



The University of Sydney

### Copyright and use of this thesis

This thesis must be used in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968.

Reproduction of material protected by copyright may be an infringement of copyright and copyright owners may be entitled to take legal action against persons who infringe their copyright.

Section 51(2) of the Copyright Act permits an authorized officer of a university library or archives to provide a copy (by communication or otherwise) of an unpublished thesis kept in the library or archives, to a person who satisfies the authorized officer that he or she requires the reproduction for the purposes of research or study.

The Copyright Act grants the creator of a work a number of moral rights, specifically the right of attribution, the right against false attribution and the right of integrity.

You may infringe the author's moral rights if you:

- fail to acknowledge the author of this thesis if you quote sections from the work
- attribute this thesis to another author
- subject this thesis to derogatory treatment which may prejudice the author's reputation

For further information contact the University's  
**Director of Copyright Services**

Telephone: 02 9351 2991

e-mail: [copyright@usyd.edu.au](mailto:copyright@usyd.edu.au)



University of Sydney  
This thesis has been  
accepted for the degree

# **Australia Says No?:**

**Policy, politics and the Australian Government's approaches to  
male violence against women during the Howard years  
(1996 - 2007)**

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the  
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the  
Discipline of Social Work and Policies Studies,  
Faculty of Education and Social Work, University of Sydney  
July 2009

**Mayet Anne Costello**  
B.A. (University of Sydney)  
B.S.W. (Hons) (University of Sydney)

## Acknowledgements

---

The old saying “it takes a village to raise a child” is an equally apt description for the process of researching and writing a PhD thesis. My “village” has been a particularly large and supportive one to whom I feel significant gratitude and appreciation for helping me get through the tough times and celebrating the successes.

First, to all those women I have known in my personal and professional life who have survived male violence against women, your wisdom, courage, strength and fortitude in the face of adversity is my inspiration. Thank you for the privilege and honour of sharing your lives and experiences with me. Remembering those who have not survived this violence also underpins my perseverance and commitment to create a world where male violence against women is a thing of the past. Thank you also to the many colleagues who work so passionately and tirelessly with women who have experienced male violence and who have taught me so much.

Thank you to all the ‘key informants’ who participated in my research for your expertise, generosity, time, and willingness to share such fascinating experiences of the policy process. I was particularly surprised and impressed by the number of key informants in important policy and political positions who agreed to be interviewed despite my limited ‘connections’ in the public service or to either the Liberal or Labor parties. This showed an impressive and widespread commitment to transparency and accountability in government as well as to the democratic process amongst those I approached for interviews across the political spectrum.

To my supervisors, Dr Lesley Laing and Dr Sue Goodwin, thank you for your advice, critical feedback, sharing your knowledge, developing my research and writing skills, and your good humour in going through draft after draft of this thesis. Special thanks also to Dr Sue Goodwin and Deborah Hart for creating a post-graduate community for social work and policy studies students which reminded me I was not alone and broadened my academic horizons.

My “uni girls” Alison Horsley, Eliza Pross, Cammi Webb, Jennayah Taranto and Beverley Bryant have provided me with constant support and friendship, have reminded me to laugh



at myself, and have provided great distractions from the thesis. There are many other wonderful people and friends in my life such as the Crawford family, Amanda Thompson, Belinda Cooley, Katrina Morris, Wendy Hanna and Rebecca Taylor who have always been supportive and understanding despite not seeing or hearing from me for months at a time while I have been writing this thesis. Thank you all.

To Lisa Howell, my physiotherapist, writing this thesis would not have been possible without your ongoing support, your understanding, your good humour and your skill keeping my body functioning as well as it could. Thank you for your professionalism, for treating me as a whole person rather than just a broken back, and for allowing me to see and experience the possibilities of a life without chronic pain.

Research is a two-way process in which interaction and relationships, with the key informants and with the data, are fundamental. As part of this two-way process, this research politicised me to actively support the Australian Labor Party in the 2007 federal election. After I had completed the interviews and was writing up the thesis findings, I was fortunate to be employed by the Hon Tanya Plibersek MP, federal Member of Parliament for the electorate of Sydney and later the Minister for Housing and Minister for the Status of Women in the Rudd Labor Government. To all my work colleagues - especially Monika Wheeler, Pia van de Zandt, Jill Lay and, of course, Tanya Plibersek herself - thank you for your ongoing support, flexibility, interest in my thesis, respect for my work, and for enabling me to contribute to the development of the Rudd Government's approaches to male violence against women.

My mother Kerry Costello and my sister Makare Costello have always supported and believed in me. Thank you both for your love and encouragement and for taking such an interest in my thesis that you were even willing to comment on earlier drafts.


Finally, to my partner, David Beament, thank you for believing in me, for encouraging me to follow my dreams, and for providing a shoulder to cry on when times are tough. I am so appreciative of your love, support, patience, and willingness to do more than your fair share of the economic and domestic labour during this time and I would not have been able to finish this thesis without you. You have also reminded me constantly of the privilege and joys of equality and respect in a relationship and the benefits to women, to society and to men themselves when men behave ethically.

## Declaration


---

This is to certify that:

- I. this thesis comprises only my original work towards the Doctor of Philosophy Degree;
- II. due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used;
- III. the thesis does not exceed the word length for this degree;
- IV. no part of this work use been used for the award of another degree; and
- V. this thesis meets the *University of Sydney's Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) requirements for the conduct of research.*



Mayet Anne Costello



Date

## Abstract

---

This thesis provides an account and feminist critical analysis of the Australian Government's approaches to male violence against women during the Howard years (1996 - 2007). This thesis uses a feminist theoretical schema which locates male violence against women in a complex web of structural (macro), institutional (mezzo) and individual (micro) factors that interact with, and are interdependent on, each other. It argues that understanding policies and policy processes requires consideration of the significance of: policy actors or participants; structures or policy machinery; and discourse. The thesis therefore employs Anna Yeatman's (1998, p.4) 'policy activism', Louise Chappell's (2002a; 2002b) 'political opportunity structures', and Carol Bacchi's (1999b) 'What's the Problem?' approach to make sense of this period.

The empirical study for this thesis was divided into two stages. Stage one involved semi-structured interviews with thirty key informants supplemented by a review of over two hundred relevant texts to develop a detailed account of this period. Stage two examined two Howard Government initiatives, *Partnerships Against Domestic Violence* and *Violence Against Women – Australia Says No*, as in-depth case studies of policy process and policy content respectively.

The research examines the ongoing salience of the femocrat strategy during the Howard years and found that feminist approaches and the femocrat strategy dominated national male violence against women policy during this period. It also found that feminists continued to be key players in the policy process; however the Howard Government challenged and reduced their discursive power. As such, the thesis explores how new policy machinery and processes reflect continuities and discontinuities with the past. This thesis also suggests that approaches to male violence against women were consistent with the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda. It argues the Howard Government's approaches can be characterised as both policies of chivalry and policies of cooption but I also introduce and develop a new way of describing these approaches as policies of transformistic hegemonic masculinity. The thesis concludes that the Howard Government's approaches transformed policies and practices which seem counter-hegemonic into instruments of hegemonic domination and were thus far from "saying no" to male violence against women.

## Table of Contents

---

<i>Title Page</i>	<i>i</i>
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	<i>ii</i>
<i>Declaration</i>	<i>iv</i>
<i>Abstract</i>	<i>v</i>
<i>Table of Contents</i>	<i>vi</i>
<i>Abbreviations, Acronyms and Terminology</i>	<i>xi</i>
<b>Chapter One - Introduction</b>	<b>2</b>
1.1 Introduction	2
1.2 Outline of Chapters	12
1.3 The Personal is Political	14
<b>Chapter Two - Contemporary Feminist Understandings of Male Violence Against Women</b>	<b>17</b>
2.1 Feminism	17
2.2 Feminist Understandings of Patriarchy (macro)	19
2.3 The Patriarchal Institutions Underpinning Violence (mezzo)	22
2.4.1 <i>The State</i>	22
2.4.2 <i>Traditional family and heterosexuality</i>	24
2.4 The Personal is Political (micro)	27
2.5 Feminist Solutions to Male Violence Against Women	29
2.6 Intersectionality and Difference	31
2.7 Hegemonic Masculinity	33
2.7.1 <i>Transformistic hegemonic masculinity</i>	35
2.8 Chapter Summary	37
<b>Chapter Three - Australian Social Policy and the Femocrat Strategy</b>	<b>39</b>
3.1 Australian Feminism and the Femocrat Strategy	39
3.1.1 <i>Policy activism</i>	40

3.1.2	<i>The femocrat strategy</i>	42
3.2	Political Opportunity Structures and Intergovernmental Cooperation	46
3.3	Public Policy Responses to Male Violence Against Women	50
3.3.1	<i>Policy as discourse</i>	50
3.3.2	<i>Policies of chivalry</i>	51
3.3.3	<i>Policies of cooption</i>	55
3.4	Australian Government Responses to Male Violence Against Women	60
3.5	Chapter Summary	62

## **Chapter Four - Government under Howard:**

### **Neo-liberalism, Social Conservatism and Political Opportunism** 63

4.1	Neo-Liberalism	63
4.2	Social Conservatism	65
4.3	Political Opportunism	66
4.4	The Howard Government's Social Policy and the Culture Wars	67
4.4.1	<i>Christianity and the campaigns of the religious Right</i>	69
4.4.2	<i>Nuclear families and traditional 'family values'</i>	71
4.4.3	<i>Gender and women's equality</i>	73
4.4.4	<i>Sexuality</i>	78
4.4.5	<i>Race, culture and nationalism</i>	80
4.5	Chapter Summary	83

## **Chapter Five – Introducing the Study** 84

5.1	Stage One: Key Informant Interviews and Texts	84
5.1.1	<i>Key informant interviews</i>	84
5.1.2	<i>Supplementary texts</i>	87
5.1.3	<i>Data coding</i>	88
5.1.4	<i>Data analysis</i>	90
5.2	Stage Two: Case Studies	94
5.2.1	<i>Partnerships Against Domestic Violence</i>	94
5.2.2	<i>Violence Against Women – Australia Says No</i>	95
5.3	Reflectivity and Reflexivity in the Research Process	98
5.4	Limitations of the Study	99

5.5	Ethical Considerations	99
5.6	Chapter Summary	101

## **Chapter Six – Male Violence Against Women**

### **Policy and Program Development 1996-2007** **103**

6.1	<i>Partnerships Against Domestic Violence (1997 - 2005)</i>	103
6.1.1	<i>Partnerships Against Domestic Violence Phase One (1997 - 2001)</i>	103
6.1.2	<i>Partnerships Against Domestic Violence Phase Two (2001 – 2005)</i>	113
6.1.3	<i>Partnerships: relationships, tensions, and struggles over meaning</i>	116
6.2	<i>National Initiative to Combat Sexual Assault (2000 – 2005)</i>	120
6.3	<i>Women's Safety Taskforce (2002) and Women's National Safety Agenda (2005 – 2007)</i>	124
6.4	Chapter Summary	126

## **Chapter Seven – Male Violence Against Women**

### **Community Education Campaigns 2001-2007** **127**

	<i>No Respect, No Relationships (2001 – 2003)</i>	128
7.1	<i>No Respect, No Relationship</i> History and Development	128
7.2	<i>No Respect, No Relationship</i> Content	133
7.3	Reactions to <i>No Respect, No Relationship</i>	134
7.4	“But then the unexpected happened...”: the Howard Government cancels <i>No Respect, No Relationship</i>	138
7.5	Making sense of the Howard Government's development and cancellation of <i>No Respect, No Relationship</i>	145
	<i>Violence Against Women – Australia Says No (2004 – 2007)</i>	147
7.6	<i>Violence Against Women - Australia Says No</i> Content	147
7.7	<i>Violence Against Women - Australia Says No</i> Telephone Helpline	147
7.8	Chapter Summary	151

<b>Chapter Eight – The Howard Government’s Approaches to Male Violence Against Women: Key findings from stage one</b>	<b>152</b>
8.1 “The only good thing that John Howard had ever done”?	152
8.1.1 <i>Women’s inequality and rights</i>	156
8.1.2 <i>Work, welfare and reform</i>	157
8.1.3 <i>The family law system</i>	157
8.1.4 <i>Supported Accommodation Assistance Program (SAAP) funding</i>	158
8.2 A Feminist Campaign?	159
8.3 Wasted Opportunities?	161
8.4 A Public Relations Exercise?	167
8.5 Discussion	171
<b>Chapter Nine – Case Study 1: Partnerships Against Domestic Violence</b>	<b>178</b>
9.1 Continuities	178
9.1.1 <i>Understandings of violence, policy activism, and individual roles</i>	179
9.1.2 <i>The femocrat strategy continues?: The Partnerships Taskforce, political opportunity structures and intergovernmental cooperation</i>	184
9.2 Discontinuities	188
9.2.1 <i>From Office of the Status of Women (OSW) to Office for Women (OFW): More than just a change of name</i>	188
9.2.2 <i>“Silencing Dissent”</i>	192
9.2.3 <i>The Partnerships Taskforce</i>	195
9.3 Discussion	200
<b>Chapter Ten – Case Study 2: Violence Against Women – Australia Says No</b>	<b>203</b>
10.1 Individualised Representations of Violence (micro)	203
10.1.1 <i>Individual pathology: male perpetrators of violence</i>	204

10.1.2	<i>“Violent relationships”</i>	206
10.1.3	<i>Blurring the boundaries between male perpetrators and female victims</i>	207
10.2	Families and Heteronormativity (mezzo)	211
10.2.1	<i>Dysfunctional families and communication problems</i>	211
10.2.2	<i>Male perpetrators of violence represented as victims</i>	216
10.2.3	<i>Idealised families</i>	217
10.2.4	<i>Heteronormativity and conservative values</i>	219
10.3	Non-gendered and Racialised Representations of Male Violence (macro)	221
10.3.1	<i>Non-gendered representations</i>	221
10.3.2	<i>Race, culture and nationalism</i>	222
10.4	Discussion	223
 <b>Chapter Eleven – Australia Says No?: The Howard Government’s approaches to male violence against women</b>		 231
 <b>Bibliography</b>		 240
 <b>Appendices</b>		 261



## Abbreviations, Acronyms and Terminology

---

<i>Australia Says No</i>	<i>Violence Against Women – Australia Says No</i> Community Education Campaign
ALP	Australian Labor Party
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
COAG	Council of Australian Governments
Coalition	Coalition of Australian Liberal and National Parties
DPMC	Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet
DV	Domestic Violence
MP	Member of Parliament
NASASV	National Association of Services Against Sexual Violence (peak body)
NESB	Non-English Speaking Background
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
<i>National Initiative</i>	<i>National Initiative to Combat Sexual Assault</i> (also referred to as <i>NICSA</i> )
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
<i>No Respect</i>	<i>No Respect, No Relationship</i> Community Education Campaign
<i>NICVAW</i>	National Committee on Violence Against Women
<i>NSVAW</i>	National Strategy on Violence Against Women
OFW	Office for Women (Department of Families and Communities)
OSW	Office of the Status of Women (Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet)
<i>Partnerships</i>	<i>Partnerships Against Domestic Violence</i> (also referred to as <i>PADV</i> )
POS	Political Opportunity Structure/s
SAAP	Support Accommodation Assistance Program
<i>Safety Agenda</i>	Women's National Safety Agenda
<i>Safety Taskforce</i>	Women's Safety Taskforce
UN	United Nations
WESNET	Women's Emergency Services Network (peak body).

### ***Howard Government:***

This refers to the various federal Coalition Governments under the leadership of Liberal Prime Minister John Howard from 1996 to 2007. This thesis uses the singular term in recognition of the consistency of approach and leadership throughout all governments in this period even though the specific ministerial leadership changed. This Government increasingly used the term 'Australian Government' to refer to itself and I use the terms interchangeably as appropriate.

### ***Howard Years:***

The period between 1996 and 2007. During this period, Prime Minister John Howard had the leadership of the Coalition between the Liberal and National political parties which formed the Australian Government.

### ***Male violence against women:***

This thesis uses this term interchangeably with domestic violence, sexual assault, violence against women, family violence, and sexual abuse as appropriate. It adopts a broad definition of male violence against women which refers to "violence women suffer *because* they are women or ...forms of violence women suffer disproportionately" (Bond & Phillips, 2001, p.484). It also defines male violence against women as: any physical, visual, verbal or sexual act or behaviour by a man/men that is adopted to control a woman/women, take away her ability to control intimate contact and which she experiences as a threat, invasion, or assault that has the effect of hurting, degrading or damaging her physically, sexually, psychologically or through social isolation, economic deprivation or leaving her living in fear (Adapted from: Kelly, 1988, p.41; National Committee on Violence Against Women, 1992, p.45).

This definition and the term 'male violence against women', rather than the more common 'violence against women', reflects the feminist positioning of the thesis. This definition offers a gendered, feminist understanding inclusive of women's diverse experiences along the continuum of violence (Kelly, 1988, 1996a) which includes sexual harassment, sexual assault, child sexual assault, rape, domestic and family violence, trafficking, and femicide. In a feminist context where all forms of male power are potentially definable as violence (Kelly, 1988, p.39), it is also narrow enough to be useful for a feminist analysis of policy and

practice. The qualifier *male* violence against women also reflects an active rather than passive voice making visible the man/men's agency, action and intention and its effect on the woman/women.

***States:***

The thesis uses this term as short hand to refer to Australian States (Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia and Western Australia) and Territories (Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory).

***Perpetrator and Victim:***

The thesis uses the term 'perpetrator' to describe men who use violence against women and 'victim' to describe women who have experienced violence from men. Although some feminists have critiqued such terms as being disempowering and as essentialising people's identities (Chung, 2002) other options such as 'men who use violence' or 'women who experience violence' are clumsy and do not taken into account the criminal nature of this type of violence. They also obscure responsibility. I agree with Sharon Lamb's (1999) assessment that throwing out the label 'victim' is not necessary and her advocacy for a conceptualisation of the term 'victim' that takes into account women's strength and agency, empowerment and the ubiquity of abuse. Similarly, I argue for a conceptualisation of the term 'perpetrator' that is not pathologising and recognises men's capacity to challenge their own violent behaviour while also holding them responsible for the crimes they have committed. In using the terms 'perpetrator' and 'victim' I do not intend any negative connotations of helplessness or pathology or to be essentialising. I instead embrace the broader and more empowered conceptualisation of these terms advocated for by others (Donovan & Vlasis, 2005, p.3; Lamb, 1999).

---

# **Australia Says No?:**

**Policy, politics and the Australian Government's approaches to  
male violence against women during the Howard years  
(1996 - 2007)**

---

---

# Chapter One

## Introduction

---

### 1.1 Introduction

This thesis provides a feminist critical analysis of Australian Government approaches to male violence against women during the Howard years (1996 - 2007). The thesis seeks to explore the question: What was the nature of the Australian Government's approaches to male violence against women during the Howard years? This question initially arose out of curiosity about how and why a sustained and comparatively well-funded public policy response to male violence against women was provided by the conservative Howard Government between 1996 and 2007.

There has conventionally been a close association between Australian governments' responses to male violence against women and the theories and practices of feminism. There is an extensive body of literature exploring policy process and the nature of feminist engagements with Australian governments, particularly the femocrat strategy. Prominent amongst this literature is the work of feminists such as Louise Chappell (2000; 2001; 2002a; 2002b), Marian Sawer (1990; 1993; 1999), Hester Eisenstein (1985; 1990; 1996) and Anna Yeatman (1994; 1998). Femocrats were Australian feminist policy activists working inside the bureaucracy and across the boundaries between government and community or non-government feminists and organisations. The literature suggests the femocrat strategy played a significant role in advocating for and shaping Australian governments' approaches to issues of particular importance to women, including male violence against women.

On the Australian political landscape, the term 'Howard years' refers to the various federal Coalition Governments under the leadership of Liberal Prime Minister John Howard from 1996 to 2007. The term recognises a consistency of approach and leadership throughout this period. Significantly, the Howard Government explicitly rejected feminism as a perspective, and feminists as legitimate players in the policy process in many areas of public policy. It also pursued a social policy agenda which reflected a particular mix of neo-

liberalism, social conservatism and political opportunism that was inconsistent with feminist values and activism. The literature on feminist engagements with the state and the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda suggests the Howard years were a period of decline for the femocrat strategy. In particular, it suggests the Howard Government increasingly excluded feminists from the development of public policy. This period is therefore usually represented in the literature as a constraint, rather than a "political opportunity structure" (Chappell, 2002a, 2002b), for femocrats and feminist activists working within or with the federal public service. At the same time, however, the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women were generally not subjected to the same level of feminist critique or scrutiny as the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda. Given this history, I was curious to explore the Howard Government's engagement with feminism and in this thesis I seek to understand how best, from a feminist perspective, the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women may be understood.

In the Australian federal system of governance, the constitutional division of powers between different levels of government means Australian state and territory governments have traditionally played the most significant role in responding to male violence against women. These state responses have included: providing criminal and civil justice responses (e.g. police, courts, criminal laws, and apprehended violence or domestic violence orders); health, counselling and support services; and social and community housing. Since the 1970s, however, Australian federal governments have increasingly developed public policy responses to male violence against women. Federal government responses to this issue have historically been differentiated from state responses by concentrating on the effects of male violence against women such as poverty, homelessness, and family breakdown (Weeks & Gilmore, 1996). These policy responses were important in enhancing the capacity of women to set up an 'autonomous household' independent of their violent partner (Ramsay, 2004; Weeks & Gilmore, 1996). They included such programs as: the Supported Accommodation Assistance Program (SAAP) which funded refuges; social security benefits including crisis payments; no-fault divorce; and other family law policies.

Between 1987 and 1990 the Hawke Labor Government expanded federal responses to male violence against women by developing the *National Domestic Violence Education Program (NDVEP)*. *NDVEP* was the first federal response specifically targeting the issue of male violence against women rather than its effects. It was coordinated by a Commonwealth/State Taskforce which also included intergovernmental and sector

representatives (Earle, Herron, Secomb, & Stubbs, 1990; Erika, 1990). The Hawke Government replaced the *NDVEP* Taskforce with the National Committee on Violence Against Women (*NCVAW*) in 1990 (Chappell, 2001, p.63; Earle et al., 1990, p.5). The *NCVAW* included greater Commonwealth, state, and NGO representation than the previous Taskforce (Chappell, 2001, p.63; Earle et al., 1990, p.5; *NCVAW*, 1992, p.vi). It developed a number of "valuable resources" including the *National Guidelines for Training in the Area of Violence Against Women* and the 1993 *Stop Violence Against Women* national campaign (Nancarrow & Struthers, 1995, p.46). In 1992 the then Prime Minister Keating launched the *National Strategy on Violence Against Women (NSVAW)* developed by the *NCVAW* (Nancarrow & Struthers, 1995, pp.45-46). This significant increase in Australian Government responses to male violence against women during the Hawke and Keating years suggests that this is a policy area that is increasingly viewed as the responsibility of federal as well as state governments.

The Coalition's victory in the federal election on 2 March 1996 and the formation of the Howard Government which maintained power until 24 November 2007 represented a new epoch in the cultural and political history of Australia. A number of commentators argue that the Howard Government was characterised by a particular mix of economic neo-liberalism, social conservatism and political opportunism, which they describe as the political genius which kept Howard in power for over a decade (see for example Brett, 2005, p.45; Brett, 2007, p.62; Kelly, 2006, p.10; Milne, 2006, p.46; Shanahan, 2006, p.40; Singleton, 2005). They also suggest that these characteristics of the Howard Government had a profound effect on the social policy agenda of the Australian Government during the Howard years. In particular, they argue these characteristics were an important part of the Howard Government's "culture wars"; which refer to what commentators describe as Howard's reactionary crusade against the political Left utilising strategies of 'wedge' and 'identity' politics in defence of a perceived mainstream consensual centre.

In terms of public policy responses to male violence against women, Louise Chappell (2001, p.64) argues that following the 1996 election of the Howard Government, the *NCVAW* and the *NSVAW* "languished under the incoming government". At the same time, however, in 1996 the Howard Government started to develop what was to become a sustained and comparatively well-funded federal public policy response to male violence against women. Following the lead of the Hawke Government, the Howard Government developed federal government responses which dealt specifically with male violence against women rather than its effects alone. These responses lasted throughout the entire

Howard years (1996-2007). They included the policy and program responses *Partnerships Against Domestic Violence* (1997-2005), the *National Initiative to Combat Sexual Assault* (2000-2005), and the *Women's National Safety Agenda* (2005-2007). Although providing some policy frameworks, these responses were largely grants programs funding research and program development (pilot programs) throughout Australia. Significantly, *Partnerships Against Domestic Violence* was also coordinated by a Taskforce composing federal and state government representatives from all Australian jurisdictions. During this time the Howard Government also developed two national community education campaigns responding to male violence against women. The first was *No Respect, No Relationship* (2001-2003) which was developed but then cancelled by the Government shortly before it was launched. The second was *Violence Against Women – Australia Says No* (2004-2007).

Federalism has not been a central issue for Australian feminists (Chappell, 2002b, p.151), particularly those concerned with male violence against women. Those feminists interested in Australian government responses to male violence against women have historically focussed on state governments given their historical responsibilities for this issue. Since 1972, however, Labor and Coalition federal governments have enthusiastically embraced what Alan Fenna (2004, p.173) calls “constitutional expansionism”. This refers to the increasing involvement of federal governments in public policy areas traditionally dominated by the states by virtue of the external affairs powers granted to the Commonwealth in the Constitution. The increasing federal activity responding to male violence against women by the Hawke, Keating and Howard Governments is illustrative of this constitutional expansionism. (A timeline and summary of these approaches and of the Office of the Status of Women which coordinated these is provided in Appendices 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3.) This increased activity suggests that feminists interested in Australian government responses to male violence against women need to turn much greater attention to Australian federal governments. This thesis offers a contribution to the feminist research that is gradually starting to fill the gap in the literature by examining federal government responses to male violence against women.

There is a small body of literature that specifically explores and analyses the Howard Government's responses to male violence against women (Chappell, 2001; Donovan & Vlasis, 2005; FitzRoy, 1999; Jones, 2004; McKenzie, 2005; Morley & Macfarlane, 2008; Murray, 2005; Murray & Powell, 2009; Phillips, 2004, 2006, 2008b; Summers, 2003b; Webster, 2006a, 2006b; Winter, 2007). This literature tends to focus on the content of the Howard Government policies and criticises the Howard Government's responses from a



feminist perspective for reflecting a socially conservative approach to male violence against women. With the exception of Chappell's (2001) interest in Australian federalism and Anne Summers (2003a; 2003b, pp.92-96) and Bronwyn Winter's (2007) criticism of the Government's diversion of funding from these programs, there has also been no attention to policy process. This neglect is important because policy process can have a significant impact on the nature and content of policies (Considine, 1994, p.73; Weeks, 1996, p.12)

It is useful to briefly outline the themes in the literature on the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women because these provide an important foundation on which this thesis is based. The literature is predominantly feminist literature which concentrates on the specific initiatives *Partnerships* and *Australia Says No* and is particularly critical of these initiatives for what the authors argue is their failure to reflect complex feminist understandings of male violence against women. The literature also criticises these initiatives for their relationship with, and contribution to, racism in Australia as well as briefly exploring some aspects of the *Partnerships* policy process.

One of the major criticisms of both *Partnerships* and *Australia Says No* in the literature is what a number of authors argue is the shift away from feminist understandings and approaches to male violence against women at a structural level (FitzRoy, 1999; McKenzie, 2005; Morley & Macfarlane, 2008; Murray & Powell, 2009; Phillips, 2004, 2006; Webster, 2006a, 2006b; Winter, 2007). In particular, they are critical of the impact of conservative political ideology and policy objectives which they argue manifest themselves in these initiatives in two main ways.

The first way the literature suggests conservative political ideology and policy objectives manifest themselves in these initiatives was by the Howard Government representing male violence against women as a gender neutral problem or as "non-gendered". They argue the Government does this in their initiatives by: containing no information about the gendered nature of this violence; using gender-neutral language; and focusing on families and individuals rather than the social context in which their violence occurs. They suggest that this representation denies the role of gendered power relations, social context and men's advantages under patriarchy inherent in feminist understandings of violence. Ruth Phillips (2008b, p.59), for example, contends that:

While there is an absence of leadership in public discussion about gender power relations between men and women, the cultural and social context that allows, and in some cases

supports, women's insecurity will remain intact, continuing to ensure that many women live with violence or in fear of violence.

Taking this critique further, Phillips (2004, p.29) argues that the gender neutral and individualised understanding of violence in *Partnerships* and *Australia Says No* are an anti-feminist backlash. She contends that the Howard Government's adherence to social conservatism and rejection of feminist analyses evident in these initiatives is "legitimized hostility" to the foundation of domestic violence as a public policy issue which had a powerful impact on domestic violence policy and its implementation (Phillips, 2006).

Similarly to Phillips, other authors (McKenzie, 2005; Morley & Macfarlane, 2008, p.34; Winter, 2007, p.33) contend *Australia Says No* was either anti-feminist or reflected the Howard Government's cooption of feminist approaches to serve the Government's own political agenda. Mandy McKenzie (2005), for example, argues that *Australia Says No* was an example of partisan political advertising which was strategically delayed to coincide with campaigning for the 2004 federal election. She also argues that the accompanying helpline was more a "marketing exercise rather than a serious attempt to assist victims of violence" (McKenzie, 2005, p.4). Supporting this, Bronwyn Winter (2007, p.33) and Christine Morley and Selma Macfarlane (2008, p.34) argue that although the funding committed to community education in *Australia Says No* was positive, the deliberate exclusion of feminist services from tendering for the helpline was: anti-feminist; an incredible waste of money; and undermined existing domestic violence and sexual assault services and the quality of the helpline itself. Morley and Macfarlane (2008, p.34) further criticise the services provided by the helpline as "disturbing and dangerous" because of the individualised, psychological and gender-neutral understandings of violence against women informing the staff's practices.

McKenzie (2005, p.1) compares *Australia Says No* unfavourably with *No Respect, No Relationship (No Respect)* which was the campaign developed by the Howard Government but then cancelled 10 days before it was due to be launched. McKenzie (2005) argues *No Respect* was a "serious and innovative attempt" to prevent violence in future relationships by reaching young people as they are beginning to form relationships. She argues it was a multi-faceted and targeted strategy that didn't "shy away from teenage sexuality, provided a model for respectful relationships, and addressed the full spectrum of abusive behaviours" (McKenzie, 2005, p.4). This analysis is supported by a VicHealth review of national and international communications and marketing activity to address violence against women

(Donovan & Vlasis, 2005; VicHealth, 2006). This review found that *No Respect* reflected a number of features of recommended practice for community education campaigns. McKenzie criticises *Australia Says No* for its inconsistency with the developmental research that underpinned *No Respect*. She argues: “it is relatively easy for governments to ‘say no’ to violence against women. But ultimately, this achieves little. If we are to prevent violence in future generations, we need to reach young people as they are beginning to form relationships” (McKenzie, 2005, p.4).

The second way the literature suggests anti-feminist, conservative political ideology and policy objectives manifest themselves in these initiatives are in their focus on family. A number of authors (FitzRoy, 1999; Jones, 2004; McKenzie, 2005; Murray, 2005; Murray & Powell, 2009; Phillips, 2004, 2006; Webster, 2006a, 2006b) suggest the Howard Government’s focus on “strengthening families” in these initiatives promotes a family reunification approach that seeks to restore the ‘family harmony’ disrupted by a man’s violence. They also contend such approaches reflect ‘pro-family’ New Right and men’s rights groups’ approaches to this issue and argue these: ignore social context; pathologise domestic violence as an individual crime perpetrated by ‘angry’, ‘bad’ or ‘sad’ men having relationship difficulties; undermine men’s responsibility and the criminal nature of their violence; and shift responsibility for male violence onto female victims who engage in “unsafe behaviours” and their families and friends. They also suggest it denies what feminist would argue are the links between domestic violence, sexual assault, and gendered power relations including traditional views of masculinity and male dominance in family relationships. Lee FitzRoy (1999, p.168), for example, argues the focus on families in *Partnerships*:

...reproduces a conservative ideology and traditional theoretical analysis of violence against women. It is not disputed that the majority of violence perpetrated against women and children is perpetrated by men in their immediate or extended families. However, a focus on the family per se, is a major discursive and theoretical shift back to a traditional analysis of dysfunctional families, rather than a broader cultural and societal analysis of why violence occurs.

Further, Morley and Macfarlane (2008) argue *Australia Says No* also constructs families in conservative terms which undermine the legitimacy of non-heterosexual and single-parent families and infers that well-functioning families are heterosexual, nuclear, and patriarchal.

Amy Webster (2006a; 2006b), Ruth Phillips (2006) and Lee FitzRoy (1999) argue the Howard Government linked this violence with certain types of families. In particular, they

argue that the Howard Government's approaches in *Partnerships* and *Australia Says No* suggest that male violence against women is mainly a problem for vulnerable families (for example poor, unemployed and homeless families), Indigenous communities, and other cultural and ethnic minorities. Webster (2006a; 2006b) in particular suggests that racism and nationalism are prominent in *Australia Says No*. She argues that for people or communities who feel isolated from the mainstream such as Indigenous communities and newly arrived migrants, the *Australia Says No* "slogan sounds more like a racist threat than an acknowledgement of the prevalence of such violence in the Australian community" (Webster, 2006b, p.46). Webster (2006a, p.17) criticises the Howard Government for employing nationalism to "construct domestic violence as un-Australian". She argues that the slogan "Australia Says No" slogan perpetuates the misunderstanding that "real' Australians do not commit violence against women (a starkly inaccurate historical insinuation)" (Webster, 2006a; 2006b, p.42). She also suggests that the Howard Government employed a politics of division in *Australia Says No* to exploit:

...the ideological sub-trend of anti-political correctness. In this way nationalism, and the idea of national identity, is used to ostracise the occurrence of domestic violence into 'un-Australian' households or communities. Domestic violence is thereby associated with ethnic and cultural minorities (Them) enabling the irresponsibility of the mainstream for the occurrence of such violence in Australia (Us) whilst consolidating Australian nationalism (Webster, 2006b, pp.29-30).

For Webster (2006b, p.46), the targets of the *Australia Says No* campaign are thus "non-majority, culturally 'othered' Australians", both Indigenous people and migrants, rather than Australians generally.

Beyond feminist criticisms of the content of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against, there is very little in the literature that explores the policy process concerning Australian Government responses to male violence against women during the Howard years. The two exceptions are Louise Chappell's exploration of *Partnerships* in the context of Australian federalism and Anne Summers and Bronwyn Winter's criticisms of the Howard Government for what they argue is the misuse of *Partnerships* funding.

Chappell (2001) explores *Partnerships* in the context of Australian federalism and the femocrat strategy. In her article critiquing the longstanding view that federalism stymies the development of progressive social policies, Chappell (2001) argues that feminists made progress on domestic violence policy with *Partnerships* despite the Howard Government's

social conservatism. She argues this was due to the political opportunity structure of Australian federalism and the interplay between federal institutions, political parties and the bureaucracy. In particular, Chappell argues that the *Partnerships* Taskforce was valuable because it provided a formal intergovernmental mechanism with representation from different federal and state jurisdictions (including progressive governments). According to Chappell (2001, p.66), the *Partnerships* Taskforce facilitated significant autonomy for state governments and commonwealth agencies in project development which created an ongoing “degree of commitment to feminist approaches to domestic violence”. Chappell concedes the nature of the projects approved by the *Partnerships* Taskforce, with their particular emphasis on ‘family’ and ‘perpetrator’ projects, reflected the strong influence of conservative discourse. Nevertheless, “the presence of competing ideas between the federal and certain state governments about domestic violence policy suggests that federalism does not inevitably lead toward conservatism” (Chappell, 2001, p.67). Thus, for Chappell, the *Partnerships* structures and presence of competing ideas between federal and state governments facilitated progressive social policy and the maintenance of competing feminist discourses and ideas during this period despite Howard Government conservatism.

Anne Summers (2003b) and Bronwyn Winter (2007) make brief comments about policy process in their criticism of what they describe as the Howard Government’s under-spending and misuse of *Partnerships* funding. Summers (2003b, p.92), for instance, argues that in 2001 alone the under-spending for *Partnerships* was \$4.3 million. She also criticises the significant amount of *Partnerships* funding used for consultancy fees while “those women at the coalface who run the services that provide refuge and other support for women and children victims of domestic violence are struggling under budgets that have scarcely increased in years”(Summers, 2003b, p.96). Further, Winter (2007) criticises the Howard Government’s reallocation of unspent *Partnerships* funds. She reports:

On May 17, 2003, Nicola Roxon, then [ALP Shadow Minister for Women, Children and Youth] ...revealed to the Australian media that AU\$10.1 million of supposedly “unspent funds relating to the Women’s programmes” (Commonwealth of Australia 2003b) were diverted in the national budget to the National Security Public Information Campaign (the fridge magnet campaign) ...The programs in question were Partnerships Against Domestic Violence (PADV; \$7.5 million unspent) and the National Initiative to Combat Sexual Assault (NCSA; \$2.5 million unspent) (Winter, 2007, pp.29-30).

Referring to this use of *Partnerships* funding Summers (2003b, p.93) argues: “that the government could raid the domestic violence piggy bank to pay for a dubious (and, many thought, politically motivated) scare campaign on terrorism speaks volumes about how seriously it takes the question of eliminating domestic violence”. Thus, both Summers and Winter express concerns about what they argue is the misuse of *Partnerships* funding.

Although the literature outlined above provides an important foundation for this thesis, on the whole the analyses within this literature tend to be rather limited in scope. The most significant gap is that the existing literature tends not to be based on empirical studies of the period. This is evident in two shortfalls in the literature. First, analyses of the content of the policies are not adequately covered and commentators draw on isolated moments or policy products or outcomes to make sense of the period. These analyses of content tend to focus on *Partnerships* and are usually brief and taken out of context. There is also no study which explores and draws together the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women as a program of policies. Second, there is a lack of knowledge or understanding of the policy process in the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women. In particular, there is no detailed study of policy process which explores the perspectives of the stakeholders and policy participants in this program of policies and the nuances involved in producing the Australian Government's male violence against women policies during the Howard years. This means that the Howard years have been a period of male violence against women policy development which has not hitherto been documented in much detail.

To fill this gap in the literature, this thesis seeks to produce an account and feminist analysis of the Australian Government's approaches to male violence against women during the Howard years (1996-2007). To produce this account and feminist analysis, the thesis reports on an empirical study undertaken in two stages. Stage one involved semi-structured interviews with thirty key informants who had been involved in, or had particular expertise in, the development of the Howard Government's responses to male violence against women. These key informants included: federal and state public servants; two Howard Government Members of Parliament (MPs); an ALP/Opposition MP; representatives of relevant peak bodies; academics; and *Partnerships* evaluators. These interviews explored: key informants' experiences, memories, and interpretations of the policy process; key informants' assessments and perceptions of the content of Howard Government responses; and key informants' perceptions of the broader social and political context in which these responses were developed.

The purpose of the key informant interviews was to develop as broad and detailed account as possible of the development, nature and content of Australian government responses to male violence against women during the Howard years to fill the gap in the literature. To achieve this objective, in stage one the data collected from key informant interviews was supplemented with a review of over two hundred relevant texts from the period. These texts included: publicly available official documents and texts of the Australia Government and Australian Parliament between 1996 and 2007; departmental working documents; and media reports (newspaper, television and radio). In the study I coded and analysed these texts thematically.

Stage two of the study involved two in-depth case studies of Australian Government approaches to male violence against women during the Howard years. *Partnerships Against Domestic Violence (Partnerships)* is explored as a case study of policy process. The national community education campaign *Violence Against Women – Australia Says No (Australia Says No)* is explored as in-depth case studies of content.

This thesis contains significant new data on the Australian Government's approaches to male violence against women during the Howard years. The empirical study produced a detailed account of the policy machinery developed during this period, the nature of the policy process, and an understanding of the content of the policies and policy outputs including the construction of the problem of male violence against women. This material provides an original contribution to knowledge in the fields of political science, social policy, government responses to male violence against women, and feminist theory and practice. In particular, this contribution includes understandings of: political and policy processes; how male violence against women is constructed and understood in Australian policy contexts; the role of feminists and feminism in Australian policy production; and policy development during the Howard Government years.

## 1.2 Outline of Chapters

**Chapter One** has outlined the literature to which this thesis makes a significant contribution to knowledge, the empirical study conducted for this thesis, the chapters in the thesis, and the role of the author. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the thesis and contextualise it in a broader context.

**Chapter Two** explores contemporary feminist understandings of male violence against women including: the theoretical schema used in this thesis to categorise feminist understandings; intersectionality and difference; and hegemonic masculinity. The purpose of this chapter is to explore concepts that are valuable for analysing the findings from the empirical study and offer a theoretical foundation to make sense of current feminist understandings of male violence against women and develop new ways of understanding the Howard Government's approaches.

**Chapter Three** outlines women's social policy and policy-making processes in Australia. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical and historical framework to contextualise the study in the Australian political and policy context. It introduces four important concepts that assist in understanding policy process including: policy activism; the femocrat strategy; political opportunity structures; and intergovernmental cooperation. It also explores feminist analyses of public policy responses to male violence against women with a particular focus on feminist conceptualisations of policy as chivalry and policy as cooption. These concepts are important because they assist to make sense of the Howard Government's responses to male violence against women and provide a theoretical foundation on which to develop a new way of understanding this period.

**Chapter Four** outlines the nature of the Australian Government during the Howard years and the neo-liberalism, social conservatism and political opportunism that some commentators argue characterised the Howard Government. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the broader social policy context in which the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women were located. This is particularly important in my discussion of whether or not the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women were consistent with their broader social policy agenda.

**Chapter Five** introduces the study by summarising the empirical research design. It explains both the data collection and analysis completed in stages one and two of the study. It also outlines important issues in the research process including reflectivity, reflexivity and ethical considerations. The purpose of this chapter is to convey how the empirical data for this thesis was collected and analysed to respond to the research question: What was the nature of the Australian Government's approaches to male violence against women during the Howard years?.



**Chapter Six** provides an account of the Howard Government's policy and program responses to male violence against women including: *Partnerships*, the *National Initiative*, the *Women's Safety Taskforce*, and the *Women's Safety Agenda*. Its purpose is to provide as comprehensive an account as possible of both the policy process and content of the Howard Government's policy and program initiatives based on stage one of the empirical study.

**Chapter Seven** provides a detailed account of the Howard Government's community education campaigns *No Respect* and *Australia Says No*. Its purpose is to provide as comprehensive an account as possible of both the policy process and content of the Howard Government's community education campaigns based on stage one of the empirical study.

**Chapter Eight** outlines four additional themes from stage one of the empirical study. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a more detailed analysis of the themes that arose from stage one of the study that extend beyond the accounts provided in the previous two chapters. This chapter also provides the evidence and discussion from which I argue the Howard Government's approaches may be conceptualised as policies of chivalry and policies of cooption.

**Chapter Nine** explores *Partnerships* as a case study of policy process. This includes continuities and discontinuities in the femocrat strategy with particular attention to policy activism, political opportunity structures and intergovernmental cooperation. The purpose of this chapter is to develop an analysis of policy process in the Australian Government's approaches to male violence against women during the Howard years.

**Chapter Ten** explores *Australia Says No* as a case study of content including analysing what the problem is represented to be during this period. The purpose of this chapter is to develop an analysis of the content of the Australian Government's approaches to male violence against women during the Howard years. The chapter also provides the evidence and discussion from which I introduce the new concept of policies as transformistic hegemonic masculinity and explain how the Howard Government transformed feminist counter-hegemonic practices into instruments of hegemonic domination.

**Chapter Eleven** provides a summary of the thesis including the key findings from the empirical study. The purpose of this chapter is to conclude the thesis and summarise the original contribution to knowledge provided by the thesis.

### **1.3 The Personal is Political**

A number of feminists (e.g. Ford, 2001; Jones, 2004; Mason, 1995, p.21) argue that, as a result of feminist and post-structuralist rejection of positivist positions on objectivity, the subjectivity of the researcher must be regarded as an intrinsic aspect of feminist research. This is because the social identity and position of the researcher can profoundly impact the production of knowledge and underpins all aspects of the research including priorities, experiences and interpretations. Mason (1995, p.21) explains it is therefore “not unusual for feminist researchers to refer to their own positionality, include their own experience, or to acknowledge their position on various theoretical aspects of the research”. The feminist ethics governing this research, particularly those grounded in feminist post-structuralism require self-reflexivity, constant reflection and the visibility and acknowledgement of the researcher in the research process. It is therefore important to briefly articulate my own identity.

As a woman and a feminist I am sensitised to the issue of male violence against women and the feminist recognition of the role of violence in gender relations. This sensitivity arises from the lived reality of all women’s lives where managing the dangers, risks and consequences of oppression and male violence is an integral part of being a woman in a patriarchal society regardless of individual experiences of violence. In the hierarchal relationships that characterise patriarchal societies, my identity as a woman is one of disadvantage compared to men. Various other aspects of my identity, however, such as class, heterosexuality, whiteness, education, physical ability and so on also afford me privileges within this hierarchy and I believe it is important to utilise my position of relative privilege to challenge the existing dominant social order and the inequalities on which it is based.

As a social worker, my professional experiences have mainly been in counselling, service development, community development, and policy positions responding to male violence against women. Before becoming a social worker, I also worked in women and children’s domestic violence refuges. Although I have made few references to social work theory or

practice in this thesis, my identity as a social worker with these experiences subtly and implicitly underpins much of this thesis. This includes key considerations such as the choice of topic, my feminist positioning, and the intent of my research.

Beyond this acknowledgement of my identity, the nature of this thesis and its focus on social policy, policy process, and politics, makes the explicit recognition of self and use of reflexivity and reflection difficult. Although therefore not explicitly reflected in the thesis, a number of important concepts and practices underpinned my empirical data collection, analysis and the composition of this thesis. These included: acknowledging my own values and biases including those arising from my political and professional allegiances and challenging these throughout the process; judging myself and the progression of the research against the values of the feminist political project; using first person at times to locate myself in the research process; and being open to reflecting on findings and changing not just the content but also the nature and structure of the research project in response.

## **Chapter Two**

# **Contemporary Feminist Understandings of Male Violence Against Women**

---

Male violence against women is a significant social issue which has been the subject of extensive feminist activism. This chapter provides an overview of feminist theories of male violence against women. The chapter starts with an outline of feminism and feminist understandings of male violence against women. The chapter then explores some feminist perspectives on the intersectionality of race, sexuality and other aspects of identity in understanding male violence against women before also exploring the concept of hegemonic masculinity. The concepts explored in this chapter are valuable for making sense of findings from the empirical study and offer a theoretical foundation to develop new ways of understanding the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women.

### **2.1 Feminism**

Feminism has played a significant role defining, theorising and responding to male violence against women (Mikhailovich, 1998; Phillips, 2008a). Feminism is not a monolithic or unified theory or political perspective and is often grouped into categories such as: liberal; radical; socialist; black; ecofeminism; cultural; political; lesbian; psychoanalytic; academic; post-modern; post-structural; and Foucauldian (Mason, 2002, p.119; Phillips, 2008a, p.58). These categories represent ideal types, however, and often overlap in practice despite some tensions between them. The feminisms most drawn upon for this thesis are radical, liberal and post-structural perspectives. This is mainly due to the role of these feminisms in particular types of research on male violence against women. That is: feminist responses to men's violence in practice have largely been shaped by radical feminists; feminist analysis of men's violence at the level of theory are increasingly influenced by post-structuralism; and feminist interactions with the state and involvement in social policy tend to emphasise both liberal and post-structural feminism (Bailey, 2006, p.2).

Common features of feminist practice and research unite the different categories of feminism. These include: some theory of gendered power relations; challenges to patriarchal 'truths', interest in knowledge and power; and a commitment to improving women's lives as individuals and a group through individual interventions, community development, policy and research (Finch, 1993; Jupp & Norris, 1993; S. Mason, 1997; Mies, 1993; Ramazanoglu, 2002). Although it is important to acknowledge the diversity within the different categories of feminism, this thesis refers to feminist understandings of male violence against women in a singular manner. This reflects the common features characterising feminist theory and my attention to only those feminist approaches that have a particular relevance to this thesis.

There is an extensive and burgeoning feminist literature and research on male violence against women which includes differing emphases and perspectives from the diverse categories of feminism. What is common to the various feminisms represented in this literature is an understanding of male violence against women as an act and choice of individual men within a socio-political and cultural context that supports and maintains their violence (Morris, 2008, p.43). In this way feminist approaches have generally differed from mainstream psychological and psychiatric explanations that attribute violence to the psychopathology of individuals using or experiencing violence or their interaction with each other (Jasinski, 2001, p.6; Morris, 2008, p.43). The following sections outline a selection of feminist literature and understandings of male violence against women of particular relevance to this thesis.

This thesis adopts a theoretical schema to organise understandings of male violence against women which adapts Anne Morris' (2008) approach to maternal alienation; a form of gender violence she identifies as occurring within families alongside domestic violence and sexual abuse. This schema locates male violence against women in a complex web of structural (macro), institutional (mezzo) and individual (micro) factors which interact with, and are interdependent on, each other. The interaction of these three levels explains the emergence and continuation of male violence against women and a single level cannot be conceptualised in isolation from the other two.

Anne Morris' (2008) approach is particularly useful because it offers a clear and concise approach that is specifically relevant to feminist understandings of male violence against women. Maternal alienation is a form of male violence against women which "refers to a range of tactics used mainly by male perpetrators to deliberately undermine and destroy the

relationship between mothers and their children" (Morris, 2008, p.1). Morris (2008, pp.2-10) argues there are substantial connections between micro, organisational and macro processes, practices, beliefs and attitudes in maternal alienation. She suggests that maternal alienation occurs within families and households (micro) but also has connections to the macro social order of the social, cultural and political arenas via practices of organisations. Although she focuses on only one form of male violence, Morris' approach has been adapted to provide a conceptual schema for this thesis. To adapt this approach I first moved Morris' 'micro' category to the middle of the theoretical schema and used the term 'institutional' rather than 'organisational' to reflect this change. I also added a new micro level that addresses the practices of individual men perpetrating violence against women rather than Morris' focus on men's relationships and practices within families. This change enables my research to focus on male violence against women generally compared with Morris' focus on male violence within families.

Morris (2008, p.11) refers to Australian social theorist R.W. Connell's notion of a "gender order" as related to her theoretical schema. Connell's (2000) "gender order" provides a comprehensive model for undertaking gender analysis that examines the overall gendered structures and patterns within societies. Her approach provides a significant theoretical and conceptual basis for feminist policy analysis. Although Morris' specific focus on male violence against women makes her approach more appropriate to adapt for this thesis, Connell's "gender order" nevertheless provides some useful concepts relevant to my theoretical schema. Compared to the "gender order", in my schema: the macro level equates to Connell's "power relations"; the mezzo level equates to her "productive relations" (gendered divisions of labour); and the micro level equates to her "emotional relations" (interpersonal relations). Instead of Connell's fourth feature in the "gender order", "symbolism", I use Carol Bacchi's (1999b) term "representation". Significantly, rather than including it directly in my theoretical schema, I use "representation" as an overarching concept to help analyse and make sense of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women.

## **2.2 Feminist Understandings of Patriarchy (macro)**

Many feminists argue that male violence against women is located within a gendered system of patriarchal power relations. Patriarchy is "an 'umbrella' term for describing men's systemic dominance of women" and "institutionalised male power" (Bettman, 2005, p.23):

Men's subjugation of women in this social system is historically rooted in political, educational, economic, religious, familial, medical, legal and social institutions as well as being contemporarily reinforced (Bettman, 2005, p.268; Cameron, 1990, p.13). Patriarchy is not ahistorical, however, and there has been significant movement towards lessening gender inequality in western countries over the past century (Bettman, 2005, p.119).

Within the system of patriarchal power relations, men and masculinities theorists argue all men do not benefit equally since dominant men use hierarchical social power and violence to establish the "pecking order" amongst men and control non-dominant men as well as women (Bettman, 2005, pp.23). Bettman (2005, pp.23), for example, argues men who do not conform to hegemonic masculinity and the dominant discourse (e.g. gay or effeminate men) pay a considerable price and are often targets of violence, ostracised or otherwise punished in the structure of patriarchal relations.

A structural model of patriarchal power provides a feminist conceptual framework for understanding male violence against women. Feminist research suggests this violence reflects "long-standing problems of massive cross-national proportions, intricately linked to each other through culturally specific patterns of female subjugation and male hegemony" (Mason, 2002, p.38). The use and threat of force is thus located within broader regimes of gender inequality including between individual men and women and within families. In these regimes of inequality, feminists argue, violence reflects and reinforces the oppression, exploitation and subordination of women (Flood, 2002, p.2; Hanmer, 1996, p.7; Mason, 2002, p.38; Murray, 2005, p.29; Patton, 2004, p.299; Shea Hart, 2006, p.77).

Feminists argue that male violence against women is therefore "a 'men-thing', evidenced empirically as what normal, ordinary men do routinely on a very substantial scale because they want to, because they think they have the right to, and because nothing effective is done to stop them" (Itzin, 2000, p.378). Further, they argue hegemonic masculinity and androcentrism encourage men to dominate those less valued, disempowered, weaker or more vulnerable than themselves to maintain the patriarchal order (Bettman, 2005, p.288; Radford & Stanko, 1996, p.65; Shea Hart, 2006, p.83). Male violence against women is one expression of this dynamic. This understanding links different types of male violence against women such as sexual assault and domestic violence in a common purpose to control, dominate and express authority and power over women (Hanmer, 1996, p.8). It suggests that although the precise behaviours may vary, there are substantial links

between different forms of male violence against women including domestic violence, rape, sexual assault, pornography, and child sexual assault.

Within this understanding, male violence against women is an instrument of gendered power and social control maintaining male dominance and female subordination regardless of individual experiences of this violence (Phillips, 2004; Russo, Koss, & Goodman, 1995, p.125; Yllo, 1993, p.54). The threat and reality of male violence against women in patriarchal societies oppress all women and restricts their psychic and physical freedom regardless of individual experiences of violence. As Gail Mason (2000, p.76) argues, women's awareness of their vulnerability to men's violence, particularly rape and sexual assault, shape their perceptions and practices of personal safety. Similarly, Jill Radford and Elizabeth Stanko (1996, pp.72-78) argue:

...men's sexual violence is part of the backdrop of all women's lives and not something experienced by a minority who can be labelled as inadequate and helpless victims. Managing sexual danger is an integral part of being female ...far from being an aberrant experience in our lives or the experience of aberrant women, [violence] is in fact the backdrop against which women's lives are lived. We have come to see male sexual violence as one of the defining characteristics of patriarchal societies.

Feminists also argue that patriarchal discourses justify women's disadvantages and shift blame and responsibility for violence from the perpetrator to the victim (Shea Hart, 2006, p.78). These patriarchal narratives minimise the extent or harm of violence, obscure men's responsibility, and may construct perpetrators as 'victims' of the system or of women's 'equal' violence.

The experiences of male victims of sexual assault illustrate how this violence is gendered at a structural level beyond the individual gender of the perpetrator or victim. Terry Gillespie, who analysed the experiences of male victims of sexual assault, argues:

...men who have been sexually assaulted by other men claim that one of the most traumatizing effects of rape is feminization ...For women to be raped by men is deemed 'normal' while for men it is abnormal, an experience which 'feminizes' men, and one which is viewed as somehow more shocking and horrifying. ...It is men who are raping women and men. So a rape victim is not merely a victim; a victim of sexual assault, whether male or female, is a victim of the gendered power relations between women and men, acted out in everyday life (Gillespie, 1996, pp.160-162).



Similarly, Chris Atmore (1999, pp.197-198) argues rape is a masculinizing act for the rapist and a feminizing act for the victim regardless of the gender of victim or perpetrator:

...we are not surprised when a man who has been raped attributes some of the trauma to being "made to feel like a woman", while it is highly unlikely that a female rape survivor would describe her experience in "opposite gender" terms. Rape is something that involves and even creates gender, independent of, or at least partly autonomous from, the bodies of the rapist and raped.

These arguments suggest male violence against women is gendered at a structural level. They acknowledge the complex relationship between gender, power and violence, and the fundamental role of gender and inequality in shaping the exercise of power in society.

## **2.3 The Patriarchal Institutions Underpinning Violence (mezzo)**

### **2.3.1 The State**

At the institutional (mezzo) level, feminists have argued that the modern western state is a gendered and patriarchal one that entrenches male power and privilege in a system of hierarchies over women and some men (Franzway, Court, & Connell, 1989; MacKinnon, 1989a; Pateman, 1988, 1989). Feminists may argue either that the state is an agent of patriarchy and operates in the interests of men or the state is itself a core part of patriarchy and oppressor of women (Franzway et al., 1989, pp.27-28). Suzanne Franzway and her colleagues argued that the state comprises a complex set of institutions and organisations rather than unified body. Yet, Franzway (1989, p.10) and her colleagues also describe multiple connections between the state, patriarchy and gender order:

These connections appear in the basic constitution of the realm of the state; in the composition of the controllers of the state apparatus; in the staffing of the state machinery and in its internal organisation; in what the state does, who it impinges upon and how. Clearly, the state is deeply implicated in the overall social advantaging of men and subordination of women. The evidence reveals not just a sexual division of labour but, more decisive, men's greater access to power through the state.

There is a large, complex body of literature exploring feminist theories of the state (e.g. Franzway et al., 1989; MacKinnon, 1989a; Pateman, 1988, 1989; Sawer, 1993; Yeatman, 1994). The way feminists argue the state creates and reinforces a public / private dichotomy is, however, of particular relevance to this thesis.

Feminists argue the state excludes women from citizenship by constructing a distinction between the public as a regulated space and the private as an unregulated space free from state interference. According to Carole Pateman (1989, p.3), in classical social contract theory philosophers argue that citizens of a polity entered a social contract where they gave up certain rights and freedoms under the governance of law and social norms to obtain the benefits and protection of society. She criticised such theories, however, as based on the assumption that the subject in this social contract exists within the spheres of economy and state and not in the realm of domestic, familial and sexual relationships. That is, according to Pateman, the 'abstract liberal individual' who freely enters contracts is inherently a masculine individual and women are only admitted to the public sphere only insofar as they are capable of emulating masculine ways of being. Pateman (1988) also argues the other side of the social contract is a "sexual contract" for men who have agreed to regulation in the public sphere to ensure their orderly access to women's sexual and domestic labour in the private sphere without state interference. The modern state facilitates this "sexual contract" by its adherence to the public/private dichotomy and the concept of the negative state where it presumes governments best promote freedom when they stay out of existing private social arrangements (MacKinnon, 1989b, pp.161-165).

This perspective of the state is extremely important to feminist understandings of male violence against women since this violence predominantly occurs within the private sphere. Historically, feminists argue the state's separation of public and private has shielded male violence against women from government interference. As Catharine MacKinnon (1989a, pp.193-194) argued:

Through this perspective the legal concept of privacy can and has shielded the place of battery, marital rapes, and women's exploited domestic labor [*sic*]. It has preserved the central institutions whereby women are deprived of identity, autonomy, control, and self-definition. It has protected a primary activity through which male supremacy is expressed and enforced. ...It polices the division between public and private, a very material division that keeps the private beyond public redress and depoliticizes women's subjection within it.

A substantial focus of feminist activism has thus been to challenge the public/private dichotomy maintained by the state. This explains the importance of the feminist catch-cry "the personal is political" in feminist activism. In the context of male violence against women, this feminist activism has focused on naming and publicising women's experiences of domestic violence and sexual assault and demanding state intervention to stop this violence (Morris, 2008, p.47).

These feminist understandings of the important role of the state in creating and maintaining women's subordination to men has generated significant questions amongst feminists about the role of the state in responding to male violence against women. MacKinnon (1989a, p.161), for example, asks: "Can such a state be made to serve the interests of those upon whose powerlessness its power is erected?". Similarly, Anna Yeatman (1994) argues the state can work to both ameliorate and compound the stresses of women's lives which arise out of their exploitation by men. She continues that the state conferring rights on women is both a paradox and liability:

This is a paradox because this very benevolence of the State – its protective power in respect of women – indicates that it is a corporate patriarch willing to sanction the uncivilised behaviours of individual patriarchs. It is a liability, because what is given by the State can not be just taken away but given in ways which underwrite the social dependency of women rather than empower them to operate out of their own capacities. Hardly any right women 'enjoy' is unalloyed in this way. For example, the State's 'protection' of women in policies and programs which work against domestic violence do not effectively redistribute gender power in society but merely give the State further power to harass the men it has already type-cast as those most likely to engage in such uncivilised behaviours (Yeatman, 1994, p.187).

This complex relationship between feminism and the state and revisions to this understanding particularly offered by post-structural feminists is fundamental to this thesis and addressed further in the feminist interactions with the state and critiques of public policy outlined in Chapter Three.

### **2.3.2 Traditional family and heterosexuality**

Some feminists argue the state has facilitated and condoned patriarchal oppression, including men's violence against women, by creating and reinforcing a public/private dichotomy. Feminists also contend that this dichotomy, which has allowed men to perpetrate violence against women with relative impunity, has largely operated in the interests of particular types of men. These feminists claim the state has historically intervened in the private sphere and regulated particular types of families including Aboriginal, poor or working-class, gay and lesbian, single-parent, and migrant families (Bacchi, 1999b, pp.166-169; Ferraro, 1996; Laing, 2008, p.74; Morris, 2008, pp.47-48). Further, while the state's public/private dichotomy masks how government policies shape relations between men and women, the rise of neo-liberalism in western democracies has also made the distinction between public and private increasingly unclear (Hearn & McKie,

2008, p.81; Morris, 2008, p.46). Traditional family and heterosexuality are two key related social institutions supported and promoted by the state in the private sphere. For many feminists, traditional family and heterosexuality are significant social institutions that reproduce the patriarchal gender order, women's inequality and male violence against women.

Many feminists consider the patriarchal family symbolic of patriarchal authority, inequality and deference of women to men (Bettman, 2005, p.287). This dominant patriarchal model of family retains strict gender roles for women as nurturers of their male partners and children while men are primary protectors and providers (Ruthchild, 1997, p.4). This model of family promotes a discourse of men's ownership of women and the related patriarchal assumptions that men protect, correct, control and dominate women in relationships (Bettman, 2005, p.287). In her cross-cultural analyses of domestic violence, Jalna Hanmer (1996) found this was the most common feature constituting the framework fully or partially legitimating violence against women. She argues "the boundaries that specify correct family behaviour for women are not those that bind men to society and cultures, however diverse cultures may be in other ways" (Hanmer, 1996, p.11). Similarly, Radford and Stanko (1996, p.78) argue:

The family, and the institution of heterosexuality which underpins it, is a central institution in patriarchal society, one in which private struggles around patriarchal power relations are enacted, and hence one in which violence frequently features as a form of control of the powerless by the powerful.

This comment also raises the important complementarity of heterosexuality in power relations which enable and authorise male violence against women.

Most conceptual frameworks theorising human relations rely implicitly upon naturalised heterosexuality institutionalised as stable, universal and monolithic heterosexual forms of family structure and identity (Richardson, 1996, p.2). Some feminists argue family is a hegemonic social and political institution which endorses compulsory heterosexuality and multiple levels of violence against women (Bailey, 2006, p.34). Critiques of heterosexuality as a hegemonic institution by feminists such as Catharine MacKinnon (1989a), Susan Brownmiller (1975) and Andrea Dworkin (1997), have been central to feminist analyses of male violence against women. These feminists argue the widespread use and threat of force/violence "is a key strategy in maintaining women's participation in heterosexual

relationships” (Atmore, 1999, p.198). Further, those women perceived as outside of dominant heterosexuality such as lesbian women are especially vulnerable to men’s sexual violence, abuse and harassment inside and outside of the family (Radford & Stanko, 1996, p.78). Hegemonic heterosexuality is therefore crucial to understanding male violence against heterosexual and lesbian women (Mason, 1995, p.56) since feminists argue this violence acts as a social control mechanism whether women are in traditional heterosexual family structures or outside them.

Gail Mason (1995) critiques feminist analyses of male violence against women for neglecting lesbian experiences. Mason (1995, p.62) argues these analyses reflect an assumption of heterosexuality that does not incorporate lesbian experiences of rape and domestic violence. She argues that analyses of violence theorising only men’s subjugation of women ignore the ways heterosexism operates to subjugate homosexual men (Mason, 1995, p.64). Research on gay and lesbian experiences of violence, particularly by Mason (1997; 2000; 2002), thus demonstrates the complex interplay of patriarchy, hegemonic masculinity, hegemonic heterosexuality and heteronormativity. Researchers on homophobic violence explore how violence is used to maintain social control and police the borders and boundaries of a particular patriarchal and heteronormative social order (Mason, 2002, p.46; Ruthchild, 1997, p.4; Tomsen & Mason, 1997). They also discuss the way social policy is an instrument of disciplinary power; normalising and enacting heterosexuality as the natural and acceptable form of sexuality against which others are judged (Carabine, 1996, p.73).

Mason’s work provides useful insights on the interplay and construction of difference. It shows that despite the historical tendency to bring together gay and lesbian experiences of violence within the conceptual framework of homophobic violence, there are many commonalities between lesbian and heterosexual women’s experiences of violence. Lesbian experiences of violence therefore offer a challenge to conventional thinking and an opportunity to consider and extend understandings of power, control, heterosexual dominance, homophobia and social constructions of gender and sexuality (Bagshaw & Chung, 2000, p.12). This suggests that it is appropriate to theorise lesbian experiences of violence within the broader context of male violence against women in a way that consciously includes lesbians rather than assimilating them and assuming equivalence with heterosexual women. Taken together, the feminist arguments explored above thus suggest that institutions such as the state, traditional family and heterosexuality entrench male power and privilege over women in a way that enables and facilitates male violence against women.

## 2.4 The Personal is Political (micro)

At the individual (micro) level, some feminists argue that male violence against women is a choice made by individual men and used in a way that is intentional, strategic, controlled, and intended to dominate and control a woman. Breaking the silence, consciousness-raising groups, naming strategies and giving voice to women's experiences of violence as well as tracing the dimensions and characteristics of this violence have been a significant part of feminist activism (Breckenridge, 1999; Kelly, 1996b; Morris, 2008, p.41). Further, much knowledge about men's individual use of violence and the strategies they use against victims has been obtained from research directly with abusive men and comparisons between their reports of their violence and those of their victims (Bagshaw & Chung, 2000; James, 1999; Laing, 1996, 2002; Morris, 2008, p.71). Consequently, there is an extensive body of feminist literature delineating the nature of male violence against women at the individual (micro) level. Of particular interest is research highlighting the way individual male perpetrators strategically draw upon patriarchal narratives to: minimise their violence and invalidate their victims' experience of the violence; shift responsibility for their violence onto their victims; and construct themselves as victims of either the system, the violent relationship or the woman's 'equal' violence.

Male perpetrators of violence against women and their supporters have employed a range of strategies to minimise the nature, extent or impact of their violence and invalidate the experiences and credibility of their female victims. These include: drawing upon rape and domestic violence mythologies about what constitutes 'real' rape or what is and is not considered domestic violence<sup>1</sup>; suggesting some types of violence (e.g. with a weapon, or against children, older women or virgins) are more serious or harmful than others; minimising their violence as 'not that bad' or as exaggerated or invented; and trivialising women's injuries (Doyle & Barbato, 1999; Kelly & Radford, 1996; Morris, 2008, p.71). Further, according to Fiona Rummery (1996, p.152), women's "sane, average, even self-preserving responses to situations of abuse are often used as evidence of their own lack of mental health". That is, perpetrators and others including the medical profession often invalidate women's experience of male violence by constructing their responses as evidence of a mental health impairment of a 'disordered' or 'sick' woman.

---

<sup>1</sup> Based on these mythologies perpetrators and their supporters tend to assert that 'real' rape is only that which occurs in a public place by a stranger and often with a weapon while domestic violence is only extreme physical violence.

Accompanying the invalidation of women's experiences of male violence are a range of strategies that shift responsibility for the man's violence to the woman victimised. Male perpetrators draw upon a rich tapestry of mythology which suggests women deserved or instigated the violence against them. Thus, perpetrators hold women responsible for the violence they committed by arguing the woman brought it on herself by, for example, wearing a short skirt; nagging, or not conforming to gendered stereotypes such as the good wife, heterosexual woman, or the chaste and non-promiscuous virgin. Perpetrators may also strategically utilise some of the early theoretical explanations of male violence, particularly from the psychiatry and psychology disciplines; which argue the personality characteristics and psychopathology of the victim are responsible for the violence (Jasinski, 2001, pp.8-10). Challenges to these strategies by feminists in recent years mean that, while they still exist, their deployment to shift responsibility for violence away from individual men is much more subtle.

One way perpetrators subtly invoke these strategies is their use of the passive voice to describe their violence (Ehrlich, 2001; Greer, 2007; Lamb, 1991). The passive voice, or passive language, refers to how a sentence is structured so the subject of a verb is undergoing rather than performing an action (Greer, 2007). An example of respective active and passive statements are: "In the US a man rapes a woman every 6 minutes" compared to "In the US a woman's rape occurs every 6 minutes" (Ehrlich, 2001, p.40). The passive voice is often used in media and academic representations of male violence against women and realigns the importance and agency of subjects and objects within a sentence or can make the agent of the action disappear altogether (Greer, 2007, p.251; Lamb, 1991).

Susan Ehrlich (2001) and Sharon Lamb (1991) describe passive representations of men's violence against women as the "grammar of non-agency" and "acts without agents" respectively. They argue these representations obscure and shift responsibility and blame from the actor (the man using the violence) and positions female victims as the problem (Ehrlich, 2001; Greer, 2007; Lamb, 1991). Ehrlich (2001, p.40) cites research that when the passive voice is used to describe cases of violence against women people attribute greater causality or responsibility to patients (victims) over agents (perpetrators) and imputed less harm to the victim. The use of passive language thus shifts responsibility away from male perpetrators to female victims and minimizes the harm caused by male violence against women. Further, Ehrlich also argues such passive representations of violence can both operationalise and reinforce hegemonic masculinity.

Another way perpetrators shift responsibility is by representing violence as 'family dysfunction' and thus as a mutual act in a way which creates a "zone of uncertainty" (Towns, 2005, p.2). Due to this zone of uncertainty, women are held to be just as responsible as men for the man's violence in the relationship (Towns, 2005, p.2). Alison Towns (2005, pp.3-4) argues perpetrators often employ mutual responsibility accounts of their violence using the language of 'dysfunctional families', 'conflict' or 'relationship problems'. She argues these men actively exploit the ambiguity zones of uncertainty create about what is violence, who is the perpetrator and who is the victim. For the perpetrator, these accounts of their violence and the zones of uncertainty they create are a tactic which minimises the nature and harm of their violence and shifts responsibility for their actions onto the targets of their violence.

A final relevant way perpetrators shift responsibility for violence away from themselves is by constructing themselves as victims. There are a range of theoretical explanations of male violence against women that focus on the personality characteristics and psychopathology of male perpetrators. These construct violent men as the victim of some sort of 'problem' such as mental illness, a personality disorder, alcoholism, bad parenting, a history of violence, the inability to communicate, or physiology or biology (Jasinski, 2001, pp.8-10). Perpetrators may strategically draw upon these explanations to elicit sympathy from their victim or others or to justify and excuse their violence. In recent years, however, this construction of perpetrators as victims has been modified and extended particularly by members of father's and men's rights groups. These men claim men and women equally violent in relationships and represent men as victims of feminist gender bias operating through institutions of the state such as family law and sexual assault and domestic violence services (Bagshaw & Chung, 2000; Gillespie, 1996; James, 1999; Morris, 2008, p.118). In her research on maternal alienation, Morris (2008) describes these as displacement strategies and argues that a fundamental aspect of male violence is its technique of projection. Morris (2008, pp.80-81) argues this makes it possible for individual "perpetrators to masquerade as victims and portray their victims as perpetrators".

## **2.5 Feminist Solutions to Male Violence Against Women**

The feminist understandings of male violence against women at the macro, mezzo and micro levels as outlined above are important because they form the basis on which feminists propose solutions to male violence. Feminists usually locate their proposals to



respond to male violence against women within understandings of systematic patriarchal gendered power relations. Catherine Bettman's (2005) research with male perpetrators of domestic violence and anthropological exploration of the Waorani and Iroquois communities illustrates this. Bettman argues women's position in a society, rather than the perspective towards violence generally, moderates the level of male violence against women. She suggests domestic violence was most likely to occur when patriarchal ideology was dominant and when it defined women as inferior to men, held women's attributes in contempt and devalued women's intrinsic worth.

This means that societies do not necessarily have to eschew violence totally for domestic violence to be absent or infrequent. In societies where egalitarian and respectful attitudes towards women are enshrined in discourse, and upheld by social institutions, domestic violence will be considered taboo. It seems clear that in Western societies, membership of different cultural groups, be they class, ethnic, religious, sporting or otherwise, allows for variation in beliefs, attitudes and behaviour but that patriarchal principles of hegemony, androcentrism and the consequent subordination of women, are pivotal and all-precedent (Bettman, 2005, p.297).

For many feminists the solution to male violence against women has been to promote egalitarianism and challenge male domination and the inequalities between men and women in society (Bettman, 2005, p.295; Ferraro, 1996; Patton, 2004, p.299; Phillips, 2008a, p.65).

These feminists also believe it is important to attend to the macro, mezzo, and micro levels of male violence against women. They argue most responses to male violence target individuals at a micro level such as through counselling, men's programs, support groups and incarceration which deals with symptoms rather than the cause of violence. Yet, as Bettman (2005, p.296) argues:

Men are socialised into a culture of violence from the top, through the overarching hetero-patriarchal society and the structures that support it. Individual men then link themselves to the ongoing process as they replicate the culture and hand it down to future generations. The men in this study, who spoke of their patterns of violence, of falling back into their old ways and needing to come back to the men's program, are clear evidence of this. For change to take place, to be meaningful and long-lasting, it has to occur at both the macro and micro-levels of society, for in a circular way, these reproduce and sustain each other.

Similarly, pro-feminist men such as Michael Flood (2002) argue there need to be profound changes in men's lives to challenge gendered power relations. Flood argues men themselves need to take part in this project by challenging their own violent behaviour and joining with women to challenge the cultural and institutional underpinnings of this violence in their communities (Flood, 2002, p.11).

## 2.6 Intersectionality and Difference

Questions of intersectionality and difference have been a significant issue and cause for debate within feminism and are of particular relevance in helping to develop new ways of understanding the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women. Gail Mason (1995, p.58) argues:

Much feminist writing locates the source of violence in concepts of patriarchy, misogyny and sexism, in analyses of power differentials that focus exclusively on the binary opposition of man/woman, masculinity/femininity. Such discourse frequently fails to consider the subjugation wrought through racist, ethnocentric or heterosexist (just to name a few) constructions of identity and the importance of these in the subjectivity of all women.

A complex understanding of patriarchy acknowledges that it creates a number of hierarchical dichotomies reflecting a superior/inferior relationship in "hierarchical constructions of difference" (Mason, 2002, p.63). These include categories such as men/women, adult/child, black/white, heterosexual/homosexual, ability/disability, wealth/poverty, educated/uneducated and strong/weak. These dichotomies help explain why women with different identities have varied experiences and levels of oppression under patriarchal social systems. It also explains why this system privileges some women (e.g. white heterosexual women) and victimises some men (e.g. black, gay or effeminate men).

In response to such criticisms, feminists have increasingly embraced the concept of intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1991). Challenging gender as the primary explanatory model for oppression, intersectionality focuses on multiple and interlocking systems of power and oppressions based on individual features of identity which intersect and modify each other (eg race, class, culture, and disability) (Bettman, 2005, p.8; Crenshaw, 1991). Intersectionality is an 'anti-essentialist' tool which assists in the recognition and representation of difference "in multiple rather than singular terms; for example, to recognise the ways in which difference of gender *and* race, rather than gender *or* race,

shape certain types of violence” (Mason, 2002, p.59). Some feminists argue that intersectionality has made contemporary feminism more inclusive of diversity and difference amongst women while still acknowledging male violence against women as a common experience grounded in structural circumstances (Atmore, 1999, p.202; Phillips, 2008a, p.58).

Mason (2002), however, rejects the concept of intersectionality to understand the relationship between violence and difference since she argues it does not fully encapsulate the highly interactive way categories of identity are articulated through each other. Mason (2002, p.77) argues intersectionality makes it difficult to “move beyond an essentialist notion of both the subject who enacts, and the subject who experiences, violence”. Mason (2002, p.77) proposes instead the concept of “mutual constitution” rather than interlocking oppressions of race, class, sexuality and various other aspects of identity. Mason’s “mutual constitution” offers an alternative explanatory framework to represent the way difference is articulated through and within each other. In this approach “the oppositions of sexual preference, ethnicity, race and class that are productive of our knowledge of violence must be brought to the forefront of feminist commentary” (Mason, 1995, p.66). Mason offers three theoretical concepts to do this: the hierarchical construction of difference; territory; and the cultural body.

Mason argues that it is possible for a given incident of violence to be dominated by one prejudice or one facet of identity. Yet she also suggests:

...we need to recognise, on the one hand, that racist, homophobic and gendered violence are all undergirded by particular constructions of difference and, on the other hand, that these constructions are produced through other forms of specificity that preclude such violence from being reduced to a single or universal category (Mason, 2002, p.77)

She therefore argues that categories of identity such as gender, sexuality and race do not simply intersect but are “vehicles of articulation” (Mason, 2002, p.61) for each other. This understanding links different kinds of violence (such as racist, homophobic and gendered) so that difference provides the rudimentary context distinguishing one form of violence (e.g. sexual assault) from the other (e.g. racist violence). Yet difference also provides a broad connecting link between these types of violence that pivot on “a sense of superiority and concomitant devaluation of the personal integrity of the racial or gendered other” (Mason, 2002, pp.63-64). From this understanding of the hierarchical construction of difference,

Mason encourages connections between types of violence and recognises the shortcomings of homogenous formulations based solely on gender, race or sexuality.

Mason links her concepts of territory and the cultural body to this understanding of the hierarchical construction of difference. She adopts the notion of territory, in terms of both its material and discursive aspects of diversity and identity, to explain violence. Territory “refers to particular locations about which people have a sense of ownership or belonging (as in ‘my’ neighbourhood or ‘my’ nation), and the conceptual categories through which people achieve this sense of belonging (as in categories of whiteness, femininity, heterosexuality); each is dependent on the other” (Mason, 2002, p.60). Mason argues that since constructions of difference grounded in bodily specificities underpin violence, the relationship between violence and difference must be an embodied one. In her model of the cultural body, she argues violence emerges from the difference between embodied constructs rather than any property intrinsic to a particular body. Combining these concepts, she continues:

...violence erupts out of the hierarchical, and visible, relation *between* bodies, the connections and disconnections, the values that this relation attributes to particular bodies, the way that some bodies are assumed to be superior to others and so on. This sense of superiority requires others to be managed to a certain degree. Violence provides one means of doing this. Hence, it is not coincidence that violence is so often patterned by systems of gender, sexuality and race. These patterns reflect some of the most normative and value-laden lines of difference between human subjects (Mason, 2002, p.77).

Through these explanatory concepts of hierarchical constructions of difference, territory and the cultural body, Mason offers a complex theoretical framework for understanding violence that is useful for analysing representations of male violence against women in this thesis. These concepts form an important part of the theoretical foundation I use to analyse *Australia Says No* in Chapter Ten and particularly to make sense of the Howard Government’s complex use of race, heterosexuality, and gender in that campaign.

## **2.7 Hegemonic Masculinity**

Hegemonic masculinity is another important concept underpinning the development of new ways of understanding the Howard Government’s approaches to male violence against women in this thesis. Antonio Gramsci’s conception of hegemony is the most relevant here. Gramsci’s hegemony refers to an intrinsically relational and complex social process in which

one social group attains social ascendancy over another group through negotiation and the subordinate group's consent rather than coercion, domination, or force (Connell, 1987, p.184; Demetriou, 2005, p.264; Finkelstein & Goodwin, 2005, p.159; Forgacs, 1988, p.423). Gramscian hegemony "did not mean violence, although it could be supported by force; it meant ascendancy achieved through culture, institutions, and persuasion" (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p.832). This hegemony also refers to a social ascendancy where other groups or patterns are subordinated rather than eliminated (Connell, 1987, p.184).

Hegemonic masculinity is a theoretical concept developed over the last two decades which has considerably influenced studies of men, gender, masculinities and gender relations (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p.829). While not strictly a feminist theory, pro-feminist men have mainly been responsible for developing this concept. Introduced by Australian social theorist Raewyn Connell, hegemonic masculinity has subsequently been used widely as a framework for research and debates about men and masculinities and has been applied in diverse cultural contexts to a range of practical and theoretical issues (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p.834).

Hegemonic masculinity is the culturally and historically idealized form of masculinity in a given setting which ideologically legitimates the global subordination of women to men (Connell, 1987, p.185; Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p.832; Messerschmidt, 2005, p.198). It is constructed in relation both to women and to subordinated masculinities (Connell, 1987, p.186). Although a minority of men enact hegemonic masculinity, it is a normative concept requiring all men to position themselves in relation to it and through which all men benefit from the "patriarchal dividend" (real social and/or material advantages) (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p.832). Hegemonic masculinity also requires compliance from women through 'emphasised femininity' (Connell, 1987, pp.183-188). Further, hegemonic masculinity is not static in its operation of power since and there may be a struggle where older forms of masculinity are replaced by new ones (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p.833). Hegemonic masculinity thus offers a dynamic theoretical conceptualisation complementary to feminist explorations of operations of gender and power.

In what they describe as their "renovated analysis of hegemonic masculinities" Raewyn Connell and James Messerschmidt (2005, pp.847-854) outline aspects of hegemonic masculinity. First, they argue hegemonic masculinity may incorporate non-hegemonic patterns of masculinity and emphasised femininity into the functioning gender order (Connell

& Messerschmidt, 2005, p.848). Second, that gender is always relational and emphasised femininity reinforces compliance to patriarchy and contributes to the construction of gender amongst men. Third, is the geography of hegemonic masculinity and the importance of place and context at three levels: local (families, communities, organisations); regional (nation-state); and global (transnational business, media, international relations) (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p.849). Finally, they suggest bearers of hegemonic masculinity may “actively attempt to modernize gender relations and to reshape masculinities” to maintain hegemony in a way that is not necessarily negative (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p.853).

### **2.7.1 Transformistic hegemonic masculinity**

In his ‘new sociology of hegemonic masculinity’ Demetrakis Demetriou’s (2005) provides a detailed critique of the inconsistencies in Connell’s theorisation of hegemonic masculinity. Connell and Messerschmidt (2005, pp.844-845) appear to acknowledge Demetriou’s arguments in their reformulation of hegemonic masculinity and recognition of the potential incorporation of subordinate masculinities and emphasised femininities into a functioning gender order. Nevertheless, they also dismiss his critique and reconceptualisation of hegemonic masculinity as applying only at local (not regional or global) level.

Demetriou (2005, p.258) argues that dominant concerns in readings of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony have focussed on the notion of the outcome of ‘consent’ and the “contextually specific and constantly shifting ‘force-consent relationship’”. Demetriou (2005, p.275) advocates looking to the complexity of the process through which this outcome is achieved instead of focussing on outcome alone. Consequently, Demetriou’s (2005, pp.257-258) focus is Gramsci’s understanding of “the process of group formulation; the complexity of interest articulation, on relationship constructions, on situated struggles and on the contingency of historical situations” as well as the formation of “historic blocs”. For Demetriou, historic blocs are flexible and formed through internal negotiation with elements of subordinated groups appropriated into the historic bloc; particularly those elements consistent with the project of domination. Demetriou combines these understandings with theoretical tools from social theorists he describes as “Gramsci-inspired” to develop his ‘new sociology of hegemonic masculinity’. These include Judith Butler’s ‘redeployment’ and ‘politics of resignification’, Stuart Hall’s ‘historic bloc’ as expressed in his analysis of ‘Thatcherism’, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s work on ‘socialist strategy’ and Honi Bhabha’s ‘translation’ and ‘hybridity’.

Demetriou's reconceptualisation of hegemonic masculinity argues that this is a concept where negotiation, manoeuvring, flexibility, concealment, reconfiguration, heterogeneity, and unrecognizability are central in a hybrid and internally incoherent historic bloc:

The collective interests of particular groups of men may be articulated through forms of political practice that do not oppose, marginalise and annihilate oppositional interest-based groupings (e.g. 'black men' or 'women') but redeploy the effects of their practices (e.g. 'gay signifiers or styles'; 'black men's culture') in order to conceal the objective oppositions of interests and to ensure their continuity (Demetriou, 2005, p.255).

Describing this as "dialectical pragmatism", internal negotiation and redeployment it is, for Demetriou, not a simple appropriation or absorption of oppositional demands or practices into the hegemonic bloc as Connell and Messerschmidt suggest. Rather, it is a 'transformistic practice' that "produce[s] hybrid, unrecognizable and potentially deceptive configurations of social practice" (Demetriou, 2005, p.264). To explain this, Demetriou argues that transformistic negotiation is negotiation at the level of political practice designed to guarantee that inequalities remain intact by concealing connections between interests and the political articulation of social practice designed to guarantee those interests. He continues:

When such an understanding of negotiation is utilised to theorise the formation of hegemonic blocs, it becomes possible to grasp the unrecognizability of power and its potentially deceptive character: in so far as 'negotiation' is not a simple inclusion/exclusion dialectic (*a la* Smith, 1994b: 17) in which an oppressive regime incorporates some oppositional elements and marginalizes others but it is a process of hybridization that translates the familiar into something new, it is a very deceptive process that transforms what appears counter-hegemonic into an instrument of hegemonic domination. Negotiation does not 'incorporate' or 'embrace' oppositional elements. It *translates* them into something novel and, in doing so, it 'alienates our political expectations' and the 'very forms of our recognition' of domination and resistance (Demetriou, 2005, pp. 262 & 267).

Thus, Demetriou's 'new sociology of hegemonic masculinity' provides a sophisticated reconceptualisation of this concept as a non-oppositional and yet effective strategy emphasizing the flexibility, situationality and hybridity of masculine domination.

Demetriou provides a detailed case study of gay masculinities in western societies and the incorporation of these into the hegemonic historic bloc to demonstrate his argument. He argues that patriarchy suffered a crisis of legitimacy and identity in western societies from

the late 1960s due to women's liberation and the emerging visibility of subordinate masculinities (e.g. gay liberation and black men). In answer to this crisis, he argues that gay culture and practices which were closer to dominant forms of femininity than masculinity, were transformitively redeployed into the hegemonic bloc "to make the gender division of patriarchy less visible and thus win women's consent" (Demetriou, 2005, p.292) for continued patriarchal domination. Demetriou (2005, p.289) suggests there was no substantial change in gay men's oppositional demands related to their interests or rights with appropriation of only those elements of political practice which, "when translated, could prove useful for the legitimation and reproduction of patriarchy". He concludes that the reproduction of patriarchy needs not be associated only with white or heterosexual masculinities since it is the hybrid and apparently contradictory articulation of hegemonic masculinity that enables it to reproduce itself. He continues:

It is in fact a hybrid masculine *bloc* that is made up of both straight and gay, both black and white elements and practices. Furthermore, whereas in Connell's empirical analysis the existence of non-white or non-heterosexual elements in hegemonic masculinity is a sign of contradiction and weakness, for me it is precisely its internally diversified and hybrid nature that makes the hegemonic bloc dynamic and flexible. It is its constant hybridisation, its constant appropriation of diverse elements from various masculinities that makes the hegemonic bloc capable of reconfiguring itself and adapting to the specificities of new historical conjunctures (Demetriou, 2005, pp.296-297).

Thus, Demetriou (2005, p.297) shows how hybridization transformed "what appears to be counter-hegemonic and progressive into an instrument of backwardness and patriarchal reproduction". Demetriou's 'new sociology of hegemonic masculinity' encouraged me to consider how transformistic practice might operate within government policies. It provided an important theoretical foundation from which I develop new ways of understanding Australian Government responses to male violence against women during the Howard years.

## 2.8 Chapter Summary

This chapter has explored contemporary feminist understandings of male violence against women. It has introduced and outlined a number of concepts that form the theoretical foundation for the analysis of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women in this thesis. First, the chapter has explained the theoretical schema adopted for this thesis that locates feminist understandings of male violence against women



at structural (macro), institutional (mezzo) and individual (micro) levels. It has also outlined the solutions feminists propose to respond to male violence against women that are grounded within these understandings. Second, the chapter explored intersectionality and difference, hegemonic masculinity and Demetriou's 'new sociology of hegemonic masculinity'. These concepts are particularly important because they form the theoretical foundation to develop new ways of understanding the Australian Government's responses to male violence against women during the Howard years.

## **Chapter Three**

### **Australian Social Policy and the Femocrat Strategy**

---

This thesis examines the Australian Government's women's policy generally and male violence against women policy specifically during the Howard years. This chapter explores literature from the disciplines of policy studies and political science concerning understandings of women's social policy and policy-making processes in Australia. It also explores feminist analyses of public policy responses to male violence against women. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical and historical framework to contextualise the study in the Australian political and policy context. The chapter starts with a discussion exploring Australian feminism and the femocrat strategy. This includes an outline of policy activism which is a key concept used in this thesis to help make sense of policy process. The chapter then explores feminist critiques of government policy responses to male violence against women with a particular focus on feminist conceptualisations of policy as chivalry and policy as cooption. Finally, the chapter briefly explains why this thesis focuses on the Australian Government given the historical responsibility of Australian state governments for public policy responses to male violence against women.

#### **3.1 Australian Feminism and the Femocrat Strategy**

Understanding feminist policy activism and the femocrat strategy is important because of the significant role of feminists in Australian governments' responses to male violence against women. The term 'femocrat' is an Australian neologism describing feminist women entering paid positions in designated women's policy agencies in the bureaucracy (Chappell, 2000, p.263; Ford, 2001, p.244; Sawer, 1993, p.1). First entering the Australian bureaucracy under the Whitlam Labor Government in 1972, Julie Nyland (1998, p.216) identifies the 'femocrats' as a notable group of Australian policy activists. Since femocrat policy activism played such an important role in government responses to male violence

against women and policy activism is an important concept in understanding policy process in this thesis, this concept is outlined below before outlining the femocrat strategy.

### 3.1.1 Policy activism

Wendy Weeks (1996, p.12) argues that it is important to grasp “the organisational and inter-organisational context in which specific policy proposals are developed”. Policy machinery and the actions of policy actors can impact on the way policy problems are represented and the way policies develop. As Mark Considine (1994, p.73) argues, “institutions not only provide a regulated structure through which new proposals travel, but confer advantage on some approaches and restrict others”. The concept of policy activism is therefore a useful concept to analyse policy machinery and policy processes.

Janet Ramsay’s (2004) research on domestic violence policy making by the Commonwealth and NSW State Governments between 1970 and 1985 offers an important background for this thesis. Ramsay’s research focuses on four key themes through which she identifies patterns of domestic violence policy process. Her first theme, the importance of policy activism, is particularly relevant. According to Ramsay (2004, pp.212-213):

As the study proceeded, further reasons for the greater suitability of the policy activism approach also became evident. These included the spontaneity of the initial feminist lead into domestic violence activism and then policy, the arrival of the issue in the policy context before the development of a representational analysis or even a name, and the continuing spontaneous pragmatism of the strategies which followed. It can be added that the more traditional policy process approaches also have difficulty in placing a process which moves with equal fluidity across the political boundaries of changing governments, and the constitutional limits of distinct, in this case Commonwealth and state, government jurisdictions.

Ramsay thus argues that traditional, rationalist or structural policy cycle or framework models of understanding policy processes are inadequate in explaining the development of Australian policy responses to domestic violence.

Ramsay also identifies the following distinctive and determining features of domestic violence policy process as a narrative of policy activism during her period of study:

...the roles and identities of, and the relationships between, the players driving the process; the lack of contest from established professionals in the field in the early stages of the insertion of

domestic violence into the policy arena; and ...the unique role and position of the refuge movement and refuge feminists in the process (Ramsay, 2004, p.213).

In sharing a similar subject matter and concern with developing policy across commonwealth and state jurisdictions, Ramsay's conclusions are significant. Her work indicates the potential value of policy activism to make sense of emerging themes around policy process from this study's interview data. It also raises the question of what relevance her conclusions would have, and what changes might be apparent, when applied to the later period of study in this thesis (1996-2007). Ramsay's research therefore offers both an historical background and important framing concept in policy activism.

Anna Yeatman's (1998) description of 'policy activism' was adopted for this thesis. Yeatman (1998) argues policy is a contested process where the agency of individual actors, the impact of institutional structures and policy machinery, and the role of discourse all play a role shaping policy. For Yeatman, activism is political action wed to participatory conceptions of democracy that displace paternalistic models where some sort of professional elite (e.g. a politician, bureaucrat or service-deliverer) makes decisions on behalf of subjects to their authority. Yeatman's (1998, pp.34-35) definition of a policy activist is therefore anyone who champions a conception of policy which opens up the process to all those who are involved in the "conception, operational formulation, implementation, delivery on the ground, consumption and evaluation" of a given policy.

Adding to Yeatman's understanding of policy activism, Deborah Brennan (1998, p.81 & 103) contends that "not all lobbying or pressure group activity is policy activism". She argues policy activism "is distinguished by the 'insider' status attained by those involved in it and by their efforts to transform fundamental assumptions and practices of the dominant policy agenda" (Brennan, 1998, p.103). Brennan (1998, p.103) suggests activism can be grounded in the promotion of new ideas or resistance to change. These observations are important in undermining common associations between policy activism and progressive social movements. Further, Julie Nyland (1998, p.217) and Paul Dugdale (1998) argue that policy activists tend to observe fluid boundaries and rely on informal networks across government agencies and with outsiders that enable them to step out of the confinement of traditional roles of 'bureaucrat' and 'community activist' to achieve desired reform goals. Nyland (1998, p.233) also notes the impact of context and argues that on entering the public sector, policy activists became "increasingly conformist with the requirements of

public sector management” and risk becoming policy elites and “the guardians of the new dominant agenda” once their authority over the policy process is established.

Significantly for this thesis, Dugdale (1998, p.107) notes that policy activists risk sacrificing bureaucratic advancement to activist commitments and/or may be constrained in their activism due to their position as a bureaucrat or member of an NGO receiving government funding. He suggests these constraints determine the division between insider policy activists and community-based activists (Dugdale, 1998, p.111). Dugdale (1998, p.119) also explores cooption:

For activists who are inside government, it is important to be seen to be trying to promote the organisation and its mission, in order to gain a better reception for their ideas by other people in the organisation. It may also enhance their capacity to deploy the organisation’s processes for policy and strategic planning. Such deep insider work may seem to drown policy activism within the demands of organisational loyalty – a classic case of ‘co-option’. But this perspective denies the possibility of ethical co-operation, and refuses to appreciate that what is being promoted by the activist can give a legitimate advantage to the institution.

Dugdale (1998, p.120) suggests the importance of security and structural location for policy activists where working with the organisation is central to pursuing the activist’s cause. He also highlights the inherent tension for policy activists who “straddle the divide” between the bureaucracy which requires an “immanent, pragmatic ethics” (Dugdale, 1998, p.121) to identify and seize opportunities within both contexts.

### **3.1.2 The femocrat strategy**

As mentioned above, the Australian femocrats were a notable group of policy activists who straddled this divide between the bureaucracy and the community; particularly feminists or the women’s movement. To advance their goals, the femocrats developed an innovative model of governance, labelled the ‘hub and spokes’ model, addressing gender and accountability throughout government and key issues of concern to women such as male violence (Sawer in Chappell, 2002b, p.87; Eistenstein, 1996; Sawer, 1999). At the federal level this model consisted of a centralised women’s coordinating unit, the Office of the Status of Women (or similar) in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (the hub) and a network of departmental women’s policy units (the spokes). Sawer (1999, p.40) lists defining characteristics of the femocrat model as: the location of the central unit in the chief policy coordination agency; the Prime Minister taking portfolio responsibility, assisted by a

woman Cabinet Minister; focal points in other government agencies; clear separation of women's and equal employment opportunity policy; gender audits of Cabinet submissions and Budget outlays; reinforcement of bureaucratic monitoring by a parliamentary party committee; funding women's advocacy groups and women's services; community representation on policy advisory bodies; and use of intergovernmental bodies to share best practice.

The femocrat strategy was a unique model of policy machinery since it was developed by the women's movement rather than the government or bureaucracy (Sawer, 1999). This model, and descriptions of the femocrats as "inside agitators" (Eistenstein, 1996) and "watchers within" (Sawer, 1999), illustrate their insider policy activism. This strategy and willingness of feminists to take policy positions in the bureaucracy to advocate for the democratic rights of all women was a hallmark of Australian feminism (Carmody, 1995, pp.46-47).

The successes and challenges of feminist policy activism within the bureaucracy and femocrats' work straddling the divide between the bureaucracy and women's movement has been well-documented (Carmody, 1995; See for example: Eistenstein, 1996; Franzway et al., 1989; Sawer, 1990, 1993, 1999; Sawer & Groves, 1994; Watson, 1990; Yeatman, 1990). It is therefore not necessary to repeat this history in detail. Significantly, however, references to Australian femocrats in this thesis focuses mainly on what Chappell (2002b, p.17) calls "majoritarian feminist activists" who are usually white and middle-class since:

The same political opportunity and constraint structures cannot be assumed for all women in any single state; rather, we need to acknowledge that the racial aspects of the state have meant that women from different backgrounds have faced different opportunities and constraints. The Anglo-majoritarian feminist movements ...have been in a relatively privileged position compared to their Aboriginal and non-Anglo contemporaries vis-à-vis political institutions.

This thesis therefore does not cover all feminist engagement with the state and any generalisations mainly apply to Australian majoritarian feminist activists and femocrats.

The activities of femocrats sparked strenuous debate in the Australian feminist movement about whether feminists working inside the state would be coopted or compromise feminist demands (Goodwin, 1999, p.52; Nyland, 1998, p.216). Many Australian feminists took a relatively hostile position to the state early on and advocated separatism and the

destruction of state structures instead of insider activism (Chappell, 2002b, p.23). They argued feminists would be co-opted and lose their identity and autonomy within the patriarchal structures of the state (Ryan, 1990, p.81). The Australian feminist literature of the 1970s, 1980s and, to a lesser extent, 1990s is dominated by this question of co-option (Goodwin, 1999; Sawer, 1993; Watson, 1990). This Australian debate also tapped into broader feminist theorising about engagement with the state which is well-documented (see for example Chappell, 2002b; Sawer, 1993; Watson, 1990).

Femocrats therefore walked a “fine line between taking advantage of openings while still being accessible and answerable to the concerns of those lobbying from outside” (Chappell, 2002b, p.85). Femocrat Anne Summers (1986) argued this was not easy since feminists were distrusted as missionaries by other bureaucrats and as mandarins by the women’s movement. Despite this tension, Australian feminists nevertheless centred their lobbying on bureaucrats rather than politicians (Eisenstein, 1996, p.200). As femocrat Sara Dowse (1984, p.139) recalls:

What has intrigued me throughout my life as a feminist activist is the fact that, despite my philosophical abhorrence of the modern capitalist state, when I want something done I look just to that arena. My expectations are low but my directions are clear. And despite the claims to the contrary, so do most of my feminist sisters, even the most radical among them.

Echoing Dowse’s comments, Roselyn Melville (1998, p.18) argues that despite seeing the state as patriarchal and hostile to their purpose, Australian feminists’ belief in the primacy of state responsibility tended to outweigh these concerns.

The apparent successes of femocrats and emerging post-modern and Foucauldian analyses caused some feminists to reject broad and homogenising designations such as “the patriarchal state” or “malestream policy” to describe public institutional processes (Goodwin, 1999; Schofield & Goodwin, 2006, p.23). Rosemary Pringle and Sophie Watson (1990, p.242), for example, advocate for the necessity of feminist engagement with the state, the inappropriateness of treating the state as a unitary whole, and the subsequent redundancy of strategies to “bring it down”. Louise Chappell (2002b) rejects conventional debates casting the relationships between gender interests and the state in either/or terms (inherently patriarchal or beneficial to women’s emancipation). Engaging with the structure-versus-agency debate, Chappell (2002b, pp.3-4) takes a “mid-position that sees the interaction between gender interests and the state as dynamic and co-constitutive

...[where] agents and structures [are] continuously informing one another". As Toni Schofield and Sue Goodwin (2006, p.22) argue:

...gender dynamics in policy making are not played out in a uniform and generalised way that stifles opportunities for resistance and change. Nor, however, are they random and contingent. There are various structures of gendered policy-making practice that suggest both possibilities for, and obstacles to, the advancement of gender equality in policy making.

These perspectives challenge views of the state as inherently patriarchal and suggest state institutions are instead culturally marked as masculine and operate "largely as the institutionalisation of the power of men" (Franzway et al., 1989, p.41). This perspective offers a framework to understand the value of feminist interactions with the state and exposes possibilities and opportunities for resistance and change.

These more complicated analyses of state power have opened up an understanding of the state "as a site of struggle between different interests, including feminist interests" (Goodwin, 1999, p.54). Goodwin (1999, p.60) thus suggests:

...analyses of women's policy machinery should focus on the way that *ideas* about what women's interests are and how they should be addressed through policy are produced, negotiated, refracted and transformed in the interactions that occur within specific organisational locales at specific points in time ...These shifts have widened the gaze of feminist political analyses to hitherto neglected sites of political interaction and policy production.

In these more complicated analyses, the state has become "conceptualised as the site of competing discourses" (Carmody, 1995, p.47). These feminist perspectives are consistent with the policy as discourse understanding adopted for this thesis discussed later in this chapter since it is through "discursive strategies" in policy and the policy process that "interests come to be constructed and represented in certain ways" (Pringle & Watson, 1990, p.230). As the key problematic dominating contemporary feminist political analyses, this theorising of the complex relationship between feminism and the state also underpins this thesis. It provides a theoretical framework to acknowledge and explain the resistance, activism and localised successes of feminists operating within the state including the apparent successes of the femocrats in progressing male violence against women policy during the Howard years.



### 3.2 Political Opportunity Structures and Intergovernmental Cooperation

The femocrat strategy and its successful engagement imprinting feminist demands on the state is a distinguishing feature of Australian feminism (Chappell, 2002b; Eistenstein, 1996; Goodwin, 1999; Sawyer, 1993, 1999; 1990; Yeatman, 1990). This success is particularly notable concerning male violence against women since Australian governments have been responsive to feminist demands for government action (McGregor and Hopkins 1991 in Weeks, 1994, p.3; Weeks & Gilmore, 1996).

Chappell offers the useful concept of political opportunity structures (POS) to explain Australian feminist engagements with the state. POS are the “consistent – but not necessarily permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentive for collective action by affecting people’s expectations for success or failure” (Tarrow, 1998, p.77) . POS for Chappell refer to how policy actors take advantage of existing opportunities and create new ones and she argues both ideology and political institutions are central in shaping feminist POS. Australian bureaucratic norms and Australian institutional structures including political parties and federalism were, for Chappell (2000; 2002a), POS that strongly influenced the development of the femocrat strategy. Sawyer (1993, p.2), who similarly attributes femocrat successes to political tradition and political opportunity, adds to these features the lack of effective organised opposition. Both authors identify two main POS that were particularly relevant and useful to the femocrat strategy.

The first, “bureaucratic norms” (Chappell) or “political tradition” (Sawyer), refers to the Australian bureaucratic history, context and political culture. Chappell (2002b, p.6 & p.104) argues feminists took such a “pro-statist” position because of the unique tolerance for, and culture of, advocacy on behalf of sectional interests in the Australian bureaucracy. She describes Australia’s weak neutrality norms and long-standing traditional of certain social groups – such as trade unions, farmers and ex-soldiers - adopting a successful utilitarian position towards the bureaucracy to meet their demands (Chappell, 2000, p.265; 2002a, p.90). This history sensitised feminists to the potential of the bureaucracy to achieve their goals and created a bureaucratic tolerance countering traditional public service neutrality in Westminster parliamentary systems (Chappell, 2000, p.265). Sawyer (1993) also argues Australian political tradition facilitated feminist engagement with the state. As a philosophy advocating an ethical role for the state in advancing social and wage justice, Sawyer suggests social liberalism in Australian politics was a POS for femocrats. She argues social

liberalism provided a sympathetic framework for feminists to empower women through anti-hierarchical or separatist organisational practices. In particular, was “the tradition of radical social movements looking to governments to meet their demands and the tradition of administrative innovation in response to those demands” (Sawer, 1993, p.2). Australian political tradition thus offered an important POS for femocrats.

Chappell and Sawer both refer to a history of political pragmatism and the absence of ideological purism amongst Australian radical social movements which was adopted by feminists and enabled them to embrace a pragmatic ideological middle-ground (Chappell, 2002b, p.22; Sawer, 1993, p.3). Through the femocrat strategy feminists “began to blend radical theory with reformist strategies in order to develop a pragmatic feminist position in relation to the state” (Chappell, 2002b, p.28). These authors thus attribute the successes of the Australian women’s movement imprinting their demands on government to “the pragmatic willingness to settle for half a loaf rather than no bread at all” (Sawer, 1993, p.4 paraphrasing Summers 1990).

The second POS, “Australian institutional structures” (Chappell) and “political opportunity” (Sawer), refers to the Australian political party system and federalism. Chappell and Sawer agree that since the Whitlam Labor Government (1972-1975) the ALP has been a significant political opportunity structure for feminists at state and federal levels. According to Chappell, “femocrats have tended to do better under ALP governments than Liberal ones, both in terms of their institutional position and policy influence” (2000, p.263). She argues:

...when in government it [the ALP] has proved to be an important ally for feminists. Most important, it has helped to create opportunities for feminists within another key arm of the state – the bureaucracy. It has been the interaction between the bureaucracy and the (relatively) progressive ALP that has set the groundwork for the Australian ‘femocrat’ strategy – the central inside strategy of the Australian women’s movement (Chappell, 2002b, p.28).

Chappell (2000, p.264) notes, however, that success has not been guaranteed under Labor governments and has come at the cost of the ALP using femocrats to ‘sell’ its policies to Australian women. The importance of the ALP as a POS for the femocrat strategy is also identified by other writers including Hester Eisenstein (1990, p.102) and Anna Yeatman (1994, p.190). For Yeatman (1990, p.89), the “significance of the party in power for the development and tenor of the femocracy cannot be underestimated”. Eisenstein (1990, p.102) does add, however, that “this strategy relies upon a willingness to accept the

constraints of what is politically expedient, that is, saleable to the electorate of the Party". ALP governments at state and federal levels, nevertheless typically offered a significant POS through which feminists were able to advance their agendas.

Australian federalism is an important part of this second POS. Louise Chappell (2002b, p.151) argues "federalism has not been an issue central to Australian feminist discourse". For this thesis, however, federalism and the roles and responsibilities of Australian state and federal governments provide important insights into the nature of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women. Federalism in Australia is an adapted North American system of government. It facilitated federation in 1901 by providing an institutional framework for combining the previously self-governing states and colonies to form a new national government (Parkin & Summers, 1996, p.9). Three key features of federalism are enshrined in the Australian Constitution: a specified division of powers between Commonwealth and State governments; a Senate as parliamentary house of review with equal State representation; and judicial review independent of elected government (Parkin & Summers, 1996, pp.9-12). Australian federalism is often referred to as 'cooperative federalism' because of the necessity of Australian federal and state governments negotiating working relationships in many policy areas. According to Fenna (2004, p.171), however, this inaccurately describes a relationship as often characterised by conflict and coercion as cooperation. Fenna (2004, p.171) argues that tensions within federalism have been exacerbated by the increasing centralisation of successive Australian federal governments.

By facilitating a 'dual democracy', Chappell (2002b, p.150) argues Australian federalism was an important POS for femocrats to manoeuvre, exploit openings and play off different levels of government. This was particularly important when governments were from different political parties (Chappell, 2002a, p.93; 2002b, pp.9-10). Following the 1975 dismissal of the Whitlam Government Chappell (2002b, p.29) and Sawyer (1993, p.4) describe how the femocrats increasingly turned to progressive state governments and intergovernmental arrangements established under Whitlam to progress feminist agendas. They argue this was critical to avoid and minimise constraints created by the incoming conservative Fraser Government where the femocrat position was more about "'holding the line' than 'breaking new ground'" (Chappell, 2002b). Thus, when progress is blocked at the federal level femocrats turned to progressive state governments, particularly ALP governments, and their femocrat policy machinery (Chappell, 2002b; Sawyer, 1993). Progressive state governments were important for femocrats because of their "political capacity and willingness (on

occasion) to 'go it alone' in a range of policy areas, including abortion, equal employment opportunity, domestic violence, sexual assault, and childcare" (Chappell, 2002b, p.163). For Chappell and Sawer federalism is thus an important POS underpinning the femocrat strategy with its 'dual democracy' enabling feminist activists to shift focus between levels of government to progress their agendas.

Increasing conservatism from governments of both political persuasions, however, presents an ongoing challenge for feminists. Following the 1993 re-election of the Keating Labor Government, Summers (2003b, p.123) argues "women' started to be depicted as an annoying lobby group that the ALP ought not to be seen pandering to". Consequently, she argues by the 1996 election campaign it seemed "women had been expunged from Labor's political agenda" (Summers, 2003b, p.123). It is thus the conservatism of the government in power, not just their political identity, which determines whether they provided a POS or constraint to feminists and the femocrat strategy. This is an important observation given the ideological shifts in Australian politics in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During this time Australian governments replaced social liberalism with conservative ideologies including a radical shift to market liberalism and economic rationalism. This shift included privileging economic interests over social goals, dismantling the Australian welfare state, and privatising human services (Weeks & Quinn, 2000, p.5; Yeatman, 1994, p.191).

The abdication of the social liberal state in favour of the 'self-regulating' markets of market liberalism means that, instead of a state which is responsive at least in part to both male and female citizens and instead of public policy at least monitored for gender effects, we will have a market society dominated by international economic interests with no accountability to women or anyone else (Sawer, 1993, pp.20-21).

This ascendancy of individualism, self-reliance and market (not social) citizenship (Weeks & Quinn, 2000, p.5) delegitimised feminism as an acceptable influence on government policies and programs (Yeatman, 1994, p.191). It is in this ideological context and shift from social to market liberalism that the federal Howard Coalition Government was elected in 1996.

This literature on the Australian social policy context and feminist activism provides important background for this thesis. Historically, the femocrat strategy was significant for feminists in providing the policy machinery to assist them progress policy responses to male violence against women. Yet, in more recent feminist work on this issue, Carole Ford (2001, pp.245&258) also notes:

The pace of conservative 'reform' demands an assertive and sustained response by feminists to ensure policy formulation and implementation that is pro-women and does not contribute further to regressive gender relations. The femocrats' 'quiet revolution' ...may have had some application to the Australian political process in the 1970s and 1980s, but how relevant and how potentially successful will it be in the new millennium?

By responding to Ford's question, this thesis offers a significant new insight into how femocrats can work within existing policy machinery when significant POS are thwarted as happened under the conservative Howard Government. In particular, this thesis extends the literature by exploring the continued salience of the femocrat strategy in the Howard years.

### **3.3 Public Policy Responses to Male Violence Against Women**

As illustrated by the above discussion of the femocrat strategy and the political opportunity structures exploited by feminists, Australian feminists have a complex relationship with the state. This relationship consists of feminists simultaneously distrusting the patriarchal nature of the state and its role in male violence against women while demanding the state respond to this violence in public policy. Australian governments have been responsive to feminist demands for action and have developed a range of public policy responses to male violence against women. Two of the ways feminists have criticised and conceptualised these public policy responses to male violence against women, as policies of chivalry and policies of cooption, are of particular relevance to this thesis. Before exploring these feminist conceptualisations of male violence against women policy it is, however, useful first to explain public policy as a concept and the policy as discourse understandings of policy adopted for this thesis.

#### **3.3.1 Policy as discourse**

Public policy is commonly defined in the policy studies literature as the action or inaction by governments to achieve certain aims or purposes that express their values (Bessant, Watts, Dalton, & Smyth, 2006, p.5; Considine, 1994, p.4; Fenna, 2004, p.3; Vromen & Gelber, 2005, p.123). This thesis adopts Bacchi's (2000) policy as discourse approach and in doing so departs from dominant approaches to studying public policy that focus on articulated social problems and their policy solutions. Policy as discourse theorists define policy as "a set of shifting, diverse and contradictory responses to a spectrum of political interests" (Edelman, 1988, p.16). This approach refutes notions of policy making as a rational, morally

neutral and value free enterprise by the state (Williams, 2000, p.157). Policy is instead recognised as part of a highly contested strategic political process constituting the shape of the issues under consideration and imposing constraints on social vision (Bacchi, 1999b, p.5; Bessant et al., 2006, p.37; Carmody, 1995, pp.42-43). It is therefore important to understand the social and political context in which a particular social policy operates.

Behind a policy as discourse approach is the premise that governments do not respond to 'real' or existing social problems that are discovered in the community but rather create or give shape to social problems in the solutions offered (Bacchi, 2000, p.48). Social policy is thus "a contested process defined as much by the efforts of those involved in making social policy to identify or 'construct' social problems as it is about attempts to solve or address them" (Bessant et al., 2006, p.37). The representation of a problem is thus crucial to subsequent policy development (Bessant et al., 2006, p.38). This approach emphasises the role of language and discourse in constructing social problems and setting limits on policies. A key focus for policy as discourse analysts is therefore representations of the problem and seeking to reveal how discursive constructions of problems make change difficult and reinforce the status quo (Bacchi, 2000).

Consistent with a policy as discourse approach, this research features problematisation and deconstruction as a focus of analysis. Modelled on Bacchi (1999b, p.60), this is a starting point for exploring what is not problematised, to draw attention to silences in existing political agendas such as power and gender relations, and to expose the impact of problem representations on shaping political agendas broadly. Bacchi also warns of the importance of investigating the problematic aspects of the framing and construction of social problems "because of the way these get picked up and reworked to advance neo-liberal claims" (1999a, p.66). This draws attention to the highly political and shifting nature of problem representation, the importance of deconstructing and situating problem representations in context, and the potential unintended consequences of these representations. Understanding policy as discourse is particularly important as a theoretical foundation for the case studies of *Partnerships* and *Australia Says No* in stage two of the study.

### **3.3.2 Policies of chivalry**

Consistent with a policy as discourse approach which perceives policy as a highly contested strategic political process, some feminists have criticised government responses to male violence against women. Two broad categories of these criticisms are of particular

relevance to this thesis. The first category includes conceptualisations of these policies as policies of chivalry where some feminists argue that governments provide a highly visible and active policy response to male violence against women focussed on “rescuing” and “protecting” the victim. Janet Ramsay (2004, p.220) explains:

The policies of chivalry focus on rescuing the victim but do little to address the roots of her subsequent victimisation or address the roots of her oppression ...Wife battering may be providing governments with a convenient, safe and popular way to respond to the demands for greater equality for women without seriously tampering with the institutions which perpetuate inequality. The high visibility of wife battering policy may be providing a smokescreen for the lack of progress in establishing effective programs to guarantee women an equal place in our societies.

Australian feminist Helen L'Orange (1985 cited in Ramsay, 2004, p.221) also argues: “I think it was easier to get progress on areas where men felt chivalrous. Domestic violence, child sexual assault, rape ...Male politicians felt good about that and felt very unthreatened by it”.

Ramsay's research on Australian domestic violence policies suggests that the policies during her period of study (1970-1985) may be considered policies of chivalry. For Ramsay (2004, p.221), a framing dilemma inherent in domestic violence policy during the time she studied was “that policing and justice system responses are inadequate unless the escaping woman has access to an autonomous household”. She argues adequate policy responses to domestic violence therefore depend on achievement of the entire women's policy enterprise that underpin the causes and consequences of men's victimisation of women. Policies of chivalry, however, do not address this broader policy enterprise such as combating institutional and structural inequality between men and women or facilitating women's capacity to establish an “autonomous household” independent of a violent man (Ramsay, 2004). Ramsay concludes that policy practitioners during this period had an unspoken awareness and tacit care about these issues and the danger of responses being policies of chivalry. She argues that this was illustrated by: feminists refraining from making emotive use of domestic violence as a publicity driver for the broad women's policy enterprise; persistent acknowledgement in policy documents of the life survival needs of women escaping violent partners; and the strength of accompanying statements of the feminist social construction of domestic violence (Ramsay, 2004).

Ann Genovese (2000) briefly explores the concept of policies of chivalry in her discussion about the politics of naming and genealogy of 'domestic violence' in Australia. Genovese (2000, p.124) locates policies of chivalry within a broader concern with the impact of liberalism on the Australian state and she argues:

...despite the importance, and success, of the feminist refuge movement and the emerging femocracy in forging a pathway for domestic violence into 'the public', feminism itself was still hamstrung and problematised by a philosophical context imbued with liberalism and correlatively (as far as issues like domestic violence were concerned) a *chivalrous liberalism*, capable of misreading the aims of feminism while delivering state support.

Genovese's link between chivalry and liberalism is important given the prominent role of neo-liberalism in the Howard Government as explored in Chapter Four.

Related to the conceptualisation of policies of chivalry, Jeff Hearn and Linda McKie (2008) argue that policies which focus on rescuing and protecting women as victims create an "absent presence" of men in dominant representations of domestic violence in social policy. They argue that since men's practices reproducing gender inequality, such as male violence against women, are heavily embedded in social, economic and cultural relations, governments often equate these with what is considered normal. Although this can take the form of governments presenting violence as gender-neutral, even when gender is explicit in domestic violence policy they argue the focus is typically policy users (women) rather than problem creators (men) (Hearn & McKie, 2008, p.79). Hearn and McKie (2008, p.79) propose government policy representations and practices should 'gender men's violence':

Gendering men's violence entails linking abuse to practices, values and assumptions that are widely accepted as normal, i.e. challenging the construction of men in ways that include power over and violence towards women. ...A broad notion of gendering policy means unpacking policy to reveal the dynamics of gender power (and the structures that support these dynamics) concealed within, which the policies may reproduce, and refocusing efforts, in 'policy' and practice, on 'problem creators' (in this case, men) rather than 'policy users'.

Thus, Hearn and McKie (2008, pp.76-79), suggest that government policy should locate male violence against women as a gendered crime that is part of a system of patriarchal power relations. They also argue that government policy should therefore require significant shifts on the part of all men rather than presuming men's violence in intimate relationships is atypical and only concerns identified 'perpetrators'.



Although not strictly representing themselves as policy of chivalry conceptualisations, a number of authors criticise some Australian approaches to prevention and community education in a way that is consistent with these policy of chivalry arguments. These criticisms are particularly important given that the community education campaign *Australia Says No* is explored as a case study of the content of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women in Chapter Ten. According to Moira Carmody (2003b, p.202), prevention approaches which focus on protecting women create a totalizing emphasized femininity which constructs women as weak, dependent and unequal. She argues that approaches such as these "rob women of any agency or ability to exert power, express desire, take control, resist, prevent or avoid their victimization in intimate sexual encounters with men. Prevention is a virtual impossibility within this theoretical framework" (Carmody, 2003b, p.202).

As a corollary of this, Carmody (2003b, p.202) argues such approaches that focus on protecting women produce an equally totalizing concept of traditional masculinity which constructs men as powerful, independent and in control. This is particularly important since, according to Michael Flood (2002, p.3), men who perpetrate sexual assault not only identify with traditional images of masculinity and male gender role privilege but also "see being male as carrying the right to discipline and punish women". This idea is important in the context of an understanding of hegemony through consent and negotiation where women are offered protection in exchange for acquiescence to male authority, heterosexuality, and dominant models of family. It suggests that prevention efforts which create these totalizing concepts of masculinity and femininity may actually increase women's vulnerability to male violence.

VicHealth (Donovan & Vlasis, 2005) and Suellen Murray and Anastasia Powell (2009) argue that many Australian crime prevention campaigns also potentially undermine prevention efforts by focusing on protecting vulnerable women in the same way policies conceptualised as policies of chivalry do. They argue that these campaigns are problematic because they only specifically identify criminal forms of physical and sexual violence. This leads men who conduct non-prosecutable forms of violence (e.g. emotional abuse) to minimise their behaviour and distance their violence from the criminal acts perpetrated by "brutal, cowardly men who are not like me" (Donovan & Vlasis, 2005, p.15). Other authors also argue that in addition to protecting vulnerable women, such approaches focus only on the behaviour of individuals and in doing so fail to consider broader community, organisational and social contents or environments through which violence is facilitated and condoned (Carmody,

2003a; Family Violence Prevention Fund, 2003, pp.10-11; Lawson & Crookes, 2003; VicHealth, 2006, p.35). Thus, according to Carmody (2003a), "while current prevention strategies continue to focus solely on attempting to control or regulate unethical desire, acts and pleasure they will fail to achieve non-violent communities".

A policies of chivalry conceptualisation of policy is therefore useful in raising two questions of specific interest to this thesis that are explored further in Chapters Eight and Ten. The first is the question of whether the Howard Government's policy and program approaches to male violence against women may be considered policies of chivalry. The second is the question of where *Australia Says No* fits with the criticisms and concerns about prevention and community educations approaches discussed above.

### 3.3.3 Policies of cooption

A second, alternative way that some feminists conceptualise public policy responses to male violence against women is as policies of cooption. Australian feminists' engagement with the state caused significant debate about the potential for cooption. These tensions and feminist fears of cooption are apparent in Ludo McFerren's (1990, p.204) discussion of the relationship between the refuge movement and feminists working inside the Australian bureaucracy:

Part of the failure to adapt has been an ongoing tendency to see the state as a fixed monolith. Refuge workers have remained unclear about the role of feminists in the state apparatus, and their relationship with these 'femocrats'. When confronted with a problem with the state, the refuges will concentrate their attacks on the bureaucrats. It has often left refuges beating their heads against the wrong brick wall. ...Early radical statements about the co-optive role of the state, the need for refuge autonomy, the contradictions of feminists in the system have become fixed in a type of refuge mythology. They are often repeated religiously without criticism or further examination, as are references to grand old struggles and epic debates.

According to Louise Chappell (2002b, p.29) this tendency to look towards bureaucrats rather than politicians meant that when working with conservative governments the gulf between 'inside' and 'outside' feminist activists usually widened with "much recrimination on both sides over funding cutbacks and negative policy decisions".

Contemporary feminist theorists maintain their concern about cooption in the interaction between feminism and the state. Regarding male violence against women, these concerns

can be conceptualised on a continuum from the absence of remedy through to the severity of harm towards women in government policy. At one end of the continuum feminists argue state responses have had limited efficacy and have largely failed to reduce the incidence and impact of male violence against women (Phillips, 2008a, p.66). Some feminists also highlight the complex and contradictory role of the state in recognizing harm and providing care and protection, while also controlling the lives of women and children subjected to violence through government policy such as welfare policies (Hanmer, 1996, p.17).

Further along the continuum, Genovese (2000) argues the relationship between feminism and the state is problematic. She argues it is critical to rethink and re-examine current domestic violence policies, acknowledge the limitations of the state, and ask questions such as "what constraints do we accept?" or "whose safety or future do we sacrifice for an investment in seeking solutions to the difference dilemma?" (Genovese, 2000, p.125). Genovese's position thus moves tacitly into acknowledging potential harm in feminists interactions with the state regarding male violence against women.

Further along the continuum, Donna Coker (2001) argues that in the context of domestic violence mandatory arrest policies, feminists have overestimated the state's capacity to provide a positive response to abused women and has underestimated the state's capacity to control and harm these same women. Consistent with this criticism, Lesley Laing (2008, p.74) notes criticism by women colour and lesbian women about second wave feminist engagement with the state. She argues these groups criticise feminists for challenging the public/private dichotomy of the state and advocating the state recognise male violence against women as a public and political issue particularly because racial and homosexual oppression begin as public events (Laing, 2008, p.74). Thus, for Laing (2008, p.74), the feminist agenda of making 'private' male violence against women a 'public' crime "can result in harmful intrusions of the state into the lives of women who are already experiencing (often unacknowledged) oppressions in the public realm".

The next perspective on the continuum moves from the harm caused to specific women to concerns about the effects on all women. Some feminists express concern about the cooption of issues of importance to feminism to reinforce the interests of the patriarchal state. For these feminists, the state only responds to male violence against women to repair or reinforce the patriarchal status quo. According to Jill Radford and Elizabeth Stanko (1996, p.78), the state's concern with male violence against women is an attempt at policing the family and heterosexuality, what they describe as the "sacred institutions of patriarchy",

to restore their legitimacy as safe institutions for women. They argue that state responses to this violence preserve institutions such as the family and heterosexuality and reaffirm, reproduce and represent patriarchal gendered power relations as in the best interests of women and children. They continue:

Achieving this requires a silencing of any feminist politics which asks disturbing questions about whether heterosexuality is the natural, normal and only possibility for women, whether it is indeed voluntary or compulsory for women living under conditions of patriarchy and whether it is in our best interests ...is this new concern with violence to women on the part of the state's police and professional carers ...a last ditch attempt at reinstating the patriarchal status quo by restoring an apparently respectable face to its central institutions, the family and heterosexuality? (Radford & Stanko, 1996, p.78).

These feminists thus suggest the state coopts feminist language, strategies and research in a way that does not reflect the feminist commitment that gave them meaning and which waters down and undermines feminist projects (Hawthorne, 2004, p.9; Radford & Stanko, 1996, p.69). Thus, although the state appears to be responding to feminist demands, they argue it has done so in a way that "negates feminist definitions, politics, research and provision of support services" (Radford & Stanko, 1996, p.77) and such state responses are thus harmful to women generally.

Consistent with this position on policy as cooption, Linda Gordon (1988), argues that deviant behaviour such as male violence against women only became a "social problem" when social policy makers perceived it as threatening social order. According to this argument, government concern with family violence only arises when traditional family norms are threatened and there is anxiety about gender relations, particularly increasing signs of autonomy on the part of women and corresponding decline of men's power over family members (Bacchi, 1999b, pp.166-167; Gordon, 1988). When grounded in these conservative fears, Bacchi argues that representations of family violence expressed within a 'family breakdown' discourse can work against the best interests of victims by containing certain assumptions about "good" families:

Violence within heterosexual married couples challenges the idealized image of harmonious and continuous pairing and hence is addressed with the goal of restoring these idealized conditions. Violence is a 'problem' particularly if it threatens to break up self-sufficient pairs and throw a number of dependent mothers on welfare support services. Given this logic, we are

offered, not an analysis of the problematic dynamics of family relationships, but strategies aimed at 'restoring' family harmony (Bacchi, 1999b, p.167).

Similarly, Kathleen Ferraro (1996) suggests family and community preservation or reunification approaches to male violence against women are founded on women's subordination to their husbands. These authors thus argue policy as cooption approaches have the potential to cause significant harm to women.

The next position on the continuum suggests the state has coopted feminism in a way that uses anti-violence interventions to win support for oppressive "law and order" policies of right-wing populist governments (Bacchi, 1999b, pp.173-176; Laing, 2008, pp.74-77; Radford & Stanko, 1996, p.77). Laing (2008, p.75), for example, argues that state framings of domestic violence as a criminal problem are consistent with conservative 'tough on crime' policies and undermines alternative empowering representations such as of violence being a problem of women's unequal access to resources. Laing (2008) and Bacchi (1999b, pp.173-176) argue these representations of the problem create a range of effects and consequences that were not what feminist activists anticipated or desired. These include: punitive and disempowering policies such as mandatory arrest or prosecuting perpetrators against the woman's wishes; casting women who fight back or do not cooperate with the state's prosecution of their partner as unworthy or uncooperative victims and discounting future requests for protection; facilitating harmful intrusion by the state into the lives of marginalised women (e.g. black women); and individualising the victim and perpetrator and deflecting attention from the role of gendered power relations as central to this violence.

This argument about the link between male violence against women public policy and "law and order" policies is important since, according to Michelle Jones (2004, pp.78-82), crime control discourses had a significant impact on the Howard Government's domestic violence policies. Similarly, Murray and Powell (Murray, 2005; Murray & Powell, 2009) argue that conservative family harmony and law and order discourses feature prominently in Australian responses to domestic violence. Australian governments' use of crime control discourses also offers an interesting link between policy as cooption and policy as 'chivalry' conceptualisations by feminists. That is, some feminists argue that crime control discourses represent the problem as being about individual violent men who need disciplining because they have committed crimes against passive women who need protection (Bacchi, 1999b, p.175; Ferraro, 1996; Jones, 2004, pp.78-84). This representation constructs male violence against women as a criminal/legal issue where this violence is framed as assault and

proponents argue that it should be treated like other forms of violence (Bacchi, 1999b, p.174). These discourses thus undermine women's empowerment and changes to the wider social structures including ongoing gender inequalities (Murray, 2005, p.32; Murray & Powell, 2009). Further, Kathleen Ferraro (1996) argues that crime control discourses also carry with them:

...the traces of racism and classism permeating the desire to discipline those who transgressed Anglo-Saxon definitions of the "family ideal". Crime control rhetoric not only eclipsed feminist efforts to alter the misogynistic foundations of that ideal. It also reinforced the boundaries between "good" and "bad" families, between men who batter and those who simply enforce a normative order of male-dominated households.

Ferraro (1996, p.78) thus suggests that crime control discourses establish the parameters of acceptable male dominance within relationships. As well as making links between racism, classism and male violence, this argument extends the policy as cooption conceptualisation by suggesting government responses to this violence may be in the governments own interests and harmful to women at a macro level.

Dawn Currie (1990) further suggests that the representation of domestic violence as a law and order issue occurred through rather than against feminist discourse; meaning feminist discourse was coopted by conservatives to advance their agendas. Similarly, Murray (2005, p.30) argues that although domestic violence is articulated in public policy as a gendered issue, it is necessary to go beyond the rhetoric of naming and consider the discourses through which policies are operationalised. Echoing these concerns more broadly, Carol Johnson (2000, pp.151-152) argues that Australian governments have incorporated the challenges posed by feminism into more traditional political discourse and have adapted grand narratives to current conditions to maintain male dominance.

Meghana Nayak and Jennifer Suchland's (2006) link between gender violence and hegemonic projects is the final position on the continuum which conceptualises policies as cooption. Nayak and Suchland argue that hegemonic projects of the state constitute, enact, produce and require gender violence rather than gender violence being an example or effect of male domination alone. Their article focuses on three key issues:

(1) how hegemonic discourses of neo-liberalism, masculinity, feminism, citizenship, borders and the state operate through gendered violence; (2) how dominant political institutions, ideas and discourses determine what 'counts' as gender violence; and (3) how responses to gender

violence engage meta-narratives about gender, race, class and nation/state, both resisting and sustaining hegemonic projects (Nayak & Suchland, 2006, pp.468-469).

Nayak and Suchland's critique links with traditional feminist critiques of the state that suggest state responses to male violence against women may be conceptualised as policies of cooption. They argue that an insidious and deceptive element of resistance is its potential to be coopted by the state to legitimise the hegemonic position of dominant actors. "Thus, those who address gender violence in the same way as the hegemonic actor, are actually supporting and endorsing the hegemonic project even if they are resisting gender violence itself" (Nayak & Suchland, 2006, p.497). Nayak and Suchland's critique provides an important grounding for my development of new ways of conceptualising the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women. In particular, their argument extends Ferraro's connection between policy responses and racism by also exploring nationalism and connections between cooption and hegemony.

These arguments about the potential of governments, particularly conservative ones, to coopt feminist agendas, language and discourse for their own purposes are important for this thesis. They raise the possibility that Howard Government responses to male violence against women can be conceptualised as policies of cooption. Further, Nyland and Suchland's link between policies of cooption conceptualisations and hegemony is important in helping me to develop new ways of understanding the Howard Government's approaches from a feminist perspective later in this thesis.

### **3.4 Australian Government Policy Responses to Male Violence Against Women**

This chapter has thus far explored state responses to male violence against women generally within Australia and has not explored the differences between Australian state and federal governments. Although the discussion in this chapter is relevant to both Australian state and federal governments, government responses to male violence against women in Australia have largely been the responsibility of the state governments. It is therefore important to briefly explore why this thesis concentrates on the Australian Government's (that is, the Australian federal Government's) responses to this issue during the Howard years.

Section 51 of the Constitution grants specified legislative powers to the Commonwealth and the States retained all residual powers (Parkin & Summers, 1996, p.11). Since many State powers involve direct service provision such as health and welfare services, criminal law, police and corrections, States have traditionally played the most significant role responding to male violence against women. Since 1972, however, Labor and Coalition federal governments have enthusiastically embraced what Alan Fenna (2004, p.173) calls "constitutional expansionism". Section 51 of the Constitution grants the Commonwealth 'external affairs' powers. Consequently, "once Commonwealth legislation in any policy field is validated by reference to international commitments, it overrides any conflicting State legislation by virtue of Section 109"<sup>2</sup> (Fenna, 2004, p.169). In women's policy these external affairs powers are significant since Australia has become a signatory to a number of United Nations agreements on the status of women such as CEDAW<sup>3</sup> (J. Summers, 1997; University of Minnesota, 1998). Due to these international obligations, Australian federal governments have taken increasing responsibility for a range of social policies specifically impacting on women, including male violence against women.

Chappell (2002b, p.162) argues Australian federal governments have used constitutional powers of external affairs (s. 51[xxix]) and conciliation and arbitration (s.51 [xxxv]) to legislate on a number of state issues of particular relevance to women (e.g. sexual discrimination, equal pay, pensions). She also highlights the role of the Commonwealth's fiscal dominance in constitutional expansionism. The High Court's 1942 Uniform Tax Case decision gave the Commonwealth fiscal dominance due to their role collecting income tax (Fenna, 2004, p.173). The Commonwealth subsequently used this fiscal dominance "unilaterally, or jointly with the states, to gain a foothold in policy areas that are not enumerated under the Constitution. Such areas include women's refuges and domestic violence, women's health and childcare" (Chappell, 2002b, p.162). Due to this constitutional expansionism, Australia has become the most centralised of all western federal systems (Bessant et al., 2006, p.212). This has exacerbated the complexity of Commonwealth-State financial and political relations and created interdependency between the tiers of government. It is therefore increasingly difficult to disaggregate responsibilities of each level of government.

---

<sup>2</sup> Section 109 provides that where there is any contradiction or inconsistency between a Commonwealth and State law, the Commonwealth law prevails.

<sup>3</sup> The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.



Given the historical responsibility of the states for many areas of women's policy, research on male violence against women policy has concentrated on Australian state governments. Research into federal government social policy areas that have traditionally been the responsibility of the states has, however, become increasingly important due to constitutional expansionism. This thesis therefore contributes to the small, emerging body of literature that focuses on federal government responses to male violence against women.

### **3.5 Chapter Summary**

This chapter has provided important theoretical concepts for this thesis from the policy studies and political science literature. It introduced four important concepts that are of particular relevance to the research: policy activism; the femocrat strategy; political opportunity structures; and intergovernmental cooperation. These concepts are important for exploring and making sense of policy process through the in-depth case study of *Partnerships* in Chapter Nine. They provide important background from which to explore the ongoing significance of feminists in national male violence against women policy and continuities and discontinuities in the femocrat strategy during the Howard years. The chapter also explored feminist analyses and criticisms of government responses to male violence against women with a particular focus on conceptualisations of policies as chivalry and policies of cooption. These are important to make sense of the Howard Government's responses to male violence against women and provide a theoretical foundation on which to develop a new way of understanding this period. Finally, the chapter also contextualised this thesis in Australian federalism and constitutional expansionism to explain why this thesis focuses on the Australian Government during the Howard years when state governments have traditionally dominated this social policy area.

## **Chapter Four**

### **Government under Howard: Neo-liberalism, Social Conservatism and Political Opportunism**

---

A number of commentators characterise the Howard years (1996-2007) as a distinct epoch in Australia's cultural and political history whose specificities had a significant impact on the social policies of the Howard Government. This chapter outlines the arguments of these commentators to provide a social, economic and political context in which to locate the Howard Government's social policies generally and their policy responses to male violence against women specifically. The chapter starts by briefly outlining what these commentators identify as the Howard Government's marriage of economic liberalism, social conservatism, and political opportunism which they argue was the stroke of political genius sustaining Howard in office for over a decade (Brett, 2005, p.45; 2007, p.62; Kelly, 2006, p.10; Milne, 2006, p.46; Shanahan, 2006, p.40; Singleton, 2005). The chapter then focuses on the Howard Government's social policy agenda and their 'culture wars' as identified by these commentators by exploring five key aspects of the government's approaches which are of particular relevance to male violence against women. Further, since Howard dominated the Coalition for 11 years following his 1996 election success "his longstanding political goals and values shaped the government's and his convictions and prejudices limited its room to move" (Brett, 2007, p.6). It is therefore impossible to separate out discussion of the Howard Government from one of the Prime Minister himself.

#### **4.1 Neo-Liberalism**

Economic neo-liberalism was one of the key characteristics of the Howard Government identified by commentators and the government itself. Economic neo-liberalism is an ideological preference for a minimalist state and small government, hostility to the public sector and social welfare, and advocacy for individualism and free markets (Clarke, 2004; Lerner, 2000). For Gwyneth Singleton (2005, p.4) Howard's fundamental political

philosophy was based on the importance of the individual and generating the free market conditions in which individual commitment to hard work and enterprise can allow achievement of self-reliance. Although much of the economic neo-liberal agenda was achieved under the Hawke and Keating governments (Brett, 2007, p.62), Howard reportedly extended the neo-liberal agenda in three main ways.

First was a massive increase in the tempo of privatisation (Manne, 2004, p.11) where government owned, funded and/or provided services were substituted with non-government (particularly Christian) agencies and private funding mechanisms (Aulich, 2005, p.58). Chris Aulich (2005, p.58) identifies five main ways that privatisation occurs: divestment (selling public industries); withdrawing public sector service delivery; outsourcing public services to private agencies; abolishing or relaxing public monopolies and encouraging competition against government agencies; and applying user-pays systems to public services. Aulich (2005, p.73) details the substantial acceleration of privatisation across all five areas under the Howard Government and concludes: "the Howard Governments have nurtured values that give primacy to the worth of private over government (or collective) activity".

Second, commentators argue the Howard Government extended the neo-liberal agenda through a sustained attack on the public sector and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs). Clive Hamilton and Sarah Maddison (2007) argue that this was part of a systemic strategy to mute opposition to the government's policies and control public opinion. Regarding the public service, a number of authors argue the Howard Government increasingly politicised the public sector by employing strategies which created a climate of uncertainty and fear, increased greater government control, and undermined public sector independence and neutrality (Barker, 2007; Ester, 2007; Halligan, 2005, p.35; Kelly, 2006, p.9). Regarding NGOs, Hamilton and Maddison (2007) and Margot Kingston (2004) argue the Howard Government silenced dissent through an unprecedented attack which included: public criticism; withdrawal or threatened withdrawal of government funding or access; changes to tax legislation; and establishing a government run peak NGO. For these authors the Howard Government thus extended neo-liberalism and undermined democracy with a detailed and deliberate strategy to silence, coopt and intimidate the public sector and dissenting NGOs.

Third, commentators argue the Howard Government advanced the economic neo-liberal agenda through labour market deregulation by dismantling the centralised arbitration system and attempting to weaken trade union power (Manne, 2004, p.10). This included:

jettisoning the Accord between government and ACTU<sup>4</sup>; direct anti-union intervention in the Waterfront dispute; and introducing the *Workplace Relations Act* (Manne, 2004, pp.10-11). After winning control of the Senate in 2004, Howard used his fourth term to overhaul the Australian industrial relations system through WorkChoices, a legislative and policy program which, according to Brett (2007, pp.62-63), was the pinnacle of Howard's career-long commitment to neo-liberal labour market deregulation.

## 4.2 Social Conservatism

The Howard Government's electoral success depended on a careful balance between neo-liberalism and social conservatism as illustrated by Howard's comment:

The point is that liberalisation in economic policy and a modern conservatism in social policy are not only appropriate to Australia's national interests as we enter the twenty-first century. They are mutually reinforcing as well. The values and priorities we bring to social policy issues provide important "points of anchorage" in a period of rapid and ongoing economic change. Economic policy liberalisation and a modern conservatism in social policy share important common values and objectives (Howard 1999 cited in Rudd, 2006b).

Carol Johnson (2000, p.150) describes this position as Howard's "politics of economic transformation and social nostalgia". According to ALP politician Kevin Rudd<sup>5</sup> (2006b), these ideological positions are ultimately unsynthesisable. Brett (2007, p.62) argues Howard's refusal to recognise the contradiction between these perspectives was, nevertheless, a key political strength. As Imre Salusinsky (2006, p.206) also argues: "by reassuring the electorate that its traditional values have been reclaimed from the social engineers, Howard has created the climate in which potentially unsettling liberal economic policies could proceed".

Social conservatism refers to a system of values promoting tradition, continuity, social unity, and social cohesion over radical social change or diversity (Singleton, 2005, p.5). Howard's social conservatism is divided in the literature into two parts. First was a 'pure' social conservatism reflected in: assertions about the centrality of the traditional family to Australian society and support for traditional family values; opposition to the republican movement; discomfort with multiculturalism, Aboriginal reconciliation and identity politics;

---

<sup>4</sup> Australian Council of Trade Unions.

<sup>5</sup> Soon after this article was published Kevin Rudd became leader of the Opposition and then succeeded Howard as Prime Minister after leading the ALP to an election victory in November 2007.

and denial of climate change (Brett, 2003, p.185; 2007, pp.28 & 62; Kelly, 2006, p.5). Second was Howard's 'conservative populism' (Melleuish 2000 in Kelly, 2006, p.5) reflected in: appeals to the '1950s white picket fence' and homely past; assimilationist and exclusionary nationalism; and his defence of certain Australian social and cultural icons (Brett, 2003, p.185; 2007, p.62; Irving, 2004, p.113; Kelly, 2006, p.5; Legge, 2006). Given its significance to the social policies of his Government, the social conservatism championed by Howard is discussed further in the context of the social policies of the Howard Government below.

### **4.3 Political Opportunism**

Howard's political opportunism and electoral pragmatism often eclipsed his ideological commitments to neo-liberalism and social conservatism (Kelly, 2006, p.10). Brett (2007, pp.6-12) argues Howard's leadership style meant he was: all about winning; divisive; would not admit mistakes; not good at policy; determined to keep control of the agenda; willing to sacrifice good policy for his reputation; and outward looking and defensive against external threats and enemies. She also argues that the primary opposition structuring Howard's thinking was party-based, between Labor and Liberal, rather than ideological (Brett, 2005, p.41). Thus, "for Howard, if something is championed by Labor, then this is sufficient reason to oppose it, no matter what the merits of the case" (Brett, 2005, p.41). A significant example of this for Brett (2005, p.41; 2007, pp.60-61) was Howard's impatience with the constraints of federalism and his enthusiastic embrace of constitutional expansionism which broke the Liberal Party's traditional commitment to states' rights. "What more is needed to explain his sudden abandonment of the Liberal Party's commitment to states' rights than that all states and territories currently have Labor governments?" (Brett, 2005, p.41). Brett argues the Howard Government consequently created a policy vacuum in many areas as good policy became hostage to Howard's reputation (Brett, 2007, pp.11 & 57). Similarly, for Mungo MacCallum (2004, pp.62-63), Howard's obsession with winning at all costs meant "he sees politics not as a way of creating a better world, but a world in its own right – the only world that matters. It is not a question of the end justifying the means; the means has in fact become the end. The reason for gaining political power is power itself".

Singleton (2005, p.16) argues that Howard's ideological commitments to economic neo-liberalism and social conservatism were therefore subsumed to political pragmatism and political opportunism when necessary. Brett (2005, pp.42-45) similarly contends that

Howard's political pragmatism and dichotomous opposition to Labor meant he ruthlessly seized opportunities and exploited them for political advantage without concern for long-term costs. She argues that the Howard Government convinced themselves of their own righteousness and was willing to bend, if not break, the rules if it served the ultimate purpose of keeping Labor out of office.

One example of Howard Government political opportunism is government advertising which has been described as an "abuse of incumbency" (Kelly, 2006, p.13) and an "unprecedented shamelessness about using public funds to support their position" (Lewis, 2006, p.190). Australian Governments have traditionally used large-scale advertising with bipartisan support for social marketing campaigns focussed on explaining policy or for health and welfare (Young, 2007, p.438). The Howard Government, however, "ror[ed] the public purse on an unprecedented scale" (Marr, 2007a, p.127) by using government funding for partisan political advertising promoting and defending the government (Young, 2007, p.438). Between 1996 and 2007 the Howard Government spent over \$1 billion dollars on campaigns on issues such as the GST and WorkChoices and campaign spending spiked just before elections (Faulkner & Tanner, 2008; Kelly, 2006, p.13; Lewis, 2006, p.190; Young, 2007, p.438). This critique of the Howard Government's advertising is particularly important because *Australia Says No* was one of the campaigns criticised as partisan political advertising as discussed in Chapters One and Eight.

#### **4.4 The Howard Government's Social Policy and the Culture Wars**

A number of commentators argue the Howard Government's social policy agenda reflects their neo-liberalism, social conservatism and political opportunism (Mendes, 2005, p.148; Singleton, 2005, p.8). Influenced by neo-liberalism, Singleton (2005) argues the Howard Government discursively constructed social problems as the problems of individuals and not society. Clive Hamilton (2006, p.44) argues this had a deeply conservative political effect which replaced understandings of structural disadvantage, social justice and exploitation with those of individuals' poor choices, failures, lack of character, or other inadequacies. Further, Brett (2005, p.25) argues Howard fused this neo-liberal ideology with a socially conservative emphasis on family and nation in the 'culture wars'.

The 'culture wars' refer to what commentators describe as Howard's reactionary crusade against the political Left utilising strategies of 'wedge politics' and politics of identity in a

défence of a perceived mainstream consensual centre. This mainstream included working class 'Howard battlers' against 'special interest groups' (e.g. feminists, immigrants, multiculturalists, Aboriginal people, environmentalists, republicans and gay people) and 'elites' (educated social progressives labelled 'the chardonnay set' or 'chattering classes') (Brett, 2004; 2007, p.12; Johnson, 2000; Manne, 2004, p.7; Rudd, 2006b, p.1). The culture wars were embodied in the 1996 campaign slogan "For all of us" which refashioned Menzies' "forgotten people", the "silent and silenced majority" (Brett, 2005, p.29; Rundle, 2001, p.24) as illustrated in the following quote:

There is a frustrated mainstream in Australia today which sees government decisions increasingly driven by the noisy, self-interested clamour of powerful vested interests with scant regard for the national interest ...For the past twelve years Labor has governed essentially by proxy through interest groups (Howard 1995 cited in Brett, 2005, p.23).

Brett (2007, p.88) argues "For all of us" thus had an inherently divisive partisan edge directed against "political correctness".

These commentators, particularly Brett, suggest Howard never provided an explicit definition of the 'mainstream' or 'special interests'. They suggest Howard intentionally left the concepts vague and strategically positioned 'Them' as whatever minority most aggrieved someone or were the subject of Government attack (Brett, 2005; Johnson, 2000, p.40). For Maddox (2005, p.78), 'Them' was therefore a strangely shifting category in which almost everyone ended up being part of the "mysterious, dangerous 'Them'". Brett (2004, p.82) argues this slogan opened a space for grievances about various "'Them' who were preventing a mainstream 'Us' from receiving our fair share of resources and recognition". She continues that Howard's focus on national interests rather than sectional interests also allowed him to collapse national interests into the mainstream consensual centre (Brett, 2004, p.77; 2007b, p.50). Expanding this point, David Marr (2007b, pp.49-50) critiques the Howard Government's "party-political assault on Australia's liberal culture" in the name of "balance between contending forces". Marr details how many majority opinions, values and positions in Australian society were strategically excluded from Howard's "mainstream", which he argues only reflected the Liberal Party's agenda.

Some commentators suggest this sustained attack on politically and socially progressive values reflected an American Republican Party style electoral strategy where Howard disempowered people through fear and then offered the "healing balm of certainty" (Evans,

2005, p.54; Rudd, 2006b, p.1; Rundle, 2001). Rudd argues Howard did this with a series of falsely dichotomous arguments, such as tradition versus modernity, in the public debate. Similarly, for Johnson (2000, pp.38-50) “many of the issues he [Howard] brought forward were seen as ‘wedge’ or ‘culture war’ issues, designed to divide, confuse and embarrass his opponents, play upon hostility to unpopular groups, and gain the support of voters who would otherwise tend to support the Labor Party”. These arguments suggest Howard’s culture wars were more about political opportunism than ideological belief.

The culture wars had two primary purposes according to Johnson (2000, p.42). First was to respond to what Ghassan Hage terms ‘the discourse of Anglo-decline’. The culture wars assisted the Howard Government maintain privileged forms of identity (e.g. white or male) by subordinating marginalised identities to the ‘mainstream’. Cultural warriors constructed “attempts to redress the effects of discrimination and exclusion experienced by migrants and Indigenous Australians” as ‘discrimination’ against Anglo-Australians (Johnson, 2000, p.42). Thus, for Johnson (2000, p.42), “the ultimate revenge of the ‘mainstream’ is to steal the identity of victim”. The second purpose of the culture wars was to police the ‘mainstream’ and:

...encourage Anglo-Celtic heterosexuals and other members of the ‘mainstream’ to construct their own identity as unquestioningly central and other identities as ‘special interests’. It is about discouraging Anglo-Celts, heterosexuals and others who do not wish to privilege their identity by denouncing them as ‘politically correct’, elitist, social engineers who are disempowering their compatriots (Johnson, 2000, p.43).

Alternatively, Rudd (2006a, p.1; 2006b, p.1) argues the culture wars were used by Howard to mask “a deeper, more unsettling reality: that the socially conservative values at the core of Howard’s cultural attack on the Left are in fact under siege from the forces of neo-liberalism that he himself has unleashed from the Right”. Whatever their purpose, the social conservatism the culture wars championed profoundly impacted on Howard Government social policies as illustrated by five areas of Howard’s political offensive against the Left outlined below which are particularly relevant to male violence against women.

#### **4.4.1 Christianity and the campaigns of the religious Right**

Rudd (2006a, p.1; 2006b, p.1) argues that right wing Christian extremism was “John Howard’s religious handmaiden in his political project to reshape Australia”. Marion Maddox (2005, pp.198 & 230) details how Howard’s promotion of the Christian Right was



disproportionate to their representation in the Australian community. She argues that Howard's primary achievement was importing the political marriage of neo-liberalism and social conservatism practised by the American fundamentalist Christian Right. Howard did this by mobilising "half-submerged religious sentiments without being specific enough to either arouse secular anxieties or provoke a theological rebuttal" (Maddox, 2005, p.200). This enabled the Howard Government to champion policy positions normally associated with the American Christian right including:

Tightened censorship, opposition to gay and lesbian marriage and parenting, reopening the debate on abortion and capital punishment, overturning euthanasia law, a preference for faith-based over government welfare and schools, intolerance of Muslims, suspicion of outsiders, hostility to 'activist' judges and a claim to exclusive, inside knowledge of 'values' (Maddox, 2005, pp.145-147).

Maddox (2005, pp.145-147) also argues Howard utilised the strategies as well as the policies of the American Christian Right such as cultivating those with more extreme views than his own or branding opponents as 'extreme' to make himself look moderate in comparison.

Maddox (2005) and Amanda Lohrey (2006, p.47), argue that Howard's use of Christianity was solely for political purposes as illustrated by his rejection of other Christian commitments such as to social justice. Lohrey (2006, p.48) argues that when prominent Christians including conservatives Cardinal George Pell and Archbishop Peter Jensen objected to Howard Government social policies on the grounds of social justice or human rights, Howard "dismissed [them] as naïve interlopers out of their field of expertise. Where they do not suit the Howard agenda, the churches are hung out to dry: Howard sucks up the moral conservatism and spits out the rest". Thus, for these commentators, a significant part of Howard's political strategy in the culture wars was importing the beliefs, politics, and strategies of the American Christian fundamentalist Right and adapting them to the more secular Australian audience.

Closely associated with Right wing Christian extremism is, according to these commentators, Howard's promotion of traditional nuclear families and "family values". They argue culture wars attempted to reframe political rhetoric, language and discursive strategies to shape public perception and gain popular support. Lohrey (2005, p.9) argues that a Christian Right strategy to gain wider community support is to downplay Christian identity and avoid language that might alert secular voters to a Christian crusade. The use

of deceptively coded conservative discourse like 'family' and 'values' facilitates a "religious dog-whistle politics" enabling political leaders to reach religious and conservative secular constituencies simultaneously (Lohrey, 2006, p.48; Maddox, 2005). The use of 'family' and 'family values' discourse was thus integral to the Howard Government's social policy agenda according to these commentators.

#### **4.4.2 Nuclear families and traditional 'family values'**

For Singleton (2005, p.9), a "defining element of Howard's conservative approach to government has been his ongoing iteration of the importance of the family to the welfare of the community and Australian society". The Howard Government described the family as the key social institution of Australian society (Johnson, 2006, p.3; Newman, 2000, p.81). Announcing their 'Strengthening Families' policy in 1996 Minister Judi Moylan (cited in Thomson, 2000, p.67) commented: "The family is the core social unit in our society ...The Coalition is absolutely committed to ensuring that the needs of families remain at the centre of public policy". Guy Rundle (2001, p.40) also argues the Howard Government "sentimentalise the family and idealise family life, viewing it as the source of all possible meaning (aside from the nation) - in a deliberate defiance of everything that can go wrong with families". Johnson (2006) suggests Howard used this idealised conception of the family to evoke 'mainstream' traditional values, security and certainty. She also argues Howard blamed many problems, such as poverty or crime, on the breakdown of this idealised family and advocated social policies designed to prevent family breakdown (Johnson, 2006, p.3).

Howard's social policies promoted a particular type of family based on a neo-conservative interpretation (Donaghy, 2003, p.15). This was a traditional, conservative, patriarchal family comprising a heterosexual couple with children and a gendered division of labour. This is illustrated by the Howard Government's support for this type of family in tax and welfare policies which mainly benefited two-parent, heterosexual, single-income families and advocated male primary breadwinners and female responsibilities for children:

The traditional 'family' remains the touchstone of Howard's socially conservative politics of identity and his government's social policy. This is the government that paid single income families \$2.6 billion per annum in non means-tested benefits but rejected Pru Goward's proposal of government funded paid maternity leave (costed at \$213 million per annum). Meanwhile, the government's proposed changes to sole parents' benefit would penalise those affected by around \$100 per week (Johnson, 2006, p.3).

Howard's social conservatism thus promoted nuclear families, "male breadwinners and the importance of mothering over career-centred feminists" (Brett, 2004, p.75; Legge, 2006, p.140).

For Johnson (2006, p.3) and Lohrey (2006, p.56) Howard's social policy agenda reflects George Lakoff's concept of the conservative 'strict-father model' which is a tough, masculine and authoritarian approach to leadership. This model of leaderships promotes the view "the nation is best run like a family by a strict father who can protect the family and teach what is right and wrong" (Johnson, 2006, p.3). For Lohrey this explains Howard's opposition to issues such as women's equality, abortion, and same-sex marriage which "directly contest and undermine the traditional authoritarian father figure and in doing so constitute a threat to the conservative value system as a whole. It is why they are front-line issues in the culture wars" (Lohrey, 2006, p.57).

Rundle (2001, p.42) argues that in addition to promoting a particular type of family, the Howard Government used advertising to train "families to behave as families, as if they could longer be trusted to perform that duty without prompting". According to Rundle (2001, p.42), the Howard Government's anti-drugs advertisements were a form of social discipline where people were told what to think and how to talk about drugs as well as being sold a "set of values and way of thinking about values". In this campaign he suggests the family "was reconstructed as an arm of the state, to whom was subcontracted the role of shaping the behaviour of the young, in a manner scripted by professionals" (Rundle, 2001, p.42). Further, Rundle (2001, p.43) argues:

Howard's desire to control how people talk to their children, to hold stubbornly to the idealised familial doctrines of a bygone dispensation, is of a piece with his larger defensiveness. Having decided the social and economic values that obtained a certain time and in a certain context are ideal and eternal, conservatism attempts to re-establish these values with all the means at its disposal. Such an imperative can license an almost unlimited attack on the present institutions of society – and particularly on minority groups within it – in the name of past cultures and meanings. ...They start with Mum and Dad, the kids and the picket fence, and they end up with Fortress Australia, in which everyone is encouraged to distrust the Muslim asylum seeker.

Rundle's argument suggests the anti-drugs campaign was a 'practice' or 'technique' of governmentality (Johnson, 2000, p.152) used by the Howard Government to construct and reinforce types of family that behaved in an idealised way. This analysis is particularly

important because of the significant similarities between anti-drugs and other Howard Government campaigns on social issues such as male violence against women.

#### **4.4.3 Gender and women's equality**

The Howard Government's opposition to equality for women formed another important front of the culture wars. According to Summers (2003, p.125), "with John Howard Australia got its most reactionary prime minister for at least thirty years. Howard is a self-confessed social conservative who believes women belong in the home". Commentators argue Howard positioned feminists as a 'special interest' (Chappell, 2002b; Sawer, 2004, p.30) and, according to Summers (2003b, p.126) launched a simultaneous two-pronged attack on women's equality and independence. The first prong of this attack identified by Summers was that the Howard Government dismantled successes of the women's movement and welfare state. This included funding for childcare, welfare policies and other programs that helped women achieve independence and maintain an autonomous household. The second prong of this attack identified by Summers was that the Howard government began a roll-back of programs safe-guarding women's equality. She argued this involved reducing the funding, authority and prestige of government and non-government organisations or policy machinery that promoted women's equality or ensured women's interests were protected.

Summer's account of Howard's attack on women's equality is apparent in the government's approach to the Office of the Status of Women (OSW) and women's NGOs. Although a key component of the femocrat strategy, the centralised location of OSW as the women's coordinating agency was easily abolished by incoming governments hostile to the femocrat strategy (Chappell, 2002b). Although Howard did not immediately relocate OSW, it did suffer a 40 per cent budget cut in 1996, creating significant staff losses that affected all aspects of their work (Sawer, 1999, p.43). Marian Sawer (1999, pp.43-48) also describes how the Howard Government abolished various other gender accountability mechanisms including the women's budget process. She argues OSW subsequently withdrew from coordinating women's policy across government and, Summers (2003b, p.127) argues, this made OSW politically impotent.

During the Howard Government's first term femocrats were unable to engage in the 'federalism foxtrot'<sup>6</sup> because Liberal or Coalition governments were in power in all States except NSW (Chappell, 2002b, p.30). Chappell (2002b, p.30) argues that the Howard Government changes to OSW therefore left "the femocrat strategy in tatters". Howard finally moved OSW from Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet to the Department for Families and Communities in 2004 and, symbolically removing "Status" from its title, renamed it Office for Women (OFW).

Sawer (1999) argues that early in their first term the Howard Government also reduced or eliminated funding for all organisations espousing a feminist philosophy. Sawer argues Minister Jocelyn Newman, the Minister for the Status of Women, was "responsible for a rapid deterioration in relations between government and NGOs, exacerbated by funding issues and exertion of close control over agendas for Ministerial round tables [representatives of national women's NGOs]" (Sawer, 1999, p.44). Minister Newman reduced by half the grants program available to NGOs and administered by OSW. This included ceasing funding to the Coalition of Australian Participating Organisations of Women (CAPOW), a national women's NGO coordinating advocacy work after they produced "an unflattering report to the United Nations" (Manning in Kingston, 2004, p.269; Sawer, 1999, p.44). Those women's organisations that maintained funding under the OSW grants program were required to sign a contract preventing them making public comment without the written permission of the Prime Minister or OSW (Summers, 2003b, p.129). For Sawer (1999, p.44), "all of these changes effectively reduced the ability of women's groups to make input into the policy process and to support those watching policy from within", thus further dismantling the femocrat strategy.

Tahnya Donaghy (2003, p.15) argues the Howard Government consistently framed women's issues within family discourse which led to a regressive shift of the gender agenda in politics. Similarly, Johnson (2000, p.78) argues "Howard's conception of women's role as citizen is closely related to his conception of the role of the family". Further, Summers (2003b, p.140) argues:

Howard's government had succeeded in a remarkably short time in pushing women off the political agenda. They have been relegated to the kitchens and bedrooms of the discourse. Women have ceased to matter. All the prime minister and government talked of were 'families'.

---

<sup>6</sup> That is, changing focus between state and federal governments and playing governments off against each particularly when different parties were in power at each level of government.

Canberra had stopped caring about women except in their roles as mothers, and the rest of the country seemed to be falling into line. The sad thing is that this was so effective that people have largely stopped noticing, stopped commenting.

For Jane Thomson (2000, p.69) this approach to family “re-enshrine[d] women as wives and mothers first, citizens second”. Johnson (2000, p.78) argues it also shifted the burden of care from the public sector to the domestic sphere of “families”, or more accurately women, and in doing so further dismantled feminist aims of equality.

The Howard Government's active resistance to feminist goals for equality was illustrated by their relationship with anti-feminist men's and fathers' rights groups (Flood, 2004a). The history and nature of the men's rights movement in Australia is well documented (see for example Dunn, 2004; Flood, 2004a; Maddison, 1999). They involve a number of anti-feminist, often misogynistic, groups mobilised in an organised opposition against feminism (Flood, 2004a; Maddison, 1999). Often linked closely to conservative Christian organisations, men's rights groups support traditional patriarchal family structures and are instrumental in right-wing backlashes against 'political correctness' (Dunn, 2004; Flood, 2004a, pp.264 & 268). Despite their claims of discrimination and bias against men, commentators argue these groups enjoyed unprecedented access to powerful political figures including Howard himself as well as funding from the Howard Government (Dunn, 2004; Flood, 2004a, p.267; Summers, 2003b, p.98).

Michael Flood (2004a) argues that the men's rights agenda is focused on defending patriarchal masculinity and revalidating male identity with particular attention to family law and child custody. He delineates their prominence in lobbying for a rebuttable presumption of joint custody in Australian family law and their significant over-representation in public submission processes in family law reform. Common claims of men's rights groups concerning family law include: there are widespread false allegations of domestic violence and child abuse against men in the context of separation; children who allege abuse are encouraged to make false claims by their mothers as a result of 'Parental Alienation Syndrome'<sup>7</sup>; men and women are equally violent in relationships; domestic violence doesn't exist; and family law courts are biased against men (Dunn, 2004; Flood, 2004a; Shea Hart, 2006; Shea Hart & Bagshaw, 2008). Men's rights groups have achieved the most success with the Howard Government in family law (Flood, 2004a). In 2006 the Howard Government

---

<sup>7</sup> PAS as it is commonly known is a false 'syndrome' originating in the United States which despite being discredited and not officially accepted in American or Australian courts is widely explicitly and implicitly referred to and successfully used by alleged perpetrators of violence in family law cases .

introduced the *Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act* to include a range of measures championed by the men's rights movements such as a legal presumption of equal shared parental responsibility as well as making it more difficult for women to disclose experiences of domestic violence by their ex-partners (NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006). These changes to the *Family Law Act* reflect the significant influence of the men's rights movement on the Howard Government.

For many women's groups and domestic violence specialist service providers, the changes to the *Family Law Act* under the Howard Government substantially increased women's vulnerability to violence before and after separation. In particular, they argue these reforms discourage women from disclosing experiences of violence by their ex-partner for the Court's consideration since they may be penalised as an "unfriendly parent" thereby potentially losing residence of their children and/or being financially penalised. After conducting an inquiry into the new *Family Law Act* the Chair of the NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice Committee, the Hon Christine Robertson MLC, reported:

The possibility that these amendments may expose women to family violence and may subordinate the best interest of the child to the interests of the parents is the most concerning element of this Inquiry. The Committee has made recommendations to the NSW Government that will attempt to address these concerns (NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 2006, p.x).

This finding supports the claims from feminists and domestic violence service providers that the Howard Government's family law changes undermined women and children's safety.

According to commentators such as Johnson (2000; 2006) and Donaghy (2003), many of the mainstream policies pursued by the Howard Government, particularly related to social welfare and workplace protections, exacerbated rather than remedied gender-based disadvantage. The ability to set up an autonomous household with their children reduces women's vulnerability to violence and facilitates leaving a man who is violent (Costello, Chung, & Carson, 2005). For women experiencing violence any employment is often disrupted by their partner's violence during and after the relationship and there is substantial research demonstrating links between domestic violence, poverty and homelessness (Thomson, 2000, p.89). Women escaping violence also often have immediate needs such as establishing a new household, ensuring the safety of themselves and their children, and dealing with the trauma of the violence. These needs often create a

particular reliance on the welfare system over paid employment. The welfare system is thus significant in maintaining or reducing women's vulnerability to this violence since:

The glib criticisms levelled at women who stay with violent partners ignores the reality they face, of being damned if they do leave and damned if they don't. Many women do not have equal access to household income, even when they are residing with a male partner. Economic dependency and the insufficiency of government benefits means that many women do not have a genuine choice in relation to staying or leaving a marital relationship (Thomson, 2000, p.89).

Thomson (2000) argues the Howard Government, however, implemented a welfare reform agenda reflecting narrow notions of individualism and self-reliance and promoting a welfare system that was pejorative, punitive, paternalistic, conditional, and demanded one-sided participation and mutual obligation from welfare recipients. Given their concentration amongst the poor, this argument suggests Howard Government welfare reform was likely to have a disproportionate negative impact on women, especially those experiencing violence.

Commentators suggest women's already inequitable access to the benefits of paid employment was also exacerbated by the Howard Government's industrial relations agenda. The 1907 Harvester Judgement entrenched in Australia a male-breadwinner and female homemaker model of the wage-earner's welfare state. Men's historical and institutional advantages in this system and comparative workplace power have meant poverty, low status and lower paid employment are still mostly concentrated amongst women (Thomson, 2000). The Australian workforce continues to be highly gendered with unequal rates of pay between men and women, increasing casualisation of women's work, and the negative impact of the inequitable distribution of the burden of caring for children and other family members (Brennan, 1999; Disney, 2004). Women were therefore substantially more vulnerable than men to the negative impacts of the Howard Government's industrial relations agenda, particularly WorkChoices. Further, the Howard Government's social policies in the tax and welfare systems discouraged women from working anything but minimal part time hours.

Another policy area commentators suggest illustrates the Howard Government's erosion of women's rights and women's equality was international relations. Australia has historically played a leadership role in international advocacy for women's rights such as through



CEDAW<sup>8</sup>. The Howard Government, however, refused to sign the second option protocol (Baldino, 2005, p.195) which would have strengthened CEDAW by allowing individual women to take grievances against their government to the International community if all domestic avenues had been exhausted. In 1997 Australia was also officially censured by CEDAW for its “retreat from international leadership on gender equity issues and for the erosion of women’s policy at home” (Sawer, 1999, p.49). These criticisms received wide media coverage at the time and “provoked a furious government reaction” (Sawer, 1999, p.50). As a result of this and criticism of Australia’s record on asylum seekers and Indigenous Australians, Howard rejected Australia’s traditional activist role internationally and instead advanced a program of non-cooperation with international agencies (Baldino, 2005, p.195; Manne, 2004, pp. 33-34). This included withdrawing from the International Court of Justice in March 2002 and refusing to sign the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. In international relations, as in their domestic policies, the Howard Government was therefore criticised for their withdrawal from the UN and erosion of women’s rights and equality.

There is general consensus amongst feminist writers that Australian women were worse off by the end of his term than when Howard first came to power (Maddison, 2004, p.42). As Maddison (2007) argues:

Australia was once a world leader in efforts to improve equality between women and men. ...Today, after a decade of a federal government overtly hostile to these goals, Australia’s standing as a leader in the global struggle for gender equality is much diminished. The recently published Gender Report for the Democratic Audit of Australia paints a worrying picture of Australia’s Progress towards gender equality. Many achievements of an earlier period have now been undone.

Thus, these arguments suggest the Howard Government failed to address women’s gendered disadvantages and actively dismantled Australian achievements towards equality.

#### **4.4.4 Sexuality**

Another important issue in the culture wars according to commentators was sexuality. Queer theorists argue that the classical liberal individual citizen is heteronormative, if not actively homophobic (Johnson, 2000, p.44). Carol Johnson (2000, p.45) argues that

---

<sup>8</sup> Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women.

discourses on equality and tolerance can deny and further oppress difference rather than affirm it. She suggests Howard publicly endorsed and financially rewarded traditional, heterosexual family types in tax and social policies while simultaneously constructing non-heterosexual relationships and families as 'private'. For Howard, according to Johnson (1997b), "sexual preference apparently only refers to 'deviant' sexualities" and this approach is part of the wedge politics of the culture wars. Howard defines the 'mainstream' (i.e. heterosexuality) as a public good to be defended and reinforced while simultaneously defining the 'other' (i.e. homosexuality) as a minority 'private' matter to be 'tolerated'. This approach to sexuality is illustrative of what Mason (1997, p.31) refers to as the "homophobic mind" since:

...homophobic minds do not really care that lesbians and gay men exist, nor do they genuinely care about what takes place in private. The homophobic mind does not want to abolish homosexuality. Indeed, the very existence of lesbian and gay sexualities gives the homophobic mind something to rally against – a way of defining itself within a hetero/homo hierarchy. ...the real struggle is being fought over the question of visibility: how and when lesbians and gay men are visible. The homophobic minds in our society *do* care when lesbians and gay men argue for legal rights or social rights. ...they care when lesbians and gay men want to be visible and blatant – on their terms.

This argument suggests Howard's rhetoric and social policies supported traditional nuclear families and actively discriminated against gay men and lesbians while simultaneously representing non-heterosexual sexualities as the 'private choice' of individuals.

Gay, Lesbian and women's rights are particular targets of the Christian Right because they undermine the conservative strict-father patriarchal model of leadership adopted by the Howard Government. Tamas Pataki (2006) argues some of the conservative hatred of gay men is related to sexism against women. He suggests that, for conservatives, gay men undermine patriarchy since "the passive, receptive homosexual is seen as not unlike a woman" (Pataki, 2006, p.104). It is therefore not surprising that some of Howard's culture war attacks on gay and lesbian rights, such as opposition to same-sex marriage and adoption or undermining the Sex Discrimination Act so single and lesbian women cannot access fertility services available to heterosexual partnered women (Hansard, 2004j; Johnson, 2000, pp.45 & 81; 2006, p.3), have also impacted negatively on heterosexual women. Johnson (2000, p.81) argues:

Howard's own attitudes to issues of 'mainstream' sexuality ...throw considerable light on his support for particularly narrow, and heteronormative, constructions of masculinity and femininity. ...His view that homosexual relations should stay a private matter and that gay and lesbian relationships should not receive the same legal status as heterosexual marriage, draws attention to a point ...the marriage contract was not just about patriarchy but also about constituting the citizen as someone with an, at least predominantly, heterosexual identity.

Howard's approach to gay rights is therefore consistent with his broader strategy as identified by Johnson of both reinforcing the oppression of 'minority' groups such as gay men and lesbians at the same time disciplining the 'mainstream' heterosexual population.

#### **4.4.5 Race, culture and nationalism**

Howard's approach to race, culture and nationalism is the last "culture wars" issue identified by commentators that is of particular relevance to this thesis. As one of the most espoused and publicly identifiable aspects of the culture wars, Howard's political and strategic use of race and culture in wedge politics is explored extensively in the literature (e.g. Brett, 2007; Dodson, 2004; Jupp, 2005; Maley, 2004; Manne, 2004; Marr, 2007b; Megalogenis, 2006; Rintoul, 2006; Rundle, 2001; Sanders, 2005). Examples of the Howard Government's political use of race and culture identified by these commentators include: immigration (e.g. the Tampa incident, 'children overboard', and their approach to asylum seekers); anti-terrorism legislation; their approach to Aboriginal reconciliation; mainstreaming Indigenous programs; and abolishing ATSIC<sup>9</sup>.

Commentators describe Howard's approach to race and ethnicity as 'assimilationist nationalism', 'xenophobic cultural populism' or 'integrationist' (Brett, 2005, p.25; Johnson, 2006; Singleton, 2005, p.13). This approach invokes a taken for granted nostalgic conservative symbolism of the "flag, monarchy and triumphalist history" of the white Australian way of life (Rundle, 2001, p.53). It also reflects Howard's 'with us or against us' dichotomy. Howard constructs what he perceives as secondary associations and loyalties as barriers to individual freedom as illustrated by his comment: "I don't like hyphenated Australians, I just like Australians" (Howard cited in Johnson, 2006, p.4). Howard (cited in Johnson, 2006, p.5) also explicitly defines Australian values as "Judeo-Christian ethics, the progressive spirit of the Enlightenment and the institutions and values of British political

---

<sup>9</sup> Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (an elected federal Indigenous representative body).

culture". Further, Howard's failure to tackle the overt racism incited by Pauline Hanson and his approach to Indigenous Australians "maintain[ed] racism as a core value of Australian society" (Dodson, 2004, p.141; Jupp, 2005, p.182; Manne, 2004, p.16; Rundle, 2001, p.25).

Brett (2005, p.41) argues Howard's nationalism is an exclusive nationalism of "insiders and outsiders". He demands that Indigenous Australians and "newcomers to this country must embrace our values" and "appear as part of the Australian community" (Howard cited in Johnson, 2006, p.7). Ironically targeting both the oldest and newest Australians, commentators argue Howard's nationalism constructs the 'other' or 'them' as the problem and repeatedly downplays structural disadvantage and racist views. David Marr provides insight into the connection between Howard's divisive nationalism and the arms length strategies of the Christian Right. He argues John Howard constructed himself as a "moderating public voice" and carefully "rode a culture of vilification that coarsened the public and intellectual life of the country" (Marr, 2007b, p.62). He also argues Howard's racist and exclusionary nationalism, like his approach to sexuality, sought to discipline both white and non-white Australians by "silencing people who are out of step with Australian values" (Marr, 2007b, p.48). Marr suggests this approach to race and ethnicity exemplified Howard's use of the politics of identity and divisive "us and them" tactics for political gain. Further, under the Howard Government Marr (2007b, p.46) argues the defining mood was an uneasy fear of each other and the elusive 'them' which the Howard Government used to discipline the population and maintain conservative power.

Significantly for this thesis, Winter (2007) and Phillips (2008b) argue that the Howard Government used male violence against women as a wedge issue to progress their agenda on race including their 'assimilationist nationalism' and 'xenophobic cultural populism'. Winter (2007, p.40), for example, argues the Government used the "protection of Indigenous women and paternalistic care of indigenous Australians more generally as a justification for the removal of indigenous people's rights" (Winter, 2007, p.40). In particular, she argues the Howard Government used sexual assault allegations as a smokescreen to justify dismantling the elected Indigenous representative body, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC). Further, according to Winter (2007, p.41), the Howard Government mobilized the concept of "respect for women" as a wedge issue to "defend Australian values"; the implied target of which was migrants from Muslim backgrounds. Winter provides an excellent example of this in her discussion of Sheikh Taj-al Din Hilaly, whose sexist comments that women are responsible for rape generated media uproar in

October 2006. Many critics of Hilaly, including Muslim critics, condemned his comment as offensive to women. Winter notes, however, that Howard's main concern was that Hilaly's comments were un-Australian: "I can say without fear of contradiction that what he said is repugnant to Australian values" (Howard 2006 cited in Winter, 2007, p.41). In this example Howard thus seems more concerned with promoting the concept of 'un-Australian' values rather than promoting respect for women or anti-violence messages.

Winter (2007) and Phillips (2008b) also argue that the Howard Government used the issue of male violence against women to support and justify their involvement in the 'War on Terror'. Winter (2007, pp.27-28) argues the Howard Government used "protecting our women and liberating other women [to] provide a veneer of morality to warmongering" such as the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. For Winter (2007, p.46), the war on terror and the Howard Government's response to male violence against women are inextricably linked:

If the war on terror is largely a fiction endorsed and embellished by the masculine Australian state to keep the population fearful and submissive, then the protection of women – a class kept insecure, docile, malleable, and both subservient to and grateful to its demon lover, in short, a class kept firmly bound within femininity – is integral to the maintenance of that fiction.

Winter (2007) and Phillips (2008b) argue that, by drawing on discourses and policies to "safeguard Australia" and "protect women", "the Howard Government mobilized a politics of fear and demanded submission to a protective authoritarian power" (Winter, 2007, p.28). Phillips (2008b, p.60) argues this dynamic parallels how men's power works at other (micro and mezzo) levels in society. Specifically, it silences and disempowers women by: subordinating women as citizens; repressing or excluding discourses such as feminists ones which challenge its authority as 'protector'; and asserts that only the nationalist protector and not women themselves can say what is and is not good for them (Phillips, 2008b, pp.60 & 68; Winter, 2007, p.28).

Winter (2007, p.26) further argues that the Howard Government's approach to this issue also drew upon a totalizing concept of masculinity and discourses of male chivalry and strength in which protection and punishment are complementary and inseparable concepts; "two sides of the same coin of male domination". In this way the Howard Government modelled and reinforced on a macro level the heterosexual male patriarch's responsibility to protect women under his authority and punish women who do not submit to his authority at the mezzo and micro levels (Ruthchild, 1997, p.3). Simultaneously, Winter also argues the

Howard Government's promotion of the 'protector state' was strategic obfuscation which separated men's power to punish and to protect. She argues "the discursive compartmentalization of masculinity into either aggressive or protective only serves to reinforce male domination by preventing one from seeing it in its entirety and complexity" (Winter, 2007, pp.26-27). Thus, Winter and Phillips suggest the Howard Government strategically utilised male violence against women as a wedge issue to progress their agendas on race, culture, nationalism and the 'War on Terror' while simultaneously increasing women's vulnerability to male violence.

#### **4.5 Chapter Summary**

This chapter has explored the nature of the Australian Government during the Howard years between 1996 and 2007. In particular it has explored the mix of neo-liberalism, social conservatism and political opportunism that a number of commentators argue characterised the Howard Government. It has also explored the expression of these key characteristics in practice through the Howard Government's social policies and their "culture wars". Specifically, it outlined five areas of the Howard Government's social policy agenda identified by commentators that had a particular relevance to male violence against women: Christianity and campaigns of the religious right; nuclear families and traditional family values; gender and women's equality; sexuality; and race culture and nationalism. This chapter is important since it provides an outline of the broader social policy context in which the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women were located.

## Chapter Five

### Introducing the Study

---

To produce an account and feminist analysis of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women I conducted a two stage study. This study sought to answer the research question: What was the nature of the Australian Government's approaches to male violence against women during the Howard years (1996-2007). This question arose from an interest in how and why the conservative Howard Government provided a sustained and comparatively well-funded public policy response to male violence against women between 1996 and 2007. To explore this research question, stage one of the study involved semi-structured interviews with thirty key informants who had particular experiences or expertise in the development of the Howard Government's approaches. The aim of the key informant interviews was to develop a broad and detailed account of the development, nature and content of the Australian government's responses to male violence against women during the Howard years. The interview data was supplemented with a review of relevant texts from the period to assist filling any gaps. Stage two involved two in-depth case studies of the Australian Government's approaches to male violence against women during the Howard years. The first case study was of *Partnerships* and focused on policy process. The second case study was of *Australia Says No* and focused on content. After detailing each of the study's stages, this chapter briefly explores reflectivity and reflexivity in the research process as well as some ethical considerations guiding the research.

#### 5.1 Stage One: Key Informant Interviews and Texts

##### 5.1.1 Key informant interviews

Semi-structured interviews with key informants was the main data collection method for stage one of the study. The purpose of these interviews was to develop a broad and detailed account of the development, nature and content of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women. The use of semi-structured interviews was

important since, in feminist research practice, it enables an interactive interview style and challenges traditional power and research hierarchies (Finch, 1993, p.174). It also allowed participants to describe their experiences freely while allowing the researcher to ascertain specific information concerning the research question. This approach balanced the benefits of structured and unstructured interviews by allowing structure and focus on the research question while facilitating the emergence of the participant's own themes, frames and ideas:

This study replicated Ramsay's (2004, p.30) approach of 'key player' or 'elite' interviews and used non-probability purposive sampling (Llewellyn, Sullivan, & Minichiello, 1999, pp.178-180) to recruit participants. I selected and approached 'key informants' to be interviewed based on their experience or knowledge about the Howard Government's responses to male violence against women. Possible key informants were identified through a range of strategies such as reading reports from the period, word of mouth, and my knowledge and experience as a social worker and policy officer in the field of male violence against women. I also planned to interview at least one key informant from each Australian state and territory who had participated on the *Partnerships* Taskforce<sup>10</sup>. Consequently, a range of possible participants were approached including Howard Government ministers, members of parliament, federal and state public servants, academics, and members of relevant peak organisations. All except three of the people approached for an interview agreed to participate in the study and there were a total of twenty-nine interviews completed with thirty key informants. Almost all of the key informants had direct experience with either *Partnerships*, the *National Initiative*, *No Respect*, and/or *Australia Says No*. The two exceptions were 'expert outsiders'; who were state public servants who had run their own state-based violence against women prevention campaigns and provided general comments on *Australia Says No* based on their expertise.

The interviews were approved by the University of Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee. The information sheet and participant consent forms are provided in Appendices 5.1 and 5.2. The ethical considerations and obligations adhered to throughout this research included: minimising potential harm; ensuring freely given informed consent and easy withdrawal from the research; and ensuring privacy and confidentiality including through coding and the safe storage of raw data (Bryman, 2001, p.479; University of Sydney Research Office, nd).

---

<sup>10</sup> I was unable to interview a representative on the *Partnerships* Taskforce from the Northern Territory. I did, however, interview three key informants from the Northern Territory with a working knowledge of *Partnerships*.



Between September 2006 and October 2007 I conducted twenty-nine face-to-face interviews and one telephone interview with key informants. I completed research trips to each Australian state and territory during this time and interviewed eighteen participants in their workplace, six in their homes, and six in cafés. Each interview involved one key informant, the exception was one interview where two key informants were interviewed together at their request. In two interviews with politicians an adviser was present for the interview. Interviews were approximately an hour long. The shortest was 45 minutes and the longest was 2 hours and 11 minutes. I taped twenty-eight interviews with a digital recording device and took written notes. In one interview I only took written notes at the request of the key informant. In two interviews I turned off the recording device during a short part of the interview at the request of the key informant when they shared information they did not wish to be recorded.

I developed an initial open-ended list of questions which are provided in Appendix 5.3. Consistent with semi-structured interviews, these questions were not prescriptive and were only used as needed to help guide conversation in the interviews. In the interviews the key informants discussed: their experiences, memories and interpretations of the policy process; how the Howard Government's responses were established and developed; and their perceptions of the social and political context. I responded to key informant's reactions and recollections through further questioning, discussion, and clarification during the interview. In two cases (with their prior permission), I recontacted key informants by email to clarify or obtain further information.

Given the sensitivity of some interview topics, I followed Chappell's (2002b, p.17) approach of enabling the interviewees to be as frank as possible by promising to protect their identities in any published work. To protect the anonymity of key informants through transcription, data analysis and thesis writing I allocated each a code number (KI.1 to KI.30) based on the sequence of interviews. A number of the key informants held more than one position between 1996 and 2007 related to the areas researched or were no longer in a relevant position (or retired) at the time of interview. The thirty key informants occupied a total of 46 different roles that were relevant to this research. During the process of writing this thesis I originally referred to key informants within the thesis using their code number. It became clear, however, that this coding system created the potential to reveal the identity of certain key informants.

To ensure key informants could not be identified in the thesis I developed a new system of allocating numbered roles and identities. The categories allocated to key informants included: Academic (those employed in universities, research positions or clearinghouses); Taskforce Member; Peak Body Representative; Federal Public Servant; State Public Servant; Government MP; Opposition MP; MCGC Member (Ministerial Council on Government Communications); and Evaluator (member of the *Partnerships* Meta-Evaluation). This system was generic to prevent revealing a key informant's identity but also numbered to differentiate between participants. I allocated the majority of key informants more than one numbered descriptor in this coding system. This was because they occupied two roles simultaneously (for example State Public Servant and Taskforce Member) or occupied two different positions during this period. When a key informant is cited or quoted in this research I refer to the most appropriate position allocated to that key informant that is relevant to the quote cited<sup>11</sup>.

### 5.1.2 Supplementary texts

To supplement the key informant interview data, I reviewed over two hundred relevant documents or texts related to the Howard Government's responses to male violence against women. The term 'text' here refers to a "linguistic cultural artefact" which includes: written texts; visual images; sound recordings; and multi-semiotic texts such as television commercials or web-pages (Fairclough, 1995, p.4; 2003, p.3). The primary purpose of reviewing these texts was to verify, clarify or contribute to facts or information provided by key informants and to fill gaps in the data. In particular, they assisted in constructing comprehensive timelines and describing the content of the Howard Government's approaches.

A hierarchy of value was applied to assess the quality of the texts reviewed for stage one of the study based on Alan Bryman's (2001, pp.370-371) approach so that texts higher up the hierarchy were give greater weight in the study particularly in the case of contradictions in the information. This hierarchy included the criteria of authenticity, credibility, representativeness, meaning, relevance, supporting evidence or consistency, and frequency of mention. The texts reviewed for stage one were divided into three different

---

<sup>11</sup> Where key informants were members of the *Partnerships* Taskforce I tended to refer to them through this role unless doing so would compromise their identity or they occupied another role that had much greater relevance to the quote or argument cited.

categories based loosely on types identified by Bryman (2001, pp.369-385) and roughly corresponding to the hierarchy of value above.

The first category was publicly available (published) official documents and texts of the Howard Government and of the Australian Parliament between 1996 and 2007. These texts included: *Partnerships* annual reports (*Partnerships* Taskforce, 1999, 2000, 2001); *Partnerships* meta-evaluation reports (e.g. Strategic Partners, 2003b); OFW and OSW websites; relevant speeches and media releases from the Government, Opposition (ALP), Democrats and the Greens; the Parliamentary Hansard; and selected national research reports from *Partnerships* and the *National Initiative* (e.g. National Crime Prevention, 2001; OSW, 2004a).

The second category was departmental working documents of the Howard Government. These included: OSW briefing notes; *National Relationship Violence and Sexual Assault Campaign* Communication Strategy (OSW, 2003a); advertisements from *No Respect, No Relationship*; unpublished evaluations; memos; emails; and National Sexual Assault Roundtable documents.

The third category was media reports about *Partnerships*, the *National Initiative*, *No Respect* or *Australia Says No*. These included: 99 newspaper articles from a variety of Australian local, state and national papers sourced from the database *Factiva*; one radio interview on Triple J's *Hack* program (Cannane, 2004); and two ABC *7.30 Report* stories (Bowden, 2004a, 2004b).

### 5.1.3 Data coding

The empirical data collected for stage one of the study, both the key informant interviews and relevant texts, were coded and analysed in a cyclical and continuous process repeated until the completion of the thesis. This process had a number of stages developed by adapting the approaches to coding and analysis described by Dale Bagshaw (2004, pp.114-115) and Margaret Alston and Wendy Bowles (2003, p.207). These were:

1. Data reduction – organising the data and categorising it into codes.
2. Data organisation – assembling the information around identified themes.
3. Data interpretation – identifying categories of meaning; recurring ideas or language; patterns, trends and explanations; and salient themes.

4. Testing emergent hypothesis against the data and further literature.
5. Searching for alternative explanations of the data.
6. Interpreting the data and writing the thesis.

These stages were not linear. Rather, they were repeated in a circular pattern, and often out of order, until the completion of the thesis. For ease of explanation in this chapter, however, they are divided these into two sections; data coding and data analysis.

Each interview was transcribed from the digital recording and read in full before importing it into NVivo. NVivo is a computer program designed to assist researchers analysing and auditing qualitative data and for seeking and exploring associations and relationships in qualitative data (Bazeley, 2007; Bettman, 2005, p.87). In the study, NVivo was particularly valuable for managing and querying data in the process of data reduction and, to a lesser extent, organisation and interpretation by managing ideas through program functions such as memos.

In addition to the interview data, I imported into NVivo all texts from stage one of the research that were in an appropriate form. These were mainly smaller documents and included: 101 media texts (99 newspaper articles and 2 television transcripts); 34 parliamentary speeches from Hansard; 36 Howard Government documents including media releases, speeches, and bulletins; and 17 non-Government political parties' media releases (ALP, Australian Democrats and Greens).


Data coding has the pragmatic goal of sorting an unwieldily body of text into manageable chunks (Bagshaw, 2004, p.95). It is a process of data reduction and organisation (the first two stages in the list above). NVivo allows a researcher to code data from imported sources into categories called "nodes" which are storage areas for references to coded text (Bazeley, 2007, p.15). I coded all interview transcripts and texts imported into NVivo loosely around the research question and the additional themes which emerged from the data. I reviewed coded transcripts and texts numerous times to ensure consistency in coding with emerging themes and I occasionally recoded passages of text into more appropriate nodes that had emerged in coding other sources. During this process of coding, nodes were often also read, re-read, reviewed, broken up or re-structured as appropriate. At the conclusion of coding there were a total of 77 nodes which were divided into the following categories: free nodes; broader Government policy agenda; funding; personal experiences and

perspectives; political and bureaucratic involvement; and policies and campaign process and development policies and campaign evaluation and critique.

After completing coding for each transcript, I assigned key informants generic attributes in predetermined categories including: current position; relevant experience (i.e. *Partnerships*, the *National Initiative*, and/or *Australia Says No*); whether they were on the *Partnerships* Taskforce; their type of position (e.g. State Government, Federal Government, NGO, Peak body); their actual positions relevant to the research; and the state or territory they were from. These attributes allowed responses from different key informants to be compared and contrasted.

#### **5.1.4 Data analysis**

Data analysis refers to stages three to six of the list above. The aim of qualitative data analysis is to find meaning in the information and data collected and to find, interpret and explain shared themes in the data (Patton, 2004, p.117). This stage of the research process allows the researcher to move beyond data management and description to explanatory theory. It is the part of the research where themes and concepts in the data can be linked together in theoretical models (Ryan & Bernard, 2000, p.782). Data analysis in the study was an inductive, cyclical and continuous process rather than a linear progression. This means the data analysis began with detailed observations and large volumes of data. I then managed the data into themes, concepts and descriptive accounts before developing explanatory accounts linked to theory. The process of data analysis used in this thesis is best explained by the concept of the analytic hierarchy developed by Liz Spencer and her colleagues (Spencer, Ritchie, & O'Connor, 2003) which is reproduced in Figure 5.1 below.



**Figure 5.1 – The Analytic Hierarchy**

(Reproduced from Spencer et al., 2003, p.212)

This analytic hierarchy is a conceptual scaffolding to guide data analysis which provides a series of viewing platforms, each of which involves different analytical tasks to help the researcher make sense of the data (Spencer et al., 2003, p.213). Spencer and her colleagues explain that the analytic process in this framework is not linear and is shown as a ladder to enable movement up and down the structure during the research process. This structure provides building blocks enabling the researcher to look ‘down’ on what is emerging, revisit original or synthesised data to develop new concepts or theories, check assumptions, or identify underlying factors (Spencer et al., 2003, p.213). Within this framework, I used two main approaches to data analysis.

First, were strategies for working directly with the data. Similarly to Michelle Jones (2004) and Catherine Bettman (2005), I used a number of tools from the grounded theory methodology although my approach did not actually follow the grounded theory approach. The tools I used from this approach to assist analyse my research data included: memos, comparison, some aspects of theoretical sampling, and the incorporation of negative cases (Ryan & Bernard, 2000, pp.782-783).

Memos are analytical notes to help researchers think theoretically about findings and can include notes recording theoretical questions, concepts, hypotheses, insights, and thoughts about future data collection (Alston & Bowles, 2003, p.208). Following the completion of coding for each interview, I developed a memo attached to each key informant 'case'. This included: a summary of details about the key informant and interview (e.g. position, why they were interviewed, and date and time of interview); a summary of the key themes in the interview; reflections on the interview; topics for further consideration; and links to theory. In addition to case-based memos, I used two other types of memos. First, I developed memos attached to nodes that linked with, and helped develop, theory. Second, I developed a journal memo that provided a higher level of abstraction, reflections, and links to theory through the research process.

Another tool I used for data analysis was comparison (Ryan & Bernard, 2000, p.783). In coding and recoding the nodes and structuring them within hierarchal structures in tree nodes, I read and reviewed the content of each node many times. As my coding categories became clearer and I sought to link these themes to theories, I compared and contrasted the interviews, the nodes and emerging themes. I also compared and contrasted these themes to theory and broader theoretical frameworks informed by the literature.

Theoretical sampling refers to theory-guided data collection (Alston & Bowles, 2003, p.11). Although I did not strictly follow a theoretical sampling approach, this concept did influence my data analysis. The comparisons I had made between interviews, concepts, nodes and themes generated new questions and queries which were included and clarified in interviews with other participants. Further, my analysis of interviews and emergent themes directed my attention to potential key informants to approach for interviews because of their particular knowledge or experience in the area or theme emerging from the data. Bettman (2005, p.89) argues prominent grounded theorists "Strauss and Corbin encourage turning towards literature or experience to find examples of similar phenomena". Consistent with

this, my data and analysis guided my ongoing searches for literature to assist develop theory and explanatory frameworks to make sense of the findings.

I also noted and incorporated negative cases into emerging theory. Negative cases refer to those that don't fit the theoretical model developed and may suggest new connections need to be made (Ryan & Bernard, 2000, p.782). I was conscious of negative cases throughout the study and tried to ensure these were incorporated into theory development and given a voice in writing up the study. Incorporating and accommodating negative cases into analysis in this way reflected some of the key principles of qualitative data including encompassing diversity and demonstrating interest in the nature of the phenomenon studied rather than its statistical distribution (Lewis & Ritchie, 2003, p.277-278).

The approach to research analysis in this study generated data-induced hypotheses. Nevertheless, some broad conceptual categories based predominantly on the research question and interview schedule had some influence on data analysis including on structuring the data and coding. This pre-determined schema was particularly influential on coding and analysing earlier interviews. These broad concepts reflected my interests in: policy context; the content of the Howard Government's responses; history and policy process; and the representation of the problem. These broad concepts were modified, adapted and developed in response to the data and emerging concepts and themes.

The second way I operationalised the analytical hierarchy in the study was through writing. This approach to data analysis was particularly relevant to the case studies in stage two outlined below. It was, however, also significant for the analysis of the interviews and review of the texts in stage one. In particular, writing as a process of analysis enabled me to more fully incorporate insights from reading, rereading and coding the supplementary texts including some of the larger documents that were not able to be imported into NVivo.

Keith Punch (1998) explains that, in the traditional model of research, writing is not done until the research is completed in its entirety. He argues a different view of research writing sees it as "a way of leaning, a way of knowing, a form of analysis and inquiry" (Punch, 1998, pp.279-280). Writing in this model is part of thinking, analysing and interpreting. Punch also argues this understanding of writing as discovery, analysis and inquiry is more common in qualitative analysis. Writing was an extremely important part of analysis in this thesis. I commenced writing early in the research process and used it to test connections between data and developing concepts, themes and theories. This was a particularly



important part of ongoing literature reviews and developing theoretical concepts to make sense of the data.

The process of writing as analysis involved constant drafting, writing, reviewing and rewriting of this thesis in a cyclical and inductive process which mirrored the general approach to data management and analysis. As data reduction and analysis progressed and clearer explanatory accounts emerged, the structure and content of the thesis were substantially reworked to reflect changes in emerging theories and hypotheses. In this process I had a system of placing sections of data, quotes, or other evidence either supporting or contradicting a specific theme in the relevant place within the thesis highlighted in blue at the time it came to my attention again. When I later came back to that point or theme in the thesis to rewrite it I would consider all the sections highlighted in blue and incorporate these into the argument or theme. This process assisted in verification in the research analysis and enabled me to continuously ground the research in the data in a way consistent with moving up and down the ladder on the analytic hierarchy.

## **5.2 Stage Two: Case Studies**

Stage two of the study involved in-depth case studies of the Howard Government initiatives *Partnerships Against Domestic Violence* as a case study of policy process and *Australia Says No* as a case study of policy content. These case studies also sought to answer the research question: What was the nature of the Australian Government's approaches to male violence against women during the Howard years (1996-2007). Whereas the first stage of the research focused on producing an account of this period, this second stage was developed to conduct a more detailed analysis of policy process and content through the two case studies.

### **5.2.1 *Partnerships Against Domestic Violence***

The first in-depth case study explored *Partnerships* and focused on policy process. I chose *Partnerships* as a case study for this purpose because of the significant experiences of key informants with this initiative and the large volume of empirical data generated in stage one about *Partnerships*. I also chose *Partnerships* because it was the most sustained and well-funded of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women. It was

therefore highly representative of the Howard Government's approaches and had the largest available body of texts for analysis.

The case study of *Partnerships* used the same empirical data (key informant interviews and supplementary texts), data coding and data analysis techniques as stage one. In stage one, the focus of the analysis was to develop a detailed account of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women. In stage two, however, the focus shifted to look in significant detail and seek to explain the nature of the policy process and roles of individuals during this period. I did this first by returning to those aspects of the empirical data that specifically focussed on policy process and the role of individuals and I applied the same techniques of data coding and analysis as in stage one. In the approach to data analysis and theory development, however, I also incorporated themes, concepts and theory from the literature outlined in Chapters Three and Four on Australian feminist engagements with the state and the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda. This literature helped me to make sense of this period and develop explanatory theory.

### **5.2.2 Violence Against Women – Australia Says No**

The second case study explored *Australia Says No* and focused on content. I chose *Australia Says No* as the case study of content because it had the largest amount of published text and material from which to conduct an analysis of this type. *Australia Says No* was also sustained over a number of years and was the Howard Government's most public and well-known response to male violence against women. Further, *Australia Says No* was funded by, and closely linked to, *Partnerships*, the *National Initiative* and the *Women's Safety Agenda*. The Howard Government also had close oversight of this campaign and excluded input from outside of the federal government. *Australia Says No* was therefore highly representative of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women and thus a valuable subject for an in-depth case study of content.

Unlike the first case study, the empirical data collected for stage one did not provide a sufficient foundation to explore the content of *Australia Says No*. I therefore developed a method of empirical data collection, coding and analysis to explore content in this case study based on Carol Bacchi's (1999b) 'What's the Problem (represented to be)?' approach.

Bacchi's 'What's the Problem?' approach departs from current approaches to policy studies that are limited to describing what governments do or refuse to do. Bacchi (1999b, pp.10-31) conceptualises policy as a strategic, inherently political process constituting the shape of the subject under construction. Her approach addresses:

...how every proposal necessarily contains presuppositions and assumptions which often go unanalysed, how these representations shape an issue in ways which limit possibilities for change. It also offers a framework for examining gaps and silences in policy debate by asking what remains unproblematized in certain representations (Bacchi, 1999b, p.12).

Starting from the premise that problematizations are a central focus of analysis, Bacchi (1999b, p.60) seeks to broaden the political agenda by directing attention to what does not get problematised in existing policy and to silences such as those of gender and power relations. Bacchi (1999b, pp.1-2) also argues that policy interpretations and constructions are themselves interventions since they contain implicit and explicit diagnosis of a 'problem' which has programmatic outcomes. Thus, the effect or outcome of policy is an inseparable part of policy analysis in this methodology.

Discourse, rather than rhetoric, is the focus of the 'What's the Problem?' approach (Bacchi, 1999b, pp.39 & 60). This approach provides conceptual tools to interrogate representations of 'problems' (Bacchi, 1999b, p.13) and is a research technique which conducts methodology, method, data collection and data analysis simultaneously. This methodology allows the researcher to identify and evaluate policy representations including: their effects on programmatic orientations; its impact on the subjects/objects of policy; and its impact on shaping the political agenda (Bacchi, 1999b, p.10). Bacchi (1999b, pp.12-13) recommends five frames containing the following questions be asked by the researcher analysing policy:

1. What is the problem of (domestic violence, abortion, etc) represented to be whether in a specific policy debate or in a specific policy proposal?
2. What presuppositions or assumptions underlie the representation?
3. What effects are produced by this representation? How are subjects constituted within? What is likely to change? What is likely to stay the same? Who is likely to benefit from this representation?
4. What is left unproblematic in this representation?
5. How would 'responses' differ if the 'problem' were thought about or represented differently?

Bacchi's 'What's the Problem?' approach thus provides a sophisticated framework to interrogate the content of *Australia Says No*. Based on Bacchi's approach I developed a

tool to conduct an analysis of texts from *Australia Says No*. Bacchi's 'What's the Problem?' approach offered a valuable foundation for this textual analysis tool and her five questions formed the over-arching framework for the tool. This tool is provided in Appendix 5.4.

Before using this tool for the data analysis for the case study of content, I collected all available primary texts for *Australia Says No*. These included: *Violence Against Women - Australia Says No* Booklet; *Violence Against Indigenous Women - Time To Say No* Booklet; posters aimed at mainstream and Indigenous audiences; a selection of four television advertisements; a pamphlet; magazine advertisement targeting women; the campaign website; and the Education Resource. Three of these texts were not in a simple written form and so I included these in the textual analysis by modifying them in the following ways. First, I transcribed the television advertisements from video tapes. Second, I printed out the material in the Curriculum Support Materials from the CD-ROM in the Education Resource Pack. Third, I watched the *Loves Me, Loves Me Not* DVD accompanying the Education Resource three times and took written notes.

Once texts were in a tangible, written form, I read through this raw data multiple times, making notes and observations on the texts themselves and highlighting passages that were of particular interest or reflected common themes. I then used the textual analysis tool I had developed and wrote answers for each of the questions in this tool by frequently referring back to the texts themselves and my notes. I was careful to provide evidence such as direct quotes or page references for my answers to each question in the tool.

Although this technique of data collection and analysis differed to the one adopted for the first case study, both used thesis writing as a form of data analysis. The completed textual analysis tool formed a significant foundation for the case study of the campaign's content. The process of writing as analysis, however, involved constantly drafting, writing, reviewing and rewriting large sections of this case study and incorporating explanatory theory and analysis. I also followed a cyclical and inductive approach by constantly referring back to the original raw data and the completed textual analysis tool to verify and further my analysis of the content of *Australia Says No* during the writing up process for this second case study.

### 5.3 Reflectivity and Reflexivity in the Research Process

The use of writing as analysis highlights the importance of reflectivity and reflexivity in the research process. It is, as Bettman (2005, p.87) argues, too simple to claim that the empirical data solely directed “the organisation and analysis of data; the coding, selection and development of themes, categories and subcategories” or explanatory theory. Contrary to positivist models of research that claim research and researchers are objective, I agree with Bettman (2005, p.87) that it is impossible for any analysis to be totally free of bias. The opinions and perspectives of the researcher invariably become part of the empirical evidence of the research analysis and conclusions (Mason, 1995, p.22). Indeed, feminist researchers often argue that personal experience and perspective is a valuable asset for feminist research (Reinharz, 1992, p.258).

As a feminist researcher I acknowledge my background, experiences, and social and political context are a valuable asset to this research project. Consequently, I am also committed to reflective and reflexive practice in the research process which locates the researcher as inextricably part of the data generation and interpretation process (Spencer et al., 2003, p.205). In this thesis I adopted a critically reflective and reflexive position by reflecting on all aspects of the research process including the topic, concepts studied, theoretical perspectives, research practices, methodologies, analyses and conclusions. I also maintained awareness of the impact of my perspectives, experiences and values. I did this by: being self-critical and reflecting on my own biases and prejudices; trying to keep an open mind; listening carefully to key informants; trying not to make assumptions; checking and summarising responses; and seeking alternative evidence to my interpretations of data.

Although I am a “privileged author” or “privileged editor” of participants’ views (Bettman, 2005, p.88), I also acknowledge the role of social interaction in producing meaning. As Bettman (2005, p.88) argues, meaning is co-produced through relationships and multiple perspectives of lived experiences and subjectivities are the product of social interactions. This research was a two-way process in which interaction and relationships, with the key informants and with the data, was fundamental. Although acknowledging this two-way relationship, where possible I attempted to use representative comments including the key informants’ exact words to reflect the general trends, themes, concepts and theories from the data. Simultaneously, I acknowledge that as a feminist researcher only ‘giving voice’ to key informants or texts is an abdication of my responsibility to link this data with broader

theoretical frameworks and feminist paradigms to advance social change (Mason, 1995, pp.11-12; Patton, 2004, p.121).

#### **5.4 Limitations of the Study**

There are some limitations restricting the generalisability of this study's findings and the capacity to replicate it. First, it was impossible to interview all participants in the policy process for all of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women examined in this period. Second, stage one of the study relied on key 'informants' recollections of the policy process. Some key informants commented on their difficulty recalling key events or policy processes during this time. This highlights the importance of having completed this stage of the study while key informants were still able to provide detailed descriptions of the policy process. It also suggests, however, that while it may be valuable to replicate the methodology from stage one of the study, it would be difficult to replicate it on this exact topic given the further passage of time. Third, although this thesis contextualises the initiatives studied in the broader policy context, it was beyond the scope of this study to explore other Howard Government initiatives in detail. Howard Government initiatives that responded to this issue beyond those studied for this thesis may provide further insight into the Australian Government's approaches to male violence against women during the Howard years. Fourth, as argued above, the opinions and perspectives of the researcher invariably become part of the empirical evidence, research analysis and conclusions. Consequently, each individual text could be interpreted in many ways as a result of the perspectives, understandings and knowledge systems of those who produce the text as well as those who receive and analyse it. This thesis can therefore only represent a number of ways of understanding the Australian Government's approaches to male violence against women during the Howard years rather than being a definitive narrative or analysis of this period. Finally, consistent with qualitative approaches to research, this thesis makes no claims to generalisability. As discussed above, however, critical reflectivity and reflexivity were nevertheless an important part of the research methodology which sought to make transparent the role of the researcher within this thesis.

#### **5.5 Ethical Considerations**

Three ethical considerations guided this thesis in addition to the requirements of the University of Sydney's Human Research Ethics Committee. These included: ethical

responsibilities as a feminist researcher; professional ethics; and ethical principles in the research process.

While there is little consensus on exactly what constitutes feminist methodology, there are distinctive features of feminist research methodologies. These include: doing research for rather than on women; incorporating perspectives, experiences, needs and interests of women as individuals and a group; and critiquing the role of power in society (Byrne & Lentin, 2000, pp.7-8; S. Mason, 1997, p.12; Mies, 1993, pp.71-71; Ramazanoglu, 2002, pp.2-16). Sally Mason (1997, p.11) argues that "feminist principles guide research but do not dictate the use of specific methods". She suggest that what characterises feminist research is how the methods are used rather than the methods themselves (S. Mason, 1997, p.27).

Feminist ethical considerations I have observed include: a choice of topic seeking positive change in women's lives; working with women rather than 'studying' them; celebrating the expertise of women on their own lives; and actively campaigning for positive change since in feminist inquiry "the point is to change the world, not only to study it" (Stanley, 1990, p.15). James Messerschmidt (2005, p.197) argues that creating a more equal society requires examining men, their advantages, how men reproduce these advantages, men's interests in challenging these advantages, and promoting possibilities for change. Similarly, Catherine Bettman (2005) and Amanda Shea Hart (2006) challenge the traditional feminist focus on women. They argue oppression and violence can only be understood by studying those who exercise social power, whether they be men perpetrating violence (Bettman, 2005) or powerful groups upholding the patriarchal social order such as family court judges (Shea Hart, 2006). By focusing on the Howard Government's approaches, my thesis observes this emerging importance of studying men, male institutions and male power in feminist work.

As a woman in a patriarchal society I recognise that male violence against women is not an abstract research topic but a constant presence in women's lives restricting our freedom and violating our human rights. Consequently, I feel an ethical responsibility to be faithful to the strength, courage and experiences of all women affected by male violence. My approach to this thesis has therefore adopted the ethical positioning and moral commitment evident in Judith Herman's (2001, pp.134-135) discussion of the difference between technical and moral neutrality in therapeutic relationships with women affected by violence. Consistent with Herman's thesis, I strive for technical neutrality in the research process

while maintaining a morally committed stance in solidarity with women victimised. This stance recognises and affirms that violence is a crime, a fundamental injustice and a violation of human rights. As Liz Kelly (1988, p.73) states:

Any researcher choosing to study sexual violence must begin with an ethical commitment, a commitment which includes not condoning abuse explicitly or implicitly, seeing the purpose of research as increasing understanding in order that more appropriate responses can be developed, and wanting to contribute to a long-term goal of ending violence in the lives of women and children.

In this thesis I view these ethical obligations as fundamental to the research design.

A second ethical consideration is the ethics of the Social Work profession. Similarly to Kayser-Jones and Koenig's (1994, p.21-30) conclusions about the tension between professional and research values in the nursing context, my role as a social worker supersedes that of researcher in certain circumstances. Specifically, the Australian Association of Social Workers (AASW) (2000, p.15) Code of Ethics require privacy and confidentiality (including in research) to be contravened in order to fulfil statutory obligations or to protect any individual whose safety is at risk. I explained to research participants these limitations to privacy and confidentiality to enable informed choice regarding disclosures I might be unable to keep confidential. The AASW (2000, p.20) also delineates ethical responsibilities specifically for research. Although many of these are consistent with requirements of university ethics committees, additional ethical considerations include: only using qualified practitioners for research requiring specialised techniques; informing research participants of the results of the research; and informing relevant bodies of results that demonstrate social inequalities or injustices (AASW, 2000, p.20).

## **5.6 Chapter Summary**

This chapter introduced the study by outlining its two stages, the importance of reflectivity and reflexivity in the research process, and ethical considerations observed. Through key informant interviews and supplementary texts, stage one aimed to develop a broad and detailed account of the development, nature and content of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women. Chapters Six and Seven provide this comprehensive account of the Australian Government's approaches during the Howard years (1996 to 2007). Chapter Eight explores key themes from stage one and how the



Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women might best be understood from a feminist perspective. Stage two provided two in-depth case studies of policy process and content respectively. Chapter Nine explores the first case study on *Partnerships* and policy process. Chapter Ten explores the second case study on the content of *Australia Says No*. The discussion at the end of each of these chapters seeks to make sense of this period and to explore how the Howard Government's approaches may best be understood from a feminist perspective.

## **Chapter Six**

### **Male Violence Against Women**

### **Policy and Program Development 1996-2007**

---

A key aim of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive account of the Australian Government's approaches to male violence against women during the Howard years. The following chapter provides the first part of this account by documenting the history, content and development of the Howard Government's policy and program responses to this issue. This account was developed from stage one of the study and includes: *Partnerships Against Domestic Violence (Partnerships)* (1997-2005), the *National Initiative to Combat Sexual Assault (National Initiative)* (2000-2005), the *Women's Safety Taskforce* (2002), and the *Women's Safety Agenda* (2005-2007). This chapter is structured chronologically and addresses the history and development, policy machinery, and the content of each policy or program.

#### **6.1 *Partnerships Against Domestic Violence* (1997 - 2005)**

*Partnerships* was the first significant Howard Government policy/program response to male violence against women and the only one with significant involvement from state governments. Consequently, many key informants were personally involved in *Partnerships* and extensive documentation was available. The account of *Partnerships* is therefore more detailed than the account of the Howard Government's other policy and program approaches. *Partnerships* involved two distinct phases; *Partnerships 1* from 1997 until 30 June 2001 and *Partnerships 2* from 30 June 2001 until 30 June 2005. Each phase differed in character, content, structure, funding, policy machinery and priority areas.

### 6.1.1 *Partnerships Against Domestic Violence Phase One (1997 - 2001)*

#### *Partnerships 1 History and Development*

On 16 February 1996 the Coalition released *Opportunities and Choice for Women*, which delineated proposed priorities for women for the 1996 federal election. Regarding domestic violence this document states: "in consultation with States and Territories, a Liberal/National Coalition will support cross-portfolio initiatives to prevent family violence" (Liberal/National Parties, 1996, p.25). The Coalition also promised to develop a more comprehensive approach to combating domestic violence by convening a National Violence Summit and supporting education programs emphasising that violence against family members would not be tolerated (Liberal/National Parties, 1996, p.25). On 2 March 1996 the Coalition defeated the Keating Labor Government in the federal election and formed government under the leadership of Prime Minister John Howard.

On 23 and 24 September 1996 the Howard Government hosted a two day national forum for 130 domestic violence specialists at Parliament House, Canberra. In her opening speech the Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for the Status of Women, Jocelyn Newman, read out a message from the Prime Minister including his request:

...to see constructive recommendations which we, the Commonwealth and the States and Territories, can work on collaboratively to address this tragedy which is destroying too many of our families ...which I can assure you will be considered seriously by this government and will be on the agenda of future meetings between the Commonwealth and the States and Territories leading to a Summit in the middle of next year (Howard cited in Newman, 1996b).

In her closing speech Minister Newman promised to circulate the forum's recommendations to relevant communities and groups and engage in "constructive talk" with the states and territories (Newman, 1996a). The Minister also suggested the forum had laid down important ground work for a National Domestic Violence Summit the Government had planned for the following year.

Anne Summers (1997) reported that the Howard Government established a working group to process the domestic violence forum's recommendations. *Federal Public Servant 4*, and *Taskforce Members 8 & 10* also made reference to this working group. They described it as a Commonwealth/State working group overseeing and authorising the upcoming National

Domestic Violence Summit. Summers noted that community groups and service providers, such as refuge workers, had no input into this working group or into the development of the National Domestic Violence Summit. As outlined in Chapter Three, the workers Summers refers to tended to be feminists who were traditionally at the forefront of domestic violence activism and heavily involved in previous state and federal government responses to domestic violence (Chappell, 2001, p.63; Earle et al., 1990, p.5; Erika, 1990; NCVAW, 1992, p.vi). Summers argues that the Howard Government's early and deliberate exclusion of these groups was a significant shift in Australian governments' approaches to domestic violence policy machinery.

On 7 November 1997 Prime Minister Howard held the National Domestic Violence Summit, in effect a one hour agenda item for the Heads of Government to discuss at the Council of Australian Governments meeting (A. Summers, 1997). At this Summit the Heads of Government released a domestic violence statement of principles (see Appendix 6.1). These principles acknowledge "domestic violence is an abuse of power perpetrated mainly (but not only) by men against women". Overall, however, the understanding of domestic violence in these principles is mainly located at the micro and mezzo levels as being a problem of individuals and within families. Although the principles acknowledge the responsibility of governments to respond to domestic violence, this appears to be limited to curbing an individual's violent behaviour and "demonstrating the unacceptability of all forms of domestic violence". Nothing in these principles suggests an understanding of domestic violence which acknowledges the role of the state or other social institutions in facilitating this violence (mezzo and macro levels).

At the National Domestic Violence Summit, Prime Minister Howard announced *Partnerships*; a new initiative reportedly founded on the Summit principles and endorsed by the attending Heads of Government (Goward, 1999; Howard, 1997; PADV Taskforce, 2001, p.2). Howard (cited in OFW, 2005a) told the Summit:

...we have agreed to launch a new initiative Partnerships Against Domestic Violence which provides a framework for innovation and sharing knowledge nationally. The Initiative will be supported by Commonwealth funds, not to supplement existing services, but to test new approaches and to show us how we can get better value from current resources and future commitments. ...the Initiative should be seen as a substantial beginning to a new commitment.

The reported reaction to the Summit was mixed. The Howard Government itself (OFW, 2005a) unsurprisingly described it positively as: "the first time all Australian Heads of

Government had come together in a united effort to address domestic violence and it marked the beginning of a new cooperative and mutually beneficial process for Australian governments". Media commentators, however, reported a negative response to the Summit. This included a report that ACT Chief Minister Carnell called the Summit "an insult to women" (Humphries & Peatling, 1997) and Liberal Senator Helen Coonan was reported to have described the Summit as having a 'lukewarm' response from women (Rollins & Davley, 1998). Summers (1997) also argued the Summit's outcomes were likely to be "buried in the news of the inevitable Commonwealth-state squabbling over revenue shares that usually dominate Premiers' conferences".

### Partnerships 1 Policy Machinery

At the Summit the Prime Minister announced a joint federal-state government Taskforce to oversee *Partnerships*. Membership of this Taskforce included two government representatives per jurisdiction nominated by their respective Premiers or Chief Ministers (Goward, 1999). *Taskforce Member 6* argued this meant "representation varied significantly depending on which agency the relevant premier believed to be their key agency on domestic violence". Taskforce reports (*Partnerships* Taskforce, 1999, p.20; 2000, p.23) list representatives from a range of state and territory departments including: offices of women's policy; Attorney-General Departments; Departments of Human Services or Health; Departments of Families and Communities or Community Services; Departments of Justice; and Departments of Premier and Cabinet/Chief Minister. These reports also state Taskforce members included three federal representatives from the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (OSW), the Attorney-General's Department and the Department of Family and Community Services.

In line with Summers' (1997) initial observation above, three key informants suggested the Howard Government appeared to exclude some feminists and feminist policy activists from the *Partnerships* policy machinery. *State Public Servant 5*, *Evaluator 2* and *Taskforce Member 8* argued the Howard Government intentionally excluded NGO representatives from the *Partnerships* Taskforce. These key informants' comments are consistent with the argument outlined in Chapter Four that the Howard Government largely excluded feminists from the development of a range of social policies of significance to women. This issue is explored in more detail in the case study of *Partnerships* in Chapter Nine.

The Taskforce reportedly fulfilled an important strategic role in *Partnerships*. A Taskforce report (*Partnerships* Taskforce, 2001) states that the Taskforce set *Partnerships* policy frameworks and program directions, identified and developed project strategies, and advised on funding priorities and allocations within each representative's jurisdiction. These aspects of its functions and its structure are evident in the Taskforce Terms of Reference and the *Partnerships* structural framework in Appendices 6.2 and 6.3. In addition to these formal structures, the Taskforce established a number of working groups with responsibilities for project development and the management of *Partnerships* priority areas (*Academic 3, Evaluator 2, Taskforce Member 8, and State Public Servants 10 & 11*). These key informants explained the membership of these working groups consisted of Taskforce members and other government and non-government representatives with specific relevant expertise. Further, as evident in the *Partnerships* structural framework (see Appendix 6.3), the Office for the Status of Women (OSW)<sup>12</sup> provided administrative support and a Secretariat for the Taskforce and managed the Taskforce's budget.

#### *Partnerships 1* Content

*Partnerships* was described as a national framework and strategic collaborative initiative between Australian federal, state and territory governments and the business and community sector (*Partnerships* Taskforce, 1999, 2000, 2001). For the Howard Government, *Partnerships 1* was reportedly an important platform shaping policy with the Prime Minister referring to it as a "down-payment" directing future domestic violence policy (cited in Strategic Partners, 1999, p.1). The Howard Government also described *Partnerships* as "a major part of the Government's strategy for strengthening families, preventing family breakdown and creating healthy and safe communities" (*Partnerships* Taskforce, 2000, p.1).

*Partnerships'* stated purpose in its public documents was to work towards the goal of preventing domestic violence, ameliorating its effects, and encouraging a more holistic response. According to the Office for Women (OFW) (2005h) *Partnerships* was to achieve this by developing "knowledge about what actually works best - testing and researching new ways of addressing domestic violence, enhancing and sharing knowledge, developing and documenting good practice and educating the community". *Taskforce Member 6*

---

<sup>12</sup> As discussed in Chapter 10, the Howard Government changed the name of the Office for the Status of Women to Office for Women in 2004. These names are used interchangeably in Chapter 7 depending on the date of the publication referenced.

commented that Taskforce members focussed on “research and development with research commissioned to plug gaps in knowledge and included a number of areas such as best practice principles, standards for work in the area and so on”. Thus, *Partnerships*' official aims are consistent with the reported aims of the *Partnerships* Taskforce.

As well as the terms of reference, the Taskforce applied the statement of principles (the communiqué) from the Domestic Violence Summit (see Appendix 6.1) to guide *Partnerships* practice (*Evaluator 2 & Taskforce Member 8*). These key informants also said the Taskforce were bound by the following six priority themes announced at the Summit:

- helping children and young people to develop healthy relationships and not to use violence – especially young people who are already at risk;
- protecting people at risk;
- helping adults to break free of violent behaviour – working with victims and perpetrators;
- working with the community – educating against violence;
- finding out what works in responding to and preventing domestic violence; and
- helping people in regional Australia (*Partnerships* Taskforce, 1999, p.1).

The wording of these six priority areas changed subtly during *Partnerships 1* and were later (*Partnerships* Taskforce, 2001, p.3) reported as:

- Working with children and young people to break the cycle of violence between generations,
- Working with adults to break patterns of violence: working with victims and violent men,
- Working with the community, educating against violence,
- Protecting people at risk: reforming legislation and improving responses by police and courts,
- Information and good practice: finding out what works and researching areas whether new information is needed to support violence prevention,
- Helping people in regional Australia; overcoming barriers to receiving assistance.

The changes in these priority themes are subtle and did not obviously impact on the meaning or focus of *Partnerships*. The second group of priority themes do, however, reflect greater attention to detail and greater specificity. Both sets of priorities also use non-gendered language, for example “protecting people at risk” instead of “protecting women at risk”. This is consistent with criticisms that *Partnerships* reflected gender neutral and individualised understandings of violence (FitzRoy, 1999; Phillips, 2004, 2006; Webster, 2006a, 2006b).

The Howard Government reported that it allocated *Partnerships* \$25.3 million funding for the three years until 3 June 2001 (Howard, 1997; OSW, 2001a). In comparison to previous federal government policy responses to violence against women, as distinct from federally funded domestic violence related programs such as SAAP or the National Women's Health Program, this funding was significant. The Hawke Labor Government's *National Domestic Violence Education Program*, for example, had \$2.2 million of funding (Earle et al., 1990; Erika, 1990). Similarly, although the Hawke and Keating Labor Governments' *National Strategy to Reduce Violence Against Women (NSVAW)*, may have influenced other federal government funding, the Strategy itself did not fund any state or federal government programs (Chappell, 2001, p.63; Nancarrow & Struthers, 1995, p.45). Thus, the Howard Government's funding of *Partnerships* was significant compared to funding allocated by previous federal governments for similar types of policies and programs.

OFW (2005h) reported that *Partnerships* funded a range of innovative research and development projects across a diversity of target groups and service sectors in accordance with its aims. \$13.3 million of the *Partnerships 1* funding was reportedly for projects in Australian Government departments, while the remaining \$12 million was reportedly for cooperative work between the Commonwealth, states and territories (Howard, 1997; OSW, 2001a; *Partnerships* Taskforce, 1999, p.1). Of this \$12 million, these sources report \$8 million was for the states and territories and \$4 million was for national projects coordinated by OSW. Overall, *Partnerships 1* funded over 100 separate national and state projects (*Partnerships* Taskforce, 2001). There is a list of these projects in Appendix 6.4. Consistent with some key informants' comments, this list suggests *Partnerships* was primarily a grants program (i.e. not ongoing funding) that allocated funding and contracted out most of the specific projects to external NGOs, state governments, private contractors, and in some cases other federal government departments or agencies. Further, it shows *Partnerships 1* comprised a diversity of state and national projects, research, resources and reports reflecting and addressing *Partnerships*' key priority areas as detailed in its annual reports (*Partnerships* Taskforce, 1999, 2000, 2001).

The Taskforce's focus on research and their stated commitment to gathering 'evidence' and evaluation is clearly evident in their activities and processes. The Taskforce established a requirement that each *Partnerships 1* project would be individually evaluated. A number of key informants spoke of the importance of evaluation as the most significant feature of *Partnerships 1*. As *Taskforce Member 8* commented:



...the evaluation was the most important thing because this wasn't recurrent money and as state bureaucrats we were all very keen that we didn't put it into recurrent service delivery because we were going to end up with that typical problem that you end up with Commonwealth funded programs is that they last for a, two years, and then the State's held, left holding the baby. So we didn't want to do that, that was very, very important and we said, right what we are going to get from this 25 million dollars is learning. We are going to really know what works for this group that hasn't had this level of investment before. So therefore the most important thing is the evaluation. So that became the priority for *PADV1*. The priority was to try things out and to learn from them.

This commitment to evaluation was consistent with the Taskforce's commitment to research and building an evidence base of good practice responses to domestic violence. As well as each *Partnerships 1* project being individually evaluated, in November 1998 the Taskforce also contracted Strategic Partners and the Research Centre for Gender Studies at the University of South Australia to undertake a *Partnerships* meta-evaluation (*Partnerships* Taskforce, 1999, p.14). This meta-evaluation was reportedly integral for planning, policy development, and documenting *Partnerships* projects and achievements (*Partnerships* Taskforce, 1999, p.14).

The Taskforce describes the design of the meta-evaluation involving formative and summative elements. According to the evaluators (Strategic Partners, 1999, pp.8-9), this meant the meta-evaluation team immediately disseminated lessons learned from projects to influence future program and policy development as well as documenting outcomes and achievements. The meta-evaluation design reportedly covered the following four key areas: technical analysis; process; theory development; and social policy input (Strategic Partners, 1999, pp.7-8). According to the Taskforce brief, the evaluators had three main aims: 1) to document and evaluate the range of *Partnerships 1* activities, promote good practice and disseminate knowledge about domestic violence; 2) inform the future direction of national action to prevent domestic violence; and 3) assist meeting *Partnerships 1* accountability requirements (*Partnerships* Taskforce, 1999, p.14).

The meta-evaluation was generally represented by key informants and official documents as an important component of *Partnerships 1* in documenting learning, disseminating findings and influencing program and policy development. Some key informants described the meta-evaluation as an "invaluable structural achievement" and "very important" (*Taskforce Members 8, 9 & 10*). Two key informants, however, were sceptical about the evaluation and one argued:

The evaluation of PADV tended to show that everything worked. Now that's the nature of evaluation I find but I think PADV and the COAG trial have been boons for evaluation companies. You look at who the evaluation companies are, who do them and most of them are the same organisation and most of them show that the huge amount of money that's gone in has had positive outcomes (*State Public Servant 12*).

This quote illustrates two other significant issues and tensions in *Partnerships* identified by other key informants (e.g. *Academics 1 & 3*, *Taskforce Members 4 & 5*, *State Public Servant 5*, *Opposition MP* and *Peak Body Representative 3*) and the literature (e.g. Summers, 2003b; Winter, 2007). First was that *Partnerships* was "chronically underspent", diverted significant amounts of funding to private consultants rather than projects at the "coalface", and the Howard Government redirected *Partnerships* funding for terrorism fridge magnets. Second was the pilot, non-recurrent nature of *Partnerships* funding. A number of key informants argued this was a problematic model of funding which undermined the Taskforce members' stated commitment to embed *Partnerships* findings in practice. Despite these concerns, the meta-evaluation was nevertheless generally represented by key informants and official documents as an important and valuable component of *Partnerships*.

One of the rationales for extensive and ongoing evaluation was the Taskforce's desire to support projects and interventions which would be sustainable and become embedded in policy and practice. The Taskforce explained this rationale as follows:

The effectiveness of *Partnerships Against Domestic Violence* will be largely determined by the extent to which it is incorporated into policy, programmes and practice at a local, state and national level. The ongoing engagement of governments, community organizations, service providers, researchers and professional bodies is critical (*Partnerships Taskforce*, 2000, p.3).

One of the key ways the Taskforce aimed to do this was through a communication strategy to share information from the evaluations with the broader community (*Partnerships Taskforce*, 1999, p.15). *Taskforce Member 8* recalled that, for the Taskforce, the communication strategy was an integral part of the evaluation and of *Partnerships*. She stated: "we decided not only to learn but we also decided it was going to be no good if we were the only ones who were learning and there needed to be a really broad, the whole sector needed to learn". Similarly, *Taskforce Member 10* recalled:

...we developed a sort of communication strategy ...I mean one of the things they wanted to do was to make sure there was sort of dissemination and learning that could occur outside just the key people. That's why they did these conferences and they did those road shows, trying

to, because at that stage it did have a view that it had a responsibility to try and disseminate the learnings that was happening – there's no point doing all this if it's not going anywhere.

Thus, an important component of *Partnerships 1* was embedding learnings from the meta-evaluation by disseminating information through the evolving communication strategy.

Through the communication strategy the Taskforce (*Partnerships* Taskforce, 1999, p.15) also stated the evaluators were to facilitate extensive consultation with the community sector, women's sector and women escaping domestic violence and conduct field consultations through the Women's Emergency Services Network (WESNET). This commitment to consultation is significant given the Howard Government's exclusion of the sexual assault and domestic violence sector from representation on the Taskforce and other related government policy machinery. It seems likely this commitment to, and action on, consultation arose from the individual feminist policy activism of members of the Taskforce. The in-depth case study of *Partnerships* in Chapter Nine explores this kind of feminist policy activism in much greater detail.

The *Partnerships 1* communication strategy reportedly involved three components. First was publications and resources including newsletters, meta-evaluation bulletins, information sheets, case studies and the *Partnerships* website (*Partnerships* Taskforce, 2000, pp.3-5). There is a list of *Partnerships 1* publications in Appendix 6.5. Second was showcasing seminars and forums in Australian metropolitan and regional centres (*Partnerships* Taskforce, 2000, p.5) which "brought people together from diverse sectors" (*Taskforce Member 8*). The stated aims of these showcases were to "promote greater awareness of the *Partnerships* initiative to improve the practice of frontline workers" (Newman, 1999c). *Evaluators 1* and *2* described their experiences of these showcases as highlighting a diverse mix of local, state and national projects. Third was that the communication strategy included a series of national conferences in Australian capital cities on *Partnerships* key themes (OFW, 2005f; *Partnerships* Taskforce, 2000; 2001, p.21). These conferences reportedly focused on: children and young people (Melbourne), men and family relationships (Canberra), Indigenous family violence (Adelaide), and women's experiences of violence across the lifespan (Perth).

## 6.1.2 *Partnerships Against Domestic Violence Phase Two (2001 – 2005)*

### *Partnerships 2 History and Development*

On 7 October 1999 Minister Newman (1999c) stated the Howard Government was committed to “move swiftly to capitalise on the outcomes to date of *Partnerships*”. According to Minister Newman (1999a), one way the Government was to do this was by announcing an additional \$25 million for *Partnerships* in the 1999/2000 Federal Budget. The Taskforce (*Partnerships Taskforce*, 2001, p.4) reported that when the *Partnerships 1* funding ceased in 2001 this additional \$25 million was to be used to develop *Partnerships 2*.

Key informants argued the *Partnerships 2* policy machinery was centralised and relationships between Taskforce members deteriorated to be far less productive than under *Partnerships 1*. They also reported the relationships between the evaluators and OSW deteriorated during this time and consequently no meta-evaluation of *Partnerships 2* was completed. This meant few of the key informants had direct experience of this program and there were few available texts about *Partnerships 2*. Consequently, less information was available to construct a comprehensive history for *Partnerships 2* as was available for *Partnerships 1*.

### *Partnerships 2 Policy Machinery*

OSW represented the *Partnerships 2* policy machinery in official documents (e.g. OSW, 2001e) as an intergovernmental Taskforce similar to *Partnerships 1*. This structure is illustrated in the diagram of the *Partnerships 2* structural framework in Appendix 6.6. Many key informants (*Taskforce Members 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10, Evaluator 1 & 2, and Federal Public Servant 4*), however, discussed the *Partnerships 2* policy machinery as differing substantially from *Partnerships 1*. These key informants' descriptions of *Partnerships 2* policy machinery differed markedly from the representation in the official documents. In particular, they described an active disengagement of the Commonwealth from the states. This included the Howard Government establishing a centralised structure and engaging consultants or communities directly to fund *Partnerships 2* projects rather than allocating funding through the states.

There were substantial differences in key informants' comments about the reason for these changes. *Taskforce Member 6*, a federal public servant, argued this centralised structure

was a natural progression from *Partnerships 1* to *Partnerships 2*, with the latter's focus on more tangible outcomes and resources. In contrast, *Taskforce Members 1* and *7*, who were state public servants, argued this was not an agreed progression amongst Taskforce members. They argued the Taskforce effectively, although not officially, became "dysfunctional" and ceased meeting. *Taskforce Member 7* argued:

Stage 1 where there was probably two components to that where they weren't as strategic as in the second half, state and territories were really at the table. The partnership was working. It was working well. There were clear priorities. There was communication. There was open involvement in this tender, this should be what should be put out to tender and this is the agreement of what should go up to the minister for, as the preferred tender to do the project ...That shifted completely. Stage 2 they went to more research projects. Not that anybody would criticise the need for research but it became the working groups ceased to exist therefore and the Taskforce meetings became more and more problematic so it very much became a process of the Commonwealth determines what is going out. So decision-making shifted completely from what some would say is not a total partnership but was still quite a supportive partnership, to one where it was totally fractured and there was unable to be anything achieved.

This discrepancy between key informants' understandings of the *Partnerships 2* Taskforce suggests that in addition to relationships breaking down, the Howard Government's approach to policy development may have changed. Possible reasons for this shift in the policy machinery in *Partnerships* are explored further in the case study of *Partnerships* in Chapter Nine.

### *Partnerships 2* Content

*Partnerships 2* was reported to be from 30 June 2001 until 30 June 2003, and was later extended to 30 June 2005 (OFW, 2005e; *Partnerships* Taskforce, 2001, p.4). The Taskforce (*Partnerships* Taskforce, 2001, p.4) states they intended *Partnerships 2* to develop a strategic framework based on the meta-evaluation of *Partnerships 1* with a focus on prevention. Similarly, according to OFW (2005c) the challenge for *Partnerships 2* was consolidating *Partnerships 1* findings and translating its "practical and theoretical understandings into a coherent and sustainable national strategy for the future".

OFW's (2005c) stated goal for *Partnerships 2* was "to establish a whole-of-government approach that reduces and prevents domestic violence in Australia". Accompanying this

goal was a commitment to: “1) Safe communities; 2) Coordinated and collaborative policy and service delivery; and 3) Commitment to evidence-based approaches” (OFW, 2005c). Further, OFW’s vision for *Partnerships 2* was: “An Australian culture that will not tolerate violence and a community that will work together to eliminate violence” (OFW, 2005b). OFW lists principles and objectives to guide the development of *Partnerships 2* which are provided in Appendix 6.7. These principles and objectives largely reflect the statement of principles agreed by the Heads of Government at the National Domestic Violence Summit in 1997 and some of the learning from *Partnerships 1*. The *Partnerships 2* principles and priority areas also reflect an understanding of domestic violence based on micro and, to a lesser extent, mezzo levels. Despite some references to ‘women’ and ‘violence against women’ within these principles and objectives, most of the language is also gender neutral.

In her Budget speech on 19 May 1999, Minister Newman (1999a) announced additional *Partnerships* funding to “focus on prevention in the key areas of children at risk, indigenous [sic] family violence, work with perpetrators and community education”. The absence or exclusion of women as victims of domestic violence in these priority areas is notable and repeated in the Taskforce’s *Partnerships 2* priority areas in their final *Partnerships 1* report (*Partnerships* Taskforce, 2001, p.4). The Taskforce lists the focus for *Partnerships 2* here as: community education, Indigenous Family Violence Grants Programme, Children and Perpetrators. This absence of women as a priority suggests a further shift from feminist understandings of domestic violence during the Howard years. Whereas feminists usually locate women and women’s experiences at the centre of responses to male violence against women, the Howard Government’s priority areas in *Partnerships 2* marginalised women. The omission of women was addressed in later references to *Partnerships 2* priorities which include ‘services for women’ (e.g. OSW, 2001e). No key informants or texts provided any insight into whether or not the Government’s initial exclusion of women from *Partnerships 2* priorities was deliberate or how women came to be included.

Consistent with *Partnerships 2* priority areas, the Howard Government allocated the \$25 million *Partnerships* funding to six main areas (OSW, 2001d; *Partnerships* Taskforce, 2001, pp.4-5; Strategic Partners, 2003a, p.4) :

- \$10 million for national community awareness raising (community education).
- \$6 million for the National Indigenous Family Violence Grants Programme.
- \$4.7 million for prevention and early intervention with children living with, witnessing and/or experiencing domestic violence.

- \$2.7 million for working with perpetrators.
- \$1 million for a National Domestic and Family Violence Clearinghouse for disseminating findings of *Partnerships* projects and broader research.
- \$600,000 for work with women's services.

There is a list of *Partnerships 2* projects under each of these priority areas in Appendix 6.6. Further details of these projects were also provided in the *Partnerships 2* evaluation report (Strategic Partners, 2004) which was incomplete and unpublished when Strategic Partners withdrew from evaluating *Partnerships 2*.

Despite its stated commitment to evidence-based approaches, *Partnerships 2* did not reflect a strong emphasis on evaluation. Although it produced reports about individual projects, these reports described the findings of the projects without actually evaluating them. *Evaluators 2* and *3* explained that although the government planned a *Partnerships 2* meta-evaluation, the relationship between OFW and the meta-evaluators deteriorated so significantly that by 2004 they had withdrawn from evaluating *Partnerships 2*. The evaluators were reportedly not replaced from within OFW or externally and so no meta-evaluation of *Partnerships 2* was completed. This history helps explain why only individual project reports from *Partnerships 2* are publicly available and neither a meta-evaluation nor *Partnerships 2* annual reports were published.

### **6.1.3 *Partnerships 1 and 2: relationships, tensions, and struggles over meaning***

The personal experiences and involvement of key informants in the development of *Partnerships* provided additional accounts of this period extending beyond the categories of history and development, policy machinery, and content. These accounts offered particular insights into the Howard Government's engagement with feminism. They therefore provided a significant foundation on which to develop new insights into how best the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women may be understood from a feminist perspective. Since these additional insights applied across both *Partnerships 1* and *2*, it is useful to explore them outside of, but also alongside, the separate accounts of *Partnerships 1* and *Partnerships 2*.

The first insight was the nature of *Partnerships* funding and the response of Taskforce members to this funding. Despite the stated emphasis on collaboration and co-operation, key informants described periods of tension and difficulties in relationships amongst

Taskforce members. One of the earliest tensions reported was over funding. *Evaluator 2* reported the Commonwealth split funding evenly in *Partnerships 1* with the \$8 million for state projects allocated so that each state and territory received \$200,000 per year over the three years. The Howard Government's decision to allocate *Partnerships* funding in this way was unlike the proportional, population-based funding in most Commonwealth-state funding agreements. Key informants reported this allocation of funding therefore generated tension amongst the Taskforce.

*Taskforce Member 8* recalled the Howard Government's departure from conventional models of funding allocation in *Partnerships* fuelled pre-existing tensions amongst Taskforce members:

The first day was horrendous. ...[we] walked into this meeting where there was so much tension and animosity. Pru Goward was chairing it and she left at 10 o'clock on the first morning and never ever came back. Never came back. And it was the most negative, destructive, there'd been all this politics that had gone on before in the lead up to the communiqué, people were carrying a whole lot of baggage from that process, it was all bizarre. Very tense, extremely tense meeting, sort of tense to the point of being hilarious ...people had decided what to spend the money on before I had got there, that was all decided at around about the communiqué time and the first year of PADV 1, ...everybody, every state did their own thing, bugger off Commonwealth we'll just do our own thing. So this first Taskforce meeting very tense and then we went out for dinner on that night ...and a few of us just said this is ridiculous. This is 25 million dollars that we don't have going into an area that so desperately needs it in terms of domestic violence that we've really got to try and make the best we possibly can of this money. And that night, that first night, I think a whole heap of us said right, let's put all of this aside and let's get the best we possibly can from this 25 million.

This comment gives significant insight into pre-existing tensions in the Taskforce and the role of funding in exacerbating these tensions. This kind of tension in Commonwealth-state relationships is not unexpected and illustrative of *Partnerships*' consistency with the broader social policy machinery. As discussed in Chapter Three, Fenna (2004, p.171) argues that despite being called "cooperative federalism" Australian federalism is as often characterised by conflict and coercion as cooperation. This initial *Partnerships* Taskforce meeting reflects the conflict in Australian federalism. This key informant also suggests, however, that federal and state public servants transcended the jurisdictional allegiances and the animosities over funding that often characterise Australian federalism in favour of feminist commitments to challenging domestic violence. This aspect of *Partnerships* was significant in the context



of Howard Government's engagement with feminism and is therefore explored further in the case study of *Partnerships* in Chapter Nine.

Another tension reported by key informants was the way *Partnerships* defined and conceptualised domestic violence. Key informants described substantial struggles over meaning and understandings of domestic violence amongst Taskforce members early in *Partnerships*. *Taskforce Member 6*, for example, discussed the shift in terminology from "violence against women" under previous Labor governments to "domestic and family violence" under *Partnerships* and the varied use of these terms across the individual state jurisdictions. She argued these differences caused tension between Taskforce members and in Taskforce meetings there was "often an endeavour to find common language with which to move forward" (*Taskforce Member 6*).

*Evaluators 1* and *2* talked about the challenges to the understandings of domestic violence presented by the nature of *Partnerships*. *Evaluator 2* argued the *Partnerships* meta-evaluation and communication strategy exposed domestic violence to a wider audience beyond the refuge and women's health sectors, that is feminists who have traditionally taken responsibility for providing specialist services. *Evaluator 1* argued the diversity of *Partnerships* participants had implications for decisions about projects funded by *Partnerships 1*. She recalled: "one of the things that [the Taskforce] were struggling with in terms of where they funded projects that were meant to be about stopping domestic violence when in fact they might kind of not be doing that or not keeping women and children safe" (*Evaluator 1*). *Evaluator 1* suggested the availability of *Partnerships* funding to projects and organisations without experience in responding to domestic violence and with no commitment to feminism had potentially detrimental implications for women and children. This was apparently an important implication of the Howard Government's disengagement with feminism.

The evaluators (Strategic Partners, 2003b) also reported that since *Partnerships* engaged with a diversity of professional and interest groups, the Taskforce wanted to thoroughly examine explanations of domestic and family violence. *Evaluator 2* argued the Taskforce sought to explore a variety of discourses and understandings of domestic violence beyond feminist ones:

So we then had to deal with, well what do we mean by feminism, what does a feminist approach to domestic violence mean and we really had to go back and this lead us into *PADV2*

and talk about what we understood the implications of domestic violence and the impact of domestic violence to be and we had to have a framework that said these things do change in a positive way and these things are counter-productive and these things we don't know about yet. And that was a fabulous conversation although it was very painful for us at the time.

*Taskforce Members 1 & 6* and *Evaluators 1 & 2* reported the Taskforce and evaluators directed significant attention to locating domestic violence as a social issue. They said that they did this through facilitated discussions and developing a working paper on guidelines for funding and the impact of different paradigms and language on projects and policy solutions. These reports suggest feminist understandings of male violence against women which previously had a prominent role in shaping government responses to this issue may have been challenged even by femocrats themselves during the Howard years. Rather than being solely a political opportunity structure for femocrats, the *Partnerships* policy machinery appeared to be a site through which the struggle over meaning and dominance between feminist and non-feminist understandings of male violence against women was played out.

Key informants reported an outcome of these discussions was the meta-evaluation's categorisation of theoretical explanations and understandings of domestic violence into different areas. These areas were: biological determinism; theories of individual pathology; sociological theories of social stress and individual risks; early feminist; interactive systems; and individual. A brief description of each of these categories is in the Executive Summary of each meta-evaluation report (see for example Strategic Partners, 2003b, p.8). Further, a table in an unpublished Strategic Partners *Partnerships 2* report (2003a, pp.10-12)<sup>13</sup> develops the theoretical categorisations from *Partnerships 1* beyond simple definitions. This table is reproduced in Appendix 6.8. Accompanying the table, the authors explain the *Partnerships 1* Taskforce concluded it was inappropriate to fund projects informed by biological determinism and individual pathology approaches. What is apparent in this table, however, is the absence of an explicit recognition of feminist understandings of male violence against women (although some feminist understandings are apparent in the 'power and oppression' category). Paralleling the exclusion of women early in *Partnerships 2*, this table suggest that, in the struggle over meaning, feminist understandings of male violence against women had become marginalised.

---

<sup>13</sup> Although unpublished the influence and use of some aspects of this report by OFW is evident in some content on the *Partnerships* website including the *Partnerships 2* framework.

This analysis of the role of *Partnerships* in marginalising feminist understandings of male violence against women was illustrated in the comments of key informants. *Evaluator 2 & Taskforce Member 8* argued the Taskforce's final agreed understanding of domestic violence for *Partnerships 1* was a "both and" approach. Described in the meta-evaluation as "post-feminist" and "post-modernist":

...the 'both and' stance resists categorical dichotomies such as good/bad or victim/perpetrator without losing site [sic] of power differences or diminishing responsibility for violence acts or accountability (Goldner 1999). Adopting this position uses multiple perspectives in morally responsible ways and brings together the categories of moral, legal and relationship. This approach to domestic violence allows for differing responses, and recognises that while there is no one 'right' intervention or policy response for all groups there are some interventions that are not effective and may be counter-productive. ...A number of funded projects were informed by explanations such as biological determinism and/or individual pathology and were seen to be limited in approach and benefit. There is an emerging agreement between policy advisors and practitioners that an holistic, integrated approach has the greatest potential for success (Strategic Partners, 2003b, p.8).

*Taskforce member 6* argued these theoretical explanations of domestic violence shaped funding criteria for *Partnerships 2* projects. This suggests that, through the policy machinery of the *Partnerships* Taskforce, the prominent influence of feminism on government responses to male violence against women was diminished during the Howard years. Rather than being a political opportunity structure, this policy machinery was a vehicle through which feminist approaches and understandings of violence were challenged. The ongoing implicit influence of feminism, however, especially given its historical prominence in government responses to male violence against women, made the Howard Government's engagement with feminism particularly complex. This complex relationship is explored further in Chapters Eight, Nine and Ten.

## **6.2 National Initiative to Combat Sexual Assault (2000 – 2005)**

### National Initiative History and Development

In 2000 OSW began developing the *National Initiative* to run parallel with *Partnerships* (*Federal Public Servant 5*). According to *Federal Public Servant 5*, OSW started developing the *National Initiative* in response to consultations with women's representatives and their analysis of the findings of the *1996 Women's Safety Survey*. She argued OSW realised

*Partnerships* was being “tugged inappropriately into sexual assault” (*Federal Public Servant 5*). Further, OSW (2001b) reported that in 2000 “the Commonwealth, state and territory Ministers for the Status of Women then identified the need to develop a national approach to sexual assault and rape as a priority issue for women”.

#### National Initiative Policy Machinery

The *National Initiative* did not have any formal policy machinery (*Federal Public Servant 5* and *State Public Servant 5*). OSW documents (2001b; 2001f) show, however, that on 27 June 2001 the Commonwealth hosted a *Sexual Assault National Roundtable of Government Officials*. This roundtable reportedly included delegates from federal and state portfolios responding to sexual assault. It sought to identify key issues in each jurisdiction and “identify better ways to prevent and respond to sexual assault” (OSW, 2001b, 2001f). OSW (2001b) stated it sought to work “collaboratively” with Roundtable representatives in an ongoing “dialogue” to determine the next steps of the *National Initiative*. This collaboration never eventuated according to *State Public Servants 5, 6 and 8*.

The *National Initiative's* policy machinery differed significantly from *Partnerships*. *Federal Public Servant 6* explained that the Women’s Ministers’ Conference rather than COAG ran the *National Initiative*. This meant “PADV had a much wider membership than NICSA generally” (*Federal Public Servant 6*). The *National Initiative's* governance structure was an inter-departmental committee of federal government representatives which took leadership on issues needing departmental coordination (*Federal Public Servant 5*). *Federal Public Servant 5* explained that each *National Initiative* project usually had its own governance structure such as a reference group. These reference groups consisted of government and NGO representatives including peak bodies, the Australian Domestic and Family Violence Clearinghouse, and the Australian Centre for the Study of Sexual Assault (*Peak Body Representative 1* and *Academic 3*).

Similarly to *Partnerships 2*, the *National Initiative's* policy machinery was therefore largely internal to the Howard Government. The fact these two initiatives were contemporaries of each other may be significant. It suggests the centralised policy machinery and exclusion of state, sectoral and NGO representatives may have been a deliberate policy of the Howard Government during this period (2000–2005). Possible reasons for this apparent centralisation are explored further in the case study of *Partnerships* in Chapter Nine.

The *National Initiative's* centralised policy machinery meant few key informants had direct experience with this program. *Federal Public Servant 5* argued that there were also few official texts outlining the *National Initiative* because it was as an internal funding program. She explained that this meant OSW did not publish strategic policy documents, principles or frameworks. As *Federal Public Servant 5* further argued:

PADV was largely a grants program. We put money out for other people to do things so you have to have all that infrastructure so people know why they are being funded whereas NICSA was us spending money against some clearly defined objectives but that's about it. ...you didn't have all that infrastructure requirement.

Apart from these insights, the limited sources of information made it difficult to provide a comprehensive account and detailed history of the *National Initiative* during this period.

#### *National Initiative Description and Content*

The *National Initiative* was "the Australian Government's commitment to reduce and prevent sexual assault" (OSW, 2004b). The aims of the *National Initiative* were to "lead and foster the development of an Australian culture that will not tolerate violence" by implementing strategies that address the increasing incidence of sexual assault in the community (OSW, 2004b). These aims mirrored those of *Partnerships* and thus demonstrate a degree of internal consistency within the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women. Consistent with this observation, OSW (2004c) stated the *National Initiative* "builds on the substantial achievements of the Partnerships Against Domestic Violence Program".

The Sexual Assault Roundtable provided OSW with a basic "roadmap of what we were going to do" and formed the basis of the *National Initiative's* four key objectives (*Federal Public Servant 5*). OSW (2003c) stated these four objectives were:

1. To promote cultural change in attitudes and behaviours to reduce the incidence of sexual assault.
2. To identify and address the immediate and long-term impacts of sexual assault on women, and the social and financial costs to the community.
3. To establish a consistent and coordinated framework for sexual assault reduction, prevention and interventions across all levels of government and the wider community.
4. To develop an information strategy to:
  - Facilitate access to national, policy relevant data to inform strategies to more effectively prevent and respond to sexual assault, and

- Establish a comprehensive evidence base incorporating both research and practice.

OSW (2004b) also stated their initial focus for the *National Initiative* was establishing a sound evidence base to inform future policy development. The *National Initiative* was to “mak[e] better use of existing sexual assault data; collect new national data; and establish a research body to explore issues relating to sexual assault” (OSW, 2004b).

OSW (2001b) submitted a successful bid of \$16.5 million for the *National Initiative* in the 2001-2002 Budget. Media commentators reported this as follows:

...the National Initiative to Combat Sexual Assault, will receive \$16.5 million over four years to fund public awareness campaigns about rape and other forms of sexual violence, as well as community projects targeting the problem. The initiative will be run in tandem with the Government's \$50 million Partnerships Against Domestic Violence strategy (Jackman, 2001 in The Courier Mail).

It will establish cross-agency partnerships “to develop, test and implement strategies to address the alarming incidence of sexual assault in the community” (Martin, 2001 in The Sydney Morning Herald).

This measure aims to increase women's safety and build safer communities by reducing the incidence of sexual assault, the Government said. (Illawarra Mercury, 2001).

As with *Partnerships*, the Howard Government's funding for the *National Initiative* represented a significant increase in funding to specific policy responses to male violence against women compared to previous federal governments.

Howard Government documents (OFW, 2005g; OSW, 2004b) show five key *National Initiative* projects. First, the Sexual Assault Information Development Framework (IDF) which commissioned the Australian Bureau of Statistics to look at current sexual assault information and data and plan strategies to address gaps in data. Second, the international Violence Against Women Survey had *National Initiative* funding for its Australian component. This United Nations survey intended to provide internationally comparable data on women's experiences of physical and sexual violence. Third, funding a full-time data analyst at the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) to work solely on sexual assault research. Fourth, the *National Framework for Sexual Assault Prevention* commissioned from Urbis Keys Young. Fifth, the *National Initiative* funded the Australian Centre for the Study of Sexual Assault (ACSSA) which was: “to improve access to current information on

sexual assault to assist policy makers and others interested in this area to develop evidence-based strategies to prevent, respond to, and ultimately reduce the incidence of sexual assault" (OSW, 2004b).

### **6.3 Women's Safety Taskforce (2002) and Women's National Safety Agenda (2005 – 2007)**

The *Women's Safety Taskforce (Safety Taskforce)* and *Women's National Safety Agenda (Safety Agenda)* were the Australian Government's policy and program responses to male violence against women near the end of the Howard years. Only one key informant commented on the *Safety Taskforce* and no key informants commented on the *Safety Agenda*. This may be due to key informants' lack of experience with these initiatives and since public servants approached for an interview who were currently working at OFW at the time of the interviews declined to participate in this study. Further, there was no reference to the *Safety Taskforce* beyond its establishment and the *Safety Agenda* was reportedly little more than a funding program. Consequently, it is only possible to provide a brief descriptive account of each initiative.

#### *Women's Safety Taskforce*

The *Safety Taskforce* was announced in June 2002 and described in the media as follows:

A national women's safety taskforce will be established today to address sexual assault, domestic violence and Indigenous family violence. The taskforce was announced in Darwin yesterday in a communiqué that followed an Australian and NZ ministerial conference on the status of women. The taskforce will be based on the current model, Partnerships Against Domestic Violence Taskforce (Sunday Territorian, 2002).

Minister for Women, Kay Patterson (2004), reported this *Safety Taskforce* first met in October 2003 and consisted of officials with responsibility for domestic violence, Indigenous family violence and sexual assault across federal, state and territory governments.

Since the *Partnerships Taskforce* never officially disbanded, *State Public Servant 6* argued the *Safety Taskforce* was a confusing addition to the government policy machinery:

...the PADV machinery was just a nightmare and very dysfunctional but the other added problem at the time was that the women's ministers had met and they'd made a commitment to

the National Women's Safety Taskforce – so something without money but something that had clear, had a clear gender perspective and could be viewed as something that was about trying to balance out what the conservative Federal Government's agenda might be. ...What is this thing that has no money but all our minister's have agreed to, ...So it became a complex web of how do you, and there was an argument to be said of stream-lining and moving everything over to the Taskforce but then the Taskforce, the money certainly wasn't there, because that was a significant thing about PADV – there was this bucket of money that while final decisions rested with the Commonwealth Minister as to what went forth and what didn't there was public servants preparing the advice that were from all jurisdictions as to what should be funded and what shouldn't.

This comment suggests the *Safety Taskforce* lacked sufficient funding and relevance at federal and state levels. Beyond these brief accounts the *Safety Taskforce* was not mentioned in the available official documents.

#### Women's National Safety Agenda

In 2005 the Howard Government replaced *Partnerships* and the *National Initiative* with the *Safety Agenda* which was funded with \$75.7 million from the 2005 budget (OFW, 2005i). As with the *National Initiative*, the official documents suggest the *Safety Agenda* was primarily a funding program with little associated policy framework or machinery.

The *Safety Agenda* aimed to build on the achievements of *Partnerships* and the *National Initiative* and to “decrease the impacts of domestic violence and sexual assault upon the community” (OFW, 2005i). OFW (2005i) stated the *Safety Agenda* was focused on prevention, early intervention, and supporting those affected by violence through the health, justice and services systems. OFW stated The *Safety Agenda's* key objectives were to: “work towards a society where women's lives are free from violence and the threat of violence, and their safety and wellbeing is secured; and position Australia as an international leader in reducing violence against women” (OFW, 2005e). OFW (2005e) also stated the *Women's Safety Agenda* would:

...promote policies and practices that address prevention, early intervention and crisis assistance; promote incorporation of demonstrated good practice at national, state, territory and local levels; facilitate the development of appropriate and comprehensive community responses; raise community awareness to reduce tolerance of violent behaviours and to reduce the use of violence; implement complementary strategies for men and boys and women and girls, to prevent family violence and reduce the use of violence in the community; and



promote programmes and policies for women's security and health - addressing the needs of women affected by violence, including recovery and wellbeing.

The similarity of these objectives with *Partnerships 2* supports OSW's assertion that the *Safety Agenda* built on the achievements of *Partnerships* and the *National Initiative*.

The *Safety Agenda* funded seven key projects (OFW, 2005i). These were: rerunning *Australia Says No*; funding the Australian Domestic and Family Violence Clearinghouse and the Australian Centre for the Study of Sexual Assault; funding research and pilot projects on domestic violence and sexual assault; training for nurses in regional and rural areas; training for the criminal justice sector on sexual assault; a dedicated sexual assault researcher at the Australian Institute of Criminology; and funding Mensline. A brief description of each project is provided in Appendix 6.9. OSW's claim the *Safety Agenda* continued the work of *Partnerships* and the *National Initiative* is supported by the number of funded projects on this list commenced under these previous initiatives.

#### **6.4 Chapter Summary**

This chapter has provided a comprehensive account of the Howard Government's policy and program responses to male violence against women. Specifically, this chapter outlined the history, policy machinery and content of *Partnerships Against Domestic Violence* (1997-2005), the *National Initiative to Combat Sexual Assault* (2000-2005), the *Women's Safety Taskforce* (2002), and the *Women's Safety Agenda* (2005-2007). Findings from this chapter offer some interesting additional insights into the Australian Government's engagement and disengagement with feminism during the Howard years. These insights form a foundation for stage two of the study and are explored further in the case study of *Partnerships* in Chapter Nine. The next chapter, however, outlines further findings from stage one with an account of the Howard Government's community education campaigns.

## **Chapter Seven**

### **Male Violence Against Women**

### **Community Education Campaigns 2001-2007**

---

Australian federalism and the constitutional division of powers mean federal governments have traditionally not been involved in service delivery responses to male violence against women. Community education campaigns have, however, played a prominent role in the Australian Government's approaches to this issue since the Hawke Labor Government's *National Domestic Violence Education Program* in 1987. This chapter provides the second part of the comprehensive account of the Howard Government's approaches by exploring the government's community education campaigns *No Respect, No Relationship (No Respect)* (2001-2003) and *Violence Against Women – Australia Says No (Australia Says No)* (2004-2007). *No Respect* was a campaign developed by the Howard Government and reportedly cancelled in December 2003 in a dramatic turn of events ten days before its scheduled launch. The Howard Government replaced *No Respect* with *Australia Says No* in June 2004. Drawing upon the empirical data from stage one of the study, this chapter develops an historical narrative outlining the history, development, and key elements of each campaign.

*No Respect* and *Australia Says No* were significant for three main reasons. First, the campaigns were products of the policies and programs outlined in Chapter Six. *No Respect* was jointly funded by *Partnerships* and the *National Initiative* and *Australia Says No* was jointly funded by *Partnerships*, the *National Initiative*, and later the *Women's Safety Agenda*. Second, these campaigns were developed internally by OFW, which is the federal government agency with primary responsibility for responses to male violence against women. These campaigns are thus highly representative of the Australian Government's approaches to male violence against women during the Howard years. Third, the Howard Government's cancellation and replacement of *No Respect* with *Australia Says No* offers a fascinating story and important insights into the government's engagement with feminism as well as into their approaches to male violence against women.

## ***No Respect, No Relationship (2001 – 2003)***

### **7.1 *No Respect, No Relationship History and Development***

Between 2001 and 2003 OSW developed two community education campaigns they later amalgamated to become *No Respect*. The first campaign was funded by *Partnerships* to address 'relationship violence'. Community education was an important component of both phases of *Partnerships* and in *Partnerships 2* the Howard Government allocated \$10 million for "national awareness raising (community education)" (OSW, 2001c, 2001d). *Partnerships* funded four national domestic violence community education campaigns. The first three of these were: 1) *Walking Into Doors*, which targeted Aboriginal people; 2) a campaign targeted at non-English speaking background (NESB) communities; and 3) *Partnerships Against Domestic Violence: A Business Approach* targeted at the private sector (*Partnerships Taskforce*, 2001, p.38). The final campaign, a mainstream campaign targeted at young people, was the largest and reportedly most controversial of the campaigns.

The *Partnerships 1* Taskforce established a working group which included participants with expertise in community education, federal and state public servants and a Taskforce representative (*Taskforce Members 7 & 8* and *State Public Servant 10*). In approximately 2000 this working group decided to run community education programs targeted at Indigenous and NESB communities which, due to the complexities of cultural considerations, relied on the advice of external consultants in their development (*Taskforce Member 10* and *State Public Servant 10*). The third campaign, which was targeted at the business community and about which there was little available published material, came from OSW rather than the working group and only produced a few posters and brochures about domestic violence for businesses (*Academic 4*). The working group decided the fourth campaign would be targeted at young people and this campaign reportedly generated significant conflict and differing opinions amongst working group members about the best approach (*State Public Servant 10*).

The main reason for this conflict in the working group was reportedly the Howard Government's desire to adapt the Western Australian Government's *Freedom From Fear* campaign into a national campaign. *Freedom from Fear* was a community education campaign developed in the late 1990s which aimed to show the impact of domestic violence on children and encourage men perpetrating violence to change their behaviour. A key

informant involved in this campaign (*State Public Servant 9*) commented that *Freedom from Fear* was well-resourced by the Western Australian Government and included funding for a men's helpline, women's counselling services and children's services to meet the demand it generated. *Freedom from Fear* apparently so impressed Minister Newman that OSW explored running a similar national campaign (*Government MP 2, Evaluator 2, and Taskforce Members 8 & 10*).

This interest in *Freedom from Fear* generated significant controversy amongst state public servants because this campaign included a "call to action" which required state governments to provide services such as refuges and counselling to meet the demand generated (*State Public Servants 7, 9 and 10*). This meant some state governments would need funding to set up new services or realign existing ones to prepare for the proposed campaign. Consequently, a number of public servants expressed concern, resistance and refusal to participate in the proposed national campaign (*State Public Servants 7 & 9*). According to *State Public Servant 9*, the states argued they were being "put upon" by the federal government's proposal and "were strongly resistant to it being rolled out to them". Similarly, *State Public Servant 7* said the federal government's proposal was irresponsible and dangerous as the proposed campaign was not going to fund the types of services *Freedom from Fear* had. She continued:

...there's no way that this is in any way moral, ah ethical, to raise all this expectation amongst women that they will be safe and there's some place for the men to be able to get help when there isn't. ...So we had a big battle with the campaign and I held out and said no and I went back to the Commonwealth saying no we won't go with it ...I remember at the time really digging in my heels, I was so angry about this campaign and these horrible smooth media people coming with no concept of what they were doing and how serious it was (*State Public Servant 7*).

The Government's own research also reportedly highlighted a range of barriers including "the lack of robust national infrastructure to support men who seek help for their violent behaviour" (OSW, 2003a, p.15). The Howard Government therefore abandoned this proposal.

Once this proposal was abandoned, the working group began developing a campaign based on *Partnerships* funded research (*Federal Public Servant 2, Taskforce Member 8, and State Public Servant 10*). *Federal Public Servants 2 & 5, Taskforce Members 4 & 8, Evaluator 2 and State Public Servant 10* argued the two main *Partnerships* research reports

underpinning this new campaign were: the *Partnerships 1* meta-evaluation report *Community Awareness and Education to Prevent, Reduce and Respond to Domestic Violence* (Strategic Partners, 2003b) and *Young People and Domestic Violence* (National Crime Prevention, 2001). These reports provide detailed and specific recommendations about community education campaigns. Appendices 7.1 and 7.2 provide key messages from these reports. In 2001 OSW also commissioned developmental research to inform the proposed campaign (OSW, 2003a, p.15).

The two *Partnerships* reports and developmental research indicated the best approach for a community education campaign would be prevention focused on young people (*Federal Public Servant 2, Taskforce Member 5* and *State Public Servant 10*). These key informants said the Howard Government therefore started developing a relationship violence prevention and early intervention campaign targeted at young people. At the same time, however, *Taskforce Member 7* and *State Public Servant 10* argued that, as with the *Partnerships* Taskforce, the campaign working group effectively disbanded. This meant the Howard Government continued developing the campaign without representatives from the states or Taskforce.

The second community education campaign developed during this period was funded by the *National Initiative* and aimed to focus on sexual assault prevention with young people (OSW, 2003a). The campaign was reportedly based on the *National Initiative's* first objective: "to promote cultural change in attitudes and behaviours to reduce the incidence of sexual assault" (OSW, 2003c). OSW (2003a; 2003c) and *Federal Public Servant 5* stated that OSW planned this campaign to have three related stages. First, was developmental research exploring young people's understanding, knowledge, attitudes and behaviours concerning sexual assault to guide the direction, tone and messages. Second, was sponsoring a national mainstream media-based arts festival targeting young people. Third, was developing an Indigenous-specific project about young people and sexual assault.

The first stage, the developmental research, was reportedly completed in June 2003 (OSW, 2003a, p.4). At this time OSW concluded there were compelling similarities between the sexual assault and relationship violence developmental research (OSW, 2003a, p.4). These included similarities in young people's experiences and attitudes and the causes of this violence. Appendix 7.3 provides a summary of these similarities. OSW (2003a, pp.16-17) also noted findings specific to sexual assault in the developmental research. These included community beliefs about sexual assault being the result of miscommunication and

the prominence of coercion in 'normal' sexual relationships. Appendix 7.4 provides a summary of the findings specific to sexual assault.

*Federal Public Servants 2 and 5* argued that when OSW received the sexual assault developmental research they realised it was logical to integrate the campaigns. As *Federal Public Servant 2* argued: "if we're going prevention and we're going young people, we're crazy if we're doing two separate things". Further, *Federal Public Servant 5* argued there were administrative reasons to amalgamate the campaigns which included preventing certain parts of the first campaign's funding being lost to general revenue. In July 2003 OSW provided the government with a *Communication Strategy* (OSW, 2003a) to amalgamate the two campaigns. OSW (2003a, p.14) argued there was "strong logic" for delivering a single campaign because: the two issues are inextricably linked; sexual assault needs to be placed in a relationships context; the target audiences and communication channels are the same; the combined approach will meet the needs of the majority of young women affected by this violence; and a combined campaign provides greater efficiencies and economies of scale given the convergence of timelines and similarities in strategic approach. According to *Federal Public Servant 2* OSW therefore began developing a combined relationship violence and sexual assault campaign, *No Respect*, from July 2003.

Once the two campaigns were amalgamated, *Federal Public Servant 2* described *No Respect* as a "massive collaborative process" with extensive national consultation. This view wasn't shared by others, however. *Peak Body Representatives 1 & 3*, *Academic 3* and *State Public Servants 6 & 10* described the deterioration of state-federal relationships and argued OSW's development of the campaign was secretive and exclusionary. These key informants also complained about the absence of consultation with the sector over campaign content; particularly with peak bodies WESNET and NASASV<sup>14</sup>. Nevertheless, according to *Academic 3* and *State Public Servant 6*, OSW also seemed "proud" of *No Respect* and "were talking about it ad nauseum".

The Ministerial Council on Government Communications (MCGC), which ultimately cancelled the campaign, were also reportedly closely involved in developing *No Respect*. The MCGC guided and approved the development of all Howard Government advertising not deemed party political. As discussed in Chapter Four, critiques of the Howard Government's advertising suggest the vast majority of it was partisan political and aimed

---

<sup>14</sup> Women's Emergency Services Network and National Association of Services Against Sexual Violence.

more at electoral advantage than community education. The composition of the MCGC supports these criticisms since it included prominent Liberal Party members rather than public servants or experts in community education. At the time they cancelled the campaign, Bowden (2004a) reported the MCGC included: a “Liberal Party powerbroker” and Minister as the Chair; one of “the PM’s trusted senior political advisers”; and a Liberal MP. This composition suggests the MCGC itself, and advertising approved by the MCGC, played an important political role for the Howard Government.

According to OSW (2003a, p.27) the MCGC was involved in developing *No Respect* from at least July 2003. *Federal Public Servant 2* and the *MCGC Member* recalled the MCGC played a prominent decision-making role including contracting research, advertising companies and consultants and approving funding. The *MCGC Member* described their involvement as follows:

The Minister [for Family and Community Services] then presents what’s called a research brief to the MCGC. We look at that research brief and it goes out to a research company, what are the statistics on domestic violence, is it a problem. Can I tell you I don’t think anybody on the committee needed advice or information that it was a problem etcetera, but that’s how it starts. Then when it comes back these are the issues then we ask the Department, the Government Communications Unit in Prime Minister and Cabinet to give us a list of let’s say five companies that could run such a campaign because of their experience in running social behaviour modification campaigns – be it anti-smoking, be it whatever else, road safety campaigns, whatever ... They then go away, what they come up with, concepts are tested in focus groups. That then comes back to us as a committee. We then usually pick two, get, tell them to go away to really flesh out big time how they would communicate the message etcetera. We then focus test that again and then the best one, or the one we think is best equipped and the research, value for money, all those considerations meshed in, they are then given the contract to go away and do the job.

Similarly, *Federal Public Servant 2* described the MCGC as having “had their hand in every single step of the way”. Media commentators (Bowden, 2004a; Martin, 2004) also reported the MCGC oversaw the campaign “every step of the way” and were briefed eleven times about the campaign. Bowden (2004a) reported the MCGC “hand-picked the [campaign] concept from several tenders and held detailed meetings with international ad agency Grey Worldwide as the campaign was refined over several months”. These commentaries suggest the MCGC thus had extensive involvement, ongoing oversight and decision-making power developing *No Respect*.

## 7.2 ***No Respect, No Relationship Content***

*No Respect's* aim was to confront and debunk harmful community misconceptions and build young people's understanding, desire and capacity to form and maintain non-violent relationships (OSW, 2003a, p.19; 2003b, p.3). OSW (2003b, p.16) planned the campaign would: be multi-faceted; provide information on how to identify negative behaviours and attitudes in a relationship; develop, promote and reinforce positive skills for non-violent relationships; and provide information about what to do if someone is experiencing abuse. OSW's aims and objectives for the campaign were therefore consistent with the recommendations of the *Partnerships* research summarised in Appendices 7.1 and 7.2 and the developmental research outlined in the *Communication Strategy* (OSW, 2003a). This is important since *Australia Says No* was criticised for not being consistent with this research as discussed in Chapter Eight.

*No Respect* was to cover a range of issues concerning "awareness", "attitudes and beliefs", and "intentions" (OSW, 2003b, pp.19-23). These issues included: understanding the nature, risks and consequence of relationship violence and sexual assault (including debunking myths); developing and reinforcing the benefits of, and strategies to form and maintain, positive and respectful relationships; and information and strategies to promote supportive responses to people who have experienced violence. OSW (2003a, p.23) states the campaign was developed according to strategic considerations from the developmental research. These included: the primary target group of 16 to 24 year olds; a secondary target group of parents and 'gatekeepers' such as teachers and sports coaches to model non-violent relationships and offer support; using a range of strategies aimed at different age and target groups; focusing on skills-based programs delivered in schools; approaching young people through peer groups; forming partnerships with individuals, groups and media organisation that influence popular culture; and telling stories and allowing young people to draw their own conclusions rather than telling them how to think or behave. Appendix 7.5 has a detailed list of these strategic considerations.

Media commentators reported *No Respect* cost \$12 million and was to be launched by Prime Minister Howard in December 2003 to run over Christmas and Summer until May 2004 (Bowden, 2004a; OSW, 2003a; Roxon, 2004c; Wallace, 2003; Walsh, 2003). *No Respect* had the following five key components: mass media advertising, youth communication activities, public relations, NESB and Indigenous specific strategies.



The mass media component, which Bowden (2004a) described as the campaign's "centrepiece", originated from the sexual assault developmental research. OSW (2003a, p.6) claimed the research demonstrated a clear role for the mass media to raise relationship violence and sexual assault onto the community's social agenda. The mass media component was a series of advertisements for television, magazines, and radio (OSW, 2003a, pp.23-24). For OSW (2003a, p.24) its primary role was to set the agenda, outline the main themes of the campaign, raise awareness about relationship violence and sexual assault, and challenge potentially harmful myths and misconceptions. Appendix 7.5 has some of the original *No Respect* advertisements.

The sexual assault developmental research reportedly found, however, that "the issue is too complex to be remedied by advertising only" and *No Respect* required additional public relations and intervention strategies (OSW, 2003a, p.6). The second part of the campaign was a communications and public relations strategy collaborating with media outlets to engage directly with young people (OSW, 2003a, pp.24-25). In a Triple J interview (Cannane, 2004) Esther Fallon, a public servant who worked on the campaign, described this as a diverse multi-media approach "for young people, by young people, about young people". The key components of the *No Respect* communications and public relations strategy were identified from a range of sources including: *Federal Public Servant 2* and *Academic 3*; OSW (2003a); the ALP (Roxon, 2004a); and the media (Bowden, 2004a; Cannane, 2004; Verity, 2004; Walker, 2004; Walsh, 2004; Williams, 2004). These included: editorials for television, radio, cinema and print; sponsorship of youth events; online resources including a website; publicity events and strategies; engaging directly with young people (e.g. text messages); *Coaching Boys Into Men* sporting program; an Indigenous specific communication program; and a NESB specific communication program. Appendix 7.6 has a summary of the key elements of each component.

### **7.3 Reactions to *No Respect*, *No Relationship***

Key informants and media commentators provided their reactions to the campaign. Some key informants said they had knowledge of the campaign because they had worked on the campaign as a public servant or 'critical friend' (giving feedback to OSW) or knew of the campaign from information OSW provided to the sector. Media commentators reportedly interviewed, and were informed of the campaign by, federal public servants who had worked on the campaign as illustrated by Esther Fallon's Triple J radio interview (Cannane, 2004) and the ABC's *7.30 Report* stories on *No Respect* (Bowden, 2004a, 2004b).

Media commentators reported a number of positive comments about *No Respect*. Tracy Bowden from the ABC's *7.30 Report*, stated "independent market research provided to the Government found these ads were overwhelmingly effective". Bowden (2004a) interviewed Dr Jill Murray, an American expert in domestic violence prevention the government invited to launch *No Respect*, who commented:

I have never seen a campaign that was so strong in terms of scope, its focus, the passion for it. ...It would have been ground breaking, absolutely ground breaking around the world. It would have been the perfect model for other countries to follow as far as what a domestic violence campaign should like look. I was so impressed with it.

Further, Cat Gander from the NSW Women's Refuge and Resource Centre and Vanessa Swan, Chair of NASASV, were both reported as describing *No Respect* as invaluable in its potential to change social values, teach young people about healthy relationships, build relationships based on equity, and prevent violence (Bowden, 2004a; Walsh, 2004). These comments suggest some workers with expertise in domestic violence and sexual assault argued *No Respect* was a positive and effective response to these issues.

Key informants who had worked on *No Respect* argued that the campaign teased out the complexities of young people's understandings and experiences of violence and was evidence-based. *Federal Public Servants 2 and 5* spoke extensively about the influence of the developmental research on *No Respect*. *Federal Public Servant 2* argued the research revealed that beyond "hard core violence" young people didn't actually understand the nuances of relationship and sexual violence or exactly what behaviours this sort of violence included. She also argued the developmental research suggested young people were very tribal in nature, were not a homogenous group, and needed to be engaged through people that they would find plausible including their peers, parents, sports coaches and teachers. She continued:

We wanted to not just have one of those campaigns that talked to women and it was sort of like, almost like, it was the woman's responsibility somehow to stop the violence. We didn't want to put blokes off by talking about perpetrators and going at that hard end approach. We felt that enough had been done on the hard end approach – that that was being done particularly in the crisis end of things. So your fellas hittin' you around, all of that, everyone actually knows what that kind of hard end domestic violence looks like. ...So we were really trying to go to the positive end of things to engage, how people talk about respectful

relationships and that, the research just showed over and over again that the idea of respect in relationships just came back up as a really meaningful sort of message (*Federal Public Servant 2*).

Similarly, *Federal Public Servant 5* argued *No Respect* was grounded in a firm evidence-base of what messages would work to prevent sexual assault and domestic violence.

*Federal Public Servant 2* also argued that the campaign integrated a complex understanding of violence as a systematic pattern of abuse located in gendered social structures and institutions rather than as an isolated behaviour of individuals. She said it moved away from prescriptive and parental approaches and simple victim/perpetrator dichotomies that young people were unlikely to identify with. She also said it reflected complexities of gender, sexuality and language:

...we tried not to be really heterosexual about it either. We didn't sort of make that like, obviously most of the examples were around heterosexual couples and stuff but we tried to speak in a way that didn't exclude. We also didn't use gendered language ...We actually tried to remove all gendered language from it as much as possible without selling out the idea, we certainly didn't shy away from fact and figures around where the violence is and that it is men against women predominantly and blah, blah. But, we didn't, we just tried to talk about 'your partner' and 'your relationship' so that we didn't immediately give guys the message that, well, 'we think you're a perve and, you know'. And also, I suppose, it's not assuming that they had self-identified as a perve already, like, because the research says they don't know what they're, that, that behaviour is perpetrator behaviour well then going out there and basically talking about perpetrators was not going to engage them in the campaign in any way, shape or form. So, it was about not trying to scare boys off.

This key informant argued *No Respect* had a complex relationship with feminism and reflected a feminist analysis of male violence by focussing on all young people's relationships as involving potentially problematic dynamics, such as inequality and disrespect. This was instead of isolating individual men perpetrating violence or their relationships as the problem. In this way, *No Respect* reflected a feminist analysis by problematising all relationships between women and men as potentially unequal. *No Respect* thus appeared to locate male violence against women in the context of unequal gendered power relations (macro level) and social institutions such as traditional families and heterosexuality (mezzo levels) under patriarchy.

Another aspect of *No Respect* which reflected its complex relationship with feminism according to *Federal Public Servant 2* was the way it approached difference and identity.

*Federal Public Servant 2* argued OSW were cognisant of the gendered nature of the violence and thus represented men as perpetrators and women as victims. Simultaneously, however, she argues OSW used non-gendered language to engage with young men as perpetrators, potential perpetrators, or victims and also to include non-heterosexual young people. This approach reflects a post-structural feminist understanding of violence in two ways consistent with the discussion in Chapter Two. First, it reflects feminist understandings that patriarchy constructs a number of dichotomous hierarchies which privilege certain groups over others based on gender, race, sexuality, wealth, education and so on. The approach in *No Respect* acknowledges violence against women is an issue for all young people and not, for example, just heterosexual young people. It also acknowledges that this violence invokes hierarchical constructions of difference and superiority such as those based on gender or sexual preference regardless of the individual identity of the victim or perpetrator (Gillespie, 1996; Mason, 2002). Second, its non-gendered, inclusive approach acknowledges that young people may have multiple subjectivities (not just victim or perpetrator) and engages with young men who may be hostile to feminism or may not identify as perpetrators. For *Federal Public Servant 2* *No Respect* thus represented a complex relationship with feminism and sophisticated engagement with young people.

The reported lack of consultation with the specialist sectors in developing *No Respect* meant another key informant expressed great surprise about her positive response to *No Respect* and her perception of the high quality of the final products. *Academic 3* argued *No Respect* represented a significant shift in approaches to prevention in comparison to other similar community education campaigns. She argued campaigns of this type had traditionally focused on a deficit model which concentrated prevention on what women should not do if they are to avoid violence (e.g. what women shouldn't wear, that they shouldn't drink or flirt). In contrast, *Academic 3* argued *No Respect*: "encouraged women's agency and power in relationships"; aimed to "develop skills to help men achieve positive relationships with women"; and "promoted to men the benefits of healthy relationships with women based on respect". Consequently, she argued:

So I was really excited and just thought if they get this right, this is going to be something that we've never, ever seen before ...it was as close to kind of coming to a cultural change that we can almost touch that, that was surprising to me they'd gone to that kind of effort and this was the Feds, I couldn't believe it that they'd contracted in this way (*Academic 3*).

*Academic 3* therefore argued *No Respect* was positive compared with previous community education campaigns on this issue which she said was surprising given the lack of consultation.

Not all key informants expressed such detailed assessments of *No Respect* and some key informants had not even heard of this campaign despite a long history of involvement with the specialist service sectors and active involvement in *Partnerships*. This finding highlighted the importance of constructing an account of *No Respect* and documenting its history. Of those key informants who did refer to or comment on *No Respect*, all except for *Government MP 1* described the campaign itself in positive terms. A number (e.g. *Academic 3* and *Peak Body Representatives 1 & 3*) criticised OSW for not adequately consulting with the sector in the development of *No Respect*. These criticisms were, however, juxtaposed against these key informants' positive assessments of the campaign's content and their surprise at this given the exclusion of the sector from its development.

#### **7.4 "But then the unexpected happened..."<sup>15</sup>: the Howard Government cancels *No Respect*, *No Relationship***

*No Respect's* launch date was reported as 1 December 2003 (Light, 2004). In late November, however, "the unexpected happened ...[and] the Liberal Party pulled the campaign" (Roxon, 2004b). Media reports that the campaign had been "shelved", "canned", "pulled", and "cancelled" by the MCGC, were contested on the *7.30 Report* by the Minister Kay Patterson. Minister Patterson told the *7.30 Report*: "to say it's been cancelled is wrong. It has been delayed" (Bowden, 2004a). Whatever the terminology, these reports suggest *No Respect* was not launched as planned in December 2003.

*Federal Public Servants 2* and *5* said *No Respect* was presented to the MCGC for final approval 10 days before the scheduled launch and at this point they refused to approve the campaign. For *State Public Servant 10*, this refusal was a "shock" and unexpected given the MCGC's close involvement in *No Respect's* development and the close proximity to the proposed launch. *Federal Public Servant 2* also described how the MCGC cancelled the campaign:

Yeah, so they saw the ads when they selected them so it was not like they didn't know what the ads looked like or what it was about. And then when we basically everything was ready to

---

<sup>15</sup> (Roxon, 2004b).

go and 10 days before launch they saw the final iterations of the ads and they, that's when they pulled it. And it was interesting the way they pulled it. It wasn't like, "nup we've changed our mind, we're pulling it". ...They started saying things like "oh, oh, it looks like we're not being tough enough on violence" ...that was the line. "Not being tough enough on violence. We're not demonstrating that violence is totally unacceptable. We're not, you know, it's our responsibility to show-". So it was really subtle and this is how they work. ...what that meant was that we just missed the whole 'Big Day Out' Tour, we missed the opportunity to get into schools with the resource ...We'd missed dates, deadlines.

These key informants thus suggest the MCGC cancelled *No Respect* at a surprisingly late stage and in an indirect way by simply missing the campaign's deadlines rather than formally cancelling the campaign.

This approach by the MCGC might explain media reports and key informant comments which suggested people involved in campaign development were not informed of what was happening. Media commentators (Bowden, 2004a; Maguire, 2004) reported that *Cosmopolitan Magazine* and the Domestic Violence and Incest Resource Centre were both involved in *No Respect* and yet were given no explanation or reason for the campaign being cancelled. Similarly, *State Public Servant 10* and *Academic 3* reported they were both involved in developing *No Respect* and yet received no official word that the campaign was even cancelled. *State Public Servant 10* did say a generic email was sent by OSW that broadly stated there would be a change of direction in *No Respect*. Apart from this email, both key informants said there was a "flurry of rumour and activity" with unofficial reports of delays but no official communication with any details.

The reasons the MCGC cancelled the campaign were therefore the subject of much public and private speculation. Based on public reports by media commentators, the Opposition, and government ministers as well as private comments by key informants, five possible reasons were proposed for why the Howard Government cancelled the campaign.

First, media commentators speculated the MCGC were concerned about what *No Respect* suggested constituted domestic violence (B&T Weekly, 2004; Walsh, 2004). They reported key Liberal politicians, including MCGC members, did not believe the verbal intimidation and psychological abuse portrayed in the campaign constituted violence (Egan, 2004; Gough & Roe, 2004; Harvey, 2003; Light, 2004; Maguire, 2004; The Age, 2004; Wallace, 2003). These media reports were consistent with the *MCGC Member's* comments that

domestic violence only included forms of violence that were against the law and, as he continued:

My view is if you're to go out into the community and say do you think that's domestic violence [verbal abuse and controlling behaviours], I think the vast majority would say no that's ridiculous but if you start saying things like that are offensive as people getting broken jaws, black eyes, etcetera, etcetera, I think you ...trivialise the serious aspects of domestic violence and by lumping it all in together. ...we said, 'look, if you want honesty and respect in a relationship the man shouldn't have to put up with everything the woman might want to do and vice versa'. The man should be able to say to his woman, if I can use that sort of possessive term, I don't like that dress you are wearing. She, similarly, can say I think your shorts are a bit tight ...With some of the concepts that were being thrown up to us and we also thought that it would devalue and give excuses to a lot of people to say, 'oh domestic violence against women, you can't even tell them their dress is too short when they are going out the door'.

These comments suggest this member of the Howard Government understood domestic violence narrowly as a criminal act at a micro level alone and that this was one of the reasons for the MCGC cancelling the campaign.

The *MCGC Member's* comments about equivalence in a relationship (e.g. a man might say I don't like the dress you are wearing and the woman might say your shorts are a bit tight) are also notable. They suggest an understanding of domestic violence that does not consider the mezzo or macro levels of gendered power relations and institutional inequalities against women. Nor do they acknowledge the way individual men strategically draw upon the mezzo and macro levels (e.g. gendered expectations of women and men's roles in families and societies) in perpetrating violence at a micro level. The perceived 'naturalness' of gendered power relations for this key informant is suggested by his comments "The man should be able to say to *his* woman..." and that a man was entitled to tell his partner "their dress is too short". Despite acknowledging his use of a "possessive term" here, this key informant nevertheless invoked patriarchal discourses of women as property and men's entitlement to direct and control women (such as telling her what she can and can't wear) as natural.

Consistent with this first proposed reason, *Federal Public Servant 2* argued the MCGC cancelled *No Respect* because of their inadequate understanding of male violence against women and of prevention. She argued the MCGC lacked knowledge about male violence against women and did not understand that prevention focuses on warning signs and

developing respectful relationships. She argued OSW was careful not to dichotomise men as the campaign's targets and encouraged all men to take responsibility for violence against women since "even if it's not you, it's probably your mate being a controlling pig". This key informant thus suggested *No Respect* addressed the gendered system of patriarchal power relations and dynamics of traditional family and heterosexuality which underpin male violence against women (macro and mezzo levels). *Federal Public Servant 2* argued the MCGC did not comprehend this more complex understanding of violence and only understood it as individuals perpetrating violence (micro level). Consequently, she argued the MCGC mistakenly perceived *No Respect's* focus on the disturbing views of young people towards violence, power and controlling behaviours as suggesting "violence is in every, virtually every relationship". *Federal Public Servant 2* also hypothesised the reasons for what she called the Howard Government's "deliberate ignorance":

I think it was an ideological thing that I think they got scared that men's groups were going to freak out ...I think it's their lack of understanding that they didn't get that actually what we were doing is talking to young men and women in a really non-judgmental way and they took it to mean that we were saying that all young men potentially are violent and all relationships are potentially violent and they saw that as more insulting [despite what] the evidence said ...It's like a combination of their ideological views affects their decisions and then make them think they're so right that they don't bother to even find out anymore information to inform themselves and I think that happens all the time. ...they choose not to receive good advice, they choose not to pay attention to research. They do really think that they know better and they convince themselves that what they think is right.

According to this federal public servant the MCGC's lack of understanding of this issue and of prevention as well as their ideological refusal to take into account alternative advice therefore played a prominent role in them cancelling *No Respect*.

The second proposed reason the MCGC cancelled *No Respect* was that it targeted men as perpetrators. Labor Senator John Faulkner reportedly argued the MCGC thought *No Respect* was "just a bit too rough on men" (Martin, 2004). Other media commentators similarly argued: the government were concerned the campaign was "anti-male" (Karvelas, 2004; Milne, 2004; The Age, 2004; Williams, 2004) and "too rough on men" (Contractor, 2004; Martin, 2004); senior government figures objected to portraying and targeting only men as aggressors and emphasising men's violence (B&T Weekly, 2004; Frazer, 2004; Harvey, 2003; Ligerakis, 2004; Morris, 2004; Verity, 2004); and at least one member of the



MCGC believed men should be shown as victims as well perpetrators of domestic violence (Merola, 2003; Wallace, 2003).

Minister Patterson argued these reports were inaccurate (Milne, 2004) and the *MCGC Member* also disagreed that *No Respect* was cancelled because of its focus on men. Nevertheless, despite these denials, other key informants' comments supported the media reports. *Federal Public Servant 5* argued: "We'd done two years of formative research and then evaluation of formative research and then design of the campaign. It was two years of hard work and the messages were very clearly targeting men and the MCGC didn't like that". Similarly, *Academic 3*, *Taskforce Member 4*, and *State Public Servant 10* all argued the MCGC were concerned about targeting men as perpetrators and perceived *No Respect* as having an "anti-male sentiment". These key informants thus support media commentator's suggestions the MCGC cancelled the campaign because of its focus on men.

The third proposed reason the MCGC cancelled *No Respect* was because it was inappropriate to refer victims of violence to a website. In response to a question from ALP politician Nicola Roxon during the House of Representatives Question Time on 19 February 2004 Prime Minister Howard stated: "It is palpably lacking in common sense to put an advertisement that, as its first piece of advice, says to somebody who has been the victim of a violent rape to go to a web site" instead of a helpline, priest, parent, police or doctor for help and information (Hansard, 2004c). Howard's comments were reported and critiqued in the media and by the ALP (Egan, 2004; Light, 2004; Maguire, 2004; Martin, 2004; Roxon, 2004b). Colleen Egan (2004), for example, argued: "Does our 64-year-old leader not realise that today's teens spend more time at computers than in confessionals? And that parents and priests rank high among perpetrators in cyclical abuse". This reason was, however, later echoed by Minister Patterson (Hansard, 2004i) and reported widely in the media (Cannane, 2004; Geelong Advertiser, 2004; Gough & Roe, 2004; Milne, 2004; SBS, 2004; Verity, 2004; Walker, 2004; Walsh, 2004). Significantly, Howard's comment is consistent with what Mungo MacCallum (2004, p.63) observed as Howard's strategy of preventing scrutiny of controversial decisions of his government by describing something as "inappropriate". In this context, Howard's approach to *No Respect* was consistent with his strategic deflection of criticism towards the government regarding a range of social issues.

The fourth proposed reason the MCGC cancelled *No Respect* was the Howard Government wanted to put forward a stronger, more clearly defined message on violence against

women. On the *7.30 Report* (Bowden, 2004a) Minister Patterson argued: "The campaign will go ahead in a way which makes sure that our message that domestic violence and violence in relationships is unacceptable and that is the campaign that will go forward". Consistent with this, Kerry Flanagan, a senior OSW staff member, reportedly said the campaign was cancelled because it needed "a clearer and more narrowly defined message" (Martin, 2004).

*Federal Public Servant 2* argued this fourth reason was a Howard Government strategy to deflect criticism. She argued it was politically impossible for the Howard Government to cancel the campaign outright and so they instead used rhetoric such as "improving, fortifying and strengthening it and making it very clear that violence against women is totally unacceptable" (*Federal Public Servant 2*). She continued:

This is the message that they kept saying and it's kind of plausible. You can sort of see, because I watched the minister get up and sell the fact that they were pulling the campaign and she said "we're not, we're not pulling it, we're strengthening it" ...It's a bit of a tricky one to explain and it's like no-one got it at the time what was happening. They thought they were tweaking the edges and ...we were going "Nup they're not tweaking the edges, this is going, it's a radical shift". It sounds so, they're so good at it, they're so convincing 'cause she, the Minister just kept saying over and over on the '7.30 Report' you see her "we're just making it stronger, we need to send a strong message to Australia that violence is [unacceptable]" ...it was a subtle thing but by changing that they actually, it was a fundamental shift and basically undermined the whole point of the campaign and why we were doing what we were doing. So they wanted just hard core violence placed into everything we did.

These comments also offer an interesting insight into the Howard Government's engagement with feminism by suggesting the government may have strategically used feminist rhetoric about responding to violence to achieve their political agenda to cancel *No Respect*.

The Howard Government's strategic argument that they were strengthening a program while dismantling it is evident elsewhere. It parallels Minister Vanstone's comment on the eve of the 2001 International Women's Day that the Howard Government was "the most female-friendly government Australia has ever seen" (Maddison, 2004, p.42). Vanstone made this comment in the context of the Howard Government's deliberate strategy to dilute women's rights in Australia (Maddison, 2004, p.42) and undermine women's equality as outlined in Chapter Three. Further, regarding health policy Amanda Elliot (2006) argues the

Howard Government discursively developed a new policy narrative constructing the problem of the health care system as the decline in private health insurance and the lack of a public/private 'balance'. While describing themselves as 'the best friend Medicare ever had', Elliot argues the Howard Government bolstered private health insurance and dismantled Medicare. Elliot's argument regarding Medicare parallels the Howard Government's approach to *No Respect*. This observation forms part of the foundation for the argument later in this thesis that the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women may be conceptualised as policies of transformistic hegemonic masculinity.

The fifth proposed reason the MCGC cancelled *No Respect* was its inconsistency with conservative objectives in three ways. First, was *No Respect* "was contrary to government objectives" (McPhedran, 2004). Second, was it did not conform to conservative values or objectives, particularly the idea teenagers could engage in consenting and respectful sexual relationships or the proposition that society supports violence against women (Bowden, 2004a; Merola, 2003; Taskforce Member 4 and State Public Servant 10). Third, was "prime ministerial strategists [were] wary of identifying Mr Howard with a campaign around teenage sex, and worried that male voters could be offended" (Walsh, 2004). These reports thus suggest the Howard Government cancelled *No Respect* because of its inconsistency with conservative objectives.

Whatever the actual reasons, the Howard Government's cancellation of *No Respect* reportedly generated a "storm of protest" from the specialist sectors and ALP (Harvey, 2003). Media commentators reported it "highlighted the Federal Government's "tenuous" commitment to the safety of women and children" (Castello, 2004). They also described it as a missed opportunity "to change the norms and values among Australia's young people which clearly do feed into sexual violence" (Bowden, 2004a). Further, given the proximity to the launch date, OSW had reportedly already paid for most of the advertising and communication strategy with at least \$1.6 million in booked television and magazine space alone forfeited (Contractor, 2004). Consequently, the ALP pursued the Government through the Senate Estimates Committee and media to uncover details of "the scandalous waste of money and change of emphasis from a violence prevention campaign to a crisis response campaign" (Roxon, 2004a, 2004b; Senate Hansard, 2004, 2005). The parliamentary records at this time show the ALP and Australian Democrats maintained constant pressure on the Government to launch *No Respect* with numerous petitions, speeches and questions

in parliament (see for example Hansard, 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; 2004d; 2004e; 2004f; 2004g; 2004h; 2004i; 2004j).

### **7.5 Making sense of the Howard Government's development and cancellation of *No Respect, No Relationship***

Given the diversity of reasons listed above, it is valuable to explore why *No Respect* was not cancelled or reworked earlier. Findings from stage one of the study suggest a significant factor was the advocacy and activism of femocrats within the federal bureaucracy. This issue is therefore explored in greater depth in Chapter Nine. Added to this, one of the strengths of this campaign was the femocrats' strategy of grounding of the campaign in evidence. An important related component, however, appears to be the location of this issue in the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda.

One argument proposed for how to make sense of this period was that although the Howard Government supported responding to domestic violence, they were simultaneously not interested in, and did not adequately understand, the issue. *Federal Public Servant 2* argued this meant the government had not carefully considered the consequences of developing a campaign of this type and allowed femocrats to progress the campaign without interference:

I think as long as it wasn't on the radar we were allowed to just get along, do what we want in the context of what we want, it was, it definitely had a feminist perspective. ...I don't think anyone really cared. It was just when it became in the public spotlight that that's when it became a problem. ...I suppose what I am trying to say is that they didn't systematically try and control what we were doing in domestic violence from that level and go better not be feminist and I don't think they gave a shit basically. I think they just went "okay, whatever".

Similarly, *State Public Servant 11* argued the Howard Government appeared not to understand the consequences of responding to domestic violence and what this might mean for challenging traditional structures of gender, male power and privilege.

Despite ongoing approvals from the MCGC, this lack of interest and understanding reportedly combined to mean the campaign was beneath the notice of the Howard Government. Further, *Federal Public Servant 2* argued the MCGC saw the campaign as a joke:

It was the 'violence against women' campaign and they'd call it the 'sex campaign' so just to give you an indication of what we're dealing with here. They'd make jokes about it. They'd make jokes "so are you telling me" – cause basically they did not understand violence against women, they have just as stereotyped view of what domestic violence is as your average person out there in the community that we were developing the campaign to inform. So you've got people who actually don't believe that domestic violence is as serious as it is, that it, that it exists in the form it exists, and that warnings signs and everything constitute, they were, and like I said, we went to them that many times saying it's going to be prevention, these are the list of behaviours we are talking about and that and they'd make jokes about it "so are you telling me if I turned to [MCGC Member] here and said 'that's a revolting tie' then I'd be being violent against him" – just giving you an example.

The *MCGC Member* interviewed denied this suggestion. In the absence of another explanation, however, these reasons provide some insight into how the campaign might have progressed so far with ongoing MCGC approval. *Federal Public Servant 2* also suggested the MCGC may not have read the strategy despite their ongoing approvals. She argued it was not until the two campaigns were amalgamated and the extra money and television components added that the MCGC started to take notice as it made the campaign more public:

...I think they didn't pay attention, and because, I mean I think that in itself says something about their lack of interest in, in women's issues and violence against women, basically, they're not interested. They don't think it's a vote winner, they're not interested. So, they were provided with, you could say that they, the kindest you could say is that they were incompetent, I suppose, but it's worse than that. It comes from a systematic, systemic attitude against women.

These comments suggest *No Respect* developed so far because of feminist advocacy and activism within the bureaucracy and because it was an issue beneath the Howard Government's notice. This last quote also suggests *No Respect* fits within the broader social policy agenda of the Howard Government which marginalised or ignored issues of importance to women.

## ***Violence Against Women – Australia Says No (2004 – 2007)***

On 6 June 2004 Prime Minister Howard launched the *Australia Says No* campaign to replace *No Respect* (Contractor, 2004). The Howard Government reportedly developed this campaign internally without consulting the sector or state governments. Consequently, few key informants provided insight into the development of *Australia Says No* and it was not possible to develop a very detailed account of this campaign. Consequently, the second part of this chapter is largely descriptive and focuses on the content of *Australia Says No* and the associated campaign helpline. *Australia Says No* is, however, explored in detail in the key themes from stage one in Chapter Eight and the in-depth case study in Chapter Ten.

### **7.6 *Violence Against Women - Australia Says No Content***

*Australia Says No* was “a national campaign developed by the Federal Government to deliver a strong message that violence against women is totally unacceptable” (OSW, 2004d). *Australia Says No* is stylistically similar to *No Respect* with the same actors, images, graphics, and focus on young people. Appendices 7.7 – 7.14 provide a selection of products such as advertisements, brochures, posters and booklets from the campaign’s media component. Unlike *No Respect* which aimed to be a comprehensive community education campaign, *Australia Says No* was primarily a media campaign. The key elements of *Australia Says No* were: advertisements on television, radio, magazines and cinema; a booklet sent to every Australian household; posters; a booklet targeted at Indigenous people; a nation-wide 24 hour confidential helpline; a dedicated website; and a Schools’ Resource (OSW, 2004d). *Australia Says No* reportedly cost a total of \$27.7 million (OFW, 2008) and was jointly funded by *Partnerships*, the *National Initiative*, and later the *Women’s Safety Agenda* (OFW, 2005b; 2005i).

### **7.7 *Violence Against Women - Australia Says No Telephone Helpline***

Reported as *Australia Says No’s* “centrepiece” was “a 24-hour confidential helpline, 1800 200 526, which provides assistance by experienced counsellors trained by Lifeline” (Karvelas, 2004). This helpline was embroiled in controversy and publicly criticised from its inception. According to *Taskforce Member 10* the Taskforce were concerned about the Howard Government establishing a national centralised helpline since: “I just thought that

national phone numbers sometimes from our research are resented because people feel that they are talking to somebody in Melbourne who has no understanding of what it's like to be in Bunbury in WA ...We didn't think it would engage people". Similarly, media commentators claimed that on a national Helpline the "counsellors will not know local resources or legislation, and will not be able to guide people directly to where they can get concrete support" (Macdonald, 2004). Further, they argued that since state governments provide crisis services, people who call the helpline will need to be referred on to local services where constantly retelling their story is likely to create a barrier to continued help-seeking (Fynes-Clinton, 2004; Macdonald, 2004).

The sector and media commentators also criticised the Howard Government for bypassing pre-existing state specialist helplines and select tendering Lifeline to run the helpline. Lifeline is a Christian volunteer phone counselling service without specialist expertise responding to sexual assault or domestic violence. Media commentators argued the helpline duplicated and ignored established services with specialist expertise, the confidence of the sectors, local knowledge and referral pathways (Bowden, 2004a; Gough & Roe, 2004; Karvelas, 2004; Martin, 2004; Macdonald, 2004; NASASV, 2004). This criticism was echoed by the *Opposition MP*:

There weré some dumb decisions taken because the Government was putting its ideology before taking a good hard look at what the best service model would be and so we said at the time that the phone line was set up that it made a lot more sense to have, sure one number if you wanted to, but had a number that directed to state-based specialist organisations that were already providing a phone service in particular in relation to sexual assault. And the decision to give the contract to Lifeline to do the phone line – I've got no objection to Lifeline as an organisation, I think they provide an excellent service – but I think taking phone calls from women who have just been sexually assaulted or are in the middle of an incident of domestic violence is a really serious business and the more experienced the people answering the phone are the better. ...the service that was provided to many of the people who phoned up was not as good as it should have been.

Similarly, the NSW Rape Crisis Centre described the helpline as a "phenomenal waste of money"; as it cost \$880,000 instead of the \$889 NASASV<sup>16</sup> quoted for a freecall number to divert callers to existing state services (Martin, 2004). In these circumstances, the Howard Government's tender of the helpline to Lifeline seems consistent with their strategies of silencing dissent and opposition to their social policy agenda as outlined in Chapter Four.

---

<sup>16</sup> National Association of Services Against Sexual Violence.

The quality of the helpline and lack of expertise of Lifeline staff was also a contentious issue. According to *Peak Body Representative 1*:

...at that time all of sexual assault and DV services were just screaming saying Lifeline has no idea how to refer, they never do it appropriately at a state level so this is going to be a horrendous dog's breakfast. And, three days before it went live ...[there was a meeting between Lifeline, NASASV, WESNET and a women's legal service] and it was at that point that their counsellors had no training on how to respond to sexual assault and DV and that's where we put into place a whole lot of training and supervision of their workers when the campaign first went to air.

Media commentators reported that the NSW Women's Refuge and Resource Centre (WRRC) tested the helpline by encouraging workers to ring the helpline with various domestic violence scenarios (Howden, 2005). In total, WRRC member services recorded about 20 interactions with the helpline of which they reported only one or two were appropriate responses to the issues raised (*Peak Body Representative 2*). The WRRC were reported to have concluded the helpline's "inappropriate referrals and responses ...[were] indicative of how little understanding many of the Lifeline volunteers have regarding the issues and services related to domestic violence" (Howden, 2005).

The lack of experience, training and expertise of Lifeline staff in responding to sexual assault and domestic violence was criticised in the 2005 Senate Estimates Committee. Evidence to the Senate Estimates Committee (Senate Hansard, 2005, p.42) records that approximately 2-5% of Lifeline's calls included issues of domestic violence and sexual assault. Further, helpline staff were not required to be professional counsellors and were usually experienced Lifeline volunteers who had moved into paid helpline positions with limited additional specialist training (Senate Hansard, 2005, p.42). ALP senators also drew attention to this lack of appropriate specialist knowledge, skill, training and experience and their concerns about the subsequent poor quality of Lifeline's services (Senate Hansard, 2005). Senator Crossin, for example, said:

I am very concerned when women tell me they get a response like, 'It's not him, it's the alcohol. Why don't you try talking to him about his drinking problem', or 'My goodness, you've got broken ribs, perhaps you ought to wear thicker clothing.' These are responses women are recording that counsellors are telling them over the Lifeline Helpline—things like 'Why do you think he hits you?', 'You ought to write down the dates and describe what happens each time.' They are very concerning comments to us. ...I have had a number of people who have



contacted me to say that counsellors had no idea whereabouts in the state they were calling from (Senate Hansard, 2005, pp.48-49).

The responses Senator Crossin recounts suggest a lack of understanding of male violence against women and inappropriate professional practice by helpline staff. These responses locate male violence at a micro level, show little understanding of the broader social context, and hold women responsible for stopping and preventing the violence perpetrated against them.

In a media release at the time, the ALP (Plibersek, 2005d) summarised their concerns about the helpline. These included that: Lifeline staff inappropriately referred clients; there was insufficient training for helpline staff; the helpline was not being evaluated; there was no assessment of the impact of the helpline on state crisis services; and women were asked to call an additional number after calling the helpline. In a later media release, the ALP (Plibersek, 2005c) also expressed concern that the Howard Government had refused to acknowledge or investigate their complaints against the helpline. The ALP concluded: "It's time for the Howard Government to take violence against women seriously, and stop putting lives at risk" (Plibersek, 2005c).

The final reported criticism of the helpline was the extra demand it generated for state crisis services without providing additional funding (NASASV, 2004). The Senate Hansard (2005, p.53) records senior public servant Kerry Flanagan explaining to Senator Crossin that the Howard Government provided \$100 to the relevant service each time the helpline referred a caller. According to *Peak Body Representatives 2 & 3*, however, this \$100 was inadequate to cover service delivery costs. They also argued there was a duplication of services in this referral process since the helpline often referred callers to state-based sexual assault and domestic violence telephone services who then referred on to women's refuges and counselling services. Consequently, the Senate Hansard (2005, pp.42-43) records Senator Crossin concluding from Ms Flanagan's comments that, while the state crisis lines received the \$100 referral payment, the refuges and counselling services providing the bulk of service delivery missed out since "the money is going to the go-between and not to the end service".

*Peak Body Representatives 1, 2 and 3* argued the helpline presented a number of challenges to crisis agencies. *Peak Body Representative 2* stated that although her agency was not a service provider, they received thousands of dollars in \$100 cheques from the

helpline from inappropriate Lifeline referrals. *Peak Body Representative 3* explained that she ran a domestic violence service which received numerous referrals from their state-wide women's domestic violence crisis service passed on from helpline referrals. She said that as a result of this referral process her service never received a single cheque from the helpline. According to *Peak Body Representative 1*, some services also reported a spike in service requests due to people contacting services directly as a result of the campaign. She said that these services did not, however, receive any additional funding to meet the demand generated from the campaign.

## 7.8 Chapter Summary

Chapter Seven has provided a comprehensive account of the Howard Government's community education campaigns *No Respect* and *Australia Says No* based on the empirical data from stage one of the study. The account has included the history and development of *No Respect* and detailed the five main reasons proposed for why the Howard Government cancelled this campaign. Chapter Seven has also noted insights into the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women and the government's engagement with feminism including how the government strategically used feminist rhetoric to justify cancelling *No Respect*. The chapter also suggested the development of *No Respect* relied on the activism of femocrats in the federal government combined with the Howard Government's lack of interest in this issue. This finding is consistent with the government's approach to women's issues generally as outlined in Chapter Four. These insights form part of a foundation on which to further explore the Howard Government's engagement with feminism in the case studies of *Partnerships* and *Australia Says No* in Chapter Nine and Ten. It appears that once they paid attention to the campaign, the Howard Government intervened, cancelled *No Respect* and developed *Australia Says No*. The second part of Chapter Seven therefore provides an account of *Australia Says No* including a brief description of the contents of the campaign and critiques of the *Australia Says No* helpline. This account of *No Respect* and *Australia Says No* is an important background and foundation for the four key themes that emerged from stage one that are explored in Chapter Eight.

## Chapter Eight

### The Howard Government's Approaches to Male Violence Against Women: Key Findings from Stage One

---

The Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women were complex and varied and stage one of the study offered significant insights into this period that were pertinent for a feminist analysis. This chapter explores these insights by outlining four key themes which emerged from stage one. First is the dissonance between key informants' positive assessments of *Partnerships* and other responses to male violence against women and their negative assessments of the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda. Second is whether *Australia Says No* was a feminist campaign which represented a progressive political engagement between feminism and the state. Third is the importance of considering *Australia Says No* in context and whether the Howard Government's approach to community education campaigns was a wasted opportunity. Fourth is the proposition that *Australia Says No* was a public relations exercise. This chapter concludes by using these key themes as a foundation to develop the argument that the Howard Government's approaches may be conceptualised from a feminist perspective as both policies of chivalry and policies of cooption.

#### 8.1 "The only good thing that John Howard had ever done"<sup>17</sup>?

The dissonance between key informants' positive assessments of the Howard Government's specific responses to male violence against women and negative assessments of the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda was a significant theme to emerge from stage one. Key informants were predominantly positive about the Howard Government's specific responses to male violence against women such as *Partnerships* and *Australia Says No*. Simultaneously, however, they argued the

---

<sup>17</sup> *Federal Public Servant 4.*

government's broader social policy agenda had a detrimental impact on women, particularly women who had experienced violence. This broader policy agenda, some argued, made the Howard Government's specific violence policies irrelevant.

The professional experiences of key informants and the high level of intergovernmental cooperation on the Taskforce meant many key informants had significant knowledge about, and experience with, *Partnerships*. Consequently, key informants provided more extensive commentary on *Partnerships* than the other Howard Government initiatives and offered important insights into how they viewed the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women.

At least seventeen of the thirty key informants described *Partnerships* as consisting of substantial strengths and positives. These positive assessments bridged political and federal-state jurisdictional divisions and two examples include:

PADV I think was a fantastic initiative. ...I think it was very, incredibly comprehensive, that it covered all sorts of areas and it really gave us a big snapshot on things that might work, things that were happening, it was a real opportunity to measure and explore domestic violence in a way that has never happened before (*Taskforce Member 4*).

The *Partnerships* I thought was actually an exciting opportunity to genuinely do some good things in domestic violence because there are plenty of people who have good program ideas that are soundly based on the available evidence and the idea of being able to get them some funding was very exciting (*Opposition MP*).

Journalist Michelle Gunn's (1999) description of *Partnerships* as earning "universal applause" was thus consistent with key informants' predominantly positive assessments of *Partnerships*.

Beyond these overall assessments, three specific areas of *Partnerships* were praised by key informants. The first was its funding. As discussed in Chapter Six, \$50 million was substantially more investment in this area than allocated by any previous federal government. A number of key informants (*State Public Servant 5, Evaluators 2 & 3, Federal Public Servants 2 & 4, and Taskforce Member 5*) spoke positively about the amount of this funding, its even distribution across the states and that the Howard Government did not try to control how the states used this funding. They argued these features of *Partnerships* funding were particularly unusual in Australian federalism. The second significant strength

of *Partnerships*' was its collaboration. Key informants argued it was a true partnership between federal and state governments which facilitated the sharing of information and innovation (*Taskforce Members 2, 4, 5 & 6, Federal Public Servant 4 and Evaluator 2*). For these key informants, *Partnerships* was a model of federal-state cooperation and one of the best examples to date of partnering between the two levels of government. The third significant strength identified was the specific projects, resources and outcomes *Partnerships* generated including the substantial research and evidence base on domestic violence (*State Public Servant 5, Peak Body Representative 3 and Taskforce Members 1, 5, 6 & 9*). In particular, key informants considered the *Partnerships* communication strategy as valuable in disseminating *Partnerships* findings and influencing state government responses to this violence particularly in Victoria and Tasmania (*State Public Servants 3, 7 & 8 and Evaluator 2*).

Key informants also identified a number of weaknesses of *Partnerships*, however. These weaknesses mainly related to the longevity of *Partnerships* projects and the ability to incorporate *Partnerships* findings into practice. *Academic 3, the Opposition MP, Peak Body Representative 3 and Taskforce Member 4* criticised the time-limited nature of *Partnerships* funding and dominance of pilot projects. *Federal Public Servant 5* also described *Partnerships* as "chronically underspent". These key informants argued the *Partnerships* funding model set up expectations within communities which were not resourced long-term regardless of the success of pilot projects. They suggested this stop/start funding combined with program underspending limited the sustainability of *Partnerships* and the capacity of governments and the sector to build upon the *Partnerships* knowledge and research base. Some key informants (e.g. *Evaluator 1, Academic 1, Taskforce Members 4, 7 & 9, Peak Body Representative 3*) and media commentators (Horin, 2005) also argued there was insufficient structural and strategic planning or leadership from the Howard Government in the development of *Partnerships* or to embed findings from its research activities. They expressed concern that: many good programs were discontinued; people moved on; and, despite the meta-evaluation, the knowledge and expertise from *Partnerships* were not fully retained. These key informants thus identified a number of weaknesses particularly related to the ability of *Partnerships* to embed its learning in practice.

Overall, key informants' predominant views were that *Partnerships* was a positive and effective policy response to male violence against women. Even of the nine key informants who identified weaknesses, four also made positive comments about *Partnerships*. Significantly, many key informants who made positive assessments about *Partnerships*

identified themselves as feminists and reported substantial experiences in policy and service delivery responses to male violence against women. Further, a number of key informants (including the *Opposition MP*, *Peak Body Representatives 2 and 3*, *Federal Public Servants 2 and 5*, and *Evaluator 2*) who were otherwise strongly critical of the Howard Government also made positive comments about *Partnerships*.

In addition to *Partnerships*, twelve key informants made positive comments about the Howard Government's approach to the issue of male violence against women more broadly. Of these twelve, five made positive comments about both *Partnerships* and the Howard Government's overall approach. The general positive comments included that the Howard Government: had done more than any other federal government on this issue; they had made violence against women a priority as a social issue; and they provided a strong and sustained commitment to this issue over many years (*State Public Servants 5, 10 & 13*, *Government MPs 1 & 2*, *Federal Public Servants 1, 4 & 6*, *Taskforce Members 3, 7 & 9*, and *Peak Body Representative 1*). *Federal Public Servant 4*, for example, argued:

I can't think who it was, but the women's movement, the women's groups said, domestic violence policy was the only good thing that John Howard had ever done. ...You know on the whole pretty good. Yes, yes I've been amazed at some of the strong stands, well I suppose it's only the result of so much pressure over years ...but I do notice things that are going on and think well really, yeah, they're doing alright. It's been taken on as a serious issue, those sort of legal responses, and service responses ...Yeah, well I think the Liberal Government's done better [than the previous Labor Government] – wash my mouth out. ...But I think the Liberal Government sort of took it on more broadly and tried to get some sort of national, get all the states on board in some sort of coordinated way. I mean it didn't really work in that sense, of getting really national coordination, but I think a lot was achieved.

A combined total of twenty-four key informants made positive comments about *Partnerships* and the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women more broadly. This shows that a significant majority of key informants assessed these policy responses as positive.

An important finding of stage one was the dissonance between key informants' positive assessments of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women and their negative assessments of the government's broader social policy agenda. This discrepancy is illustrated in *Federal Public Servant 4's* comment above where she makes a clear distinction between the Howard Government's domestic violence policy and the

government's broader policy agenda. Fourteen key informants similarly argued that specific responses to male violence against women were undermined by the negative impact of the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda on women who had experienced violence. They argued the Howard Government's neo-liberal, socially conservative policy agenda increased women's vulnerability to male violence both during a relationship and after separation. Further, they suggested this impact was so substantial it negated any positive assessment of the government's specific male violence against women policies such as *Partnerships*. The number of key informants who raised this issue was significant because they raised it independently and not in response to specific questions in the interview. These key informants identified four main social policy areas and issues that had a specific negative impact on women, particularly those who had experienced violence, each of which is addressed below.

### 8.1.1 Women's inequality and rights

Key informants argued that the Howard Government undermined women's equality and rights through their support of socially conservative policies and their concerted effort to neutralise explicit acknowledgment of gender in government policy. *Academics 1 and 3, Taskforce Members 3 and 4, State Public Servants 5 and 11, and Peak Body Representative 3* suggested this social policy agenda promoted and reinforced women's inequality with men. The majority of these key informants also explicitly linked their arguments about the exacerbation of women's inequality under the Howard Government with an increase to women's vulnerability to violence. This was consistent with early feminist arguments that violence against women arises from, and reinforces, gendered inequalities as outlined in Chapter Two. *Academic 1*, for example, argued:

It's their overall policies, they're anti-women, it's not what women need if they're going to get out of violence is it? Income, housing, not having to have contact with abusing people, legal aid, when they don't think about what you need, they've taken out all that structural stuff, or undermined the structural stuff. Maybe if they had a policy that is a human rights policy, if they did the optional protocol and they came out with a strong human rights issue, women and human rights issue, but I can't see our current government doing that much.

Further, some of these key informants suggested the Howard Government simultaneously dismantled institutional structures that sought women's equality with men such as OSW and the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. These key informants thus argued the Howard Government's social policy agenda and dismantling of the women's policy

machinery damaged women's equality and their capacity to escape men's violence as well as increasing women's vulnerability to this violence.

### **8.1.2 Work, welfare and reform**

The Howard Government's industrial relations and welfare reform agendas were raised as being particularly harmful and damaging to women who had experienced violence (*Federal Public Servant 1, Academic 1 and Taskforce Members 1, 3 and 7*). These key informants argued work and welfare policies offered an important avenue to assist women to leave violent partners. As outlined in Chapter Four, the Howard Government's industrial relations and welfare policies were particularly harmful to the most disadvantaged and, according to these key informants, increased women's vulnerability to violence. Some key informants argued these government policies reduced women's actual or potential financial independence and what Ramsay (2004) refers to as women's capacity to maintain an autonomous household with their children and away from a violent partner. Referring to the Howard Government's welfare reform and taxation policies and their broader social policy agenda, *Academic 1* concluded: "leaving violence is not going to look very attractive for a lot of women now. ...I think all of that is more important than their specific DV policy. They can do more harm to women whether they've got a DV policy or not in all those other ways". Further, *Federal Public Servant 1* also recalled:

...we were doing a lot of work on economic independence for women and we'd done a number of papers on the fact that we thought the changes to the industrial relations climate would disadvantage women. And I ended up having a personal meeting with the Minister about that where she told me that that was not the case and she was sick of me telling her that it was and she didn't want me to tell her again.

The Howard Government's industrial relations and welfare agenda thus reactivated feminist politics around the significance of financial independence which had been a key theme in feminist domestic violence activism.

### **8.1.3 The family law system**

Key informants highlighted the Howard Government's approaches and changes to family law as having a particularly negative impact on women who had experienced violence. Some argued these family law changes, including the presumption of shared care of children, "unfriendly parent" provisions and penalties for disclosing "unproven" domestic



violence, reflected the dominance and influence of men's rights groups on the government (*Academic 1, Opposition MP, Peak Body Representative 3, and Taskforce Members 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 9*). Key informants remarked these changes contradicted violence prevention principles and the Howard Government's statements against violence. Harsher critics argued these changes were "ideologically backwards", reflected "backlash politics", and "shored up violent men's perceptions of their ownership of women and children". As the *Opposition MP* argued:

...some of the changes that they've made in family law really counteract anything they've tried to do in domestic violence ...they haven't had the sort of strength of will to say to some of the more extreme elements in the family law debate that what you are doing is damaging children. They've in fact swallowed a whole lot of the rhetoric of the angry, disgruntled end of that argument and in some ways probably increased the risk of exposing people to ongoing domestic violence and they've done the easy thing but they haven't done the hard thing, they haven't done anything to genuinely help people in that situation.

For these key informants, the Howard Government's family law changes thus undermined women and children's safety and increased their vulnerability to violence by undermining the capacity of women to leave a partner from whom they had experienced violence.

#### **8.1.4 Supported Accommodation Assistance Program (SAAP) funding**

Key informants also criticised the Howard Government's funding for the Supported Accommodation Assistance Program (SAAP) which they argued was inadequate. SAAP is a joint federal-state funding program for emergency and crisis accommodation which includes women and children's domestic violence refuges. *Taskforce Member 4* and *Peak Body Representative 3* criticised what they argued was the Howard Government's inadequate funding of services, particularly refuges, through SAAP. *Taskforce Member 4* argued the *Australia Says No* campaign was particularly inappropriate given that SAAP funding did not meet current service delivery levels let alone unmet needs:

I think it's been meaningless rhetoric and I think in some ways it's absolutely disgusting that they have set up an expectation that they are a Government that actually cares about domestic violence and, which would mean in many situations that women do believe that and that they will leave, they are being given a level of confidence, that it's a climate to be confident in. That you can leave and there's going to be a number of points along the way that are going to help you. Well, it's absolute total crap, there is not and if you look at just the refuges, which is

probably still the backbone of service delivery in this country in terms of domestic violence services, turn away one out of two women a day, two out of three children a day.

These key informants continued by arguing that almost 80% of women who use refuges do not have an independent income and have few accommodation alternatives. She suggested that in this context the Howard Government was abusive in raising expectations and encouraging this vulnerable group of women to leave partners who were violent towards them. Both key informants also criticised the Howard Government's inadequate funding of other services such as domestic violence and sexual assault counselling services particularly in the context of demand generated by *Australia Says No*.

Supplementing these key informants' arguments, similar criticisms of SAAP were apparent in six newspaper articles (AAP, 2005; Horin, 2005; Hudson, 2005; Silimalis, 2005; Summers, 2003a; Walsh, 2005) and five ALP media releases (ALP, 2004; Plibersek, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d). Although it is the nature of the Opposition to oppose, the criticism of SAAP in these media releases was significant given the *Opposition MP's* positive assessment of *Partnerships* as outlined earlier in this chapter and the Opposition's support of *No Respect* outlined in Chapter Seven. These key informants and media commentators thus argued the Howard Government's responses to male violence against women were meaningless "window dressing" unsupported by adequate service funding.

## 8.2 A Feminist Campaign?

The question of whether *Australia Says No* was a feminist campaign which represented a progressive political engagement between feminism and the state was another important theme to emerge from stage one. As Winter (2007, p.33) argues *Australia Says No* appears "to send a positive message, putting government money where feminist mouths have been for many decades, [they] called for concerted action at a national level". Through *Australia Says No* the Howard Government provided a significant and sustained mass media campaign on the issue of violence against women at a reported cost of \$27.7 million (OFW, 2008). As well as being the largest financial commitment of any federal government to this sort of campaign, key informants suggested *Australia Says No* responded to feminist demands by using gendered language and providing a clear message against sexual assault and domestic violence.

In replacing *No Respect* with *Australia Says No*, the Howard Government argued they were making it clear domestic violence and sexual assault are totally unacceptable. This argument was consistent with feminist rhetoric and activism and, according to *Federal Public Servant 2* was a plausible position, "something that everyone would agree with and is actually fundamentally correct". *Australia Says No* highlights feminist language and terms such as "domestic violence", "sexual assault" and "violence against women". *Australia Says No* also positions men as the perpetrators and women as the victims of this violence. Further, some of the value positions and assumptions articulated in the campaign reflect a feminist influence. These include that: violence against women is a negative behaviour not to be condoned or tolerated by the community; sexual assault and domestic violence (physical assault) are crimes; these behaviours have a negative impact on victims; and the Government has a responsibility to respond to this issue. *Federal Public Servant 2* argued *No Respect* reflected a more complex and sophisticated feminist analysis of male violence against women than *Australia Says No* as outlined in Chapter Seven. For these key informants, however, explicit gendered language and understandings of violence were important in these types of campaigns. In replacing *No Respect* with *Australia Says No* the Howard Government thus appeared to respond to feminist demands by taking a gendered approach to male violence against women and articulating the message that violence against women is totally unacceptable.

Ten key informants, the majority of whom identified themselves as feminists, spoke positively about *Australia Says No*. Their comments included that *Australia Says No*: was "an important initiative with a positive message"; was "comprehensive"; was "a significant investment"; was "better than nothing"; "appeared to take violence against women seriously"; and got this type of violence "public attention at a national level" (*State Public Servants 12, 13 & 14, Federal Public Servant 1 and Taskforce Members 3 & 2*). A number of key informants who identified themselves as feminists thus expressed positive assessments of the campaign which suggests it may have been a progressive political engagement between feminism and the state.

Other key informants spoke positively about the content of *Australia Says No* and argued it reflected appropriate, feminist-influenced theoretical explanations of violence. *State Public Servants 10 & 13 and Taskforce Member 7*, all of whom identified themselves as feminists, spoke positively of the campaign's gendered representation of violence and its message that this violence was inappropriate. All three spoke of their surprise over these positive

features of *Australia Says No* given their negative perceptions of Howard Government social conservatism. *Taskforce Member 7*, for example, argued:

I think the Australia Says No campaign is a gendered, it does, which I find amazing. ...no-one could come away from those ads and say they are not recognising that women are the primary victims and men are the primary offenders ...I don't necessarily think the message that Australia Says No to violence against women is bad because ...while I can be critical of elements it still says 'Violence Against Women - Australia Says No'. It still takes a position.

Similarly, *Peak Body Representative 1* expressed "relief and pleasant surprise" that the campaign "did not hold women responsible for violence" or engage in too many "women-blaming messages" such as "telling women to avoid rape by not wearing short skirts". She argued the campaign "holds men responsible for violence" and suggested the Howard Government may have adopted some of the politics of feminism even though it might have been overtly hostile to feminists.

This argument that the Howard Government may have adopted feminist politics and understandings of male violence against women was supported by the interview with *Government MP 1*. Despite his narrow, criminal definition of violence against women, a number of *Government MP 1*'s comments were consistent with feminist perspectives of male violence against women. These included: acknowledging the criminal nature of this violence; the negative impact of sexual assault on women who experience it; and the importance of government interventions in this issue. This suggests *Peak Body Representative 1* may have been accurate in her suggestion the Howard Government had taken on board some of the politics of feminism. Taken together, these comments suggest that *Australia Says No* may have been influenced by feminism and reflect a progressive engagement between feminism and the state.

### 8.3 Wasted Opportunities?

The positive assessments of *Australia Says No* were not universal, however. Understanding *Australia Says No* in context suggests this campaign may have been a lost or wasted opportunity. *Australia Says No* fits within a broader genre of violence prevention campaigns classified by VicHealth as "general or specific awareness campaigns" (Donovan & Vlasis, 2005, p.32). This campaign was not radically different from many other campaigns preceding it run by Australian government and non-government organisations. It is therefore

important to explore why it was that key informants suggested the campaign may have been a wasted opportunity.

Key informants and media commentators mainly suggested *Australia Says No* was a wasted opportunity for the government to appropriately respond to, and prevent, male violence against women. *Federal Public Servant 2* argued:

At the end of the day they probably didn't even produce a violence campaign that was that different to a lot of other violence campaigns that have been out there. It's not like what they did was that, I suppose the end product was not something that hadn't been done before and therefore was a terrible thing. It was in the context it was terrible – that they are Federal Government, that they actually, it's not like they're the NSW Government and can raise crisis responses and then have their crisis responses there, they just, they don't know where those people were going so it was irresponsible, it was also, given that their research told them that they needed to do it like this, they chose to do it another way and they chose to be in the dark and go backwards and that was unforgivable basically.

These sentiments were echoed by specialists in the sector, such as NASASV Chair Vanessa Swan, who reportedly labelled *Australia Says No* “misguided”, a “missed opportunity” or a “lost opportunity” (Bowden, 2004a, 2004b; Macdonald, 2004; Walsh, 2004). From this perspective, a number of contextual issues undermined the value of *Australia Says No* as a community education campaign according to key informants and specialists in the sector. These included: the Government's cancellation of *No Respect*; the argument that *Australia Says No* did not reflect, and in some cases was contradictory to, the research and evidence on good practice in campaigns of this type; and the division of federal and state responsibilities and lack of collaboration in developing *Australia Says No*. Each of these issues is outlined below.

One of the main reasons *Australia Says No* was criticised as a missed opportunity was because it was a tertiary intervention campaign, unlike the primary and secondary prevention campaign that *No Respect* was planned to be. Despite stylistic similarities with *No Respect*, the messages and content in *Australia Says No* were significantly altered<sup>18</sup>. *Taskforce Member 2* argued *Australia Says No* was a very conventional, tertiary intervention campaign which replicated many previous state government campaigns and was thus a missed the opportunity to focus on primary prevention. Similarly, *State Public*

---

<sup>18</sup> The table in Appendix 9.1 compares the main features of *No Respect*, *No Relationship* against those of *Violence Against Women – Australia Says No*.

*Servant 10*, who had expertise in running violence against women prevention campaigns, argued *Australia Says No* was “disappointing from a prevention perspective”, “focused on violence after the fact”, and was thus a missed opportunity.

*State Public Servant 11* argued the approach in *Australia Says No* might have been harmful to violence prevention efforts. *State Public Servant 11* had expertise running men’s domestic violence groups and a state-based tertiary intervention campaign targeting violent men. He explained that there is ambivalence for perpetrators who often “simultaneously see themselves as both a victim and a perpetrator”. For this key informant, dealing with men’s perceptions and experiences of powerlessness and victimisation is an important part of tertiary intervention with perpetrators. Rather than responding to and dealing with this perception of victimisation, he argued that *Australia Says No* was likely to further entrench and reinforce it since:

...the campaign is more traditional in the sense of being a kind of a public sort of statement about the acceptability of violence against women and I think a lot of men or perpetrators switch off to that. ...my experience tells me that the men involved, the perpetrators of the violence would look at that as just another version of us being kind of picked on, of not being understood, the feminists in government reeling out these campaigns. I can imagine if you did focus groups of men who had been violent in the home they’d be saying, “not fair, it’s not just us, we were wronged too”, all of the usual stuff. They, I think, in some ways become even more entrenched in their views as a result of seeing that style of campaign. ...a lot of perpetrators will look at *Australia Says No* and say ‘that’s not me’ but along with that though they will also say that’s those bloody femos again having a go at us. ...So I don’t think those campaigns motivate men at all really to do anything. Telling perpetrators of violence that there’s a public, there’s a shameful element and that the public should be encouraged to view them negatively for their behaviour really I suspect only entrenches the view that no-one understands me, I’m a victim.

*State Public Servant 11* also argued *Australia Says No* reflected an ideological rather than a practical and workable approach to engaging violent men. He thus suggested the campaign may have reinforced perpetrators’ sense of victimisation and undermined its capacity to engage with perpetrators and successfully challenge their violence.

Media commentators similarly criticised the Howard Government for replacing the preventative focus on respectful relationships in *No Respect* with the crisis end approach in *Australia Says No* focussing on how to deal with the aftermath of sexual assault and

domestic violence. Opposition MP Nicola Roxon, for example, argued the prevention approach in *No Respect* was far superior to the crisis management approach in *Australia Says No* (Gough & Roe, 2004; Robb, 2004; Roxon, 2004a, 2004b; Walsh, 2004). Other commentators argued *Australia Says No*: reinforced stereotypes about violence (B&T Weekly, 2004; Egan, 2004; SBS, 2004); was not aimed at men's behavioural change (Egan, 2004); paid "little more than lip service to violence against women (AAP, 2005)"; treated "the symptoms of domestic violence, rather than preventing its causes" (Milne, 2004); "window-dressed images of middle Australia" (Fynes-Clinton, 2004); was not designed to offer real help (Egan, 2004; Fynes-Clinton, 2004; SBS, 2004); "missed the mark" (Fynes-Clinton, 2004); and was a "waste of government money" (Egan, 2004; Macdonald, 2004; NASASV, 2004; Walsh, 2004).

Another major criticism of *Australia Says No* was its lack of connection to a research and evidence base. The *Opposition MP* argued:

...the Government spent a fair amount of money on the campaign and it's disappointing to me and I know to many other people that it was, the money was spent in a way that didn't reflect the research and planning that went into the original campaign and was therefore probably less effective than it would have been, or should have been, or could have been. That's a real tragedy when you think about what's at stake. To have the potential to do something really well and choose not to do it really well because, for example, men might be insulted about the idea that men are being blamed for violence against women seems to me, I don't know, really quite culpable.

*State Public Servant 2, Federal Public Servants 2 & 5, Taskforce Members 7, Academic 3, and Peak Body Representative 3* also made similar comments about *Australia Says No*. They all argued the final campaign did not reflect, and was even contradictory to, the original developmental research underpinning *No Respect*. These key informants also suggested that, rather than being an accident or oversight, the Howard Government chose to ignore this research and evidence base by cancelling *No Respect* and replacing it with *Australia Says No*.

Media commentators made statements about the research and evidence base consistent with the key informants' comments above. Roxon (2004b) argued the Howard Government missed the point of their own research and contravened the advice and recommendations of experts in the field about the need for "preventing and not just reacting to violence against women". ACT Domestic Violence Crisis Services Manager, Denise Simpson,

reportedly said: “when you consider what could have been in the campaign - which really listened to what young people said in two years of consultation by the Government - then it is a missed opportunity and crying shame” (Macdonald, 2004). Similar statements and criticism of *Australia Says No* were also made in Domestic Violence and Incest Resource Centre (DVIRC) and No To Violence (NTV) media releases as well as by violence prevention specialist Michael Flood on the SBS news (DVIRC & NTV 2004; SBS, 2004). All three argued the campaign ignored two years of government-funded research and missed the opportunity to help the next generation build better relationships and learn about respect and equality in relationships. The media commentators thus also criticised *Australia Says No* as a missed opportunity in the context of not following the recommendations of the government's own developmental research.

Supporting these criticisms, *Australia Says No* adheres to none of the list of recommendations for community education campaigns from Howard Government-funded research. *Partnerships 1* publications (National Crime Prevention, 2001; Strategic Partners, 2003b) make a number of recommendations that are summarised in Appendices 7.1 and 7.2. Other than its focus on young people as a target audience, *Australia Says No* does not reflect any recommendations for practice for community education campaigns in these publications. When assessed against this research, the criticisms that *Australia Says No* was inconsistent with the government's own research on community education campaign appear accurate.

One key informant argued *Australia Says No* was also inconsistent with good practice principles for violence against women community education campaigns more broadly. *Academic 3*, a key informant with particular expertise in sexual assault prevention, argued *Australia Says No*: “just misread all of the literature, all of the program development work and evaluation work that had occurred both internationally and locally”. *Academic 3* was particularly critical of *Australia Says No*'s focus on the criminal justice system and reporting the crime of domestic violence or sexual assault given feminist discussions of the continued inadequacy of criminal justice responses. She argued she was “disappointed” by *Australia Says No* and “there was nothing about the evidence-base that was informing this campaign” (*Academic 3*). Consistent with these comments, *Australia Says No* appears to have observed few of the key recommendations for effective and appropriate violence against women community education campaigns. Indeed, it actually directly contradicts many of the recommendations for good practice from the literature.



The final way in which *Australia Says No* was argued to be a missed opportunity related to differing responsibilities between Australian state and federal governments. *State Public Servant 6* argued that, as a tertiary intervention campaign, *Australia Says No* was inappropriate for a federal government because it duplicated state responsibilities and placed significant strain on “already over-stretched” state services. Similarly, *Federal Public Servant 2* argued:

Prevention, prevention, prevention is where we should be going and not raising need at the crisis end. That's dealt with by the states, that's not our responsibility. Oh, no, no, they wanted national lines and they want to set it up now ...we knew what they were doing was actually dangerous. We're saying to them, you can actually, by raising this – and some of the things they wanted to do were actually like irresponsible and dangerous like sending information to people in the mail, like they then a big mail out and we're saying to them to send that to a woman in violence, she's not going to get that out and read it in her house, that's really, that could put her in a lack of safety.

This federal public servant thus suggested the Howard Government developed *Australia Says No* despite contradictory advice from federal public servants. For both of these key informants *Australia Says No* was problematic and a missed opportunity in the context of the division of state and federal responsibilities. They argued a campaign such as *Australia Says No*, which may be perfectly reasonable from a state government, may simultaneously be irresponsible and inappropriate when developed by the federal government.

The Howard Government was also criticised by media commentators for its failure to consult and collaborate with the states or sector in developing *Australia Says No*. As one newspaper reported: “the refocusing of the campaign away from education of young people has bitterly disappointed peak sexual and domestic violence bodies, which were not consulted in its reworking” (Walsh, 2004). Similarly, Heather Nancarrow, Director of the Queensland Centre for Domestic and Family Violence Research reportedly said stakeholders had not been consulted and “already overstretched local [state] infrastructure has not received adequate additional funding to cope with what should be a landslide of calls for help” (Fynes-Clinton, 2004). This argument was repeated elsewhere in the media (e.g. Gough & Roe, 2004). Thus, *Australia Says No* was considered inappropriate in the context of federal/state responsibilities and for the Howard Government's failure to adequately consult with the states.

#### 8.4 A Public Relations Exercise?

The final key theme to emerge from stage one concerned the Howard Government's political pragmatism and the value of *Australia Says No* as a public relations exercise to advance the government's social and political agenda. Consistent with the critique of the Howard Government's political opportunism and their advertising outlined in Chapter Three, media commentators were critical of *Australia Says No* and described it as partisan political advertising. Colleen Egan (2004), for example, argued:

They waste our money in the pursuit of power and pretend the advertising is, in fact, aimed at valuable public education. Truth is, the priority is promoting themselves. ...The Howard Government's new \$20 million anti-domestic violence campaign ... may not be the most blatant pre-election money waster (that award might go to the Anti-Terror Fridge Magnet of 2002) but it ranks among the more bizarre. Saddled with the not very hip and creative title of "Violence against women: Australia says no", the campaign is supposed to appeal to young people. That's why most of the actors are not teenagers and they look like potential Liberal voters. ...Coincidentally, the accompanying brochure means we've all paid for John Howard to put his photo over the word "values" in our letterboxes just months from a federal election. At least somebody will get value for the \$20 million.

Similarly, Gail Williams (2004) linked *Australia Says No* to the Howard Government's election campaigns and argued: "Governments are adept at alerting the community to fearsome aspects of society and then letting them know they are doing something about it". These media commentators thus argued *Australia Says No* was an example of Howard Government political opportunism and not a genuine attempt to reduce male violence against women.

A similar criticism of the Howard Government was raised by key informants. *Taskforce Members 1 & 8* and *Peak Body Representative 3* connected *Australia Says No* to government elections and political pragmatism. They argued that through *Australia Says No* the Howard Government wanted to be seen to be doing the right thing around election times and this campaign was important to help the government court the women's vote. Extending this argument, *State Public Servant 10*, suggested *Australia Says No* "feels a bit like platitudes ...it seems like the target audience is Australia per se as opposed to women who are affected by domestic violence". Similarly, *State Public Servant 14* described *Australia Says No* as "tasteful little sound bites" and "easily consumed messages" where

“they seem to be doing something when in reality you’re doing nothing”. The *Opposition MP* also argued:

...their response has generally been about being seen to be doing something rather than actually doing something. So I think that they have been eager to be seen to be tackling the problem but they haven't put much effort into doing the things that we know work ...it seems to me in some cases they've deliberately ignored doing the right thing to do the more high profile or popular thing. ...I think it's immoral to play politics with that sort of stuff.

These key informants thus argued *Australia Says No* was electoral populism rather than a genuine effort to appropriately respond to, and reduce, male violence against women.

It is not surprising that the six key informants quoted above were critical of *Australia Says No* in this way since all were outside of the Howard Government. Key informants from within the federal public service, however, also suggest *Australia Says No* was partisan political advertising. *Federal Public Servant 4* argued: “It was such a problem because the Government didn't want a ...sort of a prevention attitude change, they wanted their nice ads on TV”. Similarly, *Federal Public Servant 2* argued the Howard Government were only interested in: “big campaigns that are going to get them votes ...just a big, showy advertisement, which is what the Howard Government really loved to do because it looks like they're really doing something and it's, they're not that effective”. This key informant continued:

...they send that book around to every household so every household out there that doesn't have violence in it, every voter out there's going, “good old John Howard, he's doing stuff, it is totally unacceptable this violence against women, look at them doing something”. Now every Australian doesn't know that that's a crock and it's bad policy and it actually could have not only, it could actually have negative consequences for people, so all they give a shit about is that they look, appear to be doing something, and this is the most convenient way of appearing to be doing something ...so, you're going to impress people who don't know anything about domestic violence, sexual assault (*Federal Public Servant 2*).

These federal public servants thus argued the Howard Government was more concerned with politics than the risks the approach may have posed for women experiencing violence or the potential to change the behaviour of male perpetrators. This supports the proposition that *Australia Says No* was partisan political advertising focused on electoral advantage.

Extending this argument, the *Opposition MP* suggested *Australia Says No* was not just about political opportunism. She argued the campaign fit with the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda and reflected a strategic political use of this issue with few political risks:

I mean there's no one in the community arguing any longer that men should be able to hit their wives, or emotionally abuse them or whatever else. So running a campaign that says it's wrong to hit your wife or girlfriend, that's not a difficult decision to make. To take another step and say a lot of this is about power and control issues, a lot of this is about the relationship between men and women in society more generally, that is a more difficult decision. So I think that they've taken the first step in articulating what everyone believes, what almost everyone believes anyway that it's not a good thing to hit someone and they've sort of sort to take credit for tackling the problem but they haven't gone the next step that would genuinely begin to tackle the problem. ...There's no political cost to it and every government has to have some sort of social policy things that they run on. Even the most conservative governments have, it's bad to hurt children and small furry animals. Like there's always some sort of, people always look for a human face on any government and it's not, what they've done has not cost them at all politically, it hasn't cost them much financially either, but it certainly hasn't cost them anything politically and they've not really gone the next step to tackling the more difficult issues which may have cost them politically.

Another key informant also believed the purpose of *Australia Says No* was to generate support for the Howard Government by obscuring their conservative social policy agenda which damaged women's inequality as discussed in Chapter Four. *Taskforce Member 4* argued:

General public response to it gave a lot of confidence in the Government and I think if you were really to kind of unpack it a bit further you could say, well, there's this Government that kind of espouses these '50s families views that frighten a lot of people but then if there's this ability of the Government to put forward things about saying well we hold those values but we don't support inequality. There's all sorts of messages that come across in that that says yes we do think that the, we believe in the kind of sacredness of marriage etcetera but we don't believe in inequality. So I think it was the timing of it, all of those things, I'd say it was quite, I don't think it was an accident.

For these key informants, *Australia Says No* thus provided the Howard Government the opportunity to put "a human face" on their government, "obscure their conservative agenda" and "show they were doing something about a serious social issue" without significant political risks.

Other key informants argued the Howard Government's greater concern with being seen to be doing something rather than the substance of the campaign was illustrated by their treatment of Indigenous Australians. Despite its separate Indigenous component, *Taskforce Member 7*, *Academic 3*, and *State Public Servants 12 & 13* critiqued *Australia Says No* as culturally inappropriate and superficial. Consequently, *State Public Servants 12 & 13* who were both from the Northern Territory, recounted how they attempted to negotiate with the Howard Government to develop a complementary, culturally appropriate, Indigenous campaign. This campaign was funded by the Northern Territory Government and developed for Indigenous Australians to tie in with *Australia Says No*. These key informants recalled they contacted the Howard Government as a courtesy because they were trying to link the two campaigns and they encountered significant opposition. According to *State Public Servant 13*, the Howard Government:

...got legal advice and that we couldn't ...It actually went further than saying us, it was nobody, anywhere, could use any component of their campaign – couldn't adapt it, couldn't use it. And I just couldn't believe it because we were again trying from the start to do something co-operative, that in no way contradicted what their message was. It was trying to localise it, it was trying to get broader coverage, it was trying to do all this stuff and we had thought that we had support all along the way.

These key informants recounted in detail how the Howard Government actively blocked the Northern Territory Government's attempt to make *Australia Says No* more culturally appropriate. They argued that their experiences suggested the Howard Government had a greater concern with the *Australia Says No* branding and being seen to be doing something rather than actually eliminating male violence against women in Indigenous communities.

Key informants also suggested that the Howard Government utilised *Australia Says No* to counter criticisms by the UN of the Howard Government's previous CEDAW reports. As outlined in Chapter Four, the Howard Government had distanced themselves from UN structures and refused to observe international obligations in response to UN criticism of Australians poor performance regarding CEDAW, Indigenous Australians and asylum seekers. At the same time, however, Howard Government policies such as the invasion of Iraq nevertheless relied on an appearance of cooperation with the UN (Baldino, 2005, p.194). It was therefore important for the Howard Government to balance their non-cooperation with UN and other international agencies with the appearance of being a cooperative global citizen.

For some key informants this history with the United Nations and the Howard Government's obligations under, and criticism by, CEDAW played a role in *Australia Says No*. *Taskforce Member 2* argued *Australia Says No* was directly related: "to the criticism from the UN about Australia's performance on CEDAW ...a reaction to the criticism from the reports, the Australian reports to the UN, about its response to domestic and family violence and being, needed to be seen to be doing something". Similarly, *Federal Public Servant 6* and *Taskforce Member 7* argued Australia's obligations under CEDAW played a role in *Australia Says No*. *Taskforce Member 7* also argued: "it's something they can trot out in the UN, the reports to the UN around the Commission on the Status of Women, they always trot that campaign out. So from a PR, marketing, international obligation perspective it gives them something they can hang their head on". Consistent with these comments, one media commentator stated *Australia Says No* was "just window-dressing designed to help the Government comply with the United Nations Declaration of Elimination of Violence Against Women" (Fynes-Clinton, 2004). From these perspectives, *Australia Says No* was thus part of the Howard Government's political opportunism in international as well as domestic political contexts.

The arguments outlined above indicate that the Howard Government may have an additional purpose for *Australia Says No* beyond their professed commitment to preventing and responding to violence against women. They suggest the Howard Government's approach to the campaign was grounded in political pragmatism and was about showing the government were doing something about a serious social issue without exposing themselves to any significant political risks.

## 8.5 Discussion

This chapter has explored key themes which emerged from stage one of the study. First, was the dissonance between key informants' positive and negative assessments of the Howard Government's male violence against women policies and broader social policy agenda. Second, was the proposition *Australia Says No* may have represented a progressive engagement between feminism and the Howard Government since it was consistent with feminist rhetoric and practice responding to male violence against women. Third, was the concept of wasted opportunities and that *Australia Says No* may be considered a missed opportunity and an inappropriate campaign in the broader social, political and historical context. Fourth, was the proposition *Australia Says No* was partisan

political advertising focused on electoral populism and being seen to do something rather than being an appropriate response to male violence against women. When considered together, these themes provide an important foundation to make sense of this period and theorise how the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women may be conceptualised from a feminist perspective.

As outlined in Chapter Three, some feminists (e.g. Genovese, 2000; Ramsay, 2004) have interpreted government responses to male violence against women in terms of a politics of chivalry. From this perspective it is argued governments may offer highly visible responses to male violence against women which focus on rescuing or protecting the victim while doing little to challenge inequality between women and men. Feminists usually argue male violence against women is underpinned by individual (micro), institutional (mezzo) and structural (macro) factors. Consequently, feminists who interpret certain government policies as policies of chivalry suggest the neglect of institutional and structural factors in these responses undermines their capacity to reduce or adequately respond to male violence against women.

Analysis of the dissonance in key informants' assessments of the Howard Government's approaches suggests this understanding of policy as chivalry offers one possible way the government's approaches may be conceptualised from a feminist perspective. The Howard Government's initiatives, such as *Partnerships*, were highly visible responses to male violence against women. The extent of publicity and the number of publications released by the Howard Government as part of the *Partnerships* program as discussed in Chapter Six also suggests a deliberate strategy to make these programs highly visible. Further, the exploration of whether *Australia Says No* was a public relations exercise more so than a community education campaign highlights the highly visible nature of the Howard Government's approaches. These approaches therefore reflect the first key element of policies of chivalry understandings by being highly visible responses to male violence against women.

The Howard Government's initiatives such as *Partnerships* also focussed on protecting and rescuing women and children as victims of male violence at a micro level. *Partnerships* does not explicitly consider connections between the micro level of individual behaviour and the broader social context, either mezzo or macro levels, which feminists argue play an important role in male violence against women. This point is illustrated in the Statement of Principles guiding *Partnerships* (see Appendix 6.1) and the six *Partnerships* priority themes

outlined in Chapter Six. *Partnerships* principles and themes such as “protecting people at risk” not only explicitly focus on ‘protection’, but also reflect micro or at best mezzo level understandings of violence. These principles and themes suggest domestic violence is about individuals and relationships and they do not situate domestic violence in the broader institutional or structural context. Thus, the Howard Government’s approaches reflect the second key element of policies of chivalry understandings by focusing on rescuing or protecting victims of violence.

Key informants also argued the Government’s broader social policy agenda had a detrimental impact on women, and particularly on women who had experienced violence, by undermining women’s equality and increasing their vulnerability to violence. As discussed above, the specific examples key informants used to argue this point included: the Howard Government’s dismantling of the women’s policy machinery; industrial relations and welfare reform agendas, changes to family law; and inadequate funding of SAAP. This suggests the third and final element of policies of chivalry, that the government does little to challenge the inequality between men and women, is also apparent in the Howard Government’s approaches.

Conceptualising the Howard Government’s approaches to male violence against women as policies of chivalry thus offers one possible way the dissonance in key informants’ assessments of the Howard Government can be explained from a feminist perspective. The Howard Government’s approaches offered highly visible responses to male violence against women. Although not including macro or mezzo level understandings, these responses had the third component of feminist understandings by addressing micro factors. In this context, key informants’ positive assessments of the Howard Government’s specific initiatives such as *Partnerships* make sense. Simultaneously, key informants’ assessments of the Howard Government’s broader social policy agenda were negative because they argued the Howard Government undermined women’s equality with men and increased their vulnerability to violence. Consistent with feminists who use policy of chivalry understandings, some key informants argued the Howard Government’s positive and highly visible responses to male violence against women were meaningless in this broader social policy context. Conceptualising the Howard Government’s approaches as policies of chivalry thus offers one way of explaining the dissonance in key informants’ assessments of the government’s specific male violence against women policies and broader social policy agenda.



This conceptualisation as policies of chivalry is not, however, entirely consistent with key informants' negative assessments of the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda. Feminists (e.g. Ramsay, 2004) who use policy as chivalry understandings argue the government has little or no achievement toward women's equality at structural (macro) and institutional (mezzo) levels. For the Howard Government, however, key informants argued the government's broader social policy agenda was actually regressive and harmful to women's progress towards equality rather than static. Further, the other themes explored in this chapter of wasted opportunities and whether *Australia Says No* was a feminist campaign or a public relations exercise do not make sense if the Howard Government's approaches are only conceptualised as policies of chivalry. It is therefore useful to explore another way the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women may be conceptualised from a feminist perspective.

As outlined in Chapter Three, some feminists (e.g. Chappell, 2002b; Laing, 2008; McFerren, 1990; Morris, 2008; Murray, 2005; Radford & Stanko, 1996) argue that certain government responses to male violence against women may be understood as policies of cooption. From this perspective, responses exist on a continuum from the absence of remedy to doing harm to women. At the far end of this continuum, feminists argue governments only respond to this violence to protect and maintain women's consent to patriarchal institutions such as heterosexuality and traditional family. In doing so, these governments oppress more radical aspects of feminism and the feminist critiques of patriarchy accompanying feminist responses to male violence against women. Further, some feminists (e.g. Bacchi, 1999b; Laing, 2008; Radford & Stanko, 1996) argue responses to male violence against women may be coopted by conservative governments to win support for their own agendas. They argue that these responses, contrary to feminist intentions, individualise the crime and these governments embark on a range of interventions harmful to victims and perpetrators.

The theoretical lens of policies of cooption offers another way of understanding key informants' positive assessments of the content of *Australia Says No* and their negative assessments of the campaign in context. The Howard Government adopted feminist rhetoric and responses to male violence against women as illustrated by the government's use of feminist language and concepts in *Australia Says No*. In their approaches to male violence against women, however, the Howard Government also simultaneously oppressed more radical challenges to patriarchy (macro level) and traditional heterosexuality (mezzo level) that were available to them. This argument is supported by the Howard Government's

replacement of *No Respect*, a primary and secondary prevention strategy which addressed problematic gender dynamics in all relationships (macro, mezzo and micro understandings), with *Australia Says No*, a tertiary intervention campaign addressing individual violent behaviour (micro understanding).

The proposition that *Australia Says No* was a public relations exercise as explored in this chapter also suggests the Howard Government used this campaign to maximise their political advantages while limiting their political risks. Through *Australia Says No* the government appeared to be doing something about this serious social issue while simultaneously representing male violence against women in a limited, individualised (micro) way that most Australians would not challenge. In this respect it appears that Howard Government political pragmatism eclipsed a genuine attempt to tackle and respond to this issue of male violence against women in all its complexity. Understanding the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women as policies of cooption thus offers a useful alternative way of making sense of this period.

By conceptualising the Howard Government's approaches as policies of cooption, it is possible to make sense of the strategic value of *Australia Says No* in advancing the Howard Government's social and political agenda nationally and internationally. As discussed in Chapter Four, there was extensive criticism of the Howard Government's 1950's 'white picket fence' social conservatism and its negative impact on women and women's equality. The Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women and their use of feminist rhetoric and understandings enabled the government to show they were doing something about a serious social issue of particular concern to women. This strategy had two possible positive outcomes for the Howard Government. First, was to "put a human face" on the government and balance possible concerns women might feel due to the negative impact of the Howard Government's social conservatism on women's equality. Second, *Australia Says No* offered the government the opportunity to counter criticism of their previous reports to CEDAW and appear to be a good global citizen. These arguments suggest *Australia Says No* may be an example of what feminists critique as responses to male violence against women that are coopted by conservative governments to win support for the government's social and political agenda.

The analysis of the Howard Government's approaches as both policies of chivalry and policies of cooption suggests this government's policies and ideologies were complex and varied rather than monolithic and make sense of the apparently contradictory findings in the

key themes explored above. The analysis also suggests a change in the nature of the Howard Government's approaches over time and the likely significant impact of the government's intentional and increasing exclusion of feminist activists from the policy process. This may explain why conceptualisations of the Howard Government's approaches as policies of chivalry emerged mainly from discussions of *Partnerships* (the earlier initiative), and those as policies of cooption emerged mainly from discussions of *Australia Says No* (the later initiative).

Analysis of these findings from stage one responds to the research question for this thesis. Chapters Six, Seven and Eight provided a detailed account of the male violence against women policy field during the Howard years, and identified key moments, issues and debates. This account raised a number of issues relating to feminist engagement with the state. From a feminist perspective, the Australian Government's approaches to male violence against women during the Howard years can be understood as policies of chivalry *and* policies of cooption. Further, although it appears the Howard Government explicitly rejected feminism, there was strategic political value in the government responding to a feminist issue such as male violence against women using feminist rhetoric and understandings of this issue. This understanding offers a possible explanation for how and why the coalition of conservative political parties in the Howard Government provided such a sustained and comparatively well-funded public policy response to male violence against women between 1996 and 2007.

From stage one of the study three additional issues emerged related to the research question which would be best to explore further in the case studies in stage two. First was the significance of the broader social and political context to understanding Howard Government approaches to male violence against women. Second was the dramatic impact of policy process and the role of individuals in shaping the content and nature of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women. In particular, was the unexpected finding that feminists inside and outside of government developed a productive engagement with the Howard Government; a government they argued was hostile to women's interests. Third was the dissonance between key informants' positive assessments of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women and negative assessments of the impact of the Howard Government's broader policy agenda on women who had experienced violence. Although this dissonance could be explained by conceptualising the Howard Government's approaches as policies of chivalry and cooption, it was unusual that key informants were not more critical of this Government's

approaches given their personal and professional experiences. That is, the majority of key informants identified themselves as feminists with rich experiences with the feminist movement and various Australian governments. Stage two of the study, which consists of in-depth case studies of *Partnerships* and *Australia Says No* explores these issues in more depth. The findings from stage two are examined in the following two chapters.

# **Chapter Nine**

## **Case Study 1:**

### ***Partnerships Against Domestic Violence***

---

Feminist approaches and the femocrat strategy have conventionally dominated national male violence against women policy. This chapter examines the ongoing salience of the femocrat strategy during the Howard years by exploring *Partnerships* as a case study of policy process. The literature outlined in Chapters Three and Four suggests the Howard Government's neo-liberalism, social conservatism, and political opportunism undermined the femocrat strategy and women's equality. It also suggests the Australian Government's interaction with feminism during the Howard years was a history of animosity and decline. This period is therefore usually represented as a constraint, rather than a political opportunity structure, for feminists working within or with the federal public service. The following chapter develops insights into process and context as well as the capacity, strategies, and political opportunity structures (POS) exploited by feminists to advance their agendas despite the conservatism of the Howard Government. It tells an important story of continuities and discontinuities in the femocrat strategy during the Howard years.

#### **9.1 Continuities**

The case study of *Partnerships* in this chapter suggests there were continuities in the femocrat strategy and feminists had an ongoing salience and influence on the Australian Government's approaches to male violence against women during the Howard years in two main ways. First, was the ongoing nature of policy activism and the impact of key actors in the policy process. This included the continued influence of feminism and its impact on understandings of male violence against women even amongst conservative politicians. Second, was the significant intergovernmental cooperation evident in the *Partnerships* Taskforce and how femocrats used this policy machinery as a political opportunity structure. This contradicts the suggestion that conservative governments and the policy machinery they develop are a constraint to feminists. It also draws attention to the potential of

federalism to facilitate progressive social policy in this area despite the Howard Government's open hostility to feminism.

### **9.1.1 Understandings of violence, policy activism, and individual roles**

The Howard Government's championing of paternalism and erosion of participatory conceptions of democracy as outlined in Chapter Four suggest policy activism was unlikely to be successful during this period. In this context, Ramsay's (2004) findings about the important role of policy activism and feminism in earlier federal responses to male violence against women were unlikely to be relevant in the Howard years. Key informant comments about policy process indicate, however, the continued importance of policy activism and feminism to this period. This was particularly apparent in the roles and identities of key informants, their expressed commitment to feminism and their policy activism.

The positioning of many key informants as policy activists in the *Partnerships* policy process was apparent in their roles, identities and acknowledged feminist politics. Although no key informants used the terms 'femocrat' or 'policy activist' to describe themselves, two recurring features of key informants' responses in the interviews reflected the continued applicability of these terms to this period. The first was the self-identification of many key informants as feminists and their use of feminist definitions and understandings of violence. The second was the policy activism evident in the roles and actions of a number of the key informants in the policy process.

The self-identification of many key informants as feminists demonstrated the continued importance of feminism to the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women since the majority played an active role in the government's policy processes. Fifteen of the thirty key informants directly identified themselves as "feminists" without prompting. Based on their responses to questions, it is likely a further ten key informants would describe themselves as feminists if asked. Of the two men interviewed, one described himself in pro-feminist terms. A number of key informants also made reference to the ongoing importance of feminism to their work responding to male violence against women as illustrated by *Federal Public Servant 4*:

...we were strong feminists then and it's interesting I think even though it might be sort of, it has become a bit passé, but the principles I think are still entrenched, aren't they, in the work

that's being done even at a policy level. If you go back and analyse it all, it's sort of feminist principles isn't it – even though people don't want to call it that ...But it still was there.

Those key informants identifying as feminists represented a diversity of feminist views including radical, liberal, and post-modern feminism. Some women also said that although they identified as feminists they recognised limitations of feminism and utilised other complementary perspectives such as understandings of race, class and other aspects of diversity.

Many key informants' definitions of male violence against women reflected feminist understandings. Nineteen of the thirty key informants provided a definition or articulated their understandings of male violence against women. Of these nineteen, sixteen provided definitions which reflect elements of feminist understandings of male violence against women. These definitions drew on feminist concepts such as: power and control; violence as an enactment women's inequality with men; the gendered nature of violence; references to patriarchy; and violence as an expression of male authority or oppression reinforcing women's subordination. Some examples included:

...so it would be a kind of feminist analysis, so I'd see violence against women as sort of, another form of gender, it's an enactment of gender inequality in a sense. So it's a form of oppression against women, primarily it's a tool used by men in the sort of, the privacy of homes and the privacy of their spaces, and includes a range of behaviour from the kind of physical through to emotional, psychological, financial, stalking, that kind of thing (*Evaluator 1*).

Obviously physical violence, sexual violence, I don't think there's much to gain by sort of trying to list it. It's just anything that is designed to control women, to be cruel to women (*Government MP 2*).

Violence against women from my philosophical point of view is around expressions of patriarchy in a patriarchal society ...Women are an oppressed gender in our society in our view and individual males are expressing social male power which is entrenched through all institutions and structures and legislation and ideology throughout our societies (*Peak Body Representative 3*).

Even key informants who did not identify as feminists and who provided more conservative definitions (e.g. *Government MP 1*) also reflected a feminist influence such as recognising the gendered nature of the violence. Given the prominent role of many key informants in the *Partnerships* policy process this active feminist positioning is significant. It suggests that

feminist understandings that have conventionally dominated national policy responses to male violence against women continued to play a prominent role amongst key players in the policy process during the Howard years.

Key informants' biographies and their varied roles and identities suggest participants in the *Partnerships* policy process engaged in extensive policy activism working across insider/outsider boundaries. This was apparent in the diversity of reported roles and responsibilities where almost half occupied at least two relevant roles in the Howard years. A significant majority of key informants had diverse and shifting personal biographies reflecting their commitment to feminism and policy activism working against male violence against women. *Taskforce Member 1*, for example, clearly articulated this activist commitment in her comment: "we were very passionate about our jobs and about where our loyalties and, the, our sisterhood". It is not possible to provide specific examples of career transitions without potentially revealing key informant identities. Generally, these included careers moving between: the policy machinery of state and federal governments as femocrats; the women's community or state government service delivery sector (refuges, sexual assault services, feminist training organisations); or as feminist activists in academic positions. The fluidity of boundaries and consistency of ideological commitment to male violence against women in these career transitions as well as the maintenance of relationships across these boundaries illustrate how many of the key informants were policy activists. Moreover, some key informants explicitly described how their involvement in *Partnerships* was an expression of their feminist commitment and policy activism.

All three politicians interviewed also referred to a personal history of domestic violence policy activism even though two were in a government openly hostile to feminism. Two referred to their association with women's domestic violence refuges, one to an association with a national feminist organisation, and one to a previous femocrat job. One referred to this history and association with domestic violence as one of the reasons they entered politics. The fact that all three politicians openly acknowledged policy activist histories and associations with the women's movement is significant. It suggests that far from being on the periphery of policy making, policy activism and feminism has been mainstreamed as a legitimising feature and activity for policy and political actors responding to male violence against women. These comments suggest the femocrat strategy, feminism and policy activism had an ongoing impact on the Australian Government's male violence against women policy processes during the Howard years.



The important role of policy actors in progressing *Partnerships* illustrated its dependence on the values, commitment, policy activism, and feminism of these policy actors. These comments were in direct contrast to a disembodied, traditional, rational or structuralist understanding of policy process moving through specified cycles or stages. The following comment by *Academic 3* about her impressions of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women overall illustrate the importance of feminist policy activism to this period:

I think piecemeal, I think ill-informed, ill-thought through and visionless. I mean I just don't think there has really been a long term strategic vision for what could have been done for women and for kids and families and beyond but for women principally in dealing with what is on anyone's view and absolute epidemic of violence given the numbers that we have. That's as a whole. If I looked at the policy kind of umbrella I reckon that for me defines it. Underneath that it's always more complex and I think there were moments when there were people in positions who genuinely wanted to do much better than that and they would have moments where they would use power for good and not evil and they would do whatever they could within those confines I think to do good work. ...I worked with and met people and saw the ways in which they tried to subvert or push the parameters as much as they could but all without kind of tipping the boat or tipping the scales or being noticed.

Similarly, *Federal Public Servant 4* commented about *Partnerships*: "I've learnt how important individuals are and it shouldn't be that way in a way, should it? That it should, whatever's happening should rely on much, something much solidier than an individual's charisma, or intelligence, or ability to persuade. That's how it happens". One example given by a number of key informants about the importance of the policy activism of individuals was comparisons between Howard Government Ministers Jocelyn Newman and Amanda Vanstone. Ministers Newman and Vanstone were Minister Assisting the Prime Minister on the Status of Women between 1997-2000 and 2001-2004 respectively.

Minister Newman was reportedly integral to the early successes of *Partnerships* (*Taskforce Members 1, 5, 8 & 10* and *Federal Public Servant 4*). According to key informants, Minister Newman was a liberal feminist who had a history with feminist organisations and was enthusiastic about responding to domestic violence. *Taskforce Members 5* and *10* argued her focus on getting as much traction for *Partnerships* as possible and her determination to "put her mark" on that initiative meant she was a strong advocate for *Partnerships*. *Federal Public Servant 4* recalled how Minister Newman was really behind *Partnerships* and "valued the states coming together". This commitment to federal-state partnerships and participatory

conceptions of democracy reflects a fundamental feature of policy activism identified by Yeatman (1998, p.34). Minister Newman's feminist politics and commitment to combating male violence against women in partnership with the states is therefore an important example of the importance of individuals and policy activism in the *Partnerships* policy process.

In contrast to Minister Newman, key informants reported Minister Vanstone was not interested in male violence against women or participatory and functional federal-state relationships. Three key informants argued Minister Vanstone's lack of enthusiasm and disinterest, her conflict with OSW First Assistant Secretary Rosemary Calder, and refusal to sign briefs impacted significantly on the progress of *Partnerships* (*Federal Public Servant 5* and *Taskforce Members 2 & 10*). *Federal Public Servants 4* and *5* argued Minister Vanstone negatively impacted on *Partnerships* and it deteriorated and lost its flexibility and momentum despite its significant support from the Prime Minister's office. This contrast between Ministers Newman and Vanstone suggests the significance of the support, feminism and policy activism of key individuals in the success of *Partnerships*.

Minister Newman was, however, only one example of the policy activism of individuals mentioned by key informants as playing a significant role in *Partnerships*. Two of the other examples provided, Pru Goward and Rosemary Calder (successive First Assistant Secretaries of OSW), suggest the value of policy activism in describing the *Partnerships* policy process outside of traditional understandings of feminism. Key informants described Goward and Calder as anti-feminist or non-feminist respectively despite them being in femocrat positions and engaging in policy activism. The strength of the contradictory comments from key informants about Goward and Calder's roles in the *Partnerships* policy process was notable. There was a split between some participants who saw them as harmful or ineffective and others who saw them as playing a fundamental positive role. Policy activism provides a useful analytical frame to help make sense of these apparent contradictions.

As discussed in Chapter Three, although policy activism is commonly associated with progressive social movements this is not universal (Brennan, 1998, p.103). Goward and Calder need not be feminists to be policy activists; they only needed to attain an 'insider' status and either transform assumptions and practices of the dominant agenda or resist change through policy activism. Despite their reported anti-feminism or non-feminism respectively, Goward and Calder acted in ways which suggested they were policy activists,

perhaps even feminist policy activists, and it was apparently their relationship with feminism rather than their policy activism that prompted criticism. Brennan's argument that policy activists need not be from progressive social movements and may be advocating resistance to change or the status quo seems an appropriate description of Goward. Goward reportedly said: "it is important to question how representative some women's groups are and that governments must listen to 'the 'silent majority'" (Gunn, 1999). Her claim to be listening to the 'silent majority' and her tenacious pursuit of *Partnerships* funding as described by *Federal public servants 4 & 5* and *Government MP 2* suggest Goward was, despite her anti-feminist statements, pursuing liberal feminist goals using policy activism.

Alternatively, unlike many of her predecessors who were policy activists attracted to the bureaucracy, key informants' comments suggest Calder was an example of a bureaucrat whose policy activism and feminism were nurtured in the bureaucracy (Dugdale, 1998, p.105). Calder was a career bureaucrat who reportedly did not originally have a feminist or gendered analysis of male violence against women (*Taskforce Member 1* and *Evaluator 2*). Nevertheless, key informants described Calder as open to the findings of *Partnerships* research and, over time, convinced of the importance of understanding male violence against women as a gendered issue. Comments by *Taskforce member 8*, *Evaluator 2* and *Federal public servant 5* suggest Calder increasingly employed what Dugdale (1998, p.119) terms "deep insider" policy activism including a pragmatic ethics and ability to straddle the divide between the bureaucracy and the women's movement to progress both *Partnerships* and the *National Initiative*. Calder's policy activism is particularly notable given Minister Vanstone's lack of support. *Taskforce Members 8 & 10* and *Evaluator 2* argued that Calder's policy activism played a role in her conflict and animosity with Minister Vanstone and eventuated in her leaving OSW. This suggest Calder was an example of a policy activist who sacrificed bureaucratic advancement to their commitment to the issues (Dugdale, 1998, p.107). The nature of the policy activism of Goward and Calder thus suggests the value of policy activism and the continued relevance of the femocrat strategy to federal male violence against women policy during the Howard years.

### **9.1.2 The femocrat strategy continues?: The *Partnerships* Taskforce, political opportunity structures and intergovernmental cooperation**

The feminism and policy activism of Taskforce members, individually and in relationship to each other, had a significant impact on the nature and development of *Partnerships* according to key informants as illustrated by the first Taskforce meeting. Key informants

described this meeting as involving significant tension and conflict amongst Taskforce members mainly because of the non-proportional allocation of funding. Taskforce members were reportedly able to put aside their differences, however, and tried “to get the best we possibly can out of this money” (*Taskforce Member 8*). This decision to prioritise domestic violence over state-based loyalties reflected Taskforce members’ policy activism and commitment to feminism. *Taskforce Member 1* described how Taskforce members bonded closely as a team and were loyal to feminism, domestic violence and each other over state-based loyalties: Similarly, *Evaluator 2* commented:

...there was a total commitment to changing things for women and I think that level of commitment does not come across in most government state/commonwealth because I've done things like [other] agreements and funding and all of that sort of thing and that's not the way it works. And there was a genuine respect and caring and support for the women, each other on the Taskforce.

Further, *Federal Public Servant 4* explained any animosity and conflict amongst Taskforce members was negated by the significant respect for each other and their commitment to the issue of domestic violence. This loyalty, respect and commitment reflects Taskforce members' policy activism and suggests the ongoing salience of the femocrat strategy in the Howard years.

Many members of the Taskforce were also reportedly committed to maintaining a feminist approach to domestic violence in *Partnerships*, and convinced non-feminist Taskforce members of the importance of this. As *Taskforce Member 8* argued:

We did actually manage to get the ‘f’ word in, in the end, as you would believe. ...We did manage to talk about feminism, and be happy to talk about feminism towards the end, but it was certainly at the beginning we weren't all feminists. Not everyone who was sitting around the table was and was comfortable with that concept.

Further, for *Federal Public Servant 4* the *Partnerships* policy machinery was important in maintaining feminist responses to domestic violence during the Howard years. She argued state representatives would not let the Australian Government “get away with anything that was shonky or that was really not representing the issue fully” and strongly advocated for feminist responses to domestic violence. Not all key informants perceived this strategy as entirely successful, however. *Academic 1*, for example, argued *Partnerships* was a confused policy with a “mismatch of bits of feminism thrown in with bits of family dysfunction”. She attributed this to tensions within the Taskforce including “women’s reps

around the country tussling with the Government over what it [domestic violence] was”. Nevertheless, overall, policy activism reportedly helped to maintain feminist perspectives in Australian Government domestic violence policy despite the conservative, anti-feminist political context.

The loyalty and policy activism of femocrats reportedly underpinned the ongoing role of feminism in domestic violence policy development and the success of *Partnerships* as an example of intergovernmental cooperation. *Taskforce Member 2* described *Partnerships* as unique with its strengths of collaboration across federal and state jurisdictions, sharing information, and enabling innovation. Similarly, key informants argued the *Partnerships 1* policy machinery was: “a model of Commonwealth-State cooperation”, “a unique commitment to working in partnership with state governments”, “a proper partnership” and “one of the best examples of partnering that there has ever been” (*Federal Public Servant 4 & 5, Evaluator 2 and Taskforce Members 5, 7 & 8*). *Evaluator 2* and *Taskforce Member 8* attributed this success directly to the feminist commitments of Taskforce members. *Evaluator 2* also argued:

...it wasn't argy bargy about who gets the money and who jumps over somebody else. It was totally focussed on the clients, these are the women we're concerned about and it was never said this way, as feminists we have a chance to really make a difference with this pool of money.

Similarly, *Taskforce Member 8* described *Partnerships* as “the best Commonwealth/state experience that I have ever had and I have had a few of them in various roles in government”. She argued this was because of the collaboration amongst Taskforce members and willingness to distribute funding disproportionately based on project needs rather than the traditional per capita funding demanded in Australian federalism. These experiences and perspectives suggest *Partnerships 1* reflected the continued salience of the femocrat strategy in making use of formal structures of federalism and intergovernmental cooperation to develop progressive social policy. They also suggest the feminism and policy activism of Taskforce members and their commitment to domestic violence were fundamental to the successes of *Partnerships 1*.

The reported willingness to cooperate to ensure funding for domestic violence policy development suggests Taskforce members adopted the political pragmatism which was an important characteristic of the femocrat strategy as discussed in Chapter Three. Three key

informants, all of whom identified as feminists, demonstrated this political pragmatism in speaking of their experiences interacting with governments:

It's about using opportunities ...generally that consensus is an okay thing to build in public policy sense. ...these are the challenges for people working in any, for feminists working in any public policy area – if you see a policy opening notwithstanding that it might be used in a different way and in a different context – that issue about the conservative orientation towards the family, well as policy people we use it because it's an opportunity. So, conservative interest in the protection of the family you say, yeah, okay, let's go for it. It's about people having safe, nurturing, strong families that are capable of raising strong, nurturing, safe environments for children. No conservative is going to argue against that so it fits (*State Public Servant 5*).

...conservative governments can do reasonable things even when you think, even when their process is fucked, to know that this issue is a broader issue than traditionally aligned ...I learnt how to stay involved with bureaucratic systems and political figures. ...how not to give particular bureaucrats a hard time personally 'cause they work in systems. But also how to not embarrass ministers... because as soon as you've done that you're off their list. ...So, if you want to be in it you have to find pragmatic ways to do things (*Peak Body Representative 1*).

I guess it's that perspective that is something better than nothing? If it encourages a couple of people to take action who wouldn't normally have taken action that might be a good thing. It's such a big problem and because we haven't worked out the answers to it I guess my perspective is something is better than nothing and if there's going to be investment then we should take that. ...I learnt pretty quickly with [service] when I was director there about how important it was to engage in that political process and how powerful the advocate voices were (*Taskforce Member 3*).

All three key informants also described practical and pragmatic ways they engaged in the policy process to achieve their goals. This political and ideological pragmatism suggests the ongoing relevance and value of the femocrat strategy and policy activism to domestic violence policy development during the Howard years. It suggests feminist successes during the Howard years relied on feminists' pragmatism as well as their strategic use of the intergovernmental policy machinery as a political opportunity structure.

A final example of the ongoing importance of the femocrat strategy to the development of *Partnerships* was the policy activism of individual members of the Taskforce. *Taskforce Member 6* argued there was a tendency to underestimate how the energy of individuals pushed forward policy and much of *Partnerships'* strength was due to the relationships formed. Similarly, *Federal Public Servant 4* and *Taskforce Member 10* argued the strength

and successes of *Partnerships* related directly to the quality and nature of the individual representatives and strong personalities involved. Key informants identified a number of influential participants on the Taskforce including: head evaluator Tricia Szirom; federal bureaucrats Dianne Herriott and Robyn Waddington; and state representatives Pam Griffiths (NT), Robyn Henderson (NSW), Carol Kagi (WA), Penny Armytage (VIC), Debbie King (VIC) and Heather Nancarrow (QLD). Unlike Minister Newman, Rosemary Calder and Pru Goward, these influential participants were described by key informants as reflecting a more typical femocrat experience and strong commitment to feminist policy activism. Key informants' observations about the role of these individuals and the nature of their feminist policy activism suggest the femocrat strategy continued to play an important role in domestic violence policy development during the Howard years.

## 9.2 Discontinuities

Key informants' experiences also reveal a number of discontinuities in the policy process which suggest the Howard years were a period of decline for the femocrat strategy in this policy area. First was how the Howard Government undermined all nine key features of the femocrat strategy identified by Sawyer (1999, p.40)<sup>19</sup>. Second was the negative impact on *Partnerships* of Howard Government strategies for silencing dissent, actively opposing policy activism, and undermining the political neutrality expected of public servants in Westminster systems of government. Third was the transformation of the *Partnerships* Taskforce which undermined its progressive feminist goals.

### 9.2.1 From Office of the Status of Women (OSW) to Office for Women (OFW): More than just a change of name

Key informants argued the Howard Government's approach to OSW strategically undermined the women's policy machinery. This included detailed observations about the negative implications of this approach for the femocrat strategy and the specific role of *Partnerships* in this process. According to *Federal Public Servant 5*:

In the tough world of Prime Minister and Cabinet when you're dealing with Matters of State, capital 'M', capital 'S', to have something soft on women's issues or childcare or multi-cultural affairs is seen as pandering to a minority, it's not hard policy and it doesn't make a difference to the well-being of the country and the well-being of economics. It's about communities so it's

---

<sup>19</sup> As summarised in Chapter Two.

soft and it has to struggle to get oxygen. It's been a thankless job for every head of that Office and ...very few of them have gone on to stay in the public service. They are worn out by the time they've gone.

These observations suggest the Howard Government was biased against what it labelled 'special interest groups' (particularly women and feminists) and highlight the impact of the government's approaches on OSW staff. *Academic 1*, *Federal Public Servant 4*, *Government MP 2* and *Taskforce Member 7* also commented on the rapid turnover of staff at OSW which escalated over time. They argued frequent changes in OSW personnel made progressing *Partnerships* difficult; with the subsequent loss of corporate knowledge and absence of strong and informed leadership negatively impacting on its character and effectiveness.

The apparent diminished influence of feminism in OSW was also a significant indicator of the threat the Howard Government posed to the femocrat strategy. Under the Hawke and Keating Governments OSW had maintained an explicit feminist stance. This changed when the Howard Government was elected in 1996. The Howard Government's intolerance for feminism was illustrated by *Government MP 2*:

The Labor Party had a whole lot of people in there who were, well they were very left leaning and that meant that they had a super-feminist view of men that I think was a disadvantage to get men to take notice of what needed to be done. I think if you want to deal with somebody whose not behaving how you want them to you don't go about it that way. And I think we had a better ability to convince men – whether it's at the Cabinet table or whether it was in business..

*Federal Public Servant 4*, who worked in OSW for the Keating and Howard Governments, argued this strained relationship with feminism impacted on OSW's work and she recalled that after March 1996 OSW staff had to stop using the word 'feminist' in briefings:

We used to really have very strong sort of feminist analysis and absolutely explicitly in our briefings to ministers but the moment the Liberal Government came in that was – we couldn't use the word anymore. ...I think we had some probably explicit instructions and we weren't allowed to use the word 'Ms'.

Further, *State Public Servant 6* said she noticed a gradual trend away from feminist language and feminist analyses of male violence against women during the Howard years.



The impact of this shift from feminism was reportedly apparent in the Howard Government's male violence against women policy. *Taskforce Member 3* and *Academic 3* argued the Howard Government increasingly pressured OSW to move away from feminist perspectives on domestic violence in their policy development. *Taskforce Member 3* described the conflict generated and the pressure she observed from the Howard Government who "wanted to see it [domestic violence] as a communal issue or violence against everybody or family violence which included child abuse". *Academic 3* also argued the men's rights groups and backlash politics were very influential on the Howard Government. She argued OSW "were politically getting pressure from other ministers as I understood it and perhaps from the highest position that we were not to be talking about gender anymore in that Office". *State Public Servant 6* argued, however, that this was a gradual process and their policy advocacy meant OSW maintained some influence early in the Howard years which may help to explain the feminist influences apparent in *Partnerships*. These comments suggest, nevertheless, a discontinuity in the policy process where the Howard Government oversaw a gradual decline of the influence of feminism, OSW, and the femocrat strategy until OSW was "a mere shadow of its former self" (Gunn, 1999).

Fundamental changes at OSW reportedly undermined key features of the femocrat strategy including the wheel and spokes model according to key informants. *Academic 1*, *Peak Body Representative 1*, *Opposition MP*, and *Taskforce Members 9 & 10* commented on the shift in OSW from being a policy advisory agency to essentially a funds administration agency and the unwinding of its women's advisory capacity across the bureaucracy. *Federal Public Servant 5* described OSW under the Howard Government as "very much a poor cousin in policy terms" and "secretaries of departments were not inclined to take direction from the Office on matters they saw as their policy priorities". *Peak Body Representative 3* and *Academic 1* similarly argued a raft of bureaucratic changes at this time had a profound negative influence on how functional OSW were and their primary objective came to be "just keeping things off the front page, keeping things out of trouble really". *Taskforce Member 9* argued the implications of this shift in OSW were significant. She suggested administering significant grants-based programs such as *Partnerships* meant OSW's "eye came off things like watching what was going on in the Federal Family Court" and the growing power of anti-feminist men's groups.

*Taskforce Members 3* and *9* argued, however, that OSW's shift to a grants administration agency helped to strategically arrest the downsizing of OSW in the conservative political

climate. *Taskforce Member 9* suggested *Partnerships* offered an embattled OSW the opportunity to generate a strategically safer role by transforming itself:

I think the movement into *PADV* under the new Liberal Government for the commonwealth Office was a survival issue – it gave them a reason to continue to exist in what was a new, potentially hostile government. Don't forget that when the Howard Government came in and ...it was hello, we're not interested in gendered analyses and they publicly stood up and the Women's Office at that stage was how do we survive and *PADV* was a creation of it and the reality of it at my level is you take what you given and you use it.

The value of this perspective in understanding the changes to OSW is indicated by how often the Howard Government and OSW drew attention to the successes of *Partnerships* particularly in response to criticism (see for example: Goward, 2004; Newman, 1999b). Although therefore ensuring OSW's survival as an agency, this shift also fundamentally changed the nature of OSW's role and responsibilities from what they had been previously.

In this context of their comments about changes to OSW, *Taskforce Member 19* argued it was a logical and unsurprising final "kiss of death" to the femocrat strategy when the Howard Government transferred OSW out of DPMC and into the Department of Family and Community Services in 2004. Defending this move, Goward (2004) argued: "the concept of a women's office doing a mixture of policy and program administration in a central agency [is] out of step with modern public administration" and she challenged the mainstream public sector to apply a gender analysis to their work. She continued: "Frankly, the task of OSW was always an ambitious one; a few dozen policy officers challenging the carefully honed and negotiated Cabinet submissions of line departments with their hundreds of policy officers is doomed to end almost always in being ignored" (Goward, 2004). Goward's argument here is, however, illogical and more an argument for abolishing OSW altogether than moving it to a more junior portfolio.

That the Howard Government did not abolish OSW, but renamed it Office for Women (OFW), is symbolic. The removal of "status" from OSW's title is consistent with conservative ideology and with an apparent successful political strategy of gradually diminishing the power of the office. It also suggests the Howard Government were confident that in moving OSW, and renaming it OFW, they would successfully sever OSW's last ties to the femocrat strategy. OSW's survival, albeit in a down-graded form, may reflect their success in strategically transforming themselves into a grants administration agency that was not seen as too much of a threat to the Howard Government's conservative values.

### 9.2.2 “Silencing Dissent”<sup>20</sup>

The second significant discontinuity in the femocrat strategy during this period was the Howard Government’s “silencing dissent” in the public sector and NGOs. *Taskforce Members 3, 7 & 8, Federal Public Servants 2, 4 & 5, Opposition MP, Academics 1 & 3, Evaluator 2* and *Peak Body Representative 1* made specific reference to a “culture of fear” and the substantial level of control the Howard Government exercised over the public sector. *Opposition MP, Taskforce Member 7, Academic 1, and Federal Public Servant 2* also linked this culture of fear and gagging of public servants to OSW’s high turnover of staff and challenges in the *Partnerships* policy processes. These key informants argued the actions of the Howard Government and their tight control of the public service generated high levels of fear and anxiety amongst public servants and undermined their provision of ‘frank and fearless’ advice. Their comments suggest the culture of fear in the public sector during the Howard years as outlined in Chapter Four existed in women’s policy generally and domestic violence policy specifically. They also suggest this culture of fear impacted on Australian Government responses to male violence against women.

Two key informants argued that the Howard Government created a comparatively high degree of politicisation of the public sector. *Peak Body Representative 1* argued the politicisation of the public sector in the Howard years was exaggerated and generated more fear and higher levels of anxiety amongst federal public servants than their state colleagues. She argued “people were more frightened in Canberra” and the Howard Government’s crack down on leaks in particular generated high levels of anxiety and disempowerment amongst the public service. *Federal Public Servant 2* delineated her first hand experience of this culture of fear and harassment of dissenters which she argued was exacerbated in women’s policy because “Howard got in there and he systematically just started defunding and disempowering and disenfranchising that whole area”. These personal experiences suggest discontinuities with the femocrat strategy which relied on feminist policy activists being able to provide governments honest and open advice.

According to key informants, the Howard Government also undermined public sector neutrality and nurtured a culture of loyalty to the Government. *Federal Public Servant 5* argued their minister “wasn’t necessarily welcoming of frank and fearless advice”. For others (*Federal Public Servant 2, Opposition MP and Academic 3*), the government’s

---

<sup>20</sup> (Hamilton & Maddison, 2007)

politicisation of the public sector was systematic and insidious. These key informants argued the public service became highly politicised during the Howard years and *Federal Public Servant 2* argued:

I think that we spend a lot of our time doing things that we, writing, everything that we'd do to protect the Government and make sure we were never doing anything that would put it in an uncomfortable position even if it meant so that it wasn't ever put in a position to make a decision that might come back to haunt it. We would absorb all of that all of the time because otherwise we would just be considered belligerent or incompetent or juvenile or not professionals and just like this culture of like to be terribly tricky, and protective of the Government you're being terribly professional ...Oh, frank and fearless, frank's dead baby ...I just felt that my whole time was spent protecting the Government and doing political work.

This federal public servant also described a culture of loyalty and a variety of ways public servants operated to protect the Howard Government. She argued senior public servants "will just totally obfuscate they will do everything to protect ministers" and she used Senate Estimates Committee hearings as an example of this (*Federal Public Servant 2*).

These comments about the culture of loyalty were echoed by key informants outside the federal public service. *Academic 3*, for example, commented on the culture of fear and what she described as "misplaced" loyalty. The *Opposition MP* argued this culture of fear got worse over time and "every department has suffered the same fate and the sort of unwinding of the women's advisory capacity within the bureaucracy". She continued:

...in a culture where loyalty to the Government is rewarded above almost anything and you think about the stellar careers of the bureaucrats who were involved in the children's overboard lie, people know that if they want to get ahead that's what they have to do. ...I think that a culture develops in an organisation. If an organisation is headed by someone whose only goal is to support the Government politically then that goal inevitably permeates the culture of an organisation. I think that a lot of people who wanted to be apolitical public servants just doing their best have probably left the public service in recent years and the people who remain understand that frank and fearless advice isn't valued and why would they stick their necks out in that circumstance (*Opposition MP*).

The *Opposition MP* argued the Howard Government's politicisation of the public sector also undermined the important function the public service traditionally played in the Australian system of government. She suggested this undermined the principle of "frank and fearless" advice and encouraged public servants to provide advice on what was easy and popular

rather than the right thing to do in any given situation. Thus in addition to politicisation and culture of fear, some key informants suggest the Howard Government also nurtured a culture of loyalty which undermined the role of the public service and the femocrat strategy.

Stage two of the study suggested specialist sexual assault and domestic violence services from government and non-government organisations were subjected to similar treatment by the Howard Government as the NGOs outlined in Chapter Four. The Howard Government's relationship with WESNET through *Partnerships* was one example cited by key informants of how they attempted to silence dissent from the women's sector. Soon after forming government the Howard Government rationalised the peak bodies and as part of this process WESNET reluctantly federated with the Australian Federation of Homeless Organisations (AFHO) (*Peak Body Representative 3* and *Evaluator 2*). *Peak Body Representative 3* argued this reflected the Howard Government's attempt to silence dissent:

...they started to introduce their threat of defunding any organisation which criticised them – which they've successfully managed to do over the last few years. ...we saw some peak bodies who were quite radical get defunded so then there was the assumption that while you can't speak out against this government or you'll lose your funding so there was all those tensions within a peak about how, whether you're better off being critical and getting defunded or pulling back a bit and keeping your funding going – so there's all those tensions. We argued to them that a healthy democratic state needed to have peak bodies and criticism from the non-government sector – particularly a welfare state and that they couldn't just silence dissent like that but they weren't very keen on listening.

Although WESNET federated with AFHO, they remained an unfunded peak and were contracted by OSW to provide consultancy advice as part of *Partnerships*. *Peak Body Representative 3*, *Evaluator 2*, and *Taskforce Member 8* argued this relationship was characterised by distrust and animosity. *Peak Agency Representative 3* argued WESNET were increasingly pressured to produce deliverable outputs under *Partnerships 1* and subsequently produced a number of *Partnerships* research projects. She argued this was a strategic move by the Howard Government which intended to keep WESNET busy with research and silence public criticisms of WESNET's loss of peak body funding. This key informant suggested WESNET's relationship with the Howard Government was an example of how the government's strategies against NGOs were applied to the specialist male violence against women service sector.

The role of WESNET within *Partnerships* offered an important insight into this period consistent with Chappell and Sawyer's description of the tension between feminists inside and outside the bureaucracy as outlined in Chapter Four. *Taskforce Member 8* and *Evaluator 2* described the strained relationship between WESNET, OSW staff and the *Partnerships* Taskforce. Their description of this relationship was one of a widening gulf between femocrats inside the bureaucracy and feminists in services outside it where WESNET took an "opposition stance" against OSW (*Evaluator 2*). These key informants detailed a history of significant animosity and tension between WESNET and OSW. They argued WESNET engaged with the Minister's Office and Opposition in a way that undermined relationships with OSW. *Taskforce Members 8 & 2* and *Evaluator 2* also argued, however, that it was a strategic error excluding sector representatives such as WESNET from the *Partnerships* Taskforce. They argued this exclusion was a significant weakness undermining the Taskforce's credibility and success. This history is consistent with McFerren's (1990) comments about the tendency under conservative governments for the refuge movement to concentrate their attacks on femocrats in the bureaucracy rather than the Government itself. It supports the proposition that the gulf between 'insider' and 'outsider' feminists widens under conservative governments.

### 9.2.3 The *Partnerships* Taskforce

The Howard Government's strategic repositioning and down-grading of OSW as the centrepiece of the femocrat strategy is consistent with Chappell's (2002b, p.30) argument that the femocrat strategy was left in "tatters" during this period. Although the intergovernmental cooperation amongst Taskforce members as described above reflected continuities in the policy process, some key informants argued the *Partnerships* Taskforce also reflected a decline of the femocrat strategy during the Howard years. They argued this was particularly evident in the deterioration in relationships across the jurisdictions between *Partnerships 1* and *Partnerships 2*.

Key informants' positive comments about intergovernmental cooperation in *Partnerships* were not universal and some key informants spoke of the limitations of the *Partnerships* Taskforce even early in *Partnerships 1*. *Federal Public Servant 4* argued the *Partnerships* Taskforce never achieved national coordination or a truly national approach. Similarly, *State Public Servant 4*, from NSW which had a Labor Government, said they were suspicious of the Liberal Government. She said NSW distrusted the Howard Government's "talk about family values and family support", their conservative agenda within *Partnerships*, and their

narrowing of violence against women to domestic violence. She argued her brief for *Partnerships* was to survey the situation but not be too cooperative since the Howard Government were trying to get credit “for something they weren’t doing a lot about”. For *Government MP 2 Partnerships* was also hampered by the lack of cooperation from the states. She argued the states had “an in-built enthusiasm to discourage the Commonwealth from doing anything with them”. Although positive perceptions of *Partnerships* as a model of intergovernmental cooperation early in *Partnerships 1* were dominant, these key informants suggested these views were not universal.

Despite these negative comments, many key informants argued the deterioration in relationships in the *Partnerships* Taskforce occurred between *Partnerships 1* and *Partnerships 2*. Many spoke of *Partnerships 1* as a true partnership across jurisdictions. They argued *Partnerships 2*, however, involved: increasing Commonwealth centralisation; national rather than state-based project funding; and a breakdown in intergovernmental relationships until the Taskforce effectively became dysfunctional and ceased meeting. A number of key informants offered their perspectives on why the Commonwealth centralised the projects in *Partnerships 2* and why relationships deteriorated between the federal and states governments during this time. In grouping these reasons there was a notable difference in the comments of public servants in the state and federal governments.

The first reason key informants proposed for the changes between *Partnerships 1* and *2* was that it was an agreed progression of *Partnerships* to national projects and the Taskforce evolved to reflect these changes. *Federal Public Servants 4, 5 & 6* and *State Public Servant 9* also attributed this deterioration to key individuals leaving OSW and did not believe there was a deliberate strategy to sabotage intergovernmental relationships. All four believed the change from Minister Newman to Minister Vanstone was significant. *Federal Public Servant 5* and *State Public Servant 9* argued Minister Vanstone did not have the same passion or commitment to domestic violence as Minister Newman and consequently disengaged from *Partnerships 2*. Further, unlike Minister Newman, *Federal Public Servant 4* argued Minister Vanstone was focussed only on what the Commonwealth would do and was not interested in bringing the states together in *Partnerships 2*. She also believed changes and turnover in OSW staff significantly contributed to deteriorating relationships and made it difficult to keep *Partnerships* going (*Federal Public Servant 4*).

Alternatively, some key informants argued the inherent nature and tensions of ‘cooperative federalism’ were responsible for relationships deteriorating within the *Partnerships*

Taskforce. *State Public Servants 4, 5 and 9* argued Minister Vanstone's withdrawal from the states was part of the Howard Government's wider centralising trend away from cooperative federalism and reflected existing animosity between state and federal jurisdictions. They argued this trend was not isolated to the women's policy area and the Howard Government were "natural centralisers" who wanted more credit for the work of *Partnerships*. *Government MP 2* described becoming "fed up with the states" and argued that although she originally believed "whole-heartedly in federation, in federalism", she now believes federalism is a "waste of time" and "dead". These key informants suggested the inherent tensions in Australian federalism and the Howard Government's centralising tendencies over time eroded the capacity of the jurisdictions to work together in *Partnerships 2*. This may, however, also be an indication of a Howard Government who, having sought the cooperation of state jurisdictions early on, now had the confidence from five years in power to progress their agenda alone.

Another reason proposed for the shifts between *Partnerships 1* and *2* was the political identities of the parties in power at state and federal levels. Chappell (2002b, p.30) argues that most feminists were unable to engage in the 'federalism foxtrot' during the Howard Government's first term because Liberal or Coalition parties governed in all states except NSW. Two key informants suggested this political difference undermined NSW's cooperation in *Partnerships*. One commented "New South Wales was always hard to get on with" (*Federal Public Servant 4*). The other, *State Public Servant 4*, explained that her brief from the NSW Government was to be fairly uncooperative since, as the only Labor government, "we had nothing to gain much from sitting around that table".

By 1998, however, the pendulum had started to swing back to the ALP at the state level (Chappell, 2002b, p.30) and when South Australia elected an ALP state government in 2002 all states had ALP governments. *Academic 1* and *State Public Servants 3, 6 & 11* suggested it was the common political identity as Liberal or Coalition governments that encouraged the early intergovernmental cooperation of *Partnerships 1*. *State Public Servant 3*, for example, argued that her state had a state Liberal government when *Partnerships* started which made it much easier to collaborate and yet this collaborative relationship deteriorated when their state voted in a Labor government. Similarly, two other key informants argued:

Phase one was a partnership with the states because they were all, apart from NSW, Liberal states. So a lot of money went through the state government departments and federal



ministers ran out and launched things because it made them look good. Except for NSW, like I said, we didn't know what *PADV* was in NSW because we never got any funding because we were a Labor state. It was really obvious and then gradually all the states went Labor and so phase 2 they didn't put all that money out through the states anymore. They did it through consultancies. So I think they weren't very happy to run about working in collaboration with Labor states and making them look good (*Academic 1*).

...the fact that every single state and territory government became Labor and we had a conservative federal government parallels with when it became absolutely ridiculous. ...the clearest indication was South Australia was the last jurisdiction other than the Australian Government to be conservative and then when [it] flipped in 2002 that became, it became unpalatable. ...they would have formed the opinion that they were providing the money, why are they sharing the decision-making around that money with jurisdictions which aren't, where they've been elected out. ...They wanted the wins. They wanted to be able to use it as a policy platform for a whole range of other issues and they didn't want states being party to that win (*State Public Servant 6*).

This change in the ALP holding power at the state level thus offered one explanation for the deterioration in intergovernmental relationships between *Partnerships 1* and 2. This is also consistent with Brett's (2005) argument, as discussed in Chapter Four, that there was a clear shift in the way the Howard Government related to the states due the division between the Liberal and Labor parties being the primary opposition that structured Howard's thinking. It suggests that changes in the states to being Labor governments were a constraint rather than a political opportunity structure for femocrats in *Partnerships*.

In contrast to Chappell and Sawyer's arguments that the ALP tends to be a political opportunity structure for the femocrat strategy, these comments suggest the ALP being in power in the state governments stifled rather than facilitated progressive social policy at the federal level. Nevertheless, although femocrats were unable to engage in the 'feminism foxtrot' early in *Partnerships 1*, the comments also extend Chappell's point about the potential of Australian federalism in developing progressive social policy. Chappell (2001, p.67) argues *Partnerships* maintained progressive ideas competing with the conservative position on domestic violence due to femocrats working in conjunction with more socially progressive state governments. These findings suggest this situation was, however, only facilitated by the Howard Government's willingness early on to work with Liberal/Coalition state governments. This suggests femocrat political pragmatism enabled them to exploit a political opportunity structure through federalism when they had governments of the same political persuasion at federal and state levels.

This argument about the prominent role of the political identity of the state governments in *Partnerships 2* was, however, explicitly rejected by two key informants. *Evaluator 1* argued that although this may have been relevant she didn't think that the Howard Government were "that well organised to run such a good conspiracy". She suggested this deterioration was more due to a leadership vacuum in *Partnerships*. Similarly, *Federal Public Servant 5* argued:

...all states became Labor which is a recipe for something like that grinding to a halt. It didn't. The Prime Minister wasn't interested in it grinding to a halt. He was just interested in it being managed in a way that didn't cause any heat or steam and preferably delivered something good. ...I think the people who say it didn't reach its potential have never sat inside trying to run a program like that and have never dealt with all of the complexities of state and territory governments and the Commonwealth government ...The fact that it achieved what it achieved was pretty terrific.

These comments thus illustrate a diversity of views amongst key informants to explain the deterioration of intergovernmental relations on the Taskforce between *Partnerships 1* and *2*.

Whatever the reason for the changes, key informants argued they had a significant negative impact on *Partnerships*. *Evaluator 1* and *Taskforce Member 10* argued the states' commitment and interest in *Partnerships 2* waned due to the withdrawal of financial incentives to be involved and the Howard Government's increasing control. Similarly, *Taskforce Member 2* argued the Taskforce lost its way due a backlash against the Howard Government's changes to OSW and their controlling behaviours. *Taskforce Member 10* also noted the "downgrading" of representation on the *Partnerships 2* Taskforce. She suggests it is possible the state governments, which by 2002 were all ALP governments, followed NSW's lead and minimised their collaboration with the federal Coalition Government. Further, since state femocrats may have been more easily able pursue opportunities and feminist goals within their ALP governments, they may have been less committed to *Partnerships 2* than to *Partnerships 1*.

The Commonwealth's apparent disengagement from federal-state collaboration in *Partnerships 2* was a significant strategic error according to key informants. *State Public Servant 5* argued the states provided an important buffer in relationships between the Howard Government and the sector. She argued *Partnerships* consequently became ad hoc and disconnected to what was happening locally which undermined its ability to influence the directions of the state governments who were responsible for the bulk of

domestic violence service provision. *State Public Servant 6* argued that by by-passing the states *Partnerships 2* was not able to effectively impact on the service delivery system or connect with individual jurisdiction's policy initiatives. As a result she argued "there's a whole range of findings about how things should work and how things could be better that just don't go anywhere and are just going to sit there until, well forever". *State Public Servant 7* argued the Howard Government's approach to *Partnerships 2* was a strategic error which "let the states off the hook". She suggested the states needed to be involved in *Partnerships 2* to maintain ongoing programming and implementation of the learning from *Partnerships* projects especially since *Partnerships* was not recurrent funding. *Evaluator 1* also argued *Partnerships 2* subsequently became "isolated projects being run off on their own with very little policy development" which mirrored OSW's shift from a policy advocacy to a grants administration agency. These key informants thus suggest the disengagement between federal and state governments was a strategic flaw undermining the successes of *Partnerships*.

### 9.3 Discussion

This case study of the *Partnerships*' policy process suggests there were continuities and discontinuities in the femocrat strategy during the Howard years. This chapter has proposed that policy actors, policy machinery and structures were all significant in the *Partnerships* policy process and the final policy outcome. It has also indicated the utility of employing Yeatman's (1998) understanding of 'policy activism' and Chappell's (2002a; 2002b) 'political opportunity structures' to make sense of this period.

This case study suggests there was an ongoing relevance and salience of feminist influences and the femocrat strategy during the Howard years. As explored early in the chapter, many of the key informants who played key roles in the *Partnerships* policy process, identified themselves as feminists with policy activist histories, expressed feminist definitions and understandings of male violence against women, and identified *Partnerships* as one expression of their feminist policy activism. According to these key informants *Partnerships* was very influenced by feminism and reflected the ongoing salience of the femocrat strategy despite the Howard Government's open hostility to feminism. Although the problem of male violence against women has been constructed in a range of different ways, feminist approaches to this issue have conventionally dominated national policy approaches and these findings suggest they continued to do so even under the Howard Government.

Although feminists and femocrats have historically been important players in national male violence against women policy, they have tended to do better under more progressive Labor governments (Chappell, 2002b). During the early Howard years, feminists were unable to do the 'federalism foxtrot' (Chappell, 2002b) to exploit differences between state and federal governments because all governments except NSW were Liberal/Coalition. The Howard Government also put new policy machinery and processes in place in this period that changed the policy capacity and influence of feminists and femocrats. The literature outlined in Chapters Three and Four suggests features of this period, including the political identities of governments and the conservatism of the Howard Government, were a constraint for feminists. Consistent with, and extending, Chappell's (2001) argument about the potential of federalism to nurture progressive social policy, however, this chapter suggests feminists were able to exploit the new policy machinery such as the *Partnerships* Taskforce as a political opportunity structure to pursue feminist objectives and progressive social policy. This suggests the ongoing influence of feminism and importance of the femocrat strategy in this period despite the Howard Government's conservatism and open hostility to feminism.

The findings presented in this chapter about continuities with the femocrat strategy provide a possible explanation for the relative lack of feminist criticism of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women. Through this case study of *Partnerships* I have argued that the policy activism of feminists and femocrats impacted on the nature of Howard Government approaches to male violence against women, particularly in the early years (1997-2002). This was a different finding to the dominant feminist view reported in the literature about their interactions with the Howard Government. This feminist involvement and the government's inclusion of some feminist content in *Partnerships* can thus help explain the relative absence of feminist critique towards the Howard Government's approaches as discussed in Chapter Seven.

Although *Partnerships* thus seemed to be an exception to the Howard Government's assault on the femocrat strategy early on, the findings presented in the second half of this chapter suggest it did not continue to be. The centralisation in *Partnerships 2* and subsequent withdrawal and disengagement from the partnership heralded the deterioration of formal and informal intergovernmental relationships. Intergovernmental cooperation was an important component of the femocrat strategy. Particularly after 2002, however, this chapter argues the Howard Government increasingly eroded intergovernmental cooperation in responses to male violence against women and challenged and reduced the discursive

power of the femocrats in the policy process. This case study of *Partnerships* therefore also suggests the Howard years were a period of gradual decline of the influence of femocrats and feminist policy activists on policy process and content. It would thus seem that Chappell's observation that the Howard Government left the "femocrat strategy in tatters" (Chappell, 2002b, p.30) was an accurate one that applied to the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women as well as their broader women's policy agenda.

The role of policy process, feminist policy activism, and the femocrats' exploitation of the political opportunity structures available to them is therefore important to understanding *Partnerships*. By *Australia Says No*, however, the Howard Government seems to have largely excluded feminists inside and outside government from involvement in the development of the government's approaches to male violence against women. Despite the Howard Government's deliberate exclusion of feminists, key informants generally praised both *Partnerships* and *Australia Says No* as positive while simultaneously critiquing the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda. To explore why feminists might have assessed *Australia Says No* so positively despite their exclusion from the policy process during this period, the next chapter focuses on *Australia Says No* as a case study of content.

# **Chapter Ten**

## **Case Study 2:**

### ***Violence Against Women - Australia Says No***

---

Terms like ‘family’, ‘violence’ and ‘family violence’ have no abstract meaning and can only be understood by what they accomplish in a specific problem representation in a particular context and so any term can be made to do any kind of political work (Bacchi, 1999b, p.178). ‘Male violence against women’, for example, may be employed either for or against feminist goals. This chapter is a case study of the content of *Australia Says No* using a modified ‘What’s the Problem?’ approach (Bacchi, 1999b) analysis from stage two of the study. Consistent with Bacchi (1999b, p.165), the focus of analysis in this chapter is on how descriptors are deployed in *Australia Says No* to produce particular problem representations in a particular social and political context. The analysis for this case study found multiple representations of the problem in *Australia Says No*. These representations were complex and both operated alone and interacted with each other in a way that paralleled the feminist micro, mezzo and macro level understandings of male violence against women outlined in Chapter Two. Consequently, the discussion below is divided to reflect each level of understanding. Interspersed through this discussion, the chapter also explores the possible effects of these problem representations. The chapter then concludes by proposing that one way the Howard Government’s approaches to male violence against women may be understood from a feminist perspective is as policies of transformistic hegemonic masculinity.

#### **10.1 Individualised Representations of Violence (micro)**

Micro level understandings of male violence against women in this thesis attribute this violence to the behaviour of individuals as discussed in Chapter Two. These individualised understandings of male violence were apparent in representations of the problem in *Australia Says No* as explored below.

### 10.1.1 Individual pathology: male perpetrators of violence

When men were identified as perpetrators of violence in *Australia Says No*, the dominant representation of the problem was of the individual pathology of angry, criminal, and/or distressed men. In the Education Resource, for example, one representation of the problem was individual men's inappropriate anger management or conflict resolution skills. This was illustrated in the campaign's objective to assist young people: "identify non-violent ways of responding to conflict and stress" (Education Resource part 1, p.1). Further, the Education Resource advised young people: "holding these negative feelings [anger] in is difficult, tiring and unhealthy. Unfortunately many people release these feelings in an inappropriate way, making the situation even worse" (Education Resource part 1, p.10).

The representation of the problem as individual angry men was also apparent in Advertisement 1<sup>21</sup> where a man stated: "I got really angry and I just gave her a slap, you know, stuff happens. But she knows, I mean, she deserved it". The advertisement challenged the statement "she deserved it" with the statement "no she didn't". It did not, however, challenge the underlining premise of representing the man's violence as a problem of 'anger'. These examples suggest that one way *Australia Says No* represented men's violence was as a response to conflict and stress or as an individual man's anger management problem. This problem representation is in contrast to the feminist analyses outlined in Chapter Two which usually represent the problem as a man's calculated behaviour to control and intimidate a woman (micro) that is supported and facilitated by the institutional and structural (mezzo and macro) context.

Another way the analysis suggested *Australia Says No* represented the problem was as about criminal or bad men. The campaign texts clearly focused on the types of the violence defined as criminal by law, specifically sexual and physical assault. This representation was most apparent in how the campaign dealt with sexual assault. On page 12 of the *Australia Says No* Booklet (the Booklet) under the heading "It's a crime" was the text: "Forcing someone to have sex when they don't want to, or forcing them into having sex by making them think they will be harmed if they don't is a serious criminal offence". The Booklet then defined various types of criminal offences of sexual assault. In Advertisement 3 this representation was less explicit but still apparent with the statement: "I was raped and I told the police. It was hard but I know I've done the right thing".

<sup>21</sup> References to advertisements in this chapter are to television advertisements numbers 1 to 4 - the full transcripts of which are provided in Appendix 7.9.

The campaign's use of the narrow definition of sexual assault and domestic violence as criminal acts illustrates the prominence of crime control discourses in *Australia Says No* and the representation of the problem as the behaviour of individual criminal men. Supporting this argument, advertisement 1 delineated a number of scenarios of criminal forms of sexual assault and domestic violence. The advertisement concluded with the statement: "This behaviour is not just unacceptable, it's criminal". Similarly, in Advertisement 2, the statement "My boyfriend hits me, then he says he loves me and reckons it's all okay" was followed by "No, it's a crime". Further, page 4 of the Booklet lists problematic behaviours such as possessiveness, jealousy, threats and put downs which it identifies as precursors to, or warning signs of, criminal physical violence. This representation of the problem does not indicate that some behaviours, such as threats, may be criminal acts in their own right and it also contradicts feminist analyses which usually define these behaviours as part of, and not just precursors to, domestic violence.

A third representation of the problem in *Australia Says No* was as the individual pathology of distressed men in need of help and support for whom counselling or other health interventions would be appropriate. This representation was most apparent in the solutions offered in *Australia Says No*. In Advertisements 1 and 4, the problem was represented as an issue of the man's anger and criminal acts as discussed above and included the statement "This behaviour is not just unacceptable, it's criminal". Yet, the subsequent solutions offered were not criminal solutions such as encouraging perpetrators to turn themselves into the police, cease their criminal behaviour or call 'Crime Stoppers'. The advertisement instead advised "You can get help and support by talking with an experienced counsellor on this confidential helpline". Similarly, near the end of Advertisement 4 is the statement "If you have a problem because you've experienced or been responsible for assault or violence you can call this helpline for help and support". Despite the campaign representing the problem as a criminal act, its solutions contradict this representation by suggesting it is a problem of distressed men in need of help and support. This juxtaposition of crime control and mental health discourses is confusing and contradictory since it conflates criminal acts with men's distress.

This analysis of the campaign's representation of the problem as the individual pathology of men with anger, crime or health problems parallels FitzRoy's (1999) analysis of *Partnerships* outlined in Chapter One. FitzRoy argues *Partnerships* represents the problem as the individual pathology of 'angry', 'bad' and/or 'sad' men. There were thus similar representations of the problem as the individual pathology of male perpetrators in both



*Partnerships* and *Australia Says No*. Apart from distancing these men from the institutional and structural factors which feminists argue underpins male violence against women, this way of representing the problem, particularly as anger or distress, may also obscure individual men's responsibility by offering an excuse for their violence. Further, the links between these representations in the campaign and FitzRoy's analysis of *Partnerships* suggests the broader relevance of this analysis to the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women beyond the campaign alone.

### 10.1.2 "Violent relationships"

The way *Australia Says No* represents the problem as dysfunctional families and miscommunication is discussed in the next section as a mezzo level representation of the problem. Nevertheless, the way the campaign represents the problem as "violent relationships" is relevant to both micro and mezzo level understandings because of the way male perpetrators are represented as subjects in this approach. This is one example of the complexity of representations in the campaign which interacted with each other across the different levels of feminist understandings of male violence against women.

In *Australia Says No* the dominant representation of perpetrators as subjects was passive and consequently men were distanced from 'the' rather than 'their' violence. The campaign represents the primary problem as "violent relationships". The campaign's stated aim in the Booklet (p.3) is: "to raise young people's awareness about the harm caused when personal relationships become violent". It also describes the problem throughout the campaign with terms such as "abusive situation", "a problem with a relationship", "violent relationships", and "abusive relationships". Further, these "violent relationships" are represented as acting on their own accord thereby obscuring the agency and actions of the man committing the violence as the following examples from the Booklet illustrate:

When there is violence or intimidation the relationship can become very destructive and physically and emotionally dangerous (p.4).

A violent relationship may not be violent all the time. ...There is a strong chance that the violence will get worse over time and the relationship more abusive" (p.8).

This representation of the problem as the "violent relationship" rather than the behaviour of the perpetrator was poignantly illustrated in the Education Resource documentary about Angela Baker's experiences of her partner's violence. The documentary described these

experiences as: “a recent real relationship that went horribly wrong”, “a teenager who fell victim to relationship violence” and “Angela’s story raises awareness of the indicators of destructive relationships”. These examples suggest *Australia Says No* represented the “violent relationship” actively as the subject and thus the problem.

By representing the problem as the “violent relationship” and thus personifying the relationship, *Australia Says No* employs the type of passive language to refer to the perpetrator that is critiqued in Chapter Two. By doing this, the campaign “nominaliz[ed] the act of violence” (Lamb, 1991, pp.251-253) and diffused the perpetrator’s responsibility by making the violent relationship the active subject and the perpetrator the passive object of this representation. By representing “violent relationships” as subjects using active voice, *Australia Says No* therefore constructed men’s violent acts as “acts without agents” (Lamb, 1991) and obscured the responsibility of the perpetrator. Feminists usually argue that responsibility for male violence against women rests with the choices of individual perpetrators that are facilitated and condoned by certain institutional and structural contexts. In contrast to this understanding, the campaign’s use of language and personification of the “violent relationship” as the problem shifts responsibility for the violence from the male perpetrator and the social institutions and structures feminists argue facilitate and condone his violence and onto the relationship.

### **10.1.3 Blurring the boundaries between male perpetrators and female victims**

The representation of the problem in *Australia Says No* also blurs the boundaries between victims and perpetrators in a way that echoes how individual perpetrators themselves create “zones of uncertainty” (Towns, 2005) as discussed in Chapter Two. *Australia Says No* usually directed advice, comments, and messages to victims and perpetrators simultaneously instead of addressing them as two separate groups. This blurring of boundaries was illustrated in the Prime Minister’s statement in the Booklet (p.1): “This Booklet is a resource for young people, parents, friends and the community at large. It provides information on how to identify and avoid violent and abusive situations, how to build and maintain healthy relationships and who to contact if you need protection or advice”. Another example in the Booklet (p.4) was: “Building and maintaining a healthy relationship needs a commitment from both partners to work at it”. Similarly, one of the advertisements stated “If you have a problem because you’ve experienced or been responsible for assault or violence you can call this helpline for help and support”. Representing responses to victims and perpetrators simultaneously and offering the same

solutions (getting help and support, building healthy relationships) in this way can obscure who is responsible for the violence. It creates a zone of uncertainty which may shift responsibility evenly between female victims and male perpetrators of violence.

The campaign's use of passive language and representation of the "violent relationship" as the problem may have also seamlessly shifted the focus from the man's violence and represented the woman as the problem. In the Booklet (p.18), for example, is the statement: "What works here depends on how willing she is to see there is a problem and how abusive the relationship has become". This statement suggests the problem is the "abusive relationship" and the absence of the man as a subject of the sentence creates a "zone of uncertainty" (Towns, 2005). This absence of the man may infer it is the "abusive relationship" and the woman has (or is) "the problem". As the one with "the problem" this representation implies the victim is responsible for the violence or at least for stopping the violence. By making the man invisible in this way, the campaign shifts the focus of intervention and responsibility to the woman who needs "help and support" to address "her problem". This is contrary to feminist understandings of violence which usually require that men be held responsible for their violence.

Extending this analysis of the problem as the woman, another representation in *Australia Says No* was the failure of victims "to identify and avoid violent and abusive situations" (*Australia Says No* Booklet pp.1-3) and "letting yourself be abused" (Education Resource, part 1, p.17). This is illustrated in statements in the Booklet such as:

They might be scared that their partner will hurt them if they try to leave (p.8)

When you are frightened and your self-esteem is low, it can be hard to find the strength to leave. ...But the first step in changing things is to understand what's been happening is wrong. Even if your boyfriend or partner says they care about you and you care about them, it's not OK to be treated like this (p.9).

This problem representation suggests the psychopathology of the victim and her lack of understanding caused her to remain in the relationship. It also infers that the woman's fears are unfounded or irrational. This is in contrast to feminist analyses of men's violence which argue that women stay for a range of reasons at the micro, mezzo and macro levels. As outlined in Chapter Two, these reasons may include: the behaviour and threats of their partner to hurt them if they leave; their inability to achieve economic independence to

support themselves and their children; and social expectations about women's roles and the gendered division of labour.

The way the campaign targets solutions mainly towards victims of violence rather than perpetrators supports this argument that women/victims are represented as the problem in *Australia Says No*. Of the twenty-eight suggested solutions in the Booklet: twelve were directed at victims; nine at families and friends of victims; three at both victims and perpetrators together; two at perpetrators; and two at families and friends of perpetrators. For the young people, these solutions included: they need to build healthy relationships; and both sexes need to develop skills in assertiveness, communication, conflict resolution and anger management. For young women, these solutions include that they need to: understand the nature of violent relationships; leave violent relationships; talk to a counsellor; and do things to make themselves safe from violence such as going out in a group, planning ahead, don't be alone with someone they don't know well, and be careful with alcohol. For parents, these solutions are that they need to: talk to their children about healthy relationships and "the negative consequences of thoughtless sexual behaviour"; and identify if their child has experienced violence and respond in certain ways (e.g. encourage her to talk, give her support).

These solutions thus focus predominantly on young women and families and not on perpetrators, communities, or structural issues. They suggest the main problem is that women are not keeping themselves safe and are engaging in 'unsafe behaviours' and families are not responding appropriately. Such solutions police the behaviour of women and families and suggest they, rather than men or society, are responsible for preventing violence. From a feminist perspective, this approach blurs the boundaries between women's vulnerability to men's violence and men's responsibility for this violence.

In representing the problem as the psychopathology of the victim, the campaign is also silent about the relational and social context in which feminists argue the man perpetrates violence. In the vignettes on pages 6, 7 and 9 of the Booklet, the ideal solution to domestic violence was represented as the woman leaving the relationship. These vignettes and the Booklet generally did not take into account research findings that a man's violence is likely to escalate and he is more likely to use lethal violence against his ex-partner and/or children following separation. It also assumes women have the social and economic resources to leave the relationship and there were no children from the relationship since current family law arrangements are likely to order the man's ongoing contact with the children as outlined

in Chapter Four. Further, the Howard Government's social and economic policies could be seen to have operated as a constraint on women's capacity to leave when their partner was violent. Nevertheless, in representing the main solution to the problem as the women leaving and by not acknowledging these broader micro, mezzo and macro constraints identified by feminists, the campaign suggests the problem is the woman's psychopathology and her failure to leave.

The tone, style, nature and content of the solutions in *Australia Says No* provide further insight into how women were constructed as subjects and thus what the problem was represented to be. There was a clear difference in the language and solutions directed towards perpetrators compared to victims. The solutions outlined above suggest victims were represented as women who do not understand violence, need someone to explain to them it is not okay, and be told what to do about it. Moreover, the solutions targeted to women involved a series of directive statements as illustrated by statements from Advertisements 2 and 3 including: "you should report it", "do seek help and support", and "yes, she should [tell somebody]". Similarly, the Booklet included statements such as: "don't feel ashamed or embarrassed" (p.10), "get safe and stay safe" (p.10), "talk to someone" (p.10) and "go with people you feel safe with and who you know have your best interests at heart" (p.14).

In contrast to women, men were constructed as active agents for whom, with the single exception of the line "you must have consent", the non-directive language of choice is used. Examples of this from Advertisement 1 included statements such as "you can get help and support" and non-directive labelling of behaviour such as "that's sexual assault" or "yes you are". One of the few solutions targeted at men in the Booklet is the statement "Being someone's boyfriend doesn't give you the right to decide what they should do. And nothing gives you the right to use force" (p.13). Although this is a strong statement on the unacceptability of men's violence, it did not demand action from men in the same way as the statements towards women in the campaign demands action.

This differential use of language suggests that in the campaign women were both held responsible for the violence against them and constructed as victims who needed protection. Simultaneously, while men's responsibility for their violence was obscured by the use of passive language, they were also represented as agents who are encouraged and

not directed to “seek help”. Using directive language for women victims and the language of choice for male perpetrators inverts the relationship between victim and perpetrator. That is, it is logical that the person responsible for the violence should be directed to change their behaviour while the person victimised should be empowered to make choices about what is right for them. This language also draws upon hegemonic notions of masculinity. It suggests women are weak, passive, vulnerable, and in need of protection. As a corollary to this, it suggests men are strong, active agents who can choose their behaviour. This dichotomy echoes the aspects of hegemonic masculinity which suggest men are responsible for both protecting women and using violence as a mechanism of social control for women who do not conform to patriarchy as discussed in Chapter Two.

The Howard Government also reinforced hegemonic masculinity in *Australia Says No* in other ways. Defending the government’s replacement of *No Respect* with *Australia Says No*, Howard, for example, said on the *7.30 Report*: “Real men don’t hit women and I think it’s as good a way as I can find in my vocabulary to describe the feelings that I have on the subject” (Bowden, 2004a). He also stated elsewhere: “personal relationships are private but violence against women is unacceptable, wherever and whenever it occurs” (SBS, 2004). Further, the Prime Minister’s Statement in the Booklet includes: “It is not the role of government to tell people how to live their lives – relationships are personal and private” (p.1). Comments like these draw upon discourses of male strength and an idealizing of the family as private but also suggest male violence against women is a crisis of masculinity. Simultaneously, they also distance hegemonic masculinity from responsibility for facilitating and condoning this violence. Instead they suggest this violence comes from the breakdown of features of hegemonic masculinity such as chivalry, men’s responsibility for their family, and the privacy of the family. These are the very institutional and structural features that feminists argue underpin male violence against women.

## **10.2 Families and Heteronormativity (mezzo)**

### **10.2.1 Dysfunctional families and communication problems**

At the mezzo level, a significant representation of the problem in *Australia Says No* is as a problem of dysfunctional families/relationships and miscommunication. The first illustration of this is the role of intergenerational transmission or “cycle of violence” theories which argue child victims of domestic violence are likely to become victims or perpetrators

themselves as adults<sup>22</sup>. In the context of domestic violence and, to a lesser extent, sexual assault, representations of the problem which use intergenerational transmission theories suggest a problem of dysfunctional families who transmit violence through generations. Related to this, male violence against women may also be represented as being the consequence of conflict and miscommunication in a relationship; that is a dysfunctional relationship. Representations of male violence against women as being a problem of dysfunctional families and dysfunctional relationships respectively were apparent in *Australia Says No*.

Intergenerational transmission theories were one of the representations of the problem in *Australia Says No*. The Prime Minister stated at the front of the Booklet: "Violence can become a learnt behaviour, destroying people's capacity to form healthy relationships, now and in the next generation". Similarly, in her media release accompanying the Education Resource Minister Patterson stated: "Research shows young people are most at risk, and that harm experienced early in life has the potential to influence future relationships". Although this representation of the problem as the intergenerational transmission of violence was thus apparent in *Australia Says No*, the most prominent representation was one of dysfunctional relationships and/or communication problems. While domestic violence was usually represented as a problem of dysfunctional relationships, sexual assault was usually represented as problem of miscommunication.

One example of the representation of the problem as being one of dysfunctional relationships and communication problems was in the vignette of the counsellor's story in the Booklet (p.11). This included the statement:

...I work with people who are experiencing domestic and sexual abuse, or have experienced abuse in the past. They are just normal people, experiencing bad relationships. ...I help people build skills to maintain healthy relationships, where both parties can communicate well.

In addition to the Booklet, the Education Resource also represents the problem as one of dysfunctional relationships as illustrated by the solutions it promotes for young people. In this resource the vast majority of activities focus on conflict resolution, communication, healthy relationships, assertiveness, problem-solving skills, how to deal with strong emotions, negotiating consent, mutuality, and identifying types of violence. Violence prevention specialist Michael Flood (2004b) argues that these sorts of activities and skills

---

<sup>22</sup>This is distinct from the 'cycle of violence' used as a metaphor by human service professionals in describing a specific violent relationship as discussed and critiqued by Jones (2004, pp.138-155).

training are valuable and important in a primary prevention approach but are inappropriate in secondary prevention or tertiary intervention such as *Australia Says No*. Flood's analysis suggests that, from a feminist or pro-feminist perspective, this representation of the problem in *Australia Says No* was inappropriate for a campaign of this type since it suggests the problem is dysfunctional relationships and miscommunication rather than violence.

The Education Resource also represented the problem as being about dysfunctional relationships in a way that was confusing and contradictory. It did this by oscillating between 'abusive' and 'unhealthy' relationships as if they were one and the same thing. The Education Resource contained messages about developing healthy relationships and discussions about skill development in communicating and relating to others. The simultaneous and unclear interspersing of messages about healthy relationships with messages about violent behaviour in this Resource is, however, confusing. There was no distinction in the Booklet between an unhealthy relationship where there may be conflict or miscommunication without violence and a relationship where one partner is using violence against the other (i.e. they can exist independently of each other). Further, the 'solutions' offered were all solutions to deal with 'unhealthy' relationships rather than sexual assault and domestic violence. These solutions suggest the campaign represents the problem as being about 'unhealthy or dysfunctional relationships' in a way that is confusing and contradictory.

From a feminist perspective, these representations of the problem as the individual pathology of individual men at a micro level and as "dysfunctional relationships" at a mezzo level minimize the nature and extent of this violence and distance it from gendered power relations. They do this by setting up a dichotomy between unhealthy relationships which many people may experience and violent relationships caused by individual angry, criminal or distressed men. This suggests that male violence against women is the problem of a small minority of men and ignores what feminists argue are the widespread institutional and structural factors underpinning this violence. Such a problem representation absolves men from examining any controlling or abusive behaviour beyond physical violence and absolves society from responsibility for this violence. This argument is supported by the vignettes on page 9 of the Booklet which, after describing a woman's experience of domestic violence from her partner, conclude: "most men are not like that". This statement suggests that Radford and Stanko's (1996, p.78) argument that state responses to violence against women are an "attempt at policing the family and heterosexuality in order to clean



up its public face and to restore its legitimacy as a safe institution for women” may apply to *Australia Says No*.

In contrast to the “dysfunctional relationships” of domestic violence, the dominant representation of sexual assault in *Australia Says No* was as a problem of miscommunication. In the Booklet (p.14), for example, were the statements:

Communication is key for all relationships. Surveys report that boys in particular are anxious about communication. Many feel that they need to have a “few drinks” before they are able to talk to girls. Sometimes they might need help to find more positive ways to handle shyness and the fear of rejection. Without communication there can be no real relationship. If communication is poor or not valued, negotiating the boundaries of the relationship will be difficult, if not impossible. Poor communication can lead to conflicting expectations, especially about sex. Sex without consent is sexual assault – there is no room for confusion.

Remember if you are so drunk that you don't know if the other person is consenting – stop. It could be rape. When you know that the other person is so drunk they may not be capable of giving consent – don't do it – because this would be rape.

These comments represent sexual assault as a miscommunication problem and an accidental or spontaneous event. They obscure what feminists argue are the deliberate and planned actions of perpetrators who commit sexual assault and the institutional and structural context that facilitates and condones this behaviour.

This representation of sexual assault as miscommunication was exemplified in the “mind-reading” activity in the Education Resource (part 1, p.15). This activity was a scenario of sexual assault from the perspective of the victim (Monica) and perpetrator (Michael) which compared each of their thoughts before, during and after the sexual assault. This activity represented the rape as an accident of miscommunication as illustrated in explicit questions such as: ‘how could they have communicated more clearly?’ (part 1, p.13). It also ignores the premeditation evident in Michael's comment “I think she's telling me tonight's the night! Finally!” and his deliberate disregard of Monica's wishes evident in the comment “She keeps pushing my hands away – she probably wants to make it seem like it's all my idea so she doesn't feel too slutty”. Further, another question, ‘what could Monica and Michael have done differently?’ (part1, p.13), represents Michael raping Monica as being the responsibility of them both. This kind of representation of the problem invalidates the Booklet's statement there is “no room for confusion” and, from a feminist perspective, blurs

the boundaries by suggesting Michael and Monica are both responsible for the 'miscommunication' that it suggests led to Michael raping Monica.

In this scenario Michael also draws upon hegemonic notions of masculinity to negate Monica's non-consent and justify his own actions. An excellent example of this was the comparative comments by Monica and Michael respectively: "I told him to stop but he got on top of me and started kissing me really hard whenever I tried to say something, I tried to push him off, but he kept holding me down" compared with "She keeps pretending to struggle – it makes me feel really powerful. I'm so excited!". Michael's connection between over-riding Monica's indications of non-consent and feeling powerful are illustrative of how sexual assault is linked to performing hegemonic masculinity but this is not challenged in any way in this scenario in the Education Resource.

The Education Resource also validates Michael's interpretations of the situation by framing the problem in the questions it asks students as a problem of mutual miscommunication, seeking to develop communication skills and focusing more on the actions of Monica than Michael. Michael Flood (2004b, p.9) argues that representing sexual assault as a problem of miscommunication in ways such as this:

...obscures the gendered power relations and deliberate, planned choices that typically organise sexual violence. Men do not sexually assault because they lack skills, but because they feel they can, doing so offers certain benefits, and their behaviour is socially sanctioned. Skills training can underestimate the power men invest in existing gender relations, the ways in which dominant forms of masculinity may 'feel right' or 'make imaginative sense' to the men who inhabit them .

Yet, in addition to the two questions noted above which suggest this is a problem of mutual miscommunication, the students are also asked to consider 'what signs did Monica give that she didn't want to have sex?' and 'why didn't Michael get the message?'. These questions both focus on Monica and draw upon hegemonic masculinity by implying that it is Monica's responsibility to communicate appropriately to Michael that she is not consenting rather than Michael's responsibility to check she is consenting and appropriately interpret her signs of non-consent. As a result, the sexual assault may easily be interpreted by the students as Monica's fault. An alternative question which might shift responsibility to Michael and promote ethical sexuality could be something like: 'what steps did Michael take to find out if Monica wanted to have sex?'. By framing the questions in the way it did, however, the Education Resource implicitly supports Michael's interpretation of events and

negates what feminists would argue is his responsibility for the rape. It suggests that mutual miscommunication and Monica's failure to demonstrate non-consent in an acceptable way to Michael are responsible for the rape. In this way, this scenario strategically draws upon, and in turn reinforces, features of hegemonic masculinity which privilege men's interpretations and experiences of events over women's.

### **10.2.2 Male perpetrators of violence represented as victims**

Another possible effect of the representation of the problem as dysfunctional families and miscommunication is that the perpetrator may be constructed as a victim rather than a perpetrator of their violence. In the Booklet, "Brett's Story" (p.13) about a man facing possible sexual assault charges supports this interpretation. Brett's final statement "My mum is taking me to see a counsellor for guys. But I am really scared about what is going to happen" first of all conflates the line between the victim and perpetrator (e.g. both need counsellors to deal with 'the' sexual assault). Further, the last message the reader is left with is Brett's fear about what will happen to him. This may encourage the reader to identify and empathise with Brett as a subject of pity and possibly even a 'victim' of the sexual assault himself. Such an interpretation is particularly likely given the way the campaign represents sexual assault as a problem of miscommunication. This problem representation does not challenge what feminists would argue is Brett's agency and choice to sexually assault his girlfriend and his premeditation suggested in the line "She said she didn't want to go too far. It really bugged me that she got to make all the decisions". This statement, which is unchallenged in the Booklet, suggests the complexity of the role of gendered power relations in sexual assault as it draws on hegemonic notions of masculinity and men's perceived rights to be dominant and decision-makers over the bodies and actions of women. By not challenging Brett's statements and representing his fear in a way that might cause the reader to pity him, it is thus possible the reader might conclude that both Brett and his girlfriend were victims of the "abusive situation" and miscommunication.

In Advertisement 1, the representation of the problem of sexual assault as one of miscommunication also constructed the man as a victim of the "violent relationship". In this advertisement was the statement: "She came back to my place and she knew what we were there for and then like half way through she says no but I kept going". Although followed by "that's sexual assault", there was no clear statement about who was responsible for the sexual assault. This scenario may generate audience sympathy for the man who was implicitly portrayed as a victim of miscommunication and a victim of a

situation where each person had different expectations and did not communicate these effectively. Further, if the audience was influenced by biological determinist beliefs or myths about sexual assault, such as the “male sex drive discourse” (Ehrlich, 2001), this man could also easily be constructed as the victim of a woman who acted irresponsibly by stopping half way through a sexual encounter; thereby inverting the roles of victim and perpetrator. Similarly, in the same advertisement was the statement: “I kept going you know and the next minute she says that I forced her. But it was too late, what was I supposed to do?”. Given the continued strength of myths about sexual assault, these representations of the problem as miscommunication and uncontrollable male sex drive may cause the audience to empathise with, or perhaps minimise the responsibility of, the perpetrator. They may also reinforce sexual assault myths identified by feminists and may construct the perpetrators as the ‘victim’ of the sexual assault in the context of miscommunication or a woman who shouldn’t have agreed only to go ‘half way’.

### 10.2.3 Idealised families

The representation of the problem as family dysfunction and family breakdown and the solution of restoring and strengthening ‘good’ families were also apparent in the campaign. In particular, *Australia Says No* idealised certain types of families. Within the Booklet and Education Resource, parents were constituted positively as supportive and caring role models for their children. The Booklet (p.16), for example, contained the statement: “parents too play an important role. Family behaviour and expectations provide an important model for young people experiencing their first relationships”. Similarly, the Prime Minister stated (Booklet p.1):

The Australian Government believes that families are the backbone of a strong and health community, and loving and supportive relationships are at the heart of happy, well functioning families. Families are the best places for children to learn about love and respect, and how to build and maintain health and caring relationships.

These statements suggest the campaign assumes parents and families are positive influences on children’s lives. Further, idealised representations of families in the campaign were also apparent on pages 16 to 18 of the Booklet. These pages were specifically directed at parents under the headings “Parents Can Help” and “What Parents Can Do”. They went through positive suggestions and strategies for parents to use to help their children deal with violence. This focus on parents for solutions suggests the campaign did not acknowledge what feminists argue is the endemic extent of domestic violence and

sexual assault perpetrated by men within families. It is also at odds with the Howard Government's representations of the problem in *Australia Says No* as dysfunctional families/relationships and intergenerational transmission of violence as discussed above.

The idealised representation of the family was combined in *Australia Says No* with a focus on particular types of families. In restoring and "strengthening families" the Howard Government singled out particular types of families for attention for violence prevention; those families who were not "well-functioning" (Booklet, p.1). Expressed in the language of the culture wars discussed in Chapter Four, male violence against women in this context may be considered as a problem of the minority 'them' rather than the mainstream 'us'.

Although the focus of the campaign is on those families the Howard Government judged not "well-functioning", *Australia Says No* could also be considered to serve a strategic political purpose within the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda. The solutions to the problem promoted in *Australia Says No*, which focussed heavily on victims as well as their families and friends, suggest the campaign was as much about policing all families as it is about policing women victimised or at risk of violence and those families constructed as 'Them'. This is because these solutions are framed in the context of idealised concepts of family and contain very specific scripts and directions about how families should behave and function - in particular in responding to men's violence but also more generally.

This argument is supported by Howard's (2004) comment: "We need families to talk about the values that underpin healthy relationships - relationships that support and nurture. We need communities to have clear expectations about what is considered responsible, acceptable behaviour". Indeed, a whole page of the Booklet (p.18) was titled "What parents can do" and prescriptively tells parents what to do if their daughter has experienced violence. Similarly, pages 16-17, titled "Parents can help" contained a number of explicit and implicit assumptions, representations, and value statements of how 'good' families act. Examples of this included the vignette "Joh's Story" on page 17 which scripts how a 'good' parent should relate to their child and the statement on page 16: "We all need to understand and encourage the importance of those fundamental values that are the foundation of healthy, strong relationships: respect, communication, sharing, independence, trust, companionship, honesty". In the Booklet (p.1) Howard states: "relationships are personal and private"; a statement consistent with the liberal ideology of privacy and individualism. The content of the Booklet as discussed above, however, contradicts this statement and suggests that in practice *Australia Says No* offers a neo-liberal reversal of this idealised social relationship between the family and the state. Thus, consistent with neo-liberal and

socially conservative rather than liberal ideology, *Australia Says No* may be seen as a “practice or technique of governmentality” (Johnson, 2000, p.152) seeking to train families to behave in a certain ways and promoting conservative, idealised values about families.

This analysis locating *Australia Says No* in the broader social policy agenda of the Howard government, rather than being tangential to it, parallels Rundle's (2001, p.42) analysis of Howard Government anti-drugs campaigns as discussed in Chapter Four. Rundle argues that in the anti-drugs campaigns “the family was reconstructed as an arm of the state, to whom was subcontracted the role of shaping the behaviour of the young, in a manner scripted by professionals”. The analysis in this chapter suggests that Australian Government responses to male violence against women during the Howard years also can not be divorced from the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda. In promoting an idealised, conservative, patriarchal and traditional model of family and government *Australia Says No* fit comfortably within, and contributed to, the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda.

#### **10.2.4 Heteronormativity and conservative values**

The Howard Government's representation of the problem in *Australia Says No* was also heteronormative and reinforced hegemonic heterosexuality. In particular, the campaign focussed on, and idealised, families and relationships which were implicitly and explicitly heterosexual. In *Australia Says No* all representations of violence were of violence perpetrated within heterosexual relationships and all vignettes and images are of people who are either implicitly or explicitly heterosexual. This heteronormative representation of the problem in *Australia Says No* concealed and silenced the experiences of those who did not fit with constructions of hegemonic masculinity or hegemonic heterosexuality.

As discussed in Chapter Two, Mason (1997; 2002) argues that a sophisticated analysis and representation of male violence against women requires gender to be considered outside of individual embodiment alone. This includes a diversity of experiences in which gender relations of all types are constructed and hegemonic masculinity and hierarchies of difference created and reinforced. These include gay and lesbian experiences of domestic violence and sexual assault and men's experiences of being sexually assaulted. The individualising of the problem in the Howard Government's representations as discussed earlier in this chapter along with the exclusion of gay and lesbian experiences of men's violence is therefore significant. These representations in *Australia Says No* may have silenced and concealed the experiences of lesbian women and gay men who are subjected

to men's violence, such as sexual assault, as a punishment or hate crime for not playing by the 'rules' of hegemonic masculinity, subordinate femininities and hegemonic heterosexuality.

In representing the problem in *Australia Says No* within a framework of hegemonic heterosexuality the Howard Government also reinforced heteronormativity in a way that was consistent with their approach to gay and lesbian rights generally as explored in Chapter Four. This was done by constructing heterosexuality as a public subject of social policy, in this case a violence prevention campaign, and excluding homosexuality as presumably only to be tolerated in private sexual relationships. This suggests *Australia Says No* constructed a hierarchy which rendered lesbians and gay men invisible. In this way, *Australia Says No* appears illustrative of Mason's (1997, p.31) concept of the homophobic mind. From Mason's perspective it is significant that the homophobic mind does not care about whether lesbians and gay men exist but does seek to limit their social and legal rights as well as their visibility in public policy. It is thus the invisibility of lesbians and gay men in *Australia Says No* that suggests it represented the problem in a way that was heteronormative.

The representation of the problem of sexual assault in *Australia Says No* also reflected a socially conservative understanding of sexuality. The representation of sexual assault mixed the boundaries between consenting sexual relationships and sexual assault. The Booklet (p.16), for example, stated:

Young people can be unaware of some of the negative consequences that might result from thoughtless sexual behaviour. Even when someone is legally old enough and gives consent, indiscriminate sexual activity can have serious consequences – the possibility of sexually transmitted diseases, pregnancy, loss of reputation, being talked about, embarrassment and anxiety.

From a feminist perspective, this statement blurs the boundaries between what could be quite healthy, respectful and non-violent sexual encounters between young people and sexual assault. It represents the problem as an issue of immoral sexual relationships and moralises about the nature of these relationships and the problems of certain types of consenting sexual behaviour (i.e. "indiscriminate sexual activity"). This representation constructs sexual assault as a problem of relationships that do not fit with the conservative ideal; presumably those which are not monogamous or are "indiscriminate". It also rejects the possibility that young people can engage in enjoyable, consenting, mutual and respectful sexual encounters outside of a hegemonic heterosexuality model of sex as only between a committed, mutually exclusive heterosexual couple. These messages therefore

negate what feminists might argue are the rights of both men and women to be sexual beings and engage in consenting sexual activity without being raped as well as obscuring the way perpetrators strategically draw upon the mezzo and macro levels in their use of violence. In this way *Australia Says No* reinforced heteronormativity.

### 10.3 Non-gendered and Racialised Representations of Male Violence (macro)

#### 10.3.1 Non-gendered Representations

The representation of male violence against women in *Australia Says No* as an issue of individual men's pathology as discussed in the micro level understandings above constructs the problem as non-gendered. It does this by pathologising and distancing individual men perpetrating violence against women from the social and structural gendered power relations facilitating this violence and the patriarchal dividend it creates for all men (to varying degrees) as discussed in Chapter Two. By suggesting it is not only individual men but 'angry', 'criminal' or 'distressed' men who use violence the campaign also suggests it is only pathological or damaged men who are violent towards women. This is instead of the feminist argument that this violence is something "normal, ordinary men do routinely on a very substantial scale because they want to, because they think they have the right to, and because nothing effective is done to stop them" (Itzin, 2000, p.378). Further, the campaign's use of language and failure to contextualise *Australia Says No* in its broader social, political and historical context also suggests the representation of the problem was a non-gendered one.

There was a confusing juxtaposition of the name of the campaign, *Violence Against Women – Australia Says No*, which was gendered, with the language used throughout the campaign which is non-gendered. In the campaign's images and vignettes all perpetrators are represented as men and all victims as women. This gendering of the problem is only evident at the embodied level of individuals, however, and in the Booklet the language was usually gender-neutral. On page 8, for example, were the phrases: "Some of the time, violent people treat their partners very well"; "it's common for both the abusive partner and the victim to try and make it OK"; "Sometimes the violent person will blame the victim"; and "people subject to violence and abuse can begin to think the violence is their fault". This mix of gendered and non-gendered language and imagery is not explained in the campaign and is thus confusing and contradictory. It suggests the campaign recognises violence as



gendered at the micro level of individuals but does not recognise this violence as gendered at the mezzo and macro levels as feminist would argue is important.

The absence of the broader social, political and historical context in *Australia Says No* also illustrates its non-gendered approach. Even in the more detailed Education Resource there was no explanation or framing of the problem within gendered power relations. The Education Resource had no lessons, for example, that acknowledge feminism, the women's movement or how violence against women became an issue of public policy concern. Nor was there any discussion or acknowledgement of the historical, social and political context which continues to make women vulnerable to male violence including: ongoing systemic inequalities between women and men; social expectations about women's primary care of children and men; and the history of discriminatory laws, social acceptability of violence, control of wives/women, and of women and children being regarded as the property of men. There was also no attempt to explain or represent the links between different forms of violence such as sexual assault and domestic violence within a broader theoretical framework outside of the name of the campaign. These absences suggest the representations of the problem in *Australia Says No* individualised violence and isolated it from the gendered power relations which feminists argued underpin male violence against women.

### **10.3.2 Race, culture and nationalism**

The Howard Government's representation of the problem of male violence against women also reveals the role of race, culture and nationalism in *Australia Says No* when conceptualised within the broader social and political context. As outlined in Chapter Two, feminist understandings suggest patriarchy creates a range of hierarchies such as gender, race and age. By contextualising the campaign within its broader context, the representation of the problem of male violence against women in *Australia Says No* appears consistent with the Howard Government's culture wars and assimilationist nationalism identified by commentators as discussed in Chapter Four.

As discussed above, *Australia Says No* targets those families the Howard Government considered were not "well-functioning", which presumably includes the racially and culturally other or 'them' in the language of the culture wars. One of the strategies of the culture wars was to leave the concept of 'us' and 'them' intentionally vague so 'them' became a strangely shifting category, as explained in Chapter Four. This is particularly relevant in the context of

the Howard Government's campaign slogan "Australia Says No". This slogan invoked the notion that violence against women was a problem for those the government deemed 'un-Australian' including Indigenous people and those from non-English speaking backgrounds. The campaign also created a subject category of 'Australia' as an imagined authority which included 'us'. This distancing of the majority Australian 'us' from the non-Australian 'them' committing male violence against women was illustrated in Howard's comment: "The Government, like the *overwhelming majority of Australians*, is appalled by violence against women and deeply concerned that it remains a significant problem in our community" (2004, emphasis added). In this context, the phrase "Australia Says No" promoted a particular racialised meaning which focussed attention on those the government deemed "un-Australian" as Webster (2006a; 2006b) also argues as outlined in Chapter One.

#### 10.4 Discussion

This case study of *Australia Says No* offers an alternative way of understanding the Howard Government's approaches from a feminist perspective, in addition to the policies of chivalry and cooption understandings explored in Chapter Eight. Chapter Nine argued the role of policy process, individual feminist policy activism, and the femocrats' exploitation of the political opportunity structures available to them is important in understanding *Partnerships*. It suggested feminists were able to incorporate feminist understandings of male violence against women into *Partnerships*. This provided one explanation for why feminists, including key informants, may not have been as critical of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women as they were of the government's broader policy agenda. By the time of *Australia Says No*, however, the Howard Government had reportedly largely excluded feminists inside and outside government from involvement in the government's approaches to male violence against women. Despite this, key informants, generally praised *Partnerships* and *Australia Says No* as positive while simultaneously criticising the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda. This case study of *Australia Says No*, however, extends this discussion by providing a foundation to develop the argument that the Howard Government's approaches may be conceptualised as policies of transformistic hegemonic masculinity.

As outlined in Chapter Two, Demetriou's (2005) 'new sociology of hegemonic masculinity' reworks the concept of hegemonic masculinity. He does this by focussing on the way dominant men use the process of group formation and the formation of historic blocs in hegemonic masculinity to win the consent of those they oppress. Hegemonic masculinity

theorists and feminist understandings of policies of cooption suggest that dominant men oppose, annihilate or marginalise oppositional (e.g. feminist) interests. In contrast, Demetriou argues dominant men redeploy the oppressed group's practices in a transformistic way. That is, dominant groups appropriate and redeploy oppressed groups' practices in a way that creates something new while simultaneously reasserting and hiding operations of power. Thus, they transform what appears counter-hegemonic into an instrument of hegemonic domination.

This discussion proposes that a new way of understanding policy based on Demetriou's work is to conceptualise the Howard Government's approaches as policies of transformistic hegemonic masculinity. This conceptualisation does not replace policy of chivalry or policy of cooption understandings explored in Chapter Eight. Rather, it proposes a third level of theoretical analysis grounded upon this foundation of policies of chivalry and policies of cooption understandings. This conceptualisation helps explain how the Howard Government provided such a sustained and comparatively well-funded public policy response to male violence against women which largely escaped the feminist critique directed at the government's broader social policy agenda.

The case study of *Australia Says No* in this chapter suggests the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women may be conceptualised as policies of transformistic hegemonic masculinity in two related ways. The first concerns feminist understandings of male violence against women. The second incorporates Mason's (2002) concepts of mutual constitution, vehicles of articulation, territory and the cultural body. Chapter Eight suggests the Howard Government utilised some feminist understandings, language and concepts concerning male violence against women in *Australia Says No*. Extending this analysis, this chapter explored the multiple representations of the problem in *Australia Says No* which correspond generally with the individual (micro), institutional (mezzo) and structural (macro) levels of feminist understandings of male violence against women. Chapter Ten also suggests, however, that the way the Howard Government utilised these feminist understandings of male violence against women subverted and redeployed feminist practices to reassert and reinforce hegemonic masculinity at the micro, mezzo and macro levels.

At the micro level, feminist analyses suggest individual men are responsible for their choice to perpetrate male violence against women. Consistent with this, one representation of the problem in *Australia Says No* identified individual men as responsible for male violence

against women. It did this, however, in a way that shifted responsibility for this violence away from the male perpetrators and the social context which feminists argue facilitate and condone this violence. It also suggested that it was only 'angry', 'criminal', or 'distressed' men who committed this violence rather than it being normal, everyday men enacting normal gendered power relations and inequality between men and women as feminists would argue. By representing the problem in this way, *Australia Says No* thus isolated these men from the broader social context feminists argue facilitate and condone their violence. It also obscured the feminist argument that male perpetrators are normal, not pathological, men who strategically draw upon structural and institutional factors such as women's inequality and patriarchal family structures in their use of violence. From a feminist perspective this problem representation, however, also simultaneously diminished the responsibility of these individual men for this violence by labelling them, in FitzRoy's (1999) words, as "mad", "bad" or "sad" and thus excusing their violence.

Further, the analysis in this chapter suggests a number of additional rhetorical devices operated at this micro level in *Australia Says No* to shift responsibility for male violence against women from male perpetrators to either the relationship or the women victimised. First, the campaign represented perpetrators as passive subjects and distanced men from their violence by making the "violent relationship" the active subject. Second, the campaign represented the problem in a way which blurred the boundaries between victims and perpetrators by addressing the messages to both groups simultaneously while also directing most interventions and solutions solely to the victims of violence and their families and friends. This approach created "zones of uncertainty" (Towns, 2005) which suggest the people targeted for the solutions/interventions (i.e. the female victims and their families and friends) are the ones with 'the problem' and thus responsible for the violence. This chapter thus suggests a number of rhetorical devices as well as individual pathology representations operated at a micro level in *Australia Says No* to obscure and shift responsibility from the male perpetrators to the female victims of male violence against women.

At the mezzo level, feminist analyses suggest institutional factors such as the nature of relationships between men and women, hegemonic heterosexuality and heteronormativity play a significant role in male violence against women. Consistent with this, another representation of the problem in *Australia Says No* was of the relationship between men and women. In contrast to feminist analyses which suggest all relationships between men and women are potentially problematic within patriarchy, *Australia Says No* represented the

problem as “dysfunctional relationships” or “communication problems”. That is, at the mezzo level the problem is not institutional and reflective of problematic dynamics in all relationships under patriarchy but rather is represented as the result of individual bad families, bad relationships, or miscommunication. There was also a confusing and contradictory representation of the problem at this level which conflated unhealthy relationships in which there may be poor communication or conflict with relationships where men perpetrate violence against women. Similarly to the micro level discussed above, from a feminist perspective this representation shifts responsibility from male perpetrators and the institutional and structural context which facilitates and condones their violence. This representation may also result in the male perpetrators being considered as the “victim” of the “violent relationship” in a way likely to elicit the sympathy of the audience.

Exploring how the sexual assault of Monica by Michael was represented as miscommunication in the Education Resource strongly supports the argument that the Howard Government’s approaches were policies of transformistic hegemonic masculinity. This scenario was an excellent example of the way the campaign strategically drew upon and validated hegemonic notions of masculinity reinforcing men’s and male perpetrator’s framings of the problem of male violence against women. These framings include arguments and myths identified by feminists such as male violence against women is a problem of dysfunctional relationships, miscommunication, or the actions of the female victims. Combined with women’s dominant roles and responsibility for relationships and the private sphere and gendered divisions of labour under patriarchy, these problem representations reinforce the way hegemonic masculinity holds women responsible for the violence perpetrated against them. Instead of challenging men’s perpetration of violence, this suggests that from a feminist perspective the problem representations in *Australia Says No* validated and reinforced hegemonic masculinity and thus could actually increase women’s vulnerability to men’s violence.

The argument that the Howard Government’s approaches to male violence against women may be conceptualised as policies of transformistic hegemonic masculinity at the mezzo and macro levels is further supported by taking into account Mason’s understandings of violence. As outlined in Chapter Two, Mason (2002) proposes a number of concepts to understand violence including mutual constitution, vehicles of articulation, territory and the cultural body. Mason argues that in any single incident of violence different aspects of identity, such as race, class, or sexuality, are mutually constituted and articulated through each other in highly interactive ways. This mutual constitution occurs regardless of the

individual embodiment (e.g. race, gender or sexuality) of the victim or perpetrator. In Mason's approach violence is underpinned by a hierarchical construction of difference grounded in bodily specificities where the perpetrator draws upon "a sense of superiority and concomitant devaluation of the personal integrity of the racial or gendered other" (Mason, 2002, pp.63-64). Mason also uses the concept of territory as an important conceptual category for understanding people's sense of belonging in the context of violence. She argues that those who are dominant use the concept of territory to derive their sense of entitlement to 'manage' those they deem inferior in their hierarchical construction of difference. Although Mason applies her concepts to individual incidents of violence (micro) and their connection to social structures (macro), these concepts are, nevertheless, useful to make sense of the analysis of *Australia Says No* in this chapter.

At the mezzo level, the Howard Government's approaches to traditional families and hegemonic heterosexuality in *Australia Says No* promoted idealised conservative, patriarchal types of families and heterosexuality. One representation of the problem in *Australia Says No* suggests male violence against women is a problem for families the government has deemed not "well-functioning" including 'un-Australian' families. In this way the Howard Government could be seen to have validated and reinforced a hierarchical construction of difference and sense of superiority for 'good', traditional, heterosexual families. Moreover, this chapter argues the Howard Government promoted traditional families as a normative standard by which all individual families can be judged regardless of their experiences of male violence. That is, in Mason's language, the Howard Government invoked the notion of territory to manage those they deemed inferior as well as the population at large. This approach parallels the way Mason argues individual perpetrators draw upon hierarchical constructions of difference to justify their violence and use this violence to manage those they deem inferior. It is particularly ironic that, according to this argument, the Howard Government used male violence against women policy in *Australia Says No* to validate and reinforce the institutional conditions which Mason's argues underpins the perpetration of violence in the first place.

The Howard Government's broader social policy agenda was a conservative one and their social policies promoted traditional heterosexual families and supported a gendered division of labour as discussed in Chapter Four. From a feminist perspective, however, male violence against women exposes institutions such as traditional families and heterosexuality as potentially harmful to women's interests and may therefore erode women's support and confidence in them. It could therefore be argued that to maintain women's participation in

these institutions and advance the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda, it was important for the government be seen to respond to male violence against women.

Chapter Eight argued that *Australia Says No* was a public relations exercise for the Howard Government and the government were more interested in being seen to respond than being genuinely interested in reducing the incidence and impact of male violence against women. The analysis of *Australia Says No* at the mezzo level in the discussion above, however, suggests the representation of the problem may have operated in two additional ways to advance the Howard Government's conservative social policy agenda. First, was to maintain women's consent to patriarchal institutions such as heterosexuality and traditional family structures by showing the Howard Government was doing something about this violence. Second, was to actually promote and reinforce the superiority of traditional, heterosexual family structures by suggesting families deemed not "well-functioning" or 'un-Australian' were at most risk of male violence against women. In this way, the Howard Government could be seen to have strategically inverted feminist understandings by representing male violence against women not as a result of hegemonic masculinity and heteronormativity but rather as a crisis of these institutions. That is, through *Australia Says No* the Howard Government transformed feminist counter-hegemonic practices into instruments of hegemonic domination.

At the macro level, feminist analyses of male violence against women suggest structural factors such as patriarchy and social and economic inequalities between men and women play a significant role in male violence against women. Consistent with this, in *Australia Say No* the title of the campaign and particularly the term "violence against women" suggests the problem is a gendered one. As illustrated in this chapter, however, this gendering of the problem is only evident at the embodied level of individuals (micro level). Thus, the language throughout the campaign is primarily non-gendered and nothing in the campaign frames the problem within the broader social or historical context of unequal gendered power relations as feminist analyses suggest is important.

Beyond the invisibility of gender, at the macro level the chapter argues the Howard Government also invoked notions of race, culture and nationalism in *Australia Says No*. These are important because, as outlined in Chapter Two, some feminists argue patriarchy creates a number of hierarchical binaries such as male/female, black/white and so on. This chapter argues the Howard Government's representations of the problem in *Australia Says No* reinforced and constructed male violence against women as an issue for the racially and

culturally othered. In the broader social and political context of the Howard Government's "culture wars" this is particularly important. This representation at the macro level suggests male violence against women is a problem for 'them' rather than the mainstream 'us'. Similarly to the discussion of traditional families and heterosexuality above, in this way the Howard Government again reinforced through *Australia Says No* the hierarchical constructions of difference which underpin violence. That is, this representation of the problem attributed to the racially and culturally othered an inferiority grounded in the suggestion that male violence against women is a problem for 'them' rather than 'us'. It also distanced male violence against women as a problem of little relevance to the Australian community at large.

The Howard Government's representation of the problem in the context of race, culture and nationalism at the macro level also invoked Mason's concept of territory even more so than at the mezzo level. This is illustrated by the slogan "Australia Says No" and its potential to be interpreted as directed at those 'deemed 'un-Australian'. This slogan draws upon and reinforces the assimilationist nationalism promoted by the Howard Government in the culture wars. It therefore offered a further justification for the government to manage those deemed inferior, which in this case were the culturally and linguistically othered. The representation of the problem in *Australia Says No* at a macro level can thus be seen to have strategically contributed to the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda in the context of their culture wars. This is in direct contrast to feminist approaches which seek to challenge the sense of superiority and hierarchical constructions of difference underpinning male violence. Thus, the representation of the problem at the macro level in *Australia Says No* suggests the Howard Government transformed feminist counter-hegemonic practices into instruments of hegemonic domination.

Prominent hegemonic masculinity theorists, R.W. Connell and James Messerschmidt (2005), reject Demetriou's 'new sociology of hegemonic masculinity' as only applying to the local and not the regional (nation-state) or global levels. The discussion above, however, argues that based on the case study of *Australia Says No* it is possible to develop a new way of understanding the Howard Government's approaches which applies Demetriou's analysis to the regional (federal government) level. Further, understanding the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women as policies of transformistic hegemonic masculinity in this way offers a useful explanation for the dissonance in feminist and key informants' assessments of this government. It also provides a significant insight



into the importance of context in understanding Australian Government responses to male violence against women during the Howard years.

In this thesis I have argued that the Howard Government did not annihilate or marginalise oppositional feminist interests or practices such as feminist framings, discourses, concepts or approaches to male violence against women in *Australia Says No*. Rather I propose the Howard Government redeployed these feminist practices in a transformistic way consistent with Demetriou's 'new sociology of hegemonic masculinity'. By doing this the Howard Government created something new in *Australia Says No* which simultaneously supported the Government's broader conservative social policy agenda while hiding operations of power and their hegemonic effects. That is, the Howard Government coopted feminist counter-hegemonic practices and redeployed or transformed these into instruments of hegemonic domination. This chapter thus suggests that these approaches did not sit outside of the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda but rather were consistent with, and strategically contributed to, this agenda.

# **Chapter 11**

## **Australia Says No?: The Howard Government's Approaches to Male Violence Against Women**

---

A key problematic for feminists has been the capacity of the state to respond appropriately to social issues, such as male violence against women, which have a significant impact on women's lives. Many feminists have argued the modern western state is a gendered and patriarchal one that entrenches the power and privilege of dominant men and question the capacity of such a state to respond to their interests. Simultaneously, however, Australian feminists have historically centred their activism on the state, and particularly the bureaucracy, as illustrated by the femocrat strategy straddling the divide between the bureaucracy and women's movement. The activities of femocrats have therefore sparked strenuous debate in the Australian feminist movement about whether feminists working inside the state would be coopted or compromise feminist demands (Goodwin, 1999, p.52; Nyland, 1998, p.216). Further, although feminist approaches and the femocrat strategy conventionally dominated national male violence against women policy in Australia, the Howard years are usually represented as a constraint for feminists and the femocrat strategy.

This thesis examined the ongoing salience of the femocrat strategy during the Howard years and the complex relationship between feminism and the state that developed in this period. It sought to answer the question: What was the nature of the Australian Government's approaches to male violence against women during the Howard years? This question arose from my interest in how and why the conservative Howard Government who explicitly rejected feminism provided a sustained and comparatively well-funded public policy response to male violence against women between 1996 and 2007. In answering this question, this thesis has responded to a significant gap in the literature on the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women as well as contributing to broader studies of policy content and policy process in Australia.

This thesis contributes to general understandings of political and policy process by suggesting researchers take into consideration the significance of policy actors or participants, the significance of structures or policy machinery, and the significance of discourse. The thesis suggests that in investigations into public policy it is valuable to take into account and explore both the policy process and the outcome or content of these policies. Based on this study of national male violence against women policy, this thesis recommends the utility of employing Anna Yeatman's (1998) understanding of 'policy activism', Louise Chappell's (2002a; 2002b) 'political opportunity structures', and Carol Bacchi's (1999b) 'What's the problem approach' to make sense of this period. Beyond male violence against women in this period, these concepts are also relevant and useful to studies of the broader women's policy enterprise and feminist engagements with the state during different periods and with different governments.

A second important contribution of this thesis is filling the gap in the small, emerging body of literature on the Howard Government's responses to male violence against women. Although this literature (Chappell, 2001; Donovan & Vlasis, 2005; FitzRoy, 1999; Jones, 2004; McKenzie, 2005; Morley & Macfarlane, 2008; Murray, 2005; Murray & Powell, 2009; Phillips, 2004, 2006, 2008b; Summers, 2003b; Webster, 2006a, 2006b; Winter, 2007) provided an important foundation for this thesis, on the whole the analyses tend to be rather limited in scope and the Howard years have been a period of male violence against women policy development which has not hitherto been documented in much detail. This thesis has filled this gap by developing a comprehensive account or narrative of this period which has recorded the history, policy machinery, policy process and content of key Howard Government initiatives. This account has included the Howard Government's policy and program responses *Partnerships Against Domestic Violence (Partnerships)* (1997-2005), the *National Initiative to Combat Sexual Assault (National Initiative)* (2000-2005), the *Women's Safety Taskforce* (2002), and the *Women's Safety Agenda* (2005-2007). It has also documented the community education campaigns *No Respect, No Relationship (No Respect)* (2001-2003) and *Violence Against Women – Australia Says No (Australia Says No)* (2004-2007). The importance of documenting these initiatives while the experiences of key informants were still relatively recent and the documentary evidence was still available was illustrated by the number of key informants who had not even heard of *No Respect* despite strong associations with other Howard Government initiatives. It also provides an opportunity for feminists and policy-makers to learn from this period.

The division of powers in the Australian federal system of governance means Australian state and territory governments have traditionally played the most significant role in responding to this social issue. "Federalism has not been an issue central to Australian feminist discourse" (Chappell, 2002b, p.151). Australian research, including feminist research, on government policy responses to male violence against women has therefore tended to focus on state rather than federal governments. The significance of constitutional expansionism and the sustained response by a federal government to male violence against women during the Howard years, as documented in this thesis, suggests this should change. This thesis has demonstrated the importance of feminist researchers and activists interested in male violence against women increasing their attention towards the federal governments and the relationships between state and federal governments in the future. In addition to constitutional expansionism, this is important because this thesis supports Bacchi's (1999b, p.178) proposition that any term or concept including 'male violence against women' has no abstract meaning and can be employed for or against feminist goals. In this context, ongoing feminist concerns with cooption, although perhaps warranted, are also quite complex.

The problem of male violence against women has been constructed in a range of different ways, but feminist approaches to this issue have conventionally dominated national policy approaches and this thesis suggests they continued to do so even under the Howard Government. The Howard Government's engagement with feminism was, however, a complex one. This is evident in the key themes which emerged from stage one of the study. First, was the dissonance between key informants' positive and negative assessments of the Howard Government's male violence against women policies and broader social policy agenda. Second, was the proposition *Australia Says No* may have represented a progressive engagement between feminism and the Howard Government since it was consistent with feminist rhetoric and practice responding to male violence against women. Third, was the concept of wasted opportunities and that *Australia Says No* may be considered a missed opportunity and an inappropriate campaign in the broader social, political and historical context. Fourth, was the proposition *Australia Says No* was partisan political advertising and a public relations exercise focused on electoral populism and being seen to do something rather than being an appropriate response to male violence against women.

Based on these findings from stage one of the study, I argued that two ways the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women may be conceptualised from a

feminist perspective is as policies of chivalry and policies of cooption. Ramsay's (2004) research concluded that policies of chivalry were a useful way of describing federal government responses to domestic violence between 1970 and 1985. The dissonance in key informants' assessments of the Howard Government's approaches suggests the ongoing relevance of Ramsay's findings to this later period (1996 – 2007) since the first way these approaches could be conceptualised were as policies of chivalry. In the discussion in Chapter Eight I concluded the Howard Government's approaches were consistent with the three key elements of policies of chivalry since they were: highly visible responses to male violence against women; focused on protecting or rescuing victims of violence; and the government simultaneously did little to challenge women's inequality. Nevertheless, key informants also argued the Government's broader social policy agenda had a particularly detrimental impact on women who had experienced violence by undermining women's equality and increasing their vulnerability. This suggested a policy as chivalry conceptualisation alone was an inadequate way of understanding the Howard Government's approaches from a feminist perspective.

Consequently, the second way I argued the Howard Government's approaches could be conceptualised from a feminist perspective was as policies of cooption. The findings from stage one suggest the Howard Government adopted feminist rhetoric and responses to male violence against women at a micro level. Nevertheless, I argued they simultaneously oppressed more radical challenges to patriarchy (macro level) and traditional heterosexuality (mezzo level) that were available to them. This was particularly apparent in the government's cancellation of *No Respect*. Further, I proposed that *Australia Says No* was a public relations exercise the Howard Government used to maximise their political advantages while limiting their political risks. These findings suggested that understanding the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women as policies of cooption thus offered a useful additional way of making sense of this period. In particular, they made it possible to make sense of the strategic value of *Australia Says No* in advancing the Howard Government's social and political agenda nationally and internationally and why a government who had explicitly rejected feminism might adopt some feminist responses to this issue.

This analysis of the Howard Government's approaches as both policies of chivalry and policies of cooption suggests the government's policies and ideologies were complex and varied rather than monolithic. It also suggests a change in the nature of the Howard Government's approaches over time and the significant impact of the government's

intentional, increasing exclusion of feminist activists from the policy process. This may explain why conceptualisations of the Howard Government's approaches as policies of chivalry emerged mainly from discussions of *Partnerships* (the earlier initiative), and those as policies of cooption emerged mainly from discussions of *Australia Says No* (the later initiative).

Chapters Six, Seven and Eight therefore provided a detailed account of the male violence against women policy field during the Howard years, and identified key moments, issues and debates. This account is an important historical record of these initiatives. It also raised a number of issues relating to feminist engagement with the state on the basis of which I concluded that the Howard Government's approaches may be conceptualised as both policies of chivalry and policies of cooption from a feminist perspective. From stage one of the study there also emerged three further issues that were explored further in the case studies in stage two. First was the significance of the broader social and political context to understanding Howard Government approaches to male violence against women. Second was the dramatic impact of policy process and the role of individuals in shaping the content and nature of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women. In particular, was the unexpected finding that feminists inside and outside of government developed a productive engagement with the Howard Government; a government they argued was hostile to women's interests. Third was the dissonance between key informants' positive assessments of the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women and negative assessments of the impact of the Howard Government's broader policy agenda on women who had experienced violence. In particular, it was unusual that the key informants were not more critical of the Howard Government's approaches given their personal and professional experiences as feminists, activists and policy-makers.

The third important contribution of this thesis which emerged from the case study of *Partnerships* in stage two of the study was the role of feminists and feminism in Australian policy production. Feminists and femocrats have historically been important players in national male violence against women policy arenas. Feminists have, however, tended to do better under the more progressive Labor governments (Chappell, 2002b). Feminists have therefore usually represented conservative governments generally and the Howard Government specifically as a constraint rather than a political opportunity structure for progressing feminist goals. During the early Howard years, feminists were unable to do the 'federalism foxtrot' (Chappell, 2002b) to exploit differences between state and federal

governments because all governments except NSW were Liberal/Coalition governments. This thesis suggests that the Howard Government also put new policy machinery and processes in place in this period that changed the policy capacity and influence of feminists and femocrats. This change was not straightforward, however, and reflected continuities and discontinuities with the past since feminists and femocrats continued to be key players in the policy process but the Howard Government also challenged and reduced their discursive power.

Consistent with, and extending, Chappell's (2001) argument about the potential of federalism to nurture progressive social policy, this thesis argued feminists were able to exploit the new policy machinery such as the *Partnerships* Taskforce as a political opportunity structure to pursue feminist objectives and progressive social policy. Indeed, femocrats appeared to have significantly impacted on the nature of Howard Government approaches to male violence against women, particularly in the early years (1997-2002). This was evident in the feminist influence on *Partnerships* and *No Respect*. Although this thesis also concurred with Chappell's (2002b, p.30) proposition that the Howard Government left the "femocrat strategy in tatters", these findings have significant implications for femocrats and feminist policy activists. In particular, the ongoing relevance and salience of feminist influences and the femocrat strategy during the Howard years despite the Howard Government's conservatism and open hostility to feminism is important.

This thesis suggests that the femocrats' pragmatism and grounding of their arguments in evidence are valuable strategies which enabled them to exploit the political opportunity structures available to them even when there was a conservative or hostile government in power. The strategic transformation of OSW into a less-threatening grants administration, rather than a policy advisory agency, as explored in this thesis was also an important survival strategy which may be of use with future conservative governments. This strategy was not, however, without its risks and might only be considered a last resort since limiting the policy advisory capacity of OSW may have left women's policy more vulnerable to the Howard Government's cooption and transformistic redeployment as discussed further below.

Conservative governments such as the Howard Government are usually represented as a threat to the femocrat strategy and a constraint to feminist policy activists. The successes of feminist activism during this time, albeit moderated and somewhat constrained by the conservative political context, are nevertheless important. These successes suggest it may

be valuable for femocrats to pay more attention to the opportunities provided by cooperative federalism under conservative governments in addition to their traditional approach exploiting the differences between state and federal governments in the 'federalism foxtrot'. The experiences of feminists during the Howard years as outlined in this thesis also provide some important lessons for feminist policy activists outside of government. Historically, when conservative governments have been in power in Australia the gulf between 'inside' and 'outside' feminist activists widened with "much recrimination on both sides over funding cutbacks and negative policy decisions" and feminist activists outside the government have focused their attacks on the bureaucracy (Chappell, 2002b, p.29; McFerren, 1990, p.204). Consistent with this, the thesis suggests a similar dynamic operated between feminists inside and outside the Australian Government during the Howard years. The complex relationship between feminism and the state and the strategic way feminists adapted to the constraints the Howard Government presented them with and exploited the available political opportunity strategies suggests feminists outside of government might want to rethink this approach. Rather than concentrating their attacks on the bureaucracy, this thesis suggests that during periods of conservative government the strategic alliances between feminists inside and outside government become even more important for achieving feminist goals.

This thesis also suggests, however, that context is important and feminist engagements with conservative governments must be undertaken with great care and awareness of the capacity for 'male violence against women' to be employed both for and against feminist goals. This thesis highlights that the following warning from Glyn Davis' (1998, p.37) is an important one for feminist policy activists engaging with the state:

There are risks in policy activism. What if others take up our critique but not our policy recommendations? What if in proposing policy from the margins we unintentionally advance hostile agendas? Authorial intent, long suspect in literature, proves an equally doubtful concept in policy-making.

The fourth significant contribution of this thesis is to propose that the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women were consistent with, not anomalous to, the government's broader social policy agenda. This thesis provides an excellent example of policy-making during the Howard years illustrating how neo-liberalism, social conservatism, political opportunism, and hegemonic masculinity intersected and were reproduced. One of the ways it did this was by examining content through the case study of *Australia Says No* and exploring why feminists were not more critical of this campaign despite being largely



excluded from the Howard Government's policy machinery by this time. Based on this case study, this thesis proposed that the Howard Government used male violence against women policy to progress their conservative political and social policy agenda in a way that concealed operations of power and their hegemonic effects. To explain this, the thesis introduced and developed the concept of policies of transformistic hegemonic masculinity based on Demetriou's (2005) 'new sociology of hegemonic masculinity'.

This thesis proposed that the Howard Government's approaches to male violence against women may be conceptualised as policies of transformistic hegemonic masculinity in two related ways. The first concerns feminist understandings of male violence against women. The second incorporates Mason's (2002) concepts of mutual constitution, vehicles of articulation, territory and the cultural body. Chapter Ten argued using these concepts that, despite using feminist framings, discourses, concepts and approaches, the Howard Government represented the problem of male violence against women in a way that was contrary to feminist understandings and goals at the micro, mezzo and macro levels. This included: representations of the problem as the individual pathology of 'angry', 'criminal' or 'distressed' men; personifying "violent" or "dysfunctional" relationships and miscommunication as the problem; shifting responsibility for violence from men and the institutions and structures feminists argue facilitate and condone their violence; promoting heteronormativity and idealised conservative, patriarchal types of families; promoting non-gendered understandings; invoking race, culture and nationalism to construct violence as an issue for the racially and culturally othered; and reinforcing concepts of territory and the hierarchical constructions of difference which underpin male violence.

I have argued that the Howard Government coopted and redeployed feminist counter-hegemonic practices and transformed these into instruments of hegemonic domination. I have also suggested these approaches did not sit outside of the Howard Government's broader social policy agenda but rather were consistent with, and strategically contributed to, this agenda. This analysis highlights the importance of care in feminist engagements with the state and ongoing attention to the potential that feminist concepts and approaches can do any kind of political work. It suggests feminist activists need to carefully consider the impact of social and political context and constantly analyse what the problem is represented to be in their interactions with governments.

The title of this thesis uses the tagline of the Howard Government's community education campaign, "Australia Says No", as a question. By doing this I endeavoured to explore

whether Australia really did “say no” to male violence against women in the Howard years. I also examined the complex relationships between feminism and the state including political opportunity structures exploited by feminists and risks evident in conceptualisations of the government’s approaches as policies of chivalry, cooption and transformistic hegemonic masculinity. From a feminist perspective and perhaps ironically, this thesis concludes the Howard Government’s approaches to male violence against women transformed policies and practices which seem counter-hegemonic into an instrument of hegemonic domination. Importantly, from a feminist perspective, the Howard Government’s approaches thus undermined attempts to eliminate male violence against women and increased the vulnerability of women to this violence. On this basis, the Howard Government can be considered as being far from “saying no” to male violence against women.

---

## Bibliography

---

- AAP. (2005, 24 July). Go where? Labor says women escaping violence at a loss. *AAP Newswire (Factiva database)*.
- AASW. (2000). *AASW Code of Ethics*. Canberra: Australian Association of Social Workers (AASW).
- ALP. (2004). *Media Statement 13 May: Federal Labor's Response to the 2004/05 Budget Statement - What it says and does for Australian women*. Canberra: Australian Labor Party.
- Alston, M., & Bowles, W. (2003). *Research for Social Workers: An introduction to methods* (2nd ed.). Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
- Atmore, C. (1999). Victims, Backlash, and Radical Feminist Theory (or the Morning after They Stole Feminism's Fire). In S. Lamb (Ed.), *New Versions of Victims: Feminists Struggle with the Concept* (pp. 183-211). New York: New York University Press.
- Aulich, C. (2005). Privatisation and Outsourcing. In C. Aulich & R. Wettenhall (Eds.), *Howard's Second and Third Governments* (pp. 57-76). Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.
- B&T Weekly. (2004, 17 May). Domestic violence a 'political football'. *B & T Weekly*.
- Bacchi, C. (1999a). 'Rolling back the state?': feminism, theory and policy. In L. Hancock (Ed.), *Women, Public Policy and the State* (pp. 54-70). Melbourne: Macmillan Education.
- Bacchi, C. (1999b). *Women, Policy and Politics: The construction of policy problems*. London: Sage Publications.
- Bacchi, C. (2000). Policy as Discourse: what does it mean? where does it get us? *Discourse: studies in the cultural politics of education*, 21(1), 45-57.
- Bagshaw, D. (2004). *Verbal Abuse and Adolescent Identities: Marking the Boundaries of Gender*. Unpublished Doctor of Philosophy, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne.
- Bagshaw, D., & Chung, D. (2000). Gender Politics and Research: male and female violence in intimate relationships. *Women Against Violence: An Australian Feminist Journal*(8), 4-23.
- Bailey, A. (2006). *Feminist Analysis of Male Violence* (chapter of incomplete PhD thesis). Melbourne: Personal Communication.
- Baldino, D. (2005). Australia and the World. In C. Aulich & R. Wettenhall (Eds.), *Howard's Second and Third Governments* (pp. 189-207). Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.

- Barker, G. (2007). The public service. In C. Hamilton & S. Maddison (Eds.), *Silencing Dissent; How the Australian government is controlling public opinion and stifling debate* (pp. 124-147). Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
- Bazeley, P. (2007). *Qualitative Data Analysis with NVivo*. London: Sage Publications.
- Bessant, J., Watts, R., Dalton, T., & Smyth, P. (2006). *Talking Policy: How social policy is made*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
- Bettman, C. (2005). *Patriarchy: the predominant discourse and font of domestic violence*. Unpublished Doctor of Philosophy, Victoria University, Melbourne.
- Bond, J., & Phillips, R. (2001). Violence Against Women as a Human Rights Violation. In C. Renzetti, J. Edleson & R. K. Bergen (Eds.), *Sourcebook on Violence Against Women* (pp. 481-499). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Bowden, T. (2004a). *Controversy Over Shelved Domestic Violence Strategy*. Sydney: ABC Television Broadcast 17/2/2004. Transcript: <http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2004/s1047283.htm> retrieved 24/5/2004.
- Bowden, T. (2004b). *No Word on Domestic Violence Strategy*. Sydney: ABC Television Broadcast 30/3/2004. Transcript: <http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2004/s1077384.htm> retrieved 24/5/2004.
- Breckenridge, J. (1999). Subjugation and silences: the role of the professions in silencing victims of sexual and domestic violence. In J. Breckenridge & L. Laing (Eds.), *Challenging Silence: Innovative Responses to Sexual and Domestic Violence* (pp. 6-30). Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
- Brennan, D. (1998). Children's services and policy activism. In A. Yeatman (Ed.), *Activism and the Policy Process* (pp. 81-103). Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
- Brennan, D. (1999). Child care: Choice or charade? In L. Hancock (Ed.), *Women, Public Policy and the State* (pp. 85-98). Melbourne: Macmillan Education.
- Brett, J. (2003). *Australian Liberals and the Moral Middle Class*. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
- Brett, J. (2004). The New Liberalism. In R. Manne (Ed.), *The Howard Years* (pp. 74-93). Melbourne: Black Inc. Agenda.
- Brett, J. (2005). Relaxed and Comfortable: The Liberal Party's Australia. *Quarterly Essay*, 19.
- Brett, J. (2007). Exit Right: The Unravelling of John Howard. *Quarterly Essay*, 28.
- Brownmiller, S. (1975). *Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape*. London: Penguin Books.
- Bryman, A. (2001). *Social Research Methods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Byrne, A., & Lentin, R. (2000). Introduction: Feminist research methodologies in social sciences. In A. Byrne & R. Lentin (Eds.), *(Re)searching Women: Feminist Methodologies in the Social Sciences in Ireland* (pp. 1-60.). Dublin: Institute of Public Administration.

- Cameron, D. (1990). Introduction: why is language a feminist issue? In D. Cameron (Ed.), *The Feminist Critique of Language: A reader* (pp. 1-28). London: Routledge.
- Cannane, S. (2004). *Interview with Esther Fallon and Kay Patterson - on the Hack Program 13/9/2004*. Unknown: Triple J National Radio.
- Carabine, J. (1996). Heterosexuality and social policy. In D. Richardson (Ed.), *Theorising Heterosexuality* (pp. 55-74). Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Carmody, M. (1995). *Sites of Struggle - the development of social policy surrounding rape and sexual assault services in New South Wales, Australia*. Unpublished PhD, University of New South Wales, Sydney.
- Carmody, M. (2003a, 12-14 February). *Keynote address: New Approaches to Prevention*. Paper presented at the Practice and Prevention: Contemporary Issues in Adult Sexual Assault in New South Wales, Sydney.
- Carmody, M. (2003b). Sexual Ethics and Violence Prevention. *Social and Legal Studies*, 12(2), 199-216.
- Castello, R. (2004, 10 March). Push for DV Campaign. *The City Messenger*, p. 9.
- Chappell, L. (2000). Interacting with the State. *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 2(2), 244-275.
- Chappell, L. (2001). Federalism and Social Policy: The Case of Domestic Violence. *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 60(1), 59-69.
- Chappell, L. (2002a). The 'Femocrat' Strategy: Expanding the Repertoire of Feminist Activists. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 55, 85-98.
- Chappell, L. (2002b). *Gendering Government: Feminist Engagement with the State in Australia and Canada*. Toronto: UBC Press.
- Chung, D. (2002). Questioning Domestic Violence Orthodoxies: challenging the social construction of women as victims and as being responsible for stopping male violence. *Women Against Violence: An Australian Feminist Journal*(11), 7-15.
- Clarke, J. (2004). Dissolving the Public Realm? The Logics and Limits of Neo-Liberalism. *Journal of Social Policy*, 33(1), 27-48.
- Coker, D. (2001). Crime control and feminist law reform in domestic violence law: A critical review. *Buffalo Criminal Law Review*, 4(2), 801-860.
- Connell, R. W. (1987). *Gender and Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Connell, R. W. (2000). *The Men and the Boys*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
- Connell, R. W., & Messerschmidt, J. W. (2005). Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept. *Gender and Society*, 19(6), 829-859.
- Considine, M. (1994). *Public Policy: A critical approach*. Melbourne: Macmillan Education.

Contractor, A. (2004, 7/6/2004). Campaign strikes \$20 million blow against violence. *The Sydney Morning Herald*, p. 1.

Costello, M., Chung, D., & Carson, E. (2005). Exploring alternative pathways out of poverty: making connections between domestic violence and employment practices. *Australian Journal of Social Issues*, 40(2), 253-267.

Crenshaw, K. (1991). Mapping the Margines: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color. *Stanford Law Review*, 43, 1241-1299.

Currie, D. (1990). Battered Women and the State: From the Failure of Theory to a Theory of Failure. *The Journal of Human Justice*, 1(2), 77-96.

Davis, G. (1998). Policy from the margins: reshaping the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. In A. Yeatman (Ed.), *Activism and the Policy Process* (pp. 36-55). Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Demetriou, D. Z. (2005). *Adventures of a Diasporic Intellectual: R.W. Connell, from social class to the synthetic turn in gender analysis*. Unpublished Doctor of Philosophy, The University of Sydney, Sydney.

Disney, J. (2004). Social Policy. In R. Manne (Ed.), *The Howard Years* (pp. 191-215). Melbourne: Black Inc. Agenda.

Dodson, M. (2004). The Howard Years: A Political Interpretation. In R. Manne (Ed.), *The Howard Years* (pp. 119-143). Melbourne: Black Inc. Agenda.

Domestic Violence & Incest Resource Centre (DVIRC) and No To Violence (NTV). (2004). *Media release 7 June 2004 - Are we serious about young people and violence?* Melbourne: DVIRC & NTV.

Donaghy, T. (2003, 29 September - 1 October). *Gender and Public Policy Making in Australia: The Howard Government's Big Fat Lie*. Paper presented at the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, University of Tasmania, Hobart.

Donovan, R. J., & Vlasis, R. (2005). *VicHealth Review of Communication Components of Social Marketing/Public Education Campaigns Focusing on Violence Against Women*. Melbourne: Victorian Health Promotion Foundation.

Dowse, S. (1984). The bureaucrat as usurer. In D. Broom (Ed.), *Unfinished Business - Social Justice for Women in Australia* (pp. 139-160). Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Doyle, S., & Barbato, C. (1999). Justice delayed is justice denied: the experiences of women in court as victims of sexual assault. In J. Breckenridge & L. Laing (Eds.), *Challenging Silence: Innovative Responses to Sexual and Domestic Violence* (pp. 47-58). Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Dugdale, P. (1998). The art of insider activism: policy activism and the governance of health. In A. Yeatman (Ed.), *Activism and the Policy Process* (pp. 104-121). Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Dunn, M. C. (2004). The Politics of Father Rights Activists: Do persistent critics of the Family Court behave in a way which stands up to scrutiny. In *paper presented to National Abuse Free Contact Campaign*. Australia.

- Dworkin, A. (1997). *Life and Death*. New York: Virago.
- Earle, J., Herron, A., Secomb, L., & Stubbs, J. (1990). The National Domestic Violence Education Program - A Commentary. *Refractory Girl: A feminist journal*(36), 2-6.
- Edelman, M. (1988). *Constructing the Political Spectacle*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Egan, C. (2004, 27 June). The ad hack solution. *Sunday Times*, p. 60.
- Ehrlich, S. (2001). *Representing Rape: Language and sexual consent*. London: Routledge.
- Eisenstein, H. (1985). The Gender of Bureaucracy: Reflections on Feminism and the State. In J. Goodnow & C. Pateman (Eds.), *Women, Social Science and Public Policy* (pp. 104-115). Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
- Eisenstein, H. (1990). Femocrats, Official Feminism and the Use of Power. In S. Watson (Ed.), *Playing the State: Australian Feminist Interventions* (pp. 87-103). Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
- Eisenstein, H. (1996). *Inside Agitators: Australian Femocrats and the States*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
- Elliot, A. (2006). 'The best friend Medicare ever had'? Policy narratives and changes in Coalition health policy. *Health Sociology Review*, 15(2), 132-143.
- Erika, S. (1990). Break the Silence - The State and Violence Against Women. *Refractory Girl: A feminist journal*(36), 13-16.
- Ester, H. (2007). The media. In C. Hamilton & S. Maddison (Eds.), *Silencing Dissent; How the Australian government is controlling public opinion and stifling debate* (pp. 101-123). Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
- Evans, H. (2005). Executive and Parliament. In C. Aulich & R. Wettenhall (Eds.), *Howard's Second and Third Governments* (pp. 42-56). Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.
- Fairclough, N. (1995). *Critical discourse analysis: the critical study of language*. London: Longman.
- Fairclough, N. (2003). *Analysing Discourse: Textual analysis for social research*. London: Routledge.
- Family Violence Prevention Fund. (2003). *Integrating Community Building and Violence Prevention: Final Report*. San Francisco and Washington: Family Violence Prevention Fund and Institute for Community Peace.
- Faulkner, J., & Tanner, L. (2008). *Media Release 2 July 2008: New Advertising Guidelines*. Canberra: Australian Government: John Faulkner, Cabinet Secretary and Special Minister of State, and Lindsay Tanner Minister for Finance and Deregulation.
- Fenna, A. (2004). *Australian Public Policy*. Sydney: Pearson Longman.
- Ferraro, K. J. (1996). The Dance of Dependency: A Genealogy of Domestic Violence Discourse. *Hypatia*, 11(4), 77-91.

Finch, J. (1993). 'It's Great to Have Someone to Talk to': Ethics and politics of Interviewing Women. In Hammersley (Ed.), *Social Research, Philosophy, Policy and Practice* (pp. 166-180). London: Sage.

Finkelstein, J., & Goodwin, S. (2005). *The Sociological Bent: Inside metro culture*. Melbourne: Thomson.

FitzRoy, L. (1999). Just outcomes for women? State responses to violence against women. In L. Hancock (Ed.), *Women, Public Policy and the State* (pp. 163-177). Melbourne: Macmillan Education.

Flood, M. (2002, 18-22 February). *Engaging Men in Ending Men's Violence Against Women*. Paper presented at the Expanding Our Horizons: Understanding the Complexities of Violence Against Women - meanings, cultures, difference, Sydney.

Flood, M. (2004a). Backlash: Angry men's movements. In S. Rossi (Ed.), *The Battle and Backlash Rage On* (pp. 261-278). USA: Xlibris.

Flood, M. (2004b, 15-17 September.). *Changing Men: Best practice in violence prevention work with men*. Paper presented at the Home Truths Conference: Stop sexual assault and domestic violence: A national challenge, Melbourne.

Ford, C. (2001). *Still Invisible: The Myth of the Woman-friendly State*. Unpublished PhD, Deakin University, Melbourne.

Forgacs, D. (Ed.). (1988). *A Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Franzway, S., Court, D., & Connell, R. W. (1989). *Staking A Claim: Feminism, bureaucracy and the state*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Frazer, I. (2004, 21 February). A little respect after years of working in the area of domestic violence. *Townsville Bulletin*, p. 43.

Fynes-Clinton, J. (2004, 1 July). Violence project needs more clout. *The Courier-Mail*, p. 15.

Geelong Advertiser. (2004). Violence campaign reshaped. *Geelong Advertiser*, p. 10.

Genovese, A. (2000). The Politics of Naming: '70s Feminism, Genealogy and 'Domestic Violence'. In R. walker, K. Brass & J. Byron (Eds.), *Anatomies of Violence: An Interdisciplinary Investigation* (pp. 115-129). Sydney: University of Sydney.

Gillespie, T. (1996). Rape crisis centres and 'male rape': a face of the backlash. In M. Hester, L. Kelly & J. Radford (Eds.), *Women, Violence and Male Power* (pp. 148-165). Buckingham: Open University Press.

Goodwin, S. (1999). *Women's Participation in Policy Production: Women's Advisory Committees in New South Wales, 1975 to 1997*. Unpublished Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) thesis, University of Sydney, Sydney.

Gordon, L. (1988). *Heroes of their Lives: The Politics and History of Family Violence, Boston 1880-1960*. New York: Viking.



Gough, D., & Roe, D. (2004, 7 June). Crisis Groups Critical of New Anti-violence TV Campaign. *The Age*, p. 7.

Goward, P. (1999, 22-23 March). *Integrating Women's Supports*. Paper presented at the 3rd National Outlook Symposium on Crime in Australia, Mapping the Boundaries of Australia's Criminal Justice System, Canberra.

Goward, P. (2004, 8 November). PS must aim to get women's issues into the mainstream. *Canberra Times*.

Greer, A. (2007). Gender: Passive voices. In *New Matilda*, 23 May 2007. <http://www.newmatilda.com> retrieved 5/6/2007.

Gunn, M. (1999, 10 April). Lower Status. *The Australian*, p. 25.

Halligan, J. (2005). Public Sector Reform. In C. Aulich & R. Wettenhall (Eds.), *Howard's Second and Third Governments* (pp. 21-41). Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.

Hamilton, C. (2006). What's Left? The Death of Social Democracy. *Quarterly Essay*, 21.

Hamilton, C., & Maddison, S. (Eds.). (2007). *Silencing Dissent: How the Australian government is controlling public opinion and stifling debate*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Hanmer, J. (1996). Women and Violence: Commonalities and Diversities. In B. Fawcett, K. J. Ferraro, J. Hearn & C. Toft (Eds.), *Violence and Gender Relations: Theories and Interventions* (pp. 7-21). London: Sage Publications.

Hansard. (2004a, 26 May). *Speaker - Jennie George MP: Adjournment Speech, domestic violence, House of Representatives, Australian Parliament House*. Retrieved p.29228, [http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view\\_document.aspx?id=2258769&table=HANSARDR](http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view_document.aspx?id=2258769&table=HANSARDR) 29/11/2006

Hansard. (2004b, 29 November). *Speaker - Ms Hall: Petition, Howard Government, Antiviolence campaign, House of Representatives, Australian Parliament House*. Retrieved p.50, [http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view\\_document.aspx?id=2386745&table=HANSARDR](http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view_document.aspx?id=2386745&table=HANSARDR) 29/11/2006

Hansard. (2004c, 19 February). *Speaker - Nicola Roxon MP and Responder John Howard MP: Questions without notice, violence against women, House of Representatives, Australian Parliament House*. Retrieved p.25297, [http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view\\_document.aspx?id=2245325&table=HANSARDR](http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view_document.aspx?id=2245325&table=HANSARDR) 11/12/2006

Hansard. (2004d, 29 November). *Speaker - Senator Kate Lundy: Adjournment Speech, WESNET, Senate, Australian Parliament House*. Retrieved p.129, [http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view\\_document.aspx?id=2028509&table=HANSARDS](http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view_document.aspx?id=2028509&table=HANSARDS) 29/11/2006

Hansard. (2004e, 28 November). *Speaker - Senator Kate Lundy: Adjournment Speech, White Ribbon Day Campaign, Senate, Australian Parliament House*. Retrieved p.126, [http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view\\_document.aspx?id=2282305&table=HANSARDS](http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view_document.aspx?id=2282305&table=HANSARDS) 29/11/2006

Hansard. (2004f, 9 March). *Speaker - Senator Linda Kirk: Adjournment Speech, International Women's Day, Senate, Australian Parliament House*. Retrieved p.21145, [http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view\\_document.aspx?id=2001077&table=HANSARDS](http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view_document.aspx?id=2001077&table=HANSARDS) 11/12/2006

Hansard. (2004g, 17 June). *Speaker - Senator Lyn Allison and on behalf of Senator Natasha Stott-Despoja: Senate Motion, Women: Domestic Violence, Senate, Australian Parliament House*. Retrieved p.124035, [http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view\\_document.aspx?id=2014013&table=HANSARDS](http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view_document.aspx?id=2014013&table=HANSARDS) 7/12/2006

Hansard. (2004h, 11 May). *Speaker - Senator Natasha Stott-Despoja and Responder Senator Kay Patterson: Questions on notice, anti-domestic violence campaign, Senate, Australian Parliament House*. Retrieved p.209, [http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view\\_document.aspx?id=2205185&table=HANSARDS](http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view_document.aspx?id=2205185&table=HANSARDS) 29/11/2006

Hansard. (2004i, 31 March). *Speaker - Senator Sue Mackay and Responder Senator Kay Patterson: Questions without notice, women, domestic violence, Senate, Australian Parliament House*. Retrieved p.22446, [http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view\\_document.aspx?id=2007245&table=HANSARDS](http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view_document.aspx?id=2007245&table=HANSARDS) 11/12/2006

Hansard. (2004j). *Speaker - Tanya Plibersek MP: Speech, Grievance Debate, House of Representatives, Australian Parliament House*. Retrieved p.18880, 05/05/2002, from <http://search.aph.gov.au>

Harvey, M. (2003, 17 December). \$15m ad blitz is dropped. *Herald Sun*, p. 30.

Hawthorne, S. (2004). The political uses of obscurantism: Gender mainstreaming and intersectionality. *The Development Bulletin*, 64, 87-91.

Hearn, J., & McKie, L. (2008). Gendered policy and policy on gender: the case of 'domestic violence'. *Policy and Politics*, 36(1), 75-91.

Herman, J. (2001). *Trauma and Recovery: from domestic abuse to political terror* (4th edition ed.). London.

Horin, A. (2005, 26 November). Ignoring terrorists in the kitchens and bedrooms. *Sydney Morning Herald*.

Howard, J. (1997). *Media Release - Partnerships Against Domestic Violence*. Canberra.

Howard, J. (2004, 7 June). New attack on home violence. *Canberra Times*.

Howden, S. (2005, 31/5/2005). *Inadequate advice from abuse line*. Retrieved <http://www.news.com.au>, 22/6/2005

Hudson, P. (2005, 24 July). Family violence ads 'not enough'. *The Sunday Age*, p. 3.

Humphries, D., & Peatling, S. (1997, 8 November). Domestic Violence Strategy Attacked. *The Sydney Morning Herald*, p. 4.

Illawarra Mercury. (2001). National Approach to Fight Sex Assault. *Illawarra Mercury*, p. 69.

- Irving, H. (2004). A True Conservative? In R. Manne (Ed.), *The Howard Years* (pp. 94-115). Melbourne: Black Inc. Agenda.
- Itzin, C. (2000). Gendering domestic violence: The influence of feminism on policy and practice. In J. Hanmer & C. Itzin (Eds.), *Home Truths About Domestic Violence: Feminist influences on policy and practice - A reader* (pp. 356-380). London: Routledge.
- Jackman, C. (2001, 23 May). National plan to cut down sexual assault. *The Courier Mail*, p. 28.
- James, K. (1999). Truth or fiction: men as victims of domestic violence? In J. Breckenridge & L. Laing (Eds.), *Challenging Silence: Innovative responses to sexual and domestic violence* (pp. 153-162). Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
- Jasinski, J. (2001). Theoretical Explanations for Violence Against Women. In C. Renzetti, J. Edleson & R. K. Bergen (Eds.), *Sourcebook on Violence Against Women* (pp. 5-21). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Johnson, C. (2000). *Governing Change: From Keating to Howard*. Brisbane: University of Queensland Press.
- Johnson, C. (2006). *A Changed Culture: Howard's Australia and the ALP*. Paper presented at the Australasian Political Studies Association Annual Conference, University of Newcastle 25-27 September.
- Jones, M. (2004). *'A Fight About Nothing' Constructions of Domestic Violence*. Unpublished Doctor of Philosophy, University of Adelaide, Adelaide.
- Jupp, J. (2005). Immigration and Multiculturalism. In C. Aulich & R. Wettenhall (Eds.), *Howard's Second and Third Governments* (pp. 173-188). Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.
- Jupp, V., & Norris, C. (1993). Traditions in Documentary Analysis. In Hammersley (Ed.), *Social Research, Philosophy, Policy and Practice* (pp. 37-51). London: Sage.
- Karavelas, P. (2004, 7 June). Domestic violence push gets all-clear. *The Australian*, p. 2.
- Kayser-Jones, J., & Koenig, B. (1994). Ethical Issues. In J. F. Gubrium & A. Sankar (Eds.), *Qualitative Methods in Aging Research*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Kelly, L. (1988). *Surviving Sexual Violence*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Kelly, L. (1996a). 'It's Everywhere' Sexual Violence as a Continuum. In S. Jackson & S. Scott (Eds.), *Feminism and Sexuality: A Reader* (pp. 192-206). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Kelly, L. (1996b). When does the speaking profit us?: reflections on the challenges of developing feminist perspectives on abuse and violence by women. In L. Kelly & J. Radford (Eds.), *Women, violence and male power: Feminist activism, research and practice* (pp. 34-49). Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Kelly, L., & Radford, J. (1996). 'Nothing Really Happened': the invalidation of women's experiences of sexual violence. In L. Kelly & J. Radford (Eds.), *Women, violence and male*

power: *Feminist activism, research and practice* (pp. 19-33). Buckingham: Open University Press.

Kelly, P. (2006). How Howard Governs. In N. Carter (Ed.), *The Howard Factor: A Decade that Changed the Nation* (pp. 3-18). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Kingston, M. (2004). *Not Happy, John: Defending our democracy*. Melbourne: Penguin Books.

Laing, L. (1996). *Unravelling Responsibility: Incest Offenders, Mothers and Victims in Treatment*. Unpublished PhD, University of New South Wales, Sydney.

Laing, L. (2002). Responding to men who perpetrate domestic violence: Controversies, interventions and challenges. In L. Laing (Ed.), *Australian Domestic and Family Violence Clearinghouse Issues Paper 7*. Sydney: Australian Domestic and Family Violence Clearinghouse, University of New South Wales.

Laing, L. (2008). 'Violence', criminal justice, the law, policy and practice. In B. Fawcett & F. Waugh (Eds.), *Addressing Violence, Abuse and Oppression: debates and challenges* (pp. 67-79). Abingdon Oxon: Routledge.

Lamb, S. (1991). Acts Without Agents: An Analysis of Linguistic Avoidance in Journal Articles on Men Who Batter Women. *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 61(2), 250-257.

Lamb, S. (1999). Constructing the Victim: Popular Images and Lasting Labels. In S. Lamb (Ed.), *New Versions of Victims: Feminists Struggle with the Concept* (pp. 108-138). New York: New York University Press.

Larner, W. (2000). Neo-liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality. *Studies in Political Economy*, 63, 5-25.

Lawson, S., & Crookes, S. (2003, 12-14 February). *Surrendering the Night! - the seduction of victim blaming in drug and alcohol facilitated sexual assault prevention strategies*. Paper presented at the Practice and Prevention: Contemporary Issues in Adult Sexual Assault in New South Wales, Sydney.

Legge, K. (2006). Jumping the White Picket Fence. In N. Carter (Ed.), *The Howard Factor: A Decade that Changed the Nation* (pp. 140-145). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Lewis, S. (2006). Losing the Plot. In N. Carter (Ed.), *The Howard Factor: A Decade that Changed the Nation* (pp. 183-191). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Lewis, S., & Ritchie, J. (2003). Generalising from Qualitative Research. In J. Ritchie & J. Lewis (Eds.), *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students* (pp. 263-286). London: Sage Publications.

Liberal/National Parties. (1996). *Opportunities and Choice for Women*. Melbourne: Liberal and National Parties.

Ligerakis, M. (2004, 7 May). Domestic violence a "political football". *B&T Weekly*, p. 3.

Light, D. (2004). Lack of Respect. *The Bulletin*, 122(10).

- Llewellyn, G., Sullivan, G., & Minichiello, V. (1999). Sampling in Qualitative Research. In V. Minichiello, G. Sullivan, K. Greenwood & R. Axford (Eds.), *Handbook for Research Methods in Health Sciences* (pp. 173-199). Sydney: Addison-Wesley.
- Lohrey, A. (2006). Voting for Jesus: Christianity and Politics in Australia. *Quarterly Essay*, 22.
- Macdonald, E. (2004, 10 June). Domestic violence ads don't tell the whole story, say critics. *The Canberra Times*.
- Mackinnon, C. (1989a). *Towards a Feminist Theory of the State*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Mackinnon, C. (1989b). *Towards Feminist Theory of the State*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Maddison, S. (1999). Private Men, Public Anger: The Men's Rights Movement in Australia. *Journal of Interdisciplinary Gender Studies*, December, 39-51.
- Maddison, S. (2004). Buying in or Selling Out: the National Rural Women's Coalition and secretariats under the Howard Government. *Women Against Violence: An Australian Feminist Journal*(15), 40-45.
- Maddison, S. (2007, 7 Mar). A International Women's Day Audit. *The Age*.
- Maddox, M. (2005). *God Under Howard: The Rise of the Religious in Australian Politics*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
- Maguire, T. (2004, 20 February). The family abuse ads we're not going to see. *The Daily Telegraph*, p. 2.
- Maley, W. (2004). Refugees. In R. Manne (Ed.), *The Howard Years* (pp. 144-166). Melbourne: Black Inc. Agenda.
- Manne, R. (2004). The Howard Years: A Political Interpretation. In R. Manne (Ed.), *The Howard Years* (pp. 3-53). Melbourne: Black Inc. Agenda.
- Marr, D. (2007a). His Master's Voice: Response to Correspondence and Epilogue. *Quarterly Essay*, 27, 120-128.
- Marr, D. (2007b). His Master's Voice: The Corruption of Public Debate Under Howard. *Quarterly Essay*, 26.
- Martin, L. (2001, 23 May). Bid To Curb Sexual Assaults. *The Sydney Morning Herald*, p. 5.
- Martin, L. (2004, 14 May). Say No To Assault - A Message That Didn't Get Through. *The Sydney Morning Herald*, p. 14.
- Mason, G. (1995). *Hostility and Sexual Secrecy: Narratives of (hetero)sexed violence against women*. La Trobe University, Bundoora.
- Mason, G. (1997). Heterosexed violence: Typicality and ambiguity. In S. Tomsen & G. Mason (Eds.), *Homophobic Violence* (pp. 15-32). Sydney: The Hawkins Press.

Mason, G. (2000). Managing Homophobia. In R. Walker, K. Brass & J. Byron (Eds.), *Anatomies of Violence: an interdisciplinary investigation* (pp. 74-86). Sydney: University of Sydney.

Mason, G. (2002). *The Spectacle of Violence: homophobia, gender and knowledge*. London: Routledge.

Mason, S. (1997). Social Work Research: Is There a Feminist Method? *Affilia*, 12(1), 10-32.

McFerren, L. (1990). Interpretation of a Frontline State: Australian Women's Refuges and the State. In S. Watson (Ed.), *Playing the State: Australian Feminist Interventions* (pp. 191-205). Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

McKenzie, M. (2005). What happened to Respect? How a national violence prevention campaign went off the rails. *No To Violence Journal*, 4(1), 12-14.

McPhedran, I. (2004, 25 May). Advertisement lacks commonsense, says Prime Minister. \$1.5m bill to halt anti-abuse campaign. *The Advertiser*, p. 14.

Megalogenis, G. (2006). Mixed Race, Mixed Messages. In N. Carter (Ed.), *The Howard Factor: A Decade that Changed the Nation* (pp. 115-122). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Melville, R. (1998). The Slippery Slide of Women's Refuge Funding 1970s-1990s: the New South Wales Experience. *Women Against Violence: An Australian Feminist Journal*(5), 15-33.

Mendes, P. (2005). Welfare Reform and Mutual Obligation. In C. Aulich & R. Wettenhall (Eds.), *Howard's Second and Third Governments* (pp. 135-151). Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.

Merola, A. (2003, 28 December). Anti-violence push at risk. *Sunday Mail*, p. 22.

Messerschmidt, J. W. (2005). Men, Masculinities and Crime. In M. S. Kimmel, J. Hearn & R. W. Connell (Eds.), *Handbook of Studies on Men and Masculinities* (pp. 196-212). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Mies, M. (1993). Towards a Methodology for Feminist Research. In Hammersley (Ed.), *Social Research, Philosophy, Policy and Practice* (pp. 64-82). London: Sage.

Mikhailovich, K. (1998). *Making Meaning of Women and Violence: Echoes of the past in the present*. University of Canberra, Canberra.

Milne, G. (2004, 6 June). Violence helpline in \$20m launch. *Sunday Times*, p. 30.

Milne, G. (2006). Purpose Driven. In N. Carter (Ed.), *The Howard Factor: A Decade that Changed the Nation* (pp. 46-54). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Morley, C., & Macfarlane, S. (2008). The Continued Importance of a Feminist Analysis: Making Gendered Inequalities Visible Through a Critique of Howard Government Policy on Domestic Violence. *Just Policy*, 47(March), 31-37.

Morris, A. (2008). *Optimising the "spaces in between": The maternal alienation project and the politics of gender in macro and micro contexts*. Unpublished PhD, University of Adelaide, Adelaide.

Morris, S. (2004, 20 February). Backflip on violence ads. *The Australian*, p. 5.

Murray, S. (2005). An Impossibly Ambitious Plan? Australian Policy and the Elimination of Domestic Violence. *Just Policy*, 38(December), 28-33.

Murray, S., & Powell, A. (2009). "What's the Problem?" Australian Public Policy Constructions of Domestic and Family Violence. *Violence Against Women*, 15(5), 532-552.

Nancarrow, H., & Struthers, K. (1995). The Growth of Domestic Violence Responses in Australia: A 'Flash in the Pan' or a Sustainable Program for Change? *Social Alternatives*, 14(1), 44-48.

NASASV. (2004). *Media Release 7 June 2004 - Services outraged at waste of government money*. Adelaide: National Association of Services Against Sexual Violence.

National Committee on Violence Against Women. (1992). *National Strategy on Violence Against Women*. Canberra: Office of the Status for Women, Commonwealth Government of Australia.

National Crime Prevention. (2001). *Young People and Domestic Violence: National research on young people's attitudes and experiences of domestic violence*. Canberra: Attorney-General's Department.

Nayak, M., & Suchland, J. (2006). Gender Violence and Hegemonic Projects. *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 8(4), 467-485.

NCVAW: (1992). *National Strategy on Violence Against Women*. Canberra: National Committee on Violence Against Women, Office of the Status for Women, Commonwealth Government of Australia.

Newman, J. (1996a, 24th September). *National Domestic Violence Forum - Closing Address*. Paper presented at the National Domestic Violence Forum, Parliament House Canberra.

Newman, J. (1996b, 23rd September). *National Domestic Violence Forum - Opening Speech*. Paper presented at the National Domestic Violence Forum, Parliament House Canberra.

Newman, J. (1999a). *1999-2000 Budget Speech (19 May)*. Retrieved <http://www.padv.dpmc.gov.au>, 02/07/2004

Newman, J. (1999b, 19 April). A fair go for women. *The Australian*.

Newman, J. (1999c). *Launch of New Partnerships Against Domestic Violence Initiatives (Speech - 7 October)*. Retrieved <http://www.padv.dpmc.gov.au>, 02/07/2004

Newman, J. (2000). Reproduced document - Delivering on Our Commitments for Women 1999: Statement by Senator Jocelyn Newman, 11 May 1999. In A. McMahon, J. Thomson & C. Williams (Eds.), *Understanding the Australian Welfare State: key documents and themes* (2nd edition ed.). Melbourne: Tertiary Press.

NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice. (2006). *Impact of the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006 (Cth)*. Sydney: NSW Legislative Council Report 33.

Nyland, J. (1998). Activists in the woodwork: policy activism and the housing reform movement in New South Wales. In A. Yeatman (Ed.), *Activism and the Policy Process* (pp. 214-233). Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

OFW. (2005a). *About the Partnerships Against Domestic Violence Initiative*. Retrieved <http://ofw.facs.gov.au/padv> 31/05/2005

OFW. (2005b, 02/05/05). *About the Partnerships Against Domestic Violence Initiative*. Retrieved <http://ofw.facs.gov.au/padv/01/index.html>, 31/05/2005

OFW. (2005c, 02/05/2005). *Framework for Developing Approaches to Domestic Violence 2001-2003*. Retrieved <http://ofw.facs.gov.au/padv> 31/05/2005

OFW. (2005d, 02/05/2005). *Framework for Developing Approaches to Domestic Violence 2001-2003*. Retrieved [http://ofw.facs.gov.au/padv/01/framework\\_2.html](http://ofw.facs.gov.au/padv/01/framework_2.html) 31/05/2005

OFW. (2005e, 02/05/2005). *Partnerships Against Domestic Violence Website*. Retrieved <http://ofw.facs.gov.au/padv> 31/05/2005

OFW. (2005f, 02/05/2005). *Partnerships resources and publications*. Retrieved <http://ofw.facs.gov.au/padv> 31/05/2005

OFW. (2005g). *Sexual Assault*. Retrieved 12/9/2005, from [http://ofw.facs.gov.au/womens\\_safety\\_agenda/elimination\\_of\\_violence/previous\\_initiatives/sexual\\_assault.html](http://ofw.facs.gov.au/womens_safety_agenda/elimination_of_violence/previous_initiatives/sexual_assault.html)

OFW. (2005h). *What is Partnerships?* Retrieved <http://ofw.facs.gov.au/padv> 31/05/2005

OFW. (2005i, 02/05/2005). *Women's Safety Agenda - Elimination of Violence*. Retrieved [http://ofw.facs.gov.au/womens\\_safety\\_agenda/index.htm](http://ofw.facs.gov.au/womens_safety_agenda/index.htm) 12/09/2005

OFW. (2008). *Violence Against Women, Australia Says No Campaign Evaluation*. Canberra: Office for Women unpublished briefing.

OSW. (2001a). *Elimination of Violence Against Women - Overview*. Canberra: Office of the Status of Women unpublished briefing.

OSW. (2001b). *A National Approach to Combating Sexual Assault unpublished briefing*. Canberra: Office of the Status of Women.

OSW. (2001c). *PADV - Phase 1 History 1997-2001*. Canberra: Office of the Status of Women unpublished briefing.

OSW. (2001d). *Partnerships Against Domestic Violence - Overview*. Canberra: Office of the Status of Women unpublished briefing.

OSW. (2001e). *Partnerships Against Domestic Violence Phase 2*. Canberra: Office of the Status of Women unpublished briefing.



OSW. (2001f). Sexual Assault National Round Table of Government Officials Agenda. Canberra: Office of the Status of Women.

OSW. (2003a). *National Relationship Violence and Sexual Assault Campaign Communication Strategy*. Canberra: Office of the Status of Women, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.

OSW. (2003b). *The National Relationships Violence and Sexual assault Campaign - Powerpoint Presentation*

OSW. (2003c). Sexual Assault - Update on NICSA. Canberra, Office of the Status of Women: Personal Communication.

OSW. (2004a). *National Framework for Sexual Assault Prevention*. Canberra: Office of the Status of Women, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Australian Government.

OSW. (2004b, 28/06/2004). *National Initiative to Combat Sexual Assault*. Retrieved <http://www.osw.dpmc.au>, 19/07/2004

OSW. (2004c, 06/05/2005). *Sexual Assault*. Retrieved [http://ofw.facs.gov.au/elimination\\_violence/sexual\\_assault/index.htm](http://ofw.facs.gov.au/elimination_violence/sexual_assault/index.htm), 31/05/2005

OSW. (2004d). *Violence Against Women - Australia Says No*. Retrieved <http://www.australiasaysno.gov.au>, 10/01/2005, from <http://www.australiasaysno.gov.au>

Parkin, A., & Summers, J. (1996). The Constitutional Framework. In D. Woodward, A. Parkin & J. Summers (Eds.), *Government Politics Power & Policy in Australia* (6th ed., pp. 5-21). Melbourne: Longman.

Partnerships Taskforce. (1999). *Partnerships Against Domestic Violence: First Report of the Taskforce 1998-1999*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.

Partnerships Taskforce. (2000). *Partnerships Against Domestic Violence: Second Report of the Taskforce 1999-2000*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.

Partnerships Taskforce. (2001). *Working Together Against Violence: The First Three Years of Partnerships Against Domestic Violence*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.

Pataki, T. (2006). Voting for Jesus: Correspondence. *Quarterly Essay*, 23, 101-105.

Pateman, C. (1988). *The Sexual Contract*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Pateman, C. (1989). *The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Patterson, K. (2004, 14 September). *Home Truths Speech*. Paper presented at the Home Truths Stop Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence - A National Challenge, Melbourne.

Patton, S. (2004). *Leaving the War Zone: Fifty (three) ways to leave your lover*. Unpublished PhD, University of Tasmania, Hobart.

Phillips, R. (2004). From Waves of Action to the 'Dead Calm' - Policy Responses to Violence Against Women in the New Millennium. *Women in Welfare Education*, 7(September / October), 17-32.

- Phillips, R. (2006). Undoing an activist response: feminism and the Australian government's domestic violence policy. *Critical Social Policy*, 26(1), 192-219.
- Phillips, R. (2008a). Feminism(s) and domestic violence within national policy contexts. In B. Fawcett & F. Waugh (Eds.), *Addressing Violence, Abuse and Oppression: debates and challenges* (pp. 57-66). Abingdon Oxon: Routledge.
- Phillips, R. (2008b). Feminism, policy and women's safety during Australia's 'war on terror'. *Feminist Review*, 89, 55-72.
- Plibersek, T. (2005a). *Media Statement 22 July: Australia says no to violence against women, Howard Government says no to funding refuges*. Sydney: ALP.
- Plibersek, T. (2005b). *Media Statement 24 July: Australia says no to violence against women, Howard Government says no to funding refuges*. Sydney: ALP.
- Plibersek, T. (2005c). *Media Statement 31 May: Howard Government putting women's and children's lives at risk*. Sydney: ALP.
- Plibersek, T. (2005d). *Violence Against Women, Australia Says No Community Information Pack 21 July*. Sydney: ALP.
- Pringle, R., & Watson, S. (1990). Fathers, Brothers, Mates: the fraternal state in Australia. In S. Watson (Ed.), *Playing the State: Australian Feminist Interventions* (pp. 229-243). Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
- Punch, K. (1998). *Introduction to Social Research: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. London: Sage Publications.
- Radford, J., & Stanko, E. (1996). Violence against women and children: the contradictions of crime control under patriarchy. In M. Hester, L. Kelly & J. Radford (Eds.), *Women, Violence and Male Power* (pp. 65-80). Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Ramazanoglu, C. (2002). *Feminist Methodology: Challenges and Choices*. London: Sage Publications.
- Ramsay, J. (2004). *The Making of Domestic Violence Policy by the Australian Commonwealth Government and the Government of the State of New South Wales between 1970 and 1985: An Analytical Narrative of Feminist Policy Activism*. Unpublished Doctor of Philosophy, University of Sydney, Sydney.
- Reinharz, S. (1992). *Feminist Methods in Social Research*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Richardson, D. (1996). Heterosexuality and social theory. In D. Richardson (Ed.), *Theorising Heterosexuality* (pp. 1-20). Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Rintoul, S. (2006). Beyond Sorry. In N. Carter (Ed.), *The Howard Factor: A Decade that Changed the Nation* (pp. 123-131). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
- Robb, T. (2004, 4 June). WA; Roxon slams government's anti-violence campaign. *Australian Associated Press General News*.

- Rollins, A., & Davley, P. (1998, 16 September). Coalition's \$64m Bid For The Women's Vote. *The Age*, p. 10.
- Roxon, N. (2003a). *Minister Agrees - Cutting \$10.1 Million of Domestic Violence Money to Buy Terrorism Fridge Magnets is 'Bizarre'*. Melbourne: Media Release 19 May 2003.
- Roxon, N. (2003b). *Roxon Reveals Howard's Cover Up*. Melbourne: Media Release 17 May 2003.
- Roxon, N. (2004a). *Government Confirms \$ Millions Wasted on Anti-Violence Campaign*. Canberra: ALP Media Release 25 May 2004.
- Roxon, N. (2004b, 8 March). Just say no more. *Herald Sun*, p. 19.
- Roxon, N. (2004c). *Labor Will Run Cancelled Violence Campaign if Howard Government Doesn't*. Canberra: ALP Media Release (Shadow Attorney-General, Shadow Minister Assisting the Leader on the Status of Women) 7 March 2004.
- Rudd, K. (2006a). Faith in Politics. *The Monthly Magazine*, October(17).
- Rudd, K. (2006b). Howard's Brutopia: What the prime minister doesn't want us to talk about. *The Monthly Magazine*, November(18).
- Rummery, F. (1996). Mad Women or Mad Society: Towards a Feminist Practice with Women Survivors of Child Sexual Assault. In R. Thorpe & J. Irwin (Eds.), *Women and Violence: Working for Change* (pp. 150-161). Sydney: Hale and Iremonger.
- Rundle, G. (2001). The Opportunist: John Howard and the Triumph of Reaction. *Quarterly Essay*, 3.
- Russo, N., Koss, M., & Goodman, L. (1995). Male Violence Against Women: A Global Health and Development Issue. In L. Adler & F. Denmark (Eds.), *Violence and the Prevention of Violence* (pp. 121-128). Connecticut: Praeger.
- Ruthchild, C. (1997). Don't frighten the horses! A systemic perspective on violence against lesbians and gay men. In S. Tomsen & G. Mason (Eds.), *Homophobic Violence* (pp. 1-14). Sydney: The Hawkins Press.
- Ryan, G., & Bernard, H. R. (2000). Data Management and Analysis Methods. In N. Denzin & Y. Lincoln (Eds.), *Handbook of Qualitative Research* (2nd ed., pp. 760-820). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Ryan, L. (1990). Fathers, Feminist and the Federal Bureaucracy 1972-1983. In S. Watson (Ed.), *Playing the State: Australian Feminist Interventions* (pp. 71-84). Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
- Salusinszky, I. (2006). The Howard Idiom. In N. Carter (Ed.), *The Howard Factor: A Decade that Changed the Nation* (pp. 201-207). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
- Sanders, W. (2005). Never Even Adequate: Reconciliation and Indigenous Affairs. In C. Aulich & R. Wettenhall (Eds.), *Howard's Second and Third Governments* (pp. 152-172). Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.

Sawer, M. (1990). *Sisters in Suits: Women and Public Policy in Australia*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Sawer, M. (1993). Reclaiming Social Liberalism: The Women's Movement and the State. In R. Howe (Ed.), *Women and the state; Australian perspectives* (pp. 1-21). Bundoora, Victoria: La Trobe University Press, in association with the Centre for Australian Studies, Deakin University, and the Ideas for Australia Program.

Sawer, M. (1999). The watchers within: Women and the Australian state. In L. Hancock (Ed.), *Women, Public Policy and the State* (pp. 36-53). Melbourne: Macmillan Education.

Sawer, M. (2004). Populism and Public Choice in Australia and Canada: Turning Equality-Seekers into 'Special Interests'. In M. Sawer & B. Hindess (Eds.), *Us and Them: Anti-Elitism in Australia* (pp. 33-56). Perth: Curtin University of Technology.

Sawer, M., & Groves, A. (1994). *Working from Inside: Twenty Years of the Office of the Status of Women*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

SBS. (2004). *SBS 10 June 2004, 6.30pm TV World News Transcripts*. Sydney: Special Broadcasting Service.

Schofield, T., & Goodwin, S. (2006). Gender Politics and Public Policy Making: Prospects for Advancing Gender Equality. *Policy and Society*, 24(4), 22-41.

Senate Hansard. (2004). *Senate Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee Estimates (Budget Estimates) 24 May*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, Official Committee Hansard.

Senate Hansard. (2005). *Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee Estimates (Budget Estimates) 31 May*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, Official Committee Hansard.

Shanahan, D. (2006). Two Howards. In N. Carter (Ed.), *The Howard Factor: A Decade that Changed the Nation* (pp. 31-45). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Shea Hart, A. (2006). *Children Exposed to Domestic Violence: Whose 'Best Interests' in the Family Court*. Unpublished PhD, University of South Australia, Adelaide.

Shea Hart, A., & Bagshaw, D. (2008). The idealised post-separation family in Australian family law: a dangerous paradigm in cases of domestic violence. *Journal of Family Studies*, 14(2-3), 291-309.

Silmalis, L. (2005, 24 July). Domestic violence campaign criticised. *Daily Telegraph*, p. 2.

Singleton, G. (2005). Issues and Agendas: Howard in Control. In C. Aulich & R. Wettenhall (Eds.), *Howard's Second and Third Governments* (pp. 3-18). Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.

Spencer, L., Ritchie, J., & O'Connor, W. (2003). Analysis: Practices, Principles and Processes. In J. Ritchie & J. Lewis (Eds.), *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students* (pp. 199-218). London: Sage Publications.

- Stanley, L. (1990). Feminist praxis and the academic mode of production: an editorial introduction. In L. Stanley (Ed.), *Feminist praxis: research, theory and epistemology in feminist sociology* (pp. 3-19). London: Routledge.
- Strategic Partners. (1999). *Meta Evaluation of the Partnerships Against Domestic Violence - Current Perspectives on Domestic Violence: A review of the national and international literature*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.
- Strategic Partners. (2003a). *Partnerships Against Domestic Violence Evaluation Plan PADV II*. Melbourne: Unpublished report.
- Strategic Partners. (2003b). *Phase 1 Meta-evaluation Report: Community Awareness and Education to Prevent, Reduce and Respond to Domestic Violence*. Canberra: Partnerships Against Domestic Violence, Australian Government.
- Strategic Partners. (2004). *Partnerships Against Domestic Violence - PADV II Final Report*. Melbourne: Unpublished report.
- Summers, A. (1986). Mandarins and Missionaries: Women in the Federal Bureaucracy. In N. Grieve & A. Burns (Eds.), *Australian Women: New Feminist Perspectives*. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
- Summers, A. (1997, 9 October). A Pittance for a National Threat. *The Sydney Morning Herald*, p. 15.
- Summers, A. (2003a, 26 May). Callous treatment for the victims of brutal acts. *The Sydney Morning Herald*.
- Summers, A. (2003b). *The End of Equality: work, babies and women's choices in 21st century Australia*. Sydney: Random House Australia.
- Summers, J. (1997). Federalism and Commonwealth-State Relations. In D. Woodward, A. Parkin & J. Summers (Eds.), *Government Politics Power & Policy in Australia* (6th ed., pp. 85-112). Melbourne: Longman.
- Sunday Territorian. (2002, 23 June). Safety shield for women. *Sunday Territorian*, p. 6.
- Tarrow, S. (1998). *Power in movement: social movements and contentious politics* (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- The Age. (2004, 18 June). Facing Up To The Home Truths of 'domestics'. *The Age*, p. 14.
- Thomson, J. (2000). One size fits all? Gender and the capitalist welfare state in Australia. In A. McMahon, J. Thomson & C. Williams (Eds.), *Understanding the Australian Welfare State: key documents and themes* (2nd ed., pp. 82-92). Melbourne: Tertiary Press.
- Tomsen, S., & Mason, G. (1997). Introduction. In S. Tomsen & G. Mason (Eds.), *Homophobic Violence* (pp. vii-xi). Sydney: The Hawkins Press.
- Towns, A. (2005, 3-6 June). *Violence against women: Beyond silence*. Paper presented at the Women's Convention, Wellington, New Zealand.

University of Minnesota. (1998). *The Human Rights of Women: A Reference Guide to Official United Nations Documents*. Retrieved <http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/instr/women/engl-wmn.html> 5/6/2003

University of Sydney Research Office. (nd). *Human Ethics Research Committee Policy*. Retrieved 2/4/2004, from <http://www.usyd.edu.au/ethics/human/pol/policy.html>

Verity, W. (2004, 18 May). Call To Revive Campaign Against Violence. *Illawarra Mercury*, p. 10.

VicHealth. (2006). *Two steps forward, one step back: Community attitudes to violence against women - progress and challenges in creating safe and healthy environments for Victorian women*. Melbourne: VicHealth.

Vromen, A., & Gelber, K. (2005). *Powerscape: Contemporary Australian Political Practice*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Walker, K. (2004, 2 June 2004). Program Teaching Respect is Dumped. *Daily Telegraph*, p. 7.

Wallace, C. (2003, 16 December). Key Libs can anti-domestic violence ad campaign. *The Australian*, p. 3.

Walsh, K.-A. (2003, 7 September). Teen Sex Violence Alert. *The Sun Herald*, p. 7.

Walsh, K.-A. (2004, 6 June). Violence and Generation Next. *The Sun Herald*, p. 60.

Walsh, K.-A. (2005, 24 July). Violence ad provokes new fight. *Sun Herald*, p. 10.

Watson, S. (Ed.). (1990). *Playing the State: Australian Feminist Interventions*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Webster, A. (2006a). Reconceptualising Domestic Violence: a History of the Howard Government's Approach. *Domestic Violence and Incest Resource Centre Quarterly*, 3(Spring), 14-18.

Webster, A. (2006b). *Reconceptualising Domestic Violence: A History of the Howard Government's Approach*. Unpublished Honours, University of Melbourne, Melbourne.

Weeks, W. (1994). *Women Working Together: Lessons from feminist women's services*. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.

Weeks, W. (1996). Towards a framework for understanding and participating in social policy making. In T. Dalton, M. Draper, W. Weeks & J. Wiseman (Eds.), *Making Social Policy in Australia: an introduction* (pp. 3-22). Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Weeks, W., & Gilmore, K. (1996). How violence against women became an issue on the national policy agenda. In T. Dalton, M. Draper, W. Weeks & J. Wiseman (Eds.), *Making social policy in Australia* (pp. 141-153.). Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Weeks, W., & Quinn, M. (2000). Change and the Impact of Restructure on Australian Families. In W. Weeks & M. Quinn (Eds.), *Issues Facing Australian Families: Human Services Respond* (third ed., pp. 5-18). Sydney: Longman.

Williams, C. (2000). Introduction to Part 4. In A. McMahon, J. Thomson & C. Williams (Eds.), *Understanding the Australian Welfare State: key documents and themes* (pp. 157-161). Melbourne: Macmillan Education.

Williams, G. (2004, 4 July). Fighting Back. *Sunday Telegraph Magazine*, p. 10.

Winter, B. (2007). Preemptive Fridge Magnets and Other Weapons of Masculinist Destruction: The Rhetoric and Reality of "Safeguarding Australia". *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 33(1), 25-51.

Yeatman, A. (1990). *Bureaucrats, Technocrats, Femocrats: Essays on the Contemporary Australian State*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Yeatman, A. (1994). Women and the State. In K. P. Hughes (Ed.), *Contemporary Australian Feminism* (pp. 177-197). Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.

Yeatman, A. (1998). Activism and the policy process. In A. Yeatman (Ed.), *Activism and the Policy Process* (pp. 16-35). Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Yllo, K. (1993). Through a Feminist Lens: Gender, Power, and Violence. In R. Gelles & D. Loseke (Eds.), *Current Controversies on Family Violence* (pp. 47-62). California: Sage Publications.

Young, S. (2007). The Regulation of Government Advertising in Australia: The Politicisation of a Public Policy Issue. *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 66(4), 438-452.

---

## Appendices

---

Chapter 1 Appendices - Introduction	262
Chapter 5 Appendices - Introducing the Study	278
Chapter 6 Appendices - Male Violence Against Women Policy and Program Development 1996-2007	287
Chapter 7 Appendices - Male Violence Against Women Community Education Campaigns 2001-2007	311
Chapter 8 Appendices - The Howard Government's Approaches to Male Violence Against Women: Key findings from stage one	364



## Chapter 1 Appendices - Introduction

---

- 1.1 Timeline of federal government responses to violence against women (detailed between 1996-2006)
- 1.2 Timeline of Office of the Status of Women / Office for Women
- 1.3 Summary of the Australian Government's approaches to male violence against women (1987 – 2007)

**1.1. Timeline of federal government responses to violence against women (detailed between 1996 - 2007).**

Time period	Key laws, policies, and/or events (with dates)	Comments
1972-1975	<p>1973 App't of Elizabeth Reid - first women's adviser to the Prime Minister.</p> <p>1974 Establishment of section in Dept of PM&amp;C which became the OSW</p> <p>1974 Elsie (first women's refuge) and Sydney (first) Rape Crisis Centre opened.</p> <p>1975 National Women's Refuge Program (11 refuges) funded.</p>	<p>Source for events in this section (Weeks, 1994, pp.12-26).</p>
1975-1983		
1983-1992	<p>1983 United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women adopted in Australia (27 August)</p> <p>1985 National Consultation and Assistance Program for Women – grants increased to women's organizations.</p> <p>1985 WESP – Women's Emergency Services Program entered the Federal Supported Accommodation Assistance Programme.</p> <p>1987 National Domestic Violence Education Programme (three year initiative of federal government). Part of this was the "Break the Silence" Campaign conducted by OSW in 1989.</p> <p>1991 National committee on Violence Against Women established.</p>	<p>Source for events in this section (Weeks, 1994, pp.12-26).</p>
1992-1996	<p>1992 VAW policy (need details – confirm that this was under Keating and not Hawke).</p>	
1996	<p>September 1996 National Domestic Violence Forum convened.</p>	<p>The Forum was convened by the Commonwealth "...and attended by over</p>

		130 specialists in the area of domestic violence". (PADV Taskforce, 1999, p.4)
1997	<p>July 1997 OSW represented Australia in the 17<sup>th</sup> session of the CEDAW Committee when it considered Australia's third period report.</p> <p>15 October 1997 Launch of the National Rural Domestic Violence Information Kit – which was one of the recommendations of the 1996 DV Forum.</p> <p>November 1997 PADV launched by Heads of Government at the National Domestic Violence Summit convened by the Prime Minister.</p> <p>12 November 1997 Launch of "Business Against Domestic Violence" by the Prime Minister. Development and ongoing administrative support for this provided by OSW.</p>	<p>H.O.G meeting includes premiers and chief minister from all Australian states and territories.</p> <p>"The <i>Partnerships</i> initiative is resourced by \$25.3 million from the Commonwealth (June 1997-June 2001). Part of the package – worth \$12 million – is for cooperative work between the Commonwealth and the State and Territories. The other part of the package - \$13.3 million – is for new Commonwealth portfolio projects to be developed in consultation with the states."  <i>Partnerships</i> is coordinated by a Commonwealth, States and Territories Taskforce, the Terms of Reference of which were agreed by the Heads of Government at the Summit (Appendix B). ... As a commitment to the <i>Partnerships</i> initiative, State and Territory governments resource their representatives to participate in the taskforce as well as devoting considerable in kind resources to project management." (PADV Taskforce, 1999, pp.1&amp;3).</p>
1998	<p>February 1998 First PADV Taskforce Meeting</p> <p>November 1998 the Taskforce contracted out the meta-evaluation for PADV.</p>	<p>Taskforce includes representatives from all Australian states and territories. "In November 1998 the Taskforce contracted Strategic Partners, in collaboration with the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of South Australia, to undertake a "meta-evaluation" which over the life of the initiative will synthesize and analyse the outcomes and relationships between and across projects." (PADV Taskforce, 1999, p.14).</p>



1999	<p>1999-2000 Budget. Federal Government committed extra \$25 million for PADV. (Newman in foreword, PADV Taskforce, 1999, p.i).</p> <p>May 1999 National Forum on Programs for Perpetrators of Domestic Violence.</p> <p>October 1999 Men and Family Relationships program launched by Larry Anthony, Minister for Community Services using PADV funding.</p> <p>From November 1999 PADV hosted eleven one-day show-casing workshops in metropolitan and regional centres around Australia.</p>	
2000	<p>April 2000 PADV conference: "Children, Young People and Domestic Violence: The Way Forward" held in Melbourne.</p> <p>May 2000 tender process completed for the Men's Access line which was allocated \$1 million in seed funding through the Men and Family Relationships initiative.</p> <p>November 2000 "Men and Family Relationships" Conference.</p> <p>Unsure of year: Refusal of the Federal Government to sign the second optional protocol of CEDAW.</p> <p>"Beijing Platform for Action" and "Beijing Plus Five Outcomes Document" arise out of a Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Women held in New York in 2000.</p> <p>2000 Australian Domestic and Family Violence Clearinghouse established.</p>	<p>The Men's Access Line: "It is a preventative measure with a focus on assisting men to choose solutions that reduce the likelihood of self-harm or harm to others. The primary target groups are men facing separation and men experiencing difficulties managing their relationships with ex-partners and children". (PADV Taskforce, 2000, p.35). [personal note – these two groups seem groups that are highly likely to already be using violence. I do not think that this is necessarily really a 'preventative' measure but rather more likely to be early intervention.</p> <p>OSW is responsible for coordinating and implementing both "Beijing" UN initiatives. These include provisions related to violence against women.</p>
2001	<p>March 2001 Release of "Australia's Beijing Plus Five Action Plan 2001-2005" developed by OSW.</p> <p>April 2001 "Rekindling Family Relationships" PADV Conference.</p> <p>April 2001 Launch of "Walking Into Doors" campaign targeting Indigenous family violence.</p>	<p>Walking Into Doors campaign launched in October 2001 The campaign was developed by the Men's Access Line and the Department of Community Services The campaign is a joint initiative of the Men's Access Line and the Department of Community Services The campaign is a joint initiative of the Men's Access Line and the Department of Community Services</p>

	<p>June 2001 Phase One of PADV draws to a close and Phase Two commences which is planned to last until June 2003. Phase Two is based on a meta-evaluation of Phase One and the "Framework for Developing Approaches to Domestic Violence 2001-2003".</p> <p>June 2001 OSW convenes a round table of officials from federal, state and territory government agencies to discuss ways of responding to the problem of sexual assault against women and to commence work on a national approach to combat sexual assault.</p> <p>2001 Launch of the National Initiative to Combat Sexual Assault with a budget of \$16.5 million.</p> <p>December 2001: "Across the Lifespan: Violence in the Lives of Women and Girls" PADV Conference, Perth.</p>	<p>Large of new funding, 2001-2002 Conference, 2001</p>
2002	<p>2002 Commencement of 3 major PADV projects benefiting children (listed in DPMC Annual Report 2001-2001).</p> <p>2001-2002 OSW commissioned the Australian Bureau of Statistics to identify how existing sexual assault data could be better used, and to identify future data needs. They also commissioned the Australian Institute of Criminology to undertake the Australian component of the "International Violence Against Women Survey" and to work on data related to sexual assault.</p>	<p>In the DPMC Annual Report 2001-2002 funding for PADV Phase 1 is described as lasting until June 2004 – previous documents and reports including the 2000-2001 Annual Report list this as being until June 2003.</p>
2003	<p>February 2003 PADV Corporate Conference: "Work and Family Conflict", Melbourne.</p> <p>2003 Reallocation of \$10 million of PADV and NICSA funds for the anti-terrorism kit.</p> <p>December 2003 Withdrawal of the planned community education campaign "No Respect, No Relationship".</p> <p>September 2003 Establishment of the Australian Centre for the Study of Sexual Assault financed from the NICSA.</p> <p>2003 or 2004? Establishment of the "National Women's Safety Taskforce". This taskforce brings together Australian women's ministers' collaborative work on domestic violence, sexual assault, and family violence in Indigenous communities.</p> <p>22 December 2003 Australia (through OSW) presents the fourth and fifth reports on CEDAW to the UN.</p> <p>2003-2004 Meta-evaluations of the two funding phases of PADV were completed.</p>	<p>In 2003 the Howard Government reallocated \$7.5 million from PADV and \$2.5 million from NICSA to help pay for "the controversial and, many argued, superfluous anti-terrorism kit, which included the notorious fridge magnet, which was mailed to every Australian household in February 2003" (Roxon, 2003a, 2003b; Summers, 2003a; 2003b, p.93).</p> <p>The "No Respect, No Relationship" campaign was 'shelved' two weeks before being launched in December 2003 because "several male members of the Prime Minister's panel that approves all government advertisements said that it was too</p>



	Summary of the Australian Government's approach to male violence against women (1999-2004)	rough on men" (Bowden, 2004a; Contractor, 2004).
2004	<p>January 2004 Establishment of the "Support for Victims of People Trafficking Programme" managed by OSW.</p> <p>June 2004 End of contracted funding for the Australian Domestic and Family Violence Clearinghouse and the Australian Centre for the Study of Sexual Assault. Future funding for both services put out to tender supposedly in accordance with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).</p> <p>6 June 2004 Launch of the "Violence Against Women – Australia Says No" Campaign jointly funded under PADV and NICSA.</p> <p>October 2004 Launch of Access Economics report on the costs of domestic violence to the Australian economy.</p>	PADV and NICSA were provided with an additional \$6.7 million to run the VAW-ASN campaign between 2003-2005. As part of this campaign the government contracted out a 24 hour helpline to Lifeline.
2005	<p>30 June 2005 Completion of both PADV and NICSA and replacement with the "Women's National Safety Agenda".</p> <p>2005 PADV Showcasing events commence.</p> <p>25 July 2005 Rerun of VAW-ASN ads for two weeks.</p> <p>2005 Questions raised about the appropriateness of responses to women calling the Helpline in Senate Committee on Community Affairs considering Budget Estimates.</p>	
2006	Early 2006 VAW-ASN ads rerun.	

<p><u>Context</u></p> <p>National Commission on Violence Against Women</p> <p>Investigation &amp; accountability framework for the federal government.</p>	<p><u>Methods</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- NSVCAW policy document.</li> <li>- Training in the Area of Violence Against Women resource.</li> <li>- Stop Violence Against Women campaign 1993.</li> <li>- Increased and strengthened grants program aimed to violence including</li> </ul>	<p><u>Outcomes</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Influenced the broader funding agenda including grants under the National Agency for Women and SAAP</li> <li>- Comprehensive and coordinated strategy</li> <li>- Incorporated a monitoring and evaluation framework</li> <li>- Provision of "refugee care court"</li> </ul>
--	--	---

## 1.2 Summary of the Australian Government's approaches to male violence against women (1987 – 2007)

	Policy machinery and Intergovernmental / Intersectoral Nature.	Policy Responses / Products.	Evaluation and Critique.
<b>National Domestic Violence Education Program</b>	<p>Commonwealth State Taskforce on Domestic Violence.</p> <p>Representatives from commonwealth, state and territory governments.</p> <p>Some representation from the women's crisis sector.</p>	<p>\$2.2 million program including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- research into community attitudes;</li> <li>- National Domestic Violence Awareness month;</li> <li>- network of local committees to coordinate local activities and the appropriate distribution of resources;</li> <li>- <i>Break the Silence</i> media campaign: television advertisements, posters, radio advertisements, a national phone-in, pamphlets and information kits;</li> <li>- specific projects addressing Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities, women from non-English speaking backgrounds, young people, and rural and isolated communities;</li> <li>- 51 grants to community organizations under the National Agenda for Women;</li> <li>- <i>Break the Cycle</i> National Forum on Domestic Violence Training for service providers.</li> </ul>	<p><u>Positives:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Raised the profile and community awareness of domestic violence.</li> <li>- Good engagement of the community with <i>NVDEP</i> activities.</li> <li>- Put domestic violence on the political agenda.</li> </ul> <p><u>Negatives:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Reinforce stereotypes of violence as physical.</li> <li>- Ambiguous definitions of domestic violence.</li> <li>- Detrimental impact of other government policies on women experiencing violence (eg income security and immigration).</li> <li>- Problem of anti-violence programs from the state when it is inherently violent.</li> </ul>
<b>National Strategy on Violence Against Women</b>	<p>National Committee on Violence Against Women.</p> <p>Implementation &amp; accountability framework across federal government.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>NSVAW</i> policy document.</li> <li>- <i>Training in the Area of Violence Against Women</i> resource.</li> <li>- <i>Stop Violence Against Women</i> campaign 1993.</li> <li>- Influenced and strengthened grants programs related to violence including</li> </ul>	<p><u>Positives:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Influenced the broader funding agenda including grants under the National Agenda for Women and SAAP.</li> <li>- Comprehensive and coordinated strategy.</li> <li>- Incorporated a monitoring and evaluation framework.</li> <li>- Provision of "valuable resources".</li> </ul>



	<p>Representatives of state governments and NGOs on the Committee. Reported in the literature as being more representative than the previous Taskforce.</p> <p>Taskforce reported to have ceased to function despite not being officially disbanded.</p>	<p>National Agenda for Women and SAAP. - Influenced development of Women's Safety Survey 1996.</p>	<p><u>Negatives:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Insufficient funding for the Strategy itself and no direct funding for projects.</li> <li>- Relied on the individual goodwill of state governments and the community sector.</li> <li>- Lacked the federal leadership required.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Partnerships Against Domestic Violence Phase 1</b></p>	<p>Taskforce – focus on state projects.</p> <p>Intergovernmental Taskforce with Federal, State and Territory Representation. NGOs were specifically excluded from the Taskforce. All representatives were also departmental and so no sectoral (service delivery) representation either. Significant tensions existed amongst Taskforce members.</p>	<p><i>PADV1</i> comprised a diversity of state and national projects, research, resources and reports usually addressing the key priority areas announced at the Summit and these projects are detailed in the three <i>PADV1</i> annual reports (1999; 2000; 2001).</p>	<p><u>Positives</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Provision of significant funding.</li> <li>- Federal framework and useful policy machinery allow states control over the projects.</li> <li>- Meta-evaluation and learnings very useful to the sector and government.</li> </ul> <p><u>Negatives</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Degendering, backlash against feminist analyses, individualising and pathologising approach to violence, denying men's agency and responsibility for violence and discounting social context.</li> <li>- Focus on Indigenous and other vulnerable communities racialising violence and ignoring structure.</li> <li>- Misuse and reallocation of funding.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Partnerships Against Domestic Violence Phase 2</b></p>	<p>Taskforce – focus on national projects.</p> <p>Taskforce as for <i>PADV1</i> however this seemed to have ceased to function and the federal government took an increasingly centralised role.</p>	<p><i>PADV2</i> comprised of a range of primarily national projects.</p>	<p>As for <i>PADV1</i> above.</p>



<p><b>National Initiative to Combat Sexual Assault</b></p>	<p>Internal federal inter-departmental working group however some inter-governmental consultation with the National Sexual Assault Roundtable. Some individual <i>NICSA</i> projects had their own governance structures such as working or advisory groups.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sexual Assault Information Development Framework (IDF).</li> <li>- International Violence Against Women Survey.</li> <li>- Funding a full-time data analyst at the Australian Institute of Criminology to work solely on sexual assault research (produced 3 research reports).</li> <li>- National Framework for Sexual Assault Prevention.</li> <li>- Australian Centre for the Study of Sexual Assault (ACSSA).</li> </ul>	<p>I was unable to locate any literature evaluating or critiquing <i>NICSA</i> other than reference to the reallocation of \$2.5 million of unspent funds to the National Security Public Information Campaign.</p>
<p><b>No Respect, No Relationship</b></p>	<p>Working group under <i>PADV1</i> consisting of inter-government and NGO representatives with expertise in community education around violence.</p> <p>Participation in the development of content from some in the sector such as DVIRC however comments about the peak bodies, WESNET and NASASV being excluded. However communication about the campaign was reported as comprehensive. The Ministerial Council on Government Communications oversaw all aspects of the development of the campaign.</p>	<p>According to KIs and documents the products were developed using a substantial evidence base from <i>PADV</i>, <i>NICSA</i>, and specifically commissioned research and included the 5 key components:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- mass media advertising (television, radio, magazine, cinema),</li> <li>- youth communication activities,</li> <li>- public relations,</li> <li>- NESB specific strategies, and</li> <li>- Indigenous specific strategies</li> </ul>	<p><u>Positives</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evidence-based on research.</li> <li>- Engaged with a diversity of young people through a range of multi-media strategies.</li> <li>- Reflected a complex and comprehensive understanding and definition of violence.</li> <li>- Sought to prevent violence before it occurred and focussed on the nature and benefit of healthy and respectful relationships.</li> </ul> <p><u>Negatives</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Despite some consultation OSW did not consult widely enough with the sector on the content.</li> <li>- Intergovernmental structures had broken down by the time this campaign was being developed.</li> <li>- Was never released.</li> </ul>

<p><b>Violence Against Women - Australia Says No</b></p>	<p>No available information. The campaign was likely to have been developed by, or at least in collaboration with, OSW. The author listed on the back of the campaign booklet is Senator the Hon Eric Abetz, Special Minister of State.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Advertisements targeted at male perpetrators and women victims in various media including television, radio, magazines and cinema;</li> <li>- Booklet sent to every Australian household;</li> <li>- Posters;</li> <li>- Booklet targeting Indigenous people;</li> <li>- Nation-wide 24 hour confidential helpline;</li> <li>- Dedicated website; and</li> <li>- Schools resource.</li> </ul>	<p><u>Positives</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Represented a commitment to violence against women, good that something is being done.</li> <li>- The campaign booklet appeared to be based on 'real-life' experiences of violence and reflected specialist knowledge and expertise in the suggestions offered.</li> </ul> <p><u>Negatives</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Created an "us and them" dichotomy racialising violence as "un-Australian" and relevant only for ethnic and cultural minorities.</li> <li>- Narrow focus on family-oriented, therapeutic interventions rather than a complex socio-cultural understanding of violence.</li> <li>- Crisis end approach rather than prevention.</li> <li>- Criticisms of the Helpline tendering process too Lifeline as being ideological and the services as inappropriate and inadequate.</li> <li>- Generated additional demand on services without adequate resources to meet this demand.</li> <li>- Broader context of Howard Government policies harming women.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Women's National Safety Agenda</b></p>	<p>Women's Safety Taskforce. Reported to be based on the PADV Taskforce. Very little mention of it except for its establishment.</p> <p>Seemed to be no engagement with the state governments or the sector except for through the sectors capacity to apply for the grants in this program.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Australia Says No campaign.</li> <li>- Australian Domestic and Family Violence. Clearinghouse and the Australian Centre for the Study of Sexual Assault.</li> <li>- Research projects on domestic violence and sexual assault.</li> <li>- Training for nurses in regional and rural areas and for the criminal justice sector on sexual assault.</li> <li>- Dedicated resource at the Australian Institute of Criminology.</li> <li>- Mensline.</li> </ul>	<p>I was unable to locate any literature on either the WST or WNSA.</p>



### 1.3 Timeline of Office of the Status of Women / Office for Women

Time period	Govt and PM	Responsible Minister and title	Name of office	Structural location of office	Name of head and title	Comments
1972-1975	Labor Gough Whitlam	N/A	N/A	Dept of PM&C.	1973 Appointment of Elizabeth Reid - first women's adviser to the Prime Minister.	"... Reid's position became a very public one. While the Prime Minister retained responsibility for women's affairs, matters relating to women were routinely referred to his adviser. Reid became the only member of staff with formal authority to make statements and public appearances in her own right. In addition to her quasi-ministerial role, Reid was also pioneering the policy coordination and policy monitoring functions which were to become central to the work of OSW". (Sawer & Groves, 1994, p.21)
		N/A	1974 Women's Affairs Section established.	Dept of PM&C.	Sara Dowse (1974-1977), Head of Women's Affairs Section.	This section operated in support of Elizabeth Reid and was set up particularly to deal with the large volume of correspondence that she received but also prepared speeches and conducted research for the women's policy adviser (Sawer & Groves, 1994, p.22).
		N/A	1975 Women's Affairs Branch established to replace the Women's Affairs Section.	Dept of PM&C	Sara Dowse (1974-1977), Assistant Secretary of the Women's Affairs Branch	The establishment of this branch was intended integrate the functions of the women's adviser into the public service. When the Women's Affairs Branch was set up "Elizabeth Reid was offered the position as head of the new branch but she resigned instead. She argued that the move from the Prime Minister's Office ... to a public service position was designed to silence her. Reporting through the hierarchy of PM & C meant she would no longer have either direct access to the Prime Minister or a public voice" (Sawer & Groves, 1994, p.23).

1975-1983	Coalition Malcolm Fraser	<p>1976 Creation of new portfolio and appointment of Tony Street, Minister Assisting the Prime Minister on Women's Affairs.</p> <p>1976-1977 Ian Macphee, Minister Assisting the Prime Minister on Women's Affairs.</p>	Women's Affairs Branch.	Dept of PM&C.	Sara Dowse (1974-1977), Assistant Secretary of the Women's Affairs Branch.	<p>In appointing the Minister in June 1976, the PM increased the recognition given to the Branch. (Sawer &amp; Groves, 1994, p.24).</p> <p>During this time the wheel and spokes model of women's policy was developed.</p>
		<p>1977-1981 Bob Ellicott, Minister for Home Affairs and then Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (from 1980).</p> <p>1981-1982 Ian Wilson 1982-1983 Tom McVeigh, both Minister for Home Affairs and Environment</p>	1977 renamed Office of Women's Affairs.	Dept of Home Affairs	Kath Tapperell (1977-1983), Head of the Office of Women's Affairs.	<p>"The Women's Affairs Branch was renamed the Office of Women's Affairs in 1977, an upgrading which was to presage the hiving off of what had increasingly become an irritant. After the election of December 1977 it was announced that the Office was to be moved to the newly created Department of Home Affairs, then ranked 26<sup>th</sup> out of the 27 ministries". (Sawer &amp; Groves, 1994, p.26)</p> <p>"Sara Dowse at last went public, resigning her position and making the transfer of the Office into a political issue. ... Relocation from a central coordinating department to a peripheral one meant problems in performing the policy monitoring and policy co-ordination roles. From the depths of Home Affairs it became increasingly difficult to gain automatic access to Cabinet submissions. Nor was the Office to play such an effective role as the hub of the women's affairs wheel". (Sawer &amp; Groves, 1994, p.27).</p> <p>Sawer and Groves call this period the Office's "years of exile". p.28.</p>



1983-1992	Labor Bob Hawke	1983-1988 Susan Ryan, Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for the Status of Women.	1983 renamed Office of the Status of Women.	Dept of PM & C.	Anne Summers (1983-1986), Head of the Office of the Status of Women.	<p>"In 1983 the Hawke Government was elected with the most comprehensive women's policy of any government to date, thanks to the work of Senator Susan Ryan, assisted at the drafting level by experienced bureaucratic feminists such as Sara Dowse. ... Commitments relating to the machinery of government included the return of the Office to PM &amp; C, the restoration of women's units with 'relevant government authorities' and the setting up of a new high-level co-coordinating body, the Permanent Heads' Taskforce on the Status of Women ... The return of the Office had great symbolic importance as a statement of the government's commitment to women. It greatly strengthened the role of the Office in monitoring Cabinet proposals and advising on Budgetary proposals. It also enabled the Office to function once more as the hub of a network of women's units and to introduce new co-coordinating mechanisms such as the Women's Budget Program ..." (Sawer &amp; Groves, 1994, pp.28-29).</p> <p>"Another commitment which was swiftly implemented was a large expansion in women's refuge funding under the new Women's Emergency Services Program." (Sawer &amp; Groves, 1994, p.30)</p>	
		1988-1990 Margaret Reynolds, Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for the Status of Women.	Office of the Status of Women.		Dept of PM & C.		Helen L'Orange (1988-1993), Head of the Office of the Status of Women.
		1990-1993 Wendy Fatin, Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for the Status of Women.	Office of the Status of Women.		Dept of PM & C.		Helen L'Orange (1988-1993), Head of the Office of the Status of Women.

1992-1996	Labor Paul Keating	1993 Rosemary Crowley, Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for the Status of Women.	Office of the Status of Women.	Dept of PM & C.	Anne Sherry (1993-1994), Head of the Office of the Status of Women.	
		1993-1994 Roz Kelly, Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for the Status of Women.	Office of the Status of Women.	Dept of PM & C.	Anne Sherry (1993-1994), Head of the Office of the Status of Women.	
		1994-1996 Carmen Lawrence, Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for the Status of Women.	Office of the Status of Women.	Dept of PM & C.	Anne Sherry (1993-1994), Head of the Office of the Status of Women.	
		1994-1996 Carmen Lawrence, Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for the Status of Women.	Office of the Status of Women.	Dept of PM & C.	Kathleen Townsend (1994-1997) First Assistant Secretary of the Office of the Status of Women.	
1996-2006	Coalition John Howard	1996-1997 Judi Moylan, Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for the Status of Women	Office of the Status of Women.	Dept of PM & C.	Kathleen Townsend (1994-1997) First Assistant Secretary of the Office of the Status of Women.	
		1996-1997 Judi Moylan, Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for the Status of Women.	Office of the Status of Women.	Dept of PM & C.	1997-1999 Pru Goward, First Assistant Secretary	OSW staff numbers 30 June 1998: 40.



		1997-2000 Jocelyn Newman, Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for the Status of Women	Office of the Status of Women.	Dept of PM & C.	2000 Joanne Caldwell, Acting First Assistant Secretary  2000-2003 Rosemary Calder, First Assistant Secretary	OSW staff numbers 30 June 1998: 33. OSW staff numbers 30 June 1999: 33. OSW staff numbers 30 June 2000: 33.
		2001-2004 Amanda Vanstone, Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for the Status of Women	Office of the Status of Women.	Dept of PM & C.	2000-2003 Rosemary Calder, First Assistant Secretary  2003-2004 Kerry Flanagan, First Assistant Secretary	OSW staff numbers 30 June 2001: 40. OSW staff numbers 30 June 2002: 51.
		2004 Kay Patterson, Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for the Status of Women	Office of the Status of Women.	Dept of PM & C.	2003-2004 Kerry Flanagan, First Assistant Secretary	OSW staff numbers 30 June 2004: 45.  In the 2004-2005 DPMC Annual Report the Office of the Status of Women is no longer mentioned or delineates separately. It does note that a "Women's Policy Unit" was established in November 2004 in the Social Policy Division of the DPMC. It does not specify the number of staff for the unit but the entire division's staff is listed as being 43 as at 30 June 2005.
		October 2003 Kay Patterson appointed as the Minister for Family and Community Services.	Office for Women	Dept of Family and Community Services.	2004-2006 Kerry Flanagan, Group Manager Women and Youth.	2004 OSW was downgraded to FaCS. The 2004-2005 FACS Annual Report states: "Following the last election [October 2004] we also welcomed the Office for Women which moved to FaCS from the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet." (p.4).

		<p>2004-2006 Kay Patterson, Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Women's Issues (as well as Minister for Family and Community Services).</p>				<p>Kerry Flanagan reports to Deputy Secretary, Wayne Jackson. Under Kerry Flanagan there are also 2 branch managers: Lee Emerson, Office for Women, Policy Research and International; and Jenny Bourne, Safety, Leadership and Consultation.</p> <p>In the FaCS 2004-2005 Annual Report, the Office for Women are included under Outcome 1 "Families are Strong". There are some interesting summaries about the nature and evaluation of PADV, NICSA and VAW-ASN in part two of the Annual Report under Outcome 1.</p> <p>There does not appear to be a breakdown of staff on the basis of branches in the FaCS Annual Report.</p>
--	--	---	--	--	--	--



## Chapter 5 Appendices - Introducing the Study

### 5.1 Participant Information Statement

### 5.2 Participant Consent Form

### 5.3 Interview Questions

### 5.4 Textual Analysis Tool

The content of Federal Government policy responses to violence against women is an aspect of Australia's federal government public policy responses to domestic violence, sexual assault and violence against women between 1995 and 2005. The specific focus of this study is the policy initiatives Partnerships Against Domestic Violence (PADV) and the National Initiative to Combat Sexual Assault (NCSA) and the respective community education campaigns Violence Against Women – Australia Says No (the campaign).

The study is being conducted by Ms Hazel Orsillo and will form the basis for the doctoral Degree of Philosophy at The University of Sydney under the supervision of Dr Cathy Long, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Education and Social Work.

The research has two key aspects: (1) A textual analysis of key documents and texts associated with PADV, NCSA and the campaign, and (2) Interviews with people who have a working knowledge, or experience, of the development or implementation, of PADV, NCSA or the campaign.

I would like to interview you for about an hour to discuss your knowledge and experience of the development of PADV, NCSA and/or the campaign. During the interview, I would like to take notes and also ask you to agree to let me use/record the information. You can not participate in the interview unless it is being tape-recorded. What you tell me will be completely confidential, except as required by law. A report of the study may be submitted for publication, but individual participants will not be identifiable in such a report or publication. Data from this study will be stored in a locked mailbox on the computer files and will be disposed of by shredding and a scan.

Being in this study is completely voluntary – you are not under any obligation to consent. Participants may withdraw from the research at any time without prejudice. Any person who wishes to participate in the conduct of a research study can contact the Ethics Office, Office of Ethics Administration, University of Sydney on (02) 9351 4511.

This research will not provide the information about either my contact details or my contact with you believe may be regarded as participating in the research. Please feel free to telephone me on (040) 252 551 or in writing to h.orsillo@sydney.edu.au if you have any questions or comments at any time during the project.

## 5.1 Participant Information Statement



**The University of Sydney**

Social Work & Policy Studies  
Faculty of Education & Social Work, A35  
NSW 2006 Australia

### **Federal Government policy responses to violence against women 1996-2006. Participant Information Statement**

This research on Federal Government policy responses to violence against women is an analysis of Australian federal government public policy responses to domestic violence, sexual assault and violence against women between 1996 and 2006. The specific focus of this study is the policy initiatives *Partnerships Against Domestic Violence (PADV)* and the *National Initiative to Combat Sexual Assault (NICSA)* and the associated community education campaign *Violence Against Women – Australia Says No* (the campaign).

The study is being conducted by Ms Mayet Costello and will form the basis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at The University of Sydney under the supervision of Dr Lesley Laing, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Education and Social Work.

The research has two key aspects: 1) A textual analysis of key documents and texts associated with *PADV*, *NICSA* and the campaign; and 2) Interviews with people who have a working knowledge, or experience in the development or implementation, of *PADV*, *NICSA* or the campaign.

I would like to interview you for about an hour to discuss your knowledge and experiences of the development of *PADV*, *NICSA* and/or the campaign. During the interview, I would like to take notes and also ask you to agree to let me tape-record the interviews. You can also participate in the interview without it being tape-recorded. What you tell me will be completely confidential, except as required by law. A report of the study may be submitted for publication, but individual participants will not be identifiable in such a report or publication. Data from this study will be stored in a locked cabinet on file/tape for 7 years and then disposed of by shredding and erasure.

Being in this study is completely voluntary - you are not under any obligation to consent. Participants may withdraw from the research at any time without prejudice. Any person with concerns or complaints about the conduct of a research study can contact the Senior Ethics Officer, Ethics Administration, University of Sydney on (02) 9351 4811.

You are also welcome to provide this information sheet and/or my contact details to any colleagues who you believe may be interested in participating in this research. Please feel free to contact me on 0407 252 861 or [m.costello@edfac.usyd.edu.au](mailto:m.costello@edfac.usyd.edu.au) if you have any questions or comments at any time during the project.

5.2 Participant Consent Form



The University of Sydney

School of Social Work & Policy Studies
Faculty of Education & Social Work, A35
NSW 2006 Australia

PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM

I, ..... , give consent to my participation in the
Name (please print)

Federal Government policy responses to violence against women 1996-2006
research.

In giving my consent I acknowledge that:

- 1. The procedures required for the project and the time involved have been explained to me, and any questions I have about the project have been answered to my satisfaction.
2. I have read the Participant Information Statement and have been given the opportunity to discuss the information and my involvement in the project with the researcher/s.
3. I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time, without affecting my relationship with the researcher(s) now or in the future.
4. I understand that my involvement is strictly confidential and no information about me will be used in any way that reveals my identity.

Signed: .....

Name: .....

Date: .....

### 5.3 Interview Questions

#### **Federal Government policy responses to violence against women 1996-2006.**

##### **Interview questions / topics for semi-structured key informant interviews**

1. What is the nature of the work you do / agency you work for? What is your role in this (if agency)?
2. Very briefly, what is your understanding of the definition, causes and consequences of male violence against women? Do you identify as having a feminist perspective on this issue? [This is meant for me to get an understanding of the participant's perspective].
3. Request participant look at OSW and VAW tables – add anything important/make any corrections.
4. What experience with, or knowledge about, *PADV*, *NICSA*, or the campaign do you have? When did these experiences occur (approximate years/months)? Is your experience with these policies or the campaign because of your current position? If from a previous position, what was the nature of the work and your role in the agency that caused you to have experience with these policies and/or the campaign?

##### Unstructured interview comment

Through my research I am trying to construct an historical narrative and account of *PADV*, *NICSA* and the campaign. I am hoping to explore why these policies and campaign were developed, how they developed and operated throughout their lifespans (such as the nature of the policy process), get an understanding of the main participants and their relationships with each other, and have a good understanding of the actual nature of the policies/campaign.

##### Possible unstructured questions

5. What is your perspective on responses to male violence against women under the Coalition Federal Government (under Prime Minister Howard) over the last decade?
6. How do you think violence against women as an issue got on the policy agenda particularly under the current Federal Government?

7. What is your understanding of how and why PADV, NICSA and/or VAW-ASN were developed?
  
8. How were the issues of sexual assault, domestic violence and/or violence against women represented and constructed in the policies/campaign? Do you think this representation or construction of the issues is consistent with the Federal Government's espoused values, beliefs and agenda in regard to social issues and public policy more generally? Do you think these issues should be represented or constructed in a different way? If so, how u think and what do you think would be the consequences of this alternative representation?

If relevant for those working on the campaign: when writing about "victims" and "perpetrators" what or who were you thinking of? Were they male or female, old/young, black/white etc?

9. What was your impression of the policy process through which the policies and/or campaign were developed?
  
10. Who do you believe were the main participants in developing these policies/campaign? What were the power relationships between these participants? What conflicts were there and how were these dealt with? Did this change over time? What was your involvement with these participants and how did they interact with you?
  
11. If relevant for the research reports or campaign: Did you ever experience, or are you aware of, any interference or intervention in the process or outcomes of research, research/project reports or the campaign from Federal Government Public Servants or politicians? What was the nature of this intervention? Do you think it was appropriate? Did it have any affect on the nature or outcomes of the project/research/campaign? If so, was this affect negative or positive?

Alternatively if a Federal Government Public Servant/politician: Did you ever yourself, or are you aware of from any other Federal Government Public Servant or politician, any intervention in the process or outcomes of research, research/project reports or the campaign? What was the reason for, and nature of, this intervention? What was the outcome of your/their intervention?



12. What did you learn in your experience with PADV, NISCA and/or the campaign? How do you think these policies / campaign or the process in which they were developed can be improved? Are there any alternative policies / approaches that you would suggest? If so, what impact would these alternatives make – how would it be different?

What type of text is it (eg website, report, magazine ad, audio-visual)?

Final Question Is the text part of (PADV, NISCA or VAW-ASN)? Is the text part of a chain or network of texts within that policy/campaign?

13. On completion of my PhD would you like a summary of my final PhD thesis and/or would you like to be informed about any associated publications resulting from this research (note this will be well into the future)?

Who is the author of the text? Where are they from (eg specify gov't dept, service, country/region)?

Does the text have any other associations / affiliations (eg publisher, funding body – specify what they are)?

Where was the text located (eg website, publication reference)? If I have a copy of the text, please specify precise file location (eg PhD Folder, computer file name):

Are there any links in the text with other relevant objects or texts? How are those produced (eg close relationship, as information only, linked)?

#### Media Context

Is there any acknowledgment in the text of the social, historical, or political context in which it is located?

What moments of relevant/represented social, historical, or political events are around in the text?

Are any relevant social, historical or political events or contexts obviously excluded from the text?

#### Problem Representation

What is the problem represented to be?

What type of male violence against women is identified as the problem (eg domestic violence, sexual assault, violence against women)? Are there any links between the different types?

What is the definition of the type of violence identified as the problem?

What are the theoretical explanations or reasons represented to be for the type of violence identified?

## 5.4 Textual Analysis Tool

### Background and Textual Location

What is the name of the text?

What type of text is it (eg website, report, magazine ad, audio-visual)?

What policy is the text part of (PADV, NICSA or VAW-ASN)? Is the text part of a chain or network of texts within that policy/campaign?

Brief summary of the text:

When was the text written / published?

Who is the author of the text? Where are they from (eg specify gov't dept, service, consultancy)?

Does the text have any other associations / affiliations (eg publisher, funding body – specify what there are)?

Where was the text located (eg website, publication references)? If I have a copy of the text also specify personal files location (eg PhD Folder, computer file name):

Are there any links in the text with other relevant policies or texts? How are these presented (eg close relationship, as information only, linked)?

### History and Context

Is there any acknowledgement in the text of the social, historical, or political context in which it is located?

What elements of relevant represented social, historical, or political events are included in the text?

Are any relevant social, historical or political events or contexts obviously excluded from the text?

### Problem Representation

What is the problem represented to be?

What type of male violence against women is identified as the problem (eg domestic violence, sexual assault, violence against women)? Are there any links between the different types?

What is the definition of the type of violence identified as the problem?

What are the theoretical explanations or causes represented to be for the type of violence identified?

### Assumptions

What presumptions or assumptions underlie the representation?

Where is the level of analysis regarding male violence against women?

How is gender constituted? What is the role of gender?

What values are evident and what values does the author explicitly commit themselves to? How are these values expressed and realized (eg as statements of fact, predictions and hypothetical statements, evaluative statements, or assumed values)?

What existential, propositional or value assumptions are made?

Can any of the assumptions or values made be seen as ideological. If so, what ideological positions are evident?

### Language and Discourse

What is the nature and tone of the language used (including gendered/non-gendered, passive/active, how the message is delivered etc)?

What influences on the language are evident (eg feminist, bureaucratic)?

What discourses are drawn upon in the text? What are the main features of these discourses evident in the text?

Is there a significant mixing of discourses? If so, how do these discourses interact / how are they textured or mixed together?

### Subjects

What is the explicit or implicit role and nature of government in the text represented to be (eg is the issue considered a govt responsibility or a private one)?

Who is the intended audience of the text? Is the content and/or presentation of the text consistent / appropriate for the intended audience? If so, how? If not, how not?

Which subjects are present in the problem representation? Which are obviously absent?

How are subjects constituted within this problem representation?

Are subjects represented in an active or passive way?

Who is held responsible (or accountable / to blame) for the 'problem'?

### Effects

What effects are produced by the representation of the 'problem'?

What is likely to change with this representation of the problem? What is likely to stay the same?



What are the aims, goals and/or objectives of the policy? Which of these are privileged/dominant?

What 'solutions' are offered to the 'problem'?

What strategies and interventions are proposed or follow on from the 'solutions' offered? Where/to whom are these strategies and interventions directed?

Who is likely to benefit from this representation? How will they benefit? Who is likely to suffer from this representation? How will they suffer?

### Absences

What is left unproblematic in the 'problem' representation?

How may this text be evaluated in terms of my minimum policy practice responding to male violence against women (eg what is present, what is absent)?

How may this text be evaluated in terms of my good policy practice responding to male violence against women (eg what is present, what is absent)?

## **Chapter 6 Appendices - Male Violence Against Women Policy and Program Development 1996-2007**

---

- 6.1 National Domestic Violence Summit Statement
- 6.2 *Partnerships* Taskforce Terms of Reference
- 6.3 *Partnerships 1* Structural Framework
- 6.4 *Partnerships 1* Projects
- 6.5 *Partnerships 1* Publications
- 6.6 *Partnerships 2* Structural Framework and Projects
- 6.7 *Partnerships 2* Framework
- 6.8 *Partnerships* Explanations of Domestic Violence
- 6.9 *Women's Safety Agenda*

6.1 National Domestic Violence Summit Statement (*Partnerships* Taskforce, 2000, p.21)

## **NATIONAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SUMMIT**

### **STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AGREED BY HEADS OF GOVERNMENT**

This statement of principles comes from the combined policy and practice experience of governments, services, police, judiciary, researchers and community in dealing with domestic violence over the last two decades. It is an expression of consensus by the Heads of Government of Australia.

### **CONTEXT**

Domestic violence is widespread and complex. It is a major issue affecting the social, emotional, physical and financial wellbeing of individuals and families and resulting in significant social and economic costs to the community.

Children often witness domestic violence and are profoundly affected by this experience.

Domestic violence is an abuse of power perpetrated mainly (but not only) by men against women both in a relationship or after separation.

Domestic violence takes a number of forms, both physical and psychological. The commonly acknowledged forms of domestic violence are physical and sexual violence, emotional and social abuse and economic deprivation.

Domestic violence occurs across all groups, cultures and creeds.

Domestic violence often occurs and recurs in a pattern which affects the lives of women, men and children. Violence can continue from one generation to the next.

### **PRINCIPLES**

- All individuals have the right to be free from violence.
- All forms of domestic violence are unacceptable in any group, culture and creed.
- Many forms of domestic violence are against the law. Acts of domestic violence that constitute a criminal offence must be dealt with as such.
- The safety and wellbeing of those subjected to domestic violence must be the first priority of any response.
- Those who commit domestic violence must be held accountable for their behaviour.
- The community has a responsibility to work toward the prevention of domestic violence and to demonstrate the unacceptability of all forms of domestic violence.

### **INTERVENTION AND PREVENTION**

Reducing the incidence of domestic violence requires a shared commitment and a coordinated response by governments and the community.

Children need education and experience which enables them to build equal, respectful and non-violent relationships in adulthood.

Strategies need to include programmes aimed at early intervention and prevention of further violence, abuse or deprivation.

Strategies are needed to improve the response the criminal justice and other systems to domestic violence.

Services need to take into account the fact that women and children, as the main victims of domestic violence, have their own particular legal, health, welfare, social and economic issues.

Strategies developed to address domestic violence need to take account of the needs of all Australian communities, including the needs of indigenous people and people from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds.

Domestic violence strategies need to address the different needs and experiences arising from gender, age, sexuality, disability and geographic isolation.

Ongoing strategies are needed to increase community awareness that domestic violence is unacceptable.

## **PARTNERSHIPS AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE**

### **TASKFORCE TERMS OF REFERENCE**

#### **COMMITMENT BY GOVERNMENTS**

Heads of Government are committed to working in partnership to prevent domestic violence.

#### **ROLE OF THE TASKFORCE**

Membership of the Taskforce represents commitment on the part of governments to work together in preventing and responding to domestic violence across Australia.

The Taskforce will identify opportunities for strategic collaboration between the Commonwealth and the States and Territories to enhance knowledge and develop good practice.

The Taskforce will recommend priorities for national initiatives under the themes of *Partnerships Against Domestic Violence*. Specific projects under the themes proposed by a State or Territory will also contribute to the development of national knowledge.

The Taskforce will promote sharing of knowledge and the dissemination of information on preventing and responding to domestic violence.

The Taskforce will determine a framework for evaluation of *Partnerships Against Domestic Violence*.

The Taskforce will report annually through the Commonwealth/State Ministers' Conference on the Status of Women to Heads of Government. State and Territory representatives will report within their jurisdictions as appropriate.

The annual report of the Taskforce will be published.

The Taskforce will continue for the life of *Partnerships Against Domestic Violence*, which is funded until June 2001.

#### **MEMBERSHIP**

The membership of the Taskforce will consist of:

- one representative from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, who will chair the Taskforce; and
- up to two government representatives from each of the States and Territories.

Representatives of key Commonwealth departments working on related issues will be co-opted as required.


#### **RESOURCING**

State and Territory governments will fund their representative(s) to attend meetings of the Taskforce, which will be held up to three times a year.

The Commonwealth, through the Office of the Status of Women, will provide administrative support for the Taskforce.

The Office of the Status of Women will provide resources within a specified yearly budget for the Taskforce to seek expert advice.

6.3 Partnerships 1 Structural Framework (*Partnerships Taskforce, 2001, p.4*)



6.4 Partnerships 1 Projects (Partnerships Taskforce, 2001, pp.75-78)

FUNDED ORGANISATION	PROJECT/GRANTS TITLE
<b>NATIONAL</b>	
Office of the Status of Women (OSW)	Improving Access to Information on Domestic Violence for Women with Disabilities
OSW	Domestic Violence and Older People
OSW	Communication Strategy (Public Relations)
OSW	A) Scoping of National Endorsed Competency Standards - Stage One, Research Component. B) Development of National Endorsed Competency Standards.
* OSW	Research into Community Awareness of Domestic Violence in the Diverse Australian Community.
OSW	National Domestic and Family Violence Clearinghouse
OSW	Community Awareness Activities for Indigenous and NESB Communities.
OSW	Preventing Homelessness for Women Experiencing DV
OSW	Indigenous Family Grants Programme
OSW	Model of Domestic Violence Laws
OSW	Research into good practice models to facilitate access to the civil and criminal justice system by people experiencing DV
<b>COMMONWEALTH</b>	
National Crime Prevention (NCP)	Review of Programs- Perpetrators of DV
NCP	Violence in Indigenous Communities
OSW	Against the Odds: How Women Survive DV
NCP	DV Prevention
Commonwealth Department of Family and Community Services (FaCS)	Rural & Remote DV Initiative: a. Huon Domestic Violence Information Service b. Coober Pedy International Community and Family Centre c. Cross Border, Central Australia d. NT Project: community development and training positions e. Marnin Bowa Dumbara f. Orana Far West g. Riverina/Murray.
FaCS	Continuation and Expansion of Rural & Remote DV Initiative (DVR&R): a. Huon Domestic Violence Information Service b. Coober Pedy International Community and Family Centre c. Cross Border, Central Australia d. NT Project: community development and training positions e. Marnin Bowa Dumbara f. Orana Far West g. Riverina/Murray
FaCS	Working with Families Experiencing Domestic Violence: a. 'Let's Face It' Project — Anglicare Tasmania b. Early Intervention Project — Anglicare (Kirway, Albany), WA.

**FUNDED ORGANISATION PROJECT/GRANTS TITLE**

FaCS Working with Adolescent Boys:  
 a. 'The Rage Project' — Responsive Adolescent Group Education. Berry Street, Vic.  
 b. 'Boys Rave' — Resisting Abuse and Violence for Equality. Youth and Family Service (Logan City), Qld.

FaCS Indigenous Family Relationships Pilot Projects:  
 a. Anglicare WA (Kinway Family Counselling Service Kununurra/Wyndham) & Gawolleng Yawwoodeng Aboriginal Corporation (Kununurra Crisis Accommodation Centre). Talking Women's Business.  
 b. Family Life Movement of Australia (Interrelate) & Southern Cross University College of Indigenous Australian Peoples  
 c. Centacare Townsville & Townsville Aboriginal & Islander Health Services.  
 d. Newcastle Family Support Service & Warlga Ngurra Aboriginal Women's Refugee.  
 e. Adelaide Central Mission, Centre of Personal Education & Nunkuwarrin Yunti Aboriginal Community Health Centre — 'Indigenous Families Project'  
 f. Anglicare NT, Darwin & several indigenous organisations in Darwin.

FaCS Young Women's Relationships Pilot Projects:  
 a. Berry Street, Vic. 'Violence Prevention Project for Young Women'.  
 b. Family Relationships Institute, Vic. 'Young Women's Relationship Initiative'.  
 c. Relationships Australia, NSW. 'Does he treat you right? — Seminars'.  
 d. Relationships Australia, SA. 'What Smart Girls Know'.  
 e. Centacare, Brisbane.  
 f. Centacare Geraldton.

FaCS Relationship Support Services for Men:  
 a. Burnside Central and Mid North Coast, NSW — 'Men in Families'.  
 b. Relationships Australia, NSW.  
 c. Unifam, NSW. 'Men's Matters'.  
 d. Burnside Cabramatta, NSW. Multi-cultural men and family relationships services  
 e. Newcastle Family Support Service, NSW.  
 f. Children's Protection Society, Vic  
 g. Bethany Family Support, Vic. Men and Family Relationship Program.  
 h. Mallee Family Care, Vic.  
 i. Australian Greek Welfare Society, Vic. Counselling for Greek-speaking men and their families.  
 j. Lifeline, Bundaberg. Men and Families.  
 k. Relationships Australia and Gallang Place, Qld.  
 l. Marnja Jarndu Women's Refuge, WA. 'Men's Outreach Service'  
 m. Ngala, WA.  
 n. Centacare Catholic Family Services Whyalla, SA  
 o. Port Adelaide Central Mission, SA.  
 p. Anglicare, Tasmania. 'Tools for Men'.  
 q. Marymead Child & Family Centre, ACT. The Marymead Separated Fathers Program.  
 r. Relationships Australia, NT. 'Fathers after separation Course'.

FaCS National Men's Access Line

Commonwealth  
 Department of  
 Education, Training  
 and Youth Affairs (DETYA) Domestic Violence Workshops with Young People

FUNDED ORGANISATION	PROJECT/GRANTS TITLE
NCP & DETYA	Young People's Attitudes to and Experience of domestic violence — Research project
Department of Transport and Regional Services (DTRS)	Domestic Violence in Rural and Remote Communities Research
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC)	Family Violence Advocacy Project — Cairns
ATSIC	Family Violence Advocacy Projects: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Apunipima Cape York Health Council</li> <li>2. Kalgoorlie</li> <li>3. The Far North Queensland Indigenous Consortium for Social and Emotional Health and Well Being 'Training for Workers with Indigenous Women and Children who have Experienced Family Violence'</li> </ol>
ATSIC	Training for Agencies Working with Indigenous Women
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA)	Domestic and Criminal Violence History of Migration Sponsors
<b>STATE AND TERRITORY</b>	
NSW	Rural Crisis Intervention Partnerships Projects
NSW	Criminal Justice System Interagency Guidelines for Responding to Domestic Violence
NSW	Dubbo Integrated Response Project
NSW	Routine Screening of Patients of Specified Health Services
NSW	BiGhART Domestic Violence Prevention Film Project
NSW	Tamworth Domestic Violence Project
NSW	Promoting Healthy Relationships
VIC	Enhancement of Family Violence Protocols and Inter-Agency Linkages
VIC	Identifying Family Violence Resource Kit — the GP Kit
VIC	Koori Family Strengthening
VIC	Supporting Children and Young People who have experienced family violence
VIC	Evaluation of Co-ordinated Community Intervention Project (Moe Family Violence Project) — Gippsland
VIC	Recovery from Grief & Trauma of the Experience of Family Violence
VIC	Feasibility Study on the Implementation of an Enhanced Perpetrator Program Infrastructure
VIC	Joint Child Protection and Family Violence Services Strategy
VIC	Measuring Family Violence in Victoria
QLD	Best Practice Intervention for children and young people who witness domestic violence
QLD	Domestic Violence and Pregnancy project
QLD	Torres Strait Islander Domestic Violence Community Education/Training Strategy
QLD	Domestic Violence and Child Protection
QLD	Training for School Communities in Relation to Child Witnesses of Domestic Violence
QLD	Young Pregnant and Parenting Support
QLD	Kids and Domestic Violence Training Initiative
QLD	Indigenous Family Violence Prevention
WA	Crisis Intervention in Aboriginal Family Violence — Strategies and models for WA
WA	Training for Service Delivery



FUNDED ORGANISATION	PROJECT/GRANTS TITLE
WA	Regional Multi-cultural Access Projects
WA	Pilot Counselling Program for Aboriginal Men Responsible for Family Violence
SA	Peer education for young people at risk
SA	Competency-based Training Modules Project
SA	Consultation Project
SA	Resources for Aboriginal Communities — Young People's resource
SA	Resources for Multi-cultural Communities Project
SA	Community Action/Education Project
SA	Out of Sight — Not out of Mind
SA	Safe Living in Aboriginal Communities
TAS	Domestic Violence Integrated Information Project
TAS	Website Project
TAS	Domestic Violence Training Delivery Model for Rural Health Professionals
TAS	Indigenous Family Violence Scoping and Capacity Building
TAS	Domestic Violence and the Needs of Women with Mental Health Problems
TAS	Feasibility Study for a Regional Domestic Violence Court Support Service
TAS	Pathways and Turning Points: how women survive violent partners
TAS	Scoping study for a Tasmanian statewide perpetrator program
NT	Domestic Violence Education Package for young people: Be Cool ... Not Cruel. Phase 1: increase awareness
NT	Domestic Violence Education Package for young people: Be Cool ... Not Cruel. Phase 2 consists of extended media advertising
NT	Pilot Court-Mandated and Court-Referral Program for Offenders of Domestic and Aboriginal Family Violence
NT	Effectiveness of a Mandated Program for Indigenous Family Violence Offenders
NT	Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault intervention project for young people
ACT	No Violence in Schools (NOVIS): Building Healthy Relationships for Young People
ACT	Understanding the Domestic Violence Law in Australia — A Community Education Campaign for Ethnic Communities
ACT	Partners for Prevention — a community consultation approach
ACT	Evaluation of the ACT Corrective Services Family Violence Perpetrator Program
ACT	Interagency Family Violence Intervention Program Phase 1 Phase 2

## 6.5 Partnerships 1 Publications (*Partnerships* Taskforce, 2001, pp.79-83)

### **NEWSLETTERS, BULLETINS AND FLYERS**

*Partnerships Against Domestic Violence* Newsletters Nos 2, 3, 4,5,6 & 7

*Partnerships Against Domestic Violence* Flyer

*Meta Evaluation Bulletin* No 1

*Meta Evaluation Bulletin* No 2 — *Working with Young People*

*Meta Evaluation Bulletin* No 3 — *Working with Men*

*Meta Evaluation Bulletin* No 4 — *A Guide to Evaluation*

*Meta Evaluation Bulletin* No 6 — *Indigenous projects*

*Key Findings* — *Working with Children and Young People*

*Key Findings* — *Working with Indigenous People*

*Key Findings* — *Working with Men*

Case studies of Domestic Violence Programs in Australia:

*Working with Children and Young People: case study 1*

*Prevention & perpetrator programmes: case study 2*

*Peer education programmes: case study 3*

*Supporting rural & remote communities: case study 4*

Competency Standards Flyer

### **PARTNERSHIPS REPORTS AND PRODUCTS FROM NATIONAL PROJECTS**

*Current Perspectives on Domestic Violence: A Review of National and International Literature*

*Against the Odds — How Women Survive Domestic Violence* — Executive Summary

*Against the Odds — How Women Survive Domestic Violence* — Full Report

*Competency Standards: Research Report Stage 1* — Project to develop competency standards for people who come into professional contact with those affected by domestic violence

*Domestic Violence Prevention: Strategies and Resources for Working with Young People*

*Women, Men and Domestic Violence: an analysis of data and research on incidence of domestic violence*

*Attitudes to Domestic Violence and Family Violence in the Diverse Australian Community*

*Indigenous Solutions: working with Indigenous communities experiencing domestic violence: The National Indigenous Family Violence Grants Programme*

*The Way Forward: Children, young people and domestic violence. Proceedings of the National Forum held in Melbourne, April 2000*

*Two Lives, Two Worlds: Older People and Domestic Violence, Volume 1*

*Two Lives, Two Worlds: Older People and Domestic Violence, Volume 2*

*It's Not OK — It's Violence: Information about domestic violence for women with disabilities, including poster, brochure, card, information booklet for service providers, and cassette for visually impaired persons*

*Research into Good Practice Models to Facilitate Access to the Civil and Criminal Justice System by People Experiencing Domestic and Family Violence*

*Walking Into Doors campaign brochures: family (Archie Roach and Ruby Hunter), women (Ruby Hunter) and men (Archie Roach)*

*Partnerships Against Domestic Violence Poster*

*Partnerships Against Domestic Violence First Report of the Taskforce 1997-1999*

*Partnerships Against Domestic Violence Second Report of the Taskforce 1999-2000*

#### **REPORTS AND PRODUCTS — COMMONWEALTH FUNDED PROJECTS**

*Young People Say "DV-No Way": Evaluation of the National Domestic Violence Prevention Workshops for Young People (Produced by DETYA)*

*Domestic Violence in Regional Australia — A Literature Review (produced by Department of Transport & Regional Services)*

*Healing our Families: Family Violence Advocacy Project (produced by Apunipima Family Violence Advocacy Project, Queensland)*

*Getting What You Want: A Peer Guide into Healthy Relationships (produced by the Young Mothers for Young Women, Queensland)*

*Getting What You Want: Presenters' Workbook (produced by the Young Mothers for Young Women, Queensland)*

*Goldfields Region: Family Violence Advocacy Project (produced by Bega-Garnbirringu Health Services, Western Australia)*

*Living with Love? Booklet (produced by Geraldton Centacare and Sexual Assault Resource Centre, Western Australia)*

*Living with Love? Resource Kit (produced by Geraldton Centacare and Sexual Assault Resource Centre, Western Australia)*



*What Smart Girls Know* (produced by Relationships Australia, South Australia)

*Loves Me Not* (produced by Berry Street Inc, Victoria)

## **REPORTS AND PRODUCTS — STATE AND TERRITORY PROJECTS**

*Be cool ... not cruel: Booklets Numbers 22-27*

*Be cool ... not cruel: Community Education for Young People* (Northern Territory)

*Kids and DV*

*Practice Standards*

*Kids and DV — Evaluating Service Delivery*

*Kids and DV — Models of Service* (Queensland )

*Yipi Kits: Fun with Feelings — A resource for workers/teachers of pre and primary aged children exploring emotions and feelings* (South Australia)

*Relationship Violence: No Way! — Young Men and Relationships Violence Prevention Project Report* (South Australia)

*Violence in the Home has Many Forms: Multicultural Domestic Violence Radio Announcements CD* (South Australia)

*Silent Witnesses Kit- Domestic Violence Hurts Kids Too* (South Australia)

*Reshaping Responses to Domestic Violence: Executive Summary* (South Australia)

*Reshaping Responses to Domestic Violence: Full Report* (South Australia )

*Reshaping Responses to Domestic Violence- Appendices* (South Australia)

*Home Safe Home: The link between domestic and family violence and women's homelessness* (South Australia)

*Identifying Family Violence: Report on the Resource Kit for General Practitioners in the Western Suburbs of Melbourne* (Victoria)

*Identifying Family Violence: A Resource Kit for General Practitioners in the Western Suburbs of Melbourne* (Victoria)

*Mapping Pathways of Service Provision: Enhancement of Family Violence Protocols and Interagency Linkages* (Victoria)

*Moe Family Violence Project — A Review of the Project with Implications for Local Priority Policing* (Victoria)

*Evaluation of the Australian Capital Territory Interagency Family Violence Intervention Program: Final Report* (Australian Capital Territory)

*Crisis Intervention in Aboriginal Family Violence: Summary report* (Western Australia)

*Crisis Intervention in Aboriginal Family Violence: Strategies and Models for Western Australia*  
(Western Australia)

*Identifying Family Violence: A Resource Kit for General Practitioners in NSW* (New South Wales)

Relationship Violence: No Way! — Young Men & Relationships Violence Prevention Project  
Posters & Postcards

### **GENERAL PUBLICATIONS & SPECIAL PROJECTS**

*Budget Highlights* — Budget 1999-2000

2000-2001 *Budget Highlight For Women* (Statement)

2001-2002 *Budget Highlight For Women* (A Message From The Minister)

Women 2000

*Australian Women Working Together 1999* — an overview of the activities of Australian women's non-government organisations

*Maintaining Our Commitment to Women* — Statement by the Hon. Judi Moylan MP, 12 May 1998

*Our Commitment to Women* — statement by Senator the Hon Jocelyn Newman, Minister for Social Security and Minister assisting the Prime Minister for the Status of Women, 13 May 1997

*Working for Women: Office of the Status of Women* — Strategic Directions 2001-2003

*More Choice for Women* — statement by Senator the Hon Jocelyn Newman, Minister for Social Security and Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for the Status of Women, 20 August 1996

*Women and Parliaments in Australia & New Zealand* — discussion paper prepared for the Commonwealth/State Ministers' Conference on the Status of Women, September 1994

### **VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN**

*Training in the Area of Violence Against Women*, August 1993

*The Effectiveness of Protection Orders*

National Rural Domestic Violence Kit

NCVAW Position Paper on Mediation

*Community Attitudes to Violence Against Women* — Executive Summary

*Community Attitudes to Violence Against Women* — Full Report

*NCVAW Women and Mediation* — Information Booklet 1992

*Violence in the Home: The Big Secret*

National Stop Violence Against Women Day poster

Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault Leaflets in Community Languages (Arabic, Bosnian, Chinese/Mandarin, Croatian, English, Farsi/Persian, Greek, Italian, Japanese, Khmer, Kurdish (Kurmanji), Kurdish (Sorani), Macedonian, Portuguese, Russian, Serbian, Spanish, Tagalog/Filipino, Thai, Tigrigna/Eritrean, Vietnamese)

*Read My Lips* — Poster with text

*Another Tuesday Night* — Video

#### **INTERNATIONAL AND LEGAL**

*Sexual Assault Law Reform: A National Perspective*

*Fourth UN World Conference on Women: Platform for Action. Australia's Implementation Report, April 1997*


*Women in Australia: Australia's Third Report on Implementing the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women*

UN Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing Information Kit, 1995

United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women 1995 Infosheet: No 10



## 6.6 Partnerships Phase Two Structural Framework and Projects (OSW, 2001e)



## 6.7 Partnerships Phase Two Framework (OFW, 2005d)

Partnerships Against Domestic Violence | About the Initiative | A new National Dome... Page 1 of 6

MINISTER ASSISTING THE PRIME MINISTER FOR WOMEN'S ISSUES | WINDOW ON WOMEN |  
PARTNERSHIPS AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE | APPOINTWOMEN | NATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR  
THE ELIMINATION OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN



Office for  
Women  
Partnerships  
Against  
Domestic  
Violence

SITE MAP

You are here: Home | About the Partnerships Against Domestic Violence Initiative | A new National  
Domestic Violence Framework | Framework

### About the Partnerships Against Domestic Violence Initiative



Partnerships Against  
Domestic Violence



Partnerships Against  
Domestic Violence

#### ABOUT THE PARTNERSHIPS AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INITIATIVE

What is Partnerships?

How did Partnerships start?

Partnerships Phase 1 and Phase 2

Who is responsible for Partnerships?

National Evaluation of Partnerships Phases 1 and 2

A new National Domestic Violence Framework

#### POLICY, PLANNING AND SERVICE DELIVERY

Partnerships resources and publications

Clearinghouse

#### DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HELP

What help is available?

Examples of domestic violence

Information about domestic violence in Australia

#### A BUSINESS APPROACH

### Framework for Developing Approaches to Domestic Violence 2001-2003

#### Preamble

*Partnerships Against Domestic Violence* was initiated by Heads of Governments in 1997 to work together towards the common goal of preventing domestic violence across Australia and ameliorating its effects. The initiative grew out of a need for a coordinated approach to the problem. More than two decades of diligent effort by women's representatives, governments and service providers had resulted in a multitude of varied and sometimes conflicting responses and approaches. The emphasis of *Partnerships* was, therefore, on developing knowledge about what actually works best – testing and researching new ways of addressing domestic violence, enhancing and sharing knowledge, developing and documenting good practice and educating the community.

*Partnerships* began as a coalition of individuals and projects loosely focussed around a set of shared principles and priority themes. Over the ensuing three and a half years, it developed into a cohesive partnership between Commonwealth, State and Territory representatives who share a common understanding of domestic violence, the theoretical explanations about its nature and the most appropriate means of addressing it in differing contexts.

#### Understandings about domestic violence

Domestic violence occurs when one partner in a relationship attempts by physical or psychological means to dominate and control the other. It is generally understood as gendered violence, and is an abuse of power within a relationship or after separation. In the large majority of cases the offender is male and the victim female. Children and young people are profoundly affected by domestic violence, both as witnesses and as victims.



## CONTACT US

Many Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities prefer the term 'family violence'. 'Family' covers a diverse range of ties of mutual obligation and support, and perpetrators and victims of family violence can include, for example, aunts, uncles, cousins and children of previous relationships.

Domestic or family violence may involve a wide range of behaviours, including: physical abuse; sexual abuse; spiritual abuse; verbal abuse; emotional abuse; social abuse; and economic abuse.

Policy and service responses to domestic violence are shaped according to beliefs, assumptions and theories about how and why it occurs. A number of paradigms have been identified, based on differing values and perspectives. Not all are compatible, and some are contradictory.

Early theories focussed on identifying and treating individual or individual family 'deficiencies' which were understood to predispose them to using or being subject to violence. Approaches based solely on such models ignore significant causal factors, and are now considered inappropriate.

Later theories located violence as a reaction to sociological structures and institutions, or as a reflection of patriarchal structures in society. More recent theories take a more comprehensive view of the individual within the context of the broader society. Domestic violence is seen as arising from a complex interaction between, on the one hand, pervasive political and social structures in which women generally have less power than men, and on the other, individual responses to those structures.

### Understandings about partnerships

To improve the experiences of women and children needing help, and to reduce the level of domestic violence within Australian society, coordination, integration and consistency of domestic violence services and interventions are critical. Partnerships provide a means of achieving the necessary cooperation.

Effective partnerships are required between levels of government, between service delivery agencies and between the range of professionals involved in domestic violence. At the highest policy level, there is need for an ongoing commitment to achieving common standards and protocols, quality comparable data and coordination throughout the service system from prevention and primary research through to tertiary level interventions. Within such a framework, community level partnerships will be facilitated to pursue consistent evidence-based approaches as well as coordinating local services according to local needs.

### Sustaining the learning – a strategic approach

In 2001, a second phase of Partnerships was initiated to consolidate the findings to date, both about domestic violence and about partnerships, and to extend them. The challenge is to translate the practical and theoretical understandings into a coherent and sustainable national strategy for the future. Based on the foundation laid in Partnerships One, the following strategic framework has been developed to underpin Partnerships Two and beyond.

#### **Vision**

An Australian culture that will not tolerate violence and a community that will work together to eliminate violence.

#### **Principles**

1. All individuals have the right to live free from violence. Violence and the threat of violence against women is a fundamental violation of their human rights
2. Domestic violence is an abuse of power perpetrated mainly by men against women and is reinforced and condoned through complex interactions between individuals and their environments
3. All forms of domestic violence are unacceptable in any group, regardless of culture or creed
4. Domestic violence is an issue that affects the whole community and demands a whole of community response
5. The reasons domestic violence exists and is condoned are complex and require a range of responses
6. The safety and well-being of those subjected to domestic violence must be the first priority for any response
7. Those who use violence must take responsibility for their behaviour
8. Acts of domestic violence that constitute a criminal offence must be dealt with as such
9. The prevention and reduction of domestic violence requires strong government and community leadership to:
  - create integrated, coordinated and collaborative responses
  - build community resources and capacity.


#### **Objectives**

1. Address the immediate and long-term impacts of domestic violence and Indigenous family violence on women and children, and the social and financial costs to the community
2. Ensure all relevant policies and services are responsive to diversity and difference including: racial, cultural, and linguistic diversity, and gender, age, sexuality, disability and geography
3. Establish sustainable partnerships between all levels of government and the wider community to prevent and reduce domestic violence
4. Achieve a whole of government response through relevant policy and programme changes in the areas of health, legal, justice, social and economic policy
5. Establish a consistent and coordinated approach to violence prevention and interventions in all relevant service systems including community, income support, health, legal, justice, housing, and education
6. Enable complementary and collaborative policy, programme, and

- service delivery grounded in agreed concepts and approaches
7. Promote sustainable services and interventions underpinned by evidence-based practice
  8. Build sustainable safe community environments
  9. Develop mechanisms for the cooperative development, transfer and use of research amongst interested parties

**Goal**

To establish a whole-of-government approach that reduces and prevents domestic violence in Australia



**Outcomes, Strategies and Performance Indicators**

**OUTCOME 1: Safe Communities**

Australian communities, both of shared interest and of place, reject violence and:

- build and sustain safe community environments
- have effective and appropriate community and service strategies
- value, acknowledge and support diversity and difference

**Strategies**

1. Identify and spread understanding of the human, social and financial cost of domestic violence to communities
2. Promote, support and engage with strong community leadership that rejects violence
3. Build community capacities to reject and respond to violence and develop community

**Performance indicators**

- Reduction in incidence, severity and impact of domestic violence as measured by social indicators
- Reduction in women's levels of fear of violence
- Level of availability of appropriate domestic violence services to all communities of place and interest
- Increased awareness and responsiveness of community



- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <p>resilience</p> <p>4. Resource community organisations to provide appropriate and effective responses</p> | <p>level service providers to domestic violence issues for their client group</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Increased participation in and leadership of community activities to counter domestic violence</li> </ul> |
|---|--|

**OUTCOME 2: Coordinated and Collaborative Policy and Service Delivery**

Sustainable partnerships between all levels of government and the wider community to provide seamless and holistic responses that:

- Prevent and reduce domestic violence by addressing the:
  - immediate and long-term impacts of domestic violence and Indigenous family violence on women and children, and
  - social and financial costs to the community
- empower and meet the needs and diversity of service users and their communities
- maximise effective use of available resources through flexible funding arrangements responsive to community need, and
- are evidence-based best-practice

**Strategies**

**Performance indicators**

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Review and develop models and approaches to implement findings from research and evidence-based practice</li> <li>2. Maintain existing partnerships to sustain strong, safe communities, and develop new ones</li> <li>3. Establish integrated, complementary and collaborative policy, programmes and service delivery initiatives that address immediate and long-term social and financial costs and:                     <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- give priority to the safety and well-being of those subjected to domestic violence</li> <li>- develop understanding of the interactive aspects, and</li> <li>- reduce risk and increase resilience of individuals and communities</li> </ul> </li> </ol> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Implementation of agreed principles and strategies of the framework throughout the service system</li> <li>● Increase in and effectiveness of collaboration between different levels of government business and community sectors (eg. Business partnerships, agreements)</li> <li>● Level of targeted funding commitments for delivery of domestic violence service and responses by relevant areas of all governments</li> <li>● Level of accessibility, visibility and integration of the service system</li> </ul> |
|--|---|

**OUTCOME 3: Commitment to Evidence-based Approaches**

Policies, funding arrangements, service delivery and practice are based on agreed concepts and principles through commitment to and funding of

- research, monitoring and evaluation, education and training
- assessment and application of new or emerging technologies and approaches
- documentation and dissemination of emerging findings and knowledge, and
- ongoing community debate and engagement

**Strategies**

1. Establish mechanisms for the collaborative development, transfer and use of research by all stakeholders
2. Maintain a commitment to ongoing and new research and development initiatives that address and progress the principles
3. Implement evaluation and research findings in policy and service delivery
4. Audit the effectiveness of government policies, initiatives and service outcomes against the framework principles
5. Ongoing education and training that is continuously informed by research and development initiatives. Maintain commitment to all relevant service sectors and educational institutions

**Performance indicators**

- Level of research and development
- Level of access to, acceptance of, and uptake of research findings and policy principles throughout the service system
- Level of capacity of local communities to apply choice, understanding and skills to develop local solutions to local problems
- All domestic violence services demonstrate evidence-based practice, best practice principles and continuous improvement informed by ongoing research and evaluation

[Top of Page](#)

[FEEDBACK](#) | [COPYRIGHT AND DISCLAIMER](#) | [PRIVACY](#)

**Key web sites from OfW**

[OfW](#) | [Partnerships Against Domestic Violence](#) | [AppointWomen](#) | [Window on Women](#) | [women.gov.au](#)

Australian Government Office for Women  
Department of Family and Community Services – Box 7788, Canberra Mail Centre ACT 2610

Telephone 1800 808 863 – Facsimile +61 6212 2497 – Email [women@facs.gov.au](mailto:women@facs.gov.au)

Last modified, 02-May-2005

## 6.8 Partnerships Explanations of Domestic Violence

(Strategic Partners, 2003a, pp.10-12)

Framework	Biological Determinism	Individual Pathology	Social Stressors and Individual Risks	Power and Oppression	Interactive Systems and Individuals
<b>Key Theories</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Socio biology</li> <li>Survival of the species</li> <li>Men are made this way.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Medical model</li> <li>Psychoanalytic</li> <li>Personal stress</li> <li>Inter-generational theories</li> <li>Social learning</li> <li>Dysfunctional families</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Systems theory</li> <li>Exchange theory</li> <li>Resource theory</li> <li>Sub-culture of violence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Patriarchy – male structural power</li> <li>Public and private domains</li> <li>Gender analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>integrated theoretical explanations</li> <li>Multiple perspectives in co-existence</li> <li>Violence as a "choice in context"</li> </ul>
<b>Implications for Research</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Focuses on how domestic violence is a natural instinct of men who are responding to threats in their environment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Development of risk factors</li> <li>Research focus on searching for factors that predispose and or cause domestic violence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Focuses on studying those groups in the population considered most marginalised and most likely to come to the attention of authorities and/or using human services as a result of violence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Focus on women as victims and men as perpetrators</li> <li>Focus on how social and cultural practices support violence against women</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Need to research the interactive aspects</li> <li>Approaches to reduce risk and enhance resilience</li> <li>Can investigate how rural culture, heterosexual dominance and homophobia and racism put up particular barriers for women and their children</li> </ul>
<b>Implications for Policy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Assumes all perpetrators of violence are/will be men and all victims will be women as it is biologically determined.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Funding of psychological services and mental health interventions</li> <li>Focus on dysfunctional families in the community.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Policy focus on marginalised groups</li> <li>Programs for men in anger management and stress relief</li> <li>High risk groups require interventions e.g. deal with the "causes" – alcohol, drugs, unemployment, homelessness</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Funding for crisis intervention</li> <li>Perpetrator programs provided</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Allows for broad definition of 'family'</li> <li>Education and community development are interacting components of a response</li> <li>Consistent with government policies on community capacity building and sustainability</li> <li>Can integrate cultural diversity and indigenous family violence into the model</li> </ul>



Framework	Biological Determinism	Individual Pathology	Social Stressors and Individual Risks	Power and Oppression	Interactive Systems and Individuals
<b>Implications for Ownership</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provides an excuse for behaviour.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Individuals need treatment to change and are therefore personally responsible.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The problem is in the family and/or subculture.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Men are the problem</li> <li>Women are seen as victims/survivors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community needs to take responsibility for a violation of community cohesion and wellbeing</li> </ul>
<b>Implications for Justice</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Criminogenic profiling</li> <li>Criminal justice response</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Criminogenic profiling</li> <li>Criminal justice response</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Criminal justice and intervention responses that are targeted in areas where there is known to be high levels of domestic violence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Domestic violence is a criminal offence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Domestic violence can be "explained" but it is still a crime and not acceptable.</li> </ul>
<b>Implications for Prevention</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Men need to be trained how to "behave" and control their violence.</li> <li>Women need to learn how to protect themselves.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Based on risk factors and presumed causes identify those most at risk in families and work on individual characteristics to prevent future violence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Focus on programs around improved social interaction.</li> <li>Remove the "causes" such as limiting access to alcohol.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Focus on men taking responsibility.</li> <li>Building positive relationships</li> <li>Women's right to a safe community</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Everyone is hurt by D.V.</li> <li>Narrative approaches which name experiences</li> <li>Dealing with risk and resilience.</li> <li>Prevention and early intervention.</li> </ul>
<b>Implications for Management</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Difficult to manage "just the way things are".</li> <li>Focus on protection of women and children from male violence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Management would be around designing and supporting services for individuals to change behaviour</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Targeted approach to domestic violence that takes account of the social environment's impact on domestic violence.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Remove women and children to safe/secure environment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Women and children supported and man removed</li> <li>Clear messages from policy and courts about responsibility.</li> </ul>
<b>Implications for Intervention</b>					
<b>Adult Survivors and Victims</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide safe accommodation and protection from the male violence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Individual change</li> <li>Breaking co-dependency</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Target at lower socio-economic areas</li> <li>Increase women's understanding of how structural stressors can predispose men to violence</li> <li>Provision of resources to women who wish to leave violence relationships</li> <li>Decrease structural stressors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Awareness raising</li> <li>Empower women to make choices</li> <li>Domestic violence is a crime</li> <li>Information</li> <li>Political activity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Naming their experiences and feelings</li> <li>Identifying discourses that challenge violence and abuse and offer preferred ways of being</li> </ul>
<b>Perpetrators</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Implement legal remedies to stop men's use of violence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Getting rid of anger and frustration</li> <li>Anger management</li> <li>Strong behavioural focus</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Target at lower socio-economic areas</li> <li>Support to obtain employment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Criminal sanctions</li> <li>Groups for perpetrators</li> <li>Ensuring men take responsibility</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Interventions focus on men taking responsibility for their use of violence.</li> <li>Reinforce criminal nature of the act.</li> </ul>
<b>Children &amp; Young People</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identify those at risk based on parents' experiences and place them under surveillance.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Based on individuals or groups being identified as 'at risk'</li> <li>Individual learning</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Target at lower socio-economic areas</li> <li>Support young people to remain at school</li> <li>Provide education and resources</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Awareness raising through community education</li> <li>Gender relations</li> <li>Encourage equitable relationships</li> <li>Parenting programs for women</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>See alternatives, identify and challenge the dominant understandings</li> <li>Recognise impact on children as well as young people.</li> <li>Provide early support for children.</li> </ul>

## 6.9 Women's Safety Agenda (OFW, 2005i)

OFW - Women's Safety Agenda - Elimination of Violence

file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Administrator%20Access...

MINISTER ASSISTING THE PRIME MINISTER FOR WOMEN'S ISSUES | WINDOW ON WOMEN |  
AUSTRALIA SAYS NO | WOMEN.GOV.AU



Office for  
Women

[ABOUT US](#) | [CONTACT US](#) | [SITE MAP](#) | [HELP](#)

### WOMEN AND THE LAW

### FAMILIES AND CHILDREN

### EQUALITY FOR WOMEN

### WOMEN'S SAFETY AGENDA—ELIMINATION OF VIOLENCE

Elimination of Violence in the  
Lives of Women

Domestic Violence Help

Violence Against  
Women—Australia Says No

Domestic Violence  
ClearingHouse

Australian Centre for the  
Study of Sexual Assault

Australian Institute of  
Criminology

### Previous Initiatives

Partnerships Against Domestic  
Violence (PADV)

PADV Publications and  
Presentations

PADV Resources for Business

Sexual Assault

### WORK AND EDUCATION

LEADERSHIP AND  
CONSULTATION

APPOINTWOMEN  
—WOMEN ON BOARDS

### INTERNATIONAL

INTER-GOVERNMENT  
LIAISON

### NETWORKS

### WOMEN IN AUSTRALIA

### STATISTICS

### PUBLICATIONS

Location: Home | Women's Safety Agenda - Elimination of Violence

## Women's Safety Agenda - Elimination of Violence

In the 2005 Budget the Australian Government announced its \$75.7 million commitment to continue to take a lead role in eliminating domestic violence and sexual assault in the Australian Community.

The Women's Safety Agenda addresses four broad themes - prevention, health, justice and services. Together they aim to decrease the impacts of domestic violence and sexual assault upon the community by building on the achievements of the *Partnerships Against Domestic Violence* initiative and the *National Initiative to Combat Sexual Assault*, increasing attention on preventing violence and early intervention and support for those affected by violence.

The measure includes:

### Re-running the successful national Violence Against Women. Australia Says No campaign

This national multimedia campaign will build on the success of the 2004 campaign and will increase community awareness of the issues of domestic violence and sexual assault. Through a 24-hour help line, the campaign will provide practical assistance to those experiencing violence, to friends and family who want to know what they can do to help and assistance to those wanting to change their violent behaviour.

### Continued funding for the Australian Domestic and Family Violence Clearinghouse and the Australian Centre for the Study of Sexual Assault

These national resource centres will continue to provide central points for the collection and dissemination of Australian domestic and family violence and sexual assault policy, practice and research.

### Research projects on domestic violence and sexual assault

This element will fund research and pilot projects concerning domestic violence and sexual assault in the Australian community. It will enhance previously developed research and good practice.

### Training for nurses in regional and rural areas



Practice nurses in regional and rural areas will receive training to assist them to identify and respond to domestic violence and doctors will receive assistance to release the nurses for this training. This will give people in regional areas access to a personal and confidential referral service.

### Training for the criminal justice sector on sexual assault

This element will develop training for the legal sector to ensure that it is attuned to the sensitivities that accompany women's experiences of sexual assault. Research has highlighted the important role of the criminal justice sector in determining whether a victim of sexual assault proceeds through the legal system.

### Dedicated resource at the Australian Institute of Criminology

This will continue the valuable research programme on various aspects of sexual assault.

### Mensline

This funding recognises the demand on Mensline's services that will be generated through the re-running of the Violence Against Women. Australia Says No campaign and will provide counsellors at Mensline with training and materials on domestic violence.

[Top of Page](#)

[FEEDBACK](#) | [COPYRIGHT](#) | [DISCLAIMER](#) | [PRIVACY](#)

#### Key web sites from OfW

[OfW | Window on Women | women.gov.au](#) | [Australia Says No](#)

Australian Government Office for Women  
Department of Family and Community Services – Box 7788, Canberra Mail Centre ACT 2610

Telephone 1800 808 863 – Facsimile +61 6212 2497 – Email [women@facs.gov.au](mailto:women@facs.gov.au)

Last modified: 06-Sep-2005

## Chapter 7 Appendices - Male Violence Against Women

### Community Education Campaigns 2001-2007

---

- 7.1 Quotes summarising relevant key findings from the *Partnerships 1* Community Awareness and Education Meta-evaluation Report
- 7.2 Summary of findings from the research report on young people and domestic violence
- 7.3 Summary of similarities between relationship violence and sexual assault in campaign developmental research commissioned by OSW
- 7.4 Summary of findings specific to sexual assault in campaign developmental research commissioned by OSW
- 7.5 Strategic considerations for *No Respect, No Relationship* from the developmental research
- 7.6 *No Respect, No Relationship* original advertisements from the mass media component of the campaign
- 7.7 Key components of the *No Respect, No Relationship* communications and public relations strategy
- 7.8 *Violence Against Women – Australia Says No* Magazine Advertisement
- 7.9 *Violence Against Women – Australia Says No* Transcripts of Television Advertisements
- 7.10 *Violence Against Women – Australia Says No* Brochure
- 7.11 *Violence Against Women – Australia Says No* Poster
- 7.12 *Violence Against Women – Australia Says No* Campaign Booklet
- 7.13 *Violence Against Women – Australia Says No* Indigenous Campaign Booklet
- 7.14 *Violence Against Women – Australia Says No* Campaign Website

## **7.1 Quotes summarising relevant key findings from the *Partnerships 1 Community Awareness and Education Meta-evaluation Report* (Strategic Partners, 2003b).**

"... education based in the community is a more effective approach than national media campaigns, although it was recognized that they could be complementary. Most participants stressed the need for community education to be specific to a target community, and developed in conjunction with that community. ... Sustainability, legacy and a focus on changing behaviours – not just attitudes – should be key considerations for future initiatives of this type" (p.15).

"Health promotion activities in relation to domestic violence are therefore not particularly suited to a solely mass-media advertising approach – simple messages or slogans requiring simple behavioural change [due to their potentially serious unintended consequences]. Mass-media approaches would be more effective if their aim was to simply increase awareness of an issue, and if these were supported by other approaches for information provision and behaviour change, such as media-based editorials or drama works, or community based education activities and support services" (p.30).

"All strategies begin with the client. Rather than attempting to make an audience accept and carry out the marketer's values and beliefs, practitioners of social marketing recognise clients will only change their behaviour when they recognise it is in their interests. It is therefore essential to start with an understanding of the target audience's needs and wants, its values and perceptions... Competition is always recognised; every choice by the client involves giving up some other action. What the client sees as major alternatives must always be kept in mind so the deficiencies of these alternatives can be highlighted and the benefits of the new behaviour promoted" (p.31).

"... raising community awareness may even be detrimental to the community as a whole, and to affected individuals in particular, when awareness is raised with no additional investment in service provision and skills development. Given the prevalence of domestic violence and the relatively low level of service usage in Australia (ABS 1996), raising community awareness has the potential to awaken latent demand for domestic violence services. This is particularly the case if awareness raising is combined with a call for community or individual action. This factor should be taken into account when establishing a comprehensive multi-faceted package to response to, address and prevent domestic violence" (p.40).



"The critical long-term aim of domestic violence prevention community education is a reduction in the prevalence of domestic violence both currently and in future generations. This fundamental outcome is sometimes neglected in the development of campaigns that my focus on the more achievable and measurable objectives such as changing attitudes and brand recognition" (p.41).

## 7.2 Summary of findings from the report on young people and domestic violence

(National Crime Prevention, 2001, pp.23-24)

### Summary of Findings with Preventative Significance

- I Given the interactive nature of macro- and micro-level influences, and the role of socioeconomic marginalisation in the use of and support for violence, educative programs that include positive parenting have prevention value. Children who receive educational and supportive assistance will also be helped in their long term adjustment.
- I Early intervention for at risk children and adolescents (before the onset of violent behaviours), has more potential for prevention than addressing prevention in a rearguard action.
- I In adolescence, peers are influential in reinforcing beliefs about violence. Prevention programs, whether in schools or in the community, need to make positive use of peer involvement.
- I Preventative programs should be underpinned by theory and be multifaceted, to reflect the roles and intersections of macro- and micro-level factors: class, gender, community culture, family/individual circumstances. They should also reflect an understanding of both the role and limitations of attitudes and their influence on behaviour.
- I The understandings, beliefs and attitudes of young men and young women, and indeed, of both partners in a violent relationship, need to be addressed; and, ultimately, more open and direct forms of communication taught and encouraged.
- I Prevention strategies need to be specifically targeted to the client group. This applies as much across age and gender groups as it does across cultural groups. For particular cultural groups, the issue needs to be problematised by the broader membership of the community with, ideally, their intensive involvement in planning and delivering programs.
- I Relationship violence prevention programs should not be subsumed by a focus on conflict resolution skills, an outcome lent support by many CTS-based findings of 'gender symmetry' which tend not to measure or explain serious violence and how and why it is used.
- I Programs in the mass media which convincingly show the negative outcomes of violence (eg rejection) and positive ways of communicating could be useful in guiding young people's beliefs about violence.
- I Institutions and sporting organisations need to discourage violence.

**7.3 Summary of similarities between relationship violence and sexual assault in campaign developmental research commissioned by OSW (OSW, 2003a, p.16)**

- There is strong support from young people, their parents and other stakeholders for a government led awareness campaign to place the issue on the public agenda;
- there is a need to inform young people about the extent and prevalence of violence, particularly sexual assault, in intimate relationships and dating;
- young people's relationships are varied and complex and age and experience significantly influence attitudes and behaviours about sexual relationships;
- young people are confused about how to behave towards each other, often misunderstand each other and require relationship skills development to improve their capacity to form non-violent relationships;
- young people believe that their peers and the media has an influence on their attitudes and behaviours around relationship violence and sexual assault;
- gender roles and expectations (about 'commitment' and sex) play a role in relationship violence/sexual assault;
- young people hold a number of misconceptions including that a woman's behaviour can contribute to relationships violence/sexual assault (eg 'provocation' and flirting/teasing) and that consensual sex as a result of pressure is normal; and
- relationship violence and sexual assault are often associated with young people's lifestyles (eg. excessive alcohol consumption and drug use)

#### **7.4 Summary of findings specific to sexual assault in campaign developmental research commissioned by OSW (OSW, 2003a, pp.16-17)**

- Participants had difficulty in clearly defining when inappropriate sexual behaviour in relationships is sexual assault;
- the community is not comfortable in analysing terminology and issues surrounding sexual assault;
- consent and perceived consent emerged as a particularly difficult issue. Males and females in the study strongly believed that misinterpreting and misunderstanding communication or the signals given between two people in regard to sexual intentions represents a critical issue;
- the use of pressure to have sex is normalised behaviour. For some men pressure was euphemistically seen as 'seduction' or 'persuasion' and regarded as acceptable within a relationship. Women are less prepared to place blame solely on the male if they consent to sex under pressure; and
- irrespective of knowledge that a high proportion of perpetrators are known to the victim, many still preferred to think of sexual assault perpetrators as strangers.




**7.5 Strategic considerations for *No Respect, No Relationship* from the developmental research (OSW, 2003a, p.23).**

- While mass media will generate high awareness of the campaign messages the issue is too complex to be remedied by the use of a mass media campaign alone. Evidence from the comments made throughout the study suggests that the use of a range of strategies for different target groups, at different ages, would be more meaningful and likely to be more effective in the long term;
- peer groups are an important influence and source for advice and information;
- there is a need for skills based programs for youth. Such skills based programs have the potential to not only minimise the chance of violent or abusive behaviours occurring but also can facilitate the development of appropriate behaviours and healthy relationships. These skills are a particular need of young males;
- partnerships with influential individuals, groups and media organisations can be a cost effective and powerful way to influence the portrayal of relationships, relationship violence and gender in popular culture;
- telling stories and allowing young people to draw their own conclusions can be more credible, more relevant and therefore more effective than 'telling' them what to think and how to behave; and
- when discussing the issues of communication, anger and conflict there was a frequently made suggestion that such programs be taught in schools



7.6 *No Respect, No Relationship* original advertisements from the mass media component of the campaign




'WELL SHE WAS FLIRTING WITH A COUPLE OF MATES, AND I GAVE HER A SLAP. BUT SHE KNOWS – I MEAN SHE DESERVED IT.'

NO SHE DIDN'T.


There's never an excuse for any kind of physical violence or assault. It's always completely unacceptable and in some cases it's criminal.

Relationships can be difficult, but they must always be built on respect. And respect includes how you treat and talk to each other and giving each other space when you need it.

The first place to start exploring the issue is on the website below. It has information for young people, parents and educators. Please go to it now.

 AS FOUNDED BY THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT 2005/06

**NO RESPECT** **NO RELATIONSHIP**  
[www.respect.gov.au](http://www.respect.gov.au)



'A MATE SAID THE WAY I TREATED MY GIRLFRIEND WAS EMBARRASSING. I JUST NEVER SAW IT TILL HE SAID IT.'

THINK ABOUT YOUR BEHAVIOUR.

Relationships can be difficult, but they must always be built on respect. And respect includes how you treat and talk to each other and giving each other space when you need it.

And there's never an excuse for any kind of physical violence or assault. It's always completely unacceptable and in some cases it's criminal.


The first place to start exploring relationship issues is on the website below. It has information for young people, parents and educators. Please go to it now.



**NO RESPECT NO RELATIONSHIP**

[www.respect.gov.au](http://www.respect.gov.au)





**'I SAID NO. BUT THEN HE  
WOULDN'T STOP - I DIDN'T  
KNOW WHAT TO DO.'**

**THAT'S SEXUAL ASSAULT.**

Most sexual assault and violence doesn't take place in dark alleys or deserted parks. It happens in normal flats and houses in average streets, just like the one you live in.

The problems range from physical violence and assault to controlling behaviour and constant put-downs and criticism. No one should have to put up with it - it's always unacceptable and in some cases it's criminal.

Both sides need to understand that relationships need to be based on respect. The first place to start exploring the issue is on the website below. It has information for young people, parents and educators. Please go to it now.




AUTHORISED BY  
THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT  
CANBERRA

**NO RESPECT**

**NO RELATIONSHIP**

[www.respect.gov.au](http://www.respect.gov.au)



'WELL IT WAS ASSAULT AND I REPORTED HIM. IT WAS SO HARD TO DO - BUT SUCH A RELIEF.'

YOU DID THE RIGHT THING.

Most sexual assault and violence doesn't take place in dark alleys or deserted parks. It happens in normal flats and houses in average streets, just like the one you live in.

The problems range from physical violence and assault to controlling behaviour and constant put-downs and criticism. No one should have to put up with it - it's always unacceptable and in some cases it's criminal.

Both sides need to understand that relationships need to be based on respect. The first place to start exploring the issue is on the website below. It has information for young people, parents and educators. Please go to it now.



**NO RESPECT NO RELATIONSHIP**

[www.respect.gov.au](http://www.respect.gov.au)



**7.7 Key components of the *No Respect, No Relationship* communications and public relations strategy** Compiled from: *Federal Public Servant 2* and *Academic 3*; OSW (2003a); the ALP (Roxon, 2004a); and the media (Bowden, 2004a; Cannane, 2004; Verity, 2004; Walker, 2004; Walsh, 2004; Williams, 2004).

- Editorials for television, radio, cinema and print encouraging young people to discuss the issues through interviews, stories and documentaries with young people about their experiences and perspectives on violence. These included: a 5 part series on Triple J's morning show; 16 one hour broadcasts on Triple J's Super Request program; a 10 part animated series for broadcast on Channel V and Greater Union Birch Carroll & Coyle Cinema outlets; and editorial features in magazines such as *Sain*, *Cosmopolitan*, and *Dolly* and an e-zine (internet based magazine).
- Sponsorship of youth events including *Big Day Out*, Supercross, and Australian Mixed Touch as well as developing specific youth events for the campaign such as basketball, community concerts and hip hop competitions.
- Online resources on *No Respect's* website developed by DVIRC which included on-line forums, e-cards, user-polls, quizzes, practical relationship tips, audio and video stories, resources and referral information.
- Publicity strategies including the campaign launch and a speaking tour with a panel of experts on relationship violence and sexual assault who were also to be contacts for the media to provide specialist information and to moderate on-line and radio discussions with young people about the issues.
- Resources to engage directly with young people including text messages, developing and distributing a school curriculum resource, and distributing merchandising such as mobile phone accessories and lanyards.
- *Coaching Boys Into Men* program teaching sports coaches (particularly football) to promote positive attitudes about, and behaviours towards, women by young men.
- Indigenous specific communication program including: community liaison program; ambassadors program including well-known Indigenous people; Indigenous specific campaign materials (such as posters, brochures, messages from the ambassadors);

national song-writing competition; and sponsorship of Indigenous cultural and community events such as "The Deadly's".

- NESB specific communication strategy including: multi-cultural short film festival; youth champions program; media partnerships with selected NESB media; and NESB specific campaign materials for young people and their influencers.

## 7.8 Violence Against Women – Australia Says No Advertisement

(New Weekly, 1 August 2005)

Advertisement



OSW0077

**'MY BOYFRIEND HITS ME,  
THEN HE SAYS HE LOVES ME,  
AND RECKONS IT'S ALL OK.'**

**NO, IT'S A CRIME.**

Violence and assault against women is always unacceptable and, of course, most men understand that. Sometimes this behaviour is criminal and should be reported immediately.

Women who have suffered it should never feel it's their fault. Instead they should seek help and advice. It could be from friends or parents, or it could be by talking to an experienced counsellor on the new Confidential Helpline. You can also visit our website, [www.australiasaysno.gov.au](http://www.australiasaysno.gov.au)

Violence against women is a serious social problem. It will only stop if everybody in Australia says No.



**VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN**  
**AUSTRALIA SAYS NO**

**Confidential Helpline**  
**1800 200 526**

Authorised by the Australian Government, Capital Hill, Canberra.



## **7.9 Violence Against Women – Australia Says No Transcripts of Television Advertisements**

### Violence Against Women - Australia Says No Advertisement 1 (men's)

Image of young white man with dark short hair in blue t-shirt shown in a few different poses / stills.

1<sup>st</sup> male voice: "I got really angry and I just gave her a slap, you know, stuff happens. But she knows, I mean, she deserved it".

White writing comes up with "No she didn't" then screen blacks out to leave just the writing.

Image of young white man with blond longish hair in grey t-shirt shown in a few different poses / stills.

2<sup>nd</sup> male voice: "I kept going you know and the next minute she says that I forced her. But it was too late, what was I supposed to do?".

White writing comes up with "You must have consent" then screen blacks out and leaves just the writing.

Image of young European looking man with short dark hair, light blue t-shirt and light jacket in a few different poses / stills.

3<sup>rd</sup> male voice: "Yeah I know this bloke and we all know he hits his girlfriend, never in front of people but she won't do anything, you know, I can't say anything can I?".

White writing comes up with "Yes you can" then screen blacks out and leaves just the writing.

Image of man (a bit older), slightly darker than white European (could be Greek?) with dark hair in light blue shirt and dark jacket in a few different poses / stills.

4<sup>th</sup> male voice: "Oh you just lose control sometimes, it's only shoving and stuff. It's not like I'm one of those blokes who beats up on a woman."

White writing comes up with "Yes you are" then screen blacks out and leaves just the writing.

Image of white man with dark hair in checkered shirt in a few different poses / stills.

5<sup>th</sup> male voice: "She came back to my place and she knew what we were there for and then like half way through she says no but I kept going".

White writing comes up with "That's sexual assault" then screen blacks out and leaves just the writing.



Images of all first, second and fifth man – one at a time while 6<sup>th</sup> male voice: “This behaviour is not just unacceptable, it’s criminal. You can get help and support by talking with an experienced counsellor on this confidential helpline”.

Image of “1800 200 526” in white with “Confidential Helpline” in green in a smaller font under it.

Sixth male voice: “1-800, 200, 5-2-6”.

Image of campaign logo: “Violence Against Women” in white box with black writing and under it “Australia Says No in green box with black writing which split apart slightly. Underneath this is a white image of the Australian Government coat of arms.

6<sup>th</sup> male voice: “To violence against women, Australia says no”.

Image of black screen with white writing: top line (bold) - “Authorised by the Australia Government, Canberra”. Second line: “Spoken by [bold]: N. Brady, F. Humphreys, C. Lee, P, Stenn, G, Pro.”

6<sup>th</sup> male voice: “Authorised by the Australia Government, Canberra. Spoken by N. Brady, F. Humphreys, C. Lee, P, Stenn, G, Pro.”

#### Violence Against Women - Australia Says No Advertisement 2 (women's long)

Image of white woman, with short dark hair wearing a pink long-sleeved shirt a in a few different poses / stills.

1<sup>st</sup> female voice: “My boyfriend hits me, then he says he loves me and reckons it’s all okay”.

White writing comes up with “No, it’s a crime” then screen blacks out and leaves just the writing.

Image of Asian woman, with long dark hair wearing a red shirt and dark jacket in a few different poses / stills.

2<sup>nd</sup> female voice: “I couldn’t believe it happen. I only had a drink and he thought he could have me. I said no but he wouldn’t stop”

White writing comes up with “That’s sexual assault” then screen blacks out and leaves just the writing.

Image of dark European looking woman with long dark hair in green top in a few different poses / stills.

3<sup>rd</sup> female voice: “I know my sister gets hit by her boyfriend. She won’t talk to me, our parents, nobody, but she should tell somebody”.

White writing comes up with “Yes, she should” then screen blacks out and leaves just the writing.

Image of white woman with long blond hair, glasses and white shirt with dark jumper over it in a few different poses / stills.

4<sup>th</sup> female voice: "He goes berserk sometimes and hits me and then he says it's my fault that he lashed out at me."

White writing comes up with "It's never your fault" then screen blacks out and leaves just the writing.

Image of white woman with short dark hair and dark long-sleeved top in a few different poses / stills.

5<sup>th</sup> female voice: "When you've been raped, you feel so alone, you don't know who to talk to and if there's any help".

White writing comes up with "Yes, there is" then screen blacks out and leaves just the writing.

Images of all first, second, fourth and fifth woman – one at a time while 6<sup>th</sup> female voice: "If assault and violence has happened to you, do seek help and support. You can start by talking to an experienced counsellor on this confidential helpline".

Image of "1800 200 526" in white with "Confidential Helpline" in green in a smaller font under it.

6<sup>th</sup> female voice: "1-800, 200, 5-2-6".

Image of campaign logo: "Violence Against Women" in white box with black writing and under it "Australia Says No in green box with black writing which split apart slightly. Underneath this is a white image of the Australian Government coat of arms.

6<sup>th</sup> female voice: "because to violence against women, Australia says no".

Image of black screen with white writing: top line (bold) - "Authorised by the Australia Government, Canberra". Second line: "Spoken by [bold]: J. Baird, B. Wilson, A Schober, S. Yardley, K. Scott, A. Hegh."

6<sup>th</sup> female voice: "Authorised by the Australia Government, Canberra".

#### Violence Against Women - Australia Says No Advertisement 3 (women's short)

Image of white woman, with long dark hair wearing a yellow long-sleeved shirt a in a few different poses / stills.

1<sup>st</sup> female voice: "He hit me and at first I kept quiet but finally I spoke to someone and they really helped me".

White writing comes up with "You did the right thing" then screen blacks out and leaves just the writing.

Image of white woman, with short dark hair wearing a grey t-shirt a in a few different poses / stills.



2<sup>nd</sup> female voice: "I was raped and I told the police. It was hard but I know I've done the right thing".

White writing comes up with "You should report it." then screen blacks out and leaves just the writing.

Image of woman possibly of European or light middle eastern descent, with shoulder length dark hair wearing a bright pink long-sleeved shirt in a few different poses / stills.

3<sup>rd</sup> female voice: "In the end I was scared for my safety and I knew I had to leave him"

White writing comes up with "There is help available" then screen blacks out and leaves just the writing.

Image of "1800 200 526" in white with "Confidential Helpline" in green in a smaller font under it.

4<sup>th</sup> female voice: "If assault or violence happens to you, do seek help and support. You can start by talking to an experienced counsellor on this confidential helpline. Call 1-800, 200, 5-2-6".

Image of campaign logo: "Violence Against Women" in white box with black writing and under it "Australia Says No in green box with black writing which split apart slightly. Underneath this is a white image of the Australian Government coat of arms.

4<sup>th</sup> female voice: "because to violence against women, Australia says no".

Image of black screen with white writing: top line (bold) - "Authorised by the Australia Government, Canberra". Second line: "Spoken by [bold]: M. Wonnacott, A Schober, L. Crawford, A. Hegh."

4<sup>th</sup> female voice: "Authorised by the Australia Government, Canberra."

#### Violence Against Women - Australia Says No Advertisement 4 (combined)

Image of Asian woman [2<sup>nd</sup> female from ad 2], with long dark hair wearing a red shirt and dark jacket in a few different poses / stills.

1<sup>st</sup> female voice: "I said no but he wouldn't stop".

White writing comes up with "That's sexual assault" then screen blacks out and leaves just the writing.

Image of man [4<sup>th</sup> male from men's ad] (a bit older), slightly darker than white European (could be Greek?) with dark hair in light blue shirt and dark jacket in a few different poses / stills.

1<sup>st</sup> male voice: "Oh you just lose control sometimes, it's only shoving and stuff. It's not like I'm one of those blokes who beats up on a woman."

White writing comes up with "Yes you are" then screen blacks out and leaves just the writing.

Image of "1800 200 526" in white with "Confidential Helpline" in green in a smaller font under it.

2<sup>nd</sup> female voice: "If you have a problem because you've experienced or been responsible for assault or violence you can call this helpline for help and support".

Image of "1800 200 526" in white with "24 hours, 7 days" in green in a smaller font under it.

2<sup>nd</sup> female voice: "Call 1-800, 200, 5-2-6 for a confidential discussion with an experienced counsellor."

Image of campaign logo: "Violence Against Women" in white box with black writing and under it "Australia Says No" in green box with black writing which split apart slightly. Underneath this is a white image of the Australian Government coat of arms.

2<sup>nd</sup> female voice: "to violence against women, Australia says no".

Image of black screen with white writing: top line (bold) - "Authorised by the Australia Government, Canberra". Second line: "Spoken by [bold]: B. Wilson, P. Stefanou, A. Hegh."

2<sup>nd</sup> female voice: "Authorised by the Australian Government, Canberra"

7.10 Violence Against Women – Australia Says No Brochure (OSW, 2004d)

Call the confidential 24 hour helpline

**1800 200 526**

to talk with experienced counsellors.

Emergency

**000**

Kids Help Line

**1800 551 800**

If you wish to talk to a counsellor and do not speak English well, call Translating and Interpreting Services **13 14 50** and ask them to contact the Helpline for you.

Callers who are deaf or have a hearing impairment may call through the National Relay Service on **13 36 77** and quote 1800 200 526.

To order an information booklet call 1300 76 46 56 or visit the website; [www.australiasaysno.gov.au](http://www.australiasaysno.gov.au)  
The information booklet is available in English, Cantonese, Mandarin, Italian, Greek, Arabic, Vietnamese, Spanish, Macedonian, Turkish, Polish, Croatian, Serbian, Russian, Korean and Farsi.

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

**AUSTRALIA SAYS NO**

Information for young people, parents and the community on identifying and avoiding abusive and violent relationships and where to find help.

Confidential Helpline  
**1800 200 526**



(Front and back)



## Breaking the cycle of violence

A violent relationship may not be violent all the time. Some of the time, violent people treat their partners very well. They can be very loving and sorry for their violent behaviour. It can make it hard to see what's really happening. There is a strong chance that the violence will get worse over time and the relationship more abusive.

After a violent incident, it's common for both the abusive partner and the victim to try and make it OK – make excuses, apologise, promise to change. But there is no excuse for this behaviour and just saying sorry is not good enough. Sometimes the violent person will blame the victim – “it wouldn't happen if you did what I said”.



People subject to violent abuse can begin to think that the violence is their fault. They might start to try to fit in with whatever their partner wants, even if it makes them uncomfortable. They might feel scared that their partner will hurt them if they try to leave.

But the first step in changing things is to understand what's been happening is wrong. Even if your boyfriend or partner says they care about you and you care about them, it's not OK to be treated like this.

## Talk to someone

Listen to your feelings and trust them – if something doesn't feel right, it probably isn't.



If you need advice or information there is a range of services and support available. And this can apply to both men and women. If you've either experienced or been responsible for assault or violence you should talk to someone who cares about you. It could be your Mum or Dad, a family member or friend, or call the Helpline for confidential help.

## When you call the Helpline

- Your call will be answered by a person, no answering machines, no recorded messages
- The person who answers your call will be an experienced counsellor, not the police, not a government department
- You will not have to give your name
- Anyone who is concerned can call this Helpline
- You can request a male or female counsellor
- After talking with you about your concerns, the counsellor may offer to put you in touch with another organisation that can provide ongoing help or support



(Inside)

# SAY NO TO VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT



## CALL THE CONFIDENTIAL HELPLINE.

### FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL HELPLINE

Anybody who has experienced or been responsible for assault or violence should call this Confidential Helpline.

**1800 200 526**



### FOR THE BOOKLET

Get this free booklet with information for young people, parents and the community to help identify and avoid violent and abusive relationships. Call 1300 76 46 56 or visit [www.australiasaysno.gov.au](http://www.australiasaysno.gov.au)

**VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN**

**AUSTRALIA SAYS NO**



AUTHORISED BY THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, CAPITAL HILL, CANBERRA

7.12 *Violence Against Women – Australia Says No Campaign Booklet* (OSW, 2004d)

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

AUSTRALIA SAYS NO

Information for young people, parents and the community on identifying and avoiding abusive and violent relationships and where to find help.



## Contents

About this booklet .....	3
No respect, no relationship .....	4
It's not okay .....	6
Breaking the cycle of violence .....	8
Talk to someone .....	10
When you call the Helpline .....	10
It's a crime.....	12
Communicate .....	14
Parents can help.....	16
What parents can do.....	18
How to get help.....	19



## Good relationships make a great community

The Australian Government believes that families are the backbone of a strong and healthy community, and loving supportive relationships are at the heart of happy, well functioning families. Families are the best places for children to learn about love and respect, and how to build and maintain healthy and caring relationships.

Relationships founded on fear and violence cannot sustain or nurture either partner or the family they might hope to raise. Tragically, when a young person's early relationship experiences include violence and sexual assault, the consequences can resonate beyond the immediate feelings of hurt and confusion.


These experiences can destroy an individual's sense of self-worth. Some come to accept violence as the norm, thinking they deserve no better. Violence can become a learnt behaviour, destroying people's capacity to form healthy relationships, now and in the next generation.

When parents talk to their children about what makes a good relationship it helps young people develop and clarify their own values. It can provide an opportunity for children to talk about things which might be worrying or confusing them.

This booklet is a resource for young people, parents, friends and the community at large. It provides information on how to identify and avoid violent and abusive situations, how to build and maintain healthy relationships and who to contact if you need protection or advice.

It is not the role of government to tell people how to live their lives – relationships are personal and private. But violence against women is unacceptable. It diminishes the lives of all those it affects and it tarnishes any community that tolerates it.

John Howard  
Prime Minister



## About this booklet

This booklet is part of a national campaign to Eliminate Violence Against Women. It aims to raise young people's awareness about the harm caused when personal relationships become violent. The booklet also provides information about who to contact for help and advice if you, or someone you know, is being abused.

The personal stories in this booklet are based on people's real life experiences. Events like this are happening in our community – in the home, in the workplace, in those places we relax and have fun. Places where we should feel safe. The people in the photographs used in this booklet are models.

The booklet complements the campaign appearing on television, radio and in magazines. It seeks to encourage families and friends to talk about relationships and provides information to help identify when people, especially young people, might be involved in violent, or potentially abusive, situations.

To ensure support is available for those experiencing violence, a 24-hour Confidential Helpline has been established. When you call the Helpline on 1800 200 526 you can have a confidential discussion with an experienced counsellor. Contact details can be found at the end of this booklet.

Funding for the campaign is provided under Partnerships Against Domestic Violence and the National Initiative to Combat Sexual Assault. It is part of the Australian Government's \$73.2 million commitment to address domestic and family violence and sexual assault in Australia.

The Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for the Status of Women, Senator the Hon Kay Patterson, is responsible for implementing these two key programmes, which are administered by the Australian Government's Office of the Status of Women.

The Australian Government thanks those organisations who kindly provided material for inclusion in this booklet.



## No respect No relationship

We look for relationships so that we can share part of our lives. In a good relationship the partners support each other, sharing the good times and helping each other through the tough ones.

When someone matters deeply to us, and those intense feelings of love and respect are returned, it enables us to face the world with confidence.

Things will not always go smoothly. Building and maintaining a healthy

relationship needs a commitment from both partners to work at it.

But it is worth it, because in a good relationship people feel good about their partner and good about themselves.

Not all relationships work that way, no matter how much we might want them to. When there is violence or intimidation the relationship can become very destructive and physically and emotionally dangerous.

While every person's experience of an abusive relationship will be different, there are some common patterns of controlling behaviour and abuse, which are often evident before the relationship becomes physically violent:

- |                  |   |
|------------------|---|
| Possessiveness   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>checking on their partner all the time to see where they are, what they're doing and who they're with</li><li>trying to restrict where they can go and who they can see</li></ul>   |
| Jealousy         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>accusing their partner of being unfaithful or flirting without good reason</li><li>isolating their partner from family and friends, often by rude and objectionable behaviour</li></ul>   |
| Put Downs        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>humiliating their partner, either publicly or privately by attacking their intelligence, their looks or capabilities</li><li>constantly comparing their partner unfavourably with others</li><li>blaming the partner for all the problems in the relationship</li></ul> |
| Menace & Threats | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>yelling, sulking and deliberately damaging things that are of importance to their partner</li><li>threatening to use violence against their partner, the partner's family, friends or even a pet</li></ul>  |



## It's not OK

It's not OK to be physically threatened or scared into things which make you uncomfortable or unhappy, just because you are in a relationship.

### Caroline's Story

*I was with my boyfriend Matt for a year and a half. At first, I thought he was 'the one' – we used to have such a great time when we went out together and he was always telling me how special I was. But then he changed. He'd get really paranoid and jealous and think I was cheating on him. He was always yelling at me. After a while it felt like I couldn't do anything right, he was angry with me all the time. One time after we'd been to a party we had a huge fight. He said I'd been coming on to one of his mates, and he slapped me hard across the face. After that, it got worse. Mum was really worried about me. I tried to make excuses for Matt but she said it was Matt who had the problem. My best friend told me the same thing. I talked to a counselor and she explained that if I was so special to him then he wouldn't hurt me. If he really cared about me, he wouldn't hit me. I have a new boyfriend now. He really respects me. Sure we argue sometimes. But we have a great relationship where we can both talk about things honestly. It feels good and I feel good.*



6

### Sharon and Dave's Story

*It all started a couple of months after our daughter Emma had started seeing Michael. We didn't like him because we thought that he was too possessive. She stopped seeing her friends so she could be with him, but he would still get jealous, and yell at her if she did something he didn't like. We found it difficult to talk to her about it – when we said something, she would say he only got jealous because he loved her. We didn't want to interfere, because we didn't want her to sneak around and see him without us knowing, but the whole relationship just didn't seem right. His behaviour was having an impact on the whole family. His angry moods got worse, and one day she came back from a weekend away with cuts and bruises. After that we called a relationship counselling line, and they really helped. They helped with ways to approach Emma and talk to her about Michael's abusive behaviour, and help her understand that she wasn't to blame for his actions. When Emma broke it off, we helped by taking his phone calls for her. Now things are back to normal – Emma feels good about herself and is doing really well at uni.*



It's not OK to be put down and pushed around – shoved, hit, slapped, kicked, punched. No one deserves to be treated this way. No one should use violence – or the threat of violence – to make you do what you don't want to do.

It's not OK for someone to use the excuse that they are tired, stressed, over worked or under financial pressure as a reason for their violent behaviour.

7



## Breaking the cycle of violence

A violent relationship may not be violent all the time. Some of the time, violent people treat their partners very well. They can be very loving and sorry for their violent behaviour. It can make it hard to see what's really happening. There is a strong chance that the violence will get worse over time and the relationship more abusive.

After a violent incident, it's common for both the abusive partner and the victim to try and make it OK – make excuses, apologise, promise to change. But there is no excuse for this behaviour and just saying sorry is not good enough. Sometimes the violent person will blame the victim – “it wouldn't happen if you did what I said”.

Things may settle down for a while – the abuser may feel guilty, the victim may try to go along with whatever they want. Usually it's only a matter of time before the build-up to violence starts again.

For someone who is experiencing violence in a relationship, things can feel very confusing, especially if this is their first relationship. They may try to make excuses, think of it as an isolated incident or something that only happened because their partner was drunk or stressed. They may not be sure what behaviour to expect from a partner.

People subject to violent abuse can begin to think that the violence is their fault. They might start to try to fit in with whatever their partner wants, even if it makes them uncomfortable. They might feel scared that their partner will hurt them if they try to leave.

6

### Sophie's Story

*I had a close friend in school called Rachel. We were quite good friends through school and uni, where she met Marcus. He was a popular guy but had a violent temper. It became pretty clear that he was knocking her around. The stories she'd make up to explain the bruises were pathetic. She was always making excuses for him. She was a really bright girl but when Marcus dumped her she just went to pieces. She dropped out of uni and ended up living with Ian. Ian was just like Marcus. Somehow she seemed to think she didn't deserve any better. It was impossible to see her without Ian being around and he was so rude. I guess I just gave up and we lost touch.*

*I heard from one of our other school friends that Ian just got more and more violent. But Rachel just couldn't bring herself to leave him – the last beating was so bad she ended up in hospital. I never had the courage to talk to her about Marcus or Ian's abusive behaviour. I sometimes wonder what would have happened if I had. Maybe I could have encouraged her to talk to the police or a counsellor about what was happening. Maybe I should have tried to make her understand that she wasn't the problem – that she didn't deserve to be treated like that, and most men are not like that.*



Breaking up any kind of relationship is hard to do, but it can be particularly hard to leave a violent boyfriend or partner.

When you are frightened and your self-esteem is low, it can be hard to find the strength to leave. It's sometimes easier to hope that things will change for the better. Too often they don't.

But the first step in changing things is

to understand what's been happening is wrong. Even if your boyfriend or partner says they care about you and you care about them, it's not OK to be treated like this.

9

## Talk to someone

Listen to your feelings and trust them – if something doesn't feel right, it probably isn't. Talk to someone who cares about you. Talk to your Mum or Dad, a family member, a friend, or someone in your community like your doctor, your teacher, your local religious leader, or call the campaign Helpline for confidential advice.

Find someone you trust and tell them about what's happening to you. Don't feel ashamed or embarrassed.

You are not responsible for somebody else's violent behaviour. Your first responsibility is to yourself – get safe and stay safe.

If you want to talk to someone about your relationship or you want help to get safe, the contact points provided in this booklet will help you find the right person to give you support.

## When you call the Helpline

- Your call will be answered by a person, no answering machines, no recorded messages.
- The person who answers your call will be an experienced counsellor, not the police, not a government department.
- You will not have to give your name.
- Anyone who is concerned can call this Helpline.
- You can request a male or female counsellor.

After talking with you about your concerns, the counsellor may offer to put you in touch with another organisation that can provide ongoing help or support.

## Josie's Story

*Like many counsellors, I work with people who are experiencing domestic and sexual abuse, or have experienced abuse in the past. They are just normal people, experiencing bad relationships. Often, people will seek help once things get physically violent. But there are warning signs – like intense jealousy, yelling, constant put-downs and threatening violence – that can indicate things are getting out of hand.*

*I help people build skills to maintain healthy relationships, where both parties can communicate well. If someone has been a victim of violence, I try hard to reinforce that they are not responsible for abusive behaviour – only the abusive person is.*

*When people come to see me I try to give them options – sometimes I help them explain what has happened to the police*

*or arrange counselling – but whatever steps are taken, it's always their choice.*

*We like to think that only a stranger would hurt us, but the saddest thing is that the majority of sexual assaults are perpetrated by someone the victim knew, somewhere they thought they would be safe – in their home, at a friend's place, at work, at the local club or pub.*

*So often the violence is hidden. Friends and family suspect something is wrong, but can't be sure. I think that if someone is experiencing violence or has been assaulted, the best thing they can do is talk to someone about it, someone they trust. My job is to help people find a way to talk about what is happening. And talk through the ways they can change that situation.*





## It's a crime

It can be hard to accept that someone you care about has deliberately hurt you. We're not just talking about hitting. Abuse can also include using force or fear to make you do things that you don't want to do.

Perhaps more than at any other time in our lives, it is during adolescence and the early adult years that we seek out new experiences which help us understand who we are and what we want.

Sometimes this can involve getting caught up in high-risk situations.

Forcing someone to have sex when they don't want to, or forcing them into having sex by making them think they will be harmed if they don't, is a serious criminal offence.

- The definitions and labels differ slightly – in some states this offence is called 'rape', in others it is called 'sexual assault', 'sexual intercourse without consent' or 'sexual penetration without consent'.
- 'Sexual assault' in everyday language is a general term, which includes rape, but also other offences such as indecent assault.
- Sexual assault does not necessarily involve violence, for example it can be touching a person in a sexual way without the person's consent.

Sexual assault and violence against women is a significant problem.

Surveys have highlighted two disturbing facts:

- Only twenty percent of sexual assaults on women are reported to police.
- Fifty-eight percent of sexual assaults are committed by someone known to the victim.

The figures quoted are taken from the Australian Bureau of Statistics - Crime and Safety survey - conducted in early 2002 reporting on experiences for the most recent incident over the preceding 12 months. This is the most recent, relevant survey.

## No means no



### Brett's Story

*The police say they are going to charge me with sexual assault.*

*I met Julia at a party – I really liked her. We started going out but she was pretty old-fashioned about sex and stuff. I guess I was a bit more experienced than her. She said she didn't want to go too far. It really bugged me that she got to make all the decisions. Sure she had said "no" that night when I finally went all the way. But I just thought if she was really my girlfriend*

*and really cared about me she could do what I wanted for a change. Afterwards, she was really upset and crying, but I thought she'd get over it. She told her parents and they went to the police.*

*I've tried to explain that I was pretty drunk, but the police say that's no excuse. My mum is taking me to see a counsellor for guys. But I am really scared about what's going to happen.*

Being someone's boyfriend doesn't give you the right to decide what they should do. And nothing gives you the right to use force.

## Communicate

Communication is key for all relationships. Surveys report that boys in particular are anxious about communication. Many feel that they need to "have a few drinks" before they are able to talk to girls. Sometimes they might need help to find more positive ways to handle shyness and the fear of rejection.

## Stay safe and play it safe

Sadly, most violence against women occurs within a relationship – that's why learning how to build healthy relationships is so important. But trouble can happen outside relationships – with strangers or people you don't know well.

We have all heard or read about horrible cases where young people find themselves in terrifying situations completely outside their control.

Think about the things you can do to keep safe and out of trouble.

Plan to go out and hang out in a group. Go with people you feel safe with and who you know have your best interests at heart.

Look out for yourself and your friends – good friends make sure that their friends are safe and make safe choices.

Without communication there can be no real relationship. If communication is poor or not valued, negotiating the boundaries of the relationship will be difficult, if not impossible.

Poor communication can lead to conflicting expectations, especially about sex. Sex without consent is sexual assault – there is no room for confusion.

Have some transport plans to make sure you can get there and back safely.

Let someone know (parents, brother/sister, housemate) where you are going, and when you'll be home. If your plans change let them know.

Alcohol and sex can be a dangerous mix. If you are not in control of yourself, you won't be able to control the situation.

Remember if you are so drunk that you don't know if the other person is consenting – stop. It could be rape. When you know that the other person is so drunk they may not be capable of giving consent – don't do it – because this would be rape.

Agreeing to one type of activity such as kissing doesn't mean there is a 'green light' for other sexual contact – remember it's OK to change your mind and say "no" at any stage.

You shouldn't stop being careful just because you know the person you're with – you may not know them as well as you think.

Don't be alone and isolated with someone you don't know well.

If you start to feel uncomfortable, go with your feelings, and get to a safe place as fast as you can.



### Kylie's Story

*I was lucky because my friends were there for me and looked after me. It wasn't like I didn't know him. He'd been at the pub before, we had talked a bit. He seemed an OK guy. He kept buying me drinks and I guess I was in a mood for partying, so I kept drinking them. Way too many, way too fast. He kept trying to get me to go outside. I didn't want to but we ended up in the car park.*

*I was frightened. I felt sick. I didn't want to be there. I didn't know how to get away.*

*Tanya and Jo had been keeping an eye on me. They were worried I'd had too much to drink. They noticed I wasn't inside and came looking for me.*

*They just told him I was drunk and they were taking me home. They got my bag and me into a taxi and took me home.*

*Good friends can make a big difference.*



## Parents can help

Talking about values and what is considered responsible, acceptable behaviour is an important part of building young people's understanding about relationships.

Most young people think relationships – going together – should be fun. As they grow into early adulthood they start to look to relationships to provide support, affection, closeness.

Early on, their peer group can play a very influential role in determining what is "fun". But parents too play an important role. Family behaviour and expectations provide an important model for young people experiencing their first relationships. These early experiences often set the pattern for future relationships so don't be frightened to talk to your children about relationships.

We all need to understand and encourage the importance of those fundamental values that are the foundation of healthy, strong relationships:

Respect  
Communication  
Sharing  
Independence  
Trust  
Companionship  
Honesty

16

The experiences of your own family and friends can be a useful starting point. Even television programmes can provide examples of different types of relationships and how people treat each other. What do your kids think about how the characters react? Would they react the same way? Be sure to give them plenty of room to tell you how they're feeling about things.

Try to encourage them to stay connected with their friends and engaged in activities outside what might be their first intense relationship. These networks will be an important source of support if there are problems.

Young people can be unaware of some of the negative consequences that might result from thoughtless sexual behaviour. Even when someone is legally old enough and gives consent, indiscriminate sexual activity can have serious consequences – the possibility of sexually transmitted diseases, pregnancy, loss of reputation, being talked about, embarrassment and anxiety.

Good relationships don't work without affection and respect.



### Jon's Story

*I have a pretty good relationship with my son Nick. Angle, his mum, and I - we're proud of him. He does well in school and sport and he is a popular kid with everybody. So it was a big shock to hear him talking on his mobile phone to his mates about some of the girls at school - everyone was getting labelled either a "slut" or "trigid".*

*I don't want Nick growing up to think that sex is just some kind of recreational activity he can boast about to his mates. I think he is too young for a steady relationship, but he should treat girls with respect. Nick needed to understand that his mum and I have expectations about his behaviour. We let him know that we thought he was out of line. I asked him to think about how he would feel if someone spoke about his sister like that - or tried to pressure or humiliate her into having sex. I explained that when a guy pressures a girl, verbally or physically, he spoils whatever trust, closeness or*

*respect there may have been. He needed to understand that he could get a reputation, maybe it will mean that in the future girls he really likes won't go out with him.*

*Angle's trying to make sure that she and Nick talk more. Help him understand how the girls might feel. Give him confidence to be himself, not have to play the "big man".*

*I started to wonder about some of the boys I coach for the school team. Was anyone talking to them about relationships and respect? I've started talking to some of the other coaches about making sure our boys understand what's acceptable behaviour and the sort of trouble they can get into if they don't approach sex and relationships sensibly. I know boys aren't the greatest listeners but at least we should try.*

17

## What parents can do

Parents, other family members and friends may notice significant changes in behaviour when someone is the victim of abuse.

### What to look for:

- Is she losing interest in activities she used to enjoy?
- Is she overly worried about what her boyfriend thinks?
- Is she mainly happy when she is with him or is she worried and anxious?
- Is she concerned that he may get angry about something either you or she may say or do?
- Is she making excuses for him all the time?
- Is she avoiding friends and social activities that don't involve him?
- Does she joke about his violent outbursts?
- Has she had unexplained injuries or do the explanations she gives seem odd or implausible?
- Has her behaviour changed dramatically since she started seeing him?

### What to do:

#### Encourage her to talk to you

You could use this booklet as a starting point for a chat. Try to do this when you're alone, not in front of her friends or other family members. Sometimes it can be easier if there is another focus of activity such as going for a drive together, making a meal or doing the dishes. Try to get her to do most of the talking. Ask open-ended questions like "How do you feel? What do your friends think about your relationship? What do you want to

do in the future - now and long-term?"

#### Listen to her - don't be judgemental

If she is in an abusive relationship she probably already feels very down about herself. Don't make her feel worse. Don't blame her for what is happening. Don't tell her what she should have done differently - concentrate on what makes her happy and how she can change things now.

#### Don't tell her what to do - encourage her to think about her options

She has to find her own way through the situation, but talking to you or a trusted person can help her resolve what she needs to do. Your aim is to help her become an independent, assertive person. That is the best protection you can give her and the best way of ensuring she does not become a victim of abuse again.

#### Make clear that she has your support

She may be feeling very isolated and alone. Let her know that you care about her and are concerned about her safety. You want her to be happy and will support her in any way that will help. Be specific about why you are concerned - "We feel bad when he says you're stupid. We hate to see you nervous and unhappy. What do you think when he does that?"

#### Help her work out some realistic strategies

What works here depends on how willing she is to see there is a problem and how abusive the relationship has become. The 24-hour helpline - 1800 200 526 - is there to help you, as well as her, figure out a good approach. Please use it.

18

## How to get help

Finding the right time and courage for you to talk about these issues is important.

Relationships are a key part of our lives.

The relationship experiences of young people can affect their whole lives because how people treat us affects how we feel about ourselves - not only now but into the future.

If you need advice or information there is a range of services and support available. You can call the 1800 200 526 Helpline or contact the organisations listed at the back of this booklet.

Don't be frightened to ask for help, especially if you or someone you know is in a violent relationship or has been sexually assaulted.

Relationships may not be easy but they should never hurt.



19







**CONFIDENTIAL HELPLINE**

**1800 200 526**


Authorised by the Australian Government, Capital Hill, Canberra, ACT.  
Written by Senator the Hon. Eric Abetz, Special Minister of State, Canberra.  
Printed by PMP Print, Canberra.

7.13 Violence Against Women – Australia Says No Indigenous Campaign Booklet



VIOLENCE AGAINST INDIGENOUS WOMEN

TIME TO SAY NO



Information for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander young people, families and the community on identifying and avoiding abusive and violent relationships and where to find help.



## Good relationships make a great community



Our families are the backbone of our community, so families that are based on healthy, happy relationships help to keep our community strong.

But when we bring violence into our homes, we are threatening to break that backbone, because relationships that are built on fear and violence destroy families.

When someone experiences violence or sexual assault, the hurt goes beyond just cuts and bruises. This behaviour damages the sufferer's sense of self-worth and self-respect. It also puts our future at risk.

When a child is constantly exposed to violence and sexual assault, they learn that this behaviour is normal and acceptable. Our children cannot maintain happy, healthy relationships unless we show them how it can be done.

We need to teach our children to love and respect each other and themselves. That way we can ensure that our future generations will be strong, happy and healthy.

### About this booklet

This booklet has been written as part of a national campaign to eliminate violence against women. Information in this booklet will help you to identify if you or someone you know may be involved in a potentially violent relationship.

It also contains information on who you can call for help and advice if you or someone you know is being abused.

The stories in this booklet are based on real-life experiences, but the names

have been changed. Take the time to read this booklet, and talk about it with your children, your parents and your community.

A confidential helpline has also been established to make sure that you have access to help and support 24 hours a day. If you call 1800 200 526, you can speak to an experienced counsellor who can offer you help and support.

## No respect No relationship

A healthy relationship involves two people who care about each other, who share good times and support each other through bad times.

Of course, things don't always run smoothly, but in a healthy relationship you should be able to talk things through. Maintaining a healthy relationship takes work and commitment.

When violence and abuse become part of a relationship, this can lead to physical and emotional damage.

There are many different kinds of abuse, but there are some common types of behaviour that are often noticeable before a relationship turns physically violent. These are:

### Possessiveness

- When your partner checks on you all the time, to see where you are, what you're doing or who you're with.
- When your partner tries to control where you go or who you see.

### Jealousy

- When your partner accuses you of cheating or flirting for no good reason.
- When your partner tries to isolate you from your friends or family by being rude or making trouble.



Award-winning writer,  
actor and director  
- Leah Purcell.

*"Violence against women isn't normal; it isn't our culture. People shouldn't have to live in fear. We need people that are in strong relationships to show that you can get through this - and get through it together, not alone."*

Leah Purcell - saying No to violence against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women.

### Put downs

- When your partner makes fun of you, in public or in private.
- When your partner blames you for all the problems in your relationship.

### Threats

- When your partner yells, sulks, or deliberately damages something that is important to you.
- When your partner threatens to hurt you, your family or friends.



## It's not OK

Just because you're in a relationship, it's not OK for someone to physically threaten you, or make you feel scared or unhappy.

It's not OK to be put down or pushed around. It's not OK to be hit, slapped, shoved, kicked or punched. No-one has the right to use violence, or to threaten the use of violence, to make you do something you don't want to do.

There is no excuse for violence. It's not OK for your partner to use the excuse that they are tired, stressed or worried about money as a reason to be violent.

## Carla's story

*I'd been going out with Matt for about a year and a half. We had such a great time together when we went out, and he was always telling me how special I was.*

*But then he started to change. He'd get all paranoid and jealous and think I was cheating on him for no reason. And he was always yelling at me. After a while it felt like I couldn't do anything right - he was mad at me all the time.*



*One time after we'd been to this party, we got into a huge fight. He said I'd been coming on to one of his mates, and he slapped me hard across the face.*

*After that, it just got worse. Mum was really worried about me. I tried to make excuses for Matt, but mum said that it was him who had the problem.*

*Eventually I got up the nerve to speak to a counsellor at the local Aboriginal Medical Service. She told me that if I was so special to Matt, then why would he want to hurt me? If he really cared about me, he would never hit me. She made a lot of sense.*



Award-winning actor - Aaron Pedersen.

*"I think you can clearly see the difference between a healthy and an unhealthy relationship. If it's unhealthy - get out."*


Aaron Pedersen - saying No to violence against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women.

## Breaking the cycle of violence

Breaking up any kind of relationship is hard, but it's particularly hard to leave a violent husband or boyfriend.

A violent relationship doesn't need to be violent all the time. It may only occur when your partner has been drinking, or when they are under stress. Often they will be very sorry after it has happened, and promise that it will never happen again. But there is a strong chance that it will happen again.

You may feel like you deserve to be treated this way, or that the violence is somehow your fault. It's not - it's never your fault.



2002 Doodly Awards Male Sportsperson of the Year and champion NRL footballer - David Peachey.

*"Violence can make people too afraid to talk up. You have to find the courage to say something. Stand up and say: This is enough."*

David Peachey - saying No to violence against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women.



## Daisy's story

*I'm 50 years old, and I've been married to my husband for 30 years. He can sometimes be a violent man, especially when he's been drinking, but for the past three years he's been in jail.*

*I didn't like to admit it, but while he was locked up I was glad. It was the first time since we've been married that I didn't have to live in fear.*

*Since he's been back, I've found it really hard to cope with the violence - I'd gotten used to feeling safe while he was gone. Now I don't know if I can handle it any more.*

*But I don't want to leave my community. I'm an elder here - I've got responsibilities. And my family are here, too.*

*One day I got talking to this woman who had been at a neighbouring community, where they'd set up a "safe house". It's somewhere the women and kids can be safe but not have to leave their community.*

*A lot of the men in the community don't like the violence, and I've got friends who're in the same situation as me. We've decided to talk about setting up a safe house at the next community council meeting.*



## Talk to someone

If you are experiencing violence, it is important to understand that you have no need to feel shame or embarrassment – it's not your fault.

Talk to someone that you trust about what is happening to you. It could be your family, a friend, or an elder. Or you can call the confidential helpline.



try to teach people that there are warning signs – like jealousy and yelling, or constant put-downs – that can indicate things might be getting out of hand.

A lot of people I counsel think that it's their fault, or that they deserved to be treated that way. I always explain that they are not responsible for violent behaviour, only the violent person is.

There are a lot of different ways that I can help people when they come to see me. Sometimes they just need to speak to someone who'll listen, but sometimes I can help them to talk to the police, or talk to their families about what has happened.

Violence is too often hidden from view. Maybe friends or family think something might be up, but they can't know for sure. The best thing that someone can do if they have been physically or sexually abused is to talk to someone about it – someone they trust.

My job is to help people to talk about what is happening. When they can talk about it, that's when they can change the situation they're in.

### WHEN YOU CALL THE HELPLINE:

- Your call will be answered by a person, not a recorded message.
- The person who answers your call will be an experienced counsellor – not the police or a Government department.
- You don't have to give your name.
- You can ask for a male or a female counsellor.
- The counsellor can put you in touch with other organisations that can help you.

### Barbara's story

*I'm a counsellor at my local Aboriginal Medical Service. I work with people who've experienced domestic or sexual abuse.*

*Most of the time, people only come to me for help once things have turned violent. But I*

## No means no

Sexual assault is against the law. It's more than just rape – sexual assault is any unwanted sexual behaviour that makes you feel uncomfortable, frightened or threatened.


Sexual assault can occur within a relationship. Just because someone is your boyfriend or partner, this does not give them the right to force you into having sex.

Forcing someone to have sex with you when they don't want to or forcing someone into having sex by threatening to hurt them if they don't is a serious crime.

### Davey's story

*One night my cuz JJ was having a party, and me and my mates hit the grog big time. One of his friends, Nicki, tried to get me to dance, but I don't really dance, so I asked if she'd come out the back with me.*

*I decided this was my chance to get some action. I pulled Nicki into a dark corner. She was giggling, and didn't seem to mind.*



*Miss Aboriginal Australia, 1996 – Delvene Parkin and Champion AFL Footballer Che Cockatoo-Collins.*

*"If someone's being abused, you've got to be there for them as if they were your own flesh and blood – which often they are. Help them to take that first step; make sure they know that they're not alone."*

**Delvene Parkin and Che Cockatoo-Collins**  
– saying No to violence against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women.

*That was until I tried to put my hand under her skirt. She started pulling away and telling me "no". She didn't really mean no; I knew it. She wouldn't have come around the back with me if she wasn't interested.*

*I pulled Nicki down onto the ground and had sex with her, even though she kept saying no and shaking her head the whole time.*

*When I finally let her go she was crying, so I took off. I didn't think it was a big deal; I hadn't smacked her around or anything. Anyway, I figured she wouldn't say anything about it because it'd be too big a shame job.*

*I got the biggest shock when police came around and told me Nicki said I'd raped her.*

*While I was in jail I heard that Nicki had gone off the rails. I felt pretty bad. I'd grown up with Nicki and now she's left town because she feels too shame to stay there.*



## Play it safe

Although most violence against women happens within a relationship, it can also happen with someone you don't know well.

Think about things you can do to keep yourself safe. If you're going out, go with a group of friends that you trust. Don't be alone with someone you don't know well.

If you start to feel uncomfortable, trust your feelings and get to a safe place.

Organise safe transport to get you there and back, and let someone know where you're going and when you'll be back.

Agreeing to one type of activity, such as kissing, doesn't mean that you have to agree to any other sexual contact. It's always okay to say no.



*"Join us in our fight to stop violence in our communities."*

Ambassadors standing together to say No to violence against women.

If you or anyone you know has experienced violence or sexual assault, report it. There's no reason to feel shame - call the confidential helpline on 1800 200 526.



## Tamara's story

*I'm originally from country Victoria, but when I turned 20 I moved to Brisbane for work. I'd been there a few weeks when I met this guy and we went on a date.*

*We had a few drinks over dinner, and afterwards we went back to his place for coffee. He seemed like a nice guy. I was pretty attracted to him, but I didn't want anything serious, 'cause I'd just come out of a long-term relationship. But when I tried to leave he got all mad, and said that I'd been leading him on.*

*He tried to grab me and push me down on the lounge, and he was putting his hands inside my clothes. I had to fight him off, and luckily I managed to get out of there.*

*I realise now that I put myself in a dangerous situation. I should never have been alone with him, because I really didn't know him that well. I guess I'm lucky that I managed to get away before anything really serious happened.*

*Now when I go out I always make sure I'm with people that I know and trust. It's just not worth taking the risk.*

## Families can help

Family behaviour plays an important role for young people who are experiencing their first relationships. The way a family treats each other can set the pattern of a child's behaviour in future life. So it's important for a family to treat each other with respect, trust and honesty.

Communication is essential - don't be frightened to talk to each other about relationships. But make sure you give young people plenty of room to tell you how they're feeling.

Encourage them to stay connected with their friends and family outside of what might be their first intense relationship. Friends and family make up a vital support network - one that can offer guidance and help if something goes wrong.

Young people can also be unaware of how dangerous thoughtless sexual behaviour can be. Careless sexual activity can have serious consequences - sexually transmitted disease, pregnancy, a bad reputation, embarrassment and anxiety.

## What families can do

You may notice significant changes in behaviour when someone is the victim of abuse.

### WHAT TO LOOK FOR:

- Is she losing interest in activities she used to enjoy?
- Is she overly worried about what her boyfriend thinks?
- Is she only happy when she is with him, or is she worried and anxious?
- Is she scared that he might get angry about something one of you says or does?
- Is she making excuses for him all the time?
- Is she avoiding her friends and social activities that don't involve him?
- Does she joke about his temper or violent outbursts?
- Has she got unexplained bruises or injuries, or does she give strange excuses for them?

### WHAT TO DO:

- Encourage her to talk to you.
- Listen to her - don't be judgmental
- Don't tell her what to do - encourage her to think about her options
- Make sure she understands that she has your support and that you're not angry with her
- Help her to work out the best way to deal with things

## How to get help

It can be hard to find the courage to talk about violence or sexual abuse. But you should never be frightened to ask for help, especially if you or someone you know is in a violent relationship or has been sexually assaulted.

If you need advice or information, there is a range of services and support available for you. You can call the confidential helpline on 1800 200 526, or you can contact one of the organisations that are listed at the back of this booklet.

**Remember:** Relationships may not be easy, but they should never hurt.

Call the Confidential 24-hour Helpline

**1800 200 526**

to talk to experienced counsellors.

- For emergency situations that require immediate and urgent assistance call 000
- Young people may prefer to call the 24-hour Kids Help Line on 1800 551 800
- Translating and Interpreting Service 13 14 50
- Callers who are deaf or have a hearing impairment can call through the National Relay Service on 1800 555 677 and quote 1800 200 526
- To order extra copies of this booklet call 1300 76 46 56 or visit the website [www.australiasysno.gov.au](http://www.australiasysno.gov.au)

### ■ State and Territory Crisis and Service numbers

#### ACT

Domestic Violence	6280 0900
Sexual Assault	6247 2525
Relationships Australia	1300 364 277
Mensline Australia	1300 78 99 78

#### SA

Domestic Violence	1800 800 098
Sexual Assault	1800 817 421
Relationships Australia	1300 364 277
Mensline Australia	1300 78 99 78

#### NSW

Domestic Violence (DoCS)	1800 656 463
Sexual Assault (Syd)	9819 6565
Sexual Assault (Rural)	1800 424 017
Relationships Australia	1300 364 277
Mensline Australia	1300 78 99 78

#### TAS

Domestic Violence	1800 633 937
Sexual Assault (Southern)	6231 1811
Sexual Assault (Northern)	6334 2740
Sexual Assault (Nth West)	6431 9711
Relationships Australia	1300 364 277
Mensline Australia	1300 78 99 78

#### NT

Domestic Violence	1800 019 116
Sexual Assault-Darwin	8922 7156
Sexual Assault-Alice Springs	8951 5880
Relationships Australia	1300 364 277
Mensline Australia	1300 78 99 78

#### VIC

Domestic Violence (Melb)	9373 0123
Domestic Violence (Rural)	1800 015 188
Sexual Assault	1800 806 292
Relationships Australia	1300 364 277
Mensline Australia	1300 78 99 78

#### QLD

Domestic Violence	1800 811 811
Sexual Assault	1800 010 120
Relationships Australia	1300 364 277
Mensline Australia	1300 78 99 78

#### WA

Domestic Violence	1800 007 339
Sexual Assault	1800 199 888
Relationships Australia	1300 364 277
Mensline Australia	1300 78 99 78



Across Australia there is a network of Aboriginal Medical Services that provide health and medical assistance to the community. Many also offer counselling services and support. These are listed below.

**ACT**

Ainslie  
02 6247 1841

**NSW**

Airds  
02 4628 4837

Armidale  
02 6771 1344

Bourke  
02 6872 3088

Broken Hill  
08 8088 5544

Caroona  
02 6747 4854

Condobolin  
02 6895 4311

Dubbo  
02 6884 8211

Grafton  
02 6843 2199

Kempsey  
02 6562 6733

Menindee  
08 8091 4237

Moree  
02 6752 1099

Mt Druitt  
02 9832 1356

Narooma  
02 4476 2155

Nowra  
02 4428 6566

Purfleet  
02 6551 7444

Redfern  
02 9319 5823

South Taree  
02 6552 2154

Wagga Wagga  
02 6921 7292

Walgett  
02 6826 1611

Wellington  
02 6845 3545

Wollongong  
02 4229 9495

**QLD**

Bamaga  
07 4069 3184

Burleigh Heads  
07 5520 6799

Cairns  
07 3812 3843

Charleville  
07 4654 3277

Cunnamulla  
07 4655 1231

Dalby  
07 4662 5684

Earlville  
07 4090 1000

Gladstone  
07 4975 7066

Innisfail  
07 4061 4477

Ipswich  
07 3812 3843

Mackay  
07 4951 2833

Mareeba  
07 4092 3428

Maroochydore  
07 5443 3599

Mount Isa - Children and Youth  
07 4749 2929

Normanton  
07 4745 1673

North Stradbroke  
07 3409 9596

Rockhampton  
07 4921 3080

Sarina  
07 4956 2509

Toowoomba  
07 4632 0338

Townsville  
07 4759 4000

West End  
07 3844 2283

Woolloongabba - Brisbane  
07 3393 0055

**NT**

Alice Springs  
08 8951 4400

Ayers Rock  
08 8956 2054

Darwin  
08 8936 1717

**Katherine**  
08 8971 1828

**Nhulunbuy**  
08 8987 1102

**Tennant Creek**  
08 8962 2633

### **VIC**

**Ballarat**  
03 5331 5344

**Bairnsdale**  
03 5152 5544

**Bendigo**  
03 5442 4047

**Dandenong**  
03 9794 5933

**Echuca**  
03 5482 3075

**Fitzroy**  
03 9419 3000

**Heywood**  
03 5527 2051

**Horsham**  
03 5382 5033

**Lake Tyers**  
03 5156 5554

**Mildura**  
03 5022 1852

**Moama**  
03 5869 3343

**Mooroopna**  
03 5825 2111

**North Geelong**  
03 5277 0044

**Orbost**  
03 5154 2133

**Robinvale**  
03 5026 4329

**Sale**  
03 5143 1644

**Wangoom**  
03 5567 1270

**Warrnambool**  
03 5561 5954

### **WA**

**Albany**  
08 9842 7777

**Broome**  
08 9193 6043

**Bunbury**  
08 9791 7666

**Derby**  
08 9193 1090

**East Perth**  
08 9421 3888

**Fitzroy Crossing**  
08 9193 0093

**Gnowangerup**  
08 9827 1488

**Halls Creek**  
08 9168 6266

**Jigalong**  
08 9175 7027

**Kalgoorlie**  
08 9091 3199

**Kununurra**  
08 9168 1288

**Midland**  
08 9421 3888

**Rangeway**  
08 9956 6555

**Roebourne**  
08 9182 1400

**South Guildford/Pilbara**  
08 9279 4308

**South Hedland**  
08 9140 2922

**Tjuntjuntjarra**  
08 9037 1102

**Wiluna**  
08 9981 7063

### **SA**

**Adelaide**  
08 8223 5217

**Ceduna/Koonibba**  
08 8625 3699

**Coober Pedy**  
08 8672 5255

**Point Pearce**  
08 8836 7274

**Port Augusta**  
08 8642 9929

**Port Lincoln**  
08 8683 0162

**Yalata/Ceduna**  
08 8625 6237

### **TAS**

**Cape Barren**  
03 6359 3588

**Cygnets**  
03 6295 0004

**East Devonport**  
03 6427 9037

**Flinders Island**  
03 6359 3532

**Hobart**  
03 6231 3527

**CONFIDENTIAL HELPLINE**

**1800 200 526**

Authorised by the Australian Government, Capital Hill, Canberra, ACT.  
Written by Senator the Hon. Eric Abetz, Special Minister of State, Canberra.  
Printed by PMP Print, Canberra.




© Commonwealth of Australia

7.14 Violence Against Women – Australia Says No Campaign Website (OSW, 2004d)


Violence Against Women - Australia Says


[Home](#)  
[Getting Help](#)  
[Campaign Resources](#)  
[Campaign Booklet](#)  
[View Online Booklet](#)  
[Order Online](#)  
[Download Booklet](#)


اللغة العربية Hrvatski  
中文(简体) العربية  
[View Language Options](#)


 Search the Lifeline database

---

 Welcome to the official website for the *Violence Against Women, Australia Says No* campaign that was launched June 6 2004.

 This site provides detailed information about the campaign as well as access to the campaign booklet titled "Violence Against Women, Australia Says No".

 This booklet is available in a number of formats and in 14 languages. You can also order a copy of the booklet by filling in an order form on this site.

 You'll also find easy reference to the campaign's confidential 24 hour helpline service, along with contact information for other referral services in your State and Territory.

[Copyright 2004 Office for Women](#)

<http://www.australiasaysno.gov.au/> 1/06/2005 6:29:39 AM



[Home](#)  
[Getting Help](#)  
[Campaign Resources](#)  
[Campaign Booklet](#)  
[View Online Booklet](#)  
[Order Online](#)  
[Download Booklet](#)

اللغة العربية Hrvatski  
中文(繁體) فارسي

[View Language Options](#)



Search the Lifeline  
database



Use this section to access the online version of the **Violence Against Women — Australia Says No** booklet.

The booklet aims to raise awareness about the harm caused when personal relationships become violent. It also provides information about who to contact for help and advice if you, or someone you know, is being abused.

The booklet contains stories based on people's real life experiences.

*Note:* the people in the photographs used in the booklet and throughout this site are models.

*Format:*

English: [View online](#) | [Download](#) | [Order](#)

Other Languages: [Download](#) | [Order](#)




[Home](#)  
[Getting Help](#)  
[State & Territory Crisis  
& Service Numbers](#)  
[Other language  
options](#)

[Campaign Resources](#)  
[Campaign Booklet](#)  
[View Online Booklet](#)  
[Order Online](#)  
[Download Booklet](#)

اللغة العربية Hrvatski  
中文 (繁體) فريسي

[View Language Options](#)

 [Search the Lifeline  
database](#)



Use this page for information and details on emergency and counselling services that are available nationally, including a Confidential Helpline, emergency contact details, information for young people and translation and interpretation services.

Information is also available on [services within your State or Territory](#) and in [other languages](#).

#### Confidential Helpline

Anyone experiencing violence can call the 24-hour Confidential Helpline on 1800 200 526. When you call the helpline you can have a confidential discussion with an experienced counsellor.

#### Emergency Situation

For emergency situations that require immediate and urgent assistance call 000.

#### Young People

For young people, the 24 hour Kids Help Line may be a preferred choice on 1800 551 800.

#### Translating and Interpreting Service

If you do not speak English well and you wish to talk with a counsellor, call the Translating and Interpreting Service 13 14 50 and ask them to contact the Helpline for you.



### Hearing Impaired

Callers who are deaf or have a hearing impairment may call through the National Relay Service on 1800 555 677 and quote 1800 200 526.

Copyright 2004 Office for Women

[Home](#)  
[Getting Help](#)  
[Campaign Resources](#)  
[Campaign Booklet](#)  
[View Online Booklet](#)  
[Order Online](#)  
[Download Booklet](#)

التفقة العربية Hrvatski  
中文 (繁體) فارسي

[View Language Options](#)



Search the Lifeline  
database



Use this page to access the *Violence Against Women — Australia Says No* campaign resources, which includes a curriculum resource, booklet, brochure and poster. The resources complement the campaign appearing on television, radio and in magazines.

See below for details on how to access these resources, including downloads, print options and details on how to order these resources.

#### Curriculum Resource

This resource aims to educate young Australians about how to maintain healthy relationships and avoid being exposed to abusive behaviour. At its centre is a compelling documentary about a young girl who was severely beaten by her boyfriend. The documentary is supported by lesson plans and teaching aids.

*Format:*

**English:** [Order](#)

#### Booklet


The booklet aims to raise awareness about the harm caused when personal relationships become violent. It also provides information about who to contact for help and advice if you, or someone you know, is being abused. The booklet contains stories based on people's real life experiences. Note: the people in the photographs used in the booklet and throughout this site are models.

*Format:*

**English:** [View online](#) | [Download \(English\)](#) | [Order](#)

**Other Languages:** [Download \(other languages\)](#) | [Order](#)

**TARGET AUDIENCE:** individuals, community organisations, support services



### Brochure

The brochure is a condensed version of the booklet content and includes information about who to contact for help and advice if you, or someone you know, is being abused.

*Format:*

[Download brochure \(PDF, 575kB\)](#) | [Order](#)

**TARGET AUDIENCE:** Individuals, community organisations, support services

### Poster

The poster advertises the Helpline and booklet availability and can be displayed in public places as an easy reference.

*Format:*

[Download poster \(PDF, 98kB\)](#) | [Order](#)

**TARGET AUDIENCE:** Individuals, community organisations, support services



You need the Adobe Acrobat Reader on your computer to open PDF files. You can download a free copy of the [Acrobat Reader](#) from the Adobe website.

Copyright 2004 Office for Women



Home  
Getting Help  
State & Territory Crisis  
& Service Numbers  
Other language  
options

Campaign Resources  
Campaign Booklet  
View Online Booklet  
Order Online  
Download Booklet

اللغة العربية Hrvatski  
中文 (繁體) العربية

View Language Options

Search the Lifeline  
database

If you wish to talk to a counsellor and do not speak English well, call Translating and Interpreting Services (TIS) 13 14 50 and ask them to contact the Helpline for you. In addition, this page provides contact details and instructions on how to order a copy of the booklet. The booklet is available in English and other languages.

**ARABIC:** إذا كنت ترغب بالتحدث مع مستشار وكنت لا تجيد الإنجليزية، اتصل بخدمة الترجمة الخطية والتفوية على الرقم 13 14 50 واطلب منهم أن يتصلوا لك بخط المساعدة (Helpline). للحصول على نسخة من الكتيب في اللغة العربية اتصل بـ 1300 76 46 56.

**CHINESE:** 如果您欲跟輔導員對話，但英語說得不好，可致電131450聯絡翻譯及傳譯服務，要求他們代您聯絡Helpline。欲索取中文小冊子，請電1300 76 46 56。

**CROATIAN:** Ako želite da govorite sa savjetnikom i imate teškoća sa engleskim jezikom, nazovite Prevodilačku službu (Translating and Interpreting Service) na 13 14 50 i zamolite ih da kontaktiraju Helpline za vas.

Za primjerak brošure na hrvatskom jeziku nazovite 1300 76 46 56.

**FARSI:** اگر میخواهید با یک مشاور صحبت کنید و نمی توانید به زبان انگلیسی خوب گفت و گو کنید، به خدمات ترجمه کتبی و شفاهی به شماره 13 14 50 زنگ بزنید و از آنها برای تماس با ما کمک بگیرید.  
برای دریافت نسخه فارسی کتابچه به شماره 1300 76 46 56 زنگ بزنید.

**GREEK:** Αν επιθυμείτε να μιλήσετε σε σύμβουλο και δε μιλάτε αγγλικά καλά, τηλεφωνήστε στη Υπηρεσία Μεταφραστών και Διερμηνέων [TIS] στο 13 14 50 και ζητήστε τους να σας συνδέσουν εκ μέρους σας με την Γραμμή Βοήθειας [Helpline].

Για να λάβετε πληροφοριακό φυλλάδιο στα ελληνικά τηλεφωνήστε στο 1300 76 46 56.

**ITALIAN:** Chi desidera parlare con un consigliere ma ha difficoltà a comunicare in inglese, può chiamare il Servizio traduzioni e interpreti al numero 13 14 50 e chiedere di potersi mettere in contatto con la Helpline. Per ricevere una copia dell'opuscolo in italiano rivolgersi al 1300 76 46 56.

**KOREAN:** 영어를 못하실 경우 상담자와 통화하려면 번역 및 통역 서비스 13 14 50으로 전화하여 도움을 요청하십시오.  
한국어 안내서를 원하시면 1300 76 46 56으로 전화하십시오.

**MACEDONIAN:** Ако сакате да разговарате со советник, а не зборувате добро англиски, јавете се на преведувачката служба на 13 14 50 и и побарајте да ве поврзат со Helpline.

За примерок на брошура на македонски јавете се на 1300 76 46 56.

**POLISH:** Jeżeli chcesz porozmawiać z doradcą, a nie mówisz dobrze po angielsku, zadzwoń do Służby Tłumaczy pod nr **13 14 50** i poproś o skontaktowanie cię z infolinią.

Aby otrzymać egzemplarz broszury w języku polskim, zadzwoń pod nr **1300 76 46 56**.

**RUSSIAN:** Если вы хотите поговорить с адвокатом, но не свободно владеете английским, то обратитесь за помощью в Службу письменного и устного перевода (Translating and Interpreting Service), позвонив по телефону **13 14 50**, и попросите их связаться со службой Helpline за вас.

Для получения экземпляра этого буклета на русском языке позвоните по номеру **1300 76 46 56**.

**SERBIAN:** Ако желите да razgovarate са саветником и имате потешкоћа са енглеским језиком, позовите Преводилачку службу (Translating and Interpreting Service) на **13 14 50** и замолите их да контактирају Helpline за вас.

За копију брошуре на српском језику позовите **1300 76 46 56**.

**SPANISH:** Si usted desea hablar con un asesor y no habla mucho inglés, llame al Servicio de Traducción e Interpretación al **13 14 50** y solicite que le pongan en contacto con la línea de ayuda.

Para obtener una copia del folleto en español, llame al **1300 76 46 56**.

**TURKISH:** Bir danışmanla görüşmek istemeniz ve İngilizceyi iyi konuşamamanız durumunda, **13 14 50** numaradan Yazılı ve Sözlü Tercümanlık Servisi'ni (Translating and Interpreting Service) arayıp, sizin için Helpline'a telefon etmelerini isteyiniz.

Kitapçığın Türkçe baskısını edinmek için **1300 76 46 56** numarayı arayınız.

**VIETNAMESE:** Nếu muốn nói chuyện với người hướng dẫn/cố vấn nhưng không nói thạo tiếng Anh, xin quý vị điện thoại cho Dịch Vụ Thông Phiên Dịch số **13 14 50**, rồi nhờ họ liên lạc với Đường Dây Điện Thoại Trợ Giúp giúp.

Muốn có tập sách hướng dẫn bằng tiếng Việt xin điện thoại số **1300 76 46 56**.



[Home](#)  
[Getting Help](#)  
[State & Territory Crisis & Service Numbers](#)  
[Other language options](#)

[Campaign Resources](#)  
[Campaign Booklet](#)  
[View Online Booklet](#)  
[Order Online](#)  
[Download Booklet](#)

اللغة العربية Hrvatski  
 中文 (繁體) فارسي

[View Language Options](#)



[Search the Lifeline database](#)

Use this page for specific contact details on services available in each State and Territory within Australia.

**ACT**

Domestic Violence 6280 0900  
 Sexual Assault 6247 2525  
 Relationships Australia 6281 3600  
 Mensline Australia 1300 78 99 78

**NSW**

Domestic Violence (DoCS) 1800 656 463  
 Sexual Assault (Syd) 9819 6565  
 Sexual Assault (Rural) 1800 424 017  
 Relationships Australia 9425 4999  
 Mensline Australia 1300 78 99 78

**Northern Territory**

Domestic Violence 1800 019 116  
 Sexual Assault (Darwin) 8922 7156  
 Sexual Assault (Alice Springs) 8951 5880  
 Relationships Australia 8981 6676  
 Mensline Australia 1300 78 99 78

**Queensland**

Domestic Violence 1800 811 811  
 Sexual Assault 1800 010 120  
 Relationships Australia 3217 2900  
 Mensline Australia 1300 78 99 78

**South Australia**

Domestic Violence 1800 800 098  
 Sexual Assault 1800 817 421  
 Relationships Australia 8223 4566  
 Mensline Australia 1300 78 99 78

**Tasmania**

Domestic Violence 1800 633 937  
 Sexual Assault (Southern) 6231 1811  
 Sexual Assault (Northern) 6334 2740  
 Sexual Assault (Nth West) 6431 9711  
 Relationships Australia 6211 4050  
 Mensline Australia 1300 78 99 78

**Victoria**

Domestic Violence (Melb) 9373 0123  
 Domestic Violence (Rural) 1800 015 188  
 Sexual Assault 1800 806 292  
 Relationships Australia 9835 7570  
 Mensline Australia 1300 78 99 78



## **Chapter 8 Appendices - The Howard Government's Approaches to Male Violence Against Women: Key findings from stage one**

---

8.1 Table Comparing the *No Respect, No Relationship* and *Violence Against Women – Australia Says No* campaigns.

**8.1 Table Comparing the *No Respect, No Relationship and Violence Against Women – Australia Says No* campaigns.**

Below is a comparative table that summarises some of the key elements of *No Respect, No Relationship and Violence Against Women – Australia Says No*. This table is based on a summary of both stages of the study.

<b><i>No Respect</i></b>	<b><i>Australia Says No</i></b>
Evidence based on developmental research and <i>PADV</i> and <i>NICSA</i> research.	Not based on research.
Type of violence identified as the problem – relationship violence and sexual assault including a range of physical, sexual and psychological forms of violence (i.e. a broad definition of violence that is not necessarily criminal but generally accepted as violence in govt publications).	Type of violence identified as the problem – physical violence and sexual assault (i.e. contact violence that are criminal offences).
Focus on primary and secondary prevention i.e. focus on preventing violence before it occurs and targeting high risk groups (eg Indigenous, homeless, already victimised young people). Some aspects of tertiary intervention included there.	Tertiary intervention / prevention i.e. focus on what to do after violence has occurred.
Location of individual within a social context. Individual held responsible for the violence but located within the social context supporting their actions. Importance of socio-cultural understandings of violence in <i>PADV</i> .	Focus on individual as the cause / site of the problem. Use of pathologising language and representation of perpetrators as 'different – i.e. bad, mad or angry'.
Use of gendered concepts (eg definitions, structure of the campaign, dynamics of violence) around violence but not necessarily gendered language.	Use of gendered language but not a gendered approach with gendered definitions and understandings.
Some collaboration with the sector however this did tend to be more often a relationship of explaining what was coming. (Could be useful to have greater sectoral involvement especially from the NGO sectors).	No sectoral or non-federal govt involvement.

Communication strategy main component of campaign with media strategy to support and reinforce the communication strategy.	Media component main part of campaign with minimal communication strategy (but only school based resource).
Communication strategy focused on a range of ways of engaging young people through popular culture and their own peer groups.	Communication strategy focused on didactic learning through school environment.
Inclusive of a range of relationships (eg same sex).	Explicit inclusion of only heterosexual relationships.
Different groups of young people targeted through different components and activities in the campaign.	Young people targeted as a homogenous group.
Explained what healthy relationships looked like and skills for engaging in them. Gave the benefits of respectful relationships for both parties – i.e. continuing the relationship, happiness.	Explained what violent behaviour looked like and told victims to leave. Did not deal with either the negatives of violent behaviour in relationships (i.e. why you wouldn't be violent) or what is in it for the perpetrator to not use violence.
Esther Fallon: "for young people, by young people, about young people" (Cannane, 2004).	By the govt for the Australian population to show what they are doing about violence.
Action promoted: conduct healthy, respectful relationships, develop skills to conduct these respectful and healthy relationships (eg how you talk to each other), don't engage in violent behaviour.	Action promoted: call a helpline after violence has occurred.
Violent behaviour in relationships is unacceptable and criminal.	Mixed messages: violence in relationships is criminal however is also a 'problem' for which the perpetrator and victim both need help to solve.
Focus on engaging young people and their peers.	Focus on engaging young people's families.

**RARE BOOKS LIB.**

- 5 MAR 2000

UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY LIBRARY



0000000613775920