

Antisthenes' *Ajax* and *Odysseus*

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts, Honours in Ancient Greek and Ancient History.

Word count: 20,137

Abstract

This thesis argues that Antisthenes and his *Ajax* and *Odysseus* have been neglected and misunderstood. The texts have been translated for this study, and as there has not previously been a complete, continuous translation of them in any language, they have been appended to the front of the paper. On rare occasions when Antisthenes has been considered by modern scholars he has either been dismissed as a minor rhetorician or thought of as the founder of Cynicism. It will be argued here that he was neither. In a similar vein, his only extant works, the *Ajax* and *Odysseus*, have been generally thought of as epideictic display speeches or as an expression of his Cynic outlook. Chapter one will introduce Antisthenes and demonstrate that the speeches are not epideictic. Chapter two will consider characterisation and assess whether the *Ajax* and *Odysseus* could be examples of ethopoia. Chapter three will then situate these speeches in the broader fifth century literary and cultural context in order to understand the extent of their contribution to a wider symbolic discourse. Chapter four will demonstrate that Antisthenes' philosophy was not driven by a proto-Cynic agenda but rather by quite distinct ethical concerns.

For my mentors

Ben and Eric

Acknowledgements

I wish to express my gratitude to all the academic staff – lecturers and tutors – who have taught me at The University of Sydney. Their passion for the subject matter, rigour in teaching it, and personal interest in my academic progress has been exemplary, and is a major contributing factor to me being in a position to submit this thesis.

I also wish to thank my fellow students, especially from the later year Classics classes, for their camaraderie throughout the journey. Special thanks goes to my study *ἑτέροζυξ*, Adam Rowsell, who kept me company through enumerable hours of toil in the Fisher Stack (r.i.p.). And also to Paul Macovaz who supplied crucial German translation services usually at the shortest notice.

Last, but certainly not least, I wish to thank my mentors, Ben Brown and Eric Csapo, to whom this paper is dedicated.

I would not be studying Classics at this university if it were not for Ben. When I was wondering what university to apply to he bluntly told me 'Sydney'. When at first I was interested in other historical epochs Ben's irrepressible enthusiasm for Ancient Greek and ancient history guided me into the fold. Some semesters I think I learned more from Ben over cups of coffee about the ancient mentality and mindset than I did from the rest of my courses put together.

In my first year I elected one unit of Ancient Greek in first semester after which I intended to try other subjects. Eric Csapo taught the course. He was inspirational. I have studied more units of Ancient Greek than any other subject and have loved every minute of it. For supervising me in my Honours year I owe a substantial debt of gratitude to Eric for his teaching, guidance, encouragement, and enthusiasm for my project. I have thoroughly enjoyed it.

W.J.K.

Contents

Abstract	3
Acknowledgements	7
The <i>Ajax</i> – text and translation	11
The <i>Odysseus</i> – text and translation	15
Introduction	21
Chapter 1 – Antisthenes; his <i>Ajax</i> and <i>Odysseus</i>	24
Chapter 2 – Characterisation: Ethopoiia and Antisthenes' <i>Ajax</i> and <i>Odysseus</i>	32
Chapter 3 – Antisthenes' <i>Ajax</i> and <i>Odysseus</i> : the Literary & Cultural Context	46
Chapter 4 – Antisthenes' Philosophy of Excellence	61
Conclusion	76
Bibliography	81

ΑΙΑΣ Η ΑΙΑΝΤΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ¹

[1.1] Ἐβουλόμην ἂν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἡμῖν δικάζειν οἵπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι παρήσαν· οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ἐμὲ μὲν ἔδει σιωπᾶν, τούτῳ δ' οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν πλέον λέγοντι· νῦν δὲ οἱ μὲν παραγενόμενοι τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῖς ἄπεισιν, ὑμεῖς δὲ οἱ [1.5] οὐδὲν εἰδότες δικάζετε. καίτοι ποία τις ἂν δίκη δικαστῶν μὴ εἰδῶτων γένοιτο, καὶ ταῦτα διὰ λόγων; τὸ δὲ πράγμα ἐγένετο ἔργῳ.

[2.1] τὸ μὲν οὖν σῶμα τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως ἐκόμισα ἐγὼ φέρων, τὰ δὲ ὄπλα ὅδε, ἐπιστάμενος ὅτι οὐ τῶν ὄπλων μᾶλλον ἐπεθύμουν οἱ Τρῶες ἀλλὰ τοῦ νεκροῦ κρατῆσαι. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ εἰ ἐκράτησαν, ἠκίσαντό τε ἂν [2.5] τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰ λύτρα τοῦ Ἑκτορος ἐκομίσαντο· τὰ δὲ ὄπλα τάδε οὐκ ἂν ἀνέθεσαν τοῖς θεοῖς ἀλλ' ἀπέκρυψαν,

[3.1] δεδιότες τόνδε τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, ὃς καὶ πρότερον ἱεροσυλήσας αὐτῶν τὸ ἄγαλμα τῆς θεοῦ νύκτωρ ὥσπερ τι καλὸν ἐργασάμενος ἐπεδείκνυτο τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς. καγὼ μὲν ἀξιῶ λαβεῖν ἴν' ἀποδῶ τὰ ὄπλα τοῖς [3.5] φίλοις, οὗτος δὲ ἴν' ἀποδῶται, ἐπεὶ χρῆσθαί γε αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἂν τολμήσειε· δειλὸς γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπισήμοις ὄπλοις χρήσαιο, εἰδὼς ὅτι τὴν δειλίαν αὐτοῦ ἐκφαίνει τὰ ὄπλα.

[1.1] I wish I was being tried by the very people who were there with us during this venture. For I know that while I would only need to be silent, nothing would be gained by this man by arguing. But as it is, those who were there during these deeds are absent, and you

[1.5] ignorant men are judging me. What sort of justice could one receive from judges who are ignorant? And by arguments at that! But the endeavour came about via action.

[2.1] While I picked up and carried the body of Achilles, this man took the arms, knowing that the Trojans were not more eager about the arms, but rather to gain control of the body. For if they had gained control of it, they would have ravaged

[2.5] his body and gained requital for Hector. But the arms, these they would not have dedicated to their gods, but would have | hidden them away

[3.1] out of fear of this “brave” man, who had also previously robbed their temple of the statue of the goddess by night, and as if he were carrying out some noble deed he displayed it to the Achaeans. And I indeed I think I deserve to receive them, so that I can restore [3.5] the arms to his friends. But this man, so that he can sell them, since he surely would not dare to use them. For no coward uses conspicuous arms – he knows that the arms make his cowardice obvious.

1 Found in MS Palatinus (Bekker X) and its relatives.

[4.1] σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ἅπαντα ὅμοια. οἳ τε γὰρ διαθέν-
τες τὸν ἀγῶνα φάσκοντες εἶναι βασιλεῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς
κρίνειν ἐπέτρεψαν ἄλλοις, οἳ τε οὐδὲν εἰδότες δικάσειν
ὑπισχνεῖσθε περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἴστε. ἐγὼ δὲ ἐπίσταμαι τοῦτο,
[4.5] ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἂν βασιλεὺς ἰκανὸς ὧν περὶ ἀρετῆς κρίνειν
ἐπιτρέψειεν ἄλλοις μᾶλλον ἢπερ ἀγαθὸς ἰατρὸς διαγνῶναι
νοσήματα ἄλλω παρεῖη.

[5.1] καὶ εἰ μὲν ἦν μοι πρὸς ἄνδρα ὁμοιότροπον, οὐδ' ἂν
ἠττᾶσθαί μοι διέφερε· νῦν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ διαφέρει πλέον
ἐμοῦ καὶ τοῦδε. ὁ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι ἂν δράσειε²
φανερῶς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἂν λάθρα τολμήσαιμι πρᾶξαι.

[5.5] καὶ γὰρ μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἀνασχοίμην κακῶς ἀκούων, οὐδὲ γὰρ
κακῶς πάσχων, ὁ δὲ κἂν κρεμάμενος,³ εἰ κερδαίνειν τι
μέλλοι.

[6.1] ὅστις γε μαστιγοῦν παρεῖχε τοῖς δούλοις καὶ
τύπτειν ξύλοις τὰ νῶτα καὶ πυγμαῖς τὸ πρόσωπον, κᾶπειτα
περιβαλλόμενος ῥάκη, τῆς νυκτὸς εἰς τὸ τεῖχος εἰσδύς τῶν
πολεμίων, ἱεροσλήσας ἀπῆλθε. καὶ ταῦτα ὁμολογήσει

[6.5] ποιεῖν, ἴσως δὲ καὶ πείσει, λέγων ὡς καλῶς πέπρακται.

[4.1] So it is more or less the same all over. For those men who arranged
the contest, though they claim to be kings, entrusted
the judgement of excellence to others, and you who are ignorant have undertaken
to judge a matter about which you have no clue. But I know this:

[4.5] that no king competent to judge about excellence
would entrust this to others any more than a good doctor would allow the diagnosis
of illnesses by another.

[5.1] And if I were opposed to a man of similar character to myself, being defeated
would not matter to me. But as it is, nothing could be more different
than me and him. For while there is no exploit he would do
openly, I would not dare to do anything surreptitiously.

[5.5] And whereas I could not bear a cowardly reputation, nor
to be mistreated, he would endure being strung up for flogging if he could derive any profit
by it.

[6.1] He who in fact did submit himself to being flogged by slaves, and
being beaten with rods on the back, and punched with fists in the face, and then
having thrown rags about himself, by night he crept inside the walls of the
enemy, and having committed temple-robbery, he came back. And this he will admit

[6.5] to doing. And perhaps he will be persuasive – arguing that it is a splendid achievement.

2 LSJ δράω (s.v.) 'do, accomplish, esp. do some great thing, good or bad.'

3 LSJ κρεμάννυμι (s.v.) 'II. Pass., to be hung up, suspended'; i.e. here, as is evident from the subsequent
passage, 'hung up for flogging'.

ἔπειτα τῶν Ἀχιλλέως ὀπλων ὄδε ὁ μαστιγίας καὶ ἱερό-
συλος ἀξιοῖ κρατῆσαι;

[7.1] ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν λέγω τοῖς οὐδὲν εἰδόσι κριταῖς
καὶ δικασταῖς, μὴ εἰς τοὺς λόγους σκοπεῖν περὶ ἀρετῆς
κρίνοντας, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ ἔργα μᾶλλον. καὶ γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος οὐ
λόγῳ κρίνεται ἀλλ' ἔργῳ· οὐδ' ἀντιλέγειν ἔξεστι πρὸς τοὺς
[7.5] πολεμίους, ἀλλ' ἢ μαχομένους κρατεῖν ἢ δουλεύειν σιωπῇ.
πρὸς ταῦτα ἀθροεῖτε καὶ σκοπεῖτε· ὡς, εἰ μὴ δικάσετε
καλῶς, γνῶσεσθε ὅτι οὐδεμίαν ἔχει λόγος πρὸς ἔργον
ἰσχύν,

[8.1] οὐδ' ἔστιν ὑμᾶς ὅ τι λέγων ἀνήρ ὠφελήσει,
εἴσεσθε δὲ ἀκριβῶς ὅτι δι' ἀπορίαν ἔργων πολλοὶ καὶ
μακροὶ λόγοι⁴ λέγονται. ἀλλ' ἢ λέγετε ὅτι οὐ ξυνίετε
τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ ἀνίστασθε, ἢ δικάζετε ὀρθῶς. καὶ ταῦ-
[8.5] τα μὴ κρύβδην φέρετε, ἀλλὰ φανερωῶς, ἵνα γνῶτε ὅτι
καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς δικάζουσι δοτέα δίκη ἐστίν, ἂν μὴ δικάσω-
σιν ὀρθῶς. κάπειτ' ἴσως γνῶσεσθε ὅτι οὐ κριταὶ τῶν
λεγομένων ἀλλὰ δοξασταὶ⁵ κάθησθε.

And then this man – who has been flogged and is a temple-robber – thinks he deserves to gain possession of the arms of Achilles?

[7.1] On the contrary, I enjoin you ignorant men – judges and jury men – not to consider arguments when you are deciding about excellence, but rather to consider deeds. For indeed war is not decided by argument but by action. It is not possible to gainsay the [7.5] enemy, but either to fight and conquer, or be enslaved – in silence. Look at and consider this! That unless you judge well, you will come to realise that argument has no power in comparison | with action; [8.1] and nor is there any way an arguing man will aid you, but you will know to a nicety that because of a dearth of deeds, many and long arguments are argued. But either admit that you do not understand the arguments made, and adjourn;⁶ or judge correctly! And do this [8.5] not secretly, but openly! So that you may realise that there is a penalty that must be paid by the judges themselves, if they do not judge correctly. And then perhaps you will also recognise that you are seated here not as *judges* over the arguments but merely as *guessers*.

4 μακρὸς λόγος: Denyer (2008, 121, n.329b2) says, 'was used in particular for the rambling and incoherent rigmarole in which a slave tries to excuse his misdeeds (Eur. *IA* 313 'slave that you are, you're telling me μακροὺς ... λόγους'; Arist. *Met.* 1091a7-9 'ὁ μακρὸς λόγος, like that of slaves when they have nothing wholesome to say'; Simonides (fr. 653 *PMG*) may have written a whole book of such speeches'.

5 δοξαστής: LSJ (s.v.) 'one who forms opinions or conjectures, opp. κριτής'.
cf. δόξα: LSJ (s.v.) 'A.II.2. mere opinion, conjecture, δόξη ἐπίστασθαι, ἡγεῖσθαι, imagine, suppose (wrongly), Hdt.8.132, Th.5.105; "δόξης ἀμαρτία" Id.1.32; δόξαι joined with φαντασία, Pl.Tht.161e, cf. Arist.*Ph.*254a29 ... **speaking by guess**, Isoc.8.8, cf. 13.8'. Emphasis mine.

6 cf. Dem. 21.221 αὐτίκα δὴ μάλα, ἐπειδὴν ἀναστῆ τὸ δικαστήριον *as soon as this court rises*, i.e. *adjourns*.

[9.1] ἐγὼ δὲ διαγιγνώσκειν μὲν ὑμῖν περὶ ἐμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιτρέπω, διαδο-
ξάζειν δὲ ἅπασιν ἀπαγορεύω, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ ἀνδρός,
ὃς οὐχ ἑκὼν ἀλλ' ἄκων ἀφίκται εἰς Τροίαν, καὶ περὶ
[9.5] ἐμοῦ ὃς πρῶτος ἀεὶ καὶ μόνος καὶ ἄνευ τείχους τέταγμαί.

[9.1] But while I rely upon you to make determination about me and my affairs,
I forbid you in all areas from making guesses, and this matter is about a man,
who not willingly but rather unwillingly came to Troy, and about
[9.5] me, who am always stationed first, and alone, and without walls.

ΟΔΥΣΣΕΥΣ Η ΟΔΥΣΣΕΩΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ

[1.1] οὐ πρὸς σέ μοι μόνον ὁ λόγος, δι' ὃν ἀνέστην,⁷ ἀλλὰ
καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας· πλείω γὰρ ἀγαθὰ πεποίηκα
τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐγὼ ἢ ὑμεῖς ἅπαντες. καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ζῶντος
ἂν ἔλεγον Ἀχιλλέως, καὶ νῦν τεθνεῶτος λέγω πρὸς ὑμᾶς.

[1.5] ὑμεῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐδεμίαν ἄλλην μάχην μεμάχησθε, ἦν
οὐχὶ καὶ ἐγὼ μεθ' ὑμῶν· ἐμοὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων κινδύνων οὐδεὶς
ὑμῶν οὐδὲν ζύνοιδε.

[2.1] καίτοι ἐν μὲν ταῖς κοιναῖς μάχαις,
οὐδὲ εἰ καλῶς ἀγωνίζοισθε, πλέον ἐγίγνετο οὐδέν· ἐν δὲ
τοῖς ἐμοῖς κινδύνοις, οὐς ἐγὼ μόνος ἐκινδύνεον, εἰ
μὲν κατορθώσαιμι, ἅπαντα ὑμῖν ἐπετελεῖτο, ὧν ἔνεκα

[2.5] δεῦρο ἀφίγμεθα, εἰ δ' ἐσφάλην, ἐμοῦ ἂν ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς
ἐστέρησθε. οὐ γὰρ ἵνα μαχοίμεθα τοῖς Τρωσὶ δεῦρ'
ἀφίγμεθα, ἀλλ' ἵνα τὴν τε Ἑλένην ἀπολάβοιμεν καὶ τὴν
Τροίαν ἔλοιμεν.

[3.1] ταῦτα δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐμοῖς κινδύνοις
ἐνῆν ἅπαντα. ὅπου γὰρ ἦν κεχρημένον ἀνάλωτον εἶναι
τὴν Τροίαν, εἰ μὴ πρότερον τὸ ἄγαλμα τῆς θεοῦ λάβοιμεν
τὸ κλαπὲν παρ' ἡμῶν,⁸ τίς ἐστὶν ὁ κομίσας δεῦρο τὸ ἄγαλ-

[1.1] My argument – for which I rose to speak – is not to you alone, but
also to all the others. For I have done the army
greater good than all of you. And these things, that I would have said to you even if
Achilles were alive, I am saying to you now that he is dead.

[1.5] For you fought no battle, but those which
I also fought with you. But none of you shares with me the knowledge of the risks
I took on my own.

[2.1] And indeed, in these shared battles,
not even if you had contended honourably, would any more have been achieved. But in
respect of my ventures – through which I alone hazarded the dangers – if in fact I have
executed them successfully, then all the goals for which we came to this place have been
accomplished

[2.5] for you, and if I had failed, you would have been deprived
of but one man. For it was not to fight against the Trojans that we came
here, but to recover Helen and
capture Troy.

[3.1] And all these depended on my ventures.
For example, when the oracle pronounced Troy
impregnable unless we had first seized the statue of the goddess
by our subterfuge; who conveyed the statue here

7 ἀνίστημι: LSJ (s.v.) '1. stand up, rise, esp. to speak, "τοιῖσι δ' ἀνέστη" Il.1.68,101, etc.'

8 cf. X.Cyr.5.5.13 τὸ παρ' ἐμοῦ ἀδίκημα done by me

[3.5] μα ἄλλος ἢ ἐγώ; ὃν σύ γε ἱεροσυλίας κρίνεις. σὺ γὰρ οὐδὲν οἶσθα, ὅστις τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀνασώσαντα τὸ ἄγαλμα τῆς θεοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν ὑφελόμενον⁹ παρ' ἡμῶν Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀποκαλεῖς ἱερόσυλον.

[4.1] καὶ τὴν Τροίαν
μὲν ἀλῶναι ἅπαντες εὐχεσθε, ἐμὲ δὲ τὸν ἐξευρόντα ὅπως ἔσται τοῦτο, ἀποκαλεῖς ἱερόσυλον; καίτοι εἶπερ καλὸν γε ἦν ἐλεῖν τὸ Ἴλιον, καλὸν καὶ τὸ εὐρεῖν τὸ τούτου αἴτιον.

[4.5] καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι χάριν ἔχουσι, σὺ δὲ καὶ ὄνειδίζεις ἐμοί.
ὑπὸ γὰρ ἀμαθίας ὦν εὖ πέπονθας οὐδὲν οἶσθα.

[5.1] κἀγὼ
μὲν οὐκ ὄνειδίζω σοι τὴν ἀμαθίαν – ἄκων γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ σὺ καὶ ἄλλοι πεπόνθασιν ἅπαντες – ἀλλ' ὅτι διὰ τὰ ὄνειδη τὰ ἐμὰ σφζόμενος οὐχ οἴός τε εἰ πείθεσθαι, ἀλλὰ

[5.5] καὶ προσαπειλεῖς ὡς κακὸν δράσων τι τούσδε, ἐὰν ἐμοὶ τὰ ὄπλα ψηφίσωνται. καὶ πολλάκις γε ἀπειλήσεις καὶ πολλά, πρὶν καὶ σμικρὸν τι ἐργάσασθαι· ἀλλ' εἶπερ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων τι χρὴ τεκμαίρεσθαι,¹⁰ ὑπὸ τῆς κακῆς ὀργῆς οἴομαί σε κακὸν τι σαυτὸν ἐργάσεσθαι.

[3.5] other than I, the man whom you [Ajax] adjudge guilty of temple-robbery? For you are ignorant, you who call the man who recovered the statue of the goddess 'temple-robber', but not Alexander who stole from us!

[4.1] And while every one of you is praying that Troy be captured, I, who discovered how this will come to pass, you brand 'temple-robber'? And yet if it was really noble to capture Ilios, it was also noble to discover the means to do it.

[4.5] And while the others are grateful, you go so far as to reproach me. For through stupidity you are ignorant of the benefits you have received.

[5.1] And I in fact am not reproaching you for your stupidity – for both you and all others who suffer this condition do so involuntarily – but rather, the fact that you are incapable of believing, due to the slanders which you brought against me, that you were saved by me. And

[5.5] you are even threatening in addition that you will do some harm against these men, if they were to vote the arms to me. And indeed you will threaten often and much, before you will accomplish even the slightest thing. But if one must form a judgement from probability, I think that by your wicked rage you *will* do some harm to your very self.

9 ὑφαιρέω LSJ (s.v.) 'II. 2. *take away underhand, filch away; purloin, steal*; also Med., *filch, purloin*'.

10 τεκμαίρομαι: LSJ (s.v.) 'A. *assign, ordain*, esp. of the gods; II. after *Hom. judge from signs*; abs., *form a judgement*'.

[6.1] καὶ ἐμοὶ μὲν, ὅτι τοὺς πολεμίους κακῶς ἐποίησα,
δειλίαν ὀνειδίξεις· σὺ δὲ ὅτι φανερῶς ἐμόχθεις καὶ μάτην,
ἠλίθιος ἦσθα. <ἦ> ὅτι μετὰ πάντων τοῦτο ἔδρασας, οἶει
βελτίων εἶναι; ἔπειτα περὶ ἀρετῆς πρὸς ἐμὲ λέγεις; ὅς
[6.5] πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ οἶσθα οὐδ' ὅπως ἔδει μάχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ
ὕς ἄγριος ὀργῇ φερόμενος τάχ' ἂν ποτε ἀποκτενεῖς σεαυτὸν
κακῶ περιπεσῶν τῷ. οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀγαθὸν
οὔθ' ὑφ' αὐτοῦ χρῆ οὔθ' ὑφ' ἑταίρου οὔθ' ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων
κακὸν οὐδ' ὀτιοῦν πάσχειν;

[7.1] σὺ δὲ ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες χαί-
ρεις, ὅτι σέ φασιν οἶδε ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι; ἐγὼ δὲ δειλότατόν
γε ἀπάντων τε καὶ δεδιότα τὸν θάνατον μάλιστα· ὅστις γε
πρῶτον ὄπλα ἔχεις ἄρρηκτα [καὶ ἄτρωτα], δι' ἅπερ σέ
[7.5] φασιν ἄτρωτον εἶναι. καίτοι τί ἂν δράσεις, εἴ τις σοὶ
τῶν πολεμίων τοιαῦτα ὄπλα ἔχων προσέλθοι; ἢ που κα-
λόν τι καὶ θαυμαστόν ἂν εἴη, εἰ μηδέτερος ὑμῶν μηδὲν
δραῖσαι δύναίτο. ἔπειτα οἶει τι διαφέρειν τοιαῦτα ὄπλα
ἔχων ἢ ἐντὸς τείχους καθῆσθαι; καὶ σοὶ μόνῳ δὴ τείχος
[7.10] οὐκ ἔστιν ὡς σὺ φῆς· μόνος μὲν οὖν σύ γε ἑπταβόειον
περιέρχη τείχος προβαλλόμενος ἑαυτοῦ·

[6.1] And so you rebuke me for cowardice because I have done
harm to the enemy. But because you were toiling openly and in vain,
you were foolish. Or is it because you have done this along with everyone, you think
you are better? And then you speak to me about excellence? You who
[6.5] in the first place don't know even how you ought to fight, but just like
a wild pig is carried away by anger, perhaps one day you will kill yourself
when you fall upon something evil. Do you not know that a brave warrior
should not suffer evil in any way whatsoever, not by his own hand, or his companion's
nor even at the hands of his enemies?

[7.1] But do you delight just as children do, because these men
say that you are brave? But I say you are actually the greatest coward
of all and fear death exceedingly. You who
firstly have arms that are indestructible, on account of which
[7.5] they say that you are invulnerable. And indeed what would you do, if one of your enemies
were to approach you bearing such arms? For surely
this would be something fine and marvellous, if neither of you
were able to do anything! Secondly, do you think there is any difference between bearing such
arms and being ensconced within a city-wall? For you alone
[7.10] there is no wall – so you say. Yet in fact it is you alone who go around
with a seven-ox-hide wall wrapped around yourself.

[8.1] ἐγὼ δὲ

ἄοπλος οὐ πρὸς τὰ τείχη τῶν πολεμίων ἀλλ' εἰς αὐτὰ
εἰσέρχομαι τὰ τείχη, καὶ τῶν πολεμίων τοὺς προφύλακας
ἐγρηγορότας αὐτοῖς ὄπλοισιν αἰρῶ, καὶ εἰμὶ στρατηγὸς
[8.5] καὶ φύλαξ καὶ σοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων, καὶ οἶδα τὰ
τ' ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς πολεμίοις, οὐχὶ πέμπων κατασκε-
ψόμενον ἄλλον· ἀλλ' αὐτός, ὥσπερ οἱ κυβερνῆται τὴν νύκτα
καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν σκοποῦσιν ὅπως σώσουσι τοὺς ναύτας,
οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἔγωγε καὶ σὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας σῶζω.

[9.1] οὐδ' ἔστιν ὄντινα κίνδυνον ἔφυγον αἰσχρὸν ἠγησά-
μενος, ἐν ᾧ μέλλοιμι τοὺς πολεμίους κακόν τι δράσειν·
οὐδ' εἰ μὲν ὄψεσθαί μὲ τινες ἔμελλον, γλιχόμενος¹¹ ἂν τοῦ
δοκεῖν ἐτόλμων.¹² ἀλλ' εἴτε δοῦλος εἴτε πτωχὸς καὶ μα-

[9.5] στιγίας ὧν μέλλοιμι τοὺς πολεμίους κακόν τι δράσειν, ἐπε-
χείρουν ἂν, καὶ εἰ μηδεὶς ὄρωη. οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ὁ πόλεμος
ἀλλὰ δρᾶν αἰεὶ καὶ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ καὶ ἐν νυκτὶ φιλεῖ τι. οὐδὲ
ὄπλα ἐστὶ μοι τεταγμένα, ἐν οἷς προκαλοῦμαι τοὺς
πολεμίους μάχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὄντινα ἐθέλει τις τρόπον, καὶ
[9.10] πρὸς ἓνα καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς ἔτοιμός εἰμ' αἰεὶ.

[8.1] Whereas I go unarmed, not just up to the walls of the enemy, but inside the very walls themselves. And I overpowered the watchful sentries of the enemy with their own weapons, and I am the general

[8.5] and protector of both you and all of the others, and I know what is going on here and among the enemy, and not because I send another spying; but I myself, just as helmsmen keep watch – through the night and through the day, so that they save the sailors – so I am the one who saves both you and all the others.

[9.1] And there is no danger that I shirked, because I thought it shameful, provided I could do some damage to the enemy.

And not even if some people were likely to witness me, would I have undertaken my ventures out of lust for a glorious reputation; but either as a slave, or as a beggar and knave,

[9.5] intending to do some harm to the enemy, I would make my attempt, even if no one was watching. For war does not lend itself to making glorious displays, but to taking action continuously both by day and by night.

I have no prescribed armaments in which I challenge the enemy to fight, but by whatever way anyone wants, and

[9.10] against one or against many, I am always ready.

11 γλίχομαι: LSJ (s.v.) 'cling to, strive after, long for, τινός Hdt.3.72; ὡς στρατηγήσεις γλίχεται how thou shalt become general, Hdt.7.161; +inf., ὧν ἐγλίχοντο μὴ ἄψασθαι Th.8.15; εἰδέναι Pl.Grg. 489d'.

12 τολμάω: LSJ (s.v.) 'II. 2. sts. +part. ἐ. . . βαλλόμενος he submitted to be struck, Od.24.162'.

[10.1] οὐδ' ἠνίκα

κάμνω μαχόμενος, ὥσπερ σύ, τὰ ὄπλα ἑτέροις παραδί-
δωμι, ἀλλ' ὅποταν ἀναπαύωνται οἱ πολέμιοι, τότε αὐτοῖς
τῆς νυκτὸς ἐπιτίθεμαι, ἔχων τοιαῦτα ὄπλα ἃ ἐκείνους

[10.5] βλάβει μάλιστα. καὶ οὐδὲ νῦξ πώποτέ με ἀφείλετο, ὥσπερ
σὲ πολλάκις μαχόμενον ἄσμενον πέπαυκεν· ἀλλ' ἠνίκα ἂν
ῥέγχις¹³ σύ, τῆνικαῦτα ἐγὼ σώζω σέ, καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους
ἀεὶ κακόν τι ποιῶ, ἔχων τὰ δουλοπρεπῆ ταῦτα ὄπλα καὶ
τὰ ῥάκη καὶ τὰς μάστιγας, δι' ἃς σὺ ἀσφαλῶς καθεύδεις.

[11.1] σὺ δ' ὅτι φέρων ἐκόμισας τὸν νεκρόν, ἀνδρεῖος οἶει
εἶναι; ὃν εἰ μὴ ἠδύνω φέρειν, δύο ἄνδρες ἂν ἐφερέτην,
κᾶπειτα κἀκεῖνοι περὶ ἀρετῆς ἴσως ἂν ἡμῖν ἠμφισβήτουν.

κᾶμοι μὲν ὁ αὐτὸς ἂν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἦν λόγος· σὺ δὲ τί ἂν
[11.5] ἔλεγες ἀμφισβητῶν πρὸς αὐτούς; ἢ δυοῖν μὲν οὐκ ἂν
φροντίσαις, ἑνὸς δ' ἂν αἰσχύνοιο ὁμολογῶν δειλότερος | εἶναι;

[12.1] οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐ τοῦ νεκροῦ τοῖς Τρωσὶν ἀλλὰ
τῶν ὄπλων ἔμελεν ὅπως λάβοιεν; τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀποδώσειν
ἔμελλον, τὰ δὲ ὄπλα ἀναθήσειν εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ τοῖς θεοῖς. τοὺς
γὰρ νεκροὺς οὐ τοῖς οὐκ ἀναιρουμένοις αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς

[12.5] μὴ ἀποδιδούσι θάπτειν. σὺ μὲν οὖν τὰ ἔτοιμα ἐκόμισας·
ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ ὄνειδιζόμενα ἀφειλόμην ἐκείνους.

[10.1] When I

grow weary I do not, as you do, hand over my arms to another,
but whenever the enemy rests, then I attack them
in the night, bearing such armaments as will

[10.5] harm them the most. And nor has the night ever yet hindered me,
as it has many times readily stopped you fighting. But when
you are snoring, at precisely that time I keep you safe; and ever
doing some harm to the enemy – bearing these servile weapons, and
rags, and lash marks – during which you securely sleep.

[11.1] And did you think that picking up and carrying the body was
brave? Which if you had not been able to pick up, two men would have picked up,
and then they would have perhaps been disputing with us over the prize of valour.
And I would have been delivering this very argument to them; and what would you

[11.5] be saying as you disputed against them? Or would you have given no heed
to two, but feel shame to admit to being more cowardly than one?

[12.1] Are you ignorant that the body was of no concern to the Trojans
but it was the arms that they were eager to seize? For they were going to give back
the body, but the the arms they were going to dedicate at their temples to the gods.
For those failing to take up bodies don't have shame, but rather those do

[12.5] who don't give them up for burial. So you carried away what was easy,
while I took from them the things which, by my seizing, brings them reproach.

13 ῥέγκω: LSJ (s.v.) 'A. snore; The form ῥέγχω occurs in Hp.Aph.6.51, Arist. Il. cc., Men.Mon.711, Orph.Fr.148'.

[13.1] φθόνον δὲ καὶ ἀμαθίαν νοσεῖς, κακῶν ἐναντι-
ώτατα αὐτοῖς· καὶ ὁ μὲν σε ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ τῶν καλῶν,
ἡ δὲ ἀποτρέπει. ἀνθρώπινον μὲν οὖν τι πέπονθας· διότι
γὰρ ἰσχυρός, οἶει καὶ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι. οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι σοφία¹⁴
[13.5] περὶ πόλεμον καὶ ἀνδρεία οὐ ταυτόν ἐστιν ἰσχυσαί;¹⁵ ἀμαθία
δὲ κακὸν μέγιστον τοῖς ἔχουσιν.

[14.1] οἶμαι δ', ἐάν
ποτέ τις ἄρα σοφὸς ποιητῆς περὶ ἀρετῆς γένηται, ἐμὲ
μὲν ποιήσει πολύτλαντα καὶ πολύμητιν καὶ πολυμήχανον
καὶ πτολίπορθον καὶ μόνον τὴν Τροίαν ἐλόντα, σὲ δέ,
[14.5] ὡς ἐγῶμαι, τὴν φύσιν ἀπεικάζων τοῖς τε νωθέσιν ὄνοις
καὶ βουσί τοῖς φορβάσιν, ἄλλοις παρέχουσι δεσμεύειν καὶ
ζευγνύναι αὐτούς.

[13.1] You are suffering from envy and ignorance, the most antithetical of evils
to each other: the one makes you desire noble things,
the other turns you away from them. So you are the victim of a particularly human frailty – for
since you are strong, you suppose that you are also brave. Are you ignorant that
[13.5] cleverness and bravery in battle is not the same thing as being strong? Stupidity
is the greatest evil to those who have it.

[14.1] But I believe, that if
there ever arises a poet who is shrewd concerning excellence, he will portray
me as much enduring, and much wily, and much scheming,
and a sacker of cities – the one who alone seized Troy. But you,
[14.5] I believe, he will depict with a nature resembling that of lazy donkeys¹⁶
and grazing cattle – permitting others to chain and
yoke them.

14 σοφία: Giannantoni.

15 cf. *Pi.Fr.61* τί ἔλπεαι σοφίαν ἔμμεν, ἂν ὀλίγον τοι | ἀνήρ ὑπὲρ ἀνδρὸς ἰσχύει; *What do you imagine wisdom to be – that by which a man prevails slightly over a man?*

16 cf. *Il.* 11.555ff

Introduction

This study will aim to re-contextualise Antisthenes' *Ajax* and *Odysseus*. The majority of scholarship carried out to date on these major extant fragments of this important literary figure have considered them to be philosophical texts. This is the first serious consideration of them as literary artefacts with their place in the broader literary and cultural framework assessed and discussed.

In antiquity Antisthenes was considered to be among the three or four most important Socratic philosophers and in good company with writers such as Plato and Xenophon. His reputation in modern scholarship, however, is almost non-existent. This situation is just one of several anomalies regarding Antisthenes that this thesis will set out to address. Generally considered to have lived from about 445 to 366, the reported tradition relates that Antisthenes was a student of the sophist Gorgias before becoming one of the closest companions of Socrates. Probably of noble birth, he certainly had the means to support himself so that he could spend all his time with Socrates. Plato records that he was present at Socrates' death. A prolific author, Antisthenes composed over 70 volumes of literary and philosophical works on a range of topics rivalled only by Aristotle and Democritus. Apart from the *Ajax* and *Odysseus*, which seem to be complete, only fragments are now extant.

In the opinion of ancient scholars, Antisthenes was one of the best exponents of the pure Attic style. Ancient critics including Cicero, Panaetius, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Phrynichus and Epictetus spoke favourably of his works and numbered him amongst the most influential writers of his day. In particular he was regularly mentioned along with Plato and Xenophon as one of the most important Socratic writers and as an author of Socratic dialogues. Modern scholarship, in comparison, has virtually completely ignored Antisthenes. Handbooks on oratory and rhetoric either mention him in a single line or fail to mention him at all. The only scholarly monograph on Antisthenes ever published in English (Rankin, 1986) is titled *Anthisthenes Sokraticos* – the misspelling occurs on the cover, the spine, and the front page of the book. In Oxford's 2007 *Handbook to Greek Rhetoric*, in a discussion of Hellenic oratory, Vanderspoel credits Antisthenes with founding a school of rhetoric in Rhodes in the fourth century. Given that Antisthenes died around 366 and the Hellenistic

period began in 323, Vanderspoel is probably getting Antisthenes of Athens confused with the historian Antisthenes of Rhodes who lived c. 200 BC.

The only complete fragments of Antisthenes' work that survive are two speeches composed notionally on behalf of the epic heroes Ajax and Odysseus. Each hero in turn offers reasons as to why he should receive the arms of Achilles or why his rival should not. Being composed at the close of the fifth or beginning of the fourth century they are instances of the earliest extant, non-historical prose. They are, for example, as long as anything that survives from Gorgias. In spite of this, these works of Antisthenes, who was as famous as Plato in antiquity, have been almost completely neglected. Luis Navia published a second book in English on Antisthenes in 2001. In the entire volume he mentions these complete works twice and does not discuss them. It is not entirely surprising, however, that more people are not studying the *Ajax* and *Odysseus* given the absence of any complete, continuous translation of them in any language. This probably makes Antisthenes the only major late fifth, early fourth century writer who has not been translated. In so far as these works have been noticed by scholars, they have generally been considered epideictic or display speeches, that is, model examples of speeches presenting an ideal version of an argument guaranteed to sway the jury and win the case.

Chapter one will start off by summarising the surviving information about Antisthenes' life before moving on to survey the assessments of Antisthenes in antiquity, at which time he was much admired. As already noted, Antisthenes has not enjoyed such a high reputation in modern times. However, to the extent that he has been noticed the scholarship will be examined. The *Ajax* and *Odysseus* will be considered, with a view to deciding whether they fit the mould of 'epideictic' or 'display' speeches, as is most commonly claimed. The findings will prove to be contrary to the consensus of modern scholarship.

In the second chapter the subject of ancient characterisation will be discussed. Close attention will be paid to Lysias, as he is credited with developing characterisation, and especially ethopoiia, for ancient rhetoric. The development of characterisation and ethopoiia in particular, was an exciting moment in literary history. It demonstrated an interest and willingness on the part of ancient writers to try to understand the ethics and mindset that

motivated other people and then to represent them through appropriately devised texts. Though it might be imagined that the development of characterisation in prose writing was an important field of study for ancient literature, there is very little scholarship on the subject. Nevertheless, what there is will be surveyed and then the *Ajax* and *Odysseus* will be examined in the light of these findings to see if perhaps Antisthenes himself was participating in or even stimulating the bold and original work on characterisation that was taking place in this period.

In chapter three the place of the *Ajax* and *Odysseus* in the broader literary and cultural framework of the late fifth and early fourth century will be considered. In epic Odysseus was always portrayed as an heroic figure. However, in the second quarter of the fifth century he became a villain. In tragedy, rhetoric, philosophy and art, Odysseus came to be consistently characterised as a crafty word-smith who preyed on a series of guileless, noble Homeric heroes such as Ajax, Achilles and Priam. The surviving works in which this characterisation of Odysseus and his noble victims is evident will be surveyed and then a series of symbolically opposed ethical values will be discussed. Antisthenes' place in the wider context will be kept in mind throughout. Finally, the broader fifth century socio-historical background will be touched on.

The last chapter will consider Antisthenes' own philosophical outlook and what can be ascertained about it from the *Ajax* and *Odysseus*, as well as from his other extant fragments (which number about 200). Antisthenes has uniformly been considered to be a proto-Cynic whose philosophy is therefore generally read in conformity with Cynic views. Those authors who have thought about it all agree that Odysseus, as represented in Antisthenes' speech, is the winner of the debate with Ajax, and is also some sort of expression of Antisthenes' Cynic outlook. These views will be closely scrutinised and challenged with extensive reference to the other extant fragments as well as to Plato's *Apology*. From this study a rather unorthodox, yet also unambiguous, view of Antisthenes' philosophical and ethical concerns will emerge that will new light on the texts and on Antisthenes himself.

Chapter 1 – Antisthenes; his *Ajax* and *Odysseus*.

Though initially reported to have been a student of Gorgias, Antisthenes was most influenced by Socrates. He is said to have walked five miles every day to Athens from his home in Peiraeus to hear Socrates and he also advised his own followers to become students of Socrates (D.L. 6.1-2). He seems to have been a constant companion of Socrates. In Xenophon's *Memorabilia* he is presented as a primary interlocutor of Socrates; by his side and ready to answer questions at a moment's notice (2.5.1-3). In the same work Socrates himself says that Antisthenes never leaves him (3.11.17). He has an even more prominent role in Xenophon's *Symposium*, where he is portrayed as the most important person present next to Socrates.¹⁷ When Socrates asks him if he has a passion for anyone, he replies 'By the gods, I do have a passion, very much so: it's you!' (8.4).¹⁸ It is also reported that in Antisthenes' writings Socrates is the only person who retains his reputation as a good advisor, respectable teacher and so on (Ath. 5.220e). Plato depicts him in the *Phaedo* as one of the close friends of Socrates, present at the time of his death (59b). Afterwards it is reported that Antisthenes was responsible for the exile of Anytus and the execution of Meletus, the accusers at Socrates' trial (D.L. 6.8-9).

In antiquity Antisthenes enjoyed a reputation for conversing and debating that was the equal of any of his contemporaries. Of all the Socratics, Antisthenes alone was praised by Theopompus, who said he had consummate skill and could, by means of agreeable discourse, win over anyone he pleased (*FGrH* 115 F 295 = *SSR* 22.9ff). Xenophon described him similarly as the most agreeable of men in conversation and the most temperate in everything else (D.L. 6.15 = *SSR* 22.12f). Antisthenes' portrait in Xenophon's *Symposium* shows that it is he rather than Socrates who is the master of ἔλεγχος or 'cross-examination'. He rises to cross-examine any person who makes a statement he is dubious about,¹⁹ and actually cross-examines Socrates himself at one point (2.10).²⁰ Callias even makes a joke of

17 Noted by Sayre 1948, 238; cf. Rankin 1986, 20.

18 Socrates (not normally a winner of beauty contests) teases Antisthenes in reply that it is only his good looks that he is infatuated with and not his soul (8.6).

19 e.g. Callias at 3.4 & again at 4.2-3, Niceratos at 3.6,

20 To ask him why if, as Socrates says, women can be taught anything, he does not then teach his wife Xanthippe, 'the most difficult woman not just of this generation, but of all generations past and yet to come'.

this tendency and muses about what the best sort of music would be to accompany Antisthenes when he starts cross-examining one of the symposiasts. Antisthenes suggests whistling (presumably derisive)²¹ (4.5).

Antisthenes also had a prodigious literary output. Diogenes Laertius lists more than 70 titles, a quantity, and on a range of topics, rivalled only by Aristotle (46 works: D.L. 5.13) and Democritus (68 works: D.L. 9.13). The titles cover topics including language, dialogue, and literature, as well as ethics and politics (Prince 2006, 79). Ancient critics considered Antisthenes to be a similar calibre of writer to contemporaries who are far better known today. Phrynichus, an admirer of style, rated Antisthenes as one of the finest exponents of the pure Attic style along with writers including Plato, Xenophon, Thucydides and Critias (SSR 50). Dionysius of Halicarnassus classed Antisthenes as a Socratic writer along with Critias and Xenophon (*Thuc.* 51). Epictetus commended the writings of Antisthenes for their excellent style and discusses them in conjunction with those of Plato and Xenophon (*Discourses* 2.17.36). Lucian also mentions Antisthenes' writings in the same breath as those of Plato (*The Ignorant Book Collector* 27; *The Parasite* 43). Fronto compares lesser authors unfavourably against the trio of Plato, Xenophon and Antisthenes (*Ambr.* 392), and Julian discusses Xenophon, Antisthenes and Plato as all being users of myth in the discussion of ethical theory (*Or.* 7.215-7). We also know that along with Plato, Xenophon and Aeschines, Antisthenes wrote Socratic dialogues, the genuineness of which was attested by Panaetius (D.L. 2.64 = F 126²²). In fact, Theopompus of Chios claimed that a number of Plato's works were derived from prior dialogues of Antisthenes²³ (*FGrH* 115, F 259 = Ath. 11.508c). Because of the profound impact Socrates had on Antisthenes, Prince even suggests that it is unlikely that he would have allowed the circulation of any works – e.g. from a theoretical 'rhetorical' period as Gorgias' student – that did not reflect Socrates' influence (2006, 78-9). If so, it could be assumed that any extant fragments of his works do incorporate his Socratic values.

In terms of Antisthenes' extant fragments, about 200 have been collected. Of these, two appear to be complete works. They are the *Ajax* and *Odysseus*, two speeches crafted

21 Conjectured by Bowen 1998, ad loc..

22 In M. Van Straaten. 1946. *Panétius: fragments*. Amsterdam.

23 Perhaps to be taken with a grain of salt – the title of Theopompus' work was *Against Plato's School*.

notionally on behalf of the heroes, mounting arguments as to why they respectively deserve to be awarded the arms of Achilles. These speeches appear to have passed almost unnoticed by most of scholarship. An extensive search has not revealed that there has ever been a complete, continuous translation of them published in any language.²⁴

In so far as the speeches have been noticed, they are generally considered to be 'epideictic' or display speeches that present an ideal version of an argument. Jebb in a footnote terms them 'ἐπιδείξεις of the same class as the speeches for and against Palamedes ascribed respectively to Gorgias and Alcidas' (1907, xlvi, n. 1). In his handbook, Kennedy includes them in his chapter 'Epideictic Oratory' (1963, 170-2). Worman calls them 'set speeches' (2002, 33 & 85), and elsewhere elaborates that they are 'speeches that were written for instruction in how to compose a persuasive speech. They are thus rare examples of a mostly lost tradition of using mythohistorical figures to hone rhetorical technique' (150). Sayre also terms them 'rhetorical' (1948, 237). They have also been referred to recently as 'playful speeches', and 'exemplary debates' (Fox 2007, 544). Bearing these opinions in mind, it is worth commencing a discussion of the speeches by considering some examples of the 'persuasive rhetoric' that the protagonists employ. Of the two speeches, it is clear that Ajax's comes first because Odysseus attacks elements of his opponent's speech when he replies (e.g. *Od.* 3.6ff, 4.5, 5.5, 6.1, 6.4).

Ajax starts out in the first line by saying 'I wish I was being tried by the very people who were there with us during this venture.' That is: I wish I had another jury and not you. He then goes on to say 'you who are judging are ignorant – what sort of justice could one receive from judges who are ignorant?' (1.4f). So really asking: who are you to be judging me? You are so ignorant that you are incapable of delivering a just verdict. He claims that the judges know nothing about 'excellence' (ἀρετή) and thus are incompetent to perform the task they have undertaken (4.3). Further into his speech he addresses them as 'you ignorant judges' and orders them to only consider actions not arguments when making their judgement (7.1). He goes on to command them: 'say that you don't understand the arguments made', in other words: admit your ignorance! (8.3ff). Finally he more or less orders: I forbid you to do what

24 Rankin offered a reasonable translation paragraph by paragraph interspersed with comments; Rankin 1986, 152-73.

juries do! (9.2).

Ajax does not stop at insulting the jury but, as he builds toward the conclusion of his case, he actually begins to issue thinly veiled threats: 'This is what you should look at and consider: that unless you decide nobly, you will come to realise that argument has no power in comparison with action!' (7.6ff). This rapidly develops into direct threats: 'judge correctly. And do this not secretly, but openly, 'so that you may realise' (ἵνα γνῶτε) that there is a penalty that must be paid by those who judge, if they do not judge correctly!' (8.4ff). The purpose clause used here holds an implicit threat.

Worman suggests that Antisthenes is working in these speeches with 'ideas about how different styles ought to suit different character types to be persuasive' (2002, 33). While Ajax is certainly not bland, if his character was intended to be persuasive, it seems that Antisthenes has crafted a rather stunning failure. Evidently, Ajax is so far from being concerned about winning the jury over that he actually repeatedly insults them and then goes on to issue commands and threats. Thus it is clearly difficult to make a convincing argument that this is a model speech designed to persuade or sway the jury. Consider in contrast the remarks that Palamedes made to the jury in the eponymous epideictic speech penned by Gorgias: 'a summary of a long speech is worthwhile when one is speaking to a jury of inferiors; but before the leaders of Greece it is uncalled-for, as is the exhortation to pay attention or to remember what is said' (DK 82 B11.37). Ajax's attitude throughout the entire speech is a far cry from ever hitting a conciliatory note let alone approaching this sort of ingratiating tone. Rather than adopt a mild and appeasing persona intended to engage and win over the jurors, in his best moments Ajax is terse and indignant; the rest of the time he is strident, righteous and insulting. His character is obviously entirely unsuited to the courtroom, and thus to being used as a set piece epideictic. So it seems rather difficult to sustain the argument that it is intended as an example of an ideal rhetorical display speech that is guaranteed to win the case.

It could then perhaps be argued that Ajax is merely being set up as a foil for his opponent; a sort of straw man that Odysseus can display superior skills by demolishing. If he were really to be an effective foil, however, he should offer a very compelling and convincing

argument. Thus the brilliance of Odysseus would be revealed by his ability to overcome such a sophisticated defence. But Ajax's argument is not even a moderately good one for persuading the jurors, let alone a great one. More than anything it is actually self-defeating. So this begs the question: what then is Antisthenes setting out to do with this speech?

There are further clues as to the purpose of the speech in other things Ajax says. He regrets the fact that he cannot nobly refrain altogether from debasing himself by having to address an unworthy jury rather than letting his noble deeds speak for themselves. Unfortunately, the men worthy to judge him are not present. Thus he laments: 'For I know that, while it would only be necessary for me to be silent, nothing would be gained by this man by arguing. But as it is, those who were there during these deeds are absent' (1.2ff). (The inference here is that none of the judges belong, as he does, to the class of 'men of action'). He further emphasises the worthlessness of arguments versus action at 1.6ff, and later adds that 'because of a dearth of action, many and long arguments are argued' (8.2ff). He exhorts the jury to only consider deeds and not arguments when deciding over matters of 'excellence' (ἀρετή). 'For indeed war is not decided by argument but by action. It is not possible to gainsay the enemy, but either to fight and conquer, or be enslaved – *in silence*' (7.2ff). The words put into Ajax's mouth are very much the words that a literary representation of the noble Ajax required. In fact, he is very much his noble self and his speech is actually characterising him as such. Clearly this is not an attempt to put forward an ideal argument for Ajax's defence, but is rather an attempt to put forward an argument for the defence of Ajax's ideals. Ideals which the speech shows to be beleaguered and rare. In an important sense this speech showcases, not rhetoric, but character and values.

Further evidence of this can be found in the fact that Ajax goes on to base his whole case on character. He contrasts his dignified and noble character, taciturn but big on brave deeds, with the scurrilous and deceitful character of Odysseus, who is garrulous but cowardly. He specifically states that 'if I were opposed to a man of similar character (ὁμοίωτροπον) to myself, being defeated would not matter to me' (5.1). In reality, however, he claims that their characters could not be more different. 'For while there is no exploit he would do openly, I would not dare to do anything surreptitiously. And whereas I could not bear a bad

reputation, nor to be mistreated, he would endure being strung up for flogging if he would gain anything by it!' (5.2ff). He goes on to recount the fact that Odysseus actually did go ahead and submit to being flogged, and beaten, and punched in the face by slaves, and dressed in rags. And having done so he then robbed a temple (6.1ff). This rather naturally leads Ajax to incredulously enquire how such a wretch could imagine he deserved to gain possession of the arms of Achilles (6.6ff). By the close of his speech he informs the jurors confidently that there is no way such an 'arguing man' could possibly aid them (8.1).

It also seems that not only is Ajax characterised as himself after the model of the staunch warrior depicted in epic, but also on the model employed in fifth century literary interpretations that held him up as a bastion of nobility defending 'what is noble' (τὸ καλόν) against the rabble rousers and the base mob (οἱ πολλοί). Throughout his address, as has been noted, Ajax treats his judges as though they are entirely beneath him. He considers them to be some sort of democratic jury and utterly incapable of making judgements about 'excellence' (ἀρετή) and 'the nobility' (οἱ καλοὶ κάγαθοί). In one outburst of righteous, noble indignation he tells the jurors 'you who are ignorant have undertaken to judge a matter about which you have no clue' (4.3ff). It is clear that here Antisthenes is likening Ajax's judges to a popular democratic jury. And what Ajax is really implying is: how can a jury of the base mob possibly imagine they can judge one of the nobility on the subject of excellence?

Ajax even calls into question the credentials of the kings by claiming that they have shown themselves unworthy of their positions by abdicating their responsibility for judging the contest. He is certain that this is due to their lack of competence for the task: 'I know this: that no king competent to judge about excellence would entrust this to others any more than a good doctor would allow the diagnosis of illnesses by another' (4.4ff). In other words, they are not competent to judge about excellence because they are not real kings.

In another rather brilliant display of aristocratic contempt for the democratic institution of law courts manned by non-aristocratic judges, at one point he snidely suggests to the jurors that they should recognise 'that you are seated here not as *judges* (κρίται) over the arguments but merely as *guessers*' (δοξασταὶ, 8.7f). Real judges – e.g. aristocratic judges from the

Areopagus, appointed from among the wealthy and noble ex-Archons (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 3.6; cf. Plut. *Per.* 10.3-4) – would know a good man when they saw one. This rabble of base men do not recognise or perceive what is noble and so can only make guesses based on specious arguments crafted with flowery words. When Ajax closes his speech telling his judges that he is 'always stationed first, and alone, without a wall', (9.6) what he is really saying is: I am superior to all of you; and I don't need you.

In contrast, the speech of Odysseus generally offers arguments more calculated to win over the judges and win the debate. He creates an identity opposed to Ajax and in alliance with the jury by using the first person plural pronoun ἡμῶν (3.4, 3.7). In contrast, Ajax never uses it inclusively like this. Odysseus also enhances the perception of alienation (that Ajax himself has created) by referring to Ajax as 'you' (σύ) and the jurors as 'the others' (μὲν ἄλλοι, 4.5). He later reminds the jury of Ajax's threats against them: 'you are even threatening in addition that you will do some harm against these men, if they were to vote the arms to me' (5.5). Odysseus turns Ajax's repeated insults against the jury regarding ignorance back on him, while at the same time presumably appealing to the judges sense of vengeful righteousness, by accusing Ajax of being ignorant and ungrateful (4.6). He points out that Ajax's open struggle was pointless and achieved nothing (6.2), and that it appears that he knows nothing about excellence nor even how to fight (6.4f).

In spite of these relatively persuasive arguments, Odysseus still starts out by alienating the judges. In his first breath he more or less tells them: I have achieved more and I am worth more than the whole lot of you (1.3), and while you cannot act without me, I can without you (1.5). He adds that their efforts were pointless, even if they *had* fought bravely (which they did not, 2.2). His efforts, however, were effective (2.4), and in fact the success of the entire expedition depended solely on him (3.1). Whereas the only thing the rest of the army can do is pray that Troy might be captured, Odysseus single-handedly discovers how to do it (4.1ff). Meanwhile everyone else toiled away in vain (6.2f). Odysseus also joins with Ajax in declaring to the jurors that: you are all ignorant of my activities on your behalf (1.7), implying later for good measure that they are all foolish (6.3).

So although he mounts some well-judged arguments as to why he deserves the arms of

Achilles, it is evident that he treats his judges with an aristocratic contempt of a related ilk to Ajax's. Even when Odysseus conspicuously commends the jurors in contrast to Ajax – 'while the others are grateful, you go so far as to reproach me' (4.5) – he continues to bear an air of superiority toward his less fortunate wards. Apparently they are only too grateful to have a resourceful leader such as him to defend and deliver them. In reality, Odysseus, like his opponent, is of noble stock, but unlike Ajax, he appears to have submitted to employing (if not altogether skilfully) the language and strategies necessary to survive in a democratic system. He is, in other words, being characterised as a sort of proto-demagogue.

In summary, neither of the speeches is an effective example of epideictic. They fail to demonstrate proper respect for the judges – in Ajax's case, rather astoundingly. They also fail to deliver compelling arguments, much less ideal ones. Both speakers display a great deal of their own character rather than adopting a persona calculated to win the jurors over and hence win the case. As mentioned though, it does seem that Odysseus is being characterised as somewhat of a demagogue. As one would expect of such characterisation, he is at least reasonably persuasive. Nevertheless, his aristocratic contempt for the judges still shows through at several points.

If the speeches are not epideictic, this raises the question: what are they? And what was Antisthenes attempting to do with them? The difficulty of classifying and understanding the speeches is made evident by the lack of attention they have received. The histories and handbooks on Greek oratory either make no mention,²⁵ or cursory mention,²⁶ of Antisthenes. It appears that none discuss his *Ajax* and *Odysseus*. The speeches have received varying levels of attention from a handful of modern authors in other fields, but none really offer much depth of discussion or notice features such as the spectacularly self-defeating nature of Ajax's approach. The next chapter will explore these questions further and propose some answers to them.

25 e.g. Habinek 2005; Jost 2004; Yunis 1996; Kennedy 1994.

26 e.g. Fox & Livingstone 2007, 133, 544; Usher 1999, 296 n. 2; Johnstone 1996, 34, 37, 100; Poulakis 1995, 183 n. 7; Schiappa 1994, 131, 140; Easterling 1985, 510; Russell 1983, 16.

Chapter 2 – Characterisation: Ethopoiia and the *Ajax* and *Odysseus*.

Before commencing a specific discussion of Antisthenes and what he was seeking to demonstrate with his *Ajax* and *Odysseus* it will be useful to conduct a brief survey of the trends in rhetoric at the turn of the fifth into the fourth century. Oratory in Athens took on a whole new dimension in 427 when Gorgias, as part of an embassy from Leontini in Sicily (Th. 3.86.3), 'astounded' (κατεπλήξατο) the Athenian assembly (D.H. *Lys.* 3; cf. Pl. *Hp.Ma.* 282b) and 'amazed' (ἐξέπληξε) them with his elaborate use of rhetorical devices (D.S. 12.53.3f). This heralded the onset of a new wave of creative speech writing. Shortly thereafter, in historical prose, Thucydides too was 'utilising poetical devices' (ποιητικῆ κατασκευῆ χρησάμενος) for the speeches he was writing, while 'frequently imposing a lofty tone upon his style, and at the same time embellishing it with rather unusual words'²⁷ (D.H. *Lys.* 3). He was also lending the speakers a degree of characterisation by their style of delivery; for example the Spartans are generally depicted as terse and reticent (Francis 1993).

Then at the close of the fifth century, with a career probably commencing in 403 (Jebb 1893, i.153), Lysias developed a natural style of rhetoric, which, while retaining considerable 'force and power' (ισχὺν καὶ δύναμιν), nonetheless, 'employed ordinary and regular words' (ἐν ὀνόμασι κυρίοις καὶ κοινοῖς, D.H. *Lys.* 3). Of particular interest for the investigation in hand is the fact that he developed the ability to dramatise character in his speeches (i.156). He was known in antiquity as an exponent of the 'plain style' (λέξις λιτή), which employed 'everyday language' (ιδιωτῆς λόγος, D.H. *Dem.* 2), and as such he provided customers with speeches very much in character, so that when delivered they gave the impression of being their own words (Jebb 1893, i.159, 163). This seemingly natural style of characterisation through use of language was termed 'ethopoiia' (ἠθοποιΐα). One modern critic finds individual characterisation to be inconsistently used throughout Lysias' speeches, only really detecting it in a handful of speeches.²⁸ He sums up his study stating: 'Character-portrayal is thus far from being common to all the speeches of Lysias' (Usher 1965, 119). This estimation is at odds, however, with the premier ancient critic, Dionysius, who declares himself 'quite incapable of finding one individual' portrayed in the speeches of Lysias – of the 200 known

²⁷ ἐν πολλοῖς ἐξήλλαξε τὴν ἑρμηνείαν εἰς ὄγκον ἅμα καὶ κόσμον ὀνομάτων ἀηθέστερον.

²⁸ 1, 3, 7, 10, 16, 19, 24, 31 & 32; Usher 1965, 101-16.

to him (*Lys.* 17) – who is 'lacking character or lifeless' (ἀνηθοποίητον οὔτε ἄψυχον, *Lys.* 8).

There has been very little modern discourse on the use of ethopoiia in literary works, and the two specific studies there are in English (only one since 1892) focus squarely on Lysias (Devries 1892, Usher 1965). Jebb, in his still very useful study of the Attic orators, also devotes three pages to discussing ethopoiia as developed and utilised by Lysias (1893, 173-6). Devries' work *Ethopoiia*, a study of character types, considers only the works of Lysias. Among ancient writers employing ethopoiia, Devries finds that Lysias 'excels all others' (1892, 13). Interestingly, in the other important study of characterisation, Usher claims: 'None of the arguments adduced by Jebb, Devries and others in favour of its meaning "individual characterisation" is convincing'. Rather he thinks it can mean no more than 'moral tone' (1965, 99 n. 2).²⁹ It appears that he may have subsequently recanted this position, however, as in a more recent book, when discussing a case of 'ethopoiia', he elaborates by describing it as 'portrayal of the speaker's character' (1999, 310). Certainly Dionysius seems to think it is something like this. He attributes Lysias' ability to express ethopoiia (ἠθοποιΐα) to his 'excellence' at manifesting 'thought, diction, and composition' (διάνοια, λέξις, σύνθεσις) in his speeches (D.H. *Lys.* 8). That is to say, the thoughts, the choice of words, and the manner in which they are combined reflect the character of the person they are written for and who will deliver them. Dionysius goes on to add that 'appropriateness' (τὸ πρέπον) was an important adjunct to ethopoiia. This was Lysias' ability to match appropriate style to the speaker, the audience, and the subject matter. 'For the characters differ from each other in age, family background, education, occupation, way of life, and in other regards' (*Lys.* 9). As 'ethopoiia' is generally used in modern scholarship, it probably more accurately refers to 'characterisation' by a combination of what Dionysius called 'ethopoiia' and 'appropriateness'. Carey also notices a difference between Dionysius' and modern scholars' use of the term 'ethopoiia'; like Usher, he thinks Dionysius use of it was limited to 'moral tone', whereas modern scholars mean Lysias' 'extensive use of "dramatic" character' (1989, 10). Clearly in as much as ethopoiia has been considered (which is not very much) there remains uncertainty as to its meaning. It may or may not be 'moral

29 A position with which Todd agrees (2000, 7).

tone', 'appropriateness', 'dramatic characterisation'. This does show that to modern eyes Lysias' characterisation seems bound by ethical and rhetorical constraints that seem somewhat alien to modern literature. And yet all agree that for the first time in the history of Greek prose writing there arose a new concern for individualising speech, whether that individualisation was primarily inspired by ethical philosophy or by theatre.

The development of ethology, i.e. attempting to understand the way other people think and the values that motivate them on their own terms, is an unusual event in history. It represents a major shift in world view from a more common culturally complacent tendency throughout history to take a derogatory stance towards anything 'other'. Mikhail Bakhtin characterised it as a shift from a 'monologic' to a 'dialogic' mode of representation. Ethopoiia then is the attempt to demonstrate the way an individual of a specific social position, driven by certain thoughts and values, would act. In as much as ethopoiia for speech writing has been considered, Lysias is credited with conceiving it. In particular he is known for specialising in the development of the appropriate characterisation to appeal to juries in various sorts of forensic cases. Antisthenes' name, however, has never been mentioned in regard to ethological speech writing. But could what he was doing also be classed as ethopoiia?

Certainly Antisthenes was interested in character and how it is manifested. Listed among the titles in the second volume of his works is a treatise called: 'Concerning the Sophists: a Physiognomy' (Περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν φυσιογνωμονικός). This is the first recorded instance of physiognomy meeting with a philosophical interpretation in the ancient world (Boys-Stone 2007, 23). Tsouna surmises that Antisthenes' treatise 'probably attacked the physiognomical diagnoses attempted by the sophists', but offers no reasons why she thinks so (1998, 181). By the title, however, it seems reasonably clear that the work was about the sophists, not against them. The preposition *περὶ* does not normally have an adversarial meaning. So it is more likely that it was a discussion of the ideas of the sophists concerning physiognomy. Even more interesting for the current discussion is Antisthenes' study entitled 'Concerning Style, or, Concerning Characters' (Περὶ λέξεως ἢ περὶ χαρακτήρων), which is recorded as being bound in the same volume of his works as (and immediately

ahead of) the *Ajax* and *Odysseus* (D.L. 6.15). These works demonstrate Antisthenes' deep interest in aspects of style and character, how they manifest themselves, and how they might be represented.

In modern criticism, however, as noted in the previous chapter, Antisthenes' *Ajax* and *Odysseus* have on the whole attracted very little scholarly attention. When they have been noticed, despite a considerable divergence of opinion as to their purpose, the notion that Antisthenes was demonstrating *ethopoiia* has usually not been considered. In the most recent of only two English language monographs on Antisthenes,³⁰ Navia mentions these complete fragments of Antisthenes only very briefly twice in the entire volume, one of those times being in a footnote (2001, 14 & 51 n.4).³¹ Although he mentions the texts he offers not one word of discussion about what he thinks they are and if they might be important in any way. Indeed one of the two modern authors to make explicit mention to *ethopoiia* in conjunction with Antisthenes' speeches, does so to deny that Antisthenes was using it.³²

Moving on to consider authors who have at least looked at the texts and offered an opinion, Sier interprets the speeches as 'two sides of the same coin' representing the central ideas of Antisthenes' linguistic philosophy (1996, 80-1). Most recently Tindale suggested that the speeches 'explore important questions of courage and cowardice' (2010, 109). In a related vein, Prince thinks that the protagonists are engaged in a 'debate over the nature of virtue' (2006, 82), later reiterating that it is 'a debate about virtue and the correct meaning of "virtue" and related terms from the vantages of opposed moral characters' (83). She adds that the speeches have puzzled scholars and that they are 'not charming in any obvious way!' (83). In a slightly curious conclusion, she finally decides that Odysseus 'represents an ideal for just one aspect of the wise man, his role as *rhetor*, whose function is to direct others toward the good rather than to be good himself' (85). She goes on to argue that 'Odysseus' goal is more to convert Ajax from his rigid, shame-based moral view to virtue, and so save him from the suicide predetermined in the myth, than to win the contest for the arms. Insofar as he fails to benefit Ajax, Antisthenes' Odysseus might be a model not for success,

30 The other being Rankin 1986.

31 It is also a little unfortunate that on both occasions he also refers to the *Odysseus* as the *Ulysses*.

32 See on Eucken below.

but for a correctly constructed intention to benefit the interlocutor' (85). It will be argued below that Antisthenes' intention was somewhat different.

Evidence of characterisation in the pieces has also been asserted or denied to some extent by a handful of authors. Stanford notices that Ajax's speech is 'arrogant, insensitive, and tactless' and that he 'maladroitly implies that he thinks little of his judges, and lectures them on their proper attitude and duty' (1968, 97). Offering a rather cursory interpretation, Hesk says that 'Odysseus' speech is longer, funnier and cleverer than the somewhat inept effort of Ajax' (2000, 119). In a discussion about fifth century style, Worman gives Antisthenes considerably more credit when she assumes 'that Antisthenes was working with a notion of *charaktêr* associated with verbal style, which likely involved ideas about how different styles ought to suit different character types', but oddly takes the point of the exercise as an attempt 'to be persuasive' (2002, 33). In a subsequent more detailed look at the speeches she comes closer to the mark in arguing that 'Antisthenes fashions a more abbreviated speech for Ajax in his conflict with Odysseus, as befits the angry hero's terse character type' (169). She also notes that Ajax's 'arguments border on a blunt rudeness ... as befits the terse man of action' (185) and 'his phrases tend to be short, with frequent end-stops and simple vocabulary. As a good soldier who belongs on the battlefield rather than in the lawcourt' (186). Worman writes that in contrast Antisthenes' 'representation of Odysseus' style better befits the rhetorically adept hero' (185). Also detecting an element of characterisation, Rankin observes: 'There is a dry pawkiness about Antisthenes' characters, especially Aias, which may reflect his own personality' (1986, 153). Similarly observing the author in one of his characters – though the opposite one – Stanford feels that Odysseus 'begins with a needlessly unconciliatory remark, more characteristic of the gruff Antisthenes than of Homer's hero' (1968, 97). Most of these authors seem to regard Antisthenes' characters as a problem, or a sign of his limitations as a writer – i.e. he was only capable of presenting autobiographical characterisations. They do not recognise his works as the bold and brilliant experiment in *ethopoiia* that I will argue them to be.

Finally, there are two modern authors who specifically mention *ethopoiia* in relation to the *Ajax* and *Odysseus*. Eucken sees in the speeches 'two fundamentally different attitudes to

life, that of the wise man [Odysseus] and that of the fool [Ajax]' (1997, 270). He sees this as a philosophical battle evincing Stoic virtues and goes on to assert that the speeches are distinguished not by their "Ethopoia", but rather by their logical character'³³ (271). Contrary to this view, it will be argued here that Kennedy's observations about these works are by far the most insightful and accurate. Although he lists them in his chapter on forensic epideictic pieces, he notes that they 'do not appear to be models of structure and argument' (1963, 170-1). He goes on to provide a brief discussion of the word he translates 'characteristics' (i.e. *χαρακτήρων*, from Antisthenes *Περὶ λέξεως ἢ περὶ χαρακτήρων*).

The word could, however, mean any kind of characteristics or idiosyncrasies. Since the two speeches which we have are quite different, primarily because of the different way of thought, manner, and moral character of the speakers, it seems possible that this is what Antisthenes was trying to illustrate. Ajax is aristocratic, indignant, and resentful. He scorns the jury and will not stoop to techniques of persuasion. Odysseus is more clever, inventive, ready to claim military ability, even self-confident. We know from Porphyry's scholia to the first line of the *Odyssey* that Antisthenes was interested in Odysseus' ability to speak and in his moral character and that he discussed the meaning of *πολύτροπος*, the adjective used of Odysseus in that line in both senses. Thus, it is possible that Antisthenes is trying to illustrate something like *ethopoia*, the manifestation of personality in a speech, a subject which was clearly of contemporary interest (172).

The remainder of this chapter will be spent examining Antisthenes' *Ajax* and *Odysseus* for evidence of characterisation, and arguing that *ethopoia* is very much what he was illustrating.

As was already demonstrated in the previous chapter, Ajax is characterised quite clearly by Antisthenes as an anti-democratic nobleman. One aspect of Antisthenes' portrayal that makes this characterisation evident is Ajax's concern about 'excellence' (*ἀρετή*), a quality traditionally associated with aristocrats. Three times he stresses how important it is to correctly 'discriminate about excellence' (*περὶ ἀρετῆς κρίνειν*, 4.2, 5, 7.2). As noted by Chantraine and Frisk in their etymological dictionaries (s.v.), *ἀρετή* shares its root 'ἀρ-' with *ἄριστος*, 'best', which when used of persons means 'best in birth and rank, noblest' (LSJ s.v.). Therefore Ajax implies, quite naturally, that judging about excellence is properly the domain of 'kings' (*βασιλεῖς*, 4.2f & 4.5f). In contrast to this ideal, it is clear that here Antisthenes is

33 'Unterschieden sind sie nicht durch Ethopoiee, sondern durch ihren logischen Charakter.'

instead likening Ajax's judges to a popular democratic jury. In the fifth century mythical tradition it was the soldiers who made the judgement over Achilles arms, e.g. 'Danaans' (Δαναοὶ, Pi. N. 8.27), 'Argives' (Ἀργεῖοισιν, S. Aj. 439), but it was also the Achaean leaders who decided in favour of Odysseus. In Sophocles' version of the tale, Ajax and Teucer place especial blame on the Atreidae, Agamemnon and Menelaus, for granting the arms to Odysseus (Aj. 445, 1135-7). The kings were heavily implicated in the epic tradition as well. A scholium on the *Odyssey* relates that Agamemnon consulted Trojan prisoners to find out who had harmed them most (Σ Od. 11.547).³⁴ An additional scholium discussing the *Little Iliad* includes another of the kings, Nestor, among those adjudicating (F 2 West).

It is very interesting, however, that this is not the case here. Not only is Antisthenes introducing a deliberate anachronism and equating the soldiers to democratic jurors, but most intriguing is the fact that the kings are specifically excluded from the audience. They are not involved in the judgment at all. Ajax himself declares that the kings have 'entrusted to others the discrimination of excellence' (4.2, 5). In these circumstances, Ajax characteristically bristles at being compelled to answer to some sort of democratic court procedure controlled by base soldiers. As discussed in the previous chapter, reflecting the low esteem in which Ajax holds the men judging him, and in keeping with his self perceived superiority, he constantly gives orders to his judges, insults them, and even threatens them. He is confident declaring that his jury, when undertaking to judge 'about excellence', are attempting something about which they have not the slightest clue (4.2ff). They are directly comparable to 'the majority of the mob of men' (ὄμιλος ἀνδρῶν ὁ πλεῖστος) described by Pindar in relation to the judgement of the arms, whose 'heart is blind' (τυφλὸν ἔχει ἦτορ) and not able 'to see the truth' (ἀλάθειαν ἰδέμεν, N. 7.24ff). By characterising the judges as common soldiers forming a popular jury to consider judgement about the aristocratic Ajax, Antisthenes appears to be deliberately framing the speeches as a form of class confrontation.

This contrast of class differences and associated traits is a crucial element exploited by Antisthenes' for his development of ethopoia in the two antagonists. Ajax himself, when discussing his and Odysseus' character (τρόπος)³⁵ says 'nothing could be more different than

34 Noted by Gantz (1993, 629).

35 Ajax actually introduces the discussion with the compound ὁμοιότροπον ('similar character', 5.1).

me and him'³⁶ (5.2f). For example, in accordance with his aristocratic station in life, Ajax is characterised explicitly by himself and by Odysseus as being obsessed with his reputation and standing in society. He wishes to gain glory and to avoid shame. Thus the reason he says that he would not dare to do anything underhand is because he could not stand a 'bad reputation' (κακῶς ἀκούων, 5.3). Odysseus mentions the delight Ajax shows in the reputation for bravery he has in the eyes of others (7.1f). Odysseus also admits, that he himself does not carry out his deeds (like Ajax does) 'from a striving for a glorious reputation' (γλιχόμενος τοῦ δοκεῖν, 9.3f), because war does not lend itself to 'making glorious displays' (οὐ δοκεῖν δρᾶν, 9.6f). Odysseus also suggests that perhaps Ajax is only disputing the right to Achilles' arms because he would be ashamed (ἄν αἰσχύνοιο) to admit being shown up as cowardly by just one man (11.6f).

In contrast Odysseus is not affected by aristocratic shame culture or concerned with his standing in the eyes of others. In fact quite the opposite. He is shameless and Ajax claims he will stoop to any depths to achieve his designs – an allegation Odysseus does not deny. According to Ajax, Odysseus did not even want to come on the expedition with the chance to gain glory and with the concomitant imperative to avoid shame; Odysseus came 'not willingly but unwillingly' (οὐχ ἐκῶν ἀλλ' ἄκων, 9.3). Odysseus himself is not concerned whether specific deeds are noble or shameful as long as the job gets done. He effectively advocates a policy of utilitarianism claiming that 'if it was really noble to capture Ilios, it was also noble to discover the means to do it' (4.3f), i.e. whatever means they may be, even if they involve deception and temple-robbery (see next paragraph). He has no particular code of conduct or honour and will fight the enemy 'whatever way anyone wants' (ὅντινα ἐθέλει τις τρόπον, 9.9). Glory does not concern him and he would carry out his tasks 'even if no one were likely to witness me' (οὐδ' εἰ μὲν ὄψεσθαί μὲ τινες ἔμελλον, 9.3) or 'if no one were watching' (εἰ μηδεὶς ὄρῳη, 9.6). He even mocks Ajax's delight in having a good reputation in the eyes of others as childish (7.1f).

In order to produce a sense of outrage at what depths of depravity Odysseus might plumb with his methods, in one passage Ajax alleges that Odysseus would even submit to

36 οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ διαφέρει πλέον ἐμοῦ καὶ τοῦδε.

being 'strung up for flogging' (κρεμάμενος) if he thought it would profit him (5.6). Then to illustrate just how shameless Odysseus actually is, he states that not only did he in fact 'submit to being flogged' but also to 'being beaten with rods on the back and punched with fists in the face' – and all of this 'by slaves!' (τοις δούλοις, 6.1f). To top it all off, Odysseus then 'dressed himself in rags' (περιβαλλόμενος ῥάκη, 6.3), so that even his external appearance was utterly ignoble. His purpose for enduring such shame and humiliation was equally disgraceful, because thus arrayed he went forth and robbed the Trojans' temple (3.2). Accordingly, Ajax refers contemptuously to Odysseus as 'this flogged-man and temple-robber' (ὄδε ὁ μαστιγίας καὶ ἱερόσυλος, 6.6). Odysseus openly acknowledges that he carries 'servile weapons' (δουλοπρεπῆ ὄπλα), and wears 'rags' (ῥάκη) and bears 'lash marks' (μάστιγας, 10.8f). He confirms his shameless lack of concern about the opinions of others when he says that he would willingly take on whatever guise necessary, 'whether as a slave, or a beggar and knave' (εἴτε δοῦλος εἴτε πτωχὸς καὶ μαστιγίας, 9.4f). He freely admits to not avoiding any danger just because he thought it might be 'shameful' (αἰσχρὸν, 9.1).

As noted in the previous chapter, Ajax is from the class of the 'men of action', and as a result he continuously contrasts the power of action in relation to argument and also extols the importance of *conspicuous* action that can be *witnessed*. Hence he queries how a just judgement could possibly be made 'by arguments' (διὰ λόγων) when the deeds in question came about 'via action' (ἔργω, 1.6f). Consequently, he orders the jury to only consider 'actions' (τὰ ἔργα) not 'arguments' (τοὺς λόγους) when they are deciding about 'excellence' (ἀρετή), and points out that war also is decided 'by action' (ἔργω) and not 'by argument' (λόγω, 7.2ff). He also warns them that they will discover the lack of power 'argument' (λόγος) has in relation to 'action' (ἔργον) if they do not judge well (7.6f). In keeping with his character, Ajax could have tolerated being defeated by one of his true peers, i.e. a man of action, of 'similar character' (ὁμοίотροπος) to himself (5.1). By the same token he also wishes that he was being tried by men of the same class – men of action who 'were there during the venture' (ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι παρῆσαν) and who could thus attest to it first hand (1.1f). This last element, the conspicuity of actions that can be witnessed by others, is also critical to Ajax. He says that he himself 'would not dare to do anything surreptitiously' (5.4).

He observes that a coward like Odysseus would not dare to use 'conspicuous arms' (ἐπισημοῖς ὄπλοις) because they would make his cowardice 'obvious' (ἐκφαίνει, 3.6f). And he also demands that the jury judge 'openly' (φανερῶς) and 'not secretly' (κρύβδην, 8.5). Odysseus acknowledges that Ajax battled 'openly' (φανερῶς) (but claims it was pointless, 6.2).

Directly related to Ajax's focus on conspicuous action is his lack of interest in employing words. Ajax knows that with a perceptive panel of judges of the proper class he would only need to remain silent (1.2f). He further points out that the outcome of war, either victory or defeat, is decided in silence (7.3ff). This emphasis on silence recalls the meeting in the *Odyssey* between Odysseus and the shade of Ajax. Odysseus makes a long speech in favour of reconciliation but in response, the ghostly Ajax turns without a word and departs (11.543-70). This illustrates a trait that is pervasive in fifth century characterisations of him. It is often the narrator who describes Ajax's nobility and superiority. For example, we rely on Pindar to tell us about Ajax's manly excellence and Odysseus' silver-tongued deceitfulness (*N.* 7.20-30, 8.23-35). By contrast, with Odysseus, Pindar describes Ajax as 'tongueless' (ἄγλωσσος, *P. N.* 8.24). In this case, however, the silent Ajax gets a speech. It is a short speech – so still in keeping with his character – but it is not silence. There is no need for a narrator here to describe Ajax's characteristics. Here the ethopoia shows characterisation by itself without a narrator.

Once again, ethopoia is adduced for Odysseus by just the opposite qualities. He is not a man of conspicuous action, but as Ajax describes him, he is an 'arguing man' (λέγων ἀνὴρ, 8.1). Bearing out this estimation is the fact that Odysseus' speech is not far shy of being twice as long as Ajax's.³⁷ In his next sentence, Ajax notes that it is 'because of a dearth of action' (δι' ἀπορίαν ἔργων) that 'many and long arguments are argued' (πολλοὶ καὶ μακροὶ λόγοι λέγονται, 8.2f). The expression translated here 'long arguments' - μακροὶ λόγοι – has a derogatory connotation in addition to Ajax's obvious contempt for attempting to resolve anything using words. Denyer explains that this expression 'was used in particular for the rambling and incoherent rigmarole in which a slave tries to excuse his misdeeds (*Eur. IA* 313

³⁷ Also noted by Rankin (1986, 161), and clearly not as Worman claims only 'a third as long again' (2002, 187).

'slave that you are, you're telling me μακροὺς ... λόγους'; Arist. *Met.* 1091a7-9 'ὁ μακρὸς λόγος, like that of slaves when they have nothing wholesome to say') (2008, 121, n.329b2). In Ajax's view words are only needed by ignorant men. Ajax states that if the witnesses of their actions were testifying, Odysseus would gain nothing 'by arguing' (λέγοντι, 1.3). He muses that Odysseus might actually somehow be persuasive 'when arguing' (λέγων) to the court that being flogged and beaten by slaves, and then robbing a temple by night is a 'splendid achievement' (καλῶς πέπρακται, 6.1ff). In addition to his liking for arguments and skill as a word-smith, Odysseus is also a man who spurns and even despises conspicuous action and in fact revels in stealth. Ajax claims that Odysseus would not carry out any exploit openly (φανερῶς, 5.3f), and points out that he operates 'by night' (νύκτωρ, 3.3, τῆς νυκτός, 6.3). Odysseus agrees that he takes action 'both by day and by night' (ἐν ἡμέρᾳ καὶ ἐν νυκτὶ, 9.7) and that he attacked the enemy 'by night' (τῆς νυκτός, 10.4). As noted above, Odysseus states that fighting out in the open, as Ajax does, is futile (6.2).

As has been observed, Ajax continuously casts aspersions on Odysseus. An element of this that is often apparent is his tendency to sneer at Odysseus through the use of irony. For instance he mocks Odysseus by sarcastically calling him 'this *brave* man who previously robbed the Trojans' temple' (3.1f). He adds that Odysseus had shown off the statue he robbed to the Achaeans 'as if it were some noble deed' (3.3). He then refers pointedly to Odysseus as a 'coward' (δειλός), who would make pains to avoid revealing 'his cowardice' (τὴν δειλίαν, 3.6f). Finally, he rather incredulously questions the notion that a man who has been flogged and is a temple robber could somehow imagine he deserves to gain possession of the arms of Achilles (6.6f).

Odysseus in return adopts a patronising tone towards poor Ajax who is sadly out of touch with reality. He turns the tables on Ajax, who has repeatedly labelled the jury as 'ignorant men', by saying that it is Ajax who is 'ignorant' (οὐδὲν οἶσθα, 3.6). He goes further and adds that it is 'through stupidity' (ὕπὸ ἀμαθίας) that Ajax suffers being 'ignorant' (οὐδὲν οἶσθα, 4.6). Following this theme, Odysseus later queries whether Ajax could actually be 'ignorant' (οὐκ οἶσθ', 12.1) that the Trojans did not care about Achilles' body, and if he is really 'ignorant' (οὐκ οἶσθα, 13.4) that bravery is not the same as being strong. Odysseus muses at

some length about Ajax's 'stupidity' (ἄμαθία, 13.1, 5), and what a great evil it is to suffer from such a condition. However he indulgently, and rather patronisingly, refrains from reproaching Ajax for 'his stupidity' (τὴν ἄμαθίαν), saying that, like anyone else suffering such a condition, he cannot help it (5.1f).

As a final topic of analysis there are certain elements of verbal style that separate and therefore characterise Ajax and Odysseus. One detail is that Ajax only uses the first person plural pronoun once (ἡμῖν, 1.1), and when he does he uses it to exclude the jurors, i.e. he means 'those of us who were there', and therefore specifically 'not all of the rest of you'. He also frequently uses the second person imperative to tell his judges what to do. During a string of commands he issues during the closing phase of his speech, he orders the jurors: 'Look at (ἀθρεῖτε) and consider (σκοπεῖτε) this!' (7.6). And shortly afterwards commands: 'Admit (λέγετε) you don't understand and adjourn (ἀνίστασθε)! Or judge (δικάζετε) correctly!' (8.3f). Finally adding: 'Do this (φέρετε) not secretly, but openly!' (8.4f). Ajax then goes on to say 'I forbid you (ἀπαγορεύω) in all areas from making guesses!' (9.2). The word he chooses, ἀπαγορεύειν, is a particularly strong verb of prohibition often used by powerful men. For example Herodotus relates how the tyrant Periander forbade (ἀπηγόρευε) people from giving his son refuge (3.51.2).

As one has now come to expect, Odysseus is characterised by a very different style of speaking. It has already been noted that Odysseus' speech is roughly twice the length of Ajax's. He also creates a sense of solidarity with the judges, and opposition to Ajax, by twice using the first person plural pronoun, 'us' (ἡμῶν, 3.4, 7), to include himself and the jury. He also refers to Ajax as 'you' (σύ) and the jurors as 'the others' (μὲν ἄλλοι, 4.5) to accentuate the sense of separation between them that was first created by Ajax himself. Odysseus never uses the second person imperative nor gives the jury any sort of commands or prohibitions. So in fact he presents himself as if he were one of the same class of men as the jury, quite separate from the isolated, elitist Ajax. In this Ajax and Odysseus concur.

To summarise, Ajax is characterised in his speech as an old-style aristocrat who refuses to yield or even slightly bend to conform with the democratic court made up of base men that he is confronted with. He is unabashedly arrogant and threatening, and continuously

speaks to his judges as if they are completely beneath him. Clearly he views his inherent virtues as beyond their lowly comprehension. He regularly espouses values consistent with his aristocratic rank including the importance of excellence, the value of a glorious reputation and the need to avoid shame. And he has an impulsive urge to reject anyone and anything smacking of cowardice. His use of sarcasm and haughty aristocratic incredulity add further nuance to his character. His characterisation is not subtle, but rather by a consistently delineated aristocratic outlook it conveys *ethopoiia* in a convincing manner. In contrast, Odysseus is characterised as a man who offers no objections to being called upon to defend himself in a court composed of men of lower station. He is unconcerned about glory or shame and is purely focussed on what he needs to do to expediently complete any mission he is faced with. He patronisingly rejects Ajax's old fashioned views and approach to battle as stupid and pointless. Once again, Antisthenes develops Odysseus' *ethopoiia* by his distinct and consistently portrayed values and attitudes.

So returning to the discussion that began this chapter, perhaps Lysias did develop *ethopoiia* for efficacious speeches, but did Antisthenes precede him in thinking about and developing *ethology* for speeches as such? Certainly he seems to have been the first to write counter-productive *ethological* speeches. It is also probable that Antisthenes preceded and even inspired Plato in writing speeches that display character. Dümmler has made a reasonable case for the *Hippias Minor* being a response to Antisthenes' discussion of Odysseus' *polutropos* (and a less compelling case for the Homeric passages in the *Ion* and *Symposium* being responses to Antisthenes: 1882, 29ff). Certainly, as noted earlier, Theopompus thought that several of Plato's works were derived from earlier dialogues of Antisthenes (*FGrH* 115, F 259 = Ath. 11.508c). Yet among the chapters in a recent collection dealing with characterisation in Greek literature, Antisthenes' name does not appear once (Pelling 1990). Even Kennedy, who, as discussed above offered the only methodological insights into Antisthenes, did not consider his works significant enough to retain them in his latest book – *A New History of Classical Rhetoric* (1994) contains no references to Antisthenes. Despite that, it seems certain that these neglected pieces of Antisthenes' *are* demonstration speeches but intended to show character portraits rather than an ideal argument. If so, they

are the first examples outside drama and in prose. As such they represent an important moment in literary history for the development of oratory, dialogue and drama. They demonstrate a deep interest in understanding and representing the way others think and act and therefore they are examples of *ethopoiia*. Indeed, when all is said and done, Antisthenes proves an even better *ethopoeticist* than Lysias, in so far as his characters are *not* limited by categories of 'appropriateness' or by the populist values and motives required to win the sympathy of a democratic jury.

The place of Antisthenes' characterisations of Ajax and Odysseus in the broader cultural and socio-historical context is a topic that will be explored in detail in the following chapter.

Chapter 3 – Antisthenes' *Ajax* and *Odysseus*: the Literary and Cultural Context

It is clear that Antisthenes' portrayals of Ajax and Odysseus offer a decidedly different characterisation from that put forward in the Homeric and general epic tradition. Authors prior to the second quarter of the fifth century always portrayed Odysseus as a resourceful epic hero, albeit a cunning and tricky one, and Ajax as a noble warrior, the best of the Achaeans after Achilles. Then, starting around 467 (Carey 1981, 133), Pindar put forward an interpretation of the heroes in a series of epinician poems that introduced a radically new dynamic between the two.³⁸ Focussing his characterisation of them on their roles as protagonists in the contest for the arms of Achilles, Pindar describes Odysseus as winning the contest by virtue of deceitful words, whereas Ajax – portrayed as the nobler and mightier man by far – was cruelly cheated of his rightful prize and renown. This set a trend for the characterisation of Odysseus in particular – in tragedy, rhetoric, philosophy and art – for the remainder of the fifth and on into the fourth century. In stark contrast to his earlier heroic reputation, after 467 Odysseus came to be uniformly portrayed as a guileful, duplicitous, rabble-rousing scoundrel – in short as an anti-hero.

This crafty, silver-tongued Odysseus, used his deceitful skill with words to prey on any one of a number of guileless, old-fashioned noble types. The victims he brings undone with his verbal artifice include other Greek epic heroes such as Achilles, Neoptolemus and Philoctetes, but also non-Greek epic figures including Priam, Hecuba, Hector and even the Cyclops. This chapter will start with a survey of a range of works that feature Odysseus preying on his noble victims. Then, with a continuing focus on these works, it will move on to explore the symbolic dichotomies that these words create between Odysseus and his noble opponents, such as speech versus action, loquacity versus terseness, expediency versus honour, and so on. Another significant aim of this chapter will be to situate Antisthenes' works in this broader literary and cultural context. That is, to understand to what extent the *Ajax* and *Odysseus* were participating in, and contributing to, this wider discourse. It will then be argued that all the authors, including Antisthenes, were using Odysseus and his victims to symbolise opposite parties in a major ethical and social divide that arose with the

38 *Nemean* 7 and 8, and *Isthmian* 4.

advent of democracy. In this discourse the division was symbolised on the one hand by Odysseus who represented loquacious, deceitful demagogues who would say and do anything to achieve their utilitarian ends, and who exercised great influence over the masses; and on the other by Ajax and other traditional, intransigent aristocrats with inherent excellence, who spurn talk in favour of noble and glorious deeds.

In *Nemean* 7 and 8, Pindar describes Ajax as 'brave-hearted' (7.24) and 'most powerful in battle except for Achilles' (8.27). The arms of Achilles, however, were 'offered up to a shifty lie', and Odysseus was awarded them 'by a secret vote' (8.25f). Pindar puts the blame on 'hateful persuasion and guileful tales' (8.32). Ajax in comparison is 'tongueless' (7.24). In both these poems and *Isthmian* 4, Pindar narrates the gruesome suicide of Ajax that resulted (*N.* 7.25f, 8.27, *I.* 4.35f). Authors of tragedy regularly represent Odysseus corrupting and killing noble opponents, and profiting at their expense. In Sophocles' *Ajax*, though Athena takes credit for driving Ajax mad (49ff; cf. 450), the chorus knows that it is the 'violently persuasive' Odysseus who is destroying Ajax's reputation (150) and 'spreading trumped up charges and lies' about him (188f). In the same tragedian's *Philoctetes*, Odysseus tells Neoptolemus 'give yourself to me for a few hours of shamelessness' (83f) and persuades him to tell lies 'for profit' and in order 'to trick' Philoctetes (100ff). Philoctetes himself knows that Odysseus 'employs his tongue on every sort of evil argument and every wickedness that can help him achieve an unjust goal' (407ff), but he still falls victim to Odysseus' 'deceitful words' and 'cunning mind' (1111f).

Odysseus has a starring or supporting role as the villain in several of Euripides' extant plays. In the *Hecuba*, the chorus relate how the 'cunning, gabbling, sweet-talking, rabble-rouser' Odysseus persuades the Greeks to make a human sacrifice of Hecuba's daughter Polyxena (131ff). Though Hecuba had spared his life when supplicated, Odysseus admits that he just said 'all the words I could find to avoid being killed' (250). She retorts 'you are most thankless who seek demagogue honours' (254f), but still attempts to supplicate him in return (271ff). Odysseus artfully offers to spare *her* life (which is not being threatened), but not Polyxena's (301ff). In the *Iphigenia at Aulis* and the *Trojan Women*, Odysseus is not given a speaking part, however, in both he is the menacing demagogue who incites the assembly of

Greek soldiers to kill more royal children. In the former tragedy, Agamemnon admits to Menelaus that he will be forced to kill his daughter, Iphigenia, by 'the whole assembled Greek army' (514). He elaborates that it is because Odysseus 'the son of Sisyphus knows everything', and he is 'always guileful by nature and accompanied by the mob' (526). In the *Trojan Women*, Odysseus was 'victorious speaking in the assembly of the Greeks' (721), and the victory he won was to persuade them to hurl Hector's infant son, Astyanax, from the Trojan battlements (725). The Cyclops, in the eponymous satyr play is also noble in a simple, old-world way. In it, the satyr Silenus admits to having heard of Odysseus: 'I know of the man, the ear-splitting chatterbox, Sisyphus' son' (104). Odysseus tells Silenus that he does not want to use force against the Cyclops, 'my desire is for something cunning' (δόλιος, 447ff). He goes on to defeat the Cyclops by the method familiar from the *Odyssey* (9.313-97), involving deceitful talk and wine. The *Rhesus*, though likely to be a later play, nevertheless pits a duplicitous, skulking Odysseus once more against noble and honest prey in Hector and Rhesus.

The binary opposition between crafty, ill-intentioned Odysseus and his guileless, noble opponents also appears in philosophical and rhetorical texts. In his *Hippias Minor*, Plato features a debate about who is the 'most wily' (πολυτροπώτατον, 364c) and who the 'most simple' (ἀπλούστατος, 364e) of Odysseus and Achilles. Although Hippias and Socrates disagree which is which, they do agree that the wily man is 'skilled at deceit' (366a) and superior in 'craftiness and lying' (371d). An epideictic speech by Gorgias is written on behalf of the Greek hero Palamedes who is defending himself against Odysseus' allegations that he is a traitor. Ironically, Odysseus has accused Palamedes of being 'crafty, skilful, resourceful and clever' (DK 82 B11a.25.3-4). Palamedes, however, sets out to escape the charges by 'means of the clearest justice, explaining the truth, and not by deceiving' (33.5-6).

Finally, Pliny records a scene from a famous painting (c.450) by Aristophon, the brother of Polygnotus. He describes it as 'a painting with multiple figures, among which are Priam, Helen, Credulitas, Odysseus, Deiphobus, and Dolus'³⁹ (35.137f). The scene quite likely figured the people in the foreground and personifications of 'Credulity' and 'Guile' situated

39 numerosaque tabula, in qua sunt priamus, helena, credulitas, ulixes, deiphobus, dolus.

above or beside Priam and Odysseus respectively. This painting recalls a scene in Euripides' *Hecuba*, where Hecuba reminds Odysseus how Helen brought him before her and he supplicated her and ultimately deceived her (239-50). Proclus' summary of the *Little Iliad* also relates that Helen was by then married to Deiphobus (Arg. 2 West), and also tells us the story of Helen's discovery of Odysseus (Arg. 4). As king of the subsequently defeated Troy, Priam is obviously one of the ultimate victims of Odysseus' actions whichever way the scene is interpreted. It is easy to imagine, however, an alternate or expanded version of this story that involved him being duped in person by Odysseus.

This consistent negative characterisation of Odysseus set up in opposition to his virtuous victims – all well known Homeric heroes, and all characterized as honest straight-talking, old-fashioned aristocrats – spawned a series of ethical antitheses that will now be explored. It will readily be noted that many of these categories have been evident in Antisthenes' *Ajax* and *Odysseus* during discussions in the preceding chapters.

Speech vs. Action

Odysseus has a predilection for using speech over action. He sums up his own outlook perfectly when he tells Neoptolemus: 'when I was young I had a tongue that was inactive but an arm that was active; but when I came to put it to the proof I saw that it is the tongue, not actions, that rules in all things for mortal men' (*S. Ph.* 96ff).⁴⁰

Noble types, in contrast, detest words being favoured to deeds. In the same play, when the chorus start prematurely celebrating the capture of Philoctetes bow, Neoptolemus reproaches them 'to boast about incomplete deeds is a shameful disgrace!' (842f). Philoctetes himself later tells Neoptolemus that the leaders of the army (i.e. Odysseus) 'are cowardly in battle, but bold with words' (1305ff). Neoptolemus' father, Achilles, as Euripides portrays him in his *Telephus*, has much the same outlook. When he arrives at Troy, Achilles is clearly anxious to get fighting and asks Odysseus 'why the delay? You ought not to be lying idle here'. After a brief exchange Odysseus replies: 'It will be soon enough. One should proceed

40 Following Kovac's Loeb translation.

when the time is right'. An exasperated Achilles retorts: 'You people are always sluggish, always delaying, each of you sits and makes a thousand speeches while nothing gets done to complete the task (ἔργον). For my part, as you can see, I have come prepared for action' (δρᾶν ἔτοιμος, *TrGF* F 727c.34-46 Kannicht).⁴¹ The same opposition of speech versus action is found in rhetoric and philosophy. Palamedes, in the speech Gorgias gives him, urges his jury: 'you must not pay more attention to arguments than deeds' (DK 82 B11a.34). Palamedes also claims that judging would be a simple affair if only it were possible 'by means of arguments' to clearly show 'the truth of deeds' (35). The implication clearly being that the truth of deeds cannot be revealed by arguments. This very much calls to mind what Antisthenes' Ajax said when defending himself against Odysseus (e.g. 1.3ff, 6ff, 7.2ff).

Loquacity vs. Terseness

In literary depictions, Odysseus became renowned for his loquacity. In a fragment from Sophocles the speaker calls Odysseus 'the completely-clever chatterer (κρότημα), the son of Laertes!' (*TrGF* F 913 Radt). Elsewhere Hector attributes the same quality, calling him the 'wildest chatterer' (κρότημ', *E. Rh.* 499). Odysseus was humorously implicated in this tendency to chatter by Euripides. When Odysseus introduces himself, Silenus calls him 'the piercing chatterbox' (κρόταλον δοιμύ, 104). Silenus later tells Polyphemus that if he eats Odysseus and chews on his tongue he 'will become ingenious and extremely babbling' (λαλίστατος, *Cyc.* 314f).⁴² This sort of babbling, chattering quality is what Antisthenes' Ajax is referring to when he calls Odysseus an 'arguing man' (8.1) and refers to the 'many and long arguments' (8.2) that he will mount. Pindar discusses babbling and the damaging effect it could have on noble reputations: 'praise is confronted by insatiable greed, which is not accompanied by justice, but rather by mad men, whose babbling (τὸ λαλαγήσαι) wants to thrust the glorious deeds of noblemen into obscurity' (*O.* 2.96-8).

By contrast, Odysseus' noble opponents and their peers favour terseness. Their view is concisely stated by Phaedra in Euripides' tragedy *Hippolytus*. Reacting to the long and

41 This and other Euripides fragments in this chapter generally follow Collard Cropp's Loeb translations.

42 This and several other valuable ancient references in this chapter noted by Eric Csapo (1994).

soothing speech of her nurse, Phaedra declares 'this is the very thing that destroys well-ordered cities and homes of mortal men, overly elegant speech. You should not speak words that are pleasant to the ear, but rather say that from which good reputation (εὐκλείης) arises' (489). Antisthenes stated that 'excellence is brevity of speech' and 'baseness is speech without bounds' (SSR 104). His Ajax was extremely reluctant to speak at all, and when he did he offered a speech half the length of Odysseus'. Preferable even to terseness, however, could be silence. When Neoptolemus sees he has failed to convince Philoctetes to trust him he says 'if what I am saying is not fitting, I cease speaking' (E. *Ph.* 1279f). In comparison with Odysseus, Pindar describes Ajax as 'tongueless' (ἄγλωσσον, *N.* 8.24). He writes elsewhere: 'often being silent is the wisest thing for a man to apprehend' (*N.* 5.18). Antisthenes' Ajax points out that victory or defeat in battle are both achieved in silence (7.5) and he regretted that he was not able to simply remain silent as his defence (1.3).

Rhetorical Art vs. Plain Talk

The most noteworthy aspect of Odysseus' guile is his rhetorical art. He is described as 'exceedingly persuasive' (σφόδρα πείθει, E. *Ph.* 150). Speaking in the context of the contest for Achilles' arms, Pindar says of Homer: 'his skill deceives with misleading tales'⁴³ (*N.* 7.20-3). This assessment can probably be viewed as being aimed at Odysseus by association. Pindar also writes that when Odysseus was favoured over Ajax, the 'greatest prize' (i.e. Achilles' armour), 'was offered up to a shifty lie (αἰολῶ ψεύδει, *N.* 8.25f). Again referring indirectly to Odysseus, Pindar tells how Ajax was 'robbed' of the armour of Achilles and then adds: 'it seems that hateful persuasion and guileful tales also existed long ago: a fellow traveller of treacherous-thoughts and malicious disgrace. She does violence to the illustrious, and upholds the rotten glory of the obscure'⁴⁴ (*N.* 8.32ff). Speaking of Odysseus and expressing a very similar sentiment to this last line, the chorus in Sophocles' *Ajax* claim that 'when someone takes aim at noble souls he could not miss, but if he were to say such things against me he would not be persuasive' (154ff). Ajax himself calls Odysseus 'the craftiest

43 σοφία δὲ κλέπτει παράγοισα μύθοις.

44 ἐχθρὰ δ' ἄρα πάρφασις ἦν καὶ πάλαι, αἰμύλων μύθων ὀμόφοιτος, δολοφραδῆς, κακοποιὸν ὄνειδος: ἂ τὸ μὲν λαμπρὸν βιάται, τῶν δ' ἀφάντων κῦδος ἀντείνει σαθρόν.

speaker of all, the hated trickster' (αιμυλώτατον, ἐχθρὸν ἄλημα, 388). In Sophocles' *Philoctetes*, Odysseus tells Neoptolemus 'you must beguile (ἐκκλέψεις) the mind of Philoctetes with your words' (54f). Philoctetes himself knows well that Odysseus 'employs his tongue on every sort of evil argument and every wickedness that can help him achieve an unjust goal' (407ff). When Odysseus says he is working on behalf of Zeus, Philoctetes exclaims 'hateful creature! What things you dream up to say! By hiding behind the gods you make the gods into liars!' (987ff). After Neoptolemus has successfully executed Odysseus plan, Philoctetes admits 'the unsuspected and deceitful words of a treacherous mind beguiled me!' (1111f).

Odysseus very often employs his artful speech to persuade and manipulate assemblies and crowds. The chorus leader in Euripides' *Hecuba* relates that the debate over whether or not to make a human sacrifice of Polyxena was 'about even' until Odysseus, the 'cunning, gabbling, sweet-talking, rabble-rouser',⁴⁵ persuaded the army to go through with it (130ff). Hecuba herself later accuses Odysseus: 'you are most-thankless (ἀχάριστον) who strive for demagogue honours (δημηγόρους τιμάς) ... it is no concern to you that you harm your friends if you can say something pleasing to the mob' (254ff). In Euripides' *Iphigenia at Aulis*, Agamemnon sees Odysseus as a threat because he is 'always guileful (ποικίλος) by nature and accompanied by the mob' (ὄχλου, 526), and it is implied that he holds sway over the 'entire assembled Greek army' (514). This is later confirmed when Achilles tells Clytaemestra that coming to seize Iphigenia are 'countless soldiers, with Odysseus leading them' (1363). In the same author's *Trojan Women*, Odysseus is victorious 'speaking in the Greek assembly' when persuading them that they should take the infant Astyanax and 'hurl him from the Trojan battlements' (721ff).

The aristocratic opponents of Odysseus, however, prefer plain talk. In Aeschylus' *The Award of the Arms*,⁴⁶ Ajax declares that 'the words of truth are simple' (ἀπλᾶ, TrGF F 176 Radt). The nobility even deliberately distanced themselves from rhetorical ability. Hippolytus attractively sums up this perspective when he says in remonstrance to his father: 'though the case you argue has lovely words, if one opens it out it is not lovely. I am

45 ποικιλόφρων κόπις ἡδυλόγος δημοχαριστής.

46 Ὀπλων Κρίσις.

unsophisticated (ἄκομψος) at giving speeches to a mob but I am more skilful at addressing my peers or nobles. This also is as fate would have it. For those who are lowly (φᾶυλοι) among the wise are accomplished at speaking before the mob' (παρ' ὄχλῳ, E. *Hip.* 984-9). An example from historical biography that mirrors this sentiment and is worth mentioning is from Plutarch. He writes that Cimon was 'slandorously' (διαβάλλοντες) accused of 'flattery of the rabble, and demagoguery'. Plutarch assures readers, however, that in reality these charges were refuted by Cimon's political policies which were actually 'aristocratic and Spartan' (*Cim.* 10.7).

Guile vs. Simpleness

Odysseus had a reputation for guile ever since he was first depicted in epic. Whereas his craftiness was a generally positive attribute beforehand, in the period under consideration it became a very negative one. Referring indirectly to Odysseus immediately before he describes the demise of Ajax, Pindar warns that: 'the craft (τέχνα) of baser men can overtake and trip up a more excellent man' (*I.* 4.33-5). Ajax calls him 'son of Laertes, filthiest trickster of the army' (*S. Aj.* 381). In Sophocles' *Philoctetes* Odysseus says he has a 'scheme' (σόφισμα) for seizing Philoctetes (14), and tells Neoptolemus 'this is what we must scheme for' (σοφισθῆναι, 77). Neoptolemus asks Odysseus 'are you not telling me to speak nothing but lies?' Odysseus replies 'I am telling you to take him by a trick' (100f; cf. 102, 107f). Neoptolemus later repents that he 'overcame a man with shameful trickery and deceit' (1228; cf. 1234). In a fragment of Sophocles' *Those Who Dine Together*, Odysseus is addressed as 'you who are up to everything' (ὦ πάντα πράσσων), how manifest in you in everything is there much of Sisyphus and of your mother's father!⁴⁷ (*TrGF* F 567 Radt). Odysseus denies to the satyr Silenus that he wants to use force against the Cyclops: 'my desire is for something cunning' (δόλιος, E. *Cyc.* 449). When Hecuba learns that she has been awarded to Odysseus she laments that she is 'to be a slave to a vile and treacherous man, an enemy of justice, a lawless creature, a man who twists everything from here to there and back again with his duplicitous tongue, making enmity where previously there was friendship!' (E. *Tr.* 277ff).

47 I.e. Autolycus.

Another aspect of Odysseus' guile was his propensity to operate by stealth and in secret. In Sophocles' *Ajax* the chorus describes the 'whispered words' (λόγους ψιθύρους) that Odysseus spreads about Ajax (148) and how he 'spreads secret rumours' (187f). Pindar relates how justice was miscarried in the judgement of the arms due to 'the Danaans favouring Odysseus in a secret vote' (κρυφίαισι ἐν ψάφοις, *N.*8.26f) – Odysseus' influence is assumed. In the *Philoctetes*, after Neoptolemus has carried out Odysseus' ruse, Philoctetes tells him 'in your words you were persuasive – deadly by stealth' (λάθρα, 1271f). Antisthenes' *Ajax* similarly spoke of Odysseus' tendency to operate 'by stealth' (λάθρα, 5.3f) and by night (3.3, 6.3). Lies, deceits, disguise and ambush repeatedly characterise the man of many wiles in classical literature, as in archaic epic, with the difference being that these are now invariably cast in a negative light.

Odysseus' opponents however, preferred simpleness, and a guileless, straight forward manner and nature. In Sophocles' *Philoctetes*, when Odysseus is outlining his scheme, he admits to Neoptolemus 'I know that by nature you are not the sort of man to speak such words or to plot to harm others' (79f). Neoptolemus later confirms 'it is my nature to do nothing by treacherous plotting; that is my nature, and it was my father's nature. But I am ready to take the man by force and not by cunning' (88ff). At one point when Odysseus rebukes him, saying that neither his intentions, nor his words are 'clever', Neoptolemus responds that 'if they are just, that is better than clever' (1245f). When Neoptolemus repents of his plotting and gives Philoctetes back his bow, Philoctetes says 'you showed the nature of the stock you are sprung from, having not Sisyphus but Achilles as a father' (1311ff). Hippias, in the *Hippias Minor*, states that Achilles, who is 'the bravest man' to voyage to Troy (364c), is also 'the most simple' (ἀπλούστατος, 364e). Promoting a simple, almost naïve approach to life, Sophocles' *Ajax* declares: 'the happiest life is lived while one understands nothing, before one learns delight or pain' (*Aj.* 554f). After writing about Ajax and the damage that misleading speech can inflict on illustrious men, Pindar pleads with Zeus: 'may I stay with the simple mode of life (ἀπλόαις ζωᾶς) so that when I die the reputation (κλέος) I pass onto my children is not one of infamy' (τὸ δύσφαμον, *N.* 8.35ff).

Expediency vs. Honour

Rather than striving for traditional forms of martial glory, Odysseus is portrayed in this period as principally driven by expediency and personal profit. He will say and do whatever it takes to get the job done. Antisthenes' Odysseus freely admitted to adopting an approach that was expedient. 'If it was a noble undertaking to capture Troy, then it was noble to discover the means to do it' (4.3-4). He is prepared to adapt his methods and fight 'whatever way anyone wants' (9.9). And Ajax adds that Odysseus would do anything, even undergo a flogging, if he could 'derive any profit' (κερδαίνειν τι) from it (5.6f). In Sophocles' *Philoctetes*. Odysseus tells Neoptolemus: 'when you are doing something for profit (κέρδος), it is unseemly to hesitate' (111). Later telling him: 'take whatever is expedient (συμφέροντα) from the arguments moment to moment' (131). When he was at the mercy of Hecuba, Odysseus later admits that when he supplicated her he used 'all the words I could find to avoid being killed' (E. *Hec.* 250), and had no intention of honouring the promises he made (271ff). Philoctetes says that Odysseus hopes to snare him 'with gentle words' and that 'he will say everything and dare everything' to achieve his ends (E. *Ph.* 633f). As a result of his self-interested outlook Odysseus is not motivated by shame or honour. In relation to the expedition to Troy, Agamemnon describes Odysseus as 'the one who sailed not willingly' (οὐκ ἐκῶν), and who only proved himself a good subordinate 'once yoked' (A. *Ag.* 841f). Antisthenes' Ajax describes Odysseus' enthusiasm in identical language – he is a man who 'not willingly' (οὐχ ἐκῶν) but rather 'unwillingly' (ἄκων) came to Troy (9.2f). In a fragment from Euripides' *Philoctetes*, Odysseus muses: 'how could I be in my right mind, when I could be free from troubles and numbered among the army's masses and equally have a share of fortune with the cleverest man?' (*TrGF* F 787 Kannicht). In the same play he later begrudgingly admits: 'In my reluctance to waste the gratitude for my former exertions, I also won't refuse the present labours' (F 789).

Aristocrats, however, inherently possessed excellence (ἀρετή) and understood honour (τὸ καλόν). Pindar writes that 'excellence (ἀρετά) grows among the wise (σοφοῖς) and just (δικαίους) men up to the liquid air, as a tree shoots up fed by fresh dew' (N. 8.40f). Clearly 'the wise and just men' here as a synonym for aristocrats. While Pindar rebuked Homer for

exalting Odysseus beyond his dues (*N.* 7.20ff), he approves of his treatment of Ajax because his ἀρετή was upheld: 'he is honoured throughout mankind by Homer, who correctly set out all his excellence' (πᾶσαν ὀρθώσας ἀρετὰν, *N.* 8.37-9). Whereas Antisthenes' Odysseus avoided no risky undertaking just because it was shameful (9.1), Philoctetes tells Neoptolemus 'for high-born men, what is shameful is hateful, and what is noble is glorious' (*E. Ph.* 475f). Nobility was an inherent trait that was immediately recognisable. The chorus in Euripides' *Hecuba* declare that 'to be born of noble stock (ἔσθλων) among mortal men is to bear a wondrous and unmistakable stamp (χαρακτήρ), and more glorious still is the name of a high-born (εὐγενείας) person for those who deserve it (ἀξίους, 379ff)'. Hecuba herself later declares of her daughter, Polyxena: 'the report of your nobility (γενναῖος) has saved me from excessive grief. Is it not wondrous, that if poor earth gets what is appropriate from the gods it produces a good crop, whereas, if it misses out on what it needs, good earth can produce a bad crop; but among mankind, the base (πονηρός) are always base (κακός), and the noble (ἔσθλος) are always noble (ἔσθλος), never corrupting their nature even in misfortune, but always remaining good' (591-8).

In contrast with Odysseus, who will say whatever he needs to in order to avoid death, aristocratic concern for renown extended to preferring death to dishonour. Polyxena does not lament the fact that she is about to die – 'for death has come to me as a better fate' (*E. Hec.* 209f). When her mother, Hecuba, urges her to throw herself at Odysseus' feet in supplication (336ff), Polyxena states that she wants to die, because if she refuses to die she will be proven a base and cowardly woman (347f). She pleads with her mother: 'desire with me that I should die before I meet with a disgrace not fitting for my station' (ἀξίαν, 374f). She concludes 'living ignobly is too great a distress' (378). Even after Neoptolemus had cut her throat with his sword, Polyxena 'took great care to fall in seemly fashion to the ground' (568f). The Greeks then scurried about making preparations to honour her, rebuking those who were not helping with words such as 'Go and bring some tribute to the woman's supreme bravery and surpassing nobility!' (579f). In Euripides' *Trojan Women*, when the Greeks are coming to seize and kill Astyanax, Talthybius urges Andromache to 'show herself as wiser' by 'bearing the pain of misfortune nobly' (εὐγενῶς, 726f). In the same tragedy

Cassandra comforts Hecuba saying 'it is no shameful garland for a city to be destroyed nobly, but being destroyed ignobly is inglorious' (401f). Hecuba later urges her retinue 'come, let us rush into the fire! It is most noble to die together with our father land as it burns!' (1282f). After narrating Ajax's tale, Pindar writes 'yet honour belongs to those whose fair tale a god magnifies after they die' (*N.* 7.32f). Ajax himself declares 'the high-born man must live nobly or be nobly dead' (*S. Aj.* 479f; cf. 636).

The symbolism of Odysseus and his noble victims expresses the anxious, perhaps paranoid, vision of conservative elites in an increasingly divided and increasingly radical democratic age. The value system represented by Odysseus is overtly aligned in their minds with the most grotesque features ascribed to the demagogues, while Odysseus' opponents represent the nostalgic image of a dying breed of pure, simple, deeply principled but intransigent aristocrats. It will suffice to present just two episodes from the historiography of the period to show just how deeply current events were filtered through just such a dystopian lens.

A succinct view of the symbolic discourse that has been examined here is well illustrated by Plutarch's contemporaneous account of Cimon and Pericles which concerned events of the 460s. This period coincides with Pindar's writing, the lives of the tragedians discussed here, Sophocles and Euripides, and also the painter Aristophon. Cimon was an extremely wealthy aristocrat who was favourable to Sparta and less so to the demos (*Per.* 9.4, *Cim.* 16.1). Plutarch relates how as the Athenian empire was growing, Cimon was admired by the Athenians, and considered the foremost statesman of the Hellenic world (*Cim.* 16.2-3). As Athenian power waxed, however, and because of Cimon's affection for Sparta and tendency to chastise the Athenians for not being like Spartans, he aroused the 'envy' (φθόνος) and 'enmity' (δυσμείαν) of his fellow citizens (16.3-4). Pericles on the other hand, as he started his political career, was always confronted by the reputation (δόξαν) and wealth of Cimon, so he decided to ingratiate himself with the common people (τὸν δῆμον, *Per.* 9.2). He 'comprehensively bribed the masses' (συνδεκάσας τὸ πλῆθος) and used them to oppose the Council of the Areopagus – the traditional council composed of ex-Archons – of which

he was not a member (9.3). Pericles was 'strongly ensconced with the common people' (ἰσχύσας ὁ Περικλῆς ἐν τῷ δήμῳ) and managed to overpower the Areopagus and have Cimon ostracised – Cimon, who Plutarch describes as being surpassed by no one in wealth, lineage and beneficence toward the city. Plutarch sums up: 'Such was the power of Pericles among the common people' (τοσοῦτον ἦν τὸ κράτος ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τοῦ Περικλέους, 9.4). After Cimon's death, Plutarch tells us that no 'brilliant exploit' (λαμπρὸν) was enacted by any general against the barbarians. The Greeks were now under the influence of 'demagogues' (δημαγωγῶν) and 'advocates of war against each other' (πολεμοποιῶν ἐπ' ἀλλήλους). This state of affairs brought about an 'unspeakable destruction' (φθόρον ἀμύθητον) of Greek power (*Cim.* 19.2). This case nicely epitomises the aristocratic view of the concerns of the two sides involved in the struggle to gain symbolic power that has been examined in this chapter. Old-style aristocrats, who think they are born to rule are worried by the new democratic order that idolises the power of speech above inherent excellence and brilliant exploits. Opposed to them are the emergent democrats who are envious and fearful of the aristocrats' wealth and influence and are only too easily swayed by the persuasive powers of their demagogue leaders.

In the final quarter of the fifth century, the political backdrop for this debate was the Peloponnesian War between democratic Athens and aristocratic Sparta. A key turning point in the conflict was dramatised by Thucydides. It was a debate between orators held in Athens over how to punish the Mytileneans for revolting against the Athenians. This 'Mytilenean Debate' was held between Cleon who was in favour of executing the entire adult male population, and Diodotus who favoured sparing the men who were members of the *demos*, the common people (Th. 3.42-8). The exhortations of both orators revolve around doing whatever is profitable or expedient for Athens (3.43.1, 44.1, 2, 3, 47.5). In the end, Diodotus won the debate by convincing the Athenians that his course of action was most expedient or advantageous for themselves. Specifically, he suggested that they spare the Mytilenean *demos*, and most importantly, that thereafter they make it a policy in each city throughout their empire to favour the *demos* at the expense of the aristocrats (3.47). Very shortly after this event Thucydides narrates the story of the civil conflict at Corcyra (3.81-3).

He does so because that was where the fruits borne of this new policy were first tasted. The Athenians intervened on the side of the democrats, while the Spartans weighed in on behalf of the aristocrats, and the result was an horrific massacre.

Death in every form ensued, and whatever horrors are wont to be perpetrated at such times all happened then – and even worse. For father slew son, men were dragged from the temples and slain beside them, and some were even walled up in the temple of Dionysus and perished there. To such excesses of savagery did the revolt go, and it seemed all the more savage because it was the first (3.81.5-82.1).⁴⁸

The author of a late fifth century political pamphlet *The Old Oligarch*, confirms that the Athenians always intervene on behalf of the 'worse men' (τοὺς χείρους) in cities torn by civil war (Ps.-X. 3.10). He further notes that the Athenians 'hate the aristocrats' (μισοῦσι τοὺς χρηστούς) and they 'disenfranchise the aristocrats, take away their money, expel and kill them, whereas they exalt the base men' (τοὺς πονηροὺς, 1.14). Thucydides describes how the leaders of rival factions in the various cities gave their parties attractive slogans: on the one side 'political equality for the masses' (πλήθους ἰσονομίας πολιτικῆς); and on the other 'moderate aristocracy' (ἀριστοκρατίας σώφρονος). Meanwhile in actuality, both parties 'dared the most terrible deeds and sought revenges still more terrible, not pursuing these within the bounds of what was just or in the public interest, but only limiting them (both parties alike) to the impulse of any given moment' (3.82.8).

To summarise, by the time Antisthenes was writing his *Ajax* and *Odysseus*, the frightful consequences of the Athenian policy of backing democrats and the Spartan propensity to support oligarchs had several times been revealed in a series of brutal civil conflicts. As illustrated by the story of Cimon and Pericles, this struggle had been on going since the second quarter of the fifth century and thus formed the socio-historical environment in which all the authors discussed in this chapter lived. The atmosphere was highly charged and there was a great deal at stake. Both parties were struggling to secure ascendancy in a contest of representations in order to ensure the very preservation of life and livelihood. In this struggle, *Odysseus* alone very much epitomises the guileful orator with the ability to mesmerise and persuade the masses. As has been seen, he is overwhelmingly portrayed as a

48 In general following Forster Smith's Loeb translation.

scheming villain who employs artful deception and stealth to achieve his ends. These ends generally involve personal advantage and profit gained at the expense of a series of noble victims. Suffering by Odysseus' guileful tongue, a range of noble epic characters are used to symbolise the noble types he preys upon. These nobles, who came to symbolise the other side of the debate, include Ajax, Achilles, Neoptolemus, Philoctetes, Hector, Priam, and Hecuba. They are portrayed as paragons of aristocratic virtue, born with inherent and unmistakable excellence, and so instinctively able to recognise what was noble and good. They favour their honour and self-esteem over the favour of the demos, even at the cost of their lives, and shun the art of rhetoric that might save them. If compelled to talk they like to keep speech concise and honest. Rather than living to achieve personal profit or expediency, they desire to lead a life that leaves behind an untainted if not glorious reputation.

The next chapter will investigate Antisthenes' personal philosophical views in relation to this debate.

Chapter 4 – Antisthenes' Philosophy of Excellence

Before commencing a discussion of Antisthenes' philosophical views, it is worth carrying out a brief survey of modern scholarly opinion of what has been inferred from his portrayal of the two protagonists in the *Ajax* and *Odysseus*. In order to explain them, some writers have simply suggested that they are examples of sophistic rhetoric. Eucken sees them presenting views similar to the sophists (1997, 270), and Worman also calls Antisthenes a 'sophist' (2002, 150), and twice refers to him as 'Gorgias' student' (33 & 169). She adds that the style of the speeches demonstrates the 'technique of sophistic speechwriters' (170). Sayre imagines that they may have been written while Antisthenes was still taking lessons from Gorgias (1948, 237). As has already been argued above, however, the theory that the speeches are examples of sophistic, epideictic writing is inconsistent with their contents.

Some modern authors think that Antisthenes was promoting a specific agenda related to his ethical or moral beliefs. Thus they see the speeches less as rhetorical pieces and more as philosophical, didactic exercises. Prince writes: 'Scholars have been divided over whether or not the dispute has a winner, that is, whether we see just two incompatible views of virtue, or whether the eminently more appealing Odysseus is shown to be the better man' (2006, 83). In reality, however, opinion does not really seem to be divided. It appears, in fact, to come down uniformly in favour of the 'eminently more appealing Odysseus'. Stanford describes Antisthenes as a 'supporter' of Odysseus (1968, 96), later adding: 'Clearly Antisthenes's final intention was to show the much greater merit of Odysseus' (97). Rankin similarly asserts Antisthenes' 'preference for Odysseus' and terms Ajax 'the loser' (1986, 154). More recently, Worman declared that: 'Antisthenes reveals his admiration of Odysseus' techniques in a more direct fashion than Gorgias' (2002, 185). She further discusses Antisthenes' 'appreciation of Odysseus' versatility' and claims that he 'strongly countered' negative fourth and fifth literary treatments of Odysseus in drama and by Plato (170-1). In a more elaborate discussion, Prince argues that Antisthenes has set out to portray the symbolic and moral superiority of Odysseus. She asserts: 'Just as Odysseus used disguise in the Trojan War for a noble end ... so securing victory for the Greeks, he uses language in nonliteral ways to reclaim from Ajax every value and symbolic prize Ajax has staked as his.'

She goes on: 'Although Odysseus might seem amoral in his use of cleverness and pursuit of victory, his view of self and community sets him above Ajax in a moral sense ... Whereas Ajax behaves according to the social code, Odysseus appropriates and manipulates social categories, especially those of the slave and beggar, to promote the real interests of society' (Prince 2006, 84). So by this rationale, Odysseus is imagined as a champion of the people and 'society', and his morally questionable deeds are justified by their noble end, i.e. 'to promote the real interests of society'.

Attempts have also been made to understand Antisthenes' speeches by interpreting them as pedagogical tools for promoting his philosophical viewpoint. Antisthenes preferred Odysseus, Rankin explains, because of the fact that Odysseus is 'the more philosophical hero' and is representative of the 'Protocynic views of Antisthenes' (1986, 154). He also suggests later that certain passages provide 'a justification of Antisthenes' and subsequently the Cynics' views about *adoxia*' (169). This, as it turns out, is the most common philosophical explanation put forward: that the *Odysseus* is an embodiment of Antisthenes' alleged Cynic views. As another example, Stanford claims that Antisthenes portrayed Odysseus much more favourably as the depiction was 'from the point of view of a proto-Cynic' (1968, 97). Thus Stanford goes on to explain Odysseus' 'readiness to serve the common good, his individualism and self-sufficiency, his vigilance and 'gubernatorial' wisdom, his disregard of indignities and mutilations,' as evidence of Antisthenes' 'propaganda' promoting his 'conception of the good man' (98). He further elaborates that Antisthenes, 'like a good Cynic', represented Odysseus 'suffering in lonely enterprises to serve humanity.' Ajax, on the other hand, 'stands for those stereotyped conventions and codes of etiquette which inhibit natural virtue' (99). Prince similarly resorts to a Cynic interpretation to make sense of the speeches. 'If Antisthenes' *Ajax* and *Odysseus* are typical of the kind of persuasion he aimed for in his literature, then it seems his messages were extremely indirect ... reading Antisthenes well was not like participating in an oral conversation, but required a sort of labor. Labor (*ponos*) and exercise (*askēsis*) were indeed aspects of his proto-Cynic ethics and program for self-improvement' (2006, 83).

So it is the *communis opinio* that Antisthenes depicted Odysseus more favourably than

Ajax. Some scholars deem Odysseus to be the winner of debate due to his mastery of language and his superior moral stance. Others feel it is because Odysseus represented Antisthenes' Cynic outlook on community and the 'good man'. By this view, Odysseus seems to be favoured by Antisthenes because of his utilitarianism. He sees what needs doing to benefit the majority of 'society', or even 'humanity', and he is prepared to do what it takes to get the job done. Most of these views seem to have been formed by reference primarily or solely to the two speeches and without careful consideration of the other extant fragments of Antisthenes' thought. They also seem to have been formed accepting the assumption that Antisthenes was a 'proto-Cynic'. Fortunately there are around 200 other extant fragments of Antisthenes' thought which may be used to evaluate and test these assumptions.

Before turning to the fragments themselves, it is worth considering for a moment the shaky ground that the whole 'Antisthenes was a proto-Cynic' premise rests on. There are no known anecdotes referring to Antisthenes or his followers as 'dog' (κύων) or 'dog-like' (κυνικός) or reporting any Cynic views.⁴⁹ Aristotle applied the term 'the Dog' (ὁ Κύων) to Diogenes of Sinope (*Rhet.* 3.10.7) but when discussing Antisthenes' followers he refers to them as 'Antistheneans' (Ἀντισθενεῖοι, *Met.* 1043b). The fact that a contemporary such as Aristotle used the term κύων of Diogenes but did not do so of Antisthenes, and made no connection between Diogenes and Antisthenes is telling.

What is more, up until the early second century BC there is not even an extant mention of a Cynic school, as such. Writing in this period, Hippobotus lists nine main philosophical schools and Cynicism is not among them (D.L. 1.19). In the first century BC Cicero does discuss Cynicism, but in doing so offers one of the most compelling pieces of evidence for rejecting any connection between Cynicism and Antisthenes. As Sayre has noted (1948, 242), Cicero wrote 'we should give no heed to the Cynics' (*de Off.* 1.128) and 'the Cynics' whole system of philosophy must be rejected' (1.148). Yet he wrote approvingly of Antisthenes'

49 There is, however, one reference without elaboration that Antisthenes was nicknamed 'Simple Dog' (ἀπλοκύων, D.L. 6.13). Dudley disputes the authenticity of this name because there is not one 'anecdote or apophthegm in which Antisthenes figures as a κύων' (1937, 5). It thus seems far more likely that this name was developed by the developers of 'successions' of philosophers (see below).

writings: 'The *Cyrus B* impressed me as did the other works of Antisthenes' (*ad Att.* 12.38). So clearly he did not believe that Antisthenes had any relationship to Cynicism. In addition, there is no firm evidence that the tradition that Antisthenes is the first of the Cynics was ever postulated prior to the third century AD, when Diogenes Laertius in his successions of philosophers wrote down Antisthenes as the founder of the Cynic movement (D.L. 6.1). Epictetus, a stoic writing at the turn of the second century AD, still discussed Antisthenes in conjunction with Plato and Xenophon rather than with the Cynics (*Discourses* 2.17.36).

Confirming this notion of a manufactured 'succession', in the first century BC, Cicero reported that the Stoics wanted to claim succession from Socrates (Cic. *De Oratore*, 3.16-8). It appears that they therefore thought of Stoicism as a modified form of Cynicism and claimed links successively from their founder Zeno of Citium to Crates of Thebes, Diogenes of Sinope, Antisthenes and finally Socrates (Sayre 1948, 240). In fact, however, there is no evidence that there was any sort of connection between Antisthenes and Diogenes. The evidence we do have actually suggests that Diogenes probably arrived in Athens many years after Antisthenes' death (Dudley 1937, 2-3).⁵⁰ None of the extant fragments of so-called 'Cynic writers' Crates or Onesicratus makes any mention of Antisthenes, though they do of Diogenes (Dudley 1937, 2). Furthermore, neither the writings of Xenophon nor of Aristotle concerning Antisthenes give any hint that he possessed Cynic ideals. In fact in Xenophon's *Symposium*, far from rejecting all pleasures for an austere ascetic life-style, as did the Cynics, Antisthenes describes himself taking pleasure from eating, drinking and having sex to the point of satisfying his requirements for each (4.37-8).

Further repudiating any link between Cynicism and Antisthenes, and at the same time serving as a stepping stone towards a fuller discussion of his philosophical ideas, is the issue of shame. Cynics were known as dogs, the word from whence their name derives. As mentioned above, Aristotle refers to Diogenes of Sinope as 'the Dog' (*Rhet.* 3.10.7), and Cercidas of Megalopolis is found doing likewise (D.L. 6.77). It seems well noted by Liddell

50 Höistad attempts to reject Dudley's arguments and establish Antisthenes as the first Cynic after all. There are few surviving fragments of Cynic philosophy so he wishes to establish Antisthenes' writings as legitimate Cynic texts as they are central to the remainder of his book. The efforts to do so, however, are based on flimsy evidence and are unconvincing (1948, 8-13).

and Scott, that from Homeric times calling someone a dog was a reproach 'to denote shamelessness or audacity' (s.v., II). Antisthenes, however, took a dim view of shameful acts. He rather simply stated that 'good deeds are noble, base deeds are shameful'⁵¹ (D.L. 6.11). When he observed that the Athenians had raised an uproar in the theatre at the line: 'What is a shameful deed if its doers do not think so?',⁵² Antisthenes at once interjected: 'A shameful deed is a shameful deed, whether one think so or no' (Plut. *Mor.* 33c).

Some of the observations by modern scholars on the *Ajax* and *Odysseus* give the impression that Antisthenes favoured Odysseus because he took actions that benefited 'the majority' or 'society'. There does not seem to be support for this theory from Antisthenes own thought, however, and in fact almost the opposite seems to be the case. To be more specific, Antisthenes thought it was preferable to be excellent whether it benefited the majority or not, and whether it met with approval of the majority or not. His view of excellence actually smacks very much of the aristocratic outlook that saw a small minority of the population as possessing a natural and inherently large share of excellence. For example, he said: 'It is better to be one of a few noble men fighting against all the base men, than with the many base men fighting against a few noble men'⁵³ (D.L. 6.11). When he learned that Plato had been speaking ill of him, he said: 'It is the mark of royalty to act nobly and be ill spoken of'⁵⁴ (D.L. 6.3). Conversely, when someone said to him 'Many people praise you', he said 'What have I done wrong?' (D.L. 6.8). Thus he cautioned that associating with base flatterers was worse than falling in with crows; saying that the latter will devour you when dead, but the former while you are still alive (D.L. 6.4).

Several of the modern authors who have been discussed above mention Odysseus' skill at rhetoric and argumentation as being a clear sign of his superiority over Ajax.⁵⁵ They therefore consider that Antisthenes' characterisation of Odysseus as a proto-demagogue is a favourable one. Once again an examination of the fragments of Antisthenes' thought tells

51 τὰγαθὰ καλὰ, τὰ κακὰ αἰσχροῦ.

52 From the *Aeolus* of Euripides (*TrGF* F 17 Kannicht).

53 κρεῖττον ἔστι μετ' ὀλίγων ἀγαθῶν πρὸς ἅπαντας τοὺς κακοὺς ἢ μετὰ πολλῶν κακῶν πρὸς ὀλίγους ἀγαθοὺς μάχεσθαι.

54 βασιλικόν καλῶς ποιοῦντα κακῶς ἀκούειν.

55 cf. above, and also especially: Worman 2002, 185-8; Stanford 1968, 96-100; Prince 2006, 84-5.

another story. It is known from the catalogue in Diogenes Laertius that at least four of Antisthenes' works concerned Odysseus and that others were about Homer and the *Odyssey* (6.17). This does not mean that he was a supporter of Odysseus, however, as he may have been interested in him purely for the trope he represented, i.e. that of an aristocrat with the capacity and willingness to say and do whatever was necessary to get his way in a democratic system.

Supporting that view are a number of fragments directing condemnation at rhetorical prowess. For example, we learn that in spite of earlier being his student, Antisthenes 'attacks the orator Gorgias in his *Aspasia*' (Ath. 220d = SSR 142). We are not told on what basis the attack was made. The fact, however, that it is specified 'the orator Gorgias' rather than simply 'Gorgias' suggests that it was in his capacity as a rhetorician that Antisthenes was censuring him. It is also reported that his *Political Dialogue* (Πολιτικὸς Διάλογος), 'contains an attack on all the demagogues of Athens' (Ath. 220d = SSR 203). Further devaluing the estimation of rhetoric in Antisthenes' eyes are his anecdotal statements such as: 'excellence is brevity of speech, but baseness is speech without bounds'⁵⁶ (Gnom. Vat. 743 n. 12 = SSR 104). He also said that 'one must stop a person who is arguing in opposition, not by arguing against him, but rather by teaching. For someone would not attempt to cure a madman by being mad in return'⁵⁷ (Stob. II. 2.15 = SSR 174).

Further observations of Antisthenes about rhetoric appear to some scholars to reveal that he viewed it in a favourable light, when in fact the opposite is more likely the case. For example, when a father asked Antisthenes what he should teach his son, Antisthenes replied 'if he is to live among the gods, philosophy, if among humans, rhetoric' (Stob. II 31.76 = SSR 173). Prince interprets this by saying: 'the individual, no matter how ethically perfect and near to the gods he might be, must still practice the art demanded by his circumstance in a community of imperfect – and often downright hostile, stupid, and wicked – companions' (2006, 85). She sees this as Cynic 'rhetoric that enables the virtuous man to live in, and try to deliver benefits to, the community' (86). In other words: 'Since you must live among base

56 τὴν ἀρετὴν βραχύλογον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ κακίαν ἀπεραντολόγον).

57 οὐκ ἀντιλέγοντα δεῖ τὸν ἀντιλέγοντα παύειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν μαινόμενον ἀντιμαινόμενός τις ἰᾶται.

humanity, learn rhetoric'. Given Antisthenes other stated views on rhetoric, however, it seems more reasonable to interpret it as: 'Only learn rhetoric if you are someone who has no aspirations above consorting with base humanity. Otherwise you should learn philosophy.' Such an understanding seems confirmed by another fragment from one of Antisthenes' *Heracles* in which Prometheus rebukes Heracles for taking interest in human affairs, adding: 'You will not be perfect until you learn things higher than human' and 'if you learn a lot about human affairs you will err like a brute beast' (SSR 96⁵⁸). So it actually seems that Antisthenes was urging people not to conform to the strictures of society or sacrifice their pursuit of philosophy in favour of rhetoric. What he thought the best philosophical values were and how they might be embodied is thus the next subject to consider.

Antisthenes says in his *Heracles* that 'the goal of life is to live in accordance with excellence'⁵⁹ (D.L. 6.104 = SSR 98). Along related lines is his assertion that 'excellence alone is sufficient to provide happiness' (D.L. 6.11 = SSR 134.3). Elsewhere he declares that 'excellence is a weapon that cannot be taken away'⁶⁰ (D.L. 6.12 = SSR 134.11). So seemingly Antisthenes' philosophical outlook was driven by an ethical belief that adherence to excellence – ἀρετή – was paramount. Consequently, it is worth investigating further what qualities he believed constituted excellence and whether either of the protagonists in his *Ajax* or *Odysseus* manifests such qualities. The first evidence to consider is another of Antisthenes' assertions regarding excellence that offers further evidence in favour of rejecting the argument that he recommended acting in accordance with the wishes of the 'community' or 'society'. For it is recorded that he was also 'wont to prove' (ἀπεδείκνυε): 'that the skilled man will conduct public duties, not according to the established laws, but rather according to the law of excellence'⁶¹ (D.L. 6.11 = SSR 134.7-8). This is a rather startling assertion, especially when read in the face of the prevailing winds of scholarship that consider Antisthenes' *Ajax* the inferior man because of his unwillingness or inability to submit to the will of the community and their established laws.

58 = Themist. *Περὶ Ἀρετῆς* p. 43 R. Mach.

59 τέλος εἶναι τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν.

60 ἀναφαίρετον ὄπλον ἢ ἀρετή.

61 καὶ τὸν σοφὸν οὐ κατὰ τὸν κειμένους νόμους πολιτεύσασθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς.

Rankin discusses Antisthenes' notion of excellence and the sort of honour he thinks it implied. He concludes that: 'This honour which resided in apparent disregard of honour, was to be nourished by the Cynics for several centuries. Aias, the loser, represents the world of Cimon, of Pericles, and Nicias' (1968, 154). The 'world of Cimon, of Pericles, and Nicias' implies an old aristocratic order that, given Ajax's association with it, Rankin obviously feels is being superseded from Antisthenes' point of view. So is there any evidence in Antisthenes writings to suggest this? In fact it appears once again that the opposite is the case. For a start, two of the men mentioned, Cimon and Nicias, displayed clear laconising tendencies, and it seems that Antisthenes was more than sympathetic towards Sparta himself. As for Cimon, Plutarch describes him as a 'Sparta-lover' (φιλολάκων, *Cim.* 16.1; φιλολάκωνα, *Per.* 9.4) and he was ostracised on account of this, and the fact that he was a 'demos-hater' (μισόδημον, *Per.* 9.4). He was Sparta's *proxenos*, or special representative, in Athens (*Per.* 29.2), and regularly rebuked the Athenians for not being like Spartans (*Cim.* 16.3). He actually named his son Lacedaemonius (*Cim.* 16.1). The Athenian general, Nicias, famously favoured peace with Sparta and negotiated a settlement with them during the Peloponnesian War (Th. 5.16-19). There are also a number of Antisthenes' fragments that indicate his own laconizing tendency. For example, he said 'As Sparta is the dwelling place of men, Athens is the women's quarters' (Theon *Progymn* 33 = SSR 7). As noted above, he also said that 'excellence is brevity of speech (βραχύλογον)' (Gnom. Vat. 743 n. 12 = SSR 104). Evidently βραχύλογος is synonymous with laconic, and not surprisingly, in Plato's *Laws* we find βραχυλογία is a quality attributed to the Spartans (641e). Having established his general favourableness towards Sparta, it is interesting to consider the well demonstrated similarity between Antisthenes' terse and indignant Ajax and the Spartans. This fact has not gone unnoticed by at least one modern commentator. Even though he feels that Odysseus is clearly depicted as the winner, Rankin admits that 'Antisthenes has some sympathy for the stiff-tongued Laconian simplicity of Aias' (1986, 156). Prince also recognised that there was some correlation between Ajax's stance and Antisthenes' own beliefs, but seemingly understated the case when she wrote: 'Since his words and thoughts resonate with phrases and ideas attributed to Antisthenes in other fragments, it is clear that Ajax is meant to be

sympathetic on some level' (Prince 2006, 83). She does not explore the idea further, however, and subsequently comments that Ajax's 'extreme adherence to traditional honor usurps any sense that he has an inner soul' (83). In contrast she writes that Odysseus 'has the true ethical space of choice and agency that could count as a real soul' and that he 'criticizes Ajax' failures in self-knowledge, neglect of the psychic – or perhaps intellectual – components of "bravery" and "strength"' (84). These statements suggests that she is evaluating Ajax against different philosophical principles to those that interested Antisthenes. His preoccupation seems to have been very much one that was concerned with living according to excellence. There do not appear to be extant fragments suggesting he had an interest in the development of 'an inner soul'.

Exploring further Antisthenes' attitude towards the old, laconizing aristocracy, his claim 'that the same people who are high-born are also the excellent ones'⁶² (D.L. 6.10-11) is rather arresting. The word εὐγενεῖς translated here as 'high-born' is used especially of members of the old aristocracy (cf. LSJ s.v.). In light of this it is interesting to discover that Antisthenes himself was described as 'high-born' (γενναῖον) by Socrates (D.L. 2.31). In keeping with his class, Antisthenes appears to have taken a somewhat dim view of democracy. He observed: 'It is paradoxical that we extract the weeds from the corn and the unfit soldiers in war but in politics we don't dismiss the base men' (τοὺς πονηροὺς, D.L. 6.6 = SSR 73). In the same vein he said 'as it is dangerous to give a dagger to a madman, so it is to give power to a base man (μοχθηρῶ, SSR 76)'. What is more, Antisthenes was also renowned for his deeds in war. He distinguished himself at the battle of Tanagra in 426, leading Socrates to comment on his bravery (D.L. 6.1; for the battle see Thuc. 3.91). Thus Prince's criticism of Ajax's 'inability to adapt to his circumstance, a competitive verbal debate' (2006, 83) does not really reflect Antisthenes' own sentiment on the matter. It seems that the high-born, man of action, Ajax, actually had much in common with the author who so-characterised him. As a crowning argument in support of this interpretation it is instructive to consider Antisthenes' statement, 'that excellence is a matter of deeds, and requires neither many arguments nor much learning'⁶³ (D.L. 6.11).

62 τοὺς αὐτοὺς εὐγενεῖς [τ]οὺς καὶ ἐναρέτους.

63 τὴν τ' ἀρετὴν τῶν ἔργων εἶναι, μῆτε λόγων πλείστων δεομένην μῆτε μαθημάτων.

It has been established that what underpinned Antisthenes' ethical belief system was the importance of excellence and now it has been noted that what he thought constituted excellence was deeds or action. It is thus worth recalling some of the statements Ajax delivers about excellence and deeds in the eponymous speech Antisthenes gives him. What seemingly concerns Ajax more than anything else, and what he delivers tirades about to the jury three times, is the importance of properly carrying out 'the discrimination of excellence' (περὶ ἀρετῆς κρίνειν, 4.2, 5, 7.2). Furthermore, Ajax makes arguments regarding deeds or actions and their value and importance in comparison to words or arguments no less than six times (1.4, 7, 7.3, 4, 7, 8.2). So evidently the defence that Ajax offers portrays him as possessing an ethical position that resonates in a direct and significant manner with Antisthenes himself.

This throws new light on Antisthenes' statement, mentioned above, 'that the skilled man will conduct public duties, not according to the established laws, but rather according to the law of excellence' (D.L. 6.11 = SSR 134.7-8). Aristotle discusses at some length men of outstanding virtue and the difficulty, or even the injustice, of trying to legislate to control them (*Pol.* 1284a5-17).

But if there is any one man so greatly distinguished in outstanding excellence, or more than one but not enough to be able to make up a complete state, so that the excellence of all the rest and their political ability is not comparable with that of the men mentioned, if they are several, or if one, with his alone, it is no longer proper to count these exceptional men a part of the state; for they will be treated unjustly if deemed worthy of equal status, being so widely unequal in excellence and in their political ability: since such a man will naturally be as a god among men. Hence it is clear that legislation also must necessarily be concerned with persons who are equal in birth and in ability, but there can be no law dealing with such men as those described, for they are themselves a law; indeed a man would be ridiculous if he tried to legislate for them, for probably they would say what in the story of Antisthenes the lions said when the hares made speeches in the assembly and demanded that all should have equality.⁶⁴

Aristotle does not elaborate on what the lions said. This observation of Antisthenes' must have been so well known from his writing or political views that it did not need repeating. It is possible, however, to adduce the lions' reply with a fair degree of certainty from an

64 Generally following Rackham's Loeb translation.

identical story about the lions and the hares attributed to Aesop.⁶⁵ In Aesop's fable, after the hares finish making their speeches about equality, what the lions actually said was: 'Your words, O Hares, are good; but they lack both claws and teeth such as we have' (Aesop 241). The attribution of this observation to Antisthenes further confirms the esteem in which he held men who were pre-eminent in excellence regardless of any concern they had for the community.

At this point it is appropriate to introduce an additional parallel: the case of Antisthenes' mentor, Socrates. It has been established that excellence – ἀρετή – is paramount among Antisthenes' ethical interests and also of critical importance to his character, Ajax. It seems that for Socrates likewise, excellence was the principal concern. In Plato's *Apology*, Socrates describes himself as talking about excellence every day (38a), urging fellow citizens to strive for excellence before any other things (29e, 30b, 31b), and he tells the assembly that after he dies he wants them also to urge his sons to strive for excellence above all else (41e).

As a final and concluding argument in favour of Antisthenes being philosophically sympathetic towards Ajax as he portrayed him, Ajax's values, and conduct in court generally, will now be compared with that of Socrates. It would be fascinating to know how Antisthenes depicted Socrates in the Socratic dialogues that we know he wrote. It seems probable that he too had written an apology for Socrates. It is attested that he produced Socratic dialogues (D.L. 2.64), however, it is difficult to discern from the list of his works which ones they might be. Works that appear to be candidates for a Socratic dialogue that may have been apologetic include: *Concerning Justice and Manly Courage: a hortatory work in three books*;⁶⁶ *Concerning 'the Good'*;⁶⁷ *Concerning Manly Courage*;⁶⁸ and *Concerning 'the Law' or Concerning 'the Noble' and 'the Just'*.⁶⁹ (D.L. 6.16 = SSR 41). Other possibilities include: *Concerning Dying*;⁷⁰ and *Concerning Life and Death*⁷¹ (D.L.6.17 = SSR 41). Though it is a pity that these writings are now lost, it is fortunate that other works by contemporary authors,

65 ref. to Aesop noted by Caizzi (1966) comm. *ad loc.* on F 100.

66 Περί δικαιοσύνης και ἀνδρείας προτρεπτικός πρώτος, δεύτερος, τρίτος.

67 Περί ἀγαθοῦ.

68 Περί ἀνδρείας.

69 Περί νόμου ἢ περὶ καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου.

70 Περί τοῦ ἀποθανεῖν.

71 Περί ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου.

namely Plato and Xenophon, preserve portraits – particularly the *Apologies* – that distinctly characterise Socrates. Thus is it useful to consider those characterisations further in comparison with Antisthenes' characterisation of Ajax to see what insights can be gleaned.

Before turning to the conduct of Ajax and Socrates in court it will be valuable to consider one further area of ethical concern. For Antisthenes, along with excellence, considered justice to be of critical value. He urged people to 'consider a just man to be of greater value than a relative' and to 'make men allies who are courageous and at the same time just' (D.L. 6.11). In the *Symposium*, Antisthenes says that justice (δικαιοσύνη) is the most indisputable form of nobility (καλοκάγαθία), because 'manliness and skilfulness (ἀνδρεία καὶ σοφία) sometimes seem to be harmful both to friends and to city, but justice does not associate with injustice in any manner.' (X. *Symp.* 3.4).

Given the demonstrated sympathy between Ajax's and Antisthenes' outlooks, it is not then surprising to discover that justice is also of concern to Ajax. He speaks about the unlikelihood of achieving justice (δίκη) from his judges (1.5), as well as the 'justice' those judges will receive if they deliver an incorrect verdict (8.6). He uses the word for 'judge' (δικαστής) twice (1.5, 7.2), and the verb 'to judge' (δικάζειν) a remarkable seven times (1.1, 1.5, 4.3, 7.6, 8.4, 8.6 x2). In addition, he twice uses another word for 'judge' (κριτής) (7.1, 8.7), and the related verb 'to judge' (κρίνω) a further four times (4.3, 4.6, 7.3, 7.4). In contrast, Odysseus does not mention any of the δικ-root words even once, and only uses the verb κρίνω to claim that Ajax has judged him (3.5).

Interestingly, when Socrates was defending himself in court, as portrayed in Plato's *Apology*, he also made a great number of references to justice, judges and judging. He speaks of the importance of being 'just' (δίκαιος), both in regard to himself and others (including the judges) eight times (17c, 18a, 28b, 32c, e, 35c, 41a, 42a). Among numerous other uses of words for judges and judging, he discusses the excellence (ἀρετή) of a judge (δικαστής), i.e. 'to tell the truth' (18a), and the imperative for a judge to carry out his duties in accordance with the laws and not with favours (35c). He also speaks out about how he refused to do anything unjust, either when urged to by the crowd at the time of the trial of the generals from the Battle of Arginusae (32c), or when ordered by the tyrants when they wanted him to

make an arrest (32d).

Justice and proper judging then was a theme that was of special interest to Antisthenes, belaboured by Ajax, and also considered to be of central importance by Socrates. There is additional evidence to validate this comparison. In Xenophon's *Apology*, Socrates states 'I get comfort from the case of Palamedes also, who died in similar circumstances to mine. For even now he provides us with far more noble themes for song than does Odysseus, the man who unjustly put him to death' (26). The fact that Socrates compares himself to Palamedes, another victim of Odysseus is rather striking. It is even more notable when it is realised that Plato also records Socrates comparing himself to Palamedes, *and to Ajax*. Socrates muses about the afterlife and anticipates meeting former heroes who have died. He says: 'I personally should find the life there wonderful, when I met Palamedes or Ajax, the son of Telamon, or any other men of old who lost their lives through an unjust judgement, and compared my life with theirs' (41ab). So in both authors' accounts, Odysseus is considered to have achieved the judgement unjustly. Obviously the other interesting point here is that Socrates compares himself directly with Odysseus' victims, and specifically with Ajax.

Turning now to the defendants' conduct in court, the first thing to note is that Socrates seems to share with Ajax some of the 'aristocratic doubt' about the ability of the common men to judge 'good men' properly. He observes how the 'prejudice and dislike of the many' (ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος) has already condemned many other 'good men' (ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας, 28a). Also like Ajax, Socrates is disparaging about the effects of 'persuasive speaking' on his judges. In his speech, Ajax admits the fact that perhaps Odysseus 'will be persuasive arguing' (πείσει λέγων) that his many shameful acts were actually some kind of splendid accomplishment (6.5). With similar language, Socrates comments on how persuasively his accusers spoke (οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον, 17a; πιθανῶς λέγοντες, 23e), adding however that not a word they said was true (17a).

Continuing the comparison, Ajax as Antisthenes depicts him is utterly ill at ease with the court setting and the obligation to justify himself. He finds the entire set up to be alien and abhorrent. Socrates is not at home in front of the court either. He admits that it is the first time he has been before the court in his seventy years and hence the way of speaking in court

is foreign to him (17de). Like Ajax, however, he refuses to change his style of speaking to suit the court and specifically states that he will not be doing so (17b, 38d). He also declines to beg and beseech the judges with tears while bringing forward his children and relatives (34c, 38d). Ajax also defies his judges and bothers with no apologies for his mode of defence, but rather is disdainful about the validity of the entire juridical process. He queries the dubious chances of achieving justice from such 'ignorant judges' and 'by arguments at that' (1.6). As has been noted, he insults his judges by calling them 'ignorant' on no less than three other occasions (1.5, 4.3, 7.1).

It seems that Ajax and Socrates share a similar view also on cowardice. Ajax states that he would never dare to do anything surreptitiously, nor could he bear a cowardly reputation (κακῶς ἀκούων, 5.5). In a related statement, Socrates says that any man of even a little merit, before he considers the risk of life or death, should consider whether the things he does are the just acts of a good man or the unjust acts of a wicked man. He then goes on to quote Achilles who feared much more to live as a coward (τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὄν) than to risk death and danger while avenging his friends (28bc). This stance is very reminiscent of the general aristocratic disposition, discussed in Chapter 3, of preferring death before dishonour.

On a similar theme, Ajax concluded his speech by telling his audience that that he is 'always stationed (τέταγμαί) first, and alone, and without walls' (9.5). This is quite evocative of the manner in which Socrates asserts that 'wherever a man stations (τάξῃ) himself, thinking it best to be there ... there he must, as it seems to me, remain and run his risks, considering neither death nor any other thing more than disgrace' (28d). He goes on to claim that if it was right to remain where his commanders stationed (ἔταπτον) him in battle, then it would be terrible to desert the position where the god had stationed (ἔταπτον) him (28e29a).

Finally, Socrates is utterly self-assured of his value to the Athenians and is quite prepared to die for his principals. To this effect, he tells them that 'no greater good ever came to the city than my service to the god' (30a). If they kill him, he says, they will not be injuring him so much as themselves (30c) because they will not easily find another as useful to them as himself (30e), if they can ever find one at all (31a). Furthermore, he states that he does not

fear death (29a) and would rather die than yield to fear of doing what is just (32a). He says that even if the jury releases him on this occasion but threatens him with death if he keeps up his philosophical pursuits he will not stop (29cd) and he would refuse to change his conduct even if it meant he is 'to die many times over' (30b). So while he does not need them, and thus is happy to die, they do need him and will sorely miss him if he goes. When Ajax talks about being stationed 'first, and alone', what he similarly seems to be saying is 'I am better than all of you – and I don't need you' (9.5). Xenophon observed that 'Socrates, by exalting (μεγαλύνειν) himself before the court, brought ill-will upon himself and made his conviction by the jury all the more certain' (*Ap.* 32). It seems that Xenophon could just as easily have been speaking about Antisthenes' Ajax.

Conclusion

In antiquity, Antisthenes enjoyed a tremendous reputation as a thinker and as a literary stylist. It has been argued here that in modern scholarship he has generally been completely neglected and, when he has been noticed, he has been misunderstood and misrepresented. A central aim of this paper has been to redefine his reception in modern scholarship, by showing how important he is and how much more attention he deserves. Ultimately, the aim is to re-establish his position as an innovative and influential prose writer of the classical period.

It has been shown that ancient critics from Cicero through Dionysius of Halicarnassus to Phrynichus considered Antisthenes to be an important Socratic thinker and a fine Attic stylist. He was generally considered to be of similar calibre to writers such as Plato and Xenophon and with a literary and philosophical output rivalled by only Aristotle and Democritus. In modern scholarship, by contrast, he is almost unknown. Much of the time when Antisthenes' name has been mentioned, it has been limited to just that – a mention of his name. Many modern works on classical rhetoric and oratory fail to notice him altogether and when they do give him consideration he generally receives a brief reference in passing, e.g. 'Antisthenes, a student of Gorgias.' His *Ajax* and *Odysseus*, have been similarly ignored. They have never been given a complete, continuous translation in any language. This almost certainly makes Antisthenes the only important, late fifth century author who is not available for study in translation.

In so far as his only complete extant works, the *Ajax* and *Odysseus*, have received attention, they have been considered epideictic display speeches, and poor examples at that. The aim of an epideictic speech, particularly a forensic one, is to illustrate a near perfect argument for a given case. Viewed from this perspective, most modern scholars have assessed Antisthenes' efforts as rather clumsy and inept. This is not at all surprising, as when the speeches are subjected to more than a passing glance it is rather obvious that they are not epideictic. Rather than being persuasive, the words Antisthenes has crafted on behalf of the heroes in this debate, particularly for *Ajax*, are counter-productive and self-defeating. *Ajax*, as has been shown, appears altogether out of place in a court setting. Far

from attempting to win over or persuade his judges, instead he routinely insults and even threatens them, and he queries their competence for the task they are attempting. He makes a lot of statements that seem more suited to an indignant aristocrat being insolently challenged by those beneath his rank than a sincere litigant eager to sway and convince the jury. The way Ajax presents himself is really quite reminiscent of the way he is presented both in epic and in classical literature, i.e. as intransigent, action oriented, and the foremost warrior of the Achaeans after Achilles. In reply Odysseus does put forward a better case, at least in terms of winning the argument. The manner in which he relates to the jury, however, is hardly more appealing than the attitude of Ajax. He also insults them and ensures that they are well aware that he has done more for their mutual cause than the whole lot of them put together. Nevertheless, he is prepared to relate to them on the terms dictated by a court setting and the way he addresses them is as if he were some sort of demagogue. He is aristocratic like Ajax, but unlike Ajax he is prepared to use his position to influence and persuade the common soldiery and people.

It has been argued here that the reason the *Ajax* and *Odysseus* are not very persuasive is because they are not epideictic pieces. Some modern scholars have recognised that it is problematic to interpret them as ideal display speeches and have wondered what Antisthenes was doing with them. A couple of authors have interpreted the characterisation they detect in them as Antisthenes' own personality awkwardly spilling into them. There are a couple of notable exceptions in recent scholarship, however, for example Worman has realised that the style of the speeches suits the characters of the speakers to some extent, but still concludes that they are intended to be 'persuasive'. Kennedy, in his *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, recognised the characterisation evident in the speeches and insightfully suggested that they were perhaps intended as exercises in ethopoiia.

The development of ethopoiia represented a bold and innovative attempt to understand various people from an ethological point of view – i.e. the values and ethics that motivated them – and to characterise them in speech. The development of characterisation and ethopoiia in rhetoric has received very little scholarly attention. In the few modern works where it has been discussed Lysias is given all the credit for developing it. When the *Ajax*

and *Odysseus* are subjected to a reading with ethopoiia in mind, however, it becomes readily apparent that they are actually exceptionally good examples of it. Ajax is completely driven by his ethical concerns and by attitudes that are in keeping with his class, i.e. a born and bred aristocrat. He speaks a great deal about excellence and knows his jury is unfit to judge him on that issue. Reputation and renown are also dear to him. He is eager to attain glory and to avoid shame and it is qualities such as these that he claims set him apart from Odysseus. He has no time for wordy speeches and is only interested in conspicuous action. He would actually rather remain silent than be forced to make an argument. Since he has been compelled to defend himself he makes no effort to disguise his aristocratic contempt for his judges and actually several times issues orders and commands to them. By contrast, Odysseus is not at all concerned with maintaining reputation or avoiding shame. He freely admits that he will do whatever needs to be done, and in whatever way required, to ensure the success of any given mission. He will even willingly debase himself by being flogged and beaten at the hands of slaves if it will advance his cause. Being at ease with employing argument, his speech is characteristically almost twice as long as Ajax's. The ethopoiia in the characterisation of both Ajax and Odysseus is evident at every turn.

In view of this, it is quite clear that these important works of Antisthenes are a very early and hence rather daring and brilliant attempt to illustrate characterisation. They are in fact excellent examples of ethopoiia. Unlike Lysias' speeches which were all designed purely to win legal cases, and as such were very persuasive, these speeches are at times spectacularly un-persuasive. This is because they have no agenda other than delineating the ethopoiia of Ajax and Odysseus, and so in a very real sense they are a more serious attempt at pure characterisation. Thus they represent a critical moment in literary history that has implications for the study of character development in rhetoric, dialogue and drama.

Because they have not been recognised as examples of ethopoiia, Antisthenes' *Ajax* and *Odysseus* have never been understood in their proper literary and cultural context. An examination of the way in which Odysseus was portrayed throughout the majority of the fifth century reveals an established tradition and discourse that Antisthenes was participating in. Odysseus came to be regularly and consistently depicted as a silver-

tongued anti-hero, whereas previously he had always enjoyed an untarnished reputation as a great epic hero. Routinely opposed to him were a range of noble Homeric heroes whom he preyed upon and corrupted or destroyed. It has been demonstrated that in these symbolic representations, Odysseus' primary attributes were a propensity to use guile and crafty words to achieve his utilitarian ends. His noble victims on the other hand were routinely endowed with old-style aristocratic virtues – they valued straight forward speech over actions, and took pride in their good reputations and honour. Antisthenes, with his *Ajax* and *Odysseus*, was clearly participating in the same discourse, for which the broader socio-historical background was the emergence of democracy and the exacerbated class divisions that arose between ascendant democrats and old-style aristocrats during the Peloponnesian War.

The final and very important case that has been argued in this paper relates to Antisthenes' philosophical and ethical outlook. A survey of modern scholarship has revealed that Antisthenes is considered by one and all to be a Cynic or proto-Cynic. For the most part it has been conjectured that the speeches offer an exploration of Antisthenes' proto-Cynic philosophical views. By this rationale, the community minded, utilitarian Odysseus is considered to be closely aligned with Antisthenes' own outlook. Some authors even believe that Odysseus is trying help or educate the poor Ajax, who does not really have a proper soul. It has been clearly demonstrated here, however, that Antisthenes was not a Cynic at all and nor did he have any Cynic views. When his attitudes are considered without peering through the rather foggy lens of 'proto-Cynicism' it becomes clear that he is preoccupied with ethical concerns, and in particular with excellence – ἀρετή. Very much after the fashion of his own *Ajax*, Antisthenes was of noble birth and breeding. The extant fragments of his work reveal an adeptness for martial glory, a tendency to laconize, and a lowly estimate of the demos that are all in keeping with his class. An analysis of the *Ajax* and his other fragments reveal that Antisthenes is sympathetic to Ajax's characterisation in every way. The final and clinching evidence for this assessment is the significant parallels that have been illustrated between Antisthenes' portrayal of Ajax and Plato's portrayal of Socrates when he was on trial. Both are uneasy in court and strident in their attitude – they

refuse to make any concessions to their judges. They are both obsessed with justice and proper judging, especially in relation to ἀρετή. Finally, they are both also convinced that their judges sorely underestimate their worth.

In conclusion, this study has significantly reinterpreted Antisthenes, a critical ancient author who has suffered unfitting neglect. In particular an examination and discussion of his *Ajax* and *Odysseus* has proved that they are an original and quite outstanding exercise in ethopoiia. Antisthenes has also been rescued from the position he was erroneously installed in as the founder of Cynicism. His true philosophical values have been identified and have been shown to focus on ethical concerns similar to those of his *Ajax*. This work may help to shape future studies on Antisthenes and his role as a philosopher and literary experimentalist. Much work remains to be done, not least of which would be a fuller introductory study of Antisthenes that took into account the findings of this paper. An English addition of the fragments with a translation and commentary is another obvious gap in scholarship that needs filling. Other works that can be envisaged that would be influenced by this paper include a study of character development that takes Antisthenes into consideration, and a study of his real relationship to Socrates and the other Socratic philosophers that does likewise. All these would be proper steps to take in restoring the rightful reputation to Antisthenes – that of an intellectual yet innovative and skilful writer who was considered one of the foremost exponents of Attic literary style throughout antiquity.

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