ (Kuyper, 2007[1931], p. 125). As education scholar Robert Long (1996, p. 22) points out rightly in his work on ‘new Christian

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24 Kuyper lambasts both the ‘atheistic’ French theory of popular sovereignty and the ‘pantheistic’ German theory of state sovereignty, which he argues may seem apparently opposed but are “at heart identical” in rejecting the sovereignty of God (Kuyper, 2007[1931], pp. 85, 90; cf. Budziszewski, 2006, p. 57).
schools’ in Australia – what he calls ‘themelic’25 (i.e. ‘Christ-centred’) schools – the notion of sphere sovereignty means that:

[R]eformed [i.e. neo-Calvinist] schools tend to be able to associate more readily with other government schools and government directives. They are able to perceive the truth and good present in the government system in general more than schools that are driven by a theological dynamic which understands the state as the Antichrist.

Paralleling the delegated sovereignty to the state, God according to Kuyper (2007[1931], p. 90) has also delegated sovereignty to society, which he takes to be made up of smaller ‘sub-spheres’ of social life, each of which is understood to be sovereign over its own domain. These sub-spheres are categorized by Kuyper into four groups (Hexham, 1983): firstly, the sphere of social relationships, which describes the relational space of interaction between individuals; secondly, the corporate sphere, in which he includes all groupings of people in a corporate sense such as the university, trade unions, employers, organizations, companies, unions, etc.; thirdly, the domestic sphere, which encompasses family issues and includes

25 The term ‘themelic’ derives from the Koine (i.e. New Testament) Greek word themelios, which in its New Testament usage denotes foundations, beginnings or first principals, usually referring to an institution or system of truth (Thayer, 1977). When referring to schools, it follows the work of Long (1996, p. 2), who groups new Christian schools in Australia into the category of ‘themelic schools’ based upon their use of the term ‘Christ-centred’ as a marker of distinction from other Christian schools which are either Catholic, Protestant denominational or ecumenical. For the purposes of this thesis, I do not use the category of themelic schools because this term covers disparate Christian schools in the post-Karmel report era from movements such as the Christian Community Schools, Christian Schools Australia, Accelerated Christian Education, neo-Calvinist ‘parent-controlled’ schools and other independent Christian schools, it is not sufficiently precise for conducting a genealogy of a given movement as stemming from a particular discursive tradition.
marriage, education of children and private property; and finally, the communal
sphere, which includes all spaces of a communal nature like streets, villages, towns,
cities, etc. Each of these spheres, Kuyper argues, has its own pattern of development
and individual laws over which the sovereign God has delegated sovereignty and the
state has no power to alter (Hexham, 1983). This has tremendous implications for
how neo-Calvinists approach the state, as Budziszewski (2006, p. 58) points out,
insofar as the latter cannot extend or rule over an area of life demarcated by Kuyper
as a sovereign sphere or sub-sphere. The state, asserts Kuyper (2007[1931]), ‘[must]
never become an octopus, [but must] honor and maintain every form of life which
grows independently in its own sacred autonomy’ (pp. 96-97). Hence, as Long
(1997) again rightly points out on contemporary NCPC schooling (as part of his
broader category of themelic schools): ‘Management in themelic schools is parent-
centred. Themelic schools emphasise the biblical role of the parents as the primary
educators of their children’ (p. 29), notwithstanding what he argues to be ‘the lack of
definition of what is meant by ‘parent-controlled’’ (p. 30).

Finally, where Kuyper (2008[1931]) diverges most prominently from the
instructions of Calvin is in the third sphere of the church; for while the latter
legitimated the intervention of civil authorities into matters of religion, the former
declares that the modern state ‘lacks the data of judgment’ to intervene on religious
matters, and hence any such intervention ‘infringes the sovereignty of the church’ (p.
105). It is important at this point, however, to be cognisant that the neo-Calvinist
notion of sphere sovereignty does not correspond with the Anglo-liberal tradition’s
division between religion in the private sphere contra secular political practices in
the public sphere. For Kuyper’s conception of sphere sovereignty, it must be
recalled, is predicated on a prior, absolute vision of the sovereignty of God over all things.

This expansive socio-political vision was a formative influence for the generation of Dutch neo-Calvinist migrants to Australia, who drew upon Kuyper as their primary resource in thinking about education and the religious rationale behind it. According to Deenick, a pioneer of the NCPC schooling movement in Australia, Kuyper’s views were prevalent and influential in its establishment:

Kuyper’s perspective was part and parcel of your whole being …. the worldview was Kuyperian, and you never questioned that - the Christian newspaper, the Christian trade-union, the Christian political party etc, you never questioned that that was the way it should be, … The issue straight away was how to bring faith in the Lord Jesus Christ, and the teachings of the Word of God to permeate through the whole of the curriculum (as cited in Justins, 2002, p. 41).

**Neo-Calvinist ‘parent-controlled’ schools in Australia**

Justins (2002, p. 40) and Fowler (1976, p. 8) point out that the Dutch migrants to Australia of the 1950s held values and attitudes toward schooling that were shaped not only by the struggle for neo-Calvinist schooling in the Netherlands initiated by van Prinsterer and Kuyper, but also by a firmly neo-Calvinist discourse from the
Reformed (Calvinist) Churches in Australia which had promoted and sustained this struggle. The impetus for the establishment of NCPC schools began because its Dutch migrant founders, having experienced neo-Calvinist schooling communities in the Netherlands, wanted the same for their children (Christian Parent Controlled Schools [CPCS], 1992, p. 2). In addition, they felt that their neo-Calvinist convictions – in particular the anti-liberal sentiments of van Prinsterer and the totalizing theological and social vision of Kuyper – conflicted with both the institutional form and curricular content of Australian schools undergirded by the Anglo-liberal tradition. According to Hoekzema, a pioneer of the movement:

Some Dutch migrants of Reformed persuasion arrived in this country in the early fifties and woke to the fact that something they had always taken for granted, a Christian school, was not available, non-existent. This was quite baffling for a supposedly Christian country and mind you, these migrants’ grandparents had won the battle for equality of education only forty years before. … They realised they would need to establish Christian schools because on arrival, choosing a school for their children was taken right out of their hands. There was only the state school and from the reactions of the children, it was soon evident there was conflict between the home and the school. … At home they spoke of God the creator, at school it was the Darwinian theory. Sure there were some lovely Scripture lessons, but this very method would lead the children to believe that God
and religion was something separate and had little or nothing
to do with real life. After all, are we not to acknowledge God
in all things? … Frustrated by the lack of control over the
education of their children and the means to effect any
change, they started doing something (as cited in Justins,

Of particular note in the passage above is the neo-Calvinist rejection of the
Anglo-liberal tradition’s definition of religious education as belonging to the private
sphere separate from educational practices – that is, one that presupposes the
Protestant confinement of religion to the private convictions of the individual quite
apart from public education. This antagonistic relation to the prevailing schooling
system also coalesced with a lack of affordable options for confessional Protestants
in Australia. Unlike the families of students that attended more affluent and
established church (i.e. mainly Anglican) grammar schools, Justins (2002, p. 61),
following Van Zetten and Deenick (1991), suggests that the Dutch immigrants drew
from the lower middle classes and the upper lower classes. In addition, there was a
perception that the option of either a state-run or a church-based schooling violated
the Kuyperian notion of sphere sovereignty. In particular, as Justins (2002, p. 45)
depicts it, there was a direct relationship between this concept of sphere sovereignty
and the perspective of the Dutch migrants that education was a responsibility given
to parents by God and should not therefore be left to other agencies such as the
government or the church. This is exemplified in a study book that was widely
circulated amongst neo-Calvinist youth in the 1960s, which stated that:
The school is a sphere of life which has for its purpose the bringing to development of all the functions of the child. [...] No school ought to be ecclesiastical. The Church does not have as its task the developing of all the functions of a child by means of generally formative instruction. [...] We decidedly reject a church-school… but urge a broad basis of cooperation among all who recognise Christ as King. [...] The State can never act as educator because it must be neutral [...] The State may not play the schoolmaster any more than the Church (De Jongste & Krimpen as cited in Justins, 2002, pp. 44-45).

It was this sense of alienation from the prevailing education system, as well as the strong Kuyperian sensibility that children should be formed as ‘Christians [who] should be concerned with and involved in all aspects of life, including politics, trade-unions and newspapers’ (Justins, 2002, p. 41), that gave rise to the movement in Australia.

Understood schematically therefore, the pioneers of the movement can be broadly understood as embodying a tradition that interpreted the then-prevailing system of schooling –predicated on a division between private religion and public education – as antagonistic to its vision of ‘God in all things’ and a threat to their God-given responsibilities for their children. Insofar as a radical disjunction and
inadequacy was understood through the neo-Calvinist lens of the Dutch migrants within their newfound situation in Australia, then the birth of the NCPC schooling movement can be seen as a novel iteration of the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition in response to the then-prevailing social liberal order built upon an Anglo-liberal tradition.

In response to this circumstance, the first association for Christian ‘parent-controlled’ schools in Australia was formed in Kingston and Hobart (Tasmania) in 1953, which eventually led to the establishment of Calvin Christian School in 1962. The first association was followed by other associations in the mid-1950s in Mount Evelyn (Victoria) and Wollongong (NSW) in 1954, and in Blacktown (NSW), Brisbane (Queensland) and Perth (Western Australia) in 1957 (Justins, 2002, p. 92; also Long, 1994). In January of 1966, the National Union of Associations for Parent Controlled Christian Schools (NUPCCS) network was formed by representatives from the first NCPC schools and associations across Australia who intended to establish similar schools in other parts of the country. At its inauguration, pioneer Deenick reaffirmed the distinctive neo-Calvinist tradition that necessitated the establishment of the NCPC schooling movement. He did so by emphasizing that education for their children should be an expansive Christian education that beyond a mere inner belief is also marked by a view for what this means for all for ‘life’ and ‘culture’:

It is for this and for no other purpose that we establish our Christian day school movement. Education ought to be
Christian education, ought to acknowledge the Cross and the Crown of Jesus Christ, and ought to prepare for his return, so that generations come and go, but the church remains and Christian service and Christian life and Christian culture and Christian learning remain (Deenick, 1966).

Under the NUPCCS, two further schools were established in the 1960s and, coinciding with the extension of Federal Government education funding to community and religious schools after the 1973 Karmel Report (see Chapter 3; also Long, 1996a, p. 21), the NCPC schooling movement established five schools in the 1970s and five in the early-1980s through independent associations under its banner (Justins, 2002, p. 26; Justins, d’Arbon & Sanber, 2002). In 1988, the movement changed its name from Parent Controlled Christian Schools to Christian Parent Controlled Schools (CPCS) and established a national office to ‘represent Christian schooling at government level and to co-ordinate curricular, organizational and training initiatives’ (CPCS, 1992: 2). The organisation retained its name and structure until it rebranded itself as Christian Education National (CEN) in 2008 (CEN, 2011). At the time of writing, the movement encompassed an Australia-wide grouping of 53 member associations that together govern over 80 schools of approximately 23,000 students and 2,000 teaching staff (CEN, 2011; see Figure 15). They have become, according to Justins et al (2002):

...an increasingly significant component of the non-government, non-Catholic schooling sector in Australia. They
have experienced rapid growth in the forty years of their existence... These schools have frequently asserted that they promote explicitly Christian values. They tend to be non-elitist and are widely accessible through their low fee paying policies.

Figure 15: Locations of CEN member schools in Australia (CEN, 2010)

Theological underpinnings and foundational values of neo-Calvinist ‘parent-controlled’ schools

If a distinguishing feature of contemporary NCPC schools is their frequent assertion of ‘explicitly Christian values’ as Justins et al (2002) illustrate, or insist on
the self-description of their schooling as being ‘truly Christian,’ ‘really Christian,’ or ‘fully Christian’ as Long (1996, p. 9) reports, then it is necessary to provide an outline of what these might consist of in order to discern how such schooling interacts with the present, neo-liberal regime. As detailed above, the genealogy of this discursive tradition can be discerned from aspects of Calvin’s conception of social order, through its iteration and development in the neo-Calvinism of van Prinsterer and Kuyper, to the impact of the latter statesmen on the dispositions to and expectations of education amongst post-war Dutch Calvinist migrants in Australia, and who in turn pioneered the establishment of the NCPC schooling movement and its schools. Justins (2002) discerns two levels of ‘Christian values’ expressed by NCPC schools: at one level are the ‘foundational values’ of NCPC schools that are focused specifically on schooling while undergirding these are a set of common neo-Calvinist ‘theological motifs’ that, although encompassing a wider scope than education, continue to be operative ‘below’ the ‘foundational values’ of the geographically and demographically disparate schools (pp. 245-247; also Justins et al, 2002). I shall first outline the theological motifs of the contemporary NCPC schooling movement with regard to the broader neo-Calvinist discursive tradition, offering a sketch of how as a particular iteration it may differ from the antagonistic position adopted at its inception. This will be followed by an outline of two key foundational values that are seen by the NCPC schooling movement to be a key reflection of their fidelity to their tradition in the present conjuncture.

The socio-political context around contemporary NCPC schooling is different from that which it confronted at the time of its inception in post-war Australia. With the passage of time, numerical growth, demographic changes and a shift to a neo-
liberal regime (with accompanying changes in the educational policy environment) now constituting the present, the question thus arises as to what tendencies might characterise its task today. In order to discern how the NCPC schooling movement understands its continuity with the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition, I shall draw primarily from statements announced by the movement to address this new situation and subsequently published as the *Transforming Christian Education* (Christian Parent Controlled Schools [CPCS], 1992) document, which was jointly written and produced by twenty-four of the NCPC schooling movement’s key pioneers and emerging ‘new pioneers’ to mark thirty years since the opening of the first of their schools, as well as the circumstance whereby the ‘first generation of Christian parent controlled schooling is passing’ (CPCS, 1992, p. 3). In explicating the constituent elements of what the NCPC schooling movement considers as the basics of a ‘Christian World View,’ the document sums up its theological position concisely in a paragraph:

> Christian view of the world finds its foundation in the character and activity of God evident in the world He has made, perfectly expressed in Jesus, God’s Son, and communicated reliably in the Bible. The Scriptures tell who God is. They proclaim His creative and redemptive activity in the world which is the work of His hands. The Scriptures tell who we are and proclaim God’s calling to all human kind to be His People in His World (CPCS, 1992, p. 4).
I shall presently unpack this paragraph, written in language specific to neo-Calvinist theology, into three distinct themes that emerge and what it might mean for the movement’s approaches to its project of ‘ongoing reclamation of this most vital sphere of education’ (CPCS, 1992, p. 3). In addition to the *Transforming Christian Education* document, I shall also explore the articulation and development of such themes as expressed in supplementary writings by the academic proponents, principals, teachers and parents of the movement since that time, especially as it is contained in their two key publications – *Pointing the Way: Directions for Christian education in a new millennium* (2004) and *Engaging the culture: Christians at work in education* (2006), and two periodicals – *Nurture: Journal for Home & School* and *The Christian Teachers Journal* – which are widely circulated in the movement.\(^{26}\)

Firstly, in describing its Christian view of the world as finding ‘its foundation in the character and activity of God evident in the world He has made, perfectly expressed in Jesus, God’s Son,’ the NCPC schooling movement is affirming a perspective known as the ‘Biblical worldview.’ According to Richard Edlin (2004), a former principal of the teacher education arm of the NCPC movement – the National Institute for Christian Education (NICE), this theme is expressed in the insistence that: ‘Education is never neutral. Christian education must ensure that students learn about the world and their places and tasks in it from a biblical worldview’ (p. 2).

\(^{26}\) According to CEN (2011), *Nurture* is mainly targeted to families and the wider community. ‘The attractive page format features issues relevant to both home and school and shares news among school communities. Many schools subscribe on behalf of all school families so that it forms a part of their community building and education program. Some schools distribute copies to local churches, doctors’ surgeries and hairdressers, where a range of people can read about Christian education.’ *The Christian Teachers Journal*, on the other hand, is a professional journal targeted at teachers, academics and administrators within the movement. It is ‘published quarterly by Christian Education National through the National Institute for Christian Education. It is published by teachers and for teachers as a forum for the exchange of ideas and practices to advance the cause of Christ centred education.’
This notion of Biblical worldview stems from the discursive tradition of neo-Calvinism, which holds that the Bible in its entirety is an ‘unfolding narrative,’ consisting in a ‘comprehensive and integrated understanding of creation, fall and redemption’ (Bartholomew, 2004).

More specifically, according to an article in *The Christian Teachers Journal* by Koyzis (2006), *creation* in the first place refers to how ‘the biblical story begins [when] God created the heaven and the earth (Genesis 1:1). We further learn from scripture that God created everything after its own kind (Genesis 1:11, 12, 21, 24, 25)’; secondly, *fall* denotes a moment when ‘Sin enters the picture when God’s image bearers rebel against the patterns of obedient living he has ordained for them in that creation,’ which are exemplified by ‘failing to follow such commandments as marital fidelity, respect for life and property, speaking truthfully and so forth’; and finally, *redemption* referring to ‘redemption in Jesus Christ, renewal in the Holy Spirit and the consummation of God’s kingdom,’ which ‘does not remove us from God’s creation; it restores it to its intended purpose, including the pluriformity of communities that make up human society […] its proper task of doing justice […] uniting spouses and generating new life [i.e. procreation], [and] restore the educational enterprise to its designated task of teaching students to live and work obediently in God’s world’ (p. 16). The importance of this threefold ‘Biblical Worldview’ theme for NCPC schools sets them, at least in theory, apart from the division of religious education from non-religious education in the Anglo-liberal tradition. This is a point underscored in Edlin’s (2004) assertion that:
A sound grasp of this worldview should be a basic tool in every Christian teacher’s intellectual toolkit. It must be used to shape the Christian school’s view of the child. It will give foundational insight into curriculum construction. It will guide school and classroom relationships (p. 7).

Given the weight placed on a ‘Biblical worldview,’ the second theme – centrality of the Bible – emerge as a necessary corollary insofar as the former is predicated on being ‘communicated reliably in the Bible [because the] Scriptures tell who God is.’ According to Edlin (2004), this theme affirms that: ‘The Bible, God’s written word, has the pre-eminent place in the life of the Christian. Divinely inspired and inerrant in original form, it is authoritative for all of life, including the life of the Christian school’ (p. 3). This appears superficially to position NCPC schools within a broad camp of so-called ‘Bible-believing’ protestant, evangelical and fundamentalist schools – what Long (1996) has identified as a commonality in all ‘themelic’ schools to ‘subscribe to the doctrine of the infallibility and/or the inerrancy of the Bible and understand this to be foundational to their identity as Christian’ (p. 5; also 1994, 1996a, 1997). This is a position that appears to be confirmed by the language used in the *Transforming Christian Education* document to further describe the Bible:

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27 ‘Biblical infallibility’ denotes the ‘claim to teach, and particularly to define doctrine, without the possibility of error’ while ‘Biblical inerrancy’ denotes the claim that ‘the Bible is absolutely true and contains no error, not only in matters of faith and doctrine, but also in matters of history or the physical sciences’ (González, 2005, p. 87). While often used in conjunction or interchangeably, I submit that the difference between these hermeneutical approaches may bear significant variances in educational practice.
The Scriptures testify to Christ. Emanating from God Himself, the Scriptures carry God’s authority. Their purpose is to lead us to salvation through faith in Jesus and to equip us thoroughly for a life of faith. [Therefore] The Scriptures should occupy the pre-eminent place in Christian parent-controlled schools. As a movement we confess in our basis, our statement of faith, that the Scriptures are ‘the only absolute rule for all faith and conduct and therefore also for the education of our children at home and at school. (CPCS, 1992, p. 5)

However, while Christian symbols and high modality language are used to describe the centrality of the Bible in NCPC schools, it is also important to note that the movement’s neo-Calvinist approach is unique in its insistence that the Bible not be used as a prescriptive textbook, proof-text or rulebook for the day-to-day operation of schooling (Edlin, 2004, pp. 4-5). This stands in contrast with the claims of Long (1996), who argues that the Bible in such schools ‘is used cosmetically to support the assumptions assimilated from themelic culture’ with ‘heavy influences of fundamentalist literalism within the movement’ (p. 12), and which are in turn argued to be ‘founded in naive realism anchored in the dogma of inerrancy’ (Long, 1997, p. 21). In a publication produced by the NCPC schooling movement, for example, Christian education scholar Trevor Cooling (2006) concurs with Edlin by exhorting NCPC schools against a method of ‘literal or naïve realism’ that sees the ‘authoritative teaching of Scripture as having an unambiguous meaning that can be
downloaded from the Bible and then transmitted to Christians irrespective of the
cultural context of their generation’ (p. 79). Rather, as a pioneer of the NCPC
schooling movement Doug Blomberg (2005) is keen to emphasise, ‘[a] Christian
school is not a school that focuses on the Bible, but one that uses the Bible to focus
on all creation. It means having a biblically informed perspective’ (pp. 19-20). This
means emphasis is placed more on seeing the world through the grid of its ‘Biblical
worldview’ than literalist readings of the text. This ideal is expressed by NCPC
school principal van der Schoor (2005) as ‘the radical effect of looking at history,
mankind [sic], the future, culture, the arts, society, technology etc through ‘Christ,
who makes all things new’’ (p. 21).

A third notable theme is also evident in the abovementioned theological
position statement from the Transforming Christian Education document, and which
can be seen as an expression of the first two themes; for insofar as the Bible and
Biblical worldview ‘proclaim His [i.e. God’s] creative and redemptive activity in the
world which is the work of His hands,’ these are also held to ‘tell who we are and
proclaim God’s calling to all human kind to be His People in His World.’ In other
words, according to Edlin (2004), NCPC schools seek to foster what is labeled
‘responsive discipleship’ that constitutes this knowledge of self (‘who we are’) and
the task of proclaiming ‘God’s calling’ (p. 3). As he elaborates:

Christian education is not just an introspective activity. It
exists to equip young people to share God’s dynamic
message of hope and peace in Christ, in every vocation and
activity, with a lost and forlorn generation. [...] Christian schools should not be equipping young people to be the next generation of pew-sitters. They should be equipping young people, as they come to know King of Kings, to be his ambassadors in the world, seeking to bring his peace into all of life (Edlin, 2004, p. 12).

Edlin’s exhortation is a common theme amongst contemporary neo-Calvinists, i.e. the belief that there is a struggle that forms the basis of every culture in every generation and within every human person: ‘a struggle between the inclination to submit to God and the inclination to rebel against God’ (Bartholomew, 2004). Resonant with the socio-political vision of Calvin and the expansive neo-Calvinist politics of Kuyper, and in contrast to the nominalist and Protestant presuppositions undergirding the Anglo-liberal tradition’s division of religion-in-private/public politics, this approach rejects the consignment of this struggle to a purely spiritual realm, avowing this struggle between the submission and rebellion as an immanent struggle in everyday life and in all spheres of culture insofar the ‘Biblical worldview’ asserts ‘that creation is God’s’ and that ‘Jesus Christ is the one who restores the covenant [i.e. relation of divine grace28] between God and his creatures’ (Middleton and Walsh, 1984, p. 149). Thus, as prominent expositors of the neo-Calvinist

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28 A ‘covenant’ can be understood most generally as ‘an agreement made between two or more persons or groups in which each agrees to perform certain acts with reciprocal response from the other. Faithfulness is expected as a measure of integrity between each party and the mutual trust between them’ (Coats, 1990, p. 166). Within the Reformed and Neo-Calvinist tradition in particular, it is held that God entered into a covenant with humans and with the created order at the beginning of time. This covenant was broken by human sin, but is ultimately and comprehensively restored through Jesus as the Christ in the New Kingdom. See Bartholomew (1995)
perspective, Middleton and Walsh (1984) explain, involvement with the broader culture is not an option for the ‘Biblical Christian’:

Fleeing from the world is no option for a Christian. ...such a dualistic attitude is unbiblical, discredits the gospel and cannot really function as a viable world view. We live in this culture—there is no escape. Jesus’s call for us to proclaim his kingdom means that healing must be offered to our dying culture. (p. 150)

In NCPC schooling, this theme of ‘responsive discipleship’ is understood as having broad cultural implications, which appears to stand in contrast to claims by Long (1997, p. 21) that the ‘revolutionary messages of the Bible regarding politics, economics, history, social justice, technology, poverty and management are highly domesticated.’ Such disjunctions between the Bible and its socio-political implications do not appear to be borne out for the NCPC schooling movement, at least in its stated mission. Rather, it seeks to ‘model and nurture responsive discipleship’ by, amongst other things ‘conserving and passing on the story and worldview of its tradition,’ ‘encouraging critical analysis, different ways of knowing, inquiry and testing,’ a ‘vision of a new and better world [that] leads students to be reforming agents in society,’ and students who ‘celebrate the Lordship of Christ through glorifying him in ‘every nook and cranny’ of life, which means ‘educating the ‘whole student’ in all their ways of functioning (e.g. the intellectual, moral, cultural, aesthetic, social, physical, vocational, etc) for responsive discipleship in all
of life’ (Hanscamp, 2003, p. 7). In practice, this would apply to ‘the Christian in commerce, industry, service industries, homemaking, the arts, the military, health care and other areas’ (Edlin, 2004, p. 13).

Taken together, the three themes outlined here undergird a subtle shift in emphasis within the NCPC schooling movement since the time of its inception, albeit remaining firmly articulated within the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition; in particular, a certain easing of antagonism between the tradition of neo-Calvinism and the Australian schooling system in general. While the movement affirms the continuity of its tradition through a stated desire to foster a ‘new set of pioneers’ that embody an ‘ongoing vision [to] be humble servants of the living God’ (CPCS, 1992, p. 3), it is also cognisant of its changing approach to the prevailing socio-political context. As the Transforming Christian Education document frames it, the early Dutch pioneers’ ‘initial concerns were with survival – funding teachers and providing facilities at a time when there was little government funding’ while for the latter day movement, ‘when the schools grew to be strong and established, attention shifted to articulating educational positions and developing curricula. […] It was a time of innovation, rapid expansion and some robust debate between people and schools’ (CPCS, 1992, p. 2). This change can also be detected in the form through which the centrality of the Bible and a Biblical worldview are articulated, with an emphasis on the one hand on its translation and application through ‘engaging the culture’ (i.e. ‘history, mankind [sic], the future, culture, the arts, society, technology etc’) and enacting ‘redemption’ in the world (e.g. through ‘doing justice,’ ‘uniting spouses,’ etc), and on the other hand avoiding introspection and literalism (e.g. ‘not a school that focuses on the Bible, but one that uses the Bible to focus on all creation’).
The connection between these theological themes from the neo-Calvinist tradition and its application to contemporary education can be most evidently detected in the ‘core values’ of NCPC schooling – or what Justins (2002) identifies as the ‘foundational values’ derived from the translation and application of these ‘theological motifs’ into education-specific contexts (pp. 117-159; also Justins et al, 2002). In particular, two distinctive core values that NCPC schooling affirms as a movement are: Firstly, ‘[u]pholding a community of Christian parents having a determinative and ongoing involvement in setting the direction for the school which, under God, educates their children’; and secondly, ‘[c]omplementing the roles of parents and the Church in the education of children for responsive discipleship, equipping them to share God’s life and hope with all people and within the structures of all cultures, including their own’ (CPCS, 2007). As it is on the question of how these values of NCPC schooling are interpreted within the present neo-liberal context that the following chapters are based, I shall presently elaborate on the NCPC schooling movement’s understandings of these key values and its connections to the theological motifs they affirm, as well as to the broader neo-Calvinist discursive tradition sketched above.

Firstly, the role of parents as emphasised in NCPC schooling is linked to the neo-Calvinist insistence that God has delegated to parents the primary authority and responsibility for the education of their children. This means that while:

[T]eachers make many decisions in the day to day operation of the school… In principle, none of these decisions are
exempt from scrutiny, revision, and if necessary, change by the parents through the appropriate channels. Parental authority cannot be confined to the broad framework or to general principles. It also reaches to details of the curriculum and classroom implementation of those principles (CPCS, 1992, p. 9).

As Edlin (2004) surmises of this core value: ‘God has given to parents the primary responsibility for the nurture of their children. The Christian [i.e. NCPC] school partners with parents to assist them in carrying out this responsibility’ (p. 3). The function of NCPC schools is framed as operating in ‘partnership’ with parents and to ‘assist’ parents, which is important in this regard because of the Kuyperian notion of sphere sovereignty that places education squarely within the domestic sphere of the family. Hence, Edlin (2004) goes on to assert that this is a ‘biblical mandate’ that cannot be abrogated to the school, for:

This responsibility applies to all of the nurturing parents provide – physical, spiritual, and educational. Christian parents do not yield this authority at the school gate... Parents carry out their biblical mandate by ensuring that the policies and procedures of the institution conform to biblical patterns and by being involved in the life of the institution in appropriate ways.
Because parental nurture is a God-given responsibility, Christian [i.e. NCPC] schools should beware of language, structures and a school culture that strip parents of this responsibility (p. 9)

Of note in this elaboration of NCPC schooling’s core value of parental responsibility for the nurture of their children is its intimation of what such a responsibility entails in practice: in the first place, for parents, the rightful exercise of this responsibility involves ensuring the overall practices of the educational institution where their children are placed coheres with the biblical worldview – or what Edlin (2004) has termed ‘biblical patterns’ in this instance – and an active involvement in the institution in ‘appropriate ways,’ which include constantly monitoring ‘that their children learn about the world and their places and tasks in it in a way that celebrates the lordship of Christ over all creation,’ and direct classroom involvement ‘where parents are encouraged to observe and participate in a non-disruptive manner’ (pp. 8, 9). This notion of ‘partnership’ is concisely expressed, for example, by NCPC school parent Joan Dixon (2006) who explains that:

Christian school education will contribute to a triangular partnership comprising school, family and church, that will establish the foundations of a Christian worldview that, I pray, will stay with my children forever. My children are going to a Christian school because I want them to develop a
true understanding of their lives in the context of God’s creation (p. 5)

Like the reinforcement of the Christian worldview through the ‘triangulation’ of home-school-church explicated above, Adele Smith (2005), a parent of children at Southern Highlands Christian School in Bowral, NSW, also emphasises a distinctively neo-Calvinist interpretation of partnership between the spheres of home and school in order to consistently reinforce ‘Christian values’:

[D]o you leave your child’s education to the teachers? It won’t work, because family is the primary source of a child’s education. If a family’s example conflicts with the values taught at school, the child ends up confused. But if parents live what they ‘preach,’ you can be assured that the school will reinforce your Christian values (p. 21).

As a consequence of this insistence on parental responsibility and partnership, then, NCPC schools are in turn expected to reflect the Christian values expressed in the homes of their students, for ‘[t]he school and the home can only be mutually supportive where meaningful cooperation and interactions occur, and where a biblical perception of the relationship between the two exists’ (Edlin, 2004, p. 9). Such a ‘biblical perception’ is expected to underline the conviction that the locus of educational responsibility lies with parents while the Christian school is a partner in this, a conviction expressed as unequivocally God-given by Vernon Clark (2009),
who writes as principal of Maranatha Christian School in Victoria and as a parent of children in NCPC schools that:

I am sure that the responsibility regarding who educates our children will be answered in different ways, depending on what roles are accorded to the government and to us parents. But, when it comes to the church or Christian school, the locus of responsibility takes on a whole new dimension. Because God gives those of us who are parents the responsibility of educating our children for himself, we also have been given the control of education.

[...]

At Maranatha Christian School, we believe that the Bible places responsibility for each child’s education squarely on the shoulders of that child’s parents and that the home is the foundation upon which children are educated. We do not abrogate this responsibility from parents, but support these Christian values in giving parents a choice in education (p. 15)

Here, what is most significant for the present thesis is the connection established between the first passage that draws directly on a neo-Calvinist injunction for parental responsibility of the education of their children, and the
second passage, which frames NCPC schooling as a ‘choice’ that is consistent with that injunction. Given that the rhetoric of ‘choice’ is also deployed within a neo-liberal regime that seeks to marketise schooling in Australia, how then does the NCPC schooling movement negotiate the God-given responsibility of educating their children in such a context? In turn, how does the neo-liberal regime accommodate the particularity of the NCPC schooling movement’s claim for parent responsibility and control as a divine mandate? These questions will form the basis of Chapter 5, which will draw on the discursive antecedents of the neo-Calvinist and Anglo-liberal traditions outlined in the present and previous chapters that undergird the contemporary NCPC schooling movement and the prevailing neo-liberal discourse respectively, as well as a consideration of the discursive processes that characterise the relations between the two, giving rise to the institutional arrangements of Australian education in the present.

The second core value of the NCPC schooling movement arising from the theological themes of the neo-Calvinist tradition is the stated desire to train students to be responsive disciples within the structures of all cultures. According to Edlin (2004), this is taken to mean that: ‘Christian education is not just an introspective activity. It exists to equip young people to share God’s dynamic message of hope and peace in Christ, in every vocation and activity, with a lost and forlorn generation’ (p. 12). This core value is, in turn, undergirded by the neo-Calvinist understanding of children as a gift made in God’s image and who should hence be rightfully oriented toward glorifying God. The Transforming Christian Education document affirms that children are ‘God’s creatures – made in His image to live in relationship with Him’ and hence NCPC schooling’s ‘leading of children should not be to simply
socialize them into acceptable ways of behaving, but should give opportunities for learning, living and serving as citizens of God’s Kingdom’ (CPCS, 1992, p. 8).

Drawing on the biblical worldview narrative framework of Creation-Fall-Redemption, Edlin (2004) elaborates by describing children as ‘individually gifted image bearers of God’ who are nonetheless ‘impacted by the fall and need to find redemption in Christ. The school should [thus] help students to discover God’s peace and purpose for themselves and for the world in which they love as stewards responsible to the creator’ (p. 11). This ultimate goal of NCPC schooling is highlighted by NCPC schoolteacher and NICE lecturer Fiona Partridge’s (2004) reflection on the ‘unique role of the Christian school’:

Through Christian education we aim to prepare students to be active workers in God’s kingdom and therefore need to purposely face students toward God and his sovereignty over all things. Just as a mirror reflects whatever it is in front of, we need to line our students up with God so that their lives can reflect him. […] In a Christian school environment, we can address one area of our students’ lives that they were created for; their spiritual relationship with their creator (p. 5)

Likewise, NCPC school principal Hanscamp affirms that the NCPC school exists, in large part, to train its students inwardly in order that they may be
outwardly-oriented for the purpose of glorifying God in all areas of human life.

According to him:

The [NCPC] school is not just a ‘skills equipper’ or a preparatory ground for employment, even though this will naturally result from the effective work of the school. A Christian school will seek to model and nurture responsive discipleship within the kingdom contours of the word of God and is characterized by a number of features [which include]:

- *Discovering student’s gifts.* The Christian school helps the student to unfold their gifts, which God has given for doing works of service in the building of his kingdom.

- *Educating for all of life.* The Christian school will celebrate the Lordship of Christ through glorifying and enjoying him in ‘every nook and cranny’ of life. This means educating the ‘whole’ student in all their ways of functioning (e.g. the intellectual, moral, cultural, aesthetic, social, physical, vocational, etc) for responsive discipleship in all of life.

(Hanscamp, 2003, p. 7)

Two points from this exposition of NCPC schooling’s stated aim of cultivating responsive discipleship are of interest in the present thesis: Firstly, while NCPC schooling is described as being more than a mere ‘skills equipper’ for future
employment, it is nonetheless assumed that such skilling is a natural result of the NCPC school if it is operated effectively; and secondly, through the framing of students as bearers of ‘gifts’ bestowed by God, it is envisaged that the NCPC school will produce students who have actualised these gifts in various respects (e.g. ‘intellectual, moral, cultural, aesthetic, social, physical, vocational, etc’) so as to serve God/Christ in every arena of social life. Again, given that the neo-liberal discourse frames education as a means of human capital investment in order that future worker-citizens may actualize their abilities in the globalising labour market, how does NCPC schooling negotiate the dual demands of skilling of students for work and the actualization of God’s gifts? And again, the inverse question arises as to how the neo-liberal regime manages to accommodate schools such as those within the NCPC schooling movement, whose particular religious discourse may bring forth ends such as ‘responsive discipleship’ that are not immediately synonymous with the educational objective of the former?

These questions are the concern of the following chapter, which attends both to how the prevailing public purpose of education is defined and the accountability measures put in place to regulate schools in accordance with this purpose, as well as the approach of the NCPC schooling movement to the public purpose so defined. In seeking to address these questions, I attempt to avoid the judgment of the NCPC schooling movement as either being ‘true’ and ‘faithful’ or ‘contradictory’ and ‘unfaithful’ to some essence of the neo-Calvinist tradition, let alone some ‘core’ of Christianity. Long (1997), for example, makes the argument that:
The practical nature of schooling activity sets itself against the utopian and absolutist claims of much of the language of the lay parent body [that govern NCPC schools]. So at one level there is much talk about the ideals of themelic schooling and on another the very real business of the pragmatic nature of schooling. There is also a difference between thinking at a systemic leadership level and the school level of thinking and action (p. 24).

By contrast, I argue for the purposes of a conjunctural analysis that the different ways in which the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition is interpreted for such circumstances as the ‘practical nature of schooling activity’ or the ‘very real business of the pragmatic nature of schooling’ cannot simply be assumed to be separate or contradictory to some unsullied truth of its religious discourse, as if the apparently ‘utopian and absolutist claims’ or ‘ideals of themelic schooling’ are merely a \textit{sui generis} discourse that is concerned with otherworldly ideals or absolute moral beliefs. Rather, I follow the likes of Asad and Hall in arguing that the ‘religious’ elements of neo-Calvinist discourse can be understood as meaningful only in its \textit{articulation} with apparently ‘non-religious’ elements like literacy, examinations and marketing, which are in turn related to the education system within a broader political formation. As Asad (2003) specifies, the ‘selectivity with which people approach their tradition doesn’t necessarily undermine their claim to its integrity. Nor does the attempt to adapt the older concerns of a tradition’s followers to their new predicament in itself dissolve the coherence of that tradition’ (p. 195). Instead,
such articulations of religious discourse are ‘precisely the object of argument among those who claim to be upholding the essence of the tradition’ (Asad, 2003, p. 19). So rather than seeing a disjuncture between the NCPC schooling movement’s religious claims on the one hand and the pragmatics of schooling on the other, I abide by Hall’s (1996, p. 142) point that the meaning of religious claims comes with what else they are articulated to and their position within a political formation. As such, in addressing how the NCPC schooling movement relates to the neo-liberal regime and vice-versa, I shall attend to the discursive antecedents of both the NCPC schooling and the neo-liberal regime that may account for their possible affinities, then continue by determining the processes through which the elements of each are interpreted and acted upon in relation to the other.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I offered an account of religious education as it is understood within the neo-Calvinist tradition. In the first section, I traced a genealogy of the theological stances and foundational values of NCPC schools, which are predicated on Calvin’s sixteenth century theopolitical vision of social order and the politics of Dutch neo-Calvinism in the nineteenth century. This discursive tradition, with its expansive definition of religious education as all-encompassing, was embodied by Dutch migrants to Australia in the 1950s. However, given the then-prevailing system of education and its definition of religious education – drawn from the Anglo-liberal tradition – as separate from ‘secular’ education, an antagonism arose from participants of the neo-Calvinist tradition. Specifically, the latter rejected the
demarcation of religion from educational practices, which they perceived ‘would lead the children to believe that God and religion was something separate and had little or nothing to do with real life’ (Hoekzema, see above). Thus, associations were formed in the 1950s across Australia that would see the formation of NCPC schools from the 1960s onwards, a process which would receive further impetus in the 1970s after the implementation of the 1973 Karmel Report that made state funding available for religious schools, as I have outlined in the previous chapter. Despite the articulation of NCPC schools onto a plane of administrative comparison and government under the social liberal and then neo-liberal regimes since that time, the proponents of NCPC schooling persist in arguing that the movement maintains a vision consistent with its neo-Calvinist discursive tradition.

In the final section of this chapter, I considered at length some of the theological motifs and foundational values affirmed by NCPC schools. The former, which form the basis for the more educationally specific claims of the latter, include an emphasis on a biblical worldview that consists in seeing the world through a narrative of ‘creation-fall-redemption,’ an attendant regard for the centrality of the bible in educational practice, and a determination to foster ‘responsive discipleship,’ which entails a training of students informed by a biblical worldview to occupy positions in all spheres of contemporary social life. These theological motifs then give rise to the foundational values of NCPC schooling, of which two were highlighted: one, the importance of parental responsibility in the nurture of their children; and two, the stated goal of training students to responsive disciples who will occupy various social spheres for the purpose of glorifying God/Christ. In light of the prevailing neo-liberal regime in Australia and its discourse on the urgency of
training future worker-citizens and the efficacy of market choice in schooling, then, questions arise as to how the NCPC schooling movement interprets these foundational values in relation to these two imperatives. These questions will form the overarching basis for the next two chapters.
Chapter 5 - Fulfilling their God-given Talents: Neo-Calvinist schooling and the neo-liberal ‘public purpose of education’

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I portrayed the inauguration of the NCPC schooling movement in the 1950s by Dutch migrants as an alternative educational practice arising from an antagonism between their expansive view of religious education arising from a neo-Calvinist discursive tradition and the mainstream of Australian schooling. This tradition can be located within a broader Anglo-liberal tradition that encompasses both nominalist and Protestant presuppositions on religion and religious education. The pioneers of the NCPC schooling movement such as Deenick asserted that education for Christian children ‘ought to be Christian education, ought to acknowledge the Cross and the Crown of Jesus Christ, and ought to prepare for his return’ (as cited in Justins, 2002, p. iv), as opposed to the then-prevailing arrangements for religious education as an addendum to secular public education. Yet by the mid 1970s, NCPC schools were placed within the Australian education system alongside other religious and non-religious schools owing to the Federal Government’s extension of public funding to community and religious schools at that time. This meant that NCPC schooling could set up new schools with such funds under the condition that they justified their operational decisions in accordance with the educational objectives of the social liberal regime, which is to train workers and citizens for the good of the nation-state.
I also made the point in Chapter 3 that the supersession of the social liberal regime by the neo-liberal regime in the late 1980s led to a restructuring of the nation-state in Australia into a market-state, as well as to the reshaping of the overall objective of its education system: from serving the good of the nation to forging competitive, future worker-citizens in light of the inevitable globalisation of world markets. This has led to a proliferation of regulatory mechanisms that seek to ensure that schools are accountable for this newly defined public purpose.

In this chapter, I shall examine the relationship between the NCPC schooling movement and this imperative of the neo-liberal regime. I will pay particular attention to the prevailing public purpose of education and the accountability measures put in place to regulate schools in accordance with this purpose, and how NCPC schools in turn approach these. Drawing on government declarations and educational policy platforms, I begin with a sketch of how these might reflect the prevailing notions of what constitutes the public or national good and the role of education in achieving it. I then move on to examine the NCPC schooling movement’s construal of schooling and its purpose in relation to the broader ‘public purpose of schooling’ and centralised accountability measures like standardised testing and reporting. Drawing on the background given in the previous chapter, I point out certain nominalist antecedents within neo-Calvinist discourse that have been articulated with tendencies within neo-liberalism, particularly Calvin’s portrayal of the world, social institutions and practices as instrumental for glorifying God and Kuyper’s notion of Sphere Sovereignty, which implies that all people have an obligation to ‘render whatever dues necessary’ for the state to maintain society.
Finally, drawing from the case of NCPC schooling in relation to the present education system presented in this chapter, I submit that the public/private distinction between religious and non-religious schools may well be conceptually inadequate for understanding the place of religious schooling in Australia today. More specifically, I show through this particular case of NCPC schooling how framing the question of religious schooling as such may obscure a circuit of power that moves between public/private spheres to sustain the hegemony of neo-liberal discourse in defining the ‘public purpose of education,’ as well as the hegemonic definition of what constitutes ‘acceptable’ education in ostensibly private religious schools. On this basis, as I shall argue in the next chapter, a market for differently religious and non-religious schools is made operable insofar as differences are contained within the range of acceptable education so defined.

**Neo-liberal discourse on the public purpose of schooling**

As postulated in Chapter 3, education policy within a neo-liberal regime can be understood as prioritising the perceived needs of a global market economy in the context of international competitiveness and the formation of a more flexible, multi-skilled workforce (Lucas et al, 2007, p. 97; also Avis, 2000; Meredyth, 1998). Contrary to the prevailing understanding of neo-liberalism as entailing a withdrawal of the state, however, this has in fact necessitated the strengthening presence of the state in ‘steering’ education in general and schooling in particular as a key means of habituation for future workers in this new, globally competitive labour market.
Framed as a response to apparently inevitable global economic trends, the introduction of institutional changes in the form and direction of education were accepted as the acts of responsible governments introducing measures necessary for individual, institutional and national economic survival. Under neo-liberalism, as Davies and Bansel (2007) put it, ‘both government and society have taken up, as their primary concern, their relationship with the economy’ (p. 250). These changes were evident in Australia in the proliferation of reports on education and schooling since the 1980s concerned with ‘upgrading the quality of the stock of human capital.’ (EPAC, 1986, p. 12) The inevitability of global economic trends and the need to prepare future worker-citizens for it has – within a neo-liberal context – become a commonsense assumption undergirding education policy.

This perspective on education is that of a conduit for the skilling of future workers typifies what is known as ‘Human Capital Theory’ within neo-liberal discourse, which frames investment in education as a contribution to economic development by improving the stock of knowledge and skills necessary for future workers (Quiggin, 1999). In this view: ‘Just as physical capital is created by changes in materials to form tools that facilitate production, human capital is created by changes in persons that bring about skills and capabilities that make them able to act in new ways’ (Coleman, 1997, p. 83).

Consequently, education in a nation like Australia can be construed as a positive and ‘enriching’ investment insofar as it seeks both to gear students in general as future workers to compete effectively against workers in other nations, as well as sorting those considered ‘best and brightest’ in particular as exemplars of the
correlation between educational and economic achievement. This admixture of education both as a national investment and as a means of individual gain is, as Rizvi and Lingard (2010) surmise, based on an ‘updating’ of human capital theory for the exigencies of neo-liberal globalisation:

At a very general level, a new human capital theory has informed discussions of educational values… The new human capital theory extends this claim to the requirements of the global economy and to the competitive advantage of individuals, corporations and nations within the transnational context. (p. 80; see also Biesta, 2010; Wolf, 2002)

In the present, this assumption is evinced in the government statements and policy platforms that give rationalisations for the purpose of schooling in Australia at the Federal and State levels of government. For example, in the opening paragraph of the 2008 *Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals for Young Australians* published by the Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs (MCEETYA) – which consists of the joint Australian Federal and State Government ministers of education, the government advisory bodies like the Australian Qualifications Framework Advisory Board and statutory agencies like the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA) and the Curriculum Corporation – states that the purpose of education as a key instrument for the future prospering of citizens and the nation as a whole in the context of allegedly global economic trends:
In the 21st century Australia’s capacity to provide a high quality of life for all will depend on the ability to compete in the global economy on knowledge and innovation. Education equips young people with the knowledge, understanding, skills and values to take advantage of opportunity and to face the challenges of this era with confidence. (MCEETYA, 2008, p. 4)

What is evident from this opening statement is the assumption that the competitive employability of Australian citizens and their economic productivity are central to the future quality of life in Australia. Framed in this way, education is primarily concerned with developing the skills required for a person to become an economically productive member of the nation. While it may be argued that state-run education as a social institution in Australia has always been instrumental for state management of populations as citizens and to prepare young people for productive and responsible adult lives as workers in a historical sense (see Seddon, 2008, p. 18), as pointed out in Chapter 3, the shift in emphasis from education as primarily a ‘national good’ for the ends of the nation-state to the primacy of skilling of individuals for competition on a global market scale marks a difference between a social liberal to neo-liberal regimes. As Robertson (2000) characterises it, the task of the market-state is taken to be creating ‘appropriately skilled and entrepreneurial citizens and workers able to generate new and added economic values, [which] will enable nations to be responsive to changing conditions within the international marketplace’ (p. 187).
Given the dominance of this perspective on the public purpose of education, it is neither surprising that there has been a steady push by the Federal Government in Australia to regulate schooling through the institution of measures such as standardised curricula, testing and reporting, nor extraordinary that there is a concomitant emphasis on the need for schools to be held accountable to such measures as proof of their efficient use of public funding. For under conditions of urgency framed as a result of inexorable global economic tendencies, educational institutions such as schools are accordingly being pressured to simultaneously improve their ability to equip students for competitiveness in labour markets and new work conditions while at the same time being made more accountable to the public for their performance based on this goal (Hursh, 2010). In this way, measures like standardised curricula, testing and reporting can be seen as a means of regulating schools in accordance with neo-liberal discourse, which enables a determination of schools’ return on public investment into human capital – or more specifically in the language of human capital theory, a ‘social rate of return’ that can account for public investment on a cost-benefit basis (Whitehall, 1997).

To be ‘accountable,’ as understood conventionally, is to be ‘held to account,’ defining a relationship of formal control between parties, one of whom is mandatorily held to account to the other for the exercise of roles and stewardship of public resources (Ranson, 2003: 460). As such, accountability in turn always implies an evaluation of performance according to a predetermined set of standards, as well as some hierarchical system involving the distribution of commendations or sanctions:
[T]he account when rendered, is to be evaluated by the superior [worker] or superior body measured against some standard or some expectation, and the differences noted: and then praise or blame are to be meted out and sanctions applied. It is the coupling of information with its evaluation and application of sanctions that gives ‘accountability’ or ‘answerability’ or ‘responsibility’ their full sense in ordinary usage. (Dunsire, 1978, p. 41; see also Ranson, 2003, p. 460)

Any system of accountability is thus, as Ranson (2003: 462) points out, a form of social practice that channels individual and institutional behaviours and dispositions – that is, ‘their taken for granted ways of perceiving, judging, imagining, and acting’ – toward the pursuit of particular purposes, which are in turn always defined by particular political relations and evaluative procedures. ‘Accountability and control,’ put in a nutshell by Mulgan (2000), ‘are intimately linked because accountability is a vital mechanism of control’ (p. 563). In this way, the introduction of standardised testing in the Australian education system can be understood as a regulatory vehicle for the greater specification of what constitutes education, which in turn enables accounts of achievement to be presented in public reporting that facilitates comparisons between schools.

A prime example of this is the Federal Government’s 2008 introduction of the National Assessment Program – Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) for all students
nationwide in Years 3, 5, 7 and 9, which was administered by the Curriculum Corporation – a regulatory body established under the delegated authority of the MCEE. From the data collected from NAPLAN testing, individual and comparative school ratings on ‘Reading, Writing, Spelling, Grammar and Punctuation, and Numeracy’ measured by a ‘national minimum standard’ have subsequently been made publicly accessible through the My School website as of 2010, which makes commensurable and comparable certain sets of demographic information derived from individual schools, as well as results from NAPLAN tests and post-school destinations of each (ACARA, 2010).

It is important to emphasise at this point that accountability through standardised measures are not entirely new. While the introduction of NAPLAN and My School has been met with furore amongst schools and teacher unions (see Australian Education Union, 2010; ‘Gillard stares down teachers over My School,’ 2010), it is by no means novel; as Meadmore (1995, p. 17) points out, Australian States have since the mid 19th century always been involved directly with the governing of school populations through the technical means afforded by the examination (see also Goodman, 1968). In Australia, a key historical moment in the standardisation of testing and reporting was the 1989 State, Territory and Commonwealth Ministers of Education’s Hobart Declaration on Schooling (Australian Educational Council, 1989); a declaration informed by the Finn, Mayer, Carmichael and especially Dawkins reports (as mentioned in Chapter 3) on the link between schooling and the economy. The Hobart Declaration boasts of having achieved a consensus on ‘ten national goals for schooling’ which, for the first time in Australian history, initiated ‘a framework for co-operation between schools, States
and Territories and the Commonwealth’ and formed a basis for ‘schools and school systems to develop specific objectives and strategies, particularly in the areas of curriculum and assessment.’ The ‘national consensus’ about the public purpose of education established in the *Hobart Declaration* is manifest in the subsequent development of ‘standards frameworks’ and measures of student learning outcomes by education departments across states and territories (Rowe, 1999). By the mid 1990s, as Hill (1995) describes, ‘accountability pressures’ arising from the *Hobart Declaration* had already cemented state-wide, standardized and high-stakes assessment and reporting routines with a view to creating national standards:

All government school education systems in Australia, except the ACT, now operate programs to monitor educational standards. [...] The principal motivation behind current assessment programs is to meet public demands for educational systems to be accountable for maintaining and indeed improving standards. (p. 4)

While eventually superseded in 1999 by the *Adelaide Declaration on National Goals for Schooling in the Twenty-First Century*, which was in turn superseded by the *Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals for Young Australians* (2008), the first declaration ‘represents a shift to a centrally governed curriculum, formally endorsed by the Australian states and territories,’ as well as a strong emphasis on ‘a national framework of competency-based curricula and assessment’ (Meadmore, 1995, p. 17).
Within this historical context, then, the introduction of NAPLAN and *My School* in the late 2000s can more specifically be seen as the culmination of a coordinated nationwide educational standardisation that commenced with the *Hobart Declaration* in 1989. What NAPLAN and its accompanying *My School* website represents is the historical *apogee* of this tendency toward enforcing school accountability and efficiency by extending uniform standards across the nation. This is implied in the explanation of the ‘Purpose of NAPLAN’ by the ACARA, the statutory agency responsible for generating NAPLAN tests, processing the data and publishing it through *My School*; NAPLAN, the ACARA (2010) states, ‘has a number of purposes including reporting national and jurisdictional achievements in literacy and numeracy as well as providing accurate and reliable measures of student and school performance.’

By rendering school data and performance available on this scale, it is envisaged that standardised testing and reporting will function as regulatory instruments that hold schools accountable to the established public purpose of education. As the *Melbourne Declaration* states:

The community should have access to information that enables an understanding of the decisions taken by governments and the status and performance of schooling in Australia, to ensure schools are accountable for the results they achieve with the public funding they receive, and governments are accountable for the decisions they take. The
provision of school information to the community should enhance community engagement and understanding of the educational enterprise. This includes access to national reporting on the performance of all schools, contextual information and information about individual schools’ enrolment profile. (MCEETYA, 2008, p. 17)

In sum, the public purpose of schooling within a neo-liberal context to which schools are accountable can be characterised as a means of training future worker-citizens to be competitive in an allegedly globalising, competitive labour market and in being so, secure the future prosperity of the nation. By rendering individual schools across the nation accessible, commensurable and comparable on a common scale using certain regulatory instruments like standardised testing and reporting amongst others, schools are compelled to demonstrate that they are the efficient in their use of public investment in the development of human capital, and hence accountable to this public purpose of schooling. As McLaren (2005) points out, governments around the world have made ‘strong efforts at intervention to ensure schools play their part in rectifying economic stagnation and ensuring global competitiveness. And standardised tests are touted as the means to ensure the educational system is aligned well with the global economy.’ What, then, is the position of the NCPC schooling movement as particular type of religious schooling in this context in relation to the ends and means of this broader public purpose?
The neo-Calvinist ‘parent-controlled’ schooling movement on the public purpose of schooling

The political lobbying arm of NCPC schooling – the AACS – states explicitly in its ‘Policy Positions – October 2010 and Beyond’ document that it is both committed to the broader public purpose of schooling and supportive of government accountability measures directed toward this end:

AACS is committed to ‘the public purpose of schooling’ that is required under the registration procedures in all states and territories.

AACS is firmly committed to best practice and ethical conduct in all its schools and, to that end, is supportive of additional Government scrutiny where necessary. (AACS, 2010, p. 14)

The first statement of AACS’s policy position quoted above implies that the NCPC schooling movement as a whole, as represented by AACS, is dedicated to achieving the aforementioned public purpose of schooling. As well, what the proceeding statements further suggest is that as a sign of its commitment to this objective, NCPC schools not only accept the legitimacy of present accountability measures that might evince it, but would also support an extension or expansion of such measures. With regard to the recent NAPLAN testing and My School reporting
AACS has no concerns in relation to the existing format of individual and school based reporting of results from NAPLAN tests in Years 3, 5, 7 and 9 to parents and schools.

[...]

AACS has no objection to the publication of individual and school results to the schools but has significant concerns about the potential for the data to be used unscrupulously in the hands of the media. (AACS, 2010, p. 12)

The addition of the caveats ‘to parents and schools’ and ‘to the schools’ in both statements about standardised testing and reporting imply that for NCPC schooling movement, it is neither the legitimacy of standardised testing and reporting that is of concern nor the governmental purposes for which these standards are designed, but rather the ‘potential for the data to be used unscrupulously in the hands of the media.’ Taken together, these policy positions of the AACS suggest a broad agreement between the NCPC schooling movement and the prevailing public purpose of schooling and the accountability measures used to ensure conformity to this purpose. This alignment between NCPC schooling and the public purpose of education is further underscored by executive officer of the AACS, Robert Johnston, who in a 2007 debate over religious schooling stated unequivocally that:
As registered and accredited schools, all non-government schools that receive taxpayer dollars must demonstrate through a rigorous inspection process, that they serve a public purpose as prescribed by the office of the [NSW] Board of Studies – an agency whose functions are firmly enshrined in state legislation.

The public purpose that is served encompasses all manner of standards and expectations that the society, through the BOS, deems necessary for young men and women to demonstrate in order to acquit themselves adequately for the many roles that they will have to fulfill in the society and economy beyond their school days.

The content of curricula, the standards of performance, the values required for responsible citizenship, processes required for child protection, facilities required to support curricula, qualifications required of staff, technology required to keep pace with changing paradigms and a host of other compliance protocols – all are aspects of the standard laid down to protect the public purpose of schooling; all these and more are pre-requisite standards for any registered and publicly funded school. (Johnston, 2007; emphases in original)
In this statement by Johnston in defence of ‘non-government’ schools, the point is stated through repetition and emphasis that such schools – including NCPC schools – serve the ‘public purpose.’ It is asserted that they do so in three broad ways: firstly, by submitting to the legislative requirements for licensing – that is, ‘registration and accreditation’ – by State educational authorities (i.e. the New South Wales Board of Studies); secondly, by fulfilling the ‘standards and expectations’ that society places upon schools for the training of students for their future roles as participants in society and the economy citizens and workers; and thirdly, by complying with all accountability measures laid out by State and Federal Governments with regard to these established purposes. The fact that such a ‘public purpose’ is taken to be helping students ‘acquit themselves adequately for the many roles that they will have to fulfill in the society and economy beyond their school days’ nonetheless raises questions about the terms upon which religious ‘non-government’ schooling in general – and NCPC schooling in particular – accommodates the present commonsense about the role of education as defined by the neo-liberal discourse.

The approach of the NCPC schooling movement to the broader public purpose of schooling can be brought to the fore more specifically in the statements by various NCPC schools with regard to how they envisage the connection between their religious discourse rooted in the neo-Calvinist tradition, their goals for schooling in relation to this tradition, and the role of academic achievement more broadly in the realisation of these goals. For example, Wycliffe Christian School, located at the outer edges of metropolitan Sydney, states in its foundation statement that:
Wycliffe sees a commitment to the pursuit of both academic excellence and authenticity in Christian education as not only highly compatible twin goals but also as an act of stewardship in outworking the opportunities provided to us to nurture the gifts and talents of children and young people entrusted to our care. (Wycliffe Christian School, 2010, p. 2)

From the passage cited above, it can be discerned that for Wycliffe Christian School, there is a broad alignment between academic achievement and imperatives of neo-Calvinist discourse. For this NCPC school, the pursuit of academic excellence is held to be the outworking of its function as a Christian school – that is, the latter constitutes its ‘act of stewardship’ to nurture the God-given gifts and talents of its students. In a similar vein but with greater specificity, the chairman of the board at Dubbo Christian School in Central-western NSW affirms that:

Our mission is to provide high quality Christ Centred and Bible Based education which is both balanced and responsive. Our commitment is to produce young people who have an understanding of their purpose and a willingness to contribute to and serve their communities under the leadership of God. Our students are engaged in the local, national and international community, and equipped to fulfil
the Lord’s call on their lives. (Dubbo Christian School [DCS], 2010, p. 3)

In this statement, the affirmation of a ‘Christ Centred’ and ‘Bible Based’ education reflects with the broader NCPC schooling movement’s theological discourse on the purpose of schooling – that is, as stated in the Transforming Christian Education document and elaborated in Chapter 4, a Biblical worldview perspective that holds to the primacy of Christ in the narrative of the Creation-Fall-Redemption of the world and the centrality of the Bible as pre-eminent in the life of Christians. The function of the school, based on this understanding, is accordingly to produce graduates who work usefully in and for communities at every level – local, national and international – who work under God as an expression of their calling. This latter point corresponds to the third purpose of schooling according to the NCPC schooling movement’s theological discourse – to foster ‘responsive discipleship’ that works to bring the implications of God/Christ into every sphere of culture and society. What is the relationship, then, between this school’s stated mission to ‘prepare’ and ‘equip’ for their societal calling on the one hand, and academic achievement as defined by established educational standards on the other? In the same statement, the chairman of the board of Dubbo Christian School also claims that:

Our literacy and numeracy NAPLAN testing results are excellent. Our students have achieved very good HSC results
and the school has taken great pleasure in making a significant contribution to the academic, spiritual and character development of our students. It is the constant encouragement, nurturing, and mentoring which our students receive along with the teaching inputs from our exceptional staff which allow each individual student to develop their GOD given talents. (Dubbo Christian School, 2010, p. 3)

Here, like Wycliffe Christian School, Dubbo Christian School evinces its achievements in developing individual students’ ‘God-given talents’ with reference to the ‘excellent’ and ‘very good’ results attained in standardised tests at the Federal (i.e. NAPLAN) and State (i.e. Higher School Certificate or HSC) levels respectively. Notwithstanding the mention of its contributions to students’ ‘academic, spiritual and character development,’ these achievements in standardised tests are taken to be, at least in part, the fulfilment of their God-given talents owing to the work of the school (i.e. through ‘constant encouragement, nurturing, and mentoring’ and ‘teaching inputs from our exceptional staff’). Also noteworthy is the individual nature of such God-given talents celebrated by Dubbo Christian School, and for which achievements in standardised tests serve as one indication. From this perspective, a broad correlation is established between academic achievement and the development of students’ God-given talents, which then prepares students for responsive discipleship in different societal occupations.
The link between the actualisation of God-given talents and gifts and academic achievement is also made by Tyndale Christian School and Covenant Christian School in metropolitan Sydney. Commenting on the overall results of their students in Federal and NSW State-wide tests, the former avers that:

Senior School staff are committed to ensuring that students achieve results commensurate with their ability, and KLA [i.e. Key Learning Area] Coordinators work with staff to maximise student performance. Teachers are committed to ensuring that students are enabled to perform to their ability academically, not only because of the importance of student results in accessing further study options but also because of the understanding that students should use their gifts to the utmost, in order to prepare themselves for a life of service to God and others. (Tyndale Christian School, 2010, p. 19)

In this passage, Tyndale Christian School points to the commitment of its staff to maximise student performance in standardised tests because academic achievement represents both a means to further study and as an expression of students’ use of their God-given gifts to the utmost. It is expected that students will then use these gifts, actualised in the form of academic achievement, as instruments to serve God in their future lives. This commitment is also shared by Covenant Christian School, which states on its school website that:
Our aim at Covenant Christian School Sydney is not only for academic excellence but a broad all-round education which will enable our young men and women to take their place as Christians in our society. For some this will involve further study at University or TAFE, while others will join the workforce. We encourage our students to develop their God-given talents to the full, academically, spiritually, socially, creatively and physically.

Covenant Christian School Sydney’s HSC results are excellent and well above State average. Past students are working in many fields, including law, medicine, various trades, computing science, design, media, hospitality, full time ministry and numerous service industries. (Covenant Christian School, 2012)

Here, it is stated unequivocally by Covenant Christian School that it does not aim ‘only for academic excellence’ but an education that will enable its students to ‘take their place as Christians in our society.’ Yet the following paragraph immediately states that its HSC results are ‘excellent and well above State average.’ The connecting statement that links the first paragraph to the second paragraph is the claim that Covenant Christian School encourages their students to ‘develop their God-given talents to the full, academically, spiritually, socially, creatively and...
physically,’ which when expressed through academic achievements enables its graduates to enter various professions as Christians in society.

From these examples of NCPC schooling and the AACS’s policy positions, two points can be made in relation to the movement’s approach to the public purpose of schooling and the accountability mechanisms used to ensure adherence to this purpose: firstly, there is a broad coherence between NCPC schooling’s desire to actualise the God-given talents of its students in order that they may be responsive disciples of God/Christ in society on the one hand, and the prevailing public purpose of schooling on the other, which is to train future worker-citizens to compete effectively for employment in the context of a global economy. The mediating nexus between these objectives, which arise from two historically distinct discourses, is academic achievement in schooling as measured by its comparatively good results in tests and consequently, the post-school destinations of its graduates. Secondly – and perhaps to a degree in consequence of its favourable results – while the NCPC schooling movement appears cognisant of the limitations of such measures of education achievement in relation to Christian education as a whole, it nonetheless regards the state’s implementation and enforced observance of them as valid and legitimate. Thus, on the basis of these examples, Johnston’s and the AACS’s point that such schools serve the public purpose, and in addition abide by its standards and expectations of schooling to prepare students for future roles in society and the economy appears to be compelling.
It is at this point worth quoting the AACS’s most recent statement on its contribution to the public, which highlights its understanding of the role of NCPC schools with regard to the societal and economic structures of the nation, as well as its compliance to state legislation and the standard curricula and testing directed toward these ends:

[NCPC Christian] schools are registered by government authorities and serve a recognised public purpose. They offer curricula based on state syllabi and present students for public tests and exams. They are intensely accountable under approximately 50 pieces of federal and state legislation. Their graduates have an established record of taking their place in the multitude of institutions that make up the economy, the public service and the societal structures of our land. The beliefs, values and attitudes taught in Christian schools have flavoured their graduates’ citizenship of the nation and contributed significantly to the moral capital and the cultural mix of the country. (AACS, 2012)

As this statement asserts, then, the NCPC schooling movement positions itself as part and parcel of the education system in Australia, which serves the ends of the nation and its public by contributing to cultural diversity and the training of citizens for their place in the economy and society. This is in turn evinced, as the AACS is at
pains to emphasise here and in Johnston’s statements above, by its shared subjection to state-mandated curricula, tests and exams amongst other regulations. Yet how has it come to be that the NCPC schooling movement, which was inaugurated in the 1950s as antagonistic to the aims and forms of the mainstream education system in Australia, now exists as one institutional manifestation of it within a neo-liberal regime? In what follows, I argue that this institutionalisation of NCPC schooling is, in part, an effect of the conjunctural articulation of elements from neo-Calvinist and Anglo-liberal discursive traditions outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 and Chapter 4 respectively.

**Neo-Calvinist schooling for the training of worker-citizens: Discursive antecedents**

As I have outlined in Chapter 4, the NCPC schooling movement is built upon the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition. For neo-Calvinists, the sovereignty of God is to be seen in all things, encompassing this-worldly politics in relation to such social institutions as the state, as well as practices like education. For the latter, to (re)quote Calvin (2008[1559]), the whole world is a ‘theatre erected for displaying the glory of God’ (I, sec. 5.5). This discursive tradition led the pioneers of NCPC schooling to reject the state-run education system in Australia in the 1950s despite its provision for extra-curricular religious education, which for them would effectively lead to the separation of God from life. ‘After all,’ asked NCPC pioneer Hoekzema rhetorically, ‘are we not to acknowledge God in all things?’ (as cited in Justins, 2002: 59, see Chapter 4) How then is the contemporary NCPC schooling movement, for whom a
stated end is to form ‘responsive disciples’ who actualise their God-given talents for ‘God’s kingdom,’ to be understood in relation with the goals of the neo-liberal regime?

The answer to this lies in part with the shared nominalist construal of religion latent in the discursive tradition of neo-Calvinism. The particular alignment of this religious discourse with neo-liberal discourse can be traced to the instrumental treatment of worldly institutions and practices within the former, which gives rise to a type of Christian realism and pragmatism that seeks to influence in a Christian way – or in the language of neo-Calvinism, to ‘transform’ – actually existing societal institutions like the state and the market while treating them as a given owing to the providence of God. This then leads NCPC schooling to seek the actualisation of students’ God-given talents in accordance with a given regime and its institutions, bringing to bear their Christian ‘values’ within them. The means of achieving this is, in part, through academic achievement as measured by prevailing educational standards.

In the first instance, one may locate a nominalist construal of religion latent in the neo-Calvinist tradition in the work of Calvin himself. For instance, while affirming that all things are sustained by the providence of God, Calvin nonetheless held that the world and human practices were not innately good in themselves. Rather, they are instrumental at the hands of Christians for the purposes of
demonstrating the glory of the utterly omnipotent God they believe in. Recall that for Calvinists, the world is a divinely-given means:

This does not mean that the world is somehow ‘sanctified’ in the Christian sense: it is and remains an order of evil men \(sic\) for evil men, an order of concupiscence. But in it, as the absolutely prescribed and sole field for their probation, Christians must live their life to the honour and glory of the divine majesty, and in it the success of their praxis is the \textit{ratio cognoscendi} (reason of knowing) of their selection [as those who know God]. (Marcuse (2008[1972]), p. 23)

So in Calvin’s schema, Christians demonstrate their status as those who know God through work in the world not as a good in itself, for the world is sinful, but rather as an instrument for glorifying God. This nominal relationship between religion and practices is reflected in contemporary neo-Calvinism’s understanding of the empirical world as ‘fallen’ and in need of ‘redemption’ in the name of God, which is the task of Christians and NCPC schooling’s envisioned mission for its graduates. As NCPC schooling advocates Edlin and Thompson (2006) assert:

The gospel is truly good news. God has said ‘Yes’ to this world and ‘No’ to sin in the death and resurrection of Jesus. [...] He is reclaiming all things – trees, rocks, elephants,
kangaroos, kiwis, governmental structures, music, art, space
and aviation, technology, the imagination, and education, and
he empowers his people to be transformational witnesses to
his gospel in the twenty-first century. (p. 6)

So what the NCPC schooling movement seeks to achieve, as Edlin and
Thompson indicate, is the empowerment of its students to occupy positions within
the world and its various institutions in order to effect a ‘transformational witness,’
which is taken to mean the glorification of God in their respective future
occupations. This way of conceiving of the world tacitly draws on a distinction
between the ‘structure’ of the social world and its ‘direction’ as advanced by the neo-
Calvinist tradition and formalised by Albert Wolters, a scholar widely influential in
the NCPC schooling movement (see ‘Suggested Further Resources’ in CEN Board
Members’ Handbook, 2007; also Edlin, n.d.).

According to Wolters, ‘structure’ refers to God’s creation, which encompasses
everything in human experience including the laws of nature and societal institutions
that govern society. This structure, according to Wolters (2005[1985]), is inherently
good insofar as it is anchored in God’s providence – that is, ‘the correlation of the
sovereign activity of the Creator and the created order’ (p. 14). This truism extends
beyond the natural world to ‘the structures of society, to the world of art, to business
and commerce. Human civilization is normed throughout... There is nothing in
human life that does not belong to the created order’ (Wolters, 2005[1985], p. 25).
The ‘direction,’ on the other hand, is the orientation of the structure towards or away
from God. ‘Anything in creation,’ according to Wolters (2005[1985]), ‘can be directed either toward or away from God – that is, directed either in obedience or disobedience to his law’ (p. 59). As a consequence, for neo-Calvinists, God’s intention is that the ‘original good creation is to be restored,’ with the ‘obvious implication… that the new humanity (God’s people) is called to promote renewal in every department of creation’ (Wolters, 2005[1985], p. 73). Edlin and Thompson’s exhortation for NCPC schools to train ‘transformative witnesses’ is thus comprehensible within this framework as a call for its graduates to inhabit various social institutions (or ‘structures’) in order to change their ‘direction’ away from sin towards God.

By presupposing a separability between structure and direction – or put differently, between facts and values – what such a way of seeing the world and its institutions entails is a form of ‘Christian realism’ and pragmatism that tends to emphasise practical activity based on prevailing societal definitions of problems and how to transform the world as Christians for the sake of God (Edlin, 2006; also 2006a, pp. 67-69). For if it is stressed that Christians must interpret the general will of God in terms of its applicability to the current situation, which is defined by some form of ‘expert’ empirical analysis in what Wolters calls ‘every department of God’s creation,’ then the diagnosis of the latter must in practice take the leading role in the development of a ‘moral response’ (Milbank, 2009, p. 78). According to theologian Stephen Long (with Fox, 2007, pp. 62-63), such a sensibility draws its basis not only

29 ‘Christian realism,’ according to its chief systematisers Reinhold Niebuhr and H. Richard Niebuhr, can be understood broadly as the imperative for Christians to take responsibility for their actions and to do whatever they can to achieve demonstrable results that express their social convictions. See Wogaman, J.P. (2004).
from Calvin, but also owes to the frameworks of modern sociologists Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch who see in Calvinism an exemplar of a religion in modern society. For Weber (1978, pp. 24-26) as mentioned in Chapter 1, ‘rational actions’ designated those activities that are strictly calculable based on empirical evidence in a sphere of activity, and which are held in contrast to ‘value forms of action’ that are pursued under some law or principle deriving from traditional or affective sources. Thus, religious and moral action are for Weber ‘the irrational remainder’ beyond rational action, but which may nonetheless provide values that can be appended onto the latter as an addition to it (as cited in Long, 2007, p. 63). So the NCPC schooling movement’s stated goal to train transformative witnesses in every sphere of society, and who are motivated to align ‘directionally indifferent’ social structures to God’s will because of the gospel, is reminiscent of Weber’s (1958) argument in *Science as a Vocation* that while the ‘historical and cultural sciences’ can ‘teach us how to understand and interpret political, artistic, literary, and social phenomena in terms of their origins,’ nonetheless ‘they give us no answer to the question, whether the existence of these cultural phenomena have been and are worthwhile’ (p. 123).

According to Long (2007, p. 63), Weber’s conception of spheres of rational action *vis-à-vis* values became the dominant form of Christian ethical engagement in liberal societies through the work of Troeltsch, particularly the latter’s influential book *Social Teaching of the Christian Churches* (1992[1931]). This was achieved specifically through Troeltsch’s simplification of Christian religious expression into a typology of three types – the church, the sect, and the mystic – and argument that only the first type can provide an effective social and political engagement.
According to him, the perennial ‘social problem’ is a tension between the state and society for which the church is a mediating instrument (Troeltsch, 1931, p. 12). Troeltsch (1931) accordingly frames the central question for Christian ethics as: ‘How can the Church harmonize with these main forces in such a way that together they will form a unity of civilization?’ (p. 32) The answer, according to him, is that Christian ethics must always work within the rationality of the prevailing social order to be effective among the greatest number of people. This is because:

Nowhere does there exist an absolute Christian ethic, which only awaits discovery… all that does exist is a constant wrestling with the problems which they raise. Thus the Christian ethic will also only be an adjustment to the world-situation, and it will only desire to achieve that which is practically possible. (Troeltsch, 1931, p. 1012)

There is an affinity between Troeltsch’s work and the type of Christian realism and pragmatism exemplified by the NCPC schooling movement’s approach to the social world. This is especially apparent via American Christian realist H. Richard Niebuhr’s highly influential book *Christ and Culture* originally published in 1951, from whom Wolters (e.g. 1990), Edlin (e.g. 2009) and other key figures within the

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30 Although Niebuhr was himself a Protestant liberal, *Christ and Culture* has been ‘read by many seminary students throughout the past 40 years’ (Barrett, 1996) and his ideal types have been applied to purposes ranging from international politics (see Gustafson, 2001) to Christian youth ministry (see Erwin, 2010), as well as having a wide purchase across the Christian theological spectrum and beyond (e.g. applied to Islamic movements, see Hermansen, 2009). In Australia, Hynd (2008) observes that ‘the assumptions and analysis underpinning Niebuhr’s influential Christ and Culture typology have been carried forward […] into much current work in public theology.’ (p. 1)
NCPC schooling movement have directly drawn their approaches for the ‘transformation’ and ‘renewal’ of the world (e.g. Van Brummelen, 1989; Lambert, 1994), and which remains significant in the shaping of future leaders of the NCPC schooling movement (see NICE, 2009). In a direct reference to Troeltsch’s work, Niebuhr (2001[1951]) frames his own fivefold typology as an attempt to address the ‘enduring problem [of] the relations of Christianity and civilization’ (p. 1; see also Budde, 1992, pp. 30-31). According to Niebuhr, the transformational approach to culture – to which he credits to Calvin and Calvinists more generally – affirms the universality of sin, but maintains that cultures can be converted. This means that sin has only perverted culture that was created good, and which remains inherently good and capable of reform even when misdirected by sin (Niebuhr, 2001[1951], pp. 190-229). As is evident from this cursory treatment, what Niebuhr puts forward as the ideal approach for the Christian realist is analogous with contemporary neo-Calvinism’s Biblical worldview of ‘Creation-Fall-Redemption’ that is foundational for the NCPC schooling movement (see Chapter 4).

Niebuhr provides a typology of five ‘exclusive’ and ‘systematic’ models that Christians must choose from (Bevans, 1992, p. 30): (1) Christ against culture, (2) Christ of culture, (3) Christ above culture, (4) Christ and culture in paradox, and (5) Christ the transformer of culture. Firstly, Niebuhr explores the notion of ‘Christ against culture’ and finds some precedent in the Christian tradition for the radical juxtaposition of Christ and human cultural values. At the opposite end of the spectrum is the ‘Christ of Culture’ type. The proponents of this option practice an ‘accommodation to culture’ (Niebuhr, 2001[1951], p. 83) by claiming that Christ is to be understood as the highest aspiration and fulfillment of human civilization. The third approach is the ‘Christ above culture’ type, where Christ is understood to be part of the culture, but located its absolute apex as both its ideal and source (Niebuhr, 2001[1951], p. 135). The fourth ideal type outlined by Niebuhr is ‘Christ and culture in paradox,’ where the relationship between Christ and culture are understood as ‘two realms’ that while good are ultimately irreconcilable, therefore there exists a paradoxical tension between Christ and culture (Niebuhr, 2001[1951], p. 171ff). The fifth and final type that Niebuhr explores is the formulation of ‘Christ the transformer of culture,’ which understands Christ as simultaneously standing above and beyond human culture on the one hand, and on the other hand immanent in the midst of human activity as a force compelling positive transformation (Niebuhr, 2001[1951], pp. 191-194). Apart from being rhetorically positioned within the argument of the book as the preferred model, this final option is understood by Niebuhr to be a theme within the Reformed tradition and advocated by Calvin (Niebuhr, 2001[1951], p. 195).
This approach to social and cultural transformation can be detected at a basic level, for example, in the textbook for the ‘Certificate for Christian Education’ – NICE’s introductory in-service program for beginning teachers in NCPC schools – which posits that if God can be taken to create and sustain the world, ‘then His redemptive work through Christ will also involve a restoration of the physical creation and the work of redeeming the distorted aspects of culture’ (NICE, n.d., p. 4). This means, as it goes on to specify in language reminiscent of Niebuhr, that all human activity in spheres like the economy and politics are ‘not decreed off limits for Christians but embraced as an opportunity to transform.’ (NICE, n.d., p. 4) As education scholar and NCPC schooling advocate Ian Lambert (1994a) states explicitly with reference to Niebuhr, the purpose of such NICE programs is to ensure that education in NCPC schools is:

[I]n line with the ‘Christ the transformer of Culture’ model that is the preferred Christ/culture relationship in Christian Parent Controlled Schools in Australia [so] the development of in-service courses with a teacher as researcher focus, aims to encourage frame transformation from the bottom up, that is, by seeking to affect some kind of cognitive/ideational alignment within school communities.

Politically, the goal of this type of Christian realism and pragmatism is therefore to ‘consider both the integral witness and discourse of Christian faith and
speak with broader ‘public’ or ‘universal’ purpose’ (Werpehowski, 2005, p. 204; see also Dorrien, 2009), while the effectiveness of Christian engagement is measured by the influence of its religious values within societal structures. However, as Anabaptist theologian John Yoder (1996) points out, Niebuhr’s Calvinistic transformational approach to culture also contains two normative views about the prevailing social order: firstly, ‘that it is the responsibility of the [Christian] to stand within the ‘mainstream’ of his own religious civilization’ and therefore not resist or divide from it unnecessarily; and secondly, ‘the necessity of managing society from the top and [the] identification of political control with ‘culture’,’ which implies that Christians should seek to inhabit and influence the state, not reject it, because ‘the government becomes exemplary for all of culture.’ (p. 66)

So by assuming *a priori* that ‘God has said ‘Yes’ to this world and its existing structures like the government, the economy and the education system in an effort to influence its direction, what neo-Calvinist discourse as expressed by Edlin and Thompson and the NCPC schooling movement appears to elide are that ‘all things’ are always already manifestations of historically specific discourses that shape how one sees the world – a seeing that, as Taylor (1989) points out, ‘also helps *effect* what it sees,’ that is, ‘conceived not simply as a response to what [the world or culture] is, but as what makes it such’ (p. 449). Drawing on this point made by Taylor and Wittgenstein, theological ethicists Brian Goldstone and Stanley Hauerwas (2010) argue more specifically in relation to religion that: ‘the vocabularies by which the objects of our inquiries are conceived and apprehended are themselves manifestations of historically specific pedagogies connected, so Wittgenstein might
say, to ‘how one sees things’—and, in seeing them, intuitions how properly to live with them’ (p. 767). Hence, ‘to ‘see something as something’ is, in large measure, already to have been made by it – or, at the very least, to find oneself journeying down a path where the potentiality for such reordering [of perception] is ubiquitous.’ (Hauerwas and Goldstone, 2010, p. 786)

In other words, what the neo-Calvinist discourse of the NCPC schooling movement holds to be ‘the world-as-it-is’ and the institutions within which Christians should operate as transformational witnesses – for example, governmental structures and the education system – are not simply facts that are merely a given. Rather, the ‘world-as-it-is’ is always already constituted by a hegemonic discourse. As Chia (2000) stresses, ‘[d]iscourse as multitudinal and heterogeneous forms of material inscriptions or verbal utterances occurring in space–time, is what aggregatively produces a particular version of social reality to the exclusion of other possible worlds.’ (pp. 513-514) Thus, it is to be understood not merely as a subjective gloss on the world, but constitutive of the world insofar as it ‘carves out’ particular social realities to the exclusion of other ways of seeing. In Australia, as I argued in Chapter 3, that prior discourse arises from developments within the Anglo-liberal tradition, which institutes ‘natural’ features of social reality such as the state and the market as necessary for securing the freedom of private preferences, as well as social institutions like the education system and schooling that serve them.
For neo-Calvinist discourse, because ‘the world-as-it-is’ is taken to be the providence of God and instrumental for God’s glory, it is precisely these already existing social realities and institutions that must be occupied by transformational witnesses. Put differently, such a reckoning of the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition positions NCPC schooling as ‘having a stake in Christianising the social order’ (Hauerwas, 2000, p. 25; see also Maddox, 2011, pp. 310-313). The nominalism inherent in this type of Christian realism and pragmatism leads, on the one hand, to an approach to social reality that commits it to a form of empiricism ‘in which it appears that [the] starting point is merely a series of present social phenomena’ (Milbank, 2009, p. 87). Religious discourse, on the other hand, provides the moral, ethical and/or spiritual values for practices within the limits of what has been defined as problems in reality. Consequently, religious discourse in such a reckoning is taken not to entail substantive forms of political life as an alternative to the prevailing social order but rather, in Cavanaugh’s (1994) words, ‘a ‘spirituality’ for the frustrating tasks of the pragmatist engaged in worldly politics’ (p. 77). In so framing the world as such, then, the NCPC schooling movement is liable to correlate the task of glorifying God closely to the prevailing societal definitions of development and achievement in education – that is, as an essentially good structure (i.e. facts) albeit misdirected by sin (i.e. ‘bad’ values). This, I argue, is manifest in NCPC schooling within the present conjuncture that corresponds to its approaches to the prevailing public purpose of education more broadly, and its accountability to the state regulated standards of education more specifically.
Stemming from a neo-Calvinist type of Christian realism and pragmatism, then, NCPC schooling can be understood as seeking to actualise the God-given talents of its students in a manner that is effective in the world and its actually existing institutions for the glory of God. For instance, as Edlin (1999) states in his capacity as the principal of the NICE:

Our task is to encourage our students to bring the dynamic light of God’s revelation upon themselves and the world in which they live and then go out into that world as active disciples, seeking to restore it in the name and power of Jesus Christ. At school, and later when they graduate, those trained in Christian schools should be prominent citizens in law, commerce, medicine, education, the arts, homemaking, and blue collar employment. (pp. 162-163)

According to this approach, then, the task of NCPC schooling is seen as forming 'prominent citizens' in various institutions like law, commerce, education and the family with a Calvinist sense of ‘occupation as vocation’ – that is, as ordained by God for demonstrating his glory (see Calvin, 2008[1559], III, sec. 10.6; cf. Marcuse (2008[1972], p. 24). At no point does the question arise as to whether the terms of expression or the prevailing discourse of what constitutes a ‘prominent citizen’ are legitimate. Rather, it is assumed that the task of Christians is to ‘transform’ the existing social and economic structures in order to render these more
aligned to the neo-Calvinist conception of what glorifies God. In consequence, ‘active disciples’ are seen to be operant primarily, if not only through existing institutional forms of social life, which are seen to be the most effective mechanisms for this purpose. In a similar way, Geoff Wilson, who is the curriculum coordinator of Mount Evelyn Christian School in Victoria and sessional lecturer at the NICE argues in a three-part article published in *The Christian Teachers Journal* that the posture of radical critique and subtraction from the state and the capitalist economy adopted by minority Christian groups like the Anabaptists is unsound and inadequate for NCPC schooling because:

Not only do we need to teach our students about civics and citizenship, but we need to be active as Christians in the way in which we participate as Christian schools and Christian citizens in the civil life of our local, state and national communities. [...] The posture of cultural withdrawal is not one that most Christian schools adopt as they engage in contemporary culture, politics, education or economics.

(Wilson, 2006, p. 28)

Given this position, it is unsurprising that the NCPC schooling movement sees no conflict between its key function to cultivate students’ God-given talents and equip them to participate effectively as Christians in the institutions of the present social order to glorify God, and the prevailing public purpose of education. This is
because actualising God-given talents and the active participation of Christians is taken to necessitate the skills and accreditation that the present educational system provides. As such, Fenema (2006) explains in the NICE publication Engaging the Culture: Christians at Work in Education that academic achievement is taken to be an essential part of this task:

This cultural mandate [i.e. to glorify God in the world and all institutions] is still in effect today, and students are to be equipped to carry it out. To do so, they must become thoroughly familiar with every aspect of God’s general revelation [i.e. providence], the world over which they are to be caretakers and stewards. This involves studying the content of the various school disciplines. It also requires the skill areas – the maths, computer [sic], language – as tools with which to rule over and develop creation (p. 50).

From this passage, it is important to note how Fenema construes academic achievement in NCPC schooling as synonymous with learning about God’s providence and students’ roles as ‘caretakers and stewards.’ The specific contents and competencies listed for fulfilling the latter vocation are taken to be maths, computing and language, which incidentally overlap with the knowledge and skills required by future worker-citizens in Australia. According to the Melbourne Declaration (MCEETYA, 2008):
Literacy and numeracy and knowledge of key disciplines remain the cornerstone of schooling for young Australians. Schooling should also support the development of skills in areas such as social interaction, cross-disciplinary thinking and the use of digital media, which are essential in all 21st century occupations. (p. 5)

By defining academic achievement in literacy, numeracy and ICT as tools for the glory of God in a way that is consonant with the broader public purpose of schooling, the NCPC schooling movement is thus able to at once maintain its distinctive religious character while insisting on its accountability to state regulations and requirements. For Fenema, the implication is that such skills are merely ‘tools’ that can be directed to various ends. This encourages a view of literacy, numeracy and ICT as skill-specific competences which can be imparted to students regardless of their content and context (cf. de Castell and Luke, 1983). Yet as critical pedagogues such as Paulo Freire (2007[1974], pp. 29-52; with Macedo, 1987, pp. 37-46), Ira Shor (1992, 1997), Peter McLaren (1988, 1992), Henry Giroux (1988, 1992) and others have long pointed out, such apparently neutral ‘tools’ like literacy, numeracy and technology are in fact already in service of a prior politics. With particular regard to Australia, education scholar Ilana Snyder (2008) has charted how the definition of literacy was (and is) itself a product of highly-politicised debates – what she has dubbed the ‘literacy wars’ – that are marked by the broader cultural politics of national identity and the dominant moral order. As Australian advocate of
critical literacy Allan Luke (1999) explains, ‘neutral’ skills like literacy are always already defined by certain discourses and framed within particular political relations:

[W]ork on the history of literacy pedagogy, literacy curricula, and the manufacture of ‘literacy crises’ by governments [has] taught us that literacy refers to a malleable set of cultural practices shaped and reshaped by different – often competing and contending – social institutions, social classes, and cultural interests. If the formation and distribution of literacy is indeed about the construction of social, cultural, and economic power, how it is constructed and who gets access to its practices and potentials is hardly a foregone conclusion of skill acquisition, behavioral patterns, or natural patterns of creativity and development. (also Luke, 1994; Luke and Freebody, 1997)

For the NCPC schooling movement, however, encouraging academic achievement defined with reference to prevailing norms and articulating these with the language of actualising God-given talents enable its schools to demonstrate both accountability to the state-defined standards of education and continuity with its neo-Calvinist discursive tradition. A more specific instance of how this articulation may occur is given in Edlin’s account of what counts as the ‘biblical approach to the evaluation of students’ proper to NCPC schools. According to him, ‘[e]valuation in
school is not wrong. As well as being surrounded by numerous examples of formal and informal evaluations in all of life, we also find that the Bible lays out clearly for us the principle that evaluation is an important part of life’ (Edlin, 1999, p. 171).

Based on a particular interpretation of the Parable of the Talents in the Gospel of Matthew 25:14-30, Edlin (1999) posits what is conceived as normative for NCPC schooling through key references to neo-Calvinist discourse as follows:

In this story, Jesus is giving a picture of the evaluative aspect of his Second Coming. It is very important to see what does and does not happen in the evaluation of the three servants. Their evaluation is not comparative. The response of the master to each servant is not influenced by the performance level of the other servants. Rather, the key to assessment that occurs here is a concern with how well each servant has used the talents that he had been given. [...] The

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32The Parable of the Talents as found in Matthew 25:14-30 (in the New Revised Standard Version) reads as follows: ‘For it is as if a man, going on a journey, summoned his slaves and entrusted his property to them; to one he gave five talents, to another two, to another one, to each according to his ability. Then he went away. The one who had received the five talents went off at once and traded with them, and made five more talents. In the same way, the one who had the two talents made two more talents. But the one who had received the one talent went off and dug a hole in the ground and hid his master’s money. After a long time the master of those slaves came and settled accounts with them. Then the one who had received the five talents came forward, bringing five more talents, saying, ‘Master, you handed over to me five talents; see, I have made five more talents.’ His master said to him, ‘Well done, good and trustworthy slave; you have been trustworthy in a few things, I will put you in charge of many things; enter into the joy of your master.’ And the one with the two talents also came forward, saying, ‘Master, you handed over to me two talents; see, I have made two more talents.’ His master said to him, ‘Well done, good and trustworthy slave; you have been trustworthy in a few things, I will put you in charge of many things; enter into the joy of your master.’ Then the one who had received the one talent also came forward, saying, ‘Master, I knew that you were a harsh man, reaping where you did not sow, and gathering where you did not scatter seed; so I was afraid, and I went and hid your talent in the ground. Here you have what is yours.’ But his master replied, ‘You wicked and lazy slave! You knew, did you, that I reap where I did not sow, and gather where I did not scatter? Then you ought to have invested my money with the bankers, and on my return I would have received what was my own with interest. So take the talent from him, and give it to the one with the ten talents. For to all those who have, more will be given, and they will have an abundance; but from those who have nothing, even what they have will be taken away. As for this worthless slave, throw him into the outer darkness, where there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth.’
Master and Jesus start with the talents that have been given to each of us, proceed through and look at the task that has been set, and conclude with an evaluation of us on the basis of how well we each have used our talents to carry out the task. Whether one person concludes with a more substantial return or less substantial return is not of primary importance. The key evaluative principle is how well each person has used the talents given to him/her. (pp. 172-173; emphasis in original)

Here, Edlin draws on the figure of Jesus and the language from the Parable of the Talents to argue that the evaluation of performance in the NCPC school should be based on a relative scale, with the criteria of judgment being the extent to which each individual has actualised their God-given talents. This is striking for two, related reasons: Firstly, because his interpretation correlates in a broad sense with prominent proponents of neo-liberal discourse such as former Prime Ministers John Howard in Australia and Margaret Thatcher in the UK (1979-1990). In her infamous ‘Sermon on the Mound’ in 1988, the latter states unequivocally that the social and political lesson to be learnt from the Parable of the Talents is that ‘[w]e are told we must work and use our talents to create wealth.’ She would come to further elaborate on this claim six years later in the United States when urging her listeners of the theological correctness of capitalism:

Remember the ‘Parable of the Talents’ in the New Testament?

Christ exhorts us to be the best we can be by developing our skills
and abilities, by succeeding in all our tasks and endeavors. What better description can there be of capitalism? In creating new products, new services, and new jobs, we create a vibrant community of work. And that community of work serves as the basis of peace and good will among all men [sic]. (Thatcher, 1994)

What Thatcher’s interpretation of the parable shares with Edlin here is the identification of Christ with the figure of the unrelenting master, while the three slaves represent expressions of Christian life with two possibilities; that is, ‘to be the best we can be by developing our skills and abilities, by succeeding in all our tasks and endeavours,’ or to suffer the censure not only of society, but also (implicitly) of Christ. This is a sentiment shared by John Howard, the equally long-serving former Prime Minister of Australia (1996-2007), who in a speech delivered to a large Pentecostal church in Sydney asserted that:

The Parable of the Talents, to me has always been, has always seemed to me to be the ‘free enterprise parable.’ The parable that tells us that we have a responsibility if we are given assets to add to those assets. (as cited in Iggulden, 2007)

For Howard as for Thatcher, then, the Parable of the Talents is functionally a religious text that essentially correlates to the promotion of individual achievement,
competitive behavior and capitalist markets in neo-liberal discourse – a correlation
directly contested by Biblical studies scholars like Rohrbaugh (1993), Herzog (1994)
and Myers (2012), who argue for collectivist and anti-capitalist interpretations of it.
By implying that this interpretation of the parable is resonant with the normative
ideal of evaluation in the NCPC schooling movement – that is, the key to assessment
is to measure how well each has used the talents given to them by God – Edlin
establishes an analogy between money (i.e. denotation of ‘talents’ as used in the
parable; see Hahn, 2009, p. 99ff.), education and individual God-given abilities in a
way that parallels human capital theory, which measures how education ‘increases
the productivity and efficiency of workers by increasing the level of cognitive stock
of economically productive human capability which is a product of innate abilities
and investment in human beings.’ (Olaniyan & Okemakinde, 2008, p. 158; also
Becker, 1962) Chief proponents of this latter view such as Michaels, Handfield-Jones
and Axelrod (2001), for example, also interpret the parable similarly, claiming that:
‘The moral is that talent is a gift that must be cultivated, not left to languish’ (p. xii).
Edlin when they point out that the principle behind this parable is: ‘God’s will that
people exercise their innate talents through hard work.’ (Michaels et al, 2001, p. xii)
So while Michaels et al (2001) note that the ‘meaning of talent... has grown in
abstraction – from a unit of weight to a unit of money to a person’s innate abilities to
gifted people collectively,’ it remains ‘[a] code for the most effective leaders and
managers at all levels who can help a company fulfil its aspirations and drive its
performance’ (p. xii).
Consequently – and this is the second striking point about Edlin’s extrapolation of the biblical model for evaluation within the NCPC schooling movement – there is a particular homology and amenability between its individualised view of God-given talents and recent state-imposed standardised testing and reporting of individual students. With regard to NAPLAN, for example, the ACARA states that the ‘use of common scales covering Years 3, 5, 7 and 9 for each area or domain assessed [in NAPLAN] allows for an individual student’s achievement to be mapped as he or she progresses through schooling’ (ACARA, 2010). This resounds with Edlin’s model of sound biblical evaluation that measures the development of students’ God-given talents on the basis of an individual’s relative progress, a position shared more broadly by the NCPC schooling movement. NCPC school principal and editorial board member of the Christian Teachers Journal Brian Cox (2008), for example, affirms with regard to assessment and the Biblical metaphors of ‘blessing’ and ‘justice’ that: ‘Blessing would include a commitment to do everything possible to help the student being blessed to be successful’ (p. 3). On justice in assessment, he states that this should be defined by formal equality and constant assessment and feedback:

Justice makes sane decisions about achievements but ensures they are based on fairness. It makes sure, for example, that assessments refer to the most recent performance. [...] Thus we will provide constant assessment and feedback and both learner and teacher will have a commitment to success... The
resultant learning will be proficient and enjoyable. (Cox, 2008, p. 3)

In a similar vein and dealing with NAPLAN more specifically, NCPC schooling advocate Stephen Fyson (2008) states that: ‘On the constructive side, it seems almost a truism to say that we need ways of tracking how our students are going in some of the more concrete aspects of their learning’ (p. 9). Drawing on the prescriptions of neo-conservative education scholar E.D. Hirsch – who frames education as ‘intellectual capital’ that ‘functions like money capital in that it enables the accumulation of more capital’ (Hirsch, 1996, p. 244) – Fyson (2008) declares that an ideal form of testing for NCPC schools ‘should establish core facts in key learning areas for each stage and then test and report on all students the same way to note their progress’ (p. 10). The position of Fyson along with Cox on student assessment in NCPC schooling, which emphasise ‘success’ and ‘progress’ based on ‘blessings’ at an individual level, is demonstrably consistent with Edlin’s interpretation of the Parable of the Talents.

Taken together, the position of these key figures in the NCPC schooling movement are also discernibly consonant with NAPLAN’s focus on individual performance and relative progress. For just as Christ and the Master in the parable are said to hold each individual to account on the basis of their actualisation of God-given talents and how they are used to glorify God in various societal occupations, so the market-state through these tests holds each individual student – and schools as
aggregates of individual students – to account on the basis of their actualisation of innate abilities into key skills deemed necessary by neo-liberal discourse for the future world of work. When such an interpretation is taken together with NCPC schooling’s realist and pragmatic views on academic achievement, it can be inferred that NCPC schooling will see such standardising measures for accountability toward neo-liberal imperatives not only as legitimate, but perhaps also as consistent with its mission to create ‘responsive disciples’ and ‘transformative witnesses.’

So far, I have argued that the nominalism borne in the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition – specifically its approach to social reality and human practices as merely instrumental for Christians to demonstrate their knowledge of God’s glory – leads to certain Christian realism and pragmatism that takes actually existing societal institutions as the arena in which Christians are to be transformative witnesses by bringing their values to bear. This is the foundational impetus of the NCPC schooling movement’s desire to actualise their students’ God-given talents so that the latter may be prominent, Christian citizens who inhabit various institutions (e.g. government, business, the market, etc.), and to which the educational standards defined by the prevailing public purpose of education are seen as instrumental for this purpose. These antecedents allow the NCPC schooling movement to claim fidelity to its expansive view of religious education that actualises students’ God-given talents so that they may be responsive disciples and transformative witnesses of God more particularly, as well as demonstrate that it is accountable to the public with reference to established educational standards more generally.
The neo-liberal regulation of religious schooling: Discursive processes

If it is indeed the case that the present standardisation of education is impelled by the supposed necessity to hold schools accountable for the training of future worker-citizens according to neo-liberal discourse, then how does the market-state maintain this imperative while regulating differently religious schools, such as those within the NCPC schooling movement that might bear different accounts of education?

The key to this lies partly in the nominalist construal of religion in the Anglo-liberal discursive tradition upon which the neo-liberal regime is built. As outlined in Chapter 2, nominalism operates on the presumption of an absolute division between religion/worldly practices. This separation, I argue, persists in the contemporary Australian discourse on religious education insofar as it assumes that it primarily entails the transmission of subjective beliefs that originate in the private realm. On such a nominalist basis, the education system within a neo-liberal regime is able to accommodate religious schooling like NCPC schools, presupposing that religious discourses may be expressed in such contexts while simultaneously expecting that such discourses will not bear substantively on the educational practices they are obliged to deliver. The market-state within a neo-liberal regime is then able to at once ‘roll back’ state-run educational services and permit religious schools with their particular discourses to provide such services, while at the same time ‘roll out’ regulatory instruments that hold such schools accountable to the established standards of education.
The logic of such a distinction can be characterised as one that takes particular religious discourses as subjective and distinct from the objectives of education, which are supposed to be self-evident. Religion, in short, is held to be a matter of belief without any essential connection to practices. It follows that because it is impossible to judge between different beliefs – for example, those regarding supernatural Beings, Things or Principles – then differences pertaining to religion cannot be rationally settled. As a result, from the perspective of the state, it is held that objective empirical standards are the only things for which a public agreement can be reached once private preferences are ‘bracketed out’ from what is apparently obvious to all (MacIntyre, 1998, p. 33; Putnam, 2002, pp. 43-44).

In the case of NCPC schooling, then, this effectively means that elements of religious discourse are permitted up to a point, beyond which such schools must be held accountable for the standards of education – that is, the empirically measurable knowledge and skills that all students should be imparted as future worker-citizens in Australia. In turn, religious discourse framed as such is relegated to the realm of subjective difference and irrationality, with potential dysfunctional effects if mixed with the objective aspects of schooling (Rowland, 2003, p. 60). By confining religious discourse to the realm of private belief, then, neo-liberal discourse is thus able to define the standards of education and its public purpose, the latter of which religious schools are held accountable to. The former – which in the case of NCPC schooling was expressed in the form of neo-Calvinist injunctions to actualise the God-given talents of students and the training of responsive disciples or transformative witnesses – is permitted insofar as it bears no discernible ‘negative’ consequences on either the form or content established educational standards that
serve the broader public purpose as defined by neo-liberal discourse. Standardising measures like testing and reporting operate in such a context as regulatory mechanisms within such a regime to steer NCPC schooling so as to ensure that education so defined is effectively delivered.

In turn, religious schooling is responsible to prove by reference to these measures that it is accountable to the public purposes of education and, hence, represent a reasonable return on public investment. With regard to the case of NCPC schools in particular, the latter serve the public within a neo-liberal regime by ensuring that their religious aspects are held as private, particularistic values that bear only a nominal relationship to their publicly accountable educational practices. This nominalist partitioning is consonant with the type of Christian realism and pragmatism put forward by proponents of NCPC schooling, where religious discourse functions to define the ‘direction’ of education while its ‘structure’ is taken to be instrumental for this purpose. It is thus unsurprising, as Ryu (2007) describes in his survey of the NCPC schools in Australia, that the neo-Calvinist ‘cultural mandate’ ‘has led, in most of the [NCPC] schools, to a situation where structures and academic disciplines are comparable to most other Australian schools, save for Christian perspectives in subject content.’ (p. 98)

By separating the religious aspects of education (i.e. ‘Christian perspectives’) from the practices of education (i.e. ‘structures and academic disciplines’) that are taken to be objectively established, this has the effect of rendering religious discourse as it is expressed in NCPC schooling largely confined to the realm of the other-
worldly and irrational. As Javier Martínez (2004) characterises it, the religious as such tends to correspond with the unreal:

As soon as the sphere of the religious, in which Christianity as a whole is placed, designates a particular sphere of human activity next to other spheres (philosophy, morality, the sciences, the arts, and so on), it is thereby severed from all other human realities. Becoming autonomous, it also has to become unreal. This is because every parcel of reality possesses its corresponding sphere of knowledge, in relation to which it is completely transparent. The implication of this fact is that the different spheres of knowledge expect complete dominion over their assigned parcel of the real world. To religion there is no reality left, and therefore it cannot even be a kind of knowledge but instead has to belong to the purely private and subjective realm of sentiment and preference. Its concern, if it is conceded that it is for something ‘real,’ has to be for a wholly otherworldly ‘reality.’ Since this ‘reality’ has no relationship to or bearing on anything in this world, it will, in the end, have no reality outside of the purely subjective imagination. (pp. 11-12)

In short, what nominalism effects is a treatment of the religious dimension of schooling as an instance of subjective expression of beliefs without any necessary
correspondence to worldly social, political and/or educational realities. This process of confinement of religion into the purely subjective entails in consequence, as Rowland (2003, p. 60) describes of a parallel process in Australian Catholic schools, that the religiosity of the institution, to the extent that it exists at all, is compartmentalised and cut off from its general operation. What is billed as the uniquely religious component of the educational institution usually turns out to be ‘a weird little subculture, like the bar in Star Wars, that has little connection to the sociological reality beyond the gates of the campus.’ (Rowland, 2003, p. 60)

This tendency appears to correlate with Soucek’s (1995, p. 131) observation that under a neo-liberal regime, there is a tendency to reduce education into a form that can be standardised and measured. According to him, this has had a negative impact insofar as the drive for quantifying achievement has ‘achieved an aura of prominence, but at the expense of non-quantifiable outcomes, which have been practically banished from educational discourse.’ (Soucek, 1993, p. 13) This is a concern that is also shared by the NCPC schooling movement; the AACS (2010) states, for instance, that it ‘believes that schools must never be forced into compromising their philosophy of education or their valued outcomes simply to conform with pragmatic benchmarks that are tied to funding eligibility criteria (e.g. My School benchmarks).’ However, as the preceding investigation of NCPC schooling movement has shown, Soucek’s observation and the AACS’s concern are not entirely well-placed because ‘non-quantifiable outcomes’ in religious schools have not been wholly banished. As the case of NCPC schooling demonstrates, its neo-Calvinist discourse of actualising students’ God-given talents, training prominent citizens to glorify God/Christ in various societal institutions, and so on
that are not measurable exist palpably with standardised measures of educational achievement. Rather, in the case of NCPC schooling, I argue that religious schooling can more accurately be explained as being articulated through a nominalist separation of religion from educational practice into a logic of equivalence under this latter purpose as defined by neo-liberal discourse.

A logic of equivalence, as understood within the Gramscian analytic of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), occurs when differential demands and interests of various classes, groups and individuals are held together under a sign of common cause that establishes an interrelation of elements under a broadly-encompassing empty signifier – which is a name, word or phrase that is held up as a privileged reference point around which other discourses are ordered so as to create an overall unity (Jørgensen & Philips, 2002, p. 26). According to Laclau (2005, p. 108), the unity of any equivalential ensemble, of any irreducibly collective will in which particular equivalences crystallize, depends entirely on the social productivity of a given empty signifier, which often takes the form of a ‘name’ that disparate groups and individuals can identify with.

A good example of this, drawing on Chapter 3, is the populist movement for a state-run system of schooling in NSW that gave rise to the 1880 Public Instruction Act, which involved establishing a logic of equivalence between the liberal and Protestant positions on the place of religion in education under ‘the Nation.’ This ‘holding together’ of different positions occurs through articulation, which describes the active linking of different discourses and discursive traditions like Anglo-liberalism, Anglicanism, Baptists, Presbyterianism and others into a chain of
equivalence under an empty signifier – in this instance, ‘the Nation’ as promulgated by Parkes and others at the time – is the basic form of any hegemony.

This example also highlights another common feature of a logic of equivalence: that is, the coherence of disparate elements into a unitary bloc often manifests itself in the establishment of a political frontier, which makes reference to an antagonistic relation between ‘we/they’ or ‘friend/enemy’ and allows the elements to be equivalent to one another with reference to a common threat (Mouffe, 1999, pp. 1-6, 38-53; 2000, pp. 36-59; 2005, p. 11ff; 2005a; see also Schmitt, 2007). This was evident at the inception of the 1880 Public Instruction Act, which unified the liberal-Protestant bloc against that of the Roman Catholics who did not fit with this new order of things. The latter was thus represented as a threat to the unity of ‘the Nation’ and its progress through ‘spreading popery,’ as opposed to all other groups that supported national progress.

So in suggesting that NCPC schooling movement is articulated into a logic of equivalence within the neo-liberal regime, I posit that although it may have arisen from a distinct discursive tradition and was initially established in Australia as an alternative to the then-mainstream education system, within the present conjuncture it is articulated into a unitary bloc with other religious and non-religious schools insofar as it actively aligns itself to the public purpose of education as defined by the dominant discourse of this regime. As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, this is exemplified in the statements of Australian governments at Federal and State levels, whose operating assumption about a broad consent to Federally-stipulated educational priorities encompasses particular religious schools such as those within
the NCPC schooling movement and others within the present education system. As
the *Melbourne Declaration* envisages:

> The Melbourne Declaration will be supported by a series of action
> plans, commencing with an action plan for 2009–12. The action
> plans will outline the strategies and initiatives that Australian
> governments will undertake, *in collaboration with all school
> sectors*, to support the achievement of the Educational Goals for
> Young Australians. (MCEETYA, 2008, p. 18; emphasis added)

As this statement of intention states, the achievement of the goals of the
education system in Australia entails concerted governmental action ‘in collaboration
with all school sectors,’ which implies a common consensus to a general purpose for
all schools regardless of whether they are religious or non-religious schools, public
or private. This common consensus is elaborated more fully by the then-Minister for
Education and current Prime Minister Julia Gillard in a keynote speech to the leaders
of independent (i.e. ‘private’) schools in 2008, where she asserted that all schools
regardless of their particularities are joined by a ‘shared purpose’ – that is, to train
Australian students to be ‘citizens of the global age’:

> ...we have lists of things we agree on. And lists of urgent
> educational priorities for the country. All of us – the
> Government, public schools, independent schools and
> Catholic schools – ultimately have the same interest: ensuring
every Australian child gets the very best education possible to equip them to be citizens of the global age. I don’t pretend that everybody will have the same view or the same interest on every issue. But I am confident in our shared purpose. (Gillard, 2008)

In addition to a clear demarcation of a boundary through the use of inclusive pronouns such as ‘we’ (i.e. ‘lists of things we agree on’) and ‘us’ (i.e. ‘All of us’), a logic of equivalence is here detectable through the articulation of the different schools as ultimately having the same interest – which is crystallised in the empty signifier ‘our shared purpose.’ Presumably, this means that all schools addressed as ‘we’ – including those religiously identified like NCPC schools – share in the common purpose of schooling to equip students with ‘the ability to compete in the global economy on knowledge and innovation’ as consistent with the MCEETYA’s Melbourne Declaration (2008), of which Gillard herself was the lead signatory. This, of course, begs the question of who ‘they’ (i.e. the enemies) might be. An indication is given by Gillard in that same speech, where she states that the ‘we’ of Australian schooling constituted by schools of different sectors and religious particularities can be distinguished from certain ‘unacceptable’ others:

In reality, there are examples of excellence, and examples of unacceptable underperformance, in schools of every sector. I do not think it serves anybody’s interests to perpetuate the assumption that certain types of school are inherently, or
even generally, likely to perform better because of their sectoral status. (Gillard, 2008)

In this instance, a logic of equivalence is established by the demarcation of a political frontier that frames an antagonistic relationship between the ‘we’ and those schools who are castigated as ‘examples of unacceptable underperformance,’ and who are implied to stand in the way of ‘our shared purpose’ held by all schools regardless of their sectoral status or religious particularities (e.g. NCPC ≡ Catholic ≡ State schools). The determination of ‘excellence’ or ‘unacceptable underperformance’ is, in turn, made with reference to established educational ‘protocols and standards which reflect the shared interests of all school systems in Australia’ (Gillard, 2008). Agencies such as ACARA and measures such as NAPLAN and My School thus serve as part of a regulatory regime that seeks to hold schools accountable to the shared or public purpose of education defined by the imperatives of neo-liberal discourse. Through its insistence on sharing this ‘shared purpose’ and its consent to the concomitant state-imposed accountability measures, NCPC schooling can be seen as one articulated element in a chain of equivalences encompassing schools within the prevailing regime in opposition to certain schools which, owing to their underperformance in these measures, are castigated as those who do not share this purpose and/or who are not accountable to the public (see Figure 16). These latter schools thus constitute the ‘enemy’ against which those that are able to demonstrate accountability toward this shared purpose can be contrasted.
Figure 16: The logic of equivalence between schools (Catholic $\equiv$ State $\equiv$ NCPC) that are designated as performing under a ‘shared/public purpose’ as measured by state-enforced standards. This unitary bloc is set against schools that display ‘unacceptable underperformance’ and are separated by a political frontier (---), which demarcates schools identified under the shared/public purpose and those who are ‘enemies’ of this purpose. This is buttressed by NCPC schooling’s consent to the neo-liberal regime through its articulation of neo-Calvinist discourse in ways amenable to the shared, public purpose of schooling as defined by the neo-liberal discourse.

Based on this explanation, the hegemony of the present regime and its neo-liberal discourse on education is sustained by a logic of equivalence between different schools via a shared/public purpose. Within such a regime, regulatory instruments like NAPLAN and My School enable a common measure for determining those who are included within the equivalential chain of schools who share this purpose, and who are distinguished from schools that are examples of ‘unacceptable underperformance.’ As plainly asserted by Gillard (2008), ‘that is why we have independent agencies and institutional structures to validate and report in the public interest.’ In this way, such measures function as ‘technologies for governing at a distance’ (Rose & Miller, 2008, p. 55), which link the ‘powers of expertise’ vested in regulatory agencies like the ACARA and the Curriculum.
Corporation who are presumed to have privileged access to how education should be conducted with the ‘local tactics of education, persuasion, inducement, management, incitement, motivation and encouragement.’

For the NCPC schooling movement, such ‘local tactics’ can be exemplified by terms like actualising God-given talents and forming prominent citizens to glorify God/Christ. A circuit of power is thus operant insofar as these accountability measures thus function to regulate NCPC schooling as a form of so-called private, religious schooling by steering it toward the purposes of the market-state as defined by neo-liberal discourse, whose hegemony is in turn buttressed by an active ‘translation’ of the moralities, epistemologies and idioms of this particular religious discourse into a generalised discourse of education and academic achievement defined by neo-liberal discourse. In this way, NCPC schools are articulated to the prevailing regime insofar as they have ‘come to understand their situation according to a similar language and logic, to construe their goals and their fate as in some way inextricable’ (Rose & Miller, 1991, p. 14). This goal and fate is encapsulated, as I have argued, in the shared notion of the public purpose of education – a public purpose that appears to traverse the line of secular-public/private-religious schools.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have argued that the public purpose of education in the present conjuncture is taken to be the training of future worker-citizens to compete
effectively in an allegedly unstoppable globalising labour market. Drawing on government declarations and the educational policy platforms of the present Federal government in Australia, I focused on the consensus on education as defined by the hegemonic neo-liberal discourse – that is, education represents an investment in the human capital of the nation, and consequently, that regulatory instruments such as standardised testing and reporting to make certain that schools are accountable to this purpose and ensure a ‘return on public investment’ for the nation’s future.

NCPC schooling, as I demonstrated above with reference to several AACS and individual NCPC schools’ statements, is aligned with this public purpose of education through its accountability measures by seeing these state imposed accountability measures as a legitimate avenue for its students to exercise their God-given talents. As I have argued, this alignment can be explained as a consequence of the nominalist construal of religion as separate in essence from practices held by both the neo-Calvinist and Anglo-liberal discursive traditions, the latter of which is the basis of the neo-liberal regime. For the former, the world and human practices are framed as but instrumental to the glory of God, which leads it to adopt a form of Christian realism and pragmatism that sees social reality and its institutions as providentially-derived. Accordingly, the NCPC schooling movement seeks to actualise the God-given talents of its students so that they may inhabit and work in these institutions as synonymously Christian witnesses and prominent citizens, which coincides with the broader public purpose of education to train worker-citizens.
Simultaneously, for the neo-liberal regime built upon the nominalist presuppositions of the Anglo-liberal discursive tradition, religious schooling is regulated through a rendering of its religious discourse as subjective and private. Particularistic religious beliefs are thus permitted to be expressed as long as the standards of education according to the public purpose are executed and accounted for. In this way, the hegemony of neo-liberal discourse is sustained by the articulation of religious schools like those within the NCPC schooling movement into a logic of equivalence under a public purpose of schooling shared by all, thereby regulating particular religious schools by obliging accountable performance while still permitting them the expression of their particular religious discourses.

Within this context, as the AACS’s statements quoted above suggest, religious discourse must be translated into a generalised form that the public can consider reasonable, where ‘the public’ is here understood as represented by and delimited by ‘Australia’ as a nation-state. For the NCPC schooling movement, its particular claims ‘will always need to be channelled through the state to achieve legitimacy, as only the state can gather the diversity of interests into a transcendent unity.’ (Cavanaugh, 2011, p. 31) In order to exert influence in this socio-political context, then, religious discourse in NCPC schools must be channelled into publicly acceptable modes like academic and post-school achievement (e.g. from God-given talents to academic achievements and prominent citizens), or translated into generalized ethical demands (e.g. from responsive disciples and transformative witnesses to positive contribution to economy and society) that are more digestible for public policy. As Cavanaugh (2002) argues following Asad, religion as a discourse that is effectively detachable
from and indifferent to specific practices internal to its tradition is a specifically
nominalist innovation of liberal regimes that have facilitated the absorption of
religious groups into the modern secular state:

Religion may take different cultural and symbolic
expressions, but it remains a universal essence generically
distinct from political power which then must be translated
into publicly acceptable ‘values’ in order to become public
currency. Religion is detached from its specific locus in…
practices so that it may be compatible with [its] subjection to
the discipline of the state. (p. 82)

Rather than religious schools like NCPC schools representing a strict
privatisation of schooling, then, it can more accurately be understood as what Levi-
Faur (2005) calls a ‘new division of labour between state and society,’ which ‘is
accompanied by an increase in delegation, proliferation of new technologies of
regulation, formalization of inter-institutional and intra-institutional relations, and the
proliferation of mechanisms of self-regulation in the shadow of the state.’ (p. 13)
Within such a regime, as Laclau (2000) argues, ‘everything points in the direction of
complex processes of decision-making which could be approached in terms of
hegemonic logics, but certainly not on the basis of any simple distinction
public/private.’ (p. 53) Based on the example of the NCPC schooling movement, I
conjecture that the neo-liberal regime effectively articulates religious private schools
like those within the NCPC schooling movement into a logic of equivalence, which establishes a single plane of measurability through such regulatory instruments as standardised testing and reporting. This achieves two outcomes: firstly, as I have argued in this chapter, it enables the market-state to channel particular religious discourses like neo-Calvinism toward the end of training worker-citizens; and secondly, this in turn makes a market for school choice between public and private, religious and non-religious schools operable by rendering all schools comparable against a common scale. Yet far from representing an increase in school diversity or representing a threat to secular public sphere, as I shall argue in the following chapter, such a market for school choice allows for different types of schooling only insofar as they are nominally different.
Chapter 6 - A God-given Responsibility to Choose: Neo-Calvinist schooling and the neo-liberal market for school choice

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I sought to demonstrate how the NCPC schooling movement articulates its particular religious discourse in a manner that is amenable to the public purpose of schooling as defined by neo-liberal discourse, which is to train students as future worker-citizens in a globalised labour market. Drawing from antecedents within the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition outlined in Chapter 4, I argued that the nominalism implicit in Calvin’s treatment of the world and human practices as instrumental for the purposes of glorifying God is interpreted by the NCPC schooling movement in a specific way, which in turn allows for its articulation within the prevailing neo-liberal regime: that is, a particular Calvinistic form of Christian realism and pragmatism, which is expressed in the NCPC schooling movement’s mission to train and equip students to inhabit existing social institutions as ‘responsive disciples’ and ‘transformative witnesses.’ One key way this is done is through NCPC schools’ facilitation of students’ academic achievements, which is determined with reference to the established standards of education.

In turn, the neo-liberal regime – which is built upon nominalistic presuppositions regarding religious education from the broader Anglo-liberal discursive tradition – articulates its educational priorities with NCPC schooling
through the confinement of religious discourse into the realm of the subjective and private, whereby the latter is permitted to be expressed as long as the objective public standards of education are executed and accounted for. Measures for enforcing such standards like the recently introduced NAPLAN and *My School*, as well as the planned national curriculum to be introduced in 2013/14, serve as key regulatory instruments that channel the particular religious schools like those of the NCPC schooling movement toward the broader neo-liberal discourse on the public purpose of education.

In this chapter, I examine the relationship between the NCPC schooling movement and the neo-liberal regime’s institution of a market for school choice. Particular attention is paid in the present chapter to how particular elements within the discourse of the former, as well as antecedents within the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition more broadly, may lend credence to the imperatives of the latter. As I argue in the case of NCPC schooling and in continuity with the previous chapter, a condition of possibility for marketised school choice is the privatisation of religious discourse in religious schools, which then allows differently religious and non-religious schools to be comparable on a single plane of performance that measures their efficiency in delivering education as defined by neo-liberal discourse. By articulating their particularistic religious discourses in a manner that draws on the language of markets and choice, religious schools like those within the NCPC schooling movement, far from bringing a diversity religious education geared towards substantively plural ends, are articulated within an overarching equivalence which permits the expression of private preferences between nominally different options.
Neo-liberal discourse on a market for school choice

Labor values the great strengths of open, informed and competitive markets but believes that clear rules are necessary for markets to function fairly and efficiently. (ALP, n.d.)

Free, competitive and efficient markets should be the basis for the Australian economy. The Coalition believes free and competitive markets produce and distribute goods and services more efficiently than any other mechanism. Free markets also maximise community well-being: they give individuals maximum opportunity to take control of their own destiny and make the most of their own efforts and skills. (Liberal Party of Australia, 2010, p. 4)

In the previous chapter, I argued that the Australian Federal Government’s implementation of standardising measures is part of a push for schools to be accountable in their use of public funds for the purpose of training future worker-citizens. Such regulatory instruments like NAPLAN and My School amongst others, in ensuring that schools are accountable for their performance in attaining toward the stipulated national objective, function to articulate diverse schools onto a common
measure that renders them comparable. In so doing, they also abet a certain design for the education system according to neo-liberal discourse: the belief that a market for school choice is the most potent means for achieving desired efficiencies.

In liberal discourse, a market can be most broadly defined as a social arrangement allowing for the expression of private preferences through the voluntary exchange of goods and services. This is in turn predicated on a liberal assumption that economic activity is located primarily at the level of individual volition, which causes markets to emerge spontaneously through suppliers responding to demands, thus creating a space of voluntary exchange between individuals in society (Grassl, 2011, p. 2). Owing to this methodological individualism, markets and ‘free’ societies are in this view inextricably linked, whether society is seen predominantly as a complex of market transactions as implied in the Coalition’s Economic Principles, or whether markets are rather treated as the key organisational form of society governed by rules as implied in the Australian Labor Party’s policy platform cited above respectively. Under a neo-liberal regime that emphasises the primacy of the market, as Bell and Hindmoor (2009) point out, the market is usually defended on the grounds that it is the most efficient means of achieving societal ends because competition: ‘[is] believed to give firms and entrepreneurs incentives to develop new products and anticipate consumer demand. [Hence,] the invisible hand of the market is, according to liberal ideology, said to harness individual self-interest for the collective good.’ (p. 115)
The logic of this discourse is expressed by the MCEETYA in relation to the institution of a market in schooling. For the Federal and various State Ministers of Education that constitute the former, the stated desire for school accountability is envisaged to generate information that will facilitate a market for school choice. According to the *Melbourne Declaration* (2008): ‘Information about the performance of individuals, schools and systems helps parents and families make informed choices and engage with their children’s education and the school community’ (p. 17). By encouraging ‘informed choices’ by parents and families in a market for school choice, it is expected that competition for potential consumers of their services will ensure schools are economically efficient, hence producing optimal returns on public investment as accounted for through measurable benchmarks (see Abdulkadiroğlu, Che & Yasuda, 2012; cf. Redden & Low, 2012).

This expectation reflective of what has come to be known as ‘Public Choice Theory,’ which is based on a methodological individualism that ‘presumes all choices are made by individuals who weigh costs and benefits and choose those alternatives that will maximize their own net income or welfare potential’ (Ostrom, 1975, p. 844). Consequently, state provision of collective goods like education will fail because ‘individuals will have an incentive to take advantage of whatever is freely available and to minimize costs by withholding his [sic] own contribution to the joint efforts,’ unless ‘fiscal equivalence’ is achieved – that is, where ‘the boundaries of a jurisdiction to procure a public good or service [are] drawn so that potential benefits and costs for the potential users can be internalized’ (Ostrom, 1975, pp. 847-848; see also Olson, 1969). Hence, the implementation of a market
design in traditionally non-market spheres of life can be seen as means of achieving fiscal equivalence insofar as it allows simultaneously for the maximisation individual preferences through choice and the minimisation of fiscal expenditure by the ‘internalisation’ of potential benefits and costs by individuals. As James Buchanan (1987) – Nobel Prize winning exponent of public choice theory – claims: ‘the ultimate sources of value’ originate ‘exclusively in individuals’ who seek their own interests (pp. 586-587). The conclusion is thus that markets are more efficient at giving individuals what they want rather than governments and conversely, there is no such thing as a common good outside of individual wants and preferences.

When applied in the field of education, public choice theory can be characterised as the belief that both greater schooling efficiency and general social benefit will be achieved through the increasing of competition among schools and the matching of students to schools that reflect individual or family preferences respectively (Levin, 1992, p. 279; cf. Bowe, Ball & Gerwitz, 1994). Such matching may concern religious or philosophical preferences amongst others like academic merit and sporting achievements. Rhetorically, then, public choice approaches to education represent ‘an attempt to provide options to parents and students by giving them opportunities to choose among different schools or school districts within the

33 Interestingly, for Mancur Olson who put forward the notion of ‘fiscal equivalence’ for collective goods, education is named as a possible sphere where public choice theory may be held as inapplicable. He states that: ‘Where education of children is at issue, the desire to satisfy consumer (parent?) preferences may be subordinated to a more general interest in the future strength and productivity of the nation.’ (Olson, 1969, p. 484) This is because according to the methodological individualism of Olson’s approach, the benefits and costs of education exceed those of the individual and school: ‘If children in one locality get a poor education, this could make the national democracy ultimately work less well. If the children of that locality often migrate to another locality, this poor education becomes a problem for the recipient community. Thus each local school district finds that its educational expenditures provide an external economy to the rest of the nation, and it therefore will spend too little on education.’ (Olson, 1969, p. 485)
public sector’ (Levin, 1992, p. 279; also Chubb & Moe, 1990; Nathan, 1989) while effectively, public choice advocates argue that ‘in a market system of control, competition will motivate schools to be more responsive to the needs of their current and potential clients.’ (Byrk and Lee, 1992, p. 448) The condition of possibility for such a market system, ab initio, is a common scale of measurement between different schools as comparable options. It is here that established educational standards come again to the fore. The imposition of centralised national education policies – such as the institution of NAPLAN and My School in 2008 and the planned national curriculum soon after – are according to Apple (2006) ‘the first and most important steps toward increased marketisation’ insofar as they ‘provide the mechanisms for ‘comparative’ data that ‘consumers’ need to make markets work as markets.’ (p. 71) In short, such nationwide measures are what make a national market operable. This link between standardised education and the institution of a market for school choice on a national-scale is stated clearly in the Federal Government’s education policy platform:

The education and health sectors include schools, universities, hospitals and aged care facilities – with a diverse range of providers from the public, private and non-government sectors, and services where competition and value are often held back by jurisdictional red tape and the lack of seamless national markets.
The microeconomic reform required in these sectors involves improved market design – so that we work to create the conditions in which markets serve the public interest through vigorous competition, transparent information, greater choice and becoming more responsive to the needs of service users.

That is why the Government has delivered landmark educational reforms like *My School*, a national school curriculum, national teaching professional standards and trials of performance pay – to drive the transparency, accountability, national consistency and higher standards that will create better schools for Australian children. (Commonwealth of Australia, n.d.)

According to this policy platform, the institution of a market for school choice is construed as both a means for making schools more competitive, transparent and responsive to their clients as potential options. Such a position on school reform is characteristic of neo-liberal discourse’s emphasis on markets designed according to public choice theory as resulting in more efficient and more effective schools, which according to Hursh (2005) and others (e.g. Whitty et al 1998, Hatcher 2003) reflects a broader tendency detectable in other Anglo-liberal societies like the United States and the United Kingdom that have embraced markets as a means of improving education. As chief proponents of school choice John Chubb and Terry Moe argue in their highly influential *Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools* (1990) – a book
whose impact has reached far beyond the bounds of the United States to other nations such as Australia (see Gannicott, 1994 and 1997; cf. Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992) – school choice is to be understood as a panacea for the present ills of the education system because: ‘It has the capacity all by itself to bring about the kind of transformation that, for years, reformers have been seeking to engineer in myriad other ways.’ (p. 217; see also Braithwaite, 1992)

In addition, the Federal Government’s framing of the problem in education as primarily the fault of ‘jurisdictional red tape and the lack of seamless national markets’ implies a familiar neo-liberal refrain that schools are inefficient and unresponsive to the interests of the people they serve – what is known in public choice theory as ‘producer capture’ (see Crew & Rowley, 1988; Boyne, 1996; cf. Thomas, 1992; Robertson 2000) – and for which freed consumer choice through markets are the solution. As Macey (1989) explains of this logic in brief, the advocacy of market design posits that:

[A]s a firm increases beyond a certain size, high transactions costs, particularly the costs of monitoring employee shirking, render efficient deployment of assets within the firm extremely costly. Moving transactions out of such a firm and into the marketplace reduces the need to monitor the marginal productivity of particular assets, and thereby reduces the costs of inefficient asset use. (pp. 43-44)
According to this rationale, then, public institutions like schools (as firms) and their employees (i.e. teachers) are seen as likely to be unresponsive and evade work (‘shirking’) either because of lack of public access to information about performance or because parents cannot take their children elsewhere. Therefore, as the enthusiasm for the marketisation of schooling by the Australian Government demonstrates, there is a belief that efficiency and equity in education can only be addressed by moving education into a market model, where families and/or individuals as potential consumers of educational services can bear the responsibility of monitoring schools’ productivity and efficiency (Robertson, 2000, p. 174; also Hursh, 2005, p. 4).

What is noteworthy about the abovementioned policy platform for facilitating school choice is that it does not entail the withdrawal of the state from the market, but instead the persistent presence of the state in implementing regulatory measures on schooling, the latter of which is expressed primarily in the push for a national standardisation of testing and reporting in order to facilitate informed choices. This is an important point because as Bell and Hindmoor (2009) point out, the extent to which markets have replaced governmental hierarchy and regulation can easily be greatly exaggerated, not least because ‘marketisation and the metagovernance of markets frequently require the exercise of massive hierarchical authority.’ (p. 116)

Rather than a replacement of the state, then, the shift to marketisation through the rubric of public choice theory in the field of Australian schooling can be better understood to largely represent ‘an attempt by government to enhance or restore their
power to achieve their economic and social objectives’ (Keating 2004, p. 6), or what Peter Self (1993) has summed up with the phrase ‘government by the market.’ For within such a schema, moves toward national standardisation can be seen to function not only for regulating schools in relation to certain goals derived from the public purpose of schooling (see Chapter 5), but also as mediating instruments that pave the way for the institution of competitive relations and a market for choice in education by effecting the comparability of quantitative performance between schools that are qualitatively different owing to their respective geographic, demographic and indeed religious locations. Taken together, the simultaneous standardisation of schooling under its prevailing public purpose and the institution of a market for school choice can be seen as mutually constitutive phenomena under a neo-liberal regime. As Apple (2006) explains, there is ‘no necessary contradiction between a general set of marketising and deregulating interests and processes’ on the one hand, and on the other ‘a set of enhanced regulatory processes such as plans for national or state standards, curricula and testing’; for such regulatory mechanisms permit the state to maintain ‘steerage’ over the aims and processes of different schools from within a market mechanism, particularly ‘where such ‘steerage at a distance’ has often been vested in such things as national standards, national curricula, and national testing.’ (p. 70)

Under a neo-liberal regime, then, it can be supposed that there are two simultaneous pressures on schools in Australia: firstly, to conform to the demands of performance measures that keep schools accountable to the established educational standards for skill training; and secondly, there is also an expectation that schools
will be responsive to parents and students by marking out their differences competitively in a market for school choice. In turn, it is envisaged that a market for school choice will free parents to express their preferences by taking more control and being less dependent – especially being less ‘welfare dependent’ – for the education of their children (Proctor, Campbell and Sherington, 2009, p. 5). As Proctor et al (2009) point out, it is believed in neo-liberal discourse that: ‘[s]uch parents are more likely to take responsibility for the future of their families.’ (p. 5) Given that, as mentioned in Chapter 4, parental responsibility over education is also understood within the NCPC schooling movement as a crucial outworking of their neo-Calvinist convictions, what then is the relationship between the latter and the prevailing neo-liberal context, which also emphasises parental responsibility and its expression through the institution of a market for school choice?

The neo-Calvinist ‘parent-controlled’ schooling movement on school choice

For the AACS as the peak political lobby group of the NCPC schooling movement, it is unequivocal that the state should have a limited role in determining the education of children. This is because the primary responsibility for education, according to them, lies with parents:

We affirm that the responsibility for the education and guidance of children lies in the first instance with their parents or legal guardians, and that governments are duty bound to provide, without
distinction and on general terms of equality, both the legal right and the opportunity for parents and guardians to choose for their children schools, other than those established by public authorities, that provide for the education of their children in conformity with their own convictions. (AACS, n.d.)

In this reckoning, the role of the state is taken to be providing opportunities for parents to choose schools other than state-run schools for their children that are congruent with their ‘convictions.’ As the political lobbying arm of the NCPC schooling movement, this affirmation can be inferred as an attempt to protect the rights of parents to choose NCPC schools for their children in accordance with their neo-Calvinist religious tradition. The legitimate role of the state in this reckoning is, in turn, to secure the right and opportunity for parents to choose between schools. At the outset, then, there is a clear affinity that can be discerned between the NCPC schooling movement’s insistence on the primary responsibility of parents for choosing education, the right of parents to choose religious schools, and neo-liberal discourse’s aforementioned emphasis on market choice in schooling adjudicated by the state. This is further borne out explicitly in the political lobbying work of the AACS. For example, in an official letter to the former Minister for Vocational Education and Training David Kemp, dated 29 November 2001, the chairman of the AACS stated:
On behalf of AACS, we want to take this opportunity to thank you for your dedication to education and your commitment to ensure choice for Australian parents in schooling. Very soon after your election to government in 1996, you honoured your undertaking to abolish the New Schools Policy. This enabled many middle and working class families in Australia to look forward to an affordable choice of Christian schooling in their communities. (AACS, 2001, p. 15)

Apart from reinforcing the importance of school choice in congratulatory tones, the AACS in this letter also expresses gratitude at the then-Coalition Federal Government’s abolition of the ‘New Schools Policy.’ For Lingard (1998), this move marked the then-Coalition government as ‘using its funding clout to establish a more market-driven relationship between government and non-government schools and giving greater emphasis to parental choice in schooling.’ (p. 6) Likewise, Marginson also points to this as a key moment in the creation of a large-scale market for school choice:

By abandoning the ‘new schools policy’ and increasing the grants to non-government schools, while taking the money for these off its allocation to Government schools, the Federal Government is creating a deregulated market in private
schooling but one that is heavily subsidised by the government and in a manner designed to induce a big shift of enrolments to non-government schools. (as cited in Potts, 1999)

If it is indeed the case that the 1996 abolition of the ‘New Schools Policy’ was a watershed moment in the augmenting of a market for school choice under the neo-liberal regime as characterised by Lingard and Marginson – notwithstanding the latter’s characterisation of this change as ‘deregulation,’ which I have argued above and in the previous chapter to be a misnomer – then the AACS letter above implicates it directly in support of this cause. This position of the AACS is corroborated by another letter from the then-chairman of the AACS Jack Mechielsen to the outgoing then-Shadow Minister for Education Michael Lee, also dated 29 November 2001. Here, again, in expressing gratitude to this Federal Member of Parliament, the overwhelming emphasis by the chairman of the AACS is on school choice:

Consistent with ALP policy, you continued to advocate choice for Australian families and a needs-based funding regime that would support that choice, particularly for the socially and economically disadvantaged. We know that this was not always a popular position with elements of your
party’s constituency. We, therefore, doubly value your public commitment in this area. (AACS, 2001, p. 17)

Beyond the statements of the AACS directed at the policy level, NCPC schools have also reaffirmed the priority of parental choice on their individual websites and prospectuses, as well as in various joint advertising and marketing campaigns targeted at potential patrons. While examples of the former include such broad statements as ‘[the] Christian Parent Controlled School is based on the concept that the education of children is primarily a parental responsibility and not simply the responsibility of the State’ (Illawara Christian School (2010) and ‘[a] Christian parents controlled school gives you, the Christian parent, the right to choose’ (Davenport Christian School, n.d., p. 3), exemplary of the latter is the Why Christian Schools? booklet published in 2010, which represents a concerted elaboration by the contemporary NCPC schooling movement as a whole on their guiding ethos.

The Why Christian Schools? booklet contains an extensive appeal to particular motifs within the neo-Calvinist tradition in its justification and promotion of NCPC schools, an appeal that will be explored in more detail below. Most relevant at present is the manner in which this document repeatedly charts the different socio-political contexts where education in the form of schooling has been instituted, the various institutions like the church and the state that have historically taken on the responsibility to educate, before reinforcing the neo-Calvinist injunction of parents as
primarily responsible for the education of their children. In the section ‘Why Pay for Education?’, for example, it states:

Historically, education for most was provided by parents. At times it has depended more on churches. More recently it has been considered a government responsibility.

However God has given to parents the primary responsibility for the nurture and care of their children. This responsibility has not changed over time. It has also not been delegated to government, the church or even teachers.

If we do believe parents have responsibilities for raising children then parents also need to have choices. They should have options of where and what their children will be taught. Christian schools give parents a choice. (Why Christian Schools?, 2010, p. 8)

In this booklet, the responsibility of parents for the education of their children is given as an immutable and timeless fact owing to God’s sanction. This is in turn held in contrast to educational provision by both the state and churches. In addition, it establishes a direct link between this God-given responsibility and the need to have
choices in schooling, with Christian (i.e. NCPC) schooling put forward as an exemplary expression of school choice by framing itself as the responsible choice for Christian parents.

From this booklet and the examples from AACS’s political lobbying cited above, three points can be made with regard to the NCPC schooling movement’s affirmative position in relation to the institution of a market for school choice within a neo-liberal context: firstly, while affirming a legitimate but limited role for the state in guaranteeing conditions for education through schooling, the NCPC schooling movement maintains that the responsibility for the education of children lies primarily with their parents. Secondly and in consequence of this, the NCPC schooling movement through the AACS has taken to lobbying various governments to advance the cause of greater choice in schooling, most prominently in its enthusiastic support for the abolition of the ‘New Schools Policy’ that limited the scope for private and religious schools to expand. Finally, the reason given for the emphasis on parental responsibility for education and the translation of this into its political position on expanding school choice is rooted in an understanding of a God-given parental responsibility, which can be traced to particular antecedents within the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition. It is to this latter point that I shall presently turn.

**Neo-Calvinist schooling as market choice: Discursive antecedents**
In the section entitled ‘Who is responsible for your children?’ in the NCPC schooling movement’s *Why Christian Education?* (2010) booklet, there is an acknowledgment that even amongst those who identify broadly as Christians, ‘Christian schooling is often seen as a contentious issue’ (p. 3). However, this acknowledgment of different opinions is immediately followed by what is asserted as an incontrovertible principle with reference to the Bible:

> Yet most would agree the Bible teaches that parents are responsible for raising and educating their children. Whether Christian parents choose home schooling, secular, private or Christian schools this responsibility remains. The Bible says:
> ‘Fathers, do not exasperate your children; instead, bring them up in the training and instruction of the Lord’ (Ephesians 6:4). (p. 3)

By initiating and enfolding its appeal with the Bible as an authoritative source of life and conduct for Christians and, importantly, in its emphasis on the centrality of parental responsibility in raising and educating their children, this assertion can be seen as deriving from certain aspects of the broader neo-Calvinist tradition from which the NCPC schooling movement draws. Recall Calvin’s deliberate approach to the religious education of children discussed in Chapter 4, which can be broadly categorised as twofold: firstly, the emphasis on the parental responsibilities entailed in bringing up children, with the *pater familias* as foundational locus for the
sustenance of social order and the church (Calvin, 2008[1559], II, sec. 8.49; IV, sec. 19.13); and secondly, reorganisation of elementary schooling in Geneva in order to expand its popular reach (Sundquist, 1990, p. 94). The import placed on education by Calvin as expressed in these two aspects of his teaching and practice can in turn be respectively placed within his broader understanding of divine providence and his theological discourse on membership within the Christian community – or ‘the elect’ in strictly Calvinist terms. In the first place, given that all human life exists under divine providence for Calvin (2003), children are therefore to be seen not as ‘begotten… by a secret instinct of nature or the ‘fruit of chance’ but are gifts of God.’ (p. 110) Being so, parents must bear the burden of responsibility for their children not as merely biological offspring, but as objects of God’s providence. Secondly, for Calvin, ‘the elect are from birth full inheritors of God’s covenant and members in the church’ (as cited in Pitkin, 2001, p. 164). This means that in addition to children framed as gifts of God, they are also to be seen as future Christians who will constitute the (Calvinist-Reformed) church. So parents, as Calvin states, ‘ought to consider that children in the home constitute a ‘mirror of God’s grace,’ a sign that God cares for the family, and from this consideration be moved to fulfil their parental obligations’ (in Pitkin, 2001, p. 173). The strong emphasis by the NCPC schooling movement on parental responsibility for the education of their children can thus be seen as a present day expression of this broader neo-Calvinist lineage. As contemporary neo-Calvinist educator and NCPC schooling advocate Fenema (2006) posits: ‘Children don’t really belong to parents; they belong to God through Christ. Parents have been designated by God to be his stewards – caretakers – of children... God has consecrated these children to himself. They belong to him. Parents, in turn are to consecrate their children back to God.’ (p. 10)
Drawing on this background, then, the Why Christian Schools? (2008) booklet proceeds to position NCPC schools as a means through which parents can express their fidelity to their God-given responsibility:

Christian schools are not a way to escape from other education systems, nor take over the task of home or church. Christian schools are an expression of Christian parents attempting to fulfil their responsibility to raise and train their children in a godly manner. They do this by co-operating with, or teaming up with, other like minded parents. (p. 3)

According to the NCPC schooling movement, then, the exercise of parental responsibility held by neo-Calvinist discourse can be consistently exercised through the placement of their children into a Christian (NCPC) school. An important caveat repeated often is included that such schools do not seek to ‘take over’ this God-given responsibility, but rather represent a ‘co-operation’ or ‘teaming up’ with other parents who take equally seriously this responsibility. It is on this basis that ‘choice’ emerges as a legitimate expression of God-given parental responsibility in the discourse of NCPC schooling:

In selecting a school parents are choosing who they will partner with for the education of their child... Choosing a school which
employs practising Christians as teachers gives parents a greater say in who will be a role model for their children. Christian teachers are not perfect. Nor do they have all the answers. Yet they are part of a wider Christian community working together with, and on behalf of, parents. (*Why Christian Schools?*, 2008, p. 4)

Again, through the use of terms such as ‘partner with,’ ‘a greater say,’ ‘working together with’ and ‘on behalf of,’ the NCPC schooling movement is at pains to evince that parents remain the principal agents in the education of their children. This is a crucial point, for in affirming the consistency between Christian parents’ responsibility and ‘selecting’ or ‘choosing’ a NCPC school, a link is presumed upon which correlates the discharge of such responsibilities with the (right) choice of schools. For in choosing an NCPC school that seeks, as the booklet goes on to explain, ‘to work with parents as an extension of the family home,’ such a choice allows parents to at once avoid ‘providing a different, or even inconsistent, environment’ from the home because ‘Christian schools aim to reinforce what is taught at home.’ (*Why Christian Schools?*, 2008, p. 7) From here, it is not difficult to understand the impetus for the NCPC schooling movement’s emphasis on school choice as expressed through the political lobbying of the AACS abovementioned. For if the right to choose an NCPC school is tied to the exercise of God-given parental responsibility to raise children as Christians as is obliged by the neo-Calvinist tradition, then its potential circumscription through the lack of school choice – whether real or imagined – will be perceived as a threat to the very exercise
of this God-given task. The former principal of the NICE, Richard Edlin (1999) formulates the political implications of this logic explicitly:

Most Christians who appreciate Christian schools will agree with the arguments favouring the ‘school choice’ position. They have always maintained that education is the responsibility of parents and that parents should have access to the educational tax dollars that are taken from them so that they can use them in an educational environment of their choice, not of the government’s dictation. (p. 95)

Here, the link between parental responsibility as inherited from the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition and the contemporary impetus for a market for school choice within a neo-liberal regime is unequivocally established. For Edlin (1999), a market for choice is beneficial, in the first place, to parents because ‘[t]hey see private education as offering much better educational alternatives and outcomes than their expensive problem-ridden public schools’ (p. 94), and also because it augments ‘the necessity for Christian schools to develop and maintain strong vision and purpose statements,’ as well as an opportunity for ‘schools to insist upon pre-admission information and to state to parents clearly and lucidly the schools’ reasons for existence.’ (p. 95) It is envisioned that in being able and obligated to communicate its vision and reasons for operating, NCPC schools will be able to
communicate the distinctiveness of its vision and integrity (see Edlin, 1999, pp. 75-96).

Yet within a neo-liberal context, such a market for school choice has arguably the opposite effect because the precondition for such a market is the establishment of measurability and comparability of different schools against a common scale, a scale determined by established educational standards and enforced by various accountability measures. As de Lissovoy and McLaren (2003) explain, similarly performing schools – as far as standardised testing and reporting are concerned – are formally interchangeable regardless of differences in their locations, student populations, teachers or curricula as long as their numerical representation is the same:

As far as standardized tests are concerned, the scoring units represent the universal equivalent... in terms of which students, schools and districts can be compared. This process of reification is not new, but the subtlety of its hegemony is being stripped away, as complex human and social processes are more and more flattened into crude representations that will conform to the logic of commodity production and exchange [i.e. a market design]. (p. 133; see also Adorno, 1995, pp. 146-147)
While I shall consider the particular discursive processes that operate to effect such a levelling of substantive differences like religious discourse further below, at present it is necessary to emphasise the significance of the correlation that is established between the parental responsibility for the nurture of children in neo-Calvinist discourse and the NCPC schooling movement’s advocacy of school choice.

As mentioned above, ‘choice’ is understood within neo-liberal discourse through the frame of public choice theory. In such a reckoning, the promise of a market in school choice is to expand students’ and families’ access to schools beyond the restricted boundaries of locality defined both geographically and demographically. As such, it is assumed that choice will coincide with the freedoms of individual or family – i.e. private – preferences. The emphasis on parental choice by the NCPC schooling movement thus concurs with the sentiment of Buchanan (1991), who argues that ‘individuals are the ultimate sovereigns in matters of social organization’ (p. 225), the latter of which includes religion as an individual choice as consistent with the presuppositions of the broader Anglo-liberal tradition (Buchanan, 2005).

By presuming a simple correspondence between parental responsibility as understood within the neo-Calvinist tradition with market choice, the NCPC schooling movement can be seen as effectively articulating neo-Calvinist discourse in a way that is amenable to the register of neo-liberal discourse. Yet it is important to emphasise that despite many antecedents within the neo-Calvinist tradition that may be interpreted as ‘naturally’ allied with the marketisation of schooling through
the valorisation of parental choice – not least from Calvin’s work itself – Hall’s (1996, p. 142) point cited in the introduction that there is no necessary political logic (or ‘deep ideological structure’) to religion still appears valid for the neo-Calvinist tradition in particular. Apart from neo-Calvinist scholars and commentators like Bob Goudzwaard (1986; with Fikker, Reed, García de la Sienra & Skillen, 2001), Brian Walsh and Sylvia Keesmaat (2004), Craig Bartholomew (2009) and Michael Goheen (2009; 2011) who interpret the present regime of neo-liberal globalisation and marketisation as ‘idolatrous’ and inimical to the ‘Kingdom of God’ from an explicitly neo-Calvinist standpoint, there remain other elements from within this discursive tradition that may also be differently articulated. For example, even while stressing the authority and sovereignty of parents over their children’s education, Calvin nonetheless asserts that those parents (and indeed any authority) who is taken to transgress God’s laws – particularly those having ‘no regard for rectitude and justice’ (Calvin, 2008[1559], II, sec. 7.10) – must necessarily be disobeyed.

So while it is indeed the case that there are elements within the neo-Calvinist tradition that may give rise to the emphasis on the primacy of parental authority over education and hence a market for school choice, there are also less-often (or indeed never) emphasised elements within it that may conversely be deployed to exhort children to rebel against parental and other authorities within the present political regime, which may arguably be interpreted as transgressing ‘rectitude and justice’ (see Boer, 2009, 2009a). What this highlights, therefore, is that the position of the NCPC schooling movement represents a particular interpretation of the neo-Calvinist tradition in a way that emphasises the former elements in the present conjuncture of schooling. I shall presently explore how this leads to an alignment of the NCPC
schooling movement with the neo-liberal regime in two ways: firstly, in a broader sense as demonstrated by Edlin’s statement above, it sanctions a market for school choice by framing such an arrangement as the one most suitable for the expression of their religiosity; and secondly, in a more particular sense, by positioning NCPC schooling as one choice in a market of schools it effectively treats such religious schooling as an expression of private preferences. Considering these in turn, I shall also highlight certain antecedents from within the neo-Calvinist tradition that are deployed in order to justify this alignment.

In the first place, the correlation between parental responsibility with market choice by the NCPC schooling movement means that it has a stake in the maintenance or expansion of the marketisation of schooling. This is because such an arrangement is seen as the primary condition that makes possible the ‘free’ expression of their convictions regarding religious education. As Edlin (1999) asserts, the only way to achieve a ‘biblically obedient’ outcome is for the state to underwrite the right of parents to choose the type of education desired for their children:

It is the task of the government to maintain justice in education so as to allow parents the right to exercise their God-given authority and responsibility in determining the character of the nurture, education and schooling that their children receive. It is in this context alone that the two
elements, the role of the state and the role for the parent, can come together in a biblically obedient manner. (p. 104)

According to the logic of this discourse said to be ‘biblically obedient,’ the regulation of education by state government is indeed necessary, but only insofar as it sets the institutional conditions for school choice. This may well mean that, as Edlin (1999) goes on to state, ‘the Christian education community must be proactive in ensuring legitimate state demands concerning the education of children are met’ (p. 105) but nonetheless, the:

Christian education community must be vigilant in analysing current trends and developments in education in order to confront those that are improper and then to provide a legal and moral force that mitigates against unjust intrusions by the state into education. (p. 105)

This dual emphasis on ‘just’ state regulation and its circumscription at the point of parental control of their children’s schooling, an emphasis which is expressed in the AACS’s persistent lobbying for school choice exemplified above, reflects the influence of Kuyper and his conception of sphere sovereignty on the NCPC schooling movement.

According to neo-Calvinism under a Kuyperian interpretation, education is understood to rightly belong under the God-appointed sovereignty of the domestic
sphere (see Chapter 4), which implies that the power of the state over education is limited and that freedom of education – or the boundary between ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ intrusions in education as understood by Edlin above – means that responsibility for bringing up children lies with parents, not the state (Hoezkema, 2001). Indeed, as Bacote (2005, pp. 84-85) and McGoldrick (2000, pp. 199-200) describe, upon entering Parliament in the Netherlands in 1874, Kuyper fought primarily for two, closely connected political goals: one, to establish free Christian schools, i.e., schools free from government control; and the other, to obtain government financing for these Christian schools so that Christian parents would not have to pay taxes to support public education and tuition to support Christian schools (see also Rodgers, 1980).

The sway of Kuyper’s sphere sovereignty concept on the NCPC schooling movement’s advocacy of school choice is of little doubt. Mouw (2012, p. 49), for example, traces the strong emphasis on ‘parent-controlled’ Christian schools in Dutch neo-Calvinist communities in the US to Kuyper’s insistence that the education of children was primarily a parental responsibility. In his analysis of the concept of sphere sovereignty, Klapwijk (1980) concurs, stating that ‘the idea of the peculiar competency and responsibility of the different spheres of life still operates in wide circles [of neo-Calvinists], albeit practically and unconsciously. This probably explains the strong Christian defense of family life [and] the direct involvement of Christian parents in education and local schools’ (p. 4). According to Justins in his extensive study of the founding of NCPC schooling in Australia, Kuyper’s demarcation of sovereign spheres and the placement of education within the sovereignty of the family were foundational for the NCPC schooling movement:
As a consequence of the belief that Christian parents were responsible for the education of their children, it was argued by the pioneers that control of the educational destiny of their children should remain with parents, rather than with federal or state governments, or even a church. Part of the background to this value was the theological concept of sphere sovereignty developed [by] Kuyper which argued that the family operated within a sphere of responsibility in which it had authority over other institutions, thus parents should shape the purposes of their children’s education. (Justins, 2002, p. 124)

Based on this, the advocacy for a market in school choice as exemplified by Edlin and the NCPC schooling movement can be seen as a specific translation of the Kuyperian emphasis on the sovereignty of the domestic sphere within the present, neo-liberal context.

In addition, I argue, support for the notion of a ‘free’ market for school choice within the NCPC schooling movement can be taken as consistent with the Kuyperian division of social reality into autonomous, self-sustaining spheres, which is in turn predicated on Calvin’s notion of divine providence. According to Kuyper (2007[1931], p. 83) and as mentioned in Chapter 4, the state must never ‘become an octopus’ that stifles other autonomous spheres because each sphere is secured by
‘divine mandate’ (Kuyper, 2007[1931], p. 83). Consequently, the institution of a market in school choice can also be seen in this view as operating on the basis of divine providence as originally formulated by Calvin – a God-given arrangement for parental choice that a just state should not meddle with. Bringing this connection between Kuyper’s providentially sustained spheres and the market to the fore is Novak (2002), who argues that public choice theory and the market design are in this sense consistently Kuyperian insofar as they place primary importance upon treating the individual and their choices seriously without government interference, hence ‘allowing the market to function as an intermediary structure for transactions enhances our ability to serve [God/Christ].’ (p. 78) Extending this logic, Novak (2002) asserts that: ‘the best that man can do is to strive to do well and to live a Christian life; and that being done, the proper structures will gradually emerge.’ (p. 78) What such an assumption about providential operations through markets effectively entails is the underwriting of the market order with divine transcendence because while ‘the market is still seen as emerging from the logic of life itself’ (Milbank, 2008, p. 130) – that is, the immutability of free choice based on private preferences – this logic tends to be interpreted within a neo-Calvinistic account of providence as embodying an order laid down by God regarded as the one who moves it. In this way, ‘a constitutive capitalist excess to its own rule-governed market norms is finally underwritten by a positive transcendent instance.’ (Milbank, 2008, p. 130; also Schwarzkopf, 2012)

Such a view of markets as a providential vehicle appears to undergird the conviction of the NCPC schooling movement that a market in school choice is the most effective means for achieving its purposes, and that it is God’s will that such an
arrangement be put in place. Writing in reflection on the lobbying efforts of the AACS for its first ‘essential principle’ of ‘parental choice of school’ (AACS, 2001, p. 11) as described above, the chairman of the AACS also invokes the connection between providence and this political aim implicitly by suggesting that its public policy impact – including the abolition of the ‘New Schools Policy’ – was effected by God:

God has enabled us to achieve in representing the interests of Christian schooling and affecting public policy... Our response to this should be grateful thanks to the Lord and a determination to continue to use the AACS to effectively represent the interests of Christian schooling and all education in Australia. (AACS, 2001, p. 1)

This insistence on a linkage between a God-given parental responsibility for the education of their children and a market for school choice as the most appropriate, God-given, sphere for its expression brings up a second way in which the NCPC schooling movement buttresses the legitimacy of the present neo-liberal regime: the positioning of religious schooling, particularly one built upon the neo-Calvinist tradition, as a matter of private preferences expressed through choice. According to the AACS’s ‘Freedom of Religion and Belief in the 21st Century Submission’ (2009) to the Australian Human Rights Commission, NCPC schools are framed primarily as an extension of religion as belief in the home:
For the most part, our schools have an open enrolment policy, but are specifically designed to support Christian parents in the education of their children from a Christian perspective. As such, together with parents, the schools are an integral part of the formation of religious beliefs (in the Biblical Christian tradition). (p. 2)

Here, NCPC schools are understood to be an expression of parents’ desire to educate their children in a way that is consistent with their ‘religious beliefs.’ As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, the notion of religion as a private belief – that is, its loci are the private spheres such as the individual and family – and religious education as the transmission of that belief are effects of a specifically Protestant and Anglo-liberal inheritance. This stands in contrast to the neo-Calvinist tradition as outlined in Chapter 4, because the religious dimension is not seen as occupying the space of private belief, but rather as undergirding all things as summed up by Kuyper’s famous declaration that: ‘there is not a square inch in the whole domain of our human existence over which Christ, who is Sovereign over all, does not cry: ‘Mine!’’ So it may be argued that while Kuyper (1994) divided social reality into autonomous domains through his concept of sphere sovereignty, he nonetheless asserted that no sphere ‘is conceivable in which religion does not maintain its demands that God shall be praised, that God’s ordinances shall be observed, and that every labora shall be permeated with its ora in fervent and ceaseless prayer’ (p. 54). This Kuperian sensibility undergirded the expansive view of religion expressed by
the pioneers of NCPC schooling in Australia, who rejected any method that ‘would lead the children to believe that God and religion was something separate and had little or nothing to do with real life’ (Hoekzema as cited in Justins, 2002, p. 59). In positioning NCPC schools primarily as a reinforcement of private belief whose locus is in the home then defending the right to its existence with reference to a ‘freedom of religion and belief,’ what the AACS’s representation of NCPC schooling as a matter of free choice on the market indicates a unique interpretation of the neo-Calvinist tradition within the conjuncture of schooling in alignment with the presuppositions of the Anglo-liberal tradition.

By framing its schools as expressions of private belief, the NCPC schooling movement is thus able to advance its cause by articulating the ‘right to religious freedom’ with the ‘right of parents to choose schools’ for their children via a market which seeks to allocate goods efficiently based on individuals’ private preferences. Hence, the choice of an NCPC school is taken to be tantamount to the expression of private preferences, particularly in relation to religious belief. The Why Christian Schools? (2008) document states this articulation of religious belief and choice clearly when it puts forth a response to the question of whether parents should pay for sending their children to a NCPC school:

Parents do need to carefully consider the financial cost of education if they choose a Christian school. It will come down to setting priorities. The apostle Paul taught…
‘Everything is permissible - but not everything is beneficial. Everything is permissible - but not everything is constructive.’ (1 Corinthians 10:23)

Paul faced choices. He felt some decisions were better than others. As a parent you face the choice of ‘which school should I send my child to? (p. 8)

Here, the NCPC schooling movement draws on a particular quote from the New Testament to argue that parents should order priorities towards choosing an NCPC school for their children. In other words, the choice of an NCPC school is taken to be tantamount to the expression of private preferences in relation to religious belief. The authority of the Apostle Paul is evidently deployed here in order to draw an equivalence between the latter’s framing of choices as bearing serious socio-political implications34, the (Christian) religious convictions of parents, and NCPC schooling. Interestingly, it poses the problem as a question of choice – ‘which school

34 The social and political context for Paul’s statement in 1 Corinthians 10:23 can be understood to be very different to the one to which the Why Christian Schools? (2008) booklet is addressed. It has been interpreted, for instance, as directly addressing the elitism of some first century Christians – i.e. what is referred to in the preceding lines of this New Testament passage as the ‘knowledge of the strong’ – and their responsibilities to the poor members of their community. As Biblical scholar Neil Elliot (2006, p. 206) argues: ‘The ‘knowledge’ of the ‘strong’ in Corinth (8:4; 10:23) served to rationalize for higher-status Christians their own social expectations as responsible Roman citizens. Cultural codes for acknowledging status in a heavily stratified society underlie the practices that Paul considers abuses at the Lord’s Supper (11:17-34).’ Hence, while the ‘choice’ that the Apostle Paul posed is used in the NCPC schooling booklet as synonymous with parents’ school choice, it can also be interpreted from a more historical-critical angle as one addressed to Christians in the elite, whose superior wealth and knowledge could be deployed as a marker of their distinction from poorer Christians as was within their right as Roman citizens.
should I send my child to?’ – with the implication that Christian religion is expressed in this instance in the choosing of an NCPC school. This is further underscored in the closing paragraph of the document that follows, which states one the one hand that Christians should be thankful for choice in itself, and on the other hand that parents are accountable to God for them:

We can be thankful we do have a choice. Like all choices we make, it is one for which we will be accountable to God. Our choices can have short-term, long-term and eternal consequences. Whatever you decide, we hope and pray that this booklet has been helpful in your choosing a school for your child. (Why Christian Schools?, 2008, p. 8)

The important point to stress in this passage is the emphasis on the import placed on choices in schooling per se. While stressing the sanction and judgment of God entailed in the making of decisions, it ultimately assumes that schooling is a matter of parental choice to which it appeals. Edlin (1999) is perhaps more forthcoming in spelling out, with reference to neo-Calvinist discourse, the stakes perceived to be involved for parents in choosing schools:

The choice for Christians is this: send their children to training institutions where humankind is the object of worship in all activities or send their Children to training
institutions where God, and His plan for life, is the object of worship in all activities. For the Christian, such a choice should really be no choice at all! (p. 29)

Yet even in this stronger assertion of the religious correctness of NCPC schooling vis-à-vis other (presumably state-run) schooling, Edlin’s argument still pivots on the notion of choice, which is consistent with his position on the superior efficacy of market choice for schooling cited above. Taken together, what Edlin and the NCPC schooling movement’s position on school choice entails is a supposition that the institution of the market is a vehicle of divine providence, which offers the freedom for Christians to choose religious schools in accordance with their private convictions. It is the combination of these antecedents as expressed in the correlation of contemporary market choice discourse with the parental responsibility for the education of their children derived from the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition that are the condition of possibility for the inclusion of NCPC schooling as a feature within a market for school choice instituted under a neo-liberal regime.

The neo-liberal marketisation of religious schooling: Discursive processes

According to Friedrich Hayek (1976) – who is widely considered to be a key authority in the rhetorical invocation of free markets in neo-liberal discourse (see Turner, 2007) – markets are seen to obviate the need for any collective or societal-level decisions about the purposes to be served by economic activity. This is
considered extremely advantageous since in modern societies, no agreement is assumed to be attainable about such collective purposes, or about their relative priority. The market thus ‘devolves’ choices to individuals, who are able to pursue their own freely chosen preferences, in voluntary cooperation with one another, within the neutral framework of the market (Keat, 2008, p. 243). In such a ‘market-based’ society, as MacIntyre (1999, pp. 115-118) characterises it, the only unchosen constraints on behavior and commitments are those dictated by a rationality guided by the motive of preference maximisation. Mahmood (2001) points out likewise that the primacy in such a context is accorded to choice based on individual volition:

In order for an individual to be free, it is required that her actions be the consequence of her ‘own will’ rather than of custom, tradition, or direct coercion. Thus, even illiberal actions can arguably be tolerated if it is determined that they are undertaken by a freely consenting individual who acted of her own accord. (p. 207)

So while other commitments and responsibilities may well exist in this view, say from religious traditions, they are considered to be chosen with regard to private preference and volition. For the neo-liberal regime, then, there is a stress on the importance of the market order as ‘an indispensable mechanism for efficiently allocating resources and safeguarding individual freedom’ because, as neo-liberal discourse maintains, ‘unfettered markets produce a natural order in society from the
voluntary exchange of goods and services, promoting productive efficiency, social prosperity and freedom’ (Turner, 2008, p. 4).

Yet while rhetorically advocating the freedoms afforded by markets, in practice neo-liberal regimes like Australia demonstrate the persistence of the state in instituting and underwriting market relations. This is because according to neo-liberal discourse, a market is understood to be constituted by formal contractual exchanges among individuals seeking to actualise their own private preferences, and which is therefore allegedly indifferent in its structure to any substantive goods or commitments of the person (Walker, 2003). In light of this, the state has the primary responsibility for securing and regulating the social exchange so as to safeguard the market order from devolving into chaos (Turner, 2008, p. 5). Such a vision for ordering societal exchange cannot triumph and retain its predominance without the support of a powerful institution, and the one institution best fitted for the role is the state (Walker, 2003, p. 31). This fact betrays the convention (in claims made by politicians and academics) to draw a sharp distinction between public and private and between markets and a state regulatory hierarchy, for it ‘takes for granted the elaborate institutional infrastructure that underpins the effective functioning of markets.’ (Bell and Hindmoore, 2009, p. 123; also Jones, 1996).

In the field of Australian schooling, as I mentioned in the previous chapter, a key aspect of such an institutional infrastructure is the standardisation of education, which is exemplified in the Federal Government’s implementation of accountability
measures such as NAPLAN and My School on a national scale. By rendering all schools measureable and comparable against a common scale, what such standardisation effects is the articulation of particular differences between schools across the nation onto a plane of equivalence. In such a way, the state can be seen to first create a market through the exercise of hierarchical command (i.e. legislative power and statutory authority), and then proceed to govern through them by steering, resourcing the market through the provision of information, and monitoring the effectiveness of market players – a governmental practice that Bell and Hindmoor (2009, p. 124) call ‘metagovernance.’ This refers to the ‘ongoing steering and resourcing, as well as the monitoring of effectiveness and the provision of accountability and legitimacy.’ (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009, p. 124) Thus while so-called ‘privatisation’ may have created apparently freer markets, through metagovernance it has also led to more regulations. In addition to effecting the articulation of all schools under the purview of the market-state’s regulatory and administrative omniscience, the creation of a measurable space also serves as a precondition for a market in school choice. How, then, are religious schools like those within the NCPC schooling movement positioned within such a market design in a neo-liberal context?

In order to frame religious schools as options in a market for school choice, I contend that neo-liberal discourse presumes upon the definition of religion as an expression of private belief as borne by the Anglo-liberal tradition. This definition is in turn historically derived, as I outlined in Chapter 2, from the nominalist separation of religion from practice, the Protestant individualisation of religion as belief, and the
consignment of religion into the private sphere by contrast to the state and politics in the public sphere in early-modern English liberalism. Within a regime built upon such a definition, religion may up to a point be held as a private theory by individuals or groups, but any serious attempt to embody it in education will be proscribed beyond the point where the ‘givens’ of schooling – that is, the standards that bear on the public purpose of schooling as defined by the prevailing political regime and that can be accounted for – are thought to lie. Religious discourse that is permitted within such an arrangement, as MacIntyre (1988) points out more broadly with regard to different conceptions of the human good, can only be in the idiom of private preference:

What is then permitted in that arena is the expression of preferences, either the preferences of individuals or the preferences of groups, the latter being understood as the preferences who make up those groups, summed up in one way or other. It may well be that in some cases it is some nonliberal theory or conception of the human good which leads individuals to express the preferences they do. But only in the guise of such expressions of preference are such theories and conceptions allowed to receive expression. (p. 336)
In (re)defining religion as an expression of private preferences like any other claim on the human good, the institution of a market in school choice can thus serve as a vehicle for the expression of such preferences. Diverse religious schools may be permitted in such a market insofar as these too are but an expression of the private volition of individuals or families. Yet this way of framing religion occludes neo-liberalism’s mediation of it. Being so occluded, the dominant regime maintains a formal commitment to a ‘free’ market for schooling between competing schools of different religious (and non-religious) identities, presupposing the liberal definition of what constitutes religion, as well as preserving for itself the determination of formal-juridical procedures which make possible such a market.

So just as religion is formally permitted because it is something freely chosen as a private preference, so a market for school choice within a neo-liberal context may be framed rhetorically as offering a formal freedom to parents and families to choose schools according to any religion (or none). However, at the same time, it mediates this freedom to choose via a specific discourse that defines what religion is and exact regulatory mechanisms that supervise how it is to be properly expressed in schooling. Fredericks (2004), in his study of a parallel process with regard to Buddhist institutions under such an arrangement, argues that the confinement of substantive religious and moral discourse to the private sphere serves the economic and political status quo because, on the one hand, such discourses are removed from the realm of public discourse and through state regulation are allowed to be expressed only in private and the market as an arena of contesting wills and private preferences. On the other hand, while the state regulation compels individuals,
families and schools to express religiosity in private and in an agonistic marketplace, the political regime itself and its aims are seldom called into question (Fredericks, 2004, p. 94).

What this way of framing religion means is that the neo-Calvinist tradition within a neo-liberal regime is seen not as a matter of certain practices located within a substantive way of life and education, but confined to the realm of private preference in harmony with the presuppositions of the Anglo-liberal discursive tradition – or ‘the soul’ as is characteristic of the latter’s Protestant inflection – while its educational practices are regulated by the standards of the market-state. This latter process, which creates a simple space across differences within the national territory, then creates the illusion of diversity – that is, as exemplified in My School, the view that schools of different religious and non-religious traditions all occupy the same virtual space marked by the plurality of their private beliefs and preferences in conjunction with the ‘facts’ of their performance. The AACS (2012) in its defence of NCPC schooling appeals precisely to such a diversity undergirded by a regulatory conformity and public commitment to building the nation:

Yes, there are differences between schools that are framed by the worldviews that they subscribe to. But when [NCPC] schools are kept accountable within the terms of legislation and regulation, these differences should not be caricatured as ‘fringe’ or ‘divisive’ but rather celebrated as part of the rich diversity of the nation.
By affirming the regulation of NCPC schooling and framing its religious difference as ‘worldviews’ that are both inconsequential to its ability to perform accountably and contribute to the ‘rich diversity of the nation,’ the AACS reinforces NCPC schooling as an option on the market for school choice, but one that is ‘merely different’ insofar as ‘different religions are just so many ‘different’ ways of saying or experiencing or striving for the ‘same’ ultimate thing’ (Surin, 1990, pp. 74, 76). The religious elements of education, in such a reckoning, become a nominally ‘value-added’ extra to standard schooling in order to attract parental preferences in the schooling market (see Meadmore and Meadmore, 2004), an actuality acknowledged and celebrated by some proponents of NCPC schooling. Framing religious schooling in this way, for example, is UK Christian education scholar Trevor Cooling – featured not infrequently in the NCPC schooling movement’s publications (e.g. Cooling, 2006, pp. 75-90), websites (e.g. Cooling, 2010) and conferences (e.g. Cooling, 2011) – who points out how Christian schools can make a ‘value-added contribution to the [standard] curriculum.’ (Cooling, 2005, p. 2) In a 2005 address delivered in Australia, he summarises how such value-adding functions as a way of enabling Christian schooling to be more religiously distinctive on the one hand, while also sharing in the values of broader society on the other:

In terms of a value added curriculum in a distinctively Christian but inclusive school this has two implications.

Firstly it means the curriculum becomes distinctive when the values taught are earthed in Christian teaching... Secondly the
curriculum will be inclusive because there are shared values to be celebrated... We do this by promoting shared values.

(Cooling, 2005, p. 10)

Cooling’s attempt to articulate the religious discourse of Christian schooling as a value-added dimension to the curriculum as summarised above presupposes, of course, that religion’s relationship to the material practices of education (i.e. the curriculum) is in the first place nominal and auxiliary as ‘values’ as distinct from its ‘facts,’ and in the second place in alignment, to a large extent, to the values of society at large. Such an approach to religious discourse in education as value-added has the effect of rendering religious schools at once accountable to the public purpose of schooling (or what Cooling calls ‘shared values’) as determined by the market-state, as well as encouraging the deployment of its religious discourse in order to gain leverage in a market for school choice. This dual effect is exemplified in the public statements of Wycliffe Christian School, an NCPC school in the outskirts of metropolitan Sydney, which states that:

Educational authorities often speak of value-adding. Reference to academic results later in this report will provide evidence, in part, of the manner in which WCS adds value academically. However WCS’s commitment to academic excellence is not limited to the support provided for more able students. Academic value-adding is just as significant for the students at WCS who receive support
through its extensive Education Support Program. However even more significant in terms of *value-adding* is WCS’S commitment to promoting a holistic view of education that is outworked through four key processes: *Nurturing Faith; Unwrapping Truth; Encouraging Discernment; Enabling Thoughtful Action*. Students are encouraged to wrestle with real life issues from a distinctly Christian worldview within a pastorally supportive environment (a pastorally supportive environment for which Wycliffe is well-known). (Wycliffe Christian School, 2010, p. 3; emphases added)

So for Wycliffe Christian School, value-adding consists initially in what it does as a school to achieve good results in academic performance and aiding those students who do not do so well through its ‘Education Support Program.’ In this sense, it is aligned with the broader public purpose of schooling. Its distinctively neo-Calvinist discourse, which it claims to be central to its educational program, is framed here as a significant value-added feature of the school. These include a ‘distinctly Christian worldview’ as is consistent with the discourse of the broader NCPC schooling movement and, as is emphasised through repetition and accolade, a ‘pastorally supportive environment.’ As with Cooling’s framing of Christian schools, then, Wycliffe Christian School is in this sense demonstrably regulated and accountable in its delivery of standardised education (measured by its ‘academic results’ and ‘academic excellence’), as well as seeking to distinguish itself in a market for school choice through its religious discourse as implying (‘more significant’) value-added qualities. In effect, by associating standard education with
something larger than itself, what such value-adding may be argued to amount to is the selling of particular values with a generic educational product, a symptom of a broader tendency that Carette and King (2005) describe as the instrumental use of religion for marketing under neo-liberalism. This occurs, they claim, by associating a product with something larger than itself so that ‘a distinction can be made between the generic product and what is actually being sold,’ that is, ‘by selling a value with the product.’ (Carette & King, 2005, p. 160) Through such processes, Carette and King (2005) go on to argue: ‘religious systems and traditions are ‘merged’ in a manner that makes them fundamentally supportive of the single truth of neoliberalism’ (p. 150).

Therefore, what Cooling’s remarks about value-adding in general and the example of Wycliffe Christian School in particular demonstrate is that the market for school choice has entailed a specific redefinition of religiosity in religious schools – that is, the latter are permitted only as a choice based on individual or family preferences, which is in turn derived from private beliefs with nominal connections to the educational practices of schooling. Simultaneously, religious schools such as those within the NCPC schooling movement are compelled to compete for such private preferences, which is done primarily by associating the delivery of a standard product (i.e. educational service of schooling) with its religious discourse confined to exhortations to choose (NCPC schools) with a view to being ‘accountable to God’ and as value-added qualities in marketing itself. This reflects a market-driven understanding of the private individual or family as having the authority of choice even over religious matters, so that ‘people are increasingly treating religion as
providing commodities – acting with self-informed authority to choose those components of the religious sphere which best suit their own particular consumer requirements’ (Heelas, 1994, p. 102).

The amenability of schools within the NCPC schooling movement to such an arrangement can be understood, in some significant sense, as a conjunctural articulation of elements from the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition like parental responsibility outlined above with the presuppositions of the Anglo-liberal tradition that religion is primarily a matter of belief whose locus is in the private realm, and hence is best expressed through the free choices of individuals or families. On this basis, I argue, NCPC schools are thus rendered amenable to being contained within a market for school choice marked by a logic of nominal difference – that is, as mentioned above, where differences are non-substantive insofar as they are subordinate to a higher equivalence.

By contrast to the logic of equivalence which foregrounds the division of the social field into two, simplified camps of us/them and friend/enemy – for example, schools that are articulated under a ‘shared, public purpose’ versus ‘examples of unacceptable underperformance’ as discussed in the previous chapter – a logic of difference entails emphasising the opposite. According to the Gramscian analytic of Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p. 130ff.), it involves a dispersion of the simplified social polarities of equivalence into a larger number of more specific identities by dissolving existing chains of equivalence and incorporating those disarticulated
elements into an expanding order (also Jørgensen & Philips, 2002). However, the logics of difference and equivalence should not be seen as mutually exclusive, for ‘just as the logic of difference never manages to constitute a fully sutured space, neither does the logic of equivalence ever achieve this’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 129). This means that both logics are always existent in a given conjuncture because equivalence will always entail some acceptable differences encompassed within the ‘we’ and conversely, a logic of difference will always entail some limits, i.e. ‘acceptable’ versus ‘unacceptable’ differences. So whereas the foregrounding of a logic of equivalence as exemplified in parts of Gillard’s speech to the AISNSW cited in the previous chapter seeks to divide schools into an ‘us/them’ axis when speaking of school performance, a logic of difference attempts to weaken and displace antagonistic polarities through dissolving commonalities. This may take the form of an expansive notion of ‘diversity’ where differences are considered different within a broadly conceived ‘mainstream,’ as for example through policies of ‘multiculturalism’ or ‘social inclusion’ of disparate discourses as mere ‘life-style choices’ (cf. Bauman, 2000, pp. 38-52) or, in the case of NCPC schools a form of value-added choice derived from private preferences. This too can be exemplified in Gillard’s (2008) speech to the leaders of independent private schools where, notwithstanding the clear demarcation and exclusion of those schools she has castigated as unacceptable, the right of parents to choose between schools that are presumably within the range of acceptable differences is highlighted:

It is education – starting in the early years, going through our schools and extending to TAFE, universities and beyond – that will
shape the future productivity and wellbeing of Australia. And I want to reiterate here the Government’s support for the full right of parents to choose the school that best meets the needs of their child.

What is notable and revealing in this passage from Gillard is the valorisation of parental choice while simultaneously demarcating the diversity of schooling within a unity of an end – ‘the future productivity and wellbeing of Australia.’ It is here that the logic of difference – or what I more specifically call a logic of nominal difference – is most evident; for while the push toward a nationally standardised education may at the outset imply a negation of market choice, this is not the case. For absent such standards, there is neither a measurable base of information for school choice, nor for identifying what constitutes ‘high-performing schools’ as implied by the Federal Government. Thus, measures like NAPLAN and My School are concerned with facilitating school choice by making clear, comparable and accessible information available demonstrates an apparent logic of acceptable differences in the market insofar as qualitative differences of schools are articulated onto a single plane of measurement under the ‘shared/public purpose on education’ at the level of government (i.e. Catholic ≡ State ≡ NCPC schooling).

Simultaneously on the level of the market for school choice, schools are compelled to mark out their differences to court parental preferences primarily through competition established quantitatively in their relative performances toward these educational standards, and secondarily by emphasising their religious (or non-
religious) distinctions as qualitative, ‘value-added’ features (Catholic ≠ State ≠ NCPC schooling – see Figure 17). In short, as McLaren (2001) puts it, ‘diversity and difference are allowed to proliferate and flourish, provided that they remain within the prevailing forms of capitalist social arrangements.’ (p. liv)

Figure 17: A logic of difference in the market that positions NCPC schooling as nominally ‘different’ vis-à-vis other forms of schooling (Catholic ≠ State ≠ NCPC). Regulation of differences is effected through state-enforced standards for the ‘shared/public purpose of schooling.’ This functions as a higher logic of equivalence (Catholic ≡ State ≡ NCPC) that then enables a space of nominal differences for ‘parental choice’ (notwithstanding those who are excluded for ‘unacceptable underperformance’). NCPC schooling actively consents to the hegemony of neo-liberal discourse by rendering neo-Calvinist discourse in alignment with the market for school choice.

So contrary to the neo-liberal definition of markets as ‘free’ and the neo-Calvinist notion of markets as operating autonomously owing to God’s providence as inferred from Kuyper, this case of the Australian schooling market demonstrates how
government action is unremitting in any market order. Indeed with particular pertinence to religious schooling, Turner (2011) elucidates that from the ‘economic or market view of religion’:

[S]tates will be interested in the ‘quality’ of religious products on the market. Just as states intervene in issues to do with secular consumerism – for example testing the quality of food and the cleanliness of restaurants through various agencies charged with the oversight of public health and hygiene – so we can expect secular states to manage religions through testing the quality of their products, especially their relations with minors. (p. 176)

Within such an arrangement, the circuit of power between the market-state and individual religious schools like those within the NCPC schooling movement is sustained because a market predicated on different private preferences will always need to be undergirded by a ‘higher synthesis’ (or logic of equivalence) that absorbs the many into the one, thus creating a minimal commonality in difference. For ‘[i]n the absence of shared ends, devotion to the state itself as the end in itself becomes more urgent.’ (Cavanaugh, 2011, p. 31)

Within such a context, religious discourse in schools like those within the NCPC schooling movement can be expressed, but this tends to take the form of bearing value-added qualities like Christian values in the curriculum or a supportive
pastoral care environment in order to appeal to private preferences in a market for school choice. So even for those schools in the market from religious traditions like neo-Calvinism that contain voices who decry the excesses of neo-liberal regimes (e.g. Goudzwaard, Walsh and Keesmaat, Bartholomew and Goheen cited above), the tying of their institutional survival to competitive market relations will increase the pressures to practically conform to its logic. As Fanfani (2003) argues of the logic of the market *vis-à-vis* religious principles:

> [I]n a society in which two or more individuals have something to offer (supply), and *x* individuals require that something (demand), it is obvious that if one of the two in command of the commodity, in the absence of any impediment in the civil law (the only law that has coercive force today), puts himself in a position to supply those who require it with greater ease, his competitors will be obliged to imitate him under pain of serious losses, even if to do so they will have to do violence to convictions or ideals to which they would normally have remained faithful. (pp. 62-63)

In turn, because such a market for school choice also requires the prior institution of an equivalential space for its functioning, it cannot brook a substantive pluralism of ends that the presence of religious discourses potentially represents. To attenuate this potential, as demonstrated in the case of NCPC schooling, a general commitment is established in the form of a ‘shared public purpose for schooling’ and
its accompanying state regulation is implemented under its aegis – owing to the status of ‘civil law’ as ‘the only law that has coercive force today’ as characterised by Fanfani above – with the result that the ‘religious’ dimension of religious schooling will only bear a nominal connection to accountable and measureable educational practices. Differences in religious schooling are thus submitted to a higher equivalence, which brackets off its religious elements by designating as ‘belief,’ ‘values,’ ‘value-added’ and/or ‘culture-specific’ all the historically and politically substantive particularities potentially borne by various discursive traditions, thus effecting a consignment of different religious discourses into the form of what Surin (1990) calls ‘hyper-abstracted idioms’ that have but a nominal connection to educational practices (pp. 81-82).

In their various studies of a structurally homologous neo-liberal market for ‘controlled choice’ in Israel, Shapira, Haymann and Shavit (1995), Bekerman (2000) and Yonah, Dahan and Markovich (2008) also find that where religious schools are taken to be ‘service providers’ – that is, where education is a ‘service’ provided by the school while students and parents are individuated ‘customers’ – the implication is that such schools are subject to the principles of supply and demand in a ‘deregulated’ competitive market, as well as to a concomitant ‘re-regulation’ by the market-state under the signs of ‘quality,’ ‘objective setting’ and ‘accountability’ where each school ‘is obligated to evaluate and assess its [own] activities and achievements with complete transparency’ (Yonah et al, 2008, p. 208). Ironically in the case of the NCPC schooling movement in Australia, despite its founding commitment to an education as religiously primary and all-encompassing, its
repackaging as a religious ‘service provider’ regulated by the secular state is abetted by its advocacy of privatised parental choice in a providentially sustained market for schools, which is in turn justified through a particular configuration of elements from within the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition. Far from autonomous spheres that are self-sustaining as portrayed by Kuyper, then, its conceptual reduction of potential patrons to the status of individual agents (whether individual persons or individual families) pursuing religious education as private preferences will tend to buttress the institution of a market for school choice, one which will necessitate the secular market-state’s perpetual (meta)governance in order to guarantee the freedom of each to express their religion as a market choice, as well as to actively regulate and sustain the space required for such choices to be made. The label for this paradox of religious schooling within a neo-liberal regime put forward by Shapira et al (1995) appears, in this instance, to be apt: ‘Autonomy as ethos, content as commodity.’

Conclusion

In this chapter, I argued that according to neo-liberal discourse, a market in school choice is seen as the most efficient means of achieving the public purpose of schooling. Based on the methodological individualism of liberal discourse and the framework of public choice theory, proponents of such a market design – including both the Federal Government and the Opposition in Australian politics – have lauded its ability to generate competitive efficiency between schools while offering individuals and families a freedom of choice to suit their preferences. In order to institute and sustain such a market for school choice, however, requires the
imposition of a common scale of measurement across schools differently located geographically and demographically across the nation in order to facilitate comparison between options.

Here, the federally-implemented standardised education measures like the testing and reporting instruments of NAPLAN and My School, as well as the planned introduction of the Australian National Curriculum in 2013, come to the fore not only because they regulate schools in accordance with the broader public purpose for schooling as defined by neo-liberal discourse (see Chapter 5), but also insofar as it creates the conditions of possibility for a national market in schooling. This latter function is perhaps unsurprising, for the imposition by the state of uniform measures across a given space is characteristic of the creation of national capitalist markets since the time of their inception. As economic historian Fanfani (2003) describes of this historical process: ‘[One] means of unifying the market is the establishment of uniform weights and measures. The absolute States made a certain progress in this direction, and sometimes succeeded in abolishing or reducing the inconveniences of local systems of weights and measures. The absolute States made a certain progress in this direction, and sometimes succeeded in abolishing or reducing the inconveniences of local systems of weights and measures.’ (p. 101) While the market-state under a neo-liberal regime cannot simply be equated with the early-modern absolute state described by Fanfani, it nonetheless remains what Gamble (1979) calls a ‘strong state,’ a state that has to be active in order to maintain the conditions which guarantee ‘individual liberty’ as expressed through market choices. In this view, the tendency toward greater standardisation of education in Australia through national testing, reporting and curricula can be seen as a key means through which the state creates and sustains the conditions for a market in school choice by imposing a
uniform measure of schooling nationwide, thus allowing individuals and families to compare and contrast different schools on its basis.

The NCPC schooling movement’s view on the institution of such a market for school choice, as I canvassed above, appears to be overwhelmingly positive. Based on the affirmation that the primary responsibility for education lies with parents, the NCPC schooling movement has, through the political lobbying of the AACS, ardently supported the cause of school choice in Australia. The role of the state, according to the AACS, is to provide opportunities for parents to choose schools other than state-run schools for their children that are congruent with their religious beliefs. This is also evinced in the *Why Christian Schools?* booklet published by the NCPC schooling movement, which underlines God’s delegation of responsibility to parents for the nurture of their children by contrast to educational provision by both the state and churches, as well as by teachers. Like the AACS, this booklet establishes a correlation between this God-given responsibility drawn from neo-Calvinist discourse and the need to have choices in schooling, with Christian (i.e. NCPC) schooling put forward as an exemplary expression of responsible school choice for Christian parents.

This position of the NCPC schooling movement on market choice, I argued, can be seen as a conjunctural interpretation of elements within the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition. Specifically, the NCPC schooling movement aligns Calvin’s injunctions on parental responsibility for the nurture of children with market choice as understood by neo-liberal discourse. This effectively buttresses the present social order, in the first place, by sanctioning a market for school choice through its
framing of such an arrangement as the one most suitable for the expression of their religiosity and fidelity to their tradition. In turn, this is underwritten by an implicit identification of the market order with a transcendent or providential self-sufficiency, which involves a specific reading of Kuyper’s sphere sovereignty concept and the autonomy of arenas of social life from the state.

In consequence of such a conjunctural interpretation of sphere sovereignty, the NCPC schooling movement abets the prevailing neo-liberal regime in the second place by framing NCPC schooling as one choice in a market of schools, which effectively positions religious schooling as an expression of private preference. Yet in advancing such a market-driven position, the NCPC schooling movement occludes the persistence and presence of the state in regulating schools through the market via the mechanisms through which it institutes and sustains the latter.

In turn, according to neo-liberal discourse, I argued that private choice on the market – whether stemming from the preferences of individuals or families – is emphasised as the arena through which freedom is realised apart from the state regulation. Yet because of the neo-liberal belief in the efficacy of the market, the state persists through the exercise of hierarchical authority to create markets, and then proceeds to govern through them by steering, resourcing the market through the provision of information and monitoring the effectiveness of market players. The market in school choice can be seen in this way not as an expression of diversity as such, but as an institutional space made operable through the levelling of differences onto a plane of equivalence under governmental regulation, which is in turn geared
toward preparing for globalisation and market comparison between nominal differences.

The basis for such an arrangement for religious schooling derives from the presupposition borne by the Anglo-liberal tradition that religion is a personal and private matter. Hence, the religious discourse in religious schools within a neo-liberal regime may be professed as private belief by individuals, families and schools to a certain extent, but such matters of personal preference must be cordoned off from those standards of education that are accountably-provable and measurable. So when this privatisation of religion is taken in conjunction with the valorisation of parental choice of schooling, the market-state can be seen to articulate religious schools like those within the NCPC schooling movement into a logic of nominal differences. By levelling out substantive differences, the market for school choice gives the illusion of diversity. For religious schools like NCPC schools within such a market of nominal differences, I have argued that its religious aspects come to serve as a ‘value-added’ feature of such schools seeking to gain leverage in the market.

This presumption that religion in religious schooling is divisible from a certain way of life and materiality reveals the neo-liberal regime’s historical specificity as a product of a particular discursive tradition. More specifically, the presuppositions derived from Protestantism define religion as primarily a product of private belief and preference, and hence freedom of religion is expressed, in one way, as the freedom of private individuals or families to choose a ‘private’ religious school. The political implications of such a discourse generates a mystifying view of the state as ethically and religiously neutral, bearing a ‘thin’ procedural notion of justice defined
as the adjudication of an agonistic market for preference expression; a notion of justice shared by the AACS and Edlin in their interpretation of Kuyper’s arguments for a limited state.

In effect, what such a regime allows is not a ‘rise of religious schooling’ that can be expressed and embodied substantively in a way that opposes the secular public sphere, whether this is taken to be a positive or dangerous development depending on the side taken in the debate along the secular/religious line. As legal scholar Bhandar (2009) points out with regard to cultures in general, within a putatively secular and multicultural society that is structured along neo-liberal lines, the normative type of subject is one that is formally sovereign, autonomous and free to choose in the image of the ‘consumer citizen subject’ – in particular, one who is opposed to a self that is constrained by substantive religious obligations and desires (or should desire) to ‘live a lifestyle that comports with free-market economic principles.’ (pp. 320-321) Hence, she goes on to argue that in such a society: ‘Cultural practices and traditions, festivals, dance, music, food, and clothing have all been embraced within multiculturalism that not only tolerates difference but celebrates it in the form of commodification and consumption.’ (Bhandar, 2009, p. 321; see also Brown, 2005, pp. 151-154) By extension, if it is the case as Turner (2011) argues that ‘all multicultural societies are multi-faith societies’ because ‘in practice it is difficult to separate ‘religion’ from ‘culture’’ (p. 175), then religion of the sort articulated by the NCPC schooling movement can also be seen as acceptable insofar as it adopts the commodity form for sovereign, autonomous and freely choosing consumers.
Conclusion

Religion is permitted – not as a substantial way of life, but as a particular ‘culture’ or, rather, life-style phenomenon: what legitimizes it is not its immanent truth-claim but the way it allows us to express our innermost feelings and attitudes.

(Žižek, 2004)

In the introduction to this thesis, I noted several questions that had arisen out of the debates and controversies surrounding the new visibility of religious schooling in Australia. Specifically, they concerned what and who defines ‘religion’ and ‘education,’ how these terms have come to be defined and debated, particularly along the lines of public/private and secular/religious with regard to religious schooling in Australia today. In addition and on the basis of an inquiry into the above questions, I further asked how these definitions are acted upon in the present, what the effects of such definitions on religious schooling are and, within the present conjuncture, for what ends. In particular, these latter questions also dovetailed with those arising from reflection upon my own experiences at the intersection of religion and education. For example, are some forms of religious schooling considered more acceptable than others? If so, how are the religious claims of such ‘acceptable’ religious schools understood to be substantiated in the context of the present educational system? Are particular religious schools so different if, in their manifold variety, they can be rated and ranked beside differently religious and non-religious schools? And, if religion does not exist as a transcendent object above the fray of history, society and politics
but always involves immanent practices, then what is the role of religious schooling within the present social order? In this conclusion, I shall seek to address these questions, in part, on the basis of the argument developed in the preceding chapters. In addition and in cognisance of the limits of this thesis, I shall also gesture towards further important but unattended areas of inquiry raised by this present work, especially pertaining to religious education in non-Christian traditions within a neo-liberal context.

**Religious schooling: Privatisation, anti-secularism, or neo-liberal hegemony?**

With regard to whether some forms of religious schooling considered are more acceptable than others, I began in Chapter 1 by canvassing what is considered to be religious education in Australia today. Drawing on the one hand on the ASCRG and the High Court’s definition of ‘religion’ – that is, as primarily concerned with belief in a Supernatural Being, Thing or Principle and its associated moral conducts that are taken to give effect to that prior belief – and ‘education’ through schooling on the other hand as a means of training future citizens for employment and civic participation on the other, I surmised from these definitions that the articulation of these two elements in the form of ‘religious education’ – most visibly in its institutionalized form of ‘religious schooling’ – denotes a particular conjunction of belief transmission and the training of desired worker-citizens.
Yet as I also highlighted in Chapter 1, how ‘religion’ and ‘education’ are variously defined – and indeed debated – is dependent on the contingent historical and political settlements in any given context. Following the work of critical pedagogy scholars in the case of the latter element and contemporary scholars of religion like Asad, Fitzgerald, Cavanaugh amongst others in the former, I argued that the way religion and education are commonly understood is a product of specificities in the cultural and political field that define, demarcate and fix them in a given time and place. In other words, I take leave from the a priori assumptions that religion and/or education are phenomena ‘out there’ or ‘in essence’ that can be defined in a self-evident or unproblematic way, preferring to highlight how their conjunction in the present form of religious education – particularly in the institutional form of contemporary religious schooling – is descended from historical and political contexts that have articulated both religion and education differently over time.

In order to demonstrate the contingency of how religious education is defined and debated in the present, I offered a genealogical account of how religious education in Australia came to be defined as it is via the discursive continuities and discontinuities within the predominant Anglo-liberal tradition in Chapter 2 and 3. In tracing the genealogy of how religion has come to be conceived as primarily a set of beliefs in a supernatural Being, Thing or principle that give rise to a set of moral conducts, and religious education broadly defined as the transmission of such religion, I pointed to three key historical moments in the Anglo-liberal tradition: firstly, the rise of the late-Medieval theology of nominalism, which effectively broke the unity of religion and practical reason by positing a conception of God as
inscrutable and distant, thus separating the world into distinct orders of an apparent, secular natural world knowable by reason and a supernatural religious realm attainable only by belief; secondly, the Protestant reformation triggered by Luther and his doctrine of the ‘Two Kingdoms,’ which developed the nominalist definition of faith as belief by delimitating its locus to the ‘inner’ life of individual subjects while ‘outer’ worldly practices are merely secondary expressions of inner faith, with the latter being appropriately subject to and governed by secular authorities who are appointed by God’s divine fiat; and thirdly, accompanying the rise of the modern state as the apex of legitimate authority, the realm of religion is designated by early-modern liberals – most prominently in Britain by Locke – as belonging in the private realm where individuals strive for the salvation of their souls by worshipping God while the realm of civil society/government in public is concerned with the socio-political order of this world.

However, I further argued in Chapter 2, the liberal insistence on such a separation exemplified by Locke tends to betray the theological discourses of nominalism and Protestant religion in England that gave rise to hegemonic assumptions about religion through its ‘private’ influence on ‘public’ citizens and officials who, in turn, determine what forms of religion are acceptable or unacceptable for social order. A chief means of such private influence, I conjectured through a reading of Locke’s pioneering formulation, was through so-called private religious education and its formation of subjects that eventually come to inhabit the realm of public politics and the state. Rather than accepting the liberal framework of a separation between politics and religion corresponding to the public/private
division, which is itself predicated on a nominalist rendering of religion as belief apart from practical reason in the world and a Protestant separation of ‘Two Kingdoms,’ I posited an alternative view based on Gramsci’s notions of ‘hegemony’ and the ‘integral state.’ In this latter schema – which I adjudged to be more efficacious in foregrounding the political effects of the Anglo-liberal tradition’s public/private and secular/religious distinctions in education – so-called ‘private’ institutions can be understood not as a separate apolitical realm, but rather as the site of hegemony whereby dominant discourses are disseminated at the level of popular belief. Such popular beliefs – or commonsense – then exert an influence in the public sphere involving, amongst other things, the institution of the state, legislation, legal doctrine and politics. As such, the public sphere of liberal politics encompassing these elements is better seen as forming a ‘circuit of power’ in conjunction with the private sphere of religion. In turn, religious education can be seen as a conduit for the circulation of dominant discourses insofar as its ‘acceptable’ forms are regulated by the liberal state on the one hand, while on the other it (re)produces constituent citizens of the state that adjudge ‘acceptability’ by reference to the predominant definitions of religious education.

The effects of this circuit of power between the public and private spheres, and by implication the domains of the secular and religious, were borne out most clearly in the foundation of ‘public’ and ‘secular’ schooling in NSW after the colonisation of Australia in 1788. As I highlighted in Chapter 3, the establishment of the latter was defined in active opposition to the minority Roman Catholic discourse of the time that insisted on a definition of religion as intrinsic to educational practices. By contrast, the discourse of the emergent public and secular system, which presupposed
a nominal connection between the discourses of particular religions and general educational practices, as well as a Protestant definition of religion as primarily a matter of private conviction with a secondary connection to public morality. Drawing again on a Gramscian reading, I argued that the eventual institution of this latter conception of religious education as hegemonic over the Roman Catholic conception can be understood to be an effect of the populist articulation of Protestant and liberal discourses that gave rise to a historic bloc under the sign of ‘the Nation’ that was opposed to Roman Catholic religious education (and Roman Catholicism in general), which was castigated as ‘unjust and oppressive,’ ‘hateful and anti-national,’ ‘against the enlightened progress of the age’ and so on. In this frame, the establishment of public and secular education in NSW (and in Australia more generally), far from being what had been popularly described by the liberal discourse at the time as educational progress owing to the operation of an inevitable law, can in fact be understood as the codification of hegemonic nominalist, Protestant and liberal assumptions about religious education against the Catholic view.

The specificity and effects of the Anglo-liberal tradition’s understanding of religious education as a private affair versus public education as secular and universally-accessible was also brought to the fore when placed alongside the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition. This latter tradition, which is predicated on the expansive social and political visions of Calvin in the sixteenth century and Dutch neo-Calvinist politicians in the nineteenth century as outlined in Chapter 4, bore an expansive definition of religious education as all-encompassing. This tradition was embodied by Dutch migrants to Australia in the 1950s, which led to an antagonism
with the then-prevailing system of education and its definition of religious education as private and separate from public and secular education. This gave rise to a movement for separate neo-Calvinist ‘parent-controlled’ schools from the 1950s onward across Australia and the formation of NCPC schools from the 1960s, an educational movement that was integrated into the educational mainstream only after the implementation of the 1973 Karmel Report that made state funding available for religious schools.

The integration of religious schools such as those from the NCPC schooling movement (as well as the hitherto separate Roman Catholic schools) into the Australian education system in the 1970s after the Karmel Report brings up two further questions posed in the introduction to this thesis: How are the religious claims and values of ‘acceptable’ religious schools understood to be substantiated in the context of the present educational system? And are particular religious schools so different if, in their manifold variety, they can be rated and ranked beside differently religious and non-religious schools? In Chapter 3, I considered the place of religious education in the period of nation-building under the hegemony of a social liberal regime from the time of Federation in 1901 to the 1980s. Religious education under this political regime was demonstrably built upon the presuppositions of the Anglo-liberal discursive tradition, which maintained that the former could either occupy the public realm by recourse to broadly generalisable values that contributed to the good of the nation, or remain confined to the realm of private devotion. So while so-called ‘independent’ or ‘private’ schools based on particular religious (and non-religious) traditions like NCPC schooling were eventually assimilated into the educational mainstream in the 1970s, they were under a social liberal regime also simultaneously
levelled onto a space of administrative comparison with reference to their
collection to the hegemonically-defined national good – that is, they were judged
according to their efficacy in training workers and citizens for the nation. In short,
religious differences in such schools were positioned as ‘values’ that, while
nominally expressing the diversity of belief, were incidental to the ‘facts’ of
education (i.e. its practices), which they shared in common with non-religious
schools.

These Anglo-liberal presuppositions about religion in education were further
built upon in the shift from a social liberal regime to a neo-liberal regime from the
1980s on, which can be broadly characterised as a shift away from nation-building
toward an emphasis on forging a nation populated with skilled worker-citizens for
what is presumed to be a globalising labour market. I argued that while neo-liberal
regimes are often characterised as dogmatically and rhetorically positing free
markets – including a market in school choice – the state is still prominent in
instituting, facilitating, regulating and delimiting such markets. This restructured
state, which can be labelled the ‘market-state’ owing to its redefined function, is
evident in the simultaneous proliferation of accountability measures like standardised
testing and reporting in order to regulate schools across the nation in alignment with
the educational imperatives of the neo-liberal vision of globalisation on the one hand,
and on the other hand in encouraging a market for school choice on the basis of
performance according to such measures. Despite the rhetoric of school diversity
offered in a market for school choice propounded by neo-liberal discourse, then, I
argued that religious schooling under this regime remains confined to expressing
private ‘values’ apart from the public ‘facts’ of education deemed necessary owing to globalisation, while the market for school choice allows for the possibility of religious discourse to be framed as ‘value-added’ supplements that appeal to the private preferences of potential consumers. The most immediate effect of persisting in categorising religious schools as private in contrast to secular public schools is thus to obscure how the former – despite their formal status as ‘private’ educational service providers in the market for school choice – remain linked to the (integral) market-state insofar as they are regulated and steered through accountability measures towards the end of education as defined by neo-liberal discourse.

I considered the political effects of this manner of categorising religious schools more specifically with regard to the NCPC schooling movement in Chapters 5 and 6. This religious schooling movement, was initiated in the 1950s in explicit opposition to the mainstream education system in Australia, advancing instead an expansive view of its religious discourse as affecting all educational practices. Despite its integration into the mainstream education system today, the movement remains insistent on its distinctive neo-Calvinist theological motifs that in turn undergird its ‘foundational values’: namely, the importance of parental responsibility in the nurture of their children and the training students to responsive disciples who will occupy various social spheres for the purpose of glorifying God/Christ. How then, I inquired, are these foundational values interpreted by the NCPC schooling movement within the present neo-liberal conjuncture? This inquiry can be considered a partial address to the broader question I had posed in the introduction: that is, if religion does not exist as a transcendent object above the fray of history, society and
politics but always involves immanent practices, then what is the role of religious schooling within the present social order?

In Chapter 5, I examined more closely how the NCPC schooling movement’s foundational value of the training students to responsive disciples of God/Christ is related to the ‘public purpose of schooling’ as defined by neo-liberal discourse, which is taken to be the training of future worker-citizens to compete effectively in an (allegedly) inexorably globalising labour market. Through a consideration of the statements made by the NCPC schooling movement, I argued that despite its formally ‘independent’ or ‘private’ label, it aligns itself with this public purpose of education through accountability measures like standardised testing and reporting, seeing such measures as legitimate and as an avenue for its students to exercise their God-given talents. This alignment can be explained, I argued, as a consequence of a shared nominalist construal of religion as separate in essence from practices as held by both the neo-Calvinist and Anglo-liberal discursive traditions, the latter of which is the basis of the neo-liberal regime. For the former, the world and human practices are interpreted as but instrumental to the glory of God, which leads it to adopt a form of Christian realism and pragmatism that sees social reality and its institutions – most prominently the state – as providentially-derived. Accordingly, the NCPC schooling movement seeks to actualise the God-given talents of its students so that they may inhabit and work in these institutions as synonymously Christian witnesses and prominent citizens, which coincides with the broader public purpose of education to train worker-citizens.
Simultaneously, for the neo-liberal regime built upon the nominalist presuppositions of the Anglo-liberal discursive tradition, religious schooling is regulated through a privatisation of its religious elements whereby the latter are permitted to be expressed as long as education arranged according to the hegemonically defined public purpose are executed and accounted for. On a Gramscian reading, I surmised that the neo-liberal regime is thus able to sustain its hegemony by articulating religious schools like those in the NCPC schooling movement into a logic of equivalence under this public purpose of schooling, thereby regulating religious schools by obliging accountable performance while still permitting them the expression of their particular, private religious discourses. In addition, I also conjectured that the recent federal implementation of standardised testing and reporting instruments in the form of NAPLAN and My School serves not only to regulate schools in accordance with the broader public purpose for schooling as defined by neo-liberal discourse, but also to institute and sustain a market for school choice, which requires the imposition of common measures across all schools differently located geographically and demographically across the nation in order to facilitate comparison between options.

In Chapter 6, I furthered this argument by considering the how the NCPC schooling movement’s foundational value of parental responsibility for the nurture of children relates to the neo-liberal exaltation of a market in school choice as the most efficient means of achieving the public purpose of schooling. Based on statements and promotional literature from the former, I surmised that the NCPC schooling movement’s view on the institution of such a market for school choice appears to be overwhelmingly positive. Based on the affirmation that the primary responsibility for
education lies with parents, the NCPC schooling movement has, through political lobbying, ardently supported the cause of school choice in Australia. This position of the NCPC schooling movement on market choice, I argued, can be seen as a conjunctural interpretation of elements within the neo-Calvinist discursive tradition which aligns Calvin’s injunctions on parental responsibility for the nurture of children with market choice as understood within a neo-liberal regime. This effectively buttresses the present social order by sanctioning a market for school choice as the arrangement most suitable for the expression of their religiosity and fidelity to their tradition, a sanctioning that is underwritten by an implicit identification of the market order with a transcendent or providential self-sufficiency derived from a specific reading of Kuyper’s sphere sovereignty concept and the autonomy of arenas of social life from the state.

In turn, for the neo-liberal regime based on the presupposition that religion is a personal and private matter derived from the Anglo-liberal tradition, religious discourse in religious schools may be professed as private belief and consumer preference by individuals, families and schools to a certain extent, but such subjective convictions must be cordoned off from those objective standards of schooling that are accountably-provable and measurable. When this privatisation of religion is taken in conjunction with the NCPC schooling movement’s valorisation parental choice of schooling, I argued that the political effect is the absorption of religious schools like those within the NCPC schooling movement into a logic of nominal differences on a common scale of comparability wrought by the market-state’s accountability measures. For religious schools like NCPC schools within such a market of nominal differences, I inferred that its religious aspects come to serve as
a ‘value-added’ feature for appealing to the private religious preferences of potential
consumers in the market for school choice.

On the basis of the findings presented and arguments developed in these
chapters, then, it is appropriate at this point to pose the final question raised in the
introduction: what are some of the limitations, if any, in the way the recent rise of
religious schooling in Australia has been commonly conceived? I put forward the
case that approaching the new visibility of religious schooling in Australia through
the categorisations of public/private and secular/religious lines is limited on three
counts. In the first place, I claim that the public/private categories obscure how
religious education formally considered to occupy the private sphere – specifically
religious private schooling like that represented by the NCPC schooling movement –
is linked to the public sphere in a circuit of power that sustains the hegemony of the
prevailing neo-liberal regime. Drawing on a Gramscian reading of religious
schooling, I conjectured, more helpfully foregrounds the present case of religious
schooling as site of political hegemony, despite its formal status as private schooling.
In other words, as Buttigieg (1995) summarises following Gramsci, ‘civil society
[i.e. the private sphere] is the arena wherein the ruling class extends and reinforces
its power by non-violent means.’ (p. 26) Hence, insofar as those activities that are
claimed to belong to the private sphere like religious education actually serve to
reaffirm the public ‘reality’ of the dominant political regime – for example, the
public purpose of education as training in anticipation of globalisation and/or the
naturalness of the market – commentary on or scrutiny of the former must always
imply attention to its links and positioning with latter.
Put more pointedly, what becomes obvious in the formal division of private religious schooling versus public secular schooling is the absence of questioning of the broad consensus on the purpose of schooling in relation to the hegemony of the ‘actually existing’ political regime and economy. As Mouffe (2000) rightly points out from a Gramscian frame: ‘Consensus in a liberal-democratic society is – and always will be – the expression of hegemony and the crystallization of power relations.’ (p. 49) This consensus on the purpose of schooling traverses both sides of the public/private divide because it is sustained by both formally public and private spheres. With regard to the education system within the present neo-liberal regime in particular, it is thus evident that while ‘deregulation’ and ‘privatisation’ are often put forward as its chief modus operandi, there appears to be a concomitant expansion and extension of regulation into formally private religious schooling to ensure the conformity of the latter to the public purpose. Levi-Faur and Jordan (2005) are thus arguably right to surmise that: ‘If we were to judge neoliberalism by the degree of ‘deregulation’ it attained, it would be a failure. If we were to judge it by the degree of ‘regulation’ it promoted, it would be, on its own terms, a fiasco.’ (p. 7)

A second limitation of the present approaches to religious schooling is wrought by the dichotomy of the secular/religious. For while both proponents and opponents of religious schooling seek to defend, preserve and perpetuate the integrity of education ordered along the lines of each term in the dichotomy, it occludes how religion in religious schooling is itself increasingly mediated and transformed by the institution of a market for school choice. As Mahmood (2008) stresses with acuity, despite the common framing of the secular and the religious as inimical, both are
It is quite common to hear voices from all sides of the political spectrum posit an incommensurable divide between strong religious belief and a secular worldview. Despite this intense polarization… the religious and the secular are not so much immutable essences or opposed ideologies as they are concepts that gain a particular salience with the emergence of the modern state and attendant politics – concepts that are, furthermore, interdependent and necessarily linked in their mutual transformation and historical emergence. Viewed from this perspective, as a secular rationality has come to define law, statecraft, knowledge production, and economic relations in the modern world, it has also simultaneously transformed the conceptions, ideals, practices and institutions of religious life. Secularism… is understood not simply as the doctrinal separation of church from state, but the rearticulation of religion in a manner that is commensurate with modern sensibilities and modes of governance. To rethink the religious is to also rethink the secular and its truth claims, its promise of internal and external goods.
In relation to religious schooling, I argue in concurrence with the logic of Mahmood’s argument that the secular involves the re-articulation of religion in a manner that is commensurate with prevailing sensibilities and modes of governance. In this instance, religion is defined in accordance with the formally ‘secular’ rationale of the neo-liberal regime – specifically, that a market design is the most effective means for simultaneously achieving both the public purpose of education and the satisfaction of private preferences in belief. What this mode of governance has, in turn, achieved is the articulation of the religious elements in religious schooling as a value-added enhancement that marks out nominal differences for attracting potential consumers of educational services. Thus, far from being a substantive religious threat to the secular social order, schools like those within the NCPC schooling movement can be seen to express religiosity in ways that are commensurable with the prevailing non-religious rationality of neo-liberal discourse.

Lastly, I argue that framing the question of religious schooling along public/private and secular/religious lines elides the specificity of how religion and religious education – and by implication secular and public education – are defined in Australia as derived from the Anglo-liberal discursive tradition. The presumption of autonomy pertaining to each of these categories does not take into account the contingent historical and political shifts and settlements that have given rise to these bifurcations of the social world – shifts and settlements that are infused with specific theological and religious impetuses. In particular, I claim that by not confronting the provincial antecedents of the Anglo-liberal tradition’s categorisations of education into public/private and secular/religious raises a significant problem: namely, what is the position of religious schools that do not ‘fit in’ easily with the nominalist
assumption that religion concerned with the supernatural is separable from substantive educational practices and the Protestant-inflected definition of religion as principally privatised belief? This question is especially pertinent with regard to religious schooling arising from non-Christian traditions of religious education like Judaic, Buddhist or Islamic schools, which were regrettably not able to be explored in this thesis.

Recall, for example, the controversy over a proposed Islamic school in the Sydney suburb of Camden mentioned in the introduction to this thesis. What is striking about the denunciations levelled against it – in particular as exemplified in the letter from the Protestant ‘Camden Ministers Fraternal’ – is the homology between the arguments deployed here in opposition to Islamic religious education in the present and the arguments deployed against Roman Catholic religious education in the late Nineteenth century leading up to the establishment of so-called secular and public education in NSW as outlined in Chapter 3. It thus appears from this cursory reading that religious education that falls outside of hegemonic nominalist, Protestant and Anglo-liberal assumptions is still taken as a threat to the nation. In addition, what this example of the controversy surrounding the proposed Islamic school in Camden also underlines is the circuit of power between established ‘private’ religious institutions like Protestant churches and the secular ‘public’ sphere of Australian government and legislation, which sustains the hegemonic political order and its definition of ‘acceptable’ religion and religious education.

If it is indeed so that liberal-secular tolerance and freedom of religion – and by extension, religious education – are biased toward hegemonically established
religions like Protestantism, then what are the political effects of this on religious education from traditions that, unlike the NCPC schooling movement, may not bear nominalist antecedents, share a Protestant construal of religion and/or accept the Anglo-liberal consignment of religion to the private sphere?

This is a pressing question that I have not addressed in the present thesis. What is clear from the present work, however, is that such questions about religious education cannot be adequately treated simply along the categories of public/private and secular/religious that have hitherto framed the definitions and debates over religious schooling in Australia. Calhoun (2011) rightly points out in this regard that ‘[t]o attempt to disengage the idea of public reason (or the reality of the public sphere) from religion is to disconnect it from a tradition that continues to give it life and content’ (p. 81), and that ‘continuing to articulate norms of citizenship that seem biased against religious views [i.e. secularism] will needlessly drive a wedge between religious and nonreligious citizens’ (p. 88). By contradistinction, as I have attempted to put forward in this thesis, what is required is an approach that is cognisant both of particular instances of religious education – which may well bear their substantive traditions of historical and political interpretations of social reality – and the discursive processes that characterise its relationship with the historical and political specificities of the present conjuncture. ‘How and under what conditions [differences between traditions] can be so resolved,’ argues MacIntyre (1988), ‘is something only to be understood after a prior understanding of the nature of such traditions has been achieved’ (p. 10). Short of such a sensibility, I fear that moving beyond the disputes over the new visibility of religion in education, let alone supplanting the neo-liberal regime, may well be a distant prospect.
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