Transnational advocacy networks in campaigning: The campaign against child sex trafficking in the Mekong Subregion

Deanna Davy

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

2012
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This is to certify that:

I. this thesis comprises only my original work towards the Doctor of Philosophy.
II. due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used.
III. the thesis does not exceed the word length for this degree.
IV. no part of this work has been used for the award of another degree.
V. this thesis meets the University of Sydney's Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) requirements for the conduct of research.

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Name(s):  Deanna Davy ........................................................................................................

Date:  26th April 2012 ...........................................................................................................

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this research to my family and friends.

I credit those I have worked with in NGOs for encouraging my passion for international development.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would never have been able to complete this research without the support and friendship of my supervisor, Dr Ruth Phillips, who kept me motivated and inspired over the many months of research and writing.

I want to acknowledge the dozens of individuals in Australia, Thailand and Cambodia who gave their time generously while I was performing this research. In taking the time to tell me their stories and explain the intricacies of their organisations I was able to learn a great deal about child trafficking in Southeast Asia and the efforts of individuals and their organisations in combating this global problem. I was inspired by their commitment to improving systems for children and reducing poverty, exploitation and vulnerability.

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ABSTRACT

The rapidly expanding market in enslaved children bought and sold for sex is one of the worst transnational crimes that appear to have been facilitated by globalisation and its many effects, such as growing disparity in wealth between North and South. Child sex trafficking has become one of the most highly publicised social issues of our time and, due to its global nature, transnational anti-trafficking advocacy networks are well placed and central to lead campaigns against it. Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) in the GMS have been integrally involved in the formation of child sex trafficking policy agendas through their involvement in transnational networks and transnational campaigns and in working with governments and the private sector. Cosmopolitan anti-trafficking advocacy in these countries has led to significant progress in the Mekong Subregion by bringing the child trafficking issue onto the global social policy agenda, resulting in new child protection legislation and improved inter-agency collaboration in the region.

This PhD research focuses on the politics, processes and effectiveness of transnational anti-trafficking advocacy networks in Thailand and Cambodia. Central questions in this study are addressed. For example, how and why do anti-trafficking advocacy networks evolve? What is the ‘glue’ that binds network partners and sustains network connections over time? How do networks measure the perceived ‘effectiveness’ of the networks’ advocacy on the problem of child trafficking in the Southeast Asia region? How does North-South collaboration, and contention, and other aspects of network politics contribute to TAN effectiveness?

Research into this area is important for improving our understanding of the internal processes, mechanisms and politics and TANs, and the sustainability and effectiveness of anti-trafficking advocacy networks in combating transnational crime and promoting social justice. This research addresses the above questions through an analysis of the politics and typologies of transnational anti child trafficking advocacy networks operating in Thailand and Cambodia. Using a cosmopolitan framework the research analyses data from twenty-two semi-structured interviews with experts from anti-trafficking advocacy networks in the GMS.
List of abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMMIT</td>
<td>Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative on Trafficking</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of the Child</td>
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<td>CST</td>
<td>Child Sex Tourism</td>
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<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council</td>
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<td>ECPAT</td>
<td>End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography and Trafficking of Children for Sexual Purposes</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>GAATW</td>
<td>Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women</td>
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<td>GMS</td>
<td>Greater Mekong Subregion</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>IJM</td>
<td>International Justice Mission</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organisation</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Government Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPE</td>
<td>International Political Economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>JUNIMA</td>
<td>Joint UN Initiative on Mobility and HIV/AIDS</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAN</td>
<td>Transnational Advocacy Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRAFCORD</td>
<td>Anti-Trafficking Coordination Unit in Northern Thailand</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN GIFT</td>
<td>United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Trafficking</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNIAP</td>
<td>United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRISD</td>
<td>United Nations Research Institute for Social Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>US TIP</td>
<td>United States Trafficking in Persons Report</td>
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Chapter 1.

Introduction: Transnational advocacy networks against child trafficking

“It takes a network to combat a network” (Gary Lewis, UNODC, human trafficking seminar, Bangkok 2 April 2010).

1.1 Introduction

The accelerating pace of globalisation and international integration has significantly altered the context in which international interactions take place (Shawki, 2010, p. 381). One of the major manifestations of this process has been the rise of international organisations (IOs) and of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) forming transnational advocacy networks (TANs) to combat social inequality, global injustice, and transnational crime. These trends have resulted in major changes in the ways TANs and other civil society groups operate and have given rise to new forms of transnational activism (Shawki, 2010, p. 381). One of these novel forms of activism are the campaigns launched by TANs (Shawki, 2010, p. 381). This research examines the effectiveness of TANs against child sex trafficking in the Mekong Subregion, which have formed in the last two decades to combat child exploitation, child trafficking, and child sex tourism and promote cosmopolitan social justice values. This research examines the effectiveness of these advocacy networks through an intricate discussion of their politics, processes, the challenges and opportunities to network coordination, and internal and external enablers and barriers. Central to the research is a discussion of the power politics between Northern and Southern TAN members. While TANs have been lauded as transnational agents of change (Keck and Sikkink, 1999) they are at times flawed by the imbalance in resources and wealth between Northern and Southern partners and it is this balance of power and resources between and amongst network members that may contribute to TAN effectiveness, or ineffectiveness. Cosmopolitan
theory is used to explain the motivations of TANs with a focus on the Northern members of TANs, as these Northern TAN partners represented the majority of organisations observed, and staff interviewed, for this research. The research discusses the cosmopolitanism of Northern and Southern TAN members and how, if Southern cosmopolitanism is to be successful, TANs must strengthen the capacity of their Southern counterparts. Measuring the ‘effectiveness’ or ‘success’ of TANs becomes complex when considering the internal dynamics and power politics of TAN members – it is this effectiveness that the research sets out to address through an examination of the highlights, challenges, and negotiations of power, resources and voice that TANs against child sex trafficking in the GMS constantly experience.

Transnational issues and actors in the current era of globalisation are increasingly significant. Many of the most pressing collective action problems cannot be resolved by individual states or organisations acting alone, and the world is awash with actors whose interests and capacities span national borders (Florini, 2000, p. 15). For Keck and Sikkink (1998) transnational networks operate as ‘advocacy networks’, producing a common discourse on particular contentious issues. TANs in today's society consist of partnerships between NGOs from both North and South, UN agencies, and, to a lesser extent, government partners. These networks often have a number of partners spanning the globe, a structure including a secretariat to coordinate partners, and common values that have brought the network partners together for a specific purpose. What these networks achieve is a new form of political space beyond the state that transcends state boundaries and defies the traditional notion that development actors are bounded by local or national scales (Morvaridi, 2005, p. 135).

I initially became interested in the issue of child sex trafficking whilst employed for a non-government organisation (NGO) in Australia that campaigned internationally on this issue. In 2010 I was awarded an Endeavour Research Fellowship to spend six months in Thailand and Cambodia to study anti-trafficking advocacy networks for this research. I was hosted by
an international NGO that operated with a number of other organisations in the region on anti-trafficking campaigns and related child protection activities. This international NGO was also a partner in TANs. The Endeavour Fellowship enabled me to travel throughout Southeast Asia to meet with anti-trafficking experts in advocacy networks and gain insights into the internal politics, highlights and challenges of agency collaboration against child sex trafficking in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). In addition to learning about advocacy network activities I also gained an insight into the extent of child sex trafficking in this region and the complex ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors that exacerbate the problem.

In recent decades an abundance of literature on the issue of governments’, NGOs’ and intergovernmental organisations’ responses to the problem of child trafficking for sexual exploitation has appeared. Due to its all-encompassing nature and the fact that it is perceived, at once, as a human rights issue, a feminist issue, a poverty issue, a government policy issue, a legal issue, and a criminology issue the problem of child sex trafficking has attracted interest from a diverse range of groups – feminists, governments, non-government organisations, child protection experts, United Nations (UN) organisations, and academics, amongst others. The emerging research area of transnational advocacy networking has generated important studies within several different scholarly disciplines including globalisation studies, migration studies, human rights studies and poverty studies (Keck and Sikkink, 1999; Scholte, 2000; Tarrow, 2005; Piper, 2005; Caouette, 2006). International relations scholars, opposing the state-centred paradigm of an anarchical international political system, have analysed non-state actors in international politics (Williams, 1994; Piper, 2005). Other scholars have made use of social movement theory and focused explicitly on transnational activism (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Key researchers in the field, Keck and Sikkink (1998) conducted innovative research on transnational networks, which was followed by others (Sikkink 1999; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002). While there persist conflicting definitions and inconsistent estimates of the nature and scope of child trafficking, a wide range of researchers and academics acknowledge that the illegal trafficking of children is a growing social phenomenon greatly in need of continued research (Bales, 1999; Anderson and O’Connell Davidson, 2002; Farr, 2005). NGOs have, in particular,
contributed to the literature on child trafficking by defining the problem, and citing frequent though often conflicting statistics on the number of children trafficked. However, despite recent research and scholarship on human trafficking, debate over the universal causes of child trafficking still persists. An emerging trend among NGOs and the UN and in current academic literature is that child trafficking is not just a criminal justice problem, but a migration issue caused by globalisation (Banjeree, 2003; Brown, 2007). In other words, children migrate illegally and clandestinely because poverty in the current political economy forces them to do so. It is this risky migration that leads children to situations of increased vulnerability and trafficking. An effective response to child trafficking therefore requires a multi-level, multi-sector effort that challenges the complex political, economic and social systems that create or exacerbate poverty and lead individuals, including children, to migrate clandestinely in search for employment opportunities abroad.

In this research the role of NGOs as key actors in the global political economy is central and accepted. Their centrality is supported by cosmopolitan theory, which highlights the role of advocacy organisations such as NGOs and the UN in the fight against child sex trafficking in the current global political economy. Keck and Sikkink argue that social scientists have barely addressed the political role of activist NGOs as simultaneously domestic and international actors (1999, p. 92). There is, however, an abundance of literature on NGOs and advocacy networks in specific countries (Fruhling, 1991; Scherer-Warren, 1993). According to Korten (1990) much of the existing literature on NGOs comes from development studies, and either ignores interactions with other groups and states or spends little time on political analysis. Furthermore, the literature on TANs does not take any account of the important issue of power within networks (Henry et al, 2004, p. 7). Examining advocacy networks helps both to distinguish NGOs and UN agencies from, and to see their connections with, social movements, state agencies, and other international organisations (IOs) (Keck and Sikkink, 1999, p. 92). It helps to understand how, within an increasingly internationalised and globalised world, a fluid, cosmopolitan, but rooted layer of advocates that uses domestic resources, expertise and opportunities to advance the collective goals of the people it claims to represent is developing (Tarrow, 2005, p. 34).
Examining network politics is also a powerful means of assessing the considerable tensions created within the networks, as well as measuring the perceived ‘effectiveness’ of their collective advocacy. Dominique Caouette suggests that what is particularly challenging for scholars is to develop an informed understanding of this modality of activism in relation to the broad range of initiatives and endeavours for social change (2006, p. 1). This is especially true for international NGOs, in particular Northern NGOs, which find themselves increasingly involved in supporting this type of work in addition to locally-based community organisations and nationwide NGOs (Caouette, 2006, p. 1).

In the GMS advocacy networks have been forming since the 1990s to combat child trafficking for sexual exploitation. Child trafficking occurs in all Southeast Asian countries. In a region where the demand for young brides, adoptive infants, sex with children, images of child pornography, and cheap labour is strong, children may be trafficked at source or during migration, either en route or after reaching their destination. Origin, transit and destination countries for child trafficking exist throughout the Southeast Asia region with some countries characterised as origin, transit, or destination, and others encompassing all three (UNICEF, 2009, p. 19). Internal trafficking, from rural to urban centres and from small towns to big cities, is also a considerable dynamic although far less researched than cross-border trafficking. The regional picture that emerges from the available literature is one in which children experience serious physical, psychological, emotional and social consequences as a result of being trafficked (Dottridge, 2004; Rafferty, 2007; ILO, 2008; UNICEF, 2009; World Vision, 2009). Children also often encounter re-victimisation by the justice system as well as stigma within their communities when reintegrated and are at risk of falling back into exploitative situations (UNICEF, 2009).

 Trafficking in persons has reached significant dimensions worldwide and has become a multibillion-dollar per year business. The illegal trafficking phenomenon is not new, however the global sophistication and complexity of trafficking networks is new, as well as an increasing number of women and children who are trafficked each year (Farr, 2005).
Although statistics are limited and contested, existing data indicate that the number of trafficked individuals has increased while their ages have declined (Gupta, 2010). In ‘State of the World Population 2006’, the UN Population Fund estimated that the highest source areas in the world for the supply of human beings for trafficking purposes were South and Southeast Asia (UNFPA, 2006, p. 30). Victims from these regions can be found worldwide and the majority are women and girls (Gupta, 2010, p. 69). The global and public policy response to human trafficking has been profound. As Wong (2004) suggests, “from a poorly funded NGO women’s issue in the early 1980s, human trafficking has entered the global agenda of high politics, eliciting in recent years significant legislative and other action from the US Congress, the EU and the UN”. While End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography and Trafficking of Children for Sexual Purposes (ECPAT) (2006) reports that, to date, “there is no clear strategy to deal with the demand for sex with children”, it is the cosmopolitan activism of transnational anti-trafficking advocacy networks that has influenced the promotion of child trafficking as an important issue for public and international policy concerns.

Scholars of human trafficking agree that “little can be achieved without dialogue and cooperation between regional and international bodies, governments and NGOs” (Cameron and Newman, 2008, p. 13). Magis suggests that, with the exception of a few, the world’s many thousands of NGO groups, when acting in isolation, have no power in the international system (2009, p. 319). In addition to their insignificant size and voice, the groups can be narrowly focused on specific policy areas and highly ideological, both of which limit their comprehension of larger and related issues and diminish the capacity for the negotiations so critical in political environments (Magis, 2009, p. 319). Through collaboration, the groups acquire the ability to influence international decision making above and beyond their weak formal status and they can use the power of the collaborative to avoid cooptation (Magis, 2009, p. 319). Diani and McAdam suggest that the ‘network’ concept has become extremely popular in the social sciences in recent times as its many senses, its flexibility and its very ambiguity enable researchers to deal with phenomena of change, which are difficult to contain within the boundaries of nation states (2003, p. 4). The study of networks also enables scholars to study individual actors within networks.
In recent years, social scientists have paid increasing attention to advocacy efforts by non-profit organisations in different scales: Local, regional or national, and transnational (Acosta, 2011, p. 180). Existing literature documents the advantages of network formation and also the challenging nature of collaborative networks (Onyx et al, 2009, p. 101). As highlighted by Onyx et al, it is through collaborative relationships that knowledge and other strategically important resources are accessed and created (2009, p. 101). The goal of networking is to build a ‘collaborative advantage’ in which multiple organisations together achieve something that individual organisations could not achieve alone (Huxham, 2003, p. 30).

Theorists continue to struggle over how to define networks. The main difficulty in the research on advocacy networks, as with other subjects, is a clear definition of what these networks actually are (Acosta, 2011, p. 161). Acosta suggests that networks are “the voluntary allegiance of many organisations or informal groups in the light of a particular issue-area to be advocated for is a truly liquid form” (2011, p. 161). Scholarly work on advocacy networks emphasises the importance of studying networks’ internal organisation and structures in order to assess their effectiveness at overcoming social problems (Keck and Sikkink, 1999; Hertel, 2006). Researchers have frequently looked for tensions or opposing explanations, and used them in their theories (Eisenhardt, 2000). Many theories about organisations do not adequately explain the complexity of the realities in them (Morgan, 1986). Only a small number of studies have investigated the organisational structure, programs, advocacy activities and outcomes of advocacy organisations and networks. This is also the case with the study of networks against child sex trafficking, despite the fact that advocacy networks have been instrumental in advocating for state and regional policy on trafficking, creating measurements for progress and conducting research. Consequently, stakeholder organisations have limited information on how such networks are structured, how they operate, their internal politics, how they are effective, or what they can accomplish to ameliorate the issue of child sex trafficking. There exists a significant gap in knowledge and in academic literature on the role of TANs in responding to the issue of child trafficking in the current era of globalisation. In recent years some scholars (Keck
and Sikkink, 1998; Tarrow, 2005) have discussed the effects of transnational advocacy in relation to advances in human rights, but no studies have been done specifically on the role of TANs as a force for combating child sex trafficking. Nor have there been any studies on the power relationships among the NGO and UN members in TANs against child trafficking or the obstacles to networks’ effectiveness. While there are new studies in Southeast Asia, there is still a lack of enthusiasm to study activism in this region due to the seeming stasis in the political environment. Furthermore, there is limited published literature on the concept of partnership from a Southern perspective (Brehm, 2001, p. 17). In fact the overwhelming view of the concept in the published Southern writing on the topic is one of deep scepticism in relation to the use of the word itself, the motives of Northern NGOs and agencies who adopt it, and of the possibilities of meaningful North-South partnership (Brehm, 2001, p. 17). Research into these areas is extremely important for both improving the understanding of TANs in the current era of globalisation and the understanding of how networks organise their advocacy and balance their internal relationships. Research into these areas is also important for understanding how TANs can provide an effective cosmopolitan response to child sex trafficking in today’s global political economy.

This research highlights a number of advocacy network structures. A typology of anti-trafficking advocacy networks has been developed in this research to demonstrate the different types and structures of anti-trafficking advocacy networks in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). Network types are important for this research because they illustrate how network models play an important role in network politics and network sustainability. Network types are also important for analysing the networks’ internal processes and mechanisms, and the factors that contribute to or limit their effectiveness. Scholarly attention on network ‘effectiveness’ has tended to focus on measuring ‘impact’ over internal network dynamics. Limited scholarly attention is given to how the types of networks determine internal relationships and issues of power and voice, and how conflict can be caused by an imbalance of these factors. Network scholars have developed theories about network campaign tactics including the ‘boomerang theory’ (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) and ‘blocking’ and ‘backdoor moves’ (Hertel, 2006). However, these theories were not
useful for explaining the network types studied for this research. Addressing the question of network types provides insight into the internal dynamics of networks and how these internal dynamics can affect external network campaign outcomes.

Guided by literature on anti-human trafficking advocacy networks and drawing on in-depth interviews with twenty-two anti-trafficking experts from NGOs and UN agencies in Thailand and Cambodia, this research opens the ‘black box’ of TANs to examine their internal politics. Whilst the bulk of research on TANs in the past has focused on their campaign strategies or framing processes, this research focuses on the internal dynamics and processes of TANs against child sex trafficking and draws links between these internal politics and their effectiveness. In particular the research addresses the question of the effectiveness of TANs against child sex trafficking through an examination of: 1) the diversity of types of anti-human trafficking networks, and their motivations; 2) TAN politics and examples of positive and negative cooperation within networks; and 3) the perceived ‘effectiveness’ of network partners at working collaboratively against child trafficking and achieving network goals. Three key propositions underlie the arguments developed in this research. First, that a complex mixture of value and material interests influences how stakeholders behave in advocacy networks. Second, a conceptualisation of networks as fluid entities requires a typology in order to make sense of, and evaluate their internal dynamics and campaign processes. Third, external network ‘effectiveness’ measurement needs to be questioned due to the lack of monitoring and evaluation activities conducted of anti-trafficking campaigns.

Advancing the study of TANs as well as other types of non-state actors requires a move beyond the principles/interests dichotomy and entails an inquiry into the internal dynamics of participant NGOs, UN agencies, and states. Leaders, boards, staff, aid recipients and other interested individuals continuously interpret and shape networks’ mandates as well as the interests and goals of TANs. They navigate difficult political environments and
diminishing funding and experience not only internal collaboration but also contention on their path to success – it is these internal politics and dynamics that this research discusses.

This research takes into account the range of different anti-trafficking players, however, the focus is on three key stakeholder groups: International and domestic NGOs, international organisations (UN agencies) and governments. In order to make it impossible to identify the research participants in this study, all of them have been given simple pseudonyms based on the word ‘Organisation’ beginning with Organisation 1 through to Organisation 16. In other words, the term ‘Organisation’ when capitalised and with a corresponding number refers to an NGO, an international agency or a network and is a simple pseudonym to protect the identity of the interviewed participants.

However, in the research there is an important difference between ‘organisations’ and ‘networks’. While organisations (NGOs from North and/or South, UN agencies, and, less commonly, government agencies) may be partners in TANs, they are also recognised in the research as distinct actors with their own specificities. In the research ‘networks’ refer to groups or partnerships of organisations operating in TANs – NGOs and UN agencies. Some ‘networks’ observed for the research were established networks that operated only as partnerships with a number of members. Other ‘networks’ were ad hoc partnerships and the NGOs and UN agencies within them operated as separate entities. The ‘organisations’ observed for this research were frequently partners in one or more ‘networks’. Differentiation is made in the research between these two terms to highlight instances when the key respondents were referring to their own ‘organisation’ (NGO or UN agency) or referring to the ‘network’ (partnerships between UN agencies and NGOs from North and South).

The major focus of this research is on the politics of NGOs as NGOs are the most prominent players in anti-trafficking advocacy networks. By evaluating network emergence and NGO
influence through collaboration, this research will make a number of contributions to the literature on TANs. First, this study contributes to the understanding of the important role of NGOs within advocacy networks. Second, it contributes to the theoretical knowledge base on the internal dynamics and politics of advocacy networks that function to combat social problems. Third, it contributes to the knowledge base on advocacy networks through the development of a new typology of advocacy networks against child trafficking. Fourth, it contributes to the body of knowledge on network effectiveness by analysing the research participants’ conceptualisations of ‘success’ and ‘effectiveness’. Finally, it contributes to the literature on the important role of advocacy networks as upholders and promoters of cosmopolitan values, and as a significant force against transnational crime in the current era of globalisation. The research considers anti-trafficking networks’ ‘effectiveness’ in light of a number of ‘key elements’ identified by the research participants:

Key Element 1. Advocacy networks against child sex trafficking should target their campaigns at potential youth victims, states and the wider public (awareness raising). Campaigns should also address the ‘demand’ side of human trafficking.

Key Element 2. Partners need to share common anti-trafficking values and goals.

Key Element 3. Anti-trafficking networks should include not just NGOs but also UN agencies and government departments.

Key Element 4. Anti-trafficking networks should endeavour to balance the ‘voice’ of Northern and Southern partners.

Key Element 5. Organisations should form networks with other organisations that have complementary skills, and not organisations doing exactly the same anti-trafficking advocacy activities.

Key Element 6. Networks should have strong structures and a secretariat

Key Element 7. Networks should seek to continuously improve themselves through monitoring and evaluation of their activities.
For this research a perspective is adopted that recognises the relationship between contemporary globalisation, inequality and trafficking. This perspective is in line with that of Devetak and Higgott (1999) and their argument that globalisation inhibits liberty and justice for many people. For this research advocacy networks are understood as key players in the cosmopolitan response to contemporary globalisation, inequality and trafficking. TANs act as buffers against trafficking by promoting cosmopolitan values and global child rights, encouraging and facilitating inter-agency collaboration, and transforming global institutions into democratic structures. Kurasawa defines cosmopolitanism as “a transnational mode of practice whereby actors construct bonds of mutual commitment and reciprocity across borders through public discourse and socio-political struggle” (2004, p. 234). Cosmopolitan theory is a useful theoretical framework for this research as it provides an important conceptual standpoint for analysing issues of poverty and wealth and for posing a profound set of theoretical and policy challenges. Cosmopolitan theory remains a compelling political philosophy and approach to global challenges (Held, 2009, p. 535). It contradicts the claim that poverty and inequality are largely home-grown problems that can be solved through the application of judicious domestic policy measures, and it rejects the notion that justice is found primarily in economic relations between states (Kapstein, 2004, p. 80). According to cosmopolitans, there is nothing morally special about political boundaries, and our obligation to redistribute wealth to those overseas is as strong as to those who share our citizenship (Cabrera, 2005, p. 171). From a normative vantage-point, cosmopolitanism represents a universal ideal countering the moral dubiousness of restricted or discrete notions of a community of reciprocal rights and obligations (Kurasawa, 2004, p. 236). Cosmopolitan theory forces us to ask whether the international arrangements we have shaped actually help or hinder the life-chances of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable citizens (Kapstein, 2004, p. 81). It is also a useful framework for supporting the view that there is no reason why some groups or individuals should be worse off because of the place in which they were born or currently reside and that, overall, the global economy as it currently operates is extremely unjust (Kapstein, 2004, p. 81). Cosmopolitan theory demonstrates that there is an alternative to hegemonic, neoliberal, top-down globalisation, and that is counter-hegemonic solidarity or bottom-up globalisation (De Sousa Santos, 2006, p. 398). Bottom-up globalisation is being performed by TANs, which seek to establish a more
just global order. They achieve this predominantly through their espousal of a commitment to humanity as a whole, facilitated by building consensus on values that demonstrate a commitment beyond the nation (Carey, 2003, p. 1). TANs have emerged as prime movers on a broad range of global issues, framing agendas, mobilising constituencies toward targeted results, and monitoring compliance (Carey, 2003, p. 1). They are increasing solidarity among individuals and organisations of the world through their cross-border connections, linking people across societies and cultures, and empowering a cosmopolitan civil society. They can be conceptualised as providing a nascent layer of moral governance seeking to monitor and promote issues on the international agenda (Carey, 2003, p. 7). TANs have a key role to play in building cosmopolitan systems and promoting social justice values given their inherently cosmopolitan credentials.

This research recognises the limitations of the theoretical framework adopted for this study – cosmopolitan theory. Such limitations include the absence of Southern scholarship in cosmopolitan and globalisation theory, and the ‘failure’ of cosmopolitan theory to be a grounded and measurable entity (Skrbis et al, 2004). Connell has pointed to the dearth of inclusion of academic perspectives from Southern scholars in globalisation theory and this is a flaw that should also be highlighted in this research (2007, p. 379). Connell writes that, on the issue of the exclusion of the perspective of the South in sociology and globalisation theory, that “not Gandhi, not Fanon, in fact no one with a black face, no women, and no one from outside Europe” is present (2007, p. 379). In any discussion of globalisation and global patterns of human movement through migration and trafficking, social inequality and poverty, the perspective of those from the South should be included to provide an alternate perspective to the one provided by Northern academics. However, a Southern perspective on globalisation and cosmopolitanism is distinctly lacking in academic journals. In addition cosmopolitanism has been criticised as being a Western and elitist conception. To balance these limitations, I have endeavoured, where possible, to include the perspective of Southern scholars on globalisation’s associated issues of migration, poverty and inequality. I have also provided a discussion of globalisation in Thailand and Cambodia in Chapter 3, a discussion of the cosmopolitan motivations and activities of TANs in Chapter 3, and
reflection on North-South collaboration and contention throughout the thesis. A discussion of third world cosmopolitanism and subaltern cosmopolitan is also provided in Chapter 2 of the research to explain the different motivations of locals and Westerners operating in TANs and draw links between the campaign motivations of North and South. Cosmopolitanism is a fitting framework for this research as it explains not only the motivations and values of TAN members, but also the reasons for their transnational activity, building of a cosmopolitan civil society, and the internal dynamics and transnational collaboration that make them effective. As the majority of interview respondents were Westerners operating in global TANs, cosmopolitan theory is useful for explaining the personal motivations of these aid workers as well as the motivations of the organisations and networks they worked in.

1.2 Clarification of terms

This research was originally intended to focus on the collaboration of NGOs against child sex trafficking in the GMS. However, in the early days of the research it became clear that a large number of network interactions in this region actually involve different groups – not just NGOs but also international organisations (IOs) such as the various UN agencies, and at times government offices and agencies. In this section of the chapter the definitions of these organisations and related terms will be explained.

Advocacy network

‘Advocacy networks’ refer to groups of UN agencies, international and domestic NGOs, and government agencies participating in networks against child trafficking. Keck and Sikkink describe TANs as “actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services” (1999, p.89).

Campaigns

This research adopts Carpenter’ definition of ‘campaigns’: “Campaigns involve concerted efforts by multiple organisations lobbying for a specific outcome around a specific issue” (2007, p. 5).
Globalisation

This project adopts George and Wilding’s definition of ‘globalisation’: “The increasing interconnectedness of the world through the compression of time and space brought about by advances in knowledge and technology as well as by political events and discussions” (2002, p. 19).

NGOs

‘NGOs’, a primary focus of this study, are defined as “private, voluntary, non-profit groups whose primary aim is to influence publicly some form of social change” (Khagram et al, 2002, p. 6). For the purpose of this study and clarity of focus on the roles of NGOs in relation to the UN and states, distinction is made only between domestic (or grassroots) and international NGOs (INGOs) that are concerned with campaigning and also with service delivery.

Trafficking

‘Trafficking’ in this research is in line with the definition provided by the UN 2000 Palermo Protocol:

a) ‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.

b) The consent of the victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in the subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in the subparagraph (a) have been used;
c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered “trafficking in persons” even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in the subparagraph (a) of this article;

d) ‘Child’ shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.

1.3 Organisation of the research

This research will discuss the effectiveness of TANs against child sex trafficking in the Mekong Subregion through a discussion of their politics, values, processes, and internal and external enablers and barriers. Chapters Two to Four are the literature chapters, however, some fieldwork is weaved into the first few chapters to demonstrate the links between the empirical data and the theory provided in the earlier chapters. In Chapter Two I first review the literature on contemporary globalisation and the global political economy. In this chapter I introduce the theoretical framework for the study – cosmopolitan theory. In Chapter Two I also discuss the complex relationship between globalisation, poverty and human trafficking, the commercialisation of humans in the global political economy, and the impact of globalisation on the migration patterns of children and adults in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). Chapter two also includes a macro-level discussion of globalisation in Thailand and Cambodia specifically.

In Chapter Three I examine the literature on advocacy networks. In this chapter I establish why TANs against child sex trafficking have emerged, and what it is that they do and hope to achieve through their transnational networking efforts. In Chapter Three I discuss the meaning of ‘transnational advocacy networks’, the politics of TANs and the complex interplay between TAN members: NGOs and UN agencies, and NGOs and states, as well as other key and peripheral players; concepts of ‘norm building’ in advocacy networks, and issues of network formation and structure. In Chapter Three I also discuss TANs in Southeast Asia, and debates on network ‘effectiveness’ and accountability in networks.
In Chapter Four I examine the literature on the issue of child sex trafficking in Southeast Asia. I discuss the extent of child trafficking in the GMS and provide historical overviews of child trafficking in the two countries of study for this research – Thailand and Cambodia. I discuss, in Chapter Four, the universal causes for child trafficking in the GMS region from both the supply and demand sides of trafficking.

In Chapter Five I discuss the chosen methodologies for the research. This chapter includes a discussion of the country case selection, qualitative research, primary and secondary sources, research questions and objectives. Further, I explain the research process and data collection methods and provide a profile of the organisations and networks studied for the research, as well as discussing the limitations of the interview sample.

Chapters Six and Seven present the findings from the twenty-two semi-structured interviews with anti-trafficking experts in the GMS. These chapters present the empirical material regarding TAN politics and their effectiveness. In Chapter Six I explain the framing for data analysis, network structures and strategies, network evolution, the ‘glue’ of advocacy networks, and network political issues such as legitimacy, power and voice. I explain the development of a typology of advocacy networks as a means of discussing network processes, dynamics and network sustainability. I also discuss the positive and negative instances of advocacy networking against child trafficking. In Chapter Seven I examine the central research question regarding network ‘success’ and ‘effectiveness’ through an examination of the Key Elements of effectiveness that were identified by interview participants.

The final chapter, Chapter Eight, provides a summary of the findings from the interviews and concludes the thesis. After presenting the data results, in Chapter Eight I conclude with a discussion of how these results add to our knowledge of the contemporary anti-child trafficking movement and extend our knowledge on the politics and effectiveness of TANs.
Chapter Eight also examines avenues for future research on advocacy networks and on child trafficking, and discusses advocacy networks’ important realisation of a cosmopolitan ‘globalisation from below’ to counter significant global social problems.
“Is globalisation only for the powerful? Does it offer nothing to the men, women and children who are ravaged by the violence of poverty?” - Former South African President Nelson Mandela, 1999.

“The greatest obstacles to the realisation of the basic rights of children are not so much backwardness, ignorance, exploitative parents, superstition as, more and more, either directly or indirectly, the consequences of an increasingly integrated global economy” (Seabrook, 1998, p. 38).

2.1 Introduction

Human trafficking is not a new phenomenon, nor is the mobilisation of individuals, organisations and networks against human trafficking and slavery. Human trafficking, in particular the trafficking of children for sexual labour, is one of the most offensive and pervasive modern manifestations of global capitalism. The Economist has stated that of “all the alleged sins of globalisation, child labour has been among the most scorned” (2004, p. 73). Far from the promise of progress for victims of globalisation, this new internationalised marketplace has resuscitated the horrors of the past such as slavery, human trafficking, and child labour, among the most vulnerable and defenceless members of society (Lal Panjabi, 2008, p. 422). Human trafficking for sexual exploitation has been directly influenced by the harmful inequalities spread by the process of economic globalisation: The deepening of rural poverty, increased economic disenfranchisement of the poor, the net extraction of
wealth and resources from poor economies into richer ones, and the broad-based erosion of real human freedoms across the developing world (Kara, 2010, p. 4). The rise of globalisation has been accompanied by fierce debate of whether it comes at the cost of growing global inequality. Globalisation is increasingly linked to inequality but with often divergent and polarised results (Mills, 2008, p. 1). Research findings show that there are clear winners and losers in contemporary globalisation (Mills, 2008, p. 1). Some scholars maintain that globalisation has disintegrated national borders and prompted economic integration, lifting millions out of poverty and closing the dollar gap (Dollar and Kraay, 2002). Many others argue that globalisation is a negative force, bringing poverty to millions especially those already disadvantaged (Falk, 1999; Sassen, 2001; Giddens, 2002).

This chapter will discuss the economic marginalisation of poor women and children in Southeast Asia in the current global political economy and draw links between poverty and human trafficking. The chapter will first examine contemporary theorisations of the global political economy and examine globalisation as a macro and micro level reality rather than just a concept. Second, the chapter will examine the manifestations of contemporary globalisation including international migration and the rise of poverty in certain regions of the world with a focus on the Southeast Asia region. The personal experiences of poor Thais and Cambodians are inevitably linked to macro happenings in their society therefore it is important to examine the economic, political and cultural exchanges in the region in recent decades. Third, the chapter will link the negative effects of globalisation to the micro level reality of millions of poor families around the world who are compelled to sell the labour of their children in order to survive in the current global economy. This examination of globalisation and the global political economy sets the theoretical framework for this study as will be demonstrated through the lens of cosmopolitanism. Whilst the literature for this chapter stems primarily from global political economy theory, cosmopolitan theory is adopted to discuss the proliferation of TANs and the social justice response warranted to combat the transnational problems of poverty, inequality and trafficking.
2.2 Theorising contemporary globalisation and the modern global political economy

‘Globalisation’ has become the most over used and under specified term in the international social sciences since the end of the Cold War (Devetak and Higgott, 1999, p. 483). Various scholars have attempted to define what ‘globalisation’ is (Keller-Herzog, 1997; Devetak and Higgot, 1999; Held, 2002; Dobson, 2005). Held provides a useful summary of what he considers globalisation to consist of:

First, it (globalisation) involves a stretching of social, political and economic activities across political frontiers, regions and continents ... Second, globalisation is marked by the growing magnitude of networks and flows of trade, investment, finance, culture and so on. Third, globalisation can be linked to a speeding up of global interactions and processes, as the evolution of world-wide systems of transport and communication increases the velocity of the diffusion of ideas, goods, information, capital and people ... The boundaries between domestic matters and global affairs become fuzzy. In short, globalisation can be thought of as the widening, intensifying, speeding up and growing impact of world-wide interconnectedness (2002, pp 59 – 78).

Dobson (2005) argues that there are weaknesses in Held’s definition and suggests that Held’s definition promotes globalisation as an asymmetrical process in which not only its fruits are divided up unequally, but also the very possibility of ‘being global’ is unbalanced. Dobson suggests that Held’s metaphor of ‘stretching’ fails to capture the way in which the social, political and economic activities to which he refers cross boundaries in one direction only with the South being significantly disadvantaged (2005, p. 262). This is in line with Shiva’s (1998) perspective on the North-South divide in contemporary globalisation. Shiva argues that the notion of ‘global’ facilitates a skewed view of a common future (1998, p. 233). The construction of the global environment narrows the South’s options while
increasing the North’s (Shiva, 1998, p. 233). Through its global reach, the North exists in the South, but the South exists only within itself, since it has no global reach, thus the South can only exist locally, while the North exists globally (Shiva, 1998, p. 233).

Recent theories on globalisation tend to stress the weakening of the state in global practices (Ngan-ling Chow, 2003, p. 450; Martell, 2007, p. 174 ;). Within this perspective nation-states have lost power, influence and even sovereignty because they either choose to or have to adapt their state policies to fit the needs of mobile capital, which has subsequent consequences for the viability of social democracy and the welfare state as these are curtailed to fit the demands of business interests (Martell, 2007, p. 174). Economically, politically, and culturally globalists see transnational, global forces taking over from nations as the main sources in considerations of the economy, sovereignty and identity (Martell, 2007, p. 174). Not all scholars, however, are of the ‘hyperglobalist thesis’ that views the nation-state as having a diminishing role in regulating its economy and even its sovereignty as globalisation progresses (George and Wilding, 2002; Ngan-ling Chow, 2003, p. 450). Lindio-McGovern, for example, negates this theory by recognising how nation-states as autonomous entities play a key role in regulating global labour markets and remain accountable to social movements targeting the state’s responsibility for intervening and protecting the labour and human rights of workers (2003, p. 513 – 520). George and Wilding agree that there has been a degree of hollowing out of the state with power being moved upwards to supra national bodies, sideways to functional bodies and downwards through decentralisation (2002, p. 24). George and Wilding argue, however, that the nation-state remains much more than the shell suggested by the ‘hollowing out’ metaphor and while the state has lost a measure of autonomy and sovereignty, politics still matters a great deal and the state remains the most powerful entity (2002, p. 24).

Since a substantial portion of the world’s population is largely excluded from the benefits of globalisation, it is a deeply divisive, and consequently, vigorously contested process (Held, 2002, p. 1). The unevenness of globalisation ensures it is far from a universal process
experienced uniformly across the entire planet (Held, 2002, p. 1). Over the past several decades the world has been characterised by debt problems and under these conditions developing countries are forced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) to face a currency devaluation and reduction of fiscal deficits by the reduction of government spending on public health and education. These consequences are most profoundly felt at the micro or household level wherein families lose control and no longer exist beyond a purely survival basis. Human rights, the reasonable demands for personal security and basic well-being that all individuals can make on the rest of humanity by virtue of their being members of the species Homo sapiens, are in increased jeopardy in this era of globalisation (Harrison, 2008, p. 19). Small, poor countries are increasingly dominated by imposed economic controls that make a mockery of their rights to self-determination (Harrison, 2008, p. 19). For about two decades, the neoliberal regime, in which developed nations aid poorer nations on the condition that they restructure their economies and political systems to accommodate maximum wealth accumulation by multinational corporations, has arrived packaged as so-called ‘free trade’. This phenomenon, Harrison argues, is more than an idea or ideology (2008, p. 19). It is an “approach to the world, which includes in its purview not only economics but also politics, not only the public but also the private, not only what kinds of institutions we should have but also what kinds of subjects we should be” (Steele, 1990). Marshall (2001) suggests that market integration has generated substantial economic growth on a global scale, resulting in more jobs, improved livelihoods and an overall reduction in poverty. At the same time, by bringing larger benefits to individuals and countries already possessing physical and human capital, globalisation has accentuated disparities within and between countries (Marshall, 2001). Among the effects of this are increases in urbanisation and cross-border migration.

The impact of change in the global political economy is experienced differently and much more harshly within the South (O’Brien and Williams, 2007, p. 400). Contemporary globalisation evokes much anger and anxiety in the South and tends to be experienced as yet another round of Northern hegemony, another round of concentration of power and wealth (Nederveen Pieterse, 2000, p. 132). Contemporary globalisation is multidimensional,
non-territorial, polycentric, and the lines of inclusion/exclusion are blurred and run between the middle classes and the poor North and South (Nederveen Pieterse, 2000, p. 132). Modern globalisation is a major cause of poverty in developing countries, and it is this poverty that can lead to vulnerability, dangerous migration and human trafficking.

The consequences of poverty manifest themselves not only in the form of early mortality, disease and malnutrition and the threat of social breakdown but also in the forms of child labour, displacement and forced migration, and prostitution (Ukpere and Slabbert, 2009, p. 40). The rate of global poverty has increased owing to global inequality and that increases in income inequality and poverty in the poorest developing countries over the past decades can be attributed to globalisation (Ukpere and Slabbert, 2009, p. 43). The UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) supports this claim in its comment that “the incidence of poverty has increased in the past few years not because the world, as a whole, is getting poorer, but because the benefits of growth have been unevenly spread. There has been a striking increase in inequality” (2000, p. 11). However, if globalisation has created economic and social inequality it is disputable whether or not a renewed effort to contain or control global markets will have any effect on global inequality or income redistribution (UNDP, 2000). Economic growth cannot be accelerated enough to overcome the handicap of too much income directed to the rich. Income does not trickle down; it just circulates among elite groups (UNDP, 2000, p. 43).

2.3 Globalisation in Southeast Asia

Advocates of the success of globalisation point to the large decline in poverty in China, India and Indonesia, (countries long characterised by massive rural poverty) in the recent decades of international economic integration (Bardhan, 2006, p. 1394). Globalisation advocates such as Chen and Ravallion (2004) have estimated that during 1981 – 2001 the percentage of rural people living below an international poverty line of $1.08 a day (at 1993 purchasing power parity) declined from about 79% to 27% in China, from about 63% to 42% in India, and 55% to 11% in Indonesia. However, contrary to repeated assertions in the international
financial press, no one has yet convincingly demonstrated that this decline is mainly due to
globalisation (Bardhan, 2006, p. 1394). In China, it could instead be, to a large extent, due to
internal factors such as expansion of infrastructure or the massive 1978 land reforms or
policy changes relating to grain procurement prices or the relaxation of restrictions on rural-
to-urban migration (Bardhan, 2006, p. 1394). Those who are more dubious of global
processes point out that in the same decades poverty has remained stubbornly high in Sub
Saharan Africa (Bardhan, 2006, p. 1394).

Southeast Asia has been promoted as an example of how rapid economic development can
reduce income inequality and absolute poverty (Pangestu, 2001, p. 9). Recent decades have
witnessed rapid economic growth in the Southeast Asia region, brought about largely by
trade and tourism. Geopolitical changes in the region’s borderlands and border economy
have resulted in efforts to strengthen formal inter-state economic and infrastructural
connectivity. This rapid growth has, however, led to increased socio-economic disparity in
the Southeast Asia region.

If global economic integration, domestic economic deregulation, and rapid advances in
technology are the three great pillars of modern globalisation then Southeast Asia can
certainly be said to have manifested them in its post-war economic history (Coclanis and
Doshi, 2000, p. 61). The post-war decades of rapid material advance led to an ever-
deepening integration of Southeast Asia into the global economy (Coclanis and Doshi, 2000,
p. 61). Modern, internally oriented economic growth was established in Southeast Asia in
the context of an open, multilateral trading system based on the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade – the linchpin of the new international economic order (Coclanis and
Doshi, 2000, p. 56). Since the 1960s one of the great changes of modern history began with
the rapid growth of several Asian economies – a large component of Southeast Asia has
grown faster on average than any other part of the world over the past three decades
(Coclanis and Doshi, 2000, p. 56). In Thailand, for example, in the three decades up to 1995,
per capita income grew at approximately five per cent (Coclanis and Doshi, 2000, p. 56).
Southeast Asia has become a particularly important destination for foreign direct investment, attracting considerable sums from outside the region, which have enhanced its export performance and contributed to its long-term growth potential (Coclanis and Doshi, 2000, p. 59). Furthermore, globalisation has led to a push for ever-greater transparency in the government and corporate sectors in Southeast Asia (Coclanis and Doshi, 2000, p. 61).

However, since the mid 1980s these trends have gone into reverse (Pangestu, 2001, p. 9). The causal processes through which international economic integration, through globalisation, can affect poverty primarily involve the poor in their capacity as workers, as consumers, and as recipients of public services or users of common property resources (Bardhan, 2006, p. 1394). The self-employed workers in Asia face considerable constraints in conditions of work, including credit, marketing and insurance, infrastructure, and government regulations (Bardhan, 2006, p. 1395). These often require substantive domestic policy and governance changes (Bardhan, 2006, p. 1395). Trade liberalisation, even when increasing the mean incomes of the Asian poor, may heighten their vulnerability, particularly by increasing the variance of prices or income sources (Bardhan, 2006, p. 1397). There is general agreement on the low capacity of the poor to cope with negative price and income shocks (Bardhan, 2006, p. 1397). Faced with mounting fiscal deficits, governments often find it politically easier to cut the public expenditures for the voiceless poor, and that is primarily due to the domestic political clout of the rich who are disinclined to share in the necessary fiscal austerity (Bardhan, 2006, p. 1400). This was clearly demonstrated in 1997, when after three decades of sustained and rapid growth, financial crisis and economic recession struck Southeast Asia with a fury that shocked observers and participants alike (Coclanis and Doshi, 2000, p. 59). The massive losses of wealth built up in previous years and the hardships imposed on millions of people – in societies that lacked institutionalised welfare safety nets – constituted a watershed for Southeast Asia (Mallet, 1999).
This section of the chapter has examined globalisation in Southeast Asia. The next section of the chapter will discuss globalisation in Cambodia and Thailand more specifically and the links between globalisation and poverty in these countries.

2.4 Globalisation in Cambodia and Thailand

Cambodia

Cambodia is not exceptional in this rapidly globalising world and since the economic reforms of the late 1980s, trade liberalisation has been promoted as a source of economic growth and as one of the major weapons in fighting poverty. However despite recent gains in improving Cambodia’s economy and alleviating poverty, the distribution of benefits does not appear to have been equally shared amongst the country’s citizens.

A brief study of the recent history of Cambodia explains how globalisation has affected its citizens, especially the poor. During the Khmer Rouge regime most intellectuals and city dwellers in Cambodia were killed, a considerable number of families were torn apart, and much of the country’s material heritage was destroyed (Ledgerwood et al, 1994, p. 2). Buddhism was prohibited and brutally oppressed (Rehbein, 2007, p. 74). During the Khmer Rouge rule the leaders of this regime sought to return Cambodia to ‘year zero’, where money, markets, formal education, Buddhism, books, private property, diverse clothing styles, and freedom of movement were abolished (Chandler, 2008). In 1979 when the Vietnamese backed government took over in Cambodia, economy and society had been utterly destroyed (Rehbein, 2007, p. 75). In 1986 the Soviet Union, which had been one of Cambodia’s only aid supporters, started to pull out of Southeast Asia and advised Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to adopt a more market-oriented economy (Rehbein, 2007, p. 75). China and the US, however, opposed the emerging regional solution of the Cambodian situation and called for an international conference, which was held in Paris in 1989, and a key outcome was the installation of an interim government that included the Khmer Rouge (Rehbein, 2007, p. 75). During the years of preparation Cambodia was controlled by
international forces, UNTAC, which introduced globalisation into Cambodia (meaning the current phase of the world growing together) (Robertson, 1990). Cambodia was socially and physically disrupted when UNTAC entered the country in the 1990s (Rehbein, 2007, p. 83). After the election in 1993 the thousands of Westerners who had brought a significant amount of money, technology and modern lifestyles with them, left Cambodia (Rehbein, 2007, p. 75). Prices had risen, especially in real estate, a large sector of prostitution had emerged, and modern lifestyles had become desirable to Cambodians (Rehbein, 2007, p. 75). While the UN operation was successful in promoting democratic elections, it also brought other issues. As many have noted, international peacekeeping operations too often fuel booms in local prostitution (Farr, 2005). This can be explained through a term called congregational prostitution, which posits a relationship between demands for prostitution and the number of men congregating away from their families (Kong, 2012). Data indicates that the number of girls and women working in prostitution in Cambodia grew from an estimated 1500 in 1990 to 20 000 in 1993 (Farr, 2005). This is arguably the beginning of the sex trafficking problem in Cambodia (Kong, 2012).

While globalisation certainly exacerbated the poverty problem in Cambodia and created an expansion of the trafficking industry, equally important are social and cultural issues. Cambodia is often viewed as a patriarchal society where women’s rights are ignored, and many women are victims of domestic violence (Ostberg, 2010). Brickell and Chant (2010) have identified altruistic load as a rationale for some young women’s agreement to enter or stay in the sex trafficking industry – being a good daughter is an important cultural value to the Khmer and this includes alleviating one’s mother’s suffering and improving one’s financial situation.

The intervention of the international community in Cambodia has made the Cambodian economy entirely dependent on foreign countries, changed the political field to a democracy, and brought Western lifestyles and money into the country (Rehbein, 2007, p. 83). This money has been absorbed by a small stratum of society, mainly the political elite,
and the position of the elite has been threatened in recent decades by democratic and economic competitors (Rehbein, 2007, p. 83). The exclusive elite of Cambodia has monopolised all economic and symbolic resources and, consequently, Cambodian society has become polarised into a small totalitarian elite and a poor population that knows Western lifestyles and wealth from the UNTAC experience and from television (Kraas, 2002, p. 365). The population considers itself part of a global lower class and has little hope (Rehbein, 2007, p. 83). Rehbein (2007, p. 84) argues that efforts in the country to counter this situation may be undermined by further pressure from economic globalisation, as rising poverty may result in more unitary structures.

Cambodia today has a liberalised economy, a democracy, and – to some extent – free and independent media (Rehbein, 2007, pp 76 – 77). With regards to politics, Cambodia has a quasi-patrimonial structure and rests on the shoulders of a socialist party (Rehbein, 2007, p. 77). David Roberts has described this structure as

Power in Cambodia, both traditionally since pre-Angkorean days and contemporarily since the 1970s, has been of an absolutist nature, with little tolerance of opposition. Underpinning this is a system of patronage and clientelism that seeks to ensure the preservation of elites by lower ranks, and to ensure so far as possible positions of economic and sometimes social privilege by elites. Loyalty passes upwards... Gifts... passed downwards (2001, p. 32).

The Paris conference of 1989 “attempted to implant equality and individual choice in a society governed, and financed, through hierarchical inequality and group loyalties” (Roberts, 2001, p. 34). Democracy, which was introduced by the international community as part of current globalisation, contradicts both patrimonialism and socialism and violence often ensures to solve problems that are foreign to patrimonial structures (Rehbein, 2007, p. 78). The frequent outbreaks of violence in Cambodia have contributed to the country’s
negative image in the world (Rehbein, 2007, p. 79). Foreign direct investment in Cambodia has declined dramatically – in 1995, Cambodia received 2.4 billion dollars of foreign direct investment (FDI), whereas in 2001 it received only 200 million dollars in FDI (Rehbein, 2007, p. 79). Since Cambodia has become a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) the textile industry has declined (Rehbein, 2007, p. 79). Furthermore, Cambodia suffers from ecological destruction, especially deforestation, lack of qualified manpower, poor infrastructure, little transparency and lack of capital (Rehbein, 2007, p. 79). It continues to depend heavily on diminishing foreign aid (Rehbein, 2007, p. 79).

Rehbein (2007, p. 80) argues that Cambodians are either rich or poor. The slums of Phnom Penh are vast, begging is common there, and there are at least 20 000 children living on the streets (Brown, 2000, p. 38). Rehbein’s interviews with Cambodians revealed that 46% of key respondents in Phnom Penh thought life had been better 100 years ago, and that there persisted a mentality amongst Cambodians of “utter resignation, dissatisfaction and readiness to become violent” (Rehbein, 2007, p. 81).

**Thailand**

Globalisation in recent decades in Thailand has followed somewhat a different path to that of its neighbour, Cambodia, however, similar issues regarding wealth inequality exist. In the case of Thailand, National Economic and Social Development plans were first implemented in 1961 and designed as consecutive five-year plans. The concerns, goals and paths of each five-year plan shifted according to the analysed and anticipated needs of the Thai nation and its society in each period (Aoyama, 2009, p. 41). Especially until the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997, the plans’ overall aim was to transform the industrial structure of the nation from one of agriculture to a combination of manufacturing for export combined with earning foreign currency to sustain an import orientation (Aoyama, 2009, p. 41). This transformation, however, which succeeded in its intent to dramatically increase per capita GNP during these three and a half decades, also brought about a widening in the gap between the moneyed and those living in poverty (Aoyama, 2009, p. 41). The benefits of
globalisation in Thailand reversed dramatically in the early 1980s. Prices of its main farm exports fell, oil prices rose and agricultural expansion slowed for want of new land (Pangestu, 2001, p. 22). The need to finance growth because of limited foreign exchange from exports had incurred a large foreign debt, which the government tackled with fiscal consolidation, devaluation of the baht and moves towards liberalising trade and investment (Pangestu, 2001, p. 22). However the fiscal and expenditure policies of the Thai government in the 1980s and early 1990s aggravated inequality and the government did not transfer real income to the poor in the form of social services (Pangestu, 2001, p. 31).

Thailand’s rapid economic growth during the past decade has had at least two negative consequences. First, despite a remarkable rise in national income, development policies have failed to improve its distribution (Pednekar, 1995, p. 4). Income disparities between the urban rich and the rural poor have widened (Pednekar, 1995, p. 4). Second, the country’s economic growth, first based on agricultural expansion and later on industrialisation, has been accompanied by a number of environmental problems that affect society at large, particularly the less privileged rural areas (Pednekar, 1995, p. 4). Regional disparity in Thailand, especially between Bangkok and the central district and the poor North East, is very high (Pangestu, 2001, p. 16). In GDP growth, share of GDP, poverty level and average per capita income, the central and Bangkok area is better off than other regions (Pangestu, 2001, p. 16). The North East is still poverty stricken due to scant resources, low rainfall, poor soil and lack of investment in physical (irrigation) and human (education) capital (Pangestu, 2001, p. 16). The gap between the highest per capita region in Thailand (Bangkok) and the lowest (the North East) increased from about seven times in 1982 to nine times in 1992 (Pangestu, 2001, p. 19).

In Aoyama’s study of female sex workers in Thailand during a period of modernisation to globalisation, she found that, for the rural poor and their families, the industrial transformation resulted in deprivation of social resources attached to agricultural production, most notably to the female-centred system of communal relationships and
The political and economic practices of Thailand’s development policy were inseparably linked to pressure from various external bodies: The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the UN, European Nations, the United States, and Japan (Aoyama, 2009, p. 41). Pressure also came from within, channelled from the upper strata of society to the lower inside the Thai nation state, in the form of social engineering (Aoyama, 2009, p. 41). Poverty in Thailand has remained a constant problem and has worsened in a certain section of the Thai population as a result of imbalanced economic growth (Aoyama, 2009, p. 42). Planners did not incorporate needs gleaned from the experiences, thoughts and feelings of the country’s poor until, at the earliest, the Eighty Development Plan from 1997 to 2001 (Aoyama, 2009, p. 42). Girls and young women originally from rural farming families, paid a higher price to survive this gap (Aoyama, 2009, p. 42).

The growing scarcity of land to pass to the next generation in Thailand, combined with the demand for a new labour force and for consumer goods has transformed the means of social networking (Mills, 2008). The older generation has become more dependent on the younger generation’s wage labour and as a consequence, young people have increasingly moved out of villages to seek paid jobs that would help them secure better-paid jobs (Aoyama, 2009, p. 49). In recent decades the Thai government has offered loans to rice farmers to encourage them to transfer to multi-crop farming to adapt to such agro-industries as food processing for export (Aoyama, 2009, p. 50). However some farmers could not repay the loans and became debt-bound, resulting in their daughters ending their education to go to work (Aoyama, 2009, p. 50). The migrant daughters of these families were able to make a living and enjoy relative independence in economic, physical and psychological terms (Aoyama, 2009, p. 50). Through leaving their villages they gained access to contemporary materials and fashion, films, live music and sports, consumer goods and other aspects of the globalisation of culture and economy (Aoyama, 2009, p. 50). Thailand is also no exception to the global pattern of increasing urbanisation. About 29% of the population (18.3 million people) lived in urban areas according to 2006 data (Bangkok Post, 2010). By 2009, the urban population of all municipal areas had climbed to 36% of the
population, and future projections are that the urban population will be 47% of the total population in 2020 and 2030 (Bangkok Post, 2010).

2.5 Relevance of the theoretical framework: A cosmopolitan lens on economic and social injustice in the global political economy

Cosmopolitan theory

For this research a theoretical framework – cosmopolitan theory - has been adopted that provides a lens to examine the links between globalisation, poverty and inequality and explains the proliferation of TANs advocating for universal values, poverty eradication and acting as buffers against child trafficking. Miller claims that cosmopolitanism is now the “preferred self-description of most moral philosophers who write about global justice” (2007, p. 23). Given the increasing pressures of globalisation, the recognition that we are in need of some global conception of humanity is not surprising – increasing globalisation demands some normative understanding of global community, responsibility and governance. The underlying dynamic of globalisation is cosmopolitan, that is, it is simultaneously but increasingly differentiated growth of world markets, interstate institutions, and global civil society and norms (Brysk and Shafir, 2004, p. 5). This dynamic, once unleashed, can have diverse consequences (Brysk and Shafir, 2004, p. 5). Thus while the political economy of hegemony dictates an unequal distribution of resources among and within states and a general weakening of state citizenship, the resulting dynamic is more complex in that power is moving from weak states to strong states, from states to markets, and away from state authority entirely in certain domains and functions (Strange, 1998). For this research a perspective that recognises the relationship between contemporary globalisation, inequality and trafficking is in line with that of Devetak and Higgott (1999) and their argument that globalisation inhibits liberty and justice for many people. This research also supports the idea put forward by Delanty (2006) that cosmopolitanism concerns a dynamic relation between the local and the global. This is suggested by the term itself: the interaction of the universal order of the cosmos and the human order of the polis (Delanty,
Cosmopolitanism thus concerns the multiple ways the local and the national is redefined as a result of interaction with the global (Delanty, 2006, p. 36). Cosmopolitanism is a useful theory for making sense of social transformation and in opening up discursive spaces of world openness and thus in resisting globalisation (Delanty, 2006, p. 36). Current debates in political theory draw attention to the revival of the Kantian cosmopolitan ideal, which, it is argued, is relevant in the present context of globalisation, the alleged crisis of the nation-state and the need for global civil society (Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann, 1997). Cosmopolitanism offers a basis to establish a more just global order, predominantly through its espousal of a commitment to humanity as a whole, facilitated by building consensus on values that demonstrate a commitment beyond the nation (Carey, 2003, p. 1). TANs have a key role to play in activating the cosmopolitan system – producing frameworks for universal ethical values – given their cosmopolitan credentials (Carey, 2003, p. 1).

To be born among the global poor is still largely considered a personal misfortune rather than a global injustice (Lu, 2005, p. 406). Contemporary cosmopolitan theory is a response to a range of global problems including economic injustice, poverty, malnutrition, human rights abuses and ecological degradation (Eckersley, 2007, p. 675). Cosmopolitanism has emerged as an important theoretical approach in the social sciences in recent years (Delanty and He, 2008, p. 323). Originally a development within moral and political philosophy concerning a universalistic orientation towards world principles, it has become increasingly pertinent to social science especially in the context of issues relating to globalisation and transnational movements of all kinds (Delanty and He, 2008, p. 324). While for early cosmopolitans such as Kant cosmopolitanism was primarily a demand for the recognition of universal rights, today it has a considerable impact in the human and social sciences as a way to respond to contemporary globalisation (Delanty and He, 2008, p. 327).

Cosmopolitans argue that problems such as poverty and injustice arise from, or are intensified by, the processes of globalisation. According to a cosmopolitan reading the growing range and intensity of cross-border flows of money, people, goods, services,
pollution, disease, weapons and communication have undermined the distinctions between ‘internal/external’ and ‘inside/outside’ that have been central to the formation and practice of modern states (Eckersley, 2007, p. 675). Contemporary cosmopolitanism takes the individual to be the ultimate unit of moral worth and to be entitled to equal consideration regardless of his or her culture, nationality or citizenship, besides other morally arbitrary facts about the individual person (Tan, 2002, p. 461). As Nussbaum has put it, the cosmopolitan view holds that, wherever he or she is, “each human being is human and counts as the moral equal of every other” (1996, p. 133). As a thesis about responsibility, cosmopolitanism guides the individual outward from local obligations, and prohibits those obligations from crowding out responsibilities to distant others (Brock, 2009, p. 3). The borders of states, and other boundaries considered to restrict the scope of justice are considered irrelevant roadblocks in appreciating responsibilities to all in the global community (Brock, 2009, p. 4).

One of the principal expressions of cosmopolitanism as a political condition concerns the search for alternatives to purely instrumental economic and security relations between societies (Delanty and He, 2008, p. 324). Cosmopolitans take seriously their allegiance to the entire community of human beings by seeking global institutional reforms that dilute state sovereignty, weaken national identifications and globalise citizenship (Eckersley, 2007, p. 675). Cosmopolitans are mainly concerned with the effects of international economic policies on individual persons, especially the poor and least advantaged, with no importance attached to where these people and groups are located (Kaptstein, 2004, p. 73). Their main concern is the well-being of individuals and the effects of the prevailing international economic structure on the well-being of individual persons (Kapstein, 2004, p. 73). In cosmopolitan theory, state borders have no a priori ethical meaning (Kaptstein, 2004, p. 73). Their inquiry thus focuses on such questions as: Do contemporary international economic arrangements promote or harm the life chances of those who are most vulnerable, particularly the poor in developing countries, relative to feasible alternative arrangements? How has the international trade regime influenced global poverty rates and global income distribution? Does the global economy and its associated policies help the poor, or does it
work against them? How can the international economic structure be reformed to meet the basic needs of the poor and least advantaged? (Kaptstein, 2004, p. 74). Cosmopolitans refuse to grant any privilege to the state and are, in fact, quite sceptical that government policies serve the interests of those who are most vulnerable (Kapstein, 2004, p. 74). They take seriously, in a way that others do not, the problem of state failure and also unjust states (Kapstein, 2004, p. 74). While they recognise that states could serve the cosmopolitan end of a social arrangement in which each individual is treated equally or fairly, they also accept that many governments around the world lack the will or capacity to provide for the basic needs of their citizens especially those who, due to income, gender, race, religion or other factors, are most vulnerable (Kapstein, 2004, p. 74). Cosmopolitan theorists reject the notion that the bad luck of certain persons to find themselves locked up in states that deny or fail to provide basic human rights is reason enough for those of us who are more fortunate to turn our backs on their plight (Kapstein, 2004, p. 74). As a result they argue that efforts to secure justice should focus on the reform of social arrangements beyond the nation state (Kapstein, 2004, p. 74). They also hold that global economic arrangements should be reformed so that they no longer bring about or permit such significant shortfalls from minimally adequate living conditions for so many people (Kapstein, 2004, p. 74). One example of the ‘source’ of this economic unfairness that needs addressing is the set of international trade rules that oppress poor nations and individuals. Cosmopolitans argue that there is good reason to believe that the current structure of the international trade regime, to provide just one prominent example, is tilted in important respects against the interests of the poor (Kapstein, 2004, p. 74).

Alexander highlights the link between globalisation and the cosmopolitan civil society response in his argument that globalisation has appeared as a response to the trauma of the twentieth century in a moment of hope when it seemed that the possibility for a worldwide civil society was finally at hand (2007, p. 85). Cosmopolitanism has also been theorised as a transnational mode of practice whereby actors construct bonds of mutual commitment and reciprocity across borders through public discourse and socio-political struggle (Kurasawa, 2004). The crux of the matter lies in grasping the work of constructing and performing
cosmopolitanism from below via normatively and politically oriented forms of global social action (Kurasawa, 2004, p. 234). In a similar vein Delanty and He argue that to speak of cosmopolitanism is to refer to a transformation in self-understanding as a result of the engagement with others over issues of global significance (2008, p. 324). The ongoing challenge for cosmopolitans is to develop and sustain dialogue across cultural and civilizational worlds (Delanty and He, 2008, p. 324).

Held argues that cosmopolitanism today must start by building an ethically sound and politically robust conception of the proper basis of political community and of the relations among communities, which requires recognition of four fundamental principles (2003, p. 470). The first of these is that the ultimate units of moral concern are individual people, not states or other particular forms of human association (Held, 2003, p. 470). The second principle emphasises that the status of equal worth should be acknowledged by everyone (Held, 2003, p. 470). In other words, each person has an equal stake in this universal ethical realm and is, accordingly, required to respect all other people’s status as a basic unit of moral interest (Held, 2003, p. 470). At the centre of the cosmopolitan view is the idea that human well-being is not defined by geographical or cultural locations, that national or ethnic or gendered boundaries should not determine the limits or rights or responsibilities for the satisfaction of basic human needs, and that all human beings require equal moral respect and concern (Held, 2009, p. 537). The principles of equal respect, equal concern and the priority of the vital needs of all human beings are not principles for “some remote utopia” (Held, 2002, p. 537) but are, rather, at the centre of significant post-Second World War legal and political developments including human rights law and the statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Held’s third principle, the principle of consent, recognises that a commitment to equal worth and equal moral value requires a non-coercive political process in and through which people can negotiate and pursue their interconnections, interdependence and differences (Held, 2003, p. 470). The fourth principle is Held’s principle of inclusiveness and subsidiarity, which seeks to clarify the fundamental criterion of drawing proper boundaries around units of collective decision-making, and on what grounds (2003, p. 471). Held argues that those significantly affected by public decisions,
should have an equal opportunity, directly or indirectly to influence and shape them (2003, p. 471). Therefore, collective decision-making is best located when it is closest to, and involves, those whose opportunities and life chances are determined by significant social processes and forces (Held, 2003, p. 471). Held highlights the fact that principle four points to the necessity of both the decentralisation and centralisation of political power (2003, p. 471). If decision-making is decentralised as much as possible, it maximises the opportunity of each person to influence the social conditions that shape his or her life (Held, 2003, p. 471).

In sum, therefore, cosmopolitanism can be understood as the moral and political outlook that builds upon the strengths of the post-1945 multilateral order, particularly its commitment to universal standards, human rights and democratic values, and that seeks to specify general principles upon which all could act (Held, 2004, p. 389). These are principles that can be universally shared and that can form the basis for the protection and nurturing of each person's equal interest in the determination of the institutions that govern their lives (Held, 2004, p. 389). The aim of modern cosmopolitanism, therefore, is the conceptualisation and generation of the necessary background conditions for a ‘common’ or ‘basic’ structure of individual action and social activity (Held, 2009, p. 539). Beitz has argued that “any reasonable theory must be constrained by what is possible”, and therefore, that cosmopolitans should seek “incremental or reformist goals” (1999, p. 676). Cosmopolitan globalists do not seek to overthrow whole state systems; they seek to transform the status quo in favour of the least advantaged (Lu, 2005, p. 407).

_Criticisms of cosmopolitan theory_

While cosmopolitanism has been used as a new moral and ethnic standpoint suitable for 21st century global life, it has also been criticised as a manifestation of the mentality of the upper and middle classes (Featherstone, 2002). Scholars have also argued that cosmopolitan theory’s openness to the world is a rather “vague and diffuse notion” (Skrbis et al, 2004, p. 117). Critics of cosmopolitan theory argue that cosmopolitanism gestures in
certain directions, describing an orientation and perhaps even a disposition, but completely avoids analytical precision (Skrbis et al., 2004, p. 117). As Hannerz puts it, cosmopolitanism is a “perspective, a state of mind” (1990, p. 238). Skrbis et al suggest that scholars all stop short of making cosmopolitanism and a cosmopolitan disposition a grounded, and maybe even measurable, entity (2004, p. 117).

Cosmopolitanism has also been criticised for being an elitist, Western concept with little draw in the context of nationalism, ethno-nationalism, and territoriality – all instrumental in shaping identity among many affected by globalisation and other dynamics of change. Authors such as De Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito argue that cosmopolitan projects have a long and ambiguous history anchored in Western modernity (n.d., p. 14). Some theorists such as Calhoun (2002) have criticised cosmopolitanism as a “discourse centred in a Western view of the world”. In a similar vein Van der Veer (2002) has called it the Western and profoundly colonial engagement with the “rest of the world”. The mapping of cosmopolitanism has concerned not where in the world you find the cosmopolitans, but where in the social structure you find them (Hannerz, 2006, p. 16). Hannerz suggests that in theoretical statements about cosmopolitanism there is a “rather uncosmopolitan” disregard for other parts of the world (2006, p. 15). An alternative view is set forth even more sharply by Ashis who suggests that Europe and North America have increasingly lost their cosmopolitanism, paradoxically because of a concept of cosmopolitanism that considers Western culture to be definitionally universal and therefore automatically cosmopolitan (1998, p. 146).

As argued by Pollock et al “no true universalism can be constructed without recognising that there is a diversity of universals on which analyses are based” (2000, p. 583). More often than not cosmopolitan projects have been as Western or Northern-centric and exclusionary as the global designs they oppose (De Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito, n.d., p. 14). For example, human rights institutions and doctrines, with their Western roots and liberal bent, have oftentimes been blind to non-Western conceptions of human dignity and collective
rights that hold out the prospect for an expanded, cosmopolitan conception of rights (De Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito, n.d., p. 14). Cosmopolitanism also articulates an impulse to be rootless – to be a cosmopolitan means having no allegiance or loyalty to any particular community, being capable of renouncing identity, being motivated by universal values and the capacity to be mobile. These functions are, according to Yegenoglu, those of an elite class (2005, p. 118). Furthermore, Ong argues that cosmopolitanism “gives the misleading impression that everyone can take equal advantage of mobility and modern communication and that transnationality has been liberatory, in both spatial and political sense, for all peoples” (1999, p. 11). Yegenoglu rightly poses the question – “Where in the literature on cosmopolitanism can we locate non-mobile subjects who cannot inhabit diasporic spaces, whose marginalisation requires struggles against the strategies and regulations of the nation state, whose energy and fight, by necessity, are aimed at insertion into the nation state?” (Yegenoglu, 2005, p. 112).

Pollock et al (2000, p. 582) posit that cosmopolitans today are often the victims of modernity, failed by capitalism’s upward mobility, and bereft of those comforts and customs of national belonging. Refugees, peoples of the diaspora, and migrants and exiles represent the spirit of the cosmopolitical community (Pollock et al, 2000, p. 582). Too often in the West these people are grouped together in a vocabulary of victimage (Pollock et al, 2000, p. 582). Such benevolence is well intentioned but it fails to acknowledge the critique of modernity that minoritarian cosmopolitans embody in their historic witness to the twentieth century (Pollock et al, 2000, p. 582). Ignatieff (1994) further argues that cosmopolitanism fails to appeal to ethno-cultural minorities because the rarefied language of cosmopolitanism is antithetical to the “vernacular” politics of minority struggle.

De Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito, (n.d., p. 11) highlight the links between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic actors – for instance, between philanthropic foundations in the North and human rights organisations in the South – as well as the contradictions within transnational activist coalitions. From this viewpoint such links and tensions reveal that, far
from “happily coexisting in this effort to work together to produce new and emancipator
global norms” (Dezalay and Garth, 2002, p. 318) NGOs and other actors of counter-
hegemonic globalisation are part and parcel of the elites benefiting from neoliberal
globalisation and thus contribute to the construction of new global orthodoxies through
programs to export Western legal institutions and expertise (De Sousa Santos and
Rodriguez-Garavito, n.d., p. 11). Indeed in the transition from imperialism to neo-
colonialism the establishment of civil society was the most urgent task that backfired in
developing nations (Spivak, 1997). Transnationality further destroyed the possibilities of
redressing this failure and it is this failure that determines much of the new diaspora now
(Spivak, 1997, p. 91). Thus, access to globality is not an even one: while globalisation
enables diasporas in the developed world to fight with the weapons provided by the
discourse of democratic rights and equality, access to such claims are severely curtailed for
the underclass in the Third World mainly because the nation-state in the Third World is in
the business of adjusting itself to the injunctions of global capital (Yegenoglu, 2005, p. 105).
Welfare structures in the South cannot emerge due to the priorities of transnational
agencies as civil society shifts its understandings from service to citizen to capital
maximisation (Spivak, 1997, p. 90). Transnationalism in fact diminishes the possibility of a
functioning civil society in developing nations (Spivak, 1997, pp 90 – 91).

Third World Cosmopolitanism and other ‘cosmopolitanisms’

As the empirical material for this research was largely derived from interviews with Western
aid workers operating in global TANs mainstream cosmopolitan theory fits well in order to
explain the motivations and activities of these transnational actors. However it is necessary
to not overlook the other ‘cosmopolitanisms’ in recent literature, particularly Southern or
Third World cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism as an old concept, whose etymological
roots lie in the Greek idea of “a citizenship of the world”, has been reinscribed with different
meanings over the centuries. The local cosmopolitanism dichotomy has been part of the
sociological and philosophical idiom since the 1950s when it was attached to nationalism
(Hannerz, 1990, p. 237). Cosmopolitans were those who aligned with structures of the
nation rather than those of the locality, however, what was cosmopolitanism in the 1950s
would appear today to be a form of localism in the new global arrangement (Roy, 2012, p. 40). Irrespective of how it is defined, cosmopolitanism appears to be imbricated with histories of colonialism, nationalism and globalisation (Roy, 2012, p. 40). Most studies, focusing largely on elite cosmopolitanisms, have interpreted cosmopolitanism in its modern or postmodern meanings (Black, 2006, p. 46). These studies have opposed cosmopolitans to subalterns or seen them as compatible with rusticity or rootedness (Roy, 2012, p. 40).

The notion that a cosmopolitan was detached from local roots to embrace a larger world is indeed an elitist, Western assumption. The term ‘cosmopolitanism’ is conventionally used to describe European and liberal and elitist ideas about global consciousness (Kaur, 2011, p. 198). It is assumed that the more affluent areas are likely to be cosmopolitan but recent theorisation has brought to light other cosmopolitanisms – ‘discrepant cosmopolitanism’ (Clifford, 1992), ‘vernacular cosmopolitanism’ (Bhabha, 1996), ‘demotic cosmopolitanism’ (Parry, 2008) and ‘subaltern cosmopolitanism’ (Roy, 2012). In the process the concept has been broadened to consider factors such as class, caste, gender, region, and race/ethnicity (Werbner, 2008). Werbner (2008, p. 1) refers to ‘situated cosmopolitanism’ which implies that it is not simply an individual orientation, but also ‘collective, relational and thus historically located’ (2008, p. 2). ‘Rooted’ or ‘situated’ cosmopolitanism refers to cosmopolitans who grow out of local settings and draw on domestic resources and are the main actors in transnational contention (Tarrow, 2005, p. 1). The special characteristic of rooted cosmopolitans is not their cognitive cosmopolitanism, but rather their relational links to their own societies, to other countries, and to international institutions (Tarrow, 2005, p. 1). It is not a new wave of international sentiments, nor economic globalisation, but the increasingly intertwined networks of a complex international society, that has produced a recent increase in rooted cosmopolitanism (Tarrow, 2005, p. 1). In addition theorists speak of cosmopolitan democracy, cosmopolitan citizenship, and discrepant cosmopolitanism, which are offered as new forms of belonging and politics that are beyond the confining forms of the nation state (Yegenoglu, 2005, p. 106). These ‘cosmopolitanisms’ can therefore be understood under two broad headings: cosmopolitanism as a question of legal and
political governance, and cosmopolitanism as a question of cultural identity (Yegenoglu, 2005, p. 106).

De Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito (n.d., pp 14 – 15) argue that rather than discarding cosmopolitanism as just one more variety of global hegemony, the concept may be revisited by shifting the focus of attention to those who currently need it. The authors argue that a different kind of cosmopolitanism is needed by victims of local intolerance and discrimination, people living in misery in a world of wealth, indeed, the large majority of the world’s populace who are excluded from top-down cosmopolitan projects. Subaltern cosmopolitanism, with its emphasis on social inclusion, is therefore of an oppositional variety (De Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito, n.d., p 15). Subaltern cosmopolitanism provides a shift to a view from the experience of victims; a new perspective from the exterior of Western modernity; and a view from the reality of coloniality of power (De Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito, n.d., p 15). Subaltern cosmopolitanism provides a perspective that shifts from the North to the South, with the South expressing not a geographical location but all forms of subordination associated with neoliberal globalisation. In inquiring into globalisation from the point of view of the lived experiences of the South, therefore, subaltern globalisation takes the perspective of what Dussel (1998) has aptly called the “community of the victims”. Cosmopolitanism explicitly rejects the victim’s perspective that is central to subaltern cosmopolitan politics (De Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito, n.d., p. 9). By default or by design, those doing the imagining are the elites or members of the middle-class with the economic and cultural capital to count as ‘stakeholders’ (De Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito, n.d., p. 9). The victims in this transnational community are not passive, nor is the separation between the South and the North a static one – the perspective of subaltern cosmopolitan studies aims to empirically document experiences of resistance, assess their potential to subvert hegemonic institutions and ideologies, and learn from their capacity to offer alternatives to the latter (De Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito, n.d., p 15). If we do not confine our analysis to the diasporas of the North and do not take the metropolitan situation as the sole important site of transnationality, but rather turn our attention to the global social and economic
forces that shape the lives of subaltern groups in decolonised space, we gather a different picture of capitalist globality (Yegenoglu, 2005, p. 104). While produced by and inserted into the processes of globalisation, the disenfranchised subaltern groups of the decolonised South vanish from the discourse of transnationality precisely because they are made interchangeable or synonymous with migrants of the First World metropolis (Yegenoglu, 2005, p. 104). However, their disappearance from the discourse of globalisation should not indicate that they are outside transnationality (Yegenoglu, 2005, p. 104).

Collapsing highly diverse actors and organisations into a generic category of elites and very different agendas into a catchall category of global orthodoxies yields a politically demobilising picture of globalisation (De Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito, n.d., p. 12). Missing from this top-down picture are the myriad local, non-English speaking actors, from grassroots organisations to community leaders, who, albeit oftentimes working in alliance with transnational NGOs and progressive elites, mobilise popular resistance to neoliberal legality while remaining as local as ever (De Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito, n.d., p. 11). Southern NGOs are also actively negotiating neocapitalism and globalisation to advocate for their rights. Social movements involving some of the most marginalised classes in the global South, that is landless peasants, subsistence farmers and indigenous peoples, strategically mobilise national courts and TANs to assert their rights to their land, their culture and the environment (De Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito, n.d., p 2). Subaltern social movements may frame their grievances in global, cosmopolitan terms, sometimes with the instrumental purpose of obtaining external allies who might pressure their otherwise hostile or unresponsive states from the outside, or with a view to transferring protest to an international arena when domestic spaces for contention have been blocked (Cheah, 2006, pp 39 – 40).

Cosmopolitanism holds that globalisation is believed to enhance the possibilities for cosmopolitanism since national belonging no longer continues to be a primary source of identification, nor can claims and rights be restrained within the structures of the nation
state (Yegenoglu, 2005, p. 106). From a subaltern cosmopolitan perspective, however, such a “quick and unmitigated” reununciation of the necessity for the nation state in its entirety, especially under conditions of globalisation, can only be made by remaining blind to the specificities of the life conditions of subaltern populations within the territoriality of the nation (Yegenoglu, 2005, p. 107). A Southern perspective on cosmopolitanism criticises the cosmopolitan notion of the diminishing power of the state. The idea that nationality is receding in its importance and that, therefore, cosmopolitanism best matches up with the growing reality of culturalism is an ideology supported by cosmopolitan theorists such as Nussbaum (1996). Yegenoglu argues that the question should not be whether state power is needed or not, but whether the interests and demands of the popular will are articulated in the struggle for hegemony (2005, p. 114). Such struggles entail demanding the institutionalisation of the redistributive functions of the state to secure economic equality, however, without being articulated in the national context, these struggles cannot become hegemonic (Yegenoglu, 2005, p. 114). The state continues to be a major player and is of great importance for subaltern politics in the Third World (Yegenoglu, 2005, p. 114). As Bayat notes:

> It is, indeed an old question as to how far the quiet or even open encroachment of the poor can proceed given the omnipresence of the state and the market... Beyond simple shelter, the poor also want (and struggle for) schools, roads, and public parks: in addition to a spot in the street, vendors also need security, credit, and market information. These, plus jobs and social security, can hardly be achieved without the cooperation of the state (1997, p. 164).

A Southern perspective on cosmopolitan, therefore, demonstrates how local activists operate in complex social and political environments, navigating difficult terrain in order to work within, with, and outside states to achieve their social and economic justice goals. A final point to this section of the chapter is to highlight the reality that Southern activists operating in or outside TANs are not necessarily immune to issues of tolerance, collaboration and contention. Hannerz emphasises that contemporary subcultures, far from being only local, small-scale, face-to-face entities, are often transnational phenomena, with
their own patterns of mobility and media use, and their own frequently transnational centre-periphery relationships (2006, p. 20).

**Defence of cosmopolitanism**

The assertion that cosmopolitanism is an elite project overlooks the potential of world society, of trans-cultural sympathisers and the growing densification of contacts and support for TANs that work on behalf of such world-order values as humane governance, economic sustainability, non-violence, human rights and environmental protection, essentially for those who live underprivileged lives (Carey, 2003, p. 4). Moreover, as argued by Hannerz, significant changes in the world including new patterns of global migration and activism demonstrate there has not for a long time, or perhaps ever, really been a world divided between “haves” who move and “have-nots” who stay put (2006, p. 17). Cosmopolitanism is no longer only an elite phenomenon (Hannerz, 2006, p. 17).

As argued by Skrbis et al (2004) what matters most is not whether cosmopolitanism is a Western invention but, rather, whether it can serve as a shared universal value, applicable across different cultural and social contexts. In a similar vein Hannerz asserts that looking for the points and areas in the social structure where some kind of cosmopolitanism may grow should not be a matter only of looking up or down in the social strata as conventionally understood. Rather, we should seek out, along more varied dimensions, the loci where experiences and interests may come together, in individuals and groups, to expand horizons and shape wider sets of relationships (2006, p. 19). In questions of socio-economic justice there are significant parallels between domestic and global spheres that do allow us to identify similarities between theories of domestic and global justice (Walker, 2011, p. 83). We see that on a global level, the defining principles of liberal democracy are embodied in the cosmopolitan position that all human beings are of equal moral worth, entitled to liberty and equality of rights and resources (Walker, 2011, p. 83). Cosmopolitan theory offers a robust approach to current patterns of cooperation in Asia and internationally as well as a normative framework for comparative analysis.
This research supports the theories put forward by supporters of cosmopolitanism such as Held (2002) who argues that cosmopolitanism entails a distinct ethical orientation towards selflessness, worldliness and communitarianism. As argued by Skrbis et al (2002), the close connection between ethical commitment and cosmopolitan disposition has been one of the key characteristics of cosmopolitanism since the Stoics, but it became distinctly pronounced in the modern era, characterised by the seemingly unstoppable thrust of time-space compression fuelled by information technologies and the media. It is cosmopolitanism’s distinctly ethical commitments that drive much of the contemporary environmental, anti-war, anti-globalisation and other social movements (Skrbis et al, 2002, p. 128). Since 1945 there has been a significant entrenchment of cosmopolitan values concerning the equal dignity and worth of all human beings in international rules and regulations; the reconnection of international law and morality; the establishment of complex governance systems, regional and global; and the growing recognition that the public good requires coordinated multilateral action if it is to be achieved in the long term (Held, 2002, p. 135).

The principal political question of our times is how the issues of inequality and unevenness in the global economy can best be addressed and governed (Held, 2002, p.134). Cosmopolitan theory provides a useful framework for further thought and action on this question, in a domain of overlapping ideas that unites a significant body of progressive opinion.

Cosmopolitan theory is, despite its criticisms, the most useful theoretical framework for this research as it provides an important conceptual standpoint for analysing the above mentioned issues of poverty and wealth and for posing a profound set of theoretical and policy challenges. Cosmopolitanism remains a compelling political philosophy and approach to global challenges (Held, 2009, p. 535). It contradicts the claim that poverty and inequality are largely home-grown problems that can be solved through the application of judicious domestic policy measures, and it rejects the liberal internationalist notion that justice is found primarily in economic relations between states (Kapstein, 2004, p. 80). It forces us to ask whether the international arrangements we have shaped actually help or hinder the life-chances of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable citizens (Kapstein, 2004, p. 81). It is a
useful framework for this research as it supports the view that there is no reason why some groups or individuals should be worse off because of the place in which they were born or currently reside and that, overall, the global economy as it currently operates is extremely unjust. If we think of lived cosmopolitanism, that is the globally enmeshed lives that we live, then possibilities open up for engaging critically with our conditions.

Cosmopolitan theory also demonstrates that there is an alternative to hegemonic, neoliberal, top-down globalisation, and that is counter-hegemonic solidarity or “bottom-up globalisation” (De Sousa Santos, 2006, p. 398). Falk (1999) has devoted almost as much work to delineating the problems of an elite-imposed “globalisation from above” as he has to defending what he persuasively argues is a more liberating ideal of “globalisation from below” (Furia, 2005, p. 336). In claiming that cosmopolitanism is not inevitably elitist, Falk echoes many previous scholars who have invoked transnational social movements as evidence of a ‘bottom up’ response to certain really existing exercises of global citizenship (Furia, 2005, p. 336). As argued by Held, only a cosmopolitan outlook can ultimately accommodate itself to the political challenges of a more global era, marked by overlapping communities of fate and multilevel/mulitlayered politics (2003, p. 469).

In this research a cosmopolitan approach to the problem of global poverty and global inequality is the primary lens for the analysis of the existing international rules and their effect on the world’s least advantaged persons. Cosmopolitan theory provides a useful framework for analysing the cosmopolitan response of TANs to global social problems. Other theoretical frameworks could have been adopted for this research but fell short in providing useful frameworks to discuss both the cosmopolitan response of TANS to contemporary globalisation and social problems, and the complex relationship between globalisation, inequality and trafficking. Common to all three approaches to globalisation (communitarian, liberal internationalist and cosmopolitan) is a concern with the articulation and effects of the multilateral rules and procedures that govern international transactions (Kapstein, 2004). Communitarian and liberal internationalist theories, while useful, focus
their attention on the role of the state in the globalised economy and do not provide adequate attention to the plight of vulnerable individuals. International relations theory could also be a useful framework for this research but it similarly focuses on the state and the ways in which its members, individually and collectively, frame external policies, exercise power, maintain stability, build institutions and pursue a host of other goals that have little direct bearing on daily life within societies (Durfee and Rosenau, 1996, p. 26). Most relevant theories adhere to the proposition that, given a free market, the correction of inequalities is simply a matter of time, of absolute gains accruing to everyone and to all states through efficiencies imposed by markets (Durfee and Rosenau, 1996, p. 528). Such theories presume an essential harmony of interests among all collective and individual actors and are not concerned with relative gains or the relative deprivation of poor countries or people; absolute deprivation is expected to yield to the economic rationalisation embedded in liberal theory (Durfee and Rosenau, 1996, p. 528).

Cosmopolitan theory is a useful theoretical framework for this research as the TANs observed were mostly global Western entities, and the staff of the TANs interviewed for the research were mostly Western aid workers. Few Thai and Cambodian aid workers were interviewed and when they were their responses were constrained – no doubt because they are used to responding to donor demands and the fact that they have to be cautious about what they say about partners and donors and governments. Cosmopolitanism explains the rise and participation in TANs that is a fundamental aspect of the research. Cosmopolitan theory explains why TANs have proliferated, the values and motivations of the Western staff in them, and the reasons why NGOs and UN agencies collaborate on CST and the promotion of universal values. It explains the exclusion of states and Southern NGOs in TANs (or why their participation remains sometimes tokenistic at best). It also explains why expatriates frame their responses regarding TAN ‘effectiveness’ in terms of their ability to shape ideals and values, help the poor and underprivileged, build systems to protect children, improve the capacity of the state, improve North-South relations, build democratic structures and so on. Cosmopolitanism explains what TANs do and why they do it and it is this discussion that is central to the research and critical to understanding TAN effectiveness.
While this research is not about Southern activism against CST, the research endeavours to bring in the subaltern cosmopolitan voice where possible. The scholarly task consists of providing analytical clarity and translation devices to make efforts at understanding TAN activities intelligible. For this research a subaltern cosmopolitanism perspective is supported through discussion of local struggles in Thailand and Cambodia led by grassroots NGOs and other members of civil society. A discussion is provided of TANS in Thailand and Cambodia, and discussion of local movements such as the Red Shirt movement in Thailand, and anti-sweatshop labour campaigns led by Southern activists. Providing a subaltern perspective helps to explain the differences between the motivations of local activists as opposed to what motivates the West, and the areas of collaboration and contention between Northern and Southern activists operating in TANs.

2.6 Globalisation, poverty and human trafficking: Supply and demand

While the previous sections of the chapter have introduced the theoretical framework for the research, this section of the chapter sets out to draw the links between globalisation, poverty and human trafficking. According to a critical cosmopolitan globalist reading, it is not only inequality between rich and poor states that is increasing but also inequality and poverty within states (Held, 2002, p. 81). The new global division of labour reorganises rather than ameliorates patterns of global inequality and exclusion (Held, 2002, p. 81). Consequently, the world is no longer divided as it once was on geographic lines, that is, between North and South, but rather exhibits a new social architecture (Held, 2002, p. 81). This architecture, which divides humanity into elites, the bourgeoisie, the marginalised and the impoverished, cuts across territorial and cultural boundaries, rearranging the world into the winners and losers of globalisation (Held and McGrew, 2002, p. 81). The unevenness of globalisation divides the world and nations into polarising zones of affluence and poverty, inclusion and exclusion, and generates a deepening fragmentation of world order which finds expression in, among other things, transnational organised crime and other conflicts (Held, 2002, p. 83). Child trafficking is but one symptom of the unevenness of globalisation.
Roby (2005) suggests that the factors contributing to human trafficking can be broadly divided into two major levels. First, the macro-level, constituting the international, national and local demographic, social, economic, ethnic and cultural environments in which trafficking occurs, and, second, the micro-level of individual and familial risk factors (Roby, 2005, p. 137). Economic injustice and poverty are among the major macro-level risk factors for sex trafficking (Roby, 2005, p. 137). ‘Poverty’ in this research is viewed as a broad concept with financial and non-financial aspects including access to both social and economic capital. An understanding of the non-economic elements of poverty – lack of capital and gender discrimination – helps identify the most vulnerable to marginalisation (Asian Development Bank, 2003). To understand how poverty acts as a cause of human trafficking it is important to analyse several specific aspects of trafficking – the supply side, the demand side and the interaction between these two forces.

Scholars of human trafficking suggest that there are a number of key reasons for the growth of trafficking internationally. Gupta argues that there are six global trends that accentuate vulnerability to trafficking and have caused the surge in growth of trafficked people (2010, p. 70). First, an increase in demand for trafficked people, from end users to those who make a profit from the trade, has become the most immediate cause for the expansion of the human trafficking industry. Second, new technologies have made moving and recruiting people much easier. Third, petty criminals have been replaced by organised criminals in the human trade, turning it into a large-scale industry. Fourth, natural disasters have driven people from their homes. Fifth, displacement and migration in the absence of protection mechanisms have increased vulnerability to human trafficking. Sixth, the global economic crisis of 2008 to 2010 has increased unemployment and undermined social safety nets, contributing to increased vulnerability by exacerbating the effects of existing sources of marginalisation (Gupta, 2010, pp 70 – 71). These events have led to an increase in the number of vulnerable people that can easily be targeted by traffickers, “disposable people” as Bales (2004) calls them. In a similar vein Nanu (2010) suggests that the factors that lead to trafficking in destination countries can be broadly classified in economic, political and social clusters:
Table 1: Demand factors leading to human trafficking: Economic, political and social

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Factors</th>
<th>Political Factors</th>
<th>Social Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cost competitiveness</td>
<td>Limited control of labour standards</td>
<td>Expanding entertainment industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand for labour-intensive production</td>
<td>Limited platform offered for organisation, representation and voice of workers</td>
<td>Cultural acceptance of bride trades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand for cheap services</td>
<td>Inadequate ineffective legislation, law enforcement</td>
<td>Lack of education and access to information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growing informal economy</td>
<td>Social welfare policy failure and impact of external (IMF) pressures</td>
<td>Discrimination against marginalised groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subcontracting lines</td>
<td>Poor governmental regulation</td>
<td>Demand for sex services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(Section in italics is a modification on Nanu’s table).

Nanu (2010) also suggests that the factors that contribute to the supply side of trafficking can also be broadly classified into economic, political and social clusters:

Table 2: Supply factors leading to human trafficking: Economic, political and social

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Social</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>Ineffective regulation of labour and migration policies</td>
<td>Dysfunctional family situations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>Discrimination against marginalised groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic crises</td>
<td>Political conflicts</td>
<td>Lack of education and access to information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desire for a better life</td>
<td>War and post-war zones</td>
<td>Tolerance of violence against women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption</td>
<td>Lack of citizenship</td>
<td>Cultural, gender, hierarchy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(Section in italics is a modification on Nanu’s table).
Nanu’s tables provide a useful framework for considering the various supply and demand factors leading to human trafficking. As the above tables reflect, there are a number of economic, social and political reasons that young people are vulnerable to exploitation. On the supply side, vulnerability to trafficking can be linked to poverty, unemployment, economic crisis, political conflict, dysfunctional family situations, lack of education, and tolerance of violence, amongst others. On the demand side, vulnerability to trafficking is caused by the growing informal economy, the world demand for cheap labour, ineffective law enforcement, and discrimination against marginalised groups. A key limitation of Nanu’s tables, however, is the lack of attention to gender issues. Poverty, unemployment and economic crises are felt profoundly by females and it is often young girls who, due to economic stress, are driven to cross borders in search of work. Until recently, the supply side of poverty has been the most studied by NGOs, multilateral organisations and governments and is therefore the side of poverty that is best understood amongst stakeholders (Danailova-Trainor and Belser, 2006). This is reflected in the advocacy efforts of TANs that have largely focused on campaigning on issues related to the supply side of trafficking. This has, of course, led to the demand side of poverty being largely overlooked.

As suggested in the analyses above, poverty and increased economic inequality are important risk factors associated with child trafficking and child sexual exploitation (Shifman, 2003). Most trafficking victims come from families in poor communities lacking in economic and job opportunities (ECPAT, 2002). It is in such environments of dire poverty that traffickers prey, luring unsuspecting young victims with false promises of employment (ECPAT, 2002). Tumenaite (2006) argues that the single, most important root cause of human trafficking is the supply side of poverty. This is based on the ideology that individuals who cannot feed, clothe, and house themselves or their families due to lack of work are the most susceptible to the lure of traffickers (Marshall, 2001). However, recent research has at times disproved this point. Some research indicates that, in fact, the most impoverished individuals located in rural areas are less susceptible to trafficking than those individuals residing in medium-sized towns that are less impoverished, but are more likely to be attracted by the promises of the urban wealth and lifestyle (Feingold, 2005, p. 26;
Rende Taylor, 2003). Rende Taylor (2003) argues that, despite its important dynamic, poverty is not the ultimate cause of human trafficking. This view is supported by Feingold (2005), who argues that poverty alone is not the ultimate driver of trafficking, but poverty’s interactions with many other causes create the trafficking problem.

While not a new phenomenon, trafficking in humans is currently taking place within the context of neoliberal economic globalisation and against a complex web of global, national, and gender, class, and race disparities (Peralta, 2006, p. 13). The phenomenon of globalisation has been crucial in the expansion of human trafficking (Samarasinghe, 2003). Southern scholar, Samarasinghe, argues that the latest chapter of globalisation has actually been the catalyst that caused the explosion in human trafficking (2003, p. 93). Prior to the last chapter of globalisation that began in the 1970s and 1980s, human trafficking did certainly exist, however, in that period human trafficking was mostly contained within country borders (Marshall, 2001). At its greatest extent it may have involved some cross border movement into neighbouring countries but it was mainly restricted to certain regions of the globe (Marshall, 2001). However, as globalisation has entered its most recent and rapid phase of transition in the last few decades, human trafficking has begun to spread beyond its previously localised areas. Trafficking victims have begun to travel further and further from their home countries in search of work opportunities. This has included the leagues of children who migrate in search of work to support their families (Marshall, 2001). Children of poor families, by nature of their poverty, are less likely to be protected and thus face a higher risk of commercial sexual exploitation. Pettman identifies poverty as a form of coercion that makes the prostitution of family members a viable option (2008, p. 152). Pettman questions the validity of the voluntary/coerced distinction of prostitution and argues that this distinction is difficult to maintain, as the element of ‘choice’ is suspect in conditions of economic need, lack of options, and asymmetrical power relations, including gender relations within the family (2008, p. 153).
There are several major ways in which globalisation has served to further escalate the effects of poverty as a cause of human trafficking. The first of these is the widening of the wealth gap between countries and regions around the world (Chuang, 2006, p. 138). Globalisation has made the supply side of poverty much more clear, with the poor becoming increasingly aware that development has eluded them. Poor people, including children, realise their poverty comparatively to others and seek access to the jobs that will enable them to buy televisions, cars and other modern wants (World Vision, 2009). Traffickers have the increasing opportunity to exploit this situation by luring young people into promises of jobs in neighbouring regions or countries. As human trafficking has such close ties to slavery and has existed prior to the latest period of globalisation, it cannot be argued that globalisation is the only cause of trafficking of humans. Globalisation has, however, played an important role in the escalation of the trafficking problem, and the problem of child trafficking in particular (Emmers, 2004, p. 19). Globalisation contributes to exacerbate poverty, which leaves more people vulnerable to contemporary forms of slavery, such as child labour, child trafficking and bonded labour (Van Den Anker, 2004, p. 16).

The 2009 to 2010 global financial crisis has provided a new episode in history for viewing the transformation of child trafficking. Economic crises affect countries in many important ways that can result in the exploitation of children (Patel, 2009, p. 50). An economic downturn may involve reduced capital inflows, reduced development aid, declining export markets, changing terms of trade and a reduction in overall GDP (Patel, 2009, p. 50). As a result, countries already weakened by recent food and fuel price increases experience high unemployment, subsequently exacerbating income gaps (Patel, 2009, p. 50). Children are at particular risk, resulting in poor health indicators, lower educational attainment, reduced family incomes and subsequently increased child labour (Patel, 2009, p. 50). With the recent worldwide economic downturn, a number of anti-trafficking agencies and analysts began to look at the potential impact of the recession on the phenomenon of human trafficking (ECPAT, 2009, p. 10). ECPAT found, along with a number of scholars, that poverty will grow significantly as a result of financial crises (ECPAT, 2009, p. 11; Percy, 2009; Kane, 2009). Widespread impoverishment is already being accompanied by a fall in world exports, a rise
in unemployment and consumer prices, returns of unemployed migrants to countries of origin and a decline in remittances, with the consequent deterioration of living conditions of entire households, thus making families even more vulnerable to trafficking (ECPAT, 2009, p. 11; Percy, 2009). Compounding this is the reaction from governments that tend to adopt more restrictive immigration policies towards foreign workers, which in turn results in more irregular migration and strengthening of the informal labour market (IOM, 2009). Another negative effect of economic crises is that budget spending for social services, child protection and child care often decreases (ECPAT, 2009, p. 11). Furthermore, development aid is drastically reduced during economic downturns (ECPAT, 2009, p. 11; Patel, 2009). All these factors serve to exacerbate children’s vulnerability to exploitation and trafficking.

Recent studies by the World Bank and the IMF confirm the biased nature of the international trade regime, especially given the structure of protection and tariff escalation that currently exists in the industrial world (Kapstein, 2004, p. 79). As Clark argues, “tariffs used by industrial nations bear more heavily on products of export interest to developing countries than on imports from other industrial nations” (1998, p. 193). Whereas the nation state in previous periods was the controller and promoter of trade and regulated money, now globalised trade and money have rapidly freed themselves of national controls and have become supra-national activities (Bales, 2000, p. 472). Bales suggests that there are clear parallels between this process and that of slavery – the nation state is of diminishing importance in understanding or dealing with slavery, as the dispersal of slavery as an economic activity continues unabated (2000, p. 472). Contemporary slavery in fact thrives in the modern global political economy (Bales, 2000). Globalisation, and the expansion of the free market system, was supposed to usher in a world of better economic conditions for all as well as higher standards of living (Sandbrook, 2003, p. 259). To some extent and in some geographic pockets of the world this has occurred. But the negative side of globalisation has meant that it has, instead of bringing equality for all, created a global demand for cheap consumer goods that can only be profitably made by slave or exploited labour and a flood of people from already poor areas that are willing to supply that slave labour (Bales, 2004).
Globalisation has been a major reason for the exacerbation of trafficking, however, it is not the only reason. In the GMS social norms play a large role as men’s sexual activities are accepted by society. In addition there is the issue of the gender gap in a number of areas, but one area that is markedly apparent is that of education. Girls in the GMS region drop out of school in larger numbers than boys, and the gender gap increases as the level of schooling rises (Takamatsu, 2004, p. 281). There are fewer women in employment, positions of power, decision making, and status in society (Takamatsu, 2004, p. 281).

2.7 The commercialisation of humans in the global political economy

Kara comments that “the particular ascension of sex slavery resides at the intersection of the socio-economic bedlam promoted by economic globalisation and an historic, deeply rooted bias against females” (2009, p. 30). This comment adds to a notion that the illegal sex trade is precisely a balance of supply and demand, a perfect paradigm of the market economy (Seabrook, 1996). Seabrook argues that those who speak of the market economy as though it represented the highest achievement in the organisation of human affairs often fail to recognise that it does not obligingly cease its operations at the frontiers of decency, honour and good sense (1996, p. 129). Albrow supports this view in his comment that “globalisation now carries connotations of the commercialisation of humanity” (1996, p. 83). Therefore, in a very particular way, this commercialisation is indicative of new forms of slavery such as trafficking (Bales, 2000, p. 474). Slavery has moved away from slaves as capital investments to the use of slaves as inputs in an economic process and, as is true of other factors in the global political economy, slaves are transformed from fixed assets into fungible resources (Bales, 2000, p. 474). World demand for ever more and ever cheaper goods and services can be met only by ever more and ever cheaper labour (Turner and Kelly, 2009, p. 187). Turner and Kelly elaborate on this process:

Against this backdrop, the formal economy merges with the informal economy, the licit shades into the illicit, and the margins and grey areas are inhabited by those who traverse both, to control and profit from others whose space for action has
been limited by adverse conditions at home, and elsewhere by those who deem their business and household aspirations, or assumed sexual entitlements, are best served by the cheap or unpaid labour of others (2009, p. 187).

Human trafficking thrives in the international marketplace not only because there are always women and girls available seeking employment in richer countries and corrupt policemen to facilitate the process of movement, but also because the market has been deliberately expanded (Fein, 2007). The sex trade has become a specialised attraction for international tourism in the last decades of the twentieth century, complementing other global trends in pursuing the exotic, forbidden substances and pleasure (Fein, 2007, p. 48). Sex tourism attracts customers to foreign lands of pleasure and must produce a staff to satisfy their demands (Fein, 2007, p. 48).

It appears that the commercialisation of humans occurs when economic vulnerability combines with sufficient population and a lack of regulation or control over the use of violence (Bales, 2005, p. 113).

Economically driven, human slavery arises from the downward pressure on wage rates and prices engendered by increased competition and the portability of capital across borders (Bales, 2000, p. 481). In addition, large scale capital flows from foreign investors to countries that lack effective internal regulatory systems have also been known to increase corruption within political systems, one of the key factors that make slavery possible (Bales, 2000, p. 481). Another important factor is that if businesses, or, in the case of this research, brothels and other prostitution related establishments, are allowed to seek the highest returns from slaves with little or no ethical or legal restraints, slavery is able to flourish (Bales, 2000, p. 482). Trafficking is a significantly profitable industry. It is estimated that if sums were averaged to reflect a world population of 27 million slaves, the total yearly profit generated by slavery would be in the order of US$13 billion (Bales, 2000, p. 471). Consistent
with this projection, the UN has estimated the total market value of human trafficking at $32 billion, with $10 billion being made on the sale of individuals and the rest being profits on the victims’ labour (Lal Panjabi, 2008, p. 6). Human trafficking is attractive as a business venture because it does not require a large capital investment and it frequently involves little risk of discovery by law enforcement. In addition, trafficking victims, unlike drugs, can be resold and used repeatedly by human traffickers (U.S Department of State, 2002, p. 2). It is because free slave labour is highly profitable for those who are not averse to exploiting their fellow human, and reducing them to mere objects to be traded commercially that slavery has spread internationally (Lal Panjabi, 2008, p. 6).

2.8 The impact of globalisation on migration patterns

A key feature of globalisation is the “increased velocity of the diffusion of ideas, goods, information, capital and people” (Held and McGrew, 2004, p. 1). This diffusion is in one direction, however, with the North being advantaged and the South significantly disadvantaged (Dobson, 2005, p. 263). In the movement of people, for those in the North, space seems to have almost been altogether erased as the means of traversing it (physically and virtually) becomes ever more rapid, while for those in the South space is what encloses them, thick, material and resistant (Dobson, 2005). This idea is supported by Bauman’s notion that the world’s inhabitants are distinguished by their ability to traverse space as and when they wish:

For the inhabitants of the first world (developed countries) – the increasingly cosmopolitan, extraterritorial world of global businessmen, global culture managers or global academics, state borders are levelled down, as they are dismantled for the world’s commodities, capital and finances. For the inhabitants of the second world (the South), the walls built of immigration controls, of residence laws and of ‘clean streets’ and ‘zero tolerance’ policies, grow taller; the moats separating them from the sites of their desire and of dreamed-of redemption grow deeper, while all
bridges, at the first attempt to cross them, prove to be drawbridges (Bauman, 1998, p. 89).

It is suggested that the key underlying causes of human trafficking lie in the pull of the North in the globalised world economy, and the exclusive border and migration policies of the global North that create a nexus between trafficking and migration (Wylie and McRedmond, 2010, p. 7). The newest phase of globalisation has resulted in global migration for survival, a situation whereby millions of people, many of them children, are crossing borders clandestinely looking for employment (Bales, 2004). Legal possibilities for migration from the poorer to more affluent parts of the globalised economy are largely non-existent for ‘unskilled’ workers, leaving many people prey to smugglers and traffickers who can move them into the more prosperous centres of globalisation (Wylie and McRedmond, 2010, p. 8). Because of the huge number of poor persons willing to take the risk of clandestine migration, traffickers are able to constantly “fish in the sea of migration” in order to find new slaves (Coomaraswamy 2001, p. 3). Many of these migrants will end up in situations which could be described as forms of modern-day slavery where, deprived of their liberty, personal documents and other rights, they will face long periods of confinement in brothels, sweat shops, fishing boats and other places of forced labour (Bales, 2005).

Scholars argue that one form of globalisation is more ubiquitous than any other – human migration (Held et al, 1999, p. 283). The key concepts from globalisation theory can be brought to bear on patterns of migration concerning their extensity, their intensity, their velocity, their impact on host and home, states and societies, as well as the unevenness that arises, in part, from hierarchies of power among different migrant groups (Held et al, 1999, p. 283). Turner and Kelly argue that liberal economic and trade policies, and the new infrastructures and advanced technologies characteristic of globalisation, have not only accelerated migration, they have also fuelled changes in patterns of contemporary migration (2008, p. 191). The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) is one of the key organisations that have tried to make clear the link between migration flows and human
trafficking. IOM (2000) argues that human trafficking constitutes the antithesis of humane and orderly migration. In a similar vein Van Impe describes human trafficking as an “epiphenomenon within the continuum of the migration cycle” (2000, p. 15). Trafficking must be seen in the larger context of illegal migration flows and analysed against the backdrop of worldwide economic and political change (Van Impe, 2000, p. 123). Illegal migration and trafficking are driven by push and pull factors that cause people to leave their country either through legitimate or illicit channels (Aronowitz, 2001, p. 170). The root causes of migration, both licit and illicit, lay in the social, economic and political conditions in the sending countries – rapid growth of population, persistent poverty, high unemployment, internal conflicts resulting in widespread violence and civil disorder, oppressive political regimes and grave violations of human rights (Gunatilleke, 1994, p. 65). At a different level, inequalities in living standards as between the more developed and less developed countries and rising consumer expectations act as push factors that induce people to migrate in search of opportunities for a better life (Gunatilleke, 1994, p. 65).

Although not all migration as a consequence of globalisation or loss of livelihoods can be called trafficking, there have been increasing instances of migrants being trafficked both as a cause or consequence of these factors (Banjeree, 2003, p. 1). The consequence of globalisation for human trafficking is the easing of physical transit for traffickers and their victims, but also more tightly controlled country borders and an increased demand for trafficking victims. Although the ease of legal travel has increased, many countries have tightened border security in order to appear to be taking a tough stance on illegal migration and trafficking. This is particularly the case in recent years since the United States (US) Government has published its annual ‘Trafficking in Persons Report’, which names and shames the countries that are not complying with the United States’ benchmarks for government action on the trafficking issue. Countries that do not comply with US benchmarks for anti-trafficking action can be subject to sanctions and other punishments. One manner in which countries have attempted to prove their commitment to the anti-trafficking cause is by tightening immigration requirements and increasing border patrols. Even the 2000 UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children (Palermo Protocol) highlighted the need for increased border security with the objective that prosecution of traffickers would curtail cross border smuggling. Such policies have, however, had negative effects. Instead of contributing to the eradication of trafficking, related government policy has instead forced the individuals who would previously have attempted to migrate legally, to turn to smugglers and traffickers to help them navigate the often difficult terrain across national borders to their point of destination (Marshall, 2001). This leaves open the very real possibility of migrating adults and children falling victim to the lure of traffickers. In addition, globalisation has eased the costs and troubles associated with moving trafficking victims over great distances, making the practice even more appealing to those who plan to profit. Due to mass media and communication trafficking victims have some understanding of exotic foreign lands and opportunities but, on the other hand, have little chance of escape once they find themselves in a strange land with a foreign language. The ease of Internet communication has facilitated the trafficking process and traffickers can now find their victims online (David, 2000). This occurs through fake recruitment agencies that promise young girls jobs in foreign countries but are, in fact, a means for traffickers to recruit victims to be enslaved in brothels (David, 2000).

Migrants, especially child migrants, are dependent on agents and employers and are extremely vulnerable to exploitation in insecure and unfamiliar environments (Banerjee, 2003, p. 4). Exploitation can be economic (low or no wages) but exploitation can also be sexual or psychosocial (Banerjee, 2003, p. 4). Victims are, as Banerjee explains, exploited and prevented from escape through the employer’s retention of passports, violence or the threat of violence (2003, p. 4). In the case of adults, migration can become trafficking at different points of the migration process, however, in the case of children, even if they consented to the exploitative situation that they ended up in, they are victims of trafficking from the first moment in accordance with the Palermo Protocol definition of child trafficking. In recent years scholars have noted that, even armed with adequate information about the risks of trafficking and exploitation, migrants will still risk the journey due to the constraints characterising their own situation that create a mental disposition favouring emigration (Nieuwenhuys and Pecoud, 2007, p. 1686).
2.9 Conclusion

This chapter has provided a critical analysis of how human trafficking takes place within the current global political economy. Using the conceptual lens of cosmopolitan theory, the chapter has summarised the links between globalisation, the global political economy, poverty and inequality and discussed how these affect vulnerable humans, particularly women and girls. The chapter has posited that women and young girls from poor families are more likely to become victims of human trafficking as they migrate outside their home villages and countries in search for work. The chapter has explored the supply and demand sides of human trafficking, and the various push and pull factors that exacerbate the child trafficking problem. The next chapter will discuss the growth of TANs as buffers against child trafficking and other social problems.
Chapter 3.

Collaborative advocacy around concrete issues in an era of globalisation

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter has reflected on the notion that globalisation is having a significant negative impact on human development. Cosmopolitan globalists believe that modern globalisation has negative consequences for lower classes and poorer states in the periphery (Cohn, 2008, p. 370). A related trend, particularly within international political economy, has been the recognition of non-state actors as increasingly important players in the global political economy (Higgott et al, 2000). This chapter discusses the literature on the motivations and politics of TANs and examines the critical questions of what TANs do and why they do it. The examination of TAN motivations and politics is situated internationally and regionally (Southeast Asia) and focuses on TANs in the current era of globalisation; TANs responding to inequality; the shared values and collective identity in TANs; and internal and external stakeholders and the complexities that arise in networking in a stakeholder saturated environment. In regards to TANs in the current era of globalisation, in the GMS region there exists a complex interplay between the individuals, especially Western aid workers and grassroots NGO staff, organisations, TANs, elites, donors, governments, and the subjects of TAN intervention. This chapter discusses this complex interplay and discusses how TAN politics and network coordination contribute to their effectiveness. In this chapter I support the cosmopolitan position that an important way to counter the negative aspects of globalisation is to develop a counter-hegemonic bloc composed of campaign advocates such as labour, human rights, environmental, consumer, development, and women’s groups. This chapter will first discuss the motivations of TANS – what they are doing internationally, and regionally in Southeast Asia, and why they perform this work. The chapter examines literature on the themes of collective values and norm building in response to social injustice. The chapter then examines recent literature on the complex interplay between partners and stakeholders, TANs’ relationships with states, and
the relationships between Southern and Northern network members, and relationships with other key players. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the literature on network ‘effectiveness’.

3.2 Transnational advocacy networks as key cosmopolitan actors: Transnational action and moral legitimacy

TANs can unequivocally be viewed as genuine cosmopolitan actors, as their establishment of an agenda and political community that transcends the state or local community, their transnational competence, and their moral legitimacy are pivotal features in demonstrating their cosmopolitan character (Carey, 2003, p. 7). TANs are well placed to act as legitimate advocates for humanity and wider human concerns (Carey, 2003, p. 7). TANs are promoting moral values and commitments that extend beyond political borders, as well as beyond ideological, socio-economic and religious divides (Carey, 2003, p. 7).

Transnational activism is a means to broaden political pressure globally on common issues affecting rural citizens, such as increasing poverty, marginalisation of the rural sector, land concentration, state and private monopolies, militarism and a decaying natural environment (Turner and Caouette, 2009, p. 952). Common to many regional and transnational advocacy efforts is the central place of discourse and knowledge production and their linkages to mobilisation, network building, and constituency building, in particular the growing connections between rural, per-urban and urban-based activists (Turner and Caouette, 2009, p. 952). In the theory on cosmopolitanism it is commonly argued that there are two distinct forms of cosmopolitanism – moral and political (Carey, 2003, p. 1). Moral cosmopolitanism refers, in general, to any position that prescribes types of political practice and institutions that operate over, above or across the boundaries of the nation-state and which are at least potentially global in their reach (Carey, 2003, p. 2). Alternatively, moral cosmopolitanism refers to any moral theory that presumes the universal validity and
applicability of moral principles, whereby moral commitments extend beyond political borders as well as ethnic, ideological, socio-economic and religious divides (Carey, 2003, p. 2). TANs are characterised by non-governmental actors, pursuit of universal perspectives on social issues, civility (for example, non-violence), and trust and cooperation among groups. Regarding their activities and the influence of TANs on domestic politics, TANs increase domestic policy processes by diversifying political actors in a country, and bringing about social change. Cosmopolitan democracy argues for a range of institutions below and above the level of the state to ensure individual protection and accountability in the light of economic globalisation and the increased importance of global issues of human rights, peace and ecology that require global responses. As argued by Dombrowski “the question is not whether this notion is in the province of scholars and commentators seeking to promote a particular vision or an empirical phenomenon with real effects upon social, economic, legal, and, ultimately political practices” (1998, p. 382). In this research it will be demonstrated that TANs possess the moral muscle for this cosmopolitan project.

This research demonstrates that TANs are essentially networks of members with shared moral sentiments and beliefs about the rights and obligations of certain actors in relation to others. At once principled and strategic, TANs seek to enforce the belief systems they embody, waging campaigns to alter negative practices and, instead, support notions of global social justice and cosmopolitan values. This is accomplished in a variety of ways, for example: framing issues to win the hearts and minds of others to their cause; mobilising reliable information and expertise on an issue in ways conducive to influencing policy and norms; or naming and shaming states for unethical practices. The central motivating factor for TANs is the desire to change outcomes deemed morally objectionable, whether these are poor government regulations, threats to individuals or ethnic groups, or the abuse of the vulnerable. Where TANs are effective, they have, at once, united diverse groups for a common cause, transformed values in the societies in which they have campaigned, improved social norms, created a shared space of responsibility, and protected the vulnerable. Commitment to shared values and principles (of global justice) is central to the
The uneven ‘force field’ of the cosmopolitical has produced and will continue to produce profound examples of politically oriented cosmopolitanisms: Amnesty International, Medecins Sans Frontieres, and the Asia Pacific People’s Environment Network, to name just a few examples (Carey, 2003, p. 5). TANs have emerged as prime movers on a broad range of global issues, framing agendas, mobilising constituencies toward targeted results, and monitoring compliance as a sort of new world police force (Carey, 2003, p. 5). NGOs are central to TANs and can be viewed as authentic cosmopolitan actors that have a fundamental role to play in embracing a community of humankind. Their ability to contribute to the development of a cosmopolitan world system is attributed primarily to two factors: their transnational competence and their moral legitimacy (Carey, 2003, p. 5). The increasingly invoked notion of ‘transnationalism’, referring to various kinds of global or cross-border connections, currently frames views regarding the operation of NGOs (Carey, 2003, p. 5). This transnational dimension of the NGO operational framework is a central factor in explaining their cosmopolitan disposition and it demonstrates their identification with a larger sphere of the world (Carey, 2003, p. 5). The transnational advocacy network formulation of interests beyond the state is impelled by the reality that many of the most serious problems faced today such as climate change and terrorism, have no respect for national borders, thus their solutions must be found in the international arena (Carey, 2003, p. 5). To the extent that TANs are motivated not by material gains and/or professionalism, but rather by shared ideas and values, they form a distinct category. They are not satisfied with policy change in their field of action but seek to reshape the institutional and ideational bases of international interactions (Keck and Sikkink, 1999, p. 2). TANs are only those transnational networks ‘organised to promote causes, principled ideas, and norms, and they often involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to a rationalist understanding of their interests’ (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p. 9). In the case of TANs the factor that motivates action is collective values, a shared interest in achieving global social justice, and intellectual and emotional dedication on the behalf of staff and
participants. The shared values of TANs drive their power that comes from the strength of common convictions among like-minded individuals and groups and from their credibility when speaking on a social justice issue.

The cosmopolitan nature of TANs is highlighted by the fact that they possess a significant degree of what has been termed ‘transnational competence’, indicating a strong ability to operate in a global environment (Carey, 2003, p. 5). TANs are transnationally competent actors that are knowledgeable about local, national and international roles that contribute in a decisive way to future global security and sustainability (Carey, 2003, p. 5). This competence is augmented by their often expansive international web of membership, facilitating access to information and expertise in specific policy areas that governments are unable to match, and is strengthened by the fact that they can adopt strategies of direct action disregarding the customs and conventions that sovereignty-bound governments are required to observe (Carey, 2003, p. 5). TANs are also strengthened by the fact that they are relatively independent and non-bureaucratic and thus they are able to be both flexible and innovative. In addition, TANs possess a high degree of moral legitimacy through their cosmopolitan commitment to the interests of humanity – NGOs are often referred to as the “conscience of the world” (Willetts, 1996, p. 11). There is a growing capacity for TANs to operate alongside governments in the international arena and to challenge their authority. The global scope and multi-layered complexity of new issues has increased the need for partnerships between the established state actors and proliferating NGOs (Thakur, 2002, p. 227).

An important factor in explaining the success of TANs is the strong desire of their partners to work together to achieve their objectives. TANs have been able to build ethical consensus on values and, in this regard, are establishing a form of moral cosmopolitanism. TANs can, therefore, unequivocally be viewed as genuine actors. Their establishment of an agenda and political community that transcends the state or local community, their transnational competence, and their moral legitimacy are pivotal factors in demonstrating
their cosmopolitan character (Carey, 2003, p. 7). This places TANs in a powerful position to act as legitimate advocates for human concerns such as child trafficking.

3.3 The motivations and politics of TANs

Motivations of TANs

Gilson (2011) argues that since Keck and Sikkink’s (1999) seminal work on TANs as structures of communication with the potential to transform the “terms and nature of the debate”, a wave of scholarship has followed that has attempted to identify the relevance of such groups, focusing in particular on themes of globalisation and legitimacy. In current literature on TANs it is argued that NGOs must pursue new and perhaps unexpected alliances to successfully affect change (Hale, 2011). Creative alliances achieve a number of purposes including broadening and deepening public support (Hale, 2011). Recent studies on the benefits of collaboration among advocacy organisations conclude that TANs can have significant influence in key debates and discussion, increase their political standing, and improve access and leverage as well as political influence (Dutting and Sogge, 2010, p. 351).

Contemporary globalisation challenges the assumption that civil society is confined merely to the national setting in relation to development, by extending the spatial scale of the relationship between political struggle and contentious development (Morvaridi, 2005, p. 133). TANs challenge states and other groups on a range of issues including human rights, gender issues, and the rights of ethnic and indigenous people (Morvaridi, 2005, p. 133). They articulate linkages between local impacts and wider global concerns (Morvaridi, 2005, p. 133).

Social protests no longer operate in isolated national or local spaces but, rather, are transnational, facilitated through an array of new technologies and telecommunications
including email and the Internet. TANs exist in essence as communicative, information-sharing structures enabling political exchange between NGOs, UN agencies, and governmental institutions by effectively linking locales and coordinating strategies for action (Morivaridi, 2005, p. 135). For Keck and Sikkink (1998) transnational networks operate as ‘advocacy networks’, producing a common discourse on particular contentious issues. In recent years an increasing number of scholars have written about the importance of TANs though, as Keck and Sikkink stated, “scholars have been slow to recognise either the rationality or the significance of activist networks” (1999, p. 2). Keck and Sikkink describe TANs as “actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services” (1999, p.89). Keck and Sikkink argued that TANs are motivated by values rather than by material concerns or professional norms, thus falling outside the accustomed categories (1999, p. 89). TANs’ activities are primarily geared toward realising social change goals, and they thus represent what Sikkink and Smith (2002) refer to as “social infrastructures for change”. TANs have the important ability to reach beyond policy change to advocate and instigate changes in the institutional and principled bases of international interactions. TANs are forms of organisation characterised by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). They are advocacy networks because advocates plead the causes of others or defend a cause or proposition (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p. 8). Their ability to generate information quickly and accurately, and to employ it effectively, is their most valuable currency and it is also central to their identity (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p. 10).

TANs seek influence in many of the same ways that other political groups or social movements do. Since they are not powerful in a traditional sense of the word, they must use the power of their information, ideas, and strategies to alter the information and value contexts within which states make policies (Keck and Sikkink, 1999, p. 16). TANs’ powers of influence also stem from their ability to operate transnationally, that is, beyond borders, and to extend their advocacy to all groups. The value of Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) approach is that they define TANs as a unified web with overarching aims and strategies and in doing
so they define the concept as a type of political actor worthy of academic and political attention. Keck and Sikkink (1998) see the local effectiveness of these global networks as built on three interrelated effects: Transmitting information, invoking norms, and shifting political venues. Networks gain their fundamental leverage from the global spread of certain basic norms centred on human dignity (Evans, 2000). What these networks achieve is a new form of political space beyond the state that transcends state boundaries and defies the traditional notion that development actors are bounded by local or national scales (Morvaridi, 2005, p. 135).

Transnational networks unite citizens across the world to advocate for certain global issues (Morvaridi, 2005, p. 135). TANs usually focus on one narrow issue that is of interest to all their participants while NGOs and other global activists typically have broad agendas focusing on a range of different human rights, environmental and other issues (Shawki, 2007, p. 12). Once established, networks campaign using a number of different tactics: the collection and strategic use and dissemination of credible information, and pressure on governments and other powerful actors to uphold the values, norms and principles that they have pledged to respect (Shawki, 2007, p. 14). A cosmopolitan view of globalisation suggests that the purpose of TANs is to challenge existing norms that create situations of inequality between sections of the human population. In a similar vein Risse-Kappen et al (1999) argued that the purpose of TANs is to influence the international norms that can shape domestic politics and society. It is still the case that the diffusion of international norms crucially depends on the establishment and the sustainability of networks among domestic and transnational actors who frequently link up with international regimes (Risse-Kappen et al, 1999, p. 5; Carpenter, 2007). The study of TANs is therefore concerned about the process through which principled ideas (“beliefs about right and wrong held by individuals”) become norms (“collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity”) (Jepperson et al, 1996, p. 54), which in turn influence the behaviour and domestic structure of states (Risse-Kappen et al, 1999, p. 7).
In comparison to other relationships between organisations, networks have the potential to provide a more flexible, flat and non-hierarchical means of exchange and interaction that promises to be more innovative, responsive and dynamic, while overcoming spatial separation and providing scale economies (Henry et al, 2004, p. 839). The perceived advantages of these kinds of networks fit with NGOs’ ideologies concerning their presumed comparative advantage over the state and market. The modern aid industry encourages collaboration and co-production and has created a range of relationships, not just between state, the UN and NGOs, and NGOs and civil society, but also amongst NGOs themselves, including alliances, coalitions and networks. International NGOs and UN agencies seeking social transformation collaborate on a number of levels to influence global governance. They create and activate global networks, participate in multilateral arenas, facilitate inter-state cooperation, and act within states to influence policy and enhance public participation (Alger, 1997). Even in areas often considered to be the sole domain of states such as international security, TANs can play a role in shaping the agenda and contributing to policy change (Price, 1998).

In a media-saturated global environment, the communicative power of TANs - the capacity to reach a global audience and shape international public opinion – is considerable (Held, 2002, p. 69). This is manifest in the ways the networks exert influence by exploiting distinctive political strategies including influencing public attitudes, interests and identities; redefining the agenda of local, national and global politics; providing communities and citizens with a voice in global decision-making fora; and seeking to make governments and corporations accountable for their actions and decisions (Held, 2002, p. 69). Although a decade or so old, as the network literature has demonstrated, networks do a great many things including lobbying governments, standard-setting, monitoring of compliance with standards and laws, and naming and shaming norm violators (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). In the last decade many TANs have developed in the fields of advocacy and policy within the environmental movement, the women’s movement and the human rights movement, amongst many others. Among the more recent and successful transnational campaigns are the Jubilee 2000 ‘drop the debt’ campaign, the AIDS campaign, the international coalition
for the establishment of the International Criminal Court, the campaign against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, and the Ottawa Convention banning landmines (Held, 2002, p. 69).

In the growing literature on TANs they are seen to challenge existing structures of hierarchical authority and governance (Gilson, 2011, p. 289). Devetak and Higgott have suggested that, theoretically, one of the functions performed by non-state actors is to hold states and intergovernmental organisations to account (1999, p. 491). In much the same way that domestic civil society expresses itself via the public sphere, TANs are attempting to voice their concerns in a global public sphere (Devetak and Higgott, 1999, p. 491). While these groups remain outside the official realm of the institutions of states, they seek to establish the interests and rights of those generally excluded from discussion (Devetak and Higgott, 1999, p. 491). While this global public sphere is still in an ‘embryonic’ stage, it is possible to see the contours of an evolving arena where social movements, non-state actors and ‘global citizens’ joining with states and international organisations in a dialogue over the exercise of power and authority across the globe (Devetak and Higgott, 1999, p. 491). This can be seen to have come to fulfilment in recent years, for example, in the development of the Millennium Development Goals. In such a theoretical formulation, TANs and other kinds of transnational associations become the principal actors in the reconstruction of political authority at the global level (Devetak and Higgott, 1999, p. 492). This idea relies on transnational associations bringing together politically, culturally and territorially diverse organisations and individuals to advance a common agenda on one or another issue of global import (Devetak and Higgott, 1999, p. 492).

Arts (1998) has argued that the purpose of organisational advocacy is to exercise political influence, which he defines as “the achievement of (a part of) one’s policy goal with regard to an outcome in treaty formation and implementation, which is (at least partly) caused by one’s own and intentional intervention in the political arena and process concerned”. The aim of TANs, it follows, is not just the initial impact on decision-makers, but also to influence
the collective policy outcome, namely the treaties concerned (Stokman, 1994). Some researchers define influence as “the modification of one actor’s behaviour by that of another” (Cox and Jacobsen, 1973, p. 3). This definition is appropriate for domestic origin networks that generally seek to influence a state or corporate actor to change its policies. However, influence can also be felt without behavioural changes such as occurs when actors recognise a new problem, enhance their knowledge of an issue, attend issue-oriented conferences, prioritise the issue in debate or policy-making arenas or accept new beliefs or norms about the issue (Heckel, 2005, p. 24). Researchers have illustrated a variety of strategies that advocacy network organisations use to exert influence. Most scholars describe, for example, NGOs influencing others through the collection and dissemination of expert information, as the ‘mobilisation of shame’ or ‘information politics’ (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Bryer and Magrath highlight the importance of information within TANs in their argument that above all, what moves, and in doing so moves everything else, is information (1999, p. 169). Rapid, even instantaneous, information exchange can put people in touch with each other as never before, creating the possibility of new strategic alliances with concerned people. The provision of expert information can generate attention to particular issues, provoke debates in multiple arenas, set agendas in international conferences or frame the problem in ways that motivate states and other groups and individuals to change their behaviour (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p. 25).

TANs use global networks and ideologies to shift the balance of power at the local level in favour of the dispossessed (Evans, 2000, p. 231). As discussed in the previous chapter they are not likely to overturn the whole state and market apparatus, however, they constitute challenges to ‘business as usual’ both globally and locally, and are in this sense ‘counter-hegemonic’ (Evans, 2000, p. 231). In a cosmopolitan globalist reading Falk had argued for a new focus on ‘globalisation from below’ rather than the typical ‘globalisation from above’ (1999, p. 139). Falk suggested that the historic role of ‘globalisation from below’ was to challenge and transform the negative features of globalisation from above, both by providing alternative ideological and political space to that currently occupied to market-oriented and statist outlooks and by offering resistance to the excesses and distortions that
can be attributed to globalisation (1999, p. 139). These processes have been described by some theorists as ‘global politics’ – a term that usefully captures the stretching of political relations across space and time, and the expansion of political power and political activity across the boundaries of the nation state (Held et al, 1999, p. 49). The idea of global politics challenges the traditional distinctions between domestic, international, inside/outside, territorial/non-territorial politics, as embedded in conventional conceptions of the ‘political’ (Held et al, 1999, p. 50). According to a cosmopolitan reading, although governments and states remain powerful actors, they now share the global arena with an array of other agencies and organisations including intergovernmental organisations, international agencies, quasi-supranational institutions such as the European Union and non-state actors including transnational bodies such as multinational corporations, transnational pressure groups, transnational professional associations, and social movements (Held, et al, 1999, p. 50). The growth in the number of new forms of political agency and organisation reflects the rapid expansion of transnational links, and the corresponding desire by most states for some form of international governance to deal with collective policy problems (Held, et al, 1999, p. 50).

**Politics of TANs**

Whilst understanding the motivations of TANs is important, ultimately only a study of their politics can explain how and why TANs are effective. This section of the chapter discusses recent literature regarding the evolution, dynamics, processes and politics of TANs and how these politics determine whether networks become sustainable and effective.

TANs often form in one of two ways: Northern NGOs or UN agencies approach Southern NGOs and offer to lend their voice, resources and funding power to the development of a network. Alternately, Southern NGOs approach larger, Northern NGOs and UN agencies and request their assistance in organising a network campaign to influence states in order to achieve social change. Keck and Sikkink (1999) referred to this latter approach as the ‘boomerang’. The boomerang theory applies where a government violates or refuses to
recognise rights - in this study the rights of children to be protected from sex trafficking - and where individuals and domestic groups of the norm-violating country often have no recourse within domestic political or judicial arenas (Keck and Sikkink, 1999, p. 89). They may therefore seek international connections to express their concerns and even to protect their lives (Keck and Sikkink, 1999, p. 89). While many networks have come together in the boomerang method, others have evolved more organically. Hertel (2006) has identified further patterns of campaign development within networks, such as ‘blocking’ or ‘backdoor moves’, which allow for weaker members of networks to influence the overarching campaign. Drawing from social movement theory Hertel (2006) describes both as ‘mechanisms’ for campaign development.

Keck and Sikkink (1998) suggest two reasons that account for the emergence of TANs. Political entrepreneurs, essentially activists who are deeply committed to a certain cause, establish networks when they think that cooperation within a network can advance their cause. In international politics, networking had become an effective and therefore increasingly common form of transnational activity since the 1990s (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p. 12) and continues today across a range of key social, environmental and economic issues (Carpenter, 2007; Dutting and Sogge, 2010). Furthermore, enhanced opportunities for international contacts, the decreasing cost of international travel and communications and the rise of international conferences as fora for addressing social concerns have contributed to the proliferation of networks across the North and South.

Recent literature on TANs has identified and described different transnational advocacy network structures. The development and sustainability of a network structure is crucial to network effectiveness as the structure of the network informs communication amongst network partners, resource and funds management, and stakeholder responsibility. Two decades ago Rucht (1997) had identified two different types of advocacy network structures: Horizontal and vertical. Horizontal coordination consists of coordination between groups from different countries where none dominates the other (McAdam,
Tarrow and Tilly, 2001). Cumbers, Routledge and Nativel (2008) describe the ‘horizontal’ operation logic as where groups engage in a decentred, non-hierarchical network of relations. These are characterised by flow, multidimensionality, varying intensities of effect and affiliation, and unpredictability as opposed to status, hierarchy, obligation and predictability that is found in other structures (Cumbers et al, 2008, p. 187). Such an operational logic strives to work outside of formal political structures, eschew leadership roles, and represent active challenges to formal ways of decision making, emphasising the need to accept responsibility for acting (Cumbers, et al, 2008, p. 187). Vertical coordination of TANs refers to a pattern where national groups not only coordinate directly but do so through an international body that has some influence and, therefore, is not just a node of communication. The overall structure is decentralised, thus limiting the power of the international body and facilitating a flow of communication from the bottom to the top as well as direct communication among national sections (McAdam et al, 2001). Whichever form the advocacy network takes it is likely that there will be some internal challenges in terms of maintaining a democratic structure and forging strong relationships amongst all stakeholders due to variances of opinion, goals or value systems. This, then, presents a challenge to being part of a truly cosmopolitan network, given that democracy itself is unevenly defined.

One of the defining characteristics of TANs is that they cohere around cosmopolitan principled beliefs that can be loosely translated to mean normative ideas that provide criteria to distinguish right from wrong. Collective values and identity are crucial to network effectiveness. Collective identity is described by Melucci as the “result of purposes, resources, and limits, as a purposive orientation constructed by means of social relationships within a system of opportunities and constraints” (1995, p. 43). The actors ‘produce’ the collective action because they are able to define themselves and their relationship with the environment (Melucci, 1995). The definition that the actors construct is not linear but produced by interaction, negotiation and the opposition of different orientations (Melucci, 1995, p. 43). Individuals or subgroups, with their similar values and goals, contribute to the formation of a collective ‘we’. Smith suggests that collective
identities represent the mesh between the individual and cultural systems or the sets of attitudes, commitments, and rules for behaviour that those who assume the identity can be expected to subscribe to (2002, p. 506). Such identities are negotiated by activists themselves in their production of the collective ‘we’ in relation to opponents (Smith, 2002, p. 507). Melucci also argues that a certain degree of emotional investment, which enables individuals to feel like part of a common unity, is required in the definition of collective identity (1995, p. 43). Collective identity is never entirely negotiable because participation in collective action is endowed with meaning but cannot be reduced to cost-benefit calculation and always mobilises emotions as well (Melucci, 1995, p. 45). Smith suggests that geographic boundaries, limited shared experiences, cultural diversity, and high transaction costs are likely to complicate the process of collective identity formation for transnational organisations but that organisations with capacities for routine transnational exchange and negotiation may be able to overcome such obstacles (2002, p. 507).

From a more pragmatic perspective, some theorists such as Faulkner (1995) have suggested that more relevant to network survival than values and collective identity is resources. Faulkner (1995) claims that the key to an organisation’s survival is the ability to acquire and maintain relevant resources. Edwards and McCarthy suggest that five types of resources are important to networks: Moral, cultural, socio-organisational, human and material resources (2004, pp 125 – 128). Moral resources encompass “legitimacy, solidarity support, sympathetic support, and celebrity” (Edwards and McCarthy, 2004, p. 125). Cultural resources may include the knowledge and skills needed to produce campaign materials or to network with like-minded groups (Edwards and McCarthy, 2004, p. 125). Human resources refer to labour, leadership skills and in-depth knowledge of related issues, all resources that “inhere in individuals rather than in socio-organisational structures of culture more generally” (Edwards and McCarthy, 2004, p. 127). Finally, material resources include money and other resources such as office space, computers and other office supplies. Faulkner argued that it is not merely organisational efficiency, but organisational power and the capacity of the organisation to preserve itself that determines competitive survival (Faulkner, 1995, p. 16). When the supply of a resource is stable and abundant, problems in
TANs are unlikely. However, when an environment is changing and the resource is no longer certain and stable, the organisation becomes increasingly vulnerable (Yanacopulos, 2005, p. 98). Yanacopulos argues that resource uncertainty may in fact result in greater efforts at network coordination (2005, p. 98).

In a study exploring networks, Katcher (2010) interviewed committed network leaders and developed a key perspective on TANs and networks within social movements. Katcher claims that the fluidity causes movement networks to sometimes appear disorganised and unwieldy, which has led to a devaluing of their contribution and a push for more formal structure and control (2010, p. 54). Openness and flexibility are necessary components of such networks (Katcher, 2010, p. 54). Networks that do not have the ability to learn, adapt and change will wither and become uninviting and ultimately irrelevant to new leaders (Katcher, 2010, p. 54). Moreover, they lose the ability to respond authentically to political and membership complexities and ever-changing needs of movements in the context of the “unstill waters of society” (Katcher, 2010, p. 54). From her scholarly research on networks Katcher (2010) highlights the key ingredients for a successful network, including agreement on a shared political frame: Network members must understand, integrate and contribute to a shared vision; align on shared values and principles; and deepen a sense of trust, belonging and identity. In a similar vein Dutting and Sogge (2010) point to four factors sustaining network interaction: Personal trust, particularly at the level of leaders - without this social ‘glue’ at the top, NGOs cannot easily keep inter-organisational links alive; pragmatism - clear division and complementarity of tasks, and transparency. The scholars also suggest a number of factors putting collaboration at risk, or blocking it altogether, including irreconcilable differences in organisations’ ideologies and objectives; irreconcilable differences in leadership styles, leading to problems of transparency and insufficient mutual respect and trust; competition among NGOs for donor funding; and NGO fears of being submerged with others, with resulting loss of visibility and means to claim accomplishments as their own (Dutting and Sogge, 2010, p. 354). Furthermore, as argued by Dyrud et al, the scarcity of donor funds for most organisations can cause more competition than cooperation (2007, p. 23). There are naturally perhaps as many obstacles as benefits to
organisational collaboration in TANs. When joining collective structures, organisations run the risk of losing control over their own activities (Yanacopulos, 2005, p. 98). Pfeffer and Salancik emphasise that the “price for inclusion in any collective structure is the loss of discretion and control over one’s activities” (1984, p. 134). It has been claimed that to gain control over the activities of another organisation, the focal organisation must surrender some of its own autonomy (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1984, p. 134).

Autonomy is also defined relationally in the context of North-South relations of power: an autonomous organisation is able to maintain horizontal relations with other actors as equals, while a dependent organisation, by contrast, becomes locked into vertical relations, often with a donor, in which its freedom to determine its own strategic direction is constrained (Brehm, 2004, p. 1). Within TANs, exchange takes the form of individuals engaged in mutually supportive action and the networks are in a constant state of flux as objectives and members change (Henry et al, 2004, p. 8). Networks involve committing resources to mutually acceptable objectives, sharing risks and long term collaboration (Henry et al, 2004, p. 8). Powell argues that each party is dependent on resources controlled by another and benefits are gained by pooling resources as both benefits and burdens are shared, “in essence, the parties to a network agree to forego the right to pursue their own interests at the expense of others” (1994, p. 247). However, while some of these characteristics are applicable to relationships between Northern members in TANs, the position of Southern participants is more questionable. Northern TAN members may attempt to legitimise themselves to donors and states by reference to their membership of such networks whilst simultaneously legitimising their relationship with Southern partners by reference to their expertise (Hudson, 2001, p. 335). Henry et al suggest that the claim that TANs are somehow more responsive to traditional knowledge is also questionable since it is highly likely that they are legitimising their own beliefs and practices or at best articulating their interpretations whilst presenting them as the views of the marginalised (2004, p. 13). Brehm argues that in the specific context of interactions between NGOs in the North and the South, partnerships supposedly bring benefits related to the comparative advantages of the two sets of organisations (201, p. 7). However there is an inherent
contradiction here as in reality partnerships between Northern and Southern NGOs are generally imbalanced in favour of the North, given its control over resources (Brehm, 2001, p. 11). The power distortions in networks that arise from the transfer of resources can undermine mutuality; this means that partnerships need to compensate by respecting non-monetary contributions, especially the knowledge and expertise of Southern partners (Muchunguzi and Milne, 1995, p. 24). Furthermore, as highlighted by Fisher, the flows of information and resources within TANs are “not seamless, smooth, or consistent, and organisational structures may function as points that constrict as well as encourage flows of money, people, information, development workers, bureaucrats, and activists” (1997, p. 453). Not all Southern coalitions have been able to avail themselves of TANs, and coalitions of Northern NGOs have selectively assisted Southern groups, depending on the utility of specific issues for furthering their own agendas (Fisher, 1997, p. 453).

Yanacopulos explains that a key motivation for NGOs in forming networks and coalitions is their economies of scale (2005, p. 101). Advocacy at the global level is extremely expensive and no one organisation can afford to finance and support a global advocacy campaign (Yanacopulos, 2005, p. 101). This factor has influenced the strategic reconfigurations of organisations. Furthermore, information sharing and the specialisation of skills is also an essential cost saving and value-added element of forming networks and coalitions (Yanacopulos, 2005, p. 101). An additional benefit of networks is that they harness expertise through pooling research, staff, funds and resources. Another key network motivation is to take advantage of the strengths or comparative advantages of different NGOs as well as the expertise of the UN agency partners (Hudson, 2002, p. 411). Perhaps most important reason, however, is the collective weight that such cooperation can provide (Hudson, 2002, p. 411). As Baehr (1996) argues, by aligning, organisations can minimise overlapping endeavours and share resources. Baehr (1996), writing about human rights NGOs and particularly his experience with Amnesty International, discusses both the advantages and disadvantages of NGO collaboration. He suggests that NGOs can be more effective through cooperation because they can maximise resources and avoid duplication of efforts (Baehr, 1996). However, he also likens NGO collaboration to ‘herding cats’ and
emphasises the challenges of maintaining legitimacy, independence and goals within NGO collaborative efforts (Baehr, 1996).

Baehr’s (1996) comments regarding the challenges of collaboration can arguably be applied to most examples of TAN coordination, and his comments illustrate some of the obstacles to effective coordination that occur amongst members of TANs against child sex trafficking in the Mekong Subregion. In this region a complex interplay exists between TANs, states, individuals and the recipients of TANs’ advocacy – victims and traffickers. Positive collaboration occurs frequently but TANs also experience contention as they attempt to navigate difficult political terrain in order to organise partners, coordinate campaigns, lobby governments, provide services to victims and communicate with partners regionally and transnationally. The collective values and goals of TAN members provide a ‘glue’ to their collaborative work but in the case of child sex trafficking there continues to be debate over the issues of victim ‘rescues’, prostitution, and addressing the ‘demand’ side of trafficking. These politics, and their centrality in informing TAN effectiveness, will be examined throughout this and the rest of the research chapters.

This section of the chapter has discussed the motivations and politics of TANs. A further discussion of some of the obstacles to effective networking such as complex North-South relations, will be provided in later sections of the chapter. The next section of the chapter focuses on the transnational advocacy networking that is currently occurring in Southeast Asia.

3.4 Transnational advocacy networks in Southeast Asia

While organised collective action is strong in certain regions of the world, transnational activism is a relatively new phenomenon in Southeast Asia. Diverse social movements and
TANs have emerged in Asia in the past four decades in response to emerging problems such as chronic poverty and inequality. The past twenty years has seen greater democracy take root in most of Asia, and there have been increased political freedoms, even in some tightly controlled societies such as China and Vietnam. The People’s Power movements, in the Philippines in 1986, in China in 1989, and mass demonstrations in Myanmar in 1988 and Thailand in 1992 and 2010, were a new symptom of a new approach to politics spurned by the growth of a new middle class.

Transnational activism emerged in Southeast Asia as a response to socioeconomic and political processes associated with globalisation, as well as a consequence of relative and limited political liberalisation that has characterised some Southeast Asian countries (Caouette, 2007, p. 150). As Loh and Ojendal note that “for although the Southeast Asian countries enjoyed unprecedented high rates of economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s, and experienced pluralisation of their societies, nevertheless, the state authorities continued to dominate over their societies” (2005, p.3). Transnational activist organisations in Southeast Asia have established themselves in countries where relative political space existed, or at least allowed, for global organising (Caouette, 2007, p. 150).

In recent decades in Southeast Asia, as in many other regions of the world, there has been a growing tendency to organise and work transnationally. The Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and increasingly Malaysia host various forms of transnational activist organisations (Caouette, 2006, p. 6). Today Bangkok, Manila, and Jakarta act as “nodes of transnational activism”, places that “provide not only the practical infrastructure required by transnational NGO networks, but also a political climate that is not too hostile toward civil society activism” (Piper and Uhlin, 2004, p. 14). As discussed by Piper and Uhlin (2004, p. 19):

> Considering fairly recent and ongoing changes towards democratisation in this region, it is not surprising to find rising civil society activism in general and increasing number of NGOs in particular. Transnational linkages within the region are part and
parcel of this development – although numerically not as developed as in other parts of the world.

In Southeast Asia in particular issues related to human rights, election monitoring, environmental issues and regional integration as well as economic globalisation have been prominent themes of transnational organising (Caouette, 2006). Human trafficking has also been a central theme leading to the formation of cross-border networks in this region (Caouette, 2006, p. 6).

Until recently, local NGOs working independently of Southeast Asian governments did not exist (Pednekar, 1995). The economic liberalisation programs launched by these centrally planned countries in the late 1980s, however, have brought specific changes conducive to the formation of more independent development-oriented groups (Pednekar, 1995). In Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia, following the introduction of economic reforms in 1998, it has become mandatory for NGOs to be involved in reviewing government policy and suggesting reforms.

More funding and international changes led in the 1980s to far more non-governmental activity in Asia. Moreover, there was a shift in focus as political repression lessened and there was a growing interest and concern with various marginalised groups such as ethnic minorities and women (Gilson, 2008). The growth in the usage of the Internet quickened the pace of social learning and development amongst such networks (Gilson, 2008). In Southeast Asia transnational activism has been a defining feature of civil society processes, especially since the 1997 Financial Crisis (Caouette, 2006, p. 12). In this region TANs have produced shared identifies and a common understanding of issues, as well as generated common campaigns and proposals that can be put forward during regional and international gatherings and implemented both at the regional and national levels (Caouette, 2006, p. 12). Furthermore, TANs’ activism has connected grassroots NGOs’ struggles to a broader set
of issues and struggles, thus amplifying the work being performed at the local level in the region. Not only have TANs come to be accepted by the states of the GMS region, but they now carry with them a much more international focus and demonstrate the confidence to work with external groups (Gilson, 2008). Simultaneously, groups are no longer simply working alone, but increasingly are collaborating at other regional and international levels in order to gain greater leverage and strengthen their own claims (Gilson, 2008).

The development of NGOs in Cambodia and Thailand has followed different strands depending on the socio-political situation in these countries. NGOs have emerged in these countries when the political environment has been relatively open and free from rigid State control (Pednekar, 1995). In Thailand, which has enjoyed longer periods of political stability and political freedom, local NGOs are the most diversified in mainland Southeast Asia and are now a force capable of creating social change. NGOs in Cambodia are independent of the government partly because most were formed during the UNTAC period of the early 1990s, and after Cambodia’s return to democracy following the 1993 elections (Pednekar, 1995). Cambodian NGOs receive support from international NGOs, donor agencies including various UN bodies, and governments of other countries. The Cambodian government itself provides little, indeed any, support (Pednekar, 1995). Pednekar (1995) argues that according to NGO workers in Cambodia, the government’s attitude toward local NGOs is more suspicion than cooperation. The Cambodian NGO sector has emerged in the mirror image of international NGOs since the opening up of the country in 1991 (Brehm, 2004, p. 3). In a context where the state was the sole actor in development over many decades, Cambodian NGOs are now filling the gaps that are emerging after decades of conflict (Brehm, 2004, p. 3).

Religion has also played a role in the proliferation of NGOs in Southeast Asia. In Thailand the Christian church is fully recognised by the Thai government and benefits from religious freedom (Horstmann, 2011, p. 88). This political tolerance has motivated the presence of multiple Christian missionary agencies in Northern Thailand, from where they operate in the
politically much more sensitive environments of the neighbouring countries (Horstmann, 2011, p. 88). For many people in Southeast Asia, survival becomes a daily struggle collecting garbage, working in factories, or as wage labour under the minimum wage, while Christian networks provide shelter, food and security in a hostile environment (Horstmann, 2011, p. 92). In Thailand, while the state puts severe constraints on the movement of refugees in the borderland by confining them to the borderland, Christian missionaries present themselves as saviours as they provide crucial access to humanitarian aid, social services, transnational networks and global ideologies that are closely associated with modernity and education (Horstmann, 2011, p. 93).

Since the atmosphere of suspicion in the 1970s when, during the height of the Communist Party of Thailand’s insurgent activities, grassroots-level NGOs were accused of being communist front organisations, the NGO-government relationship has come a long way to at least the beginnings of sustained coordination (Pednekar, 1995). Recent decades have seen TANs in the GMS region play an increasingly influential role in framing the debate around a wide variety of international policy concerns (Ratner, 2003, p. 75). The government of Thailand has accepted that NGOs do not work against the system and that they are often effective in overseeing projects at grassroots levels (Pednekar, 1995). NGOs too are beginning to accept that they alone provide no alternative to development and that their job is to complement the work of government and official donor organisations (Ruland and Ladavalya, 1991, p. 58).

The development of Thai NGOs has run parallel with recent socio-economic changes. The initial wave of NGOs concentrated on health, literacy and economic activities as a means of promoting overall human development (Pednekar, 1995). Securing funding is going to become a more challenging task for Thai NGOs as external funding which, according to one estimate, accounts for 70 – 90 percent of the budget of most NGOs, is declining (Pednekar, 1995). With its rising economic prosperity, Thailand is receiving significantly lower priorities from external funding agencies (Pednekar, 1995).
Not all transnational activism in Southeast Asia, however, has proved constructive. The Red-Yellow Shirt struggle in Thailand is a good example of this and has raised questions regarding issues of class, poverty, labour movement politics, the Thai governments’ support (or lack thereof) of social movements, and the activism of academics and NGOs in Thailand. The Red Shirts – so called because of the colour they wear to identify themselves and their group’s formation – were originally inspired by political activists and social critics. Members are mainly rural workers from outside Bangkok but the group also includes students and activists who see attempts by the urban and military elite to control Thai politics as a threat to democracy. The political crisis and unrest in Thailand during the last decade represents a class war between the rich conservative elites (Yellow Shirts) and the urban and rural poor (Red Shirts) (Ungpakorn, 2009, p. 76). The Red Shirts have in the past decade successfully mobilised millions of Thai citizens who felt cheated by the government, the existing economic system, and felt disenfranchised. The Red Shirts were largely politically motivated but also with a strong and real sense of grievance regarding the state of injustice in the country. The movement used the cry of ‘double standards’ to rally a call to the poor of the country’s rural North-East and urban centres, such as Bangkok too. It was a response also to the Yellow Shirts, who mobilised to bring down the former government of Thaksin Shinawatra. The issue has also questioned the position of NGOs and NGO networks as during the clashes during the past decade they have failed to defend freedom of speech and democracy, instead joining with the conservative elites and the military in their attempts to totally undermine the democratic process and all forms of social justice (Ungpakorn, 2009, p. 76). Having lived in Thailand in 2010 and witnessed the Red Shirts’ occupation of central Bangkok over a period of several months in 2010 and the subsequent military presence in the city centre, death of a number of Red Shirt protesters, economic devastation, and the stress suffered by Bangkok residents and expats residing in the city, it is easy to see that there is a deep socioeconomic divide amongst Thai citizens that is largely driven by poverty and class struggle. The Red and Yellow crisis brings to light a number of complex issues occurring in Southeast Asia that complicate the achievement of social justice – the power wrangling between elites, the military, the monarchy and the state; class difference, particularly between urban and rural areas; the influence of NGOs and academics; and corruption and nepotism. The Red-Yellow movements seem destined to continue to plague
Thailand in the near future as the ideologies and actions of the two groups have proved to be more divisive than conciliatory. However a positive outcome is that the Red Shirt movement, having started out as passive voters who supported former Prime Minister Taksin and his political party, have now organised themselves into a grassroots pro-democracy movement (Ungpakorn, 2009, p. 76), which reflects the strengthening of civil society and transnational activism in Southeast Asia.

Study of TANs in Asia highlights areas of collaboration and contention between North and South. As argued by Tarrow, the rise in transnational activism has been geographically uneven, indicating the continued importance of domestic structures as a springboard for activism (2005, p. 11). Participation in TANs continues to vary dramatically between the industrial countries of the North and the less-developed countries of the South. While participation from the global South grew during the 1980s and 1990s, the developing world is still less present in the transnational social movement sector (Tarrow, 2005, p. 11). In the new century, there is “still a net advantage for the richer, more well-connected citizens of the North, where resources are plentiful and the core of international institutions are found” (Tarrow, 2005, p. 11). Turner and Caouette argue that transnational activists seldom work exclusively at the global level (2009, p. 963). They tend to be ‘rooted’ at local and national levels, simultaneously engaging different levels of government (Turner and Caouette, 2009, p. 963). Many have remained involved in national struggles, arguing that advocacy and policy engagement at one level does not deter activism at another level (Turner and Caouette, 2009, p. 963).

In Southeast Asia transnational activism has emerged largely as a response to socio-economic and political processes associated with economic globalisation and agrarian transformation, and the limited political liberalisation that has characterised some Southeast Asian countries (Caouette, 2006). Greater integration into the economy has resulted in an intensification and thickening of the organisational density of social movement and transnational networks in the region (Turner and Caouette, 2009, p. 964).
addition, in the past decade there has been an acceleration in the number and intensity of local and global contacts between social movements, NGOs, and transnational networks throughout Southeast Asia (Piper and Uhlin, 2004). Turner and Caouette argue that constructs such as ‘local’ and ‘global’ are inadequate to examine and explain the forms of resistance taking place: “Rural resistance comes in a complexity of forms, is diversifying rapidly and is never static” (2009, p. 950). In most cases in Southeast Asia, TANs are able and interested in creating linkages and coalitions among diverse types of actors operating on different scales (local, national, and international) in order to respond to various political contexts (Turner and Caouette, 2009, p. 965). Turner and Caouette also highlight the fact that there are a number of dilemmas and choices when transnational networks seek to bring local perspectives to the regional and global scales (2009, p. 965). In fact, “this weaving is oftentimes more problematic than usually described” (Turner and Caouette, 2009, p. 965).

3.5 Key players in transnational advocacy networks – NGOs and UN agencies

In current literature scholars have examined the changing roles that NGOs now play in some important dimensions in international affairs (Brinkerhoff, 2007; Broome, 2009, p. 62). In particular scholars have begun to focus more closely on the interactions between NGOs and international economic organisations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation (Martens, 2005; Brinkerhoff, 2007; Broome, 2009, p. 62). Broome (2009) argues that scholars have sought to build up an explicitly normative case for expanding the international role of NGOs. From a cosmopolitan perspective progressive goals can be achieved through incorporating NGOs within the formal-decision making structures of international economic organisations, as a means to achieve greater democratisation (Broome, 2009). In an era of global transformations, challenges to the sovereignty of states, and rapid technological change, NGOs have, through their involvement in TANs, gained a higher profile in their efforts to influence the international policy processes (Held, 1999). Devetak and Higgott argue that “the interest in how to alter (resist) globalisation represents a shift in the modus operandi of NGOs, from the field to the corridors of power. In many policy domains they have become the discursive opposition”
(1999, p. 493). Recent scholarship by theorists such as Broome (2009) highlights how, when and why NGO advocacy networks may be able to exert influence on changes in international economic regimes, as well as the potential limits to this influence. Broome (2009) points to the Drop-the-Debt campaign as one of the best known ‘success stories’ of a coordinated public advocacy campaign among NGOs to effect political change. This campaign highlights the power of NGOs operating in TANs, first, through the exercise of moral authority in which NGOs can shape how political issues are defined; second, through NGOs’ ability to influence how policy responses to particular issues are crafted, which may involve influencing both the scope of policy change and the process through which it is implemented; and finally, through NGOs’ engagement in a symbiotic relationship with UN organisations and states that can potentially transform the political environment within which international regimes are constructed as well as influencing how they evolve (Broome, 2009, p. 76). In this example NGOs were responsible for introducing a strong moral dimension to an international issue and transforming the political context in which debt problems were understood (Broome, 2009, p. 77).

Whilst the major players in TANs are international and domestic NGOs, UN agencies are also prominent players. The UN is both a political community and a central institution of global politics (Thorn, 2006, p. 292). On the one hand, as an inter-state organisation, the UN is subjected to the power hierarchy of the inter-state system – the dominant state powers in the Security Council can block or manipulate decisions in accordance with their national interests (Thorn, 2006, p. 292). On the other hand, the UN might also be seen as a part of a global civil society, as relatively independent UN organisations that interact with NGOs from various countries, bypassing the state level, and giving space to transnational social movements opposing the interest of dominant state powers (Thorn, 2006, p. 292). Tarrow (2005) argues that international organisations create political spaces and arenas for non-state actors to establish ties among themselves, to organise, and to mobilise. These organisations generate new information, implement policies agreed to by member states, and create new rules, and thus their functions make them focal points of transnational activism (Shawki, 2010, p. 385). Shawki suggests that international organisations allow non-
state actors access to the global public policy process, and, furthermore, that TANs campaigning on issues that are on the agendas of International organisations face a more open political environment than TANs that are not (2010, p. 386). This is because international organisations not only create a focal point for transnational campaigns but also set the stage for TANs to engage in processes that can help them advance their goals and have political impact (Shawki, 2010, p. 386).

Recent literature (Gotz, 2008) on the relationship between NGOs and UN agencies suggests a continued impasse between the two groups of organisations. Within current UN thinking, there is a definite sense of the organisations being ranked by their status, which brings about a number of adverse effects for NGOs: Discrimination between consultancy haves and have-nots, organisations being turned into objects of the discretionary grading power of intergovernmental organisations, with a potentially pacifying effect, and consultancy ultimately becomes a political game (Willetts, 1996, p. 33). However, it is undeniable that progress has been made in recent years and NGO presence at World Bank and other UN meetings has become the norm rather than the exception. NGOs’ participation in UN activities helps NGOs gain prestige in politics and before the larger public by being able to cite a consultative relationship with the UN and, moreover, in this capacity they wield a certain potential to influence multilateral processes (Boutros-Ghali, 1995, pp. 345–9). Since the 1990s relations between NGOs and the UN have improved, extending NGO participation in such traditionally sealed fora as the Security Council and NGOs now have permanent formal participation rights in the Human Rights Council and at all special UN conferences (Martens, 2005). Today approximately 3400 NGOs are recognised by the UN and over time their participation rights have increased (Willets, 2011). They receive all UN documents and circulate their own statements to government delegates (Willets, 2011). They hold their own meetings as ‘side events’ to the official proceedings, and at times they table their own agenda items and open the debate (Willets, 2011). Boas and McNeill (2003) suggest that the ‘multifacetedness’ of international organisations is an opportunity for NGOs to engage with institutions at various levels: “Over the last two decades NGO interaction with multilateral
institutions (directly and through member states) has been perhaps the single most important cause of reform” (2003, p. 3).

3.6 NGO and UN relationships with state and civil society in a globalised world

As it appears that NGOs have evolved from the failings of government, there have ensued inevitable periods of mistrust between the two groups. However in modern society, states and NGOs are forging better relationships and states now channel large amounts of foreign aid through NGOs, a situation that suggests a stable level of trust between the two entities. NGOs have been lauded for their comparative advantage over governments when it comes to the delivery of poverty alleviation projects and programs (Edwards and Hulme, 1992, p. 16). This comparative advantage is derived from the assumption that NGOs offer cheap and innovative programs that benefit the poor (Edwards and Hulme, 1992, p. 32). The structure and organisation of NGOs also sets them aside from governments. Often their non-hierarchical values and relationships, which invite participation and partnership, stand in stark contrast to government structures. However, like it or not, states remain “the ultimate arbiter and determinate of the wider political changes” (Edwards and Hulme, 1992, p. 16). In light of this, NGOs have little choice but to retain and strengthen positive working relationships with donor and recipient governments whilst endeavouring to maintain their public status as accountable, non-government organisations.

The global context in which NGOs and UN agencies operate has changed dramatically in the past few decades. Some examples that reflect this change include the growth of the ‘miracle’ economies of East and Southeast Asia, the downfall of these very economies in the Asia crisis of 1997, and the end of the Cold War, which set Russia and Eastern Europe on a path of market orientation and democracy, the wakening of the ‘sleeping giant’, China, and the Information Technology revolution (Malhorta, 2000, p. 655). Significantly and in line with the growth of globalisation, there has been a distinct reduction in recent years in levels of official development assistance. NGOs and UN organisations have to increasingly adapt to a future with diminished aid (Malhorta, 2000, p. 656). In adapting to this changing world
these organisations have important decisions to make. The most important of these choices is deciding between ‘development as delivery’ and ‘development as leverage’. The former term suggests a process of continuing on as before, bypassing sustainable development while concentrating on relief work in order to ensure the inflow of donor funds and thus the organisations’ own existence (Fowler, 1997, p. 228). In pursuing this option they risk becoming “contractors for the international system and its agenda” and neglecting their important mission as agents of change (Edwards and Hulme, 1992, p. 211). The latter option offers more in terms of social change by ensuring the retention of the NGOs’ original visions of development. Non-state actors share a preoccupation with flexibility and visibility in the context of intense competition for scarce resources (Fowler, 1992, p. 17). As a result, some transnational NGOs form close ties with states while others endeavour to keep states at a distance (Hellinger et al, 1988, p. 148). In modern society NGOs and other international non-state actors in the developing world are experiencing increasingly ambiguous relationships with states as they endeavour to maintain strong local identities and autonomies whilst working within the political boundaries established by the state as well as their larger international NGO partners (Stiles, 2000, p. 36).

In Southeast Asia, in order to have any impact on a target state, that state must have accepted international norms, at least to the discourse level. This provides the members of a network with a moral leverage to criticise the state. Secondly, the target state must be caring about its international image. In Southeast Asia states tend to favour relationships with UN agencies and international NGOs over partnerships with grassroots NGOs, who they consider to be loud, militant and difficult to control, as they don’t speak the same bureaucratic language that intergovernmental and international NGOs have learned.

NGOs and UN agencies in the modern global era must also work with civil society if they wish to survive and expand. Whilst the role of civil society in development remains contentious, empirical evidence suggests that civil society has an important part to play in the evolution of social and political development. Mitlin et al suggest that civil society, and
the place of NGOs within it, must be treated carefully, historically and conceptually, and overall, relationally (2007, p. 1702). Within development studies civil society has been predominantly understood in two main ways, at each of two main levels (Bebbington and Hickey, 2006). At the level of ideology and theory, the notion of civil society has flourished most fruitfully within either the neoliberal school of thought that advocates a reduced role for the state or a post-Marxist/post-structural approach that emphasises the transformative potential of social movements within civil society (Mitlin et al, 2007, p. 1702). Civil society is generally accepted as the body of organisations existing outside the government sector, but which influences government and its policies. It includes non-government organisations, the media, trade unions, student groups, artists, intellectuals, public protesters and any other groups who are interested in the country’s social, economic and political development (Kingsbury, 2004, p. 176). Civil society is positive in that it contributes to public discussion on national issues, which, in turn can influence social and political events. As it involves the people whose lives are influenced by political and other institutions, it draws attention to all the elements of ‘good governance’ that are necessary for development – transparency, accountability, efficiency, and fairness. A healthy civil society generally equates to healthy political and social systems. Whilst it appears that civil societies have similar long-term goals, the sheer diversity of the civil society grouping can result in periods of conflict. Compounding this is the rush by donors to strengthen civil society without a wider understanding of how civil society works. The challenge for NGOs, therefore, is, as Fowler suggests, to learn from civil society and to become “nodes, hubs, enablers and supporters of civil networks” (1997, p. 223). It may be argued that NGOs and UN agencies – why they exist, what they do, what they say, who they relate to – can only be understood in terms of their relationship to these more constitutive actors in society, as well as in terms of the relationships among these constitutive actors, and between them, state and market (Mitlin et al, 2007, p. 1702). This does not necessarily mean that NGOs and UN agencies are merely instruments of these actors (although they may be), but it does mean that they are not constitutive and are certainly not the most important actors in civil society (Mitlin et al, 2007, p. 1702). On the one hand NGOs and UN agencies function as a safety net and an antidote to both state and market failure, and on the other hand – as organisations with
connections to local populations - vehicles for democratisation and a component of a “thriving civil society” that needs to be nurtured (Reimann, 2006, p. 60).

3.7 ‘Northern’ and ‘Southern’ network members within advocacy networks

Henry, Mohan and Yanacopulos suggest that one of the most fundamental limitations in much of the networks literature is that, although there is some understanding of the power relationships between networks and their environment, there is little theorisation of power relationships within and between networks (2004, p. 849). Networks are often idealised as egalitarian or flat forms of organisation and distinct from hierarchies since, in theory, they lack an ultimate arbiter (Henry et al., 2004, p. 849). These attributes have the potential to allow networks to act as a distinct institutional arrangement between organisations and individuals with highly variable levels of power, status and resources. Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) original study on networks was largely optimistic, defining networks in terms of their reciprocal and horizontal relations of information exchange (Carpenter, 2007, p. 114). But such a view arguably masks the issue of power relations within networks (Mische, 2004). As discussed above, one of the central claims of TANs is that they may link Southern grassroots communities to Northern policy makers. Although this claim is central to NGOs’ claims to legitimacy, its validity is rarely questioned and it is clear that some networks exhibit hierarchical tendencies (Henry et al., 2004, p. 849). Hudson (2001) critically examines the meanings of legitimacy in transnational networks by exploring the accountability of NGOs in them. Hudson (2001) argues that legitimacy is socially constructed and, therefore, shaped by the network form of organisation that transnational advocacy takes. NGOs must, he argues, balance and prioritise multiple and diverse relationships such as Northern and Southern governments, donors, corporations and Southern NGOs (Hudson, 2001).

Henry et al suggest that networks are never static but are constantly evolving through contestation and resistance (2004, p. 850). The mechanics of power within the networks
therefore become of critical interest to understanding how networks evolve and function. In the transnational networks literature the main and often only objects of analysis within the networks are the Northern actors, with Southern perspectives being marginalised and only being of importance when they affect the legitimacy of Northern actors (Henry et al, 2004, p. 850). In such research, Southern NGOs only appear to be important when they make demands of Northern NGOs. Northern experiences of participation in transnational networks are, therefore, clearly privileged over Southern ones, thus marginalising Southern NGO agency (Henry, et al, 2004, p. 850). Castells suggests that the network may act as a gatekeeper – inside networks, opportunities are created while outside the network survival is increasingly difficult (2000, p. 187). In a similar vein Cumbers et al argue that, within networks, decision-making often devolves to a surprisingly small elite of individuals and groups and that groups from the North that are often better resourced and because of their structural positions, communication skills and experience in activism, tend to wield disproportionate power (2008, p. 190). In order to achieve a cosmopolitan social justice model, equal power and influence must be an objective of all network members. Within cosmopolitanism theory, networks must focus on the decentralisation of political power (Held, 2003, p. 471). If decisions at issue are translocal, transnational or transregional, then political institutions need not only be locally based but must also have a wider scope and framework of operation (Held, 2003, p. 471).

Any campaign or issue raised in TANs has a local grounding (Acosta, 2011), however the power, resources and voice balance between the two groups is often not an equal one. Batliwala (2002) has observed that Northern groups and networks, even if they have ‘Southern’ organisations in their membership, occupy much of the space for citizen input at the multilateral institution level, and ‘elite’ NGOs at the national level. In a similar vein Hulme and Edwards (1997) have expressed their concern that a division may arise between well-funded Northern NGOs, which provide services, and poorly funded Southern NGOs, which promote social mobilisation. Edwards argued that NGOs and citizen networks feel they have the right to participate in global decision-making, yet much less attention has been paid to their obligations in pursuing this role responsibly, or to concrete ways in which
these rights might be expressed in the emerging structures of global governance (2001, p. 146). The North-South power imbalance also extends to the UN. Edwards wrote that “only 251 of the 1,550 NGOs associated with the UN Department of Public Information come from the South, and the ratio of NGOs in consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council is even lower” (2000, p. 18). Segaar (2006) argued that Northern NGOs frequently claimed to ‘represent’ Southern NGOs in networks and international fora without proper consultation, and were therefore little more than rhetoric in practice.

A common perspective in the literature on North-South relations in TANs is that movement participants who come from the North more closely resemble the Northern power-holders they oppose than the movements in the Global South that ostensibly share their views (Hulme and Edwards, 1997). According to this theory power imbalances permeate TANs – Northern participants hold mainstream cultural, social, and political status and provide their partners with scarce economic resources and thus can control their Southern partners. Therefore the Southern NGOs that best “sell themselves”, conform to donor discourses and practices, are the ones that “win” resources and survive. Following this theory, Northern supporters may also demand efficiency, accountability to donors, and quantitative results, pushing Southern movements to become hierarchical, bureaucratic and detached from their own constituencies (Hulme and Edwards, 1997). Southern groups, this perspective suggests, depend too heavily on their Northern counterparts to challenge them.

Network theorists point out that whilst the balance of resources is important, actors from the North and the South supply each other with different things, and they do this with greater or lesser intensity (Ritzer, 2008, p. 435). This can lead to both collaboration and competition (Ritzer, 2008, p. 435). Global NGOs, UN agencies and their advocacy networks, while representing the issues and concerns of poor or marginalised people in global policy realms, often have few formal or structured links with direct stakeholder constituencies. As highlighted by Southern scholar, Batliwala (2000), their ‘take’ on issues and strategic priorities is rarely subject to debate within the communities whose concerns they represent.
Grassroots constituencies and their formations can therefore often feel ‘used’ by their Northern counterparts in many ways with the smaller, domestic NGOs feeling dominated by the global NGOs and UN agencies, or the ‘mass-base tokens’ used by them to lend credibility (Batliwala, 2002). However, linkages are still important for both parties and despite the obstacles to networking, Southern and Northern groups continue to formulate TANs for social change. It appears that the positive aspects of networks include the fact that networks provide access, leverage, and information (and often money) to struggling domestic groups (Risse-Kappen et al, 1999, p. 18). Furthermore, international contacts can ‘amplify’ the demands of domestic groups, prise open space for new issues, and then echo these demands back into the domestic arena (Risse-Kappen et al, 1999, p. 18). For the less powerful developing country actors, networks can provide access, leverage and information and, often, financial support that they could not expect to have on their own. For Northern groups, networking with Southern NGOs may make more credible the frequent assertion that they are struggling with, and not only ‘for’ their Southern counterparts (Keck and Sikkink, 1999, p. 93). In this way networks that link Southern NGOs to the rest of the world are crucial to achieving cosmopolitan solidarity.

Fieldwork in Thailand and Cambodia in 2010 supported a number of these theories, especially the argument that Northern organisations push Southern organisations to formalise and become more efficient and more accountable to donors, however, the theories do not explain the complex interplay between Northern and Southern NGOs, UN agencies, donors, and beneficiaries that I witnessed in the GMS. Each network is different and the theories on the North-South divide were not apparent in each network observed for this research. The theories also treat Southern NGOs as monolithic structures with the same structures and aims and ignore the dynamics and areas of collaboration and contention that occur within Southern movements.
3.8 Debates on network ‘effectiveness’ and issues of accountability in networks

While the previous sections of the chapter have discussed the politics and dynamics of TANs, this final section of the chapter sets out to discuss the literature on TANs’ accountability and their effectiveness, which are central questions in this research. The term ‘effectiveness’ is a complex one and the term’s meaning when applied to analysing advocacy networks provides a challenge for advocacy network staff and scholars alike. TANs rarely conduct research projects to monitor and evaluate the ‘effectiveness’ of their programs and campaigns. This poses inevitable problems for measuring the effectiveness of advocacy network collaboration and the perceived or actual success of their collective campaigns. Furthermore, in ignoring the question of network and campaign effectiveness networks are also ignoring questions of accountability in TANs. Accountability in this sense refers to the networks’ accountability to those they claim to support, that is, the recipients of their campaigning, as well as the international donors who fund the advocacy work. Atkinson and Scurrah suggest that there are two aspects to the issue of organisational accountability – accountability to those who fund and support them, and accountability to those whom they wish to help (2009, p. 214). There is also a significant and powerful informal accountability that these organisations have to the members of the public (Atkinson and Scurrah, 2009, p. 214). Unless an organisation can maintain the trust and good-will of those who donate money to it or support its campaigns, its ability to function and its financial viability will be undermined (Atkinson and Scurrah, 2009, p. 214). Foreman suggests that accountability is a function important to any governance structure and that, from a top-down perspective at least, NGO boards hold staff accountable to the mission and principles of the organisation while, in turn, NGO governing boards must be accountable to multiple stakeholders – donors, partner organisations or members, and the poor or the beneficiaries of the NGOs’ work (1999, pp. 179 – 180). Critics such as Hulme and Edwards (1997) highlight the obstacles to having a broad base of stakeholders and suggest that NGOs focus too much on the demands of donors and the conceptions of ‘accountability’ developed by donors. Hulme and Edwards (1997) question the ability and willingness of NGOs to confront national and international vested interests or structural inequalities when the organisations are drawing closer to donors and donor interests. NGOs have come too close to being donor-
driven and upward accountability and donor definitions of achievement take precedence over global and national structural issues of poverty (Hulme and Edwards, 2007).

Schweigert (2006) links ‘effectiveness’ to the cause and effect as the human mind’s way of grasping the relationship between past, present and future as both continuity and change, through time, under the influence of natural forces and human agency. Schweigert argues that questions of effectiveness are part of a fundamental human effort to make sense of experience, an effort that is necessary for any understanding of reality and at the same time an effort that is always problematic (2006, p. 419). It is problematic not merely because human experience is endlessly extensive but because causal understanding in itself is ultimately a leap from evidence to understanding and a leap that requires, in the difficult cases that concern scientists and evaluators, some method to assure the inferential leap is justified (Schweigert, 2006, p. 419). Consequently accountability based on standards of effectiveness appeals to a criterion that rests on a problem requiring methodological solution, and conversely, effectiveness cannot be reduced to the straightforward administrative function of accountability despite their similarities (Schweigert, 2006, p. 419).

Atkinson and Scurrah (2009) also discuss the question of effectiveness. They pose the important question - What characterises an organisation that can be regarded as legitimate, as usefully adding to the debate about issues in the South (or any other issue) from one that cannot (Atkinson and Scurrah, 2009, p. 208)? They argue that the characteristics would include having knowledge that is solidly based on research and/or experience, being recognised by other legitimate bodies as having useful knowledge or expertise to bring to the debate, and being sensitive to the views of those who are being spoken for or about (Atkinson and Scurrah, 2009, p. 208). The scholars stress, however, that this route to legitimacy through democratic effectiveness or usefulness gives a “voice but not a vote” and “it conveys the right to speak, to have views heard, but not the right to take part in decision making” (Atkinson and Scurrah, 2009, pp. 208-209).
Herman and Renz (1999) suggest that the most obvious and frequent approach to defining and evaluating organisational effectiveness is to ask - to what extent does an organisation reach its goals? This question assumes that organisations have goals, that goals can be discovered, that the goals are at least somewhat stable, that abstract goals can be converted into specific, objective measures, and that data relevant to those measures can be collected, processed, and applied in a timely and appropriate matter (Herman and Renz, 1999, p. 108). This leads to problematic assumptions. Herman and Renz argue that the language people speak of proving effectiveness and showing results suggests that people believe that outcomes assessment will generate and establish causality but there is a danger in such unjustified causal inferences in both positive and negative situations (1999, p. 120). In a positive situation a non-profit organisation may take credit for an outcome for which it is only slightly responsible, and funders might be convinced and increase program funding with resources that might have been more effective elsewhere (Herman and Renz, 1999, p. 120). In a negative situation (such as no improvement in some measured outcome over time), the inference likely would be that the program is a failure yet it is conceivable that ‘no change’ in participants might represent a considerable achievement if comparable people who were not receiving program services experienced a decline on that outcome measure (Herman and Renz, 1999, p. 120). Herman and Renz suggest that we should consider more than just responsiveness to current stakeholders and that considering the interests of the least advantaged in a community or society would be a more demanding conception of responsiveness (Herman and Renz, 1999, p. 123).

Better organisational evaluation is not merely a matter of better or more measurement (Ostrower, 2005). Without a clear conception of effectiveness, organisations cannot assess, quantitatively or otherwise, how close they are to the mark, and thus risk adopting measures first and then adjusting their conceptions to fit the measures (Ostrower, 2005). With careful discernment of organisational aims and values, organisations can take better advantage of continual improvements in evaluation methods and designs and avoid being attracted away from their fundamental purposes by new technologies of data collection, new methods of analysis, and anecdotal accounts or program success (Ostrower, 2005). In
today’s world NGOs are hard-pressed to know what they have achieved in their advocacy work, and hence what they should be accountable for (Hudson, 2001, p. 339). Organisations balance and prioritise their relationships with other organisations on the basis of values, whether these values concern profit-maximisation, increasing market-share, empowering the poor, or generating transnational solidarity (Hudson, 2001, p. 344). More precisely, the ways in which organisations balance and prioritise their relationships with other organisations reflect what their real, in contrast to simply stated values are (Hudson, 2001, p. 344). As modern NGOs claim to be value-driven they can expect to be scrutinised to see whether they practise what they preach (Edwards, 1999).

Provan and Milward argue that what is most lacking in contemporary theory is an examination of the relationship between interorganisational network structures and activities and measures of effectiveness (2001, p. 414). Valuating network effectiveness is critical for understanding whether networks, and the network form of organising, are effective in delivering needed services to communities (Provan and Milward, 2001, p. 414). Evaluation of network effectiveness is especially important for those who formulate public policy at local, state and national levels so that scarce public funding can be allocated to service-delivery mechanisms that are utilising resources efficiently while adequately serving public needs (Provan and Milward, 2001, p. 415). In the context of this study, measures of success in campaigning rest in some cases in the responsiveness of states to the problem of child sex trafficking, as well as the number of raids conducted to rescue children and states’ commitment to educating citizens about the risks of trafficking and equipping citizens with the skills and values to deflect risk.

The prevailing view in the networking literature has been that interdependent groups of two or more organisations that consciously collaborate and cooperate with one another are more effective at providing a complex array of community-based services than the same organisations are able to do when they go their own ways (Alter and Hage, 1993). Cooperation is particularly appealing when the profit motive is absent because the potential
downsides of cooperation such as reduced autonomy, shared resources, and increased dependence, are less likely to be seen as a threat to organisational survival (Provan and Milward, 2001, p. 415). Assessing the effectiveness of networks is not an easy task and assessing the effectiveness of a network is much more complex than evaluating that of a single organisation (Provan and Milward, 2006, p. 416). A significant challenge lies in the fact that the analysis of multiple organisations requires dealing with multiple sets of constituencies, and the joint production of services may satisfy clients with multiple needs but it may also raise problems regarding resource sharing, political battles and so on (Provan and Milward, 2001, p. 416). Measuring network ‘effectiveness’ therefore is not a straightforward task and is rendered even more complicated by competing internal and external factors. As such, a clear conceptualisation and model for measuring TAN effectiveness has been developed, driven by the empirical material, for this research. This model will be explained in detail in chapter 7.

3.9 Conclusion

Michael Edwards (1997) predicted in 1997 that the future for Northern NGOs lies in the direction of international alliances and coalitions of agencies working synergistically toward common long-term goals that abandon the donor-recipient relationship in favour of collegial working or authentic partnership. Edwards argued that the prime task of these coalitions is to do whatever is necessary to promote and preserve non-exploitative or at least less exploitative relationships in a world increasingly driven by market economics and related power relations (Edwards, 1997). Rather than solid and stable blocs of ‘North’ and ‘South’, NGOs in the 21st Century confront a rapidly changing patchwork quilt of poverty and exclusion that requires new and genuinely international responses (Edwards et al, 1999). However, despite the disagreements and probable future fragmentation of NGOs in both North and South, most agree that there are increasing opportunities for organisations to work together across institutional boundaries in order to influence the forces that underpin poverty and discrimination, finding partnerships and synergy where few existed before, and moulding not just a strong civil society but a society that is just and civil in all that it does (Edwards, et al, 1999).
TAN members share collective cosmopolitan values and common goals. Despite their collective motivations and, in most cases, sound structures that facilitate effective communication and resource sharing amongst partners, contention can exist owing to other political factors such as competition over funds; challenging relationships amongst partners and with other key players such as states and donors; the challenge of reaching consensus on issues related to rescues and prostitution; providing victim services in poverty stricken economies that lack employment opportunities; faith based versus secular; amongst many other areas of political wrangling and contention. TANs in the GMS region operate in a complex political environment and navigate a complex interplay between organisations, states and individuals. How TANs leverage politics and their external environment largely determines their sustainability and effectiveness.

This chapter has discussed the recent literature on TANs with a focus on the literature on TAN motivations and politics. The chapter has also discussed the meaning of ‘TANs’ and analysed the key players in TANs, that is NGOs and UN agencies, and the complex interplay between organisations, states, TANs, and individuals. The chapter has raised issues related to the vexatious nature of campaigning and discussed why it is difficult to measure effective collaboration when programs of monitoring and evaluation are largely absent from network agendas. The chapter has posited that only a study of networks’ motivations and politics can help us to understand their sustainability and effectiveness. In the next chapter child sex trafficking as a core social problem in South East Asia will provide an important context for this study.
Chapter 4.

Child sex trafficking in Southeast Asia

“All world citizens are equal, but some world citizens are more equal than others” (Kurasawa, 2004, p. 240).

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapters have introduced the notion that in the current globalised world, human trafficking is an expanding social problem. According to the UN’ Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2006), the trafficking of human beings has reached epidemic proportions over the past decade. Human trafficking has recently become the world’s second most lucrative illegal trade, behind the illegal drugs trade (Thomas, 2009). More than a decade ago Hodge argued that “the contemporary international slave trade has received little attention in the social work literature” (1997, p. 163). The case is now very different. The contemporary slave trade and human trafficking are subjects that have attracted theorists of diverse disciplines, particularly in the last decade. In addition to state documents, UN agencies such as UNICEF, as well as many NGOs and researchers have written about the issues of slavery and human trafficking (Bales, 2001; Bales, 2004; Brown, 2007; Aradau, 2008; CATW, 2008; Aronowitz, 2009; ECPAT, 2009).

This chapter will focus on the issue of child trafficking for sexual exploitation in the Southeast Asia region and its varied causes. It will first discuss the debates over the definition of ‘trafficking’ and also the issue of reaching a consensus on the meaning of the ‘child’. From a cosmopolitan reading it will then examine the literature on the issue of child sex trafficking in the Mekong Subregion and provide a historical overview of child trafficking
in the two focus countries for this research – Thailand and Cambodia. The chapter engages an international political economy (IPE) and globalisation framework to conceptualise the causes of child trafficking in the region including the supply and demand elements of child enslavement. Applying a cosmopolitan lens, the chapter illuminates a number of the difficulties faced by TANs advocating against child trafficking in this region. Such networks face the challenge of not only working on structural improvements with states but also combating human traffickers, rehabilitating victims, supporting minority groups, advancing gender rights and working within a complex environment of government incapacity and corruption, scarcity of donor funds, and contention over aspects of trafficking including rescues, and debates on prostitution and ‘consent’.

4.2 Reaching a consensus on the definition of ‘trafficking’

There is a broad consensus that child trafficking is an issue that urgently needs to be tackled. Most research reports start from the premise that child trafficking is a ‘sinister’, ‘serious’, or ‘major’ problem. Complicating the sex trafficking discourse is the fact that whilst a wide variety of literature exists on the subject of trafficking for sexual exploitation little delineation is made between the trafficking of women and children (UNICEF, 2005). Early twentieth century conventions defined trafficking as internal or cross-border movement for purposes of prostitution, and defined all sex work as trafficking, whether the women and girls were in the profession voluntarily or not (GAATW, 2007). The modern definition of trafficking has been defined by various organisations, not only states but also intergovernmental organisations and NGOs. Pointing out that until recently there was no internationally agreed-upon definition of trafficking, a handbook from the Global Alliance Against Trafficking in Women gives some modern definitions of trafficking from the UN and from the Human Rights Standards for the Treatment of Trafficked Persons (GAATW, 2007). Common elements in these definitions include movement from community of origin; fraud, force, deception, or coercion; and exploitation in slavery, near-slavery, or servitude with or without pay (GAATW, 2007). The modern definitions do not require that sexual exploitation be involved for it to be called trafficking and GAATW (2007) emphasises that movement for
sexual exploitation is only one type of trafficking, though it has arguably been the most prioritised form for concern.

The most widely accepted definition of human trafficking in modern society comes from the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, better known as the Palermo Protocol (November 2000). The Palermo Protocol has proved a highly useful tool in establishing a widely used definition of trafficking that all organisations can use – states, UN agencies and NGOs. According to the Protocol:

a) ‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.

b) The consent of the victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in the subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in the subparagraph (a) have been used;

c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered ‘trafficking in persons’ even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in the subparagraph (a) of this article;

d) ‘Child’ shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.
As the Protocol implies, sexual trafficking refers to a specific subset of wider phenomena of human trafficking. It can be understood as the component of human trafficking that deals with the use of persons – almost exclusively young women and children – in prostitution and other forms of sexual exploitation (Goodey, 2004). As subsection (b) of the Protocol clarifies, the use of whether a victim ‘consents’ or not is ‘irrelevant’ (UN, 2000). In essence, the Protocol holds that consent cannot truly be given when acts such as fraud and deception are employed. Exploitation rather than consent is the central feature of the Palermo Protocol’s definition (Aronowitz, 2004). The emphasis on traffickers is also evident in the fact that the Palermo Protocol is a supplement to the UN’ Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. It is these organised criminal networks that have played an instrumental role in the globalisation of sexual trafficking (UNODC, 2005) although, as this chapter will explain, the trafficking of children in Southeast Asia operates as more of a cottage industry rather than a large-scale criminal enterprise as occurs in Eastern Europe.

Wylie and McRedmond argue that the adoption of the Palermo Protocol and its tripartite definition of trafficking as involving deceptive/coercive recruitment, movement and exploitation of a person, has driven the debate on trafficking forward and has been a crucial factor in states’ recognition of human trafficking as a serious problem (2010, p. 2). NGOs, governments, and UN organisations have widely lauded the Palermo definition of ‘trafficking’ as a step towards ensuring structure and cohesion in approaches to the prevention of trafficking and the prosecution of traffickers (UNODC, 2008). Advocacy organisations and networks have, however, also pointed out that the definition reduces trafficking to a law and justice issue rather than a problem associated within the larger global issue of uneven wealth and resource distribution due to globalisation (Canadian Council for Refugees, 2009). Because trafficking is a transnational crime, a definition that is accepted across boundaries is essential for developing and implementing anti-trafficking laws as well as combating the problem.
4.3 Reaching a universal understanding on the meaning of the ‘child’ and the protection and rights of children

Reaching a universal consensus over the meaning of the term, ‘child’, has proved to be just as difficult as that of reaching consensus on the meaning of ‘human trafficking’. Satz poses the important question that many scholars have tried to answer – What is the normative basis of modern society’s view of ‘childhood’? (2010, p. 156). Satz suggests that the concept of a ‘child’, implicit in virtually all our moral and legal practices, is that a child is a person who is in some fundamental way not developed, but rather, developing (2010, p. 157). Children cannot be assumed to have full agency as they lack the cognitive, moral, and effective capacities of adults, and they seldom have the power in the family to make decisions about how to allocate their time and other resources (Satz, 2010, p. 157). It is because of this undeveloped condition that parents or surrogates are needed to act on children’s behalf with special obligations including the obligations to protect, nurture and educate children (Satz, 2010, p. 157).

Two important international agreements define the age of the ‘child’ and the child’s right to protection from exploitation – the 2000 Palermo Protocol and the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The third part of the Palermo Protocol definition prescribes the requirements with regards to children:

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered ‘trafficking in persons’ even if this does not involve any of (these) means.

(UN General Assembly, 2000: Article 3c).

This translates to mean that, for children, trafficking does not necessarily involve threat, coercion or use of force. The recruitment, transport harbouring or receipt of children for
the purpose of exploiting them is automatically ‘trafficking’ (Australian Institute of Family Studies, 2005, p. 3). A criticism of the Palermo Protocol is that it uses a rigid notion of ‘the child’ which lacks any nuances (Huijsmans, 2008, p. 331). It defines the ‘child’ technically on the basis of age as any person below the age of 18 years and thus leaves no room for children’s evolving capacities (Huijsmans, 2008). It also ignores dramatic sociocultural as well as socioeconomic heterogeneity hidden in the singular notion of the ‘child’ (Huijsmans, 2008, p. 331). A second problem with the Palermo Protocol’s definition of the ‘child’ is that by a priori rendering children’s consent to ‘exploitation’ irrelevant, it denies children any form of agency, even at a conceptual level (Huijsmans, 2008, p. 336). The result is that children are treated as passive victims of abuse in need of rescue rather than inviting more child-centred approaches to address child trafficking (Huijsmans, 2008, p. 336).

The Optional Protocol to the CRC on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (Optional Protocol, 2000) does not directly define child trafficking, but it does describe the sale of children as “any action or transaction that transfers a child from one person or group of persons to another for remuneration or any other benefit”. This definition emphasises the trafficking process that eventually leads to the exploitation of the child, thus enabling States to prosecute intermediaries, agents, and employers involved in such a process (Davitti, 2010, p. 43). Article 3 of the Optional Protocol calls on States to criminalise the offer, delivery or acceptance, by whatever means, of a child for the purpose of sexual exploitation, transfer of organs of the child for profit, or engagement of the child in forced labour (Davitti, 2010, p. 44). According to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, article 32.1:

State Parties recognise the right of the child to be protected from economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development.

As the Palermo Protocol and the CRC suggest, a child cannot be deemed to make the decision to enter the sex trade voluntarily. A child should be protected from hazardous work, and sexual exploitation and prostitution certainly fall into the category of ‘hazardous work’. A legally defined child can only be a victim and be ‘trafficked’. Other relevant legal articles emphasise the ‘protection’ of children with regards to sexuality and sexual activity. Article 19 of the CRC declares that “State parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury, or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse” (UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 19). Article 34 of the CRC declares that

States Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. For these purposes, States Parties shall in particular take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent: (a) the inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity; (b) the exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices; (c) the exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials

(UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 34).

Despite the protocols and conventions in place to define the age of consent for children’s work and the protection and rights of the child, in the midst of international discussions on the ‘child’ there is still confusion over the distinction between ‘child’ and ‘young adult’ and pre-pubescent and post-pubescent children. Even among post-pubescent children there is a distinction between a thirteen year old and a seventeen year old in terms of maturity, ability to work as a young adult and engage in sexual activity (Peters, 2007, p. 27). Although the CRC has been signed and ratified by a record number of countries around the world, the age of ‘majority’ is still not necessarily completely clear between regions, countries and local communities. In this regard, under Thai law, for example, employment of children younger than 15 has been prohibited since 1998 (Pearson, 2005, p. 17). Thailand has signed the
Palermo Protocol but not yet ratified it (UNHCHC, 2011). In Cambodia, under the 1996 Law on the Suppression of Kidnapping, Trafficking and Exploitation of Human Beings, a minor is defined as a person under the age of 15 (Sok Sam Oeun, 1996). In China, the age of majority with regard to labour is 16. Thus, by law, what constitutes a ‘child’ is not only unclear, but it is also not the same in legal documents for all the GMS countries. As Peters points out, the reality in many traditional cultures in the Mekong region is that young people aged between 15 and 17 are often considered ‘adults’ in their own societies (2007, p. 27). They may marry, and otherwise function as adults (Peters, 2007, p. 27). This view is supported by Qvortrup who argues that “what children do and what is expected from them is largely historically and culturally determined” (2004, p. 267). Furthermore, the age of ‘consent’ to work or engage in prostitution varies across states and countries and according to the age and agency of the individuals involved in sex. The age of consent is not static either and has changed over the centuries especially with regards to same sex intercourse (Waites, 2005, p. 45 – 46). Thailand, for example, increased its minimum age from 13 to 15 in 1987, and to 18 in relation to prostitution in 1996 (Waites, 2005, p. 49).

Further complicating the issue is that traffickers, victims, brothel owners and clients alike all have reasons for hiding the age of the victim. Sources in a recent study tell of one brothel tactic that forces girls to lie about their age, place of origin, and reasons for migrating (Project Parivartan, 2006, p. 11). Researchers also tell of a process of falsifying papers to officially make a newly trafficked girl over 18 (Human Rights Watch, 1995). In a study conducted by Sen (2003), respondents were asked their ages and received different responses from those currently in trafficked situations versus those who were ‘survivors’. Survivors were more likely to admit to being under 18 at the time of interview (20% vs 18%) and much more likely to admit they were trafficked when they were under 18 (60% vs 40%) (Sen, 2003).
4.4 The extent of child trafficking in the Mekong Subregion

The UN Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking (2008) states that there are no universally accepted estimates of child trafficking numbers throughout the world. Indeed, difficulties in identifying victims and differences in applying trafficking definitions to local realities make such estimates virtually impossible. However, some commonly quoted figures provide some sense of the magnitude of the problem. UNICEF (2009) suggests that globally, about 10 million children, mainly girls, are subjected to various forms of sexual exploitation worldwide. A further one million children are estimated to enter the commercial sex trade each year (UNICEF, 2009). UNICEF (2009) further estimates that a third of all sex workers in Southeast Asia are between the ages of 12 and 17. Kristof (1996) similarly notes that more than a million girls and boys, aged 17 and younger, are engaged in forced prostitution in Asia. A recent study by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (2009) estimates that 43 per cent of all victims of forced labour worldwide are trafficked for sexual exploitation. According to Child Wise (2007), an Australian NGO working on the human trafficking issue both domestically and internationally, more than 250 000 sex tourists visit Asia each year, with 25 per cent coming from the United States, 16 per cent from Germany and 13 per cent from both Australia and the United Kingdom. This includes those seeking sex with children, a practice better known as child sex tourism, and those specifically targeting pre-pubescent children, that is, paedophilia (Peters, 2007). However, in most countries the major demand that creates a market for commercial sexual exploitation of children is still domestic. The World Bank suggests that local perceptions of childhood, which often differ from the international legal norm, contribute to this phenomenon (2003, p. 15). According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (2009) in Asia there are estimates of at least one million Asian children forced into different forms of ‘sexual exploitation’ with the problem being especially “alarming” in a number of Asian countries: Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Cambodia and Nepal. Fieldwork in Thailand and Cambodia demonstrated that trafficking was particularly alarming in several specific areas of the region including border cities and sex tourism hotspots such as Pattaya in Thailand.
Over the past decade international NGOs, together with UN agencies, governments and other bodies, have become increasingly aware of the widespread phenomenon of child trafficking – both across borders and within nation-states themselves. Much attention has been given to the Asia-Pacific region, and especially the GMS that, for various reasons that will be discussed, has become a hub for trafficking in children, particularly for the purposes of sexual servitude. The Asian countries surrounding the Mekong River (the six countries of the GMS – Cambodia, China, Laos PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam) have among the highest incidence of internal and transnational migration in the world (Zheng, 2008). Hundreds of thousands of men, women and children in this region leave their homes to cross borders each year in search of new economic opportunities and a better life (World Vision, 2008, p. 2). The countries of Cambodia and Thailand are therefore within a region where the ease of cross-border movement coupled with the relative economic prosperity and political stability of some countries has attracted large numbers of would-be economic migrants. Despite the ease of cross-border mobility, political sanctions against would-be migrants in destination countries have created a need for networks of ‘people-movers’ to facilitate cross-border movement. That these facilitators often serve as links to low-paid, exploitative and slave type jobs, including sex work, in the destination countries is hardly surprising. Further impacting the migration of adults and children in the region, the lucrative tourism industry in the GMS has not only created jobs within legitimate sectors but has also stimulated a demand for women and children – both male and female – in the entertainment sector, which generally translates as the sex sector (Dottridge, 2004, p. 23). Many of the children in this sector are poor and have low education levels (Peters, 2007, p. 20). The sex sector can offer these poor migrating children higher paid jobs than they would find elsewhere (Peters, 2007, p. 24).

In the Southeast Asia region children are trafficked either within their own countries or over the border into neighbouring countries, for example from Laos to Thailand or Cambodia to Thailand or Thailand to China, or Myanmar to Laos, and so on (Dottridge, 2004, p. 20). Some children are moved across international borders and some are trafficked across the world into developed regions such as Europe, the United States and Australia (Marshall,
Fieldwork in Thailand and Cambodia demonstrated that children are also trafficked internally and even within individual cities – children were particularly vulnerable in rural areas where changes in rural ownership and livelihoods and changes in local laws had made it difficult for locals to find employment.

Lim (1998) argues that whilst adults might choose sex work as an occupational choice, children can only be considered victims of coercion and trafficking. Children, in contrast to adults, are clearly much more vulnerable and helpless against the established structures and vested interests in the sex sector, and are much more likely to be victims of debt bondage, trafficking, physical violence or torture (ILO, 1998). In a similar vein Marshall (2001) has argued that children’s ‘choice’ is questionable as it is often motivated by poverty or other extenuating circumstances. Because of extreme poverty, families in the Southeast Asia region have been known to be manipulated into giving up their children to recruiters to make ends meet when faced with bleak economic opportunities (Leung, 2003). Some children are turned over to recruiters by their families as part of an ancient practice known as debt bondage, in which children, usually girls, are sent to work for creditors until they pay off a family’s debt (Blackburn et al, 2010, p. 108). In many cases of trafficking in the GMS, the children have themselves initiated the migration process, motivated by real and/or perceived differences in lifestyles, employment opportunities and pay levels between Thailand and surrounding countries (Huijsmans, 2008, p. 341).

4.5 Historical overview of child trafficking in Cambodia and Thailand

Cambodia

Cambodia is noted as being one of the poorest countries in the world (Blackburn et al, 2010, p. 108). Of the Southeast Asian countries touched by child trafficking, Cambodia is one of the most affected, especially in regard to health issues such as HIV/AIDS. Human trafficking in Cambodia has been heavily influenced by its history of civil conflict, the growth of the sex sector as a result of UN intervention and UN presence in the country, and the country’s
lagging economic development. Due to decades of conflict in the country, Cambodian society and infrastructure was virtually destroyed and has been slow to recover following the peace settlement of 1991 (Owen, 2005, p. 483). The period prior to this settlement was characterised by famine, poverty and rampant political violence. Sweeping purges and political repression were common in Cambodia for decades, resulting in several generations of Cambodians being affected by death, unemployment and acute poverty (Owen, 2005, p. 484). The aftermath of the Khmer Rouge regime is still felt both psychologically and economically and plays a direct role in labour and sexual exploitation arising from ill-prepared migration (Shelley, 2010, p. 159). The upheavals caused by the conflict and lack of opportunities in rural areas have fuelled a return to the cities and urban areas, all but emptied during the Khmer Rouge period (Shelley, 2010). With well over half the population below the age of 20, Cambodia faces a growing problem of providing decent work for its young population, with growing unemployment further increasing the drive toward cross-border migration for employment, and perpetuating the cycle of vulnerability to human trafficking (Shelley, 2010, p. 159).

As a result of the destruction throughout the country and the new UN liberal, post-Cold War goal of democratisation following the Khmer Rouge rule and civil conflict, a UN transnational team entered the country in the 1990s with the goal of rapidly transforming Cambodia into a democracy (Paris, 2004, p. 81). It was at this time with the entrance of UN forces into the country that human trafficking first appeared in Cambodia (Aoi et al, 2007). The effects of the substantial period of violent conflict in the country left the general population in an especially vulnerable position. During the period prior to UN intervention, general Cambodian institutional life ceased to exist and many of the services normally provided by a government disappeared. There were few schools, religious organisations, or legitimate economic opportunities that could provide the education and stability necessary for normal lifestyles. This lack of structure and education left many Cambodians without the knowledge or understanding necessary to be aware of the dangers posed by traffickers. The rapid infusion of foreigners with large sums of money that followed the entrance of both UN military forces and civilian officials led to an increased demand in the sex sector
across the country (Aoi et al, 2007). It is estimated that the size of the sex sector surrounding UN installations during this period tripled (Aoi et al, 2007, p. 33). This expansion was largely aided by the absence of other forms of legal employment for women and children. Due to the complete disruption of society that occurred during the decades of conflict there was massive poverty in the country and many girls found themselves without viable employment and little education, which made them particularly susceptible to the lure of traffickers. The supply and demand of growing sex sectors and a vulnerable population led traffickers to take advantage of those who needed employment to provide for their families.

While there is little doubt that the sex industry in Cambodia expanded during the UNTAC period, some scholars suggest that it should also be noted that both married and single Cambodian men have frequently visited brothels both before and after the Khmer Rouge (Takamatsu, 2004, p. 281). Even following the departure of UN forces from Cambodia, the sex sector has continued to thrive as the Cambodian government continues to promote traditional tourism as a source of much needed economic growth. Among the tourism centres of Southeast Asia, Cambodia is well known as a haven for child sex tourists (Peters, 2007). Significant numbers of Asian and Western men travel to Cambodia for sexual encounters with children (Samarasinghe, 2003). Illustrative of this is that 51 per cent of Cambodian girls in one study had lost their virginity to a tourist or foreign client, indicating the important role that sex tourism plays in the growth of trafficking (Samarasinghe, 2008, p. 110). Investigators have discovered girls as young as five years of age working in the sex trade in Cambodia (Blackburn et al, 2010, p. 107). Brown (2007) discusses in depth the existence and popularity of what she labels the ‘virginity trade’ in Cambodia. She argues that the trade “clearly shapes the patterns of trafficking within Cambodia, and given the extensive cultural links between virginity loss ... and the sex industry, it is arguably the largest factor contributing to entry into commercial sex” (Brown, 2007, p. 59). Cambodian families are often facilitators of trafficking as highlighted by Kneebone and Debeljak: “Between 30 per cent and 40 per cent of parents sell their children for sex” (2010, p. 140). Previously considered a source country, the sex trafficking industry in Cambodia is now so
large that children from outside the country are trafficked into Cambodia to work in the sex trade (UNIAP, 2009). There is evidence that child victims from neighbouring countries such as Vietnam and China are routinely trafficked into Cambodia and forced to work in the sex industry (UNIAP, 2009).

Many of the issues regarding Cambodia’s economic development remain unresolved and recent economic downturns in the late 1990s and mid 2000s stalled or reversed many of the gains that had been achieved in recent years. Although there are some glimmers of legitimate democratisation and social reform in Cambodia, government corruption in the country remains rampant and a hindrance to any concerted advocacy network anti-trafficking prevention programs (Kaida, 2006). With much of the country’s population under 20 years of age and few prospects for economic growth, the Cambodian government is struggling to provide adequate employment for its young population, leaving many young Cambodians susceptible to the grasp of traffickers (Kaida, 2006). Such obstacles have affected the government’s ability to create coherent national anti-trafficking policies. However, with the assistance of domestic and international NGOs, TANs, and UN agencies such as UNIAP, some progress is being made in terms of developing more comprehensive anti-trafficking legislation (Cambodia Today, 1999). Historically, the first piece of anti-trafficking legislation adopted in Cambodia was the Law on Suppression of Kidnapping, Trafficking, and Exploitation of Human Persons, which was enacted in 1996 (Yasunobu, 2004). This law focused solely on the victimisation of women and children forced into the sex industry. The law led to increased prosecution against those found guilty of trafficking women and children for sex, but failed to set up protection and rehabilitation facilities for the victims of trafficking (Yasunobu, 2004). As a result, victims were poorly treated and Cambodian officials relied heavily on the facilities of domestic or international NGOs to undertake the task of rehabilitation rather than instituting government run organisations. This legislation remained in effect until the enactment of the 2008 Law on the Suppression of Human Trafficking and Commercial Exploitation. Prior to its adoption, the Cambodian government had been under a great deal of pressure from both the United States and international anti-trafficking NGOs to take on a larger role in the combating of human
trafficking within the country (Unmacht, 2003). Many critics stated that Cambodian officials were relying on outside organisations to handle the issue of trafficking rather than taking action themselves (Yasunobu, 2004). The new legislation has been useful in that it has clearly defined what trafficking is and it has acknowledged the many forms of human trafficking present in Cambodia (Royal Kram of Cambodia, n.d.). The law has also expanded and increased the powers of police officers investigating and prosecuting trafficking cases (US Department of State, 2008, p. 81). Traffickers prosecuted under this new legislation are subject to far more severe punishments than previously (Royal Kram of Cambodian, n.d.). Although statistics regarding prosecution of traffickers in Cambodia are often considered unreliable, data released in the 2008 US Trafficking in Persons Report show an increase in the overall level of trafficking prosecution within the country (US Department of State, 2008).

The enactment of this legislation was coupled with the establishment of a national anti-trafficking task force. The goal of this national taskforce is to improve interagency efforts for combating trafficking. Trafficking prevention efforts in Cambodia have increased with the passage of the comprehensive anti-trafficking legislation and the proliferation of other new policies. There has also been an increased effort in the country to promote the level of women’s and children’s rights. The Ministry of Women’s Affairs and the Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans and Youth have initiated efforts to raise the level of awareness regarding trafficking and provide rehabilitation and protection programs to the victims of trafficking (UNIAP, 2008). These groups have organised vocational training programs for children to aid in trafficking prevention. The government has also undertaken efforts to reduce the sex tourism industry in the country. The Ministry of Tourism has begun producing and distributing pamphlets and information flyers to foreign tourists arriving in the country, warning them of the punishments that await those who sexually abuse Cambodian children (US Department of State, 2008, p. 84). The Ministry of Tourism has teamed up with several NGOs including World Vision International to conduct workshops and training sessions educating staff of the hospitality industry on how to recognise and take action against
instances of child sex tourism, and it has also developed a program designed to protect children from being drawn into the sex tourism sector (ILO, 2008).

A major obstacle in Cambodia to effective anti-trafficking initiatives continues to be that of government corruption. In Cambodia the government continues to prosecute its own police for trafficking-related corruption charges. For example, in 2006 the former Deputy Director of the Police Anti-Trafficking and Juvenile Protection Department was convicted for complicity in trafficking and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment and two officials under his supervision were also convicted and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment (Humantrafficking.org, 2011a). Former US President George Bush stated in 2005 that the Cambodian government had “failed to address the trafficking complicity of senior law enforcement officials” (Bush, 2005). In addition to corruption, other aspects of state performance on the trafficking problem continue to exacerbate the problem. Fieldwork in Cambodia brought to light the shameful practices of the Cambodian government – the constant harassment of brothel owners for bribes that serve to add to trafficking victims’ debts; the collusion of government staff in illegal adoption practices; and the irregular act of rounding up child prostitutes and moving them to rural areas when dignitaries visited the capital Phnom Penh, amongst others.

**Thailand**

The causes and extent of child sex trafficking in Thailand are much better understood than in Cambodia due to Thailand’s long history of both human trafficking and advocacy organisations’ anti-trafficking interventions in the country. Slavery is not a new phenomenon in Thailand and slavery, especially bonded slavery, has strong historical roots (Rende Taylor, 2003). In Lanna Thai history, the king owned all farmland and if the people were unable to pay their taxes or owed any other debt they could choose to place themselves, their wives, their children or their junior kin in debt bondage (Rende Taylor, 2003, p. 413). Debt bondage slaves could be bought out of slavery but often were not and once entered into debt bondage, the slave could be resold (Rende Taylor, 2003, p. 413).
Daughters were often resold as the male corvee labour system demanded a constant supply of female slaves for domestic and sexual services (Rende Taylor, 2003, p. 413). There is evidence that as early as the fourteenth century the Siam government licensed and taxed prostitution and there has been recorded government control and intervention into the sex sector since that period (Lim, 1998, p. 130). While these practices were abolished by King Rama V in 1905, social hierarchy, sexual slavery and the leveraging of children to pay family debts persist in modern Thailand (Rende Taylor, 2003, p. 413).

The sex industry in Thailand received a substantial boost during the Vietnam War, when nearly 40,000 American service members entered the country on rest and recreation periods (Hitchcock, 2008). The increased number of American servicemen in the country occurred at the same time as globalisation was creating new trends in global travel and communication. Globalisation brought an even greater number of foreigners into Thailand looking for sex. Migrating children from poor neighbouring countries such as Laos, Cambodia and Burma, looking to escape poverty and civil conflict in their own countries, were lured into sexual servitude to meet the needs of the growing Thai sex tourism industry (Hitchcock, 2008). Even these regional sources could not meet the needs of the burgeoning tourism sector and young girls were trafficked from as far away as Eastern Europe (US Department of State, 2008, p. 243). During this period of rapid expansion there was little action taken by the Thai government to curtail it (Hitchcock, 2008). Indeed the Thai government openly promoted the growth of sex tourism until the late 1980s (Hitchcock, 2008, p. 247). In the past two decades the Thai government has bowed to international pressure and ceased its public promotion of sex tourism and instead declared its intention to eradicate child sex tourism and child trafficking (Peters, 2007).

The reasons for human trafficking in Thailand differ somewhat to those of its neighbours due to the unique status of women in Thai society. Thai family structure is described as matrilocal and matrilineal (Mensendiek, 1997, p. 163). The family is structured around female members and although the authority rests with the senior male, it is transmitted
through the female line (Mensendiek, 1997, p. 163). The traditional role of women upholding the household has meant that women have needed to seek ways to respond to the changing rural economy. The failure of the traditional subsistence farming economy has driven many women and girls to migrate to Bangkok or neighbouring countries in search of means to support the family. A study by Phongpaichit (1982) found that migrant Thai women and young girls send their earnings back home as remittances, and some females return to their families after a period of time. Phongpaichit concluded that “it is not helplessness but the sense of responsibilities they feel” that drives Thai girls into prostitution, and that the sex trade provides a means of survival for many of the rural poor (1982, p. 68). Bales suggests that in Thailand the case of women and children who are forced into prostitution reflects the differences between old and new forms of slavery (2000, p. 467). Thailand’s rapid population growth has meant that there is a surplus of potential slaves while the country’s rapidly changing economy has led to increased poverty and desperation (Bales, 2000, p. 467). In Thailand there is often no ethnic difference between the slaveholder and the victim - young Thais are enslaved by Thai brothel owners and the primary distinction is between rural slaves and urban slaveholders (Bales, 2000, p. 468).

Due to Thailand’s long history of intervention in the sex industry, it is not surprising that the country’s anti-trafficking legislation and policies are more advanced than its neighbours. Thailand first acknowledged the presence of human trafficking in 1928 with the Trafficking in Women and Girls Act. This legislation aimed to reduce the number of women and girls forced into prostitution in the hope of decreasing the occurrence of sexually transmitted diseases (Wongboonsin, 2007). This legislation was replaced in 1997 with the Prevention and Suppression of Trafficking in Women and Children Act. This law greatly expanded the prosecution and severity of penalties associated with human trafficking. As with the previous law, this act was aimed at the reduction of sexually transmitted diseases rather than responding to trafficking as a human rights violation. In 2007 the Thai government passed its comprehensive anti-trafficking law, the Prevention and Suppression of Human Trafficking Act. This act recognises the existence of sex trafficking and extends the status of
victim to males, which was not present in previous legislation (Wongboonsin, 2007). The law significantly increases the penalties associated with the crime of human trafficking and addresses government corruption, with those within government found to be involved in trafficking schemes susceptible to receiving double or even triple the punishment accorded to a Thai citizen (Wongboonsin, 2007). Under the new policy, prosecution of traffickers in Thailand has increased. According to the 2008 US TIP report, during that year the Thai government reported over 140 cases of sex trafficking that were investigated and prosecuted, up from the 88 of the previous year (US Department of State, 2008, p. 44).

Human trafficking prevention efforts have increased in response to the new legislation and policies. The Thai government has undertaken awareness campaigns across the country that have focused on safe migration practices and integrating the importance of human rights into general school education (Humantrafficking.org, 2011b). Sex tourist education has also received increased attention for trafficking prevention purposes. Upon arrival in Thailand, foreign tourists have received information regarding the high traffic sex sector in the country and the penalties that are associated with the criminal act of abusing a child in Thailand (US Department of State, 2008, p. 245). The new trafficking legislation has also improved the resources provided for rehabilitating and protecting trafficking victims. New programs, which largely focus on preventing the re-trafficking of children, offer various services to increase the victim’s level of education and vocational skills. All female trafficking victims, Thai or foreign, are now offered shelter and rehabilitation services upon their rescue (US Department of State, 2008, p. 245). There are currently nine trafficking victim shelters that are located regionally and run by the government to assist victims of trafficking (US Department of State, 2008, p. 245). Fein estimates the overall number of shelters, run by the state and also NGOs, in the country at ninety-seven (2007, p. 51). The government has also established overseas protection and rehabilitation measures to ensure that Thai citizens identified as trafficking victims abroad are returned home and safely reintegrated into society. Fieldwork in Thailand showed that there are many instances of positive collaboration now between NGOs and the police and that in tourism hot spots such as Pattaya the identification and protection of children has vastly improved as a result of
police commitment to children’s welfare. Whilst the children themselves may not trust the police, they do trust the NGOs that collaborate with the police and will therefore turn to NGOs for assistance and protection.

Not all scholars, however, believe that Thailand is moving forward in its anti-trafficking efforts. Shelley argues that the sex industry in Thailand is still viewed as a form of development capital (2010, p. 161). She points to the issue of government corruption and collusion in human trafficking and suggests that trafficking remains a major source of revenue for the police who share the proceeds of this large-scale activity with politicians and political parties (Shelley, 2010, p. 162). The sex industry in Thailand is not, she argues, the consequence of well organised crime groups as in many other countries but rather the result of networks of criminals working with government officials who assume a key role in the trafficking of Thai citizens and migrants (Shelley, 2010, p. 162). Other critics such as Obokata (2006) argue that despite a recent flurry of legislation against human trafficking, the government of Thailand still tolerates the sex industry because of the large amount of profit it generates. Blackburn et al (2010) state that the sex industry contributes more than $22 billion to Thailand’s gross domestic product. This statistic underscores why the sex industry in Thailand is so entrenched in Thai culture (Blackburn et al, 2010, p. 107). Furthermore, despite promises to stamp out government corruption the practice continues unabated. In Mae Sai in Northern Thailand, for example, brothels pay a certain amount of bribe money to the police each month for each girl (Obokata, 2006, p. 52). In 2003, 50 police officers of the Bangkok Metropolitan Police were removed from active duty because of allegations that they had taken bribes from human traffickers (Obokata, 2006, p. 52).

As the economy continues to develop in Thailand there have been fewer Thais available to traffic into the domestic sex trade so traffickers have turned their attention to the ethnic hill tribes in Northern Thailand who lack citizenship and are thus more vulnerable. The North of the country remains poorer than the South and has retained its status as the agricultural corner of the country. The hill tribes of the region rely on agricultural practices to survive
and have few rights (Sara, 2010). They are not allowed to own property and have no right to vote and often they are excluded from the education system and free health care (Sara, 2010, p. 170). Most hill tribe people cannot, in today’s globalised world full of price fluctuations and increasing unemployment, earn a sufficient income on agriculture alone and so descend on the major towns of Bangkok and Chiang Mai to beg, sell handicrafts or send their children to work (Sara, 2010, p. 170). They are constantly subject to arrest and harassment from police and local Thai citizens, and have little chance of protection when they fall prey to unscrupulous traffickers (Sara, 2010, p. 170). Changes in the economy have also affected local Thais and made some Thai citizens vulnerable to trafficking. Changes in rural land ownership have led a vast number of farming families to send children to the cities of Bangkok and Chiang Mai, amongst other urban centres, in search of work. Fieldwork demonstrated that a number of families send their children to Bangkok and believe they are employed in factories when, in fact, they have been trafficked and sold to Bangkok brothels. Other families understand where their daughters have found employment and turn a blind eye to their sex work due to the valuable remittances that are, in some cases, sent home to support the extended family.

4.6 Causes of trafficking in Thailand and Cambodia in an era of globalisation – supply and demand

Having discussed the unique child trafficking situations in Thailand and Cambodia, this section of the chapter will address the causes of trafficking in these countries in the current era of globalisation from both ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ perspectives.

4.6.1 Supply

Trafficking of children in the Southeast Asia region takes place within a rapidly globalising economy. Rende Taylor points out that rapid globalisation in Thailand has resulted in massive labour migration streams of rural Thais to Bangkok and abroad (2003, p. 411). An unfortunate derivative of this phenomenon is the trafficking of Thai women and girls,
primarily to work in the sex sector (Rende Taylor, 2003, p. 411). Archavanitkul (1998) contends that the factors determining child trafficking in Cambodia and Thailand are a combination of poverty and life under a long period of war in the country. Most trafficked children in Cambodia and Thailand come from poor families, often with many children, many of whom are family headed by widowed women (Archavanitkul, 1998, p. 3). Poverty provides the context in which children are forced, sold, tricked, lured, kidnapped, or trafficked into commercial sexual activities (Fraley, 2005). By the term ‘poverty’ it does not mean that all children living in poor conditions are forced to undertake this work. Poverty is, however, a factor that pushes many children into prostitution (Fraley, 2001). The first World Congress Against the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in 2001 suggested that reductions in welfare and minimum wage levels are among the pressures that lead children to exploitative work and to live on the streets. Poverty creates a sense of enormous debt and desperation for many families in the Mekong Subregion and therefore creates the necessary conditions for children to become victims of child exploitation and trafficking. An example of this kind of poverty-led child trafficking is the case recently illustrated in ‘Not For Sale: End Human Trafficking and Slavery’s (2012) online victim stories. The website tells the story of a young Cambodian girl, Srey Neang, whose parents were struggling to care for five children in a camp for internally displaced Cambodians. The camp was situated near the border with Thailand where food was scarce and jobs non-existent. An old woman and her son came to the camp seeking a young girl to be a house servant and her parents made the difficult decision to sacrifice one child for the survival of her siblings (Real Stories from Asia – Not For Sale: End Human Trafficking and Slavery, 2012). Srey ended up trafficked into slavery not only by the old woman but, upon the old woman’s death, also by her son (Real Stories from Asia – Not For Sale: End Human Trafficking and Slavery, 2012). A similar story of poverty was recently illustrated in the Thai newspaper, Phuket news (www.phuketgazette.net/phuket_news/2012) in which poor girls from the Northern part of Thailand were promised jobs in Bahrain but instead trafficked into prostitution.
Not all researchers agree that poverty is the key cause for the ‘supply’ of child trafficking in the GMS. As discussed in earlier pages, Rende Taylor challenges the argument that poverty is the only reason for trafficking in the GMS in her behavioural ecology study of child labour and prostitution in rural Northern Thailand. She argues that while poverty and low educational attainment are often cited as the key root causes of trafficking in women and girls, not all poor girls end up in these situations (Rende Taylor, 2003, p. 411). Her study shows that hazardous labour is, rather, driven by a concern for providing status symbols for the matriline and the opportunity costs represented by education. The families of girls who have spent most of their childhood in school expect high returns on their human-capital investment (Rende Taylor, 2003, p. 411). In the GMS region daughters are still generally socialised to feel responsible for the welfare of their natal family members, particularly younger siblings and elderly parents, throughout life (Rende Taylor, 2003, p. 413). Beyrer (2001) has researched Shan women and girls trafficked into the sex industry in Southeast Asia and concluded that poverty is not the reason for their trafficking, rather, the complex and tragic modern political history of the Shans is largely to blame (Beyrer, 2001, p. 544). Shans have been forced off their land, fled to Thailand and neighbouring states, and, as a result, are vulnerable to trafficking and exploitation. Despite being subject to harassment and arrest by Thai authorities they continue to come to the country, driven by even more difficult situations in their homeland (Beyrer, 2001, p. 545).

Gender discrimination plays an important role in trafficking as women and girls, who remain more excluded from the formal employment sector than their male counterparts, remain the most vulnerable to trafficking. The traditional Thai proverbs, “to have a daughter is like having a toilet in your front yard”, and “a woman is only worthy when she has a husband” speak volumes regarding the subordination of Thai women in society (Sara, 2010, p. 173). ‘Good’ daughters in Thailand will work as prostitutes for many years to elevate the status of the family (Sara, 2010, p. 176). Patriarchy also plays a role in trafficking with patriarchal attitudes and cupidity allowing men to sell women, turning them into mere commodities (Fein, 2007, p. 58). Bales (1999) has highlighted the additional problem of consumer culture in Thai society as a cause of trafficking. He points to a recent survey in the northern
provinces of Thailand that found that of the families who sold their daughters, two-thirds could afford not to do so but instead preferred to buy colour televisions and video equipment (Bales, 1999, p. 40). In a similar 2003 study Rehbein asked Cambodians about their material wishes and received responses of ‘cars’ and ‘houses’. Fieldwork in Thailand and Cambodia in 2010 confirmed Rehbein’s (2003) finding – staff of TANs stated that a number of ‘rescued’ trafficking victims escaped the shelters in which they were subsequently placed and returned to brothels due to a desire to not just support their families, but also to buy consumer items.

Other globalisation-related issues in Southeast Asia have also negatively affected poor girls and women in Thailand and Cambodia and increased the supply of girls at risk of trafficking and exploitation. An example of this is the rise and fall of the garment industry, which has traditionally been a major source of employment for GMS citizens. The garment industry presents one of the clearest examples of the differential impacts of trade policies and practices on men and women (Garwood, 2005, p. 22). Women are employed in far greater numbers than men in the industry and often occupy lower-paid positions (Garwood, 2005, p. 22). Multinational corporations rely on the competitive advantage of women’s disadvantage locally, to suppress wages across the industry globally (Garwood, 2005, p. 22). The phasing out of the Multifibre Arrangement in 2004 has meant massive job losses for some of the 29.3 million people working in the garment industry, many of whom are women (ILO, 2000, p. 13). As factories close, women and girls are left unemployed, and countries have competed in a ‘race to the bottom’ (Garwood, 2005, p. 21). While it is difficult to find evidence to support the link between unemployment and vulnerability to trafficking it is highly plausible that a number of the girls recently made unemployed by the fall of the garment industry have ended up in desperate situations and thus at a higher risk of exploitation and trafficking. Interviews with network staff in Thailand and Cambodia confirmed this theory and suggested that a major supply factor for trafficking is the vast number of girls made quickly unemployed by changes in the economy.
4.6.2 Demand

As this research is discussing children trafficked for sexual exploitation the ‘demand’ side of child trafficking clearly involves the buyers of children’s labour as well as the traffickers that organise and profit from children’s sexual exploitation. ‘Demand’ can also be understood as the global market that demands cheap and abundant child labour in the sex industry. ‘Demand’ can embrace a broad and divergent range of motivations and interests and refer to employers’ requirements for cheap and vulnerable labour, to requirements for household and subsistence labour, or even to consumer demand for cheap goods and/or services – or any combination of these factors (Anderson and O’Connell-Davidson, 2003).

The purchasers of children’s sexual labour are predominantly local Asian men (and to a much lesser extent, women) and foreigners. Most visitors to the Southeast Asia region will inevitably encounter one of the sex tourism hot spots where foreigners seeking sex with local adults and children are in abundance. Fieldwork in Thailand, particularly in Cambodia, demonstrated that non-sex tourists are a minority here – what the tourists are looking for is sex and there is agreement amongst trafficking experts in the region that many tourists do not ask or care about the age or circumstances of the young boys and girls whom they pay for sexual encounters. There have been numerous recent cases in the international and local media of Western sex tourists being arrested and prosecuted for buying sex with children or participating in sex trafficking (www.phuketgazette.net/phuket_news/2012). A recent example was Canadian John Wrenshall who spent eight years in Bangkok running a brothel, buying children as young as four, “training” them and selling them to other sexual predators (Vancouver Sun, 2012). The ‘demand’ side of trafficking is also illustrated in the case of paedophile Nicholas Griffin who was extradited from Cambodia after serving a year in jail for committing indecent acts on seven boys ranging in age from seven to 12. The 54 year old had set up an orphanage near Siem Reap where he abused the children (Vancouver Sun, 2012). ‘Demand’ can vary from region to region in Southeast Asia, as various countries try to deal with their own domestic trafficking problems. It is believed that part of what is pushing travelling sex offenders into Cambodia is Thailand’s increased enforcement of child sexual abuse laws (Vancouver Sun, 2012).
There is a widespread belief among organisations studying the sex sector in the GMS that the domestic and Asian tourist in and to Thailand and Cambodia often has a preference for young virgins (Peters, 2007). While hard data to support this has proved elusive, anecdotal evidence appears to confirm this phenomenon (Peters, 2007). There are documented cases of sex clients paying high prices for virgins (Peters, 2007, p. 25). More recently it is thought that the HIV/AIDS epidemic is driving sex clients to seek virgins who, they believe, have the ability to cure them from the disease (Peters, 2007, p. 25). This, in turn, pushes the age of a virgin back more and more so that younger and younger children are being exploited and many children are thus increasingly being subjected to risk of transmission of the HIV/AIDS virus (Peters, 2007).

4.7 The response of Mekong Subregion states to child trafficking

As this chapter has discussed, child trafficking in the GMS is often a migration for labour problem gone wrong in the globalised economy (Chuang, 2006). The dynamic of wealth divide between rich and poor between countries and within them has created a spate of ‘survival migrants’ who seek opportunities abroad as a means of survival as jobs disappear in countries of origin (Ghosh, 1998). Situating the child trafficking phenomenon in the broader context of globalisation and migration for survival spotlights how deeply rooted child trafficking is and the underlying socioeconomic forces that impel children to migrate for work. It also demonstrates how the focus on the back end of the trafficking process, that is, of the crimes of the trafficker and the abuses committed in the course of trafficking, is but a small part of the much broader problem of trafficking. Mekong Subregion governments have been deeply reluctant, however, to view trafficking in this broader frame, that is, as a problem of migration, poverty, discrimination and gender-based inequality and violence (Chuang, 2006). States have tended to view child trafficking as a ‘law and order’ problem requiring an aggressive criminal justice response (Chuang, 2006, p. 139). Unfortunately, solutions that fail to account for the broader picture can only hope to ameliorate the symptoms, rather than address the causes of the problem (Chuang, 2006, p. 146). Whilst TANs have turned their attention toward the issues of globalisation and migration (World Vision, 2008; ECPAT, 2009), GMS states are still reluctant to accept the
reality that the problem of trafficking begins not with the traffickers themselves, but with the conditions that caused victims to migrate under circumstances rendering them vulnerable to exploitation. Child trafficking is but an ‘opportunistic response’ to the tension between the economic necessity to migrate, on the one hand, and the politically motivated restrictions on migration, on the other (ILO, 2005, p. 46). Such limitations to legal migration opportunities feed the opportunities for traffickers who are simply ‘fishing in the stream of migration’ to take advantage of the confluence of survival migrants’ needs for jobs, on the one hand, and the unrelenting market demand for cheap labour, on the other (Thomas, 2004).

All labour and consumer markets are socially and politically constructed in the sense that what people buy and sell is determined, to a large extent, by a complex set of structural and ideological factors (Gupta, 2010, p. 79). The state plays a crucial role in shaping what is bought and sold and by whom and on what terms (Gupta, 2010, p. 79). Therefore to explore the demand side of child trafficking is not simply to inquire about the individuals who exploit or consume children’s labour but also to question the way in which states, through their action or inaction, construct conditions under which it is possible or profitable to consume or exploit this labour. In the Southeast Asia region state actions and inaction range from tacit promotion of sex tourism as revenue earned by the Thai government to ignoring the mass export of trafficked labour for domestic work (Gupta, 2010, p. 79). The governments of the GMS have emphasised that it is far from their intention to promote policies that exacerbate the trafficking problem (Robinson, 2006, p. 55). However, it is clear that the growth of the sex industry in Thailand and Cambodia is in fact in direct response to the countries’ national responses to global economic planning (Robinson, 2006, p. 55). For example, where mass tourism has been promoted as a global investment strategy, a large and unskilled workforce is required (Robinson, 2006, p. 55). Simpkins goes so far as to argue that the Thai state was an active participant in the development of the country’s sex industry:

Since the 1950s the Thai state has been complicit in the formation of the sex industry. Military leaders invited United States troops to station themselves near
Bangkok; parliament enacted laws that criminalised sex workers, but not sex consumers; and leading bureaucrats created a ministry to coordinate investment in the tourist industry, a known catalyst of demand for sexual services ... State activity became central in sanctioning and promoting the Thai sex industry (1997, p. 72).

Governments have taken very different approaches to tackling trafficking depending on their ideological stance on trafficking and associated issues such as prostitution. The United States has introduced the annual Trafficking in Persons report, which names and shames and then imposes sanctions on governments that the US does not believe are trying hard enough to combat trafficking to and from individual countries. The US TIP report has attracted considerable criticism from countries that feel the Report favours US allies and rates poorly those countries that the US does not count amongst its close friends. Kaptstein suggests that the US TIP report is rarely a useful tool, since most of the countries in question either do not receive United States donor aid or are of such compelling importance to US national security that the US is unwilling to crack down on them (2006, p. 111). Kaptstein wrote of the former Bush administration: “The administration, like its European counterparts, seems to feel that a few slaves should not be allowed to get in the way of high politics” (2006, p. 111).

An interesting comparison in anti-trafficking state policy comes in the way of the divergent approaches of the Swedish and Dutch governments to human trafficking. The Dutch government famously legalised prostitution in October 2000. The intention was that once prostitution was legal and regulated the police would be better able to pick up the signs of human trafficking and thus prevent the practice (Kaptstein, 2006, p. 112). However, this has not proved to be the case and sex slaves continue to enter the black market in the officially sanctioned red-light district (Kaptstein, 2006, p. 112). The Swedish government, on the other hand, has criminalised the buying of sex. The law relating to this was introduced in 1999 and since this time close to 1000 men have been charged with seeking to purchase the services of a prostitute (Kaptstein, 2006, p. 112). While the Swedish government has
claimed that the new law has reduced the number of prostitutes on Swedish streets a
counter argument has been that it has just served to push prostitution even further
underground and thus facilitate the practice of trafficking even more than before (Kapstein,
2006).

In Southeast Asia, state responses to child trafficking are hampered by issues of internal
government corruption. Government officials of all levels profit from the sale and
exploitation of their fellow citizens and despite efforts from the Thai and Cambodian
governments to stamp out the practice it continues unabated (Shelley, 2010). Compounding this is the fact that GMS states still cannot afford, especially in the case of Cambodia, to pay government employees a good salary, so the lure of profiting from individual trafficking victims is a strong one. In recent years GMS governments have become increasingly concerned about the lack of law enforcement to protect children from traffickers (US Department of State, 2010). This may be a result of advocacy network efforts to campaign for more and better policy to protect children from human traffickers or another plausible explanation is that of the US TIP. The Mekong Subregion countries have shown considerable pride in complying with international standards to either aim for tier 1 or 2 ratings (which suggest compliance with international standards and ongoing efforts to eradicate trafficking and cooperate with other organisations and states). Cambodia and Thailand were both ranked within Tier 2 by the US Department of State in its 2008 TIP Report, which indicates that the countries have a significant trafficking problem but that their respective governments are taking significant steps to combat the problem (Blackburn et al, 2004, p. 111).

On a local level, however, the issue is much more complicated and corruption continues to
hamper government efforts to combat trafficking. Research into human trafficking in the
region has reported that border officials take bribes from traffickers; police accept bribes
from brothel owners; police and judges make arrangements to ‘register’ brothel workers by
falsifying legal documents to establish age of majority for a fee; police accept bribes to
ignore the presence of workers; police make arrests and raids in order to get bribes; police are sometimes clients or demand sex for no pay; in some cases police are even known to traffic women and children (Project Parivartan, 2006, p. 5). Brothel owners have developed ways of dealing with the police force, such as befriending and bribing police; moving or hiding girls in attics or boxes during raids for which they had advance notice; bailing workers out of jail; and forcing workers to change their names and stories to avoid repeat-offender charges (Human Rights Watch Asia, 1995). While there has been a recent proliferation of national and regional laws to protect children from trafficking, in many cases the laws are not effectively implemented on the ground. There are frequent reports of police acting incorrectly on a trafficking case with the end result of traffickers walking free or victims being re-trafficked (Project Parivartan, 2006).

Responding to poor state responses to child trafficking in the region, TANs have increasingly lobbied for better regional coordination of laws and treaties relating to child trafficking offences, as well as the implementation of new laws to protect all children from trafficking and better prosecution of traffickers. A recent success has been the introduction of extraterritorial legislation that prosecutes traffickers and abusers of trafficked children in their home countries. According to this extraterritorial legislation, anyone who abuses a child while in another country and escapes that country without being caught can later be prosecuted and jailed in his or her home country for the crime he or she committed abroad (World Vision, 2008).

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the debates over the definitions of ‘child’ and ‘human trafficking’ and summarised the extent of child trafficking in Southeast Asia. It has provided a discussion of the historical bases for the expansion of child trafficking in the region, including the history of UN presence in Cambodia during the aftermath of the war, and the growth of tourism as a key contributor to the expansion of sex tourism and child sex trafficking to cater for the influx of male tourists to the region. It has included a discussion
of the supply and demand elements of child trafficking in Thailand and Cambodia in the current global political economy and highlighted poverty and labour migration for survival as key causes for child trafficking. It has discussed the barriers to effective transnational advocacy networking against child trafficking including government inaction on the issue and government corruption and collusion in trafficking. The next chapter will discuss the methodology used for data collection in the field for this study in Thailand and Cambodia.
Chapter 5.

Methodology Chapter

5.1 Introduction - Country case selection

Although this research discusses the issue of child sex trafficking as a social issue spanning the continents, Thailand and Cambodia served as the primary country case studies for the analysis of TANs’ activities. Through the study of these two countries and the TANs against child sex trafficking operating within them, interesting networking phenomena became evident including the development of cohesive networks against trafficking; TAN politics; the collective sharing of resources, knowledge and expertise among the groups; the shaping of social policy on the issue as a result of the advocacy campaigning of these networks; and the new activity of some networking occurring between the networks, especially in Cambodia. As per the descriptions of the history of the current state of child sex trafficking in Thailand and Cambodia, these countries form the nexus of child sex trafficking activity in the Mekong Subregion and are clearly the most documented countries for both trafficking and sex tourism. Given the nature of this research, it was necessary to rein in the scope of the study and focus on just two of the six countries that form the Mekong Subregion.

5.2 Qualitative Research

Due to the difficulties of quantifying a complex and transnational social problem, employing a qualitative research methodology has allowed the exploration of normative and theoretical questions within the social science framework. The strategies employed – analysing secondary sources, conducting in-depth, semi structured interviews, participant observation, and process tracing – have illuminated complex advocacy networking processes against child trafficking in Thailand and Cambodia.
5.3 Primary and Secondary Sources

A first step for this qualitative research was the extensive review of primary and secondary sources and historical data on child trafficking and slavery and associated issues such as sex tourism and forced labour. Especially since 2000 an increasing number of non-state actors began conducting research and issuing reports on the issue of child trafficking. Now there are many hundreds of studies on human trafficking globally. In the Mekong countries there is a multitude of UN and NGO reports on the subject of child trafficking for sexual exploitation. Secondary sources accessed for this research included books, academic journal articles, newspaper articles, speeches, international conference reports, and other publications. The printed materials reviewed included a wide range of published and unpublished documents pertinent to the issues of TANs and child sex trafficking in the Mekong Subregion. Thanks to the growth of electronic databases of journals, newspapers, and magazines, and also the proliferation of internet websites of many organisations (UN and non-governmental organisations) I have been able to save a substantial amount of time and money in gathering most of the documents and publications. In cases of materials and data that were not available from library searches or the internet, especially publications such as NGO newsletters and annual reports, these were obtained through direct contact with relevant NGOs and UN agencies during the six months I spent in Thailand and Cambodia for data collection in 2010.

5.4 Research questions and objectives

The central research question of the study was: How effective are advocacy network partners at working together to achieve their goal of combating child sex trafficking in Southeast Asia?

Secondary research questions included:

- How do organisations (NGOs and UN agencies) form TANs? What structures do they adopt?
• What are the advantages and disadvantages of anti-trafficking TANs? How is it important that NGOs and UN agencies organise their advocacy in networks rather than organisations working independently of each other?

• What is occurring in TANs’ internal politics and what are the internal and external factors that facilitate or impede organisations’ participation in TANs?

• How are TANs contributing to a cosmopolitan ‘globalisation from below’?

Key interview questions included:

Who does your organisation partner with? Does your organisation partner with NGOs/UN agencies with a similar ethos? Are these ongoing partnerships? If not, why? Is this part of what you might call a wider network? Or do you have another preferred term? (for example, coalition, alliance, partnership).

How has this network evolved?

What are the major benefits for your organisation in being part of an advocacy network?

What are the disadvantages for your organisation of being part of an advocacy network?

What are the obstacles to achieving network success?

How is your network structured? How are resources, funds and tasks shared within the network?

Is the network seen as being/een effective in its goals? How is ‘effectiveness’ conceptualised in the network?

Interview questions focused on the history of the organisation, processes (for example, decision making, conflict resolution) and activities (programs, policy strategies), reasons why the network chose to work on anti-trafficking initiatives, and how the network defined its success and effectiveness. These questions linked to the research objectives.
The objectives of the proposed research were:

- To examine the attitudes and insights of anti-trafficking experts from NGOs and UN agencies on the question of the ‘effectiveness’ of TANs against child sex trafficking.
- To determine which hierarchical, structural, and power principles, politics and processes are being utilised by anti-trafficking networks.
- To highlight the challenges and opportunities for organisations operating within the transnational advocacy network movement.
- To explore how organisational structures of NGOs and UN agencies practising in networks change and develop over time, within different geographical, historical and political contexts and how these may affect networks’ sustainability and success.

Since little was known about TANs and their organisational structures, I adopted an exploratory, naturalistic approach to help answer the research questions.

5.5 Research Process

This research took on the form of an exploratory study via qualitative methodology. The importance of utilising qualitative methodologies included the provision of a research vision namely “where it is that the analyst wants to go with the research”, and “the flexibility to get there, and the ability to interpret and analyse raw data (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). I adhered to the notion that qualitative interviews relied on the participants’ abilities to make sense of their world and why it exists and continues to exist. The research process consisted of three stages, which could be described as ‘going there’, ‘being there’, and ‘being here’ (Birch, 1998). ‘Going there’ is “the theoretical exploration before the field, that places the researcher in a particular position when entering, defining and gaining access into the field of inquiry” (Birch, 1998, p 172). In this stage of the research I collected secondary resources and performed literature reviews. ‘Being there’ refers to the actual field work, establishing relationships with the research participants and collecting data (Birch, 1998, p. 172). During this stage of the research I spent six months in Thailand and Cambodia.
performing semi-structured interviews with representatives of anti-trafficking NGOs and UN agencies, attending conferences and seminars and other networking opportunities. ‘Being here’ is the process of data analysis and writing the final report, performed by the researcher (Birch, 1998, pp 172 – 173). During this stage of the research I used NVivo software to code the interview transcripts, perform qualitative data analysis, and wrote the chapters of this research.

5.5.1 Sampling and recruitment strategies

Development of the sampling frame for the study started with the process of determining clear sampling criteria. I identified organisational experience with practising network involvement as the primary criteria for selecting organisations as I believed that representatives of such organisations would be in the best position to shed light on the phenomenon of organising networks to advocate against child sex trafficking in the Mekong Subregion. Because I was interested in examining how organisational structures within organisations and TANs changed and evolved over time, I chose to include all types of networks, formal and informal, and networks that had only ad hoc or campaign specific advocacy activities. As I was interested in issues associated with hierarchy and power within networks I deemed it necessary to consider all types of networks to compare the different activities of the different network types to then examine and compare their effectiveness and sustainability.

At the next stage, to help identify organisations most suited for the study, I put together a list of potential characteristics of NGOs and UN agencies that were based on my review of relevant theoretical and empirical literature and included the following:

- Network age: Since the study of networks and their perceived influence on the trafficking debate demanded an overview of their activities over time, I disregarded networks that had been formed after 2008. I focused my attention on NGOs that
were transnational and/or international in nature and that had operated since at least 2005.

- Organisation/network type, size and scope: I looked at the size of NGOs and UN agencies, the number of staff working in the field of trafficking, the organisations’ publications, annual reports, online research and resource centres, involvement in direct service, policy design and implementation and advocacy and other activities.

- Organisation/network ideology: I researched the organisations’ and networks’ ethos and values as publicised on their web pages and within their annual reports and compared them with the organisations they work with. This was performed in order to examine the organisations’ and networks’ ethos and goals, and funding arrangements.

- Internal structural arrangements, policies and relations: I assumed that the NGOs and UN agencies would emphasise full equality of members/employees and, where applicable, equality of their offices in different countries, and would utilise consensual decision making processes. I assumed, from previous experience working for NGOs, that offices in different countries would operate as autonomous entities and that each office would be responsible for making routine operational decisions and coordinating daily organisational activities in its geographic area, while critical decisions would be made by the entire staff on the basis of consensus, using electronic forms of communication (for example, email, teleconferences). I made no assumptions about the way that decisions were made by the networks and assumed that the management and decision making of network members would not necessarily be conducted in the same way that individual NGOs and UN agencies conduct their internal decision making processes.

- Relationships with external environments, financial agreements: I assumed that the NGOs and UN agencies would demonstrate a sound level of organisational autonomy and financial self-sustainability, for example, that they would be largely voluntary in nature, rely on membership dues and grants as well as funds raised from mail appeals, child sponsorship programs and other sources. I was mindful of the fact
that some NGOs are much larger and wealthier, especially those in the ‘North’ than their ‘Southern’ counterparts. I was also curious about the imbalance in wealth amongst the organisations and whether this could have an impact on the internal power dynamics in the networks.

The development of a preliminary sampling frame was not a difficult process. All UN agencies and most NGOs have their annual reports and information on their ethos, partners, sponsors and members, organisational structure, as well as activities such as policy design, advocacy and campaigns on their websites for all to see. I was able to find approximately twenty-five NGOs and UN agencies that worked, currently or in the past, as part of a formal or informal network, with offices in Cambodia and Thailand, that could be useful for interview purposes. After emailing the generic email addresses of these organisations I was able to establish a preliminary sample for face-to-face interviews. These organisations fell into three general categories: (1) international NGOs that work within one or more anti-trafficking networks and have country offices in Thailand and/or Cambodia, (2) UN agencies that operate within networks, or act as the coordinating group for networks, and also have country offices in Thailand and/or Cambodia, (3) ‘Southern’ NGOs that function within one or more networks, either with other Southern NGOs, Northern NGOs, or UN agencies, or a combination of the groups, and have an office in Thailand and/or Cambodia.

The recruitment of participants began in March 2010 after my research project had been approved by the University of Sydney Human Ethics Committee. At the first stage of the recruitment process, an official information letter explaining the purpose of the study and research procedure was emailed to all potentially participating NGOs, UN agencies and TANs selected for the study, as all of them had official email addresses. I requested interviews with one or two staff from the UN agencies and larger NGOs and one staff member from the smaller NGOs. Not many changes had to be made from the original short-list. Several NGOs and UN agencies referred me to other NGOs and networks to add to the interview sample; two networks declined to participate and one interview was tentatively set up but never
confirmed nor conducted. As I had secured an Endeavour Research Fellowship and was able to inform the NGOs, UN agencies and networks that I would be in Thailand and Cambodia for a period of six months and able to meet them during the months of March through to September 2010, at their office or another location of choice for the staff, I had little difficulty in finding a time when staff were available as six months was a generous window of time to conduct the interviews.

5.5.2 In depth interviews in Cambodia and Thailand

Being primarily motivated by an interest in the relationships amongst NGOs and UN agencies in TANs, the primary strategy of collecting information about the dynamics of networks combating child trafficking was conducted through in-depth semi structured interviews with representatives of international and domestic NGOs in Cambodia and Thailand, and key actors in relevant UN agencies. The purpose of the semi-structured interviews was to build a complete picture of the TANs, their diverse structures, the anti-trafficking advocacy strategies employed, and the processes of overcoming conflict.

Data collection was conducted in Thailand and Cambodia during one six month trip. All the interview participants spoke good or fluent English. The interviews were conducted with child trafficking experts who worked in NGOs, UN agencies, and academia in Bangkok (Thailand), Pattaya (Thailand), Chiang Mai (Thailand) and Phnom Penh (Cambodia). All the interviews were conducted in person with the exception of one telephone interview. Most of the interviews were conducted at the research participants’ offices with the exception of two interviews that were conducted in local cafes. The nature of the research and the dearth of information on the research questions necessitated collection of primary data from staff with considerable experience in TANs.
5.6 Ethics Committee

In early 2010 an application was submitted to the University’s Human Ethics Committee to request permission to conduct interviews in Thailand and Cambodia for the research. The application included a completed consent form and information form and contained evidence of non-coerced recruitment of research participants (for example, original emails to generic network email addresses and responses from staff). The consent and information forms were translated into Khmer and Thai by accredited translators. Every person interviewed was provided with these forms in their preferred language and told that the interview was for PhD research in the Faculty of Education and Social Work at the University of Sydney. It was also explained to them that networks’ and individuals’ names and individual responses would be kept anonymous, and all data would be de-identified to ensure absolute anonymity of the research participants and their networks. This was especially important considering the organisations’ and networks’ need to work effectively with donors and states and not be seen criticising state policy or state inaction on the child trafficking problem.

5.7 Informed consent procedure

All potential participants received an official information letter explaining the purpose of the study and research procedure (see Appendix) and those who agreed to participate signed informed consent forms (see Appendix) prior to the interviews. The one research participant interviewed over the phone submitted his signed consent form by email after scanning the document (prior to the interview). The research participants were advised that their participation in the study was completely voluntary. They were guaranteed the right to refuse to answer any questions at any time and to withdraw from the study at any time. The participants were informed that the interviews would be audio-recorded to ensure transcription accuracy, and that the tape recorder could be turned off at any time upon their request. In one case where the participant did not wish to be tape recorded, interview notes were taken instead.
The participants were assured of the strict confidentiality of their interviews. They were advised that neither their names nor the names of their organisations would be mentioned in reporting the findings of the study, and that pseudonyms for individuals and organisations would be used instead. The participants were informed that the interview tapes would be kept secure, first at the PhD candidate’s apartment in Bangkok, and then the Chief Investigator’s office at the University of Sydney, and destroyed after seven years. The interview participants were also advised that their involvement in the study would carry no immediate benefits to them or their organisations, yet they would be making a long-term contribution to the development of a new body of knowledge about TANs against child sex trafficking and network effectiveness. They were offered the option of receiving feedback upon the completion of the research. Since the aforementioned strategies of ensuring participants’ privacy and confidentiality were followed diligently throughout the project, the research participants were not subjected to any risks.

5.8 Data collection and sources

The sources of data for the study included:

(1) Semi-structured, in depth interviews, with twenty-two research participants from sixteen organisations and networks in Thailand and Cambodia.

(2) Over 3000 pages of NGO and UN documents, such as mission statements, constitutions, annual and financial reports, organisation charts, work manuals, newspaper clippings, books, brochures, conference proceedings, newsletters, flyers, and press releases, were read and analysed. Most documents were obtained through organisations’ web sites, other internet pages or directly from organisations’ and networks’ offices in Thailand and Cambodia.

(3) Over 200 minutes of audiovisual material including documentaries on child trafficking and stateless children in the Southeast Asia region, and movies developed by key anti-trafficking activists. All material was provided by libraries or research participants free of charge.
Research participant interviews were conducted between March and September 2010. The participants were interviewed using an open-ended, semi-structured interview guide, which contained questions about the participants’ respective organisations (organisation purpose, history, programs/activities, participation in network, network organisation and structure, challenges, network successes etc) and a series of conceptual questions regarding the participants’ understanding of the term ‘network’ and what it means to be part of a network; their interpretation of the concepts of power sharing and internal politics; their assessment of the advantages and strengths of being part of a network and the external factors that support or impede the creation and survival of such networks; their views on the importance of democracy and conflict resolution in networks; and their perceptions on the effectiveness of networks in the double sense of organisations effectively working together and organisations in networks effectively combating child sex trafficking in the GMS. The interview questions were pre-tested at an Australian anti-trafficking NGO prior to departing for the six-month stay in Thailand and Cambodia.

During the interviews I paid attention to facial expression and body language and took into account non-verbal communications and certain dynamics between myself and the interview participants, all of which helped me to better understand the participants’ experiences and to hear the ‘multiple voices’ in their speech (Devault, 1990). While recognising that language is socially constructed (Devault, 1990) I chose to adhere to the tactics of minimal intrusiveness, allowing participants to tell their stories in their own words (Davis and Marsh, 1994). In addition I kept a reflective journal that acted as an important means of recording emotions and perceptions (of the interview participant, the organisations/networks and things mentioned). Following each interview, I wrote notes on my impressions of the interview and the non-verbal cues of the interview participant. I then immediately transcribed the interview and entered the transcription and any additional notes into the qualitative software, NVivo.
5.9 Other methodologies: Participant observation and process tracing

Participant Observation

Although the focus methodology for the research was semi structured interviews, participant observation and process tracing were also used as data collection tools. Participant observation is a qualitative methodology that has been broadly adopted by the social sciences. It was useful for this research in that it assisted in gaining a familiarity with the organisations studied and interviewed, individual charismatic leaders and policy makers in their appropriate settings. I spent six months based in Bangkok working in a voluntary capacity for World Vision International on a child trafficking research project, and attending regional meetings and conferences. The position at World Vision International provided me with the opportunity to observe the internal dynamics of an international NGO deeply involved in the anti-trafficking movement and its interactions with other organisations. I became privy to information, internal reports and staff responses to events and other activities. As a researcher for World Vision for six months and part of an inter-agency anti-trafficking network I was able to experience first-hand the frustrations and jubilations for staff working in advocacy groups with multiple organisations and also the benefits of such networks. As I was working at the regional office for World Vision International, my nationality, sex or skin colour did not pose any problem for assimilating into the office environment as the office was very multicultural, the staff of other NGOs and UN agencies in Bangkok were ethnically diverse and Bangkok is itself a very international city.

Participant observation was conducted over approximately twenty hours at several sites. The following activities were observed: Human trafficking seminar at Chulalonkorn University in Bangkok in March 2010; a UNIAP networking meeting in Bangkok in March 2010; a UNIAP networking meeting in Myanmar in August 2010 and various inter-agency meetings at the World Vision office. Field notes were recorded in a separate journal for each activity and reviewed using NVivo for analysis.
Process Tracing

Another secondary methodology applied to the research was that of process tracing. Explanations need to be grounded in process tracing if they are to show the mechanism of network expansion and issue framing (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, 34). A process tracing methodology has been promoted by constructivists who are most interested in the development and impact of norms in the domestic arena. Gurowitz (1999) recommends for process tracing: “First, a focus on the actors who mobilise international norms; and second, an examination of the specific domestic circumstances that those actors confront”. I employed the method of process tracing in which I used the responses of research participants in in-depth interviews, participant observation, literature, NGO and UN documents including annual reports, national conference reports, and my own attendance and presentations at international conferences, to create a timeline of the mobilisation of anti-trafficking non-state actors in Thailand and Cambodia. Process tracing also served as an important methodology for triangulating research participants’ responses to my questions on the evolution of the networks.

5.10 Profile of the research participants

Twenty-two research participants from sixteen organisations were interviewed for the study. A number of participants were prominent activists in the international anti-trafficking movement, and most had many years of experience working for a variety of both non-government and intergovernmental organisations. The NGOs included: Six ‘Northern’ international organisations and five ‘Southern’ NGOs. In addition there were participants from four UN agencies. Of the NGOs, four were NGO TANs though their NGO members also operated as independent entities. The organisations and networks exhibited different degrees of internationalism, and varied in their practices. All participants were still active employees in their respective organisations. Three interview participants were founding members of their organisation or network. Of the participants, eight had been with their organisations for at least five years, and one had been working in an NGO for less than a year. Because the focus of the study was on the organisations and networks and not
individual network staff, I decided not to ask direct questions about the participants’ backgrounds unless it was absolutely necessary, and to rely on the information disclosed voluntarily during the interviews and obtained through organisational documents. To protect the identity of the participants their comments were de-identified where required.

Thirteen research participants were female in this study and nine were male. Seven were from Thailand, five were from Cambodia and the others were of diverse origins including American, Dutch, Italian, English, Australian and Indian. Their ages ranged from approximately twenty five to sixty years. In three interviews there was more than one staff member acting as research participant so the comments of both interview participants were transcribed and analysed. The following table summarises the organisations interviewed, the location of the offices where the interviews took place, the level of work authority of the research participant and whether the organisation is in effect a network of organisations rather than a single entity – NGO or UN agency. For the purposes of ensuring the anonymity of research participants and organisations, I have not noted whether organisations are NGOs or UN agencies.
Table 3: Networks observed and interviewed for data collection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview number</th>
<th>Organisation name (pseudonym)</th>
<th>Location (country)</th>
<th>Level of authority of research participant</th>
<th>Network?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Organisation 2</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Organisation 1</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Organisation 1</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>High *(telephone interview)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Organisation 4</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Organisation 8</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Organisation 8</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Organisation 11</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Organisation 3</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Organisation 3</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Organisation 14</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Organisation 13</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Organisation 7</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Organisation 5</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Organisation 10</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Organisation 10</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Organisation 9</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Organisation 12</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Organisation 15</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Organisation 14</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Organisation 6</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Organisation 4</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Organisation 16</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

160
As the table above suggests, only four representatives of established networks were interviewed for the research. The other research participants were employed at Northern or Southern NGOs, or UN agencies. However it is important to note that these organisations considered themselves partners in TANs. Most organisations were only involved in one TAN, however, a small number of organisations were involved in more than one TAN, or had been involved in the past in several TANs. Using participant observation, a number of additional TANs were observed for the research.

5.11 Limitations of the Sample

While it was envisaged that the interview group would be fairly representative of the different position levels within the organisations and networks this was not the case. The majority of research participants held positions of authority within their individual NGOs, UN agencies or TANs. This had both positive and negative implications for the research. It meant that the balance was shifted toward a managerial level of responses from staff who may not have always necessarily understood what was occurring in the field. However, this also meant that the research participants had the capacity to answer some complex questions on advocacy networking and how their conceptualisations of networking effectiveness applied to the research participant’s network. There was also an imbalance in terms of the number of research participants from the ‘North’ and from the ‘South’. The majority of research participants were from the ‘North’. This is, however, not surprising as the majority of staff in TANS in Southeast Asia are Westerners. Again, this had both positive and negative implications for the research. On the one hand I did not have to grapple too frequently with interpreters, but on the other hand the responses were not entirely reflective of the opinions of Thai and Cambodian activists, and an overall Southern perspective on the issue of advocacy networking against child sex trafficking is therefore lacking in the research. To balance this, during the data analysis stage of the research I spent more time analysing the interviews from Southern research participants and ensuring that their voices were present in the findings and discussion chapters of the research. In addition a discussion of third world cosmopolitanism has been provided. The fact that a majority of interview respondents were from the West also supports the theoretical
framework adopted for the research, cosmopolitan theory, which tends to be a Western conception that explains the motivations of Westerners operating in TANs.

The relative homogeneity of the research participants, most of whom were white, middle class, university-educated adults from industrialised countries, could also be construed as another limitation. This limitation was partially offset by the fact that all research participants had diverse international and organisational experience. Moreover, research on TANs shows that most of these organisations are typically made up of and/or run by middle-class white, well-educated professionals (Alvarez, 1998). Therefore, my sample merely reflects the current state of affairs. Other research challenges included those posed by travelling long distances to perform interviews; language barriers and the need on one occasion for interpreters to assist in interviews; and having to reschedule interviews many times to fit in with research participants’ busy schedules.

In light of these limitations, the twenty-two individuals and sixteen organisations included in my study do not represent the full spectrum of international NGOs, UN agencies and TANs campaigning in the field of anti child sex trafficking in the GMS, nor does the data assume to represent the opinions of all Thai and Cambodian campaigners. The sample is, however, large enough to provide substantial and useful information concerning the research participants’ perceptions on the value of the networks and the diversity, complexities, and effectiveness of the networks. It was also sufficient to draw out key characteristics of TANs against child sex trafficking, then substantially answer key research questions in this study.

5.12 Data analysis and quality control

Each research participant interview recording was transcribed and analysed as soon after the interview as possible. The accuracy of the transcription was checked against the interview recordings, and changes to the transcripts were made where needed. Information obtained from the interview transcripts was combined and compared with organisational
documents and video materials. The following themes emerged: Network’s history, ethos, the nature of its activities, structure, policies, procedures, rules, financial arrangements; relationships with NGO, government and UN members; and networks’ relationships with external environments and stakeholders. Open coding was also used to flag conceptual themes such as the networks’ assessment of the strengths and advantages of networks and the internal and external factors that supported or impeded the creation and survival of the network. Coding helped to further develop the conceptual theme coded ‘the research participants’ views on the importance of networks for anti child trafficking advocacy’, producing five new themes that were coded as: ‘The issue of leadership, resource sharing and power within networks’; ‘organisational processes – starting and sustaining networks’; ‘conceptualising advocacy network politics’; ‘trafficking and slavery conceptualisations’; ‘structural issues around trafficking’; and ‘advocacy network effectiveness’.

For the analysis of the interviews I sought the assistance of NVivo 8. With the help of the software I coded and analysed the interview transcripts. Initially the themes appearing in the research were used in order to develop the ‘codes’. As the analysis proceeded new categories emerged from the data that led to the development of additional ‘codes’. The data was therefore decontextualised and taken away from the context of the interview, then recontextualised in the new context formed by the specific category or ‘code’ that had been created to analyse similarities and differences in research participant responses. All the material was analysed this way and then subsequently re-read and re-analysed in order to proceed with data interpretation.

5.13 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the methodology for the research. I conducted twenty-two semi-structured interviews with anti-trafficking organisations and networks in the GMS over a six month period in 2010. The interviews were coded using NVivo. Additional methodologies used included process tracing and participant observation. The next chapter will discuss the
data from the interviews and the key themes that emerged during the data collection process.
Chapter 6.

Politics of TANs: Recognition of intersectionality, commitment to transnational networking, and contention

6.1 Introduction and framing for analysis

Drawing on the current literature on TANs this study complements a growing field of scholarship on advocacy network analysis. A number of theorists have written about the evolution and effectiveness of TANs and lauded their usefulness in combating social problems (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Banjeree, 2003; Katcher, 2010). As discussed in previous chapters, when it comes to promoting and protecting rights of marginalised or vulnerable groups, TANs have been particularly active in providing direct services such as organised planning relating to the rescue and rehabilitation of sex workers; efficient functioning of non-institutional services; primary education; skills training; health care; and pre travel information (Banjeree, 2003, p. 8). This is in great part due to the weakness of the welfare services provided by states in the region. The study of the effectiveness of TANs in anti-human trafficking activities in the GMS is therefore an important one. However it is not one without obstacles or limitations.

This chapter discusses the politics of TANs and TAN effectiveness through a discussion of the empirical material. The chapter presents the data from the twenty-two qualitative interviews conducted with anti-trafficking network representatives in Thailand and Cambodia. The first section of the chapter discusses the limitations of theories put forward by authors including Hertel (2006), and Keck and Sikkink (1998). In order to analyse the specific networks encountered in this research, an advocacy network typology has been developed. The typology demonstrates how networks, even though they exist to pursue similar objectives, evolve in a complex context of multiple players and controversial social,
economic and political problems. The typology is useful for reflecting on the various sizes, structures, and campaign activities of diverse network types. The second section of the chapter discusses anti-trafficking advocacy network structures and how these structures may have an important impact on networks’ effectiveness and sustainability. Some anti-trafficking network structures or models were more prevalent in the GMS than others. Some types of networks appeared to be more enduring than others. The reasons for this diversity are discussed in the second sector of the chapter. The third section of this chapter discusses the evolution of moral imperatives of the networks. While the networks demonstrated cosmopolitan values and had strong moral imperatives to reduce child sex trafficking and this imperative provided a key driver for their collaborative efforts and activities, a more complex picture emerged in the other drivers for network evolution. In addition, complexities emerged regarding the relationships within the networks, particularly those involving North-South relations. The fourth section of the chapter discusses the politics of TANs and negative instances of collaboration including competition for funding and branding. The chapter concludes with a summary of the research participants’ perceptions on how TAN politics and the positive and negative aspects of collaboration affected the networks’ overall effectiveness in achieving their goals. A more thorough investigation of the ‘effectiveness’ of the networks is conducted in Chapter Seven.

6.2 Network structures and strategies

TAN politics begin with their structures and strategies. Acosta (2008) suggests that networks can be divided into four broad categories or strategic operations: 1) project driven: Those where NGOs and interest groups come together for a specific task; (2) value driven: Those whose members share a set of values that drive them to try and disseminate them to a larger audience; (3) exploratory: Those that try to innovate ways of solving problems or sharing knowledge; and (4) contestatory: Those dedicated to challenging specific policies, politicians, institutions or corporations. Scholars have also discussed the subject of the structure and pattern of TANs. Keck and Sikkink (1998) identified a key pattern of action within network campaigns that advocacy groups use transnationally: The ‘boomerang’. This ‘pattern of influence’ entails an effort by local organisations or activists
to bring pressure to their states from abroad after they have found internal channels blocked for changes in policies or legislation (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Hertel (2006) has described how some networks may allow for small and relatively powerless organisations to gain legitimacy and influence by a series of strategies within larger networks. Specifically, Hertel refers to two ‘mechanisms’: ‘Blocking’ or ‘backdoor moves’ that allow for weaker members of networks to influence overarching campaigns. ‘Blocking’ consists of action by ‘receiving-end’ activists “aimed at halting or at least significantly stalling a campaign’s progress in order to pressure senders to change their frame” (Hertel, 2006, p. 6). ‘Backdoor moves’ consist of actions by receiving-end activists to augment a campaign’s normative frame by adding “distinct, secondary reference points and/or policy proposals” usually without conflict and indirectly (Hertel, 2006, p. 6).

Acosta (2011) suggests that these strategies help understand procedures within networks in order to develop theoretical models that would be applicable to a wide range of networks. However, Acosta’s (2011), Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) and Hertel’s (2006) theories on the structure and strategic orientation of networks, while useful, are not adequate to describe the networks I studied for this research. The networks I observed in the GMS were fluid, and elaborate in structure and strategies, and thus require a typology to differentiate between their unique models. While Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) boomerang theory is a useful framework for examining several of the networks I studied for this research, it only applies to those networks that seek to influence foreign governments to put pressure on domestic governments, which was not the kind of advocacy that occurred in the anti-trafficking networks I observed in the GMS. In the GMS governments were already very aware of the trafficking problem and often working collaboratively with TANs in Thailand and Cambodia to combat it. As this chapter will show, the governments of the GMS were active partners in a small number of the TANs. Similarly, Hertel’s (2006) theory on ‘blocking’ and ‘backdoor’ moves is not of any particular use in examining the anti-trafficking TANs I observed in the GMS. While North-South differences did exist within the networks, ‘blocking’ and ‘backdoor’ moves were not strategies undertaken by the GMS anti-trafficking networks to influence campaign outcomes.
With these theoretical limitations in mind, a typology of TANs against child trafficking in the GMS has been developed, as set out in the table below. Of Acosta’s (2011) network categories, his ‘project driven’ networks relate to my type of ‘campaign networks’; his ‘value driven’ networks correspond closely to my ‘faith based model’; his ‘exploratory’ networks correspond with my ‘inter-agency networks’; and his ‘contestatory’ structure is similar to my ‘ad hoc networks’. A number of additional anti-trafficking advocacy network structures also existed in the GMS. These are represented in the table below.

**Table 4: GMS Anti-Trafficking Networks Typology**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>STRUCTURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peak international</td>
<td>Broad-based. Includes UN agencies as well as NGOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO specific</td>
<td>Consist of only domestic and/or international NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-agency</td>
<td>Inter-agency – government, NGO, UN, academics and other members of civil society. These networks often act as the coordinating network for a number of networks and taskforces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locational</td>
<td>Contained within a specific geographic area, for example, North Thailand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global/international</td>
<td>Large NGOs across donor states with a presence in most continents and a combination of head offices and field offices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith-based</td>
<td>Linked to formal religious organisations. In the GMS region the faith-based networks are predominantly Christian.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign</td>
<td>Ad hoc coalitions. Often brought together for a short period of time and largely dependent on donor funding and timeline demands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>Coalition of NGOs and other organisations set up to respond to a specific problem often in a specific region, for example, child sex tourism in urban Thailand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth focused</td>
<td>Media and NGOs – trendy youth-oriented campaigns pitched to this specific target group in order to educate young people in the North and South about child trafficking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>Opportunistic – for example, aid workers forming an informal network over after-work drinks.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As the above table suggests, in the GMS there were ten distinct anti-trafficking network types or structures ranging from very structured and formal to informal. The types reflect the various hierarchical structures of the anti-trafficking networks in the GMS as well as the relevance of donors to the structure of networks (for example, strategic networks); the geographic location of the network (for example, locational networks); the importance of organisational ethos to the network (for example, faith based); and the target campaign audience (for example, youth focused networks). As the following analysis of the interview data suggest, the networks often flowed across more than one different type depending on the ethos of the networks, the campaign focus or donor demands, the network location, networks’ charismatic leaders, and the history of the network partners working together. A thorough investigation and explanation of each example of inter-agency anti-trafficking cooperation in the GMS would be so lengthy that it is beyond the scope of this chapter. A discussion of a select number of the advantages and disadvantages, internal and external politics, struggles and triumphs of the networks studied is, however, very possible to prove the value and effectiveness of such networks.

6.2.1 Network profiles

A brief summary of each advocacy organisation or network (under simple pseudonyms) interviewed for this research is provided below and its type outlined. Only sixteen organisations/networks and their pseudonyms are listed below because two interviews were conducted with six of the organisations/networks. Please refer to page 20 for the list of pseudonyms.

Organisation 1

Organisation 1 plays a very important role in repatriating victims of trafficking. It also works on issues such as the protection of trafficking victims, manages detention centres and shelters, and lobbies for better policy on trafficking in the GMS. Organisation 1 is a peak international organisation that is involved in a number of inter-agency networks. It has a strong structure and a number of offices in the GMS. It often acts as a coordinating agency for networks during the initial stages of their evolution and, specifically, provides training
and funding to government officials to network with other agency partners. It also coordinates a number of conferences and meetings in the region to share resources and knowledge on anti-trafficking activities.

Organisation 2

Organisation 2 works to protect children from child labour, sexual abuse and prostitution. It works on research into these issues and prioritises working with governments, UN agencies and NGOs in the GMS. Organisation 2 is a peak international organisation that coordinates and works in a number of inter-agency networks in the GMS. It conducts important research on human trafficking in Thailand and Cambodia and publishes a large number of resources that it shares with its partners and the public. Due to its advanced knowledge of human trafficking issues this organisation is often highly sought after in the initial stages of the evolution of a network and its staff have a presence at most human trafficking fora and taskforces.

Organisation 3

Organisation 3 is an international intergovernmental organisation that has offices throughout the Southeast Asia region. Organisation 3 works with children and migrating children and adults as well as on diverse but associated issues such as HIV/AIDS. It develops innovative programs across these issues to educate local communities about the risks of trafficking and to improve the health and well-being of vulnerable populations. Organisation 3 is a peak international organisation. It has a strong structure and head offices in most GMS countries. It conducts important research on human trafficking issues and has a presence in a number of anti-trafficking networks, coalitions and taskforces. It first developed a presence in Thailand in 1961. In the 46 member states and 2 associate members of the Asia-Pacific, it is present with a network of 13 field offices comprising cluster offices, country offices, and regional bureaux. In Bangkok it has a double role as regional bureau for education, and cluster office. As regional bureau for education, it provides strategic expertise, advisory, monitoring and evaluation functions to member states, other field offices, and UN country teams in the area of education.
Organisation 4

Organisation 4 is an international intergovernmental organisation that, in Southeast Asia, works directly with and for children in all areas of the Mekong Subregion. It cares for children and their families and teaches children the skills they need for future life. The organisation is also actively involved in related areas such as health and education and works with governments. Organisation 4 is a peak international organisation that is frequently asked to act as a coordinating office for the start-up of networks. It has a strong structure, considerable resources and numerous offices in the GMS. It works closely with NGOs on addressing the ‘bigger picture’ of child trafficking and improving the areas that make children vulnerable to trafficking, for example, poverty alleviation, and better education for all children. Assistance is targeted at the most vulnerable children and young people in 26 priority provinces across Thailand.

Organisation 5

Organisation 5 is a well-resourced intergovernmental organisation, established in 2005, to facilitate stronger and more coordinated response to human trafficking in the GMS. It is managed by a regional management office in Bangkok, with country project offices in the capitals of Cambodia, China, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. Organisation 5 works in several key areas including targeting interventions, strengthening advocacy on human trafficking and improving the community’s knowledge base on human trafficking. It has an extensive research base and works with key government, UN and NGO partners to develop interventions and protect victims. Organisation 5 is a government-UN-NGO coalition that has a very strong structure. It frequently acts as a coordinating network for its own partner members as well as other networks in the region. The seven offices have a combined staff of approximately 35 and an annual budget of approximately US $2.5 million. It is funded primarily by six key donors and independent of any UN core funding. The primary donors include the governments of Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United States, as well as a Spanish Foundation – ANESVAD. As an inter-agency project Organisation 5 works with governments, UN, and civil society partners at all levels – regional, national, and community. It has over 250 local and international partners across
seven countries including well-known international partners such as ILO, IOM, UNDP, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNICEF, and UNODC, ECPAT, Oxfam International, Save the Children, and World Vision, and dozens of local civil society organisations.

**Organisation 6**

Organisation 6 is a well known global NGO that conducts a variety of programs related to food and water security, education, health, peace and justice and HIV and AIDS. It is a faith-based organisation and, in Cambodia, its ministry is focused on the lives of Cambodia’s poorest children and their families. Organisation 6 works in a number of areas associated with the human trafficking issue including protection, prevention, and prosecution. It works not only in the Greater Mekong region, but throughout the Asia-Pacific. It works closely with governments and NGOs to develop improved systems of communication and systems for protecting children, improving shelters and law enforcement processes. Organisation 6 is a global NGO network with a large number of head and field offices in the GMS. It has a long history of anti-trafficking advocacy and in coordinating NGO networks in the region. In Cambodia its ministry includes 27 districts in 7 provinces and Phnom Penh. It partners with a number of Cambodian NGOs, churches, and government ministries including the Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Social Affairs and Youth Rehabilitation, Ministry of Rural Development, Ministry of Health, as well as international organisations such as the World Food Programme and the World Health Organisation.

**Organisation 7**

Organisation 7 campaigns for long term change to improve the lives of children. It has a specific mandate to work on the issue of child trafficking and works with governments to change policies and practices, locally and internationally to ensure that children’s rights become a reality. It has a long history in working with children and in anti-child trafficking advocacy activities and thus is often sought to participate in new anti-trafficking networks, taskforces and fora. It has a number of head and field offices in the region and works closely in the field with child victims.
**Organisation 8**

The vision of Organisation 8 is to realise the right of all children to live free of child prostitution, child pornography and child trafficking for sexual purposes. Organisation 8 is a network of NGOs and individuals dedicated to improving the lives of children in Asia. It seeks to encourage the world community to ensure that children everywhere enjoy their fundamental rights free and secure from all forms of exploitation. It has a mandate to work on the issue of child sex trafficking and child sex tourism and has a large base of supportive agencies. It works to shape policy on human trafficking in the Asia region and educate foreigners about the implications of child sex tourism. Organisation 8 is a large NGO specific network with a secretariat and a coordinating office but a relatively non-hierarchical structure. Organisation 9 is composed of groups based all over the world; the International Board, elected by the International Assembly; and the International Secretariat. In 1996 the network consisted of 17 groups. By 1999 it had grown to 53 groups, and in 2007 it consisted of over 80 groups in more than 70 countries. Its groups are very diverse – some are large coalitions of NGOs; some are small groups composed of individuals; and some groups have activities covering a wide range of child sex trafficking issues while others concentrate on only one aspect. The International Secretariat is the administrative and coordinating unit of Organisation 9 and is based in Bangkok. Every three years the groups meet at the International Assembly, which is the highest decision-making body of the organisation. The International Board, composed of eight regional representatives from all continents, together with an independent chairperson, treasurer, secretary, and youth representative, are elected at the Assembly and normally serve for three years. The groups are involved in the implementation of various activities to protect children at local levels, while the Secretariat provides technical support and information, and holds workshops and other educational forums to extend and exchange knowledge among groups in different countries. It also represents and advocates on key issues at the international level on behalf of the network. As it has a long history of anti-trafficking and anti-sex tourism advocacy in the region.
Organisation 9

Organisation 9 is a network of NGOs that works collaboratively on the issue of child trafficking. It is committed to developing educational resources on the issue of child trafficking and emphasises advocacy and preventative measures for vulnerable groups. It addresses human trafficking and exploitation through coalition building, advocacy and research. The network has an office in Cambodia and has recently expanded into the USA and Canada. Organisation 9 is committed to seeing more safe places for victims of exploitation and trafficking, with high quality after care and an emphasis on successful reintegration. This includes alternative care programs such as foster care, kinship care, and community based care. It provides support and resources to individuals, NGOs and churches; develops and distributes innovative resources to assist with programs working in the areas of prevention, intervention, rehabilitation and reintegration; develops training programs to build the capacity of staff working directly with survivors; facilitates advice clinics and forums for NGOs to discuss and address issues relating to their work; and carries out specific research studies that make recommendations at both program and advocacy levels. It has recently developed advocacy programs that address the ‘demand’ side of trafficking and its staff target sex tourism hot spots in Cambodia to educate Western tourists about child sex trafficking. Its global partners include The Asia Foundation, the British Embassy in Phnom Penh, Child Wise, Love 146, UNIAP, UNICEF, World Vision Cambodia, and a number of other NGOs, churches, and foundations. Organisation 9 is a faith-based coalition of NGOs.

Organisation 10

Organisation 10 is an anti-trafficking network providing a comprehensive range of services regarding human trafficking solutions in Northern Thailand. It was founded in 2002 with the cooperation of the Chiang Mai Coordination Centre for the Protection of Child and Women’s Rights. Organisation 10 is a multi-disciplinary team of police, social workers, doctors, government bureaucrats, and NGOs. It was established to engage in solving the problems of human trafficking in the upper North region of Thailand. It operates in the nine provinces of the North: Mae Hong Son, Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, Phayao Lamphun, Lampang, Phrae Nan, and Tak. It serves as a medium between governmental NGOs and private organisations in
providing aid to victims of human trafficking. It coordinates the activities of NGOs to improve systems for protecting children from trafficking, prosecuting traffickers and preventing human trafficking by educating local communities and children. It receives human trafficking cases from network organisations and from the general public. On occasion it has rescued migrant workers imprisoned by their employers. It also conducts prevention activities: the first type is the development of life-skills in at-risk groups and in the general population at regional, provincial, district, sub-district and village levels to decrease the risk of human trafficking. The second type of prevention activity involves public relations campaigns through various forms of media such as printed media, radio, and activities organised in observance of Stop Human Trafficking Day with the cooperation of network NGOs in the nine provinces. It also hosts a ‘Human Trafficking Resource Centre’. The sources of its funding are contributed by the Asia Foundation, US Aid, UNICEF, and the US Embassy. Organisation 10 is a locational and inter-agency network.

Organisation 11

Organisation 11 aims to improve the lives of children in developing countries by enabling children and their families to meet their basic needs, building relationships to increase understanding between cultures and promoting the rights of children around the world. Organisation 11 works on the issue of child trafficking in Southeast Asia from a development perspective and targets communities to improve livelihoods in order to prevent trafficking from occurring. Organisation 11 is a global organisation with a strong structure and a large number of offices in the GMS and internationally.

Organisation 12

Organisation 12 is a network of twelve NGOs in Cambodia. Its main objectives are to raise awareness on the issue of trafficking, provide direct assistance to victims and at-risk groups, and strengthen law enforcement. Its main work has been to fight child trafficking in nine provinces and in Phnom Penh. In 2003 it received a grant from Terre des Hommes Germany to run the Campaign Against Child Trafficking Project. To strengthen the network it has registered with the Ministry of the Interior (in 2009). Organisation 12 is an NGO specific network.
**Organisation 13**

Organisation 13 works to prevent the sexual abuse of children as well as performing outreach to street children, conducting fieldwork and research and providing safe shelters and homes for trafficking and sexual abuse child victims. For the children in these centres the organisation provides vocational and emotional training and life skills development programs. Organisation 13 is a strategic NGO that networks with a number of partner organisations including government agencies on the specific issue of child sex tourism. It is also a locational network in that it focuses on a specific part of Thailand where child sex tourism is particularly prevalent.

**Organisation 14**

Organisation 14 is an international NGO that, in Southeast Asia, works on the issue of human trafficking. It works to coordinate the activities of NGOs in the region, works with governments to develop capacity building and trains all active anti-trafficking NGOs in identifying trafficking victims and working with them through the prosecution process. Organisation 14 is a global network with a strong structure and a presence in all GMS countries.

**Organisation 15**

Organisation 15 works with women and children victims of human trafficking. It focuses on the protection of trafficking victims and has a number of trauma centres and shelters throughout the region that provide secure shelter, food, clothing, counselling and therapy to victims. It works with other NGOs to ensure the safe return of victims to their homes, and offers life skills training so that trafficking victims are not re-victimised. Organisation 15 is a faith-based network of NGOs.

**Organisation 16**

Organisation 16 raises awareness on human trafficking through concerts and other youth focused programs and activities. The campaign inspires youth from origin and destination countries to take action against human trafficking. Organisation 16 is a youth focused network.
As the profiles of the organisations and networks studied for this research reveals, the most prevalent anti-trafficking advocacy network structures in the GMS were the peak international, NGO specific, inter-agency coalitions, and global/international groups. Also prevalent in the region were locational networks. While research participants lauded the value of informal networks, these models seemed to be far less common than large global networks. NGOs were clearly the key players in these networks, having a dominant presence in each network type with the exception of inter-agency networks that were composed of NGOs, UN agencies and government partners. UN agencies had a frequent start-up role for some of the TANs, particularly peak and NGO-specific networks, but then often took a step back to allow NGOs to coordinate the network. Government partners were only observed to have a formal presence in inter-agency networks. There was frequent overlap between a number of NGOs and UN agencies that were present in more than one network and more than one type of network.

What makes the networks ‘transnational’ is that on the one hand the knowledge they produce seeks to explain regional and global processes, and on the other hand, this knowledge nurtures and sustains collective action. The networks are connected to various international coalitions around development issues, gender issues, and global social justice. While they are part of transnational networks, the individual partner organisations are recognised as distinct actors with their own specificities.

Most NGO networks observed for this research could fit into the broad category of ‘NGO specific’ networks, however, the different types of NGO specific networks, for example, strategic, and locational NGO networks, have been included in the typology table to highlight the specific campaign or geographic focus of these NGO networks. It should be noted that the typology table reflects the networks observed in the region during the six months of data collection. Some network type representatives (for example, strategic networks) were not interviewed for this research.
This first section of the chapter has discussed recent theories on the structures, strategic orientations, and campaign activities of TANs and the limitations of these theories for analysing the anti-trafficking TANs I observed in the GMS for this research. Due to these theoretical limitations I have developed an advocacy network typology to better explain and discuss the structure, orientation, activities, sustainability and effectiveness of GMS anti-trafficking networks. The typology allows the opportunity to reflect on the similarities and differences between the network types and the intricate processes of collaboration occurring within the networks. The next section of the chapter will discuss the evolution of the networks observed for this research and link network evolution to the structures adopted by the networks. The next section of the chapter will also explore why some networks survive while others wither and fail, and how the choice and adoption of network structure affects TAN politics and is plausibly linked to networks’ sustainability and effectiveness.

6.3 Evolution and motivation of the networks

Crucial to understanding the politics, sustainability and effectiveness of TANs against child trafficking in the Mekong Subregion is some reflection on questions pertaining to the reasons why the networks initially developed and why they adopted specific structures. Some preliminary questions must be asked, including: How did the proliferation of NGOs against human trafficking in Thailand and Cambodia occur? Why did network partners come together to form networks? How did these networks become sustained over time? How do UN agencies coordinate amongst themselves and other groups when in some cases they have very similar mandates? Does the network’s structure have an effect on the network’s sustainability and effectiveness? Addressing these questions ultimately helps to answer the central question of this research – how effective are TANs at working collaboratively to achieve the goal of combating child sex trafficking in the Mekong Subregion?

In the fight against trafficking in the GMS and internationally there are three major categories of contributors: National governments, the UN (and its various agencies), and
NGOs from both the ‘North’ and the ‘South’. Other participants include the private sector, the media and academic/research institutions. Many of the partners, particularly NGOs, are on the ground, carrying out day-to-day operations such as protecting victims, performing ‘rescues’ and repatriating victims to their home countries. The UN serves as the important forum where international consensus on human trafficking is built and where the bulk of coordination takes place (Dyrud et al., 2007, p. 22). National governments, of course, remain important contributors because they have the power to legislate and have access to enforcement mechanisms, intelligence and resources to fight trafficking (Dyrud et al., 2007, p. 22). Historically these organisations – NGOs, government and UN agencies - have had little experience of coordination, largely due to financial constraints and economic, labour, education and political concerns and differences (Interview 9: Organisation 3).

In responding to interview questions about the evolution of the networks, research participants pointed to the demands of donors and to the history of anti-trafficking funding from the United States as key reasons for the development of, initially, anti-trafficking NGOs and, subsequently, anti-trafficking networks in the GMS. A representative from organisation 3 explained that, at least for the birth of organisation 5 – a key inter-agency anti-trafficking coordinating network in the GMS - and that of a handful of other NGOs, this was largely the result of an extremely large (1 billion US dollar) donation from the Turner Foundation, a private American trust. The substantial Turner Foundation grant aimed to “get the various UN agencies to work together on human trafficking issues and for the UN to work with NGOs and the private sector where possible and appropriate” (Interview 9: Organisation 3). Subsequently organisation 5 was established in the early 2000s and mandated to consist of and coordinate UN agencies, NGOs, and GMS governments.

Human trafficking also received attention in the 1990s and 2000s because of the HIV/AIDS pandemic (Interview 8: Organisation 3). Health experts during this time visited brothels and talked to sex workers about public health and how and why sex workers started working in the brothels and “realised that many of the prostitutes had not consented to their
employment” (Interview 8: Organisation 3). Anti-trafficking and anti-forced labour campaigns in the region were subsequently launched to combat forced prostitution and more NGOs became interested in issues to do with HIV/AIDS and human trafficking. From there, with the Ted Turner funding, campaigning against human trafficking simply “snowballed” (Interview 8: Organisation 3):

The issue at the time seemed to be neglected but then it snowballed. There was this feeling ... There were a few people working on this issue of human slavery and people being caught in the sex industry when they didn't want to be there. You began to see the social breakdown in Eastern Europe. Then the Ted Turner Foundation gave money specifically and trafficking became a big thing. The money was given to the UN and they were told to work together with more than one UN agency, plus governments and civil society. That was a major statement (Interview 8: Organisation 3).

As this quote reflects, TANs in the GMS emerged in response not just to the specific issue of child sex trafficking, but an interest in a number of related issues such as slavery, prostitution, poverty, HIV/AIDS, and forced labour, amongst others. It appears that the cosmopolitan values of Northern NGOs brought them together to form TANs to combat these issues at regional, national and international levels. In the 1990s, at the same time as the Ted Turner Foundation was providing large amounts of funding for anti-trafficking activities, the United States government was creating new legislation on human trafficking. The US passed its first human trafficking bill in 2000, which led to the US Trafficking in Persons law and the US Trafficking in Persons Report Card (US TIP) for countries all over the world except itself. The US government was also actively encouraging the development of anti-trafficking legislation in all countries and provided funds for the development of this legislation (US Department of State, 2001; Interview 8: Organisation 3). The US government also actively encouraged anti-trafficking advocacy, particularly the development of awareness programs to prevent trafficking from occurring. However, an early problem in
anti human trafficking advocacy was that US money for anti-trafficking campaigning was conditional. In the early years of this funding under the Bush and Clinton administrations the majority of funding from the US government was reserved for NGOs that specifically did not support women working as prostitutes (Interview 9: Organisation 3). Therefore the bulk of US anti-trafficking funds in these early years was given to non-secular NGOs and faith-based TANs:

You had to make it clear anti-prostitution work. You couldn’t help sex workers, you had to treat them as victims and save them from their abysmal situation regardless of whether they were there as consenting adults or not (Interview 8: Organisation 3).

Under current US President Obama these restrictions have eased (Shelley, 2010) and current USAID funding is given to both secular and non-secular anti-trafficking NGOs and networks. As this quote suggests, a key area of contention for TANs is that of the networks’ (and individual partners’) stance on prostitution. Whilst the majority of TANs observed for this research did not actively engage in the prostitution debate and, rather, focused on assisting all trafficking victims, whether they were formerly employed as prostitutes or not, the issue is a key political issue and can have an important impact on relationships with governments and, most importantly, donors.

Anti-trafficking TANs in the GMS also formed in the 1990s to assist target groups such as stateless children and adults in, for example, the hill tribe region of Northern Thailand. Being stateless in Thailand means having no identification papers and therefore no formal access to education, healthcare, and social services (Interview 9: Organisation 3). Children and adults from ethnic hill tribes are more vulnerable to traffickers than other Thais and cannot rely on the protection of police in cases of exploitation. Issues of statelessness and issues of HIV/AIDS in Thailand have been closely linked in previous years (Interview 8: Organisation 3). In the GMS in the 1990s a new taskforce on HIV was created, the Joint UN
Initiative on Mobility and HIV/AIDS in South East Asia (JUNIMA), as a network of governments, including ASEAN, NGOs and UN agencies. The goal of JUNIMA was to promote universal access to HIV prevention, treatment and care for migrants in Southeast Asia:

JUNIMA started out of real needs. You have migrants who were not or didn’t have access to testing or treatment and were often exposed to increased risks from a variety of different situations. Governments were treating them extraordinarily badly. The statelessness working group basically came together organically and ... it was a small group but now it’s very large. But all these agencies who had different types of knowledge and needs to do with statelessness so that’s why they came together (Interview 9: Organisation 3).

As this quote suggests, globalisation was not the only reason for child sex trafficking in the GMS. Historical issues specific to the Southeast Asia region such as statelessness, gender inequality, and matrilineal family practices in Thailand, also contribute. The quote also reinforces cosmopolitanism’s role in bringing NGOs with shared values together to promote universal values and address inequality.

In summary, this section of the chapter has discussed the participation of the three major categories of actors in the fight against child sex trafficking in the GMS – NGOs, UN agencies and governments. It has discussed several of the key precipitative reasons for TANs developing in this region, including funding from the Ted Turner Foundation, NGOs coming together for key causes and to promote cosmopolitan values, and the development of important US legislation on human trafficking. The rise of TANs against human trafficking in the GMS can be interpreted as a cosmopolitan response to issues of poverty, inequality and trafficking. In responding to issues such as statelessness, HIV, and trafficking TANs have promoted cosmopolitan values and advanced the cosmopolitan notion that “each human
being is human and counts as the moral equal of every other” (Nussbaum, 1996, p. 133).

The motivations for networks were coded during data analysis so that the reasons for networks coming together could be analysed for each separate network. This assisted in the process of establishing a timeline for each network’s evolution, determining the significance of donor funding, and analysing other network motivations such as NGOs forming networks for specific social issues.

6.3.1 The proliferation of anti-trafficking organisations in Thailand and Cambodia as a key driver for networking

There are other reasons for the proliferation of anti-trafficking TANs in Thailand and Cambodia beyond the top-down US government, donor mandated or specific campaign target explanations discussed in the above section. There was a general consensus in the participant interviews that the rise in the number of anti-trafficking networks was in great part due to the proliferation of anti-trafficking organisations in the GMS. Interview participants explained that individual anti-trafficking organisations, particularly NGOs, proliferated not only because of US funding for anti-trafficking activities but also because Thailand and Cambodia have been easy countries for NGOs to operate in:

Thailand is the great land of NGOs. You get 4 Thais, you get 5 NGOs. It’s also a relatively easy country for foreign NGOs to work. Certainly easy compared to China or Vietnam or Laos. Cambodia is also full of NGOs (Interview 9: Organisation 3).

As dozens of NGOs, both international and domestic, appeared in the anti-trafficking sector in the GMS it was inevitable that there would ensue a replication of programs and victim services, confusing and conflicting messages to the public, and competition between the NGOs for donor funding (Interview 5: Organisation 8). TANs developed out of the NGO proliferation, to ameliorate this confusing situation and in order to share knowledge,
resources, funds and capacity to better prepare countries to fight trafficking and protect victims.

Interview participants explained that individual anti-trafficking organisations had two key reasons for wanting to form TANs against trafficking. First, the organisations wanted to work together in the best interests of the victim. Through collaboration, individual organisations were able to share knowledge, resources and expertise for the improvement of victim services, and had a stronger political voice with governments for developing anti-trafficking legislation (Interview 6: Organisation 8). Second, organisations wanted to avoid a situation of producing confusing and conflicting messages for the public, which could only serve to exacerbate human trafficking in the region:

At the end of the day we only have this much money and resources. The assumption is if you have a billion dollars, the problem will go away. Much of what we’re trying to do is say, guys, what can we do to get it down to the closest thing to three or four silver bullet things where we can work together collectively, to make sure we address the needs of the victim. We also want to make sure we don’t have 15 000 messages to give people (Interview 13: Organisation 5).

Campaign messages have evolved in the past two decades and individual organisations and TANs have learned from past mistakes. In the earlier years of anti-trafficking advocacy the campaign message was simply – “don’t migrate” (Interview 22: Organisation 16). In recent years the campaign message has changed to – “migrate if you need to, but make sure you have all the information before you make any decisions and make sure people know where you are going so that you are protected” (Interview 22: Organisation 16). With experience, networks have developed knowledge and understanding of the complex reasons why GMS citizens, especially youth, risk clandestine migration for employment, and end up in situations of exploitation, and have developed their campaigns messages accordingly.
With campaigning experience the three major anti-trafficking contributors in the region – governments, the UN agencies, and NGOs – have learned the importance of collaboration. In the past two decades significant efforts have been made in the GMS to improve inter-agency anti-trafficking coordination. For example, in Cambodia a new National Taskforce on Human Trafficking was created in 2007, which has been an important first step for Cambodia’s anti-trafficking stakeholder coordination. With the creation of the Taskforce, government and NGOs in Cambodia had finally come together rather than working as two separate spheres. Eleven government agencies joined the Taskforce, which is led by a Secretary of State in Cambodia. The Taskforce has approximately 150 NGO partners and some NGO networks represent other smaller domestic NGOs within the Taskforce. Its creation was timely and catalytic in opening up talks between key player organisations and consequently moving the human trafficking debate forward (Interview 19: Organisation 14).

In addition, the development of UNIAP as the coordinating agency for governments, UN agencies and NGOs in the region has proved useful in bringing together the various groups under one network and ensuring the streamlining of anti-trafficking campaign goals, the development of human trafficking legislation and improvements in protection systems for children. UNIAP was established in 2000 with a central focus on trafficking in persons and a mandate to facilitate a stronger and more coordinated response to human trafficking in the GMS. UNIAP also hosts the Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative Against Trafficking (COMMIT), which has fuelled major progress in anti-human trafficking efforts in the GMS since its inception in 2004. In 2004 the six governments of the GMS (Cambodia, China, Laos PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam) signed a historic Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) against Trafficking in Persons that committed the governments to a response to human trafficking meeting international standards, highlighting the need for multi-lateral, bilateral and government-NGO cooperation to fight human trafficking. UNIAP’s research and organising of regular conferences and workshops have also provided important opportunities and spaces for the diverse organisations to network and share expertise and information.
6.3.2 Developing a network structure

Acosta (2011) argues that the operational structure of TANs is key to understanding their influence, development and potential. Research participant interviews revealed connections between the operational structure of networks, internal politics, and networks’ sustainability and effectiveness. Some of the more institutionalised networks, for example, followed clear designs of leadership and negotiation as the result of long histories of working in anti-trafficking networks in the region. Most of the networks, however, adapted to changing circumstances and were flexible enough to change according to their needs and external influences such as donor demands.

The actual processes in which organisations came together for anti-trafficking advocacy purposes were diverse. Some research participants suggested that the best way for networks to develop was to allow them to grow “organically” (Interview 8: Organisation 3), that is, not in a top-down fashion and without leading to the development of a central structure such as a secretariat:

The network started out with a couple of people over drinks saying “oh you guys know about that, we know about this, there’s this other area that neither of us knows about” and then bringing those groups together. As opposed to some other groups where they’re set up from the top because someone decided that was a good idea (Interview 8: Organisation 3).

Other research participants suggested that without a formal structure, networks would not survive. While research participants believed that a sound structure was important for the network to develop, they also lauded networks’ endeavours to remain non-hierarchical (Interview 5: Organisation 8). Research participants who cited sound network structure as crucial to advocacy network sustainability suggested that, charismatic leaders or not, staff
come and go but a central structure kept the network functioning despite changes in staff, leadership, funding and other obstacles:

It (the network) is very organised, a lot of potential, a strong secretariat, it looks at different areas. The structure is really necessary. The secretariat really pushes and lobbies and encourages participation (Interview 21: Organisation 4).

There needs to be someone who coordinates the network and gets the rollout of the activities occurring. Structure is crucial. (Interview 7: Organisation 11).

There was consensus in the interviews that the organisation that initially called together the network had to take on more responsibility for nurturing the network during its initial phases. If one organisation convened the first network meetings, NGOs subsequently naturally looked to that organisation to provide initial network leadership (Interview 4: Organisation 4). The role of network facilitator seems to have normally fallen, in the early days of a number of the networks, to a UN agency, particularly in the case of inter-agency and campaign networks. UN organisations had the capacity, the resources, and the funds to perform this coordination role and most NGOs and governments in the region immediately looked to the UN to provide assistance in the initial stages of the development of the network. However, this responsibility was not always welcomed by UN agencies and as anti-trafficking NGOs have grown in number and strength UN agencies have sought to hand this responsibility back to NGOs (Interview 4: Organisation 4). This comment from a UN staff member expresses some of the frustrations experienced by UN agencies as a result of having to take on this role as organiser and coordinator for the networks:

We don’t want it (the network) to be led by [organisation 4] because it’s supposed to be more civil society and NGOs working together. But we know that in the initial
phases we need to take some leadership role to establish the terms of reference, to get it into the cycle pattern with meetings and the agenda. So for that we provide funding for the venue, they have to get together partners. But we don’t want to be leading it for a long time, we want to take a back seat and still provide resources but the leadership of the group should be evolving from NGOs (Interview 4: Organisation 4).

It was evident from the interviews that the management and activities of the network largely depended on the form that the network adopted. Not all the networks observed for this research had similar structures. Some of the groups were clearly networks with members working together on a common campaign, for example, campaign and strategic networks. Others were taskforces that contained a range of NGO partners, government and bilateral agencies, for example, inter-agency networks. In addition there were different technical working groups. There were also individual, one-on-one relationships with UN and NGO partners or more informal tripartite partnerships. Further, funding relationships where one organisation funded another for service delivery but worked closely with one or more other organisations on policy development, advocacy or improving community development also existed as TANs. Some networks were open to new members and looking to expand without limit whereas other research participants argued that networks must limit the number of members or risk no longer being able to monitor and manage partners and activities and thus becoming unsustainable. There also appeared to be no standard network duration. Some networks were organised around a specific campaign with a timeline of, for example, two years. Other networks such as Organisation 8 were ongoing and continuously expanding, and still others changed and evolved into new and different structures over a period of time again with no set timeframe. Many networks were organised around donor demands – if the donor stipulated that the campaign project cycle was three years then that is how long the network existed unless funding was renewed or alternate sources of funding were found. Time and donor constraints posed obvious problems for the networks’ abilities to look ahead and plan for future campaigns and monitor and evaluate the impact of current campaigns. The interviews conducted in this
research revealed a vast diversity in network size, structure, campaign activities and targets, although there was frequent overlap in campaign goals and instances of the network members participating in more than one network (Interview 1: Organisation 2).

The participant interviews highlighted a belief that TANs should not be created in a hurry. The networks studied did not evolve overnight and were, in fact, formed over time and sometimes adapted into new forms with the addition of new members over time (Interview 8: Organisation 3). Networks often started with just two or three members and slowly grew to include more members. The process of growth often occurred in very informal ways with organisations’ representatives sitting down and saying “I would like to coordinate with the people that are working at different angles of assisting victims of trafficking and you can provide education and expertise in this area so let’s work together to get more choices for the victim” (Interview 2: Organisation 1). This was often the case for NGO networks and informal networks. However this kind of initial network coordination was rarely the case with inter-agency networks that possessed more formal structures from the outset. Whilst diversity in network members was welcomed, the interviews revealed that all networks wanted to work only with other organisations that had exceptional knowledge of human trafficking as an issue, as well as expertise, and a “positive attitude toward anti-trafficking campaign activities” (Interview 5: Organisation 8).

This section of the chapter has discussed some of the ways the different types of networks studied in this research developed, and the various reasons why individual NGOs and UN agencies working in the field of anti-trafficking advocacy have chosen to collaborate in networks. The next section of the chapter will discuss the essential elements for sustainable and effective anti-trafficking advocacy networking.
6.4 The ‘glue’ of advocacy networks

Charismatic leaders and information sharing

There was consensus in the interviews that the real ‘glue’ of TANs lay in human resources. What ultimately held anti-trafficking networks together and allowed them to improve and expand were the people who staffed them. The networks studied in this research were essentially groups of people from one organisation joining groups of people from other organisations and working through issues of personal and organisational competition, differences in opinion and perspective and values and finding common ground on interests, skills, resources, funds and knowledge. The leaders and staff of the networks were crucial to the success of the networks. The participants for this research possessed strong opinions about the importance of charismatic leaders in networks:

Every single project is person based. The strength of [Organisation 5] was, if I had somebody down in Malaysia that I needed to help I didn’t call on [Organisation 1], I called up (John Smith) who was working on these things for a long time ... And if little ‘Atsu is in jail in Singapore and you want to get her out it’s probably better to have someone you can pick up the phone to and call and say what you need (Interview 9: Organisation 3).

There was also consensus in the interviews that networks needed to share information transparently and efficiently in order to survive. As Evans (2000) has stated, widespread information is in itself a weapon. Keck and Sikkink have suggested that information exchange is the key element that lies at the base of the need for the relationship development of networks (1998, p. 2). With special attention to transnational ties, Keck and Sikkink argued that a strategic use of information keeps TANs as creative and innovative actors that can use such expertise to exert influence in political systems (1998, p. 2). Information within the networks observed for this research was disseminated in a variety of
ways – email, telephone exchanges, meetings and meeting minutes, conferences, and workshops. Because network members often worked and operated in different cities and countries, the bulk of network information sharing and communication was done by email and telephone. In some networks members met regularly – fortnightly or monthly – and brought all network partners together once or twice a year. However, for other networks the membership was far too broad and members relied on email and telephone to keep abreast of what was occurring within the networks.

Donor demands and common cosmopolitan values

The ‘glue’ of TANs was also provided by a donor or funding agency that sometimes dictated who network members should be working with and what networks should be doing in terms of advocacy activities. Some organisations and networks rejected this model and assumed their own direction. A faith-based network in Cambodia described how, in a bid for US government funding, an NGO met with other organisations to discuss possible collaborative activities in line with the donor funding. Whilst the funding never eventuated, a network nonetheless developed as the previous discussions had provided an arena for preliminary networking talks and the collective interest for developing a network:

It was better this way because the network is not based on finances but is based on this common goal and concern. It’s entirely about sharing resources, about working together on initiatives... What we’re trying to do now is work on the strategy, decide what we want to do, and then get funding. Some organisations, they often try, they feel like they need to get the funding, so they get the initiative based on the funding. We’re trying to avoid that. In the end it’s not a good strategy it’s just based on where the strategy is. Obviously donors have demands and strings attached and sometimes that’s okay and sometimes it’s not (Interview 16: Organisation 9).
An interesting characteristic in anti-trafficking funding arrangements that appeared in recent years is that donors have been asking anti-trafficking organisations to network more (Interview 1: Organisation 2). They have also added some strings to monitoring and evaluation activities and asked for more concrete evidence of progress, especially regarding the people involved in trafficking – namely the victims and the traffickers. However, providing concrete proof of improvements has been the ‘Achilles heel’ of advocacy organisations and networks in the region (Interview 22: Organisation 16). With few prosecutions and rescues providing quantitative evidence of ‘progress’, producing results for donors has been a constant challenge. Donors, especially large government donors such as USAID, have requested proof of either more “lives saved” or more “baddies in jail” (Interview 9: Organisation 3). Research participants did not lament this situation but rather, suggested that such a string attached to funding can mean that organisations were simply forced to work even harder:

There needs to be a connection between what you (organisation) are doing and real people who need help, or the bad guys go to jail. And it’s an extremely important connection. With human rights in general it’s easy to have all these meetings and break things down and put them in special papers and it’s all a lot of intellectual masturbation basically. We have to be more vigilant to what we’re doing. And it’s good, it forces us to do our jobs in a better way (Interview 13: Organisation 5).

What ultimately holds TANs together is the common cosmopolitan values shared by network members and the collective interest in stopping human trafficking, helping victims and punishing the perpetrators of this exploitative practice. All research participants expressed a desire to eradicate child trafficking and all participants also mentioned the importance of having ‘mutual interests’, ‘commitment’ and ‘common values’. The secretariat, if there was one, had an important role to play in ensuring that member organisations’ activities and practices were in line with the core values and interests of the network:
We look very much at how the organisation approaches the issue of child protection, how they’re aware of it in practice, how it’s applied in their practice. For example organisations that run shelters, either reception centres or long term shelters, then we’ll look into how they apply the issue of child protection in the operation of their shelters (Interview 6: Organisation 8).

This quote, from a Western aid worker operating in a North-South global network, suggests a power play between the organisations in his TAN. Although the key respondent meant only to express the importance of shared values, the quote suggests that the Northern TAN members can control who comes in and out of the network. It also suggests that Northern TAN members ‘judge’ Southern partners’ work, and therefore act as a gatekeeper – allowing only those Southern NGOs that prove themselves as ‘worthy’ to join the TAN. The North-South divide was very apparent in interviews with Southern NGO staff who were restricted in their responses. One interview in particular left me with the impression that the Southern aid worker interviewed was so used to responding to donors that she no longer had the confidence to speak openly about the TAN’s work.

This section of the chapter has discussed the essential elements to ensuring network sustainability. It has discussed the ‘glue’ of TANs against child trafficking in the GMS, which consisted of shared values and commitment, charismatic leaders and efficient staff, and transparent information sharing between network members. The next section of the chapter will discuss how, when this ‘glue’ is present in TANs, there can be considerable opportunity for positive cooperation that benefits not just the TANs but also their beneficiaries and wider communities.

6.5 Positive collaboration in networks

This section of the chapter will discuss how, when networks have the required resources to be sustainable, examples of positive cooperation between network members become
apparent. This section of the chapter will discuss the benefits of advocacy networking for individual organisations, as well as for trafficking victims and GMS states. The chapter will also discuss the ‘danger’ of anti-trafficking organisations working alone.

6.5.1 The benefits of advocacy networking

All research participants affirmed the importance of inter-agency collaboration as a means of combating child trafficking in the GMS. Advocacy networking against child trafficking has helped to ensure a number of important benefits for trafficking victims. Foremost amongst these has been the benefit that victims are able to access a wide range of rehabilitation services. TANs have also helped vulnerable children acquire knowledge and tool sets to mitigate their risks of exploitation. Furthermore, networks have facilitated effective collaboration among law enforcement agencies across jurisdictions so that bureaucratic obstacles are minimised and perpetrators of child trafficking cannot escape justice.

The central question of this research is - how effective are the organisations within TANs at collaborating to achieve their goal of combating child sex trafficking in Southeast Asia? In order to make some sense of this question it is necessary to analyse the perceptions of the research participants on the subject of network benefits, as well as what they consider ‘positive’ cooperation. Also worth considering is why the organisations formed networks in the first place rather than choosing to work independently of each other. At the international level it may be argued that policymakers have already started to recognise the value and benefits of coordination. The UN, for example, has frequently highlighted the need for improved coordination among stakeholders involved in combating trafficking (Interview 4: Organisation 4).

While there was consensus in the interviews on the importance of collaboration, responses differed somewhat between representatives of the different types of TANs. Representatives of NGO specific networks cited networking benefits such as improved
outreach to ethnic minorities and stateless persons whereas peak international and inter-
agency networks saw networking benefits residing in the frequency of networking and
strategy meetings achieved, improved systems building with governments, and an increased
number of trafficker prosecutions. The mandate of the network certainly influenced the
network representative’s perception of network ‘benefits’. Interview participants from child
protection mandated networks, for example, saw the benefits of networking in the
improvement of systems for children whereas inter-agency networks with their mandate for
government-UN-NGO collaboration considered the key benefits to be the successful
coordination of these groups, the creation of memoranda of understanding, and new
trafficking legislation. Analysis of the interview data revealed that the benefits of advocacy
networking can be divided into a number of subgroups including internal network benefits,
that is, the benefits for the member groups; the benefits for the child victim of trafficking
who is ultimately considered the focus of the advocacy campaigning; the benefits for GMS
states; and benefits for the international community. These will be explored in the next
sections of the chapter.

6.5.2 Internal networking benefits

For all the types of networks observed for this research, key internal benefits of networking
were the sharing of human trafficking knowledge and resources. Other identifiable internal
benefits were that the organisations involved in networks avoided duplicating anti-
trafficking prevention and protection projects. In doing so the organisations were able to
avoid wasting time on setting up programs that were already being conducted by other
organisations and therefore save valuable human and financial resources. I will refer to
these internal benefits as ‘avoidance’ benefits. By virtue of being in a network, the partner
organisations could avoid losing valuable time, energy and resources on program
replication, leaving space and resources to instead focus on other activities. In doing so the
networks could also avoid inter-agency competition. Organisations got “huffy” or
antagonised (interview 13: Organisation 5) when they realised they were doing a similar
campaign activity to another organisation. A mentality of competition for reputation,
prestige and donor funding existed amongst the different TANs and also amongst TAN
partners, particularly within peak and international TANs, and partner members felt they constantly had to prove their value to donors to continue to receive funding. No network partner wanted to know that an activity they had been working on for some time was being replicated by another organisation “just down the road” (Interview 13: Organisation 5). While organisations were generally willing to share resources and knowledge they did not want to share donor funding or branding prestige (Interview 1: Organisation 2).

Research participants also cited cross-cultural learning as a key internal benefit to being part of a network. Being able to access and work with domestic NGOs or international NGOs and UN agencies was seen as an enormous benefit to network members whose knowledge of the sector was frequently limited to their geographic corner of the globe or specific expertise, for example, the management of trafficking victim shelters. Collaborating with other groups meant that organisations could access information and knowledge about grassroots groups and issues such as statelessness from domestic NGOs, as well as access resources, funding for and knowledge of child protection from UN agencies. Further, collaboration allowed network partners to better understand the trafficking problem in other countries by networking with foreign network partners during biannual or monthly fora, conferences and so on. The internal benefits to the network members also included the obvious benefit of having more reach and impact for less money or more “bang for less buck” (interview 21: Organisation 4). The campaign ‘reach’ and ‘impact’ referred to the international community as the recipients of such outreach and also governments of the GMS, and even other target groups such as paedophiles and traffickers. Directing campaigns at all these groups cost individual organisations significant amounts of money and required considerable manpower. Collaborating with other network members who were already working on that particular target group or in a specific geographic location meant that organisations could develop joint campaigns to further their public outreach or organisations could “piggy back” (Interview 9: Organisation 3) on already existing campaigns, lending their funds, resources and knowledge to existing programs and activities.
6.5.3 Networking benefits for victims, states, and the international community

Research participant interviews revealed not just internal benefits to advocacy networking but also external benefits such as streamlining assistance to trafficking victims, improving state capacity to combat child trafficking in all its guises, and improving legislation and awareness raising in the international community. These perceived networking benefits demonstrated the cosmopolitan tendencies of the TANs and their staff. Although research participant interviews suggested a strong emphasis on the internal benefits of networking, the ultimate focus of the networks was the improvement of systems to protect children. In advocating for the protection of children the networks focused on many different program areas including outreach (for example, to all classes of hotels in the region that were frequented by paedophiles and buyers of sex); setting up and managing shelters for victims; working with minority groups and trafficking awareness raising. Through these collaborative efforts networks were developing common understandings of child protection through their collective activities, developing common standards for child protection and subsequently building stronger systems for child protection.

An important focus of anti-trafficking network advocacy was that of targeting governments in trafficking prevention and victim protection activities. TANs against child trafficking needed to forge strong relationships with GMS governments in order to improve child protection systems and processes for prosecuting traffickers. TANs had no choice but to work with and improve relationships with governments because ultimately it was still GMS governments that created the laws and policies that protected victims and punished traffickers and paedophiles. NGOs and UN agencies could lobby hard for victim protection mechanisms but it was ultimately the state that had the power to make arrests and prosecutions, deport paedophiles, and take guilty individuals and groups to court. NGOs and UN agencies could facilitate processes such as working with governments to identify victims and paedophiles, but the police were still ultimately responsible for coordinating and executing victim rescues.
Research interviews suggested that while some distrust between governments and NGOs continued to exist, UN agencies had succeeded in developing solid relationships with governments of the GMS as had some international NGOs. Some friction persisted between the GMS governments and grassroots NGOs and between the UN agencies themselves. However, despite instances of conflict, some important relationships between the groups had developed. Organisation 13 explained that it had a very strong relationship with the local police and when NGO workers were made aware of a paedophile in the town they immediately initiated liaison with the police and coordinated paedophile arrest and victim support. Additionally the organisation worked collaboratively with governments by providing counselling and rehabilitation to child victims and encouraging children to make statements against the accused paedophile or trafficker and continue through the court process.

Such advocacy network relationships with government were crucial for the benefit of the victim. Without the assistance of local NGOs the children would not feel comfortable making statements and working through the “long and stressful court process” (Interview 11: Organisation 13). Due to a long history of government, especially police, corruption in the GMS, children in these countries had developed “fear and distrust of police” and would frequently hide from police during brothel raids and avoid making statements to police for fear of being placed in shelters or prison or repatriated to their home communities without having made any money to support their families or, worse, still in debt to the traffickers (Interview 11: Organisation 13). A factor that has compounded this lack of faith in the police is the fact that many out of court settlements between paedophile and child victim have been made in recent years. These settlements without trial have left child victims “feeling like the authorities and adults believe that they have simply lied about the abuse” (interview 11: Organisation 13). Further, there have been many cases also of police corruption as paedophiles are released “time and time again for a small bribe and the abuse of the child has thus been allowed to continue” (Interview 20: Organisation 6). Without the collaboration of NGO staff that the children trust the anti-trafficking work of governments would be greatly inhibited.
TANs have also been successful in influencing GMS governments in other ways. They have been successful at reducing government ‘sensitivities’ with regards to talking about and responding to sex trafficking (Interview 15: Organisation 10). As discussed in previous pages, TANs have played pivotal roles in influencing governments regarding the formation of policy on child protection and trafficking. Further, TANs against child trafficking have undoubtedly played a significant role in reminding GMS governments that their role is to protect citizens (Interview 21: Organisation 4). This has been a big step forward from the situation of previous years wherein, for example, the Thai government promoted sex tourism as a source of foreign revenue whilst turning a blind eye to government corruption and collusion in trafficking activities.

Another major benefit of networking against child trafficking was that trafficking campaigns could reach all corners of the globe rather than just a small geographic area. Human trafficking campaigns have been adapted and developed to target citizens in a large number of developed countries to educate Western citizens about slavery, trafficking, forced labour and ethical consumerism and make the West aware of the penalties imposed on those who travel to poorer countries to abuse children. The development of extraterritorial legislation to prosecute paedophiles no matter what country they are in has been a major milestone in anti-trafficking policy development.

With a united voice advocacy network members have provided an effective buffer against child trafficking. As one research participant commented, “there is real value in coming together, the voices together are a lot more difficult to quiet than on their own” (Interview 10: Organisation 14). In forming TANs against child trafficking network partners were able to share resources and knowledge, had improved access to victims, improved opportunities for liaising with and lobbying GMS governments, and a stronger campaign message and reach in the international community.
6.5.4 The ‘danger’ of anti-trafficking advocacy organisations working independently of each other

To better understand the benefits of TANs against child sex trafficking it is useful to imagine what the GMS would look like if anti-trafficking organisations had continued to work independently of each other. With the significant amounts of funding for anti-human trafficking activities in the 1990s provided by donors such as Ted Turner a large number of NGOs and UN agencies flocked to the GMS to take a “slice of the pie” (Interview 1: Organisation 2). The anti-trafficking sector in the GMS found itself “overloaded” with financial support and NGOs (Interview 13: Organisation 5). Subsequently a negative situation arose in which organisations were working on similar campaigns and projects, tapping into the same donor sources, doing the same training with governments and projecting sometimes contradictory migration messages to the public (Interview 1: Organisation 2).

In the 1990s the central message of anti-trafficking campaigns was ‘don’t migrate’, which reinforced the gendered disempowerment of women and girls in the region with regards to labour and migration. Such campaigns promoted the idea that women and girls were naive and needing protection and should not leave home to look for employment opportunities abroad (Interview 9: Organisation 3). With improved knowledge and experience many advocacy groups adapted their campaign message to ‘migrate if you want but do it safely’ (Interview 9: Organisation 3). Unfortunately campaign messages have often not reached the desired target audiences especially, for example, in the North of Thailand where many stateless youth and ethnic minority groups reside. Even armed with campaign messages and warnings it has remained open to debate whether many GMS citizens have changed their minds about their migration plans (Interview 2: Organisation 2). As discussed in earlier chapters, the current era of globalisation has exacerbated poverty and many citizens, including children, therefore seek to migrate for the purpose of finding employment. Even when armed with information about the risks of trafficking it is uncertain whether adults and children would ignore the lure of the cities (Interview 2: Organisation 1).
Another issue compounding the campaign message confusion in the 1990s and early 2000s was that a number of Christian organisations promoted the idea that all trafficking is sex trafficking, which simply equates to “bad” prostitution (Interview 3: Organisation 1). The idea was advanced by a small number of religious organisations that all prostitution is ‘bad’, therefore being involved in prostitution meant that women and girls had invariably been trafficked (whether they consented to the work or not) and needed “rescuing” (Interview 3: Organisation 1).

Over the past two decades anti-trafficking organisations have acknowledged that human trafficking is a multifaceted problem and that no one single organisation can do everything required to combat this transnational problem. The creation of TANs has provided a means of coordinating organisations’ campaign goals, campaign messages and public outreach. The creation of UNIAP as the coordinating body for NGOs, UN agencies and governments in the region was an inevitable occurrence. With dozens of organisations working on anti-trafficking projects in the region it was necessary that a coordinating body was developed to stem the confusion and competition that had arisen from the situation of having a large number of organisations in a small geographic area working on the same issue. As Organisation 5 suggested:

I would imagine that someone else would have come along to fill the gap. If the funds are there to allow some entity like (UNIAP) to be there ... Someone else would have filled the gap (Interview 13: Organisation 5).

In recent years coordination amongst anti-trafficking organisations has become such a priority that TANs have started to see the benefits of collaborating with each other. In Cambodia four major TANs against human trafficking developed in the last two decades and the networks are “strong and flourishing” (Interview 16: Organisation 9). Interview participants in Cambodia suggested that there was interest amongst these four networks of
‘networking the networks’, that is, getting the major four networks to work more collaboratively to further improve and streamline the prevention, protection and rehabilitation activities of anti-trafficking organisations and networks in the country.

This section of the chapter has discussed the benefits of advocacy networking for anti-trafficking organisations and networks as well as the benefits of advocacy networking for trafficking victims and the states of the GMS. It has discussed the danger of anti-trafficking organisations working independently of each other. When individual organisations come together in TANs they have a much stronger ‘voice’ in the international community, and are able to target different groups and develop a number of complementary campaign activities rather than just focusing on small aspects of the trafficking problem. The next section of the chapter will explore some instances of negative cooperation between the network players.

6.6 Network politics: Negative cooperation between network members

Having explored in some detail the various benefits of advocacy networking and instances of positive cooperation between the network players, it would be remiss to not also acknowledge the various difficulties associated with inter-agency network collaboration. In fact it is these network politics that ultimately determined the effectiveness of TANs against child sex trafficking. Research participants suggested that, at times, such networking can be “difficult”, “challenging”, and “exhausting” (Interview 13: Organisation 5) as organisations endeavoured to find consensus on various issues such as campaign activities, campaign messages, funding and policy.

There was consensus in the research interviews that when anti-trafficking networks were unable to overcome differences in ideology or policy the effectiveness of their collaborative work was greatly hampered. Despite major progress in the GMS in coordinating anti-trafficking organisations and activities there were still some major obstacles to effective advocacy networking. While there was a collective interest in improving systems for child
victims of trafficking, the TANs were still staffed by humans and therefore exhibited human problems including competition for resources, power and organisational prestige, conflicts of values and interests, and conflict and competition over the best methods to prevent human trafficking and protect trafficking victims.

Anti-trafficking organisations approached the trafficking problem and the development of anti-trafficking campaign activities from a number of different perspectives. The staff of, for example, inter-agency networks often wanted to proceed with anti-trafficking activities from a criminology perspective, whilst those of Organisation 4 wanted to proceed with a child centred focus and still others wanted to proceed with a human rights or feminist or Christian approach. Further complications arose over the issue of donor demands. Donors wanted numerically measurable outcomes, which in some instances led networks to focus on donor demands rather than performing activities they deemed more important (Interview 4: Organisation 4). In addition organisations’ stance on prostitution also led to instances of conflict as a small number of organisations continued to debate whether prostitution was ever truly a freely chosen profession. Some organisations focused their campaigning on sex trafficking to the detriment of enhancing the region’s awareness of labour trafficking issues. Obstacles to effective networking were present in all the types of networks observed for the research. However, more problems appeared to exist in peak, inter-agency and international networks as these networks were not only large, with a number of diverse partner agencies, but also plagued by large institution problems such as bureaucracy and hierarchy. The interviews brought to light many examples of network politics at play and subsequent instances of negative network cooperation. The next section of the chapter sets out to discuss these politics and instances of conflict and the consequences of negative cooperation for advocacy networking against human trafficking.

6.6.1 The fallibility of NGOs

In discussing the obstacles to effective advocacy network coordination it is important to consider that NGOs, the major members of TANs, are not monolithic structures with
perfectly aligned structures and goals. The NGOs studied for this research were, in fact, very diverse. They had varied agendas, structures and sizes, divergent goals and ethos, and different levels and sources of funding. Some NGOs were part of one advocacy network while others belonged to many different networks and contributed as much or as little time and input as they deemed fit to those networks. NGOs in TANs may have shared visions but the network members were not the same organisations or people and tensions arose when the network ‘spoke’ for its members without prior consultation. As one interview participant stated “in representing the network, we have to be very careful what we say” (Interview 16: Organisation 9).

The NGOs studied for this research, particularly large international NGOs, were often managed in a similar fashion to businesses – they possessed strong structures, secretariats, administrators, boards, budgets and they produced financial and annual reports. They had an inherent need to be transparent, for the benefit not just of donors but also stakeholders, network partners and their beneficiaries. The NGOs observed for this research did not and could not know everything about international development and aid related issues, nor did they know everything and work on every aspect of anti human trafficking advocacy, legislation, protection of victims, and rehabilitation. One interview participant likened NGOs trying to do everything to “a person doing neurosurgery on weekends for fun” (Interview 9: Organisation 3). NGOs needed to “stick to what they know” (interview 9: Organisation 3) and diversify only when they had the appropriate skills and human resources to do so. Getting involved in areas they did not fully understand was potentially “dangerous” (Interview 9: Organisation 3).

The participant interviews highlighted a number of areas of negative cooperation within TANs against child trafficking in the Mekong Subregion. A key aspect of network politics involved funding. NGOs were in competition in the region over funding, reputation, and branding (Interview 2: Organisation 1). Funding was a constant concern for anti-trafficking organisations in the GMS, and a lack of funding led to substantial inefficiency in anti-
trafficking operations, as well as to competition between agencies. Competition over donor funding was less of a concern for faith-based networks as well as for some larger international, peak and inter-agency networks that had secured long-term Western government donor funding. Many examples of negative cooperation amongst the anti-trafficking advocacy network partners could be traced to the simple problem of getting diverse organisations with different mandates, which were naturally in competition with each other over donor funding, to collaborate (Interview 1: Organisation 2).

A number of research participants commented on the effort required to get NGOs coordinated and TANs up and running and ensure their continuation over time. Research participants referred to such efforts as ‘exhausting’ and used terms when referring to network coordination such as “death by coordination”, and “death by meetings” (Interview 10: Organisation 14). In order to ensure network sustainability network partners needed to communicate and meet regularly. Some TANs frequently called members to network partner meetings. This kind of regular networking posed a problem for the organisations that participated in more than one network, as well as grassroots NGOs with little funding to support this kind of regular travel. Research participants lamented the money and time that coordination required:

I think there is considerable death by coordination! You spend so much time coordinating with other groups what you’re doing that it really eats into your time to do stuff. Picking and choosing which networks are really going to be beneficial to you is somewhat difficult. In a place like Cambodia I felt like I was going to coordination meetings every other day about one issue or another. I think there’s definitely a limit. Diminishing marginal returns after a certain stage on coordination. I’m sure local organisations feel the same (Interview 10: Organisation 14).
Most interview participant complaints regarding the time wastage associated with ‘death by coordination’ and ‘death by meetings’ came from research participants in Cambodia where meetings were even more frequent than in Thailand. This was due to the geographical proximity of organisations in Cambodia – NGO partners could attend a meeting with only a day’s travel whereas in Thailand network partners needed to travel larger distances. In Thailand, therefore, more network communication was conducted by email or telephone. However, there was a strong consensus in the interviews that the anti-trafficking advocacy organisations were better coordinated and worked more closely in Cambodia than in Thailand due to this geographic proximity (Interview 19: Organisation 14).

To overcome the obstacles associated with getting network members together, networks often conducted a large amount of their communication by email and telephone. The purpose of meetings and email and telephone communication was for the network partners to have the opportunity to share their current work, publications, research, campaign highlights, and concerns. Despite the fact that the majority of network structures, particularly the NGO network types, were intended to be horizontal entities with all members being able to share information freely and equally, organisations were under no real obligation to share information. Research participant interviews revealed that some NGOs shared information and practice openly, whereas other NGOs only shared the “little that they wanted to” (Interview 18: Organisation 15). Research participants suggested that information sharing was more frequent and transparent at the lower rungs of the network ladder, for example, between field workers and social workers. The upper echelons, on the other hand - the managers, CEOs and other persons situated in positions at the higher levels of the NGO ladder - tended to share information less or share it more strategically (Interview 18: Organisation 15). Some research participants gave practical reasons why it was sometimes good to not share information, for example, when a new rehabilitation project for victims was being trialled and the network did not want to share project information until it had been monitored and evaluated and its effectiveness proven (Interview 18: Organisation 15). Sharing information too early, rather than being of benefit to the networks, could actually create “more harm than good” (Interview 18: Organisation
However, generally when network members did not share information it was because “they don’t think there’s a value in sharing their information or they’re worried about undermining their agenda” (Interview 5: Organisation 8). There was a clear consensus in the interviews that not every individual in every organisation was willing to share information at the same level (Interview 1: Organisation 2).

Another key aspect of TAN politics involved members’ performance and contribution to the network. In NGO specific networks punishments were at times delivered to organisations that did not behave ‘properly’ in networks (Interview 5: Organisation 8). Improper behaviour included, for example, not sharing information with other network members, not reporting on campaign activities as requested, not submitting budgets and expenditure and other information, not participating in network activities or making a contribution to the network at all for extended periods of time (Interview 5: Organisation 8). Disaffiliation processes existed to deal with underperforming partner agencies. Research participants in NGO specific networks emphasised that the NGO partner disaffiliation process did not occur overnight but, rather, over several months (Interviews 5 and 6: Organisation 8). The underperforming member or members in question were supported to overcome the problem at hand, given many warnings in the form of letters, emails, phone or face to face conversations and then eventually disaffiliated if the network deemed it necessary. Organisation 8 explained that there were sometimes problems associated with getting disaffiliated NGOs to understand that they were no longer part of the network and were no longer allowed to use the network branding. Such disaffiliations were “not uncommon” (Interview 5: Organisation 8). They were a daily reality of advocacy networking in anti-trafficking work in this region. NGOs in this region “come and go, they jump on the anti-trafficking ‘bandwagon’ and then can quickly fall off it as another trend arises elsewhere” (Interview 9: Organisation 3). Many NGOs “failed because they did not grow and expand, did not understand how to write grant and other funding proposals or constantly submitted the same proposals year after year with no view to expanding the organisation or making it financially viable without donor assistance” (Interview 4: Organisation 4). Even with charismatic local leaders and passionate staff, NGOs that did not share information within
the network, contribute to the network’s sustainability, adapt and change were “likely to fail” (Interview 19: Organisation 14). This brings to light again the question of North-South contention in TANs as the disaffiliation process was described from the perspective of Northern TAN members, and the examples they provided were of instances of disaffiliating Southern NGO TAN members who were considered ‘dead weight’ to the TAN. As no examples were given in interviews of Northern NGOs being disaffiliated it could be assumed that Northern TAN members used their power to demote lesser performing Southern members. This example also illustrates Northern TAN members’ failure to build the resources and capacity of Southern members – instead of building their capacity the TAN responded in a top-down fashion to Southern NGO partners’ inability to perform in the TAN.

6.6.2 The problems associated with North-South collaboration in advocacy networks

The majority of TANs studied for this research were NGO specific or global NGO networks composed of international and grassroots NGOs. The inter-agency networks observed for this research also included NGOs, UN agencies and government partners from the North and the South. However the majority of TAN aid workers interviewed were from the Western and the majority of TANs observed for this research were comprised of Western NGOs and UN agencies. Outside the TANs interviewed for this research existed a number of Southeast Asian NGOs working at a local level to ameliorate the negative manifestations of poverty and inequality in their countries. Some of these NGOs were members of transnational TANs, whilst others operated independently of any Western influence or partnership. Therefore the region presents a kaleidoscope of NGO activity – TANs operating transnationally, Southern NGOs acting domestically and occasionally partnering with TANs, and Southern activists operating at a local level. The fluidity of TANs in this region and the ad hoc and long-term collaboration between organisations makes drawing any conclusions regarding North South relations amongst NGOs and TANs challenging, however, some threads in collaboration and contention can be highlighted in this research.
NGOs from both the North and the South joined TANs with different ideas about what the network could provide the individual organisation (Interview 5: Organisation 8). As discussed in previous sections, a key aspect of TAN politics involved funding, and an immediate obstacle to North-South networking was evident in the question of the fundraising role of the networks. Participant interviews highlighted the misperception that some grassroots NGOs thought the network’s role was to help them to fundraise. Assisting individual organisations with fundraising was rarely the role of TANs (Interview 10: Organisation 14). Only two NGO networks interviewed for this research had any role or responsibility in assisting domestic NGOs to raise money to support their work. One of these NGO specific networks tried to avoid the role of fundraiser by providing its members with money directly from its own donor funding pool (Interview 17: Organisation 12). In this example funds were distributed evenly amongst the network partners unless NGO partners were planning a particularly large campaign that required additional financial assistance. Most networks with a large number of partners tried to emphasise to domestic NGO partners that the network had no responsibility in fundraising and that it was the responsibility of the individual organisation to secure its own funding and to ensure its own financial health (Interview 5: Organisation 8).

As international NGOs were better versed in responding to donors and managing budgets an impasse sometimes arose in NGO networks between international NGOs that were better financed and better practised in financial reporting, and domestic NGOs that were less financially secure, more dependent on donors, and less able to spend time writing financial reports, with the bulk of NGO staff situated in the field rather than in an office. Research participants from global NGO networks complained that domestic NGOs “don’t understand the importance of maintaining good administrative and financial systems and records” (Interview 10: Organisation 14). This led to instances of conflict in which international NGOs became critical of their Southern counterparts due to the domestic NGOs’ failure to submit financial reports:
One issue that we sometimes face is very dedicated program people who are very ideological and they are very committed and passionate about their work but they don’t see the need for strong administrative or financial systems. And helping the partners to understand that it’s great that you want to do all this but you need an accounting or bookkeeping system that’s going to track because if you don’t you’re not going to get a second grant. If you can’t properly account for the first grant from us then personnel and I understand that they look at it and think ‘I have a dollar from you and that means that if we have to hire an administrator that means that X percent less is going to our activities’. I would say it’s more on the administrative side of things that tends to be a challenge. There are a lot of really good dedicated people but understanding administration and finance is a necessary evil! A necessary part of any well functioning organisation, if they’re to succeed in the long term. (Interview 10: Organisation 14).

Domestic NGOs in NGO networks were frequently supported by network partners to complete and submit financial reports (Interview 5: Organisation 8). However, after several ‘warnings’ grassroots NGOs that still underperformed in this area would be disaffiliated from the network (Interview 5: Organisation 8).

Despite challenges to North-South advocacy networking Northern organisations and networks had little choice but to continue to work with their Southern counterparts. Northern NGOs “needed” (Interview 1: Organisation 2) domestic network partners for their field knowledge and access to trafficking victims. As one research participant explained:

The higher up the food chain you get, the higher up the ladder, the more distance you get from there to the beneficiaries ... So even for these international NGOs, they still have to work with the local NGOs on the ground to be the implementers ... Sometimes the capacity of these groups is not what we would like it to be, but that’s
the way it goes. You just try to find someone you can work with and get the job done (Interview 1: Organisation 2).

As this comment suggests, some interviews with staff of international and inter-agency networks reflected a Northern attitude of ‘just putting up with it and getting on with it’ when working with grassroots NGOs (Interview 10: Organisation 14). Northern network members tended to “try to ignore the North-South differences and just keep the supply of money to the domestic NGOs going” and “hope for a report of some kind at the end of the project cycle” (Interview 13: Organisation 5). Some research participants highlighted the danger in this kind of approach and suggested that they preferred, rather than “simply supplying money to the domestic NGOs”, to “actually go and work with the grassroots partners to improve their capacity” and assist with stabilising grassroots NGOs’ structure, and ensuring their growth and sustainability (Interview 9: Organisation 3).

Another aspect of TAN politics and a key obstacle to effective North-South advocacy networking in the GMS highlighted in the interviews was that of representation. As the voice of grassroots NGOs in Thailand and Cambodia with their national governments remained weak, international NGOs or UN agencies sometimes ‘represented’ grassroots NGOs in national taskforces and other networks. Cambodia’s National Taskforce on Trafficking possessed rotating NGO chairs and had pledged to use these rotating chairs to incorporate the voices of grassroots NGOs. However the structure of the Taskforce did not allow sufficient space to invite all domestic anti-trafficking NGOs in the country to meetings and fora. Therefore larger NGOs from international NGO TANs ‘represented’ Southern NGOs in the Cambodian Taskforce (Interview 19: Organisation 14).

The inter-agency networks interviewed for this research were aware of the problem of ‘representation’ and had already considered methods to overcome this problem. Tension over representation was considered only a minor problem in NGO specific networks and
rarely a problem in locational or campaign specific networks that were generally comprised of Southern NGOs with no formal international NGO participation. Representation was more frequently a problem in inter-agency networks and international NGO networks in which the voice of Northern NGOs often overwhelmed that of grassroots groups.

Research participant interviews revealed a number of other problems associated with North-South collaboration in TANs against child trafficking in the GMS. Some interview participants from inter-agency and global TANs cited problems with Southern network partners in issues related to domestic NGO corruption and the need to build up grassroots NGOs’ knowledge and capacity. An additional lamentation was that collaboration between Northern and Southern members was costly and these costs were generally borne by Northern network members.

Negative collaboration between Northern and Southern network members led situations of “distrust” (Interview 1: Organisation 2). Some Northern partners brought with them traditional views of working with the South, and the ideology of “just putting up with it” suggested complacency in improving these North-South relations. An interview with a Southern NGO representative revealed a fear present in Southern NGOs related to funding compliance. In this particular interview the research participant was clearly hesitant to answer certain interview questions for fear of risking current donor funding arrangements. This example serves as a reminder that although organisations may choose to network for reasons of social justice, the partnerships themselves may not always be equal and paternalism exists even in TANs that claim to be egalitarian in membership. Interviews with research participants revealed the sensitivity of both Northern and Southern NGOs to power and resource imbalances in networks.
6.6.3 The challenges of UN-NGO networking

A key difficulty in enhancing cooperation among anti-trafficking networks in the GMS lay in the fact that no single agency has been mandated to take the lead in the coordination of efforts. The UN Protocol has not mandated a single country or organisation to perform this role. Informally, however, most domestic and international NGOs tended to see UN agencies as the ideal group to take on the role of network coordinator. The UN did not always welcome this role and UN-NGO partnerships did not always progress smoothly.

UN agencies were partners in a number of inter-agency, international, and campaign and location specific networks in the GMS. The various UN agencies maintained a public facade of getting along well with NGOs in the region, however, instances of negative cooperation and conflict persisted between the UN and NGOs, particularly domestic NGOs. The process of getting UN agencies, NGOs and government to work together in the region in the first place had been “very, very messy” (Interview 9: Organisation 3). These groups simply “do not know how to naturally cooperate” (Interview 9: Organisation 3). One of the main reasons cited for this problem was that the UN doesn’t “like domestic NGOs getting involved in UN things” (Interview 9: Organisation 3):

The UN doesn’t particularly trust grassroots NGOs. In other words they are most comfortable with working with NGOs that are like international agencies in terms of having them involved in higher level meetings (Interview 9: Organisation 3).

Another reason for poor cooperation was that NGOs tired of trying to keep up with the UN pace of meetings and “UN minutia” (Interview 9: Organisation 3):

You watch this process where something starts off fine and tends to turn into a UN talking shop. And so as a result NGOs tend to drop out, it’s not that they’re pushed
out, they just tend to drop out. Because if you get more and more discussion about UN minutia that no one cares about, they (the NGOs) have a tendency to be less interested (Interview 9: Organisation 3).

An important aspect of network politics involved network hierarchy. While UN agency interview participants described the value of the UN-NGO there was a clear hierarchy in the GMS with UN agencies at the very top of the ladder and domestic NGOs at the bottom. UN agencies provided domestic NGOs with funding, resources, capacity building and access to donors and state fora. Domestic NGOs were the implementers of funded programs and projects in the field, and provided international NGOs and UN agencies with local knowledge and access to aid beneficiaries. Often the groups only met at networking seminars and other regional meetings. There was consensus in the interviews that there was even less association between these two advocacy networking groups than between the Northern and domestic NGOs. UN agencies were located in cities whereas domestic representatives were often in the field working directly with victims.

Another key aspect of network politics was transparency and inclusion. A problem highlighted by some UN agencies was the concern over some religious NGOs and networks that were considered “secretive”, and that “work only amongst their own kind” and “do wacky things” (Interview 3: Organisation 1). UN research participants were able to quickly name several key organisations that they preferred to partner with on anti-trafficking campaigns, and those they chose to avoid. There was a definite preference to partner with international NGOs and far less interest in partnering with religious NGOs. The same handful of preferred NGO partner names came up in the research interviews time and time again, raising the question of whether UN agencies were inadvertently creating a small monopoly on their partnerships in the region, to the exclusion of Southern NGOs.
There was tension not only between UN agencies and NGOs but also between UN agencies themselves. UN agencies sometimes competed over money and had overlapping mandates. As argued by Held, it is far from clear which global issues are the responsibility of which international agencies, and which issues are to be addressed by which particular agencies (2004, p. 371). A UN research participant explained:

"They (UN agencies) are all in competition with each other. Each agency has its own network of funders. UNICEF is based in New York but it’s very rich. The UNDP is based in New York, they again are perceived as a coordinating mechanism and therefore it gets more money. UNESCO has its headquarters in Paris and they have their own budget coming from their own member states which is different from the membership dues that go to the UNDP... So you see there are different budgets already. Each organisation sees itself as being the protector, the supporter, the gatekeeper of particular issues. So UNESCO is education and culture, UNICEF’s mandate is children. ILO is labour. UNDP is good governance at the moment in all the different countries. So the problem is when you try to work together you get people with different mandates. It shouldn’t be that difficult for them to coordinate but some of the mandates are overlapping (Interview 8: Organisation 3)."

6.6.4 Organisations not addressing the ‘bigger picture’ of networking

The TANs observed for this research sometimes failed to target their anti-trafficking campaigning at the root causes of child exploitation. In other words the networks were selectively blind about the ‘bigger picture’ of child trafficking. The ‘bigger picture’ here refers to the root causes of trafficking including poverty exacerbated by contemporary globalisation, lack of state support systems for young people and children, and lack of women’s empowerment. It also refers to the reasons – outside the globalisation-related causes – that exacerbate the child sex trafficking problem, such as gender inequality, traditional systems of debt bondage, and statelessness. Individual NGOs, particularly grassroots NGOs with limited budgets, tended to at times take a band-aid approach to their
anti-trafficking advocacy work and focus on one activity at a time, for example, the building of shelters. Considerable anti-trafficking advocacy network attention has been paid to the building of shelters for victims, awareness raising through television and radio campaigns, and the creation and dissemination of campaign material. However, there has been little campaigning that has situated the issue of trafficking where it should be: As a child “vulnerability among other vulnerabilities” and as a “failure of systems” to protect children from exploitation (Interview 21: Organisation 4). Only the UN agencies and a select number of international NGOs and their associated networks have addressed the ‘bigger picture’ of child trafficking in their campaigning and in their work on building systems to protect children in the GMS. Therefore while cosmopolitan values may have brought a number of TANs together, the TANs observed in this research did not necessarily know how to promote universal values when faced with seemingly insurmountable social problems and limited budgets.

In the research interviews child trafficking was treated as a regional problem created by regional or even national problems. There were multiple reasons for this – NGOs were weighed down by financial and resource constraints and individual NGOs were unable to work on all aspects of the child trafficking problem. Instead they were forced to choose a small number of areas of interest. As this comment from a research participant shows, organisations clearly lamented the fact that they were unable to address all aspects of trafficking and were forced to focus their resources on smaller projects:

We’re not trying to tackle the socio-economic issues, it’s too big. We’re really just about general trafficking awareness. (Interview 22: Organisation 16).

It appeared that when individual NGOs joined TANs they were provided with improved opportunities to address the ‘bigger picture’ of child trafficking. The combining of NGO expertise and access to trafficking victims with the expertise of UN agencies led to the
creation of arenas for the organisations to share their knowledge and resources to address the child trafficking problem at multiple levels. Networks are now able to enter debates at the global level including at UNIAP and other UN conferences, and global conferences on issues related to poverty, migration, trafficking, and gender issues.

6.6.5 Hindrances to network effectiveness: Reliable data and state corruption and collusion in trafficking

Research participant interviews revealed that an ongoing problem negatively affecting the ability of the TANs to do their work was the lack of reliable data and statistics on the nature of and number of children trafficked in the GMS. Governments in the GMS failed to maintain anti-trafficking organisational data. In most countries the basic question of “is there a list or database of organisations working on these issues?” was typically answered with a negative response. As highlighted by Todres, when one considers the fact that government agencies and social service providers often do not have a clear idea of how each agency and organisation fits within the multi-sector network of services for victims it is no wonder that victims struggle to figure out how to access services, at-risk children often do not have access to information that might help them avoid exploitation, and traffickers can continue to operate with little risk of punishment (2010, p. 40). The problem of poor data has historically been exacerbated by some NGOs that chose to inflate the numbers of trafficking victims to highlight the seriousness of the problem and subsequently increase donor funds (Interview 9: Organisation 3). This inflation of victim numbers has only served to undermine the credibility of NGOs and has led to a detrimental situation in which organisations, journalists and governments time after time cite the same statistics having never queried their authenticity:

They regularly said that there were “2 million prostitutes in Thailand”, which would have meant that approximately 1 in 4 Thai females under 39 was in sex work. And there were “800 000 child prostitutes”, which would have meant you would have tripped over them (Interview 9: Organisation 3).
Adequate baseline data and systems for sharing real data between governments, the UN and NGOs in the region have also been severely lacking. This has created problems for TANs in reporting to donors on the number of victims who have been ‘saved’ from trafficking and for forming any firm conclusions on whether the number of victims has decreased:

The data question, nobody knows the data. How could they say it’s (trafficking) not happening like it did before when before we didn’t even have baseline data. The police and government are not capturing the data. If you don’t have such data how could you even start to do research on the issue? It’s still so underground.

(Interview 5: Organisation 8).

Network monitoring and evaluation activities were also severely lacking in the region. NGOs in particular have been “notoriously bad” at monitoring and evaluating the impact of their anti-trafficking activities (Interview 22: Organisation 16). This is despite the fact that monitoring and evaluation of program and campaign activity was “crucial” to assess that the programs in place were having a positive effect rather than a negative one on the target groups (Interview 13: Organisation 5). While many organisations in the development field have been guilty of not putting enough time and energy into monitoring and evaluation, this gap seemed even more prominent in the anti-trafficking sector in Southeast Asia. Only one interview participant from a youth focused network (Interview 22: Organisation 16) was able to discuss his organisation’s meaningful and ongoing monitoring and evaluation activities. A UN research participant highlighted the danger of anti-trafficking organisations ignoring the issue of monitoring and evaluation of current advocacy programs:

We need to understand the implications of what we do. You may have 1500 interventions, maybe only 20 of them will make a difference. But we allow ourselves the luxury of taking money and saying “we’re making a difference”. We need to evaluate ourselves. People will say “no, we can’t do that, we’re doing God’s work”.
We’re afraid to evaluate what we’re doing. We are almost afraid to find out that what we’re doing isn’t so awesome (Interview 13: Organisation 5).

As this statement suggests it was not enough that anti-trafficking networks continued to develop and implement campaigns against child trafficking. In order for the networks to be effective it was necessary that the networks regularly monitored and evaluated the effectiveness of their programs and campaign activities if their ultimate goal of preventing trafficking and aiding trafficking victims was to be achieved.

While there was consensus in the interviews that relationships had recently improved between NGOs, the UN and governments in the GMS, some government activities or inactivity continued to make progress against child trafficking difficult. Some of the challenges faced by TANs included complex trafficking laws, government staff not being cognisant of trafficking laws, governments not collecting human trafficking data or sharing information at the regional or international level, and government staff that were corrupt or facilitated child trafficking. There was consensus in the interviews that a major flaw in government information sharing included that of releasing information regarding paedophiles:

Governments do not share lists of known paedophiles. If you want to do something more important than prosecuting someone after they’ve violated a child, it’s important to keep them (the paedophiles) out in the first place (Interview 9: Organisation 3).

The networks that succeeded in working with governments were those that had contacts within government agencies that were open to working collaboratively. This NGO-
government collaboration often excluded grassroots NGO networks such as geographic and NGO specific networks:

NGOs and government have a very adversarial relationship. They see each other as the enemy. Rather than necessarily working together to solve a problem it’s sort of criticise one side then defend. There’s a reluctance on the government side that they don’t know all the answers, that they need to improve, that their systems aren’t perfect. We see in our programs that our groups approach the government to adapt laws and it’s still the bureaucrats say “well who are you?” and “we’re the experts and we know how to do this and our systems are fine and you just don’t understand them”. That’s definitely not a partnership relationship. Unless you have a sympathetic ear in the government or you happen to know someone in government, government’s not really open to external ideas (Interview 10: Organisation 14).

Some grassroots NGOs in the region asked confronting questions of governments, which led to distrust between the two groups. It was well known in the region that the Chinese government, due to its dislike for public criticism, did “not like NGOs at all” (Interviews 8 and 9: Organisation 3). Governments in the GMS were also not open to criticism from UN agencies and international NGO networks:

The government doesn’t like criticism. Here (Thailand) they’re very, very, very annoyed by any criticism about their country. Whether it’s about losing face or whatever it is. Cambodia is the same. They don’t take kindly to criticism either. A couple of days ago the Cambodian government threatened to kick out the resident UN coordinator because criticisms had been made on a law to handle corruption (Interview 1: Organisation 2).
This comment reflects the prominent role of the state in networks being effective and how states can limit networks by asserting their powers. It also reflects the lack of cohesive social justice objectives across GMS states. Cosmopolitans face significant challenges when faced with governments that do not support and promote the best interests of their citizens and promote ideals of equality and justice amongst their populations.

The relationship between anti-trafficking NGO networks and states in the GMS functioned in a somewhat inverse way to NGO-state relationships in developed countries. In Southeast Asia a number of international NGOs had far superior budgets and trafficking expertise to that of state agencies. State departments in the GMS had meagre budgets to conduct anti-human trafficking campaign activities. This was particularly the case in the least developed countries of the region such as Laos. The responsibility therefore fell to UN agencies and international NGO networks to provide the governments in the region with funding for anti-trafficking activities, capacity building, training and coordination. A somewhat confusing situation therefore arose with government staff being supported and trained, and sometimes paid by international NGOs and UN agencies to attend networking meetings, seminars and other fora. However, the state still had the ultimate power over decisions regarding trafficking legislation, trafficker prosecutions, and victim rescues. A frequent complaint of international NGOs in the region was that they spent a considerable amount of time and effort training government staff on trafficking issues only to have the staff moved to different positions or different regions after several months (Interview 10: Organisation 14). Subsequently, the NGOs had to “simply start the training process all over again” (Interview 10: Organisation 14).

TANs faced complexities in working with governments because they recognised the rampant government corruption that hindered their work. By virtue of their mandates, TANs were designed to challenge the state and stamp out negative practices such as corruption. But in this region and this particular field of anti trafficking work, it was necessary for NGOs and UN agencies to maintain good working relationships with state departments. Therefore, all
the different types of networks were forced to think hard about possible repercussions before publicly accusing governments of corruption. Such accusations could seriously damage inter-agency working relationships and the NGOs’ and UN agencies’ push for improved legislation against trafficking and improved systems of protection for children (Interview 21: Organisation 4).

6.7 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the politics of TANs, which are central to the research question of TAN effectiveness. Differences in organisational goals, levels of expertise, organisation size, inconsistent trafficking legislation, unclear definitions of ‘trafficking’, and conflicting stances on prostitution have all contributed to conflict within TANs against child trafficking in the GMS. In addition, external barriers such as government corruption and inactivity on trafficking pose significant challenges to advocacy network coordination and campaign success. In discussing both the positive and negative aspects of network coordination this chapter has reflected on the various obstacles to advocacy networking against child trafficking in the GMS as well as the perceived benefits and highlights of advocacy networking. This chapter has also shown that while significant problems persist in getting the various advocacy groups to work together, some progress has been made in the region in recent years. A good example of this is the Asian Taskforce Against Human Trafficking in Cambodia that has successfully brought together all the groups in an ongoing inter-agency partnership against human trafficking. The region has witnessed the development of various memoranda of understanding between governments and advocacy organisations as well as the development of trafficking laws and extraterritorial legislation. While individual NGOs continued to take a band-aid approach to their advocacy work, when the organisations united in TANs they were provided with the important space to share skills, resources and funds and therefore address the ‘bigger picture’ of child trafficking, meaning the structural or root causes of the problem.
The chapter has addressed several of the key research questions for this research including questions related to the motivations for and evolution of the networks; network values and goals; obstacles and hindrances to networking; and highlights of networking against child sex trafficking in the GMS. The chapter has also demonstrated that there is an alternative to hegemonic, neoliberal, top-down globalisation, and that is counter-hegemonic solidarity or bottom-up globalisation (De Sousa Santos, 2006, p. 398). Supporting Held’s (2003), view, this chapter has demonstrated that only a cosmopolitan outlook can ultimately accommodate itself to the political challenges of a more global era, marked by overlapping communities of fate and multilevel or multilayered politics. The chapter has also examined some of the contemporary literature on TANs and concluded that the theories put forward by theorists such as Keck and Sikkink (1999), while useful for describing network tactics, are not adequate to discuss the structure, processes and campaign activities of the TANs observed for this research in the GMS. I have, therefore, developed a typology of anti-trafficking TANs in the GMS to better explain the structures or models, activities and sustainability of the different networks observed for this research. As this chapter has shown, the most prevalent network types in the GMS were NGO specific, peak international, global and inter-agency networks. The next chapter will discuss the sustainability and effectiveness of the different types of networks and examine the essential principles for effective anti-trafficking advocacy networking.
Chapter 7.

Key Elements of effective transnational advocacy networking against child sex trafficking

7.1 Introduction

The previous chapter addressed the question of the benefits of advocacy networking against child trafficking and examined the issue of network politics and instances of positive cooperation between network partners. It also examined the obstacles to effective advocacy networking against child trafficking in the GMS and discussed internal and external barriers to effective networking such as distrust between network members, partners not sharing information, and government inactivity on the trafficking issue. Given the discussion in the previous chapter of the various obstacles to effective anti-trafficking networking in the GMS it may appear that there were too many hindrances to cooperation for the network partners to have been effective in successfully collaborating to achieve their goals. However, this appears not to be the case. The TANs I observed for this research were important spaces for collaboration and collective success against trafficking to be made possible and the interviews revealed many examples of effective collaborative campaigning against child trafficking in the GMS.

The goal of this research was to examine the effectiveness of anti-trafficking TANs in the GMS. As the second data analysis chapter, this chapter explores this question through an analysis of the research participants’ views on the effectiveness of anti child trafficking TANs in the GMS. The chapter first examines the barriers to measuring the ‘success’ and ‘effectiveness’ of anti-trafficking TANs in the GMS. This chapter also discusses the importance of conducting monitoring and evaluation activities in order to measure network effectiveness. As discussed in previous chapters, the monitoring and evaluation of network
campaigns and other activities has traditionally been largely absent from advocacy network agendas. Bearing in mind the obstacles to measuring effectiveness and the absence of monitoring and evaluation activities conducted by NGOs and TANs, the second section of the chapter will examine the effectiveness of the networks according to seven ‘Key Elements’ that I identified during the process of interviewing and data analysis. These Key Elements can be understood as core priorities or principles, identified by the research participants, which were considered necessary for the networks to be sustainable and successful. When this research started it was proposed that the research would answer the question – “which advocacy network types seem to be the most effective in fighting child trafficking in the GMS?” However, after analysis of the interview data it became apparent that this question could not be answered as the reach and impact of advocacy network activities could not realistically be measured. By considering network ‘effectiveness’ according to the seven Key Elements, however, conclusions could be made about what the research participants considered the principles of ‘effective’ advocacy networking. TAN ‘effectiveness’, according to the research participants, was defined as advocacy networking that promotes positive cooperation between partners, promotes awareness of child trafficking in the GMS, and provides streamlined services for victims and improves child protection systems. Effective networking also meant that networks collaborated with governments on trafficking policy and legislation and improved government capacity to fight child trafficking. Effectiveness was considered ‘internal’ and ‘external’ with internal effectiveness referring to the successful collaboration of the partners within networks while external effectiveness referred to positive outcomes for child trafficking victims and improved relationships with governments.

7.2 Barriers to measuring network effectiveness

The various definitions of network ‘effectiveness’ and ‘success’ and the barriers to measuring ‘effectiveness’ have been highlighted in recent academic literature and discussed in chapter 3. Gamson argues that it is useful to think of ‘success’ as a set of outcomes, recognising that a given challenging group may receive different scores on equally valid, different measures of outcome (1975, p. 28). These outcomes fall into two basic clusters:

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One concerned with the fate of the challenging group as an organisation and one with the distribution of new advantages to the group’s beneficiary (Gamson, 1975, p. 28). The central issue in the second cluster focuses on whether the group’s beneficiary gains new advantages during the challenge and its aftermath (Gamson, 1975, p. 28). As Gamson contends, network effectiveness needs to be analysed in relation to the groups concerned. For this research the concerned groups were the organisations involved in the TANs and the beneficiaries of the networks’ advocacy – child trafficking victims, GMS governments and GMS communities. In considering these groups, already complexities develop concerning any attempt at an evaluation of networks’ effectiveness – which group or groups should be focused on when measuring effectiveness? How can the effectiveness of network campaigns be measured when the beneficiaries of the TANs’ campaigning have not been interviewed? How can a fluid concept such as ‘awareness raising’ be measured when there are flow-on effects to this kind of campaigning that cannot be quantified?

An important barrier to gauging the success and effectiveness of the TANs and their campaigns is the complexity of the question – whose perception of ‘effectiveness’ or ‘success’? The research participant interviews demonstrated a diversity of conceptions of effectiveness. For example, a grassroots NGO field worker expressed a different perspective of advocacy network effectiveness and success to that of a UN representative. A child trafficking victim will probably conceptualise an NGO’s effectiveness differently to the adult staff of TANs. Opinions on network effectiveness may also differ depending on where in the world an individual is placed, his or her age, sex, background, culture, length of time involved with or working for the network, adherence to the network ethos and goals, and position within the network. For this research in cases where two interviews were conducted with representatives of the same network it was clear that staff of the same organisation did not necessarily agree on the level of effectiveness of a particular campaign. Some staff, for example, thought a campaign had been highly effective while their colleagues admitted problems in, for example, partner cooperation and campaign outcomes. Further, some research participants suggested that networks were highly effective whereas other staff from the same network pointed out the instances of negative
collaboration and suggested that much more work needed to be done to improve cooperation.

7.2.1 Monitoring and evaluation of network effectiveness

Research participant interviews reflected a cognisance on the part of NGO and UN staff of the difficulties associated with measuring the impacts of anti-trafficking advocacy campaigns in the region. As this research participant comment suggests, measuring campaign impact is extremely challenging and this challenge is exacerbated by a lack of monitoring and evaluation activities:

I’m not sure there is an obvious impact. There’s an impact for the members of the network because they can come up with common approaches and a better understanding of what each other is doing but I’m not sure about the impact on changing policy or other things. I’m not sure networks are very good at monitoring or evaluating their impact (Interview 4: Organisation 4).

Adding to this complexity was the fact that network effectiveness was interpreted differently by individuals. Some research participants suggested that network effectiveness was about network’s ability to fulfil its mandate:

I believe we had done some good protection and rehabilitation work. Effectiveness is about our mission statement (Interview 18: Organisation 15).

Other research participants understood ‘effectiveness’ only at a very personal level rather than at a network level:
It’s (the network) extremely effective! I enjoy my work and talking to the other
groups. I get such nice emails from the groups. (Interview 6: Organisation 8).

More data might be available on the effectiveness of campaigns if monitoring and
evaluation activities were undertaken regularly. However, for all the networks studied for
this research, these activities were rare. The only exception to this was Organisation 16,
which regularly conducted a number of meaningful monitoring and evaluation activities.
Research participant interviews demonstrated that there was little attention among the
TANs to systematically assess the effectiveness of direct and indirect prevention and
advocacy efforts. Anti-trafficking programs and projects were often designed by those
running the organisations without baseline data and little research initially went into the
planning and implementation of projects. Many of the projects had no reported outcomes
that were directly related to reducing the number of victims trafficked. In reporting on
their work NGO networks often referred to activities that took place and the number of
participants involved, but there was no attached measurement of how these activities had
been beneficial and to whom. Without measures of attitude change or changes in the
public’s knowledge of trafficking it was unknown whether the programs were having any
effect and were a good use of donor funds. When interventions were developed without
sound methods for assessing their effects it was possible that they were ineffective or,
worse, had unintended negative effects. Yet campaigning without monitoring and
evaluating the impact of the campaigns seemed to be the norm in a significant number of
the organisations and networks observed for this research.

A problem for the networks in measuring network and campaign effectiveness was that a
significant amount of their campaigning consisted of ‘awareness raising’, which was
extremely difficult to evaluate in terms of reach and impact. Awareness raising activities
had historically avoided monitoring and evaluation analysis by NGOs due to the difficulties
in quantifying their impact on the public. Research participant interviews highlighted the
fact that after two decades of ‘awareness raising’ of human trafficking in Western countries
a fatigue had developed amongst the anti-trafficking community regarding the usefulness of these awareness raising campaigns. Some anti-trafficking experts were very critical of the ambiguity of trying to enhance the Western world’s ‘awareness’ of human trafficking at all, and believed that the world was now “well aware” of the trafficking problem (Interview 9: Organisation 3). In referring to the recent Body Shop anti-sex trafficking campaign, a research participant had the following criticism of awareness raising campaigns, conducted in Western countries, on sex trafficking:

I’m not completely sure that rubbing yourself with ginger after you’ve taken a shower is really going to help too much but the Body Shop wants that. But it’s hard then to move to “what has actually happened?” No one is ever held responsible for programs. We ask – “what are you doing?” The answer is “oh we’re raising awareness”. Maybe twenty years ago you were raising awareness. I’m not sure there is much of an impact (Interview 9: Organisation 3).

Research participants also criticised other ‘awareness raising’ activities such as the targeting of middle range and higher end hotels in anti sex tourism and sex trafficking campaigns:

The Accor group of hotels has taken a strong stance on child sex trafficking. But how many paedophiles were taking children to the Accor hotels to begin with? Generally they go to 2 star hotels. It’s nice that they did this but there is little impact (Interview 9: Organisation 3).

This example highlights the importance for TANs to think strategically when developing anti-trafficking campaigns. As the example shows, it was important for TANs to consider who the campaigns were designed to target or assist. Misguided campaigns such as in the examples provided above meant that networks wasted valuable funds and missed reaching important target audiences. These examples also highlight the challenges for TANs in measuring the effectiveness of campaigns that cannot truly be quantified. The fact that experts in the
region were already critical of the validity of the campaigns suggests that an evaluation of their effectiveness would result in rather dismal findings. On the flip side if more networks monitored and evaluated their campaigns and project work they may have found some hard proof that they were making an impact, or achieving very little, and subsequently been able to better direct their funding and advocacy efforts.

With these barriers to measuring and evaluating the effectiveness of TANs in mind, during the data analysis stage of the research I identified a number of key advocacy network effectiveness ‘elements’, derived from the interview data. These Key Elements were the principles highlighted by research participants as essential for the networks to thrive and be sustainable and successful. The seven Key Elements discussed in the next section of the chapter were those that were most frequently identified by the research participants in the interviews. Not all research participants were unanimous on the Key Elements and there was some dissent particularly regarding Key Element 6 pertaining to the importance of the network having a sound structure as a requirement for network success. However, overall there was consensus that these seven principles were essential for network success and effectiveness and that if networks were to thrive and be sustainable they must incorporate these principles in their structures, values and advocacy activities.

This section of the chapter has outlined the barriers to measuring advocacy network effectiveness. It has highlighted the barriers to effectively measuring TAN success such as the absence of monitoring and evaluation of advocacy network campaigns and projects. The chapter has also discussed the ambiguity of ‘awareness raising’ activities and the challenges of measuring the reach and impact of these kinds of activities. The next section of the chapter will discuss the seven ‘Key Elements’ of effective advocacy networking against child trafficking that were identified in the interviews with research participants in Thailand and Cambodia.
7.3 Key Elements of effective anti-trafficking advocacy networking

As discussed in the previous section of the chapter, measuring the effectiveness of TANs is a task fraught with obstacles. Individual advocacy organisations and networks did not conduct regular monitoring and evaluation activities. Further, challenges arose over the question of – whose perception of ‘effectiveness’? Another significant obstacle to measuring the effectiveness of TANs was that the impact of the networks’ campaigns cannot be quantified. How many lives were saved? How many children were not abused? These are difficult, perhaps impossible, questions for TANs to answer. However, despite the obstacles to measuring advocacy network effectiveness, analysis of the research interview data shows that there are a number of key principles that networks may follow in order to ensure the promotion of cosmopolitan values, and network sustainability and effectiveness. Therefore, while barriers to measuring network effectiveness may have existed, by considering the presence or absence of the Key Elements it is possible to gain an understanding of how the TANs observed for this research were successful in achieving effective collaboration and network effectiveness.

Key Element 1. TANs against child sex trafficking should target their campaigns at potential youth victims, states and the wider public (awareness raising). Campaigns should also address the ‘demand’ side of human trafficking.

Key Element 2. Partners need to share common anti-trafficking values and goals.

Key Element 3. Anti-trafficking networks should include not just NGOs but also UN agencies and government departments.

Key Element 4. Anti-trafficking networks should endeavour to balance the ‘voice’ of Northern and Southern partners.

Key Element 5. Organisations should form networks with other organisations that have complementary skills, and not organisations doing exactly the same anti-trafficking advocacy activities.
**Key Element 6.** Networks should have strong structures and a secretariat

**Key Element 7.** Networks should seek to continuously improve themselves through monitoring and evaluation of their activities.

These seven Key Elements to effective anti-trafficking advocacy networking will be discussed individually in the next section of the chapter.

### 7.3.1 Key Element 1: TANs against child sex trafficking should target their campaigns at potential victims (youth), states and the wider public (awareness raising). Campaigns should also address the ‘demand’ side of human trafficking.

**Campaign targets**

Research participant interviews revealed that advocacy network campaigns and activities were often directed at a number of different targets. However, some networks directed their resources only at specific target groups. For example, research participants from NGO networks described their mission as conducting advocacy campaigns targeted at potential child trafficking victims, and providing protection and rehabilitation services to abused children. Inter-agency network partners primarily focused on improving inter-agency collaboration between government, UN agencies and NGOs in the region and worked on improving trafficking policy, legislation and prosecutions. Some NGO networks, particularly the smaller types such as geographic and campaign focused networks had a particular focus on groups such as street children while other networks had been established to provide multiple services. There was consensus in the research participant interviews that while individual organisations may have taken a band-aid approach to their work and focused on only a small number of projects, TANs were better able to extend their campaign reach to a larger number of groups and at multiple levels. Research participants discussed a diverse number of campaign targets and campaign activities that were being conducted in the GMS, which could be divided into prevention, protection, rehabilitation and rehabilitation activities. These are represented in the table below.
Table 5: Campaign targets and activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus Area</th>
<th>Campaign Target (individual or group)</th>
<th>Methods and Campaign Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>Victims: Minority groups and hill tribe children; Governments; NGOs; The ‘demand’ side: Paedophiles, buyers and consumers of sex, traffickers. Donors</td>
<td>Dramas; radio; TV; concerts; brochures and leaflets; tuk tuks; billboards; movies on buses; School curriculum Hotlines ICT awareness Signs in hotels Lobbying governments and private sector to take an interest in CST International awareness raising Strengthening child protection systems Coordination of different organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Victims</td>
<td>Shelters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Training police and other government officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosecution</td>
<td>Victims</td>
<td>Improving training for governments on legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Governments</td>
<td>Development and dissemination of laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation and Repatriation</td>
<td>Governments</td>
<td>Shelters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Counselling pre and post repatriation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Victims</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

As the table above demonstrates, the targets of advocacy network campaigning were primarily the child victims of trafficking, potential victims, perpetrators, the wider GMS communities and GMS governments. Research participants explained that for networks to be effective all these groups must be considered in the development and implementation of campaign activities. For example, while TANs assisted the child victims of trafficking, it was essential that GMS governments were lobbied to develop new legislation to protect child victims.
TANs, by virtue of their shared resources and larger capacity, were well equipped to target campaigns at the individuals and groups relevant to the trafficking issue: Children (the victims) who had been trafficked, children who were ‘at risk’ of trafficking (including minority groups and hill tribe children), governments and various subsectors of government including the police and Ministries of Justice, Social Welfare and so on, the private sector (especially companies running hotels and internet cafes that may inadvertently play a role in facilitating the child exploitation process), and the ‘demand’ side of trafficking including paedophiles and human traffickers. Depending on the mandate of the individual organisation or network, campaign targets stayed the same or changed over time. Not all organisations or networks had the same campaign targets. For example, Organisation 4 focused on the child, structural change for improved child protection systems and working with governments; Organisation 3 focused on ethnic minorities; Organisation 13 focused on street children and child sex tourists; Organisation 6 and Organisation 7 focused on awareness raising and protecting child victims of trafficking.

Within the broad category of campaigning for child victims there were several subcategories of campaign targets including ethnic minorities, street children, child prostitutes and child labourers. Several of the networks observed for this research focused their campaign efforts on the specific target group of stateless children. It has been identified in Thailand that a key risk factor for being trafficked or exploited in that country is not having citizenship:

The single biggest risk factor for someone in Thailand to be trafficked or otherwise exploited is lack of citizenship. About 40% of highland people in Thailand do not have citizenship (Interview 9: Organisation 3).

Children and adults without citizenship in Thailand have often denied access to the education and health systems, denied access to employment, have no recourse to owning
land or property and thus, due to their poverty and marginalisation, are far more vulnerable to traffickers. Some TANs tried to ensure, therefore, through their campaigning that “everyone has the right to register, to have an identity. We want to make sure that everyone has an identity and Thai nationality” (Interview 7: Organisation 11).

Campaign activities

Keck and Sikkink have pointed to two factors concerning the political outcomes of TANs: Issue and actor characteristics (1998, p. 26). The researchers argued that networks tend to be most successful when they mobilise around value-laden issues “involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals, especially when there is a short and clear causal chain assigning responsibility” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p. 27). Therefore successful campaigning and mobilisation is likely to occur around the first type of issue involving physical harm to innocent persons – in the case of this research, children. All the types of networks studied for this research focused a significant proportion of their campaigning on the child victim of trafficking and potential victims of trafficking. Interview data reflected the desire to network from a programmatic point of view. In order to improve child protection systems it was necessary to have interested groups working together to build functioning systems in countries where such systems were still in a state of underdevelopment:

It’s trying to develop, work with other partners to develop standards for child protection and a common understanding of what is child protection because it’s not always an area that’s understood. There’s not a lot of consensus, and in terms of looking at building a system you obviously need coordination between partners, it makes sense from a programmatic point of view. It makes sense that you need people, especially in the area of child protection, you need coordination, you need people working together, you need all the systems working together, you need people who have an understanding of the issue. Because by nature it’s a very multi-sectoral area you have to have people working together if you actually want to improve the system (Interview 4: Organisation 4).
The majority of NGO networks in the region focused their attention on preventing trafficking and protecting the victims of trafficking rather than finding and prosecuting human traffickers. In recent years, however, NGO networks have endeavoured to balance their campaign activities across the ‘4 Ps’ – prevention of trafficking, protection of victims or potential victims, prosecution of traffickers and the overarching policy work that coordinates the prevention, protection and prosecution efforts (World Vision, 2008). The target group of advocacy network campaigning remained children and most advocacy work consisted of awareness raising campaigns in addition to protection services for victims. However, larger NGO networks and inter-agency networks had increasingly broadened their capacity to address all 4 Ps where possible. Smaller NGO networks tended to concentrate on one or two of the Ps, normally prevention or protection. The networks that focused on prosecution and policy were inter-agency networks with government, particularly police partners.

**Government as a campaign target**

Whilst most advocacy network types focused their campaigning on at-risk children and child victims of trafficking some network types such as inter-agency networks, had a broader mandate and focused their collective efforts on building systems to improve standards of child protection in the region, while also endeavouring to change public perceptions of children so that they were no longer seen as inferior to adults or as objects to be traded. Inter-agency networks worked closely with governments of the GMS on anti-trafficking training and capacity building. Research participants emphasised the importance of this kind of capacity building as the governments of the GMS did “not have good reputations with regards to child welfare” (Interview 5: Organisation 8):

The governments’ commitment (to child sex trafficking and child sex tourism) could be so much better, it’s so weak. Governments don’t place the welfare of children as a high priority (Interview 5: Organisation 8).
Networks adopted the responsibility of training government staff on child protection legislation:

We try to engage them (the government) in our preparations and processes. We work with the government operational staff, we organise training, we have manuals and the resource person. The participant who attends the training will get that material. We have to engage the staff in the organising, we plan the concept papers and the curriculum together. We teach them the child protection system, we show them their roles and work out how to work together. We push them to study more. We join forces. We learned that in the government there are many capacity building programs but when we work with the staff we realise that they don’t know how to implement the knowledge that they get from the training into their work. It’s a very big problem (Interview 12: Organisation 7).

Building the capacity of GMS governments and their commitment to combating trafficking was an ongoing process for the types of networks engaged in this kind of work, primarily inter-agency networks and peak, international NGO networks. The governments of Cambodia and Thailand have recently introduced laws and policy on human trafficking to protect victims and punish traffickers (UNIAP, 2008). Both governments have been publicly vocal about their desire to eliminate trafficking. However, research participant interviews highlighted a clear gap between state rhetoric and reality. Laws had not been adequately disseminated to all levels of government staff so there continued to be cases of government staff that should be in the know, for example, the police, not being aware of the relevant laws to protect victims. Trafficking victims were still arrested and immediately repatriated to their home countries rather than being supported as victims of trafficking and receiving protection services, as required in memoranda of understanding between the GMS states and other relevant trafficking and child protection laws (UNIAP, 2008). The role of TANs in the GMS, therefore, has been to improve state capacity to fight child sex trafficking in its
own borders and regionally, and also to fill the gaps left by government in protecting its young citizens.

**The private sector and GMS communities as targets for advocacy campaigning**

In addition to directing anti-trafficking campaigns at children, working with governments and improving government capacity, TANs also targeted the private sector in the GMS and GMS communities. Research participants highlighted the importance of working with the private sector, particularly companies that may inadvertently play a role in facilitating the trafficking and exploitation of children in the region. A number of NGO networks had started working with hotels in the GMS (where the sexual exploitation of children took place), as well as travel agents, recruitment agencies, tuk tuk drivers, and internet cafes. Working with these private sector organisations helped not only to identify and work with the users, or the ‘demand’ side of the trafficking of children, but also child victims. For example, NGO networks trained internet cafe staff on methods to ensure that children were using safe webcam and internet chatting facilities:

Many homes in Thailand don’t have computers. We ask the internet cafe owner to be involved in taking a role to protect children, putting in software to block certain websites, having stickers and posters in their cafe for example around this (child sex trafficking) issue, not allowing children to use webcams and those sorts of activities. If there’s a mutual interest then we will start from there and when the relationship develops we do an assessment of a position of the organisation with regards to the rights of the child, we talk about the issue of the prostitution of children (Interview 6: Organisation 8).

There was consensus in the interviews that it was important to target advocacy network campaigning at not just at-risk youth but at all citizens of GMS communities. The TANs hoped to inspire GMS citizens to better understand the child trafficking issue and respect
child rights. In performing this type of advocacy, networks also hoped to inspire GMS citizens to “become advocates themselves” (Interview 16: Organisation 9):

The thing we want to do more than anything is we realise that for long term sustainability changes are going to happen and people’s world view needs to change from not seeing children as objects in a way which they’ve become vulnerable, to seeing them as valuable and the using of protection and of us working with them. So the understanding of child rights it’s not just a theory. For me if we’re looking at a definition of what advocacy is it’s about changing people’s world view so that they become advocates themselves. That’s the ultimate goal. Children themselves can speak out and we can work with them on that (Interview 16: Organisation 9).

Campaigns addressing the ‘demand’ side of trafficking

In addressing advocacy network campaigns at at-risk children, states, and GMS citizens, TANs were attempting to halt the ‘supply’ side of trafficking. Anti-trafficking campaigns in the GMS were frequently more focused on addressing the ‘supply’ side of child trafficking rather than the ‘demand’ side. However some organisations and networks, especially some faith based NGO networks, had recently turned their attention toward the difficult area of tackling the buyers and consumers of child sex, or the ‘demand’ side of trafficking. There was consensus in the interviews that targeting the ‘demand’ side of child sex trafficking remained relatively unfamiliar and difficult terrain for anti-trafficking TANs in the GMS. Only one of the networks observed for this research had a current campaign addressing the demand side of trafficking and this campaign was being conducted as a pilot project. This campaign was run by a faith-based network that felt a strong moral imperative to address the buyers of sex as a means of stemming the abuse of trafficked women and children. The following statement from a representative of organisation 9 touches on the need for networks to develop “creative ways” to address the ‘demand’ side of trafficking:
One of the initiatives that we’re starting to work on is a project targeting male sex tourists. The idea is to go into the red light areas where the tourists are and involving a number of expatriate volunteers, and basically talking with the men and challenging why they’re there, what they’re doing. Again I think this, we believe as Christian organisations that people can change ... For some I think that when they’re challenged that their conscience is affected. They think about what it’s doing to their family, about what it’s doing to them, to the girl or boy and they’re willing to think about a different way ... Frankly we haven’t done very well in addressing demand. We need to think of creative ways to do it and this might be one way of tackling it (Interview 16: Organisation 9).

There was consensus in the interviews that the core reasons that TANs had largely ignored the ‘demand’ side of child trafficking were poor knowledge and poor baseline data of traffickers and perpetrators, government unwillingness to address the users of child sex tourism, a lack of resources to direct campaigns at both the supply and demand sides of the issue, and a lack of resources to stretch campaigns to all corners of the globe. TANs often left the responsibility for campaigning on the demand side of trafficking to organisations based in Western countries. Some peak and global NGO networks worked closely with their partners in developed countries on campaigning against ‘demand’ as it was thought that if people were educated in their home countries about child trafficking and child sex tourism they would be less inclined to visit GMS countries to abuse local children. In recent years NGO networks and inter-agency networks have displayed posters in Southeast Asian airports and around cities warning tourists of the penalties for abusing local children. The creation of extraterritorial law has been helpful in enabling networks and governments to pursue prosecutions of foreign paedophiles after they have returned to their home countries. Furthermore, there was some evidence in Thailand and Cambodia of previous and ongoing efforts to rein in the demand for child sex from foreign visitors. During the six months of data collection for this research I stayed in a number of hotels and in several of them signs were clearly displayed on hotel walls explaining to patrons that having sex with a child in the hotel was illegal and that child sex abusers would be punished. These ‘warnings’
were signed by the national governments (of Thailand or Cambodia) and by the campaigns’ partnering organisations.

Key Element 1 has demonstrated that for campaigns to be successful they must concurrently target the different concerned groups – child victims of trafficking, potential victims, governments, the wider GMS community, and the private sector. Campaigns should also address the ‘demand’ side of trafficking though this is an area that has traditionally been ignored as networks have focused their resources on the supply side of trafficking. Key Element 1 has also shown that some networks, due to budget constraints or specific mandates, only concentrated their resources on one particular target group. Other large NGO networks such as peak and global networks and inter-agency networks extended their campaign reach to all target groups and covered all the 4 Ps. Research participants strongly believed that only when all groups and areas were targeted concurrently, would real change be achieved. Research participants acknowledged that some networks were unable to focus on all groups and all 4 Ps but highlighted the fact that by virtue of being part of TANs, individual NGOs and UN agencies had more resources and expertise and therefore an improved opportunity to address the 4 Ps. Key Element 1 has shown that TANs are well placed to promote the cosmopolitan belief that “cruelty is the worst thing we can do” (Linklater, 2007, p. 20). Through targeted campaigning, aimed at children and at-risk youth, GMS communities, and traffickers and other perpetrators, TANs are universalising the scope of ethical concern and supporting the universal culture of human rights by protesting against violations wherever they may occur.

7.3.2 Key Element 2. Partners need to share common anti-trafficking values and goals.

As discussed in Key Element 1, research participant interviews revealed that TANs in the GMS possessed strong cosmopolitan ideals that inspired their desire to protect children. Anti-trafficking TANs wanted to work closely with governments to improve government capacity to fight trafficking, as well as to improve anti-trafficking policy and legislation. Networks also desired to raise awareness in GMS communities so that child protection and
the respect of child rights became norms and human trafficking became an understood and recognised problem.

With the large number of individual organisations working against child trafficking in the GMS and forming transnational anti-trafficking TANs there is value in considering the question – how do organisations decide who to partner with in networks? The importance of shared values to TANs was a key theme observed in the interview data. A commonly expressed sentiment in the interviews was that in order for organisations to join TANs against child trafficking there needed to be shared partner values and a strong collective desire to do anti-trafficking work. There was consensus in the interviews that in order to be effective, TANs must incorporate members with similar anti-trafficking values and goals. Research participants emphasised this point repeatedly and suggested that it was “perhaps the most important principle for successful advocacy networking” (Interview 1: Organisation 2). Organisation 8 explained that its network believed so strongly in the importance of shared values and commitment to anti-trafficking work that an affiliation process had been designed for new NGO partners wanting to join the network. During this affiliation process NGOs had to prove their values, their commitment to anti-human trafficking activities, their knowledge of human trafficking and their enthusiasm to conduct anti-trafficking activities. The network would assign NGOs a number of tasks to perform to ‘test’ whether NGOs had the values, capacity and resolve to do the work prior to organisations becoming affiliated with the network.

Inter-agency networks also had stringent affiliation processes to prove organisations’ values and commitment to anti-trafficking work. There was consensus in the interviews with representatives of inter-agency networks that only reputable peak and global NGOs were invited to join inter-agency networks. These Western NGOs would then ‘represent’ a small number of domestic NGOs that had also been vetted and whose reputations, experience and values had been checked. While other NGO networks did not have such stringent affiliation processes, there was unanimous agreement in the interviews that networks only
wanted to partner with organisations with similar values and a mutual commitment to anti-trafficking activities. This goes some way to explain why faith-based networks were comprised only of non-secular organisations even though, using the example of the faith-based network, Organisation 9, they were ‘open’ to all NGOs, secular or non-secular (Interview 16: Organisation 9).

Values and anti-trafficking commitment were two themes closely linked by research participants. Research participants emphasised the point that NGOs were not simply ‘good’ (Interview 17: Organisation 12) just because they were NGOs. NGOs must prove their mettle and their commitment and values in their campaigning activities:

We need to find partners with strong skills and commitment to do the activities. If you don’t have commitment how can you do it? So we talk openly amongst the partners about this. If we have commitment we have a strong voice. If there’s no commitment there’s no voice (Interview 17: Organisation 12).

Networks preferred to partner, therefore, with organisations with proven track records in anti-trafficking campaigning, as well as organisations with considerable human trafficking knowledge, and shared values. Without these shared values it was assumed that the partnership would never be a truly equal one. Networks also tended to prioritise having partners that they had already worked with or partners that provided a specific service that the network deemed beneficial, such as victim counselling. Smaller NGO network types such as informal and geographic networks tended to prefer to partner with NGOs they had worked with before and that they knew shared common values and a similar level of motivation. This was less the case with the larger NGO specific networks that, with dozens of partners, could not have previously partnered with all individual NGOs. Larger network types had systems in place, however, to ensure that common values and motivation were present in partners through, for example, affiliation or referral processes.
A common thread in the interviews was the idea that “united we’re going to make a difference” (Interview 13: Organisation 5). If organisations worked independently of each other, “those small delicious projects” (Interview 13: Organisation 5) would not achieve much. It was from this common commitment, vision, and shared value system that organisations found partners to work with and that the networks expanded:

We always ask ourselves – How do we take what works and doesn’t work and do that next step? We have partners and we can grab their hand two at a time and walk down the path together. It’s a case of ensuring it’s not us who is imposing our views on them but collectively coming to the decision that we should go a certain direction because this organisation offers something, and this other organisation offers something. To get to that point we need to work together. It’s a clumsy process sometimes. If you don’t have a vision and a sense of where you’re going, some organisations never get anywhere. There’s no pass forward. It’s maintenance of the status quo. (Interview 13: Organisation 5).

Key Element 2 has demonstrated that for networks to be effective partners must have a shared commitment to anti-trafficking activities and shared cosmopolitan values. Networks preferred partners with experience in the field and expertise in anti-trafficking advocacy. Some networks had stringent affiliation processes to check that these values and commitment were present. This was less frequently the case with smaller NGO networks such as geographic networks that had in many instances already worked collaboratively with network partners on previous campaigns.

7.3.3 Key Element 3. Anti-trafficking networks should include not just NGOs but also UN agencies and government departments.

In addition to the importance of having shared values and commitment, research participants discussed the value of networks having members from different sectors, that is,
not just NGOs but also UN agency partners and government partners. There was consensus in the interviews that inter-agency collaboration across all sectors was crucial to effective advocacy networking against child sex trafficking. For example, in order for agencies to work effectively on victim protection, networks needed to first have a good working relationship with the police as well as prosecutors so that they could collaboratively work in a way that best assisted the trafficking victims. Inter-agency networks, by virtue of their structure, were already comprised of representatives from NGOs, UN agencies and governments so were already collaborating across multiple sectors. The call for inter-agency network collaboration came more from the various NGO networks, particularly grassroots networks such as locational and faith-based networks that concentrated a large proportion of their work on protecting and rehabilitating victims. Research participants from all types of NGO networks expressed a desire to work with UN and government partners either regularly or on an ad hoc basis when the need arose.

Research participant interviews revealed that NGO networks that possessed UN and government partners did so for a number of reasons. Partnering with UN agencies enabled networks to gain access to the UN’s expertise and capacity on trafficking, training programs and access to governments. The UN often represented NGOs in national and regional fora, therefore by partnering with the UN, NGOs were ensuring that their ‘voice’ was heard at a higher political level. This was particularly important for Southern NGOs that frequently lacked a voice with their own governments and in international fora. Partnering with UN agencies also sometimes enabled NGOs to source new avenues of funding. NGOs collaborated with governments in order to train government staff on human trafficking issues and improve government capacity to fight trafficking. NGOs also networked with GMS governments to improve anti-trafficking policy and legislation and facilitate collaborative victim rescues and arrests of paedophiles. There was consensus in the interviews that it was also important for NGOs to network with UN agencies and governments in order to be able to better plan for victim services. A representative from Organisation 13 explained how that network worked closely with the police on rescues and paedophile arrests. When the network was made aware of a paedophile in the area the
staff would immediately call their police counterparts and, working with the witness (usually a child living on the street) they would organise the arrest of the paedophile. The representative from Organisation 13 explained that local children “did not trust the police” so would not report cases of abuse directly to police but, rather, would contact Organisation 13. Organisation 13 had a good reputation in Thailand for working with street children, caring for them and placing them in shelters or adopted families. The police, on the other hand, did not have a good reputation with local children and because of Thailand’s long history of promoting sex tourism and arresting prostitutes rather than the buyers of sex and human traffickers, child prostitutes and street children did not trust government agencies, particularly the police. Organisation 13, through its liaison with the police and prosecutors, was able to assist a large number of children through the court process and seek compensation for their abuse. This example illustrates the importance of Southern NGOs to TANs – the children would only trust grassroots NGOs that they knew and trusted. It is therefore in the interest of TANs to network closely with Southern NGOs and engage their expertise and local knowledge.

Research participants from UN agencies explained that from the UN perspective partnering with NGOs was essential in order to have access to child victims of trafficking. NGOs were the organisations predominantly responsible for managing protection shelters for trafficked children. NGOs, particularly grassroots NGOs, had a strong presence and considerable expertise working in the field with victims and at-risk groups. Without links to grassroots NGOs, the UN’s access to these aid beneficiaries and trafficking victims would be greatly hampered.

Research participants also explained that, in partnering with agencies from all sectors, anti-trafficking TANs had a stronger political voice. Locational networks usually aspired only to campaign in their immediate geographic area. However, all the other types of networks wanted a national, regional or even international voice to discuss the child trafficking problem. The networks were not engaging in Keck and Sikkink’s ‘boomerang’ model, as the
governments of the GMS were already aware of the trafficking problem and working to combat it. The TANs I observed for this research were utilising the resources available to them in the form of the diversity of their network members to ensure that their voices were heard.

Research participants from NGO networks explained that network ‘effectiveness’ was often measured in terms of improved relationships with stakeholders and network partners, including governments. The interviews reflected a strong correlation between campaign effectiveness and improved relationships with GMS governments:

"We are very effective. We have a strong voice at national and local levels. For effectiveness we look to our successes with the government. We have to go along with the governments, we have to talk with them rather than oppose them. We want them to have good collaboration with us. We share our objectives with the government framework (Interview 17: Organisation 12)."

Key Element 3 has discussed the value of engaging partners from all anti-trafficking sectors (NGOs, UN agencies and governments) in TANs against child trafficking. In partnering with members from diverse sectors, networks were able to leverage different skills sets and expertise to improve campaign reach and to have a stronger political voice. Inter-agency networks, by virtue of their structure, were better at this kind of cross-sector networking than other network types. However, NGO networks, particularly the larger peak and global NGO networks and locational networks also prioritised inter-agency collaboration. Through partnering with diverse groups across all sectors networks were better able to plan for and meet the needs of victims and were therefore more effective at achieving their network goals."
**7.3.4 Key Element 4.** Anti-trafficking networks should endeavour to balance the ‘voice’ of Northern and Southern partners.

Key Elements 3 and 4 are closely linked. As discussed in previous pages networks wanted to partner with organisations from all sectors and they also wanted and needed to partner with grassroots NGOs. North-South collaboration was a key aspect of network politics, however, while the desire to network across all sectors appeared a truly voluntary commitment, some networking relationships with grassroots NGOs were considered ‘forced’ partnerships by a number of research participants and a necessity rather than a truly voluntary decision. This was not the case for all networks. Some network types, for example, faith-based networks, prided themselves on their positive, non-hierarchical working relationships with Southern NGO network members. However, other networks, particularly peak and global networks, expressed a ‘need’ rather than a desire to network with Southern NGOs. The attitude expressed by some research participants of networking with Southern organisations as “just getting on with it” suggested that collaborative North-South relationships did not always progress smoothly. Nonetheless North-South NGO networking remained a necessity for the networks to effectively identify, access and assist child trafficking victims. Key element 4 touches on the important theme of power within networks and explains how a balance of power is essential if TANs are to be effective.

Research participants from all types of networks specifically talked of wanting to partner with NGOs and UN agencies with ‘capacity’, ‘knowledge’, ‘skills’ and other positive traits. Preference was given to partnering with a small handful of NGOs that had proven track records in organising campaigns, projects, rescues and rehabilitation activities, and that also had the funds and the donors to support them. Often domestic NGOs looked to this small group of key international NGOs or to a lead UN agency to develop the network and coordinate the secretariat or coordinating office at least in the initial phases of network development.
Representatives from inter-agency networks expressed a desire to see more Southern NGOs represented in this type of network and lamented the fact that the grassroots NGO voice was ‘represented’ by larger peak and global NGOs. While inter-agency networks had devised strategies to ensure that the voice of the Southern NGOs was heard, for example, through rotating chairs within national taskforces, there was still frustration that the structure of the network did not allow for Southern NGOs to have a stronger voice in the network. Southern partners expressed a desire to have a partnership in TANs based on genuine dialogue, where their own experience is recognised and where Northern NGO partners are more transparent about the decision-making processes within TANs.

At the time of interviews for this research, Organisation 14 was trialling different exercises to make the Southern NGO voice stronger in its inter-agency fora. Research participants highlighted the problem that when the voice of Southern NGOs is restricted, relationships within the networks became strained. This inevitably led to instances of distrust, conflict and therefore network ineffectiveness.

In the GMS relationships with Southern partners were not given precedence in all types of networks. Some types of networks, particularly the larger NGO international networks, maintained a customer-client attitude to networking with Southern NGOs. Southern NGOs enabled Northern NGOs to access child victims of trafficking while Northern NGOs provided Southern partners with important resources and sometimes funding. A core problem in equalising the power balance between the Northern and Southern network members lay in the unequal resources between the two groups. Northern NGOs were significantly better funded and resourced than their Southern counterparts. Instances of negative networking between Northern and Southern network members due to resource related tensions sometimes led grassroots NGOs to leave networks (Interview 13: Organisation 5). Research findings suggest that the power dynamics in TAN relationships may reinforce organisational hierarchies and patterns of exclusion. To counter this some networks, particularly inter-agency networks, had systems in place to prevent instances of North-South conflict. Instead
of merely funding Southern NGOs and leaving them to their own devices, these networks would endeavour to “hold the hand” of Southern NGOs and train them “collaboratively” to “increase their capacity” (Interview 9: Organisation 3). Furthermore, TANs at times enforced North-South power imbalances by selectively choosing which Southern NGOs to partner with. Power imbalances were less of an issue within the smaller network types such as locational networks, due to the closeness of partners and the futility of creating power struggles within these types of networks. However power imbalances were apparent in the larger network types such as peak and international networks that were structured, at times hierarchical, and also at times dominated by Northern NGOs and UN agencies. These Northern NGOs operating in TANs were able to set standards of behaviour and enforce these standards, as well as ‘grow’ the network by selectively recruiting new members.

Key Element 4 has shown that there were serious obstacles to balancing the North-South voice in networks in the GMS. This was less of a problem for some specific types of networks including locational and faith-based networks due to their small geographic focus and long history of working with NGOs from both the North and South. Inter-agency networks endeavoured to find new ways to ensure that the voice of Southern organisations was adequately represented and that the relationships within the network were balanced and equal. However other NGO networks, especially the larger peak and international networks, struggled to create a North-South balance. For these network types partnering with Southern NGOs was sometimes considered a ‘forced’ partnership. Not all research participants, however, considered this kind of ‘forced’ partnership in a negative light and explained that it was simply how “things work” in the region (Interview 1: Organisation 2). This is in line with Smith’s argument that gaps between Northern and Southern members persist, but that some good North-South relationships can arise from this kind of forced partnership for a common good (2002, p. 505). Key Element 4 has touched on some of the obstacles to promoting cosmopolitan values – even within networks, whose aim is to promote these values, there are internal issues surrounding voice and equality. Before networks can hope to successfully promote cosmopolitanism they must first balance their own internal relationships within networks.
7.3.5 Key Element 5. Organisations should form networks with other organisations that have complementary skills, and not organisations doing exactly the same anti-trafficking work.

Research participant interviews revealed that network strength is derived from the diversity of its members and no one individual organisation can perform all anti-trafficking tasks on its own. Moreover, while organisations may want to network, competition occurs between partner organisations and this can lead to instances of conflict amongst network members that compete over donor funds, branding and reputation.

The interviews with anti-trafficking experts brought to light the importance of organisational diversity in networks as a means of reducing instances of conflict between partner organisations. Research participants couldn’t “emphasise enough” that anti-trafficking TANs “should partner with organisations with complementary skills, not with organisations doing exactly the same kind of work” (Interview 1: Organisation 2). Two decades of experience in the anti-trafficking advocacy field had taught networks that it was better to diversify members to increase capacity and capability rather than have partners with similar skills sets and performing similar tasks, which only led to activity repetition and conflict between partners (Interview 1: Organisation 2). Diversity of network partners meant, for example, that some NGOs could concentrate on the protection of trafficking victims while others focused on child trafficking prevention activities. Through operating in networks, organisations were thus able to better meet the legal, health, shelter and service needs of victims as well as focus on awareness raising. As previously discussed, although trafficking victims were the focus of networks’ advocacy campaigning, network partners spent considerable time performing other activities such as training police, working to improve human trafficking legislation, lobbying governments, organising and conducting rescues in conjunction with police, and conducting awareness raising campaigns. When faced with a large number of victims, networks needed to have the capacity and resources to deal with all aspects of victim protection and rehabilitation. Performing all tasks simultaneously was
bought the scope of any individual organisation’s expertise and capacity. When organisations partnered with other organisations with different areas of expertise they were able to better meet the needs of the victims and target their campaigns more broadly. This meant that the networks’ impact was stronger and that victims’ needs were better met.

TANs provided the formal and informal channels for organisations to initially meet, compare strengths, and consider service gaps:

A lot of effective networking can happen just connecting. They compare what they’re doing and they say “ok what we’re doing here is something and we’re not really sure what’s going on and we haven’t been able to do very well in the past”. Or “this is going well” and that can spark an interest and spark a connection. You can have a huge impact on the way something happens just by connecting people who didn’t know each other before. (Interview 16: Organisation 9).

Some anti-trafficking TANs in the GMS had processes in place to ensure that organisations were complementary to other members in the network and not performing exactly the same activities or services. As this comment suggests, network representatives placed considerable emphasis on the value of organisations partnering with organisations that complemented their anti-trafficking work:

There’s really no point hooking up with someone who is doing exactly the same thing. I can’t overstate that. It would be far better for you to find someone who is doing something slightly different and which complements what you’re doing (Interview 1: Organisation 2).

Research participants suggested that a key reason organisations should seek partners with skills different to their own was to avoid the replication of victim services. Research
participants from NGO networks explained that by networking with organisations with complementary skills they were also able to prevent disruption to network function when an NGO left the network. Diversity of network partners provided a safety net for when partners left the network and a gap in expertise or victim services was created by partner attrition. In those networks that possessed diversity in partner membership, other organisations could quickly step in to fill knowledge and service gaps. There was consensus in the research interviews that the strongest network type at ensuring complementary collaboration was the inter-agency network. By virtue of their inter-agency diversity these networks ensured that government, UN and NGO partners had complementary expertise and areas of interest, and were not replicating the same tasks. Network types that struggled with ensuring that members had complementary skills sets were peak and global networks. Organisation 2 pointed out that a small number of international NGOs in the region continued to work together on campaigns but that instances of conflict often occurred because the international NGOs, with their very similar skills and capacity, were in competition over network campaign tasks as well as donor funding, branding and prestige.

There was consensus in the interviews that networks were far more effective at combating child sex trafficking in the GMS than organisations acting independently of each other. While the profit motive was never entirely absent from anti-trafficking advocacy network agendas in the GMS, a significant number of effective networks had evolved in which members with diverse skills from all sectors had come together to form networks against child sex trafficking.

Key Element 5 has demonstrated that a key principle to effective advocacy networking against trafficking in the GMS is that network members must partner with organisations with complementary skills, rather than partnering with organisations with similar expertise, performing similar anti-trafficking activities. This is important for ensuring that networks can assist large numbers of beneficiaries with diverse needs. By networking with organisations with complementary skills, networks could also ensure that there was less
chance of duplication of programs and services, that important campaign messages were streamlined, that a gap was not left when an organisation decided to leave the network, and that instances of conflict between network members, who were naturally in competition over funding, branding and prestige, were avoided. Diversity of organisations in networks also meant that campaign reach and impact with GMS citizens and governments was stronger.

7.3.6 Key Element 6. Networks should have strong structures and a secretariat

When this research began, it was proposed that a partnership with too many members would lead to conflict and a lack of network coordination and effectiveness. This could also lead to instances of poor network communication, duplication of projects, and internal conflict. However, research participant interviews revealed that the number of members participating in the network was not necessarily important, as long as the network possessed a strong coordinating structure, a lead coordinating entity, such as a secretariat, and frequent, transparent communication and information sharing across the network. Network size and hierarchy were not important for effective networking but a strong network structure was. A strong structure was described as being a strong, central, transparent structure that is able to coordinate, facilitate, and negotiate with other organisations, all of whom, nonetheless, maintain their own authority as distinct organisations. This is different from a ‘hierarchical’ structure that was described by key respondents as a vertical command structure and bureaucratic. A number of large organisations such as governments and UN bodies possessed hierarchical structures.

TANs against child trafficking in the GMS were, at the time of data collection, still a recently new phenomenon and these networks continue to evolve in size and structure. The inter-agency network, UNIAP, provides a good example of the importance of sound structure to network effectiveness. UNIAP was established in 2000 with a mandate to strengthen the coordination of organisations in the fight against trafficking in the region and to implement a wide range of protection, rehabilitation and reintegration programs. In 2004, UNIAP
brought together the governments of Thailand, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, China and Vietnam, thirteen UN agencies and many local and international NGOs to establish the Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative Against Trafficking (COMMIT). COMMIT was the first regional instrument to make a serious effort to institutionalise a multi-sectoral approach to make certain that the responsibilities and commitments made in the memoranda of understanding between GMS governments were implemented in accordance with international norms and standards. The articles within the Subregional Plan of Action specifically referred to the need for governments to work together with international organisations and NGOs to close all avenues of exploitation (Jayagupta, 2009, p. 236). In Thailand, a number of memoranda of understanding have been developed to strengthen inter-agency coordination. The Memorandum of Understanding on the Operations and Non-Government Organisations Engaged in Addressing Trafficking in Children and Women focused on cooperation between government agencies and NGOs, while the Memorandum of Understanding on the Operational Guidelines of Non-Government Organisations Concerned with Cases of Trafficking in Women and Children addressed cooperation and action within the NGO community (Jayagupta, 2009, p. 233). The memoranda of understanding provided for operational taskforces on rescues and suppression of trafficking crimes, and comprised representatives from government agencies and NGOs forming a multi-disciplinary team (Jayagupta, 2009, p. 233). UNIAP has proved to be a highly effective network for the coordination of a significant number of the diverse anti-trafficking organisations and networks in the region. UNIAP not only hosts COMMIT but also acts as a coordinating office for the GMS governments, many Northern and Southern NGOs, and UN agencies, providing them with platforms for discussion, coordinating workshops and seminars, and acting as a central resource and information hub. Network structure was crucial to UNIAP and it drew heavily on its structure to determine inter-agency cooperation, partner tasks and responsibilities, the development of policy and legislation, and trainings. Without its sound structure, secretariat, and its mandate to coordinate anti-trafficking stakeholders, UNIAP would have not been able to make the significant contributions it has already made to the GMS region including government cooperation, the development of memoranda of understanding between governments, government capacity building, and the streamlining of human trafficking campaign messages in the region.
Network structure

Research participant interviews revealed that in order for all types of networks to be effective, they must have sound structures. Interviews with anti-trafficking experts reflected a preference for structured, organised networks with a secretariat or a central coordinating office that was responsible for communicating structure and activities and relaying information between network partners. While such a strong structure may invoke impressions of cumbersome, conservative, bureaucratic structures, this was not often the case in anti-trafficking TANs in the GMS. In this region, the secretariat or coordinating office acted as the backbone of the advocacy network and provided the coordination and communication centre that the network required in order to share information with its diverse partners and coordinate and streamline campaign activities.

Some anti-trafficking advocacy network types were more structured than others. Inter-agency networks were the most structured of the types of networks studied for this research. Inter-agency networks possessed secretariats that acted as the central coordinating office and that channelled information and communication between network partners and other stakeholders. The role of the secretariat was also to define and disseminate the partners’ individual roles, rights and responsibilities within the network. Peak and international NGO networks also had strong structures. Peak and international NGO network types, similarly to inter-agency networks, also had a coordinating office or secretariat that defined the network partners’ roles and responsibilities. The secretariat was generally situated in and managed by the network’s head office. Some networks such as Organisation 8 had secretariats and strong and organised network structures but prided themselves on being non-hierarchical. However, with a coordinating office situated within the network’s head office that determined information and communication flow and was looked to for network coordination and leadership, it was possible that the network was more hierarchical than its representatives chose to admit. Faith-based, locational, youth focused and informal networks were generally less structured and far less structured than the larger network types. Faith-based networks, by virtue of their religious mandate and values, endeavoured to retain non-hierarchical structures and ensure that all members were
represented equally with the same ‘voice’ within the network. In some of the smaller NGO networks there was no formal hierarchy to define roles, responsibilities and relationships. In these small NGO specific types of networks no one organisation could control or restrict another.

There was consensus in the interviews that in order to ensure network effectiveness a transparent network structure was required as well as a full understanding amongst the partners of the role and responsibility of each organisation in the network. Network representatives from inter-agency network types and larger NGO networks such as peak and international NGO networks believed that it was beneficial for these types of networks to have terms of reference, individual ownership of a task, a strong secretariat, rotating chairs, joint leadership plans, and the flexibility to change the direction of the group. This structure seemed to be most popular amongst networks that needed it, for example, inter-agency networks that incorporated partners from government and UN agencies and that focused on developing laws and policy on prosecution and that had specific targets for achieving certain policy goals. Some participants in the more formal and structured networks such as inter-agency networks emphasised the importance of designing specific network rules, for example, through memoranda of understanding or agreements about how the organisations were to interact and treat each other as well as their roles and responsibilities in the network. In the inter-agency networks observed for this study such memoranda and agreements already existed and guided partner activity and responsibilities. On the other hand there were the smaller (informal, faith-based, locational or campaign) types of NGO networks that had more fluid, informal structures. A number of representatives from these types of networks expressed a network ‘pride’ in not having too solid a structure. In these types of networks partners met on a regular but infrequent basis and conducted the bulk of their communication by email and telephone. These more informal types of networks avoided actively encouraging other organisations to join the networks. For these types of networks the development of the network and the expansion of the networks could not be rushed and had to evolve “organically” (Interview 9: Organisation 3) over time. Network members had to want to join the network. Furthermore, in these types of networks,
partners must “raise their hand” (Interview 5: Organisation 8) to request a specific task rather than being told what activities they must perform as a network member. To these types of NGO networks the longevity and sustainability of the network was achieved through, for example, these subtle tactics:

We don’t give tasks to anyone because you can’t just ask people to do things. But in the fora when we’re discussing an issue or developing something we might say ok if we’ve got ten people in this room and ten different organisations represented ... we say to them “would you mind working on this” or “how can we develop this so that we can share some of the time that’s going to need to be involved in making this happen”. Organisations will be willing or not willing to do that. In the end the organisations can decide how much they want to be a part of [Organisation 9]. Obviously the more they invest in being part of something the better. I think with the network a lot of what we’ve done, our intention, has been to benefit all the members so they can improve what they themselves are doing (Interview 16: Organisation 9).

Despite good intentions and, in many cases, sound network structures to ensure efficient communication and reduce opportunities for conflict, tension nonetheless occurred in some of the networks observed for this research. In some NGO networks there persisted, amongst a small handful of partners, a very simple but strongly rooted ideology of ‘what the network can do for me’. There was consensus in the research interviews that partner organisations were cognisant that they must ‘put in’ a certain amount of time and effort in order to ‘get out’ of the network what they needed in terms of branding, resources, capacity, stakeholder networking opportunities, and financial support. What the organisations must ‘put in’ to ‘get out’ of the network differed depending on the particular NGO and NGO network in question. Domestic NGOs in NGO specific networks, with their local knowledge of child trafficking and associated problems, ‘put in’ this local knowledge, as well as their case work skills, their language and translation skills, their knowledge of
ethnic minorities and stateless groups and their knowledge of local cultural practices. Northern NGOs utilised these resources and what they in turn ‘put in’ was money, resources, manpower in the form of staff, access to donors, assistance with writing grants and other proposals, written publications and research, coordination and management, and advice and assistance for the local NGOs on organisational growth and sustainability. Northern NGOs also, very importantly for domestic NGOs, gave the domestic groups the vital voice that they needed to take their knowledge and concerns to policy level through meaningful dialogue with governments in the region. This was a major benefit to domestic NGOs who were often not “liked” or “trusted” (interview 9: Organisation 3) by national governments. Although there were rarely written rules in NGO specific networks on what an individual organisation had to ‘put in’ to ‘get out’ of the network there seemed to be a collective understanding amongst partners that becoming a network partner meant they could not just ‘take’ constantly from the network. In the vast majority of cases network partners strived to offer as much as they could to the network, and shared whatever information and resources that they had available for the benefit of the network. This discussion does reflect the elitist conceptions of Western aid workers on the North-South imbalance in TANs. The idea of Southern NGOs ‘taking’ from TANs and not ‘putting in’ reflects a Western and elitist conception of the South’s position within the network and a patriarchal attitude towards North-South collaboration.

Therefore, while structure was extremely important to some types of networks such as inter-agency and peak and international NGO networks, it was less important to smaller NGO specific networks that prided themselves on being able to network more fluidly and informally. Research participant interviews revealed that the structure of the network determined the important flows of communication between network partners. This constant flow of communication and information kept network partners fully cognisant of their roles and responsibilities within the network, network activities and campaigns, and kept them aware of what they must be ‘putting in’ to ‘get out’ in order for the network to continue to function effectively. Sound network structure meant that network partners
could have a ‘voice’ in the network by communicating to other partners directly or through the network’s secretariat or other coordinating office.

Network Size

Research participant interviews revealed that the size of networks was not necessarily related to the effectiveness of TANs against child sex trafficking in the GMS. Small advocacy network types such as locational and strategic networks were able to concentrate their efforts on one or two specific areas of expertise, for example, the protection of children in shelters. Larger network types such as peak and global NGO networks as well as inter-agency networks, with their broad base of partners, were able to meet the diverse health, shelter and protection needs of victims as well as conduct awareness raising campaigns. There was consensus in the research interviews that obstacles to effective networking, associated to network size, only occurred in instances of partner attrition. As discussed in earlier pages, in these instances a gap in expertise and capacity was sometimes left in some of the smaller network types by the departing partner organisation. Subsequently problems could arise when a victim had needs that the network could no longer support. In such cases small NGO networks needed to refer victims to another organisation or network for victim support and services. Larger network types such as peak and international NGO networks did not experience this problem as the diversity of their members meant that all the needs of victims could be met by the network and that the gap left by a departing partner could swiftly be filled by an existing member. With increased partner numbers, these larger NGO networks were better able to leverage their collective resources to meet victim needs. The secretariat or coordinating office had a crucial role to play in these instances by providing rapid information to network partners and ensuring that there was no disruption to campaign implementation or victim services because of a partner leaving the network.

The obstacle most commonly discussed by research participants with regards to the size of larger NGO networks was that, due to the large number of NGO partners, NGOs were
sometimes “not aware of what all the partners were doing” (Interview 5: Organisation 8). There was also the risk that partners would not feel that their skills and capacity were properly used in the network. Larger network types overcame this obstacle by bringing network members together as frequently as possible in, for example, biannual fora, workshops and meetings and through delegating specific tasks to partners that they were then requested to report on in meetings and workshops. This provided a space for NGOs to share their knowledge and expertise with other partners. Larger NGO networks such as peak and global networks were also able to delegate tasks to avoid the coordinating office staff experiencing burnout. This meant better time management and less secretariat staff changes as the network relied on the network structure to keep partner organisations working effectively together.

There was consensus in the interviews that creating a strong counter trafficking movement in Cambodia may have been easier than in Thailand because of the geographic proximity of advocacy organisations in Cambodia. Network members in Cambodia could travel to meetings and workshops in a day. In addition the social networking of anti-trafficking organisation staff was more frequent in Cambodia as staff deliberately or inadvertently ran into each other in bars or at anti-trafficking seminars and other events in the country. From my six week visit in Phnom Penh it was discernable that the aid sector was a close knit circle with (though mainly Western) aid staff frequently fraternising outside work time. Cambodia may prove to be a useful future case study for reflecting on the benefits of pursuing both formal and informal networking opportunities as the country has hosted both kinds for several decades now. With the creation of the Asian Taskforce on Human Trafficking the country has witnessed the development of a strong, organised anti-trafficking network involving governments, UN agencies and international and domestic NGOs with voices at all levels represented through rotating chairpersons. In Cambodia four major TANs, representing the large number of anti-human trafficking and child protection NGOs and UN agencies in the country, have developed since the 1990s. While obstacles to network success were still visible in Cambodia at the time of data collection, the country had
progressed rapidly in terms of getting anti trafficking advocacy organisations to work together for the common good of children in the region.

Key Element 6 has shown that network structure has a considerable role to play in networks’ sustainability and effectiveness. A sound network structure with clearly designated partner roles and responsibilities meant that networks partners were fully cognisant of their roles and responsibilities in the network and that the coordinating office could delegate tasks to individual organisations. A central coordinating office meant that partner organisations could quickly and efficiently collect and share information and resources. While a small number of research participants argued that structure was not important to network effectiveness, interview data suggested that the most enduring networks were those with strong structures and a secretariat and those that were able to bring network partners together regularly. There was consensus in the interviews that the size of the network did not have an impact on network effectiveness. However, it was apparent that larger networks, due to the diversity in expertise of partners, were able to provide more comprehensive services for victims and quickly fill any gap left by a partner leaving the network.

7.3.7 Key Element 7. Networks should seek to continuously improve themselves through monitoring and evaluation of their activities

There was consensus in the interviews that monitoring and evaluation activities were important to networks’ sustainability and effectiveness. Research participants emphasised that networks must know whether their campaigning was having a positive effect on target populations in order to effectively plan future campaigns and projects. However, monitoring and evaluation activities were largely absent in the networks studied for this research, with the exception of Organisation 16, which spent considerable resources on monitoring and evaluation activities to assess its campaigns’ impact and success.
Research participants highlighted the fact that it was extremely difficult for networks to apply monitoring and evaluation measures to gauge the effectiveness of advocacy network campaigns and their perceived or actual impact on their targets. Some networks had tried to develop monitoring and evaluation activities to measure the success of their campaigns and programs but often with little success. Research participants explained that common questions raised in discussions about monitoring and evaluation of anti-trafficking campaigns included - How can it be possible to measure how many children are ‘prevented’ or ‘rescued’ from trafficking when statistics are poorly kept, and children are often not properly identified as victims of trafficking? How is it possible to count how many traffickers or paedophiles have been warned about the penalties for abusing children and how many have decided to stay at home rather than travelling abroad to abuse a child? It was similarly challenging to quantify how many people in the region had been touched by awareness raising campaigns. Though a certain number of flyers and posters may have been developed and distributed, it was impossible for anti-trafficking groups to know exactly how many young people read them and decided to change their migration or work plans as a result.

Anti-trafficking TANs were not altogether concerned about the lack of hard proof of their successes, realising the challenges posed by proving such success, and instead focused on just “getting on with the job at hand” (Interview 22: Organisation 16). The request for ‘numbers’ often come from donors. In recent years donors, especially more experienced government donors such as USAID, may have requested precise statistics on networks’ progress but generally they have understood that hard evidence of program data and effectiveness was difficult to come by (Interview 22: Organisation 16). Possibly the only real statistics available regarding campaign impact or effectiveness lay in the numbers of arrests of paedophiles, the number of prosecutions of paedophiles and traffickers and other criminal related statistics. In addition networks tended to count how many children had been ‘rescued’ from brothels in raids, though statistics regarding what happened to these children after their rescues, such as cases of re-trafficking, and admittance to shelters, were poorly kept and hard data was difficult for networks to produce.
Organisation 16, heavily funded by USAID, was the only network studied for this research that had a specific budget to spend on monitoring and evaluation activities. This put the organisation in a unique position to be able to apply the findings from evaluation activities and incorporate them into future programs and projects:

You know a lot of times the monitoring and evaluation aspect of a project is sort of an afterthought, only a small percentage of the budget. But it’s been really focused on at [Organisation 16] and because of that the value directly informs each subsequent campaign (Interview 22: Organisation 16).

At the time of data collection the target audience of this advocacy organisation was at-risk youth and migrating young people in the GMS. It thus followed that the monitoring and evaluation activities conducted by Organisation 16 focused on attitude shifts in the campaign target audience. The following comment explains how campaign evaluation was conducted by Organisation 16:

We have a population of people and we try to have a representation of people from different areas and also male and female, varied age range. And we ask a series of questions relating to knowledge about trafficking and attitudes about trafficking and behaviours, so for example the questions range from “have you heard the term human trafficking before?” or “how do you feel about ....”. Instead of open ended questions it’s for example a range of responses from “it’s a horrible thing” to “it’s very unlucky”... We feel it’s an effective campaign if knowledge has increased. We also feel that the campaign has been effective if attitudes have shifted. With attitudes we’re trying to see an increase in empathetic feelings. And then behaviour is the hardest (Interview 22: Organisation 16).
As the comment suggests, Organisation 16 considered a campaign had been effective if there had been a shift in attitude amongst the target audience of young GMS citizens. This shift in attitude represented an improved understanding of child trafficking, an awareness of the risks of migration for employment, and the development of empathy for trafficking victims.

There was consensus in the interviews that there were dangers associated with networks not performing monitoring and evaluation activities. Research participants explained that not all anti-trafficking advocacy was good advocacy and not all network programs were beneficial for victims. Anti-trafficking organisations had historically focused on spending donor funds on victim-centred projects without adequate analysis of program outcomes or their effectiveness. Research participants suggested that organisations could become obsessed with helping beneficiaries without paying sufficient attention to whether the programs were actually of benefit to trafficking victims. An example of this was the protection projects developed by advocacy organisations in the region that included vocational training for victims of trafficking residing temporarily in protection shelters. While the intentions of NGOs working with trafficking victims in shelters were no doubt altruistic, organisations limited girls’ vocational training to a mere handful of skills including sewing and hairdressing without adequate reflection on whether these skills would lead to employment once the girls left the shelters. In many cases, due to prolonged unemployment following repatriation from the shelters, female victims of trafficking ended up re-trafficked as their newly learned skills did not lead to meaningful employment and they were again forced to migrate in search of alternate employment:

If I see one more program that takes girls and teaches them how to sew or be hairdressers! If there was a girl taught to be a hairdresser for every girl who was taught to sew they might actually earn a living! This doesn’t lead to jobs (Interview 9: Organisation 3).
An additional challenge lay in applying monitoring and evaluation activities to measuring the internal cooperation of networks, for example, how well partners worked together within networks. While there was no monitoring and evaluation activity to measure this kind of networking success, research participants described the importance of this kind of networking as a means of improving the coordination of the anti-trafficking movement in the region:

It’s difficult... in a meeting 2 people connect, they share notes, they end up friends and support each other. That’s not something you can prove when you are writing your annual reports. It’s much easier to say “we’ve done this training, now 30 organisations have child protection policies”. That’s easier for us to demonstrate. It’s hard to prove effectiveness (Interview 16: Organisation 9).

Key Element 7 has shown that monitoring and evaluation activities are important in order for networks to understand the impact of their work and plan future campaigns and victim service provision accordingly. However, very few of the networks observed for this research were actively performing regular or even ad hoc monitoring and evaluation activities. Research participants pointed out that many areas of their work, for example, awareness raising, could not be easily evaluated nor could their impact be measured. Most TANs did not have specific budgets to perform monitoring and evaluation activities. The example of Organisation 16 has, however, proved that monitoring and evaluation activities can be applied to campaign activities and are a useful tool in understanding the network’s effectiveness in terms of reaching and influencing its youth campaign targets. Until networks are able to develop regular monitoring and evaluation practices it will remain difficult for networks to prove that their campaigns are making a difference.

7.4 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the effectiveness of TANs. Research participant interviews showed that for networks to be sustainable it was important that they continuously
attempted to increase resources, capacity and expertise, and network with diverse partners from all sectors and from both the North and the South. In order for the networks to be effective they must also have shared cosmopolitan ideals and values, commitment and goals and ensure that the balance of power and voice within networks was kept equal. The most sustainable networks were the networks that possessed sound structures, diversity in partner members, incorporated NGOs from the North and the South as well as partners from government and UN agencies, and prioritised transparency and information sharing. Successful networks usually had a secretariat or another coordinating office that controlled the flow of information amongst network members and kept members updated on network activities and individual organisations’ roles and responsibilities within the networks. Network size was not considered particularly important to network success but a sound network structure, common values and motivation were. Network partners learned many lessons through their participation in networks that could be shared with other organisations in the GMS. These lessons will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. In light of the difficulties associated with quantifying network success and effectiveness, the chapter has proposed seven Key Elements, as identified by the research participants, for network effectiveness.
Chapter 8.

Conclusion: The context, role and impact of TANs against child sex trafficking in the GMS

8.1 Introduction

This research has provided new insights into transnational actors and has begun to cumulate knowledge regarding the nature and the dynamics of TANS, TANs’ politics, and their micro-processes. Through an examination of the perspectives, insights and experiences of NGO and UN agency staff in TANs against child sex trafficking in the GMS, this research has built new knowledge about TANs, networks’ promotion of cosmopolitan values, networks’ internal processes, areas of positive and negative collaboration, and networks’ effectiveness in combating child sex trafficking in Thailand and Cambodia. This research has demonstrated that the complexities and scope of child sex trafficking demand a broad spectrum of organisations to collaborate in order to combat such an insidious social problem. The research has revealed that anti-trafficking advocacy is significantly more effective when performed by TANs as opposed to individual organisations operating independently of each other. It has shown that the need for cosmopolitan thinking and acting has never been greater and that an increasing number of individuals in TANs believe that they must take a moral stand on vital global issues such as child sex trafficking.

This chapter discusses the key contributions of this research to the literature on TANs. The chapter summarises the key findings from the research, including the benefits of collaboration in TANs and critical issues in TAN politics and in improving partnerships. It then identifies the avenues for future research on TANs and child trafficking that this research encourages. The chapter concludes with a discussion of TANs’ important role as a form of cosmopolitan ‘globalisation from below’ in responding to global social problems.
8.2 Solidarity across borders: Summary of benefits of collaboration

Supporting prior scholarship, this study finds that TANs are a significant force in combating social problems (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Held, 2002; Morvaridi, 2005; Hertel, 2006). Previous research on TANs has emphasised the campaign strategies, campaign reach and impact of TANs (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Hertel, 2006). Research has tended to focus on theories to validate the effectiveness of networks without paying adequate attention to the intricate processes of negotiation, collaboration and cooperation that occur between network players. Applying a cosmopolitan lens to the research data, this research has departed from previous scholarship by focusing on the investigation of the cosmopolitan response of TANs to child trafficking. It has added to current scholarship by investigating network types, network processes, and network dynamics. It has investigated network ‘effectiveness’ according to anti-trafficking experts’ conceptualisations of the term and through an examination of the intricacies and complexities of TANs.

The research has demonstrated consensus among anti-trafficking advocacy network experts in the GMS that TANs were extremely beneficial to all network members. Networks provided members with opportunities to share knowledge and expertise about child trafficking and exchange contacts and resources. Networking against child trafficking enabled organisations with different mandates and expertise to share skills and capacity for a broader and improved response to child trafficking including prevention, protection, and prosecution activities and rehabilitation of victims. In addition, by networking against this problem, stakeholder organisations were able to have a stronger voice in lobbying for new child trafficking policy and legislation, and improved opportunities for working collaboratively on improving child protection systems in the GMS. Most importantly, networking contributed to a redistribution of knowledge, power, influence and material resources from the rich North to the core Southern actors working on the ground in local NGOs in the GMS.
The research has demonstrated that advocacy networking against child trafficking has helped to ensure a number of benefits for victims. Foremost amongst these has been the benefit that victims are able to access a wide range of services. Networks have facilitated the streamlining of victim services and once victims were identified, networks were effective in referring victims to partner agencies for a range of protection and rehabilitation services. In addition, TANs have helped vulnerable children acquire knowledge and tool sets to mitigate their risks of exploitation. Networks have also facilitated effective collaboration among law enforcement agencies across jurisdictions so that bureaucratic obstacles have been minimised and perpetrators of child trafficking do not escape justice. Improved prevention-oriented coordination has facilitated the involvement of all sectors of society so that anti-trafficking networks can move toward the ultimate goal of preventing the exploitation of children. In providing such victim services, and through the direct sharing of global political economy knowledge, networks have brought an equal level of counter-activity to a social problem that is clearly enhanced, even promoted, by the economic connectedness of the globalisation of criminal networks that sell children’s sexual labour as a commodity.

This research has also demonstrated that cross-cultural learning was a key benefit for partners in anti-trafficking TANs in Cambodia and Thailand. Being able to access and work with domestic NGOs, international NGOs or UN agencies was seen as an enormous benefit to network members whose knowledge of the sector may be limited to their geographic corner of the globe or specific area of expertise. Working with other groups meant that organisations could access information and knowledge about grassroots groups and issues such as statelessness and ethnic minorities from domestic NGOs, as well as access resources, funding and the child protection expertise of UN agencies. Another major benefit of collaboration was that anti-trafficking campaigns could reach all corners of the globe rather than just a small geographic corner. Campaigns have been adapted and developed to target citizens not just in the GMS but also in a large number of developed countries to teach such developed nation citizens about slavery, trafficking and ethical consumerism and make the West aware of the strict penalties imposed on those who travel
to poorer countries to sexually abuse children. This expansive outreach, beyond the borders of the GMS, and the incorporation of cultural difference and engagement, reflects the essentially cosmopolitan nature of TANs and provides an important model for addressing global social problems.

### 8.3 Summary of TAN political issues

This research has revealed a number of critical issues in TAN politics and of different factors that enhance or constrain the ability of TANs to be effective at achieving network goals and combating child sex trafficking. These include the extent of NGO and UN links with governmental power, the level of consensus and solidarity within the networks, consensus on values and goals, network structure, and the external environments in which TANs conduct their anti-trafficking campaigns. This research has demonstrated that while there were many perceived benefits to advocacy networking there were also numerous challenges to positive collaboration amongst network partners. Cooperation is naturally difficult when organisations with different skills and mandates and often with different understandings of child ‘trafficking’ come together in networks. Organisations not sharing information openly and transparently was cited as a key problem for effective networking against child sex trafficking. A lack of trust and poor communication were also cited as key reasons for making advocacy networking against child trafficking a difficult process at times. Unresponsive or corrupt law enforcement personnel were an ongoing problem for networks that must work with governments in order to develop legislation and implement a number of victim services. Moreover, an imbalance in North-South resources and voice was a major reason for contention within networks. This research has demonstrated that successful networking meant breaking down such barriers. The following section of the chapter summarises some of the key areas, highlighted by research participants, for improving network partnerships and ensuring network sustainability and effectiveness.
8.3.1 Diversity of members within networks

This research has demonstrated that collaboration between agencies should not always be assumed to be effective partnerships. Partnership linkages did not function by themselves and took time to develop. Whether structural or operational if linkages were to be effective the mechanisms underpinning them had to be carefully managed and the relationships within the networks needed to be cultivated over time. This research has demonstrated the importance of maintaining diversity in network partners within anti-trafficking TANs. States, UN agencies and NGOs, by nature of their divergent mandates, are very different groups with different, but at times overlapping, interests and goals. International NGOs and grassroots organisations all sought resources to serve their aid recipients while preserving the autonomy to chart their own destinies. It might be concluded that the organisations observed in this research (NGOs, UN agencies and governments) need networks, not only because there is significant discourse of collaboration within the development industry, but also because the level of uncertainty in the funding environment is such that, particularly in the case of Northern NGOs, organisations have the ability to assert their legitimate role in the development process.

This research has demonstrated that networks sought diversity in partners for a number of reasons. Partnering with UN agencies enabled the networks to gain access to information, the UN’s expertise and capacity on human trafficking, training programs and access to GMS governments. UN agencies often ‘represented’ NGOs in diverse national and regional fora. Therefore in partnering with the UN, NGOs were ensuring that their ‘voice’ was heard at a higher political level. Partnering with UN agencies also enabled NGOs to source new avenues of funding to ensure the continuation of their work. Networks collaborated with governments in order to train government staff on child trafficking issues and improve legislation, child protection mechanisms, and government capacity. They networked with governments to facilitate collaborative victim rescues and the arrests of paedophiles. Such relationships highlight the complex political economy of child sex trafficking. The drivers of this industry are embedded in economics, national interests (in tourism) and international crime. Therefore the power to counter such an embedded structure must be drawn from all
sectors. These relationships also highlight the, at times, patriarchal attitudes of Northern agencies towards their Southern counterparts. In order to be effective TANs must support Southern cosmopolitanism through a redistribution of wealth and resources and ensure that partnerships are more than tokenistic and short-term relationships.

8.3.2 The ‘bigger picture’

This research has demonstrated that individual anti-trafficking organisations, particularly grassroots organisations, had little ‘voice’ with states and the GMS community in campaigning for child trafficking prevention and victim protection. However, when organisations united in TANs they were able to share resources, knowledge and skills and thus have a stronger campaign reach and impact in the GMS community and a stronger political voice with GMS states. There was consensus in the interviews that organisations needed to pay more attention to the global political economic processes occurring in the GMS in order to more effectively tailor their campaigns to lobby for improved legislation to combat child trafficking.

This research has demonstrated that a core problem associated with addressing the ‘bigger picture’ of child trafficking was the obscurity of networks’ ‘awareness raising’ activities. It was impossible for TANs to gauge the impact of these awareness raising campaigns and, therefore, whether the campaigns were making a difference in the behaviour and choices of children, traffickers and paedophiles. As highlighted by Nanu (2010) trafficking prevention campaigns in the GMS tend to focus on efforts to raise public awareness about the problem of child trafficking through public information campaigns and other means. Anti-trafficking awareness raising campaigns in the GMS aimed to increase public knowledge about trafficking and varied in scope and magnitude. They ranged from, for example, global social media and rock concert campaigns to much smaller tuk tuk advertising campaigns. Nanu (2010) argues that outreach and information campaigns will have short-term effects for many reasons, including the fact that trafficking is a very flexible activity, taking different forms at different times. Research participant interviews revealed that a major problem
with awareness raising campaigns was that in many instances, the young people who needed the information were not touched by the campaigns because, due to high levels of poverty and illiteracy, they do not read or have access to the media.

This research has also demonstrated that anti-trafficking TANs in the GMS need to turn their attention more to the issue of child trafficking ‘demand’. Montgomery points out that child prostitution has been a major cause of concern in recent years but there has been no widening of the debate (1998, p. 150). Instead, “campaigning groups have simply become increasingly shrill in denouncing it” (Montgomery, 1998, p. 150). This research has revealed that even if individual organisations theoretically supported women’s and children’s empowerment as a goal of programming, they did not necessarily challenge the structures that reinforced gender subordination. This research has demonstrated that in order to build a protective environment for children to ensure that children are safe, TANs must address the underlying causes of child trafficking including the gendered demand for cheap labour and the growth of the commercial sex industry, exacerbated by globalisation. Individual advocacy organisations, with their limited human and financial resources, acting independently of each other, could never hope to address these underlying causes. Through operating in TANs, however, network partners had significantly improved opportunities to combine knowledge, resources and skills to address the structural reasons for child trafficking in the GMS.

8.3.3 Network structure, secretariat and efficient communication

This research has demonstrated that a key aspect of TAN politics involved the lack of cooperation among organisations in TANs. Poor cooperation among TAN members represented a significant obstacle to effective linkages to combat child sex trafficking. Competition for funds appeared to be a primary reason why organisations operating within TANs have failed to cooperate. Organisations also competed over branding, prestige, and the control and ‘ownership’ of campaign activities. Research interviews demonstrated that in order to overcome instances of negative cooperation in TANs against child trafficking it
was essential that networks were well structured with a secretariat or a coordinating office and that efficient, transparent and regular information flowed through the network.

Research participant interviews demonstrated that there were steps that networks could take to increase the level and quality of communication amongst their partners. Foremost amongst these was that member organisations must know which agencies are participating in the network and what their unique roles are as well as their contributions (research, expertise etc). Strong and formal network structures seemed to be most popular amongst network types that needed it, for example, inter-agency networks that incorporated partners from government and UN agencies, and that focused on developing laws and policy on trafficking and that had specific targets for achieving certain policy goals. Some participants in the more formal and structured networks, such as inter-agency networks and peak and international NGO networks emphasised the importance of designing specific network rules, for example, memoranda of understanding or agreements about how the organisations were to interact as well as partners’ roles and responsibilities to the network.

The research has demonstrated that the characteristics representing network capacity, performance and achievement were strongly linked and contributed to network effectiveness. Both capacity and performance were influenced by the values and beliefs that members of the network held to the extent that there was agreement on those beliefs. The findings of the research suggest that network capacity and performance were equally necessary. However, more importantly, balance between these must be maintained. Network capacity could be informally assessed by a small number of structure characteristics such as a high degree of formality and a functioning strategic plan. Network performance could be assessed by the degree to which processes were in place that focused efforts across the individual, network, community and policy levels. Although each network achieved successful program outcomes and some achieved perceived policy victories, each network was more likely to point to evidence of the network as an anti trafficking leader and its ability to respond quickly and effectively to pertinent issues as its achievement and
the reasons for its effectiveness. There was consensus in the interviews also that achieving successful collaboration of network partners and ensuring the regular and rapid flow of information and tasks amongst the network partners were also distinct signs of achievement.

8.3.4 North-South relations and ‘voice’

Central to TAN politics is the question of North-South ‘voice’. One of the most important findings in this research is that effective TANs endeavour to balance the ‘voice’ and resources of Northern and Southern NGO partners. This research has demonstrated that when the voice of Southern NGOs is restricted, relationships within networks can become strained. The imbalance in North-South ‘voice’ inevitably led to instances of distrust and conflict amongst network members and therefore instances of network ineffectiveness. Some network types were better at balancing the voice of Northern and Southern partners than other types. The networks that were more successful at achieving a North-South balance were the smaller NGO networks such as geographic and strategic networks that had long histories of collaboration and had already worked through problems related to conflict over branding and reputation. In these types of networks each partner had an equal voice and understood its role within the network. Faith-based TANs were also successful at balancing the North-South voice and at maintaining egalitarian relationships between NGO partners. This was largely due to their religious mandate and strong values regarding equality in relationships. Inter-agency networks, global and NGO specific networks experienced many problems the balancing North-South voice. It was clear that these types of network were dominated by Northern agencies from the UN and the Northern international NGO sector. However, as demonstrated by the Asian Taskforce in Cambodia, inter-agency networks were putting in place systems to improve the ability of Southern organisations to have a ‘voice’ in networks at higher political levels. TANs could certainly improve the management of partnerships by empowering Southern NGOs’ engagement in TAN decision-making processes. For example, Southern NGOs could be represented on the Boards of their Northern NGO partners and be involved in decisions concerning policy and governance. Northern NGOs in TANs should focus on strengthening the financial
independence and long-term sustainability of Southern NGO partners by providing institutional support and funding for projects. Clearly defined expectations, rights and responsibilities, as well as increased transparency on the part of Northern TAN members, could improve North-South relationships within TANs.

This research has demonstrated that despite obstacles to effective North-South networking, there were significant benefits to networking for Northern and Southern NGOs. Southern NGOs enabled Northern organisations to identify and access child victims of trafficking. Southern NGOs also contributed local knowledge to TANs including expertise on stateless persons and minority groups. Northern NGOs provided their Southern partners with human and material resources, expertise on working with donors, and expertise writing funding and other reports. Northern NGOs also sometimes assisted their Southern counterparts with securing funding either directly from the network or via other funding schemes such as government donor funding. Therefore both Northern and Southern NGOs contributed to networks, albeit in different ways. The difference in the North-South contributions was generally interpreted by research participants as ‘positive’ as their contributions were complementary and Northern and Southern network partners were both able to ‘put in’ certain resources and knowledge to the network in order to ‘get out’ what they required to sustain their organisations and continue their important anti-trafficking campaign work and provision of victim services. However, a core problem existed in equalising the power balance between the Northern and Southern network members. This research has demonstrated that a power imbalance lay in the unequal resources between the two groups. Northern NGOs were considerably better funded than their Southern counterparts. Northern NGOs, with their considerable human and material resources, were better positioned to conduct long-term anti-trafficking campaigns than their Southern counterparts. Their funding could be directed to multiple areas rather than limiting Northern organisations to focus on a specific area of expertise. In some TANs more financial and human resources equated to a stronger voice in the network as Northern NGOs, in effect, controlled the purse strings of the network. This was more often a problem in the large network types such as peak and international NGO networks. Competition over voice
and funding led to instances of conflict between Northern and Southern network partners. In some cases negative networking between Northern and Southern network members in peak and international NGO networks led to grassroots organisations leaving networks. The research has demonstrated that Northern organisations need Southern organisations in order to successfully perform their work of accessing and aiding trafficking victims. Thus while relationships between the two groups may remain strained, Northern NGOs have a strong imperative to make sure these relationships are sustained.

**8.4 Directions for future research**

This research presents avenues for future scholarship on TANs. First, the research calls us to reconsider exactly what constitutes an ‘advocacy network’ type. As this research has demonstrated, there are a number of different types of ‘advocacy network’ in the anti-trafficking advocacy sector. This research has revealed that advocacy network types and their structures are normally reflective of networks’ goals and campaign strategies. Advocacy network scholars have recently discussed TANs’ campaign strategies (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Hertel, 2006). Keck and Sikkink (1998) developed the boomerang theory of campaign action in which national NGOs appeal to foreign countries to put pressure on their home governments in order to raise awareness on certain social issues. Hertel (2006) identified ‘blocking’ and ‘backdoor’ moves in which networks attempt to either block or change the direction of an advocacy campaign. While these theories are useful for understanding TANs’ campaign strategies, they did not explain the different network types and campaign strategies I observed in the anti-child trafficking movement in the GMS. Given the diversity in network size and type, and the diversity of networks’ advocacy and protection activities, it would be inaccurate to conclude that these networks are monolithic structures with similar values, goals and campaign strategies. This research has contributed to the scholarship on TANs by examining the different anti-trafficking advocacy network types. The research has demonstrated that networks’ campaign activities and strategies are highly diverse, and that a number of different anti-trafficking advocacy network types exist.
It would be beneficial for future scholarship to investigate characteristics that comprise an ‘advocacy network’ and revisit how the concept is currently operationalised. Future research could explore the different network types and the relationship between network structures, networks’ campaign strategies, and networks’ sustainability. Future research could also consider the question of the relationship between network types and network ‘effectiveness’—are some network types more effective than others? In order to answer these questions effectively it would be both interesting and challenging to continue studying some of the networks observed for this research over a more extended period of time.

Second, in applying a cosmopolitan lens, this research has contributed to current scholarship by highlighting how perspectives on collective values inform the choice of network partners in TANs. As this research has demonstrated, cosmopolitan values, meaning the values that support justice and equality for all, are extremely important to network members who tend to partner with organisations with values similar to their own. Shared commitment and values are considered so important to network members that a number of networks ‘test’ that these values are in place during a network affiliation process. Future research could explore values and commitment as drivers for network development and sustainability—are some network types more effective than others because of partners’ shared values? Are faith-based networks more effective than other network types because of the partner agencies’ tightly aligned religious values? Future research should also address the issue of power within TANs. In the literature on TANs the main and often only objects of analysis within the networks are the Northern actors with Southern perspectives being marginalised and only being of importance when they make demands of Northern actors. As such, Northern experiences of participation in TANs are privileged over Southern ones, which marginalises their agency. Unfortunately this research has been based on data derived from interviews with mostly Western aid workers so again, the data strengthens the perspective of the North and marginalises that of the South. To avoid this marginalisation in future research, research into TANs should focus on Southern perspectives and understandings as part of an explicit project of facilitating Southern empowerment through TANs. Future research should consider members of the South such as the urban elite,
traditional leaders, and political activists and consider how Southern cosmopolitanism may be distinct from, or dependent on, Northern cosmopolitanism.

Third, this research contributes to recent scholarship on TANs through its examination of network politics. This research has demonstrated that there are a number of important aspects of network politics that determine TAN effectiveness, including transparency, openness, performance, North-South collaboration and ‘voice’. This research demonstrates that networks need sound structures and a secretariat or coordinating office in order to provide efficient and transparent communication to network partners and to ensure network sustainability. Future research into the structures of TANs could shed additional light on the relationship between network structures and network sustainability. Are some structures, for example, formal network structures more effective than the smaller, informal network types? This is important considering the significance of network structure and network communication to achieving network movement objectives and will provide important insight into how structures mediate network dynamics and processes.

Fourth, this research has contributed to the literature on network ‘effectiveness’ and promoted the notion that scholars should move beyond viewing TANs’ outcomes as either a success or a failure. This research has, rather, discussed the ways in which the TANs observed have been successful and how this success is conceptualised by different actors. Much of the research on TANs has focused on network mobilisation, as opposed to outcomes, and there is comparatively little scholarship and literature on network effectiveness. This is in part due to the difficulties that researchers face when studying network effectiveness. As discussed in this research, one of the possible ways of measuring network outcomes and effectiveness is to examine whether or not a network has been successful in achieving its stated goals. However, as also highlighted in this research, this approach to studying network outcomes also has a number of drawbacks, some of which are particularly problematic. For example, a lack of meaningful monitoring and evaluation activities prevents networks from assessing their own effectiveness in working with
beneficiaries and having an ‘impact’ on the GMS communities targeted by awareness raising campaigns. This research has contributed to the scholarship on TANs by reporting that TANs assess their effectiveness both internally and externally. Some networks, particularly larger network types such as inter-agency and peak international NGO networks emphasised the importance of both types of effectiveness. Smaller network types focused more on external effectiveness, that is, reaching and serving victims and at-risk groups and individuals. Future research into the value of monitoring and evaluation activities could shed additional light on the importance of networks’ self evaluation of their activities and provide insight into the important themes of accountability and legitimacy in TANs. Researching the ways in which networks ‘measure’ the success of their campaigns and why and to what extent monitoring and evaluation activities are absent from network agendas will further demonstrate the complexity of network relationships with donors, the challenges to ‘measuring’ unquantifiable campaign activities, and the ambiguous nature of ‘awareness raising’ campaigning. Research needs to be conducted into new methods to measure the impact of awareness raising campaigns, as at present these are largely absent from network agendas. Future research could include strategies to measure public communication or awareness raising campaigns and their desired outcomes that are affected by a complex and broad set of factors. This research could look into issues and measurements related to awareness raising campaigns such as awareness, knowledge, intentions, attitudes, reported behaviour, and behaviour changes.

Research also needs to be conducted on the development of a systematic standard for measuring the long-term outcomes for children who are rehabilitated after trafficking and reintegrated into their local communities. Research needs to be conducted to understand whether trafficking victims are accepted back into their communities and whether the skills they receive in vocational training are useful to assist them to generate their own incomes once they leave shelters. At present these questions cannot be answered by TANs due to a dire lack of monitoring and evaluation of existing programs and projects and limited budgets and resources to perform these activities. This would provide a more complete picture of
what vocational training and other services are required in order to ensure that trafficking victims are not re-trafficked in the future.

Fifth, this research has demonstrated that there is a dearth of scholarly attention directed to the ‘demand’ side of child sex trafficking. At present we do not fully understand why individuals enter the business of child trafficking or why they buy the exploited sexual labour of children. Common stereotypes insinuate that greed, money, and power are motivators, but nothing else is known as to whether or not these are the only motivations (Blank, 2003). It is imperative that future research tackle the difficult terrain of trafficking ‘demand’ and to add to the knowledge base of how clandestine systems and processes are developed and maintained that allow the trafficking of children to transpire.

Sixth, while this research illustrates how the confluence of resources, structures and types inform the processes in which networks operate, the research also raises questions on how other contextual factors shape campaign processes and outcomes. More formative work is needed to identify how environmental factors influence network characteristics. A key area needing further research is that of external environments as facilitators or inhibitors of advocacy network activities - how supportive are governments of network campaigns? Do states facilitate or block networks' campaigning? Does the legislative environment support TANs or is it a hindrance to networks’ campaign work? This research has demonstrated that governments of the GMS, with the exception of China, were on the whole supportive of TANs campaigning against child trafficking. However the research has demonstrated some instances of tension, particularly as TANs are torn between publicly criticising government corruption and collusion in child trafficking and treading carefully so as not to offend states. This research has demonstrated that TANs need to work collaboratively with GMS governments as states still control the development of legislation, paedophile arrests, and the coordination of victim rescues. Future research should consider how the external political environment affects networks’ ability to perform their work effectively, which will in turn further advance knowledge on the contextual factors that mediate network
processes and network effectiveness. This research would benefit greatly from additional data collected at international events, for example, TAN strategy meetings between network partners, UN conferences and other fora. Joining TAN partners at international conferences and observing their interactions with governments would deepen our understanding of the political interactions and outcomes of their transnational campaigning efforts. This would also enable researchers to consider the views and perspectives of government officials on TAN advocacy, as the government perspective is lacking in the literature.

Finally, future research should be conducted to better understand the role of TANs as buffers against transnational crime. Research should also address the question of the ‘bigger picture’ of advocacy networking against transnational crimes. This research has revealed that activists are often too busy focusing on immediate problems, (for example, coordinating victim rescues), to be able to address the ‘bigger picture’ of child trafficking, that is, its complex underlying causes. This research has demonstrated that advocacy organisations have good reasons for not directing campaign activities at addressing the root causes of child trafficking. The structural reasons for trafficking are overwhelming. Individual anti-human trafficking organisations can only ever act as a ‘band aid’ for the negative effects of globalisation due to budget and resource constraints. NGOs are compelled to work only on specific areas of the supply and demand of child trafficking rather than tackling the structural reasons for trafficking, which include widespread poverty, global economic inequality, and gender discrimination. This research has revealed that TANs, by virtue of the combined expertise and resources of partner organisations, have opportunities to address the underlying structural reasons for child trafficking in the GMS. Some future research questions should be addressed, including - how do budget and resource constraints influence TANs’ framing of social problems? If advocacy organisations were better resourced would they be more likely to situate child trafficking as a vulnerability within wider vulnerabilities, and hence address issues of poverty, inequality and globalisation?
The study has shown that, due to its global dimensions, effective strategies to stop the sale and exploitation of children require a concerted international response. As highlighted by Todres (2010), several steps are necessary to begin to address coordination issues, including the development of national plans of action as well as regional and subregional plans, integration of all sectors into programs to combat trafficking and commercial sexual exploitation of children, and correspondingly the incorporation of anti-child exploitation initiatives into the work of organisations operating in each sector, and, finally, the strengthening of inter-jurisdictional cooperation. This research has demonstrated that effective anti-trafficking stakeholder coordination faces many obstacles, however, they are not insurmountable. Successfully addressing child trafficking requires the involvement of all sectors of society, not only law enforcement, immigration and social services but also the health care and education sectors, the tourism and transport industries and many other stakeholders that come into contact with children or whose businesses benefit from or facilitate the exploitation of children. Improved coordination will help realise efficiencies and maximise the return on the investment of resources into specific program areas and campaign activities. Given the current global economy and diminishing foreign aid, it is important to ensure that resources are used efficiently and effectively and improved coordination among stakeholders is central to achieving that goal.

As TANs become more common in our political landscape, research about them gains in perspective, form and depth. Studying and understanding TANs and local, national and international activism opens a rich and ‘kaleidoscopic’ (Turner and Caouette, 2009, p. 967) research agenda. With the proliferation of research on TANs, it is important that research does not define certain categories of TANs as the ‘right ones’ or the ‘wrong ones’. As this research has shown, networks are extremely diverse and fluid and constantly changing over time and it is important that they remain so. This research finds that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ to TANs. They should be allowed the leeway to improvise and create as they develop over time, particularly for the smaller types of TANs such as locational, informal and strategic networks that have less formal structures than the larger peak and inter-agency TANs.
8.5 Conclusion: Transnational advocacy networks as a cosmopolitan ‘globalisation from below’

This research supports Tarrow’s (2005) argument that within an increasingly internationalised and globalised world, a fluid, cosmopolitan, but rooted layer of advocates is developing that uses domestic resources, expertise and opportunities to advance the collective goals of the people it claims to represent. This research also supports Magis’ (2009) view that, with the exception of a few, the world’s many thousands of NGO groups, when acting in isolation, have no power in the international system. In addition to their insignificant size and voice, the groups can be narrowly focused on specific policy areas and highly ideological, both of which limit their comprehension of larger and related issues and diminish the capacity for the negotiations so critical in political environments (Magis, 2009, p. 319). Through collaboration or networking, the groups acquire the ability to influence international decision making above and beyond their weak formal status and they can use the power of the collaborative to avoid cooptation (Magis, 2009, p. 319).

Through transnational advocacy networking against child sex trafficking, TANs are conducting a form of “globalisation from below” in the GMS. Clearly there is an alternative to “globalisation from above” (Falk, 1999) and this is what has been labelled “globalisation from below” (Falk, 1999, p. 139). The idea of “globalisation from below” is to challenge and transform the negative features of globalisation from above, both by providing alternative ideological and political space to that currently occupied by market-oriented and statist outlooks and by offering resistance to the excesses and distortions that can be attributed to globalisation (Falk, 1999, p. 139). Globalisation from below is currently occurring as organisations use global networks and ideologies to shift the balance of power in favour of the dispossessed (Evans, 2000). In the case of TANs against child sex trafficking in this research, TANs in the GMS have pushed child sex trafficking onto the global social policy agenda, built global networks, and transformed opinion on child protection and child rights in order to shift the balance of power in favour of the vulnerable. As argued by Evans (2000), cosmopolitan activists are turning the old aphorism “think globally and act locally” around. They are “thinking locally” in discovering how to solve problems that manifest
themselves at the local level, but “acting globally” in building transnational networks and campaigns that use extra-political leverage to make local improvements possible (Evans, 2000). Cosmopolitan theory has provided a useful framework for this research as it has placed the role of TANs as transnational actors in global fora, and considered the ways in which their activities can be understood as constituting new forms of “cosmopolitan citizenship”, contributing to globalisation from below, and as part of a shift to “cosmopolitan democracy” (Reilly, 2007, p. 182).

The TANs that participated in this research promoted cosmopolitan values and the building of cosmopolitan systems in order to create an anti-trafficking movement. The networks were key cosmopolitan players for a number of reasons – the TANs created norms, promoted cosmopolitan values, protected the vulnerable, encouraged inter-agency collaboration, built human rights institutions and child protection systems, and acted as effective buffers against contemporary globalisation and transnational crime. Supporting cosmopolitan theory, as put forward by Kapstein (2004), this research has demonstrated that TANs, as key cosmopolitan players, have successfully rejected the notion that the bad luck of certain persons to find themselves locked up in states that deny or fail to provide basic human rights is reason enough for those of us who are more fortunate to turn our backs on their plight (Kapstein, 2004). The cosmopolitan TANs observed in this research have supported the notion that efforts to secure social justice should focus on the reform of social arrangements beyond the nation state (Kapstein, 2004). They have also held that global economic arrangements should be reformed so that they no longer bring about or permit such significant shortfalls from minimally adequate living conditions for so many people (Kapstein, 2004).

There can be little doubt that cosmopolitanism has been greatly enhanced as a sociologically pertinent topic due to the tremendous transformation in rights that has occurred in recent times (Delanty, 2006, p. 30). The rise of human rights doctrine as “an acceptable justification for various kinds of international intervention, ranging from
diplomatic and economic sanctions to military action, in the domestic affairs of states” (Beitz, 1999), indicates the ascendancy of a cosmopolitan view of global injustice that includes violations of common rights and duties owed to all human beings by virtue of their humanity (Lu, 2005, p. 403). Without such developments the realisation of global justice, the central focus of Beitz’s (1999) cosmopolitan vision, will remain elusive (Lu, 2005, p. 406). There are many recent examples in history to support cosmopolitanism’s legitimacy and success in building influential international institutions and promoting social issues onto global agendas, including the Geneva Conventions, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and the World Social Forum. In the early nineteenth century, the moral movement against slavery achieved political success by generating moral empathy, extending solidarity and psychological identification to non-white others for the first time (Alexander, 2007, p. 88). In the mid twentieth century, the narration and memorialisation of the Holocaust formed a powerful basis for expanding moral universalism, establishing genocide as a principle for evaluating national, ethnic, and religious power (Alexander, 2007, p. 89). The project of ‘making poverty history’ is a recent expression of how cosmopolitanism has become central to the political imagination in recent years (Linklater, 2007, p. 19). The global anti-sweatshop movement also illustrates the networked character of a cosmopolitanism globalisation from below (Kurasawa, 2004, p. 244). In a similar vein the Jubilee 2000 movement has successfully addressed poverty relief, but has also focused on reforming the unequal power structures that manifest themselves in aid conditionality and on giving developing countries voice in setting the policies that affect their economies and their development opportunities (Shawki, 2009, p. 90). Another example is that provided by the global campaign for women’s rights, which has highlighted the gendered ways in which traditional approaches to human rights have privileged male-defined aspects of civil and political rights in situations where violations are carried out by the state (Reilly, 2007, p. 185). As a result of the campaign, several significant gains have been achieved in the form of new international human rights standards, including the recognition that violence against women is a violation of human rights in the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, and in the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (Reilly, 2007, p. 186). Further, in the 1990s a UN Rapporteur on Violence against Women was appointed to investigate the issue of violence against women
and to encourage effective governmental, regional, and UN remedial measures, and the
Beijing Platform for Action, widely considered a ‘blueprint’ for women’s human rights, was
adopted by 189 countries (Reilly, 2007, p. 186).

In a similar vein to the women’s rights and other social justice movements, TANs in the GMS
have promoted the cosmopolitan notion of global justice and supported the creation of
global fora to fight child trafficking. Examples include the Global Forum on Human
Trafficking, the Asian Taskforce, UNIAP, and also international legislation such as that
provided by the CRC and the Palermo protocol, and extraterritorial legislation to intercept
and punish perpetrators. Another important recent example is UN.GIFT, which was
launched in March 2007 by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, in cooperation with the ILO,
the IOM, UNICEF, OHCHR, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) with the aim of eradicating human trafficking “by reducing both the vulnerability of
potential victims and the demand for exploitation in all its forms; ensuring adequate
protection and support to those who do fall victim; and supporting the efficient prosecution
of the criminals involved, while respecting the fundamental human rights of all persons”
(UN.GIFT, 2012). Through conventional and unconventional advocacy activities such as rock
concerts and social media campaigns, anti-trafficking networks have been successful in
broadening their appeal by reaching out to members of the public who may not be able to
join protest marches but are willing to engage in and support “innovative activities with a
critical edge” (Kurasawa, 2004, p. 251). Further, anti-trafficking networks’ development of
fora and involvement in creating new legislation have pushed the child trafficking issue onto
the global social policy agenda and promoted the goal of universal child rights. They have
also provided participants with opportunities to exchange and acquire first-hand
information about the difficult political, cultural and socio-economic circumstances faced by
ordinary citizens on all continents, in order to gain more global perspective (Kurasawa,
The cosmopolitan response to child trafficking is not new. Voluntary associations in the late 19th and 20th centuries fought to bring the trafficking and slavery issue to the fore, and set about creating local and international mechanisms for tackling the problem at different levels (Cree, 2008, p. 765). A number of the ideas in this thesis are, therefore, not new. Nor are the ideas presented in this research utopian. The arguments presented in this research do not begin from visionary aspirations of what might be, but from the concrete accomplishments of activists who have chosen to act globally through TANs. New child rights mechanisms and measures such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Palermo protocol attest to the success of TANs and the potential for non-governmental actors to play a significant role in shaping international norms, and international law and policy.

This research finds that current global problems cannot be ‘solved’ without a coordinated cosmopolitan approach that considers the complex underlying causes of trafficking. It would be folly to attempt to eradicate child trafficking in Thailand and Cambodia without also simultaneously addressing poverty, unemployment, government corruption, gender inequality and restricted avenues for legal migration. Anti-trafficking advocacy network success has been significant but there is much more that needs to be done. Child trafficking is part of the global political economy and is therefore likely to increase under conditions of poverty, unemployment, and social and economic transition, especially in regions where there are limited legal migration opportunities. TANs continue to expend much energy keeping children’s rights on key UN and government agendas. Recent successes highlight the critical importance of sustained cosmopolitan network practice that engages with global political, legal and economic arenas in the struggle to keep a global focus on children’s rights issues at a macro level. There is little doubt that this kind of transnational advocacy will increase in the future as our rapidly globalising world continues to exacerbate the divide between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’.
There are many manifestations of heinous crime present in the world today and the exploitation of children for sexual purposes is just one such criminal practice. This research has shown that there is a universal concern and compassion, through hard working individuals in TANs, attempting to eradicate trafficking. It will ultimately require a coordinated response by government, UN agencies and NGOs to contribute to meaningful systemic change in hopes of preventing future child trafficking and exploitation of vulnerable children in Thailand and Cambodia. With network partners’ combined resources and expertise, shared cosmopolitan values, and commitment to global rights and equality, TANs are well positioned to lead the global fight against child sex trafficking.
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PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM

1. ____________________________________________[PRINT NAME], give consent to my participation in the research project.

TITLE: A study of the effectiveness of international non government organisation (NGO) networks in advocacy campaigning: the campaign against child sex trafficking in the Mekong Sub-Region.

In giving my consent I acknowledge that:

1. The procedures required for the project and the time involved have been explained to me, and any questions I have about the project have been answered to my satisfaction.

2. I have read the Participant Information Statement and have been given the opportunity to discuss the information and my involvement in the project with the researcher/s.

3. I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time, without affecting my relationship with the researcher(s) or the University of Sydney now or in the future.

4. I understand that my involvement is strictly confidential and no information about me will be used in any way that reveals my identity.

5. I understand that being in this study is completely voluntary – I am not under any obligation to consent.

6. I understand that I can stop the interview at any time if I do not wish to continue, the audio recording will be erased and the information provided will not be included in the study.
7. I consent to: ...

i) Audio-taping YES ☐ NO ☐
ii) Receiving Feedback YES ☐ NO ☐

If you answered YES to the "Receiving Feedback Question (ii)", please provide your details i.e. mailing address, email address.

Feedback Option

Address: ________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________

Email: ________________________________________________________________

Signed: ...........................................................................................................

Name: ...........................................................................................................

Date: .............................................................................................................
ប្រការភាសាខ្មែរ

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6. ប្រការ/ការដេញឈ្មោះ ប្រការ/ការដេញឈ្មោះចេញពីអត្ថប្រយោជនៈពីរៀះរៀងក្នុងការប្រការ/ការដេញឈ្មោះចេញពីអត្ថប្រយោជនៈពីរៀះរៀងក្នុងការប្រការ/ការដេញឈ្មោះចេញពីអត្ថប្រយោជនៈពីរៀះរៀងក្នុងការ ប្រការ/ការដេញឈ្មោះចេញពីអត្ថប្រយោជនៈពីរៀះរៀងក្នុងការប្រការ/ការដេញឈ្មោះចេញពីអត្ថប្រយោជនៈពីរៀះរៀងក្នុងការ

7. ប្រការ/ការដេញឈ្មោះ

- ការសម្របសួស្រលំសាន បានបញ្ចូល □ បានត្របូ文化底蕴 □
- ការសម្របសួស្រលំសាន បានបញ្ចូល □ បានត្របូ文化底蕴 □
- ការសម្របសួស្រលំសាន បានបញ្ចូល □ បានត្របូ文化底蕴 □

ដើម្បីបង្កើតការសម្របសួស្រលំសានការអ្វីដែលប្រការ/ការដេញឈ្មោះចេញពីអត្ថប្រយោជនៈពីរៀះរៀងក្នុងការ។

ជាំឈ្មោះការសម្របសួស្រលំសាន

- សាលាទន្ន ស្ថាបនា □ សាលាទន្ន ស្ថាបនា □

- សាលាទន្ន ស្ថាបនា □ សាលាទន្ន ស្ថាបនা □

- សាលាទន្ន ស្ថាបនា □ សាលាទន្ន ស្ថាបនា □

- សាលាទន្ន ស្ថាបនា □ សាលាទន្ន ស្ថាបនា □

- សាលាទន្ន ស្ថាបនា □ សាលាទន្ន ស្ថាបនា □

- សាលាទន្ន ស្ថាបនា □ សាលាទន្ន ស្ថាបនា □

Translators Certification:
I, Levisda Douglas, accredited NAATI Level III Translator (NAATI No.12342), certify that I have translated the document above from the English language to the Khmer language faithfully to the best of my ability and skills.
26/02/2010

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6. ฉันทราบถึงสิ่งที่กล่าวมาที่จะทำให้ถูกต้องทั้งหมดต่อไป ฉันสามารถจะปฏิเสธถึงความที่ฉันได้รับมันไว้ในทางที่ถูกต้องถูกทฤษฎีว่าที่ฉันได้รับมันไว้ใช้ในการศึกษา

7. ฉันยอมรับว่า:

 i) บันทึกถึงที่กินที่ดินไม่ถูกต้อง ถูกต้อง □ ไม่ถูกต้อง □

 ii) ได้รับรายงานเกี่ยวกับข้อมูล ถูกต้อง □ ไม่ถูกต้อง □

 ถ้าฉันยอมรับว่า บันทึก ค่อยๆ ค่อยๆ ได้รับรายงานเกี่ยวกับข้อมูล (iii) โปรดให้วางแผนเกี่ยวกับข้อมูลที่อยู่ภายใน โปรแกรมนี้ หรือ ที่อยู่อื่นแล้ว

 ตามปรารถนาของทางจัดสรรรายงานเนื่องด้วย

 ที่อยู่ในปัจจุบัน:


 ตั้งแต่:


 ลงชื่อ:


 Translators Certification:

I, Ruud Hood, accredited NAATI Level III Translator (NAATI No.520), certify that I have translated the document above, from the English language to the Thai language faithfully to the best of my ability and skills.

26/02/2010

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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION STATEMENT
Research Project

Title: A study of the effectiveness of international non-government organisation (NGO) networks in advocacy campaigning: the campaign against child sex trafficking in the Mekong Sub-Region.

(1) What is the study about?
This study is an exploration of the development and effectiveness of transnational NGO networks against child sex trafficking in Thailand and Cambodia. I am interested in finding out about the establishment of NGO networks working together in campaigns against child sex trafficking in the Mekong Sub-region and the perceptions of NGO network staff on the internal dynamics and perceived effectiveness of such NGO networks. I am hoping to contribute to current understandings of the effectiveness of NGO networks and their role in shaping policy on key social problems such as child sex trafficking.

(2) Who is carrying out the study?
The study is being conducted by Deanna Davy and will form the basis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at The University of Sydney under the supervision of Dr Ruth Phillips, Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Education and Social Work at the University of Sydney.

(3) What does the study involve?
The study involves individual interviews. Face to face interviews will be undertaken at the NGO participant’s office. Alternately, participants can choose to participate in a telephone interview. The individual interviews will involve answering a set of semi-structured, open-ended questions about NGO networks and your organisation’s participation in the network/s and how that contributes to the campaign against child sex trafficking. The interviews will be audio taped with your permission.

(4) How much time will the study take?
Individual interviews will take between 60 and 90 minutes.

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(5) Can I withdraw from the study?

Being in this study is completely voluntary - you are not under any obligation to consent and - if you do consent - you can withdraw at any time without affecting your relationship with the University of Sydney.

You may stop the interview at any time if you do not wish to continue, the audio recording will be erased and the information provided will not be included in the study.

(6) Will anyone else know the results?

All aspects of the study, including results, will be strictly confidential and only the researchers will have access to information on participants. A report of the study may be submitted for publication, but individual participants will not be identifiable in such a report.

(7) What if I require further information?

When you have read this information, Deanna Davy and Ruth Phillips will discuss it with you further and answer any questions you may have. If you would like to know more at any stage, please feel free to contact Deanna Davy on (0066) (0) 87009 6024 or dday5014@uni.sydney.edu.au or Ruth Phillips on (0061) (02) 9351 6899 or r.phillips@flinders.edu.au.

(8) What if I have a complaint or concerns?

Any person with concerns or complaints about the conduct of a research study can contact the Deputy Manager, Human Ethics Administration, University of Sydney on + 612 8627 8176 (Telephone); + 612 8627 8177 (Facsimile) or ce.humanethics@sydney.edu.au (Email).

This information sheet is for you to keep
ប្រការ 1: ការសម្រេចនេះបានប្រកួតប្រជុំជាមួយនឹងក្រុមហ៊ុនថ្មីៗដែលមានការធ្វើការជាមួយ NGO ដែលរួមទាំងស្ថានភាពអន្តរជាតិបរទ័ត្នមានប្រកួតប្រជុំគ្នា។

(1) ម្ចាស់ក្រុមហ៊ុននេះ និងការសម្រេចនេះ៖
 ការសម្រេចនេះត្រូវបានធ្វើឡើងដោយក្រុមហ៊ុនថ្មីៗដែលមានការធ្វើការជាមួយ NGO ដែលមានចម្លើយក្នុងការប្រកួតប្រជុំជាមួយស្ថានភាពអន្តរជាតិបរទ័ត្ន។ ការធ្វើការមួយនេះត្រូវបានធ្វើឡើងដោយមុខងារយូរ៖
 ចំណាត់ពីប្រកួតប្រជុំ។

(2) ការសម្រេចនេះបានប្រកួតប្រជុំជាមួយ NGO ដោយសារពីការឆ្លងកាត់សម្រាប់ការប្រកួតប្រជុំ។

Deanne Dwy ការសម្រេចនេះបានប្រកួតប្រជុំជាមួយ NGO ដោយសារពីការឆ្លងកាត់សម្រាប់ការប្រកួតប្រជុំ។

Ruth Phillips ការសម្រេចនេះបានប្រកួតប្រជុំជាមួយ NGO ដោយសារពីការឆ្លងកាត់សម្រាប់ការប្រកួតប្រជុំ។

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(3) ដំណោះស្រាយបញ្ហារបស់ក្រុមហ៊ុន៖
ការសម្រមោលប្រការពីអំណាចសំខាន់បង្រួបបង្រួម។ ការស្វែងរកអំណាចសំខាន់ និងការសម្រាប់ប្រការសំខាន់ និងការសម្រាប់ការបង្រួបបង្រួមសំខាន់។ ការស្វែងរកអំណាចសំខាន់ និងការសម្រាប់ប្រការសំខាន់ និងការសម្រាប់ការបង្រួបបង្រួមសំខាន់។ ការស្វែងរកអំណាចសំខាន់ និងការសម្រាប់ប្រការសំខាន់ និងការសម្រាប់ការបង្រួបបង្រួមសំខាន់។ ការស្វែងរកអំណាចសំខាន់ និងការសម្រាប់ប្រការសំខាន់ និងការសម្រាប់ការបង្រួបបង្រួមសំខាន់។

(4) ដំណោះស្រាយបញ្ហារបស់ក្រុមហ៊ុន៖
ការសម្រមោលប្រការពីអំណាចសំខាន់ និងការសម្រាប់ប្រការសំខាន់។

(5) ដំណោះស្រាយបញ្ហារបស់ក្រុមហ៊ុន៖
ការសម្រមោលប្រការពីអំណាចសំខាន់ និងការសម្រាប់ប្រការសំខាន់។

(6) ដំណោះស្រាយបញ្ហារបស់ក្រុមហ៊ុន៖
ការសម្រមោលប្រការពីអំណាចសំខាន់ និងការសម្រាប់ប្រការសំខាន់។

(7) ដំណោះស្រាយបញ្ហារបស់ក្រុមហ៊ុន៖
ការសម្រមោលប្រការពីអំណាចសំខាន់ និងការសម្រាប់ប្រការសំខាន់។

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(8) ប្រសិនបើមានការប្រយុជការជំនាញនៃការប្រការប្រជាពលរដ្ឋ ត្រូវតែប្រការដោយមូលនឹងការប្រការនេះយ៉ាងណាមួយ?  

នូវន័យសញ្ចាតិការប្រការពីការប្រការប្រជាពលរដ្ឋ ប្រការប្រជាពលរដ្ឋក្នុងការប្រការប្រជាពលរដ្ឋ សូមឈ្មោះអតិថិជនជាតិនិងអតិថិជនសេវាកម្ម។ ពាណិជ្ជកម្មស្ថានភាពអន្តរជាតិបានទទួលបានសេវាកម្មណាមួយ។ ទូរស័ព្ទ: +61 2 8627 8176

អំពី: -61 2 8627 8177 ឬ ro.humanetics@sydney.edu.au ។ តួន័យទំព័រ 1 ។

នៅក្នុងបញ្ហាការប្រការប្រជាពលរដ្ឋនេះ ត្រូវបានប្រការប្រជាពលរដ្ឋ។

Translators Certification:
I, Levisada Douglas, accredited NAATI Level III Translator (NAATI No. 12342), certify that I have translated the document above, from the English language to the Khmer language faithfully to the best of my ability and skills.
20/02/2010

Transnational NGO advocacy networks against child sex trafficking
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ก้าวแรกข้อมูลของผู้เข้าร่วม
โครงการวิจัยดังกล่าว

ชื่อสกุล: การศึกษาเพื่อวิเคราะห์ระดับของเครือข่ายของเครือข่ายที่มีมิตรภาพของรัฐบาล (NGO) มากมายในการ
ดำเนินการที่เป็นการเปลี่ยนแปลง: การรวบรวมข้อมูลการดำเนินการในกลุ่มแนวโน้มใหม่ที่เกิด

(1) การศึกษาที่เกี่ยวข้องกับ

การศึกษานี้เป็นการสำรวจการทัศนคติและประสิทธิภาพของการศึกษา NGO ซึ่งมีการดำเนินการที่
เกี่ยวข้องกับองค์กรต่างประเทศและองค์กรนักธุรกิจ นักทฤษฎีมาจากหลายกลุ่มที่เรียกว่าเครือข่าย
NGO เพื่อการทำงานร่วมกันในการรณรงค์และกระทำพิจารณาข้อเสนอในการรวบรวมข้อมูลที่เกิด

(2) ใครเป็นผู้ดำเนินการศึกษานี้?

ผู้แทนจากดร. ดาวนู (Deanna Davy) เป็นผู้ดำเนินการศึกษา ซึ่งจะให้เป็นพื้นฐานของวิทยานิพนธ์ระดับ
ปริญญาโททางการศึกษาที่มหาวิทยาลัยซิดนีย์ ภายใต้การจัดทำของคณะครูที่ปรึกษา ฟิลิปส์ ซึ่งเป็นผู้บรรยาย
อาจารย์ของคณะการศึกษาและงานสังคมศาสตร์มหาวิทยาลัยซิดนีย์

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(3) การศึกษานี้เกี่ยวกับข้อมูลอะไรบ้าง?

การศึกษานี้จะสวัสดีกับการสัมภาษณ์เป็นรายบุคคล การสัมภาษณ์ดังกล่าวจะมีขึ้นที่ที่ทำงานของผู้ぁข้างกล่าวของ NGO หรืออินเทอร์ ผู้เข้าชมสามารถเลือกทำการสัมภาษณ์ทางโทรศัพท์ได้ การสัมภาษณ์เป็นรายบุคคลจะ
เพื่อให้การดูดความเป็นข้อมูลแบบที่ควรจะ แปลเสียไป เพื่อการต่อเนื่องโดย NGO และการเข้าร่วมของ
องค์กรของทุกฝ่ายในเครือข่าย และการปฏิบัติการ์ให้รู้เรื่องผลกระทบต่อความสัมพันธ์ด้านการดูแลช่างดี การ
สัมภาษณ์จะถูกบันทึกไว้ในหลักเกี่ยวกับข้อมูลที่ทำการทำให้ได้

(4) การศึกษาจะใช้เวลาเท่าไร?

การสัมภาษณ์เป็นรายบุคคลจะใช้เวลาประมาณ 40 ถึง 90 นาที

(5) ตัวอย่างของคํ่าตอบต่อการศึกษานี้ได้ไหม?

การเข้าร่วมในการศึกษาที่นี้เกี่ยวกับความสัมพันธ์อย่างสิ้นเชิง—ดูผู้โดยไม่ได้ข้อมูลมหาใดๆ จะมอง
เช่นร่วม—ถูกไม่ต้องการเข้าร่วม—คุณก็มอบตัวอย่างเมื่อใจไม่ได้ใจไม่ต้องการและทีพักพิง
ถูกไม่ต้องการที่จะได้รับข้อมูลโดยไม่ได้กลุ่มที่จะจูงใจการสัมภาษณ์โดยใจไม่ได้ พบปะที่เกี่ยวกับการ
สัมภาษณ์จะถูกตอบออกและข้อมูลที่คุณจะไม่ต้องการใช้ในการศึกษา

(6) จะมีการสืบสวนผลของการศึกษาไหม?

ทุกด้านของการศึกษา รวมทั้งผลที่ออกมา จะถูกจัดสรุเป็นความละเอียดอย่างเคร่งครัด ซึ่งผู้ที่มีส่วนที่จะ
เข้าใจประเด็นของผู้เข้าร่วม นั้นอาจมีการพิจารณาผลระหว่างการศึกษานี้ เท่าถึงงานจะไม่มีความระบุตัว
ผู้เข้าร่วมแต่ละคน

(7) แล้วสิ่งที่คุณจะทราบข้อมูลเพิ่มเติมอย่างไร?

เมื่อคุณได้รับข้อมูลนั้นแล้ว คัดเลือก เวลา และ รูป พิลักษ์ส์ จะเห็นสิ่งที่คุณต้องการ และจะตอบคำถามของคุณ
ถูกมีการถามที่คุณต้องการได้ข้อมูลเพิ่มเติมโปรดติดต่อที่ ได้ชื่อ เวลา ที่
หมายเหตุ (061) (02) 416 485 351 หรือ dday5914@unisyr.d.edu.au หรือที่ รูส พิลักษ์ส์ ที่
หมายเหตุ (061) (02) 9351 6598 หรือ r.phillips@edfac.usyd.edu.au
(8)  แล้วฉันต้องเตรียมเรื่องราวหรือข้อข้อเท็จจริงในเรื่องนี้หรือไม่?

โครงงานที่นี้ขอเชิญให้ผู้สนใจมีการสมัครเข้าร่วมโครงการแก้ไขการวิจัยที่เหมาะสมในเรื่อง ๆ โปรดติดต่อสู่สำนักงาน แผนกบริการ
สำนักงานมรรคบุญ เพชรบูรณ์จังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้ หมายเลข + 612 8627 8176 (โทรทัพ) และหมายเลข 612 8627 8177
(โทรสาร) หรือ ro.humanethics@sydney.edu.au (อีเมล)

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English language to the Thai language faithfully to the best of my ability and skills.
26/02/2010
Interview questions

1. Introductory questions on the TAN:

   - How many staff work in the organisation/network? When was it established? What kind of project/campaign work does the organisation specialise in? What are the major sources of funding? What is the organisation’s ethos?

2. What is the primary goal of your organisation in campaigning against child trafficking? How and when did your organisation first become involved in issues associated with child sex trafficking?

3. Can you explain how your organisation campaigns for victims of child trafficking and prevention of trafficking? How does your organisation address both the supply and demand sides of trafficking? Please provide details.

4. Has the network organised the campaign specifically to advocate for the victims of child sex trafficking? How are these framed differently to campaigns that concern the rights of adults or other kinds of trafficking?

5. How would you characterise your organisation’s stance on the debate in Thailand/Cambodia on the issue of child sex trafficking? Does the organisation feel it is a: poverty/globalisation and migration/gender/human rights/slavery/criminal etc issue?

6. Do you know of any organisation (besides your own) that is working with or for child victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation?

7. How does your organisation view the role of advocacy networks and intergovernmental organisations in assisting Thailand/Cambodia in combating child sex trafficking?

8. Who does your organisation partner with? Does your organisation partner with NGOs/UN agencies with a similar ethos? Are these ongoing partnerships? If not, why? Is this part of what you might call a wider network? Or do you have another preferred term? (for example, coalition, alliance, partnership).

9. How has this network evolved?
10. What are the major benefits for your organisation in being part of an advocacy network?

11. What are the disadvantages for your organisation of being part of an advocacy network?

12. What are the obstacles to achieving network success?

13. How is your network structured? How are resources, funds and tasks shared within the network?

14. Is the network seen as being/been effective in its goals? How is ‘effectiveness’ conceptualised in the network?

16. What has been the catalyst for Thailand/Cambodia to pass certain laws and protocols (specific examples) since the 1990s?

15. What are the most successful strategies in campaigning against child sex trafficking and positively influencing government and social policy on the issue?

17. How is your organisation’s anti-trafficking work funded? Does the organisation’s accountability to corporate and other donors affect the organisation’s campaign priorities?

18. What are the greatest challenges for your organisation’s work?

19. In your opinion, how can child trafficking be stopped? What is needed so that trafficking in children for sexual exploitation can be reduced?