WOMEN AND WORK
IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN:
DECONSTRUCTING THE “CRISIS” OF
THE GENDER ORDER

Lillian Mai

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Declaration: “This work is substantially my own, and where any part of this is not my own work, I have indicated this by acknowledging the source of that part or those parts of the work”
ABSTRACT

The 1990s saw important developments in the employment practices of Japanese women as necessitated by economic recession. Japanese women are increasingly postponing their traditional roles of wife and mother in lieu of expanding education and employment opportunities, suggesting that we are approaching or witnessing a period of redefinition of the prevailing gender structure.

This thesis offers a theoretical exposition of this “crisis” in the gender structure utilising Connell’s concept of “hegemonic masculinity” and Finnemore and Sikkink’s “norm life cycle model”. This thesis will be presented as follows: i) hegemonic masculinity will be applied to the Japanese context to argue for the centrality of masculinity defined through the corporation, and for its significance in an understanding of femininity; ii) discussion of the “feminisation” of part-time work in Japan will test whether a challenge to the gender order from within of this nature represents a profound redefinition of the hegemonic gender structure; and iii) discursive study of Japanese state legislation and policy will reveal government commitment to ensuring continuity in gender norm dynamics.

The findings suggest that we are not witnessing a period of “crisis” or profound transformation in the gender structure for greater gender equality. The pervasiveness of gender norm ideology in Japan is such that once established these norms have maintained an internal momentum so that changes in the material sphere are constrained by these ideational structures and not vice versa. The current period is marked by cooptation of gender norm challenges by corporations and government in an effort to neutralise gender norm challenge.
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**Gender Order** or **Gender Regime** is a concept that defines the pattern of gender arrangements in any specific social structure, in any given period (Connell 2002, pp.53-55). The prevailing gender regime in a given context is the result of contestation over hegemonic ideals of masculinity and complimentary ideals of femininity which provide the normative standard to which the sexes behave within their appropriate gender identities. The historically prevailing gender regime in Japan is characterised by patriarchy, as exemplified by the traditional social institution of the *ie* family unit. The *ie* system of the Meiji era is modelled on the patrilineal family system of the *samurai* household, with a male head and each family member considered to be directly subordinate to the emperor (see Hsia and Scanzoni 1996; and Smith 1987). However, the waning of the economic miracle and end of the double-digit growth era in the early 1990s has brought changes in the traditional structure of the gender regime in Japan – increased unemployment, decline in fertility rates, decreased rate of marriage, increased participation of women in the labour force, and increased educational attainment for women – which indicates that we are seemingly witnessing a period of redefinition for the prevailing gender order. It is the goal of this thesis to investigate these changes to the current gender structure in contemporary Japan in order to illuminate whether we are witnessing a period of “crisis” or profound transformation in the gender structure and to offer an understanding of what this change means for the current nature of gender relations in Japan.
Tremendous changes have taken place in women’s employment in Japan. The bursting of the bubble economy in the 1990s, with labour shortages and increases in the average cost of living, necessitated that women remain in part-time employment after marriage to supplement the household income, whilst for the first time Japanese men were seeing a reduced emphasis on the guarantee of lifetime employment as evident by rising levels of unemployment. In the 1980s, Japan’s rate of unemployment moved within the band of 2 percent and 2.8 percent. This figure increased to 2.2 percent in 1990 to reach the record level of 5.5 percent in 2002. Moreover, whilst the female unemployment rate has historically exceeded that of the male rate of unemployment, this trend was reversed in 1996 when the male unemployment rate began to outstrip that of women. In 2003, the male unemployment rate stood at 5.5 percent compared to 4.9 percent for women (Osawa 2004-05, pp.100-101). Women’s labour force participation rate has also now reached approximately 40 percent of the total paid labour force (Kumamoto-Healey 2005, p.457). Moreover, whilst the wage ratio between men and women has historically and currently remains in favour of men, there has been a narrowing of the gender wage gap which figured at 60.2 percent in 1990 and improved to 66.8 percent in 2003 (Osawa 2004-05, p.102).

In addition to changes in women’s employment, there has also been an expansion in the educational attainment of Japanese women. The university enrolment rate for women has increased over the last decade from 15 percent in 1990 (compared to 33.4 percent for men) to reach 33.8 percent by 2002 (compared to 47 percent for men) (Osawa 2004-05, p.97). Also, as of 1990, 37.4 percent of girls advanced from High School to enrol in Junior Colleges or University (compared to 35.2 percent of boys) (Tsuya and Oppenheim Mason 1995, p.149). This would suggest that women’s
labour market improvements have in part resulted from their broadening education attainment.

Scholars have noted that expanding education and employment opportunities for women is partially explanatory of Japan’s fertility crisis (see Rindfuss et. al. 2004; Kosaka 1994; and Davis 1984). Japan’s birthrate has now declined to the below replacement level of 1.34 births per woman (see Dyer 2005; and Lunn 2000). In addition, there are suggestions that there is a positive correlation between fertility decline in Japan to below-replacement levels since the mid-1970s, and the postponement, or indeed, avoidance of marriage and hence childrearing. Japan has an extremely low illegitimate birthrate of approximately 1 percent of all births (Tsuya and Oppenheim Mason 1995, p.147), which suggests that the overall decline in childbirth is due to the postponement of the age at marriage. The mean age at marriage for women has historically remained stable at 25 (Condon 1985, p.18), but increased to 27 in 1990 (Tsuya and Oppenheim Mason 1995, p.147). In 2006, the mean age at marriage for women had reached 28.2 years of age (Japan Statistics Bureau 2007). Hence, due to increased economic opportunities to remain in paid employment arising out of expanding education levels, Japanese women have consciously delayed marital and childbirth responsibilities in rejection of traditional family roles. Indeed, this denouncement of familial roles on the part of Japanese women may be conceived as a direct challenge to the nuclear family ideal of the ie system, with the daikokubashira “salaryman” head – a male breadwinner with his two children and full time ryosai kenbo (“good wife, wise mother”) counterpart – which was promoted and cemented from the post World War II period to the early 1980s (see Hsia and Scanzoni 1996).
Distinct changes in the economic milieu caused by the end of the economic miracle and advent of the post-industrial era, have resulted in challenges (of which the above trends are symptomatic) that indicate that the prevailing patriarchal gender regime in contemporary Japan is nearing “crisis” point. Women have the opportunity to re-draw the balance of power between the sexes. It is due to this set of factors unique to the Japanese case at this point in time, that I argue for scholarly attention on Japan as the best case study in discussing hegemonic gender relations, and gender order dynamics with recourse to the below question:

*How Have Practices in Women’s Work Redefined the Nature of the Gender Regime in Contemporary Japan?*

The remainder of this thesis is therefore concerned with investigating how the current state of the gender order in contemporary Japan was and is defined; what the role of women and work is in a “redefinition” of the gender structure; and how stakeholders in that structure including business and the state have responded to the challenges of the 1990s in their management of the gender order. It is hoped that an accurate account of the gender order crisis can be offered through examining the structural constraints and individual agency, in conjunction with normative gender considerations.

In support of such a theoretical discussion this thesis will be presented as follows: chapter one will canvass the existing literature on gender discourse and gender relations in Japan to arrive at a conceptual framework informed by a social theory of gender; chapter two will build a methodology for examining gender order
developments vis-à-vis a constructivist feminist approach that will offer a criteria to chart the development and decline of hegemonic gender norms relevant for a discussion on hegemonic gender regimes; chapter three will implement the hegemonic gender norm model to the Japanese case with a preliminary treatment of the nature of the prevailing gender order in Japan before being able to deduce how it has been transformed (if indeed this is the case); chapter four will investigate the tremendous growth in part-time employment for women since the 1990s and relate this change to the prevailing gender norm standard; and chapter five will examine the Japanese government’s response to the feminisation of part time work to reveal the nature of state commitment to gender norm dynamics and its role in managing the gender order challenge.

In order to substantiate theoretical development and conceptual reasoning of the above trajectory, I will draw upon primary data including government policy and legislation, as well as quantitative evidence obtained from official government statistics and other non-government labour market figures. Data of this nature allows for a balance between providing a breadth of understanding of the broader trends and developments in the Japanese context, which is helpful in discussing the nature of “crisis” in the gender structure, as well as a depth of discussion of the nuanced political machinations underpinning such developments. However, it must be stated that my absence of understanding for the Japanese language hindered access to more current government statistics (especially post 1999). In addition, official Japanese government statistics have been criticised for their propaganda-like nature which obscures the accuracy of such data. For example, the White Paper on Gender Equality series papers, which is released annually by the Prime Minister Cabinet Office,
includes only cursory data that gives the impression that Japan has achieved greater gender equality in line with its commitments towards the Vision of Gender Equality. However, the White Paper on Gender Equality papers do not provide data on working hours within employment types, which would reveal the auxiliary nature of women’s work in part-time employment. Thus, the perception maintained by the White Paper on Gender Equality papers is that women have increased access to employment, and are engaged with part-time labour which is more complementary to the realities of their domestic responsibilities - progress is gender equality is being achieved. The government’s aversion to honne (negative depiction of events) in preference for tatemae (which involves a more positive and idealized spin on events), constrains the availability of more current data as the government buys the necessary time to create such positive inclinations (Woronoff 1997, p.10-15). Nevertheless, when analysed in conjunction with other non-government data, official government statistics are still valuable in discerning broad macroeconomic trends.

In addition, this thesis does not include any original qualitative data due to time and resource constraints. I am not proficient in the Japanese language and as such could not undertake a research study including interviews with Japanese women in Japan, which would have complemented quantitative and discursive data used, especially in discussing changes in values underpinning hegemonic gender norms. As such, I acknowledge that an investigation of gender order developments without qualitative support of this nature can only ever be a partial understanding. The implication is that there is a gap in the literature due to lack of qualitative research that is outside the scope of this current thesis.
Chapter 1

**Conceptualising Gender Relations in Contemporary Japan**

Existing literature on gender discourse in Japan is inadequate to explain the current state of play for gender relations. Dominant ideology concerning masculine and feminine identity predicated on sex role theory treats male and female, masculine and feminine, as equivalent however separate concepts in the treatment of gender politics. This mutually exclusive treatment of gender relations does not allow for an accurate account of developments in the gender regime as constructs of male and female, masculine and feminine, are relational concepts which cannot be understood in isolation from the other (Kimmell 1987). However, masculinity and femininity are mutually enforcing concepts, and transformations within one category will have recurring affects on the other. A conceptual framework that transcends this binary understanding of gender politics and seeks to locate both halves in a relational explanatory mechanism is offered and an overall theory of equilibrium in gender arrangements is posited. That is, a treatment of femininity on the overall gender order must be made with reference to indirect impacts on masculinity.

**Existing Explanations**

In addressing gender studies discourse in contemporary Japan with respect to the recent developments mentioned, past scholars have tended to analyse gender relations from either a female or male standpoint through the prism of sex role theory.
Sex role theorists maintain that gender relations between men and women are based upon social roles that are entrenched in social stereotypes predicated in biological differences between male and female (Mitchell 2004; and Nicholson 1994). Therefore, because women are generally physically weaker than men, they are best suited to domestic duties such as the rearing of children of which they are equipped with the necessary reproductive tools whilst men are expected to economically support the household unit in the public realm of production in lieu of their physical attributes. Sex role theory moves away from biologically determinist accounts of the ways in which men exercise power over women by virtue of their biologically given physical attributes, or “the form of political right that all men exercise by virtue of being men” (Allen 1996, p.24), to a greater appreciation for the social forces that constitute and inform contextually bound gender structures.

From the female standpoint, existing theory on gender discourse in Japan has tended to focus on the effect that changes in the economic milieu has had upon the changing role of women vis-à-vis the *ryosai kenbo* ideal. This conceptual framework generally seeks to analyse the progress of the women’s movement by measuring how far women have progressed from the *ryosai kenbo* ideology, which considers it natural and virtuous for a woman to obey her father in youth, her husband in maturity, and her son in old age, to arrive at a nuanced understanding of the day-to-day behaviour and experiences of Japanese women (see Immamura 1996; Roberts 1994; Iwao 1993; Uno 1993; Smith 1987; Condon 1985; and Lebra 1984). In addition, authors have also sought to analyse changes in the role of Japanese women through discussions of their labour market experiences (see Broadbent & Morris-Suzuki 2000; Gottfreid & Hayashi-Kato 1998; Kosaka 1994; Davis 1984; and Osako 1978). The central concern
for such scholars is how the *ryosai kenbo* ideology constrains women’s public persona through the need to balance work/life responsibilities in order to uphold their *ryosai kenbo* duties (men are exempt from such social expectations to engage in domestic duties, and hence can more freely pursue non-familial related goals).

Due to the narrow focus on the *ryosai kenbo* ideal as informed by sex role theory, existing scholarly discussions have generally been presented in a dichotomous frame with most authors incorporating a ‘public versus private’ divide in their conceptual framework. For example, the recent study of the feminisation of part-time work in Japan, Kaye Broadbent argues that part-time employment is an employer and state based strategy to utilise women’s labour as an economic shock absorber, whilst not to upset the male breadwinner status quo of the existing gender work contract (Broadbent 2003). In this view, Japanese women are seemingly challenging the prevailing gender equilibrium by compromising their traditional domestic roles in preference for greater economic independence in the workplace. However, in accepting part-time employment over full-time employment, Japanese women are in fact relinquishing their workplace rights and unknowingly contributing to the further entrenchment of their status as second-class citizens in line with *ryosai kenbo* expectations. Such explanations cannot offer a systematic theorisation of the nature of change, as gender relations are re-constituted to uphold the dynamics of the current structure. That is, how the prevailing gender balance is historically constructed from the changes within gender relations themselves (Demetriou 2001, p.338).

Conversely, the male-focused line of analysis highlights that men are also required to fulfil a socially determined gender role, that of the *daikokubashira*, which
complements the *ryosai kenbo* model (Smith 1987, p.4). Whilst the literature on women’s gender roles in Japan are widespread and profuse, studies of male gender roles has only emerged in response to the studies on women. In his seminal study, “Japan’s New Middle Class: The Salaryman and His Family in a Tokyo Suburb” (1967), Vogel presents an ethnographic study to explain the everyday interactions between the sexes from a male conceptual viewpoint, from which subsequent authors have been able to build their *daikokubashira*-informed conceptual frameworks. This includes scholars such as Chiba and Osamu (1997) who analysed the relationship between lifetime employment for Japanese males and their social standing in society, and Dasgupta (2003 and 2005) who discusses the importance of the *daikokubashira* ideal to Japanese male constructions of identity. The aforementioned studies into Japanese male gender roles all acknowledge that men’s agency is not constrained within a system that was constructed by men to privilege men, as experienced by women. Therefore, the aim of role theory analysis from the male perspective is not to measure the level of deviation from the existing order as it is in the female-centred analysis, but to understand the strategies men use to retain and uphold the structures that legitimise, enforce and perpetuate their authority over women.

Role theory derived from the one-dimensional approach that is informed by a masculine *daikokubashira* or feminine *ryosai kenbo* conception fails to appreciate the subtle transformations in the exalted gender structure, even in light of seeming continuity. As Kimmel notes, “masculinity and femininity are relational constructs; the definition of either depends on the definition of the other” (Kimmell 1987, p.122). Sex role theory reduces gender to two mutually exclusive, homogenous and complementary categories without acknowledging the multiplicity *between* and *within*
gender categorisation, and thus cannot truly account for social inequality and power
(Peterson 2003; Connell 2002, 1995, 1993, 1987; and Kimmell 1987). The inability for sex role theory to understand the multiplicity of femininities and masculinities arises from its preference for conceptualisation of expected role behaviour over actual role enactment (see Clatterbaugh 1998; and West and Zimmerman 1987). That is, inconsistent behaviour to the normative standard is labelled as “private dissatisfactions” rather than a signal for the myriad deviations within genders. As Dasgupta reveals, the daikokubashira archetype is not the empirical reality but a standard to which all Japanese men aspire (Dasgupta 2005, p.168; also see Howson 2006; and Bird 1996). Moreover, this limitation of sex role theory prevents it from understanding resistance to power and hence cannot account for a systematic theory for change. As Demetriou notes, “[c]hange has always been a major topic in sex role literature, but the inability of the theory to grasp power, resistance to power and ultimately contradiction between and within genders prevents it from conceptualizing change as internally generated within gender relations themselves.” (Demetriou 2001, p.339). It is from this major shortcoming in the broad literature on gender discourse that Connell develops a conceptual framework to explain the “global dominance of men over women” (Connell 1987, p.183). The central concept under consideration in Connell’s theory of gender is “hegemonic masculinity,” which will be considered for the purposes of this thesis.
Transcending Sex Role Theory: The Case for a Social Theory of Gender

According to Connell, at any given point in time in a specific context, there are several “cultural ideals” for being male. The model for being male that gains the greatest cultural acceptance, and exerts the greatest power over all other less privileged forms of being male, can then be considered the “hegemonic” model (Connell 1987, p.84). Connell argues that this appropriation for understanding masculinity in a “hegemonic” framework cannot be transferable to discussing femininities as women lack the social power to construct institutionalised power relationships over other women. Moreover, the construction of femininity lacks the dominance-submission characteristic that is the defining feature of hegemony analysis (Connell 1987, p.187). Thus, under “hegemonic masculinity” men and women, masculinities and feminities are subordinated in reference to the exalted archetype.

In order to determine which “masculine” model is archetypal, Connell proposes that relations among groups of men in a specific context must be analysed in a three-tiered approach. Firstly, it must be determined which groups dominate. Groups that are generally more culturally accepted tend to hold power in the given structure. Secondly, we need to determine the degree of complicity to the dominant mode in order to test the extent to which social structures are involved with promoting and sustaining the particular model. Finally, relationships of authorisation and marginalisation help to restate the second approach of analysis by explaining how it is that social structures help to maintain the dominant position of some groups of males over others (Connell 2005, pp.76-81).
Auxiliary to the concept of “hegemonic masculinity” is that of the tendency towards crisis. The systematic feature of men to dominate over women, and women to historically contest this subordination defines the nature of the patriarchal system (Connell 2005; and MacInnes 1998). Hence it is evident that there can be counter-hegemonic challenges from within the structure, be it from oppressed forms of masculinities or femininities, that may be indicative of a movement towards a “crisis” point in which new groups are able to “challenge old solutions and construct a new hegemony” (Connell 2005, p.77). Given the recent developments in the economic sphere in Japan, the task at hand is to determine at which point in that process we are currently witnessing.

**Summary**

It has been argued that a social theory of gender premised on the conceptual propositions of hegemonic masculinity developed by Connell is the best prism through which gender relations can be discussed. Chief in determining the nature of current equilibrium conditions between masculinity and femininity in this analysis is the centrality of “ideal” masculinity. From the central tenants of hegemonic masculinity theory discussed above, it can be deduced that since hegemonic masculine ideals characterise the current pattern of gender arrangements, then any changes or challenges to this reference point will possibly result in a redefinition of the gender order. The following chapters will be concerned with firstly building a model to which this hypothesis can be tested using constructivist tools, and secondly offering case studies to explore the empirical reality of this theoretical proposition in
the case of Japan. The result is a discussion of the nexus between the ideational sphere and material sphere in determining the current nature of gender relations in contemporary Japan.
Chapter 2

**Gender Politics and Gender Norm Dynamics**

In support of a conceptual framework informed by a social theory of gender based on hegemonic masculinity theory, a “feminist constructivist” approach is developed. Feminist theory is partnered with the constructivist tool of normative analysis to systematically investigate historical developments in the gender regime of Japan. This “feminist constructivist” understanding of gender relations is discussed using a “gender norm” life cycle model in a three stage process to determine whether hegemonic masculine gender relations in Japan is in a period of consolidation, acceptance or decline with reference to changing patterns in women’s employment practices. Hegemonic masculinity is seen to be in “crisis” if it is in serious challenge from counter-hegemonic ideals. The goal is to understand the causal mechanism between femininity, masculinity and gender order balance, as well as the interrelationship between changes within one gender identity to the overall gender structure.

**Feminism and Constructivism: From an Ontology of Becoming**

Within the realm of the social, indeed political, sciences scholars have commented on the rise of a constructivist “ideational turn” since the 1980s (Reus-Smit 2001, Hopf 1998, and Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). The preoccupation with constructivism as a major challenger to the utilitarian understandings of realism and
liberalism has been marred by criticism of the constructivist research program, or lack thereof (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, p.392). Moreover, academics have also noted constructivist’s aversion to providing a systematic theory of power which cannot account for causality and explain political change (Locher and Prugl 2001, p.117). It is argued that these vulnerabilities in the constructivist program can be addressed through greater investment in a partnership with feminism and the establishment of a greater dialogue between these two theories.

Constructivists focus on ideational rather than material structures in the creation of ideas, norms, knowledge, culture, and identity that form the basis of collectively held “intersubjective” understandings of social and political interactions (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Thomas 2001; and Adler 1997). As Locher and Prugl note, “[c]onstructivists describe the world not as one that is, but as one that is in the process of becoming; they replace a ‘positional’ with a ‘transformational’ ontology” (Locher & Prugl 2001, p.114). Constructivists assert that political processes are social processes – political processes are constructed when actors follow rules and norms that are constituted by institutions, symbols, and languages in everyday life. Indeed, in their interactions with these structures, political actors engage in reproducing the structures that give their actions meaning, as well as legitimise their identity within the system. Theirs is a school of inquiry that attempts to mediate agency and structure in a manner that is “co-dependent” and mutually constituted – actors are allowed greater agency under the constructivist program, albeit their agency is constrained by the practices, interests, and identities of existing actors prevailing in the system in particular historical periods (Hopf 1998, p.177). Due to constructivism’s core assumptions, constructivists are chiefly concerned with framing and understanding the
answers to process questions – “how” norms and identities that shape social behaviour are formed - rather than understanding the nature of causality in political change when these structures are transformed. Thus, constructivism is criticised for a lack of a research agenda - there is little need to invest in a “constructivist methodology” for empirical analysis if the questions framed begets abstract theoretical answers, not hard and fast empirical proof. Meta-theory is not the goal, nor is it plausible, for constructivists as events and phenomena are contextually unique.

Like constructivism, feminism shares in the belief that the core concept of gender in feminist analysis is socially constructed. However, it must be acknowledged that this shared belief is also a point of departure for feminists. As Zalweski notes, feminism is best framed as being “numerous sets of practices, theories, philosophies and perspectives which take gender as an important and often central category of analysis” (Zalweski 1995, p.341). Feminist theory is not a homogenous collective but has different variants with varying key assumptions – ranging from radical, liberal, critical realist and interpretive feminism – which leads to divergent theoretical frameworks and research agendas (Sylvester 1996, p.254; see also Randall 2002). Sylvester argues that there are two broad forms of feminist conceptualisation that most feminist theory can be categorically placed. Feminist theory is either positivist and “assimilationist” in seeking to uncover the gender biases in political theorising that have largely been unable to account for a “woman’s experience” in political phenomena in order to better include women in political processes. Alternatively, feminist theory can result from a “sceptical inclining” standpoint that highlights the reflexive, interpretive and fluid manner in which gender is socially constructed so that it is not discernable to conflate “women’s experiences”
in meta-theory (Sylvester 1996, p263). The latter “sceptical inclining” feminist positioning conceptualises “masculinities” and “femininities” so that assimilation of a feminist account is not critical for validating women’s experiences. A prescription of transformation not reconciliation of current methods of enquiry is recommended. Theorists such as Tickner argue for a reformulation of existing methods of theorising so that gendered narratives can be truly overcome (Tickner 1988). Due to the variant nature between feminist theories, there can be a difficulty in amalgamating feminist theories with other theories of political science (Locher & Prugl 2001, p.112). Therefore, I do not assume a convenient and happy marriage between feminism and constructivism without acknowledging and addressing profound differences.

In elucidating a marriage between constructivism and feminism, it must be noted that I allude mainly to the interpretive school of feminist theory. Interpretive approaches to feminism focus on the meanings that shape actions and institutions that constitute gendered identities in everyday life (Bevir & Rhodes 2002, p.131). Whilst interpretive feminism and constructivism are epistemologically compatible due to their fundamental belief in an ontology of becoming, it must be acknowledged where the two theories diverge. Namely, (1) constructivists are not chiefly concerned with power in the formation of social processes whereas feminists are deeply concerned with the nature of power to an understanding of social processes between and within genders; and (2) constructivists are more concerned with explaining political behaviour rather than changes in political behaviour, which feminists seek to understand for an analysis of power (Locher & Prugl 2001, p.111; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p.888). Nevertheless, through persistence in sociological methodology and explicit acknowledgement of ontological compatibility between variant strands of
feminism and constructivism, a middle ground between feminism and constructivism to reach a conceptualisation of “feminist constructivist” theory can be achieved. In doing so, I posit an empirical methodological partnership between interpretive feminism and constructivism using “gender norm” as the unit of analysis to discern key developments in Japanese gender relations since the 1990s. It is this gender norm theorisation that will now be discerned.

**Feminist Constructivism and the Gender Norm “Life Cycle” Model**

In order to explain the origins of gender norms in Japan, their mechanism for gender identity influence, and the locus for change in the prevailing gender order, a blending of interpretive gender theorisation premised on hegemonic masculinity theory, as discussed in the preceding chapter, and constructivist conceptualisation by Finnemore and Sikkink as manifest in the norm “life cycle” model is advocated in order to arrive at an understanding of gender order equilibrium. From this Feminist Constructivist standpoint I will arrive at the gender norm “life cycle” model to investigate questions, including: i) what is a gender norm and how is it manifest in a society? ii) how are gender norms constructed or deconstructed? iii) how do gender norms impact on gender politics? and; iv) how are gender norms involved in the equilibrium and disequilibrium of the gender order. I will arrive at this juncture using research drawn from the following areas: empirical analysis of the trend in “feminisation” of non-regular employment in Japan and examination of developments in legislation and state policy including the “Vision of Gender Equality” policy, the Equal Employment Opportunity Law, the Child Care and Family Care Leave Law,
and the Part-time Work Law. It is hoped that through discussion of such case studies a greater dissection of the profound impact of gender norms on men and women, masculinities and femininities, and gender politics in Japan will be discerned.

**Definitions**

Norms are generally defined as being a set of collectively held standards of “appropriate” and “inappropriate” behaviours for actors with given identities (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p.891). Norms can either be categorically regulative, in that they constrain behaviour through moral assessment of the degree of “oughtness” for particular actions, or constitutive which allow behaviours A, B or C to be acceptable under certain conditions X, Y or Z (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p.891). Norms are important in explaining and understanding political behaviour because they regulate the available set of actions participants can choose from in certain historical, cultural and political contexts. Actors are bound to these normative posts by virtue of their identity of engagement within the prevailing structure. Participants recognize that deviant behaviour generates disapproval and stigma from co-identities whereas conforming behaviour invites praise and legitimacy for continued participation in the group structure. Moreover, Finnemore and Sikkink note that a norm is said to “exist” when its acceptance reaches beyond a “critical mass” of actors whereby the reflexivity or “doing” of the norm in everyday interactions has become internalised by a reasonable segment of the population so as not to raise any alarms of social discord (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p.892).
Within the context of feminist theory and gender politics discourse, gender norms refer to the standards of behaviour that socially constitutes appropriate conduct between and within masculine and feminine identities (Martin 2003, Donaldson 1993, Connell 1990, and West and Zimmerman 1987). Hopf argues that, “identities perform three necessary functions in a society: they tell you and others who you are and they tell you who others are” (Hopf 1998, p.175). In gender relations, those identities are constructed in opposition and complement the otherness between men and women, masculinity and femininity. In Japan, the *daikokubashira* ‘salaryman’ masculine ideal and complementary *ryosai kenbo* ‘good wife, wise mother’ feminine archetype are the two compounding normative gender identities that ensure the legitimisation and reproduction of the gender order status quo. By engaging with the “appropriate” behaviour of the male corporate warrior image, Japanese salarymen confirm their own identities as ‘men’, as well as perpetuate the hegemonic gender order that gives meaning and legitimacy to their ‘masculine’ identities vis a vis the corporation. Moreover, in acting in the ‘good wife, wise mother’ mould, Japanese women reinforce their feminine identity vis a vis their supplementary identity to that of the salaryman ideal, and hence validate the harmony and continual standard of the prevailing gender structure. That is, gender relations in Japan constitute a “mix” of gender norms premised on heterosexual gender relations – an intermarriage between hegemonic *daikokubashira* masculinity and emphasized *ryosai kenbo* femininity. To understand the historical trajectory and present intersubjective conditions of gender relations in Japan, I refer to the gender norm “life cycle model” discussed below, as adapted from the norm “life cycle” model of Finnemore and Sikkink.
The Norm “Life Cycle” Model

According to Finnemore and Sikkink, norm emergence, influence and change dynamics can be understood in three stages.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Norm Emergence</th>
<th>Norm Cascade</th>
<th>Norm Internalisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stage 1</td>
<td>Tipping Point</td>
<td>Stage 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: “Norm Life Cycle” model taken from Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p.896)

Figure 1 illustrates that the first stage in Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm “life cycle” model is norm emergence; subsequently there is a period of norm cascade; and finally norm internalisation. With respect to gender, the same “labels” of gender norm development at each respective stage still applies to distinguish motives and mechanisms for gender norm influence and adherence throughout the various degrees of gender norm crystallisation.

STAGE 1: NORM EMERGENCE. This is the period of norm building. Norm entrepreneurs who have a vested interest in challenging the status quo, for both belligerent and altruistic motivations, “frame” issues by way of broadening existing definitions of proper behaviour for co-identities in the community. It must be noted, “new norms never enter a normative vacuum but instead emerge in a highly contested normative space where they must compete with other norms and perceptions of interest” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p.897; also see Thomas 2001, p.33). Therefore, it is the role of norm entrepreneurs to sometimes initially engage in deviant behaviours from the accepted standard in order to persuade decision makers and elites
that the new benchmark is more congruent with prevailing historical, cultural and social forces (Hopf 1998, p.177). Thus, once norm entrepreneurs have persuaded a critical mass of actors to accept their position as norm leaders in the newly constituted order, the norm reaches a threshold whereby the norm has been institutionalised and codified within at least an organisational context so as to allow for the continual process of socialisation in the second phase of norm cascade (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p.900). Within the organisational context of the workplace, gender identities are codified within the everyday institutional practicing of gender. Women perform the menial administrative tasks whilst men engage in higher decision making roles. This “practicing” of gender over time and organisational space leads to the broader socialisation of gender identities compatible with such a gender division of labour in the public, and also private, spheres.

STAGE 2: NORM CASCADE. Norm entrepreneurs and norm leaders enhance widespread norm conformity through reformulating the matrix for norm compliance to promote the new standard of behaviour. Finnemore and Sikkink posit that norm entrepreneurs and leaders limit public opposition through the creation of a new community to which members must transfer their allegiance to in order to maintain the legitimacy of their identities. Those who comply with the socialisation process are exalted to the status of heroes for others to emulate, greater conformity to the new standard is received with praise and deviation is ridiculed by co-identities (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p.902). Therefore, for successful norm cascade to reach the final stage of norm acceptance, norm leaders must reverse the cognitive calculations of members so that conformity to the challenged norm becomes increasingly irrational within the context of identity homogeneity in group dynamics. For example, women
who assume managerial positions or other powerful positions are labelled as “pseudo-men”, and thus gender norm defection of this nature is discouraged through ridicule of being “un-feminine”.

STAGE 3: NORM INTERNALISATION. Norms are accepted when they acquire a “taken-for-granted” quality and cease to be an issue on the agenda for collective debate (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p.895). The criteria being that the “doing” or practicing of standards of behaviour becomes non-reflexive so that the challenged norm to which the new norm supplanted becomes “sub-rationally unthinkable” (Martin 2003, p.352). More importantly is that whilst there may be a period in which “old” and “new” norms coincide, but once one norm becomes increasingly internalised we will usually witness the corresponding decline in the competing norm.

Summary

The nuanced conceptualisation of gender relations using constructivist feminist lenses with an appropriation of the “norm life cycle” model examined to gender analysis in contemporary Japan will now be the focus of the following chapters. Prior to investigating the nature of challenges to the gender order from within and mechanisms adopted for managing gender order instability, I will firstly consider the historical development of the prevailing hegemonic gender arrangement in Japan in order arrive at an understanding of the changes in gender norm dynamics to the present period. From this theoretical foundation I will discuss and explain recent developments in the labour market for women, with particular reference to the
rising discourse on the feminisation of part-time work in Japan, and relate these changes to the underlying hegemonic gender structure. Subsequently, I will analyse the extent to which stakeholders have been able to codify progressive gender neutral norms in the legislature in order to examine the degree of norm acceptance and protection. It is hoped that through this historically constituted methodological program, a comparative understanding of what gender relations in Japan was and is can be offered.
Chapter 3

*Sarariimen*: Hegemonic Masculinity and the Dynamics of Gender Norm Compliance

The ideologies of “Sarariiman” (salaryman) and “Daikokubashira” (male “breadwinner” salaryman supporting the household) are the hegemonic masculine ideals in Japan to which resulting masculinities and femininities are defined. In order to understand challenges to this masculine reference point and indeed any transformation in the gender structure, it must first be explained the rise and nature of this hegemonic masculine ideal. The crystallisation of the *sarariiman* normative ideal in Japan will be discussed in three stages as espoused by the three stage norm “life cycle” model of Finnemore and Sikkink. The current and continual relevance of this hegemonic masculine norm is reinforced by norm entrepreneurs (corporations) in spite of exogenous economic challenges manifest in the economic downturn of the 1990s. Historically and presently, the gender regime in Japan is defined by compliance to the *sarariiman*/*daikokubashira* masculine ideal for men and supporting *ryosai kenbo* ideal of femininity for women.

The *Daikokubashira*: Masculinity Defined Through the Corporation

Orii Hyuga, a personnel manager at Nippon Kokan steel mill (Japan’s second
largest steel mill with over 24,000 employees at two major sites) of 25 years, stated in his memoir that:

One day [in 1953], an accident occurred at the Kawasaki mill [of Nippon Kokan (NKK)]. Upon investigating, Vice-Superintendent Komaki discovered that the accident resulted from the employee’s exhaustion from staying up all night to care for his daughter, who was in the NKK hospital with a serious illness. Komaki was shocked at this fact, and he resolved that...the company’s welfare policy would have to be turned around 180 degrees to focus not only on the employee and the workplace, but to involve housewives and families, to increase the housewives’ cultivation, to systematize daily life, and to serve as an advisor or counsellor to realize the fruits of family health (Orii 1973 as quoted in Gordon 1997, p.246).

The resulting action from this observation was the enactment of an in-company welfare system that encouraged workers and their families to adopt the “traditional family” model, referred to as the “New Life Movement” (Gordon 1997). The movement was enacted in NKK in 1953 and by 1955 had become codified in all branches of the company. The central tenets of the movement were to harmonize “family life” with “corporate life” so that the two spheres were seen to be mutually congruent. Programs were designed to heighten morality through family planning measures and redesign social life so that Japan would evolve into a Kigyo Shakai (company-centred society) (Kimoto 1997; and Gordon 1997). In order to do so, movement programs were focused on the deliberate socialisation of the
daikokubashira and ryosai kenbo gender ideals for the betterment of the company (for further discussion of the programs instilled by NKK, please see Gordon 1997). As Orii further qualifies in his memoir:

[I]n any human being’s life, workplace and home are intimately and inseparably related. Life in the home is the barometer for the next day’s life [at work]. In principle the housewife is in charge of home life, and we can say that the husband both takes his rest and builds his energy under her initiative. Thus, we wished to elevate the housewives who played this role and thereby establish the foundation for a bright, cheerful home, a bright society, and beyond that, a bright, cheerful workplace (Orii 1973 as quoted in Gordon 1997, p.247).

The in-house initiative of NKK illustrates the widely held view of Japan’s corporate elites that the family unit can legitimately be used as a means to achieve cohesion and efficiency in the workplace (Crawcour, 1978; and Bhappu 2000). That is, in order for efficient use of labour in the workplace, a specific gender division of labour and particular gender role ideals premised upon the daikokubashira and ryosai kenbo norms within the private sphere are tantamount (Gordon 1997, p.246). Of significance in the NKK case is the ordering of importance placed upon the corporate masculine identity above that of supporting feminine identities. Orii’s account highlights the centrality of the daikokubashira norm in acting as a reference point to which all other masculinities and feminities must coordinate. If not for the Vice-Superintendent’s concern over the performance of his male employee and all those
others in the firm, then NKK executives would not have embarked upon a national corporate initiative to streamline the activities and behaviours of corporate spouses. In the case of NKK, Japanese familism had been incorporated under the banner of a corporate familism so the behaviour of co-genders in the Japanese family acted in accordance with a desire to ensure efficiency and harmony at the family unit level in order to fit in with the corporate family. The corporate family by extension of the traditional Japanese family unit became the central community for coordinating social life and gender relations between the sexes. In other words, the norm emergence of the hegemonic masculine ideal of the daikokubashira, was constructed vis-à-vis the Japanese firm, and is the principle in which the prevailing Japanese gender order is organised.

In order for the Japanese firm to bolster the daikokubashira hegemonic ideal, the ‘sarariiman’ identity with the promise of a “family wage” to support his household as exemplified through the practice of lifetime employment and seniority wages was instilled. Scholars have noted the centrality of the lifetime employment system as a symbol of Japan’s unique industrial relations system that has lead to the ascendency of the sarariiman (Kasuya 2005; Bhappu 2000; Clark 1988; Rohlen 1988; Cole 1979; Dore 1973; and Abegglen 1958). The permanent lifetime employment system refers to the practice whereby an employee enters a company after school graduation (including from Junior High School to University level), receives in-company training, is payed according to length of service (or seniority), and remains an employee of that company until retirement (Ahmadjian and Robinson 2001, pp.623-624). Hence the economic stability offered through the practices of lifetime employment and seniority wages legitimises the continual reverence for and
reproduction of the daikokubashira hegemonic ideal in Japan. The institutionalised dynamics of the lifetime employment system also ensures the socialisation of hegemonic masculine gender norms and compliance to such ideals is enforced through the carrot of economic stability and communal membership offered through the company.

Whilst the sarariiman identity is the hegemonic masculine ideal in Japan, it is pertinent to note that the system upon which the norm is premised is limited to a small prestigious group of highly educated male employees who are framed as “heroes” for all other would-be sarariimen to emulate. Scholars note that only approximately 20 per cent of the workforce in Japan is covered under the lifetime employment system (Cole 1979, p.61). Therefore, as Dasgupta notes of this cleavage between the ideational prescription and empirical reality:

[T]here is no denying that this ‘ideal’ of hegemonic masculinity does exert a powerful influence on men’s lives (and the lives of women as well) through the instruments of state and society, most men do not or cannot measure up to it. Thus, underlying the seemingly powerful dominant discourse are a host of individual ontologies of masculinity that engage with the dominant in varying ways. This engagement takes place both at a wider societal level and on the level of the individual (Dasgupta 2000, p.191).

Nevertheless, although permanent employment has been more culturally associated with the managerial class than with the majority of the workforce, it is due to the
efficacy of this norm to shape and constrain masculine behaviour and gender identities of all non-privileged male members of Japanese society that is key for ensuring norm compliance within masculine identities (Dasgupta 2005, p.168).

I will now investigate the historical development of the *sarariiman* norm in accordance with the “Norm Life Cycle” model espoused by Finnemore and Sikkink discussed in the previous chapter. In doing so I will discern the mechanisms through which the *sarariiman* hegemonic masculine principle influences subordinate masculinities and corresponding feminities. Of particular interest is to gain insight into which historical stage the prevailing gender order with the *daikokubashira* as central emerged, understanding how the hegemonic masculinity norm is manifest in Japanese society, what actors were involved in the construction of the norm in question, and the current outlook for the *sarariiman* and *daikokubashira* norms. Moreover, I wish to ask how the *sarariiman* and *daikokubashira* identities remain prominent in the gender discourse despite recent economic pressures that have called into question its continual legitimacy.

**Norm Emergence: Constructing the Sarariiman**

The discourse on the emergence of the principles underpinning the *sarariiman* norm is marred by the question of to what extent there is a direct institutional continuity in employment institutions from the pre-modern period to the present day. In other words, is the practice of permanent employment a case of “conscious invention” by norm entrepreneurs or of “conscious borrowing” from the past? (Dore
1973, p.376). It is arguable that permanent employment and the foundations of the sarariiman identity is both a modern innovation and pre-modern tradition (Kasuya 2005; and Dore 1973). Business elites in the large merchant houses including Kikkoman, Mitsui, Sumitomo and Mitsubishi deliberately framed corporate programs with the rhetoric of “family-as-firm,” by way of reaching back into pre-modern familial traditions in order to overcome the economic pressures of skilled labour shortages and high labour mobility during the early twentieth century (Crawcour 1978, p.229). Therefore, whilst market forces precipitated labour management policies in Japan, it was the doctrine of traditional vertical familial ties instilled by business decision makers that provided the structural model of the modern firm. It is a relationship of childlike filial obligation from employee to employer and lifelong paternalistic responsibility from employer to employee that regulates the Japanese system of corporate loyalty and obligation. The framing of such norms premised on traditions of the past increased the acceptability of the emerging norm as it was seen to be congruent with the cultural piety of co-identities.

In his study of the historical development of industrial relations policies of the House of Mitsui from the Edo period (1603 to 1868) to the present, Kasuya demonstrates that the management policies of one of Japan’s oldest keiretsu’s is both an invention and an innovation (Kasuya 2005). Kasuya notes that the employment practices used by the House of Mitsui was representative of other merchant houses in Japan during the Edo period (Kasuya 2005, p.227). In principle, only young boys from the proprietors’ hometown were recruited into the family-owned and run business, and lived with the manager not unlike household servants. Employers were gradually promoted to higher ranks in regular intervals, with their wages rising
accordingly to reflect their seniority in the business. As a reward for their lifelong honesty, hard work, obedience, and loyalty, employees would progress to become managers, general managers and even have the opportunity to establish a business of their own as an extended branch of the merchant house (the branch-house system) using their retirement allowances (Kasuya 2005, p.227; see also Crawcour 1978, p.228). In the modern era, large Japanese corporations no longer recruit local village boys but Japanese college graduates of universities to which the corporation has a close tie, thereby replacing the village connections with a tertiary network (Beck and Beck 1994, p.36). Once hired, employees engage in in-house training to be promoted regularly according to tenure, with pay rises accordingly, to either become an executive or retire at the age of fifty-five. Thus, there have been subtle changes precipitated by the changed social, cultural and economic circumstances, however the ethos of the Japanese management system prevails.

In re-inventing the corporate structure, Japanese business elites invoked cultural traditions premised upon pre-modern familial principles that were prevalent in village life. That is, business norm entrepreneurs framed management practices in response to economic pressures presented at the turn of the century that placed the social group above the individual. In doing so, compliance with group dynamics, including acting as the corporate warrior for Japanese men and as the corporate housewife for Japanese women in a heterosexual relationship for the benefit of the firm, was more achievable and manageable:

The Japanese traditionally live in villages, where residents knew each other for whole lifetimes. Only that social group – the village and the
family in the context of the village – defined the individual. To be cut off from the village or the family, therefore, was to be cut off from one’s personal identity and connectedness (Beck and Beck 1994, p.63).

Business decision makers reformulated the matrix for norm compliance by tightening the social fabric so that the threat of deviant behaviour or identities is deterred by the highest social punishment imaginable, *mura hachiba* (social exile) from the community in which one belongs to become a *ronin* (social pariah). Punishment for gender norm defection through the threat of social marginalisation acted as the stick to which norm compliance was ensured.

**Norm Cascade: Entrenching the Sarariiman**

In institutionalising the *sarariiman* norm, business elites embarked upon entrenching the permanent employment system for all companies to emulate, with the goal to make lifetime employment the standard national industrial relations practice. Although the period of a worker’s employment tenure began to lengthen to greater approximate that of a ‘lifetime’ commitment in the 1920s, it is generally agreed that the lifetime employment system did not become established in the majority of large firms for both skilled white collar labour and semi-skilled blue collar labour until after World War II (Kasuya 2005; Fruin 1983; Cole 1979; and Dore 1973). The majority of Japanese youths experience similar employment experiences that cover their life
cycles from recruitment and induction into a firm through to retirement. The phases of employment are elaborated as follows:

1. THE RECRUITMENT PROCEDURE. Japanese firms follow a four step recruitment process for new college graduates: 1) universities appointment bureau are contacted to refer a quota of suitable students to sit the company entrance exam; 2) entrance exams; 3) interview screening; 4) personal background checks (Dore 1973, p.49). The purpose of the cumbersome process is to ensure thoroughness in choosing the right candidate to which the firm will get maximum returns for their lifelong commitment as beneficiary. And conversely, that the candidate will honour their filial obligations to the company throughout their tenure.

2. SOCIALISATION INTO THE COMPANY. In inducting the employee into the firm as one of the company’s cohort of sarariimen, the employee is afforded several non-monetary benefits, which further instils loyalty, diligence and obedience. These benefits include short term company housing for bachelors or honeymooning couples, company sponsored low-interest rate home loans, educational loans for dependents, sports club memberships, use of company resorts and inclusion into company expense accounts for entertaining purposes (Beck and Beck 1994, p.77). These benefits encourage the development of interpersonal linkages between the new employee and the company, as well as with other company personnel to further tighten the company social fabric. It is intended that once the new recruits become accustomed to such standards, that they will limit defective behaviour and actions to maintain such privileges and ensure their continual membership into the company community.
3. SALARY. As mentioned, Japanese worker’s salaries have become quite predictable under the vestiges of the lifetime employment and seniority wages. Even during the Edo period in the House of Mitsui, there was a visible relationship between tenure, title and salaries, which remains in the present period (Kasuya 2005, p.229). It has been noted that it is not the modest wages that encourages employee productivity but the promise of security and prestige with working for a prominent Japanese firm (Beck and Beck 1994, p.79). Moreover, considering the rigidity and predictability of the Japanese management system with respect to salary and promotion practices, labour mobility is discouraged as employees who defect from their social contract with the company in lieu of an opportunity with another company will have to re-start their careers at the bottom of the hierarchy at the new firm.

4. PROMOTION. Although the promise of seniority wages with lifetime employment ensures an economic and social safety net for employees, the roles of bucho (general manager) and shacho (president) are limited and cannot be attained by everyone. Moreover, promotions are not awarded on merit or tenure alone, but great emphasis is placed upon personality and ability to best conform to the company’s interpretation of sarariiman (Beck and Beck 1994, pp.79-83). That is, the nature of Japanese companies’ promotional system is another carrot to which employees can be motivated to conform to company norms and expectations.

5. RETIREMENT. Employees are generally faced with an early retirement compared to their Western counterparts between the ages of fifty-five to sixty, unless they have been lucky enough to secure a position of yakuin (president or director) (Beck and Beck 1994, pp.83-84). Once retired, employees can expect a lump-sum retirement
benefit to supplement their savings (Beck and Beck 1994, p.83). Again, the company’s standard retirement policy provides a measure of predictability and stability for employees in their old age, to which non-\textit{sarariimen} are not afforded.

Therefore, during the post-World War II era, Japanese business decision makers harmonised their labour management policies so that lifetime employment and seniority wages was the standard industrial relations program in the majority of large Japanese firms. In order to gain access into this social community, Japanese men had to aspire to the \textit{sarariiman} identity. The pervasiveness of the Japanese employment system ensured familial-like allegiance to the firm in return for continual legitimacy and access in the cohesive Japanese fabric. Successful corporate elites fortunate enough to secure \textit{yakuin} positions serve as exemplars for other would-be \textit{sarariimen}, whilst non-compliant \textit{sarariimen} relegated to their low-level positions serve as the stick that warns against deviant behaviour and actions. That is:

\[ \text{The more an individual internalizes the classic Japanese system of the primacy of the group, follows the norms, and tries to encourage others to follow the norms, the more loyalty that individual is likely to show to the group. As each act of social control invoked by a specific social control forms an ever-tightening spiral. In the minds of many Japanese these concepts – standards, control and loyalty – have been wound together so tightly that the differences have become almost impossible to tease apart (Beck and Beck 1994, p. 66).} \]
The result for the present period being that business decision makers as *sarariimen* norm entrepreneurs have become successful in their attempts to reverse the cognitive considerations of Japanese men so that non-conformity to the *sarariiman* and *daikokubashira* gender norms is a non-option in the context of identity cohesion in corporate community dynamics.

It is notable that during this period of internalization of the *sarariiman* identity in the corporate context, there is a corresponding institutionalisation of the *daikokubashira* ideal and *ryosai kenbo* archetype in the localised family unit level. In order for men to become effective *sarariimen*, Japanese women had to be satisfied in being managers of the household. The lifelong commitment structure of the permanent employment system is not conducive to the reproductive roles of women as wives and mothers. Hence, Japanese women were discriminated against in labour management policies for the economic effectiveness of the nation. In other words, it is in the post World War II period, that the prevailing gender order of *daikokubashira* central gender figure, with supporting *ryosai kenbo* counterpart emerged (this is to be the focus of the next chapter).

**Norm Acceptance: ‘Doing’ the Sarariiman**

By the 1990s, the prevailing gender order of *daikokubashira/ryosai kenbo* and corporate warrior norm had become firmly established. In a comparative ethnographic study of fifty-two Japanese and fifty-two American adults on social and cultural psychology, Mathews’ study confirmed the degree of internalisation in which
Japanese co-identities conformed to the espoused gender norms (Mathews 1996). Mathews’ survey indicated that the *ikigai* (that which most motivates one to live) for was family and children for Japanese women, and work and company, followed by family, for Japanese men. Moreover, Japanese respondents placed a higher degree of importance on social affinity, in comparison to American respondents, which is congruent to the group over individual mentality upheld by the firm-as-family doctrine.

Moreover, qualitative fieldwork conducted in the 1990’s of white collar employees of two Japanese private sector organisations in a prefecture of northern Japan conducted Dasgupta, confirms the degree of internalisation of the *sarariiman* norm to social constructions of masculinity as perceived by Japanese men. Respondents offered the following views on the centrality of work to their perceptions of masculine identity:

> [I]n this day and age, I think “work” still…occupies a big part in a man. There’s the consideration of how this will change in the future. But for now…I think work is probably by and large the main thing…I think work occupies a big part of myself (quoted in Dasgupta 2005, p.170)

> At the point I joined this organization…I expected to continue in this job for life; and thought I’d get married, and after a child was born, on the salary I receive, would support a family; that was my
thinking. And, since now that I’m married and have a family, I still think that (quoted in Dasgupta 2005, p.170)

[If] I didn’t have a job, just thinking about a situation when I may not have a job is scary…It’s frightening…It’s like you become an animal which can’t hunt/find its food. Because an animal which can’t get its own food, at that point, within the animal kingdom that signifies death (quoted in Dasgupta 2005, p.171)

The result being, the ideology which defines and determines hegemonic masculinity primarily through work has become thoroughly entrenched in Japanese masculine psyche so that the “reflexivity” or “performativity” (the process whereby gender identity is constructed through repetitive enactments or “performances”, to borrow the term of Judith Butler) (Butler 1990) of the hegemonic masculine gender norm has sub-rationally become the accepted standard for masculine conduct. In other words, it can be stated that the sarariiman and daikokubashira norms have become the accepted hegemonic masculine identity in Japan.

The 1990s Forward: The Decline of the Sarariiman?

It has been eluded that we are seemingly witnessing a decline, indeed a crisis, of the permanent employment system and sarariiman gender norm. The bursting of the economic bubble in the early 1990’s has seen an increase in the unemployment rate to over 5 percent, as well as a tightening of the lifetime employment system as
firms have downsized and reformed their labour management practices to remain economically viable in the period of internationalisation and deregulation of Japanese industries. Ahmadjian and Robinson argue that the trend in downsizing amongst Japanese firms in the 1990s has delegitimised and deinstitutionalised the practice of permanent employment as the social networks underpinning the lifetime employment system have been undermined by the disruptions to labour management policy (Ahmadjian and Robinson 2001). Announcements of corporate downsizing was met with criticism by the media and the Japanese community as an “unfair” breach of corporations’ paternal responsibility to their employees, which in turn undermine their reputation as preferred employer for future cohorts of company recruits, which will consequently have a negative generational impact for the survivability of the lifetime employment system (Ahmadjian and Robinson 2001, pp.624-626).

Further micro analysis of company responses to the recent economic pressures do not support the view that the age of permanent employment and the sararimann is over. National surveys and interviews conducted by the Ministry of Labour between 1993 and 1995 to comparatively discuss Japanese employment adjustments during economic downturns with respect to recessions in the 1990s, 1986, and 1974 reveal a coordinated effort by Japanese business to lessen the severity of employment adjustments during periods of recession (Usui and Colignon 1996, pp.554-555). The results indicate that Japanese firms engage in a sequence of labour adjustment strategies that seek to encourage internal labour flexibility with the least disruption to labour and avoid termination where possible. The sequence of labour adjustment strategies is as follows:
1. reduction of overtime work and bonus;  
2. reassignment and dispatching of workers;  
3. no mid-career hiring and no hiring of new graduates;  
4. dismissal of part-time and temporary workers;  
5. allocation of extended vacations;  
6. temporary factory closing; and  
7. voluntary retirement and dismissal of workers  

(Usui and Colignon 1996, p.555)

What does this evidence present for the current outlook of the lifetime employment system? The suggestion is that whilst the lifetime employment practice has been declining for the new generation of cohorts and for those entering retirement (on the principle of last hired, first fired and that older employees are more expensive to retain under the seniority wage system), the “core” workforce of those in between recruitment and retirement ages remain protected (Ono 2007, p.35). Moreover, the Japanese government had revised legislation in response to the 1974 oil shock recession under the Employment Insurance Law with the enactment of the Employment Stabilisation Services programs, which economically compensates employers to avoid the termination of staff in recessions. Further, in 1994 the Ministry of Labour strengthened the government’s commitment to this program by relaxing the eligibility requirements for companies receiving subsidies as well as extending the duration of subsidy receipt for up to three years under the Total Plan for Employment Adjustment. The legislation uses employee contributions equal to 1.25 percent of the employees salary to reward and relieve companies that restructure without terminating employees using strategies including temporary release from work or temporary
transfer of staff to other firm branches (Usui and Colignon 1994, pp.563-564). In supporting such legislation, the Japanese government is acknowledging the significance of the lifetime employment system and sarariiman lifestyle to the continual harmony of Japanese society and gender relations. Hence, the defining practice of lifetime employment and sarariiman lifestyle remains a continuing feature of Japan’s employment system despite recent economic pressures that have threatened to undermine its legitimacy and longevity.

**Summary**

The pattern of gender relations in contemporary Japan is characterised by the efficacy of the sarariiman and daikokubashira male gender norms, which emerged from pre-industrial traditions of the Meiji era to be institutionalised in the post World War II period and firmly accepted in the present period. Throughout the various phases of norm crystallisation corporate institutions and corporate elites have been the main parties in encouraging the internalisation of this norm. Indeed, these male hegemonic gender norms have been constructed vis-à-vis the corporation. It has been argued that initial motivations of corporate norm entrepreneurs has been due to economic imperatives, but once these norms were established continual maintenance and reverence for these ideals have become *internally* driven. Whilst the emergence of these hegemonic masculine norms initially developed from material motivations, once entrenched and accepted the new practices, institutions and cognitive reasonings (mainly lifetime employment, seniority wages and the family-as-firm doctrine) which uphold and reproduce these norms have created an internal dynamic such that
exogenous material factors have become less consequential in their shaping and legitimacy (as illustrated via discussion of the economic challenges of the 1990s). Resultantly, the current outlook for the gender regime in Japan is such that the ideational structure frames and constrains motivations and developments in the material structure and not vice versa. This is further explained and supported with reference to a discussion of emerging trends in women’s employment practices, which will the focus of the following chapter.
Japanese women’s representation in paid work is perceived as being symptomatic of women’s denouncement of traditional *ryosai kenbo* duties in line with aforementioned trends in expanding tertiary qualifications and postponement of marriage and childrearing. However, closer examination of the “feminisation” of part-time employment, which refers to the growing trend of Japanese women in non-regular employment, reveals that engagement in part-time work does not present an avenue through which women are able to challenge the prevailing *sarariiman* male gender norm and *daikokubashira* centred gender order. Indeed, the growing practice of the feminisation of part-time employment is a measure to which women’s dissent is co-opted into the prevailing gender arrangement as intended by corporate norm entrepreneurs with the support of the state apparatus.

**Women in the Japanese Labour Market: A Current Overview**

Prior to conceptualising the gendered nature of work in Japan, an overview of women’s employment must first be provided. There has been a steady increase in women’s labour force participation since the immediate post-war period. Official statistics reveal that in 1950, the number of female workers engaged in the wage
laid labour market totalled 3.6 million, which increased to 10 million by 1967, and as at 1998 figured as 21.3 million (Japan Institute of Women’s Evolution [hereafter JIWE] 2007). Moreover, women’s employment has increased by 80.8 percent over the period from 1974 to 1999 to now comprise 40 per cent of the total workforce, as indicated in table 1.

Table 1. Employees in the Japanese labour market by gender, 1974-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Employment</th>
<th>Male Employment</th>
<th>Female Employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Millions</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Millions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>35.12</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>23.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>41.80</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>26.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>51.44</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>31.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>52.20</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>31.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Kezuka 2000 quoted in Kumamoto-Healey 2005, p.458, table. 4

Further, that the growth in female composition of the labour force in the post-war period has also seen significant changes in the composition of the female workforce between regular full-time employment and irregular part-time forms of employment, as well as by industry. Table 2 illustrates that there has been considerable growth in the incident of part-time employment in the Japanese labour market, and that female employees overwhelmingly represent this. Indeed, as Broadbent notes, “[w]omen have always been a presence in Japan’s paid workforce; what has changed is that more women are employed in part-time work” (Broadbent 2003, p.4). It is pertinent to note that non-regular employment in Japan includes casuals, temporaries, dispatch, piece, seasonal, sub-contract, day workers as well as part-time workers so as not to conflate the term. Nevertheless, of the number of
female non-standard workers in Japan, part-time work represents the growing form of employment for women.

One-fifth of Japan’s non-agricultural workforce is employed part-time and women comprise 68 per cent of the part-time workforce (estimations as of 2003, reveal that this figure has now reached 72 per cent) (Broadbent 2003, p.1). In 1994 the increase in the number of part-time jobs was 9 per cent on the previous year, and in 1995, the number increased again by 14 per cent from the 1994 figure (Broadbent 2003, p.4). This is comparable with the labour adjustment strategies by business, mentioned in the previous chapter, for greater labour flexibility in order to offset the dampening effects from the economic recession of the 1990s, which peaked in 1994.

Table 2. Female part-time employees in the non-agricultural sector, 1974-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Employment</th>
<th>Part-time employment</th>
<th>Number of female part-time employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Millions</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Millions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>35.12</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>3.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>41.80</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>4.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>51.44</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>9.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>52.20</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>11.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Kezuka 2000 quoted in Kumamoto-Healey 2005, p.458, table. 4,

Notes: Kezuka defines part-time employees (including seasonal and irregularly employed persons) as those whose weekly working hours total less than 35 hours. This definition excludes temporary workers and the self employed

Also of significance is that of the 72 per cent of female part-time workers, 57 per cent of women are working in tertiary and service sector industries including retail, wholesale, finance, health and restaurants (Broadbent 2003, p.3). Broadbent notes that of these tertiary and service sector female part-time employees, 25.5 per cent are
employed in sales positions, 19 per cent are represented in production roles, 18 per cent in service and 13 per cent in clerical positions (Broadbent 2003, p.3). Table 3 reveals that women’s status in low-level non-regular employment with relatively limited decision making responsibilities is manifest in the persistent wage differentials between men and women in Japan (see Nagase 1997).

Table 3. Hourly pay for regular and part-time workers by sex, 1989-1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Female-to-male wage ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regular Workers (Yen)</td>
<td>Part-time workers (Yen)</td>
<td>Wage ratio (Regular worker=100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>70.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1201</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1295</td>
<td>886</td>
<td>68.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>1155.0</td>
<td>811.0</td>
<td>70.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Kezuka 2000, based on Ministry of Labours *Basic surveys on wage structure* quoted on Kumamoto-Healey 2005, p.460

Another form of non-regular employment of which women predominate is in the temporary work sector. Weathers notes that of almost 90 per cent of the registered temporary workers in Japan, who comprise 1.1 per cent of the total workforce and 3.9 per cent of all non-regular workers, are women (Weathers 2001, p.204). Whilst the total number of temporary workers is not significantly large, the concentration of women in this form of generally low-level and low-paying (also mostly clerical) work where they are afforded limited legislative protection relative to full-time employees similar to the case of part-time employees is of interest (for further discussion see Weathers 2001).
The overall trend for the feminisation of women’s labour in Japan in part-time, indeed non-regular, forms of employment is evident over the life cycle. Scholars have noted the “M” shape for women’s labour force participation (see Kumamoto-Healey 2005, p.452; and Yu 2002). Japanese women have empirically remained in the workforce up until marriage and re-enter the workforce after childbirth or when their children are of school age, forming an “M” shape which peaks around the 20-24 and 45-49 age brackets (refer to table 4).

Table 4. Employment rates for women by age group, 1970-1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Female employment rate as percentage of total female workforce by age group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female employment rate of total workforce (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Considering the structural rigidities of the Japanese labour market, marked by practices of lifetime employment and seniority wages, women’s non-market choices over their life cycle are not compatible with the system of continuous employment and therefore must ‘choose’ part-time employment to better balance their life/work responsibilities.

To reiterate, the general statistics confirm that the current state for women and work in the Japanese labour market are as follows: Japanese women now comprise of
a significant segment in the paid labour force in Japan. Recent economic challenges, due to the economic recession of the 1990s, has seen increasing casualisation of the workforce to retain internal labour market flexibility, with minimum disruption to the work practices that affect the “core” standard labour force covered by permanent employment practices (ie. the sarariiman). Women of late marrying age or married women re-entering the labour force after childbirth and childrearing decisions have largely filled this trend towards greater employment of non-regular workers.

The question I seek to address for the remainder of this chapter is “does the trend in the feminisation of part-time work in Japan represent a case for hegemonic gender norm compliance or departure?” and “what is the outcome of this for the prevailing gender order?” Of interest is the social and political logic, and ramifications underpinning women’s representation in part-time employment for gender relations between the sexes. That is, whether women’s involvement in non-regular employment affords them greater ability and power to redress the gender balance as a result of their enhanced economic standing, or whether this ‘enhancement’ in economic status by way of part-time employment is merely a chimera. I seek to understand the political and ideological motivations of the main actors involved (women and business) in participating in this social and economic phenomenon, as well as relate these changes to the normative gender structure vis-à-vis an analysis of how they impact upon the prevailing daikokubashira/ryosai kenbo hegemonic gender order.
Conceptualising the Feminisation of Part-time Work in Japan

Prior research has tended to adopt either supply or demand side explanations to explain women’s concentration in part-time and non-standard forms of employment. The family “life cycle” nature of women’s work centres on the incompatibility between continuous lifetime employment practices for women and their domestic responsibilities throughout their life course including marriage and post-natal responsibilities (Kumamoto-Healey 2005; Osawa 2004-2005; and Nakamatsu 1994). It is argued that part-time work is an attractive “choice” for married women with child rearing responsibilities that are time-poor and favour the flexible working hours that are not afforded to full-time status employees (Nakamatsu 1994, p.88).

Alternatively, Houseman and Abraham highlight labour demand conditions such as the need from Japanese firms to have an “auxiliary” pool of labour that can be easily and cheaply adjusted to relieve exogenous economic pressures (Houseman and Abraham 1993). The logic is that in high growth periods, part-time worker hours can be extended to meet increasing service or production demand, and can be relieved through attrition or hiring freezes during tough periods. Again, the assumption by employers is that the majority of part-time employees who are married, seek paid employment to supplement the daikokubashira household income – hence the prevalence of the “M” curve in female labour force participation rates over the female life course. Thus it is seen as inefficient to invest in the “managerial” career track of female workers who empirically leave the workforce after marriage and re-enter only
on part-time basis so as not to interfere with the competing demands of their non-market duties (Brinton 1988, p.318).

Prevalent among both supply side and demand side explanations is the construction of women’s work with reference to *ryosai kenbo* gender norm ideology. Women’s status in paid employment is auxiliary to their roles as mothers and wives in the private sphere. It assumes that there is a natural choice for women to engage in part-time employment whilst ignoring the structural barriers that limit the available range of options to women. For example, regular full-time working women who leave the workforce after marriage, cannot re-enter the labour market after child birth to reassume their regular worker status even if this was their primary choice. The existing labour relations system, premised upon continuous employment and tenure-based wages, privileges and rewards male workers who can commit to the demanding organisational culture of long hours at work, after work socialisation with colleagues, and frequent inter-branch reassignments which women with familial responsibilities cannot compete with (Gottfreid and Hayashi-Kato 1998, p.30). Institutionalised labour market constraints can act as a barrier to free labour mobility between regular and non-regular employment for women, thereby restricting their available options for employment “choices” to that which does not detract from the security of permanent employment for the “core” workforce. The limitation of such analysis is that it cannot account for the power disadvantage of such kinds of gender bias in existing practices of work. Moreover, profound explanations for the persistence of gendered perceptions of women’s work cannot be discerned.
Building from the dichotomous conceptualisation of married women in part-time employment presented by supply and demand side theorists, structural based explanations have been presented. Such explanations do not offer optimistic predictions for future developments in gender equality. Rather, they identify the recent changes in women’s employments as an empirical testament to the survival of the lifetime employment system and continual efficacy of the sarariiman hegemonic masculine gender norm. Gottfried and Hayashi-Kato draw on qualitative and quantitative fieldwork evidence established during the early to mid 1990s to conclude that a gendered wage contract modelled on the daikokubashira and ryosai kenbo gender roles to approximate a male “breadwinner” gender contract, is upheld and reproduced by the prevailing Japanese employment system. This gender wage contract favours men as full-time wage earners and women as part-time auxiliary wage workers. Moreover, that structural legitimacy of the Japanese industrial relations system is supported by coordinated efforts by capital and the state to entrench this gender contract for greater economic efficiency (Gottfried and Hayashi-Kato 1998). Therefore, women’s engagement with part-time work does not represent greater economic choice or freedom for women to engage in public and private life (see Kamamoto-Healey 2005), rather it serves as a political strategy used by business and the state to neutralise calls for gender equality and legitimise continual reverence for the sarariiman hegemonic masculinity norm.

Further, in light of the recent trend in the feminisation of part-time work, Kaye Braodbent’s field study of Daiichi (a pseudonym) supermarket chains in Japan from 1992-1993 further develops on this discourse in arguing that the expansion of part-time employment is a coordinated employer and government strategy to create a
segregated employment track for women that is able to co-exist with and support the maintenance of lifetime employment practices. Further, the labour cost savings from the feminisation of part-time employment directly ensures the viability of lifetime employment for the core (male) workforce, which is traditionally more labour-expensive (and afforded greater employment rights). Broadbent maintains that part-time work is a deliberate institutional strategy to further entrench the gendered division of labour and hence the prevailing gender order between the sexes (Broadbent 2003 and 2001). These explanations shift the focus from gendering women and work with recourse to the *ryosai kenbo* gender norm to that of the *daikokubashira* gender norm. Women’s contribution and status in paid employment is conceived as being complementary to and supportive of the prevailing gender order. Indeed, the state and businesses are integral in the construction and maintenance of such gender norm dynamics.

Arguments such as those presented by Gottfried and Hayashi-Kato, and Broadbent are further strengthened when analysing current tax system incentives which seek to perpetuate the dependent familial role of married women in part-time employment and *daikokubashira* “breadwinner” role of Japanese men in full-time employment. The Japanese tax system stipulates that those earning less than one million yen annually are exempt from paying income tax. This incentive is targeted at part-time workers (ie. women) who work 22-30 hours of work per week, based on the average hourly pay for women as indicated by the Ministry of Labour in 1995 (Yu 2002, p.502). Moreover, husbands with spouses earning less than the stipulated amount receive tax deductions on their annual salary in addition to health and pension insurance for their dependents from their employer if their spouse earns below the
threshold of 1,030,000 yen per year (Yu 2002, pp.502-503). This tax incentive is not an example of progressive state policy in acknowledging women’s dual role in the public and private sphere, but effectively encourages part-time wives to remain in part-time employment and thereby reinforce the gendered division of labour in society and the current gender order (see Nakamatsu 1994). It is evident that the feminisation of part-time work is a means through which continuity in the prevailing gender order with the woman as primary caregiver (*ryosai kenbo*) and male as breadwinner (*daikokubashira*) can be achieved. Through greater emphasis upon gender biases in the structural sphere, a more holistic understanding of the gendered nature of women and work that can be accounted for and persistencies in the system has been conceived.

**Summary**

Women’s representation in part-time employment is a gendered work strategy designed by corporate norm entrepreneurs and codified in tax legislature by the state, not a measure to which women are able to challenge the gender order from within. The feminisation of part-time work as a gendered employment strategy co-opts women’s aggravation with their *ryosai kenbo* normative gender identity under the pretext of greater “choice” and work/life balance and gives women the perception that they have a greater voice in the corporate sphere to which Japanese daily life is structured. The strength of the *sarariiman* and *daikokubashira* hegemonic masculine ideals continues in spite of women’s “protest” from within the material sphere. The framing of the material sphere by the ideational structure with recourse to gender
arrangements in Japan is also exemplified in employment legislature and state related policy. Indeed state actions and policies are framed with chief consideration to supporting corporate strategies in the management of gender relations and maintaining the gender order status quo.
Chapter 5

Employment Legislation and State Protection of Gender Norm Dynamics

The 1990s presented two major concerns for the government at the end of the post World War II high growth era: a declining birth rate approaching below replacement level; and ascending unemployment. These issues directly challenged the legitimacy of the existing gender contract as the vestiges of the *sarariiman* system could no longer seemingly be guaranteed under flailing economic growth (Hitoshi, Ryuko and Osamu 1997). In order to ensure gender order stability and perpetuate gender norm dynamics underpinning that equilibrium, it will be maintained that the Japanese government has replicated business in its strategy to encourage women into irregular modes of employment for the betterment of the *daikokubashira* ideal vis-à-vis promoting women as the primary caregivers. This government strategy of catering to the needs of corporations for a flexible workforce under the strident pressures of economic recession, packaged in the rhetoric of greater work/life balance for women, illustrates business and state commitment to continue delivering on the promise of lifetime employment and seniority wages for the core *male* workforce. This alignment of state and corporate objective has been co-opted and institutionalised in legislation and policy as evident by: i) the Equal Employment Opportunity Law; ii) the Child Care and Family Care Leave Law; and iii) the Part Time Work Law. The focus of this chapter is to reveal how the aforementioned legislation and policies has resulted in the state’s continual reverence for the gender order status quo.
Government Response to the Economic Challenges of the 1990s

By the mid to late 1990s, the Japanese government had enacted reform that seemingly questions the future relevancy of existing hegemonic gender norms. Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro cited socioeconomic developments evident in the 1990s – the ageing population, the declining fertility rate, the maturation and internationalisation of the Japanese economy – as reasoning for social reform and reconceptualisation of the existing gender contract with the goal of building a gender-equal society (quoted in Osawa 2000, p.3). Hashimoto’s pledge for reform was premised on the recommendations presented in the report, “Vision of Gender Equality: Creating New Values for the 21st Century” (hereafter the “Vision of Gender Equality”; available at http://www.gender.go.jp/english_contents/toshine/index.html) submitted by the Council for Gender Equality (created by ordinance of the government) in 1996, which was refashioned under “The National Plan of Action for Promotion of a Gender-Equal Society by the Year 2000” (second revision 1996, hereafter the “Plan for Gender Equality 2000”; available at http://www.gender.go.jp/english_contents/koudou/index.html). In addition, the Vision of Gender Equality was ratified in legislature as, “The Basic Law for a Gender Equal Society” which was passed in 1999. The goal of such legislation is to create the following:

[A] society in which both men and women shall be given equal opportunities to participate voluntarily in activities at all levels as equal partners and shall be able to enjoy political, economic, social and cultural benefits as well as to take responsibilities equally...a
society where men and women can jointly participate in activities according to their individual characteristics, without being restricted by “gender”, a social and cultural construct (Vision of Gender Equality, Part 1, Point 1.1).

Moreover, in order to achieve such an outcome of “gender neutrality” (in this case, where the act of being either a man or a woman has no bearing on available choices or opportunity in every aspect of social involvement) the Vision of Gender Equality states as one of its primary goals:

[T]o adjust the conditions of society which will enable men and women to participate as equal members in not just the family and workplace, but in every field of society…it is necessary to review those systems and customs based on stereotyped gender roles, from the viewpoint of gender equality…it is necessary to change the family-oriented views underlying those systems and customs into the individual-oriented views, and to establish frameworks of society which will neutrally apply to every citizen, whatever life style each individual may chose (Vision of Gender Equality, Part 2, Point 1.1).

In order to achieve such ends, the Vision of Gender Equality report outlines five key recommendations as part of its reform programme, outlined below:
Table 5. The Reform Programme for the Vision of Gender Equality

1. Forming a society with no gender-related prejudice
   
   (1) Revision of systems and customs which might lead to gender-related prejudice

   (2) The construction of a social system where men and women have an equal share of paid and unpaid work

   (3) Making a social infrastructure from the standpoint of socially-oriented people

2. Establishing gender equality in the workplace, family and community

   (1) Equal opportunity and equal treatment at the workplace

   (2) Promotion of gender equality in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and self-employed businesses

   (3) Promotion of gender equality in the ageing society

3. Promotion of joint participation by men and women in policy decision-making

   (1) Promoting the participation by men and women in policy decision-making processes

   (2) Studying the measures of “positive actions”

4. Reinforcing efforts to promote/protect the right to live without discrimination by gender

   (1) Elimination of violence against women

   (2) Promoting/protecting human rights in the media

   (3) Establishing reproductive health/rights

   (4) Promotion of gender equality to open the way for a diversity of choices through enrichment of education and learning
5. Contributing to the “Equality, Development, and Peace” of the Global Community

(1) Infiltrating international norms and standards in Japan

(2) Contributing towards “Equality, Development and Peace”

Source: The Vision of Gender Equality, Part 2

The rhetoric of the reform language is to refashion the basic social principles underpinning the existing normatively ingrained gender relations fabric – group obligations and responsibilities above the individual, in exchange for paternal patronage under the corporate protective umbrella – and precipitate the decline of the daikokubashira/ryosai kenbo normative path in preference for a more open “gender equal” structure that is not marred by gender biases. The principles of the Vision of Gender Equality purports that the removal of gender constraints is not only a moral imperative, but also essential to the long-term efficiency of social functioning in Japan (Osawa 2000, p.8).

Despite the emergency manifest in the language of the Vision of Gender Equality, little supporting policies have been passed and hence current results have been limited, leading to a questioning of the government’s actual commitment towards such profound reform. In an assessment of the monetary, legislative and policy contributions of Hashimoto and subsequent administrations to the Vision of Gender Equality reform, Osawa argues that state commitment for said reform is constrained by their general fiscal imperatives – to either have tight or loose budget balances – and hence the grand goal of gender-equality is secondary to broader macroeconomic imperatives (Osawa 2000). Moreover, the White Paper on Gender
Equality 2007 (available at http://www.gender.go.jp/whitepaper/ewp2007.pdf) indicates that traditional gender norms concerning appropriate gender roles are still prevalent. The ongoing expansion of female labour force representation, especially in non-regular forms of employment, has not developed with a corresponding change in social attitudes as women are still seen as the primary caregivers (eg. the percentage of those who take a childcare leave among all women who give birth during their career and among all men whose spouses give birth is 72.3 percent for women and 0.5 percent for men; quoted in the White Paper on Gender Equality 2007, p.27). Therefore, the 1990s has seen a general expansion of Japanese women’s burden in the public and private sphere, and hence further entrenchment of hegemonic gender identities, not the challenge of fundamental gender norms as hoped by the Vision of Gender Equality reform. This position is further supported when investigating the broader legislative context concerning women and employment.

The Legal Framework for Gender Equality

Subsequent to the end of the Second World War, the first general law regulating employment relations was passed in 1947 under the Labour Standards Law. The Labour Standards Law covers such subjects as employment contracts, payment of wages, working hours, rest days, annual paid leave, protection of children and pregnant women, and workers’ compensation etc. (Yamakawa 2001, p.632). This legislation was revised in 1998, and amendments enacted in April 1999, to set more stringent regulations concerning the amount of overtime work for female workers responsible for the care of dependents (including children and/or extended family
members), should they request shorter overtime hours for caregiving responsibilities (Kumamoto-Healey 2005, p.462). However, the Labour Standards Law ensures for the provision of basic standards in employment irrespective of sex and as such cannot be called upon to legislate against specific instances of gender discrimination in labour relations. Of more specific relevance for women’s employment rights in the post war era is the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL) of 1985 (amended in 1997), the Child Care Leave Law (CCLL) of 1991 (revised in 1995 and renamed the Child Care and Family Care Leave Law [CCFCLL]), and the Part-time Work Law (PTWL) in 1993.

It is arguable that the Vision of Gender Equality represents a continuity in the Japanese state’s efforts to manage the existing gender order with the interests of capital. Seemingly progressive for gender equality, this legislation actually further entrenches workplace inequality and the status of women as periphery workers without addressing the cleavages in the rights of part-time workers (of which women are over represented) versus full-time workers. The superficial attempts made by the government to revise and enact legislation regulating women’s employment is a strategy to promote the “family friendly” face of the state in support of the stated objectives of the Vision of Gender Equality policy, without profound long-term commitment towards developing a gender neutral society. The end objective is not to challenge or supplant the status quo gender norm structure, to revise traditional cultural values concerning gender roles and create a gender equal society, but to alter women’s perceptions of their available choices and opportunities so that reproduction becomes more viable and attractive in the current environment of declining fertility. Hence the state remains committed to perpetuating the accepted gender norm.
dynamics of the hegemonic masculine *daikokubashira* archetype and complementary feminine *ryosai keno* identity exalted under the current gender regime.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL)

The Law on Securing, Etc. of Equal Opportunity and Treatment between Men and Women in Employment, commonly referred to as the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL) of 1985, was enacted to ratify the Japanese government’s commitment towards the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which was ratified by Japan in 1985 (for a discussion on CEDAW and the impact of global gender mainstreaming on national gender relations policy see Zwingel 2005; and True 2003). The EEOL is the basic statute of equal opportunity between men and women in employment. Where the Labour Standards Law only regulates equality in employment between the sexes with respect to wages (Yamakawa 2001, p.636), the original EEOL encouraged (but did not compel) employer’s from discriminatory actions against women in terms of: i) recruitment and hiring; ii) assignment and promotion; iii) training; iv) fringe benefits; and v) mandatory retirement age, resignation, and dismissal (EEOL, available at http://www.jil.go.jp/english/laborinfo/library/documents/llj_law4.pdf).

At its inception, the EEOL was heavily criticised for its encouragement provisions (“duty to endeavour”) and its ineffective provision of a dispute resolution process (Knapp 1995). The 1985 EEOL failed to “prohibit” the actions it was enacted to legislate against due to the absence of any penalties for non-compliance. Moreover, the 1985 EEOL has been attributed for the formal institutionalisation of the two-track
employment system, which reinforced a lifetime managerial employment programme for men and a menial non-progressive administrative employment path for women (Kumamoto-Healey 2005, p.464; Gelb 2003, p.52; and Molony 1995, p.292). In reaction to the “moral duties” clause of the new legislation, employers circumvented the legislation by reforming the language of the longstanding practice of sex-segregated two-track hiring and work system which discriminated against the course of employment between the sexes according to the “career-track” for men and the “mommy-track” for women – now referred to in gender-neutral terms as the “managerial track” and the “general/clerical track”. This revision in recruitment language allowed employers to maintain the perception that they were upholding the spirit of the EEOL whilst transferring the onus of gender-equality to women who “choose” their career path in line with their domestic duties. Thus, the 1985 EEOL was inadequate in providing an impetus for a gender-equal society as its ineffective language had the opposite effect of encouraging “motherhood” protection at the firm level through the institutionalisation of the two-track employment practice. Moreover, the 1985 EEOL provided for legal reinforcement and state legitimacy of the daikokubashira/ryosai kenbo gender norm structure, which sough to neutralise defections to the gender norm structure.

In light of these inefficiencies, the EEOL was revised in 1997 to reinforce prohibition against “discrimination on the basis of sex,” including indirect discrimination, and child-rearing related forms of discrimination (Nakakubo 2007) to greater reinforce provisions for a gender-equal society. The new legislation clearly prohibits discrimination against men and women in respect to recruitment, hiring, assignment and promotion, whereas the 1985 EEOL had only obliged employers to
“endeavour to provide” equal opportunity (see Chapter 2, Articles 5 and 6). Moreover, the 1997 revisions stipulate that discrimination shall not be made on the basis of sex, not just against women. In light of this fact, the progressive developments of the 1997 EEOL are seen as a greater commitment towards a gender-equal society in support of the Vision of Gender Equality objectives.

However, whilst the 1997 EEOL has addressed some of the existing discrepancies between the employment rights of men and women in regular employment, it has not addressed discrimination between the sexes within differing types of employment. In 1985, 68.1 percent of all employed women held regular full-time positions. This figure has consistently shown a downward trend over the last decade to now figure at 47.3 percent of all employed women (White Paper on Gender Equality 2007, p.24). The 1997 EEOL does not address gender equality with respect to employment status and as such, in this era of increasing feminisation of non-regular modes of employment, its relevancy for challenging the status quo of entrenched gender norms will continue to be diminished.

The Child Care and Family Care Leave Law (CCFCLL)

The CCLL of 1991 was enacted to give entitlement to a worker irrespective of sex to take leave to care for a child less than one year of age (comparable to maternity leave in western nations). Under revisions in 1995, this law was renamed the CCFCLL to greater reflect the difficulty in harmonising family life and working life with the problems of an ageing society and the social onus for care of the elderly on family members (traditionally the daughter in law, under a three-generation household
with the husband’s parents as additional “dependents”). The amended statute provides for leave to be granted to any employee (with the exception of day labourers or those employed under fixed-term contracts) who requests such leave of absence to care for either a child under the age of one or a family member (CCFCLL, available at http://www.jiwe.or.jp/english/law/law4_1_1.html). Provisions include that: i) persons undertaking such leave application be employed by the employer for a continuous period of at least one year; and ii) it is likely that the employee will continue at the place of employment at the end of their leave period (Articles 5 and 11). The law stipulates that an employer cannot refuse a submission for child care leave or family care leave (Articles 6 and 12), or dismiss or treat an employee disadvantageously for making such leave applications (Articles 10 and 16). Moreover, the CCFCLL does not require the employer to make any monetary payments to employees applying for such leave in their period of absence (Kumamoto-Healey 2005, p.465).

The provision that employers are not legally obliged to monetarily support employers in their applications for child care and family care leave is significant in determining the matrix of economic opportunity loss with respect to who takes leave. Considering that 82.2 percent of Japanese men are in stable and regular employment (White Paper on Gender Equality 2007, p.24), it is reasonable to assume that despite the gender indiscriminate nature of the language of the CCFCLL, it is more economically efficient for men to remain in continuous employment and for their female spouses to assume the primary care giver responsibility due to their relatively lower wages and less stable employment status. Indeed, this is statistically supported as previously mentioned with only 0.5 percent of men taking childcare leave. Moreover, Japanese men perform only 12.5 percent of total housework in double-
income families, which greatly reflects the internal division of labour in Japanese households with women as the primary care givers (White Paper on Gender Equality 2007, p.14). The CCFCLL does not address the core values of Japanese society in respect to gender roles, as stringent employment expectations have remained stable among employers (eg. Japanese men work an average of 46.5 hours per week and women work an average of 35.1 hours per week which is one of the highest in OECD countries) (White Paper on Gender Equality 2007, p. 15), which is not conducive to greater work/life balance for women and hence does not allow for any profound changes in the division of labour in the workplace. Again, the CCFCLL is another piece of legislation which illustrates the state’s positioning of state protection of “motherhood” above “worker” identities for women, and hence perpetuation of the daikokubashira/ryosai kenbo gender order.

This positioning is further supported with respect to the Child Allowance System, which awards a monetary “baby bonus” to women for bearing children. The Child Allowance programme encourages women to start bearing children in light of the below replacement level birth rate. As of April 2007, the government doubled its monetary commitment to this scheme (the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare available at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/child-support/index.html). The state now awards 10,000 yen per month per child paid for the first and second child under the age of three to the end of elementary schooling. In addition, the commitment for the provision of 10,000 yen per month for third and additional children up until the end of elementary schooling remains effective and unchanged. Furthermore, the Child Allowance scheme stipulates that the allowance will not be paid to parents or guardians whose combined income for the previous year exceeds
the income ceiling threshold for their income bracket (see the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare website for further details).

The nature of the policy is such that it encourages women to adhere to the *ryosai kenbo* normative path vis-à-vis an economic incentive. Within the context of the rigid Japanese employment system, women who exit the labour market for child rearing purposes “choose” to become periphery workers as their post-natal child rearing and household responsibilities effectively make them ineligible to re-enter the labour market as regular employees with full employment status, responsibilities and rights (as reflected in the “M-shaped” employment curve for women’s employment participation) (see Imada and Ikeda 2007). These circumstances are further reinforced by the income ceiling stipulation of the Child Allowance policy which coupled with tax incentives aforementioned in the previous chapter, again limits women’s employment choices through encouraging women to deliberately maintain their annual salary below a given level (albeit, that of a supplementary income earner) in order to receive such company and state incentives. The outcome for such legislation and state policy is that the objectives of the Vision of Gender Equality with true gender-neutral roles are negated, and women’s roles as mothers and wives are further entrenched in covert support of traditional gender norm dynamics.

*The Part-time Worker’s Law (PTWL)*

The Law Concerning the Improvement of Employment Management, Etc. of Part-time Workers, known as the Part-time Work Law (PTWL), defines part-time employees as those “whose prescribed weekly hours are less than those of regular...
employees employed at the same establishment” (Chapter 1, Article 2; available at http://www.jiwe.or.jp/english/law/law3_1_1.html). The law encourages (but does not legally obligate) employers to “promote the effective utilization of the actual work conditions of Part-Time Workers concerned, and maintain balance with regular workers by securing proper working conditions” (Chapter 1, Article 3) through effective measures to secure their proper working conditions and management. Moreover, the PTWL stipulates that employer’s should “endeavour” to clarify the working conditions of part-time employees through prompt documentation upon hiring outlining the nature of their employment contract in regards to working hours and working conditions (Chapter 3, Article 6). As mentioned, the PTWL does not stipulate any penal provisions for employers who are in violation of its content, but acts as a legal guideline for employers to improve the management of part-time employees, especially in respect to assigning supervision (see Chapter 3, Article 9) and compelling the Minister of Labour, employer organisations and government organisations to provide relevant advice and guidance to encourage employers to invest in the further education and training of their part-time personnel (see Chapter 3, Article 11).

The PTWL is marred with similar limitations as the 1985 EEOL in terms of lack of enforcement ability, and a dispute resolution process (see Braodbent 2001 and 2003). Moreover, the fluid definition of part-time workers prescribed by the statute as those “whose weekly hours are less than those of regular employees employed by the same establishment” has resulted in increasing room for the exploitation of part-time employees with respect to their employment rights. It has been noted that an overwhelming majority of part-time workers in Japan work similar hours to that of
their regular employee counterparts (e.g. “part-time” employees at Maruko Keihoki work only 15 minutes less than “full-time” workers each day, and “part-time” workers at Azumi lingerie company work only one hour behind their “full-time” colleagues; quoted in Broadbent 2003, p.63), and perform the same or similar duties and responsibilities albeit with less working rights in terms of leave loading, additional allowances, job training, working conditions, and career succession (see Nakamura 2007 in the Japan Times available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20070405fl.html).

The inefficiency of the PTWL to realistically reflect the current employment conditions of part-time workers further limits its ability to address and ensure the relative welfare of part-time workers, and hence leads to a questioning of its role in state management of gender relations with respect to the workplace. It is evident that the PTWL is a gendered strategy to encourage women into non-regular employment status in an effort to cater to business needs of lower internal labour costs and greater labour flexibility. The end objective of which is not to unequivocally deliver on the promise of the Vision of Gender Equality in a bid to transplant the existing hegemonic gender norm dynamic for a gender-neutral alternative, but to ensure the longevity and viability of the vestiges of the lifetime employment system for men in support of the centrality of the daikokubashira hegemonic masculine norm.
Summary

The *daikokubashira* centred normative structure defined through corporate imperatives has become so internalised such that Japanese state policy and positive law on gender equality and employment is framed in compromise to the structures that ensure the longevity of the prevailing gender regime. The Japanese state is under domestic pressure by Japanese women (via the declining birth rate) to engage in the discourse on gender neutrality as exemplified by the Vision of Gender Equality, however must formulate such *perceived* commitments so that it does not profoundly impede upon current gender norm dynamics. The limited scope of employment legislation including the EEOL, the CCFCLL and PTWL in reflecting the growing needs of women’s work rights under current employment practices in non-regular work is incongruent with the language for gender equality in the Vision of Gender Equality (the government’s primary statement on gender equality). The implication of which is that the state remains committed to preserving the current gender regime and has deliberately failed to address limitations in employment legislature in an effort to neutralise individual Japanese women’s challenge through the framing of women as the primary care givers in reinforcement of *ryosai kenbo* ideology. The gender regime with the *daikokubashira* as central is not in decline but remains entrenched and exalted by corporate norm entrepreneurs and state support.
Conclusion

In addressing the question, “How have practices in women’s work redefined the nature of the gender regime in contemporary Japan?” a social theory of gender and feminist constructivist conceptual framework premised on the norm life cycle model of Finnemore and Sikkink was employed. The findings suggest that increased access to the labour market for women would seemingly provide women with greater economic autonomy, and indicate that women are renouncing their traditional gender normative path from within. However, business groups in their role as norm entrepreneurs have established strategies to negate these challenges to ensure the continual reproduction of lifetime employment and seniority wage privileges for their daikokubashira core workforce. This framing of non-regular employment as progressive for gender equality has been a conscious strategy on the part of business to neutralise the challenges to the hegemonic gender order status quo that developed in the 1990s. However, regular modes of employment with full worker rights have not been offered to women making part-time work a gendered strategy. Moreover,

[...]hose who engage in full-time employment are often seen to have legitimacy to approach the state as citizens with demands. Those who are engaged in part-time work or domestic labour, or who are in receipt of welfare benefits, do not share such legitimacy. (Mackie 1994, p.35)
The effect of gendering part-time work for women has been the further entrenchment of the *ryosai kenbo* ideology, not the redefinition of gender norms for the betterment of gender neutrality.

In addition, the government in support of corporate activities, has also adopted this framing of non-regular employment for women as being conducive for gender equality, albeit with the objective of protecting the longevity of the *daikokubashira/ryosai kenbo* gender regime. The Japanese government has failed to support its commitment to gender equality as espoused in the Vision of Gender Equality with accompanying policy and legislative reform. Rather, existing and amended legislation is limited in its employment protections for women, effectively institutionalising women’s identity as mothers and wives before that of workers and citizens. Consequently, the Japanese government has placed macroeconomic objectives such as economic recovery and fertility improvement above concerns for gender neutrality and in doing so has legitimised business efforts to neutralise and co-opt this period of “challenge” of the gender order so that continuity in hegemonic gender relations is ensured. At present, the gender regime in Japan remains characterised by the centrality of the *daikokubashira* hegemonic masculinity ideal to which all other subordinate masculinities and feminities are defined. This continuity in gender norm dynamics in spite of exogenous economic challenges and challenges from *within* the gender order is testament to the pervasiveness of gender identity ideology in ordering the pattern of gender relations in Japan.

Whilst the current period under consideration has not indicated any deviation from the *daikokubashira* centred gender regime, it has been alluded that the following
generation of sarariimen may provide further challenge to business and state support of traditional gender relations. As mentioned, in light of the economic recession, businesses engage in a sequence of labour adjustment strategies that are designed to have minimal impact on their internal labour market and allow them to ensure the vestiges of lifetime employment and seniority wages for their core (male) workforce. Within that sequence of labour adjustment strategies, the most stringent course short of dismissal is new hiring freezes to which the next cohorts of sarariimen have been most affected. It would be interesting to briefly consider employment strategy impacts on the next generation of corporate warriors in light of the prospective outlook for the gender order equilibrium.

“Freeters”: Young Atypical Workers and Jobless Youth in Japan

“Freeter” is a term adopted from the English word “free” and German “arbeiter”, meaning worker and refers to young non-regular workers aged who have chosen arubaito (casual employment) or part-time work over regular employment commitments in rejection of the corporate mould. Depending on labour market and employment definitions, the estimated total number of freeters ranges from two million to more than four million (Honda 2005; Kosugi 2004). The latter criteria incorporates a broader definition to include unemployed youths who are searching for work without success and those who have withdrawn from the labour market because they have given up job hunting.
Table 6 Changes in the ratio of youth engaged in part-time jobs, temporary jobs and other non-regular employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age 15-25 (excluding students)</td>
<td>Age 25-34</td>
<td>Age 15-25 (excluding students)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Part time/temporary employment</td>
<td>Other non regular employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Part time/temporary employment</td>
<td>Other non regular employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Kosugi 2002, table 1, p.7

As table 6 illustrates, whilst non-regular employment rates have traditionally been higher for women irrespective of age, the rate of non-regular employment for both men and women has risen considerably over the 1990s. The percentage of part-time and temporary workers 25 years old and younger is increasing sharply for both men and women, reaching 18.1 percent for men and 24.9 percent for women and in 2001. For the 25 to 34 age bracket, while disparities between men and women in non-regular employment have traditionally been large, both numbers increased in the latter half of the 1990s. It can be discerned that the number of part-time and temporary-job workers in the 25 year old and younger category is rising sharply for both men and women, with that trend also evident with those in their late 20s. That is, male Japanese youths are catching up to their female counterparts in assuming non-regular, auxiliary worker and citizenship identity. This is the most alarming indication that the gendered path from High School to University in the creation of sarariimen is in decline.

It has commonly be noted that changes in labour demand of graduates from businesses has been the primary factor explaining the increase in the non-regular
employment rate among young people and the increase in non-regular employees at the expense of regular employees generally. (Hori 2007; Honda 2004; Inui 2003; and Genda 2000). In 1992, the number of new graduate recruitment was 1.67 million, which declined to 220,000 in 2003 (Kosugi 2004, p.53). The school-to-work system in Japan has traditionally provided the main mechanism through which youths find regular employment. Under this system, Japanese high schools receive graduate job application notices from local employers as required by the Employment Security Law 1947 (amended in 1949). They then engage with counselling of their students and recommend which employers to apply for post-graduate positions. Typically, High Schools will recommend only one student for each opening, creating internal competition between students for the most desirable job. Moreover, students are recommended for only one position at a time. If the students fails the application process then he or she must further consult with teachers to gain a recommendation for another job (Brinton 2000, p.291). The school-to-work system is highly predicated on longstanding social networks, or “institutional social capital” (to borrow the concept from Brinton) between employers and tertiary institutions (see Brinton 2000). The reduction in graduate recruitment places as a direct result of hiring freezes has resulted in a breakdown of this institutional social capital, which is the crucial initial process through which *sarariimen* are created.

On the labour demand side, a survey conducted by the Japan Institute of Labour (2000) monitored high school students residing in metropolitan areas to discern the motivations leading students to become freeters. The survey found that 50 percent of freeters wanted full-time employment but were obliged to resign their search when no job offers were made, which is supportive of the labour demand
reasoning. Of greater interest is the other half of freeters who had no clear direction of what they wanted to do post-graduation and opted for non-regular employment to avoid forced employment into the corporate normative path (Kosugi 2004, pp.57-60). This represents a shift in values of the generation under consideration for the avoidance of the roles and responsibilities traditionally defined as that of a full member of society in the Japanese context. As Genda argues, “the resulting unemployment of young people is a luxury unemployment that does not involve real financial necessity. To them, work is a discretionary pastime, or a means of earning pocket money” (Genda 2000; also see newspaper articles by Hoffman 2003; Cortazzi 2001; Ashby 2000; and Naito 2000).

Whether it is due to exogenous economic imperatives or fundamental shifts in social values, Japanese youths (especially males) are increasingly seeking atypical forms of employment which is a marked deviation from the traditional gender normative path. Moreover, freeter employment is not a passing phase for young people until they can be incorporated into the regular job market. The Japanese cabinet office estimated that the number of freeters in their late 30s has tripled since 1989 to figure at 800,000 in 2003 resulting from the limited vocational training opportunities associated with arubaito and pato (part-time) employment (quoted in Mori 2005, p.22). Considering that the promise of lifetime employment stability as the carrot for gender norm compliance is waning in importance for the next generation of reserve sarariimen it is pertinent to ask whether male youths represent a possible challenge from within for the future outlook of the Japanese gender regime. Moreover, it will be of interest to witness how women will respond to this “levelling” of gender identities as the hegemonic masculine ideal is increasingly renounced by the
next generation of males. However, it can be assumed that norm entrepreneurs (corporations) and the Japanese state will attempt to manage further normative deviations when economic circumstances will allow to create renewed legitimacy for the daikokubashira centred gender order.
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