CREATORS, CREATURES AND VICTIM-SURVIVORS: 
WORD, SILENCE AND SOME HUMANE VOICES OF SELF- 
DETERMINATION IN APOCALYPTIC LITERATURE FROM THE WYCLIFFE 
BIBLE OF 1388 TO THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD CONFERENCE ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS OF 1993

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THE TITLE

Creators, Creatures And Victim-Survivors: Word, Silence And Some Humane Voices Of Self-Determination In Apocalyptic Literature From The Wycliffe Bible Of 1388 To The United Nations World Conference On Human Rights Of 1993

THE THESIS

In contemporary apocalyptic rhetoric, polyvalent figures of victim-survivors augment creator-creature dualism, ancient and current. Particular attention is paid to a shift in the creator-creature motif which was foreshadowed in the writings of Giambattista Vico and has been carried forward into contemporary criticism by Northrop Frye. This pursuit attempts to make available to contemporary concern an appreciation of a variety of concepts of humanity, all of which may contribute to an enhanced toleration of diversity.

THE ARGUMENT

A very simple argument is pursued against the acceptance of one-eyed visions and univocal utterances in interpretation of apocalyptic rhetoric. It is an argument for paying attention to miscellaneous images and polyvalent utterances. This entails an accommodation in thought of convergent and divergent horizons of imagery. So it is an argument for thoughtful tolerance.
ABSTRACT

This analysis of apocalyptic rhetoric brings nine generations of the written text of the Johannine Apocalypse into a contemporary (1989-1994) framework which includes phenomena such as self-determination, mutual interdependence and psychoterror. The discussion is mediated by disciplines and backgrounds of Religion and Literature. The critical method is religio-literary.

Literary themes from the Johannine Apocalypse, especially themes of annihilation, torment, blessedness and rapture, structure the discussion. These themes are related to ideas of self-determination such as were proclaimed at the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights (UNWCHR), Vienna, 1993.

The discussion questions the axioms of self-determination, especially the matter of indivisibility which came to issue during UNWCHR, Vienna, 1993. Some policies and practises of the Australian government's human rights activities are discussed. Attention is then redirected to the Johannine Apocalypse as a polyvalent source of apocalyptic ideation and a source of social empowerment.
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For Bill Maidment's vigorous scrutiny, Bill Jobling's testing inquiry, Jim Tulip's encouragement and facilitation of the research, Eric Sharpe's reference library, Donald Philip Verene's interest in the Vico Chapter, Ian Hancock's interest in the Romani Chapter, Paul Barnett's interest in the early Johannine Chapter, Margaret Cunningham's generosity in testing practical applications, Bob Denham's generosity with soon to be published material, Shoji Nakamura's interest in questions about Christian immersion in Buddhism, Garry Trompf's kindly supervision of my transition into religio-literary poetics, and the company of the postgraduate seminar, my thanks. To friends and familiars, mehurcule!
INTRODUCTION

I owe thanks to the School of Studies in Religion, formerly the Department of Religious Studies, at the University of Sydney. Creators, Creatures and Victim-Survivors found kind accommodation among the students and staff there. The religio-literary method which I shall describe and demonstrate throughout this thesis is founded on guidelines provided by that School and by the Department of English Literature where I gained my earlier education in method.

Founding Professor Eric J. Sharpe has written that a scholar considers, at the outset, her material, motive and method. The material is contemporary apocalyptic rhetoric and the apocalyptic literature from which it takes most of its terms. The motive is to investigate the material. The method is innovative. I have called it religio-literary criticism.

About religio I have learned at the Sydney School to be circumspect. One of the most valuable facilities I have encountered is the non confessional approach. Mine is not a hermeneutic of faith and hope is not a method. Given a non confessional sanction, the subject of religion can be approached from the perspectives of any faith or none. As my subject led me to an interest in religious pluralism, that accommodation was essential.

Sharpe tells us that Shleiermacher, Coleridge and Emerson stand behind the emerging tradition of comparative religion. He describes this tradition is liberal and 'Hellenic' rather than 'Hebraic': religious studies is witnessing a shift in theological emphases from transcendent doctrines to immanentist doctrines. In the foreground of comparative religion according to Sharpe stands Nathan Soderblom (1866-1931). Soderblom's thought indirectly informs the non confessional approach of Sharpe's Sydney School. It is ecumenical, spanning many religions; phenomenological, 'taking all religions seriously... as religions'; and immanentist, 'Religious is the man to whom something is holy'.

Now, in 1994, the non confessional approach is in jeopardy as a rise of fundamentalist devotionism insists that there can be no understanding of religion from the outside. I concur with Sharpe: 'The numinous is... not to be inferred from man's contemplation

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3 Sharpe, Eric J., Professorial Address to the Postgraduate Seminar, School of Studies in Religion, University of Sydney, March 3, 1993.
of sense data.\textsuperscript{4}

As consequence of the rising fundamentalism, affiliation is becoming more important and dialogue is becoming less so. Moreover, certitude is being valorised and literalism is becoming fashionable. For example, in a recent discussion of Higher School Certificate Examinations, an interviewer for the Australian Broadcasting Commission asked a member of the Board of Studies, 'How do you test real interpretation?'\textsuperscript{5} The question is worrisome; that it received an answer is more so.

There is therefore a pressing need to articulate a method which might satisfy a working compromise between some of the devotionism and open dialogue. Religio-literary criticism attempts that. It works with a lower ceiling and wider horizons than theology. It differs from literary criticism by sustaining a metaphysical interest as well as a comprehensive purview.

In this matter, we can follow David Lawton, asking of Biblical and scriptural material, not what it means but what it can be taken to mean.\textsuperscript{6} This approach is supported by Mark Ledbetter; 'No methodologies have claim to the interpretation, but only an interpretation (his emphases).\textsuperscript{7} The religio-literary method maintains diversity in the interests of pluralism, seeking encounter rather than certainty.

The study entitled Creators, Creatures and Victim-Survivors is composed of one primary element; apocalyptic rhetoric. There are three secondary elements; humane voices, silence, and divine word. There is also a fifth element, brought to bear by interpretative intent; the victim-survivors constitute the fifth element.

How are figures of victim-survivors related to apocalypses? Is victimization nurtured by apocalypse? Or by certain kinds of apocalypse? Those are questions which this study proposes to investigate.

The hypothesis is that there are kinds of apocalypse which do foster victimization and

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other kinds which point beyond victimization. The gist is this: if some apocalypses foster victimization while others do not, people may find it useful to be able to differentiate kinds of apocalypse; and to explore apocalypses comparatively, multicultural, that is pluralistically.

Why hypothesise a connection between apocalypses and victimization? To answer this question it is necessary to refer to my earlier study of apocalypses, Figments of Armageddon. That there is a relationship between phenomena of apocalypse and figures of victims, especially victims of genocide, emerged as a fact of that work but the nature of the relationship remained unexplored. Creators, Creatures and Victim-Survivors contains the heretofore neglected exploration.

Figments of Armageddon examined the rhetoric of apocalypses in English by reference to the popular concern about the uses and abuses of nuclear technologies which was expressed in literature and popular culture during the 1980s. Textual analyses showed that so-called nuclear apocalypses confront readers and writers with many ethical and hermeneutical questions which refer, implicitly and explicitly, to problems of victimization. Three of the many questions are reiterated below. They are sufficient to demonstrate the rationale which informs our interest in figures of victims.

The questions which follow emerged at the conclusion of the lengthy argument contained in Figments of Armageddon. Consequently, their terms may be somewhat cryptic here. I have, however preserved the language of their original expression so as to render them accessible to further scrutiny, if required.

The first question:

Do the transformations and empowerments which ensue from the development of nuclear technologies serve well the goal of collective survival?8

The answer to that is negative and failure of collective survival constitutes genocide. So this question implies directly the problem of victimization by genocide. The second question follows:

How, if the principles of Buddhism, Shinto and Christianity do not suffice (to give form and meaning to the holocausts of Hiroshima and Nagasaki), might form and meaning be given to the experience of both the deliverers and the

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receivers of nuclear holocaust?⁹

This question addresses a central problem of victimization by genocidal pogroms. The third question addresses the pragmatics of extermination; victimization by assault is an axiom of extermination:

If one enacts indefensible assault on others, has one not demonstrated the means by which such assault may be enacted upon oneself?¹⁰

We found that victims of genocide, of holocaust, of assault, exist among the figures of nuclear apocalypses. Further questions arose. Do such figures inform other apocalypses? How? How not? To what effect? These questions might be viewed as pretexts to Creators, Creatures and Victims.

Who are the creatures and creators who stand at the head of our subject? They are better known as a duo: Creator-creature, commonly recognised by apocalypticists as a dualism or duality. Our method (developed in Figments of Armageddon and being tested in Creators, Creatures and Victims), however, is not dualistic but pluralistic. Religio-literary criticism asks of these commonly accepted forms of expression, Who or what else might be present?

One might query the necessity of confronting one's readers with a title which challenges the conventional, singular usage, 'Creator'. That query indicates a prejudice against pluralism. That prejudice resides within the English language itself. As William Blake pointed out, the Bible (with its God-Creator) codifies our art and, as Northrop Frye has demonstrated, the Biblical code is structural to English literature. The prejudice for pluralism implicit in our title is not intended to challenge the precepts of monotheism nor even to raise a theistic question. It is intended as affirmative action for the preservation and extension of elasticity in any of the codes by which we communicate.

Of course, the less conventional an interpretation is, the more it is difficult to read and write. In Chapter Three we will observe some of the problems of simultaneity and atemporality which Giambattista Vico's unconventional hermeneutics provoke. In Chapter Four we will observe Northrop Frye's ameliorative techniques by which he generalises an intuition which must otherwise remain idiosyncratic. Needs must defend the extra effort.

¹⁰ ibid., p. 403.
Contemporary apocalypses provide an agenda of questions to address to Biblical material. We proceed from religio-literary considerations to social concern, finding a background in the Bible and a foreground in contemporary victimization. Ruairidh (Rory) Boid calls this an 'environment of concepts'. In an environment of apocalyptic concepts, victim-survivors are not new; they are the invisible authors of much of it. It is their present attempt, through contemporary apocalyptic rhetoric, to gain visibility, credibility and recognition that is new.

There is, however, a trend in ethical questioning known as the humanist tradition, to which their efforts toward self-identification belong. There are many definitions of humanism but the sense implied here is that put forward by Alan Bullock; an emphatic interest in things human rather than things non-human. This is no denial of divinity, gods or of other non-human entities, merely a preoccupation with humanity. This view contrasts with, for example, that of Corliss Lamont who asserts that humanism admits of no supernatural entities or conditions.

Humanistic absolutism such as Lamont's collapses into nonsense because people identify themselves and recognise one another in terms of what we are not. Bullock, Vico, Frye and Sharpe all acknowledge this necessity. Sharpe, for example, maintains that religion cannot exist without a sense of human limitation vis a vis a transcendent order of being but it is the scholars task to set the study of religion free from submission to any transcendent authority. Sharpe points out that religio signifies being obedient to an order and asserts that, in religion, the supernatural is normative. The student must, he tells us, accept the assumption of the transcendent as integral to the source, so religion cannot become the playground of random subjectivities. Thus Sharpe disposes of humanistic absolutism (and absolutism in general). In Chapters Three and Four we will observe that Vico and Frye follow similar precepts.

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Our humanism, then, is attenuated. No 'God-is-dead' argument is entered into here. The argument of this religio-literary analysis is more in accord with that of Church Father Irenaeus, observing a two-phase development of humanity. First as respondent creatures, second as free creatures. Or, as John Hick describes it: 'drawn through their own freedom towards an individual and corporate perfection'.

Our attenuated humanism shows us that victim-survivors are proclaiming themselves; emerging from their virtual annihilation effected by common ignorance of their conditions and circumstances. As Jose Ortega y Gasset puts it, humans have no choice but to be always doing something to keep ourselves in existence. In contemporary apocalypses, as we shall observe, people emerging from abysmal experiences proclaim to the rest of the world that they are still among us.

Part One of this study is entitled 'Words and Silence in Apocalyptic Rhetoric'. It explores texts and methods by which apocalypses can be investigated. The term 'apocalyptic rhetoric' begs its own questions, though. What is apocalyptic? Chapter One puts forward a working definition. With Chapter Two there begins an exposition of apocalyptic literature aimed to answer the question, What, in this context, is apocalyptic rhetoric? This exposition continues throughout the dissertation. Chapters Three to Five, taking rhetoric as a peculiar resonance which supports a truth put forward by speaking or writing, explores interpretative methods. In Chapter Six some broad contexts of apocalyptic rhetoric are discussed. Chapters Seven and Eight comprise analyses of the Johannine Apocalypse, by which a paradigm for the interpretation of contemporary apocalypses (essayed in Part Two) is drawn. Chapter Nine concludes Part One with a retrospective overview.

Part Two of the study, entitled 'Some Humane Voices of Self-Determination' demonstrates and discusses some applications of the religio-literary method which is wrought through Part One. The whole work is primarily engaged with the metatexts of apocalypse. Our preliminary observations showed that it has a metatextual association with genocide. A methodological problem exists in the fact that genocide is a concept of modernity and postmodernity not antiquity but apocalypse takes all three eras into its scope. Chapters Eleven to Thirteen mirror the anatomy of the Johannine Apocalypse followed in Chapter Ten. This is to show the relationship of the particular (Johannine) apocalypse to the more generalised apocalyptic rhetoric which

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is addressed in Part Two.

Through words, pictures and signs which symbolise a coeval association of creation and eschaton, traditions of apocalyptic literature have accumulated. They are not exclusively Christian but the New Testament Apocalypse is their primary referent. Nevertheless, in their context we will encounter, for example, Altizer’s call for an immersion of Christianity in Buddhism, as well as references to the Hindu Wheel of Life, and the Romani Star Magic. They all have significance as symbols of apocalypse; the dancing Siva, or the crucified Christ, or a solar eclipse, each may serve as a metaphor in the literature of apocalypse. And there can be apocalyptic significance without symbolic representation; Buddhism can entertain a silent apocalypse in every breath.

Little needs be said here about what constitutes things literary, except to acknowledge that Northrop Frye’s work, as I have read it, provides the vehicle by which literary form is described in this thesis. Frye writes:

`One of the first things I noticed about literature was the stability of its structural units: the fact that certain themes, situations, and character types, in comedy let us say, have persisted with very little change from Aristophanes to our own time.‘

Frye describes a literary universe. Its geography can be discerned as movement, through time, of themes, narratives and constellations of symbols. We can imagine it in terms of peaks and troughs, like the waves of the sea, or the earth’s waves which are mountains. The waves of literature move slowly, like the coming and going of mountains. Apocalypses are like that. The Johannine text is one example of this.

It is well to mention here that controversy exists over the use of the term Johannine, especially with reference to the Biblical Revelation. The New Testament book entitled Apocalypse, otherwise known as Revelation, is called herein the Johannine Apocalypse. The first person narrator of the Johannine Apocalypse uses the name John but whether that name is a fiction or whether it refers to the disciple John, exiled to the isle of Patmos, or the author of the Gospel of John, or John the Divine, or another, is uncertain. The text, however, is commonly known as the Apocalypse or Revelation of John, and Johannine is an already accepted by some as a descriptor of it.

It is possible that the text is the product of the shared efforts of a group, or circle, of

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like-minded thinkers; a Johannine circle. Institutional convocations can maintain such a literary circle over centuries, especially when the scholars canonise texts. Oscar Cullman's book The Johannine Circle makes a strong case for this possibility.\(^\text{18}\) To acknowledge the possibility of collective authorship and the pluralism inherent therein, the term Johannine is preferred here.

Ideas of literary unity and authorial unity attend much of the discussion of the Johannine Apocalypse. To add to this, history intrudes upon literature, imposing a metonymy of proper names and 'real' persons which is not pertinent to the poetics. Take, for example, Austin Farrer's interpretation. He understands the author of the Johannine text as an individual and, writing of the difficulties of discovering an interpretative method appropriate to the Apocalypse, writes: He (John) must be allowed to be his own interpreter and build up his symbolic background as he proceeds.\(^\text{19}\) Here is the well known fallacy of authorial intent. Or is it something else? Henry Barclay Swete, questions the value of pursuing the question of authorship. He suggests that the discourse amounts to little more than the assertions of writers who have found in the analysis of the book a fascinating field for intellectual exercise.\(^\text{20}\)

Mention should be made in this connection of the words kerygma and kerygmata. They comprise terms of reference by which discussion proceeds throughout this study, so a brief note on their usage is required here. In the Greek, kerygma is singular and neuter; kerygmata is the plural. According to OED, the word 'kerygma' comes from the Greek noun denoting proclamation and the verb to proclaim. We see from this noun/verb connection that kerygma refers not only to an event which has been accomplished as proclamation but also to the act of accomplishing it. In English, the plural form, kerygmata, seems hardly to have survived. The atrophy of the plural form reflects an influence of Christian dogma on English language.\(^\text{21}\)

In Christian monotheism, kerygma is singular, being the always unique Word of the supreme God. A religious belief in words as agents of creation informs such concepts of kerygma. In literary and religio-literary criticism, however, monotheism has no monopoly on terms. Nevertheless, literary discourse on proclamation has roots in


\(^{21}\) For my more detailed discussion of singularity and pluralism with regard to kerygma, see Keable, 1991, pp. 351-370.
Christian thought and the singular usage is current. This, however, is a precarious usage, functioning in English with the same ambivalence between singular and plural senses as does the word ‘media’.

Self-proclamation and self-determination are linked in apocalyptic rhetoric by kerygma. Of particular interest to this study is the appropriation of some and not other forms and symbols of traditional apocalyptic rhetoric to contemporary discourse of self-determination. Note that English is employed as lingua franca to an international community of readers and listeners, so the intricacies of the English language must interest us here.

Self-determination was coined to denote the right of all subjects of a state to choose their government (as in the American Declaration of Independence, 1776 and French Declaration of the Rights of Man, 1793). Later it indicated the right of states to secede from multinational states and empires (as in the Charter of United Nations). OED tells us that since 1924 the term 'self-determination' has had legalistic applications, denoting the independent determination, or definition, by a state of its own polity.

The discourse of self-determination, however, is bifurcated. Since 1683, the common usage of the term has denoted determination by one's mind or will by oneself or itself. The second, legalistic denotation will come under discussion in Part Two of this thesis but the more common usage is employed throughout.

The question of self is the more pressing. This archaic, Old English word for 'same' was used for emphasis, as in he self [sic]. During the Seventeenth Century, under ecclesiastical influence, this emphasis was displaced; self came to mean 'the same'. The definite article here imports transcendence where none was before. Consequently, an implicit ambiguity attends the word self; is it a transcendent or an immanent entity which constitutes the self? Is it both? Neither? Both and neither?

It is not necessary to pursue this question in depth here. A summary account of the emergence of contemporary, common usage will suffice. The popular usage of 'self' according to the Australian Macquarie Dictionary, denotes a person or thing referred to with respect to individuality; or it stands as a prefix, expressing reflexive action, as

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in self-control, self-help, self-conscious or self-centred.\(^{24}\) Note the assumption of individuality. There are 139 words listed whose prefix is 'self' in addition there are 191 further listings, making a total of 330; all of them words which, by reference to 'self', take individuality as given.

If selfhood assumes individuality, what is that? The Macquarie Dictionary tells us that 'individual' denotes single, particular or separate; existing as a distinct, individual entity, or considered as such. Notice the reiteration of the subject in its own denotation here; to be individual is to be individual, according to the second entry. Despite this paucity of terms, the denotations run to eleven entries. The ninth:

- a distinct, indivisible entity; a single thing, being, instance or item,

is particularly noteworthy.

The entry of the concept of indivisibility into the scope of selfhood indicates an enigma of individuality. It is the enigma which attends the Old English 'he self'; if emphasis is required, then the question arises, Who might be 'he not self'? This enigma has motivated, since the Seventeenth Century, the import of the definite article, rendering 'self' not as a synonym 'same' but as a proposition 'the same'; the same as what? From whom and what are we ourselves indivisible?

Dictionaries alone cannot render up an answer to that question. Nor will this study attempt to make any conclusive answer to it. What is attempted is an examination of some of the assumptions which attend the matter of self-determination. The first Macquarie Dictionary denotation, 'determination by oneself, without outside influence', will serve to focus the issue; can any entity known to humanity exist 'without outside influence'? If so, how so; how might this be known? In other words, Is self-determination conceivable, obtainable, and desirable?

At the Nuremberg Trial, in 1945 it was decided that individuals have responsibility for their participation in collective action.\(^{25}\) So, since the Nazi Holocaust, there has been an ethical dimension to the problem of genocide which impinges on individuals. It is a dimension where tolerance and equity become matters of survival; where the attitudes which humans adopt toward one another determine collective viability.

\(^{24}\) Macquarie Dictionary, Macquarie Library, Sydney Australia, 1982.

\(^{25}\) The individuals in question at Nuremburg on 2 November 1945 were Nazis, including Borman and Goering. Russian, American, British and French delegates, one per country, tried twenty-four of their German peers on four counts: the conspiracy of Nazism; wars of aggression; war crimes; crimes against humanity. Twelve were condemned to hanging, three were acquitted, one suicided and one escaped; the rest received varying terms of imprisonment. Pears Encyclopaedia, Book Club Associates, London, 1982.
As the discussion of human rights in Chapter Twelve will show, the assumptions of individualism have pervaded the English language as mass communications have been developed. So the medium betrays the message. This tends covertly to put idealism in service of discrimination. That is compatible with what Nazi and neo-Nazi fascism attempts to do by overt means. It compels speech. That is because silence is readily taken to be consent to atrocity.

This problem of language has been illustrated recently with regard to the cryptofascism of Derrida, whose mentor, Heidegger, joined 960 prominent educators in signing a vow to support Hitler and the National Socialist regime. The point at issue is not so much that Heidegger signed the agreement but that he did not retract it when opportunity allowed. It is the silence which is significant. Likewise Derrida's silence with regard to this matter is tantamount to denial. A very strong example of this kind of cryptofascism is Francis Fukuyama's 'The End of History? After the Battle of Jena'. Fukuyama utterly denies fascism, insisting that it no longer exists. His argument, however is supremacist, exclusivist, individualist and adversarial; in short, fascist. The point is that what is not said is at least as important as what is said.

How might one escape from the treacherous ignorance which makes cryptofascism possible and, as consequence, makes people into victims or perpetrators while denying them other alternatives? Like Robert Jay Lifton, we might pay attention to Albert Camus: 'I had been aware for decades of Albert Camus' insistence that we be neither victims nor executioners.' Camus writes: 'all I ask is that, in the midst of a murderous world, we agree to reflect on murder and make a choice.' How might one live in a world of executioners and victims without being the one or the other? That is the question which has motivated the research upon which this thesis is based. The chapters of the thesis will unfold that argument.


It is necessary here to explain some matters of editorial style. I have used the Australian Government Style Manual.\textsuperscript{31} This style is current and facilitates the inclusion of clear references to archival materials and special-purpose documents, United Nations documents, for example. As this thesis includes references to a variety of informing materials and is addressed to a variety of readers, the abovementioned style has been preferred because of its reader-accessibility.

I have followed this manual in all matters except one which relates to my Chapter Fifteen where both footnotes and endnotes are used to separate notes on the Romani Porrajmos and the Jewish Sho’ah. This is to enlighten the similarities and differences between these two aspects of the Nazi Holocaust. Footnotes are numbered throughout the text and the endnotes, occurring in this one chapter only, are alphabetically identified.

I have quoted extensively from sources. Quotations are particularly prolific in the discussion of Vico’s poetics in Chapter Three, because Vico’s thought is convoluted and his grammar is complicated. The quotations are to illustrate precisely the issues to which I address discussion.

There are some slight anomalies among the Biblical line numbers, especially with regard to the Wycliffe version of 1388 in relation to later generations. They are not major. For example Apocalypse 6:8 in the Wycliffe is Apocalypse 5:7 in many others.

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document. In the Bibliography, United Nations documents are listed chronologically.

There are topic statements following most of the chapter headings. They are presented in bold type to separate them from the rest of the text. They are intended as a guide to the essential points of the argument.

Chapters Fifteen and Sixteen follow slight variations in formulation. The former is a special case study and the latter a field report. The types of data which they contain have determined their form. Chapter Seventeen comprises a discussion of the document as a whole. Chapter Eighteen contains the conclusions.

This religio-literary interpretation of apocalyptic rhetoric, being non confessional, does not seek specifically to affirm or deny any existent, denominational interpretations. So religious doctrines or orthodoxies are suspended or bracketed from consideration in this thesis. This may result in claims which are, from orthodox perspectives, outlandish, but I do not believe that any orthodoxy can be damaged by being asked to consider them.
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For Bill Maidment's vigorous scrutiny, Bill Jobling's testing inquiry, Jim Tulip's encouragement and facilitation of the research, Eric Sharpe's reference library, Donald Philip Verene's interest in the Vico Chapter, Ian Hancock's interest in the Romani Chapter, Paul Barnett's interest in early Johannine Chapter, Margaret Cunningham's generosity in testing practical applications, Bob Denham's generosity with soon to be published archival material, Shoji Nakamura's interest in questions about a Christian immersion in Buddhism, Garry Trompf's kindly supervision of my transition into religio-literary poetics, and the company of the postgraduate seminar, my thanks. To friends and familiares, mehurcule!
CHAPTER 1

According to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED)\textsuperscript{32}, the noun 'apocalypse' has been used in English since the Middle Ages and the adjective 'apocalyptic' has been used since 1629. The definition of apocalypse given in OED reads, in part:

The 'revelation' of the future granted to John in the isle of Patmos; also the book of the New Testament in which this is recorded. By extension: any revelation or disclosure.\textsuperscript{33}

These denotations beg the question of what constitutes a revelation.

There is little agreement about the denotations of apocalypse. Other dictionaries and encyclopaedias tend, in the main, to appropriate or copy from OED. So there is a general tendency to take the Biblical Revelation as given, then to interpret it by assumption rather than by examination.

A diversity of denotations has emerged. It is a source of the polyvalence mentioned in our topic. Apocalypse sustains a multiplicity of meanings. The diversity maintains the word apocalypse as a diffuse indicator and an enigmatic signifier. Because of this diffusion, apocalyptic rhetoric can be used to proclaim almost anything.


\textsuperscript{33} OED
The sources of apocalypse have been designated variously: divine inspiration, Christianity, Judaism with Christianity, and Judaism with pre-Judaic mythology. These sources flow to a confluence in Johannine Apocalypse\(^\text{34}\); reference to the Johannine Apocalypse as the prime example of apocalypses in general is consistent in major dictionaries and encyclopaedias.

As we have observed, OED offers three denotations of apocalypse. All of them, by their reference to the Bible, albeit implicit in the first and third and explicit only in the second, construe the word as a referent of Christianity. The first states explicitly that the Johannine Apocalypse is a primary source of the meaning of the word apocalypse; the second and third, are gained by extension of the first. So the use of the word apocalypse implies, in all these cases, reference to the Johannine Apocalypse. Hence, according to OED, the connotations of apocalypse have to do with Christianity, the New Testament Revelation being part of Christian scripture. As the Johannine text is still active in ecclesiastical and secular discourses, this derivation amounts to extant, intertextual signification.

The Macquarie Dictionary denotes apocalypse as including Judaic and Christian

\(^{34}\) The New Testament book entitled *Apocalypse* or *Revelation*. 
pretexts.\textsuperscript{35} It offers this denotation:

revelation; discovery; disclosure. (from writings, so named, Jewish and Christian, which appeared from about 200 B.C. to A.D. 350, assuming to make revelation of the ultimate divine purpose; Gk. apokalypsis revelation).

The etymology of apocalypse has been traced to Greek origins:

relation to the verb to uncover; taken literally it denotes the taking off of a cover.\textsuperscript{36}

Lids taken off, those jars revealed the stuff of augury, the pickled entrails of the long-dead which were consulted magically as signs of cosmic events yet to manifest on Earth. Hence, a motif of death-in-life and life-in-death informed the word apocalypse in the Johannine usage.

David Lyle Jeffrey's Dictionary of Biblical Tradition

refers to the Biblical Books of Revelation and Daniel to exemplify the scriptural apocalypses which are known to literary tradition. Quoting Northrop Frye's definition of Revelation, 'our grammar of apocalyptic imagery', Jeffrey's encyclopaedic work

\textsuperscript{35}Macquarie Dictionary, Macquarie Library, Sydney Australia, 1982.


tells us that no precise definition of apocalypse is accepted among scholars.⁴⁸

Themes of destruction and re-creation are elements of apocalyptic literature; destructive themes are the more common.⁴⁹ Scriptural reference to alpha and omega is confined to the Johannine Apocalypse (1:8; 21:6; 22:13).⁵⁰

Apocalypses have permeated English.⁴¹ Jeffrey's dictionary exhibits a kind of Christian chauvinism which is common in English discourse. Its terms of reference assume the existence of the metaphysical reality which the apocalypses, especially the Johannine Apocalypse constellate. So the discourse conveys subtle statements of belief along with its denotations. We can see this on page forty seven, for example. Eschatological destruction is assumed here in association with weapons of mass destruction considered to be apocalyptic.

This exemplifies very well how supremacist, or at least hierarchical Christian pretexts can eclipse other modes or formulae of expression. For example, weapons of mass

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⁴⁹ ibid, p. 47.

⁵⁰ ibid., p. 32.

⁵¹ Jeffrey, 1992, p. xiii.
destruction threaten people with sickness and mutation, not worlds’ end. Or see on page six hundred and sixty six [sic], where Northrop Frye who, all his career eschewed unified field theories, is attributed author of 'a master paradigm of creative imagination'. This gentle but insidious supremacism complements a Christian evangelicalism whose vehicle are apocalypse.

The Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Religion\textsuperscript{42} construes apocalypse in a manner which is similar to that of the Macquarie Dictionary, defining it thus: 'A type of literature, prominent in Judaism from c.250 B.C. and the first century of Christianity. Couched in symbolic language.'

Eliade's Encyclopaedia of Religion\textsuperscript{43} also defines apocalypse as including among its pretexts both Judaic and Christian references. It makes a secondary reference to 'Jewish Apocalypses', particularly the Old Testament books of Daniel and Enoch, after an initial assertion that apocalypse refers to Christian rather than Judaic texts: 'Apocalypse, as the name of a literary genre, is derived from the Apocalypse of John, or Book of Revelation, in the New Testament.' Two types of apocalypse are recognised. They are interconnected. Modern colloquial usage, however tends to


separate them, using 'apocalypse' to denote a catastrophic disaster. This diminishes the revelatory sense of the word.

Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics\textsuperscript{44} defines apocalypse as including Judaism and ancient myths among its sources. Apocalypse, according to Hastings, is a form of literature whose earliest example is the Old Testament book of Daniel. It is eschatological, supernatural, and mythological, making use of ancient images not confined to Israel.\textsuperscript{45}

In summary, OED and the Encyclopaedia of Religion refer explicitly to the Johannine Apocalypse. The Macquarie Dictionary, the Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Religion and the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics give dates which include the first century C.E., during which the Johannine Apocalypse is held to have been written. The Johannine book of Revelation, inscribed in Greek in about 90 C.E., is the earliest work to call itself an apocalypse.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{44} Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Clark, Edinburgh, 1909.

\textsuperscript{45} Eschatological is the adjective from the noun eschatology. According to the Macquarie Dictionary, eschatology denotes: 'the doctrines of the last or final things, as death, judgement, the future state etc.' OED denotes eschatology: 'The science of the "four last things: death, judgement, heaven and hell"'. The OED denotation is repeated in the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.

\textsuperscript{46} See Revelation 1:1 quoted in Encyclopaedia of Religion. 1987.
This consistency of reference to the Johannine Apocalypse indicates that, in English, it is paradigmatic to the word apocalypse and its cognates. It also signifies that the agents of apocalypses are words; the Johannine Apocalypse eventuates through a written text.

Of course, the nature of words is a matter which permeates literary criticism. Religio-literary criticism, however, encounters a special difficulty in this matter. The difficulty resides in the proclamation of the son of the god as the word of the god. Two anomalies occur. First, there is a tendency to dichotomise human speech and writing and the divine word. This dichotomy is expressed by capitalisation; word and Word. Secondary to this is a dispute as to whether the Bible constitutes Word or word. The authorial voice of the Johannine Apocalypse maintains that it bears witness to the divine word of his supreme god, expressed in Apocalypse 1:2 'the word of God'.

Nine generations of the Bible in English the word of Apocalypse 1:2 without capitalisation. Furthermore, the figure of Jesus in Apocalypse 12:13 exemplifies a

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contiguity, if not coincidence of divinity and humanity which challenges any
categorical difference between divine word and human words. In Wycliffe's version,
Jesus is designated as utterly unique, requiring capitalisation of the definite article to
demonstrate principality and equivalence with the god: 'The sone of God'.

The Tyndale version gives us 'the worde off God', deleting the capitalisation of the
definite article, substituting 'word' for 'son'. This maintains the capitalised status of the
god but the resonance of the utterly unique son is diminished.

The Authorized Version maintains capitals for both the article and the god, giving us


Some disparity in the numbering of verses is evident from version to version, notably the NEB but, with the exception of the Moffatt Bible, variations tend not to be gross.
'The word of God'; making word and son synonymous. The Moffatt Bible gives us something similar, 'THE LOGOS OF GOD' (sic upper case).

The Revised Standard Version differs. It makes a hybrid by adding capitalisation to the noun: 'The Word of God'. The effect of this is to entitle the son as the word and as the god.

The Authorized Vulgate, the New English Bible, the Jerusalem Bible and the Revised English Bible differ again, giving us, 'the Word of God'. The capitalisation has slid away from the article and onto the noun. This entitles the word as the god but there is no immediate sense of a unique, begotten son.

The point: By the proclamation of the god, the category of the divine remains stable throughout; the category of humanity, signified as a son, is changeable but ever present. As Northrop Frye put it in his diary: 'God speaks only through man & very often it's very obvious that man is creating God's speech.' A physical, human presence is necessary to the making of words; divine inspiration cannot speak except through a human body.

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48 Frye, Notebook 11e (not dated) (82), not yet published, MSS by kind permission of Robert Denham ed., p. 46.
In apocalyptic literature ethical concern is expressed regarding the simultaneous presence of divinity and humanity. Ninian Smart explains some of the cultural aspects which informed this concern among the Romans and Hellenes to whom the Johannine Apocalypse (among many others) spoke.\textsuperscript{49} In brief, Hellenistic Greek polytheism and Judaeo-Christian monotheism were required by Roman rule to reconcile. A synthesis of philosophical terms eventuated but remained ambiguous in their concepts of the humanity and divinity of the figure of Jesus as the Christ. The Council of Nicea, held in Constantinople in 325 C.E. affirmed the unique, human and divine, nature of the Christ.

The agreement made at Nicea was not conclusive but equivocal. The Council of Chalcedon in 452 C.E., which attempted to clarify matters by declaring the dual, human and divine, nature of the Christ confused matters by furthering the ambiguity. Dualism itself is multifaceted. N.T. Wright lists ten kinds of duality.\textsuperscript{50} They include theological/ontological duality, expressed as creator/creature dualism; anthropological duality, expressed as body/mind dualism; psychological duality, expressed as good/bad dualism; and cosmological duality, expressed as a dualism of real-true form and material simulacra. as this study proceeds, the relevance of these kinds of dualism


to apocalypses will be made evident. Suffice to say here that apocalyptic dualism and
the ambiguity from which it springs are complicated matters.

The ambiguity persists. Take, for example, John Hick’s recent publication The
Metaphor of God Incarnate, reviewed as a 'talking point' in the Expository Times.\textsuperscript{51}
According to this article, the problem is one of explanation; 'the impossibility of
explaining how.

This controversy is at the centre of concern in apocalyptic writing. When we read or
hear apocalypses, the Johannine and others, we encounter the changeability of
humanity, inspired by a transformative divine message and imagined in terms of
significant metamorphoses.

There is also consistency among dictionaries and encyclopaedias as to the
mythological import of apocalypses. Pre-Judaic, Judaic, Christian and syncretistic
myths are mentioned repeatedly. The conception of apocalypse as a literary
phenomenon is also consistent.

Literature, although it may be the primary phenomenon of apocalypse, is not the only

The Macquarie Dictionary refers to ‘writings’ and OED refers specifically to the Book of Revelation; the Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Religion, the Encyclopaedia of Religion and the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics all describe apocalypse as a form of literature. The theological phenomenon of divine revelation and the sociopolitical phenomenon of millenarian revolution are of great importance. Theological and sociological signification are as important to a wholistic understanding of apocalypse as are the significations found in literature.

There is no contradiction between literary and theological or literary and sociopolitical definitions of apocalypse. Rather, there are variations of emphasis depending upon whether the origin or source of the apocalypse is held to be divine, political, or something else, such as poetic inspiration. The dependency of apocalypses on literary expression being generally acknowledged, it is not necessary for literary critique to engage with questions of origin.

The immediacy of apocalyptic rhetoric is the more accessible to literary critique because apocalyptic experiences tend to be expressed as literature. We might say that literature is the most commonly used vehicle of apocalypse. This is especially marked in texts of apocalyptic literature which make references, explicit or implicit, to

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Christian and Jewish traditions of religion. Such texts can be called religio-literary. This study observes religio-literary trajectories assuming that numerous origins stand behind the form of experience which is recognised as an apocalypse.

There is a difference between religio-literary criticism and theology. To understand it, it is useful to consider the theological definition of apocalypse put forward by Thomas Altizer\(^5\). Altizer tells us that the simultaneous reversal of the past and realisation of the future constitutes apocalypse:

only a radical negation and transcendence of the world of the past can make possible the advent and realisation of a new world of the future.\(^5\)

This is an impossible convergence, a paradox which defies reconciliation except through faith. It is the assumption of faith which marks the methodological difference.

Altizer asserts that apocalypse is necessary to Christian faith. He tells us that, in order to meet the demands of modern and postmodern life-circumstances, Christian faith must undergo an apocalyptic revolution. He does not, however, perceive apocalypse as being particular to Christianity. He writes:

For (in respect to apocalypse) I am losing all sense of the particular identity of the Christian faith, and have become persuaded that Christ is actively and

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\(^5\) Altizer, 1979, p. 9.
immediately present whenever darkness or Hell is actual and real.\textsuperscript{55}

Altizer's main focus, nevertheless, is upon patterns of Christian belief. He claims that Christian consciousness is presently undergoing a revolution or radical alteration, an apocalypse. He tells us that the theological groundwork for this alteration had been done by the end of the 19th century by such thinkers as Blake, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Marx, Dostoyevsky, Nietzsche and Freud. He points out that a process acknowledging that is occurring now. Altizer makes a strong case for this conception of apocalypse. It is discussed in more detail in Chapter Six.

Sociopolitical analyses of apocalypse, those of Paul D. Hanson, Yonina Talmon and Garry W. Trompf, for example, are compatible with Altizer's definition of apocalypse.\textsuperscript{56} Norman Cohn's \textit{In Pursuit of the Millennium}\textsuperscript{57} is seminal to the idea that apocalypse does have a sociopolitical dimension. Cohn's insight is in the identification of apocalyptic absolutism with totalitarianism. Trompf and Talmon take this further.

\textsuperscript{55} ibid., p. 13.


Both identify apocalypse as millenarianism, a sociopolitical phenomenon wherein direct, revolutionary action is preferred to literary speculation. This position is also taken by the Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Religion.

The expectation of this-worldly salvation informs millenarianism. Talmon tells us that millenarian movements are: ‘religious movements that expect imminent, total, ultimate, this-worldly collective salvation.’\(^{58}\) The convergence of saved world and this world is as impossible as that of world of the past and new world. So, for sociology as for theology, faith provides continuity where argument falters.

Trompf, (associating millenarianism, millennialism, chiliasm, eschatology and messianism, as fungibles of apocalypse) indicates clearly the association of apocalyptic futurism and millenarianism. He tells us that apocalyptic tradition is gaining strength.\(^{59}\) Trompf explains millenarianism as a kind of apocalypticism to which he attributes images of consummation; an eschaton which is cosmic and controlled by divinity. He proposes a non absolutist hermeneutical approach to apocalypse which acknowledges its finality but not as totality. By its expectation, millenarianism participates in

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\(^{58}\) Talmon, 1966, p. 159.


Millenarianism is anchored to the Johannine line, 'When the thousand years are over...', millennium being understood as the thousand years. The Johannine text makes no clear stipulation as to which particular thousand-year span of time is signified. So millenarianism makes of millennium a sign of apocalypse.

Sociologist Paul D. Hanson eschews the term millenarianism and its cognates.\footnote{Apocalypse 20:7, The Jerusalem Bible Popular Edition with Abridged Introductions and Notes, Darton, Longman and Todd, London, 1968.} Hanson writes of 'apocalyptic'. In his title, The Dawn of Apocalyptic, and in his usage throughout, Hanson uses the adjective 'apocalyptic' instead of the noun 'apocalypse'. Used in this way, the adjective may masquerade as a noun but it is not quite the same thing and anomalies may arise. One might and probably should ask, Apocalyptic what? Apocalyptic phenomena and conditions seems to be the best available answer. They, according to Hanson, are sociological entities, coping mechanisms employed by cultures in crisis: 'the community response of the oppressed and afflicted to a world

on the edge of the abyss.\textsuperscript{63}

Despite his sociological orientation, Hanson uses literary terms, telling us that apocalyptic is generically different from testament, oracle and parable. He tells us it involves eschatologisation, rapture and drama, having bearing on events to come; its usual function is the giving of comfort.\textsuperscript{64} According to Hanson, very diverse materials are assimilated into apocalyptic:

ancient Canaanite myth, Hellenistic historiography, Jewish and Egyptian wisdom, Persian religion, alongside copious reference to and commentary upon Biblical writings.\textsuperscript{65}

So, Hanson tells us, apocalyptic compositions may seem baroque, eclectic, esoteric, bizarre and arcane.\textsuperscript{66}

Hanson explains this diversity of elements as a sign of society's attempt to reconstitute a sense of order or cosmos:

The vacuum caused by the group experience of alienation explains the nature of the response. Unless a new symbolic universe is constructed to replace the old, life will lapse into chaos. From traditions of the past, from neighbouring

\textsuperscript{63} Hanson, 1979, p. 443.

\textsuperscript{64} ibid., p. 427.

\textsuperscript{65} ibid., p. 433.

\textsuperscript{66} ibid.
cultures, and from every-day experience images and concepts are drawn into the central perspective of the group in the critical process of reconstruction.\footnote{ibid., p. 434.}

This position is similar to Altizer's.

Referring to post exilic history, Hanson tells us that, against the dominant, hieratic program there arose another movement, known now as apocalyptic. Hanson describes it as more cosmic in orientation and more symbolic in expression than the legalistic hierocratic program.

The balance between prophecy and legalism is crucial to an appreciation of apocalypses. Hanson quotes Ezra 7:14, 'the laws of your God, which is in your hand'. The interesting interactions of laws, words and symbols are pivotal to Hanson's notion of apocalypse.

In an appendix, Hanson sketches an overview of the development of apocalyptic phenomena and conditions.\footnote{ibid., pp. 427-444.} In the Common Era, the Pharisees and the Essenes (and other sectarian groups) perpetuated an already existent apocalyptic genre. John the Baptist preached repentance from an apocalyptic perspective. Jesus' announcement of the coming Kingdom of God developed the apocalyptic kerygma. The Book of
Revelation is the most famous of all apocalyptic writings.

If we take into account all of the abovementioned denotations and definitions of the word apocalypse, we might understand it as a transformational kind of literature which is patterned on the Johannine Revelation and its kerygma, Christian and mythic. It makes grandiose claims, supported by eschatological, supernatural and mythological imagery, to knowledge of the future. So apocalypses are mythopoeic, ahistoric and polemic; capable of radical expression.

The scope of apocalyptic tradition is enormous, taking in thousands of years of iconographic accretions and hundreds of years of literary accretions. To discuss apocalypses, writers accept impossible convergences which constitute paradoxes in their thinking and anomalies in their communicative media. Literature sustains the apocalypses, traditional and radical, by providing a vehicle capable of conveying such complex communications.
APOCALYPSE - A WORKING DEFINITION: SUMMARY

Apocalypses have been extant for more than two thousand years and the word 'apocalypse' has been used in English since the Middle Ages. It is generally agreed that apocalyptic texts indicate revelations but there is little agreement as to particular revelations. Consequently, apocalypses are neither univocal or ambivalent. Rather, they are polyvalent, bringing together in an conflicted melange such phenomena as supreme gods, adversarial demons, abysmal beasts and mortal humans.

We might say that apocalyptic texts constitute a literature of change. The texts put forward revelations and hypothesise about the various transformations the revelations necessitate. Apocalyptic texts include diverse forms of written and oral expression.

Literary, theological and sociological discourses all participate in critical interpretation of apocalyptic phenomena and conditions. This study focusses on literature and scripted performances, finding a paradigm of apocalypse in the Johannine Apocalypse. The main sources of apocalypses in English are divinities and myths of Judaic and Christian traditions. Their main preoccupations are ethical.

Apocalyptic texts, written and spoken, use images and symbols to express their ethical
Constellations of visual and aural symbols mediate acquiescence in change. By use of apocalyptic symbols individuals and communities can make meaning out of disorder, order out of chaos. Clusters of symbolic demons, beasts and humans, all subjugated to a supreme divinity, has been a major symbolic constellation but its hegemony is now in question. In contemporary apocalypses, there are figures and voices of victim-survivors where none were before. They augment the traditional, theological dualism. These apocalyptic figures, being speaking characters in the cosmic drama of apocalypse, have brought humanity into dialogue where heretofore it was mute. A third voice, expressing notions of human self-determination emerges into the apocalyptic chorus. It augments a well known pair: the divine interdict whose character is that of creator and the affirmative host, heavenly, earthly and abysmal, whose character is that of creature. With this human element, a sense of human creativity comes into apocalyptic rhetoric.

69 For discussion of ethical codes, see Robin W. Lovin and Frank E. Reynolds, 'In the Beginning' in Robin W. Lovin and Frank E. Reynolds, (eds.), *Cosmogony and Ethical Order*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1985, pp. 1-39. Lovin and Reynolds point out that the modes by which ethics are expressed include legal codes, wisdom literature, ritual actions and cosmogonic myths.
CHAPTER 2
ON TEXTS 2: LITERATURE OF APOCALYPSE

The literature of apocalypse is vast. To describe it here, major works have been identified and main preoccupations noted. Its various hermeneutics receive brief mention. The discussion touches on its poesy, giving special attention to the emergence of victim-survivors as figures of apocalypse.

The grandiosity of apocalyptic poetics is exemplified by Apocalypse XXI:6-8, first rendered into English by John Wycliffe in about 1380. Since Wycliffe’s translation, there have been many generations of the Johannine Apocalypse in English. Their differences are of interest to Biblical hermeneutics, which is theologically based, as well as to literary criticism. Some of the various generations will be discussed later with regard to their differences from one another and the rhetorical effects of the differences. It must suffice here to demonstrate by four exemplars that there are various generations exist whose variations in poetics are accessible to a religio-literary critique.

(Apocalypse XXI:6-8) And he seide, that sat in the trone, Lo! Y make alle thingis newe. And he seide to me, Write thou, for these wordis ben moost feithful and trewe. And he seide to me, It is don; I am alpha and oo, the bigynning and ende. Ye schal zyue freli of the welle of quic watir to hym that thirsteth. He that schal overcome, schal welde these things; and Y schal be God to hym and he schal be sone to me.

And he who sat ont the throne said, Behold, I make all things new. (These words I was bidden to write down, words most sure and true.) And he said to me, It is over. I am Alpha, I an Omega, the beginning of all things and their end; those who are thirsty shall drink - it is my free gift - out of the spring whose water is life. Who wins the victory? He shall have his share in this; I

70 Wycliffe, 1388, op. cit.
will be his God, and he shall be my son.\textsuperscript{71}

And he that sate vpon the throne, said, Behold, I make all things new. And hee said vnto me, Write: for these words are true and faithfull.

And he said vnto mee, It is done: I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end. I will giue vnto him that is athirst, of the fountaine of the water of life, freely.

He that ouercommeth, shall inherite all things, and I will bee his God, and he shall be my sonne.\textsuperscript{72}

Then he said, "All is over! I am the alpha and the omega, the First and the Last. I will let the thirsty drink of the fountain of the water of Life without price. The conqueror shall obtain this, and I will be his God, and he shall be my son;...\textsuperscript{73}

Then he who sat on the throne said, 'Behold! I am making all things new!' And he said to me, 'Write this down; for these words are trustworthy and true. Indeed', he said, 'they are already fulfilled. For I am the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end. A draught from the water-springs of life will be my free gift to the thirsty. But all this is victor's heritage; and I will be his God and he shall be my son."\textsuperscript{74}

Each version proclaims all things transformed or made new. Here is kerygma of apocalypse in company with the abovementioned literary features by which apocalypses are defined. Cosmic drama and mythic content are clearly evident. Claims

\textsuperscript{71} Vulgate Bible, 1949, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{72} The Holy Bible an Exact Reprint in Roman Type, Page for Page of the Authorised Version Published in the Year 1611 With an Introduction by Alfred W. Pollard, Oxford University Press, London, 1911, no page nos.

\textsuperscript{73} A New Translation of The Bible Containing the old and New Testaments, James Moffatt, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1926, p. 338.

to knowledge about the beginning and end of all things are grandiose; impossible as well. Knowledge of a putative future is expressed by statements about what will (schal) happen. Eschatological imagery exists in the discard of things old which is implicit in making new. Supernatural imagery informs the idea of the father of all. The well of life (welle of quic watir) provides a transformative image, signifying change.

There are many interpretative approaches to apocalyptic literature but all of them agree that metamorphoses, eschatologisation, futurism, grandiosity, mythology and drame are elements of it. These elements bring to the literature a character which can be recognised as spiritual or religious, at least insofar as it is mysterious, being related to change and ineffable experience.

Wright tells us that, two thousand years ago, most people would not have heard of the apocalypses and many who did would have disapproved of the mystical content and subversive political intent. Wright also points out that the apocalypses are not primarily dualistic or eschatological. They are the are part of hopeful preparation for dramatic change.

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75 Wright, 1992, p. 280.

76 ibid., p. 208.
The dramatic nature of apocalyptic literature is emphasised in D.S. Russell's analysis of it. Russell's definition of apocalyptic literature proceeds by listing features. This procedure renders his analysis repetitive; tending to self-referential exposition. The lists, however, provide a valuable tool of acquaintance with many of the features by which apocalypses are recognised by critics from many schools of thought.

Russell describes apocalypses in terms of three common elements: literary form, derivation from the Apocalypse of John and its antecedents, and futuristic, symbolic language. In addition, he lists five common features of apocalyptic literature: the writing is a form of teaching; it has inflammatory content; both historical and literary facts are observable; the symbols which the writers use are traditional; and the literature includes many kinds of writing but all are marked by the presence of predictions.

In apocalyptic literature, according to Russell, we find claims to the possession of secret knowledge, claims to know about an end-of-world and claims to divine inspiration. His analysis includes remarks on the 'highly dramatic' language which attempts to describe what he calls the 'inexpressible scenes' of apocalyptic literature. This latter confused statement illustrates the difficulties critics have in coming to

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Russell identifies in apocalypse a cosmic drama which includes the defeat of an arch-enemy and which is played out on Earth. It is the playing out of the cosmic drama of apocalypse on Earth which distinguishes it from the earlier, so called mythic drama from which it draws its images. This point is not emphasised by Russell who seems to have taken it as obvious. As consequence of this lack of emphasis, the sociopolitical inferences of Russell's analysis have tended largely to be ignored. Talmon, for example, makes a great deal out of the same point.

According to Russell's analysis, the mythic imagery shows how apocalypticists are eclectic: '(They) drew upon non-biblical traditions, making free use of cosmic mythology'.\footnote{Russell, 1964, p. 185.} Their expression of ideas about the End, the Last Day, the 'Day of the Lord', for example, depend largely upon images from ancient, mythic traditions. Russell writes:

\begin{quote}
For the most part they (early apocalypticists) were using the stereotyped language and symbols which belonged to a fairly well-defined tradition whose roots went back to the distant past.\footnote{ibid., p. 122.}
\end{quote}

Russell refers to the example of the ancient Babylonian myth of combat between a

\footnote{Russell, 1964, p. 185.}
\footnote{ibid., p. 122.}
god-creator and a sea-monster which, modified in Hebrew tradition, is described variously as Dagon, Leviathan, Rahab, and the Serpent. Thus, he suggests, the conception of the Day of the Lord includes a reinstatement of divine righteousness over what is monstrous and unrighteous. Can anything be more dramatic than a cosmic event which includes monsters from the alien deep among its players the brings its action to a consummate end?

Apocalypticists, Russell claims, appreciate their own roles in the cosmic dramas they describe.80 His interpretation of this participatory aspect of apocalyptic interest is similar to Hanson's. Both find in the dramatic conflict a commentary on the tensions between prophecy and law. Using similar terms to Hanson's (and, as we shall discover in Chapter Six, Altizer's), Russell calls apocalypse, 'the response of faith which the nation was called upon to make'.81 Thus Russell encapsulates the idea of a literature, in service to society, conveying religious and mythic motifs into a discourse of conflicted change.

Apocalyptic literature reflects and distorts the maelstrom of apocalyptic thought, expressed as 'I am alpha and omega'. Futures are confirmed as ends turn into new

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80 ibid., p. 264, Schonfeld quoted by Russell: "(They) were conscious that they were playing a leading part in the last Act of a stupendous cosmic drama".

81 Russell, 1964, p. 16.
beginnings. Apocalypse, taken thus, is an artefact of continuity. In its metaphors and its realities, some of the assumptions of revelation and of revolution are made communicable.

The apocalyptic literature to be examined in this study extends from Wycliffe's first English translation of the Johannine text, through poetry by Milton and Blake, stories of the Romani Porrajmos (the devouring of the people) and a novel by Bernard Malamud. The dramatic scenarios include the Inquisition, the Nazi Holocaust, the call to nuclear rapture, environmental renaissance, and present day torture chambers.

A body of literature with a history of some two thousand years, containing ideas about worlds' ends and creation, conjured by images of entities and powers, supernatural, unnatural and natural, cannot be homogenised. The elements of literary form, of divine revelation, and of sociopolitical ideology are intertwined in apocalyptic literature. But they are partially differentiable as aspects of the miscellany of notions of human continuity, called apocalypse.

The scope of the literature of apocalypse is illustrated here by the results of a survey (DIALOG* Information Retrieval Service, truncated keyword search, APOCALYP?) conducted in 1990. The survey was conducted in 1990, using DIALOG* Information Retrieval Service. University of Sydney's Fisher Library made possible the access to
these databases at a cost of about $350 for technical assistance and time at the
terminal. The following DIALOG* files were searched. LCMARC (Library of
Congress Machine Readable Catalogue), representing monographic works catalogued
by the Library of Congress since 1968. REMARC (Retrospective Machine Readable
Cataloguing) databases, representing works catalogued by the Library of Congress
1897-1980 which are not included in LCMARC. LINGUISTICS AND LANGUAGE
BEHAVIOUR Abstracts, representing selected materials on the nature and use of
language. PHILOSOPHERS INDEX, representing selected journals of philosophy
and related fields. MODERN LANGUAGE ASSOCIATION (MLA) Database,
representing comprehensive coverage of current scholarship in modern languages,
literature and folklore. PSYCHINFO (Psychological Abstracts Information Service)
Database, representing extensive coverage of articles related to psychology.

To extend the scope of the survey beyond the DIALOG* definition of apocalyptic
literature, a truncated keyword search was preferred. This was felt to be necessary to
the independence of the study. This researcher's definition of apocalyptic literature
was to depend heavily on the findings of the Dialog* search, so prudence was served
by avoidance of overdependence on librarians' categories. The truncated keyword
APOCALYP? was designed to identify titles and abstracts which include any word
whose first eight letters are APOCALYP, i.e., apocalypse, apocalyptic,
apocalypticism, apocalyptstts, apocalypses, apocalyptick.
The survey identified 900 articles. They include 84 described by DIALOG* as apocalyptic literature. Items not described by DIALOG* as apocalyptic literature comprise Biblical interpretation; history, especially church history; sociology; film; various literatures differentiated by ethnicity, such as, English literature, American literature, Latin literature, Nigerian literature and Italian literature; and literature differentiated by genre, such as, science fiction.

Martinists, Millenarian, Myth, Science Fiction and Wisdom Literature.

Forty four authors are named by the survey. Seventeen of them are discussed in the Oxford Companion to English Literature (OCEL). By reference to that compendium, some indications of the place and preoccupations of the literature of apocalypse in English have been discerned.

According to OCEL editor Harvey, the second principle of his compilation (the first being to list authors and literary phenomena) is to explain common allusions. It should be noted with regard to that claim that John, Johannine, Apocalypse and Revelation receive no mention in OCEL. Armageddon (Apocalypse XVI:16) is included but without cross reference. OCEL reiterates the OED definition under the heading 'apocalypse'. To discuss the apocalyptic book of Daniel, OCEL refers to the works of Caedmon who produced them c 670. That date, then, may mark for us the commencement of apocalyptic literature in English. Although Harvey, in his preface,

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82 The seventeen are: Daniel, Enoch, Isaiah, Mark; Blake, William, 1757-1827; Eliot, Thomas Stearns; Eliot, George, 1819-1890; Langland, William, c1330-c1400; Lawrence, David Herbert, 1885-1930; Lewis, Clive Staples; Marvell, Andrew, 1621-1678; Milton, John, 1608-1674; Orwell, George, 1903-1950; Shakespeare, William, 1564-1616; Shelley, Percy Bysshe, 1792-1822; Spenser, Edmund, c1552-1599; Yeats, William Butler, 1865-1939. Oxford Companion to English Literature (OCEL), Harvey, Sir Paul, ed., Clarendon, Oxford, 1967).

83 OCEL, p. 75. In the late 7th century, as an aged person, Caedmon entered the monastery of Streaneshalch (Whitby, England). Bede said Caedmon was an unlearned herdsman who received suddenly the gift of song and put into verse scriptural passages which had been translated to him. In 1655 Francois Dujon (Franciscus Junius) published 'Genesis', 'Exodus', 'Daniel' and 'Christ and Satan', long scriptural poems which he took to be Caedmon's. Modern scholarship denies them to Caedmon. His first hymn, which Bede quotes, is the only authentic fragment of his work.
mentions as mythology works as disparate as Hesiod's Theogony and the Koran, he makes no indication that Biblical writings might be mythic. The entry under 'Bible' in the body of OCEL is confined to comments on etymologies and translations of the Old Testament and New Testament.

OCEL does not recognise apocalyptic literature as a category or genre. It would be misleading, however, to ignore the matter of genre because it is frequently raised with regard to definitions of apocalyptic literature. To take apocalypse as a genre, one must use the term loosely, meaning a bit of literature, what kind of bit remaining unspecific. There is much debate about genres and their relations to apocalypse. This, however, is focussed more toward defining genre than apocalypse. So we will be brief in our attention to it.

Hanson asserts: 'The term apocalypse should be applied strictly as the designation of a literary genre.'\(^84\) His own analysis, however (as we shall find in Chapter Six), does not do this. Confusions like this arise frequently when apocalypse is taken as a genre.

Take, for example, E.P. Sanders' article 'The Genre of Palestinian and Jewish

\(^84\) Hanson, 1979, p. 430.
Apocalypses'.

Sanders puts forward a number of possible definitions of apocalypse then remarks that all of them beg the problem of genre. So despite its title, the article tells us that apocalypse is not a genre. Sanders points out that by listing features of so-called apocalyptic literature then adding their own nuances to those features, critics have extended the term to mean many things. He notes that many so-called apocalyptic pieces do not contain a majority of the listed features while many of the features exist in works not recognised as apocalyptic. So Sanders, too, notes confusion arising from a generic approach.

Lars Hartmann, in his article 'Survey of the Problem of Apocalyptic Genre', makes a similar point to Sanders'. Hartmann tells us that apocalypse, being what he calls a mixtum compositium presents problems if viewed as a genre. He lists some desiderata for future investigations of apocalypses, suggesting, as Hanson does, that detailed analyses of individual texts may solve the problem of genre. Thus Hartmann also notes the confusion of generic approaches to Apocalyptic literature.

Whether they are encountered as part of a genre or not, the preoccupations of the

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literature of apocalypse are largely ethical. This is especially marked in its cosmic drama wherein divine, human and demonic figures wreak good and evil at the edge of time. The dramatic conflict is not whether time will triumph over the abyss, constituting a victory of life over death. Apocalyptic drama hinges on conflict between the values of goodness and evil. The dramatic argument is that a demonic victory would be incompatible with collective continuity. So goodness is preferred to evil.

Although ethical positions are marked in apocalyptic drama, it should be noted that apocalyptic ethics proceed through many phases of literary expression. Drama is the most readily observed but not necessarily the most significant. We will return to this matter in Chapter Eight.

The continuity of humanity is assumed in apocalyptic literature. Ethical questions are addressed to the means of human continuity, asking of the metamorphs or transformational figures of the discourse if what continues is human, animal and zoomorphic. Apocalypses portray humanity as being capable of demonic and divine manifestations as well as human ones. Through apocalypses, ethical discourse addresses the question, What might it mean to be human?
Take, for example, William Langland's Vision Concerning Piers Plowman. This work addresses an ethical question of reciprocity. Piers leads the way to truth in return for help with his ploughing; some assist, some do nots. Another example, John Milton's Paradise Lost, presents the problem of a humanity caught between satanic evil and divine goodness. In both these examples, what is being examined is the ethical character of humanity.

Further examples: William Blake's Book of Thel treats the ethical theme of mutual self-sacrifice; Mary Shelley's Frankenstein or the Modern Prometheus treats the ethics of technological advance. W.B. Yeats' interest in ethics, religion and the supernatural brought him to edit works of William Blake and Edmund Spenser, both ethicists. Yeats' essay 'Ideas of Good and Evil' denotes by its title its ethical theme.

In the literature of apocalypse one can discern concern for reciprocity, goodness, self sacrifice, social responsibility and salvation. But these ethical themes, although they are integral to the literature of apocalypse, are not sufficient as descriptors of it. In apocalypses we find some of the widest horizons of meaning used in literature. Apocalypses may contain almost anything a person or a people can imagine,

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87 The authorship of *Piers Plowman* is disputed but usually attributed to Langland, c1330-c1400. There are three versions: (A) 1362, (B) 1377, (C) 1392.

88 *OCEL* refers to Mary Shelley's work not in her own right but as an adjunct to Percy Bysshe Shelley's.
separately and together. In an apocalyptic scenario the beginning and the end of the world meet; people live at an edge of time, creating, de-creating and re-creating cosmos, chaos and whatever else springs to life.

The symbols of apocalypticism, range from divine and angelic to demonic and adversarial. But the physical human who needs nothing more than a drink of water is not left out of the spectrum. This breadth of concern and plurality of horizons enables apocalyptic literature to put forward rich hypotheses of the human condition. Elements as diverse as law and phantasmagoria inhabit the literature of apocalypse.

For example, through the figure of the messiah, tension between this-worldly, national and political elements and other-worldly, universal and transcendent elements is explored. Making a similar point, Jan Bergman puts forward the valuable insight that the motifs may signify an attempt to break out of monism and cyclical eternity.

Apocalypticists claim to reveal divine truths which had been secret until the writer gave them expression. Such claimants include mathematicians who try to make squares out of circles. Included also are poets who try to make beginnings out of

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89 Russell, 1964, p. 308.

endings. The discourse of apocalypstists seems to depend on imagining oneself present at all six sides of a cube at once so it does not lend itself to verbal expression. However, we may glean from it an important key to apocalypticism: it requires active imagination of a present condition or set of conditions.

The literature of apocalypse has been approached by diverse interpretative methods. Sometimes critics use a language of faith without acknowledging its confessional implications. This is particularly noticeable when apocalyptic literature is put under theological scrutiny. In that discourse the Judaeo-Christian God tends to be proclaimed as though no other divinity can be imagined. What emerges is analysis wherein the freedom of the divine to be other than transcendent, singular and supreme is obscured.

A hermeneutic tendency to identify pairs is also marked. The creator-creature dualism mentioned in our topic is an example of this. The identification of themes, such as finality, judgement, demonisation and absolutism, inclusivity, futurism and prediction, is also common. The orientation toward future, imagined events and away

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91 Revelation, Jerusalem Bible, 20:6, 'I am the Alpha and the Omega, the Beginning and the End.'

92 See OED, 'apocalypists... cyclometrists'.

93 Some examples of the diverse interpretative methods are discussed in Ch. 3.

94 The works of Veilhauer, Thompson and Barnett discussed in Ch. 3, exemplify this tendency.
from present and past, actualised events is another feature of apocalyptic literature. A futuristic orientation facilitates the maintenance of the elements of secretness. When futures, no matter how abominable, are imagined, past and present abominations are denied, thus they tend to remain secret.

Analyses of apocalyptic literature tend to be cataclysmic (focussed by time foreshortened and grand opposition), dualistic (focussed by arch enmity or divine-demonic opposition) and atavistic (by participation in divine inspiration). Such methods of interpretation have enshrined the divergence of apocalyptic horizons at the expense of diminished attention to their convergence.95

There is a tendency in contemporary interpretation to emphasise the eschatological panorama of apocalypse by suppressing the neological horizon. Perhaps this is a consequence of the abovementioned inclination to dichotomise. Take, for example, the following assertions of David Miller and Robert Bosnak: Miller tells us, 'an "apocalypse" is the literal "end", the real Armageddon, finished and done for.'96 For Bosnak, apocalypse is 'our Judaeo-Christian vision of the end that is linked to

95 Convergence and divergence are illustrated in Ch. 8.

redemption and messianic vengeance... our obsession with the end’.\textsuperscript{97} Assertions like these, which assume the equivalence of apocalypse and eschatology and fail to note their complementarity, are prolific in contemporary, popular texts. Such emphasis on ideas of a final ending has tended to subvert consideration of futuristic, neological elements of apocalypse.

The literature of apocalypse is complex. To divorce the neological and the eschatological panorama is tantamount to hearing the line 'I am the Alpha and the Omega'\textsuperscript{98} as 'I am the Omega'. To illustrate further: it is to affirm John Milton's lines,

\begin{quote}
Him the Almighty Power/ Hurl'd headlong flaming from th' ethereal sky/ With hideous ruin and combustion down/ To bottomless perdition,\textsuperscript{99}
\end{quote}

and to deny these,

\begin{quote}
As from a second root shall be restored/ As many as are restored.../ So heav'nly love shall outdo hellish hate,/ Giving to death, and dying to redeem.\textsuperscript{100}
\end{quote}

To apprehend Alpha and Omega as one is to conceive of a poignant conceit such as Robert Frost expresses in his poem 'Fire and Ice':

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{97} Bosnak, 'Introduction: Re-Imagining the End of the World', in Andrews et. al. (eds.), 1987, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{98} Revelation 1:18


\textsuperscript{100} Milton, 'Paradise Lost'(3:288-289).
Some say the world will end in fire,
Some say in ice.
From what I’ve tasted of desire
I hold with those who favour fire.
But if it had to perish twice,
I think I know enough of hate
To say that for destruction ice
Is also great
And would suffice.\textsuperscript{101}

In this poem two seemingly eschatological horizons are envisaged but the second, being second, operates neologically. The line, 'But if it had to perish twice', projects a future wherein even the end of the world is not the end of the world. This is a conceit of perpetual ephemera. The convergence of desire and hate, fire and ice, which occurs with the final word, 'suffice', fuses desire and hate in paradoxical relation to one another. Despite the first indications of the title, simple, dualistic opposition is not an element of this poem.

To apprehend Alpha and Omega as one is also to conceive of acquiescence as a value of creation, as at the end of Bernard Malamud's God's Grace:

Buz laid the wood in an orderly row on the altar and applied a match to the dried logs. He poured spices and myrrh into the smoke. The flames sprang up, crackling in a foreign tongue.
'Untie my hands and I won't move, I promise you. I shan't blemish the sacrifice. If that's what I am, that's what I am.'\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{101} TBA

Here we find the father cast as willing sacrifice to a wayward, simian son. In his pastiche of Biblical motifs, Malamud signals the coeternity of humanity and divinity in acquiescence: 'If that's what I am, that's what I am.' Like Frost's poem, Malamud's novel proceeds by paradox rather than dichotomy.

Eschatologisation, however, is common practice in contemporary literature of apocalypse. The examples of Frost and Malamud are exceptional. The astrological millennium, year 2000, tends to be viewed in the light of human capability for technologically induced eschaton. This is marked in mass media broadcasts. In mass communications, contemporary apocalypticism is expressed largely through speech but much of what we hear is scripted for purposes of broadcasting. Thus apocalyptic literature continues its development in contemporary times.

The inclination for eschatologisation was very strong during the 1980s. During that decade, end-time myths were closely associated with nuclear technologies. Apocalypticism gave way almost entirely to eschatology. The mere word 'nuclear' became a sign of ending which was so strong that it almost aborted discussion of continuity in connection with nuclear technologies. All living species were portrayed as the victims of inevitable extinction brought about by an omnicidal regime known as
the nuclear military industrial complex.\textsuperscript{103}

In such contemporary discourse, an equation of apocalypse and an absolute end-of-world is accepted. This assertion of a literal end can operate as an instrument of psychoterror in the service of absolutism. A prime example of this is provided by the phenomenon of nuclearism which has been critically described by Robert Jay Lifton.\textsuperscript{104} Nuclearism, often encoded as 'nuclear apocalypse', perpetrates terror of nuclear technologies. It does that by asserting that the power of those technologies for destruction is absolute. Pseudo-divine powers are attributed to the technologies and the human agency in the making and wielding of them is denied. The polemic of nuclearism insists on obedience to the wielders of the nuclear strong force as an imperative of survival. In this coercive rhetoric, ideas of choice are displaced by ideas of obedience.

Eschatology, though, cannot totally eclipse apocalyptic neologisms because, as Lifton notes, futurism is elemental to both: 'our exploration of end-of-world imagery

\textsuperscript{103} See Keable, 1991, pp. 368-370.

suggests, in itself, a countering force.\textsuperscript{105} Lifton points to a realised eschatology wherein ideas of world catastrophe suggest their own opposites, ideas of re-creation.

Realised eschatology is not to be found in the old sources. It is a hermeneutical device; probably a modern response to nihilist existentialism. Suffice to say here that it is a conception of end-of-world as a past event. In a realised eschatology, the ejection by the divine of the satan from heaven is taken as constituting a past end-of-world and all human experience participates in the eschatological denouement of that event.

The apprehension of a realised eschatology does not denude apocalypses of their ethical concern. Human choices, although committed already to ending, are still held to be essential to the manner of ending. As Gore Vidal puts it:

because there is no cosmic point to the life that each of us perceives on this distant bit of dust at the galaxy's edge, all the more reason for us to maintain in proper balance what we have here. Because there is nothing else. Nothing. And quite enough, all in all.\textsuperscript{106}

Vidal's realised eschatology brings ethical concern right down to earth.

During the 1990s, eschatology is giving way to neology. A resurgence of salvationism

\textsuperscript{105} Lifton, "The Image of "The End of the World"" in Andrews et. al. (eds.), 1987, pp.31-46. In this essay Lifton offers an extended analysis of contemporary apocalyptic and eschatological ideation.

is evident, especially in the literature of environmental renaissance.\textsuperscript{107} In this resurgence, hope, both grandiose and forlorn, shows itself to be elemental to the literature of apocalypse.

In the apocalyptic rhetoric of contemporary environmental renaissance, the symbolic figure of Gaia (Gaea, Ge), primordial goddess and earth mother, has been invoked as a symbol of Earth. We are invited to imagine Gaia as the [sic] planetary organism. We are to understand that she is primarily programmed for self-repair and self-defence. So our salvation is in attending to hers.

This unashamed fundamentalism is reported by John Postgate who reports the emergence of the contemporary Gaia, through the work of James Lovelock. Gaia has swollen, as Postgate puts it, 'first into a hypothesis, later into a theory, then into something terribly like a cult'.\textsuperscript{108} Summing up the inappropriate grandiosity of this vision, he writes:

\begin{quote}
After all, when someone rediscovers the wheel, rather than say, "I told you so", the more courteous of us nod with satisfaction that enlightenment has spread to yet another colleague and quietly get on with our business. But when the colleague proposes a Goddess of Wheeliness to unify the global
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{107} See e.g. broadcasts by Jonathan Porritt, David Suziki, Dr Susan George, and the many 'together we can save the world' projects with which they are associated in mass media.

\textsuperscript{108} John Postgate, 'Gaia Gets Too Big for Her Boots', \textit{New Scientist}, 7 April, 1988, p. 60.
aptness of his newly discovered wheel, we shake our heads sadly; and when the Wheely-Goddess worshippers start popping up all over, then it is definitely time to worry.\textsuperscript{109}

What is grandiose, fundamentalist and dangerous about the Gaia hypothesis is its homogenisation of hope.

Another example of hope homogenised can be found in Weng Meng's 'On the Cross'.\textsuperscript{110} Weng Meng, Minister of Culture in China at the time of the Tiananmen Square massacre, has written this apocalyptic triptych in search of a collective way forward for all China. He has concluded that apocalyptic hope is necessary to the salvation of modern China. That hope he finds in the forlorn proposition that, although it is possible to kill thousands, it is not possible to kill millions of peaceful protesters. So, according to Weng Meng, apocalyptic hope resides in peaceful protest against tyranny, notwithstanding a massive body count.

Acquiescence in hope, whether expressed in poetic terms such as the Johannine, 'Hooli, hooli, hooli!', or in contemporary political, terms such as peaceful protest marches and self-defensive self-restraint, is elemental to the literature of apocalypse. That element is challenged in contemporary apocalypses by paradoxes similar to that

\textsuperscript{109}ibid.

\textsuperscript{110}Marian Garlick, \textit{Weng-Meng's Mythopoeic Vision of Golgotha and Apocalypse}, Visiting Lecture to Department of East Asian Studies, University of Sydney, 12/7/1991. Garlick's report of Weng Meng's \textit{On the Cross} was delivered orally, the paper being in production and due for publication.
presented by Frost's 'Fire and Ice'. As Frost's poem suggests, contemporary images of torment and literal annihilation can serve as tools of hate.\textsuperscript{111}

What, for instance, is the status of the end in the following scenario? Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles' Michaelangelo (a character in an animated cartoon programme broadcast on childrens' television, in which no one ever dies), being tortured by the devices of an intergalactic power who hates him, drawls: 'There's got to be a limit (dude), even to your grosseities!' Has there got to be a limit?

Benjamin Netanyahu, for example, tells us that terrorism, 'the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends', is a way to 'win' in contemporary global politics.\textsuperscript{112} He recommends terrorism as a tool of international politics. Geoffrey Robertson tells us, 'the tyrant and the terrorist are two sides of the same debased coin'.\textsuperscript{113} He recommends humanitarian activity, including just law to conciliate revenge. Beside the tyrant and the terrorist, can justice be found? Desmond Tutu describes activities of hatred which displace justice:

\begin{quote}
There is no peace because there is no justice...
Because there is global insecurity, nations are engaged in a mad arms race, spending billions of dollars wastefully on instruments of destruction, when millions are starving...
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{111} In Ch. 2, we encounter Johannine images of torment and annihilation as tools of divine goodness.

\textsuperscript{112} Benjamin Netanyahu, 'Terrorism: How the West Can Win' in \textit{Time Magazine}, April 14, 1986, p. 30. Netanyahu was, at the time of publication, Israel's Ambassador to the United Nations.

We have the capacity to feed ourselves several times over.\textsuperscript{114} The capacity to feed ourselves is overwhelmed by institutionalised hatred, demonstrated by the arms race, international insecurity and loss of peace. How, then, might people acquiesce in hope?

The literature of apocalypse has been augmented during the late twentieth century by writers' attempts to respond to the combined challenges to apocalyptic hope of hatred and desire.\textsuperscript{115} They illustrate the kind of oppression against which they work by describing the atrocities of torturous techno-beaurocratic regimes, especially the Nazi regime of Adolf Hitler.\textsuperscript{116} Thus the aberrations of that regime, which sought national supremacy by domestic policies of slavery and extermination have become symbols of victimisation, oppression and injustice.

The new population of writers tends generally not to be hopeful; vengeful rather. Their population includes some who experienced life in Nazi concentration camps, to whom Nazis are persons and holocaust is more than a metaphor. Primo Levi and


\textsuperscript{115} See Bruno Bettelheim, Surviving the Holocaust, Fontana, London, 1979, Revised 1986, for discussion of what philosopher Emile Fackenheim terms an adequate response.

\textsuperscript{116} Hitler's regime was itself millenarian. See for examples, Hitler, Adolf, Hitler's Table Talk 1941-1944, Martin Boorman (ed.), Norman Cameron and R.H. Stevens trans., Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1953, p. 33. The reiterated theme of the enslavement of Europe as the salvation of Earth permeates this book.
Bruno Bettelheim, for example. Also included are writers to whom Nazis and genocide are not persons and policies but poetic figures. Sylvia Plath, for example. What is most remarkable is that those writings which are informed by life experience tend to be the less vengeful. Contemporary conditions seem to call for a third way of responding, something which is neither vengeful or hopeful.

Responses to the Nazi genocide bring to the word 'holocaust' a new meaning. The ancient Baruch 1:10 tells us that holocausts are 'offerings for sin'. Such holocausts were to serve a covenant to stave off suffering. But since 1948, holocaust has denoted genocide, that is internment and extermination of entire populations. It is important to understand in this connection that the genocide qua genocide practised by the German Nazis is a late twentieth century politico-legal phenomenon. It had no existence before 1948.\textsuperscript{117} The word holocaust, used in this connection, is anomalous. To suggest direct relationships between Biblical verses and genocidal mentalities or actions is fatuous. No such intent informs this study. What interests us here is a borrowing or appropriation, even misappropriation, of apocalyptic terms and symbols.

We might say that Nazis and others like them, by making mass murder into a human artefact of torture, effected a mutation of covenant which is indicated by the word

\textsuperscript{117} Ch. 13 will address the subject of genocide in detail.
holocaust. Responses to this mutation, expressed in terms of genocide, constitute in the literature of apocalypse a new element. It is the voice of the victim-survivor.

Victim-survivors do not populate the Johannine Apocalypse, although, as we shall discover in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight, the text assumes victimisation and oppression. Apocalypse VI:9-11 describes the souls of the martyrs asking for vengeance but that plea has no resonance in the Johannine heaven. They cry out:

    Hou long thou, Lord, that art hooli and trewe, demest not, and vengest not oure blood of these that dwellen in the erthe?

These complainant voices are stilled immediately. The vengeful souls, once silent, are arrayed in the white stoles of the blessed and admonished to wait until every last one of them is dead. They raise no further complaint.

Victim-survivors do populate contemporary apocalypses, though. Robert Jay Lifton and Eric Markusen write of them in The Genocidal Mentality; Norman Cohn gives us their history in his Warrant for Genocide; Bernard Malamud, in his abovementioned God's Grace, explores a repertoire of responses to the circumstances of a fictional victim-survivor. International law creeps toward regulation of genocidal action through war crimes trials, proposed legislation on weapons of mass destruction and sanctions against torturous regimes such as apartheid and ethnic cleansing.
The Nazi holocaust and the Inquisition and the rule of the Zadokites before them tended to be highly legalistic in their methods. So we know that the problem of genocidal mentality is not amenable to legislation alone. Despite the legislative efforts, the protestations of the victim-survivors persist. Contemporary apocalyptic literature expresses their complaints by reference to the Nazi holocaust, the conflagration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the Inquisition among other cataclysms. The Johannine Apocalypse and its arcana furnish images by which the victim-survivors of contemporary genocidal mentality protest.

Advocacy joins with self-proclamation as the circumstances of victims of circumstances which are described as apocalyptic become known. Ursula Le Guin advocates the liberation of scapegoats in her story, 'The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas'.

she also challenges illusions of perfection and affirms freedom of choice. Thus she effects a convergence of eschatological and neological horizons while suggesting a third way. This is what Northrop Frye would call a participating apocalypse.

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118 Ursula Le Guin, 'The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas', pp. 275-282. Le Guin says the story is her response to William James' moral philosophy but she is not explicit as to which part of it. Perhaps she is responding to this: 'without a claim actually made by some concrete person there can be no obligation, but there is some obligation wherever there is a claim' (his italics), William James, 'The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life' in The Will To Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, Dover, New York, 1897 (1956), p. 194.

119 Frye's critical analysis of apocalypse in literature is the subject of Chapter Four of this thesis.
Le Guin's story brings us to the utopian city of Omelas. Underneath Omelas there lives one abject child. The joy of the city is built on the child's detention in sorrow; it makes compassion possible; everybody knows that. Every now and again someone will walk alone, away from Omelas, knowing the Utopia to be an illusion. Why do they walk away? Because the child is in them; their bondage to perfection is her prison; the door is open to anyone who admits imperfection.

The existence of victim-survivors is not new. Few others have had any use for apocalyptic literature. Apocalypses could be described as the literature of the oppressed. The persistent, self-proclaiming voices of the victim-survivors are the new items. What could not be said (except by the abovementioned martyrs) is now stuttering toward articulation.

The Johannine Apocalypse now has the accretions and erosions of two thousand years. We can say that it is an ancient, contemporary text whose images have been appropriated by victim-survivors of genocidal mentality. Hence Johannine images, if not Johannine symbols, have entered the contemporary literature of apocalypse in association with figures of victim-survivors.
CHAPTER 3
ON METHODS 1: VICO'S THREE RING CIRCUS

PREAMBLE

To take a methodical approach to apocalyptic literature while accepting it as being forged at the edge of chaos and the brink of time is to adopt a heuristic device by which apocalypses can be examined. In other words, a philosophical model of literary language is prerequisite to analysis and criticism of apocalyptic texts. Without such a stabiliser, criticism tends to fall into the persuasions it sets out to investigate.

The heuristic device which structures the method I have developed has four main parts. Three of them are borrowed from Giambattista Vico's New Science and Ancient Wisdom of the Italians. The fourth I have appropriated from Northrop Frye's Creation and Re-creation, The Great Code and Words With Power. The

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elements of literary language which have focused this study are metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and kerygma as defined by Frye. The interest is focused on the poetic interactivity of these literary tropes.

As we have noted, in apocalyptic literature, apocalyptic figures, including humans and animals, gods, demons, and beasts from the abyss, co-exist in complex and changeable matrices of meanings. Contemporary apocalyptic rhetoric speaks through broadcast media to mass populations and through diplomatic channels to discrete groups, as well as through literature to diverse readers. As a consequence of this diversity, miscellaneous interpretations have developed. Not all of them can be pursued in the course of one document. A fair balance has been struck by taking the four abovementioned literary elements to be our major tropes or turning points. What I have called Vico's three-ring circus and Frye's fourth order of words are described in Chapters Three and Four to follow. These titles describe the theories which inform the religio-literary method by which I have approached the tasks of investigating and discussing some of the diverse significations of apocalyptic rhetoric.
VICHIAN THEORY: AN OVERVIEW

Vico was a Providential Christian of the late Renaissance. He used literary structures which he fashioned from a classical mythology to give eloquence to his thought and writing. Most marked of these structures is his division of time into three ages symbolised by gods, heroes and vulgar humans. Being interrelated (by language, at least), the ages can accommodate the huge scope and long history we have identified as apocalyptic. The accretions, iconographic, philosophical and literary, of the apocalyptic tradition can also be included. Vico has delivered, through his structured eloquence, an argument for civility among people, peoples and nations.

Vico was a master of poetics. His literary theories, therefore, are relevant to the transformational kind of literature and language that is called apocalyptic. He has demonstrated how, by providence and given rhetorical and eloquent use of language, models of thought become models for thought and vice versa. In the flux, transformations (of thought, figurae sententiarum) occur.

Vico affirms the power of human breath to enliven words. So, in his poetics, Word and word converge in a multivocal, polyvalent poesy. His insight, that by poetry humans can create and re-create themselves, is the 'master key' to his abovementioned New Science. Vico writes:
This discovery (that human speech is poetic, i.e., creative), which is the master key of this Science, has cost us the persistent research of almost all our literary life. ¹²⁵

This insight does not deny any theopneuptos or creative, divine Word. Vico gives eloquent expression to the distinction between human words and a divine word:

In our religious beliefs... in which we acknowledge that the world was created from nothing in time, the following distinction must be drawn: that created truth is convertible with what is made while uncreated truth is convertible with what is begotten. ¹²⁶

In common, contemporary usage, the distinction is far from clear.

Max Fisch, in his Introduction to New Science, has affirmed the importance to Vico's thought of the creative power of poetic speech:

It was the discovery of this poetic or creative wisdom, the wisdom of the poets or makers of human institutions, that was the master key to the new science. ¹²⁷

Michael Mooney has interpreted Vico's insight in terms of mind, language and

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creativity:

herein we have the most fundamental novelty of his work. Mind does not precede language, but arises with it, and both in turn are the necessary outcome of social urgency, the result of a spontaneous attempt, gradually made conscious, to grasp a startling experience through images that are familiar.\textsuperscript{128}

Put succinctly: thought and society are co-determinitive. Donald Verene has explained the master key as experience ordered in imaginative universals. He remarks, however, that Vico's commentators have not commonly adopted the method of the imaginative universal.\textsuperscript{129}

Vico does not address himself directly to the subject of apocalypse but his long explanation of successive creations describes its own apocalyptic course. Fisch summarises thus:

There is not only an original and individual birth for each system but a continual birth of new institutions within it, a continual transformation of old institutions, and even a rebirth of the nation after death.\textsuperscript{130}

Vico's apocalypse names Metaphysic as the writer's and readers' guide and puts within


\textsuperscript{130} Fisch, 'Introduction' to Vico, 1744, B1, p. xxi.
the metaphysical purview providence and all the rest of creation. This form gives self-
reflection to humans in a way that the Johannine Apocalypse does not.\textsuperscript{131} Despite
these differences, transformations and the ethical postures by which they can be
survive inform both Vico and the Johannines.

What does Vico's master key open up? His address is to social contract (after
covenant with providence). Social contract, he tells us, is forged of language, law and
imagination. According to Vico, by social contract, that is, through a language of
human enthusiasm for their own survival, humans make, un-make and re-make
themselves. To put it another way, it is breath that empowers words, contracts and
deeds.

In summary, Vico's argument is as follows. To be human is to be civil. Not to be civil
is to be bestial, feral or barbarous.\textsuperscript{132} Bestiality despairs of the succours of godless
nature but humanity apprehends godliness, thus being enlightened to something
superior to nature. By apprehending godliness, humans are enabled to constrain the
despair which motivates only immediate self-interest and results in injustices and
death. This constraint of immediate self-interest enables civility, that is, the realisation

\textsuperscript{131} This difference is demonstrated by the analysis of the Johannine apocalypse put forward in Ch. 2.

\textsuperscript{132} 'Bestial', 'brutish' 'feral' and 'barbaric' tend to be used synonymously in translations of Vico's thought. In Vico's
cosmos godlike, heroic, humane and bestial attributes of humanity maintain entropy. Particular attributes may be
predominant at any given time.
of commonality through just action motivated by collective interest. So civility depends on godliness on the one hand and collective human self-restraint on the other.

Commonality is represented by Vico as a responsive utterance evoked by a Jovian thunderclap which awakened in all the nations the ability to employ language. The philosophical discourse presented in New Science is built on axioms which rest on that motif, itself acknowledged as an invention: 'Axioms XL11-XLV1 give us the beginning of our historical mythology.'

The Jovian motif, however, contains a conceit. The first words, made in response to a Jovian thunderclap, are not transactional utterances but a tokens of self-affirmation; the self-affirmation of the first person. Thus emerges a self-proclaiming humanity.

Metaphorical convertability operates in the Jovian motif, though. This first reading cannot deny its antithesis. The thunder itself, taken figuratively, may be understood as Jove's self-affirmation as first person. Either reading can stand. If we prefer the former, then Jove's utterance can be encountered as a metaphor of human speech. If, on the other hand, preference is given to the latter, the evoked human utterance as the

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133 See Vico, 1744, paragraph 342, p. 102.
134 ibid., paragraph 203, p. 73.
self-affirmation of the second person and everybody is 'thou' to a providential 'I'. Read either way, the figure conjures an immanentist humanism.

Vico's ideas were developed in the late Renaissance, at a time when theology was integral to philosophy. Vico acknowledged this:

The philosophers have not yet contemplated His providence in respect of that part of it which is proper to men, whose nature has this principal property: that of being social.\footnote{ibid., paragraph 2, p. 31.}

His insights spring from a broad horizon of interests, including law and jurisprudence, etymology and poetics. They comprised, as Mooney tells us, an early humanism:

a cycle of studies known as the studia humanitatis - grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history, and moral philosophy - a schema that consolidated the "humanities" as we know them and gave their masters a new name - "humanists".\footnote{Mooney, 1985, p. 41.}

These horizons can readily embrace the ideas about worlds' ends and new worlds coming which constitute apocalypses.

This is not to assert without evidence that these diverse Vichian horizons are relevant to contemporary apocalyptic concern. There is a current tolerance for invocations of Vico's name to support almost any theory.\footnote{Verene, 1981, p. 23.} Verene warns against this tendency. He asserts that Vico had little effect on the development of modern thought and notes a
danger of interpreting obscure, original thinkers, such as Vico, to support positions
with which they were not acquainted. Timothy Bahti has put forward a similar
cautions, telling us that Vico was virtually unheard of in the eighteenth century and
came to modern notice through interest in Erich Auerbach.\footnote{138}

A survey of Vichian themes which are salient to literature in general and apocalyptic
literature in particular follows. Thus the relevance of Vico's theory to apocalyptic
literature is illustrated. Applications are demonstrated in Chapter Eight.

Vico's eloquence is generally understood to be poised on three interrelated concepts
which he allegorised as the ages of the gods, heroes and vulgars. The term 'vulgar' is
preferred here to 'human' because Vico's notion of what is human is so complex. Fisch
has attempted to describe the nature of the complexity:

\begin{quote}
Vico distinguishes three successive ages in the nature or development of
nations - that of gods, that of heroes, and that of men; and he distinguishes
three corresponding natures - divine, heroic, and human. It is true that this is
only one of three senses in which he uses the term "human". In one sense, all
three natures are human; in a second sense, the second and third in contrast
with the first; in a third sense the third in contrast with the first and second.\footnote{139}

By use of the term vulgar, the demotic activities of humans is denoted in a way which
implies contiguity with rather than separation from the godly and heroic activities.

\footnote{138} Timothy Bahti, 'Vico, Auerbach and Literary History'in \textit{Vico: Past and Present}, Giorgio Tagliacozzo (ed.),
Thus vulgar eloquence is recognised as one form among many, all of which are available to human usage.

Eloquence is a phenomenon which Vico's writings exemplify. History, mythopoeia, and poetics are major elements of it. There is consonance between Vico's allegorical gods and the figures which historians accept as mythic. There is accord between Vico's heroic figures and many historical leaders. Vulgars, being stuck for words, speak in poetry. So the structure of Vico's discourse is essentially tripartite.

The tropes are ordered by Vico into a quasi hierarchy (quasi because it is heuristic), hence they furnish in his writing (not necessarily his thought) a syntagmatic dimension or sequential order. Metaphor is prime, also primitive. Out of it springs metonymy and out of that synecdoche. Irony springs from reflection on all three. Mooney defines irony as a fourth trope:

Tropes (verba translata) are words with transferred meanings... Such transfers in meaning occur in four logically predictable ways: from one thing to something similar (metaphor); from cause to effect or vice versa (metonymy); from the whole to the part or vice versa (synecdoche); and from one thing to its opposite (irony). These are the primary tropes, from which all others derive or deviate.\(^1_{40}\)

Mooney's denotation of irony as a Vichian trope ignores the qualities of irony which

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\(^{139}\) Fisch, 'Introduction' to Vico, 1744, C7, p. xxiv.

\(^{140}\) Mooney, 1985, p. 79.
permeate metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche. A more Fryeian view of irony is adopted here: 'irony is built into the very conception of narrative.'\textsuperscript{141} This approach does not deny the importance of irony but understands it as a diffuse rather than a discrete element. If the tropes can be viewed as performing in a three-ring-circus whose big-top is myth, irony might be understood as a clown who can bring ridicule without destruction to any of the acts. As Vico puts it:

> Irony certainly could not have begun until the period of reflection, because it is fashioned of falsehood by dint of a reflection which wears the mask of truth.\textsuperscript{142}

So irony is important to decodification but it is not an element of the code itself. Rather, irony is an attitude of interpretation made possible by reflection on some or all of the tropes.

Note that three elements, if constellated as a tripartite entity, admit of four interstices. Meanings are made between and among elements. To discern metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche as major tropes in the Vichian constellation is not to deny the importance of irony, nor of proclamation or kerygma and silence.

White has argued that Vico's important contention is that metaphorical naming by

\textsuperscript{141} Frye, 1990, p. 83.

\textsuperscript{142} Vico, 1744, paragraph 408, p. 131.
similitude both necessitates and makes possible the development of tropes.\textsuperscript{143} White's argument, however, does not go far enough. To apprehend Vico's argument vis a vis tropes, it is necessary to recognise, as H. P. Adams has, that similitude is an artefact of identity. Adams writes: 'he (Vico) had written in 1708 that minds are formed by language and not language by minds.'\textsuperscript{144} This observation makes evident the inadequacy of White's argument, which makes an end-point of similitude. Further to the point Verene observes that socially enshrined linguistic symbolism asserts identities not similarities.\textsuperscript{145} Although similitude is an important element of Vico's theories of tropes, they cannot be reduced simply to identification by similarity.

Given the importance of the interstitial operations of language to Vico's discourse, an appreciation of the rhetorical difference between similarity and identity is essential. The difference comes to issue in the matter of certainty. Vico points out that certainty and veracity maintain no necessary relation:

> anyone who is confident of perceiving something in a clear and distinct idea of the mind, is easily deceived, and he will often think that he knows a thing distinctly when he has only a confused consciousness of it, for he has not learned all the elements which belong to the object and which distinguish it


\textsuperscript{145} Verene, 1981, p. 74-76. See also p. 173-175. See also Mooney, 1985, p. xiii.
from everything else.\textsuperscript{146}

Such an observation calls truth justice and jurisprudence into question.

It is important to note that Vico's hierarchical order of tropes is heuristic. It is not to be confused with a belief that language follows a developmental agenda. In New Science the hierarchy is imploded when the circularity and, hence, simultaneity of tropic function is realised. This occurs when readers understand that metonymy proceeds to synecdoche by particularisation and synecdoche reverts to metaphor by generalisation. Vico's model foreshadows an appreciation of the two-way processes of language which has been expanded recently by the hermeneutics of Gadamer, Habermas and Kristeva.

For the purposes of this discussion, metaphor is taken to be prime.\textsuperscript{147} Out of it springs metonymy\textsuperscript{148} and out of that synecdoche.\textsuperscript{149} Irony may attend on any or all the others.

All the tropes are available to human agency.

\textsuperscript{146} Vico (Palmer trans.), 1988, p. 73.

\textsuperscript{147} See Vico, 1744, paragraph 404, p. 129, 'All the first tropes are corollaries of this poetic logic. The most luminous and therefore the most necessary and frequent is metaphor.'

\textsuperscript{148} ibid., Book Two, Section Two, 'Poetic Logic', paragraph 409, p. 131. Out of metaphor developed metonymy, i.e., agent put for act, subject for form (and accident), and cause put for effect; in metonymy universals are particularised, the particular standing for the universal.

\textsuperscript{149} ibid., paragraph 407, p. 130, 'synecdoche developed into metaphor as particulars were elevated into universals or parts united with other parts together with which they make up their wholes.'
The tropes, understood in this way, can serve as versatile artefacts of self-determination. The converse is also true; insofar as language is the vehicle of thought, the tropes (together with the thoughts by which they are formed are all that is available to human agency. Thus they are also fundamental to persons' and peoples' self-determination.

It is in relation to self-determination that some of the most speculative feats of language can be, perhaps must be, performed. To express self-deterministic thought, one requires, among other things, a sense of who and what the self might be and not be, as well as a sense of how, and even if, one might be determined. As we shall discover, poetry, according to Vico, makes credible what is impossible. Suffice to say here that such speculation is integral to language.

In this connection, Vico's treatment of justice and jurisprudence becomes relevant to contemporary concern. Verene has expounded on Vichian rhetoric, telling us that Vico broke with the tradition which held rhetoric to be secondary to philosophy and law, showing instead that philosophy and rhetorical eloquence are inseparable. Verene goes on to write: 'Understood in this sense rhetoric is an activity in which the

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mind constructs a knowledge of itself. Verene maintains that to understand Vico one must apprehend both his sense of rhetoric and his sense of scientific inquiry. Drama plays a noteworthy part in Verene's consideration of the rhetoric too. He calls New Science 'theater of memory' and Vico's science 'performative'.

Verene takes Vico's notion of end as seriously as his notion of origin and understands corso as a tragic unit. Verene writes:

> Once poetic wisdom as the basis of society is gone, it is gone. The gods disappear with the disappearance of the language of the gods.

Note, however, that talk about gods and the language of the gods cannot be the same thing; the language of the gods is mute. Silences permeate verbal interstices to make voices articulate with language. So this 'tragic' end of history cannot quite be consummate.

Our aim here is to discuss the dynamism and complexity, symbolic and temporal, which, together with a regulated agility of tongue, comprise in Vico's rhetoric an

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151 ibid., p. 165.
152 ibid., p. 28.
153 ibid., p. 106; p. 156.
155 ibid., p. 221.
eloquent humanism. As we shall demonstrate in Chapter Eight, Vico's categories of eloquence prove to be useful as tools to facilitate critical reading of apocalyptic literature. As we shall demonstrate in Chapter Fifteen, consideration of Vico's categories of literature can enable self-determination as well. As Part Two of this study will show, apocalyptic elements are, in contemporary literature and verbiage, appropriated increasingly to support rhetoric of self-determination. So an understanding of Vico's insights may prove doubly enlightening when we apply them to eloquent apocalyptic texts which proclaim human rights.

Mooney writes of these apocalyptic elements of Vico’s thought as 'a notion of humanity as process nascimento'. This orientation, according to Mooney, frees Vico's work from conventional and dogmatic elitist formalism which valorised the philosophic sensitivity of the few as the vehicle for salvation of the many. Trompf has referred to this nascimento process as 'the problem of "general revelation"'. These terms approximate what we have called here the beginnings and the ends of worlds.

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157 ibid., p. 258.
The tripartite structure supports in Vico's writing a cerebral performance which he
called, 'a rational civil theology of divine providence' or, in brief, New Science. That
work points out one of the axioms of human self-determination: a 'credible
impossibility'\textsuperscript{159} expressed as 'verum-factum'; we take to be true what we make to be
so and vice versa. Verum-factum pertains to all Vico's tropes. It is a processes by
which true facts and factual truths are wrought.

This is a sophistication of the impossible convergence noted in Chapter One as a
feature of apocalyptic literature. Vico's civics do not suggest that humans are
responsible for all creation but he appreciates human powers and limitations as part of
creation. An acquaintance with the creative convertibility which Vico's New Science
propounds and demonstrates can enable the formulation of such contemporary
questions as, How is it that genocide is made true? That question will be addressed
later. It is necessary here to consolidate an acquaintance with the idea that 'verum et
factum conventuntur' what is true and what is made are convertible.

There is little accord among scholars regarding the interpretation of the principle of
verum-factum but there is no contention with Verene's view of its importance: 'New
Science is governed by the verum-factum principle. Only what is made by the human

\textsuperscript{159} Vico, 1744, paragraph 383, p. 120. See also Mooney, 1985, p. xi.
can be known by the human.\textsuperscript{160} It may be useful to an appreciation of its contemporary relevance to note that a comparable concept of human creativity stands behind W. I. Thomas’ influential Chicago School of Sociology. Thomas’ distinctive analysis is that of the self in society; is something is held by the collective to be true, it has real consequences.\textsuperscript{161} Vico’s analyses are proto sociological, pertaining to the social function of words and the status of human selves vis a vis creation.\textsuperscript{162} As Verene has remarked, verum-factum is as transformational a concept as can be.

It seems that Vico exercised great freedom in his use of the rhetorical juxtaposition of verum and factum. His conception of convertability according to Verene, a metaphysical doctrine of truth in On the Ancient Wisdom of the Italians and a principle of history in New Science.\textsuperscript{163} It is the convertibility rather than the designation of what is true and what is made which is of importance here in either

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{160} Verene, 1981, p. 191.
\textsuperscript{162} Selective ignorance is a sinister corollary to this which requires mention. For examples, see Lifton, 1986, p. 445. See also Lifton and Markusen, 1988, p. 240. Here is one illustration. Holocaust scholar Raol Hilberg found in tens of thousands of Nazi documents only one usage of the word ‘kill’; it was in an edict concerning dogs. The omissions supported ritual ignorance, disavowal and nonfeeling.
\end{flushright}
Like Verene, Leon Pompa tells us that verum-factum theory is a matter of identification: 'the identity of the true with what is made or done... everything that is involved in this is of human making'.\(^{164}\) Pompa pursues an interesting tangent to Vico's and Verene's exposition of verum-factum. He points out that divine creatio ex nihilo is a given in Vico's thinking but it seems to be bracketed. As making is an activity, a creator is assumed a priori. Vico takes providence as a given. Thus Vico's rhetoric renders up the paradox that, in tandem with creatio ex nihilo, la Provvedenza operates a priori. Here is an example of credible impossibility. Pompa points out that Vico appreciated the impossibility of establishing metaphysic a priori, humans being capable of knowing only what they have themselves made. Again, it is the convertibility of doing and making true which is of importance.

Trompf differs from Verene and Pompa, putting God and the Vulgate on par with la Provvedenza and verum-factum.\(^{165}\) Trompf tells us that verum-factum is an epistemological concept, that is, a theory of knowledge.\(^{166}\) He writes: 'As humans we

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\(^{165}\) Trompf, 1994, p. 63.

\(^{166}\) ibid., p. 62-63. See also Fisch, 'Introduction' to Vico, 1744, F2, p. xxxi, for discussion of Vico's epistemology.
can only pretend to know what we can create.' With this admission of pretence, there is a segue out of epistemology into poetics. In Trompf's analysis Vico's theory of eloquence, once acknowledged in the title as la poesia, is eclipsed by an emphatic gnosis which takes verum-factum more as an origin and less as a vehicle of Vico's thought. In this interpretation, a cryptic proclamation, 'Verbum, Logos'\textsuperscript{167}, displaces with an imported certainty the creative ambiguity inherent in the convertible verum-factum.

By contrast to Verene, Pompa and Trompf, Michael Mooney has minimised the importance of verum-factum. Mooney writes:

\begin{quote}
The verum/factum [sic] principle, in particular, I felt, had assumed and continues to assume a centrality in Vico criticism unwarranted by its actual importance in his thought.\textsuperscript{168}
\end{quote}

For Mooney, civil necessity makes human speech inventive.\textsuperscript{169} He refers to Vico's figure of a Jovian thunderclap to clarify this point:

\begin{quote}
in the image of the thundering heaven, man and nature alike are caught up into a single rhetorical act... a universal historical necessity - the impossible credible that civilised the feral wanderers.\textsuperscript{170}
\end{quote}

Mooney tells us that Vico appreciated the impossible credible as a conceit, made

\textsuperscript{167} ibid., p. 86.

\textsuperscript{168} Mooney, 1985, p. xi.

\textsuperscript{169} ibid., p. xiii.

\textsuperscript{170} ibid., p. 213.
effective by freshness of expression. He names as a Vichian contribution to rhetoric, 'logic of induction, one in which the distinction between perception and judgement collapses.\textsuperscript{171} This analysis depends on Vico's insight that imagination is more robust in proportion as reasoning power is weak.\textsuperscript{172} As Mooney puts it, for Vico, humans are 'poem and poet alike'.\textsuperscript{173}

Mooney explains that Vico's idea of first words as mute gestures of recognition, symbolised as hieroglyphs, is itself a conceit of deus artifex. This conceit, he tells us, extends into Vico's theory of poetics, through which homo artifex is manifest as humanity makes and re-makes itself. This is Vico's paradox or impossible convergence.

Vico's literary theories include among the necessary activities of the poetic imagination metaphysics and ethical jurisprudence. His poetics rests on four tropes, three of which are discrete while one, irony, is diffuse. His theory of poetic imagination makes meaning interstitial; occurring between and among the tropes.

\textsuperscript{171} Mooney, 1985, p. 131.

\textsuperscript{172} Vico, 1744, paragraph 185, p. 71.

\textsuperscript{173} Mooney, 1985, p. 214.
VICO'S HISTORICISM

Vico describes in the New Science a history composed of human events in flux between disintegration and cohesion. Civil cohesion, he tells us, necessitates the servitude of bestiality to philosophy, as well as body to mind and baseness to nobility. History is made, according to Vico, of human achievements; the successes and failures of human lawmaking and lawkeeping.\textsuperscript{174} So, for Vico, history is a descriptive art sourced in civics and expressed poetically.

Vico's poetic historicism describes the birth, decay and rebirth of whole societies, which he calls nations.\textsuperscript{175} 'Nation' designates a system of discrete institutions which develop, independently of each other, similar systems. They change as a result of internal stress.\textsuperscript{176} Vico's nations should not be confused with sovereign nation states of the late twentieth century.

Vico suggests that the nations, once made, disintegrate and turn barbarous again, inclining to bestiality rather than nobility. Cohesion being necessary to survival, re-

\textsuperscript{174} Vico, 1744, p. 15 para 2.
\textsuperscript{175} See Fisch, 'Introduction' to Vico, 1744, B5, pp. xxi-xxii.
\textsuperscript{176} ibid., B5, p. xx.
integration is imperative. So through the ebb and flow of barbarism and nobility, that is, by corso in ricorso, humanity makes, un-makes, and re-makes itself as a product of its own institutions. Vico writes: 'we have observed the marvellous correspondence between the first and the returned barbarian times.'

Verene has asserted the importance of this view of barbarism to an understanding of contemporary societal phenomena; fragmentation and anomie, for example. What Vico calls the barbarism of reflective thought, a severe form of barbarism, is explained by Verene as a loss of the connection of imagination with wisdom:

a loss of the human's image of itself, the inability of the thinker to reflect his own wholeness into the products and divisions of his own thought.

Verene tells us that at the end of New Science Vico describes a descent into a barbarism made more inhuman than that from which we emerged. It is a consequence of the overuse of intellect in human affairs. Vico saw his age and Verene sees his as being dominated by the barbarism of reflection.

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177 See Vico, 1744, pp. 12-17.
178 ibid, paragraph 1046, p. 397.
We have noted that, in Vichian terms, reflection is necessary to irony which masks truth. So reflection burdens language and jurisprudence by taking the focus off the poetic justice by which truths might be realised. Without justice of any kind, a civil nation cannot maintain itself; barbarism ensues until necessity again produces civility.

Corso in ricorso is a descriptor which Vico calls his method:

By such a method, the beginnings of the sciences as well as of the nations are to be discovered, for they sprang from the nations and from no other source.\footnote{Vico 1744, paragraph 51, p. 33.}

Fisch explains it thus:

When he calls the world of nations the world of men, he means that what were beasts in the world of nature become men in the world of nations ... in a sense they make the world of nations, and in the same sense they make themselves by making it.\footnote{See Fisch, 'Introduction' to Vico, 1744, C6, p. xxiv.}

So, according to Vico, it is by virtue of our institutions, nations as he calls them, that human self-determination is effected. Divine, heroic and barbaric qualities all attend in the human character. A qualitative inclination can be fashioned by action founded on words which convey wise thoughts.

Both linear and non linear processes are involved in Vico's theory of effective creativity. In corso events follow one another but in ricorso they wash through one
another like the ebb and flow of tides. Each may meet with the others, separately and
together. Fisch writes:

   Course and recourse, as in the flow and ebb of tides, may mean traversing the
   same stages in opposite directions; or recourse may mean simple recurrence, a
   coming back or around of some particular event or state of affairs; but the
   strongest and most literal meaning is a retraversing of the same stages in the
   same order. This is the meaning of the term in the title of Book Five and in the
   titles of its first two chapters.\textsuperscript{183}

I do not agree that this third, literal interpretation is the strongest. This interpretation
depends on the reader's ignoring all that has gone before to show simultaneity. It is
easier to write about set sequences but remember, this is the last book of the New
Science. Much is done in the earlier books to deconstruct sequences and fixations.
The literalism of this example belongs to Fisch not Vico.

Vico's work itself traces a ricorso but a Fischean reading cannot elucidate it. Instead
it tends to confuse the terms so that ricorso is read simply as corso going backwards.
This minimises the tides of association between language and law, law and commerce,
civility and bestiality. The sense of ebb and flow is diminished because linearity is
emphasised.

Vico's sense of atemporal or simultaneous eventuality can make a first reading of New
Science a bamboozling experience. The three ages live simultaneously in Vico's

\textsuperscript{183} Fisch, 'Introduction' to Vico, 1744, L2, p. xlii.
present. His sequential (syntagmatic) markers are to be found among the tropes which provide the key to understanding the institutions of humanity.

History, for Vico, is, by virtue of its narrative form, as fabulous or phantasmagorical as myth. In New Science, Book One Section One, 'The Establishment of Principles', Vico demonstrates the unreliability of historical chronologies. He shows the making of history as mythopoeic, depending upon rhetorical coherence to make its facts. It would be a mistake, however, to read this axiom as an argument against history as such, because recognition of the institutions to which Vico ascribes civility depends on apprehension of them as historical phenomena. It is to the limitations of narrative form and linear temporality not to history that Vico addresses his criticism.

Although it may be anachronistic to claim that Vico deconstructs historicism, he does take history apart, excoriating to its core of truths or axioms. Individual, human doers and their doing of historic deeds, he tells us in Book One, may be imaginary. He argues this by pointing to the temporal anomalies propagated by historical chronologies:

These men (the ancients) and deeds either did not have their being at the times or in the places to which they have been commonly assigned, or never existed at all.\textsuperscript{184}

\textsuperscript{184} Vico, 1744, paragraph 43, p. 29.
This conceit operates rhetorically to acknowledge the frailty of narrative as a vehicle of history (it is pertinent to notice in this context Vico's own temporal anomalies). Vico even suggests that the collective doers of historic deeds, that is, the nations, might also be imaginary, or at least, dreaming themselves into existence:

> every nation, barbarian or civilised has considered itself to be the oldest and to have preserved records from the beginning of the world.\(^{185}\)

The point is that an imaginary existence may be as significant in the affairs of humanity as any other kind.

We may take it that Vico's is an ironic historicity. Take, for example the miraculous births of the Heraclids:

> The Heraclids or sons of Hercules are scattered abroad through Greece more than a hundred years before the coming of Hercules their father.\(^{186}\)

As the British proverb has it, 'the child is father to the man'.

Vico used irony to romp in historical nonconformity. Take, for example, this riposte to historical chronologies:

> Now by making twelve short epochs of the twelve gods of the so-called greater gentes, that is the gods consecrated by men in the time of the families, a rational chronology of poetic history leads us to assign to the age of the

\(^{185}\) ibid., 'Book One: The Establishment of Principles', paragraph 53, p. 34.

\(^{186}\) ibid., paragraph 77, p. 42. See also paragraph 79, p. 43. We are given the reverse view with regard to Orpheus, 'So, in the life of one man, so many civil institutions are formed, for which the extent of a thousand years would hardly suffice!'
gods a duration of nine hundred years. This gives us the beginnings of universal profane history.\textsuperscript{187}

This pomposity, in its full context, is comical. Vico uses the humour to point out how arbitrary historical chronologies may be. The passage is also polytheistic. There are many gods here. When doing history, one is, as Vico says it, among the 'treacherous reefs of mythology'. He assures us, however, that his principles ensure service to truth:

\begin{quote}
But these treacherous reefs of mythology will be avoided by the principles of this Science, which will show that such fables in their beginnings were all true...\textsuperscript{188}
\end{quote}

How can Vico’s principles ensure truth? They can, as he demonstrates, reveal poetic truth.

Such ironic historicity as this enables Vico to construct his own fable, or fabulous history, against which his poetic facts are drawn. He writes: 'whatever men saw or imagined, or even did themselves, they took to be divinity.'\textsuperscript{189} So human agency and divine creativity are convertible in Vico's poetic view of history.

\textsuperscript{187} ibid., paragraph 69, p. 40.

\textsuperscript{188} ibid., paragraph 79, p. 43.

\textsuperscript{189} ibid., paragraph 69, p. 40.
Eloquence, according to Vico, springs from poetic wisdom and poetic logic by which language gains its persuasion. Wisdom and logic are, of course, inseparable from the traditions to which they adhere. The traditions include myths, mythologies and mythopoeys.

Vico's use of mythopoeic structures pertains to his use of grand figures; the gods, heroes and vulgars. By use of these figures he signifies types of humanity, more and less godly, noble, humane and barbaric. He identifies types of language, more and less eloquent. As Vico puts it:

expressions of the first nations later became figurative when, with the further development of the human mind, words were invented which signified abstract forms.\textsuperscript{190}

So memory of the past, configured as mythic characters and expressed mythopoeically, shapes present thinking and doing.

Demonstrating the philosophical function of the grand figures, Vico, takes his perspective from the age of men. This makes the demotic, transactional dimension of

\textsuperscript{190} Vico, 1744, paragraph 409, p. 131. See also Mooney, 1985, p. 224.
society primary. In his own eighteenth century vernacular\textsuperscript{191}, or demotic language, he writes of three ages:

(1) The age of the gods, in which the gentiles believed they lived under divine governments, and everything was commanded them by auspices and oracles, which are the oldest institutions in profane history. (2) The age of the heroes, in which they reigned everywhere in aristocratic commonwealths, on account of certain superiority of nature which they held themselves to have over the plebs. (3) The age of men, in which all men recognized themselves as equal in human nature, and therefore there were established first the popular commonwealths and then the monarchies, both of which are forms of human government.\textsuperscript{192}

Note that the ages as described by Vico are past, and are presented retrospectively. They are metaphysical. Consequently, they can be apprehended simultaneously. Their corso describes their cycles; their ricorso can be but is not necessarily regressive. The interactive element is the more important; direction is figurative in this (as ain any) metaphysical structure. So Vico's thought is neither cyclic nor progressive.\textsuperscript{193} By reference to the three past ages, an accumulation of human experience can thus subjected to philosophical scritiny whose concern is for present demotic civility.

Mooney, Bahti and Caponigri all concur in the view that in, Vico's method, temporal differences give way to symbolic equivalence. In his preface, Mooney commences:

\textsuperscript{191} See Verene, 1981, p. 9. Vico's works were written first in Latin then in Italian.

\textsuperscript{192} Vico, 1744, paragraph 31, p. 20. See also paragraph 381, p. 119-120, the auspices and oracles of ancient Greeks were called \textit{mystae}, 'which Horace learnedly renders "interpreters of the gods"'.

If among the many truths of Vico's New Science there is one that is deepest, it is the truth that language, mind, and society are but three modes of a common reality.\textsuperscript{194}

Bahti accords with this, claiming that Vico's thought construes a mental language common to all nations, hence atemporal.\textsuperscript{195} Caponigri argues for an appraisal of providence as a concept of jurisprudence, designed to reconcile ideal and temporal orders:

\textit{at the risk of paradox it must be asserted that the immanence of the transcendent is the central principle of his historicism and the whole meaning of his doctrine of providence.}\textsuperscript{196}

These writers agree that the three Vichian ages symbolise linear temporalism subsumed to an immanent commonality.

Manuel, Fraser and Trompf, however, do not take this view.\textsuperscript{197} Manuel tells us that each age is utterly separate and experienced independently.\textsuperscript{198} He affirms 'a unilinear advancement'.\textsuperscript{199} Manuel's argument, however, contradicts itself by affirming Vico's

\textsuperscript{194} See Mooney, 1985, p. ix.

\textsuperscript{195} Bahti, 1981, p. 104.


\textsuperscript{198} ibid., p. 151.

\textsuperscript{199} ibid., p. 154.
insistence that the invention of gods, language, myth, law and custom are an indigenous, human emanation. There is no evidence, in Vico, Manuel, or elsewhere of three species of humanity. Manuel oversimplifies and absolutises Vico's three ring circus into a unidirectional progression (Vico's Grand Parade?). Like Manuel, Trompf states that Vico's aesthetic, philological and literary theory demands evaluation in a diachronic framework. By this approach, one tends to lose sight of Vico's multifaceted, metaphysical refractions of the providence from which his human miracle emanates.

Fraser has asserted that Vico's interest was in tracing human progress. The transition from the use of force and privilege to the use of justice and law is construed by Fraser in developmental terms. Fraser's interpretation seems to rest on his assumption that providence is essentially progressive.

A similar assumption intrudes into Trompf's claim that Vico argues for 'a providential

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200 ibid., p. 160.

201 Trompf, 1994, p. 84.


203 ibid., p. 34.
advance away from bestiality.  Fraser and Trompf have both ignored Vico's notion of a dynamic tension between divinity and bestiality or barbarism in the human condition. According to Vico, it is because of our defilements and our divinity both, coexistent, that civility ensues. As we have observed, Vico's three-ring-circus shows us regress, stasis and metamorphosis as well as progress. In it any effective inclination toward civility and away from barbarism cannot depend on providence; human agency is required.

To enter a critical discourse on mythopoeia, one requires a sturdy metaphysical trapeze which is adaptable to temporal and atemporal (as well as spatial and non spatial) conditions. Such is Vico's, built of custom, law, myth and language all grounded at once in humanity.

The mythopoeic figure constellated by Vico's three ages is neither simple nor static. It is like a three-ring-circus. At times one ring or another may dominate interest but the interaction of all three is most important. Its movements are not either linear or cyclic but both (and sometimes, when it is chaotic, neither).

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204 Trompf, 1994, p. 70. See also, ibid., p. 77.
VICOS THREE-RING CIRCUS... cont'd
VICOS POETICS

New Science, Book Two, Section One, 'Poetic Wisdom', comprises about two
hundred pages demonstrating that wisdom, metaphysics, logic, speech and languages,
morals, economy, politics, history and cosmology are all made meaningful by poetics.

Mooney has emphasised the importance to Vico of poetic wisdom. He quotes Vico:

Wisdom, he (Vico) writes, has three ultimate tasks: "to restrain by eloquence
the ferocity of fools, to turn them from error through prudence, and to bring
them benefit through virtue".205

Vicos Book Two constitutes an exegesis on his claim that poetics provide the master
key to understanding human institutions.

If the motif of the three-ring-circus is appropriate to Vicos mythopoetics. As we have
observed, it carries over as an apt descriptor of his phenomenological poetics too.

Vico assigns a kind of language to each of the great ages. They are mute hieroglyphs,
expressive symbols and transactional letters. Vico writes:

(1) The hieroglyphic or sacred or secret language, by means of mute acts. This
is suited to the uses of religion, for which observance is more important than
discussion. (2) The symbolic, by means of similitudes, such as we have seen
the heroic language to have been. (3) The epistolary or vulgar, which served
the common uses of life.206

205 Mooney, 1985, p. 113.

206 Vico, 1744, paragraph 32, p. 21.
In this tripartite constellation, signs, symbols and letters are, like the ages themselves, apprehended simultaneously. Each is dependent upon the others for its significance.

Vico tells us that deliberate, emblematic signification ‘togas, devices, chairs of ivory’ weakens metaphor and strengthens metonymy. This makes strong the foundations of obedience to law; the codes standing for commands backed by symbols of power.

Vico points out that letters (writing) are not essential to law; the strongest laws are known as custom.\textsuperscript{207} He notes also that it is in demotic or vulgar thought that proof becomes relevant and necessary. This is because the question of reality arises when transactions are at stake.

Vico makes significant to this argument the well known practice of priests of keeping secret their doctrine.\textsuperscript{208} Building upon this commonly acknowledged image, he points out that the metonymy of law is also secret, if it refers to symbols which is unexplained. He goes on to disclose the elitism inherent in such secrecy: metonymy, used in this way, he says, is a 'basis of lordly liberty'.\textsuperscript{209} By such arguments and examples, Vico demonstrates how law, jurisprudence and government depend on

\textsuperscript{207} ibid., paragraph 67, p. 39. See also paragraph 330, p. 96.

\textsuperscript{208} ibid., paragraph 95, p. 49.
symbols for their expression.

Civil liberty, whether it is expressed by lordly or humble means, depends on the jurisprudential maintenance of the national institutions. These include cities, empires, wars and peace, fiefs and census. Also included among the institutions necessary to civility are commerce, public treasuries, colonies and commonwealths. Vico's attention to commerce and its attendant institutions is of special importance. In the nations transaction is of prime importance and so-called vulgar languages are the poetic, that is, creative forms of expression.

Transactions between institutions require regulation, hence the laws require codification: 'The need for certainty of ownership was a large part of the necessity for the invention of characters and names'.\textsuperscript{210} Governments, too, require warning of wars, treaties of peace and just laws of victory.

According to Vico, the concerns of government are both demotic and imperfect, as are the laws which serve governmental regulation: 'man perceives, judges and reasons,
but his perception is often false, his judgement rash and his reasoning defective.\(^{211}\) Put another way:

judgements turn out to be false when their concepts turn out to be either greater or less than the things they propose to signify.\(^{212}\)

It is upon this flawed, defective and disproportionate judgement that civil humanity depends. Verene, who differentiates verum from certum elucidates Vico:

the convertibility of verum and factum is crucial to the New Science... But without Vico's concern with the relationship of certum to verum in the law, he would never have achieved his understanding of the relationship of philology and philosophy.\(^{213}\)

As Guido Fasso points out, Vico's interest in certum springs from his investigation into the relation of historical law to ideal law.\(^{214}\) The relation of the true and the certain is that of the rational and the authentic.\(^{215}\)

Vico, according to Verene, is notable for his grasping the importance of language and


\(^{213}\) Verene, 1991, p. 1; p. 139. See also Verene, 1981, pp. 43-44.


\(^{215}\) Fasso, 1976, p. 12.
eloquence to human will, decision and law, that is, jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{216} It is human determination not providential necessity which makes civil law:

Providential order understood on the model of jurisprudential thinking is different from necessity. What is done out of necessity involves no act of human will. But certum in Vico's view is always auctoritas.\textsuperscript{217}

Civil liberties, then, are maintained by symbols not by force. Jurisprudence is more poetic than prescriptive. Here, then, is a model of humane self-determination whose crux is poetic justice.

Three forms of poetic jurisprudence are described by Vico. 'Mystic theology'\textsuperscript{218}; 'Heroic jurisprudence'\textsuperscript{219}; and 'Natural equity'.\textsuperscript{220} Three forms of government are formed by three kinds of jurisprudence. They are seen by Vico as corollaries to the three kinds of language.\textsuperscript{221} Vico's canny inclusion of silence as an element of language makes this constellation difficult to grasp until one understands that meanings are made between and among elements, not by any one of them in isolation.

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\textsuperscript{216} Verene, 1991, pp. 47-54.
\textsuperscript{217} ibid., p. 146.
\textsuperscript{218} ibid., paragraph 37, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{219} ibid., paragraph 38, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{220} ibid., paragraph 39, p. 25.
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In Book Four of the New Science, Vico reiterates this pattern of argument. He correlates characters, hieroglyphs, and emblems and words, to mute rituals, heroic blazonings, and articulate speech. These are, in turn, correlated to jurisprudence: divine jurisprudence measuring justice by solemnity, hence reflecting mute hieroglyphs; heroic jurisprudence being concerned with the propriety of words, hence reflecting the privilege of emblazonment; human jurisprudence seeking truth in facts, hence reflecting the creative potential of articulation in making true the sought-after facts. Appreciation of Vico's legend of the development of jurisprudence is important because in it we find a clear affirmation of difference between demotic and heroic concerns.

Vico's expression does not always make clear the distinctions between heroic and humane modes of thought. The confusion probably arises through the polyvalence of Vico's own position. As commentator he takes a transcendent perspective which, in his own terms is heroic; as individual he resides in a demotic milieu which, because of its absolute proximity to the writer, tends to be taken for granted.  

The three modes of language, hieroglyphic, symbolic and epistolary, may be construed as three aspects of any vernacular, including our contemporary discourse. They are

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222 e.g., ibid., paragraph 29, pp. 18-19.
mutually dependent and simultaneous in occurrence. Vico writes:

To enter now upon the extremely difficult (question of the) way in which these three kinds of languages and letters were formed, we must establish this principle: that gods, heroes, and men began at the same time (for they were, after all, men who imagined the gods and believed their own heroic nature to be a mixture of the divine and human natures), so these three languages began at the same time, each having its letters which began with it. They began, however, with these three very great differences: that the language of gods was almost entirely mute, only very slightly articulate; the language of heroes, an equal mixture of articulate and mute, and... the language of men, almost entirely articulate and only very slightly mute.\textsuperscript{223}

The three together, according to Vico, form a dictionary or lexicon, which is a source of meaning. Enrico Da Mas has recognised this model of Vico's as putting mythology at the service of philology: 'Thus (for Vico) mythology constitutes a unique philological resource.'\textsuperscript{224} As Vico explains it:

> From these three languages is formed the mental dictionary by which to interpret properly all the various articulated languages, and we make use of it here wherever it is needed... Such a lexicon is necessary for learning the language spoken by the ideal eternal history traversed in time by the histories of all nations.\textsuperscript{225}

This abstract language analysis (lexicography) can be elucidated by consideration of fantasia, an ideal, common, unspoken, human language built of common sense.\textsuperscript{226}

\textsuperscript{221} ibid., paragraph 446, p. 149.


\textsuperscript{225} Vico, 1744., paragraph 35, pp. 22-23.

Fantasia is part of a model of an ideal eternal history in which every nation has a Jove and a Hercules. Vico expounds this:

There must in the nature of human institutions be a mental language common to all nations, which uniformly grasps the substance of things feasible in human social life and expresses it with as many diverse modifications as these same things may have diverse aspects. A proof of this is afforded by proverbs or maxims of vulgar wisdom, in which substantially the same meanings find as many diverse expressions as there are nations ancient and modern.

To apprehend this lexical phenomenology is, Vico asserts, to possess the 'master key' to his New Science:

We find that the principle of these origins both of languages and of letters lies in the fact that the first gentile peoples, by a demonstrated necessity of nature, were poets who spoke in poetic characters. This discovery, which is the master key of this Science, has cost us the persistent research of almost all our literary life, because with our civilised natures we cannot at all imagine and can understand only by great toil the poetic nature of these first men. The characters of which we speak were certain imaginative genera (images for the most part of animate substances, of gods or heroes, formed by their imagination) to which they reduced all the species and all the particulars...

Later he reduces this insight to an aphorism, 'poetry founded gentile humanity.' One might wish that Vico had come to this humanistic point rather more quickly, as he might have done, except for the Inquisition. Inquisitorial literalism could hardly have tolerated this claim for human self-creation. The Inquisition did not invite direct expression of belief in human self-creation, such as may be enjoyed by our

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228 Vico, 1744, paragraph 161, p. 67.

229 ibid., paragraph 34, p. 22.

230 ibid., paragraph 214, p. 75.
contemporaries.

Take, for example, psychoanalyst James Hillman's statement: 'a narrative is primarily a poetic fantasy'.\(^{231}\) This opinion is accepted as authoritative in the field of psychoanalysis. It presumes without question a self-deterministic human creativity such as was very much in question when Vico's works were in preparation.

Verene says Vico has a theory of the first thought (poetic wisdom) and the last thought (the barbarism of reflection).\(^{232}\) With barbarism of reflection comes a literal mind which has forgotten how to speak in two ways at once. Hence it has lost its dialogic power, having relinquished argumentation to absolutism.

Vico's poetics do not contest the truth of literalism but contextualises it among many other phenomena, equally true, all being ascribed to providence: 'God as providence'.\(^{233}\) Vico writes:

> Divine providence has so conducted human institutions that, starting from the poetic theology which regulated them by certain sensible signs believed to be divine counsels sent to man by the gods, and by means of the natural theology which demonstrates providence by eternal reasons which do not fall under the senses, the nations were disposed to receive revealed theology in virtue of a

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\(^{233}\) ibid., p. 118.
supernatural faith, superior not only to the senses but to human reason itself.\textsuperscript{234}

Vico goes on to assert that civility is sustained by providence not by human endeavour.\textsuperscript{235}

These proclamations of providential beneficence might seem to imply that barbarism serves as the prime motivator of human activity, providence having provided all else. In an earlier part of his discussion, however, Vico has attributed prime motivation to fear of barbarism. Fear awakened gods (in humans)\textsuperscript{236}, fear 'forces us to remember how to speak'\textsuperscript{237} and fear 'allows us to become the artificer, to practice the divine making in ourselves'.\textsuperscript{238} Against the implications of this line of thought, a beneficent providence is proclaimed repeatedly, albeit paradoxically.\textsuperscript{239}

In a final section entitled 'Conclusion of the Work: On an Eternal Natural Commonwealth, in Each Kind Best, Ordained by Divine Providence', Vico summarises this case. Sovereign commonwealth is understood as giving rise to

\textsuperscript{234} Vico, 1744, paragraph 366, p. 112.

\textsuperscript{235} ibid.

\textsuperscript{236} ibid., p. 90.

\textsuperscript{237} ibid., p. 93.

\textsuperscript{238} ibid., p. 94.
philosophy which, in turn, gives rise to eloquence. Subsequent to the attainment of a human sense of sovereignty, popular states become corrupt and so too do philosophy and eloquence. Civil wars ensue as a result of the corruption. Providence supplies three remedies; subjugation (servitude) under a just monarch; subjugation as slaves to a just nation; subjugation to barbarism. Out of subjugation, piety is re-discovered and with it civility. Note that no alternative to subjugation is suggested.

So Vico's theory of human creativity, sanctioned by providence and cushioned by a profusion of complementary truths, has survived and flourished despite waves of post Inquisitorial absolutism. Being proclamatory, the praise of providence tends to be juxtaposed and non sequitur to the argumentation but its rhetorical force is the greater for that. Vico's use of proclamatory rhetoric in regard to providence indicates an awareness of the power of proclamation. His usage demonstrates a personal facility and his discussion indicates a professional reserve with regard to kerygma. One can, however, observe Vico's proclamations as being separate from his metaphorical, metonymic and vulgar expression.

Vico's presentation of the emergence of the nations, through sovereign commonwealth, philosophy, eloquence and poetic foundations is not without humor.

\cite{ibid., paragraph 100, p. 51."}
Take, for example the following elements of New Science. Vico calls them axioms:

(1) Because of the indefinite nature of the human mind, wherever it is lost in ignorance man makes himself the measure of all things.

(2) It is the property of the human mind that whenever men can form no idea of distant and unknown things, they judge them by what is familiar and at hand.²⁴⁰

Here is a conceit of human creativity. If what is unknown cannot be encountered except in anthropomorphic terms, then humans cannot know anything other than what they have made. The humour lies in the conceit of ignorance and illusion:

That which did it all was mind, for men did it with intelligence; it was not fate, for they did it by choice; not chance, for the results of their always so acting are perpetually the same... It is true that men have themselves made this world of nations (and we took this as the first incontestable principle of our Science.²⁴¹

In the light of the abovementioned axioms, this principle reflects the absurd megalomania, by which humans, Vico included, make claims to knowledge. This appreciation of the nature of knowledge, which is founded on illusion, ignorance and need, is crucial to Vico's argument in New Science. Both axioms are explained further in On the Ancient Wisdom of the Italians:

When, therefore, man sets out to investigate the nature of things, he eventually realises both that it is impossible to achieve his goal, because he does not contain within himself the elements by virtue of which composite things exist, and that this is a consequence of the limitations of his mind, since everything exists outside himself. Turning this defect of his mind to useful ends, he

²⁴⁰ Vico, 1744, Book One, Section Two 'Elements', paragraphs 120 and 122, p. 60.

²⁴¹ Vico, 1744, paragraph 1108, p. 425.
invents for himself two things by abstraction, as they call it: the point, which can be drawn, and the unit, which can be multiplied. But both are fictions: for if a point is drawn it ceases to be a point, and if a unit is multiplied it is no longer one. Moreover, man has taken it as his right to proceed from these to infinity, so that he can draw lines without end, and multiply the unit indefinitely. In this way he fashions for himself a world of shapes and numbers, such as can be contained entirely within himself, and by the extension, shortening and connection of lines, and the addition, subtraction and calculation of numbers, he produces an infinite number of works, because the truths he perceives within himself are infinite.²⁴²

Note the inclination toward indefinite multiplicity; no tendency toward singularity is expressed. Note also that the ideas of multiplicity and point are put forward as fictive facets of a singular, invisible god.

How, then, might one do as Vico suggests in On the Ancient Wisdom of the Italians? How 'acknowledge absolutely that which He has revealed to us'?²⁴³ Through silence? Through inertia? Acquiescence? What value have the fictions? Do the fictions have the value of making possible the perpetuation of humankind through social institutions? If this does not affect the immutable god, why does providence facilitate it? This is a question of faith which Vico says cannot grammatically be asked (because it is predicated on understanding something not human). The acknowledgement Vico has suggested seems to be a matter of faith. A figure of providence, benign and unquestionable, eclipses these lacunae in human visions of self-creation.


Vico's philosophy of language gains the status of a poetics by its advancement of hypotheses which link artistic representation to metaphysical speculation and concrete re-creation. A hypothesis of image-word correlation is established in Vico's discussion of his frontispiece. A hypothesis of word-word correlation is presented in the discussion of tropes. A hypothesis of action-word correlation is put forward in the discussion of law, justice and jurisprudence.

Let us consider first Vico's correlation of images and words. Vico's new orientation to philosophic thought is signified by his frontispiece. In the frontispiece, a diagrammatic pictograph, detailed by annotations, places image over concept, speech over argument and mythic divination over fact. Images (universalis fantastici) are fundamental, they are not 'concepts in poetic cloaks'. Verene explains:

In Vico's thought images are not images of something; they are themselves manifestations of an original power of spirit which gives fundamental form to mind and life... The image is to be understood in its own terms.

The mind contains both image and concept - and more. The strict metonymy which

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244 Vico, 1744, pp. 1-23, 'Explanation of the Picture Placed as Frontispiece to Serve as Introduction to the Work'. See also Verene, 1981, p. 30. The frontispiece and its explanation first appeared in the second edition of New Science but the title Scienza nuova seconda refers to both second and third editions (1730 and 1744).


246 ibid., p. 212.
Vico builds against his frontispiece is ironic, being an element of his eloquent technique.

The hypothesis of image-word correlation is established in Vico's discussion as he delivers a metonymy to accompany the frontispiece to his New Science. The frontispiece and its annotations dictate several 'this-stands-for-that' relations. The annotated frontispiece specifies the metonymic and allegorical values of the symbols he uses. By this means, Vico correlates pictographic images with the verbal terms upon which his later argument depends.\(^{247}\)

Vico's symbology tells us that ignorance is illuminated by metaphysic. Imagination (whose perspectives are majestic) enables the metaphysical illumination to find expression. He posits a golden age of ignorance wherein people 'actually believed that they saw gods on earth'.\(^{248}\) An altar is nominated as a celestial sign but not a sacred entity; metaphysical purity is equated not with direct reflection but with refraction through a convex jewel 'reflecting and scattering the ray abroad' not 'taking private illumination'.\(^{249}\)

\(^{247}\) See Verene, 1981, p. 35, on poetic wisdom, *sapienza poetica*, through which a new understanding of image and rational idea is achieved.

\(^{248}\) Vico, 1744, paragraph 3, p. 4.

\(^{249}\) ibid., paragraph 5, p. 5.
Under Vico's hieroglyph of metaphysic as through a jewel, 'ascending higher' than the purviews of other philosophies. Vico's metonymy valorises metaphysic over providence. From the heightened perspective of his metaphysic, his three ages can be seen to furnish a motif against which his discussion of language is set. One might construe Vico's metalinguistic figure as achieving depth, or in Ricoeur's terms 'thickness', whereas his metaphysic achieves height. The depth which is so represented shows off Vico's own depth of poetic expertise, comprising rhetoric and eloquence.

Herein lie what Vico calls 'new principles of Mythology'. These new principles are revealed through elements of a fabulous, theological poetry, also new:

In the first place, the fables of the gods were stories of the times in which men of the crudest gentile humanity thought that all institutions necessary or useful to the human race were deities. The authors of this poetry were the first peoples, whom we find to have been all theological poets, who without doubt, as we are told, founded the gentile nations with fables of the gods.

When the gods are fables, the vernacular can reduce heroes, behemoths and divinities to emblems and inflate humanity to demons, titans and giants. In Vico's symbolism, people can, for example, be bestial-and-human or divine-and-human. Vico defines humanity as a refinement of personhood.

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251 Vico, 1744, paragraph 7, p. 6.
So Vico's image-word hypothesis, is metaphorical in its symbols and humanistic in its significations. Taking metaphysic personified to be his guide, Vico writes from her ironic perspective as shown in his annotated frontispiece. Take, for example, the following brief illustration:

   The tablet with the alphabets is put between the divine and the human symbols because with letters, from which philosophies had their beginning, the false religions began to disappear...  

Thus Vico writes as transcendent observer, climbing higher than his fellows and contemplating, with metaphysic, her realm of divine and human symbols. That realm is the realm of humanity (potentiated by divine providence) not the realm of divinity (divine providence just-so).

Vico differentiates his own philosophical position from that of others. He explains that metaphysic, in the others, contemplates God as divine providence transcendent: 'above the order of natural institutions'. His work takes a different perspective:

   For in the present work, ascending higher, she (metaphysic) contemplates in God the world of human minds, which is the metaphysical world, in order to show His providence in the world of human spirits, which is the civil world of nations.  

Further to this point, Vico writes:


253 ibid., paragraph 2, p. 3.
All the hieroglyphs visible on the ground denote the world of nations to which men applied themselves before anything else. The globe in the middle represents the world of nature which the physicists later observed. The hieroglyphs above signify the world of minds and of God which the metaphysicians finally contemplated.\footnote{ibid., paragraph 42, p. 26.}

Note that social organisation (nation) is put first and remains for Vico the prime object of human activity. It is followed by contemplation of nature and of metaphysics made sensible by reference to social organisation. This conjugation of foci reflects Vico's firm assertion that humans can understand only what humans have made. Only insofar as humans have made their social order can they understand the physical and metaphysical realities against which the birth and rebirth of nations occurs:

\[(that)\] the world of civil society has certainly been made by men, and that its principles are therefore to be found within the modifications of our own human mind.\footnote{Vico, (Palmer trans.), 1988, p. 51.}

All this is backgrounded by religion personified as la provvedenza:

if religion is lost among the peoples, they have nothing left to enable them to live in society: no shield of defense, nor means of counsel, nor basis of support, nor even a form by which they may exist in the world at all.\footnote{Vico, 1744, paragraph 1109, p. 426.}

Thus by correlation of image and word Vico constructs a virtual reality in which self-determination might occur. So Vico has provided a formulation by which others might make true what remains virtual to him. To realise the virtual, collective agreement to
his otherwise idiosyncratic formulation would be necessary.

Conventions which correlate words and images may be useful in the building of a labelling vocabulary but image-word correlation alone is not sufficient to discourse. If, for example, a subject is to be discussed which is theretofore unknown to the discussants, pictographic figures alone cannot be adequate. Without similitude with something already known, a picture might evoke any meaning or none. In such cases the words themselves are required to operate figuratively.

Let us now consider Vico's correlation of words and words. This is the speculative dimension of language. Elizabeth Sewell has acknowledged speculative thought as a component of Vico's poetics.\textsuperscript{257} Mooney explains: 'There are more things in the world than there are words... Thus the tropes and figures we devise are not mere ornaments; they are necessities of communication.'\textsuperscript{258} Vico's hypothesis of word-word correlation is presented in his discussion of tropes.

Vico's focus was on tropes as figures of thought (figurae sententiarum) not figures of speech (figurae verborum). He asserted that the mind assumes various postures to


\textsuperscript{258} Mooney, 1985, p. 79.
achieve speech as the body does to achieve action. The figures of thought constitute the mental procedure through which a speaker leads a listener.

Word-word correlations are complementary to image-word accord. Truth, in this mode, is contingent on what is made or done. So action-word correlations may come into play. Action, understood in this way, is always speculative. The word-word correlations sustain the figures of thought. Insofar as these relations of thought to language are concerned, the embodiment of speculative thought is not the most difficult task. Rather, it is not possible to use language without participating in some speculation. According to Vico, this kind of speculation, which is a necessary component of metaphorical language, is a burden rather than a leavening of language and word-action correlation is prone to error.

Vico calls these necessary errors 'poetic monsters':

Poetic monsters and metamorphoses arose from a necessity of this first human nature, its inability to abstract forms or properties from subjects. By their logic they had to put subjects together in order to put their forms together, or to destroy a subject in order to separate its primary form from the contrary form which had been imposed upon it. Such a putting together of ideas created the poetic monsters.259

The point is, although speculation is inescapable, it brings truth into question, as do

259 Vico, 1744, paragraph 410, p. 132.
credible impossibilities.\textsuperscript{260} There is little agreement among scholars as to the implications of verum-factum with regard to truth. A brief survey of various approaches follows.

Verene tells us that verum-factum occupies a metaphysical, middle ground, half way between the divine and the natural: 'Vico's work is not a poem or a history... New Science is a metaphysical fable.' According to Verene, Vico, by his spurious etymologies, positioned his metaphysical fable (verum-factum) among the origins of Western thought.\textsuperscript{261} Thus Verene characterises New Science by its mythopoesy.

According to Verene, verum-factum stands between the two givens of logic and criticism: a middle term. By introducing this middle term, Vico makes a syllogism out of an existing dualism, making possible a shift from bald assertion into dialogue, following Aristotelian principles.\textsuperscript{262} Verene's observation, that verum-factum is the middle term of all middle terms, that is, it can mediate any truth: 'the verum-factum permits the making of any truth.'\textsuperscript{263} expresses an appreciation of the philosophical freedom which Vico forged through his mythopoeia.

\textsuperscript{260} See Vico, 1744, Ch. 2, 'Truth'. See also Verene, 1981, pp. 36-84.

\textsuperscript{261} Verene, 1981, p. 125. See also p. 46.

\textsuperscript{262} ibid., pp. 159-160.

\textsuperscript{263} ibid., p. 47.
By contrast to Verene's metaphysical analysis, Pompa and Trompf prefer historicism. Both focus on Vichian figures of institutions, taking the view that poetry exists because it re-affirms an existent and institutionalised society. Thus they elevate verum-factum to the status of doctrine of historicity.

Fisch has called the historical view a Hebrew-Christian view of institutions. He points out that this Judaeo Christian idea holds that institutions, secular and sacred, were established by God, Word or Christ, and that their history comprises 'a single series of unique acts'. This, he tells us can give rise to objections which Vico met by excluding the Hebrew-Christian tradition from the scope of the New Science and positing multiplicity.\textsuperscript{264}

The historicist approach makes the readings of Trompf and Pompa problematic. Trompf finds Vico's thought obscure, incoherent and rambling: 'riddled with obscurities, apparent 'non sequiturs' and labyrinthine diversions'.\textsuperscript{265} Nevertheless, he draws from Vico's poetic ambiguity what he calls 'the universe of history',\textsuperscript{266} 'universe

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Fisch, 'Introduction' to Vico, 1744, F5, p. xxxii.
\item Trompf, 1994, p. 56.
\item ibid., p. 63.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
of discourses, and 'the universe of language'. Thus what started with Vico as convertibility, that is, poetic ambiguity expressed as verum-factum, is turned into a conceptual polyvalence of grand proportions.

Pompa also grapples with poetic ambiguity. For example, Vico's story of the Heraclids creates anomalies in temporal historicity. Pompa explains them away, ignoring Vico's proud claim to the discovery of a poetic master key and suggesting instead that Vico was in a hurry and made editorial errors. A riposte to this interpretation of Pompa's, is provided by Mooney:

Nothing ever seems to fit in his writings, yet somehow it always does; and even when he botches his facts, his arguments seem always to come out right.

What is anomalous to historicity is not necessarily so to poesy. Moreover, Pompa takes verum-factum as the subject rather than the process of the New Science so he proceeds through a recitation of the making of human institutions. Noting that these institutions are proclaimed by Vico as the bounty of providence, Pompa is moved to question the pertinence of providence: 'it is not clear what work there is for

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267 ibid., p. 81.
268 ibid., p. 82.
269 See Vico, 1744, paragraph 79, p. 43, quoted above (Heraclids existed before their father, Hercules).
providence to do'.\textsuperscript{272} We have noted already Vico's riposte to such a question.\textsuperscript{273} It is impossible for humans to investigate effectively the nature of things because we can understand only what we have made. Things not made by humans then, are providential, just-so.

Pompa's query can be answered further by reference to the work of Momigliano who has affirmed Vico's proclamations of providence as achieving for the New Science that endurance which renders it pertinent to postmodern thought.\textsuperscript{274} Perhaps it is the proclamatory rather than the providential aspect which requires attention. That line of thought will be developed in Chapter Eight. Suffice to say here that Vico's proclamations of a durable providence have carried forward his complex insights.

Paradoxically, Pompa's questioning of the role of providence serves to consolidate, not to weaken, Vico's assertion of the importance of providence. This happens because the question echoes the proclamation, sustaining its moment. Proclamations are eloquent but they are not articulated through reason; they operate kerygmatically. To object to them is to give them life. Thus Pompa's objections to providence, which arise from his nomination of verum-factum as the subject of the New Science, are

\textsuperscript{272} Pompa, 1982, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{273} Vico in Pompa, 1982, pp. 53-54.
delivered by Vico's rhetoric into the lap of providence; opposition offers no release.

Mooney's analysis is different again. He takes Vico's historicism as a conceit of verum-factum: as humans create history so history creates humans. A consummate, human divinity is indicated here but not proclaimed. Mooney accepts Vico's major tropes as being the crux of eloquent truth-making. He puts forward a critique which identifies Vico's axioms with metaphor and his indications with synecdoche. Furthermore, he draws attention to the metonymic operations of the annotated frontispiece to New Science. Mooney writes:

Axioms are frequently expressed as metaphors, summaries are rhapsodic or filled with examples, and even the beginning of his final New Science is an extended commentary on an elaborate frontispiece.²⁷⁵

Taking into account the strengths and weaknesses of these diverse interpretations, we might summarise as follows. Vico tells us that, by recognising similitude and lack thereof, humans speculate, making remarkable what is otherwise unimportant. Thus we render significant both our utterances and our silences. We tend perpetually to be discovering and rediscovering the remarkability of our institutions. We seek, by speculation, to regulate them, necessitating a hypothesis of action-word correlation. Such an hypothesis is put forward in Vico's discussion of law, justice and


²⁷⁵ Mooney, 1985, p. 257.
jurisprudence.

Vico's jurisprudence exists in a tradition which begins with pre-Socratic poets and orators. Mooney describes it thus:

(It is a tradition) which holds that language is a primary in culture, metaphor a necessity, and jurisprudence our highest achievement... In Vico, then, eloquence became what it had always been potentially in the tradition: a description for social process itself, for the very course of civilization, a course with a definable logic - namely rhetoric - and a systematic account of its triumphs - namely jurisprudence, a term that Vico understood as the Roman jurisconsults themselves had, as "the knowledge of all things human and divine," most notably the institutions of religion and law.276

It follows that what humans make of themselves, by re-creation, alteration or extermination, and whether or not justice is to play a part, is up to us.

Vico's jurisprudence demonstrates the poetic nature of lawmaking; the keeping and the breaking of laws are also shown to be poetic.

In this regard, Vico's rhetoric is more judicial than literary.277 Laws, Vico tells us, are dependent for their substance on mythology which includes history. They are dependent for expression on poetics. This, he argues, is so because in poetics resides the key to their meaning. Denial of the poetics of law Vico posits as a form of stupidity. He writes:

276 ibid., p. xii.

277 ibid., pp. xiii-xiv.
Men of limited ideas take for law what the words expressly say. Intelligent men take for law whatever impartial utility dictates in each case.\textsuperscript{278} Verene explains: 'The prudence of the human world is 'jurisprudence' because law is the cause of the human world'.\textsuperscript{279} Where truth is contingent, justice rests with human choices.

Vico tells us that, having fallen from complete justice, 'men, having fallen from complete justice by original sin',\textsuperscript{280} humans create for themselves the circumstances wherein justice can prevail. Civil institutions provide an 'as though' form of justice, once removed from divinity. That is, a metaphor of justice: 'live like men in justice',\textsuperscript{281} poetic justice. Insofar as we uphold this civil justice, we humans, according to Vico, attenuate our innate bestiality.

In New Science, history provides the figures through which the making, un-making and re-making of humanity are revealed. Law provides a counterbalance by which the arguments for perpetuity and consummation are maintained. Jurisprudence pertains to civil law, written and unwritten, including custom and diplomacy as well as legislation.

\textsuperscript{278} Vico, 1744, paragraph 319, p. 93; paragraph 323, p. 94.

\textsuperscript{279} Verene, 1991, p. 38.

\textsuperscript{280} Vico, 1744, paragraph 2, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{281} ibid., paragraph 2, p. 4.
and regulation. Vico's theology, divinity, rhetoric, eloquence and mythopoeia give voices to the figures and to the advocates of his jurisprudence which he calls civil sovereignty. Vico writes: 'care for piety and attachment to religion brought people to civil sovereignty'.\textsuperscript{282} With these words, Vico effects a sudden shift, by juxtaposition, from his ironic history to the poetics of justice.

Vico enters the discourse of jurisprudence by enshrining custom over law. This is the principle of jus cogens. In summary: philosophy, by considering idealised states of humanity and enlightened by common sense, gives rise to legislation. As Mooney points out, plausibility, founded on common sense, is crucial to this idea of custom.\textsuperscript{283}

Legislation makes institutions by which collective human continuity is ensured. There are tensions; the balance of legislation, choice and common sense is dynamic. In the flux, people make, sustain, unmake and re-make themselves and their institutions. According to Vico, the civil sovereignty of nations is founded on an unambiguous (univocal), common sense which is encoded poetically as religion.\textsuperscript{284}

Vico's 'new principles of mythology' make religion eminent: 'among all peoples the

\textsuperscript{282} ibid., p. 422.

\textsuperscript{283} Mooney, 1985, p. 263.

\textsuperscript{284} Vico, 1744, paragraph 27, p. 17.
civil world began with religion'. Religion serves and is served by social order. Divinari (auguries) signify the future in divine terms, immortality being located in human progeny. These are understood as allegories of a providential truth:

true poetic allegories which give the fables univocal, not analogical, meanings for various particulars comprised under their poetic genera... Uniform ideas originating among peoples unknown to each other must have a common ground in truth.

What is being allegorised is an idealised notion of human existence which is, Vico claims, common to all humanity. The unifying principle is immanence. According to Vico, it is mutual immanence that distinguishes humans.

Metaphysic is Vico's main symbol of immanence, his 'root metaphor'. His signified transcendent is providence. Even personified as la Provvedenza, providence, therefore, remains metaphysical, never more than a hypothesis, tolerant of any proposition.

Providence may enable the realisation, mute in worship but expressed poetically in proverbs, allegorised by fables and realised by institutions, of human immanence, but that is not necessarily the case. If providence is transcendent then, according to Vico, humanity is attenuated. Vico tells us it is the privilege of chosen people to be relieved

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285 ibid., paragraph 8, p. 7.
286 ibid., paragraph 144, p. 63. See also paragraph 210, p. 75.
of full human agency. Fisch makes this clear:

distinguishing two kinds of providence: [1] the direct and transcendent providence of unique and special acts, which are the privilege of the chosen people, and [2] the immanent providence operating according to uniform laws and using means as natural and easy as human customs themselves, which was all the gentiles had. Of these kinds of providence, the former is incompatible with full human agency in the making of institutions, and so also is any combination of the former and the latter, but the latter by itself is not.287

Verene takes it further by explaining that Vico's nations cannot include the Hebrews because they live inside divine history (and have no Hercules hence no Heraclids), being the direct manifestation of their God.288

Vico's poetics magicalise similitude. He conjures similitude as a nexus of credulity, justice and assent by which people and peoples affirm meaning against unmeaning and realise their continuity against discontinuity. Thus Vico's poetics take an apocalyptic trajectory whose signifiers are beginnings and endings made and done in confluence as corso in ricorso. What begins and ends is humanity.

So human custom forges human custom. Vico affirms the power of immanence as a human phenomenon. By inference, transcendence is a kind of metaphor. Vico's insight, that what is made is what is true, is an insight into a human immanence whose jurisprudential potentials are yet to be tested. Providence, metaphysic and, in this

287 Fisch, 'Introduction' to Vico, 1744, F5, p. xxxii.
connection, humanity itself, comprise a poetic symbolism whose applications are yet to be proved.

Vico's poetic symbolism sustains a balance which favours neither our making (including re-making) nor our un-making but shows the way to either and both. It is human action, realised as choice, which determines the role of justice in the affairs of the living: verum-factum. According to Vico, we humans make and un-make our own circumstances through the (mytho) poesy of our thought, expressed by our language. We make ourselves, godly, heroic, human, and bestial. Oscillating through mute reverence to assertion, transaction and mute irreverence, we make and un-make our selves and our institutions, constituting among them pharaonic houses, heroic wars, just peace, and atavistic bestiality.

By its balance, scope and dynamic tensions, Vico's poetics provide a model of literary language which lends itself to analyses of apocalyptic literature. As we noted in Chapter One, apocalypses are mythopoeic, ahistoric, polemical and capable of radical expression. Such complexity can challenge any interpretative method but it renders many simply inadequate. Vico's poetic model is mythopoeic in its figures, ahistoric in its approach, polemical in regard to a need for civility, and radically metaphysical. It is not, however, a contemporary model and it is lacking therefore. In Chapter Four we will explore, following Northrop Frye, some advantages and disadvantages of
adopting a Vichian approach in our religio-literary criticism.

Within Vico's three-ring-circus alchemical acts of separation are performed: the human is distilled from gods, heroes, and beasts. The acts are linguistic, poised on rhetoric and eloquence. All together these acts constitute literature. The circus proceeds, all three rings performing simultaneously the creation of humanity signified by the capability of choice-making and demonstrated through language expressed as literature.
CHAPTER 4
ON METHODS 2: FRYE'S FOURTH ORDER OF WORDS

In his abovementioned works, Creation and Re-creation, The Great Code and Words With Power, Northrop Frye pays attention to elements of literature which he calls metaliterary. Frye's critique of the metaliterary extends Vico's poetics. The structure from which Frye's metaliterary critique commences is a Vichian three-ring-circus; metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche are accommodated in a big-top Frye calls myth. Mythic themes resonate with interactions among the three tropes. Vico's poetic model a literature delivers poetic truths to its readers by means of bundles of hypotheses, bound together by similitude (verum-factum). Frye's method advances from this Vichian structure to include kerygma among the major tropes. It is by this inclusion that what was literary has become metaliterary. Kerygma is creative proclamation, including if not comprising proclamation of divinity. Kerygma delivers another kind of truth: certum. In Frye's analysis, human beings make everything; form, content, execution and accident. This he calls re-creation. Frye's fourth order of words brings to significance voices, nuances, emphases and pauses whose rhetorical operations tend otherwise to escape criticism.

During a forty-five year academic career (1939-1984), Frye addressed himself to concerns, themes, hypotheses, and structures of literary criticism. He pursued a particular interest in apocalyptic symbols. Biblical metaphors, Classical myths and the Western tradition of literature written in English inform his discussion of apocalypses ancient and contemporary.²⁸⁹

This study refers mainly to Frye's last publications but it should be noted that the ideas

which he consolidated therein were developed through his earlier work. Of particular
importance is his seminal work, Anatomy of Criticism. A thorough analysis of Frye's
contribution to literary criticism cannot be attempted here. What is important to this
discussion of apocalyptic texts and methods by which they might be interpreted is
Frye's augmentation of Vico's poetics.

Frye's metaliterary critique first endorses and then departs from Vico's model. This is
effected by expansion; three elements become four. In Frye's fourth order of words,
kerygma joins the other major tropes. In Frye's critique, kerygma resonates in
literature like a grace note in an orchestra, adding to the mythopoeic possibilities of
any and all of the pieces.

Vico did not analyse kerygma in his New Science. He used it, though, to proclaim
providence. Kerygma and kerygmatic effects have been used by preachers and
summoners for centuries. The use of kerygma was, for a long time, conventionally
restricted to clergy, effecting a separation of ecclesiastical and secular expression.

different to that associated with Rudolf Bultmann, see Frye, 1990, p. 103. 'the worst thing we can do is to try to
"demythologise" anything'. See Joseph J. Kockelmans, 'On Myth and its Relationship to Hermeneutics' in Cultural
Bultmann's important position in the field of hermeneutics. For further detail regrading the differences between

This was confirmed by the divorce of the academic study of humanities and theology initiated at Humboldt University in 1809. Many universities copied the Humboldt model. So discussion of kerygma as a category of literary criticism was effectively pre-empted, literary criticism having emerged as an academic discipline after 1809.

Since the Humboldt divorce, the guardians of scriptural stylistics have been disinclined to welcome analyses which read the Bible and its kerygma as a literary text. Nevertheless, some critics, including Frye, have disregarded the separation, finding a categorical division of humanities and theology untenable. Robert C. Culley has recently put the issue into the context of textual determinacy.

Culley explains that several approaches to Biblical hermeneutics, most notably historical, textual and canonical, vie for hegemony. He describes his own transition toward a Fryean, textual reading, telling us that during his doctoral studies the pertinence of Frye's literary criticism to Biblical scholarship became evident to him: 'it began to dawn on me slowly that it was not unreasonable to read the Bible as a text, because that was what it was.' Thus Culley, among others, opens the way, to a

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294 ibid., p. IX.
religio-literary consideration of Frye's conception of a fourth order of words whose trope is kerygma. An encounter with kerygma as a metaliterary phenomenon may serve as a welcome bridge between theology and literary criticism.

Frye's analysis indicates that a pluralistic, secular re-appropriation of kerygma has taken place. Kerygmatic rhetoric now serves a variety of purposes. So the kerygmatic resonances of contemporary rhetoric secular and ecclesiastical now require critical notice.

Frye's inclusion of kerygma in his metaliterary critique has effected a very potent alteration to literary criticism. It has opened up one more mystery than Vico's master key could do. In Frye's later critical works the Vichian horizons are extended. As consequence, literary criticism can consider methodically some of the relations of a divine word to human creativity, especially poetry, rhetoric and eloquence.

In his Larkin-Stuart Lectures of 1980, published under the title Creation and Re-creation, Frye summarised the position which he was to develop later as metaliterary. In Creation and Re-creation, Frye studies the metaphor of creation,
taking creativity as a feature of human life. A brief interpretative outline follows.

The work is concerned with the way the Bible has affected literature written in English:

   Page one of the Bible says that God created the world; page one of the critics’ hand-book, not yet written, tells him that what he is studying are human creations.²⁹⁷

Frye acknowledges as other to his own view two common notions of creativity. One is the ideology which holds that a creating god is a projection of human imagination; the other is the opposite ideal, which holds that a creating god is progenitor of all.

Frye names Karl Barth as an author holding the latter ideal and takes up a position antithetical to Barth’s.²⁹⁸ Creation and Re-creation develops a dialogue with Barth’s position.

An excursus is necessary here to enlighten Frye’s terms. The works of Barth and Schleiermacher, as shall become clear, have a significant bearing on his way of understanding kerygma. The crucial differences concern the matter of freedom. Schleiermacher’s opinions stand behind Frye’s usage; regard to some of them can

²⁹⁷ ibid., p. 1.
²⁹⁸ ibid.
make more clear the differences between Frye's and Barth's concepts of creativity and creation.

For Barth, freedom constitutes an ability to submit to the goodness of a supreme god; the submission is against sin. This freedom is not self-determined: 'not an act of self-reflection or self-determination'. 299 It is one of the supreme god's imperatives. 300 A human who takes up the freedom thus to submit is, as Barth understands it, a creature of the god: 'We understand man as a creature of God'. 301 For Barth, kerygma is a summons to acknowledge a covenant made by evil humans to a good god: 'the creature to whom the Creator is faithful'. 302 In this view, humans are always subjugated and compelled by kerygma. For Barth, Frye tells us, God is creator and human is creature whose primary duty is to understand what it is to be a creature of God. 303

Schleiermacher's discourse contrasts with Barth's. Schleiermacher, although


300 ibid., p. 453.


unequivocal in his declaration of an omnipotent, divine creator, does not deny the possibility of human self-determination; something yet to be realised:

the proposition 'God has created,' considered in itself, lays down absolute dependence, but only for the beginning... it (creation) lays down something which is not immediately given in our self-consciousness.\textsuperscript{305}

The unrealised element, according to Schleiermacher, becomes available to human self-consciousness as premonition. Such a premonition or divination can, he tells us, obviate the need for redemption: 'a real premonition - of the process which will put an end to the state of needing redemption.'\textsuperscript{305} The insight which Schleiermacher calls premonition is tantamount to a Christian humanism in which humanity and divinity both possess freedom of choice, for good, evil and anything else:

as certainly as Christ was a man, there must reside in human nature the possibility of taking up the divine into itself, just as did happen in Christ.\textsuperscript{306}

So, by virtue of the unfinished character of divine creation, creators have to create creatures but creatures can make what they want, of their creators or anything else. Frye's liberation of kerygma into a pluralistic, secular method of literary criticism reflects this Schleiermacherian idea. In brief: we humans cannot understand what it is to be a creature of God unless we make ourselves so and that is paradoxical; we deny

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\textsuperscript{305} ibid., p. 68. See also p. 64.

\textsuperscript{306} ibid., p. 64.
our creativity while using it to realise ourselves as creatures.

In Creation and Re-creation, Frye maintains that it is now necessary to satisfy a human sense of autonomy which has been repressed.\textsuperscript{307} The autonomous human is free to speak; words are both the symbols and the agents of the sense of autonomy which Frye affirms here. There is also freedom to write.

The story that humanity is free to tell is disturbing and disturbed. The telling is full of turns. For example, a common apprehension of human creativity is put in association with the Biblical story of Eden, the serpent and the Fall (Genesis: 2-3). A common assumption emerges; that creativity somehow involves participation in guilty knowledge or evil or contamination by sin.\textsuperscript{308} Consequently, what humanity sees in the mirror if its own creative achievement is what Frye calls a psychotic ape; Hitler, Idi Amin, Jones of Guyana, any and all of these people reflect any and all of the rest.\textsuperscript{309} To remedy this, Frye maintains that a concept of re-creation is required.\textsuperscript{310} By re-creation both the 'ape' and the human are transformed by compassion.

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\textsuperscript{307} Frye, 1980, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{308} Ibid., pp. 10-11.
\textsuperscript{309} Ibid., p. 54.
\textsuperscript{310} Ibid., p. 65. See also, Frye, 1983, p. 112.
\end{flushright}
Following Vico, Frye takes words to be agents of human creativity. His notion of human autonomy, however, declines to make any response to commands or imperatives. So the motif which was so useful to Vico, of a consummate, divine word to which all human utterance must be a response, is insufficient to Frye's argument. Likewise the idea of kerygma as a divine summons to all creatures. Frye's pursuit of re-creation brings into question any dichotomy of divine word and human words.

Frye introduces the capitalised 'Word' into this discussion not by reference to scriptures but by reference to Lacan and his psychoanalytic method:

the effect of a full Word is to re-order the past contingent events by conferring on them the sense of necessities to come.\(^{311}\)

Thus consummate Word is located in a secular affair, therapy. It is devoid of religious, ecclesiastical or spiritual connotations, except by any associations the reader might bring to the text. The effect of this secularisation of word is to liberate it from dogma and into myth.

Humans, Frye has pointed out, do not live naked in the world but in a protective envelope made up of myths. The envelope is usually called culture or civilization.\(^{312}\)

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\(^{311}\) Frye, 1980, p. 15. See also, p. 54, 'a vision of re-creation as a future goal in which our own efforts are involved.'

\(^{312}\) ibid., p. 5. See also, Frye, 1983, p. 50.
Frye calls mythology the total structure of human creation conveyed by words. Literature is at its centre, constituting what Culley interprets as 'a verbal universe'. This is re-created in every generation by the poets. If we remember what Vico has told us, we will take the poets to be ordinary people, vulgars. The poetry is our collective, human stammering, produced as we invent approximate terms for our ineffable encounters. This re-creation is perpetual, perpetuity being necessary to accommodate the ever-changing patterns of human life:

the thinker who is annihilated on Tuesday has to be annihilated all over again on Wednesday: the fortress of thought is a Valhalla, not an abattoir.

So all of it belongs to all of us. Yet one cannot know all the dimensions of an experience; our cultural heritage is our social past, realised and repressed. We are both autonomous and ignorant, seeking metamorphosis.

Frye tells us there are (at least) two aspects to a working idea of re-creation. First is to conceive of making again. Second is to realise the potentials of the language by which the concept can be expressed. It is through the second aspect that we can approach the first: 'expand the whole history of language itself as a form of human

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313 ibid., p. 7.
314 Culley, 1993, p. IX.
communication and consciousness.  

To expand the whole history of language is to challenge both language and history. Frye puts forward some crucial considerations, the first, regarding history. Contemplation of a historical past suggests a leap into a vision of redemption. To make history is to attempt redemption not of the past but of a future, whose inevitability seems to be indicated by (cruel) events to date. The redemptive efforts of history-making tend to be counterproductive, conjuring a futuristic illusion which is inclined to deny the immediate importance of presence. Freedom, liberation from cruelty at least, is sought but the seeking is not successful. Frye writes:

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Steady perversion of the vision of free and equal social future, as country after country makes a bid for freedom and accepts instead a tyranny far worse than the one it endured before.
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Thus Frye challenges historians and history itself to defend or discard the status quo.

Regarding language, Frye reminds us that speech, hence language, emanates from the human physical body; diaphragm, lungs and breath take precedence over denotations, types and intertextuality. He differentiates vocabulary from metaphor, demonstrating

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317 ibid., p. 67.
319 ibid., p. 15.
320 ibid., p. 65.
the contiguity of subjective and objective worlds which language approximates. He demonstrates that the emergence of descriptive language is a response to the co-existence of vocabulary and metaphor.

Frye's idea of a continuous re-creation draws on Vico's verum-factum to support the idea of metaphor but it is upon certum that vocabulary is founded. Verene's observation is informative: 'certum in Vico's view is always auctoritas [authentic].' An utterance evoked by the thunderclap (phenomenal or noumenal) which awakens self-awareness is authentic; a statement of presence. So it is part of a human vocabulary which, by collective agreement, can be used to convey thoughts.

Further to certum, Fasso points out that, in Vico's thought, the true and the certain hold the relation of the universal and the individual. This relation is also evident in Frye's thought. Donald R. Kelley takes it further, perhaps too far. He claims that certum belongs to human consciousness but verum belongs to the nature of the divine. This claim evokes the notion of humanity and divinity in schism which is challenged by the concept of certum. There is more evidence and support for a notion

322 Fasso, 1976, pp. 6-7.
of mutuality with regard to certum. As Howard N. Tuttle points out, to achieve certum factum, knower and object become one.\textsuperscript{324} This kind of immanentism is a feature of kerygma, according to Frye.

Frye's understanding of kerygma, then, accords with Vico's notion of certum and factum. The kerygma, then, stands at the interface of humanity and divinity in law as well as in rhetoric.

Frye writes:

\begin{quote}
The principle laid down by the Italian philosopher Vico of verum-factum, that we understand only what we have made ourselves, needs to be refreshed sometimes by contemplation of something we did not make and do not understand.\textsuperscript{325}
\end{quote}

The thunder is something that humans have not made. Frye designates thunder as radically metaphorical (his italics).\textsuperscript{326} What is radical about it is that it is utterly ambiguous. A thunder-clap can evoke human utterance, so thunder can stand for a divine command; that divine command, however, depends for its expression on human

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\item \textsuperscript{324} Howard N. Tuttle, 'The Epistemological Status of the Cultural World in Vico and Dilthey' in Giambattista Vico's \textit{Science of Humanity} (Giorgio Tagliacozzo and Donald Phillip Verene eds.), Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1976, p. 246.
\item \textsuperscript{325} Frye, 1980, p. 6.
\item \textsuperscript{326} ibid., pp. 68-69. See also Frye, 1983, p. 14-15; p. 24.
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utterance. To illustrate further: thunder cannot talk; only humans can talk. Words big and small depend on human breath. So a celestial word is nothing unless embraced as a metaphor to inform human utterance.

So thunder provides simultaneously a pretext for personal self-assertion and a metaphor for the self-assertion of a universal first person. That is Jove in Vico's myth but, as we shall observe, in Frye's it is any self-expressive being, people and psychotic apes included. Frye's four orders of words makes sensible what Vico made visible. Speech reveals in every breath a first person, engaged in self-assertion.

Is the language by which humans re-create themselves (and all they know) something that people have made, or not? It is both, and neither. Frye writes:

    the recreating of language attaches man to words in such a way that words become something much bigger than he is... a power of human self-transcendence, a step away from the narrow humanism that has to stop with the psychotic ape in the mirror.\textsuperscript{327}

Frye's psychotic ape owes something to Schleiermacher's sensitivity to the human tendency to self-reflect. For Schleiermacher, that tendency, especially the impulse to talk about humanity and self, comprises a proclamation of divinity bound to sin:

    in so far as He Himself was the offering, He is to be compared to the sacrificial animal... As sacrificer, however, He is active and His suffering can be only an

\textsuperscript{327} ibid., p. 70-71.

Having hoist his argument to such a pinnacle of metaphysical poesy, Frye delivers a humanistic tour de force which is based on the understanding that any communicating utterance brings about a transformation of the speaker and of what is spoken about. He has set Vico's metaphysic in context with Barth's creator and creature. What he draws from this juxtaposition advances both those positions.

First, he explains spirit as a metaphor, showing that, in the New Testament, 'spiritually' means 'metaphorically'. It follows, then, that spirit might, like the thunder, be encountered as an entity as well as a metaphor:

> The terms "word" and "spirit", then, may be understood in their traditional context as divine persons able and willing to redeem mankind. They may also be understood as qualities of self-transcendence within man himself, capable of pulling him out of the psychosis that every news bulletin brings us so much evidence for.\footnote{ibid.}

Is every word an entity, capable of transforming us as well as the world we speak of and to? If so, then silence, too, is transformative.

Lest megalomania ensue, it is necessary here to recall Frye's cautionary remark; we
may do well to contemplate what we cannot make or understand. This call for restraint of credibility was made, as we noted, with reference to Vico's verum-factum, which proceeds by making credible the impossible. It might also apply to making audible the unspeakable.

These words of Frye's, written in his notebook, bear consideration in this connexion:

"I am a wise and good man" is grammatically impossible, because such predicates cannot be attached to anything beginning with "I am"... The ego doesn't co exist with wisdom & goodness.  

There are things which words cannot sensibly express without address to a second person. In Frye's example, wisdom cannot proclaim itself. A second person is necessary. Otherwise wisdom, at least, must be subsumed to silence. Frye writes:

(this is) close to what Blake, in a phrase taken from the Book of Revelation, calls the "everlasting gospel," a conception which implies that the human race already knows what it ought to be thinking and doing, though the voices of repression, made articulate by competing ideologies, keep shouting the knowledge down.

Belief enters into the matter here. Frye tells us that enacted belief, which entails social vision and common action, has to compromise with professed belief, ends

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331 ibid., p. 73.

332 ibid., p. 72.
(fruits) taking precedence over principles. A need for restraint shows itself to be the more pressing here because this raises consideration of verum-factum and certum in concert. Verum-factum, by making credible what is impossible, can enable people to make things. Certum is its own author; a self-assertive entity, authenticated by its own proclamation. Kerygma expresses certum. It can enable people to believe things.

If what one says (professed belief) is not identical to one's autonomous doings (enacted belief), then by speaking one is robbed of breath; what is spoken is robbed of authenticity. Language, however, proceeds by approximation. So the compromise of professed and enacted beliefs (and vice versa) attends every spoken word.

Here is Vico's metaphysic without the guardian, providence. The god is set free from Inquisitorial literalism. This can also be recognised as Barth's creature, understanding that, by definition, a creator has power to make creatures and only creatures. So creators are bound to creaturely dependence; but creatures have the power of choice. They can preserve, liberate or enslave the creator.

This, according to Frye, is not creation but re-creation:

this would not be new, but the power of genuine Word and Spirit, the power that has created all our works of culture and imagination, and is still ready to
re-create both in society and ourselves.³³³ It is the power of words, recognised as the efficacy of human voices, making possible the culture and imagination by which people can make and do what they choose. This is kerygma, understood in a metaliterary sense. This institution, as a category of literature, of effective human voices which can choose their relation to their creator and their creations promises a change to literary criticism and to Biblical hermeneutics.

In his last two books, The Great Code and Words With Power, Frye expanded, refined and elucidated the ideas outlined in Creation and Re-creation. In those later works he has explained that kerygma is metaliterary, standing between myth and poetry as a rhetorical form.³³⁴ Thus he has consolidated the position from which he initiated the inclusion of kerygma among literary tropes.

It is commonly held that kerygma reverts, reaffirming an existing myth or gospel by making an echo of it. Frye conjectures that kerygma might convert as well.³³⁵ For Frye, kerygma might project from present to future; myths might inform kerygma with

³³³ ibid.
elements which have not yet been brought into language.\textsuperscript{336}

New constellations of language and thought might emerge; new patterns by which to make sense of things. This apprehension has become important in cultures where hi-tech, virtual realities can pervade the literary (and other) experiences of readers and writers. Frye's method supports a critique of the similitudes, convergences, harmonies and discords by which contemporary facts and certainties can be made.

Frye has suggested that kerygmatic conversion may be actualised by a mutual identification of kerygma and revelation. That is re-creation; the concatenation of kerygma and revelation. He wrote of this kind of revelation as a paradoxical restoration: 'restoring everything we have never lost.'\textsuperscript{337} Thus Frye admits to serious consideration (as a fourth order of words) a multiplicity of self-proclaiming voices, ranging from wise divinity to psychotic ape. Their kerygmata can include complex symbolism, aural and visual, the result of several thousand years' iconographic and literary accretions. Their kerygmata and apocalypses are contiguous, perhaps coincident. Frye writes:

> What the Apocalypse proves to be is not a summary of biblical doctrines or

\textsuperscript{336} ibid., p. 138; p. 168; p. 198; p. 200; 206-7; p. 224. See also, Frye, 1990, p. 98.

even a summary of its historical narrative. It is primarily a vision of a body of imagery, where the images of every category of being, divine, angelic, paradisal, human, animal, vegetable, and inorganic, are all identified with the body of Christ. That means the images are metaphorically related, metaphor being expressed as a statement of identity, in the form "this is that." Whatever is not part of the body of Christ forms a demonic shadow, a parody of the apocalyptic vision in a context of evil and tyranny.\textsuperscript{338}

Here is a descriptive rendition of Biblical kerygma. This is! Everything is the body of the Christ. Such a proposition can be made true, verum factum, if we make it so, but there is more to it. It is certum, if the Christ is understood as 'the Word of God'.

According to Frye, kerygmatic effects penetrate the vernacular, that is, transactional, contemporary, demotic, language.\textsuperscript{339} Apocalyptic symbols cut across all the phases of language discussed by Vico. Consequently, the poesy of the vulgars changes.

It is in this sense that kerygma is, in Frye's parlance, metaliterary. It belongs as much to talk as to writing and its truth is determined by its receiver. As Frye puts it: 'The metaliterary begins with the process of perceiving some kind of "that's for me" detail in one's reading.'\textsuperscript{340}

Frye's attention to the metaliterary operations of literature supplements Vichian


\textsuperscript{340} Frye, 1990, p. 113.
perspectives. As Frye puts it, 'Mythology is not a datum but a factum of human existence.'\textsuperscript{341} This statement is crucial to Frye's ability to distinguish poetic language from a special purpose rhetoric.\textsuperscript{342} The inclusion of kerygma as a major trope, along with metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche, brings under criticism the poetic language and the special purpose rhetoric of what Frye calls the 'transcendental signified'.\textsuperscript{343} So theology and literary criticism might meet without conflict to investigate kerygmatic operations which serve human intent, Christian and non Christian.

There is no denial of divine creation or theopneuptos here nor is Frye's idea without precedent. The idea of the mutual immanence of humanity and divinity is at least as old as belief in virgin birth. We have found it in the Johannine Apocalypse. Vico invented an eloquent way of discussing it. Frye's criticism shows us the assumptions behind Vico's eloquence. In Vico's conception, humans are configured as being, at least in part, creatures of their own creation. An enhanced appreciation of the potentials of human choice emerges as consequence. It is that which Frye pursues.

Frye has taken up the invitation, delivered by Vico to find humanity participating in its own creation. The articulation of this advance is an achievement of Frye's erudition. It

\textsuperscript{341} Frye, 1983, p. 37.

\textsuperscript{342} See Frye, 1991, p. 35.
is one thing to be given a fact but it is another to use it as an artefact. A new poetic fact requires not only a new myth but also literary and linguistic matrices to convey it and a hermeneutic by which to interpret it. Centuries of collective effort go into the making of these cultural devices before they can be articulated as artefacts. Frye's criticism articulates myth, language and literature with human creativity in a way which enables a revisioning of the capabilities of humanity.

Nearly three centuries separate Frye from Vico but it is in Frye's metaliterary criticism that the now not-so-new fact of human-as-creator finds a hermeneutic, a literature, and an encounter with a new myth. Vico's humanistic intimations about the creative process, dynamic and outrageous as they might have been in the late Renaissance, are a just-so story in Frye's twentieth century. As Frye states:

In the opposition to Galileo and Bruno it seems clear that it was social concern that was wrong; but in this age of atom bombs and energy crises it is equally clear that social concern has its case too.\textsuperscript{344}

Postmodernity takes for granted that humans can participate in creation and destruction of cosmic proportions.

The inextricability of our creative and destructive capabilities has emerged as a

\textsuperscript{343} ibid., p. 34.

\textsuperscript{344} Frye, 1983, p. 51.
predicament of this century, especially with regard to technological advances. In the technologically assisted proliferation of humankind known during the latter half of this century as the population explosion, together with a steady investment of assets and intelligence in the development of techniques of mass destruction, human-as-creator is manifest even while human-as-creature persists. Frye's theory of literary tradition locates an apocalypse in this present predicament of humanity.

In this apocalypse it is the choices of people, collective and individual, which make true the existence of creators and creatures and whatever else. So we may say that Frye's work elucidates Vico's. Through Frye's hermeneutic, the just-so story of verum-factum finds in an old apocalyptic mythology a new literature, also apocalyptic.

According to Frye, apocalyptic literature portrays humanity in two main ways.\textsuperscript{345} The more common portrayal is of humans as creatures, things of their divine creator, their continuance utterly dependent upon the divinity. From this perspective, servitude and obedience, affirming divinity, provide the best hope of human continuity. The less common portrayal is of humans as immanences, autonomous and divine; participants in co-creation. There is nothing new about this alternative. As we shall observe in Chapter Eight, it has been available, though not commonly disclosed, at least since the

\textsuperscript{345} ibid., pp. 136-137; Frye, 1990, pp. 260-262.
inception of the Johannine Apocalypse.

These two types of apocalypse are called panoramic and synergistic in this thesis. A panoramic apocalypse may reveal in human-as-creature an invitation to identify as victim. A synergistic apocalypse precludes the characterisation of humans as victims, except by their own choice.

Frye tells us that kerygma is the vehicle of apocalypse. He tells us also that myth is the linguistic vehicle of kerygma. In religio-literary terms, any apocalypse can be encountered as a myth. So metaliterary kerygmata might proclaim humans as victims, creatures, creators, or something else again. The choice that humans have is whether or not they will give voice to, that is, proclaim, any number of self-determinations.

As kerygmata are self-assertive, one might do well to ask, Who or what is it that asserts itself through this metaliterary dimension? No firm answer is proffered by Frye who stops short of full-blown speculation by re-asserting verum-factum: 'As Vico says, Verum-factum: man understands only what he has made (and that only up to a

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347 ibid., p. 30.
Thus Frye's critique, like Vico's, proceeds within an attenuated humanist compass. Nevertheless, by juxtaposing a brief excursus on stoicheia tou kosmou, that is, on numinous entities who attend the universe in mysterious ways, Frye extends the conventional parameters of humanistic concern:

The stoicheia tou kosmou are the mysterious natural forces that, originally local, tend to retreat from man until, by Paul's time, most of them were in the stars. It is precisely because man has not made them and does not understand them that he is impelled to worship them. They do not, however, exist as objects of worship, hence when they become such they are filled with human projections.  

This extension further enlivens Frye's metaliterary discourse.  

Without this speculation of Frye's, the relevance to this study of Vico's insights would be sorely attenuated. Vico and Frye enter this discussion as yokefellows, their works elucidating, separately and together, our study of apocalyptic rhetoric. Creature and creator stand united behind us as we explore with Frye.  

The trajectory of Frye's discourse transcends the traditional, apocalyptic dualism of creator and creature to enter an ecumenical immanentism of mutual self-creation. By his persistent use of the term co-creation, Frye maintains a divine-human dichotomy.

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but by his consideration of mutual immanences, he points beyond it.\textsuperscript{350} This brings into play an unusual method of inquiry by which the precepts of the apocalypses can be investigated with regard to the creative operations of words, including a divine word. Such a method promises to facilitate a systematic, religio-literary investigation of contemporary, apocalyptic rhetoric such as this study attempts.

As prelude to our adoption of this a mode of study, it is necessary to consider a little further the elements of Frye's thoughts on the metaliterary dimension or fourth order of words. His writings on the subject did not achieve full articulation. There was to have been a volume to follow The Great Code and Words With Power but Frye's decease intervened. One can, however, in kerygma, silence and stoicheia tou kosmou discern three elements of what he called metaliterary.

Together with silence, the kerygma and the stoicheia tou kosmou operate in the metaliterary dimension. Their relation to liberation is interstitial, occurring between speaker and speech. One might say, by analogy, that to study the metaliterary dimension is to study the stoichiometry of literature.\textsuperscript{351}

\textsuperscript{350} See, e.g., Frye, 1990, p. 312.

\textsuperscript{351} To illustrate: according to the Macquarie Dictionary (1982) the cognates \textit{stoichiometry} and \textit{stoichiology} are terms which refer to elements. The former is a chemical term indicating atomic weight, the latter is a physiological term indicating cellular makeup.
The stoicheia tou kosmou get in between what is said, what it is being said about, and the sayer. Concerning the stoicheia tou kosmou, we find again the notion of the magicality of language, such as is associated by Frye with kerygma. Frye tells us of a dangerous form of idolatry which he associates with stoicheia tou kosmou.\footnote{Frye, 1983, p. 165.} It is effected by projecting something humans have made onto something they have not made. For example, the wheel projected onto a celestial constellation and taken for a wheel of fate. What is dangerous about this? We give it life by breathing it into words but, like a Golem or a Frankenstein's monster, it is not human, not restrained by humane concern. In the metaliterary dimension, apocalyptic rhetoric changes register.

This idea is expressed by one of Nikos Kazantzakis' characters, Brother Leo, in this way:

Yes, may God forgive me, but the letters of the alphabet frighten me terribly. They are sly, shameless demons - and dangerous! You open the inkwell, release them; they run off - and how will you ever get control of them again! They come to life, join, separate, ignore your commands, arrange themselves as they like upon the paper - black with tails and horns. You scream at them and implore them in vain; they do as they please.\footnote{Nikos Kazantzakis, \textit{God's Pauper}, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1963, p. 3.}

According to Aristotle, the stoicheia tou kosmou are the letters of the alphabet, elements of speech, phonemes. Aristotle writes: A letter is an indivisible sound, not just any such sound, but one from which intelligible language may be produced;
animals also, it is true utter indivisible sounds, but none that I should describe as a letter.\(^{354}\) There are, however, many other nuances of the stoicheia tou kosmou.

According to Thayer, stoicheia can denote a diminutive of upright post; the gnomon or numen of a sun dial or its shadow [the presence of the numen being known by sight of its shadow and not the pointer itself]; an element, a first principle, a first beginning; or a simple sound (of the voice as the first element of language). Tou could denote where, how, anywhere, and somehow. Kosmou could denote order, world, and universe. In brief, stoicheia tou kosmou can denote fundamentals of the universe and primary elements of the world in many forms. This magicality of stoicheia tou kosmou emanates from a Hellenistic syncretism and could include: ‘the elements from which all things have come’; and ‘spirit elements of the world... envisaged as personal beings parallel to the ‘guardians and trustees’.\(^{355}\) Thayer has remarked on this diversity of meanings: ‘The meaning of stoicheia tou kosmou is quite disputed’.\(^{356}\)

Aristotle's assertion that, in poetics, the written characters are simulacra, not to be confused with the sounds they represent is also canvassed by Plato: 'we shall not


\(^{356}\) ibid., p. 881.
recognise the images of letters which may appear in water or mirrors before we know the letters themselves'.

In the Christian apostle Paul's Biblical writings, the stoicheia tou kosmou are autonomous, speaking entities who enslave humans. Allegiance to them is, according to Paul, un-Christian. Frye finds stoicheia tou kosmou in celestial constellations as well as in speech sounds used poetically. He explains them as being, to Pauline Christianity, demonic. Thayer, also making reference to Pauline usage, explains that, in a positivistic philosophy such as Paul's gospel, they are utterly adversarial. Such dynamic ways of encountering the spoken word, Frye's included, are not common in the late twentieth century but to ignore them is to deny a powerful dimension of poetics.

More needs to be said concerning kerygma. Frye has likened it to proverb which

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358 Paul Galatians 4:3, Jerusalem Bible, 'before we came of age we were as good as slaves to the elemental principles of this world (stoicheia tou kosmou). Paul Galatians 4:9 'how can you want to go back to elemental things like these (stoicheia tou kosmou), that can do nothing and give nothing, and be their slaves?'

359 Paul Colossians 2:8, ibid., 'Make sure that no one traps you and deprives you of your freedom by some secondhand, empty, rational philosophy based on the principles of this world (stoicheia tou kosmou) instead of Christ.' Here the apostle disparages any resonance with non Christian kerygma.


suddenly delivers a great thought; a key to meaning which resonates to produce in a reader or listener an inner harmony; the aforementioned "that's for me" feeling; a magical line or phrase which suddenly extends one's vision. Kerygma informs the kind of language which is associated with spell-saying, cursing, oath-taking and speaking-in-tongues. Kerygmata can be associated with stoicheia tou kosmou. A speaker, then, may so well to consider her words; it is their making-by-saying operations which differentiate kerygmatic from other tropes.

In philosophical terms, noumena are always metaphysical and are opposed, therefore to phenomena. The abovementioned Pauline attitude is reflected in this posture. By it the idea that the stoicheia tou kosmou can enter into words is suppressed. Frye's current metaliterary hypothesis is that by verbal expression of the noumena, a vehicle for the redemption of evil might be discovered.

In linguistic terms, as the syntagmatic operations of a gerund affect a sentence or an utterance, kerygma operates paradigmatically, requiring instead of a sentence or utterance a myth or a literature. Its similarity to the gerund is in its action-existence synergy. Dan O. Via Jr., Robert A. Johnson and James I.H. McDonald all agree that


both a language event (a word in a text) and a trans-linguistic subject (myth) operate through kerygma.

Via, defines kerygma: a 'trans-linguistic subject (which) is the parole of God, the reality of God'. Johnson identifies the simultaneous making-and-announcement of an event as kerygma and anchors it firmly to the New Testament:

Kerygma, then, means both the word of God, as expressed in the language of any time and place, and its specific historically conditioned formulation in the New Testament.

Mc Donald defines kerygma in literary terms and notes an 'inherent ambivalence' which exists in both the Greek word 'kerygma' and the English word 'preaching'.

In the kerygmatic coincidence of trans-linguistic subject (myth) and language event (word), both Via and Johnson perceive the autonomous replication of the myth. That is, they hold with the common view that kerygma necessarily reverts. This idea that the reversion is inevitable, however, can be self-imposed and illusory. In both Via's and Johnson's arguments the conception of kerygma is predetermined as an echo. So reverberation with a particular mythic source, one which can be recognised as such by Via or Johnson, is definitive. God and the New Testament are their axioms.


The most common source of recognised kerygmatic resonance is the New Testament. Frye acknowledges the kerygmatic strength of the Bible as being unique in the cultural tradition of the West but he also acknowledges a secular kerygma.\(^{367}\) He takes the Communist Manifesto and the axioms of Mao Tse-Tung as short-lived examples.\(^{368}\) What Frye, Johnson, Via and Mc Donald agree is that there is no individual basis for kerygma. Without the support of a mythology, Frye explains, kerygma becomes a 'rhetorical vacuum'.\(^{369}\) A proclamation without mythic emmanation, then, is an empty sign.

Frye's more generous parameters of kerygmatic recognition bring into consideration kerygmata which are older than and/or other than New Testament writings. As consequence, the concept of revelation is expanded, so that kerygma refers to mythic proclamation in general and not to particular dogmas. Given a Fryean receptivity, kerygmata may even include proclamation of the unmanifest, neti neti or nirvana, for example. Nihilism may emerge as a type of apocalypse whose antitype is the kerygma of a world in perpetual re-creation.

\(^{367}\) Frye, 1990, pp. 117-118.

\(^{368}\) ibid.
Kerygma constitutes what Frye called a fourth order of words in addition to Vico's three (poetic language or metaphor, assertive, legalistic language or metonymy, and transactional, interpersonal language or synecdoche). It is the identification of one thing with another thing that informs verum-factum but it is the identification of the one as the other which produces kerygmatic effects. Kerygmatic effect is not verum-factum. It is certum; certum factum if people make it so.

To summarise this subtle difference: a metaphor proposes that X is Y, this is what Vico called a 'credible impossibility'. Without some degree of collective acceptance of this, language is stillborn or, as Vico puts it, 'mute'. Legalistic assertion proposes that X is put for Y; interpersonal transaction proposes that X is as - as Y; kerygma proclaims X is!

Kerygma does not depend on collective acceptance; kerygma proclaims - each time as for the first time - X is! In the utterance of the proclamation the speaker is the spoken, the writer is the written; what is breathed is the breather, the word is the person. In rhetorical terms, these things are certainties; certum factum. This is another kind of truth that humans can make.

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369 ibid.

370 Frye, 1983, p. 87; p. 101; p. 82.
In kerygmatic expression, humane words of self-determination encounter a creative, divine word and neither silences the other. Rather, a mutual immanence of divinity and humanity is given expression. This, according to Frye, is traditionally called revelation, kerygma being the vehicle of revelation. If people have brought kerygma out of the pulpit, then the dynamic tension of self-expression and self-restraint has become a matter of survival. Why? Because, if what people say might give authenticity to their gospel (certum factum), might realise their principles (verum-factum), might make true and truly make a self-determined humanity; if we might bring about what we are talking about, then it is time to pay close attention to our rhetorical use of apocalyptic symbols.

Frye's critique of kerygma points to a new Genesis, or at least a re-creation of the old one. Vico's conceit regarding the thunder is suggestive of an alternative to Genesis. Can re-creation go so far?

According to Frye, re-creation requires the taking of another or a different perspective regarding unity. The necessary perspective, he tells us, can tolerate

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371 Vico, *New Science*, 1744, paragraph 383, p. 120.

imperfection and discontinuity, having passed through concern for unity. It may even tolerate multivocal and multifocal phenomena. He writes: 'We have now to get a glimpse or two of that wider perspective.'\textsuperscript{373} This promises a way of receiving some of the enigmatic suggestions, nuances and resonances of apocalyptic literature, ancient and contemporary. Following Frye, this study investigates kerygmatic or metaliterary effects in and of apocalyptic symbolism.

It is necessary to a functional grasp of this method to recognise silence as an active component of expression, kerygmatic and otherwise. It is possible for non verbal phenomena, such as the shibboleth and gesture and ephemeral phenomena, such as rituals, to signify mythopoeically. A non verbal pretext may even constitute a kerygmatic meaning. Such a pretext can exist without expression through words or through graphics and manifest aurally as a pause between sounds.

Mircea Eliade has argued that repetition is the silent component by which ritual reinforces the myth of time\textsuperscript{374}, David Levin has described this primal lull: 'an infinitely creative silence, which lies behind the horizon of our own egological choices.'\textsuperscript{375}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{373} See Frye, 1990, p. 312. See also, p. 114; pp. 169-171; p. 207.
\end{itemize}
becomes evident that silence is the complement of wise creativity. The indications are that creative power, as far as humans can know of it, resides in words. Both the words and the silence depend on human spirit, manifest as breath.

If we advert to Vico's heuristic ages, we could say that Frye's assumption is that people presently inhabit a kerygmatic age or, at least, are in ricorso toward it. From that perspective, the metaliterary dimension is immanent and kerygma, silence and stoicheia tou kosmou are as articulate as metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche. What is articulated, according to Frye, is not always an old myth. New myths might also emerge. Both human and inhuman entities may assert themselves through words as, constellated by literary activity, the metaliterary dimension affirms a variety of principles. Thus pluralism taxes tolerance as conventional restraints on kerygmata are challenged. Frye employs an idea he attributes to Heraclitus, that every human is his or her own Logos:

if anything in them (the Gospels) strikes the reader with full kerygmatic force, there is, using the word advisedly, a resurrection of the original speaking presence in the reader.\(^{376}\)

Perhaps it is a mistake to dichotomise divinity and humanity when words are under consideration. Frye seems to have thought it is. An investigation into ethics proceeds

\(^{376}\) See Frye, 1983, p. 100. See also Frye, 1990, p. 114.
as Frye attunes to the metaliterary. We might call the kerygma, the silence and the stoicheia tou kosmou elements of metaliterary resonance.

In Vico's thought, participation in creation, through the making of choices by human-as-creator, is always a potential; it is just so to Frye. This is not to deny providence but it is to reappropriate her hegemony. What we say shapes what we do, and creative choice commences with the way we express thoughts in words.

There are four important issues which spring from Frye's hermeneutic of the fourth order of words. First, one can encounter a text as an articulate entity. Second, one can inquire of the text who or what, in addition to the putative authorial voice, is asserting itself through the words. This augments conventional interpretative methods by asking how the metaphors, metonymy and similes accommodate the autonomous kerygma. So one can appreciate the mythopoeic potentials inherent in the resonances of the stoicheia tou kosmou and in articulate silences as well as in the kerygmata. Third, one can pursue the aforementioned question of whether and how people participate in their own creation. Fourth, one can determine for oneself whether to give a human voice and a hearing to elements some of which are not intrinsically human. In short, one can address oneself directly and critically to that literary dynamism which is called mythopoeia, apprehending, in addition to its imagistic effects, its metaphysical implications and its rhetorical resonances.
CHAPTER 5
ON TEXTS AND METHODS - SUMMARY

The Johannine Apocalypse, otherwise called the New Testament Book of Revelation, provides most of the apocalyptic terms which are current in English language. The Bible, including the New Testament Apocalypse of John, has permeated thoroughly the English language. Apocalyptic motifs such as the abyss, the plagues, the beasts and their marks, the vengeance of the righteous and the New Jerusalem or new world coming, have entered contemporary idiom.

In contemporary discourse, people use apocalyptic terms to indicate extremes of human experience. Their topics include genocide, torture-trauma and victimisation. Self-determination is set against abuse of human rights. In this discourse, apocalyptic images are borrowed from the Bible and from other apocalyptic literature but the thought to which they are appropriated is contemporary.

This study does not aim to determine whether these borrowings constitute appropriation of misappropriation. Its goal is to develop ways of understanding the contemporary apocalyptic language. This puts literary criticism in service to ethical concern, as it is expressed in contemporary apocalypses. The aim is to develop and demonstrate the interpretative method called here religio-literary.
How might the contemporary, apocalyptic figures be interpreted? This question begs others. In particular, the questions of Word and words, with regard to monism, dualism and pluralism. There is a problem of intrusive dualism here. The categories of divine word and human words can be one and the same thing to some people but not to others.

In order to proceed we need two things. First, a heuristic model by which to stabilise the otherwise fluid boundaries of our working categories. Second, a memory marker to ensure that we finish by reaffirming the model as heuristic and the boundaries as fluid. As to the memory marker, I refer to William Blake:

There is a Void, outside of Existence, which if entered into
Englobes itself & becomes a Womb.  

In these words one can recognise an idea of fluid and unbounded existence.

To satisfy the first need, for a model of thought by which to stabilise our working categories, we can adopt Frye's, including the element of kerygma and a 'Fourth Order of Words'. This interpretative structure, as we have observed, includes three of Vico's categories of rhetoric. The religio-literary model contextualises Vico's New Science and Frye's later works.

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As we have observed, Vico's New Science proves useful for developing an understanding of relations between human self-determination and human words. Vico's poetic master key, verum factum as he put it, can open up a way of understanding human creativity which includes self-creation or self-determination, in relation to speech and writing. Verum factum expresses the Vichian insight into the convertibility, in language, of what is true and what is made.

The point is in the making: people make it so; whatever it might be. What people say and how, collectively, they say it conditions what comes true in their world. So words are creative and words exist in human speech. Hence, human speech is creative.

We found that Vico's poetic master key opens up a vision of three orders of words. They are poetic language (this is that), assertive or legalistic language (this stands for that), and transactional or interpersonal language (this is as... as that). All of them operate simultaneously, like a three-ring-circus. When their resonances persuade listeners to act as though the words are true, then they are made true; verum factum.

What of divine Word? Vico's humanism acknowledges a beneficent Providence by whose permission all the events known to humanity proceed. All the words that humans know are put as responses to a Providential thunderclap. Most interpreters of
Vichian theory accept that Vico's figure of Providence is put rhetorically for the Christian Godhead. So the dualism of divinity and humanity is formally maintained in Vico's theories of rhetoric. As the verum factum theory was put forward at a time when the Inquisition was still active, the Providential presence might best be understood as a heuristic lock-pick rather than a devotional figure or icon. That, however, need not concern us here.

Frye has brought to Vico's theories of rhetoric a consideration of divinity and a divine word. In his later works Frye has confronted the question of the relations between divine word and human words.\(^\text{378}\) He has done that by including among the categories of literature kerygma. Kerygma configures the fourth order of words. This admits to the study of literature, law, commerce, oracle, riddle, aphorism, and any other body of words, a radical consideration of divinity. Any verbal vehicle might accommodate a divine entity. Enigmatic entities, the stoicheia tou kosmou, might be there too. And silence may complement mindful speech; the restraint of words by silence can be a compassionate form of human expression, without conflict with any expression of divinity.

\(^{378}\) Northrop Frye, Notebook 27 (1985) [72], p. 64 (Notebooks and diaries not yet published, MSS by kind permission of Robert Denham ed., 1994). 'The real Creator is also a creature, or rather, a new vision of the first conscious creature.' See also R. J. Reilly, Romantic Religion: A Study of Barfield, Lewis, Williams, and Tolkien, University of Georgia Press, Athens U.S.A., 1971. p. 225. Rielly quotes Barfield, "I know that without me God can live no instant; if I become nothing, He must of necessity give up the ghost." This position accords with Frye's.
Kerygma can make emphatic what is otherwise hypothetical. This occurs with the realised co-incidence of divine word and human words. Frye's description of the Biblical Apocalypse constitutes a Christian humanism which does not deny the divine breath of creativity. Nor does it deny evil, casting it as the shadow of everything that is.

So the New Testament Apocalypse, according to Frye, does not tell people to deny evil. It tells us that people who recognise goodness are inextricably bound to evil. We are in need of evil, if we want to know goodness. So we need the entity which Frye refers to as, 'the psychotic ape in the mirror'.\textsuperscript{379} We have it to take with us. Conflict of goodness and evil, then, is revealed as an opportunity for mediation, a dramatic device not a principle. In this configuration, the kerygma, which is marked as divine (Word) and unmarked kerygmata are contiguous, being co-extensive, even co-incident. Goodness and evil both speak with human voices.

Here is Frye's insight: the inclusion of the demonic parody into the apocalyptic vision; to annihilate evil we have to admit it and live with it in understanding. Then it can be redeemed. Otherwise we are inclined, in the names of righteousness, justice and humanity to treat things as expendable. As consequence we commit crimes against

\footnote{Frye, 1980, p. 70-71.}
This is a hermeneutic of tolerance. Frye identifies it as a Gospel of Love. But there are limits to tolerance. Sometimes the psychotic ape is intolerable. One might desire its death but that is suicide; it resides in the mirror. Can we perhaps annihilate the ape-thing and own up to our own psychosis, with a view to healing it? Perhaps if people abandon the modes of individuality and indivisibility this can be done. This might restore some of the original sense to Wycliffe's 'ech cursid thing schall no more be.' Little evidence of such a turn has come to hand.

Perhaps the psychotic ape, to be rendered null, has to be understood, soul, spirit, body and whatever else. This kind of understanding calls for an experiential humanism; a nirvana. Frye recognised it as a goal of Lacan's psychoanalytic theory. In both cases and others, tolerance, compassion and mediation are elements of it.

Frye's method brings extended hermeneutical horizons to his criticism of literature, including apocalyptic literature. He embraces tolerance and pluralism.\textsuperscript{380} So those of us who want to know what we are being asked to understand when victim-survivors

\textsuperscript{380} See also Martin Buber, \textit{I and Thou} (translated by Ronald Gregor Smith, Second Edition with a Postscript by the Author added), T.& T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1959. Buber's work pre-figures Frys. He accepts a divine-human dualism and interprets from within it (p. 3.); his position respects non Christian thought (p. 61; p. 88.); he enteratains the divinity of human persons.
appropriate apocalyptic terms to their contemporary rhetoric can follow Frye and add to our toolbox. The liberation of kerygma into literary criticism radicalises the other tropes, bringing to mind new dimensions of possibility. With kerygma, words escape from bondage to similitude. This is identity not likeness.

Fryeian theory may go some way toward answering Wright's call for a more wholistic approach to apocalyptic hermeneutics. As Wright puts it:

>a theory which locates the entire phenomena of text-reading within an account of the storied and relational nature of hman consciousness.\(^{381}\)

These words could well describe Frye's critical analyses of apocalypses. Moreover, Wright calls for a hermeneutic of love in which reader and text are simultaneously affirmed.\(^{382}\) As we have observed, this is a feature of Frye's later work.

Frye's interpretation is unconventional in its pluralism. That makes it valuable in multicultural and multi-temporal circumstances such as are created by the appropriation of images from the Johannine Apocalypse to contemporary rhetoric. The facilitation of expression and discussion of multi-temporal aspects of apocalyptic thought and literature are of particular importance.\(^{383}\) We have encountered in Chapter Three

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\(^{381}\) Wright, 1982, p. 61.

\(^{382}\) ibid., pp. 62-64.

\(^{383}\) For further discussion of temporal and atemporal modes of expression in literature, see Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor: Multidisciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language*, Robert Czerny (trans). with Kathleen
some of the difficulties brought about by adhesion to historicism and we noted in Chapter Two Altizer's remark that memory not history constitutes the collective human past.\footnote{384} Historicism in Biblical hermeneutics is now under scrutiny.\footnote{385} We cannot enter into that debate here.

Some major differences between Frye's approach, which tends toward inclusivity, and the many others, which incline toward exclusivity, can be illustrated by reference to Stephen Prickett's Words and 'The Word'\footnote{386}

Using methods of literary criticism, Prickett, diagnoses a malaise in modern Biblical translation. Both Biblical and Literary criticism have suffered a loss, imposed by the Humboldt divorce of theology and humanities. Moreover, theories of what he calls 'cultural relativity' and 'the emergence of the new' are problematic, giving rise to a group of dynamic but confused and inchoate ideas emmanating from the notion of the 'poetic'. The pluralism implicit in this second state of affairs moves Prickett toward

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\footnote{384} See also E.J. Hobsbawm, 'Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today' in \textit{Anthropology Today}, Vol. 8 No. 1., February, 1992. pp. 3-5. Hobsbawm analyses the political determinism and selective memory by which modern European history is being constructed.

\footnote{385} See, e.g., Jarl Fossum, 'The Logos Concept in the Prologue to John's Gospel: A New Interpretation' delivered at the \textit{Twelfth International Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature}, Leuven, 1994. Jossum's challenge to historical method is one among many which were voiced formally and informally at the Leuven conference.

\footnote{386} Prickett, 1986, op. cit.
curing us of it:

Our problem is not so much that the original event is inaccessible to us (as it is) but that, in another sense, it is apparently accessible in too many ways... At its centre lies an event of such complexity and mystery that it resists translation into any of our preconceived categories or disciplines.  

There is no celebration of pluralism here. This critical formulation goes so far as to deny pluralism. Prickett assumes a centre and a singular event. No other form is entertained. This position is antithetical to Frye's which is inclusive, pluralistic and de-centred.

Prickett's ideation does not acknowledge any inconsistency in writing about language as a whole and assuming that all forms of language are one. He writes:

To discuss biblical hermeneutics in the light of poetic theory is not to apply an alien concept, but to restore a wholeness of approach that has been disastrously fragmented over the past hundred and fifty years.

The wholeness he refers to is denoted 'The Word' in Prickett's title. His criticism offers erudite discussion of the many parts of the one but he eschews pluralistic discourse, preferring always a Christian monotheism.

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388 ibid., p. 59.
389 ibid., p. 197.
Prickett is engaged in what John Macquarrie calls 'God-talk', that is, theology. For Prickett, '[in making poetry] humanity is resonating with the divine will that created the world ex nihilo.' These words affirm that his literary criticism takes his confession of faith as an axiom. We noted similar positions in the works of Hanson, Russell and Thompson.

There is a difference between a declared position, such as Vico's or Frye's, and an assumed one, such as these represent. The difference is in the dialogic position. Hidden assumptions and hidden agendas tend to distort dialogue. By contrast, Frye's less presumptuous terms can (as Part Two demonstrates) facilitate dialogue.

Although Prickett acknowledges that literary critics tend to belong to the salvation business (his term); English is saturated with Christian values. He does not acknowledge that his remarks to that point include his own critical methods. He remarks, for example, that English must be a difficult (but not impossible) language in which to practise Buddhism. He does nothing, however, to facilitate understanding...

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391 ibid., p. 53.

392 ibid., pp. 198-199.

393 ibid.
of or dialogue with Buddhist perspectives or those of any non Christian tradition.

Prickett's method favours dualism; his categories are composed of opposites. This, notwithstanding the existence of non binary modes of thought, some of them nested in non Christian traditions, he declares as universal:

Without a common reality the notions of subjectivity and objectivity, truth or falsehood, fact or fiction have no meaning. We share a common world - not least in our common discovery of limitations... People are born and die. 394

So, Prickett's critical method puts Christian values for all religious values and, more importantly, takes the creative aspect of poetics as emmanations of Yaweh. When he writes of 'the tangled relationship between the 'religious' and the 'poetic"", he is writing from an exclusionist perspective. 395

This approach renders up a reaffitmation of the Christian God with every analytic offering it makes. For example, by comparing translations of 1 Kings 19:12, 'still small voice' and 'voice of thin silence', Prickett is able to illustrate metaphor as an ambiguous trope: 'Yaweh is and is not'. 396 Thus the metaphors are bound a priori to a Christian mythos. From the point of view of a Christian faith that might be just so but

394 ibid., p. 207.
396 ibid., pp. 11-12.
criticism is required properly to examine and defend its own axioms. Both Frye and Vico, as we have seen, attended to that requirement.

Prickett's adhesion to traditional Christianity weakens his appreciation of the Biblical logos. For example, he tells us that the abovementioned 'still small voice' is the type of the logos in John 1; it presents always a tension of opposites. The type and antetype relations of the Old Testament and the New Testament are not disputed here. The tension of opposites is, however, questionable. There are many kinds of tension; opposition is only one of them. To reduce all dynamic tension to opposition reflects a simple dualism. Here is the dualism of the human and divine, intruding by use of words into an understanding of words. Prickett's position is more apposite to Barth's; Frye's to Schleiermacher's.

The dualism can develop into something else. Prickett writes:

"if the 'Poetic Genuis' is to be identified with the logos as a human manifestation of the 'living word' of God, it is important not to read that metaphor of 'life' in any organic sense... human growth - the growth of the mind - depends upon the ability to assimilate variety, discontinuity, and disconfirmation. When poetic language is described in terms of 'life' it is in that latter peculiar and disturbing sense."

This division of organism and mind accommodates the kind of crypto-fascism that is

397 ibid., p. 170.

expressed in Heidegger's 'language speaks'. When the matter-mind dichotomy is brought together with the concept expressed as creatio ex nihilo, it not only accommodates the cryptofascism, it provokes it. Creatio ex nihilo is a non canonical idea which springs from a fallacy of concrete annihilation which is discussed in Chapter Six. Suffice to say here that it lends itself to considering noumenal nothingness as though it is phenomenal; 'the nothingness'.

In Prickett's critique, a hieratic and hegemonistic metaphysic is assumed then enforced. In Prickett's words: 'To make the New is the prerogative of the logos'.\(^\text{399}\) This proclamation of Prickett's resonates with Barth's insistence on the importance of a creature-creator dualism.

Prickett does not discuss creator-creature dualism, he asserts it. The limitations brought about by that assertion can be illustrated by his analyses of Vico's and Frye's poetics. He acknowledges Vico, telling us that the poetic 'master key' requires a difficult mental leap.\(^\text{400}\) He succinctly illustrates, pointing out that the Italian poesia comes from the Greek to 'make' 'For Vico... the poetic... is how the mind creates'.\(^\text{401}\) So he does not engage with the matter of credible impossibility which is the seat of

\(^{399}\) ibid., p. 241.

\(^{400}\) ibid., p. 50.
the difficulty of the master key. He proceeds by putting together ideas of progression and retrogression, in an unacknowledged mimesis of ricorso. Thus Prickett includes Vico's poetics in the scope of his discourse but, unlike Frye, he does not adopt Vico's insights.

Prickett's reading of Vico founders, however, like others we shall discuss in Chapter Six, on the assumption of progress. He acknowledges Vico's appreciation of the undifferentiated subjectivity and objectivity as a creative power but cannot put that appreciation into a present context. Blinded by his own transcendent literalism, Prickett claims that the connection of poetic language with creation of reality eludes other critics, including Vico (and Frye). The progressivist positivism in Prickett's own assumptions makes him the author of the mistake he attributes to the others. He argues that, naive participation in language gives way to the 'more developed' literal. He calls spontaneous, participation 'primal', assuming that a knowledge of the history of the words constitutes an ability to make literal meanings.

Prickett acknowledges Frye's debt to Vico, telling us that Vico's terms, 'poetic',

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401 ibid., p. 52.
402 ibid., p. 203.
403 ibid., pp. 85-90.
'heroic' and 'vulgar' are Frye's 'hieroglyphic', 'hieratic' and 'demotic'.⁴⁰⁴ This he interprets as a three-fold interpretation of language common to Frye and Vico. So he ignores Frye's later works. Moreover, he carries over the fallacy of progress. For example, he criticises Frye's category of the demotic by refusing the example of business records. The notion that demotic or vulgar terms existed in ancient Sumerian business records, just as they do in contemporary ones, sets up too much cognitive dissonance with Prickett's notion of the 'primal'.⁴⁰⁵

In this progressivism, antiquity is primitive, opposing the present and eventual enlightenment. So he advises against applying the term poetic to what Frye would call demotic. Thus he misses two points. One is Frye's, that simile configures language in the demotic phase, rendering it as poetic as metaphor. Susanne Langer calls this a 'new key'.⁴⁰⁶ The other point is Vico's; that language, in order to be formed, enters into poetics. So, by his own analysis, Prickett's work stands as a contrast to Frye's.

Furthermore, Prickett puts forward no appreciation of Frye's insight into the descriptive motivation of the language of trade and transaction; this is worth as much

⁴⁰⁴ ibid., p. 70.
⁴⁰⁵ ibid., p. 71.
as that. Regarding the issue of kerygma, he pre-empts is without examination. He dismisses Frye's engagement with this fourth form of expression by equating kerygma with demythologisation, following Bultmann.\footnote{ibid., p. 72.} Prickett dismisses demythologisation. Thereafter, by mistaken association, his interest in Frye diminishes almost to nought.

Prickett's dismissal of Frye's later work has resulted in some anomalies of literary criticism which can help here to illustrate the case for a Fryean approach. Take, for example, the matter of polysemous or many-sided meaning.\footnote{ibid., p. 208.} Prickett quotes Lukács: 'The language of the novel is a system of languages that mutually and ideologically interanimate one another.'\footnote{Lukács, \textit{The Theory of the Novel}, 1971, p. 47 in Prickett, 1986, p. 210.} He ignores Frye's:

what is implied (by Dante's use of the word 'polysemous') is a single process growing in subtlety and comprehensiveness, not different senses, but different intensities or wider contexts of a continuous sense, unfolding like a plant out of a seed.\footnote{Frye, 1983, p. 221. See also pp. 220-222.}

There are points of difference in the 'comprehensiveness' and in the organic metaphor of Frye's terms. Here is something that is not pure metaphysic. In the 1980s (and since then) mention of plant growth constitute a call for consideration of hybridism, mutation and even an engineering of elements. Prickett's method prefers terms that are
The most telling point of difference between Prickett's approach to words and Frye's is evident in the matter of apocalyptic evil. Prickett begs the question of evil, writing about 'disconfirmation', a disconcerting element of apocalypse: 'Nothing that has gone before has prepared us'. His example, however, is drawn from Dante not Revelation; Beatrice's rebuke to Dante (Canto 30-31). Thus he addresses a more gentle and less shocking kind of dramatic conflict than Frye's demonic parody encounters. Prickett's is a hyperliterate apocalypse, more concerned with words themselves than with psychotic apes:

At the most basic level we have words themselves - the proper study of linguistics and etymology; at the most complex we find 'story', what is being intentionally said, whether intended as fictional, historical, or discursive - the proper field of a whole range of disciplines including theology, philosophy, literary criticism, and the various branches of history. Between these two extremes, and in some sense joining them by a bridge, we now have to insert metaphor - by common assumption the proper realm of the poetic - but whose exact theoretical function is disputed and unclear.

This passage appears in Prickett's final chapter, entitled 'Metaphor and Reality'. Notice the assumption of a given reality. He tells us that the occasions when our two eyes provide two different sets of information are extremely rare and happen only

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under exceptional purposes.\textsuperscript{413} Here he betrays his own point about the ambiguity of metaphor.\textsuperscript{414} The abandonment of ambiguity is necessitated by the assumption of a given reality.

This is important because the pre-emptive equation of 'The Word' with all meaning and reality amounts to a Christian chauvinism. It renders dialogue between and among religions almost null, so reduced are the terms of acceptance. This, in turn, renders the interpretation of apocalyptic symbols almost self-referential.

People searching the apocalyptic store of images for terms by which to speak of their unprecedented experiences can find none if what is unique to them is turned into an echo of an old story from somebody else's book. So Prickett's and similar approaches have little to offer to the contemporary discourse of self-determination. How might a religio-literary method, built of Frye's tropes be more useful? It might loosen the grasp of literalism which, in concert with the barbarism of reflection renders apocalyptic language all too potent.

How, then, might we interpret the self-determining proclamations of victim-survivors

\textsuperscript{413} ibid., p. 223.
\textsuperscript{414} ibid., p. 189.
who refer, for example, to the abyss, the beast or Armageddon? Are we being asked to support a genocide to end genocide? Might the complaints of victim-survivors at the service of apocalyptic desire? Not necessarily. If we take into account the kerygmatic nuances of the abysmal imagery, it becomes evident that complainants have tended to conflate into it the protestation of the martyrs. This muddles together death and annihilation, forgetting redemption and creating a plea for both vengeance and understanding.

A religio-literary method can open a way to more understanding interpretations. The advantage would be a liberation from dysfunctional literalism. In our religio-literary model, a metaphor of transformation envelops all the apocalyptic images, resonating with the kerygma: change is! A metonymy of the divine son, put for word and standing for change, supports the metaphor. A simile, this change is as great or small as we make it, emanates from both. The change is proclaimed within the myth of a god as a stable but not necessarily immutable category, receptive to the metamorphoses of humankind. What changes is humanity; metamorphosis, even by death, is part of that change.

This apocalyptic motif can show us that something else besides the notion of expendability is being called up when apocalyptic imagery is appropriated to contemporary discourse. We are being asked to attend to things which have yet to be
named. We are being asked to listen to a new voice whose certainty is complaint. We are being asked to understand the present claim of the victim-survivor; that one has been treated like the devil himself.
CHAPTER 6
ON APOCALYPTES AND OPPRESSION: SOME SOCIAL CONTEXTS

It is not sufficient to a thorough analysis of apocalyptic rhetoric to examine literary phenomena without consideration of their social contexts. This is a very brief survey of the main elements of four apocalyptic contexts. There are many apocalypses with various social contexts but oppression is a theme which all of them share. This diverse field is exemplified here by the work of four scholars. They are Martha Himmelfarb's speculation on Jewish and Christian apocalypses415, Paul J. Alexander's appreciation of Byzantine apocalypses416, Paul D. Hanson's appreciation of Post exilic Hebrew apocalypses417 and Thomas Altizer's prolegomena for Postmodern Ecumenical apocalypses.418 A link between apocalypse and victimisation is commonly recognised in these discussions of apocalyptic phenomena and conditions. That gives them relevance to this religio-literary analysis.

HIMMELFARB ON JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN APOCALYPTES

Martha Himmelfarb finds oppression in the relationship of legalism and sin. She calls Christian and Jewish apocalypses 'tours of hell'. Her interest is in the concentration, in apocalypses, of sinners awaiting punishment in heaven [sic].419 Her study of apocalypse is a study of sins. Her method is to list sins, categorising their types.

In apocalypse she finds a long lived tradition in which sin is elemental.420 According to


417 Hanson, 1978; 1979; 1982, op. cit.


419 Himmelfarb, 1983, p. 73.

420 ibid., p. 173.
Himmelfarb, one of the benefits of studying long lived tradition is that it enables one to see how interests change. The sins discussed by Himmelfarb range from murder to chatter in synagogue, sexual sins and sins of speech.

According to Himmelfarb, sins of speech are condemned in the Hebrew Bible, early Jewish literature, Rabbinic literature, and early Christian literature. It follows, she claims, that blasphemy in the sense of oath-breaking very important.  

For Himmelfarb, the many figures of sin constitute an apocalyptic scenario against which she questions the rationality of legalism. She points out the relative visibility and invisibility of types of sin, showing, for example, that sins of speech and sexuality, tend toward invisibility, unlike murder which is difficult to conceal. Himmelfarb treats apocalypses as a victimised babble of misunderstood sinners, itself an indication of inadequacy in earthly legal systems.

\[421\] ibid., p. 72.
PAUL J. ALEXANDER AND BYZANTINE APOCALYPTES

Paul J. Alexander has written on the origins, development and diffusion of Byzantine apocalypses between the 4th and the 11th centuries. He tells us that apocalyptic visions of an approaching end-time permeate Christian history. In her Introduction to Alexander's book, Dorothy L. Abrahamse supports this view, affirming that, in early Christian times, believers prepared to recognise signs of an eschatological drama which was held to be impending.  

Alexander's description refers to the Syriac Apocalypse of Pseudo-Methodius. According to Alexander, it commenced its exposition in Mesopotamia during the first decades of Arab domination. Translated into Greek, it became basic to Byzantine apocalyptic tradition. Alexander shows that Pseudo-Methodius' subject was the succession of kingdoms pointing to their consummation in heavenly kingdom.

The Byzantine figure of the Antichrist has, according to Alexander, many precedents. He makes the important point that the personification of the Antichrist does not occur in Byzantine apocalypses. It was from the 5th century onward that Church Fathers


\[423\] Alexander, 1985, p. 18. The Visions of Daniel and the Apocalypse of St Andrew the Fool and the Cento of the True Emperor are redactions of the apocalypse of Pseudo-Methodius.
insisted on the identification of the Antichrist as a human being, not a devil or a Devil. So the personification of the Johannine satan is a reinterpretation of the text. We will return to the theme of the satan in Chapter Ten.

Alexander treats three major themes: the Last Roman Emperor, Gog and Magog; and the legend of the Antichrist. Byzantine apocalypses predict, that at the end of time, a last Roman Emperor would surrender his imperial office and power to God.\(^\text{424}\) The emperor's task is to make war against non-Christians but he surrenders to heaven instead. After the surrender of the last emperor, Antichrist comes into domination. The god combats the reign of Antichrist by a variety of means, including shortening time, the 'Gathering of the Elect', and the sending, sacrifice and resurrection of prophets (Enoch and Elijah) who denounce Antichrist. This, according to Alexander, is consistent in all versions.

Gog and Magog are the names of nations, "very impure nations"\(^\text{425}\) of the North. In Byzantine apocalypses, according to Alexander, Gog and Magog invade after the surrender (to heavenly domination) of the last Roman Emperor. The defeat of Gog and Magog is dependent on angelic intervention. Byzantine apocalypses predict

\(^{424}\) ibid., p. 151.

\(^{425}\) ibid., p. 185.
Antichrist's eternal punishment. Eternal punishment is prescribed also for all who claim Antichrist as king or emperor.

These Byzantine visions make apocalypses out of torment. People are characterised as being oppressed by their own ignorance. Alexander tells us that most Byzantine apocalypses expect many Jews and Christians to turn to worship of Antichrist in mistake for a Messiah. So eternal torment can, in byzantine terms, result from actions committed in error.

In these Byzantine apocalypses, human actions find their significance in their outcomes, which are inclined by ignorance to evil. Humanity perpetuated, albeit by perpetuation of evil, is crucial to these apocalypses. Humanity cannot survive unless people commit evil, intentional or mistaken. So humans survive by evil. Merciful angelic intervention consigns the people to annihilation; divine intervention punishes people by torment.

These are dark apocalypses. Humans are characterised as creatures of evil. The best hope is annihilation got by the merciful understanding of the angels.

426 ibid., p. 200.
427 ibid., p. 203.
ibid., pp. 207-208.
HANSON ON POST EXILIC HEBREW APOCALYPTIC

Hanson defines apocalyptic writings by a temporal location. What he calls the Dawn of Apocalyptic occurred in 597 B.C. It was consolidated in 587 B.C. Post exilic Hebrew apocalyptic emerged at this time. The Biblical Isaiah exemplifies apocalyptic texts, according to Hanson. The struggles of the post Exilic Hebrews against the felt oppression of Roman law characterise what he calls apocalyptic.

Hanson warns that contemporary apocalyptic expression is not normative of the ancient. He writes:

The most common outside source to which the origins of apocalyptic are traced is Persian dualism, especially as it was mediated by later Hellenistic influences.429

Thus he suggests the maintenance of historical values. He does not signal any acknowledgment at all to processes such as appropriation, fragmentation and reappropriation. Nor does he signal any allowance to literary simultaneity, such as Vico's and Frye's poetics observe. Thus Hanson's definition renders itself vulnerable to criticism as instruments such as CD ROM and INTERNET facilitate the import of ancient symbols into contemporary texts for purposes of sudden impact.

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429 Hanson, 1979, p. 5. See also Hanson, Paul D., 'Apocalyptic Literature' in Douglas A Knight and Gene M. Tucker (eds.), The Hebrew Bible and its Modern Interpreters, Scholars Press, Chico, California, 1985, pp. 465-488.
As we shall observe, Hanson's practical method yields to necessity and his early historicism is gradually displaced by more literary considerations. This is advantageous because a method which adheres to a strict temporal location fails as ancient symbols, debased and incomplete, are liberated into contemporary apocalypses. So clusters of apocalyptic imagery are reconfigured to serve present purposes. The time bound critic is likely to have little to contribute to the developing discourse, except to judge that what is now called appropriation is misappropriation.

Take, for example, Robert M. Grant's argument that Church history traces a strict sequential development out of apocalypticism into hierarchical structures, such as those preferred by the apostle Paul.\textsuperscript{430} What Grant's method does is to provide a metonymic code, based on Pauline structural hierarchies, within which progress can be described.

Grant's method disposes of apocalyptic symbolism in all but its allegorical mode, 'these things are an allegory'.\textsuperscript{431} Hence it disposes of the complexities of metaphorical ambiguity. This method proceeds with the fallacy of intentionality. As Grant puts it, the goal is to 'find out what writings meant to their authors and first readers'.


\textsuperscript{431} Grant, 1983, pp. 42-49.
In the matter of language, Hanson's approach is comparable to Grant's claims that biblical texts, including apocalyptic texts, constitute a 'Language of Confession'.\textsuperscript{432} It is, he writes, 'the honest, faithful expression of true feelings within the trust and freedom of a living relationship'.\textsuperscript{433} What is meant by true feelings, trust and freedom Hanson does not make clear.

This language of confession, he asserts, is neither 'consistency' or 'facticity'. Explaining consistency, Hanson affirms subjectivity in Biblical hermeneutics. He warns that subjectivity must be balanced by objectivity. He calls upon history to provide the objective aspect of interpretation. To do this he writes on facticity, he refers to Schleiermacher's observation that literal readings of the Biblical narrative are inappropriate. Literal reading, he claims, 'exposes the more significant sides of life'. Hanson does not show a relationship between true feelings, objectivity and significant sides of life, so his discourse on apocalyptic language remains cryptic. He does, nevertheless, hold to his theme of authorial intent.

Although his references and discussion make it clear that the language of confession is

\textsuperscript{432} Hanson, 1979, pp. 4-5.

\textsuperscript{433} Hanson, 1982, p. 1.
neither subjective nor literal, Hanson gives no succinct definition of it. He applauds the diversity of Biblical texts as an expression of the language of confession, telling us they encode responses to a relationship with the god of the scriptures which is experienced as ongoing. He asserts that, in ancient times, the god was revealing a universal purpose which has continued to be revealed until the present. Thus Hanson makes affirmations of faith as though making socio-literary critique. The following affirmation makes this clear:

the emphasis on language as that which evokes understanding must be enlarged to make room for discernment of divine manifestation not only in Word, but in world, that is, in patterns of order and purpose in nature and history.

Note that Hanson inserts the capitalised Word, signifying the Christian God, without acknowledgment or explanation. By that device the confession of his faith is inserted into his critique. As we have observed in reference to Prickett's work and by contrast to Frye's, such assumptions obfuscate rather than facilitate discussion.

By asserting the need to accommodate ideas of divinity 'not only in Word, but in world', Hanson touches on a metaliterary conundrum. He assumes that by making larger their language people will approach an expression of the ineffable. He has failed

\[\text{434 ibid., p. xvi.}\]

\[\text{435 ibid., p. 9.}\]
to observe that beside (or around) any utterance is juxtaposed the silence of the ineffable. To expand language is, paradoxically and simultaneously, to expand ineffability.

Hanson represents the language of confession by making close analysis of Old Testament texts, especially Isaiah. In this apocalyptic literature, he tells us, the world was consigned to doom. To compensate, the cosmic imagery of myth was embraced. This was, as Hanson puts it, 'a more ethereal vision, a purely transcendent solution'.

He writes:

> The visionaries thus abandoned all hope for the existing order, and along with this goes the abdication of half of the prophetic tension, the social and political responsibilities inherent in the prophetic vocation... the notion of the importance of human participation in reform is replaced by the passive posture of those awaiting God's total annihilation of the enemy and his creating of a blessed new order.'

In summary: an ideal form called the Kingdom of God [Hanson mentions no end-of-world, only Kingdom], was pitched into a future inferred by covenant; this brought past and future into a creative, reformist dynamism.

As we noted in Chapter One, Hanson criticises sociological methods for finding a crisis at the root of every apocalyptic movement. The crisis, according to Hanson, is a minority phenomenon. It is the collapse of a well-ordered world view. The majority

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436 Hanson, 1982, p. 55.
continues without experiencing the crisis.\footnote{ibid., p. 2.}

In this matter, Hanson concurs with Yonina Talmon's abovementioned definition of millenarianism. Talmon argues that felt oppression is more inclined than actual oppression to give rise to millenarian movements. The movements may be seen as uprisings of outrage against oppression, real or imagined.\footnote{Talmon, 1966, pp. 186-187.} The point to be made is that apocalyptic rhetoric is used to provoke responses to oppression not merely to describe it.

Frith Lambert makes the important point that political instability can bring about a collective self-consciousness of the structure by which a group maintains its identity. Volatile political pressures can motivate a shift in the collective focus from rights and obligations to relational possibilities. Given such a shift, groups and individuals both can exploit a potential for change.\footnote{Frith Lambert, \textit{Tribal Ideology in Ancient Israel}, Thesis, PhD, Anthropology, University of Sydney, Sydney, 1988, p 137-138.} What is being exploited is the convertibility of the metaphors by which the members of the group identify with one another.

Hanson describes apocalyptic eschatology as a rhetorical form which emerged as the
first expression of Hebrew faith in Yahweh challenged the orthodoxy of the Pharaohs. Being a reform activity, it required its own form. This was problematic.

The problem was that the early Yahwist's concept of form was construed as against sin. This was radical. The conventional concept of form was understood as an effect of a primordial event and sin was not supposed to be primordial. So an idea of reform which construed itself against sin could not be rendered coherent.

In response to this problem, the Hebrew prophets forged eschatologisation as a solution. This is an idea of pre-ordained consummation. It operates by paradox. The end of things, that is eschaton or consummation cannot be known. It is imponderable. So it can be primordial and futuristic, past and future being at least unknown, perhaps unknowable. What can be known is the present. The prophets supply what should be known. The present is thus rendered as a state of sin and the struggle against oppression is configured as a struggle for reform and against sin.

Thus post exilic Hebrew apocalyptic is described by Hanson as a propaganda of political reform. The need for reform was perpetuated by the oppression under Roman law. This is what Hanson calls, 'plain history, real politics, and human
instrumentality'. The apocalypticists related their visions to pragmatics within the sociopolitical orders which governed them and their followers. This is why, according to Hanson, contemporary apocalypses and ancient ones are so very different.

In 597 B.C. and again in 587 B.C. hope and pragmatism polarised. Israel's political identity as a nation was ended and visionaries abdicated increasingly the task of translating their visions into historical events. Until 587 B.C. 'reasonable optimism' (Hanson's term) had made possible the maintenance of prophetic capability but optimism appeared much less reasonable as the Jews felt themselves to be crushed by political injustices. Hanson writes:

The visionary element is the vision of a divine order transcending all mundane institutions and structures, a vision which constantly calls those institutions and structures under judgement, stubbornly refusing at the same time to become identified with them.

With the waning of hope, the role of the visionary became increasingly that of myth-maker, myth offering an escape from harsh reality by affirming the motif of glorious promise. The complete return to a mythic world view was, according to Hanson, accomplished by Gnosticism. Hopeful vision was embraced by apocalyptic movements.

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440 Hanson, 1979, p. 11.
441 Hanson, 1979, p. 16-28.
442 Hanson, 1979, p. 30.
Hanson argues that the development of apocalyptic eschatology is neither sudden nor anomalous. There were earlier precedents. He refers to the untranslated visions, Exodus 15, Judges 5, Joshua 10, and Ugaritic mythopoeia. So early apocalyptic is not an unexpected development but a return to ancient roots. He tells us that, viewed historically, three primary factors account for the development of apocalyptic eschatology. They are: self-identification with the classical, prophetic tradition, literalisation of mythopoeic material, and a crisis-ridden community threatened by factional schism between visionary and hierocratic interests.

Hanson sees apocalyptic eschatology as a development out of prophetic eschatology. Prophets, such as, Isaiah, acted as political advisers to kings, integrating religious visions and political realities, and maintaining a tension between allegiance to cosmic order and responsibility to the mundane. He writes:

(They) were capable of holding together the tension as they work for responsible change while at the same time being guided by a hope whose final grounding is in divine providence.

Hanson tells us that apocalyptic mentality cannot be explained by reference to a

443 ibid., p. 17.

444 Hanson, 1982, p. 41. See also Hanson 1979, p. 18.
His stated aim is to re-focus discussion of apocalypse upon the ancient texts and upon the sociological matrices within which the texts took form. This interpretative method valorises durability as does Himmelfarb’s opinion. A magical, enhanced reality is taken to be resident in ancient texts and their putative times.

In what Hanson calls his contextual-typological method he purports to reconstruct the societal matrices out of which Hebrew apocalypses, exemplified by the Biblical Isaiah emerged. He describes this method as an analysis of themes and forms, followed by literary analysis. His exegesis carries forward a densely detailed description of institutions in flux. The literature, according to Hanson, encodes a people's attempt to bring order to otherwise chaotic circumstances.

Is it essential to locate apocalypticism in post-exilic Judaism? Might one not reflect upon a contemporary situation? If, for example, the emergence and expression of Hitler's apocalypse can be found comparable to the apocalypses of post-exilic Judaism, are the latter more real and the former less real? As we are now living with the consequences of both, I contend that both are as real to us as we make them and may require our attention.

\[445 \text{ ibid., pp. 20-21.}\]
Hanson describes a diverse symbology of apocalyptic expression. He uses a single feature, eschatology, as a rubric by which to distinguish apocalyptic from other phenomena and conditions. Challenging the method of listing features, he asserts that that method is inadequate. Thus his method differs from that of Russell and others who list themes and functions. He affirms the centrality of what he calls 'the strand of apocalyptic eschatology'. He extrapolates from his material a credible community situation.

He acknowledges this step as questionable but defends it as crucial, claiming that it is necessary because it may provide valuable insight into history. Thus Hanson pursues an interest in symbols by entering the myth of time and employing metaphors of history. The motifs of oppression and struggle suffice to render the putative communities credible, at least in dramatic terms.

Hanson characterises the ethical dimension of apocalyptic literature as a drama of struggle. He writes:

prophetic figures struggling to maintain the vital creative tension between

\footnote{ibid., p. 7. See also Hanson, 1982, Ch. 3 'Apocalyptic Seers and Priests in Conflict, and the Development of the Visionary/Pragmatic Polarity.}

\footnote{ibid., p. 43.}
vision and realism which is the heart of genuine ethical religion has survived throughout.\textsuperscript{448}

His recognition of the ethical dimension of the literature, however, seems to be obfuscated by his preoccupation with differentiating vision and reality.

According to Hanson, when realism is separated from vision it becomes a sterile preserver of the status quo. He tells us that vision separated from reality leads to a retreat into ecstasy and away from social responsibility.\textsuperscript{449} He advocates the integration of vision and realism:

\begin{quote}
the creative dynamism of our religious heritage has developed especially under the tutelage of those carrying forward the prophetic tradition of being guided by a vision of the Kingdom but being equally zealous in integrating that vision into the realities of the everyday world. This posture does not imply a denial of the authenticity of the apocalyptic response. It merely reserves it for those for whom it is intended, those suffering from a sense of alienation which threatens to cast life into the abyss.\textsuperscript{450}
\end{quote}

He acknowledges that programmatic exploitation of apocalyptic symbology has led to nationalistic, racist and dogmatic social development but he does not address this as an ethical issue. Instead, he tells us it is pseudo-apocalyptic. Here is an example of the abovementioned limitation of his method; argument is reduced to quibble. Is the struggle of the post exilic pawn more real than that of the postmodern victim-

\textsuperscript{448} Hanson, 1987, p. 31.

\textsuperscript{449} ibid., p. 444.

\textsuperscript{450} Hanson, 1979, p. 30.
Hanson finds opposition to tyranny in apocalyptic. Opposition is maintained against a hierocratic order which not only oppresses but crushes minorities under its rule. A question arises. Hanson writes:

Of such systems it must be asked, Do they grow out of a responsible attempt to relate a sensible view of reality to contemporary life in a manner which is constructive, creative, and compassionate, or do the draw elements from various earlier sources into a program aimed at heroism, deification and self-aggrandizement, whose final motivation can be traced to a pathological death-wish for the mass of humanity and contempt for the entire created order?451

Thus he recommends inquiry of apocalyptic sources as to whether or not they valorise victimisation by threat of omnicide. In post exilic Hebrew eschatology, according to Hanson, human agency struggles for recognition: 'human agents appear as mere pawns in the cosmic chess game'.452

Hanson acknowledges two kinds of apocalypse: 'it becomes apparent that we have in the Bible two rival programs of restoration.'453 The one he describes as a blueprint of hierocratic pragmatists, the other as a mythopoeic dream of visionaries:

after the return from exile one segment of the Jewish community responded to the correlation of heritage and new events with a rather pragmatic program

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451 ibid., p. 443.
452 ibid., p. 28.
453 ibid., p. 71.
modelling restoration on structures of the immediate past. Others articulated visions of a new order of nature and community by appeal to archaic (in part mythopoeic) traditions of the distant past. He understands them as being necessarily connected. The tension of their connection he calls 'dynamic transcendence'. In the connection, he tells us that creative and redemptive aspects of faith may be appreciated simultaneously. This, he asserts is the consequence of the visionary and the pragmatic postures, occurring together.

Here is an example of the sense of simultaneity which Hanson's statements about his method seem to exclude. It is also an example of his historicism yielding to literary considerations, mythopoeia for example. Hanson's exegesis suggests, as does Frye's literary critique, that the visionary writings lend themselves the more to creative realisation. Furthermore, Hanson valorises the visionary tradition. He writes:

The cosmic vector, manifested especially, though not exclusively, in the rich contemplative and sapiential materials of our heritage, describes depth-dimensions of reality without whose abiding presence the dynamic movement of the teleological vector would disintegrate into chaos.

Going even further from his early injunction against temporal negotiation, he mentions Thomas Merton's twentieth century writings as being outstanding in contemporary

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454 Hanson, 1978, p. 68.
455 ibid., p. 71.
456 ibid.
expression of the cosmic vector.\textsuperscript{457}

To summarise, the hierocratic blueprint is designed to safeguard holiness which is reserved for the few: 'The saving activity is initiated and carried out by the Divine Warrior himself.'\textsuperscript{458} The visionary dream is that all people will be holy.\textsuperscript{459} Conflict between protagonists of these two views seems inevitable.\textsuperscript{460} Out of the conflict new ways of conceptualising restoration are discovered.\textsuperscript{461}

\textsuperscript{457} ibid., footnote 2, p. 102.
\textsuperscript{458} ibid., p. 28.
\textsuperscript{459} ibid., p. 73.
\textsuperscript{460} ibid., p. 75.
\textsuperscript{461} ibid., p. 79.
ALTIZER ON POSTMODERN ECUMENICAL APOCALYPTES

Thomas Altizer identifies apocalypse as a revolutionary element of Christian faith. It constitutes an ever present challenge to any status quo. Recognition of this, Altizer asserts, is overdue in late twentieth century Christian communities, especially the communities of theologians:

No problem is more overwhelming in our situation than that of the relation between Alpha and Omega, beginning and end, and most forcefully so insofar as their respective and contrary identities now appear to be passing into each other, thereby dissolving and erasing the integral and individual identities of both beginning and end.\footnote{Altizer, 1985, p. 9.}

Altizer accuses theology of tardiness in recognising its own now-occurring and necessary revolution. He writes of 'annulling all previously established forms of faith' and argues that to perpetuate itself in the contemporary world, the Christian faith must embrace then revise history.\footnote{Altizer, 1979, p. 27.} So Altizer lives within the social context of the apocalypse he describes. He challenges his tradition from within. Arch conservatism among guardians of the Christian faith effects the oppression which concerns him:

the traditional Christian idea of God as the absolutely sovereign and transcendent Lord has been assaulted as an ultimate barrier to the expansion of consciousness and experience... to affirm the creatureliness or finitude of man [sic] and the world, and to seek to impose limits or barriers upon the infinite expansion of consciousness and experience, is to speak against the whole movement of modern history, and to make faith antithetical to everything...
which is manifest as reality in the modern world.\textsuperscript{464}

Altizer's challenge suggests a human creativity bound in mutual immanence with the divine yet sensitive to the contingencies of an imploding universe. Metamorphosis is Altizer's 'revolution'. It emanates from the idiom of beginning-in-ending and ending-in-beginning. What is mysterious is the simultaneity; end-of-world (eschaton) and new-world-coming (creation or re-creation) stand together in a present plenum.

Beginning itself is becoming a surd in our consciousness, a cipher without a code, the only code ready to hand being one which reverses our given identity of beginning by apprehending it as the beginning of the end.\textsuperscript{465}

This analysis of Altizer's is highly compatible with that of Frye's later works. His expression is more accusatory but his method demonstrates mediation of opposites, as does Frye's. Moreover, Altizer observes two apocalyptic horizons, neological and eschatological, which are similar to Frye's. It follows that Altizer's critique can be used to support the religio-literary method.

Altizer explains contemporary apocalypses as a neological responses to eschatological conservatism:

So it is that the most advanced forms of the imagination in the West are now assaulting all form and structure... if only because all we have known as life is now appearing in the image of impotence and death.\textsuperscript{466}

\textsuperscript{464} ibid., pp. 31-32.

\textsuperscript{465} Altizer, 1985, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{466} ibid., p. 24.
If the will to break or transcend previous limitations is a decisive mark of the modern world, Altizer points out, it is also a mark of traditional Christianity. But Christian theologians, according to Altizer, are playing tricks, trying to maintain a misbegotten status quo. Thus they are tending to affirm silence in the name of revolution.

Altizer explains that when theologians call for thorough transformation and translation of their axioms, they tend covertly to re-affirm those axioms by repetition. We can recognise this as the institutional use of kerygma. Furthermore, he points out that the way of silence is the oldest way of faith. Here is an implicit recognition of Vico’s mute hieroglyphs. Altizer writes:

A compulsion for relevance and the new can in itself warn us of the presence of an attachment to the irrelevant and the old. It can also be a means of deepening the power of an ancient symbol by disguising its name.\textsuperscript{467}

Altizer argues that the abnegation of history is one form of the return to silence. It must lead to a dissolution of Christian faith (because it denies word and words). He tells us that, when contemporary Christian faith is turned away from the world and worldly expression, it is not revolutionary but reactionary.

Altizer challenges what he identifies as a tricky illusion, a theological tendency to

\textsuperscript{467} See Altizer, 1979, p. 19.
separate history and faith. The separation, he claims, involves an attempt to neutralise history by isolating it from faith. The separation of history and faith has simply given to ancient dualism a new name and face.

The attempt to dichotomise history and faith, Altizer tells us, marks the continued existence of the classical problem of dualism. Theologians who posit a radical gulf between the world and faith deny that one can be judged in terms of the other. They claim that faith and world exist autonomously. But, Altizer asks, can Christianity exist without recognition of a profane world?

Has modern theology in fact accepted the autonomy of the modern world? Surely the answer to this question can only be no. For where in modern theology can one find an acceptance of the world in its own terms?468

Conservative, modern theology, he tells us, has accepted the world only by denuding it of ultimate meaning and value. This makes perceived existence wholly dependent on faith. The past, however, is enshrined in memory not history. By annulling its previous history, it can revolutionise itself in the interests of current relevance.

Altizer's distinction between annulment and abnegation is a fine one but it is important. An annulment recognises what has gone before but deems it irrelevant to the current situation while abnegation simply denies what has gone before. Hence, a

468 ibid., p. 30.
revolution may be effected which is not one of destruction of the past but one of displacement of history by memory. Thus necessary knowledge can be conveyed by forms which are more coherent to present need:

This ground can be real or realised only with the advent of a uniquely human consciousness, which is to say a consciousness that is either liberated or distanced from both the sacred and the natural realms.  

Like Vico and Frye, Altizer recognises a revolutionary spiral of reiteration, a cyclic moment, re-creation. This he identifies as apocalyptic. His theology propounds a creative humanity in need of words to express itself against a conservative status quo whose vehicle is silence. Thus Altizer, like Frye, recognises kerygma and silence as elements of apocalyptic thought.

These four analyses find among their examples myths and beliefs which inform Judaic and Christian communities ancient and modern. We can discern oppression as an element common to all these analyses. Whether the apocalyptic rhetoric calls for acquiescence or resistance, oppression motivates its expression.

Himmelfarb tells us little about Jewish and Christian apocalypses except that they constitute a source of oppressive legalism. She puts forward a valuable insight into the legalism; it tends to foster self-victimisation. The response which Himmelfarb calls for is a reassessment of the precepts upon which laws are made, kept and enforced.

Alexander describes a model of apocalypse which calls for acquiescence; Byzantine apocalypse. He makes an observation which supports Himmelfarb's; punishment is predestined within a legalistic model which criminalises trespass. This victimises trespassers.

Hanson tells us of the oppression of people viewed as pawns in a cosmic chess game. The motivating element is an attempt to balance a destabilised community. Hanson offers two analyses. First, extreme polarisation of hierocratic and visionary politics brings about extreme oppression. Second, by moderate polarisation a re-creative
dynamic tension can be maintained.

Altizer finds oppression in extreme conservatism maintained by ignorance. Apocalyptic traditions challenge this. The response which Altizer supports is the disclosure of a liberating metamorphosis whose means of attainment can be found within the apocalypses.

In all these analyses of apocalypses, ethical questions have arisen. An encounter with the creative potential of humanity is shown to be part of the data of apocalypse. So the question of victimisation by oppression demonstrates its relevance to the study of apocalypses. These analyses, taken together, suggest that victim-survivors might be understood as subjects of the apocalypses; the literature of apocalypse constitutes a literature of the oppressed.
CHAPTER 7
ON APOCALYPTES AND EXPRESSION: SOME LITERARY INTERPRETATIONS

There are many ways, devotional and non devotional, of reading the Johannine Apocalypse. Interpretations tend to be as bizarre as their source and more idiosyncratic. The diverse field of apocalyptic interpretation is exemplified here by four works. They are D.H. Lawrence's diatribe 470, Paul Barnett's treatise 471, Henry Barclay Swete's aforementioned compendium 472, and Leonard L. Thompson's poetical analysis. 473 They are discussed here with special reference to the their treatment of annihilation, that is, the second death.

DAVID HERBERT LAWRENCE'S DIATRIBE

What Lawrence attributes to the Johannine Apocalypse is not borne out by any of the Biblical texts addressed in this study. His references to the Johannine Apocalypse are spurious. What he has written is a diatribe against elitism, whose connections with the Johannine Apocalypse are effected by juxtaposition facilitated by invective.

Lawrence's book illustrates the autonomy of the word 'apocalypse' which he appropriated as his title. Although his work is a fictional pastiche, it is encountered in context with textual analyses of the Biblical Revelation. This general acceptance


472 Swete, 1922, op. cit.

seems to be motivated by the notion of divine sanction which attends the Johannine Apocalypse; an idea that the god would have intervened to prevent publication unless the work was somehow 'right'.

Lawrence gives us a three page history of all Christianity to contextualise the Johannine Apocalypse. In it early Christian Churches are anti social, almost anti human, wanting the end of the world. After the Dark Ages, the Catholic Church, reinstates humanity by meshing Christian festivals with harvest festivals. The Reformation (he makes no mention of Inquisition) dehumanises the Church again by seeking to bring down worldly power. This dehumanisation continues into Lawrence's own time, as the democratic weak try to usurp aristocratic strength. He concludes with a sociological assessment:

So today, Society consists of a mass of weak individuals trying to protect themselves, out of fear, from every possible imaginary evil and, of course, by their very fear, bringing the evil into being.\textsuperscript{474}

The achievement of the Johannine Apocalypse, according to Lawrence, is in its having survived for nearly two thousand years. This opinion harmonises with Himmelfarb's and Hanson's, in its valorisation of durability. Lawrence, however, does not demonstrate the usefulness of tradition as the others do. He simply asserts a value.

\textsuperscript{474} ibid., p. 17-19.
Claiming that a book lives as long as it is unfathomed, Lawrence marvels that for so long people have puzzled their brains over the Apocalypse, 'to find out what, exactly, it revealed in all its orgy of mystification.' He then proceeds to so puzzle his own brain with diverse notions which he associates, by juxtaposition, with the Johannine Apocalypse. He supplies a number of conjectures, got by imaginative reflection.

Lawrence's reflections on the apocalyptic mysteries comprise a long chapter. In it he jumbles together Hellenes, Chaldeans, Jews and Christians, all from various epochs. Revelation is characterised as a series of parasitical appropriations therefrom: 'Apocalypse is a veritable heathen feast of them'.

Some crass theology attends Lawrence's conjectures. He tells us that Judas' betrayal of Jesus by a kiss is mirrored by the Johannine Apocalypse which is the betrayal of the rest of the Bible. Lawrence attempts sarcastic witticisms: 'they could not be happy in heaven unless they knew their enemies were unhappy in hell. What is expressed

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475 ibid., p. 3.
476 ibid., pp. 27-38.
477 ibid., p. 33.
478 ibid., p. 22.
479 ibid., p. 64.
through these literary mechanisms is spiteful rather than thoughtful.

Lawrence is not altogether alone in his interpretation. A recent publication by A.N. Wilson characterises the apocalyptic writing as vindictive, given to vilification, and deranged. Like Lawrence's claims, Wilson's are not backed by textual evidence.

Lawrence equates the Johannine Apocalypse and his own opinion of the popular Church. Thereupon he attacks the Church, the Bible and the Apocalypse. Claiming that the Johannine Apocalypse is the least attractive book of the Bible, Lawrence develops the theme of the unattractiveness of the Bible, condemning overexposure to moralism, dogma and fixity of interpretation. He attacks the Bible for being vulgar, repetitious and allegorical. It is, he says, unnatural of imagery (the beasts with eyes front and back), impossible of imagery (beasts in the midst of the throne and round about the throne), unpoetical. It is unpoetical, he claims, because it is arbitrary, and ugly (he insists that blood is ugly).

From this ill-founded attack on the usual consensus that Revelation is poetic and imagistic, Lawrence leaps to the assertion that two kinds of human nature exist, aristocratic and democratic. To the former he attributes inner strength (Christ is an

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aristocrat). To the latter, weakness (John is a democrat). This dichotomy, he tells us, renders Revelation popular among the underprivileged, 'Down among the uneducated people', as he puts it.\textsuperscript{481} Here is the association of apocalypse and oppression which we observed in Chapter One. This time it is a free association. It should be noted as another example of the autonomy of the apocalyptic form,

According to Lawrence, one person, John, wrote the apocalypse called Revelation. He makes John of Patmos and John the Divine into one person, offering no acknowledgment of the contention about the authorship of the Johannine Apocalypse. He does, however, insist without foundation that the John who wrote the Apocalypse is not the John who wrote the Gospel. He judges the former to be inferior to the latter.

He expands into a theme of superiority, claiming that the apocalypse is the work of a 'second rate mind' and has effect on 'second rate people'. It is, Lawrence asserts, a literary scam, outrageous for elitism and supremacism:

\begin{quote}
John the Divine had on the face of it a grandiose scheme for wiping out and annihilating everybody who wasn't of the elect, the chosen people, in short, and of climbing up himself right to the throne of God.\textsuperscript{482}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{481} Lawrence, 1931, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{482} ibid., p. 7-8.
This supremacist figure of apocalypse is his own fiction. As we shall observe in Chapter Eight, the Johannine Apocalypse achieves its aspirational dimension by images of walking in light not by images of climbing up. Moreover, his equation of annihilation and massacre (as we shall learn from Swete and Barnett) is mistaken.

Nevertheless, the figure of climbing up is crucial to Lawrence's invective (supremacist itself) against supremacism:

> It is very nice, if you are poor and not humble... to bring your grand enemies down to utter destruction and discomfiture, while you yourself rise up to grandeur.

Lawrence makes his aristocratic versus democratic contrast of Jesus and John into a generalisation. He tells us that, while the strong taught renunciation and love, the weak began to express rampant hate of the strong. By reference to this generalisation he characterises Biblical teaching thus:

> "Down with the strong!": The grand biblical authority for this cry is the Apocalypse. The weak and pseudo-humble are going to wipe all worldly power, glory, and riches off the face of the earth, and then they, the truly weak, are going to reign. It will be a millennium of pseudo-humble saints, and gruesome to contemplate. But it is what religion stands for today: down with all strong, free life, let the weak triumph, let the pseudo-humble reign.

Pursuant to this assertion, Lawrence makes all sorts of unfounded claims about the natures of Buddha, St Francis, Shelley, Lenin and President Wilson.

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483 ibid., p. 7.

484 ibid., p. 11.
Lawrence's diatribe evokes supremacism as the dark side of Christianity, individualism and democracy. He asserts that the religions of renunciation, meditation, and self-knowledge are essentially individualistic and do not satisfy the collective aspect of humanity. Apocalypse, he says, shows us alienation:

We cannot bear connection. That is our malady. We must break away, and be isolate. We call that being free, being individual. Beyond a certain point, which we have reached, it is suicide.  

Thus Lawrence, by means of conjecture, inaccuracy and fabrication, reaches a position vis a vis suicide. This position is not dissimilar to that which we found among the indications of Frye's analysis. That is, to kill the 'psychotic ape in the mirror' is to kill one's self; to escape terminal alienation we require connection.

The question of suicide, however, is an extrapolation from the Johannine Apocalypse. It is not an issue addressed in the Biblical text. Nor does Frye's critique address suicide; his mirror shows him the issue of living with evil. Lawrence imports the matter of suicide into Revelation.

The Johannine Apocalypse, as we have observed in Chapter Two, does address a question of martyrdom and self-sacrifice but this is not the same thing as the matter of

485 ibid., pp. 102-103.
suicide. There is a complicated ethical discourse which debates the finer points of the
difference but it is not relevant here. Suffice to say here that the hand which slays a
martyr is not his or her own.

Having imported a suicidal dilemma into the Johannine Apocalypse, Lawrence,
reaches outside of it for an antidote. He borrows from the sun worshippers an old
neological image: 'Start with the sun, and the rest will slowly, slowly happen.'
Lawrence makes of apocalypse a propaganda of nihilism. Preoccupied by an
idiosyncratic, eschatological vision, he apprehends only one apocalyptic horizon. He
does not admit any perception of multiplicity. His intuition of the synergistic burden
of apocalypse, expressed as a malady of disconnection, ends in a dualism of death and
life. He resolves this by syncretism not synergism, invoking the sun to signify
continuity.

Lawrence's interpretation of the Johannine Apocalypse does not arrive at the matter
of the second death because it (the interpretation) entertains only one horizon. This

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486 Some of the parameters of that debate can be explored by reference to Shakespeare's 'Hamlet', which questions
the status of the *felo-de-se* or a self-murderer, that is, a suicide in 1601 and John Donne's *Biathanatos*, written c 1608
and published in 1646-7. The writings of Church Fathers Augustine and Aquinas inform the abovementioned English
debate. For a summary analysis, see Sprott, S.E., *The English Debate on Suicide: From Donne to Hume*, Open Court,
puts forward a more recent summary. See also Eco, Umberto, 'Suicides in the Temple' in *Travels in Hyperreality: Essays*,

487 ibid., p. 103 (final lines of book).
renders the perspectives shallow. There is little of use, except the aforementioned observation of the autonomy of apocalypse, that can be drawn from Lawrence's piece.
PAUL BARNETT'S TREATISE

Paul Barnett's writings put forward a treatise on how to understand the Johannine Apocalypse, Revelation, as he calls it. He acknowledges Revelation as a difficult book, associated with claims to know the signs of evil and of the worlds' end. These claims are made by people Barnett calls 'sects and fringe denominations'.

Barnett ascribes authorship to a single author, John. He conflates the contentions over the authorship of the Gospel of John and those over the identity of the seer of Revelation. He opts, by reason of textual similarities, for the idea that both were authored by the one person.

Barnett offers us 'the keys to its interpretation'. He acknowledges preterist, futurist and historicist interpretations as other to his. Preterist hermeneutics, he tells us, focus exclusively on John and his readers. Barnett objects to this: 'only a lesser part of Revelation would have been meaningful to John's contemporaries.' Futurist interpretations, he tells us, focus on the end-time and fail to do justice to the needs of original Christians. He objects also to historicist hermeneutics, telling us that thy take

489 ibid., p. 5.
Revelation to be a forecast of the whole of history. He protests: 'only a small part of the book can be relevant at any one time.'

In the face of these objections, Barnett proposes to adopt all three modes together. He adds two further considerations. They are the treatment of the evangelical and the treatment of the apocalyptic. Thus he makes a heuristic separation of apocalyptic expression and Revelation.

Barnett's metaphor, 'keys', is a diminutive of Vico's, 'master key'. Like Vico, Barnett sets up a firm 'this stands for that' metonymy. He asserts that the central focus of Revelation is Christ not the last battle. Thus he points out clearly that Armageddon is not a major focus of apocalypse. This is an important point because, as we will see in Chapter Thirteen, the apocalyptic lamb tends to get mixed up with the goat of the holocaust in contemporary apocalyptic symbolics. Suffice to say here that Barnett affirms a neologism in preference to any simple, eschatological symbolism.

The promise of the second coming is not a major focus of Revelation either, according to Barnett. He asserts that revelation itself is the major focus of the

\[490\text{ibid., p. 33.}\

\[491\text{ibid., p. 34.}\]
Johannine Apocalypse. Revelation, according to Barnett, delivers to its participants liberation into guilt free, death free consciousness: 'Christ has conquered the twin evils of guilt and death by his own death and resurrection.' As a consequence of such liberation, Kingdom is now a reality of Christian praxis.

Barnett's interpretation assumes that in the Johannine Apocalypse, as in other parts of the New Testament, the great end-time battle lies in the past not in the future. It is a battle which has been won once and for all.

The future is entirely controlled by the past. The past in question is, of course, the already completed victory of Jesus over those evil forces which were against him. This is realised (not simple) eschatology. Barnett claims that this is perhaps the most important of the keys given in his book.

The realised eschatology is of great hermeneutical importance. It enables Barnett's interpretation to entertain a thoroughly neological perspective without compromising its depth. As we shall observe, this is effected by his adoption of two neological horizons. Commencing from that perspective the discourse arrives at a vanishing point among the mysteries of the revelation of the new.

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492 ibid., p. 11.

493 ibid., p. 40.
Barnett touches on the question of evil. Asking rhetorically, 'If Christ has conquered, why is there evil?' The words: 'There can be no doubt that the Revelation attributes the evil of the world and within history to the Devil', however, pre-empt this question. So Barnett makes a rhetorical denial, claiming that the Johannine text is unambiguous in regard to evil.

The mystery of the number of humanity ('nombre of man') is demystified by Barnett:

John's second call to his readers is for wisdom (13:18) to understand that the forces pitted against them are neither divine or eternal. Despite his pretensions to deity, as signified by his seven heads, the beast's number is a human number. In other words, while the evil one who inspires this assault is a supernatural being, his human instrument is not. Wisdom as mediated by John's teaching, will enable the reader to have a true perspective on these matters. The beast is only human.

Barnett asserts that the god is not the source of evil. He praises the god's restraint of the evil. In human terms, such restraint is got by choosing death in preference to evil torment: 'Even though killed they are not defeated.' Thus Barnett affirms

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494 ibid., pp. 20-23.
495 ibid., p. 21.
496 ibid., p. 113.
497 ibid., p. 21.
498 ibid., p. 21-22.
499 ibid., p. 23.
opposition to evil as a principle to die for.

It is the realised eschatology which enables the escape from persecution by acceptance of death. A believer knows already the conquest of guilt and death. Barnett writes: 'In bearing their testimony to Jesus they must not shrink from death.'\textsuperscript{500} This attitude resonates with earlier Hebrew martyr themes. Barnett praises the Johannine Apocalypse as a message which has relevance wherever and whenever enslavement to evil is threatened.

According to Barnett, the four keys of Revelation are tyranny, chaos, persecution and destruction. These he takes to be crucial leitmotifs of Johannine Apocalypse. These images, Barnett tells us, overlap one another but are 'teased apart' in the Johannine Apocalypse so that they can be identified.\textsuperscript{501} These four are all dark themes, indicating a need for a comforter. Here, again, is the theme of oppression which we have observed in association with apocalypses.

Barnett teases apart a neologism which he calls the two beat rhythm of the Johannine Apocalypse: 'This two beat gospel/worship format occurs repeatedly throughout the

\textsuperscript{500} ibid., p. 110.

\textsuperscript{501} ibid., p. 9.
His metaphor is auditory not visual. He writes:

The many expressions of worship in the Revelation affirm from the heart and with the mouth that God and the Lamb were the only ones to whom one could entrust one's all. Worship is the mind's conviction and the mouth's confession that reality, truth and goodness are to be found in God and the Lamb and not in any other.  

The two beat, being evangelic and worshipful, provides a response to the demonic aspects of suffering. Interpreted in that way, the two beat can be understood as a vehicle of divine, authorial intent. Barnett writes: 'it must be read in the terms which the writer gives, not those which the reader brings to the text.'  

Some comments of Eric J. Sharpe's can help us to appreciate the subtle operations of Barnett's two beat neologism. Sharpe tells us that a non-charismatic Christian majority has scaled down the Bible's visions and voices, ecstasies and trances to what they, being non-charismatic, could comprehend. He points out that ecstasy, nevertheless, is an element of religious experience. The Book of Revelation sustains the most graphic of passages relating to ecstasy. Visions, disembodied voices,

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502 ibid., p. 19. See also footnote to p. 113: a motif of formal-proclamation-followed-by-praise.

503 ibid., pp. 13-14.

504 ibid., p. 36.


506 Sharpe, 1985, p. 120.
glossolalia, symbolic events, loss of consciousness and secrets furnish Sharpe's argument with many examples.

Being composed of evangelic then worshipful expressions, the two beat can invoke an ecstatic or rapturous response to suffering. Barnett expands upon this by reminding his reader that, although John operates only 'in the Spirit', the Spirit has no character-role in the Apocalypse. Thus Barnett evokes his readers' preferred notions of spirit.

In Barnett's interpretation of Revelation, praise is offered, by means of the two beat, to the enthroned one or to the lamb. His example: 'Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord God Almighty who is and was and is to come (Revelation 4:8)... Worthy art thou... for thou didst create all things' (Revelation 4:11). Barnett's two beat does not constitute a dichotomy but a double affirmation of blessedness. It can signify redemption; annihilation by blessed rapture.

Against the double affirmation of the two beat, Barnett observes pairs; the godly woman and the harlot, the Holy City and Babylon, the slain lamb and the beast with one head dead, the mark of the beast and the name of the lamb, the community of

Christ and the community of the Beast.\textsuperscript{508} Thus Barnett simplifies the literary phenomenon which Frye has called the demonic parody of apocalypse into a parody of the bipartisan politics of good and evil: 'Revelation portrays a kind of climax of evil'.\textsuperscript{509} The evil Barnett describes seems to be a political thing, made of Roman imperialism and Christian epiphany. So, in Barnett's interpretation, a kingdom of blessedness always proclaims goodness over opposition. This is the kerygma of Christian divinity.

Barnett takes up discussion of these paired motifs in another publication, 'Polemical Parallelism'.\textsuperscript{510} Under this title he discusses goodness and evil in Revelation as conflict between the cult of Christ and the cult of the emperor. The emperors, he reminds us, had founded a system of public instruction on emperor-worship. He interprets Revelation as containing both the injunction to worship the god not the emperor and the instructions on how to do that.

The use of parallelism in rhetoric, however, is a broad subject which touches on some

\textsuperscript{508} ibid., pp. 11-12.

\textsuperscript{509} ibid., p. 62.

essentials of poetics. It engages with metaphysical interest. For example, James J. Fox has taken up Roman Jakobsen's work to carry forward a theory of canonical form.\footnote{511}{Fox, James J., 'Roman Jakobsen and the Comparative Study of Parallelism' in Roman Jakobsen: Echoes of His Scholarship, Peter de Ridder Press, Lisse, 1977, pp. 59-90.}

Fox explains Jakobsen's categorisation of parallelism into two types. One is an ever-present aspect of poetic language. This type of parallelism is dynamic and integral to poetics. It makes possible the trope of metaphor, the mode of metamorphosis and the function of comparison, all commonly accepted hallmarks of poetry.

The other is reified. To describe this type of parallelism, Fox uses Jakobsen's word 'canonical' denoting 'compulsory'. These patterns indicate that certain similarities enjoy high preference.\footnote{512}{Fox, 1977, p. 60.} Fox demonstrates, by detailed comparison that similarities exist across canonical parallelisms of many languages and cultures.\footnote{513}{ibid., pp. 60-80.} Along with a form of speaking which is markedly different from any given vernacular, canonical parallelism is used for special, specific purposes. Examples include, shaman's journeys, communications with spirits, preservation of ancient traditions, the utterance of sacred words and the writing of scriptures.\footnote{514}{ibid., p. 80.}
These abstractions make more sense if one understands that in Pythagorean numerology, one is not a number but the principle underlying number. The Dyad is the first division of Unity, viewed as the creator of the infinite, the beginning of multiplicity, the beginning of strife and also the possibility of logos in the relation of one thing to another. The metaphysical considerations of Fox, Jacobsen and Barnett to not adhere to contemporary, binary mathematics.

Fox points out that poet Gerard Manley Hopkins had, in an early (juvenile) work, suggested that artifice might reduce itself, in principle, to parallelism. Verse was, according to Hopkins, a repeated figure in spoken sound. It is to the repeated figure that Fox turns our attention but it must be remembered that the personal vehicle of spoken sound is prerequisite.

Fox emphasises an important point: parallelism does not constitute a dual symbolic

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517 Fox, 1977, p. 60, F'n 5.

classification. Although there are two parts to any parallelism, they are parts of a bifurkated whole. A parallelism is a form, one element only of the many by which poetic symbols are constellated.

At risk of digression, it is opportune to note here that this confusion of dichotomy, meaning cut in two, and dual, referring to the abovementioned Pythagorean dyad or two-in-one, has many aspects. For example, Robert Polzin, responding to contributions published in Semeia 63 (Part Two: The Unnabed and the Unnameable) is critical of authors who dichotomise groups and individuals: 'there is not a clearcut distinction between individual and group'. This is pertinent to the overall concern of this thesis. Perhaps it is a mistake to dichotomise a divine word and human words; or their presence, even their manifestation.

Now to return to Barnett. In another of his works on apocalypse, 'Revelation in its Roman Setting' Barnett draws attention to some important background to kerygma or proclamation. He mentions the sebastophoroi. These were officers of the Roman state, one of whose functions was to reveal phainein the god emperor in such a way


that people would revere his eikon or image.\textsuperscript{521} For a century before the Johannine Apocalypse was written, imperial cults sought hegemony in Roman Asia. Their principals, Nero and Domitian, for example, would send an image to be shown and even worshipped before visitation of intended colonies by the emperor. This eikon signified evil to Hellenic Christians.

Taking into account this ancient method of mass preparation for colonial domination, we can follow Barnett as he widens the horizons of his discussion to include modern examples of oppression. He writes:

\begin{quote}
For Domitian substitute the names of Hitler or Stalin who set themselves up as God-like beings and then demanded total allegiance from their people.'\textsuperscript{522}
\end{quote}

Today there is concern about the increasing influence of dominant icons, undemocratic tyrants and oppressive owners of media empires, for example.\textsuperscript{523} The metaphor of colonisation carries this concern, expressed as cultural imperialism.

Mass communications, ancient and postmodern, have, it would seem, astonishing potentials for both oppression and liberation. The icons focus worshipful attitudes into reverence for certain anchors who serve the interests of their barons. Barnett's keys to


\textsuperscript{522} Barnett, 1989, p. 30; p. 122.

\textsuperscript{523} Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio National, reported an International Conference on Media Control at University of Technology, Sydney, October 31, 1993.
interpretation open up again the idea that the power of images can be defused and their energy turned to goodness by evangelic worship. 'In every generation Christians are required to affirm Christ/God/the Lamb and deny the gods of wealth and power.'

The Johannine Apocalypse, Barnett tells us, concerns primarily the issue of worship given and worship withheld. Worship implies both affirmation and denial. Offered to the Christ it makes worship of the emperor impossible.

According to Barnett, Revelation was written as a response to totalitarianism in general and against Domitian in particular. Its supremacism is designed to create a cognitive dissonance with other supremacist claims. Those of Domitian are given a historical primacy by Barnett but he makes those of Stalin, Hitler and other absolutist tyrants equally important.

Barnett reaches outside of the Johannine text to substantiate his claim for the temporal reality of divine kingdom, referring not to the Johannine text but to Colossians 2:15. This is necessary to his rhetoric; to simplify the metaphysical proposition of the second death. He asserts that evil is to be annihilated. This

524 Barnett, 1989, p. 64.
assertion requires a futuristic, temporal context. Kingdom provides it. Barnett immediately redirects attention to the Johannine Apocalypse, affirming consistently its rapturous rather than its tormentous significations.

Barnett's redirection to rapture is comforting and apt. Apocalypses can be read and said to produce a state of comfort in the face of torment. That is one of the purposes of Revelation; the invocation of a celestial comforter. So, according to Barnett, through the Johannine Apocalypse, by preferring Christ to all else, one might enter into a mystic state to escape palpable anguish, pain, agony and torment.
Swete observes, in the apocalyptic battles, what he thinks might be a primitive conception of world war.\textsuperscript{525} He acknowledges that the date of the writing of the Johannine Apocalypse is uncertain. It might have been written under Domitian, Claudius, Nero, Vespasian, Trajan or others. Swete, following Irenaeus, opts for Domitian. So he dates it between the years 90 and 96 C.E.\textsuperscript{526} He reads it as an atemporal response to evil, absolutism and totalitarianism. These views accord with Barnett's.

The Johannine Apocalypse, Swete tells us, is a disclosure of Jesus' divinity, expressed in terms of his heavenly life.\textsuperscript{527} It grows out of prophecy.\textsuperscript{528} Its Biblical contexts are the Books of Ezekiel, Enoch, Esdras, Baruch.\textsuperscript{529} With the Johannine Apocalypse, Swete claims, national hopes gave way to the goal of the conquest of all humanity: "The whole book is a sursum corda, inviting the Churches to seek strength in the faith

\begin{footnotes}
\item[525] Swete, 1922, p. 208.
\item[526] ibid., pp. cvi- cvii.
\item[527] ibid., p. ix.
\item[528] ibid., pp. xvii-xxi.
\item[529] ibid., p. xxii-xxvi.
\end{footnotes}
of a triumphant and returning Christ.\textsuperscript{530} Swete observes that, in other apocalypses, the Messiah is an uncertain and unrealised idea but, in the Johannine Apocalypse, the Messiah is the already victorious, ascended, and glorified Christ.\textsuperscript{531} Like Barnett, he takes this to be a certain and realised condition.

Swete investigates in detail both Greek and English texts.\textsuperscript{532} His primary focus is philosophical. Swete analyses the Johannine Apocalypse as an achievement of order over chaos.\textsuperscript{533} In concert with a metaphysical philosophy, the main points of Swete's interest include numerical (arithmetical), proportional (geometric) and dramatic (literary) qualities of the text. They are selected from many possibilities which he acknowledges in passing.

Swete's appreciation of the order communicated by the Johannine Apocalypse does not obfuscate his appreciation of its ambiguity. Rather, his philology indicates ambiguities by which order and chaos are balanced. Convergent horizons of exaltation and suffering reveal to him more than one apocalypse:

\begin{quote}
It is an apocalypse of the glory of the exalted Christ; it is also an apocalypse of
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{530} ibid., p. xciv. See also p. xxix.
\textsuperscript{531} ibid., p. xxviii.
\textsuperscript{532} ibid., pp. cxx-cxxx.
\textsuperscript{533} ibid., xxxviii-xliv.
the sufferings and the ultimate triumph of the militant Church.\footnote{ibid., p. xxxi.}

In this stereoscopic analysis, Swete's thinking is comparable with that of Frye and Altizer. The differentiation of panorama and participation is not so strong here as it is in Frye's abovementioned works but, written in 1922, we can observe that Swete's interpretation prefigures Frye's.

Although the authorship of the Johannine Apocalypse is disputed, Swete points out that the Latin Church fathers, Ambrose, Jerome, Rufinus, Augustine, and Innocent accepted it as the work of John the Apostle.\footnote{ibid., p. cxviii.} Swete insists that the Johannine Apocalypse is the work of one seer.\footnote{ibid., pp. xcix-civ.} His position is firmly opposed to the idea of the Johannine Circle.

According to Swete, individual authorship of the Johannine Apocalypse is evident in peculiarities of the vocabulary, grammar and syntax. He writes: 'The book has clearly passed through the hands of an individual who has left his mark on every part of it.'\footnote{ibid., p. li.} This view is maintained by strict adherence to a written text.
A refined appreciation of the grammatological complexities of the Johannine Apocalypse (in the Greek and the English) leads Swete to insist that it is, in form, an epistle and, in intent, a pastoral. His point is that the text is received by hearing (it is oral and aural) not by reading (it is not visually received). From this perspective he denies it a literary intent. He presents his detailed appreciation of its eloquence as a metaphysical philosophy.

The temporal association of apocalyptic writing with events and conditions which prevailed at the time of its writing is important, Swete argues. There is accord between Swete and Hanson in this matter. Their view reflects a historical realism in which apocalyptic symbols are interpreted as temporal equations. Swete writes: 'Two empires were about to meet in mortal combat: the Kingdom of God represented by the Church, the World-power represented by Rome.'

An understanding of (then) contemporary Jewish belief on Messianic Reign is also essential, according to Swete, to an appreciation of the 'thousand years' motif. He explains that the messianic period was variously designated. For example, 100, 600, 1,000, 2,000, 7,000 years; seven 'days', each of a thousand years being an allegory of

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538 ibid., p. xciv.
539 ibid., lxvi.
the 7 days of creation. The 'thousand years' is taken by Swete to signify eternity, or years beyond count. He acknowledges that the idea existed also in Zoroastrian thought. This also harmonises with Hanson's opinion.

Swete asserts that the Johannine Apocalypse is the only one which is correctly termed an apocalypse because it is the only one whose symbols satisfy historical materialism. He writes:

the N.T. Apocalypse alone stands in a real relation to the life of the age in which it was written, or attempts to reveal the meaning and issues of the events which the writer had witnessed or was able to foresee. The N.T. Apocalypse alone deserves the name.\textsuperscript{541}

Here we find a seeming subjugation of symbolic readings to historicism but Swete did not hold to this hermeneutical position. Here is his affirmation of the symbolic nature of the writing:

The visions of which these books largely consist present a succession of strange and sometimes weird or even monstrous shapes, designed to suggest ideas that could not be expressed in words, or persons or forces that the writer preferred to leave unnamed... The imagery of the Apocalypse lays under contribution all the departments of nature and life.\textsuperscript{542}

Again we can observe Frye's description of the Johannine Apocalypse prefigured; note

\textsuperscript{540} ibid., p. lxxviii.

\textsuperscript{541} ibid., xxxii. Post canonical apocalypses discussed by Swete include the Gnostic \textit{Anabaticon Pauli}, the \textit{Revelations of Stephen and Thomas}, the \textit{Petrine Apocalypse}, and an \textit{Apocalypse of Paul}.\textsuperscript{542}

\textsuperscript{542} ibid., p. cxxxii.
the inclusion of monstrosity. Swete identifies in the Johannine Apocalypse a self-conscious lexicon of symbols which stand for or represent the departments of life. This is a way of describing a literature as reflecting and enhancing life.

Some marvellous cross-cultural speculation informs Swete's interpretations of symbols. For example, he claims that the red beast may have been dyed with cochineal, to catch the eye. Or it may have been dyed with the blood of martyrs. His point, he says, is that it is eye catching which indicates pride in itself.\textsuperscript{543}

Another example of Swete's lexical symbology is his treatment of the mark of the beast. This, he tells us, signifies Antichrist, Rome, or any formidable adversary. His historical correspondences are tidy but symbolic nonetheless. The many heads of the beast, for example, represent heads of government; the many names of beast represent appropriation of divine names by government officials of Rome.\textsuperscript{544} A mark, Swete explains, is a brand. People bore brands to signify slavery or conspicuous devotion.\textsuperscript{545} Here his historicism fails him. He offers no indication as to whether it is devotion or slavery that is signified by the mark of the beast.

\textsuperscript{543} ibid., p. 215.

\textsuperscript{544} ibid., pp. 161-165.
The insufficiency of historicism to interpretation of the Johannine Apocalypse is indicated by Swete's abandonment of his historical metonymy for magical arithmetic. In his commentary on the number of the beast he affirms, by speculative calculation, that the number of the beast is possessed by and does not posses humanity. As he puts it:

... let him who has intelligence... a character not without its value in spiritual things... calculate... (the meaning of) the Beast's number, for (Beast though he is) his number is that of a man...\(^{546}\)

This magical arithmetic turns into to poesy as, to propound the symbolism of the lake of fire as the second death, Swete conjures 'a greater and final Death'. By immersion in the Lake of Fire, he explains, both the phenomenon and the condition of death are destroyed; annihilated. Thus this lake of fire represents second death; nihil.

In this metaphysical poetry, the imagery is largely eschatological. With regard to the second death, Swete tells us that Death and Hades are an inseparable pair, both of them annihilable. Death represents a physical fact (phenomenon) and Hades its spiritual consequences (condition).\(^{547}\) Thus Swete differentiates death and annihilation; the second death constitutes release from all phenomena and conditions which humans can know. This constitutes a metaphysic in which everything returns to

\(^{545}\) ibid., p. 173.

\(^{546}\) ibid., p. 175.
nought; the nothingness out of which things are created.

So poesy joins metaphysical philosophy, lexicology, historicity and magical arithmetic in Swete's compendium. He puts forward an interpretation of revolutionary world conquest, driven by a paradox of vengeance and balance. Swete's formulation of his ideas regarding the Johannine Apocalypse are consonant with Frye's and Barnett's. Of particular note is his metaphysical and rhetorical clarity with regard to the concept of the second death.

\[^547\] ibid., p. 273-4.
LEONARD L. THOMPSON'S POETICAL ANALYSIS

Leonard L. Thompson encounters the Johannine Apocalypse as a text of worship, of existential phenomenology and of poetry. He examines a number of approaches before putting one forward. He analyses terms, such as, apocalypse, apocalyptic eschatology, and apocalypticism, referring them respectively to literary, religious, and social aspects of revelatory writings. So for Thompson 'apocalypse' denotes a literary event, 'apocalyptic indicates a religious event and 'apocalyptic eschatology' signifies a social or political event or movement. These are three aspects of the one phenomenon called revelation. Thompson tells us that such terms are used by scholars so as to be more systematic in their analyses.\footnote{Thompson, 1990, p. 23.}

Thompson attributes the Johannine text to one seer, a living document, a repository of a vast symbology, social and mythic. It is not possible or desirable, according to Thompson, to know all of the seer's preoccupations: 'Social boundaries are only one dimension of the seer's world boundaries.'\footnote{ibid., p. 200.} He resists the view that the social location of the seer offers a clue for understanding a Johannine view of the world. This position is contrary to Hansons and Swetes. It may be the more applicable in the
late twentieth century as rapid appropriation, reappropriation and misappropriation of apocalyptic terms and images tends to proliferate contexts.

Thompson reports the genre debate.\textsuperscript{550} He compares Klaus Koch's brief definition, 'secret, divine disclosures about the end of the world and the heavenly estate', to Philipp Veilhauer's lengthy lists of elements; exhortations, pseudonymity, visionary sources, futuristic history, devaluation of the present, inclusivity and God-ordained eschaton.\textsuperscript{551} He points out that Veilhauer claims the crux of apocalypse is eschatology.\textsuperscript{552} Thompson writes:

\begin{center}
Crisis, comfort, hope exhortation, consolation, and the like are thus themes and formal elements that help to make the genre "apocalypse." They are part of the generic elements that constitute the "vantage point" of the apocalyptist.\textsuperscript{553}
\end{center}

Thompson does not take up any of the generic positions he describes.

There is a tendency in criticism to treat separately the genre and the social setting which produced it. Thompson warns against this. He remarks: 'a single apocalypse

\begin{footnotes}
550 ibid., pp. 18-24.
551 ibid., pp. 18-19.
552 ibid., p. 19.
553 ibid., p. 175.
\end{footnotes}
may be used in different ways in different social settings.\textsuperscript{554} According to Thompson's view, the poetry of the Johannine Apocalypse relates world view to myth not political view to social setting. He finds its achievement in its inclusivity:

There is, of course, a surplus to experience that cannot be refracted through language; yet... His language works its "poetic," creative function... Working in that powerful medium of mythic language, the seer relates his local conditions to what is most inclusive, most cosmic, most total.\textsuperscript{555}

Inclusivity is achieved, in part, by what Thompson calls 'soft boundaries' (put between pairs). Thompson explains: at points in the Book of Revelation, the Lamb and the various Beasts form dyadic relationships, becoming doubles: 'split images of some more fundamental wholeness'.\textsuperscript{556} He expands: 'Even God and Satan, the epitome of good and evil respectively, are not separated by hard, impervious boundaries.'\textsuperscript{557} This emphasis on figuartive pairs is similar to Barnett's.

The notion of the interpenetration of goodness and evil, expressed by pairing figures, the god and the satan, for example, is compatible, up to a point, with Frye's. So Thompson's hermeneutics accord with the religio-literary method in the matters of goodness and evil. There is an important difference, however, with regard to

\textsuperscript{554} ibid., p. 25.
\textsuperscript{555} ibid., p. 200.
\textsuperscript{556} ibid., p. 81.
\textsuperscript{557} ibid.
Thompson does not pursue the matter of the second death. Whereas Frye and, following him, I have taken the second death, that is, annihilation and its image, the devouring of the fiery pit, to stand for divine understanding, Thompson stops short. He apprehends the conflict of opposites, albeit the boundaries are soft ones, without a complementary apprehension of a non conflicted state; nihilo. To do this, as we observed in Chapters Six and Seven, is to maintain a conflicted, dramatic vision in which there is no release from suffering. We might say that Thompson's interpretation of the Johannine Apocalypse valorises a horizon of torment.

Thompson's analysis displaces the metaphysical question of annihilation by raising the literary questions of immanence and transcendence with regard to myth. This literary play between drama and poesy is questionable because it abandons ethical concern. Thompson's analysis of the Johannine Apocalypse assumes acquiescence in suffering. That is Byzantine not Johannine. Caution is required; the implicit abstraction, effected by ignoring the figure of suffering humanity, lends itself to cryptofascism.

Appreciating the mythic dimension, Thompson asks whether religion, especially apocalyptic spirituality (his term), can be expressed through the mundane modes by which people accommodate to 'everyday realities of existence'. This dichotomy of the
spiritual and the mundane implies a supernaturalisation of the apocalypse with attendant elitism. It is informed by an intense literary discourse on immanence and transcendence which, according to Thompson, exist in balance and uphold ambiguity.\(^{558}\)

James Rigney, explains how, in the rhetoric of preaching, a preacher might be lost to a secrets of immanence and transcendence:

> the preacher’s authority endowed him with an insight into his text which in turn allowed him to discern references, connections and illuminations concealed from the laity. Because they were concealed these facets of text were often expressed as metaphor: that is, by understanding and experiencing one thing in terms of another. In such circumstances a preacher could lose his way in a world of immanence and transcendence.\(^{559}\)

Further to immanence and transcendence, Thompson writes:

> The presence of both modes guarantees that the revelation of transcendence is integrally related to human earthly existence. In apocalypses, there is no radical discontinuity between God and world (spatial transcendence) or this age and the world to come (temporal transcendence).\(^{560}\)

Thompson finds in myth a common order where present and future, time and space are coordinates not categories:

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\(^{558}\) ibid., p. 198.


\(^{560}\) Thompson, 1990, p. 31.
Not only are distinctions blurred among past, present, and future, but also time and space are related as coordinates of a common order. So, by its participation in myth, apocalypse can achieve a balance of immanence and transcendence. This can facilitate literary inclusivity. To what purpose?

Thompson, like Frye, pursues his lines of thought into metaliterary consideration. He takes up the discussion of kerygma. The difference between their two interpretations is one of concern. Frye maintains explicitly an ethical concern for humanity. Thompson inclines more toward a formal concern for the aesthetics of language.

Thompson tells us that, taken as an article of worship, the whole Johannine Apocalypse is self proclamatory, that is, kerygmatic. He explains that worship entails an equivalence of context and content. This equivalence is what Frye calls identification as (not identification with). Although the images are dyadic, the kerygma, according to Thompson, is one, an inclusive multiplicity. This implies an equivalence of kerygma and Christian Word. As we noted in Chapters Six and Seven, Frye's is a more expansive definition.

Thompson explains that such expressions as exhortation to hope and faith and messages of comfort mediate crisis. He describes them as 'topoi related to that of

\[^{561}\text{ibid., p. 86.}\]
Thompson explains kerygma as a response to crisis. He understands too, that the response is itself creative; the kite evokes the pretext. By proclamations (of faith or hope in this example) apocalyptic language enhances sensitivity to crisis situations while crisis situations enhance sensitivity to apocalyptic language.\footnote{ibid., p. 175.} Note, with regard to the inherent cryptofascism, there is a tendency here to describe an aesthetic without mention of the matter of sustained suffering which makes it observable. The 'crises' have to do with pogroms, murders and torture.

Thompson writes, 'The work mediates its own message.'\footnote{ibid., p. 73.} This can be read as a reformulation of verum-factum; Like Vico, Thompson entertains only the Christian God as the informant of the equivalence of message and works.

Thompson tells us that, if the kerygma is encountered phenomenologically, idiosyncratic apocalypses can spring from the Johannine text. He quotes Walter Schmithals: '[apocalypse] primarily has its roots within itself, namely in the
apocalyptic experience of existence.\textsuperscript{564} If it is taken as poetry, the Johannine Apocalypse achieves an expanded voice and vision for humanity: 'enlarges human expression and the possibilities of human experience'.\textsuperscript{565} An idiosyncratic apocalypse expressed as certum might be understood as charisma. Thompson, however, does not pursue that.

He pursues the creative potential of ambiguity; verum-factum. Ambiguities of kerygma and image, according to Thompson, make possible the extraordinary inclusivity of the Johannine Apocalypse:

this monistic flow (the energy of the God as Pantocrator) of divinely ordered being can never quite be compartmentalized into creature and creator, God and Satan, this age and the age to come, or heaven and earth. That is the unbroken world disclosed through the language of apocalypse.\textsuperscript{566}

These lines indicate Thompson's assumption that kerygmatic words are equivalent to the Christian Word of God. This singular word knows no suffering but Thompson's analysis cannot explain this; it is a matter of the second death but not pursued here by Thompson. Like Hanson, Thompson admits his own axiom of faith into his rhetoric without argumentation.

\textsuperscript{564} Walter Schmithals, \textit{The Apocalyptic Movement}, Abingdon, New York, 1975, p. 150, in Thompson, 1990, p. 27.

\textsuperscript{565} Thompson, 1990, p. 199.

\textsuperscript{566} ibid., p. 91.
Thompson has written a devotional analysis of the poetics of the Johannine Apocalypse. He gives emphasis to kerygma, the auditory dimension of the imagery which proclaims we note he sometimes capitalises the word, making it 'Kerygma' as in 'Word'. As Thompson puts it:

The reciprocal relations between language and experience can be seen in John's treatment of the Christian proclamation (kerygma). The Kerygma is a verbal proclamation that enfolds a mode of Christian existence in the world. Similarly, Christian existence enfolds the verbal proclamation. The repeated formula "the Word of God and the witness of Jesus Christ" testifies to both verbal and sociological proclamation and to an adaptive strategy by means of which Christians engage with their world.\(^{567}\)

Thompson takes the Johannine Apocalypse as an exemplar rather than a subject, explaining by reference to it some poetic operations of kerygma. He does not put forward an interpretation of the metaphysical implications of kerygma. This analysis maintains itself by the assumption of torment but it does not acknowledge that foundation.

\(^{567}\) ibid., p. 199.
ON APOCALYPTES AND EXPRESSION: SOME LITERARY INTERPRETATIONS SUMMARY

It is evident from the interpretations discussed above that the assumptions of Christian monotheism are strong among those who write about the Johannine Apocalypse.\(^{568}\) The authorial assumption that 'God' stands for all expressions of divinity is common among these interpreters. There is a marked tendency in all of our examples to presume upon Biblical intertextuality. So there is an inclination toward evangelism and away from criticism.

This interpretative determinism invites reductionism. The impact of the critical argumentation is diminished because the axioms of the arguments are not explained. The impact of the imagery of the text under discussion is rendered superior to the discussion. Physical facts (phenomena) become confused with spiritual consequences (conditions). Mystification occurs as consequence. We have observed this in terms of the autonomy of myth.

Take, for example, the mystery of the second death and the image of the fiery pool (Apocalypse 17:8). Second death is part of a complicated metaphysical discourse on annihilation. Considered without its philosophical counterparts, such as creatio ex nihilo, anathema, kenosis and metanoia, the image of the fiery pool inclines to literalism. Taken literally it lends itself to confusion with torment and punishment; but torment is a physical fact made by similitude to suffering, and punishment is a condition or spiritual consequence of guilt. Torment and punishment are not equivalents of annihilation; they are physical events aptly signified by concrete imagery but annihilation is metaphysical.

A fallacy of concrete annihilation can arise. It draws on the imagery of the Johannine Apocalypse but not on the argument. We have encountered the argument as realised eschatology. In it annihilation is fait accompli; people are made ex nihilo; things are what we make them. The fallacy proceeds by three stages. First, it concretises torment, punishment, mortality and annihilation, associating all of them with the image of the fiery pool. Second, it reflects on the concrete image, reducing all conditions to Earthly circumstances. Third, it personifies the image, understanding personal and political action to be an agent capable of effecting annihilation. The fallacy readily accommodates policies of destruction, such as genocidal mentality, suicide and nihilism.
From the image of the second death, the fiery pool, each interpreter reaches outside the Johannine text; to interpret one conjures. With the exception of Swete, however, these critics conjure no explanatory discourse on annihilation. Instead they supply contemporary versions of images of physical suffering, torment and punishment.

Swete finds a primitive conception of world war beside but not inside the fiery pool. So it is evident that a metaphysical address to annihilation does not obviate present, physical questions of ethical value. Neither can address to physical concern eclipse the metaphysics.

Barnett puts twentieth century tyrants such as Hitler and Stalin into his apocalyptic context. He advocates opposition (unto the death, if necessary) to tyranny. So his argument remains earth-bound. As we have noted, though, it assumes the metaphysic of realised eschatology. For Barnett, the metaphysic of the second death supplies the fortitude to resist oppression.

All of the interpretations examined here, excepting that of D.H. Lawrence, find in the Johannine Apocalypse a paradigm of balance. As Lawrence's remarks are pitched at but not sourced in the Johannine Apocalypse, the nature of their exception is not significant here. As we noted his address to suicide imports into the apocalyptic
context an irrelevant matter. Conversely, by making his address to annihilation, as
against massacre, he fails to recognise the metaphysical dimension of the apocalypse.

World war, incipient suicide, tyrants, these are modern images of victimisation which
are conjured into the Johannine Apocalypse by its interpreters. This suggests a
significant omission; a lacuna exists in the Johannine Apocalypse. It is the voice of
complaint. This silence invites readers and listeners to receive the apocalypse in
association with their own circumstances. So the Johannine Apocalypse can meet
challenges of mortal suffering at many levels of intensity.

What, according to the interpreters whose works we have consulted here, is being
expressed by the Johannine Apocalypse? There is praise of the god in the face of
adversity. There is faith in the god beyond adversity. These two motifs are recognised
in all four analyses. There is also belief in salvation from suffering, by death and
resurrection. Perhaps the most important, although the least explained, of the
apocalyptic motifs is that of acquiescence in redemptive annihilation.

What can we draw from the particular characteristics of the interpretations we have
examined? From Lawrence we can learn of the autonomous power of apocalyptic
mythology when it is placed in context with resistance to oppression. From Barnett's
two beat we can learn of the rapturous power of twinning metaphors of salvation and
liberation. From Swete we can learn to articulate the concept of annihilation as a process of understanding. From Thompson we can learn of a kerygma whose expression is the certainty of a divine presence.

Two more general observations can also be drawn. First, the oppression is of less ethical importance that the transcendence of vengeance. The Johannine poetics almost fail this point because the dramatic imagery is excessive. For example, as Barnett notes, an emergent supremacism is expressed by the Johannine text; it is an attempt to confront dramatically the Roman God-Emperors. Age-old cosmic drama also adheres to this Johannine imagery. So mythic motifs of conflict between titans tend to displace the more delicate issue of vengeance and its consequences.

Second, the poetic balance of the Johannine Apocalypse brings forward the issue of choice; a matter of life and death. Although this balance is appreciated as ambiguity by Swete and Thompson, their view is augmented by Barnett's. He finds an unambiguous poetry; opposition to evil counterpoised by a double affirmation of goodness. Thompson's idea of kerygma is compatible with the affirmation of goodness. Put together these interpretations suggest a tripartite poetical structure graced by kerygma.

There are methodological considerations which arise from these observations. Diverse
ideas are expressed through the Johannine Apocalypse. The varietous interpretations we have examined here suggest separately and together a need for an interpretative method which can accommodate dissonance as well as accord. The religio-literary method described by this thesis can address that task. When applied to texts, the Vichian three-ring-circus and the Fryean fourth order of words accommodate a much wider hermeneutical scope than their two interpreters encountered. Perhaps a contemporary religio-literary analysis of the Johannine Apocalypse can contribute some refinement to the already sturdy apocalyptic vehicle. By appropriation, re-appropriation, mis-appropriation, interpretation and re-interpretation people continue to communicate with one another, despite their abysmal differences. The Johannine Apocalypse, resonating with the other apocalypses, empowers that vehicle of communication. In Chapter Eight a religio-literary interpretation of the Johannine Apocalypse will be demonstrated.
CHAPTER 8
JOHANNINE APOCALYPSE: A RELIGIO-LITERARY ANALYSIS

PREAMBLE

As preliminary, it is necessary to consider some general issues which have affected the emergence of the several generations of the Johannine Apocalypse in English. The anatomy by which this religio-literary interpretation proceeds has four main parts. Two convergent horizons and the issue of their convergence approximate a Vichian three-ring-circus. A performative kerygma constitutes a fourth element. For the purposes of discussion, the horizons are called eschatological and neological. The temporal indications of these terms are heuristic: the horizons 'englobe', to use William Blake's term, so whatever we say of one of them is metaphorically convertible to the other.

The Johannine Apocalypse entered the English language in about 1380, being translated from the Latin by John Wycliffe (c. 1324-1384). For forty or fifty years, Wycliffe was connected with the University of Oxford as a tutor, Head of College and Professor. Consequently, he had great influence in the preparation of clergy as well as the education of lay persons and nobles. Through his students, his work and ideas permeated all the parishes of England. He translated the Bible into the vernacular to disseminate it the more widely.

Wycliffe's translations are faithful to the Vulgate text. The earliest, being literal in its adherence to the Latin order of words, created anomalies of meaning in English but the later translations conformed to English idiom. The integrity of the text is maintained in both versions insofar as there are no distortions or insertions made for
doctrinal reasons.\textsuperscript{569} Wycliffe was the first to translate of the whole of the Bible into English.

The very earliest known renditions of Christian scriptural material into the vernacular of Britain were accomplished by Bede (c. 673-735 A.D.). Through Bede, the poetics of his contemporary, Caedmon, which included some parts of the Johannine Apocalypse, was also translated into English but these works, like others before Wycliffe were fragmentary.\textsuperscript{570} Later editions of the Wycliffe Bible were based on Anglo-Norman manuscripts of the 14th Century. English versions of the French Apocalypse were current in the fourteenth century. The later Wycliffite version was based on one of these.\textsuperscript{571}

Wycliffe's translation was widely disseminated throughout England during and after 1380. The dissemination of the scriptures in the vernacular was politically significant. It created a challenge to the authority of the mediaeval Church by making more


\textsuperscript{570} For further discussion of the status of Caedmon's fragments see Bede, \textit{A History of the English Church and People}, Leo Sherley-Price (Trans.), Penguin Harmondsworth, 1955. See also Sweet (no call name given), \textit{Sweet'e Anglo-Saxon Reader in Prose and Verse} (revised 1967 by Dorothy Whitelock), Oxford, Clarendon, 1876 (reprinted 1979), pp. 42-50.

\textsuperscript{571} Swete, 1922, p. cxcv.
generally available what had theretofore been privileged reading.

Wycliffe was an early and important contributor to reform of the Christian Church in England and his scriptural translations played an important role in the Reformation. Through clergymen who had been trained by Wycliffe and his colleagues, English parishioners gained access for the first time to literary processes of verification by replication. Kerygma could be proclaimed by preachers with the certainty of textual accuracy. Consequently, attention to the written word displaced attention to the erstwhile sayer of the word. Literalism was on the way. So while the personal power of the clergy diminished, the power of the scriptures themselves was enhanced.

Wycliffe's Biblical translations, together with Tyndale's, form a foundation upon which the later generations of the Bible in English rest. Wycliffe believed that his translation was essential to the promotion of a living Christian praxis in England. He maintained that the receipt of kerygmatic preaching was even more important than receipt of the sacrament.\(^\text{572}\) There is a high degree of similarity between Wycliffe's Apocalypse and Tyndale's Revelation but there are important differences, some of which will be discussed later in this chapter.

\(^{572}\) Stacey, 1964, pp. 79-89. See also Stefan Oltean, 'A Survey of the Pragmatic and Referential Functions of Free Indirect Discourse' in *Poetics Today: International Journal for Theory and Analysis of Literature and Communication*, Vol. 14 No. 4, Winter 1993, pp 691-714. Oltean takes up an interest in subvocalisation, which he calls inner speech, that is pertinent to Wycliffe's view.
William Tyndale (c. 1484-1536) published translations from Greek into English of the same scriptures as Wycliffe had translated from Latin. Tyndale's version of the Bible was published in 1525 and revised in 1534 and 1535. Tyndale had read divinity at Magdalen College, Oxford University at an early age. Later he attended the University of Cambridge, probably with a view to studying under Erasmus who lectured Greek there from 1509-1514. Until the taking of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453, Greek had been largely lost to the English.\textsuperscript{573} Tyndale's intention to translate the New Testament from Greek to English was strongly opposed in England, being considered heretical by Church authorities.

Tyndale took his project to Germany and found sanctuary in the city of Worms. He was able to complete his translation and to revise it twice before he was captured by British agents. He was delivered into the hands of German officials and denounced as a heretic. After more than a year's imprisonment, he was tried, condemned, tied to a stake, strangled by a hangman then burnt.

Since Wycliffe and Tyndale, there have been many revised editions of the Bible in English. To discuss all of them is beyond the compass of this study. In addition to the

\textsuperscript{573} Bosworth, 1888, p. xviii; p. xxvii.
Wycliffe 1388 and Tyndale 1534 translations, nine generations of Biblical revision in English have been selected for discussion here. They are the Authorized Version of 1611, the Moffatt Bible of 1913, the Authorized Vulgate of 1949, the Revised Standard Version of 1952, the New English Bible of 1961, the Jerusalem Bible of 1968, and the Revised English Bible of 1990.

These versions have been selected for study here because all have been widely

574 Wycliffe, 1388 (1979), op. cit.


Some disparity in the numbering of verses is evident from version to version, notably the NEB but, with the exception of the Moffatt Bible, variations tend not to be gross.
disseminated. Consequently, they have contributed directly to the development of the vernacular by which apocalyptic ideas are conveyed in English. There is no special significance in there being nine versions discussed here. Nine proved to be a workable number, providing adequate coverage.

The several versions are included here so that their shifts of emphasis can be compared. As we shall observe, the comparisons show that apocalyptic images wax and wane among the generations. Some are maintained in the contemporary idiom almost unaltered from the Wycliffe or Tyndale versions. Others are altered; some have faded away. It is the fact of change not any evaluative notion which is illustrated here.

No consistent preference for either Wycliffe's or Tyndale's renditions is demonstrated in the other versions. Take, for example, the matter of the red beast's gender (Apocalypse XVII:8). The beast attains marvellous flexibility of femininity, masculinity and androgyny. The red beast is engendered variously; Wycliffe uses 'she', Tyndale, Moffatt and the New English Bible use 'he', the Authorised Vulgate uses 'it', and the Authorised Version uses no pronoun at all.

A further example is well illustrated by the matter of the stigma borne by those who adopt the character of the beast in Apocalypse XVI:2. Wycliffe gives us 'wounde fers and werst' and Tyndale 'a sore botche'. The Authorized Version echoes Tyndale with
'grieuous sore' as do the Revised Standard Version with 'foul and evil sores' and the Revised English Bible with 'foul malignant sores'. The New English Bible gives us 'foul malignant sores', and the Jerusalem Bible 'disgusting and virulent sores'. Here we see Tyndale's adjective accepted and strengthened, being used as a noun in five cases. The Moffatt Bible, however, renders the phrase 'noisome, painful ulcers', and the Authorized Vulgate gives us 'an ulcer... malignant and troublesome'. Thus, in the Moffatt Bible and the Authorised Vulgate, Wycliffe's 'wounde' and Tyndale's 'botche' are conflated into 'ulcer', showing that both and either are generally accepted, neither being preferred.  

An acquaintance with a variety of versions of the Johannine text facilitates an appreciation of the compound nature of the apocalyptic symbolism. Because the symbols are themselves complex (that complexity being readily observable in any one text), a tendency to ignore this dimension of their intertextuality prevails in literary criticism. 

575 Apocalypse XVI:2
Tyndale Bible, 'a sore botche apon the men which had the marke of the best [sic]' 
Authorized Version, 'grieuous sore vpon the men which had the marke of the beast' 
Moffatt Bible, 'noisome, painful ulcers broke out on those who bore the mark of the Beast' 
Authorized Vulgate, 'an ulcer broke out, malignant and troublesome, upon all men who bore the beast's mark' 
Revised Standard Version, 'foul and evil sores came upon the men who bore the mark of the beast' 
New English Bible, 'foul malignant sores appeared on those men that wore the mark of the beast' 
Jerusalem Bible, 'on all the people who had been branded with the mark of the beast and had worshipped its statue, there came disgusting and virulent sores.' 
Revised English Bible, 'foul malignant sores appeared on the men that wore the mark of the beast and worshipped its image.'
The trajectory across generations which I have taken here represents an attempt to do what David Lawton advocates; to encounter the Bible's power to signify. That is to apprehend 'not what it means, but what it can be taken to mean.' As we noted in Chapter One, a process of ebb, flow, accretion and attrition which is not necessarily an evolution or a developmental progression informs apocalyptic symbolism. This process approximates to what Vico calls corso in ricorso. To receive the several generations simultaneously makes possible the appreciation of a mosaic of interpretative possibilities, none of them absolute.

The Wycliffe Bible of 1388 is our primary source here; simultaneous reception is a product of hindsight and the temporality of reading-acts is incontrovertible. So there must be a first encounter. Moreover, the temporality of grammar requires consideration; it is in the interests of coherence to acknowledge a point of commencement. Wycliffe's version is not valorised here nor in common usage; it serves our heuristic purpose.

The Wycliffe version can serve our interpretative purpose because it is not particularly well known. It is given primacy here for two reasons. First, it is not familiar to readers

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and listeners now; its language, although it is English, is not the contemporary vernacular.\textsuperscript{577} This makes careful listening necessary to understanding. It enhances the internal resonances of the text. So the ear not the eye responds to the similitudes and certainties within the text. This enhances the impact of word-word relationships and diminishes the impact of image-word or iconographic effects. This is to facilitate appreciation of the metaphysics of the poetry.

The second reason for our giving preference to the Wycliffe Bible of 1388 is that it was very widely disseminated in its time and its terms and iconography are dynamic in contemporary apocalyptic usage. The arbitrary, executive decision was prompted by Wycliffe's use of the title, 'Apocalypse' rather than 'Revelation'. This too was in consideration of auditory resonances.

In case the English vernacular of 1388 should prove too taxing to readers, the Authorised Vulgate if 1949 is used in the text of this thesis to provide a parallel in modern English. That version has been chosen by following the preference of Northrop Frye. As his work on the Bible has so influenced the development of the method used here, it is appropriate to refer to the version upon which he worked.

\textsuperscript{577} Read aloud, the Wycliffe English of 1388 is readily comprehensible to a variety of respondents whose \textit{lingua franca} is English. This was proved among residents of International House, University of Sydney, who kindly helped me to test the accessibility of the Wycliffe version. Initial difficulties in decoding were consistently overcome by reading aloud.
Quotations from the Vulgate are presented in italics for purpose of easy differentiation.

The interpretation of the Johannine Apocalypse put forward here demonstrates a religio-literary method. We proceed by reference to two divergent horizons, thematically determined, and their partial convergence (following Vico and Frye). We also refer briefly to a fourth element which is observable in concert with the three; it is kerygma (following Frye). In this interpretation the Johannine Apocalypse is not encountered devotionally. The aim of the criticism is to discover some of the many present influences of the Johannine Apocalypse on contemporary apocalyptic rhetoric.
AN ESCHATOLOGICAL HORIZON

IMAGES OF SUFFERING AND TORMENT

Suffering and torment, threatened and actual, according to the Johannine Apocalypse, are conditions of life. The Johannine ethic allows that to torment can be one of the activities of goodness, being a tool of conversion to Christian devotion. Take the following example:

(Apocalypse IX:4-5) And it was zouun to hem, that thei schulden not sle hem, but that thei schulden be tormentid fyue monethis.

such men as did not bear God's mark on their foreheads. These they had no power to kill, only to inflict pain on them.

With these words, torment is sanctioned, being prescribed for those without the mark of the god on their foreheads, the mark being got by self-subjugation to the god.

Very severe suffering, called torment in double measure, is also sanctioned as an activity of goodness. For example, it is prescribed as punishment to the Babylonians for self-glorification:

(Apocalypse XVIII:6-7) and double ze double thingis, aftir her werkis; in the drynke that she meddldid to zou, mynge ze double to hir. As myche as sche glorifiede hir silf, and was delcis, so myche turment zuye to hir.

578 Unless noted otherwise, primary Biblical references (quotations) in this text are drawn from the Wycliffe version of 1388, op. cit. To ease reception, quotations from the Authorised Vulgate of 1949 are presented in parallel and in italics. Where variations which are significant to the interest of this study but do not warrant detailed explanation occur in other versions, the relevant lines are entered as footnotes.
brew double measure for her in the cup she has brewed for others.

There is general agreement among the several versions of Apocalypse XVIII:6-7 but perhaps the cheerful, songlike cadences of the Revised Standard Version and the (spiteful) exclamatory emphasis of the Revised English Bible deserve note:

(Revised Standard Version)
Render to her as she herself has rendered, and repay her double for her deeds; mix a double draught for her in the cup she mixed. As she glorified herself and played the wanton, so give her a like measure of torment and mourning.

(Revised English Bible)
Pay her back in her own coin, repay her twice over for her deeds Give her a potion twice as strong as the one she mixed! Measure out torment and grief to match her pomp and luxury!

These lines are included here to illustrate the point that torment, in this context, is accepted unreservedly as a tool of goodness. Not to choose the god is to choose severe torment.

Both these examples can be read as representing torment as a tool of coercion got by fear. The fear of torment is itself a torment. By it one can be forced to live desirous of death:

(Apocalypse IX:6) men shulen seke deth, and thei schulen not fynde it; and thei schulen desire to die, and deth schal fle fro hem.

men will be looking for the means of death, and there will be no finding it;
longing to die, and death will always give them the slip.

We are told that people who try to die will be thwarted; denied death. This is torment in double measure, concocted for the agents of evil. So the satan too is consigned to torment:

(Apocalypse XX:9-10) And the duel, that disseyuede hem, was sent in to the pool of fier and of brymstoon, where bothe the beeste and fals prophetis schulen be turmentid dai and nizt, in to worldis of worldis. Amen.

and the devil, their seducer, was thrown into the lake of fire and brimstone, where, like himself, the beast and the false prophet will be tormented day and night eternally.\(^{579}\)

In the Johannine Apocalyptic scenario, most if not all unrepentant or unbelieving beings might expect torment, it being the means of bringing them to redemption. For example, the multitude to whom the seer is told to prophesy (Apocalypse X:11) heard of two angelic witnesses (Apocalypse XI:1-13) who wield fire death, blood, plague and earthquake. This, they are told is to frighten everybody ('the liuing') so much that

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\(^{579}\) Apocalypse XX:9-10
Authorized Version, ‘And the deuil [sic] that deceuied them, was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and the false prophet are, and shall be tormented day and night, for euer and euer.’
Moffatt Bible, ‘and their seducer, the devil, was flung into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the Beast and the false Prophet also lie, to be tortured day and night for ever and ever.’
Revised Standard Version, ‘and the devil who had deceived them was thrown into the lake of fire and brimstone where the beast and the false prophet were, and they will be tormented day and night for ever and ever.’
New English Bible, ‘the Devil, their seducer, was flung into the lake of fire and sulphur, where the beast and the false prophet had been flung, there to be tormented day and night for ever.’
Jerusalem Bible, ‘Then the devil, who misled them, will be thrown into the lake of fire and sulphur, where the beast and the false prophet are, and their torture will not stop, day or night, for ever and ever.’
Revised English Bible, ‘Their seducer, the Devil, was flung into a lake of fire and sulphur, where the beast and the false prophet had been flung to be tormented day and night for ever.’
they will praise the god:

(Apocalypse XI:13) sent in to drede, and zauen glorie to God of heaven.

filled with dread, and acknowleged the glory of God in heaven. 580

We have here the seeds and echoes of that Inquisitorial frame of mind wherein to torment one who does not hold with a particular belief can be viewed as a kindness, facilitating repentence. Simple eschatology, combined with excessive literalism and the structural enshrinement of violence constellates this. 581 Suffice to say here that it reflects a form of primitive monism which inclines to absolutism.

The Johannine apocalyptic images present at least ten categories of tormented ones. There are, for example, those who received the god's seven final torments, poured out, at the god's command, from heavenly vials to earth, by seven angels (Apocalypse XVI:1-21). There are those who bore the sign of the beast and broke out in the abovementioned foul sores after the emptying of the first vial (Apocalypse XVI:2). There are those who died in the sea made bloody by the pouring out of the second vial (Apocalypse XVI:4); and those who died by having nothing to drink when the

580 Apocalypse XI:13
Authorized Version, 'affrighted, and gaued glory to the God of heauen.'
Moffatt Bible, 'awestruck, and gave glory to the God of Heaven.'
Revised Standard Version, 'Terrified and gave glory to the God of heaven.'
New English Bible, 'in terror did homage to the God of heaven.'
Jerusalem Bible, 'overcome with fear, could only praise the God of heaven.'
Revised English Bible, 'filled with fear, did homage to the God of heaven.'

581 Inquisitorial torment is discussed in Part Two.
rivers and wells were made into blood by the contents of the third vial (Apocalypse XVI:6). There are those who were tormented by the heat of the sun after the emptying of the fourth vial (Apocalypse XVI:8). There are those who belonged to the kingdom of the beast and suffered after the emptying of the fifth vial:

(Apocalypse XVI:10-11) And the fifthe aungel schedde out his viol on the seete of the beeste, and his kyngdome was maad derk; and thei eten togidere her tongis for sorewe, and thei blasfemyden God of heuene, for sorewis of her woundis; and thei diden not penaunce of her werkis.

And the fifth angel poured out his cup where the beast's throne was; and with that, all the beast's kingdom was turned into darkness, in which men sat biting their tongues for pain, finding cause to blaspheme the God of heaven in their pains and their ulcers, instead of finding cause for repentance in their ill deeds.582

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582 Apocalypse XVI:10-11
Tyndale Bible, 'And the fifte angell poured out his vyall apon the seate of the beste, and his kyngdome wexed derke, and they gnewe their tonges for sorowe, and blasphemed the god of heven for sorowe, and payne of their sores, and repented not of their dedes.'
Authorized Version, 'And the fift Angel powred out his viall vpon the seat of the beast, and his kingdome was full of darkness, and they gnawed their tongues for paine, And blasphemed the God of heauen, because of their paines, and their sores, and repented not of their deeds.'
Moffatt Bible, 'The fifth poured out his bowl upon the throne of the Beast; his realm was darkened, and men gnawed their tongues in anguish, blaspheming the God of heaven for their pains and their ulcers, but refusing to repent their doings.'
Revised Standard Version, 'The fifth angel poured his bowl on the throne of the beast, and its kingdom was in darkness; men gnawed their tongues in anguish and cursed the God of heaven for their pain and sores, and did not repent of their deeds.'
New English Bible, 'The fifth angel poured his bowl on the throne of the beast; and its kingdom was plunged in darkness. Men gnawed their tongues in agony, but they only cursed the God of heaven for their pain and sores, and would not repent of what they had done.'
Jerusalem Bible, 'The fifth angel emptied his bowl over the throne of the beast and its whole empire was plunged into darkness. Men were biting their tongues for pain, but instead of repenting for what they had done, they cursed the God of heaven because of their pains and sores.'
Revised English Bible, 'The fifth angel poured out his bowl on the throne of the beast; and its kingdom was plunged into darkness. Men gnawed their tongues in agony, and cursed the God of heaven for their pain and sores, but they would not repent of what they had done.'
There are those who gathered at Armageddon (Hermagedon) to do battle with the god (Apocalypse XVI:14-16). There are those who blasphemed the lightning, thunder, hail, plague and earthquake which destroyed cities and islands and flattened the hills when the seventh vial was emptied (Apocalypse XVI:17-21); and there are those of Babylon who during that catastrophe were especially punished:

(Apocalypse XVI:19) and greet Babiloyne cam in to mynde byfor God, to zyue to it the cuppe of wyn of the indignacyoun of his wraththe.

And God did not forget to minister a draught of his wine, his avenging anger, to Babylon.\(^{583}\)

There are kings who lament the torment and destruction of Babylon (Apocalypse XVIII:9) There are seafarers who bewail the burning of Babylon (Apocalypse XVIII:17-20). There are merchants who had had trade with Babylon (Apocalypse XVIII:14-15).

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\(^{583}\) Apocalypse XVI:19

Tyndale Bible, 'And grett Babilon came in remembraunce before God, to geve vnto hyr the cuppe of wyne of the fearcenes of his wrathe.'

Authorized Version, 'and great Babylon came in remembrance before God, to giue vnto her the cup of the wine of the fiercenesse of his wrath.'

Moffatt Bible, 'God remembered to give Babylon the great the cup of the wine of the passion of his anger.'

Revised Standard Version, 'God remembered great Babylon, to make her drain the cup of the fury of his wrath.'

New English Bible, 'God did not forget Babylon the great, but made her drink the cup which was filled with the fierce wine of his vengeance.'

Jerusalem Bible, 'Babylon the Great was not forgotten: God made her drink the full winecup of his anger.'

Revised English Bible, 'God did not forget Babylon the great, but made her drink the cup which was filled with the fierce wine of his wrath.'
In summary, the Johannine torments include deliberate terrorisation exacted in the name of the god, stigmatisation by foul sores; drowning in blood; death by thirst, there being only blood to drink. There is torment by fire and by the heat of the sun and there is darkness and sorrow. There is thunder, lightning, plague, earthquake and deprivation, delivered as signs of the god's indignation. All these torments are accompanied by the material losses which ensue from catastrophe. Anyone who does not express submission to the god and who might, consequently, be deemed unrepentant, is put forward as a subject of torment.

Further to the abovementioned tormented ones, there are those who fell to the reaper, an angel who, with his sickle, harvested humanity as grapes to be squeezed of their blood in the winepress of the god's anger:

(Apocalypse XIV:19-20) And the aungel sente his sikil in to the erthe, and gaderide grapis of the vinzerd of the erthe, and sente into the greet lake of Goddis wraththe. And the lake was troddun without the citee, and bloud wente out.

So the angel put in his sickle over the earth, and gathered in earth's vintage, which he threw into the great wine-press of God's anger; and when the wine-press was trodden out, away from the city, blood came from the wine-press.\footnote{Apocalypse XIV:19-20}

\footnote{Tyndale Bible, ‘And the angell thrust in his sykle on the erth, and cut doune the grapes of the vyneyarde of the erth: and cast them into the gret wynefat of the wrath of god, and the wynefat was trodden with out the cite, and bloud came oute’.}

\footnote{Authorized Version, ‘And the Angel thrust in his sickle into the earth, and gathered the vine of the earth, & cast it into
Who are these people? The text does not make clear whether or not they are among the unrepentant. Is their torment gratuitous?

This, of course, is the question of faith which, as Vico pointed out, cannot be asked by a believer. A religio-literary criticism, however, might essay some consideration of it.

One might be tempted to discard this question of gratuitous torment, assuming that it arises out of an over-exuberant poesy. But if that is the case with regard to this passage, how is it not the case with regard to almost any other to be found in the Johannine writing? An exuberant poesy is undeniably a feature of the Johannine Apocalypse. Does the Johannine poesy engage in gratuitous violence?

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the great winepresse of the wrath of God. And the winepresse was troden without the citie, and blood came out'.
Moffatt Bible, 'So the angel swung his sickle on the earth and culled the clusters from the Vine of earth, flinging the grapes into the great winepress of God's wrath; outside the City was the winepress trodden, and blood gushed out'.
Revised Standard Version, 'So the angel swung his sickle on the earth and gathered the vintage of the earth, and threw it into the great wine press of the wrath of God; and the wine press was trodden outside the city and the blood flowed'.
New English Bible, 'So the angel put his sickle to the earth and gathered its grapes, and drew them into the great winepress of God's wrath. The winepress was trodden outside the city, and for two hundred miles around blood flowed from the press'.
Jerusalem Bible, 'So the angel set his sickle to work on the earth and harvested the whole vintage of the earth and put it into a huge winepress, the winepress of God's anger, outside the city, where it was trodden until the blood that came out'.
Revised English Bible, 'So the angel swept over the earth with his sickle and gathered in its grapes, and threw them into the great winepress of God's wrath. The winepress was trodden outside the city, and for a distance of two hundred miles blood flowed'.
The matter of gratuitous violence arises also as an matter of Biblical hermeneutics. It can be illustrated by the following comparisons. Take Apocalypse IX:5 in which the exterminating angel, king of the locusts, is instructed in the torment of humanity. Wycliffe's word is 'tormentid'. Torment and torture are synonymous; both signify something twisted (L. tortura). Tyndale renders this as 'vexed'. This word (L. vexare), although it signifies trouble, affliction and disturbance, does not suggest the perversity or twisting by which torture is effected.

The Authorized Vulgate and the Jerusalem Bible turn vexation to punishment, rendering up respectively, 'to inflict pain on them' and 'to give them pain'. These versions preserve Tyndale's translation insofar as the twisting is concerned. Torture is not punishment it is coercion. The Authorized Version, Moffatt Bible preserve Wycliffe's sense; 'tormented' and 'tortured' are their preferred terms.

The other renditions, however, expand Wycliffe's sense to accommodate a desire to torment. Revised Standard Version gives us, 'they were allowed to torture them'. The New English Bible echoes this with, 'These they were allowed to torment'. The Revised English Bible echoes both, 'They were given permission to torment them'.

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585 The abovementioned example of Apocalypse XVIII:6-7 also has relevance here.

586 See Chapter Eleven for further discussion of torture.
Note that these are recent generations of the Bible; issued in 1959, 1961 and 1990, respectively. Interestingly, the older versions are more humane in this matter than the more recent generations.

It is evident that our question requires answers from at least two quarters. First, the Johannine text as translated by Wycliffe and Tyndale show that a matter of delicacy exists here. Tyndale's version softens Wycliffe's, taking out the tormentous twist and delivering instead something closer to quotidian irritation. All the others, however preserve the twist. So this question of gratuitous violence gives rise to the issue of torture; can that ever be a necessity?

Second, the expansion into torturous desire is gratuitous; permission is not at issue here but restraint is. So the Revised Standard Version, the New English Bible and the Revised English Bible sanction an indulgence in twisted or perverse activity where the others do not.

This question of gratuitous torment arises again with regard to the saintly martyrs who are tormented by the entities of evil (Apocalypse XIII:7). Take, for example, the seven-headed dragon-beast, worshipped because one of its heads looks deathly but cured of death; ten horns, diadems and blasphemies adorning the heads. That beast could, we are told, defeat the saintly ones. The martyrs make that defeat into an act of
faith so their torment is realised. Why might the saintly martyrs suffer torments similar to that exacted upon the unrepentant?

Perhaps it has to do with the matter of vengeance. As we observed in Chapter Two of this study, Apocalypse VI:9-11 tells us of the martyrs' unheeded call for retribution ('Hou long thou, Lord, that art hooli and trewe, demest not, and vengest not oure blood'). Apocalypse XII:10 tells us more of their belief that the methods of their defeat must eventually be enacted upon their erstwhile tormentor:

(Apocalypse XII:10) he that ledith in to caitifte, schal go in to caitifte; he that sleith with the swerd, it behoueth hym to be slayn with swerd. This is the pacience and the feith of seyntis.

The captor will go into captivity; he who slays with the sword must himself be slain with the sword. Such good ground have the saints for their endurance, and for their faithfulness.  

The vision demonstrates, however, that those poor souls cannot achieve fully their liberation into the heavenly chorus until their voices are free of complaint. So the question itself is rendered unholy. Whether or not such a question is holy, its existence

587 Apocalypse XII:10
Tyndale Bible, 'He that leadeth into captivite, shall goo into captivite: he that kyleth with a swearde, must be kyld with a swearde. Heare is the pacience, and the fayth of the saynctes.'
Authorized Version, 'Hee that leadeth into captivitie, shall goe into captivitie: Hee that killeth with the sword, must be killed with the sword. Here is the patience and the faith of the Saints.'
Moffatt Bible, 'Whoever is destined for captivity, to captivity he goes: whoever kills with the sword, by the sword must he be killed. This is what shows the patience and the faith of the saints.'
New English Bible, 'Whoever is meant for prison, to prison he goes. Whoever takes the sword to kill, by the sword he is bound to be killed. Here the fortitude and faithfulness of God's people have their place.'
Jerusalem Bible, 'Captivity for those who are destined for captivity; the sword for those who are to die by the sword. This is why the saints must have constancy and faith.'
is pertinent to this discussion.

One can shift the focus to the question of evil, arguing that Johannine torments are delivered to all humans by the absolute opposition of the second beast to the god (Apocalypse XIII:11-15). To do that though, is non productive; it begs the original question and confuses the issues.

The second beast seems to create an imperative; that one must have either the name of the god or the name of the beast upon one's hand or forehead in order to enter into trade:

(Apocalypse XIII:16-17) And he schal make alle, smale and grete, and riche and pore, and fre men and bonde men, to haue a careter in her rizthoond, ethir in her forhedis; that no man may bie, ethir sille, but thei han the character [sic], ether the name of the beeste, ethir the noumbr of his name.

All alike, little and great, rich and poor, free men and slaves, must receive a mark from him on their right hands, or on their foreheads, and none might buy or sell, unless he carried this mark, which is the beast's name, or the number that stands for his name. 588

588 Apocalypse XIII:16-18

Tyndale Bible, 'And he made all bothe smale and grett, ryche and poore, fre and bond, to receave a marke in their right hondes, or in their forheddes. And that no man myght by or sell, save he that had the marke, or the name of the beest, other the nombre of his name.'

Authorized Version, 'And he causeth all, both smal and great, rich and poore, free and bond, to receiue a marke in their right hand, or in their forheads: And no man might buy or sell, saue he that had the marke, or the name of the beast, or the number of his name.'

Moffatt, 'and he obliges all men, low and high, rich and poor, freemen and slaves alike, to have a mark put upon their right hand or their forehead, so that no one can buy or sell unless he bears the mark, that is the name of the Beast or the cipher of his name.'

Revised Standard Version, 'Also it causes all, both small and great, both rich and poor, both free and slave, to be marked on the right hand or the forehead, so that no one can buy or sell unless he has the mark, that is, the name of the
A close reading of Apocalypse XIII:18 may take us toward an answer to the question of suffering. In that verse, a third way is suggested:

(Apocalypse XIII:18) Here is wisdom; he that hath understanding, account the number of the beast; for it is the number of man, and his number is six hundred sixty six.

Here is room for discernment; let the reader, if he has the skill, cast up the sum of the figures in the beast’s name, after our human fashion, and the number will be six-hundred and sixty six.

NOTE: re. Apocalypse XIII:18 the Authorised Vulgate differs significantly from all other versions. It gives no confirmation of the equivalence of the number of humanity (man) and the beast. Perhaps the lacuna signifies the operant difficulty of interpretation. The Authorized Version and the Jerusalem Bible render ‘the number of man’: ‘the number of a man’; the Moffatt Bible gives us ‘the cipher of a man’; the Revised English Bible offers us; ‘the number represents a man’s name’; and the New English Bible gives us ’a man’s name’.

Here the reader is adjured to wisdom in the realisation that the number of the beast is the number of humanity. 589 Two things follow. Realisation of both of them might be considered wise. First, if the number of the beast is the number of humanity, then all humans bear the mark of the beast; a duplicate cannot be necessary to their right to

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589 Swete 1922, p. 175. affirms that the number of the beast is possessed by and does not possess humanity. His interpretative translation in part reads thus: "... let him who has intelligence ... a character not without its value in spiritual things ... calculate ... (the meaning of) the Beast's number, for (Beast though he is) his number is that of a man."
trade. By this interpretation, trade may be taken as incontrovertible, a social necessity, and threats to its continuance may be seen as fatuous. Second, if the number of the beast is the number of humanity, then simply by accepting the offer of the mark of divinity, humanity may transform itself. Such a transformation might entail metamorphosis by death. Thus the social necessity of trade would be obviated. Only participation (by uncompromising opposition) in the second beast's absolutism (in opposition to the god) can render that path intolerable. The absolute positions propagate the torture; compromise facilitates transformation.

Here we advert to the speculation, mentioned above, about the liberation of the satan. In the same way as the satan might be liberated by human preference for anything other than evil, so might humanity be liberated from attachment to demons. Is one presented here with choice as to whether one will confirm the insignia one's demonic nature or one's divine nature? Such an interpretation might find confirmation in these lines:

(Apocalypse XV:2) hem that ouercamen the beeste, and his ymage, and the noumbre of his name, stondynge aboue the glasun see hauynge harpis of God.

And by this sea of glass the victors were standing, safe now from the beast, and his image, and the mark of his name, with harps of God's fashioning.

The choice may be beset by fear of the unknown provoked by freedom. Equanimity is at stake. But the ultimatum itself is tormentous and self-made; to live with it is to opt for torture. Choice exists.
So the rhetoric resonating against the images of torment which furnish this eschatological horizon of the Johannine Apocalypse tells us that death is better than any adoption of evil, voluntary or co-erced. The choice which is offered by such tormentous, eschatological rhetoric is the choice of the martyrs; to die rather than recant. The poetry affirms that it is better to have one's life come to nought than to find oneself in service to evil.
A NEOLOGICAL HORIZON

IMAGES OF BLESSEDNESS AND RAPTURE

Images of providential liberation, accompanied by songs of praise for divinity, furnish a strong rhetoric of blessedness and rapture which permeates the Johannine Apocalypse. These images provide a counterpoise to those of suffering and torment (and vice versa). A significant difference, however, between the eschatological and neological horizons can be observed. The difference, as we shall show, is in the status of humanity with regard to metaporphosis. Regard to the motif of the second death will illustrate it here.

We have observed that figures of living humanity carry a burden of suffering, threat and torment in the Johannine Apocalypse. These are the images which furnish what we have called the eschatological horizon. There is no protection against suffering, even for saints or martyrs (Apocalypse II:9-12). In Johannine terms, suffering is the price of self-awareness; to identify as a human being is to identify with suffering.

Torment is double suffering. It ensues from absolutism; even absolute opposition to evil. Death can be preferred to a life bound to evil but fear ensues from the prospect of death as well as from torment. So suffering continues unless a body welcomes metamorphosis, notwithstanding death's uncertainties. Equanimity comes to a test.
This is illustrated in Apocalypse II:9-11; III:7-14 The Churches of Smyrna and Filadelfie are weak compared to the strength of the evil which confronts them but they are told to maintain faith, to the death if necessary, victorious death being the attainment of heaven. It is not strength of force but strength of faith which is required of these people. The Johannine affirmation of heaven is followed immediately by a statement regarding the second death:

(Apocalypse II:11) 'He that overcometh, shall not be hurt of the second death'

The second death shall have no power to hurt him.

The line tells us that second death is no threat to believing Christians. What might it be otherwise? Why is this remark about the second death made in this way? What might it mean?

To answer this question requires an acquaintance with a complicated metaphysical figure of the Johannine Apocalypse. It is necessary first to appreciate the configuration of the neological images against which the metaphysic operates.

The second death has to do with blessedness and rapture but this moiety of the apocalyptic imagery tends not to be carried by figures of living humanity. Instead, the
images are associated with figures of the divine, the angelic and the dead. These enigmatic figures operate as symbols of redemption.

Spatial signifiers, such as proximity to the divine throne support the symbols of redemption. Auditory images attend the visual panorama; songs of praise to the god, for example:

(Apocalypse IV:8) Hooli, hooli, hooli, the Lord God almyzti, that was, and that is, and that is comynge.

The chorus, however, is not populated by human forms but by morphs or transformations. Four winged creatures (beestis) with eyes front and back, for example. These creatures are not the same as any found on earth, although they are described by their similitude to the lion, the calf, the human, and the eagle. Note that although something like a human is included here, it is not a human.

Among the blessed, also, are four unlikely horsemen. These figures might be understood as horse-men, almost like centuars. They too are not quite human. They signify co-eternity of heavenly and earthly experience, being both human and not human.

There is the white horse-man who appears with a crown and a sword shaped for winning fights ('ouercomynge') after the first seal of the book of life is opened by the
lamb (Apocalypse VI:2). There is the red horse-man who appears after the breaking of the second seal with a sword to interrupt earthly peace, setting humans to slaying each other (Apocalypse VI:4-5). There is the black horse-man who appears after the breaking of the third seal with a balance in hand to reckon the cost of life's material necessities (Apocalypse VI:6). There is the pale horse-man, the rider named Death, who appears after the fourth seal going all over the earth to kill (Apocalypse VI:8).

There are also many angelic figures among the blessed. These are as follows. The seven who carry and later deliver the god's final torments (Apocalypse XV:1); the angelic witness to the divine revelation (Apocalypse I:1); the angels who mark with the sign of the god the foreheads of those who serve the god (Apocalypse VII:1-9); the seven angels with trumpets.

Of the seven with trumpets, the first heralds hail, fire and blood, to be spilled down, burning the earth, the trees and the grass (Apocalypse VIII:2-8). The second heralds the casting of a great, burning hill into the sea, making bloody the sea, killing sea creatures and capsizing ships (Apocalypse VIII:8-10). The third heralds a falling star to make bitter the well water, poisoning many people (Apocalypse VIII:10-12). The fourth heralds the darkening of the sun, moon and stars, making dark the day and inspiring woe to humanity (Apocalypse VIII:12-13). The fifth heralds the falling of a star which opens the pit from which smoke rises to darken further the sun, liberating monstrous locusts and their king, the exterminating angel (Apocalypse IX:1-13).
The exterminating angel is not to harm the grass or the trees but is to torment (not to kill) any people who have not the god's sign on their foreheads. The torment is so that they want to die but cannot find death. The sixth angel heralds the unbinding of four angels who can kill with fire, smoke and brimstone, another third of humanity. These angelic trumpeters and their familiars are horrific and terrific figures of awesome capability.

The seventh angel does not immediately blow his trumpet but announces that when he does so the god's secret will be revealed, 'the mysterie of God skal be endid' (Apocalypse X:7). At the eventual trumpeting of the seventh angel, the eternal reign of Jesus Christ is heralded:

(Apocalypse XI:15) The rewme of this world is maad oure Lordis, and of Christ, his sone; and he schal regne in to worldis of worldis. Amen.

The dominion of the world has passed to the Lord of us all, and to Christ his anointed; he shall reign for ever and ever, Amen.

The god's mystery, then has to do with transforming the mass slaughter out of which the Christ's ascendancy proceeds.

So the symbolisation of redemption is achieved, largely through the use of non human figures possessed of blessedness as a given element of their already immortal being.

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See also Apocalypse X:11: 'to hethene men, and to puplis, and langagis, and to many kings'. To end the mystery, the seventh angel, before blowing his trumpet, gave to John a little book to eat so that he might prophesy to the multitude.
There are, however, exceptions; repentant souls. For example, the twenty-four crowned elders seated near the throne of the god (Apocalypse IV:4-5). Also included are those exceptional people who live and die without lies and guilt; the best of all humanity (Apocalypse XIV:4-6).

We find, gathered together among the blessed, the following. Those whose repentance is got by provocation of fear ('Drede' Apocalypse XIV:7); the dead believers (Apocalypse XIV:13); the vigilantes, always ready to do battle for the god (Apocalypse XVI:15); and those who have overcome the beast and all his signs (Apocalypse XV:2). The most blessed of all these figures is one of the exceptional dead people; Jesus. So a person who is prepared to live and die for goodness is part of the blessed convocation.

The images of such blessed humanity are transformational; their forms tend to be uncertain although their presence is not. Take, for example the image of the lamb (Apocalypse V:6). This, standing for Jesus, symbolises blessedness as an identification of humanity and divinity in the human son of the god. This image suggests that much of what we identify as a human form, a human life, is relinquished by the blessed.

Take also, for example, the image of the human face which is included among the four blessed beasts (Apocalypse IV:7). This image puts the humanoid visage along with
leonine, bovine, and aquiline. They are all disembodied and depersonalised, confirming humanity as a sub-category of their shared divinity (Apocalypse IV:7-8).

The most important exception is the transformational figure of the divine lamb. Among all the god's convocation, the lamb is the only one found worthy of opening the god's book of life. This figure signifies the presence of Jesus as Christ (Apocalypse V:6-7). The convocation, by singing a new song, make of the resurrected Jesus and the lamb one person whom they adress as 'Lord our God':

(Apocalypse V:9) Lord our God, thou art worthy to take the book, and to opene the seelis of it; for thou were slayn, and azenbouztist vs to God in thi blood.

Thou, Lord, art worthy to take up the book and break the seals that are on it. Thou was slain... ransomed us with thy blood and [hast] given us to god.

This imagery is ethereal and unstable but how else might the transformations be expressed? The versatility of human spirit is neither a spatial nor a temporal matter so the techniques of image making are challenged. The Johannine Apocalypse puts forward these images as expressions of the metamorphoses of humanity.

The presence of the god is implicit in this imagery. That presence, however, does not burden further the overwrought imagery. It augments it with kerygma. By the songs, the music and the words of the blessed, the god is praised:

(Apocalypse XIX:1-8) Alleluya; heriyng, and glorie, and vertu is to oure God; for trewe and iust ben the domes of hym... Alleluya; for oure Lord God almyzti hath regned. Ioye we, and make we myrthe, and zuye glorie to hym.

Alleluila; salvation and glory and power belong to our God; his sentence is ever true and just... Alleluila, the Lord our God, the Almighty, has claimed his
kingdom; let us rejoice and triumph and give him praise.

This song of the blessed, in which their joy and mirth is proclaimed as glory given to the god, exemplifies the mood by which blessedness is recognised.

The main difference between the eschatological and the neological horizons is now illustrated. It is in the solidity (or otherwise) of human forms. The neological horizon is populated not by solid, suffering humanity, as the eschatological horizon is, but by an ethereal and rapturous alternative.

The depersonalised imagery is extended as numbers are used to represent humanity in change. This, however, proves problematic. Take, for example, the numbers of the hosts of the faithful:

(Apocalypse XIV:1) an hundrid thousynde and foure and fourti thouyeande.

a hundred and forty thousand.

Like the numbers of the years of millennium, these thousands require no one-to-one correlation. They are better understood as ciphers or sigils attempting to convey a sense of the magnitude or enormity. There is a common tendency, however, toward arithmetical literalism. It is evident in the Vulgate version above. The impossible but credible thousands of the metaphor have been tidied into a mathematical possibility. This suggests, quite improperly given the context, a very large body-count.
Another way of substantiating the sense of humanity in flux or metamorphosis is evidenced as the rhetoric bends to repetition. This makes of the concluding chapters a hall of mirrors; swelling the blessed elect by replication. Take, for example, those invited to the lamb's wedding feast (Apocalypse XIX:9). We meet them again among those who would rule with Christ and again among those who have refused the beast, its image and its sign. The refusers of the beast are given separate, explicit mention as well as being, implicitly among those who dwell in the New Jerusalem. Thus further replication is achieved and yet more is suggested by the developing image of the city (Apocalypse XXI:1-2).

Eventually we are told of the kings of the earth who will bring their glory and honour into the New Jerusalem while the folk will walk in its divine light:

(Apocalypse XXI:22-25) And Y say no temple in it, for the Lord God almyzti and the lomb, is temple of it. And the citee hath no nede of sunne, nethir moone, but thei schyne in it; for the clerete of God schal liztne it; and the lomb is the lanterne of it. And folkis schulen walke in lizt of it; and the kyngis of the erthe schulen brynge her glorie and onour in to it.

I saw no temple in it; its temple is the Lord God Almighty, its temple is the Lamb. Nor had the city any need of the sun and the moon to shew in it; the glory of Gode shone there, and the Lamb gave it light. The nations will live and move in its radiance; the kings of the earth will bring it their tribute of praise and honour.

No glory and honour is afforded the folk nor might they enter the city. Here, perhaps, there is another clue as to why, in the Johannine Apocalypse, the images of humanity blessed remain so insubstantial. Their metamorphosis is essential to their liberation.
Can a person elect to be king? Jesus did. So the poetry turns again to choice.

So redemption is symbolised as metamorphosis; change and choice. Its figures are transformational, challenging with fluidity every established sense of form. Its images are enigmatic and its mood is joyous.

Out of what does the mood of the blessed, a rapturous mood of happiness and merriment, spring? It springs from a celebration of the enactment of the god's torments:

(Apocalypse XVIII:20) Heune, and hooli apostlis, and prophetis, make ze ful out ioye on it, for God hath demed zoure dom of it.

Triumph, heaven, over her fall, triumph you saints in heaven, apostles and prophets; God has avenged you on her.

Those who are joyous and mirthful are those whose devotion has brought horror and terror to nought. By acquiescence in redemptive annihilation they can ignore torment. That is their rapture. It is the secret of the second death.
ESCHATOLOGICAL AND NEOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE
THE THREAT OF EXPENDABILITY AND THE ISSUE OF CHOICE

The eschatological horizon can reveal that death is better than a life of evil. Divinity prevails while humanity acquiesces in change. Mortality submits to death so suffering can be brought to nought by choice.

The neological horizon can reveal that suffering and death are nothing to fear because blessed rapture is present in anyone who chooses change. Divinity prevails while humanity acquiesces in goodness. Mortality submits to annihilation so transformations can be got by goodness.

When the eschatological and the neological horizons converge, a lacuna (‘vacuum' in local parlance) is left by death's absence from the agenda of suffering. This lacuna is encountered by the transformative spirit of blessed rapture. The issue of choice springs to life in a human being. To make a life, to ignore the potential, or to do something else, those are issues of choice we can find at this convergence of apocalyptic horizons.

There are, in this Johannine, metaphysical poetry, accretions of ethical concern. The most common is a question of form; what constitutes a human form? This question
prevails as the issues of choice are explored.

In the Johannine Apocalypse, redemption marks the preferred form of human life. The presence or absence of repentance is crucial to the redemption. We have observed that the Johannine ethic finds in suffering acceptable means of bringing people to repentance. So redemption entails release from suffering and torment. In Apocalypse XVI:10-11 (see above), for example, the authorial voice deplores those not brought to repentance. As consequence of intransigence, the exterminating angel, king of locusts whose desire it is to torment people, is released.

We have noted also that repentance, whatever the motivation, is held to be praiseworthy (Apocalypse XIV:7). So persuasion and coercion are contiguous in the Johannine rhetoric. Ends justify means in this framework of redemption; any device by which repentance can be won is as praiseworthy as the repentance itself.

The Johannine Apocalypse makes explicit the behaviours requiring repentance. First, they are presented in general terms. The adoption of false teachings, for example, and the utterance of false prophecy; all the activities which false prophets condone (Apocalypse XIX:20). These generalities are exemplified by the Churches of Pergamus and Taitira (Apocalypse II:14-16; II: 20). There is also equivocation, of which the Church of Laodice is accused (Apocalypse III:15).
In the Johannine apocalyptic scenario, most if not all unrepentant or unbelieving persons can expect torment, inflicted as a means of bringing them to repentance. These expectations, however, are not necessarily fulfilled. Take, for example, the satan's host, devoured by fire which, delivered from heaven, consumed them:

(Apocalypse XX:9) fier cam doun of God fro heune, and devorede hem.
But God sent fire from heaven to consume them.591

Thus merciful release from the promised, everlasting torment is proffered. Such is the providence of the god.

The motif of the satan describes this same pattern but in a more cryptic form. His torment is to be bound for a thousand years into the abyss (Apocalypse XX:1-2). That, however, is not the end of it. If the abysmal torment fails to get repentance, the god will understand. As Karl Barth so neatly puts it: 'everything created by God is good. We cannot change it; nor can the devil.'592 So the adversarial efforts of the satan can only come to nought; annihilation does that.

591 Apocalypse XX:9
Tyndale Bible, 'and fyre cam doune from God, out of heuen, and devoured them'.
Authorized Version, 'and fire came downe from God out of heauen and deuoured them'.
Moffatt Bible, 'but fire descended from heaven and consumed them'.
Revised Standard Version, 'but fire came down from heaven and consumed them'.
New English Bible, 'But fire came down on them from heaven and consumed them'.
Jerusalem Bible, 'But fire will come down on them from heaven and consume them'.
Revised English Bible, 'But fire came down on them from heaven and consumed them'.

Why is the satan not annihilated? Does he serve a divine purpose? How? Does the satan make goodness good by being its other? Does goodness require an other? It would seem that it does, at least for the purposes of literary expression, for how can goodness be characterised or dramatised except as other to badness or evil? Is an absolute goodness possible? Or does an absolute anything render itself null, at least to language? Without its other, goodness is an empty sign. Anything at all may be put into an empty sign.

So goodness, as enunciated in the Johannine Apocalypse, is in need of an other. What is proffered is an opposite, evil. Enter Satan; the satan, an age old adversarial spirit, devil-advocate to goodness and provocateur of evil, personified. The Johannine Apocalypse delivers torment not annihilation upon this figure who is bound for a thousand years into the abyss (Apocalypse 20:1-2). The fiery pool, too, delivers torment not annihilation to the satan. Thus goodness is dramatised in terms of conflict with an arch-enemy.

This satan has only the life that humans give to him, being a figure of poetry, a personification, by which people can make things real in their world. Whatever motive humans have for giving life to him he is their creature. He can be liberated by human preference for any other; anything else. By this argument we can encounter the
paradox of complaint: people who take on the relationship of victim to evil become
the tormentors of the satan; they become the devil they oppose and repentance, again,
is required.

The mission for the conversion of humanity to repentance is one of misbegotten
impatience born of fear and a concrete eschatology. As we have observed by
reference to Barnett's work, a realised eschatology understands divine judgement,
enacted by the ejection the satan from heaven, as a past-and-future event; ever
present. In other words annihilation already embraces humanity, excepting a collective
belief to the contrary.

Dependence on opposition to evil is part of that collective belief. It is an attachment
which inhibits any fully realised eschatology. Impatience for eschatological fulfillment
can prompt coercion toward redemption. A programme of fear, threat being the
coercive agent, develops. Second death, bulwark against despair, desiderata in the
face of torture, is reconstructed as part of a threat of torment.

The Johannine Apocalypse does not call for this kind of interpretation but it is readily
appropriated to it. As our several generations of the Book of Revelation show, the
convergence has been exploited by reconstructive criticism which inclines to
psychoterror. It is deconstructed here with a view to liberation.
The rhetoric of blessedness serves a twofold purpose in the reconstructive phase which approximates Vico's 'barbarism of reflection'. While it serves superficially to alleviate the otherwise unutterably dismal message of torment, it serves more subtly to reinforce the threat of torment. The state of blessedness, being blithe, worshipful and continuous suggests its other, miserable, worshipless, discontinuous and, consequently, indescribable. Rapture turns to lament as people contemplate what they cannot say and do.

I repeat: it is necessary to understand that, in Johannine thought, death is not an equivalent of annihilation. The condition of annihilation cannot be temporal, so 'second' can only be poetical; perhaps it can help to re-interpret, substituting 'other' or even 'poetic', making 'other or poetic death'. This poetic death is a way of averting the thanatos or one's negative energies. It is a form of blissful ignorance; forgiving forgetfulness.

We are told directly in Apocalypse XX:13-15 that this other death can be effected on death (as well as hell and those not written in the book of life). If we grasp the fact of atemporality and then let our ears interpret for us, it becomes evident that death and
annihilation are two separate, partially homonymous, entities. Nevertheless, confusion persists inside and outside of the Johannine text.

This confusion is the same thing as we have called the fallacy of concrete annihilation in Chapter Seven. Here we will confine the interest with regard to the fallacy to the internal operations of the Johannine text. In Chapter Seven of this thesis, we encountered the fallacious thinking as a hermeneutical issue; an interpretative anomaly brought to the text by its readers.

What can be threatening about this fossilised metaphysic? It has been made

593 (Apocalypse XX:13-15)

And it was demed of ech, aftir the werkis of hem. And helle and deth weren sente in to a poole of fier. This is the secunde deth. And he that was not founden writun in the book of lijf, was sent in to the pool of fier.

*and each man was judged according to his deeds, while death and hell were thrown into the lake of fire. This is the second death; everyone must be thrown into this lake of fire, unless his name was found written in the book of life.*

Authorized Version, ‘and they were judged every man according to their works. And death and hell were cast into the lake of fire: this is the second death. And whosoever was not found written in the booke of life, was cast in to the lake of fire.’
Moffatt, ‘and all were judged by what they had done. Then Death and Hades were flung into the lake of fire, and whoever was not found enrolled in the book of Life was flung into the lake of fire - which is the second death, the lake of fire.’
Revized Standard Version, ‘and all were judged by what they had done.’
New English Bible, ‘they were judged, each man on the record of his deeds. Then Death and Hades were flung into the lake of fire. the lake of fire is the second death.
Jerusalem Bible, ‘and every one was judged according to the way in which he had lived. Then Death and Hades were thrown into the burning lake. This burning lake is the second death; and anybody whose name could not be found written in the book of life was thrown into the burning lake.’
Revised English Bible, ‘Everyone was judged on the record of his deeds.’
threatening by association with expendability. That is a matter of indignity rather than of obliteration. The people are frightened of harm and humiliation.

Who or what is threatened by expendability? Evil; the satan, Satan? No. The satan is a poetic figure, personified. It is people who are threatened with expendability; anyone who persists in a life without remorse. Who are these people?

We are told of those who corrupt the earth and who should, as consequence, be destroyed:

(Apocalypse XI:18) to distrie hem that corrumpiden the erthe' 'and destroying the corrupters of the world'⁵⁹⁴

We are told of the whore in purple and red, figure of Babylon's unrepentant population, who perishes by burning:

(Apocalypse XVIII:8) sche schal be brent in fier, for God is strong, that schal deme hir.

she will be burned to the ground; such power has the God who is her judge.⁵⁹⁵

⁵⁹⁴ Apocrypha XI:18
Tyndale Bible, 'and shouldst destroy them, which destroy the erth.'
Authorized Version, 'and shouldest destroy them which destroy the earth.'
Moffatt Bible, 'the time for destroying the destroyers of earth.'
Revised Standard Version, 'destroying the destroyers of the earth.'
New English Bible, 'to destroy those who destroy the earth.'
Jerusalem Bible, 'to destroy those who are destroying the earth.'
Revised English Bible, 'to destroy those who destroy the earth.'

⁵⁹⁵ Apocrypha XVIII:8
There is much agreement between most versions in this matter but The New English Bible differs significantly from the others in our sample. Tyndale Bible, 1534, 'she shallbe [sic] brent with fyre: for stronge ys the lorde god which
There is also the red beast upon whom the whore of Babylon rides. The red beast is already dead, travelling from death to perdition without further chances of redemption:

(Apocalypse XVII:8) sche schal stie fro depnesse, and sche schal go in to periching.

it must rise from the abyss, and find its way to utter destruction.

Also included among those to be consumed are the people of Gog and Magog, the abovementioned satanic host. So persistent cowards, unbelievers and evil, murderers and fornicators as well as witches, worshippers of idols and liars are threatened with expendability:

(Apocalypse XXI:8-9) But to ferdful men, and vnbeleueful, and cursid, and manquelleris, and fornycatouris, and to witchis, and worshipperis of idols, and to alle lirie, the part of hem be in the pool brennynge with fier and brymstoon, that is the secounde deth.

But not cowards, not those who refuse belief, not those whose lives are abominable; not the murderers, the fornicators, the sorcerers, the idolaters, not those who are false in any of their dealings. Their lot awaits them in the lake that burns with fire and brimstone, and it is the second death.\(^{596}\)

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596 Apocalypse XXI:8-9

Tyndale Bible, 'But the fearefull and vnbelevynge, and the abominable, the murderers, and whoremongers, and sorcerers, and ydolaters, and all lyars shall have their parte in the lake which burnyth with fyre and brymstone, which is the seconde deth.'

Authorized Version, 'But the fearfull and vnbelevynge, and the abominable, the murderers, and whoremongers, and sorcerers, and idolaters, and all lyars shall have their parte in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone, which is the second death.'

Moffatt Bible, '“but as for the craven, the faithless, the abominable, as for murderers, the immoral, sorcerers, idolaters, and liars of all kinds - their lot is the lake that blazes with fire and brimstone, which is the second death.”'
Further to the fallacy of concrete annihilation, take Apocalypse 22:3. In the Wycliffe Bible of 1388 the line reads, 'And ech cursid thing schal no more be'. There is a difference between the Wycliffe and the Tyndale versions regarding Apocalypse 22:3. The Tyndale reads, 'And there shalbe no more cursse'. This tells us that it is the curse itself, not accursed things, that will cease to exist. In each case, however, something is taken to be expendable. Tyndale and Wycliffe resonate in all the other versions. In this example, a metaphor of annihilation interacts with a metonymy of liberation and a simile of freedom, to produce a sign of expendability.

The 'curse' or 'ban' was the order by which defeated peoples were slain by conquering Roman armies. To make the curse expendable is different to making people

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597 This difference resonates variously in later versions. Tyndale's more abstract expression is maintained by the Authorized Version, 'And there shall be no more curse', the Authorized Vulgate,'No longer can there be any profanation', and the Jerusalem Bible, 'The ban will be lifted.' The Moffatt Bible, the Revised Standard Version, the New English Bible and the Revised English Bible, however, echo Wycliffe's translation. The Revised Standard Version gives us, 'There shall no more be anything accursed', the New English Bible gives us, 'and every accursed thing shall disappear', the Revised English Bible gives us, 'Every accursed thing shall disappear', and the Moffatt Bible, 'None who is accursed will be there', 'there' signifying the life eternal in the city of the god.
expendable. Those not destroyed often became valuable; as slaves. As subjugation
displaces expendability fear of humiliation attaches to the metaphor.

The sense that humans may be destroyed is subtle yet significant in the Wycliffe
version, 'thing' being capable of including humanity in the English of 1388. It is
rendered almost insignificant by Tyndale's abstraction. This raises a question of
choice; slavery or death. As we have observed, the ethical preference is to choose
death.

To summarise: there are those who persist in failure to repent, those who perpetuate
the ways, prophecies and teachings which are contrary to those of the god, and those
who indulge in sophistry, doubt or other equivocal attitudes. Those who corrupt the
earth, the ways of corruption enduring through cowardice, unbelief, evil-doing,
murder, fornication, witchery, idolatry and untruth are also included. Such persons are
symbolised by the unrepentant populations of Babylon, and of Gog and Magog.

It is not for the doing of such deeds or the making of such errors that a person is
threatened with expendability. That liability is carried by a charge of unrepentant
persistence in such deeds or errors. In contemporary terms, such persistence is often
phrased as, 'no redeeming features'. For example, in a recent (in Australia) broadcast
of Star Trek, Mr. Data says to an unrelenting and vexatious extraterrestrial entity, 'No
redeeming features; I think you should be destroyed.\footnote{Star Trek, TCN9, Sydney, Australia, 13/5/92.} When no redeeming features are discovered, no compassion is raised. This dehumanises both the agent and the recipient of the destruction.

The images by which this argument is conveyed might persuade one that the human is characterised in the Johannine Apocalypse as a creaturely victim to both divine and demonic powers. Attention to the resonances of the argument rather than its images shows, however, that it is a matter of choice. The Johannine Apocalypse answers the question of how to live with mortal suffering, including torment, by showing those conditions to be contingent on choice.

Further to this matter of choice, the several generations of the Johannine Apocalypse in English which we have examined have tended to make it obscure. As we have observed, choice has to do with the sign or number of the beast (Apocalypse 13:11-15). It also has to do with the sign of humanity. With regard to humanity, only the Wycliffe Bible and the Revised Standard Version give us a collective, hence interdependent humanity. The Wycliffe Bible gives us 'the nombre of man', a fullblown generality signifying one number (cipher) to emblemise (signify) all humanity. This interpretation resonates in the Revised Standard Version which renders it, 'a human
number'. The others give us particularisation, a person, an individual; 'a man'. So the majority, by affirming individualism, bring into eclipse the notion of collective choice. As it is collective belief in the necessity of the satan which prevents our liberation from evil (and the satan's liberation from toment) this obscurantism is oppressive.

Is there a plot here, preventing any collective choice for acquiescence in blessed rapture? Is this an individualistic trend; an attempt to roll up all human goodness into one, the Christ, so that a dramatic case can be made for a promised victory over the Antichrist or the satan? Frye made a note in his diary which mentions a corollary to this which is pertinent here. He wrote:

'To identify the devil-state with an individual, to make him a scapegoat of a pure devil is the ultimate act of evil, & can come only from one who has made himself into a pure accuser, & so by ghastly paradox becomes the Satan he attempts to project on another.'  

There is exquisite torment, then, in the denial of the second death to the satan. If the satan lives through human beings, denial of the second death would constitute a perpetuation of torment from generation to generation, counted in human lives.

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599 (Apocalypse XIII:18). The Authorized Version renders the phrase, 'the number of a man', the Moffatt Bible gives us 'the cipher of a man', and in the Jerusalem Bible, the phrase reads 'the number of a man'. The Authorised Vulgate, gives no verbal translation; perhaps that lacuna suggests the operant difficulty of interpretation against which the Revised English Bible offers us, 'the number represents a man's name'. The New English Bible takes further the particularisation of the human figure, giving us 'a man's name', bringing into total eclipse the occlusion of the notion of a choice shared by all humanity.

600 Northrop Frye, Diary, 1949 [262].
In all versions included in our sample, humans who choose to identify themselves with deviltry; with neither divinity or deviltry; and with both divinity and deviltry, are threatened with expendability by those who identify themselves absolutely with the god. Thus pluralism is quelled. The tendency in English usage to make things singular (making stereotypes out of types) can reinforce this rhetoric of expendability.

There is, however, an absurdity to any fear which the threats of expendability might provoke. The threats are founded on a fallacy so there is nothing to fear. The perspectives of realised eschatology make clear this absurdity; the threat is an incitement to panic now about something which happened at the beginning of time. The perspectives of form criticism from Vico to Frye and Lawton also make clear this absurdity. As Lawton puts it, 'for criticism, meaning is always at least double.' 601 So by critical thought, the literalisation of the metaphysic of the second death, effected by supplying it with imagery then concretising the images, can be appreciated as a conceit.

In the Johannine apocalypse, the threat of expendability is an oppressors' threat. Redemption is a certainty for all who choose to make it so. Fear of expendability is

the foil against which the rhetoric of blessedness and rapture is raised. Redemption is liberation and repentance is a matter of choice. To understand that is to attenuate the suffering brought about by fear of physical destruction. The Johannine text is an invitation to make one's choices.
A BRIEF NOTE ON KERYGMA

In the Johannine Apocalypse, self-assertive proclamations of realised divinity assert themselves above and beyond anything adversarial. Kerygma achieves a poetic counterpoise of blessedness and annihilation in redemption. This poetry activates a synaesthesia of auditory signals and visual images. Thus the resonances of rapture operate anarchically. This produces a synergism of blessedness and rapture which voices itself like a grace note over all the horizons of the Johannine Apocalypse.
SUMUP JOH

Here we have a thematic analysis of the Johannine Apocalypse, augmented by a brief statement on kerygma. Where stand the metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche that structure our analytic approach? And has kerygma so little to say? Where is the fourth order of words?

The tropes have configured our reading of the Johannine symbols, making it possible to discuss them. They are both pretexts and kites of the poetics in which our studious interest is invested. Our horizons, discussed in terms of patterns of images, can now inform us of their tropical interrelationships.

For example, the eschatological horizon tells us that suffering hurts as much as torment; this is its synecdoche. Metonymy informs the neological horizon telling us that annihilation stands for liberation; redemption is put for a fresh start. Moving between the ideas which emerge as synecdoche and metonymy diverge and converge is a metaphor of creation.

This tripartite model has made possible some consideration of the conditions to which this apocalypse responds. Moreover, it has facilitated some insight into the ways by which the response is crafted. This has interpretative value, the most important aspect of which is the ability to maintain a sense of simultaneity. Although we have had to
disassemble, discern and discriminate parts of the apocalyptic matrix in order to bring them into a critical analysis, they are always coalescent.

The fourth order of words can be discussed now, with regard to that perpetual coalescence. Two considerations account for the slight attention we have paid to the kerygma thus far. First, the whole apocalypse is a kerygmatic event; apocalypse is proclaimed. So all the confusions of an echo chamber can be conjured up by paying direct attention to it. That cannot serve an analytic purpose.

Second, as we have noted, kerygma is a certum, an expression of certainty. The Johannine Apocalypse proclaims the certainty of redemption. That certainty is the possession of the seer; divine, humane, inspired by the god and uttered by the words of the Johannine person, certain of redemption.

Returning now to our first point; an analysis of kerygma has to be kerygmatic. To discuss the kerygma is to repit it. Our religio-literary analysis of the Johannine apocalypse affirms the proclamation of redemption therefore. But more than that is required of criticism. To demonstrate a critical method which includes the metaliterary, kerygmatic, fourth order of words, I submit the following illustrative example.
First, the question. Along with the three generally recognised tropes of literature, metaphor, metonymy and simile, there exists a fourth trope, kerygma. The literary form through which apocalypse is achieved is kerygmatic. Kerygma is self-proclamatory, depending upon no other tropes. So, if the Johannine apocalypse embodies a proclamation mutual to the divine and the human, how do they proclaim themselves?

We take Frye's observation as our guide:

starting with the fourth chapter [of the Johannine apocalypse], there follows an incredible tour de force singlehandedly working out the entire dianoia or metaphor-cluster of the Bible along with its demonic parody, an achievement ranking with the dizziest technical flights of literature.\(^6\)

If we advert to the Johannine Apocalypse, where can we find its metaphor cluster or key pattern, together with a divine and a demonic figure? Take, for example, the convergence of Apocalypse 20:7-9 and Apocalypse 21:6-8.

(Apocalypse 20:7-9) And whanne a thousynde yeeris schulden be indid, Sathanas schal be vnbounden of his prisoun; and he schal go out, and schal disseyue folkis...

Then, when the thousand years are over, Satan will be let loose from his prison, and will go out to seduce the nations...

(Apocalypse 21:6-8) It is don; I am alpha and oo, the bigynnyng and ende. Y schal zyue freli of the welle of quic watir to hym that thirsteth.

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6\(^0\) Frye, 1980, p. 103.
It is over. I am Alpha, I am Omega, the beginning of all things and their end; those who are thirsty shall drink - it is my free gift - out of the spring whose water is life.

Here is a meeting of neological and eschatological horizons; beginning and ending converge as alpha and omega in both passages. Divine and demonic figures diverge. A choice, between deceit and compassion comes to issue.

That the speaker is redeemed is signified by the fact of the speech; to speak from heaven is to signify redemption. Here is a metaphor of creation. The thousand years is as long as the beginning and end. Here is synecdoche. The beginning and the end stand for the speaker, identified as alpha and omega. That is the metonymy. Words proclaim themselves; kerygma.

There is a tension between the stoicheia tou kosmou, encountered as the letters of the alphabet, and the resonating self who proclaims 'I am'. It is a tension of principles; the pluralistic stoicheia resonate discordantly against the singular, self-proclaiming voice but the discords enliven the tone. What is proclaimed is reflexively ambiguous; it knows its own absurdity. Words cannot convey singular meaning; nor can persons; nor their poems. Attachment to life's illusions persist, even as they are denied; for who shall speak unless another is there to hear?

So the kerygma and the kerygmata wrestle at the edge of time. What shall we make of
that? As we listen to the rhetoric, shall we prefer the harmonies to which we are already trained? If we do that, we will know that the apocalypse tells us a story, woven out of imagistic themes, about good and bad and their agents, suffering a tormentous conflict which never seems to end. Or shall we prefer the aspirational chord of the songs of praise; echoes of the divine 'I am'? If we do that, we will know that the apocalyptic voice addresses us as 'thou'. Or shall we tolerate the discords of lesser voices learning, how to speak? If we do that, their cacophony may reveal what is otherwise ignored.

Criticism requires an address to all these possibilities. A fourth order can hardly be appreciated in the absence of the three. In Part Two I shall demonstrate further, by application to contemporary apocalyptic rhetoric, this religio-literary method.
CHAPTER 9
VICTIM-SURVIVORS, CREATURES AND CREATORS: PART ONE

SUMMARY

This religio-literary analysis of apocalypses shows that the common assumption of an apocalyptic dualism is being challenged. The challenge comes from an emerging, postmodern synergism. A humane-and-divine creativity has begun to proclaim itself in contemporary apocalypses.

The process of this challenge is not one of displacement but of augmentation. The dualism is necessary but not sufficient to the re-creative needs which are expressed by contemporary apocalyptic rhetoric. The present apocalypticists seek a third way by which the apocalyptic scenario in which they have discovered themselves can be re-interpreted.

This synergistic approach to apocalyptic expression can be useful to the interests of tolerance and pluralism. The convergence of eschatological and neological apocalyptic horizons embraces dualism, then departs from it. Two kinds of apocalyptic awareness emerge simultaneously. As Frye, writing about the New Testament or Johannine Apocalypse, puts it:

The panoramic apocalypse gives way, at the end, to a second apocalypse that, ideally, begins in the reader's mind as soon as he has finished reading, a vision that passes through the legalised vision of ordeals and trials and judgements and comes out into a second life. In this second life the creator-creature,
divine-human antithetical tension has ceased to exist, and the sense of the transcendent person and the split of subject and object no longer limit our vision. After the 'last judgement,' the law loses its last hold on us, which is the hold of the legal vision that ends there.  

The second apocalypse described by Frye is synergistic. The idea of a non dualistic synergy of divine and human creative energy was put forward by Melanchthon; 'Synergist', denoting one who holds the doctrine of synergism, was first used in 1657. Synergism was coined in 1764 to denote the theological doctrine that the human will co-operates with divine grace in the work of regeneration.

This admits a notion of a lawless creativity; it accommodates the idea that humans might synergise creatively to pass beyond legalism; to regulate behaviour by law, even divine law, is to dissuade self-restraint. The synergistic apocalypses entail human choices as participation in the doing of creation. Whatever one instantiates or facilitates is seen to be a part of creation; eternal as creation is eternal, ephemeral as creation is ephemeral. In synergistic apocalypses, the dualistic panorama becomes mind's eye.

Northrop Frye's critical analysis forwards a synergistic hypothesis but Frye is not the only critic to favour synergism. R. J. Reilly and Nikos Kazantzakis, for example, also

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604 OED
develop synergistic trajectories. R.J. Reilly, describing the thought of Owen Barfield, puts it like this:

More and more, according to Barfield, we are moving beyond the institutional church which has meant for us "fatherhood," regularity, law. We are moving toward something, not different, but new, a transformation of that father-law into subjective law, or "son-law," the dictates of the individual conscience. Reilly calls this 'situation ethics' and writes of 'the private and subjective agony of choice.' He also makes a perspicacious comment about the synergistic insight: "The phrase "radical immanence" frightens most of us: we do not want to be God." The Fryean synergism expresses a participation in godliness rather than a displacement of the god.

An idea of Nikos Kazantzakis' may serve to clarify further the idea of synergistic apocalypses. Kazantzakis perceives, in the human situation, an opportunity to participate in creation. He lodges his ideas in metaphor, constructing a philosophical version of the ancient Minoan Bull Dance. Through this metaphor he establishes a view which he calls the 'Cretan Glance'. This glance reveals the horns of dilemma,


606 ibid.

607 ibid., p. 225.

symbolised by the horns of the bull, as a springboard to a third and alternative position, above and beyond the dualism of the horns.

Synergistic apocalypses can be creative or destructive, ordered or chaotic. Human choice determines what an apocalypse can realise. The choices can be made by actuation, acquiescence or ignorance.

So the victim-survivors of our title emerge from our discussion as both creators and creatures of the conditions in which they find themselves. They are empowered by their own words which participate more and less in expressing divinity. They acquiesce in silence to achieve their creative synergism but they also raise their voices in self-affirming proclamation.

CREATORS, CREATURES AND VICTIM-SURVIVORS:
WORD, SILENCE AND SOME HUMANE VOICES OF SELF-
DETERMINATION IN APOCALYPTIC LITERATURE FROM THE
WYCLIFFE BIBLE OF 1388 TO THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD
CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS OF 1993

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PART TWO

PROLOGUE

Does apocalypse lend itself to oppression, torture, genocide and victimisation? No. It lends itself to recovery from those things. They have gone before.

But Viktor Frankl tells us that taking apocalypse as an axiom of survival is a victim posture, both common and suicidal; he demonstrates Logotherapy as an alternative.¹ What Frankl's use of the word signifies is a concretised eschatology. Our use of the word signifies endings and beginnings, physical and metaphysical, in flux. Such are apocalypses by which people can recover themselves.

That sounds very poetical. It is, but as Hayden White says: (poetizing) represents a mode of praxis.²

SOME HUMANE VOICES OF SELF-DETERMINATION

In the rhetoric of self-determination we find old images and symbols put to new uses as people and peoples appropriate apocalyptic terms to express an ever emerging sense of identity. In Chapter One, definitions of apocalypse were found to be diverse, although allusions to the Johannine text were common. Investigation of the Johannine text, conducted in Chapter Two, showed a creature creator dualism which gives no voice to victim-survivors or their this-worldly concerns. In Chapter Three, interpretations of apocalypses, the Johannine and others, were shown to bring to the creature creator duality associations with extra textual victims. The import of these sociopolitical contexts to apocalyptic writing provides a background of oppression against which the voices of victims resonate.

The sources which informed chapters two and three proceed ostensibly from a phenomenology which brackets human agency, understanding that ultimately things are done by a god whose Word is supreme. The phenomenology which of the sources which inform Part Two is different. It emphasises human agency, tending to displace ultimate with mediate terms. In both cases the bracketing is imperfect so the irrepressible agencies of divinity and humanity tend to spill out and mingle.


² Hayden White quoted in Young, James E., Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust: Narrative and the Consequences of Interpretation, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1988, p. 4.
CHAPTER 10
BACKGROUND: SLAVERY AND FREEDOM
This chapter will show that ideas of freedom which are inherent in contemporary rhetoric of self-determination draw on apocalyptic rhetoric for their expression. Contemporary ideas of freedom are expressed against coercion, torture, genocide and other processes of oppression. A right to choose against such forms of oppression is proclaimed an entitlement to human rights. Self-determination is one of the ideals of human rights activism although, as we shall discover, the terms by which the ideals are expressed are confused and even self-contradictory. First, though, to the posterior matter of freedom.

There are many ways of expressing ideas of freedom. Take, for example, the contrast between freedom as a collective condition, an idea favoured by several Oriental nations, most notably the People's Republic of China, and freedom as an individual condition, such as is favoured by some Western nations, most notably the United States of America. Their various definitions of freedom hold in common the idea of liberty.

Liberty and freedom raise complex issues into which we do not enter here, except to say that there are important if subtle differences between being free from and free to. In brief, to be free is generally agreed to be without bondage or compulsion. To be free is not to be enslaved.

Slaves, ancient and modern, may be seen as the architects of ideas of freedom. By whom are the values of freedom embraced? Slaves. Who are the slaves? Those who are not free, being bound into submission; those for whom obedience is an imperative. Orlando Patterson's book Freedom and the Making of Western Culture\(^3\) describes as inextricable the relation of ideas of freedom and conditions of slavery. For Patterson, the jewel in the lotus is the fly in the ointment: liberation, 'the ultimate veneration of choice', collides with restraint, 'the tragic interdependence of good and evil', while freedom emerges as a cultural value.\(^4\)

The choice for freedom is, in part, a choice for force; necessary force, that is. Patterson, in his earlier publication, Slavery and Social Death, quotes emancipated slave Frederick Douglass:

"A man without force is without the essential dignity of humanity. Human nature is so constituted that it cannot honour a helpless man, although it can pity him; and even that it cannot do long, if the signs of power do not


\(^4\) Patterson, 1991, pp. 405-406.
arise."\(^5\)

Freedom has to do with the ability to use necessary force and to eschew the use of unnecessary force. This is related to the aforementioned assumption of self-determination that a self exists which can preserve and defend against offence.

Philosopher Harry Frankfurt has put forward a vigorous case for liberation got by a choice for freedom. Frankfort's claims are compatible with Patterson's. Frankfurt argues that humans may be 'wantons' or 'persons', depending on their own choice. 'Persons' take freedom to control their wanting and 'wantons' take freedom to want, being dependent for existence on its creator.\(^5\)

Ehud R. Toledano points out that the dichotomy of slavery and freedom is illusory. Toledano explains that slavery constitutes a continuum, comprising many degrees of servitude.\(^7\) He admits Patterson's preliminary definition, '"the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonoured persons"'\(^8\), as radical but useful because it accommodates discussion of the mutual dependency of slave masters and slaves.

Patterson pursues a hermeneutic of concern for self-determination to elucidate a history of the ideas by which the attainment of freedom has been attempted in the so-called Free West. He locates the commencement of ideas of freedom in the wishful thinking of slaves. He claims that the idea is still associated with that source: 'the idea of freedom has never been divorced from this (slavery), its primordial servile source.'\(^9\) So dreams of freedom make the experiences of slavery survivable. Hence slavery and freedom are two parts of the same phenomenon:


\(^8\) Patterson, 1982, p. 13. in Toledano, 1993, p. 481.

The origins of Western culture and its most cherished ideal, freedom, were founded, we will see not on the rock of human virtue but upon the degraded time fill of man's vilest inhumanity to man.\textsuperscript{10}

Failure to recognise the inextricability of slavery and freedom, according to Patterson, springs from too great an emphasis on legalism.\textsuperscript{11} This point harmonises with Hanson's analysis of the prophetic and hierocratic (legalistic) approaches to oppression which we encountered in Chapter Six. Patterson makes the important point that human preferences, even preference for freedom, require self-restraint. The alternative, he insists, is constraint. Law is an attempt to achieve collective means of self-restraint but it is inclined to degeneration (as Vico pointed out) into barbarism and constraint.

Notions of freedom and slavery have what Patterson calls a supernatural and a social aspect. Referring to the Stone Age society of the Tupinamba, he tells us that by defining their enemies, societies defined themselves in social and in supernatural terms.\textsuperscript{12} For example, the supernatural aspect depended in part on the eating, after having been served by him or her, the slave. The process of ingestion enacted a mystery of transformation. As Patterson puts it: 'the consumption of the hated other, the not-being, the not-I, the Them-object that made Us possible.'\textsuperscript{13}

Patterson shows us freedom as a tripartite value made up of personal, civic and sovereignal elements.\textsuperscript{14} Personal and civic freedoms precede sovereignal freedom.\textsuperscript{15} Pericles' funeral oration (c. 431 B.C.), delivered in response to the Peloponnesian War, marks the integration of the these aspects of freedom. Patterson writes:

Pericles has isolated, and praised, all the three basic elements of freedom. He has seen how they form a unity, how each requires the other two. But he has clearly seen the tension in the triad. One of the three elements of freedom must form the fundamental note, and the speech seems to be a struggle aloud, an internal debate in the full glare of the Acropolis, and of

\textsuperscript{10} ibid., p. 48.
\textsuperscript{11} ibid., p. 1.
\textsuperscript{12} ibid., p. 17.
\textsuperscript{13} ibid., pp. 17-18.
\textsuperscript{14} ibid., p. 3f f.
\textsuperscript{15} ibid., pp. 83-88.
history, over which element should dominate the harmony.\textsuperscript{16}

Patterson tells us that, since Pericles' speech, questions as to whether there should be freedom or not have been displaced by questions of primacy among the three elements and which class should control its meaning.\textsuperscript{17} Patterson quotes two of Pericles' definitions, emphasising that they are paradigmatic to ideas of freedom that have developed subsequently:

\begin{quote}
(Civic freedom) power is in the hands not of a minority but of the whole people; (personal liberty) We do not get into a state with our next door neighbour if he enjoys himself in his own way, nor do we give him the kind of black looks which, though they do no real harm, still do hurt people's feelings.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

Sovereign freedom has primitive precursors in the Homeric idea of free community.\textsuperscript{19} It was not until after the Persian Wars of the fifth century B.C., however, that sovereign freedom became an actuality. In the Persian wars, enslavement became a very real cost. It displaced the victory, death and escape which were the more tolerable costs of former wars.\textsuperscript{20} As consequence the meaning of freedom expanded its domestic meaning of not being dominated by tyrants and came to mean not being enslaved by tyrannical foreigners.\textsuperscript{21} What we know now as nationalism embraces this notion of freedom. It is expressed as national sovereignty.

An important configuration of sovereignal freedom is called by Patterson the organic version.\textsuperscript{22} In that version a purposeful community is imagined to be more free than its individual members. To be free in terms of this model is to find one's identity by finding a place in a collective. The People's Republic of China, many contemporary tribal organisations, and Nazi Germany exemplify this idea of freedom. Patterson illustrates thus: 'However painful the admission, Nazi Germany

\begin{verbatim}
\textsuperscript{16} ibid., p. 103.
\textsuperscript{17} ibid., p. 104.
\textsuperscript{18} Pericles in Patterson, ibid., p. 100. See also pp. 402-403 for further discussion of the ambiguity of personal liberty.
\textsuperscript{19} ibid., p. 82.
\textsuperscript{20} ibid., p. 83.
\textsuperscript{21} ibid., p. 86.
\textsuperscript{22} ibid., p. 403.
\end{verbatim}
was, for Germans, a free state, the freest and most powerful collective experience of any Western people up to that time. The combination of this idea of freedom with the powers and forces of nation states has made people free as never before to change others, to impose their definitions of what is desirable, and to organise or order activity. Sovereign freedom can be empowering and debasing, it can liberate and enslave. Choice emerges therefore, as the creative dynamic.

Civic freedom, called demokratia in Greece of the late fifth century and called democracy worldwide the late twentieth century, has as its crux the principle of participative politics. Linked to this is extension of franchise but this is problematic because the desirability of inclusion is enhanced by the possibility of exclusion. This intensifies when exclusion entails domination. Xenophobia, racism, nationalism, nativism, misogyny, sexism, and other modes of discrimination thrive on the notion of exclusion, particularly when coupled to ideas of common purpose and common good. As Patterson puts it:

It is no accident that the greatest mass democracies of the ancient and modern worlds - Athens and the United States - share this evil in common: they were both conceived in and fashioned by, the degradation of slaves and their descendants and the exclusion of women.

In participative politics, people choose whom they will oppress; democracy offers its citizens the opportunity to choose modes of civility. Policies of discrimination or neutrality, tolerance, acceptance and compassion can be pursued, if the majority so decide. Discrimination has been the predominant mode. Civic freedom, when interpreted as democratic politics has tended to cultivate oligarchy. Motifs of domination, then, are ever present, being both pretexts and kites of what we encounter as civic freedom.

Personal freedom is illustrated superbly by Patterson’s reference to Marguerite Porete and her Free Spirit movement. It began in Gaul in the early thirteenth

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23 ibid., p. 404.
24 ibid.
25 ibid., p. 404. See also p. 82, the term demokratia was first used as a pejorative.
26 ibid., pp. 404-405.
27 ibid., p. 405.
28 ibid., p. 405.
century and lasted about five centuries. It pointed the way for self-realisation by valorising personal freedom, recognising isolation and domination as its twin dangers. Some lines from Porete's discourse elucidate this:

It (freedom) means that she does nothing, whatever the circumstances, which works against the perfect peace of her spirit.

Patterson shows how Marguerite Porete, in achieving her paradigm of freedom and simultaneously offending the Inquisition, exemplifies an ambiguity which is inherent in notions of freedom:

Marguerite's dialogue is the most sublime expression of personal freedom as an inner experience. It was also pure heresy... Eighteen months of Inquisitorial torture did not break her spirit... On the first of June, 1310, Marguerite was burned alive by a huddle of priests, solemnly praying for the freedom of her soul.

This is an example of Christian practises being associated paradoxically with ideas of personal freedom.

We have observed that paradox in the text of the Johannine Apocalypse in relation to the marks of the god and the beast. Moreover, we have noted with regard to Swete's explanation of a mark as a brand that the brands signified either slavery or conspicuous devotion. The paradox resides in the perceived ambiguity of devotion and slavery.

If we advert again (briefly) to the Johannine Apocalypse, we find it is unambiguous in this matter; slaves, being persons in bondage, find opposites in people who are free. Take, for example, Apocalypse XIII:16-17. Wycliffe (1388) gives us 'fre men and bonde men', Tyndale (1534), 'fre and bond'; Moffatt, 'freemen and slaves'; the Authorized Version, 'free and bond'; the Authorized Vulgate, 'free men and slaves'; the Revised Standard Version, 'free and slave'; the Revised English Bible, 'free man and slave'; and the Jerusalem Bible, 'slave and citizen'.

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29 ibid., p. 400.

30 ibid. This is the response of Porete's character, Lady Love, to Reason's inquiry into what she means when she says, 'Soul is in the true freedom of Pure Love when she does nothing which could be against that which her inner peace requires.'

31 ibid., pp. 400-401.

32 Swete, 1922, p. 173.
Here we have the pivotal issue of freedom; it is the riddle of the human creature and, as we shall discover in the chapters that follow, a Sisyphean element of self-determination. The question: Who submits, and to whom? The answer? Indications are that each questioner finds his or her own answers the this conundrum.

In the Western tradition as Patterson describes it, this is a personal matter. Patterson summarises the elements of personal freedom thus:

That people are free to do as they please within limits set by the personal freedom of others; that legally all persons are equal before the law; that philosophically the individual's separate existence is inviolable; that psychologically the ultimate human condition is to be liberated from all internal and external constraints in one's desire to realize oneself; and that spiritually the son of God made himself incarnate, then gave his life in order to redeem mankind from spiritual thralldom and to make people equal before God.33

These lines encapsulate a response to the question of submission which is generally taken as an assumption in the democratic West. Note that the assumption of Jesus as Christ is included in it. We noted in Chapter One the equivocation and dualism which attend the status of Jesus as both divine and humane. This, I suggest, lies at the seat of the paradox of devotion and slavery.

Patterson relates two ideas of spiritual freedom to the motif of Jesus as Saviour. In the first, he tells us, 'Spiritual freedom was divine enslavement.' This idea hinges on original sin by which all people are held to be enslaved to the god. The second is a later, Pauline idea: that people who have not the courage to die for their principles are enslaved to life but Jesus' death has bought them out of that slavery.34

Patterson tells us that the association of Christianity with freedom has been both orthodox and heretical. He tries to disentangle some of the resultant confusion but his own dualism, expressed as an axiom of irreconcilable good and evil, subverts his discourse. Patterson writes: 'we have been unable to transcend the evils that come with the blessings of personal freedom'.35 With these words, what began as a dialogue between freedom and equality changes into an apocalyptic proclamation.

33 ibid., p. 402-403.
34 Patterson, 1982, pp. 70-72.
35 ibid., p. 403.
Patterson's argument falters on the commandment to love. He writes:

people were not made free by Jesus to love God; they were commanded to do so... There is no conception of spiritual freedom. We surrender totally to God, as a perfect slave does to his master.\textsuperscript{36}

Thus he shows how freedom can be a conundrum to Christian orthodoxy. His image of a servile congregation making of the divine a slave master makes no suggestion of the idea of choice which otherwise permeates his discussion. Jesus' message, according to Patterson, was not concerned with freedom but with equality: 'the commandment to love is a commandment to personal equality'.\textsuperscript{37}

According to Patterson it was Paul of Tarsus not Jesus of Nazareth who implanted freedom in Christian soteriology laying the concept of freedom in the foundations of the early Church: 'In the Christian soteriology that triumphed, freedom in the literal sense of redemption became the central religious goal'.\textsuperscript{38} Subsequently, during the Middle Ages, the person but not the message of Jesus became the object of devotion and the figure of Jesus Christ became an icon of freedom, although Jesus' message was one not of freedom.\textsuperscript{39}

The fine point of difference between freedom and equality collapses into conceit with the following assertion:

in the image of the nailed, dying God, we see the permanent horror of constraint; in the image of the wooden cross - the vertical crossroad, the Pythagorean "Y" - we see the ultimate veneration of choice.\textsuperscript{40}

This image of Christ crucified embarrasses the idea of freedom. What is embarrassing is that, imagistically, the Christ is still nailed there, constrained. While the dualism of goodness and evil prevails, humanity dangles at the crossroads of torment and rapture.

An alternative to both elements of the dualism, that is, something which is neither

\textsuperscript{36} ibid., pp. 300-303 (Patterson's italics).

\textsuperscript{37} ibid., p. 302.

\textsuperscript{38} ibid., p. 315.

\textsuperscript{39} ibid., p. 303ff.

goodness or evil seems to be indicated for liberation from both and either.\textsuperscript{41} That omnijective conception of both and neither is not, however, what Patterson's argument suggests.\textsuperscript{42} His early suggestions of autonomous human choice give way to the idea of divine command. So volition becomes onus. For example, Patterson calls personal freedom a value complex unparalleled by any other culture. He tells us that its attributes, which extend into legal, philosophical, psychological and spiritual concern, articulate liberty and equality through individuality. He points out that it is not immune to selfishness, alienation, greed and dehumanisation. He asserts that people are obliged to defend goodness even though it may lead to evil: 'that inhering in the good which we defend with our lives is often the very evil we most abhor.'\textsuperscript{43} This interpretation of personal freedom puts to the individual the matter of personal choice, for good or for evil, not as a privilege but as an imperative. Patterson argues for freedom of choice but employs a constraint to make his case

Despite this weakness in his metaphysics, Patterson's pursuit of the subject of freedom as part of an entity called Western Culture is enlightening. His dualism, moreover is not absolute. Absolute dualism brings about a condition which Patterson calls 'imperceptibly close to slavery'.\textsuperscript{44} Its most widely recognised manifestation occurred through the lengthy process which is now known as the Inquisition.

Between the thirteenth and the fifteenth century, at the time of the Inquisition, mass manumissions in much of Europe met elitist reaction. Techniques of repression and exploitation were refined to reinforce the oppression of the masses and the absolutist state emerged. Its corollary was the growth of doctrines justifying the resistance of subjects to unjust rulers.\textsuperscript{45

\textsuperscript{41} See also Nikos Kazantzakis, The Last Temptation of Christ, Simon & Schuster, 1960; Martin Scorsese's (1988) film of the same name; and rock singer Madonna's (1991) video clip of the same title; Barbara Thiering's books Jesus the Man and Jesus of the Apocalypse as examples of this idea of liberation.

\textsuperscript{42} For a non specialist introduction to the implications of omnijectivity see Fritjof Capra, The Turning Point, Fontana, London, 1984, esp. p. 54ff. To be omnijective, a perspective is both and neither subjective and objective. Altizer's aforementioned prescription of an immersion of Christianity in Buddhism might be ameliorative of dualistic and omnijective perspectives.


\textsuperscript{44} Patterson, 1991, p. 360.

\textsuperscript{45} ibid., pp. 360-361; 384.
The expression of absolutism associated with the Inquisition is relevant to our topic. Although there is no pretence here to have studied the Inquisition in any detail, it is worthwhile to address the interpretation of the Inquisition by G.C. Coulton, published in 1938. Coulton compares the Truce of God, by which the wars of the Dark Ages were concluded and the Inquisitors gained their power, with the twentieth century League of Nations:

the Truce of God... had only the modified success which has attended the modern League of Nations. Its main sanction was in the anathema of the Church; but she seldom came forward to pledge her authority in these bloody quarrels; nor was she always, even then, above suspicion of partiality. 46

As we shall discover, the United Nations, offspring of the League of Nations, attracts similar criticisms to those aimed by Coulton at the Truce of God. His analysis of the sources of preferential bias, backwardness in material support of principles, and general mediocrity of success, enlightens our subject. Coulton interprets the Inquisition as a humane attempt to bring order to chaos. In that sense it may be understood as an attempt to pursue self-determination.

Coulton commences by quoting the chronicles of Ralph Glaber, a monk of Cluny living and writing about 1017. Glaber writes of goodness and evil, future rewards and punishments, perfection, imperfection and 'retaliatory vengeance'. 47 Coulton enlarges on these themes. Take, for example, his quotation of St. Bernadino of Siena, writing about 1420:

just as the skilful musician needs the bass for his effects, so the harmony of the universe is perfected by a due admixture of groans from the Damned. 48

There is an unhappy similarity between this and Patterson's image of the Inquisitors' prayers offered for Porete's perfection. This image provides heavenly rapture contingent on agony.

Absolutism coupled with intolerance brought the torments of torture to legal issue in the Middle Ages. In the Dark Ages there was no formal place in law for torture, although there was the Ordeal called 'Judgement of God'. The Council of Reims of


47 Coulton, 1938, p. 4.

48 ibid., p. 20.
1157 prescribed torture for all suspected [sic] heretics. The Lateran Council of 1215, made it a definite law for every orthodox Christian to seek out and exterminate heretics. In 1252, Pope Innocent IV published a bull authorising torture in all heresy cases.\footnote{ibid., pp. 152-153; 109.} Note that 'torture' did not refer to flogging (authorised by St Augustine) but to more severe ordeals. Such devices as the rack, thumbscrews, or this:

A fierce fire is lit; the patient is laid with his feet shackled and turned towards the fire; they are rubbed with lard or grease or any other penetrating and combustible matter. He is thus burned horribly.\footnote{Marsolier, \textit{Histoire des Inquisitions}, quoted in Coulton, 1938, p. 155.}

The heretics were those who denied the Trinity, for example, and those who claimed that the creation story was a fable because the world had always existed.\footnote{Coulton, 1938, p. 3.}

The heretics invited some of the Inquisitor's violence by their own violent words or deeds but the excesses of the Inquisition cannot thus be explained. It was the investiture of popes with sovereign power over life and death that made the Inquisition possible: 'The principle of the Inquisition is the Pope's sovereign power over life and death.'\footnote{ibid., p. 315.} With papal sovereignty, both the principle and the practice of the Inquisition became murderous.\footnote{ibid., p. 324.}

The murderous, absolutist governments which enacted the Inquisition were structured thus: a sovereign entity (the Papacy) with power over life and death was supported by a hegemonic elite who sanctioned perfectionism; all were maintained by murderous, coercive technology. Coulton notes that, armed with such a machinery as the Inquisition assembled, a government is necessarily absolute.\footnote{ibid., p. 316.}

Although murderous motives and machines provided the ways and means by which the Inquisition proceeded, its source was intolerance. The intolerance which he found at the root of the Inquisition is interpreted by Coulton as an evil. This evil, he claims, is the crux of the problem of civil liberty. The Inquisitors were...
unequivocal perpetrators of evil-doing toward unbelievers, heretics, witches and savages. The so-called savages, for example, were people who, because of famine, took to cannibalism:

Wayfarers were seized... the bodies of dead men were torn from their graves... as a defence against famine. Yet it grew at length to such a pitch of madness that beasts were safer from the ravisher than men.

To torment and exterminate the hungry people instead of feeding them is, in this analysis intolerant and evil. To illustrate his distaste, Coulton quotes historian Lord Acton:

It is the combination of an eager sense of duty, zeal for sacrifice, and love of virtue, with the deadly taint of a conscience perverted by authority, which makes them (the Inquisitors) so odious to touch and so curious to study.

Coulton views the evil of intolerance as a failure of wisdom. Absolutism, with its valorisation of perfection is associated with this kind of failure. The wisdom that Coulton offers to his readers as a means to overcome this kind of intolerance is what he calls a childhood solution: 'You cut, and I choose: or vice versa.' This is the wisdom of Solomon.

Patterson goes very much further than Coulton in his analysis of the inextricability of human history-making and its consequences in Western sociopolitical practices. Both, however, show us a culture caught up with causes and effects. Patterson’s analysis brings us to the threshold of the Vichian insight, verum-factum. He makes Sophocles 'Creon' his vehicle and writes:

Sophocles insight was the fundamental sociological one: that people by their collective actions construct a universe that works by its own laws and reason.

This humanistic critique of Western culture is not quite strong enough in Patterson's prose to be called a counterpoise to his dualism but it is a significant

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55 ibid.
56 Glaber quoted in Coulton, 1938, p. 4-5.
57 Coulton, 1938, p. 167.
58 ibid., p. 319.
59 Patterson, 1991, p. 124.
element of his critique. Patterson makes what he calls a sociological observation, that Pericles' oration for the war dead did not mention the gods but referred to the "unwritten laws" of the city:

He uses the term in the wholly sociological sense of strongly sanctioned conventions which, if broken, are punished not by gods but by social disapproval.\(^{60}\)

This juxtaposition of a reasoning, regulated humanism with a theology of command gives Patterson's book particular relevance to this study. That is because it puts genocide and apocalypse into context with one another.

Patterson discusses the apocalyptic movements of the Middle Ages as genocidal regimes which function by collective scapegoating.\(^{61}\) He suggests that those movements were 'proto-Nazi' in their racial fanaticism.\(^{62}\) Pursuing this theme, Patterson writes:

However painful the admission, Nazi Germany was, for Germans, a free state... the bleak sociohistorical truth remains that in their claim that what they felt was freedom, the Nazis had the whole long history of the Western tradition of sovereignal freedom on their side.\(^{63}\)

In Patterson's analysis, genocide is a factum of apocalypse. He notes, for example, the 'genocidal anti-Semitism' of the apocalyptic movements of the Middle Ages.\(^{64}\) Thus he takes apocalypses as vehicles of a kind of human choice making which can prefer genocide. Similar preferential choices are made in contemporary times by religious fundamentalists, totalitarians, Nazis and other supremacists.\(^{65}\) Patterson calls this 'the tragic interdependence of good and evil',\(^ {66}\) but tragedy takes his own thought to the abyss. He concludes with this descriptor of those who seek freedom:

\(^{60}\) ibid., p. 120.

\(^{61}\) ibid., p. 390.

\(^{62}\) ibid., p. 390.

\(^{63}\) ibid., p. 404.

\(^{64}\) ibid., p. 390.

\(^{65}\) ibid., p. 390.

\(^{66}\) ibid., p. 405.
All who have come up from the abyss of slavery and serfdom - the children of slaves as well as the children of slave mongers.\textsuperscript{67}

So Patterson's metaphysics locates evil at the heart of freedom, and liberty in the dreams the oppressed.

Like the Johannine Apocalypse, Patterson's work addresses matters of choice. There is, however, a difference in the subject of the choosing. The Johannine proposition invites us to choose between good and evil. Patterson's choice for good is already made; he invites us to choose a way to goodness. To do this he furnishes the reader with near horizons of torment and suffering and far horizons of blessedness and rapture. This composition is metaphysically naive and depends heavily for its persuasion on coercion by fear. So it lacks the depth and balance of the Johannine form, although Patterson's vision is apocalyptic.

Where the Johannine text brings its Christ into heaven where creatures sing praise and victims do not exist, Patterson' leaves the Christ on Earth where creatures protest about the cross and victims are nailed up in perpetuity. This kind of apocalypse stands behind much of the rhetoric of self-determination.

Slavery is not a thing of the past. A brief, illustrative excursion into some elements of contemporary, humanitarian concern about slavery follows. In 1808 the United Kingdom and United States of America ended their slave trading. In 1862 the USA abolished slavery. In 1991 the United Nations created the Voluntary Trust Fund on Contemporary Forms of Slavery. People, however, are still enslaved, psychologically and physically. Take, for example, a graffito, visible in Sydney in September 1993, announcing, 'Debt is the Slavery of the Free'.\textsuperscript{68} This indicates a luxurious form of psychological slavery. Physical slavery persists too. South Africa, for example, has no law to prohibit slavery; refugees from Mozambique who go to Kangwani in South Africa are sold into slavery.\textsuperscript{69}

Contemporary forms of slavery exist in many other places too. In Brazil, for example, slavery was formally abolished 1888 but forced labour continues. This is effected through contrived debt. Workers are lured onto trucks, taken long distances, then 'charged' for transportation, food and tools. Of course, they have

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{67} ibid., p. 406.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{68} Sighted 1/9/1993 on the Bankstown railway underpass, N.S.W., Australia.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{69} Suter, Keith, 'New Forms of Slavery Flourish' in Unity, United Nations Association of Australia, Australian Capital Territory, April, 1993, p. 5. Haitians meet similar circumstances in the Dominican Republic's sugar plantations; forced child labour on so-called Persian carpets is also comparable.}
no money to pay so they cannot discharge the debt. They are detained by armed guards and forced to work, say, on forest clearance in the Amazon.

Furthermore, in the United Kingdom, since 1980, visitors' visas have been granted to the domestic employees of overseas visitors. These visas are not work permits so they do not enable the workers to change their employ. Although their working conditions do not meet British standards, these workers have not the freedom to terminate their employ; they are, in effect, enslaved. This anomalous situation reflects the polygenic nature slavery and freedom.

The complex relations of freedom and slavery are compounded as a contemporary, political pragmatism which favours the old dualism of goodness and evil appropriates to its own persuasions the rhetoric we have identified as apocalyptic. Orlando Patterson's novelette, Die the Long Day provides an example. This is an early and, from a literary point of view, naive work but, like Patterson's later master work, it pursues a hermeneutic of civil concern for humane self-determination. The point of interest is Patterson's rhetorical appropriation of apocalyptic terms into his arguments.

Accommodating all at once motifs of goodness and evil, freedom and slavery, and oldness and newness, Patterson meets a huge literary problem. It is the forging of an of ending to his story and a conclusion to his argument. He solves this problem by ringing in, at the very last moment, an apocalyptic neologism, 'It was almost dawn.'

There has always been a new day coming, people always live at the end of time. Eternal renewal is a potent symbol of endurance. These final words leave us with a story in which goodness does not defeat evil nor does freedom supplant slavery but hope is invested in the new day coming. Here is an illustration of ideas about freedom finding in a neological apocalyptic horizon a cluster of strong symbols by which affirmations of hope can be supported by the motif of all made new. Patterson's conclusive use of this apocalyptic neologism in Die the Long Day contrasts with his use of eschatological horizons to end Freedom. Both demonstrate the relevance of apocalyptic symbolism to ideas of oppression and liberty. Both provide examples of the appropriation to a contemporary rhetoric of self-determination of apocalyptic images and terms albeit without an appreciation of the constellation of metaphysical symbols by which they are attended.

70 ibid.


72 Patterson, 1973, p. 203.
Torture can make death desirable. This is an apocalyptic theme we encountered in Chapter Eight. We observed an eschatological horizon of images and ideas of actual physical suffering, as a moiety of a more extensive apocalyptic balance. We also observed that this eschatological horizon, devoid of balance, comprises a tool of terror. Contemporary discourse on torture-trauma tends to be devoid of the necessary balance. It is clinical and ghastly so there is an inclination to isolate its facts. As consequence, the issues tend to lose their broad significance and the discourse becomes self-referential. Absolutism by totalisation readily occurs then. But something else occurs too. A determination toward retribution which ignores the tormentous implications of its own prospective actions. In the vernacular, torture has to do with pain, cruelty, hatred, revenge, agony, anguish, and twisting-and-forcing. Torturing has to do with distortion and perversion. The English word springs from the Latin, tortura, signifying twisting, writhing, torment. It is important to understand that torture is not punishment. The pains of torture are not bound to any measure or balance such as punishment attempts to enact. Moreover, the fact of torture does not necessarily signify any causal offence; it is a cucking stool mentality that would tell us otherwise. If one has been tortured, that does not necessarily signify that one is guilty of anything. Torture does not deny the fact of human rights but it makes impossible one's enactment of them. The concept of human rights makes more exquisite the pursuits of torture. There is the twist.

In 1991, Time Magazine brought the subject of torture into the popular forum by publishing an article by Frederick Ungeheuer entitled 'After the Torturer's Touch'. This article tells us that torture is an 'inhuman plague'. Thus Ungeheuer invokes the imagery of Apocalypse X:11; XI:1-13; and XVI:17-21, wherein the god's plagues torment the unrepentant.

It may not be the author's intention to invoke divinity or repentance. Rather, the article applauds the existence of treatment centres. Nevertheless, authorial intent, the resonances of apocalyptic eschatology penetrate the prose. The rhetoric, however, advocates neither torment nor redemption but it simply concretises the idea of destruction. Ungeheuer tells us (correctly) that the purpose of torture is to destroy persons not to extract information.

The pre-texts this article are different from those of the apocalyptic plagues. The Johannine plagues are collective as well as individual; but an individualism is
assumed by Ungeheuer in which to destroy a person is to annihilate a self. This, of course, is fatuous, denying the cultural adhesions by which individuals exist. More importantly, it brings into operation the abovementioned fallacy of concrete annihilation. We noted in Part One that this fallacy tends to provoke intolerance, bred from fear and impatience.

Here is a twisted dynamic. The people seeking treatment to heal their wounds are not associated with compassion or comfort but with a terror even more severe than the one which has brought them to notice. Ungeheuer uses images of this terror to concretise an eschatological horizon. This is done in medico-legal and religio-legal terms.

Ungeheuer’s is a little article, just a page or so, but it enjoys wide circulation, being part of the greater matrix of mass communications. So we can assume that it can have many kites or effects. What, though, are its pretexts?

The article reflects a discourse on torture which is a metatext of the primary suffering. The metatext is generated largely by service-providers. It is not, by and large, the raw testimony of people who have been tortured, although many of the abovementioned providers have first-hand experience of torture (As we shall discover, there is no clear division between torturers and comforters). This is a discourse of self-identification got by advocacy. Testimony is turned to the rhetoric which Ungeheuer renders as medico-legal and religio-legal as sufferers find their advocates.

There follows a summary review of the discourse. Interest is focussed on apocalyptic assumptions and resonances which are observable in it. As there is little common agreement as to terms, we have entered into some detail to illustrate differences. The preference for the term victim-survivor, which this thesis demonstrates throughout, is configured in this discussion.

In 1984, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted, by consensus, the

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74 Ungeheuer, Frederick, 'After the Torturer's Touch', *Time Magazine*, November 1991, pp. 48-49. Given the power of assertion in popular media such as *Time Magazine*, the following should be noted. Ungeheuer opens the article with 'The French stopped torturing after the war in Algeria'. Reports from French New Caledonia (Kanaky) contradict this. See, for example, *Bwenando le premier journal de Kanaky*, Nos. 40, 42, 43, 45, 47 Noumea, June-July 1986; Australians for Kanak Independence, Aki Newsletter, 1987, pp. 1-9. These less well known publications both carry reports from the massacre at Ovea in 1986 and the assassination of Kanak leader Jean Marie Tjibaou in 1987 which contradict Ungeheuer's assertion.

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. It has been open for signature since February 4, 1985. The articles of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights the 1956 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and later conventions, on genocide, apartheid and slavery had culminated in the 1975 Declaration of the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment which understands torture as an offence to human dignity.  

The case of Filartiga v. Pena in the United States of America set a precedent whereby nations who are signatories to the United Nations Covenants are bound to prosecute torture under their national laws. Paraguayan Joelito Filartiga was tortured to death by Asuncion police in 1976. His family filed a civil action against their compatriot in the United States. After four years of civil action, the United States Court of Appeal made its judgement in their favour, stating: 'the torturer has become, like the pirate and slave trader before him... an enemy of all mankind.

The Convention is articulated to the United Nations system through the Declaration. United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuellar heralded the Convention as an instrument against an evil, abominable practice and the pamphlet cover carries the superscript, 'Outlawing an Ancient Evil: Torture'. So the institutional power of both the United Nations and the United States of America stands as principle to the association of torture and evil.

To deny the association of torture and evil is impossible and undesirable but it is necessary to inquire into the terms of their rhetorical association. That necessity is precipitated by the potential for psychoterror which resides in the abovementioned fallacy, which concretises a metaphysical figure. The concretisation of evil can have similar but more severe effects; cryptofascism can thrive of any hesitation to investigate them.

It may be more important to inquire into the relations of certainty and torture. Torture cannot succeed but torturers are certain that it will. Personal and collective autonomy cannot be eradicated so the only thing certain about torture is

76 United Nations Department of Public Information, Convention Against Torture And Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (DPI/847), United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland, April, 1985, p. 1.


78 Convention Against Torture And Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (DPI/847), 1985, p. 1.
its twistedness.

There is a similarity between the United Nations Secretary General's rhetoric and that of Orlando Patterson, discussed in Chapter Ten. It is the same assumption of Christian dualism as gives rise to the conundrum of submission. So, paradoxically, torment is perpetuated, even as an instrument is created whose intent is to terminate it.

Take, for example, the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture. Since 1981, it has straddled some of the inadequacies inherent in the Declaration and the Convention by recognising 'the need to provide assistance to victims of torture in a purely humanitarian spirit.' With the nominal existence of a fund for victims, perpetration is also signified and suffering becomes compensable, being construed as a consequence of an immoral act. With this development it becomes possible for victimisation to be construed in a perverse way as a sign of goodness; likewise, compensation is mistaken for reward.

What follows is that, to benefit from either the fund or the Convention, people or peoples must identify themselves as victims. This same anomaly occurs with regard to treatment and recovery from torture trauma. A conceited denial expressed, No one recovers from genocide, prompts people to maintain symptoms as witness to the fact of the genocide.

The claim of a victim stands against a recognised victimiser, and against any institutions, such as law enforcement, criminal justice, and various social services which facilitate the torture. The claims usually seek restitution by recourse to law. This restitution is a form of vengeance by which people seek to bring conflict to rest: 'making peace with the catastrophe and its wake'.

Consequently, discourse on torture is permeated by religio-legalism, especially metaphors of witness and testimony. Take, for example, the many publications of Amnesty International, or Judith Perera's 'Refuge From the Torturer.' Both

79 ibid., p. 2.
81 ibid.
seek to verify truth by replicating the words of witnesses. This is a quasi-religious notion of truth; it stems from the conventions of kerygmatic preaching.

This is not an argument against Christianity. It is against excessive concretisation and an attendant loss of metaphysical potency. The case of John Gerard, a Jesuit, tortured in the Tower of London in 1597, serves well to illustrate the desirability of a non reductive Christian believing. He said to his torturers, 'You can do with me what God allows you to do - more you cannot do.' Thus he endured. Later he escaped.

The Amnesty International publication offers readers illustrated witness of over fifty cases and Perera puts forward testimony of tortured persons from over ninety countries. The legalism reflected by these items tends to be blurred against religious ideas about a divine Justice, Judgement and Truth.

It is medico-legalism, however, which penetrated the discourse of torture-trauma in a definitive way. Accepted definitions of what constitutes torture tend to be formed from medical concepts, and medical practitioners tend to be valorised above others as expert witnesses of truth in matters of torture. So strong is the influence of medical thinking in the discourse on torture that a specialist jargon has emerged.

Charles R. Figley defines some basic concepts: Trauma, from the Greek for "wound", a sense of assault by a foreign body and the consequent scarring; Catastrophe, an overwhelming event which is the situational prerequisite for the emergence of trauma; Traumatic Stress Reaction, behaviours and emotions consequent on trauma manifest during a catastrophe; Post Traumatic Stress Reaction, behaviours and emotions consequent on trauma manifest after a catastrophe; Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, damage caused by any or all of the above. The terms emerged from the American Psychiatric Association's 'Manual of Mental Disorders of 1980.85

A brief, explanatory history of the medico legal aspects of torture has been constructed by Allodi and Cowgill, using Foucault as their source:

From the dawn of mankind man has inflicted intense pain and suffering on his fellow of the species wittingly for pleasure, for punishment, to submit

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him to his will or to destroy his humanity.\textsuperscript{86}

By the end of the 18th century overt physical punishments were less used than before and by mid 19th century torture ceased to be part of the legal process. But, they tell us, during the mid 20th century news from the Nuremburg trials of the so-called scientific experiments of the Nazi doctors demonstrated a resurgence of torture activity. There has followed a resurgence in legal activity, as self-identifying victims seek redress. With this medico-legalism, doctors are invited to heal injustice.

The jargon is mysterious, many writers proceed by the use of initials and numbers. The following examples are illustrative. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association of 1968 and 1980 (DSM-II and DSM-III) include torture syndrome under the general term Transient Situational Disturbances (DSM-II, Code no. 307) or Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, Acute Chronic or Delayed (DSM-III, Code no. 308 and 309). Bombing, torture and death camps are noted among the stressors. The Ninth Revision of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-9) of the World Health Organisation has similar classifications. Torture-trauma syndrome is included among stress response syndromes, gross stress reactions and post-traumatic stress disorders.\textsuperscript{87}

These codes are effective deterrents to public access to the discourse. Patient access too. So they forge an elitist discourse in which personal aspects of the subject are subsumed to the formalities of expression. Attention is deflected from suffering humanity to precision of codes. This is dehumanising.

As the complexity of the syndrome is further appreciated, so the abovementioned jargon thickens. It is evident that, as a clinical entity, torture syndrome is complex. Yael Danieli demonstrates the heterogeneity of responses to trauma as exemplified by the holocaust. She emphasises the need to guard against expecting all victim-survivors to behave similarly.\textsuperscript{88}


Anxiety, insomnia, nightmares, somatic conditions, phobias, suspiciousness, fearfulness without hysterical elaboration constitute the syndrome. There is an interesting omission, too. Allodi and Cowgill tell us that psychoses are not included among the symptoms of torture syndrome; a basic diagnostic criterion is the lack of any apparent predisposition to mental disorder in the individual affected.\textsuperscript{89} What has happened to the schizophrenics and other psychotics? Their testimony is rendered null by current definitions.

Allodi and Cowgill assert that torture syndrome is a valid and useful clinical entity which it defines a major problem. It is a problem of public health. It necessitates collaboration among medical, legal, governmental, religious, humanitarian agencies to mount programmes for remediation and torture prevention.

The emphatic need for provision of remedial services is illustrated by the important observation reported by Figley. Withdrawal, preoccupation and violence can be part of the recovery process. Hence service provision is essential to prevent misunderstandings which could lead to people being punished for recuperating.\textsuperscript{90} Thus insofar as torture is separated from legalism, it tends at present to be appropriated by medicalism. There is no suggestion in these documents that the syndrome itself and recovery from it might be civil matters. community wisdom defers to professional expertise in the matter of torture.

Michael R. Trimble describes torture-trauma syndrome or disorder as a manifestation of withdrawal, depression, depersonalisation and anxiety, associated with re-experience of the traumatic event. He mentions nightmares and dissociative states as symptoms of the disorder.\textsuperscript{91} Trimble, Allodi and Cowgill and others affirm anxiety as an effect of torture-trauma but this is not without contention. Eitinger, for example, finds his main point of interest in the human regenerative capacity, claiming that, among 227 Norwegian concentration camp survivors only 43\% exhibited phenomena of anxiety. He acknowledges the medico-legal origins and implications of the disorder.\textsuperscript{92}

Trimble explains that what is now called post-traumatic stress disorder is a


\textsuperscript{90} Figley in Figley, 1987, p. 407.


\textsuperscript{92} Eitinger, I., 'Anxiety in Concentration Camp Survivors' in Australia and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 3, 1969, pp. 348-351.
common and well known human problem which has a history of several hundred years. The condition has had many names including, post-traumatic neurosis and post-traumatic psychoneuroses, malingering, survivor syndrome, post-Vietnam syndrome, compensation neurosis and concentration camp syndrome.

Roland Littlewood and Maurice Lipsedge give an example of compensation neurosis: insistence by a patient that s/he will continue to become ill until, say, better housing is found. Thygesen and Hermann in 1954, coined the term 'concentration camp syndrome':

a term which would help to rehabilitate victims, also financially, by helping them to qualify under the law of compensation to victims of the occupation.

Thygesen points out that the syndrome took ten years to establish and another fifteen to describe thus far - and the work is not finished.

Are we witnessing here the medico legal revenge of the victim-survivors of the concentration camps? Or is this the perpetuation of medical experimentation by torture? Consider: (a) doctors selected, choosing people for torture in forms including medical experiments, excessive labour, starvation, death by gas-enhanced asphyxiation; (b) Concentration Camp Syndrome gained medico legal recognition; (c) income was accepted as necessary to recovery; (d) a catch is thus created - inability to earn income is one of the symptoms of the syndrome; (e) so now the doctors select, prolonging the lives of the tortured ones by signing for social security/ sickness benefits and remediation. Whatever the motives, these is a current explosion of interest in the subject of torture-trauma.

Trimble locates the commencement of this explosion of interest in victim-survivor's testimonies earlier than most others, claiming that the testimonies from the American Civil War and World War One, as well as Workers' Compensation Acts, mark commencement. He refers to Samuel Pepys' and Charles Dickens' diaries as containing good civilian accounts of the disorder, the former with regard to the Great Fire of London and the latter regarding a Kentish railway accident. He quotes William Shakespeare's description, 'thick-eyed musing and cursed melancholy'.

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94 Paul Thygesen, 'Concentration Camp Syndrome', Department of Neurology, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, 1980, pp. 224.

95 Trimble, 1985, p. 12.
Ronnie Janoff-Bulman tells us that the experience of victimisation by torture endures much longer than the precipitating incidents. The disorder, she tells us, stems from the shattering of the basic assumptions of the victims, especially belief in personal invulnerability, the perception of the world as meaningful and the perception of oneself as positive. She acknowledges that the term victim is problematic, making the spurious claim that it is useful insofar as it relieves the victim of responsibility for what happened.\textsuperscript{96}

The examples mentioned above illustrate how medico legal terms have proliferated within the discourse on torture. This proliferation indicates that, at the nexus of medical and legal concern, people are struggling to find words by which to describe the experiences which torture brings about. Moreover, the tendency to submit the subject to professional jargon suggests a veiled ignorance on the part of the practitioners who are called upon for authoritative opinions.

There is another struggle, this one at a conceptual level, which requires expression through action rather than words. It attends any interface of medicine and torture. Physicians, psychiatrists and other practitioners who use clinical observations of interactive body-mind functions do much of their work at the edge of torture. This ethical precipice is not much acknowledged in the Anglophone discourse but the Tembu have a single word to denote that inner feeling of unease which may herald the development of a madness or the call to be a healer.\textsuperscript{97}

Legal and ethical choices are formally required of medical practitioners by their Hippocratic oath (and the Convention) but in each case they require reinterpretation by each individual conscience. Jonsen and Sagan point out that, while ethical medical practice appears incompatible with the practice of torture, human morality is not circumscribed by medical tenets.\textsuperscript{98} In this matter there is cause for alarm.

Raj Jandoo tells us that doctors are often engaged in activities that are difficult to reconcile with any conception of medical ethics. He claims that by maintaining high standards of medical practice and ethics, doctors could reduce torture and ill treatment but they do not. Doctors, by collective adherence to their codes of


\textsuperscript{97} Littlewood and Lipsedge, 1989, p. 218.

ethics, could be protective against torture but they are not.\textsuperscript{99}

Jandoo's critique is similar to the others: the doctor's presence sanctions the torture and transgresses medical ethics in terms of the Hippocratic Oath, the Declaration of Geneva 1946 and the Declaration of Tokyo:

\begin{quote}
I will maintain the utmost respect for human life from the time of conception; even under threat I will not use my medical knowledge contrary to the laws of humanity;
\end{quote}

(Doctors) shall not countenance, condone or participate in the practice of torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading procedures.

Perhaps we could learn from the Tembu and anyone else whose culture openly embraces ailing and healing as a continuum, how to enter dialogue with medical practitioners on this very delicate matter.

Miriam K. Feldman tells us there are more health professionals engaged in torture than there are involved in treating its consequences. Doctors assist torturers by refining the techniques so as to avoid death.\textsuperscript{100} Amnesty International publishes illustrative descriptions of medical involvement in torture:

\begin{quote}
"I was subjected to both physical and psychological torture... I was seen by a doctor after nearly all the torture sessions... I was given a document to sign which stated that I had been well treated."\textsuperscript{101}
\end{quote}

Allodi and Cowgill have also formulated several ways in which physicians serve as accomplices to torture. Their doctoral presence can be used to disguise the fact of torture by emblemising the healing ethic. In addition to this sanction, doctors lend their medical materials and equipment, including their knowledge, to the purposes of torture. By remaining silent and not denouncing wounds and injuries inflicted by torturers and by reporting inaccurately the cause of death by torture, medical practitioners use their authority to excuse torture. By doctoring the injured so they cannot escape by death, doctors prolong torture.\textsuperscript{102}

\begin{footnotes}

\textsuperscript{100} Miriam K. Feldman, 'A Pathway to Recovery' in Minnesota Medicine, Vol 71, September, 1988, p. 540.


\textsuperscript{102} Allodi and Cowgill, 1982, p. 98.
\end{footnotes}
Doctors do not have easy choices to make with regard to torture because they may themselves be victims to cultural chauvinism. For example, European doctors may regard as pathological some experiences, such as religious possession, which are common in other cultures. One does find curative interventions torturous if their goal is to eradicate one's divine spark.

On the issue of chauvinism in the medical profession, Feldman's abovementioned article provides a number of examples. Feldman commences with the assertion that misdiagnosis and inappropriate care are likely to ensue unless practitioners know whether or not a patient has been tortured. She refers to the opinions of two medical practitioners that, in the event of medical intervention failing in the cure of chronic pain, patients should be asked if they have been tortured.

Feldman's own chauvinism, however, gets in the way of her argument at this juncture. She asserts that the question should be asked if the patient was not born in the United States of America. She writes that she does not believe it is in the usual American experience to understand torture. She differentiates torture from other acts of violence by emphasising state sanction. Torture, in her definition, requires the acquiescence of one or more public official. Thus medical opinion is subsumed to legalism. Moreover, she asserts that people who have torture-trauma symptoms outside of the definition of torture which includes the presence of a government official are paranoid and not 'reality based'.

This notion of excluding United States citizens is rejected by Perera. Many questions arise as to the validity of such a restricted definition as Feldman's. Torture is part of human repertoire which thrives on repression. So categorisation like Feldman's is dangerous.

Is there an important difference between torture enacted in a scenario of domestic violence, families and homes being state sanctioned institutions, and torture enacted under any other state sanction? What are the significant differences between, for example, religious or political dissidents who find themselves committed to activism for human rights in the face of a torturous, tyrannical regime and families who find themselves committed to cohabitation with tyrannical and abusive members?

103 Littlewood and Lipsedge, 1989, p. 249.

104 Feldman, 1988, p. 539.

105 Ibid., p. 538.

Albert R. Jonsen and Leonard A. Sagan point to the Nuremberg trials as the first awakening of world attention to medicalisation of torture. They add to the declarations mentioned above by Jandoo\textsuperscript{107}, the Declaration of Helsinki, 1964, affirming a physician as a 'protector of life and health'.\textsuperscript{108} Jonsen and Sagan assert that by tolerating, justifying, ignoring and assisting in torture, medical practitioners are involved at every level of torture.\textsuperscript{109} The authors refer to Solshenitsyn's claim that the prison doctor is the interrogator's and the executioner's first assistant. They state the view that medical personnel participate directly in torture when they confine political dissenters to mental hospitals, attempting to destroy the autonomy of the person.\textsuperscript{110}

In a section headed 'The Ethics of Torture' Jonsen and Sagan point out that contemporary moral philosophers and theologians have tended to neglect the topic of torture. They refer to British author Brian Crozier's assertion that in, for example, Algeria 1957, Ulster 1971, and Uruguayan Tupamaros 1972, the torture yielded information which was valuable in the protection of others and is thereby acceptable.

To refute Crozier's argument, Jonsen and Sagan quote Kant's repudiation of the notion that service to a greater good could sanction violations of individuals:

"act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end".

They also mention Montaigne, Voltaire, Bentham, Beccaria as examples of desirable, humanitarian philosophers sprung from the Enlightenment.\textsuperscript{111} Further to their point, they acknowledge that some of the arguments against torture have come from the ancients. In this connection, they make the important point that humanitarian ideals, especially ideas of dignity, being culturally determined, require renewal by re-contextualisation.

Torture itself may need periodical re-contextualisation. Dr. Inge Kemp Genefke

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{107} The Declaration of Geneva and the Declaration of Tokyo.
  \item \textsuperscript{108} Jonsen and Sagan, 1978, pp. 30-34.
  \item \textsuperscript{109} ibi d., p. 33.
  \item \textsuperscript{110} ibi d., p. 35.
  \item \textsuperscript{111} ibi d., pp. 35-38.
\end{itemize}
has observed, over fifteen years, the homogenisation of torture techniques.\textsuperscript{112} Whereas culturally determined differences used to be evident, similar technologies are now in the hands of torturers who are trained, skilled and paid worldwide. This suggests a shift in emphasis as technologies instead of persons become foci of blame for torture.

Similarities do exist, however, in the Kafkaesque excesses of totalitarian bureaucracies. For example, both the German Nazis and the Kampuchean Khmer Rouge death squads kept meticulous records of their work. The case of the Nazis is well known; the torturers’ problems of sharpening pencils and not smudging their work-sheets are annotated in the Khmer Rouge records.\textsuperscript{113}

Robert H. Kirschner states that in cases where drugs are administered for purposes of torture, physician participation appears to be ubiquitous.\textsuperscript{114} Physicians examine people to check whether they are 'fit for torture', especially when drugs are used.\textsuperscript{115} Kirschner differentiates two forms of governmental activity using drugs for torture. First, he mentions but does not detail seemingly purposeless, sporadic drug use. This amounts to random reinforcement and requires further investigation.\textsuperscript{116} Second, drugs are used to modify so-called deviant behaviour, such as political or religious dissent. The drugs may be a means of securing a denunciation by dissenters of their dissenting ideas and behaviour. In this connection, the drugs are sometimes used to justify psychiatric hospitalisation. Sometimes they are used as punishment, by horrible side effects.

We noted above that legalistic notions of witness and testimony, sometimes mingled with religious ideas of a divine Justice and Truth, have informed the subject of torture. The treatment of torture-trauma, that is the post traumatic phase of torture, has been permeated by similar elements. Testimony can be used as a therapeutic tool.\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{112} Genefke quoted by Feldman, 1988, p. 540.


\textsuperscript{115} Kirschner, 1984, p. 313.

\textsuperscript{116} Random reinforcement is one of Behaviour Modification's strongest mechanisms.

For example, an oral testimony, tape recorded then transcribed and edited, can be used to restore in a patient personal and political ties which are necessary to healing. By verbalisation, healing can be facilitated; object consciousness is redirected away from traumatic experience and toward auto assertion. Moreover, repetition, such as is necessitated by the processes of editing the text of the testimony, assists in the resolution of grief. During the therapy, symbolic substitutions can be negotiated, for example, a speech act may be substituted for an act of revenge. Thus the more fiercely energetic responses to torture can be rendered quiet, if the patient finds that healthy:

In summary, the testimony acts by restoring affective ties, by orientating aggression in a constructive manner, and by integrating fragmented experiences.\(^{118}\)

Therapeutic testimony to torture is not necessarily verbal. One's body bears testimony in many silent ways. Ron Kurz, Hector Prestera and Stanley Knelman are among the therapists who report on this aspect of torture.\(^{119}\) Kurtz and Prestera describe some physical effects which occur as testimony of torture-trauma:

When the innate wholeness of the body is disrupted, we are banning from awareness the impulses which arise in our bellies, genitals, hearts, arms, legs, and other parts of the body.\(^{120}\)

Knelman explains some of the longer term consequences of disrupted bodily wholeness:

People under a long siege of muscular contraction, of self discipline, of holding tight, cannot suddenly be flexible.\(^{121}\)

To interpret the silent testimony of the body, practitioners adopt the axiom that we are our bodily processes.\(^{122}\)

\(^{118}\) Cienfuegos and Mnel lì, 1983, p. 50.


\(^{120}\) Kurtz and Prestera, 1976, p. 8. See also Knel man, 1975, p. 22. See also Knel man, 1975, p. 37.

\(^{121}\) Knel man, 1975, p. 164.

\(^{122}\) ib i d., p. 9.
Therapeutic testimony, verbal and silent, can be encountered as a multiple entity. Many reiterations, each standing for a facet of a truth but not pretending to express all of it, can be necessary. Some victim-survivors ask for impunity of testimony in the interests of daring to speak. This is especially important to admission by torturers that torture has occurred. The importance of this can be appreciated if it is understood that many torturers are themselves tortured. There is no clear division of whole-life activities which makes a person categorically one or the other.

An expansive idea of truth is contrary to the abovementioned legalism which valorises a singular truth. The polyvalent, therapeutic truth can accommodate transformative reorientation of attitudes, such as recovery from torture-trauma requires. Many sufferers, however, are bound to ideas of revenge which confuse a divine justice with human law.

Yolanda Gampel has written about the kind of therapy which facilitates polyvalent truth-making. Gampel recorded interviews with twenty five Jewish adults, all of whom were children aged two to twelve years, at the beginning of World War Two. Remembering their wartime and pre-war persecutions, interviewees began to relate their stories in manners unsuited to their present chronological age. This disparity, when recognised by the interviewees, enabled them to appreciate their childhood responses to the persecutions as separate from their adult responses to them. The consequent reorientation of teller to story was found to relieve some of the anguish which, for the interviewees, accompanied their stories.

Practitioners whose healing works by tolerating polyvalent truths, facilitate in themselves and their patients autonomy with regard to the formulation of a true self vis a vis torture. An appreciation of the cultural symbols which are constellated by notions of self seem to be a necessary corollary to such an approach. In almost Vichian terms, Littlewood and Lipsedge put it thus:

In cultural life, we build up complex networks of symbols, associated with others by a direct equivalence or resemblance (metaphor: 'red material' to 'blood') or because they have a certain relation to them (metonym: 'socialism' to 'the blood of the workers').

By the redistribution of symbolic equivalences, a private liberation can be achieved against adverse cultural, social or political determinism. Such flexibility can


develop as a defence when torture-trauma threatens to overwhelm other mind and body functions. This kind of therapeutic intervention usually operates under the rubrics of disempowerment, empowerment, and self-empowerment.

Interventions such as Littlewood and Lipsedge have described appropriate to the healing arts the power of language, private and public. They identify, as a problem of torture-trauma experience, confusion in communication. This, he tells us is a result of trying to describe experiences for which there is no established, acceptable code. Existent symbols, he tells us, are always 'overdetermined', that is, they refer to many different things. Consequently, communications fail to achieve specificity and the speaker experiences disempowerment. With the development of nuances, articulated to the experience of torture-trauma illness, self-empowerment becomes possible.\(^\text{125}\)

Many people have been driven by torture to seek asylum outside of their home country. Consequently, refugee resettlement issues arise which call into question the definitions and interventions which attend the subject of torture. In 1987, a report was commissioned in Australia by the New South Wales government Department Health to investigate the needs of the refugee population.\(^\text{126}\) The researchers (in accordance with the literature cited above) have understood dependency, debility and dread as the aims of torture. They identify the primary purpose of torture as being to instil terror in individuals and societies.\(^\text{127}\) The difficult point is that torture is a domestic activity, wherever home might be.

Putting forward a detailed exemplification of refugees' experiences regarding torture and trauma before and after their seeking of asylum, the authors make two main points. There is no evidence for spontaneous recovery; problems endure through generations. Thus a need for state sourced, ameliorative interventions is demonstrated; costs to health departments will be the greater if no interventions are provided.

Government funded assistance aimed at the reassertion of personal and cultural

\(^{125}\) Littlewood and Lipsedge, 1989, pp. 218-242. See also Marianne Exposure to Torture’ in Contemporary Family Therapy 10 (4), Winter, Human Sciences Press, Copenhagen, Denmark, 1988, pp. 280-287.

\(^{126}\) Janice Reid and Timothy Strong, Torture and Trauma: The Health Care Needs of Refugee Victims in New South Wales, New South Wales Department of Health, Cumberland College of Health Sciences, Sydney, 1987. The report includes an extensive bibliography; Appendices D and E include testimonies reprinted from Australian national newspapers.

identity as part of refugee resettlement is understood by caseworkers as a necessity. It is understood also that interventions are bound to fail unless ethnic variables are taken into account. As Erwin Randolf Parson puts it:

the transcultural therapist must master a variety of cognitive, behavioral, experiential and dynamic methods, along with social and community therapies, in conjunction with solid, coherent transcultural sophistication and broadened world view.\(^{128}\)

Caseworkers insist that culture and education are integral to human well being. They argue for special help to migrant children who tend to be isolated from those cultural and educational matrices which provide test situations by which children learn.\(^{129}\)

In Australia, these views were affirmed in 1992, at a national forum entitled 'Welcome Stranger'. The forum found consensus regarding the need for international protection and effective asylum procedures for an estimated 17 million refugees. Delegates criticised the Australian policy of detention of asylum seekers. They referred to the American experience; 95% of applicants released into the community appear as required in the immigration court. They affirmed that the Jewish and Muslim faiths share with Christianity a profound commitment to caring for the stranger in our midst.\(^{130}\)

The question of detention is of particular importance because the reaffirmation of one's cultural affinities and personal relations is essential to recovery from torture-trauma. Caseworkers report that most asylum seekers, because they are seeking domicile and citizenship, are very unlikely to abscond. As detention inhibits recovery, it can be seen as a continuation of the torture-trauma process.

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Of equal importance is the question of self-identification. 'Victim', 'survivor' and 'victim-survivor' are loaded terms by which people seek to demonstrate a mental attitude with regard to torture-trauma and recovery from it. This very limited vocabulary is overextended, being required to serve patients, practitioners and observers. The inadequacy of the vocabulary can be illustrated by the terms in which Danieli encodes her four part typology of victim-survivor families: 'victim families, fighter families, numb families and "those who made it"'.

The assignment of terms tends to proclaim victimisation. Take, for example, this opening statement: Exposure to torture represents one of the most extreme forms of victimization that human beings may experience. Or take Baroness Quincey's remark, made while speaking of a woman who had just seen her son's head sawn off, that she 'takes up advocacy for victims'. The abovementioned Amnesty International publication and many others proliferate the term victim, often using it several times in one page. Thus the association of torture and victimisation is maintained in the vernacular.

Since 1975, there has been a marked upsurge, in news media of attention to testimonies of victims of torture. There has been a simultaneous upsurge of similar interest in the literature of the social sciences, especially psychology. There is a tendency in the literature to explain torture as the repudiation of the autonomy of the victim, reducing him or her to a mere means to the ends of others. Thus the literature tends to reinforce the intention of the torturers.

Some attempts have been made to escape from this pitfall of rhetoric by displacing the word victim and giving preference to the word survivor. This, however, has led to confusion of another kind because the terms survivor and survivor mode belong to clinical and quasi clinical jargon. The difficulty would seem to arise from the inadequacies of a labelling approach to complex human affairs. If that is so, an

131 Dani el i, 1985 p. 295f.
136 ibid.
exchange of labels cannot be expected to work great improvements, although changes in emphases can be significant. In order to clarify pre-emptively this issue, a brief description of so-called survivor mode is offered here.

John P. Wilson explains survivor mode as a secondary condition of torture-trauma. With torture-trauma, people often experience a range of symptoms from irritability and restlessness to distressing flashback experience. To escape these afflictions, people usually engage in avoidance strategies. This involves repression, denial, blocking, perceptual distortion and projection which, when successful, may return unassimilated imagery to unconscious memory. Effective coping may ensue.

If, subsequently, the person's threshold for effective coping is weakened, re-experiencing and associated distress tend to recur. So tormented, a person may adopt a survivor mode of functioning. This is characterised by some or all of the following. Altered states of consciousness, hyper alertness, hyper vigilance, excessive autonomic nervous system arousal, frenetic behaviour, paranoid ideation, mistrust, and use of survivor skills and cognitive capacities learned during the traumatic episode. In addition, the person may experience oscillation between their survivor mode and their ordinary mode of function. This usually involves a dissociative reaction. Many torture-trauma survivors, when they re-encounter death, cannot respond on a deep level, or even accept it.

This peculiar form of distress which Wilson describes is quite different to the common meanings of survivor.

The words of Iranian poet Saeed Soltanpour who was imprisoned under the Shah and then arrested and executed by the then new Islamic government, 'hear my voice/ As it sings in the slaughterhouse', might provide something of a cross cultural bridge between the psychologism of the so-called mode and the expressed experiences of victim-survivors. Jo Ayers echoes Figley's terms as she puts forward a definition which serves well in this context: 'Being a survivor, then, is making peace with the memories of the catastrophe and its wake.'


139 See also Gampel, 1988, p. 507.


141 Ayers, Jo, 'Victims or Survivors? The Effects of Torture and Trauma on Refugee Children' Final Oral Seminar April 3, 1992, M Ph. Degree in International Health, Department of Community Health, A.C.T., 1992, pp. 1-
The Australian state of New South Wales provides, through its Health Department a Service for the Treatment And Rehabilitation of Torture and Trauma Survivors which functions under the acronym STARTTS. Here is a cunning word play which enables participants to explore for the essentials of a fresh start without denying the torture, trauma and need for service which has brought them to their present situation.

At STARTTS, caseworkers mediate the conflicted postures, psychological and physical, which can come about as consequence of holding with self-contradiction. Two attitudes, 'I will never tell' and 'I will not forget', held simultaneously, maintain a victim-survivor position. The main signifiers in casework dialogues are non verbal, fine gesture, for example and gross body language. Semi verbal signifiers, such as, word salad and emphatic metaphor are also very important. Using Vichian terms, we can say that, at STARTTS, people work at the edge of the language of the gods; or we can say that the work is very poetical. It is also remedial, serving practical values which are based on clients' needs.

Some cross-cultural observations made at STARTTS can show the pertinence of apocalyptic ideation to the assessment of needs. Many clients see themselves as being in a drama triangle, made up of a 'victim' a 'persecuter' and a 'rescuer'. The schism of victim and persecutor furnishes a horizon of suffering. The rescuer is expected to bring release from this. These horizons, as long as they are divergent, can maintain hope.

What commonly happens is that the divergence is maintained. This opens up a panoramic apocalypse in which a self-identified victim lives in the certitude of a rescue. A sense of entitlement follows. This is a posture from which people can demand rights, to asylum or assistance, for example.

With the convergence of a client (as victim) and a caseworker (as rescuer) this apocalyptic panorama gives way to a second kind of apocalypse.

In the second kind of apocalypse, the impossibility of rescue (made credible at first by a mistaken idea of a casework) is apparent. A person can then recognise an inner self who may or may not be a rescuer. This inner self participates synergistically in the drama. So it is a perpetrator as a rescuer. To recognise this is to encounter a synergistic apocalypse. Such encounters facilitate recovery.

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142 Margaret Cunningham, Director, STARTTS (NSW) and the STARTTS staff and library 1993-1994 have provided a generous supply of source material to this chapter.
There are many Australian aboriginal people who have been tortured but to date they have not used this service. It must suffice here to show that torture has occurred; we cannot pursue a discussion of service needs in this study. The issue will be encountered again, however, in Chapter Twelve.

An illustrative example, however, should be mentioned here. Take the case of the Yir Yoront. This people who have no use for egalitarianism, no terms in their language for equality, and no interactions in the communal life which observe equality, have experienced tormentous suffering because of egalitarian values. Missionaries gave steel axes to as many Yir Yoront as would receive them. This rendered the traditional stone axes obsolete. Simultaneously it rendered obsolete the significance of the stone axe by which relations and interactions among Yir Yoront were governed. As consequence, relationships and interactions became meaningless. Mostly the Yir Yoront have died. The survivors have lost their people. We do not know of any of these people finding support in conventional Australian torture-trauma services.

As we have noted above, to detail what it might mean to find one's identity as a survivor of torture is beyond the testimonial power of words. Some informed and discursive attempts have, however, entered the literature. One such is Bruno Bettelheim's essay, 'Surviving'.

This essay is distinguished from many others of the same genre by its process; it is not a self-referential description of torturous circumstances. Bettelheim writes in response to auteur Lina Wertmuller's film Seven Beauties and Professor Terrence Des Pres' book The Survivor. Both, according to Bettelheim, interpret survivorship falsely.

Bettelheim puts the popularity of both works in context with the fact that Nuremburg War Criminal Albert Speer's accounts of Nazism, along with sympathetic biographies of Hitler, are now best sellers in the United States of America.

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America and Germany. He makes the point that, while holocaust survivors die out, all people now live under the spectre of Auschwitz, Hiroshima, atomic bombs, genocide, and contemporary concentration camps. Bettleheim's critique indicates that both Des Pres' and Wertmuller's interpretations put forward inaccurate and ill considered information about the parameters and necessities of survival. The essay sets out some remedial considerations.

Bettleheim criticises Wertmuller's artistic use of two themes; heroism and naivete. Guilt is a theme of survival which, according to Bettleheim, requires more attention than Wertmuller has given it. He quotes Elie Wiesel, 'I live therefore I am guilty.' Bettleheim states that one of the most significant aspects of survivorship is that one feels guilt, although one knows one is not guilty. He explains this in terms of the luck aspect and refers to Lifton's reports from Hisoshima of the same phenomenon.\(^{145}\)

Neither heroism nor naivete, according to Bettleheim, contributes positively to survival. Consequently, belief that they do is misinformed and dangerous. He insists (more than once) on what he calls the harsh and unpleasant fact of the concentration camp; that prisoners' actions had little to do with their survival. Bettleheim, explains that to survive by escaping was impossible:

> From the beginning of the German concentration camps, in 1933, until the forties, only three prisoners managed to escape and survive'.\(^{146}\)

The little that one could do was to endure but survival depended on being set free.

Bettleheim attacks Des Pres' quasi analytic claim that survivors of the Nazi concentration camps lived 'beyond the compulsions of culture' (Des Pres' phrase). That, according to Bettleheim, did not facilitate but endangered survival in the camps. He illustrates in some detail how reciprocity of care made survival possible. For example, there was mutually protective behaviour among prisoners at roll call; they shared out the exposure to bitter cold and to hostile scrutiny.

Survival, Bettleheim tells us, bears 'testimony to a humanity that not even the abomination of the concentration camp can destroy.' That humanity, as he interprets it, is neither heroic or naive nor guilty or innocent. It is cultured and cultivated, finding civility in the most unlikely of places. It has an irrepressible creativity nurtured by mutual need. Bettleheim's paired notions of humanity and


\(^{146}\) Bettleheim 1979, footnote p. 169.
survival neither invite nor tolerate simplistic or stereotyped notions.

The riddle of the human creature which we noted in Chapter Ten stands behind the subject of torture-trauma and the Sisiphean task of finding an answer to it stands in front. The terms of the discourse on torture are not overtly apocalyptic but, in addition to the abovementioned riddle, opposition to oppression, belief in change for the better, and an inclination for vengeance are evident in it.

Of most importance are the two tendencies to isolate and to overly concretise the discourse on torture-trauma. Torture tries to turn 'I' into 'me' and 'thou' int it. This intensifies an already threatening imagery and makes ready a tool for further torment. More needs to be reported of the processes of remediation, amelioration and mediation by which people make their recovery from torture-trauma.
CHAPTER 12
A NEOLOGICAL HORIZON:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS

On December 10, 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Since then, ideas about individual, civil and sovereign freedoms have been formulated and reformulated through international laws enacted by instruments of the United Nations. Treaties, conventions and resolutions are the main instruments of international law. United Nations conventions and resolutions augment traditional treaties. Thus, in the interests of international security, the rules of international law are negotiated and renegotiated in various United Nations forums. Tolerances are established by allowances and sanctions, supported by negotiation, persuasion, and the economic and military force of United Nations members. The question of jus cogens, that is common agreement which can overrule any other laws is the negotiators' central legal problem. The question of self-determination is the negotiators' main practical problem. Together they make the business of human rights multifarious and complex. In the interests of simplicity, some main points are put forward here in brief. A discussion of human rights in action follows in Chapter Five.

The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights\textsuperscript{147} conjures a human family of which all people are members. Everyone in the human family shares dignity and equal, inalienable rights. The preamble invokes Charter of the United Nations as an affirmation of faith in the rights asserted therein by member states of the United Nations. Some relevant parts of the Charter read:

\begin{quote}
1 (3) To achieve... respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all... 13 (1b) promoting... and assisting in the realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms\textsuperscript{148}.
\end{quote}

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights extends the Charter, proclaiming an agreement to prohibit barbarous acts which inhibit dignity and equality and to provide recourse against tyranny and oppression.\textsuperscript{149}

The ideas upon which the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of

\textsuperscript{147}\textit{Universal Declaration of Human Rights}, Final Authorized Text, Reprint (15-37902), United Nations Department of Public Information (UNDPI), New York, 1992.

\textsuperscript{148}United Nations, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, Department of Public Information, N.Y. [UNDPI], 1989, pp. 3, 10. Other articles covering the area of human rights include: 55(c), 56, 62(2), 68, and 76(c).

\textsuperscript{149}UNDPI, 1989, paragraph 5.
Human Rights, and other resolutions, conventions and treaties of the United Nations are founded derive from the humanist tradition. With the European Convention on Human Rights, the Charter and the Declaration, albeit they are frail instruments, represent an instrumental extension of humanism.\textsuperscript{150}

The universal human family is a mythical entity, poetic, in a Vichian sense. The myth assures us that human rights are as real as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that the Declaration stands for human rights, and that the Declaration is a sign of human rights. The metaphor of the universal family stands behind a rhetoric of protest against indignity, inequality, oppression and tyranny. Proclamations of freedom of opinion and assembly, welfare state, public education, civil peace, free elections, responsible government, and rule of law as being inalienable from humanity are founded on it.\textsuperscript{151}

The poetic nature of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is most evident in the Preamble. The metaphor of the human family is superbly impossible but made credible by collective denial of its opposite. The denial was necessary to survival after the almost universal death immersion effected by World War Two.\textsuperscript{152} By addressing its own enigma, the Declaration operates self referentially to build its lexicon. For example, in the phrases 'fundamental freedoms'\textsuperscript{153} and 'fundamental human rights'\textsuperscript{154}, the adjectival referent is the Declaration itself which states in its first paragraph that the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains thirty Articles, twenty nine of which proclaim elements of freedom from bondage. Article 29 differs from the others; it proclaims duties: 'Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his [sic] personality is possible'. The inclusion of


\textsuperscript{151} Bullock, 1985, p. 184.

\textsuperscript{152} For further discussion of denial, see Dorpat, Theo. L., 'Denial, Defect, Symptom Formation and Construction', in Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 1983, Vol. 3 (2), pp. 223-253, 'Denial refers to the unconscious repudiation of some or all of the total available meanings of an event to allay anxiety or other unpleasurable conditions. Denial involves cognitive arrest; it creates psychic defects-failures to symbolize, or put into words, whatever is defended against.' See also the several works of Robert Jay Lifton cited elsewhere in this document. Denial, in this context, is a psychologism.

\textsuperscript{153} UN DPI, 1989, paragraph 7.

\textsuperscript{154} ibid., paragraph 5.
the word 'alone' in this context renders the Declaration capable of accommodating the paradox of bondage to individualism in the so-called free world. Individuation is emphasised and pluralism is eclipsed, as if there is only one community or type of community in which human freedom and fulfilment can be realised.

Members of the unique community envisaged by the authors of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are to enjoy the freedoms enshrined in the other Articles, which proclaim, affirm and prohibit selected activities. Article 1, for example, proclaims freedom, equality and brotherhood (although none of these conditions is defined). Article 2 affirms that entitlement (to rights) is without distinction. Prohibition of slavery is enshrined in Article 4. Article 5 prohibits torture. Article 9 prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile. Article 14 affirms a right to seek asylum from persecution. Article 15 affirms nationality for everyone.

Such affirmations and prohibitions are open to contention. For example, to be duty bound to a community which gives preference to individuality while denying the values of primordial pluralism is problematic to many of the world's indigenous peoples. For further example, a mandatory assignation of nationality diminishes the opportunities for the survival of several of the world's nomadic and gipsy peoples.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights sets an agenda wherein the principles of a humane legislation might eventually be encoded into international law. It does not set an agenda for activism. Consequently, human rights activists tend to follow something of a via negativa. It is largely by reference to alleged infringements of the Declaration and its pursuant instruments that the popular concept of human rights takes shape.

Prior to World War Two, the protection of human rights fell to non government organisations. Hence it was the governed not the governors who enshrined in the constitutions of nation states the protection of minorities and the fight against slavery. With the coming into being of the United Nations, the protection of human rights became a matter of international concern. The United Nations provides an international structure whereby non government organisations and governments are able to operate at a global level to protect human rights. By the end of World War two, the concept of human rights covered civil and political, economic and cultural rights. The Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and its two international covenants and optional protocols, have been formally adopted by the human family, configured as the international community and represented by the United Nations.

Most importantly, the United Nations instruments made the protection of human rights into an international concern. That national governments are disinclined to
participate directly by enshrining human rights in national laws is illustrated by the Australian case. Although the Australian government is very active in human rights affairs within the international arena, Australia has no Bill of Rights and no vehicle for importation of international human rights conventions. Hence protection of human rights rests among the following: member states of the United Nations; non government organisations whose members can utilise United Nations instruments; and individuals who inform the governments and the non government organisations.

Individuals can complain of human rights violations to the United Nations by using the mechanisms for complaint provided under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the Convention Against Torture. Furthermore, the Economic and Social Council resolution 1503 (XLVIII), known as the 1503 procedure, provides additional legislation by which complaints which fall outside of the terms of reference of the other mechanisms can be addressed.

Moreover, complaints can be made by an individual to any of the Working Groups and Special Rapporteurs appointed by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. To carry a complaint, one needs to know how to employ the existent mechanisms and that involves cooperation with non government organisations and government officials.

Take, for example, the following. Princeton University Professor Richard Falk and his colleague, Robert Jay Lifton conceived the idea of requesting from the United Nations' International Court of Justice an advisory opinion as to the threat to humanity of nuclear weapons. Retired New Zealand Judge Harold Evans has taken up Lifton and Falk's idea and, since 1985, has sought many nations' support to bring the question to the United Nations General Assembly so that it can be referred to the World Court. This is one example of interaction among individuals, non government organisations and the United Nations.

This example shows how the idea of the human family, as projected by the United Nations, finds its elements in individually self-deterministic human beings. Individual membership in and cooperation with collectives is taken as a matter of

\[155\] Kirby, Justice Michael, Silver Anniversary Lecture, International House, University of Sydney, Australia, May 26th, 1992.


free choice. The anomaly of bondage to freedom can, nevertheless, arise. For example, member states of the United Nations are liable to pay compensation if aliens are maltreated while residing in their territory. The compensation, however, is payable to the state of which the offended individual is a member.\(^{158}\)

In this connection, the case of the government of the Peoples’ Republic of China requires special mention, because it constitutes a problem within the United Nations family. China, represented by the Taiwan based Republic of China (R.O.C.) in the first instance, was a founding member of the United Nations. In 1971, the mainland based People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) displaced the R.O.C. It did not ratify the International Covenants on Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.\(^{159}\) The Chinese government's view of self-determination takes the state as the embodiment of the proletariat, so no citizen can have claims against the state.\(^{160}\) This stands in stark contrast to the view which emphasises personal individuality.\(^{161}\)

In the late 1970s, several million people who had been violated by repressive movements, such as the Cultural Revolution, were rehabilitated within China. At that time, the Chinese government-regulated press expressed general opposition to detention, condemning the Cultural Revolution as a gross violation of human rights.\(^{162}\) By contrast, after the Tienamin Square massacre of June 4, 1989, press articles concentrated on the violation of the collective right to self-determination of Chinese nationals.\(^{163}\) So-called Western states, especially the United States of America, were alleged to be manipulating the issue of human rights in order to violate China’s sovereignty.\(^{164}\)

China reached a nadir in its overall condition of human rights as constituted by United Nations instruments on 20 May, 1989. This date marks the declaration of martial law in Beijing and its physical reinforcement by the mass killing of non-

\(^{158}\) St John, 1993, p. 33.
\(^{160}\) Kent, 1990, p. 6.
\(^{161}\) ibid., p. 11.
\(^{162}\) ibid., p. 59.
\(^{163}\) ibid., p. 60.
\(^{164}\) ibid.
violent protesters in Tienamin Square.\textsuperscript{165} Pursuant to the mass slaughter, by June 13, leaders of the protest had been named in shoot-to-kill orders. By the end of August the arrest and detention of thousands of people were confirmed and organised interrogation of residents in their streets and workers in their units was carried out.\textsuperscript{166} Thus freedom of thought and speech and association were all undermined in the name of human rights, reinterpreted as collective, national sovereignty.

Collectivist ideas of human rights, Chinese and others, ignore the precept that membership of a group is one of the rights enjoyed by any individual. Voluntary and involuntary collectivism are differentiable by reference to their outcomes. Twentieth century Fascism, Nazism and Communism exemplify the latter. Voluntary collectivism, such as trades unions' solidarity and socialism, as in collective education, housing, health and respite care, are extensions of individual human rights.\textsuperscript{167}

It is necessary to put human rights issues in the context of international law. It is important to understand that this is a normative order. It expresses particular moral principles, stipulating what the signatories believe ought to happen. International law cannot and does not attempt to predict what will happen.\textsuperscript{168} The authors of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights did not intend it to be a binding part of international law.\textsuperscript{169} Rather, they sought to augment customary law, still allowing for debate, dialogue and meaningful abstentions among member states votes.\textsuperscript{170} The term for this kind of law is jus cogens. As we observed in Chapter Three, Vico maintains that this springs from the same common humanity as makes language possible.

The Australian government explains jus cogens as super-customary rule.\textsuperscript{171} It is "a peremptory norm of general international law".\textsuperscript{172} Its common sense rule is so

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[165] ibid., p. 68.
\item[166] ibid., pp. 27-28.
\item[167] Bullock, 1985, p. 171.
\item[169] Humphrey, 1989, p. 159; p. 204.
\item[170] ibid., p. 159.
\item[172] Espiell, Hector Gros, \textit{The Right to Self-Determination:} \\
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
fundamental as to override any conflicting treaties. Although the Australian government acknowledges jus cogens as a matter of controversy in international law, it affirms that it has been asserted (their word) in relation to human rights. Jus cogens, according to this view, is exemplified by prohibitions of slavery, genocide and racial discrimination.\(^{173}\) United Nations Special Rapporteur Hector Gros Espiell concurs with this, quoting the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. He tells us that the only expression of opposition to acceptance of principles of self-determination as jus cogens came from Portugal in 1964. The government of Portugal considered that 'these concepts (of self-determination and human rights) have been debased by realities'.\(^{174}\) This discussion enters into matters of jurisprudence.

What, then, are human rights? They are expectations which pertain to individuals because they are human beings and for no other reason. They are freedoms which derive, according to the United Nations Covenants on Human Rights, from the inherent dignity of the human person.\(^{175}\) The belief which underpins the Covenants is that human persons have intrinsic value. This is expressed by reference to the Renaissance phrase, 'dignity of man'. The ideas behind this use of the word 'dignity' valorise communication, speculation, imagination, ratiocination and self observation.\(^{176}\) By use of the word 'dignity' in this connection, attempts are made to generate respect for these powers, latent and potent, which humans possess.

From a historical perspective, human rights instruments of note include the English Magna Carta of 1215, the British Bill of Rights of 1689 and the English 'rights of the subject'. Also included are the American 'civil rights'; the French Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789 and les droits publics; the Geneva Convention of 1864 and the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907.\(^{177}\) The Geneva

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\(^{173}\) Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1993, p. 31.

\(^{174}\) Espiell, 1980, paragraph 72, p. 11.

\(^{175}\) Humphrey, 1989, p. 20.

\(^{176}\) Bullock, 1985, p. 155.

\(^{177}\) See Humphrey, 1989, pp. 21-37 for a succinct outline of the historical development of the principles of human rights as understood by the United Nations' instruments of law. See also Aust. Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1993, p. 116. This manual traces the concept of self-determination to the American Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the French Declaration on the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1793. It refers also to the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960 and the Covenants on Human Rights of
Convention obliges states to act against contravention of its provisions. The American and the French declarations define freedom and equality in terms of liberty, private property, the inviolability of the person and resistance to oppression. The abovementioned instruments express primary characteristics of humanistic belief as expressed in international law.

International law is primitive; it is in its early stage of development, pertaining to an emerging international community. So it is weak law. The mechanisms are weak. This reflects political reality. Why do human rights need to be protected by international law? This question begs at least four answers. There is the moral principle by which it is wrong to allow brothers and sisters of our common humanity to be persecuted. There is the regulatory matter which needs a superior legal order by which national legal orders can be judged. There is the speculative issue which predicts that as transnational transactions increase there will need to be a world law to recognise human values. Most importantly, there is political necessity. A persistent pattern of gross violations causes international conflict and war. International law represents an emerging, collective sense of a need for a global jurisprudence.

This fourth item can be understood in terms of ricorso into barbarism, such as Vico has explained as an inevitable phase of human existence. The member states of the United Nations, by their instruments of law, ostensibly contend with that inevitability. United Nations human rights instruments constitute an important body of law but is far from universal in its application and has few, if any, executive organs.

The Charter of the United Nations nominates threats to international peace and security as the only source of legitimation for the use of force:

1966.

179 Humphrey, 1989, p. 15.
180 ibid., p. 102.
181 ibid., p. 13.
182 ibid., p. 15.
183 ibid., 'World law is Humphrey's term
184 ibid., p. 13.
185 ibid., p. 204.
nowhere does the Charter authorise the United Nations to use force in situations where there is no threat to international peace and security.\textsuperscript{186}

Links between peace and security and human rights protection are now being forged. So there is virtually no effective recourse to law in cases of human rights violation. What stands at the threshold of redress for human rights violations is the matter of national sovereignty:

because of the power of states and the importance they attach to what their leaders call their sovereignty, the difficulties are enormous.\textsuperscript{187}

The principle of national sovereignty was established at the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. The Peace of Westphalia was amplified by the treaty of Nuremberg, 1650. Thus the concept of Nation State was realised in modern terms.

The principle of national sovereignty makes national governments the supreme regulators of their territories. It follows that a state cannot allow, without its consent, other political entities to make or apply their own rules in its territory. The corollary holds that a state should not interfere in the internal affairs of other states, or compromise their territorial integrity. Moreover, no matter how they differ in size, population, location or military capabilities, nation states are equal with respect to legal rights and duties.\textsuperscript{188}

Nevertheless, legal documents like the United Nations Charter do not have precise, clear meaning to all member states of the United Nations. It is open to any state to interpret aspects of international law, including human rights law, according to its own interests. So the enigma of national sovereignty tends to fill the vacuum which is created by any failure to endorse personal sovereignty. The problem of human rights violations or atrocities is not a problem of sustaining national sovereignty. It is a problem of ameliorating national sovereignty to the extent that states can tolerate the realisation of personal sovereignty among citizens. This is a problem of means.\textsuperscript{189} Force is impertinent. Appropriately, all the United Nations has is peaceful adjustment and persuasion. Hence, protection and promotion comprise the legitimate activities of the United Nations in human rights matters.

\textsuperscript{186} ibid., p. 36.

\textsuperscript{187} ibid., p. 204.


\textsuperscript{189} Humphrey, 1989, p. 37.
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights, formed in 1948, with a Sub-Committee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, provides the main international forum for the promotion and protection of human rights.\textsuperscript{190} The methods recommended are conferences, debates, seminars and round tables.\textsuperscript{191} The Commission is a kind of pre-legislative body.\textsuperscript{192} It has relatively little responsibility for settlement of issues.\textsuperscript{193} Since 1967, however, it has had power to investigate claims of gross human rights violations. This is with a view to determining patterns of gross violation.\textsuperscript{194} There are two very important failures among the many successful activities of the Commission. They are failure to recommend for inclusion in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights some provision for the recognition of the right of individual petition and the protection of minorities.\textsuperscript{195}

Minorities who identify themselves by their racial, linguistic or religious characteristics sometimes claim status as peoples but these groups have no legal status, under international law. Although they may have demonstrable political existence, they have no legal existence.\textsuperscript{196} In international law, peoples' rights refer to two things only, national self-determination and the rights of trade unions to national organisation.\textsuperscript{197} 'Peoples', in United Nations parlance, refers to national populations. Nationality conditions individuality.

A difficulty arises with regard to the meaning and meanings of self-determination. Although member states of the United Nations have accepted, for working purposes, the precise and legalistic definition discussed above, the citizens of many of those states find the legalism insufficient. In individual terms, self-determination is arguably a religious, spiritual or philosophical matter.

\textsuperscript{190} Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1993, p. 4.


\textsuperscript{192} Humphrey, 1989, p. 93.

\textsuperscript{193} ibi d., p. 97.

\textsuperscript{194} ibi d., p. 98.

\textsuperscript{195} ibi d.

\textsuperscript{196} ibi d., p. 22.

\textsuperscript{197} ibi d., p. 22.
As we have noted, etymologically construed, a self, expressed in English, is a sameness of the Christian god. To discern who and what it is that one can be the same as is a philosophical transaction, if not a religious assertion or a spiritual similitude. These issues comprise a metaphysics of self-determination. In physical terms, however, the international community, as represented by the United Nations, has sought to make recourse to law possible when practical difficulties in national self-determination arise.

Nations are the selves whose self-determination is to be promoted and protected by international law. There is a pretextual, democratic assumption that individuals make up the nations. Individuality and freedom of choice are axiomatic to United Nations definitions of self-determination. The main issue of self-determination to which the international community has addressed its efforts is decolonisation. It has a corollary in sovereignty.\textsuperscript{198} Friendly relations among nations hinge on the Charter principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, when peoples are understood to comprise the whole populations of nation states.

Of particular relevance is the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. There are difficulties with interpretation of this and other instruments which proclaim self-determination as a human right. The difficulties emerge as the equation of peoples and nations dissolves through the metaphor of family and into the assumption of the person. Take, for example:

\begin{quote}
The right to self-determination is a collective right... the beneficiaries of which are peoples - whether or not constituted as independent states... To respect the independence of peoples and their existence and personality is also to respect the sovereignty and integrity of their states.\textsuperscript{199}
\end{quote}

The word 'personality' is applied here to a whole nation but that fact is implicit not explicit. It is all to easy to admit a poetry of individualism here. Unless one maintains a regard to this extra textual detail, one might imagine that 'whether or not constituted as independent states' and 'respect for the sovereignty and integrity of their states' are contradictory clauses. In the broad context of colonialism and decolonisation, however, they are not. The issue of sovereignty addressed here is


\textsuperscript{199} ibid., p. 118, para. 691.
not a question of individual versus state. It is a question of colonial state versus emerging state. The matter in focus is national not personal liberation.

It is evident that the political aspect of self-determination is preponderant but economic, social and cultural aspects are assuming increasing importance. This is becoming a matter of urgency as neo-colonial interference takes the form of economic pressure and domination. Racial discrimination, subversion and intervention are the main ways by which neo colonial domination is installed. The information media and mercenaries are the main tools of interference.

Among the recommendations made by Special Rapporteur on self-determination Aurelieu Cristescu are three of particular interest here. There is an assertion of a need to ensure that mass communications are used to disseminate information which will promote rapprochement and friendship among peoples. There is an insistence on the need for a new international economic order. In it economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights are to be expressed in context with the realisation of the right to self-determination. There is emphasis on the ideal of the dignity and value of the individual who is to be free and liberated from fear and poverty. Again, it is important to remember the axiom of democracy; it is as a member of a self-regulating, democratic nation that the individual, as far as United Nations instruments provide, can realise this freedom and liberty.


Espiell's report on the implementation of human rights by way of resolutions on self-determination puts forward a detailed circumlocution, plentifully footnoted to disclose sources both spoken and printed. Thus it invites further discussion of its topic by tacit acknowledgment of the inconclusive nature of events to date. This invitation is reinforced by the provision of very slender recommendations, comprising three paragraphs. The first states that the rapporteur's recommendations are of a general character. Next is a statement that colonialism

\[200\text{ ibid., p. 119, para. 694-698.}\]

\[201\text{ ibid., p. 118-119, para. 691.}\]

\[202\text{ See ibid., pp. 123-125, para. 714-729, for the recommendations in full. See esp., p. 24-125, para. 721-723; 728.}\]

\[203\text{ ibid., p. 124, para. 725.}\]
is doomed to give way to self-determination which rests on non-discrimination. Third and last, a recommendation of a juridical nature: ‘that a declaratory resolution should be drafted for adoption by the General Assembly’.\textsuperscript{204} So this marvellously particularised item ends by telling us that there ought to be a law.

Self-determination, according to Espiell's special report, is fundamental to other human rights and to international peace and security.\textsuperscript{205} The Special Rapporteur endorses any means by which liberation from colonial and foreign domination can be gained: ‘all available means, including armed struggle’.\textsuperscript{206} The report asserts that domination of peoples can be identified by exploitation. Furthermore, peoples whose freedom has been illegally suppressed by external forces, including the various forms of imperialist oppression are those whose struggles for self-determination should receive United Nations support.\textsuperscript{207}

The report invokes Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 'All peoples have a right to self-determination'. It also invokes the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant on Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960).\textsuperscript{208} It acknowledges that many countries who no longer suffer from colonialism now suffer from neo-colonialism and imperialism.\textsuperscript{209} It invokes the proclamation of Teheran of 1968, adopted by the United Nations International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 1968, and asserts that self-determination of peoples is implicit in that and all preceding United Nations human rights instruments. It asserts that, on February 11th, 1975, the Commission on Human Rights resolution 3 (XXXI) made this explicit.\textsuperscript{210}

The report defines a people as a human community capable of functioning to ensure a common future. The rapporteur acknowledges that characterisation of self-determination as a collective right of peoples raises theoretical problems because of the difficulty of defining the concept of a people:

\textsuperscript{204} Espiell, 1980, p. 69, par a. 288.
\textsuperscript{205} ibid., p. 2, par a. 7.
\textsuperscript{206} ibid., p. 2, par a. 10.
\textsuperscript{207} ibid., p. 7n.
\textsuperscript{208} ibid., p. 8, par a. 46-48.
\textsuperscript{209} ibid., p. 8, par a. 47.
\textsuperscript{210} ibid.
To assert that self-determination constitutes a collective right of peoples does not mean that an individual right, to which all human beings are entitled, cannot exist at the same time.\footnote{ibid., p. 10, para. 57.}

Nevertheless, he specifically excludes minorities. Nations and individuals furnish the focus:

In the Special Rapporteur’s judgement, it is important likewise to try to conceptualise the right to self-determination as a right of the individual. The Commission on Human Rights has repeatedly invoked it as such, without giving a precise reason.\footnote{ibid., p. 10, para. 58.}

Here is a clear invitation to extend the discourse on self-determination within the forum of dialogic explorations of human rights provided by the Commission. The questions are, By what configurations is humanity to be recognised? To which configurations of humanity might self-determination legitimately apply? How might self-determination be realised? and By what criteria might the concept of self-determination, understood as a human right, be evaluated? To answer these questions it will be necessary to examine, within the appropriate United Nations forum, assumptions, forms and consequences of individualism, pluralism and collectivism.

Self-determination is not at issue among peoples who are already organised in the form of nation states.\footnote{ibid., p. 10, para. 60.} When people have established a nation state they have, according to the special rapporteur, established their self-determination.\footnote{ibid., p. 9, para. 56.} What follows is a matter of refinement not implementation. This assumes that nations shall have governments which represent, without distinction as to race, creed or colour, their entire diversity of peoples.\footnote{ibid., p. 10, para. 60.} Here is a Vichian turn. If speakers and writers representing the cooperating nations express their thoughts as though the abovementioned assumption is a certainty, it is the more likely to come to be true. If its truth is a poetic one, it is the stronger for that because, by mythopoesy, it resonates with many well established figures of divine justice.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[211] ibid., p. 10, para. 57.
\item[212] ibid., p. 10, para. 58.
\item[213] ibid., p. 10, para. 60.
\item[214] ibid., p. 9, para. 56.
\item[215] ibid., p. 10, para. 60.
\end{footnotes}
Vichian axiom that real consequences follow from behaving as though something is real. He seems also to have grasped the pragmatics of Vichian eloquence. He has published a book\textsuperscript{216}, which he launched with an address to the General Assembly of the United Nations\textsuperscript{217}, and his department has published a manual.\textsuperscript{218} These publications bring into the vernacular the otherwise arcane expression of the United Nations human rights discourse. They find their facts in the formal documentation of the international legislature and they interpret those documents with a view to mediation of major difficulties and their associated conflicts. Their aim is to bring the human family, now called the international community, away from its war torn past and into peace and security. Thus the poetic nature of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights begins to be used creatively to advance in practise the potentials of the United Nations instruments.

Evans' book Cooperating for Peace was launched as an Australian contribution to meeting the global demands made of the United Nations. The book attempts three main tasks: to clarify concepts and vocabulary, to suggest criteria for responses to security problems, and to suggest priorities for reform.\textsuperscript{219} The book refers to human rights protection as part of peace keeping.\textsuperscript{220} It refers to the establishing human rights of and the eliminating of discrimination as part of peace building.\textsuperscript{221} It refers to a human rights community and human rights problems as part of peace making.\textsuperscript{222} Seven main problems are addressed: economic and social deprivation, disparate distribution of wealth and resources, chemical weapons, nuclear weapons proliferation, threat of conflict between states, proliferation of conventional weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and resurgence of violent ethno-nationalism.\textsuperscript{223} Six basic conditions for ensuring effective peace keeping operations are nominated: clear and achievable goals, adequate resources, close coordination, impartiality, evident external support, and a 'signposted exit',

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\textsuperscript{218} Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1993.
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\textsuperscript{219} Evans, 1993b, pp. 5-6.
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\textsuperscript{220} Evans, 1993a, p. 12.
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\textsuperscript{221} ibid., p. 52.
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\textsuperscript{222} ibid., p. 94.
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\textsuperscript{223} Evans, 1993b, pp. 1-2.
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that is, clearly designated termination criteria. Procedures for cooperative security, are put forward as a hierarchy of possible responses to security problems. The first line of defence is preventive diplomacy, escalating through preventive deployment, peacemaking, peace keeping and sanctions to peace enforcement.

Cooperative security affirms Article 1.4 of the Charter, which designates the United Nations as a centre for harmonising the actions of nations. Emphasis is placed on actions not sentiments. The book proceeds by imploring the international community to think, rethink and reshape existent institutions to meet new realities. There are seven priority areas for change: restructure the United Nations Secretariat, improve funding, improve management of peace operations, attend to preventive diplomacy, re-think humanitarian relief coordination, raise the profile of peace building, and regenerate the Security Council.

There is a marked difference between the articles and reports of the United Nations and Evans’ book and manual. Assertion marks the difference. Evans’ interpretation is put forward with a ring of certainty. Every state, according to Evans, has the capacity to deliver to its people distributive justice and political and civil rights. States have the capacity to protect and promote independence of judiciary and primacy of rule of law regarding human rights and associated issues such as economic and social, refugee and humanitarian agreements. States have an obligation to review national human rights policy and practise in relation to international standards. Such assertions as these move the metaphors and transactions of the human family toward a metonymy of law and justice.

When an international conflict involves significant human suffering, the forcible delivery of humanitarian relief comes into question. This is peace enforcement. The first instance of it occurred in 1991 when Iraq was forced to allow

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224 ibid., p. 8.
225 ibid., p. 7.
226 ibid., p. 11.
227 ibid., pp. 8-10.
228 Evans, 1993a, p. 53.
229 ibid., p. 53.
230 ibid.
231 ibid., p. 146.
international agencies to deliver relief to Iraqi Kurds in 'Operation Provide Comfort' instigated by the United Nations Security Council. A second peace enforcement program was initiated in 1992. Relief was forcibly delivered to Somalia under a United Nations Security Council Resolution resting solely on humanitarian grounds.\textsuperscript{232} Foreign Minister Gareth Evans recently stated Australian Parliamentary Question Time that Peace Enforcement is not possible at present in Rwanda. He explained that Peace Enforcement takes a lot of forces and the international community does not have the will to provide them. Peace Keeping, that is, support for identified enclaves will be pursued instead.\textsuperscript{233}

Evans' hermeneutic can be elucidated by reference to its apocalyptic horizons. The close horizon of cooperative security is the one we have called blessedness and rapture. It stands between a vulnerable human population and catastrophe. A horizon of torment and suffering is not denied but held in more distant regard. A new order is viewed optimistically.

It is hardly surprising to find a question of sacrifice emerging out of this conception of cooperative security. Is it self-sacrifice or enforced sacrifice? That is the conundrum which is faced when structural discrimination, otherwise known as structural violence or, more properly, structurally enshrined violence, becomes visible. Evans accepts change as being a painful process, 'Some of that change is bound to be painful for some people, but that is the way of change.'\textsuperscript{234} He offers as rationale that the United Nations must inflict some pain in order to survive. This is out of accord with the neological vision; the eschatological horizon of torment looms larger when pain is admitted and the horizon of blessedness and rapture retreats somewhat. The credible impossibility of the happy human family becomes incredible, at least for the sufferers of the pain. Cooperative security begs this question. Balance is invoked not by argumentation but by proclamation. In Evans' words, 'For everything that has gone wrong over the last few years, there is something else that has gone right.'\textsuperscript{235} Thus the question of sacrifice returns to the selves, individual and collective, who participate, by choice or by force, in cooperative security.

Cooperative security, by ensuring the integrity of existent states, falls largely into what the Australian government takes to be the external aspect of human rights.

\textsuperscript{232} ibid., pp. 153-155. The peace keeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina has, since 1992, had a humanitarian aspect but intervention is not premised solely on humanitarianism

\textsuperscript{233} Gareth Evans, ABCTV, Parliamentary Question Time, 6/6/94

\textsuperscript{234} Evans, 1993b, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{235} ibid., p. 3.
The internal aspects ensure freedom of thought, conscience, expression, movement and association. This dichotomy is straddled by the right to self-determination. It is acknowledged as being both collective, pertaining to externals, and individual, pertaining to internal affairs.  

Reconciliation is the tenet under which the Australian government approaches the issues of self-determination, internal and external. The contrasting examples of Angola and Cambodia illustrate external reconciliation. In Angola, the party which lost in the first elections was given little stake in the new government and violence has ensued. In Cambodia, all parties which contested the election are being given opportunity to pursue their goals within the new Cambodian state. The principle is now being tested by practise.

Internal issues of self-determination can be exemplified by the resurgence of ethno-nationalism. This is taking violent forms, as some minorities who identify themselves by ethnicity seek self-determination either within their existing nation or by secession. The Australian government's position was demonstrated by its emphasis on the importance of the United Nations International Year of the World's Indigenous People, 1993. The three Australian publications to which we are presently referring were all published in that year and the manual has it especially inscribed on its title page. This is of particular note because many members of Australia's indigenous, aboriginal population assert that their right to self-determination is not properly realised by the national or the state governments.

Australia has taken a leadership role in the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP), which has drafted a declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples [sic peoples]. This position was foreshadowed in a report of the New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Board, published in 1984. The report affirms the adoption by the Australian government in 1981 of the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. It puts the Declaration in the context of human rights legislation, as well as the context of the discrimination that can occur in people's daily lives. Religious freedom, of course, implies freedom of association,

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236 Aust. Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1993, pp. 116-117.
237 ibid., p. 114.
238 ibid., p. 4.
239 ibid., p. 117.
assembly and expression.²⁴¹

At the 1993 session of WGIP, the Australian contingent reaffirmed the view that the principle of territorial integrity of states and the principle of self-determination of peoples [sic] require reconciliation.²⁴² That need is illustrated by the following claims, made by indigenous Australians in the context of self-determination: 'we struggle for recognition of our sovereignty',²⁴³ '(we are) refugees in our land'.²⁴⁴

These claims are reinforced by the Australian Catholic Bishops, who made it clear in their 1972 statement that Australian aboriginal people should be dominant in the making of decisions which most affect them. The 1988 Bicentenary Pastoral Letter reaffirmed this, calling on governments to encourage aboriginal independence, autonomy and self-management within the Australian nation.²⁴⁵ Reconciliation between the Australian nation state and the Australian indigenous nations may require conciliation, in the form of a treaty, before reconciliation can occur. These matters struggle to issue by use of the rhetoric of self-determination.

Father Frank Brennan, addressing the situation of the Australian indigenes in the Charles Strong Memorial Lecture 1992 told us this:

> their claims to land rights, sovereignty and self determination are being heard, but are restricted by prevalent notions of private property, national sovereignty and assimilation.²⁴⁶

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²⁴² Humphrey, 1989, p. 27.
²⁴³ ibid., p. 118.
While indigenous peoples’ claims are advocated and presented to the courts in existent legal terms, the thrust of their arguments will be distorted. That is because their complicated laws are being misinterpreted as simple collectivism then forced into an individualistic mode of expression.

This hazard to contemporary, collective self-identification at law springs from an Old Testament precept. It concerns covenant. To make covenant is to make a one-on-one relationship; 'a single entity, which could be partner in a covenant or contract.' Among humans, covenants are modelled on the divine covenant of the one, supreme god with the one people. This metaphor persists in many modes of contemporary legalism.

This has been known but ignored for a long time. Jomo Kenyatta pointed it out. He explained that the idea of communal or tribal ownership of land is a misrepresentation of the land tenure of the Gikuyu. Each family unit has land rights and all families combine to protect the collective boundaries.

Take, for example, the complications of ownership in the Australian case of Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank (1991). An aboriginal artist complained that the national bank had reproduced his work on banknotes without permission. The artist had signed a document authorising reproduction. Under customary aboriginal law, the approval of the tribal elders of the Galpu to whom the design belonged was required; the individual has no sole agency. This case was settled out of court. It is one example of many such complications. In short, discrimination against the aboriginal people of Australia is maintained side by side with advocacy and affirmative action for their well being.

There are about 15,000-20,000 Australians whom Australian legislation does not acknowledge, even to the extent that it recognises the indigenous aborigines. They are the people who have their ancestry among the South Sea Islanders. They are not accommodated as a discrete cultural or ethnic minority but they suffer problems of ethnic and cultural discrimination similar to but more severe than those of the aboriginal peoples. So, although about 10,000-12,000 of these people

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247 Lambert, 1988, p. 149.


identify as South Sea Islanders, several thousand identify as aboriginal Australians or Torres Strait Islanders. Their situation illustrates some of the subtleties of self-determination, understood as an intra-national human right.

About two centuries of racial discrimination and harsh treatment has contributed to the present disadvantage of Australian South Sea Islanders who make up one of the poorest minorities in Australia. They are a people in need, especially with regard to school retention, employment skills, home ownership and health. De facto access used to be available to those who denied themselves South Sea Islander identity and identified as Australian aboriginals or Torres Strait Islanders. This de facto identification has denied South Sea Islanders' collective identity and, as consequence, inter and intra ethnic tensions have increased. Present denial, by the Aboriginal and Torres Straits Islander Council (ATSIC), of de facto identification forces South Sea Islanders into mainstream Australian programmes. For example, South Sea Islanders have a problem in getting business loans. Both the Australian banks and the Aboriginal and Torres Straits Islander Council (ATSIC) tend to discriminate against South Sea Islanders' loans applications.

Many South Sea Islanders were brought involuntarily, during the 19th century, to Australia as forced, indentured labourers. Legally an indentured labourer is not a slave. The three year contracts or indentures absolved the workers' masters of the responsibilities which attended slave holding. So many South Sea Islanders were worse off even than slaves. Nevertheless, South Sea Islanders refer nowadays to their ancestors having been brought to Australia as slaves. Many were sold into slavery by their own families or villages. Few females, 4%-6%, were recruited to work in Australia so men who sought union with women had to break with their traditional marriage lines. Consequently, a return to the homeland


252 ibid., p. 62.


254 ibid., p. 77.

255 ibid., p. 78.
became nonsensical if not fatal. Furthermore, traditional payback made the prospect of returning home untenable; because South Sea Islanders had died in Australia, so their families expected to take a life by way of compensation. Hence, people who had shared a journey with a deceased expected to die if they returned home. Inadequate rations, improper shelter and floggings have characterised their working and living conditions of the South Sea Islanders in Australia.

In 1977, the Royal Commission into Human Relationships recommended that action be taken to ensure South Sea Islanders' eligibility for benefits available to aboriginal Australians. The recommendation was not implemented. There is a three part criterion for establishing aboriginality. It comprises descent, identity and acceptance. A similar criterion has been suggested to enable recognition of South Sea Islanders as a discrete minority. Affirmative action cannot ensue until the discrimination against these people is acknowledged.

The Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission has made six recommendations with regard to Australian South Sea Islanders. They are as follows. The Australian government should recognise them as a unique minority, severely disadvantaged by racial discrimination. Australian government agencies should develop new programmes aimed at the specific needs of the South Sea Islanders. Australian government departments should give special attention to equal opportunity and access, especially with regard to social security and housing, for South Sea Islanders. Educational support schemes comparable to ABSTUDY should be implemented for South Sea Islanders' benefit. Budget allocations should be made to ensure culturally appropriate programmes to ensure housing, legal, child care and financial services for South Sea Islanders. The Australian government and its agencies should take steps to increase public awareness of South Sea Islanders and their role in Australia's history.

Recognition, in this matter, is tantamount to protection of Australian South Sea Islanders' human rights. The report of the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission states:

256 ibid., p. 82; 85.
257 ibid., p. 85.
258 ibid., p. 82.
259 ibid., p. 3.
260 ibid., p. 70.
261 ibid., p. 71-72.
In international law, the term recognition implies a concomitant acceptance by states to ensure protection of minorities by guaranteeing non-discrimination and equality before the law.\textsuperscript{262}

In the case of the Australian South Sea Islanders, then, recognition implies protection. Self-determination, understood in terms of the Australian vernacular, is a prerequisite to that recognition. This matter demonstrates that recognition of discrete minorities is a necessary part of the realisation of human rights expressed as self-determination.

There is an attendant matter which requires magnification. It arises in the WGIP arena and many others. If the intention of clarifying concepts and vocabulary is to carry forward, then attention must be given to the conceptual differences between 'people' and 'peoples'. Here we have two words standing for at least three ideas. 'Peoples', in strict United Nations parlance, refers collectively to national populations, that is, the citizens of more than one nation. In this sense 'people' refers to all the citizens of one nation state. In common usage, however, 'people' and 'peoples' refer to various inter and intra national groupings. Some of the collectives signified by this usage identify themselves as inherently pluralistic, having no condition to which the word people can apply. From this perspective, one might argue that the imposition of conventions of English language usage is itself an infringement on self-determination.

The Australian government has appeased the United Nations international community by using the phrase 'World's Indigenous People' but it has reinstated 'peoples' at WGIP level. It has followed this inconsistency by suggesting that indigenous peoples all over the world might consider themselves as one people.\textsuperscript{263} This constitutes a challenge toconciliation which extends beyond the single issue of whether to use 'people', 'peoples' or something else. Perhaps it is a challenge to examine the qualifiers, 'indigenous' and any other, with a view to settling for human rights without discrimination.

The grand rhetoric of human rights brings into the public forum the apocalyptic question of the changing nature of humanity. It conjures an unreal, ideal family which, for symbolic purposes approximates the heavenly host of the Johannine Apocalypse. Thus a mood of blessed rapture is conjured into association with the attainment of human rights. In this rhetoric, a horizon of apocalyptic neologisms provides a background against which the facts of torture and other severe forms of suffering can for the purposes of discussion be set.

\textsuperscript{262} ibid., p. 69.

\textsuperscript{263} ibid.
CHAPTER 13
ESCHATOLOGICAL AND NEOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE: GENOCIDE

The eschatological and neological horizons of the contemporary apocalyptic rhetoric with which we are engaged here converge in the matter of genocide. Their convergence creates anomalies; the axioms of human rights activism and of genocidal action are inimical to one another. The one affirms the idea of an indivisible humanity whose continuance depends on tolerance of difference. The other affirms, as a necessity of human survival, the attenuation of difference by division and disposal. It is important to note that genocidal pogroms are a form of torture. Genocide is a torment whose rhetoric uses the fallacy of concrete annihilation. Extermination is not annihilation.

Genocide is the deliberate extermination of peoples. Robert Jay Lifton encapsulates it thus:

'Genocide', coined by Raphael Lemkin (from Greek genos race, tribe, and Latin cide killing, coined in 1944, defined in United Nations General Assembly in 1946 as 'denial of the right of existence of entire human groups' and enshrined in 1948 in the United Nations Convention on Genocide.\textsuperscript{264}

It is massive mass murder; the systematic obliteration of humanity identified in terms of types, especially stereotypes. It is a very old phenomenon but it was not named until the 1940s. The governments of empires, kingdoms, nations and tribes have, since antiquity, followed policies of selective endowment and deprivation of particular sections of their communities. Genocide is an extreme example of selective deprivation. Genocidal policies attempt to obliterate both the presence and the memory of selected groups or peoples.

Genocide is a form of torture. It is dehumanised and works through stereotypes. To be carried out, it depends on highly discriminatory government policies. Bureaucratic power is necessary to make currency of counterfeit identities by which whole peoples can be stereotyped. The stereotypes have to do with contamination. Peoples fear harm by pollution from others. Preemptive killing ensues.

Although it was outlawed in 1948 by the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, not all governments agree that genocide is illegal or even undesirable. International diplomacy shows a general tolerance of policies of extermination based on racist and nationalistic preferences. As Chalk and Jonassohn point out: 'potential perpetrators have taken care to victimise only those groups that are not covered by the convention's

\textsuperscript{264} Lifton, 1986, p. 466.
Genocide is not extraordinary; it is part of the ordinary range of collective, human activities. Cases of genocide include the following. Assyrians (under Senacherib against Babylon, 689 B.C.), Amalekites (see Exodus 17:8-16, Deuteronomy 25:17-19 and 2:32-34 and 3:1-7, 1 Samuel 15:2-8 and 30:1-19, Joshua 7:20-21, 2 Kings 15 and 16), Melos (by Athens, 416 B.C.), Carthage (by Rome, 149 B.C.), Mongol conquests (8th and 13th Centuries), Albigensian crusades (13th Century), Christians in Japan (17th Century), witches in Europe (14-17th Centuries), Indians of the Americas (1492-1789), Indians in USA (19th Century), Tasmanians in Australia (18-19th Centuries), Zulus under Shaka (19th Century), Hereros of SW Africa (19th Century), Armenians in Turkey (1915), USSR (under Stalin), the Nazi holocaust, Indonesia (1965-66), Burundi (since 1970s), Bangladesh (since 1970s), Cambodia (1970s), East Timor (since 1970s), Indians in the Amazon (since 1970s).

In 1944, after World War Two, Raphael Lemkin and others identified and defined genocide. This was done in preparation for the prosecution of German Nazi war crimes. Lemkin, in Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, coined the term genocide and pioneered scholarship on the subject. Lemkin's is an inclusive definition. It includes any acts which contribute to the weakening of the viability of any given group of people. So non-lethal acts which undermine the liberty, dignity, and personal security of members of a group are, according to Lemkin, genocidal. Attacks on political and social institutions, culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of a group are also genocidal. Lemkin's terms are included in what came to be known as the Nuremberg Principles.

Following the Nuremberg Principles, the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was passed in 1948. It constitutes the first instrument of international law against genocide. In part, the Convention reads thus:

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266 ibid., p. xvii.


Article II... 'acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical [sic], racial or religious groups [sic] as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Article III. The following acts shall be punishable: (a) Genocide; (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) Attempt to commit genocide; (e) Complicity in genocide.

Article IV. Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals. 269

In addition to the United Nations Convention, Chalk and Jonassohn draw attention to the definition of genocide in the Canadian Criminal Code: Hate Propaganda: Advocating genocide: 281.1:

(1) Every one who advocates or promotes genocide is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for five years. (2) In this section "genocide" means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part any identifiable group, namely: (a) killing members of the group, or (b) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction... (4) In this section "identifiable group" means any section of the public distinguished by colour, race, religion or ethnic origin. 270

This definition is not as inclusive as Lemkin's. Some thinkers, Chalk and Jonassohn, for example, go so far as to repudiate the usefulness of the United Nations and its Convention:

The United Nations, once a body that condemned the practice of genocide, is rapidly becoming one that condones it. Any hopes for the prevention of such killings in the future need to be placed elsewhere. 271


270 Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990, p. 8.

271 ibid., p. 12. See also p. 4.
This strong view was formed in response to the inclusion of representatives of the Cambodian Khmer Rouge at the United Nations, as well as the acceptance of the Indonesian government's extermination of about one third of the population of occupied East Timor.

There is not, however, any immediate substitute for the United Nations. If an alternative is required, it will have to be created. That is, unless genocide is to be legitimated, accepted and left without challenge. As this chapter will show, collective decision to legitimate genocide would be tantamount to collective suicide.

Pretexts inform definitions. The subject of genocide has many pretexts, including internationalist, nationalist, and populist goals, which tend not to be expressed directly but operate in the discourse on genocide as assumptions. The assumptions are usually expressed symbolically. They permeate the figurative language, residing in the metaphors by which ideas are conveyed. Some common ideas about genocide are discussed here in terms of their pretexts and rhetorical expression.

When Lemkin and others identified and defined genocide they created a legalism. The prosecution of German Nazi war crimes was their declared pretext. When the international community adopted the Nurenburg Principles which arose out of Lemkin's definition of genocide, the legalism was used to serve internationalist goals. So images were drawn from the eschatological horizon to serve the neological; murder was put as other to human rights.

The Nurenburg Trials demonstrated the deficiencies of the legalism vis a vis internationalist goals. The structurally enshrined violence by which nations are made and maintained embarrass in many ways the Nurenburg principles and their offspring, human rights. The promulgation by the international community of the Convention marked a compromise. Strict legalism gave way to a more flexible communalism in a definition of genocide which is, as we have noted, less inclusive than Lemkin's.

Sovereignty is the idea which lies at the root of the compromise upon which international legalism depends. Law, force and power, invested in people, peoples, states and communities, comprise the issues of sovereignty. Metaphors of sovereignty permeate the legalism by which communication concerning the international community proceeds. So the ideal of sovereignty is the shared vanishing point of the eschatological and neological horizons. It is a significant lacuna.

Pieter N. Drost's two volume exposition on genocide and humanicide explains a
The subject of sovereignty has caused great confusion and suspicion in the international forum because many ideas of sovereignty have no correlate in law. Sovereignty is a human characteristic but human beings have the status of objects in international law. According to Drost, the purpose of international human rights laws is to promote humans to the status of subjects of positive law, recognised as such between states. As they stand, the legal instruments deny people and peoples recourse to international legislation. The legalistic distinction between the legal person and the whole person renders national sovereignty a nonsense because any law of sovereignty must reside in human persons.

The confusion caused by the subject of sovereignty is compounded as disparate notions gain currency. For example, in international law, sovereignty assumes mutual non-interference: each state agrees not to intrude upon the internal politics of another. Paradoxically, international affairs entail such interference. Eloquent diplomacy makes this possible. A clear illustration of this compound confusion can be drawn by reference to the term 'crime against humanity'.

Crime against humanity is an idea which has been developed during the Twentieth Century by member states of the United Nations. It is described, in part, thus:

... murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or any war crime...

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273 Article 6 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights puts forward as principle the recognition as a person before the law but there is no machinery by which to make it so.


This description reflects the enigmatic nature of the idea. It fails to define clearly what is the humanity against which the crimes are enacted and it verges on the tautologous proposition that such a crime is a crime.

The Guardian Weekly carries an illustrative item.\(^{276}\) In an item headlined, 'Crime Against Humanity Must Be Recognised By Humanity', it reported thus: Bangladesh, in Khagrachari district, approximately 1,200 people, Jumma villagers, were locked in their homes and burned as part of the Bangladesh government's policy of genocide against the indigenous Jumma. The item includes the comment that the event was so well covered up that there has been almost no international comment. Diplomatic eloquence includes silence.

Similar examples abound as rhetorical legalisms proliferate. The case of the French colony of New Caledonia, Kanaky, as the indigenous people know it, is one of the most extreme.\(^{277}\) France is a member state of the United Nations. Member States of the United Nations have agreed that colonisation is incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the principles of international law. In short, colonisation is a crime against humanity.

Franz Fanon characterises colonialism as a totalitarian mentality which perceives the colonised peoples as essentially evil.\(^{278}\) Chalk and Jonassohn recognise in genocidal policies (which include colonization) 'a need to destroy victims who can be portrayed as the embodiment of absolute evil'?\(^{279}\) In the rhetoric of decolonisation, we hear the claims of victim-survivors; that they have been treated like the devil himself.

The United Nations Special Committee for Decolonisation was formed in 1961, following the proclamation in December 1960 of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Resolution 1514 (XV)).\(^{280}\) In 1987, the French Government enacted a paradox by defending against allegations of crime against humanity vis a vis colonialism while administering to Kanaky New Caledonia as if it were part of Metropolitan France. This was achieved by


\(^{278}\) Fanon, Franz, The Wretched of the Earth, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1981.

\(^{279}\) Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990, p. 20.

setting up a referendum on decolonisation without following United Nations guidelines.

A spectacular boycott to that referendum was called by the FLNKS, a coalition of separatist political parties who call for decolonisation and independence. People from tribes all over the archipelago would walk from all parts of the country to Noumea, a ten day journey for many, people would come together to join in non violent protest against colonial oppression. Right wing extremists, including the party of the National Front, called for a counter march. French authorities banned all marches and positioned 8,000 gendarmes, gardes mobiles and Red Beret Parachutists among the tribes and across the roads. Thus the institutional power of the French government was mobilised in tacit support of right wing extremist goals.

The boycott, however, was neither less spectacular or less thorough. Eighty three per cent of Kanak voters boycotted the referendum. Camping together in various places across the country about 12,000 people carried out the intention of peaceful, non-violent protest; the gathering at Noumea became one among many.

At Noumea there were manifestations of violence as 53 participants were set upon by police and injured as they sat. International news broadcasts included pictures of the people being beaten by police. So the police brutality was publicised and a political stalemate was achieved by the so-called referendum of 1987. These events occurred despite the proliferation of legalism, or perhaps because of it.

People usually have to cooperate as groups to defend against a discriminatory regime, adopted by a national government or an international consortium. Individual self defence techniques are not usually adequate to defend against state sanctioned violations. Carried by proclamations of genocidal victimisation, claims for redress demand the attentions of national governments all over the world. Thus the creation of groups identified by association with genocide is perpetuated.

The claims tend to be proclamatory and legalistic, affirming victim-survivors' rights to a hearing as well as a voice. For example, Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), told the World Conference on Human Rights in June, 1993, that occupation is a violation of human rights and the international community had refrained from taking effective measures to end what was 'tantamount to genocide'. The self proclaiming existence of victim-survivors, such as Arafat and the PLO, is the most evident of the themes which

have accumulated about the proclamations. Redress is a common pretext in this theme.

Not all groups defending against genocide are as successful as the PLO. For example, at the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights (UNWCHR), in Vienna, 1993, a big red banner was hung at the entrance to the Vienna International Centre. It read, 'UN Take Action Against Turkish Massacres in Kurdistan'. In the display area were two large posters proclaiming the killing of the Kurds and picturing flesh tormented in ways that made a hope of death. All that was to no avail. Eventually a black wreath announced 'we leave in anger... violators inside, victims outside. The Turkish Kurds had abandoned their hope in the United Nations.

At least ten other groups used a variety of means to express similar concerns. People from the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh, Iraq, Kanaky, Kashmir, Kwang Ju, Montenegro, Punjab, Latin America, Sudan, Tibet all proclaimed themselves as being in defence against present genocide.

To accuse their nation states of genocide, victim-survivors have tended to identify themselves by reference to the Nazi holocaust as well as to current events. Thus the Nazi holocaust has become a metaphor of more general oppression. The corollary is also significant; general oppression can serve as a metaphor of holocaust. The ideas are convertible. Take for example this statement by Elie Weisel, one of the first to write first person accounts of the Nazi genocide:

> All the pogroms, the crusades, the persecutions, the slaughters, the catastrophes, the massacres by sword and the liquidations by fire - each time it was Abraham leading his son to the alter, to the holocaust all over again.  

The idea of perpetration is the keystone to the Nazi holocaust paradigm. As we have noted in Chapter One, this response to the Nazi genocide has brought to the word holocaust a new meaning in which the self-proclaiming defendant identifies against a legalistic motif of perpetration.

The legalistic motif was invoked to establish the existence of perpetrators even before the rights of the victim-survivors had been codified. With the coming into being of the United Nations, the protection of human rights became a matter of international concern. This concern was reflected in various articles of the United Nations Charter of 1942. Take, for example Article 1 (3):

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To achieve... respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all... 13 (1b) promoting... and assisting in the realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms... and assisting in the realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms...

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was, however, passed before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Both were adopted in 1948, on the 9th and 10th of December, but two Resolutions on genocide had been passed two years earlier, in 1946. So the Convention precedes the Declaration and refers more directly to the Charter and the Nuremberg Principles than to the Declaration. Legalism notwithstanding, recognition proves to be the more important issue over time.

To think and communicate about genocide, people and peoples refer to the Nazi holocaust as a paradigm so, in many ways, it informs the rhetoric of genocide. One can argue against the wisdom of thinking paradigmatically about genocide. Perhaps each instance of such an enormity requires its own unique moment. Words, however, cannot achieve that. Nor can laws. Nevertheless, the telling of the stories of the Nazi holocaust continues. Ostensibly this serves political ends. The Nazi holocaust has become a sign, indicating demands for recognition and redress.

Apocalyptic rhetoric permeates the contemporary discourse of genocide as writers and speakers grope for terms. Biblical images of extermination have been appropriated, perhaps misappropriated, by moderns and postmoderns to describe genocide. Biblical names, such as Amalek and Armageddon resonate in the discourse. Holocaust too, as we have already noted, indicates in contemporary texts a number of notions not encountered in the Bible.

Lifton's discussion of Nazi doctors provides some enlightening examples. 'We may say that the doctor standing at the ramp represented a kind of Omega point'. To signify governments' accumulation of genocidal means, he writes of 'genocidal behemoths'. So here we find the Johannine end or turning-point and the abysmal, apocalyptic beasts, their images invoked to give expression to twentieth century thoughts on genocide.

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Lifton's use of such terms is not naive. His comments include the excesses of the German apocalyptic tradition who dwelt on a death-oriented collective end such as Wagner's 'twilight of the gods'.\textsuperscript{286} He explains, however, that the Auschwitz atrocities were brought about by more than mythopoesy alone.

Genocide requires the collusion of many people in the killing project. Elements of genocide include a collective death immersion followed by a failed promise of revitalisation; consequent intensification of collective death imagery and commensurate hunger for cure. The primal images are those of death immortality and murderous cure. Valorisation of doctrines over persons is essential to the realisation of the images.\textsuperscript{287} Genocidal action requires that these elements be enshrined in or at least tolerated by governments.

A sense of, even desire for, the end of the world is part of human potential, Lifton tells us. It can be evoked by terror and desperate need for hope. Apocalyptic ideologies intensify the terror while offering a hope.\textsuperscript{288} Moreover, the image of the endless life of one's people supports one's own sense of transcendence.\textsuperscript{289}

Lifton tells us purification tends to be associated with sacrificial victims and genocide can be understood as an attempt to sacrifice a whole people. The goal is to kill death.\textsuperscript{290} Here Lifton offers us an insight into the fallacy of concrete annihilation as it occurs in the contemporary apocalyptic matrix.\textsuperscript{291} The appropriation of apocalyptic imagery to projected mass-killing can engender the necessary collusion of the many in genocidal mentality.

Lifton exemplifies this by showing that what the Nazis took to be their sacred biology was apocalyptic. He quotes popular writer Ernst Mann's words of 1922, 'doctors could be the true saviours of mankind'.\textsuperscript{292} Ernst Haekel was another popular and frequently cited authority. His political biology asserted that humanity could be divided by colour and intelligence into separate species and that physical

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{286} Lifton, 1986, p. 428.
\item \textsuperscript{287} ibid., 1986, p. 470-472; p. 489.
\item \textsuperscript{288} Lifton, 1987, p. 6.
\item \textsuperscript{289} Lifton, 1986, p. 473.
\item \textsuperscript{290} ibid., pp. 484-485.
\item \textsuperscript{291} See also, Reynaldo Arenas, The Assault, Viking, New York, 1994. Arenas describes levels of annihilation from self to all associated selves.
\item \textsuperscript{292} ibid., p. 44.
\end{itemize}
characteristics signify intellectual and moral capacity. These examples show that the people were colluding in a so called sacred science which was sick and rotten and seeking metamorphosis.

An interesting, current example of this kind of apocalyptic rhetoric in service of genocidal mentality is provided by the United States' National Violence Initiative, announced in a speech made by Dr Frederick Goodwin to the U.S. National Health Advisory Council on February 11, 1992. The U.S. government preceded the German Nazi government in founding a eugenics programme. In 1907, involuntary sterilisation was sanctioned by law in Indiana. Nazi eugenics commenced in 1933. Both used a similar rhetoric, based on the metaphors of hygiene and cleanliness which echo in contemporary discourse as ethnic cleansing. For example, in 1939, Harvard Anthropologist E.A. Hooten advocated 'biological housecleaning'.

The National Violence Initiative purports to be a program to prevent adult violence. Its methods include the selection, by use of alleged biochemical and genetic markers, of children as young as five for biological and behaviour modification. The criterion for selection is focussed on the brain neurotransmitter serotonin.

Serotonin is biochemically connected to melanin which contributes to the darkening of skin pigmentation but the effects of either serotonin or melanin in behaviour are strongly disputed. Nevertheless, a construct has been developed which identifies dark skin colour with propensity for violence.

The association of particular skin colours with criminality is potentially genocidal because detention can be used as an instrument of eugenics. In the U.S. state of California, there are 40,000 more prison inmates than in the countries Britain and Germany combined. African-American and Latino people are disproportionately represented among the U.S. detainees. Although considerable public attention is drawn to 'death row' prisoners, the massive populations of other detainees and the implications of their detention receive relatively little publicity.

[293] ibid., p. 441. See also p. 470.


[295] ibid. p. 43.

[296] ibid.

Further to the melanin-serotonin connection, 'designer weapons' otherwise known as 'ethnic weapons', that is, non-lethal devices which interact negatively with persons with more than a modicum of melanin skin pigmentation, have been developed in the U.S. Simultaneously, several drugs affecting serotonin neurotransmission have been submitted to the Food and Drug Administration. Prozac, the first of these serotonergic drugs to be released, is currently the largest moneymaker in the pharmaceutical industry. Prozac has recently arrived on the Australian pharmaceuticals market.

There also exists a project of eugenics called the Human Genome Project. Dr. Kidd of Yale University Genetics Department, is to put on gene file, cheek, hair and blood samples from individuals from over 700 communities. The project has multi billion dollar funding from the US National Institutes of Health and the Department of Energy. Similar projects exist in Europe and Japan. The project aims to obtain genetic information from some 50,000 to 100,000 genes for purposes of human engineering. The project accepts those numbers as representing all varieties of humanity. There is an axiom of totalism here which disallows the diversity of new information which comes as humans mutate. The axioms of the project are those of genetic discrimination.

A study by Harvard Medical School has identified thirty instances of genetic discrimination in which health insurance, car insurance and jobs, for example, had been denied certain individuals because of their genetic makeup. When socioeconomic effects are redefined as biomedical problems, clinical interventions and incarceration displace education and equal opportunity. When the putative biomedical problems are further redefined as the issue of subhuman individuals, positive eugenics and genocide are already under way.

Is genocide an abomination, signifying inhumane cruelty, or a humane necessity, signifying sacrifice? Pre Columbian Mayan societies used to make sacrifices of thousands of pulsating human hearts freshly torn from their living bodies. Was that genocidal? Take the example of the discovery at the ruins of Carthage of six thousand infants, each sealed in an individual, sacrificial urn. Is it evidence of genocide? Or is it anachronistic to label such events with a word which has been invented to stand for contemporary events? Was there, in ancient Mexico or Carthage, any ethic which so ennobled the individual as to make such killing a crime? Did the infants sacrificed at Carthage enjoy recognition as sovereign


entities? Even now free, sovereign humanity struggles toward self expression and the pretexts to recognition of human sovereignty are still being forged.

Genocide has been addressed from many perspectives. Chalk and Jonassohn's book surveys many of them, arguing that pluralism is both cause and solution to problem of genocide. In brief, Kuper (1981) typologises genocidal motivation as (a) religious, racial, ethnic conflict, (b) conquest by terror, (c) ideological. He categorises victims of domestic genocide (a) against indigenes, (b) against hostages, (c) against colonised citizens, (d) for racial/ethnic power. He includes Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Tibet, East Timor, Vietnam and points to a need for pressure groups, legal institutions, and agreements to facilitate preventative measures. Kuper suggests that pluralism is causal to genocide. Horowitz (1976, revised 1980) views genocide as 'a fundamental policy employed by the state to assure conformity to its ideology and to its model of society.' Fein (1983) typologises genocide as (a) developmental, (b) despotic, (c) retributive, (d) ideological. Bauer (1984) insists that holocaust is a special type of genocide, being annihilation. (The only modern example of this, according to Bauer, is the Nazi extermination of Jews). This view perpetuates the fallacy of concrete annihilation which we observed in Part One. Smith (1987) points out that in 20th century genocide victims are selected because of who they are whereas, in earlier times, they were selected because of where they were or what they had. It is evident that there is little agreement among scholars regarding the subject of genocide.

Has it ever been any other way? As we have seen, genocide is not a new phenomenon. It is the formulation of complaint against the fact of it which is new. We have seen, in the example of the Johannine apocalyptic, that it has been possible to accept genocide as an inevitable act of a god, worthy of praise.

Genocide creates complications and complexities in human relationships which find no sufficient explanation in the dual categories of goodness and evil. In moral terms, it is an empty sign. Take, for example, the case described in Peter Matthieson's book and Hector Babenko's film, At Play in the Fields of the Lord. In this case, the effective agent of the genocide was a virus, carried by an ignorant visitor seeking brotherhood. The opportunistic virus obliterated a tribe of indigenes. A colonial presence, adjacent to the tribal lands, made possible the presence of both the vagabond and the virus. The colonials had attempted to exterminate the tribe with bombs but accident served the genocidal purpose where planning had failed. Mattheisson's tale demonstrates that, in the matter of genocide, the relations of motives, plans and outcomes are neither simple nor direct.

Can genocide occur by accident? Dictionary definitions tend to preclude accidents

300 ibid., pp. 15-24; 213-214.
by denoting deliberate plans as elements of genocide. However, such denotations can be misleading because they give no clue as to the relationships between the plans and the mass killings. If, for example, we consider as genocidal the deadly outcomes of colonialism, we may see how plans for the well being of certain communities can result by default in the demise of others.

For example, describing Tasmania in his diaries of the voyage of the Beagle, Charles Darwin noted the nexus of colonial expansion and the absence of indigenes.\(^{301}\) His observation can now be construed in terms of genocide but such a construct is the product of anachronism and hindsight. In its own time, Darwin's attitude was considered well informed, as were these words of Sir Thomas Browne:

> Can any system (which the Superior race would submit to) be suggested by which the fatality attendant on the contact of white and aboriginal races would be avoided or mitigated?\(^ {302}\)

Darwin's example, however, serves to illustrate that the costs of genocide, intentional or accidental, do not disappear.

As consequence of genocide, cultural decline ensues. So, in the long run, genocide affects whole communities, tormenting everyone. Along with the Australian case, the cases of Spain since the Inquisition and the case of Turkey since the genocide of the Armenians illustrate this. In Turkey, a significant sector of the necessary work force was lost with the Armenians. Most doctors and nurses, for example, were Armenian, so wounded Turkish soldiers could not be treated in hospitals.\(^ {303}\) The folly of genocide seems to be that the rhetoric of cleansing heralds the odour of corruption.

Moralism, however, cannot prompt a sufficient response to genocide. Moralistic responses tend to alienate the topic of genocide by oversimplification. An equation of death with evil is often adopted and this provokes denunciations which state fatuously that genocide as evil because death is involved.

What genocide does to life as well as death is at issue. Death immersion defies


\(^{302}\) Sir Thomas Browne, 'Contact With Civilised Races' in *Notes and Queries on Anthropology*, Edward Stanford, London, 1874, pp. 139-141.

\(^{303}\) Jonassohn, Kurt, 'Some Consequences of Genocide for the People of the Perpetrator States', in Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990, pp. 415-421.
moral categorisation. For example, if people perceive that they are too few, they are constrained by need to be tolerant. Under such circumstances, to kill people may be seen as tantamount to suicide. So killing becomes undesirable; evil rather than good. If, on the other hand, there is a perception among people that they are too many, tolerance diminishes. As consequence, killing can be perceived by some as desirable. In such a case, the issue of killing changes from whether to kill to whom to kill.

Alienation by oversimplification commonly emerges from condensed versions of Lemkin's legalism. Ideas of criminality conflated with ideas of evil and informed by prejudice tend to be expressed as moral statements when Lemkin's definition is reduced. Mary Anne Warren's book Gendercide provides an example of this. Warren refers to the Oxford American Dictionary to define genocide as 'the deliberate extermination of a race of people'. If race can be a determinant of genocide, then, according to Warren sex or gender determines gendercide. One wonders if a proliferation of terms can be useful to an understanding of genocide; suffice to say that Warren's gendercide is a form of genocide.

What is notable in Warren's discussion is the intrusion of the word 'wrongful' into her redefinition of genocide. This intrusion occurs in a paragraph which affirms that discriminatory killing of males is also wrong so the intrusion does not signify gender bias. What it signifies is prejudice against her subject; she has accepted without argument that there can be no case for genocide.

This wishful posture is not supported in law. Conventions, treaties, acts and other instruments of law are under constant review as attempts are made to codify the very judgement that Warren has already made. No effective instrument for the prevention or arrest of genocide has yet been made.

One might be inclined to excuse such seemingly naive moralism as Mary Warren's book presents as a product of her declared preoccupation with another topic.
feminism. That interpretation, however, cannot be applied to Colin Tatz's writing. A long time scholar of genocide, Tatz published an article for the Sydney Morning Herald. 309 It is headlined 'The Evil Face of Humanity' and it asserts that genocide is the ultimate inhuman behaviour. Thus Tatz executes his moral judgement at the outset. What follows is hyperbole. Tatz tells us that genocide confronts, confounds, challenges, assails and assaults. Why? Because it is evil. Noting that the article is published in a newspaper and is not representative of Tatz's work, one is prompted to wonder. Is the moralism a sop to a popularistic Cerberus? Mass communications outlets prefer that information be conflicted, dualistic and alienated from any immediate concern for conciliation, reconciliation or mediation. The apocalyptic drama of the arch enemy is put to work here.

Most commentators accept without question that genocide finds its primary motive in evil. Take, for example the common use in this connection of the word perpetrator. 310 To have effected this moral judgement, however, is not to have elucidated the phenomenon.

The evil of genocidal thought and action cannot be denied but we learn little about genocide until we understand that evil is not its only motivator. Good intention has characterised many genocidal regimes. For example, the Inquisitors worked their tormentous killings for the redemption of souls, Marguerite Porete's, for example. None of the former Nazi doctors Lifton interviewed had come to any ethical evaluation of their participation in the genocide. 311 Lifton, like other commentators, judges genocide to be evil. The Nazi doctors, he explains, made a Faustian bargain exchanging their contribution to the genocide for various psychological and material benefits. Despite the fact that doubling is an alternative to radical breakdown of the self 312, one is always responsible for Faustian bargains; for individuals they entail a choice for evil. 313

Moral effort, whether activated for good or for evil, is not sufficient to cause genocide; moral judgement is not sufficient to prevent it. Given the inefficacy of the laws against genocide, one finds oneself a position comparable to Star Trek's Captain Pickard when, encountering an extraterrestrial who has exterminated wholly another kind he stated: 'We are not qualified to be your judges; we have no

309 Australia, December 20, 1993, p. 11.
310 Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990, p. 35; p. 421.
312 ibid., p. 422.
313 ibid., p. 418; pp. 423-424.
law to fit your crime.314

So instead of discussing its wrongness we might do better to discuss its undesirability. To pursue genocidal policies is, according to Lifton, Sisyphean; that is useless and ineffective. Furthermore, the consequences of such feckless pursuits are evidently self-destructive. Perhaps collusion in genocide, whether or not it is an act of evil, can be better understood as a consequence of ignorance.

State sanction and the mobilisation of massive populations is necessary to a genocidal action. So, instead of embracing moral theory, one may do well to investigate genocidal motivation in terms of intranational and international political interest. To mobilise their populations, nations require adequate means of coercion. Threat alone has proved inadequate; the Nurenberg Principles, by holding people individually responsible for their collusion in genocide, recognise that. Belief, based on an axiom of discrimination, is necessary to genocidal action.

Many governments have found social Darwinism, understood as 'survival of the fittest' to be an effective facilitator of such belief discrimination and genocide. Hatched in the 1860s by Herbert Spencer, this phrase, signifies covertly the cessation of all but a superlative few, the 'fittest'. Social Darwinism may be tantamount to genocidal mentality: when a collective right to survive is held to be contingent on fitness to survive, genocidal mentality is activated. This is a seat of discrimination.

Prompted by social Darwinism, people make criteria for discrimination by particularising elements of humanity, such as, race, skin colour, religious belief or praxis, behaviour, health and genetic makeup. Such particulars are taken as indicators of types of people and peoples. States make criteria for genocide when policies affecting the continuity and cessation of sectors of their population are determined by such particulars.

Groups subjected to genocide are often invented by the genocidal regime. Killing others may be part of the self-legitimation of new regimes. Take, for example, the pogroms of Stalin or those of the present government of Bangladesh against the Jumma. The opposite may also be true. For example, the state of Israel's protestations against the Nazi genocide may be seen as part of its developing national identity.315 So the creation of groups may make genocide possible and the enactment of genocide may make possible the creation of groups.316

315 Leibowitz, E, Dr. Elhanan Leibowitz a Philosopher for All Seasons, Viewpoint Video Productions, Israel and Palestine, 1991.
316 For further discussion of this kind of invention, see Eric Hobsbawm 'Introduction' to Hobsbawm Eric and Ranger, Terence (eds.), The
Genocidal potential can move from possibility to actuality when governments or government sanctioned institutions assign to it bureaucratic and technological means. Genocides are always performed by a state or other authority.\textsuperscript{317} Contemporary genocidal methods include state propagated psychoterror, social engineering, and eugenics. Such methods assume the location of sovereignty in states not in persons.

Paradoxically, many twentieth century genocides are committed in the name of democracy. Moreover, there is a shift in function. Genocide used to be committed in reaction to felt external threat. It has become a consequence of felt internal threat. The case of Burundi serves as an example. With democratisation the ruling minority has killed pre-emptively, in response to perceived threat.\textsuperscript{318}

If humanity is state decreed, so is inhumanity, often dressed as subhumanity or expressed as demonisation. Thus a selective rhetoric governs populations whose survival is state decreed. The rhetoric indicates likely recipients of endowments and deprivations. The rhetoric of vermin and hygiene, such as was used by the German Third Reich and now informs the term ‘ethnic cleansing’, provides the clearest example.

It should be noted that many cultures harbour such terms of vilification. A Japanese group who are traditionally outcast are called 'Eta', the word signifying 'full of pollution', 'full of filth' or 'abundant defilement.\textsuperscript{319} In Australia many words can be used (illegally) to signify the same.

Through genocide, human worlds may be so changed that their continuity depends on their metamorphoses. Genocide, then, may be taken as an apocalyptic event, apocalypse being a symbol of change. Of course, it can be argued that humans and their worlds undergo metamorphoses in every instant of their existence. One might experience 'Apocalypse Now! And now! And now!' as a way of life. A sensitive buddha nature might find an apocalypse in every breath. The metamorphoses in an individual's life tend, however, to be imperceptible to any but the individual, unless they are magnified by participation in a collective event. Genocide is such an

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\textsuperscript{318} ibid., pp. 35-40.

\textsuperscript{319} Lifton, 1986, p. 482.
\end{small}
event.

The destruction of peoples involves the disruption of cultural integrity. Elements such as the getting of food and water, finding shelter, developing defence arts, language and mythology comprise culture and ritual dispatch of the dead is a very important element of cultural integrity. Collective continuity is affirmed against individual mortality during funerary rituals. A protective mythology is thereby re-enshrined and language is articulated to it. Consequently, other behaviours such as defence arts and food-getting are articulated to the protective mythology and cultural integrity is maintained.

Human survival is severely threatened when ritual dispatch of the dead becomes impossible. Such an impossibility arises whenever mass death occurs, although mass graves, burnings, or other disposals may give partial satisfaction to the bereaved. Massive mass death, such as genocide, makes satisfactory dispatch of the dead virtually impossible. Literature, oral and written, may fill the breach when traditional rituals lose significance. Literature is the more valuable because collective denial makes data difficult to come by; records may not be kept, they may be one-sided or inconsistent, even fictitious.

People begin to make and tell stories whose aim is to repair their damaged cultural integrity. To tell how survival was achieved is to revivify a protective myth by affirming life over death. This kind of literature is exemplified by the stories of the Jewish and Romani people who have lived through Nazi the holocaust, by the stories of the Japanese hibakusha who have lived through the atomic holocaust, and the Australian aboriginal people and other indigenes who have lived through colonialism. All of these literatures bear witness to genocide as an ongoing, intergenerational trauma.

Genocide is an issue of our time. Some people have inherited the unresolved grief of the gas-oven holocaust of the German Nazi forces and the atomic holocausts of the Allied forces. Younger people have inherited with us the repercussions of the Kampuchean killing fields and we have recently passed the legacy of the betrayal of the Iraqi Kurds to the very young. Indigenous peoples all over the world declare themselves subjects of genocide by industrial and post industrial societies. As the military-industrial complex to which the world economy is geared is a source of weapons of mass destruction, all of us who use the money economy are in collusion with genocidal mentality. Methods, motives and mistakes tend to be muddled together as it becomes evident that genocide refers to many types of event, ranging from overt war crimes to subtle anomalies in well meant policies.

Genocide presents a metaphysical, apocalyptic conundrum. If the memory of a

320 Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990, p. 41.
people is obliterated, how can we know of it? Such a question points to what Robert Jay Lifton has called 'the future of immortality'.\textsuperscript{321} Solutions to the conundrum may have as much to do with the atemporal mysteries of regeneration as with the temporal facts of history. One might say that genocide affects peoples' ability to get back to the future. So, as with other apocalyptic subjects, the sequential conventions of time which usually regulate historicist investigations fall short when required to describe genocide and its repercussions.

The literature of apocalypse has been augmented during the late twentieth century by writer's attempts to accommodate genocide. In the contemporary apocalypses, the Nazi holocaust has become a trope. Responses to the mutation of covenant into genocide, signified by twentieth century holocaust, constitute in the literature of apocalypse new element. It is the voice of the victim-survivor.

The philosophy and dramatic or the metaphysical aspects of genocidal victimisation come together in the field of apocalyptic literature. There is a body of sociopolitical literature which philosophises legalistically but does not address the drama of genocide. By this discourse laws are made and criticised. The laws tend not to work. So they are made and criticised again. Hence this discourse rapidly becomes reductive and self referential.

In apocalyptic literature there are paradigms of genocidal victimisation by which a variety of approaches, legalistic and otherwise, may be examined. To focus upon apocalyptic literature in the matter of genocidal victimisation is to put literary criticism at the service of social discourse. In a panoramic apocalypse, a figure of imperative victimisation is outlined. This is the victim who has no choice. Human beings place themselves and one another in this conflicted and dramatic situation much of the time. This presents a practical problem in that laws against genocidal victimisation do not prevent it. We can see how societies, by reference to such a panorama, make, remake and unmake their victims. By asking ourselves how far our expressed thinking on genocide constitutes crime against humanity, we might gain some insight into how genocide is made true. Choices can then supplant imperatives.

An understanding of how not to make such victims in the first place, or at least how not to make any more of them, is, however, also required by current social discourse. Lifton and Markusen have put forward a life-enhancing alternative to genocidal mentality.\textsuperscript{322} The essentials of it are to reclaim human agency, to make policy of national defence which is neither genocidal nor threatening, to understand the after-the-fact inseparability of victim and perpetrator so as to

\textsuperscript{321} Lifton, 1987, pp. 10-27.

\textsuperscript{322} Lifton and Markusen, 1988, p. 255-279.
maintain the separation before the fact, to understand that our species is under threat of self-extinction, to realign the elements of the self so as to affirm species consciousness focussed on common security as well as individual humanity: 'a species embracing sense of self'. We can recognise this as a synergistic apocalypse.

It embraces the future, locating the past in the present: 'I live on in humankind'. This suggests not a new species but a new relationship with what we are. In Lifton and Marcusen’s alternative, we have become immanences of our species, responsible for healing, killing and mediation; receptive to ineffable mysteries and predicaments, sensitive to creative and destructive insight and capable of choice. This is to retrieve one's individual death from the grotesquerie and absurdity of the collective experience of genocide. Moreover, it is to curtail one's collusion in genocidal mentality, becoming not killers but healers of our species.

As Lifton has put it, one takes on a survivor's imperative to bear witness. In other words, attend to the voices of victim-survivors, our own and others', and lend our voices to their advocacy. Our rhetoric and eloquence as well as our attention might usefully be conditioned by a generic introduction to synergistic apocalypses, such as Northrop Frye has put forward in his abovementioned works.

Victim-survivors populate contemporary, genocidal apocalypses. As international law creeps toward the regulation of genocidal action, the Nazi holocaust, together with the holocausts of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Maralinga, Rwanda, Goradze, and so many others, furnish images by which the victim-survivors of genocidal mentality protest. In Chapter Sixteen we will return to the subject of genocide in the context of the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights. At that event, genocide was definitive if not defined.

So the eschatological horizon, configured as a state of suffering understood as torture in this case, and a neological horizon, configured as a new world order, converge when genocide is under discussion. Genocide, then is an element of contemporary apocalyptic thought. It is a vanishing point or significant lacuna.

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323 ibid., pp. 259-261.
325 ibid., p. 279.
327 ‘Maralinga Clean-up’ in Pacific Research, Vol. 6, No. 3, Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, A.C.T., August 1993, p. 32, tells us that the Maralinga Tjarutja people will not be able to inhabit their lands in the traditional way, even if the clean-up is successful.
which can masquerade as an idea of annihilation but, as this analysis shows, it is not that. It is a terrifying, concrete form of torture.

The voices of the victim-survivors of genocide are heard as they cry out against the abomination called genocide. They claim recognition as part of the mythological human family and as members of the living population of earth. Their wisdom is that of experience; they have survived the most extreme conditions, those which are commonly described as apocalyptic.

They are evidence, living documents, of many kinds of apocalypse. The synergistic apocalypses which Frye has described are included. Lifton and Markusen have also written of something very similar. What these writings and the talk upon which they are based promise might be a means by which the 'psychotic ape' of genocidal mentality could be brought out of the mirror.
CHAPTER 14
FOREGROUND: VICTIMOLOGY AND VICTIM-SURVIVORS

Victims are common in contemporary discourse, especially that of the broadcast media. Reports of rape, child and parent abuse, plunder, genocide and possession of weapons of mass destruction are common examples, some of which are discussed here.

OED and Webster's International Dictionary both define a victim as a living thing whose definitive value is in expendability; 'killed and offered as a sacrifice to some deity or supernatural power.' To make victims, creatures are used as symbols of communication with a god. This way of making victims is called religious sacrifice. These definitions accord with the Latin stem victima which denotes, 'one who suffers death or severe treatment'.

So notions of expendability and suffering predominate among the denotations of the word 'victim', along with ideas about self-sacrifice. The self-sacrificial victim is exemplified in OED by the Christian messiah, Jesus: 'The offering of Christ of himself to the Father as a propitiatory victim in his voluntary immolation upon the cross.' Jesus' self sacrifice to torture and death is a Christian mystery.

In the contemporary vernacular, suffering is emphasised in relation to victimisation but it tends not to be related to the suffering of Jesus' crucifixion. The Macquarie Dictionary tells us that a victim is a sufferer, 'one who feels pain and distress'. In this definition the suffering of the victim may arise from adversity, swindles and sacrifices: 'a sufferer from any destructive, injurious or adverse action or agency.' This definition reflects not the first but the second definition given by OED, 'A person who is put to death or subjected to torture by another.'

In Roget's Thesaurus we find the following. Victim: dupe as a gull; defeated as prey; sufferer as martyr. Victimise: to kill as to inflict violent death, murder, assassination, lynching; to deceive as to defraud to injure as to wrong or molest; to baffle as to nonplus or trump. Roget gives three leading associations of victimisation: with suffering as in pain, opposite to pleasure; with defeat as in failure, opposite to success; and as dupe or fool, other to the wise or sagacious. According to these definitions, a victim is anyone who suffers. The sacrificial aspect of the word is in eclipse.

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A new discourse called victimology has come into being. It is the discourse of the non sacrificial sufferers; self-sacrifice seems not to be a value in it. Victimology has broad scope, international, national, regional and local, Robert Elias in The Politics of Victimisation: Victims, Victimology and Human Rights puts forward a summary analysis of its development: 'We have accumulated over forty years of victimological writing'. To date, victimology has been informed largely by the insights of sociology, history, psychiatry and criminology.

Elias argues that the roots of victimisation are in the politics of individual and institutional crime against humanity. Thus he builds into his argument a resonance with instruments of international law and the United Nations. As we have observed in Chapter Twelve, there is no process of international law or in the United Nations which recognises individuals as sovereign entities. This point marks a lacuna in Elias' argument. He has adopted an international vernacular used by many human rights activists. Its weakness is that it tends to assert goals as realities.

We noted earlier that the United Nations definition of Crime Against Humanity is weakened by its tautology (such a crime is a crime). This weakness is echoed by Elias. As he develops the theme of human rights, he develops a circular argument; the creation of victims is itself a crime against humanity, he tells us.

Who are the putative victims of crime against humanity? Elias nominates almost everyone. There are those who suffer from consumer fraud, pollution, unnecessary drugs and surgery, food additives, workplace hazards and diseases, police violence, censorship, discrimination, poverty, exploitation, and war. There are those who suffer malnutrition, inequality, racism, sexism and ageism, legal injustices, oppression, genocide, displacement, persecution, colonialism, psychological labelling, conditioning and repression.

Elias' discussion affirms that, to avoid victimisation, one must make deliberate efforts against it. He confuses human-as-creature and victim-ready-made. The effect of identifying people as victim-creatures is to encounter them as figures of

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334 ibid., pp. 10-21; p. 33.

335 ibid., p. 3.

336 ibid., p. 24.
victimisation, passive objects of persecution. These figures are denuded of complexity as the variety of responses to persecution is ignored and a stereotype hardens.

This stereotype indicates that persecution necessarily makes victims; that one who is persecuted has no alternative but to be victimised. Having been persecuted, one is entered into the category of victim. Hence the perception of the persecutor is affirmed. So this victimology is inclined toward totalistic expression wherein everybody is victim or a perpetrator. No third way is admitted or sought.

Elias tells us that people are frightened. What they are frightened of is harm. The fear of harm is the wisdom of the body. Driven by fear, people have tried to enhance their criminal codes but there are many forms of harm which cannot be brought under criminal codes. For example, an Australian survey shows ill health, retrenchment, governmental power, ageing, the power of big business, death and trouble with in-laws as the things most feared by respondents. Legislation does not assuage fear of harm.

Furthermore, legal actions ignore harms against which no laws have been passed. Existent laws can even obstruct the attempts of complainants to communicate other needs. By criminalisation, societies have tended to make victims out of the so-called criminals, while failing to remedy the victimisation already in existence.

Perhaps recourse to law is not a beneficial course of action. Societal reconstitution may be preferable. To achieve such a goal would entail an acknowledgment that discriminatory violence is, in any given society, included in the structures of social control.

Meantime, disappointed in law and vociferous in their disappointment, figures of victims tend to expand, becoming figures of victimisation. The stereotypes proliferate. They are diminished in detail, so they reduce the multiplicity of signs by which humanity is expressed against dehumanisation. They function as grand figures of disempowerment, sacrificed to evil in the form of crime; being denied choice and compelled to torment and suffering. This view is so strong in the Australian state of N.S.W. that the government funds a $64 million initiative called the Victim's Compensation Scheme. Beneficiaries are self-identified victims of crime. Here is an abnegation of the idea of self-

337 ibid., p. 170; p. 192.
340 Sunday Telegraph, Australia, August 2, 1992, p. 11.
immolation and a denial of participation in any self-sacrificial activity. In this usage, victims are those against whom crime has been committed.

By making laws against certain kinds of suffering, rape, murder, abuse, slavery, torture and genocide, for example, people have tried to pre-empt victimization. The laws have not been successful in regulating the violence and, as consequence, there is a rapidly increasing body of unmet protest. The legalistic efforts to regulate violence by law have tended, moreover, to be counterproductive. By striving for definitive descriptions of the objectionable activities, people have created a discourse by which techniques of victimisation can be communicated with little restraint.

It may be preferable to take suffering as a fact of existence or a figment of perception and liberate the sufferers from the stereotypes of victimization. If victimisation is to be understood, then an inquiry into the patterns of belief and thought which inform the subject would seem to be overdue. An inquiry into the hidden agenda of the victim-as-problem approach is also indicated.

In contemporary national and international affairs, violence, including the ability to harm and to victimise people, is structurally enshrined in most if not all social institutions. People are inclined to accept this. Unless the institutions fail, people tend not to imagine alternatives.

With regard to alternative views, there is a neglected aspect to the English which is also important. It has to do with wizards and witches, charming and cheating and magic. Shipley denotes it thus:

Gc wicca: wizard; wicce: witch. See uied. bewitch. wile and its doublet, guile, beguile.' Shipley includes victima as the Latin stem. In full: 'victim - uieik 111: divination. L victima: beast for sacrifice; usually the entrails are the source of prophecy. victim.[sic]

Although the magicians of England have tended to vanish into the underground, victim charm is still recognised. Take, for example, an article about the failure of the marriage between Britain's Prince and Princess of Wales describing as 'victim's charm' the demeanour of the princess. Here we find more interpretative resonance given to wicce than to victima. This Old English sense of victimhood is far more dynamic and ambiguous than the Latin. The indications are that this royal


342 Weekend Australian, Australia, June 13-14, 1992, p. 23.
victim is a little witch. To be victim does not imply expendability in this usage. Victim charm does not have so much to do with sacrifice as with magicality, guile and beguiling.

John Taylor puts forward an interpretation of victimology which takes this into account. It is less sympathetic to the victims than Elias'. Taylor tells us that victimology capitalises on violence. He explains that the new academic discipline of victimology expands the compulsions, maladies, syndromes and presumptions which complement victimisation. According to Taylor, the shared goal of victims and their advocates is to establish 'victim status' for monetary gain. As Taylor explains it, to achieve victim status, people establish a right then prove that they have been denied it. He calls victimology part of a 'rights industry' leading to 'rights inflation'; springing from a psychology of entitlement.

The case of writer Donna Williams' highly principled ascent to recognition as a professional victim is a good example of this. Williams, self-identified victim of autism, alienation and childhood abuse, has written two books to tell us about herself. She tells us in her imprimis to Somebody Somewhere, 'it wasn't fair enough' and she ends with the sentiment 'I will fight for the right or die trying'. What is it that would be fair enough and worthy of her self-immolation? Grammar does not suffice; Williams calls it, 'simply be'. What is 'simply be'? Stuffed toys and the wind in the grass. Why are they fair enough? Because they do not retaliate nor even respond, whether they are abused (by Williams) or embraced. So Williams claims that it is her right to punch, shout, cuddle and croon in company and without consequence.

Writing about this modus operandi, Chris Eiper has called Williams, 'an inveterate survivor, a victim of her own victories'. Eiper, who supervised Williams for her honours degree in Sociology, claims that he has never met another student so self-

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345 ibid., p. 233.

346 ibid., p. 199.

347 ibid., p. 212.

oriented. If this is a gentle way of calling her a victim of her own making, one is inclined to agree.

In her 'Authors Note', Williams shows her Vichian appreciation of the power of words: 'to build castles in the air and make them real'. The castle she has built reads up as a version of Bettleheim's Empty Fortress, a symbol of abjection. Williams' books demonstrate an opportunistic grasp of the contemporary victim myth. The literary figure that she has made of herself is that of the victim victorious.

Personal opportunism is not the only aspect of victim-making which Elias' discussion omits. He largely ignores the sacrificial aspects of victimisation too. Although he acknowledges that victimisation may be ritualised in connection with religious sacrifices, he does not pursue the matter:

As the religious example suggests, victimisations may not always be deplored; they may fulfil certain functions.\(^{349}\)

This is not surprising, given that Elias construes victimology as a political concern and politics are commonly considered in secular terms. Nevertheless, to take secular terms as being devoid of influence from religious thought is, at best, naive; and to demonstrate a political practice devoid of religious rhetoric is impossible.

What emerges from both Elias' and Taylor's interpretations is that the status of victim is available to all. Given both authors' extensive exemplification, one must wonder if there exists any human being who is not a victim. One might question the usefulness of the category of victim construed in this way.

Victimization is commonly taken as a problem of societies, local regional and global, and as a problem of human rights, but both these constructions take the victim as given. Taken as a problem of mentality, victimization may be analysed in terms of its precepts.

There follow some examples of contemporary, broadcast usage of the word 'victim'. These illustrative examples are drawn from an extensive sample collected from national and international Anglophone print and broadcast media, 1991-1994. In them, victims are products of murder, attempted murder, rape, torture, sexual assault and crime in general.

Here is the notion of victim charm, reinterpreted as victim cunning. A 'letter to the editor' objects to the publication of an article which claims that the infidelities of

Jack the Ripper's wife had driven him to his crimes. This matter is taken further by another article, 'Victims Blamed for Rape'. This tells us of a survey in which 24% of male respondents and 15% of female respondents believe that rape can be justified. Thus community attitudes perpetuate rape. Who are the victims; those who are raped or the whole violent society?

Another article uses the word 'victim' to describe people murdered by a serial killer. The report tells of a Russian on trial for fifty three acts of murder, mutilation and cannibalism allegedly committed over twelve years. Throughout that period, the accused was married, raising a family and working as a schoolteacher and office worker. For five years, no warnings were published about these crimes; the news was suppressed by the government. Authorities have admitted to having executed the wrong person in their haste to stop the killer. The accused has confessed but testified that he has felt no remorse. Who are the victims in such a case? The family, workmates, fellow citizens, the proxy, and the accused himself, as well as the dead ones, might well be described as having been victimised by this abomination.

Another article tells us of an Amazonian tribal chief accused under non tribal law of rape, torture and attempted murder of his children's language teacher. In his defence the chief has accused his wife of having committed the crimes. Who is victim here, governess, wife, accused or all of them? Note that this item and the one above report of alleged crimes. The accused had not been judged but their names were published. This kind of publicity is arguably a way of victimising the accused.

These examples demonstrate an anomaly of the word 'victim' which exists between the dictionary denotations and the common usage. There is no sense of self-sacrifice among the press examples cited above. The implications are that the victims suffer because laws have been broken. In this vernacular, victims are made by crime.

So the academic and the popular discourses of victimology show that making laws does not necessarily serve the interests of justice. In the case of the discourse on victims, the equation of illegality and evil is a mistake. It is what we have called the torture of the satan. Alternatives are always available. It is possible to maintain

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352 Sunday Telegraph, April 26, 1992, p. 43.
personal sovereignty against dehumanisation: ‘transforming fear, conflict, and pain of the survivors into an active exploratory enterprise of profound significance’. In the case of victimology, the drama of good and evil has usurped the common sense of jus cogens.

The overdependence of victimology, and the contemporary discourse on victims in general, on criminalisation can be seen as a consequence of one-eyed apocalypticism. Images drawn through the Johannine and other apocalypses by order of the victims. These images are strung together to effect this kind of demonisation by which a grand antithesis to victimisation becomes comes rhetorically viable.

The drama of good and evil, whose focal point is the suffering victim, is taken up as an axiom of victimology. The victim, however, is taken to be a creature without choice. So the horizons of this apocalypse are made idiosyncratic; the personal suffering of each individual becomes all there is to immanence.

When the individual is immanent, transcendence can be taken for an equivalent of death; undesirable to the drama-bound victim. So the victims and their advocates set out to do two things. They seek to punish victimisers and to pre empt further suffering. As they are bound to the immanence of individual experience and have ignored collective effects as well as non human influences, their laws, in effect try to regulate life itself.

Such an enterprise cannot succeed; one applauds its failure. Its success would amount to terrible oppression. Meantime, the drama is entertaining the masses and the broadcast media reap the profits.

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CHAPTER 15
SPECIAL CASE STUDY:
THE INTERNATIONAL ROMANI UNION REPRESENTING THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF A TRANSNATIONAL MINORITY

and Vlax. It is not a term which is preferred by the people. 'Rom', the plural 'Roma' and the adjective 'Romani' were formally adopted in 1971 by the International Romani Union as preferred terms of self-identification. The Romani people, who constitute a transnational minority, have been subjected repeatedly to slavery, genocide and torture in many countries. Most importantly, violations of the human rights of Romani people continue to the present day. As consequence, the International Romani Union presses the United Nations Social and Economic Council, the European Union, and the European Court of Justice, to codify a jurisprudence which includes the collective culture of the minority and the individual expressions of it.

In a Fact Sheet issued in 1990 (RIJ(USA)vj/90) the International Romani Union describes itself as an umbrella organisation coordinating many regional and national bodies in about thirty countries throughout the world. Reunification is its proclaimed purpose. Language, culture and education are the nominated means of the reunification and the monitoring of media misrepresentation is given particular importance. War crimes reparations and the forging of ties with India as ancestral homeland are included among the commissions of the International Romani Union. The purpose of the reunification is to fight against discrimination: 'to combat anti-Gipsy [sic] racism in all its forms'.

The formation of the International Romani Union constitutes an intricate and detailed story of which salient points must suffice here. In 1971, the First World Romany Congress met in London. In 1978, the Second World Romani Congress met in Geneva. In 1979 Yul Brynner, Ian Hancock, Ronald Lee and John Tene instigated a petition for consultative status to United Nations and membership to United Nations Economic and Social Council was gained. In 1981, the Third World Romani Congress met in Gottingen. In 1986 application for formal relation to UNICEF was made and granted. It was followed by similar, successful applications to UNESCO and WHO. The Fourth World Romani Congress, met in 1990, outside Warsaw in Poland, and was sponsored in part by UNESCO. In 1990 the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, at the request of the International Romani Union, included Roma in its working group on slavery. In the same year, membership to the European Conference on Security and Cooperation was gained.\(^3\)

\(^3\) Hancock, Ian, 'The East European Roots of Romani Nationalism in The Gypsies of Eastern Europe', Crowe, D., and J. Kolsti eds., M.E. Sharpe, New York, 1990, p. 145. See also Liegeois, Jean-Pierre, Gypsies: An
There is a sequence of strong precedents upon which the International Romani Union is founded. For example, in 1722, a thousand armed Roma united to fight for their freedom in German states. In 1872, there was a huge conference of Roma in Darmstadt, Germany and in 1879 a pan-European Romani conference was held in Kisfalu, Hungary. In 1906, Bulgarian Roma petitioned (unsuccessfully) for equal rights. In 1908, the National Gipsy Association of America was established to bring housing and education to American Roma and in 1928, the Red Dress Gypsies' Association addressed the same concerns to President Roosevelt. The Pan Russian Romani Union had emerged during this time but was suppressed in 1929 by Joseph Stalin. The genocide of World War Two deterred Roma from openly identifying themselves. Immediately after the war, the European Romani population was numb and political activity was minimal.  

By 1959, Romani activism had recommenced. The silence and consequent invisibility of Roma was broken by proclamations of human rights, riding on invocations of the United Nations Charter. Take, for example, Ronald Lee's words: 'We are not dogs and we have our rights under the Charter of the United Nations...'.

Thus the Romani people identified against past vilification; not as pariah-dogs, creatures, or victims but as human persons, and determined to claim their status as such, the people formed the National Romani Organisation and the World Romani Community. Subsequently, a Romani Cultural Centre was established in Brussels and claims for schooling, repeal of discriminatory laws, development of a Romani-language literature, and reparations for war crimes were made. The French government under De Gaulle, embarrassed by the claims for war crimes reparations, banned the World Romani Community in 1965. In the same year a breakaway organisation, the International Gipsy Committee was founded and the claims for reparations were again pressed. By 1972, following the first World Romani Congress of 1971, twenty three international Romani organisations in twenty two countries had affiliated with the committee.

Ian Hancock summarises the Romani case for post war reparations thus:

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Hancock, 1990, p. 143.


It was felt that the fragmentation of the once cohesive population has been the result of hostile, external factors, not voluntary internal ones.\textsuperscript{359}

No post war reparations, however, were proffered and no organised attempts were made to reorient the survivors. Moreover, Interpol has continued to use files compiled by the Nazis and to pursue anti-Gipsy activities.\textsuperscript{360}

Until 1954, in Bavaria, a special police office existed to register Roma with Interpol.\textsuperscript{361} During the 1920s special police were routinely photographing and fingerprinting Roma.\textsuperscript{362} In 1905 a census of Roma in Bavaria had been carried out on the rationale that they were a pest whose existence required defensive vigilance; in 1926 a law was passed to suppress the so-called Gipsy plague; and in 1928 they were placed under permanent police surveillance. All these acts were in contravention of the constitution which guaranteed equal rights for all.\textsuperscript{363} In 1899 the Bavarian Office for Combating the Gipsy Nuisance had begun to catalogue the Bavarian, then the whole German, then the Austrian populations of Roma. As consequence of all this bureaucratic activity, Interpol has extensive Romani genealogies in its possession. It is not indemnification but discrimination that has marked the post war experiences of the Romani people.

Those who sought indemnification were limited by the Bonn Convention which restricted indemnity hearings to cases of nationalistic and racist persecution, such as German Jews had suffered.\textsuperscript{2} German policy had classified Roma as congenitally asocial (asoziale) and criminal so their cases did not conform to the category. The cases of Roma who had been caught after Himmler's decree of December 16th, 1942, which consigned Roma to Auschwitz, were heard but others were not. In Serbia, the policy of final solution, or obliteration by mass murder, of Roma had been declared complete. So no Roma were acknowledged there and issues of compensation were pre-emptively nullified.\textsuperscript{364}

\textsuperscript{359} ibid., p. 139.
\textsuperscript{360} ibid., p. 143.
\textsuperscript{361} Liegeois, 1986, p. 94.
\textsuperscript{363} Liegeois, 1986, pp. 90-92.
In Germany, Italy, Spain, France, Britain, the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Russia, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Bulgaria post war persecution of Roma persists. Nazism is resurgent. In Germany, for example, neo Nazi groups are 'outing' Romani refugees so as to have them deported as undesirable, illegal immigrants.

Despite the continued persecution, none of the Romani committees, associations and congresses has had as its aim the assimilation of the people to the host society. Integration (involvement without loss of identity), however, is sought. The common goal has been to achieve an end to anti Romani discrimination; to claim without equivocation a right to exist as self-determining transnational minority.

The discrimination and consequent persecution against which the International Romani Union is active is not a uniquely modern phenomenon. Roma have occupied the European continent for more than five hundred years. In 1322 two European Franciscans documented meeting with Roma. Linguistic analyses suggest that the language and hence the people may have emanated from the north of India.

Migrations commenced c1000 and in 1407, Roma entered Germany. By 1449 they were being driven out of Frankfurt-am-Main. By 1498 they had been declared by the Reichstag to be traitors to the Christian countries and, as consequence, they were denied passports and could be killed with impunity. In 1579, Augustus of Saxony banished the Roma, as did many of the sovereign states created by the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. In 1652, local authorities of Bautzen were fined heavily for allowing Roma into the town, and in 1659 a group of Romani people was exterminated at Neudorf. In 1661 the death penalty was imposed on Roma captured in Saxony and until the present day Roma have been stigmatised and hunted. A pattern of discrimination and persecution has continued into the late

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365 See Kenrick and Puxton, 1972, pp. 194-205 for details of post war European persecution of Roma to 1970.


368 'Transnational society' and 'transnational company' are terms coined by Raymond Aron (Paix et guerre entre les nations, Paris, 1962) to describe relationships, activities and organisations which operate across national borders. See Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, 1978. 'Transnational' has a synonym in 'multinational'.

369 Liegeois, 1986, p. 36.
twentieth century.

Take, for example, the British Highways Acts of 1959 and 1968, which, together with their associated land acts, which are still current, make illegal the nomadic aspects of Romani culture. In 1959 the Highways Act prohibited Roma (not others) from encamping on highways. In 1967 an appeal was made against this law, claiming that it is an expression of racist discrimination. The appeal failed. The High Court ruled that the definition was not racist because the so-called Gypsies were defined by their nomadic way of life and nomadism is not a racial characteristic. The Caravan Sites Act of 1968 reinforced the abovementioned Act of 1959. The assimilationist intent of the 1968 act is evident: 'It is hoped that in the long term the Gypsies will become completely integrated among the settled population.' As of 1977, three quarters of all Roma have had no lawful abode.

The abovementioned Highways Acts beg reflection on the American situation. Roma are the only ethnic minority in the U.S.A. who are specifically named as the subjects of certain laws. Such discriminatory naming is unconstitutional but police departments maintain "Gipsy Divisions". The words of Terry Getsay of the Illinois State Police Gipsy Activity Project are illustrative: 'The label 'Gipsy' refers to any family-oriented band of nomads who may be from any country in the world.' Little public or legislative attention is given to this anomaly in the American democratic system.

These examples beg further reflection. Similar acts passed in West Germany in 1938 outlawed nomadism. That law was revoked in 1965 but another was maintained which restricted the travels of school age children, enacting stern registration requirements. This policy is still under discussion, now among the European Community. Coupled to this law is a policy of assigning then

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370 ibid., p. 130.
371 ibid., p. 131.
372 ibid., p. 131.
375 ibid.
376 ibid., pp. 105-107.
repeatedly reassigning accommodations.\textsuperscript{378} This forces Romani people to travel purposelessly, while travel for cultural purposes is outlawed. As travelling is enshrined in Romani culture as one of the wellsprings of identity, such policies are clearly designed to effect assimilation or extermination. The Council of Europe has condemned such practises under the European Convention on Human Rights.\textsuperscript{379}

In 1989 the first meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe \textsuperscript{sic} met in Paris and included Roma in their discussion. In 1990 a second conference issued from Copenhagen a five chapter final document whose fourth chapter is devoted entirely to discussion of the rights of ethnic minorities. Article 40 names Roma/ Gypsies as presenting particular problems.\textsuperscript{380} The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, in Recommendation 1203 (1993) on Gypsies in Europe, adopted specific legislation to protect minorities. The recommendation acknowledged that non-territorial minorities, such as Roma, need special protection.\textsuperscript{381}

Consideration of the relation of slavery and freedom to the matter of human rights and its issue of self-determination, illuminates further the Romani position. Liberation from slavery is a strong metaphor in contemporary Romani rhetoric. Hancock, for example, writes: 'those who have paved the way have been those most directly descended from the freed slaves in Romania.'\textsuperscript{382}

In the Romanian principalities, Roma were enslaved until 1856.\textsuperscript{383} Full emancipation did not come until 1864. There are parallels with black American history.\textsuperscript{384} Slavery commenced in Romania as part of the slave holding empire of the Byzantine Turks. The kinds of slaveholding were maintained in Romania until 1863. These included chattel slaves, those whose children were born slaves.\textsuperscript{385}

\textsuperscript{378} Liegeois, 1986, p. 179.
\textsuperscript{379} Kenrick and Puxton, 1972, p. 173.
\textsuperscript{380} Interface, No. 3, August 1991, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{381} Interface, No. 11, August 1993, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{382} Hancock, 1987, pp. 148-149.
\textsuperscript{383} Liegeois, 1986, p. 110.
\textsuperscript{384} Hancock, 1987, p. 136.
\textsuperscript{385} Lee, Ken, Lectures at Newcastle University, August/September, 1993.
Slavery has twentieth century resonances too. Bogumila Michalewicz is one of many who report the Romani peoples' enslavement to German private enterprises - Farben, Krupp, Siemens, Blaupunkt, Duramill, Hubert Land, Kramste, Elektroacustic KG, Dynamit AG, Alkania Werke - who used the Nazi concentration camps as a source of slave labour.\(^\text{386}\)

Here is an example of the point made by Orlando Patterson: slaves dream of freedom. The International Romani Union is a political manifestation of that kind of dreaming. The Roma have organised themselves to claim a right to freedom from slavery, persecution and discrimination.

Innumerable examples of discrimination exist. A few will suffice as illustration. Two English job advertisements illustrate systemic discrimination against Roma. One is for an Assistant Gipsy Liaison Officer and calls for someone to 'enforce', 'evict', and 'treat'. The other is for an Asian Liaison Officer and calls for someone to 'assist', 'achieve' and 'interpret'. They were issued side-by-side in the same document, a 1985 publication of the City of Leeds' Department of Environmental Health.\(^\text{387}\) A Save the Children Fund report of 1983 found that in Britain infant mortality among Roma is fifteen times higher than national average. In 1968, in Birmingham England, a public broadcast was aired, advocating extermination of Gypsies as 'impossibles'. In 1969, an Essex newspaper advocated mass murder as a solution to a so-called Gipsy problem.\(^\text{388}\)

In 1976, Czechoslovakian newspaper Bratislava Smena carried the text of a governmental proposal for compulsory sterilisation of Gypsies as an act of "socialistic humanity": 'The destruction of the Gipsy minority is the task...\(^\text{389}\) In 1983, a Hungarian pop song commenced, 'The only weapon with which I can defeat them is a flame-thrower; I will exterminate all Gypsies, adults and children...\(^\text{390}\) The European discrimination against the Roma which, as we have noted, commenced in 1498, can be demonstrated as a continuum. During the 1830s German authorities removed Romani children from their families and a Child Appropriation law has recently been passed in the European Union. A colleague, discussing human rights, recently advanced the idea that this is where there must be a double standard, because Gipsy children will ruin tourism.

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\(^\text{387}\) Hancock, 1987, pp. 101-102.

\(^\text{388}\) ibid., p. 100.

\(^\text{389}\) ibid., p. 102.

\(^\text{390}\) ibid., p. 103.
Attitudes such as these and the vilification which attends them illustrate a very deep European tradition of discrimination against Roma.

Angus Fraser tells us that the Romani people have nursed their autonomy through half a millennium of adversity. Now they are unified against the prejudice by which they have for so long been oppressed. Consequently, they have become more conspicuous than ever before as they claim the right of a small, vulnerable minority to be different to the hegemonistic culture.

According to Fraser’s telling of it, the salient issues of post war Romani history are flight, deportation and displacement. Adaptation and flexibility, he tells us, have made possible the survival of the Roma. For example, personal communications may be maintained by telephone, obviating literacy and arduous or dangerous journeys. Sedentary dwellers are now in the majority; settling does not signify abandonment of valorised mobility. Migrations, especially movements from one to another European country, are, nevertheless, a feature of the Romani culture as depicted by Fraser. He notes the wisdom of forming small, mobile units capable of travelling long distances. It is important not to romanticise this mobility. Travelling populations are not perpetual tourists. Beware the stereotype of the Gypsy Rover.

Discrimination against Roma has been and is still provoked by stereotypy. Two stereotypes are very strong. One conjures the image of Rom as noble descendant of a lost race. In the other Roma are figured as degenerate itinerants. Both are extreme, divorced from any reality in which living Roma find themselves. This stereotypy has the effect of rendering a living Rom well nigh invisible because who she or he is does not fit any predetermined image. No moderate and decent connotations are contextualised in either of the stereotypes. As consequence, it is very difficult for Roma to claim individual or collective rights.

The abovementioned invisibility springs from the argument that ‘proper’ Gypsies have no ‘real’ language, cultural capacity or political acumen. To argue for this view is tantamount to proclaiming the people extinct. What follows from this argument is to consign them to fairy tales.

Take the example of Dora Yates, longtime honorary secretary of the Gypsy Lore

391 Fraser, 1992, p. 318.

Society, who asserted that Romani nationalism could exist only in fairy tale. The fairy tale implodes when we understand that a struggle against discrimination, torment and genocide informs the so-called Romani nationalism. Yates' opinion exemplifies the stereotype of the Gipsy Rover. Their many forced displacements and resettlements have rendered literacy in any language almost impossible for most Roma. As consequence, it has been easy for unrealistic literary and lyric images, such as that of the Gipsy Rover, to flourish unchecked. Such images mask the actual circumstances of the people.

Sometimes the stereotypes operate axiomatically. Prejudice can reside in the assumptions which inform writers' choice and editors' clearance of words and phrases. The following example requires attention.

Donald Kenrick, Grattan Puxton and editors for Chatto Heinemann have chosen the term 'war victim' to describe Romani claimants and would-be claimants of reparations for war crimes. Interestingly, with the entry of the word 'victim' into their discussion, the rhetoric takes on an ambiguity not evidenced heretofore, at least as far as their Chapter Nine is concerned. They call the challenge of assimilation a dilemma, assuming an either-or imperative where none exists. They then apply a quotation from Dr. Jan Kochanowski of the Sorbonne, asserting that Gypsies must now take their 'last chance'. This, it seems, is a choice between extermination and assimilation. The effect on Kenrick and Puxton's discourse of this inclusion is to bring in an element of psychoterror. Pressure of time is brought to bear by the notion of the last chance. Yet there is no choice to make because, as earlier parts of the same text show, assimilation and extermination are two aspects of the same condition. Perhaps the authors' and editors' intention is to emphasise the plight of the so-called victims for whom their discussion appears largely to attempt a benign advocacy. Perhaps they are unaware of the terrifying prospect their example affirms as inevitable but, If so, why so?

This example of ambivalence toward Romani wellbeing is one of three which occur in as many pages of the Kenrick and Puxton text. Each of the others is

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393 Hancock, 1990, p. 138.

394 ibid., pp. 50-51.

395 Rosemary Wight, Vice President of the Romani Association of Australia, intends to submit, in late 1994, a thesis toward a B.A. (Hons) degree in Humanities at University of Technology, Sydney, Australia, entitled, 'The Progressive Establishment of Negative Romani/ Gipsy Stereotypes in 19th and 20th Century Writings'.

396 Kenrick and Puxton, 1972, p. 206.

397 Kochanowski quoted by Kenrick and Puxton, ibid.
relatively slight but, in sum, the phenomenon requires critical attention. First, the
authors have remarked the importance of the preferred, Romanes term, Rom
(Roma, Romani). Nevertheless they do not affirm it by usage. A preference for
the Anglophone 'Gipsy' and 'Gypsies' predominates throughout their text.
Moreover, the authors further Anglicise their terms to 'Roms'. Some authorial
ambivalence toward Romani preferences is suggested if not indicated by this.

Close observation of preferred terms can too easily generate a thought-police
attitude, such as is evident in contemporary discourse on what is politically
correct. One consequence of negative critique in that context can be to frighten off
speakers and writers. That is not the intention of these comments which are put
forward to encourage a sensitivity to nuance. For example, common Australian
usage renders up the spurious collective noun 'Romanies'. Like Kenrick and
Puxton's 'Roms' this suggests an inability or an unwillingness to adopt the
grammatical plural Roma. Such anomalies put one in mind of Gandhi's observation
that to effect universal literacy in English would be tantamount to enslaving the
world. In cases of the compulsive use of 's' to denote plurality, the concept of a
primal collectivity is enslaved to the individualistic assumptions of modern
English. As the Romani people have raised their voices in the international
community as a transnational entity, the nuances of collective expression of
plurality bear careful consideration.

To return to Kenrick and Puxton, there is a second anomaly in their expression
which also requires consideration. When discussing the self assertion of so-called
Gipsy nationalism, the authors tell us that the Roma will be borne forward to self-
realisation, responsibility and progress. This is tantamount to telling us that
those three characteristics are equally lacking in Romani existence. Self-
realisation, understood as a codified right of the transnational minority to self-
determination, is certainly lacking. Responsibility and progress, however, are
questions of self-determination. So the merging of all three operates paradoxically,
robbing the concept of self-determination of sense.

Prejudice against Rom and Roma has persistently made fragmentation a feature of
survival. Persecution has made necessary a separation into small groups. That
facilitates an extreme unobtrusiveness of culture by which survival is maintained
through quietism. The Australian case may serve as an example. Just over 1,000

398 ibid., p. 204.
399 In Australia, 'Romani' is at present being displaced 'Romanies', even in the literature of the Romani Association of Australia.
400 ibid., p. 208.
401 Hancock, 1990, p. 136.
people identified themselves as Roma in the Australian census of 1986. Self-identification as a Rom is problematic, not least because post-war migration to Australia has provided sanctuary to Nazi and other right-wing activists. A quantitative rhetoric which denies the importance of small numbers is one technique for maintaining the unobtrusiveness. This, however, can serve in a twisted way to facilitate the denial by authorities, on the grounds of inadequate numbers, of the Romani peoples' collective rights. Hence the emergence of the International Romani Union.

Quantitative responses have been and still are made with regard to the subjugation of the Romani people to the genocidal policies of the German Third Reich. Such responses illustrate some of the longer term consequences of extreme quietism. For example, in August 1984, 4,000 survivors of the Nazi holocaust met at a reunion in the Catskills. Although more than 20,000 Roma were registered at Nazi concentration camps and extermination camps, no mention of them was made at the reunion. The New York Times magazine (July 9, 1984) reported the reunion and also made no mention of the Romani presence in the concentration camps. Nullification, such as this, is one extreme end of the continuum of quantification; at the other end is the absolutist idea of a totalising count. Neither extreme is an appropriate measure with regard to human affairs.

When arithmetical metaphors fail, geometric ones fill the vacuum. They represent body-count in proportional terms, usually percentages of living to dead. As Yehuda Bauer has pointed out with regard to the Jewish experience of the Nazi holocaust, when numbers and proportions are being compared, people are being forgotten.

Romani people have a word for the Nazi holocaust; porrajmos, signifying devouring, is the word preferred by many Romani people. The metaphor of being eaten alive is an apt expression of the awareness of being preyed upon by the German Third Reich and its puppets. This metaphor resonates with the notional symbiosis, to be discussed later, which informs Romani concepts of humanity.

The Memorial Book: The Gypsies at Auschwitz-Birkenau (Gedenkbuch: Die Sinti und Roma im Konzentrationslager Auschwitz-Birkenau) was compiled to stand as evidence of the Porrajmos. It is a vast compendium in two parts. Part One includes a history of the Sinti and Roma camp at Auschwitz-Birkenau.

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404 'Gypsies' appears in the English translation but not the original
Two includes survivors' accounts and a chronology of the campaigns against the Roma and Sinti. Both parts include lists of the names, over one thousand pages in fine print, of the Sinti and Roma who were killed by the Auschwitz-Birkenau phenomenon. Facsimiles of the handwritten camp registers are included as well as photocopies of the file cards which tally with the identification numbers tattooed onto the people's skin. This is a macabre but necessary document comparable to the Hiroshima Book of the Japanese hibakusha. The Memorial Book bears testimony to the enormity of the so-called 'final solution' that is now called holocaust.

Hitler, Eichmann, Goering, Himmler and Heydrich authored what they called the 'final solution'. Heydrich put it into action:

in June 1941, Einsatzgruppen under Heydrich Liquidated hospital patients as well as Jews, Gypsies and Communist functionaries.

Hitler put its ideation into words:

monkeys put to death any members of their community who desire to live apart. And what the apes do, men do, too, in their own manner. Bismark was perfectly right when he said that any human society which suppressed the death penalty, the ultimate expression of human defence against the asocial, merely from fear of a possible error of justice, was simply destroying itself.

Here is an extreme manifestation of social Darwinism. First an impossible category of asocial people is invented and with it the so-called criminal type. Then the death penalty is prescribed for those who are classified as belonging to the

title. As the title explicitly names Roma and Sinti, that convention will be observed instead of the International Romani Ubi on preference when referring to the Memorial Book.


category or type.¹ Precedents for this method of discrimination exist in Frenchman Lombroso's book The Criminal Man, popular in the late nineteenth century, as well as the English Habitual Criminal Act of 1859 and the Colonial Indian Criminal Tribes Act of 1870.⁴⁰⁹

The fatuous notion of criminal race was not beyond Hitler's power of imagination. So anyone who argues, in this context, that the asocial category is different to a racial category has underestimated him. On the evening of October 25, 1941, Hitler, prophesying the extermination of Jewry, called Jews 'That race of criminals'.⁴¹⁰ So it is silly to take as significant, with regard to the Nazi holocaust, the difference between asocial and racist labels.

Hancock traces the commencement of the genocidal policy against Roma to 1933, the year in which Hitler came to power. Roma were targeted for genocide by their inclusion in the so-called asocial category. From 1934 Roma were being sent to camps, Dachau and Mahrzan, for example, for eugenic sterilisation.⁴¹¹ There are several examples to demonstrate that racism motivated these policies. One is a Nazi party proclamation of 1938 that the Gipsy problem (their term) was categorically a matter of race. Another is a statement made in the same year by race hygienist Adolph Wurth that "the Gipsy question that we face today is above all a racial question". Perhaps most telling is the statement by Dr. Johannes Behrendt of the Office of Racial Hygiene which dictates, "All Gypsies should be treated as hereditarily sick; the only solution is elimination."⁴¹² During the Porrajmos the Roma were confronted by the full force of the machinery of state, focussed on their obliteration.

In the U.S.A. a project was launched during the 1980s to create a Holocaust Memorial Museum to memorialise victims and honour survivors.⁴¹³ The U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council was formed in 1980 to realise the project.⁴¹⁴ In 1984 Simon Wiesenthal, the famous Jewish Nazi-hunter, wrote to protest the omission of Roma from the Council.⁴¹⁵ In brief, the council, formed in 1980, included no

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⁴¹⁰ Hitler, 1953, p. 87.

⁴¹¹ Hancock, 1988, p. 53.

⁴¹² ibid.


⁴¹⁴ Hancock, 1988, pp. 55-64.
Rom until 1987, when just one person was appointed. One Rom remains.

Both Roma and Jewry were the subjects of systematic, institutionalised persecution by Nazi Germany. There is, however, a contention that the Nazi genocide of Jews is unique, the Jewish situation being incomparable to that of any other people. This point of view can be understood if one remembers Vico's analysis of the immanence, for the Hebrews, of history; that the Jews alone dwell inside divine history. To understand a perspective, however, is not the same as agreement with the opinions it delivers. This issue requires debate.

The debate falls within the arena of contemporary human rights discourse but there are questions of historical hermeneutics at issue too. For example, Ian Hancock and Norman Cohn make cases in their writings which are almost mirror images of one another. Hancock claims that the coming of the Nazis brought new and terrifying policies against Jews but meant only the intensification of existent policies against Roma. Cohn tells us of the unique policies against Jewry which pre-existed the holocaust. Read together, the texts ask for reconciliation; each writer seems to be contending with his own shadow.

There are many examples of pronouncements affirming the Jews' circumstances under the Nazis as unique. Not all of them are Vichian appreciations of a special theological relationship. Some proceed by disparaging the experiences of others. To illustrate: one commentator has, written that Nazi policy against the Roma was "more apparent than real"; Posner and Ware's Mengele: The Complete Story omits mention of Gypsies from its index, despite Mengele's well documented obsession with Gypsies so-called.

Although one might prefer to sing the Gipsy Rover song, imagining lightheartedness and freedom, and one might want to ignore the Mengele abomination, arrant denial calls for remediation. Robert Jay Lifton has documented Mengele's experiments in The Nazi Doctors. Sinti memorist Hans Braun has written the following:

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417 Hancock, 1988, pp. 45-49.

Dr. Mengele took out a long needle and inserted it in his (a Gipsy child's) back, into his spine, all the way to the top... (next day) There was a runoff in the cement block with blood in it. And there lay the child, he had cut him open from top to bottom with a saw, like a butcher would cut open an animal. He had taken out his intestines and put them into jars filled with clear liquid. These were his "experiments".

Braun's first-person reminiscences do much to repair the omission of information about Nazi policies toward Roma and Sinti which, according to Gabrielle Tyrnauer, constitutes a vast lacuna in holocaust literature. Tyrnauer asserts:

Jewish survivors know better than anyone that there was a Gipsy camp in Auschwitz and that Mengele was its doctor.

Thus she issues a direct challenge to the refusal to acknowledge the Romani presence in the camps and the medical experiments conducted on Romani people. Sybil Milton has also delivered a direct challenge to the diminution of the Romani persecutions during the Nazi holocaust. She states that it is 'simply wrong' to claim that the Nazis had no specific policy regarding Gypsies. Michalewicz is more subtle but no less challenging. She mentions the Mechau, a family of eight Polish Gypsies (her word) who were included in Dr. Mengele's experiments. The whole family exhibited a rare case of heterochromy. They were starved to death so their eyes could be removed for study.

Between 1933 and 1945, Nazi Germany subjected the Roma to a campaign of systematic extermination. By 1942 over thirty thousand Roma genealogies had been listed and people subsequently restricted to particular living areas; in 1939 and 1940 mass deportations (to Poland) were effected; and in 1942 almost all

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422 Michalewicz, 1988, p. 173.
German Roma were arrested and transported to Auschwitz for extermination.\textsuperscript{423}

While denial threatens them with oblivion, facts require repetition, if they are to remain facts. Michalewicz delivers a succinct summary. Unlike Braun (above) she does not locate herself inside the horror she is describing. Consequently, her prose courts a danger of lapsing into recitation, losing the immediacy which makes horror abominable. Here, at the risk of magnifying this danger but with the intention of acknowledging more events than this document can encompass in any detail, is a precis.

others, all of whom were called Gypsies, in the camps. Exploitation followed by mass murder was carried out in the camps, Chelmno on Ner and Belzec being built exclusively for the purpose of extermination.\textsuperscript{424} Extermination was organised; there were 1,500 dead per day at Stutthof.\textsuperscript{425} In the town of Szczurow, the old and numerous Gipsy community was completely obliterated. Exploitative private enterprises used the concentration camps as a source of slave labour.\textsuperscript{426} There was torture in the camps; some Gipsy musicians were required to play as their people were tortured. Gypsies were forced to wear a black triangle, signifying asoziale. Dr. Mengele conducted macabre experiments on living and dead Gypsies. Many documents were destroyed in 1944 as the Allies advanced.\textsuperscript{427}

With the arrival of the allied forces came the etic observations of the liberators. Describing the opening of the concentration camp at Belsen, Kenrick and Puxton tell us that few of the detainees had energy even to walk out of their prison. When they did they began to realise for the first time the immensity of the destruction of their people. During their internment they had had no way of knowing that the vitsi, the great families and clans, had been reduced to fragments. With no families to accommodate them after their liberation, many people were housed in displaced persons' camps. At Dusseldorf-Lierenfeld, some were sent to the same barracks as had imprisoned them during their transport to the concentration camps. Until 1947, Roma coming out of the concentration camps could, under a 1926 law, be arrested and sent to labour camps.\textsuperscript{428} An Auschwitz survivor, submitting to a

\textsuperscript{423} Liegeois, 1986, pp. 92-93.

\textsuperscript{424} Michalewicz, 1988, pp. 177-178.

\textsuperscript{425} ibid.

\textsuperscript{426} ibid., p. 176.

\textsuperscript{427} ibid., pp. 172-184.

medical examination after applying to reside in her home town, could be obliged to accept as her interviewer the same doctor as sterilised her in the camp. The same bureaucracies that could subject the displaced persons to that level of insensitivity, also punished them for the loss of their papers.

So liberation did not bring an end to the torture. There was no release from the terror. There is a European fireside story by which we can communicate some of this bind. In it, we run from a nightmare thing which we cannot name or describe. We escape from it and, struggling for terms to convey the horror of our encounter, we hear a beloved voice saying, 'Was it like this?' We look to the face of the beloved. It is the face of the nightmare thing.

To defend against the nightmare horror and the waking terror that the Porrajmos has come to stand for, the people have formed International Romani Union (IRU). Under the auspices of the IRU, Romani self-identification as a transnational minority is being realised. Thus the struggle for freedom from slavery, forced assimilation, systemic persecution, prejudice, discrimination, and inequity continues.

Here is a summary example of how it continues. On March 4, 1992, the United Nations Economic and Social Council Commission on Human Rights the forty eighth session of the United Nations Economic and Social Council Commission on Human Rights was convened. The session commenced with invocations, recognising the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, and recalling the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The agreements enshrined in the abovementioned instruments were unanimously reaffirmed. Discussion of a draft resolution to protect Roma (item 18) ensued. German and Japanese delegates proposed an amendment to make clear that the protection of the minority, encoded in item 18, applies only in states where Roma have traditionally been living as subjects. Expanding on this, another German delegate explained that Roma are not regarded as a minority in Germany. This not-a-minority view was repeated by another German delegate later. The catch, of course, is in the invocation of a non existent tradition; the minority populations of Roma enjoy no appropriate traditional recognition. That is the crux of the present issue. After lengthy discussion in which the desirability of

429 ibid.
establishing a Special Rapporteur and a database was mooted, the meeting agreed
to postpone the vote on the protection of Roma.

The forty eighth session seems to have closed with an implicit exclusion of the
Romani minorities, at least for the time being.\textsuperscript{432} The pre-emptive invention, by the
Japanese and German diplomats, of a putative tradition has, in this case,
forestalled recognition of self-deterministic, Romani concepts of origin and
tradition. Nevertheless, those concepts do exist.

Tradition, that is, ceremonial activity with pageantry and other paraphernalia, such
as, emblems, symbols and ritualised practises, is largely an invention of the late
19th and 20th centuries.\textsuperscript{433} The invention of tradition has three main purposes: to
symbolise existent social cohesion and affirm group membership; to establish or
legitimise institutions and establish authority; to socialise particular values, beliefs
and behaviours, especially those of submission.\textsuperscript{434} Traditions have four common
features: an imagined golden age; claims to documentary evidence; falsification of
documents and history; creation of an industry in emblematic artefacts.\textsuperscript{435} In the
thirty or forty years before the first world war, traditions were invented with
greater assiduity than at other times.\textsuperscript{436} Two outstanding examples of the invention
of tradition are the creation of the Boy Scouts by Baden-Powell and the Nazis by
Hitler.\textsuperscript{437}

The first and third of the abovementioned purposes, that is the affirmation of
status quo and the valorisation of submission, are served by Japanese and German
invention regarding item 18. The International Romani Union is inventing a
tradition to serve the second purpose, that is, to establish and legitimise its
institution and establish its authority. In this sense, the invention of tradition is part
of the process of self-determination.

\textsuperscript{432} For an alternative and congratulatory interpretation of these
events see \textit{Interface}. No. 5, February, 1992 [sic]. According to its
citations, this February '92 item offers an interpretation of the March '92
proceedings.

\textsuperscript{433} \textsc{Hobsbawm}, 'Introduction' in \textsc{Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds.)}, 1984, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{434} \textsc{ibid.}, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{435} Trevor-Roper, Hugh, 'The Highland Tradition in Scotland', \textsc{Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds.)}, 1984, p. 41.

\textsuperscript{436} \textsc{Eric Hobsbawm}, 'Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914' in
\textsc{Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds.)}, 1984, p. 263.

\textsuperscript{437} \textsc{Hobsbawm in Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds.)}, 1984, p. 4f; p. 286.
The four common features of tradition-making mentioned above are borne out by the activities of the International Romani Union. The assertion that one of its goals is reunification conjures a golden age of original unification. The origins of the Roma, however, are not known. In 1841, Bataillard identified them as the blacksmiths of the Bronze Age. Indications are that Roma came from India, perhaps a millennium ago. Probably from the Rajput district in the north-west. Brahmins in need of physical defence could raise Roma from the low caste of the sudras or untouchables to the higher kashatria or warrior caste. Thus those Roma who worked as mercenaries and body guards enjoyed upward mobility. It is not known when this began. It is known that certificates of descent from the sun and the moon, whose symbolic associations continue now among the Vlax Roma, were awarded the elevated ones. On the strength of these and other probabilities, Hancock defines the Romani people as a nation lacking a homeland. Ken Lee of the Romani Association of Australia puts this nicely, finding in India, 'our source, not our territory'. In this connection, a homeland of the mind, or transportable territory, Romanipen, has been conjured. Thus the Romanestan dreaming has begun as the Roma reassemble.

The preferred story of traditional Romani origin demonstrates the second common feature of tradition-making, claims to documentary evidence. It runs as follows. About 950 A.D. Roma left North India. This was determined during 18th century through linguistic interest in Sanskrit. Migrations followed. Throughout the Middle Ages, the people moved through Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Turkey (Anatolia) then to Greece, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Russia, England, Scandanavia, France and Portugal. Linguistic evidence supports this too. There were further migrations. Some Roma were transported as convicts: from Spain and Portugal to Angola and Goa; from Britain, France, Holland and Germany to North America; and from Britain to Australia. Three Romani convicts were recorded in records of the First Fleet. This story converts dependence on the oral tradition of storytelling to reference to documentary evidence by valorising linguistics.

Regarding the falsification of documents and history, the Romani tradition includes this sophisticated and eventually tragic example. Until the 15th century, many people, including the Roma, carried letters of safe conduct in Europe. One

439 ibid., p. 23.
440 Hancock, 1990, p. 134.
441 Hancock, 1990, p. 133.
such letter was verified by the Pope and some were forgeries. The letters presented the Roma as Christians from Egypt who were required to do penance by wandering. Seven years’ wandering was prescribed as penance for evil doing. Pleading that they had been very evil indeed and therefore needed to wander further, the Roma developed an elaborate confidence trick. By the early 15th century, however, the scam had become transparent. As consequence, Romani sedentarisation was no longer tolerated, so the once voluntary nomadism became forced.

It is in the creation of an industry in emblematic artefacts that the International Romani Union and its precursors have excelled. Flag, anthem, emblems of office, all the insignia of a self-determining people are in existence. The International Romani Union has materialised as the representative body of a transnational minority. At the World Romani Congresses, at the United Nations, at the Council of Europe, Roma assert Romani tradition and, more important, by this assertion claim rights to human dignity and self-determination.

The first World Romani Congress was organised by the International Gipsy Committee in 1971, near London. Vanko Rouda was president. The Romani national flag was embellished and its adoption reaffirmed. An anthem Dzelem Dzelem was adopted and Roma (Rom, Romani) were affirmed as the preferred terms of identification. Five standing commissions were formed: Social Affairs, War Crimes, Language Standardisation, Culture, and Education. Negotiations with the Council of Europe were initiated and in 1972 membership was gained. Meanwhile, the journal Roma, official organ of the Romani Union, commenced publication. At the Second World Romani Congress of 1978, delegates to the United Nations, the UN Human Rights Commission, and UNESCO were elected. In 1979 United Nations recognised the International Romani Union.

Romani representation at the international forum has been made by monarchs, presidents and chiefs. 1937 saw the coronation of King Janus Kweik of Warsaw. Formal dress was rented from Warsaw Operas House for the occasion. In 1946, Janus' successor, Rudolf Kweik, was proclaimed king. He, however, abandoned the title, becoming President of the World Council. In 1959, Ionel Rotaru preferred the title Supreme Chief. Present day senior office bearers of the

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443 Hancock, 1990, p. 145.
445 ibid., p. 145.
446 ibid.
447 ibid., p. 147.
International Romani Union are the President, Vice-Presidents, Secretary General, and Head of the NGO-ECOSOC Praesidium.

The majesty of the 1930s and 1940s reflects the Romani experience of genocide. Australian aboriginal lawyer, land-rights activist, media commentator and negotiator, Noel Pearson mentions with sympathetic irony that there are many, many kings buried on Australia’s Palm Island. Many Jewish princesses also reflect this phenomenon, as do the displaced chieftains of lost tribes and the queens of the Amazons. Those who remember the words to the song of the Gipsy Rover will know that he is ‘Lord of these lands over’. The creation of a parallel reality, populated by an elite among whom one is mighty, is part of a self-defensive grandiosity with which the dispossessed, in order to survive, build a protective myth. Such a myth, however, can be built or adopted for other purposes too. As propaganda suggesting, for example, that all so-called Gypsies are complacent lords of their own destiny, the myth can mask a hostile reality of human rights abuses.

The struggle for human rights takes many forms among Romani people. As we have observed, motifs of enslavement form a background to concepts of freedom in the Western tradition. The International Romani Union, finds cultural antecedents in the East but members reside, for the most part, in the West. The motif of slavery has been adopted as a sign of an iniquitous past which requires restitution. This is comparable to Zionism and Black Power movements. A 13th century Romanian Bill of sale for Roma as slaves is held to be a first document or early proof of the presence of Roma in Europe. In 1913 the Romanian Roma end to their slavery. The conference of the General Association of Gypsies of Romania, in 1933, sought to make December 23 an annual Romani holiday to commemorate the emancipation of Roma from slavery. The conference also proposed the establishment of a Romani library, hospital and university and adopted a national Romani flag. In this example, the interconnection between the rhetoric of liberation from slavery and the demand for restitution in the form of civil facilities is clear.

There is another aspect of slavery which deserves special attention here because it brings to the human rights vernacular much more than a rhetoric of liberation. Chattel slaves, whose children were born slaves, were used as subjects of breeding programmes. This involved forced impregnation. Thus the rhetoric of eugenics entered the thinking of slavemongers and slaves alike. It has permeated liberationist language with anomalous assumptions. Take, for example, the statement that the forced impregnation of Romani by Gadze constitutes an

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448 Hancock, 1990, p. 140. The journals, Romani Family, Romani Voice and also flourished during the 1930s in Romania.
offence, being assimilationist and diluting the gene pool. This statement is not incorrect but it proceeds from a eugenicist perspective which values bloodline above the whole person. Viewed from a more wholistic perspective, it is evident that the forced impregnation constitutes the offence, who, by whom and why are peripheral.

The rhetoric of eugenics is seductive. For example, Hancock, writing in defence of Romani rights to recognition, affirms the 1987 Harvard medical study which concluded, after an analysis of blood groups and blood types (haptoglobin phenotypes, HLA types) that Roma are a genetically related people. This, presumably, is to pre-empt any claims to the opposite which point to genetics as evidence. This collusion with the geneticists may, however, prove to be counterproductive in the longer term. If the people look to Harvard and genetic medicine for proof of their cohesion, they give to Harvard and genetics the power to disprove. The argument ignores biodiversity, harmonising instead with the human genome project.

It was Romani activists who raised objections in 1981 to the use of research from the Nazi eugenics programme. Policies for the prevention of breeding (by sterilisation) of Romani people preceded their extermination. It was felt that such procedures should not be considered beneficial in any way. It was scholarly literature with eugenicist assumptions which led Himmler to search for specimens of "pure" Gypsies. The legislation regarding so-called asocials, and the persecution of the Roma which proceeded as direct result of that legislation, constituted a programme of eugenics. But, as we have observed, the rhetoric of eugenics can permeate the language even of those who argue vigorously against the programmes.

Interest in eugenics is closely linked to interest in genealogies. Many peoples institute and maintain their identity by establishing genealogies. In concert with modern bureaucratic practise, genealogies, instead of protecting the people whose cohesion they represent, can make those people terminally vulnerable. Hans Braun's flight, at the age of sixteen from the Gestapo and his eventual capture is

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450 Tyrnauer, 1986, p. 158.


one example. Because of eating rituals and taboos, Braun was obliged to go to his relations for meals. Hence the genealogies made it possible for the Gestapo to predict his movements. In such circumstances, to abandon one's cultural obligations is to abandon that which one is trying to save. Forced abandonment, such as concentration camp routines effected, is painful and damaging. It is a form of torture. When a prime artefact of one's protective culture provides means to one's tormentors, one is very much at risk.

Scholarly interest in Anthropology encourages the compilation of genealogies into forms which are useful to bureaucrats. Pride in identity tends readily to cooperate by codifying what otherwise remains among the arcana of discrete groups. It was scholars, too, who provided the information which made possible the Nazi's deliberate violation of taboos. For example, the provision of horsemeat to Roma and pork to Jews. Nevertheless, scholarly interventions are not altogether undesirable.

Without a flow informed opinion, of which scholarship is part, a culture is bound to lose vitality. Roma are aware of this, so criteria for ethical scholarship come into question. Gabrielle Tyrnauer refers to studies conducted during the early 1980s whose researchers encountered suspicion. One team decided not to learn Romanes so as not to be seen to be prying into secrets. This phobic reaction to ethnic difference is neither rational or desirable. Communication is required if prejudiced suspicions are to be overcome; withdrawal and subsequent silence exacerbate fear. All professional pursuits entail encounters with privileged information; confidentiality is a matter of professional ethics. Moreover, the need to manage secrets is something that any person may encounter. The abovementioned researchers might have learned enough of Romanes to make clear the difference between their work and prying. Recoil from difficulty such as Tyrnauer's example illustrates, tends to compound the original obstacle.

Ethnicity is not the only source of phobic reaction to and from scholarship which concerns Roma. Racism, often based on the abovementioned eugenicist assumptions, can also interrupt or subvert scholarly development. When appreciation of the contribution of a scholar is qualified by a racial descriptor, scholarship has given way to politics.

Academic papers are properly appreciated for their scholarly achievement, not because of their author's identity with any particular collective. When we lose

454 Braun, 1988, pp. 165-166.
456 ibid., pp. 161-162.
sight of this, we are inclined to deny the importance of criticism. To criticise constructively the elements of the collective humanity by which we are all identified is crucial to scholarship. The current trend toward attributing extra veracity to work that takes an emic trajectory constitutes a denial of the individual's right to choose in these matters. There is confusion. The affirmative action which provides redress for unjust exclusion, such as identification by gender, physique, and antecedents has brought about, provides a scholar with an opportunity to engage; no more than that. The work stands as testimony to the subject not to its individual, authorial medium.

Some of Gabrielle Tyrnaeur's comments provide a clear example of what can happen when eugenicist assumptions and emic valorisation get mixed up together with a misplaced notion of authorial testimony. She asserts that testimony of the Porrajmos, unless written, dies as persons die. On the strength of her assertion, she presses for urgent attention to the gathering of written testimony. Her assertion of the necessity of writing denies the intrinsic orality of Romani culture as well as the intergenerational effects of torture trauma. On the strength of that implicit denial, she assumes that the Romani culture has been without means of self-actualisation. This is fatuous and chauvinistic:

Because the Gypsies lack a literate or historical tradition, scholars who work with them have an obligation to support their new desire for self-actualisation.

Chauvinism is not the same thing as eugenism but note this: Tyrnaeur makes gipsy and scholar into two separate categories, adopting a rhetoric which suggests that no Rom is a scholar and vice versa. Is this assumption based on the idea that Romani orality cannot support the literacy necessary to scholarship? Is it based on the idea that all literate Roma were lost to the Porrajmos? Both of these ideas harmonise with the ideal of Nazi eugenics which she set out to criticise. Her call for testimony, by scholars of Porrajmos is not misguided but it seems to be guided by sentiment rather than reason.

There is a case for scholars to be witnesses to genocide, including the Porrajmos, insofar as it is relevant to their specific field of interest. To study Cambodia entails an acquaintance with the killing fields of Pol Pot; to study the Ukraine entails a mention of Stalin's; to study Armenian affairs necessitates knowledge of the Armenian genocide by Turks; to study Jewish affairs necessitates knowledge of their genocide during the Nazi holocaust; to study Romani affairs necessitates mention of the Porrajmos; and so on. Moreover, the subject of genocide itself

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457 ibid., p. 164.
458 ibid., p. 162.
requires testimony. The development of reasoned, critical discourse on genocide will probably call for contributions from scholars, past present and future and of all kinds.

Classes, categories, types and kinds are among the conceptual tools necessary to verbal formulation of thought in any language. Stereotypes and archetypes mark the development of major conduits for common thought processes. They are grand forms, wrought by frequent usage. Their function is to carry one emphatic image above a complex background. Racist stereotypes, for example, may carry a hateful image above the diversity of feelings which attend human affairs. Such devices have been much used by eugenicists, especially those of Nazi Germany, to inspire a wish for the extermination of particular kinds of people. Racist eugenics cannot be overestimated as a factor in the Nazi policies but it is important to understand that race, type, kind and class were synonymous. For example, Jewish people, Roma and Sinti people and handicapped people were viewed as constituting three races.

The usefulness of a stereotype has been spent when it resonates with its own background. This generates interference and interrupts communication. For example, writing against discriminatory practises, Hancock takes issue with a report made by the Hungarian Government in 1983. The report asserts that there is prevalence among Gipsy [sic] children of mental retardation due to cultural deficiency. To carry his argument, Hancock invokes a Swedish medical report which refutes deficiency of intelligence among Gypsies [sic]. Hancock's parry begs a question, If the children were deficient, would discrimination against them then be tolerable to him?

Happy to say, Hancock's prolific and consistent advocacy of non discriminatory practises is so very strong that the question we have raised can be nothing but a heuristic device. The resonance of his rhetorical background of non discrimination absorbs the resonances of the abovementioned discriminatory assumption. It is, however, necessary to appreciate these subtle difficulties which can arise through the rhetorical axioms which are inherent in the topic. With many new writers and scholars approaching the fields of genocide studies, holocaust and Porrajmos studies, and associated subjects, caution is necessary.

There are less important but still significant stereotypes which adhere to discussions of Romani culture that require brief mention here. The self-identification of Roma by adhesion to rituals and taboos by which others are excluded is one such. In a close study of what she calls the ideology of defilement, Carol Miller explains marime in terms of separation of clean from unclean. She gives many examples but there is a notable omission. No unifying principle is

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459 Hancock, 1987, p. 103.
acknowledged She offers no suggestion of what might hold an individual together, so no sense of person emerges. What resonates most strongly here is the background noise of the Nazi rhetoric of racial Hygiene. The result is a caricature of every Rom as having an unclean doppelganger in constant attendance.\footnote{Carol Miller, 'American Rom and the Ideology of Defilement' in Gypsies, Tinkers and other Travellers, Farnham Rehfisch (ed.), Academic Press, London, 1975, pp. 41-54.}

Angus Fraser tackles a similar issue of separation, identifying the sense of radical otherness of Rom from Gadze as a mainstay of Romani self-identification. This, however, he understands as a paradox because the relation of Roma to Gadze is symbiotic. By recognising the complexity of the paradox, Fraser escapes from the stereotypy which mars Miller's piece. The paradox can be understood in terms of ironic self-alienation. This may be elucidated by consideration of the name Vlax: 'Vlax a. and n. same as Wallachian.'\footnote{Webster's Dictionary, 1952.} Wallachia is a former Danubian principality, now part of national Romania. 'Wallachian' refers to the citizens and the language of Wallachia. Wallach or Wallack, refers particularly to a member of one of the Romance speaking peoples of Romania and generally but is cognate with the Old German walh for foreign. Hence Vlax resonates with the alienation of the attempted assimilation of a discrete minority to a national identity.\footnote{ibid.} The Vlax demonstrate an ironic self-reflection, taking a great pride in their name which is tantamount to their pride in their survival.

One is always both Rom and Gadze and one copes in the same way as one maintains a balance with marime. This appreciation of symbiosis or synergy is a sophisticated way of thinking which has great relevance to internationalism, multiculturalism and their ambitious brainchild, globalism. Fraser's description of recent developments in Religion vis a vis Romani culture is of particular interest in this connection.\footnote{Fraser, 1992, pp. 311-315.} He reports that the tendency has been to adopt the religions of whatever countries they occupied. There are, consequently, Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant and eclectic families. Pentecostalism has become very popular in recent times, converts are called alelulyas.\footnote{ibid., pp. 311-315.} The religious liberty described by Fraser brings a new sense to religious pluralism. One can pray wherever and with whomever one is invited. Roma tend to join in with whatever a religion offers and continue ritual observance privately. This pluralistic synergism signifies a sense of primordial similitude with all humanity.
Perhaps this ability to participate in pluralism is one of the reasons that the Porrajmos has resulted in a dynamic, collective, survivalist response. We have mentioned so-called facts of the Porrajmos but they represent verum-factum defied. An incredible possibility emerges instead of a credible impossibility. What we must grasp as possible is that anyone can be a target and everyone is implicated.

Consider again the words of U.S. policeman Terry Getsay: ‘The label ‘Gipsy' refers to any family-oriented band of nomads who may be from any country in the world.’

Given homelessness or a preference for peripatetic behaviour, in Getsay's definition anyone is a Gipsy. By that definition one is undesirable, requiring police surveillance. Self-defence against this potential assault on civil liberty includes denial of the authority of police such as Getsay. The Nuremburg principles demonstrate this.

The Romani Porrajmos and the Jewish holocaust both mark the same crime against humanity, a crime against all humankind. The crime is to consign humanity to oblivion through genocide. It is a mass phenomenon which depends on killing memories as well as persons. If humanity enjoys symbiosis and synergy, then it is a crime against self. It follows that, to deny any of the people and peoples who have been killed as consequence of genocidal policies is to collude in the crime. Self-determination begins with self-defence. What we can defend against first is crime against humanity.

\[465\] Hancock, 1988, pp. 62-64.
CHAPTER 16
FIELD REPORT: UNITED NATIONS WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, VIENNA, 1993

BACKGROUND

A semiotic analysis is required to balance the literary thrust of this study. Thus some of the sources and effects of the literature can be examined. It was understood during the planning of the research project that such an analysis would require observation of and participation in oral discourse.

People and peoples claiming to be defenders of human rights and people identifying themselves as survivors and victims of human rights violations would attend the UNWCHR. So the UNWCHR would provide a field in which one could observe rhetoric, writings and other signs and signals used by people to communicate about these events. As apocalyptic verbiage was evident in the forward planning documents, it was reasonable to assume that it would be observable in some parts of the conference proceedings. As this report will show, that assumption proved correct.

Ideally the discourse would be concerned with the instruments of human rights, giving regard to issues of protection and violation. The rhetoric of self-determination could thus be investigated in the context of human rights discourse. Moreover, the presence or absence of apocalyptic verbiage could be observed and interpreted.

An ideal opportunity to pursue the necessary field work was provided by UNWCHR. By consultation with Sarimin Jacques Boengkhi, FLNKS Special Envoy to UNWCHR of Kanaky (Indigenous New Caledonia), it was possible to gain Observer Status, that is, to attend in the public gallery and enter otherwise restricted areas. The University of Sydney approved my use of scholarship funds for this purpose. It was possible to attend from Friday, June 18, 1993 to Wednesday June 23, 1993, that is, the second week of the conference.

STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

The report from the field comprises three parts. First, selected field notes. This is a brief, analytic report of the conference. Observations fall under four broad headings. They are, 'Some Definitions of Human Rights', 'Protections and Violations of Human Rights', 'Self-determination in Action', and 'Apocalyptic Verbiage'. An interpretative description of the scenario and a copy of my briefing on arrival are also included. The second part of the report from the field comprises

466 The United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 1993, is called here by its acronym UNWCHR.
parallel documentation. This is a survey of key issues as reflected in United Nations reportage of the conference. The third is prospectus in review. This is an investigation into precepts which shaped the agenda.

METHOD OF REPORTAGE
A phenomenological method is used, by which both observation of and participation in the UNWCHR are taken to be an encounter. The mode of encounter was receptive, as other to a provocative or proactive mode. Hence observations and quotations furnish the data. The topographic location of the phenomenon is the Conference Centre at the Vienna International Centre. All incidents which the researcher encountered inside the physical bounds of the Centre and its gardens are taken as parts of the phenomenon. As much priority as possible was given to note-taking but, of course, that is only one contingency of the situation. Notes, therefore, are attenuated by circumstance.

THE TYPE OF INTERPRETATION
An inclusive, pluralistic and non conclusive hermeneutic is preferred. These preferences are based on the axioms that inclusivity may mediate prejudice and pluralism may obviate supremacism. Non conclusive interpretations, if they are not wholly non judgemental, suspend final judgements. So the trajectory of the interpretation tends more toward indication than assertion.
FIELD NOTES
THE PHENOMENON ENCOUNTERED:
AN INTERPRETATIVE DESCRIPTION OF THE SCENARIO
Huge skyscrapers stand well off the road in parks and gardens; figures of grandiosity. By a long walk up a wide path one approaches the high buildings. Clusters of security personnel in black berets stand with muzzled dogs at several junctures.

The grandiosity is juxtaposed with impotence. A hunger strike is announced by big banners outside a tent beside the long path. Hungry eyes gaze out from the tent. Few of those walking up the path pay any attention. The hunger strikers are largely ignored.

A wide flight of steps, ascending to huge glass doors, evoke again the element of grandiosity. This is further enhanced by the chrome barriers and the many security persons in blue shirts who confront all who enter. A pass is required to continue entry toward the conference chamber and its halls and galleries. Without a pass one may turn left into a coffee shop or turn about and descend by escalator to the basement. The general public are welcome to enter the basement. One can read, in this scenario, grandiosity structurally enshrined and violence structurally enshrined, public concern and outrage structurally excluded.
FIELD NOTES
BRIEFING ON ARRIVAL: 18/6/93

Sarimin Jacques Boengkhih delivered the following observations to me on my arrival. That was Friday, late afternoon, the fifth day of the conference which he had attended throughout. The briefing was accompanied by an illustrative walk-through of the Vienna International Centre.

The agenda of the non government organisations (NGOs) has been hijacked by the subject of torture. Indigenous peoples do not need to persuade the world that torture exists. Indigenous people and peoples are disappointed.

Indigenous peoples' non government organisations expected, because this is United Nations International Year of Indigenous Peoples, full facilitation. Such amenities as seating at the same level as government delegations, automatic inclusion on the agenda of speakers and automatic access to translation from indigenous languages to United Nations lingua franca would comprise full facilitation. These expectations had been assumed; arrangements had not been explicit. Seating was provided but in a mezzanine gallery. That seating would accommodate 500 persons but 3,000 non government organisations' delegates had expected to be seated. Many people feel they have been tricked.

There are some indigenes who have been included in governmental delegations. For example, there are two aboriginal women on the Australian team. That is unusual. For most, inclusion on the agenda has depended on negotiations among non government organisations, as well as between non government organisations and governmental delegations. But there are no facilities for translation among indigenes nor between indigenes and official agencies. Non government organisations have said this is bad organisation.

Instead of full facilitation, a number of suggested cluster-groups have been nominated by a preparation committee. For example, Indigenous Peoples Non Government Organisations and Asia Pacific Non Government Organisations. United Nations lists more than 225 indigenous peoples around the world. There is great diversity so there is not one voice.

All delegates have been invited to join one or more of the nominated cluster-groups. Negotiations toward the gaining of a voice, that is, inclusion on the conference agenda, commenced among members of the various clusters. Many non government organisations' delegations had assumed that inclusion on the agenda would guarantee them a hearing but that is not so. The agenda is prepared daily and time does not allow all of the speakers included on any one day's agenda to be heard on that day. Inclusions do not carry over automatically from day to day. Because of such factors as flux in attendance and in non government organisations consensus, the agenda requires daily renegotiation.
Many non-government organisations, including those of the indigenous peoples, have perceived as unfair the procedures (outlined above) by which the agenda is formed. Many have found it impossible to communicate their grievances. Others have found it extremely difficult. All have found the dichotomy of official and unofficial business abysmal.

Underpinning the unfairness is cultural chauvinism. There is evidence of this in the policies of governments. It is within non-government organisations' policies as well. For example, a philanthropic institute for human rights (Boltzmann Institute), set out to provide funds to African delegations. Of one hundred and thirty-two (132) African non-government organisations, twenty-six (26) have attended UNWCHR. What inhibited the attendance of one hundred and six (106) African non-government organisations? All Africa was to be serviced by one travel agent; in Vancouver. To communicate with it the, non-government organisations were given a fax number only. Accompanying information was in German.

The Boltzmann case illustrates what is wrong with this conference. Many people are invisible and cannot be heard, except in the basement. Everything official is upstairs, in the restricted areas.
FIELD NOTES
SOME DEFINITIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
22/6/93 (3 people in gallery and very few in chamber)
Public Gallery (Observer to Formal Proceedings),
Sao Tome and Principe Government Delegation
The delegate spoke as a representative of a least developed country. He asserted a single reality made of needs, shared by all humans. They are water, light and food. He claimed that these comprise the minimum needs of human dignity. His government, he concluded, asks for United Nations assistance in attaining these minimum standards as it looks forward to 21st century.

These people seek an escape out of barbarism.

22/6/93
Public Gallery (Observer to Formal Proceedings),
Niger Government Delegation
The delegate spoke as a representative of an emerging state. He asserted that law is not the tool to achieve human rights. An international human rights agenda is necessary but this is but not necessarily to be founded on international law. As Niger has no political prisoners now, the government asks United Nations for funds to build proper civil jails.

These people seek refuge from barbarism in institutional civility.

Saturday, 19/6/93,
Non Government Organisation Area, Hall K,
Women's Human Rights - Africa,
Comments from the floor
The group expressed general scepticism about nexus of democracy and human rights, pointing to the nexus of democracy and free market as dangerous. A plea for optimism over pessimism, in the face of danger, was given strong applause. The group questioned the relevance of democracy to famine and war stricken lands, especially where the government agenda is to violate human rights. Sudan, Mozambique and Nigeria were named as examples of this. There was general agreement on need for human rights education, especially para legal clinics.

These people question the credibility of democracy, finding it impossible.

22/6/93,
Public Gallery (Observer to Formal Proceedings),
Agence Culturelle de Cooperation Technique
The delegate affirmed a need for human rights law.

These people abnegate the common sense of jus cogens, seeking instead a codified
rule of law.

22/6/93
Public Gallery (Observer to Formal Proceedings),
Committee for Restoration of Human Rights, Cyprus
The delegate concluded with a plea for 'rule of law not rule of man (men?)'.

These people, like those mentioned above, abnegate the common sense of jus
cogens, seeking instead to depend on codified law.

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FIELD NOTES
PROTECTIONS AND VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

21/6/93, (3 people in gallery)
Public Gallery (Observer to Formal Proceedings),
Sri Lanka Government Delegation,
Women's equal rights 1993
The delegate announced that Sri Lanka ratified the Convention Against Torture in 1993. The effort now is to effect equality of women. Despite such advances, Sri Lanka is a poor country and, the delegate asserts, 'the human spirit can be broken by poverty'.

Here is a potential victim posture.

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22/6/93
Public Gallery (Observer to Formal Proceedings),
Panama Government Delegation
The delegate made a plea for human rights to be a daily task of family and school. He proclaimed 'respect for human rights' and the importance of rights protection, asserting that stability and rule of law are threatened by human rights violations. He recounted invitations from Panama to Human rights groups to visit asserting that human rights violations are now properly dealt with in Panama. Affirming the convention against torture and associated agreements and referring to terrorism as an international crime, he admitted the slow pace of establishing human rights protections. He reaffirmed human rights with standard rhetoric, as 'indivisible'. He announced that Panama is in favour of self-determination and sovereignty but pointed out that those can be assaulted from within states. Commenting at length on the need for brevity, the delegate affirmed human rights, democracy and development as 'just peace'.

Here is a victim-survivor posture

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Sunday, 20/6/93,
Non Government Organisation Area, Hall K,
Walkway
A big, red banner flew at the entrance to the Vienna International Centre. It read, 'United Nations Take Action Against Turkish Massacres in Kurdistan'. In the display area are two large posters proclaiming, with ghastly illustrations, the mutilation and killing of Kurds in general and eight journalists in particular.

The Turkish Kurds' protestations against genocide and torture had to compete with at least eight others. Abominable displays showing flesh tormented in ways that made a hope of death were mounted by non government organisations from Kurdistan, Iraq, Kashmir, Kwang Ju, Montenegro, Punjab and Latin America.
Others, the Sudan and the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh, for example, presented more discreet and perhaps even more convincing evidence. Whatever the vehicle of expression, the message was clear. Genocide and torture occur.

Here is a victim posture.

22/6/93
Public Gallery (Observer to Formal Proceedings),
Ethiopia Government Delegation
The delegate delivered a long, elegant speech, proclaiming human rights protection. At the end of it he referred to, 'a civil war of rare atrocity', between Sierra Leone and Liberia, 'amounting to a genocide'. He concluded by urging for resolution of the conflict.

Here is a victim-survivor posture.

22/6/93
Non Government Organisation Area, Hall K, Walkway.
Iraqi Non Government Organisations' Display and Information Table
Angry young persons expressing outrage against human rights violations in their country. An information table bearing prolific print material. Both backed by a huge wall of explicit torture photographs.

Here is a survivor posture.

22/6/93
Public Gallery (Observer to Formal Proceedings),
Iraq Government Delegation
Despite the expressions of outrage downstairs, less than twenty people listened from the public gallery to the delegate for Iraq. His main point was that self-determination requires non interference. His thrust, that Iraqi human rights have been violated by United Nations intervention, 'practically a war of aggression' (the Gulf War), as consequence of which thousands of women and children are still dying.

Here is a victim posture.

23/6/93
Non Government Organisation Area, Walkway,
Iraqi Non Government Organisations' Information Table
I approached the table intending to ask for responses to (a) the speech of the head of the Iraqi governmental delegation had made and (b) the wall of large photographs of tortured human flesh against which the table was set. I was told that the Iraqi government represents itself as a defender of human rights but is not
so. Five million people suffer and one half million are dead by cooperation of United Nations. One half million are imprisoned. My two respondents were unable to respond verbally or even to look at the photographs against which they were working.

Here is a victim-survivor posture.

22/6/93, 
Public Gallery (Observer to Formal Proceedings), 
Committee Against Torture
The delegate made three main points: torture is universal; there are two conventions on torture; the recommendations from conventions require implementation. His thrust, all torture is an offence to human rights. The same people all over the world, that is, human rights activists, are tortured by governments. Methods of torture, physical and psychological, are the same all over the world. As a result, people cannot sleep, lose their identity, self respect, dignity and ability to function. That is the aim of the torture, hence so-called torture victims prefer to be called torture survivors. The effects spread to others and societies suffer so it is necessary to get rid of torture.

Here is advocacy for a victim posture.

Sunday, 20/6/93, 
Non Government Organisation Area 2, 
Seminar 'Socialised Forced Reinterpretation', 
Speaker, H.C. Paula, Medgroup, Vienna
Paula argues that pseudo-hallucinatory messages emanate through microprocessors secretly implanted in the bodies of individuals. Reinterpretation, or 'alteration of signification', is forced by the implants, making people modify their perceptions so as to avoid intolerable psychological conflict (cognitive dissonance). The crucial aspect of this theory is the claim that conscience is subverted prior to the awakening of ethical concern. This interference constitutes a form of torture.

Here is advocacy for a victim posture.

Victims, survivors and victim-survivors are all represented. victim-survivor postures, those of Ethiopia and Iraq, for example, tend to gain rhetorical force by comparing their circumstances with others. Victim and survivor postures tend to lose rhetorical force by taking a self-referential focus. Advocacy for victims demonstrates by far the strongest rhetorical force. This is got by a convergence of references to others and a certitude of right.
FIELD NOTES

SELF-DETERMINATION IN ACTION:
PACIFIC NON GOVERNMENT ORGANISATION

Tuesday, 22/6/93,
Non Government Organisation Area 4,
Morning Meeting of Asia Pacific Non Government Organisation in Preparation for Formal Address to the Conference
Members of the Asia Pacific Non Government Organisation who had a particular interest in the Pacific (delegates from Fiji, Vanuatu, Kanaky New Caledonia and Australia, for example) met to discuss the desirability of attempting to reform into two non government organisations one for Asia and one for the Pacific.

Much was at stake. To decline participation in the amalgamated voice of Asia Pacific might be to lose what had been gained. There was no guarantee that a Pacific Non Government Organisation would attain a voice, i.e., a place on the agenda. Nevertheless the meeting agreed to attempt reform as Pacific Non Government Organisation.

After the decision was made, the courteous words, 'Does anyone have anything else to raise?' were formally spoken, although it was known that the decision to reform required immediate action. Australian cultural chauvinism, having democratically waited its turn, spoke up, and at length. 'What you've all got to understand', were the opening words, followed by a little lecture on how the United Nations works. This precipitated distrust and unsettled a number of issues of group dominance which had had to be settled, if temporarily, so that the meeting could be held. The dogmatic assumptions of both democracy and literacy created the chauvinism here.

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22/6/93
Lunchtime encounter,
Non Government Organisation delegate from Fiji
With the words, 'No more Asia Pacific', a member of the pro reform group (mentioned above) apprised me of their success. They had met with the Australian government delegation. Together they agreed that a new Pacific Non Government Organisations group should be made. The group may use the human rights machinery in Australia and go home (now mid-conference) to set up human rights education programmes immediately.

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SELF-DETERMINATION IN ACTION TWO: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL

Monday, 21/6/93,
Non Government Organisation Area 4,
Amnesty International Workshop
The archives will show that Amnesty International held daily empowerment workshops to help people and peoples to gain a voice at the United Nations. The workshop I attended involved singing some songs and playing some games to express solidarity (for human rights). One of the games included sharing opinions of the conference.

In that context a regional spokesperson for Amnesty International expressed to me her astonishment and anger over the changes of schedule and general disorder of conference events. She said she had thought that events which were written on the United Nations schedule were thereby guaranteed to happen as writ.

The planned activities (songs and games) empowered the very young to direct their elders. The informal exchange facilitated ventilation which discharged emotion. The billing of the event as a training session, however, struck me as misleading. Both the structure of the session and the opinions (about faith in print disappointed) which were expressed through it struck me as naive and puerile.

22/6/93
Public Gallery (Observer to Formal Proceedings),
Amnesty International
Amnesty President Jean Pierre Sane spoke from his desk in the chamber, thus declining to join the official party on the podium. He asserted that the commitment to human rights which is enshrined in the United Nations constitution is broken every day. He called for United Nations coordination of effort against human rights violations. He deplored the conference, claiming that non government organisations had not been taken seriously. He challenged the putative assertion that non government organisations are not realistic but are naive, in their demands. He used a rhetoric of escalating repetition, asking ironically, 'Mr President, is it naive?'

22/6/93
Public Gallery (Observer to Formal Proceedings),
International Federation of Free Trades Unions (IFFTU)
The speaker for the International Federation of Free Trades Unions (IFFTU) was interrupted and obscured by Amnesty jubilant. As he spoke, very noisy congratulations were delivered to the speaker for Amnesty International. Someone was aiming a camcorder at him and laughing, hopping about and vociferating at length. The naive partisan was oblivious to the gestures and signs by which supporters of the IFFTU tried to subdue her. What might pass under other circumstances for mere exuberance provided in these circumstances an ugly display of inability to share opportunity.
FIELD NOTES
APOCALYPTIC VERBIAGE
Monday, 21/6/93,
Public Gallery (Observer to Formal Proceedings),
Morning, General Debate,
Theme: Children
Children and adolescents spoke (read) to the Conference. Applause was generous, attendance was not. A child, speaking for the Philippines, delivered an ultimatum: children's rights or the 'end of the human race'.

A simple eschatology is in evidence here.

21/6/93,
Public Gallery (Observer to Formal Proceedings),
Burundi Government Delegation
The delegate asserted that, with 'Millennium in seven years' and a 'New World Order on the way', the 'human person is the lynch pin'. She acknowledged the contradictions inherent in multiplicity, exemplifying by listing human rights abuses. She affirmed the indivisibility of human rights and social and economic development, emphasising the point that developing countries have been 'bled white by colonialism'.

A millenarian apocalypticism is in evidence here.

21/6/93,
Public Gallery (Observer to Formal Proceedings),
Mongolia Government Delegation
The delegate asserted that human rights struggles have gone on 'from the dawn of civilisation'. Mongolia wants a move to a new world, 'from a bipolar world to a multipolar world'. Unless countries develop human rights it is impossible to develop a free market economy.

A realised eschatology with polyvalent prospects is in evidence here.

22/6/93,
Public Gallery (Observer to Formal Proceedings),
Sierra Leone Government Delegation
The delegate proclaimed, 'on the eve of the twenty first millennium we welcome the opportunity to participate'. This conference is to review 'complaints of human rights' and to work toward 'enjoyment of human rights'. Human rights are a component of sustainable development.

A millenarian apocalypticism is in evidence here.
The delegate spoke against Western colonialism, 'An indelible mark of shame on the brow of civilisation... As we enter a new millennium, let us pledge (for human rights).

A realised eschatology with absolutist prospects is in evidence here.
FIELD NOTES
OBSERVATIONS: SUMMARY
There was far more emphasis on violations than on protections of human rights at the UNWCHR. This suggests a victim posture which is much stronger that survivor postures or victim-survivor postures. The need for improved instruments, especially a criterion for action against genocidal regimes was addressed, but not expansively. Ao a neological horizon is present but weak. Protections were addressed by governments in two ways. Most commonly, the existing instruments of international law were mentioned affirmatively but without elaboration. Sometimes such affirmations were coupled with an implicit plea for improved status in the international community. For example, delegates for Niger and Panama claimed that their countries have rectified previously inadequate provisions and their address was linked to plea for funds. Likewise, Sri Lanka coupled the announcement of having signed the Convention Against Torture with a statement on poverty. These examples illustrate a strong tendency to look to law and legislation to solve problems of human rights.

Human rights protections received hardly any attention from non government organisations, except as a foil to outrage focussed on violations. This affirms the abovementioned victim posture. Many people had come to the conference to confront the issues of crime against humanity, torture and genocide. They had come to talk about abominable happenings, to reveal, graphically and rhetorically, the aberrations of torture, and to proclaim injustice. They had not come to listen. This suggests that few opportunities to ventilate about perceived victimisation exist in national arenas. Very few attended in the chamber to hear the formal statements; most of the available seats were unoccupied. This suggests that the legislation which people envisage as a solution to human right abuses is idealised. Few had patience for the slow actuality of law-making.

The discourse of the non government organisations was one of ventilation. Few came to employ the structure provided by United Nations protocols to improve their realisation of human rights. Some wanted to challenge those structures. Some wanted simply to participate in the circus the others created. They encountered an event which had many levels of veracity; many people discussed with intensity the question, Where is the real conference? This suggests that the proclamation of human rights is vaporous, lacking concretisation.

The upstairs versus downstairs and inside versus outside motif fuelled this kind of discussion. It provided an apt metaphor for he ventilation of feelings about injustice. This demonstrates the tendency to prefer dramatic conflict to resolution of conflict.

The confusion between equality and freedom which Orlando Patterson has discussed was in evidence. Human rights tended to be expressed in terms of equal
rights to freedoms. Hence, equal access to opportunity is what is sought by many delegates of non government organisations here. This goal is predicated on thinking which is pre-emptory of the United Nations' human rights discourse. The equation is not necessarily incorrect but requires proving, in terms that are generally accepted by governments.

The United Nations process was largely ignored by non government organisations. Several mechanisms set in place to effect the inclusion of non government organisations were also ignored. A notable exception is H. C. Paula of the Viennese Medgroup against torture, who spoke on the final day, having withstood the bureaucratic necessities attendant on receiving permission to speak in the United Nations forum. For the most part, however, we heard about exclusion not about efforts to gain inclusion. This was reflected in the non attendance in the public gallery during the second week. Rather than participate by listening to delegates, people preferred to complain. They ignored the statements made by the delegates. Instead they proclaimed their ideals. So insistence on what ought to be displaced the business of formulating what can be.

There seemed to be little general awareness of the limitations of the United Nations process in particular or large, international conferences in general. For example, people did not understand that making a noise in the chamber is not the same thing as having a voice there. I was told that one of the reasons for non attendance in the public gallery in the second week was that people had called out their grievances while singing and dancing in the gallery during the first week. They were tolerated for a short time then, when they did not desist, were asked to leave. This was interpreted by many as intolerance and discriminatory exclusion so the many boycotted the galleries from then on. The many felt excluded, betrayed and resentful of what seemed to them to be the misappropriation of their discourse by a self elected elite.

On the strength of this and similar incidents, some government delegations suggested naivete as a cause of the frustration of non government organisations. The non government organisations, as reflected by Amnesty International, disagreed. The president of Amnesty International capitalised on this schism in his formal presentation to the chamber, reiterating rhetorically, 'Mr. President, is it naive?' From the public gallery neither claim seemed utterly unreasonable. Both shrewdness, such as that of the Pacific non government organisation, and naivete, such as was voiced by the representative of Amnesty International who spoke to me, were evident.

An example of naivete is provided by the standing down of the non government organisations' preparation committee. This was effected on the grounds that it was a preparation committee so its work had to be complete by the commencement of the conference. By dismissing the committee, the non government organisations
bound themselves into re-inventing procedures instead of following those which had been established. As consequence they had little time to further their participation in the conference. That is naive literalism.

There was naivety also in the indigenes' disappointed expectation of, for example, translation facilities across indigenous tongues. Not every culture tolerates such linguistic exchanges and perhaps, if diversity is desirable, we can learn from the wisdom of peoples who are not prepared to make the compromises necessary to univocal proclamations. There was naivety in the non government organisations' interpretation of full facilitation, including full public access and seating as well as a prescriptive agenda. Not all delegates could attend for the whole conference, so the flexible agenda was essential to maximise the use of available time and personnel. Full public access would overwhelm security facilities, potentially endangering all present. One strong indication of the naivety which attended the conference lies in this comment, overheard in a foyer, proffered to explain the non attendance in the public gallery, 'All you see is people doing things'.

What the formal statement against naivety, made by the delegate for Amnesty International, did most effectively was to affirm the sense of exclusion that other non government organisations were expressing. That was particularly interesting because Amnesty itself does have a voice: expression of outrage was a major cause of other non government organisations failure to gain voice. Thus the self-determination of Amnesty International as moral arbiter of the UNWCHR served three main purposes. First, it subverted the potential for development of expertise among non government organisations by provoking intensified ventilation. Second, it firmed the special position of Amnesty International's senior representatives as privy to governmental discourse. Third, and paradoxically, it enhanced the reputation for reliability enjoyed by Amnesty International among non government organisations.

It is difficult to know where naivety turns into cunning. Take, for example the woman in the telecommunications fax/post centre, scampering with frustration and keening with rage because she could not transmit he fax. The tantrum appeared to be a product of naivety distressed. An attendant came immediately to the rescue, sending the missive and giving comfort. As it turned out, there was a long queue of people waiting for that same assistance. Jubilant and enjoying coffee while others still stood obediently in line, our dramatic colleague showed her cunning.

Is there secondary gain to be had from the appearance of ineptitude? Take, for example, the performance of the delegate for the Committee for Restoration of Human Rights, Cyprus. The delegate spoke over the time limit. She delivered a high pitched lament, bewailing that perpetrators of human rights violations have not been punished. As she over-reached the time limit, her vocalisation was confronted by a clacking sound, microphone enhanced, over which no speaker
would expect to be heard. Despite this, she continued. Eventually she faltered. The chair then insisted that the delegate conclude. After several gasps of 'ah' and 'er', she concluded with a plea for rule of law. The chair formally, if ironically, thanked the delegate for speaking within the time allocated. The effect of this was to create an image of frail human determination overwhelmed by an inhumane mechanism. The plea for absolute rule of law, however, is realised by the speaker's inability to abide by rules.

The United Nations has kept a peace keeping force on Cyprus since March 1964. There are difficulties regarding withdrawal because settlement has not been agreed. Why does this non government organisation prefer this seeming ineptitude to formal address clearly delivered?

Among some delegates there was a quiet wisdom at work below the superficial display of naivety. The self-determination of the Pacific non government organisation is a strong example. At risk of losing all by asking for separation from Asia, the delegates for the Pacific found success, eventually being recognised in their own right. Delegates representing the Australian government, responded to the new status of the Pacific peoples' non government organisations with two offers. First, free use of facilities. Second, condescension; it was suggested that the Pacific non government organisation's delegates go home, depending on the Australian government to ensure their interests. The first offer was gladly accepted but the second was taken with reserve. Some delegates for the Pacific non government organisation stayed to end, waiting until their formal address could be received by the forum. On 22/6/93 the official Journal used the words, 'Asian and Pacific Non Government Organisations', instead of the former usage, 'Asia Pacific', to announce the group's inclusion on the agenda. On 23/6/93 the Journal listed the 'Pacific Non Government Organisation'. Thus a new channel of communication with the United Nations was opened by and for the peoples of the Pacific.

Most of the formal statements took human rights to be a matter of legalism, denoting legislation as the definitive form of human rights. Most of the statements tended anomalously to equate law with justice but this was not universal. One exception was the statement made by the delegate for Niger. In this emerging state, financial assistance for the building of minimum standard jails is held to be of more importance than the refinement of international legislation. Likewise, the delegate for Sao Tome and Principe pointed out that, in his least developed country, provision of potable water and adequate food is of prime importance.

The majority of delegates, however, proclaimed a need for improved instruments of international law. The Committee for Restoration of Human Rights, Cyprus, the French Agence Culturelle and the African women's non government organisation made explicit demands for improved laws. Other delegates,
governmental and non-governmental, insisted that the proliferation of genocidal regimes made necessary a strengthening of international preventative law and the establishment of a war crimes tribunal.

Perhaps the language of demand not appropriate to the goals of that conference. Perhaps a quiet questioning would be the more effective form of address. The rights of humanity have not yet been defined so long discussions lie in wait of speakers. There seems to be a proliferation of strong terms and a paucity of investigative ones.

Because the Convention Against Genocide exists, genocide is a strong word in United Nations discourse. It is acknowledged as a crime against humanity. Of course, covenants and strong language cannot ensure that genocide does not occur. The non-government organisations from Kurdistan, Iraq, Kashmir, Kwang Ju, Montenegro, Punjab and Latin America, the Sudan and the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh all showed evidence of oppression by genocidal regimes. Moreover, the government delegate for Ethiopia described the conflict between Sierra Leone and Liberia as genocidal, although the word was largely eschewed by governmental statements. Human rights optimists tend to imagine a Utopia where just laws prevail against torture and genocide but law can be as much an instrument for as against genocide. So legalism is an unlikely solution. The strong word has, nevertheless, been given expression by many voices.

The enactment of trade sanctions provides the international community with one potential alternative to intensified law making. The nexus of democracy and free trade was explicitly recognised by the delegates for Sri Lanka, Burundi, Mongolia, Sierra Leone, the Asian Forum and the African women. The connection was not accepted uncritically and opinions of the benignity of democracy in this context were variable. The African delegates, for example, questioned the possibility of realising democracy in famine and war-stricken lands. The issue of national sovereignty informed much of the reserve, informing warnings about sham democracy which can mask a government agenda to violate human rights.

The anomaly of national sovereignty was illustrated by Iraqi case. As the delegate for the nation proclaimed sovereign, national rights to the international forum, individual people and minority peoples protested that they are taken to be chattels of state. They proffered photographs of the effects of physical torture to add emphasis to their protestations. Such illustrations brought an added poignancy to the remark of the delegate for Sao Tome and Principe that the minimum requirements of human rights include light.

The agenda of human rights is inseparable from the agenda of torture and genocide but they are not quite the same thing. When we are talking about human rights, what we are very carefully ignoring is genocide. We talk about genocide
and torture when we discuss human rights violations.

One of the main problems evident at the UNWCHR was the existence of a torture-genocide cycle. Out of state sanctioned torture, genocidal regimes tend to emerge. A corollary to this is the emergence of ideas of retributive genocide. Is the human rights rhetoric a smokescreen for genocidal intent? A petition pleads for an end to conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina by all available means. Is this an invitation to sign for a genocide to end genocide? When discussing human rights, are we also valorising techniques of genocide?

A profusion of ideas and wishes about human rights were vented at the UNWCHR. The discourse was chaotic and the issues were frequently unclear. Nevertheless, among the many voices, one chord arose which delivered to democracy the question of sovereignty. Who or what is and might be in possession of human rights? That question emerged in many guises, demonstrating a shared problem in need of solution.

Thus a need for improved definitions of human rights, and clarification of the precepts upon which such rights are and might be based, showed itself. This is not the same thing as a need for improved instruments of prosecution. What harmonised the diverse statements was a need for a means of expression, a rhetoric, of human decency. Despite poverty and exclusion, elitism and humiliation, there emerged an identifiable, common need for a peaceable dignity.

The juxtaposition of dignity and decency with barbarism, atrocity and abomination challenges the power of words. It taxes the vernacular, causing speakers to extend into their mythic antecedents in search of terms. One kind of words that is commonly chosen to attempt such ambitious expression can be described as apocalyptic. Verbiage such as, 'new world order', 'end of the human race' and 'millennium', were used formally by delegates for Burundi, Sierra Leone and the Asian Forum on Cultural Development. Thus an apocalyptic mythos was articulated which underpinned formal and informal discourse at the conference. The statement of the delegate for the Asian Forum on Cultural Development presents an extended example. Decrying colonialism as, 'An indelible mark of shame on the brow of civilisation', she invoked the apocalyptic figures of the satan and of recalcitrant human collusion in evil. Those figures call up eschatological images. Thus, in less than one sentence, a grand apocalyptic scenario was conjured into the discourse.

Here we have an example of apocalypse furnishing a literature, in this case an oral literature, of the oppressed. The statement of the delegate for the Asian Forum resonated with the words, 'bled white by colonialism', of the delegate for Burundi. Decolonisation was the missing issue of the conference.
In the silence, though, and emanating through scant verbiage, an apocalyptic ambience informed the conference. For example, during the second week, the Vienna International Centre became like an apocalyptic city. Many people stayed outside, like the Johannine shades, defined by the light of hope. But hope is not a method. Will more of the people find ways to contribute to considered discourse next time? Perhaps apocalyptic figures can provide some with a vehicle. I heard one group of people cheerfully agreeing in an upstairs washroom that we now live in interesting times as we enter an 'apocalyptic millennium'.

A polyvalent multiplicity which calls itself human was realised at the Vienna Conference. Humanity was trying to define itself. It is a wonder of diversity which cannot yet recognise its own parts. It is a multivocal entity which has not yet determined the sources of its own utterances. It is a conflicted being with many of its members struggling for resolution.
PARALLEL DOCUMENTATION

Apocalyptic verbiage was in evidence in the parallel documentation of the UNWCHR, although it was not prolific. For example, Press Release HR/3839, 15 June, 1993, gave us, 'new world order' and 'a new world'. Press Release HR/3834, 15 June, 1993, gave us, 'the dawn of a new millennium'. Although the end of the world was not invoked, the end of the century was mentioned at least five times. Put in context with a new world and a dawning millennium, the turn of the century tends to take on apocalyptic overtones.

The key issues of slavery, genocide, torture and victimisation were all addressed in the parallel documentation. Their general context, of course, was human rights. Many examples exist in the extensive United Nations documentation. A few of the diverse examples must suffice here to illustrate the variety of attitudes which were expressed toward these issues.

Statements by Ibrahima Fall, Assistant-Secretary-General for Human Rights and Secretary-General of the World Conference, set the agenda for the documentation. He asserted (Press Release HR/3834 15 June, 1993) that, because of the activities of the United Nations General Assembly, the areas of human rights protection have become increasingly precise. They are, suppression of genocide, abolition of slavery, efforts to combat torture, and elimination of all forms of discrimination based on race, gender, religion or belief. Thus genocide, slavery, torture and discrimination entered the discourse.

Special attention was given by Ibrahima Fall to the issue of torture. Press Release HR/3833, 9 June, 1993, reported a that together with the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples, the problem of refugees and of internally displaced persons and the elimination of torture was to be a focal issue of the conference.

Addressing matters of justice and freedom, Pascal Gayama, Assistant Secretary-General of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), asserted that Africa had been forced to come to grips historically with a terrible heritage of colonialism and slavery. He did not suggest that the problems of this heritage can be overcome by legislation but invited considered, ethical debate. By contrast,
Lojze Peterle, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovenia, asserted that a permanent international court should be established to deal with war crimes such as apartheid, genocide and white slavery. This statement was pre-emptive of debate, affirming an unequivocal legalism. Thus the issue of slavery was addressed.

The strong word, genocide, was published with regard to Bosnia Herzegovina, Palestine and racist discrimination in general. Press Release HR/3843, 16 June, 1993, mentioned genocide in a headline, 'World Human Rights Conference Appeals to Security Council to End Genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina'. The article told us that former United States President Jimmy Carter and delegates from twenty three other nations had made this call. Press Release HR/3847, 16 June, 1993, quoted Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), telling the UNWCHR that occupation is a violation of human rights 'tantamount to genocide'. Document HR/3849/Corr.1, 18 June, 1993, told us that Giovanno Conso, Minister of Justice of Italy, had said that national sovereignty, while remaining a basic element in international relations, must not be considered as an obstacle to appropriate attention and action by the international community, notably in cases of genocide or institutionalised racism.

It is evident that the parallel documentation presents no conflict to the oral discourse as we observed it. Both have shared the same key issues and demonstrated a variety of attitudes toward them. Both have maintained an almost subliminal but significant apocalyptic ambience. Both are inconclusive, containing the many contradictions, paradoxes and conflicts by which ideas about human rights are presently being formulated.
Three days after the end of the UNWCHR, a Final Declaration was released. A new vision for the next century was proclaimed. The human being [sic] was affirmed as the central subject of human rights; a high Commissioner for Human Rights was recommended; and individual responsibility for war crimes was affirmed; victims of human rights abuses were recognised; and 'universal authority' of human rights was bruited.

Two months after the end of the conference, the Secretary General issued a self-congratulatory press release, announcing a new level of cooperation between non-government organisations and the United Nations. One hundred and sixty two organisations participated actively in the conference and more than 2,000 individuals attended the Non Government Organisations' Human Rights Forum. The press release tells us that such cooperation indicates that the universality and breadth of the United Nations' perspective.

United Nations Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's 1992 Human Rights Day speech served as a background to the terms of reference by which the goals of the UNWCHR, were formed. According to the special issue of its review journal, Objective Justice, dedicated to reporting on the preparations for the conference, the major issues are, freedom from torture, starvation and discrimination; freedom to vote; freedom of belief; a right to education and health; and recognition of the dependence of development on democracy and popular participation. In short, 'to create an international culture of respect for human rights'. The aim of the conference, then, was to promulgate throughout the world an acceptance of democratic values linked to ideas of human dignity and decency.

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470 ibid., p. 5.

471 United Nations 'Secretary-General Calls for Greater UN NGO Cooperation in Field of Social Development' (Press Release SG/SM/5076: PL/824), 8 September, 1993, p. 5.


474 ibid., p. 3.
The Secretary General's speech had invoked a neological, apocalyptic horizon as he proclaimed a new world:

Here then, in 1992, a better world is within our reach. It is time to move forward deliberately and conscientiously towards the realisation of the vast potential of this unique Organisation and to bring new life to the world of the Charter.\textsuperscript{475}

The new world, as described in the 1992 speech, would comprise the preservation of the moral authority of the United Nations within a democratic family of nations.\textsuperscript{476} This includes recognition of the United Nations as a forum and a paradigm of the consensus building and socio-economic stability which are necessary to democratic, political freedom.\textsuperscript{477}

Humanitarian action, as far as possible, would be integrated with efforts to resolve the underlying causes of crisis. Otherwise it is futile. In Somalia, for example and in former Yugoslavia, the provision of humanitarian relief had been deliberately prevented. Such is the consequence of unresolved conflict.\textsuperscript{478} Numbers of internally displaced persons now exceed numbers of refugees and continue to increase. Although the post-war mechanisms for refugee assistance have served well, there is now need to review the institutional mandates.\textsuperscript{479}

Objective Justice reports that the decision to convene the conference was motivated by two accepted facts. Enormous progress has been made in spelling out human rights and human rights continue to be violated everywhere.\textsuperscript{480} A primary aim of the conference would be to make human rights integral to social and economic development everywhere.\textsuperscript{481}


\textsuperscript{476} ibid., p. 68, para. 169.

\textsuperscript{477} ibid., p. 67, para. 168.

\textsuperscript{478} ibid., p. 61, para. 156-157.

\textsuperscript{479} ibid., p. 62, para. 160.


\textsuperscript{481} ibid.
The specific objective of the conference was to assess progress in Human Rights since the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. That would entail identifying and overcoming obstacles to further progress; examining the relationship of development and human rights; finding ways to better implement human rights standards and treaties; strengthening United Nations promotional and monitoring mechanisms; and recommending ways to ensure the necessary financial resources. The focus was to be broad and the conference was not to be a forum for allegations of human rights violations in particular countries.\textsuperscript{482}

Non government organisations would be granted observer status at the conference. This was to enhance the relevance of the conference to the International Year of Indigenous People [sic singular, their usage]. Furthermore, non government organisations representing women, children, refugees, displaced persons, migrant workers, minorities, elderly and disabled people and AIDS sufferers would be included on the agenda so as to find ways to strengthen their rights.\textsuperscript{483}

The journal tells us that the International Year of Indigenous People was held to be of special relevance to a conference on human rights because indigenes all over the world have been brutally dispossessed. They have suffered genocide, slavery and servitude and forced to give up native languages, traditions and resources. Faced with poverty and discrimination, they seek increasingly to exercise a full range of human rights. An estimated 300 million indigenes inhabit 70 countries worldwide. Two problems are common among the indigenous peoples. Loss of ancestral lands and threat of forced assimilation. Indigenes are continually challenged by bias, marginalisation and alienation.

Stating that it remains unclear exactly how these various issues will be raised at the conference, the journal offers a brief history. In 1953 and 1969, two International Labour Office (ILO) conventions on indigenous populations came into being. In 1982, the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations was created. The group meets annually and many indigenous peoples' organisations attend as observers [sic observers, no voice]. The group is working toward a declaration of rights for indigenous peoples (sic plural). A draft now proclaims a right to protection from genocide; to maintain and develop distinct ethnic and cultural identities; use their own languages; own and control traditional lands and to be compensated for lands that are confiscated; to be consulted on development projects; and to exercise autonomy in local and internal affairs.\textsuperscript{484} In

\textsuperscript{482} ibid., p. 4. \\
\textsuperscript{483} ibid., p. 6. \\
\textsuperscript{484} ibid., pp. 22-25.
the light of this preparation, the disappointment of the indigenous peoples in the conference signifies faulty communications. Both expressive and receptive modes of communication fall into question as misunderstanding on a huge scale is evident.

Referring to matters of development, the organisers acknowledged that some countries object to standards of human rights compliance being imposed as a condition of their receiving aid. As consequence, it was expected that the question of national sovereignty would arise, especially with regard to United Nations authority in cases of human rights violations. The question, however, was not pursued by the planners so no terms of reference were laid out. We noted the enigmatic nature of the question of sovereignty at the conference. As it was implicit rather than explicit on the planners' agenda, the fact that it emerged at all might be taken as signifying its irrepressible importance.

Mary Robinson, President of Ireland, was the General Rapporteur to the conference. Her conclusions emphasised the importance of minimum standards of human rights. She affirmed that minimum standards are both universal and indivisible, that is, they are the elements of human life support. Thus Mary Robinson's critique takes its trajectory beyond issues of political sovereignty and cultural autonomy, into a common physicality.

Mary Robinson asserts that claims that human rights instruments are essentially Western in nature are to be resisted, because they erode universality with particularity. The subversion of the principle of universality undermines the minimum standards to which the international community is committed. Mary Robinson remarks that Western religions and culture have no monopoly on basic human rights; Islam, the Hindu-Buddhist traditions and other traditions all share in universal minimum standards which must not be eroded.

In this context, it is the rights not the humanity which possess indivisibility. Catherine Lalumiere, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, in her speech made in advance of the UNWCHR, made that same point:

Another fundamental principle is the indivisibility of human rights. These

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485 ibid., pp. 5-6.


487 Robertson, 1993, p. 3.
rights form an indivisible whole, whether they be civil, political, economic, social or cultural rights.\textsuperscript{488}

The notion of indivisible rights is not, however, the only interpretation. The word 'indivisible' was used in several of the contexts to mean several things at the conference. The poetry of an indivisible humanity sometimes pre-empted the agenda of indivisible human rights. Moreover, the notion of indivisibility itself was not universally accepted among delegates.

Neelan Tiruchelvam, in his speech to the interregional meeting organised by the Council of Europe in advance of the UNWCHR, explained the common criticism of the concept of indivisibility. He indicated the possible development of fascist oligarchies, as a consequence of donor generated development models, based on the notion of indivisible rights. In his model, the motif of indivisibility serves centralisation. Progressive exclusion from critical decision making follows centralisation, whose consequence is increased authoritarianism. Inequality and regional disparity increase with privatisation and commercialisation. These tendencies are increasingly incompatible with the realisation of human rights.\textsuperscript{489}

Robinson's conclusion, however, has more to do with the recognition of economic and social rights along with other human rights than it has to do with authoritarian centralisation. That is not to deny the importance of vigilance against authoritarianism. It is another aspect of the human rights complex. Robinson emphasises suffering, degradation and humiliation. Children, for example, dying of malnutrition at their mothers' breasts; imagine the profundity of the despair. Or take another example, 60,000 people sheltering in refugee encampment without a single latrine. Imagine the lassitude of a people who have not the energy to make their toilet. Thus Robinson illustrates the need for attainment of minimum standards.

In a world that is capable of providing 2,600 calories in food every day for every


person, failure to provide it diminishes everyone's humanity.\textsuperscript{490} So underdevelopment is a Human Rights violation. Catherine Lalumiere put this in plain terms:

under-development, hunger and poverty are abuses of the fundamental human rights of those afflicted by them; these might be said to be structural violations of human rights.\textsuperscript{491}

Robinson asserts that human rights cannot be left exclusively to United Nations, the European Community or national governments; a people to people response is required. She advocates an individual assumption of responsibility and engagement on a large scale.\textsuperscript{492}

What happened, then, at that conference which took twenty five years to come and three years to plan? Governments spoke and listened to other governments. Some of the non government organisations engaged in dialogue with others and with governments. People and peoples encountered others, forging in many ways the languages, methods and techniques by which human rights might be realised. How far did the conference take the people of the world toward the grand ambition of creating 'an international culture of respect for human rights'? It took us to the brink of a lacuna which, at this stage, we can neither bridge nor plumb. It took us to the perpetually unanswered and perpetually inspiring human question, What might it mean to be human?

\textsuperscript{490} Robertson, 1993, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{491} Lalumiere, 1993, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{492} Robertson, p. 9.
CHAPTER 17
ON VICTIM-SURVIVORS, CREATURES AND CREATORS:
DISCUSSION

Part One of this dissertation concluded by affirming the creativity of victim-survivors who use apocalyptic rhetoric to express their responses to conditions they find oppressive. Part Two puts forward some analytic observations of what has been created by use of that rhetoric. The whole study has investigated relationships between genocidal mentality and apocalyptic rhetoric. We find that there is no necessary connection but there is a strong preferred connection.

The activities and ideas which we have observed in relation to Crime Against Humanity, which includes the crime of genocide, provide strong evidence of this preference. We have observed the dependence of the concept of Crime Against Humanity on adversarial thought. This is expressed through apocalyptic rhetoric and founded on a dualism of good and evil which tends to demonise evil. We have noted also, in connection with the idea of indivisibility, that Crime Against Humanity assumes offence to the Christian god. This idea is also conveyed by apocalyptic rhetoric. There is a consequent confusion of heaven's justice and earth's laws. By a consequent and common anomaly of thought, law breaking is interpreted as an offence to God; abstract and material realities are mixed together; metaphysical wisdom falls into ignorance.

This anomaly is conveyed by the conflation of what the Johannine Apocalypse calls the fiery pool and the second death. We observed how concrete images, especially images of fire, have accrued to the concept of the second death, eclipsing redemptive, metaphysical thought with a vengeful psychoterror. Genocide stands in a twisted way for both the psychoterror and the metaphysic of annihilation. It stands at the nexus of the confusion, denying the interpenetration of metaphysical and physical realities by reducing them to one thing. So, through our study of the Johannine Apocalypse, we can diagnose the preference for connecting genocide and apocalypse to be an outgrowth of excessive concretisation, demonisation and conflation.

The Vichian and Fryeian thought which informs our religio-literary method, can be used to relate the Johannine Apocalypse to the United Nations process. We can express this in abstract as follows. The United Nations process largely ignores the existence of individual and small group selves. So does the Johannine Apocalypse. Instead, collective existence is proclaimed (certum-factum).

In United Nations terms, this collective existence is called national sovereignty but machinery for the realisation of sovereignty (verum-factum) is partial; incomplete. In Johannine terms the mystery of the second death can uphold the necessary machinery. As consequence, an anomaly arises in the United Nations discourse by
which the proclaimed certainty of sovereignty masquerades as a religious truth comprising both divine law and customary law or common sense wisdom (jus cogens). Self-determination, as it is understood in the contemporary vernacular, is an illusion sprung from that anomaly.

This is worrisome. It gives rise to an illusory goal of effective, international legislation, by which crimes against humanity can be prosecuted. Pursuit of this goal is counterproductive. This is because the anomalous focus by which the goal is envisioned makes invisible the alternatives by which change might be got. So, where we might otherwise find strategies for reconciliation, we find prescriptions for punishment.

Ideas of self-determination by which advocacy for human rights proceeds, bring genocide and apocalypse together in this way. We have shown them to be prefigured by ideas of slavery and freedom and reconfigured as victimology. Both of the structural figures maintain a dyadic relation of goodness with evil. Thus they inform a grand dramatic scenario in which humans are immersed in conflict.

This is an apocalyptic panorama in which people dream of choice but believe they have none. The rhetoric of human self-determination is constrained in this scenario by the immanence of the transcendent. In other words, human self-proclamation has no resonance, being absorbed by the white noise of a giant, self-proclaiming divine word.

In this connection, we can understand victimology, with its enthusiasm for law, as a contemporary version of the hierocratic apocalypticism described by Hanson. It uses apocalyptic images legalistically, trying to write down a human self-formation which maintains its intrinsically human identity, even in the presence of divine immanence. The legalism configures the metamorphoses of humanity in terms of creature and creator and literalises these terms to represent the human as the creature of divine creativity. Thus the law makers participate tacitly in the well known activity of the apocalypticists, claiming divine inspiration. What is forthcoming is not a new humanity but a new law.

What is human? This question is operant whenever law or poetry are present. To seek answers, we can redirect to apocalyptic rhetoric, ancient and contemporary, as we have done in this study. As we have observed, it can be enlightening to reinterpret pluralistically much of the interpretative literature which complements poetic apocalypses such as the Johannine Apocalypse. This is because the critical tradition has tended to overemphasise dualism and dichotomy in order to support a pre textual monotheism.

If we must dichotomise so as to create the interstices of signification which people want to explore, we might consider a human-humane dichotomy instead of
dislocating the human-demon and the human-divine. The more subtle form can accommodate better the idea of possible choice. Choice takes thought beyond legalism, not to a rejection of law but to a preference for less restrictive practises. By this approach, an apocalypse can facilitate more synergistic participation in change than humans usually imagine for themselves.

In a synergistic apocalypse a humane-divine reciprocity exists. This is not human subjugation to divinity, law, or any other entity. It is a sense of mutual, creative immanence which augments the traditional dualism of creator and creature. We meet with its basic rationale when we attend to the debate about the naming of victims, survivors, and victim-survivors. That debate is important to the field of torture-trauma.

Fieldwork caused me to alter the terms of my working title from 'victims' to 'victim-survivors'. It became evident that self-identification as a victim is inclined toward stasis, or repetitive re-affirmation of a victim posture which resists change. Insights from the field of torture-trauma recovery led me to appreciate the victim-survivor's preferred usage. These people understand how damaging it can be to have to establish victim status; to show, for example, that one does not have the protection of one's government. To seek asylum from another government one must do this. It is tantamount to rendering oneself defenceless. To survive this is to experience the kind of great change which is commonly described as apocalyptic.

In this connection, it can be useful to take up Robert Jay Lifton's intuition, that all of us are victim-survivors. Lifton relates this to the holocausts of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, suggesting that we all became hibakusha (atom bomb survivors) with the pika-don (flash-boom). To embrace rather than deny this can open up the possibilities which synergistic apocalypses explore:

... a higher self-regard. We feel more authentic in our life and work - as physicians or clergy, as scientists or artists, as teachers or students, as human beings alive to ultimate threat and hopeful of working toward a future beyond... threat.  

This is the antithesis of the commonly preferred association of genocide and apocalypse.

In the Johannine Apocalypse we meet with the idea of killing death; 'second death'. In this interpretation of apocalyptic rhetoric we have taken the idea to be metaphysical. We have understood the Johannine motif of redemption in terms of...

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493 Robert Jay Lifton, 'Toward a Nuclear Age Ethos' in The Future of Immortality and Other Essays for a Nuclear Age, p. 278.
the metaphysical idea. We have criticised the tendency to concretise this idea.

This is not to dichotomise metaphysical and physical realities but to understand their mutuality or interpenetration. Nor is it intended to imply that only these two aspects of perceived reality interpenetrate. We have argued for pluralism, multiplicity and miscellaneous in this matter.

We have found that the tendency to concretise the metaphysical poetry of the second death substantiates genocidal ideation. Concepts of extermination and annihilation collapse into images such as that of the fiery pool, fabricating a sign of expendability. We have found that sign to be current in contemporary apocalyptic rhetoric.

Some people fear annihilation in terms of extermination. Some seek to exterminate in order to annihilate. Apocalyptic horizons, eschatological and neological, provide images by which exponents of both these standpoints affirm their fears and wishes.

If the mistaken connection of genocide and apocalypse is to be undone, a dynamism or synergy needs entering into. This is what Altizer calls dynamic tension, what Hanson calls dynamic transcendence and what Frye calls participating. Through a dynamic or synergistic receptivity mediated views can be got. It can become evident that divergent horizons which support ideas of extermination can be augmented by convergence with other horizons. Where, for example, a schism of goodness and evil provokes the killing of so-called evil people, mediation can augment intervention. If we cannot love psychotic apes, we might expand into compassionate synergy enough to tolerate them.

So the connection of genocide and apocalypse is not to be defused by reducing conflicted dichotomies to one-point identifications. It is necessary to magnify the complexities of the apocalyptic vehicle. To illustrate, we advert to the Johannine line, 'each cursed thing shall no more be'. A Johannine thing, as it is conveyed by the English of 1388, is an immanent concatenation of events whose person gains identification by kerygma. This is not an individual in any modern or postmodern sense; it is an enigma finding form by relation to a god from whom it is indivisible. By its ignorance, such a being can annihilate. This is to redeem evil by ignoring it. Zoroastrianism teaches a similar precept, as does Buddhism. So the line has no necessary connection with genocide; it has to do with finding a tolerable, collective human self-determination.

Literature, the Johannine Apocalypse, for example or Robert Frost's 'Fire and Ice' which we mentioned in Chapter Two, frees imagination to explore how a viable humanity might be made and maintained. By reference to such literature, consequential action can be evaluated hypothetically. Critical attention to literary
hypotheses can facilitate imaginative explorations of the various ethical positions put forward by the literary rhetoric. Such positions can be understood not as precepts for action but as concepts for examination.

For example, to questions about the relationships of victims and apocalypses, we can pursue several hypotheses. As we observed, D.H. Lawrence hypothesises that apocalypses make victims. Paul Barnett hypothesises that apocalypses liberate victims. Paul D. Hanson hypothesises that victims make apocalypses. This study supports a hypothesis that victims are data of apocalypse. Any and all of these hypotheses can be judged true, if people make it so.

However, one would advocate reserve in accepting the kind of free association which supports Lawrence's hypothesis. Such an analysis, which proceeds by inference but without anchorage to precise textual references comprises little more than a creative but opinionated assertion. One wants to know why the author, by his spurious associative rhetoric, seeks to deny his own creation.

To entertain simultaneously a variety of hypotheses, if they are anchored to texts, can be illuminating. If, for example we take into account all (except Lawrence's) of the abovementioned hypotheses, we can critically reinterpret the contemporary apocalyptic rhetoric. We can begin to discern the tentative meanings of the contemporary apocalypses. We can begin to attune to apocalyptic rhetoric, as this study has attuned to the contemporary rhetoric of self-determination.

Are the people who appropriate apocalyptic terms to proclaim themselves as victims, survivors and victim-survivors trying to tell us that change is painful? Or are they trying to tell us that injustice is being done? Perhaps both, and neither; perhaps it is something else again. The hypothesis of pain is supported by agreement that apocalyptic scenarios include wars, famines, environmental degradation and torment. The hypothesis of injustice is supported by consensus that apocalyptic horizons include eschatological and neological images of judgement. These hypotheses, however, do not deny clever and inventive reparations, marvellous civil achievement and, most important, success in surviving. Apocalyptic rhetoric has a diversity of features, socio-political, revelatory, literary and religio-literary.

Apprehension of diversity, however, is likely to make very limited sense unless a harmonising idea is brought to it. Compassion can provide some necessary harmonics. The ideal and prejudicial aim of this study is to explore for paradigms of thought by which victimization can be rendered null. This intention rests on the premise that victimization is not an imperative of human existence. It rests also on a question, What, when we use and respond to apocalyptic rhetoric, are we choosing to make true?
As this discussion of apocalyptic rhetoric draws to its conclusion, some general issues require brief attention. This is to respond to challenges which did not arise from the research itself but from the pursuit of the research. The following questions were brought to the study by interested observers. I will do my best to answer them here.

To the question of advocacy of violence, put to me as a statement, 'there is no advocacy of violence in the Apocalypse', I respond that the study addresses assumptions of violence not advocacy of it. I agree that there is no evident advocacy for it in, for example, the Johannine Apocalypse.

To the question of singularity, also put to me as a statement, 'apocalypses are singular not plural; you cannot say 'creators'', I respond that the singular view is probably right but not absolutely right. The diverse perspectives by which apocalypses are approached will render up a variety of interpretations, all of them both right and wrong. I have put forward one alternative.

One is well advised to understand that the rhetoric of absolute singularity can be so strong in contemporary apocalyptic literature that it frightens people. This frightening kind of apocalypse can serve as a tool of psychoterror. So powerful is the rhetoric of psychoterror that its users can even frighten themselves with it.

We observed this particular hermeneutical danger while preparing the Masters Thesis which was the forerunner to the present document. During the 1980's, for example, 'nuclear Armageddon' was proclaimed as an apocalyptic threat, omnicidal and inevitable, by people all over the world who wanted to frighten the nuclear military industrial complex away. As consequence of their own forceful use of language, some of those people began to expect final catastrophe. Thus they toppled into the subject they set out to explain. That is poor critical practise which, having once diagnosed it, I have subsequently sought to avoid.

To write about 'creators' in this context is to write about religio-literary figures. As I stated in my Introduction, this is not a theological study and the entity known as Creator is not integral to our method. Creators, Creatures and Victim-Survivors seeks to remedy an overemphasis on singular forms which facilitates absolutism.

Finally, to the two questions provoked by my treatment of kerygma. The first, Why bother to describe the conventional literary forms before explaining about kerygma? The answer to this is that metaliterary kerygma can hardly be perceived, much less discussed, except by reference to the other tropes. To apprehend a fourth order of words, it is necessary first to have apprehended three. So I have explained kerygma as a performative element in what I have called a three-ring-circus of more conventionally recognised tropes.
The second question is derivative of the first and was put to me as a retort. Its only kerygma! Kerygma is interesting to religio-literary criticism as one element among others of literature, in this case of apocalyptic literature. Meaning is interstitial. We have invested in a ticket to a religio-literary three-ring-circus because that is where we can observe the performances of kerygma as well as those of other elements, enigmas and lacunae by which meanings are sometimes made.
CHAPTER 18
CONCLUSIONS
This study has, by use of a religio-literary method, put forward an inclusive and pluralistic reading of apocalypses which calls for tolerance. We have examined an eschatological horizon made up of the immediate and painful experience of emergent selves, focussed on suffering and torment. We have also examined a neological horizon, made up of hopeful futurism, looking to ameliorate a painful past while accommodating the change. We have observed that convergence of these two horizons can give rise to opportunities for self-identification by choice.

There are at least three perspectives from which this nexus of choice is describable. Three have been detailed in this study. They are called here metaphysical, material and convergent. From a metaphysical perspective a potential for annihilation, or the cancellation of each horizon by the other, becomes evident. In literary terms this works through a metaphorical operation in which one thing can be taken for another. Philosophically speaking, it offers a release from the concerns of selfhood identified by relation to an other. A 'second death' is put forward as a liberation.

From a materialist perspective, however, the abovementioned idea of annihilation can masquerade as a reversion to suffering and torment. The suffering is illusory but intolerable nevertheless. In this second condition, aspirations for improved futures are eclipsed and a form of psychoterror ensues.

The convergent perspective balances these eschatological and neological concerns to maintain a sense of continuity. The emergent selves who apprehend this kind of convergence can experience persons as concatenations of events, without fixation; always in flux.

This third alternative constitutes an immanentist humanism which this study has encountered and affirmed in relation to literature in general and apocalyptic literature in particular. Convergent vision and ideation makes it possible to witness the presence of selves who are contributors to the apocalyptic action. This constitutes a synergistic apocalypse whose creative entity is composed of an emergent human selves along with all that they encounter.

To discuss such constellations of apocalyptic symbols, an interpretative tool is required which can embrace physical and metaphysical elements. We have found that Vico's poetics can do this but in a limited way. Metamorphoses, for Vico, are bound to suffering and must always return to suffering. This is because in his metonymy, the essence of creativity is not possessed by the ones being changed. The people can talk themselves into being but their words belong to something not human.
Frye's poetics includes Vico's but, as we have shown, goes further toward an immanentist humanism. For Vico, people can talk themselves into being; making true facts of themselves. For Frye, that is passe. His poetics understands that to talk we breathe. To make things with our talk we breathe sense into our words.

To develop a critical analysis of apocalyptic literature which considers both the visions and thought conveyed by it, it is necessary to engage with at least three things at once. Our religio-literary method has done this by discerning of two horizons, their convergence, and the attendant kerygma. The two horizons furnish scenarios wherein the interplay of images can be observed. Their convergence enables the observation of the figures or emergent forms which are at issue. The kerygma provides voice and, if there are kerygmata, voices. These things can be taken as elements of apocalyptic literature. They are attended by enigma and silence, so there are six elements; seven when we count the observing self.

The horizons of law and prophesy (legislation and poetry, in modern terms) are very easy to discern. The horizon of law and legislation is very strong in the contemporary apocalyptic rhetoric of the 1990s. Exponents of the horizon of prophesy and poetry are embarrassed just now by the mythopoeic proclamations of new-world-coming among people immersed in genocidal activity. Burundi, for example and Sierra Leone. The legalistic horizon is not embarrassed by genocide; each is the other's raison d'etre.

Of the figures which can be discerned at the convergence of eschatological and neological horizons, the victim-survivor is the most evident. Its self-proclaiming voice makes this so. Self-determination is proclaimed by victim-survivors who, participating in eschatological drama and neological thought, seek to identify humanity.

Our critical exploration of apocalyptic literature has shown that four phases of literary expression course through them. They are poetic or metaphorical, legalistic of metonymic, transactional or demotic, and kerygmatic or self-proclamatory. Without irony we would probably be unable to discern these phases in terms of their differentiated forms. Irony enables the critical regard by which the interstitial nature of rhetorical expression can be addressed. So it is irony which makes possible our understanding of verum-factum of the identification of one thing with another.

The fourth order of words, however, depends on certum-factum rather than verum factum. The figure by which it can be discerned is kerygma which identifies things not with but as others. Kerygma is a radical trope.

Our research has shown that the matter of identification as requires particular attention with regard to apocalyptic evil. To identify someone or something as evil
can demonise them by personifying the satan, called Satan (Sathanas) in the Johannine text. Evil brings conflict into the apocalyptic scenario, rendering it dramatic. The adversarial character can give goodness something to talk to where otherwise silence would suffice.

Simply to break silence is to effect apocalyptic change. But persuasion toward goodness is all that change, expressed in words, can offer to evil. Thus a self-perpetuating, adversarial discourse is effected. Once entered into it promises no resolution; what it does offer is sustained drama in which evil emerges as a giant figure of mythological proportions.

Nevertheless, a disinterested humanity proclaims itself from time to time. It requires accommodation in the institutions of civility. Such self-proclamation is exemplified in this study by the voices of victim-survivors and their advocates. To accommodate them has required acknowledgment rather than denial of evil. That is what Frye points out by reference to the psychotic ape in the mirror of humanity.

The kerygma then, is transformational and tends not to be accessible to irony. Viewed ironically kerygma is reduced to simple assertion but taken as a metaliterary figure, comprising abstract concepts as well as concrete images, it is not simple, although it is very assertive. For example, kerygma can be taken to identify simultaneously as four persons; Holy Ghost-god, Supreme Father-god, and Humane Christ-god, and the human speaker. By encounter with kerygma we have found religio-literary symbolism to be a medium, and the critic to be a mediator, of an immanentist humanism located in apocalypses. The critic has become apocrificator.

Perhaps this is the kind of thing Thomas Altizer had in mind when he called for an immersion of Christianity in Buddhism. There are many paths by which the questions raised by contemporary apocalyptic rhetoric might be pursued. Whenever a person expresses the idea that beginning and end are one, apocalyptic poetry is likely to have been expressed. So we are wise to be wary any single myth.

How, then, might we approach the well established motif of creator-creature indivisibility? A both-and-more approach is necessary to a full investigation of this motif. Humans can be either, both, and more than creators and creatures. Where, how and whether we find identity depends on where, how and whether we look for it.

Where do we find human-as-creator? In the same place as human-as-creature. In our analysis, the Johannine Apocalypse demonstrates this. As we have shown, the Johannine Apocalypse puts forward alternatives of self-identification in a balanced
way which offers choice to the reader. It has become evident through our discussion that the choice is not simple; the possibilities of human identity are innumerable.

If we are what we make of ourselves, how shall we make ourselves tolerable to one another? We introduced this question, by reference to Camus and Lifton, as a motivating element of this thesis. We asked, How might one live in a world of executioners and victims without being the one or the other? We conclude that, by attending to a performative kerygma in context of a religio-literary three-ring-circus, we can undertake a compassionate exploration by which a tolerant humanity might be identified.
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Bureaucratic organisation for annihilation, absolute focus on the group and its rrolary, the assertion that the group poses absolute danger, distinguish the orish case. See Lifton, Nazi Doctors, 1986, p. xiii: 'Jews were the main object of e Nazi genocide'. See also p. 460, Lifton quotes from Hitler's statement, January 1, 1939: 'If international finance Jewry within Europe and abroad should succeed ce more in plunging the peoples into a world war, then the consequence will not Bolshevisation of the world and therewith the victory of Jewry, but on the ntrary, the destruction of the Jewish race in Europe.' See also 466-467.

The resurgence of Nazism in Germany is well illustrated by the emergence of Neo-Nazi ideologue Ingo Hasselbach, who was proclaimed Nazi Fuhrer of Berlin in 1992. There are several such Fuhrers in contemporary Germany. Christian Worch, Fuhrer of Hamburg, has been Hasselbach's mentor. To an interviewer's question about anti-
emitism, Hasselbach responded, "The Jews that I have known, myself and from story, have always been greedy penny-pinchers who always put themselves above hers as the chosen people and try to come into power from their almighty situation." To the question, "Are you acquainted with any Jews?", he answered "I once knew a Jew. Yes." Hasselbach advocates concentration camps for Jews, Gays and anarchists, 'to protect our society from aids'. Such delusional bigotry asasselbach's illustrates ignorance as a central problem of the Nazi worldview.

Elhanan Leibowitz interprets the resurgence of Nazism, now called neo Nazism, as an aspect of national identity which is equally problematic in Israel, Germany and nowhere. Of the state of Israel, he remarks, 'We are headed for Judaeo Nazism. I illustrate Nazi mentality in Israel he remarks that Jews who kill Arabs are seen many as heroes; an 18 month sentence was given to a Jew who shot into an Arab hooly yard, killing a child. Leibowitz tells us that after the Six-day War the state of Israel became a machinery for violent Jewish rule over Palestinians. Jewish generals give orders to break prisoners arms and legs and others are fulfilling them - that is the point... that was Eichmann's plea, "I have carried out legal orders"... and where does that put us, if we are using the same arguments as Eichmann?' He predicts that current policies, if enforced, will make Israel into a racist state, likely to become involved in a war of extermination with the entire Arab world. Leibowitz interprets the popularisation of Sho'ah (Holocaust) as a central phenomenon of Israeli nationalism, an attempt to forge a Jewish identity. He marks that Sho'ah was unmentionable in the 1950s.

Discrimination and consequent persecution are not unique to Romani people. Anti-Semitism is comparable, not least in that any anti-Semitism tends to evoke images and memory of the Nazi Holocaust. A majority of Jews believe that anti-Semitism is grown to such an extent that they should be particularly concerned about it but most non-Jews believe that anti-Semitism is unimportant. All forms of bigotry have their own and anti-Semitism is not a primary form of bigotry. Moreover, European anti-Semites feel more threatened by Muslim Algerians and Turkish guest workers than by Jews. A 1991 survey of the American Jewish Committee found that in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Gypsies, former Communist officials, international business representatives, Arabs, Asians and blacks all aroused more negative feelings than Jews: 'The principal threat now is not to Jews as such but to people who are considered strangers. The most cheering of the recent findings about anti-Semitism is not about anti-Semitism at all' Hertzberg, Arthur, 'Is Anti-Semitism Dying Out?' in New York Review of Books, June 24, 1993, pp. 51-57, esp. p. 57.

Extreme measures of a non-numerical kind also attend many of the responses to the details of the Nazi Holocaust. Literary critic George Steiner has remarked that he handles this material does so at their peril. Psychologist Alvarez has observed that several suicides of his acquaintance had prepared themselves by immersion in Holocaust literature. Writers of Holocaust testimony, Borowski, Amery, Celan, Wycz, Levi were all of them suicides. James E. Young makes the observation:
nunciating their pain seems not to have kept them from despair (as Camus suggested). No matter how survivors try to share their experiences, all that others can understand is that their memories are theirs alone. Young, James E., Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust: Narrative and the Consequences of Interpretation, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1988, p. 127. See also Danielli, 1985, p. 299. Danielli acknowledges the importance of the conspiracy of silence which developed as victims/survivors learned that many others preferred not to listen to them and those who did could not believe them. This was particularly painful for those who had survived by determination to bear witness.

People are forgotten also when figures of Nazi-persecuted Jewry are conflated to one grand figure of all persecuted persons. As memories crystallise into symbols, the figure of the 'Holocaust Jew' may become a stereotype. Young says: 'the Holocaust) might be said to have become "its own archetype"' ibid., p. 100; 21; pp. 99-116. Tony Judt, in her review of Susan Zucotti's book The Holocaust, the French and the Jews (Basic Books, 1993), makes a similar point; that the single minded concentration on that particular horror may preclude other concerns, placing the Jewish experience in something of a vacuum of self indulgence. Judt, Tony, Betrayal in France' in New York Review of Books, Vol. XL No. 14, August 12, 1993, p. 31-34.

Bauer is Director of the Holocaust Studies Centre, University of Jerusalem, author of several books and international scholar and speaker. His proclaimed mission is to prevent the denial of the Holocaust by which he strictly denotes only the Jewish persecution and genocide under the Third Reich. Bauer warns against searching for an exclusively metaphysical comprehension of the Nazi Holocaust. Questions like, Who were the murderers? and When was the mass murder planned and why? are preferred by Bauer. To face such questions is, he tells us, essential to understanding of the more symbolic expressions of response to the Nazi Holocaust, such as literature. Bauer argues that failure to face such questions renders literature escapist. Young, 1988, p. 88.

According to Bettleheim, two disturbing aspects of humanity, the wanton destroyer and the victim shorn of all defences, are what the Nazi Holocaust signifies. Such a symbol, understood as a lived experience, is, Bettleheim knows, burdensome. Denial is a natural but unwise response. Here are some of Bettleheim's facts. Systematic extermination of Jews commenced after U.S. entry into the war. Gas chambers were first used in the euthanasia programme but public reaction put an end to it. There was no such reaction against the mass murder of Jews. Many Germans, not only Nazis, benefited materially from the persecution of the Jews. From 1933 to the beginning of the war the Nazi state wanted to get rid of the Jews by resettlement but no country would have them. Later, the Nazis offered a clandestine deal America to sponsor and resettle German Jews but the American government would not permit the deal. Not only the German people but people all over the world knew the plight of the Jews and did not intervene. People who were murdered by the Nazi state were not martyrs; they did not die for a cause nor did they choose death.'The Holocaust - One Generation Later' from Bettleheim, Bruno, Surviving the Holocaust, Fontana, London, 1979 (Revised 1986), pp. 192-214. See also Frankl, Viktor, Logotherapy: Man's Search for Meaning, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1959.
The word 'Holocaust' is itself controversial in this connection. Comments from Bruno Bettleheim and James Young serve as exemplars here. It was Americans who termed the mass murder conducted by the Nazi state 'the Holocaust'. Bettleheim asserts that it is a misnomer which functions as a distancing device by which intellectual responses are facilitated and emotional responses are suppressed. Moreover it resonates discordantly with memories of the sacrificial rituals celebrated by the ancient psalmists. This Bettleheim calls a profanation of God and man. He points out that the Nazis used similar circumlocution when their mass murder of Jews was described as the 'final solution'. 'The Holocaust - One Generation Later' from Bettleheim, Bruno, Surviving the Holocaust, Fontana, London, 1979 (Revised 1986), pp. 192-214. See also Young, 1988, pp. 85-88. Young precises the importance of naming thus: 'As one of the first hermeneutical moves regarding an event, its naming frames and remembers events, even as it determines particular knowledge of events.' The terms 'Holocaust' and 'shoah' evoke other, earlier destructions, especially massacres. The Hebrew word shoah resonates with Old Testament writings, especially those describing the repeated destruction of Israel. In Biblical texts, the Greek Holokauston is consonant with the Hebrew ola, signifying sacrifice by fire. Hence the English word Holocaust refers to destruction by conflagration.

Bruno Bettleheim's many publications describe the salient features of the Nazi Holocaust. The idea of mass murder on a gigantic scale was embraced by the millions who accepted Adolf Hitler as their Fuhrer. These were normal, ordinary people who allowed a system to rule them. Mass extermination of people has occurred throughout history; the Nazi Holocaust is made unique by its modern scientific and pseudo-scientific rationale and European cultural acceptance thereof. Eugenics is at the foundation of Nazi Holocaust thinking; 'this pseudo-science of racism'. Without technology, eugenics could not have killed so many people. Take, for example, this communication from the providers of gas chambers: 'We acknowledge your receipt for five triple furnaces, including two electric elevators for raising corpses' and 'For putting the bodies into the furnace, we suggest simply a metal fork moving on rollers'. The cooperation of efficient technology and pseudo-scientific delusions is a real danger. The 'only effective antidotes against this danger... (is) this ability of our imagination to suffer with and for our fellow human beings'. Bettleheim, Bruno, 'Introduction', Surviving the Holocaust, Fontana, London, 1979 (Revised 1986), pp. 9-13, esp. p. 13.

The Memorial Book has entered Holocaust literature although, there are battles about what constitutes 'real' Holocaust literature. Some refuse to admit works not written during or immediately after the events. This is a form of denial, the issue of reality versus unreality displaces horror. Countering this demand for immediacy,ewish philosopher Emile Fackenheim, whose search for appropriate response to the Nazi Holocaust has entered Holocaust literature, has reported that it took several years before his experiences during his internment at Sachsenhausen began to gain herence. A literary problem arises because the violence of the Nazi Holocaust tends to be diminished by written reportage because there are difficulties of presentation of the facts of the Nazi Holocaust. Moreover, factual reportage is achieved by excluding (not including) as much data as possible. The literary
Problem spills into quotidian life as some write to prove that they defeated the
inal solution but, as they write, they observe that some things can lose existence
being named. This constitutes a sticking point. (This is discussed by Frederick
offman in *The Mortal No*, Princeton University Press, 1964; Ricoeur's idea of
ulated error', Jameson's 'ideology of a text', and Derrida's 'White
ology'. Young, 1988, pp. 32-33; p. 67; p. 91. See also Buck, Joan Juliet, 'An
review of Louis Begley's novel *The Man Who Was Late*. Buck tells us that Begley
caped, as a child with his parents, to America from the Warsaw ghetto. At the age
55, after maintaining an almost complete silence on the subject of the Nazi
ocaust, Begley decided 'an abridged, ironic version would do.'
The incongruity of holding one person responsible for the state sanctioned
nder of millions must be noted. Bettleheim discusses this with reference to
mann, pointing out that what Eichmann did was to talk to people and to sign
ers. It was others who carried out the orders. As corollary, there is no justice
ishing Eichmann for Pharaoh's misdeeds. 'Eichmann: the System, the Victims'
om Bettleheim, Bruno, *Surviving the Holocaust*, Fontana, London, 1979 (Revised
6), pp. 133-149. See also Buruma, Ian, 'The Anarch at Twilight' in *New York
view of Books*, June 24, 1993, pp. 27-30, esp. p. 27. Buruma reviews two books by
st Junger, *Aladdin's Problem* and *A Dangerous Encounter*, and conducts an
view with Junger who remarks that Hitler was not special but a product of his
me who did what (we) all wanted by expunging the humiliation of Versailles and
ting rid of unemployment but then he spoiled everything with the excesses of the
i state.
'Survival of the fittest' and natural 'struggle' and 'selection' entered the
zi rhetoric but they rejected much of Darwinism because of its egalitarian view
nings. By undertaking selections, Nazis sought to control evolution (not a
rian principle), making their own version of it. Lifton, *Nazi Doctors*, 1986,
. 16-17.
Death was not always viewed as a penalty in Nazi Germany. Toward the end of
88, relatives of children with perceived deformities or impairments were
esting euthanasia or 'mercy killing' of infants. The case of baby Knauer,
d in the absence of law by Chancellor Hitler, whose death was decreed in
939, marked the commencement of the euthanasia programme. Lifton, *Nazi Doctors*,
6, pp. 50-51; f'n 15 p. 50.
To dwell inside divine history is to be a chosen one, such as, Henry Kissinger,
reportedly found the Nazi holocaust disturbing because it severed the link
 tween his god's will and the progress of history. Frank Devine, 'More Tricky than
cky', a review of Walter Isaacson's book, *Kissinger*, in the Weekend Review of the
Cohn's Warrant for Genocide tells us that about one third of the civilians
led by the Nazis were Jews whose situation was unique because they were singled
 for hatred, torment and humiliation in ways that others were not. This hatred
explained by Cohn in terms of the development from mediæval to modern times of
belief, especially among Christians, in a world conspiracy among Jews to dominate others by subterfuge and material gain. That belief, Cohn tells us, is achieved as colligation of ideas in the forged document known as the Protocols of Zion: after the French Revolution, the myth of the Jewish world conspiracy developed out of traditional demonology; how it inspired a whole series of forgeries, culminating in the Protocols of Zion, how the Protocols were used to justify the massacres of Jews during the Russian civil war; how they swept the world after the First World War; how they took possession of Hitler's mind and became the ideology of his most natical followers at home and abroad - and so helped to prepare the way for the annihilation of European Jews.' Cohn tells us that Bruno Bettelheim (The Informed Heart, 1961) found that the SS guards at Dachau and Buchenwald believed absolutely in the Jewish conspiracy. Cohn, 1970, p. 11; 13; 235.

Cohn points out that Hitler's fanaticism motivated systematic extermination in the form of Entfernung, the removal of the Jews altogether. One of Cohn's examples of the Nazi extermination of Jews comes from SS doctor Pfannensteil, who, after seeing the numerous dead at Treblinka, remarked to Globocnik, the local SS head, 'Looking at the bodies of the Jews, one understands the greatness of your good work.' Cohn, 1970, p. 199; p. 236.

See Cocks, Geoffrey, Oxford University Press, New York, 1985, pp. 11-12; 104. 'It is true that German psychiatrists were mobilised to some degree to espouse the exercise of Nazi eugenics, that is, the merciless treatment of those deemed fit for inclusion in the racial community (Volksgemeinschaft). The Nazis attempted to single out, exclude, sterilise, and finally exterminate all those individuals suffering from severe incurable or congenital mental illnesses - whom they defined, like the Jews, as biological enemies. They exercised the same brutality toward many mental patients as they did toward their political opponents... While the full extent of the perversion of psychotherapy as an active exercise in racial anti-Semitism in medical practice remained unrealised by the Nazis, we have noted that this was not the case with psychiatry... The psychiatrists' scientific tendency to objectify the human subject was often lethal to their hands.'

Young interprets the metaphorical operation by which people were seen as vermin 'archetypal thinking'. His view construes as inevitable certain responses to particular cues, e.g., pest means exterminate. Young considers such thinking dangerous because, by manipulation of the archetypes, compulsions can be created. Young, 1988, pp. 94-95; 98. This exemplifies the power of metaphor at work in what David Roskies has called 'the most demonic of conspiracies between literature and life.' Roskies, David, Against the Apocalypse, Harvard University Press, instituted appropriated Jung's theory of archetypes, pursuing a project called 'Forest and Tree in Aryan-German Spiritual and Cultural History', which was piloted as a proposal called 'Forest and Tree in Dreams'. It was to be funded in part by the Reich Forestry Office but Ancestral Research was the catch-all into which the
The idea of Lebensunwertes Leben, life unworthy of life, is more relevant than racism. The escalation from coercive sterilisation to killing then mass killing was sanctioned under the notion of 'impairment'. People who were classified as impaired were described as ballast, 'empty shells' and 'already dead'. See Lifton, Nazi Doctors, 1986, p. 21ff; p. 47. The confusion of race, class, category, kind, and her labels is illustrated by the Nazi's laws against homosexuality, See Cocks, 85, Ch. 6. 'The Institute at Work', Subsection 4. 'Homosexuality, Infertility, and Other Problems: "The Institute and the SS", pp. 202-216. Homosexuality was a crime punishable by not one but three sections of the German Penal Code. It was regarded as national and biological treason and associated with notions of cultural cline. Homosexuality was recognised as something to be transcended; failure to ascend rendered one a degenerate, 'a homunculus and therefore excluded from the race of life.'ibid., p. 206. The homosexual activities of their beloved young, however, precipitated a need for further categorisation: 'The Nazis were forced to distinguish between homosexuals per se, who they declared to be biologically degenerate, and the susceptibility of Aryan adolescents of good stock and breeding merged with regard to childlessness: 'Under Hitler the problem of homosexuality was linked to another priority: that of combating the declining birth rate. Childless people were viewed as suffering from physiological or psychogenic infertility and social health insurance covered the cost of so-called curative intervention, ibid., pp. 210-211. Note also the complications which arose with regard to neurotics: 'The major question for psychotherapists of the Third Reich was how to deal with neurosis among their patients... (they argued that) mental function (of a neurotic kind) was a result of conflict, not heredity, conscious obedience, greed, or cowardice.' ibid., p. 103.