Copyright in relation to this thesis*

Under the Copyright Act 1968 (several provisions of which are referred to below), this thesis must be used only under the normal conditions of scholarly fair dealing for the purposes of research, criticism or review. In particular no results or conclusions should be extracted from it, nor should it be copied or closely paraphrased in whole or in part without the written consent of the author. Proper written acknowledgement should be made for any assistance obtained from this thesis.

Under Section 35(2) of the Copyright Act 1968 the ‘author of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work is the owner of any copyright subsisting in the work’. By virtue of Section 32(1) copyright ‘subsists in an original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work that is unpublished’ and of which the author was an Australian citizen, an Australian protected person or a person resident in Australia.

The Act, by Section 36(1) provides: ‘Subject to this Act, the copyright in a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work is infringed by a person who, not being the owner of the copyright and without the licence of the owner of the copyright, does in Australia, or authorises the doing in Australia of, any act comprised in the copyright’.

Section 31(1)(a)(i) provides that copyright includes the exclusive right to ‘reproduce the work in a material form’. Thus, copyright is infringed by a person who, not being the owner of the copyright and without the licence of the owner of the copyright, reproduces or authorises the reproduction of a work, or of more than a reasonable part of the work, in a material form, unless the reproduction is a ‘fair dealing’ with the work ‘for the purpose of research or study’ as further defined in Sections 40 and 41 of the Act.

Keith Jennings
Registrar

*‘Thesis’ includes ‘treatise’, ‘dissertation’ and other similar productions.
AUSTRALIA-JAPAN RELATIONS IN THE ERA OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE, 1896-1911

by

Isami Takeda

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to explore the importance of Japan in the formulation of Australia's defence and foreign policy between 1896 and 1911. The emphasis is on Australia's policy towards Japan. This is the first study which comprehensively looks at the immigration, trade and defence aspects of Australia-Japan relations in this period. This study attempts to examine Australia's perceptions of and attitudes to Japan, the major factors and motives behind Australia's policy-making on Japan, and the consistency of Australia's foreign and defence policy-making on Japan.

In the field of immigration, Japan became the central concern of Australian politicians; the parliamentary debates on the Immigration Restriction Bill of 1901, which laid the basis for Australia's immigration policy for more than 50 years, concentrated on the Japanese. In its external trade relations, Australia gradually regarded Japan as one of the important countries in the Asia-Pacific region. In the broad context of Australia's foreign and defence policy, the Russo-Japanese war was a turning point. The recognition of Japan as the most formidable naval power in the Pacific caused at the end of the war special anxiety in Australia; Australia began to see Japan as a military threat. The Japanese which had been considered only in connection with Australia's immigration policy and trade development were now the focus of attention in the area of national security. After 1905, fear of Japan was at the centre of Australia's defence policy. To cope with the new international tensions in the Pacific, Australia's decision-makers adopted three policies toward Japan. As a short-range policy, Australia tried to pursue conciliatory measures such as an amendment of the Immigration Restriction Act in 1905 which
would ease friction with Japan. As a medium-range policy, Australia adopted and supported the continuation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. As a long-range policy, Australia sought to build its own national defence power against a future Japanese invasion by introducing compulsory military training and constructing Australia's own navy.
AUSTRALIA-JAPAN RELATIONS
IN THE ERA OF
THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE,
1896–1911

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in History

by

Isami Takeda

Trinity Term, 1984
The University of Sydney
CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS i

ABBREVIATIONS v

AUTHOR'S NOTE vi

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II. THE ORIGINS OF THE JAPANESE QUESTION IN AUSTRALIA, 1896-1900 11

III. THE WHITE AUSTRALIA POLICY AND JAPAN 45

IV. AUSTRALIA'S RECEPTION OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE, 1902 60

V. AUSTRALIA-JAPAN TRADE AND THE NSW COMMERCIAL AGENCY 74

VI. AUSTRALIA'S RESPONSE TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 106

VII. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR FOR AUSTRALIA-JAPAN RELATIONS, 1905-1907 141

VIII. GROWTH OF AUSTRALIA-JAPAN TENSION AND THE 1911 RENEWAL OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 210

IX. CONCLUSION 312

BIBLIOGRAPHY 322
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In the preparation of this thesis, I have incurred many debts of gratitude to individuals and to institutions. Professor Neville K. Meaney of Sydney University, my supervisor, gave me generous guidance and persistent encouragement over a number of years, and provided me with invaluable intellectual stimulus, new insights and sometimes trenchant criticisms. Without his untiring supervision, this thesis would never have been completed. To him above all I owe thanks.

Professor Ian Nish of the London School of Economics helped me to understand the essentials of my argument in the initial stages of my research. He introduced me to the diary and papers of Ernest Satow. It was a great pleasure to exchange views with a scholar of such high standing. I am also grateful to Mr D.C.S. Sissons of the Australian National University, who generously allowed me to make use of his unpublished MA thesis and other research papers of his. He kindly aided me with some details of the Australian-Japanese relations from the 19th to the early 20th century. With his comments, I was saved from falling into many pitfalls.

At the Institute of the Commonwealth Studies in London University, Dr Peter Lyon and Dr R.F. Holland showed me great hospitality. They allowed me to participate in the Commonwealth Seminar and gave me many constructive suggestions. My days in London were much more fruitful than I could have hoped because of them. I particularly want to thank Professor Peter Lowe of the University of Manchester, who stimulated my interest in the British policy towards Japan and encouraged me in many ways.

I would like to thank Professor Rōyama Michio and Professor Shiratori Rei, who were my former supervisors respectively at Sophia University
and Dokkyo University. They gave me access to the field of Australian studies and political science. My gratitude is also extended to Professor Kawata Tadashi of Sophia University, who followed with sympathetic interest the progress of my research and offered his competent advice. Professor Watanabe Akio of Tokyo University helped me to think out the characteristics of Japan's foreign policy through a series of discussions, and I am deeply grateful to Professor Nakajima Mineo of Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, whose perceptive comments were greatly appreciated. Professor Miyata Ikuo of Kagoshima University supplied beneficial information on more the detailed aspects about economic field, in particular statistics, while he was a visiting Professor to Sydney University. My talks with him formed an unforgettable part of my memory of time in Sydney.

I should also like to express my sincere gratitude to Professor Kawaguchi Hiroshi of Seikei University and Professor Usui Hisakazu of Dokkyo University. They have been always helpful to me both with academic and personal matters since I met them in Tokyo in early 1970s. Under their guidance I learned a great deal.

My thanks must also go to the following scholars who gave me useful suggestions on various subjects: Professor W.G. Beasley (SOAS, London University) on Japanese foreign policy, Dr Andrew Porter (King's College, London University) on Salisbury's diplomacy, Dr Colin Newbury (Commonwealth Institute at Oxford University) on colonialism, Professor Norman Graebner (University of Virginia and the visiting Professor to Sydney University) on the U.S. diplomacy in the Pacific, Professor Matsuda Mikio (Dokkyo University) on international judicial status of the Dominions in the pre-war era, Professor Ishii Mayako (Dokkyo University) on British economic imperialism in the Far East, and Dr Sugiyama Shinya (London University) on Japanese trade activities in the Far East. Professor Tsunoyama Sakae
of Wakayama University and Professor Yamamoto Yuzō of Kyoto University
who kindly permitted me to participate in the seminar held at Kyoto
University on the subject of Japanese commercial relations in 1982. With
their generosity, I could examine valuable collections of Tsushō Isan
(Japanese commercial report).

I am pleased to thank Mr John B. Armstrong and Mr Robert Thornton
for the permission of using their unpublished MA theses which proved
useful to my research.

For their unfailing assistance in research, I am much indebted to
a number of librarians: Ms Edwards of Australian Archives, Mr William
Fogarty of the Australian War Memorial, Ms S. Surman of the Bodleian
Library at Oxford University, Ms Pamela Porter of the Department of
Manuscripts in British Museum, Ms Yamada Hiroko, Mr Kikuchi Kōichi,
Mr Kamiyama Akiohoshi and Mr Inoue Yūichi of Japanese Diplomatic
Record Office (JFMA) in Tokyo. And I especially express my heartfelt
appreciation to Ms Angela Houstoun, the Search Department of the Public
Record Office in London for her detailed references and assistance. They
have been thoughtful enough in locating and forwarding materials from
archives and most patient with my questions. In addition, Ms Margaret
Woodhouse in Sydney was very kind to show me rare collections of her
pictorial cards printed "the U.S. Great White Fleet's Visit to Australia."

Mr David Crawford of Sydney University has read each chapter
of this thesis and has been most generous with his time and advice. I
am extremely thankful not only for his accurate corrections but also
his friendship. I am further indebted to Ms Wilma Sharp who has typed
my manuscript. She performed this task with precision.

Life in Sydney has been most pleasant and happy with many friends,
in particular, Mr Ōsawa Mikio of the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Mr Aoki Hiroshi
and Mr Tsuchida Jutarō of the Asahi Shimbun, Mr Melchor Tatlonghari of Singapore University, Mr Stephen Garrett, and Mr and Mrs Young-Sok Song. At the University of Sydney, Mr A. Cahill, once my acting supervisor, Ms B. Purkis and Ms J. Thuraisingam have each in their own way made a contribution to the progress of my study. I appreciate very much their constant support and understanding of my work.

My research has been aided by both the University of Sydney and the Australia-Japan Foundation, which generously granted me vital and timely financial assistance. With a Research Grant from the Australia-Japan Foundation, I accomplished my research in Britain and Japan. Most importantly, I wish to convey my thanks to the Executive Director Mr P. Hocker, Mr Ross Westcott and Mr Allan Noble of the Australia-Japan Foundation and the former advisor, Mr Hori Takeaki who is my "onshi" in Sydney.

Finally, I must thank both the Takeda and the Kaneda families and my wife. I dedicate this book to them with respect.
ABBREVIATIONS

AA Australian Archives
ANU Australian National University
AWM Australian War Memorial
C.D.C. Colonial Defence Committee
C.I.D. Committee of Imperial Defence
C.O. Colonial Office
C.P.D. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates
CPP Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers
DAIA *Documents on Australian International Affairs, 1901-1918*, edited by G. Greenwood and C. Grimshaw
DT Daily Telegraph (Sydney)
F.O. Foreign Office
JFMA Japanese Foreign Ministry's Archives (Nihon Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan)
M.P. Member of Parliament
NGB Nihon Gaikō Bunsho (Japanese Diplomatic Documents)
NSW New South Wales
NSWPD New South Wales Parliamentary Debates
PRO Public Record Office, London
SMH Sydney Morning Herald
In Japanese personal names, the family name proceeds the given name.

Some words are used interchangeably in this thesis. The term "Commonwealth government", "federal government" and "Australian government" are used interchangeably. The term "Dominions" is also used sometimes instead of "self-governing colonies", when this thesis touches upon the imperial affairs after the 1907 Colonial Conference.

When referring to or citing Japanese language materials, original titles are romanized, and length marks, for instance Katō, are omitted where some of the generally accepted common proper nouns such as Tokyo are referred to.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to explore the importance of Japan in the formulation of Australia's defence and foreign policy between 1896 and 1911. This is the first study combining the history of Australia-Japan relations in the fields of immigration, trade and defence. Likewise it is the first study of this nature using various published and unpublished materials in Australia, Japan and Britain. This study has been undertaken in the hope that it will contribute to answering the following three questions: First, what were the distinct Australian perceptions of and attitudes to Japan? Secondly, What were the major factors and motives behind Australia's policy towards Japan in the fields of immigration, commerce and defence? Thirdly, what was the pattern of Australia's foreign and defence policy with respect to Japan?

This thesis examines the period 1896-1911. The year 1896 is most important because Japan established its first consulate in Australia, to be staffed by Japanese consuls. It is also important because "Japan" made its first appearance as a topic in the colonial parliamentary debates. Finally it is important because in the following year Queensland adhered to the 1894 Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty which led to the colony signing the gentleman's agreement with Japan in 1900. During the period from 1896 to 1911, when the Anglo-Japanese alliance was renewed for the last time, there was a crystallization of Australia's attitudes towards Japan on matters dealing with immigration, trade and defence.

The subject of this study is not entirely new. There are already some important works. Among them, D.C.S. Sissons has made a major contribution to the study of Australia-Japan relations. His regrettable
unpublished MA thesis "Attitudes to Japan and Defence, 1890-1923" is the most authoritative and classical work which examines consistently Australia's defence attitudes to Japan through a study of three events — the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5, the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 and the first World War of 1914-8. In his study, two important points are made. First, the Sino-Japanese war had no substantial impact on Australia's defence attitudes, and secondly, it was the Russo-Japanese war which caused a major shift in these attitudes. The result was that Australia perceived a military threat from Japan.\(^1\) The work confines itself to explaining Australia's changing attitudes to Japan, when the latter waged three different wars against China, Russia and Germany.

Despite its thorough analysis of these particular questions, it does not show Australia's attitudes to the Anglo-Japanese alliance which considerably influenced Australia's strategic thinking, nor attitudes to the visit of the US Great White Fleet, which took place in the height of Australia's fear of Japan. Later his research extended to Japanese immigration questions. There are series of works undertaken in the 1970s including a biographical study of Japanese migrants of the Takasuka family,\(^2\) a study on Japanese prostitutes and labourers in northern Australia,\(^3\) a study dealing with Japan's motives behind a proposal for racial equality clause

at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. With the exception of the study on the Japanese racial equality clause, the common theme of these exhaustive works is to explain the aspects of the Japanese immigration question in Australia. Although they have undoubtedly contributed to a better understanding of the Japanese immigration to Australia, there is only a brief treatment of the decision-making of the federal government on the immigration questions and its diplomatic negotiations with Japan. None of these works, including his MA thesis, examine the diplomatic aspects of the Japanese immigration questions between 1901 and 1905, nor do they analyze the Anglo-Australian discussions and disputes over the subject of the Japanese questions.

The diplomatic side of the Japanese immigration questions in Australia have been studied by A.T. Yarwood, J. Armstrong and K.J. Melhuish. A.T. Yarwood has revised a classical work of Myra Willard, and examined thoroughly the policy and administration of the White Australia policy from the late 19th century to 1923. One of his important contributions is to shed light on the international dimension of the White Australia policy, in particular the Australia-Japan diplomatic negotiations in the late 1890s. He has made a comprehensive study of Asian immigration to Australia generally and in 1964 published the most standard and authoritative book Asian Migration to Australia, one chapter of which is devoted to the Japanese immigration issue. This chapter is mainly concerned with the diplomatic negotiations between Australia and Japan in 1904 and


1905. In it, however, there is little treatment of the motives behind Australia's decision to open the negotiations with the Japanese government. J. Armstrong has made a detailed and important survey of the Japanese immigration question in Queensland in the 19th century. It is the first major attempt to trace the evolution of the Japanese question in Queensland and its decision to adhere to the 1894 Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty. While Armstrong is restricted to case study of Queensland, K.J. Melhuish places the similar issue in the broader context of inter-colonial relations.

N.K. Meaney examines the Japanese questions in the broad framework of Australia's foreign and defence policy in the Pacific. His main concern is to evaluate the Japanese question through a concept of security. In his book The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14, he illustrates how Australia's national security had been jeopardised by changing international relations in the Pacific as well as in Europe. He notes the growing importance of Japan in Australia's Pacific policy, especially in matters touching immigration and defence. This is one of the most important works

7. A.T. Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia: The Background to Exclusion 1896-1923, Melbourne, 1983, Ch.5.
which places Japan in the broad context of Australia's foreign and defence policy-making. It, however, does not show the whole spectrum Japanese issues which influenced Australia's policy-making.

From the viewpoint of the British foreign policy, there are the three major works, those of I.H. Nish, N.R. Bennet and P. Lowe. Nish places Australia's position in the perspectives of Anglo-Japanese diplomacy. His article, "Australia and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1901-1911," is the only article which attempts to assess Australia's impact on the continuity of the Anglo-Japanese alliance negotiations from 1902-1911. 11 Bennet examines Australia's attitudes to and role in the development of the Anglo-Japanese alliance from 1902-1911. He attempts to evaluate Australia's influence on British policy towards Japan and concludes that Australia had a considerable impact on Britain's decision to renew the alliance at the 1911 Imperial Conference. 12 On the other hand, Lowe reaches a different conclusion. His article "The British Empire and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1911-1915" and book Great Britain and Japan, 1911-1915 show that though the British government had consulted Australia, Britain's decision to renew the alliance in 1911 was not directly influenced by Australia. 13 Since their main interest of research is in the British policy-making, they do not elaborate on Australia's views of the alliance.

Scholars, as noted above, have examined various aspects of Australia's relations with Japan, and Britain on the subject of Japanese questions such as immigration and defence. There has been, however, no attempt

---

to illustrate the position of Japan overall in Australia's policy-making in the field of immigration, commerce and defence between 1896 and 1911.

During the period 1896-1911, Australia became a federated nation and faced, for the first time, major imperial and international questions in the field of immigration, commerce and defence. It was chiefly about Japan that these questions were raised. Japan was replacing France, Germany and Russia as Australia's most important international problem in the Pacific. The major problems which Japan presented to Australia were new and complex. In the process of formulating Australia's foreign and defence policy towards Japan, there were three dimensions of international and imperial relations which Australia had to take into account: the Anglo-Japanese relationship, the Anglo-Australian relationship and the Australia-Japan relationship.

(1) The Anglo-Japanese Dimension

There emerged a new international political structure in the Pacific owing firstly to the conclusion of the 1894 Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, and then the conclusion of the 1902 Anglo-Japanese alliance. Britain's decisions to enter into the two treaties with Japan have often been cited as examples of a major shift in British Far Eastern policy. The Anglo-Japanese alliance is generally considered to mark the end of isolation and a departure from the traditional relationship with Britain. Australia, as part of the British Empire, was necessarily influenced by Britain's new policy in the Pacific, which implied a new structure of international relations in the region. Japan was first recognised as a first-class international power by Britain with the conclusion of the commercial treaty of 1894, which abolished Japan's unilateral tax concession to Britain and granted free admission of its nationals into
Britain. Britain had recognised in effect that "Japan was fully entitled to the rights of civilized nations." Japan's international status was much enhanced in 1902 by the formation of defensive alliance with Britain. The alliance was renewed and revised in 1905 and 1911 to meet the new defence requirement of Britain and Japan. The impact of the commercial treaty and the alliance with Japan was immense. Under Article XIX of the commercial treaty, the Australian colonies were granted a right to decide whether they would adhere to the commercial treaty or not. As a result, there were two factors which Australia had to consider: Japan as a source of immigrants, and Japan as a potential market.

The conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance had a tremendous impact on Australia's strategic position in the Pacific. British naval dependence upon Japan in the Far East allowed a withdrawal of five British battleships from the Pacific to the Home Waters just after Japan's defeat of the Russian Baltic Fleet in the Russo-Japanese war. Following that withdrawal, Australia's traditional dependence on British sea power and its geopolitical isolation altogether disappeared. Eventually these changes in international relations came to dominate Australia's strategic concerns and paved the way for the formulation of a new defence policy.

(2) The Anglo-Australian Dimension

Constitutionally Australia had no diplomatic power to negotiate with foreign countries. Given the formal structure of the British Empire, negotiations were only supposed to be undertaken through the British Foreign Office and Colonial Office. Although the Department of External Affairs was established in 1901, it was by no means an Australian counterpart.

to the British Foreign Office. Institutionally there was no official apparatus for conducting diplomacy. As an integral part of the British Empire, Australia was theoretically not in a position to have a different foreign policy from that of Britain. Under the principle of diplomatic unity, the assumption was that there should be only one diplomacy under one Foreign Office.

Despite these rules, direct negotiations took place between Australia and Japan bypassing Britain in the subject of immigration, and two gentlemen's agreements were concluded. Were they both but an early form of Australian diplomacy? The idea of diplomatic unity was based on the principle that Britain's well-calculated foreign policy should be the foreign policy of Australia and the other Dominions. The geo-political differences among the Dominions was one of the main factors endangering this principle of diplomatic unity, and the working out of that factor can be seen in the Anglo-Australian disputes over Japan in the first decade of the 20th century. Australia's fear of Japan after the Russo-Japanese war was strengthened by the US-Japan friction over the Japanese immigration in California. Against this background of the US-Japan war scare, Australia sent a direct invitation to the US Great White Fleet to strengthen solidarity in the Pacific against Japan's naval supremacy.

(3) The Australian-Japanese Dimension

In the history of the White Australia policy from the 1890s to the 1910s, Japan was the only Asian country to protest officially against the White Australia policy and to establish its own consulate in Australia staffed by its own officers. In Australia, the Japanese immigration question was mainly discussed as a future problem. The preventive effect of the anticipated influx of Japanese labourers was the justification of the White Australia policy towards Japan. Unlike the Chinese question,
the Japanese immigration question had many aspects to it; the establishment of a direct steamship service between Australia and Japan after the Sino-Japanese war, a growing number of Japanese companies formed to promote emigration, diplomatic protests of local Japanese consuls in Australia, and Queensland's secret adherence to the commercial treaty.

This study will examine the general nature of the Japanese immigration question in Australia and investigate whether there were any changes in attitude reflecting changes in Japan's significance in the Pacific. It will look at the motives and factors behind Australia's concession to Japanese immigration in 1904 and 1905, the former resulting in the conclusion of the Passport Agreement which permitted the entry of Japanese merchants, students and tourists, and the latter allowing a modification of the 1901 Immigration Restriction Act.

In the field of commerce, Australia's trade with Japan was steadily increasing, in particular owing to an increase in Australia's wool export. After the Sino-Japanese war, Japan strengthened its merchant marine and sought to expand its trade in the Pacific region. Because of rapid modernization and the swift introduction of Western technology, Japan came to be regarded as a future market for Australian staples. Australia's decision to foster the bilateral trade with Japan by appointing commercial agents to Japan and the Far East represented a new trend in Australia's external trade relations. Among the various states' commercial agents, the NSW representative assumed the most important role in cultivating Australia's external trade relations with Japan. In this respect, the thesis will assess the performance and role of the NSW commercial agent and consider problems which the commercial agent faced in the course of promoting Australia's trade with Japan.

In the field of defence, Australia's fear of Japan became acute after
the Russo-Japanese war. Although Japan had not the slightest desire to invade the southern continent, Australia seemed never to be able to shake off the fear of Japan. There was a sharp change in Australia's views on Japan between the Russo-Japanese war and the postwar period. Australia's pro-Japanese feeling during the war quickly disappeared and a fear of Japan surfaced. This work will try to account for Australia's pro-Japanese feeling during the war, and to estimate to what extent the fear of Japan influenced the formulation of its defence policy, and its attitudes toward the revision of the Anglo-Australian naval agreement, the establishment of an Australian navy, and the introduction of compulsory military training.
CHAPTER II

THE ORIGINS OF THE JAPANESE QUESTION IN AUSTRALIA, 1896-1900

It was not until 1896 that the Japanese officially became one of the major targets of the White Australia policy. From 1896 until the federal Parliament passed the Immigration Restriction Bill in December 1901, there was a series of debates both in the colonial Parliaments and in the federal Parliament on how Australia should exclude the Japanese. During the five years leading up to 1901, Australia determined its approach to Japanese immigration and adopted various measures to exclude Japanese nationals.

Between 1896 and 1901, Australia was not seriously concerned about Japanese naval and military power, but it did become alarmed by the prospect of Japanese migration. Unlike the Chinese immigration question, the Japanese immigration question became a major issue for the colonial governments in their relations with both Britain and Japan, since the Japanese government protested directly to the Australian colonies and Britain about the matter. Between 1896 and 1901, Australians decided to build, what C. Price calls "The Great White Walls" against the Japanese, and Japan made representations to Britain on the subject of immigration to Australia. Furthermore, after the establishment of the local consulates in Australia, it became possible for Japan to make direct protests to Australian authorities. In this sense, the exclusion of Japanese immigrants led to one of Australia's earliest experiences in external affairs.

In the course of examining the views of the NSW Premier George Reid on Japan, A.T. Yarwood summarises the uniqueness of the Japanese

question in the White Australia history:

Japan was a new type of non-European power, posing quite
different problems from the people of China, India, and Africa.
Above all, there was a determination to join the comity of nations
as an equal member, a powerful sense of national honour and
racial pride, and a sensitivity to affront that led Japanese diplomats
to reject identification with other coloured races.\(^2\)

It was only Japan that criticized and threatened the White Australia
policy. The peculiarity of Japanese issues lay especially in its international
dimension. Australia's exclusionist policy was formulated when Japan
was assuming the position of a first class nation in the Pacific. This
was evidenced in the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese treaty of commerce
and navigation in 1894, and Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese war
of 1894-5. In particular, the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese commercial
treaty had considerable impact upon Australia's relations with Japan.\(^3\)

Article XIX of the treaty allowed the six Australian colonial

---

2. A.T. Yarwood, "A White Australia in Prospect: Colonies and Commonwealth

3. The so-called "fubyōdo jōyaku" (unequal treaties) signed on 26 August
1858 had been unfavourable to Japan. To remedy the inequality,
Japan attempted to obtain a revision of the treaties as this would
mean an important landmark in its struggle for recognition as a
power. The principal aim of such treaty revision was to secure Japan's
fundamental rights. The unequal treaties granted foreigners privileges
in certain ports and the right to try their nationals in their consular
courts. They also froze the rate of duties on imported foreign goods.
Recognising Britain as the most prominent power in the Far East
and as a country with a large share of Japan's external trade and
with a large number of foreign nationals resident in the treaty ports
of Japan, it was decided to initiate a treaty revision with Britain.
The Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty was only the first step in
a series of negotiations with the other powers. It was a vital step
in setting the pattern for later negotiations. Following the conclusion
of the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty of 1894, Japan attempted
to establish reciprocal relations with various other countries such as
the United States, France, Germany, Russia and Austria as well
as the British white colonies including Australia and Canada.

For general readings, see I.H. Nish, "Japan Reverses the Unequal
of Oriental Studies, No.13, 1975; Inō Tentarō, Jōyaku Kaiseiron
no Rekishiteki Tenkai (The Historical Development of Debates on
the Treaty Revision), Tokyo, 1976; Inoue Kiyoshi, Jōyaku Kaisei:
Meiji no Minzoku Mondai (Treaty Revision: The National Task during
the Meiji Period), Tokyo, 1955; Yamamoto Shigeru, Jōyaku Kaisei-shi
(History of Treaty Revision), Tokyo, 1943; Kawashima Shintarō,
Honpō Tsushō Seisaku Jōyakushi Gairon (Outline of Japanese History
of Trade Policy and Commercial Treaties), Tokyo, 1941.
governments — NSW, Victoria, Queensland, Tasmania, South Australia and Western Australia — to make their own decision on whether or not they would adhere to the treaty. The same article provided for Australia's entry into the agreement "within two years from the date of the exchange of ratifications of the present Treaty." If these colonies wished to join the treaty, each of them were required to notify the British diplomatic representatives at Tokyo.\textsuperscript{4} Therefore the commercial treaty stimulated discussions on Japan in the fields both of immigration and commerce.

For Australia, the crucial stipulation in the treaty was Article I which stated that

The subjects of the two High Contracting Parties shall have full liberty to enter, travel, or reside in any part of the dominions and possessions of the other Contracting Party, and shall enjoy full and perfect protection for their persons and property.

Australia's colonial politicians feared that adherence to the commercial treaty would result in an influx of Japanese immigrants. Furthermore, it seemed unlikely that Australians would emigrate to or visit Japan in great numbers. If Australia joined, it seemed that the White Australia policy would be endangered.

On the other hand, Article III of the treaty promised application of "the most favoured nation" treatment to the bilateral trade between the contracting parties, and there were prospects of trade expansion between Australia and Japan. Article III stated:

There shall be reciprocal freedom of commerce and navigation between the dominions and possessions of the two High Contracting Parties. The subjects of each ... may trade in any party of the dominions and possessions of the other by wholesale or retail in all kinds of produce, manufactures, and merchandise of lawful

commerce, ... [and] shall have liberty freely to come with their ships and cargoes to all places, ports, and rivers ... which are or may be opened to foreign commerce, and shall enjoy, respectively, the same treatment in matters of commerce and navigation as native subjects, or subjects or citizens of the most favoured nation.

Article I and III opened up the whole question of the Australian colonies' position in its external relations with Japan. Australia now had the right to determine its own policy in foreign relations.

Against this background, the Japanese questions were discussed throughout 1896. Australians' determination to exclude the Japanese and other coloured races was well demonstrated when the NSW Parliament discussed the Coloured Races Restriction and Regulation Bill in 1896. Following the passage of the bill in the NSW Parliament, Anglo-Japanese and Anglo-Australian talks took place in order to try and ease tension created by this legislation. The Japanese opposed the colony's right to exclude migrants on racial grounds. After lengthy negotiations the Australian colonies, Japan and Britain reached an agreement in 1897 about the way in which the Japanese would be excluded from the colonies, especially from the colony of NSW, without affecting Japan's international reputation.

Australia-Japan relations again deteriorated when in 1897 it became known to the public that Queensland had secretly adhered to the commercial treaty. This was contrary to the overwhelmingly unanimous resolution adopted at the 1896 Premiers' Conference in Sydney. The Queensland case was one of the major reasons why the Barton federal government introduced the Immigration Restriction Bill as well as other exclusionist bills in 1901 against the coloured races and why the federal Parliament unanimously passed them. The Queensland case was a good example for the federalists to show how a federated Australia was necessary to keep Australia white.
to keep Australia white against the parochial interests of Queensland.

This chapter attempts to show, firstly the peculiar nature of Australia-Japan relations between 1896 and 1900, secondly the British dilemma caused by the White Australia policy both as an international and an imperial question, and finally the reasons for and the nature of the Queensland's adherence to the commercial treaty.

Characteristics of the Japanese Immigration Question

The Japanese immigration question was the topic of continuous discussion between Australia and Japan from 1896 onwards. As the Australian colonies' official diplomatic channel to Japan, Great Britain was likewise involved in the argument. Each of the three parties perceived the issue differently. For the Australian colonies, it was a matter of national interest, specifically the preservation of the European character of a community consisting only of the white race. After experiencing an influx of Chinese coolies into the Australian gold fields and learning from American history of the black problem, the colonies decided to extend their Chinese immigration restriction to all coloured races, including the Japanese and the Indians in 1896. Australians would allow no exception to the exclusionist policy, even though the number of Japanese in Australia was relatively small, and most were settled in very remote areas of the Northern Territory, South Australia, Western Australia and Queensland.


The Australians seemed to resent the presence of the Chinese in their local communities and the same result was feared if Japanese were granted immigration rights. Thus the exclusion of the Japanese arose not out of social conflict but the fear of social conflict. It was a preventive measure: to keep Australia free from non-whites in the future.

For Japan, the issue involved national pride. In an interview with the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, Katō Takaaki, the Japanese Minister in London, stated that Japan regarded the White Australia policy as a matter of pride and as a matter which deeply offended Japanese public opinion. Since 1894 Japan's position had been greatly enhanced. Japan's victory over China in 1895 had vindicated its military position in the Far East and made it a formidable power. It valued the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1894 which placed Japan, for the first time, on a level of equality with European Powers. Notwithstanding Japan's increase in international status and the provisions of the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty, the Australian colonies had, in building their "Great White Walls," discriminated against the Japanese and had treated them as being inferior to Europeans. The inclusion of the Japanese in the White Australia policy was decided when Australia opted for non-adherence to the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty. Japan then had to save its face since its reputation in its own eyes was at stake.

For Great Britain, the Australian immigration policy caused imperial and international problems. The exclusion of the Indians from Australia raised an imperial question since it violated the notion of the equality of all the Queen's subjects. The exclusion of Japanese caused international


8. Note by Kato to F. Bertie, Assistant Under-Secretary, F.O., 1 September 1897, FO 46/548/71-72.
difficulties since Britain could not avoid the burden of expressing Australia's mind to Japan, and transmitting Japan's stand to Australia, and since it did not wish to compromise its new aim of cultivating Japan's friendship in the Far East. Not surprisingly, the British tendency towards ambiguity and compromise quickly surfaced.

The White Australia Policy and Japan

After enacting a series of laws against the influx of Chinese into Australia, the colonial leaders decided in 1896 to extend the immigration restriction to the other coloured races, especially Japanese and Indians. The question of the restriction of Japanese was connected to the issue of whether Australia's colonial governments should join the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty before August 1896, when Australia's colonial right of adherence to the treaty expired. The reciprocal rights of entry and residence under the treaty caused anxiety in Australia. Soon after receiving the text of the commercial treaty in February 1895 from London, the colonial governments consulted with one another about what course of action they would pursue. Between March and September 1895, the colonial Premiers exchanged telegrams and letters with one another in an effort to clarify their views on the matter. All the Premiers were agreed that the colonies should adopt a consistent and unified policy. This desire to create a unified policy caused Charles Cameron Kingston, the Premier of South Australia, to suggest on 30 September the holding of an Inter-Colonial Conference on the Japanese treaty and immigration questions.


Subsequently the NSW Premier George Reid arranged for the summoning of a conference in Sydney on 4 and 5 March 1896 to discuss the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty. Representatives from all colonies except Western Australia attended the conference. Of the four subjects listed for discussion, the commercial treaty was undoubtedly the most important. The Premiers believed that if they signed the treaty, it would be impossible to maintain a White Australia. For the delegates, the fear of Japanese immigration more than outweighed the potential commercial advantages. Thus the conference agreed unanimously to adopt measures to restrict the entry of the coloured races, including even the British Indian, by extending the provisions of the Chinese Restriction Act and by not adhering to the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty.

At this conference, the issue of Japanese immigration was of prime importance. In all the colonies, Australian fear of Japanese immigration had been exacerbated by the Sino-Japanese war of 1895-5 and the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty. In the NSW Parliament, following

---

11. Despite Kingston's urgent call, the other governments had shown no signs of accepting the urgent summoning of the inter-colonial conference merely for the purpose of discussing the Japanese questions. "The lack of urgency caused difficulties and delays in arranging when and where the conference would be held." Reid was reluctant to give the Japanese question "undue prominence" and suggested that the agenda of the conference should be widened to make federal defence the principal subject. One reason behind his reluctance was "to avoid arousing the pressures of public agitation" since the treaty question was supposed to be dealt with federally. Kathleen J. Melhuish, "Australia and British Imperial Policy: Colonial Autonomy and the Imperial Idea, 1885-1902," Ph.D. thesis, University of Sydney, 1965, pp.456-458.

12. Four subjects for discussion were (1) federal defence, (2) "vital subject of Undesirable Immigration" which included the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty and the Japanese immigration as well as other Asiatic labourers, (3) federal quarantine, and (4) coast lights. SMH, 4 March 1896.

13. SMH, 4, 5, 6 March 1896; Queenslander, 7 March 1896.
the resolution of the 1896 Colonial Premiers' Conference, there was a lengthy debate of the question which was typical of the debate found in all other colonial legislatures at this time. The significance of the NSW debate is highlighted by the fact that it was the NSW exclusionist bill which was the model for the 1901 federal bill establishing the White Australia policy.

The Premier George Reid acting for NSW government, presented the Coloured Races Restriction and Regulation Bill on 14 May 1896, and it was passed on 12 November 1896 after an extensive discussion which centred upon Japan. William McMillan, a colleague of Reid and a key figure amongst the Free Traders, defined the chief aim of the bill:

We propose to shut out a nation which is rising into the first class by energy, by intellect, and by material resources — I mean the Japanese.14

Referring to "the negro question" in the United States, Thomas Davis argued that Australia should avoid such racial conflict and suggested the application of an exclusion measure against "a quasi-civilised country like Japan."15 The discussion was dominated by the desire to take preventive measures against the Japanese,16 and the belief that adherence to the Anglo-Japanese treaty would ensure an influx of Japanese immigrants. It was also suggested that the warships engaged in the Sino-Japanese war would be diverted to an ocean-going commercial steamship service, which would inevitably increase the number of Japanese passengers, mainly immigrants, heading for Australia.17 The character of the bill

15. Ibid., p.3963.
16. Ibid., pp.3951-3966; DT, 14 October 1896.
was well explained by A.H. Griffith:

This is simply a preventive measure .... this bill will affect our relations with the Japanese more than with any other people. The Chinese are already excluded by the existing act, and it is the Japanese Empire which will be most particularly affected by the passing of this measure. The Japanese have not yet commenced to come to Australia in large numbers, but they have commenced to come to some of the northern colonies in small numbers, and in increasing numbers.18

For the NSW government, as well as for the other colonial governments, one of the chief reasons for Australian federation was to keep the whole Australian colonies as the preserve of white civilization in the Pacific.19 Therefore, it was believed that the NSW government should not adhere to the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty, despite the commercial benefits it promised. The immigration policy was thus considered far more important than that of trade. When Japan offered, in August 1896, to sign a gentleman's agreement restricting Japanese immigrants and asked for the NSW adherence to the commercial treaty,20 the NSW government did not hesitate in rejecting the proposal, believing that any such agreement would curtail the success of the White Australia policy.

In all these debates, the Australian evaluation of the Sino-Japanese war and its consequences were critical. The impact of the Sino-Japanese war was viewed from three aspects: defence, commerce, and immigration. On defence, Japan's defeat of China was seen as a check to the Russian southward thrust, which was the main threat to the British Empire in

20. Ambassador [sic], Tokyo, to Secretary of State, Despatch 163, 21 August 1896, FO, Confidential Print 6905, No.81, cited in D.C. Sissons, "The Immigration Question in Australian Diplomatic Relations with Japan 1875-1919," paper presented to Australia and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science, 43rd Congress, Brisbane, 1971, pp.28-29.
the Far East. So Japan's military achievement indirectly helped to protect the Australian continent against Russia.\textsuperscript{21} Japan at this time was not considered a potential enemy or threat.\textsuperscript{22} As for the commercial viewpoint, trade between NSW and Japan was expected to increase significantly since it was reported that a number of warships were to be diverted from military operation to commercial service in the Pacific. The news was welcomed by some NSW parliamentarians such as Alexander Brown and E. Pulsford, a protagonist of a free trade policy.\textsuperscript{23} However, the opening of a steamship service between NSW and Japan was believed to contribute not only to the development of trade but also to an increase in the number of Japanese immigrants into Australia.\textsuperscript{24}

Certainly there were solid grounds for fearing an expansion of Japanese migration. During the 1890s the number of Japanese entering the colonies gradually increased from about 500 in 1891 to 3953 in 1901.\textsuperscript{25} Most settled in the remote areas of Queensland, Western Australia and the Northern Territory, such as in Thursday Island and Broome, but a small number also established themselves in NSW and Victoria.\textsuperscript{26} The Australian desire to stem Japanese immigrants was prompted by the establishment of Nippon Yoshisa Imin Gaisha (Japan Yoshisa Emigration Company)

\begin{itemize}
\item The number of parliamentarians who saw Japan as a military threat was small. For example, R. O'Connor and S. Charles were anti-Japanese. \textit{NSWPD}, Vol.86, pp.4768-4768, 5 November 1896.
\item For a different view, see J. Shepherd, Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East, New York, 1939, pp.6-10.
\item \textit{NSWPD}, Vol.86, pp.4763, 4765, 5 November 1896.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p.4958, 11 November 1896. L.F. Heydon was of this opinion.
\end{itemize}
in 1891, which was set up to promote Japanese emigration to the colonies as well as by the decision of Nippon Yusen Kaisha (NYK, Japan Steamship Navigation Company) to run a regular service between Japan and Australia before the Sino-Japanese war. The introduction of this latter service had been postponed owing to the war, but was expected to commence soon after the war and so make Japanese emigration far easier. The Australian colonial governments were aware of the new direction in the Japanese shipping policy through the British government's sources and the press. The British information reached Australia when all the colonial governments were considering their attitudes to the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty. The British Colonial Secretary Lord Ripon in mid 1895 supplied the colonial governments with an accurate analysis of the future activities of shipping companies and emigration companies. The report stated that:

> There exists a strong inducement for the migration of Japanese labourers and artizans to the Colonies in the great difference of wages — the wages in our Colonies being many times greater than they are in Japan, where they are extremely low — and, if adequate facilities are afforded, that inducement is likely to be effective. Such facilities as now exists will almost certainly be very greatly increased as soon as the war is terminated. A large number of merchants steamers which have been purchased by Japan for the purpose of the war will then be thrown out of employment, and it is proposed to utilize them by the establishment of new lines of steamers to the Australian ports and elsewhere. Emigration agencies exist in Japan, and their energies will no doubt, with the increase of facilities, be directed in that quarter, and the prospects of a labour difficulty arising there under such circumstances cannot be said to be remote.

Then it made particular reference to Australia:

> Canada may possibly from its climate and other circumstances not offer the same attraction as Australia.\(^\text{27}\)

---

\(^{27}\) Confidential despatch, Ripon to the government of Queensland, 7 May 1895, Qld. Premier's File 102. The same despatch was also sent to the other colonies. Ripon enclosed Le Poer Trench's report on the Japanese shipping and emigration companies in his despatch.
The judgement was most perciplient since the NYK's decision to open
the service was based on the assumption that "in the future Australia
will become the most hopeful suitable emigration place for Japanese."28

The emigration company "Nippon Yoshisa" was, under the directorship
of NYK, intended to promote Japanese emigration. To avoid possible
criticism, NYK set up the emigration company under the name of "Yoshisa,"
which seemed to have nothing to do with NYK. This scheme to promote
Japanese emigration to Australia was launched, theoretically, in October
1896 when NYK, with the assistance of "Yoshisa" Emigration Company
and a special subsidy from the Japanese government, commenced its
service between the two countries.29 However although the Japanese
authorities subsidized the steamship service of NYK between Japan and
the colonies, the government made no official commitment to these
plans. On the contrary, the government's policy was ostensibly not to
encourage the Japanese emigration.30 Consequently this plan was in
essence a private enterprise initiative.

In the light of these developments, Australian anxieties were understandable
and the NSW Coloured Races Restriction and Regulation Bill of 1896
was passed. As the numbers of Japanese entering Australia were small,
the legislation was clearly preventive and racial, and its parliamentary
passage soon prompted a diplomatic protest from the Japanese government.

E. Satow's Negotiation in Tokyo and Japan's Attitudes

Following the establishment of its consulate office in Townsville,
Queensland on 7 March 1896, and of a second office in Sydney on 12 June

28. *Nippon Yusei Kabushiki Gaisha Gojūnen-shi* (Fifty Years History
of NYK), Tokyo, 1935, p.150.

29. Annual subsidy from the government was £70,000. *Ibid.*, pp.150-151;

30. For instance, letter of Nakagawa Tsunejirō, Japan's consul in Sydney,
to G. Reid, NSW Premier, 24 November 1897, AA.CRS A8 01/203/1.
1897, the Japanese Foreign Ministry became well aware of the development of the White Australia policy.\(^{31}\) Although the Ministry had already appointed Alexander Marks in November 1879 as a Japanese honorary consul in Melbourne,\(^{32}\) it was not until after the creation of its two consulate offices in Sydney and Townsville that it obtained detailed reports about Australian immigration policy. The question of the White Australia policy was raised when the Japanese government moved to negotiate with the Australian colonies about the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty. In the course of discussing the commercial treaty, the Japanese government accumulated knowledge about Australia and the White Australia policy both through its consular reports and also through its contact with the British diplomatic representative in Japan, Ernest Mason Satow who arrived in Tokyo on 28 July 1895. Satow's role in the negotiations was crucial. Since he represented the interests of the whole British Empire in Japan, he had to deal with all questions regarding Australia's adherence to the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty. Therefore, one of his first tasks in Japan was to inquire whether the Japanese government was ready to negotiate a commercial treaty with the self-governing colonies. He was "a careful and painstaking organizer" of the legations business

31. These Japanese consuls in Australia were relatively low-level officers of the Ministry since their main role was to represent and protect the interests of Japanese immigrants and to survey commercial prospects in the Australian markets. Australia was not such a Power that Japanese decision-makers had to take its political, strategical and diplomatic aspects into consideration. It was hardly an object of high politics. So it was natural that the Ministry sent only minor diplomats. In contrast, a posting to Japan's legation in London was considered to be the most prestigious appointment of all, and only first-class diplomats had a chance to go to London. The commercial surveys of the local consuls appear in the Journal of Commercial Reports (Tōshō-isan), from January 1894 to March 1913 which was published by the Foreign Ministry. Tsunoyama, Sakae, "Japanese Consular Reports," Business History, Vol.XXIII, No.3, 1981.

and a man of "conscientiousness and acute observation." He sent various despatches to the British Foreign Office and kept a daily diary. His early experience as an interpreter in the Bakumatsu period of Japan helped him to establish strong personal relations with the key decision-makers in the government in the later 1890s.

As a result of an official communication from London in October 1895, Satow realized that the Australian colonies would decline to adhere to the commercial treaty unless they obtained major concessions on the Japanese immigration issue and he informed the Japanese government accordingly. In carrying out these negotiations, he had to deal with Saionji Kimmochi, the acting Foreign Minister, following Mutsu Munemitsu's illness, in the Ito Hirobumi government. In the months immediately after the Sino-Japanese war and the three-power intervention, the Japanese government was not inclined to pay any serious attention to Australia, and it seems most probable that, in late 1895, the Japanese government had no definite policy towards Australia. Japan's unenthusiastic attitude to the colonies was reflected in Satow's talks with Japanese officials. Probably due to the instruction from Mutsu who "wanted to delay giving a reply," Saionji and the Vice Foreign Minister Hara Takashi did not reply to Satow at all. Two months after this approach, Satow on 19 December

35. In October, Satow began his initial inquiry and negotiation by handing an aide-memoire regarding Japan's treaty discussions with Australia.
36. Ibid.
met Saionji to press the issue with him and to inquire whether the Japanese government would make a concession to the Australian colonies on the immigration question. Saionji was not prepared to explain the delay, merely implying that he was acting under Mutsu's instructions. Satow was not satisfied with this answer and next day took up the matter with the Prime Minister Ito. Ito answered straightforwardly that there were several self-governing colonies in Australia and that it would be necessary to treat each colony separately. At this meeting Satow informed Ito that the Australian colonial governments would "probably reserve [the] right to legislate about [the] immigration of labour."37 Satow explained to Ito about Australia's established anti-Chinese policy and its strong opposition to the free entry of the coloured races.

Satow was determined to make the Japanese government understand the peculiar nature of the White Australia policy. Through his frequent visits to the Foreign Ministry, Satow attempted to reach agreements between Japan and the colonies. In talks with Saionji and Hara between February and March 1896, Satow persistently pointed out how Australians had resisted the introduction of the coloured labourers and accordingly asked the Japanese government to modify Article I of the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty which guaranteed the free entry of the nationals. Satow was well aware that the Japanese government was firmly opposed to the racial exclusion of Japanese nationals, and in an interview with Hara on 5 March, Satow confessed that he was "in a great difficulty" to adjust both interests.38 As Bernard M. Allen, a biographer of Satow, writes, Satow kept "hard at work trying to smooth out the difficulties that were raised in Australia and Canada in reference to the question

37. Satow Diary PRO 30/33/15/17/145-146, 20 December 1895.
38. Satow Diary PRO 30/33/15/17/166-168, 5 March 1896.
of immigration."

Being influenced by Satow's continuous representation to the Japanese government, Saionji expressed in February his willingness to accept in the Australian colonies the same arrangements that had been made with the United States. In March Saionji and Hara decided to accept the Australian colonies' right to exclude manual labourers but not artisans. They still desired "omission of the word 'artizans' as that term [would] make the treaty, altogether too restrictive." Saionji and Hara had come to appreciate that the question of Japanese indentured labourers had become a subject of growing concern not only in Australia but also in Canada and the United States. As the United States had taken measures to restrict the Chinese immigration, it had a foretaste of the Asian immigration question. Facing the US demand to regulate Japanese indentured labourers, the Japanese government finally recognised the US immigration restriction rights in the US-Japan commercial treaty of 1894.

The Japanese government had no direct authority over emigration, which was essentially a matter for each prefecture, and this domestic division of power further complicated the problems faced by Tokyo in coming to terms with the Australian colonies. Following the Inter-Colonial Premiers' Conference's decision not to sign the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty, there was no further diplomatic contact between Satow and the Japanese government until the Nelson government of Queensland informed the British government that it was prepared to adhere to the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty if the term "labourers" included "artizans." On 16 July, Salisbury instructed Satow to inform the Japanese government

40. Letter, F. Bertie to Under-Secretary, C.O., 10 February 1896, Qld. Premier's File 102.
of the Queensland proposal. Satow communicated this matter to Saionji on 18 July. At first the Japanese government appeared unwilling to consent, but when Komura Jutaro, a man with a rational mind who established a high reputation among foreign legations in Japan, took charge, Satow was able to make greater progress. Komura who was the Vice Foreign Minister June 1896 to 12 September 1898 made the designated concession to Queensland. In a private letter to Salisbury, Satow accurately remarked that "Komura is intelligent and educated in European fashion, and he will no doubt get to the bottom of the whole affair." He was the first high ranking official who saw the trade advantages which might follow from having the Australian colonies adhere to the commercial treaty. It seems highly likely that Komura made up his mind between 17 and 20 August that the Japanese government should not lose the chance to have at least one of the Australian colonies committed to the treaty, and he did not find any great difficulty in applying the immigration arrangement embodied in the US-Japan commercial treaty to Queensland.

After receiving a telegram from Salisbury, Satow went to see Saionji on 17 July and informed him that NSW and Victoria were "not inclined to adhere to the treaty unless they got liberty to restrict emigration" and that they would "probably want to insert artizans" in addition to the word "labourer." Saionji promised to consult with Komura about this matter. On 19 August, Satow saw Komura and mentioned that "the

43. Telegram, Salisbury to Satow, 16 July 1896, FO 46/471/47,49.
44. Note, Satow to Saionji, 18 July 1896, FO 46/468/447.
47. Satow Diary PRO 30/33/16/1/29-30, 17 August 1896.
question of adhesion of certain colonies to our Treaty" depended on "the inclusion of artizans," which he said was "a small concession for Japan to make." Because of Satow's strong representation, Komura might have formed a false impression that all the Australian colonies would disregard the unanimous resolution of the Premiers' Conference, and join the treaty if Japan accepted the colonies' exclusive right to restrict the influx of Japanese labourers and artisans. For Komura, it was desirable that at least NSW, Victoria and Queensland should join the treaty since these three colonies controlled a major part of Japan's trade with Australia. Komura acceded to the inclusion of "artizans" in addition to the word "labourer," provided that the three colonies of NSW, Victoria and Queensland altogether adhered to the treaty.48 One of the major factors behind Komura's decision was to promote commercial relations between Japan and Australia. He was well aware of the fact that NYK was about to "start a line of steamers to Australia." The new regular steamship service should in his view be encouraged by every possible means including the conclusion of the commercial treaty. Because of the establishment of the steamship service, Komura was of the opinion that "the principal colonies [NSW, Victoria and Queensland] should come in to the Treaty."49

In the afternoon of 20 August, Komura visited Satow and told him that Japan was prepared to negotiate with the three principal colonies by admitting their right to restrict Japanese immigrants. Although Komura's decision was made without the formal consent of the cabinet, he was now in a position to take full responsibility in this matter. In the Komura-Satow talks, Satow guaranteed that Queensland would join the treaty and adopted the view, based on the British analysis that NSW and Victoria would follow

48. Confidential despatch, Selbourne (for Colonial Secretary) to Lamington, 16 September 1896, Qld. Premier's File 102.
49. Satow Diary PRO 30/16/1/31-32, 20 August 1896.
suit. However contrary to Satow's expectation, NSW and Victoria declined to negotiate and the former moved to introduce the anti-Japanese legislation in late 1896. The Japanese diplomatic protests followed.

**Japan's Early Diplomatic Protest and British Attitudes**

The Japanese diplomatic protests were directed at the NSW parliamentary legislation, since it was the first colonial immigration law to discriminate against Japanese and thus to cause Japan to lose face. The immigration question in Australia unexpectedly became a big issue in Japanese diplomacy: a matter of "prestige" in the Pacific. From the late 19th century to the early 20th century, a series of immigration questions arose on the Pacific coast of Canada and the United States and also in Australia. This period was also one of modernization in Japan. The modernization policy of the Meiji era was aimed at enabling Japan to negotiate with the Western world on an equal basis. The 1894 Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty was regarded as one of the most important steps towards enhancing Japan's international status, a status which would allow Japan to move away from the various "unequal treaties" with the Western Powers. The outcome of the Sino-Japanese war had enormous implications when seen in this perspective. The racial logic of the White Australia policy, however, by lumping the Japanese along with the Chinese, constituted a severe blow to Japanese aspirations. When the Australian colonial Premiers decided unanimously to adopt the coloured races restriction measures, Ōkuma Shigenobu, Japan's Foreign Minister, complained that the purpose was to "exclude Japanese immigrants from Australia."

---

50. Ibid.
Since the restrictive measures put the Japanese subjects on the same footing as the Chinese, whom Japan defeated in 1895, and also threatened the NYK regular service, which was looking forward to an increase in trade, the Japanese government could not ignore this question. The Japanese government, however, found it difficult to agree on a response to this situation, and there was "a considerable divergence of opinion" in the Privy Council and the Cabinet.\(^\text{54}\)

The cabinet's first response was to try to persuade the NSW government to give up the racial clause in its bill or at least to exempt the Japanese from it. They attempted to do so by working almost wholly through Katô Takaaki, Japan's Minister in London, who received all the important Japanese consular reports from Sydney and Townsville. It was not the Japanese consuls in Sydney and Townsville but Kato who took the major role in making diplomatic protests and in seeking a solution to the problem. Katô proceeded to ask Salisbury on 25 November 1896, for his support in seeking to change the NSW bill in Japan's favour. He complained to Salisbury that the NSW bill as well as the other colonial bills appeared to the Japanese government to be wholly gratuitous so far at least as Japanese are concerned, because there are ... only about one hundred in New South Wales, which if they are permitted to take effect in the present form, they cannot but affect the friendly relations which now exist between Japan and those colonies.\(^\text{55}\)

Katô's second appeal, following the same line, was made to Salisbury on 14 December. On both occasions, it appeared to Kato that Salisbury attempted to evade the burden of influencing the NSW legislature, by pointing out Australians' colonial autonomy in matters such as immigration legislation.\(^\text{56}\) To Salisbury, Katô "appeared to be impressed with the

\(^{54}\) Letter, Satow to Salisbury, 24 November 1896, FO 46/548/5-7.
\(^{56}\) Itô Masanori (ed.), Katô Takaaki, Tokyo, 1929, pp.349-350.
outrage inflicted on his country ... in treating Japanese as if they were Chinese, and applying the same precautions against immigration to the one as to the other."

In consultation with Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, Salisbury sought the best way to conciliate Japan. On 27 April 1897, the Colonial Office informed the Foreign Office that the NSW bill had been reserved for Her Majesty's approval and that Chamberlain did not intend to take any action in regard to the bill until he had had the opportunity to discuss the matter with the colonial Premiers at the Colonial Conference which was to meet in London. Salisbury suggested to Chamberlain that he should consider suggesting to the colonial Premiers that "Japanese merchants, tourists should be exempted from the restrictions applied to Asiatics in general." Salisbury's proposal, however, did not meet Japan's demands because the NSW bill already had an exemption clause for missionaries, merchants, tourists and students. He could not find any solution despite a series of protests by Katō, and no development took place before the Colonial Conference was held in the summer of 1897.

During the period of the Colonial Conference, from June to July 1897, Japan's envoys attempted to collect information on British and colonial intentions, and regarded this conference as the best opportunity to use Japanese and British influence to modify the colonial legislation. On 8 July, Katō presented a note verbale to Salisbury, stating that "the Imperial Government sincerely hopes that a serious consideration may be bestowed by Her Britannic Majesty's Government" on Japan's demand, and warning that an exclusion of Japanese from NSW would "have the

58. Letter, Under-Secretary, C.O., to Under-Secretary, F.O., 27 April 1897, FO 46/548/17.
59. Letter, F. Bertie to Under-Secretary, C.O., 9 July 1897, FO 46/548/17.
effect of putting a check upon the good relations between Japan and 
Australian Colonies, which are likely to become very important in the 
near future. This note was transmitted on 9 July by F. Bertie to the 
Colonial Office. When the conference was held, Chamberlain and the 
staff of the Colonial Office found that the Australian colonies were 
keen to keep the colonies white, and solely for European colonization.
Furthermore, he showed his sympathy with colonial feelings towards 
Asiatics and stated that "their fears of an influx of Asiatic immigrants 
are by no means chimerical."

When the Colonial Office considered Katō's note, John Anderson 
minuted that there was "no doubt much force in M. Katō's memo," but 
he noted that the colonial Premiers "are determined to persist in their 
policy of maintaining a 'white' Australia and further to persist in declaring 
that in their legislation." Taking Australia's determination into consideration, 
the Colonial Office reached a unanimous conclusion that "we shall not 
be able to prevent legislation excluding Japanese labourers and artisans." 
All that they could suggest was that the Australian colonies be requested 
to consider the possibility of applying the Natal formula for excluding 
Asiatics from Australia, a formula based on a literacy test.

In order to solve the international and imperial problems posed by 
both Japanese and Indian migration rights, Chamberlain asked the colonial 
Premiers to adopt the Natal formula in restricting the coloured races.
He did not, however, obtain any assurance at the conference that the 
NSW government, or any other colonial governments, would accept the 
proposal, since they required colonial parliamentary assent for the modification

60. Note Verbale by Katō to Salisbury, 8 July 1897, FO 46/54831-33.
61. Minute by J. Anderson, 14 July 1897, CO 418/4/143/144; Note by 
Under-Secretary, C.O. to Under-Secretary, F.O., 17 August 1897, 
FO 46548/39-41.
62. Letter, John Bramston, Assistant Under-Secretary, C.O., to Under-Secretary, 
India Office, 17 August 1897, CO 418/4/126-127.
63. Minute by J. Anderson, 14 July 1897, CO 418/4/143.
64. Minute by Edward Wingfield, Assistant Under-Secretary, C.O., 17 
July 1897, CO 418/4/135.
of immigration bills. It was not until 7 October 1897 that Chamberlain received a reply from George Reid, the NSW Premier, concurring in a vague way with the adoption of the Natal formula. 65

Katō's Protest in London and the "Sentimental Question"

The most frustrating period for the British Foreign Office over the Japanese immigration question now followed. Katō personally impressed on Salisbury on 1 September that the racial "slur" on Japan could not be ignored by his government because of its "sentimental" and international implications, and he asked Salisbury to ensure that the NSW government accepted the Natal formula. 66 Just after meeting Salisbury, Katō went to see F. Bertie, Assistant Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, and repeated the Japanese request which Katō had already conveyed to Salisbury. He told Bertie that, if the NSW government would accept the Natal formula, the 'Amour Propre' of Japanese ... who [were] indiscriminately placed under the general term of 'Asiatics,' may be saved, more especially because the complaint of my government is based more on sentimental than on material grounds, although of course there are also the latter considerations involved in the question to a certain extent. 67

These statements made by Katō are very important in two respects. Firstly, he accepted migration restrictions using the "Natal" formula, since he thought that the NSW government would certainly require some means of population control, and he calculated that such control would be most acceptable to Japan if it took an educational form. 68 This concession, which Katō was able to impress on Tokyo, was often quoted by the British side when the Australian federal immigration legislation in 1901 also

65. Letter, Daniel Cooper, Agent General for NSW in London, to Under-Secretary, C.O., 7 October 1897, FO 46/548/89.
66. Note by Salisbury to Chamberlain, 1 September 1897, FO 46/548/69-70.
67. Note by Kato to F. Bertie, 1 September 1897, FO 46/548/71-72.
took an anti-Japanese form.

Secondly, the question was considered by the Japanese mainly as a matter of pride. From 1896, when Japan officially protested against the White Australia policy, both the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office found some difficulty in understanding the Japanese case owing to its vagueness. It was perhaps not until September that the departments fully understood that the Japanese diplomatic protest was motivated primarily by their desire to save their prestige in the eyes of the world, not to gain material advantages. It was in September that various members of the staff of both the Foreign and Colonial Offices began, for the first time, to approach the problem from this angle. It seemed to them that the key point was phraseology. Bertie sent a note to the Colonial Office asking:

> Whether any means can be found of satisfying the Japanese government in this particular, having regard to the sentimental character of their objections which might possibly be removed by some change of phraseology without affecting the practical working of the proposed legislation.\(^69\)

Since Katō’s intention was to obtain special treatment for the Japanese, F.H. Villiers, Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, after meeting Katō proposed to the Colonial Office two alternatives of phraseology: a replacement of the term " Asiatic" in the bill by the term " Asiatic and Japanese"; or the insertion in the bill of a separate clause relating exclusively to the Japanese. Yet while Salisbury approved Villiers’ idea,\(^70\) Chamberlain did not.\(^71\) Towards the end of September the Foreign Office realised the enormous difficulties with which it was faced. The term " non-European" instead of " Asiatics" was considered, but it was rejected because of possible

---

69. Note by F. Bertie to Under-Secretary, C.O., 6 September 1897, FO 46/548/73-74.
70. Memorandum on "Japanese Emigration to Australia" by F.H. Villiers, 23 September 1897, FO 46/548/77-78.
71. Note by E. Wingfield to Under-Secretary, F.O., 23 September 1897, FO 46/548/79-80.
complications with the United States. The Foreign Office in the end failed to find a suitable phrase and feared that there was "no prospect of the Australian Colonies exempting Japanese from the exclusion applied to all non-Europeans." Chamberlain was also unable to suggest any wording by which Japan could be "distinguished from other Asiatics in a prohibition." The Foreign Office was reluctant to talk to Katō on this question because there was "not much left to tell M. Kato." 72

On 1 October, Katō had talks with F.H. Villiers and stated that Japan could not accept Salisbury's suggested alternative phraseology. He then pressed earnestly that "another effort should be made to induce the Colonies to adopt the Natal Act." 73 Japan's acceptance of the Natal test afforded the first step towards a solution to the problem, and on 7 October the Colonial Office received a telegram from the NSW government through its Agent General in London, Daniel Cooper, agreeing to a modification of the NSW bill along the lines suggested by the British government. 74

Responding to the delicacy issue of international and imperial relations, the NSW government did indeed abandon the Coloured Races Restriction and Regulation Bill and passed, on 24 November 1897, a new immigration bill called the Immigration Restriction Bill, containing the Natal formula with provisions for a European language test. Although Reid accepted the Natal test, the new legislation was in some ways more restrictive than its predecessor. The new bill had the effect of excluding all coloured people, including merchants and students. The NSW decision to adopt the Natal act provided the only possible solution for the Foreign and Colonial Offices as well as Japan. Since the Australian national views on White Australia had been so strongly expressed at the Colonial Conference,

73. Memorandum by F.H. Villiers, 2 October 1897, FO 46/548/82-83.
74. Letter, Daniel Cooper, to Under-Secretary, C.O., 7 October 1897, FO 46/548/89.
Chamberlain remained uncertain to the end whether the colonies would accept his compromise. For Chamberlain the matter was a very troublesome one for whatever its international implications, Great Britain was not in a position to resist the White Australia policy.

Queensland Adherence to the Commercial Treaty

Contrary to the unanimous resolution reached at the 1896 Inter-Colonial Conference in Sydney, the Hugh Nelson government of Queensland decided to become a party to the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty in March 1897. Queensland's sudden change in attitudes took place just after the Sydney conference and the Queensland State election of March 1896.

Since Nelson's change in attitude to the treaty is not fully recorded, it is difficult to reconstruct the decision-making process. There were however probably four main factors which influenced his decision. They were firstly the precedent of the US-Japan commercial treaty which contained a special proviso allowing either party to regulate the immigration of labourers, secondly Japan's willingness to concede similar proviso to the Australians, and thirdly the pressure of Queensland's industrial capitalists and plantation owners who relied upon the Japanese labourers in the pearl-shell fishing industry and sugar cane industry, and fourthly the anticipated commercial advantage to be derived from the treaty.\(^7^5\)

---

As already shown in the previous section, between February and March 1896, the Japanese government showed signs of changing its attitude to Australia and informed the British government that Japan would accept the colonies' right to restrict the Japanese labourers with the exception of artisans.76 Japan placed the colonies on a parity with the United States. The Queensland government, taking advantage of this new development, sought a proviso in the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty which would regulate the flow of the Japanese "labourers" including "artisans." This request went beyond Japan's agreement with the United States, whose proviso applied only to the regulation of labourers, not mentioning artisans. If Japan accepted Queensland's new proposal, Nelson had "no objection to the stipulation of the Treaty."77

After communicating this new proposal to Japan through the British government, Nelson wrote a letter to the NSW Premier Reid in order to justify Queensland's action. While recognising the importance of the White Australia principle, Nelson explained that:

the objections to the adhesion of the Australian Colonies ... arose from the fact that, at the time when the Sydney Conference was held, it was feared that the drawbacks inseparable from an unrestricted influx of alien labour would outweigh the benefits to be derived from the formation of closer commercial relations with the Japanese Empire. ..... [After the Inter-Colonial Conference in Sydney] it was learnt, however, that the Government of Japan would have no objection to the insertion in the Treaty of a proviso, applicable to these Colonies,... This proviso would give ample power to place any necessary restrictions on the introduction into Australia of labourers from Japan, and, such being the case, this Government could see no further reason for depriving the Colony of the undoubted advantages to be anticipated from the operation of the Treaty.78

Nelson was of the opinion that once the fear of the Japanese immigration was removed, there was no reason to oppose the commercial treaty.

76. Note verbale, Saionji to Satow, 19 March 1896, FO 46/467/159-162.
78. Letter, Nelson to Reid, 19 June 1896, Ibid.
Queensland's new proposal of restricting labourers and artisans meant ostensibly that Queensland sought much severer term than the United States. It meant that Queensland could effectively secure the maintenance of the White Australia policy by a special proviso regulating the immigration flow.

By mid 1895, Nelson had known that there was a proviso in the US-Japan commercial treaty regarding the question of immigration. The proviso in the US-Japan treaty allowed the rights of residence and trade, but did not "in any way affect the Laws, Ordinances, and Regulations with regard to trade, immigration of labourers, police, and public security, which are in force." This proviso was a clear reflection of the gravity of the Japanese immigration question in the United States.79 When the US-Japan treaty was announced, H.S. Wilkinson, the British diplomatic representative in Tokyo, examined this proviso and evaluated its implication for the Australian colonies. He remarked that the word "labourers" in the treaty would be interpreted to mean "unskilled labourers" and that Japan would probably offer "no objections to the Colonies obtaining the benefit of the proviso." But he added that it might be more difficult to induce the Japanese government to concede that "the proviso should extend to skilled as well as unskilled labourers." Furthermore he reported the prospect of closer relations between Australia and Japan since Japan was about to open a regular steamship service to the colonies.80

For Nelson, the principle of a White Australia did not necessarily

---

79. Regarding the background of the Asian migration question in the United States, see Wakatsuki Yasuo, Hainichi no Rekishi: America niokeru Nihonjin Iimin (History of Exclusion of the Japanese: Japanese Immigrants in the United States), Tokyo, 1972, pp.11-43.

mean the total prohibition of Japanese labourers from Queensland, but rather their regulation. The regulation clause in the commercial treaty was very flexible because Queensland had in principle the ability to control the number of the Japanese labourers.

Regulation, not prohibition, of the Japanese skilled and unskilled labourers suited Queensland's interests since the pearl-shell fishing and sugar cane industries in Northern Queensland depended to a degree upon Japanese labourer. Unlike NSW and Victoria, Queensland could use the Japanese labourers in these particular economic activities. In this sense, the total prohibition of the Japanese from the colony was not welcomed by the industrial capitalists or plantation owners. According to a study of J. Armstrong, Nelson had a close link with the capitalists and plantation owners who desperately needed coloured races for a source of cheap labour, and, to serve their interests, he encouraged the introduction of the Japanese cheap labourers into Queensland. In order to divert possible criticism from the other colonies, on the introduction of the Japanese labourers, Nelson manipulated the immigration statistics in order to give a false impression of the number of Japanese labourers.81

The decisive factor behind Nelson's decision was undoubtedly Japan's acceptance of a proviso regulating the entry of labourers into Queensland. As Wilkinson's memorandum on immigration had said, the Japanese government was willing to insert a proviso in the treaty which regulated the immigration of Japanese indentured labourers, with the exception of artisans.82 This Japanese concession was not however enough for Nelson because Japan refused to include "artisans" in the proviso. Since the Inter-Colonial Conference had unanimously resolved to adopt measures to restrict all

82. Note verbale, Saionji to Satow, 19 March 1896, FO 46/467/159-162.
coloured races, either unskilled or skilled labourers, Nelson had to retain complete power in order to regulate not only unskilled but also skilled labourers. This led him to request the Japanese government to concede that the term "labourers" should include "artisans." In August, he confirmed Queensland's attitudes to this matter:

> the retention of the power of restricting alien immigration is of such vital importance to the welfare of the Colony that unless the proviso is so framed as to have the Government free to legislate ... [the restriction of] the influx of Japanese artisans, they [the people of Queensland] feel that it will be impossible for them to take advantage of the stipulations of the present Treaty.\(^83\)

Nelson believed that if he obtained a major concession on this matter from Japan, there would be no injurious effect on the White Australia principle. Nelson sought the best method to meet the divergent interests in Queensland and concluded that Queensland could join the commercial treaty provided that the colony could retain the right to regulate all Japanese immigration into Queensland. Although his decision was communicated to the other colonial Premiers, he postponed his official communication to Japan until the Queensland State election finished in late March.\(^84\)

Until Satow signed the protocol on behalf of Queensland in Tokyo in March 1897, Nelson's decision was a well kept secret.

Nelson's independent action provoked of course a hostile response from the other Premiers. The Premiers of NSW, Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania expressed their regret that Queensland did not consult with them before breaking its pledge made at the Inter-Colonial Conference.\(^85\)

---

84. In the March election, Nelson led the Ministerialists and won 41 seats out of 72. Although the Labor Party, a strong supporter of the White Australia policy, increased its seats to 20, the Ministerialists still had a comfortable majority. The power balance made it easy for him to pursue his goal of making a treaty with Japan.
85. Letter, Reid to Nelson, 4 June 1896; Telegram, E. Braddon, the Premier of Tasmania, to Nelson, 23 June 1896. The summary of this communication is found in "Precise of Papers connected with Japanese Treaty," Qld. Premier's File 102.
George Turner, the Premier of Victoria, sent a telegram to Nelson regretting Queensland's self-centred action:

[We] regret you have taken such action without prior consultation with other colonies represented at [the] Sydney conference where it was unanimously agreed. [The] matter was one for Federal action. 86

It was a severe blow to the federal movement. In the late 1890s, the leaders of the movement were convinced that to act in the united spirit was indispensable for achieving the federation of Australia. To their way of thinking, there was no excuse or justification for Nelson's action. Nelson was bluntly accused of being an anti-federalist. When the Premiers' Conference was held in Hobart in February 1897, the colonial leaders again adopted a resolution which confirmed their common approach to the immigration question and declared that they would not take advantage of the concessions offered by Japan. Soon after the conference, Reid and Turner sent letters to Nelson stating clearly that they would not follow the Queensland precedent but would act in accordance with the resolutions adopted at Sydney and Hobart. 87

In answer to the criticism from the other colonies, Nelson repeatedly claimed that the resolution at the Sydney conference was adopted on the basis that immigration problems would outweigh the possible advantages to be derived from closer commercial relations. He argued that new circumstances prevailed following Japan's acceptance of a special proviso regarding immigration restrictions, and asserted that the Queensland government could now see no reason for rejecting the commercial advantages of the treaty. 88

Despite its earlier reluctance to include "artisans" along with the

---

86. Telegram, Turner to Nelson, 23 June 1896, ibid.
term "labourers," the Japanese government finally accepted Nelson's proposal. On 16 March 1897, the Foreign Minister Ōkuma signed the Queensland protocol to the treaty. It stated that:

Whereas Queensland, ... acceded to the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and Japan, ... That the stipulations contained in the first and third Articles of the above-mentioned treaty, shall not in any way affect the Laws, Ordinances, and Regulations with regard to trade, the immigration of labourers and artisans, police and public security which are in force, ...\(^89\)

All the other colonial governments refused to negotiate with Japan, although they were likely to receive the same or similar concessions on the immigration issue.\(^90\)

Contrary to Queensland's expectation, there was after its adherence to the treaty, a sharp increase in the number of Japanese indentured labourers entering Queensland.

The Number of Japanese Immigrants to Queensland, 1894-99

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1894</th>
<th>1895</th>
<th>1896</th>
<th>1897</th>
<th>1898</th>
<th>1899</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>370</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>862</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While Nelson was away from Brisbane attending the 1897 Colonial Conference in London, a campaign against the influx of Japanese cheap labourers began to grow up. When he was asked by the acting Premier Horace Tozer whether the government would introduce coloured races restrictive measures against the Japanese, Nelson stated that he was "averse to any other restrictive measure."\(^91\) He wanted to avoid any direct restrictive

\(^89\) Protocol signed on 16 March 1897, enclosed in confidential despatch, Satow to Salisbury, 16 March 1897, _ibid._; FO 46/483/11.

\(^90\) NGB: Bessatsu, "Tsūshō Jōyaku to Tsūshō Seisaku no Hensen" (Supplementary volume on the Development of and Changes in the Commercial Treaties and the Commercial Policy in Japan), p.997.

\(^91\) Telegram, Agent-General of Queensland, London to H. Tozer, 23 August 1897, Qld. Premier's File 102.
measure against Japanese and wished to reach an understanding with the Japanese government to prevent further increase in immigration to Queensland. Nelson however did not long remain in office. There followed the three short-lived governments of Byrnes, Dickson and Dawson, and then Robert Philp became Premier on 7 December 1899. After lengthy negotiations between the Queensland government and Iijima Kametaro, Japan's consul in Townsville, a gentleman's agreement was signed in 1900. The agreement decided to make 3,247 the maximum number of Japanese to be allowed into Queensland. This figure was believed to be the total number of Japanese in the colony at the end of 1898. This was the first official agreement concluded before federation between Australia and Japan using direct negotiations. In 1904 when the federal political leaders attempted to reach another gentleman's agreement with Japan, this colonial experience offered some lessons to the leaders on how to conduct diplomatic negotiations.

Similarly after these negotiations with Queensland, Japan decided that direct negotiations bypassing Britain could be attempted in the future. The agreement between Queensland and Japan had important implications for the later development of Australia-Japan relations, and the somewhat cumbersome method of diplomatic negotiations through the British Foreign Office was soon to become outmoded.

---

92. Secret despatch no.13, Iijima to Aoki Shūzō, the Foreign Minister, 10 October 1900, NGB, Vol.33, No.399; Letter, James R. Dickson to Iijima, 3 October 1900, Ibid.
CHAPTER III
THE WHITE AUSTRALIA POLICY AND JAPAN

On 1 January 1901, the six colonies of Australia were merged into the Commonwealth of Australia. The first action of the new federal Parliament was to introduce a unified immigration policy. By 1901 the White Australia policy was decided, and there was a consensus among the federal parliamentarians that Australia should be settled only by white men. The three major political parties, the Protectionist, Free Trader and Labor, pledged themselves to keep Australia white, and the federal Parliament passed the Immigration Restriction Bill in December 1901. The Immigration Restriction Act was a landmark for the newly federated nation, and was important not only for the process of Australia's nation-building but also for its external relations with Japan. Since the parliamentary debates on the bill were chiefly centered around the Japanese immigration question, Australia had to face a series of Japanese diplomatic protests. It was the first experience for the federal government in international politics.

The federal government believed that it needed to introduce a unified immigration policy in order to preserve the homogeneous racial character of the nation. The Immigration Restriction Act also offered a means of bringing to an end Queensland's secret adherence to the 1894 Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty, which had been a drawback to the federation movement in the late 1890s. The motives behind the White Australia policy were racial, political and economic. Geographically, Australia's isolation from Europe increased the antipodean feeling of insecurity, that Australia was surrounded by the teeming millions of the coloured races. Whatever the motives were, there was no doubt in 1901 that the federal Parliament
would pass a bill to exclude all coloured races. Support for the White Australia policy was firmly entrenched. This chapter aims to examine to what extent the Japanese question became a central topic in the federal debates on the Immigration Restriction Bill, and also, how the Japanese government reacted to Australia's racial exclusion policy.

Soon after forming the first federal government, the Prime Minister, Edmund Barton, announced on 17 January 1901 at Maitland that White Australia was the first plank in the federal government's platform. In this speech, Barton outlined the government's immigration policy and mentioned that restrictive measures on Asian labourers were necessary.¹ There was no debate over Barton's White Australia policy. In fact, leading up to the first federal election of 19 and 30 March, all political parties attempted to win public support by pledging themselves to keep Australia white. Barton, the leader of the Protectionists, placed the White Australia policy high on his list of political priorities in order to obtain the support of the labour class.² George Reid of the Free Traders and the Free Trade organ, Daily Telegraph, advocated the total exclusion of the coloured races.³ The Labor caucus meeting adopted "A White Australia" as the first plank of a "fighting Labor Platform."⁴ The Labor Party's organ Worker strongly emphasised the necessity of racial discrimination.⁵ There was no doubt that the first federal Parliament would discuss the White Australia policy and eventually make laws excluding Asians.⁶

---

2. SMH, 27 February 1901.
3. DT, 14 February 1901.
6. Regarding the consuls' reports on the Barton's federal platform, see the following: Despatch No.10, Eitaki Hisakichi, Japan's consul in Sydney, to Katō, 21 December 1901, JFMA, 1.6.2.9; Despatch No.3, Iijima Kametarō, Japan's consul in Townsville, to Katō, Ibid.; Despatch No.33, Eitaki to Katō, 8 May 1901, NGB, Vol.34, No.617.
From the federal election onwards, there was strong support for a unified immigration restriction measure which would exclude the coloured races, notably Japanese, Indian and the Pacific Islanders. In view of the anticipated federal legislation, the Japanese government decided to alert the federal government to Japan's objections to such a policy. The Japanese government adopted a two-pronged approach, first a direct protest through Japan's Consul Eitaki Hisakichi in Sydney, and second an indirect protest through Japan's Minister Hayashi Tadasu in London.

Eitaki took up his position as consul in Sydney on 16 January 1899 and remained there until 19 August 1903. Before the Sydney appointment, he had worked together with Iijima Kametaro, a consul in Townsville, when both had been under the supervision of Chinda Sutemi at Japan's consulate in Incheon, Korea. Soon after he arrived in Sydney, Eitaki started studying the policy and attitudes of the political parties towards the White Australia issue and he produced a report in 1899 which acknowledged the strong possibility of federal legislation excluding Asians and suggested that the Japanese government adopt "some appropriate measures" to tackle any likely anti-Japanese measures. After the federal election in May 1901, he was convinced that the Japanese government should take every possible step to prevent Australia's direct exclusion of Japanese nationals. To achieve this, he attempted to obtain information about the draft of a federal immigration restriction bill before it was submitted to Parliament.

---

7. Eitaki was born on 12 December 1866 in Niigata Prefecture and graduated from Chūō University in 1889. He joined the diplomatic service on 10 February 1891 and had overseas postings in Korea and China between 1893 and 1898. His last posting overseas was the Consul-General in Hawaii, 1911–12. As a consul in Sydney, he covered not only the whole of Australia but also New Zealand and the South Pacific. Between late May and early June 1901, he went to New Caledonia for the purpose of solving the Japanese strikes at a nickel company. Eitaki Hisakichi, Kaiko Nanajūnen (My Reminiscences in Seventy Years), Tokyo, 1935; Argus, 9 July 1901.

He also warned Barton that Japan would resent any action which discriminated between Japanese and Europeans on racial ground, and suggested that the Japanese government should ask Britain to put pressure on Australia to secure this objective.

When the Barton government began drafting the federal immigration bill in May, Eitaki Hisakichi instructed Alexander Marks, Japan's honorary consul in Melbourne, to try to obtain a copy of the draft bill. Iijima also tried to gain access to the draft bill by using his personal contacts with the Queensland senator James George Drake, who was a minister in Barton's cabinet. In their efforts to attain the information between May and June, they failed dismally; in fact, Barton had not completed drafting the bill at the time Marks approached him on Eitaki's behalf. Meanwhile, Eitaki came to believe that the bill would undoubtedly be contrary to the Japanese interests and that there was a strong possibility that a section of the Labor party would move an amendment in Parliament to exclude all Asians from Australia. In a letter to Barton on 3 May, Eitaki stated that:

The Japanese belong to an Empire whose standard of civilization is so much higher than that of Kanakas, Negroes, Pacific Islanders, Indians, or other Eastern people, that to refer to them in the same terms cannot be regarded in the light of a reproach which is hardly warranted by the fact of the shade of the national complexion.

He recognised Australia's right to limit the number of immigrants and proposed a gentleman's agreement by which the number of Japanese immigrants would be limited, but which would exempt the Japanese from "the operation of any Act which directly or indirectly imposed a tax on immigrants on the grounds of colour." Further he agreed that:

10. Letter, Iijima to Drake, 1 June 1901, ibid.
11. Despatch No.33, Eitaki to Katō, 8 May 1901, NGB, Vol.34, No.617.
As Japan is under no necessity to find [an] outlet for her population, my Government would readily consent to any arrangement by which all that Australia seeks, so far as the Japanese are concerned, would be at once conceded.

Before concluding his warning to Barton, Eitaki reminded the Prime Minister that the Australian-Japanese trade was steadily increasing, and by this statement Eitaki hinted that an exclusion of Japanese would be averse to Australia's economic interests.¹²

Soon after sending this letter to Barton, Eitaki urged the Foreign Minister Katō Takaaki to ask the British government to advise the Barton government against adopting any anti-Japanese measure.¹³ Following Eitaki's suggestion, the new Foreign Minister Sone Arasuke directed Hayashi Tadasu, Japan's Minister in London, to ask for the good offices of the British Government to advise the Australian Government either to give up the presentation of such a bill [of Asian restriction] or to repeal any provision which would be disadvantage to the Japanese Imperial subjects.¹⁴

Following Sone's instructions, Hayashi made an immediate appeal to the British government on 4 July.¹⁵ The British government, however, was unable to meet the Japanese requests, mainly because it was not in a position to influence Australia's domestic legislation unless it seriously affected British interests. It forwarded the Japanese note to Barton and had to await the Australian reaction. The Foreign Office replied to Japan that "No communication on the subject has been received" from the Commonwealth government.¹⁶ Britain respected Australia's autonomy

¹² Letter, Eitaki to Barton, 3 May 1901, NGB, Vol.34, No.617; AA. CRS A8/01/203/1; Australasian, 8 June 1901.
¹³ Despatch No.33, Eitaki to Kato, 8 May 1901, NGB, Vol.34, No.617.
¹⁴ Telegram, Sone to Hayashi, 3 July 1901, NGB, Vol.34, No.621.
¹⁵ Letter, Hayashi to Lansdowne, 4 July 1901, AA. CRS A8/01/17/9; AA.CP 78/1, Bundle 1/65. He had the same diplomatic representation to Bertie. Memorandum, Hayashi to Bertie, 8 August 1901, AA. CRS. A8/01/203/1.
in immigration matters. At the 1897 Colonial Conference, Britain and
the Australian colonies had reached a general agreement using the Natal
formula as a formally non-discriminatory measure for restricting immigration.
If Australia used the Natal formula in its federal immigration bill, Britain
would be badly placed to offer criticism of the bill.

**Parliamentary Debates on Japan**

On 5 June Barton placed the Immigration Restriction Bill before
Parliament. The parliamentary debates took place from the second
reading on 7 August until December. The focal point of the discussion
was the method of excluding Asians, particularly the Japanese. Surprisingly
Barton's immigration bill had initially a provision (4a) which required
any would-be immigrant to "write out and sign in the presence of the
officer a passage of fifty words in length in the English language dictated
by the officer." To the Japanese this provision was a less offensive
method of excluding the coloured races than the European language
test of the Natal formula. Eitaki received the Barton proposal with
satisfaction, because there was no distinction between European languages
and the Eastern languages, and because Australia placed the Japanese
upon an equal footing with Europeans. He remarked that in view of this
language test provision, "Japan should not take any objections" to Barton's
draft bill. It is possible that Barton had taken the Japanese protests
into consideration and made a concession to the Japanese government
in order to avoid any diplomatic complications. Personally Barton professed
to be "in favour of directly shutting out coloured races."

---

19. Despatch No.46, Eitaki to Sone, 30 July 1901, **NGB**, Vol.34, No.622.
    See also letter, Eitaki to Barton, 11 September 1901, **AA. CRS A8/01/203/1**.
the first day of the second reading in the Parliament, Barton hinted that
the European language test was replaced by the English one for the purpose
of avoiding anticipated diplomatic trouble with Japan:

The moment we begin to define ... that every one of a certain
nationality or colour shall be restricted, while other persons
are not, then as between civilized powers, amongst whom must
now be counted Japan, we are liable to trouble and objection,
which go to postpone the making of our laws and which lead
to difficulty in the application of them. These things should
therefore be avoided.21

This obscure statement suggested that the draft bill had taken the Japanese
diplomatic objections into account. A.T. Yarwood shares this view and
regards Barton’s proposal of the English test mainly as a concession to
Japan.22

Though Barton did not wish to restrict the entry of Europeans by
means of an English dictation test,23 he faced unexpected attacks on
his proposal in the parliamentary debates. Firstly, a number of the parlia-
mentarians showed their distrust in the English test as a method of immigration
restriction. They regarded it as being too imperfect to restrict all the
coloured races and too conciliatory to Japan. William McMillan a deputy
leader of the Free Trade Party, accused Barton of being unfair to the
British subject as well as to Europeans. While Welshmen, Irishmen and
the French Canadians were at a disadvantage, the educated Japanese
could take advantage of the English dictation test:

We want to keep out the Japanese labourer. Why, Japan is
becoming at present a highly-educated nation. English is being
taught in the schools there, and in a few years there will not
be a Japanese labourer who will not be able to fulfill this test....
this very test will be absolutely useless amongst some of the

22. He mentions that “whereas a test in a European language might
draw diplomatic objections from Japan, the choice of the English
could not possibly be cavilled at from that quarter.” A.T. Yarwood,
Asian Migration to Australia, p.27.
eastern people. Every Japanese who comes here will soon be able to successfully pass this test in the English language.  

Samuel Mauger, a Victorian Protectionist, supported this argument and demanded strongly that "all coloured immigration" should be "absolutely prohibited." Other Protectionists such as King O'Malley and Hume Cook were of the same opinion and believed that the proposed bill could not shut out the Japanese people and was therefore unsatisfactory.

J.C. Watson, the leader of the Labor Party, who shared this view, asserted that:

> With the Oriental, as a rule, the more he is educated the worse man he is likely to be from our point of view. The more educated, the more cunning he becomes, and the more able, with his peculiar ideas of social and business morality, to cope with the people here. We know that many uneducated white people are proved later to be valuable colonists. It would be an error to pass any legislation which would place a bar in the way of immigration from the other European nations.

Watson proposed to prohibit the immigration of any Asia-African peoples. As the parliamentary debates proceeded, it became clear that Barton's bill was unacceptable to the majority of parliamentarians. When they discussed the weaknesses or deficiencies of the bill, the Japanese were considered more likely to pass the English dictation test than some Europeans.

Secondly, the provision of the English dictation test met with British opposition. The British government was afraid that European countries would resent such a test, since European and Asian would be treated alike. There was a fear that Britain would have to face a series of protests from the European countries. In order to avoid such diplomatic problems, the British government decided that the royal assent should be withheld.

24. CPD, 1901-2 Session, Vol.IV, pp.4628-4630, 6 September 1901. See also DT, 9 September 1901.
26. Ibid., pp.4638-4641.
27. Ibid., pp.4636-4637.
28. In August, Watson had already circulated the proposed amendment on the bill to provide that no aboriginal inhabitant of "Asia, Africa, or the Pacific Islands" should be allowed to enter Australia. Argus, 26 August 1901.
if the bill were to be passed "in its present form." The Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain suggested to the Governor-General Lord Hopetoun that:

Foreign European countries will continuously henceforth, raise objections to education test proposed, which certainly constitutes wide departure from policy hitherto observed. You should, therefore, press for substitution of European for English language.29

Since it was anticipated that the Barton proposal would damage Britain's relations with many European countries, the British government would not accept the proposed bill containing the provision of the English dictation test.

Being subject to British pressure as well as opposition's criticism, the Barton government was compelled to modify the Immigration Restriction Bill. In the midst of this wave of criticism, the Attorney-General Alfred Deakin on 12 September 1901 made a controversial speech in the Parliament which defined the clear intention of the Australian government concerning the aim of the bill. He was eloquent on the subject of White Australia.

To divert the oppositions' criticism, he stated that:

I say that the Japanese require to be absolutely excluded.... I contend that the Japanese require to be excluded because of their high abilities. I quite agree ... that the Japanese are the most dangerous because they most nearly approach us, and would, therefore, be our most formidable competitors. It is not the bad qualities, but the good qualities of these alien races that make them dangerous to us.... It is the business qualities the business aptitude, and general capacity of these peoples that make them dangerous.30

Recognising the White Australia policy as "an absolute essential to the unity of Australia," Deakin declared that the white Australia policy was the Australian version of "the Monroe doctrine" in the Pacific.31 He claimed that all political parties were "united in the unalterable resolve

29. Secret letter, Chamberlain to Hopetoun, 9 September 1901, AA. CP 78/1, Bundle 2/65.
31. Ibid., p.4807.
that the Commonwealth of Australia shall mean a 'White Australia,' and that from now henceforward all alien elements within it shall be diminished."32 In his speech, the traditional logic and justification of White Australia was abolished and a new interpretation was adopted. Although the Japanese subjects represented

the highest class of those who seek to come here, and ... who are capable of being dealt with on the same footing as any other civilized power,

Deakin strongly advocated that because of "their high abilities" the Japanese immigration should be stopped.33 Despite Deakin's assurance of Japanese exclusion, his speech was not good enough to satisfy William Morris Hughes. Hughes pointed out that "The intelligent, educated, sensitive Japanese would gain admission," whilst the non-English speaking white would be turned back.34 He strongly demanded that Australia should not be subject to the Japanese diplomatic protests. He continued that:

We want a white Australia, and are we to be denied it because we shall offend the Japanese or embarass His Majesty's Ministers?35

After Hughes's speech, Barton understood the open hostility to the bill and agreed to replace the word "English" with the word "European."36 With this statement, Barton removed an impediment to the passing of the bill. Although Barton attempted to insert the word "English" as a superficial concession to Japan, a majority of the parliamentarians sought a more direct exclusion of the Asian races. The debate in Parliament seemed to be directed solely at the Japanese nationals. Contrary to Barton's original hopes, the Japanese government found the parliamentary

32. Ibid., p.4817.
34. Ibid., p.4823.
35. Ibid., p.4822.
36. Ibid., p.4834.
debates offensive, along with Barton's decision to modify the bill.

In the course of the parliamentary debates, Eitaki became fully aware that some parliamentarians were making efforts to abolish the proposed bill and replace it with a more racially-oriented restriction bill. Being distressed by the anti-Japanese discussion, he decided to remind Barton that Japan would accept the bill containing the English dictation clause and would be prepared to arrange a gentleman's agreement with Australia with respect to the limitation of the number of Japanese immigrants if Australia desired to control it. He reiterated that any direct racial restriction of the Japanese subjects should be avoided. To ease Australia's fear of Japanese immigration, Eitaki also used the daily papers to present Japan's emigration policy and to correct Australia's misinformation about Japan. He was, however, extremely disappointed and distressed at Deakin's speech of 12 September which recommended that the Japanese should be excluded because of their great abilities. In addition Barton's announcement of the substitution of the European language for the English language test was a severe blow.

Both Deakin's speech and Barton's announcement were hardly acceptable to Japan. With respect to Deakin's speech, Eitaki made prompt representations to Barton stating that the bill was "specially directing its operation against a friendly nation [Japan], and without sufficient justification." He attempted to threaten Barton by stating that it was necessary for the Japanese government to "make the strongest possible protest in the proper quarter."

37. Letter, Eitaki to Barton, 11 September 1901, AA. CRS A8/01/203/1.
38. Eitaki made a protest to a wrong statement made by the federal parliamentarians. Argus, 5 September 1901. He also had an interview with the press to promote the better understandings of Australia towards Japan. DT, 18 September 1901. Following Eitaki's appeal, Kitamura of Kanematsu Co. sent two letters to DT to support Eitaki. DT, 20, 24 September 1901. In Queensland, Iijima also contributed an anonymous article to the local paper. Despatch No.87, Iijima to Komura, 28 September 1901, containing a copy of the article, NGB, Vol.34, No.630.
39. Letter, Eitaki to Barton, 16 September 1901, AA. CRS A8/01/203/1.
In addition to the Immigration Restriction Bill, the Commonwealth Parliament was also discussing the introduction of the Postal Bill which would ensure that "only white labour" would be employed in the Commonwealth mail carriage service. These two bills were, stated Eitaki, nothing but a "reproach" to the Japanese nation. Eitaki informed the new Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro of the new political developments. Komura was one of Japan's most distinguished diplomats and was fully aware of the nature of the White Australia question, since he had been involved in Queensland's adherence to the 1894 Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty. On 2 October when Komura received a telegram from Eitaki informing him that the "English language test in the immigration bill have been altered to any European language," he decided to try to persuade the Barton government out of its defiant policy towards Japan by seeking Britain's support.

When Komura decided on an appeal to Britain, he was in the midst of the Anglo-Japanese alliance negotiations, which had begun in mid 1901. Ironically, the alliance was being negotiated from July 1901 onwards, at the very time the Barton government was introducing the Immigration Restriction Bill aimed at excluding the Japanese from Australian soil. The period covered by the alliance negotiations was much the same as that for the discussion and passing of the Immigration Restriction Bill in federal Parliament. It seemed to the Japanese government that Japan was the prime target of the policy. As Eitaki Hisakichi remarked, the Immigration Bill became "a restriction bill as if being solely aimed at excluding the Japanese." Hayashi Tadasu, Japan's Minister in London,

41. Telegram, Eitaki to Komura, 2 October 1901, NGB, Vol.34, No.632.
42. Eitaki Hisakichi, Kaiko Nanajū-nen, p.121.
was engaged in protesting against Australia's anti-Japanese legislation to the British government while making every effort to conclude the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Speaking of the deteriorating relations between Australia and Japan, A.T. Yarwood suggests that the Japanese government made "a possible threat of breaking off the alliance negotiations" in December 1901.43 Furthermore, he argues that the Immigration Restriction Bill became "the object of a diplomatic barrage that threatened at one stage to wreck the negotiation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance."44 However, since the alliance was of great importance to Japanese national security, the Japanese government never thought of delaying nor breaking off the alliance negotiations. From Japan's strategic viewpoint, the anti-Japanese legislation in Australia was "a minor irritant."45 In fact, Hayashi raised the issue of the White Australia policy with the British government quite separately from the discussions leading to the Anglo-Japanese alliance.46

Komura regarded the modified bill as racially oriented discrimination, and instructed Eitaki on 4 October to appeal directly to the Governor-General, Hopetoun who had, according to the constitution, the right to suspend the bill.47 Bypassing Barton, Eitaki expressed his hope that "the Commonwealth Parliament might see its way clear to avoid legislating in such a manner as to make distinctions affecting the Japanese on the grounds of race and color."48 While Eitaki was making a protest in Australia against

44. A.T. Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, p.38.
46. For example, letter, Hayashi to Lansdowne, 16 December 1901, NGB, Vol.34, No.641.
47. Telegram, Komura to Eitaki, 4 October 1901, NGB, Vol.34, No.633.
48. Letter, Eitaki to Hopetoun, 5 October 1901, NGB, Vol.34, No.635.
the anti-Japanese legislation, Hayashi was asking for Britain to intervene from London. On 7 October, Hayashi, following instructions from Komura, sent a note to the British Foreign Secretary Lansdowne, complaining of the European language test which "aimed to discriminate against Japanese" and which would result in "practically the closing of that continent to Japanese subjects in general."49 Three days later, Hayashi renewed his appeal to Lansdowne and asked him to help "remove from the legislation these disabilities."50

The Japanese demand that Australia "modify the educational test" so as to "place Japanese on an equal footing with European immigrants" was promptly communicated from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office.51 The Colonial Office was reluctant to handle the Japanese protests. The general policy of Britain was not to "object to legislation to exclude all persons ... who failed to pass an education test." Since Australia's legislation was based on the principle of a European language test, there was no further legitimate reason for Britain to interfere with the Australian case.52 In view of the fact that the British government advised the Australian government to substitute a European language for English language test, H.E. Dale, an officer in the North American and Australasian Department of the Colonial Office, minuted that "it is impossible for us to press the Commonwealth Government to give up their educational test."53 This view was unanimously accepted in the Colonial Office. The Colonial Secretary, Chamberlain was not sympathetic towards Japanese position. Chamberlain reminded Lansdowne that in

49. Note, Hayashi to Lansdowne, 7 October 1901, AA. CP 78/1, Bundle 2/65.
50. Note, Hayashi to Lansdowne, 10 October 1901, ibid.
51. Letter, Bertie to Under-Secretary, C.O., 10 October 1901, CO 418/16/271-172.
52. Confidential note, C.P. Lucas, Under-Secretary of C.O., to Under-Secretary, F.O., 23 September 1901, FO 46/670/119-122.
53. Minute by H.E. Dale, 14 October 1901, CO 418/16/275.
1897 Katō Takaaki, the then Japan's Minister in London, had asked for Britain to help induce the Australian colonies to adopt the Natal method. Eventually they adopted that method in order to restrict the entry of the coloured races. Since Australia's modified bill was based on the same Natal method to which Kato had agreed in 1897, Chamberlain did not think that Britain was in a position to "suggest a modification of the Australian immigration test," or that "the Commonwealth Government would be able to entertain such a suggestion."54 Despite the Japanese diplomatic protests to the Foreign Office as well as to the Governor-General, the British government declined to put further pressure on Australia. As Dale minuted, he did not see that the British government could "possibly disallow the Bill." And he spoke for the Colonial Office as a whole.55 Since the British failed this time to take up the Japanese cause, the federal government ignored the diplomatic protests and proceeded to legislate for a White Australia. Australia's firm determination to exclude the Japanese as well as the other coloured races was well described by Hopetoun:

the feeling in Australia against the unrestricted entry into the Commonwealth of large numbers of Foreigners, and more especially of large numbers of Asiatics, is so intense that I cannot blame my Government for having introduced a measure of this kind.56

The Commonwealth Parliament passed the Immigration Restriction Bill with the European dictation clause on 3 December, and the Governor-General gave the royal assent on 23 December.57

54. Letter, B. Cox, Under-Secretary, C.O., to Under-Secretary, F.O., 18 October 1901, FO 46/548/407-408. See also a note (immediate), Cox to Under-Secretary, F.O., 4 January 1901, FO 46/670/233.
56. Secret despatch, Hopetoun to Chamberlain, 12 November 1901, CO 418/10/394-396.
57. A month later, Deakin declared that the Japanese-Queensland agreement was no longer effective. CPD, 1901-2 Session, Vol.VII, p.9150, 23 January 1902. Eitaki had already been notified on 17 January 1902 by Barton about the federal decision regarding the Queensland-Japan agreement. Telegram, Barton to Eitaki, 17 January 1901, NGB, Vol.35, No.407.
CHAPTER IV
AUSTRALIA'S RECEPTION OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE, 1902

Australia welcomed the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902. The leaders of the various political parties and the press commented favourably on the alliance as it related to both international security and commerce, while they were reticent about the effect of the alliance on the White Australia policy.

On 30 January 1902, Great Britain entered into the defensive alliance with Japan "largely by reason of her eastern, rather than her European, interests." The British political leaders as well as the Japanese were "content with limited objectives in the far east." The main objective was strategic. Britain and Japan had a common interest in checking the Russian expansionist policy. By forming the alliance, Britain and Japan were, in the words of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Selbourne, "obviously too strong for Russia"

---

in the Far East.\textsuperscript{2} In this strategic sense, the alliance was formed "as a counterpoise to an aggressive Russia."\textsuperscript{3} This objective of the alliance was clearly reflected in its preamble which strictly defined its application to "the extreme East." Britain and Japan pledged themselves to uphold the independence and territorial integrity of China and Korea and to secure the equal opportunities in these areas for the commerce and industry of all nations. The alliance recognised the special interests of Britain in China and those of Japan in Korea. It was "an entirely new departure" for Britain's diplomacy, since its traditional policy was to "avoid entangling ourselves [Britain] in foreign alliances."\textsuperscript{4} The alliance, which was to remain in force for at least five years, made no reference to Australia. There was no thought of Australia's interests in the negotiations. But, the Anglo-Japanese alliance did have certain indirect implications for Australia's interests in the fields of security, overseas trade and immigration.

**Australia's Recognition of the Alliance**

The signing of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was reported in Australia on 13 February. Since the alliance negotiation had been conducted secretly the Australian political leaders did not possess any information about the negotiation before the official announcement of the alliance. It was not the policy of the British Government to communicate this kind of diplomatic...

---

2. Letter, Selbourne to Balfour, 3 November 1901, Balfour Papers 49707/103-104. Selbourne estimated a naval strength in the Far East in late 1901 as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Battleships</th>
<th>1st Class Cruisers</th>
<th>2nd Class Cruisers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


4. Very secret, draft of despatch, Lansdowne to MacDonald, 7 January 1902, Cab 37/60/4.
matters to Australia and other Dominions. Therefore, the Australian political leaders only became aware of the alliance through the cable news published in the daily papers. When the alliance was announced, the federal Parliament was in session, but there was no discussion on the subject of the alliance in either House, nor did the alliance become a main subject of any of the political parties' meetings, nor was a committee appointed in the Defence Department to consider the impact of the alliance. Because of a lack of the vital documents such as the cabinet records, it is impossible to trace how the government viewed the alliance. It is only possible to establish the Australian attitude towards the alliance by looking at the various statements published in the newspapers.

The government's view on the alliance was presented by the Prime Minister Barton on the day when the alliance was reported. Barton received the news "with satisfaction" and focussed his attention on the three points of security, commerce and immigration. Firstly, he welcomed the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance from the naval and military position of Australia and expressed that it would be "rather beneficial than otherwise." He interpreted it as an effective security arrangement to serve the interests of the British Empire in the Pacific and to strengthen the defence position of Australia:

> In the first place, the treaty does not increase, but rather diminish, the risk of ruptures with any foreign powers. To that extent it is a distinct advantage to the Commonwealth. In the next place, the Empire, whose life and integrity are vital to us, is placed in a much stronger position in both a military and naval sense. In the third place, it is impossible to suppose that anything in the treaty increase, any risk of any attack upon Australia.

In order to check the Russian expansionist policy in the Far East and to

---


maintain the status quo in Britain’s favour, the alliance was "a distinct advantage to the Empire." He regarded the alliance as being "highly beneficial to the Commonwealth" because the British Empire, whose naval supremacy was vital to Australia, would be placed in a much stronger position. Article III of the alliance ensured the Anglo-Japanese defence cooperation if any other Power joined in hostilities against one of the Allies. Since Britain and Japan were maintaining the naval forces superior in strength to any other power in the Pacific, the alliance further strengthened the British naval position. The enormous naval significance of the alliance was again stressed by Barton on 15 February when he attended a dinner party being arranged for Major-General E.T.H. Hutton. The speech was prepared beforehand, so that it reflected clearly an official view of the Barton cabinet as a whole on the alliance. He mentioned that the alliance was "a guarantee of the peace of the world generally" and was "greatly a guarantee of peace to Australia." And "the sea power" of the British Empire and of Japan were "mutually augmented by the treaty," so that it was hoped that the alliance would contribute to Australia’s defence. He supported the strategic value of the alliance and made no critical remarks on this particular point.

Secondly, Barton saw the alliance as an advantage to Australia’s trade with the Eastern countries, Japan and China. Since the preamble declared "equal opportunities" in China and Korea for "the commerce and industry of all nations," he thought that the alliance would allow the operation of an "open door" policy, which might contribute to the commercial interests of Britain and Australia. He welcomed such a policy and expected that

---

7. SMH, Argus, Advertiser of 14 February 1902.
9. SMH, Advertiser of 19 February 1902; Brisbane Courier, 20 February 1902.
Australia's trade with China would be available "on fair terms, as against a policy of absolute exclusion, which formerly prevailed in China."\textsuperscript{10} Besides the strategic importance, the alliance was "largely a commercial one" and intended to promote the trading interests of Britain, which in turn would be also "good for the trading interest of Australia."\textsuperscript{11} Although Australia's trade in 1902 was predominantly dependent upon Britain and the British Empire, the Eastern trade was gradually attracting commercial interest in Australia. The potentially huge market of populated China and the sudden rise of industrialised Japan were the main factors behind Australia's concern about the Eastern trade. The NSW government's decision in 1902 to appoint a commercial agent in Japan was a fair indication of Australia's aspirations for trade expansion in Asia, in particular Japan and China.\textsuperscript{12} Without any doubt, the Barton government, which sought to encourage Australia's external trade, supported the alliance because of its potential commercial value.

Thirdly, the alliance was examined by Barton as it related to the White Australia policy. It might only be on this point which the Australian government would have been slightly worried about a possible negative effect for the alliance. He reviewed the Australian-Japanese negotiations regarding the federal immigration policy. He made it clear that the Japanese nationals were no longer permitted to enter Queensland under the Japanese special arrangement with the Queensland government in 1900. It was the policy of the Barton government that all immigration matters should be handled federally and therefore the Japanese arrangement with Queensland concerning

\textsuperscript{10} \textit{Age}, 14 February 1902.
\textsuperscript{11} \textit{SMH, DT, Argus, Advertiser} and \textit{Brisbane Courier} of 14 February 1902.
\textsuperscript{12} The detailed treatment of this subject is covered in Chapter III-2.
the entry of the Japanese immigrants was overridden by the passage of the Immigration Restriction Act in 1901. Although the Japanese Consul-General Eitaki Hisakichi accepted that the Japanese immigration agreement with Queensland was no longer valid, Queensland still enjoyed preferential trade with Japan under the commercial treaty. The nature of the alliance was quite different from that of the commercial treaty and there was no relation between the two. Barton was cautious about the indirect implication of the alliance for Australian's immigration policy for fear that Japan might exercise its diplomatic power, now based on the alliance, to achieve better treatment of the Japanese nationals in Australia. He probably downplayed such possibilities when he asserted that the existence of the alliance had no implication for the immigration issue:

With respect to the Australian Alien Immigration Act, I do not see that the treaty [the Anglo-Japanese alliance] itself will make any difference.13

Despite the fact that the Immigration Restriction Act had received the Governor-General's assent in the name of the King, this Act was not necessarily irrevocable according to the Constitution Act, since the British still had a right to disallow the Act within one year from the date of the Governor-General's assent. In order to remove any doubts about the likely results of pressure being brought to bear on the topic of Japanese nationals in Australia, either by the Japanese government or by the British with its right of veto, Barton repeatedly mentioned that the alliance would not in any way affect the White Australia policy. On 17 February, he remarked that:

Countries may enter into alliances, but these do not necessarily interfere in any way with their domestic legislation.14

Providing that Japan did not attempt to interfere with the Commonwealth's

13. Age, 14 February 1902. See also, SMH, DT, Argus, Advertiser and Brisbane Courier of 14 February 1902.
immigration policy, Australia had every reason to view the alliance as
a most satisfactory diplomatic arrangement. Barton's concern for the
preservation of the White Australia policy caused the British government
to pledge its support on this question. To avoid any Anglo-Australian misunderstandings
and to allay Australia's fears, the British government decided to inform
Barton that "His Majesty will not be advised to exercise His powers of
disallowance" with regard to the Immigration Restriction Act.\textsuperscript{15}

In order to demonstrate Australia's hearty acceptance of the alliance,
Barton sent a congratulatory message to Eitaki and to the British government,
and expressed his high appreciation of the alliance.\textsuperscript{16} It was reported that
Eitaki received a large number of similar messages from prominent citizens
and the one from Barton was "a specially cordial telegram." According
to Eitaki, the general consensus of opinion expressed by these messages
was that the alliance would exercise "a potent influence maintaining peace
in the Far East."\textsuperscript{17}

Barton's statement on the alliance was well received in Australia and
it summed up neatly Australian opinion. Among the opposition groups,
an immediate comment came from J.C. Watson, the leader of the Federal
Labor Party. He fully agreed with Barton's overall remarks on the three
points of security, immigration and commerce. Among the three points,
the possible effect of the alliance on the White Australia policy was "a
matter of keen interest." Aware of Barton's warnings about Britain and
Japan, Watson stated that the alliance would have "no injurious effect
upon the Australian Alien Immigration Act." Furthermore, Japan's commercial

\textsuperscript{15} Letter, F. Bertie, F.O. to Under-Secretary, C.O., 12 March 1902,
FO 46/670/50.

\textsuperscript{16} Telegram, Barton to Eitaki, dated 13 February 1902, printed in Age
and DT, 17 February 1902. Barton sent a similar message to the British
government. British Parliamentary Debates, 4th Series, Vol.CIII, p.1281,
27 February 1902.

\textsuperscript{17} Argus, SMH and Brisbane Courier of 15 February 1902.
and industrial aspirations would require theoretically "her to retain all her population." He continued to comment that "Her financial position and her search for markets, coupled with considerations of naval defence, bind her to Great Britain by strong ties."  

The views expressed by Barton and Watson were also shared by George Reid, the leader of the Free Traders. He considered that "this alliance is one of the most momentous steps which Great Britain has taken during the last quarter of a century" and that it marked "a new departure" in the Far Eastern politics. In addition, he expressed his hope that the United States should join the alliance departing from its isolationist tradition, and that the tripartite alliance would become "another great advance and an important stride towards what we all hope for, namely, the ultimate fusion of the Anglo-Saxon race." While Reid was emphasising the value of establishing a tripartite alliance in the Pacific, William McMillan, the deputy leader of the Free Traders, focused his attention on the strategic meaning of the alliance. Being at variance with the traditions of the Salisbury diplomacy, the alliance was "the greatest political departure" in British diplomacy. McMillan believed that the alliance shifted "the scene of interest from Europe to the East" and reflected a strong British determination to counteract Russian influence in the Far East. Since the Russian expansionist policy would lead to "the disintegration of China," the formation of the alliance was important in order to uphold the status quo. He looked upon the alliance with "lively satisfaction, as being a happy augury for the maintenance of British influence in the East."  

18. *Age*, 17 February 1902.  
19. *SMH*, 14 February 1902. See also *Argus*, *Advertiser* and *Brisbane Courier* of 14 February 1902.  
in political circles was that the alliance was of the greatest importance to Australia's interests, in particular its security and commerce. The alliance not only lent the protection of the Japanese navy to Australian commerce but also contributed to Australian security against possible attacks from a Russian, or German fleet. The Sydney Morning Herald went to the heart of the matter when it said that:

Australia is most vulnerable on the north, so that an offensive and defensive alliance with Japan will, it is contended, not only protect the northern portion of the Commonwealth, but will secure the trading interests of Australia in the Far East.21

There was no opposition to the alliance; both the federal cabinet and the federal opposition leaders were agreed upon the importance of the strategic and commercial advantages accruing to Australia.

At the State level, the Premiers commented on the alliance and reiterated a number of the points made by the federal leaders. The NSW Premier John See supported strongly the alliance and agreed that it was "an eminently satisfactory one" and was an advantage to Australia and the whole world.22 In view of the commercial interests in the East, the alliance, said See, would considerably benefit Australia. Australia's increasing interest in Far Eastern trade, especially Japan, was exemplified in the NSW government's decision to appoint a commercial agent in Japan to promote the trade with "that progressive country" Japan. The alliance was expected to "make matters work smoothly," and it would no doubt be of great assistance to the trade between Australia and Japan.23 He believed that Australia's uneasy relations with Japan over immigration would be improved by the alliance. In his own words, the alliance was "a capital one" for Australia.24

22. Age, 18 February 1902.
23. SMH, 14, 18 February 1902.
24. DT, 18 February 1902.
The commercial value of the alliance was also referred to by J.H. Want, the former Attorney-General of the Reid NSW Government, 1894-1899.\textsuperscript{25} The maintenance of peace and security in the Far East resulting from the alliance would provide a proper environment in which trade between Australia and Japan could flourish. The South Australian Premier John G. Jenkins was also of the opinion that the alliance would be "of mutual benefit to the Eastern trade." Following Barton's assurances regarding Japanese immigration, Jenkins expressed his desire that "the new alliance will not have any effect upon the question [of the White Australia]."\textsuperscript{26} The Queensland Premier Robert Philp received the news of the alliance with "a feeling of satisfaction." Reflecting on Queensland's special relations with Japan, he hoped that the alliance would have "the effect of making the Commonwealth Government more circumspect in dealing with Japanese."\textsuperscript{27}

The common feature of these statements made by the state politicians was that their views were almost identical with Barton's although their scope of interest was restricted to commerce and immigration. They tended to evaluate the alliance in a narrower sense than the federal parliamentarians. Overall, the Australian political leaders enthusiastically endorsed British Far Eastern policy and all expected the commercial relations between Australia and Japan to improve. Even though Australia had been at odds with Japan over immigration in 1901, Australia's favourable response can be explained by the fact that Australians did not see Japan "as an immediate menace to their security."\textsuperscript{28}

Major-General E.T.H. Hutton of the Australian army took a different view of Japan and the alliance from the politicians. In 1895 when he had

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{25} SMH, 14 February 1902.
\item \textsuperscript{26} SMH, 19 February 1902.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Age, SMH and DT, 14 February 1902.
\item \textsuperscript{28} N.K. Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14, Sydney, 1976, p.117.
\end{itemize}
been a commander of the NSW military forces, he had seen the Sino-Japanese war as a turning point in Asian history and perceived Eastern threat to Australia. Nor did his standpoint change even after the alliance was concluded in 1902. In response to an inquiry from Barton, Hutton said that "the present epoch in the history of Australia was one of immense difficulty and gravity, not only to the Commonwealth but to the relations of the Empire with the East." He provided four reasons to support this statement; firstly the rise of Japan into a power of the first magnitude, secondly the opening up of China, thirdly America as an expanding power in the Northern Pacific, and fourthly the opening of the Panama Canal in the near future. He concluded that due to the power struggle in the Pacific, Australia needed to build up its defence.29 There was very little support for this view of Japan and Australia in 1902.

Press Reaction in Australia

The Australian daily newspapers were almost unanimously in favour of the alliance. Apart from the public statements by the politicians, the response of the press to the alliance is the only clue to public opinion in Australia. The Melbourne Age devoted an editorial to the historical significance of the alliance and declared that the splendid isolation of Britain was ended "in a very momentous Alliance." Only touching upon its strategic aspect, the Age asserted that "the interests of England and Japan in the Far East are identical" both being opposed to the ambitious designs of Russia:

this treaty ... bring[s] satisfaction to the minds of the vast majority of the 400,000,000 British subjects who will read and understand its purport. It writes in mutual support of each other the greatest naval Power of the East with the greatest naval Power of the West.30

Although the paper did not mention the direct impact on the Australian

29. Age, 18 February 1902; SMH, 19 February 1902.
30. Age, 15 February 1902.
defence, it acknowledged the strategic importance for Far Eastern politics. The *Sydney Morning Herald* followed the same line. All accepted that, as the Melbourne *Argus* put it, the aim of the alliance was "to stay, to check, or to control the march of Russia in Manchuria and Korea." While the first editorial of the *Argus* on the alliance was devoted to a general evaluation of its significance in Far Eastern politics, the second editorial touched upon its significance as it related to Australia's security. It praised the alliance as a defensive and offensive arrangement, claiming that the British sea-power in the Far East would be considerably augmented. It stated that:

> the strengthening of Great Britain's sea-power in the East confers additional security on Australia. It was from the East that any danger of a naval blow was apprehended. Japan was herself a conceivable foe. Now she is an ally, and one situated precisely where she can be of the most valuable service to us.  

It supported the positive effect of the alliance on Australia's security which had been and was still heavily dependent upon the British naval power in the Pacific. The *Brisbane Courier* welcomed the Anglo-Japanese alliance "with peculiar satisfaction." Japan became Britain's ally "instead of being a possible enemy" and created with Britain the strongest naval power in the region which added to the naval security of Australia. The paper acknowledged not only the alliance's strategic importance but also its possible implication for Australia's external trade in the Far East, since the declared open door policy would stimulate "an ever-increasing trade, in which Australia may largely share."

The *Sydney Daily Telegraph* carried two editorials on how the alliance might affect Australia's interests. While regarding the alliance as a satisfactory

31. SMH, 13, 17 February 1902.
32. Argus, 13 February 1902.
33. Argus, 14 February 1902.
34. Brisbane Courier, 15 February 1902.
arrangement, the editorials criticised a suggestion made in the London Times that Australia should consider "legislatively the legitimate susceptibilities" of Japan. The paper claimed forcefully that Australian "determination to keep this continent for white men" should not be thwarted in any way by the alliance. Urging the maintenance of the White Australia policy, the Daily Telegraph advised Australians to insist upon the policy in order to avoid any possibility that the Japanese government would use the alliance to press its desire for a modification of White Australia:

The firm conviction of Australians is that an infusion of people of the colored races is one of the last things desirable. These people are unacceptable to us socially, and cannot be admitted into the national family .... Their vast numbers in close proximity to us constitute a menace in face of which there is no resort of precaution but to bar all our gates. Australian policy in that regard is not selfish.35

Apart from the possible negative effect of the alliance on White Australia, the paper was of the opinion that the alliance was acceptable to Australian interests.

Australia's divided views on Japan were well demonstrated by the Adelaide Advertiser. Since Australia's security relied upon the British navy, Japan became "an important factor in the sum from an Australian point of view" with respect to the naval strength of the British Empire in the Pacific. For Australia's security, the Anglo-Japanese alliance could be nothing but satisfactory, but there were reservations about how it might affect Australia's racial policy towards Japan:

As regards Australia, our policy is to cultivate friendly relations with Japan, as with all Eastern countries, and yet preserve our shores from inundation by the teeming millions of Asia. On purely theoretical principles, it may seem inconsistent to a nation that we desire to be something more than friendly with it, but that at the same time we seek to exclude its people from our territory.36

Accepting Japan as Britain's naval ally and rejecting Japan as a coloured

35. DT, 18 February 1902. See also DT, 13 February 1902.
36. Advertiser, 13 February 1902.
race were the typical Australian attitudes to Japan in 1902 when the alliance was announced. Quoting the British writer Rudyard Kipling's jingle, the Advertiser justified the White Australia policy that "East is East, and West is West; And never the twain shall meet." Although the alliance augmented British power in the Pacific and offered a promise of security to Australia, it could not override "differences of race, education, traditions, and national aspirations" between Australia and Japan.\(^{37}\)

The only hostile comment on the alliance was made by the racially-oriented jingoistic weekly the Bulletin. Focussing on the racial aspect of the alliance's effect, it accused Britain of bad faith in that "The alliance marks a further move in the process of converting the British Empire into a nigger state." It was disgraceful for the British Empire to make alliance with "a colored nation against white Europe."\(^{38}\) The comment was restricted to the racial aspect of the Australia-Japan relations and the journal was unable to lead public opinion in that direction between 1902 and 1905. On the whole, Australia's press comments were surprisingly similar to Barton's statement.\(^{39}\)

\(^{37}\) Ibid.
\(^{38}\) Bulletin, 22 February 1902.
\(^{39}\) Regarding the press reaction in Britain and Japan, see I.H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp.226-228.
CHAPTER V
AUSTRALIA-JAPAN TRADE AND THE NSW COMMERCIAL AGENCY IN JAPAN

Between 1901 and 1905, there was a distinct move in Australia towards expanding trade in the Pacific as well as in the Far East. During this period, Japan became an ally of the British Empire, and once the fear of Japanese immigration was removed, Australia's energies were directed towards exploiting the commercial possibilities of the alliance.

Due to the size of Australia's domestic market, Australia had to rely upon exports in order to sell its primary products and to sustain economic growth. The continued expansion of the staple exports was a major factor in the maintenance of high living-standards. Thus, expanding overseas markets were vital, for Australia's economic well-being. The export commodities such as wool, gold, wheat and minerals (coal, copper and silver-lead) were essential to Australia's economic development. And of all these commodities, wool since the early 19th century, had been the most important income earner.¹ Since the 1890s, Japan had become a significant market for Australian wool, especially true after the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5 and the establishment of NYK's regular steamship service between Australia and Japan in 1896.

According to the Japanese official statistical data Nippon Teikoku Tōkei Nenkan (The Japanese Imperial Statistical Yearbook), the bilateral trade between Australia and Japan for the period 1894-96 was double that

---
¹ In the 1890s, Australia's wool exports fell sharply following the effects of depression and drought. Wool lost its position as the chief export item between 1901 and 1903, due to the high growth of gold and the increase of minerals' exports. Despite this fact, wool was always regarded as the most important staple export. E.A. Boehm, Twentieth Century Economic Development in Australia, 2nd ed., Melbourne, 1979, pp.89-91.
of 1891-93. The value of total Australia-Japan trade (average value) for the period 1891-93 was 3,200,062 Japanese Yen, by 1894-96 the value had risen to 6,238,957 Yen, and by 1897-99 to 10,049,927 Yen. Australia's exports to Japan showed a steady increase and by 1897-99, they were worth about five times as much as in the first period of 1891-93. Wool constituted more than 70% of the total value of imports from Australia between 1894 and 1896.²

The discovery of a new wool market in Japan was welcome news to the pastoralists and businessmen of Australia especially as the value of wool exports had fallen considerably as a result of the economic depression of the 1890s, the growth of the total wool clip, and the falling demand in overseas markets. The depression hit the wool industry very severely and caused unemployment and the oversupply of wool products.³ Against this background, the governments of NSW, Victoria and South Australia sent commercial agents abroad in the late 1890s for the purpose of examining the prospects of bilateral trade. And these agents went not only to Britain and Europe, but also to India and the Far East including Japan.⁴ Despite

---

2. These statistical figures are computed based on the data provided by Nippon Teikoku Tökei Nenkan (The Japanese Imperial Statistical Yearbook), Vol.14, 1895-Vol.21, 1902.

3. The economic depression in the early 1890s was followed by the great drought which began in 1895 and lasted until 1903. During the drought, Australia's sheep flock fell from 100 million in 1895 to 54 million in 1903. It was caused not only by the drought but also by "a long-run imbalance involving the overproduction of wool in terms of both overseas demand and carrying capacity in Australia." E.A. Boehm, Twentieth Century Economic Development in Australia, p.26; See also W.A. Sinclair, The Process of Economic Development in Australia, Melbourne, 1976; reprint ed., 1983, pp.147-158; R.V. Jackson, Australian Economic Development in the Nineteenth Century, Canberra, 1977, pp.63-73; Samuel Wadham, Australian Farming 1788-1965, Melbourne, 1967, p.38.

Australia's heavy reliance upon the British trade, the colonies during the economic depression attempted to find new markets for these products.

Although the foundations of Australia's future trade relations with Japan had been laid during the 1890s, it was not until 1902 that a permanent commercial agency was established in Japan. NSW was the first Australian state to send a commercial agent to Japan. In 1901 the federal Parliament passed the Immigration Restriction Bill to exclude Japanese including business people. Despite Australia's hopes for expanding trade with Japan, Japanese business people were not allowed to enter Australia unless they passed the dictation test. Furthermore there was a fear that all states except Queensland were at a disadvantage in their commercial relations with Japan because they had not signed the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty of 1894. For these reasons, NSW, Victoria and South Australia became interested in having a commercial agent in Japan. In fact, the Australian states thought of exploring new markets for itself in the so-called "East" covering Japan, China, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Singapore and Indonesia. Among the countries of the East, Japan however was thought to offer the greatest opportunities. This helps to explain why the NSW government retained a commercial agency in Japan without interruption from 1902 to 1922, when the Commonwealth government moved to appoint Trade Commissioners to Singapore and Shanghai.

The NSW commercial agency became the most important of Australia's trading posts in the Far East, because firstly it provided Australia with a model of a commercial agent in the East, secondly it contributed to the development of Australia's trade with the East, in particular Japan, thirdly it gave Australia an official presence in the East, even if only a state presence and finally it also played the role of political agent for the Commonwealth government during the World War I.
The origins of the appointment of the NSW commercial agent in the East are to be found in the late 1890s when the NSW government began considering the appointment of a commercial agent to London, in addition to an Agent-General. This move was prompted by the competition with other states during the economic slump. At the instance of the Premier George Reid, in 1898 T.A. Coghlan produced a report on the management of the Agent-General's Department, in which he mentioned the desirability of appointing "a produce expert attached to the Department" who would deal with trial shipments, and would report on the possibilities of trade. The responsibility of the produce expert would be "generally similar to those of the Board of Trade attache to the British Embassies." In his opinion, the produce expert would receive his instructions from the Agricultural Department and would have to keep closely in touch with the British and foreign markets. One of his duties would be to send in regular reports dealing with "the openings for trade not yet availed of." There was no further development in Reid's ministry regarding appointments of commercial agents, but when a Protectionist, William John Lyne, formed a ministry with John See in September 1899, they revived this question and asked Henry Copeland, the Agent-General for NSW in London, to draw up a detailed statement of the functions of a commercial agent in London. Copeland reported that a commercial agent might be "of considerable assistance in opening up and developing trade" in particular goods, such as poultry, hares, flour, wheat, wines and timber. His views were rather restricted in a geographical sense in that he stressed the need to create "a little Australia

in London."6 Under John See's ministry, Joseph Barling, a member of Public Service Board, visited London to inquire into the feasibility of the government appointing commercial agents in London and on the Continent. He reported "very favourably as to the appointment of a commercial agent in London."7 With respect to the appointment of commercial agents in various countries, he found it "very desirable," but he suggested postponing for a time the appointment of agents to foreign countries until the government had some experience of the commercial agency in London.8 All these reports were consistent in their view that "the State should be specially represented at the world's centre of commerce and elsewhere with the view of securing for our [NSW] producers the best result of their labors."9 Although there was no mention of Eastern trade in these reports, the necessity of expanding the NSW external trade in the world was strongly expressed.

Consequently the See government moved to establish commercial agencies not only in London but also in some other important commercial centres, and on 2 September 1901 the public was informed through an article in the Daily Telegraph that See had decided to place £5,000 on the Estimates for the establishment of commercial agencies in London, South Africa, and China. Japan was not mentioned, but there was no doubt that an agent appointed in China would cover Japan.10 J.C.L. Fitzpatrick, a Free Trader representing Rylstone, an area reliant upon the export of primary products, was a keen advocate of this idea and he raised the issue in the Legislative

---

9. DT, 2 September 1901.
10. Ibid.
Assembly on 25 September 1901. He argued that NSW trade had been "outstripped" by the other states, especially Victoria, so that "some definite action in this matter should be taken immediately by the powers that be." The statistics shows that Victoria's exports had increased from £12.6 million to £13 million while the NSW exports in the same period had only increased from £18.1 million to £18.2 million. Since Victoria's increase in exports was largely due to the operation of Victoria's commercial agency in London, Fitzpatrick concluded that the only course open to NSW was to appoint commercial agents overseas. In reply, See said that such an action was indispensable for promoting the commercial interests of NSW, and affirmed that the government had set aside the sum of £5,000 for the purpose of establishing commercial agencies in London, South Africa, China and "probably one in some other place." The Appropriation Bill containing the budget for establishing the commercial agencies was passed in Parliament with little dissent.

See was now in a position to decide the exact location of the agencies and the men in charge. In 1901, Japan had never been mentioned as a likely centre in government papers or the newspapers. It seems however that Japan replaced China as a suitable location in January 1902. There was no doubt that London would be the most important commercial centre. On 12 November 1901, it also became clear that the See government would definitely send a commercial agent to South Africa, which was supposed to be next in importance after London. China was regarded as the third

12. Victorian Year Book, 1903, p.244; NSW Statistical Register, 1901, p.146.
15. SMH, 8 January 1902.
place, and Japan was additionally mentioned in early January 1902 as "probably a fourth." In the cabinet meetings between 7 and 17 January, it was decided that Japan should take China's place partially because it would be more difficult to find a suitable agent for China who had an adequate knowledge of the country.

The NSW government received about 200 applicants willing to serve abroad as commercial agents for the state. In 1901, John See stated that he would consult the Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber of Manufacturers in order to give them an opportunity to "guide the Government in the best course of procedure in the appointment of these men." The Sydney Chamber of Commerce was aware of the government intention to appoint the agents and had already decided to ask Premier See to "outline the duties of the proposed agents." See wished to be quite certain that the persons selected would be fitted for the work and possess "the confidence of the public" as well as the Chamber of Commerce. When a special meeting of the cabinet took place on 17 January 1901, the first two out of the three agents were selected namely: C.C. Lance for London and E.A.P. Whiteley for "Japan" including China and the East. The appointment of a commercial agent for South Africa was delayed, but later G. Valder filled the position. In the opinion of See, Whiteley was a man who had "a knowledge of" Japan,

17. DT, 7 January 1901; SMH, 8 January 1902.
18. SMH, 18 January 1902.
19. DT, 7, 8, January 1902; SMH, 8 January 1902.
21. DT, 3 September 1901.
22. DT, 2 September 1901.
23. Lance continued his duty as the Commercial Agent for NSW in London until 1905. His resignation was announced in June 1905 and he returned to Sydney in September, SMH, 17, 19, 20, 15 September 1905.
24. SMH, 18 January 1902.
as well as of "our own trade requirement."25 Another special meeting was held on 21 January to agree upon the appointment of a commercial agent "for the East" at which time Whiteley was given this broader role.

Whiteley had for the previous 13 years been employed by the shipping firm of Messrs. Gibbs, Bright, and Co. in Sydney, and had been manager of the Newcastle branch for the preceding four years. He had been in charge of the shipping business of the Eastern and Australian Mail Steam Company for 10 years. Furthermore he was deputy-director of the Newcastle Chamber of Commerce.26 See mentioned that Whiteley had "a large amount of experience in connection with the kind of business he would be engaged in with Japan, which would also include China and Java."27 In addition to his professional career, he had good relations with the Japanese as well as the Chinese residents in Australia. When Eitaki Hisakichi, Japan's Consul-General in Sydney, sent the Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro a despatch regarding Whiteley's appointment, he mentioned that Whiteley was one of Eitaki's best friends in Australia and was kind enough to take the Japanese visitors around Newcastle when they visited there. When Whiteley applied for the position of commercial agent, he asked Eitaki to write a letter of recommendation to John Kidd, the Secretary for Mines and Agriculture. Eitaki had no difficulty recommending Whiteley as the best person to fill the position.28 For the See government, Whiteley was the most suitable man to fill the position because of his business experience, because of his senior position in the Chamber of Commerce, because of his experience

25. Ibid. The salaries of the commercial agents were as follows: in London, £1,500 per annum; in the East, £750; in South Africa, £750. NSWPD, 1902 Session, Vol.X, p.883, 22 July 1903.
26. SMH, 22 January 1902; Despatch No.15, Eitaki to Komura, 21 January 1902, JFMA, 6.1.8.30-1.
27. SMH, 22 January 1902.
28. Ibid.; Despatch No.15, Eitaki to Komura, 21 January 1902, JFMA, 6.2.8.30-1.
dealing with the Japanese and the Chinese, and his strong connection with the Japanese consulate in Sydney.

Whiteley's task was to "develop new channels of commerce" and to "watch carefully every movement in the countries" in which he would represent NSW, and to afford the public "the fullest information as to the sale of our [NSW] products, and the very best means of dealing with them." William McMillan, deputy leader of the federal parliamentary Free Trade Party between 1901 and 1903, who was one of the founders of the Free Trade Association and was a frequent writer to the press on commercial matters, expressed confidence in Whiteley's role in the East:

There were many markets for Australia to exploit besides those under the British flag. In the East, with their teeming millions of consumers, the opportunity was waiting for us open armed. Food products, which they desired most, Australia could raise and supply, and the appointment of an agent to push trade there was an important step.

Whiteley shared McMillan's opinion and held an optimistic view of Eastern trade. He believed that there would be an enormous demand for Australian wool in the markets of the East, since the Japanese and Chinese had begun to wear "wool instead of cotton." The statistics had already shown a great increase in wool trade with Japan. He had a clear picture of the future Eastern trade and a plan to visit various countries such as Russia, China, Korea and the Philippines after establishing his permanent office in Japan. As a part of his job, he had to bring samples of the NSW products supplied to him and make known to "the citizens and to the authorities of the countries in which he was stationed all the resources of this State."

One of the problems, which Whiteley had, was to prepare to deal with the

29. SMH, 20 January 1902.
31. DT, 3 April 1902.
32. Ibid.
33. Despatch No.15, Eitaki to Komura, 21 January 1902, JFMA, 6.1.8.30-1.
34. SMH, 22 January 1902.
Japanese attitude to the White Australia policy. Thus the *Sydney Morning Herald* expressed the view that Whiteley might "find it hard to do business in Japan just at present owing to ... some irritation by reason of our restrictions on immigration." 35 Since there are no surviving records, it is hard to tell what sort of trouble he faced in promoting Australia's products in Japan and how he attempted to foster the NSW trade with Japan while he was there. In fact, he did not have enough time to pursue his job, since he died in Fou-chou, a capital city of Fukien Province in China in the middle of 1903. 36

It seemed that Whiteley dispatched several reports to Premier See, indicating that in Japan and in the East, there would be "an increasing demand of flour, tinned meats, tallow, wool, timbers," all of which could be supplied by NSW. 37 After establishing his office in Kobe in 1902, he travelled to Vladivostock in Russia, and Seoul and Fusan in Korea. He covered a large amount of territory and supplied important commercial news for NSW. 38 He chose Kobe as his base, since Kobe was the largest port in Japan. 39 Kobe was undoubtedly the best commercial centre in

35. SMH, 27 January 1902.
36. Despatch No.57, Fuji, Japan's Chancellor in Sydney, to Komura, 25 September 1903, JFMA, 6.1.8.30-1.
38. SMH, 17 December 1902.
39. In early 1902, Kobe or Nagasaki were considered to be the most suitable place for the commercial agent. Since the commercial agent in Japan had to cover a wide area in the East, Kobe or Nagasaki rather than Yokohama was convenient to the agent. Although Yokohama was the second largest imports port, it was far from the rest of the Eastern countries.

### Trade Transaction at the Three Principal Ports (Index: 1,000 Japanese Yen)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yokohama</th>
<th></th>
<th>Kobe</th>
<th></th>
<th>Nagasaki</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Export</td>
<td>Import</td>
<td>Export</td>
<td>Import</td>
<td>Export</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>133,823</td>
<td>88,528</td>
<td>77,206</td>
<td>125,979</td>
<td>4,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>139,016</td>
<td>89,293</td>
<td>74,748</td>
<td>144,516</td>
<td>4,474</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Japan in which to establish an office aimed at fostering the Australian trade. The NSW government approved of Whiteley's decision.

After Whiteley's sudden death, there was a question whether the NSW government would appoint a successor to the NSW commercial agency in Japan. Alfred Edden, a Labor member, expressed the view that the rural area of NSW was in a "deplorable state" on account of the drought, and questioned, in the state Parliament, the value of all commercial agencies. He asked Premier See about the possibility of recalling all the agents in view of NSW's poor economic position. See replied that he would not "take any action of that kind" and rejected the idea of withdrawing the commercial agents. Subsequently See advertised for a fresh commercial agent in the East. He received 150 applications for the job and on 30 September 1903 announced the appointment of John Bligh Suttor at an annual salary of £750. There was no discussion on the qualification of Suttor in the Parliament although unlike Whiteley he had no commercial background.

According to a study by Glen Walsh, Suttor's qualifications and experiences "hardly justified his appointment." The most plausible reason for his appointment might be "his family's political connection." The Suttors, prominent pastoralists in NSW, had been associated with local politics for many years. Francis B. Suttor was a cousin of J.B. Suttor, and was one of the leading political figures in NSW when J.B. Suttor was appointed as the commercial agent. This may help to explain why there was no fierce debate at all on Suttor's qualifications in the state Parliament. In commercial and manufacturing

41. Ibid.
circles, there were some objections raised over the selection of Suttor as the commercial agent in the East. In view of Suttor's professional career, it seemed to commercial experts in NSW that Suttor would know little of Eastern trade and therefore might not be a suitable person to fill the position of commercial agent. Suttor was also quite an unknown figure in Japan since he had no connection with the Japanese consuls or businessmen.

Despite these doubts about Suttor's qualifications, the See government did not change the decision. Suttor left Sydney on 28 October for Manila where he stayed for two weeks to inspect the commerce and industry of the Philippines. On 28 November, he departed from Manila for Kobe via Hong Kong, where he stayed for two and half days. Finally in December 1903, he re-established the office of the NSW commercial agency at Kobe.

The potential importance of Japan in Australia's external trade was well recognised in the first decade of the Commonwealth. The appointments of commercial agents in the East by various states were a fair indication

45. Suttor was born on 10 December 1859 in Wyagdon, Bathurst in NSW as the fourth son of John Bligh Suttor (senior) who had been a large-scale pastoralist and a member of the Legislative Assembly in 1867-72 as well as of the Legislative Council in 1881-86. Suttor joined the Department of Public Works on 15 December 1879 as a draftsmen and surveyor. Later he served as Resident Engineer on the State Railways until he was appointed as the agent in Japan, and he was an Associate Member of the Institute of Electrical Engineers. Fred Johns's Annual, 1912, p.140; Who's Who in the Commonwealth of Australia, Sydney, 1922, p.267; Kurita, Shinjiro, Who's Who in Japan, Tokyo, 1913, pp.119-120; Who's Who in the Far East (June) 1906-7, Hong Kong, p.302; B. Nairn (ed.), Australian Dictionary of Biography, Vol.6, pp.229-230; SMH, 1 June 1925.

46. Despatch No.57, Fujii to Komura, 25 September 1903, JFMA, 6.1.8.30-1.

47. Despatch No.65, Fujii to Komura, 31 October 1903, Ibid.; DT, 22 January 1904. In Hong Kong, Suttor had a series of interviews with the British acting Governor, the Commodore of the British fleet, the contractors agent for the Naval Dock Works and the leading commercial firms. Before establishing his permanent office in Kobe, he had already produced a commercial report (dated 2 December 1903) on the commercial value of Hong Kong. DT, 22 January 1904.
of Australia's great concern for the promotion of Australia-Japan trade in this period. After the NSW appointments of the commercial agents E.A.P. Whiteley in 1902 and J.B. Suttor in 1903, the governments of Queensland, Victoria and South Australia looked at the NSW commercial achievement and concluded that NSW gained much from this initiative. As George Swinburne, the Victorian Minister for Agriculture, expressed it in 1905, the NSW commercial agent Suttor was "very successful" in fostering the NSW trade with Japan.\[48\] In fact, the NSW commercial agency acted as the model for the other states' commercial agencies in the East.

The Queensland government, inspired by the NSW move, decided in 1904 to send Frederick Jones as its commercial agent.\[49\] Victoria considered appointing a commercial agent in the East in 1905, and commissioned R.B. Lerien to work on a three-year contract in March 1906.\[50\] By at least 1906, South Australia also had started to think about having a commercial agent in the Far East with a view to promoting its commercial interests in Japan, China and India,\[51\] and in 1909 decided to send Major Norton.\[52\] The actual trade between Australia and Japan grew steadily after the Sino-Japanese war and even more sharply from the time of the Russo-Japanese war, and the states were acting to maximise this development. There was a growing view in Australia that Japan was a new and valuable outlet for Australian primary products, in particular wool. The major task of the commercial agents in the East was to nurture the market for Australian products in

---

Japan and to increase Australian exports to that country.

Among the Australian commercial agents in the East, the NSW commercial agent was the most successful. After his appointment in Kobe, Suttor cultivated a close relationship with many companies all over Japan and established a strong relationship with leading commercial and shipping firms in Tokyo, Yokohama and Kobe.53 Through his personal connection with the Japanese firms, he gained access to up-to-date commercial information. The wool industry with which he had the strongest ties through his career in Japan was the best example. Since he had to communicate with a number of the Japanese merchants, Suttor decided to learn the Japanese language in order to make his business more efficient and effective. It seems that he had a reasonable grasp of the Japanese language by late 1905. When John See, the former NSW Premier, visited Japan in November 1905, he had language assistance from Suttor. See mentioned that

[Suttor] has acquired a knowledge of the Japanese language. Had it not been for his knowledge of the Japanese language, I should not have been able to learn what I did in regard to the Japanese character, and what I should call their inner life.54

While mastering the language, he devoted himself to opening up new markets for NSW not only in Japan, but also in Hong Kong, the Philippines and Singapore. Though he was the NSW commercial agent for the East covering Japan, Korea, China, Manchuria, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Java, Singapore, Burma, India and the Dutch East Indies, it was in Japan that he found the most promising commercial prospects for NSW. His keen attention to Japan was reflected in his commercial reports in which Japan always occupied the main place. Suttor contributed not only to an increase in the Australian exports to Japan, but also through his up-to-date reports to Australia's

53. SMH, 20, 25 1904. In 1905, his scope of interest extended to the northern part of Japan, and he visited Fukushima, Sendai, Morioka, Aomori and Hokkaido.
54. SMH, 25 December 1905.
awareness of Japan's political and commercial condition. Sutor's reports were often circulated among the other states through various newspapers in Australia, and he soon became known to the other governments and business circles of other states. His major concern was always to discover how Australia could increase its exports to Japan and how he could remove any obstacle to the progress of Australia-Japan trade.

**General Trend of Bilateral Trade**

The trade between Australia and Japan grew steadily after the Sino-Japanese war and sharply from the Russo-Japanese war. The figures shown in the following Table 1 illustrate the growth of the bilateral trade over twenty years. The figures quoted represent the values (Japanese Yen) as furnished by *Nippon Teikoku Tōkei Nenkan*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3-year-period</th>
<th>Exports &amp; Imports (Average Value)</th>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Exports to Australia (Average Value)</th>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Imports from Australia (Average Value)</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1891/93</td>
<td>3,200,062</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,379,397</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>820,665</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894/96</td>
<td>6,238,957</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>3,837,423</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>2,401,534</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897/99</td>
<td>10,049,927</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>6,040,771</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>4,009,156</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900/02</td>
<td>14,141,730</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>8,235,974</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>5,905,756</td>
<td>719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903/05</td>
<td>23,464,208</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>11,863,991</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>11,600,217</td>
<td>1,413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906/08</td>
<td>29,245,396</td>
<td>913</td>
<td>14,304,887</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>14,940,509</td>
<td>1,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909/11</td>
<td>39,361,262</td>
<td>1,230</td>
<td>20,466,874</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>18,894,388</td>
<td>2,302</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Even though the early trade was small in value, the growth rate of the trade was high. The trade for the period of 1894-96 was double that of the previous period 1891-93, mainly owing to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war which enabled Australia to export a large volume of wool to Japan.
A sharp increase of trade occurred in the period 1903-05 when Japan was at war with Russia. Australia's exports of wool and horses were a major contribution to the marked increase of trade during the Russo-Japanese war. Even after the war, the bilateral trade continued to show a steady increase and in the period 1909-11 it rose in value to 12.3 times that of the first period of 1891-93. Of course, Australia's major trading partner was still the British Empire, in particular Britain, which accounted for 70% (in average) of Australian trade between 1901 and 1911.\textsuperscript{55} During the same period, Japan's share of total Australian trade was only 1.09\%.\textsuperscript{56}

Looking at Australia's overall trade relations including the British Empire, Japan played a relatively minor role. Despite the small share in Australia's trade, Japan was becoming an important trading partner among foreign nations and was the most promising country in the East. In 1904 Japan was ranked as the fifth most important trading partner in the category of foreign countries by \textit{The Official Year Book of New South Wales}.\textsuperscript{57}

It placed special emphasis on Japan as a "large market for many of the products" of NSW. The factors mentioned were Japan's victory over China in 1895, Japan as an "enterprising country," with the establishment of the

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
& 1901 & 1904 & 1907 & 1910 & 1911 \hline
1901 & 73.0\% & 77.0\% & 68.8\% & 67.3\% \hline
1902 & 72.8\% & 71.1\% & 65.8\% & 67.8 \hline
1903 & 70.0\% & 69.9\% & 67.1 \hline
\hline
\end{tabular}


\textsuperscript{56} The Japanese share in Australian trade is as follows:

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
& 1901 & 1904 & 1907 & 1910 & 1911 \hline
1901 & 0.4\% & 1.1\% & 1.0\% & 1.0\% \hline
1902 & 0.9 & 1.0 & 1.5 & 1.1 \hline
1903 & 0.5 & 1.4 & 2.1 \hline
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{The Official Year Book of NSW 1904-5}, pp.188,204. The United States, France, Germany and Belgium were listed as the important trade partners.
NYK line of steamers to foster bilateral trade, and finally the opening up of a new market in Japan for Australian wool.58

The exports from Australia to Japan consisted chiefly of primary goods such as wool, lead, wheat and flour. Among them, wool constituted the largest and most valuable item. The Japanese statistics show that the value of imported Australian wool between 1894 and 1911 constituted 57.3% of total Japanese imports from Australia, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Japan's Imports of Wool from Australia as a Percentage of the Value of Japan's Total Imports from Australia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>71.18</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>46.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>78.03</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>56.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>71.32</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>25.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>57.73</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>48.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>51.51</td>
<td>1907</td>
<td>73.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>55.08</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>32.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>30.95</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>59.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>38.97</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>67.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>51.82</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>50.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


With the exception of 1899, 1901 and 1903 during Australia's great drought, the Australian wool represented more than 20% of Japan's total wool imports. The Australian share increased to 44% in 1907 and to 55.10% in 1910.

Japan increased its imports of Australian wool mainly because of the progress of the wool spinning industry, the high demand of the army for the soldiers' winter coats, and the abolition of the import duties on

58. Ibid.
wool. The Sino-Japanese war increased rapidly the wool production for military use in Japan and eventually contributed to a marked increase of Australian wool exports to Japan. Most of the army's winter uniforms were made of Australian wool.\textsuperscript{59} To promote Japan's wool industry, in April 1896, the Japanese government decided to abolish the import duties on wool.\textsuperscript{60}

It was Kanematsu Fusajiro who organised the Japanese wool firms to protest against the government tariff policy on wool and persuaded the government to abolish the import duties. Kanematsu was a founder of the Australia-Japanese wool trade in the Meiji era. He had already established "Australia-Japan Trade Kanematsu Fusajiro Company" in Kobe in order to engage mainly in the bilateral trade and had opened a branch of his firm in Sydney in April 1890.\textsuperscript{61} After J.B. Sutter was appointed as the NSW commercial agent in Kobe, the Kanematsu company, the biggest Australian wool importer, established a close relationship with Sutter. In fact, it was in the field of wool trade that Sutter won fame not only in Australia but also in Japan. Through Sutter's untiring efforts in Japan, a number of wool importers and manufacturers became involved in Australia-Japan wool trade.\textsuperscript{62} NSW accounted for 60.35% of all Australian exports to Japan


\textsuperscript{60} For the promotion of the domestic textile industry, the Japanese government also abolished the import duties on cotton. Norin Suisan-shō hen, Nōrin Suisan-shō Hyakunen-shi (A 100-Year History of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery), Vol.1 (Meiji hen), Tokyo, 1979, pp.163-165.

\textsuperscript{61} Ito Kotaro, Nihon Yōmō Kōgyō-ron (Study on Japan's Wool Industry), Tokyo, 1957, pp.35-39.

\textsuperscript{62} After Sutter died in Kobe on 17 May 1925, his body was buried in Kasugano Foreign Cemetery, Kobe, and two years later his Japanese friends organised a memorial to unveil a bronze bust of the late Sutter, which was subscribed for by the Japanese Woollen manufacturing companies including the Nihon Keori Kaisha (Kobe), the Muslin Bōshoku Kaisha (Osaka), the Tokyo Keori Kaisha (Tokyo), and the Japanese wool importers including Messrs. Kanematsu & Co. (Kobe), the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha and the Mitsubishi Shōji Kaisha (Tokyo). The fund raising for building
in 1904. NSW exported to Japan in 1904 scoured wool to the value of £225,459 which comprised 64.27% of the NSW total exports to Japan. Because of the centrality of wool in Australia's total exports to Japan, Suttor was in the best position to promote the trade.

Suttor in 1904 produced his first comprehensive "Report on the Manufacturing Interests and Industrial Development of Japan," in which he touched upon the correlation between Japan's education and its rapid industrial progress, the relations between employers and employees, historical trends of the government policies on industrial development, and the possible expansion of NSW trade with Japan. He was very impressed with the development of the woollen and steel industries. He observed that

the Japanese are now making a close study of the woollen business, and before long will prove formidable competitors on the markets of the world. With wages at a few pence per day, and hours worked daily from twelve to sixteen, it will prove a different matter for other nations to compete against such odds. The Japanese are not by any means lazy; men, women, and children are hard workers.

Turning to the heavy industry, Suttor mentioned that "the Japanese Government recognised the importance of the inauguration of the iron and steel works on modern principles, both in regard to military and industrial requirements." As a consequence, Japan provided a new outlet for NSW wool and ores.

After investigating Japanese industry for nine months, Suttor arrived at the conclusion that Japan was "destined to be one of the greatest manufacturing

a bronze bust of Suttor was conducted by Mr Fujii of Messrs. Kanematsu & Co., the biggest wool importer in Japan. This memorial ceremony showed how Suttor had devoted his efforts to increase Australia's wool trade with Japan. A copy of Japan Chronicle, 21, 27 May 1927 in NSW State Archives, Premier's Department Correspondence, 4/6260.3, 1903-22.

63. The Official Year Book of NSW 1904-5, pp.188, 204-5.
64. NSW Joint Volumes of Papers presented to the Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly, the second session of 1904, Vol.IV.
65. Ibid., p.2. (The page number of this particular document referred hereafter is the actual page number of the commercial report.)
66. Ibid., p.2.
countries in the world. The logical conclusion of Suttor's analysis was that "the best course for New South Wales to follow" was to supply Japan with the raw materials.

One of Suttor's most notable successes as the NSW commercial agent was to persuade the Japanese government to purchase Australian horses. Suttor "largely assisted" the Japanese government in importing Australian horses. As a result of Suttor's negotiations, Australia in 1904 exported 9,957 horses to Japan, whose total value was about 1.7 million Japanese Yen. This considerable number of horses was purchased in Australia on behalf of the Japanese government, for service with the Japanese Army in Manchuria. As Suttor reported in his annual commercial report of 1904 on Japan, Australia held "first place for horses" in Japan. This was one of the main factors in Australia's marked increase of exports to Japan during the Russo-Japanese war. As shown in the NSW performance in trade with Japan, there were good reasons for the NSW government to send Suttor to Japan and to keep him in Kobe for twenty years.

Next to wool, lead was the most important export item. Australian lead was first recorded in the Japanese official statistics Nippon Teikoku Tōkei Nenkan in 1902 which had covered the lead trade from 1897. Australia's average percentage of Japan's total lead imports (value) between 1897 and 1911 was 52.58%. It rose to 56.03% in 1902 and then 94.21% in 1911.

67. Ibid., p.1.
69. Age. 14 April 1905.
70. The price was computed based on an assumption that average cost per head was 170 Yen. But 1,103 horses out of 9,957 died during the shipment. Rikugun Sanbo Honbu-hen, Hi Gōshō Yōran, p.79.
In 1911 almost all imported lead came from Australia. Apart from wool and lead, the Japanese official statistics recorded regularly Australia's wheat and flour as Japan's important imports.

Until 1899, Japan's major exports to Australia were primary products such as rice, sulphur, camphor, fish oil and whale oil. Among them, the main export was rice. In 1894, rice made up 67.19% of Japan's total exports (value) to Australia and still represented 54% in 1898. Rice's importance however, decreased sharply from 1899 due to the severe drought throughout Japan. Subsequently Japan became a rice importing country.

Table 3. Japan's Export of Rice to Australia as a Percentage of the Total Value of Japan's Exports to Australia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>67.19</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>34.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>64.35</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>24.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>57.46</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>16.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>54.16</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>6.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>54.29</td>
<td>1907</td>
<td>2.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>39.99</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>29.48</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>33.43</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>33.43</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


After rice, sulphur was the most important Japanese primary product exported to Australia, but never amounted to more than 11.37% of Japan's total

---

exports (value) to Australia in 1908. However for Japan, Australia was the most important sulphur market overseas since Australia purchased 57.9% of total Japan's sulphur exports.\textsuperscript{74} Sulphur was used to refine sugar in Australia.

From 1900, the amount of low-level industrial goods which Japan exported to Australia was increasing, while the amount of primary products was decreasing. The former chiefly took the form of habutae (silk products), apparel (cotton), fancy goods and porcelain. As Table 4 shows, habutae came to constitute the largest item of domestic products' exports to Australia in the 1900s.

Table 4. Exports of Habutae to Australia for Biennial Periods as a percentage of the Total Value of Japanese Exports to Australia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1900/01</th>
<th>1902/03</th>
<th>1904/05</th>
<th>1906/07</th>
<th>1908/09</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.78</td>
<td>18.45</td>
<td>30.27</td>
<td>37.29</td>
<td>40.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Australia's ideal pattern of trade with Japan was that Australia should become a major exporter of raw materials and a modest purchaser of Japan's low-level industrial products.\textsuperscript{75} This pattern of trade relations was being realised by 1900 and decisively after the Russo-Japanese war. This trade pattern operated until Australia embarked on its Trade Diversion Policy

\textsuperscript{74} 1903 24.6% 1905 29.8% 1907 28.3% 1909 36.0% 1911 27.8%
1904 28.5 1906 35.0 1908 57.9 1910 31.8


in 1936 to avoid Japan's over-export of textile against the British textile.76

J.B. Suttor and the White Australia

Australia's exports to Japan did not have to overcome any artificial barrier such as high tariff walls.77 However if Australian manufacturing industries wished to export their products to Japan, Australia was at a disadvantage, since all Australian states with the exception of Queensland had refused to sign the 1894 Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty and had had to pay higher import duties than countries such as Britain and the United States. In addition to this disadvantage, Suttor believed that the operation of the White Australia policy against Japanese nationals might be a severe obstacle to Australia's export of manufactures to Japan.

He was deeply concerned about the effect of the White Australia policy on NSW's and indeed Australia's trade with Japan. Under the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, almost all the Japanese businessmen were unable to visit Australia even for a short period of stay. Unless the Japanese could come freely to Australia, it was obvious that it would be difficult to expand bilateral trade rapidly. Suttor reported that statements made in Australia about Asia were published in Japanese newspapers and that racially-oriented statements received an angry response from the Japanese. Since he was fully aware of the Japanese criticism of the White Australia policy, he feared that trade difficulties might arise from the racism of


77. In May 1910, Suttor reported that wool and woollen goods were "unaffected by the new tariff" of Japan, and were still to be "admitted free." J.B. Suttor, "Report of Japan, 1909," NSW Immigration and Tourist Bureau, Bulletin, No.42, 1910, p.12.
In 1906, Sutter produced a special report as to the effect of the White Australia policy upon Australia's Eastern trade. He asserted that:

the trade representatives of other States [foreign countries] have directly asked Asiatics why they should send their orders to Australia, in view of the Australian attitudes towards Asiatics, and I am confident that a vast amount of harm has thus been done to our commercial interests.79

Sutter argued that trade rivals adopted psychological tactics and "skilfully utilised" Australian racism to Australia's detriment. In addition to this racial factor, Australia's non-adherence to the commercial treaty had an adverse effect on Australia's expansion of exports to Japan. He insisted that:

Australian products are met with a customs impost much higher than is applicable to American, British, or German manufactures, the great advantage conferred by Australia's comparative proximity to Japan does not neutralise.80

For instance, Australia had to pay a duty of 30% on condensed milk whereas America and Canada, both of which had signed a commercial treaty with Japan, paid only 5% under the conventional tariff. On sole leather, Australia under the general tariff paid 28 shillings per 132.27 lb. against 11 shillings 10 pence of Canada. The discriminatory tariff also applied to woollen blankets and toilet soap.81 Due to Japan's heavy demand for sole leather for its military use, Australia's sole leather exports to Japan sharply increased

---


80. Ibid.

81. On woollen blanket, 26 shillings 10 pence per 133 1/3 lb. against 15 shillings 8 pence; on toilet soap, 20% against 10%. NSW Parliamentary Papers, 1906 Session, Vol.IV, Part 2, 'Australian Trade with the Far East,' pp.1133–34; DT, 12 May 1905.
during the Russo-Japanese war by 15 times in 1905 compared with the previous year.82 However soon after the war, Australia was unable to compete with American sole leather which had lower import duties. The export value of sole leather decreased sharply from £56,073 in 1905 to £2,167 in 1906 owing to the US commercial advantage under the Japanese tariff policy.

In his annual report of Japan's trade for 1906, Suttor concluded that the conventional duties still did "operate against the expansion of Australian trade, and make it practically impossible to compete."83 The Japanese tariff, believed Suttor, was "a great drawback" to Australian export of manufactured goods.84 Although the total value of Australia's exports to Japan steadily increased, Suttor considered that the future growth of Australia's exports to Japan would be restricted by its non-adherence to the commercial treaty. After the Canadian government adhered to the commercial treaty unconditionally in January 1906, Suttor argued that Australia should follow its example for, as a result of this arrangement, Canada became entitled to reduce import duties which placed Australian export items at a comparative disadvantage.85 Unless Australia adhered to the commercial treaty, the Japanese conventional tariff would affect adversely not only the products of NSW, but also the whole Commonwealth, except Queensland. Suttor's experience in Japan had led him to the opinion that Australia should adhere to the commercial treaty and that Australia should modify the White Australia policy so as to encourage the Japanese

84. NSW Intelligence Department, Bulletin, No.2, p.11.
85. C.P. Lucas' Memorandum of July 1908, "Confidential, The Self-Governing Dominions and Coloured Immigration," CO 886/1; Canada's trade with Japan increased greatly during the Russo-Japanese war, Brisbane Courier, 11 February 1905.
businessmen to engage in Australian trade.

**Establishment of NSW Intelligence Department**

On 17 May 1905, the NSW Premier J.H. Carruthers summoned a conference of Ministers, public officials, and representatives of *Sydney Morning Herald*, *Daily Telegraph* and *Sunday Times* for the purpose of establishing an Intelligence Department. The proposed aim of this new department was generally to function as "a bureau of public information, collection as well as advisory."86 One of the major motives was to strengthen the function of the Agent-General, the state's official representative in London, by supplying him with up-to-date information about NSW, which would enable him to "follow and counteract rapidly misrepresentation of the State abroad."87 Of seventeen specific functions set forth, two referred to NSW Commercial Agents. The new department would compile a weekly budget of news for the Agents and send a precis of their reports to newspapers and other interested parties in NSW.88

The Intelligence Department arose out of the idea that there was no scientific and systematic approach to the supply, collection and utilisation of certain information, including commercial information from Suttor in Japan. Hence Carruthers saw the necessity for establishing the Intelligence Department:

> I get day by day information of a most valuable character from our Commercial Agents. That information very often leads to

---

86. DT, 1 July 1905. He also was responsible for advertising large blocks of Crown lands when available, for organising periodical shows of NSW products, for carrying out all administrative work concerning the New Zealand International Exhibition, for sending weekly cables through Reuters, for publishing the state statistics, for counteracting injurious statements appearing in public, and for publishing NSW handbook and various pamphlets and for developing tourist traffic.


88. DT, 1 July 1905.
business which gives profitable employment to both labour and capital in this State .... [Concerning distribution of information] our efforts are not scientific, not systematic. A lot of the information that we obtain might be better distributed if there were [a] systematic effort.89

The Intelligence Department, attached to the Premier's Office, was founded in July 1905. H.C.L. Anderson, a former public librarian, was made the permanent head of the Department.90 Subsequently the Department received and published all sorts of overseas commercial news.

After the establishment of the Intelligence Department, reports from the commercial agents - J.B. Suttor in Japan, C.C. Lance in Britain and G. Valder in South Africa - were often given extensive coverage in the Sydney Morning Herald and the Daily Telegraph. Among them, Suttor was the most well known commercial agent since his reports appeared most frequently in the press.91 All representatives of the press at the initial conference had agreed to accept Carruthers' proposal and to print the commercial agents' reports whenever space in the papers was available.92 The Sydney Morning Herald, which had already rendered intermittent assistance to the publication of the commercial reports from 1902, gave strong support

89. NSW Intelligence Department, The Establishment of an Intelligence Department in NSW. Proceedings at a Conference in the Premier's Room, 17th May, 1905, Sydney, 1905, pp.4-7.
90. DT, 1 July 1905. Anderson was appointed on 6 June 1905 and in 1906 he had five staff each in the Intelligence Department and in the Bureau of Statistics. NSW Intelligence Department, Bulletin, No.21, pp.48-49. Between 1906 and 1917, the name of the Intelligence Department was often changed. In September 1906, an amalgamation of the statistician's office (formerly under the Chief Secretary's Department) with this Intelligence Department became "the Intelligence Department and Bureau of Statistics." But in 1908, the Intelligence Department was superseded by "the Immigration and Tourist Bureau" while the Bureau of Statistics became a separate department called "Bureau of Statistics and Registry of Friendly Societies and Trade Unions." See the index card information of Mitchell Library under the title of the NSW Intelligence Department.
92. NSW Intelligence Department, Bulletin, No.21, p.22.
to the foundation of an Intelligence Department.93

With the aid of the Intelligence Department and the press, Suttor became widely known not only in NSW but also throughout Australia. Because of their importance and high value, his reports were often published in the other states' newspapers, including the Age, the Argus and the Brisbane Courier.94 Taking Suttor's commercial performance into account, the NSW government under successive Premiers had sound reasons for continuing the commercial agency in Japan.

Proposal for Joint States Commercial Agents

In 1905, there was an attempt to establish a joint states commercial agency in Japan. It was discussed at the Commonwealth-States Premiers Conference at Hobart which the federal Prime Minister George Reid convened from 6 to 17 February 1905. The outlook of the conference was not bright since the main issue was the federal financial problem and the states' debts.95 In connection with the states' financial problems, the question of funding the states' commercial agents abroad was raised. The Daily Telegraph mentioned that the NSW government had been "compelled to limit Mr Suttor to a considerable extent in regard to expenditure, which made it harder for him to continue the excellent service he was performing on behalf of the State."96 During the conference, the premiers discussed the importance of commercial agents for Australia and the cost problems involved. The

93. SMH, 7 September 1905.
94. For example, Brisbane Courier's editorial (dated 13 September 1905) entitled "Japan and the 'Open Door'" touched exclusively upon the role of Suttor.
95. SMH, 6, 20 February 1905.
96. DT, 4 March 1905.
common understanding was that Australia should undertake a positive commitment to overseas trade and that efforts should be made to reduce the cost of commercial agents by coordinating the efforts of the states. NSW, Victoria, Queensland and South Australia showed a positive interest in this subject. NSW particularly desired to reduce the heavy financial burden of maintaining its overseas representatives, of which the London Agent-General's office was the most expensive, and the Far East's commercial agency was second most expensive.97

At the conference, the NSW Premier Carruthers asked the other states to provide financial assistance to help maintain the NSW commercial agents, especially Sutor in Japan, in return for the states gaining the right to Sutor's services. In the course of discussion with Carruthers, the Queensland Premier Arthur Morgan and the Victorian Minister of Agriculture George Swinburne agreed to an arrangement by which the NSW commercial agent would also represent Victoria and Queensland. Queensland would make equivalent savings by abolishing its commercial agency in the East after the contract with its agent F. Jones expired. Swinburne hoped that the remaining states would also associate themselves with this proposal.98 Victoria was the most ardent advocate of the proposal. At the last meeting of the Premiers on 17 February, Swinburne moved a resolution:

That where it is found desirable to appoint commercial agents in various parts of the world the States should unite in appointing a common agent, to ensure efficiency, save expense, and avoid unnecessary competition.99

The resolution received general approval. The Victorian representatives approached Carruthers to "be permitted to share with" NSW, the representation

97. SMH, 20 February 1905.
98. Age, 18 February 1905.
99. SMH, 18 February 1905. There was disagreement on the offices of Agent-Generals in London whether the states would convert them into commercial agents.
by Suttor at Kobe and by Valder at the Cape, of their "joint commercial interests." Carruthers had no objection to this proposal, and Victorian and NSW leaders reached an agreement in principle on the joint representation of the states in the East and South Africa.

On 1 March 1905, Swinburne sent a formal letter to Carruthers offering to share the cost of the NSW commercial agencies which had, he said, done "splendid work" in Japan and South Africa. At the same time, South Australia announced its wish to join in this scheme. On 3 March Carruthers formally endorsed the idea of co-operative action with Victoria and South Australia. To consult in detail about the financial arrangement with NSW, Swinburne visited Sydney in April and had talks with James Ashton, Minister for Lands, and Samuel W. Moore, Minister for Mines and Agriculture and finally with Carruthers. The cost to Victoria of undertaking this project was estimated to be $2,000 a year. They agreed that Suttor would remain in Japan as "the joint representatives of the two States" because of his proven performance. There was no doubt that Carruthers and Swinburne endeavoured to keep Suttor as a permanent commercial agent for both states in Japan. Swinburne wrote of Carruthers that:

He wants Mr Suttor to remain in Japan, and thinks that Mr Valder might return from Africa. In that case Victoria could make the South African appointment.... The present Eastern agency has been very successful, and he is anxious to extend it.

100. SMH, 20 February 1905.
101. SMH, 27 February 1905.
102. Age, 2 March 1905.
103. SMH, 4 March 1905.
104. DT, 10 April 1905; SMH, 10, 13 April 1905.
105. DT, 21 April 1905.
106. Age, 14, 19 April 1905. There was some opposition among business circles in NSW and Victoria concerning the joint representation.
To strengthen their Eastern representation, the state leaders were also
willing to consider establishing a new commercial agency in India. 107

Between April and June, new difficulties emerged. One was the federal
government’s suggestion to Victoria that the Commonwealth should take
over the Joint States Commercial Agencies. Prime Minister Reid was
of the opinion that the Commonwealth government should have control
over all commercial agents abroad. 108 In a letter to the Victorian Premier
Bent, the federal Minister for Trade and Customs mentioned that the Commonwealth
Ministry had "power to appoint commercial representatives in various parts
of the world." 109 Since the Commonwealth proposal was intended to prevent
unnecessary duplication of offices, to attain economy and to provide the
commercial agents with higher status, the Bent cabinet was inclined to
accept to the Commonwealth's argument. Victoria thought it better to
organise commercial agencies at a national level. On the other hand, Carruthers,
proud of the fact that NSW had already successfully established the commercial
agencies, opposed Commonwealth intervention. 110 A second difficulty
arose from the Sydney merchants' hostility to the joint agency. They feared
that the joint representation of the states would hamper the established
commercial interest of NSW. They believed that it would be difficult to
reconcile the commercial interests of the different states, for instance
NSW, Western Australia and Tasmania were competing with each other
to export hard-woods.

107. Age, 19 April 1905; SMH, 13 April 1905.
108. DT, 24 June 1905.
109. SMH, 20 June 1905. It was once asked by Carpenter, MP on the Commonwealth
power of appointing commercial agents. W. Lyne replied that "Such
appointments could be made under the Trade and Commercial provisions
of the Constitution subject only to the approval of Parliament as to
the necessary expenditure." CPD, 1905 Session, Vol.XXV, p.184, 26
July 1905.
As a result of these considerations, Carruthers came to believe that it was necessary to have separate agencies or "at any rate it was not advisable to have joint Commonwealth ones." The NSW and Victoria agreement on the joint commercial agency was not pursued and since the Commonwealth government's proposal depended upon the states assistance and cooperation, it was unable to put it into practice. The outcome was that each state was left to look after its own commercial interests abroad.

111. DT, 7 July 1905.
CHAPTER VI

AUSTRALIA'S RESPONSE TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war was a turning-point in the history of Australia's relations with Japan. The war broke out on 8 February 1904, when the Japanese navy launched a night attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur. After a series of campaigns in Manchuria and the struggle over Port Arthur, the war ended with the Japanese defeat of the Russian Baltic Fleet in the battle of Tsushima, in the sea of Japan in late May 1905, and the peace treaty was signed at Portsmouth, Maine on 5 September.1

Between 1901 and 1904, Japan became the eastern ally of the British Empire under the Anglo-Japanese alliance and established supremacy of sea power in the Pacific along with the British navy. The Anglo-Japanese alliance, which promised to ensure indirectly the defence of Australia within the wider framework of British world strategy, caused the Australian national leaders to reconsider Australia's relations with Japan. In Australia, the federal government accepted the raison d'être of the alliance in the Pacific and ceased to discuss the Japanese immigration problem after 1902. On the other hand, the fear that Russia would extend its sphere of interests and influence to Central Asia, Manchuria and Korea, caused some anxiety in Britain and Japan.2 Australia accepted the British assessment and was

---


hostile to the Russian expansionist policy and generally showed sympathy
towards Japan which had the task of containing Russia in north-east Asia.
In December 1903, writing a letter to his brother Gilbert, Hubert Murray,
judge and governor in Papua from 1904 to 1940, mentioned that "Sympathy
here is all on the side of the Japs [sic] in the expected war - a curious thing,
for we will not allow them to land in Australia." Apart from the question
of the White Australia policy, Australia did not have any serious problems
with Japan. Thus when the war broke out, Australia criticised the expansionist
Russian policy in Asia and sided with Japan. Of course there were some
alarmists wary of Japan, including a section of the Labor Party, and the
weekly magazine, the Bulletin, but public opinion, as represented by the
press, supported Japan and showed a new respect for that country. The
Bulletin, despite its attitude, fully recognised the strength of Australia's
pro-Japanese feeling:

> the Australian-published journals are now ranged unanimously on
> the side of the Yellow Man.... Public opinion is thus being swayed
towards a sympathy with the Japanese cause.

This popular view of Japan was also reflected in the policy of the Australian
government during the war.

Australia's attitude to Japan, however, took a different direction when
Japan achieved the complete destruction of the Baltic fleet off the coast
of the island of Tsushima. Following Japan's victory, in the so-called "second
Trafalgar", the British Admiralty moved five battleships stationed in the

---

3. Letter, H. Murray to G. Murray, 29 December 1903, F. West (ed.),
Pacific to Home waters in order to maintain its safety margin in the North Sea over the German fleet. As a result of the war Japan emerged as the great power in the Pacific and the Anglo-Japanese alliance was renewed. There was greater British dependence on Japan's navy in Asia, because it had had to withdraw British battleships in the Far East to counter the German naval challenge in Home Waters. The Anglo-French entente of 1904 and the Anglo-Russian agreement which followed in 1907 were further evidence of British preoccupation with European security, and it was the United States response to Japanese-American disputes over Japanese immigration problems which caused the United States to develop a countervailing naval force in the Pacific. These new developments in international affairs caused Australia to re-examine from 1905 to 1907 its relationship with Japan.

_Australia's Public Opinion and the War, 1904 – May 1905_

Australia's views on Japan during the Russo-Japanese war were freely aired in the press, and to a certain extent in political circles. There was no major debate on Japan, nor on the strategic outcome of the war, nor on the commercial aspects of the war in the federal Parliament. The federal parliamentarians were primarily taken up with discussing domestic problems such as those involved in the Conciliation and Arbitration Bill. In the field of foreign affairs and defence it was the more immediate questions of the New Hebrides and the German expansionist activities in the Pacific which attracted their attention. Even though there were some strategic assessments of the Japanese position in the Pacific by certain military officers such as Major-General Hutton, Japan did not figure largely in defence

policy-making during the war period. Fears of Russian expansion and a
desire not to embarrass Great Britain caused Australia to suppress any
doubts about Japan.

Arthur James Balfour, the British Prime Minister, watched "with great
interest to see what effect the growth of a great Japanese Power has upon
Australia." But the Australian parliamentarians during the war discussed
neither the foreign nor the imperial aspects of the war. In a reply to Balfour,
Lord Northcote, the Governor-General of Australia, explained Australia's
political situation and wrote that "the curious indifference to the Russo-
Japanese war continues." Immediate attention lay elsewhere and he pointed
out that there was "a good deal of temporary irritation over Germany's
conduct" in shutting out Australia's trade from the Marshall Islands. A
German monopoly in the Marshall Islands, would seriously affect Australia's
trade interests in the South Pacific. In this sense, the German presence

7. Letter, A.J. Balfour to Lord Northcote, 20 October 1904, Balfour Papers
49697/48.

In this same letter, Northcote described Prime Minister Reid as "jumping
cat," and Deakin as "a fanatical Chamberlainite." Watson was "a very
straight, intellectual fellow" and with "an unmanageable" Labor Party.

9. Ibid. Australia's annual trade with the British and non-British Pacific
Islands for 1903 came to about £1.2 million. The exports alone represented
£780,000.

10. Senator S. Smith submitted a motion urging the government to take
counteraction against Germany. CPD, 1904 Session, Vol.XXIII, p.7365,
24 November 1904. Burns Philp Co., Australia's biggest shipping company,
faced a series of German threats in the Pacific. Since Burns Philp
was subsidized by the Australian government, this became a political
problem for Australia, Britain and Germany. See letter, NSW Agent-General
Coghlan, to Under-Secretary, CO, 25 August 1905, CO 418/41/179-181;
DT, 16 January 1905 (editorial "Australian Trade in the Pacific"). Regarding
the list of the Burns Philp's damage caused by Germany, see CO 418/41/182-183.
The Australian government was of the opinion that the action of the
German Colonial Authorities was "a contravention" of the Declaration
in 1886 and asked the UK to negotiate with Berlin. See letter, F.C.
Sascelles (British Embassy in Berlin) to Herr von Tschirschky, 31 January
1907, CO 418/57/112-113.

Especially from 1905, Burns Philp regarded German competition
as a greater menace than the French, who were finally confined to
the New Hebrides. On the Australian-German commercial conflict
in the Pacific, see K. Buckley and K. Klugman, The History of Burns

There are a series of editorials on German questions which appeared
in SMH, for example: "The Open Door in the Pacific" (3 May 1905),
"Germany and the Pacific" (5 and 9 May 1905), "German Naval Power
in the Pacific was, at least during the war, more directly feared by Australia since Germany was becoming "distinctly hostile to Great Britain."11

This chapter and the following chapter attempt to show why pro-Japanese feeling in Australia emerged during the war and why it changed into fear of Japan afterwards. The aim of this chapter is to illustrate the fragile structure of pro-Japanese feeling in Australia.

Japan as a British Ally

When Iwasaki Kazuo, Japan's Consul-General in Sydney, recalled in 1905 the Australian war-time attitudes to Japan, he had no doubt that "Australia had been sympathetic" to Japan.12 The same view was also held by Herbert A. Parsons, the honorary consul in Adelaide representing Japan.13 The most important reason for Australia's sympathetic attitude to Japan was that Japan was the ally of Great Britain in Asia, and Russia was at odds with the British Empire over issues stretching from Turkey in the Near East through India to China in the Far East. Since the formation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902 Australia had accepted the strategic rationale for this new diplomatic connection. It had been understood in Australia that the alliance would prevent Russia from expanding its power

---

11. SMH, 4 November 1904.
12. SMH, 4 November 1905. Since the outbreak of the war, SMH fully reported the Japanese official announcement of the war, cabled from Tokyo to Japan's consulate in Sydney and the Japanese cause of the war which was expressed at any reception of Japan's consulate in Sydney. These Japanese reports were considered trustworthy. SMH, 12 February 1904; DT, 27 June 1904.
in Asia and keep Australia out of Russian hands. Thus it was natural for Australia to be sympathetic toward Japan while it was at war with an enemy of the British Empire.

When the Japanese consulate organised a reception party celebrating the Meiji Emperor's birthday in Sydney on 3 November 1904, among those who attended were the NSW Premier J.H. Carruthers and his cabinet members, Brigadier-General Finn, the Lord Mayor Alderman S. Lees, Sir F.B. Suttor, representatives of foreign consulates, prominent commercial people, and Japanese and Chinese residents. In the city and harbour, the Japanese flag was displayed, and red and white decorations were displayed in honour of the event. A prominent politician, Sir Francis Suttor, was the first speaker to refer to the alliance at the reception. He had represented NSW at the Ottawa Colonial Conference in 1894, was vice-president of the Executive Council from June 1900 to May 1903, president of the Legislative Council in June 1903, and also a trustee of the national art gallery and the Australian museum. He spoke in "commendatory terms of the alliance" between Britain and Japan, and praised the aim of Japan's war against Russia:

[Japan] had now proved herself to be one of the most enlightened and powerful nations. The war ... would have a wonderful influence on all future diplomatic negotiations.

He recognised Japan as "a great nation" and spoke of its progress as "phenomenal". Echoing Suttor, Lord Mayor Lees hoped that Japan would be victorious, not only for the good of that nation, but also for the peace and welfare of the world. No voice was raised in criticism of Japan. Even T.W. Waddell,

---

14. SMH and DT, 4 November 1904.
16. DT, 4 November 1904.
17. Ibid.
a member of the NSW Legislative Assembly, who had regarded Japan as
"a third-class Power," now considered Japan to be a first-class nation because
she was following the example of British ideas and technology in the war
so efficiently. He strongly upheld "the alliance with the mother-country."

The *Sydney Morning Herald* reported his views:

> he believed the sentiment was voiced by nine-tenth of the British
> Empire when he said that they wished to see Japan succeed in giving
> the Russians the great dressing [down] she ever received.18

Finally, Colonel Bell appealed to "patriotic sentiment" in support of Japan.
Australians not only offered a verbal encouragement but also practical
help such as "the spontaneous and general subscriptions" to aid the sick
and wounded Japanese soldiers.19 J.B. Sutor, NSW commercial agent
in Kobe recommended that Australia should go even further in offering
assistance to Japan. He wrote:

> Japan is not a country with riches. I, therefore, appeal to my
> countrymen for voluntary support by way of money, food, or clothing,
in order to assist as much as possible to allay privations and hardships
during the coming winter months. ... Every act of Japan since the
war commenced must call for the greatest admiration.20

He believed that the White Australia policy had allowed a bad image of
Australia to develop in Japan which was a cause of friction between the
two countries. There was little doubt that he decided to take this opportunity
to cultivate bilateral relations and promote trade, which was his chief
function as a commercial agent stationed in Japan. Commenting on this

19. *It was reported in DT that the Australian offers were made in the
various Japanese representatives in Australian cities by individual
persons. DT, 12 January 1904. Iwasaki mentioned that he had received
many offers from men who were anxious to go and fight under Japan's
banner, and ladies too had been desirous to go as nurse. SMH, 4 November
1904.*
moral and practical support of Japan, Iwasaki judged that this was evidence of "a practical recognition and approval of the alliance" in Australia. 21 Australians were "apparently, anxious to see service with England's island-ally against the Muscovite." 22

During the war, a number of newspaper editorials were published, and the great majority were in favour of Japan. There were, however, three periodicals which were hostile towards Japan; the Tocsin (Labor), the Advocate (Roman Catholic), and the most unrestrained and imported of all the Bulletin. 23 The Bulletin was the only widely read exception. All other publications accepted the strategic value of the alliance and endorsed Japan's justification of the war against Russia. The Age expressed the view that England had had "either prescience or the good fortune to make an alliance with Japan" in 1902, when Japan had been regarded as "a semi-barbarous sovereign of a fifth rate nation" by Germany, France and Russia. 24 Considering Russia's encroachments in Tibet, Persia, Afghanistan and India, which would collide with the interests of the British Empire, the West Australian supported the alliance as a defence of the British Empire and described Japan as "a great Power", while criticising Russia's expansionist policy. If Russia succeeded against Japan, it argued that:

Manchuria and Corea [sic] will assuredly, in that case, become incorporated in the Muscovite Empire while in China, Russia's influence will at once be recognised as paramount. 25

A triumph of Russian arms in Asia would endanger the British sphere of interests in Central Asia. These strategic considerations had made "the

21. SMH and DT, 4 November 1904.
22. DT, 12 January 1904.
25. West Australian, 8 February 1904.
mass of Englishmen pro-Japanese in their political faith" as they had their fellow Britishers in Australia.26

Apart from this aspect, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was seen as a deterrent to any Japanese ambitions to extend into Australia's sphere of influence. The German Emperor's famous cartoon of the "Yellow Peril", suggested that the yellow races would attempt to destroy the western civilisation, and this cartoon became a source for alarmists' views in Australia after Japan's success in the war with Russia.27 The Sydney Morning Herald admitted that though "the alliance with Great Britain makes Japanese ambitions of interest to all British subjects," and the White Australia policy and Australia's geographical position would make them "of particular interest to Australia," it rejected the idea of the "Yellow Peril", which was regarded by racists as a side-effect of the alliance, detrimental to Australia's security, and sided with Japan in the war with Russia.28

The Daily Telegraph repudiated the alarmist fears of a Japanese invasion of Australia and stressed the importance of the Anglo-Japanese alliance for Australia:

A Japanese victory would ... put an end to any Japanese invasion of Australia. Japan would find ample scope for her energy and a broad field for her emigration in establishing her influence and possibly her flag in Korea and Manchuria. There would be no thought of Australia while she was so employed.... so long as an unbeaten British navy holds the sea-road between Asia and Australia, or Japan is an ally of England, this continent need not fear any Asiatic peril. Japan may become our real friend while we are peopling this territory with Europeans.29

This was an argument for the continuation of the alliance, which was seen

26. Ibid.
27. These alarmists suspected Japan of being an organiser of a pan-Asian movement destined to expel the British from India, as well as the foreigners from China and Japan. Argus, 22 October 1904.
28. SMH, 27 February 1904.
29. DT, 20 June 1904.
as a necessity for the protection of British interests in the Far East and as an obstacle to Russian expansion. As long as these conditions remained, Australia could be sympathetic to Japan. When the Brisbane Courier advocated "cultivating the friendliest relations with Britain's Eastern ally, and as far as possible removing all cause of friction" between Australia and Japan, it should be noted that this attitude was formulated within the context of the particular international relations prevailing in 1904-1905 and was therefore conditional and restricted.30

The Dogger Bank and Labor's View

The development of strained Anglo-Russian relations through the Dogger Bank incident was another reason to make Australia hostile to Russia, and the emotional reaction to the incident consolidated Australian press opinions in Japan's favour. There was only indirect discussion of Japan when the Attorney-General Sir Josiah Symon moved in the Senate a motion in terms identical with those moved in the House of Representatives, condemning Russia over the Dogger Bank incident which had taken place on the evening of 21-22 October 1904 in the North Sea.31 In placing it before the Senate,

he appealed to the whole brotherhood of the Empire to speak with a united voice in offering the strongest moral support to the British government. Symon submitted the motion:

That his Senate feels bound, in the present grave crisis, to express its profound indignation at the cruel and wanton attack recently made by a Russian Fleet upon British fishermen whilst they were engaged in their peaceful calling.

After having a brief talk with the leader of the Labor Party, he believed he had Labor's consent to the motion and moved it in the Senate on 28 October. In contrast to the earlier proceedings in the House of Representatives, the motion was not accepted unanimously as four Labor senators opposed it and presented an amendment. The debate was dominated by a discussion of the alleged unfairness of language in the motion adopted by Symon, particularly as to whether the Russian attack on the British fishing trawlers had been "cruel and wanton." The motion was positively supported in the course of the debate by three Free Traders, Edward D. Millen, Edward Pulsford and M. Staniford Smith, and rather moderately by six Labor senators of Anderson Dawson, George Henderson, Gregor McGregor, F. Lionel O'Keefe, George F. Pearce and Joseph H. Turley, even though the last two Labor men had some reservations about the motion. Despite the fact that the leader of the Labor Party approved the motion, the party was divided into two groups in the Senate.

Generally, the Free Traders expressed their profound sympathy and strong moral support for Great Britain, and condemned the Russian officials

32. SMH, 29 October 1904.
34. To consult the leader of the opposition happened "only a minute before the Senate met." CPD, 1904 Session, Vol.XXIII, p.6265, 28 October 1904.
35. Sissons argues that the Japanese fear prompted "three Labor senators" who were Givens, Pearce and Turley to oppose the motion. D.C.S. Sissons, "Attitudes to Japan and Defence," p.26 and the footnote 5. This, however, was only partly correct because Pearce and Turley followed the motion, as did Stewart, Higgs and De Largie. Higgs presented an amendment which was supported by Givens and De Largie.
of the Baltic Fleet, and in this they showed their emotional attachment
to the mother country. Among these, S. Smith took the hardest line and
described the Russian system of government as "the most cruel despotism
in Europe."36 He stated that:

The war between Russia and Japan is the result of the greed and
earth-hunger of the Russian people... In the course of their conduct
of the war the Russian people have constituted themselves
international pirates.37

The Labor men showed a somewhat different attitude to this incident. Even
though the majority shared an emotional affiliation to Britain and supported
the motion,38 there existed a pro-Russian group. This group saw the Anglo-Russian
relations and Russo-Japanese relations, from the perspective of the white
race. In this sense, for some Labor men, the Russo-Japanese war was
essentially a racial war between the white and the yellow.

These Labor Senators argued that firstly the language of the motion was too
critical of Russia and of a Russia which had been condemned unheard, secondly
the press in Australia as well as in Britain was prejudiced against Russia,
a European country, and on the side of the yellow Asian country Japan.
Senator William Higgs stated that the terms of the motion were the result
of "villainous misrepresentation" of "the great Russian nation" by the Australian
daily press which was "deliberately biased against the Russians, and in
favour of the Japanese." He explained that Symon's motion and the press
editorials were part of "a capitalist scheme" to bring the Russians into
contempt and in its place he offered an amendment, seconded by his Labor

37. Ibid., p.6271.
38. For a movement in states' Parliaments, see SMH, 29 October 1904.
colleague, Thomas Givens. He accused "the capitalistic section of the press" of entertaining "a feeling of antagonism towards Russia" and being "in favour of Japan". Noting the existence of "a distinct pro-Japanese feeling ... by a certain section of the community in Australia and Great Britain," he confessed that his sympathies were enlisted "on behalf of the European, and not the little brown Asiatic nation." Senator James C. Stewart endorsed his fellow and blamed the Australian press for being infected with "Russophobia."

Even though two Labor men, Pearce and Turley, spoke for the Symon's resolution, their political stands were quite different from the Free Traders'. Stating that his approval of the resolution was not the reflection of his attitudes to the Russian people, Peace also indicated that he sympathized with "the European nation as against the Asiatic nation." In 1901 he had spoken of the Asian threat in the federal parliamentary debates over the defence bill. And later when he became Defence Minister in the Fisher government, his enthusiasm for defence against Japan was "particularly a reaction to the Russo-Japanese War." Another Labor senator, Turley, agreed with Pearce and stated that he "always" sympathized with the European.

Labor's uncertainty concerning Japan was also reflected in the debate over the defence reorganization bill, which James W. McCay, the Defence

39. He was apprenticed for five years as a printer to Western Advocate; compositor on DT and SMH, 1881-86; an editor of Australian Workman, then Australian Worker, 1893. Joan Rydon, A Biographical Register of the Commonwealth Parliament 1901-1972, Canberra, 1975, p.106. He might have a strong distrust of the non-Labor papers. S. Smith placed Higgs in a pro-Russian group. CPD, 1904 Session, Vol.XXIII, pp.6261, 6271, 28 October 1904. The amendment was on the lines of the motion moved by Richard Sedden in the New Zealand House of Representatives. Ibid., p.6262.
40. Ibid., pp.6262-6263.
41. CPD 1904 Session, Vol.XXIII, p.6275, 28 October 1904.
42. Ibid., pp.6266-6267.
44. Peter Heydon, Quite Decision: A Study of George Foster Pearce, Melbourne, 1965, p.52.
45. CPD, 1904 Session, Vol.XXIII, pp.6271-6272, 28 October 1904.
Minister in the Reid administration, brought down on 2 November 1904. While most of the discussion of the defence bill centred around the administrative problems of the Armed Forces, James Page, a prominent Labor member in Queensland, attempted to explain the importance of Japan's victories to Australia's defence needs. Being under the impression that Australia's Defence Forces were "in a state of chaos" and therefore ill-prepared for any invasion from overseas, he advocated military training for the entire population as the best scheme. His idea coincided with the memorandum furnished by a military officer, which emphasised the geographical isolation of Australia "the only Island Continent" inhabited by "one white race" with "one language." Page maintained that Australia was "now coveted by the overcrowded races of the East, the Japanese are equal to any white race on sea or land, and a very few years may make the Chinese the same." The pro-Russian and anti-Japanese views of the Labor men were not shared by a majority in the Parliament or a majority of the press. Among the major city press, the Bulletin was the only publication to take the same line as the pro-Russian group of the Labor Party.

The Racial Views of "Bulletin"

The Bulletin took a strictly racial view of the Russo-Japanese war. Since it had started off with careful drawings of news events in 1880 and established "an unrivalled artistic and technical team," the Bulletin became pre-eminent in the field of the political cartoon, whose main theme was

---

47. Ibid., pp.7497-7499, 25 November 1904.
48. Ibid., p.7498.
49. Ibid.
racism, republican nationalism and protectionism. This weekly magazine represented the views of these Australian republicans and radicals who were hostile to British colonial attitudes towards Australia. Possibly because of its maverick position in the Australian press, its provocative and derogatory language would "appeal strongly [sic] to the public."

The Bulletin defined the war as a "race-struggle" between the bear of the white European and the monkey of the yellow Asiatics. It always used derogatory terms like monkey, Japs and the yellow man. When war seemed imminent in January 1904, it started questioning Japan's position in international relations and doubted the value of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which was a "wholly unnatural alliance" for a white people. It also criticised the purpose of the alliance which was to check Russian expansion in Asia and argued that Japan would not contribute anything to the future interests of Australia but rather constitute the main danger to Australia's security:

[Owing to the Anglo-Japanese alliance] if England goes to war to help Japan Australia will be expected to follow weekly after, and to let flow blood in the championship of people who are jealously excluded from Australia lest they contaminate the Australian race.

And by the very existence of the alliance, it gave a warning that:

50. Norman Lindsay, a famous cartoonist, joined the staff in 1901 and worked for the Bulletin until 1922. Though Lindsay's own political sympathies were not radical, he was willing to work to editorial direction. R.B. Walker, The Newspaper Press in New South Wales, 1803-1920, Sydney, 1976, pp.227-228.


52. Letter, F. Fox to A. Deakin, 18 November 1905, Deakin Papers MS 1540/1/13/1264-1268.


54. For instance, the political cartoons describing anti-Japanese feelings, Japanese menace to Australia and a racial war appeared in the following issues: 14 January 1904; 11, 25 February 1904; 15 December 1904; 23 March 1905; 8 June 1905.
'the Empire' is bound to friendship with the only possible foe that this section of 'the Empire' has reason to dread. The racial logic of the Bulletin was employed in attacking the Japanese role in the war. A Japanese victory would have fatal repercussions to Australia due to the loss of white prestige in Asia. Since Australia had been peopled by the white race, it was hard to accept the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the idea of Japanese victory. Based on a firm belief that no European power endangered the White Australia policy or would undertake the "wanton and dangerous enterprise" of invading Australia, the Bulletin insisted that:

whilst a Russian victory would mean to Australia no threat and no danger, it would remove by humbling the growing arrogance of a mushroom Asiatic Power, the danger, which some regard as considerable, of an effort by China and Japan allied to win Australia for the yellow races.

Because of the imperial connection which placed Australia indirectly under the alliance system, Australia was exposed to "the humiliation and the danger of having to support Japan" in the Russo-Japanese war.

The radical magazine made it clear that the Australian position was quite different from the British. It did not accept the Jingoistic-Imperial spirit predominant in British politics, which looked upon Russian expansion as a blow and menace to Britain. Simply comparing Russia as a white military power with Japan as a yellow naval power with surplus population, it rejected a Russian attack on Australia as "a wild improbability," but considered a Japanese attack as "a quite likely contingency." The editorial published ten days after the beginning of the war concluded that:

56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
A Russian victory would clear from the horizon the only war-cloud that threatens this continent. A victorious Japan would bring within measurable distance the choice to Australia of abandoning its national aspirations or fighting for its very existence.59

Taking a series of Japanese victories into account, the Bulletin turned its eyes to Australia's defence and probable Japanese invasion of Australia. It admitted that the Australian military system was complete in regulations, but warned that Australia was "for all practical purposes defenceless."60

On the other hand, Japan as it demonstrated by its manoeuvres in the war, had a remarkable navy and army. Recognising Australia's vulnerable position as "a lonely outpost of the white race on the very borders of Asia," it urged self-defence against Japan, which if not heeded would be tantamount to a surrender of Australia to Japan.61 Towards the end of the war, the Bulletin came to believe that Japan had a desire to expand, and Australia was "in the way of the earliest spread."62

To deter Japan from expanding in the Pacific and moving against Australia, this magazine put forward the novel argument, that the enlargement of the French colonial power in the South Pacific might "prove good insurance."63 The Bulletin's argument, claiming that Japan was a menace to Australia's security, was not accepted by, or at least openly accepted by, the Australian political community during the war. It was not until Australia came to evolve a new strategic appreciation of the changed balance of power in the Pacific after the battle in the Sea of Japan in 1905 that the Bulletin's argument and public opinion began to merge.

59. Ibid.
63. R.C. Thompson, Australian Imperialism in the Pacific, p.188.
Japan's Status and the "Yellow Peril"

The Bulletin's "Yellow Peril" depiction of Japan had no equivalent in the daily press. The Sydney Morning Herald described the Dogger Bank incident as "the murderous assault" made by the hopeless Baltic Fleet under the Czar, who was "the supreme and irresponsible ruler of his great Empire." As punishment, it suggested leaving Admiral Rozhdestvensky, commander of the Fleet to "the mercy of Admiral Togo, who will make short work of him and his fleet."64 It questioned the capabilities of the Russian navy, stating that:

the Baltic fleet is practically an inept body, notorious for the youth and inexperience of its officers, which are on a par with its badly-equipped ships, untrained men, and inferior armament.... The Baltic fleet would fall an easy victim to ... the British navy.65

This anti-Russian mood was also evident in the Age, the Argus, the Daily Telegraph and the Brisbane Courier. The Sydney Morning Herald said that "the real ambition of Japan" was for success in industry and commerce, and rejected the idea of the "Yellow Peril" fostered by Kaiser Wilhelm and eloquently propagated by the Czar who had claimed that:

there may one day arise from the East a horde of barbarians who will sweep away all the strongholds of civilisation unless we are leagued together against the attack.66

Since the Kaiser's colonisation policy in the Asia-Pacific region as well as the Czar's in China were adverse to the interests of the British Empire,

64. SMH, 27 October 1904. The Sydney Morning Herald referred to the domestic instability of Russia and the Western Australia mentioned the revolutionary forces in Russia which were threatening the foundation of the throne of Nicholas II. SMH, 20 September 1904; ibid., 26 January 1905; Age, 23 February 1905; DT, 10 March 1905. Regarding the International Commission of Inquiry into the "shameful bombardment of defenceless trawlers" by the Fleet, see SMH, 28 February 1905; Western Australia, 19 December 1904.

65. Western Australia, 27 October 1904.

66. SMH, 5 November 1904.
Australia's newspaper saw little merit in the "Yellow Peril" theory and had interpreted the situation through Australian perspectives. On the surface, both the concept of the "Yellow Peril" and the White Australia policy were the same in terms of racial policy but different in substance. Australia regarded the Kaiser's racial policy mainly as his colonial expansionist policy, which would have the effect of changing the international balance of power. In this sense, it had a dynamic character and was military aggressive. By comparison, the White Australia policy was static and defensive since its aim was to keep Australia white and not challenge the status quo. The Age accused the Kaiser, in his disparaging remarks about the Japanese, of being "like a little boy in an orchard who has just been witnessing the chastisement of another boy for taking one apple, and knows that he himself has two in his pocket."67 For Australia, the apple meant the German colonial interests in China and the Pacific. The Argus suggested that Germany used the "Yellow Peril" theory as the justification for the expansion of the Shantung settlement in China into "a great German dominion." This ambition would later meet a serious obstacle in a victorious Japan.68 Because Germany realised its strategic vulnerability in China if Japan won the war against Russia, it was important for her to assist Russia. The Argus concluded that the Kaiser's claim of "yellow danger" was "groundless" and expressed what they claimed to be the real danger:

The only yellow peril to Europe would be the subjection and permanent occupation of Manchuria and northern China by Russia.69

67. Age, 11 May 1905.
68. Argus, 22 October 1904.
69. Ibid.
The Brisbane Courier was of the same opinion:

The "yellow peril" was never at any time more than a bogey, deliberately raised by Kaiser and Czar to find some reasonable excuse for spoliation of Chinese territory and to carry out a policy which would eventually have made the Pacific the centre of world-conflicts.\(^70\)

In averting the Russian and German danger from Britain and Australia, the press found Japan to be a friend and agreed with Japan's war aim. Consequently the Kaiser's "Yellow Peril" claim was not connected to the White Australia policy in the mind of the Australian press as it was seen to be strategically and economically against the interests of the British Empire. Australia's commercial confrontation with German colonial authorities in the Marshall Islands, who closed the door to the Burns Philp should also be remembered.

The Australian press presented Japan as a first-class modern nation, an Asiatic power fully trained, equipped, united and disciplined. The newspapers were all impressed by Japan's efficient methods of training, its preparations for war and its sophisticated tactics and strategy.\(^71\) The Brisbane Courier summarised the Japanese superiority:

> the Japanese have proved their right to be regarded as amongst the foremost of nations whether as regards commerce, intellectual culture, or military and naval strength... their business of maintaining the integrity of the Far East against European aggression with a thoroughness ... must command general admiration.\(^72\)

The Argus regarded Japan as a nation of the twentieth century and Russia as still living in the middle ages, and took a position similar to the Brisbane Courier on the war:

---

70. Brisbane Courier, 6 September 1904.
71. See the following example: SMH, 10, 11, 13 February; 20 September; 5 November 1904, 3 January 1905; DT, 10, 11, 12 February; 3 March; 31 May; 27 June 1904; 4 January; 7 March; 29 April 1905; Brisbane Courier, 12, 31 May; 5 September; 9 November 1904; 4, 16 January; 15 March 1905; Argus, 22 October 1904; 13, 15, 17 March 1905.
72. Brisbane Courier, 31 May 1904. See also an editorial dated 9 November 1904.
[the war] established the right of Japan to rank as a first-class fighting state.... Asia has produced an empire which can meet European empires on a footing of equality. The most aggressive of European Governments has been ordered off Asiatic soil by an Asiatic Government, and the Asiatic Government has made good its order by force of arms.\textsuperscript{73}

The \textit{Daily Telegraph} claimed that Japan was "forced into war" by Russia, and that Australian public opinion took it for granted that Japan was justified in asking that Russia should "foot the bill" of its own "folly.\textsuperscript{74} Moreover, Japan had earned the right to be received into "the comity of nations.\textsuperscript{75} Japan's success subsequently led to a re-examination of Australia's immigration policy.

The debates over the Dogger Bank incident inevitably precipitated comparisons between Russia and Japan. It is clear that during the war Australian public opinion was sympathetic to Japan and that the Labor men who voiced a racially oriented view in the Senate spoke for only a small minority. However, Australia's favourable attitudes to Japan were ultimately determined not by its assessment of the merits of the Russo-Japanese conflicts, but by its evaluation of the strategic value of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the importance of the alliance for the supremacy of the Royal Navy.

\textbf{Conclusion of the Passport Agreement}

The Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, took full advantage of Australia's friendly attitudes to Japan, in mid-1904 to conclude a Passport Agreement in order to permit Japanese merchants, students and tourists bearing passports

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{73.} \textit{Argus}, 15 March 1905.
\item \textbf{74.} \textit{DT}, 23 February 1905.
\item \textbf{75.} \textit{Brisbane Courier}, 9 November 1904.
\end{itemize}
to enter Australia temporarily without being subject to the dictation test. The federal government's new approach to Japan was largely the result of its increased influence in the Asian-Pacific region. Recognising Japan as a British ally, as a supporter of the security interests of the British Empire in Asia, and as a future market for Australia's primary products, Deakin understood the necessity of establishing friendlier relations with Japan.

Deakin and his successors' motives in proposing the Passport Agreement were to remove a cause of friction with Japan and to foster bilateral trade by granting free entry of the Japanese merchants, without injuring the basic policy of excluding permanent Japanese settlers. Deakin pursued this policy through direct negotiation with the Japanese Consul-General in Sydney, instead of going through the formal British diplomatic channels. This is, what A.T. Yarwood calls, "the Commonwealth's first venture in diplomacy." 76 There is no evidence to suggest that Australia's decision-makers undertook the new initiative from fear of Japan.

The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war imparted "some urgency" to Deakin's policy on Japan. 77 Being aware of the new respect for the Japanese in Australia and anticipating rapid trade expansion because of the war, Deakin decided to remove a cause of strained relations with Japan and to adopt a scheme which would foster the trade development. Not only the federal but also states' leaders showed their keen interests in promoting trade between the two countries. It was widely recognised in Australia that future trade with Japan would expand and add to the nation's prosperity. But the 1901 Immigration Restriction Act was an obstacle in the way of

this development. According to the Act, almost all Japanese merchants
were prohibited from entering Australia unless they passed the European
language dictation test, or unless they obtained rare certificates of exemption
far in advance. The problem of securing an adjustment to the White Australia
policy was, however, formidable. A radical alteration of the White Australia
policy would be unacceptable to Australians. At an annual meeting of
the Australian Natives' Association held in Melbourne in February 1904,
he touched upon the importance of the White Australia policy at some
length:

It was the very essence of Australian life. It gave to the people
the amplest powers of self government .... The association of yellow,
brown, and black would lower the white standard — and that was
why they were advocates of a White Australia.\(^78\)

Since the White Australia policy was a national security policy, domestic
politics required careful treatment of the Japanese questions.

Thus Deakin proposed an informal arrangement to meet the desires
of both parties. To this end Deakin initiated a communication, of his "own
volition," with the Japanese Consul-General Iwasaki Yazuo in order to
arrive "at some understanding whereby visitors from Japan, whether tourists
or traders, could be received" in Australia without being subject to the
education test.\(^79\) Being aware of the delicacy of the White Australia policy,
Iwasaki appreciated Deakin's action and expressed his personal admiration
of the "courageous course" which Deakin was adopting.\(^80\)

---

78. DT, 2 February 1904.
79. CPD, 1905 Session, Vol.XXVIII, p.3887, 20 October 1905; Argus, 21
  October 1905. Iwasaki was a graduate of Law School, Tokyo Imperial
  University. He joined the diplomatic service in July 1900 and had
  his first overseas posting to Shanghai in 1901. When he took up his
  position at Sydney on 25 November 1903, he was 31 years old. Gaimusho
  Nenkan (Official Yearbook of the Foreign Ministry, Japan), Tokyo,
  1907, pp.97-98.
80. Confidential letter, Iwasaki to Hunt, 22 April 1904, Deakin Papers
  MS 1540/1/11/979.
Deakin started work on the proposal, in early 1904, after he received representations from John M. Creed, a member of NSW Legislative Council, who was "a critic of the White Australia policy." Brian Dickey concludes that Creed was "successful in urging the Deakin government in 1903-4 to allow Japanese travellers and traders with passports." Since there is no clear evidence how Deakin was influenced by Creed, it is still doubtful that Creed was the critical influence shaping Deakin's external policy towards Japan in 1904. It, however, may be true that Creed's representations helped influence Deakin's reconsideration of the status of the Japanese in Australia. On 30 December 1903, Creed, who was deeply impressed with Japan's potential power in the Pacific, wrote to Deakin that since the Japanese were "of high intelligence, of great enterprise in every field of science and industry, and have such pride of race, as equals ... that of any European nation," it was "entirely contrary to far-seeing policy" to make the Immigration Act apply to the people of Japan. He stated that:

Though the Japanese Government is anxious to cultivate commercial relations with Australia, and, therefore, desires the free entrance of its educated men, it is ... entirely averse to any considerable number of its ordinary workers coming here.

Because the Japanese government was directing the flow of emigrant

---

81. J.M. Creed (1842-1930) was not only a physician but also a politician. He was nominated to the Legislative Council in August 1885 and held his seat until 1930, being "a willing speaker on a wide range of subjects." He criticised the lack of Australian defence preparedness in the late 1890s and attempted to achieve social welfare reforms in NSW. Australian Dictionary of Biography, Vol.3, pp.492-493.

82. Letter, Creed to Deakin, 30 December 1903 published in DT of 16 March 1904. Creed offered this letter on 14 March for publication to DT. Unfortunately, "Creed and Japanese entry into Australia," which as an original correspondence between Creed and Hunt in the Department of External Affairs files (AA. CRS A1/11/7775) was destroyed. There is no reference about Creed in Deakin Papers and Hunt Papers on the subject of the Passport Agreement, not in the Colonial and Foreign Offices file of the Public Record Office, London. According to the Japanese diplomatic documents, there is no evidence to suggest that Creed had a Japanese connection.
workers to its newly acquired colony of Formosa, but not to Australia, he argued that:

the Asiatic restriction law is unnecessary, so far as the Japanese are concerned, for the protection of Australian workers, and its continuance in regard to that race is a useless and impolitic germ of probable dangerous future hostility.\(^{83}\)

Creed proposed changing the operation of the Immigration Restriction Act so as to admit the Japanese under similar conditions to Europeans.

Creed also suggested that this discussion on procedure should be conducted in secret sittings of the Parliament, thus avoiding the publicity of offensive remarks by "short-sighted men wishing to curry favor with ... their constituents."\(^{84}\)

This argument did not immediately appeal to Deakin, and in 1904 Creed put his case again to Prime Minister and made further proposals for adopting a passport arrangement between Australia and Japan, by which the only non-labourer Japanese passport holders would enter Australia without being subject to the education test.\(^{85}\) By accepting Japan as one of the great powers and avoiding Australia's "possible compulsory submission" to Japan in the future, Creed urged Deakin to consider a passport arrangement as having the "advantage of a voluntary concession" to Japan.\(^{86}\)

Under the direction of Deakin, Atlee Hunt, the Secretary of the External

---

83. Letter, Creed to Deakin, 30 December 1903, published in DT, 16 March 1904. He argued his case from the point of security. If Japan was "victorious in the imminent war with Russia," he stated that its standing among nations would be "so vastly increased that she is not likely to tamely submit to what she considers a national humiliation." Taking Australia's future perilous position into account, Creed warned that "If ... Japan comes out victorious over Russia, we may to yield to the superior force she could bring to bear upon us, which, if separated from the Empire, we shall be powerless to resist, or if still united with it will receive such lukewarm support as would leave us but little choice but to accept the terms proposed."

84. Ibid.


86. Ibid.
Affairs Department, replied to Creed that under the existing certificates of exemption (the section 3-h of the Immigration Restriction Act), there was a wide power of exemption conferred upon the government and this would make it possible for Japanese merchants to enter Australia if they supplied their names in advance. Stating that this practice was "found to work well," Hunt rejected Creed's idea of the passport arrangement between Australia and Japan.\textsuperscript{87} Even though Hunt rejected Creed's suggestion, it is hard to believe that Deakin was not influenced by Creed at all, since Deakin approached Iwasaki on 16 April 1904 three days after Hunt's reply to Creed.

Deakin set about framing Australia's new policy towards Japan cautiously and, remembering Creed's suggestion, attempted to establish a new framework of bilateral relations by reviewing the past experience of Australia-Japan relations. The key point was to offer better treatment of a certain class of the Japanese nationals, without changing the core of the White Australia policy. He went over the Barton-Eitaki correspondence and also the Queensland correspondence with Japan on the gentleman's agreement. When he reviewed the correspondence which had taken place between Eitaki and Barton, he picked up some helpful hints for formulating a policy towards Japan. In a letter of 3 May 1901, Eitaki had suggested that the Japanese government would "readily consent to any arrangement by which all that Australia seeks ... would be at once conceded," so that Australia's federal government

\textsuperscript{87} Letter, Hunt to Creed, 14 April 1904, published in DT, 23 April 1904. Creed had a habit of making an appeal to the press for acceptance of his ideas. He proceeded to DT for publication of his letters to exercise pressure upon the federal government. Noting the favourable attitudes of the general public to Japan just after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war, he thought that disclosure of his letters would not endanger his political carrier in NSW, but rather be appreciated by public opinion. \textit{Australian Dictionary of Biography}, Vol.3, pp.492-493; DT, 16 March, 23 April 1904.
could "formulate some proposals which ... would allow of the people of Japan being excluded from the operation of any Act."88 It appeared that Japan would be prepared to accept any Australian proposals which would give some concession to the Japanese. What this letter meant to Deakin was that Australia could come to an arrangement over Japanese entry into Australia without modifying the Immigration Restriction Act. Therefore he could theoretically proceed to negotiate secretly with Japan while he would not be disturbed by any debates in Parliament. And in a letter of 11 September 1901, Eitaki had mentioned that under the Japanese Emigration Protection Act, "no Japanese" might go abroad "without first applying to the Government for permission to do so," and that each application form had to be accompanied by a guarantee "for the good conduct of the emigrant while abroad," and the government would grant a passport only to approved applicants.89 Of course Deakin did not wish to give right of entry to all Japanese, but to certain qualified Japanese such as merchants.

There was in fact a precedent for a passport arrangement in Australia. In 1897 Queensland had agreed to a similar procedure when it adhered to the 1894 Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty. Allowing entry to those whom the Japanese government granted a passport, in 1900 they had reached a gentleman's agreement restricting the number of Japanese in the colony to 3,247. A series of negotiations were conducted directly between the Queensland government and the Japanese consul in Townsville bypassing the formal British diplomatic channel. Bearing this in mind, Deakin realised the possibility of concluding a new gentleman's agreement with Japan through direct negotiations.90

88. Letter, Eitaki to Barton, 3 May 1901, AA. CRS A8/01/203/1.
89. Letter, Eitaki to Barton, 11 September 1901, ibid.
90. Despatch, Deakin to Governor-General Northcote, 29 December 1905, CO 418/44/23.
Deakin's direct approach to Japan meant a departure from the Anglo-
Australian understanding on the established procedures for Australia's negotiations
with foreign powers. After experiencing Japan's direct protest to the Barton
government on the subject of the Immigration Restriction Bill in 1901,
Barton had reached an understanding with the Colonial Office between
1901 and 1903 that all diplomatic communication and correspondence excluding
matters of welfare would be conducted through London. Despite Barton's
pledge to the Colonial Office, Deakin "authorised this direct correspondence"
for two reasons. He judged that the principles did not preclude discussion
"admitted on both sides to be of a preliminary and to a large extent unofficial
character," which might lead to more formal negotiations to be conducted
through "ordinary diplomatic channels." To justify his argument, he referred
to the precedent of the Queensland case. In answer to a critical rebuke,
Deakin told the Colonial Office that had the communication taken place
through the Foreign Office and the Japanese Embassy in London, much
time would have been lost and "the occasion of obtaining even this preparatory
provision might have been indefinitely postponed."  

Deakin instructed Atlee Hunt to communicate with Iwasaki on this
passport arrangement and on 16 April 1904, Hunt sent informally a "confidential
communication" to Iwasaki:

In the opinion of the Prime Minister, the operation of the Immigration
Restriction Act has now been observed for a sufficient time to
permit the consideration of means by which British subjects and
the subjects of friendly Powers might be placed upon a footing

93. Ibid. The Deakin Papers, Hughes Papers and Hunt Papers being in
the custody of the Australian National Library at Canberra do not
contain any significant cabinet minutes on this issue.
which would enable the Commonwealth, without altering either its law or its general practice, to afford special treatment in such instances.

In this communication, Deakin proposed to accept the Japanese merchants, students and tourists if they were "provided with passports sufficiently identifying them, and specifying the purpose and duration of their visit."94 This arrangement would not apply to Japanese who wished to reside permanently in Australia. He also offered a similar arrangement to India, whose subjects had also been excluded from entering Australia.95 In his letter to Iwasaki, Deakin referred to the earlier correspondence between Beitaki and Barton, and asked whether the Japanese government still held to the same position. Furthermore, he recognised the inconvenience involved for intending Japanese visitors who had to give notice of their intention to visit Australia "in sufficient time for the necessary Certificates of Exemption to be prepared." Deakin was not willing, however, to change or attempt to change the current legislation and stated that the federal government would preserve "all the powers of the Immigration Restriction Act." He added that the new passport arrangement would be "tentative."96

Iwasaki confirmed the case of his predecessor Beitaki and responded that Japan would wait "with much pleasurable anticipation, the promised formal communication."97 Unfortunately Deakin did not complete these negotiations. Just after Iwasaki's reply reached Deakin, his government on 22 April resigned from office. When the Labor Party formed a new government under the leadership of John C. Watson, with W.M. Hughes

95. Circular No.13-80-6, J. Wilson, Secretary to the Government of India to all local governments and administration in India, 18 October 1904, Ibid.; See also SMH, 6 December 1905.
as the External Affairs Minister, the negotiations were discontinued. Placating Japan in this new political situation, Hunt explained that negotiations would be unavoidably delayed since Deakin had had the intention to include India in the arrangement. Iwasaki was very disappointed and regretted "the unfortunate political accident which has deprived ... Mr Deakin of the office." He was concerned that Deakin's initiative might be stillborn and he asked for Hunt's aid in receiving the issue.

Through the NSW Premier Waddell, Hunt received a letter from Sutter in Japan who urged "the desirableness of adopting some such course ... with a view to fostering commercial relations between Australia and the East." Sutter warned about the effect of the Immigration Restriction Act on the trade relations between Australia and Japan. He drew attention to "the vast amount of injury" being done to the NSW products, owing to the restrictions placed upon the Japanese merchants. In order to facilitate the growth of commercial relations, Sutter urged some modification of the immigration restrictions. In due course, Sutter's representations were brought to the notice of the federal government through Atlee Hunt who, after receiving Sutter's letter, made a memorandum regarding "The Immigration Restriction Act 1901. Visits of Asiatic Merchants, Travellers, &c., to Australia" which was sent to Hughes on 21 July.

Hughes read the memorandum on 29 July, and had it "under consideration for some time" before deciding to resume the negotiations with Japan.

100. It took some time before Watson and Hughes became aware of the fact that Deakin had been "in communication with the Japanese consul and had initiated steps towards facilitating the admission of tourists and traders," since the negotiation was kept secret during the Deakin administration. Argus, 21 October 1905.
102. SMH, 26 September 1904.
103. Hunt once mentioned that this matter had been "revived by the letter" from Sutter. Memorandum, Hunt to Hughes, 21 July 1904, AA. CRS A1/25/27045.
Watson was "quite prepared to agree to facilitating the admission of Japanese ... who come as tourists or traders and not to settle here." On 10 August, Hughes confirmed the government's formal proposal to Japan and notified Iwasaki of Australia's proposal:

> It has now been decided that any persons bona fide of the classes mentioned above [merchants, students and tourists] desirous of visiting Australia will be admitted to the Commonwealth provided they are in possession of passports from [the Japanese] government.\(^{105}\)

He also made clear the motives of the passport agreement by stating that "this exemption will be the means of promoting intercourse and improving trade relations." From the Japanese side, Edward William Foxall, the English Secretary in the Japanese Consulate in Sydney, made clear to his close friend Atlee Hunt that the main object was to "facilitate and promote Trade and Commerce between the Two countries."\(^{106}\)

Hughes proposed to make this arrangement effective from 1 October. Soon after Iwasaki received this proposal, he cabled the Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro, inquiring whether he could proceed to the drawing of and signing of an agreement. Komura authorised Iwasaki to conclude the agreement on 19 August. Iwasaki accepted the terms and conditions referred to in Hughes's proposal.\(^{107}\) Hughes, however, could not formally conclude this arrangement, because the Watson government resigned on 17 August over the Conciliation and Arbitration Bill.

Soon after the formation of the new government of George Reid and Allan McLean, Iwasaki wrote to Reid and mentioned the Deakin-Hughes

\(^{104}\) Argus, 21 October 1905.
\(^{106}\) Private letter, Foxall to Hunt, 4 February 1910, Hunt Papers MS 52/1315.
\(^{107}\) Letter, Iwasaki to Reid, 19 August 1904, JFMA, 3.8.2.33-8; AA. CRS A1/25/27045.
proposal.\textsuperscript{108} Reid, representing the Free Traders' interests, had no difficulty in confirming that the passport arrangement would take effect from 1 October.\textsuperscript{109} Accordingly the decision was conveyed on 31 August to the office of the Collector of Customs whose office was responsible for immigration matters at Australian ports.\textsuperscript{110} After settling the negotiations with Iwasaki, Reid responded to Suttor through the NSW Premier. On 22 September, Reid wrote to Premier Carruthers, notifying him of the conclusion of the Passport Agreement between Australia and Japan and stating that "the exemption will be the means of promoting intercourse and improving trade relations."\textsuperscript{111} The new policy of the federal government on the admission of Japanese was disclosed through the \textit{Sydney Morning Herald} of 26 September 1904, which mentioned the positive role of Suttor in concluding the agreement.

What was significant in the Australia–Japan relations was that Australia demonstrated "the continuity of policy in spite of frequently changing Ministries."\textsuperscript{112} The Protectionist Deakin's initial proposal was carried out by the Watson Labor government, and finally concluded by the Free Trader Reid. All three parties shared a new approach to Japan, all exemplifying a friendly attitude and a new respect, partly caused no doubt by the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the Russo-Japanese war. The federal governments recognised the importance of Japan in Australia's trade relations and made a concession

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{109} Letter, Reid to Iwasaki, 24 August 1904, NGB, Vol.37-2, No.925-3; Telegram, Iwasaki to Reid, 26 August 1904, AA. CRS A1/25/27045; Letter, Iwasaki to Reid, 29 August 1904, Ibid.

\textsuperscript{110} Circular No.04-7564, Hunt to Collector of Customs, 31 August 1904, AA CRS A1/25/27045; Letter, Collector of Customs to Hunt, 2, 3 September 1904, Ibid.

\textsuperscript{111} Letter, Reid to Carruthers, 22 September 1904 published in SMH, 26 September 1904.

to the Japanese temporary visitors such as merchants. The Passport Agreement was one of the most successful achievements in Australia’s trade policy, and exceptional in the history of the state-Commonwealth relations. While the state governments encouraged Australian trade with Japan by sending the commercial agents in the East, the federal government removed an administrative barrier to the visits of the Japanese merchants to Australia. In the broad context of Australia’s foreign policy-making, the Passport Agreement was important since it was the first direct diplomatic achievement of the federal government. The lessons of the direct negotiation in 1904 had a considerable impact on the style of future negotiations. Australia learnt that the federal government could achieve its diplomatic goals either through the normal British diplomatic channels or through direct negotiation with the foreign country concerned. In view of Deakin’s direct negotiations with the Japanese government in 1905 and his direct invitation to the US Great White Fleet of Roosevelt in 1908, the conclusion of the Passport Agreement was extremely important not only in the context of Australia-Japan relations, but also as it related to Australia’s overall foreign policy-making in the Pacific.

Commenting on the agreement, the *Sydney Morning Herald* under the headline of "Japan and Australia" praised the federal decision and stated that "the public will note with satisfaction the wise and proper attitude" of the government to Japan.\(^\text{113}\) It accepted the commercial reasons for modifying the White Australia policy and suggested that the new government would have an immediate effect on the role of the NSW commercial agent in Japan. The paper showed its appreciation of Suttor’s role and efforts

\(^{113}\) *SMH*, 26 September 1904.
to promote trade with Japan:

One result of this action will be to strengthen the hands of our Commercial Agent in the East, to whose representations on the subject we owe Mr. Reid's announcement. This officer was naturally much hampered in his efforts to increase and improve our business relations with Japan by the existence of an obstacle to the personal intercourse of Japanese merchants ... in developing the various products of New South Wales. 114

And it rejected a mere assumption held by some "fanatical" believers in a White Australia that this new administration of the Immigration Restriction Act would be immediately followed by an influx of Japanese labourers.

Following the Australia-Japan Passport Agreement, the range of concession was later extended to include Chinese, Siamese and Vietnamese. As to the Chinese, authority to grant similar exemptions from the provisions of the Immigration Restriction Act was granted to the states' commercial agents in the East - J.B. Suttor of NSW, R.B. Lerien and J.M. Sinclair of Victoria, and F. Jones of Queensland. 115

For Japan, the agreement represented the achievement of the goal to have Japanese accorded an equal status with Europeans. On the occasion of the Meiji Emperor's birthday reception in Sydney on 3 November 1904, Iwasaki rejected strongly an idea of the "Yellow Peril" and expressed gratification that the federal government had removed "the stigma of undesirableness from Japanese merchants, students, and tourist travellers and to permit them ... to enter the Commonwealth without restriction," albeit subject to the regulations which were imposed to prevent any abuse of the privilege. 116

114. Ibid.
116. SMH, DT, 4 November 1904; Brisbane Courier, 9 November 1904.
He regarded the agreement as showing "grace and courtesy" by Australia and maintained that it would "do much to promote the increase of trade, to the mutual benefit of both countries."117 In Japan, Suttor noted the changing Japanese attitudes to Australia as a result of the Passport Agreement. He remarked in his annual report for the year 1904 that the Japanese were now "looking with more favour towards Australia."118 Though the Japanese government welcomed Australia's changing policy, it did not solve the vexed question of Japanese immigration. Since the Japanese subjects were not yet placed on the same footing as European people for this purpose, the Passport Agreement was still "unsatisfactory" to the Japanese government.119 Even though Iwasaki admitted that "every nation had the right to adopt whatever means it deemed necessary to protect its institutions and interests," he cast doubt on the means adopted by Australia against the Japanese.120 Japan, increasing in prestige and reputation as a result of the Russo-Japanese war, was gradually strengthening its bargaining power and in 1905 after the war attempted to gain better treatment of the Japanese subjects.

117. SMH, DT, 4 November 1904.
120. SMH, DT, 4 November 1904; Brisbane Courier, 9 November 1904.
CHAPTER VII

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR FOR
AUSTRALIA-JAPAN RELATIONS, 1905-1907

The changes in the balance of power in the Far East as well as in Europe between 1905 and 1911 forced Australia to reconsider its defence and external policies in the Pacific. During this period, the most important event in the Far East was Japan's victory over the Russian Baltic fleet and Japan's emergence as the undisputed naval power in the Western Pacific. This Japanese position in the Far East was further strengthened in 1905 by the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance whose scope was extended to India and became defensive-offensive. The second Anglo-Japanese alliance, which was to last until 1915, provided Britain with an opportunity to withdraw its battleships from the Pacific in order to meet the German naval challenge in the North Sea. Just after the battle in the Japan Sea, the Admiralty decided in June 1905 to recall five battleships from China in order to augment the strength of the Home Fleets, namely the Channel Fleet, the Atlantic Fleet, and the Mediterranean Fleet. The First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, Sir John Fisher, deployed the Home Fleets in "an anti-German and a pro-French manner."1 In the meantime, Japan was left to guard British interests in Asia and India.

The Anglo-French entente of 1904, which resolved the outstanding issue between the two countries was based on the assumption that Germany posed a common threat to Britain and France. It was tested at the time of the Moroccan incident in 1905 when Britain supported France against Germany. Britain became increasingly suspicious of Germany after this

---

crisis and was inclined to strengthen the entente with France and even to reach an agreement with Russia over India.  

In these circumstances, there was a change in the direction of British strategic policy. The transformation of European political relationships became much clearer in 1907. In that year, both Britain and Japan reached agreements with Russia. This followed the Japanese-French accord of March 1907 which recognised the rights of each nation in Asia—Japan's sphere of influence in Korea, Manchuria and Fukien, and France's influence in Indochina and south China. In effect, Japan had become "identified with the Triple Entente in Europe." In response to the German menace, Britain by 1907 had organised a new pattern of alignments in Europe. The British Admiralty policy was directed towards countering the German naval challenge. It seemed to Australia that the new international situation caused enormous and novel problems in defence.

Since 1906 there had been tension between the United States and Japan over California's treatment of Japanese residence and the Open Door in Manchuria. The United States openly objected to the Anglo-Japanese


alliance which encouraged Japanese naval building. The US suspicions of Japan not only weakened the original value of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, but also caused Australia to feel insecure since the bilateral terms of the alliance would require Britain to stand with Japan against the United States in the event of a US-Japan conflict. And because of this US-Japan confrontation, Britain sought to revise the alliance in 1911. All these changes in international relations meant for Australia the end of isolation in the Pacific.

During the period of 1905-1911, there emerged an Australian foreign and defence policy: in 1905 Australia attempted to meet Japan's objections to immigration restrictions; in 1907 a revision of the 1903 Anglo-Australian naval agreement took place; in 1908 an invitation was extended to the US Great White Fleet to visit Australia; in 1909 the Australian navy was established and compulsory military training was introduced. All of these developments came about because Australia after the end of the Russo-Japanese War perceived a threat from Japan. It was Alfred Deakin who was preeminently responsible for formulating these policies, in his second cabinet from July 1905 to November 1908, and then his third cabinet from June 1909 to April 1910. Between and after Deakin's administrations, Andrew Fisher as head of successive Labor governments continued to pursue a similar strategy.

By 1911 Japanese authorities were well aware that Australian public opinion was hostile to their country. Japanese naval and military circles clearly understood that Australia's major source of anxiety in defence was Japan and that their new defence planning was directed against Japan. In 1911, the Army General Staff of Japan (Sambō Honbu) produced a 290-page

5. I. Nish, Alliance in Decline, pp.28-80.
6. N.K. Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14 is the most authoritative account of this subject.
long report on Australia and New Zealand which covered various subjects such as history, geography, population, industry, trade, political institutions, finance, transportation, telegraphic communication, army and navy. The report aimed to provide basic information concerning Australia and it was intended to be a handbook on Australia for the Japanese military officers. Reviewing Australia's naval and military development, the report concluded that Australia's fear of Japan had started after the Russo-Japanese war and that this fear had been intensified by two factors: the weak defensive capabilities of Australia, and the remoteness of Australia from Britain, and the likely inability of the British navy to come to Australia's aid.⁷

块

**Australia and the Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance**

The second Anglo-Japanese alliance was signed on 12 August 1905 by the British Foreign Secretary Lansdowne and the Japanese Minister Hayashi Tadasu in London and was officially published on 27 September.⁸

Since Britain did not consult Australia on the subject of the renewal, the Australian statesmen knew, "only through the information published in the press," about the renewal of the alliance.⁹ The scope of the alliance was extended to cover regions of Eastern Asia and India for the duration of ten years. There were two important changes in the second

---


alliance: firstly it was to operate in the case of an attack by a single power, which was called "kōshu dōmei", the offensive-defensive alliance; secondly, it provided for the Japanese military assistance in India if the security of India was threatened. Even though the alliance did not officially commit itself to the security of Australia, it had an indirect impact on Australian security.

The alliance encouraged Japan's naval expansion, and Japan achieved a predominant position in the Pacific after 1905. It caused the United States to be suspicious about Japan's naval policy. The US hostility to Japan was openly shown in 1906 and the time of disputes over Japanese residents in California. Because of the US-Japan tension, the absence of British battleships in the Pacific after 1906 made Australia feel insecure. Since the alliance partially entrusted the protection of the interests of the British Empire to Japan, it created serious security problems for Australia because of the US-Japan antagonism and because Australian governments were uncertain whether Japan would honour its commitment and the treaty. The second alliance, unlike the first alliance, brought with it conflicts between Australia and Britain over the meaning to be attributed to the alliance and over the degree to which Japan could be relied upon to protest British interests in the Pacific.

10. Mahajan studies the question of Indian security in the context of British foreign policy decisions which were influenced by "fear of Russia." Sneh Mahajan, "The Defence of India and the End of Isolation. A Study In the Foreign Policy of the Conservative Government, 1900-1905," The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.X, No.2, 1982. It was reported in the press that the Indian public and press had received the term of the second alliance quietly, and the native opinion was curiously lukewarm. SMH, 5 October 1905.

The Press Reaction to the Alliance

Most of the early comments on the alliance came from the press.\textsuperscript{12} Taking Russia's future expansion in Asia and the Anglo-German hostility into account, the \textit{Brisbane Courier} supported the continuance of the alliance because it was "absolutely necessary in the interests of Great Britain's Asiatic Empire."\textsuperscript{13} Since Russia had the potential power to expand its interests into Central Asia, the threat from Russia forced a direct threat to the British Empire, especially to India. The fate of the Indian Empire and all of the British possessions in the East depended "in a measure upon securing a continuance of the present alliance ... on a broader and a permanent footing."\textsuperscript{14} When the terms of the second alliance were released, the newspaper concluded that:

\begin{quote}
It is almost unnecessary to say that the defence of Australia has also indirectly been strengthened by the alliance of the two Powers.\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

As long as the alliance was confined to purely "defensive" measures against Russian expansion, \textit{SMH} stated that it would be received in Australia "with hearty approval by all who desire the maintenance of peace."\textsuperscript{16} There was consensus among major metropolitan newspapers that the value of the alliance was to be found in its contribution to the maintenance of the existing balance of power in Asia and in its contribution to the peace of the region.\textsuperscript{17} The renewal of the alliance was justified insofar as it would make "European cupidty and aggression impossible" in Asia and would

\textsuperscript{12} Major comments on the alliance were made in the public through the press or the Commonwealth parliamentary debates. Significant remarks by the official circle are not found in the various unpublished materials in Australia.

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Brisbane Courier}, 15 May 1905.

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Ibid.}, 10 May 1905.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid.}, 28 September 1905.

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{SMH}, 2 September 1905.

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{West Australian}, 29 September 1905 (cited in DAIA, pp.145-146); \textit{SMH}, 2, 5 October 1905; \textit{Brisbane Courier}, 3 May, 12 August 1905; \textit{DT}, 15 May 1905; \textit{Age}, 29 September 1905.
keep Australia away from the international political struggle. Since the Kaiser's "Yellow Peril" denunciation of Japan attempted to break the balance of power in Asia the DT refuted it at least in a strategic sense, if not for its racial slur.

While the press accepted the strategic value of the alliance, some newspapers thought that it would be degrading if Australia had to throw itself on the mercy of Japan. Britain's increasing dependence on the alliance unquestionably encouraged Japan's naval expansion and helped bring about its predominant position in the Pacific. This great Japanese naval power could be used to protect the British Empire from European aggression, but it could also expose Australia to Japanese diplomatic blackmail or even invasion. Moreover there was no assurance that the alliance would continue forever. Because of this contradictory nature of the alliance for Australian security, there was a cleavage between Australian and British interests.

This Australian ambivalence towards the alliance was best illustrated by the editorial of the Melbourne Age. Soon after the official announcement of the conclusion of the second alliance, the Age ruminated on the future security of Australia:

The peace of Asia may perhaps be assured for a generation by the important treaty.... To Australia this Anglo-Japanese Treaty means more than any engagement into which the British Government has entered since the settlement of this part of the Empire. Singapore is to be made a great British naval station.... Singapore is henceforth to mark the boundary of the special sphere of British naval influence, and that all to the eastward of that point will be patrolled by the Japanese as the paramount naval power of the Pacific.... The Commonwealth should take up on its own account some part of the naval burden of Empire. Australians must recognise, whether they like the fact or not, that their shores are now washed by an Asiatic ocean. They have rightly pinned their faith to the doctrine of a "white Australia"; but, while preventing any possibility of

18 DT, 12 September 1905.
19 Ibid.
an inrush of foreign colored labor, they should treat travellers and merchants of highly intelligent races like those of Japan and India with courtesy and consideration.\textsuperscript{20} Though there was a promise that the Singapore naval base would be enlarged for the safeguarding of Australia, New Zealand and other British possessions in the Pacific, it was not likely that such a promise would be carried out in the near future.\textsuperscript{21} While accepting the importance of the alliance, the \textit{Age} questioned Australia's security under the Japanese ascendancy in the Far East. It proposed that Australia should make a positive contribution towards naval defence and toward mollifying Japan over outstanding immigration issues. With respect to Australian defence, it commented that the Anglo-Australian naval agreement offered "no personal security" to Australia since the Australian squadron would be removed in time of war to any part of the world. Despite the Anglo-Japanese alliance, it warned against Australian statesmen's relying on Japanese naval assistance; this would be "a very great mistake." Behind this conviction, there was "mistrust" of Japan and a feeling that it would not be "honourable for Australia to look to an Asiatic power for its naval defence."\textsuperscript{22} The \textit{Age} further stated that Australia, in the absence of any British and Australian permanent naval forces worthy of the name, would have to rely on Japan's naval power. The logical conclusion of this argument was the establishment of an Australian navy.

While the metropolitan newspapers expressed their mixed feeling about Japan, the \textit{Bulletin} demonstrated a consistent anti-Japanese attitude. In addition to the established editorial principles of racism, nationalism and protectionism, the \textit{Bulletin}, after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Age}, 29 September 1905.  
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{SMH}, 26 September 1905.  
\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Age}, 24 August 1905.
war, evinced a ferocious hatred of Japan and their pro-Japanese statements were a major topic for its editorials. The Free Traders, Bruce Smith and Edward Pulsford, were "two renegades" since they were "always against Australia and always for the nigger, the Chinaman, and the colored man generally — demanding the free admission of the Jap to this country."  

The Japanese was always drawn as a monkey. The Russo-Japanese war was depicted as a war between the Japanese monkey and Russian bear. When the second alliance was published, Japan which now had a new and expanded role in contributing to Indian defence, was described in a political cartoon as "J. Bull's Pet Monkey." As a fervent supporter of Australian nationalism and the White Australia policy, the Bulletin found the second Anglo-Japanese alliance to be "of course, profoundly distasteful," and argued that:

white race supremacy is the only hope of democratic civilisation. An alliance which further buttresses a Yellow Race, and raise up at our very door a powerful antagonist of European ideas, cannot be looked upon in any other light than that of calamity.

It took an unfriendly attitude towards the alliance. In the event of British involvement in a war, the Japanese navy and army would proceed to protect the British interests in the Far East. If it happened before Australia built up its army and arms factories, it would be "better for Australia to invite Britain's white enemy to come right in and defend the country against Britain's Brown Ally." Criticising the Japanese colonial administration in Korea

24. Ibid., 5 October 1905. In the political cartoon, a monkey carries a rifle and wears an army hat of "NIPPON." He defends the first line of defence for India and walks along the border where there are two signposts: "NOTICE! TRESPASSERS WILL BE SHOT! BY ORDER J. BULL," and "NOTICE! BEWARE OF THE MONKEY! HE BITES! J. BULL." The native Indian soldier holds the second line of defence and finally John Bull is "wearing a benevolent expression in the background."
25. Ibid.
which now counted as "a Japanese province," the Bulletin considered the European invasion a less evil than Australian dependence upon Japan's military assistance. Australian security would be best protected by the Commonwealth establishing a proper defence system of its own. Under its own defence system, Australia could put "the national back against the wall and fight with both hands and feet to keep out white invaders and Brown Allies." Japan was regarded as the great threat to Australia's white civilisation and survival. Facing up to the changed naval balance by which Japan ruled the Pacific, it warned that

Civilisation will, in the future, pay many a pilgrimage of hatred to the tombs of those traitors to the race who, by the Anglo-Japanese alliance, sold the White Man's hegemony for a temporary political advantage.27

Australia was no longer an isolated island continent in the South Pacific. Viewing Japan as "a war-power," the Bulletin declared that the "threat to the Commonwealth" lay "in the growth of Japan's might."28

The Alliance in the Parliamentary Debates

The parliamentary debates on Japan took place between November and early December 1905 when the Parliament debated the admission of Japanese to Australia and the amendment of the Immigration Restriction Act. Recognising Japan as a strong ally of Britain and the predominant naval power in the Pacific, Deakin attempted to appease Japan by modifying the Immigration Restriction Act. The majority of parliamentarians agreed to adopt Deakin's conciliatory policy to Japan since the primary object of his policy, stated a prominent Free Trader Joseph Cook, was to "remove a cause of offence to that great eastern nation.29 There was a fear that

27. Ibid., 1 November 1906.
28. Ibid., 15 June 1906.
29. CPD, 1905 Session, Vol.XXX, p.6309, 6 December 1905. See also the statement by Free Trader Patrick Glynn, ibid., pp.6321-6322. See also the statements by Free Traders such as E. Lonsdale and Patrick Glynn. CPD, 1905 Session, Vol.XXVIII, p.4869, 9 November 1905; Ibid., Vol.XXX, pp.6321-6322, 6 December 1905.
Japan would cause a number of problems for Australia's racial policy by bringing to bear its enhanced diplomatic and naval power upon the Commonwealth. As long as the alliance remained, Australia would probably avoid a Japanese military threat and so preserve the White Australia. As a medium-range policy, most of the parliamentarians accepted the alliance as a fait accompli and a reasonable defensive device. Speaking of the alliance, Egerton Batchelor, the Labor M.P. and later Minister for External Affairs in the first and second Fisher administrations, said:

If there were no alliance we should have possibly something more than a feeling of irritation on the part of the Japanese; and might have to consider whether our Defence Force was adequate to effectively maintain a White Australia.

The value of the alliance was appreciated by James H. McColl, the Protectionist M.P., who stated that the alliance would make "the position of Australia as regards the danger of invasion absolutely safe." Since to a certain degree Australia's security depended upon the existence of the alliance, it was believed that it would be disastrous to have it terminated while there was no adequate British fleet in the Pacific which could protect Australia from Japan. William Knox, a notable Free Trader in Melbourne, also expressed Australia's fear of Japan:

If it were not for the alliance between Great Britain and Japan, we might regard the nearness of Japan to Australia as a very great danger, deserving the most serious consideration.

Then he put a simple question:

Is it to be imagined that the 4,000,000 people who are scattered over this great continent could effectively resist the Japanese

30. Though a number of parliamentarians supported the alliance from Australia's point of view, an imperial-minded Free Trader William H. Kelly supported it from the point of British world strategy. Since he was so pro-British, he rejected the idea of establishing an Australian navy, and stated that "the argument for creating four small cruisers, because England cannot protect us against Japan, is simply ridiculous." CPD, 1905 Session, Vol.XXVI, p.2000, 7 September 1905.
32. Ibid., p.6315.
if they chose to attack us, and we were unsupported by Great Britain.33

Because of this fear of Japan, the Labor Party, too, came to accept the need to establish a national defence force including an Australian navy. The Labor movement had been inclined to "oppose anything that smacked of militarism" before the Russo-Japanese war. Militarism was disliked by the working-class people because the troops had been employed against the striking workers in NSW and Queensland. This anti-militarism was one of the factors which determined Labor's opposition to the Boer War.34 The most important reason Labor changed its attitudes to militarism was, however, the defeat of Russia by Japan. Dr William R. Maloney, the Labor M.P. for Melbourne, appeared as an ardent anti-Japanese protagonist during and after the war. As a result of his visit to Japan in early 1905, he became suspicious of Japan's war aims and developed a strong distrust of Japan. Maloney made the round trip from Melbourne to Kobe via Manila, Hong Kong and Canton. He also went to Tokyo by train from Kobe where he probably received some assistance from the NSW commercial agent J.B. Sutter. He was accompanied by the Labor Senator Edward Findley. On their return journey to Melbourne in early May, Maloney and Findley stated that they had come back "strengthened in their desire to see Australia kept a white nation." Maloney's hatred of Asian people was directed more against the Japanese than the Chinese.35 After his trip to Japan, in 1905 Maloney published Flashlights on Japan and the East which was a scare-

mongering booklet. Responding to this attack on Japan, Free Trader Bruce Smith accused Maloney of racial prejudice:

[Maloney] started from Australia with very many racial prejudices, and a determination to keep all Asiatics out of Australia. The book shows that his visit to Japan has caused him to completely shed all the grounds for his prejudices.

Maloney's fear of Japan was intensified after Japan's naval victory in the Japan Sea. Then he came to assert confidently, though without any evidence, that Japan had sized up Australia's "weakness from a defence stand-point" by stationing its spy in Australia to photograph strategic points. This fear of Japan made him regard the United States as "a sentinel in the Pacific" and appreciate the United States occupation of the Philippine Islands as a buffer between Australia and Japan. In the last resort to defend Australia, he hinted that a compulsory military service might be necessary.

This fear of Japan was shared by another senior Labor parliamentarian W.M. Hughes. To him, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was not a perfect defence for whiteman's Australia. According to the alliance, Japan was supposed to protect the interests of the British Empire in Asia, but it was also Japan that resented most the White Australia policy. Australia's increasing reliance on Japan in defence was, stated Hughes, "not calculated to inspire with confidence those who have the ideal of a White Australia."

In 1901 when the Federal Parliament had debated the Immigration Restriction Bill, he had made it clear that while the immediate reason for being concerned about coloured immigration was economic, ultimately it was "a question

36. The pamphlet was not solely written by Maloney though the ideas and arguments were of his. The language used in the pamphlet is that of Francis Myers, Maloney's private secretary. CPD, 1905 Session, Vol.XXVII, p.2951, 28 September 1905. W. Maloney, Flashlight on Japan and the East: Notes and Observations on a Trip by the "Taiyuan" March to June 1905, Melbourne, 1905.


of national survival." Before the Russo-Japanese war he had feared the peaceful infiltration of Japanese labourers into white Australia. After the end of the war, he began however to see Japan as having a more dangerous threat, namely a threat of military aggression. With the withdrawal of the British fleet from the Pacific, he came to believe that Australia had been left "defenceless." To Hughes, defence was "a leading throughout his political life." After 1905, Japan became the central focus for this interest. It was with this fear of Japan in mind that on 9 August 1906, in introducing a motion calling for universal military training, he submitted that:

in order to effectively defend the Commonwealth against possible enemies, it is imperative that all able-bodied adult males should be trained to the use of arms and instructed in such military or naval drill as may be necessary for the purpose.

This was his third attempt to persuade Parliament to adopt a compulsory military training scheme modelled on the Swiss system, where every adult male from the age of eighteen to sixty underwent a certain period of training. Even though the motion was once again rejected, the Labor Party for the first time took up the idea of military training and before the federal election of December 1906 it added a scheme for a citizen's defence force to the

45. His earlier attempts were made in 1901 and 1903, but he was unable to point a clear and present danger to Australia. He referred to possible dangers from Europe and Asia, in which Japan did not occupy the first military threat to Australia.
party's manifesto. This marked the Labor Party's move away from anti-militarism.

Labor Senator George Foster Pearce was openly suspicious about the value of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. He had a deep fear and hatred of Japan. Discounting the notion of European threats to Australia, he asserted that it would be "foolish" if Australians took the Anglo-Japanese alliance to be "a guarantee for all time." Indeed he defined Japan as a military danger to Australia:

Japan had shown that she is an aggressive nation. She has shown that she is desirous of pushing out all round .... She has, for the first time, tasted the fruits of conquest and territorial aggrandizement. And is there any other country that offers such a temptation to Japan as Australia does? I say that we should be, ostrich like, hiding our heads in the sand, if we refused to recognise that there is a possibility of territorial aggrandizement in our direction from some Eastern nation.47

Even before the Russo-Japanese war, he urged the establishment of an Australian navy. After the war, he joined with Deakin, Watson, Hughes and others, to advocate the universal military training. And while it was Deakin who was to be the chief author of Australia's new defence policy, it was Pearce who, under the Labor governments of Andrew Fisher, W.M. Hughes, Bruce-Page, and J. Lyons between 1908 and 1934, was chiefly responsible for putting it into effect.48 Pearce's enthusiasm for defence was "particularly a reaction to the Russo-Japanese war."49

Japan, the Alliance Negotiations and White Australia

One way of considering the Russo-Japanese war was in terms of a racial war between the white and yellow races. At that time, the German

46. SMH, 5 October 1906.
Kaiser was one of the leading exponents of this view. During the war, Japan was afraid that Germany was forming a European union against the alleged "Yellow Peril." Throughout the Sino-Japanese war and the Triple Intervention, the Japanese government had been cautious about the European reaction to Japanese diplomacy and war aims. For Japan, the Triple Intervention of Germany, Russia and France in 1895 was seen as the first practical outcome of the "Yellow Peril" doctrine. It was natural for the Japanese government during the Russo-Japanese war to suspect the Kaiser of enlisting support for the Russian cause and of attempting to form a united European front against Japan. Unless Japan fought against this doctrine, there would be "a danger that European countries will actually join together against us [Japanese]."

Speaking of the possible impact

50. Miwa Kimitada, Kan Taiheiyō Kankei-shi (History of International Relations in the Pacific), Tokyo, 1968, p.162.

51. In early 1895, just before the end of the Sino-Japanese war, the German Kaiser looked on the rising power of Japan with deep suspicion and began insisting that if Japan became the dominant power in the East, Asian races would be united under Japan and subsequently invade Europe and destroy Christian culture. To illustrate this, he had a sketch drawn which was heavy with symbolism. In this, the Buddha in the storm-cloud represented the "Yellow Peril" and the archangel Michael urged the female personification of the European powers, including a reluctant Britain, to unite and fight against the "Yellow Peril" in order to protect European Christianity. Having commissioned an artist H. Knackfuss to complete the cartoon, the Kaiser sent it as a personal gift to the Russian Tsar Nicholas II. At that time, he enclosed a letter (dated 10 July 1895) and mentioned that Germany would make every effort including naval assistance to help Russia introduce European culture into Asia and to protect Europe from Asian threats. R. Storrry concludes that behind the Kaiser's racist expression, there was "calculated policy — the consistent determination to keep Russia's gaze on the East, away from Europe." Richard Storrry, Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia 1874-1943, London, 1979, p.32. See also the following works: Hashikawa Bunsō, Kōka Monogatari (The Story of the Yellow Peril), Tokyo, 1976, pp.18-20; Wakatsuki Yasuo, Hainichi no Rekishi (History of Exclusion of the Japanese), Tokyo, 1972, pp.85-87; Matsumura Masayoshi, "Kōka Ron" (The Yellow Peril Doctrine) in Nihon Gaikō-shi Jiten (Dictionary of the Japanese Diplomatic History), Tokyo, 1979, pp.261-2.

of the "Yellow Peril" doctrine upon the British people, George Clarke, the secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, commented in 1904 that "Further Japanese success on large scale would probably tend to produce an exaggeration of the 'Yellow Peril' alarms from which we are not wholly exempt in this country."\(^{53}\)

The Japanese government wished to prevent the interference of the three European powers and to this end decided to send Suematsu Kenchō to Europe. Suematsu was a pro-British statesman, a graduate of Cambridge University, a prominent member of the Seiyūkai Party and had been the Minister of Interior under the Ito Hirobumi cabinet of 1900-1. His main task was to "prevent the growth of misunderstanding among the British people" concerning the Japanese war aims by acting as "a special unofficial ambassador" to Britain.\(^{54}\) He certainly attempted to manipulate the British press and public opinion. His immediate aim in London, however, was to counter the "Yellow Peril" doctrine in Europe. To achieve this objective Suematsu sent articles to continental newspapers and periodicals. Other Japanese diplomats in Europe such as Makino Nobuaki in Vienna also attempted to combat Russia's anti-Japanese "yellow peril" campaign. Makino met intellectuals on the Continent in order to explain the Japanese justification for the war and published pamphlets showing fallacy of the "Yellow Peril" doctrine in both the German and French languages.\(^{55}\)

---

53. Letter, G. Clarke to A. Balfour, 4 January 1904, Balfour Papers 49700/1-3.


55. Makino was the second son of Ōkubo Toshimichi who had been one of the prominent founding-fathers of the Meiji era, and in 1905 was the Minister to Australia. Later he became the Privy Councillor, then the Foreign Minister and the official delegate at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Makino Nobuaki, Kaiko Roku (Memoir), Vol.1, Tokyo, paperback ed., 1977, pp.282-3.
These facts show how the Japanese government was deeply concerned about racial problems during the war. The Japanese sensitivity to the problems caused by racism was well demonstrated in a special telegram which Hayashi Tadasu, Japan's Minister in London, sent to the Tokyo government in order to encourage it to agree to an extension of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. After several talks with the British officials between March and May 1905, Hayashi received on 17 May a definite statement of British objectives in renewing the alliance. The British worked to convert the existing defensive alliance into an offensive-defensive alliance and to extend the scope of the treaty to include India. Before communicating Lansdowne's view to the Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro, Hayashi expressed his personal views on the subject in order to influence his government over the new British proposals. Accepting the British terms, he advocated the strengthening of the alliance to protect Japan against "a war of revenge on Russia's part sometime in the future." He also saw three other advantages in this move; the first would be to obtain the assistance of all the major powers, namely Britain, the United States, France and Italy at the peace conference; the second would be to defeat the scheme of the Russians and the Germans to form a European union under the doctrine of the "Yellow Peril" against Japan, and the third to put more pressure upon the British Dominions and the United States to cease excluding Japanese labourers on racial grounds. He believed that the only foreseeable conflict of interests between Japan and the Anglo-Saxon nations would be in the field of commerce, and he did not believe that it would have any impact on the Anglo-Japanese alliance. His communication to Komura then emphasized not only the preventive effect of the new alliance,

---

but also the likely favourable side-effects of the alliance on the racial problems in Australia, namely the better treatment of Japanese.

After considering this telegram, Komura wrote a lengthy memorandum for the cabinet. The memorandum accepted in principle the British proposals and endorsed Hayashi's arguments, especially his strategic arguments.\textsuperscript{58} Hayashi expected that the renewal of the alliance would form a bond between the Japanese and the Anglo-Saxon races, and that, as a result of it, Australia's racial objections to the entry of Japanese would be negated. He was of the opinion that, if these racial questions remained, they would "lead to serious complications in the future."\textsuperscript{59}

It seems that Japan's growth in prestige and power during 1905 inspired Japanese diplomats and consuls to assert more clearly and confidently their grievances against Australia. In a lengthy despatch of 10 June 1905 to Komura, Tayui Rinzaburo, Japan's consul in Townsville, explained the present situation of the Japanese indentured labourers in Australia and the mechanism for excluding the coloured races from the country and for preventing the coloured residents from obtaining a re-entry certificate after they had left Australia. Tayui further remarked that Australians were beginning to see Japan's victory over Russia as a threat to Australia's security and to the White Australia policy because Japan might use its new military and diplomatic strength to have its own way. Even though "the arrogant Commonwealth Government had taken the Japanese request into account and made visits of the Japanese businessmen, students and

\textsuperscript{58} Komura presented his memorandum to the cabinet on 24 May and the cabinet approved it on the same day. Memorandum, Komura to the cabinet, 24 May 1905, \textit{Nihon Gaikō Nempū Shūbun Shūron} (Chronological Table of Japanese Diplomacy and Major Documents), Tokyo, Vol.1, pp.137-8.

\textsuperscript{59} Telegram, Hayashi to Komura, 20 May 1905, \textit{NGB}, Vol.38-1, No.16.
tourists to Australia easy," he was in doubt about the future immigration policy of Australia:

In the future if we leave the matter alone, it is possible that they [the Commonwealth government] will plan a new scheme [of immigration restriction] which is disadvantageous to us. When we face any disadvantage, without hesitation we should find an appropriate time to force the Commonwealth Government to remove the disadvantageous points.\textsuperscript{60}

At the time Tayui was communicating with Komura, the Australian government was considering a change to the Immigration Restriction Act so as to remove a contract labour clause which had limited the entry of British skilled and unskilled workers into Australia and that had given rise to tension between the Commonwealth and Britain. A special concession given to the Pacific coloured labourers was also coming to an end.\textsuperscript{61} When the Commonwealth Parliament came to discuss these matters, Tayui suggested that Japan should not lose this chance to demand the modification of the act in Japan's favour and to seek better treatment for the Japanese residents in Australia. He suggested four demands which Japan might put to Australia:

1. The European language test should not be applied to Japanese. Australia should adopt the Japanese language test for Japanese subjects, or not adopt any dictation test for Japanese.
2. The re-entry permission for Japanese residents in Australia should be given without complicated administrative procedures.
3. Australia should permit a family reunion when a labourer calls his family in Japan to come to Australia.
4. Japanese should be treated differently from the other coloured races.

\textsuperscript{60} Confidential despatch No.3, Tayui to Komura, 10 June 1905, NGB, Vol.38-2, No.1139.

\textsuperscript{61} The debate on the defect of contract labour clause started when six British contract hatters were not allowed to land, because according to the clause in the Immigration Restriction Act prohibiting the entry of labourers under contract if similar labourers could be obtained in Australia. In December 1905, the Parliament passed Contract Immigrants Act which permitted only the unrestricted entry of the British contract immigrants. CPD, 1904 Session, Vol.XXI, p.4519, 13 September 1904; Ibid., pp.4758-4760, 4810-4812, 21 September 1904; Age, 8 December 1905; SMH, 30 October 1903; Ibid., 5,6,9,11 September, 12 October, 13 November 1905.
If Japan could not persuade the Commonwealth government to meet these Japanese requests through direct negotiations or through its formal diplomatic channel via London, he proposed to use the new Anglo-Japanese negotiations, as a lever, and he regarded that as the best chance of influencing Australia. These demands were of course based on the extraordinary success of Japan in the war and international recognition of Japan's status as a world power. Both Hayashi and Tayui little doubted that the inferior position of the Japanese in Australia would be immediately and completely remedied, and saw the occasion of treaty revision as the best opportunity for Japan to press its demands. They believed that the Commonwealth government would accede and relax the Japanese immigration restriction once it considered Japan's dominant position in the Pacific.

Prime Minister Katsura Taro and his Foreign Minister Komura who had been responsible for concluding the initial alliance in 1902, understood the political significance of the alliance in world politics and regarded it as the centrepiece of Japan's diplomatic and defence policies. He was anxious to continue it for the prestige it offered and for its political and strategic value, and therefore did not discuss the racial problems in the negotiations with the British government. The Japanese did not want to make the alliance negotiation too complicated. As had happened in the first alliance negotiations, the Japanese government separated the Dominion immigration question from the agenda of alliance negotiations and left the question in the hands of the local consuls.

Deakin's Conciliatory Attitude to Japan

In 1905, in response to the broad change taken place in the international situation, especially in Europe and Asia, the Australian political leaders felt compelled to reconsider their defence and foreign planning after the Moroccan crisis of April-May 1905 and the Algeciras conference of January-March 1906. Britain became increasingly suspicious of Germany. In Europe the Anglo-German naval rivalry had already begun. In Asia and the West Pacific Japan, following its defeat of Russia's naval forces, had achieved a dominant position. These international changes had a tremendous impact on the Australian decision-makers, in particular Alfred Deakin. Japan became a major concern for them not only in immigration matters but also in defence.

Australian political leaders began to recognize the implications of these novel international developments for the Commonwealth's geo-political position, and to express their concern with this new balance of powers, in particular Japan's new status in the Pacific. Deakin was the main figure responsible for directing public attention to Australia's new relationship with Japan. When the Russo-Japanese war ended with the battle of the Japan Sea, Deakin, then in opposition, granted an interview to the Melbourne Herald on 12 June 1905 in which he delineated his deep anxiety at the consequence of Japan's victory. He focused on Japan mainly because of its "strategic ascendancy in the Pacific and its evident ambition." He came to perceive


Australia's serious vulnerability partly because of Japan's dominant naval power in the Pacific, and partly because of accelerated British commitment to European politics, both of which heralded the end of Australian isolation. His statement received great publicity and the Senate ordered it to be printed as a Parliamentary Paper. Soon after this interview, Deakin on 5 July formed his second ministry. Now Deakin was in a position to put his new ideas on foreign policy into practice.

**Deakin-Iwasaki Direct Negotiation**

Deakin's first approach to Japan was to offer a compromise settlement of the immigration issue. His main aim was to remove any source of friction with Japan while retaining for Australia its control over the immigration restriction. Deakin was well aware of Japan's campaign to undermine the "Yellow Peril" doctrine in Europe. Even though the Japanese government did not carry out a special campaign against the White Australia policy during the Russo-Japanese war, Deakin was sensitive to Japanese feelings on their limited rights of entry, as opposed to Europeans. Deakin had already held direct negotiations with the Japanese Consul-General Iwasaki Kazuo in Sydney in 1904 which had resulted in concessions being given to the Japanese merchants, students and tourists under the Passport Agreement. Deakin was "no doubt" encouraged by "the quiet but generally favourable reaction in Australia to the Passport Arrangement" to initiate a further conciliatory measure.65 Unlike the Passport Agreement which was determined primarily by commercial interests, Deakin's approach to Japan in 1905 was, however, dominated by strategic considerations. He decided to reopen talks with

---

Iwasaki for the purpose of reaching a bilateral agreement satisfactory to both Australia and Japan.

In August 1905, Deakin instructed Atlee Hunt, the permanent head of the External Affairs Department, to write a letter to Iwasaki suggesting that the Japanese emigration to Australia might be regulated under a new special bilateral arrangement, instead of being dealt with wholly under the Immigration Restriction Act.66 Following this communication, Deakin and Iwasaki exchanged letters and had direct talks with each other between August and November 1905. There were two issues on which they had to reach an understanding: the definition of Japanese "immigrants" acceptable under the proposed agreement, and the nature of a bilateral agreement. Firstly, Iwasaki inquired on 17 August if Deakin proposed to admit "any other classes of Japanese" apart from students, merchants and tourists because there was no clear definition of the Japanese nationals in the letter from Hunt to Iwasaki.67 If not, the proposed new agreement would not mean any departure from the 1904 Passport Agreement and the situation would remain fundamentally the same. In fact it was not Deakin's intention to alter the core of the White Australia policy as far as the Japanese were concerned, only to modify its administration.68 Therefore, for Deakin, the new agreement would not include labourers and artisans, but merely the specified classes of Japanese already allowed in as temporary residents under the Passport Agreement. Even though Deakin and Hunt indicated that the existing policy of the Commonwealth with respect to the Japanese

66. Letter, Hunt to Iwasaki, 11 August 1905. Precise of this communication survives in the files of Prime Minister's Department, Pacific Branch, AA. CRS A2219, Vol.1-A 'External Relations 1894-1918.'
67. Precise to letter, Iwasaki to Hunt, 17 August 1905, Ibid.
68. Precise of letter, Hunt to Iwasaki, 21 August 1905, Ibid.
immigration was likely to remain unchanged, there were other passages in the letter to Iwasaki which seemed to the latter to "imply a desire to adopt some further means of showing an increasing spirit of friendliness on the part of the Commonwealth towards Japan." Iwasaki did not understand the exact meaning of the letter and he hoped by going to Melbourne and dealing directly with Deakin, he would be able to have the Australian government accede to the 1894 Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty.

Since the details of the interview between Deakin and Iwasaki, and the negotiations which subsequently transpired are not recorded in the Australian records, it is only possible to trace the development of the negotiations by relying upon the Japanese diplomatic records. On 20 September, Iwasaki had an interview with Deakin at the Prime Minister's Office in Parliament House. Deakin was accompanied by Hunt, and Iwasaki by his secretary E.W. Foxall. Since his appointment in 1900 as the private English secretary to the former Consul-General, Foxall had been assuming an increasingly important role in the Japanese Consulate in Sydney and had rendered valuable assistance to Iwasaki. Iwasaki presented Deakin with a note, suggesting that the Immigration Restriction Act should be amended to exempt people of any country with which the federal government had a treaty, and that Japan would give any assurance desired by Australia as to immigration in accordance with the rules adopted for the European countries, and finally that the language test in the Act should be altered from "an European" to "the English." In reply, Deakin said that he did not oppose in principle

70. Confidential letter No.9, Iwasaki to Katsura, 10 November 1905, Ibid.
the idea that the Japanese should be treated differently from the other coloured races and the European language test should be amended so as to be less offensive to them.\textsuperscript{72} It is clear enough that Deakin did not refer in any way to the signing of a commercial treaty with Japan.

After the interview with Deakin, Iwasaki had a private talk with Hunt. Iwasaki drafted a telegraphic message summarising his interview with Deakin and handed it to Hunt for confirmation before sending it to Japan. According to Iwasaki's report, Hunt inserted in pencil "the initials 'C & N' (Standing for Commerce and Navigation) after the word 'Treaty' in the draft."\textsuperscript{73}

Thus Iwasaki began to hope that Australia would join the 1894 Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty and seek a bilateral agreement for restricting the number of Japanese immigrants on much the same terms as the Queensland government had done. As a result of Hunt's insertion of the initials "C & N," Iwasaki thought that all class of Japanese would be covered in the proposed treaty. If Iwasaki's claim is correct, Hunt is probably responsible for the misunderstanding between the Japanese negotiators and the Australians. It is very likely that after Iwasaki left for Sydney, Deakin came to know that Hunt had hinted at Australia's interest in signing a commercial treaty. This helps to explain why Hunt sent two different kinds of letters to Iwasaki in a short period, one being his response to the Japanese proposal and the other being Deakin's stand-point on the issue, which separated the commercial treaty negotiations from the immigration restriction negotiations.

Hunt's mishandling of the matter caused Deakin to instruct Hunt to write a lengthy letter clarifying the policy of the federal government on

\textsuperscript{72} Confidential letter No.9, Iwasaki to Katsura, 10 November 1905, JPMA, 3.8.2.33-7.

\textsuperscript{73} Confidential letter, Iwasaki to Hunt, 6 November 1905, ibid.
Japanese immigration and the commercial treaty. In the first letter Deakin said that he would give the Japanese proposals "his careful consideration in framing the amended Bill [the Immigration Restriction Amendment Bill] which he hoped to submit to Parliament" and he asked Iwasaki for information on "any further communications" with the Japanese government. That there were two different kinds of letters sent by Hunt to Iwasaki in a short period tends to support the authenticity of the Japanese diplomatic records in which Hunt was reported to understand "the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation" by the term "treaty."

In the second letter to Iwasaki, Deakin set out his position in unambiguous terms. Firstly, he asserted that Australia was prepared to amend the Immigration Restriction Act so as to exempt the Japanese nationals from its operation. Secondly, the exemption of the Japanese from the provision of the Act would be carried out by a special bilateral agreement, with a reciprocal provision intended to control the movement of the Japanese by the Japanese government and the Australian people by the federal government. Thirdly, by this special agreement, Deakin stated that he did not "understand an ordinary Treaty of Navigation and Commerce." Even though Australia was anxious to promote trade with Japan in every possible way, Deakin maintained that "the negotiations in respect of the terms of such a Treaty [of Commerce and Navigation] should be conducted quite independently of any discussion of the terms of the suggested amendments of the Immigration Restriction Act." Deakin insisted on the separation of the issues of immigration restriction and commercial treaty. To strengthen his argument, Deakin quoted a passage of the letter written by the former Consul-General Eitaki who had stated that the Japanese government would "readily consent to

74. Private letter, Hunt to Iwasaki, 29 September 1905, ibid.
any arrangement by which all that Australia seeks so far as the Japanese are concerned, would be at once conceded."75

Iwasaki was taken by surprise and expressed his dissatisfaction at the result of his negotiations with Deakin:

I ... am sorry to learn that Mr Deakin has changed his mind, or has found some insuperable obstacle in the way of carrying out the suggestion which, at this request, I submitted for his favourable consideration by confidential letter on the 20th ultimo. The clearness of the terms of that letter, and the fact that the draft of the cable which ... was submitted to you, renders it, to my mind, almost incredible that there could be any misunderstanding as to what was actually agreed upon between us.76

For Hunt, it was "a surprise." In reply, he reviewed the developments of the negotiations and clarified again Deakin's point of view, but never admitted Iwasaki's claim that he had suggested Australia's adherence to the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty. While the White Australia policy should not be altered except "in its form of expression," what Deakin sought for was how best it could be made "operative without giving any cause for offence" to the Japanese government. Finally, Hunt stated that Deakin had not "in any way changed his mind in connection with this matter" and was still ready to meet the Japanese wishes, consistent with the preservation of the White Australia policy.77 Since Australia's basic policy was so clearly and strongly expressed in these exchanges, there was no room for Iwasaki to have further talks on this subject. Iwasaki mentioned that "it is perhaps not much use to discuss this point [the commercial treaty] further now, so long as Mr Deakin has no intention of making a proposal to the Parliament" on the

75. Unofficial letter, Hunt to Iwasaki, 10 October 1905, ibid.
lines of the Japanese original suggestion, and concluded that "my negotiations with him have failed, and that a new condition of affairs has arisen."78

Meantime, the Melbourne Argus had disclosed that Deakin had been negotiating directly with Iwasaki in order to arrive at a bilateral understanding with Japan which would have the effect of modifying the Immigration Restriction Act in order to make it less offensive to the Japanese.79 Following the report in the Argus, Deakin had to defend himself against the attacks of Watson and the Labor parliamentarians. To make his stand clear, Deakin explained his action:

If it be found possible ... to restate the general principles of our immigration restriction policy in another form, without altering their substance, so as to avoid hurting the susceptibilities of the people of Japan, or of any other people, I, for one, shall be only [sic] happy to propose it.80

Then he proposed to amend the wording of the Immigration Restriction Act. Though he did not reach a bilateral agreement with Japan, Deakin still sought to revise the Act in order to conciliate Japan. In November 1905, the Immigration Restriction Amendment Bill was presented to the Parliament. It substituted "any prescribed" language for "any European" language in the dictation test clause (section 3a) and created a new section (4a) which exempted from the dictation test any subjects of foreign countries with which the Commonwealth government had made an arrangement regulating admission. Debate on the bill took place between 6 and 13 December,81 these amendments were passed by both Houses with assurances that they

78. Confidential letter, Iwasaki to Hunt, 6 November 1905, ibid., No.1143-5.
would not endanger the white Australia policy. Despite the change in the
words of the act, European languages remained the basis of the dictation
test since no other languages were ever prescribed by the Parliament.82

It seems that both Deakin's method of handling the issue upset Iwasaki,
and the relations, at the official level, between Australia and Japan cooled.
In a report to the new Foreign Minister Katō Takaaki, Iwasaki strongly
denounced the Immigration Restriction Amendment Act as a "wicked means"
to camouflage Australian racism.83 Deakin's attempt to placate Japan
in 1905 was the only example of an Australian government down to 1921
trying to deal with the Japanese using conciliatory diplomacy.

Japan in the Parliamentary Debates

It was not only the Protectionist Deakin who sought improved relations
with Japan after its victory over Russia. Soon after the Russo-Japanese
war, an immediate request for reconstructing Australia-Japan relations
came from two Free Traders, Bruce Smith, M.P. and Senator Edward Pulsford.
Bruce Smith was a pro-British statesman and the president of the British
Empire League in Australia which was "an anglophilic pressure group drawing
its patronage from judicial and vice-regal circles, its executive from prominent
conservative politicians, and its membership from middle-class commercial
and professional groups."84 The League was established in 1902 to strengthen
the imperial connection. Smith, the managing director of the shipping

82. A.C. Palfreeman, The Administration of the White Australia Policy,
Melbourne, 1967, pp.82-83.
84. Maurice French, "The Ambiguity of Empire Day in New South Wales
1901-21: Imperial Consensus or National Division?" The Australian
firm Howard Smith & Sons from 1884-1888, and the president of the Employers Union, was a well-known anti-Socialist. His case for improved Australia-Japan relation was based on the importance and role of Japan in the context of British imperial interests. In addition, he possibly saw Japan as a promising trade partner for Australia. On 28 November Smith submitted a resolution to amend the White Australia policy so as to make it more acceptable to Japan. He proposed "differentiating the Japanese people from other Asiatic races" and placing them upon "the same footing of international amity as that which is now extended to all European peoples."

The Japanese enthusiastically endorsed this proposal. Baron Suematsu Kenchō, Japan's special emissary in London, welcomed the proposal. Since he was engaged in refuting the "Yellow Peril" doctrine in Europe, Smith's motion appealed Suematsu as a means by which "the dread of the Yellow Peril" and the discrimination which followed from it could be brought to an end. It met the Japanese wish that they should be regarded by "Europeans in a different light from the rest of Asiatics." Rejecting the notion that Japan was a menace to Australia, he expressed the hope that the Commonwealth government would "lead the way" to place Japan in the front rank of nations. In Australia Iwasaki responded carefully to the Smith's initiative and on 6 December, two days before Parliament was to debate the motion, had a talk with Smith about the substance of the motion, the political climate

85. His regular contribution to the Pioneer of Allahabad, a leading newspaper of Northern India and largely read by the official classes, was a part of his effort to strengthen the imperial connection. Private letter, Webb to Deakin, 7 November 1909, Deakin Papers MS 1540/1/30/2444-5.

86. Regarding his anti-Labor and anti-Socialist view appeared in the election campaign, see SMH, 12 December 1903.


88. DT, 11 January 1905.
in the House, and the parliamentary schedule. Smith was doubtful that
the House of Representatives would immediately adopt a radical change
to the 1901 Immigration Restriction Act. He explained that the motion
would not be discussed in detail because the Prime Minister, Reid, was
about to close the Parliament.89 Then Iwasaki took up the methods with
Reid who confirmed that there was no spare time to debate Smith's motion.
In this conversation, Iwasaki detected that Reid seemed worried about
Labor's strong opposition to the proposal. Since the parliamentary schedule
did not permit this motion to be discussed, Iwasaki decided not to press
Smith, but he obtained a promise from him that he would move the motion
as soon as the new Parliament opened.90 During the succeeding nine months,
that is down to 28 September 1905 when Smith moved this motion in the
House, it would appear that the Japanese Consulates supplied Smith with
materials to support his case, since much of the evidence which he cited
in arguing for the motion could not be obtained easily in Australia.

The 1905 motion was a modified version of his 1904 resolution and
the rationale underlying it remained unchanged. Arguing that Japan was
in the front rank of civilized nations, one of the most progressive peoples
in the world, the trusted friend and ally of Britain and the British Empire,
and among the greatest naval and military powers of the world, Bruce Smith
proposed to exempt the Japanese from the present exclusion policy. However

89. Despatch No.113, Iwasaki to Komura, 15 December 1904, NGB, Vol.37-2,
No.926. Herbert A. Parson, an honorary consul in Adelaide representing
Japan, held a pessimistic view on the motion if it was voted in the
House. Although there was "the immensely increased feeling of goodwill"
towards Japan amongst Australians, he still thought that a majority
would oppose "the unrestricted" introduction of Japanese into Australia.
Despatch No.6, Parson to Komura, 4 January 1905, NGB, Vol.38-2,
No.1137.

90. Despatch No.113, Iwasaki to Komura, 15 December 1904, NGB, Vol.37-2,
No.926.
he did not suggest the abolition of the White Australia policy as it affected the Japanese. He proposed to amend the Immigration Restriction Act in order to permit "the regulation of the admission of the Japanese people" to Australia by two methods, firstly through a bilateral agreement regulating Japanese admission by "diplomatic negotiation and mutual arrangement," and secondly by including the Japanese language along with the English language as the basis for the educational test. What he intended to do was to remove from the Japanese the stigma of being grouped with the other Asiatic races as "prohibited immigrants," while still preventing an unrestricted flow of Japanese to Australia. He criticised the Commonwealth decision in 1901 to slam the door on the Japanese as "a diplomatic mistake" especially since he saw the Anglo-Japanese diplomatic relations as an "intimate alliance and diplomatic marriage."92

To head off his critics Smith again made it clear that the question was a matter of "the national pride and self-respect of a great nation" which had concluded an alliance with Britain.93 He wished the parliamentarians to understand that he did not advocate an uncontrolled flow of Japanese into Australia but stated the necessity of moving this motion "from considerations of international policy, because we know that Japan has become one of the great factors of the world's peace."94 In the course of the debates, Smith quoted several statements illustrating Japan's sense of outrage, made by prominent and influential Japanese figures such as Itō Hirobumi, Ōkuma Shigenobu, Kaneko Kentarō, Suematsu Kenchō, and Nitobe Inazo. The motion was seconded by William Knox, who was also a Free Trader, and

92. Ibid., p.2942.
93. Ibid., p.2943.
94. Ibid., p.2950.
president of the Victorian Chamber of Mines and the Chamber of Commerce.  

Because of his pro-Japanese and pro-imperial attitudes, Bruce Smith was an easy target for the Bulletin and the Labor Party.  

The motion received a cold response in the House. As a tactical measure the Labor Party members requested that the motion be postponed, until the government presented its Immigration Restriction Amendment Bill. While the discussion on the motion was postponed, the House started debating the government's bill, by which Deakin attempted to offer a superficial concession to the Japanese.  

Despite Smith's careful preparation of his case, he could make no progress because a majority of parliamentarians opposed such a substantial concession to Japan. As the Brisbane Courier reported it, Australian opinion hardly tolerated Bruce Smith's suggestion.  

While Smith carried the case for change in the House of Representatives, Edward Pulsford spoke for the Japanese in the Senate. Pulsford was an ardent Free Trader, an organiser of the 1900 Free Trade Conference in Sydney, a financial editor of Daily Telegraph in 1887, and "prolific writer on commercial, financial and tariff subjects." In 1900 he became the first president of the NSW division of the Australian Free Trade and Liberal Association. Like Smith, Pulsford also accepted the British evaluation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and regarded "the adjustment of relations between races" as the great problem of the British Empire. He was very

95. SMH, 29 September 1905.
96. When Smith attempted to move the motion in 1904, the Bulletin carried a cynical picture. In the picture, Smith was talking to a Japanese burglar and brought a ladder of "Pro Alien Eloquence" to help the burglar. Smith's words were "My good fellow, so far from interfering, I intend to help you in every way. Here's a ladder, and if there's any other little thing you require, let me know." Bulletin, 15 December 1904.
98. Brisbane Courier, 2 October 1905.
concerned about the Japanese reaction to the White Australia policy and its negative effect on Australia-Japan trade relations. Once in 1904 he attempted to move a motion which was designed to make the Immigration Restriction Act less offensive to the Japanese. In 1905 he published a pamphlet on Japan, *The British Empire and the Relations of Asia and Australasia: Immigration Restrictions in Australia*, which was intended to make the Australian people aware of Japanese feeling about the White Australia policy. Summarizing his argument, he declared that:

Japan! It is in connection with Japan that the most signal condemnation of Australian legislation arises.... The alliance constituted an effectual proof of the mutual esteem and the mutual interests of the two Empires, and, at the same time, showed how far Australian politicians were out of touch with their own people.\(^{101}\)

And referring to Canada's decision to join the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty and the possibilities of an enormous expansion of trade in the East, Pulsford proposed the admission of Japanese into Australia on mutually agreed terms.\(^{102}\)

This pamphlet was widely noticed in the metropolitan press, and frequently referred to the parliamentary debates on the subject. Reflecting pro-Japanese feeling in Australia during the Russo-Japanese war, only the *Bulletin* directly attacked the pamphlet. The *Sydney Morning Herald* published the essence of it without any critical comment.\(^{104}\) The *Daily Telegraph* also published extracts and referred to the importance of Japan in the commercial field.\(^{105}\)

---

101. E. Pulsford, *The British Empire and the Relations of Asia and Australasia: Immigration Restrictions in Australia*, Sydney, 1905, pp.5-6. It might be possible to assume that the Japanese government rendered financial assistance to publish this pamphlet by using Kimitoshi (Special operation fund) of the Foreign Ministry. It had once happened when Edward W. Foxall published a book *Colorophobia* in 1903. However I could not find any documents in the Japanese archives which supported a possibility that Pulsford had received a publication grant from the Japanese government.


In the light of Japan's achievement in war, the _Argus_ welcomed the publication as "a very timely article."\(^{106}\)

On 28 September Pulsford gave notice of motion that:

> it is the wish of both the Empire of Japan and the Commonwealth of Australia to maintain the purity of their respective races, this Senate hereby affirms the desirability of a treaty being made under which all questions relating to emigration and immigration may be arranged. The Senate further expresses its earnest hope that the friendship between the people of the Empire of Japan and those of the Commonwealth of Australia may be maintained, to their mutual advantage and to the well-being of the whole world.\(^{107}\)

When Pulsford moved this motion, he delivered what the _Argus_ described as a "carefully prepared and informative speech" on how Japan viewed the White Australia policy.\(^{108}\) To strengthen his argument, he also cited a London _Time's_ article written by George Ernest Morrison, an Australian-born prominent correspondent in Peking, which attacked the Russian and German campaign propagating the "Yellow Peril" doctrine.\(^{109}\)

The politicians' response to Pulsford's pamphlet was, at least, reserved. There was a strong consensus among the Senators that Australia should take Japan's new position into consideration and re-orient its external policy to Japan. For them, the most important considerations were the outcome of the Russo-Japanese war and the conclusion of the second Anglo-Japanese alliance. On 27 September, some Labor Senators, led by G.F. Pearce, denounced the pro-Japanese line of the pamphlet. Pearce described the publication as "a greater disgrace to Australia than the Immigration Restriction Act."\(^{110}\)

---

106. _Argus_, 7 August 1905.
107. The proposed motion reported in _SMH_ is slightly different from the actual motion moved to on 26 October 1905. _SMH_, 26 September 1905; _CPD_, 1905 Session, Vol.XXVIII, p.4121, 26 October 1905.
Generally, the Labor Senators tended to be cautious about the consequences of Japanese military power and they regarded Japan as a potential threat to Australia's security. Hugh De Largie, the Labor Senator for Western Australia, saw Pulsford's motion as merely "an expression of good-will" to a powerful Japan and supported it as a conciliatory measure to a power which might in the future menace Australia.¹¹¹ Because of his deep suspicion of Japan, Pearce was very cautious about Pulsford's proposal for a bilateral treaty.¹¹² Although Pearce was not altogether opposed to the introduction of some conciliatory measures, he declined to support Pulsford's pro-Japanese motion which he thought might undermine the White Australia policy. Instead of totally rejecting the motion, Pearce moved an amendment to render the original resolution harmless. He proposed to leave out the words that "this Senate hereby affirms the desirability of a treaty being made under which all questions relating to emigration and immigration may be arranged."¹¹³ His proposed amendment was adopted without any discussion.¹¹⁴ A majority of the Senators acknowledged the necessity of fostering better relations with Japan, but would not make a substantial concession on the admission of Japanese into Australia. The politicians held that Australia should strive for improved relations with Japan in view of Japan's enhanced international status and its naval position in the Pacific. The politicians' perception of Japan was changing in accordance with that country's changing naval position in the Pacific. They began to see Japan

¹¹² Ibid., pp.5649-5651. As early as in 1901, Pearce stated in the Parliament that "I cannot see the possibility of any of the European nations for the purpose of conquest, which could be their only purpose, opening up a war of aggression on Australia, whereas there is a possibility of the earth hunger in eastern nations leading them to pick a quarrel with Australia for the purpose of securing these valuable and only partially populated lands." CPD, 1901-2 Session, Vol.I, p.260, 23 May 1901.
¹¹⁴ Ibid.
not only as an ally of Britain but also as a potential enemy of Australia.

Deakin and the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty

Australia's federal government went to some troubles to distinguish its approach on trade relations with Japan from its exclusionist immigration policy. Though Deakin's attitude to Japan was after the Russo-Japanese War, principally based on a strategic evaluation of Japan's position in the Pacific, he also concerned himself with Australia's commercial relations with "the new Power in the Pacific."

The Federal government had a strong desire to foster Australia's trade with Japan. And it was also anticipated that the Japanese government would be looking for facilities for trade expansion at the end of the war. Nevertheless when Deakin attempted to improve Australia's trade relations with Japan, he could not escape from the inevitable disagreement with Japan over the White Australia policy. Before achieving proper trade relations, two questions had to be resolved: one was whether to join the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty and try to recover Australia's competitive power in Japan, which had been challenged by American and Canadian trade expansion, and the other was the peculiar status of Queensland which had been enjoying the trade benefits of the commercial treaty since 1900 through its independent arrangement with Japan.

In September 1905, it became known that the Canadian Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier had asked the British Foreign Secretary Lansdowne to arrange Canada's adherence to the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty so as to "secure for Canadian products the minimum tariff" which had been benefiting the United States and British products exported to Japan. At the end

115. Age, 15 July 1905.
116. SMH, 27 September 1905.
of December it was reported that Canada was going to sign the commercial treaty.\textsuperscript{117} Immediately Deakin inquired of the Colonial Office about the terms of the arrangement.\textsuperscript{118} The reply of the Colonial Secretary Lord Elgin was rather embarrassing for Deakin since he reported that Canada had expressed "its desire to adhere absolutely and without reserve" to the commercial treaty.\textsuperscript{119}

During the whole period of this study, the federal government never attempted to change the core of the White Australia policy, and it was by and large supported by the press. Even though the \textit{Daily Telegraph} had supported the Free Traders' view on the importance of Australia-Japan trade development, it endorsed the government's attitudes on this question of the commercial treaty:

\begin{quote}
there is a wide difference between the Australian and the Canadian conditions. The Australian people are practically unanimous in their desire to keep this continent for the white races. Every State in the Commonwealth holds the same view in this matter, and the proximity of this country to China and Japan brings the danger of a possible swamping by Asiatic immigrants infinitely closer to us than to the people of British Columbia.\textsuperscript{120}
\end{quote}

Since there was a strong national consensus on the maintenance of the White Australia policy, it was impossible for Deakin to follow the Canadian example. His answer was clear that Australia would only adhere to the commercial treaty on certain conditions.

The second problem was posed by the incompatibility of the Immigration Restriction Act with the 1897 Queensland's adherence to the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty. After federation, it was thought unjustifiable and unfair that only Queensland should receive the substantial trade preference.

\textsuperscript{117} Telegram, Northcote to the Colonial Secretary, 23 December 1905, AA. CP 78/1/1084; Letter, Deakin to Northcote, 29 December 1905, \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{118} Letter, Deakin to Northcote, 29 December 1905, \textit{ibid.}; Letter, A. Hunt to an Official secretary of Northcote, 4 January 1906, \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{119} Letter, Elgin to Northcote, 11 January 1906, \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{120} DT, 18 December 1905.
from Japan under the commercial treaty. This question could have been easily settled if Australia had followed the Canadian example and signed the commercial treaty with Japan. The commercial benefits of the treaty would thus have been extended not only to Queensland but also to the other Australian states. Since such a course was politically unacceptable, the only alternative was to find some way to bring the Queensland agreement with Japan to an end and so place Queensland on the same footing as all the other states.

In reaching this decision, Deakin was assisted by the NSW commercial agent J.B. Suttor and the NSW Premier Carruthers. Suttor, on several occasions, had written of the trade advantages which Queensland enjoyed in Japan over the other states. Based on Suttor's remarks, Carruthers urged Deakin to "take steps to ensure equal advantages to the rest of Australia." On 1 May 1906, as a result of these considerations, Deakin sent a formal communication to the Governor-General, Lord Northcote asking the British government to enter into negotiations with Japan on the possibility of Australian adherence to the commercial treaty. Deakin explained that the federal Parliament was "not likely to relax its immigration restriction laws so far as to permit unrestricted immigration of Japanese to Australia, or even to consent to an arrangement similar to that made by Queensland in 1897." He hoped that the 1904 Passport Agreement and the Immigration

121. The Japanese government accorded preferential treatment to Queensland's goods under the Conventional Tariff while the other Australian states were forced to pay higher duties under the General Tariff. There was a widening the gap of import duties between the Conventional Tariff and the General Tariff. When the new Japanese tariff came into operation in October 1906, this difference became much clearer. On condensed milk, Queensland paid 2 pence per dozen (the other states 1 pound); on sole leather, 11 shillings per picul (1 pound 8 shillings); on wine (bottle or cask), 4 pence per litre (8 pence); on alcohol, 1 shilling per litre (1 shilling 4 pence); on blankets, 10 shillings per picul (3 pounds 7 shillings). The picul equals 133 1/3 lb. DT, 11 October 1906.

122. Argus, 13 June 1906.

123. Despatch, Deakin to Northcote, 1 May 1906, CO 418/44/321-323; FO 371/87/78; AA. CP 78/1/1084; Despatch, Northcote to Elgin, 7 May 1906, ibid.
Restriction Amendment Act of 1905 which was made "chiefly in deference to the susceptibilities of the Japanese people" and would satisfy the Japanese.

The Colonial Office seems to have been surprised at Deakin's proposal, but it asked the Foreign Office to open negotiations with the Japanese government. The Colonial Office doubted that Australia could succeed in the talks. Taking into account Japan's strong post-war bargaining position and Canada's adherence to the treaty, H.E. Dale, a junior officer in the Colonial Office, noted that:

I have considerable doubts whether Australia is wise in raising this question. It seems to me not improbable that the effect of approaching the Japanese Gov't will be that the latter will ask for an assurance that the Immigr: Restr: Acts [sic] will be administered in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty of 1894, i.e. without any discrimination against Japanese. 124

He feared that the revival of this issue would cause the Japanese government to withdraw trade preferences granted to Queensland. 125 Dale's analysis was unanimously accepted by the Colonial Office. Another officer G. Johnson agreed that the Australian position was made "more difficult" by the Canadian acceptance of the treaty "without reservation." 126 N.B. Cox, Assistant Under-Secretary, shared Dale's doubts and suggested that the Foreign Office "had better make confidential inquiries to begin with." 127 The Colonial Secretary Elgin and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Winston S. Churchill, who had taken this post in December 1905, approved these suggestions on 12 July 1906.

The Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey, instructed the British Ambassador C. MacDonald to "sound the Japanese Government as to whether Australia

---

125. Ibid.
126. Minute by G. Johnson, 7 July 1906, CO 418/44/318.
127. Minute by H.B. Cox, 7 July 1906, Ibid.
could become a party to the Treaty without giving up the unrestricted right of legislation of the Parliament of the Commonwealth to restrict immigration deemed to be undesirable."

On 5 September, MacDonald addressed a note to the Japanese Prime Minister Saionji Kinmochi. In 1906, Japan's foreign policy came "under the control of Hayashi Tadasu." He was one of the most pro-British diplomats in the Foreign Ministry since he had studied in London from 1866 to 1868 and been Minister and later Ambassador to Britain between February 1900 and March 1906. Between 1901 and 1905, he had played an important role in the Anglo-Japanese alliance negotiations and of course had been aware of the Japanese immigration questions in Australia. As he had protested on several occasions against the White Australia policy, it is likely that he bore ill feeling towards the Australian government. Hayashi gave a polite but negative answer to Deakin's proposal. Referring to the Canadian unconditional acceptance of the commercial treaty as a "fact," Hayashi mentioned that:

The wish of Australia, which is geographically in close affinity with Japan, ... is a source of great pleasure to me as showing that the long-cherished hope of the Imperial Government has reached a stage where it is about to be finally realized.

Then a couple of days later, MacDonald had an interview with Hayashi "in order to elucidate some further expression of his views." MacDonald explained to Grey that Hayashi considered the 1904 Passport Agreement and the 1905 Immigration Restriction Amendment Act "as far too stringent" and "the standpoint he takes on the question appears to me to be one from

---

130. Letter, Hayashi to MacDonald, 1 October 1906, FO 371/87/101.
131. Confidential despatch, MacDonald to Grey, 9 October 1906, ibid.
which there is very little hope of the Japanese Government receiving." He concluded that the minimum Japanese request would be the terms agreed to in the Japan and Queensland agreement.\textsuperscript{132} Three days later, he sent his final assessment of this question from Tokyo to London:

I am strongly of [the] opinion that there is little probability of the Japanese Government extending the commercial benefits of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1894 to the Australian Commonwealth unless the latter, on her side, is willing to make substantial concessions in the matter of Japanese immigration.

And he concluded that "Viscount Hayashi's views appeared to be so opposed to the terms suggested by Mr Deakin."\textsuperscript{133}

The Foreign Office was reluctant to have further negotiations with Japan unless Deakin changed his policy. In the Foreign Office's view, the negotiation was not "entirely a matter for the C.O. [Colonial Office] and the Colony."\textsuperscript{134} The stand of the Japanese eventually "cooled the Australian ardour for a settlement" with respect to the Japanese immigration and commercial issues.\textsuperscript{135} Since Deakin knew his proposals were only met "half-way," he decided to give up further negotiation and moved to solving the treaty problem of Queensland in another way. After a number of inquiries and discussions between Australia and Britain, Deakin took steps to give notice of termination respecting Queensland's agreement with Japan. The notice was given in June 1908 and the federal government thus finally removed the anomaly.\textsuperscript{136}

\textsuperscript{132} Confidential despatch, MacDonald to Grey, 6 October 1906, FO 371/87/91; CO 418/49/561.
\textsuperscript{133} Confidential despatch, MacDonald to Grey, 9 October 1906, FO 371/87/101-104; CO 418/49/601-603.
\textsuperscript{134} Minute by Walter Langley, senior clerk of the Far Eastern Department in the Foreign Office, 10 October 1906, FO 371/87/90.
Early Evolution of National Defence Policy

By the end of the Russo-Japanese war, Australian statesmen were under great strain because of the vulnerability of Australian security. The vulnerability stemmed mainly from the British inability to provide for the defence of Australia and Japan's undisputable naval supremacy in the Pacific. In consequence, Australia was at the mercy of the new eastern power, Japan. Amongst the statesmen, Alfred Deakin was chiefly responsible for formulating Australia's early defence policy. In June 1905 just after the naval battle of the Japan Sea, Deakin in his interview with the Melbourne Herald stressed the changing balance of power in the Pacific and Australia's inability to resist any naval attack from overseas. He explained the basic problem for Australia's defence and proposed the development of a Dominion navy to cope with Australia's new circumstances. The interview received wide publicity and on 31 August the Senate ordered it to be printed as a Parliamentary Paper. Richard A. Crouch, an anti-Japanese Protectionist M.P., described Deakin as the political figure who was "leading public opinion" in Australia on defence matters.

In the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese war, Deakin pointed to "the

137. Herald, 12 June 1905. Deakin's interview appeared under the title of "The Defence of Australia. Her Supreme Question To-day. Great Statement by Mr Alfred Deakin, M.P. Former Prime Minister Sounds a Call to Action What is Required of Us in a New Situation." A summary of and comment on Deakin's interview appeared in the Sydney papers of 14 June. SMH, 14 June 1905; DT, 14 June 1905.


striking growth of three new naval powers — the United States, Germany, and Japan," and pointed out the problems this caused. Australia used to depend "largely on its isolation for security" but was now within "striking distance" of various foreign naval stations. He noted that Japan was "the nearest of all the great foreign naval nations to Australia." It became clear that Japan was the centre of his concern. Recognizing that Australia's defence forces were "inadequate in numbers, imperfectly supplied with war materials and exceptionally weak on the naval side," he urged Australians to reconsider their country's basic defence policy in the light of "a conspicuous alteration" in international politics. It was a time to cease debating questions of defence organization and to create a national defence policy.\(^{140}\) The Russo-Japanese war gave him "a good opportunity to stress his long-held belief in the strengthening of naval defence.\(^{141}\) To meet the new requirements of Australian defence, Deakin made three suggestions: the first to strengthen harbour defences of the capital cities, the second to reconsider the Anglo-Australian naval agreement for the purpose of protecting Australian coast and harbours from foreign cruisers, and the third to increase the nation's population. The solution to the first point was to be found in establishing Australia's own naval forces consisting of submarines, torpedo boats and torpedo-boat destroyers which could protect its coastal trade and harbours. He supported also the idea of acquiring "sea-going ships," but it was, he stated, "a question of finance" because under the existing Braddon clause of the Australian constitution the federal expenditure was restricted. With a view to the efficient defence, he stated that "a great influx of desirable settlers is

---

necessary all round Australia," and asserted "emphatically" that it was
"the duty of all able-bodied men to fit themselves for defence work."¹⁴²

On 5 July Deakin formed his second cabinet.¹⁴³ During his two administration
from July 1905 to April 1910, he was "continuously concerned with the
question of naval defence" in Australia.¹⁴⁴ In August Deakin took the
first step to solve the Australian naval question and approached the Colonial
Office asking for a re-examination of the existing naval agreement with
Britain.¹⁴⁵ He was motivated to do so not only by his strategic consideration

---

¹⁴². Herald, 12 June 1905. The Reid government quickly responded to
the Deakin statement, and the Treasurer Sir George Turner asked
W.T. Bridges, the Chief of Intelligence, for his professional comments
upon the statement. Bridges replied on 23 June that "Speaking broadly
it may be said that no exception can be taken to the statements" referring
to the naval defence and to the military forces in particular. Remarks
by the Chief of Intelligence, 23 June 1905, AA. B 168/04-184(4).

¹⁴³. SMH, 6 July 1905.


¹⁴⁵. The imperial understanding on this naval agreement was reached among
Australia, New Zealand and Britain at the Colonial conference held
in London from 30 June to 11 August 1902. Joseph Chamberlain, The
Colonial Secretary, presided at the Conference which was attended
by the Prime Ministers of Dominions: Edmund Barton of Australia,
R.J. Seddon of New Zealand, Wilfred Laurier of Canada, and three
other Prime Ministers of Cape Colony, Natal and Newfoundland. On
the subject of naval defence, Barton commented that the Commonwealth
government did not "at present" attempt to obtain "the nucleus of
a Navy of our own" because of the financial problem, especially under
the Braddon clause which restricted the government to receive only
20% of the net Customs and Exercise Revenue for use as federal expenditure.
As an alternative, Barton went into a new ten-year naval agreement
with Britain in 1903 with the approval of the Parliament, by which
Australia was to contribute £200,000 and New Zealand £40,000 annually
for the naval force on the Australian Station (Article VIII and X of
the Naval Agreement). According to Article 1, the Australian squadron
would consist of one 1st class armoured cruiser, two 2nd class cruisers,
four 3rd class cruisers and four sloops. All of which were supposed
to be modern type except drill ships. The sphere of operation was
determined to be the waters of the Australia, China and the East Indies
Stations. The 1903 agreement became the first Anglo-Australian naval
arrangement and superseded the 1887 colonial naval defence agreement.
Barton gave his written assent to the 1903 naval agreement on 25
September. C.O. Miscellaneous No. 144, Confidential, "Conference
between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Premiers
of Self-Governing Colonies. Minutes of Proceedings and Papers laid
before the Conference," 1902, p.30, CO 885/2; Dominions No.16, Secret,
"Agreement between His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom,
the Commonwealth of Australia, and the Colony of New Zealand, 1903"
in "Confidential Papers laid before the Imperial Conference, 1909,"
pp.15-17, CO 886/2; SMH, 11 December 1902; Meredith Hooper, "The
Naval Defence Agreement of 1887," The Australian Journal of Politics
but also by the unpopularity of the naval agreement in Australia.\textsuperscript{146} In his despatch to the Colonial Office, Deakin stated that:

the present Naval Agreement is not and never has been popular in the Commonwealth .... There is much truth in the customary interpretation that its want of popularity is due to the fact that none of our grant is applied to any distinctively Australian purpose.\textsuperscript{147}

The unpopularity of the naval agreement became evident in late 1905, since British security promises to Australia were not strictly carried out. Firstly, with respect to the Far East, which was Australia's first line of defence, there was disappointment at the Admiralty's decision to withdraw its five battleships. W.M. Hughes, a Labor advocate of national defence, warned of Australia's weak position in the era of the Anglo-Japanese alliance:

the fact that we should now rely on the Japanese for the maintenance of British supremacy in eastern seas is not calculated to inspire with confidence those who have the ideal of a White Australia, and all that term connotes .... The British Fleet might be withdrawn from our coasts, and we left defenceless.\textsuperscript{148}

Reflecting on the Admiralty's new concentration policy in Europe, Deakin held the view that "the security of Australia would be gone, and the opportunities of Anglo-Saxon growth here in instant danger of curtailment."\textsuperscript{149} From late 1905, there was a common belief that the whole security of Australia was at stake.

\textsuperscript{146} Northcote, the Governor-General of Australia, classified the objectives of the agreement into four classes: (1) the party selfish, who want Great Britain to defend them greater, (2) those who object to the payment of "tribute" by a free democracy to another country, (3) those who advocate Australia having, and controlling, her own Navy, and (4) a less advanced branch of School 3; who say they should have a voice in the management of the Australian Squadron, proportionate to Australia's contribution. Based on the imperial logic, Northcote was of the opinion that Australia should bear its share in the cost of the defence of the British Empire, since Australia was "a positive source of weakness to the Mother Country." Letter, Northcote to Balfour, 21 May 1905, Balfour Papers 49697/53-54. The similar remarks on the unpopularity of the agreement in Australia had been also made by Eitaki Hisakichi, Japan's consul in Sydney. Despatch No.45, "Report re the Expenditure of British Australian Squadron," Eitaki to Komura, 4 August 1903, JFMA, 1.6.3.2-23-1. See also Age, 24 August 1905.

\textsuperscript{147} Despatch, Deakin to Governor-General, 28 August 1905, CO 418/37/74-80.


\textsuperscript{149} CPD, 1906 Session, Vol. XXXV, p.5573, 26 September 1906.
Secondly, the naval agreement was under attack since the strength of the Australian squadron did not strictly conform to the terms of the Anglo-Australian naval agreement. A. Perceval Matheson, a Free Trader Senator for Western Australia, charged that the Australian squadron was "far below the contract strength under the terms of the agreement." 150 According to W.R. Creswell, Director of Naval Forces, the fighting strength of the Australian squadron would be "considerably diminished" by the British proposed substitution of the 1st class protected cruiser "Powerful" for the 1st class armoured cruiser "Euryalus." 151 Acting on Creswell's advice, the federal government protested against the Admiralty disregarding the precise stipulations in the naval agreement. 152 R.A. Crouch argued that since the naval agreement had not been "honestly observed, either in the matter of the size of the ships in our waters or in the number of Australians" who were employed upon them, Australia should discontinue the payment of the naval subsidy. 153 Relating the Japanese defeat of the Russians and the chagrin felt by the Japanese over the White Australia policy, he asserted that:

we ought to be prepared to shoulder our responsibility for having given umbrage to nations like Japan — by reason of our White Australia policy — by defending our action through the taxation of our own people and by the force of our own arms. 154

---

150. As the following table shows, Matheson exaggerated his criticism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of Vessel</th>
<th>Required by agreement</th>
<th>Actual strength in 1905</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st class cruisers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd class cruisers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd class cruisers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sloops</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


151. Confidential despatch, Deakin to Northcote, 20 October 1905, CO 418/37/274; Confidential minute paper on Naval Agreement Act, by Creswell, 12 October 1905, CO 418/37/276-277.

152. Age, 8 February 1906.


154. Ibid.
Deakin took advantage of these criticisms of the existing Naval Agreement to suggest replacing it with a distinctly Australian naval force.

At present we are without any visible evidence of our participation in the naval forces towards which we contribute. Our £200,000 a year would seem in part repaid if we were enabled to take a direct and active part in the protection of our shores and shipping.\(^{155}\)

At first he suggested to the Admiralty the establishment of "a rapid and regular service of first class steamers" which would in peacetime assist in developing trade, and in providing for the practical training of the Royal Naval Reserve, and in war be converted for naval purposes.\(^{156}\) Though Sir Montagu F. Ommnney, Permanent Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office, was sympathetic to Deakin, the Admiralty was not. Deakin's proposal did not commend itself to the Admiralty, whose opinion was that it was not only of "extremely limited efficacy" in war, but also "costly in its operation."\(^{157}\)

Before receiving a reply to his proposal, Deakin raised the problem of naval defence with Sir George Clarke, the secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D.). Deakin sent a private telegram asking for Clarke's advice as to "the best means of obtaining a scheme of defence and of armament etc. for all the ports of Australia."\(^{158}\) Clarke suggested that Deakin refer the Australian naval question to the C.I.D. and following Clarke's suggestion, Deakin in November requested the C.I.D. to frame a general scheme for Australia's defence based on the following points:

1. Selection of ports in need of defence
2. Standard of defence of each port
3. Local naval defence of such ports
4. Scheme of defence to be harmonious

---

156. Ibid.
In his approach to the C.I.D., he showed his interest in establishing a naval force for coastal defence.159

Deakin's concern with Australia's naval defence was supported by Captain W.R. Creswell, the Director of Naval Forces.160 Fundamentally Creswell was an advocate of an Australian navy and had ambivalent attitudes to the British authorities who rejected "Naval effort of any kind of [sic] Australia."161 The Russo-Japanese war which demonstrated clearly "the absolute determining nature of sea power," strengthened his belief in building Australian local navy.162 In a defence memorandum, which he prepared for the Australian government, Creswell proposed to establish a separate navy comprising three cruiser-destroyers, sixteen torpedo-boat destroyers, and fifteen torpedo boats.163 He urged the establishment of a destroyer service for Australia's local defence which would be under the control of the federal government.164 This spoke directly to Deakin's own beliefs. They echoed the points that Deakin had raised in the Herald's interview in June 1905.

The next step which Deakin adopted in December was to send Creswell and Major-General William Throsby Bridges, the Chief of Intelligence, to Britain in order to assist the C.I.D. in framing the general scheme of

159. Letter, Deakin to C.I.D., 11 November 1905, Balfour Papers 49702/144.
160. Creswell was a former officer of the Royal Navy, and naval commandant of the three colonies of South Australia, Queensland and Victoria. When he was the Queensland's naval commandant, in 1900 he was selected to command "Protector" as the International Relief of Legations Forces from Australia to the Boxer Disturbances in China. Henry J. Feakes, White Ensign - Southern Cross: A Story of the King's Ships of Australia's Navy, Sydney, 1951, pp. 103-109.
161. Secret despatch, Creswell to T. Playford, Defence Minister, 10 October 1905, AA. B 173/S 05-187.
162. Argus, 1 June 1905.
163. The acquisition of these vessels was supposed to be extended over a period of seven years, at an average cost of £33,000 per annum. He estimated the total cost of construction and maintenance of the vessels during seven years at £2,300,000. "Report (a) by Captain Creswell as to the formation of an Australian Navy, dated 10 October 1905," CPP, 1906 Session, Vol. II, No. 66.
Australian defence. 165 In his letter to the Governor-General Northcote, Deakin stated that their task was to offer the C.I.D. "all necessary information and assistance in drawing up such [a] scheme." Regarding the local naval forces, Deakin reminded the Governor-General that there was "a strong public opinion in the Commonwealth in favour of some action in regard to local naval defence for ports, harbours and coastal trade." 166 Before leaving Melbourne for London, Creswell was further instructed by Thomas Playford, the Defence Minister, that he should inquire into and gain "every possible information with regard to the latest naval developments," in particular torpedo boat destroyers, torpedo craft, coastal defence systems of torpedo boat flotillas and submarines. 167 While Creswell acquainted himself with the latest naval equipment, he was expected to be given the opportunity of examining "confidentially" the C.I.D. recommendations and of supplying his views. 168 He was, however, not asked to appear before the C.I.D. and give assistance and materials. The C.I.D. refused to allow him to examine the recommendations on Australia's naval defence forces, before they were sent off to Melbourne.

The C.I.D. showed little understanding of Australia's concern about

---

165. Bridges was a professional army officer, a participant at several Australian intercolonial military conferences in the 1890s, the secretary to the Federal Military Conference in Sydney, and the commander of the Brigade Division of Field Artillery in Sydney after his service in the Boer War. In 1905, he was appointed the Chief of Intelligence and occupied a seat in the newly established Military Board. Later he established the military college and led the 1st Australian Division at Gallipoli during the first World War where he was killed. C.D. Coulthard-Clark, A Heritage of Spirit: A Biography of Major-General Sir William Throsby Bridges, Melbourne, 1979, Ch.1-5; C.E.W. Bean, Two Men I Knew: William Bridges and Brudenell White, Founders of the A.I.F., Sydney, 1957, pp.3-76.

166. Letter, Deakin to Northcote, 28 December 1905, AA. CP 290/15 Bundle 2; CO 418/44/5-7.


168. Despatch, Deakin to Northcote, 20 February 1906, CO 418/44/164-165.
Japan and Pacific security. But they drew up a defence scheme and made several recommendations as to the organization of military forces. In May 1906, the Colonial Defence Committee (C.D.C.) which was a sub-committee of the C.I.D. completed the Australian defence scheme and the C.I.D. approved it on 25 May. The federal government received the C.I.D. report in July. As regards the proposed establishment of a local naval defence, the C.I.D. report pointed out that there was "no strategic justification" and "no strategic necessity" for creating an Australian navy. Britain perceived no potential threat to Australia in the Pacific where the Anglo-Japanese alliance was functioning as a security guarantee. Localised vessels of the destroyers type could play "no effective part" in securing the object of the protection of Australian floating trade. The report strongly rejected Creswell's strategic assessment:

the employment of a naval force as "a purely defensive line" is a misapplication of maritime power opposed to every sound principle of naval strategy.\(^{170}\)

The C.I.D. was opposed to an autonomous naval force for Australia even though it might only be autonomous in peace time, and reaffirmed the importance of the unified naval policy of the Admiralty. The C.I.D. rejected any idea of an invasion of Australia by foreign powers such as Japan, except possibly on a limited scale by a small number of unarmoured cruisers.\(^{171}\)

\(^{169}\) In October 1905, Clarke had already decided to refer the question of Australia's defence schemes to the C.D.C. which was "quite prepared to take it up." Letter, Clarke to Balfour, 7 October 1905, Balfour Papers 49702/82-85.


\(^{171}\) When the federal government had raised the questions in 1905 as to whether 7.5 inch guns were sufficient protection for Fremantle against armoured cruisers, the British authorities had already responded that "Colonial Defence Committee after consideration of reports on experience in Russian-Japanese War do not consider Fremantle likely to be attacked by armoured cruisers." Secret telegram, Lyttleton to Northcote, 11 October 1905, AA. CP 290/15 Bundle 1. See also SMH, 18 November 1905.
According to the British view, Australian defence requirements would find satisfactory realization in the Anglo-Australian naval agreement once it had time to take full effect. The C.I.D. believed that the Russo-Japanese war had had no impact on Australia's defence needs. Its logical conclusion was that Australia could assist the imperial defence by increasing its contribution to the imperial Australian squadron under the Anglo-Australian naval agreement. The recommendations were "fairly satisfactory" to George Clarke, but quite contrary to Australian sentiment.\textsuperscript{172} Taking this into account, the C.D.C. was willing to admit that these British views were "not generally acceptable in Australia."\textsuperscript{173}

By late 1906 it became much clearer that Australia's local naval policy differed from that of the Admiralty and the C.I.D. Soon after the C.I.D. report reached the federal government, Creswell furnished Deakin with a report of his visit to Britain. He reasserted his view on the need for local naval force which was in flat contradiction to the C.I.D. arguments. While recognising the importance of the Royal Navy for Australia's protection against any serious invasion, he questioned whether the exigencies of war and major operation might not require the Australian division of the Pacific Fleet to leave the Australian station and thus leave Australia unprotected. To make up for the withdrawal of the British navy in the Pacific, Creswell strongly argued that Australia should "gradually create sea power." He believed that a torpedo defence was the most practical proposal and presented a new scheme for a naval force comprised of four ocean destroyers, sixteen destroyers of "River" class, and four 1st class torpedo boats.\textsuperscript{174} In September

\textsuperscript{172} Private letter, Clarke to Balfour, 20 May 1906, Balfour Papers 49702/208-211.

\textsuperscript{173} J.R. Chancellor, Secretary of Colonial Defence Committee, "Colonial Defence, Precise of Important Events connected with the Question of Colonial Naval Contribution," p. 8, CO 537/571.

\textsuperscript{174} "Report of the Director of the Naval Forces (Capt. W.R. Creswell) on his visit to England in 1906 to inquire into the Latest Naval Developments" of 6 August 1906, pp. 13-14, CPP, 1906 Session, Vol.II, No. 82.
Creswell summoned a meeting of the Commonwealth naval officers to consider the C.I.D. recommendations and his own view. They rejected the C.I.D. recommendations on local naval defence as "inadequate and inappropriate" and submitted that the grounds upon which the Commonwealth Naval Forces was disapproved of by the C.I.D. were "insufficient." Then the meeting resolved that:

Having in view our defence conditions and obligations to the Empire, a destroyer and torpedo defence supplementary to the Royal Navy will best insure coast defence and continuance of trade.175

Creswell dominated the meeting and persuaded the participants to reaffirm his contentions. By the end of 1906, Creswell had become the most ardent proponent of an Australian navy.

On 25 April, Deakin made his first remarks in the public on the C.I.D. report. He urged the necessity of creating a citizen army and local naval force, and referred to the C.I.D. report. He regretted that "the most eminent authorities" in Britain had "by no means grasped the special features of Australian circumstances."176 Deakin was no more inclined than Creswell and other local naval officers to accept the British rejection of the idea of an Australian navy. Deakin was bitterly disappointed at the result of the British investigation of Australian defence needs and expressed his dissatisfaction to Richard Jebb, a famous critic of imperial affairs and one of his closest friends:

We have just received a Defence Scheme that is not a complete scheme by any means and is only emphatic in its condemnation

---

175. "Report of Committee of Naval Officers of the Commonwealth, to consider the Memorandum of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and Report as regards the Naval Defence of Australia" of 12 September 1906, CPP, 1906 Session, Vol. II, No. 86; SMH, 2 October 1906. The meeting was presided over by Creswell himself and held in Melbourne. Other participants included C.J. Clare (Naval Commandant of South Australia), F. Tickell (Naval Commandant of Queensland), W.J. Colquhoun (Commonwealth Naval Forces of Victoria), F.H. Brownlow (Officer Commanding Commonwealth Naval Forces of NSW) and G. Macandie as the secretary.

176. SMH, 27 August 1906.
of any and every plan of allowing Australia a floating defence of any kind in any terms - what can we do with such people ...?177

At the same time, Deakin decided to make use of the London Morning Post to protest against the British government. During his federal political life, he was often "utilising the vast power of the British press."178 Since January 1901, he had been an anonymous correspondent for the Morning Post and contributed a series of articles on Australian affairs.179 About a week before his first public criticism of the C.I.D. report, Deakin completed an article on defence under the title of "National Defence" for the Morning Post. After reviewing the land forces and militia reserve, he accused the British government of ignoring Australian political sentiment. The C.I.D. condemned "any and every form of distinctively Australian naval force," in particular the proposals submitted by Creswell to Deakin. He explained that Australian sentiment would not be "appeased by contributions of men and money to a fleet" and argued that:

We pay £200,000 annually towards it, while Canada pays nothing. Yet we get far less naval protection than that Dominion .... Self-respect, self-esteem, self-assertion, whatever name is given to it, a sentiment of the duty of self-defence, strong already, is growing stronger the more we realise our strategically perilous position south of the awakening Asiatic peoples and as one of the two warders of the Pacific Oceans.180

On 26 September during the House debates on the defence estimates, Deakin endorsed Creswell's plan for establishing a local navy and proposed to begin it by ordering torpedo boats and coastal destroyers.181 His proposal, however, did not come into effect in 1906, since a federal election was due in December,


179. See the introduction by La Nauze, which appeared in Alfred Deakin, Federated Australia: Selections from Letters to the Morning Post 1900-1910, edited by J.A. La Nauze, Melbourne, 1968.

180. Morning Post, 6 October 1906. The nominal date of writing in Sydney was 20 August 1906.

and the proposal needed the approval of the new Parliament. It was not until 1909 at the Imperial Naval Defence Conference in London that the question of Australia's local naval defence was solved. The significance of Deakin's defence statement in framing Australia's future naval policy was threefold: firstly he made the first official statement on Australia's own navy, secondly it demonstrated the different national interests of Australia and Britain in dealing with Pacific strategy and security, and thirdly it set out a national defence policy which was subsequently endorsed by both the Labor Party and the Free Traders.

It is important to note that the defence issue became bipartisan. All the party leaders expressed the same views of Japan and looked to Australia's defence in the light of Japan's enhanced power and prestige. Before a federal election of December, the Parliamentary Labor Party included in its platform provisions for a national defence.182 The party recognised coastal defence as an essential scheme to meet any exigencies of war in Europe which would inevitably cause the withdrawal of the British fleet from Australian Waters. By endorsing Deakin's naval policy, the Labor Party pledged "immediate provision being made for coastal defence by torpedo boats or other suitable vessels." As regards land defence, the party advocated the establishment of a citizen's defence force.183 Amongst the Labor men, W.M. Hughes was the most ardent supporter of national defence. During his election campaign in the South Sydney electorate, he related the need of national defence to the Japanese menace. Referring to the news that Japan and China would combine in training their troops,

182. The fighting platform included fiscal policy, tax scheme, anti-trust measure, nationalisation, old age pension and immigration policy.
183. SMH, 5 October 1906. Hughes had already moved a resolution to adopt universal military training for "all able-bodied adult males." CPD, 1906 Session, pp. 2580-2589, 9 August 1906.
he warned that:

[The Chinese] could not forget how the Japanese had from a small, insignificant race sprung into a powerful nation .... there was a possibility of the Chinese and Japanese becoming a menace to the whole of the Western nations.184

The Labor's support for Deakin's defence proposal strengthened his government's hand when it conducted further talks with the British government on the naval defence question.

The Anglo-Australian Naval Agreement and a Local Australian Naval Force

When the British government asked the self-governing colonies to send their representatives to London in 1907 to talk about imperial matters, Deakin decided to bring the question of naval defence before the Colonial Conference.185 In February 1906, Lord Elgin, the new Colonial Secretary in the Campbell-Bannerman liberal government, requested Australia and other self-governing colonies to send him a list of subjects, which they wished to discuss at the Colonial Conference. After hearing from the Dominion governments, the Colonial Office suggested that the organisation of future conferences, imperial defence, preferential trade and emigration be considered the major topics for discussion. Of these subjects, imperial defence was

184. SMH, 14 November 1906.
185. According to the resolution of the 1902 Colonial Conference, it had been decided that future meetings would be held quadrennially. The first three Colonial Conferences of 1887, 1897 and 1902 had met in London incidental to important imperial pageantries associated with the Golden and Diamond Jubilees of Queen Victoria and the Coronation of Edward VII respectively. Since 1902 the Anglo-Colonial conference had become institutionalised as a distinct organ in imperial affairs. Due to the political and parliamentary circumstances in Australia and New Zealand, and the election of a new British government in December 1905, the Colonial Conference was postponed from 1906 to 1907. Richard Jebb, The Imperial Conference, Vol. II, London, 1911, pp. 10-25. Regarding an imperial movement between 1903 and 1907 in which the Pollock Committee played an important role, see John Kendle, The Colonial and Imperial Conferences 1887-1911: A Study in Imperial Organization, London, 1967, Ch. IV. On the subject of organisational problems of the Colonial Conferences, see Ronald Hyam, Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office 1905-1908: The Watershed of the Empire-Commonwealth, London, 1968, Ch. 9.
the most important both for Australia and for Britain. For Britain, the question was how to organize a defence system which would combine the colonial financial contribution to Britain with the unity of imperial defence policy. Deakin had approached the C.I.D. and the Colonial Office for the purpose of modifying the existing naval agreement. Britain recognized that there would be some areas of conflict at the conference. When Winston S. Churchill became the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Colonies, he minuted that the self-governing colonies did not show "any indication of a desire on their part to contribute in substantial proportion to the cost of the Imperial fleets and armies." 186 According to British imperial policy, it was necessary to reach an understanding with Australia and the other self-governing colonies. For Churchill the main aim of the 1907 Colonial Conference was to secure "the establishing of good personal relations between the new Liberal Ministry and the leading men in the various Colonies." 187 Therefore the 1907 Colonial Conference was important for Britain as well as for Australia.

Deakin's major security concern at the Colonial Conference was naval defence. In April 1906, Deakin had protested to the Colonial Office that the Naval Agreement had been "interpreted differently by the Lords of the Admiralty." While pressing Australia for the payment towards Britain under the terms of the agreement, the Admiralty had failed to carry out its part of the arrangement. Furthermore he complained that Britain "without the consent of Australia" had removed the second class cruiser "Cambrian" from the Australian station to the west coast of America, a locality far removed from its specified sphere of operation. 188 The naval agreement

187. Ibid. See also remarks by the Admiralty, 25 April 1906, CO 418/49/91-96.
188. Despatch, Deakin to the Governor-General, 26 April 1906, CO 418/44/292-295.
of 1903 ignored the local protection of Australia, and thus did not suit it. Australia claimed that the naval agreement meant "taxation without representation," and that it would "stifle the maritime aspirations of Australia and give even less security," compared with those services rendered by the previous agreement of 1887.\(^{189}\) Deakin's naval defence policy was aimed at establishing a new strategic balance in the Pacific. There were two important factors which moulded his resolution. The first was that Japan had established naval supremacy in the Pacific and that British reliance on the Japanese navy increased Australia's vulnerability. Deakin did not reject the raison d'être of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, but did not accept it as a permanent device for securing the Australian defence. He believed that Australia's long-term policy should be to establish its own navy in case it should be left defenceless with the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, or by the absence of sufficient British naval power to protect Australian coasts.

The second factor was that the Pacific had since the Russo-Japanese war, become a theatre of conflict for Japan and the United States. In November and December 1906, the discrimination against Japanese schoolchildren and migrants in California brought about an estrangement between those two countries.\(^{190}\) The US President Theodore Roosevelt's pro-Japanese


\(^{190}\) After the San Francisco earthquake of April 1906, the Japanese government and the Japanese Red Cross presented San Francisco city with 500,000 Yen for a relief fund, which exceeded the combined total fund received from the other countries. Japan was offended very much when the San Francisco School Board decided to exclude the Japanese schoolchildren from all the public schools and to transfer them to an oriental school located far from the residential areas. It was also painful for Japanese that the Exclusion League carried a campaign for a boycott of Japanese restaurants in San Francisco. In addition, there was a number of anti-Japanese incidents in San Francisco, such as an American boycott on Japanese owned laundries, barbershops, and food shops. The number of anti-Japanese demonstrations in 1906 was reported to be 57 (39 cases of bodily attacks on Japanese and 18 cases of the housing damage
feeling faded away after the Russo-Japanese war, and US opinion turned against Japan over the immigration problem in the west coast of the States. Furthermore the United States demanded the Open Door in Manchuria and accused Japan of introducing an exclusive economic policy in China.\footnote{With respect to the deteriorating relations between the United States and Japan, see Iriye, Akira, \textit{Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911}, Cambridge (Harvard), 1972.} In Australia the Japan-US friction revived concern about Japanese immigration and more importantly caused Australians to suspect that Japan might cause further problems for Australia's international relations in the Pacific. Australia's peculiar geo-political position in the Pacific caused the Australian political leaders to reassess its national defence policy. Despite the limits of Australia's national power, namely its small population and naval and military strength, its political leaders developed their own way of thinking about foreign affairs which reflected their distinctive perception of the national interests.

In his opening speech at the Colonial Conference on 15 April 1907, the British Prime Minister H. Campbell-Bannerman moved to placate the Dominions, but he made it clear that in the British view "the cost of naval defence and the responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs hang together."\footnote{Dominions No. 12, Confidential, "Extracts from Proceedings of Colonial Conferences Relating to Defence," Colonial Office, July 1909, p. 189, CO 886/2.} The long-established British policy was to promote a unified and coordinated defence and foreign policy for the British Empire. There was no doubt that Campbell-Bannerman had no intention of sharing the control of foreign policy with the Dominions.\footnote{His successor Henry Herbert Asquith who was Prime Minister 1908-1916, had a similar view. Letter, R. Jebb to L.S. Amery, 23 May 1912, Jebb Papers Box A-E.} Even though the British liberal leaders had
a strong commitment to the unity of the Empire's policy, they could not
deny the emergence of Dominion nationalism and thus expressed their sympathy
for the problems which each Dominion was facing.

When naval defence was discussed on 23 April, Lord Tweedmouth,
the First Lord of Admiralty, made a statement on the naval defence of
the Empire, which represented British attitudes to the Dominions. Tweedmouth's
speech disclosed "a more sympathetic attitudes on the part of the Admiralty"
towards the establishment of Dominions' local naval forces.\textsuperscript{194} He stated
that:

\begin{quote}
We welcome you, and we ask you to take some leading part in making
more complete than it is at present the naval defence of the Empire.... I know that you gave to the Government and to the Admiralty,
with a free and unstinting hand, the help that you thought you could
manage to give.\textsuperscript{195}
\end{quote}

Among the Dominions' representatives, Deakin was the most outstanding
figure. He appreciated "the frankness" with which Tweedmouth approached
the subject.\textsuperscript{196} He was, however, cautious enough to avoid any direct
commitment and this caution was evident when he met representatives
of the Admiralty to discuss naval defence.\textsuperscript{197} Facing up to the Admiralty's
central responsibility for the defence of the Empire, Deakin did not challenge
"the paramount importance of 'unity of control' for all the general Naval
forces of the Empire." He rather changed his tactics by stating that "the
control which Australians desired was constitutional". He stated that:

\begin{quote}
the people of Australia regarded the present contribution of
200,000 l. to the cost of the Imperial Navy as being somewhat
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{194} Confidential, Colonial Defence, "Precis of Important Events connected
with the Questions of Colonial Naval Contribution," by J.R. Chancellor,
Secretary of C.D.C., 30 April 1909, p. 8, CO 537/571.
\item \textsuperscript{195} "Extracts from Proceedings of Colonial Conferences relating to Defence,"
p. 213, CO 886/2.
\item \textsuperscript{196} Ibid., p. 215.
\item \textsuperscript{197} Representatives of the Admiralty were Capt. Ottley (Director of Naval
Intelligence), Capt. Tudor (Assistant Director of Naval Ordnance),
Capt. Jones (Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence) and Graham
Greene (Assistant Secretary of the Admiralty).
\end{itemize}
in the nature of a tribute, and it is therefore desirable to find some means ... without offence to the constitutional doctrine that the Government which levies taxation should be responsible for the expenditure and management.\(^{198}\)

Though Deakin demanded the political control of the local navy, he did not further stress the matter of an independent Australian navy, partly because he needed enough time to consider the substance of the Admiralty's policy, partly because he perhaps realised that the other Dominion leaders were not prepared to support an Australian request for an independent navy, and partly because he was still searching for the best possible means of attaining "a flexible relation, as intimate as possible" between Australia and Britain, which should encourage the development of Australia's local defence "to the fullest extent, and in such a form as to supplement to the best advantage the Imperial Navy in our hemisphere."\(^{199}\)

When the conference sat in private, Deakin touched upon the British interests in the South Pacific. In the era of imperialism, rival nations had found "a footing" in the Pacific, and moved to exploit the "greater spaces."\(^{200}\) Consequently French and German colonialism were viewed with apprehension due to the geographical proximity of their activities to Australia.\(^{201}\) In the course of the discussion in London, though Deakin did not mention Japan at all, it would be hard to believe that he in putting the Australian case on the Pacific naval question did not have Japan in mind. On the contrary,

\(^{198}\) Colonial Conference, 1907, Confidential Papers No. 218, "Memorandum of Interview between Mr Deakin and Representatives of the Admiralty," 24 April 1907, AA. CP 103/12/6; CO 885/18; Cab 17/48.

\(^{199}\) CPD, 1907-8 Session, Vol. XLII, 13 December 1907.

\(^{200}\) Miscellaneous No. 203, Confidential, "Minutes of Proceedings of the Colonial Conference, 1907; 13th, 14th, and 15th Days," p. 117, AA. CP 103/12/6; CO 885/18.

\(^{201}\) One of the major press responses to the Colonial Conference was the publication of articles in SMH on how France and Germany developed their interests in the South Pacific, and how the British government failed to meet the challenge. This series was reprinted as the pamphlet British Mismanagement in the Pacific Islands, Sydney, 1907. It warned that the British Empire could be in "grave danger" from aggression outside and from discontents within if Britain ignored the Australian interests in the Pacific. Being against the background of the Japan-US friction, it stated that Japan would "hold" the Philippines in the future.
he probably understood well that his strategic evaluation of world politics would not be accepted by the British government whose basic strategic thoughts were European-centred. Before the Russo-Japanese war, Britain's major strategic concern had been directed towards Russia and France. However since Britain entered into "friendly relations" with France in 1904, it had come to see Germany as the chief threat. Britain came to consider "the question of invasion from the standpoint of Germany." Referring to German naval expansion, Sir George Clarke, the secretary of the C.I.D., noted that:

In recent years, the situation has been changed to a certain extent by the great development of the German mercantile marine and by the marked increase of German port accommodation and general facilities which now provide the means of rapid embarkation on a considerable scale.202

It is even possible that the British warned Deakin against raising the Japanese question at the conference. Deakin was, nevertheless, worried about British ignorance of Pacific affairs and he stated plainly that "the course that has been followed and consistently followed in Australia has neither been understood nor appreciated here."203 The conference ended without any resolutions on naval defence. Even though the conference itself did not have any significant impact on the imperial defence scheme, it marked a traditional stage in the development of an Australian navy. Britain was now ready to discuss the revision of the existing naval agreement, and at the conference Britain and Australia agreed to have further talks on this matter.

After returning to Melbourne, Deakin worked out a naval defence scheme with the aid of his Defence Minister Thomas T. Ewing who replaced

Senator Thomas Playford on 24 January 1907. First of all Deakin called for the enlistment of 1,000 Australian seamen. He also suggested that the Royal Navy retain two P class cruisers manned by 400-1,000 Australian seamen, to be stationed permanently off the Australian coast in "peace or war." In addition, he proposed a loan of two other P class cruisers to Australia for training local naval militia. In order to solve the problem that none of Australia's grant was applied to "any distinctively Australian purpose," he proposed this defence scheme for the purpose of allowing Australia "a direct and active part in the protection of our shores and shipping." He urged the importance of a local navy for the protection of local interests. The aim of his proposal was to increase Australia's defence capability and to decrease its vulnerability against invasion, and to "unite with the mother country in securing better defence."

The Admiralty was reluctant to agree to this proposal which they believed went "beyond [the] general understanding" arrived at the Colonial Conference. The Admiralty opposed the permanent stationing of the two P class cruisers in Australia and the loan of two other cruisers to Australia. Graham Greene, Assistant Secretary of the Admiralty, thought that it was essential for the Admiralty that complete control of the vessels in time of war should be secured to the Commander-in-Chief and to the imperial government. The new Director of Naval Intelligence Captain Edmund J.W. Slade shared this view and opposed Deakin's scheme. In a letter to Tweedmouth,

204. Despatch, Deakin to Northcote, 16 October 1907, CO 418/52/599-603.
206. Telegram, Colonial Secretary to Northcote, 7 December 1907, CO 418/52/680-682.
207. Despatch, G. Greene to Under-Secretary, C.O., 7 December 1907, CO 418/56/66-69.
Sir John Fisher, the First Sea Lord, criticised Australia's attitudes and stated that "The Colonies one and all grab all they possibly can out of us and give us nothing back." The Colonial Office held the same view as the Admiralty. The Colonial Secretary Lord Elgin said that Deakin's proposal did not conform with British naval interests. The British government suspected that Deakin's defence proposal would be a source of weakness in the imperial defence.

**Deakin's New Defence Planning**

Despite the British opposition, Deakin decided to pursue his defence policy. On 13 December, the last day of the parliamentary sitting in 1907, he placed a comprehensive defence plan before the Parliament. The proposal provided for a system of naval defence and a compulsory military training scheme. Contrary to his approach to the British government in London, Deakin argued the defence needs for Australia from an Australian standpoint. Firstly he explained the changing strategic position of Australia in international relations. He said that:

> There was a time, not long since, when it was confidently maintained that Australia was outside the area of the world's conflicts, and might regard with comparative quietude any hostile movements in other parts of the globe. That comfortable outlook has long since passed away. No one can contend that Australia is outside that arena to-day.

It was clear in Deakin's eyes that it was Japan, France and Germany whose changed position had transformed Australia's geo-political position. Among them, Japan might be "antagonistic" to Australia's interests. In the light

---


210. Telegram, Elgin to Northcote, 13 December 1907, CO 418/56/75.

211. CPD, 1907-8 Session, Vol. XLII, p. 7509, 13 December 1907.
of the power struggle in the Pacific, "our problem of naval defence," said Deakin, "is a special problem to be viewed in the light of our special circumstances." Apart from Australia's share in the defence of the high seas, this was "a principal element in shaping the local naval proposals."\(^{212}\) Australia would rely on the Royal Navy for its defence on the high seas. But its local naval forces would take responsibility for the protection of the continent's coastline. And a citizen army would play the key role in protecting the national territory against invasion.

Deakin accepted that it was important that Australia's defence scheme should be in harmony with the British standards of organization and discipline. Thus he adopted the Admiralty's view that the submarine was "the most important and most effective weapon."\(^{213}\) As an initial naval force, he proposed a three-year programme to purchase nine C class submarines and six torpedo boat (coastal) destroyers. The C class submarine was the most modern type in Britain and the torpedo boat destroyer was the most up-to-date of their class.\(^{214}\) These vessels were to form an Australian naval force which "would be outside the Naval Agreement, and remain solely under Commonwealth control."\(^{215}\) He regarded the Australian flotilla as a constructive addition to the Royal Navy. Referring to "the extremely pregnant statement" made by Campbell-Bannerman that "the control of naval defence and foreign affairs must always go together," Deakin made a comment that:

> It implies that for the present, seeing that we have no voice in foreign affairs, we are not obliged to take any part in Imperial naval defence. It implies, also, with equal clearness, that when we do take a part in naval defence, we shall be entitled to a share in the direction of foreign affairs.\(^{216}\)

\(^{212}\) Ibid., p. 7511.
\(^{213}\) Speech by Tweedmouth, 23 April 1907, "Extracts from Proceedings of Colonial Conferences relating to Defence," p. 214, CO 886/2.
\(^{214}\) Two submarines would be stationed in NSW, two in Victoria, two in Queensland, one each in South Australia, Western Australia, and Tasmania. One torpedo boat would be stationed in the chief harbour of each state.
\(^{216}\) Ibid., p. 7512.
He was also of the opinion that Australia should have a certain power in
diplomatic negotiations on the subject of international affairs in the Pacific
which would directly affect Australia's interests.

For a land defence, he proposed the creation of a National Guard. This
proposal owed much to the advocacy of the National Defence League which
had been set up in late 1905 when defence became "national concern."217
On 5 September 1905, the NSW Division of the National Defence League
was established in Sydney, and on 1 December the Victorian Division held
its inaugural meeting. The League was supported by the liberals, the conservatives
and the Labor men, and Deakin, Ewing, Watson and Hughes all gave it their
blessing. The League was founded on "a strictly non-party basis."218 The
purpose of the League was to secure "a universal compulsory training (military
or naval) of the boyhood and manhood of Australia" for purposes of national
defence, the military training to be along the lines of the Swiss system.219
One of the important reasons for this campaign was the "recent development"
in Asia where Japan had become a supreme power.220 Though not a mass
movement, the League played a significant role in promoting concern for
defence after the Russo-Japanese war and had "a large part in creating
a climate for the enactment of compulsory military training" in 1909.221

By the time Deakin proposed the introduction of the compulsory military
training in 1907, he had already gained in principle the agreement and cooperation

217. SMH, 6 September 1905.
218. Ibid., 14 October 1905. The League had its chief organ, The Call which
was edited by W.M. Hughes.
219. DT, 7 September 1905. Regarding the Swiss system, see SMH, 7 September
1905.
220. SMH, 9 November 1906.
221. The League ceased its activities in late 1910 after Australia adopted
a compulsory military training as a national defence policy. Thomas
W. Tanner, "Race as a Factor in the Strengthening of Central Authority:
White Australia and the Establishment of Compulsory Military Training,"
in Bruce W. Hodging, D. Wright and W. Heick (eds.), Federalism in
Canada and Australia: The Early Years, Canberra, 1978, p. 242.
of the opposition parties.

In Deakin's 1907 scheme, every male adult from 19 to 21 would be required to spend about sixteen days in local camps each year for three years. He hoped that in eight years a National Guard of 218,000 trained men would be available. To counter criticism of militarism he explained that his proposal was based on the democratic system of military organization in Switzerland and was intended to achieve a citizen military force.222 When he explained the rationale of his new defence scheme, his thoughts were always dominated by a fear of Asia, particularly Japan. Australia's defence scheme was crystallized by this fear of invasion. Deakin's proposal was to be only the beginning of a comprehensive national defence system, but it had considerable importance in Australian politics. Indeed by December 1907, all parties had approved the defence policy.223

In Britain, the Colonial Secretary Elgin and officers of his department read Deakin's "important speech with much interest."224 Since Deakin had acted in accordance with the Admiralty's recommendation to make submarines the basis of Australia's local navy, there was no question about the composition of the naval force. The Colonial Office, nevertheless, questioned Deakin's interpretation of Campbell-Bannerman's speech at the Colonial Conference. G. Johnson, principal clerk of the Colonial Office, wrote that Deakin made "an incorrect reference" to Campbell-Bannerman's words. When the latter said that the control of foreign affairs and the control of naval defence must go together, Deakin deduced from that:

When Australia takes any part [sic] in naval defence, they are entitled to take part in the control of foreign affairs.225

223. Ibid., p. 7536.
224. Minute by H.E. Dale, 22 January 1908, CO 418/52/739.
225. Minute by G.W. Johnson, 23 January 1908, CO 418/52/739.
C.P. Lucas, Assistant Under-Secretary, agreed. The Colonial Office rejected Deakin's version of Campbell-Bannerman's words. The young Winston Churchill, Parliamentary Under-Secretary, was firmly opposed to Deakin's view and he minuted that:

[Australia] will never provide any ships of any serious value. Local torpedo boats were their only idea at present. They will never pay the money necessary for a proper squadron.

But he warned that:

a few ineffective vessels under an Australian flag may easily cause nasty diplomatic situations.

And finally he concluded sarcastically that:

We might give Mr Deakin a measure of control in Foreign policy exactly proportionate to the Australian contribution to Imperial defence, without such risk.226

Furthermore the Admiralty opposed the divided control of the warships in the British Empire in time of war.227 The British authorities did not care for Deakin's analysis of Australia's strategic position and a defence policy nourished primarily by a fear of Japan. Nevertheless they could not but be affected by the persistent strength of Deakin's representations. Stemming from the different evaluation of the situation in the Pacific, the Anglo-Australian differences were becoming a political issue which necessitated further talks on naval defence in 1909, when the Imperial Defence Conference met in London.

227. Under international law, there should be only one "Executive Authority in the British Empire capable of being recognised by foreign states." Despatch, G. Greene to Under-Secretary, C.O., 10 February 1908, CO 418/65/18-23.
CHAPTER VIII
GROWTH OF AUSTRALIA-JAPAN TENSION AND THE 1911 RENEWAL
OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

Deakin's Invitation to the US Great White Fleet

Australia's concern for Pacific security was well demonstrated after
the US government announced the cruise of the Atlantic fleet in 1907. The
cruise of the US fleet, consisting of sixteen battleships, was obviously intended
to demonstrate US naval power in the Pacific, and in 1907 and 1908, it
came to be widely regarded as a naval demonstration against Japan.1 From
1906 when the San Francisco school question about Japanese exploded to
1908 when Roosevelt sent his Atlantic fleet into the Pacific, the US-Japan
relations had often been tense and the air full of war talk.2 Despite the
renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1905 and the agreements with
France and Russia in 1907, Japanese political leaders such as Ito Hirobumi
were disappointed at the fact that Japan was not accepted as an equal.
In particular they resented the US discrimination against Japanese residents

1. The world cruise was "Roosevelt's own idea." He had initially the
idea in 1905 and for two years he shaped his plans secretly. For Roosevelt's
motives to send his fleet around the world, see Robert A. Hart, The
Great White Fleet: Its Voyage around the World 1907-1909, Boston,
1965, Ch.1. Howard K. Beale summarised Roosevelt's objects to send
the fleet as follows: (1) to impress Japan with American power so
that it would not be tempted to make trouble, (2) to give the people
an object lesson that would win support for speeding up the completion
of the Panama Canal, (3) to stimulate American pride in the navy
and therefore to increase sentiment for a large navy, and (4) to provide
the navy much needed practice. Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt
and the Rise of America to World Power, Baltimore, 1956; New York,
clearly admitted in the British officialdom that the fleet was going
"as a demonstration against Japan." Minute on the US fleet, in the
Colonial Office file, 20 February 1908, CO 418/66/72. See also "General
Report on Japan for the year 1907" enclosed in despatch of C. MacDonald,
the British Ambassador to Japan, to Grey, 19 February 1908, FO 371/474/541.

2. Regarding the war scare in America, Hata Ikuhiko, Taiheiyō Kokusai
Kankei-shi (History of International Relations in the Pacific), Tokyo,
1972, pp. 67-73.
in California.\textsuperscript{3}

The US-Japanese dispute over immigration in California reached a new stage when President Roosevelt decided to send the US fleet to the Pacific. There was talk of war on both sides of the Pacific.\textsuperscript{4} The Japanese government was, however, eager to maintain friendly relations with the United States. Since the United States was very important to Japan as an economic market and as a supplier of capital to the Japanese industry, the Japanese government sought to find every possible way of avoiding conflict. The Japanese government instructed its Ambassadors, Ministers and Consuls to send reports on foreign attitudes to Japan and their despatches and reports showed clearly that many feared the outbreak of war between the United States and Japan. European observers freely predicted war between the United States and Japan.\textsuperscript{5}

\begin{enumerate}
\item William R. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909, Austin (Texas), 1958, Ch.5; Richard Storry, Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia, 1894-1943, London, 1979, Ch.6. The US Ambassador to Britain, Whitelaw Reid's speech at New York represented the war scare in the world. He rejected strongly any eventual war between the United States and Japan and ridiculed "sensational press nonsense" about Britain's obligations to support Japan's war against America. SMH, 22 February 1908.
\item Kurino Shinichiro, Japan's Ambassador to France, reported that the French had generally a pessimistic view of US-Japanese relations. The war scare put Japan in a difficult position to obtain large foreign loans in France. Therefore, Kurino was of the opinion that unless Japan disclosed its diplomatic efforts towards the United States to solve the Japanese immigration questions, it would be almost impossible to raise a huge loan in France. Public opinion in Spain was expecting Japan's war against the United States. Since Spain had been defeated in the Spanish-American war, there was strong anti-American feeling. Inagaki Manjiro, Japan's Minister in Spain, mentioned that Spain would offer financial support for Japan's military operation against Spain's former enemy, the United States. In case of war with the United States, he suggested raising a loan in Spain. The war scare became very real to the Chinese people on the East China coast. There was a strong speculation in Amoy that Japan would wage war against the United States when the US fleet called there. Being scared at a possible naval warfare in the East China coast, the Chinese people, reported Japan's Consul Mori, evacuated from the coastal area to the inland. Despatch No. 1, Kurino to Hayashi, Foreign Minister, 5 January 1908, NGB, Vol. 41-1, No. 107; Secret despatch No. 3, Inagaki to Hayashi, 5 January 1908, ibid., No. 108; Despatch No. 18, and Secret despatch No. 18, Mori Yasusaburo to Komura Jutaro, 21 October 1908, ibid., No. 134, 135.
\end{enumerate}
The crisis in the Pacific quickly inflamed public opinion in Australia and evoked public debates on the future defence of Australia. Speaking on defence preparedness, W.M. Hughes mentioned that Australia's defence system was "totally inadequate," to protect the Commonwealth from an external threat, implying Japan. He warned that the East had awakened. The Melbourne Age also contended that the defence guarantee under the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance had caused the withdrawal of the British battleships from the Pacific and left "the naval supremacy of the Pacific" to Japan. In view of the Pacific crisis, the Age warned that Australia which was a "rich sparsely settled, and as yet undefended country" was at the mercy of a colored race whom our 'White Australia' ideal has bitterly offended. It welcomed the US naval cruise into the Pacific which would help to lessen the danger of Japanese aggression and strengthen Australia's security by recapturing the Anglo-Saxon naval predominance in the Pacific. From Australia's view point, the world cruise of the US fleet should be encouraged to assist Australia's national security.

The Japanese Consul-General in Sydney assessed carefully the Australian reactions to the US fleet's visit. Ueno, who became the Consul-General in Sydney in September 1907, had extensive knowledge of the Japanese immigration question in California, since he had been Chancellor of the San Francisco Consulate for two years from May 1892 and the second class Consul in that city from October 1900 until his transfer to Sydney. Through his examination of various newspapers and frequent talks with Edward

---

8. Ueno Kisaburo was born in Akita prefecture in March 1864. He graduated from Senior High school of Commerce in July 1900 and subsequently joined the Foreign Ministry. His overseas appointments were San Francisco as Chancellor of the Consulate (May 1892), Berlin as Chancellor of the Legation (January 1895), Hong Kong as the 2nd class consul (October 1897) and San Francisco as the 2nd class consul (October 1900). Gaimushō Nenkan (Official Yearbook of the Foreign Ministry), Tokyo, 1909, p. 104.
W. Foxall, the private secretary of the Consul-General, Ueno gained a comprehensive picture of Australia's attitudes towards Japan. He concluded that Australia's fear of Japan began just after the Russo-Japanese war, and that the press in Australia had speculated about Japanese territorial ambitions in Australia. He also noted that the press opinions had become increasingly anti-Japanese, and after Roosevelt's announcement of the US world cruise, this tone had intensified. The struggle for supremacy between the yellow and the white races became a common subject of discussion. Australia's public opinion believed that the Pacific nations in 1908 were on the brink of war.

For Australia, there were several lessons to be learnt from the US-Japan dispute. Firstly since much of the US-Japanese tension originated from the presence of the Japanese immigrants in California which caused a severe unemployment problem among the white Americans, and this seemed to justify the White Australia policy. The US fleet would be welcomed "especially because it is manned by men of common kinship and speech, and because blood is thicker than water." Secondly, the cruise of the US fleet in the Pacific supported Deakin's view about the importance of naval power. The fleet's visit to Australia would be "an education for Australia." Thirdly, Australia became acutely aware of its perilous position in the Pacific. The renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance had left the naval supremacy of the Pacific to Japan. Since British interests in the Pacific as well as in India were under the protective umbrella of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Australia was forced to rely upon Japan's naval assistance in case

10. SMH, 5 February 1908.
11. Ibid.
of emergency. Had there been a US–Japanese confrontation, Australia would have been in a delicate position because Britain was formally required to go to Japan's aid under the alliance. It was totally unacceptable to Australia that both Australia and Britain would be on the side of Japan in case of war between the United States and Japan. Against this background of international relations, Deakin made his decision to invite the US fleet to come to Australia. From 1907 to 1908, Australia attempted to establish a new tie with the United States based on their common hostility to Japan.

Deakin's Direct Approach to the United States

On 16 December 1907, the sixteen white painted battleships of the so-called Great White Fleet left Hampton Roads for San Francisco. During the fleet's stopover at Port of Spain, Trinidad from 23–29 December, Alfred Deakin, as Prime Minister, informally invited the United States naval force to visit Australia. Bypassing British diplomatic channels, a practice which Deakin had already followed twice with Japan, he informed J.P. Bray, the US Consul-General in Melbourne on 24 December, that the Commonwealth government would welcome the US fleet to its shores. In his letter to Bray, Deakin expressed "our sympathy with our kinsmen in their demonstration of naval power" in the Pacific. Facing the common problem of Japanese immigration and a threat of Japan, he welcomed the presence of the US fleet in the Pacific and the fleet's visit to Australia which would be "a further token of the close alliance of interests and sympathies" between Australia and the United States. Although the Commonwealth government would, said Deakin, address a formal communication to Roosevelt through the British government, Deakin suggested the US Consul-General communicate Australia's enthusiastic
invitation to the US fleet direct to President Roosevelt.¹²

Two weeks later, Deakin sent a long letter to Whitelaw Reid, the US Ambassador to Britain, in order to solicit his assistance. Again Deakin ignored the convention of the British Empire that communications of a diplomatic nature should be carried out through the British government. Although Deakin mentioned that his letters of request to the United States were a "preliminary notice" and that they were sent "semi-officially,"¹³ his diplomatic representation was definitely a breach of the diplomatic unity of the British Empire. Since Deakin had already met Ambassador Reid at least three times in London when he was attending the 1907 Colonial Conference, Deakin had no hesitation in approaching him directly.¹⁴ He requested the US government to "help Australia" by accepting an Australian invitation to the US fleet and said that:

The appearance in the Pacific of such an Armada is an event in the history of the United States, but of that Ocean. We are naturally deeply interested in its significant voyage, and anxious to have some opportunity of expressing our sympathy with our kinsmen in their timely demonstration of naval power in what may be loosely termed our ocean neighbourhood.¹⁵

Although W. Langley, Assistant Under-Secretary of the British Foreign


¹³ Telegram, Northcote to the Colonial Secretary Elgin, (received) 28 February 1908, CO 418/60/99.

¹⁴ R.A. Hart writes that "Ambassador Reid went straight to the top, asking King Edward to allow the fleet to visit Australia." There is no evidence in the Colonial and Foreign Offices' documents that Reid played a crucial role in influencing the British government. R.A. Hart, The Great White Fleet, p. 154.

¹⁵ Letter, Deakin to Whitelaw Reid, 7 January 1908, FO 372/564/236-238; CO 418/60/108-110.
Office, found Deakin's letter to Reid "very cordial," Australia's irregular diplomatic methods to the United States were certainly not welcomed by the British government.\(^\text{16}\)

Through his direct representation to the United States, Deakin sought to establish the Anglo-Saxon solidarity which would with US assistance, strengthen the naval position of Australia, and impress upon Australians the importance of having a modern navy. Deakin's action was important, since Australia made the British government accept Australia's decision to invite the US fleet. The British decision-makers considered Deakin's actions to be irritating and troublesome and a challenge to the British Empire's diplomatic unity and British's special relations with an ally, Japan. In a letter to Deakin, L.S. Amery, a member of British Parliament and later the Colonial Secretary in the Baldwin cabinet from 1924 to 1929, expressed his anxiety that "What I don't like is that owing to our practical withdrawal from the Pacific there should be an sort of underlying idea that Australia is welcoming not merely honoured guests but possible defenders."\(^\text{17}\)

**British Views on Deakin's Diplomacy**

On 24 January 1908, Deakin informed Northcote, the Governor-General of Australia, of his semi-official contacts with the US Consul-General in Melbourne and the US Ambassador in London, and he asked that the British government forward an official invitation to President Roosevelt "through the usual diplomatic channels." Deakin emphasized again that the US fleet's visit would be "a further token of the close alliance of interests and sympathies which already exists between the two countries."

\(^{16}\) Minute by W. Langley, 15 April 1908, FO 371/564/233.

\(^{17}\) Letter, L.S. Amery to Deakin, 10 July 1908, Deakin Papers MS 1540/1/23/2069-73.
He and his colleagues had "the fullest confidence" that the Australian people
would give the US fleet "an enthusiastic, wholehearted welcome."18 Since
the US fleet was already half way around the South American continent
by early February, Deakin, who was well aware of growing public interest,
sent a telegram to the British government in addition to the previous ordinary
despatch. Owing to public pressure, an invitation to Roosevelt, said Deakin,
could not be "long withheld." Then he suggested the British government
"telegraph" the Australian invitation to the US government. He requested
a prompt reply.19

The Colonial Office in London received Deakin's telegram at 10:45
am on 12 February. The telegram was circulated among the staff of the
Colonial Office the next day. Taking the complexity of the British Empire's
policy-making process into account, Charles P. Lucas, Assistant Under-
Secretary and head of the Dominions Department, made suggestions after
consulting both the Foreign Office and the Admiralty about how to handle
this matter.20 It was beyond the power of the Colonial Office to decide
this delicate diplomatic question. Francis Hopwood, Permanent Under-
Secretary from January 1907 to July 1911, commented that Australia's
invitation to the US fleet was certainly "a demonstration for the delectation
of Japan."21 Winston Churchill criticised Deakin's initiative and stated
that "It ought certainly to be discouraged from every point of view."22
In view of the international repercussions, the Colonial Secretary Elgin
decided to seek opinions from the Admiralty and the Foreign Office, and

18. Confidential letter, Deakin to Northcote, 24 January 1908, CO 418/60/17-18;
    FO 372/564/134-135.
19. Telegram, Northcote to Elgin, (received) 12 February 1908, CO 418/60/42;
    FO 371/564/110.
20. Minute by C.P. Lucas, 13 February 1908, CO 418/60/41.
21. Minute by F. Hopwood, 13 February 1908, Ibid.
22. Minute by W. Churchill, 13 February 1908, Ibid.
on 15 February, the matter was referred to both offices. 23

Charles Inigo Thomas, Permanent Secretary of the Admiralty, stated that the US fleet's visit to Australia might be "inconvenient" to Britain and that the Admiralty would be "glad if it were not entertained by the United States Government." But since the subject was very much a question of Britain's foreign policy involving its relations with Japan and the United States, the Admiralty left the decision to the Foreign Office. 24

The Foreign Office received the proposal with mixed feelings. Fundamentally, there were two points to be considered: firstly the purpose of the US world cruise to Australia and its implication for Britain's relations with Japan, and secondly the British response to the Australian request in terms of British relations with the United States. When President Roosevelt disclosed his plan for a world cruise, it came as a surprise to the Foreign Office. As C.W. Bennett, British Consul-General in New York, wrote to James Bryce, British Ambassador in Washington, "The idea in itself is almost too fantastic to be true." 25 Such a naval demonstration by the US in the Pacific was in the view of the Foreign Office far too provocative to Japan. Moreover, Australia's commitment to the US strategy was a severe blow to British diplomacy. Firstly, the world cruise was commonly supposed to be an anti-Japanese demonstration and therefore Britain was not in a position to encourage Roosevelt to extend the voyage to Australia, which Japan would certainly resent. Facing the German naval challenge in Europe, Britain had to be on good terms with Japan to protect its colonial interests in the Pacific. Secondly, Britain was in a difficult position to withhold an invitation to Roosevelt. If Britain had ignored Deakin's direct appeal to the United

23. Minute by Elgin, 14 February 1908, ibid.
25. Letter, C.W. Bennet to J. Bryce, 6 December 1907, Bryce Papers USA 27/189.
States and refused the visit of the US fleet to Australia, the United States would interpret the British action as an unfriendly one and would regard the nature of the Anglo-Japanese alliance as anti-American. Britain was caught in a dilemma.

To extricate itself, Britain seemed to have only one option left, namely to invite the US fleet to Australia and simultaneously to explain the British position to Japan. Charles Hardinge, Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, mentioned that:

I do not see how under present circumstances we can withhold the invitation. If it is accepted by the U.S. Gov't., which ... seems probable, we can explain the circumstances to the Japanese Gov't. so as to avoid any uneasiness on their part.  

In his private letter to Ambassador Bryce, Hardinge repeated British inability to refuse the US fleet's visit to Australia, though the Japanese government might "not like our action in doing anything to encourage the American fleet to cross the Pacific." While Britain wanted to retain the friendly relations with Japan under the alliance, it was also necessary to avoid a clash with the United States at all costs. Hardinge in supporting reluctantly the US fleet to Australia, hoped that the United States would itself resolve Britain's problem. As a concluding remark, he mentioned that:

I imagine the American Gov't. are pretty sure to refuse an invitation which would take their fleet so much out of the natural course even if they do cross the Pacific.  

By 20 February, the Foreign Office, after the frequent communication with the Admiralty, decided that the British government could not "refuse to be the channel of invitation" to the US President. It concluded that it would be "better not to raise any objections" to Deakin's unofficial diplomacy.

28. Note, W. Graham Greene, Assistant Secretary and Principal Clerk, Admiralty to C.P. Lucas, C.O., 22 February 1908, CO 418/66/77-78.
The Anglo-Australian Friction

Before the British official request reached the United States, Elihu Root, the US Secretary of State, had expressed a wish in Washington on 21 February that it might be possible to send part of the fleet to Australia. He also announced the acceptance of Deakin's invitation to the US fleet. In addition to his brief announcement, Root confirmed for the first time that the US fleet might make a world cruise via Australia and Suez to the Atlantic. Root's announcement was promptly reported in Australia and in Britain. In Melbourne on 23 February, Deakin publicly confirmed that the federal government had forwarded an invitation to Roosevelt inviting the US fleet to call at the principal Australian seaports. He stated that the US fleet's visit would mark "a new era in the history of this part of the world."³⁰

The Colonial and Foreign Offices were considerably perturbed by Root's premature announcement.³¹ C.P. Lucas, head of the Dominions Department in the Colonial Office, urged that the Foreign Office should "as soon as possible ... telegraph a formal invitation" to the United States.³² On the contrary, Grey was of the opinion that "it would now be a mistake for H.M.'s Government to approach the U.S. Government in the matter" and that Deakin should be rebuked for his "incorrect" action.³³ Grey was certainly critical of Deakin's irresponsible diplomacy.

Since any remonstration would create an Anglo-Australian confrontation

³⁰ Times, 22 February 1908.
³¹ SMH, 24 February 1908; Times, 24 February 1908.
³² Later in his private talk to Bryce, E. Root expressed regret for the appearance of a premature announcement. Telegram, J. Bryce to E. Grey, 15 March 1908, CO 418/66/121.
³³ Minute by C.P. Lucas, 22 February 1908, CO 418/66/72.
³⁴ Minute by C.P. Lucas, 22 February 1908, CO 418/66/73.
and lead Deakin to attack the Anglo-Japanese alliance, C.P. Lucas came
to believe that it would be "better not to criticise Mr Deakin over this
matter."34 Therefore, in a draft telegram to the Governor-General, which
was communicated to Deakin, the Colonial Office showed implicitly its
displeasure and mentioned that "a further invitation from H.M.'s Government
would now seem to be superfluous and might lead to confusion and possible
misunderstanding."35 Through its frequent communication with the Colonial
Office, the Foreign Office became aware of the fact that Northcote had
"so many difficulties with Mr Deakin that they [Northcote and the Colonial
Office] do not much like to increase them."36 Being sympathetic to Northcote's
difficulty with Deakin and avoiding Deakin's implied criticism of the Anglo-
Japanese alliance, Grey came to concur with the Colonial Office's view
that Britain should send an official invitation to the United States, and
not provoke Deakin. Grey stated that:

It is undesirable to say anything at the moment which might prompt
Mr Deakin to say that it was evident because of the Japanese alliance
that we did not approve of this invitation having been sent. But
later on the C.O. [Colonial Office], after this incident is disposed
of and forgotten should have it pointed out to Mr Deakin that the
invitation [to foreign Govts should not be given locally except
through us as circumstances are conceivable in which grave
inconveniences might result.37

Charles Hardinge fully agreed with Grey and suggested telling Deakin at
an appropriate occasion that the visit of the US fleet to "a British Colony"
was "a matter of Imperial and political importance which should not be
decided by the Colony alone."38 Regardless of the Foreign Office's complaints

34. Ibid.
35. A draft telegram, Elgin to Northcote, 22 February 1908, Ibid.
36. Minute on a conversation with C.P. Lucas, by C. Hardinge, 24 February
1908, FO 371/564/113.
37. Note, Grey to Elgin, undated February 1908, CO 418/66/74-75.
38. Minute by C. Hardinge, 24 February 1908, FO 371/564/113.
against Deakin's unusual methods, Britain could not refuse the US fleet's visit to Australia. When he took the Anglo-Japanese relations into account, W. Langley, Assistant Under-Secretary, had to confess that "It is sincerely to be hoped that the Japanese emigration question will be settled by that time." On 1 March, Ambassador Bryce on behalf of the British government forwarded the official invitation to President Roosevelt.

Deakin did not accept the Colonial Office's mild reproof. On the one hand, Deakin was not happy about Britain's dilatory response to Australia's request to forward the invitation to Washington. This is why Deakin renewed the request to the British government on 28 February. On the other hand, he was very disappointed at the British misinterpretation of the Times' report. Since the British government passed judgement on Australia's action "without making inquiries" from the Australian government, Deakin condemned the British government for its "discourtesy." As a result of the negotiations regarding the US fleet's visit to Australia, Anglo-Australian relations deteriorated and the British officials came to regard Deakin as a bombshell. The attitudes of the Colonial Office towards Deakin became increasingly tough. Lucas stated that Deakin was "hopelessly in the wrong" and that he did not attempt to consider "whether the visit [of the US fleet] would accord with Imperial policy." Churchill minuted that "I should be disposed to ignore Mr Deakin." A simple comment of the Colonial Secretary Elgin was that it was "useless to explain to Mr Deakin."

40. Letter, Lucas to Under-Secretary, F.O., 29 February 1908, CO 418/60/104.
41. Deakin's memorandum forwarded to Northcote, enclosed in despatch, Northcote to Elgin, 4 March 1908, CO 418/106-107.
42. All comments by Lucas, Churchill and Elgin were made on 7 April 1908. CO 418/60/105.
The US Fleet's Visit to Australia

On 14 March in Sydney, Deakin received a cable message from Victor I. Metcalf, the US Secretary of the Navy, announcing the US fleet's visit to Sydney and Melbourne. The message was handed to Deakin when he was delivering an address on "National Defence" to a large audience under the auspices of the Australian National Defence League at Centenary Hall. He read the message out to the assembly and called for three cheers for the United States, then for three more cheers for the King. As the Sydney Morning Herald reported it, Deakin could not "repress his triumph" in diplomacy.\(^{43}\) The US fleet's visit to Australia was regarded as "a prophetic recognition of our [Australia's] coming status as a Pacific Power." The Pacific was to become in the future the "highways of the world's trade, and possible storm centres of world politics."\(^{44}\) In the course of the speech, he urged the importance of national defence in an unstable world. The underlying theme of his defence thinking was the changing balance of power in the Pacific, a theme he had constantly reiterated from the time of his interview to the Melbourne Herald on 12 June 1905. Reminding the audience of the outcome of the Russo-Japanese war, Deakin argued that:

> the last storm which broke upon the world raged in the North Pacific. Who could say that the South Pacific might not be the scene of the next? We had relied upon our isolation in Australia; We had thought ourselves so far removed from the world's storm centres as to be out of reach of attack. That was true at one time; it was not to-day.

Although Australia owed its present security to the British navy, he warned Australians of new strategic circumstances in the Pacific. He mentioned repeatedly the end of isolation and urged that the national defence powers


\(^{44}\) An editorial entitled "The American Fleet." Ibid.
were required to "protect national interests." Then he asked Australians to support his scheme for a local navy which could provide coastal and harbour defences. The following week, the governments of Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia and Tasmania, and various local governments started expressing a strong desire to invite the US fleet to their ports. The New Zealand government also requested the British government to extend the US fleet's visit to that Dominion.

On 20 August 1908, the US fleet consisting of sixteen battleships under the command of Admiral C.S. Sperry, dropped anchor in Port Jackson. The circumstances under which the fleet paid its visit to Australia were extraordinary, and it was an unqualified success. The reception prepared for the fleet was well planned. This was the greatest international pageant in the early Commonwealth. The major buildings and streets in Sydney and Melbourne were lavishly and emblematically decorated, whilst at night the public buildings and vessels of the fleet were brilliantly illuminated. In Melbourne, a very fine fireworks display took place in the evening. The governments of NSW and Victoria appointed a number of committees, each of which was charged with arranging a particular entertainment for the US sailors. The NSW government published a 40-page booklet A Welcome to the United States Fleet, as a souvenir. The federal government proclaimed two public holidays during the visit of the fleet in Sydney. To celebrate the occasion, on 20 May the federal Labor Party had established a celebration committee whose members were Andrew Fisher as chairman, E.J. Russell,

45. An article entitled "National Defence." SMH, 16 March 1908. See also an editorial entitled "Mr Deakin's Speech," SMH, 16 March 1908.
46. Telegram, F.O. to Bryce, 2 April 1908, CO 418/66/149; SMH, 18, 24 March 1908. Sydney City Council had invited it to Sydney in early February. SMH, 5, 6, 1908.
47. Letter, Louis Mallet, Assistant Under-Secretary, F.O. to Under-Secretary, C.O., 19 March 1908, CO 418/66/125.
48. NSW Government, A Welcome to the United States Fleet, Sydney, 1908. This booklet is in the custody of Mitchell Library, NSW (Index card No.981 N).
T. Brown, K. O'Malley, and two Senators of Storey and Henderson.49

It was reported that during the week in which the fleet was in Sydney, business was more or less at a standstill. Many special occasions such as dinners and tea parties, schoolchildren's mass demonstrations, and a parade of the US sailors, were arranged.50 A number of pictorial cards to commemorate the visit of the fleet were printed. There were at least 42 different cards printed in honour of the occasions. One of them represented Australian-American solidarity in the Pacific by decoding the letters "U.S.A." and "United by blood, Strengthened by tongue, Armed for peace."51 Throughout the week of the fleet's visit to Sydney, the Sydney Morning Herald and the Daily Telegraph devoted three or four pages each day to reporting on the Americans and the celebration organized to commemorate their parade on Australian soil. Australia's fervent welcome to the Great White Fleet became clear expression of Australia's fear of Japan. Discussing the importance of the white armada, the Labour Worker defined Australia's enemy and questioned the value of the Anglo-Japanese alliance for Australia:

the ally of to-day is the enemy of to-morrow, and the question is if ever that squadron should come what will Australia do? ... we will not be able to defend, and some hanging fleet will happen along and salute us with shell fire instead of blank cartridge. That's why we advocate a citizen soldiery and an Australian Navy.... The United States will be found supporting Australia against Japan.52

Acknowledging the hospitality extended to the fleet, Theodore Roosevelt wrote a letter to British Ambassador Bryce that "the fleet has had a wonderful reception in Australia, and I quite agree with you that one of the real and great benefits of the voyage is getting us a little in touch with your people


51. All postcards are in possession of Mrs Margaret Woodhouse in Sydney.

52. Worker, 29 August 1908.
in the South Pacific."

British officials received coolly the news from Australia about the reception given to the fleet. R. Sperling, a Foreign Office clerk, minuted with regret that "the Australians seem to have quite lost their heads over the visit of the U.S. fleet." Another clerk connected Australia's welcome with its political motivation. He thought that "The Australians look to the American fleet to protect them from Japan — hence their frenzy." For Deakin, the Great White Fleet's visit was a great success. He won out in his diplomatic challenge to Britain, which was forced to sanction Deakin's semi-official diplomacy towards the United States. He successfully stimulated public interest in creating Australia's navy and then sought to make use of the US fleet's visit to achieve his naval policy. As Donald Gordon puts it, it was Deakin's hope that "the sight of the American vessels would rouse the maritime spirit of the Australian people, and encourage them to enter upon a naval effort of their own." It was from Japan, not Germany that Australia's political leaders saw the threat to Australia's future security in the Pacific. Australia's invitation to the US fleet, whose aim was a naval demonstration against Japan, was a prelude to the establishment of an Australian navy, an issue which was finally settled as a result of agreements reached at the Imperial Naval Conference in London in 1909.

Japan's Response to the Visit of the US Fleet and to Australia's Pacific Fears

On 13 March, Victor Metcalf, the US Secretary of the Navy, announced officially that the fleet would visit Hawaii, Samoa, Melbourne, Sydney, the Philippine Islands and return to the Atlantic via the Suez Canal. Soon

---

53. Letter, Roosevelt to Bryce, 7 September 1908, Bryce Papers USA 9/151.
54. Minute by R. Sperling, 25 August 1908, FO 371/564/328.
56. SMH, 16 March 1908.
after Metcalf's announcement, the US-Japanese tension was reduced by the Japanese invitation for the fleet to visit Tokyo. It was necessary for Japan to avoid a conflict with the United States, which was a huge economic market, an important source of financial capital to Japan and a greater military and naval forces. On 14 March, Takahira Kogoro, Japan's Ambassador to the United States, sent a telegram to Hayashi Tadasu, the Foreign Minister, that the US fleet should be invited to the principal ports of Japan. Takahira argued that the only reason why Japan was left out of the announced itinerary of the fleet was "because of absence of her [Japan's] invitation." Since the fleet's visit to Australia was "on the invitation of Australian Government," he suggested Hayashi follow the Australian action of inviting the US fleet. Takahira's request was soon renewed after being informed unofficially that Roosevelt would accept the Japanese invitation, Takahira renewed his advice to Tokyo.

To reduce US-Japanese tension, the Japanese government accepted Takahira's recommendation and instructed him to get in touch with the Secretary of State, E. Root, and inform him of Japan's decision to invite the fleet to Japan. Without any delay, Roosevelt accepted the Japanese invitation. Writing to the British Foreign Secretary Grey, Bryce stated that Roosevelt's acceptance would "allay the violence of anti-Japanese feeling in the Pacific States." At the same time, Grey told Elgin that the US fleet cruise could "hardly allow itself to be turned into an anti-Japanese

57. Brief comments on the British newspapers (Daily Mail, Daily News, Daily Chronicle, Express) were appeared in SMH, 23 March 1908.
58. Telegram, Takahira to Hayashi, 14 March 1908, JFMA 5.1.8.41/USA, Vol.1; NGB, Vol. 41-1, No.110.
59. Telegram, Takahira to Hayashi, 16 March 1908, JFMA 5.1.8.41/USA, Vol.1; NGB, Vol.41-1, No.111.
60. Telegram, Hayashi to Takahira, 18 March 1908, JFMA 5.1.8.41/USA, Vol.1; NGB, Vol. 41-1, No.112; Gaimusho (Foreign Ministry), Komura Gaikōshi (History of Komura's Diplomacy), Vol.2, Tokyo, 1953, pp.309-312.
demonstration," and now he did not see any objections to the fleet's visit to any part of the British Empire. In fact, Japan gave a warm welcome to the fleet. The Japanese government organised Beikoku Kantai Settai Iinkai (The Japanese Reception Committee) which issued a pamphlet Beikoku Kantai Settai Shidai (Official Program for the Reception of the American Fleet). It was a great relief to the British government that Japan invited and entertained the fleet. R.A.C. Sperling, Assistant Clerk of the American Department in the Foreign Office, said that "The Japanese outlay on the reception seems to have been a brilliant piece of speculation." F.A. Campbell, Assistant Under-Secretary, minuted that "So every one was pleased!" As Beilby Alston, Senior Clerk of Far Eastern Department, concluded, it was a "success." Following this event, the US-Japanese negotiations concerning outstanding Pacific problems came to a successful conclusion in the Root-Takahira agreement.

Ueno Kisaburo, Japan's Consul-General in Sydney, closely followed Australia's reactions to the US fleet's cruise in the Pacific. He examined the main newspapers, in particular the Sydney Morning Herald and the Daily Telegraph, and apart from the metropolitan daily newspapers, read regularly the Labor weekly Worker and the jingoistic weekly the Bulletin. Many newspaper cuttings were sent to the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo. Through an examination of the Japanese diplomatic documents, it seems that Ueno had a regular consultation with his private secretary Edward W. Foxall.

---


63. Beikoku Kantai Settai Iinkai (The Japanese Reception Committee for the US Fleet), Beikoku Kantai Settai-Shidai (Official Program for the Reception of the American Fleet at Yokohama and Tokyo, October 17th-24th, 1908), Tokyo, 1908. The 26-page booklet was printed both in English and in Japanese. JFMA 5.2.8.41/USA, Vol.3; FO 371/477/417-434.

64. Minutes by R.A. Sperling and F.A. Campbell, 20 November 1908, FO 371/477/402; Minute by B. Alston, 23 November 1908, FO 371/477/409.
about the significance of the fleet's visit for Australia-Japan relations.

It is most probable that Foxall gave Ueno information about Australia's politics, the political parties' attitudes towards Japan, and Deakin's political intention to invite the fleet.65

In his political report on Australia to the Foreign Minister Hayashi, Ueno placed his observations on Australia's invitation to the US fleet in terms of Deakin's defence and foreign policy. While recognising Australia's fear of Japan, he concluded that:

There is no doubt that the real intention of Deakin to request eagerly the U.S. Fleet's visit to Australia is to demonstrate [the] marvellous naval power of the fleet, to encourage the general public to promote the growth of the military thinking, and therefore to contribute [to] the building of the national defence policy whose necessity has been cried out by the present government and part of the opposition party.66

The hypothetical enemy of this national defence policy was Japan. Ueno believed that the National Defence League was using the fear of Japan to justify its own existence and to urge the building of national defence. He was of the opinion that Australia's invitation to the US fleet was raised and promoted by Deakin and his political colleagues of the National Defence League from the point of "political strategy and tactics," in order to "stimulate public support" for the naval policy of the government. Furthermore, Ueno said that Deakin and his supporters manipulated the general public which was ignorant of Japan, and which feared Japan because of the presence of its powerful navy and army in the Pacific.67

65. Foxall was recommended to wear the insignia of the Order of the Sixth Class of the Sacred Treasure owing to his persistent assistance to the Japanese Consul-General. Note (no. 127), the Foreign Minister Uchida to the Prime Minister Saionji, 17 May 1912, JFMA. 6.2.1.5-8.

66. Despatch No.15, Ueno Kisaburo to Hayashi Tadasu, 24 March 1908, JFMA, 5.1.8.41/USA - 1.

Since the end of the Russo-Japanese war, the successive Japanese Consul-Generals and the Foreign Ministers had been well aware of the anti-Japanese feelings in Australia. All political parties in Australia had pledged themselves to maintain the White Australia policy, and the Japanese were always referred to as "the most formidable coloured race" which would endanger the maintenance of the White Australia policy. In the Japanese government's eyes, the White Australia policy was essentially an "anti-Japanese policy." The European-American Bureau of the Foreign Ministry produced an internal report entitled "The White Australia" as Taiheiyo Mondai Kenkyu Shiryo (Research Paper on the Pacific Affairs), Series No.3. It analysed Australia's fear of Japan. Firstly, Australians were afraid of Japan's future expansionist policy in the Pacific. They saw that while Australia was a huge undeveloped island continent, Japan was a densely populated small island. Though the latter had already established its sphere of interests in the East and Asia after the Russo-Japanese war, it was not sufficient for Japan to feed its people. Therefore, Australians speculated that Japan would "always have a strong desire to acquire its overseas territory for the survival of the nation and to direct its territorial ambition towards Australia." To carry out its territorial expansion in the South Pacific, Japan had sufficient naval and military power, and Australia's local defence forces were very weak. Secondly, Australia's fear of Japan was further increased by the US-Japanese confrontation over the issues of Japanese immigration in California. Although Australians were "not

68. Special report on "Australia's Status and Policies" which was drafted as Research Paper on the Pacific Affairs, (Series No. 16), p.63, enclosed in Secret despatch No.11, Tamaki Katsujiro, Acting Consul-General to the Foreign Minister Uchida, 28 April 1921, JFMA, 1.2.3.3-1-12.

69. Secret report, "The White Australia," which was drafted as Research Paper on the Pacific Affairs (Series No.3) by the European-American Bureau for the use of the Foreign Ministry, July 1921, the Foreign Ministry. JFMA 1.2.3-1-12.
much concerned about Sino-Japanese relations," they paid "close and serious attention to American-Japanese relations." In Ueno's opinion, newspapers' editors and political agitators were chiefly responsible for creating Australia's crisis mentality, whereby they attempted to make Australians believe that the next war would take place between the United States and Japan. For Australians, the United States was more than a friend in the Pacific; as a nation it shared a common ancestry, western culture and philosophy, a common English language and of course a common enemy in Japan. Australia's sense of vulnerability and its attachment to the White Australia were expressed wholeheartedly when the US fleet visited Australia.70

The secret report of the European-American Bureau suggested that Australia's public opinion and its attitude to Japan was greatly influenced by the newspapers, and since the Japanese foreign policy in the Pacific at that time sought a peaceful expansion through commerce, and the extinction of racial friction in order to avoid any detrimental effect on trade, Japan was eager to dispel the yellow peril fear in Australia as indeed in the rest of the world. To meet Japan's desire, Foxall suggested to Ueno that Japan should "use newspapers" to make the public opinion pro-Japanese.71 He was suggesting in other words that Japan attempt to manipulate opinions, through articles and editorials in Australia's newspapers. Foxall's suggestion was presented to Ueno after the US official acceptance of Deakin's invitation to the US fleet. Ueno communicated this matter to the Foreign Minister Hayashi two months before the fleet visited Australia. It appeared that the Japanese government, however, did not sanction this proposal in 1908, perhaps partly because Australia's nationalistic fever was too acute to

70. Ibid.
71. Secret despatch No.1, Ueno to Hayashi, 20 June 1908, JFMA, 3.8.2.33-8.
allow Japan to manipulate its newspapers, and partly because the Japanese government did not find any urgent necessity to do so given the improved relations between the United States and Japan. There is no evidence to suggest that the Japanese government sought to influence the editorial policy of the metropolitan newspapers during the US fleet's visit to Australia.72

The 1909 Imperial Defence Conference and the Australian Navy

Following the US Great White Fleet's visit to Sydney and Melbourne, defence became an issue of central concern in Australia. At the opening of the Parliament on 16 September 1908, the new Governor-General Dudley announced that the principal subjects which the government would deal with in the session were, a scheme for national defence, the location of permanent federal capital, the federalization of navigation laws, and an amendment of the customs tariff act.73 In a despatch to the British Colonial Secretary Crewe, Dudley reported the political mood of Australia in late 1908 and mentioned that "The all-absorbing topic at this moment is the defence question, which Ministers have placed in the fore-front of their programme."74 In the Parliament, there were a number of speeches stressing the urgency of establishing the means of national defence and pointing to countries which would threaten Australia. Referring to Germany's naval ambition, Joseph Cook, a prominent Free Trader and the Defence Minister

72. In 1910, the Japanese government began considering the possibility of a systematic manipulation of newspapers in the world, including Australia. The Foreign Minister Komura instructed Saitō Miki, the Consul-General in Sydney, to study editorial policy and influential figures in the editor's room of each newspaper. Saitō reported the result of his study in 1911. Japan's attempted manipulation of Australian newspapers took place actually after the Paris Conference. Secret despatch No.6, Komura to Saitō, 11 October 1910, JFMA, 1.3.2.21-4; Secret despatch No.2, Saitō to Komura, 8 April 1911, ibid. Secret telegram No.91, Tamaki Katsuji, the Consul-General to Uchida, the Foreign Minister, 3 November 1920, JFMA, 1.3.1.35-2-2; Secret telegram, Uchida to Tamaki, 8 November 1920, ibid.; Secret despatch No.9, Tamaki to Uchida, 18 April 1921, ibid.

73. With respect to the acts and bills of the third Parliament, see Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law 1901-1929, Melbourne, 1956; reprint ed., 1972, Ch.5.

in 1909-1910, saw Germany as the principal menace to the British Empire in the North Sea. Cook was well aware of the fact that there was growing public anxiety in Britain over rumours of Germany's accelerated naval shipbuilding. Cook's speech showed that Australians in late 1908 had come to accept the British view that Germany represented a new threat to the British Empire. Since the Royal Navy was Australia's first line of defence, it would be disastrous for Australia if the German navy challenged the Royal Navy in the North Sea. In such circumstances, Australia could not expect reinforcements of the British naval power in the Pacific, and consequently Australia would be threatened and exposed to an ambitious and expansionist Japan. Before and after the US Great White Fleet's visit to Australia, the press constantly reported the dangers threatening Australia. Owing to the establishment of Japan's naval supremacy in the Pacific and the US-Japanese confrontation over the Japanese immigration questions, nature of the security afforded by the Anglo-Japanese alliance was increasingly questioned in Australia. Because of the changing pattern of international relations, there was a great demand for the improvement of Australia's defence.

On 29 September, the Defence Minister Thomas Ewing introduced the second reading of the Defence Bill embodying Deakin's 1907 scheme for compulsory military training. Because of the realignment of political parties in November, the debates on the bill were suspended until September 1909. Following the caucus decision of 5 November 1908, the Labor Party withdrew its support from the government because of the quarrels over

76. Thomas W. Tanner, Compulsory Citizen Soldiers, Sydney, 1980, Ch.IX, X.
77. CPD, 1907-8 Session, Vol. XLVII, p.877, 7 October 1908.
domestic policy, Deakin was compelled to resign, and on 13 November the first Fisher Labor government came to office. Even though this first Fisher government was short-lived, Fisher had to cope with a new imperial problem, namely the German naval challenge to Britain, as well as the established fear of Japan.

When the Prime Minister Fisher was on a tour of Australia in early 1909, he read the sensational news that by 1912 Germany would match Britain in its number of Dreadnought type battleships. On 16 March the British Prime Minister H. Asquith and the First Lord of the Admiralty, R. McKenna, in introducing the naval estimates for 1909-10 in the House of Commons, made disturbing statements about the growing strength of the German navy. McKenna explained that Germany was hastening its naval shipbuilding program and would complete thirteen Dreadnoughts by 1912, possibly seventeen, while Britain was planning to build only eighteen Dreadnoughts in the same period. The Admiralty came to believe in January that Germany would have seventeen Dreadnoughts by 1912, assuming that Germany ordered four in the autumn of 1909 for the 1910 naval program.

79. C.E. Frazer had consistently opposed the Labor's alliance with Deakin and moved the resolution to discontinue the political alliance with Deakin. On 5 November, Caucus met and carried the resolution by 19 to 7 and 6 Pairs on each side. The Caucus minutes of 4, 10, 12 November, Patrick Weller (ed.), Caucus Minutes 1901-1949: Minutes of the Meetings of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party, Vol.1, 1901-1917, Melbourne, 1975, pp.222-225.

80. 'Memoirs of M.L. Shepherd, 1873-1936,' AA.CRS A1612.

81. The German government authorized the construction of the first two Dreadnoughts in 1906, three more in 1907 and under the supplementary German Navy Law of 1908, four Dreadnoughts were scheduled for 1908 and another four for 1909. This made at least a total of thirteen German Dreadnoughts available for action by 1912. For the authoritative account of the Dreadnought scare, see Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919, Vol. I, The Road to War, 1904-1914, London, 1961, Ch. VII. With respect to the impact on the Dominions, see Donald C. Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defence, 1870-1914, Baltimore, 1965, Ch.X. Regarding the German naval program, see Holger H. Herwig, "Luxury" Fleet: The Imperial German Navy 1888-1918, London, 1980, Ch. IV.
In these debates, all naval comparisons were made only with Germany and the British government thereby tacitly admitted that they had abandoned the two-power standard policy. In a regular cabinet letter to King Edward VII, Asquith stated unequivocally that the British naval construction was "so calculated as to keep us always ahead of the German programme."82

McKenna's speech produced disquiet throughout Australia. Australia's major newspapers reported the details of the British debates on naval affairs and carried a number of editorials demanding that Australia offer assistance to the British government.83 Despite a tension-easing speech on 18 March by Dr Irmer, the German Consul-General in Australia, the public anxiety over the German challenge was growing.84 The Melbourne Age, which had considerable influence in Victoria, put forward the idea that the federal government should present a Dreadnought to the mother country.85 The Sydney Morning Herald stressed the importance of maintaining British naval supremacy and stated that:

To the British Empire that supremacy is necessary, not for the gratification of any national vanity, but for the preservation of the Empire, as such, and of Britain as a first-class Power. But to maintain that supremacy on a two-Power basis is a stupendous task.86

The logical conclusion of this argument was to contribute an Australian Dreadnought to the Royal Navy.87

On 22 March, the New Zealand government offered to bear the cost

---

82. Cabinet letter, Asquith to the King, 24 February 1909, Asquith Papers 5/86-87. The Conservatives led by James Balour urged the government to take immediate action to meet the German challenge.

83. The Sydney Morning Herald, in its headlines, described the British naval position as "Naval Supremacy. In Grave Peril. Germany's Dreadnoughts Fleet Exceeding Anticipations. A Dangerous Situation." SMH, 18 March 1909. See also the editorial entitled "Britain's Peril."

84. SMH, 19 March 1909.

85. Age, 19 March 1909.

86. SMH, 19 March 1909.

87. SMH, 22 March 1909.
of constructing one Dreadnought and if necessary the cost of constructing a second. The leader of the opposition in New Zealand approved the government's policy next day and appealed to the public to join in the defence of the British Empire to "our last shilling and last man." The British government "warmly acknowledged and gratefully accepted" the swift offer of New Zealand. Following New Zealand's patriotic response to the crisis, the Australian press started putting pressure on the federal government. "The Tory element in both Victoria and New South Wales," said Dudley, "enthusiastically supported the proposal [of a Dreadnought gift], especially when the Government of New Zealand offered a ship on behalf of that Dominion." The Melbourne Argus blamed Fisher for delaying his decision on a Dreadnought gift. The Sydney Morning Herald continuously protested that the government should contribute a Dreadnought to the Royal Navy. In Sydney and Melbourne, various public meetings were held and public feeling was deeply stirred. Pro-British imperialists such as Bruce Smith and Senator Pulsford were persistently outspoken on the topic and urged the Fisher government to agree to make a gift of a Dreadnought to Britain.

Dudley was cautious in his approval of the newspaper campaign for the Australian Dreadnought. For him, "the most curious features" were the action of the Age. Since the attitudes of the Age were "usually so anti-Imperialistic and so strongly in favour of an Australian navy," it seemed

88. Admiralty Memorandum regarding Imperial Conference on Defence, Cab 37/100; Cabinet letter, Asquith to the King, 23 March 1909, Asquith Papers 5/95-96; SMH, 23, 24 March 1909; D.C. Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defence, 1870-1914, pp. 230-234.
89. Cabinet letter, Asquith to the King, 23 March 1909, Asquith Papers 5/95-96.
90. Private and Confidential despatch, Dudley to Crewe, 18 April 1909, CO 418/70/274-283.
91. Argus, 2 April 1909.
93. SMH, 22, 25 March 1909; Deakin's anonymous political reports entitled 'Aid to Naval Defence' and 'Offer of a Dreadnought,' Morning Post, 8, 17 May 1909.
to him "incomprehensible" that it should have suggested a Dreadnought gift to Britain "unless some other motive lay behind its proposal." Dudley attempted to work this puzzle out. Though relying on "pure conjecture," in a confidential despatch to the Colonial Secretary Crewe, Dudley felt able to assert that:

I should not be in the least surprised if the real reason of its [Age's] action was to be found in a desire to bring about an increased activity in the creation of a local Navy by initiating a proposal to give assistance to the Imperial Navy,... up to the present proposal to spend any considerable sum upon a local flotilla has been met by many people of Tory views with the argument that Australia is not yet rich enough to afford such luxuries.

Then he came to the crux of the matter:

These however are the very people who are now crying aloud for the expenditure of two millions upon a Dreadnought - and the Age and its sympathizers will therefore be able to say - You are ready to spend two millions on a Dreadnought - there is however a difficulty about doing it - Let us therefore drop that suggestion and spend the money upon a flotilla of our own!94

This analysis impressed Crewe. And it might have some effect on the decision to propose the formation of a Pacific Fleet at the 1909 Imperial Conference. The British government had come to realise that it was not easy to fit Australia into an imperial naval policy.

The Naval Policy of the Fisher Government

From the time of McKenna's speech on the naval crisis to his own policy speech at Gympie in Queensland, Andrew Fisher had about two weeks to make clear his government's stand on the Australian Dreadnought controversy. Malcolm L. Shepherd, who was Fisher's private secretary, recorded that "Mr Fisher would have no Dreadnought offer made as far as Australia was

was concerned," and "he was against any such idea from the first." Just before the Dreadnought controversy, Fisher had committed his government to construct an Australian local navy based on the recommendations of Captain W. Creswell, who proposed the acquisition of swift and mobile warships for the defence of a long coast line. Without communicating with the Admiralty or the Commonwealth Parliament, Fisher and his Defence Minister Pearce gave orders for the construction of three "River" class torpedo boat destroyers which were "required to be fit for high sea service, and the defence of the coastal trade between the ports." 

On the Dreadnought matter, Fisher attempted to evade the issue by saying that the situation was "altogether too serious." Although he publicly declared that "the resources of the Commonwealth would be at the disposal of Great Britain if ever there was any trouble," he did not mean that the Commonwealth would immediately present a Dreadnought to Britain and abandon its plan for an Australian navy. Fisher's basic naval policy was to create Australia's own navy and not to simply offer an Australian Dreadnought to Britain. The attitude of the Fisher government towards the Dreadnought question was "pretty generally endorsed by the Labour Associations throughout the various States." On 23 March in Melbourne, Fisher announced that the government would not offer a Dreadnought and warned that "the people are on the wrong track." He stated that:

> It would be pleasing to any man in my position to ride on the popular wave of feeling and be the first to make such an offer. It would be flattering to any man; but it is because I think it would be an

---

97. SMH, 20 March 1909.  
98. SMH, 22, 23 March 1909.  
error in the present position of Australia and Imperial politics to do so that the Government has resisted the public appeal. We shall be doing a greater service to the Empire by pursuing our own policy and relieving her of the burden of defending the Australian shores.

And he continued that:

The offer of a Dreadnought, important as it may be, is not a policy. It is a mere spasmodic effort. The only policy that would effectively meet any danger to the Empire would be a steady, persistent, and determined policy to provide for the adequate defence of Australia, and assist the mother country in time of emergency.100

The Governor-General Dudley felt "pretty certain that the proposal to present a Dreadnought has induced Mr Fisher to put forward a much more ambitious Naval Programme."101

There were fundamentally three reasons why Fisher came to the decision that Australia should not offer a Dreadnought. Firstly, the federal government had "an entirely different position" on the subject of naval policy from the New Zealand government.102 Australia was seeking to establish its own local navy for local protection. Fisher was of the opinion that the strength of Australia's naval forces would form an adequate defence for Australia in the Pacific and reinforce the British naval power. Therefore Australia's naval policy should not be understood to be against the common interests of the British Empire, but to promote it by Australia's local approach. On the contrary, New Zealand had a policy of "relying implicitly upon the Imperial Navy." New Zealand did not contemplate establishing a navy of its own.103

Secondly there was the problem of financial resources. Since the federal expenditure in 1909 was still restricted by the Braddon clause, it was impossible

100. SMH, 24 March 1909.
102. SMH, 26 March 1909.
103. SMH, 23 March 1909.
for Fisher to allocate funds for both an establishment of a local navy and the construction of a Dreadnought for Britain. Fisher explained that:

We will have to find money for our own big defence policy. That will be difficult enough. The offer ... of a Dreadnought now would simply mean that when in a month or two public excitement has died down, and the money had to be raised, the expenditure would look so great that Australia's own defence policy would suffer very seriously. 104

Assuming that there was only one choice in terms of financial resources, Fisher's avowed reason for the refusal of a Dreadnought gift was that the federal funds would "more usefully be spent in creating a local flotilla, than by the gift of a warship to the Imperial Navy." 105

Thirdly, the government's policy was shaped by its strategic analysis of the international relations in the Pacific. It was absolutely impossible for Britain to maintain naval supremacy both in the North Sea and in the Far East. The naval concentration policy in the North Sea meant that the British interests in the Pacific had to rely increasingly upon the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The US Great White Fleet's visit to Australia had made it clear that there was a strong suspicion of Japan in Australia. When the alliance ceased in 1915, Australia would have to cope with this new international circumstances "in the event of trouble with Japan."

On 30 March at Gympie, the centre of his constituency in Queensland, Fisher with his broad Scottish accent delivered his government's long-promised policy speech. The first half of his speech was devoted to the discussion of national defence. Fisher proposed three major defence programs; the adoption of compulsory military training, the establishment of an Australian

104. SMH, 25 March 1909.
navy, and the creation of a munition and boat-building industry. He reaffirmed
his refusal to offer a Dreadnought to Britain, and proposed instead the
implementation of the naval scheme recommended by the Commonwealth
Naval Officers' Committee. Fisher's scheme comprised four "Ocean" destroyers,
nineteen "River" class destroyers and a 2,000-3,000 tons coastal steamer
to police the South Sea.\textsuperscript{106} It was to cost £2,698,000 in a three-year program
of construction and maintenance.\textsuperscript{107} He emphasized the importance of
Australia having its navy. Fisher's proposal to build naval vessels in Australia
would help develop "self help, self reliance, and self sufficiency, and lighten
the burden of the Mother Country for our defence."\textsuperscript{108}

On 8 April, Fisher received a telegram from his Attorney-General
Hughes who urged the reconsideration of the Anglo-Australian naval arrangement
in view of the heightened Dreadnought crisis and public fervour. With
the consent of Pearce, Hugh Mahon and J. Hutchinson, Hughes asked Fisher
to reexamine the gravity of the Anglo-German naval rivalry and suggested
that:

Matter now rests with Great Britain. If she should declare further
action than our naval policy advisable in interests of empire generally,
and that we should offer Dreadnoughts, then we should continue
that into a declaration of emergency and forthwith make [an] offer
of Dreadnoughts to the extent desired. The matter really now
rests with Britain.\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{106} The Fisher government placed orders for the building of "two in England
and for the parts of third to be sent out and assembled at Cockatoo
Dockyard, Sydney." The three destroyers were named "Parramatta,"
"Yarra," and "Warrego." G.F. Pearce, Carpenter to Cabinet: Thirty-Seven

\textsuperscript{107} The cost of the construction and maintenance of four "Ocean" destroyers
was £1,124,000, of sixteen "River" class destroyers £1,544,000, and
the maintenance cost of a coastal steamer £30,000. SMH, 31 March
1909.

\textsuperscript{108} "A short unsigned statement of the Naval Policy of the several Australian
Governments from 1906-1910," AWM. Pearce Papers Bundle 5, item
15.

\textsuperscript{109} Confidential telegram, Hughes to Fisher, (received) 8 April 1909, cited
Despite this pressure from within the government, Fisher replied that his ministers should "Keep to policy outlined at Gympie." Sticking up for the Labor's policy, announced at Gympie on 15 April, Fisher sent the British government the official naval policy of the Commonwealth. As "a basis for co-operation and mutual understanding," he summarised Australia's basic approach saying that:

all the Dominions of the British Empire ought to share in the most effective way, in the burden of maintaining the permanent naval supremacy of the Empire.... This Government is of [the] opinion that, so far as Australia is concerned, this object will be best attained by encouraging Naval development in this country.

In order to fulfill this task, Fisher agreed to continue the 1903 Naval Agreement until its expiration, but insisted on establishing "a Naval Force" which would be under the control of the federal government in peacetime. "In time of war or emergency," Australia's naval forces should be placed by "the Commonwealth Government under the orders of the Lords Commissioner of the Admiralty." Fisher decided to negotiate directly with Britain on the subject of imperial naval defence. On 29 April, Fisher asked the Governor-General to send a telegram to the British government requesting the convening of an imperial defence conference in order to consider "definite lines of co-operation for the naval defence of the Empire." By coincidence, just before receiving this communication, the British government had itself

110. Telegram, Fisher to Hughes, undated April 1909, ibid.
112. In the course of reaching this point, Pearce had "several times urged Mr Fisher to suggest a conference on defence" with Britain. "Memoirs of M.L. Shepherd, 1873-1936," AA. CRS A1632.
113. Secret letter, M.L. Shepherd, Secretary of the Prime Minister to the Official Secretary of the Governor-General, 29 April 1909, (received) 30 April 1909, AA. CP 290/15 Bundle 1; Secret and confidential telegram, Dudley to Crewe, 1 May 1909, ibid.
decided to hold an Imperial Defence Conference for the same purpose. On 1 May 1909, the British invitation reached Melbourne.  

The Proposal for an Australian Fleet Unit

When F. Hopwood, the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office, received news of Fisher's commitment to develop Australia's local navy, he discussed this matter with the Colonial Secretary Crewe and suggested that "the details of Colonial Naval Defence must be considered ... by the Imperial Defence Committee." The Colonial Office resolved to have a comprehensive discussion about the overall defence question in the Empire. To this end, interdepartmental talks about the imperial defence system took place between the Colonial Office, the Foreign Office, the Admiralty, the War Office, the C.I.D. and the Prime Minister. During the second half of April, the British government decided to "suggest [the] possibility of a subsidiary conference on defence." On 30 April, the British Prime Minister Asquith informed King Edward VII of the cabinet decision for a "consultation with the self-governing Colonies on the subject of Imperial defence, especially in its naval aspect." Asquith decided to summon an imperial defence conference in the summer of 1909. The main subject of this conference was undoubtedly "a centred [sic] policy of naval defence of the Empire."

Fisher accepted the British invitation, but before the conference there

114. Telegram, Crewe to Dudley, 30 April 1909, ibid.
116. Minute by Crewe, 29 April 1909, ibid.
117. In the summer of 1909, the leading statesmen of both Canada and South Africa were scheduled to visit London respectively in connection with questions of naval defence and the new constitution.
was yet a further change in government in Australia. Deakin, the leader of the Protectionists, negotiated a fusion with the Free Traders led by Joseph Cook and the ex-Protectionist Tariff Reformers led by John Forrest. A coalition made up of the three opposition parties successfully moved a motion of no confidence against Fisher on 27 May and on 2 June, Deakin formed the new government. This was Deakin's third and last administration.

Although Deakin had initiated the campaign to create an Australian navy, during the height of the Dreadnought scare he had supported the idea of a gift of a Dreadnought to Britain. This, however, did not mean that he had abandoned his idea of a local navy. His policy was to offer an Australian Dreadnought for Britain and also to create a local navy for Australian waters. Deakin continued to argue that Australians should "defend our shores against invasion" from the North and establish a local navy for its own protection. He said that "the eyes of foreign nations" in Asia were upon Australia and urged that Australia should "always be prepared." 119

Since Deakin's long-established naval view was to regard the Royal Navy as the first line of Australia's defence on the high seas, he realised the absolute importance of British naval supremacy. 120 He mentioned that "Until we have sufficient population and sufficiently equipped men, Australia must remain under the protection of the British navy." 121 When the position of the British Empire was imperilled by the German naval buildup, he had to conclude that Australia should "come forward and, at her own cost, present the mother country with a Dreadnought." 122

119. SMH, 30 March 1909.
120. Deakin wrote to G. Clarke, the Secretary of the C.I.D. that "The Imperial Navy must continue to be our first line of defence and for a time our only efficient against serious attack or invasion." Private letter, Deakin to G. Clarke, 8 January 1906, Deakin Papers MS 1540/15/3549-3551.
121. SMH, 8 April 1909.
122. SMH, 22 March 1909.
the gift of an Australian Dreadnought to Britain, Deakin ratified Fisher's naval program and compulsory military training scheme. Dudley was surprised that Deakin agreed to offer a Dreadnought, for, he reported, Deakin was "primarily responsible for" the policy of an Australian navy and still a firm believer in locally based defence. Dudley saw a great possibility that Deakin might "after all in the end range" himself on the side of the Australian Labor Party on the subject of a local navy if the policy of an Australian navy did not advance at all by the gift of a Dreadnought.

Just after taking office, Deakin took a somewhat different line on the Dreadnought issue. He suggested that Australia should offer "an Australian Dreadnought or such addition to its naval strength as may be determined after consultation with [the] Naval and Military Conference in London." The offer was to the British Empire and not to Britain. Furthermore, this communication was directed not only to the Colonial Secretary but also the Prime Minister Asquith as "President of [the] Imperial Conference."

In preparing for the Imperial Defence Conference, the British government reviewed all defence questions which affected both Britain and the Dominions. After taking all factors into consideration, the British government decided to propose the creation of a Pacific Fleet made of distinct units. It itself accepted the establishment of an Australian navy. Although the idea of a Pacific Fleet occurred to the British government in the course of preparing for the conference against the background of the Dreadnought scare, it

123. Despatch, Dudley to Crewe, 10 May 1909, CO 418/70/312-318; an editorial entitled "Mr Deakin's Speech," SMH, 8 April 1909.
125. Deakin's message showed clearly his interpretation of the constitutional relations between the self-governing colonies and Britain. Normally, a despatch from a Dominion was directed to the Colonial Secretary, not to the Prime Minister. He had already advocated the new constitutional structure at the 1907 Colonial Conference. Confidential telegram, Dudley to Crewe, (received), 4 June 1909, CO 418/70/375.
that Australia might be welcoming the US fleet as "not merely honoured guests but possible defenders." Amery might have been eager to recover British naval prestige when he said that "My conclusion is not that we should have been chilly or indifferent to the Americans, but that we should have an adequate naval force in the Pacific."127 But in the process of British decision-making on the subject of a fleet unit, there is no evidence to suggest that this policy was adopted for reasons of prestige.

The second explanation which seems more plausible is British concern for the strategic interest in the Far East. The C.I.D. met on 29 June 1909 to consider the Imperial defence system in the Far East in connection with the future of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. At that meeting, looking towards the possible termination of the alliance in 1915, it considered whether Japan might attack Hong Kong and Singapore, though not Australia. Arthur Wilson, Commander in Chief of the Channel Fleet and later the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, predicted that Japan could take Hong Kong probably "in a week." He considered, however, that it was highly unlikely that Japan would take advantage of the Anglo-German tension to attack Hong Kong. As long as the Anglo-Japanese alliance existed, he was of the opinion that "We do not necessarily require a superior naval force in the Far Eastern waters."128 John Fisher, the First Sea Lord, revealed the basis of British naval strategy in the Far East, arguing that:

our fleet distribution in the Far East is due purely to our present relations with Japan, and that before the Treaty expired we would increase our fleet in the Pacific. The Admiralty do not consider that we have given up the local command of the sea in the Far East.129

127. Letter, L.S. Amery to Deakin, 10 July 1908, Deakin Papers Ms 1540/23/2069-73.
128. C.I.D. Minute of the 102nd meeting, 29 June 1909, Cab 2/2/2/50-52.
129. Ibid.
Fisher was basically opposed to the Anglo-Japanese alliance which was, in his words, "The very worst thing that England ever did for herself!" The alliance made it possible for Britain to concentrate its fighting forces in the Home Waters but compelled it to abandon its supremacy in the Pacific. As a professional naval officer, he disliked the alliance "from the fighting point of view." 130 Since the German naval challenge was the decisive factor causing Britain to reinforce its naval power in the North Sea, there were no spare Dreadnoughts which could be sent to the Far East. Pre-Dreadnought ships were not regarded as adding in any realistic way to naval strength. 131 In view of budgetary considerations, it was also highly unlikely that Britain could provide sufficient naval reinforcements to meet a Japanese threat in the Far East. Taking the strategic value of the alliance into consideration, the C.I.D. concluded that "So long as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance remains in force, the British possessions in the Far East are secure." In the event of the termination of the alliance, the C.I.D. suggested that "Care should be taken sufficiently to reinforce the fleet in the Far East before the termination of the Alliance in order to neutralize the danger from a preponderant Japanese fleet in the China Seas." 132 The consensus view in the Foreign Office was to maintain and renew the alliance but no decision was taken in 1909


131. As the figure for naval strength (excluding ships over 20 years of age) in May–July 1909 revealed, the total number of British armoured ships was 82 while the combined forces of Japan and Germany were 54 ships. Britain had 7 Dreadnoughts and Invincibles, 40 pre-Dreadnoughts, 35 armoured cruisers. Japan had 11 pre-Dreadnoughts and 11 armoured cruisers, Germany had 24 pre-Dreadnoughts and 8 armoured cruisers. By 1912, Germany was believed to be likely to have 13 or 17 Dreadnoughts and Japan 2 Dreadnoughts, while Britain would only have 16 or 20. In view of the predicted naval strength of Germany in 1912, Britain was unable to send any Dreadnoughts to the Far East. C.I.D. minute of the 102nd meeting. 29 June 1909, Cab 2/2/2/50-52.

132. Ibid.
on whether or not Britain would try and prolong the alliance in 1915.\textsuperscript{133} The C.I.D. did not discuss the matter of a separate fleet in the Pacific whilst in the course of analysing the Far Eastern naval situation. Britain was so preoccupied with the German naval challenge that it could not supply sufficient naval forces in the Pacific to counter the Japanese navy. In this sense, the British idea of a distinct fleet was not the outcome of pure strategic evaluation, but rather political in view of the Dominions', especially Australia's determination to create their own naval forces.

The third explanation is that the British government proposed the idea of a fleet unit to reconcile the interests of both Britain and Australia. The established British naval policy aimed to achieve maximum naval strength in the form of a single navy financed by contributions of the self-governing colonies. Under the policy, maximum naval power would be obtained "if all parts of the Empire contributed ... to the maintenance of the British Navy."\textsuperscript{134} In this context, Britain had concluded the 1903 Naval Agreement with Australia whose government was required to contribute £200,000 as an annual subsidy to Britain. Despite the fact that Australia was contributing to this fund, no major fleet of the Royal Navy visited Australian waters between 1906 and 1909. Due to the withdrawal of British battleships from the Pacific, Britain had left the protection of its Dominions to Japan whose government had a strained relations with the United States over the immigration problems in California. Against this international background Australia was compelled to reappraise the strategic implications of the Anglo-Japanese alliance for the future of Australian security and to reconsider the adequacy


\textsuperscript{134} Admiralty Memorandum, laid by Reginal McKenna before the Imperial Defence Conference, 20 July 1909, Cab 37/100; CO 886/2.
of imperial naval defence in the Pacific. Fear of Japan dominated the foreign and defence policy of Australia up to 1909. In order to lessen Australia's fear of Japan, Britain was compelled to reassess the imperial defence system. From the British point of view, the question was rather political than strategic in that it did not share Australia's fear of Japan. The Imperial Defence Conference came up with "a compromise" which met Australia's demands for a local navy while permitting "the Admiralty to save face."  

By June 1909, there was a consensus in the Colonial Office that Britain should assist the Dominions to create their own naval forces. The staff of the Colonial Office commonly placed Australia in the forefront of Dominion nationalism. In May J.R. Chancellor, the secretary of C.D.C., produced a report on the question of colonial naval contributions and remarked that:

> it is now generally recognised that the establishment of local naval forces by the self-governing Dominions offers the only satisfactory means by which they can contribute to the naval defence of the Empire.  

He paid considerable attention to the naval program and policy submitted by Deakin and Fisher. His conclusion was to accept Australia's local naval force, while relying on Deakin's plan that the locally enlisted personnel should form part of the Royal Navy and that the Dominion governments would relinquish control over their local naval forces in time of war. He believed that New Zealand would follow the Australian practice sooner or later. Therefore he suggested that Britain should advise New Zealand to devote the money available for naval defence to the establishment of a local force.  

137. Ibid.
In the Colonial Office, A.B. Keith minuted "Let Australia experiment by all means." 138 W.A. Robinson, a first class clerk, suggested adding "something like a sea-going navy," to a local navy, but reaffirmed the strategic importance of the Anglo-Japanese alliance:

it is necessary that the full value of it (the alliance) to the defence of the Empire as a whole should be made quite clear at this Conference [of Imperial Defence]. The Australians ought to realise that its ending will mean defence changes on a scale of which they have no experience. 139

Agreeing with Robinson, H.C.M. Lambert, a principal clerk, came to the conclusion that "we should make a determined effort to induce the Admiralty to give up the Naval contribution and instead to encourage the Local navies." 140 With regard to the local navy, Col. J.B. Seely, the Under-Secretary, stated that it would be "advisable for every reason to make the local fleet...

[which] may one day grow into great fleets to co-operate with the central fleet." 141 There was a consensus view in the Colonial Office that Australia should establish its own navy. Since the Deakin-Fisher naval program looked mainly to a coastal-harbour defence force consisting of cruisers, torpedo-boat destroyers and submarines, it is doubtful whether the local navy of this type would have made a substantial contribution to the Royal Navy on the high seas.

The view of the Admiralty was that a Dominion government should aim at forming "a distinct fleet unit" which would be "capable of action not only in the defence of coasts, but also of [sic] the trade routes, and would be sufficiently powerful to deal with small hostile squadrons should

139. Minute by W.A. Robinson, 4 June 1909, CO 537/571/2-3.
140. Minute by H.C.M. Lambert, 4 June 1909, CO 537/571/3-4.
such ever attempt to act in those waters." The Pacific Dominions together
with the Royal Navy would form an Imperial Pacific Fleet originally consisting
of the Australian fleet unit, the East Indies and China fleet of the Royal
Navy and New Zealand's gift battleships, and the Canadian fleet. In the
opinion of the Admiralty, each fleet unit should consist of one Dreadnought
battle-cruiser of the "Indomitable" class battleship, three unarmoured "Bristol"
class cruisers, six "River" class destroyers and three "C" class submarines.
The scheme envisaged an expenditure of £3,695,000 for the Australian
fleet unit, with an annual outlay of £750,000 for the maintenance. 142 The
whole idea of a fleet unit was, concludes Gordon, "substantially tailored
to meet the needs of the Australian areas." 143 The idea was then submitted
to the Imperial Defence Conference.

Australian Navy and Deakin's "Pacific Pact"

The Imperial Defence Conference sat in London from 28 July to 19
August 1909. 144 J.F.G. Foxton, Minister without portfolio, represented
the Commonwealth and was accompanied by Creswell and Bridges as his
naval and military advisers. Foxton was in constant contact with Deakin
who had to remain in Melbourne as the leader of the Fusion government.

On 3 August McKenna, the First Lord of the Admiralty, placed the Admiralty's
scheme for a Pacific Fleet before the Dominion representatives. As Asquith
explained later in the House of Commons, the remodelling of the British

142. Admiralty Memorandum, laid by R. McKenna, 20 July 1909, Cab 37/100;
CO 886/2. The original Admiralty memorandum of 13 July was submitted
to a sub-committee of C.I.D.

143. D.C. Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defence, 1870–
1914, p. 237.

144. The participants were from Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
Cape Colony, Newfoundland, Natal, Transvaal, and Orange River Colony.
"Proceedings of the Imperial Conference on Naval & Military Defence
at the Foreign Office, Whitehall (First Day 28 July - Sixth Day 19
August 1909," Deakin Papers MS1540/15/3677.
squadrons in the Far East was considered "on the basis of establishing a fleet, consisting of three units, one in the East Indies, the second in Australia, and the third in China Seas." In time of war, the combined forces of the three fleets would form a single Pacific Fleet which would be under British control. Since the strategic case of each Dominion required separate consideration, the British government had held separate meetings with the representatives of each self-governing colony. Canada was reluctant to support the establishment of such a fleet in the Pacific because it had with limited finance to consider two ocean fleets. However, McKenna's proposal was most acceptable to the Australian delegates.

Foxton on behalf of Deakin argued the importance of creating such a fleet in Australian waters and the value of a combined fleet in the Pacific. He reminded the British government of the fact that:

there is always present with us in Australia — and the same remark applies with equal force to New Zealand — the fact that we are in close proximity to the teeming millions of two great Asiatic powers. The awakening of the East has very great significance for Australia and New Zealand, and although at present everything is as one could wish from the Australian and New Zealand point of view, we have to look far into the future, and there might be possibilities in that connection which it is necessary for us to make provision for.

Foxton because of Australia's fear of Japan, welcomed the idea of augmenting imperial naval defence in the Pacific. Although the conference met ostensibly to discuss the German naval challenge against Britain, the discussion centered around naval affairs in the Pacific. The British meeting with the Australian delegates resulted in a provisional agreement for the creation of "an Eastern Fleet of the Empire."

147. Ibid., p.46.
As a result of the conference, Australia adopted a fleet unit scheme exactly as laid down by the Admiralty. The vessels should be manned as far as possible by Australians who would be governed by regulations and naval discipline similar to the Royal Navy. The Australian navy should be in peace time under "the exclusive control of the Commonwealth Government" as regards its movements and general administration. The annual subsidy of £200,000 under the existing naval agreement of 1903 would continue to be paid to Britain until the Australian fleet unit was built and stationed.\textsuperscript{148}

In Melbourne, Deakin explained the new defence arrangement and described the character of the fleet scheme as "entirely Australian, and entirely different to the existing squadron."\textsuperscript{149} As Foxton at the Imperial Conference related Australia's defence needs to the Pacific peril, so the Defence Minister Cook in making a statement regarding the creation of a Pacific Fleet, pointed out the threat from the North. He claimed that the defence conference had been held in order that:

> the various overseas dominions of the Empire could concert common measures of defence to meet a common menace in the Pacific and Eastern waters. The result is that we jointly accept the responsibility for naval defence in the Pacific, leaving Great Britain free to concentrate her efforts in the North Sea.\textsuperscript{150}

On 21 September, Cook expounded the government's defence policy and introduced a bill to provide for the creation of an Australian navy, based on the Admiralty's proposal, and simultaneously allowing for the introduction of compulsory military training. He justified the existence of these larger


\textsuperscript{149} SMH, 1 September 1909.

\textsuperscript{150} SMH, 30 August 1909.
defence forces mainly in terms of meeting the threat from the North. Australia's naval program was designed primarily to achieve security by building up "a buttress to the Empire, instead of being a dependency on it." There was "an unequal distribution of forces there that is brought about by reason of Great Britain's relations with Japan," and in his speech, Cook maintained that Australians could not put their trust in the alliance.\textsuperscript{151} There was little opposition to the defence bill and it passed both Houses in December. The defence debates in Australia after the Imperial Defence Conference were directed towards Australia's sense of strategic vulnerability in the Pacific. In effect, Australia's fear of Japan was further intensified by British preoccupation with the German naval challenge. Despite the fact that Australia obtained the future promise of an imperial defence under the Pacific Fleet scheme, Australia's fear of Japan did not disappear. The 1909 Defence Act was aimed clearly at Japan.

The anti-Japanese character of the defence policy was further pursued by Deakin. Since Australia had to wait at least four years before it acquired an Australian fleet, Deakin sought to enhance Australian defence by diplomacy. Six days after the introduction of the 1909 Defence Bill, Deakin worked out a security plan for the Pacific. On 27 September, he wrote "directly" to the British Colonial Secretary Crewe suggesting "an Agreement for an extension of the Monroe Doctrine to all the countries around the Pacific Ocean supported by the guarantee of the British Empire, Holland, France, and China, added to that of the United States."\textsuperscript{152} He excluded Japan

\footnotesize{151. SMH, 22 September 1909. See CPD, 1909 Session, Vol. LI, pp.3607-36, 21 September 1909.}

as Australia's threat and Germany as the threat to Britain's security from
the original membership of this Pacific pact. In his letter to Crewe, Deakin
described his idea as "a proposition of the highest international importance."
This security pact purported mainly to preserve the existing territorial
status-quo in the Pacific and subsequently to force Japan to remain in
north-east Asia. It was evident that the scheme was mainly directed against
Japan and perhaps against a possible Japanese-German coalition. The inclusion
of China as an original member made the character of the Pacific pact
even more anti-Japanese. He mentioned that "some such Agreement might
serve to some extent the present interest of every country affected except
perhaps Japan and Germany." He referred implicitly to Japan as the danger
to Australia's security. Deakin would be delighted to invite the warships
of Holland, France, and the United States to visit the Commonwealth,
but not those of Japan, whose squadron had already visited Australia "unasked." 153
Relying upon the traditional balance of power arguments, Deakin attempted
to restructure international relations in the Pacific by erecting a discriminatory
security arrangement. The preservation of the existing power balance
by diplomatic arrangement which would contain Japan was the essence
of his idea. Since Deakin, who left office soon after, was not able to follow
up this proposal, he kept it secret. The proposal itself was rather vague
and failed to gain British support. There are several questions which Deakin
would have to answer if he had pursued it further.

The first question related to the relations between the Pacific pact
scheme and the existing Anglo-Japanese alliance. The alliance purported
to provide Britain with ample security in the Pacific. The distribution
of the British naval vessels was dependent on the strategic value of the

153. Confidential letter, Deakin to Crewe, 27 September 2909, Grey Papers
FO 800/91/251.
alliance. It was therefore certain that Britain would not take part in such an anti-Japanese front, after all the British government had consistently avoided any provocative actions against Japan. In this sense, a Pacific pact aimed at Japan was totally against British interests in the Pacific. While the alliance existed, Britain was not in a position to support and adhere to such a discriminatory measure. In view of the strategic importance of the alliance, the Pacific pact did not seem feasible.

The second question arose out of the contradictory nature of the proposal. If Deakin had desired to preserve the existing power balance in the Pacific, he could not successfully achieve his goal by excluding Japan. Furthermore he had to reconcile the Pacific pact scheme with the aim of the Root-Takahira note, which was exchanged on 30 November 1908 between the US Secretary of State Elihu Root and the Japanese Ambassador to the United States, Takahira Kogoro. The Root-Takahira note was an inoffensive arrangement. Both powers purported to maintain the status-quo in the Pacific and agreed to support the independence and integrity of China. There was a sharp difference between Deakin's offensive security pact against Japan and the United States' inoffensive arrangement. It was highly unlikely that the United States would support Deakin's devise by scrapping the Root-Takahira note.

The British government certainly supported the political significance of the Root-Takahira note. The Foreign Secretary Grey welcomed "exceedingly" the agreement and congratulated the US Ambassador in London:

> the conclusion of the Agreement in question cannot fail to have beneficial results, not only to the respective interests of the United States and of Japan, but to the general peace in the Pacific and the Far East.154

---

154. Despatch, Grey to Bryce, 4 December 1908, FO 371/477/539.
Crewe was astonished to receive "this curious letter of Deakin's." It was far beyond his imagination. In his letter to Grey, Crewe succinctly expressed that "Personally I rather dread a concrete discussion between Australia and ourselves on these subjects."\(^{155}\) Grey replied to Crewe on 11 November that:

1. We could not make an arrangement without asking Japan to join ab initio.
2. I think it would be undesirable to make an arrangement to which any other European Powers were a party without also including Germany in the negotiations.

In other words, he continued that:

an agreement made without the inclusion of all the Powers who had possessions in the Pacific would be resented by those who were left out.

The proposal was seen to be too inconvenient and inflexible since Britain should not be able to "acquire the French interest in the New Hebrides in any bargain without the consent of the United States Government and the other Powers, who were parties to the proposed Pacific Agreement."

In such circumstances, British diplomacy might become "tiresome" business.\(^{156}\)

On 15 December, Crewe replied to Deakin "in the sense of Sir E. Grey's letter ... about the proposed Pacific Agreement."\(^{157}\) Crewe repeated the argument of the Foreign Office and asked for Deakin's due consideration about the "precise form" of the Pacific pact which might be "the subject of endless discussion."\(^{158}\) Before the discussion could be resumed, the

---

156. Private letter, Grey to Crewe, 11 November 1909, Grey Papers FO 800/91/248. In the Foreign Office, F.A. Campbell studied this subject. Grey informed Crewe of the Foreign Office's analysis which was agreed by Charles Hardinge, the Permanent Under-Secretary. Minute by C. Hardinge, undated November 1909, Grey Papers FO 800/91/249.
coalition government was defeated by Fisher's Labor Party in the election of 13 April 1910. Since Deakin had only raised the subject informally with Crewe, and appears not to have consulted his cabinet colleagues or any others for that matter, the proposal died with Deakin's fall from office. With all its limitations and its vagueness, the Pacific pact scheme was the last diplomatic initiative of Deakin. It is important to note that an underlying theme of Deakin's foreign and defence policy was to restore the naval supremacy of the British Empire and to form a grand protective defence measure against Japan.

The Introduction of Compulsory Military Training

Japan's predominant naval position in the Pacific and its deteriorating relations with the United States over the Japanese immigration problems led Australia to believe that Japan would become a threat to Australia, in particular after the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. In December 1907 Deakin was the first prime minister to adopt a compulsory military service as an essential ingredient in Australia's defence policy. His speech responded to the changing international relations around Australia. Australia was no longer "outside the area of the world's conflicts," and was brought into closer touch with an "antagonistic" country. When he mentioned that Australia should have its own power to "hold our own territory against invaders," his attention was directed towards Japan.


161. Ibid., p.7512.
In Deakin's speech, comparison of defence power was made with Japan.

He stated that:

'We attach great importance to the creation of the utmost power of resistance locally, both as to war materials and men. We are at the very beginning of a period of development which I trust will be as thorough and complete as that of Japan.'

Deakin appealed, in evocative tones, to Australia's patriotism. As a concluding remark, he crystallised the core of his defence scheme, stating that "Our ideal is a defence of the people for the people and by the people." Through his ministerial speech, Deakin indicated that the compulsory military training was designed to meet the threat from the North.

The defence speech was well received by the Labor Party. After reading Deakin's speech, Pearce, who was chiefly responsible for the implementation of the defence program, sent a personal letter congratulating the Prime Minister on the speech which he "so impatiently wanted" to hear. Pearce's eyes were definitely directed towards an armed Asia power, Japan. While writing in support of the universal training, he also stressed the need to reorganise Australia's naval forces to meet a Japanese threat:

'Above all we must watch the North and I would humbly suggest that the preponderance of the boats should be kept as near Thursday Island, Broome and Darwin as is possible consistent with other phases of the policy.'

Thursday Island, Broome and Darwin had the largest Japanese population in northern Australia. In case of war with Japan, these areas were commonly regarded by Australian alarmists as the landing places for major Japanese invasion forces. Pearce urged Deakin to "keep Australia for the white

---

162. Ibid., p.7530.
163. Ibid., p.7535-36.
164. Peter Heydon, Quiet Decision: A Study of George Foster Pearce, Melbourne 1965, Ch.8.
165. Personal letter, Pearce to Deakin, undated December 1907 (most probably 25 December), Deakin Papers MS 1540/15/3618.
race" against Japan and to build up national defence forces to provide a barrier against invasion. 166

Hughes, who had been advocating compulsory service since 1901, had submitted in August 1907 another resolution. 167 Japan, which was "armed to the teeth," was now the focus of his attention. 168 In order to defend the white man's Australia, Hughes urged that:

to defend a country possessing a coast line of 8,000 miles, a country committed to a policy certainly irritating to the last degree to some nations, no longer to be despised or spoken of as barbarian, and outside the pale of civilized peoples, we must rely upon some much more effective means of defence. Some day, unless I am much mistaken, those nations will inevitably adopt other means of enforcing those already made known to us. No one, who is not deliberately blind, can fail to recognise the quite acute position now existing between the inhabitants of the western slope of the United States of America and those of Japan. Nothing but the fact that America possesses a population of 80,000,000, and that any attempt to crush such a country would demand the forces of a nation at least similarly numerous, does, I believe, cause Japan to hesitate to declare war. We have a population of 5,000,000, we are isolated from the rest of the world, and we have here a second rate, or third rate, naval detachment, which, under the terms of the Naval Agreement, may, at any moment, be withdrawn. 169

Debate on the motion was, however, adjourned, but he encouraged the Labor parliamentarians to acknowledge the importance of his motion when they considered the deteriorating relations between Japan and the United States. In 1906 Labor's platform had spelt out the need for a citizen's defence forces, and in 1908 Hughes won his battle and compulsory military training became part of the Labor's platform. 170 In July 1908 at the Interstate Political Labor Conference, the compulsory service was officially adopted

---

166. Ibid.
168. DT, 17 December 1910.
169. CPD, 1907-8 Session, Vol. XXXVII, p.1283, 1 August 1907.
as a part of Labor policy. As D.C.S. Sissons claims, it was obvious that "Japan loomed large in everyone's mind" at the conference.\textsuperscript{171} The only reason for adopting the compulsory service was the threat from the North. Therefore, when the Fisher Labor Party took office in November, its defence policy looked towards the creation of an Australian navy and the introduction of compulsory military training. By the time of the US Fleet's visit to Australia, the Protectionist and the Labor leaders had accepted a common national defence policy. As a result, the defence issue became a non-party issue.

After the great success of the US Great White Fleet's visit to Australia, the Deakin government proposed the introduction of a new Defence Bill in 1908, dealing with a scheme for national defence. On 29 September 1908, Thomas Ewing, the Minister for Defence from 24 January 1907, presented the Defence Bill which provided for the compulsory military training based on Deakin's defence policy speech of 1907. The bill proposed both compulsory cadet training of boys from twelve to eighteen years of age and compulsory military training of young men from eighteen to twenty-six years of age.\textsuperscript{172} The proposal was, stated Ewing, "a preparation designed to keep Australia intact and white."\textsuperscript{173} Senator E.D. Millen, a Free Trader who was to become the Defence Minister in 1913-14, also supported compulsory military service. He had paid attention to the geo-political peculiarity of Australia in the Pacific. Like Deakin, he too argued that isolation, which had been to some


\textsuperscript{172} The latter was required to serve in the Defence Force for each of the first three years eighteen days in camp and for each of the last five years seven days in camp.

\textsuperscript{173} CPD, 1907-8 Session, Vol. XLVII, p.454, 29 September 1908.
extent Australia's protection, was "rapidly disappearing" and that there were no adequate self-defence forces to counter an Asian threat. Fear of Japanese power was an important factor behind his defence thinking. He defined Australia's role as "the mission of establishing a western civilization amidst Oriental surroundings" and he was anxious in case there might be a racial war in the Pacific.\textsuperscript{174} Although universal training was "practically agreed to" in Parliament, the 1908 Defence Bill failed because the Deakin government fell before it was fully debated and passed.\textsuperscript{175}

When Deakin returned as leader of the Fusion government in June 1909, he presented Defence Bill embodying the principle of compulsory military training, and on 21 September, Joseph Cook, the new Defence Minister, presented the bill in the House of Representatives.\textsuperscript{176} In 1908, Cook had been more preoccupied with the German naval threat to the British Empire, and had rejected the common view in Australia that there was "some terrible menace overshadowing Australia from the East," and had remarked that "the only menace I know to-day is in the North Sea." He seemed to be the only parliamentarian who refused to believe that Japan cast a jealous eye over Australia. In 1908 he had asserted that:

\begin{quote}
We are in friendly alliance with Japan for some years to come, and that country has recently shown its real intention by reducing its defence expenditure by £20,000,000. Is that evidence of a fresh menace overhanging or overshadowing Australia?\textsuperscript{177}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{174}\textit{Ibid.}, p.47, 17 September 1908.

\textsuperscript{175}Despatch, Dudley to Crewe, 1 October 1908, \texttt{CO 418/61/194-197}. There were few opposition to the bill. John Forrest and W. Irvine were the major opponents.

\textsuperscript{176}Another significant event was the visit of Lord Kitchener to inspect Australia's practical defence system. \textit{CPP}, 1910 Session, Vol. II, No.8, "Defence of Australia. Memorandum by Field-Marshal Viscount Kitchener of Khartoum."

\textsuperscript{177}\textit{CPD}, 1907-8 Session, Vol. XLVII, p.116, 17 September 1908.
Even so, he was not free from apprehension that Australia's security might be imperilled after the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1915. After the imperial naval defence system had been fully discussed at the 1909 Imperial Defence Conference in London, Cook shifted his attention to the naval situation in the Pacific. There were strategic problems facing Australia: the absence of the British battleships in the Far East, the indisputable Japanese naval position in the Pacific, and Australia's absolute dependence on the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

During the second reading of the 1909 Defence Bill, Cook demonstrated his concurrence in Deakin's strategic analysis of Australia's geo-political position and spoke of the defence problem in the Pacific region. He was now "a most enthusiastic advocate" of the compulsory military training. He drew attention to the effect of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in terms of the naval strength of the different powers in the Pacific. He noted that there was "the unequal distribution" of naval forces in the Pacific which was all accounted for "by reason of Great Britain depending upon its treaty with Japan." Cook went on to say that:

Here is the disposition of the forces in the Pacific so far as I can ascertain of battleships Great Britain has none; Japan fifteen, and America one. Of armoured cruisers Great Britain has four, Japan twelve, and the United States eleven. As a matter of fact, we are dependent absolutely upon the treaty with Japan, which I believe will be loyally honoured so long as it continues.

The Opposition Leader Andrew Fisher quickly interjected that the alliance would be continued "So long as it suits the parties, as is the case with every other treaty." Fisher's short comment induced Cook to express Australia's attitudes towards the alliance and its defence efforts.

178. A remark by Hughes, DT, 23 October 1909.
He remarked that:

No nation depends entirely for its security upon treaties, and that is our position at this moment.... So far as I can ascertain, the waters of the Pacific are now as important from a naval point of view as are the waters of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.\footnote{180}

What this statement indicated was that Australia should support the treaty as long as it lasted, but should not put its complete trust in the alliance's efficacy. Australia was exposed to an Asian threat and formed the most vulnerable part of the British Empire. Taking the future abrogation of the alliance into account, Cook was of the opinion that the Commonwealth should be well prepared to resist any Asian invasion by introducing compulsory military training as well as creating an Australian navy. Therefore he endorsed the naval agreement reached at the 1909 Imperial Defence Conference to establish the Imperial Pacific Fleet in the Pacific region. For Joseph Cook, creation of the Imperial Pacific Fleet was one of "the best measures to be taken to meet a common menace, particularly in the Pacific."\footnote{181}

The 1909 Defence Bill prescribed the continuation of the existing militia system and the establishment of a compulsory military training service ranging from compulsory junior cadet training for boys of twelve to fourteen years of age, through compulsory senior cadet training for boys of fourteen to eighteen years of age, to compulsory military training for young men of eighteen to twenty years of age. The adults between twenty-one to twenty-six years of age would be registered as compulsory reserve forces, that is, the militia. After twenty-six years of age, the adults would join

\footnote{180. \textit{Ibid.}, p.3615.}
\footnote{181. \textit{Ibid.}, p.3616.}
a rifle club. Discounting the senior cadets, a total of 206,000 well-drilled and thoroughly trained men were expected to be ready for national defence.

Inside the Labor Party, there were a series of discussions regarding the compulsory military training programs from 30 September to the end of October. Pearce who was, like Hughes, an earnest supporter of universal service, suggested to the members of the Labor Caucus that the Defence Bill be regarded as "first business." On 13 October, there was a lengthy debate on the subject of compulsory training. Pearce and Thomas Givens, a Queensland senator, moved a resolution that "we support the compulsory principle." They argued that the compulsory clauses of the Defence Bill were essential for Australia's defence. The motion was carried by fifteen votes to nine. Then it was decided that the Labor Party should support the compulsory principle embodied in the 1909 Defence Bill. The Defence Bill received large majorities in the Parliament for the principle of compulsory military training. The royal assent was given to it on 13 December. Despite the heavy cost of the scheme, the compulsory military training service received a non-party support in view of the perceived Japanese threat.

182. The following was the proposed military strength of each class.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Division</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior cadets</td>
<td>14-18</td>
<td>75,000 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen forces</td>
<td>18-20</td>
<td>37,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militia</td>
<td></td>
<td>29,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trained reserve</td>
<td>21-26</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle club members</td>
<td>27-</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>281,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

183. The first line military forces consisting of militia and citizen forces were 68,000 in number. The estimated cost of this military defence scheme would be £1,407,000 for the financial year of 1910-1911. It would be raised to £1,742,000 in 1914-15 when the scheme would be in full working order. CPD, 1909 Session, Vol. LI, pp.3622-23, 21 September 1909; ibid., p.3627.


185. The Labor Caucus meeting of 13 October 1909, ibid., p.244.

186. The Defence Act, No.15 of 1909.
Allegations of Japanese Espionage

Reports of alleged Japanese espionage from 1906 onward were further evidence of Australia's apprehension about Japan and its intentions. Australians took it for granted that the Japanese government had sent its intelligence agents to investigate the country and that "this was a preliminary to the making of plans and to a subsequent attack."187 Between 1906 and 1911, there were two major public allegations of Japanese espionage in Australia, the first took place in the days of the second Deakin administration and the second during the second Fisher administration.

The first alleged incident was reported in February 1906. The source of information about this case was a letter received by "a well-known citizen of Sydney from a Thursday Island correspondent." Since it was a private letter, the name of the informant was not published. In the letter, it was stated that two Japanese had left Sydney in November 1905 for Japan by the steamer Australian. They were Kanematsu Fusajiro, the president of Kanematsu Trading Firm in Kobe, and Nishikawa Bunnosuke, the representative of the Foreign Trade Investigation Association in Kobe. When their steamer called at Thursday Island where there was a large Japanese community, the Japanese passengers came ashore. The two named Japanese gentlemen were accidentally left behind when the steamer docked at Goode Island. But their luggage was still on board. The Customs authorities discovered among the passengers' personal effects "complete plans of Sydney Harbour and fortifications."188

Without waiting to confirm the facts of the matter, the Daily Telegraph accepted the allegation of Japanese espionage and attempted to demonstrate

188. DT, 8 February 1906.
how Japan was a potential danger to Australia. After referring to interviews with Australian military authorities, who did not deny the probability of Japanese spying activities in Australia, the Daily Telegraph remarked that:

Japan is now Great Britain's ally, but may not always stand in that relation to us, and we in Australia have, therefore, possibly a greater proportionate interest in the doings of the new Power than people in other parts of the Empire. As a matter of fact, there is very good reason for believing that our friends, the Japanese, have Australia under very close survey, ... Residents of Northern Queensland particularly talk about the Japanese espionage that is practised, and they represent that Salvation Army "soldiers" and members of cinematograph concert companies which have come to Australia from Japan keep their eyes very wide open during their travels, and invariably carry pocket-books with them in which they make careful notes upon almost every conceivable subject, from the cost of a dinner to the depth of water in small and obscure bays and harbors on the coast.¹⁸⁹

Spurred on by this incident, the Daily Telegraph began to reconsider the Japanese fleet's visits to Australia in 1903 and to suspect the aim of it. In mid 1903, the Japanese fleet of Admiral Kamimura Hikonojō had paid a visit to various parts of Australia. The fleet had been sent to Australia after the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and was well received. In Melbourne, Kamimura had received "the very great kindness and courtesy" of the then Prime Minister Edmund Barton. Barton had entertained the Kamimura fleet lavishly as it represented an ally of Britain.¹⁹⁰ When the fleet visited Sydney in June, Kamimura and members of his crew with the Japanese Consul-General Eitaki Hisakichi paid an official visit to the Governor-General Tennyson. Indeed, the wife of the Governor-General recorded that the Japanese fleet's visit as "a great success."¹⁹¹ On 1 September 1903, Kamimura had suggested that the Japanese government confer decorations

¹⁸⁹. Ibid., 9 February 1906.
¹⁹⁰. Letter, Kamimura to Barton, 23 May 1903, Barton Papers MS 51/1/117a.
¹⁹¹. Diary of Audrey Tennyson, 28 June 1903, in A. Hasluck (ed.), Audrey Tennyson's Vice-Regal Days: The Australian Letters of Audrey Tennyson to Her Mother Zacyntha Boyle, 1899-1903, Canberra, 1978, p. 290. See also the message of Kamimura to Australian people, DT, 7 July 1903.
on a number of Australian officials in consideration of the courtesy and kindness shown by the Commonwealth government to the fleet. Although there had been no suspicious voice raised against the fleet's visit to Melbourne at the time, the paper argued in 1906 that Kamimura had brought his fleet "skilfully through some very treacherous waters into a good deep patch, right away from the ordinarily-navigated section of the coast" because the Japanese navy had acquired all the details of Melbourne port owing to its systematic espionage. The daily newspapers' excitement over the alleged Japanese espionage was welcomed by the Bulletin which was a staunch advocate of the "Yellow Peril." No matter whether the allegation was true or not, the Bulletin asserted that "Anything which calls public attention to the imminence of the Asiatic peril is of some advantage."

There is, however, no evidence of systematic Japanese espionage in Australia in 1906. Of course, the Japanese navy and army accumulated various kinds of information concerning Australia, in particular on Australia's defence organisation, but it was a part of its general studies of foreign countries. There is no evidence in the Japanese official files or records which suggests that the Japanese navy or army were carrying out systematic espionage in Australia as a preliminary to an invasion. When the two Japanese passengers from the steamer were reported to be the alleged spies, the Japanese Consul-General Iwasaki Kazuo referred to the incident as "ridiculous." He pointed out that the two Japanese were merchants of Kobe and did

192. The First Class of the Order of the Rising Sun was conferred upon Tennyson and Barton. Vice Admiral Fanshawe and E. Hutton were also honoured. Note, Kamimura to Yamamoto Gombei, 1 September 1903, JFMA, 6.2.1.5-7. See also SMH, 14 April 1905. After the Japanese decision to confer decorations, the British government approved of conferment upon Tennyson and the Australian officials. Letter, C. MacDonald to Salonji, 18 May 1906, JFMA, 6.2.1.5-7.

193. DT, 9 February 1906.
not possess any map or plan of Sydney harbour defences. What they actually possessed were the materials provided by the Harbour Trust in Sydney concerning harbour administration.\textsuperscript{195} Immediately after the publication of the espionage allegation, the Japanese Consulate set out to investigate the matter. Because of the distance between Thursday Island and Sydney, the Japanese Consul in Townsville became involved in the investigation and concluded that the crew of the steamer found by accident a map of Sydney harbour, and as a result rumours had grown in the telling, which finally led to the story of espionage.\textsuperscript{196} As the \textit{Brisbane Courier} admitted, the rumour of the Japanese espionage was evidently magnified into statements that the fortifications of Sydney harbour were the subject of papers and plans found on the steamer.\textsuperscript{197}

The significant point of this incident was that by 1906 there already existed an apprehension of Japan in Australia and daily newspapers like the \textit{Daily Telegraph} tended to regard Japan as Australia's future enemy.

The second claim of Japanese espionage was first made public by the press in 1908 and then by the Defence minister G.F. Pearce in April 1909, at a time when fear of Japan was very acute.\textsuperscript{198} During a trip to Queensland, Pearce met various local people who personally informed him that the Japanese were "spying out the land." A number of pastoralists reported that a small party of Japanese were travelling from station to station. The ostensible object of the party was understood to be an exhibition of films. Since the money obtained through the exhibition seemed hardly

\textsuperscript{195} DT, 9 February 1906. Since Nishikawa had little knowledge of the English language, he was accompanied by Fujii, the Chancellor of the Japanese Consulate.

\textsuperscript{196} Secret despatch, No.1, Townsville Consulate to Katō Takaaki, 10 February 1906, JFMA, 5.1.7.25; Despatch No.20, Townsville Consulate to Kato, 24 February 1908, Ibid.

\textsuperscript{197} Brisbane Courier, 10 February 1906.

adequate for the support of the travellers, the pastoralists believed that
the Japanese government was subsidising them for the purpose of espionage.
In the opinion of the Defence Minister Pearce, the highly suspicious behaviour
of these Japanese was clearly shown by the fact that:

at every station where they have called they have minutely questioned
the station hands on points which would seem to have no interest
except for men who desire to report on transport and supply facilities.199

These Japanese were reported to be anxious to obtain information regarding
the location of watering-places, the direction of all the adjacent roads,
the number of cattle and horses, the number of people employed, the distance
from point to point, and the nearest route to railway lines and the sea coast.
Pearce contended that these actions could not be "without significance,"
and hinted that these suspicious Japanese movements had something to
do with the Japanese designs against Australia.200 Pearce mentioned that
the pastoralists in Queensland believed that the Japanese were "most persistent
in seeking information that would be [of] service to an army on the march." In his press interview, Pearce did not deny a view that "these so-called
showmen were subsidised by the Japanese War Office to collect the information."201

Pearce's announcement of the alleged Japanese espionage caused Senator
Robert Best, who had been Vice-President of Executive Council and leader
of the Senate in 1907-8, to suggest that the espionage might be directed
against Australia's vulnerable defences. Because of Japanese ambitions,
the existence of Australia was "in peril," and as a result Australians had
to "look to their defence." To Best, "a vital feature of the defence of Australia"
was the Northern Territory, the most likely place for the Japanese invasion.202

199. Argus, 2 April 1909.
200. Ibid.
201. DT, 2 April 1909.
202. Ibid.
When Pearce became aware of the allegations against the Japanese, he instructed officers of the Defence Department to investigate the matter. Since apprehension of Japan had intensified, the Defence Department had already in 1906 started investigating movements of Japanese in Australia.\footnote{203} Through its early machinery of intelligence, the military authorities supplied official information to Pearce which confirmed him in the belief that the Japanese in question were "a party of special intelligence officers."\footnote{204} In fact, the military authorities did not obtain any confirmation of the statement that "the Japanese were acquiring information calculated to be useful for military purposes."\footnote{205} However, the suspicious movements of the party were sufficient evidence for Pearce to believe that they were Japanese military intelligence officers. Although he remarked that espionage was the daily business of all countries, Pearce paid special attention to the Japanese espionage, because he, like most Australian political leaders, regarded Japan as the greatest threat to this country. He stated emphatically that the incident should "serve to make us more ready to properly protect ourselves."\footnote{206}

Responding to Pearce's statement, the new Japanese Consul-General Ueno Kisaburo denied that Japanese were engaged in espionage in Australia. Describing Pearce's statement as a "poor compliment to pay the Japanese Government," Ueno stated that:

\begin{quote}
Considering that Japan is an ally of the great empire of which Australia forms part, and that the sentiments of Japan towards Great Britain are of the warmest and most cordial description,
\end{quote}

\footnote{203. See the Defence Navy Correspondence Files in AA. MP 84/1, 1906-1917.}
\footnote{204. \textit{DT}, 3 April 1909.}
\footnote{205. \textit{Argus}, 5 April 1909.}
\footnote{206. \textit{DT}, 3 April 1909.}
the suspicion that she would send spies to Australia under any circumstances is at once ridiculous and unkind.

Then he criticised Pearce saying that:

I find it hard to believe that the Minister for Defence can have lent the weight of his high and important official position to such paltry rumours. 207

As with the 1906 case, there was no definite evidence to prove the charges of the Japanese intelligence operations in Northern Australia. There is no material recorded in the Japanese archives that the government sent intelligence officers to Australia to obtain strategic information for the military purposes. For Japan, Australia was not a country of strategic concern at all until the late 1930s. But for Australia, Japan was always the centre of its strategic concern after the Russo-Japanese war.

At this time, the Defence Department showed a keen interest in movements of so-called "suspicious" Japanese and began accumulating information regarding Japanese residing in and travelling about Australia. Since the number of intelligence officers in the Defence Department was too few to carry out this investigation in the Northern Australia and Queensland, the authorities called in the Queensland State Police Department and Criminal Investigation Branch to help with the surveillance of the Japanese in these parts. 208

The Defence Department was convinced in 1909 that there was a wide network of the Japanese espionage in Australia. Major-General J.C. Hoad, the Inspector-General of the Commonwealth Military Forces and a member

207. Argus, 3 April 1909.
208. See the following instances. Secret and confidential despatch (regarding secret memorandum Commissioner of Police, 16 June 1906), R.W. Carraway, Sub-Inspector's Office to Police Department, Townsville, 22 July 1908, AA. MP 84/1, File No. 1877-5-4.
of the Council of Defence, was of the opinion that the Navy Intelligence
Department of Japan was receiving secret information from the Japanese
luggers in Northern Australia. Hoad had been sent as an Australian military
attaché to observe military manoeuvres of the Japanese during the Russo-Japanese
war.209 Hoad had been impressed with the success of the Japanese campaigns
and with "their patriotism, bravery, good organisation, and skilful leading
by their own officers."210 Once Japan came to be thought of as Australia's
most likely future enemy, Hoad's image of Japan might have strengthened
the Defence Department's judgment about Japanese espionage. In 1909,
Hoad came to the conclusion that Japan was carrying out organised espionage
in Australia. In his report to the Secretary of the Defence Department,
Hoad stated that:

"this office is aware of the fact that Japanese luggers are numerous
on the North Coast of Australia, and that they display marked
activity in obtaining information relating to the coast there.... It
may be safely accepted that all information acquired by Japanese
luggers is promptly forwarded to the Naval Intelligence Department
of Japan; but it is impossible to prevent the information being
so transmitted."211

Since there was "no breach of international comity" on the part of the
Japanese, Hoad and his office were "helpless" to prevent the continuation
of the so-called Japanese espionage in Australia. The only solution which

209. "Record of Services, Colonel J.C. Hoad, C.M.G.," AA. B 168, File
No. 04-32(8). Hoad left Tokyo for the front of the Russo-Japanese
war on 20 July 1904 and returned Tokyo on 20 August. Unfortunately
he had only "some ten days" experience of campaigning, "due to illness
of his escort General Sir W. Nicholson." Despatch, C. MacDonald
to Lansdowne, 22 September 1904, CO 418/34/513-514. Thus, Argus
regretted "the speedy termination of Colonel Hoad's mission to the
seat of war." A large part of his time in the Far East was spent in
Japan. Argus, 9 November 1904. See also CPD, 1904 Session, Vol.
XXI, p.4028, 10 August 1904. C.D. Coulthard-Clark, A Heritage of
Spirit: A Biography of Major-General Sir William Throsby Bridges,
Melbourne, 1979, pp.46-47.

210. Notes on the Russo-Japanese war by Hoad, to Captain R. Muirhead
Collins, Secretary for Defence, 14 December 1904, AA. B 168, File
No.04-32(4).

211. Minute Paper, Hoad to Secretary, Defence Department, 26 November
1909, AA. MP 84/1, File No. 1856-1-79.
he reached "from the point of view of national safety" was the suggestion that the Commonwealth Parliament should pass legislation on the subject of Japanese espionage. Then he remarked that:

This would appear to be within the competence of the Federal Parliament, without affording any causus belli to Japan, though it might create Japanese resentment.\footnote{212}

Hoad's minutes exemplified how Australians became suspicious of the Japanese after the Russo-Japanese war. Though such an anti-Japanese espionage bill was not presented to the Parliament, a series of alleged Japanese espionage incidents led to the provision embodied in the Commonwealth Crimes Act of 1914 which "penalises in certain circumstances the making of unauthorized soundings."\footnote{213} Despite the Japanese official denial of the alleged espionage in Australia, the defence officials never ceased suspecting and investigating the Japanese during the period of this study. In 1913, the scope of Australia's investigation of Japanese activities was extended to the South Sea.\footnote{214}

\section*{Australia's Views on Japan and the Alliance before July 1911}

Between 1902 and 1911, successive Australian governments took a consistent attitude towards the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The Australian

\footnote{212. Ibid.}

\footnote{213. An address by E.L. Piesse for a conference of intelligence officers, Australian Military Forces, 17 April 1924, cited in D.C.S. Sissons, "Attitudes to Japan and Defence, 1890-1923," Documentary Appendix XIII.}

government never sought to terminate the alliance, but accepted and supported
the continued existence of the alliance in the interests of Australia's security
in the Pacific. Although the Japanese were never popular in Australia
except for a brief period during the Russo-Japanese war, the Australian
government endorsed the strategic value of the alliance in the sense that
it acted as a deterrent to a Japanese invasion of Australia, and constrained
Japanese ambitions in the Pacific. The alliance was a form of insurance
for Australia.

The Australian government confidently expected that the alliance,
which had been renewed in 1905 would continue until its expiration in 1915.
Thus the proposal of the British government to renew the alliance in 1911
took them by surprise and there was little debate in Australia about the
desirability or otherwise of such a move. Though the alliance itself was
little discussed in Australia before the 1911 Imperial Conference, nevertheless
fear of Japan was of central concern to Australian defence and diplomacy
and this concern had necessarily some implications for Australia's attitudes
to the alliance.

During Andrew Fisher's two terms in office both in 1908 and again
in 1910, the Labor government fixed its eyes on Pacific affairs and followed
a consistent defence policy. Just before leaving for London to attend the
Imperial Conference in 1911, Fisher in Adelaide was interviewed about
naval defence and he confirmed his commitment to a defence policy for
the Pacific:

We are [sic] criticised for declining to present England with a
Dreadnought at a time when there was a scare about a possible
trouble with Germany. Germany is not our danger — We have to
look to the Pacific for a menace if there is any, and I consider
that we are taking the right steps to guard against invasion....

215. Argus, 8 April 1911; DT, 10 April 1911. Re the Labor's policy on the
Dreadnought gift, see Argus, 27 April 1909.
It was quite clear that the "menace" in the Pacific was nothing but "the island empire of Japan." While Fisher was in Britain, the Attorney-General W.M. Hughes, who was acting Prime Minister in his absence, without a knowledge of the on-going C.I.D. debates on the Anglo-Japanese alliance, contributed a long article on defence to his regular political column in the Daily Telegraph. In view of the probable termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1915, the defence problem was to be "at once the most complex, the most urgent, and the most vital." In the course of the argument, he examined the original nature of the alliance, its significant effect on Japan and Britain, and the future strategic condition of Australia in case of an abrogation of the alliance in 1915. He predicted that the alliance would not be renewed and that Australia's security would be endangered:

In 1915 the Anglo-Japanese Treaty expires. It is a thing easily said; yet nothing could be more pregnant with meaning for us. For it may conceivably be the epitaph which the future will write upon our national tomb.

Then he raised two points in connection with the alliance, the one bearing upon the imperial defence and the other upon Australia's security including the maintenance of the White Australia policy. With respect to the first point, the alliance had allowed Britain to withdraw all its battleships from the Pacific, leaving Japan to safeguard its interests there:

If there was no Anglo-Japanese treaty one of two things would have happened; either Great Britain would have had to construct with feverish haste the equivalent of the five battleships and 14 cruisers now withdrawn from the Pacific in order to maintain her narrow margin of superiority in the North Sea — or else she would have withdrawn the Pacific fleet and left her interests in the East and Pacific, including Australia, practically without any protection at all; in which case something very interesting might have happened to us.

So far the alliance had been of great service to Britain and Japan, and

216. DT, 27 May 1911.
its continuation was most important to Australia given the disposition of
the British fleet. Hughes argued that:

unless the treaty is renewed [in 1915], ... we shall be left without
any local protection at all, save only that which we ourselves can
provide.

He was of the opinion in 1911 that the Japanese government would prefer
not to renew the alliance since the alliance was no longer serving the Japanese
interests:

There may be many reasons why Japan would elect not to renew
the present or enter into another treaty with Great Britain. She
may prefer to walk alone, or to make a treaty with some other
Power, e.g., Russia or Germany.... If the treaty is not renewed
for any such cause, we cannot be held responsible. But it is from
quite another quarter that a probable cause for the refusal of Japan
to renew the treaty may be looked for. We are committed to the
"White Australia" policy. Our immigration legislation is directly
aimed at the exclusion of Japanese, whom we class as undesirable
citizens.... It is perfectly well known that the Japanese very keenly
resent our attitude.217

Hughes did not urge the discontinuation of the alliance at all but warned
the Australians of some possible results if the Anglo-Japanese alliance
should be terminated in 1915. Australia was not capable of defending its
soil against Japanese aggression. Because of this fear of Japan, Hughes
wanted doubtlessly to maintain the alliance until Australia and Britain
could restore sufficient naval defence forces to counter the Japanese.

It was curious that he did not raise the question of a possible British
involvement in a US-Japan confrontation. But this can probably be explained
in that US-Japan tensions had evaporated after the United States "Great
White Fleet" had visited Japan in 1908 and the two countries had signed
the Root-Takahira agreement. Had there been such a confrontation, Britain
under the alliance would technically have been required to go to Japan's

217. Ibid.
assistance. Even though Britain had made it clear that it would not support Japan in such a contingency, the Australian government probably considered that the alliance was a potential problem for the Anglo-American relations and as such had reservations about it. Unless the alliance was modified, it was possible that the Americans might, despite British protestations to the contrary, consider that it could be invoked against them. However in 1910 and 1911, there was no major discussion of this question in either the Parliament or the cabinet.

In fact, there were no comprehensive debates on the alliance before the 1911 Imperial Conference, since nobody anticipated that it might be renewed so soon. Australia's fear of Japan was well demonstrated in the Senate's debates on the naval defence bill in 1910. In the debate, there was a general tendency for the senators to argue the necessity of Australia's naval defence needs in terms of a Japanese threat. Albert John Gould, a Free Trader and President of the Senate between 1907-10, referred to the Japanese success in the Russo-Japanese war and argued that the imaginary enemy likely to invade Australia was Japan. He concluded that Australians should be prepared to "defend ourselves against such an attack" from Japan.218 Anthony J. St.Ledger, a Liberal Free Trader from Queensland, spoke in support of Gould's view and announced unhesitatingly his fear of Japan. Agreeing with Labor's policy of a strong navy, St.Ledger justified an establishment of Australian navy in the changing international relations in the Far East and stressed the absolute necessity of the Imperial Pacific Fleet to maintain the status quo in the Pacific.219

James C. Stewart of Queensland, who was a Labor Senate Whip between 1901 and 1908, was of the opinion that for Australia, the worst international

219. Ibid., pp.5581-82.
situation would be the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the formation of a new alliance between Germany, an enemy of Britain, and Japan, an enemy of Australia. It would be perilous to Australia, stated Stewart, if "Germany and Japan entered into an alliance for offensive and defensive purposes." While Germany was regarded more or less as a distant enemy, Japan was the immediate threat to Australia, particularly in the case of the ending of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

These hostile attitudes towards Japan prompted the Defence Minister Pearce to disclose his own uneasiness about Japan. Since the end of the Russo-Japanese war, Pearce had become a major proponent of Japanophobia. He often referred to Japan when he discussed Australia's defence problems in the Pacific. In the parliamentary debates, he insisted that there was a strong possibility the Japanese, after the expiration of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, would invade Australia and eventually force the Australian government to repeal the White Australia policy:

if, in the event of war, Japan chose to send a single battleship to Sydney, Melbourne, or to any of our capital cities, we could not make an effective reply to it.... A single Japanese battleship at any one of our ports might demand the repeal of that legislation [the White Australia], and a few shots from such a vessel would make the population of that port think seriously about repealing that legislation.

Pearce's fear for the nation's future security followed not from the continuation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, but from its possible termination. During the time of the Dreadnought crisis in 1909, he had delivered a speech at Bendigo, Victoria, stressing Australia's perilous strategic position in the Pacific in view of the anticipated termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance

220. Ibid., pp.5584-88.
221. Personal letter, Pearce to Deakin, undated December 1907, Deakin Papers MS 1540/15/3618.
in 1915. He remarked that:

In six years' time the Anglo-Japanese alliance would expire. Six years' time, and what might happen? No man could think of the future without trepidation. When it was remembered that the British Empire might at any time be involved in a European trouble which would tax its resources, and at the same time there might come a demand from the Asiatic people that our ports nearest them should be open to their overcrowded millions, was it not worth while making a sacrifice against that time?223

Pearce did not seek the abolition of the alliance, but rather seemed to prefer its continuation unless Australia and Britain should be able to restore the British imperial naval supremacy in the Pacific. Fear of Japan caused Australians to support the maintenance of the alliance and at the same time to suspect any Japanese residents and travellers of acting as spies for the Japanese navy and army. Because of their suspected links with the Japanese intelligence organisation, the Japanese divers in the pearl fishing industry were especially undesirable. Referring to the large Japanese contingent of fishermen engaged in the pearl industry in Northern Australia, Pearce came to assert in 1911 that "a very large floating coloured population" of the Japanese should leave Australia together.224 Throughout these debates on defence, it became evident that Australia's most likely enemy was Japan, but there was no demand to abrogate the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

It might be possible to think that because of Australia's hostility to the Japanese, the Anglo-Japanese alliance must have been certainly imical to Australia's interests. This view, that the Australian government did not accept the alliance because of Australia's hostility to Japan, was held by the British government.225 On the contrary, the Australian government...

223. SMH, 7 April 1909.
accepted and supported the alliance in 1911 as it had in 1902 and 1905. There is no evidence that either the Australian government or the major newspapers as voices of public opinion opposed the existence of the alliance. The alliance had never been an election issue between 1902 and 1911. In fact, the government saw the alliance as constraining the Japanese movements in the Pacific. With the absence of a major British naval force in the Far East, the alliance was seen at least as some sort of diplomatic barrier against a direct Japanese invasion of Australia.

In discussing the defence authorities' views on Japan, it will be sufficient to refer to a memorandum produced in 1907 by W.R. Creswell, Director of the Naval Forces, for the use of the Prime Minister. The memorandum entitled "Considerations Affecting the Naval Defence of the Commonwealth" analysed Australia's strategic condition after the Russo-Japanese war.226 The focal point of this memorandum was the analysis of the future strategic situation in the Pacific and its impact on Australia's defence. Admitting the relative decline of British naval power, because of "the growth of great foreign Navies," in particular Japan, the United States and Germany, Creswell paid most attention to the Pacific region where Australia's security interests were directly affected. First of all, he rejected the possibility of a war in the Pacific between the British Empire and the United States. "America is not likely to be one of the Pacific Powers ranged against England." But it was "not inconceivable that Japan might be"; it was not an Anglo-Saxon nation like the United States. Creswell regarded non-Anglo-Saxon nations, such as Japan and Germany, as Australia's hypothetical enemies. Looking to the future, Creswell was afraid of the formation of a German-Japanese

front against the British Empire after the Anglo-Japanese alliance was terminated. Germany was "a power strongly based on the Pacific" and "the power striving for rivalry in Naval matters with Great Britain." Germany was commonly regarded as the most likely enemy of Britain. He remarked that:

Combination against England between a European power and Japan (or China) would make the defence of the Commonwealth a matter of extreme difficulty, or, it may be frankly admitted, impossibility, unless we earnestly profit by the intervening years of shelter and safety to develop our powers of resistance.

Until the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war, "attack from European powers or European bases only" had been considered for the Australian defence.

The Japanese naval victory against Russia had changed the whole balance of naval power and Creswell interpreted it in the Australian context:

Attack from Extra-European powers [mainly Japan] must gradually enter more and more into our defence calculations. Attack from main bases in the North Pacific is a new factor. It seriously lessens the value of our old strategic position.

The "Extra-European Dangers" to which he referred were future attacks from Japan and China. Creswell did not think that China alone would have its power to threaten Australia's security, but thought that Japan would influence China and that eventually both powers would act together against the interests of Australia:

Japan's need of an outlet is as great as Germany's — perhaps greater. The Eastern shores of the Pacific have just been denied them. Her need is urgent. Our "White Australia" laws she feels to be wounding and unjust. There is the possibility that Japan will furnish China with the organizing leaven, and act in sympathy with her in acquiring lands to relieve the high tension of population that both peoples feel today.227

In this defence memorandum, Creswell clearly defined Japan as a probable

227. Ibid.
enemy of Australia, but did not suggest the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Unless Australia developed self-sufficient defence forces which would restore British naval power in the Pacific, the ending of the Anglo-Japanese alliance would be a most foolish diplomatic act. While the alliance was still valid, Creswell was of the opinion that, while the alliance was still valid, Australia should create its own navy. The alliance gave Australia breathing time to strengthen its defence power.

In the Department of External Affairs, Atlee Hunt was the only senior public servant who may be entitled to be called "an external affairs adviser" to the government. Since the External Affairs Department was concerned mainly with the administration of immigration policy, the federal territories, and a subsidy to the shipping companies like Burns, Philp & Co., Hunt was not in a position officially to advise the government of the day on the subject of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. In 1910, Hunt disclosed his personal views on the alliance to H.A. Gwynne, editor of London's The Standard. Hunt's communication was made as a reply to a letter which Gwynne had sent to the Prime Minister Fisher. In writing to Fisher, Gwynne had directed his attention to Germany's naval expansion and pointed out that Germany would make an alliance with Japan when the Anglo-Japanese alliance ended. If the German-Japanese alliance had taken place,

This would be a disaster for Australia, for in case of a war with Germany it would mean that the Japanese fleet would dominate the Eastern waters.

To maintain Australia's security, he suggested that Fisher should promote a great scheme of white immigration into Australia and approve the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance for another ten years. From circumstantial evidence, it would appear that Fisher did not seem to oppose the view proposed

by Gwynne. Fisher referred the letter to Egerton Lee Batchelor, the External Affairs Minister. Batchelor, who was not experienced in external affairs, eventually sought the aid of Hunt. Hunt showed a great interest in the matter. Hunt denied that there was a prospect of a future German-Japanese alliance or a hostile action by Japan against Australia. Hunt said:

But do you really think it is likely, if Japan and Great Britain do not renew their treaty, that the next step will necessarily be a Japanese-German rapprochement in active hostility to Great Britain? ... I can hardly come to the same conclusion. It seems to me to be far more likely that Japan will decide, for a time at any rate, to go along quietly. With Korea to develop, and possibly Manchuria, I do not think she will be very keen on acquiring a part of our empty North.230

Hunt rejected the idea of Japanese territorial ambition in Australia and did not show any sympathy for the hostile view of Japan in Australia. To him, a German-Japanese alliance was out of the question. The most decisive reason for Hunt's optimistic view of Japan was his long-standing personal relations with the Japanese consulate in Sydney. Since being appointed as Secretary of the External Affairs Department in 1901, he had frequent contacts with successive Japanese Consul-Generals and their private adviser E.W. Foxall, who was an old friend of his. Foxall seemed to play an important role in facilitating the personal relationship between Hunt and the Japanese Consul-Generals.231 Through his direct contacts with them and Foxall, Hunt must have developed a favourable view of Japan. However there is no evidence that Hunt's sympathetic view on Japan was seriously considered

230. Letter, Hunt to Gwynne, 3 September 1910, Hunt Papers MS 52/2203. 231. See the following correspondence. Letter, Foxall to Hunt, 28 June 1903, Hunt Papers ms 52/2107; letter, Foxall to Hunt, 11 December 1908, ibid., 1314; Private letter, Foxall to Hunt, 22 April 1910, ibid., 1317; Letter, Foxall to Hunt, 25 June 1910, ibid., 2294; Private Letter, Foxall to Hunt, 16 January 1911, ibid., 1318; Letter, Hunt to Foxall, 15 February 1911, ibid., 1319; Foxall was "deservedly popular with the heads of all the Commonwealth and State Departments with which our Consulate-General has to deal." This is what the Consul-General Tamaki said in praising Foxall for the services he had rendered the Consulate. "Twenty Years' Service. With Japanese Consulate-General, Mr E.W. Foxall entertained by Japanese Residents," JFMA, 3.9.3.12 — Consulate.
by the Commonwealth government. Under successive governments between 1908 and 1916, Hunt's influence in foreign policy-making gradually declined.\footnote{232}

It was through the press that the question of how a US-Japan confrontation would affect the Anglo-Japanese alliance was raised. Just before receiving news of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the Melbourne \textit{Argus} had a prophetic editorial on "The Weak Spot in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty." Although US-Japanese friction had ceased after the US fleet's visit to Japan and the exchange of the Root-Takahira notes disclaiming mutual aggressive intentions, the \textit{Argus} argued that "the possibilities of strife remain - in the position of Japanese residents of the Pacific States and in the clash of commercial interests in Eastern Asia." Although the arbitration treaty was a first step to avoid a British involvement in a future US-Japanese confrontation, it asserted that:

with the Anglo-Japanese alliance unaltered, the threat of such a war [between Britain and the US] remained an international possibility, in circumstances which all British communities would view with dismay. Therefore, the terms of the alliance have had to be modified.\footnote{233}

The \textit{Argus} did not wish to advocate the abrogation of the alliance but rather supported an amendment of the alliance. It hoped that the alliance could be modified in order to avoid the possibility of a US-British conflict in the event of US-Japanese hostilities. The second point was to restore imperial naval forces in the Pacific to avoid British over-reliance upon Japan which would make Australia more vulnerable after the termination of the alliance:

At present Japan is without any serious naval rivalry in the Pacific.... An Anglo-Japanese alliance will be increasingly unpopular if renewed under such conditions as to make it appear that Britain is dependent on Japan because of the insufficiency of her own resources.\footnote{234}

\footnote{232. P.G. Edwards, \textit{Prime Ministers and Diplomats}, pp.16-17.}
\footnote{233. \textit{Argus}, 15 July 1911.}
\footnote{234. \textit{Ibid}.}
In the months preceding the 1911 Imperial Conference, the Sydney Morning Herald had a number of editorials and articles on the Pacific security with special reference to Japan's position as a Pacific power. They examined the Pacific problems from various aspects and attempted to foresee the future course of international relations. The Sydney Morning Herald thought the alliance was an important security device but had doubts about the future:

For the moment the alliance is helpful, both to us and to Japan; but it is quite an open question whether the situation will not have changed completely by 1915. So far as Great Britain is concerned she would probably be willing to continue the status quo indefinitely. The friendship of Japan as a great naval Power in the East is obviously worth cultivating, and if that friendship can be maintained we are relieved of a very serious naval expenditure, and a very serious risk of dividing our strength in time of war.

Though the alliance was contributing to the British interests in the Pacific, there was still "something unnatural in our present Oriental linking." In the event that Japan and the United States should struggle for the mastery of the Pacific, the Sydney Morning Herald wondered whether Australia would perceive itself to have a "divided duty." While the alliance lasted, this could be a difficult problem for the British Empire. Since the alliance had become an integral part of the British world strategy, the future of the alliance should be decided in the context not only of Pacific affairs but also of European affairs. Without any substitute for the alliance, Australia and Britain could not terminate it. In this sense, "The answer does not lie in Asia; it lies in the North Sea." Naval considerations would determine whether the alliance would be renewed or not:

While the European pressure upon the naval resources of the United Kingdom continues as emphatic as it is to-day, it is inevitable that the Royal Navy cannot be represented in the Pacific as strong as the interests to be protected fully require. At the moment the treaty with Japan relieves Britain of immediate anxiety on that score.\footnote{An editorial entitled "America in the Pacific," SMH, 21 November 1910.}

Therefore unless the Imperial Pacific fleet was completed, it was not a wise policy for Australia and Britain to terminate the alliance. When Japan was no longer a partner of Britain after 1915, it was rumoured that the next stage might be a coalition of Japan and Germany. Given the disposition of Britain's naval power, immunity from the danger of the German-Japanese alliance was "assured to us [Australia] only so long as the Anglo-Japanese treaty lasts."\footnote{An editorial entitled "Australia and Japan," SMH, 11 August 1910.} When the Japanese Government officially announced the formal annexation of Korea in 1910, the Daily Telegraph commented on the event and explored a deep meaning in the Japanese annexation:

What it will do is give Japan another 10,000,000 people to recruit her armies from, pay her taxes, and give her their practically exclusive trade by which she will be made so much stronger to push her enterprise whenever else ambition may lead.... The event ... is not without a special interest for Australia.

The alliance was working to contain Japanese expansionism in the East Asia. As far as the strategic value of the alliance was concerned, the Daily Telegraph did not suggest the alliance be abandoned. Indeed no newspapers denounced the alliance.\footnote{DT, 26 August 1910.}

The only significant critic of the Anglo-Japanese alliance came from the Bulletin. Since the signing of the first Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902, the Bulletin had continuously represented the alarmists' view and expressed Japanophobia. From the beginning of 1910 to June 1911, that is down to...
the announcement of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, it published
a number of articles attacking the alliance and Japanese territorial expansionism.
The whole discussion on the alliance and the Japanese expansionism was
consistently based upon an assumption that Japan would not renew the
alliance in 1915 but would join a Triple alliance of Germany, Austria and
Italy.241 But the Bulletin stood alone in its intransigent racialist view
of the alliance.

British Views of the Alliance and Australia – Japan Relations

The British government began examining the strategic evaluation of
the Anglo-Japanese alliance in terms of Australia's defence needs in 1910
as a preliminary to discussion at the Imperial Conference which was due
to meet in the summer of 1911 at the time of the coronation of George
V. The alliance was examined in the course of reviewing the general principles
governing the defence of the British Empire, and the strategic relations
between Great Britain and the overseas Dominions. The British believed
that the alliance should be renewed under the existing strategic conditions,
for Britain substantially relied on the alliance for the security of the British
interests in the Pacific. Though the British government was adamant that
its foreign policy decisions should not be shared with the Dominions, but
should be taken finally by the British alone, nevertheless, during 1910–1911
it gave serious attention to the Dominions' attitudes to the alliance, particularly
Australia's views on Japan. It was well recognised in Britain that the rapid
growth of Japan as a naval and military Power had caused "special anxiety
in Australia and New Zealand."242 Owing to Australia's open hostility

242. Secret, "Memorandum on the Strategic Relations existing between
the United Kingdom and the Oversea Dominions and India," by W. Nicholson,
29 March 1911, Cab 5/2/2.
to Japan and its fear of Japanese invasion, Britain believed that the Australian government would possibly oppose the continuation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. This is one of the main reasons why the British government decided to consult Australia and other Dominions over the subject of the renewal of the alliance in 1911.

The Colonial Defence Committee (C.D.C.) which was a permanent sub-committee designed to make recommendations regarding the Dominions and Colonial Defence, was engaged in considering the "scale of attack" for Australia's case. This particular question had been initially raised by Prime Minister Alfred Deakin in 1909. He had asked the British authority to consider the scale of a probable attack on Australia, owing to "alterations during last three years [from the end of the Russo-Japanese war] in balance of naval power, and recent naval developments."243 The Colonial Secretary Crewe promised to refer this matter to the Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D.), but declined to answer immediately Deakin's request because "it raises large questions of principle involving other parts of the Empire."244 In fact, the C.D.C. undertook a comprehensive review of the imperial defence system, and looked at the problems posed by Deakin in that context. Until the completion of a general memorandum dealing with the defence of the British Empire as a whole, the C.D.C. deferred producing defence memoranda regarding the particular case of Australia. Accordingly the C.D.C. completed a series of reports on imperial defence and Australia's case, called "Scale of Attack."245

243. Secret letter, Deakin to Dudley, 15 September 1909, AA. CP 290/15, Bundle 2.
244. Secret telegram, Crewe to Dudley, 2 October (received 4 October) 1909. Ibid.
The future of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was one of the vital questions discussed. J.R. Chancellor, the secretary of the C.D.C., stated that:

As regards Japan, the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has, up to the present time, relieved us from the necessity of considering the scale of attack that modern Japan could bring to bear on British possessions in the Pacific. For, so long as the Japanese Alliance remains operative, not only is the risk of attack by Japan excluded from the category of reasonable probabilities to be provided against, but British naval requirements are held to be adequately met if the combined British and Japanese forces in the Eastern seas are superior to the forces of any probable combination of two naval Powers.... On strategic grounds, ... it is highly improbable that Japan would undertake serious operations against Australia....

The analysis of the C.D.C. was based totally upon the strategic conditions created by the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Therefore, it rejected any idea of a large scale Japanese invasion of Australia and concluded that "it is not reasonably probable that any land attack on Australia, more formidable than a raid by a small landing force such as could be conveyed by three or four unarmoured cruisers, will be undertaken." Chancellor commented however that the termination of the alliance might have "far-reaching effects upon the position of Australia and necessitate a reconsideration of the scale of probable attack." On 26 January 1911, the C.I.D. discussed Australia's scale of attack and accepted the basic conclusion of the C.D.C. The importance of the alliance was fully acknowledged. The Foreign Secretary Edward Grey mentioned that "this comparative immunity of Australia from the danger of oversea attack" rested upon the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the Japanese navy.

The British government and the Foreign Office did not question the

248. Minute by the C.I.D. meeting, 26 January 1911, p.4, Cab 2/2/2; "Australia. Scale of Attack under existing Conditions," Memorandum by C.I.D., 24 February 1911, Ibid.; See also the internal memorandum on "Imperial Naval Policy," undated, Cab 1/33.
strategic value of the alliance. Examining a report of C. MacDonald, British
Ambassador to Japan, who observed that "the Japanese are undoubtedly
heart and soul in favour of the alliance and its renewal,"
249 Charles Hardinge,
the permanent under-secretary of the Foreign Office, reflected the consensus
view in the office and minuted that:

If the alliance is terminated in 1915 Japan will have her hands
free to act in the Far East without restraint – or control by us.
It is possible that we might in that case find the Japanese fleet
arrayed against us in the Pacific or allied with that of some other
Power. There are changes that are unpleasant to contemplate,
and I believe that in 1914 it will still be our policy to be in alliance
with Japan. 250

Grey agreed with this view. He accepted that the alliance was "the backbone
of his policy in east Asia," and the integral part of the British world strategy. 251
For Grey, it would be "disastrous" if the British Government was to denounce
the alliance when "the time for its renewal comes." 252 Arthur Nicolson
who was appointed as the new permanent under-secretary in November
1910, shared Grey's view and expressed that:

I presume that on the part of this country there would be no intention
of denouncing the Treaty – and ... in 1914 or earlier we shall discuss
with Japan the terms of its renewal.... The maintenance of the
Japanese Alliance is of such vital Imperial interest 253

From these remarks, the Foreign Office had no doubt that the maintenance
of the alliance was indispensable to the British strategic and diplomatic
interests. This view was accepted by the cabinet as a whole.

Although the British government was determined to renew the alliance
in early 1911, there was a question whether the British view would be acceptable

249. Despatch, MacDonald to Grey, 13 June 1910, FO 371/918/87-91.
250. Minute by Hardinge, 12 July 1910, FO 371/918/86.
251. I.H. Nish, "Great Britain and North-East Asia, 1905-1911," in F.H.
Hinsley (ed.), British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey, Cambridge,
to Australia and other Dominions because of their uneasiness about Japan. Australia's fear of Japan was an important subject for the sub-committee of the C.I.D. which was appointed in July 1910 to consider the defence questions to be laid before the 1911 Imperial Conference. In a long letter to A. Nicolson, Charles L. Ottley, the secretary of the C.I.D., raised the question whether "anything is to be said to the Representatives of the Overseas Dominions - regarding the Anglo-Japanese Alliance" at the coming Imperial Conference. Since the alliance was increasingly affecting the Dominions security, Ottley suggested that it might be advisable to ascertain whether "the Australians or the Canadians hold any strong views" on the future of the alliance. Ottley argued that Britain should hold a meeting in advance with the Dominions to discuss the question of the alliance no matter whether the alliance was denounced or renewed in 1915:

From the Defence point of view it is extremely desirable to know a few years beforehand what are the probabilities of the alliance being renewed or not. At present we maintain only a small naval force in the Far East, relying on our alliance with Japan.... The Admiralty will I expect require ample warning if this necessity of reinforcement of the Far Eastern fleet before the termination of the alliance] is likely to arise, for it is very desirable to effect the strengthening of the Far Eastern Fleet gradually, so as not to make the change of policy conspicuous. 254

Since the reinforcement of the Far Eastern fleet commensurate with the Japanese navy would imply a sharp increase in the British naval building programme, it was evident that:

plainly all these considerations will be largely influenced by the naval preparations of Australia, New Zealand and Canada (Pacific Fleet). Postulating therefore that - (owing in part perhaps to the objections of the Dominions) - there was any question of denouncing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, I think we will agree that it ought to be made clear to the Dominions representatives that it would devolve upon them to assist us materially in providing the increase of naval force necessitated by the new international situation.

254. Letter, Ottley to Nicolson, 15 January 1911, Cab 17/74; FO 371/1140/75-77.
Recalling the recent "ignorant criticism" made by Australia against the Declaration of London, Ottley took precautions against a similar action by Australia in the alliance:

It would be very untoward if a similar demand to denounce or renew reached us from Australia in 1915, just when H.M.G. had decided to renew or denounce the Alliance with Japan. If therefore the Australians or the Canadians hold any strong views on this question, it may perhaps be advisable to ascertain them now - at the Imperial Conference next May - rather than run the risk of having them sprung upon us at an inopportune juncture 3 or 4 years hence.

Ottley expected that Australia would be hostile to the alliance and its possible renewal in 1915. It is interesting to note that even the secretary of the C.I.D. seemed to believe that the Australian government opposed the continuation of the alliance and did not understand how Australia really viewed the alliance in the Pacific. There was no detailed assessment in Whitehall on the Australian view of the alliance. Nor did the Governor-General of Australia supply a report on the subject. The British government took it for granted that the Australian government would oppose the alliance because of Australia's fear of Japan. Despite the fact that the British government did not make an extensive examination of Australia's view of the alliance, the statement by Crewe, now Secretary of State for India that "in Australia public opinion was thoroughly hostile to the alliance" was unanimously accepted by the cabinet. On the contrary, the Australian government had never hinted that it desired the termination of the alliance in 1915. Nor had the major newspapers demanded the abandoning of the alliance. In this sense, it was the British misunderstanding of and apprehension about the Australian attitudes towards the alliance which prompted Ottley's proposal for a special session of the Imperial Conference to discuss the future of the alliance. As a result of this special session, Ottley expected

255. Minute of the C.I.D. meeting, 26 January 1911, Cab 2/2/2.
that "After all, all sensible men in Australia and New Zealand [would] fully realize that their only substantial safeguard against Japan is the British fleet," whose construction commensurate with the Japanese fleet was impossible due to the Anglo-German naval tensions in the North Sea.

In proposing direct talks between Britain and the Dominions, Ottley was not without any reservation about the way in which the special session would be carried out. He was a little distrustful of the Australian politicians:

Frankly, I dread any sort of discussion with our brethren in Australia on these delicate and secret topics.... I believe that of almost everyone who has ever had to deal with Australian politicians, they seem incapable of keeping a secret. Sooner or later somebody talks to the Press. But - on the other hand - the last thing wanted is a howl from Australia or Canada, if and when the British Government decided to renew the alliance.

To remove every possible risk, he suggested that "The fewer the number present the better; probably an informal meeting" at the Foreign Office or the C.I.D. before a plenary session of the whole Imperial Conference.²⁵⁶

The first response of the British government was cool. There was no enthusiasm for Ottley's suggestion. The Prime Minister Asquith regarded the question of the alliance as an "inopportune topic to bring before the Imperial Conference."²⁵⁷ At first Grey was also averse to discussing the subject of the alliance with Australia and the other Dominions:

I shall be against proposing its renewal [of the alliance] as a subject for discussing at the Imperial Conference. But one of the Dominions may raise the questions; if so I think we should explain the value of the Alliance as stated by Sir C. Ottley and try to end the discussion there. Meanwhile the decision is that we do not bring it before the Conference or discuss it there if it can be avoided.²⁵⁸

A. Nicolson followed the same line as Grey and replied privately to Ottley

²⁵⁶. Ibid.
on 18 January 1911 that:

the maintenance of the Alliance is of such vital Imperial interest that its prolongation or otherwise should not be dependent on the views of our Dominions, and that it is therefore one solely and exclusively for the Imperial Government to decide, without any reference whatever to the Colonies. One of them may of course raise the question and if so, it might be desirable to explain the value of the Alliance as stated in your letter; but the decision should end there if possible; Meanwhile the decision, in which the Prime Minister concurs, is that His Majesty's Government will not bring the matter before the Conference or discuss it there if it can be avoided.259

The Admiralty also rejected Ottley's suggestion, and had no wish to raise the Pacific naval question or the Anglo-Japanese alliance at the Imperial Conference.260 The British government's rejection of Ottley's suggestion was a clear indication of Britain's desire to maintain its exclusive control over imperial foreign policy.

However the attitudes of the British government to "consultation" with the Dominions over the alliance changed significantly after the 108th C.I.D. meeting. The new Colonial Secretary L. Harcourt considered the consultation would have a useful "educative effect."261 Although Asquith and Crewe expressed doubts, Grey began reconsidering the possibility of private consultations with the Dominions about the alliance. Grey suspected that the Australian politicians would "require a good deal of education" about the importance of the alliance.262 The British concern about Australia's attitudes to the alliance was increasing before the Imperial Conference.

In early May, the C.I.D. produced a special memorandum on Australia and the alliance, which was intended to support the continuation of the alliance

259. Private letter, Nicolson to Ottley, 18 January 1911, FO 371/1140/79-80; Cab 17/74.
260. Letter, Under-Secretary, Admiralty to Under-Secretary, C.O., 3 August 1910, CO 532/19/440-441.
and to encourage Australia's defence development. It concluded that the Anglo-Japanese alliance gave "a considerable measure of security to Australia."\textsuperscript{263} This C.I.D. report which was an addition to the previous "Scale of Attack" memoranda indicated clearly a degree of British apprehension about Australia's anticipated opposition to the alliance.

While Grey was considering an education for the Dominions, Philip Kerr was starting a new education for the British imperialists on Dominion matters. After joining "Milner's Kindergarten" in South Africa, Kerr returned to Britain in 1909 and became a founder of the quarterly imperial review \textit{Round Table}.\textsuperscript{264} In the February issue of the \textit{Round Table} in 1911, he raised the question of the alliance and its impact on the Dominions. He shared the same view as Grey on the strategic value of the alliance.

so long as Japan was friendly the Pacific coasts of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, the sea frontiers of India, and the East coast of Africa were safe from attack, for there was no other power which could reach them with modern ships of war. The alliance guaranteed the friendship of Japan for at least ten years. Its importance, therefore, to England has been that it has allowed her to concentrate her resources against the menace of the German fleet, has guaranteed the peace of the Far East, and the safety of the Indian frontiers, and has protected the Empire against the hostility of Japan.\textsuperscript{265}

Since the Dominions were "vitally" affected by the British foreign policy, he urged the necessity of "consultation" between Britain and the Dominions over the imperial foreign policy at the coming Imperial Conference in order to frame "a common policy for the Empire."\textsuperscript{266} This article was certainly intended to inspire a discussion on the imperial foreign policy at the Imperial

\textsuperscript{263} Secret, "Australia and New Zealand. Strategic Situation in the event of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance being Determined," Memorandum by the C.I.D., 3 May 1911, Cab 2/2/2.


\textsuperscript{265} \textit{Round Table}, February 1911, p.122.

\textsuperscript{266} \textit{Ibid.}, pp.148–9.
Conference and to suggest to the British political leaders that the British Empire should be strengthened by closer consultation. In order to educate the Dominions, Grey, perhaps influenced by the Round Table, finally agreed to discuss the renewal of the alliance at a secret meeting of the C.I.D.

After Grey decided to consult the Dominions, he received a message from the Australian government which demanded that the Dominions should be "informed and consulted in negotiations with foreign Powers as to matters affecting any of them" at the Imperial Conference. Furthermore the Australian government proposed to establish a "Foreign Relations Advisory Committee," composed of the British Foreign Secretary and representatives of the Dominions, which would hold regular meetings in London. The purpose of this committee was to exchange frank views on foreign matters which affected the Dominions and to provide the opportunity for working out a common policy for the Empire on the mutual understanding.\(^{267}\) The Colonial Office strongly resented this Australian proposal. It was understood that the proposal was to "eliminate the S[ecretary] of S[tate] for the Colonies entirely!"\(^{268}\)

On the other hand, the Foreign Office responded favourably to this proposal. With respect to the request of consultation, Grey had already decided to discuss these foreign matters which had "special interest for the Dominions." In order to achieve a common foreign policy for the British Empire, he became aware of the necessity to establish new consultative machinery.\(^{269}\) This Australian proposal indirectly influenced Grey to hold the secret session of the C.I.D.

\(^{267}\) Despatch, Dudley to Harcourt, received 8 May 1911, CO 532/26/91.
\(^{268}\) Minute on the proposal which was agreed by C.P. Lucas and L. Harcourt on 8 May 1911, CO 532/26/90.
\(^{269}\) Letter, W. Langley, F.O. to Under-Secretary, C.O., 12 May 1911, CO 532/29/44-45.
Although N. Bennett argues that it was necessary for Britain to "win Dominion approval" for the renewal of the alliance, the British decision to consult the Dominion was motivated more by the desire to educate the Dominions, than by strategic or diplomatic necessity.\textsuperscript{270} Before consulting with the Dominions, the British government had already reached the decision to renew the alliance. This had been done in March when Grey had informed Katō Takaaki, the Japanese Ambassador to Britain, of the British decision to extend the alliance and to revise it as a result of arranging an arbitration treaty with the United States.\textsuperscript{271} Writing to the King George V in March, Asquith reported that Kato was "quite willing that such a case [of arbitration] should be excepted from the operation of the Alliance" and that the British government had decided to "propose to the Japanese Government a renewal of the Alliance (which expires in 1915) for a further term of 10 years."\textsuperscript{272}

Imperial foreign policy was not discussed at the imperial conference itself, but only at the special meetings of the C.I.D. The British consultation with the Dominions over Japan took place on 26 May. It took the form of a secret session of the C.I.D., at which Asquith took the chair. Among the fifteen participants from the British side, Asquith, Grey and Harcourt were the key figures.\textsuperscript{273} Australia was represented by the Prime Minister Andrew Fisher, the defence Minister G. Pearce and the External Affairs


\textsuperscript{272} Cabinet letter, Asquith to the King, 29 March 1911, Asquith Papers 6/22-23.

\textsuperscript{273} The rest of the British participants were R. McKenna (First Lord of the Admiralty), A.K. Wilson (First Sea Lord), A.E. Bethell (Director of Naval Intelligence), A. Nicolson (Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office), the Earl of Crewe (Secretary of State for India), Viscount Haldane (Secretary of State for War), W. Nicholson (Chief of the Imperial General Staff), H. Wilson (Director of Military Operations), Viscount Esher, Viscount Kitchener, I. Hamilton (Inspector-General of the Oversea Forces), and C. Ottley (Secretary of the C.I.D.). Minute of the 111th meeting, the C.I.D., 26 May 1911, Cab 2/2/2.
Minister Egerton L. Batchelor. The other Dominions were represented by their Prime Ministers. Before tackling the subject of foreign policy, Asquith reviewed the defence developments of the Dominions since the 1909 Imperial Defence Conference and the work of the C.I.D. on imperial defence. He paid special attention to the Australian anxiety about Japan and refuted the possibility of a Japanese threat to Australia during the continuation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. He concluded that under existing condition, Australia gained "a large measure of security from the danger of overseas attack through the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance." Australia's security would be at stake "in the event of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance being determined." The message of Asquith to Australia was simple: the British government needed the alliance which was also the indispensable defence guarantee for Australia.

Then Asquith asked Grey to speak on the international situation. Grey gave an authoritative account of the foundations of the British foreign policy:

what really determines the Foreign Policy of this country is the question of sea power. It is the Naval question which underlies the whole of our European Foreign Policy, and more than the European Foreign Policy.... Sea Power, and the necessity of keeping the command of the sea, was the underlying cause and motive of our action .... it ... is a common interest between us here at home and all the Dominions.

This statement was a prelude to his justification of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. He delivered a long and well-prepared speech on Britain's foreign relations with European nations, the United States and Japan. One third of his speech was devoted solely to Britain's relations with Japan and the alliance. The rest of the speech regarding European affairs was only important

274. Re the political background and career of Batchelor, see Australian Dictionary of Biography, Vol.7, pp.206-8.
275. Minute of the 111th meeting, the C.I.D., 26 May 1911, Cab 2/2/2, p.9.
276. Ibid., pp.9-11.
to explain how the British Government relied upon the alliance in its world strategy. Grey argued unequivocally that if the alliance came to an end in 1915,

it cannot be doubted that not only would the strategical situation be altered immediately by our having to count the Japanese fleet as it now exists as possible enemies, but Japan would at once set to work to build a fleet more powerful than she would have if the alliance did not exist. We, on the other hand, instead of keeping the modest squadron in Chinese waters which we do at the present time, would have to keep - if we are to secure the sea communications between the Far East and Europe, and also between the Far East and Australia New Zealand - a separate fleet in Chinese waters which would be at least equal to a two-Power standard in those waters, including in that two-Power standard counted possibly against us not only the Japanese fleet as it is at the present time, but the fleet which Japan would certainly build if we put an end to the alliance... in the interests of strategy, in the interest of naval expenditure, and in the interests of stability, it is essential that the Japanese Alliance should be extended.

Grey proposed to extend the alliance for another ten years on the condition that the renewal of the alliance would not "in any way affect the question of the freedom of the Dominions to deal with the question of immigration," and on the condition that the renewed alliance would exempt Britain from any obligation to go to war with a Power with whom it had a General Arbitration Treaty.277

Andrew Fisher, in reply, said that provided the situation over immigration remained unchanged, the prolongation of the alliance would meet with "very favourable views from Australia" and would be "a great satisfaction to the people of Australia, because undoubtedly we are somewhat apprehensive of the immediate future."278 The other premiers echoed Fisher's assessment and gave their approval to the prolongation of the alliance. Just before the adjournment of the discussion, Pearce gave a personal assessment.

277. Ibid., pp.17-18.
278. Ibid., p.20.
of the alliance. Though all the rest of the discussion was carried out on a rational basis, Pearce injected an emotional element which had little or no basis in fact. Pearce stated vehemently that:

the Japanese Treaty has been most unpopular in Australia,... We in Australia are undoubtedly nervous as regards the Japanese, because perhaps we are nearer than any of the other Dominions, ... There will be a strong outcry against the renewal of the Treaty, because it has always been immensely unpopular in Australia. 279

This statement does not mean that Australians demanded the ending of the alliance. The alliance was unpopular only as a substitute for the British fleet in the Pacific. As this study shows, there was no Australian opposition to the maintenance of the alliance except for the Bulletin and its offshoot Lone Hand. The Bulletin had become critical of the alliance because it believed that the Japanese government would denounce the alliance and that Australia would eventually be exposed to the Japanese danger. Even Pearce himself did not oppose the existence of the alliance. It was Pearce's intention to warn the British government that it could not always expect an easy and automatic approval of the alliance.

At this secret meeting of the C.I.D., the Dominions for the first time obtained firsthand knowledge of Britain's foreign policy and also of its decision to renew the treaty. Although the initial motive of Harcourt and Grey to consult the Dominions was for education, the meeting itself was for Britain a great success and played an important role in achieving a common policy for the British Empire. 280 In his regular cabinet letter

---

279. Ibid., p.23.
to the King George V, Asquith reported that:

The Cabinet were gratified to learn that the representatives of the Dominions had unanimously approved the proposed renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance this year, for a further term of 10 years, i.e. until 1921. 281

For Australia and the other Dominions, it became an important precedent in seeking closer consultation on foreign policy. The more divergent interests the Dominions had, the closer consultation the British government needed. The British decision to consult Australia and the other Dominions was highly significant "as recognition of their growing power and importance." 282

In 1911, Australia's special anxiety about Japan had some effect on Grey's foreign policy speech. Since the British Government expected fierce opposition to the alliance from Australia, Grey felt that strong persuasion was necessary to make the Australian representatives understand their strategic vulnerability should the alliance be terminated. During this consultation, the Australian government exercised its influence, though limited, on British policy-making. Australia's uneasiness over the future threat of Japan, which was revealed in the meeting, caused the Foreign Office to approach the Japanese Ambassador Kato Takaaki and to inform him that suspicion of Japan was growing in Australia. After Kato communicated this matter to the Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro, the Australian government elicited an assurance from the Japanese government that it would never countenance the emigration of its nationals to Australia. 283

281. Cabinet letter, Asquith to the King, 31 May 1911, Asquith Papers 6/41-42. In July, Harcourt admitted publicly in the House of Commons that the Prime Ministers of the Dominions were consulted and unanimously approved of the renewal of the alliance. DT, 21 July 1911.


Australia's Reaction to the Renewal of the Alliance

The renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was formally announced on 13 July,²⁸⁴ and the news was generally welcomed in Australia. The major newspapers printed the original text of the 1905 alliance, the alterations in the 1911 alliance and the comments on the new alliance expressed in the London Times of 15 July.²⁸⁵ The most important modification was to make the clause concerning mutual assistance in time of war inapplicable when either of the allies was fighting a nation with whom the other had an arbitration treaty. There was no excitement in Australia when the renewal of the alliance was announced. Nor was there any public opposition to the revised alliance. The political parties and the press calmly accepted the renewal without reservation and supported its strategic value for Australian security.

Among the politicians, immediate responses came from W.M. Hughes, the Attorney-General and acting Prime Minister, W.A. Holman, the acting NSW Premier, and Bruce Smith, a well-known Free Trader in NSW. Though being slightly dissatisfied that he had not been consulted or informed beforehand about the renewal of the alliance,²⁸⁶ Hughes acknowledged the importance of the revised alliance and supported it positively:

the renewal of the treaty has a most important bearing upon the future defence policy of Australia. No simple factor in the defence problem, not merely of Australia, but of the Empire, is so significant as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Then he noted its importance for Australia:

we may congratulate ourselves - the treaty has been renewed.

²⁸⁴. The most authoritative account for the background and negotiations of the alliance is I.H. Nish, Alliance in Decline, Ch.2-4.
²⁸⁵. For example, SMH, DT, Argus, Age, and Brisbane Courier of 17 July 1911.
²⁸⁶. DT, 25 July 1911.
This gives us breathing time, and in spite of everything, makes distinctly for the maintenance of peace.\textsuperscript{287}

He took the view that in the next ten years Australia should develop its self-defence power in case of the termination of the alliance after 1921. The question was not whether Australia liked the alliance or not, but whether it needed the alliance or not. Were the alliance to be terminated, there was a possibility that Japan would range against Britain, either by forming a new alliance with some other naval power or alone. Australia's vulnerability would be easily exposed without the alliance. Hughes endorsed the renewal of the alliance because of its inescapable strategic necessity.

Holman concurred with Hughes on the strategic value of the alliance. He took an ever more sanguine view of its terms. He stated that the renewal of the alliance was "a matter for the warmest congratulation." Recognising the new arbitration clause as "an enormous defence, and a bulwark in the maintenance of international peace," he suggested that it must dispel the scare that had frequently been raised in regard to Japanese aggressiveness. As a result of the alliance, Australia's fear of Japan became "so much bunkum."

To avoid strained relations between Australia and Japan in the next decade, Holman hoped that:

something else will fade into oblivion at the same time - that is that particularly venomous spirit of a section of Australian journalism which characterised the efforts made to stir up international hostility between ourselves and the Japanese.\textsuperscript{288}

Holman's unexpected conciliatory statement on Japan were echoed by Bruce Smith, who was a well-known Free Trader and the president of the British Empire League. Because of his close relations with the Japanese Consulate

\textsuperscript{287}SMH, Argus, Age, DT, Brisbane Courier and Mercury, 18 July 1911.
\textsuperscript{288}SMH, Argus and DT, 18 July 1911.
and businessmen, he was often a target of the Bulletin's anti-Japanese hysteria. This time Smith attacked the journalists by stating that:

the scare of a Japanese invasion of Australia, which has been so persistently and ungenerously fomented by a section of our Australian press for its own commercial purposes, and, unfortunately, had its effect upon a large and hysterical portion of our own people, who read that sort of journalism and study nothing outside our own local affairs - that scare is surely now set at rest.

Rejecting strongly any Japanese aggressive design on Australia, he asked the Australians to cease talking about "our Japanese friends as 'monkeys,' and learn to respect them as one of the coming races of the world."\textsuperscript{289}

In defence circles, the revised and extended alliance was also welcomed. On 6 September, the Council of Defence met at the Victoria Barracks in Melbourne and discussed the C.I.D. defence memoranda and the effect of the alliance. Rear-Admiral W.R. Creswell was expected to speak on the needs of naval defence under the new strategic conditions provided by the revised alliance. He was, however, unable to attend the meeting owing to illness, and sent instead his notes on national defence. At first Creswell expressed dissatisfaction with the defence memorandum of the Colonial Defence Committee. Despite the fact that the C.D.C. defence memorandum had been formulated before the renewal of the alliance, it did not give "adequate weight to the new Naval conditions" created by the Russo-Japanese war. Creswell noticed that there was a different perception of Pacific naval defence between Australia and Britain. Before the renewal of the alliance, he had thought that the completion of a strong fortress against overseas invasion was the urgent matter. On the subject of the alliance, he considered that "the last Japanese Treaty has greatly modified in our favour the urgency of the question of fortress defences." The alliance

\textsuperscript{289} DT, 19 July 1911.
gave Australia a further ten years of breathing space, so that Australia was relieved of the necessity of urgently completing its defences against Japan. In this sense, Creswell was in favour of the renewal of the alliance which would divert an immediate Japanese danger and give Australia another chance to complete its national defences. The Council of Defence examined the new strategic conditions under the new arbitration clause would operate. The clause removed the fear of an Anglo-American war following from a Japanese-American war. However there was a possibility that Japan would make a similar arbitration arrangement with a third Power such as Germany. If Japan were to sign an arbitration treaty with some naval Power like Germany, the British Empire would not be able to count Japan as an ally in an Anglo-German war. The Council of Defence argued that:

> it will now always be possible for a conflict to take place in which the British Fleet will not be able to count on Japanese support.

Under these circumstances, the Council did not consider that "the mounting of Armour-Piercing guns at Sydney should depend solely upon Anglo-Japanese relations." Based on this strategic analysis, it concluded that the national defence of Australia should be further promoted despite the revised Anglo-Japanese alliance.

The renewed alliance never did make Pearce abandon or modify his rooted fear of Japan. While accepting the alliance, he urged the build-up of the defence forces. His conviction was further strengthened by his trip

---


291. The Minutes of the Council of Defence, 6 September 1911, Ibid.
to Japan following the Imperial Conference in 1911. On 29 June, Pearce, accompanied by E.L. Batchelor, left London for Germany, Russia, China, Japan and the Philippines. He paid an unofficial visit to Japan, visiting Yokohama, Tokyo, Nikko, Kamakura, Kyoto, Miyajima and Nagasaki. To Pearce, Tokyo was "very Europeanised and a crude raw ugly style of Europeanism." In Kyoto, he found Australia in the zoo where he saw "exiled the kangaroos and Emus worthily representing Australia in the animal kingdom." During his trip, he was impressed with the diligent and hard-working Japanese. Pearce wrote that the Japanese gave him "the impression of possessing wonderful alertness combined with untiring energy." Since the trip was not official, no exchange of views between Pearce and the Japanese government officials took place on the subject of immigration and defence.

After returning to Australia, Pearce in an address to the Brunswick Political Labour Council, spoke about his Far Eastern tours. His major attention was directed to Japan. He stated that preparations had to be made for "war" though the aim of the Labor party was peace. "Australia's future" would be "more largely affected by the nations to the north than any group of European powers." Europe was a month's journey from Australia, but it took "only eight days to go from Japan to Australia." In view of the future uncertainty after the termination of the alliance in 1921, it was imperative that "Australians should arm themselves to be in readiness for

292. DT, 1 July 1911.
293. "An account of Senator the Rt. Hon. G.F. Pearce return from England to Australia commencing on 29th June, 1911 via Germany, Russia, China, Japan and the Philippines," AWM Pearce Papers, Bundle 4, item 7, pp.20-29.
294. Ibid.; Argus, 25 August 1911. Before leaving London for his trip, Batchelor had mentioned that he would discuss some question relating to the Japanese immigrants and visitors with the Japanese government. When Batchelor and Pearce were travelling in Japan, the Attorney-General Hughes in Melbourne denied the statement of Batchelor. Hughes announced that Batchelor's visit to Japan was not connected with "the administration or the character of the Immigration Restriction Act." DT, 1, 19 July 1911.
any emergency."

The press reaction in Australia was generally in favour of the alliance. The Sydney Morning Herald praised the extension of the alliance and mentioned that "no event could be more welcome." It was pleased to see that the possibility of an Anglo-American war was removed by a new clause of a general arbitration clause. The arbitration clause made the alliance more acceptable to Australia. It asserted that:

The people of the Commonwealth have always recognised that the alliance neither conflicts with their fixed policy, of which the cardinal principle is the preservation of a White Australia; nor in any way diminishes their obligation to prepare for their own defence.

Had the national policy of Australia been endangered by the existence of the alliance, hostility to the alliance would "almost certainly have arisen."

As long as the alliance acted to restrain Japanese action in the Pacific, it would be "acceptable" to Australia. As a concluding remark, the SMH stated that:

the next ten years will give Australians time to test the value of their own resolves to become capable of self-defence. In 1921 we shall hope that the alliance will be again renewed, but we shall also hope to be able to face the possibility of its denunciation with confidence. 296

The SMH saw the alliance as the most important security arrangement in the Pacific. The Daily Telegraph had three editorials on the alliance between 17 and 19 July. Emphasising the significance of a general arbitration clause, it hoped that the Anglo-Japanese alliance would cease to "be an entangling alliance, while retaining all its efficacy as a peace-preserver in Eastern Asia." It admitted that in Australia there had been "the confident predictions that Japan would replace it by a German-Japanese Alliance"

295. Argus, 23 October 1911.
and that it was now "signally falsified." The DT defined the meaning of the alliance in terms of Australia's security:

She [Australia] may count with reasonable confidence upon a breathing space of ten years, during which she can develop her military and naval defences, and encourage an influx of immigrants to settle her empty protection against whatever dangers may be in store for her in the future.... Australians generally will regard the renewal of the alliance as a welcome respite rather than as a guarantee of lasting immunity.297

This opinion was exactly the same as that offered in the SMH. From the point of security, it expressed that Australia was greatly indebted to Britain for "protection embodied in British diplomatic policy - as in this extension of the alliance with Japan." In this particular sense, the DT mentioned that the alliance was "often and warmly acknowledged" in the political columns.298 On the other hand, the alliance enabled Japan to "grow more and more powerful, and increase in armaments as well as in population," until 1921 when Japan would be "truly formidable." While the alliance would protect Australia for the next ten years, it would also enable Japan to build up its defence powers. The DT argued that:

All the more reason for Australia to employ the next 10 years in building up her defensive strength with unremitting diligence. A decade is a very short period in the life of a nation - but it may be a very decisive period.299

The Brisbane Courier reached the same conclusion of SMH and DT and remarked that "The practical extension of the alliance to 1921 will probably enable those Australians who have been in dread of the Yellow Peril to sleep in their beds for another decade, and generally its effect on the world's peace would be satisfactory." It recognised the important change in the

new alliance which was designed to obviate any entanglement between Britain and the United States. In the next ten years, what Australians could do was to strengthen the national defence system.  

The Hobart Mercury pointed out that Britain would no longer be obliged under the alliance to fight against the United States in case of a US-Japanese war. The Mercury welcomed this revised alliance, which would "lose its dangerous aspect and ... come to be ... something in the nature of a guarantee of peace in the Far East." Then it hoped that the alliance would have a peaceful effect in the Pacific and would become "a means of improving the commercial relations."  

The renewal of the alliance, coming so unexpectedly, had a tendency to drown for a while the anti-Japanese voice of the Bulletin. Before the middle of 1911, the Bulletin had persistently criticised Japanese policy and actions claiming that Japan would not agree to an extension of the alliance in 1915. Since the fact of the renewal cut the ground from under the Bulletin's feet, this weekly ceased attacking the alliance. This might even represent a silent recognition of the alliance by the Bulletin. Whatever the reason for this brief respite, this policy of restrained view lasted less than six months. In the spectrum of Australian opinion, the Bulletin was of little importance. Looking at the overall response both of the politicians and the press, it is clear that the alliance in 1911 was as popular as the first and second alliance of 1902 and 1905. Australians valued the diplomatic influence which the alliance gave the British Empire.

CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION

From 1896 to 1911, Japan began to play a major role in Australia's foreign relations. In the field of immigration, Japan became the central concern of Australian politicians; the parliamentary debates on the Immigration Restriction Bill of 1901, which laid the basis for Australia's immigration policy for more than 50 years, concentrated on the Japanese. Simultaneously, Australia viewed Japan as the most important potential market in its plans to expand trade in the Asian and Pacific region. In the broad context of Australia's foreign and defence policy, the Russo-Japanese war was a turning point. Australia's recognition of Japan as the most formidable naval power in the Pacific caused it to see Japan as a military threat. After 1905, Japan, which up to that time had been considered primarily in connection with immigration and trade policies, became also the focus of attention in the area of national security. After 1905, fear of Japan was at the centre of Australia's defence policy.

From 1896 to 1904, the two most important issues in Australia-Japan relations were immigration and trade, and these two issues were closely intertwined. Before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war, Australia was fearful, not of Japan's military strength, but of a possible influx of Japanese migrants to Australia. The Japanese immigration question was an important issue in the colonial and federal Parliaments. The question first came to the fore as a diplomatic issue in 1894 following the signing of the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty. The Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty not only promised preferential treatment of Australian goods if the Australian colonies adhered to the treaty, but also assured free entry and residence for people of both contracting parties. Thus the question
of the colonies' adherence to the treaty was considered not only as a commercial question, but also in light of the White Australia policy. The maintenance of the White Australia policy was considered to be far more important than the possible growth of trade with Japan. Furthermore, since Australia's major exports were primary products which had low import duties or no duties in Japan, there was no urgent need for the Australian colonies to sign the treaty.

Australia discussed the Sino-Japanese war in immigration and commercial terms. The colonial debates on the war almost ignored the strategic implications of the war for Australian security. When Jack Shepherd argues that the Sino-Japanese war was the turning point of Australia's attitude to Japan and that Australians from that time regarded Japan as a new "menace" in the Pacific, his argument, being totally based on John Plummer's articles in the Japan Daily Mail, does not give an accurate picture of the Australian reaction to the war. Rather the Australian colonial leaders when they perceived that a number of Japanese warships were to be diverted from military operations to commercial service in the Pacific, looked to an expansion of trade between the Australian colonies and Japan. Indeed the first practical effect of the war on Australia was the opening of a direct steamship service of NYK, subsidized by the Japanese government, between the Australian colonies and Japan.

It was, however, feared that the establishment of this shipping service would also contribute to an increase in the number of Japanese migrants to Australia. Since NYK had assisted an emigration company Nippon Yoshisa Imin Gaisha in promoting Japanese emigration business, there were solid

1 Jack Shepherd, Australia's Interests and Policies in the Far East, New York, 1939, p.7.
grounds for believing that Australia might, sooner or later, face an influx of Japanese immigration. Despite Japan willingness to concede to Australia the right to restrict the entry of Japanese labourers and artisans all the Australian colonies except Queensland declined to adhere to the commercial treaty. After federation, the Commonwealth governments persisted with this policy. Defying the unanimous resolution reached at the 1896 Inter-Colonial Conference, the Queensland government took independent action and secretly adhered to the treaty. The lesson learned from Queensland's action intensified the need for a unified immigration restriction policy. This was one of the chief reasons prompting the Barton government to introduce the first federal immigration restriction bill in 1901. The parliamentary debates on the bill took place mainly in terms of the exclusion of Japanese.

In its external commercial relations, Australia demonstrated a consistent desire to promote trade not only with Britain and the British Empire but also with foreign countries such as Japan. While relying greatly upon the existing trade links with the British Empire, both the colonial governments and the first federal governments attempted to diversify Australia's trade. Australian governments adopted a trade diversification policy to solve the unstable demand-supply relationship of Australia's staple products, in particular wool. To maintain price stability and to earn foreign income, the Australian governments, before and after the federation, sought to find new and reliable overseas markets. In pursuing the goal of diversification, Australia looked to Japan as one of the potentially large markets for Australia's primary goods, particularly wool. Japan was becoming attractive as a market because it was in process of industrialisation which required it to import substantial quantities of primary products. Moreover the two wars in which Japan was engaged between 1894 and 1905, boosted the demand for Australian wool. Japan's wool imports increased rapidly to meet the
needs for military overcoats. Following these wars, the woollen coat gained wide acceptance and led to a strong demand for the Australian products. After the Japanese established a direct and regular steamship line service between Australia and Japan, Australians hoped that bilateral trade would become much easier and closer.

The Australian States decided to promote closer economic relationship by appointing state commercial agents to the Far East. The NSW decision to appoint the commercial agents E. Whiteley and J.B. Suttor to Japan was the most notable response to this new economic interest. Suttor's success in fostering bilateral trade between NSW and Japan was so envied by Victoria, South Australia and Queensland, that all three states offer to join in a common commercial agency in Japan. While the proposal of a joint commercial agency, for a variety of internal political reasons, did not bear fruit, it nevertheless testified to the success of Suttor. Mastering the Japanese language, he was able to penetrate the Japanese commercial society and establish strong ties with the leading trading firms in Japan. Suttor was able to supply up-to-date Japanese commercial intelligence news to businessmen and government officials, and was able to keep the NSW and federal governments informed about Japanese attitudes towards Australia. His reports were published and appreciated in all states. From time to time, Suttor's remarks and suggestions were communicated to the federal government by the successive NSW Premiers. He was critical of the White Australia policy because of the adverse effect he felt it had on Australia-Japan commercial relations. Although he never rejected the significance of the White Australia policy for Australia's nation-building, he considered that the insensitive application of the policy to Japanese was unnecessary and harmful. His representations on this issue in 1904 revived the Australia-Japan negotiations on the Passport Agreement which
allowed Japanese merchants to enter Australia without passing the European
dictation test. Furthermore he advocated Australia's adherence to the
1894 Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty in order that Australia's products
could compete more effectively with those of the United States and Canada.
Suttor, however, failed to overcome the federal government's fear about
the free entry of Japanese into Australia which was guaranteed under Article
I of the treaty. In a way, Suttor's position in Japan was increasingly similar
to that of Dr G.E. Morrison, a correspondent of the *Times* in Peking and
later an adviser to the Chinese government, who came to identify very
closely with the Chinese. While Suttor was serving Australian interests
in Japan, he came to sympathize with the Japanese and seemed sometimes
to argue a Japanese point of view in his commercial reports.

Despite its opposition to the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty, the
federal government was willing to make some concessions to appease Japanese
feeling, concessions which it hoped would facilitate trade relations. To
this end, the federal government firstly attempted through direct negotiation
to reach an understanding with Japan which would make it easier for businessmen,
tourists, and students to enter Australia. In 1904 Australia signed the Passport
Agreement with Japan for this purpose. In contrast to the view suggested
by some students of this question such as A.T. Yarwood, and N.K. Meaney,
it is clear that the Passport Agreement of 1904 was entered into for commercial
not strategic reasons. It was only at the end of the Russo-Japanese war
that Australia's decision-makers started considering the strategic aspect
of the Japanese presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Recognising Japan
as an ally of Britain, the major factor behind the conclusion of the Passport
Agreement was Australia's desire for trade expansion.
In 1906, the Commonwealth government under Prime Minister Deakin's leadership did make overtures to Japan about joining the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty. Deakin was influenced to take this step, partly by Japan's enhanced status in the Pacific, partly by the 1905 renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which strengthened ties between Japan and the British Empire, and partly by his desire that Australian goods should not suffer in comparison with those of the United States and Canada which had already signed the treaty. Deakin proposed that Australia should adhere to the treaty if Japan would agree to drop Article I of the treaty and admit Australia's supreme right to restrict Japanese. The Australian government insisted that trade and immigration policy should be kept separate. In terms of negotiation methods, Deakin adopted, what Watanabe calls, "the Queensland method," that is he wished to regulate Japanese immigration by a bilateral agreement and to regulate the trade under a commercial treaty. The Japanese government had from 1904 shown willingness to accept this method, but the Australian government had put them off. When however the Deakin government in 1906 offered to negotiate Australia's adherence to the Commercial treaty following the Queensland method, the Japanese government had changed its mind. Since Japan's defeat of Russia in 1905 which established its naval supremacy in the Pacific, it had demanded that Australia should sign the commercial treaty unconditionally. The Japanese claim was further strengthened by Canada's unconditional adherence to

---

2 Watanabe Akio, "Osutoria no Taigaitaido no Kihonteki Patan: Tainichi Kankei wo Chūshin ni" (The Basic Pattern of Australia's Attitudes to External Problems: With Special Reference to Japan) in Royama Michio (ed.), Nichi-Gō Kankei no Shakaiteki Kiso (The Societal Foundation of Japanese-Australian Relations), Tokyo, 1981.
the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty. Although Deakin's approach to
Japan was based on the Queensland precedent, there was a sharp difference
between Deakin's proposal for regulating Japanese immigration and Queensland
practice. While the Queensland government accepted Japanese labourers,
artisans, merchants, students and tourists under the 1900 agreement, Deakin's
idea was to accept only temporary visitors such as merchants, students
and tourists under a new bilateral agreement. This was nothing but a mere
repetition of the 1904 Passport Agreement in another form. Thus in effect
Deakin was seeking a more restrictive settlement than the Queensland
arrangement had provided for, while the Japanese were seeking more liberal
arrangement. This is why the 1906 negotiation broke down.

In the year between 1902 and 1905, Australia's strategic relations
with Japan took on a new character. The major factors shaping the new
character were firstly the conclusion of the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance
and its renewal in 1905, secondly Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese
war and the emergence of Japan as the supreme naval power in the Pacific,
and thirdly Britain's decision to withdraw its major naval forces from the
Pacific to the North Sea in order to cope with a German naval challenge.
These factors when taken together produced a new and more threatening
aspect to Australia's perception of Japan. The 1902 alliance impressed
on Australia, for the first time, the strategic importance of Japan in the
Pacific. The alliance marked the end of British isolation and Australia
came under its protective umbrella. The alliance was welcomed because
it increased Britain's naval capacity to counter the common enemy, Russia.
The alliance was also appreciated from a commercial point of view, since
it was hoped it would contribute to an increase in Australia-Japan trade.
Australia's conclusion of a Passport Agreement with Japan in 1904 took
place in the atmosphere created by the alliance and was an acknowledgment
of that country's new importance for Australia's trade. This amicable approach to Japan changed drastically after the Russo-Japanese war. Japan's dominant naval position coupled with the withdrawal of British naval forces caused Australia to take a new look at Japan. As a result of these developments, Australia accepted the second alliance of 1905 with mixed feelings. The fear that Australia might be swept by Japanese immigrants was converted into the new fear that a Japanese army might invade Australia. Australians feared that Japan would expand its power to Asia and the South Pacific and that Australia might be a future target of Japanese imperialism, especially if the Anglo-Japanese Alliance should be terminated.

Of all the countries in the region Japan was the most assertive. Japan alone persisted in seeking changes to the White Australia policy and pressed its suit on the Commonwealth government not only through its representatives in Australia but also through its Ambassador in London. Numerous allegations of Japanese espionage in Australia were evidence of how Australia's fear of Japan almost took on hysterical proportions after 1905. The US-Japanese friction, initially caused by the presence of the Japanese immigrants in California and developed further by the cruise of the US Great White Fleet, helped confirm this Australian view that the Pacific was becoming a centre of international conflict. Furthermore the Japanese immigration troubles in California suggested that Australia might have to face similar difficulties unless the federal government upheld the White Australia policy.

For Australia after 1905 the Anglo-Japanese alliance posed problems. While Australia restricted the entry of Japanese on racial grounds, it found itself as a result of the alliance formally depending upon Japan for its security. At least this is how Britain saw the alliance operating in the Pacific. The Australians were disturbed that Britain had removed its battleships from the Pacific and left the protection of its interests in the hands of the Japanese
navy. Many were sceptical about Japan's willingness to act as Britain's partner in the Pacific. Some thought that Japan might break up the treaty when it suited it and attack Australia. Others considered that once the alliance came to an end and the diplomatic restraint was taken away, Japan would take advantage of its dominant position to push its interests and even bring naval pressure to bear on Australia. These changes in international relations in the Pacific alarmed Australia's decision-makers. Under these conditions, Australian policy-makers were compelled to consider how they could maintain the core of the White Australia policy, achieve national security and avoid Japanese aggression.

To cope with these new international tensions, Australia's decision-makers adopted three policies toward Japan. As a short-range policy, Australia tried to pursue conciliatory measures such as an amendment of the Immigration Restriction Act in 1905 which would ease friction with Japan. As a medium-range policy, Australia accepted and supported the continuation of the alliance. Although the Japanese were unpopular in Australia, the Australian government accepted that the alliance acted as some kind of restrictions on Japanese ambitions in the South Pacific. There was always concern over what would happen to Australia if the alliance were to be terminated and this state of mind led the decision-makers to introduce a comprehensive defence policy. As a long-range policy, Australia sought to build its own national defence power against a future Japanese invasion by introducing compulsory military training and constructing Australia's own navy. In addition to these measures, Australia invited the United States Fleet to Australia for the purpose of strengthening the Anglo-Saxon solidarity against the common enemy, Japan. After 1905 Australia's fear of Japanese military power caused its political leaders to adopt an aggressive attitude towards Japan. The best example of this unfriendly attitude was Deskin's Pacific
Pact proposal which was intended to contain Japanese expansion in the Pacific region. Successive Australian governments perceived the Japanese problem in similar terms. Regardless of their political party affiliations, they analysed Australia's strategic position in terms of fear and adopted almost identical measures in defence and foreign policy aimed at averting the Japanese threat.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Primary Sources

1. Official Unpublished Records

(a) Australia

i. Australian Archives, Canberra

CA 1: Governor-General's Office, 1901-.
   CP 78/ 1 Correspondence relating mainly to Imperial
         Matters, 1901-1912.

CA 7: Department of External Affairs I, 1901-1916.
   CRS A1 Correspondence Files, Annual Single
            Number Series, 1903-1938.

   A6 Correspondence Files, Annual Single
          Number Series, 1901.

   A8 Correspondence Files, Folio System,
          1901-1902.

   A981 Japan, Pt. I, II.

CA 12: Prime Minister's Department, 1911-1971.

   CP 103/ 12 Records of Imperial Conference, 1897-1933.

   CP 290/ 15 Papers extracted from the Records of
            the Governor-General, 1903-1926.


   13 do.

   447/ 2 Correspondence Files, 'Secret and Confidential,'
          1918-1926 (E.L. Piesse Papers).

   CRS A 1108 Pacific Branch: Volumes of 'Correspondence
            and Papers' relating to External Affairs,
            assembled by the Director, Pacific Branch,
            Major E.L. Piesse, c. 1920-1921.

   A 2219 Pacific Branch: Volumes of Papers on
          'External Relations,' 1918-1923.

   A 2939 Correspondence Files, Secret and Confidential
          Series (First System), 1914-1918.

   A 3932 Correspondence Files, Secret and Confidential
          Series (Second System), 1918-1926.

   A 3934 Correspondence Files, Secret and Confidential
          Series (Old Files), 1926.
**CA 15:** Department of Home and Territories, 1916-1928.

**CRS A1** Correspondence Files, Annual Single Number System, 1903-1938.

**Department of Army**

**CRS A2653** Minutes of Military Board, 1907-1951.

**Council of Defence**

**CRS A2032/XR** Minutes, Council of Defence, May 1905-Feb. 1915.

### ii. Australian Archives, Melbourne

**CRS B 168:** Correspondence Files, Annual Single Number Series, 1901-1906.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01/5370</td>
<td>Joint Naval and Military Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/25</td>
<td>Question of Recruiting Permanent Artillery in order to send Necessary Relief to Thursday Island.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>442</td>
<td>Thursday Island, Arrangement to Combat expected Domestic Violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>618</td>
<td>Narrative of Instructional Operations by a Cavalry Division, Remarks by Hutton.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1652</td>
<td>Military Committee of Inquiry, 1901.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1696</td>
<td>Visits of Foreign Warships. (2) Japanese Officer from Visiting Warships. (3) Japanese Training Squadron.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/1149</td>
<td>Colonial Defence Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1156</td>
<td>(1) Thursday Island Cable System. (2) do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5589</td>
<td>Submarine Mine Defence, Memo by Creswell.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6238 Hutton's Speech.

6941 Overseas Trips by Naval Personnel.
(1) Russo-Japanese War.
(2) Japan.

04/32 Attachments relating to Russo-Japanese War.
(1) - (9).

184 Council of Defence and Board.
(1) 'The Defence of Australia,' Deakin.
(2) List of Permanent Officers.
(3) do.
(4) Comments by Chief of Intelligence.

04/4272 Thursday Island.

4319 Administration of Defence Forces.
(2) Military Board.

6259 Naval and Military Resources, 1905.

7084 Distribution of Intelligence.

05/5018 Council of Defence.

6276 Remarks by Chief of Intelligence, on Deakin's Interview.

06/17 Report by Creswell.

5033 Books for Defence Department.

5178 Thursday Island.

CRS B 173: Secret Correspondence Files, Annual Single Number Series with S(Secret) Prefix, 1905-1907.

S 05/111 Matters of Deakin Interview.

144 Reports by Chief of Intelligence.

187 Reports of Bridges, Creswell.

S 06/54 General Scheme of Defence (C.I.D.)

58 Report of C.I.D.

60 do.

66 General Scheme of Defence (Bridges).
1810/1/80  C.I.D. Memo.

1821/1/124  Air Defence, For Dominion Air Forces.

129  Supply of Information to Consular Representation.

1850/1/7  Taking Extracts from Secret Documents.

20  Method of dealing with Secret Documents.

32  Official Correspondence for the East.

33  Documents and Papers return to by Treasurer.

1851/2/18  Constitution of Council of Defence.

19  Meeting of Council of Defence, 1912.

34  Re Council of Defence.

46  Memorandum, Council of Defence.

60  Personnel No.1, Standing Committee. Council of Defence.

81  German Possessions in the Pacific.

98  Position of Administrator, German New Guinea.


1855/1/6  Review of Naval and Military Consideration, Commonwealth.

56  Premiers Conference, Agenda Papers.

58  Protection of Australia.

82  General Principle of Imperial Defence.

1856/4/156  Strategic Position of Australia and New Zealand.

382  Thursday Island, Defence Scheme.

388  do.
427 Amendments of Defence Scheme, 1919.


5/ 15 Protection against Espionage (Japanese).

32 Iron Deposits at Yampi Sound, Western Australia.

55 Summaries of Articles taken from the Vernacular Press, Japan.

60 Japanese in Java, 1917.

69 Message sent from Japanese Warships.

81 Intelligence Notes on German South Pacific Islands occupied by Japanese, 1918.

109 South Sea Islands.

144 Relations between Australia and Japan, 1919.

152 Japan and Racial Discrimination, 1919.


172 Defence of Australia (Naval Staff), 1920–1921.

220 Thursday Island, Department of Defence, 1923–1924.

1880/1/ 15 Oil Discoveries in Late German New Guinea.

30 Bulk Shortage of Oil.

1889/2/256 Foreign Ships Movements.

289 Entry of Allied War Vessels.

1894/6/131 Naval Proposals, 1909.

1997/2/179 Intelligence Officer to Papua New Guinea.
2021/1/ 6 Transfer of Intelligence Centre
Sydney, 1913.
9 Naval Intelligence.
140 Naval Board.
154 Censorship Incident, Queensland
Hansard, 1918.
243 Netherlands East Indies, 1919.
250 Current Events in Philippines, 1919.
251 Secret Service Funds, 1919.
260 Naval Intelligence.
363 Visit of Casey to U.K. and Canada,
1923.
461 Intelligence, Far East, 1925.

2022/1/ 3 Proposal to purchase Japanese
Property in German New Guinea.

CRS B 198: Subject Index Cards for Correspondence Files,
Multiple Number Series, 1906-1917.

2173/1/- Foreign, Japanese Squadron.

MP 84-1: General Correspondence, 1906-1913.
720 / 7/ 31 Thursday Island.
799 / 1/ 28 do.
63 do.
64 do.
3/ 68 do.
96 Payment to R.A.G.A. men under Immigration Act.
129 Thursday Island.
189 do.
4/ 1 do.
3 do.
6/ 44 do.
10/ 26 do.
1856/1/79 Japanese on Northern Australia.
88 Defence of Northern Australia.
2/20 Report on Swiss Military System
7/505 Article 'The Scotsman' re Australian and Japanese.
1877/3/8 Alien Population at Broome.
5 re Jap. Espionage.
18 Visit of Japan, Training Ships to Western Australia.
23 Japanese Activity in Western Australia.
1901/6/3 Lord Kitchener's Report.
5 do.
9 Thursday Island.
1954/1/8 History of Russo-Japanese War from War Office.
74 'History of Japanese War.'
80 Reports of British Officers on Russo-Japanese War.
344 'Russo-Japanese War' by Ross to be ordered for Library.
2021/1/35 Creation of Secret Intelligence Service proposed.
2215/6/64 Foreign Cruisers in Pacific.
2310/1/69 do.

MP 729/1
00/51 Thursday Island.
00/3063 Council of Defence, 1899.

MP 1049/1: Department of Navy, Secret and Confidential Files, 1911-1922.
13/022 Thursday Island.
0245 Activity of Japanese at Western Australia.
0269 Japanese Photographer at Thursday Island.
0286 Admiralty Island, Japanese.
0326 Japanese in German New Guinea.
14/0449 Japanese Naval Intelligence Officer.
0461 Australian Claims, Japanese.
16/0230 Japanese Fishermen, Western Australia.
17/0117 Japanese Cruisers.
18/0477 Australian Monroe Doctrine, Speech by Hughes, Comments by Japan.
0491 White Australia and Japan's Press.
0526 Illicit Entry of Japanese.
0789 Intelligence Notes on Japan.
19/ 057 Visit of Japanese Squadron.
075 Visit of Japanese Officers.
079 Japanese Army.
0118 Japan-U.S. Policies in the Pacific.
0153 Japan's Acquisition, Pacific.
0171 Information concerning Japan's Ship.
0213 Japan's Mission to U.S.
20/ 039 Japan in Ladrones.
047 Japan's Trade in Pacific.
053 Thursday Island.
057 Japan's Wireless Station in Rabaul.
088 Intelligence Branch Report on Japan.
089 The Occupied Mandate Islands.
090 Japanese, South Sea Islands.
093 Japan and Australia.
094 Japan's Naval and Military.
20/0256 Intelligence, Japan and Alliance.
0259 Intelligence Reports, Far East.
0468 Japanese Navy.
0471 Japanese Rioting at Broome.
21/066 Japanese Naval Estimate.
0125 Japanese in the Pacific.
0136 Thursday Island Intelligence.
0428 Mandate to Japan.

iii. New South Wales State Archives, Sydney

Premier's Department.

Correspondence (1): Letters Received, 1907/1934.

9/1943 A-77, 1926.
X2033 Premier's Department Record Register, 1911.
X2034 Premier's Office Index, 1912.
X2041 Premier's Office Register, 1912.

4683–4687

Correspondence (2): Letters Received: Special Bundles, 1895-1973.

1/1015 Procurement of Information concerning Japan's Interests in the Pacific (Correspondence with Suttor), 1917-1920.

4/6260.1 Subsidy to Sydney to Java and Singapore Steamship Service, 1907-1911.


Colonial Secretary.

Index of Correspondence.

5/2609 Colonial Secretary's Index to Correspondence, 1905.
iv. Queensland State Archives, Brisbane

Premier's Department.


PRE 102, 105.

(b) Japan (Diplomatic Record Office, Tokyo)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JFMA</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1.1.1</td>
<td>Statement of new Foreign Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu to Japanese Envoy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.2.12</td>
<td>Japanese Foreign Relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.4.2</td>
<td>Direct Communications between British Government and Japanese Consul re Diplomatic Affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.3.3-1-12</td>
<td>Foreign Policy File: Australia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.3.8</td>
<td>International Affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.1.35</td>
<td>Public Relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.1.35-1</td>
<td>Public Relations, Part-time Employee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.1.35-1-1</td>
<td>Public Relations, Japanese.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.1.35-1-2</td>
<td>Public Relations, Foreigners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.1.35-2</td>
<td>Public Relations, Expense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.1.35-2-2</td>
<td>Public Relations, Canada and Australia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.2.6</td>
<td>Foreign Language Newspapers in Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.2.12</td>
<td>G. Morrison of the Times.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.2.15-4</td>
<td>Report re Editorials of Foreign Newspapers, Australia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.2.21-4</td>
<td>Instruction re Research on Newspapers' Principle, Owners, Editors and Influence in Australia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6.3.2-6</td>
<td>Domestic Politics, Britain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6.3.2-23</td>
<td>Domestic Politics, Australia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6.3.9</td>
<td>Foundation of the Commonwealth of Australia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6.2.17-9</td>
<td>Domestic Affairs, Sydney.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6.3.20</td>
<td>Management of Diplomatic Matters.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.6.3.22 Research on Foreign Political Parties.
1.6.3.23 Report re Politics of Foreign Countries.
1.6.3.32 Racial Problems.

JFMA  2.1.1.7 The 1st Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Matsumoto Records).
2.1.1.12 The 2nd Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Matsumoto Records).
2.1.1.25 The 3rd Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Matsumoto Records).
2.1.1.25-1 The Alliance and Foreign Public Opinion, 1910-1917.
2.1.1.43 Renewal of the Alliance.
2.4.2.2 Abolition of Racial Discrimination and the Paris Peace Conference. Re Japanese Policy and Attitudes, see Vol. 3.

JFMA 3.2.1.20 Communication from Agriculture Ministry re Promotion of Japanese Exports, 1904.
3.2.1.25 Promotion of Japan's Trade, 1909-1921.
3.2.4.14 Re Consular Reports, 1897-1901.
3.2.4.23 Foreign Press Comments on Japan's Trade.
3.2.4.40 Current Situation of Japan's Trade.
3.2.4.45 Reports re Foreign Trade: Australia.
3.3.9.13 Reports of Japanese Commercial Commissioners, London and Hong Kong.
3.4.6.3 Japanese Enterprise in the South Sea.
3.5.8.56 Queensland's Acts re Pearl-Fishery.
3.6.1.9 Australia's Navigation Bill, 1903-1904.
3.6.10.26 Australia's Postal Bill affecting Australia-Japan Mail Service.
3.8.1.3 Japanese Regulation for Protecting Emigrants.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.8.1.5</td>
<td>Regulation of Emigrants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8.1.8</td>
<td>do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8.1.11</td>
<td>Emigration Policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8.2.2</td>
<td>Emigration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8.2.27</td>
<td>Nippon Yoshisa Emigration Company, Business Correspondence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8.2.33</td>
<td>Japanese Immigration Restriction in Australia, 1893-1921, 9 vols.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8.6.19</td>
<td>Takekoshi Yosaburō's Visit to Indochina, the Strait Colonies, the Philippines and the Dutch Colonies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.9.2.3</td>
<td>Consular Reports on Immigration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.9.3.12</td>
<td>Foreign Employee at Japanese Consulates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFMA 4.1.6.5</td>
<td>Allegations of Japanese Espionage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.8.41</td>
<td>Fleet Cruise of Foreign Countries, the United States, 3 vols.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.8.47</td>
<td>Naval Power in the East.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFMA 6.1.2.28</td>
<td>Establishment of Japanese Consulates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.5.6-32</td>
<td>Appointment of Consuls at Townsville and Sydney.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.6.29</td>
<td>Consular Reports of Sydney and Townsville.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.8.7</td>
<td>Name List of Foreign Representatives in Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.8.30</td>
<td>Foreign Commercial Commissioners in Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.1.5</td>
<td>Bestowal of Sacred Treasurer upon Foreigners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFMA 7.1.6.4</td>
<td>Gaikō Yoshō (Diplomatic Reports).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.6.5</td>
<td>Gaikō Ihō (Diplomatic Reports).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(c) Great Britain (Public Record Office, London)

Cab. 1: Miscellaneous Records, 1866-1922.

Vol. 3/36 Alien Immigration, 1902.

Cab. 3: Memoranda, 1901-1939.

Vol. 2/2/42A Invasion, Note by the Secretary, 1907.
42B Invasion, Letter from Mr Balfour, 1907.
42C Invasion, Notes on Invasion supplied to Mr Balfour, 1907.
43A Statement by A.J. Balfour before the Sub-Committee on Invasion, 1908.
44A Invasion, Report of a Sub-Committee appointed by the Prime Minister to reconsider the Question of Oversea Attack, 1908.
78A Attack on the British Isles from Oversea, Memorandum by the Secretary, 1914.

Cab. 4: Memoranda, 1901-1939.

13B Memorandum by Intelligence Division (War Office), 1903.
68B The Anglo-Japanese Agreement, Memorandum by General Staff, 1905.

Cab. 5: Memoranda, 1901-1939.

64C Australia: Scale of Attack, 1911.
65C Canada: Scale of Attack on Pacific Coast, 1911.
66C Hong Kong: Standard of Defence, 1911.
68C Canada: Scale of Attack on Prince Rupert, 1911.
69C Australia: Scale of Attack, 1911.

72C Memorandum on the Strategic Relations existing between the U.K. and the Overseas Dominions and India, 1911.

75C Canada: Scale of Attack, 1911.

76C Australia: Scale of Attack under Existing Conditions, 1911.

77C New Zealand: Scale of Attack under Existing Conditions, 1911.

78C Australia and New Zealand: Strategic Situation in the Event of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance being determined, 1911.

79C South Africa: Scale of Attack, 1911.


Cab. 11: C.I.D. Colonial/Oversea Defence Committee, Defence Schemes.


Cab. 17: Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers, 1902-1918.

Vol. 9 Commonwealth Co-operation in Naval Defence of the Empire, 1912-1913.


Vol.54 Japan in Relation to Russia, 1903-1908.


Vol.74 Renewal of Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1911.


133 do.

142 do.

143 do.

146 Alien Immigration, 1901.

Vol. 60/1  Anglo-Japanese Agreement, 1902.

3 do.

4 do.

5 do.

10 do.

11 do.

12 do.

14 do.

16 do.

17 do.

33 do.

40 Alien Immigration, 1902.

Vol. 67/79 Alien Immigration, 1903.

83 Naval Policy, 1903.


Vol. 89/74 Foreign Office Views on the Redistribution of the Navy, 1907.

Vol. 100/98 Imperial Conference on Defence: Admiralty Memorandum, 1909.

99 Naval Programme, 1909.

Vol. 11/ 6  Australia: General Scheme of Defence, 1906.

Vol. 14/ 7  Statement made by A.J. Balfour before the Sub-Committee on Invasion, 1908.

          10  Minutes of 100th Meeting (Report of the Sub-Committee on Invasion), 1908.

          11  Invasion: Report of a Sub-Committee on Invasion to reconsider the Question of Oversea Attack, 1908.

Vol. 17/ 2  Australia: Scale of Attack, 1911.

          3  Canada: Scale of Attack on Pacific Coast, 1911.

          5  Minutes of 108th Meeting, 1911.

          9  Australia: Scale of Attack under Existing Conditions, 1911.

          10  Canada: Scale of Attack on Prince Rupert, 1911.

          11  Australia: Scale of Attack, 1911.

          13  Report of a Sub-Committee of C.I.D., 1911.

          16  Minutes of 109th Meeting, 1911.

          21  Canada: Scale of Attack on Prince Rupert, 1911.

          16  New Zealand: Scale of Attack under Existing Conditions, 1911.

Vol. 18/27  Australia and New Zealand: Strategic Situation in the Event of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance being determined, 1911.

          28  South Africa: Scale of Attack, 1911.

          29  Minutes of 110th Meeting, 1911.

          33  Co-operation between the Naval Forces of the U.K. and Dominions, 1911.

          40  Minutes of 111th Meeting, 1911.
41 Minutes of 112th Meeting, 1911.
42 Minutes of 113th Meeting, 1911.
44 Co-operation between the Naval Forces of the U.K. and Dominions, 1911.

Vol. 23/ 9 Minutes of 122nd Meeting, 1913.
Vol. 24/ 19 Minutes of 123rd Meeting, 1913.

CO 418: Original Correspondence, Australia, 1889-1922.

1896/ Vol. 3.
1897/ Vol. 4.
1901/ Vol. 9, 10, 16.
1902/ Vol. 18, 19, 23.
1903/ Vol. 26, 29.
1904/ Vol. 31, 34.
1905/ Vol. 36, 37, 41, 42, 43.
1906/ Vol. 44, 45, 49.
1907/ Vol. 52, 56, 57.
1908/ Vol. 60, 61, 65, 66.
1909/ Vol. 70, 71, 76.
1910/ Vol. 78, 79, 80, 84, 85.
1911/ Vol. 88, 89, 90, 95, 96.
1913/ Vol. 110, 111, 118, 119.
1914/ Vol. 122, 123, 128, 129.
1915/ Vol. 132, 133, 134, 140, 141, 142.
1917/ Vol. 157, 158, 159, 164, 165.
1919/ Vol. 176, 177, 178, 183.
CO 532: Dominion Office, Original Correspondence.

1908/ Vol. 5, 6, 7, 9, 10.
1909/ Vol.13, 14, 15, 16, 19.
1910/ Vol.21, 22, 16.
1911/ Vol.27, 28, 29, 30.

CO 537: Original Supplementary Correspondence, Australia.

Vol. 459 Australia, Limits of Australian Naval Station, 1911.


Vol. 576 Dominions, Representation of the Dominions on the Committee of Imperial Defence, 1912.

Vol.577 do.

CO 881: Confidential Print, Australia, 1833-1923.


CO 885: Confidential Print, Dominions, Miscellaneous.

Vol. 6, No.111 Conference with Colonial Premiers, 1897.

Vol. 8, No.144 Colonial Conference, 1902; Record of Proceedings, and Papers laid before Conference.

No.158 Immigration of Asiatics into the Colonies; Correspondence, 1902-1903.

Vol.17, No.189 Emigration, Report by H.C.M. Lambert on His Visit to Australia and New Zealand, 1905-1906.

No.195 Colonial Conference, 1907; Memoranda and Correspondence printed for the Conference and not circulated, 1902-1907.

Vol.18, No.198 Colonial Conference of 1907; Question of Inviting the Australian States; Memorandum by Mr Churchill, 1907.
| Vol. 1, No. 1 | Dominions, Self-Governing Dominions and Coloured Immigration; Memorandum by C. Lucas, 1908. |
| No. 2 | Dominions, Suggestions as to Coloured Immigration into the Dominions; by C. Lucas, 1908. |
| No. 3 | Dominions, Treatment of Asiatics in the Dominions; Correspondence, 1897-1909. |
| No. 5 | Dominions, Imperial Conference; Correspondence, 1907-1908. |
| No. 6 | Dominions, Question of Treaties as affecting Dominions; Memorandum by Mr Keith, 1908. |
| No. 7 | Dominions, Imperial Conference; Further Correspondence, 1908-1909. |
| Vol. 2, No. 10 | Treatment of Asiatics; Further Correspondence, 1909. |
| No. 11 | Imperial Conference; Further Correspondence, 1908-1909. |
| No. 12 | Extracts from Proceedings of Colonial Conferences relating to Defence, 1887-1907. |
| No. 13 | Conference on Naval and Military Defence; Correspondence relating to Summoning, 1909. |
| No. 14 | Proposed Formation of an Imperial General Staff; Correspondence, 1909. |
| No. 15 | Defence Conference, 1909; Minutes of Proceedings. |
| No. 16 | Defence Conference, 1909; Confidential Papers laid before the Conference. |
| No. 17 | Defence Conference, 1909; Minutes of Sub-Conferences at the Admiralty. |
| Vol. 3, No. 19 | Imperial Conference; Further Correspondence, 1909-1911. |
| Vol. 4, No.21 | Treatment of Asiatics; Further Correspondence, 1910-1911. |
| No.25 | Imperial Conference, 1911: Organisation of the Colonial Office; Memorandum. |
| No.26 | Self-Governing Dominions and Coloured Immigration; Memorandum by Mr Just, 1910. |
| No.29 | Proposed Reorganisation of the Colonial Office; Memorandum by C. Lucas, 1910. |
| No.30 | Summary showing Action taken on Resolutions of Conference of 1907 and Other Matters affecting the Dominions, 1910. |
| No.31 | Merchant Shipping Legislation; Memorandum by Mr Keith, 1910. |
| Vol.5A, No.35 | Imperial Conference, 1911; Reorganisation of the Colonial Office; Memorandum by Mr Just. |
| No.36 | Imperial Conference, 1911; Memorandum showing proposed Action of His Majesty's Government on Resolutions proposed by Dominion Governments. |
| Vol.5B, No.38 | Imperial Conference, 1911; Minutes of Proceedings. |
| Vol. 6, No.44 | Treatment of Asiatics in the Dominions; Further Correspondence, 1912-1913. |
| No.45 | Imperial Conference; Further Correspondence, 1912-1913. |
| Vol. 6, No.46 | Naval and Military Defence; Correspondence, 1911-1912. |
| No.47 | do. |

**FO 46: Japan, General Correspondence (In Letters).**

<p>| Vol. 468 | do. |
| Vol. 469 | do. |
| Vol. 470 | do. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vol.</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>471</td>
<td>do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>475</td>
<td>Sir E. Satow, Commercial Treaty, 1896.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>481</td>
<td>Sir E. Satow, Diplomatic, 1897.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>482</td>
<td>do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>483</td>
<td>do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>484</td>
<td>do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>490</td>
<td>Sir E. Satow, Commercial Treaty, 1897.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>533</td>
<td>Sir E. Satow, Commercial Treaty, 1900.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>535</td>
<td>Sir E. Satow, Diplomatic, 1900.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>536</td>
<td>do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>537</td>
<td>do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>541</td>
<td>MacDonald, Whitehead, Diplomatic, 1901.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>542</td>
<td>do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>543</td>
<td>MacDonald, Whitehead, Treaty, 1901.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>545</td>
<td>Domestic, Baron Hayashi, Diplomatic, 1901.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>558</td>
<td>Domestic, Viscount Hayashi, Diplomatic, 1902.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>670</td>
<td>Immigration of Japanese into British Colonies, 1902-1905.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FO 371: General Correspondence, Political.

Vol. 87  Japan, General Correspondence, Political, 1906.

Vol. 474  Japan, General Correspondence, Political, 1908.

Vol. 477  do.

Vol. 564  Japan, General Correspondence, Political, 1909.

Vol. 918  Japan, General Correspondence, Political, 1910.

Vol. 1144  do.

Vol. 1145  do.

Vol. 2382  Japan, General Correspondence, Political, 1915.

FO 800 (Vol. 35-113): Edward Grey Papers.


FO 800 (Vol. 159-191): F. Bertie Papers.


Vol. 186  Papers, 09/1 to 11/34, 1909-1911.

FO 800 (Vol. 192): Baron Hardinge Papers.

Vol. 192  Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1906-1911.

FO 800 (Vol. 244-248): B.F. Alston Papers.


FO 800 (Vol. 331-335): J. Bryce Papers.

Vol. 331  Correspondence, 1904-1908.

Vol. 332  Correspondence, 1909.

PRO 30/33: Sir Ernest Satow Papers.


Vol. 15/17  Diary, Nov. 1894-Apr. 1896.

Vol. 16/1  Diary, Apr. 1896-June 1898.
2. Official Published Records

(a) Australia

i. Commonwealth of Australia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Session</th>
<th>Vol.</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901-2</td>
<td>I-Vol.XII, 9</td>
<td>May 1901-10 Oct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>XIII-Vol.XVII,</td>
<td>26 May 1903-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>XVIII-Vol.XXIV,</td>
<td>2 Mar. 1904-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>XXV-Vol.XXX, 7</td>
<td>June 1906-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June 1906-9</td>
<td>Oct. 1906.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers.

CPP 1901-2 Session - 1911 Session.

Classification of the Commonwealth Public Service. 1 July 1904.

List of Permanent Officers of the Commonwealth Public Service.

1 January 1907; 1 January 1911.

ii. States

New South Wales Immigration and Tourist Bureau.

Bulletin, No. 28, 1908.

, No.36, 1909.

, No. 42, 1910.
Bulletin, No. 47, 1911.

______, No. 56, 1912.

______, No. 61, 1913.

______, No. 67, 1914.

New South Wales Intelligence Department.


______, No. 19, 1907.

______, No. 21, 1907.
"Report on the Formation and Initiatory Work of the Intelligence Department, July 1905-Aug. 1907."

New South Wales Intelligence Department.


Facts about New South Wales, Australia.

A Welcome to the United States fleet.

New South Wales. Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly,
Parliamentary Papers, 1901-1911.
Parliamentary Record, 1917.
Joint Volumes of Papers presented to the Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly, 1904.
Journal of the Legislative Council of New South Wales.

Parliamentary papers, 1901-1911.

South Australia. Parliamentary Debates, 1901-1911.
(b) Japan

Nihon Gaikō Bunsho (Japanese Diplomatic Documents)

NGB  Vol.27 (1894) - Vol.45 (1912)

Nihon Gaikō Bunsho: Jōyaku Kaisei Kankei (Japanese Diplomatic Documents relating to Treaty Revision).

NGB: Bessatsu, 'Tsūshō Jōyaku to Tsūshō Seisaku no Hensen' (Supplementary Volume on the Development of and Changes in the Commercial Treaties and the Commercial Policy of Japan).

NGB: Bessatsu, 'Jōyaku Kaisei Kankei Gaiyō' (Supplementary Volume on the Outline of the Treaty Revision History).


3. Non-official Unpublished Materials

(a) Australia


Edmund Barton Papers.

MS 51/ 1 Correspondence, 1817-1910, Folder 11,14.
5 Speeches, Articles, 1898-1901.
7 Other Political Papers, 1891-1911.

Deakin - Jebb Correspondence.

MS 339/ 1/ 1 - 80 Letters dated 1906 - 1923.
1A -80A Photocopies of Contents of Folder 1/1-80.
Alfred Deakin Papers.

MS 1540/ 1  General Correspondence, 1880-1919.
3  Notebooks and General Manuscripts.
7  Journalism.
14  Barton Government, 1901-1903.
  A. General Correspondence.
  D. General Papers.
  E. Portfolios.

Andrew Fisher Papers.

MS 2929/ 1  General Correspondence, 1885-1940.
3  Parliamentary Papers, 1901-1915.
6  Defence and Foreign Relations.

W.M. Hughes Papers.

MS 1538/ 1  General Correspondence, 1903-1952.
16  Prime Minister, 1915-1923.
    Sub Series I. Domestic Policy and Administration.
    Sub Series II. International Relations.

Atlee A. Hunt Papers.

MS 52/ 3  Correspondence with A.M. Campbell.
26  Correspondence with Japanese Consulate-General, 1908-1916.
29  Correspondence with Hugh Mahon, 1915-1916, re Japan.
30  Correspondence with Prof. Harrison Moore.
31  Correspondence with Colonel James Burns.
32  do.
33  General Correspondence with Burns Philp.
34 Correspondence with Walter H. Lucas
37 Papers chiefly valuable for Autographs.
38 Miscellaneous Correspondence.
39 do.
40 do.
41 do.
42 Letters of Congratulation to Hunt on receipt of C.M.G. Honour.
43 Miscellaneous Correspondence.
44 do.
45 Miscellaneous Printed and Undated Material.

George F. Pearce Papers.


MS 1827/2 Imperial Conference, 1911.

MS 1927/4 'Carpenter to Cabinet.' Papers re publication of a book.

ii. Australian War Memorial, Canberra.

George F. Pearce Papers.

Bundle 1 (Folder 1,2,3), 4,5,6, 7.

(b) Great Britain


H.O. Arnold-Forster Papers.

MS. 50294 Vol. XX Admiralty Papers, 1900-1903.

A. Submarines.

B. Colonial Navies and Colonial Contributions.

C. Foreign Navies.
A.J. Balfour Papers.

B: Correspondence with Prime Ministers, etc.


49697 Vol. XV Dominion Premiers, Statesmen and Governors-General, 1904-1930.

C: Cabinet, Committee of Imperial Defence and Foreign Affairs.

Add. MS. 49699 Vol. XVII Cabinet Memoranda, etc., 1914-1928.

49700 Vol.XVIII Sir G. Clarke, 1904.

49701 Vol.XIX Sir G. Clarke, Jan.-July 1905.

49702 Vol. XX Sir G. Clarke, July 1905-1916.

49707 Vol. XXV 2nd Earl Selborne, 1889-May 1904.

49708 Vol.XXVI 2nd Earl Selborne, June 1904-1922.

49723 Vol. XL1 H.O. Arnold-Forster, 1905-1908.

49727 Vol. XLV 5th Marquess of Lansdowne, 1881-1902.

49728 Vol.XLVI 5th Marquess of Lansdowne, 1903-Sep. 1904.


49731 Vol. XLIX Viscount Grey of Fallocon.


49747 Vol. LXV Papers relating to Foreign Affairs, 1902-1913.

49774 J. Chamberlain.
ii. Bodleian Library, Oxford University.

H.H. Asquith Papers.

I: Correspondence.

MS. 5 1908-1910, Copy of Asquith's Cabinet Letters to the King.

6 1911-1912, do.

7 1913-1914, do.

8 1915-1916, do.

IV: Parliamentary, Cabinet, Official Papers.

MS. 111 1914, Apr.-Sept.


113 1915, Jan.

114 1915, Feb.-Mar.

129 1916, Aug.-Sept.

J. Bryce Papers.

MS. USA 1 Letters from Charles William Eliot, President of Harvard to Bryce.

9 Letters to Bryce from Theodore Roosevelt, 26th President of the U.S., 1901-1909. Letters to and from E. Root.

22 Letters from Bryce to Americans.

27 Embassy Papers, 1906-1908.

28 Embassy Papers, 1908-1909.

31 Embassy Papers, 1910-1911.

32 Embassy Papers, 1911.

33 Embassy Papers, 1912-1913.

L. Harcourt Papers.

IV: Papers of Lewis Harcourt as Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1910-1915.

MS. 466 1910-1916, Private Correspondence.

467 do.
do.

Correspondence with b (fols. 111-82). Lord Dudley, Governor-General of Australia, 1910-1911.

Correspondence with Lord Denman, Governor-General of Australia, 1911-1913.

Correspondence with Sir Ronald Munro Ferguson, Viscount Novar, Governor-General of Australia, 1914-1917.

Letters from Lord Emmott, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, during His Visit to Canada, Australia and New Zealand, 1913.

Correspondence with Sir Bickham Sweet-Escott, Governor of Fiji and High Commissioner and Consul-General for the Western Pacific, 1912-1915.


Miscellaneous Memoranda concerning the Dominions, 1912-1914.

Colonial Office Telegrams circulated to the Cabinet, Aug. 1914-Aug. 1915.

1914, Aug. Reports on Operation in British Dominions and Colonies, and German Territories.

1915, Jan. do.

V: Miscellaneous Papers of L. Harcourt arranged by subject.

1914-1915, Correspondence, Memoranda and Printed Papers concerning Foreign and Domestic War-time Matters.

1916, Jan.-June. do.

1916, July-1917. do.
VI: Official Printed Papers, 1907-1916.

MS.  589  1911-1916, Cabinet Memoranda relating to Japan


A. Milner Papers.

MS. Milner Dep.  46  Correspondence, 1918-1919.

388  Papers relating to Mandates and Negotiations for the Peace Treaties, 1918-1920.

389  1919, Jan.-May.

390  1919, June-Dec.

MS. Eng.hist.  C.699  Colonial Office Files of Milner's Correspondence with Ministers and Others, arranged alphabetically, 1919-1921. A - E.

C.700  F - N.

C.701  P - S.

C.702  S - Z.

C.703  Miscellaneous Colonial Office Correspondence.

C.704  Colonial Office Files of Milner's Personal Correspondence, arranged alphabetically, 1919-1920. A - H.

C.705  J - Z.

C.706  Colonial Office Correspondence with Ronald Munro Ferguson, 1st Viscount Novar, as Governor-General of Australia, 1918-1920.

2nd Earl of Selborne Papers.

MS. 17  Correspondence with Commanders-in-Chief, Australia, 1901-1905.

20  Correspondence with Commander-in-Chief, China, 1903-1905.
4. Non-official Published Materials

(a) Australia


---


---


---


Matheson, Alexander Perceval.

Pearce, George Foster.

Piesse, E.L.
"Japan and Australia." Foreign Affairs, Vol. IV, No. 3, 1926.

Pulsford, Edward.

Weller, Patrick, ed.

West, Francis, ed.

(b) Japan

Eitaki Hisakichi.
Kaiko Nanajū-nen (My Reminiscences in Seventy Years). Tokyo, 1935.

Iijima Kametaro.
"Gōshū Hogo Bōeki Taikai Ketsugi Jōkyō" (Resolutions of Protectionists' Trade Conference in Australia). Tōhō Kyōkai Kairō, No. 72, 1900.

Inagaki Manjirō.
"Nanyo no Jissei" (Current Affairs in the South Sea). Tōhō Kyōkai Hōkoku, No. 24, 1893.

Katsū Takaaki.
"Nichi-Ei Dōmei ni tsuite" (On the Subject of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance). Tōhō Kyōkai Kairō, No. 85, 1902.

Makino Nobuaki.

Pooley, A.M., ed.

Satō Torajirō.
"Gōshū Renpō to Seijijō no Tsurasuto" (Australia's Federation and Politics). Tōhō Kyōkai Kairō, No. 81, 82, 1901.
Takahashi Sakue.
"Beikoku Imin narabini Hainihi Jijō ni tsuite" (Japanese Emigration to America and the Exclusion of Japanese). Tōhō Kyōkai Kaihō, No. 169, 1909.

Tōa Kenkyūjo.


Ueno Kisaburō.
"Beikoku Taihei'yōkan no Nihonjin" (Japanese in the West Coast of the United States). Tōhō Kyōkai Kaihō, No. 150, 1907.

(c) Great Britain

Boyd, Charles W., ed.


Haldane, Richard B.

Jebb, Richard.

Jebb, Richard.
The Imperial Problem of Asiatic Immigration. Paper to be read before the Colonial Section of the Royal Society of Arts, London, April 1908.

Kerr, Philip.

Kidd, Benjamin.

Marder, Arthur J., ed.

Satow, Ernest.
5. Year Book and Statistical Materials

(a) Australia

Authority of the Government of the State of New South Wales. 

Coghlan, T.A. 

Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics.

(b) Japan

Nippon Teikoku Tōkei Nenkan (Japanese Imperial Statistical Yearbook). 

Nihon Gaimushō, ed. 

Tōyō Keizai Shimpōsha, ed. 

6. Other Collected Documents

Gooch, G.P., and Temperley, Harold, eds. 

Greenwood, Gordon., and Grimshaw, Charles., eds. 

Nairn, Bede, and Serle, Geoffrey, eds. 
7. Newspapers and Periodicals

Advertiser (Adelaide)
Age (Melbourne)
Argus (Melbourne)
Australasian (Melbourne)
Bulletin (Sydney)
Brisbane Courier (Brisbane)
Daily Telegraph (Sydney)
Herald (Melbourne)
Japan Advertiser (Tokyo)
Japan Daily Mail (Yokohama)
Japan Times (Tokyo)
Mercury (Hobart)
Morning Post (London)
Round Table (London)
Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney)
Times (London)
West Australian (Perth)
Worker (Sydney)

8. Biographical Sources

China Mail, ed.  

Commonwealth of Australia.  

Jinji Kōshinjo, ed.  
Dai Yon Pan: Jinji Kōshinroku (Who's Who in Japan, the 4th edition).  

Johns, Fred, ed.  
II. Secondary Sources

1. English Language Materials

Alexander, Fred. 

Allen, Bernard M. 

Amery, Julian. 

Anderson, Hugh, ed. 

Armstrong, J. 

Barclay, Glen St.J. 

Barrett, John. 
Beale, Howard K.

Bean, C.E.W.

Beloff, Max.

Bennett, Neville.

Blackton, Charles S.

Boehm, E.A.

Bolton, Geoffrey C.

Booker, Malcolm.

Boyle, T.

Braisted, William Reynolds.

Buckley, K., and Klugman, K.
Burley, K.H.

Butler, J.R.M.

Caiden, Gerald E.

Choi, C.Y.

Clark, Manning.

Cole, Douglas.

Connolly, C.N.

Corp, E.T.

Corris, Peter.

Coulthard-Clark, Christopher D.


Crawford, Raymond M.

Crisp, L.F.


Field, L.M.

Firth, Stewart.

Fitzhardinge, L.F.

French, Maurice.

Garvin, J.L.

Gollan, Robin.

Gollin, Alfred.

Gowen, Robert J.
"Reexamining that 'Dangerous Divergence of Interest and Ideal': Japan's Role in the Early Evolution of the British Empire-Commonwealth, to 1914." East Carolina University, 1979. (Mimeographed.)

Gordon, Donald C.


Gordon, Donald C.

Grattan, C. Hartley.

Greenwood, Gordon, ed.
Greenwood, Gordon.  

Grenville, J.A.S.  

Hancock, W.K.  
*Australia.* London: Ernest Benn, 1930.

Hardwick, G.A.  

Hargreaves, J.D.  

Harris, Jose F.  

Hart, Robert A.  

Herwig, Holger H.  
"Luxury" Fleet: The Imperial German Navy 1888-1918.  

Heydon, Peter.  
*Quiet Decision: A Study of George Foster Pearce.*  
Hinsley, F.H., ed.

Hodgins, Bruce W.; Wright, Don; and Heick, W.H., eds.

Hooper, Meredith.

Howard, Christopher.

Howard, Michael.

Hoyle, A.R.

Huttenbach, Robert A.


Hyam, Ronald.


Hyslop, Robert.

Ingis, K.I.
Iriye, Akira.


---


---


---

Jackson, R.V.


---

James, Robert Rhodes.


---

Johnson, Franklyn A.


---

Jones, F.C.


---

Judd, Denis,


---

Kellaway, Carlotta.

"White Australia' – How Political Reality Became National Myth."


---

Kendle, John Edward.


---

The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975.

---


---

Kennedy, Paul., and Moses, John A., ed.


---

La Nauze, J.A.


Levi, Werner,

London, H.I.

Loveday, Peter.

Loveday, Peter; Martin, A.W.; and Parker, R.S., eds.

Lowe, Peter.

Lyon, Jens Sorensen

McDermott, W.J.


MacFarlane, W.H.

McGuire, Frances Margaret.
Mackay, Ruddock P.

McKellar, N.L.

McKinlay, Brian, ed.

MacKirdy, K.A.

McMinn, W.G.

McQueen, Humphrey.

Madden, A.F., and Morris-Jones, W.H., eds.

Mahajan, Sneh.

Main, J.M., ed.

Mansfield, Bruce.


Marder, Arthur J.

Markus, Andrew.

Maxwell, James A.

Meaney, Neville K.


Megaw, Ruth.

Mehrotra, S.R.

Millar, T.B.

Monger, George W.


O'Collins, Gerald.
Patrick McMahon Glynn: A Founder of Australian Federation.

O'Connell, D.P., ed.

Okamoto, Shumpei.
The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War. New York:

Padfield, Peter.
The Great Naval Race: The Anglo-German Naval Rivalry, 1900-1914.

Palfreeman, A.C.
The Administration of the White Australia Policy. Melbourne:

Papadopoulos, G.S.
"Lord Salisbury and the Projected Anglo-German Alliance of 1898."

Patterson, G.D.
The Tariff in the Australian Colonies, 1856-1900. Melbourne:

Penny, Barbara R.
"Australia's Reactions to the Boer War - a Study in Colonial Imperialism."

Penson, Lillian.
Foreign Affairs under the Third Marquis of Salisbury.

Poynter, J.R.
"The Yo-Yo Variations: Initiative and Dependence in Australia's External Relations, 1918-1923."

Price, Charles.


Prince, E.J.G.

Reese, Trevor R.

Reynolds, Henry.

Reynolds, John.

Roe, Michael.

Rolo, R.J.V.

Rose, J. Holland; Benians, E.A.; and Newton, A.P., eds.

Sawer, Geoffrey.

Sharman, G. Campbell.

Shaw, A.G.L.

Shepherd, Jack.

Shields, R.A.

Sinclair, W.A.
Sissons, D.C.S.

"An Immigrant Family." Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU, August 1975. (Mimeographed.)


"Australian-Japanese Relations: The First Phase, 1859-91." Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU, October 1978. (Mimeographed.)


"Japanese in the Northern Territory, 1884-1901." Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU, October 1974. (Mimeographed.)


"The Immigration Question in Australian Diplomatic Relations with Japan, 1875-1919." Paper presented at the 43rd congress of the Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science, Brisbane, May 1971.


"The Japanese in the Australian Pearling Industry." Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU, June 1978. (Mimeographed.)
Souter, Gavin.  
Sydney: Collins Australia, 1976.

Spector, Ronald.  
Admiral of the New Empire: The Life and Career of George Dewey.  

Spinks, Charles Nelson.  

Stargardt, A.W.  

Steiner, Zara.  
The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898–1914. London:  


Starr, Graeme.  
The Liberal Party of Australia: A Documentary History.  

Storry, Richard.  
Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia, 1894–1943.  

Tanner, Thomas W.  


Thompson, Roger C.  


Timlin, Mabel F.


Trevelyan, George M.

Tsunoyama, Sakae.


Wadham, Samuel.

Walker, R.B.

Ward, Russel.


Watt, D.C.

Weibe, Robert H.  

Wilkinson, H.L.  

Willard, Myra.  

Wilson, Keith.  

Whyte, W. Farmer.  

Withers, Glenn.  

Wright, D.I.  

Yarwood, A.T.  


Yarwood, A.T., and Knowling, M.J.  
2. Japanese Language Materials

Arikawa Jisuke.
"Hakugō Shugi" (The Principle of a White Australia).  
Kokka Gakkai Zasshi, Vol. 35, No. 6, 1921.

Ashida Hitoshi.
"Eiryō Jichi-Shokuminchi no Hōritsujō no Chii" (The Judicial Status of the British Self-Governing Colonies).  
Kokusaihō Gaikō Zasshi, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1924.

Banno Junji.
Meiji Shisō no Jitsuzō (The Meiji Philosophy and Its Reality).  

Fujimura Michio.

Furuya Tetsuo.
Nichi-Ro Sensō (The Russo-Japanese War).  

Hagiwara Nobutoshi.

Hanzawa Hiroshi, ed.
Meiji no Gunzō (The Figure of Meiji).  Vol. 6: Ajia eno Yume (New Prospect in Asia).  

Harada Katsumasa.
Mantetsu (South Manchurian Railway).  

Haraguchi Kunihiro.
"Nippon Kanada Kankei no Ichikōsatsu - 'Rumyu Kyoyaku' Kaitei Mondai -" (The Revision of the Lemieux Agreement and the Japanese-Canadian Relations).  

Hashikawa Bunsō.
Kōka Monogatari (The Story of the Yellow Peril).  

Hata Ikuhiko.
"Meijiki ikō ni okeru Nichi-Bei Taiheiyō Senryaku no Hensen" (History of the Pacific Strategy of Japan and the U.S. since Meiji Era).  

Taiheiyō Kokusai Kankei-shi (History of International Relations in the Pacific).  
Hosoya Chihiro.

Ikeda Kiyoshi.

Ikei Masaru.

Imai Shōji.

Inō Tentaro.

Inoue Kiyoshi.

Iriye Akira.
"Heiwateki Hattenshugi to Nippon" (Peaceful Expansionism and Japan). Gokō Kōron, October, 1969.


Irie Toraji.


Ishikawa Tomonori.
Itō Kōichi.

Itō Kōtarō.

Itō Masanori, ed.

Izumi Shinsuke.

Kachi Teruyoshi.

Kamikawa Hikomatsu.

Kanematsu Shōten Chōsabu., ed.

Kashima Morinosuke.


Katayama Kunio.

Kawaguchi Hiroshi.
Kawashima Shintarō.


Kobayashi Tadao.


Kokuryūkai, ed.


Kotono Takashi, ed.


Kuroha Shigeru.


Madarama Fumio.


Matsuda Mikio.


Matsumoto Gorō.

Indo to Gōshū (India and Australia). Tokyo: Seiki Shōbō, 1942.

Matsumoto Hiroshi.


Meaney, Neville K.,

Miwa Kimitada.

*Kenn Taihei* Kankai-shi: Kokusai Funsō nonakano Nihon
(History of International Relations in the Pacific: Japan in the

Miyata Mineichi.

Gōshū no Shigen to Shokumin Mondai (Australia's Natural Resources

Mizoguchi Toshiyuki.

"Nihon Tōchika ni okeru 'Nanyō Shotō' no Keizai Hatten - 1922-38 -"
(Economic Development of the South Sea Islands Under the Japanese
Occupation). Keizai Kenkyū (Hitotsubashi University), Vol. 31,
No. 2, 1980.

Mizuno Rū.

"Nihon Imin Ketto no Sokuseki" (History of Japanese Emigrants).
Raten Amerika Kenkyū, Vol. 16, No. 8, 1943.

Murashima Shigeru.

"Nichi-Ei Dōmei-shi no Ichisokumen: Ryōkoku Gunji Kyōshō no
Seiritsu wo megutte" (One Facet of History of the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance: Problem of the Military Arrangements). Kokusai Seiji,

Nagaoka Shinjirō.

"Kato Takaaki-ron" (Study on Kato Takaaki). Kokusai Seiji, No.
1, 1966.

Nancyoku Rōjin.

"Gōshū no Chiseki oyobi Jinkō" (Land and Population of Australia).
Tōhō Kyōkai Hōkoku, No. 13, 1892.

Narita Katsushirō.

*Nichi-Gō Tsūshō Gaikōshi* (Diplomatic and Commercial History

Nihon Seinen Gaikō Kyōkai Kenkyūbu., ed.
Taihei* Yōron (Readings on the Pacific Ocean). Tokyo:
Nihon Seinen Gaikō Kyōkai, 1941.

Nippō Yūsen., ed.

*Nippō Yūsen Kabushiki Gaisha Gyouin-shi* (Fifty Years History
of Nippō Yūsen Kabushiki Gaisha). Tokyo: Nippō Yūsen Kabushiki
Gaisha, 1935.

Nonaka Tokio.

"Nihon Imin-ron" (Study on Japanese Emigration). Nōgyō Keizai
(Hyōgo Nōka University), No. 4, 1959.

Ōe Shinobu.

"Kindai Sensō-shi ni okeru Nichi-Ro Sensō" (The Russo-Japanese
War in the History of Modern Warfare). Shichō (Ôtsuka Shigakkai),
Oka Yoshitake.


Sakai Hideo.


Sakane Yoshihisa.


Sakeda Masatoshi.
Sasaki Seiji.
"Nichi-Gō Kōryū no Enkaku" (Historical Development of the Japanese-Australian Relations). Keizai Keiei Kenkyū Nempo (Kobe University), No. 28, I, 1976.

Satō Seizaburō, and R. Dingman, ed.

Shibusawa Keizō, ed.

Shigemitsu Osamu.

Shinobu Junpei.

Shōda Kenichirō, ed.

Somura Yasunobu.

Sugiyama Shinya.
"Bakumatsu, Mejishi koki nookeru Sekitan Yushutsu no Dōkō to Shanhai Sekitan Shiiji" (Trends of Japan's Coal Export and the Shanghai Coal Market in the Late Tokugawa Period and Early Meiji Era). Shakai Keizai Shigaku, Vol. 43, No. 6, 1978.

Takahashi Seiichi.

Tokutomi Iichirō, ed.

Tsunoda Jun.
Tsunoyama Sakae.


"Nihonma ni no Yushutsu Shijō toshiteno Gōshō" (Australia as Japan's Rice Exporting Market). Keizai Riron (Wakayama University), No. 185, 1982.

"Ryōji Hōkoku ni tsuite" (Research Notes on "Consular Report"). Keizai Riron (Wakayama University), No. 167, 1979.

Uchiyama Masakuma.

Ueda Toshio.

Uno Shunichi.

Wakatsuki Yasuo.

Wakatsuki Yasuo, and Suzuki Jōji.

Wakayama–ken, ed.
Watanabe Akio.

"Nichi-Gō Kankei-shi no Shomonsei" (Some Problems on Australia-Japan Relations). Kokusai Seiji, No. 68, 1981.

"Ōsutoraria no Taigaitaido no Kihonteki Patan: Tainichi Kankei wo Chūshin ni" (The Basic Pattern of Australia's Attitudes to External Problems: With Special Reference to Japan) in Rōyama Michio (ed.), Nichi-Gō Kankei no Shakai teki Kiso (The Societal Foundation of Japanese-Australian Relations), Tokyo: Nichi-Gō Chōsa Inkai, 1981.

Yamada Saburō.
"Gōshū Imin Seigenhō ni taisuru Seisaku ni Tsuite" (Lecture on Australia's Immigration Restriction Act). Tohō Kyōkai Kairō, No. 99, 1903.

Yamaguchi Hiroichi.

Yamamoto Shigeru.

Yano Tōru.


Yoneda Minoru.

Yoshimura Michio.
"Dai Sankai Nichi-Ro Kyōyaku Seiritsu Zengo" (Study of the Convention Concluded between Japan and Russia in 1912), Kokusai Seiji, No. 2, 1965.
3. Theses

Armstrong, John B.

Atkinson, Leon D.

Bennet, N.R.

Cross, J.A.

Davies, Helen M.

Grimshaw, Charles.

Lilk, George.

Melhuish, K.J.

Sissons, David C.S.

Snelling, R.C.

Thornton, Robert.

Walsh, Glen.