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Keith Jennings
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*‘Thesis’ includes ‘treatise’, ‘dissertation’ and other similar productions.
YOU'VE TAKEN OUR SCHOOLS!

The Role and Development of the Catholic Education Office Sydney, 1939-1987

J. J. Luttrell

A Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements of the degree of
Master of Education (Honours)

Faculty of Education
University of Sydney
1992
There has been a revolution in the administration of Australian Catholic schools since the 1960s. The administration of most Catholic schools has passed from religious congregations and parish priests to complex and predominantly lay-staffed organisations, called Catholic Education Offices (CEOs).

This study examines the history of one CEO, that of the Sydney Archdiocese. Founded in 1939 as a modest amplification of the Archdiocesan Inspectorate, it has become the second largest CEO in Australia, administering a school system comparable to that of Tasmania or Western Australia. Two aspects are examined — firstly, the way its role changed to assume the administration of a system of schools; secondly, its development into a large, complex organisation.

This history is conceptualised in three stages — 1939–60, 1960–75 and 1975–87. Before 1960 the CEO was a base office for the clerical Inspectors of Schools and a communications link between the archbishop, religious congregations, and parish priests. Inspection was its primary responsibility. In the second stage, 1960–75, the CEO ceased to be an inspectorate and rapidly assumed a major share of the administration of most Catholic schools in Sydney, thereby creating a new system and itself becoming a large, complex organisation. This rapid change was accompanied by much confusion and tension within the school system and the CEO. So the final part, 1975–87, describes a long struggle to restructure both the administrative leadership of the new school system and the CEO itself as an organisation, according to a model of corporate accountability.

By 1987, the CEO's authority was both affirmed and enhanced. It now appeared that the future of Sydney Catholic schools would be strongly determined by the Sydney CEO. The same prediction might be made for the other Australian dioceses.
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Several of these also read and commented on draft chapters. Their assistance and interest is greatly appreciated.

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Finally the author extends sincere appreciation to his fellow Marist Brothers who gave him the opportunity and support for this study. Dr Peter Codd’s insights and technical assistance were especially important. Much encouragement was also given by his family and friends. Gratitude is owed to all of these.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.C.E.R.</td>
<td>Australian Council for Educational Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMMA</td>
<td>Assistant Masters and Mistresses Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Br</td>
<td>Brother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBFC</td>
<td>Catholic Building and Finance Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCD</td>
<td>Confraternity of Christian Doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEC</td>
<td>Catholic Education Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Catholic Education Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEOL</td>
<td>Catholic Education Office, Leichhardt. This is the central office and holds archives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEOS</td>
<td>Catholic Education Office, Sydney — where distinction needed from other CEOs. It includes central and regional offices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIO</td>
<td>Catholic Industrial Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSFO</td>
<td>Catholic Schools Finance Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSA</td>
<td>Catholic Secondary Schools Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUSA</td>
<td>Catholic United Services Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOGS</td>
<td>Defence of Government Schools (Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fr</td>
<td>Father</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAC</td>
<td>Industrial Affairs Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDSP</td>
<td>Important Documents Sent to Principals (a CEOL file)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITA</td>
<td>The Independent Teachers Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mgr</td>
<td>Monsignor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCEC</td>
<td>National Catholic Education Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P &amp; F</td>
<td>Parents and Friends Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPSU</td>
<td>Parent Participation in Schools Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Religious Education Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAA</td>
<td>Sydney Archdiocesan Archives, St Mary's Cathedral, Sydney.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACS (B)</td>
<td>Sydney Archdiocesan Catholic Schools (Board)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJCA</td>
<td>St Joseph's College, Hunters Hill Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sr</td>
<td>Sister</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abbreviations for Religious Congregations.

The recent convention in Catholic circles is followed of using lower case letters for the initials of religious congregations and orders, to distinguish these from letters showing academic qualifications. For example one might refer to Ronald Fogarty, fms, PhD. Initials of congregations mentioned in this study are placed with the shortened or common names given to these congregations:

- cfc  Christian Brothers
- cm   Vincentian Congregation
- csb  Brigidine Sisters
- fms  Marist Brothers
- fdnsc Daughters of Our Lady of the Sacred Heart
- fsc  De La Salle Brothers
- fsp  Patrician Brothers
- ocarm Order of Carmelites
- osu  Ursuline Sisters
- rsj  Sisters of St Joseph (Brown Josephites)
- rsm  Sisters of Mercy
- sgs  Sisters of the Good Samaritan
- sj  Society of Jesus (Jesuits)
Introduction

If one inquired who was responsible for the administration of Catholic\(^1\) schools in Australia since European settlement, the authorities cited would be Catholic bishops, parish priests, and leaders of religious congregations\(^2\). They determined the foundation, development and organisation of schools — up to about 1965.

In the mid 1960s a deputation of parish priests met the Archbishop of Sydney, Cardinal Norman Gilroy, with the complaint: "What has happened? You've taken our schools from us!"\(^3\) Their group remonstration evoked a sense of the high importance of their schools to the Australian Catholic community. More importantly it signalled the beginning of a fundamental change in the century old administrative arrangements. Parish priests were beginning to lose control of their schools. Moreover the same complaint was surely voiced by many members of the religious congregations who, within two decades, were to surrender the administration of the majority of the schools that they had long and energetically nurtured.

While the archbishop took the brunt of the priests' complaint, he personally was not to be the new manager or administrator. He and the bishops of other dioceses gradually transferred the responsibility for the administration of most Catholic schools to complex organisations which have developed in each Australian diocese. These are known as Catholic Education Offices (CEOs). In general there is one CEO for each of the 28 dioceses in Australia. Thus New South Wales has twelve CEOs, the two largest being in Sydney and Parramatta. Although CEOs have existed in most dioceses since 1940, most of the change and growth has occurred

\(^1\)The word "Catholic" will refer to the Roman Catholic Church throughout this study.

\(^2\)Catholic Canon Law has traditionally distinguished religious orders from religious congregations and religious institutes. The distinction is not relevant for this history and so the term congregation will be used throughout for what might strictly be termed order, congregation or institute.

\(^3\)Related by Bernard McBride, Executive Secretary of Gilroy's Catholic Building and Finance Commission, in an interview with the author, 22 October 1988. See J. Luttrell, The Development of the Catholic Education Office, Sydney (unpublished, 1988), transcript p.6. All interviews cited in this study were conducted by the author. All transcripts cited are from this work by Luttrell.
since 1960. In most cases it has taken until the 1980s for the present shape of a CEO to crystallise.

Reasons for this Study

The growth of these systems and their administering CEOs represents a remarkable change in the administration of Catholic schooling in Australia. Yet literature on this change is sparse and inchoate. The most comprehensive and widely accepted general study of Catholic schooling in Australia, Br Ronald Fogarty's Catholic Education in Australia 1806–1950⁴, makes no mention of Catholic Education Offices. Thus, while CEOs did exist in the 1940s, Fogarty did not see them as essential to Catholic schooling, which was then largely dependent on religious congregations. The only extensive study of a Catholic Education Office has been carried out by Helen Praetz who, in her Building a School System: A Sociological Study of Catholic Education⁵, traced the development of the Catholic Education Office of the Melbourne Archdiocese to the stage of its being the dominant Catholic educational bureaucracy in Victoria. This work was a sociological case study of the development of the organisation and the extension of its authority and power. Recent developments in Victoria have been outlined by a former Director of the Melbourne CEO, Fr Francis Martin, who has discussed the issue of the centralisation of power in the hands of the CEO.⁶

There are no comparable studies of other Catholic Education Offices in Australia, despite the fact that most dioceses have a CEO. Nor does there seem to be material relating to overseas offices. In the United States the diocesan offices have not developed to the extent of those in Australia largely because there is no government funding for Catholic schools. This was indicated in the 1970s when Andrew Greeley, a sociologist, called for the development of a structured, professional administration of U.S. Catholic schools.⁷

⁴Catholic Education in Australia 1806-1950 (Melbourne, 1959), 2 volumes.
⁵H. Praetz, Building a School System (Melbourne, 1980).
⁷See his conclusion in A.M. Greeley, W.C. McCreary and K. McCourt, Catholic Schools in a Declining Church (Kansas City, 1976).
This study attempts to supplement the limited treatment of these organisations by examining the history of the second largest CEO, that of the Archdiocese of Sydney. The importance of the Sydney CEO can be illustrated in several ways. Administering the second largest private education system in Australia (after the Melbourne CEO), the Sydney CEO has developed into a complex organisation comparable to the smaller Australian state Departments of Education such as those of Tasmania and Western Australia. Recent figures (for 1989) show that the Sydney CEO, with a staff of over 150 personnel, administered 169 schools containing 65,699 pupils, while the Melbourne CEO administered 356 schools and 139,292 pupils. After Sydney, the next largest CEOs, in respect of numbers of pupils cared for, are Brisbane, Perth, Parramatta and Adelaide, down to the smallest, Broome, which caters for 1,425 pupils.

However, the importance of the Sydney CEO since 1939 is not adequately reflected by these 1989 figures because the Sydney Archdiocese originally covered a much larger area. Large sections of the original archdiocese were taken to create the diocese of Wollongong in 1951 and the two dioceses of Parramatta and Broken Bay in 1986. Another measure of the significance of the original Sydney Archdiocese is that approximately 23 per cent of Australia’s Catholics live in the metropolitan area of Sydney.

A further reason for studying the Sydney CEO is to identify features which distinguish it from other CEOs. While there are similarities amongst the various CEOs, each diocese is autonomous and so each CEO has developed its own administrative structure and mode of operation. A feature of the Sydney model of administration is the effort to decentralise authority. In contrast, the more common pattern in other Australian archdioceses has been for the metropolitan CEO to consolidate its central authority and even extend it to other dioceses within the state. The Melbourne and Brisbane CEOs are notable examples. Thus, because of the variation in the different systems, there is a need for study of the operation of a number of CEOs in order to gain a more comprehensive picture of their role and importance. This study of the Sydney system is one contribution.

9Ibid.
This history will examine the role and development of the Catholic Education Office, Sydney, from its origin in 1939 to 1987 by which time its present role and structure had crystallised. It will complement the above-mentioned studies of the Melbourne Office and thus contribute towards an understanding of the profound changes that have occurred in the administration of Catholic schools in Australia, especially in the last twenty years.

**Scope and Structure of the Study**

The sub-title, "The Role and Development of the Catholic Education Office Sydney, 1939–1987", indicates the two areas of focus in the thesis. While the CEO is a complex organisation in itself, it also operates in an environment or network of wider relationships with other organisations. There is always a dynamic relationship between the CEO and the wider system. Therefore this examination of the "role" of the CEO will mean showing its relationship to other groups, such as the Catholic hierarchy and religious congregations, schools, and government departments. Tracing the "development" of the CEO will involve looking at the organisation itself — its origins, leadership, evolving structures and functions, up to 1987.

The development of the CEO is sketched from its foundation in 1939 when it could hardly be termed an organisation. The study ends in 1987 because in that year the present role and structure of the CEO was stabilised or crystallised after some decades of change and debate. The forty-eight year span was undertaken because it allows an appreciation of the transformation of the CEO from a small office with very limited power to a large and most influential organisation. Because of the length of the period, only some facets of the role and the development can be given due treatment.

Three stages can be discerned in the history of the CEO. In its early years to about 1960 it was a small group of inspectors visiting and liaising with schools run by religious congregations. Secondly, in the 1960s and 1970s, it developed into a much larger, more powerful and complex organisation, mainly because of the creation of a centralised system of schools in the archdiocese. The final stage overlaps with the second stage. From the mid 1970s there was a protracted process of reforming the administration
network of the new system of schools. In the process, the CEO, which was a key part of the network, underwent consequent changes. This stage ended in 1987 when the archdiocese had finally agreed upon and appointed a reconstructed CEO within a reconstructed administrative network.

This study of the development of the CEO is therefore divided into three parts which correspond to the stages just outlined. To help explain the changes in the role of the CEO and in its internal history, each of the three parts will begin with a survey of the historical context of these changes, noting important international, national and ecclesiastical developments which would affect Catholic schools in Sydney. Further chapters in each part will discuss the changing role and development of the CEO in the particular stage. Accordingly each part will have a narrowing range of subject matter, beginning with the general historical context, moving into the system of administration of Catholic schools in Sydney and finally focussing on the CEO itself as an organisation.

There will be no attempt to estimate the overall impact of the CEO upon Catholic schooling in the period. Such an objective would presuppose a broad study of the history of Catholic education in Sydney since 1940. However within the limits of the narrative, the reader should find useful indications of the influence of the CEO, especially for the period since 1965.

Methodology

Primarily this is a history of the changing role and development of the organisation. Research began with the hypothesis that the CEO was an important new player in the history of Catholic schooling in Sydney. From this hypothesis flowed the need to find adequate information on the development of the CEO. The evidence discovered needed to be interpreted and incorporated into a narrative.

Sources

Archive documents and interviews provided most of the data for the study. Documents relating to the CEO were found mainly in its present headquarters at Leichhardt and in the Sydney Archdiocesan Archives at St Mary’s Cathedral, and to a much lesser extent in various schools and other church institutions. There was a great variety of material, notably
correspondence, circulars issued by the CEO, investigative reports on the CEO, and minutes of meetings.

Because this is a history of recent events it was possible to interview or correspond with many of the past and current members of the CEO and with people such as school principals who had close dealings with the organisation. In its fifty three years of existence there have been only four Directors of the CEO. The first died in 1985 but the remaining three have been readily accessible for interview. Sometimes middle ranked staff in the CEO were specially helpful in that they were familiar with particular projects and departments. Overall these interviews were a most valuable means of gaining a sense of the atmosphere of the CEO and the perspectives (sometimes conflicting) of its members.

Another source of understanding has been the personal experience of the author in teaching since 1967 in several Catholic schools whose administration had just been transferred from the management of a religious congregation to that of the CEO and in two schools which have remained independent of the CEO system. This has given a sense of the significance of the CEO takeover.

Newspapers, especially the Catholic Weekly, also reflected the general period and helped to situate the history of the CEO. Apart from these sources, secondary historical works, especially those dealing with the Catholic Church and Catholic schooling in Australia, filled in the background for the history of the CEO.

**Some Problems with Sources**

The availability of documentary sources was uneven for different periods and at times quite sparse. Because the CEO moved its headquarters four times up to 1983, much of the earlier documentation has been lost or destroyed. This is especially true of the 1950s period. What has been preserved for the period up to about 1975 in either the Archdiocesan Archives or the present CEO Archives is a substantial array of material on mixed topics in unsorted file boxes. Important sets of documents such as CEO circulars and minute books for the early decades were not found. Sometimes the gaps could be filled by other means such as interviewing, but there are still some consequent uncertainties in the narrative.
Because the narrative deals with recent events and even current CEO members, there was need for considerable sensitivity in both seeking information and in writing the history. Most of the persons named in the study are still alive. Necessarily the study treats problems, criticism and conflict in the CEO at various times. Nevertheless, no restrictions were placed on access to available documentation and persons approached were generally prepared to give interviews.

Most of the interviews were with current or past members of the Sydney CEO. They were prepared to answer all questions put to them. However they were often quite circumspect and did not offer information or comment on what the author subsequently believed were very significant issues. Interviews were also held with those affected by the CEO, such as teachers, principals and even trade union representatives. Some approaches were made to interview bishops who had significant parts to play in the administration of Sydney Catholic schools in recent years. Regrettably no personal interviews with bishops resulted.

These were some of the difficulties in dealing with the sources. Despite such problems the overall picture was able to be discerned and written into a history which does not camouflage problems and controversy. Opinions, interpretations and judgements are necessarily part of the history. Since they refer to the recent past, these interpretations will perhaps be modified by future commentators who will have the advantage of a longer perspective.

The CEO and Models of Organisations

This discussion of methodology has stressed that the study is primarily historical. At the same time there is value in looking to sociological approaches to organisations as a way of isolating and directing attention to important issues in the history of the CEO. Sociology can prompt some relevant questions on the nature and implications of changes narrated. Such issues and questions will be indicated in the following discussion of theories of complex organisations. These are outlined at this point so that reference can be made to them where relevant in the historical narrative.

A useful categorisation of three models of organisations was given by Pusey in his examination of the secondary education system of
Tasmania. A brief sketch of these models shows that each has some bearing on an understanding of the CEO.

The first model is the rational bureaucracy as defined by Max Weber. It is a hierarchy to which members are appointed on the basis of expertise. They have security through fixed salaries, tenure and a career path up the bureaucratic ladder. A single set of goals is communicated to all parts of the organisation and officials operate according to clearly defined roles and a comprehensive set of written procedures (the "files"). Power is exercised from a control centre which, in Weber's terms, "concentrates the means of administration" (funding, property and personnel). Forces of inertia or conservatism can also influence bureaucracies. The key note of this model is its claim to a disinterested and impersonal rationality based on rules, procedures, areas of jurisdiction and lines of authority.

As the CEO developed, it increasingly acquired features of the Weberian bureaucracy, such as development of a hierarchy and some operation according to written procedures. These features will be indicated during the course of the study.

Also it might be asked whether the CEO followed the model of Vatican bureaucracy. Catholic Church central government in Rome was certainly bureaucratic in its aggregation of curial departments presided over by cardinals and manned by numerous clerical officials. Dioceses had much simpler administrations but still observed some common procedures. The argument could be put that the CEO, a creature of bishops familiar with Roman bureaucracy, was shaped in part by Church practice. It might be similarly argued that the bureaucratic procedures of state Departments of Education provided a model for the CEO.

Pusey's second category, the "Technical" model, is also characterised by rationality and impersonality. The "Technical" label is attached because the model was applied early by Frederick Taylor to the management of industrial enterprises. Experts plan and control each step of the labour

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11Michael Fusey, *Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (Sydney, 1976), pp. 8-29.
12This description also relies on Weber, "Bureaucracy" (translated 1946, no date given for German original) in F. Fischer and C. Siriani (eds.), *Critical Studies in Organisation and Bureaucracy* (Philadelphia, 1984).
process. Goals are defined by consensus or decree, and means are devised for achieving the goals. It is believed that for the achievement of any goal a “one best means” can be rationally ascertained. Definition of roles of officials is needed to prevent role ambiguity or conflict within the organisation.

Because the CEO is not an industrial enterprise concerned with fulfilling clear production goals, it is not well described by this Technical model. The employment of professionals or experts in an organisation is another feature which the technical model does not accommodate well and this study will have to examine the increasing professionalisation of the CEO in the 1970s and 1980s. Nevertheless one feature of the model can be salvaged as useful for discussing the CEO, that is the importance given by these “scientific managers” to defining the roles of officials and units within the organisation.

A difficulty that Pusey finds with the above two models is that they do not take into account human individuality and needs which prevent these ideal systems being fully implemented. He does not accept the Weber assumption that a bureaucracy can be so dehumanised that it succeeds in “eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational and emotional elements which escape calculation.”

Pusey argues for a “Human Relations Model” in which the psycho-social needs of the members of the organisation are basic determinants of its structures and procedures. He wishes to retain the formal, rational order of the Weber model and the “techno-logic” of the operations of the scientific managers, but he believes that these need to be “congruent” with the psycho-social order. The problem with this third model, as a mirror for studying the CEO, is its imprecision — a natural consequence of its concern for human individuality.

However, a related model which does take more account of the psycho-social realm was developed in the 1970s. Glassman and Weick proposed the concept of the “Loosely Coupled System” for describing educational organisations. “Coupling” refers to the links of authority and

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14 ibid., p.32.
supervision between different parts of the organisation. "Loose coupling" implies that the different elements of the organisation retain a degree of integrity and independence. Weick claims that "loose coupling" can have a number of meanings, such as a relative lack of regulation, infrequent inspection and supervision, a "delegation of discretion", and decentralisation of activities.

In a "loosely coupled system" there can be a lack of clarity in goals and variation in the ways of achieving goals. These features could be seen amongst the staff of a school or of an educational administration such as the CEO. Then, what does "couple" the organisation together? Ecker suggests that in schools and educational administrations the "coupling" is achieved by appropriate credentialling of both officials and curriculum.16

The above models of human organisations draw attention to significant issues in the history of the development of the CEO. For example, Weber's bureaucratic model leads to an examination of the hierarchical structure of the CEO and the degree of control of members through established policies and procedures. Correlative to this is the Loosely Coupled model which prompts one to explore the extent of discretion and freedom of individuals and departments in the CEO. Taylor's Technical approach draws attention to the importance of clear goals and role definitions both for the CEO as an organisation and for its individual members.

However these approaches are only useful guides and need to be considered in a less structured way in a thesis which applies essentially historical methodology. Both T.B. Greenfield and Richard Bates have persuasively questioned the validity of sociological models as descriptive of educational organisations.

Both claim that concentration on models of a system distracts from the importance of the ideas of individuals in the system. Greenfield attacks the notion that an organisation is an objective entity independent of the observer. Rather he sees organisations as combinations of individual people with no power beyond that granted by the will of their individual members. To understand an organisation it is important to fathom "deeply ingrained patterns of thought and action" which govern the

functioning of the organisation. Richard Bates argues that ideology must be taken into account. Systems theories are themselves value-laden. Thus he sees the organisational systems of Weber and Taylor as designed to benefit the capitalist employer seeking to gain the best return from labour.

Because the supervision and fostering of Catholic values and ideology was a main reason for the founding of the CEO, the emphasis given by Greenfield and Bates to ideals and values is a relevant addition to the other organisational theories outlined above. Consequently this history will sketch and examine the philosophy of the CEO over its stages of development.

Objectives and Outcomes

The above review of organisational theory was incorporated in this introduction so that the main narrative would be uninterrupted by explanation of organisational theory. It is appropriate now to summarise the main outcomes intended.

A major objective of the study is to trace and examine the changing role of the CEO in regard to Sydney Catholic schools. This history will show Catholic authorities in Sydney after 1950 grappling with extreme pressures on the century old pattern of administration of Catholic schools by parish priests and religious congregations. From 1965 to 1987 the diocesan leaders employed a series of central organisations and structures, including the already existing CEO, to manage the Sydney Catholic schools. It was not a tidy process directed by long-term planning. But all the while the CEO played an increasingly important role in the new centralised system of administration of Sydney Catholic schools. At the end of the story, in 1987, there is a new system of schools and a transformed Catholic Education Office, which has taken the reins of educational leadership. It is an outcome similar but not identical to that in the other dioceses, all of

which faced the same challenges to their Catholic schools. As such it is a case study of a most significant but little chronicled development in Australian Catholic and educational history.

The second main objective is to trace the origin and development of the CEO itself and its transformation into a large, complex organisation. Throughout the narrative a range of issues will be examined — such as leadership styles, changes of leadership, the laicisation of the membership, growth of departments, the decision to set up regional branch offices, functions and activities in particular periods, and the prevailing philosophy or ideology of the CEO. It will be shown that the changes were sometimes tentative and pragmatic, and attended often by controversy and conflict.

The resulting picture of this complex organisation will show its important responsibility as leader and ultimate manager of the majority of Catholic schools in the archdiocese. To some Catholics it appeared as a threat to their independent Catholic schools, built by laity, clergy and religious congregations in the face of sectarian opposition. To them it was a formidable organisation which had “taken away our schools.” Other Catholics would find hope in the resilience of Catholic schools and in the professionalism of the laity in the CEO who had accepted much of the responsibility for the schools.
Part I

IN THE CHURCH MILITANT

c. 1900 – 1960
Chapter One
Australian Catholics and their Schools

c.1900-1960

Catholics in Australian Society c.1900-1960

On January 1, 1901, Lord Hopetoun moved in procession from the Sydney Domain towards Centennial Park where he was to be sworn in as first Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia. His carriage paused outside St Mary’s Cathedral where the Catholic bishops, presided over by Irish-born Cardinal Moran, looked down from a dais. Four thousand children from Catholic schools sang a hymn composed for the occasion, gave three cheers, and sang the national anthem. The procession then resumed its progress, to the pealing of the bells of St Mary's.¹

This tableau reflected well the position, character and aspirations of Catholics in Australia in the first half of this century. The new national leaders here were giving recognition to the Catholic Church as a religious denomination of status equal to others, even the Church of England. On the dais, the prelates, mostly born in Ireland and trained in Rome, represented the patriarchal hierarchy of the Catholic Church. Also distinctive of this church were the numerous children whose presence and uniforms demonstrated the existence of separate Catholic schools and the youthful promise of Catholicism in Australia.

Cardinal Moran, as Archbishop of Sydney from 1884 to 1911, had given Catholics a voice in political and social issues although he tried to avoid giving the impression of encouraging a Catholic sect or pressure group. Catholics themselves generally aspired to be integrated into Australian life

¹ Account is given in B.T. Doyle and J.A. Morley, The Catholic Story (Sydney, 1953), p.32.
and to rise beyond their Irish "rockchopper" tag. If anything, with their working class predominance and leanings towards the Labor Party, they stood for an Australian identity rather than for loyalty to the British Empire.

There was a substantial continuity or persistence of the above profile of Catholics at least until the Second World War, and in some respects until the 1960s. On the other hand it is also evident that since 1945 the world, Australia, and the Catholic Church have changed radically. Indeed the theologian Karl Rahner has seen in the Second Vatican Council of 1962-5 the end of what he terms the "European Church" and the beginnings of a genuinely "World Church". Therefore it may be helpful to recall for the contemporary reader this former era and context in which the Catholic Education Office began in 1939. This background to the history of the CEO relies upon recognised authorities in fields such as the history of the Catholic community and the history of Catholic education in Australia.

Although Catholics sometimes had mixed feelings towards the monarch of the British Empire, they accepted and even rejoiced in a powerful monarchy and hierarchy in their own Church. In the religious sphere, their monarch was the Pope who created cardinals ("princes of the Church") and appointed bishops to all the dioceses. The bishop in turn appointed a parish priest to be in charge of each parish in his diocese. Lay Catholics, the "flock", had no say as to who would be their pope, bishop or priest. The European and American democratic revolutions had made little impact on the structure of government in the Catholic Church; and in this period it was taken without comment that every member of this hierarchy was male.

A sense of the "triumphalism" of Catholics, based on the durability of the Church and of the extensive authority possessed by the pope and bishops, is captured in a speech in 1932 by Eris O'Brien, later to be appointed a bishop. He was preaching at the consecration of Bishop Farrelly in Lismore:

Kings and dynasties perish. The glories of the ancient Empires of East and West have passed, leaving but heaps of ruins in Africa, Constantinople and Rome. A new civilisation has arisen in Europe almost blotting out the grandeurs of the past. But the Catholic Church endures for ever...

The authority entrusted to a bishop is comprehensive and formidable. At his consecration a crozier, symbol of monarchical power, is given to him. But while she

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2 This idea is explored by Edmund Campion throughout his Rockchappers, (Melbourne, 1982).
entrusts to him these wide powers, the Church demands that he should be a wise ruler, just and stern, but nevertheless, considerate of human weakness.  

Thus Australian Catholics espoused democracy in their relationships with their fellow Australians at the secular level, but accepted a non-democratic structure in their Church. They might accept the authority of their parish priest for thirty years, but vote their members of parliament out of office after one term.

While Catholics sought social equality and integration within Australian society, their leaders also endeavoured to maintain a distinctive Catholic character in the sphere of religious doctrine and practice. Michael Kelly, Archbishop of Sydney 1911-40, was noted for his warnings against "mixed marriages" of Catholics with others. He feared that the faith of Catholics would be weakened by such associations, as is evident from his Pastoral Letter read out in all parishes in 1935:

THE PREVAILING SCANDALS affecting Faith and Morals are not few, and may not be cloaked nor excused by fashion or custom...

Scandals affecting Faith are:-(a) Mixed Marriages; (b) Merely secular Education, compulsory and free; (c) Delay of Infant Baptism beyond one week; (d) Promiscuous Reading; (e) Certain non-Catholic Lectures in Philosophy and History; (f) Unguarded social intercourse with the unbelieving or irreligious...

In these areas of religious doctrine and practice, Catholics generally gave a large measure of public assent to the laws and rulings of their pastors, although there were many instances of "mixed marriages".

Thus a group loyalty or tribalism was advocated and maintained in many ways. Church leaders instructed Catholics that it was their serious obligation to attend Mass every Sunday, to marry "within the fold", and to send their children to Catholic schools. Such strictures were presented and widely received as serious matters of conscience. Catholics were also exhorted to identify themselves publicly as such, especially by joining Catholic groups or "sodalities" — for men there were the Holy Name Society, the St Vincent de Paul Society and the Knights of the Southern Cross; for women, the Sacred Heart Sodality; for girls, the Children of Mary Sodality; and for boys, the Crusaders of the Blessed Sacrament. Homes were decorated with standard Catholic religious pictures and would often receive some of the numerous Catholic magazines and pamphlets. Social needs were met by Catholic tennis

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5 Ibid., pp. 435-6.
clubs, Catholic bush-walking clubs, parish fetes and parish balls, while Catholic adolescents were expected to stay together in the Catholic Youth Organisation (from which it was hoped they would select their marriage partners). A notable exception, however, was that there were no Catholic trade unions or political parties. Perhaps this was because Catholic leaders from the turn of the century, such as Pope Leo XIII and Cardinal Moran, were noted for their sympathy for the condition of the working class. Thus an affinity developed in Australia between the Australian Labor Party and Irish Catholics.

Catholics maintained that they could use these extensive strategies to preserve a distinctive Catholic solidarity and way of life and yet remain loyal and valuable citizens of Australia. Their argument was similar to that used by advocates of multiculturalism in Australia in the 1980s. Nevertheless sectarian animosity and mutual suspicion between Catholics and Protestants was an enduring fact of life, strongest between 1870 and 1925, but persisting certainly into the 1960s. Any hint of Catholic Church activity in politics ignited sectarian outcries — as Cardinal Moran, Dr Mannix, and the Catholic "Industrial Groups" discovered in separate periods.

A distinction was commonly made by Catholic leaders in this period between "the Church Militant" and the "Church Triumphant". The "Church Militant" were loyal Catholics fighting during their lives on earth against demons led by Satan and human beings hostile to the Catholic Church. After their deaths these faithful Catholic soldiers joined the "Church Triumphant" (the saints). Implicit was the notion that the "World" outside the Catholic Church was dangerous and that a Catholic could only find salvation in the "one true Church" which was the Barque of Peter the Fisherman on the storm-tossed oceans of the World. Indeed the campaigns began in childhood. Edmund Campion quotes the hymn/battle song which older Catholics remembered singing during their primary school days:

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I am a little Catholic,
I love my Holy Faith;
I will be true to Holy Church
And steadfast unto death.
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I shun the schools of those who seek
To snare poor Catholic youth;
No Church I own — no schools I know
But those that teach the truth.
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7Rockchoppers, p.68.
This "Church Militant" saw Catholic schools as training academies for their loyal soldiers. At their Confirmation, at the age of about 10, the children would receive from the bishop a token slap on the cheek to remind them that they were "soldiers of Christ". There were obviously other motifs and models of the Catholic Church in the period (such as the notion of sheep in a fold), but this military image was certainly present and provides an apt title for this first period up to 1960 in which the CEO was founded.

The 1950s decade witnessed the beginnings of some important changes to this overall profile of the Australian Catholic Church of 1900-60. Firstly, post-war immigration from southern and eastern Europe added about one million Catholics and diluted the Irish character of the Australian Church. Catholic response to the new cultural groups was varied. Some parishes expected the migrants to assimilate their religious practices to the current Australian practice. Others made provision for special chaplains and liturgies for strong migrant groups. The effect of this population influx on the schools will be treated in Part Two.

One can also see stirrings amongst educated Catholics who would soon welcome the revolution in the Church brought by the impending Second Vatican Council. A greater number of young Catholic laity and clergy were studying at university, especially in Melbourne and Sydney. More concerned than in previous decades with questions of philosophy and theology, they had some acquaintance with the théologie nouvelle popular in Paris in the 1950s and soon to be so influential in Vatican II. Assertiveness of lay Catholics was also provoked by the divided responses of Sydney and Melbourne Church leaders to the ALP Split of 1954. In Victoria this lay assertiveness was seen in the confrontation between the Movement/National Civic Council supporters and the intellectuals who produced the Catholic Worker newspaper. Although the majority of Catholics followed the direction advised by their bishops, there were signs here of the divisions which would occur in the Church in the next two decades.

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8This new movement in theology is summarised in P. Collins, Mixed Blessings (Melbourne, 1986), p.16.

9The activities of Catholic intellectuals in the 1950s are described by P. O'Farrell, Catholic Church and Community, (Sydney, 1983), pp.402-9.
Catholic Schools c.1900-1960

Another important source of Catholic solidarity, Catholic grievance, and sectarian animosity was the ubiquitous Catholic school which had been strongly promoted by the bishops since the nineteenth century. Until the 1860s Catholic schools in New South Wales had been maintained with great difficulty in a “dual system” in which governments provided financial support to both government and denominational schools. There were severe deficiencies in the denominational schools, including the lack of training of many teachers and the paucity of their equipment. Protestant opinion shifted to favour the national schools and became indifferent to the continuation of denominational schools. Consequently, in the next two decades governments in all the Australian colonies decided to direct all funds to state schools.

In response, the Catholic hierarchy, deprived of government funding for Catholic schools, decided to continue their schools without government help. Their determination had also been strengthened by Vatican statements on education and by their disillusion with the education of Catholics in public schools in Ireland and the United States. Because Catholics believed in conscience that they should not be compelled to send their children to secular schools, they resented as unjust their having to pay taxes for the support of these government schools.

The bishops’ solution for maintaining independent Catholic schools was found in the religious congregations then burgeoning in Europe and Australia, many of them established in the nineteenth century specifically for the provision of Catholic schools. Australian bishops scoured Europe and Ireland for congregations with such success that, by the early twentieth century, many religious congregations were strongly established in Australia and it was clear that they could provide the majority of the teachers needed. By 1950 the schools of the Archdiocese of Sydney were staffed in the main by 2446 sisters, 672 brothers, and 30 priests. The preponderance of female teachers is striking. Reasons included the fact that most Catholic schools were primary schools in which it was traditional to have nuns teaching, the

10 Fogarty, Catholic Education in Australia (Melbourne, 1959), vol. I, p.118.
11 Ibid., p.279. Fogarty's figure of 162 brothers seems to be a misprint. The figure of 672 brothers is that given by the Australian Catholic Directory for 1951 (which gives figures for 1950).
tendency of many men to become priests rather than religious brothers (who in those times were seen as having lower status than priests), the fact that nuns usually demanded less in stipends from the parish priests than brothers did, and finally, the international numerical predominance in the Church of nuns as against brothers. Some lay teachers were employed in the schools, but not in positions of authority, and they were outnumbered by religious teachers in a proportion of about six to one.

The advantages of having religious congregations were many. Their members were educated in Catholic doctrine and practice, they recruited their own members and thus provided a source of teachers for the future, they were self-disciplining because their members were bound by vows of obedience to superiors within their particular congregations. Finally, the members of congregations were not paid wages or salaries. Instead, they received comparatively small stipends.

Hence it came about that the responsibility for administering and staffing Catholic schools was taken over by the religious congregations. Although in most cases the schools were owned by the diocese, they still came very strongly under the influence of the particular congregations which ran them. This dual influence meant that problems of authority or jurisdiction sometimes arose between parish clergy and the teaching congregations in the schools. An example might be where the religious brothers or sisters believed that the parish priest was providing them with inadequate living quarters. Such a problem might have to be resolved by the bishop of the diocese or by negotiations between the bishop and the leaders of the particular congregation.

How were Catholic schools established? By the 1930s the initiative was usually taken by a parish priest or a bishop who would invite a religious congregation to staff a parish primary school. If the congregation accepted,
the priest would then rely on parish contributions for the building of the school which would consequently be owned by the parish or the diocese. If lay teachers were needed for these schools their salaries would be paid either from school fees or by the parish priest. A typical example was in Woollahra. In 1926, the parish priest, Fr P. O'Reilly, appealed to the Marist Brothers congregation to establish a school in his parish. After the Marist Brothers Provincial Council had agreed (with a little reluctance), Fr O'Reilly bought a property for the intended school which was officially opened by Archbishop Kelly in 1928.15

Thus, if one were to try to describe a typical Catholic school of the 1940s, it would be a co-educational primary school (Kindergarten to Sixth Class), integrally part of a parish in a city suburb or country town, and run by a congregation of religious sisters. In most cases these parish schools developed a secondary “top” of pupils who wished to continue their education, perhaps to Third Year (when the Intermediate Certificate could be awarded). Catholic schools providing education to Fifth Year (Leaving Certificate level) were far less common and tended to be for more affluent pupils. However, it was a common practice that when a congregation of sisters began a parish primary school, they would also establish a secondary school which would take boarding pupils and provide music lessons, thereby supplementing the meagre income from the parish school. Some of the older secondary schools for girls were associated with the head houses of congregations of religious sisters.

In these procedures there was little planning by bishops, priests and leaders of religious congregations for the development of schools across the diocese. Provision of schools depended on factors such as the affluence of a parish, the initiative and enthusiasm of a parish priest and whether a religious congregation already had schools in the requested region. The result was a concentration of schools in the older suburbs of Sydney set against a limited provision of schools in developing areas. This imbalance was conspicuous in secondary education. For instance, by 1950, about nine secondary schools for girls had been established in the eastern suburbs of Sydney, but there were no full secondary schools for girls or boys between Parramatta and Katoomba. To the north and south of the Archdiocese the disparity was less, but still very clear.

15Account is in Brother Alban Doyle, The Story of the Marist Brothers in Australia (Sydney, 1972), p.504.
The overwhelming concentration of Church educational effort was in the parish primary and secondary schools. Tertiary education for lay Catholics was not undertaken by the Catholic Church. In fact, in 1923, Archbishop Kelly expressed the view that sixty per cent of higher education was unnecessary.\textsuperscript{16} Nevertheless many of the religious teachers attended university part-time and obtained degrees. Teachers conferences and associations such as the Catholic Education Association of New South Wales also helped improve the competence of teachers.

What was distinctive of Catholic schools before 1950? A social profile has been well sketched by Edmund Campion.\textsuperscript{17} The schools boldly displayed their "romantic Catholic" character. Crosses crowned buildings and distinguished every classroom. Standardised religious statues and pictures abounded in classrooms, corridors and foyers. Teachers wore religious habits (uniforms) and encouraged pupils to carry rosary beads and wear religious medals. Punctuating the school time-table and calendar were prayers and religious activities, while formal religious instruction (mostly via the standard \textit{Australian Catechism}) was a daily event. With the parish school and church frequently being in the same block, classes were accustomed to attending the church in school time for Mass, Benediction or Confessions. At any time a local priest might "drop in" on a lesson or be seen in the playground.

Class sizes tended to be between forty and sixty in the primary classes, but much smaller in the secondary. Overall class sizes were increasing and this trend would greatly intensify in the 1950s when many religious sisters and brothers customarily taught classes of more than sixty pupils; indeed classes of over ninety were not remarkable. Clearly this influenced and limited teaching methods and styles.

Finally one might note the sense of integration and identity between school and parish. For example, a Catholic might be baptised in St Kevin's Church, Eastwood, attend St Kevin's School, Eastwood, which his/her parents had helped to build, and later marry and live in St Kevin's Parish.

This bond between Catholic school and church had its origin in the authority and mandate of the bishop of the diocese who was seen as having ultimate responsibility for Catholic education. Even international religious

\textsuperscript{16} P. O'Farrell, \textit{The Catholic Church and Community in Australia}, p.379.
\textsuperscript{17} See his \textit{Rockchoppers} pp. 67-70 and \textit{Australian Catholics} (Melbourne, 1987), pp. 141-56.
congregations under Roman jurisdiction\textsuperscript{18} had to defer to the authority of the bishop in matters affecting the education of his flock. This provision of religious education was viewed by the bishops as a serious responsibility of their office and as the foundation of their decision to establish Catholic schools.

Plenary Councils of the Australian bishops in 1905 and 1937 saw a danger of straying or perversion (\textit{periculum perversionis}) arising from attendance at state schools and declared that only the diocesan bishop could give permission to parents, in special circumstances, to enrol their children in state schools. The bishops declared that parents who sent their children to public schools without such permission were sinning gravely \textit{(mortaliter)}. If, in the confessional, they indicated that they would continue in this course of action, it was declared that they were not “disposed” or fit for Absolution (pardon by the Church).\textsuperscript{19} The wording of these decrees of the bishops seemed to leave some discretion to priests as to how strictly they should be applied to particular Catholics, but they also highlighted the gravity of the obligations on bishops, priests and parents and allowed priests to take a strict interpretation.

Papal statements further emphasised this responsibility. In 1929, Pope Pius XI issued an encyclical, \textit{Divini Illius Magistri}, which in English translation was entitled: \textit{On the Christian Instruction of Youth}.\textsuperscript{20} He invoked the “sacred Canons”, as well as the teachings of Pius IX and Leo XIII, to warn against attendance at non-Catholic schools, “whether neutral or mixed” because the “so-called neutral or lay school ..is bound to become irreligious” (Paragraph 68). In the religious school suitable for Catholic youth he declared that

\begin{quote}
...it is necessary that all the teaching and the whole organisation of the school, and its teachers, syllabus and textbooks in every branch, be regulated by the Christian spirit, under the direction and maternal supervision of the Church. (Paragraph 69)
\end{quote}

It was therefore the policy of the bishops to have their parish priests provide Catholic schools in all areas so that a place in a Catholic school was available for every Catholic child. But, since all parents were instructed to send their

\textsuperscript{18}These were governed by a superior, usually based in Rome. Other congregations looked to the bishop of a diocese as their superior.

\textsuperscript{19}\textit{Acta et Decreta concilii plenarii australiensis, III, habit. apud Sydn., 1905 (Sydney, 1907), No.322, and Decrees of the Fourth Plenary Council which concern Religious and Catholic Schools (Sydney, 1937), No. 628.}

\textsuperscript{20}The English translation can be found in T.P. McLaughlin (ed.), \textit{The Church and the Reconstruction of the Modern World} (New York), 1957. Quotations are from this text.
children to Catholic schools, the bishops took little action to see to the religious instruction of any Catholic children in state schools. This policy was maintained until the 1960s when it was clear that the great increase in the Catholic population meant that more and more Catholic children were in state schools.

In Sydney the schools were spread over a large area. In the 1930s the archdiocese extended to Nowra in the south, Lithgow in the west, and to Belmont and Swansea in the north. According to the 1939 report of the Diocesan Inspector, the “total enrolment (in Catholic schools) was 50,910 of which 9,104 were pupils of secondary schools and 41,816 were divided among the remaining types of school” (i.e. mainly primary).21

A bishop might visit each school in this sprawling archdiocese perhaps once every three years, but it was clear that he also had to delegate his responsibility for supervising Catholic education. His local representative was the parish priest who had the authority to monitor and influence religious instruction in the schools. To supervise the schools in both religious and secular instruction the archbishop also appointed an Archdiocesan Inspector of Schools. The first Inspector was appointed in 1883 and the practice of inspection was continued until the late 1960s.

Further details could fill out this sketch of the context of Australian Catholic life and schooling in which the Catholic Education Office of Sydney was created in 1939. The above account attempts to provide enough of the pertinent elements of this context so as to assist the reader’s appreciation of the early history of the CEO. Certain issues can be seen emerging even in this background survey. After 1910 Catholics followed the Australian trend of seeking for their children more than the elementary education which was the norm of the early twentieth century. What demands would this make on Catholic schools? Later the conservative official Church and its leadership would meet a world emerging from World War II, experiencing the breakdown of empires, and seething with social protest in the 1960s. The Church had invested enormous energy and funds into schools for all Catholic children. Could this effort be sustained in the face of the influx of migrants that would enter Australia after 1945? Could the religious congregations continue to run their own independent systems of schools and meet the needs of a rapidly expanding population? Clearly the schools faced great challenges.

21Thirty-seventh Annual Report in "O'Connor-Pierse" file, SAA.
These were issues and pressures emerging strongly at the end of this period 1900-60. The Sydney CEO was founded in a decade when the Church was relatively stable and the pressure for adaptation of the schools was less urgent. This study will now examine the foundation, role and development of the Sydney CEO in the period 1939 to 1960.
Chapter Two
Founding the Sydney CEO
1939–60

The original Catholic Education Office in Sydney was a direct development of the archdiocesan inspectorate of Catholic schools. Until 1960 it continued, in the main, the work of the earlier inspectors, but its functions extended beyond inspection of schools. This chapter will explain the origin and development of the CEO from 1939 to 1960, its role in the archdiocese, and its main activities. The role and development of the early CEO will be treated side by side since the CEO was at this time just a small team.

Establishment of the Catholic Education Office Sydney

After Catholic schools were excluded from the government system in the 1880s the Catholic bishops of Australia were convinced of the need for inspectors and examiners of schools in each diocese. Indeed this had even been called for by Pope Leo XIII in the late nineteenth century.¹ In Sydney, after the colonial government ended funding and inspection for denominational schools, the first diocesan inspector, Mr J. W. Rogers, was appointed by Archbishop Vaughan in 1883.² In 1897, the archbishop appointed a priest, Fr Timoney, to the position and provided him with an office at St Mary’s Cathedral. Thenceforward until 1982 the position of Diocesan Inspector of Schools was always held by a diocesan priest. From 1929 to 1939 the Archdiocesan Inspector was Fr Timothy O’Connor who was based at St Mary’s Cathedral and assisted by Mr John Connolly MA.

There were strong links between the archbishop and the inspectors. The inspector owed obedience to the archbishop both as employer and as ecclesiastical superior and his office was provided at the archbishop’s own headquarters. The Inspector of Schools was thus an agent of the

¹The well-established tradition of official Church insistence on providing diocesan inspectors is documented in Fogarty, Catholic Education in Australia, vol. ii, pp.424-6.
²Fogarty, p.425. See also The Freeman’s Journal, 12 May 1883, p.15, which stated his salary as 500 pounds per year.
archbishop, fulfilling the function indicated by his title. There was no
suggestion that the Inspector headed an education office.

In April 1939 Fr Thomas Pierse was appointed Inspector of Schools for the
Archdiocese.\(^3\) The innovation in this appointment was that, with the
authorisation of Archbishop Kelly, he established the Catholic Education
Office in Roma House, 586 George St, Sydney. Why was it established
then?

The impetus seems to have come from the wider Church as well as from
Sydney. As mentioned in Chapter One, Pope Pius XI had published in 1929
his encyclical, *The Christian Education of Youth*, which reasserted Vatican
commitment to religious schools as opposed to "neutral" schools. In
Australia itself, from the late 1920s, there was some recognition of the
need for coordination of the administration of Catholic schools across the
various dioceses and religious congregations. At the time the Coadjutor
Archbishop of Sydney was the scholarly and widely travelled Michael
Sheehan who envisaged a state Catholic education authority which would
set standards and supervise the training and certification of teachers.\(^4\)

On behalf of the bishops, Sheehan applied to the Irish province of the
Vincentian priests for a man to become Chairman of a Board of Catholic
Education and Director of Primary Education for New South Wales. The
Vincentians agreed to send Fr John Thompson. He had gained a Master of
Arts degree from the National University of Dublin and a Diploma of
Education at Oxford and from 1922 to 1929 had lectured at St Mary’s
Teacher Training College, Strawberry Hill in Middlesex.\(^5\) The bishops
suggested that he take several months to view educational establishments
in Europe before he came to Australia.

In June 1929 the bishops appointed Thompson as the first Director of
Catholic Education in New South Wales “in the interests of co-ordinating
the teaching in Catholic schools”. His term of appointment was for five
years, but he was reappointed and continued as Director until the 1950s.

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\(^3\) His appointment was announced in the *Catholic Press*, 13 April 1939. However he had
been Acting Inspector from the start of 1939.

\(^4\) See C.J. Duffy, "What Decided the Direction of Catholic Education in N.S.W.", *Journal of

\(^5\) The accompanying details concerning Thompson are taken from the obituary in *The
Catholic Weekly*, June 12, 1958 and from D.F. Bourke, *The History of the Vincentian
One of his main functions was to examine the novices of the various congregations and provide them with a certificate of teaching. However, it has been asserted that Archbishop Kelly and his successor had minimal interest in Sheehan's plans. Thompson was given no staff and was also made vice-rector and then rector (from 1933) of St John's College within the University of Sydney. Then Sheehan himself resigned as coadjutor in mid 1937 and returned to Ireland.

In 1936 Thompson attended a Catholic Education Congress in Adelaide. Here he chaired a meeting of Diocesan Inspectors of Schools, included among whom was Timothy O'Connor from Sydney. The group recommended that the bishops be asked to appoint a Director of Education in each Province (i.e. state). Thus they were recommending that Thompson's position be extended to each state. The terms of the recommendation show that the Director was meant to be more a coordinator and clerical ambassador than an inspector. They recommended:

That in the capital city of each Province a priest be appointed to be called the Director of Education who will treat on behalf of the Archbishop and Bishops of the Province with the Minister of Education, the State Department of Public Instruction, the Faculty of Education at the University, and other public bodies ... on matters affecting educational policy and curricula — such Director to keep in close touch with the Diocesan Inspectors of the various dioceses.

In his own Archdiocese the Director would be the delegate for the Archbishop to arrange and maintain the coordination of the Catholic school system and to exercise a general supervision over the various types of Catholic schools (parochial, central, technical, commercial and secondary).

The latter enumeration of the types of Catholic school in 1936 and of the number of state bodies related to Catholic schools showed that the bishops were responsible for a much more complex operation than that of the 1880s. Requirements of school certification and registration, teacher training and participation in public examinations were just some of the factors creating the need for some overall coordination and supervision at a state level of the schools separated within a state by diocesan boundaries and run by a variety of religious congregations. Directors of Education,

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7This was held as part of the celebrations for the centenary of the foundation of South Australia.
8Archbishop Mannix had already appointed a Director of Education in Victoria in 1932. See Praetz, Building a School System, p.5.
such as Thompson, were being appointed for whole states, but the Church operated more according to diocesan boundaries. A diocesan office would be accountable to the local bishop and could enable some coordination of educational activities within the diocese.

There were other factors. One should recognise that interest in education reform was in the air in Australia in the late 1930s. Bishops like Archbishop Sheehan were very much aware of the national debate on educational reform which had been stimulated especially by the New Education Fellowship conference in its travel from state to state in 1937.10 Possibly the financial strains of the 1930s were a consideration in the move to set up Education Offices. In areas severely affected by the Depression it must have been difficult for schools run by individual congregations to maintain standards comparable with the state schools without government financial support. At the same time there was some demand for the extension of secondary education and the development of technical schools. A central office could encourage some liaison amongst congregations and schools to meet some of these demands.

In 1937 the Catholic bishops of Australia met in the Fourth Plenary Council. Though they published over sixty decrees relating to Elementary Schools, High Schools, Colleges, and Universities, they made no explicit reference to either Diocesan Inspectors, Directors of Education, or Catholic Education Offices.11 Thus there was no endorsement by the bishops of the recent recommendations of the Diocesan Inspectors in regard to state-wide coordination of Catholic schools.

A precedent for founding an Office rather than simply appointing a Director of Education came from the Melbourne Archdiocese which, when appointing a Director for Education for Victoria in 1932, also established a Catholic Education Office under this Director.12

So by the 1930s it was clear that some Catholic educational leaders recognised that mere inspection of Catholic schools was no longer sufficient. There was a need for some coordination of activities and

10See A.D. Spaull, *Australian Education in the Second World War*, ch. 6; and K.S. Cunningham, "Ideas, Theories and Assumptions in Australian Education" in J. Cleverley and J. Lawry (eds.), *Australian Education in the Twentieth Century*, ch.4.

11*Decrees of the Fourth Plenary Council which Concern Religious and Catholic Schools.*

communication and liaison with relevant "public bodies", as called for in the recommendation of the National Congress of 1936.

The Sydney response to this need for coordination and liaison was limited. There was already a Director of Education for New South Wales in John Thompson who had been appointed in 1929. Thus the only apparent development was in announcing the setting up of the Catholic Education Office in 1939.

At the time there seemed to be very little significance in the creation of the Sydney CEO. Was it simply the inspectorate under a new name? Is there justification for saying that the history of the CEO began in 1939? Certainly the Office created in 1939 would have been understood by most, including Archbishop Kelly, as a mere change of address for the Inspector of Schools. The author has found no record of an official "opening" of the CEO nor of a Catholic Weekly announcement of its creation. Its leader, Pierse, retained the title of Diocesan Inspector of Schools, presumably to distinguish him from the Director of Education [Catholic] of New South Wales. In fact it was not till 1951 that the head of the CEO was given the title of Diocesan Director of Schools. By this time Thompson had retired and a new Director of Education was not appointed. The departure of Sheehan in 1937 meant the removal of a supporter of educational coordination in Sydney. So there is an argument that the Sydney CEO is really a creation of later years, perhaps the 1960s.

Nevertheless, an "Office" had been created and listed in the official Australasian Catholic Directory and the very term did suggest a potential for its expansion in personnel and influence. There was the beginning of its independence in its separation in location from the Cathedral. Moreover there is no doubt that the present organisation grew out of the Office established in 1939.

**Development and Personnel 1939-60**

At its start the CEO had only two members. Fr Thomas Pierse, BA, DipEd, was Diocesan Inspector from 1939 to 1948 and was largely concerned with supervision of religious instruction and the general condition and

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13 Duffy, "What Decided the Direction of Catholic Education in N.S.W.", p.29.
management of the schools. Assisting him until 1951 was Mr Kevin Ryan, MA, who inspected the secular curriculum of schools from 1940 to 1951.

Pierse, like Archbishop Kelly and many of the priests, nuns and brothers of the period, was from Ireland — born in Listowel, County Kerry. Unlike most of the priests whose tertiary education was only in philosophy and theology, he also had gained a Bachelor of Arts degree from the National University in Dublin. In this sense he could claim to have some expertise in both the secular and religious fields. Soon after ordination in 1926 he migrated to Sydney and served in several suburban parishes. Then Archbishop Sheehan arranged for him to study at the University of Sydney for a Diploma of Education which he gained in 1935.14

In 1946 Pierse was joined at the CEO by Fr John F. Slowey (now Monsignor Slowey) who had completed a Diploma of Education at Sydney Teachers College in 1945.15 In 1947 Pierse went on a home trip to Ireland, leaving Slowey in charge.16 The latter became ill in 1948 and spent some time in hospital, and so in early 1948 Archbishop Gilroy appointed Fr Walter O’Grady as Assistant Inspector of Schools. O’Grady had been sent by Gilroy in 1945 to study at the University of Dublin where he gained a Diploma of Education.17 He was in charge of the CEO for nine months in 1948 until Slowey recovered.18 When Pierse returned in 1948, he retired as Inspector and moved into parish work. Slowey was appointed Diocesan Inspector for Schools for 194919. He was to remain in charge of the CEO until 1981.

15 It was exceptional for priests or members of religious congregations to study at Australian universities until the 1960s. There was a fear that the environment of free inquiry, especially in departments such as Philosophy and Psychology, could endanger the faith of priests or religious. Some members of teaching congregations were given permission by their superiors to study part time at university, but their normal teaching responsibilities were not alleviated. Similar fears were held for lay Catholics and it was hoped that groups such as the Newman Society within the universities would counter such dangers.
16 Ibid., p.1.
17 Brian Crittenden, a member of the CEO in the late 1950s, states that Gilroy originally sent O’Grady to Dublin to prepare him for teaching at the diocesan seminary at Springwood. Interview 23 April 1992, at La Trobe University, Melbourne.
18 Interview with Fr W.O’Grady, Sydney, 24 September 1990.
19 There is some dispute about the year in which Slowey became Diocesan Inspector. The Australasian Catholic Directory (editions for 1948 and 1949) still listed Pierse as Diocesan Inspector for 1948 and 1949 but this probably was printed before the 1949 appointments were finalised. Debrett’s Handbook of Australia (Sydney, 1987) states that Slowey became Diocesan Director in 1949. However Walter O’Grady, in a conversation with the author on 9 November 1990, insisted that Slowey had been appointed Diocesan Inspector in 1948. Slowey himself has said that he was appointed “Director” in 1949 - see The
O'Grady worked as Inspector until the end of 1962. Kevin Ryan died in 1951 and was replaced in his role of inspector of the secular curriculum by Fr (later Mgr) Cornelius Duffy, DD, PhD, who continued this function until 1962.

Thus from 1939 to 1954 the CEO maintained a small and quite stable nucleus of five inspectors — Pierse, Ryan, Slowey, O'Grady and Duffy. The bishops usually selected priests possessing a further tertiary degree (beyond their normal theological qualifications) which presumably would give them appropriate status amongst inspectors in the government system and before the Catholic teachers they were inspecting, few of whom had tertiary qualifications.

In the mid 1950s O'Grady was more involved in administration at Roma House headquarters and two additional priests took over the bulk of the inspection of Religious Education. Fr Gregory Meere, BEd, DipEd, joined the CEO as an Inspector from 1955 to 1963 and Fr Brian Crittenden for the years 1956-1959. Thus by 1957 Slowey and O'Grady were central administrators while Duffy, Meere and Crittenden undertook most of the school inspections. Apart from these there was a secretary/typist and, at the end of each year, a secretary employed to help prepare for the annual Primary Final Examination. From 1960 to 1965 Crittenden, while no longer an Inspector, maintained contacts with the CEO, for instance at meetings of the Sydney Catholic Education Board.

**Working Conditions**

The working conditions of the CEO were very cramped and limited. At first the CEO was located on the second floor of Roma House, 586 George St, in a room provided rent-free by the proprietors of the premises, Pellegrini and Co. Ltd. Perhaps the archbishop had made it known to the Pellegrini management that he had need of a room for an office. It would

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Administration of Catholic Education in Schools of the Archdiocese of Sydney (paper given in 1972), CEOs.

20 Interview with O'Grady, 24 September 1990.

21 In 1960-1 he was a Teaching Fellow at the University of Sydney, a student in the U.S.A. in 1962-4, and a Lecturer in Education at the University of Sydney in 1965. Who's Who in Australia 1991 (Melbourne 1990).

22 Archbishop's Secretary to Fr T. O'Connor, 8 July 1937, in "O'Connor-Pierse" file, SAA.
have been in their interest to accommodate him because much of their trade involved Catholic churches and schools. The new premises had actually been offered to the previous Inspector, Fr Timothy O'Connor, in mid 1937, but it seems that he did not take up the offer, probably because he was unwell in his last years as Inspector. It was left to Pierse to move to Roma House when he took charge in 1939.

A decade later Duffy was not impressed by CEO facilities:

In 1951 when I joined the Education Office of Sydney there was no room for me to sit at a desk in the one tiny office, supplied rent-free, in Pellegrini’s building in George St, fully occupied as it was by two inspectors and one typist. Until then, the rating given to the young cleric in charge of the Office — Fr Slowey B.A. — was that of Inspector. It was in 1951 that Sydney gave the lead in elevating the position to the rank of Director — as a matter of prestige .... The salary was minimal...the records show the allowance at from twenty to fifteen pounds per month, petrol included.\(^23\)

Besides its space limitations, the paucity of CEO resources is illustrated in some of its financial records. Expenditure of the Office for July to December 1939 was £1952\(^24\) and for July 1952 to February 1953 was £755.\(^25\)

At first Pierse was given light priestly duties so that he could concentrate on the work of inspection. Gilroy appointed him as Assistant Priest at St Francis’ parish, Albion St, Surry Hills (Haymarket):

In Haymarket Parish you will have no parochial obligations but you will be expected to keep yourself available for the celebration of two Masses in the Cathedral Parish on each Sunday.\(^26\)

However it is possible that his parish responsibilities may have increased, because in 1942 he was named Priest in Charge\(^27\) at the same parish. With him was an Assistant Priest who probably carried out the bulk of parish duties. This arrangement continued until 1947.

Pierse used to travel to the schools by public transport. In 1939 he asked the Archbishop to provide him a loan with which to purchase a car:


\(^{24}\)‘Receipts and Expenditure for the Six Months Ending 31st December, 1939’. In “O’Connor-Pierse” file, SAA.

\(^{25}\)‘Receipts and Expenditure for the Period 5th July 1952 to 19th February 1953’. In “Director of Education” file, SAA.

\(^{26}\)Gilroy to Pierse, 9 December 1938, in “O’Connor-Pierse” file, SAA.

\(^{27}\)This was announced in the *Catholic Weekly*, 13 August 1942. Priest in Charge implies a temporary status, as distinct from that of Parish Priest.
After eleven weeks experience it is quite clear to me that travelling on trains, trams and buses, changing from one to the other with long waits in between, is slow, irritating and a consumer of time and energy. ... When I arrive back at my office in the evening I am not only psychologically tired but physiologically tired and find it difficult to write out reports or do any study.  

The request was not granted.

A comment by Pierse to Gilroy in 1945 gives a sense of the increasing pressures of his work:

The administration of Education in the Archdiocese is taking more and more of my time; it has now reached the proportion of a full-sized job. If we had two more inspectors (priests) all the schools could be visited in a year, and I would have more time for office work, and also I would have more freedom to visit, (if necessary two or three times a year), the schools that need most attention.

Pierse here appears conscientious, yet concerned that much more needed to be done. As an inspector Pierse was remembered for his tall, forbidding appearance and irritable, brusque manner. Perhaps his demanding working conditions contributed to his irritability.

In 1958 the Office was moved to the second floor of Cusa House, 175 Elizabeth St, which was the administrative centre for various archdiocesan services. Just two rooms were provided. One was for clerical work and the other could be used for interviews.

Agents of the Bishops

Before outlining the activities of the early CEO it is important to explain its role in the archdiocese. This was delegated by the archbishop and involved acting on his behalf. It was the responsibility of the bishops to ensure that Catholic education was available to all Catholic children. The CEO inspectors were the instruments and servants of the Archbishop of Sydney in helping to discharge this responsibility. He appointed them to the role and could dismiss them. When the CEO began in 1939, Archbishop Kelly had virtually retired and Archbishop Gilroy, his Coadjutor, was archbishop in practice. So from 1939 to his retirement in 1971 Gilroy had

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28 Pierse to Archbishop Gilroy, 30 December 1939, in "O'Connor-Pierse" file, SAA.
29 Report, 17 April 1945, ibid.
30 This impression of his manner has been gained in conversations with pupils and teachers that he inspected, one of whom is Margot Keaney, the archivist at his final parish of Clifton Gardens.
authority over Catholic schooling in the archdiocese and it was he who appointed Pierse and later Slowey to be in charge of the CEO.

It is conceivable that, having made the appointments, the archbishop could have delegated wide freedom to the CEO inspectors for the formulation and implementation of educational policy. In fact the opposite occurred. Gilroy kept a close supervision and check on the CEO. Pierse's monthly circular to the schools, the Catholic Education Gazette, had to receive a Nihil Obstat from a diocesan Censor\(^{31}\). After the Gazette of 1 April 1940 had included an instruction discouraging schools from employing non-Catholics, the archbishop tersely rebuked Pierse:

> I shall be grateful if in future, before any orders are given by means of the Gazette, as for example the fifth item in the current issue, you will first submit them to me in writing.\(^ {32}\)

Gilroy gained a reputation for being non-confrontational in the public arena. Here perhaps we have an early instance of his diplomatic caution.

When Slowey succeeded Pierse as Inspector of Schools in 1949 he also referred to Gilroy many detailed matters which, in later years, would be handled internally by the CEO. Examples in the 1950s were the propriety of a mass pledge to be recited by children at the St Patrick's Day Sports, the question of having a summer uniform for the Patrician Brothers' school at Fairfield, and whether the St Vincent de Paul Society might conduct rag collections in Catholic schools.\(^ {33}\)

Other means of supervision available to the Cardinal included his receipt of an annual report from the Catholic Education Office and his reading of the individual School Report Books during his regular visitation of parishes. The CEO annual reports were brief (between two and five pages) and give only a very sketchy picture of the state of the Sydney schools. They varied in arrangement each year and contained items such as statistics of the number of pupils in the different types of schools and comments on the work of pupils in diocesan examinations. Problems were also touched upon. In fact the Report for 1944 reads more like a litany of problems and needs, as some extracts show:

\(^{31}\)This was a statement by a diocesan theologian that from a doctrinal point of view "nothing prevents" the publication of the newsletter.

\(^{32}\)15 April 1940, in "O'Connor-Pierse" file, SAA.

\(^{33}\)See "Director of Education" file, SAA.
Abuses are gradually being eliminated, although sometimes they die hard. There is still difficulty in obtaining co-operation from the Brothers’ schools, especially the Christian Brothers....

More first class Kindergartens are also necessary, if we are to stop the trek to the public schools...

In the Secondary sphere, we have only one or two Girls’ Schools with facilities for teaching Chemistry and Physics. This is a great drawback to girls, who wish to take a Science course at the University...

The cost of books and equipment for our schools is a terrific burden, especially as sales tax is added...34

This 1944 report was less than two pages long and is the last one sighted by the author until that of 1982. It seems that the practice of furnishing the archbishop with an annual report from the CEO was abandoned. In producing these reports the CEO was helping the archbishop to discharge his responsibility for the schools.

The archbishop also visited the priests of the archdiocese about once every two years. During these visits he would read and sign the School Report Books which recorded the comments of the CEO inspectors. The School Report Books kept at each school provided him with a sketch of the state of the school. However, the detail of this sketch varied with the inspector. In fact some books contained mostly a series of “Good” and “V.Good” annotations. The visit also gave the archbishop and parish priest a chance to discuss problems relating to the parish school.

As chief pastor of the archdiocese the archbishop also received letters on school matters directly from individual Catholics. Frequently these were complaints or requests since the archbishop was the final place of appeal in Australia. Letters could deal with such matters as compulsion in wearing school uniforms, the expulsion of a pupil, accusations of unorthodox teaching of Catholic doctrine. Sometimes the archbishop would refer the issue to the CEO for comment.

It can be seen from the above that the archbishop delegated to the CEO his responsibility for overseeing Catholic education so that the CEO inspectors were his agents. They were appointed by him and ultimately responsible to him. Now it is necessary to discuss a further body with influence over the CEO — the Catholic Education Board.

34 In "O’Connor-Pierse" file, SAA.
Soon after his appointment as Diocesan Inspector, Pierse requested that Gilroy establish a Diocesan Education Board so that the responsibility for formulating policy and deciding difficult cases of the application of policy would not be borne by him alone. In June 1939, the archbishop announced that the first Catholic Education Board would consist of Archbishop Gilroy, a nominee of the archbishop (Mgr Meany, an earlier Inspector of Schools), the Director of Education for N.S.W. (Fr Thompson), and the Clerical Diocesan Inspector (Fr Pierse). Its exclusively priestly composition was unrepresentative of the teaching staff of the schools and of the parents of the pupils. Yet it is unlikely that this would have been questioned in the hierarchical Catholic Church of the 1930s.

This Board continued to exist in the 1940s and dealt with issues submitted to it by the CEO. O'Grady, an inspector in the 1950s, recalled that it met about once every term and he commented that the Board had a prestige and authority in the eyes of the State Government and Education Department which the CEO lacked. One can speculate that the notion of a board conveyed a sense of higher wisdom or bureaucratic prestige. As an example of its interests the Board's agenda for 1950 included a request to have parochial school holidays correspond with government school holidays, requests to hold school on Saturdays, the introduction of Home Science as a standard subject for girls, the minimum age of enrolment in primary school, and overcrowding at boys schools. Cases of disqualification of Primary Final classes were also referred to the Board. These were rare cases when it was decided that individual schools had contravened the regulations for the conduct of the examination. Thus, in 1949, the Education Board disqualified the Marist Brothers' school at Randwick from all passes and prizes in the Primary Final examination, despite appeals from the headmaster and the Marist provincial leader.

Crittenden has stated that the Board meetings provided a forum at which the Inspectors, especially those "in the field" (Duffy, Meere and himself),
could inform Gilroy and other Church authorities of the condition of the schools and of problems they observed. Often they were the bearers of bad news. They drew attention to the need to improve methods of teaching Religion and voiced alarm at the severe overcrowding of primary schools and the difficulties this caused both teachers and pupils. A related concern was the living conditions of some of the nuns and brothers. He recalls that Gilroy would take up such points with parish priests and leaders of congregations and that on occasions he, Crittenden, was made aware of the disapproval of some of these.39

The CEO and the Religious Congregations

While the CEO was the agent of the archbishop in regard to Catholic schools and could refer problems to the Catholic Education Board, its relationship with the religious congregations was a most significant aspect of its role in the period up to the mid 1960s. The main reason for this was that religious congregations provided the administration and most of the staffing of every school in the archdiocese and consequently developed a measure of influence and independence in the parishes. If a relationship with a bishop or parish priest was difficult, it was possible for the congregations to withdraw their members from the area involved. Though infrequent, there had been cases where congregations had withdrawn their members from particular areas, and, in extreme cases, from the whole country. Since the schools depended on the religious congregations for their existence, this was a weighty consideration. Therefore each congregation enjoyed a strong degree of independence and influence which the new CEO had to take into account.

The independence of a religious congregation also depended on whether it was a diocesan congregation subordinate to the bishop of the diocese or whether it was an international congregation whose major superiors were based in Rome. Members of a Rome-based congregation looked to their superiors in Rome in regard to a major decision, rather than to a bishop or parish priest. A local bishop, seeking the help of a congregation or making a complaint against it, might have to write either to the major superiors in Rome or to the Sacred Congregation for Religious in Rome which

supervised all religious congregations. This was a lengthy and often unsatisfactory process. In Australia by the 1940s all male religious and most female religious were in such Rome-based congregations. Thus the congregations had great autonomy and influence in their dealings with local bishops and clergy.

The new CEO experienced some difficulty in dealing with the congregations. It was difficult for many religious from international congregations, such as the De la Salle Christian Brothers or the Jesuits who had administered schools for centuries, to defer to secular priests who had no experience in teaching. In fact some congregations, such as the De La Salle Brothers, had been given by the pope the privilege of exemption from inspection by the diocese. Thus in early 1939 a Sydney school refused to allow Mr Connolly, the Assistant Diocesan Inspector, to inspect the primary school, on the grounds that it had a papal exemption and had also been inspected by the State Inspectors for state registration. Lay status would also have been a disadvantage for Connolly in this confrontation with the religious congregation. Pierse, the Diocesan Inspector, appealed to Gilroy. Extracts from his submission illustrate well the difficulty faced by the CEO:

I respectfully submit the following points for your consideration:-

(1) No school is exempt from examination in Christian Doctrine. There is no difficulty in this matter.

(2) Several Communities have a privilege of Papal exemption from examination in secular subjects.

(3) This exemption holds only when the school is the property of the Community; in other schools the Brothers or Sisters are the "agents" or "employees" of the Parish or Diocese. The Bishop, through his Inspector, has a right to see that the work is being effectively done in these schools.

(4) The question of Registration is irrelevant. It simply means that the school is approved by the State Department....

(6) The words "outside Mr Connolly's jurisdiction" really mean "outside the archbishop's jurisdiction".40

This case shows some of the problems of the relationship of the new CEO as agents of the diocesan bishops in dealing with a variety of influential religious organisations. The CEO was really in a position of claiming authority but having limited power to enforce policies if a congregation was recalcitrant. Further evidence of the weakness of the CEO position will be given in the later section on the CEO function of Inspection.

40 Pierse to Gilroy, 12 April 1939, in "O'Connor-Pierse" file, SAA.
Functions of the CEO to 1960

There were two main types of functions of the CEO in these years. One type embraced the administrative functions whereby it acted as a somewhat rudimentary administrative centre and contact office for the schools of the archdiocese. These administrative functions will be elaborated below. The other type of function was the on-site inspection of schools carried out by Pierse but increasingly delegated to Assistant Inspectors.

Central Administrative Functions

The first portfolio of central administration was carried out mainly by Pierse and his successor, Slowey. It was a many-faceted role, covering a variety of services. A key aspect was communication.

A Communication Link

A primary function was that the CEO was the major link between the Sydney hierarchy and the schools. Decisions of the bishops affecting education could be passed on to the schools via circulars from the CEO — although it must be noted that the bishops could also communicate with the schools through parish priests, superiors of religious congregations, and the official diocesan newspaper, The Catholic Weekly.

Sending of circulars to the schools was an important activity of the CEO. Pierse sent out a monthly Catholic Education Gazette to parish priests and religious teachers. It gave information on events of the school year, reminders of diocesan regulations and policies, notices of diocesan examinations, comments of inspectors, and exhortations on areas to be improved. Perhaps as a defence against residual sectarian hostility it was stressed that “All matter in the Gazette should be regarded as confidential”. These circulars, each of about four pages, sought to promote a degree of unity and cooperation amongst the teachers of the different religious congregations of the diocese. However, the author has sighted copies only for the early 1940s. It is possible that Pierse maintained this newsletter to 1948.

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41 Vol. VI, 25 January 1940. Some copies, ibid.
In 1940, he issued an archdiocesan Syllabus for the courses in Religion (Primary and Secondary) and Secular Subjects (Primary only).\textsuperscript{42} Besides curriculum information it also contained sections on examination regulations and prizes, advice regarding spelling and physical education, and admonitions for the reduction of corporal punishment. Pierse issued a revised Religion Syllabus in 1942 in which more policies and regulations were included — on the length of the school day, school uniforms, truancy, the keeping of registers. There were also "School Organisation Suggestions".\textsuperscript{43}

Issuing of policies and regulations did not ensure compliance. Pierse noted in 1941 that "A number of Parish Priests have been making inquiries about school hours, school holidays, and corporal punishment".\textsuperscript{44} In 1943 he asked the archbishop to stress to parish priests that "Parish Priests are the managers of all Parochial Schools, including ...Brothers Schools", and that school uniforms were optional.\textsuperscript{45} Again, his report for 1944 noted that "There is still difficulty in obtaining cooperation from the Brothers' schools, especially the Christian Brothers."\textsuperscript{46} He lamented also that, despite the CEO policy on corporal punishment, "Sometimes, too, I am afraid the rod is used to further religious knowledge".\textsuperscript{47} In 1946 Pierse still complained that "Though there are definite Diocesan regulations for Boys' and Girls' Schools on corporal punishment (page 39 Syllabus) yet they are not being observed."\textsuperscript{48} This policy was that corporal punishment should be as limited as possible — to boys only, for breaches of discipline only, and administered by the Teacher in charge of the school.\textsuperscript{49}

The temptation for teachers to extend school hours, especially in Sixth Class, also seems to have been difficult to control. Permissible hours were clearly published in the 1942 Syllabus, but in 1950 the Catholic Education Board still found it necessary to address this question. The following regulations which they suggested for the "Bursary Class" (those in Sixth

\textsuperscript{42} Syllabus (Sydney, 1940).
\textsuperscript{43} Religion Syllabus (Sydney, 1942).
\textsuperscript{44} Pierse to Archbishop Gilroy, 29 July 1941, "O'Connor – Pierse" file, SAA.
\textsuperscript{45} Memo of Pierse, 27 April 1943, ibid.
\textsuperscript{46} Report, 17 April 1945, ibid.
\textsuperscript{47} ibid.
\textsuperscript{48} Signed memo with no addressee, 1 July 1946, ibid.
\textsuperscript{49} Religion Syllabus (1942), p. 39.
Class competing for State Bursaries) indicate the competitive pressure on teachers:

The Bursary Class must not begin before 9 a.m. and must not continue after 4 p.m. during the first two terms. During the last term the time may be extended to 4.30 p.m. each day. In addition during the last term three hours are also allowed on Saturday morning.50

Such examples point to a lack of executive power in the CEO. Superiors of religious congregations, not the CEO, were the employers of teachers and it seems that in Brothers' schools especially there was a selective compliance with CEO instructions.

Overseeing Religious Instruction

A specific and important function of the Office was to supervise the Religious Instruction in the schools. In the formal curriculum this Religious Instruction was the main justification for the whole effort to maintain Catholic schools. In addition to prayers at regular intervals in the school day and occasional sacramental rituals, Religious Instruction was in most cases the only "subject" area which was significantly different from, or additional to, the formal curriculum of the government schools. In fact Catholic schools generally followed N.S.W. Departmental syllabuses, although primary Social Studies held some Catholic "variations". Nevertheless, while the above comments refer to the formal curriculum, one must remember too the "Catholic" impact of the Catholic family background of most of the pupils attending a school adorned with prominent Catholic symbols, staffed by religious congregations and visited regularly by parish clergy.

The Australian hierarchy showed their concern for this responsibility at their Fourth Plenary Council in 1937 when they required that a Religious Instruction syllabus be "carefully drawn up and printed" and accurately followed, that all pupils were "to stand an examination once a year", the examination was to be set by the diocesan examiner who was in all cases to be a priest, and, in secondary schools, there was also to be an oral

50 From notes appended to Agenda for meeting of 19 July 1950, in "Director of Education" file, SAA. There was great pressure on Catholic schools to succeed in Sixth Class. One of the few forms of government aid available was the State Bursary awarded at the end of primary school. There was strong rivalry between "Bursary teachers" of the different congregations. The author was in Sixth Class in a convent school in 1955 when lessons began at 8.15 a.m. and concluded at 4.30 p.m.
examination presided over by a diocesan examiner or a priest or a religious appointed by a bishop.\textsuperscript{51}

Thus the Sydney CEO was delegated the task of ensuring that there was a Religion syllabus for Sydney schools and that it was being followed. The bishops could have commissioned the drafting of a single syllabus for all dioceses. In practice local dioceses seem to have produced their own. What was produced in Sydney?

In 1940 a Syllabus, Part One of which was a “Course of Study in Religion”, was issued by Pierse for all schools of the Archdiocese.\textsuperscript{52} He was helped in the preparation of this syllabus by Fr John Thompson, c.m.\textsuperscript{53} Each class was to be taught prescribed prayers and hymns, aspects of the Liturgy, Catholic Instruction from the \textit{Australian Catechism}, “Bible History” and “Christian Politeness”. Much reliance was placed on teaching via the \textit{Australian Catechism}, popularly known as the “Green Catechism”, which was seen as a concise summary of Catholic doctrine. It was a modified version of the catechism drawn up by Archbishop Butler of Cashel in Ireland in 1775 and had been endorsed by the Plenary Councils of Australasian bishops of 1895 and 1906.\textsuperscript{54} The syllabus stated that instruction in Catholic doctrine was to be completed by memorisation of prescribed sections of the catechism, most of which was to be achieved by the end of Sixth Class.

In the section of the syllabus relating to secondary school there was also a strong emphasis on what was called Catholic Evidence Work which meant providing the evidence or rational basis for Catholic doctrines and being prepared to answer non-Catholic “objections”. All pupils in Second, Third and Fourth Years were required, at least once annually, to take part in a \textit{public Catholic Evidence Demonstration}. Suggested topics included: the Last Judgment; Heaven; Baptism; Why the Church condemns Communism; Divorce; Outline of Catholic Social Teaching; the Real Presence. This evangelistic or missionary objective was an attempt to carry out the concern of the Catholic Church in the 1930s to promote what was

\textsuperscript{51} Decrees of the Fourth Plenary Council, Numbers 616, 617.
\textsuperscript{52} Archdiocese of Sydney, \textit{Syllabus} (Sydney, 1940).
\textsuperscript{53} Thompson was then Director of Catholic Primary Education for all N.S.W. and Vice­rector of St John’s College at the University of Sydney.
\textsuperscript{54} See article in \textit{Catholic Press}, 12 Jan 1939.
termed Catholic Action. The importance of this for Catholic schools was proclaimed by the Australian bishops in 1937:

It is most desirable that youths in colleges and high schools be carefully imbued with the principles of Catholic Action. Hence we desire that during the year special instructions be given in which the meaning Catholic Action shall be clearly set forth and the students shall be taught the necessity of such action and the practical means of cooperating with the clergy for the salvation of souls.\(^{55}\)

Another syllabus direction was that in a school inspection each child in secondary school was expected to show the Inspector a Sunday Mass Book, a copy of the New Testament, Rosary Beads, prescribed text books, and a Religion note book.\(^{56}\)

In 1942 Pierse felt it necessary to issue a revised *Religion Syllabus*.\(^{57}\) Primary School Religion topics were now itemised for each class and term and it was emphasised that Catechism Instruction and Memorisation should not be carried out in isolation but should be correlated with Bible History and Liturgy. Teachers were also reminded that Religion should result in “action rather than mere knowledge or words” and were urged to promote the Catholic Action movement by enabling secondary pupils to join “Parish Sodalities and Catholic Action Groups”.\(^{58}\)

Nevertheless, in 1945 Pierse was still unhappy with the Religion Syllabus and the teaching of Religion, as he indicated in his Report to Archbishop Gilroy:

I am of the opinion that while we use the Green Catechism as a text book, the teaching of religion will be uninspiring. It is an excellent book, but it is only a Catechism, it does not give enough help to the teacher who is incapable of giving adequate instruction or who, maybe, has not the time to prepare an adequate instruction.\(^{59}\)

Pierse was also disillusioned with the Religion Syllabus for secondary schools, especially its emphasis on rote learning and “Apologetics”. In 1945 he endorsed a new syllabus for secondary schools by Fr J. Thompson who

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55 *Decrees of Fourth Plenary Council*, no. 643.
56 ibid.
57 *Religion Syllabus* (Sydney, 1942).
58 ibid., p.7.
59 Report (to Archbishop Gilroy), 17 April 1945, in "O’Connor-Pierse" file, SAA.
stressed that it contained no prescribed text-books and “no formal course of Apologetics”.  

It seems that there were no further syllabuses issued by the CEO for over a decade. Then from European Catholic catechetical theorists in the 1950s there came an appeal to Catholic authorities for a new, more positive approach to religious education. Their call for religious education to be based on the kerygma (proclamation of the “Good News”) persuaded many Catholic educationists in Sydney. In response the Sydney CEO issued in 1958 new syllabuses for Infants classes, Primary classes, and Secondary Classes. They had only trial status and comments regarding their use and improvement were invited. While these syllabuses for teachers were still couched to a degree in traditional theological language, they no longer insisted on the traditional catechism as a basis and stressed the new catechetical approach:

The syllabus is offered for a trial period... Essentially it is kerygmatic and Christocentric, being planned to teach the glory of our calling as Christians and our nobility as adopted children of God.  

At the same time the CEO knew that the Australian bishops had not abandoned their faith in the catechism and had commissioned the writing of a new catechism which might be more attractive to pupils of the late 1950s. The CEO realised that their new syllabus might soon have to take into account the new catechism and also the additional senior year proposed by the Wyndham inquiry into secondary education.

The Sydney bishops likewise were aware that all was not well in the teaching of Religion in the archdiocese. Crittenden relates that at the end of 1955 Gilroy notified him that he was to be an inspector of schools and sent him for a briefing to Bishop Lyons who was bishop in charge of education. Lyons declared that there was an urgent problem in the teaching of Religion and that he was to take up the work of inspection with a minimum of preparation. He was to be given a year of teacher training at the teachers college for nuns in North Sydney (as the only male

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60 See Syllabus of Studies in Christian Doctrine for Use in All Catholic Post-Primary and Secondary Schools in NSW (Sydney, 1947) and letter of Pierse to Gilroy, 10 Nov 1945. Both documents are in “O'Connor - Pierse” file, SAA.  
61 From "Trial Religious Education Syllabus for Secondary Classes" (1958), p.1. Copy is held by Religious Education Department in CEOL.  
in the group) and would also begin evening study for an Arts degree at the University of Sydney.

In 1957, while continuing evening university work, he began full time inspection of Religious Education. At this time Crittenden and other inspectors sought to reduce the teachers' emphasis on the learning of the Catechism and to promote the newer catechetical approaches mentioned above. To this end he organised conferences for teachers and introduced two small periodicals. These were *Compass* which appeared in the late 1950s and then *Word and Life* from 1960 to 1964.\(^{63}\)

This provision of a Religion syllabus and guidance in catechetical approaches was one major method that the CEO used in exercising its delegated role of supervising the teaching of Religion in schools. Another instrument of supervision was the Diocesan examination in Religion, set and marked by the CEO in accordance with the directive of the 1937 Plenary Council of Australian bishops. This examination (the Primary Final) was held annually in Sixth Class until 1968. Until the early 1940s there was also a Diocesan Examination for secondary classes. The conduct of these examinations is explained further in the following section. Here it is treated because of its function as a method of overseeing the teaching of Religion. The numbers in each school of those who passed and failed in all Primary Final subjects and in secondary Religion were forwarded to the archbishop along with the annual Report. A high standard was demanded. As an illustration, in the 1942 examinations, thirty-two per cent of secondary pupils in the eleven schools of the Sisters of Charity and fifty per cent of pupils in the twelve schools of the Marist Brothers failed the subject of Religion.\(^{64}\) These results produced some alarm and questioning among the teachers and the congregations concerned.\(^{65}\)

This use of examinations was clearly a questionable method of furthering Religious Instruction. The author has seen no evidence that it was maintained after the early 1940s in secondary schools. The remarkable point is that it lasted so long in Primary Schools when public

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\(^{63}\)With the latter he was greatly assisted by Sr Gregory sgs and Fr Kevin Walsh.

\(^{64}\)Examination Results submitted 23 February 1943, "O'Connor-Pierce" file, SAA.

\(^{65}\)Aware of the need for improvement, Br Andrew, Provincial Superior of the Marist Brothers, began a series of examinations in primary and secondary classes in the 1930s. They were held at the end of each term. The papers were set by a committee of experienced teachers and were sent to a central site to be marked. See examination papers held in SJCA.
examinations were out of favour in government education systems in Australia. The retention of these examinations was favoured by the CEO as will be explained below.

Conducting Diocesan Examinations

The conduct of diocesan public examinations was a major responsibility of the CEO. In 1939 the CEO conducted separate examinations for three certificates. The Diocesan Certificate was for pupils in the Eighth Class of primary school and under fourteen years of age; the Commercial Certificate was for pupils following a "Commercial" curriculum; and the Merit Certificate (Primary Final) Examination was for "the purpose of testing the attainments and intelligence of pupils in the Sixth Class".66

By 1941 the main examination had become the Primary Final Examination and was a major work of the Office. It was held at the end of Sixth Grade in the subjects of Religious Knowledge, Mathematics, English and Social Studies. The papers were set and marked by the priests of the CEO or by selected religious teachers in the schools with some assistance in marking from seminarians of St Patrick's College, Manly. Results of Honours, Pass, and Fail were published in the Catholic Weekly and it was recommended that only those who passed should proceed to secondary school.67 By 1962 over 6000 children were tested each year.

Much emphasis was given to performance in public examinations and creditable results were seen as a way of justifying the existence of Catholic schools. Thus the last section of Corrigan's history of Catholic schooling in New South Wales68 was devoted to comparing the relative performance of Catholic and government school students in public examinations in the early twentieth century. The Catholic newspapers also published the results of Catholic students in the Leaving Certificate and Intermediate Certificate examinations, along with letters commenting on the fine performances of Catholic students.69

All this was in contrast to the thinking in the state system which was moving away from public examinations and relying more on I.Q. tests. In 1943 the High School Entrance Examination was abolished and in 1944 the

66 From Regulations published in Catholic Weekly, 15 June 1939.
67 Interview with Fr W. O'Grady, 24 September 1990.
68 Catholic Education in NSW (Sydney, 1929).
69 See for example Catholic Press, 26 Jan 1939 and 2 Feb 1939.
Intermediate Examination became partly internal.\textsuperscript{70} Moreover the newly founded Australian Council for Educational Research and its Director, K.S. Cunningham, advocated the use of standardised tests and I.Q. tests as diagnostic tools which would replace the traditional external examinations.\textsuperscript{71} But in Sydney Catholic schools the Primary Final competitive examination was seen as a way of ensuring standards. Examination conditions were strict: "The teacher of the Diocesan candidates must not be present in the Examination hall. Should the teacher infringe this rule the pupils will be disqualified."\textsuperscript{72} There were at least two cases, in 1939 and 1949, where whole Primary Final classes were disqualified upon the decision of the Sydney Catholic Education Board.\textsuperscript{73}

\textbf{Liaison with Government Authorities}

The CEO also provided some liaison between Catholic schools and government authorities. Before 1960 there was limited need for this because Catholic schools were independent and received no direct State Aid. However, registration requirements gave opportunity for valuable contact. Catholic schools were subject to State Government inspection for certification. Parents were legally obliged to send their children to a certified school. Moreover only schools with government registration could submit candidates for public examinations and State Bursaries. Thus the government inspectors were very important visitors to Catholic schools and their sympathy was crucial when they faced the question of whether to certify a school which had classes of up to 100 pupils. Slowey relates how issues such as the lack of sufficient toilets caused the temporary withholding of certification and became major local crises. But he believed that political realities precluded any government attempt to close a Catholic school.\textsuperscript{74} For the resolution of such issues it was important that there be good relations between Education Department officials and Catholic authorities.

\textsuperscript{70}See A. Barcan, "The Transition in Australian Education", in J.Cleverley and J. Lawry (eds), \textit{Australian Education in the 20th Century} (Melbourne, 1972), p. 185.


\textsuperscript{72}Catholic Weekly, 15 June 1939.

\textsuperscript{73}Correspondence is in "O'Connor-Pierse" and "Director of Education" files in SAA. Some detail on the 1949 case is given earlier in the chapter.

\textsuperscript{74}Interview 23 September 1988, transcript p.14.
When the N.S.W. government in 1941 raised the school leaving age from fourteen to fifteen years, Catholic schools were faced with the need to provide more secondary classes. The organisations immediately affected were the religious congregations which had to find the extra secondary teachers. The Sydney CEO also responded to this challenge by participating in the first Provincial Conference of Directors of Education and Diocesan Inspectors which was held in Sydney in 1941. The participants decided to encourage schools to prepare as many students as possible for the Intermediate Certificate and to promote commercial and technical departments.75 At this time there was a strong growth in enrolment in government technical schools. Here we have an example of the CEO's attempting to help Catholic schools respond to challenges set by the government or by community demands.

World War II contingencies also demanded Church-State cooperation. A month after the outbreak and after consulting Emergency Services authorities, Pierse issued instructions on how schools should deal with bombing or gas attacks.76 He also collaborated with state authorities in a contingency plan to move children to safer inland areas.77 Slowey continued such relationships from 1949. He had to channel "indirect" government assistance to Catholic schools, such as the distribution of free milk, public transport passes for children, access to the purchasing of items in Government Stores, some sales tax exemptions, and promotion of ABC school broadcasts. He had a good working relationship with Dr Harold Wyndham, the N.S.W. Director-General of Education in the 1950s and was a member of the Wyndham inquiry committee into secondary education in New South Wales set up in 1953.

Other Activities of the Central Administration
The CEO also arranged and promoted an annual Catholic Teachers Conference held in the May vacation for two or three days. The vacation was extended to allow for this, and all teachers of the Archdiocese, religious and lay, were expected to attend, though it seems that the proportion who attended was moderate. These were inservice days usually

75 Minutes of First Provincial (NSW) Catholic Education Conference of Directors of Education and Diocesan Inspectors, in "O'Connor-Pierse" file, SAA.
76 Circular to Principals, 3 October 1939, in "O'Connor-Pierse" file, SAA.
with different programs for primary and secondary teachers. They usually consisted of lectures by priests, religious brothers or sisters, and sometimes by State Department experts. These days provided the benefit of acquainting teachers with developments in education and of bringing together the members of different religious congregations. Apart from this traditional May conference there were other occasional conferences, such as catechetical conferences in the late 1950s.

The CEO was also a centre for the compiling of statistics on Catholic schools. Figures on total enrolments and enrolments in particular classes were obtained each year. This function was to be very valuable during the 1960s reorganisation.

Did the CEO provide inspiration or leadership for educational initiative and innovation in Catholic schools? An educational reform movement developed in Australia in the period 1938-46 which A.D. Spaull has sketched in some detail, showing first how the N.E.F. Conference travelled each state and set up branches. Various reform plans were promoted by a range of groups such as teachers’ unions, the A.C.E.R., and by academics such as G.S. Browne and C.E.W. Bean. Reform proposals impinged on educational administration, curriculum, teacher education and working conditions.78 There was also the movement towards scientific testing promoted especially by K.S. Cunningham and the A.C.E.R.79 Was the CEO involved in this movement? Pierse’s Reports for this period show no awareness of a national concern for reform. They deal with the maintenance of the schools in the face of war-time exigencies and stress that standards are being maintained especially in performance in public examinations.

Limits of CEO Administration

When one considers the extent of CEO influence and responsibilities today it is revealing to note what the CEO did not administer in the period 1939-61. It did not receive and administer the finances of the Catholic schools. At that time the finances were managed at the local level by the parish priest and the principal of the school. Nor did the CEO control the building and expansion of schools. Likewise the employment, payment, and

78 A.D. Spaull, Australian Education in the Second World War, (Brisbane, 1982), ch. 6.
working conditions of teachers were local school and parish matters outside the control of the CEO. In fact the major influence in these matters lay with the religious congregations who, in cooperation with parish priests, agreed to set up and staff schools in particular areas, appointed members of their congregations as principals and teachers to the schools, and transferred them when local or religious congregational needs demanded. Thus it would be incorrect to suggest that before 1961 the CEO was a bureaucracy which administered a school system.

Finally it might be asked whether the CEO was involved with Catholic children who did not attend Catholic schools. There is little evidence of this in this period 1939-60. The 1940 Annual Report mentions that "The Christian Doctrine Correspondence Course for country children is working well" but there is no similar reference in later reports. In 1955 Slowey informed Cardinal Gilroy that he knew of no Catholic instruction in Public Schools except for that of two lay volunteer societies, the Theresians and the Legion of Mary. Church authorities still hoped that nearly all Catholic parents could be persuaded to enrol their children in Catholic schools:

**Inspection**

The second major type of function of the CEO was that of inspection and general contact with schools and parishes "in the field", as distinct from administrative functions carried out in the central office. In carrying out this inspectorial role the CEO was maintaining a well established tradition. Fogarty notes that in 1895 the Second Plenary Council of Bishops decreed that a priest inspector be appointed to promote the efficiency of all the schools. Indeed this theme of efficiency had been stressed in Pope Leo XIII's letters on education and most of the Australian dioceses had welcomed government inspection of their schools and secular curriculum since the late nineteenth century. Thus the inspection of the religious

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80 For instance the Marist Brothers had a policy that a principal could administer a school for six years only. The congregation might transfer the principal earlier than this if it thought fit.

81 In "O'Connor-Pierse" file, SAA. Archbishop Sheehan had written a series of correspondence lessons. Perhaps these were used in the Correspondence Course to which Pierse refers.

82 Letter of 11 June 1955, in "Director of Education" file, SAA.

83 Fogarty, p.426.

84 ibid., p.425.
curriculum was seen as a pastoral responsibility and that of the secular curriculum as a means of promoting the efficiency of Catholic schools and perhaps demonstrating this efficiency to the government and the public.

School inspection, as distinct from work in the central office, was carried out in the main by Pierse (1939-47), Ryan (1940-51), O'Grady (1948-62), Duffy (1952-62), Meere (1955-63), and Crittenden (1957-59). Regular contact was sought. Pierse claimed that "Nearly all schools in the Archdiocese were inspected during the year 1939" and O'Grady noted that it was hoped to have an Inspector visit each school each year. O'Grady further claims that most schools were regularly inspected (about once every two years) during his time as assistant inspector from 1948 to 1962. Copies of the School Report Book viewed by the author verify this for at least primary and intermediate schools.

The procedure for such inspections has been described by O'Grady. In one year one priest would inspect the teaching of Religion as well as the general condition of facilities and classes. In the alternate year Kevin Ryan or his successor, Duffy, would inspect the teaching of secular subjects. The inspector would first contact the parish priest so as to arrange a time for the inspection. The latter would then notify the principal of the school. The inspection would be carried out in one school day. In a parish school the inspector would usually have a lunch-time or after-school meeting with the parish priest when they would discuss any school problems. The School Report Book, kept by the parish priest, indicates what was being observed. There was a page for the general running of the school with sections such as Buildings and Equipment, Grounds, Cleanliness, Provision and Use of Teaching Aids, School Libraries, Supervision (a) of Children and (b) of Staff, Discipline and Christian Politeness, Distribution of Teaching Load. Then there was a section for each class from Kindergarten to Third Year, with lines for comments on each subject. It is doubtful that an inspector could examine all the subjects for each class in one day. This is borne out by the St Bernadette's, Dundas report book.

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85 Thirty-seventh Annual Report, p.3, in "O'Connor-Pierse" file, SAA.
86 Interview 24 September 1990.
87 Ibid.
88 The School Report Book was the record of CEO inspections. It was kept at the parish presbytery. Copies have been made available to the author for St Bernadette's Primary School at Dundas, Marist Brothers School at Auburn and St John's Girls School at Auburn.
89 Interview 24 September 1990.
which shows general comments on just a few inspection items in two different inspections.

The School Report Books were kept by the parish priest and the current reports were read and initialled by the archbishop or bishop who would visit the parish every few years. It can be seen from this procedure that in this parish school structure there was a degree of contact, communication and even supervision involving bishops, parish priests, religious congregations, and schools. The CEO had the major limitation of having only one or two inspectors regularly "in the field" but it also had the advantage of a ready-made parish network for transmitting episcopal policies. Both the CEO and the parish priests were an administrative network for enabling the archdiocesan hierarchy to communicate with and supervise the schools run by the congregations. When regional secondary schools serving several parishes began to develop in the 1960s this parish communication and control network became less effective.

The objectives of the inspectors seemed to change over the period. Pierse began his work in 1939 with the aim of improving standards. He advocated the developing of good habits of speaking, reading, and writing and the compilation of a library for each class. Discipline, order, and respect were demanded, especially in the presence of the Inspector. His monthly Catholic Education Gazette contained instructions and advice on school organisation and the improvement of discipline.

He seems to have been very active in visiting the schools, inspecting 106 schools himself in 1939 (while Ryan inspected 82). His reports on individual schools are quite detailed over many subjects and show special concern for the improvement of Religious Instruction. In rare cases where he considered urgent action was required, he sent reports to the archbishop who usually contacted the provincial superior of the congregation responsible. Extracts from two such reports illustrate both the Inspector's concern for the schools and his unequivocal manner. The first example refers to an orphanage:

When I arrived all the children had been herded into a dark, evil-smelling room...the children to my mind seemed to be neglected; they evidently did not have baths for quite a considerable period. They have no visiting doctor and from my observations it seemed that some of the children were suffering from physical

91 ibid.
defects which may need immediate attention. Their progress in school was retarded through lack of essential materials such as books and copybooks. Some of the children were using wallpaper on which to draw!!

The second is an inner-city primary school:

I regret having to record that I consider the Organisation, Direction, Supervision, General Tone of the school and the knowledge of Religion shown by the pupils to be unsatisfactory.

When I arrived at the school at 9.45 a.m. there was general chaos... There must be a general tightening up of discipline. Start by being punctual. Distractions in class such as fiddling with pencils, rosary beads, books, money, etc., can be cured if the children are made to join their hands behind their backs during periods when the teacher is putting questions to the class. Shuffling feet, looking around, lounging on desks and prompting was also in evidence.

In the 1950s the manner of the inspector seems to have been ameliorated. O'Grady indicated that the inspection was not meant to be an instrument of authoritarian control but rather a means of fostering positive relationships among hierarchy, priests and schools. He was emphasising the importance of the inspector as a contact or link between the hierarchy and the school. Inspection reports in School Report Books might be cursory, as indicated earlier in the Dundas school example which shows only a few general comments by two different inspectors. Cardinal Gilroy must have noted the differences between the Pierse style and that of inspectors of the 1950s.

Above then is a description of the functions and activities of the CEO up to about 1960. Inspection was certainly the main function in the 1940s, but there were always other activities and responsibilities. As the number of inspectors was increased in the 1950s the Director of Schools became more involved in administration rather than in inspection.

**Philosophy of the CEO**

A history of the CEO should include some attention to ideas dominant in the CEO and propagated from there. These dominant ideas might be termed its philosophy. By this term I am referring to perceptions about the aims and nature of education. One might also include the vision of the

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92 Report for orphanage, 17 July 1939, in "O'Connor-Pierse" file, SAA.
93 Report on ...School, 20 June 1941, ibid.
94 Interview 24 September 1990.
role of the CEO in Catholic education. This philosophy would be expected to shape and explain CEO activity. What was the philosophy present in the CEO in this early period?

In the 1940s it was largely that of the Church hierarchy and of Pierse, as communicated by his circulars and his policies towards the schools. However he does not set down his vision of Catholic school in a comprehensive way and so one must seek out some of its elements. Firstly he is convinced of the value of religious schools and approvingly quotes the London *Times* of February 17, 1940:

> The truth, of course, is that religion must form the very basis of any education worth the name, and that education with religion omitted is not really education at all.  

How was religion to "form the very basis" of education in Sydney Catholic schools? Pierse frequently stressed that Religion was the most important subject and had to be taught in an interesting way each day even when there was temptation to concentrate on secular subjects for public examinations. In the 1942 syllabus it was specified that primary classes should have one hour each day for Religion (exclusive of Choir Practice) and secondary classes should have forty-five minutes each day. Short class prayers were to punctuate the day and the actual prayers and their times were specified for Infants Schools. Secondary pupils were encouraged to join Catholic societies before they left school because "We know that too many of our children are drifting away from the Church after they leave school".

Although they did not state this, it would also seem that the hierarchy and clergy believed that it was helpful to provide a closed Catholic environment where teaching of the orthodox doctrines could be carried out under their supervision. The pre-Vatican II desire of isolation of the "Church Militant" from the contaminating "world" was still reflected in the 1960s by annual warnings in CEO circulars regarding the Children's Anzac Eve Commemoration:

> Pupils of Catholic schools in other areas of the Archdiocese may attend similar (Anzac Eve) ceremonies, provided there is no service (i) which is to be conducted by

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95 Thirty-seventh Annual Report, in "O'Connor-Pierse" file SAA.  
96 For example see "Diocesan Inspector's Report" for 1944 in ibid.  
a Minister of Religion or (ii) which includes anything contrary to Catholic faith. The form of service should be examined beforehand. 98

It is most probable that similar attitudes prevailed before 1960.

The message was given that it was the responsibility of Catholic schools to nurture and preserve the faith of Catholic children. In the Catholic Education Gazette, the task of preserving the Catholic faith of children was held before teachers as “a terrible responsibility”:

Is it not true to say that many lose their faith through ignorance? If the teacher is to blame for this ignorance he will have to account for it on the day of judgment. 99

The first years of school were seen as specially important in this regard, as indicated by the Regulation that lay teachers should not be placed in charge of classes below Fourth Class. 100 The assumption here is that lay teachers were inferior and last-resort substitutes for members of religious congregations.

The CEO and the hierarchy also seem to have accepted the view that, apart from Religious Instruction, the rest of the curriculum could be the same as that of government schools and that Catholic schools should take part in public examinations. This perpetuated Cardinal Moran’s approach to Catholic schooling by which Catholic schools followed the state curriculum and added the teaching of religion. This is a different vision from the earlier nineteenth century Benedictine ideal that the whole curriculum should have a religious character even if one took Archbishop Vaughan’s characterising of state schools as “seed-plots of immorality” as rhetorical exaggeration.101

Catholic children were encouraged to maintain a distinctive identity while remaining loyal and productive Australian citizens. Primary children had to buy the Catholic School Paper instead of the magazine produced by the Education Department which was seen as too secular in outlook. The Catholic magazine was edited by a diocesan priest, approved by the bishops.

98Circular from Fr Slowey, 7 Feb, 1963. Copies of this and some other 1960s circulars are in archives of St Joseph’s College Hunter’s Hill (SJCA)
100ibid., p.42.
101This contrast between the Benedictine ideal of education and Cardinal Moran’s pragmatic approach has been outlined in O’Farrell, The Catholic Church and the Community, pp. 230–3, and in G. Haines, Lay Catholics and the Education Question in Nineteenth Century NSW (Sydney, 1976), pp. 191–2.
of New South Wales and promoted by Pierse. It contained articles, stories and poems similar to those in its government school equivalent, along with some distinctive Catholic features such as lists of Feast Days for the month, lives of saints and missionaries, and religious poems. There was also thinly disguised indoctrination, as in the following extract from a story involving neighbouring school children:

Peter tossed back his hair..."We don't go there. We go to the Catholic School."

"Why don't Catholics go to State schools?" asked Bob.

"Oh, well, because we want to learn our religion. We think religion is the most important lesson of all — before arithmetic or English or history or anything — because, you see, it is learning about God and how to worship Him. And we say prayers first thing in the morning and last thing in the afternoon."

"Couldn't you learn enough religion at Sunday School or at Church?"

"Can't be done!" smiled Peter. "We want it every day." 102

In secular subjects Catholic schools generally followed State Department syllabuses but modified them in Social Science to include treatment of Communism and in History to allow an optional study of Irish History. Reinforcing this Irish association was the effort made by the CEO to organise the annual St Patrick's Day Sports. In 1939 Pierse was listed in the organising committee as Director of School Sports and Drills. 103 The day was seen as a chance to display to the outside "world" the value of Catholic schools. Pierse was displeased with the children's behaviour in 1939 and wrote to teachers in 1940:

On big occasions like the St Patrick's Day Sports we are on show and people form comparisons between the behaviour of Catholic School children and Public School children...we are on trial before the bar of public opinion and we will be judged by results. 104

During the Second World War Catholic children contributed to a Catholic fund for the war effort, Catholic United Services Association 105 (CUSA), and schools were encouraged to sing, after the daily morning prayer, either the hymn "Australia" or the hymn "God Bless Our Lovely Morning Land". 106 "God Save the King" was not promoted. There seems to have been little deference paid in Catholic schools to the British Empire,

102 Catholic School Paper, vol. 10, no. 1, 1 Feb 1940, p. 15. Copies can be found in SPM.
103 Catholic Press, 16 March 1939.
104 Gazette, vol. VIII, 1 April 1940.
105 Diocesan Inspector's Report, 1942, in "O'Connor-Pierse" file. SAA.
except perhaps in the study of the English History course (when the State syllabus was followed).

It is clear also that a strong anti-Communist stance was promoted by the CEO in the 1940s. This accorded with the attitude of the Australian bishops in 1942 when they opposed the government's lifting of bans on the Australian Communist Party.\textsuperscript{107} For Sixth Class and lower secondary, Sr M. Dunstan Wilson's pamphlet, "The Child and the Communist", was prescribed by the Syllabus. Secondary pupils were required to study Communism as part of their Catholic Evidence study.\textsuperscript{108} In the 1939 Diocesan Examination, thirteen-year-old students were asked to write essays on:

\begin{quote}
The right of Private Ownership, and the Communististic viewpoint in this respect. Why must we obey our parents, the laws of the country in which we live, the laws of the Church? Explain why Communists obey their laws.
\end{quote}

and, in relation to the current Civil War in Spain, they were asked to explain: "What was the result of the struggle and how will the result benefit the Christian world in the future?"\textsuperscript{109} Anti-Communism in the schools simply reflected the policy of the Australian Church leadership in the 1940s and 1950s. Archbishop Gilroy secretly directed the Sydney branches of the Movement which sought to prevent trade unions coming under Communist Party leadership. He even appointed his auxiliary bishops as overseers of the Movement, firstly Patrick Lyons in 1950 and then James Carroll in 1954.\textsuperscript{110}

The CEO, especially Pierse, did provide a degree of balance and humanity in its perspective of Catholic schooling. Against the tendency to focus on success in secular subjects and compete with state schools at this level, Pierse stressed that religious instruction and formation should be the focus. Nevertheless he was a little ambivalent in this area in that his annual reports always noted the successes of Catholic schools in public examinations. The CEO was also concerned to moderate excessive school hours and showed sensitivity in its policy on school uniforms, especially during World War II:

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\textsuperscript{107}Catholic Weekly, 17 Sept 1942. \\
\textsuperscript{108}Syllabus (1940). \\
\textsuperscript{109}1939 Diocesan Examinations in Religion and English History in "O'Connor-Pierse" file, SAA. \\
\textsuperscript{110}See G. Williams, Cardinal Sir Norman Gilroy (Sydney, 1971), pp. 52-53.
\end{flushright}
While it is recognised that the wearing of a school uniform has many advantages, yet teachers should note that the wearing of such uniforms by children in Parochial Schools must not be made compulsory, on account of the extra expense incurred by poor parents.  

Corporal punishment in schools was deplored by Pierse and other inspectors, even though they knew it was being widely used, especially in the brothers’ schools.

Did this philosophy change in the 1950s under Slowey and O’Grady? Few records for this period in the form of circulars and publications have been found. So it is difficult to be sure of the philosophy of the CEO. The overall Church was yet to be influenced by the changes of the Second Vatican Council and so one would expect some continuity of the thinking of the 1940s. This is borne out by examination of the trial “Religious Education Syllabus” issued by the CEO in 1958. While there is inevitable distortion in selective quotation, continuity of traditional outlook can be seen in the syllabus for Third Year with its Scholastic doctrinal terms (“the Beatific Vision”, “supernaturalising the natural virtues”), and in its social curriculum whereby pupils are to be taught that capitalism is “lawful, even essential” and Communism is “a menace...to Christianity”.

There was a widespread assumption that it was preferable that Catholic pupils be taught by members of religious congregations. In the 1950s, however, pupil numbers were expanding and Slowey realised that lay teachers could no longer be discouraged. Instead, he helped inaugurate the training of lay teachers at Catholic Teachers College at North Sydney (see below).

The above notions of CEO philosophy are sketchy. That there was no formal, carefully constructed CEO philosophy of education has been noted by Barry Collins who was in the CEO from 1965 to 1991. He comments that up to 1970 there was a “lack of a spelt-out philosophy for Catholic schools...we didn’t have a lot of research...There wasn’t much time.”

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111 Religion Syllabus (1942, p. 40)
112 Memo, initialled “T.J.P.”, 1 July 1946, in “O’Connor-Pierse” file, SAA.
113 "Religious Education Syllabus for Secondary Classes", pp.21-29.
Father Slowey and Teacher Training

In reviewing this early period one should recognise the work of Slowey in helping to initiate teacher training for lay teachers. This work was not a direct responsibility of the CEO yet it is relevant in that it came to occupy a good deal of the time of the Director of the CEO.

Until some time in the 1950s the hierarchy of Sydney discouraged the employment of lay teachers. The Religion Syllabus of 1942 contained the following regulation:

Lay Teachers should not be employed in Primary Schools. Where necessity demands the employment of a Lay Teacher, he or she should NOT be put in charge of the Kindergarten, Infants, 1st, 2nd or 3rd Classes.\(^{115}\)

But this could not continue. In the 1950s there was great expansion in the attendance at Catholic schools due firstly to the “baby boom” following World War II and secondly to the government immigration program. Numbers in Sydney Catholic schools grew from an estimated 51,000 in 1940 to 91,000 in 1958, with 68,000 of these being in primary schools.\(^{116}\) Furthermore it was realised that the coming Wyndham reorganisation of the 1960s would involve an extra year of school and require more teachers. While numbers joining religious teaching orders also increased in the 1950s, this increase could by no means match the demand for more teachers.

In about 1957 Slowey had a meeting with Mother Leone, Superior-General of the “Brown” Josephites, and asked if she would assist in an Archdiocesan move to train lay teachers. He reports that she was enthusiastic and cooperative.\(^{117}\) He then approached Cardinal Gilroy who set up an investigating committee consisting of Mgr Cronin, Fr P. Landers, Bishop Freeman and Fr Slowey. They recommended the initiative to train lay teachers. It can be noted that the Melbourne Archdiocese had experienced an even greater need for teachers and that there had already been initiatives in lay teacher training by the Sisters of Mercy at Ascot Vale, the Presentation Sisters at O’Neill, Elsternwick, the Brigidine Sisters.

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\(^{115}\)Religion Syllabus (1942.), p. 42.

\(^{116}\)School Children in Archdiocese of Sydney 1957 and 1958 in "Files 59-64", CEOL.

\(^{117}\)Interview 26 September 1988, transcript p.18.
at Kildara and the Notre Dame de Sion Sisters at Box Hill. By 1956 they had 121 lay women in training.\textsuperscript{118}

Consequently in 1958 the former St Joseph’s Training School at Mount St, North Sydney, became Catholic Teachers College with an initial intake of 43 young Catholic lay women.\textsuperscript{119} Slowey persuaded a good number of parish priests to promise an annual levy of one hundred pounds to pay for this and provide a small living allowance for the trainees.\textsuperscript{120} This CEO initiative was designed to provide only female teachers for primary schools. There were separate efforts in the 1960s by the De La Salle and Marist congregations at Castle Hill and the Christian Brothers at Strathfield to train male teachers for boys schools.

**Conclusion**

Above is a review, for the period 1939-1961, of the origins, role, functions, activities and philosophy of the CEO as a central office (which usually meant Pierse, Slowey, and O’Grady) and of the work of inspection in the schools by Ryan, O’Grady, Duffy, Meere and Crittenden.

It is also revealing to note what the CEO did not do. It did not receive and administer the finances of the Catholic schools. School finances were then managed at the local level by the parish priest and the principal of the school. Nor did the CEO control building or expansion of schools. The employment and working conditions of teachers was a local school and parish matter outside the control of the CEO. It would be incorrect to suggest that before 1961 the CEO was a bureaucracy which administered a school system.

The CEO also occupied a relatively weak position. Authority and influence in the schools lay with the religious congregations who administered and staffed the schools and with the archbishop who authorised the congregations to teach in his diocese and who held the deeds to much of the school property. The CEO inspectors were delegated authority by the

\textsuperscript{118} Catholic Education in Victoria (Symposium Papers, Melbourne, 1986), p. 41.
\textsuperscript{119} J. Slowey, interview 26 September 1988, transcript p.18.
\textsuperscript{120} ibid, p. 22
archbishop, but their limited resources and inexperience greatly restricted this authority in practice.
Part II

INVolVEMENT AND COMPLEXITY

c.1960-75
Chapter Three
Aggiornamento

Until the 1960s the CEO was a small office with a few clerical inspectors who maintained a degree of liaison between the archbishop and schools controlled by a variety of religious congregations, and who provided regular inspection of these schools. Between 1960 and 1975 the CEO underwent extensive transformation to become a large and complex organisation administering a new system of schools. This transformation, experienced rather than planned, occurred as a result of concurrent significant changes in the world, in Australian society, and in the Catholic Church which forced the CEO to undertake new responsibilities. By 1975 the new CEO and a new system of schools was established in Sydney.

Now, in Part II, this period of transformation will be examined. This chapter therefore will deal with developments in the world and in the Catholic Church which led to change in Catholic schools in Australia in the period 1960-75. In Chapter Four the development of a new system of Catholic schools in the Archdiocese of Sydney will be described, along with the changing role of the Sydney CEO in this system. The final chapter in Part II will explain the changes in the personnel, organisation and functions of the Sydney CEO which resulted from the pressures and challenges outlined in Chapters Three and Four. But first the wider context of change.

Some International Influences

At the international level, newly elected Pope John XXIII recognised the extent of change facing the world in general and the Catholic Church in particular when he surprised Church leaders with his convening of an Ecumenical Council (Vatican II) in 1962. To sum up one of his main objectives he used a catchword aggiornamento, meaning “renewal”, “adjustment” or “adaptation”. He was asking Church leaders to recognise that this was a new world, that there were major problems facing humanity and that the Catholic Church needed to come to terms with these. An aggiornamento was needed which would filter down to all the
dioceses of the Church, and would therefore affect the Archdiocese of Sydney.

It should only be necessary to remind the reader of the extent of change that the world was facing in this period. Peoples were still recovering from the trauma and dislocation of World War II with its legacy of destruction, refugees and Cold War stand-off. With European powers reduced in status, millions of their colonial subjects were gaining independence and creating a new balance of nations in which the populous “Third World” nations were a vocal bloc in the new United Nations Organisation. As areas such as India, Egypt and China asserted their independence, there was growing recognition that Europe and the U.S.A. did not have a monopoly claim to civilisation. Australia was geographically closer to the emerging nations than to its traditional European models. Improved travel, communication and information systems also drew Australia from its insularity into this emerging world.

It was also a period of liberation movements with concerns for justice and human rights. As coloured peoples attained independence in Africa and Asia, blacks in the U.S.A. marched and struggled for equality, with stark, world-wide publicity from the TV cameras. Newly liberated nations also recalled that the Catholic Church was often a part of the former colonial structure. In like vein, feminists campaigned for greater opportunity for women and their charges of a tradition of male oppression were embarrassingly exemplified in the power structure of the Catholic Church.

Youth protest, strident and direct, marked these years and climaxed in the late 1960s with peace marches, student riots, paralysis of universities, and urban guerilla movements. With many more students in secondary and tertiary education than ever before, the potential for questioning and rebellion against traditional authorities was intensified and there was even a romantic excitement in the violent cameos played out by Danny the Red, Patty Hearst, Che Guevara and the Kent State University victims. Could such youth be comfortable in an authoritarian Catholic Church shaped by the nineteenth century condemnations against liberalism? And there was ferment in the Church. Amidst the youth ferment of 1968, Archbishop Marty of Paris proclaimed that “God is not conservative”.

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Writing of changes in Australia, W.J. Hudson asserted that

the two decades to 1970 comprised years of such profound change in Australian experience as to allow a confident prediction that future historians will see them as a watershed comparable only perhaps with the 1850s.²

Several such changes significantly affected the Australian Catholic Church and its schools. The Australian population increased by over two million between 1961 and 1971, with nearly half of the increase due to migration. Since many of the migrants were Catholics from southern Europe their arrival increased the Catholic proportion of the population from 20.7 per cent in 1947 to 27 per cent by 1971, so that in 1975 Catholics comprised about 4 million in a total population of 15 million.³

Until the 1960s, Australian governments attempted to “assimilate” these migrants to an Anglo-Australian way of life, but this policy was changed in the early 1970s to the present policy of multi-culturalism. This change had important consequences for educational programs which now sought to make children aware of the strengths of many cultures.

The Irish foundation and character of the Australian Catholic Church was weakened by the arrival of so many Mediterranean Catholics. They did not always share the Irish submissiveness to the clergy or the belief in the necessity of paying for separate Catholic schools.

Another consequence of the migrant infusion was the decline of sectarianism arising from stereotypes of the British as Protestant and loyal to the Empire and of Catholics as Irish and therefore suspect. There was a much greater degree of tolerance for Catholics than had existed in the 1920s.⁴ Catholic loyalty to Australia had been demonstrated in World War II, under the leadership of Cardinal Gilroy, a Navy veteran of the Gallipoli campaign. The practical fruit of this new tolerance was the change in public opinion in favour of State Aid to private schools, as will be described later in this chapter.

³O’Farrell, Catholic Church and Community, p.404.
Vatican II Aggiornamento

So far this portrayal of the period 1960-75 has noted international and national developments which had their impact on the Catholic Church and Catholic schools in Australia. At the same time in the Catholic Church itself there was a revolution occurring which would profoundly affect the Catholic Church and its schools in Australia and the new school administrators, the CEOs.

To observers in the 1950s, the Catholic Church appeared very much in the mould shaped by defensive reaction to the Protestant Reformation and the anti-liberal and anti-Modernist stance imposed by Vatican leaders since the time of Pope Pius IX. Its defensiveness was intensified by the anti-religious activities of Communists, now more threatening in the rhetoric of the Cold War era. Therefore the Church portrayed itself as a refuge or unchanging rock of safety, the Barque of Peter, in a turbulent, anti-religious world. Orthodoxy, uniformity and discipline were the foundations of Catholic solidarity which was guarded by a male, clerical hierarchy, headed by the Vicar of Christ. Seminaries and formation houses for religious congregations were expanding. Lay Catholics were encouraged to involve themselves in social action, but under the guidance of the clergy. In theological and moral areas they were expected to be loyal to doctrines approved by their bishops.

While this is a simplistic picture, the Catholic Church could easily have been seen in this light in the 1950s. However twentieth century developments and forces, especially those unleashed by World War II, created enormous pressures for adaptation and change in the Church. These appeared first at the scholarly level, mainly in Europe, in the 1940s and 1950s. Historical investigations by scholars such as Yves Congar, Jean Danielou and Marie-Dominique Chenu undermined the view that there was an unchanged body of teaching and practice formulated by the first Christians or the Church Fathers. Henri de Lubac, Karl Rahner and John Courtney Murray challenged the neo-Thomist approach to theology established in the seminaries. There were corresponding initiatives in biblical studies, liturgical studies and in catechetics. In biblical studies especially, there was a growing recognition of the contribution of Protestant scholars. At the same time there were bishops and priests who
were persuaded by these writers and by their pastoral experience of the need for change.

The stirrings of such groups would most likely have modified the Church in the 1960s. In this light one can see the convocation of the Second Vatican Council in 1962 as a searching response by John XXIII to the problems and questioning of which he was well aware. By bringing together leaders from all over the world and including theological advisers such as Karl Rahner, Yves Congar and John Courtney Murray, the Council soon demonstrated that the apparent monolithic unity of the Church in its theology and pastoral approaches had broken down. There was a range of positions and groups which, in the four sessions of the Council from 1962 to 1965, grappled with their differences and succeeded, with a degree of compromise, in agreeing upon a remarkably new vision of the Church, its role in the world, and its pastoral approaches.

From the titles of the many documents of Vatican II one can grasp the range of issues faced: the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy; Decree on Ecumenism; Declaration on Religious Liberty; Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity; Declaration on Christian Education. The degree of change varies in the documents, but is most striking in the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, which was approved in the final session. An extract dealing with the laity shows the change in the self-image of the Church and in its view of humanity:

It is their (the laity's) task to cultivate a properly informed conscience and to impress the divine law on the affairs of the earthly city. For guidance and spiritual strength let them turn to the clergy; but let them realise that their pastors will not always be so expert as to have a ready answer to every problem (even every grave problem) that arises; this is not the role of the clergy: it is rather up to the laymen to shoulder their responsibilities under the guidance of Christian wisdom and with eager attention to the teaching authority of the Church.5

This and other passages place a new emphasis on the competence and responsibility of lay people and admit the limitations of the clergy. The Christian's right to dissent, hinted at in the reference to "a properly informed conscience", was also affirmed in The Declaration on Religious Liberty. This is a Church more open to the world, and admitting that it does not have a monopoly on truth.

From a theological point of view Karl Rahner saw Vatican II as proclaiming the transformation of the Catholic Church from "a Western Church to a world Church":

...theologically speaking, there are three great epochs in Church history, of which the third has only just begun and made itself observable officially at Vatican II. First, the short period of Jewish Christianity. Second, the period of the Church in a distinct cultural region, namely, that of Hellenism and of European culture and civilisation. Third, the period in which the sphere of the Church’s life is in fact the entire world.6

In other words, Vatican II provided the theological underpinning for a revolution in the Church’s organisation, pastoral activity and relations with the rest of humanity.

As is usual with revolutions, the working out or implementation of the ideas of the Vatican Council was accompanied by excesses, tensions, confusion and polarisation between traditionalists and progressives. Major reforms, such as in the liturgy, needed to occur, but these were sometimes introduced hastily and with insufficient explanation or guidance at the local level. John O'Malley, a church historian in the U.S.A., reflected on the enormity of the tasks demanded:

From the viewpoint of Church history, it can be categorically asserted that never before in the history of Catholicism had so many and such sudden changes been implemented, often without adequate explanation, that immediately touched the lives of all the faithful, and never before had such a radical adjustment of attitude been required of them.7

In the decade following it seemed that progressives had gained dominant influence in the Church, but their critics pointed to unfortunate developments which they blamed on the forces unleashed by the Council: uncertainty and anxiety from the new theological pluralism; the discarding of cherished devotional practices; the exodus of many priests and religious from their calling; the undermining of structures of authority; the decline in Sunday Mass attendance; confusion in religious education.8 Was this the aggiornamento hoped for by John XXIII?

7"Vatican II: Historical Perspectives on its Uniqueness and Interpretation", ibid., p.24.
8The impact of the Council internationally and in Australia is discussed in Paul Collins, Mixed Blessings (Melbourne, 1986), chapters 3 and 7 and in O'Farrell, The Catholic Church and Community, pp.425-9.
Pope John's successor, Paul VI, in a 1967 encyclical letter, Populorum Progressio, called upon Christians to work for a redistribution of the world's wealth towards the poorer nations. However this impetus for social responsibility and confirmation of Rahner's judgement that the Church was becoming a World Church was soon overshadowed by the controversy aroused by his Humanae Vitae (1968) which condemned artificial contraception. This issue could not be avoided by lay Catholics and it is accepted that most made the decision to reject the official teaching of the Church and that many priests quietly supported them. Here was a major consequence of the Council's affirmation of the laity and of freedom of conscience.

Challenges for Australian Catholics

Australian Catholics were ill-prepared for the repercussions of these international movements in the 1960s. Patrick O'Farrell portrays the Australian Church of 1962 as isolationist, self-absorbed, conservative, practical, and "lacking any strong body of indigenous thought" which might be a buffer against the "radical European and American religious theorising unleashed by Vatican II." When Cardinal Gilroy was setting out for the first session of the Council in 1962 he addressed the General Meeting of the Catholic Secondary Teachers Association. The minutes preserve a tone of anxiety:

He said we all knew when the Council would begin, but when it would end, no man knew. The difficulty of reaching decisions in a gathering of thousands of bishops, all entitled to speak, was obvious. He feared that the Council would be the cause of acute disappointment to many, for the impossible was expected of it... The teachers knelt to receive the episcopal blessing, and his Eminence then left...10

When the Council ended in 1965, Gilroy returned to oversee the implementing of its unsettling reforms. He retired in 1971, having presided over the Sydney Church and Catholic schools since 1937.11

The Australian Church was not spared the resultant trauma, tensions, dismantling of structures, decline in numbers of priests and religious, and the polarisation which had affected Europe and the U.S.A. But the period was also seen as "a springtime in Catholicism...the church was...becoming

10Report of Second Term General Meeting, 22 July 1962, in SJCA.
11From 1937 to 1940 he was Coadjutor to Archbishop Kelly who had virtually retired.
more relevant to contemporary men and women." Important to this new spirit was the perception that there could be questioning, freedom of expression within the Church. This questioning occurred amongst laity, especially over the ban on artificial contraception, and amongst priests and religious sisters and brothers. Dramatically expressive of the new spirit was a public clash in 1966 between Mother Gorman, a visiting nun from Boston, and Bishop Muldoon. Popular pressure caused the bishop to give a qualified apology to Mother Gorman for his criticism of her as "a female deceiver who is so puffed up by her own arrogance and pride that she no longer has any room left for love of the Church".

One of the trends in this period, the decline in the number of priests and religious, was of particular relevance to the maintenance of Australian Catholic schools. In the 1960s the religious congregations maintained a high level of recruitment, but by no means matched the demand for more and better trained teachers. Then, after about 1968, religious congregations in the Westernised world experienced much turmoil resulting in a drastic decline in numbers which has continued to the present. Why the decline occurred is a complex question involving consideration of many factors, such as the emphasis on freedoms and individual fulfilment expressed in contemporaneous protest movements and in the new theological outlook emerging from the Second Vatican Council. It was clear that the Catholic schools could no longer depend so much on the religious congregations and that only the provision of many lay teachers would enable them to continue.

**Australian Catholic Schools 1960-75**

As regards schooling in Australia there were some striking trends. In 1950 there were 1,291,815 pupils in Australian schools. By 1970 there were 2,768,233. Thus in these two decades Australian schools doubled the number of pupils they had taken 150 years to accumulate. Secondary schools increased their population by 278 per cent because secondary education became a standard expectation after 1945 and a year was added to secondary education in several states, including New South Wales. Since

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13 ibid., p.174.
14 1968 was a key year internationally for university youth protest, controversy over Vietnam, and political violence.
the Catholic proportion of the population was increasing, there was an enormous demand made upon Catholic schools to accommodate the demand for places, especially in secondary schools. Major expansion of Catholic schools followed, with an increase of 188,000 pupils between 1954 and 1971.\textsuperscript{15} But they could not keep up with the expansion of the Catholic population. In the 1960s and 1970s the proportion of pupils in Catholic schools as compared with the total Australian enrolment declined, falling from 19.6 per cent in 1965 to 17.6 per cent in 1971.\textsuperscript{16}

The demand was also for at least a doubling of teacher numbers, training of teachers needed for secondary education, new buildings, and for the funds to pay for all these items. This program of school development required leadership and coordination which the religious congregations found difficult in providing. It will be shown below that the religious congregations were unable to maintain their dominant leadership role in schools and that the leadership vacuum was to be filled by CEOs, a solution which was not obvious in the 1960s.

In the face of these daunting problems and in the more open climate encouraged by Vatican II, a debate arose over the future of Catholic schools in Australia. The issue was whether the Catholic Church in Australia could continue its official policy of providing Catholic schooling for all Catholic children in the face of the crisis of costs and numbers of pupils described above. At the very end of the Vatican Council, Brian Crittenden, a former Sydney CEO Inspector of the years 1956-9, claimed that the existence of a separate Catholic system of schools

\ldots meant that the Church has not been present in the public schools through the witness of children and adolescents living authentic Christian lives. It also means that the Church has not shown sufficient concern for the quality of the common human values which the public school should be promoting.\textsuperscript{17}

He called for the abandonment of "the crippling effort of maintaining a separate system of elementary and secondary schools" and a "diffusion of the vast effort...to the whole Catholic population" and suggested that the Church should devote its resources to setting up parish Schools of

\textsuperscript{15} J.E. Bourke, "Catholic Education in Australia", in P. Tannock (ed.), The Organisation and Administration of Catholic Education in Australia (Brisbane, 1975), p.4.
\textsuperscript{16} ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Reported in the Catholic Worker, October 1965, p.6.
Religion to serve all ages and groups. Here was a priest publicly questioning the policy accepted in every diocese of Australia at the time. His lecture was ignored by the official Sydney newspaper, The Catholic Weekly, although reported in the lay sponsored, Catholic Worker in Melbourne. His views even featured in the mass circulation Woman’s Day. In 1967-8 the Catholic educational journal, Dialogue, ran a series of articles on the issue of the future of Catholic schooling. Key articles were by Brother Brian Stanfield who summarised the case against having a Catholic school system and by Fr Gregory Meere, a former Inspector of the Sydney CEO, who took the view that

So far from the Catholic schools being only a relic of the past...a truly exciting vision confronts them, of what they might achieve in the new age, in the aggiornamento era.

Strong action was taken in 1970 when the Archbishop of Melbourne removed Fr Patrick Crudden from his position as Director of the Melbourne CEO because of his views that the provision of Catholic schools for the 1970s was an impossible task and that the Church should concentrate on working with the Catholic children within the state schools. After his departure Crudden continued his critique:

The future of the Church in Australia depends very much on its ability to recognise and accept the fact that the future of education rests with the state schools. The first and most significant decision to be made is to open no more schools either primary or secondary. This should be understood as a first step towards phasing out existing schools.

Whether Crudden’s pessimism about Catholic schools is justified for the long term remains for a later generation to decide. However, at the very time he was backing away from Catholic schools, these schools were on the threshold of receiving substantial government funding which would stabilise a good proportion of them for the foreseeable future.

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18 B.S. Crittenden, "Catholic Schools - What is the Future?", notes for lecture given at Newcastle, 8 August 1965, in "Education Booklets" file, SAA. In 1965 he was a lecturer in the Faculty of Education at the University of Sydney - Who’s Who in Australia 1991 (Melbourne, 1990).

19 Interview with Crittenden, 23 April 1992.

20 "Crisis in Roman Catholic Schools", Woman’s Day, 29 November 1965.

21 See B. Stanfield, "The Arguments Against a Catholic School System - a Summary", in Dialogue, volume 1, number 2, Summer 1967; and G. Meere, "The Arguments Against a Catholic Education System Re-assessed", in Dialogue, volume 2, number 1, Summer 1968.


Government Funding and its Consequences

For about a century, schooling in Australia had been the responsibility of each state government, with little federal government involvement. In the period after 1960 the federal government expanded its role in education relative to that of state governments, increasing expenditure by 1966 to 17 per cent of Australian educational expenditure and establishing in 1966 the Department of Education and Science. Catholic schools were soon to receive substantial federal funding.

The decline of sectarian suspicion of Catholics noted above and the critical need for funds for Catholic schools in the 1960s combined to give Catholic schools a breakthrough in the long-running State Aid debate in this period. Catholic leaders realised that centralised funding arrangements would only alleviate but not resolve the financial crisis and so in the decade 1962-72 they pursued a strong campaign for direct government funding of private schools. The very success of this campaign brought changes to the administration of Catholic education, especially in the direction of creating central organisations for the distribution of this funding.

The State Aid issue was dramatised in July 1962 when Goulburn Catholic parents tried to enrol their 2000 children in the local state schools. They returned to their own schools after a week.24 From the point of view of this study it is interesting that Archbishop Eris O'Brien of the Canberra-Goulburn Archdiocese soon afterwards announced the establishment of a Catholic Education Office in Canberra to administer "a new and greatly augmented building program to meet the requirements of Catholic education in the expanding city."25

The Sydney hierarchy favoured a more low-key, conciliatory strategy, but, perhaps hurried by the Goulburn initiative, Cardinal Gilroy and Bishop James Carroll, on September 10 1962, presented a formal petition to the

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N.S.W. premier, seeking specific, limited assistance for Catholic schooling.26

A breakthrough for the private schools soon occurred. In the 1963 federal election campaign, Prime Minister Menzies had promised grants for science laboratories for all schools, including private schools.27 This was the first time that a government promised direct funding to Catholic schools. Contrary to the traditional fear of an anti-Catholic backlash, he was not punished by the electorate and so from this time political parties were prepared to consider the provision of direct funding to private schools in their policies. In the same campaign Menzies had also promised scholarships for senior secondary students, with an additional sum included “if the successful student were attending an independent school”. Similarly in 1963 the New South Wales Labor government introduced a subsidy for all secondary pupils. However these federal scholarships and state subsidies could be explained as government assistance to parents rather than as direct State Aid to the schools.

The Australian bishops privately kept their requests before politicians throughout the decade and set up Catholic Schools Committees at federal and state level to negotiate with the respective governments. In Sydney they developed a negotiating committee under Archbishop James Carroll which contained experienced lay advisers such as Ambrose Roddy who had links with the A.L.P. Right, the Federation of Sydney P and F Associations and the Knights of the Southern Cross.28 Another adviser was James Kelleher, editor of the Catholic Weekly, who in his 1962 book, Roman Fever, counselled a cautious campaign which would win over the non-Catholics and avoid a back-lash of “Roman fever” which had “always been the greatest obstacle to the granting of some form of financial relief to Catholic parents and school.”29 At the national level the bishops also formed a Federal Catholic Schools Committee in 1967, composed of one

26This interpretation of the State Aid campaign in the Sydney Archdiocese is given in M. Hogan, The Catholic Campaign for State Aid.
27It does not seem irrelevant that Menzies opened a non-funded science block at a prominent Sydney independent school on 16 July 1961 and returned the next day for a private inspection of the science facilities. This was recounted to the author by the then headmaster, Br Othmar Weldon. See also Don Smart, “The Industrial fund”, in I. Palmer (ed.), Melbourne Studies in Education, 1964 (Melbourne, 1964), pp. 81-105.
lay and one clerical representative from each state, with Archbishop J. Carroll as its chairman.

Some lay groups were impatient with this style and developed their own organisations, the most efficient and influential being the Australian Parents’ Council. In 1968 a series of nine public meetings was organised in different Sydney centres to promote the campaign for State Aid. Public and press opinion also became more sympathetic to the private school viewpoint. At the parliamentary level the Democratic Labor Party, which advocated “educational justice” for private schools, was perceived as an irritating but important force in determining election outcomes and therefore requiring some attention from the main political parties.

Thus it was a multi-pronged campaign — episcopal lobbying, pressure from lay organisations, grass roots meetings, D.L.P. outspokenness. The campaign was successful. In 1968, the budget of the N.S.W government included provisions for direct per capita grants for all pupils and in 1969 the federal government introduced a scheme of recurrent grants to private schools based on a per capita grant. Federal government funding increased in 1969 with grants for building libraries and for teaching English as a Second Language. In sum, by 1970 all Australian governments had legislated to provide substantial, direct assistance to independent schools. It is unlikely that an observer in 1960 would have predicted this turnaround.

The period 1963–9 had seen the worst of the financial crisis for Catholic schools. By 1970 the future was brighter, though still clouded. Speaking to teachers in March 1970, Slowey, head of the Sydney CEO, declared that

...1969 was the year of decision!...Only the hope of adequate assistance from Governments could turn the scale. The future lay in the balance! Thank God,

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30 Hogan documents some of the lay impatience, especially in dioceses south of Sydney, with the Bishop Carroll/Sydney style of quiet negotiation for State Aid. See The Catholic Campaign, pp.118-9.


32 Accounts of the State Aid campaign are in Hogan, The Catholic Campaign for State Aid, and J.E. Bourke, “Roman Catholic Schools”, in D.A. Jecks, Influences in Australian Education (Perth, 1974), ch. 11.
responsible civic authorities found it possible to extend government subsidies to independent schools, sufficient for them to hold on...33

After the A.L.P. won federal government in 1972, the Australian Schools Commission sought to implement the A.L.P. policy of providing funds on a “needs” basis and so divided private schools into eight categories of need (A-H). Since Catholic systemic schools generally fell in the most needy categories, it was expected that a substantial amount of the proposed increase of about half a billion dollars in federal funding for public and private schools in 1974-5 would go to Catholic systemic schools.34 There followed a major injection of federal funds into Catholic schools as allocated by the Schools Commission. Thus in 1973 there were total government (federal and state) allowances of $123 per primary student and $175 per secondary student.35 By 1978 this had increased to a minimum of $257 and maximum of $416 per primary child and between $412 and $664 per secondary student.36 Allowing for the severe inflation of the period37 it can be estimated that between 1973 and 1978 government funds to Catholic schools were doubled in real terms.

The extension of funding was accompanied by federal government demands for information and for accountability from Catholic schools. Such demands, as well as the government preference for dealing with representative Catholic authorities for a whole state, led eventually to the employment of further administrative staff in CEOs and the formation of Catholic Education Commissions (CECs) in each state.38 These latter organisations would also become an important part of the new system of administration of Catholic schools in Sydney.

There were further reasons for the establishment of CECs. While each diocese in Australia administered its own group of schools there was need for contacts and coordination of policies amongst the dioceses. For

33Sermon delivered at annual Teachers' Mass, St Mary's Cathedral, Sydney, 12 March 1970 in "General 68-71" file, CEOL.
35From leaflet, "Catholic Schools 1973", issued by CEOS, 15 January 1973, in CEOL.
36See leaflet, "Catholic Schools Sydney - 1978", issued by CEOS, in CEOL.
37Annual inflation rose from 4.5% in 1972 to 16.9% in June 1975. See Manning Clark, A Short History of Australia (Melbourne, 1986), p.245.
38These developments are surveyed in H. Praetz, Public Policy and Catholic Schools (Melbourne, 1982), pp.26-30.
instance salary and industrial issues could not be kept isolated in a diocese. Also religious congregations administering schools sometimes had difficulty in forming coherent policies for their congregations when they met varying responses from bishops in different dioceses. The formation of a CEC in New South Wales in 1975 exemplifies this growing cooperation amongst the dioceses and is most important for the development of the Sydney system which will be discussed in Chapter Four.

In New South Wales several Catholic negotiating groups had developed for the purpose of utilising the new funding possibilities. These groups represented the whole state rather than individual dioceses within the state. In 1964 the Catholic Education Board of New South Wales was constituted, containing representatives of the hierarchy, the CEOs, teaching congregations, Catholic teachers colleges and the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine. Later a Catholic Schools Committee (N.S.W.) was formed, with both clerical and lay representatives. When the Federal Interim (Karmel) Committee published its report in 1973 it sought a response from Catholic authorities. In response to this Report and its recommended injection of funds, the bishops created the Interim Catholic Education Commission of N.S.W. in 1973. In this committee were bishops, superiors of religious congregations and members of the CEOs. Thus by 1973 there were three groups concurrently dealing with governments — the Catholic Education Board (N.S.W.), the Catholic Schools Committee (N.S.W.), and the Catholic Interim Committee.

The federal Schools Commission preferred to negotiate with a single Catholic authority representing a whole state and to disburse funds in block grants to each state. Since the funding would be ongoing, it was necessary to have a properly constituted authority with which to deal. Accordingly, in February 1975, the N.S.W. Episcopal Conference replaced the three above-mentioned committees with the Catholic Education Commission of N.S.W. which was seen as a means

39 This Board was for all the dioceses of New South Wales and was distinct from the Sydney Catholic Education Board which will be described in Chapter Four.

40 These developments are outlined in the Catholic Interim Committee’s “Submission to Dr K.R. McKinnon”, November 1974, p.32. SPM archives.
Its first chairman was Archbishop James Carroll and it maintained a small permanent staff. Its first offices were located in the same Chippendale building as the CEO, but in 1978 the CEC moved to the archdiocesan headquarters, Polding House, 276 Pitt St, Sydney.

**Religious Education**

Two other developments in this period were related to the Catholic Church's responsibility for ensuring that children received adequate religious education. In earlier decades the Church leaders had strongly discouraged Catholics from sending their children to state schools. Now the Church accepted the fact that an increasing proportion of Catholic children were in state schools. So, in the 1960s, the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine (CCD) was set up by the bishops in the 1960s to provide Religious Instruction for these children. Inevitably it was a poor relation to the Catholic schools, in the respect that the teachers were unpaid parish volunteers, with limited catechetical training, who could usually teach a class for at most one hour per week. Local evidence of the current importance of this work in the Sydney Archdiocese is reflected in the break-up of the 1992 Charitable Works Fund which is the official parish collection for services conducted by the archdiocese. The CCD is one of sixteen services to receive funds, yet it was to be allocated 21 per cent of the funds. Admittedly this would still be a minor amount in comparison to the funds received by Catholic schools.

Nevertheless the foundation of the CCD was a recognition by the Church of the large numbers of Catholics in state schools and of a pastoral responsibility for their religious education. The work of the CCD in state schools is also a sign of the breakdown of the pre-Vatican II isolation from the rest of society.

Another effect of the revolution following the Council concerned Religious Education in Catholic schools themselves, the area crucial for their identity. The former catechism foundation was abandoned, leading

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41 From leaflet, "Catholic Schools Sydney - 1978", CEOL.
42 In New South Wales it began in 1965.
to a period of confusion and uncertainty in methods. This will be traced more thoroughly in relation to the work of the Sydney CEO in supervising Religious Education.

This chapter has taken a broad view of the period 1960 to 1965 with the aim of emphasising the welter of change that swept the world, the Catholic Church and Australia. It was also intended to point to international and national developments in the period which would influence Catholic schools in Australia.
Chapter Four
The CEO and the Early System
c.1960-75

Moving from the world and national context, this chapter concentrates on the central administration of schooling in the Archdiocese of Sydney. From 1939 to 1960 the Sydney CEO had maintained a fairly steady pattern of providing some central administrative services for the schools of the archdiocese and regular inspection of the schools on behalf of the archbishop. The schools were administered and staffed by religious congregations so that, in effect, each of these congregations had its own small system of schools. This network of congregational schools was the "system" whose foundation and development Fogarty had traced. Writing in 1959, his conclusion was perceptive and prophetic in regard to the demands for a new system, the problem of staffing, and the influence of the increasing proportion of lay teachers:

One more point, relevant at the close of this book, is the uncertainty concerning the future of the system. Constant pressure from diocesan authorities for more and more schools has strained staff to the utmost; and in the past decade the increase in candidates for the teaching orders has not been commensurate with the increase in the Catholic school population. Whether this gap will continue to widen, or prove to be merely a passing phase and close again after the steep rise in population has levelled out, it is difficult to say. Should it not close and Catholics desire to preserve their independent system intact, lay teachers will have to be employed in increasing numbers until a point is reached where the structure of the system could eventually change, reversing the whole order of its development: the religious could gradually withdraw into a smaller number of select schools, leaving the parochial and diocesan schools in the hands of lay teachers.¹

By 1960 there were several major pressures which were soon to force a degree of coordination and rationalisation upon the varied groups of schools run by religious congregations, so that the beginnings of a single system of Catholic schools emerged in the archdiocese. The CEO was a key player in this development and itself began to change in both organisational structure and in relationship with other groups involved with Sydney Catholic schools. This chapter deals with the changes in the role of the CEO as this system developed in the 1960s and 1970s.

¹Fogarty, Catholic Education in Australia, volume 2, p.478.
The 1960s decade was a crisis period which saw the CEO at the centre of Catholic efforts to ensure the survival of Catholic schools strained to the limit by burgeoning enrolments and meagre finances. This was also the period in which the Vatican Council had engendered a spirit of debate within the Church. Catholic educationalists were aware of the contemporary questioning of Catholic schools in the United States. Sydney also had its critics, such as Brian Crittenden, a former CEO Inspector of the years 1956-59.

The year 1962 was an early focus for many of these changes and pressures. In 1962, First Form classes in secondary school ushered in the Wyndham reorganisation in New South Wales, which brought a massive challenge to Catholic schools and the CEO. The simmering State Aid issue boiled over dramatically with the Goulburn parents' school “strike” in July 1962, and, in the wider Church context, 1962 was also the inaugural year of the Second Vatican Council which was a catalyst for profound changes in the Catholic Church. This Council asked Catholics to change their whole outlook to the rest of the world. They were to abandon any tendencies to defensiveness, isolation and triumphalism. Such a change in outlook invited them to reconsider the rationale for Catholic schools and the type of Catholicism promoted by them. Debate on these fundamental issues ensued after 1965, as explained in Chapter Three.

By the 1970s the Sydney Catholic schools had survived the crisis although there was no chance of their fulfilling the 1940s ideal of “Catholic schooling for every Catholic child”. Their survival in this period was due to rationalisation and reorganisation of the schools, the beginnings of a new, centralised system of schools, the creation and work of the Catholic Building and Finance Commission, and the success of the widespread campaign for direct government grants to private schools which culminated in the first direct State Government grants in 1968 and the bipartisan promise of Federal assistance in the 1972 elections. Though not always in the van of the initiatives, the CEO was caught up in the process and experienced its own change and development as a consequence.

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3 See Chapter Three above.
4 According to Br Quentin Duffy (Marist Brothers’ provincial 1958-64), Cardinal Gilroy still proclaimed this slogan in the 1960s.
Influences for Creating a Centralised Catholic System

In this critical period there were several factors which rendered inadequate the traditional arrangements for Sydney Catholic schools and their administration. These included the increase in the Catholic school population, the demands of the Wyndham reorganisation, the difficulties experienced by religious congregations and the opportunities now provided by government funding. To ensure availability of the new government funding, the Catholic Church found that it needed to develop new administrative structures at diocesan, state and federal levels.

The number of pupils in Sydney Catholic schools had almost doubled between 1939 and 1958, even though the creation of the Diocese of Wollongong in 1951 had reduced the area of the archdiocese. A Catholic Weekly editorial in 1962 expressed the sense of crisis:

In and around Sydney the pressure on accommodation in Catholic schools is becoming almost unbearable. The official report of the Cumberland County Council shows that the population of the City of Parramatta has increased 29.1 per cent in the last seven years, Holroyd is up 39.4 per cent, Baulkham Hills 56.6 per cent and Blacktown a staggering 213.7 per cent.\(^5\)

Class sizes, especially in the developing suburbs, were alarming. Slowey noted that "...in the 1950s...you had Sisters teaching 60, 70, 80, 90 — even up to, I would say, 130 as the greatest number."\(^6\) Br Bernard Bulfin recalled his early years at the Patrician Brothers' school at Blacktown:

I could quote Fairfield, I could quote Parramatta or Liverpool or anywhere, I was there in the west but all of a sudden in the mid fifties we had a tremendous influx of migrants when this school was established. Now when I started off teaching here in '56 I was teaching Fifth Class and I had 100 students. The Brother below me had 120 and the person in Sixth Class had 95...\(^7\)

Even in the older suburbs the classes were large by today's standards.

Yet, even with the growth in enrolments and class sizes, Catholic schools were losing ground to government schools in terms of the proportion of the Catholic population that they were educating. Separate figures for the metropolitan area are not available, but, in N.S.W. as a whole, Catholic primary school enrolments as a percentage of total enrolments declined from 21.8 per cent in 1965 to 19.9 per cent in 1969. Secondary enrolments

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\(^5\)Catholic Weekly, 19 August 1962. This issue dealt with the Goulburn Catholic school "strike".

\(^6\)Interview 23 September 1988, transcript p.12.

\(^7\)Interview 31 October 1988, transcript p.2.
declined from 20.6 per cent to 19.2 per cent in the same period. Thus it was clear that there was an erosion of the ability of Catholic schools to meet the ideal of providing places for all Catholic children.

On top of this loomed the demands of the Wyndham reorganisation. In the 1950s, Slowey was a member of the Committee chaired by Dr Wyndham which led to the Wyndham Report and the 1961 Education Act in N.S.W. In 1962 the CEO spelt out the implications of the Act in a document to schools and parishes, "Reorganisation of Secondary Education". All secondary schools would now have to provide a Fourth Form and the senior schools a Sixth Form. Moreover in each Form would be three streams — Advanced, Ordinary Credit, and Ordinary Pass — which would demand more individualised teaching. The teaching of Science and the provision of science laboratories would now be compulsory. In the past some Catholic secondary schools did not have laboratories.

The above pressures created a need for many more teachers in Catholic schools. But in this very period numbers in religious congregations began to decline. Only the provision of many lay teachers would enable Catholic schools to meet the demands. Funds would be required both to train these teachers and then to pay them at a higher salary than the relatively low stipends paid to the religious teachers.

Major funding was also required for the building of new schools in the spreading metropolitan area and to upgrade existing schools to meet the demands of the Wyndham reorganisation, especially in the provision of Sixth Forms. These financial pressures occurred at a time when governments were still most reluctant to give direct funding to Catholic schools. Moreover demands could be very uneven and especially severe upon parishes in growing suburbs where families were relatively poor. The traditional parish-based schools could not meet all these severe demands and consequently the archdiocese in 1965 moved to a centralised system of funding Catholic schools which also began the creation of an archdiocesan system. This will be described below.

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8 Figures from Praetz, Public Policy and Catholic Schools (Melbourne, 1982), p.10.
9 In "Files 59-64", CEOL.
10 In St Patrick's School, Parramatta, the science laboratory equipment was reported as consisting of one plastic bucket. McGrath, These Women?, p.188.
11 See Chapter Three.
Catholic leaders realised that centralised funding arrangements would only alleviate but not resolve the financial crisis and so, in the decade 1962–72, they pursued a strong campaign for direct government funding of private schools. This national campaign has been outlined in the previous chapter. Its success brought changes to the administration of Catholic education, especially in the direction of creating central organisations for the distribution of the new funding.

The Emergence of a System

As a result of the above influences, a centralised system of schools developed in Sydney, the administration of Catholic schools shifted from religious congregations to a network of administrative groups set up by the bishops, and the CEO role changed as it accommodated itself to dealing with these new administrative bodies set up by the hierarchy, principally the Catholic Building and Finance Commission. Before discussing these new arrangements it will be helpful to review the relationship of the CEO to the Sydney hierarchy in this period 1960–75.

The CEO and the Sydney Hierarchy

CEO staff members were the employees of the Sydney archbishop and responsible to him for the administration of Catholic parish and regional schools. From the foundation of the CEO, Cardinal Gilroy had taken a close interest in the administration of Catholic education, either as Coadjutor Archbishop in 1939 or as Archbishop from 1940. In August 1971 Gilroy retired from the archbishopric.

His successor, Archbishop James Freeman, did not initiate major changes in policy. He delegated much responsibility for educational matters to his long-serving auxiliary, Archbishop James Carroll, who had been much involved in the State Aid campaign in the 1960s. Thus in 1973 Carroll was Chairman of both the State and Federal Catholic Schools Committees and, in 1975, became Chairman of the N.S.W. Catholic Education Commission. Because of this involvement he suggested to the Cardinal that he be freed from some other episcopal responsibilities so that he could give due time to the pressing educational problems of the period.12 Eventually, in 1978, Freeman appointed him Episcopal Vicar for Education in Sydney. Thus

the episcopal involvement in the central administration of Sydney Catholic schools now lay principally with Carroll.

The bishops left the CEO Inspectors to run the emerging system and make day to day decisions. Yet the subordination of the CEO to the hierarchy was demonstrated in several ways. One example is that Catholics, including parish priests and leaders of religious congregations who had complaints about Catholic schools, often directed these to the archbishop rather than to the CEO. The archbishop would then write to the Director of the CEO for an explanation of the situation.

The CEO did not generate its own revenue and so was dependent upon the archdiocese in this area. Until 1965 it had to apply to the archbishop for its funding. From 1965 the CEO received its funding from the Catholic Building and Finance Commission which was created by Cardinal Gilroy (to be described below). Each year the CEO had to submit its annual budget to this Commission, which might not always grant the requested total. Later when government funds for particular programs such as Multicultural Education became available for schools they were also channelled to the CEO through other bodies such as the Catholic Education Commission of N.S.W.

The bishops also assumed a controlling interest in leadership appointments. Leadership opportunities were not advertised in the press. It seems rather that vacancies were filled after discussion amongst the current leadership and the hierarchy. In this way Archbishop Freeman appointed Br W. Simmons as the first Deputy Director. Simmons' appointment in late 1977 and the approval of his request for overseas study suggests that the bishops had him in mind as successor to Slowey. When the latter suggested that a willing Area Director of the N.S.W. Department of Education be allowed to transfer to the CEO and take a position as an Assistant Director, the hierarchy did not agree.

Reorganisation of Schools

Until the 1960s, one could talk of a system of Catholic schools only in the very limited sense that there were vertical links between each school and

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13 Examples of these letters were indicated in Chapter Two.
15 See letters between Slowey and Archbishop Carroll, 17 December 1976 and 18 February 1977, ibid.
the hierarchy via the parish priests and the clerical inspectors of the CEO. The schools were generally parish schools established by religious congregations at the invitation of parish priests. But there was little formal association amongst schools at a horizontal level. Instead the different religious congregations really had established their own systems and there was even occasional rivalry between congregations over gaining pupils. Each school and congregation had independence in areas such as the employment of teachers and the setting of school fees and salaries, although they had to respect the wishes of individual parish priests and of the archbishop. Contacts amongst schools and congregations were limited and mostly voluntary, such as in inter-school sport or debating, or in participation in the Catholic Secondary Schools' Association.

In the previous section it was explained that by 1960 there were extreme pressures on Catholic schools coming from the growth in school population and the demands of secondary reorganisation arising from the Wyndham reforms. In the face of these pressures Catholic leaders realised the need of a more coordinated and systematic approach than that of the past. But there was yet another consideration which persuaded diocesan leaders of the need for systematisation.

The pressures for change described earlier had already impelled congregations and parishes to undertake a spate of building and development in the early 1960s. Between June 1959 and February 1961 twelve new Catholic schools were opened in Sydney and others received substantial additions. The *Catholic Weekly* declared:

*One of the greatest building programs in Australia's history is now in progress as the admission rate to Catholic schools rises by thousands each year.16*

The program continued so that in 1963 the newspaper introduced a monthly building section. The problem with this building surge was that it was not centrally coordinated and supervised. Individual parishes and congregations were undertaking initiatives and large financial commitments while other areas were in great need for schools. The unprecedented extent of this development posed dangers that some parishes might over-commit themselves financially and the archdiocese might have to come to their rescue. There was also the problem that

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16 2 February 1961.
parishes with the greatest need in expanding suburbs might find the greatest difficulty in raising funds for building.

The bishops and the CEO were aware that the loose arrangements amongst diocesan authorities, the parishes, and the various congregations were not coping with current challenges. In 1962 the CEO issued a document, “The Reorganisation of Secondary Education”, which explained:

In the Archdiocese of Sydney 150 Catholic schools have secondary classes and cater for 31,000 pupils, whilst in the approximately same area of the State system, 122 schools cater for over 100,000 pupils.

It must be obvious that we cannot possibly afford to convert all Intermediate schools into Four Year Schools; nor could sufficient Religious teachers be found, or lay teachers paid, to multiply in every existing post-primary or Intermediate school the extensive range of subjects required by the new curriculum.

...Bowing to the necessity imposed by the new secondary system, the Diocesan authorities have no alternative but to establish central schools in order to give our Catholic pupils the same courses as those provided for pupils in State schools.17

Thus, in 1962, parishes and schools were being informed that a major rationalisation of secondary schools was soon to occur. The creation of central (later called “regional”) schools meant the development of a system of schools in which primary schools would have to be grouped as “feeder schools” for a central school, some secondary schools would be reduced to primary, and others extended to either Fourth Form or Sixth Form. Slowey indicated the complexities of the rationalisation:

There was an Intermediate School conducted by the Sisters of St Joseph at Arncliffe, there was an Intermediate School likewise conducted by the Sisters of St Joseph at Rockdale and there was a similar situation at Kogarah. Leaving apart the complication of joining or coordinating schools of different congregations, it would immediately be seen that one school would need to be formed out of the three schools... now where would that school be located? Would there be enough locations? Would further accommodation need to be added to the one selected? What difficulties would there be for the transport of pupils by public transport...? Where would the finance come from to erect the new buildings?18

This reorganisation required discussion, compromise and cooperation amongst the groups involved — parish priests, provincials of teaching congregations, principals, teachers and parents. This was where the CEO, principally Slowey and his assistant, Fr Ronald Hine, played an important role. They convened meetings with provincials of congregations, hierarchy and selected clergy; they conducted surveys of schools to obtain information on enrolments and specific needs; they visited sites and met

17In “Files 59-64”, CEOL.
18Interview 7 October 1988, transcript p.2.
with parish priests and principals; they reported findings and progress to Bishop Freeman who was then the bishop responsible for education in Sydney. All this required very extensive and detailed negotiation.

Clearly the Sydney bishops and the CEO were aware of the urgent demands for rationalisation and reorganisation, as is shown by the above-mentioned circular on "Reorganisation". Their problem in the 1960s was in establishing an enlightened, efficient and authoritative body which could persuade the disparate religious congregations to participate in the changes.

From 1962 to 1965 the bishops worked with advisory committees. One member of these committees, Br Quentin Duffy fms, recalls that the early rationalisation of Catholic schools was done

...on an ad hoc basis with some Provincials being co-opted by the then CEO ... and the Bishop. Although this group had no "statutory" authority, it was responsible for the first steps in rationalisation. It was replaced almost imperceptibly by the Education Committee of the CBFC.19

He remembers communication with the authorities as being haphazard, with little information being given in writing, so that he might be summoned to attend a committee meeting without knowing its membership beforehand.

While these committees could be ad hoc, they dealt with major issues. One such meeting was convened on 4 September 1962 at Cusa House where the CEO had prepared for it a plan for rationalisation. About fifty schools were to be affected. Examples of proposals show the radical and wide-ranging changes envisaged:

Develop as Four Year High Schools: Rockdale, Lakemba, Chatswood.
Reduce to Primary: Arncliffe, Bondi, Surry Hills.
Cathedral: abandon Girls School.
Bondi Beach: Marist Brothers invite Christian Brothers to take the school.
Cronulla and Caringbah De La Salle: possible combination?

The extent of these proposals would stagger present day CEO planners who engage in exhaustive consultations over the rationalisation of schools in an area.

19 From letter to author, 27 January 1991. The "CBFC" will be explained in the next section of the chapter.
20 From "File 59-64" in CEOL.
However the CEO could not make the final decisions. It could draw up plans and arrange negotiations amongst bishops, congregations and pastors, but ultimately decisions were made by the archbishop who could accept, reject or modify the proposals. When decisions were made it was the task of the CEO to inform schools, explain the new policies, and monitor problems that arose.

Cardinal Gilroy required appropriate expert advice for these momentous decisions. The CEO was providing information on educational needs and making proposals for rationalising and restructuring schools to meet the Wyndham requirements; but the Cardinal also sought management, financial, building, and legal expertise for these decisions. In October 1963 Archbishop James Carroll announced the formation of a Catholic Education Development Council in Sydney which contained advisers with legal, business and political experience, such as J.M. Kelleher, M.J. O'Neill, and J.T. Ludeke. They were to advise on a five year plan for rationalisation of schools.21

Then, in 1965, Mr Geoffrey Davey was co-opted by Cardinal Gilroy to lead the process of reorganisation. He was a former architect and businessman and also a friend of Mgr Wallace who probably suggested Davey's name to Gilroy for the task of managing the continuing reorganisation of schools.22 The Cardinal was soon persuaded that it was best to replace the Catholic Education Development Council with a more structured and formal committee to oversee the reorganisation of the schools of the archdiocese. He did not entrust this role to the CEO because its members did not have the financial, legal and building industry experience required for the program of rationalisation. Consequently, in 1965, Cardinal Gilroy appointed an advisory committee called the Catholic Building and Finance Commission (CBFC).

The Catholic Building and Finance Commission and the CEO

The CBFC was constituted to supervise and manage the program of building and development then under way in the archdiocese and, in so doing, it provided the foundation of a system of schools. By 1969 schools were called either "systemic" or "non-systemic", according to whether or
not they agreed to cooperate with the CBFC. The latter continued as a body separate from the CEO until 1984 when it became the Catholic Schools Finance Office which in turn became part of the CEO itself in 1987.

Its inaugural meeting on 24 March 1965 was chaired by Cardinal Gilroy and included Auxiliary Bishops Freeman, James Carroll, and Muldoon; Fr Slowey and Fr Hine of the CEO; parish priests — Mgr Wallace, Fr T. Kerr, Fr G. Wallington, and Fr C. Keller; four legal men — Messrs Justice McKeon, T. Ludeke, Hugh d'Apice, and K.H. Morrissey; Mr Donald MacLurcan, an architect; and Mr Reg. Shanahan, experienced in finance. Geoffrey Davey was appointed Executive Officer of the Commission and Mr Bernard McBride as accountant. The cardinal also appointed three committees — Finance, chaired by Bishop Carroll, Education under Bishop Freeman, and Building, chaired by Bishop Muldoon — thereby giving all the bishops a direct involvement in the new school system.23 Membership of the CBFC was honorary and changed over the years. Bernard McBride became Executive Secretary in June 1967 and served in that capacity until 1987. When Davey retired from the Commission in 1969, McBride succeeded him as the senior, full-time, and salaried executive and became the day-to-day “face” of the CBFC. Other long-serving members were Slowey and d’Apice.

Gilroy would usually walk from St Mary’s Cathedral to Cusa House to preside at the meetings held every second Wednesday. In a Minute of 4 May 1965 he indicated the purpose and scope of the CBFC:

It is my intention that all decisions on matters relating to Education which result in financial demands on parishes and/or in the construction of new buildings or extensions and alterations to buildings, shall be made by the Commission, and recommended to me, so that I may give the required authority.24

Slowey recently explained that Gilroy’s intention was that

by forming a body under his own chairmanship, consisting of all the authorities involved, he hoped (that it) would arrive at consensus in decision-making, and would then have its decisions put into effect. He saw this as a body which he had formed for democratic consultation but which would make decisions under his chairmanship and obviously also under his final guidance because he could approve the decisions that were made.25

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23Minutes of the CBFC, 24 March 1965, CEOL.
24From “Education Office 1965-1966” file, SAA.
25Interview 7 October 1988, transcript p.11.
McBride, the Executive Secretary, commented that it was not meant to be representative of all groups in Catholic education (for instance, the P & F Associations were not represented). Instead members were chosen for their special skills — in church administration, architecture, finance, law.26

Clearly this new organisation was likely to impinge on the operations of the CEO. Therefore, in writing this history of the CEO, it is important to show the relationship between the two bodies. Slowey explained:

The Catholic Education Office was related to the Catholic Building and Finance Commission as the source of information concerning, for example, the location of schools that might be proposed, of schools that existed....The Building and Finance Commission... was a decision-making body; the Catholic Education Office was the arm which provided the data, and, if you like, some advice about matters, but it was not a decision-making body...it was the service organisation...27

The CBFC immediately created an Education Committee (chaired by Bishop Freeman) to advise it on educational needs. On the original committee were Slowey, Hine, and Ambrose Roddy of the CEO, Crittenden who was a former CEO Inspector, along with the lawyer, T. Ludeke, congregational superiors Br Quentin Duffy and Sr M. Christopher, and experienced Catholic educationalists, V. Couch and J. Brock Rowe.28 CEO members of this committee were the ones who had best access to schools data required by the CBFC.

In this way there developed two separate bureaucracies with separate offices, although both were in the same Cusa House building until 1971 and then at Abercrombie St, Chippendale. Their leaders, Slowey and McBride, both assert that there was a good working relationship between the two organisations, at least in the Gilroy years.29 A major reason for this was that Slowey, the CEO Director in these years, and later his Assistant-Director, Collins, were also members of the CBFC.

Still it was a new situation for the CEO and Slowey's first circular to schools in 1966 made it clear that recent difficult decisions had been made by the CBFC and that the CEO was simply implementing them:

26Interview 22 October 1988, transcript p.3.
27Interview 7 October 1988, transcript p.12.
28Minutes of CBFC, 1965, in CEOL
29Interview with McBride on 22 October 1988, transcript p.4, and with Slowey on 7 October 1988, transcript p.12.
In this time of transition the Cardinal and his advisers will look for your advice and your sympathetic cooperation in the efforts that are being made to provide a systematic organisation of our resources. The problem has been grasped... Please be patient with the inevitable difficulties of transition. My colleagues and I will do all in our power to join with you in the smooth working out of the decision handed on to us by the Commission.30

The above “decision” notified principals of compulsory salary scales for lay teachers and of a standard scale of school fees for parochial and diocesan regional schools. The CBFC had moved towards taking financial control of schools. Later, in 1966, it was decided that school fees should, in the main, be remitted by the schools to the CBFC which in turn would pay salaries to lay teachers and stipends to religious. This meant that lay teachers began to see themselves as employees of the CBFC as well as of a particular school. When government grants for science blocks and libraries were given to private schools after 1965, the CBFC decided how the grants would be shared amongst the systemic schools. It also took over the task of rationalising the school system to meet the requirements of the Wyndham reorganisation. Whose financial independence was being reduced? That of the religious congregations, local religious principals, and local parish priests. This centralisation of finances was the foundation of the new centralised system.

There was some discontent. In the mid 1960s a deputation of parish priests complained to Cardinal Gilroy that “you've taken our schools from us”.31 Amongst religious congregations, especially some congregations of brothers, there was a good deal of resistance to the increasing controls and influence of the CBFC. But by 1969 the provincial superiors of three of the four brothers congregations were prepared to sign an agreement which contained a set of conditions imposed on their schools by the CBFC.32 Also Bernard McBride complained of the failure of a number of secondary principals to hand in the required amount of school revenue to the CBFC.33 Thus, while a congregation might agree to place a school in the system, this did not ensure that the local principal, perhaps used to past independence, would comply with all the requirements of the CBFC. Most religious congregations also decided to keep some of their schools outside the new system so that they remained independent of the CBFC.

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31Interview with B McBride, 22 October 1988, transcript p.6.
32CBFC Minutes, 22 January 1969.
33Interview 22 October 1988, transcript p.6.
For the CEO itself, the creation of the CBFC also meant a change in its source of funds. Previously the CEO had been funded directly by the archbishop and it seems that even in 1972 he was providing an allowance for running costs. Any increase of staff or new project required an application to the archbishop for funds. However by the mid 1970s the CEO was receiving its main funds from the CBFC which gained its revenue from the new government grants and from school fees.

The CEO was required to submit an annual budget to the CBFC for its approval. In the mid 1970s when government funding for private schools was greatly increasing and the CEO itself was adding to its personnel the CEO budgets grew rapidly:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>$257,000</td>
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<td>1976</td>
<td>$467,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>$605,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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It seems that the CBFC usually approved the CEO budget without much questioning. However, in 1976, the CBFC Minutes complain that the CEO budget had been overspent by $37,000 and that "no explanation has yet been received". Thus there was a financial dependence of the CEO on the CBFC and some potential for friction. As government funding increased and the New South Wales Catholic Education Commission took over negotiations with governments from 1975, the CBFC became less influential. Still it continued as paymaster for the CEO.

Thus the CBFC was the main agent in creating the new system of Catholic schools in Sydney and the CEO was linked with this process in providing information and recommendations related to the needs of the schools. It should be stressed, however, that the role of the CBFC related mainly to planning, building and finances. As the new system developed it was the CEO which helped shape other key facets such as curriculum development and policies on staff selection and development.

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34 CBFC Minutes, 29 November 1972.
36 Minutes, 28 April 1976.
37 The role of this new commission of the bishops was explained in Chapter 3.
By 1970 the Sydney bishops believed that the CBFC had helped them survive the educational crises of the 1960s, but they saw a need to evaluate the working of the CBFC. A firm called P-E Consulting Group (Australia) was asked to make a preliminary survey of the working of the CBFC with a view to changes for the future.38 Archbishop James Carroll, while agreeing with the P-E Group's initial submission, was in favour of a further restructuring of the CBFC which would involve the creation of an Education Committee with some form of "corporate responsibility" for the Education Office.39 This would seem to involve broadening the membership of the CBFC to include more educational representatives and formally subordinating the CEO to a restructured CBFC. By the end of 1970 the CBFC had decided that its membership structure should not change but they clarified the roles of the various dependent committees.40 So no major restructuring resulted from these suggestions and discussion during 1970, and the CEO and CBFC remained as two separate bureaucracies with their own sources of influence.

The Catholic Education Board (Sydney)

Apart from being a service organisation for the archbishop and the CBFC, the CEO had one more nominal superior in the late 1960s. From 1939 the archbishop had appointed a Sydney Catholic Education Board which formulated or approved educational policies and regulations. As described in Chapter Two, the Board met about once a school term in the 1940s and 1950s.41 With the advent of the CBFC it seems to have become dormant if not defunct.42

However the Board was reconstructed in 196743 — perhaps an indication of some uneasiness amongst educational leaders about the growing power and agenda of the CBFC. Cardinal Gilroy was president of the new Board. The chairman was Bishop Freeman and Slowey was deputy chairman. Its

38 See P-E Consulting Group, 'Submission to the Catholic Building and Finance Commission' (3 July 1970), in "Education Office 1970-73" file, SAA. Only the Introduction to the Submission is in the file. The author did not find the substantive proposals in the report.
40 CBFC Minutes, 9 December 1970, pp.4-6.
41 Records of meetings are scarce but this is the recollection of Fr W. O'Grady in interview 9 November 1990.
42 This is certainly the opinion given by Slowey in an interview of 16 November 1990.
43 Its inaugural meeting is mentioned in the Catholic Weekly, 10 August 1967, and in CBFC Minutes, 2 August 1967.
eighteen members represented parish clergy, religious teaching congregations, and lay educationalists and academics.\textsuperscript{44}

Its authority, on paper, seemed considerable. A memorandum from Slowey, undated but probably late 1967, explained that, with the reconstruction of the Board, the Education Committee of the CBFC was to disband and be replaced by a Schools Planning Committee within the CEO and this new committee would make its submissions on school planning needs to both the CBFC and the Education Board. A new Schools Staffing Committee within the CEO would also submit to the Board its estimate of teachers required for the coming year. The Board would formulate “a long-term policy for teacher training in the Archdiocese for the good of both the Religious and Lay Teachers”.\textsuperscript{45}

Thus from late 1967 the CEO was responsible to, and serving, both the CBFC and the Catholic Education Board. There was potential for inefficiency in this dual overlordship. Auxiliary Bishop Muldoon complained to Gilroy that “The dichotomy: Commission-Board, has always seemed to me undesirable”\textsuperscript{46} and he advocated the amalgamation of the Board with the Commission.

Within the Board itself there was early dissatisfaction and uncertainty about its role, as shown by the Minutes of its meeting of 12 March 1969:

The difficulties presently being experienced by the Board were stated by many members. The purposes and functions of the Board seem to be unclear in the minds of the members...The relationship between the Board and the Commission was mentioned as being an unhappy one.\textsuperscript{47}

A meeting in May 1969 discussed the “need of the Board to establish itself”\textsuperscript{48} and at a September 1969 meeting of the CBFC Archbishop Carroll denied a complaint that the Board “does not exist at this stage” and maintained that it was merely “in recess” for the purpose of reorganisation and redefinition of functions.\textsuperscript{49} It is revealing that Slowey

\textsuperscript{44}Catholic Education Board Members, in file "Papers of Mgr C. Duffy", SAA.
\textsuperscript{45}Memorandum on the Committees to be set up in the Catholic Education Office, in file "E 68-69" SAA.
\textsuperscript{46}Undated letter in "Education Office 1969" file, SAA.
\textsuperscript{47}Minutes are in "Education Office 1969" file, SAA.
\textsuperscript{48}Minutes of Catholic Education Board meeting, 12 March 1969, in "Education Office 1969" file, SAA.
\textsuperscript{49}CBFC, Minutes, 17 September 1969.
now claims that the Board never had actual authority comparable to the CBFC and became obsolete in the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{50}

Thus, in the early 1970s there was some uncertainty and dissatisfaction concerning the central structures administering the schools of the archdiocese. The CBFC was clearly an influential organisation and overshadowed the Board which was hardly known to the public. The uncertainty and resulting inefficiency would have spilled over to the functioning of the CEO which was responsible to both organisations. Then, to further complicate these arrangements, the CEO soon had to take account of a further organisation, the Catholic Education Commission (CEC).

\textit{The Catholic Education Commission and the CEO}

The foundation of state Catholic Education Commissions in Australia in the mid 1970s was described in Chapter Three. They were founded mainly because governments preferred to deal with representative authorities for whole states rather for the more numerous dioceses. The CEC of NSW was established in 1975. Its first chairman, Archbishop James Carroll, was closely associated with the CBFC in Sydney and in 1978 would be appointed Episcopal Vicar for Education in Sydney.

Apart from obvious office proximity in Sydney there was a close relationship between the CEC of N.S.W. and the Sydney CEO. The CEO was responsible for schools of the Archdiocese of Sydney, but these schools needed the Federal funds which were only being granted through the CEC which spoke for all dioceses of N.S.W. Sydney “systemic schools” thus had to follow the procedures laid down by the Federal government and the CEC. At the same time the CEC needed information and guidance from the Sydney CEO on the particular requirements of the archdiocese.

\textbf{The New Role of the CEO}

In the 1960s and 1970s the role of the CEO was remarkably changed and extended. It was no longer primarily a small group of episcopal agents whose chief tasks were to liaise with leaders of religious congregations and to inspect their schools. At the behest of the Sydney bishops the CEO

\textsuperscript{50}Interview 17 November 1990. According to Praetz 61-67, a similar fate befell the Melbourne Catholic Education Board which been set up in 1969 but had to be reconstituted in 1974 with more limited functions.
became a key part of a network which was forging and administering a system of schools in the archdiocese. It now dealt with religious congregations, not so much as supervisors of their curriculum, but more as a coordinator and leader in helping to create systemic schools which could meet the critical challenges of the period. But, in its creation, leadership, and management of the new school system, the CEO was really the less powerful partner of the bishop's financial arm, the Catholic Building and Finance Commission. Finally the very success of the State Aid campaign meant that the CBFC-CEO partnership also had to work within a further state-wide network of CEOs supervised by the Catholic Education Commission of N.S.W.
Chapter Five
A Complex Organisation Develops

Between 1960 and the mid 1970s, the role of the CEO changed as it became part of a central administrative leadership for a new system of Catholic schools. The development of this new role was outlined in Chapter Four. The subject of the present chapter is the internal development of the CEO which followed from its changing role.

From its foundation in 1939 until 1960, the CEO had been primarily a team of inspectors, headed by Pierse and then Slowey. Pierse, Ryan, Slowey, O’Grady and Duffy used their tiny office in George St, Sydney as a base for their demanding schedule of visits to schools. The CEO inspector was usually a diocesan priest (and thus male), with theological training and often an educational qualification but no experience in teaching or administering schools. Their office staff consisted of one or two secretaries. However the CEO did fulfil other functions such as being a communications centre for the schools and influencing the religious education curriculum. These early activities were explained in Chapter Two.

By 1977¹ major changes had taken place in the personnel base, structure, functions and philosophy of the CEO. Its staff numbers were nearly fifty and the former simple team began to acquire some bureaucratic features. Members of religious congregations and lay Catholics, male and female, outnumbered the few remaining priests. The CEO now employed a range of staff with specialist training and experience in fields such as catechetics, curriculum development, educational administration, and various social sciences. With expanded numbers, diversified services and departmentalisation, it developed into a much more complex administrative and service organisation — hence the title of this chapter. A CEO employee would spend much more time working in committees and at a desk than in visiting classrooms. The “inspector” would now be

¹The period for this chapter is the approximate period 1960 to 1975. No list of CEO staff for 1975 or 1976 was found by the author in either CEO or Archdiocesan archives. Therefore these comments are based on the 1977 list of staff which would presumably have been larger than that of 1975.
termed a "consultant" or an "adviser". This chapter will trace these changes in the personnel base, the structure, functions and philosophy of the CEO from 1960 to the mid 1970s by which time the CEO had grown into a complex and influential organisation.

Broadening the Personnel Base

Mgr Slowey was Diocesan Director of Schools for all of this period. Other members of the CEO in the 1960s were diocesan priests Gregory Meere in 1962–3, Ronald Hine from 1963, Geoffrey Dickenson 1965–1969, Peter Christie 1966–8. Hine from 1965 was also Deputy Director of the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine which gave religious instruction to Catholic children in state schools. He had an office in Cusa House for this work. Fr Barry Collins, after studying for a Bachelor of Arts degree and Diploma of Education at the University of Sydney, joined the CEO on 18 March 1965. He recalls that the staff had then grown to eight — four priests, one layman, three secretaries. The layman was Ambrose Roddy who began work there in 1963 as an administrative secretary. Bishop James Carroll commented on Roddy in 1963 that "Up to date his value to the CEO has surpassed the highest expectations." There was also a Miss Mary Mahuteaux, whom Slowey appointed as supervisor of female lay teachers. She had extensive experience in Catholic schools in England.

Although religious congregations had been running the schools since 1900, it was only in this period that their members became part of the CEO. This first occurred in 1963 through the appointment of a Diocesan Committee of Supervisors which contained a representative of each of the major teaching orders. It was convened by Slowey, who saw the need for some standardisation of the curriculum which he hoped might be achieved through this committee. Committee supervisors were not official members of the CEO. However in 1965 Br Mark May fms and Sr Norbert Donnelly rsm were appointed as Inspectors of Schools (primary schools) and Br M. Shanahan cfc as Inspector of Schools (secondary schools). Slowey drew Cardinal Gilroy's notice to the need to explain the


3In letter to Cardinal Gilroy 7 February 1963, in "Education Office and Commission 62-64" file, SAA.

4See letter of Slowey to Carroll, 10 September 1962, ibid.

5Interview with author 7 October 1988, transcript p.14.
change to Catholics who were used to a long tradition of clerical inspectors: "It may appear startling to nominate the Teaching Religious as Diocesan Inspectors and assistants to the Director of Schools."\(^6\) In 1968 Br Kelvin Canavan fms replaced Br Mark May as primary inspector and Sr Aloysius Carmody osu became Supervisor of Catechetics. In 1970 Fr Bruce Hawthorne joined the CEO as a clerical Inspector of Schools and Mr W.A. Bloomfield replaced Ambrose Roddy as a secretary.

The appointment of members of religious congregations as Inspectors recognised the importance of the contribution of the religious congregations in administering and staffing Catholic schools for a century. However, as has been noted by Madeleine McGrath, there was only one female Inspector appointed along with two males, although sisters teaching in the schools outnumbered brothers by more than six to one.\(^7\)

The complex administrative and educational policies demanded by the Wyndham reorganisation\(^8\) and the influx of capable and experienced congregational Supervisors to the CEO in the 1960s revealed the limitations of the priest Inspectors. Unlike most government school inspectors, these priests had never administered a school. Indeed some began their work at the CEO without having any teaching qualifications or experience. They had theological qualifications which enabled them to oversee Religion syllabuses and teaching with respect to doctrinal content. However their theological training was based on the neo-Scholastic theology taught in seminaries at the time. This was not the theology of the likes of Congar, Karl Rahner and Courtney Murray who helped change the direction of the Second Vatican Council nor of Jungmann and Hofinger who led the European movement for new approaches in the teaching of Religion. These priest inspectors had some familiarity\(^9\) with the new “Catechetics” but one could not say that they

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\(^6\)Letter of 4 August 1965, in file "Education Office 65-66", SAA.
\(^7\)M.S. McGrath, *These Women?* (Sydney, 1988? - no date given), pp.196-7.
\(^8\)The implications of the Wyndham reorganisation for Catholic schools were indicated in Chapter Four.
\(^9\)In the late 1950s Crittenden tried to persuade teachers to place less reliance learning of the Catechism. Interview 23 April 1992.
were well prepared to help schools meet the crisis that would occur in the teaching of Religion in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{10}

It was a difficult and unreal assignment for these young priests who were aware of the incongruity of their "inspecting" schools run by experienced teachers.\textsuperscript{11} Slowey was very concerned. In 1966 he expressed to Gilroy the view that every priest appointed to the CEO should receive "specialised teacher training" of at least one year in a teachers college. He also requested that one of the priests of the CEO be sent to London for one year to study Catechetics.\textsuperscript{12} Apparently Gilroy did not admit the importance of overseas catechetical study because the request was refused. It was not till 1977 that Barry Collins, who had been in the CEO since 1965 and who was eventually to head the catechetical division of the CEO, was given leave to study overseas (in Boston).

The 1972 staff list reveals a growing but still small CEO of seventeen members. The traditional title of Inspector of Schools was now held by three diocesan priests, two religious brothers and one religious sister. Two religious sisters were Supervisors of Catechetics and the position of Education Consultant was given to Mr Les McGuire. Other new positions were held by lay people — Registrar of Teacher Education (Miss Beverley Hassett), Secretary (Mr Harry Barker).\textsuperscript{13} Thus religious sisters and brothers had equal status with priests as Inspectors and lay men and women were fulfilling new tasks required by the CEO, such as maintaining a register of lay teachers. As yet the CEO did not have the benefit of the extensive government funding which was to be provided after 1973.

By 1977 the CEO had changed considerably, largely because of the new revenue available to Catholic schools. Staff numbers more than tripled to over fifty, as can be seen in Appendix B. Of these, only two, Slowey as Director and Collins as Assistant Director, were diocesan priests. The two important departments of Primary and Secondary Education were headed by religious brothers, Kelvin Canavan and Walter Simmons, while there was a lay Coordinator, Catherine Duncan, for a Multicultural unit of eight.

\textsuperscript{10}This crisis will be discussed later in the chapter.

\textsuperscript{11}Their predicament was described by Isabel Donnelly who was one of the first congregational inspectors appointed in 1967. Interview 10 February 1991.

\textsuperscript{12}Memo Of Slowey to Gilroy, 21 June 1966, in "Education Office 1965-66" file, SAA.

\textsuperscript{13}See J. Slowey, "Administration of Catholic Education in Schools of the Archdiocese of Sydney", paper given in 1972, in Box 1, CEOL.
members. There were now 31 lay officers and 16 religious sisters and brothers. The title of Inspector had been abandoned in accord with a new understanding of the function of CEO officers and in line with terminology in government education systems. Instead of the erstwhile Inspectors there were now more than twenty Consultants.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{Working Conditions and Procedures at the CEO}

In 1958 the CEO had been moved from Roma House, George Street, to the first floor of Cusa House in Elizabeth St where other archdiocesan offices were located. The CBFC began its operation in 1965 on the top floor of the same building.

There was little improvement in working space — Collins remembers the area as "probably the size of a decent-sized staff-room in a primary school".\textsuperscript{15} By the late 1960s there were at least six inspectors and three secretaries working in this confined area. Fortunately much of the work of the CEO at that time involved visiting schools and parishes, so it was unusual that all staff would need to be at Cusa House simultaneously.

Financial restrictions were probably the main reason for these cramped conditions. Except for some small revenue from the Primary Final examination, the CEO did not generate any revenue and so its budget had to be approved and met by the archbishop up to 1965 and then by the CBFC.\textsuperscript{16} The result was a frugal operation with little freedom to innovate. More funds became available as the CBFC expanded its financial influence over Catholic schools.

Given such constraints, the demands of the work itself, and the educational and administrative inexperience of some members of the CEO, difficulties and criticism were to be expected. Slowey asked the Cardinal for additional clerical staff in 1965. This led to Geoffrey Davey’s being asked by the cardinal to investigate the organisation of the CEO. Davey strongly supported Slowey’s request:

\textsuperscript{14}See ‘Catholic Education Office Sydney Professional and Administrative Officers: January 1977’ in "Edu 4" file, SAA. It is reprinted as Appendix B.

\textsuperscript{15}Interview 25 August 1988, transcript p.1.

\textsuperscript{16}Slowey noted the early arrangements in a letter to Bishop Freeman of 31 January 1964, in "Education Office and Commission 62-64" file, SAA.
The present staff have to work very long hours... and have been constantly in attendance on Saturdays; despite this there is still much undone. The administration of the Teachers' College and the demands resulting from an expanding program make it essential to increase the personnel available.\(^{17}\)

Still, in December 1966, Davey stated that in the operation of the CBFC "the only bottleneck is in the operation of the Catholic Education Office, and this was not the fault of Mgr Slowey..."\(^{18}\)

These crowded conditions dictated another move of the CEO and CBFC in late 1971\(^{19}\) to the unused buildings of the former St Benedict's School, 1 Abercrombie St, Chippendale (more commonly referred to as Broadway). Here the CEO occupied the ground floor and the CBFC the top floor. While there was now much more space, the rooms were simply partitioned classrooms and there were problems over the fact that the premises were really part of the St Benedict's parish centre which included the church, a primary school and presbytery, all on the one block.

**Growth of Organisational Complexity**

Before 1960 the CEO was simply organised in a two-tiered structure in which the Diocesan Director held authority over Assistant Inspectors and one or two clerical assistants. As the CEO expanded in personnel and responsibilities it began to develop a more complex structure. There was evidence of this even in the 1960s despite severe constraints in finance and office space.

One way that the CEO overcame its restraints of staffing, expertise and funds was by the creation of committees which were directed by the CEO but which consisted mainly of honorary helpers from outside. Perhaps the prototype was the Diocesan Committee of Supervisors, first convened in 1963 and consisting of representatives of each religious congregation involved in schools. This committee was able to assume much of the

\(^{17}\)G. Davey to Cardinal Gilroy, 8 July 1965, in "Education Office 1965-1966" file, SAA. The "Teachers' College" mentioned was the Catholic Teachers College at North Sydney which at this time trained women to teach in Catholic primary schools.

\(^{18}\)CBFC Minutes, 21 December 1966.

\(^{19}\)The author has not been able to ascertain the exact date of the move. It seems to have been made at the end of 1971. There was a Memorandum to Principals sent from Cusa House Elizabeth St on 10 October 1971. 1972 communications are all from Broadway.
inspectorial function of the CEO, as will be described later in this chapter. Slowey and Hine also customarily worked in committees set up by the CBFC, especially its Education Committee.

From 1968 it was decided that the committees would virtually determine the structure and mode of operation of the CEO. The stimulus for establishing these committees was the reconstruction in 1967 of the Sydney Catholic Education Board which had the authority to examine proposals of the CEO in regard to planning and policy.20 Previously CEO planning proposals had been examined by the Education Committee of the CBFC. Slowey wrote an extensive memorandum in which he noted that the reconstruction of the Board necessitated new structures within the CEO:

> With the reconstruction of the Education Board ... the Education Committee is to go out of existence. The Schools Planning Committee within the Education CEO will combine the previous functions of the Diocesan Inspectors and the Education Committee as far as planning schools.21

While its inauguration may have pressed the CEO to set up committees, in practice this Board only survived for about a year and seems to have had little influence on the schools system.

Nevertheless, a set of committees was formed within the CEO: the Schools Planning Committee which would draft school building programs for submission to the CBFC and the Catholic Education Board; the Staffing Committee dealing with the recruitment, appointment, and transfer of teachers; the Committee for Religious Knowledge which would supervise and coordinate the work of Religious Education consultants appointed by each congregation; a Teacher Training Committee to help the Board formulate policies on training of new teachers and to promote inservice training of current teachers; a Primary Schools Committee to be concerned with the standards of education in primary schools; and a Secondary Schools Committee to deal with secondary schools issues.22

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20The revival of this Board has been described in Ch. 4.
21'Memorandum on the Committees to be set up in the Catholic Education Office', no date but presumed late 1967 or early 1968, in "68-69" file, SAA.
22ibid.
Like the 1963 Committee of Supervisors, each committee contained CEO Inspectors and outside members. Slowey summed up his hopes for the new arrangements:

It is to be hoped that the setting up of these Committees within the Education CEO will give it the machinery it requires to deal with the great variety of problems with which it is faced. From the foregoing description it will be noted that the Committees are more like "working parties" than Committees in the ordinary sense. The scheme aims to bring into the service of the Education Office a large number of voluntary competent workers, not just advisers.

As the administration of Catholic Education develops over the years to come, the Committees may well prove to be the beginnings of the various departments which of necessity, must eventually come in the structure of the Education Office.23

Two aspects of this conclusion are noteworthy. He hoped that the CEO could attract "the service of a large number of voluntary competent workers".24 Until 1970 this was an important consideration because the CEO and the schools had minimal government financial assistance. Perhaps such voluntary service was more likely to be achieved when teaching was seen to be a "vocation" for both religious and lay teachers. There was less likelihood of this as members of the CEO began to view themselves as paid professionals and as industrial relations issues became important in Catholic schools.

Secondly, these committees could give rise to departments with the CEO. This would be true of the Religious Education Committee and the Primary Schools Committee, both of which developed into active departments of the CEO in the 1970s. However, it will be seen in a later chapter that the CEO eventually rejected the model of Primary and Secondary Departments in favour of a division according to "Services", a change which corresponded with current practice in the state Department of Education.

A further CEO committee arose out of a concern for public relations. This concern had been voiced by Slowey in 1964 when he asked Cardinal Gilroy for permission to produce "a worthy bulletin" to give information to schools.25 The Cardinal agreed, but said that the bulletin must finance itself.26 It seems that nothing was done. In 1968 the Catholic Education

23ibid.
24ibid.
26Letter to J.Slowey, 1 February 1964, ibid.
Board created a “Study Committee for the Public Image of Catholic Education” whose members were Mgr Duffy, Mother Gonzaga rsm, and Dr P.J. O’Farrell. By 1970 the CBFC also had its Public Relations and Publicity Committee but Archbishop Carroll became concerned about its activity:

...The role of the Public Relations and Publicity Committee should be to publicise favourably the decisions and the efforts of the Commission. Instead, it seems to have become in large part an opportunity for the nominated representatives of the Parents and Friends to air their grievances....27

He favoured its replacement by a single Public Relations Officer who would provide favourable publicity for the secular press and the Catholic Weekly.28 His concern was understandable in that the CBFC had created the committee to provide information and publicity and not to act as a forum for debate. Moreover the airing of grievances and problems could impinge on the hierarchy’s campaign for increased government finance in which Archbishop Carroll had long been very active.

Accordingly, the CBFC in late 1970 proposed that the work of its Public Relations and Publicity Committee could be better carried out “through an officer of the Catholic Education Office”.29 Instead a committee was retained, now called the Catholic Education Office Information Committee. Its chairperson was Barry Collins of the CEO and its members represented parochial clergy, school principals, the Catholic Teachers’ College, teachers, and Parents and Friends Associations. At the first meeting Collins explained that

the Committee was to be considered as part of the Education Office and its purpose would be to lead or guide in the important field of communication....It was further envisaged that the Committee might spread information about Catholic Schools to the mass media...30

Because most of the members were not employees of the CEO, this committee was more of an adjunct to the CEO as distinct from the other Departments described above which were staffed by employees. Its function was intended to be limited to the provision to the public of

28 ibid.
29 Minutes, 9 December 1970.
30 Committee Minutes, 13 July 1971, in “General 68-71” file, CEOL.
information about the work of the CEO. No reference has been found to the work of the committee after 1972, so it may have been short-lived.31

As departments developed there was a need for communication among them and for unity of overall objectives. In 1973 there was an attempt to provide at least a symbolic departmental unity of the four groups in the CEO — the Catechetical Centre, Secondary Education, Primary Education and Migrant Education. They were gathered into a team called CREDO (Catholic Resources and Educational Development Organisation). This glib acronym was not maintained, largely because it did not cover further departments which soon arose in the CEO, such as the School Social Work Division.

The CEO staff list for 197732 shows some fulfilment of this trend towards departments. It lists the three distinct departments of Primary Education, Secondary Education and Religious Education, along with the School Social Work Division and a team of eight allocated to a Multicultural Education Program (funded by a specific Commonwealth grant). Most developed of the Departments was Primary Education, which had ten Consultants assigned to specific regions of the Archdiocese.33

The bureaucratic hierarchy was also being extended — from the Director down through Assistant Director, Director of Department, Consultant, Officer. The top two positions of Director and Assistant Director were held by the two remaining diocesan priests, Slowey and Collins. This was in accord with the tradition of the CEO but it also reflected the fact that they were its two longest serving members. In the next rank of Department Director were two religious brothers. Lay men and women occupied the majority of the remaining ranks in the hierarchy.

31There is further confusion about the status of this committee. In late 1972, in a paper, 'Administration of Catholic Education in Schools of the Archdiocese of Sydney' (CEOL), Slowey listed the Information Committee as responsible to the CBFC rather than the CEO. Perhaps, in the eyes of CEO leaders of the time it did not matter in practice who had jurisdiction over the committee.

32See Appendix E, 'Professional and Administrative Officers: January 1977'.

33This regionalisation of the CEO had actually begun in 1968 when each of the three priest Inspectors was given responsibility for the schools in a particular Episcopal Region of the Archdiocese. Thus Dickinson was given the Northern Region, Christie the South-eastern area, and Collins the Western Region. See CEO Circular to Schools, 5 February 1968, in SJCA.
However, the 1977 list does not show the relative status on the hierarchy of such officers as the Assistant to the Director (Staff Relations), the Executive Officer Assisting the Director, the Research Officers, or the Teacher Registrar. As departments and special roles developed there would need to be clear definitions of roles, territory, and lines of communication.

Another embryonic change appearing in the 1977 staff list is that the Primary Education Department has several Regional Consultants for areas such as Central Metropolitan, St George, Metropolitan West - Outer. This foreshadowed the 1980s development when the CEO and the systemic schools were to be organised into a structure of five regions — as will be explained later in the study.

Thus, by the mid 1970s the CEO had changed from being a simple team of a few priest inspectors (as in the 1950s) to a larger and more complex organisation. There was a hierarchy of positions, departmentalisation, and the beginnings of regionalisation. Through the period 1960–75 there was some continuity in the leadership of the CEO provided by Mgr Slowey (throughout), Fr Collins (from 1965), Sr Norbert Donnelly (from 1967), and Br Kelvin Canavan (from 1968). However, the structure of the developing organisation in the period 1962–75 was experimental and changing as the administrators sought to cope with new demands and circumstances.

**CEO Functions and Activities c.1960–75**

This section will review the main functions and activities of the CEO for the period 1960–75. Most of these functions had been performed by the CEO in the earlier decades, but there were some additional functions which arose from the creation of the new schools system, especially in regard to the employment of lay teachers. These developments will be dealt with first.

*Lay Teachers and the CEO*

With the expansion and reorganisation of Catholic schools in the 1960s the number of lay teachers increased quickly. Many regarded their teaching as a type of "vocation" or "apostolate" which motivated them to accept a salary much lower than that received in a state school. For example in 1963 John McDermott gave up work in business which
provided a salary of thirty six pounds a week and a company house and car, so as to teach at Marist Brothers Kogarah with a salary of twenty three pounds per week.34

Still it was difficult to attract a sufficient number of capable lay teachers. One restricting factor was that the Sydney Catholic Education Board policy stated that married women were not to be employed in parochial schools and women were expected to resign upon marriage. This policy applied until at least 1963 when Cardinal Gilroy gave Slowey permission to waive the regulation if he "were to judge that any detriment to the pupils' education would follow a change of staff."35

It had generally been left to the individual schools to classify teachers for salary and make arrangements for items such as sick leave, long service leave, and superannuation (the last mentioned would rarely have been provided). Variation and inconsistency were inevitable. Slowey in particular was concerned because from the late 1950s he had been involved in the development of the Catholic Teachers College at North Sydney36 and realised that its graduates would be affected by inequities in conditions for lay teachers. So in the early 1960s the CEO began to address this problem by supervising and regulating the payment, sick leave and insurance of teachers whom it had appointed to parochial schools, most of these being graduates of Catholic Teachers College.37 Slowey was very aware that more was needed and in 1964 wrote to Gilroy:

...until the Catholic Education Office classifies, pays, insures and makes arrangement for superannuation and long service leave, for all teachers, the situation will become only more unsystematic and unworkable.38

The urgency of problems concerning lay teachers was immediately underscored by the Catholic Building and Finance Commission established in 1965. A joint report to the CBFC, prepared by Slowey of the

34Interview 16 November 1988, transcript p.3. Mr McDermott was still teaching there in 1988.

35See letter of Slowey to Gilroy, 6 January 1964, in "Education Office and Commission 62-64" file, SAA. A reason for this regulation may have been the strong view advocated by Catholic leaders that mothers should be at home attending to the needs of their families. A schoolteacher mother would erode this ideal.

36See Chapter 2.

37See Circular to Principals, 'Employment of Lay Teachers Appointed by the Catholic Education Office', 6 February 1963, "Education Office and Commission 62-64" file, SAA.

38Letter of 6 January 1964, ibid.
CEO and Geoffrey Davey of the CBFC and entitled Lay Teachers—Salaries and Conditions, began with the statement that "The most serious problem facing the schools in the immediate future is the employment of lay teachers" — surely a dramatic judgment when one considers the concomitant building and restructuring demands of the Wyndham program.

The advent of the CBFC provided an impetus towards the regulation and improvement of teacher conditions. The first need was to classify the teachers in terms of qualifications and experience. Slowey arranged for this to be done by a committee consisting of Ambrose Roddy of the CEO, J. Ludeke of the CBFC, and G. Gleeson of the Public Service Board. In August 1966 he announced the completion of this classification of all lay teachers then employed in parochial or regional schools. In September 1966 the CBFC approved Slowey’s request that this committee be a permanent "Advisory Committee on Salaries and Conditions" serving the CBFC.

The CBFC in 1966 set mandatory salary scales for all lay teachers in parochial and regional schools. There were some protests in particular cases where these scales meant a reduction in salary. Also in 1966 it directed that the teachers be paid from a central fund rather than by the individual schools. At first the CBFC employed the accounting firm of Egan and Joyner to send out the salary cheques to teachers, but from 1969 the CBFC itself undertook this task.

Thus this major problem which the CEO had recognised in the early 1960s was being addressed after 1965 by the CBFC and the CEO working together. Further cooperation occurred in 1968 when the CEO set up a Staffing Committee which was to be "a working committee concerned with the recruiting, appointment, and transfer of teachers." It would maintain liaison with the Classifications Committee of the CBFC and would

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39 Lay Teachers - Salaries and Conditions in ibid. This is an undated draft report but the contents indicate that it was written in 1965.
40 CBFC, Minutes, 31 August 1966.
41 ibid., 28 September 1966.
42 Information from Mr W. Scott, employee of the CBFC 1970-84. Interview Sydney, 30 October 1990.
develop a register of teachers requiring positions. Notwithstanding these steps there was still much to be done to improve conditions for teachers, especially in terms of higher salaries, equal salaries for women, and a superannuation scheme.

The 1960s also saw the beginnings of lay teacher organisation and industrial action. In 1964, an organisation called "The Catholic Institute of Teachers", was writing to Slowey concerning employment conditions of teachers. Then, in early 1967, occurred the first teachers strike in Sydney Catholic schools. Twelve teachers from De La Salle College Revesby and five from Christian Brothers College Bondi Beach went on strike in protest over CEO announcements to principals in November 1966 that the CBFC would now pay the salaries of teachers from a central fund and according to a salary scale standard for the archdiocese. These new arrangements meant that some teachers would be paid less than individual principals had agreed to give them, a fact deplored by some of the principals who actually supported the teachers' deputation to the CEO. The teachers met Ambrose Roddy at the CEO and handed him their grievances in writing. But the salary levels were a matter for the CBFC rather than for the CEO and Slowey referred the teachers' case to that organisation for a decision.

In this dispute the CEO was dealing only with groups of teachers and their individual supporters, including some principals and parents. It did not have to deal with the teachers' union of the time, the Assistant Masters and Mistresses Association (AMMA), because, until 1971, the AMMA executive was firmly against such industrial action. A 1969 editorial in its official journal, Inter-AMMA, put this position strongly:

We shall certainly "sound the death-knell of the Independent School system" if we allow ourselves to become involved in strikes and stop-work disputes. At all times let reason and common-sense prevail and ensure that our disagreements (and

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43 See J. Slowey, 'Memorandum on the Committees to be set up in the Catholic Education Office', undated, in "E 68-69" file, SAA.
44 See letter from its president, Peter Young, 5 October 1964, in "Education Office and Commission 62-64" file, SAA.
45 The strike is reported in an article in The Bulletin for 25 February, 1967. The author has not been able to find the CEO circular to principals of November 1966 which is cited in the article. The first state teachers strike also occurred in 1967.
46 See letter of Slowey to Gilroy, 28 February, 1967, in SAA. He submitted a set of recommendations to the Cardinal on the issue.
there will no doubt be plenty) are settled in a way that causes no inconvenience, hardship or poor example to the children whom it is our privilege to teach.47

However it was Catholic school teachers in the AMMA in the 1970s who helped transform it into an industrial union.

Up to 1971 the AMMA leadership promoted the conciliatory policy indicated above. But in that year its "Old Guard" executive resigned and John Nicholson, an "Industrialist", was elected secretary.48 He pledged to be a full-time official and to concentrate on improving working conditions of members. In 1972 the AMMA was renamed the Independent Teachers Association (ITA) and now followed a more industrial approach.

However, the CEO itself would have been shielded from most disputes, since they usually concerned working conditions and salaries, which were under the aegis of the CBFC. In these years there was no legal or industrial section within the CEO organisation.

Inservice Education for Teachers

Since the CEO and CBFC had created a system of Catholic schools and assumed responsibility for employing most of the teachers in the system (apart from the members of religious congregations), it was incumbent on them to ensure that these teachers achieved and maintained professional standards in their work. To this end they required opportunities for inservice education.

While inservice education for teachers was encouraged by the CEO in the 1960s, it was limited by scarcity of funds. Nevertheless opportunities were found, sometimes with unpaid help. Thus, at the annual Teachers' Conferences of the archdiocese, held each May, lecturers from the Department of Education might offer their services.49 Also the flourishing Catholic Secondary Teachers' Association contributed significantly to the planning of these conferences. The 1967 conference had separate programs for Infants, Primary, and Secondary teachers, and


48The terms "Old Guard" and "Industrialist" are used in Robert Menzies, A Work in Progress Towards a Trade Union History (Sydney: 1984, unpublished), pp. 43-6. This account of the change in the union relies on Menzies' narrative.

49This certainly happened in 1962. See Circular of Slowey, 4 May 1962, SJCA.
was also arranged in regional clusters.\textsuperscript{50} One of the days of the conference was given over to inservice for principals.

In spite of these efforts at organisation, it seems that teachers were not always enthusiastic about attendance, as this 1968 CEO circular implied:

\begin{quote}
The Conference will be held on the days set aside for this purpose, i.e., May 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, the extra days following the Autumn Vacation. These days should be kept free so that teachers may attend the Conference....Lay teachers should be informed that these days are not holidays and that they are expected to attend the Conference to qualify for the payment of salary.\textsuperscript{51}
\end{quote}

On the other hand Canavan recalled that, at the 1973 Conference held at the University of Sydney, there were about 4000 teachers enrolled.\textsuperscript{52}

Another economical way of providing inservice was for an individual school to organise staff development days which relied on expertise within the school itself or perhaps an outside consultant. The CEO encouraged these days, but by 1977 found it necessary to legislate that each school could have four "pupil-free days" per year for inservice organised by the school.\textsuperscript{53} Parents, themselves educated in times when pupil-free days were unknown, were likely to query the practice with either principals or the CEO and so the CEO explained in a circular to parents:

\begin{quote}
One of the more effective means of Teacher Development has been a program whereby the whole staff of a school has taken a full day together to examine the strengths and weaknesses of the school in light of the Church's mission in education. Such professional days can be of great assistance to the schools as a whole, the individual teachers and the children.\textsuperscript{54}
\end{quote}

In the mid 1970s there were abundant inservice programs organised by government education departments and by subject associations (such as the English Teachers Association of N.S.W.). The Commonwealth Government Schools Commission provided considerable subsidies for these programs. Catholic school teachers were welcome at these meetings and could often receive refunds from the government for costs of attendance. Again the CEO encouraged participation in these courses.

\textsuperscript{50}Conference programme in file "E 68'69", SAA.
\textsuperscript{52}Interview 6 April 1992.
\textsuperscript{53}See leaflet, "Catholic Schools Sydney 1977", CEOL.
\textsuperscript{54}ibid.
But there were two areas where it was felt that Catholic teachers needed specific help. Religious Education was crucial to the identity of Catholic schools and in the 1970s it would be fair to say that it was in crisis. A later section of this chapter will trace the problems that developed, but it is mentioned here as an important example of inservice need. The second group in need of help was the principals, who needed guidance and training to administer the much larger and more complex schools of the 1970s.

In the Religious Education field the CEO organised a number of two or three day conferences. Slowey and Collins particularly remember the significant impact of the 1972 lecture tour of Fr Anthony Bullen, a catechetics specialist from England. Since such courses were generally held outside school hours, they required both effort and expense on the part of teachers attending.

Provision of specialised training for school principals was a well recognised need by the 1960s. The curriculum was more complex, schools were larger, the increasing number of lay teachers required more cognisance of industrial and legal factors. In 1962 Slowey arranged a course of seminars for principals. These Sunday morning seminars were led by Br Ronald Fogarty fms. They dealt with a broad range of administrative topics, such as leadership qualities and supervision. One principal, Sr Patricia Anderson rsm, described them as "the most significant professional development I have undertaken and the basis of my leadership development". "Cluster meetings" of principals in regions were also arranged and a Primary Principals Association was formed.

Responsibility for lay teachers and principals in regard to their working conditions and professional development was therefore an important new function of the CEO in the 1960s and 1970s. This became all the more

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55 Examples can be found in document "Inservice Courses and Activities organised by the Catholic Education Office 1971-2", Religious Education Division CEOL.
57 Letter of Slowey to Gilroy 10 September 1962, in "Education office and Commission 62-64" file, SAA.
important as religious congregations declined in numbers and handed over their schools to the new system run by the CEO and CBFC, which would now rely on lay teachers to make up the majority of the staffs of the schools and, in the 1970s, to become principals. Linked to this responsibility for staff was a need for accurate information on numbers of staff and pupils; and so the CEO was required to maintain accurate statistics.

**A Centre for Compiling Statistics**

By 1967 there was a system of schools in the archdiocese composed of those schools which were prepared to hand over to the CBFC the responsibility for paying the majority of school costs, especially that of salaries. The execution of this CBFC responsibility required decisions at the centre which affected individual schools and teachers. Here the CEO acted as a secretariat and agent of the CBFC. Firstly, they had to provide information to the CBFC concerning pupil numbers, staff numbers and building requirements. For instance, the CBFC needed to know the number of pupils in a school so as to determine the number of teachers and ancillary staff (such as secretaries) whose salaries it should pay.

A corollary of this was that the CBFC and the CEO needed to agree on a standard pupil-teacher ratio for the schools in the system, within the annual budget approved by the CBFC. Such standardisation had not been required in pre-system times when the principals had the independence to decide their own staff numbers. These statistics were also required for the CBFC's consideration of school building and accommodation requirements.

As government funding increased, government departments also required detailed information as a guide for the allocation of funds. Therefore compilation of statistics became an essential and important task of the CEO.

This function, as well as the previous ones dealing with the classification, employment and inservice of lay teachers, were all additional or intensified responsibilities of the CEO arising from the creation of the centralised system in the late 1960s. These new functions did not mean

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59 In fact the Sydney CEO in 1972 was compiling statistics for all schools in N.S.W. and the A.C.T. See J. Slowey, 'Administration of Catholic Education in Schools of the Archdiocese of Sydney' (1972 unpublished paper), p.4.
the immediate abandonment of the original primary responsibility of the CEO, that of inspection.

**Inspection and Supervision**

When the CEO began in 1939, most of the working time of its members was devoted to on-site inspection of schools. By 1970 this was not the case, partly because of the increasing demands of other types of work and because of the delegation of inspection to supervisors from religious congregations. Still, it is clear that this function was still regarded as significant because all the leading officials of the CEO were still termed Inspectors.

The responsibility for inspection was delegated to the religious congregations in that each was asked to provide a member for the Diocesan Committee of Supervisors, created in 1963. At its first meeting there were 32 Supervisors, a number which increased later. Bishop Freeman, as president, outlined the functions of the committee:

a) You will visit your own schools and fill in a form at the end of the visit. Copies of this will be given to the Parish Priest, the Principal of the School, your Religious Superior and the Education Office.

b) Once a month you will attend a meeting of the Supervisors for general discussion to improve standards.

c) You will bring your reports to these monthly meetings and hand them to the Office.60

These instructions show that the Diocesan Inspectors were delegating their role of inspection and were now acting as convenors and facilitators of the Supervisors. At the same time the CEO was attempting to coordinate and keep a check on the work of the new Supervisors.

The initiative also reflected a major shift in the CEO understanding of the work of Inspectors. Bishop Freeman's address emphasised to the supervisors that:

You will not be supervisors in the sense of being inquisitors. You will try to help the teachers in the places where you go. You will go with candour, point out difficulties and help teachers to overcome them....Look on yourselves as helpers.61

This preference for "supervision" as opposed to "inspection" was maintained by Slowey and it also became current amongst school leaders.

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60 Undated copy of minutes of inaugural meeting in 1963, in "Education Office and Commission 62-64", SAA.
61 ibid.
In the early 1960s, many religious principals had participated in courses on school administration given by Ronald Fogarty and there was widespread appreciation of the formation acquired therein. One of the participants, Isabel Donnelly, who later became a leading member of the Committee of Supervisors, recalls Fogarty elaborating a concept of "supervision" from the Latin derivation of the word — "a vision beyond", "a vision above". He stressed that the administrators themselves needed to study and be well informed so that they could help one another and the teachers in their schools. Several of these religious administrators joined the Committee of Supervisors, bringing with them this vision.

However, it seems that the procedural goals of the Committee (such as monthly reporting to the CEO) were fulfilled very imperfectly. By 1973 it was admitted within the CEO that the system of reporting on school inspections had "lapsed in regard to most schools". Most of the Supervisors were not released from their existing work in their congregations and so could not devote much time to this work of supervision. This was predictable in that the supervisors were unpaid assistants to the CEO which had very limited funds and which relied on the cooperation of congregations with their own varying problems and attitudes towards outside inspection.

The other most significant result of the association of the CEO with this Committee was that, within three years, some members of the Committee were appointed to the CEO as Inspectors of Schools. As Inspectors they were primarily officers of the CEO rather than representatives of their particular congregations. This shift continued in the 1970s when the religious congregations were declining in influence in schools because of reduced numbers or diversified missions. Gradually individual congregations withdrew their representatives from the Committee of Supervisors, and it faded out of existence by the end of the decade. In turn, the CEO, with greatly increased funding available, was able to employ its own Consultants and Advisers to continue the

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63 See comment of Kelvin Canavan in Minutes of CEO Staff Meeting, 5 April 1973, CEOL.
64 This is the recollection of one of the supervisors, Norman Hart fms — interview 17 November 1990.
function of "inspection" or "supervision" which the Committee of Supervisors (of the congregations) had fulfilled in the 1960s.

**Supervision of Religious Education**

Religious education was fundamental to the existence and identity of Catholic schools and the CEO had always been given responsibility for its supervision. As mentioned earlier, the CEO had previously tried to fulfill this responsibility by having priest Inspectors inspect Religion classes, by setting a public examination in Religious Knowledge at the end of Sixth Class, and by providing a Religion Syllabus based on the Australian *Catechism*. This text had been commissioned and approved by the Australian hierarchy for the whole of Australia and thus provided a convenient and generally unquestioned basis for the earlier Religion syllabuses issued by Pierse in the 1940s. This responsibility for providing a Religion syllabus continued to be acknowledged. The Director of the CEO Religious Education division, Barry Collins, agreed in 1991 that the provision of Religion syllabuses had been seen since the 1940s as an "essential part of the work of the Inspector of Schools and the CEO".  

In the 1960s these methods of fulfilling the responsibility of supervision of Religious Education were no longer effective. It has been described above how Slowey arranged for representatives of religious congregations to take over the inspection function carried out by the priests in the CEO. These new Supervisors were certainly concerned with enhancing Religious Education in the schools, but their portfolio encompassed the whole curriculum and involved them in helping principals and teachers cope with the challenges of the 1960s. Consequently, they would have had limited opportunity to monitor the adequacy of the teaching of Religion.  

Then the second means of supervision was removed when the CEO ended the Primary Final Examination in 1969. This had included an examination on Religious Doctrine which provided some direction to

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65 This was stated in a letter to the author, 14 March 1991. Collins ceased to be Director in 1991 when the Religious Education division was incorporated within the Curriculum Division.

66 This is not to imply that the CEO inspectors of the 1950s were always able to monitor adequately the classroom teaching of Religion. Their task was also very demanding because of the number of schools.

67 More will be said about this decision in the section following.
teachers and also an external check on the doctrinal knowledge of the pupils.

For a while the CEO (and the bishops) hoped that its third method of supervision could remain effective. In the 1950s the Australian bishops had accepted that the traditional catechism was inappropriate, but they believed that the method of basing instruction on a catechism was sound. So they commissioned the writing of a new catechism for all Australian schools and this Catholic Catechism appeared in the schools in 1962.68 This was certainly an improvement on the previous text and was a useful basis for many teachers for the rest of the decade. But its limitations were apparent from the beginning, most obviously in that it did not cater for pupils beyond Third Year (Intermediate). Moreover, this was a new generation of pupils brought up with television for whom catechisms were unappealing. The limitations of the catechisms and the influence of newer catechetical ideas, especially from western Europe and the United States, meant that different approaches to religious education would be required in the 1970s.

The excitement and turbulence of the 1960s ensured that the whole area of religious education became quite sensitive and controversial. Western society was shaken and challenged by student discontent and questioning of orthodoxy, by civil rights and anti-Vietnam War protests, by the feminist movement, by the disintegration of colonial empires. For Catholics, the debates and conclusions of the Second Vatican Council added to the ferment. In this milieu the prescriptive and structured catechism could not survive.

Its gradual demise exposed the inadequacy of the Religion syllabuses of the 1960s and was a major problem for all dioceses. The Sydney CEO was not spared. Circulars of 1964 to 1969 prescribed the use of the appropriate book of the "My Way to God" series for Grades 1 to 4, and the Catholic Catechism for Grades 5 and 6 and Forms I to III. An optional "detailed syllabus" for Form IV was available from the CEO and it was left to teachers "to draw up a suitable program of studies" for Form V.69 These CEO syllabuses were in roneoed form and by 1969 were termed simply

69See "Religious Education Syllabuses" in Circular of 23 November 1965, SJCA.
"suggested syllabuses"\textsuperscript{70}. In 1970 the CEO issued a syllabus for Kindergarten to Grade 6, \textit{Guidelines for Education of Faith},\textsuperscript{71} which was still based on catechisms but was less prescriptive, as suggested by its title and by explanatory notes such as "Although teachers are not obliged to observe details of the Guidelines, the headings proposed are integral to a balanced program of Education of Faith..."\textsuperscript{72}

The CEO was really caught between those advocating prescribed learning of clearly defined segments of Catholic knowledge (summarised in a catechism) in each year of school and those who believed that the catechism approach was inappropriate and counter-productive. The latter group claimed that religious education had to begin with the "experience" of the child and needed to take into account the child's "readiness" for particular teachings and concepts, an emphasis quite common in all Australian primary schools at the time. As a middle way, the 1970 Primary \textit{Guidelines} stated that the religion program should be "child-centred", "experiential", and should "form a basis for abstract theological understanding in later years", but it also recommended specific chapters of the catechism for particular years.\textsuperscript{73}

With this move towards guidelines and supervision rather than prescriptiveness and inspection in the area of Religious Education, the CEO came to act according to a "loosely coupled" model of organisation as described in the Introduction. Experiential approaches in catechetics and respect for the individual consciences of both pupils and teachers precluded any attempts by the CEO to place anything more than minimum uniformity or controls on what was happening in individual Religious Education classrooms.

It was in secondary schools that discontent with the catechisms and the need for an appropriate syllabus were most felt. The author has not been able to find explicit evidence of the existence of a syllabus for junior secondary schools (by then Forms I to IV) corresponding to the above Primary school \textit{Guidelines}, but CEO circulars mentioned below imply

\textsuperscript{70}See CEO circular of 28 January 1969, SJCA.

\textsuperscript{71}A revised edition was issued in 1971.

\textsuperscript{72}From section on "Pastor-Parent-Teacher Meetings", \textit{Guidelines for Education of Faith} (1970).

\textsuperscript{73}ibid.
that there was a junior secondary syllabus. To compound the problem, the new catechisms were not intended for senior secondary school, which by 1967 had gained an extra year (Sixth Form). It seems that the CEO were relying on outside help to fill this vacuum. CEO circulars of 1968 and 1969 repeated the hope which was destined to remain unfulfilled:

Forms V and VI — a syllabus is not yet available. Teachers of religion in senior classes will be pleased to know that work is proceeding on the preparation of the official text books for Forms IV, V, VI to be published by the Hierarchy of Australia.74

Even this project, although sponsored by the Australian bishops, led to trouble for the CEO. The Form V “texts” were being prepared by a working party of teachers based in Sydney. In 1969 drafts of these texts were being trialed at some Sydney schools and the bishops received a number of complaints that they contained unsound doctrine, were “humanistic”, and that the pupils were being treated as guinea pigs. Cardinal Gilroy wrote to Slowey in May 1969 that “No experimentation should be undertaken in any grade without prior consultation with the Director of Education and approval by the Archbishop”75 and he reiterated his concern in July:

I think it desirable that you as Director of Catholic Education in the Archdiocese take full responsibility to see that only orthodox religious teaching is imparted in the Schools of the Archdiocese.76

The Cardinal’s tone seems harsh, considering that this project was commissioned by the bishops rather than by the Sydney CEO and was being carried out by a committee drawn from a range of dioceses. His caution contrasts with that of successive Melbourne Archbishops, Knox and Little, who were prepared to support similarly controversial religious education programs, especially the Guidelines for Religious Education, sponsored by the Melbourne CEO.77

In response to Gilroy’s strictures, Slowey, who supported the Sydney project, notified Gilroy that a panel of priest theologians was to work with the writers of the texts for Year 11 and ensure the orthodoxy of the texts

74 Circular of 28 January 1969, SJCA.
75 28 May 1969, in “Education Office 1969” file, SAA.
76 23 July 1969, ibid.
which duly became available in 1971 as a series called *Come Alive*.\(^{78}\) Perhaps because of this rather bitter controversy and the sheer difficulty of writing texts acceptable to all dioceses and in a time of world student upheaval, the national texts for Year 10 and 12 were never completed. In the middle of the controversy, and probably because of it, the CEO itself published *Guidelines for Fifth-Sixth Form Catechetics* 1970. Its Foreword tersely noted the CEO dilemma:

The Senior Secondary Religious Knowledge Committee has spent much time and effort in attempting to carry out a task, which seemed at times to defy all efforts, to create unity or cohesion in expressing the aims, content and method of Senior Catechetics.\(^ {79}\)

Thus, at the end of the 1960s, the CEO retained its responsibility for guiding and supervising religious education in the archdiocese, but was still struggling to develop adequate ways of discharging this responsibility. The demise of the catechism and the disagreement about methods of religious education resulted in a lack of direction and organisation in religious education in schools. A class in 1971 might be taught by an advocate of recent trends in catechetics and then in 1972 by a conservative devotee of the catechism. To help deal with such confusion, the CEO in 1975 asked, but did not require, all schools to appoint a Religion Coordinator.\(^ {80}\) This extensive and demanding role could embrace curriculum development, organisation of religious ceremonies, liaison with Religion teachers, school executive, clergy and parents. It is a role which is now seen as essential and mandatory in each school. So the promotion of the role of the Religion Coordinator was one way that the CEO tried to fulfil its responsibility for the supervision of Religious Education in the archdiocese. Nevertheless, the creation of this role of Coordinator was only a help towards easing the tensions and differences in the area. Local clergy or parents could criticise the Coordinator on matters of curriculum or the effectiveness of the Religious Education courses.

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\(^{78}\) *Come Alive* (Sydney, 1971). One of the writers of the series, Br Alfred Dolahenty fms, told the author on 21 April 1991 that the priest advisers never appeared to help them. It seems that Slowey just wished them to be available in the event of further criticism.\(^ {79}\) *Guidelines for Fifth-Sixth Form Catechetics*, p.3.\(^ {80}\) See pamphlet, 'Religion Coordinators', in Religious Education division CEOL.
A further initiative of the CEO was to set up at the Broadway premises a Catechetical Resources Centre. This was begun in late 1972 and soon had a staff of six members led by Sr Loyola Carmody osu.81 Initially the centre circulated to teachers a bulletin, "Catechetical News" and helped organise in-service courses.82 Again this function of providing Religious Education resources was welcomed by the schools and the CEO has maintained it ever since.

Nevertheless, sniping at the state of religious education continued in the 1970s and the CEO was sometimes the target. In 1972 Slowey addressed the Senate of Priests of the archdiocese in response to a letter from the Senate expressing "anxiety...shared by Priests, parents and teachers".83 In 1977 the Catholic Weekly carried articles and letters criticising errors and superficiality in Religious Education.84 Superiors of religious teaching congregations were concerned at this spate of criticism and complained, in a joint letter to Cardinal Freeman, about the lack of leadership of the CEO in the area of Religious Education, pointing to the fact that the CEO’s Director of Religious Education was then pursuing studies abroad and no Acting Director had been appointed.85 Slowey’s reply to the Cardinal’s subsequent referred inquiry indicated no ready answers in train for the intractable problem of reassuring parents and pastors of the adequacy of religious education, “the primary reason for the existence of Catholic schools”.86

The Primary Final Examination

Another curriculum issue affecting the CEO was that of the continuation of the Primary Final Examination which it had always conducted. In the mid 1960s there was considerable criticism of the examination, principally because it was claimed to be a highly competitive examination putting undue stress on children approaching adolescence and because comparable primary examinations had long been abandoned in the N.S.W. government schools. Such arguments were strongly advanced in

81See circular of Slowey to principals, 6 March 1973, in "Mgr Slowey" file, CEOL.
82Leaflet, "Catholic Schools 1973", CEOL.
83See his "Introduction to an Address on Education of Faith", 25 May 1972, in CEOL.
84See issues for June 1977.
85Br Kieran Geaney fms to Cardinal Freeman, 6 July 1977, in "Edu 4" file, SAA.
863 August 1977, "Edu 5" file, SAA.
1966 by a sub-committee of the Diocesan Supervisors. A further problem was that it was becoming extremely difficult to set papers in subjects such as Social Studies in which the government syllabuses provided for many optional variations of the course. In spite of these views, Slowey, when referring the Supervisors’ report to Cardinal Gilroy, respectfully opposed their recommendation:

...I believe that any evils associated with the examination are not caused by the examination itself, but by the emotional response of those who prepare the candidates. I believe that standards would drop if there were no external examination...  

Gilroy decided that the public examination should be retained but that results were not to be published in the Catholic Weekly.

Nevertheless the Supervisors’ opposition eventually prevailed. On 18 April 1969, Slowey announced to schools that “the Cardinal has approved a recommendation of the Catholic Education Board that the Primary Final be discontinued.” He stressed however that it should be replaced within schools by a positive program of testing.

An implication of this abolition was that the CEO, which had now delegated inspection to the Supervisors of the religious congregations, no longer had any direct measure of the effectiveness of the Religious Instruction in the primary school. Of course many catechetical observers and teachers would have argued that academic knowledge of doctrine should not be the main goal of Religious Education anyway.

Liaison with Government Authorities

One of the purposes of the Australian bishops in their creation of CECs in the 1930s had been that of enabling liaison with government authorities who had the authority to grant or withhold registration for the schools. This was increasingly important after 1965 as government finances were offered to Catholic schools and the Commonwealth government entered the area of school education. Most of the negotiation with governments was carried out by bishops or their advisers, and eventually by the

87 Report of Sub-committee Meeting re Primary Final, Monte Sant Angelo College, North Sydney, 24 March 1966, in “Education Office 1965-1966” file, SAA.
88 Slowey to Cardinal Gilroy, in letter attached to report, ibid.
89 Cardinal Gilroy to Mgr Slowey, 6 August 1966, ibid.
90 Circular Letter to Principals of Primary Schools, ibid.
Catholic Education Commissions created by the bishops in each state after 1974.

But the CEO maintained a part in this liaison. It promoted the circulation of the state government's *Education Gazette* in Catholic schools and encouraged Catholic teachers to attend state inservice programs. Catholic schools also had access to the Government Stores Department.

While the CEO was promoting this helpful relationship with government departments, in the 1960s the State Aid issue came to the political forefront and had to be taken into account by Catholic educational authorities. It was shown in Chapter Three how the Sydney bishops developed a negotiating committee to approach governments for the extension of funding.

The CEO supported the Sydney bishops' approach but did not involve itself in an overt public campaign. It was a non-political organisation administering schools on behalf of the Catholic Church. However, Ambrose Roddy was a member of Archbishop Carroll's negotiating committee and also administrative secretary of the CEO in 1963. Thus there was some unobtrusive CEO involvement in the campaign.

Perhaps CEO personnel of the period 1960-75 could nominate other functions that they carried out. Still, the above account certainly shows that the CEO had extended its range of activities and functions as it increased in numbers and complexity as an organisation. These changes lead on to the question of how the philosophy of the CEO developed during these years.

**Philosophy of the CEO 1960–75**

A brief account of the philosophy of the CEO for its early years of 1939–60 was given in Chapter Two. It was pointed out that Catholic educational authorities, who belonged to a Church which then defined itself as "the one, holy, Catholic and apostolic Church", believed it to be important that Catholic children receive Catholic instruction in a protected environment of Catholic parish and school.

In the 1960s, just as the Catholic Church of Vatican II was becoming more open to "the World", the CEO now appeared more willing to have
children in Catholic schools mix with the broader society. Schools were urged to participate in Education Week and British Youth Sunday. Teachers were encouraged to attend inservice courses run by the Education Department. Until 1968 schools had been forbidden to attend Anzac Day services conducted by a non-Catholic cleric. From 1969 they could attend them, as long as the parish priest approved the form of service beforehand.

No comprehensive document on the philosophy of the Catholic school in the context of Australia in the 1960s was issued by the CEO, and so one has to infer some main principles. One revealing source is the sermon delivered by Slowey, its long time Director, at the Annual Teachers' Mass, 12 March 1970. Here, in a year when the Director of the Melbourne CEO was questioning the Church investment in Catholic schools, Slowey reaffirmed his belief in the value of the Catholic school and argued that the first reason for such schools was that parents had a prior right of choice as to how their children be educated:

> The adequate and practical justification for the existence of the Catholic school rests securely on the desire of Catholic parents for this kind of school — a desire endorsed officially by the Church.

Thus, the schools depended on a "commission" from the parents and the Church. In nominating this "adequate" justification, he allowed that there was a theoretical justification which could be "conceptualised and expressed in the language and concepts of contemporary thought and philosophy". However he made no attempt to develop this.

Another feature of his vision of Catholic schools was that this choice of the parents and Church had meant the deliberate shouldering of a burden and struggle by parents, teachers and pupils:

> Let us take courage from the inspiration and sacrifices of our own parents and teachers, and from the sacrifices of the parents of the approximately one hundred and fifteen thousand pupils in Catholic schools in the Archdiocese of Sydney.

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91 CEO circular of 4 May 1962, SJCA.
92 For instance see CEO circular of 4 February 1966, SJCA.
94 In "General 68-71", CEOL.
95 ibid.
96 ibid.
97 ibid.
Slowey was talking here to teachers in the newly born system of Catholic schools. But this element of Catholic ideology was not new. The same theme of sacrifice and struggle had been present through this century. Thus it was evoked by Cardinal Gilroy in appealing to parish priests in 1963:

...To this end I am calling upon every Parish to maintain and, where possible, to increase its self-sacrificing efforts to provide Schools for the children of the Archdiocese. School-building must have priority over all other parochial projects.98

Slowey was prepared to continue the sacrifices and build more schools, even when some economic advisers were counselling consolidation and restraint. In October 1968 the Finance Committee of the CBFC advised that drastic action was needed to avoid a projected one million dollars short-fall in 1969 revenue. CBFC Minutes reflect Slowey’s counter view:

Monsignor Slowey said if a million dollars had to be saved it would probably mean cutting the system in halves, if not more. He felt basically and philosophically whatever we have to do we ought to carry on with whatever we have, as long as we can, even if it means only taking us into part of next year. He knew this was a complete diversion from the predictions of financial experts.99

The same concern was voiced in 1976 by Collins, the Assistant Director:

...an attitude seems to be growing that if no religious teachers are available then we should not be thinking of expanding the Catholic system. As these ideas conflict with our basic philosophy, I raise the matter for the attention of the Catholic Building and Finance Commission ...Appropriate examination of our funding systems and potential will demonstrate publicly our concern and our resolution to expand our school system whenever necessary and possible.100

When government per capita grants in 1969 ensured that increased revenues had averted the recent financial crisis, Slowey was still not thinking of consolidation and safety. He was now concerned for the lack of schools in developing areas and saw in the government per capita grants a new opportunity for extending the system to needy areas. He suggested that the CEO and CBFC encourage pastors to begin new Catholic schools which would thus attract state and federal per capita grants. Significantly, he suggested that these schools be started with lay teachers — the CEO was no longer relying on religious congregations:

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98Circular 19 July 1963, in “Director of Education 62-64” file, SAA.
99Minutes, 2 October 1968.
100From letter to Executive Secretary of CBFC 14 May 1976, in “Schools Commission B” file, SAA.
It was the kind of vitality to be envisaged. If one continued to accept subsidies for pupils and maintain schools only in built-up suburban and city areas, we would be in danger of some kind of stagnation. Such a (new) generation would go by default if nothing is done for the developing areas at a time when financial subsidies make new schools possible.\textsuperscript{101}

Thus, at the end of this decade of massive building and rationalisation, the Sydney CEO was firmly committed to the preservation and extension of Catholic schools. It perceived and portrayed them as justified by the choice of parents and Church and by the sacrifices of Catholics since 1880. In the above statements of the CEO leaders, Slowey and Collins, one notes an element of defiance of the views of financial advisers who were urging caution and consolidation rather than expansion.

\textbf{Conclusion}

A system of Catholic schools was created in the Archdiocese of Sydney in the period c.1960-75. The lot fell to the CEO, in conjunction with the CBFC, to take responsibility for this expanding system. Consequently there was immense change and development in the CEO itself.

From a small team of about five in the early 1960s, the CEO grew to about fifty in 1977 and included a much wider spectrum — men and women, members of religious congregations, lay consultants and specialists. Women now outnumbered men, although not in the top positions of authority. While the number of priests declined, the remaining two held the two highest positions of authority. The small team of inspectors had become a more complex organisation, with bureaucratic features such as an extended hierarchy, the growth of departments and the use of committee procedures. At the same time, the relative independence of these new departments accorded with a loosely coupled model of organisation. Twice in the period the CEO moved premises to accommodate the increased staff.\textsuperscript{102}

Responsibilities of the CEO had increased and become more complex. It continued to be a liaison office in matters of schooling between the bishops and religious congregations, parish clergy, parents, and state authorities. But now it also had to work with the CBFC and CEC. It continued to supervise schools, especially in the area of religious

\textsuperscript{101}ibid., 3 November 1969.
\textsuperscript{102}It would appear that in these changes of location much archival material has been lost.
education, which had become a minefield of criticism. Additional functions and responsibilities came from the creation of the system of schools. The CEO now had to allocate staff to systemic schools (in accordance with the budget approved by the CBFC), to organise inservice for teachers, and to report to the CBFC on accommodation and building requirements for the system.

In the period 1939–60 the main function of the CEO had been to maintain some supervision, on behalf of the archbishop, over the religious education and general condition of schools managed by religious congregations. After 1965, the CEO, in conjunction with the CBFC, assumed a management role as religious congregations handed control of their schools to the new Sydney system. This administrative function of the CEO/CBFC came to overshadow the earlier function of supervision of religious education. The latter function remained, but its fulfilment was greatly complicated by the pluralism and even polarisation of opinion aroused amongst Catholics after Vatican II.

Most of this change and growth in the role and composition of the CEO occurred in reaction to the many challenges of the period. There is no sign that they followed a long-term plan. Problems and criticism arose in the 1970s, leading to a lengthy search for an improved structure for the administration of the new Catholic system, and this will be explored in the next Part.
Part III

Restructuring the Administration

c.1975-87
Chapter Six
Curbing The Excesses

The Sydney CEO changed and developed rapidly in the period 1960-75 because it was asked to respond to challenges posed by substantial changes and pressures which were international, Australian, ecclesiastical and educational. These CEO developments set within this quite volatile world and Catholic Church provided the content for Part II of this study. While these times could be exciting, there were excesses and extremes in the movements and the changes affecting society in general, the Catholic Church, and Australian Catholic schools. It was shown for instance how the rapid implementation of ideas of the Second Vatican Council was unsettling and uncomfortable for many Australian Catholics. Others agreed with the need for change, but saw many of the changes as hasty, extreme or shoddy. In Catholic schools the abandonment of catechisms in Religious Education led to superficial, uncoordinated, experimental programs which brought down heavy criticism on the schools.

A reaction to this turbulence developed in the following years c.1975-87, involving some return to conservatism in both general society and the Catholic Church. The dust needed to settle, excesses had to be recognised and curbed. This was the general mood of the period, although there were exceptions, such as the debate over environmental protection.

For Sydney Catholic schools and the Sydney CEO the reaction took the form of establishing, shaping and refining policies and structures for the new system and new CEO which had emerged in the period 1960-75. The next decade exposed many of the teething problems of the new system and its administration. After protracted tinkering with the system, there was a flurry of reconstruction in the mid 1980s which led to the establishment of what might be termed a “New Model” CEO in 1987. This final Part of the study will examine efforts to adjust and improve the Sydney Catholic system and to clarify the role of the CEO within the system. The consequent changes to the structure, personnel and activities of the CEO which resulted in a stronger CEO will make up the last chapter of the section. To understand these changes it is helpful to begin with a review of the wider context of this period, c.1975-87.
Return to Conservatism

Protest movements were much less evident in this period largely because their protests had been addressed at the legislative level, whether in the form of Civil Rights Acts for U.S. blacks, Land Rights for Australian Aborigines, or equal opportunity laws for women. Movements and causes remained but their supporters no longer had such spectacular and blatant grievances to campaign against. Further progress required persistent, patient and detailed work to analyse and remedy the gaps and failures in the legislation.

Meanwhile there was ample evidence of a widespread desire to return to traditional ways and policies and to rein in the reformists of the 1960s. In the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev had nipped the “Prague Spring” in the bud in 1968 and in the late 1970s was concerned to maintain Soviet influence in Afghanistan. U.S. colleges returned to some stability, especially after troops left Vietnam and President Nixon resigned. By 1980 U.S. voters sought the security promised by Ronald Reagan with his appeal to traditional morality and national pride. In the south and west of the U.S.A. biblical fundamentalism increased its already strong influence. A similar movement was seen in the Islamic world with the spread of radical Islamic fundamentalism in areas such as Iran. Britain’s equivalent leader was Margaret Thatcher, with her “dry economics”, dismantling and privatisation of government enterprises and Falklands flag waving.

Economic recession was a major factor in the turn to conservative management. Western nations, grappling with an energy crisis, rising unemployment and inflation, sought ways to cut their spending. Reductions were often in domestic or social welfare areas because military spending remained high in response to the demands of a rekindling of the U.S.–Soviet arms race in the early 1980s, and instability in the Middle East.

The Whitlam years in Australia had brought extensive change in areas such as education, Aboriginal land rights, health care, withdrawal from Vietnam and independence for New Guinea. For many it was an euphoric time which ended in bitterness and recrimination with the disabling and dismissal of the government and a legacy of economic crisis.
At the 1975 federal election Australians rejected the social reform emphasis of the Labor Party and put their hope in Malcolm Fraser’s promises of better economic management and more controlled government spending. Despite a resources and property boom in the early 1980s there was still high inflation and unemployment. Moderate Labor governments were in power in several states and from 1983 also at the federal level. Hawke’s Labor government approach was very different from the “crash through” methods of Whitlam. It promised to reduce divisions and confrontation by “consensus” politics and the convening of an “Industrial Summit” which led to a series of “Accords” amongst governments, unions and employers. Consequently there was a blurring of traditional differences amongst political parties. Voters preferred competent managers to ideologues.

**Education in Australia**

Economic difficulties from the mid 1970s impelled governments to seek ways of reducing costs in schooling, especially through supervision of expenditure and requirements for accountability. Catholic schools and CEOs, now funded in great part by governments, had to make administrative arrangements which would satisfy government demands for financial accountability.

The federal government continued to increase its influence in education policy. The Liberal-National Party coalition under Malcolm Fraser maintained the federal Schools Commission which sought to promote equality of opportunity through helping schools to achieve “equality of outcomes”. Schools were assessed for their needs and continued to be graded into categories according to their need for funding. The Commission also influenced schooling by directing funds for specific purposes such as Disadvantaged Schools and Multicultural Education programs. Concerned about youth unemployment and community criticism of standards of literacy and numeracy, the federal government canvassed the notion of a “Core Curriculum” for Australian schoolchildren, strove to improve retention rates in senior secondary school, and encouraged the development of TAFE colleges.

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Immigration policy was a significant concern for the federal government and had important implications for education. The sector of the Australian population coming from a non-English-speaking background continued to increase, with a significant shift towards Asian immigration. In the period 1971-80, 27.2 per cent of immigrants were from Asia (30.4 per cent still from the British Isles). In 1981-7, 35.9 per cent were Asian immigrants (10.4 per cent Vietnamese), with only 22.7 per cent from Britain.\(^3\)

By 1975 previous government approaches of "assimilation" and "integration" of migrants had been replaced by the now accepted policy of Multiculturalism, although Australians still had varied understandings of the term. For the federal Schools Commission the policy meant substantial funding provision for English as a Second Language programs and for Multicultural Education. Community language schools were also funded by the government from the mid 1970s.\(^4\)

Another emphasis of the Schools Commission was the devolution of decision making from central bureaucracies to the individual school and its community. Curricula were to be shaped to local needs. External examinations were scaled back further and in some areas completely replaced by assessments carried out by the schools. It will be shown that this policy of devolution of authority away from the centre would be an important development in Sydney Catholic schools.

Regarding the ancient State Aid issue, Prime Minister Whitlam claimed in 1974:

> ...we buried once and for all the futile and divisive debate over so-called 'state rights' and 'state aid' for schools. We not only freed vast amounts of money for schools, we freed the whole debate on education, so that from now on, parents, teachers and education authorities can engage rationally in discussion about what is best for our schools.\(^5\)

This was true to an extent, but there was still some opposition to government funding. However the opponents received a major setback with the failure of the constitutional challenge to government funding

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\(^2\)In 1982 the original twelve categories were reduced to three.


brought to the High Court by the Defence of Government Schools Council in 1981. It was interesting too that criticism of government aid to private schools tended now to be on the lines of the Schools Commission argument of economic need and opportunity. Was it right to redistribute government funds from ordinary schools to further advantage wealthy private schools? Of course most Catholic schools would not be in the wealthy category and so Praetz has observed that

...the basis of the state aid debate moved from religion to class. For the first time, Catholic schools were shown to be among the most impoverished in the nation. Along with other disadvantaged pupils, those in Catholic schools needed financial help.\(^6\)

It was also consistent with the demise of assimilation policies for migrants and the endorsement of multicultural education. If pluralism in cultures was endorsed by governments and received some financial support from them, a similar argument could be made for funding a variety of religious schools.

Above, then, are some of the major external features and trends of the period 1975-87 which would have a bearing on Catholic schools and the development of the CEO. Undoubtedly the catalogue could be extended. For instance Crittenden sees a “considerable support for relativism not only in moral and aesthetic values but in any kind of knowledge.”\(^7\) What then of developments in the Catholic Church itself?

The Catholic Church c.1975-87

Galvanised by the Second Vatican Council, the Church had undertaken and been disturbed by unprecedented changes in theology and outlook, as was outlined in Chapter Three. Attempting to be more “catholic”, its leaders addressed all of humanity and not just Catholics on issues such as poverty, war and social justice; they engaged in dialogue with other denominations and with Communist leaders. Paul VI and, notably, John Paul II visited most countries, including Australia. Previous popes had rarely travelled outside Europe.

The demography of the Catholic Church was changing. In 1980 there were an estimated 785 million Catholics, making up 18 per cent of the world

\(^6\) ibid.

\(^7\)“Philosophy of education in Australia”, in Keeves, Australian Education, p.7.
population. While Church government headquarters was in Europe only 200 million Catholics lived there, whereas there were 350 million Catholics in the Americas. On the other hand there were only about 56 million Catholics in the whole of Asia. In Western Europe and North America there was a significant fall in the number of priests and members of religious congregations and a rise in their average age. A similar pattern occurred in Australia.

With the reduced numbers of priests and the encouragement given to lay responsibility since Vatican II, there has been some movement towards lay leadership. Usually this involved membership of advisory boards in a diocese or a parish and much depended on the willingness of the local clerical leader to allow participation in decision-making. In developed countries many of the laity have also gained tertiary degrees in theological, biblical and other religious fields. Naturally they look for ways of using their knowledge and expertise in the church ministry.

As has been indicated for western society in general since 1975, there was also a conservative reaction within the Church. This certainly appears to be reflected in the administration of John Paul II, elected Pope in 1978. A crowd-pleasing and much travelled leader, he has nevertheless used his influence to "hold the line" of traditional policy on issues such as attitudes to Communism, sexual morality and the requirement of celibacy for priests. It is claimed that he is gradually replacing progressive bishops with conservative ones, especially in developing areas where "liberation theologians" are calling for active involvement by the Church in politics. The head of the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith, Cardinal Ratzinger, is also a modern byword for conservatism. The theologian Hans Kung has likened John Paul to another crowd-pleasing and conservative Pope, Pius IX. However it should be remembered that such an image is only true for the period after 1960. John Paul II would probably be considered a liberal in comparison with most earlier popes this century.

As regards Australia, Paul Collins has sketched a profile of the Catholic population for the early 1980s:

8These and following figures are given in Paul Collins, *Mixed Blessings* (Melbourne, 1986), pp.129-135.
Catholics constitute about 27 per cent or about 4 million people out of just over 15 million. The Catholic population is growing at a marginally faster rate than the general population, it is much younger, has more women than men, is centred in south-eastern Australia and has a larger number of migrants from non-English-speaking backgrounds.\(^9\)

Clearly, immigration trends have eroded the older Irish-Australian base of the Catholic Church.

Metropolitan leaders have changed in the period. In Sydney, James Freeman was succeeded by Edward Clancy in 1983. Archbishop James Carroll, the veteran auxiliary bishop and church lobbyist, was still a major influence in New South Wales Catholic education until the early 1980s, but his place has since been taken largely by Bishop Murphy of Broken Bay, Bishop Robinson of Sydney and Archbishop Francis Carroll of Canberra-Goulburn. In Melbourne, Thomas Little replaced Cardinal Knox in 1977 and in Brisbane Francis Rush became archbishop in 1973.

Commentators have not been kind to Catholic episcopal leaders in this period. In the eyes of Patrick O'Farrell

...the episcopacy of the mid-1980s consisted of forgettable men, pleasant, well-intentioned, eminently prayerful, but apparently bereft of dynamic, or innovative spirit...

The generally debilitated condition of episcopal leadership in the 1980s constituted a major problem in a church traditionally so led. Inertia prevailed within.\(^10\)

Paul Collins agrees that the Australian bishops collectively "still seem a hesitant, unadventurous group, unable to master much creative leadership". He suggests that they have been "frightened into conformism" by memories of past divisions aroused by the outspokenness of leaders such as Mannix and Cullinane.\(^11\)

Furthermore, there has been a decline in the number of priests available to lead parishes. In Sydney the ratio of priests to laity has risen from 1:1750 in 1966 to 1:2650 in 1986 while the average age of priests has risen from about 33 to about 53.\(^12\) At the same time there have been relatively few candidates entering seminaries to train as priests for the future.

\(^9\)ibid., p.183.
\(^10\)Catholic Church and Community, p.442.
\(^11\)Mixed Blessings, pp.189-190.
\(^12\)ibid. p.194.
Similar declines have affected the religious congregations. For example the number of sisters declined from 14,622 in 1966 to 10,575 in 1986 and these latter had an average age of 58. On the other hand it should be noted that many sisters have undertaken advanced tertiary studies in recent decades and have fulfilled roles which in earlier years would have been performed by priests. They have become assistants to parish priests, inspectors and consultants in CEOs, lecturers in teachers colleges, even members of Marriage Tribunals.

Thus it is clear that, while the total population of Catholics has grown in recent decades, a shortage has developed of the traditional local leaders — priests, sisters and brothers. There was obviously an opportunity for the Australian Catholic Church to heed the encouragement given by Vatican II and theologians in recent years to allow lay people to help fill the leadership vacuum. For this to happen, the new lay ministers required adequate education in the appropriate areas, pastoral, scriptural and theological. There has been a strong increase in the number of lay people undertaking such courses. Generally however these lay people have to pay their own way and when they gain qualifications they still face difficulties in finding opportunities to use them in the traditional parish structure. Patrick O'Farrell saw few reasons for hope at the end of these years:

Twenty years after the end of the Second Vatican Council...the Australian Catholic Church remains in a kind of suspended animation. Its daily work of prayer, sacraments, charity and teaching proceed, but no longer in the atmosphere of certain security that pervaded its old world....The collapse of confidence has been so complete...as to call into question the recuperative powers of a body laid low by the challenges of change.13

He does admit glimmers of hope, such as the Church’s “resources — the young lay people generally”. Also the present account of the Church’s maintenance and expansion of the Sydney schools reflects an overcoming of O'Farrell's “collapse of confidence” which probably did affect schooling in the late 1960s.

**Catholic Schools in Australia c.1975-87**

A decline in the enrolment of pupils in Catholic schools as a percentage of total school enrolment for the period 1960-75 has been noted in

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13Catholic Church and Community, p.447.
Chapter Three. With the help of government funding this was reversed after 1975. Thus 16.9 per cent of Australian pupils were in Catholic schools in 1976, increasing to 17.9 per cent in 1981. The increase represented about 35,000 pupils and 70 new schools.\(^\text{14}\)

The growth of the private school sector and increasing Commonwealth funding for private schools, with Catholic schools comprising the bulk of these, caused great concern in the government schools and helped to inspire the already mentioned, unsuccessful DOGS challenge in the High Court. Catholic authorities tried to avoid confrontation with the government school lobby and, in their submissions to government, emphasised the common needs of both government and Catholic schools. The Schools Commission increased funding for Recurrent Costs in Catholic schools over the period since 1975 at least in line with inflation, but reduced the amount given for capital development.\(^\text{15}\) This has meant that staff salaries have been met but there is some difficulty in expanding school facilities or in building schools in new areas where the need arises.

Another feature of this period has been the establishment of a more coordinated and streamlined network of administrative leadership of Catholic schools. In the early 1970s a considerable number of committees and organisations had been set up to negotiate with state and federal governments. By 1975 these sometimes overlapping groups had been rationalised so that in each diocese there was a Catholic Education Office, in each state a Catholic Education Commission (CEC), and in Canberra the National Catholic Education Commission (NCEC). The latter was established in 1974, under the chairmanship of Bishop Frank Carroll of Wagga, and was serviced by the Federal Catholic Education Office, which had been operating in Canberra since 1968 especially for the gathering and coordination of information on Catholic schools across the nation. The advent of the Schools Commission in 1973 was a major catalyst in the setting up of this network of administration and communication.

Laicisation of the staffs of Catholic schools and of CEOs accelerated in this period. Between 1971 and 1976 a third of religious sisters left primary

\(^{14}\)Figures from Praetz, *Public Policy and Catholic Schools*, pp.52-3.

\(^{15}\)Ibid., p.60 for 1976 to 1980. Currently in 1992 it is notable that Catholic authorities have been placing the need for increased capital funding before political parties preparing for the next federal government election.
school teaching to engage in other work.\textsuperscript{16} Thus by 1979 about four out of five teachers in Catholic schools were lay and the total number of teachers had grown substantially, with a resulting decrease in the pupil-teacher ratio.\textsuperscript{17} Most principals were still religious but the number of lay principals was increasing. In 1973 about 1 per cent of principals were lay persons; by 1979 it was 26 per cent nationally.\textsuperscript{18} A similar transformation occurred in the CEOs, as will be shown by the example of the Sydney CEO in Chapter Eight.

Reasons for the takeover by the lay teachers and lay administrators included the funding available to pay salaries comparable with those in the government systems, the decline in the number of religious available for this work, and the more positive Church appreciation of the laity as exemplified in the documents of Vatican II. In the area of Catholic schooling, the role or ministry of the laity as affirmed by the Vatican Council has thus been much enhanced.

As the school staffs became increasingly laicised, the need for communication, unity of effort and cooperation amongst teachers, parish clergy and hierarchy was an important issue. Catholic lay teachers were better educated and more assertive than those of the 1960s. They had to relate to parish priests and bishops who were on average a generation (or even two generations) older than them, in a Church whose international and Sydney leadership had become somewhat conservative, as noted above. Lay teachers in many primary schools before 1965 had seen the parish priest as one of their employers. Now they were paid by the CEO. In these general changes, one can see potential for greater distance and misunderstanding between school staffs and church authority.

Communication and cooperation was facilitated, however, by CEO leaders and by school executives. The leadership of both CEOs and schools tended to be Catholics who had grown up before Vatican II and appreciated the changes that the Church and schools were undergoing. Many CEO leaders, school principals and assistant principals were members or ex-members of religious congregations who could act as a communication

\textsuperscript{16}\textit{ibid.}, p.35.

\textsuperscript{17}Figures from P. Donnan, "An Encounter with the Challenge of Lay Administration", paper given at Second National Catholic Education Conference, May 1980, p.5.

\textsuperscript{18}\textit{ibid.}, p.5.
bridge between church authorities and the younger lay teachers (including some non-Catholics) who made up the majority of the teaching staffs. Thus the religious congregations continued to exert an influence for stability and tradition in the schools, even though their numbers in the schools had greatly declined. Older lay teachers also served this function.

With the essential support of government funding, Catholic school systems became well established in each diocese in this period. At the head of each system was a Catholic Education Office, the structure of which varied from diocese to diocese. Having become administrative leaders of diocesan systemic schools, the CEOs faced a variety of challenges in the period. As religious congregations handed over their schools to the CEO administrators, the latter had the responsibility of maintaining a distinctive ethos in the schools which would justify their continuation as separate Catholic schools. Related to this challenge was the ever-present difficulty of providing an acceptable religious education curriculum. With government funding came the need for uniform management procedures, disclosure of finances and accountability for the use of funds. Here the Catholic schools faced the pressure of being accountable, while guarding their autonomy against increasing government influence.\textsuperscript{19} The development of centralised systems has also tended to distance administrators from local concerns and so there has been a need to create structures which allow for local and regional representation.

Such were the challenges for CEOs administering systems of Catholic schools in the period 1975-87. Against this background the next Chapter returns to the changing role of the Sydney CEO in its task of administering the schools of the Archdiocese of Sydney.

\textsuperscript{19}Catholic administrators in New Zealand have experienced difficulties in this regard after they opted to "integrate" most of their schools with the government system.
Chapter Seven
Restructuring the Systemic Administration

By the early 1970s there was a system of Catholic schools in the Sydney archdiocese replacing the disparate networks of schools previously controlled by religious congregations. Authority and influence over these schools was rapidly shifting from the religious congregations to the two organisations, the CEO and the CBFC. In addition, because of the growth of government funding, the archdiocese could no longer act independently and so had to work with both state and national Catholic Education Commissions.¹ Thus the new system of schools was managed by a network of several organisations, the two most important being the CBFC as the financial arm and the CEO as the educational arm. The archbishop and his three auxiliary bishops were members of the CBFC and so there was direct episcopal involvement in important policy decisions.

This structure for administering Catholic schools had grown in an ad hoc fashion, addressing needs, problems and pressures as they arose. These pressures and problems were seen as primarily financial and so both new organisations, the CBFC and CEC, were chiefly concerned with funding.

Soon it became evident that there were difficulties in the relationship between and the CBFC and CEO. Parents of children in the system received an annual leaflet which baldly stated that the CBFC was “responsible for the financial conduct of the Regional and Parochial schools” and the CEO was responsible for “coordinating and administering the educational aspects of Catholic schools”.² The problem was that many issues had both educational and financial aspects, one of which usually had to receive priority. Often the CBFC’s financial arguments won the day because most important decisions were made at CBFC meetings (normally chaired by a bishop) where the CEO had only two or three voting representatives. Moreover, the CBFC had the advantage of controlling the funds of the system. So there were problems of power and of differing perspectives —

¹See Chapter 3.
²From 1978 leaflet, "Catholic Schools Sydney - 1978", CEOL.
the CEO could perceive the CBFC as restricting its educational initiatives and the CBFC could worry that the CEO was financially irresponsible.

A major strand of this chapter is the controversy over whether this dual control of the system should remain and whether the CEO should take over financial management of the schools. It will be shown below that the issue appeared in various inquiries on the administration of the system and that eventually in 1986 it was decided to end the system of dual administration and to give the CEO control over the finance office. Some members of the CEO and CBFC would have seen this as a struggle for power, eventually won by the CEO. In other eyes it was a prudent restructuring made necessary by new conditions. Whatever interpretation is given, it represents a major change in the role of the CEO. It was also to involve a new model of administration in which the archbishop would hand over leadership of the system to a Board, and management to the CEO. The CEO would be responsible to the Board and the Board to the archbishop.

Apart from the CEO–CBFC issue, there were questions about the future of the system. In the 1970s further change was expected, but there was little sign of an overall vision or master-plan for Catholic schooling which might accommodate future pressures. Criticism and debate about the system and its administration intensified in 1972 and in the period 1980–1987.

In 1972 there was a flurry of debate stimulated by two factors. Firstly, there was a federal election pending and all major parties had now been won over to substantially increased funding for private schools. State Aid was a prominent issue in the 1972 campaign and had significant implications for the administration of the new Catholic systems. Secondly, all the dioceses of Australia were experiencing similar changes and they had scheduled the First National Conference on the Administration of Catholic Education to be held at the University of New England, Armidale, in September 1972. Important promoters of the conference were Professor W.G. Walker of the University of New England and Mgr J.E. Bourke of the Federal Catholic Education Office. The educational administration of the various archdioceses would come under scrutiny at the conference and comparisons would be made.
Criticism and Calls for Reform

Perhaps in anticipation of ideas and debate likely to surface at Armidale, Slowey submitted to Archbishop Freeman in July 1972 a proposal for the CEO and CBFC to be merged in a Catholic Education Commission which would retain the existing CEO and would be served by committees for Finance, Development and Planning, Building, and Information. A key recommendation was that the top positions in the Commission would be Director General (presumably Slowey, the present Director of the CEO) and Assistant Director General — Administration and Finance. This would remove the autonomy of the CBFC by bringing it under the authority of the Director General. Along with the system of committees, Slowey proposed the creation of a Catholic Education Board which would advise the Director General on any matters of policy or procedure. He acknowledged that his proposal was drafted by a senior CEO officer, Les McGuire, whose basic position he quoted:

> The present system with confused lines of communication, duplication of responsibilities and effort, staff shortages in vital areas, is unable to fulfil its function adequately.

Thus the issue of dual administration of the system was confronted by Slowey with the proposal that the Director be given authority over both the educational and financial arms of the administration. The proposals were not accepted by Archbishop Freeman. It is likely that the CBFC would have resisted its proposed subordination to the CEO. Moreover, Archbishop James Carroll, who had close associations with members of the CBFC, was opposed to the bringing of the two offices under the control of the one Director General. He argued that as state government practice kept Treasury and Education as separate departments, each responsible to the premier, so the CEO and CBFC should stay separate, each reporting to the archbishop. So the dual administration was to remain.

Then in August 1972 a Catholic parent, F.J. Cuttance, submitted to Fr Collins of the CEO a Report to the Educational Development and Planning

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3 J. Slowey to Archbishop Freeman, 6 July 1972, in "1973 Education Office and Planning" file, SAA.
4 Ibid.
5 His notes of 20 July on Slowey’s proposals are ibid.
Committee\(^6\). The wide-ranging report advocated major changes, such as the replacement of clergy in the CEO with "dedicated educators/administrators of proven ability", a transfer of management of the system from bishops and clerics to educators and parents, and the transfer of the financial role of the CBFC to the CEO — again the issue of dual administration was being raised. After Slowey's proposals had been rejected it was unlikely that such a radical and trenchant report from a lay person outside the system could move the authorities to act. Nevertheless it was circulated and was part of a general concern for administrative change in 1972. Much of what Cuttance called for in 1972 was eventually implemented in the 1980s, particularly the establishment of an Education Board to supervise the whole administrative structure.

In September 1972, Catholic educational leaders met at Armidale for the national conference mentioned above. With the increasing importance of the federal government in the financing of Catholic schools, there were various proposals at the conference for the creation of a national system of Catholic education which would incorporate the existing diocesan systems. Since Catholic schools were traditionally administered in individual dioceses and registered by state departments of education, there was no chance that a centralised, uniform system would be established. Practically it was recognised that the need was to ensure efficiency of the diocesan administrations and collaboration amongst them. To this end the conference, which was only advisory to the bishops, agreed upon a brief set of summary principles and recommendations, termed "The Armidale Statement". As far as the reform of the Sydney system was concerned its fifth point was significant as a further call to action:

The time is overdue for a thoroughgoing investigation of the administration and organisation of Catholic education and for the delineation of more efficient and effective patterns of governance.\(^7\)

Thus in 1972 the Sydney educational leaders were aware of a substantial degree of criticism of the existing administration and decided to hold a meeting in Sydney on 19 November 1972. Slowey presented a paper which

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\(^6\)ibid. The committee addressed is presumably the Educational Planning and Development Committee of the CBFC.

\(^7\)Printed in P.D. Tannock (ed.), *The Organisation and Administration of Catholic Education in Australia* (Brisbane, 1975), p.244.
outlined the existing administrative structure and then a response was delivered by Gerald Gleeson. Gleeson was not a member of the CEO or CBFC. A former Director of the Department of Technical Education and in 1972 a member of the Public Service Board of New South Wales, he was experienced in the operation of bureaucracies. On the issue of the dual administration by the CBFC and CEO, he would retain both as independent organisations, but would add an Education Board which would be concerned with “general policy formulation” and would “make reports and recommendations to the Archbishop... on matters relating to Primary and Secondary Catholic Schools”. Essentially Gleeson opposed Slowey’s proposal to bring the CBFC under the control of the Director of Education.

At this point it is relevant to note the increasing involvement of Archbishop James Carroll in questions of restructuring the administration. He had long been influential in the campaigns for State Aid, especially as an auxiliary to Gilroy. Gilroy had created the CBFC in Sydney and had faithfully chaired its meetings. After Gilroy’s retirement in 1971, the new archbishop, James Freeman, had far less familiarity with the educational administration than Carroll and so Freeman allowed Carroll to investigate the restructuring needs of the schools administration.

In November 1972, Carroll asked Gerald Gleeson to make a study of the educational administration of the archdiocese (at the same time as Gleeson was responding to Slowey’s proposals for restructuring). His hastily compiled Report on the Administration of Catholic School Education - Sydney Archdiocese emphasised the need for reform:

...there is common agreement that the present administrative structures are unsatisfactory and inadequate to serve the system efficiently. Major weaknesses are lack of definition of authority at a number of levels, lack of accountability, lack of adequate forward planning, lack of community involvement. There is also common agreement that the Commission is too large and unwieldy...

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8 Paper 1 - Administration of Catholic Education in Schools of the Archdiocese of Sydney', in "Box 1" file, CEOL.
9 Paper 2 - Proposals for Change', in "1973 - Education Office Planning" file, SAA.
10 ibid.
The report was largely an amplification of his paper at the November 19 seminar mentioned above. As justification for retaining the Finance Commission as a body separate from the Education Office he cited government practice in which departments and their respective treasuries were independent of each other. He proposed the establishment of a Catholic Education Board of eight members, with the CEO Director as Executive Member. It would be "concerned with general policy formulation and not the day to day management of the Office." The CBFC should be whittled from its existing twenty members to eight "selected on ability and the time to serve the Commission". He also recommended that the CBFC be chaired by an auxiliary bishop (Carroll would be a logical choice), although he did not rule out Freeman's remaining as chairman. The CEO should be reorganised so that the Director and his staff could accept full "responsibility and accountability" for the management of the educational system.

This Gleeson Report took a conservative approach to reform in one major respect. Rejecting the proposals of Slowey and Cuttance, it advocated the retaining of the existing dual system of CEO and CBFC, but with some internal restructuring of each organisation. It seems that Archbishops Freeman and Carroll accepted this view. However there was no attempt to cut back the size of the CBFC, as Gleeson had advocated. The two organisations remained independent, each being accountable to the Archbishop of Sydney. No Catholic Education Board was created.

Thus the 1972 movement for extensive structural change withered away. It is likely that a main reason for preserving the status quo was that each of the above proposals for reform involved increasing the influence of the CEO at the expense of the CBFC. The latter organisation was the recent creation of the Sydney hierarchy, which respected the financial and management expertise of the members of the CBFC and its achievements in dealing with the funding and planning crisis of the 1960s. Archbishop Carroll's attitude was probably influential. It was illuminated by a letter to Archbishop Freeman in September 1973. While praising Gleeson as an "invaluable" adviser, he differed with him by preferring an enlarged CBFC which would give representation to interested people as yet unrepresented.

12 Gleeson, Report, p.7.
13 ibid., p.2.
14 ibid., p.5.
in the system, such as lay teachers.\textsuperscript{15} Carroll's vision of the CBFC included six subordinate committees one of which he called the Education Committee (or Board).\textsuperscript{16} Clearly this reconstructed CBFC would be very influential.

Gleeson had recommended that an auxiliary bishop should chair the CBFC and that Archbishop Freeman need not involve himself directly in education. Carroll, in the same letter, suggested that, because of his current involvement in federal and state committees considering the implications of the Australian Schools Commission's \textit{Schools in Australia} report, he himself might take this role and that he might concentrate more on educational responsibilities. Other auxiliaries could relieve him of some of his pastoral duties.\textsuperscript{17}

Carroll thus showed little enthusiasm for the various 1972 proposals for pruning the CBFC or creating an Education Board. This meant that the CEO retained its limited role as the "education arm" of the administration and the CEO-CBFC issue was still unresolved. Perhaps Carroll felt that administrative restructuring could wait, because in 1973 he was preoccupied with the challenges and opportunities of the Karmel Report which he regarded as promising more radical changes in finance and administration than even the Wyndham Report had produced.

Carroll believed that the Schools Commission programs could be implemented more effectively if the archdiocese was to be divided into regions. He noted that the Melbourne CEO had already appointed ten Regional Officers for this purpose and urged Freeman to move towards setting up educational regions.\textsuperscript{18} It was several years before action was taken by Freeman but then the process of regionalisation revived the question of restructuring the educational administration and the role of the CEO in that administration.

\textsuperscript{15}Carroll to Freeman, 27 September 1973, in "1973 -Education Office Planning" file, SAA.
\textsuperscript{16}ibid.
\textsuperscript{17}ibid.
\textsuperscript{18}ibid.
Regionalisation

Vatican leaders in this period were recommending that large dioceses, such as Paris or Westminster, should be divided so as to allow closer contact between bishop and people. In 1971 they directed that the Archdiocese of Sydney be divided. One way of doing this was by regionalisation. Archbishop Freeman became convinced that Sydney was too large a diocese and on 1 January 1978 he announced its division into five Pastoral Regions — Northern, Southern, Eastern, Inner Western, and Outer Western. Each region was placed under the care of an auxiliary bishop. It was hoped that this division of care, which was constituted on an experimental basis for five years, would allow closer and more effective pastoral contact within the archdiocese. Thus the regionalisation was meant to assist the bishops and clergy of the archdiocese in their various forms of ministry to the Catholic community. There is no evidence that regionalisation was sought by the educational authorities of the 1970s, the CEO and the CBFC.

Since schools provided one of the main forms of pastoral contact it was logical that the education system should somehow be matched to the five Pastoral Regions. How this might best be done was a difficult problem, but the Sydney hierarchy supported in principle what Archbishop Carroll termed “this historic re-structuring of the administration of Catholic schools”. Archbishop Freeman took a first step by commissioning Br Ambrose Payne fsc to make a report in which he would recommend appropriate ways of regionalising the administration of Catholic education within the archdiocese. Payne, a De la Salle brother, had been involved in teacher formation from the mid 1960s and from 1969 to 1979 was foundation Principal of Catholic College of Education (at Castle Hill), one of four Catholic Teachers Colleges in Sydney. He had also studied educational administration at the University of New England. He was a foundation member of the National Catholic Education Commission from 1974 to 1978 and a member of the Catholic Education Commission of

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19 Carroll referred to this decision in the above letter of 27 September 1973.
20 Barry Collins believed that Freeman was following current Roman preference for the reduction of dioceses. Interview 25 August 1988, transcript p.27.
21 Carroll to W.X. Simmons, 16 August 1977, in "Edu 4" file, SAA.
22 These were run by congregations at Glebe, North Sydney, Strathfield, Castle Hill and Dundas.
New South Wales from 1975 to 1982. James Carroll was chairman of both of these commissions. In Payne's work in the above roles he developed a respect for and friendship with Carroll who valued his advice on the administration of the schools.\textsuperscript{23}

Payne's First Interim Report was presented to Archbishop Freeman in early 1978.\textsuperscript{24} He recognised that the three months given him for preparing the report necessitated that it be seen as "interim". Nevertheless he displayed a familiarity with the state of Catholic clerical and school organisation in Sydney in the 1970s and a sensitivity to what he termed the "art of administration".\textsuperscript{25}

Payne's proposals for regionalisation involved major changes in the administrative structure of the Catholic system which would have markedly changed the role and composition of the CEO. The hypothetical "would have" is used because these proposals were not accepted. However they are worth noting because they presume a need to change the administrative structure in the late 1970s. A fundamental principle was an attempt to separate the "formulation and authentication of policy" from the management of the enterprise.\textsuperscript{26} For the formulation of policy and the advising of the archbishop, a new organisation would be created, the Sydney Catholic Education Council which would contain representatives from the central administration and the five proposed regions. Management of the system would be in the hands of central and regional Catholic Education Commissions which would replace and incorporate the roles of the existing CEO and CBFC. Key personnel in the Commissions would be the Chief Archdiocesan Education Officer and five Regional Education Officers, each of whose positions would be filled by advertising in the national press — this advertising itself being an innovative procedure in the archdiocese. His sketch of the proposed administration can be seen below in Appendix C. Optimistically he predicted, given the acceptance of the recommendations, "the effective

\textsuperscript{23}A measure of Payne's abilities is given in a tribute he received on 30 April 1991 when he was retiring as head of Catholic College of Education. Dr V Couch stated that in the previous forty years he had worked with fourteen principals of colleges of education. The two outstanding principals were Ivan Turner and Ambrose Payne.

\textsuperscript{24}Apparently it was unpublished. Only an undated copy is kept in "Educ 5" file, SAA. The early 1978 date is inferred from p.1 of the report.

\textsuperscript{25}ibid., p.4.

\textsuperscript{26}ibid., p.3.
reorganisation of the administration of catholic education in the archdiocese by 30 June, 1980."\textsuperscript{27}

In fact the Report bore little immediate fruit. Archbishop Carroll reported on 31 March 1978\textsuperscript{28} that the Sydney bishops had "given lengthy consideration to the First Interim Report ... and had recorded certain decisions." Firstly he himself had been appointed Episcopal Vicar for Education, a position above the other auxiliary bishops in educational matters. An Archdiocesan Education Council was to be created with "a financial arm and an educational arm". However this seemed to be an expansion of the CBFC but with "some increase in educational representatives." It was not the Sydney Education Council envisaged in the Interim Report, which would have merged the CBFC into an Education Commission. In the event, no Sydney Education Council was created.

Why were Payne's proposals shelved or rejected? One can speculate that they involved far-reaching changes, which would have required further research and careful planning. Suitable personnel would have been required to fill the proposed positions of Executive Officer and five Regional Education Officers and perhaps the bishops had questions about whether such suitable personnel were available. Public advertising of church positions was also against traditional practice. The proposals also involved shifts in responsibility and power from the existing CBFC and CEO. A clue to the answer was provided by Payne himself in the Report:

\begin{quote}
I feel obliged to place on record the alarming lack of confidence in the administration of Catholic education which was openly expressed by a wide cross section of those interviewed as part of the preparation for this Report. It is not an exaggeration to report that a significant number were of the opinion that nothing serious will eventuate from the present enquiry and that it is unwise to spend heavily in setting up structures which will further obfuscate an already unsatisfactory position.\textsuperscript{29}
\end{quote}

These comments point to an inertia within the system and indicate that the criticism and dissatisfaction documented for the early 1970s had degenerated into a level of pessimism.

\textsuperscript{27}ibid., p.16
\textsuperscript{28}From a copy of a letter in "Edu 5" file, SAA. The copy has no addressee.
\textsuperscript{29}Report pp.29-30.
The bishops persisted with their policy of regionalising the school system and in November 1979 commissioned another study, this time by Br Norman Hart fms. Hart’s experience had been in the roles of principal in pre-systemic Sydney schools and later of Supervisor of Secondary Schools for the Marist Brothers congregation. In the late 1960s he had been a member of the CEO Committee of Supervisors and had chaired the CEO’s Secondary Schools Committee. Thus, while not an actual employee of the CEO, he had gained experience of its working and of the system of secondary schools in the archdiocese.

His report, *Regionalisation of Catholic Schools*, was presented to Archbishop Carroll in May 1980. His original brief had narrower terms of reference than Payne’s and primarily involved delineating the role of regional co-ordinator for each of the Pastoral Regions. Consequently Hart concentrated on the regionalising of the CEO itself rather than on the restructuring of the total system. Specifically, he did not address the question of the continuation and role of the CBFC. Hence it is more appropriate to discuss the regionalisation of the CEO itself in the next chapter, which deals with the internal development of the CEO in the 1980s.

However, it was impossible to regionalise the CEO without considering the total system and so Hart did make some suggestions which affected the role of the CEO within the system. Like Payne he proposed the separation of policy formulation and administration. For policy he recommended the creation of a Sydney Catholic Schools Council and for administration the creation of a Sydney Catholic Schools Office. The Council would have resembled Payne’s Sydney Catholic Education Council. A significant difference is that Hart recognised that the Charter of such a Council was beyond the terms of his brief and that the CBFC would continue as a separate organisation within the system, even though he suggested that the Council “might assume some of the functions of the Catholic Building and Finance Commission.”

Hart’s recommendations for the regionalisation of the CEO itself were generally accepted by the bishops, as the next chapter will show. On the

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30See *About Catholic Schools*, vol. 3 no. 9 (March 1979).
31N. Hart, *Regionalisation of Catholic Schools* (Sydney, 1980).
32Ibid., p.16.
other hand, the CBFC was left untouched and no Catholic Schools Council was created. Thus his report influenced the internal development of the CEO but had little immediate effect on the role of the CEO in relation to the other organisations within the system. However Hart believes that in the long term the regionalisation strengthened the CEO as an organisation and encouraged its eventual incorporation of the financial arm.  

Thus by 1980 there had been criticisms and proposals but little change to the administrative structure of the system which had developed in the late 1960s. But in the early 1980s attention was being drawn to a related and partly structural problem. It was the question of appointment of leaders in the system. Simmons, the Deputy Director of the CEO, alluded to what he called the problem of “succession”:

I would respectfully point out that most if not all of the leading figures in the Catholic school system in the Archdiocese of Sydney are at or beyond the normal retiring age. It is obvious that we cannot rely indefinitely on their energy, ability, vision and initiative. …the transition in leadership is part of the educational challenge we must inevitably face in the future.  

Those near to retirement included Archbishops Freeman and James Carroll and Mgr Slowey. Simmons’ choice of language carried connotations of an administrative dynasty in charge of the school system; but perhaps the allusion was unintended. Hitherto such “leading figures” as the Director of Schools and the Deputy Director had been appointed by the archbishop, after private consultation with colleagues. This was traditional Catholic Church procedure. There was no public advertising of positions to the laity who were simply informed of the appointments by an official statement. By 1980 this method of appointment was under question and the issue would be raised in a new report by Ambrose Payne.

Another Payne Report

Reform of the system at the macro-level had still not been undertaken. Again Archbishop Carroll called upon Ambrose Payne. On 12 December 1980 he commissioned Payne to undertake another survey which had no specific terms of reference, but which Payne assumed, from the letter of

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33Interview 11 November 1991.
34“Moving into the Eighties”, (unpublished paper circulated within CEO), 1 February 1980, CEOL.
commission, to be dealing firstly with the "roles and responsibilities of key personnel in the Catholic Education Office itself."  

This second Payne report, submitted to the bishops in May 1981, looked at the adaptability of the CEO itself to the regionalisation of the school system and also discussed the functioning of the whole system, including the role of the CEO. This latter aspect of the report is most relevant here.

Key to Payne's recommendations was his analysis that the Sydney Catholic education system operated according to a "linear delegation" model. The bishop's responsibility to teach was delegated down through a series of levels from the Episcopal Vicar, to the Director of Schools, to lower levels in the CEO, and finally to teachers within the schools. For the efficacy of the model it was essential that access to the delegator (ultimately the archbishop) be "open, regular and continuous" and that "the higher level possesses the capacity to resolve matters referred to it from the lower level."  

His conclusions were scathing and trenchant:

- It is my view that the current operation of the Archdiocese in the matter of Catholic Education is characterised by a general breakdown of the "linear delegation" model ...It is my considered opinion that whilst the concept of linear delegation is posited on continuity in the relations existing between the delegator and those to whom he has delegated responsibility, the conduct of Catholic Education within the Archdiocese is best characterised by discontinuity. Indications of discontinuity are prevalent in all aspects of Archdiocesan involvement in Catholic Education.

A most alarming aspect of the discontinuity was that the Director of Schools [Slowey] "finds considerable difficulty in establishing contact with the Cardinal Archbishop and the Episcopal Vicar [Archbishop Carroll]" and that in practice the Deputy Director was seen by the Vicar as his most effective channel "in conveying Archdiocesan Policy to the Catholic Education Office". Furthermore, he noted that the Vicar and the Director

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36ibid., p.6.
37ibid.
38ibid., p.7.
were each unable, for “undoubtedly good and quite different reasons”, to “devote the time to the task which linear delegation demands.”

He saw consequences of such discontinuity as including a “general lack of confidence ... which prevents decisions from being referred, if necessary, or taken, if appropriate”, delays and impasses in the arbitration of disputes, and all parties being “driven to action and initiatives which are in fact individually and not collectively taken.” His report also dealt with problems within the CEO itself and with the demands of regionalisation. Reference will be made to this in the next chapter on the internal development of the CEO.

Payne did not discuss the working of linear delegation from the archbishop to the CBFC. This appears to be because he understood from his letters of commission that

the first part, to be presented in April 1981, if possible, was to concern itself with the roles and responsibilities of key personnel in the Catholic Education Office, Sydney.

Consequently both his criticisms and recommendations made no mention of the CBFC and there is no indication as to whether there was similar “discontinuity” in its dealings with the archbishop or the CEO.

The explicit target of Payne’s criticisms was not individuals, such as Slowey or Carroll, but the linear delegation model of administration which he believed unworkable in the 1980s when

the conduct of Catholic education in the Archdiocese demands relationships with many more schools, organisations, government and semi-government instrumentalities, parents, teachers, children, as well as a familiarity with wider areas of knowledge and expertise than was the case when the office and delegation to the Director of Schools was initially made.

Nevertheless the report carries at least implicit criticism of current leaders such as Slowey, suggesting that they were no longer abreast of the “wider areas of knowledge and expertise” required to advise the archbishop on complex policy decisions. At the level of day to day management of the system Slowey came under criticism:

39ibid.
40ibid.
41ibid., p.2.
42ibid., p.6.
Currently decision making at the maintenance level rests with the Director of Schools or the Assistant Directors, Primary and Secondary. In this regard it appears that the Director of Schools is reluctant to appear as the person primarily responsible for decision making within the organisation.\(^\text{43}\)

The thrust of the report, then, was a rejection of the existing model of administration of the Sydney system and a criticism (implicit at the very least) of the capability and performance of the current Director. Therefore Payne recommended that the archbishop replace this mode of delegation of his responsibility for education by a new model of administration — a mode characterised by "disengagement" of the archbishop and by "collegial" decision making:

> Essential to the variation of the mode of delegation is a movement towards a disengagement from direct responsibility at the level of the Ordinary [Archbishop Freeman] and the commissioning of a group of appointed persons to carry out the task of Catholic education in the Archdiocese according to general guidelines established by the Archbishop. The exercise of responsibility by the Archbishop would be in the context of appointment, the issuing of policy directives, systematic reporting and confirmation or discontinuance of appointment. The establishment of a group of commissioners would establish a "college" for purposes of decision making and have the chief executive officer responsible to an immediate and full time expert panel of which he would be one.\(^\text{44}\)

In practical terms, Payne was recommending that the CEO be made responsible to a "college" or "expert panel", which would have to be appointed by the archbishop. He was looking towards the corporate model of administration of large organisations in which an independent board formulates major policy and appoints a chief executive officer to be responsible for the overall management of the corporation.

This proposal was not new. As narrated above, Slowey and Gleeson in 1972, Payne in 1978 and Hart in 1980 had advocated some form of council or board to remove the burden of policy formulation and referred problems from the archbishop. What was significant here was the unflinching and challenging case made for urgent reform. The criticisms were too blunt and fundamental to brush aside.

What was the outcome of the report? Inertia for two more years. The report was not published and had very limited circulation. Nor were there any structural changes to the system in 1981–2. There was a leadership

\(^{43}\text{ibid., p.9.}\)
\(^{44}\text{ibid, p. 15.}\)
change in that Slowey resigned as Director of Schools at the end of 1981 and was succeeded by his Deputy, Br Walter Simmons, in January 1982. But there was no immediate move to respond to the series of calls to relieve the archbishop and Episcopal Vicar of the responsibility of being the ultimate resort in terms of policy formulation and of arbitration of difficult educational questions.

Several factors could explain the lack of response to the calls for restructuring of the systemic leadership. There was no indication that Archbishops Carroll and Freeman saw an urgent need for a board or took any steps towards establishing one. The CEO itself was preoccupied with the major task of establishing its five regional offices and defining their functions as laid out in Hart's program. There is also some evidence that CEO leaders feared that a board would be an additional encumbrance for CEO operations. In 1982 the CEO had created an internal board of its own Directors (Central and Regional) whose principal function, according to Simmons, the new Director, was "to develop policies and to order priorities that promote quality education in Catholic schools". Perhaps the CEO leaders feared that an additional external Board would complicate or restrict their initiatives in policy formulation.

Thus in the beginning of 1983 the administrative structure for leading and managing the archdiocesan schools system was essentially the same as in 1967 when the system was being inaugurated. And this was in spite of a series of criticisms and officially commissioned reports calling for major restructuring of the central administration. There were two recurring proposals in the reports. The first was for some form of education board or commission to which the CEO and CBFC would be accountable — a recommendation for which the administrative leaders had so far shown little enthusiasm. The second recommendation was for improved communication and coordination between the educational and financial arms of the administration. While all agreed with this in principle, there was great division over the means proposed for achieving the improvement, especially if it meant the incorporation of the CEO and CBFC into one organisation.

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45 This was a recollection of Ann Clark, a Regional Officer 1982-4 and Assistant Deputy-Director of the CEO 1984-6. Interview 21 October 1991.
46 W. Simmons, 'Educational Perspectives in 1982-3' - paper given at Southern Region Educational Conference, 6 July 1982, in "Edu 6" file, SAA.
Finally, in 1983, the first structural changes to the administrative leadership of the school system took place. They were very tentative and limited changes, but they represented the beginnings of a movement for systemic reform, which was to culminate in major change in 1986-7. In 1983 the Catholic Building and Finance Commission was renamed the Catholic Schools Finance Office (CSFO). The implication of this seems to have been that planning of buildings for the system was recognised as the responsibility of the CEO, which developed a small but influential planning unit headed by Bernard Edwards. Then in late 1983, Cardinal Clancy convened the first meeting of the Sydney Archdiocesan Catholic Schools (SACS) Board, soon to be known as the Interim SACS Board since it was to be replaced by a reconstituted board in 1985.

The SACS Board

Here seemed to be the board called for in reports stretching back to 1972. At its inaugural meeting at the Archdiocesan headquarters, Polding House, on 22 November 1983, the chairman was the Episcopal Vicar for Education, James Carroll. The other members, appointed by Archbishop Clancy, were Bishop P. Murphy, Fathers P. Brogan and T. Duggan, Brothers W. Simmons, K. Canavan, and J. Taylor, Sister Regina Bochat, Dr V. Couch, Mrs M. Norris, and Messrs H. d'Apice, P. Malouf, T. Daly, A. Coman, and B. McBride (Executive Secretary). These appear to have been selected because they were involved in important areas of the Catholic school system, including the CEO, the CSFO, the national and state CECs, principals’ associations, teachers colleges, parental associations and parish administration.

The decision to convene this Board may have been influenced by the fact that Archbishop Freeman retired in early 1983 and Edward Clancy was installed as the new Archbishop of Sydney on 27 April 1983. Also, within a few months, Archbishop Carroll was to retire as Episcopal Vicar for Education and be replaced by Bishop Murphy. Thus, by 1984, the long-serving leaders of the administration of Catholic education in Sydney, Freeman, Carroll, and Slowey, had been replaced by Clancy, Murphy, and Simmons. The bishops may have decided that this time of change in leadership was a good opportunity to make structural changes.

47 Interim SACS Board, Minutes, 22 November 1983, in CEOL.
But the composition of the new Board did not suggest that there would be major changes of direction in the education policy. While the CEO by 1983 had over 130 employees, only two of its members were on the SACS Board. The CSFO (formerly the CBFC) had only about 20 employees. Yet five members of the SACS Board had been long standing members of the old CBFC and the Executive Secretary of the SACS Board was Bernard McBride, who had been Executive Secretary of the CBFC/CSFO since 1969. Thus the CSFO was strongly represented on the new SACS Board and a reading of Board Minutes 1983–5 show a preoccupation with issues of finance and school building, very like the minutes of the former CBFC.

Cardinal Clancy had not given the board a clear mandate. Archbishop James Carroll, at the first meeting, explained that because of the development and increasing complexity of the Catholic school system over the last twenty years it was

...opportune...that a single body should be set up to advise the Archbishop, and endeavouring, as we each have some expertise — both in general terms and in some particular area — to exercise jointly our accumulated wisdom, with the help of the Lord, and to carry things on from this point.49

In fact, within this broad ambit, it was being left to the Board itself to define its own functions and procedures. To begin this task Carroll invited Simmons and Canavan to present some “Preliminary Thoughts” to the Board. These thoughts, analogous to a “Mission Statement”, emphasised a strong leadership role for the Board:

1. The Board should concern itself with the PROMOTION and IMPROVEMENT of Catholic schools in the Archdiocese. It should seek to maintain, better and develop Catholic schools in the five regions of the Archdiocese and provide the required leadership.

2. The Board should establish POLICY and delegate to the C.E.O. and the C.B.F.C. the responsibility for the implementation of policy and the associated MANAGEMENT functions....

6. The Board should hold accountable the C.E.O. and the C.B.F.C. for the leadership, and administration of the Catholic school system. The C.E.O. and C.B.F.C. should report to the Board, and to the wider Catholic school community, on a regular basis.50

Such ideas certainly involved fundamental reform of the Sydney system and would have more clearly defined the role of the CEO within the

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48See 'Present Functions of the Catholic Building and Finance Commission', 23 January 1984 - document provided for the SACS Board. See SACS Board Minutes, CEOL.
49ibid.
50ibid.
system. It is interesting that CEO leaders were being called upon to outline the functions of the new Board even though there is little indication that they had sought or welcomed the creation of a Board and they had no say in its composition. The increasing strength of the CEO in terms of educational and bureaucratic expertise was being recognised by the Board.

In February 1984 an official press release announced the establishment of the Board:

The primary purpose of the new Board will be to promote greater efficiency in educational administration by coordinating the operations of the Catholic Education Office and the Catholic Building and Finance Commission. The Board has also been given the task during 1984 of reviewing existing procedures and of recommending appropriate structures for the future.

This statement presupposed that the CEO and CBFC would remain as separate entities for the time being and that the work of the Board would largely involve improvement of procedures and relationships. This was not the focus expressed by Simmons and Canavan in their “Preliminary Thoughts” in November 1983, calling for strong leadership from the Board, especially in establishing policy. Further structural change was not portrayed as urgent.

Over the next few years the Board was not perceived as successful in its “primary purpose” of coordinating the activities of the CEO and CSFO. A major problem here, at least from the perspective of the CEO, was that there was an unhealthy competition for influence between the two bodies — a “them and us” atmosphere in which the CEO saw the CSFO as restrictive and over-cautious regarding the funding sought by the CEO, while the CSFO regarded the CEO as financially irresponsible and unrealistic. Such a characterisation has the limitations of a generalisation, but it is supported by the research of Canavan, the Deputy Director, who recorded dissatisfaction of CEO staff with the CSFO. In such competition the CSFO had the advantage of managing the funds

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51 With the exception of Hart who, in his *Regionalisation of Catholic Schools* (1980), p. 15, had envisaged a Sydney Catholic Schools Council.


53 This was the impression of Ann Clark, Assistant Deputy-Director 1984-6. Interview 27 October 1991.

54 He saw the dissatisfaction as related “to the struggle of an organisation to survive and develop, to be secure, to accumulate power, and to be autonomous.” K. Canavan, Perceptions and Expectations of Roles, Services, Structures, and Goals of the Sydney Catholic Education Office Held by Principals and CEO Staff, (Ed. D. Dissertation, San Francisco, 1986), p.264.
upon which the CEO depended. The creation of the SACS Board did not seem to improve the situation. This is likely to have been because the two strongest interest groups represented on the Board were the CSFO and the CEO.

During 1984 the Board met each month and addressed the task of reviewing administrative structures. Thus the April meeting of the Board received Discussion Papers which included "Functions of the Board", "Some Functions of the Catholic Education Office/Sydney", and "Some Functions of the Catholic Building and Finance Commission.55 But it seems that the questions of structural reform or significant policy formulation were swamped by major practical issues concerning the establishment of new schools. These actually illustrated to the Board the problems of the CEO and the CSFO having to work together on such questions. Consequently, little progress was made during 1984 on the question of structural reform for the central administration.

Nevertheless, Archbishop Clancy was apparently satisfied with the experiment of the Interim SACS Board because, in February 1985, the Interim SACS Board was replaced by the Sydney Archdiocesan Catholic Schools (SACS) Board which Archbishop Clancy now established "on a permanent basis".56 Its members, appointed for two years, were mostly drawn from the Interim Board and Bishop Murphy continued as chairman. Thus, by 1985, there had been limited, tentative changes in the leadership structure, but it is doubtful whether teachers or parents involved with Catholic schools would have perceived any significant changes. They were still in practice dealing with either the CEO or the finance office.

**Searching for a Better Administrative Structure 1985–6**

The creation of a Board did not satisfy the critics of the administrative structure. Essentially, it was a part-time addition superimposed on the old structure of the two independent organisations of the CEO and CSFO. It met once a month and had no permanent staff except for the Executive Officer of the Board, Bernard McBride, who was also head of the CSFO.

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55 See Minutes, 28 April 1984.
56 Minutes, 20 February 1985.
This potential conflict of interest, added to its part-time role, made it difficult for the Board to provide the leadership expected of it and to improve cooperation between the CEO and CSFO. Even though CEO budgets were now submitted to the SACS Board instead of the CSFO, the Board relied on CSFO advice when giving approval to the budgets.

There was urgent need for precision and definition of roles within the leadership structure, even if the total system was to remain "loosely coupled". Canavan concluded from his research in 1984–6 that

> The system is characterised by a confusion resulting from an uncertainty of the roles and mutual expectations of principals, priests, the CEO, the CSFO and the Sydney Archdiocesan Catholic Schools Board.

At the end of 1984 there were still no approved documents setting out the roles of the SACS Board, the CEO and the CSFO.

An attempt to remedy this situation was made in 1985. At the first SACS Board meeting in 1985, a printed Charter for the Board was circulated. The Minutes give no indication of its authorship, but the meeting agreed that it should be published and distributed in the Catholic community. The Charter was quite detailed, containing 28 articles extending over 9 pages. It assumed that the CEO and the CSFO would remain as separate instrumentalities.

Despite this initial optimism the Charter was not circulated beyond the Board and there was no immediate press release. This seems to indicate that the bishops and some members of the Board had second thoughts and saw the need for further reflection and clarification of roles. There must have been strong dissatisfaction with it because it virtually disappeared from discussion after 1985. So in 1985–6 there was still no definition of roles of the main organisations in the leadership structure.

In the ensuing attempts to define or redefine these roles one can discern some key questions, the answers to which would have a bearing on the role of the CEO in the administrative structure. They could be summarised as follows:

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57See discussion of organisational models relating to the CEO in Introduction.
58Perceptions and Expectations, p.28.
59A copy may be found in the "Restructuring" file, CEOL. It may have developed from a Provisional Charter tabled by Archbishop Carroll as Document E6.0.1 at the meeting of 26 September 1984. See SACS Board Minutes, 26 September 1984.
1. Should policy formulation (the SACS Board) be completely separated from management (CEO and CSFO) or should management leaders be members of the SACS Board? To date CEO and CSFO leaders had been members of the Board. A corollary of this question would investigate the extent of the Board’s involvement in the day to day management of the system.

2. What should be the relationship of the Director(s) of the management group to the SACS Board?

3. If management leaders were to be members of the Board, which leaders? Should CEO Regional Directors be members or should they be represented by central Directors? There was an argument maintaining that the benefits of regionalisation would be weakened if the regional offices were not directly represented on the Board.

4. Should the CEO and the CSFO remain as separate entities within the system or should they be merged into a single instrumentality?

On these questions the members of the new SACS Board were divided and uncertain. But, at their first meeting on 20 February 1985, the Board Chairman, Bishop Murphy, announced that Archbishop Clancy had commissioned one of the Board members, Dr Victor Couch, to undertake

...the Review of the whole question of Structures and Procedures of the Catholic Education Office and the Catholic Schools Finance Office ...and also the Review of the financial arrangements which exist between the CEO, the CSFO, the Schools and the Parishes; and finally, to recommend a cohesive set of Structures and Procedures as set out in the Charter of the Board.60

Couch was chosen because of his experience as a former deputy principal of Sydney Teachers College and as an adviser to the bishops in educational matters over the years. He indicated then that he hoped to complete the Review by May 1985. Information was to be obtained by interviews and from documentation made available from the relevant offices in the system.

In May 1985 he presented Part 1 of the Review to the SACS Board. This dealt with structures and procedures of the CEO and CSFO, inter-relationships between the central offices and the regional offices, and certain responsibilities of school principals with regard to the CEO and

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60 Minutes for 20 February 1985.
CSFO. He identified thirteen problem areas within the system, the tenor of which is indicated by some of the names he gave to them: "The Financial Accountability of Principals", "Failure of Principals to use or understand fortnightly pay summaries", "Fragmentation of Leadership Development", "An Inadequate System of Communication", "An Imbalance in the Organisational Structure", and "The Absence of A Central Filing System in the Catholic Education Office". To address each of the problems he made twenty Recommendations which would have brought the CEO closer to Weber's model of rational bureaucracy.

The Review raised a storm in the CEO where, at an informal meeting of CEO Directors on 14 June 1985, it received unanimous condemnation, expressed in comments such as "unhelpful document", "not appropriate change model", "does not address structural separation of the two Offices", "hidden agenda", and "too much influence from the financial realm".63

After further reflection and discussion, the CEO Board of Directors, on 21 August 1985, submitted to the SACS Board and Archbishop Clancy a "Response from the Board of Directors".64 They now accepted some of the problem descriptions and recommendations of the Couch Review, but took issue with the methodology of the investigation, the negative portrayal of the system, and with several of the recommendations. There was serious criticism of the process and methodology such as:

It was unfortunate that participants were not involved in planning the review process. The selection of interviewees was seen as limited at best... In one Department five or six persons were interviewed while in another Department no one was interviewed...It appears that a structured interview process should have been established and agreed upon before interviews were carried out.65

They concluded by implying that the Review had missed the wood for the trees:

The title of the review includes the word "structure" but the main elements of the structure of the Catholic Education Office were ignored. The Board of Directors, the Catholic Education Office Committees, the functioning of the Regional Offices,

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62 ibid., pp.42-3.
63 Minutes of Informal Meeting of the Board of Directors, 14 June 1985, In "Restructuring" file CEOL.
64 "A Response from the Board of Directors", 21 August 1985, in "Restructuring" file, CEOL.
65 ibid., p.2.
...were all neglected. A major problem in existing structures — the lack of clarification of the role of the Sydney Archdiocesan Catholic Schools Board, the Catholic Education Office and the Catholic Schools' Finance Office and their inter-relationship appeared not to be recognised.66

Such reaction seems to have dealt a body blow to Couch’s investigation. His recommendations had to be rethought. The second part of the Review was never compiled. One imagines that CEO members at least would have had reservations about further cooperation with the Review. In later 1985 discussions were held between Couch and CEO Directors after which Couch agreed to modify and consolidate his original thirteen recommendations into seven.67

The process of structural reform of the system had stalled. In May 1986 the SACS Board agreed to set up five Working Parties to deal with the amended Couch Recommendations (I to VI), but this step did not give promise of prompt change. Possibly Archbishop Clancy became concerned over the inertia because, on 10 June 1986, he wrote to the new Chairman of the SACS Board (Bishop Geoffrey Robinson68) a letter requiring the SACS Board to give “immediate attention” to the implementation of Recommendations I-VI of the Couch Report and to take responsibility for the re-structuring of Catholic Schools administration in Sydney to meet the requirements consequent upon the creation of the new dioceses.69

This latter direction points to a further development which complicated the task of structural reform but which also made it more urgent. At this time, in May 1986, the Archdiocese of Sydney had been reduced in size by the hiving off of areas in the north and west to create two new dioceses, the Dioceses of Broken Bay and Parramatta. These areas contained many schools under the administration of the SACS Board, the CEO, and the CSFO. From a schools point of view, these new dioceses corresponded to the Northern and Outer Western Regions of the former Archdiocese of Sydney and since 1982 each of these regions had been developing its own Regional Office of the Sydney CEO. There were many questions now posed by the formation of the new dioceses, but the key one was whether these Regional Offices should become new CEOs completely independent of the

66ibid., p.9.
67SACS Board Minutes 27 November 1985, pp.4-5.
68Bishop Murphy, the previous chairman, was now bishop of the new Diocese of Broken Bay.
69Quoted in SACS Board Minutes, 25 June 1985, p.2.
parent CEO at Leichhardt, or whether the educational administrations of the three dioceses should be integrated in some fashion. At this point in the story it suffices to say that the bishops of the three dioceses soon decided to establish CEOs completely independent of Sydney, although some services of the Sydney CSFO were to be used for about a year.

In mid 1986 it was evident that structural reform of the administration of the now reduced Sydney system was complex and making very slow progress. The Working Parties set up at the June meeting of the SACS Board seem to have been abandoned. But in July the Board tried again and appointed a small committee to

...clarify the roles and relationships of the Sydney Archdiocesan Catholic Schools Board, the Catholic Schools Finance office, and the structures and functions of the Catholic Education Office and the Catholic Schools Finance Office.70

Members of this new Working Party were Miss Ann Clark, (Assistant Deputy Director of the CEO), Br Kelvin Canavan (Deputy Director of the CEO), Mr Peter Stuart of the CSFO, Mr Alan Coman (principal of a systemic secondary school) and Dr William Moore (a former principal of the Catholic Teachers College at North Sydney). The creation of a somewhat representative committee was itself an innovation, since previous investigations and reports on the administrative structure had been delegated to individuals, all of whom (with the exception of Hart) had been from outside the system being investigated. In this case all of the committee (except Canavan)71 were members of the SACS Board and for the first time CEO presence was strong in that Clark was Convenor of the Working Party and Canavan was its Secretary. The participation of Moore gave a degree of credibility in that he was not an employee of the system being investigated.

Another factor, which was to be reflected in the Reports of the Working Party, was that Canavan had just returned from two years' study leave. His doctoral research had been closely related to the problems of the Sydney administrative system, as is indicated by the title of his dissertation —

70The revised recommendation is quoted in SACS Board Minutes for 20 August 1986. Ann Clark, Convenor of the Working Party, indicates that the establishment of the committee arose out of a recommendation she made to the SACS Board at its meeting in June 1986. Interview 22 October 1991.

71 He was just returning from study leave and was welcomed to the SACS Board at its first meeting in 1987.
Perceptions and Expectations of Roles, Services, Structures, and Goals of the Sydney Catholic Education Office Held By Principals and CEO Staff.  

This committee made substantial progress. They were helped by the fact that Archbishop Clancy had urgently directed the SACS Board to “take responsibility for restructuring of the Catholic Schools administration.” The Board then gave the committee terms of reference which were wide-ranging enough to address the whole system, yet were quite specific:

C.8 That during the remainder of 1986 and 1987 the roles and relationships of the Sydney Archdiocesan Catholic Schools Board, Catholic Education Office, and Catholic Schools’ Finance Office be reviewed and clarified.

C.9 That the structure and staffing of the Catholic Education Office Sydney and the Catholic Schools’ Finance Office be reviewed and determined in the light of Number 8. (This would include size and number of educational regions.)

Another factor was that the reduction of the Sydney Archdiocese through the creation of the two new dioceses simplified the introduction of a new structure.

The Working Party proceeded by interviewing the members of the SACS Board on major issues concerning the restructuring, holding meetings to consider the responses of the SACS Board members, and then drafting a report for the SACS Board’s consideration. After a draft Report was considered by the SACS Board, the Working Party attempted to revise and refine it in the light of Board recommendations or criticisms. Reports were submitted in September, October and November 1986, the last being substantially accepted as the basis for the reorganisation of the system.

In its first Report (September) the Working Party concentrated on defining the roles of the SACS Board and the Administration. Document A of the Report provided an extensive description of the role of the SACS Board, under the headings of Leadership and Direction, Financial Direction/Control, Development and Consolidation, Accountability, and Service to the Archbishop. Document B outlined the Role of the Administration, which was summarised as “The implementation of

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75Ibid., Document A.
policy of the Board, the administration and the operation of the system".\textsuperscript{76} Appended to the Report was a review diagram of the evolving organisational structure of the administration of Sydney Catholic schools from 1960. It is reprinted in this study as Appendix D.

In using the broad title of Administration, the Working Party left open the question of whether the educational (CEO) and financial (CSFO) agencies should be merged. However, a substantial Appendix to this first Report, outlining findings from research and previous investigations, as well as summaries of the responses of SACS Board members to the Working Party’s questions, provided support for an integration of the two agencies. Nevertheless, there was a minority on the SACS Board and in the Working Party itself who resisted integration. They argued that the Finance Office needed to be independent of the Education section so as to ensure financial responsibility and accountability in the Education Office.\textsuperscript{77}

In its September meeting the SACS Board discussed the Report and affirmed that it “forms a reasonable basis from which to proceed“. They recommended some additions and revisions which did not affect the main principles of the Report.\textsuperscript{78} So the Working Party incorporated these suggestions and also addressed some of the other major issues listed above. The acceptability of the Committee’s formulation of the roles of the SACS Board and of the Administration was demonstrated by the Board’s reprinting of these sections in 1989, in a published document available to interested parties.\textsuperscript{79}

Their second Report\textsuperscript{80}, presented to the Board in October, concentrated on the structure of the total administrative network. It advocated a corporate management model in which a board formulated policy for implementation by the management of the corporation. The Working Party also recommended that the Management should be integrated with the SACS Board, meaning that some senior executives of the management

\textsuperscript{76}ibid., p.10.

\textsuperscript{77}This was clearly put by Victor Couch who saw a parallel in the government system in which the Treasury was independent of the Department of Education. See his letter to Bishop Robinson, 5 February 1987, ibid.

\textsuperscript{78}SACS Board Minutes, 24 September 1986.

\textsuperscript{79}Role and Functions of the Sydney Archdiocesan Catholic Schools Board and the Catholic Education Office, Sydney (Sydney 1989).

\textsuperscript{80}Second Interim Report from the Working Party on Roles, Structures, Relationships and Staffing", 15 October 1986, in “Restructuring" file, CEOL.
should be members of the Board. Heading the new Administration\textsuperscript{81} was
to be a single official, the Executive Director of Schools. This same officer
would also be the Executive Officer of the SACS Board and would be
accountable to the Board for the Administration's implementation of
Board policy and management of the system. The Administration would
include the three departments of Religious Education, Educational
Services, and Finance, each of which would be accountable to the
Executive Director of Catholic Schools. Thus the CEO and the CSFO were
to be merged. These proposed relationships between the Archbishop of
Sydney, the Board and the Administration (CEO) are presented
diagrammatically in this study as Appendix E.

The principle of integrating the Management with the SACS Board was
best expressed in the proposal that the Executive Director of Schools would
simultaneously be the Executive Officer of the Board. This was later
explained as an attempt to bridge the "perceived gap between the Board
and the Education Office"\textsuperscript{82}. It would also increase the authority of the
CEO because hitherto the Executive Secretary of the CSFO had been the
Executive Officer of the Board. A further means of integration was that the
Directors of the three CEO departments were to be members of the Board.
At this stage there was no proposal that Board membership be given to
Regional Directors.

The Report grasped a twenty year old nettle with the proposal to
incorporate the finance office within the CEO, thereby removing the
strong and independent status of the financial arm. This was a major
change which had been debated and resisted since the early 1970s. Fears
that the new administration would be financially irresponsible were
countered with the argument that the SACS Board itself would monitor
the administration. The new CEO would be accountable to the Board and
to its recommended Standing Committee on Finances.

The SACS Board, at its meeting of 24 October 1986, accepted the proposal to
amalgamate the financial and educational organisations. So by this stage
there was substantial agreement on the structure of the administrative
network and on the roles of the organisations within the network.

\textsuperscript{81}The terms Management and Administration are used interchangeably in the Reports.
\textsuperscript{82}Bishop Robinson phrased the problem this way in his 'Circular Letter to Clergy', 22
January 1987, in "Restructuring" file CEOL.
The Working Party now proceeded on its Third and Final Report\(^\text{83}\) which was discussed by the Board at its meeting of 19 November.\(^\text{84}\) The Board, having agreed to the overall management structure proposed in the Report, resolved to advertise forthwith the position of Executive Director of Catholic Schools. The advertisement appeared in the *Sydney Morning Herald* of November 22. This was the first time that the position of chief executive of the CEO had been publicly advertised. It was also the first time that lay persons were invited to put themselves forward as candidates.

While this November meeting of the Board also endorsed the regional structure of the schools system and the CEO, a major unresolved issue was that of representation of the three Regional Offices in the new administration. In this Report the Working Party proposed that the Regional Directors should be members of the SACS Board or, at the very least, of its Standing Committees. A decision on the issue was deferred by the Board to its December 10 meeting. By January 1987 it was decided that the Regional Directors would attend and speak at Board meetings but not as members\(^\text{85}\). Eventually, in 1987, the Regional Directors were admitted as full members of the SACS Board. This decision enhanced the influence of the Regional Offices in the CEO.\(^\text{86}\)

By 1987 the new administrative structure for the schools of the archdiocese was in the process of realisation. The new SACS Board was commissioned by Archbishop Clancy at a religious ceremony on 29 July 1987. The Board was chaired by Bishop Geoffrey Robinson and contained the Executive Director of the CEO, the three central Directors and the three Regional Directors as ex officio members as well as nine members appointed by Archbishop Clancy, representing parents, principals and parish priests.

Its leadership role was stressed by the chairman, in December 1987:

> Bishop Robinson emphasised that the Board is...the Archbishop's main advisory Educational Body. Consequently it is confronted by huge tasks, a variety of questions, and will have many difficult decisions to make. Its function cannot be

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84Minutes 19 November, p.5.
85See Circular letter of Bishop Robinson to clergy 22 January 1987, in "Restructuring" file, CEOL.
86It is ironic that the archdiocese itself, which had initiated the principle of schools regionalisation by dividing into pastoral regions, has since abandoned pastoral regionalisation.
This leadership role applied to all Catholic systemic schools in the archdiocese "whether those schools are the direct administrative responsibility of the archdiocese or operated by Religious Institutes". However its role and authority regarding non-systemic schools administered by religious congregations has not been clarified.

This Board–Chief Executive Officer structure provided a new model of administration for the Sydney Archdiocese, which needs to be seen in contrast to that described in the second part of this study (1960–75). Part Two portrayed a revolution in which Sydney Catholic schools run by religious congregations were gathered into a centrally administered system. The central administration was a patchwork association of organisations (CEO, CBFC and the short-lived Sydney Catholic Education Board) set up by the bishops in ad hoc fashion to meet needs as they arose. It was a clerical solution in which Archbishops Gilroy and James Carroll were in close touch with the administration and gave strong influence to chosen advisers, especially those in the CBFC. The Sydney hierarchy had direct involvement in educational administration since the archbishop was chairman of the CBFC and the three auxiliary bishops were members. Major decisions were made in CBFC meetings and announced by the bishops to laity and even parish priests.

This chapter has traced the protracted efforts in the 1970s and 1980s to restructure this centralised administrative network which controlled the Sydney systemic schools. The outcome was a corporate management model of administration where episcopal involvement was changed to that of appointing educational leaders and requiring accountability.

Several influences led to the introduction of this model. The inadequacies of the former system were criticised by Catholics encouraged by the atmosphere of Vatican II and 1960s forthrightness to take a more assertive role in the Church. Dependence on government funds in the 1970s

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87 SACS Board Minutes, 15 December 1987, p.8.
88 Role and Functions of the Sydney Archdiocesan Catholic Schools Board, p.1.
89 This view was expressed by Canavan, the present Executive Director of the CEO, in an interview on 6 April 1992.
brought with it the pressure to be more open and accountable and to conform with bureaucratic procedures. Catholic educationalists in Sydney were aware of administrative developments in other states and overseas. Advisers to the bishops, such as Payne, Hart, Couch and Canavan, had the theoretical expertise and practical experience to analyse the existing organisations and recommend new models. They saw efforts in state education departments in the early 1980s to improve efficiency, coordination and accountability, for instance with the establishment of an Education Commission in New South Wales. By the 1980s there was wide agreement that the former model of administration needed to be changed. The arrival of new educational and episcopal leaders in the 1980s, as well as the creation of the new dioceses in 1986, provided the final impetus towards the adoption of the new model of administration in 1986–7.

The CEO and the New Structure

At the end of 1986 Walter Simmons resigned as the last Archdiocesan Director of Schools. The position of chief executive officer of the Board was then advertised under the title of Executive Director of Schools. Selected for the position by Archbishop Clancy was Kelvin Canavan, the former Deputy Director of the CEO. As head of the executive he was the personal link between the Board and the new CEO. He also led the new CEO which incorporated the former CEO and CSFO. This incorporation was realised in stages during 1987 as the former CSFO staff and services were relocated from Polding House in Pitt St, Sydney, to the headquarters of the CEO in Leichhardt.

In this new structure the authority and influence of the CEO was greatly enhanced. Before 1987 it shared influence with the CBFC/CSFO and was in some respects the junior partner. Now the CEO Executive Director managed both the educational and financial arms of the administration and replaced the head of the former CSFO as Executive Officer of the SACS

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91 He was welcomed as Executive Director at the SACS Board meeting of 12 February 1987.
Board. On the SACS Board itself the CEO representatives made up seven out of the sixteen members. With twice the representation of any other group (parents, principals or parish priests), CEO influence in the administrative network was greatly strengthened in comparison with its influence in 1986.
Chapter Eight
The New Model CEO Emerges

The process of restructuring the leadership network of the Sydney Catholic school system was examined in Chapter Seven. From the restructuring came a more influential role for the CEO in this leadership network. At the same time there were important internal developments in the CEO as an organisation. These changes will now be addressed by continuing the narrative which, in Chapter Five, had traced the development of the CEO into the late 1970s. By this time it had become a substantial centralised organisation, based at 1 Abercrombie St, Broadway, employing about sixty officials who were organised into five departments or units.¹

In the 1980s there were two main stages in the development of the CEO. Until 1986 it was the educational arm of the administration, working in partnership with the CBFC/CSFO. This stage saw important leadership and organisational changes, particularly the regionalisation of the CEO. The organisation continued to grow in personnel numbers and complexity. Then in 1986–7 the division of the archdiocese and the major restructuring of the administration took place, as described in Chapter Seven. From this emerged a new model CEO. This history of the CEO will end with the inauguration of this restructured CEO in 1987.

Leadership

In looking at CEO development, 1975-1987, there are important changes to note in regard to its leadership. After four decades in which there was one change of Director, there were three Directors in the 1980s. The new Directors brought their own style of leadership. The second change was a shift towards a more collegial mode of leadership.

A Change of Director

John Slowey’s years as Director of the CEO had never been easy and in his last years, 1978–81, he was heading a growing organisation which was still trying to define its role and settle its own structure within a larger archdiocesan administrative structure, itself in need of basic reform. There

¹See 'Guide to Central Services for Primary Schools' (1979), in "Edu 5" file, SAA.
were problems with the CEO, but these could not properly be addressed until the restructuring of the macro system had been undertaken. This did not occur until after Slowey retired.

It is most likely that Payne's report of 1981² put pressure on Slowey to step down. Although entitled The Catholic Education Office and Regionalisation, it gave little attention to the issue of regionalisation (already addressed by the Hart Report in 1980). Rather it trenchantly criticised, as outlined in Chapter Seven, the "linear delegation" mode of operation within the administration of the Catholic schools system. Secondly it focussed on problems within the central office, especially concerning the role of the Diocesan Director, as Payne was aware:

I am conscious of the inevitability that much of the focus of a survey such as this concentrates on the position of the Director of Schools.³

Problems included the lack of job descriptions for the Diocesan Director and some other Directors, a reported difficulty of communication between the Director and the bishops, the "over involvement" of CEO personnel in "subsidiary activities", making the Director, in particular, less available for Office matters.⁴ He noted some dissatisfaction concerning leaders' giving "undue attention" to the affairs of Catholic Teachers College Sydney (which Slowey had helped to found in 1958) and to membership of State and Commonwealth committees. Thus the report, which had been commissioned by James Carroll, the Vicar of Education, amounted to an indictment of the mode of leadership within the system and of the performance of the current CEO Director.

This report must have been a harsh blow to Slowey. It pointed to the need for major change, much of which would have to wait until the whole structure of the administrative system had been reformed; and this was beyond his control. At the same time he was facing the complex process of implementing the regionalisation of the administration. He was sixty six years old and restructuring would clearly be protracted. So he was prepared to resign as Archdiocesan Director of Schools at the end of 1981, but agreed to continue as an Educational Adviser to the Archdiocesan Council.

²This report was discussed in Ch. 7 in relation to systemic restructuring. See above pp. 154–157.
³The Catholic Education Office Sydney and Regionalisation, p.8.
⁴Ibid., p.13.
Slowey had been head of the CEO for the thirty three years since 1948 and any difficulties of the final years should not overshadow his overall achievements. He had inherited a small office of priest inspectors and is remembered as a leader who extended responsible positions in the CEO, firstly to members of religious congregations and then to lay persons. He fostered the transformation of the function of the Inspectors from that of inspection to that of supervision (the Inspectors were later to be called Consultants and Advisers). He was a member of the Committee chaired by Dr Wyndham which reshaped secondary schooling in New South Wales. For the implementation of these reforms in Catholic schools he was a central participant in the subsequent complex negotiations of the 1960s, bringing together leaders of religious congregations, school principals, parish priests and the new CBFC. From these negotiations developed the present archdiocesan system of schools. To staff this system he promoted the training of lay teachers to supplement the diminishing ranks of the religious congregations and helped found Catholic Teachers College Sydney. Under his leadership the CEO itself became departmentalised in the 1970s, a development made necessary by its growth in personnel and range of services. He also championed the continuation and even the spread of Sydney Catholic schools in the 1960s when the lack of funds were producing calls for their curtailment or closure. Perhaps his colleagues remember most the quality of pastoral concern he brought to his role:

The worth of the priest, the pastor, is treasured in the hearts of those unknown numbers of people touched by the care, the respect, the consideration of this kind and gentle administrator.

The new Diocesan Director of Schools was Br Walter Simmons who had been Deputy Director since 1977. The appointment, taking effect in January 1982, was made by Archbishop Freeman, after consultation with the Vicar for Education and the other auxiliary bishops. In accord with Sydney Church tradition there was no advertisement for applicants. However it was the first time that someone other than a priest was appointed as head of the school system.

Simmons, a Christian Brother, had been a secondary school principal at Wagga and Waverley. At Waverley he was close to Archbishop James Carroll who resided at Woollahra and who later supported his appointment as

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6A tribute from Barry Collins who had worked with Slowey in the CEO since 1965. ibid.
Diocesan Director. He joined the CEO in 1972 and took charge of the Department of Secondary Education. Following several months leave to study educational administrative systems in North America and Britain, he was appointed Deputy Director of the CEO in August 1977, a position which he retained until his appointment as Director of Schools.

As Deputy he had signalled some of the emphases that he would bring to the leadership. In 1980 he circulated a paper, “Moving into the Eighties”, in which he maintained that, while the 1970s battles for the overall maintenance and viability of the Catholic schools had been won, the new challenge was for the improvement of the quality of education sought by a more demanding and discriminating Catholic population. For this improvement of quality he saw a need for a continuing review of the aims and strategies of Catholic programs and for evaluation of outcomes, all of which required more systematic research than had been conducted hitherto. On becoming Director in 1982, his first Circular Letter to Schools took “the quest for quality” as its theme.

His “Moving into the Eighties” paper favoured a style of leadership characterised by

a strategy of evolutionary and unobtrusive diplomacy and a capacity to continue the low-profile approach that has constantly sought to avoid antagonism and to build up interest coalitions.

As Director he seems to have carried this “low-profile approach” into avoiding involvement in press debates, unless press reports were “potentially damaging” to the operation of Catholic schools. He was reluctant to appear personally in the public media and relied on CEO publications such as About Catholic Schools for publicity. This “low-profile approach” and “unobtrusive diplomacy” had been characteristic of Slowey. But he differed from Slowey in the greatly increased volume of written communication he had with CEO staff and school principals. He studied issues carefully and seemed to prefer to put his thoughts in writing.

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7See Archbishop Freeman’s letter of appointment, 13 August 1977, in “Edu 4” file, SAA.
8“Moving into the Eighties”, 1 February 1980 (CEOL), pp.6-7.
910 February 1982, CEOL.
10“Moving into the Eighties”, p.8.
11See his letter to Principals, 8 December 1983, in “IDSP” file, CEOL.
Conspicuous by its recurrence in Simmons' instructions to school principals is a demand for preserving the Catholic ethos of the school by care in selection of staff. Simmons faced the reality that the Catholic schools were not as obviously Catholic as they had appeared in the 1960s. Members of religious congregations were a dwindling minority on their staffs, parish clergy were less frequent visitors, religious education programs were controversial, standard salary rates meant that non-Catholics would be attracted to teaching positions.

His first Circular to Schools set the pattern:

> It is difficult to see how a Catholic school can maintain its ethos if it engages staff whose personal values do not reinforce those of the school. Commitment to the school's objectives and adherence to its values are a paramount consideration in the employment of staff.12

Soon afterwards he forthrightly lamented the presence of teachers whose commitment was "a neutral grey" and especially, those teachers with "two lives, with the private dimension known to be at variance with the public".13 Those who should not be employed included persons without formal teaching qualifications, non-practising Catholics, non-Catholics "hostile to Catholic beliefs and practices", and known "practising homosexuals".14 He rejected the claim that such selection criteria contravened rights to privacy or anti-discrimination laws. While the above demands were rigorous, they were consistent with his concern for preserving a Catholic ethos in schools. He claimed that "the Catholic school community" (ie. priests, administrators, parents and pupils)

> ...insists that its teachers practise what they profess, exemplify what they expound, and support the philosophy and policies of the school that engages them.15

These concerns for quality, research and preservation of the Catholic ethos of the schools marked the individual leadership of the new Director of Schools. In this period there was also a trend towards making the CEO leadership more collegial.

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13'School Principals and Quality Education', 26 March 1982, in "IDSP' file CEOL.
14'Staff Selection and Appointment', 10 September 1984, in "IDSP" file CEOL; see also Annual Report 1984, p.10.
The CEO Directorate/Board of Directors

Until about 1975, leadership of the CEO involved the Director of Schools (Slowey) exercising a fairly loose supervision over a growing number of departmental units. It was shown in Chapter Seven that a series of reports on the systemic administration had recommended that the leader of the CEO be provided with a board responsible for major policy formulation but that the hierarchy took no steps to implement this recommendation until 1983. Moreover the CBFC, which had a major influence in financial and planning decisions before 1975, met far less frequently. With the increase in government funding, some of its functions had been transferred to the state body, the CEC. In fact in 1979 the CBFC met only once, chiefly to approve the CEO budget for 1980. Consequently, in the late 1970s the legal responsibility for policy formulation and major decisions ultimately rested with Archbishop Freeman and his Director of Schools. It seems to have been an onerous situation for Slowey. Payne noted that even in “maintenance matters it appears that the Director of Schools is reluctant to appear as the person primarily responsible for decision making within the organisation.” Therefore, given the Director’s need for advice and the increasing complexity of the organisation, it was natural that the CEO departmental leaders evolved as a group influential in policy making in the CEO.

By 1979 the CEO had a departmental structure, comprising the departments of Religious Education, Primary Education, Secondary Education, Special Programs, and Planning and Accommodation. Each of these in 1979 was headed by an Assistant Director, except for Secondary Education and Special Programs which were headed by Senior Co-ordinators. The group of Directors was now termed the Directorate. They held meetings which provided for some coordination amongst the departments in the CEO. Agenda items for 1979–80 showed much discussion on costs and ways and means of providing services, and a variety of issues such as restructuring the CEO, corporal punishment in schools, and the four term year. So the Directorate provided advice for the Director of Schools on major policy issues. An indication of its importance was that in 1981 Archbishop Carroll and Bishop Murphy attended the meetings.

16See CBFC Minutes for 1979.
17Catholic Education Office Sydney and Regionalisation, p.9. This was also discussed in Ch.7.
18Guide to Central Services for Primary Schools 1979, "Edu 5" file, SAA.
An indication of its importance was that in 1981 Archbishop Carroll and Bishop Murphy attended the meetings.

When Simmons became Director of Schools in 1982 he renamed the Directorate as the Board of Directors and declared it to be the most significant evidence of an attempt to develop “a collective style of leadership” and a “collegial approach”, thus taking up the recommendation of the 1981 Payne Report. He noted that the Board was composed of “the ten Central and Regional Directors together with Archbishop Carroll and Bishop Murphy” and that it had about twenty formal meetings in the year. Apart from the Directors, other CEO heads of units were sometimes present at the meetings. When the archbishop established the SACS Board, external to the CEO, in 1983, the CEO Board of Directors continued to meet.

While the Board gave an opportunity for collegial leadership it also came under some criticism. In October 1982 Simmons asked Br Robert Goodwin to undertake a two week review of the CEO, with an emphasis on “the efficiency and effectiveness of our decision-making processes and our delivery of services to schools.” Goodwin had been principal of several Marist Brothers schools in New South Wales and Queensland during the 1960s when the new Catholic systems of schools were being formed. From 1974 to 1979 he was Supervisor of Marist Brothers secondary schools in both those states and from 1980 to 1985 was a Consultant in the Brisbane CEO. His Report revealed that the Board was seen as most influential within the CEO, but also as somewhat closed and inaccessible:

> The Board has a reputation for short abrupt replies unsupported by constructive comments. There is a sense of helplessness which suggests that those outside the Board can influence neither the agenda nor the decision.

Such comments, even though negative, indicate that there was a real shift towards collegial leadership within the CEO in the 1980s. The Board of Directors became an important leadership structure within the CEO, although it should be noted that it only had authority to give advice to the Director of

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21 ibid.
22 Thus in 1985 the heads of the departments of Personnel, Legal and Industrial matters, and School Development were members of the Directorate.
23 Simmons to Goodwin, 5 October 1982, CEOL.
Schools. In the now large and complex organisation, with its departments and regions, the Board provided a forum for identifying problems within the organisation, for formulating policy and for obtaining some coordination amongst the departments and regions. Its importance is indicated by its practice on several occasions of meeting over two or three days at a conference centre away from headquarters, especially when important policy issues such as the restructuring of the CEO were at stake. It was noted in Chapter Seven how the united criticism of the Board of Directors contributed to the discarding of Couch’s proposals for restructuring the administrative network.

**Regionalisation**

The most significant change in the CEO in the early 1980s came from the decision to regionalise the CEO and its services. Since about 1967, as religious congregations allowed most of their schools to become systemic, the administration of Catholic schooling in Sydney had become increasingly centralised under the CEO/CBFC partnership, whose inner-city headquarters administered schools in areas as far-flung as Sutherland, the Blue Mountains and Gosford. Unlike the state education system, the CEO had no Area Offices to give a more personal contact between schools and the central administration, and there were not infrequent grumblings of religious principals and parish priests about CEO/CBFC controls over “our schools”.

The CEO itself took a small step towards regionalisation in 1977 when its Primary Department decided to work in regions and appointed Regional Consultants for seven regions. But these Consultants still worked from the central office at Broadway.

The decision for regionalisation of the total CEO came from the bishops. Reference has been made in Chapter Seven to the division of the archdiocese in 1978 into five Pastoral Regions and to the commissioning by the bishops of Payne in 1978 and Hart in 1979 to make recommendations on how the schools system might be regionalised.

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On 30 September 1978 the CEO advertised for five Regional Coordinators. As there is no record of these positions being filled it seems diocesan leaders decided that more study needed to be given to the practicalities of regionalisation. Accordingly Hart was appointed to the CEO in March 1979 as Assistant Director (Regionalisation), with the brief of drafting a report on the process. His *Regional Administration of Catholic Schools* was presented to Archbishop Freeman in November 1979.

Although regionalisation was an episcopal policy, Hart still saw a need to convince many people in the school system of its value. In the schools and parishes some feared that it would be merely an extension of a costly and interfering bureaucracy. In the CEO/CBFC some believed there were too few “suitable personnel...for its successful implementation”.

Hart did not deny the above dangers, but he argued that regionalisation was important for promoting the integration of the efforts of administrators, schools and parishes:

...teachers need great support and encouragement. Regionalisation is one means of increasing that support by bringing administration closer to parish and school action; and, of more critical importance, by helping to secure much greater identification of pastors, principals, and parents with the education system of the archdiocese.

He believed that resistance to regionalisation came from the lack of opportunity for debate on the subject and so he devoted Section 15 of his Report to ways of “selling” the change. He suggested that it would reduce the “alienation” of the present administration by allowing it to identify more closely with the Catholic community, thus giving it more credibility.

In the new administrative system recommended by Hart, policy formulation would not be the responsibility of the CEO but of his proposed Sydney Catholic Schools Council, upon which he did not elaborate. Thus policy formulation would be a function of the central administration of the system, although he did recommend that advisory Regional Education Councils should be established as well.

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26 "Edu 5" file, SAA.
27 See Chapter Seven for further background on this report.
29 ibid., p.6.
30 ibid., p.27.
Regionalisation was to apply to the administration or management of the system. All of this meant a reform of the CEO, which he renamed the Sydney Catholic Schools' Office. Its leadership, office location, decision-making processes, and its provision of services would all be regionalised around a central Schools' Office under a Director.

Heading each of the five Regional Offices would be a Regional Superintendent who was to be given wide responsibilities as administrative leader of the regional office and schools and as a link between the Schools' Office and regional bishops, priests and schools. The Offices would provide services to their schools, such as assistance in curriculum development suited to local needs, inservice programs, and promotion of cooperation amongst regional schools, parents and priests.

Meaningful regionalisation, Hart stressed, required that decision-making be regionalised.31 This was an area where guidelines would have to be clarified, but he envisaged the Regional Superintendent having authority to make decisions in areas such as staffing and that "some leeway to meet contingencies will be available".32

Finally Hart proposed that his recommendations be implemented according to a time-scale of five phases up to the end of 1982. To this point the plan would be experimental and reversible. Phase 6 would be in 1983 and would mean "appropriate decisions for future action".33

The Report was approved by the Archdiocesan Council (the Sydney bishops) and published in May 1980 "as a basic guide in developing the regionalisation of school administration and services" and the program was to be undertaken "without delay".34 The first step in its implementation was the appointment of five Regional Schools Officers at the start of 1981. These were Hart himself (Northern Region), Br Anthony Whelan cfc (Southern), Miss Ann Clark (Eastern), Sr Patricia Heenan rsm (Inner Western) and Br Aengus Kavanagh fsp (Outer Western). The positions were filled through private negotiations rather than by seeking applicants through advertisement.35

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31ibid., p.23
32ibid., p.24.
33ibid., p.11.
34Archbishop Carroll's Foreword, ibid., p.3.
35Hart was asked to nominate suitable appointees. Interview 11 November 1991.
In 1981 the Regional Schools Officers, attempting to establish themselves, experienced a variety of difficulties which they variously described as "confusion regarding the role of the Schools' Officer", "resistance to the concept of educational regionalisation", "confusion, and in some instances scepticism", "some personnel from the Catholic Education Office find it difficult to see their role in Regionalisation."\(^{36}\) Hart found a tendency in the central office to hold on to authority.\(^{37}\) Generally progress was slow. A similar impression was gained by Ambrose Payne who found that there was little effort by April 1981 to integrate the activities of the new Regional Schools Officers with the activities of the existing departments. However he formed the impression that the Regional Schools Officers themselves were making good contacts "in the field".\(^{38}\) Clearly some members of the CEO were still not convinced about the wisdom of the regionalisation process. This was understandable because of the complexity of the new arrangements which was reflected in comments by Simmons in 1982:

> The establishment of the five Regional Offices has created a complex network of interdependencies in which close linkage with the Central Office is of major importance. The situation entails the identification of critical interfaces and key relations.\(^{39}\)

Three years later Simmons remembered the climate as being cautious but not hostile:

> Regionalisation was inaugurated several years ago in a comparatively neutral climate of opinion. Its foundation excited neither strong support nor violent opposition. Between these two extreme positions the middle ground was occupied by the uncommitted who preferred to adopt a wait-and-see attitude.... Some interested parties considered its introduction untimely, but all groups were prepared to suspend their judgment and assess the worth of the experiment on its merits.\(^{40}\)

At the start of 1982 the Regional Offices were established at Randwick (Eastern), Willoughby (Northern), Hurstville (Southern), Lewisham (Inner Western), and Marayong (Outer Western), and during the rest of 1982 staff were redeployed to these from the Central Office. Likewise in 1982 the Regional Officers (now called Directors) were included in the Board of

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\(^{36}\)From 'Report on Regionalisation' by the Regional Schools Officers, 10 August 1981, in 'Edu 5' file, SAA.

\(^{37}\)Interview 11 November 1991.


\(^{40}\)Annual Report 1985, p.9.
Directors of the CEO, a move which Simmons, the new Diocesan Director, saw as part of "a progressive devolution of authority".\footnote{Annual Report 1982, p.10.}

1983 was to be Phase 6 of the Hart time-scale, when a decision had to be made by the bishops and the CEO as to the future of regionalisation which to that point was intended to be "experimental and reversible". In the event this deadline seems to have been a non-issue, which suggests that there was no thought amongst authorities of reversing the process. The Annual Report 1983 made no mention of any doubt about the continuation of regionalisation and indeed noted the increase of staff and services in the regional offices.\footnote{Annual Report 1983, p.17.} The regional structure was there to stay.

Opinions were mixed concerning the success of the project. Goodwin's above mentioned review of the CEO in late 1982 involved five days' interviewing key personnel at the central office and five days' interviewing staff in the regional offices. This was a useful external review of the process of regionalisation at the end of its first year of implementation. His report accepted regionalisation as a "reality" but was critical of communication and decision-making procedures in the central office. He commended the Regional Offices for features such as the "pervasive and effective leadership" of the Regional Directors, effective and easy communication within the offices and with schools and he noted that clergy and principals were "very satisfied with the functioning of the regional office".\footnote{Robert Goodwin, Report to Directors, p.13.} Hart, who had steered through the plan for regionalisation in 1980 and had the experience of being Director of the Northern Region, commented in 1984 that

\begin{quote}
Much still has to be achieved, especially in the separation of policy-making from executive action and the clarification of roles between central and regional offices.\footnote{Annual Report 1984 (CEO), p.20.}
\end{quote}

More favourable was Couch who believed that by 1985 regionalisation had been a "pronounced success", to the benefit of schools.\footnote{Review of Structures and Procedures, p.4.} Simmons' final Report in early 1986 claimed regionalisation had generally been a marked success:

\begin{quote}
The Directors of the five Regional Offices...have surpassed expectations... They have brought educational administration closer to the schools affected and they have personalised the delivery of support services... In addition, they have created
\end{quote}
co-operative networks to enable expertise developed in a particular setting to be more generally available and shared with school clusters in other regions.46

Nevertheless this was a report with an inevitable public relations quality and there are indications in his strong praise of the Regional Officers that he was supporting them in their difficult role.

In the 1990s there are still difficulties with the regional structure. This is to be expected, given the complex balance of central and regional roles and functions that regionalisation entails. It is telling that the off-spring CEOs, Parramatta and Broken Bay, have not adopted a regional structure. Indeed the Archdiocese of Sydney itself has abandoned its own division of the archdiocese into Pastoral Regions, a division which had provided Archbishop Freeman’s justification for his instructions to regionalise the school system.

Other Organisational Changes

In 1979 CEO personnel numbered about sixty. With regionalisation there was a rapid increase. In 1982 there were about 100 in the Central Office and about 25 in the five Regional Offices (the first year of these Offices). By 1985 the Central Office numbers increased to 126 and the Regional Offices had now built up to about 80. Thus between 1979 and 1985 the number of CEO personnel had nearly quadrupled.47 However this overstates the increase since many officers worked in a part-time capacity. Nevertheless it is clear that there was a substantial growth in personnel in these years.

With increased numbers there was need for more departmental organisation. In Slowey’s final years as Director of Schools, five main departments had crystallised in the CEO: Religious Education, Primary Education, Secondary Education, Special Programs, and Planning and Accommodation.48 Most departments were simply a group of Consultants and Advisers grouped under a Director49 or Senior Co-ordinator, but the Special Programs Department linked two government funded programs— for Disadvantaged Schools and for Multicultural Education.

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47 Figures are taken from the Annual Reports for 1982 and 1985.
48 Guide to Central Services for Primary Schools 1979’, in “Edu 5” file, SAA.
49 Slowey used the term Assistant Director for these leaders. Simmons referred to them as Directors.
Each department in 1979 was headed by an Assistant Director, except for Secondary Education and Special Programs which were headed by Senior Coordinators. Such titles are a pointer to the strength of departments and the influence of their leaders within the CEO. In 1979 the Primary Department under Kelvin Canavan was the largest, with seventeen members, mainly because most of the pupils and teachers in the CEO system were in primary schools. The Department of Secondary Education in 1979 had only eight members, but by 1981 it had grown to twelve and its head was now styled Director of Secondary Education. However, in 1981, Peter Crimmins was Assistant Director in charge of the Planning and Accommodation Department of only seven officers, whereas Robert Webb was still only Senior Coordinator of the Special Programs unit of sixteen members.

There was also a hierarchy of authority: Diocesan Director of Schools, Deputy Director, Director of a Department (e.g. Religious Education), Senior Coordinator, Co-Ordinator, Senior Consultant, Consultant, Adviser. Then there were posts of indeterminate rank such as Assistant Director, Associate Director, Librarian.

The number of organisational units within the CEO increased during the 1980s. These included the five Regional Offices and also units within the Central Office in which, by 1983, there were sixteen different Offices, Departments, Units and Programs. There were various experiments and attempts to group these into larger units, although the groupings changed over the years. In 1982 these units were grouped into six major Offices or Departments, but an observer, Goodwin, found that this led to difficulties in horizontal communication:

*Unfortunately the horizontal breadth of the Department of Development is so long that some of the areas consider themselves as “satellites” to the venture. It appears that the department could profitably be divided.*

These big departments were broken down in 1983, but by 1985 the sixteen groups in the Central Office were again consolidated into five umbrella Offices or Departments: Office of the Diocesan Director of Schools, Office of the Deputy Director of Schools, Religious Education Department, School

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50 Guide to Central Services for Primary Schools 1979, “Edu 5” file, SAA.
51 ‘Staff - 1981’, ibid. Technically he was an Assistant Director, a rank below Deputy Director.
52 ibid.
54 Report to Directors on Some Aspects of the Administration, p.4.
Development Department, and School Resources Department. In the view of Dr Couch, who reviewed the structures of the CEO in 1985, the groupings of government funded programs in the last two departments were still unsatisfactory for coordination and monitoring of costs. Perhaps such instability and change was to be expected given that the CEO was growing and at the same time had to decide which units and services should be kept in the Central Office and which should be reallocated to the Regional Offices.

Some organisational changes reflected developments that were occurring in government Departments of Education. Primary-secondary division was built into the organisation of the 1970s, with its Departments of Primary Education and of Secondary Education. As occurred in the state school sector, these departments disappeared in the 1980s and programs were organised from Kindergarten to Year 12 (K-12), although particular Advisers might have expertise suited for certain age groups of pupils. The functions of the CEO were also presented as “Services” and the CEO as a service organisation for the benefit of the schools. Its “Guide to Regional and Central Services” was issued annually to schools.

A Controversial Department

One department which was specially significant after 1982 was the CEO’s Sydney Industrial Office. With the increase in the number of lay teachers in the system in the 1970s, the development of the I.T.A. as an industrial union, and the spread of litigation in Australia, there was a need for the CEO to give constant attention to legal and industrial issues. The bishops of New South Wales had recognised the same need in 1972 when they gathered a group of advisers named the Industrial Affairs Committee (IAC). In 1980 the IAC established in Polding House, Sydney, a small permanent office, called the Catholic Industrial Office, (CIO) which was to give advice on, and help deal with, industrial issues affecting any Church organisations in the state, particularly if court action was involved. It was realised that industrial issues tended to have state-wide repercussions, hence the value of a committee for

56 Review of Structures and Procedures, p.28. The background to this report was given in Ch. 7.
all dioceses in the state. Thus if the CEO needed legal and industrial advice or representation it could consult the CIO.

Until September 1982. Then Simmons advised schools that the CEO had set up a new unit, the Sydney Industrial Office Broadway, which would assume responsibility for industrial matters pertaining to the administration of Sydney systemic schools. It would contain a Legal and Industrial Officer (Beverley Hassett) and a Classifications Officer (Paul Slattery). Simmons explained his move to the schools:

I am confident that our Industrial Office at Broadway will provide an efficient and more personalised service for our schools and hopefully, a more peaceful industrial climate.

Later in 1982 the new Industrial Office arranged a two day workshop for principals to help them deal with "personnel problems which arise in schools and which may have industrial connotations."

It was important that the new CEO legal unit work in harmony with the statewide CIO, again for the reason that industrial policies and legal rulings could have wide repercussions. However the two units were independent of each other, with the CIO reporting to the bishops of New South Wales and the Sydney Industrial Office reporting to Simmons. Some serious disagreement did occur.

The role of this new industrial unit within the CEO became controversial. Because Simmons regarded legal and industrial issues as most sensitive and requiring immediate attention, he located the Legal and Industrial Office within his own Office, with immediate access to himself. All other department heads were answerable in the first instance to the Deputy Director of Schools.

This special position of the Legal and Industrial Office, however warranted, itself created discontent within the CEO. Even in November 1982 Goodwin perceived the special place of this office as breaching the established model of "linear delegation" of authority and advised that it "could more easily fit in

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57 Information from telephone interview on 13 May 1992 with Mr T. Daly, a member of the IAC in the 1970s and 1980s.
58 Notice to school staffs, 6 September 1982, in "IDSP" file, CEOL.
59 Simmons to Archbishop Freeman, 13 September 1982, in "Educ 6" file, SAA.
60 Notice from Simmons to principals, 4 November 1982, in "IDSP" file, CEOL.
61 See 'Educ. 6' file, SAA.
the section co-ordinated by the Deputy Director".62 Couch found the problem still there in 1985, reporting that

A general impression is created that legal and industrial matters have a higher priority than educational matters. The effect on the morale of staff at the Central Office is not good and there is a ripple effect in the Regional Offices.63

To remove the impression of privilege he recommended that the Religious Education and Personnel Departments should also be brought into the Diocesan Director's ambit so that they might be perceived as having the same status as the Legal and Industrial Department. In the event the position was not changed until the major restructuring of the CEO in 1987.

This impression of concentration on legal and industrial aspects in the period 1982-6 might also have been gained from the number of CEO communications to schools on these matters. These included notices about selection, appointment, and conditions of employment of staff, and CEO viewpoints on certain cases or issues taken up by the ITA which received press coverage often unfavourable to the CEO.64

Image, Communication and Accessibility

There was a danger that the CEO might appear to be preoccupied with these industrial and legal issues rather than with educational concerns. This could detract from the image it wished to present as a service organisation. And perceptions of teachers and parents were important. By the early 1980s this large central bureaucracy, located in inner Sydney and growing in size and influence, inspired some resentment and discontent in the schools and parishes, especially in the outer suburbs. Br Bernard Bulfin, principal of Patrician Brothers Blacktown throughout the 1970s, felt that there was a "them and us" relationship between the CEO and the schools, especially those in outer areas.65

Further indications of public relations and communication problems appear in the Goodwin Report of November 1982. Although being dramatically

62Report to Directors on Some Aspects, p.4.
63Review of Structures, p.31.
64An example was a notice to teachers to counter suggestions that teachers were facing retrenchment as some schools were being closed or rationalised. See "Information Sheet for Teachers", 23 March 1984.
selective, Goodwin summarised criticisms made to him during his review of the CEO:

Letters etc emanating from the office are recognised as legally accurate, but are couched in a form of language that does not convey the human and Christian face of the office. Callers, too, are apparently unable to make satisfactory contact by telephone. In fact a bad image is projected which must hinder effective delivery of services and make difficult compliance with decisions. It is seen as a big empire, autocratic, over-staffed, providing little information...obviously the accuracy of these statements can be challenged, but they do represent the perceptions of some outside the office.66

He suggested the appointment of a public relations person and some rearrangement of workloads in the office. However he thought most improvement would come from the transfer of operations to the regions, a process still in its early stages.

His criticisms were applied to the Central Office rather than the five Regional Offices which had been started in February 1982 at Willoughby, Hurstville, Randwick, Lewisham, and Marayong. After a year of their operation Goodwin was impressed:

These are suitably situated, pleasantly decorated, organised and differ by region ...In addition it operates as a base for operations for others who work full-time or part-time in the region... They (the offices) are used for seminars and meetings of teachers and parents of the region in many cases...

Communication is easy as the office is geographically accessible. The telephore system is simple and the clerical assistant is always available. She is pivotal to the total operation...

Excellently produced and composed newsletters help the schools and others keep in touch and supplement the normal channels.67

Bernard Bulfin was well qualified to comment on the advantages of the regional offices, having been principal of Patrician Brothers Blacktown since 1968. He felt that CEO people at Central Office saw the Outer Western Suburbs as “miles and miles away” and seldom visited them. But with the establishment of the Outer West Regional Office at Marayong and later Blacktown:

...we found that it developed into a family atmosphere and people in the office itself were very approachable and available at all times because obviously they had a smaller group of people to look after so I would say it was a very big advantage...68

66Report to Directors, p.4.
67ibid., p.3.
68Interview 31 October 1988.
Hart observed that within a few years the Regional Offices had established relations with pastors "which seemed to be more personal and effective than before" (ie. when there were only CEO and CBFC central offices).69

**Changing the Office Locations**

Between 1982 and 1987 most of the Regional Offices moved their original premises for various reasons, such as the partition of the archdiocese in 1986, a need for more space, or for the provision of better accessibility for the schools. The Inner West Office in 1987 moved west from its Lewisham terrace house (owned by the Christian Brothers) to rented office space in the centre of the Beral shopping centre. In January 1984 the Eastern Office was transferred from 165 Avoca St, Randwick to 191 Alison Road, Randwick. The Outer Western Office had begun with a small office at John Paul II Senior High School, Marayong. In April 1982 it leased commercial premises at 57A Dunmore St, Wentworthville and then in 1986 moved to a renovated church at Flushcombe Rd/Marion St, Blacktown. In 1986 it became the CEO for the new diocese of Parramatta. The Northern Office remained at Willoughby until 1986 when it became the CEO of the new diocese of Broken Bay. The Southern Region Office remained at 5 Crofts Avenue, Hurstville.

The central office had been located at Abercrombie St Broadway since November, 1971, in premises rented from the Parish of St Benedicts. The buildings included the former Marist Brothers technical school (St Benedicts Broadway) and a Good Samaritan Sisters convent. So the offices were really partitioned classrooms. On the same site was a primary school and the parish church and presbytery. With several different projects located in the same site complex, it was understandable that problems arose between the CEO and parish, all the more so because the CEO seemed to keep growing. Apparently minor issues such as parking assumed major proportions in this restricted inner city area. Consequently new premises were sought for the central office.

On 18 April 1983 the central office occupied the former St Martha's Convent at 38 Renwick Street, Leichhardt. This had been conducted by the Sisters of St Joseph (rsj) as a boarding and industrial school for girls, but the school had been closed for some years. These premises were purchased by the

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69Interview 11 November 1991.
archdiocese and then rented to the CEO.\textsuperscript{70} The building itself was attractive but rambling and required renovation for its new function, at an estimated cost of $250,000.\textsuperscript{71} It was located in a central, semi-residential area, with gardens, more parking space and privacy.

Thus, in the 1980s, the CEO transferred its central operations to what was generally accepted as a more satisfactory location and was building up new regional offices at the same time. From these locations it was able to provide a range of services and carry out its main functions. At this point it is appropriate to look at the activities in which CEO personnel were engaged.

**CEO Functions and Activities 1978-87**

Before reviewing these functions it is useful to consider the numbers of pupils and teachers in the schools served by the CEO in the period:

### Catholic Systemic Schools Sydney Archdiocese\textsuperscript{72}

#### Pupils

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>67,660</td>
<td>32,755</td>
<td>100,415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>68,964</td>
<td>34,116</td>
<td>103,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>70,053</td>
<td>35,833</td>
<td>105,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>70,608</td>
<td>38,479</td>
<td>109,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>70,307</td>
<td>40,211</td>
<td>111,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>70,210</td>
<td>40,478</td>
<td>110,688</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Teachers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2,710.9</td>
<td>1,942.7</td>
<td>4,653.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>3,195.6</td>
<td>2,736.7</td>
<td>5,932.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total pupil population administered by the CEO grew by 10 per cent between 1980 and 1985 but a decline began in 1985. After the outer western and northern region separated to become new dioceses in 1986, the archdiocese covered an area in which the school age population was in a

\textsuperscript{70} Annual Report 1983, p.9.

\textsuperscript{71} Elswick House was the original house on the site but had been demolished by 1938. See CBFC Minutes 31 March 1982 and pamphlet "Elswick House" (Sydney CEO, no date).

\textsuperscript{72} Annual Report 1985 (CEOS, 1985), p.71. The number of teachers is expressed in full-time equivalent terms.
decline which was expected to continue during the 1990s. The bulk of the pupils (67 per cent in 1980) were in primary schools where pupil numbers increased by 3.75 per cent between 1980 and 1984 but then began to decrease. There was an increase of 24 per cent in secondary school enrolments, largely due to the increased demand in Australia for senior secondary education. The CEO was responsible for about 80 per cent of children in Sydney Catholic schools, with independent (non-systemic) Catholic schools educating another 23,000 pupils.

For an organisation which grew to employ about 220 staff and was spread over six locations one can only give a sketch of its functions and activities in recent years. This outline relies especially on the Annual Reports and the following document submitted to the SACS Board in 1984:

Some Functions Of The Catholic Education Office/Sydney

1 Is commissioned by the Archbishop of Sydney to assist schools which have the specific mission of "a critical systematic transmission of culture in the light of faith and the bringing forth of the power of Christian virtue by the integration of Culture with faith and of faith with living." P.39 The Catholic School, Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education.

2 To provide genuine leadership and vision for a large network of Catholic schools.

3 To ensure that sound Catechetical instruction takes place in schools which are communities of faith.

4 To foster effective and harmonious communication between Central Office and Regions and the systemic schools, other interested bodies (ie. Pastors and Orders) and the wider community.

5 To liaise with the C.B. & F.C. in order to ensure the most effective use of resources.

6 To prepare for the Finance Committee annual projections of systemic school enrolments and school staffing requirements.

7 To prepare for the Finance Committee an annual budget of income and expenditure for the C.E.O.

8 To establish for each systemic school a level of general staffing in accordance with the decisions of the Finance Committee and/or Archdiocesan Board.

9 To distribute to systemic schools recurrent resources under the Special Purpose Programs (eg. E.S.L. teachers).

10 To authorise the payment of salaries by the C.B. & F.C. for individual principals and teachers according to the relevant Awards.

11 To appoint lay principals (First Assistants and Primary Assistants to the Principal) to systemic schools.

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73 This was predicted in the Annual Report 1988-9 (CEOS, 1989), p.38.
75 This was the 1985 level before the new dioceses were created in 1986.
76 Submitted as document 3.12, 28 April 1984 — see SACS Board Minutes. Presumably, this was drafted by the CEO.
12 To identify and develop quality personnel for school leadership and C.E.O. positions.
13 To provide for principals and teachers comprehensive professional support in the form of staff and executive development, and curriculum development.
14 To facilitate the effective development of staff within systemic schools and the building of Christian Community through total staff interventions and the administration of staff inservice.
15 To provide, within the limits of available funds, services that meet the particular needs of individual students (Special Education Program, Hearing Impaired Program, Visually Impaired Program, Pastoral Care Program).
16 ...employee within the system and to protect the legal rights of the system.77
17 To increase the involvement of parents in systemic schools (with particular emphasis on the work of the Parent Participation Unit and H.D.C.V. Programs).
18 To liaise with the C.E.C. and the NSW Department of Education.
19 To provide assistance to pastors and school communities on the establishment of new schools and extensions to existing facilities.
20 To submit to the Board an annual report outlining the involvement of the C.E.O. in the Catholic school system of the archdiocese.

In this catalogue one observes traditional religious and cultural aims alongside newer administrative functions. These functions and activities will now be loosely grouped and described in the following sub-sections.

**Leadership and Vision**

"To provide genuine leadership and vision for a large network of Catholic schools" was the first specific function listed in the SACS Board document. This broad function was acknowledged and stressed in the mid 1980s. Earlier reports and documents do not specify the function of leadership, although in practice the CEO would have exercised leadership functions, such as when negotiating with congregations and parishes concerning the formation of the system of schools.

Before 1970 each religious congregation had provided leadership and its characteristic vision for the schools it administered and the CEO was simply expected to provide a degree of support and supervision, especially in Religious Education. But in the 1970s the congregations transferred most of their schools to the new system administered by the CEO and CBFC. Moreover the number of religious teachers was soon greatly outnumbered by lay teachers, and lay Catholics began to be appointed as principals of the

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77The beginning of this point was missing from the archive copy of this document.
systemic schools. Thus the opportunity for the congregations to provide leadership or influence in the schools was greatly diminished.

It was soon appreciated that, with the substantial withdrawal of the religious congregations, the CEO was the only institution with the potential of taking up the role of leader of the systemic schools. This was not just a role of ensuring that the schools be efficient educationally; it was also a question of vision. There was a real danger that the schools might lose their Catholic ethos and identity. This concern underlay the Diocesan Director's insistence on employing only "practising" Catholics or non-Catholics supportive of Catholicism.\(^78\) By 1985 he saw this as the main challenge for the future:

Basically, the problem is to ensure that Catholic ethos and identity are preserved and promoted. Identity is not a completely static concept; it has dynamic dimensions. It is both inherited and transmitted. Each generation makes its own contribution to the tradition received and seeks different ways of expressing its ethos....The Catholic Education Office considers that strengthening the religious character of Catholic schools is a necessary condition for increasing the effectiveness of Catholic schools.\(^79\)

He looked to the Department of Religious Education to take a major role in the nurturing and transmission of this religious character in the schools.

Leadership was undertaken in other areas. The education and support of principals and middle management leaders in schools was a major example which will be explained later in the chapter. The CEO also contributed to the development of general policies which might be of guidance to schools. Principals had expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of CEO policy guidelines.\(^80\) To assist principals who were facing parental criticism over the selection of literature texts such as *Sons and Lovers* and *The Chocolate War*, Simmons provided a Position Paper, "Selection of Texts in Catholic Schools".\(^81\) In 1985 the CEO actually issued a Policy Statement entitled "Formation of Policy within the Catholic Education Office, Sydney" which set out a framework for the process of policy formulation within the CEO. This framework was then incorporated in new policy statements on "Admission of Children with Handicaps into Catholic Schools" and "Religious Education Co-Ordinator in Catholic Systemic Schools".

\(^78\) See W X Simmons, 'Staff Selection and Appointment', 10 September 1984, in "IDSP" file, CEOL.
\(^79\) Annual Report 1985, p.10.
\(^80\) Simmons to Principals 13 November 1985, in "IDSP" file, CEOL.
\(^81\) 24 August 1984, ibid.
Staff Appointment and Development

CEO leadership involved taking responsibility for the appointment of suitable staff in the schools and for their support and professional development. Religious congregations still appointed their members to systemic schools, but the proportion was rapidly decreasing in favour of lay teachers. Thus in the Sydney Archdiocese in 1975 there were 1,276 religious teachers (26.4%) and 3,549 lay teachers (73.6%) but in 1979 there were 933 religious teachers (16.6%) as compared with 4,704 lay teachers (83.4%). This shift continued in the 1980s and so the responsibility of principals for recruiting suitable lay staff increased proportionately. From 1972 these lay teachers gained their own voice through the Independent Teachers Association in which lay teachers in Catholic Schools were the majority of the membership.

The CEO's role in employment was given more precision in 1984 when industrial proceedings led to a statement by Archbishop Clancy that the archbishop accepted “full and final responsibility for all lay teachers and lay ancillary staff in Systemic Schools within the Archdiocese of Sydney”. Previously this issue had not been tested in the courts but it had generally been maintained that the responsibility for employment or dismissal of school staff lay with the individual school principal and not with the archdiocese.

For lay principals this was a reassuring decision. Members of religious congregations who had been appointed principals knew that they would have the resources of their congregation to support them if they faced court action over an employment issue. The lay principals, without such backing, must have been very anxious at the possibility of facing personal legal action over claims such as wrongful dismissal of an employee.

A rider most significant for the CEO was added by the archbishop:

I delegate to the Diocesan Director of Schools for the time being full responsibility in respect of the employment of lay teachers and ancillary staff in Systemic Schools within the Archdiocese of Sydney with power to make all necessary and appropriate arrangements in respect of such employment.

83The formation of the ITA was described in Chapter Five.
84Clancy to Piggott Stinson, Solicitors, 27 March 1984, in "Edu 6" file CEOL.
85Ibid.
Thus the CEO Director had become the delegated employer for the system and this meant a major increase in the authority of the CEO, with a corresponding decrease in the authority of principals (including religious principals of systemic schools, since they employed mainly lay teachers). On the other hand the principals were assured of legal backing by the archdiocese. This decision helps to explain the prominence Simmons gave to the CEO’s Legal and Industrial Department in 1984-5.

Following the archbishop’s statement the Diocesan Director reserved to the Central Office the responsibility of selecting Principals and First Assistants to the Principal in secondary schools and Principals of primary schools. Regional Directors were delegated the responsibility of selecting Second Assistants to the Principal in secondary schools and First Assistants in primary schools. All other school appointments were delegated to the principals. Suspension and dismissal of staff were reserved to the Diocesan Director.

In the 1970s the provision of lay principals became quite a challenge for the CEO, especially as congregations, with their numbers declining, were finding difficulty in continuing to provide principals. In 1976 Slowey appealed to the leaders of the religious congregations to slow down their rate of withdrawal from principalship, since in the 1975-6 period the CEO had been required to appoint 30 lay principals. These needed training and support and also commanded a salary at least three times that of the stipend paid to a religious principal.

By 1982 the CEO had drawn up a formal process for the selection, appointment and evaluation of lay principals. It was conducted by the Personnel Department of the central office and featured a panel interview of a “short list” of applicants.

Lay principals were relatively new in the Catholic system in this century. They were pioneers who had to earn credibility before Catholics accustomed to schools administered by religious congregations. A sense of their particular dilemmas was conveyed by Peter Donnan, who, when appointed principal of

86 Deputy Principal in earlier parlance.
88 Slowey’s appeal is quoted in McGrath, These Women?, p.216.
89 Appointment, Re-Appointment and Evaluation of Principals of the Archdiocese of Sydney’, 14 May 1982 in “IDSP” file, CEOL.
De La Salle College Ashfield in 1972, was the first lay person to be appointed principal of a secondary school in the archdiocese:

...assuming that our layman is not an ex-Religious, it is likely that he has had little or no formal training in religious education since his own school days. He may be a fervent and "practising" Catholic, but I ask: Is this all he needs — is it a sufficient qualification? — to build or at least maintain a vital faith community around him in the school which he controls?  

He also pointed out the compromises involved for the principal with a family — dilemmas which must always have been faced by government school principals but which were new in the Catholic system. Finally there was the question of acceptance by the Catholic community:

It is my experience — not only in my own school - that a newly appointed lay Principal will not be accepted as warmly or trustingly by the "welcoming" school community as his Religious counterpart... After more than seven years one still hears within the wider school community I belong to, a statement I have heard often: "Oh, the school isn't what it used to be when the Brothers were there!"  

Recognising such needs and the key role of the principals, the CEO endeavoured to provide them with support and growth opportunities. The School Development Department under Mr James Hawes provided a Principals'/Assistant Principals' course and in 1985 Mr Peter May was seconded to the CEO to "act in a pastoral role with Principals" and to advise the Director on the their development needs.  

By 1986 the CEO was preparing to trial a "Spiritual Renewal Program for Principals" to be offered to a limited number of applicants.  

What was offered to other members of school staffs? The School Development Department provided for total school staffs a program called "Creative Discipline in the Catholic School" and a management course for Subject Co-Ordinators. Inservice in subject areas was provided or fostered by the CEO in the ways already described in Chapter Five for the 1970s, with additional consultants and advisers employed in the 1980s. Some of these were in Central Office and some in Regional Offices, a division which must have required some delineation of respective roles.

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90 Donnan, "An Encounter with the Challenge of Lay Administration", p.7.
91 ibid., p.9.
92 Letter of Assistant Deputy Director to Principals, 14 January 1985, in "IDSI" file, CEOL.
93 Simmons to Principals, 13 March 1986, ibid.
Curriculum Development and Support

Curriculum support, a developing function of the CEO in the 1970s, was a service strongly affected by the regionalisation of the CEO. By 1982 the CEO maintained a central Curriculum Development unit containing thirteen members (some part-time). With regionalisation the central unit was reduced in 1984 to five members, but each Regional Office was given about five curriculum officers who were mainly involved in curriculum support programs and contact with individual schools.

The reduced Central Office curriculum unit began to concentrate on developing and presenting programs applicable across the archdiocese. Thus in 1984-5 this unit worked on such programs as Curriculum Development Processes in Catholic Schools, Computer Education in the Archdiocese of Sydney, Social Literacy, Time Management — Stress and Relaxation. A publications section issued curriculum support documents and a journal, Curriculum Exchange, which presented developments of special relevance to Catholic schools.94

Two special units emerged in this period which were seen as supporting the ethos and identity of the Catholic school. These were the Pastoral Care unit and the Parent Participation in Schools unit. By their creation the CEO was communicating that the curriculum was more than academic and religious.

Pastoral Care was a traditional ecclesiastical term signifying the overall concern of bishops and priests (as “good shepherds”) for the spiritual and personal welfare of their “flocks” in parishes, church schools and hospitals. Catholic leaders argued that this care should be a feature of Catholic schools and should be found in such aspects as the Religious Education curriculum of the school, opportunities for prayer and sacraments for staff and students, the relationship of teachers to pupils, the discipline code, and help for individual students in difficulty. Another expression of this concern was that in the 1980s most Catholic schools, with more funding available, were able to appoint Counsellors for students with problems.

In 1982 the CEO recognised this emphasis by setting up a Pastoral Care Unit of four Consultants led by Mr Norbert Egan. These promoted the development of Pastoral Care programs in schools and of regular contacts amongst those with special responsibility in the area, such as Counsellors.

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1984 a Pastoral Care Consultant was appointed to each region. However the central unit was disbanded in 1985 and three of the Regional Offices did not reappoint a Pastoral Care Consultant. This could give the impression that the CEO was scaling down its efforts in this area. On the other hand it was argued that Pastoral Care was a responsibility for all staff rather than for specialist consultants.

Complementing this pastoral care emphasis was a Parents Resource Group set up in Sydney in the 1970s to assist Catholic schools in presenting programs on what was termed Human Development and Christian Values, in accordance with guidelines issued by the CEC of N.S.W. Family relationships, peer relationships, and sexuality were important fields covered by the group. Until 1980 this was an unfunded service offered by volunteer parents. Then in 1981 the CEO formalised it by establishing a Department of Parent Participation in Schools, with five members in the Central Office and five Regional Co-ordinators. Some of these were part-time employees or volunteers. During the 1980s the unit expanded its programs to include drug education and support courses for parents.95

Underlying the CEO's involvement in curriculum development and support was the rapid proliferation of personnel mainly concerned with curriculum from about 35 in 1979 to about 120 in 1985.96 Strong expansion was in areas where government funding was available. Availability of government funds for special programs along with the recognition of the need and value of the programs encouraged the growth of personnel in areas such as Special Education, Multicultural Education, and Participation and Equity.

In this short review of the curriculum activities of the Office in the 1980s it is impossible to describe all the varied activities and initiatives. The above section attempts to indicate the range of curriculum activity and give some characteristic examples. To complete the outline it is important to comment on curriculum activity in Religious Education.

**The CEO and Religious Education**

This history has shown that the CEO evolved from the appointment of diocesan priests as inspectors whose first responsibility was to safeguard the teaching of Catholic doctrine in Catholic schools. This religious instruction

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96 See 'Guide to Central Services for Primary Schools' (1979) and *Annual Report 1985*, pp.72-5.
was thus seen as essential for the success of Catholic schools and for their identity. Chapter Five explained that during the 1970s the CEO moved away from the practice of inspecting and testing classes on their knowledge of catechisms. The term “inspection” was abandoned in favour of “supervision”, which was then delegated from the priests to representatives of the religious congregations. Instead of prescribing a set body of doctrine to be taught from catechisms, the CEO tried to develop “guidelines” based on recent theories of religious education. These changes brought criticisms from some Catholics that Catholic schools and the CEO were failing to discharge their key responsibility of ensuring the transmission of Catholicism.

In the 1975-87 period the central Religious Education Department of about five consultants and advisers was maintained. Its Director was Barry Collins who had been appointed to the CEO in 1965. His being the only priest remaining in the CEO from 1982 was a symbolic statement by the bishops of the importance they attached to this department. When regionalisation began in 1982, one or two Religious Education Consultants or Advisers were appointed to each region.

Provision of a curriculum broadly acceptable to schools and to the spectrum of Catholics ranging from those stressing transmission of traditional doctrine to those emphasising adaptation to current needs and personal experience of children remained a most pressing challenge for the Department. The need was most pressing in Sydney secondary schools where there was no agreed syllabus. In 1979 Archbishop Carroll wrote to Collins:

...we are confronted with a serious situation. A sufficient number of interested people express criticism of Religious Education in Catholic schools, especially secondary schools, to weaken the morale of teachers and also to raise questions which demand serious attention.97

To meet the need the CEO decided in 1980 to trial without publicity in ten Sydney secondary schools the Religious Education Guidelines98 of the Archdiocese of Melbourne, in the hope that this could become the basis of an agreed curriculum. This blew up into controversy in the Catholic Weekly when the trialing was revealed and attacked by the executive of the Sydney Parents and Friends Association. The tenor of the debate is evident in a subsequent letter:

97 15 March 1979, in "Edu 4" file, SAA.
98 Religious Education Guidelines (Melbourne, 1975-8).
Parents whose children are being taught the “easy” religion recommended by the Melbourne Guidelines and similar types of modernist catechesis, should be up in arms...

The situation at present is that in some schools the Faith taught by Jesus Christ, God, is made to vie for consideration with the “latest” philosophy and theology of teachers who no longer accept the authority of God’s Vicar on earth.99

Collins and others wrote to the Weekly, defending the trialing and pointing out errors in the attacks.100 However it was clear that a forceful group (even if a minority) would continue to harry the efforts of the CEO. In the event the Melbourne Guidelines were not adopted as a curriculum for Sydney schools.

Instead the CEO convened working groups of CEO personnel and outside advisers to draft a Religious Education document for the archdiocese. This resulted in a document for primary schools, A Journey in Faith, published in 1982, and one for secondary schools, Faithful to God: Faithful to People, in 1984. While these were advisory as regards catechetical methods, in the area of doctrine they were prescriptive, although with nothing like the detail of the traditional catechisms. Therefore the CEO had moved beyond the issuing of guidelines. However the continued division of the curriculum into primary and secondary seemed to lag behind the trend in other CEO departments of treating curriculum as a continuum from Kindergarten to Year 12.

The provision of these documents seems to have reduced the criticism. Collins indicated in 1991 that in recent years he had received far fewer letters criticising the condition of religious education in the schools.101

A major achievement in Religious Education in the 1980s was the development and consolidation of the role of Religious Education Coordinator (REC) in schools. In the 1970s the CEO had simply recommended that each school should appoint an REC and this was generally accepted.

Now the CEO provided special inservice opportunities for them and tried to promote their status in the schools:

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100 ibid., March 30.
101 Interview, 19 April 1991.
...it is considered important that on-going support for Religious Education Coordinators and teachers be seen as a top priority for the total system.\textsuperscript{102}

In 1986 formal and salary recognition was given to the position of the REC. The CEO Board of Directors decided that a full-time REC should be appointed in each school. The REC would have time-release from teaching to allow fulfilment of the coordinator’s duties and would receive a salary allowance graded according to qualifications and experience.\textsuperscript{103}

Religious Education was not such a minefield of controversy in the late 1980s. Various factors seem to have contributed to this. The CEO’s publication of prescriptive curriculum documents in the 1980s, the improvement of the position of the REC and promotion of inservice in Religious Education were certainly factors contributing to a more peaceful climate.

\textit{Communications and Liaison}

During the 1980s the CEO also became a communications centre in the Sydney schools system, providing communication within the system and maintaining liaison with other parts of the wider network. This involved communication and cooperation with the National Catholic Education Commission (NCEC), the CEC of NSW, the CBFC, SACS Board, the CIO (all of these making up the Church administrative network), with government departments, the schools, the ITA, parishes, principals associations and parents associations. As the system of administration and schools became more extended and complex, the need for such communication and liaison also grew and was formulated by the CEO as the most important function after the provision of leadership and supervision of religious education:

\begin{quote}
...To foster effective and harmonious communication between Central Office and Regions and the systemic schools, other interested bodies (eg. Pastors and Orders) and the wider community.

To liaise with the C.B. & F.C. in order to ensure the most effective use of resources.\textsuperscript{104}
\end{quote}

How such communication and liaison was achieved took many forms. From Central Office there were circulars and policy documents to schools. There was also the monthly newsletter, \textit{About Catholic Schools},\textsuperscript{105} for schools and

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{103}Policy on Religious Education Co-Ordinators’ (Sept 1985), in "Edu 6" file SAA. The policy was to be implemented in 1986. It was also a policy with major financial and industrial implications because the ITA was likely to seek these allowances for other dioceses.
\textsuperscript{104}‘Some Functions of the Catholic Education Office/Sydney’ (28 April 1984).
\textsuperscript{105}In 1985 Couch found this “highly regarded by schools and parents” - “Review of Structures and Procedures”, p.8.
\end{flushright}
parishes. Regional Offices developed more personal contacts through the visits of their Consultants and Advisers to schools and parishes and through meetings arranged with parent groups. Inservice programs for principals and teachers was another means of communication. Office personnel would also participate in meetings and committees involving other groups in the educational network such as the CEC, the CBFC and the federal Schools Commission.

One could not expect perfect communication and liaison to be achieved. The 1982 Goodwin Report, mentioned earlier in this chapter, pointed to a poor image of the Central Office in the schools and parishes, but saw improvement of communication coming from the regionalisation program. 106

Couch in 1985 found poor communications with the Catholic Schools Finance Office (the new name, adopted in 1983, for the CBFC) to be a major problem:

The major source of tensions between the Catholic Schools Finance Office and the Catholic Education Office, both central and regional, is the inadequacy of communication links. From neither Office is there a systematic pattern of written communication, whereby those officers who should know are informed simultaneously. 107

Such inadequacy was linked with the structure of the Catholic system in the early 1980s. Improvement could be expected when the CEO was remodelled after 1986 in line with the reform of the administrative system as outlined in Chapter Seven. In the new system the Catholic Schools Finance Office (CSFO) would become part of the CEO and would be located on the same premises at Leichhardt.

**Limitations on CEO Functions**

An understanding of the CEO can also be gained by noting the limitations on its activities. Before 1987 the CEO was required to present to the CBFC (CSFO from 1983-6) an annual budget of its income and expenditure which was to be approved by the CBFC for the following year. The CBFC was the equivalent of the treasury for the Catholic school system, managing funds coming from governments and school fees, and deciding how much funding was to be granted to Catholic schools and the CEO in a given year. It was the task of the CEO to present a budget detailing the financial needs of the system for items such as teacher salaries, maintenance of buildings, publications, and the

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106 "Report to Directors", pp.2-3, 12.
107 Review of Structures and Procedures, p.29.
upkeep of the CEO itself. Since the CBFC could question and demand revision of budget estimates, it was very likely that the CEO would inflate its estimates as a safeguard. The CEO was also at some disadvantage because the CBFC did not make available its own income or expenditure. This financial dependence of the CEO meant that it could not make independent decisions about vital issues such as pupil/teacher ratios, how schools could manage their funds, and the amount of funding to be apportioned to the CEO itself.

A related function outside the decision-making authority of the CEO was that of the building and expansion of schools or of their closure. Until 1983 these decisions were made by the archbishop as advised by the CBFC and then by the SACS Board from 1983. The CEO had the important but limited role of advising the CBFC or the SACS Board of the need for new schools or for the rationalisation of established schools in particular areas.

This review of the functions and activities of the CEO in the period 1978-86 shows some significant shifts from earlier CEO functions. Until the 1970s the leadership of the schools was with the religious congregations. Now the CEO was required to provide leadership and vision to the system. Furthermore, the CEO assumed the responsibilities of being employer and supporter of the staff in the system. With the help of government funding, curriculum support and development was undertaken much more extensively. For a system of increasing complexity, the CEO was expected to be a type of communications hub, a function which it fulfilled with limited success. It was also expected to coordinate its activities with the CBFC/CSFO. Problems in this relationship with the financial arm of the system were a main factor leading to the restructuring of the administrative system, as described in Chapter Seven. In this restructuring the CSFO was incorporated within the CEO, a change occurring in 1987.

**Creating the New Model CEO, 1986-7**

The CEO itself was changed as a result of the restructuring of the central leadership of the system which occurred in 1986-7, as outlined in Chapter Seven. There were five main changes to the system. In May 1986 the Sydney Archdiocese was reduced in size by the creation of the new dioceses of Parramatta and Broken Bay. The SACS Board was reconstituted in 1987 and confirmed as chief adviser to the archbishop in educational matters. The CEO and the CSFO were merged, with the CSFO being incorporated within the
CEO. The CEO became the executive arm of the SACS Board. Finally the position of the head of the CEO was changed. The title was changed from Diocesan Director of Schools to Executive Director of Schools. This signified that the head of the CEO was also the Executive Officer of the SACS Board and thus provided a nexus between Board and management. Each of these fundamental systemic reforms brought corresponding changes to the CEO and these latter changes will now be explained.

The Reduction of the Archdiocese

In April 1986 Pope John Paul II announced the creation of the new dioceses of Parramatta and Broken Bay. In broad terms these took from the Archdiocese of Sydney the areas north-west of Berala and north of North Sydney. These were areas of growing population, especially in districts such as Blacktown, Penrith and Gosford. The extent of the reduction can be seen in the following figures for 1988:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diocese</th>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Pupils</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>65,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parramatta</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>29,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broken Bay</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>16,929 108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The responsibilities of the Sydney CEO in terms of numbers of schools and pupils were approximately halved by the partition of 1986.

How did this reduction of responsibility affect the CEO? Though the new dioceses were proclaimed in 1986, they did not set up their own Education Offices until the beginning of 1987 and even then the Sydney CEO carried out financial services, such as payment of salaries, for the new dioceses until late 1987. So the transfer of responsibilities was gradual.

It should be recorded that in mid 1986 some CEO personnel canvassed the possibility of the three dioceses' retaining a central services office which would manage appropriate aspects, such as finance or teacher classification, for all three dioceses. The bishops decided not to follow this model, perhaps because it cut across the traditional independence of a diocese.109 Their attitude seems to have been clarified at a meeting of the CEO Directors and the three bishops concerned on June 26 and 27, 1986. The idea of a shared services unit was raised again at the SACS Board meeting of 20 August 108 01Official Directory of the Catholic Church in Australia 1988-1989. 109This view was suggested by a member of the Working Party on 17 October 1991.
1986,110 but was not discussed at later meetings. Consequently the three dioceses would have their own independent CEOs and dependent schools systems. This pattern has eventuated since 1987, in contrast to the Victorian pattern where the Melbourne CEO provides a range of services for all the Victorian dioceses.

The loss of the Northern and Outer Western Regions meant that while the Sydney CEO maintained its regional structure, there were now only three regions, as shown on the map below.111

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110 SACS Board Minutes 20 August 1986.
Of these remaining Regions, both the Inner Western and the Eastern Regions were in older suburbs where the size of the school population was declining. In contrast, the Southern Region (including districts such as Liverpool and Sutherland) covered more than half the archdiocese and was increasing its school population. Over the total archdiocese pupil numbers were showing a small decline, marking a trend which the CEO expected to continue. Thus for the Sydney CEO the emphasis would be on maintenance, renovation, and rationalisation of existing schools rather than on building new ones. Rationalisation involved the closure of some declining schools and relocation of pupils and teachers, a process requiring both firmness and diplomacy on the part of the CEO in the face of almost inevitable protest from groups affected by the changes.

Another consequence of the loss of the two regions was that many of the regional staff moved with them to make up the staff of the CEOs of the new dioceses. They had been given guarantees that the division of the archdiocese would not cause them to lose their employment.

The Incorporation of the CSFO

This was a fundamental change. The merging of the CEO and CSFO in 1987 meant that the CSFO lost its independent access to the SACS Board and the archbishop. Instead of reporting directly to the SACS Board it now became responsible to the Executive Director of the CEO, who was in turn responsible to the SACS Board. From 1987 the Finance Office became one of three divisions within the CEO central office—those of Religious Education, Educational Services, and Financial Services. Finance Office personnel moved from their former premises in Polding House, Pitt St, to CEO headquarters at Leichhardt. This process happened gradually in 1987 once the first Director of Financial Services, Mr Geoffrey Joy, had been selected and appointed.

For the CEO, the incorporation of the CBFC meant a degree of financial independence and responsibility. It now managed the funds available for Catholic schools and could allocate them to projects as it judged fit, although there was some supervision from the SACS Board. The CEO had maintained that before 1987 the allocation of funds was being excessively determined by financiers rather than by educators. Now it had the opportunity to give appropriate weight to both educational and financial considerations, since both were now the responsibility of the CEO.

112Based on figures and comments in Annual Report 1988-1989, p.38.
One would expect also that the tensions between the educators and financiers which existed when they were in independent organisations and on separate sites would now be greatly reduced. Both divisions, Educational Services and Financial Services, now reported to the one Executive Director who had the authority to resolve differences between the two divisions. There had also been discontent in the former CEO because the CSFO did not make its finances public. With the incorporation of the CSFO in the CEO, this source of discontent was removed and the budget of the CEO now became a public document prepared by its own Financial Services division.

**The New Managers**

The first steps in the reorganisation of the CEO were the appointment of executives to fill the leadership positions of Executive Director, Central Directors (Religious Education, Educational Services, and Finance and Resources\(^{113}\)), and the three Regional Directors. The Executive Director of Schools was to be appointed by the archbishop (Clancy) and the other six Directors by the Chairman of the SACS Board (Bishop Geoffrey Robinson). Applicants were to be sought by advertising in the national press, a departure from the previous practice whereby persons were approached privately by the current administrative leaders.

The key position, that of Executive Director of Schools, was advertised in November 1986. A small committee of the SACS Board interviewed four applicants and recommended Kelvin Canavan, the Deputy Director of the former CEO. His appointment by Archbishop Clancy was for five years and would involve formal appraisals after two and five years, with the possibility of reappointment.\(^ {114}\) He was head of a staff of about 150 in central and regional offices.

In the Central Office the former Department of Religious Education was retained and its leader, Fr Barry Collins, continued as Director of Religious Education for the new Office. In February 1987 advertisements were placed for the positions of Director of Educational Resources and of Director of Finance and Resources. Dr Ross Keane was selected as Director of Educational Resources and Mr Geoffrey Joy as Director of Finance and

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\(^{113}\) In 1987 this position was advertised as Finance and Resources. Since 1988 it has been called Financial Services.

\(^{114}\) Canavan was appraised in early 1991 and the SACS Board reappointed him for a further five years.
Resources. With these three Directors, in place it was now possible to reorganise the Central Office into its three divisions.

In the three Regional Offices Mr Barry Dwyer was retained as Director for the Eastern Region and Sr Joanna Conway rsm for the Inner Western Region. Both of these had been Regional Directors under the former CEO. The Directorship of the Southern Region was advertised and Mrs Vicki Tanzer was appointed.

**Maintaining the Regional Emphasis**

Formation of a new structure gave an opportunity for the Sydney CEO to retreat from the regional structure they had set up in the early 1980s. The archdiocese itself had already abandoned its own Pastoral Regions (set up in 1978) which had been the original reason for regionalising the school system. The CEOs of the two new dioceses rejected the regional model.

Instead the regional structure was affirmed. Its development had involved considerable investment of personnel and publicity by the CEO. Moreover devolution of authority to Regional Offices accorded with the principle of *subsidiarity* which both Vatican and Australian Catholic leaders espoused as a virtue of government. By subsidiarity was meant the principle that decisions should be made and tasks performed at the “lowest” possible level at which they can be made or performed.

Nevertheless within the Central Office in 1986 there was a case made by the Department of School Development, led by James Hawes, for the maintenance of a central specialist team to provide selected educational services which could be of benefit to all schools — such as leadership training and programs related to fostering a Catholic ethos. Hawes envisaged a skilled department which could conduct such programs in all regions and in other dioceses if invited. However the “regionalists” in the CEO saw such a unit as undermining the role and influence of the Regional Offices, encroaching particularly on the work of curriculum consultants.\(^{115}\) The new CEOs of Parramatta and Broken Bay showed little interest in the services of the unit and so the idea was abandoned during 1987. This strengthened the influence of the Regional Offices.

\(^{115}\)Position papers for both sides of this debate were submitted to the SACS Board in November 1986. See "Restructuring" file, CEOL.
Another bulwark for the Regional Offices was the agreement of the new SACS Board to admit the Regional Directors as full members of the Board. At the beginning of 1987 it was announced that “they will be present at all meetings of the Board and will be able to speak there for the schools in a far more direct manner”.\textsuperscript{116} By mid 1987 they were accepted as full members.\textsuperscript{117} This meant also that at SACS Board meetings there would now be seven members from the CEO in a group of about seventeen.

**Conclusion**

Since 1975 the CEO had grown in numbers, professionalism, complexity and influence, but its operation had been hampered by internal tensions and problems with the Finance Office. It had been difficult to address these problems while authorities spent over a decade in deciding upon a new structure for the administration of the school system. Role clarification and restructuring of the CEO were further complicated by the decision to regionalise and later reduce the archdiocese. 1986-7 was a period of decision-making which resulted in the fashioning of a new model CEO.

It was now an administrative and management organisation, acting on behalf of, and accountable to, the SACS Board. By its incorporation of the former CSFO it now had the freedom to manage its own finances. The regional structure had been endorsed, although there were still centre-region difficulties to be addressed in later years.\textsuperscript{118} Overall there was a definite structure and it seemed the period of uncertainty and searching had ended. It was now the task of the CEO to prove itself to be a worthy leader of the systemic schools of the Archdiocese of Sydney.

\textsuperscript{117}See SACS Board, "List of Members", 22 July 1987, ibid.
Conclusion

The founding of the Sydney CEO gave no indication of the large and complex organisation it would later become. There was no fanfare opening, just a notification to schools of the existence and location of the office. Its modest premises only existed through the charity of the religious bookshop, Pellegrini and Company, which offered the original CEO a small room in Roma House, George St, Sydney. The archdiocese did not provide Church funds for acquiring separate premises for the new CEO. Nor did the first head of the CEO, Fr Tom Pierse, receive a personal allowance for the work. Like any priest in the archdiocese, Pierse received a salary from his parish and was expected to travel by public transport to schools throughout the metropolitan area until he was able to arrange his own finance for buying a car. It was understood that Pierse would spend most of his time inspecting schools, as earlier inspectors had done. Archbishop Gilroy simply appointed him to the position just as he appointed any priest to a parish.

To Catholic teachers and priests of the 1940s Pierse carried some weight as an inspector. But at that time his office, the CEO, would not have been regarded as an organisation as it is today or as the state Department of Education was regarded by state teachers. In the main it was just an address to which one mailed letters intended for Pierse.

By the 1980s those who understood Catholic schools, especially teachers, saw the CEO as a large, complex and powerful organisation, responsible for the maintenance and future of most Catholic schools in Sydney. Like any powerful organisation, the CEO could arouse reactions of respect, trust, impatience, frustration or anger. It employed teachers and supervised their careers. Parents and parish priests were consulted on important matters, such as curriculum developments or the reorganisation of schools in a district, but final decisions or recommendations were made by the CEO. It could be criticised, but it could not be ignored.

This history has traced and attempted to account for the above transformation of the original CEO and its role in the Archdiocese of Sydney over 49 years. The narrative was divided into three stages, bounded by the years 1939–60, 1960–75 and 1975–87. In looking back over
these years one can point to a number of major factors which determined the role of the CEO and shaped its development. They included external challenges, pressures from within the CEO itself, and the influence of significant individuals within and without the organisation. As a conclusion to this study, a brief review of the key developments and the main determining factors in each of the three stages will now be given. Reference will also be made to theories of complex organisations which help understanding of the nature of the CEO in these stages.

1939–60

The foundation and early operation of the CEO occurred in a world shaken by World War II, and within the hierarchical, authoritarian Catholic Church still strongly influenced by the spirit of the anti-liberal First Vatican Council of 1870. Sectarianism in Australia was less sharp than in earlier decades, but it was still a factor influencing Catholics to support their schools and maintain in them, somewhat militantly, a distinctive Catholic ethos. The parish-based schools were administered and almost totally staffed by religious congregations. There was no one system of Catholic schools in Sydney, but the schools of each congregation were linked by the corporate spirit of the congregation so that one might talk of receiving "Jesuit education" or of imbibing "the Mercy spirit".

The early development of the CEO in the 1940s as a modest extension of the long-established archdiocesan inspectorate arose out of national concerns and hopes in the 1930s for improvements in schooling. Within the Catholic Church the national Catholic Education Congress of 1936 and the efforts of Coadjutor-archbishop Michael Sheehan of Sydney to improve educational standards in New South Wales encouraged the founding of the tiny CEO in 1939. Its founding Inspector of Schools, Fr Tom Pierse, ensured its continuation by his diligence as an inspector and his development of further functions of the CEO.

From 1939 to about 1962 the CEO was a small team of Diocesan Inspectors, all diocesan priests with the exception of one layman, Kevin Ryan. Their role was to be deputies of the Archbishop of Sydney who delegated to them his responsibility of ensuring that the schools were faithfully teaching Catholic doctrine. This obligation was reduced in most minds at the time to ensuring that the *Australian Catechism*, approved by the Australian
bishops, was known by Sydney children. The CEO also provided the archbishop with information on the condition of the schools and on problems they were facing. It was a communication link between the archbishop and schools, parish priests and religious congregations. Governments and the state education department also liaised with the CEO as representative of Catholic schools in Sydney, although such contacts were not extensive. Thus the original CEO had the role of an inspectorate on behalf of the archbishop and of a communications office for the main players in Catholic schools at the time — bishops, religious congregations, parish priests and state authorities. Its primary role was still that of an episcopal inspectorate but its role as a central communications and liaison office provided a basis for the complex organisation which was to develop after 1960.

The Introduction to this study suggested that sociological theories of organisations could help in understanding the development of the CEO. The question was raised as to whether certain models of organisations, such as rational bureaucratic models, helped to describe the organisation of the CEO. It should be noted that the question related only to the CEO itself and not to the wider administrative network in which the CEO operated. In these first decades the CEO was a small and very simple organisation in which a Diocesan Inspector of Schools had authority over a few Assistant Inspectors and one or two secretaries. Pierse, the first leader of the organisation, developed influence because of his considerable energy and domineering personality as an inspector, his tenure of the position for ten years, and his status as the only priest inspector until 1946. His successor, John Slowey, also acquired influence from his continuous tenure of the position from 1949 and his priestly status. Observers portray him as conciliatory where Pierse was confrontationist. When forthright priests, such as Duffy, Meere and Crittenden, were appointed to the CEO as Assistant Inspectors in the 1950s, the position of Slowey as leader of the CEO seems to have become more that of primus inter pares in a simple organisation where there were few bureaucratic structures to bolster the leader's authority.

The power of the CEO over the schools was also very limited in this period, when most influence lay with parish priests and religious congregations. The parish priest was an influential figure in any school, since schools were generally built, owned and maintained by the parishes.
Religious congregations administered schools, appointed principals and staff, and employed lay teachers where required. In cases of controversy, appeals were usually made to the archbishop, not to the CEO. Thus power over funds, staffing and building lay mainly with parish priests and religious congregations, although it was recognised that these were all under the authority of the archbishop.

CEO authority was derived from the position of its inspectors as representatives of the archbishop in regard to schooling. They themselves could praise or criticise a school but could not enforce any changes except by appealing to the archbishop to take some action. They had no control over funding or staffing of schools. The CEO itself depended solely on the archbishop for its running expenses in an age where there was no government funding for Catholic schools.

From its first year the CEO was never an independent body responsible only to the hierarchy. The Archbishop of Sydney has always maintained groups "above" or in partnership with the CEO. These have included the Catholic Education Board established in 1939, the Catholic Building and Finance Commission, the Catholic Education Board as reconstructed in 1967, and, currently, the Sydney Archdiocesan Schools (SACS) Board. It should be noted however that these were generally part-time organisations, that their actual power varied over the years, and that the CEO provided much of their agenda.

Such a pattern may be characteristic of Sydney Catholic schooling. The first Board was established at the request of the CEO, but the formation of the later groups reflects a desire by some prominent clerical and lay Catholics to have an input into policy decisions regarding Catholic schooling. In the Melbourne Archdiocese it was not until the 1960s that the Catholic Education Office had to defer to an Education Advisory Council and later to a Melbourne Catholic Education Board. Praetz maintains that the influence of this Council and Board was short-lived and eventually overwhelmed by the CEO bureaucracy.¹

Had the CEO never been founded, Catholic schools probably would have survived into the 1960s, just as they had from 1880 to 1939. Nevertheless the archbishop did need deputies who would keep in touch with the

condition of the schools, especially in regard to their teaching of Catholic doctrine. There was also a need for some central office with which the numerous religious congregations and the state authorities could communicate. Thus before 1960 the CEO was useful but not essential to the continuation of Catholic schools.

1960–75

In the second stage of its development, from about 1960 to 1975, the CEO assumed a role of administrative responsibility for a new system of Catholic schools in Sydney, and it developed markedly in size, complexity and influence. These changes to the CEO occurred in response to the crisis experienced by Catholic schools in the 1960s when their continued existence was threatened. This crisis was provoked by a doubling of pupil numbers in twenty years, the demands of the Wyndham reorganisation, the decline in numbers in religious congregations, extreme funding difficulties, and the spirit of social and ecclesiastical ferment which swept the world and the Catholic Church in the 1960s. Some central organisation was needed to coordinate responses to the crisis.

The catalyst for change in the schools and the CEO in this period was Cardinal Gilroy’s establishment in 1965 of the Catholic Building and Finance Commission, which was meant to address the staffing and funding crisis. The CBFC undertook to manage the economic aspects of Catholic schooling in the archdiocese, especially in regard to payment of teachers, school maintenance costs, and school building needs. By 1975 about 80 per cent of Sydney schools had agreed to accept such management by the CBFC. Thus these schools, which had formerly belonged to loose systems developed by particular religious congregations, now belonged to an archdiocesan system managed jointly by the CBFC and the CEO.

The role of the CEO now became that of partner to the CBFC in developing and administering this new system of Catholic schools. The CBFC in this period had overall authority in regard to finance, industrial conditions and capital development in the systemic schools. However it needed the advice and information of the CEO when making major decisions. The CEO had important statistical information and educational expertise for the guidance of the businessmen, clergy, lawyers and architects who predominated in the CBFC. In this partnership the CEO was responsible
for the educational aspects of the system, especially curriculum, staff selection and staff development.

This dual control of the system, in which the CEO and CBFC were independent organisations reporting separately to the archbishop, caused tensions. Both organisations were administering the same system of schools and had to make policy decisions which had both educational and financial dimensions. In practice this meant that the CEO had to present an annual budget to the CBFC for approval. CEO personnel disliked having to go “cap in hand” to non-educators for funds. The CBFC balance sheet was not a public document and this gave rise to suspicions that funds were being withheld from the schools.

Other major factors for change in this period were the more open and less defensive world vision of the Catholic Church, especially as expressed in the Second Vatican Council, the decline in sectarianism in Australia and the related infusion of government funds into Catholic schools from the late 1960s. These factors helped create a CEO expanded in size and functions and working in cooperation with governments to maintain a system of schools with a continued Catholic ethos.

In this period the two most prominent individuals were the CEO Director, John Slowey, and Archbishop James Carroll. Slowey, who was in charge of the CEO from 1949 when the CEO was more an inspectorate, presided over this “loosely coupled system” which seemed to accumulate personnel and departments as needs and funding appeared. Slowey did not seek to create a streamlined bureaucracy and he operated before the contemporary era of “strategic plans”. James Carroll was not a member of the CEO but this study has shown his importance from the early 1960s until the mid 1980s in negotiating for government funding, in his influence with the CBFC and the later CEC of NSW (which he founded), and in his role as Vicar for Education from 1978. His influence was also significant in the appointments of CEO leaders in the 1980s.

When government funding began to flow in unwonted volume to the schools in the 1970s the financial position of the CEO improved. Much of this funding was on a per capita basis, but there were also specified projects receiving substantial federal funding for which the CEO would make application. Thus during the 1970s the CEO became less financially
dependent on the CBFC, although it still presented its budget annually to the CBFC for approval.

In terms of power over the new system the CEO was really the junior partner to the CBFC which, by the late 1960s, controlled the funds for the system, paid the salaries of staff and decided the amounts that schools could have for maintenance or capital works. In contrast, the Melbourne CEO at this stage had more power over its equivalent system because it controlled the funds to the schools. In matters of religious curriculum or staff development the Sydney CEO tended to issue guidelines and advice to schools rather than mandatory policies. Its influence came rather from the services and leadership it attempted to provide.

The important CEO role of inspection of the schools disappeared in this period. As described in Chapter Five, inspection was replaced by a concept of "supervision" and the former work of inspection was changed to a service role of providing support and advice to schools. Schools were now visited by CEO Consultants and Advisers rather than by Diocesan Inspectors. These changes arose out of trends already present in the government systems and the recognition by CEO leaders that the increasingly complex and sophisticated schools required support and advice from the CEO rather than judgment. Since the CEO and CBFC were now controlling the employment of teachers they had responsibility for the professional care and development of these teachers.

While no longer "inspecting" schools for their teaching of Catholic doctrine, the CEO still was very conscious of its responsibility for ensuring that they provided an effective Religious Education program, since this was accepted as essential for the maintenance of the identity of Catholic schools. In the controversial post-Vatican II decade this became a difficult responsibility to fulfil, especially as there was a contemporaneous revolution in catechetical approaches, which troubled many Catholics. The CEO received much criticism, especially in the 1970s, for what was perceived as a serious decline in the effectiveness of Religious Education in the schools.

Because of its changing role and increased responsibilities, the CEO expanded greatly in this period. In 1960 it was still a small team of four Inspectors of Schools, led by John Slowey. By 1972 it had grown to 17...
members, and to 50 members by 1977. This accelerated growth in the 1970s was made possible by the increased government funding and was required for the fulfilment of its growing responsibilities.

The background of CEO personnel also changed. In the key positions of Diocesan Director of Schools and Assistant Diocesan Director there were still the two diocesan priests, Slowey and Collins, each of whom had direct access to the archbishop. But by 1977 they were well outnumbered by the 16 religious sisters and brothers and 31 lay officers, a change which reflected the laicisation of the teaching staff in Catholic schools and the greater recognition given to religious and laity in the Church of the 1960s and 1970s. Apart from personnel changes reflecting shifts within the Catholic Church, there was also a strong group of professionals with expertise in fields such as multi-cultural education, social work, and particular subject areas. Thus the CEO acquired a much broader range of personnel compared with the four clerical inspectors of 1960.

A further change was in the developing complexity of the CEO organisation. There was a hierarchy in which authority was delegated downwards from the Director to the Assistant Director, Directors of Departments, Coordinators, Consultants and Officers. Personnel were organised into seven groups (variously called Departments, Divisions or Programs) and the staff of one of these, the Department of Primary Education, were further divided into regional groups.

As a complex organisation, the CEO in this period was not a strictly rational bureaucracy along the lines of models proposed by Max Weber or Frederick Taylor. Reports of observers of the CEO organisation in the 1980s, such as Payne (1981) and Couch (1986), bore witness to the lack of bureaucratic controls within the CEO. Rather the organisation might best be described by the model of a "loosely coupled system", which is the way Canavan, Director of Primary Education in the 1970s, remembers it. In such a system there is usually less concern about goal achievement, because it is difficult to obtain agreement or precision about what the goals or products of the organisation might be. This applied to the CEO which was responsible for effective Catholic education. It is a truism to state that

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2Staff numbers for 1975 or 1976 were not found in CEO archives but the trend is still obvious from these figures.
3As outlined in the Introduction.
there would not be unanimity amongst educators or educational administrators in defining goals of education. If goals of a loosely coupled system are imprecise then it is likely that role descriptions of officials will be imprecise. Again Payne could find no published job descriptions for the CEO Director of Schools or the Assistant Director and noted that "both the Departmental Heads and Deputy Director drafted their own specifications of duties".\(^4\) Payne's stress on the discontinuity of activity within the CEO in 1981 further bears out the aptness of the loosely coupled description.

It was asked in the Introduction whether the CEO might still be described as a bureaucracy in the form of traditional Church bureaucracies, best exemplified by the large curial departments in Rome. Church leaders in Australia would certainly have had some experience of Roman bureaucracy. However the CEO showed little similarity to this model. Its leaders were neither cardinals nor bishops, its membership became increasingly laicised, and it was influenced much more by Australian laws and customs than by Canon Law. Nevertheless, before 1980, appointments to the CEO were made very much according to Church custom. Bishops and priests inquired privately about possible appointees without advertising the positions. Senior appointments to the CEO were simply announced to the diocese by the archbishop. Diocesan Directors were appointed in this way until 1982. But in 1986 the CEO advertised in the national press for its new Executive Director and thus moved further away from any Roman model of bureaucracy.

The CEO, then, was not a tightly knit, bureaucratic organisation. What did bind it together, even if loosely? In general one might look to a shared loyalty to the Catholic Church in Australia. In this period the leaders of various departments in the CEO were mainly diocesan priests appointed directly by the archbishop, or members of religious orders appointed by congregational leaders. The lower-ranked personnel were generally loyal Catholics, several being former religious. Most members of the CEO, having themselves been educated in Catholic schools, shared an admiration for the achievements of earlier educators and a desire for the continuation of Catholic schooling. Except for a few critics such as Crudden and Crittenden, they accepted the received view that Catholic schools were

important for the future of the Catholic Church in Australia and that their work in the CEO was a contribution to that future.

1975–87

In the third and final stage, 1975–87, there was no radical change of role for the CEO as was seen in the second stage, but there was a consolidation and extension of the role of the CEO as manager of the system of schools created in the 1960s. 1975 was not a pivotal year. The CEO continued to grow in influence, size and complexity as an organisation. So the years 1975–87 have been treated as a third stage partly for the convenience of managing a long period of development of the CEO. However, there is a degree of unity given to these years by the world return to conservatism and consolidation. Socialism, whether in Communist nations or of the democratic socialist parties, had not realised its promise; radical movements of the 1960s and 1970s had lost their edge; universities and high schools were more settled; Whitlam had given way to Fraser; governments were turning to the economic rationalists for solutions to their intractable economic problems. The watchwords were responsibility, accountability, management.

Towards a clearer, stronger role

These concerns resonated in the story of the CEO in this period as regards both its role and development. Its role as manager of the system of schools of the archdiocese was both strengthened and clarified in 1987 when a “new model” CEO was constituted as leader and manager of the school system, with the mandate to implement the policies of the new Sydney Archdiocesan Catholic Schools Board.

From the mid 1970s a powerful influence on the CEO was a concern for efficiency and accountability demanded by governments providing funds and by lay and religious professionals within the Catholic school system. While there is no indication that governments sought to dictate management structures in the Catholic diocesan systems, nevertheless CEOs were influenced to shape their structures and practices to meet government funding requirements. With state and Catholic systemic schools each dealing with the same government departments in funding programs, Catholic authorities would have become more familiar with structures and procedures in state school systems. This experience would
have been of value to them in the restructuring of the Sydney systemic administration. There were also advisers of the CEO, such as Victor Couch and Gerald Gleeson, who were very familiar with the structures of the government school system. Government funding also led to the development of state and national Catholic Education Commissions. Membership of these commissions gave Sydney authorities, such as Archbishop Carroll and Ambrose Payne, familiarity with the systemic administrations of other dioceses, and resulting comparisons could show deficiencies in the Sydney structures. Overall, this dependence on government funding and increased contact with governments led to scrutiny of the Sydney administrative structures and put pressure on CEO leaders to improve the efficiency and accountability of their administration.

In 1972 a flurry of proposals for administrative change came to nothing. More effective catalysts were the archbishop's decision to regionalise the archdiocese and the related reports commissioned by the Sydney bishops — those of Payne in 1978 and 1981 and of Hart in 1980. These led to the first step in reorganisation, the regionalisation of the school system and of the CEO.

The tortuous struggles, especially of the years 1978–87, to reshape the administration of the system and to clarify the role of the CEO were traced in Chapter Seven. Until 1983 the CEO had a rather loose accountability for its management of the schools to the archbishop through his Episcopal Vicar for Education. To present day observers, accustomed to role definitions and job descriptions, it may seem remarkable that from 1939 to 1986 the CEO functioned without any formal charter from the archbishop publicly outlining its role. From 1983 there was some movement towards clarification of role when the CEO came under the authority of a SACS Board, at first termed "Interim" but then taking more durable form in 1985. Then in 1986 the SACS Board and CEO developed a mutually agreed statement of their separate roles and functions. Thus by 1987 the role of the CEO had been officially clarified so that it was stated to be the "administrative arm" of the SACS Board, responsible for the "IMPLEMENTATION and MANAGEMENT of Board policy and

5This was drafted in 1986 but was only confirmed (with minor revisions) by the archbishop in 1989. See Role and Functions of the Sydney Archdiocesan Catholic Schools Board and the Catholic Education Office, Sydney (Sydney, 1989).
priorities". However, constitutions are really attempts at directing or structuring practice and so it is likely that the actual role of the CEO in relation to the SACS Board and the schools may not completely correspond to this published statement of its role.

Not only was the role of the CEO clarified in this period of restructuring, it was also strengthened. This occurred in 1986 with Archbishop Clancy’s acceptance of the SACS Board proposal to incorporate the Catholic Schools Finance Office within the CEO. Thus was removed the dual administration of the schools system by the CEO and the CBFC/CSFO which had existed since 1965 and had been an object of criticism by the CEO. The CEO now controlled its own budget, allocated funds to schools for maintenance and capital works, paid the salaries of employees within the system, and invested system funds where appropriate. While a corresponding accountability accrued to the CEO, this financial responsibility clearly involved a major extension of its role and a strengthening of its power in the system.

An important reason for the restructuring of the educational administration in 1986 was that in May 1986 the Archdiocese of Sydney was substantially reduced in size and numbers of schools by the creation of the new dioceses of Parramatta and Broken Bay. It was immediately after these new dioceses had been announced that the SACS Board Working Party began drafting proposals for the restructuring of the administration of the Sydney schools system.

In this period 1975–87 the CEO continued in its earlier role of being a liaison centre in the Sydney Archdiocese for the many other government and Church bodies which had interests or influence in Catholic schools. It also gave emphasis to its responsibility of providing leadership and direction within the system. This became increasingly important as religious congregations continued to decline in membership and influence and handed over more schools to the administration of the CEO. As the schools became more laicised there was a corresponding need to maintain the Catholic ethos of the schools by development and supervision of the Religious Education curriculum, by appropriate selection of principals and staff, and by staff development programs.

6ibid., p.5.
Internal Changes

For the CEO itself, this third stage saw the most extensive changes of its history. The number of personnel more than tripled and lay professionals continued the earlier trend of replacing the priests and religious congregational appointees who had predominated in the CEO before 1975. As regards leadership there had been one change of Diocesan Director in the period 1939–1981. In the 1980s there were two changes in six years, with John Slowey being replaced by Walter Simmons in 1981 and Kelvin Canavan succeeding Simmons in 1987. With the development of the Board of Directors the leadership also became more collegial. Fewer employees owed their position to private agreement between CEO leaders and a bishop or congregational superior. By the 1980s, appointments to positions in the CEO generally involved advertisement of the positions, panel interviews, and subsequent appraisal. Then there was the regionalisation of the CEO with the creation of five regional offices sharing responsibility with the central office (itself moved to new premises at Leichhardt). Finally one must recall the fundamental restructuring involved in 1987 when the CEO incorporated the CSFO, the central office was organised into the three divisions of Religious Education, Educational Resources, and Finance and Resources, and the top position of Diocesan Director of Schools was replaced by that of Executive Director of Schools, a role which really merged the previous two leadership positions of the former CEO and CSFO.

This appointment of the Executive Officer in 1987 was a foundation plank for the present structure of the CEO. The role description of the new head of the CEO reflected the emerging character of the organisation. In 1986 the SACS Board advertised in the Sydney Morning Herald for the new position of

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF CATHOLIC SCHOOLS

This position incorporates two major areas of responsibility:

(i) Chief Executive Officer of the Board; and

(ii) Senior Administrator of the Catholic Schools System...

The position requires:

1. The ability to articulate and share a vision for the evangelisation of the children and youth of the archdiocese through the ministry of Catholic schooling;

2. The ability to serve as the Executive Officer of the Board, to interpret and implement Board policy;

3. The ability to contribute to the development of sound educational policy matters and to oversee the administration of Financial...and Human Resources; and
4. The ability to lead a large Administration staff and to ensure the provision of educational services to a network of schools in a cost-effective way.\textsuperscript{7}

The advertisement reveals in several respects that the modern CEO is a far cry from that of 1939. The CEO has a "large Administration staff", its responsibilities are broad and include financial management. The language of corporate management ("Executive Director", "Financial and Human Resources", "cost-effective") sits alongside the religious concepts of "evangelisation" and "mission". Tom Pierse, who died in 1985, would have marvelled at the transformation of his original modest inspectorate.

As was stated in the Introduction, it would be widely believed today that the viability of Sydney Catholic schools depends on the leadership and administration of this "new model" CEO.

It also became a more complex organisation than in the 1970s as larger numbers of staff led to groupings into service departments. Departmentalisation sharpened the need for effective horizontal and vertical communication and coordination within the CEO. Further complexity arose from the introduction of regional offices and the division of responsibilities of central and regional personnel. At the same time the CEO itself had to be sensitive to its place in an increasingly complex environment or network which included episcopal committees, CECs, federal and N.S.W. government departments, trade unions, industrial courts, principals associations, and parents associations.

**Describing the CEO as an Organisation**

Growth in personnel, responsibility, complexity and power of the CEO in this period led to concerns about the efficiency of its structures and management. This concern was all the more to be expected in an era when governments and other organisations were very conscious of the need for effective management. Hence the series of reports into the workings of the CEO, especially from 1978 to 1986.\textsuperscript{8} The authors of these studies, especially Payne, Hart, Couch, and Canavan, had theoretical and experiential knowledge of the administration of complex organisations. Their aggregated advice led to the eventual restructuring of the CEO along the model of corporate responsibility. The creation of the SACS Board to

\textsuperscript{7} *Sydney Morning Herald*, 22 November 1986.

\textsuperscript{8} See Chapter 7.
oversee general policy, the appointment of an Executive Officer of the SACS Board, the designation of the CEO as "administrative arm" of the SACS Board, the lines of accountability amongst the CEO departments, the Executive Director and the SACS Board, all reflect a corporate model of organisation. Indeed one can see the skeleton of this structure in Payne's first report of 1978. This "corporatisation" of the CEO affected its internal structure and its role within the system of administration of schools in Sydney.

Could the CEO of the 1980s still be termed a "loosely coupled system" as it was described above for the 1970s? Overall this is still an appropriate description because the CEO is a service organisation employing professionals who guard their professional freedom. In curriculum development, in teacher support and development, in making allowance for regional differences and needs, in dealing with industrial issues, in making recommendations to open or close schools, there is no "one best way" of acting as would be advocated by the theorists of scientific management or rational bureaucracy. In such areas CEO professionals require a degree of freedom. Organisational control over them is by providing some bureaucratic guidelines, by demanding appropriate credentials for their appointment and by periodic formal appraisal of the effectiveness of their work.

Such patterns of organisation developed by the CEO acceded with trends in Church and society in the period. In the Catholic Church since Vatican II more emphasis was being given to individual responsibility and to the development and contribution of the laity. Members of religious congregations were also engaging in much more tertiary and professional education than in earlier decades. These laity and religious provided the senior staff of the CEO in the 1970s and 1980s and their expertise helped shape the changing CEO. At the same time the CEO was aware of changes in government education systems which sought to break down centralised bureaucratic controls and give more flexibility and local responsibility in administration. Furthermore, the Vatican, in the 1970s, had advised the Sydney bishops that their archdiocese was too large. Thus it was not coincidental that in this period the CEO adopted a regional structure.

9Interim Report to the Archdiocesan Council, pp.5-8. A diagram of his proposed structure appears in Appendix C.
The Weberian rational bureaucratic model and the "loosely coupled" model were both seen by Canavan as appropriate for his 1986 study of perceptions and expectations of the Sydney CEO:

As the CEO utilises a rational bureaucratic form of operation, principals and CEO staff experience loss of autonomy, and respond by resisting the demands of those in authority. When the CEO adopts a more loosely-coupled model of operation a different pattern of power-structure-belief relationships may be observed. Some CEO services are more suited to a bureaucratic approach, while others (e.g. curriculum development in a particular school) are more suited to the approach consistent with that found in a loosely-coupled system.10

Does the CEO now function in some respects as a rational bureaucracy as Canavan has suggested? In a bureaucracy, personnel have defined roles within a hierarchical and departmental structure. Policies and guidelines have to be followed and files have to be maintained.

There is a hierarchy of positions within the CEO, from Executive Director down to Adviser, and the CEO has arranged for the systemic schools to develop a similar hierarchy of Principal, Assistant to the Principal, Coordinator and Teacher. In the related area of classification of CEO staff and teachers for salary purposes, there are precise bureaucratic formulas which are followed. There is also opportunity for promotion up this bureaucratic ladder in both the CEO and the schools. Bureaucratic regulation of the schools is strong in the financial services division of the CEO which pays the salaries, determines the number of teachers and ancillary staff that schools may have, and allocates funding for maintenance. Some of these controls are determined by industrial awards and, in applying them, the CEO is really just carrying out the responsibilities of the employer as required by the award. Another feature of Weber's model of bureaucracy was its concern to perpetuate itself and to preserve its influence or authority. There are no immediate threats to the existence of the CEO, but the Executive Director has warned of unwanted government influence on Catholic education accompanying government funding.11 This warning reflects a fear12 that the independent authority of the CEO in managing Catholic schools could be undermined.

The CEO therefore does operate more bureaucratically than in the 1960s and has established effective control over the Sydney system by

11Reshaping Our Catholic Schools for the 21st Century (Sydney, 1990), p.11.
12This is not to imply any self-serving motivation.
bureaucratic structures and procedures. Praetz showed that in the Melbourne Archdiocese in the 1970s the Melbourne CEO acquired effective authority over systemic schools by the use of bureaucratic procedures. This study has seen a similar control develop in Sydney, but in a different fashion. The main difference in Sydney was the protracted struggle to remodel the CEO administration which was not achieved until 1987. Before 1987 there was growing bureaucratic control of the schools, but much of this was by the CBFC/CSFO rather than by the CEO.

The rational bureaucracy model is only a helpful but incomplete framework for understanding this complex organisation. There are degrees of bureaucracy. An organisation can be more bureaucratic the more it formulates detailed rules and procedures and narrows the areas of discretion in which its personnel can take initiative. In the CEO there is considerable discretion and professional freedom given to staff working in curriculum and staff development areas. This discretion is enhanced by the fact that most of these staff are based in regional offices with the mandate to take account of local conditions. The CEO also gives considerable freedom to school principals who choose their own staff and decide their own curriculum within state and CEO guidelines. Rank and file teachers are little affected by the CEO in their classroom practice. At most, the CEO encourages them to attend inservice courses and provides advisers in curriculum. There is certainly no bureaucratic control over curriculum and teaching practice. In the 1980s any supervision of teaching performance was by the local school executive rather than by the CEO. Therefore it can be concluded that, while the CEO shows some features of the rational bureaucracy, its overall organisation is better described as a "loosely coupled system". Indeed the labels themselves are of secondary importance. However, the fact that they can be usefully applied shows the complexity of the organisation which grew out of the inspectorate of 1939.

**The Contemporary CEO**

Although this study concluded in 1987, it can be observed that, up to the present in 1992, the CEO role and structure have been maintained according to the pattern established in 1987. The CEO was then designated

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as leader and manager of the system. Nevertheless adaptability would always be required, as Canavan, the Executive Director, recognised:

Change is inevitable... We can, however, take control of this change. With a dedicated, united effort, Catholic schools, supported by the Directors and staff at the Catholic Education Office, can use the 1990s to exercise a prophetic role.14

In particular the regional structure required adjustment:

In 1991 the challenge facing the Catholic Education Office is to adjust organisational and management arrangements in order to improve the quality of service to schools by reducing the ambiguities and tension that are present in our regionalised organisation.15

In 1991 there were 178 Catholic schools in the Archdiocese of Sydney. Only 18 of these were administered independently by religious congregations. 160 were systemic schools managed by the Sydney CEO.16 While it is theoretically possible for a systemic school to become independent of the CEO, there have been no indications of schools taking steps to do so. Indeed, one might plausibly speculate that it would be easier for an independent school to join the system than for a systemic school to become independent of the CEO. These considerations indicate that the CEO has consolidated its leadership and authority over Catholic schooling in Sydney.

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16Catholic Education Commission, N.S.W., Newsletter, April 1992.
APPENDIXES
APPENDIX A

Catholic Education Office (1972):

The Executive members and officers of the Catholic Education Office Sydney, are:-

**Director:**

**Assistant Director**

**Diocesan Inspectors of Schools:**
- Rev. Father B. Hawthorne,
- Sister M. Norbert, R.S.M.
- Rev. Brother Kelvin, F.M.S., B.A., M.A.C.E.

**Supervisors of Catechetics**

**Education Consultant**
Mr. T.E.L. McGuire

**Registrar of Teacher Education:**
Mr. W. Bloomfield

**Director's Secretary:**
Miss Florence Hull

**Secretary:**
Mr. T.H. Barker

**Assistant Secretary:**
Mr. A. Barton

**Teacher Registrar:**
Miss Beverley Hassett

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1) J. Slowey, Paper 1 — Administration of Catholic Education in the Archdiocese of Sydney (1972), in Box 1, CEOL.
APPENDIX B

Catholic Education Office Sydney

Professional and Administrative Officers: January 1977

Diocesan Director of Schools:
Very Rev. Mgr J.F. Slowey

Assistant Diocesan Director of Schools:
Rev. B.F. Collins

Executive Officer Assisting the Director:
Miss Beverley Hassett

Religious Education
Rev. Marius Dawson O.Carm.
Sr Mary Philip sgs
Sr Eulalie rsj

Secondary Education

Director of Secondary Education:
Br W.X. Simmons cfc

Consultants
Sr Jose Thompson rsc
Mr Brock Rowe
Mr Peter Crimmins
Sr Catherine McGrath rsm (Asian/Social Studies)
Br Gregory Bruchhauser fsc (Art/Craft)
Sr Veronica rsm (Library Services)

Assistant To Director (Staff Relations):
Mr Nicholas Peres

Primary Education

Director of Primary Education:
Br Kelvin Canavan fms

Coordinator of Consultants:
Sr Isabel Donnelly rsm

Regional Consultants:
Sr Mary Giovanni fdnsc 
Sr Dymphna Mary rsj
Sr Jennifer Fahey rsc
Sr Johanna Conway rsm
Mr Grahame Uhlmann
Sr Monna Cowburn csb
Mr John Walker
Mr Les McGuire
Miss Patricia O'Carroll
Miss Janet Powell

Rev. G.P. Schneider sj
Miss Patricia Cook
Miss Margaret Johnson

2From “Educ 4” file, CEOL
School Social Work Division
Miss M. Tyrrell (Senior Officer)
Miss M. Bayldon
Miss M. Shannon
Mr S. Mills
Miss F. Sweeney

Primary School Library Service
Miss Kaye Lynch

Multicultural Education Programme
Miss Catherine Duncan (Coordinator)
Miss Althea Purdy (Consultant)
Mrs Margaret Bates (Teacher Consultant)
Mrs Kay Blackshaw (Teacher Consultant)
Mrs Sheila Deaves (Teacher Consultant)
Mrs Margaret Zanghi (Teacher Consultant)
Mrs Kathie Smithies (Project Officer)
Mrs Kay Moechtar (Secondary)

Human Relations/Christian Development Consultant
pending appointment

Schools Accommodation and Planning Officers
Mr T.H. Barker
Mrs Judith Guiran
Mr Alan Colman

Research Officers
Miss Monica Thom
Miss Patricia Tsykalas

CEO Librarian
Mrs Rosemary Manchester

Teacher Registrar
Miss Helen Cunneen

Lay Principal Assessment
Mr W.D. Carr

Assistant Secretary
Mr John Dexter
APPENDIX C

Schematic presentation of Relationships in the Proposed Regionalisation of the Administration of Catholic Education in the Archdiocese of Sydney.

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3 From Payne, First Interim Report, p.8A, in "Educ 5" file, SAA.
APPENDIX D

A PERCEPTION OF
BASIC ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF SYDNEY CATHOLIC SCHOOLS

1964

Archbishop

CEO
Policy
Management

Schools

1965-82

Archbishop

CBFC
Policy
Management

CEO
Policy
Management

Schools

1983-86

Archbishop

S.A.C.S. Board
Policy
Management

CSFO

CEO

Schools

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APPENDIX E

Coordination of the Former CEO and the Former CSFO into a Single Administration

SYDNEY ARCHDIOCESAN CATHOLIC SCHOOLS BOARD

ARCHBISHOP OF SYDNEY

CHAIRMAN

BOARD

Appointed Members

Ex-officio Members

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF CATHOLIC SCHOOLS

Deputy Director: Religious Education

Deputy Director: Educational Services

Deputy Director: Finance

ADMINISTRATION

SYDNEY CATHOLIC SCHOOLS

BOARD:

Ex-officio members:

(5)

Chairman

Executive Director of Catholic Schools

Deputy Director of Schools: Religious Education

Deputy Director of Schools: Educational Services

Deputy Director of Schools: Finance

Appointed Members

(8)

Appointed by the Archbishop for a fixed term with some retiring each year.

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